


*The*  
**UKRAINIAN**  
**REVIEW**



**I**

**LONDON**  
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# UKRAINE



## UKRAINE AGAINST MOSCOW

by

ALEXANDER CHOULGUINE

The Memoirs of the first Foreign Minister of Ukraine covering the turbulent days of 1917 and the subsequent struggle for the independent Ukraine define the foreign policy of Ukraine.

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*Jaroslav Stetzko*

## **RUSSIAN IMPERIUM IS NOT INVINCIBLE!**

### **THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN**

We have frequently pointed out that the free world over-estimates the strength of the U.S.S.R., since it forgets that Russia's power lies in the weakness of the West and, above all, in the latter's ideological, ethical and political weakness. It is Moscow that, by means of its propaganda which has assumed proportions hitherto unknown in the world, endeavours to convince the free peoples of the world that it is invincible. In reality, however, the U.S.S.R. is not a monolith, but a Russian imperium which rules over several nations. Even if one assumes that the Russians number more than 90 million instead of 80 million, there are still over 100 million non-Russians in the Soviet Union; and if one adds a further 90 million, that is the population of the satellite countries, then the Russians constitute less than one-third of the population of the peoples ruled by Moscow; and for a ruling nation this figure in itself is certainly too small to guarantee its predominance completely.

On the other hand, however, the population of the NATO countries numbers 250 million, without taking Spain, let alone Finland, Sweden or Switzerland, into account. And whereas the peoples in the U.S.S.R. who have been subjugated by Moscow are only waiting for the day of their liberation, the free peoples of the West—should they be forced into a desperate situation—will always wage a war in order to save their own freedom.

If one now also takes into account the 15 to 20 million present and former concentration camp internees, deportees and other persons who are most definitely opposed to the Soviet regime, then it becomes obvious that the human potential on which Moscow has to rely is extremely uncertain. The myth about Moscow's inexhaustible human reserves is, after all, nothing but a myth.

Incidentally, it goes without saying that Red China must also be taken into account, and its human reserves are certainly inexhaustible. Mao Tse-tung once affirmed that even if 100 million Chinese were killed in an atomic war, there would still be about half a milliard left. China's cannon-fodder is naturally also taken into account by Moscow, and the USA have nothing to equal it. But what is of primary importance is not the number of people, but the infiltration of ideas, that is the *political factor*. The hearts and minds of the subjugated peoples can be won over, and the arms which they have been forced to bear by their arch-enemy can be used for the cause of freedom. The great task of the West consists precisely in neutralizing human hearts and minds, and what is more, in winning them over to its side. Regarded from this point of view, the *purport* of the psychological war seems of primordial significance in this final game for the sympathy of the subjugated peoples and nations; and it is precisely for this reason that Formosa must never be left to its fate by the USA. The Chinese masses are not Communist-minded and can never be so. Deeply rooted national traditions and a way of life which is five thousand years old can never be obliterated by several decades of terrorist rule, nor can Marx replace Confucius, or Lenin—Sun Yat-sen.

Japan, too, has not yet had its final say, but, in any case, it will never become Communist. India, spiritually misled by Nehru, will sooner or later find its way back again to its own great and individual Indian spiritual world, which is the very antithesis of anti-human Communism with its dialectical and historical materialism, with its militant atheism which is so alien to the Indian mentality.

Moreover, the ethical, ideological and political weakness of the Soviet Russian imperium internally will compel it to continue to carry on the colossal psychological war, which is becoming more and more costly and which aims more and more at the disintegration of the West,—that is to say, an even more intensive activity of the Communist parties and other Fifth Columns in the West; for Moscow's strength lies in the psychological weakness of the free world. In reality, Moscow is a giant with feet of clay. Ethically, ideologically and politically, the West is in a position to deal Russia a serious blow—indeed, the revolution of Budapest already dealt the latter an ideological blow which was without precedent—and need not fear Russia's military strength, for the soldiers who bear arms in this case are persons whose hearts and minds the West can and should win over for itself.

Let us now, however, consider the actual military aspect of the problem. According to NATO experts, the Soviet army consists of 175 divisions, of which 75 are tank units. The satellite states have about 65 divisions, which makes a total of 240 divisions. In the event of war, the U.S.S.R. would be able to set up 300 divisions within a short time. Within the Soviet Union the Bolsheviks can combine the national detachments of their armies as needed, since, in principle, there are no national troops there; but this, naturally, does not mean that the percentage of non-Russians in the Soviet army is decreased; and, in any case, statistics can only be falsified on paper. On the other hand, however, a similar national element in the satellite armies will always have the overwhelming majority, and these armies will always be an unreliable factor in the calculations of the Kremlin.

Thus, in ideological and political respect, the Bolsheviks can rely neither on the Soviet army as a whole, nor on the satellite armies, and only the Russians themselves will fight for their imperium out of conviction. But what is the position as regards Soviet military science? Military science is making more and more progress from year to year, and what was ultra-modern five years ago, is now completely out of date. The military equipment of the 175 Soviet divisions, which has remained unchanged for years, is nowadays no longer of great significance; it is only adequate for guerilla warfare, but not for a clash with the modern divisions of the West. Moscow, however, has neither the financial means, nor the industrial capacity to modernize the military equipment of these 175 divisions. And this is hardly surprising in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. probably only produces 75,000 cars a year. Moreover, Moscow is not in a position to develop the technique of precision rapidly, which today is the basis of the war industry.

If, however, Moscow were to equip the 240 divisions at its disposal with modern weapons, it would need 180 milliard dollars to do so. In 1957, Khrushchev himself affirmed that the free world was spending 60 milliard dollars a year on armament,—and this figure is certainly not too low; and what it means in practice can be seen from the fact that the entire armament of Nazi Germany (up to the outbreak of World War II) did not cost more than 15 milliard dollars. In the same year, however, the U.S.S.R. spent 100 milliard roubles on armament, which at the most can only equal the purchasing power of 10 milliard dollars, but actually fluctuates between 6 and 7 milliard dollars.

It is true that, apart from its land forces, Moscow is also equipping huge naval and air forces. But it is precisely in this field that Moscow is finding it increasingly difficult to keep up with the modernization of military science. Who knows, for instance, whether fighter planes will not be replaced by long-range rockets tomorrow? And, in any case, the huge progress of military science can only keep pace with the free productive activity of man. Whether slave labour can compete with the latter for any length of time, is extremely doubtful. It is true that one can let slaves build canals, railways and mines under the whip of the overseers, and the "sputniks" are constructed by a highly qualified team which is limited in number; but science today demands the willing productive activity of numerous masses, as well as the advancement—unhampered by political motives—of the best elements amongst thousands or millions of people working in freedom. The completely centralized, ideologically totalitarian, excessively bureaucratized and terrorized Soviet industry is not in a position to produce a numerous elite which would be necessary in order to keep pace with the free productive activity of the free peoples.

The NATO experts assume that the U.S.S.R. at present has at its disposal over 20,000 planes of its own, which could be used immediately for the purpose of war, as well as over 2,500 military planes belonging to the satellite states, but these huge figures are more likely to scare the free population of the West than to reassure it.

It is obvious from the statistics that the economic capacity of the U.S.S.R. in almost every sector is only equal to a proportion of the capacity of Europe which is still free, not to mention the

	National Income		Foreign Trade (in mill. dollars)	
	Total (in mill. dollars)	Per capita (dollars)	Import	Export
USA	235,600	1,553	8,964	10,285
Free Europe	117,318	390	25,198	20,437
USSR	59,500	298	1,049	1,141

USA. As regards the production of motor vehicles, free Germany alone surpasses the entire Soviet Union, and the same also applies in the case of the engineering and electrical industries. It is true that the satellite states midify these figures in favour of the countries of the Communist bloc, but not decisively. Red China, on the other hand, as far as population figures are concerned, surpasses the entire bloc of European and American countries, but precisely as regards the economic aspect needs as much external help in order to be able to develop further as, say, Africa. Red China, incidentally, also subjugates other peoples who also long for independence.

Even so, the West can only gain a decisive political superiority over the Communist bloc by means of a better *idea*,—namely, by putting its trust in the revolutionary national forces of the peoples subjugated by Russia; otherwise, its superiority as regards the military, financial, economic and technical potential will be no advantage at all.

The free world must realize that the above-mentioned 175 Soviet divisions are allowed to continue to exist in their partly out-of-date form because Moscow needs them to crush any possible internal insurrections. For this purpose the Kremlin does not consider it necessary to have modern weapons—atomic bombs and long-range rockets cannot, of course, be used in street fighting or in guerilla warfare—but thousands of tanks, such as those which crushed the heroic revolution of Budapest. Thus, the purpose of these 175 Soviet divisions is not only to make naive persons in the West fear the “invincible” forces of the Soviet Union, but also, in the first place, to protect the integrity of the present Russian imperium against the national liberation movements of the peoples subjugated by Russia.

These out-of-date weapons, however,—of which the West has no need whatever, since national revolts which would have to be crushed by tanks are unthinkable in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Great Britain or in the USA,—are also needed by Russia for the “local” wars which it carries on (although it does so with foreign cannon-fodder): it was precisely with such weapons that the war was fought in Korea, Vietnam and the Near East, and they are also good enough for the African partisans. In other words, Moscow needs such weapons for the civil wars which it instigates either directly or indirectly, and with the help of which it aims to expand its rule. But the time is not yet ripe for a third world war,



and time is not always on Moscow's side, least of all as regards the technical sector. As far as military science is concerned, the West will always have the advantage over Moscow, provided that the latter does not succeed in subverting the West from the *moral* point of view. Incidentally, the West is apt to overlook an important point with regard to the "inexhaustible" masses of Soviet cannon-fodder: the huge loss of human lives in World War II, which, after all, only ended 14 years ago, has by no means been made good in the Soviet Union, and it will take almost a whole generation before normal conditions in the age-groups prevail once more.

For this reason, the cold war is at present of the greatest significance: internal differences and the ethical decay of the West are today more important for Moscow than a hundred divisions, and the Fifth Columns, the pacifists and the "neutralists," the instigators of the fear of atomic war, are far more important than any military science. And it is for this reason that further foreign policy diversions and "peaceful" attacks on the part of Moscow can be expected in the near future,—all of them and political subversion of the West. The Kremlin will do everything in its power to effect a recognition of the status quo of the territories which it has conquered, and in this way will seek to intensify the distrust of the subjugated peoples towards the West. Of course, there will also be some rattling of sabres, but for the time being Moscow will not venture to start a world war: whenever it encounters determined resistance, it will hurriedly withdraw. On the other hand, however, it will in every way support the campaign conducted by naive pacifists and blind Russophiles against atomic weapons, in particular against the arming of the free world and free Germany with such weapons. In this respect a *one-sided* disarmament or non-armament will, naturally, only increase the deadly danger of a Russian invasion immeasurably; for it is only a country equipped with atomic weapons that does not tempt the Russians, precisely because it is not weak, to carry out a surprise attack. In any case, however, the West must always take into account the possibility of a Kremlin ruler deciding to start a nuclear world war if he sees no other means of retaining his position,—even if only for a short time: in such a "border case" the Kremlin ruler in question will not have the least scruples in staking the life of all human beings on earth. Moscow, however,

will never agree to an effective control of atomic armament, a fact which has already been proved often enough in the course of the completely futile conferences held in Geneva. One must bear in mind in this connection that never in the history of the world has a totalitarian dictatorship submitted to an effective control of its actions.

Instead of continuing to experiment (and there is no other way of defining the vague and hesitant policy of the West towards Moscow) with "peaceful coexistence"—incidentally, without the least success, the West should endeavour to counter-balance the weakness of its world strategy by recognizing and supporting the national liberation movements behind the Iron Curtain, which are directed against *every form of Russian rule*. Since the West cannot hope to equal the quantitative superiority of the Soviet Union and Red China as regards the human potential, it should endeavour to influence the psychic quality of the armed "Soviet subjects,"—above all, that of the non-Russians, who are most certainly not in the least interested in preserving and expanding the Russian imperialist prison of peoples.



W. Luzhansky

## **40th ANNIVERSARY OF WEST UKRAINIAN FREEDOM UPRISING**

On November 1, 1958, the Ukrainians at home and in exile commemorated the 40th anniversary of the Ukrainian national rising in the West Ukrainian ethnographical territories which formerly belonged to Austria-Hungary. In Red-Russian occupied Ukraine, however, these celebrations were naturally organized on a small scale and held secretly, in view of the fact that the Red Russian secret police, if informed of such celebrations, would promptly resort to repressive measures.

On November 1, 1918, the non-Ukrainian troops in the Ukrainian ethnographical territory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were disarmed by Ukrainian armed forces and compelled to withdraw. Thereupon, the Ukrainian National Council of Lviv proclaimed the independence of Ukraine in the Ukrainian territories of East Galicia (including the Lemky region, which extends beyond the Ukrainian-Polish border-river Sian in a western direction), the Ukrainian Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine. This revolutionary rising in West Ukraine was undoubtedly one of the most bloodless revolts in the history of the world and it was effected in a most orderly way: the Polish, Roumanian, Hungarian and Jewish national minorities were assured of the inviolability of their rights and their freedom of movement provided that they maintained a loyal attitude towards the newly created state of West Ukraine. Incidentally, the non-Ukrainian population on the whole behaved in an orderly manner and approved of the setting up of the new state of West Ukraine.

Unfortunately, however, this state of affairs did not last long, for the Poles and Roumanians soon proceeded to attack the new Ukrainian state from the west, as well as from the south. In

November, 1918, the Ukrainian-Polish war for the possession of Ukrainian Galicia and the town of Lviv (Lemberg) broke out and lasted nine months. The Roumanians contented themselves with occupying the Ukrainian Bukovina (in the east) and the region of Marmarosh Syhit (in the south), a fact which involved considerable bloodshed on both the Ukrainian and the Roumanian side.

The Peace Conference of Versailles intervened twice in the Ukrainian-Polish war,—the first time, at the end of February, 1919, when a peace delegation of the Entente, headed by the French General Barthelmy, brought about the temporary cessation of hostilities between the Ukrainian and Polish forces. The delegation suggested a demarcation line to the two belligerent parties, the so-called "Barthelmy Line," behind which the Ukrainian forces were to retreat and which was to serve as the basis for establishing the Polish-Ukrainian frontier. The Ukrainians, however, refused to accept this proposal, since it involved the cession of various important Ukrainian towns and the capital of Galicia, Lviv (Lemberg), as well as of the oil-producing region of Boryslav and Drohobytch to Poland.

The Ukrainian offensive was thereupon resumed, but it was not long before the Peace Conference of Versailles intervened a second time. A new demarcation line was now suggested by General Botha. It was to extend about 20 kilometres east of the "Barthelmy Line," and the Poles were to be given the town of Lviv, but not the oil-producing region of Boryslav and Drohobytch. In order to mitigate the disappointment of the Ukrainians at this proposal, the Council of the Four Major Powers promised to recognize an independent Republic of West Ukraine within the frontiers fixed by General Botha and to provide the West Ukrainian army with arms in order to continue the war against the Russian Bolsheviks. The Ukrainians finally accepted this proposal. The Poles, however, began to prolong the peace negotiations, and the purpose of this manoeuvre soon became obvious when they attacked the West Ukrainian national army with an army under the command of General Haller, which had been trained and equipped in France and was to be used against the Bolsheviks. The Poles thus broke their promise to the Allies to use this army against the Bolsheviks and violated this international obligation in a flagrant way. On April 19, 1919, the Polish troops, reinforced by Haller's army, began to attack the Ukrainian front and eventually succeeded in breaking through the Ukrainian lines.

After weeks of grim fighting, the West Ukrainian national army was finally forced to withdraw from West Ukrainian territory and to retreat beyond the former Austrian-Russian border-river Zbrutch (which for centuries had divided Ukraine into two parts). Here the West Ukrainian army joined forces with the East Ukrainian troops and together they managed to capture the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, on August 30, 1919.

But the Polish-Russian collaboration, which had existed for centuries and which had as its aim the partition and subjugation of Ukraine, made it impossible for the Ukrainians to preserve their independence for any length of time. The Peace Treaty of Riga in 1921 between Poland and Red Russia divided Ukraine between these two countries. For the second time in the history of Poland, her collaboration with Russia at the expense of Ukraine resulted in the incorporation of Poland by Russia after the Treaty of Riga; the first time was after the Polish-Russian Peace Treaty of Andrusiv in 1667.

The fact that the Ukrainian people have commemorated the 40th anniversary of their rising in West Ukraine is clear proof that they will never relinquish their right to national freedom and to the unification of all the Ukrainian territories in one single Ukrainian state. Not only the rising of November 1, 1918, in Lviv and in other Ukrainian territories of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also the proclamation issued on the historic square of St. Sophia in Kyiv by the representatives of all the Ukrainian territories, regarding the unification of all these ethnographical territories in one common and indivisible Ukrainian state, are events in the modern history of Ukraine which will clearly decide its course in the future. It is inconceivable that the Ukrainian people should ever abandon their national claims and demands of November 1, 1918, and of January 22, 1919. The peoples of Asia and Africa may gain their freedom in rapid succession, but the Ukrainian people, in the spirit of self-sacrifice, will continue to fight for this ideal until the independence of their native country is restored once more on the ruins of the artificial and presumptuous Russian state colossus.

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Yuriy Studynsky

# The Idea of Independence and Unity of Ukraine in History

## A Brief Survey

The French professor of international law—Geoffre de la Pradelle, gave a lecture on the diplomatic documents connected with the outbreak of World War I. In this lecture given in the university of Paris he pointed out that Tsarist Russia did not wish to enter World War I against the Central Powers sooner then the Entente Powers would agree to the following two Russian postulates:

1. Russia's wish to annex Constantinople,
2. Russia's wish to incorporate the Ukrainian Galicia for the purpose of crushing the deadly danger for the Russian empire: the Ukrainian political and cultural bastion in that Western part of Ukraine.

Tsarist Russia endeavoured for centuries to denationalize the Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian (White-Ruthenian) peoples in order to form a unique national and state organism, the so-called "one and indivisible Russia."

Hence, the Ukrainian Black Sea and the Ukrainian Eastern Galicia were object of secret diplomatic negotiations between Petersburg, London and Paris before World War I.

The ultimate demands of Russia were the annexation of Constantinople and Galicia after a victorious war waged against the Central Powers. The Allied Powers were obliged to accept these Russian postulates, according to Prof. de la Pradelle.

The murder of the successor to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Hapsburg, in Sarajevo seems to be at present nothing else than a mere insignificant incident that would not have had any evil consequences if the war machine would not have been prepared already sooner for the purpose of being put into motion.

### HOW DID TSARIST RUSSIA MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR THE ANNEXION OF GALICIA?

Already in 1767 a detachment of the Russian troops under the command of General Krechetnikov entered the Western Ukrainian capital Lviv (Lemberg), allegedly for the purpose of restoring order in the town; but in fact, he did not but wish to prepare a basis for the later annexation of Galicia. The political disorder in Poland of that time was in favour of these Russian annexation plans.

But when a few years later Austria demanded Galicia with Lviv, Russia was ready to declare war against Austria. However, thanks to political negotiations this war could be avoided.

During the third partition of Poland in 1795, the Russian general Tutolmin declared in his proclamation of July 18, 1795, that the areas of Kholm, Belz and Lutsk that have been occupied by Austria were parts of the Russian state.

During the Napoleonic wars in September 1805, Tsar Alexander I. planned to unite all Polish territories under his sceptre. At this time the Russian diplomats proposed Austria to cede Galicia to Russia for which cession it would be recompensated by the territories of Silesia and Bavaria. In such a way the Bavarians would have become Austrians in 1805, if Vienna would have accepted the Russian proposal and ceded the Ukrainian Galicia to Russia. By the way, these plans could not have been realized because of the Austrian defeat at Austerlitz.

A little later Russia could effectuate at least partially her plans with regard to Galicia. During the Austrian-French war in 1809, Russia supported Napoleon and was rewarded by the annexation of the Galician area of Ternopil.

Prince Golitsyn, commander-in-chief of the Russian army corps, who had to prepare the annexation of Galicia received from Tsar Alexander I a secret instruction. In accordance with this instruction, Golitsyn was ordered to win the population of Galicia for Russia by convincing the Ukrainians of Galicia that Russia—by making war upon Austria—wished to protect the local population.

Waging war against Napoleon, Tsar Alexander I instructed in his autograph letters, of February 1811 the Russian Ambassador in Vienna that all Polish territories, hence also Galicia, had to be conquered by all means; Austria should have been recompensated by the Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

The Congress of Vienna (1815), however, rejected all Russian demands aimed at the annexation of Galicia; moreover, Russia was

obliged to cede the Galician area of Ternopil to Austria.

Count Tatishchev, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, developed a very considerable diplomatic activity that was aimed at the final annexation of Galicia by Russia. According to the respective documents, Russia planned—in the spring of 1829, to declare war against Austria for the purpose of occupying Galicia.

Count Muravyov emphasized in his special memorandum of 1840 that the annexation of Galicia was a “necessity and duty” for Russia.

In 1846, Tsar Nicholas I expressed his firm will to exchange the Polish territories as far as Bzura and Vistula for Galicia that was in possession of the Austrians.

#### A FEW WORDS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE STATES IN WHICH THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE WERE LIVING

After the loss of their national independence the Ukrainian people continued their political and cultural life in a restricted form under the foreign occupation. The idea of the Ukrainian independence was too fresh in the minds of the Ukrainian people and could, therefore, in no way be extirpated from the hearts of the Ukrainians. Between several parts of the vast Ukrainian territory there existed a very significant exchange of national and cultural values. Later on, the Russian-Austrian frontier across the Ukrainian territory hindered this exchange strongly enough but did not stop it fully.

That part of Ukraine that was under the Russian occupation had lost the last remnants of its political autonomy in 1781 having been divided into several Russian gubernias. The peasants had become serfs of the new Russian rulers of that time.

The Russian policy towards Ukraine resulted in the slogan that “three Ruthenian tribes should form a national unity.” That is why the Russians forbade, in the virtue of the ukazes of 1863 and 1866, the use of the Ukrainian language in the literature. This prohibition was valid till the revolution of the years 1905-7. The revolution did not, however, favour any Ukrainian national rights.

Austria annexed those Ukrainian territories that had formerly belonged to Poland and Turkey. In 1775 the Ukrainian Bukovina was ceded to Austria by Turkey. Galicia and Bukovina now formed an administrative Austrian unit till 1850. In accordance with a political agreement (the so-called *Ausgleich*) of 1867 between the Austrians and Hungarians the Hapsburg monarchy was divided into two states: Austria and Hungary having a common monarch. Thus Carpathian Ukraine became a part of the Hungarian kingdom.

In virtue of the Austrian constitution (art. 19) all Austrian peoples were equal; all peoples had the inviolable right to preserve and develop their own nationality and language. "The state recognizes the equality of all national languages in school, office and public life."

The Austrian state law did not recognize the nation as a subject to law; but there existed special national rights for all citizens and languages.

In brief, under the protection of the Austrian constitution all peoples were able to develop their own national life on their ethnographic territories.

#### THE UKRAINIAN RENAISSANCE

In Ukraine under the Russian occupation the traditions of the Ukrainian Hetman state could not be so easily extinguished by the Russian oppressors. The national renaissance there begins with the publication of the "Aeneid" by Kotliarevsky in 1798.

The Ukrainian renaissance under the Austrian rule began with the publication of the "Rusalka Dnistrovaya" ("The Fairy of the Dnister") by Markian Shashkevych (in 1837) and of the poems by Yuriy Fedkovych (a few years later). The national renaissance in Galicia and Bukovina stood under a great influence of Central Ukraine (under the Russian occupation) and of the national renaissance of the Slavonic peoples of Austria as well.

In 1848, all prominent Ukrainians in Austria declared that their political aims were the same as in Ukraine under Russia. They emphasized in their political declarations the unity of the Ukrainian people under the Austrian and Russian rules.

A collection of poems, "Kobzar" ("The Kobza-Player"), by the greatest Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko became in the middle of the 19th century a national gospel for all Ukrainians on both sides of the artificial Austrian-Russian political boundary that had cut the Ukrainian ethnographic territories into two unequal parts.

The Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius initiated the rebirth of the Ukrainian political thought in the Tsarist empire. The members of this brotherhood wished to establish a Pan-Slavonic Federation in which Ukraine would be an equal political partner.

During the discussion regarding the mutual Polish-Russian relations, the magazine "Kolokol" No. 61 ("The Bell") edited by Herzen published an article entitled "Ukraine." It was in 1860. The author presented a historical survey of the Polish-Ukrainian

and Russo-Ukrainian relations by emphasizing the fact that Ukraine had the full right to be independent in the future Slavonic federation. We find there e. g. the following words: "Neither the Russians nor the Poles are entitled to call those territories as theirs that are inhabited by the Ukrainian people."

Almost at the same time Rev. Vasyl Podolynskyi preached in Galicia that there would come soon the time when the Ukrainian independence would be restored on the whole Ukrainian ethnographic territory. He wrote e. g. as follows: "We are Ukrainians and as such firmly believe in the resurrection of a free and independent Ukraine. Nothing can keep us from doing the same what other peoples in Europe are doing. We shall not be silent until we shall be free and equal like other peoples of Europe. We wish to be an independent people and we shall succeed in winning our freedom, because the voice of the people is the voice of God. We have learnt from our fore-fathers to be patient while pursuing our national aims."

The greatest poet of Western Ukraine—Ivan Franko—published a poem (March 17, 1883) in which we find the following passage: "Our glorious Mother-Ukraine will rise happy and free from the river Kuban to the river Sian (From the Caucasian to the Carpathian Mountains)—she will be one and indivisible."

In 1880, in Central Ukraine the Ukrainian "Hromada" ("Society") had in its programme the full independence of Ukraine in her ethnographic boundaries.

Hence, a free and independent Ukraine from the river Sian in the West to the river Kuban in south-eastern Ukraine (near the Caucasus Mountains) was the political programme of all Ukrainians on both sides of the artificial political boundary between Austria and Russia.

In the last year of the 19th century the Ukrainian Radical Party in Galicia demanded a Ukrainian national law in Austria and the restoration of an independent Ukraine (1896).

In 1895, Yulian Bachynsky had published the work "Ukraina Irredenta" in which he claimed the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state.

The Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party included in its political programme the independence of Ukraine (1899).

The Ukrainian National-Democratic Party in Galicia claimed the independence of all Ukrainian territories too.



At the same time the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party (RUP) in Great (Central) Ukraine claimed the full independence of Ukraine and declared that the revolution in Russia should be for all enslaved peoples in Russia not only a social but also a national revolution. This very party published the book "Independent Ukraine" (1900) that was of a tremendous importance for the further development of the Ukrainian political thought.

The Ukrainian People's Party that was founded in 1903 had included in its programme the ideal of Ukrainian independence, as well.

In 1900, Ukrainian students proclaimed at their meeting in Lviv (Lemberg) that their political ideal was the full independence of Ukraine.

Since 1908 a European armed conflict seemed to be unavoidable; that is why all Ukrainians tried to be prepared for this moment in order to be able to restore the Ukrainian independence.

During World War I Ukrainian volunteers from all Ukrainian territories fought against the Russian invaders in Galicia and Bukovina. When Ukraine became free and independent (1918) the Ukrainian Government in Kyiv claimed the Ukrainian territories under the Austrian rule. On 22nd January, 1919, the unity and independence of all Ukrainian ethnographic territories was proclaimed on the historic Sophia Square in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. The representatives of all Ukrainian territories, hitherto divided by artificial political boundaries, participated at this historic Ukrainian political manifestation.

United Ukrainian armies from all Ukrainian territories struggled for this Ukrainian highest political ideal in Ukraine from 1917 till 1921. Later the Ukrainian armed underground forces continued the liberation struggle against all oppressors of Ukraine. The famous Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is active at present in the whole Ukraine and will not cease to fight till the Ukrainian independence will be restored at last.

The Ukrainian emigrants scattered all over the world have worked for the ideal of the independence and unity of all Ukrainian territories in one Ukrainian state too. It is true, they were obliged to leave their native country before the advancing and robbing hostile armed forces but they hope that the moment of the Ukrainian independence and unity is not so far because truth and justice must in the end prevail.

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Hon. Edward M. O'Connor

### ***American Political Realism and the Russian Empire***

Our entire national life is today plagued with the disease of conformity. In the space of a very few years the hard instinct has all but obliterated the role of the individualist—the demand is today to be like everyone else lest you stand aside from the herd. We are driven to not only look alike but to think and act alike. This dangerous trend towards sameness will, if not treated to shock and challenge, soon make us into the “faceless mass” which the communist agitators and other demagogues find ideal manipulation and control.

This era of conformity has some very strange characteristics,—here are some of them:

1. Our people on the whole want everything given to them in capsule form.—This applies to the knowledge as well as medicine and food.

2. A new species of “experts” has grown up, most of them self proclaimed, who are in charge of manufacturing the “thought Capsule.”

3. These “thought capsules” are then offered to the public through all media of mass communications.

Thus we have arrived at a position where a few experts are doing all the thinking on critical issues, for large segments of our population. Those who think for themselves and express their ideas lay themselves open to being called wrong by a large body of opinion or to the odious charge of being an “odd ball.” It matters not whether the large body of opinion moulded by the so called experts is correct; but what does seem to matter is that this opinion is

challenged by someone who has not been properly established as an expert. The fear of being called wrong by this false criteria of judgement has discouraged dissent, originality of thought and indeed accuracy of information and individual judgements thereon.

In no field of endeavour is this curse of conformity so apparent as in the field of international political affairs. A group of "hot house" experts has been nurtured who see the international problems of our times through a mirror of their own making. This mirror reflects nothing more than what they want to see and builds a make believe world arena upon which they manufacture their thought capsules for the unsuspecting American Public. This is especially true with respect to current public opinion on the Russians, their present empire and their plans for a world empire.

As evidence of this unhappy state of affairs I invite your attention to these following examples:

1. In the public mind Russia is most times equated with the Soviet Union. Few Americans know that Russia is only one of the many nations which make up the Soviet Union. One seldom hears reference made to the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic in which the majority of the people are Russians but which also contains several other large and important geographical areas of non-Russian people. Less frequently do we hear reference to the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union, their history or their aspirations for national independence.

2. We constantly hear the people of the Soviet Union referred to as Russians. This despite the fact that the Russians are the minority people of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the non-Russian people of the Soviet Union who comprise the majority of the population resent being called Russians and we can only alienate them by the use of such offensive reference.

3. We hear the Soviet Union referred to as a nation whereas in reality it is an empire made up of many different nations as of which have suffered the loss of their national independence at the hands of the Russian imperialists during the past forty years.

4. More lately we hear the people of the Soviet Union called the Soviet peoples. This abstract, and meaningless term has turned the entire population of the Soviet Union into a faceless, and inanimate mass. The end results are profound confusion in the public mind on a critical subject which is in reality so simple that it should be common knowledge.

5. Just a few years ago one of the self proclaimed experts writing for a leading weekly pictorial coined the high sounding phrase of *Homo Sovieticus*. No doubt he sought to impress his readers with scholarly verbiage, without any knowledge of the violence he was doing to the truth or the absurdity of his conclusion. He made the bold statement that the Russians have erected a new human species called the Soviet man. It is true that the Russians have been attempting to create such a new species of man, that is, a man who would be devoid of all human feeling, insensitive to the heritage of his forefathers, lacking the normal desires and hopes which distinguish man from the animal, and unconstrained by the natural law which has guided the behaviour of man since the beginning of time. This would mean turning man into an automaton, responsive only to the will of the Kremlin. The Russian leaders have not been successful in this effort nor will they ever be, because no man or group of men have the power or capability of altering the basic nature of man. Mr. Khrushchev knows this to be a fact much more than the crop of head shrinkers who are posing as experts on what they call Soviet affairs.

6. A derivative of the false notion of *Homo Sovieticus* is the ridiculous claim to a Soviet society—a term used to describe the state of life behind the Russian Iron Curtain. This of course, would intend to include the people of the so called satellite nations as well as the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. The term Society, assumes a well established way of life in which the vast majority of the people comprising it believe in and willfully support its tenets. The facts are that no more than 5% of the people of the non-Russian nations behind the Iron Curtain believe in no less than support the alien way of life which has been imposed upon them. Even this figure appears extravagant if we look back upon the recent Hungarian Freedom Revolution. In these circumstances we find that a very large number of the new ruling class, included within the 5% factor, deserted the regime and joined in the national liberation effort. Thus the allusion of a Soviet society was shattered beyond repair.

I have used these examples of loose and wishful thinking as a means of demonstrating what most of the so called experts see in the mirror of their own creation and to underscore what lies at the base of our failure to adopt a realistic and positive policy toward the world-wide threat of Russian Communist imperialism. It is a truism in every field of human endeavour that unless the basic

elements of a problem are defined and understood there is no possibility of arriving at a solution to the problem. This is precisely the case with respect to the historic Russian problem so far as the American people in general are concerned and to a surprisingly large extent is true in circles responsible for our foreign policy.

Turning to the international scene, I should like to examine with you our position with respect to a political force which is reshaping the world order. I refer to nationalism—that is, the movement of large numbers of homegeneous people toward nationhood or national independence.

Since the end of World War II we have witnessed many nations of South East Asia, South Asia, and Africa throw off the status of colonies and establish their national independence. The United States was the first to take firm and positive steps to accord with the natural aspirations of people, which has come with the political awakening in vast areas of the world. In the case of the Phillippines we declared our intention to help that nation realize its aspirations for national independence before World War II was over. Immediately following the war this goal was realized in an orderly and mutually satisfactory manner. There can be no doubt that our action in this case provided a powerful stimulus for the national liberty movements throughout Asia and Africa. In taking this course of action we acted in accord with our honoured belief in the right of all people to national self-determination.

Now some twelve years after the Independence of the Phillippines we see that the old colonialism of Asia has passed into history. The old colonialism of Africa is slowly but surely following a similar course as the colonial or metropolitan powers are faced with the aspirations of politically awakened people and nations. All thinking men hope that the necessary changes will be made in an orderly and just manner but the march of human events tells us these changes cannot be avoided.

In the course of these developments in the free world the Russian leaders have been forced to use unique tactics in order to accomodate their plans to the driving force of nationalism. They learned long ago that communism as an ideological appeal could not compete successfully with the related power of nationalism. The two are diametrically opposed in both philosophy and purpose. In Asia and Africa they have attempted to infiltrate and take over the national liberation movements. No one can deny that they have enjoyed

some success. Viet Nam is a case in point. There an old time Comintern agent, Ho-Chi-Minh, moved in on the liberation movement and then plunged that country into a bloody war. Aided and abetted by the Russians and Chinese Communists he has managed to divide that nation and hold control over its northern region. Elsewhere, the Russians have worked from the inside of newly independent governments, retarding their natural development, causing disruption and confusion, all pointed toward their eventual take over of power in these countries. Where their efforts have been recognized and rebuffed they have resorted to neutralizing those nations—that is, divorcing them from the cause of human justice and the stream of progress.

In the former colonial areas as well as those areas of the free world still in colonial or dependent status, the Russian communists and their followers pose as anti-imperialists, anti-colonialists. They loudly claim to be defenders of the rights of nations to self-government. To say that their efforts have not been successful is to flirt with disaster. They have in fact deluded large numbers of people in Asia and Africa who are not communists or sympathizers, on this score. At the same time they give equal attention to branding the U.S. as an imperial and colonial power in all these areas where such words carry a curse and the deepest feelings of hate. In this, unfortunately, they have also enjoyed success. This Russian propaganda campaign has been carried throughout Latin America—where one now hears the frequent cry of “Yankee Imperialism.” In Europe the Russian theme is “Yankee economic imperialism and exploitation.” On all fronts and in all areas of the world, no matter how remote, the Kremlin propaganda machine paints the Russians as defenders of the national independence movement and the United States as colonial power, exploiter of other nations and economic imperialists.

In factual contrast the record shows that the only imperial power left in the world is the Russian one and their empire of today extends well beyond the dreams of Tsar Peter.

In the face of these hard facts we still seem, as a nation, to be unwilling or unable to see the realities of life behind the Russian Iron Curtain. We fail to see this vast area of the world with hundreds of million people involved as a Russian Empire—which in fact it is.

1. We fail to see the Russians and their historical attachment to dreams of a world empire as the cement and outward driving force of the Empire.

2. We fail to see the precise parallels between life within that empire under the Russian Tsars and life under the new Russian elite class.

3. We have failed to learn that the corrupt reign of the Russian Tsars was brought to an end by the national independence movements which spread like wildfire throughout the empire during the period 1917-1920. The public mind has been led to believe that the Bolsheviks were responsible for the collapse of the empire.

4. Slowly but surely we seem to be closing our minds to the aspirations of the people of the satellite nations as we are misguided with the nation or national communism and the theory of political evolution which is now offered as a tonic for the conscience of inaction.

5. We have closed our minds to the age long struggles of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union for their national independence—a struggle which today occupies the major attention of the schemers in the Kremlin.

6. We seem to be completely unaware that the most powerful political force within the modern day Russian empire is not Communism but Nationalism which represents the great masses of people who like all mankind want to be free and independent in their national life and affairs. Communism represents nothing more than the small elite class, the new Russian aristocracy.

7. We are inhibited in our thinking and actions by the strange notion that if we merely suggest the injustice of a modern day Russian empire we will offend the Russian people. We owe nothing more to the Russian people than we owe to all the other people of the world. From the national interest point of view our history as a nation tells us we owe more to the Poles, the Hungarians, the Balts, the Ukrainians, the Armenians, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Roumanians, the Byelorussians, the Georgians, the Croatsians, the Slovenes, the Serbs and other non-Russians. These were the people who contributed to the building of our nation and whose sons and daughters today will stand legally in its defense.

8. We have been unwilling to date, to extend our support for the principle of national self determination to the non-Russian Nations of the Soviet Union. By this failure we have deprived our

foreign policy of the dynamic driving force which would put it in tune with the aspirations of all the people of the world.

9. Strangest of all, we have not hesitated to announce our support for the right of the people and nations in the free world to national self-determination. Only recently President Eisenhower wisely extended the public recognition to all nations of the Near and Middle East. It is time that this same public recognition was extended to the mature and friendly non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union.

So, my friends, it is apparent that we, as a nation, must discard the self-made mirrors of the new crop of Soviet experts, if we are to see the Russians, their present empire and their drive for world empire with the realism our present danger demands. You can serve the course of justice among nations and peace by being a non-conformist on this vital issue and a dissenter wherever and whenever you encounter the so-called Soviet expert.

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### ***A French Eye-witness Writes...***

In their editions of November, 1958, the Lyons paper "Essor" and "Le Pèlerin" published reviews on and extracts from the book by G. Nicolas, a Catholic priest. This French priest relates his experiences, including details about his arrest in Russia by the Bolsheviks, about his internment in Vorkuta and about the life of the Ukrainians there. He also expresses his gratitude to the Ukrainian priests who helped him to hold divine services and managed to obtain grapes, etc., for these services, and adds that it was here that he learnt so much about the Ukrainian Church.

Up to 1939, there were 2,275 priests in the territory of Ukraine occupied by Poland (Galicia), and there were also various Catholic organizations for the three and a half million members of the Ukrainian Church. The persecution began

with the entry of the Russian troops. Mass deportations now became the order of the day. In April, 1945, the five Ukrainian bishops were arrested, but this was actually only the beginning of the ruthless Bolshevik persecutions.

On June 18, 1945, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was incorporated in the Russian Orthodox Church. The priests who opposed this measure were arrested. The same policy was pursued in Carpatho-Ukraine. Bishop Romzha was the leader of the resistance there and he was later murdered by the Bolsheviks. From 1949 onwards, all the churches were closed down, and the priests, as well as many of the members of the Ukrainian Church, were deported. But, as the French priest, G. Nicolas, emphasizes, religious activity continues there, as does the fight for freedom.

("Ukrainets," No. 50, 1958)



Dr. Dmytro Donzow

## Russia and the Occident

Common opinion sees the cause of the disease with which the social organism of Europe is stricken in the conflict between various forms of imperialism, that are hostile to each other. This opinion is not shared by the author, even though he may consequently run the risk of being accused of being "reactionary" or paradoxical. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the author does not share this opinion completely.

There can be no doubt about the fact that the present state of chaos is a result of the conflict between "imperialisms"; and undoubtedly, the hysterical clamour of the lower classes for a new social order is one of the main causes of the crisis. But at the back of these conflicts there is a deeper or, at least, an older conflict.

This other conflict remains latent in the social struggle which Europe is undergoing. This other conflict was at the bottom of the conflict of 1914 between the two groups of states which were hostile to each other. It was also at the bottom of the fight for freedom of the Austrian and Turkish Slavs against the Habsburg and Ottoman conception of an empire. And the same factor is evident in the revolution of 1648 in Ukraine and in the national revolutions of 1917 in East Europe. This conflict, which Leibnitz and Renan, Napoleon I and Hugo, Engels and Lord Beaconsfield foresaw with considerable alarm, which suggested visions of revenge to Herzen and Leontyev, Bakunin and Gorky, is the great conflict between two forms of civilization, between two political, social, cultural and religious ideals,—**the conflict between Europe and Russia.**

The fact that this conflict is actually based on numerous problems which disturb our era, will best be realized if we consider the last phase of this conflict, that is to say the phenomenon which now bears the ineffaceable designation of Bolshevism, and if we analyse this phenomenon, which many members of our indiscriminating intellectual class regard as the most perfect form of a social revolution.

What is Bolshevism?—those who support it unconsciously ask (for those who support it consciously do not put this question), and answer: it is an international movement and its aim is to overthrow imperialism, capitalism, nationalism and all the other idols of the bourgeois pantheon. Bolshevism, so its opponents retort, is the rebellion of slaves, the negation of logical laws and of the laws of national economy. Bolshevism — a third category of persons affirm — is a conspiracy to suppress Christianity. Both the first, the second and the third category are right, inasmuch as Bolshevik Russia has actually started social movements of international significance. But all three categories ignore the fact that Bolshevism, as its designation signifies, is a Russian and, indeed, primarily a Russian phenomenon. It is true that the foremost aim of the paid and of the idealist agents of Bolshevism outside the Soviet Union was the destruction of the European bourgeois order of society. But was that all? Was this the only reason for the violence with which countless such agents in Vienna, Budapest, Copenhagen, Rome, Paris and other centres, large and small, of the West carried on their work of destroying the existing order in the countries concerned? Was the overthrow of a system of exploitation really their foremost aim, or should one perhaps look for other deeper and stronger motives in their violence, motives about which Dostoyevsky wrote in his day? In his "A Writer's Diary" he wrote: "Why do practically nine-tenths of the Russians when travelling abroad always seek to establish contact with European leftist circles, who, as it were, disdain their own culture? Is this not an indication of the Russian soul, to whom European culture has always been something foreign? I personally hold this opinion. The Europeans, however, regard us, rather, as barbarians, who roam about Europe and are pleased to have found something which can be destroyed; who carry out destruction for the sake of destroying and merely in order to enjoy seeing everything fall to pieces,—just as the wild hordes did in the past, as for instance the Huns, who invaded ancient Rome and demolished this holy city without knowing what great cultural treasures they were destroying."<sup>1</sup>)

Is there at least a grain of truth in these words of this gifted Muscovite? And if so, then do his words only apply to such wanderers of the revolution as Bakunin, or even Herzen, too, who cursed the Western world with the words: "Long live chaos, vive la mort!" Or do they also apply to Lenin's followers who predicted the decline of European democracy? Or, possibly, also to the head procurator of the Russian "most sacred synod," Pobedonostsev, who violently attacked this same democracy as the "biggest lie of our era"? Do they apply only to Bakunin's intellectual descendants, to the Russian Red Army, or also to the army of the Tsar, which was as eager to turn the Galicians and other West Ukrainians into orthodox Russians as the Bolsheviks were to turn them into Russian Communists? Do they not apply to that army which is trying to force its

"pax Moscovitica" on Europe just as violently as Lenin tried to drag the latter into his Communist league of nations, into his "societas Leniniana (or leonina)"? Can the question raised by Dostoyevsky be applied only to the Red cavalry armies which carried their social system—that of the "Soviets"—into the West, or also to Catherine II's military rabble, who likewise brought the social system of Russia of those days, namely serfdom, to Ukraine?

And if that is the case, then must we not regard these migrations in Europe on the part of armed and unarmed Muscovites of various generations, who take a pleasure in destroying something there—whether it is the Greek Catholic United Church or the capitalist order, as **phenomena of one and the same category**, with a continuance which is more universal and more dangerous than Bolshevism or Tsarism? One can affirm with certainty that **the ideology of Muscovite Communism and that of Tsarism are merely two different forms of one and the same thing, namely of the same phenomenon of a more general character—and this is nothing other than the Muscovite Messianism which wages war against the West.** Threateningly and rapaciously, Bolshevist Russia, just like the Russia of Nicholas I's day, is constantly on the look-out for "a possibility to destroy something."

The answer to all the above questions has already been given, time and time again, by the Russian intellectuals,—by the same persons who once cultivated "national traits" and, later, played a part in the "Cheka" and "proletarian cult,"—the advocates of the idea of Russian Messianism: the Russian "intelligentsia," who in their own opinion are the guardians and the personification of the ideals of "truth and right," the prophets of the great mission of the Russian people which will make the entire human race happy, but in our opinion are the "propaganda makers" of Muscovite, Petersburg, Petrograd and Leningrad imperialism and of Russian imperialism over again, the sentimental apologists of the Muscovite "urge towards the West," the severe prosecutors in the historical law suit of the nations, who, with blood-stained hands, knock on the door of the Occident,—in short, the "advocatus diaboli."

It is possible that the representatives of this Russian intellectual class differed from one another as regards mental powers and genius. But all of them, prophets and harlequins alike, had one characteristic in common,—a deep mystical belief in the great predestination, in the world mission of the Russian people. They could paint their people in rosy colours like the national fanatics did, or could compare it to a herd of cattle, as for instance Chekhov did in his "peasants" ("moujiks"); or they could kiss the hem of its stinking "caftan," as Count Leo Tolstoy did, or, in fear of its unfathomable and incomprehensible nature, could appeal to the bayonets of the Tsar, like P. Struve and other no less famous writers of the once (after the revolution of 1905) well-known compilation "Signpost" ("Vekhi") did,—it all

came to the same thing! Whether angel or devil, Apollo or centaur, half man and half animal, this people was in the eyes of the entire Muscovite intelligentsia a people chosen by God, and if it was an animal, then it was a sacred animal before which all other peoples should bow down in awe and reverence. This people and no other was to preach a new gospel to the agonized West. It alone was to proclaim the redeeming "Let there be light" amidst the chaos of the world.

"I believed and I still believe that Russia, which must take the lead in a new formation of the Eastern states, is to give the world a new culture, too, and is to replace the decadent civilization of Romanic-Germanic Europe by this new Slavic-Eastern civilization,"—thus wrote the "Pope" of the Slavophiles, Leontyev, in the days of Nicolas I.<sup>2</sup>) And the Slavophil poet Tyutchev, prophesying the death of the West in the near future, exclaimed: "Above the gigantic ruins of the West, Russia which is even greater will rise up, like the Holy Ark... Who will venture to doubt her predestination?"—"The West has already said all it could say. *Ex oriente lux!* Russia alone is predestinated to assume the spiritual leadership of Europe!"—such is the passionate cry of that notoriously fanatical advocate of Moscow's Slavophilmania, S. Bulgakov. And, moved by these words, Rozanov answers, like an echo, "It was high time this was said." Pushkin idealizes Russian serfdom by contrasting it with the "suppression" of the English peasantry<sup>3</sup>), and writes verses imbued with a violent hatred of European civilization.<sup>4</sup>)

For years, the Russian patriot and visionary, A. Herzen, dreamt of the longed-for decline of the West and of "new barbarians who will come to destroy it." The Slavophil Y. Samarin dreamt of the role which Russia was to play "in the whole world," whilst the confirmed revolutionary, Bakunin, was convinced that the Russian people "will introduce new fundamental ideas into history and will create a new civilization, as well as a new faith, new laws and new life." Gorky "spits in the face" of America and of "lovely France," in the name of the ideals of Moscow's proletarian rabble; and Lenin usurps the legacy of the first apostle of the socialist Church, by whose edicts the thrones of the socialist idols of the Occident who have fallen into sin shall collapse, just as in former times royal thrones were overthrown by the edicts of Pope Innocent or Pope Boniface. And even Chaadayev, too, ends his "Apologia for a Madman" by expressing his faith in Russia's great predestination. "Our task—so he writes—consists in bringing a saving principle of order to a world which has become the prey of anarchy. Russia must not refuse to fulfil this mission, which has been entrusted to her by the heavenly and by the earthly ruler." The voices of all the representatives of Russian political thought united in a single hymn of praise in honour of their people; and all of them were prepared to agree with the official conception of Russian history which the notorious chief of the secret

police of Tsar Nicolas I, Count von Benckendorf, formulated as follows: "Her (Russia's) past was amazing, her present is more than illustrious, and her future will surpass all that human imagination can conceive" (and here the Count was obviously thinking of the Bolsheviks in advance).

There were some representatives of Russian Messianism who stressed the "healthy forms" of the Muscovite state structure which were to save Europe; others wanted to cure the world with the help of the Muscovite peasant community, the "Obshchina," with its system of land as common property, or saw Russia's mission in the liberation of the Slav peoples (the white internationalists), or in the "liberation" of the world proletariat (the red internationalists), or in the theoretical ideal of an ethical rebirth of mankind through Russia. Some dreamt of Moscow as a "Third Rome," others saw in Moscow the capital of the Third International. The ideologists of Muscovite Messianism differed from one another as far as the individual details of their ideas were concerned, but they were all firmly convinced that the Russian people, though perhaps grudgingly and not by any means voluntarily, would nevertheless, like a donkey spurred on by the shouts of its drivers, drag along all the other peoples in its wake towards an unknown but great future, in which these theoreticians, obsessed by a political mania, saw the shining vision of either a new "civitas dei," or the Muscovite cross on St. Sophia's Cathedral, or a "socialist fatherland of all workers."

Exaggeration and one-sidedness! But Messianism is not exclusively a peculiarity of the Russian people,—the sceptical will retort. But it is not a case of either exaggeration or one-sidedness, for what I have designated as Muscovite Messianism (and, incidentally, Pan-Muscovitism would be a more fitting designation) cannot in any way be regarded as identical with analogous phenomena amongst other nations and most certainly not with Pan-Latinism or Pan-Germanism.

It is true that Pan-Latinism had one advantage in its favour, namely that once before in history it had already had a definitely organized political form. Etruscans and Iberians, Illyrians and Celts once formed a single kingdom. But after its collapse, the uniform traditions, which the Church had done its utmost to foster, gradually died out, and the Pyrenees and the Alps proved to be an obstacle which even put an end to the former unity of languages. The imposing attempt on the part of the great Napoleon to unite France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Portugal under his sceptre, and the less imposing attempt on the part of Napoleon III to subject Italy to his supreme power, can be regarded as the last convulsions of the Pan-Latinist idea.

As far as the Germanic world was concerned, there was even less basis for a Messianist movement. The political disintegration of the German race and the fact that certain parts of it became independent (Austria, Holland, Switzerland) doomed the Pan-Germanic idea to failure on the continent from the outset. The few bold attempts

which were made to revive this idea artificially were rendered improbable and fantastic by the events of our century.

The British form of Pan-Germanism has, it is true, shown a greater vitality, and such ideas as a Greater Britain or an Imperial Federation are certainly not merely phantoms. But unlike Pan-Muscovitism, this form of Pan-Germanism does not overstep the limits of its own race and lays no claim to domination over other peoples, with the exception of those which are less civilized than the British themselves. Because of its claims and the force of its impetus, Muscovite Russian Messianism, which seeks to rule over peoples that are superior to the Russian people, both from the cultural and also from the political and economic point of view, represents a phenomenon which stands out isolated in the history of Europe during the past three hundred years.

Sceptics will reply: "That may be so, but surely Messianism does not constitute the essence of Bolshevism?" They will point out that the form which Bolshevik propaganda assumes in the West is a temporary phenomenon, which is just as transitory as the state forms introduced by Napoleon, which were the outcome of the French Revolution; and this latter event, so they will affirm, resembled Bolshevism inasmuch as it was surely, in the first place, a social revolution. And what connection can the conflict between Russia and Europe have with it, they will ask.—This way of reasoning will no doubt seem irrefutable to those whose memory only goes back as far as yesterday or to those who always ascribe the same significance to social movements which the leaders of such movements endow them with. But if we study this extremely complicated problem more thoroughly, we come to quite a different conclusion,—namely, that the "liberation of the world proletariat" and the "liberation of the Slav peoples" are empty phrases, at the back of which there is quite a different factor. **And this is Muscovite Russian Messianism, which is already known to us.**

Apart from the bombastic phraseology of the Bolsheviks, which they use to impress their subjects, whose intellect has been blunted by starvation, and their foreign adherents, who have been won over by various methods, there is another obvious characteristic trait of Bolshevik ideology; and that is consideration of the entire foreign policy of Bolshevism not from the aspect of such opposing conceptions as "revolution and reaction" or proletariat and bourgeoisie," but from the point of view of the **antagonism between Russia, as the vanguard of Asia, and Europe as a whole.** When the Bolsheviks play off national religious movements in the Orient against Great Britain, they are appealing not to any class conflict, but to the national fight of the East against Europe. When they seek to obtain the help of some Moslem ruler and leader or other, this is not an alliance on their part with the "international revolution" against the "international reaction," nor a policy of alliance with the working masses, but merely an alliance of states against states, the usual "bourgeois" policy, the

policy of national interests, the fight for Russia's supremacy over Europe,—a policy from which the Bolsheviks try in vain to absolve themselves. When Lenin attacked Great Britain and America, he censured their **Anglo-Saxon** (and not their capitalistic) freedoms, which he took good care to put in inverted commas.<sup>5)</sup> When Bukharin criticized the "compromising elements" of the European working classes, he was not so much attacking the "traitors" of the working class as the "German, Austrian, French and English Mensheviks."<sup>6)</sup> When Trotsky tried to rekindle the "patriotic fire of his red mercenaries in the war against Poland, it was not so much a war against the Szlachta nobility as a war against **the Poles**... It is precisely at the **European** "slowness of thought," at the **French** "petty bourgeoisie" and at the English "cretinism" that the Soviet Russian Olympus hurls its thunderbolts. It is Europe that opposes Russia's political expansion, that is the enemy of Bolshevism and its Asian allies! On one side, Russia,—on the other, Europe! Such is the formula of Soviet Russia's foreign policy.

And it is interesting to note that this policy considers the other Russian Messianist ideology, the Slavophil trend, from the same point of view. If a Slav problem arises, it is not considered individually or abstractly, but as a preliminary stage in the general campaign against the West. If the Turkish problem is broached anew, the Slavophiles even support the idea that the Turks should be allowed to remain in Constantinople, provided that it looks as though the outcome will be that the Sultan is to be replaced by a commissar of one or other of the European Major Powers. Where the internal affairs of the European peoples, who are either under Russian domination or not, are concerned, all these questions are considered from the point of view of consolidating Russia's power with regard to Europe.

A further comparison reveals an even more striking analogy! The Bolsheviks declare war on the European "bourgeois" order by appealing to the proletariat. And the old bourgeois Slavophiles likewise declared war on this same bourgeoisie by appealing to the same proletariat! Were they likewise champions of socialism, or are the Bolsheviks Slavophiles? Neither is the case. But both trends served or serve the same national Muscovite ideal, which necessitates the decline of Europe. Leontyev based his political theory on the following argument: "In this meaning of culture and of living, which I regard as so important, all the Slavs, the Southern and Western Slavs alike, are nothing but an unavoidable evil, since all these people as far as their intellectual classes are concerned represent nothing more than the most ordinary and most commonplace European bourgeoisie in the history of the world."<sup>7)</sup>

"Nothing more than the most ordinary bourgeoisie"! How does the tsarist Leontyev come to make such a statement? Is it a lapse on his part? No, not at all,—it is his firm conviction, for he also writes elsewhere: "It is high time to put a stop to the development of the

petty bourgeois (that is, precisely, of the bourgeois!—D.D.), liberal progress!"<sup>8</sup>) And two pages further on, he again refers to the "Slav brothers" and expresses his regret that "these, to judge by all their qualities and faults, resemble the European bourgeoisie of the most mediocre type for more closely than we do."—On page 415, this anti-bourgeois tsarist writes: "If the world is to cast aside bourgeois civilization in the near future, the new ideal of humanity will of necessity spring from Russia, from a people amongst whom bourgeois qualities are less developed." These words might, in fact, have been uttered by Lenin or by Bukharin, who based their idea of the world mission of the Russian proletariat on the argument that it was less permeated by bourgeois morals and the corresponding prejudices than its Western counterpart.

But the author argues quite logically! If this "bourgeois civilization," which he hates so intensely, is dying, then there must be someone to dig its grave. In Lenin's opinion this grave-digger is, of course, the revolutionary proletariat. **And Leontyev holds the same view!** France was the chief herald of the bourgeois culture of those days, and for precisely this reason it was to be destroyed, so the Russian Pan-Slavists maintained, by the proletariat, of course. "If it is necessary for the further independence of Eastern Russian thought from Romanic-Germanic thought and for the adoption of a new cultural course and of state forms that the prestige of Romanic-Germanic civilization should be lowered further and further in the eyes of the people of the East, and if it is necessary that the superstition regarding this civilization should be transformed into a violent prejudice against it as rapidly as possible, then it is to be desired that the country which has taken the initiative in modern progress should compromise its genius as speedily and finally as possible."<sup>9</sup>) So much for France! And since Leontyev wrote his pamphlet at the time of the Commune of Paris, he appeals for help to its Phrygian cap, which had been set up on the towers of Notre Dame and which was to proclaim the final decline of the bourgeois world. In his opinion it would, of course, be even better if Paris, with its "bourgeois" churches and its parliamentary buildings, were to vanish from the face of the earth completely; and since this is hardly possible without Bolshevik methods, the latter are also recommended by Leontyev. "Is a victory and the rule of the Commune—so he asks—at all possible without vandalism, without the material destruction of buildings, cultural monuments, libraries, etc.? Surely not; and in view of the modern means of destruction, it is far easier to reduce the greater part of Paris to dust and ashes than it was in ancient times to destroy other great centres of culture, as for instance Babylon, Nineveh or ancient Rome. And this should be the wish of everyone who aims to introduce new forms of civilization."<sup>10</sup>)

These words are neither the reflections of a fanatic obsessed by some mania, nor are they a quotation from a leading article in the



Bolshevist official state organ "Izvestiya," but, I repeat, the profound opinion of a Russian patriot, who was fully aware of the irreconcilable hostility between his country and Europe and tried to find voluntary or involuntary allies for his cause everywhere,—just as Zinoviev and other "commis voyageurs" (commercial travellers) of Bolshevism, who likewise preached terrorism and vandalism in the name of the "new forms of civilization," did. This does not, of course, mean that Leontyev was a Communist or that Zinoviev and his comrades were Pan-Slavists. In every case their appeal to the proletariat is nothing but a farce, a means to achieve aims which have as little connection with the liberation of the proletariat as Russian Pan-Slavism has with the liberation of the Slavs,—a means to kindle a world conflagration which would engulf the entire European civilization.

Leontyev, incidentally, was not the only person to express opinions which appeared original, when viewed in the light of his era and his personality. The well-known and intellectually fairly important ideologist of Slavophilism, O. Miller, wrote at about the same time as Leontyev: "If we were to begin to support it (the nationality principle) amongst the Slavs, we should stir up the whole of former Europe against us and we should have to seek bases against it precisely in Europe itself, namely in a close cooperation everywhere with its new forces."<sup>11</sup>) What is meant by "new forces"? Precisely the same forces on which the tsarist Leontiev and the Communist Lenin also set their hopes. To ensure the prosperity of Russia and the destruction of Europe, elements are to be stirred up in the West that are hostile to European civilization. Of what concern is it to the Muscovite supporters of bourgeois trends if these elements march along under the red banner of socialism and take their oath not on the Gospel of St. Mark, but on that of St. Marx? They are only concerned with doing their work! And the supporter of the Russian peasant community and of autocracy, the German Müller, who became a Russian Miller, actually stresses that it would be advisable to disregard all the principles of legitimism which are allegedly a characteristic feature of Russian policy, and to join forces with the Mephistopheles of the revolution! Referring to the mission of Russia, he writes: "It seems to me that it would be extremely important for Europe's attitude towards us if we were genuinely to renounce the policy which we pursued up to the Orient War (that is to say, the Crimean War of 1853-1856,—D.D.), if we were to abandon all traditions of our legitimism mania and our revolution phobia." Russia (that is, tsarist Russia!) is to show her "firm determination" as well as her "ability to prove to the peoples of Europe by deeds that our task, beyond the borders of the Slav world, too, is liberation." And elsewhere, Miller writes as follows: "But if the peoples of Europe still continue to believe them (their ruling classes), and if these peoples are a blind tool in the latter's hands and declare war on those with whom they ought to make a pact of friendship, then what is to blame for this

fact are, for the most part, the former sins of our own policy and the period in which this policy was suffering from the virus of legitimism and the aversion to freedom with which it had been inoculated."<sup>12</sup>)

In other words, the essence of the opinions expressed at length by Miller in his book is that Russia, as regards her policy towards Europe, is to rely on the revolutionary elements there and, with their aid, is to pull down the entire structure of the so-called bourgeois or, as the West sees it, European culture as such. Similar opinions are also expressed by other Slavophil "patriotic writers," as for instance, Yuriy Samarin, who advised Russia "to take over from the Poles the task of liberation which, sooner or later, whether we want to or not, we shall be obliged to fulfil in the whole world." And Bakunin was obsessed by a similar idea: "complete negation of the West" and the great liberation mission of the Russian people, headed by its Tsar.<sup>13</sup>)

As for Herzen, however, he hopelessly confuses the mission of tsarism with that of the proletariat and paints a crass picture of the Last Day of Europe, in which he assigns the role of the seraphic herald to the Don Cossack who "will come in due course to waken the European blocks of stone and rock, provided that they have not already been wakened by the trump of the Last Judgement which will be pronounced on them by the socialism of revenge—Communism."<sup>14</sup>)

But we have said enough as regards Herzen and Bakunin, for, after all, they were to a certain extent socialists, too. How, on the other hand, is one to interpret the opinions expressed by Samarin and Miller or by Leontyev, whom no one is likely to suspect of a liberal, let alone a revolutionary, attitude? How is one to interpret the entire practice of Russian policy in Europe from the days of Alexey, the father of Peter I, until the reign of Nicholas II,—a policy which actually broke with the principles of legitimism again and again, inasmuch as it disseminated revolutionary, demagogic propaganda amongst the Ukrainian and Polish peasants against their "masters" of the nobility, and also amongst the Finnish peasants' independence movement, amongst the Balkan "Rayahs" against their Turkish "oppressors," and amongst the Slav peasants in Austria-Hungary against the "German and Hungarian bourgeoisie exploiting them"? How is one to interpret the idea of tsarism itself, the "kingdom of the poor," the dictatorship in favour of the indigent,—which so closely resembles the Soviet ideology—also a "dictatorship of the poor against the rich"? Were the initiators of this policy—all the Ordin-Nashchokins, Menshikovs, Panins, Gorchakovs, Izvolskys, Shebekos and Hartwigs—agents of the world revolution? If one considers a Bolshevik idea which is apparently not a plagiarism,—namely, the plan to mobilize the Moslem peoples against "Western imperialism," then in this case, too, not the leaders of the Third International, but their teachers are to be congratulated on having invented this idea; for the said Leontyev

had already affirmed that "a danger for Russia has arisen in the West" and that allies must be sought against this danger: "should Islam want to become one of these allies, all the better"; for "there are very strong and marked traits in the Russian character which remind one far more of Tatars or other Asiatics—or of no one at all—rather than of Slavs." An alliance with the Moslems would be advantageous, for the simple reason that they have not yet been imbued with any "Europeism."<sup>15</sup>) Does not Bolshevism for the same reason look for allies there for its Tartar socialism, as Kautsky called it?

One could quote other examples and other Slavophiles without end; the ideas expressed will always be found to tally with Lenin's ideas. One could also study passages from the works and speeches of the latter,—one is certain to come across plagiarism from the Pan-Slavist gospel. A toying with the idea of the revolution and of the proletariat, a crusade against the bourgeoisie, amorous glances towards Asia, tirades and attacks against the principle of legitimism,—these ideas and methods are used equally by Lenin and the Pan-Slavists. And in both cases there is one and the same aim,—the destruction of "rotten" Europe ad maiorem Moscoviae gloriam,—the Europe that is hostile to all the forms of the Russian state which have existed so far.

Precisely herein and in nothing else lies the common feature of the two forms of Russian imperialism—the tsarist and the Bolshevik form. Indeed, the Russian pre-revolutionary publicist Strakhov had already realized this fact when he said: "If we consider our nihilism as a whole and from the entire aspect of its expressions, we shall realize that its sceptical opinion as regards Europe (and not of the bourgeoisie!—D.D.) is its most important characteristic. In this respect, persons of the most genuine Russian trend very frequently agree completely with the ideas of the nihilists" (and vice versa, we should like to add,—D.D.).<sup>16</sup>) Leroy-Beaulieu, too, realized this fact and held the opinion that nihilism was a form of protest on the part of Russia against Europe.<sup>17</sup>) A protest which very soon developed into sadistic dreams and affirmed that Paris would be razed to the ground, which exhorted the workers of Europe "to massacre their leaders who have become middle-class," as for instance Zinoviev-Apfelbaum did at the Congress of the German "Independents" in Halle; a protest on the part of the barbarians who "roam about Europe... and are pleased to have found something which can be destroyed... without knowing what great cultural treasures they were destroying" (Dostoyevsky, see above). Their demagogic watchwords are nothing more than merely a means of warfare, a kind of naphtha which—as Herzen says—should be poured on the edifice of Occidental culture, of which every Russian is aware, so that either an "earthly absolute ruler," Nicholas Romanov, or a dictator over the world proletariat, Lenin or Trotsky-Bronstein, could establish himself at the scene of

(Contnd. on inside back cover.)

Volodymyr Derzhavyn

### ***The Case of Pasternak or the Self-exposure of Bolshevik Literature***

The awarding of the Nobel Prize for Literature to the Soviet Russian writer, Boris L. Pasternak, namely in recognition of all his works, but, in particular, for his last novel "Doctor Zhivago," has not only raised a great deal of dust as regards his person, but has also become something of a world sensation. Indeed, a clash has occurred in the field of literature between two worlds, the Free World and that of Communist enslavement, and these two worlds have once again shown that they are incompatible and spiritually incommensurable. To the Ukrainians this is nothing new, for in the course of the 1930's alone, Ukrainian literature lost more than 150 writers (about three times as many as Soviet Russian literature) through Bolshevik terrorism; in the present case, however, the illusions existing in the West as regards "peaceful coexistence," "cultural relations" with Moscow, "fundamental changes" in the Bolshevik cultural policy since Stalin's death, etc., have been put to a hard test, with the result that this literary event has gained a certain political significance, not only for the so-called Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, but also for the entire Soviet Union and, consequently, for Soviet Ukraine, too.

In the "Big Soviet Encyclopedia" ("Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya") of 1934 B. Pasternak was characterized as follows:

"Boris Leonidovich Pasternak, born in 1890, the son of the painter Leonid Pasternak<sup>1</sup>) studied philosophy in Moscow and Marburg. . . Endeavoured to elevate himself above the confusion of the social struggle to the level of bourgeois culture. But pulsating life breaks through the bourgeois idealistic cloak of his poetical works. In the latter are reflected, too, the events of the era of the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat and for its consolidation. . . Pasternak always and under all circumstances defends the

freedom of literary creation... To begin with, he accepted the revolution as an elementary force, later as an inevitable evil. The author's theory about the incompatibility of art and socialism is based on experiences in his personal life, for in Pasternak's opinion art is always the manifestation of one individual character, of one individual person. Socialism, as he sees it, is merely a smoke-screen in the darkness of theories and an epoch in which men "suspect" each other... Pasternak's great talent has earned him the reputation of an original writer who has a certain influence on Soviet literature."

As can be seen, this is a fairly mild criticism for the year 1934; and it contains no harsh censure: it is true that it is hinted that this man is of no use whatever to the dictatorship of the proletariat and Bolshevik "socialism," but nevertheless there appear to be "extenuating circumstances," and the accused is not actually a direct enemy of the "proletarian" revolution.<sup>2</sup>) Apart from the usual Marxist-Leninist phraseology, the author of the article has, in fact, even shown a love of truthfulness which is surprising when we consider his social milieu, for he actually admits Pasternak's great literary talent to a certain extent; and one must not reproach him for not saying anything definite about the nature of this talent: that he could not do, for it would have been branded as "propagating bourgeois-idealistic literature."

Incidentally, the style of Pasternak's lyric art is fairly complicated and it is hard to assign it to any one specific category. His rich and profuse metaphors are fundamentally symbolical in character and their purpose is, in the first place, to give a lasting meaning and value to momentary impressions and feelings. It is characteristic that one of his best lyric volumes bears the title "My Sister Life" (the word "life"—"zhizn'"—is feminine in Russian); all Pasternak's poetry is inspired by a striving to capture feelings that are alive and by a subtle subsequent impression of the phenomena of animate and inanimate Nature. His language is perfect and extremely elegant, and his profuse wealth of original metaphors is profound, intricate and sometimes even baroque, but never rhetorical.

In the 1920's he also wrote a number of longer lyric and epic poems (some of them with historical subjects from Russia's recent past, as for instance "The Year 1905" and "Lieutenant Schmit"), as well as a "Novel in Verse"—"Spektorsky;" in these works, as also, incidentally, in his mature lyrics, his style approaches classicism.

His belletristic prose is naturally far more "prosaic" and usually reveals a certain lack of firmness in outline, and in this respect it to some extent resembles the prose of Rainer Maria Rilke; and, as in the case of Rilke, his stories, which are not very numerous, have a higher artistic value than his longer works. In spite of this, however, Pasternak's prose works, too,—even including his fairly long-winded autobiography—reveal the same aesthetic qualities as his poetry, only in a more or less modified form.

It goes without saying that Pasternak's philosophy of life is strongly influenced by Leo Tolstoy,—but not so much by the old Tolstoy, who was a moral fanatic and an anti-religious rationalist, as by the young Tolstoy, the writer of the "Cossacks" and the "Tales from Sebastopol," with his spontaneous love and religion of Nature.

In the 1930's Pasternak ceased writing poetry almost completely, but he translated numerous works in verse, and his translations of Shakespeare and Goethe ("Faust") and also of the Georgian (Caucasian) poets are rightly regarded as outstanding; and in the field of belletristic prose he now preferred to work on his memoirs; that is to say, he now devoted himself to those literary genres which have the advantage of needing less "ideological solicitude" on the part of the respective Party and state organs and manage to exist because they do not cause a public sensation. It was easy for Pasternak to effect this change, for since the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution he had kept aloof from public life and so-called literary social activity, with its ever-increasing shameless flattery of Bolshevism. It was precisely his studies and travels in the West and, in particular, his profound interest in West European literature that were the main reason for the fact that he remained more and more isolated in Soviet Russian literature, in spite of the extremely high opinion of his literary work which was held by the small number of genuine connoisseurs who could venture to oppose their opinion to the ever-increasing Bolshevization and enslavement of the Russian mentality,—and in the second half of the 1930's they could no longer venture to do so at all.

His last work, however (and it is quite likely that it will remain his last, unless he allows himself to be forced into writing a falsified palinode),—"Doctor Zhivago," the novel which has now become world-famous, was written over a period of ten years and, to a certain extent, is a synthesis of his views on the nature of man and human society; it is the last attempt of the author to express

his own thoughts in a positive and unmistakable form, even though he does so with considerable reserve.

As measured by artistic standards, "Doctor Zhivago" is not a masterpiece of belletristic prose, and in this respect it is even inferior to certain of Pasternak's shorter stories; it is, incidentally, significant that the "Poems of Yuriy Zhivago," which have been added to the text of the novel, from the poetic point of view far surpass the prose text (indeed, they are among Pasternak's best lyrics and for the most part, incidentally, deal with Christian religious themes). It is true that this novel is not an epochal work of art, but it is nevertheless a worthy continuation of Russian pre-Bolshevist belletristic prose: one might say, half-way between Leo Tolstoy and Anton Chekhov. But, of course, it is not this quality alone which has gained such a huge response for this novel (and also the Nobel Prize for literature).

This has been achieved by the candour and truthfulness with which the author subjects the entire "Communist" social and cultural policy of the Soviets to a criticism, which in form appears mild, but in its final effect is destructive,—namely, a criticism exclusively from the standpoint of the human personality, which, according to the author's innermost conviction, alone contains and radiates the true "living life" (the fact must by no means be overlooked that the surname "Zhivago" is nothing other than an archaic form of the genitive of the adjective "zhivoy"—"living"). Without concerning himself with any social, political, economic or national interests, the author considers the Communist totalitarian standardization of all spiritual life exclusively from the point of view of the value of personality—and condemns this standardization as completely absurd and false.

Thus, what appears to West European literary circles to be particularly incomprehensible,—namely, the complete political condemnation, expressed in hysterical forms (which remind one very strongly of Goebbels's "Propaganda Ministry"), of a novel which has obviously been made to look "non-political," is from the Bolshevik point of view the most natural thing in the world: although Pasternak does not set up any other society or "constitution" against the Communist society and "constitution," he denies the fundamental idea of the totalitarian regime, that is to say, also the most totalitarian regime, namely the Bolshevik regime, by his purely ethical "non-political" attitude.

Of course, in principle this is nothing new,—except that the literary circles of the West have taken far too long to realize that writers who refused to make a compromise with Bolshevik totalitarianism, in the field of ethical Russian (Muscovite) literature, too, were either physically exterminated or else forced to silence (as, for instance, Gumilev, Tsvetayeva, Akhmatova, Mandelshtam, Pilniak and many others),—with the sole difference that the Soviet Russian regime has always avoided committing such large-scale massacres in the field of Russian literature as have been carried out in the field of the non-Russian literatures of the U.S.S.R. (Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Georgian, Jewish, etc.). But there is also another aspect to the “Pasternak Case,” which we have so far not mentioned and which even to those who are well acquainted with Red Moscow is something new,—namely the circumstances under which the agitation campaign against Pasternak was set going and the reasons why it assumed the form it did.

It is an established fact that the author only ventured to offer the manuscript of his novel to the Soviet state publishing firm (and in the U.S.S.R., as well as in the latter’s satellite states, all publishing firms are state-owned and only differ as regards the special branch of literature of each one) after Stalin’s death, that is to say at the time of the alleged political—and, in particular, cultural political—“thaw.” It is hard to say whether Pasternak had important reasons for hoping that his book, like that of V. Dudintsev,<sup>3</sup>) might pass “unnoticed” through the state and Party censorship during the temporary and general confusion. But it seems fairly certain that the handing over of the manuscript to the Italian Communist publishing firm, D. Feltrinelli, for the purpose of translation, was effected *with the permission* of the Soviet state publishing firm, as well as of the “Soviet Authors’ Society.” Fruitless attempts of the latter, later on, to prevent the publication of the Italian translation and recover the manuscript for Moscow, seem to have met with little or no support on the part of the Soviet embassy in Italy;<sup>4</sup>) nor does any particularly strong pressure seem to have been brought to bear on Pasternak in this connection: he is said to have written a private letter to Feltrinelli, to the effect that he should dispose of the manuscript as he saw fit. In any case, the publication of the novel, first of all in the Italian language and then, later, in several other West European languages, did not result in any particularly strong agitation on the part of the Soviets or in any repressive measures against the author; it was not until



he was awarded the Nobel Prize that the storm began to rage, and its extreme violence cannot deceive one as to the fact that it came far too late to be meant sincerely.

The assumption that the Soviet "supreme authorities" were not previously aware of the whole matter and were only roused out of their indolence by the fact that the author had been awarded the Nobel Prize, seems as incredible as possible to anyone who has the least idea of the precise way in which the Bolshevik state and Party apparatus functions and operates. There must have been some other reason for the fact that the same book, the possible publication of which in foreign translations was regarded by the Soviet government fairly indifferently and passed over without comment, when awarded the Nobel Prize, caused this government to go into a rage. The reason is very plain: such a high distinction as the Nobel Prize makes both the publication of "Doctor Zhivago" in the *Russian* language (abroad) and the great interest of Soviet Russian readers in this novel absolutely inevitable; thus the Russian text (or at least the tenor of its ideas) will to a greater or lesser extent seep through into the Soviet Union,—and it is precisely this fact which in the opinion of the Bolshevik "Party and Government" is most undesirable.

Bolshevism can calmly accept the circulation of this novel amongst West European and American or Afro-Asian readers: for it is a book which is not intended for the masses (it is far too complicated for that and has no primitive appeal whatever), nor for those circles which in the free world represent the close target of Bolshevik propaganda; it is focussed on those who share the views of the author, on pacifists and "quietists" and other non-political humanists, and these Bolshevism need not fear. Even though the circulation of the book outside the U.S.S.R. may increase the passive antipathy towards the latter, this will not make the active anti-Bolshevist resistance any stronger. And, as a last argument, the book might even prompt some Western readers to have "conciliatory" thoughts; namely, that if such outstanding works can originate in the Soviet Union and if, in the event of their publication abroad, no reprisals are taken against the author, even though the work in question is not tolerated in the Soviet Union itself, then the said "Soviet culture" cannot really be as bad as it is made out to be!

Meanwhile, however, there is no longer any chance of anybody thinking such a thing, for repressive measures have already been taken, since the Soviets are determined to do their utmost to prevent

the circulation of this book amongst Soviet Russian readers. For what reason?

Because Pasternak's book—and herein lies its greatest merit—radically destroys a legend, which is insignificant as far as other countries are concerned, but within the U.S.S.R. and, to be more exact, amongst the Soviet Russians themselves, the real Muscovites, counts for a great deal,—the legend of the Russian cultural heritage. Prior to and during the early years after the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks behaved in a very international manner, but they would not have been able to retain their power, nor would they have been able to assert themselves in World War II, had they not persuaded the majority of the ethnical Russian (Muscovite) population and, in particular, the Russian intellectual classes that Soviet Russia was the direct, regular and organic continuation of pre-revolutionary Russia, so that Russian national feeling must collapse with loyalty to Soviet Russia: namely, that those who were anti-Bolshevist would in this way betray the interests not only of the "international proletariat," but also of the Russian motherland, too!

It is undoubtedly true that the Soviet Russian Red imperium in many respects, and, particularly, in political respect, is a direct and organic (as far as imperialism and despotism can be organic) continuation of the Petersburg imperial absolutism and of the Moscow tsarist empire which preceded it; but this does not fully apply as regards spiritual culture and, above all, literature, and it is precisely this fact which is a vulnerable spot as far as Russian (Muscovite) national consciousness is concerned. The Soviet Russian press has had a very definite reason for referring, since the end of the 1920's, to the great Russian writers of the last century—Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, the Tolstoys (Alexis and Leo) and Chekhov, and, since the beginning of the 1940's, even to Dostoyevsky with hypocritical reverence and for doing its utmost to present them, at least partially, as the spiritual predecessors of Soviet Russia; and now a writer has turned up,—of the same rank, flesh of their flesh, whose chief work on every page reveals that he is a peer of the great thinkers of Russia's past and who, as it were in their name, expresses his denial of Bolshevism and does so, not in abstract terms, but in his entire poetic work, in such a way that every educated Russian is bound to realize and feel it.

Of course, we mean a born Russian. But the native Russians constitute the only large component part of the Soviet population on which the Bolsheviks can to some extent rely, since this compon-

ent part relies to some extent on the Bolshevik system,—namely, on the strength of the national and imperial feeling of solidarity, whereas there can be nothing but mutual distrust and mutual hatred between Bolshevism and the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union who have been subjugated by Moscow.

It would be superfluous to discuss the question as to how far Pasternak is right in denying the right to existence of the Soviet Russian "culture," as it were, in the name of the classics of the Russian pre-revolutionary literature (as regards Dostoyevsky, Leo Tolstoy and Chekhov he is undoubtedly right); the main thing is that he believes in his convictions in this respect and is also capable of convincing others. But those who attack the Bolshevik claim to national Russian culture are attacking the Bolshevik claim to national Russian loyalty, that is to say the sole large-scale and comparatively firm pillar and support of the regime. And the only thing to do is to stamp such a man as a "traitor to the Soviet people, to the cause of socialism, peace and progress," and, if possible, to compromise him by his "voluntary" renunciation of the Nobel Prize.

Only a fool could have believed that the Soviets would have let Pasternak travel to Stockholm if he had insisted on accepting the Nobel Prize. For various reasons it would have been extremely embarrassing for Khrushchov to have forbidden Pasternak to travel to Stockholm; the only possibility, therefore, was to force him to a "voluntary" renunciation,—and this was what was actually done; otherwise, he would have died "of heart-failure," with a "post-humous" renunciation. At any rate, he would have left his wife and children to the Bolsheviks as a "security."

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#### NOTES

1) He was a personal friend of Leo Tolstoy and illustrated several of the latter's works in a masterly way.

2) One must not, of course, overlook the fact that the edition in question of the "Big Soviet Encyclopedia" was declared to be "counter-revolutionary" only a few years after its appearance and was accordingly confiscated.

3) "Not by Bread Alone," — a work which only attacks individual so-called "harmful excesses" of the Bolshevik system, however, not making any attempt to combat the system, from the ideological point of view.

4) The fact that the Italian Communist Party likewise did not intervene (even though Feltrinelli's publishing firm must, at least financially, be dependent on this Party) can, incidentally, be explained by temporary differences of opinion in this Party.

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Vera Rich

## **"The Caucasus" of Shevchenko**

The "Caucasus" of Shevchenko is generally admitted to be one of the greatest and most significant works of the poet, if not the greatest and most significant. In it, political and personal emotion become fused with and through poetic art, and the result is a poem that not only holds an important place in Ukrainian literature, but is worthy of consideration as one of the major works of world literature.

Yet, in spite of its universal themes of grief and oppression, the "Caucasus" remains an essentially personal and particularized expression of these themes, and although we may read it, and, in part, appreciate it without any knowledge of the background, yet for a full appreciation of the poem, we must understand the circumstances under which it was written.

The "Caucasus" was written in 1845, and belongs therefore to the same period in Shevchenko's life as "The Great Vault," and "The Epistle." In the early 1840's, Shevchenko had revisited the Ukraine for the first time since his childhood, and had realized, in a new way, the horror and oppression of the Muscovite-Russian occupation. In his earlier poems, such as "Kateryna," (the story of a Ukrainian maiden seduced and then abandoned by a Russian soldier), the Russians are little more than conventional tyrants, belonging to folklore rather than reality; it is not until after this visit to Ukraine that the intense note of personal bitterness becomes so apparent in Shevchenko's poetry.

This new bitterness towards the Russians awakened in the poet a new sympathy towards the Poles. He had always admired the Czechs, having a particular admiration for the Czech poet Jan Kollar, and the scholar Pavel Safarik, and had always felt great sympathy towards their struggle for national recognition and independence, but to the young Shevchenko, Poland had been the

traditional enemy of Ukraine, and although, during his stay in Warsaw, the patriotic Dunia Haszowska had tried to interest him in the Polish cause, it was not until this new wave of hatred for the Muscovite oppressor was awakened by his visit to Ukraine, that Shevchenko began to think of the Poles as fellow-sufferers under the same tyranny. As a result of this new sympathy for the West Slavs, he prepared an edition of his poems in the Latin script. This edition appeared in print in 1844, and contained illustrations by two artists. One of these, Bashilov, is relatively obscure, but the other has a name we shall remember—Count Jakiv de Balmen.

This Jakiv, whom Shevchenko calls "My friend, my one friend" was an officer in the Russian army—the normal profession for a man of his rank. Like Shevchenko, he was devoted to the cause of Ukraine, and of all oppressed nations. However, shortly after the publication of this Latin-script anthology, Count Jakiv was posted to the Caucasus, to fight for the Russian cause, against the Caucasian tribes who were struggling to retain their independence against the "civilizing" forces of the Russians. It was in memory of Jakiv, and in horror that his friend had been forced to die for the wrong side, that Shevchenko wrote "The Caucasus."

Such, then, is the background of the poem. However political and personal emotion are not enough to make a poem great—sincerity is necessary but not sufficient to create a work of art. We may admit, with Dr. Gustav Sprecht,\*) that Shevchenko became a symbol of his country, in the manner of Homer and Virgil, of Dante, Rustaveli, Shakespeare, Goethe, but other men have become patriotic symbols without ever writing a line of verse. If the "Caucasus" is a great poem, it is a great poem on account of its artistic merits, and not on account of its personal or political content. Indeed, if it were not for the artistic merits of the poem, we might find ourselves bogged down in a mass of emotionalism, and while we might sympathize with Shevchenko's ideas, we would not find any great artistic merit in their expression.

However, this does not happen; "The Caucasus," is, in fact, a triumph of poetic art. In its varied patterns of rhyme and rhythm (the general pattern of which are reproduced in the present translation), Shevchenko has found a medium that will express both deep emotion and biting sarcasm, that unites flowing lyricism and bold colloquialism.

\* G. Sprecht, "Schewtschenkos Sonderstellung in der neueren Weltliteratur", in "Taras Schewtschenko, der Ukrainische Nationaldichter" Berlin, 1937.

It is worth digressing here to consider the metre of "The Caucasus," since Shevchenko's metres, are, in general, not well understood. From the traditional poetry of Ukraine, Shevchenko inherited two main types of prosody—that of the *Kolomyika* verse, which had lines of alternately eight and six syllables (a pattern which frequently occurs in this poem, e. g.

"For our soul shall never perish,  
Freedom knows no dying,  
Even Satan cannot harvest  
Fields where seas are lying,"

and that of the *Koliadka* verse which had lines of eleven or twelve syllables. Both these metres had considerable freedom of stress. Shevchenko enlarged this traditional pattern of rhythm by the introduction of iambic and anapaestic metres. In this poem, he uses a variety of these metric patterns, with great artistic effect—the sudden change to anapaests in the lament for Jakiv being particularly striking.

However, it is not as a tour-de-force of prosody, but rather as a structural triumph that the "Caucasus" is outstanding. Shevchenko has organized his material into three main themes, each related to the others and to the whole poem as the movements of a symphony are inter-related.

The first movement centres around the theme of everlasting suffering under oppression. To the poet, the Caucasus is the natural home of such suffering; here

"From the dawn of time, Prometheus  
Hangs, the eagle's victim."

It is not the suffering of the Caucasians, nor indeed, of the Ukrainians, that concern the poet now—his voice is the voice of suffering and oppressed humanity, crying out in anger to the God who, it seems, has transferred His allegiance to the banner of the oppressor; yet still defiant, still proud, and still, in spite of everything, hopeful. This is eternal suffering, in the face of eternal oppression. The repetition of the refrain

"Mountains beyond mountains,  
Crags in stormclouds cloaked,  
Wild heights sown with sorrow,  
Soil that blood has soaked"

suggests the passage of long ages, filled with oppression and misery, of which we see only a small part, though it stretches back to the

"dawn of time," and forward to the day that is only a hope, when at last,

"Liberty and right shall triumph."

Compared with these slow eternal patterns, the second movement is frighteningly modern. Now, our attention is focussed on one oppressor and one victim:—we see the Caucasian war, hear the insidious paternalism of the Russian propaganda. The poet now becomes a cynical commentator, tearing to shreds the Imperial benevolence, until finally their policy is revealed for what it is: a desire for world domination, that is willing to bend religion, civilization and even the basic human instinct to help the less fortunate, until they become catchphrases, and the tools of propaganda.

After the fire and clash of this second movement, the poet sinks back into a quiet lyricism. Again, he becomes identified with the suffering, but this time it is on a deeper and more personal level. He is mourning his friend Jakiv, forced to fight on the side of the oppressor, mourning for Ukraine, where even the graves of ancient heroes have been plundered, mourning for his own misery, and for the deeper servitude which remained, even after his technical emancipation from serfdom. Yet still there is hope. He calls on Jakiv,

"Come, living soul, come to dwell in Ukraine,"

and it seems that from that moment, the spirit of Jakiv is there, brooding over the last stanzas of the poem, dominating them, as the suffering Prometheus dominates the first movement, and as the poem moves to its last quiet phrases, Jakiv seems to become, not only the friend and protector of the poet, but a very symbol and incarnation of the spirit of hope and liberty.

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Taras Shevchenko

## THE CAUCASUS

(DEDICATED TO MY YAKIV DE BALMEN)

"Who will give water to my head, and a fountain of tears to my eyes?  
and I will weep day and night for the slain..."

*Jeremias ix. 1.*

Mountains beyond mountains,  
Crag in stormclouds cloaked,  
Wild heights sown with sorrow,  
Soil that blood has soaked.

From the dawn of time, Prometheus  
Hangs, the eagle's victim;  
All God's days, it pecks his ribs,  
Tears the heart within him.  
Tears, but cannot drink away  
The blood that throbs with life,  
Still it lives and lives again,  
And still once more he smiles.  
For our soul shall never perish,  
Freedom knows no dying,  
Even Satan cannot harvest  
Fields where seas are lying;  
Cannot bind the living spirit,  
Nor the living word,  
Cannot steal the sacred glory  
Of almighty God.

Not for us to stand against Thee,  
Not for us to judge Thy deed:  
For us our daily bread to knead,  
Well-mixed with blood and sweat and tears;  
The hangman's smile above us leers;  
Our drunken truth sleeps on—as dead!



When will she awake to action?  
 When, worn out with strife,  
 Lord, wilt Thou lie down to rest  
 And grant our people life?  
 Truly we believe Thy might  
 And Thy living Word:  
 Liberty and right shall triumph,  
 And to Thee, o Lord,  
 Every tongue shall offer praise  
 Through the length of days.  
 Meanwhile—rivers rise in flood,  
 Swollen streams of blood.

Mountains beyond mountains,  
 Crags in stormclouds cloaked,  
 Wild heights sown with sorrow,  
 Soil that blood has soaked.

"And there, Our Majesties surprised  
 (Naked and starving though it be)  
 A poor, but natural liberty.  
 The hunt is on!..."

Since then, the ground  
 It strewn with conscripts' scattered bones.  
 And tears? And blood?

Enough to drown  
 All emperors with all their sons.  
 And grand-sons eager for the throne  
 In widows' tears...

And maidens' tears  
 Shed secretly the whole night long?  
 What of the fiery tears of mothers?  
 The blood-stained tears of aged fathers?  
 Not rivers now—a sea full-flood,  
 A sea of fire...

Glory, Glory!  
 Glory to wolf-hounds, trappers, hunters,  
 And to the tsars, our "little fathers"

Glory!  
 And glory to you, dark blue mountains,  
 Frost and snow protect you,  
 And to you, great-hearted heroes,  
 God will not forget you.  
 Struggle on—and be triumphant!  
 God Himself will lead you;  
 At your side, fight truth and glory,  
 Right and holy freedom.

You'll be taught

So

In our domain

We take, you give;

And when you've given—  
straight off to heaven,  
And take the family if you like!

And as for us! What don't we know?  
There's stars to count, and corn to sow.  
We curse the French. And we can sell  
(They make fine stakes at cards as well)  
People—not negroes, our own kind,  
Just simple Christians, we don't mind.  
For we're not Dagoes! God forbid  
That we should deal in stolen goods,  
As Jew-boys do. We live "by law"! . . ."

By the apostolic law?  
Then you love your brethren?  
Hypocrites, with vipers' tongues,  
Rogues accursed by heaven!  
Yes, you love your brother's skin.  
Never mind his soul!  
Rob him "by law" when you need money,  
Cash to pay a daughter's dowry,  
Fine fur jackets for your bastard,  
Slippers for your wife,  
And expences you don't mention  
In your family life!

Why then, wast Thou crucified,  
Christ, Thou Son of God?  
Was it just for us good people,  
For the word of truth?  
So that we would mock Thee, maybe?  
That's the way it was!

Shrines and chapels, candelabra,  
Ikons, clouds of incense,  
Deep prostrations, never tiring,  
Honouring Thy Image.  
Grant us theft and war and murder,  
So that we may kill our brother,  
Behold, we offer gifts to Thee,  
Loot from a fire, fine tapestry!

"We are the enlightened! Now  
We bring the radiant sun,  
Reveal the blessed light of truth  
To sightless little ones.  
Come to us, and all you ought  
To know, will be made plain,  
Prison-building will be taught,  
How to forge your chains,

How to wear them, how the knout  
     Is plaited—we'll explain  
 All our science. Only yield  
     Your mountains to us please!  
 They alone defy us now;  
     We hold the plains and seas!"

And they drove you there, Yakiv, to die as a stranger,  
 My friend, my one friend—not for our Ukraina,  
 But for her hangman, they made you shed blood,  
 —Not black blood, but good; and you drank your reward  
 From a Muscovite chalice of Muscovite poison  
 My friend, my dear friend, in my thoughts unforgotten!  
 Come, living soul, come to dwell in Ukraine;  
 Fly across banks with the Cossacks, stand guard  
 By the robbed mounds of heroes, and wait in the plain,  
 Sharing the tears that the Cossacks are weeping,  
 Until I escape from this slavery and pain.

Meanwhile, I have seeds to scatter;  
     All my aching grief,  
 All my thoughts; God grant they blossom,  
     Speaking in the wind.  
 Peaceful winds from Ukraina,  
     Bearing dew, will carry  
 All my thoughts to you, dear brother,  
     Greeting them with sorrow,  
 You will read them to the end,  
     Recalling quietly  
 The heroes' graves, the plains, the hills,  
     The land you loved, and me.

Translated by Vera Rich.



Zenovia Mosichuk

## ***The Role of Women in the Liberation Struggle of the Ukrainian Nation***

From time to time, on pages of free world press, news are found about the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian nation for its freedom. On grounds of these insufficient and often incorrect sources of news, the reader of the free world is not able to grasp the true picture of the Ukrainian resistance movement uninterrupted for more than forty years, although it is carried out in the hardest circumstances by a nation which consists of a compact 45 million people on 900,000 square kilometres of rich soil in Eastern Europe surrounding the Black Sea. The international political situation seems to be unfavourable for Ukrainians. This is one of the reasons why the press doomed the events happening now in Ukraine to oblivion, although it dedicates much more space to the affairs of many smaller nations.

For this very reason, we, women of Ukraine, who were able to get a political asylum in the free world, take this opportunity to describe the unbearable situation that our people live in, enslaved, though in their own land,—and their struggle for freedom. Another reason for our wish to let you know about this struggle is that women play an important part in it.

More than 70 years ago (in 1884) first women's associations were established as an organized form of emancipation movement. As their basic aim, members of these associations put a demand, to have equal citizens' rights with men, so that women would be able to participate in national struggle for the independence of Ukraine. This demand seemed so justified and purposeful that Ukrainians with their leaders of the day supported the cause. Ukrainian women won equal rights without experiencing opposition of their own community, an experience which women in other countries of the world had to overcome, and because of this fact Ukrainian women were able to take part in the struggle for liberation of Ukraine.

This was an epoch of preparation of the ideological basis of the Ukrainian liberation movement of recent years. Ukraine was then under two occupant forces: the greater, Eastern part with Ukrainian capital Kyiv was under Russian occupation, and Western part of the country with its main centre Lviv, under Austro-Hungarian occupation. With brutal political actions Russian Tsarism suppressed even the slightest sign of craving for political self-determination.

The greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, was sent to Siberia, on a warrant signed personally by Tsar Nicholas the First. In 1876 by a Tsarist decree Ukrainian books were not permitted to be published and even the singing of Ukrainian songs was banned.

Austria, on the other hand, an empire of the Western type, recognized cultural autonomy for Ukrainians. The Ukrainian territories under its occupation were covered with a network of Ukrainian grammar- and high-schools, cultural-educational, youth, women's, economical, farmers' and sportsmen's clubs. Thousands of people put their time and efforts into these clubs; women participated as much as men. As a result of their work Ukrainian cultural and economical levels were raised noticeably. In this part of Ukraine numerous poets and writers from the Eastern part (under Russian occupation) were able to publish their works. Among these were the works of Lesya Ukrainka.

This poetess, a genius in a sense, who mastered 11 languages, is considered a spiritual leader of the Ukrainian freedom movement. Because of her poor health (tuberculosis of the bones) which cut her life short in her forty-second year (1913) she was unable to participate in active struggle, but "a pen may be mightier than a sword". All her works contain a strong protest against political subjugation and an ardent call for freedom. Her works together with that of Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko put ideological basis for our struggle for liberation and independence. We hope that some day more of Lesya Ukrainka's writings will be translated and published, thus enriching the treasury of world's best literature.

Beside Lesya Ukrainka, there were a few other poetesses whose writings were not as talented as hers but were filled with the same love for their country and freedom. It is this boundless, active love, full of self-denial, that is characteristic of our freedom fighters.

Because of this kind of love, characteristic of mothers' hearts of all ages and countries, it is small wonder, that when a suitable situation arose to grasp a rifle in order to fight for freedom, amongst soldiers women were found too. Some of their names are: Olena Stepanivna, Hanna Dmyterko, Sofia Halechko. This suitable opportunity arose during the First World War. Revolution broke out in Russia. Austro-Hungary disintegrated. Then, on 22nd of January 1918, in Kyiv, Ukraine was proclaimed an independent nation. Ukrainian liberation movement developed into an armed resistance which continues even up to date. Reason for this is that Poland and Russia, who were always hostile to Ukraine and who are no allies themselves, in 1918, advanced from two sides, thus leaving almost no chance for Ukraine to strengthen its borders. The Ukrainian Army organised with haste and without thorough training but with soldiers filled with desire to defend their country, during three years was faced with enemies on three sides: "white" (Tsarist) Russians, "red" Russians and Poles. The Western Allies disorientated by slanted propaganda on the part of "white" Russians and Poland, did not support Ukrainians.

Our Army was hit by an epidemic of typhus. Bolsheviks were able to organize a "fifth column" from local communists. Our weakened army was not able to hold on, while Russians and Poles signed an agreement of peace in Riga (1920) and on this basis split Ukrainian territories among themselves. Taking most of this opportunity, Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania grabbed a piece of Ukrainian territory, too, south and east of Carpathian Mountains.

Soldiers had to put down their arms, but the people did not give up. On the Polish occupied territory a secret military organization (Ukrayins'ka Viys'kova Orhanizatsia—U.V.O.) was organized in 1920, headed by Colonel Eugene Konovalets. Its activity consisted mainly of keeping propaganda and national spirit among Ukrainian people alive and sabotaging Polish repression measures. At the highest point of its activity was the heroic death of a female member, 30-year old Olha Basarab, who was a member of the Chief Committee of U.V.O.

Arrested by the Polish police in 1924, she refused to give names or facts about U.V.O. Broken physically by tortures but not in spirit she died in a few days. The death of this woman filled all Ukrainians with hate and disgust towards the executioners. Her death had a greater effect on the whole nation than volumes of books and brochures. It raised the curtain unveiling the barbarous, inhuman, immoral means used by the occupant in order to suppress the desire of Ukrainian nation for freedom.

On Olha Basarab's death, words said by a great historian of the French Revolution, came true: "Government which sentences women to death, sentences itself to death". Her death moved people to a greater understanding for freedom fighters. Idealistically-minded youth followed her example in great numbers. One of the principle of U.V.O.: "Neither tortures nor death will force you to betray secrets of the Organization", which this woman held to, penetrated the blood of Ukrainian freedom fighters up to this date, who guard this principle with their own lives. This is the secret of our freedom fighting movement, which is based on the steadfastness and calmness of its members and so was able to withstand an overwhelming majority of the enemy. Today it is impossible to list names of all heroines and heroes who rather accepted death by means of tortures than betray their friends and ideals.

At this same time in Eastern Ukraine (occupied by Russians) in the five-men Committee of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (S.V.U.) there was a woman Ludmyla Starytska-Cherniakhivska. She was a well-known author and translator, daughter of the famous dramatist M. Starytsky, wife of a university professor and cousin of the great Lesya Ukrainka. On behalf of S.V.U. she led antibolshevik resistance in the circles of Ukrainian writers and intellectuals. After five years of S.V.U. existence, Bolsheviks uncovered it and in 1930 staged an open trial (in Kharkiv) of 45 of its most important members. During this trial the sixty year old Mrs. Cherniakhivska was looked up to in awe and with respect for the way she carried herself. Without the least care for herself she pointed out all false Bolshevik lies, who claimed to be the real liberators of all those affected by injustice, of all enslaved ones, but—they treated the country that they occupied now in that very same way. In order to break Mrs. Cherniakhivska, Russians used another of their skilled tricks. They notified her only daughter, who then lived with her husband in Paris, that she would be permitted to see her mother. Feeling safe (being safe-guarded by an international passport) she came. When she arrived for the arranged visit, the G.P.U. (later known as N.K.V.D.) gave her mother an ultimatum: either she would "confess" during the trial, or her daughter

would be prosecuted. The poor mother stood fast. She was sentenced to 8 years of hard labour while her daughter lost her mind in prison and died.

Then, in Western Ukraine, U.V.O. was reorganized and renamed to O.U.N. (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). Its aims and leaders did not change, only the ideological and political basis was broadened and the strategy of actions enlarged. In this association women enlarged their activity, carrying out responsibilities on all levels, including the Chief Committee. Although O.U.N. was illegal during Polish occupation, it grew to such an extent that it became and still is the leading body in Ukrainian freedom fighting movement. Ukrainian youth from all levels became followers of O.U.N. wishing to become members of the organization.

The significance of women in O.U.N. was great. Without their help much of what was achieved would not have been. Women worked as couriers and messengers, they carried code letters and messages which could have never been sent by mail. They transported banned Ukrainian political literature, kept it in hiding places, helped in publishing Ukrainian newspapers and brochures. They worked as information sources, they defended members of O.U.N. when Polish police were searching for them, they organized aid for families of imprisoned members, took care of political prisoners, collected money for parcels for them, and for paying their lawyers' bills.

This work, full of sacrifice led to an unforgettable event. All the work was carried out with conspiracy, great sacrifice and modesty. In Warsaw in 1936 there was a big trial of members of OUN for killing Minister of the Interior Affairs of Poland Pieracki. OUN sentenced him to death, because the minister of a country that called itself democratic and which was shouting about its thousands years old culture, did not hesitate to carry out principle of collective responsibility of Ukrainians, and gave an order to the Polish police and army for mass punitive expeditions against Ukrainians in 1930 known in the outside world as "Pacification of Galicia" (Western province of Ukraine). One of the accused was Stepan Bandera, head of OUN. It was then, that his name was first heard as belonging to a person with qualities of a great leader and an unyielding fighter. At this same time two female university students which were also arrested received warm sympathy from people: Daria Hnatkiwska and Katria Zarytska. Their personalities, bravery, idealism and modesty captured the hearts of not only all Ukrainian people but also the Poles who opposed the movement. So far, Polish press always presented the movement as being without any ideological background, only a rebellion of untamed, uncultured people from the lowest classes. Appearance of these two girls with great personal culture and intelligence made the Poles keep quiet about the "rebellious brutes" and made the unprejudiced Poles change their outlook about the freedom-fighting movement. Although a great percentage of OUN members came from villages and the ranks of working men, they were not the "lowest level", because they were people with high ideals. Membership in OUN was not easily attained. Only people with very high moral standards were accepted. To conclude about the Warsaw Trial,—although the accused were all sentenced, the trial itself brought great moral triumph for OUN.



In 1939 on the grounds of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, Western territories of Ukraine were also taken by Russians. Then, too, Ukrainians did not give up, although it was clear that the struggle with Bolsheviks would be much worse than with Poles. Right from the beginning, the Russians organized a regime full of terror in order to frighten the freedom-fighting movement and thus to break the spirit of resistance and the will of Ukrainians for independence. Arrests and exiles to Siberia went under way. OUN felt this action mostly. In NKVD's prisons unbelievable torture methods were applied to people who were only suspected of any relation to OUN. Although these tortures broke peoples' health and took many lives, they never broke their morale. Members of OUN and other Ukrainians who were brought up on the example of Olha Basarab's life were spiritually prepared and were able to hold out.

In Lviv, on January 1941, there was another trial, now of 59 members of the movement. It was the only trial where private lawyers were permitted. Families and public were not admitted. From all 59 young men and women only one broke down. Some of the accused had not even recovered from the tortures received. Some were even unable to walk well, because their joints were twisted or their muscles were torn out. All girls ranged between the age of 16 to 24. Although most received death sentences, all carried themselves calmly and confidently. Afterwards, only for some, sentences were changed to 15 years of hard labour.

In June 1941 under German pressure Russians left Ukraine in a panic. Then, before the eyes of shocked people most unimaginable sights were unveiled: cells and prison yards in all cities and towns full of corpses of political prisoners, men and women. Some had signs of tortures, some were burned, some were cemented alive in closed cells. These sights are impossible to relate in detail.

Deep mourning for national heroes did not paralyze the will of people for freedom. On the 30th of June 1941, Act of Renewal of Ukraine's Independence was proclaimed. Ukrainians hoped that Germans would support them or at least respect their freedom, but it turned out to be otherwise. German Gestapo arrested members of the Chief Committee of OUN and sent them to concentration camps. So, without having a moment for a little break, Ukraine had to carry on its fight, now with another enemy. At first, the old methods were applied, and this fight was no easier than that against the Russians. Again, more thousands of heroes died, some of them well-known. Among them was a poetess and an editor of a literature and art magazine in Kyiv—Olena Teliha. This young, charming woman was loved and respected by all Ukrainians. She died at Nazis' hands, as well as two other well-known girls, who during the Russian occupation were sentenced to death in the trial of 59, and later were pardoned and by some miracle rescued from Berdychiv prison in 1941. One of them was a twenty-one year old Natalka Vynnykiv, shot in Kyiv in 1942, and the other, twenty-six year old Halyna Stolar, killed in prison in Berlin, in 1943. During the short time of German occupation thousands and thousands of Ukrainian women were killed, young and old, often expectant mothers and mothers of numerous children. Thousands were also taken by force for hard labour to Germany.

In 1942, OUN changed into an open way its form of fighting by organizing Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins'ka Povstancha Armiya—UPA). Women joined as doctors, nurses, medical assistants, messengers, couriers, scouts, instructors, co-workers, technical personnel of publishing and radio-station. At the same time they were all soldiers. Together with men they fought in unimaginably hard situations of underground struggle against two world powers: Hitler's Germany and since then and up to now—Red Russia.

From time to time, some news reach us via secret channels about the heroic struggle of women, members of UPA. For example, a young wife of a member of Chief Committee of OUN, Anka Arsenych, when surrounded in an underground hideout by the Russians fought till the last, and then had to blow herself and her husband up with the last hand-grenade. That was just one example of many. And how many women who were not in UPA Army show full heroic sacrifice by helping the Insurgent Army with food, clothing, medicines, by hiding them in special hideouts, by taking care of their wounded, by warning them against enemy... Thousands and thousands of them fell into the hands of NKVD and today populate the numerous camps in Siberia. But even there, they continue their struggle until their last breath. A Hungarian, who returned from Siberia, Dr. Farkesi, brought information about heroic death of 500 Ukrainian women prisoners in a concentration camp in Kingiri (Kazakhstan). By joining hands, they barred the way to Soviet tanks during a big prisoners' strike. Needless to mention, all were massacred by these tanks.

In July 1954, Ukrainian Congress Committee in U.S.A. made known to the American press two letters received from Ukrainian prisoners in Siberia. One of them was addressed to the United Nations. In it prisoners related the unbearable way of life in "Soviet slave camps of death" and demanded from the Committee for Defense of Human Rights an investigation and intervention on their behalf. This letter was signed by 8 men and 5 women group leaders. For eight men, there are five women! This proportion clearly conveys the part taken by Ukrainian women in the struggle for freedom. What is the reason for this? Do Ukrainian women have special rebellious or war instincts and tendencies? Not at all!

As we already mentioned, the main reason is the deep, unbounded love of their own country and a strong desire to achieve freedom, even if it is for the price of one's own life. It is woman, who feels mostly and suffers mostly from the results of national enslavement and totalitarian despotism. By killing, aggressors deprive women of their sons and daughters, wives of their husbands, children of their parents. For an example we will take the wife of the heroic leader, General of UPA—Taras Chuprynka-Shukhevych, Mrs. Natalka Shukhevych. In 1944 she did not emigrate, only stayed beside her husband. In Ukraine marriages retain their sanctity and unbreakability of Christian Sacrament. The old Roman custom—"where you are Caius, I am Caia", is kept up in Ukraine too. So, the Soviets while not able to get the Chief of Staff of UPA poured out their hatred on his innocent family. His wife was arrested and two small children were sent to children's torture prison. And just how do NKVD's institutions for orphaned children look? Why such a penalty

for his wife and children? His wife's guilt lies in the matrimonial loyalty. In the whole cultured world it is the basis of family life, while for the barbaric Muscovites it is a crime! And just where is the guilt of small children?

In 1955 a Frenchman returning from Russian prisons related the tragic fate of Shukhevych's son in a Soviet concentration camp. The NKVD insisted that the 13 year old boy write an open letter to his father with a request to give himself up. The boy was threatened, but he held on, and the letter was never written. For this, for his loyalty to his father, he spends his days now in a prison, without proper clothing, without shoes, but with tuberculosis. As for Mrs. Shukhevych and the other child,—their fates became the fates of many thousands of Ukrainian women and their children.

It is much easier for a woman to be exposed to tortures herself rather than just stand by the sufferings of her loved ones. Ukrainian women participate in the struggle for independence, so that finally in Ukraine there would be peace, freedom and happiness for everyone again. This is the aim of the Ukrainian nation in the resistance and self-determination struggle.

Opposers of independence of Ukraine often used in ill will the fact, that freedom-fighters called themselves nationalists. They identified this movement with the vicious nazism. Russians were the first to do this, although they were quite capable of differentiating between freedom fighting nationalism of enslaved peoples and between nationalism of imperialistic nations. For their own propaganda purposes they support nationalistic struggle of the so called "colonial nations," while the struggle of people enslaved by them, they call fascism or nazism. But now, the rest of free world is beginning to see the difference.

The doctrine of nationalism is explained by Ukrainian freedom-fighting movement as the natural right of all peoples for their own national sovereignty on their own ethnographical territories. OUN leads its struggle under the slogan: "Freedom for all peoples, freedom for all individuals",—because only national and individual freedom gives an opportunity to keep dignity of an individual, who is the foundation for culture and civilization.

Individual and national enslavement lowers one's dignity. It is impossible for an honest, honourable person to be loyal to an aggressor's government, because this would make him an ally of the enemy, thus nullifying his regards for human worth. Only the weak in spirit fall into the net of terroristic scheming of the occupant, but then, they also fall in conflict with their own consciences, which torture them their whole lives. Only those, who have no moral standards, no honour, do it without any scruples, usually for the sake of a career. But a similar situation appears with people of the occupying nation; people with moral standards, who are forced to terrorize the freedom fighters, they feel the same tragedy of the lowering of their own esteem. Because of this, aggressors' governments try to shape young people's characters, by low morals, subdued feelings, into heartless, inconsiderate, robot-like slave drivers. So it was with Germany's "Hitler-Jugend" (Hitler's youth), and so it is now with Russian Comsomol Youth.

Imperialism and colonialism are remains of the last epoch. Their purposefulness is gone now. Present development of communication and science

enables even the most backward peoples to hasten their cultural progress. Speaking of Russian imperialism, what is its role in civilization and cultural progress? They are enslaving peoples of Europe and Asia, some of whom have a higher and older culture than their aggressors have now. Russians are covering up their own imperialism and colonialism with the slogan for international solidarity of the exploited workers' classes and the dictatorship of proletariat. Let us now consider, what is happening inside the Russian Empire. It is almost forty years since the Bolshevik Revolution. After the bloody massacre of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, and after their mass emigration behind the frontiers, only few of those classes were left. But even those are nearing their old age now. Youth and middle aged people today were brought up during the new regime. Where then, do millions of political prisoners come from, who spend years and years in prisons and concentration camps of the U.S.S.R.? At whom were Polish communists shooting, on Kremlin's orders, during the Poznan Revolt? At the people! Tsarist Russia sent thousands of people to Siberia, but Communist Russia sent millions upon millions. Can Moscow call this progress? Can dictatorship of the assumed proletariat be called progress? Does success of a type of government depend on the constant interchange of dictatorship by different classes? Does the bloodflowing socialistic revenge have to be the ideal of mankind?

In 1928 the Bolsheviks enforced the collectivization of farming, a move which was supposed to ensure the achievement of the highest standard of agriculture. In Ukraine alone 7 million men, women and children died, either in Siberia or by enforced famine. Stalin said then, that one should not store the eggs when one wants to eat omelette. More than a quarter of a century later the minister of agriculture of Russia Matskevich with staff arrived in USA in order to learn from American farmers (private ownership) the modern agricultural ways. For this "progress" millions of people paid with their lives for the sake of collectivization...

It is not for the sake of the working classes that Russians are fighting for, it is for the hegemony over the world. To achieve this they would not stop to choose the means: enforcement, terror, mass-killings, double-crossing, and lies.

It is against this, that Ukrainian people stood up to fight: not only to defend their right for national independence and freedom, but also for moral principles, which are the basis of the entire civilized world.

We, Ukrainian women, with great pride and joy note that among women of the free world there are more and more people who are aware, that politics must be based on laws of morality and fairness in internal as well as in external affairs of any nation. It is no small wonder that women play such an important role in the Committee for Individual and Human Rights at the U.N.

On the pages of the French press appeared a declaration by the wife of a known politician, calling for moral principles in politics. It is in the name of these principles that we are warning the women of the free world: The road of coexistence with those who murder millions of people in concentration camps—is a suicidal road. The free world has enough moral

power and technical means in order to oppose a clique of fugitives who grasped the power in Russian "Empire" and terrorized the rest.

We are warning the women of the "colonial nations," that one who keeps in colonial dependence by means of terror nations of Europe and Asia and promises liberation for you,—does this for his own purpose. You, who know what it means to have no freedom, have no right to be deaf to cries and tortures of millions of political prisoners in U.S.S.R.

In the name of the worldwide standards of morality and justice, we appeal to women of the whole free world to support with all your capacities the protest and the fair demands of Ukrainian political prisoners, which were stated in the letter to the United Nations.

Do not ease your conscience by the argument, that the case of Russian concentration camps and prisons is Russia's own internal business. If you will take the stand that Russia has the right to punish millions of people for their political ideals and striving for freedom, then by doing this you accept the right of communist parties in every country to do the same in their respective countries, if they should get to power.

Did you ever pause to think for what purpose do Russians use the unpaid, slavlike labour of millions of political prisoners? It is for the expansion of military production, atomic weapons, etc. Did you ever think of the position and the feelings of the political prisoners who fought for individual and national freedom, and now are forced to produce weapons, aimed against the free world, with their own hands?

They are protesting against this by risking their own lives, by sabotaging that work. They throw themselves under tanks, they CALL YOU FOR HELP!

WOMEN OF THE FREE WORLD, happy daughters, wives, and mothers! Will you remain cold and indifferent to cries of sentenced to death Ukrainian women?

Women—citizens of the free nations, will you remain cold and indifferent to the struggle for national independence and citizens' rights of Ukrainian and other enslaved by Moscow nations?

We call you to condemn the system of Russian concentration camps of forced labour as a disgrace of our age of culture and civilization.

We appeal to mothers of the free world to sentence morally the prosecutors of children of political prisoners and opposers of Russian totalitarian government, and to damn them, for the prosecutions of children and teenagers, as the HERODS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY!

WE APPEAL TO YOU TO GIVE YOUR MORAL SUPPORT TO THE VICTIMS OF THE COMMUNIST TERROR AND TO ALL THOSE WHO FIGHT THAT TERROR IN THE NAME OF FREEDOM, IN THE NAME OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE, IN THE NAME OF REAL HUMAN PROGRESS!

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Leonid Lyman

## The Tale of Kharkiw

### (Conclusion)

#### CHAPTER THREE

##### 1.

German planes penetrate the low clouds and soar over Tovarish Stalin Boulevard, over Svoboda Street and the small alley at the end of which is the "Donbas" restaurant, where Leonid now spends most of his time. Like an unwelcome apparition the planes fly, without objection or interference, on to the appointed raid.

Autumn hangs over the Socialist Donets Basin. For the most part, the days are cloudy; then, without beginning or end, the clouds move low, touching the high smokestacks of the factories.

Sometimes the planes pierce the beauty of a sunny autumn day and appear high over the city, like butterflies glittering in the azure sky.

The people gaze up at the sky like children, pleased to think that they are not afraid. "Photographing the vicinity," they say. Our future, it seems, is still in the far distance; indeed, we have always been fed with the future. At present, we cannot make a start; war, so it seems, is a horrible insecurity which brings constant nervousness and, thus, in this state of collective hysteria, no independent initiative is born. It will not be long before a slogan will come into being,—save yourselves as best as you can.

Our army is luring the Germans into the heart of the country.

Maria now has no permanent abode. In her last letter to Leonid, she warned him that she would send him a telegram, telling him to which city she was to be evacuated. But the tempo of war is so swift that it is impossible to orientate oneself; each day brings new surprises and complications. And, in the end, Maria and Leonid are suddenly cut off from one another completely.

In the square, a crowd has gathered in front of the loudspeaker. The position of Moscow's front has definitely become worse, for the enemy has received heavy reinforcements and has gained some victories. When the announcer begins to read out the "front news," the people disperse, frowning.

New propaganda posters bearing the words: "Comrades, remember that there are murderers, robbers and executioners in the ranks of the SS!"—appear on the shopwindows and walls in the city.

Everything about this young city is now old and final, and Leonid, if he does not get stuck somewhere, will most likely be the last to leave it. Perhaps it will soon be possible to curse the Soviet government openly.

One's eyes gradually become accustomed to the surroundings of Kramatorsk. Some sort of a decision must now be reached, however risky and dangerous

it may be. For it is impossible to sit here any longer and wait like an ox to be harnessed to the yoke. You cannot disguise yourself in this city; you feel as though you were sitting in the palm of someone's hand and every move you make is being watched. We should live in large cities,—be there when there is danger, for it will spur us on to heroism and will train us to be daring.

The vast Donbas plain stretches into eternity. And this rich black soil, like a human being, seems to feel human pain, too, especially when the German bombers roar in the clouds and the whole earth trembles; like a straw in the wind, Leonid feels that it wants to cast him off,—to fall somewhere and mortally hurt himself.

Fearfully, people inquire of Leonid which of the three roads leads to Mykhaylivka,—they are people in civilian attire,—seeking some sort of Mykhaylivka. "We are on our way to take up firing positions." So it is true, then, that the people are fighting,—are forced to fight. The entire country is fighting under the lash of the whip; the entire country is nothing but irony. Indeed, it is even more than irony,—a profound tragic fact. Give these people an opportunity to speak their inmost thoughts! Give them an opportunity to save themselves! Instead of whipping them as though they and not the party and government are to blame for defeat. You see, Comrade Stalin, the prosperity your leadership has brought! It isn't even right to resort to irony. It was all a lie: there isn't any socialist fatherland; in fact, there isn't even a good-for-nothing state; there isn't a nation, there isn't a people. There isn't anything which would make living easier!

The German planes swoop and soar behind the clouds and fly into the iron and cement heart of the Donbas. The people of the city gather the husks of the kolkhoz maize and carry them home, in bundles, on their backs, for this is now the only way of obtaining bread. The men who have been mobilized march along the roads in droves, like geese, their gas-masks slung over their shoulders. The population in this way is preparing for war. "A home war."

One must sympathize with these people even when they reach the limits of their patience and resort to crime; for they are exhausted beyond human endurance, hurt by life, and do not know who tricked them so cleverly.

Professor Ivanov was right when he said that human development does not run parallel with the calculations of the astronomical year. Sometimes, history repeats itself, and one is again reminded of a slogan of the former October days,—“Except chains, the proletariat has nothing else to lose”!

Bitterness is added to pain when, for a short time, the drone of the planes ceases and one still hears, in the distance, the chugging of the train to Balakleya. This is an autumn of memories, losses, hopes and disillusionment: A fortune-teller once told Leonid that if he did not perish at the age of twenty-two, he would live a long time, and he is now approaching his twenty-second birthday.

Nobody wants to go to war, but all are forced to go, for it is their “debt to the country.” On the fields, in the valleys, on the outskirts of the small towns, in the trenches—hundreds and thousands are dying. “Defense of

the Fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen." When the roar of the battle subsides and dusk falls, hundreds of city dwellers—all those proletarianized by force—go and rummage in the fields behind the line of battle, like carrion-crows, looking for corpses and pulling off their clothes and boots. "They no longer need these,"—they say and weep. "We will fight the enemy on his territory"—was the watchword of the Communists, but it has not been realized.

For two days now, Leonid and Valentine have been discussing what to do and where to go. Perish at the front for the eternally famished student life, for fear, for insult? No, we will no longer keep step with this kind of life, and in this anarchy they can no longer force us into this nonsensical struggle. They cannot impoverish all. They did not give us the right to disillusionment, to pessimism, to personal happiness. We were part of a huge barrier. And because the sword of proletarian justice still hangs over our head, we must be quiet. The Petrograd Bolsheviks shamefully fooled our unenlightened predecessors, but we shall be more careful. The main thing is to find a minimal possibility of struggle and to achieve a field of open combat.

Once again, Leonid and Valentine go into the centre of the city and enter the "Donbas" restaurant, with its "commercial prices," but now, for some reason, they are dissatisfied as they sit here.

The external tumult and confusion covers up the inevitable demise of the country. Most of the trains are now reserved solely for the transportation of war supplies, and travelling is only permitted with special passes. Indeed, only officials are allowed to travel. A chance neighbour at the table in the "Donbas" restaurant, at which Leonid and Valentine are seated, has twice been to Kharkiv,—there and back. He knows all the entrances and exits and advises them to take a joy-ride to Kharkiv as soon as possible, before the front line is set up here.

The two friends hurry to the depot. On the way there, Valentine drops in at a store to purchase something, whilst Leonid remains standing on the sidewalk. Through the window of the store, Valentine suddenly sees a cordon of policemen stopping men on the street and taking them off somewhere. Leonid, too, is amongst those who are led away. A cold chill passes down Valentine's spine. When the street is quiet once more, he comes out of the store and, looking round, like a chased dog, walks in the direction of the station and, passing through the ruins, reaches the platform. The loss of his friend has made Valentine depressed and has dispelled his last doubts as to what he should do,—cling to the horrid "motherland," or renounce it. There is only one solution,—to travel to Kharkiv and wait for Leonid there—if he succeeds in escaping. In Valentine's mind, queer and various suppositions arise as to his friend's fate.

## 2.

Valentine reaches Kharkiv without mishap. He has not been in the city for more than a year, and it now reminds him of a huge restaurant in which



a ball has just ended,—or, rather, a frenzied orgy which has finished up with complete chaos and confusion.

Here one feels the nearness of the front,—both during the day, when the cannon roar deafeningly, and during the night, when the lowering clouds shroud themselves with distant cascades of fire. Despair hangs over the city. The initiative is slowly being taken over by scoundrels. It is becoming dangerous to walk in the streets. And every normal expression of life is already regarded as irrelevant.

Valentine on his arrival in Kharkiv has gone about things in the way that he and Leonid agreed upon. Through various channels and through accidental conversation, he gets news of Maria and learns that she, too, is now in Kharkiv. And at his first meeting with her, he tells her at length of all that has happened since he last saw her.

Maria is standing in front of the venetian window and is holding the end of a transparent blue blind.

"Valentine, do you like twilight or brightness? Why do I ask? Because a strong light, so it seems to me, vitrifies a person and the atmosphere, too, and this creates a feeling of superficiality and officiality. Yes, I know, it may be a momentary illusion. You see, Valentine, such comic thoughts now come to my head that I am almost ashamed of them myself. I knew long ago that we should part. What? At least, don't be a propagandist now. I shall, of course, leave Kharkiv, but what of that? Everything is so confused at present that it is hopeless to try and sort things out in some order or other. What is more, Leonid is not likely to withdraw. There certainly is some sort of plot between you. And you, Comrade Valentine, are telling me an untruth."

Valentine assures Maria that the Germans attack spasmodically, and that Kharkiv is, therefore, safe for the time being. It will be a long time before it falls, for at the moment all is quiet on the front.

The street is crowded with tanks and Red Army soldiers.

"What do you think, Valentine, is this an attack or a retreat? Oh, how filthy they are..."

A man is putting up new propaganda posters on the walls of the buildings.

In addition to their regular army tasks, the Red soldiers have been given the extra duty of singing more. Songs increase the fighting spirit,—songs in service for the defence of the endangered fatherland. Soon, the military and civilian structures of Kharkiv will be on fire, and the cement bridges over the River Lopan will be destroyed.

Perhaps, under ordinary circumstances, Valentine would not give Maria such unconvincing arguments in order to calm her, but the present dramatic circumstances are forcing him to play the false optimist and adopt an unnatural pose.

"Comrade Valentine, if I remember rightly, we became acquainted during the meeting of the tenth-class pupils of Kharkiv with the students of your Institute. Isn't that so? It was a wonderful, free meeting. I remember that on that occasion I made many foolish remarks. Sometimes I uttered altogether pointless and impudent or insolent words and laughed for no reason, but at that time the atmosphere seemed suitable for such humour. But suddenly,

there was an attitude of indifference to everything. And just look how fooled we were with such horrible phrases as "enemies of the people," "enemies of humanity," "traitors to the fatherland."

For some reason, our country has so many traitors,—in fact, mostly traitors. War creates style, a style of life and, in particular, a political style.

A huge clock hangs in the window of the drug-store across the road and on its face, instead of numerals, there are the letters "Vladimir Ilyich." People are now saying that if Vladimir Ilyich Lenin were still alive, conditions would be much better. Indeed, they are saying all sorts of things at present.

Maria is gazing out of the window.

"Leonid might die. That sort of person is generally shot. Aren't you ashamed to utter such nonsense, Valentine? I was at the front the whole time and know only too well what sort of a fate awaits such people. What? "Against the wall!" I know you don't wish me ill, but don't jest with me. Your assurances do not calm my fears; on the contrary, they unnerve me."

Valentine tells her that Leonid adheres to the principle that in order to evade danger, it is wisest to remain in the dangerous spots; and, in any case, so he adds, Leonid has a considerable sum of money on his person.

"Come and sit here, Valentine,—here, next to me. Look at the comforts we have in this room,—but what use are they to me now? I am afraid of everything, and don't know how to save myself. I shall leave Kharkiv alone, because only the military are leaving the city. And you, Valentine? Are you going to remain in Kharkiv? In that case, take care of yourself. Beneath us is not a land with plains and beautiful buildings; before us is not earth, but a catafolque. My parents are probably greatly worried about me. The war will soon drive us to frenzied hysteria. If you are successful in getting out of Kharkiv, give my regards to Leonid. No, no, for some reason everything is so clear, and I seem to understand things in advance. What, in your opinion, Valentine, is romanticism?"

New explosions interrupt their conversation. And suddenly, the roar of planes is heard as they fly directly over the house-tops like streaks of lightning, casting shadows on the floor.

"Valentine, have you read the German leaflets?"

A dense cloud of smoke is visible in the distance.

"At the moment, one doesn't know whom to blame and with whom to be angry. When you left me yesterday, Valentine, I wept for a long time. But if you were to ask me the reason now, I shouldn't be able to explain. An individual is like a flower. It is part of this earth and should not be transplanted. As the time draws closer for me to leave this city, the pain increases and bitterness follows, especially when I suddenly find myself alone. Practically the whole of my life is connected with Kharkiv. And you no doubt realize what that means. Almost every person has his or her own peculiar whims, without which they are less attractive. Leonid and I used to go for walks in the streets of Kharkiv, late at night when the city was less crowded and silent. And on such occasions it is interesting to observe and listen to the personalities and echoes of the streets. But my mother is a Communist,—to be more correct, a born Communist, just as Leonid said.

I, however, was indifferent to this fact. There was many an opportunity for laughter, and I did not foresee any danger. But the whole time my mother was watching Leonid, and when we had to travel to Western Ukraine, though he fooled me, he considered this the best opportunity to rid himself of our Communist family. All this was happening in a state of mistrust. But when I actually left for Western Ukraine, we were still in touch with each other. Leonid and my mother belong to two different worlds, and since we did not have the personal courage to part, then let the war separate us."

Valentine goes to see Maria three times a day, and the rest of the time he prowls about the city alone, like a wolf on a forest trail. The streets are the best source of information. For some time now, he has been toying with the idea of asking Maria to remain in Kharkiv, and he certainly has many arguments in favour of this idea, but he does not dare broach the subject, especially not as Maria has obviously not thought of such a possibility. The student graduates have been discharged from the army and for this reason Valentine is in no danger of being taken away forcibly, as happened in the case of Leonid.

Rumour now has it that new mass-plundering has begun, and Valentine tells Maria that she must leave the city immediately. "Planned evacuation has commenced."

"But it is too late today,"—Maria replies.

In this country everything is planned, even when there are no plans. Valentine blames himself for not insisting earlier that Maria should leave Kharkiv.

"Beneath us is not earth, but a catafalque." How tragic this sounds. Twilight is far off, but the thick clouds which are hanging over the city create an illusion of evening.

Maria is at home and lying on the divan. She covers her face with her small hands and, then, memories come alive again, like errors committed: a quarrel with Leonid—a mistake; the excessive interference of her mother into her personal life—a mistake; the brutal severity of the party and government toward the people—a mistake; and it is also a mistake that she, at this moment, when the entire population is dying, is suffering and struggling without will-power and, like the pre-revolution city woman, is sitting waiting for good weather from the sea. She wonders vaguely what will happen next? The Soviet government will never be able to return. Indeed, it will hardly venture to return, for the Red Army, when retreating, burnt all the bread and grain, ruined whole industries, destroyed bridges and, what is more, mercilessly murdered all prisoners. Maria has heard so many of the wounded Red soldiers cursing the Soviet Government. In peace-time no one would dare to do so. But this is the grim and horrible reality of war: in the valleys, trenches and fields lie corpses—corpses—corpses; and people who look like future corpses. In the hospitals the nurses give the wounded Red soldiers newspapers and propaganda leaflets to read, but the men sadly ask "What do we need these for?"

This is the first time that Maria has ventured into the whirlpool of this turbulent life without her family. So far, her parents have always smoothed the path for her and she has never had to worry her head with decisions. But now her independence of her family may become fatal, for at the moment one cannot foresee from which direction the real, not the illusory, danger is likely to come. The thoughts of youth are always chaotic, and especially so at the moment. Somewhere, far away, her party mother is perhaps angry and perhaps grieving and regretting that she allowed Maria to go to Kharkiv alone.

Maria's thoughts wander on. Leonid is undoubtedly in danger or dead. He will never return. Perhaps he no longer wants to return. We shall never again walk through Shevchenko Park together late at night. It is very bitter to think that a person close to you does not understand you at all right to the end, especially when there is no longer any possibility of overcoming this superficial misunderstanding.

Archeologists excavating Pompeii found the preserved bodies of persons who were clasped in each other's embrace, for their end came so unexpectedly. As a rule, when life is so turbulent, the end comes unexpectedly. Future generations will know nothing at all about us. We shall not be preserved, but burnt by the lava of mass volcanoes: our fate—the steppes, which dislike embracing anything dead. New people will live here. They will laugh, and, likewise, holding hands, will stroll through the streets of the large cities in the evenings. They will not mourn us. They will be indifferent to the fact that we did not hold hands, but died individually in such pain.

Once again, Maria thinks of Leonid. With him beside me, war would not be so frightening. We should simply overlook the horrors. ("Besides, the right to live is the right to die.")

An old woman with two small children sits down at the corner of the street. Beside her, there are some cumbersome bundles. The children are putting sugar in their mouths in handfuls. The sugar has been heaped in a mound on the sidewalk. Angrily, the woman addresses the passers-by, who, however, hurry on and pay no attention to her. Perhaps her home has been destroyed and she has nowhere to go to. Perhaps one should take her and the two children in and give them shelter? But Maria is scared to go out into the street. Two boys are rolling a large barrel along the sidewalk. Further along the street, some more people are rolling barrels,—one, two, three. One of them is carrying a huge bundle. He is stopped, and bundle is pulled off his back and the contents looted.

Maria thinks—if only our people were not Communists,—if only our government were not Communist; then no one would attack us. Even nowadays, the villagers regard the word "Communist" as shameful and dishonourable.

Leonid simply has no conscience if, in such perilous time, he abandons a defenseless girl with whom he has so boldly declared himself ready to face life's eternal and painful losses.

Maria's thoughts wander on and she smiles slightly, but even this smile dies out of her face as speedily as it appears.

Circumstances, particularly such as these, influence conduct. If Leonid were here, we would open the window and sitting together we would gaze indifferently at night blazing in Kharkiv.

When this loathful life begins to crack so obviously and unmercifully, many desires of the future are inevitably born. Dreams are pleasant up to the point where they melt into reality,—then, they become bitter. To hope is to fool oneself and it is the greatest happiness, even though it is an illusory one.

But to come to the point,—who is this young man, Valentine? Can one depend on him? Only because he is a friend of Leonid,—and he would therefore not resort to despicable behaviour. In any case, he is not to blame for the fact that Maria has so far not left Kharkiv. It is true that he has told her she need not leave the city in a hurry, but how this time of waiting will end is not yet to be foreseen. Maria herself wants to delay the execution of the court's sentence, as it were. She wants to believe in beautiful and altogether unbelievable things. She believes in illusions. Everything can be achieved, provided that one has the necessary will-power.

Meanwhile, it has grown dark. There is an atmosphere of uneasy silence in Maria's room, which at intervals is lit up by the lights of passing military cars.

Valentine has arrived.

"Valentine, what is your idea of an irresponsible and frivolous person? Can it be that you have not the slightest experience of life? What? Why am I reproachful? Because you are trifling with a human life."

Maria was somewhat surprised that Valentine did not react to her reproaches:

"How do you manage to be so composed?"

Valentine was silent for a while. Then he said:

"Don't stand so close to the window, Maria. Yes, it is true, we don't react to reality in the same way today. I am composed because I have always felt at home in Kharkiv. Comrade Maria, are you listening? There is an endless, unrecognizable half-military column marching along the Bilhorod road,—the soldiers of the Red Army,—tired, dishevelled and dirty, but undaunted. I asked them what the chances were of getting out of Kharkiv. Maria, it is essential that you should get out of the city—at least thirty kilometres, and from there, I believe, you will be able to catch a train that will take you further away. Maria, will you let me send you away tomorrow? Good. But you must go tomorrow, for this is the last chance. Yes, there is only one chance of escape. It is dangerous for you to remain."

Powerful searchlights sweep across the sky, trying to spot German planes. Valentine helps Maria to pack the most essential things for her departure.

"Tell me something about yourself, Valentine," Maria begs. Later on, she adds: "Let us talk until morning. It would be a crime to sleep away such a turbulent night of war."

"No, Maria, it is best to leave the preserves here, to balance the suitcase. You think I have no experience of life, don't you. Let me tell you about an incident in my life,—but only on the understanding that tomorrow we part. As a student I was forced to "volunteer" for the Finnish front. The tiny

country of the Communist Tojvo Anjtikajnen had become our enemy. To begin with, they trained us for combat, and for the time being I was in the rear-guard section. On one occasion, we marched into a Finnish village in the front line. There was not a living being to be found there. The commander explained that the people evidently hid in the woods during military operations and might return now any minute. Well, we waited for them to return for three whole days, but no one appeared. Like primitive savages we walked through the empty rooms, looking at the beautiful furniture, illustrated journals, mirrors and vases,—everything so beautifully arranged and clean, that the commander got quite angry and said "There isn't even a spot where one can spit!" After we had spent a night in the rooms, however, they resembled a pigsty. We still went on waiting for the owners to return, but they never came. And the commander suddenly hit upon the idea of telling us that capitalists and landowners had lived here and that for this reason they had made off and would not return.

"We marched further inland and capitalists had apparently been living everywhere, for no one ever returned. In one house, to our surprise, we found an old woman. As swift and as unexpected as lightning, she killed our commander with a jack-knife. We felt that we were entirely unnecessary and undesirable in the country of Suomi, the country of the Communist Tojvo Anjtikajnen. I, too, might have died in Finland..."

Suddenly, Maria grabs hold of Valentine's hand:

"Oh, you mustn't do that. You will spoil the photos,—you will break the side of the suitcase. Look, I'll show you. See,—here we are with Leonid, after the rain, in front of the Hotel International. We always took pictures after the rain, because the drops of rain create an impression of light, life and elegance."

Valentine suddenly gives a start. "Why, Maria, you have diverted my attention so much that I have quite forgotten to tell you the most important piece of news. Leonid must be in Kharkiv! Just listen to this! As I was walking along, I suddenly heard someone say, "Hey, friend!" I turned round and caught sight of a familiar face in a car. It was only later that I recalled that he was a student from our Institute. I only knew him by sight. He told me that Leonid is searching for me in the city."

"Such things are only possible in books and movies,"—Maria interrupts.

"And also during a war," Valentine adds.

"Why are you angry, Maria? It is only in such a state of chaos that one can save oneself. In any case, he has a revolver, so the student said, which he took off a drunken soldier. They have organized a whole gang of students. Yes, I shouted out to him, but I am not sure whether he heard and whether he will see Leonid. The chauffeur grumbled and refused to stop. I ran after the car, but it disappeared round a corner."

As the glare of the searchlights shines into the room, Valentine gazes at the childlike-questioning expression on Maria's face. She is silent. Later, she says unexpectedly, probably from deep joy:

"Valentine, tell me some more about Finland. Why are you silent?"

Silence fills the room.

"Valentine, you will never make a good doctor. Why? I don't know why. Why have you told me this when you know that I am leaving for some unknown "dark corner" tomorrow?"

Finally, Maria begs him to tell her some more about Finland. He says that his mood has changed and that he does not care to relate any more of his experiences, but then continues all the same.

"They were strange and unforgettable impressions. They formulated people's knowledge more definitely than a hundred 'Short Courses of the History of the Communist Party.' Don't you see, Maria, that all the people have already hidden, like rats, to finally rid themselves of their "socialist fatherland;" they are even willing to throw themselves into the enemy's arms. A person of culture going to Finland as a conqueror, armed with a bayonet, must feel sullied from head to foot. The feeling of worthlessness acts fatally on me."

In a building nearby, someone starts playing a piano. Only the insane play at such a time. War increases the number of cripples and insane.

After a pause, Maria says:

"It might be well to tell my mother all this."

"Yes, tell her when you meet her again," answers Valentine.

Maria has already heard a great deal about the Finnish campaign, and there is now no point in arguing with Valentine.

It is already late, but sleep does not come.

"Listen, Valentine,—when I was in Western Ukraine, I met many interesting people there. They were under the impression that when we arrived we should be entirely different from the types we proved ourselves to be. Their constant idea is that what is Ukrainian is Ukrainian. Are you Ukrainian?—they asked me. I replied, yes,—but they laughed at me and retorted, you make a very poor Ukrainian. They said, come to us, we shall teach you national consciousness. But war broke out, and they saw us off with bullets. The whole world hates us; perhaps, it is because we have an unenlightened government; somehow, in our country, everything turns out to be primitive,—the proletariat took over the government too soon. I understand you, Valentine, and do not blame you."

Love is reality; and what is more, it needs reality. If love is deep, connected with trials and struggle,—a love for which one struggles ten or, maybe, twenty years, then it becomes an art. Love in a socialist country is linked up with the rubrics of "private or individual life." Everything personal must be placed at the service of generality. "Love creates miracles, friends"—said the propaganda representative at one time. Love is a matter of state importance, because a Communist cannot have a wife "with a dark past." Leonid—Maria—Valentine! He has the right to have a wife who stands by her to the last, like a knight. It is only necessary for a woman to extend her hand,—that's all. Love for the fortunate—is lightness.

Somehow Maria's mind has not yet grasped the fact that Leonid may be here, close by in our city, and she is hesitant to believe that this is true. But Valentine again interrupts her thoughts: "Maria, I think you feel cold?"

"You are a sportsman, Valentine. One need have no fears when with you."

## *The Art of Painting in Soviet Ukraine*

The article by V. Horodskoy, "The Autumn Exhibition" ("Literaturna Hazeta," Kyiv, December 2, 1958), gives—partly against the wish of the author—a very clear picture of the present standard of painting in Soviet Ukraine. Below, we quote some of the most important points of this article:

"The Autumn Exhibition of Works by Kyiv Artists" has been open in Kyiv for two weeks now. This is a creative report by masters of different generations on work performed in 1957 and 1958. Many artists are taking part, showing the best works...

Works of the oldest Ukrainian masters of the art of painting gladden the heart. The fine, lyrical landscapes of K. Trokhymenko, S. Yerzhivsky, and F. Konovaliuk show that their talents are not aging.

A. Atkayan's "Pasture in the Woods" and "Autumn Day" are masterpieces of beautiful colour and interesting composition. The colours in "The Street" by the well-known master S. Otroshchenko are beautiful. This is Kreshchatyk (the main thoroughfare of Kyiv) in the winter. One feels that the artist has put a lot of love for his native city into the small picture.

The talented work of P. Sulymenko "The Flood" is done in somewhat sharp tones, but it does not leave the viewer indifferent: this is indeed how the early spring flood looks in Kyiv...

It is surprising that our artists paint only in oil. There are very many different means for painting, but only one study by B. Boldyriev (and this is a fairly poor one) is done in water-colour; a few good portraits and genre drawings in gouache were done by S. Podereviansky. And that is all. In general, portraits and genre themes are poorly represented.

A few works do not save the show.

A deep human approach to woman's character is evident in a portrait by D. Shavykin. A bold and masterful drawing, and vivid manner of painting put this work among the better portrait canvases created by Ukrainian artists...

A sensation, and numerous arguments were aroused by the "Portrait of a Girl" by the painter who is always seeking something, V. Zaretsky. Many visitors thought that this beautiful young girl was an unfortunate "gang-moll," while others saw in her a student deep in thought. The picture is characteristic of our times. The arguments had a surprising ending: the board of directors ordered the "controversial" picture to be stored in a broom-closet. What a smart solution...

The exhibition showed about 100 works by 60 painters. A great majority of the landscapes, still-life, flowers, and several portraits carry standard inscriptions: girl with pig-tails, head of a girl, portrait of grand-mother...



One enters the exhibition hall from a noisy and busy street, with hundreds of passing cars, thousands of pedestrians, each with his current problems on his mind, important problems closely tied up with the life of the country. And suddenly, the sharp contrast of the hall. Obviously, there is art and feeling. But there is no breath of the present, no search for new and fresh themes which flow from life itself. Man of labour has not been shown, he has been avoided. And you ask yourself the unavoidable question: in what period were these works painted?

Writers and scholars, workers and engineers, they are all busy today, engaged in great titanic undertakings. The Soviet land is facing a new plunge into the future. Have the artists a right to stand by?

Participants in the exhibition are mostly people of the older generation, many are over 50 and 60... Where are the younger artists? Apart from V. Zaretsky, Y. Yachenko, L. Turovetsky and two or three more, we cannot name any. Does this not, to a certain extent, explain the absence of works depicting bold searching, struggle—pictures of heroes of our time?..."

In spite of the use of a few Bolshevik propaganda catchwords ("search for new and fresh themes which flow from life itself," etc.), the author is unable and does not want to conceal the fact that Soviet Ukrainian painting today (1) has no outstanding representatives of the younger generation, (2) as far as its themes are concerned, is extremely monotonous and similar (landscapes, stereotype impersonal portraits—and nothing more, not even a still life!), (3) is, even in its technique, characterized by a far-reaching "uniformity" (almost exclusively oil painting), and (4) is finally treated by ignorant Party bosses as ruthlessly as was the case under Stalin (the scandalous incident with regard to the controversial "Portrait of a Girl" by V. Zaretsky).

"In what period were these works painted?"—the author asks rhetorically. But it is quite clear,—under Bolshevik occupation, after Muscovite obscurantism had for forty years endeavoured—and, in fact, still ruthlessly continues to endeavour—to exterminate all living creativeness in Ukrainian art.

### ***Distribution of Ukrainian Books and Newspapers***

In an article entitled "To Improve Book Sales" ("Literaturna Hazeta," Kyiv, December 5, 1958), two well-known Ukrainian women-writers, Maria Pryhara and Natalia Zabyla, describe the gross mismanagement in the distribution of the Ukrainian press; the only thing with which one can reproach these two writers is that, for political motives, they describe what in reality was and is the intentionally achieved result of the Bolshevik Russification policy in Soviet Ukraine, as a regrettable "individual case":

"The question has been raised many times in newspapers and at literary meetings that there exist considerable shortcomings as regards books in the Ukrainian language.

Some officials working in book distribution who are unwilling to get the books to readers have invented a number of baseless reasons. They allege unashamedly that it is very hard for them to figure out the demand of readers for books, and that the demand is diminishing. Is it really so? Of course not. We meet with denials of this absurd allegation at every step. Most likely it is not a diminishing demand, but clumsy workers in book distribution who are unwilling to make the necessary effort.

We want to mention books for children. It is quite understandable that we Ukrainian writers of children's books are worried about this aspect of the matter.

We wish to begin with some figures.

There are over 30,000 schools in Ukraine, and out of that number 25,366 use Ukrainian as the language of instruction. Over 7 million children are enrolled in these schools. We know that every school has a large library. To this should be added another 1,157 state children's libraries in counties and cities, not to mention trade union and other libraries of a mixed type which have children's departments. In addition, there are nurseries. And how many more books do parents buy for their children for the home?

Thus, the quota of readers is not small. What is the explanation of diminishing orders for children's books which we are witnessing now? Let us look at the figures. Whereas in 1958 book distributing houses ordered, for example, 150,000 to 200,000 copies of a book for pre-school aged children, they are ordering only 18,000 to 40,000 for 1959. And matters are not desperate with books for pre-school children, because books for school-age children are being ordered in even smaller quantities: 9,000 to 12,000 copies. Simple arithmetic shows that only one-third of the schools will be able to get these books. Even books of favourite subjects with children, adventure and science-fiction stories are being ordered in quantities 6 and 7 times smaller.

What is the reason? Is there really a smaller demand for Ukrainian books for children? Or are they lying on library and book-store shelves?

This is what librarians from Kyiv and Chernihiv provinces said, meeting recently at a conference in Kyiv:

"We have a shortage of books in the Ukrainian language—said the librarian from Myronivka, Kyiv province.—We are accused of failing to supplement the library with Ukrainian books. But what can we do, if the suppliers say in response to our requests that such books are not available?"

The same complaint was made by the librarian from Ichnia, Chernihiv province:

"Very few Ukrainian books are being sent from the warehouses, in spite of a great demand for them. If there are any such books in the warehouse, they never lie around, but are bought faster."

Comrade Selivanova, director of acquisitions of the Boychenko district, said the works of O. Honchar are available only in Russian. In the village of Koriukivka, Chernihiv province, there is a literary analysis of the works of M. Lermontov in Ukrainian, but a similar book about O. Honchar is only in Russian.

"Ukrainian books don't stay on shelves, they are all circulating," added an employee of the Oster district library, "there is a particular shortage of books for pupils of the first through third grades."

"The situation is discouraging"—said the librarian from Skvyra, Kyiv province, "we have nothing for the circulation department because there are not enough Ukrainian books even for reading in the library."

We have quoted these examples from only two Ukrainian provinces, but things are probably no better in others.

The sudden drop in editions cannot be justified..."

## The Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia

The lively activity of the Ukrainian emigrants on this side of the Iron Curtain and their achievements in the field of national culture are forcing the Soviet Russian occupant to mention various questions, to publish certain articles and works and to allow certain problems to be discussed which he would prefer to conceal completely from the Ukrainian people; for a separate and individual field of Ukrainian research and learning, of Ukrainian art and Ukrainian literature, may also lead to the political independence of the Ukrainian nation. The creative activity of the Ukrainian cultural elite in exile is nevertheless evoking certain reactions in the Bolshevik camp; the questions which are raised by these emigrants must be answered in some way or other by the Bolsheviks, and though the latter's answers are nothing but lies and propagandist tricks, they nevertheless show up the Russification experiments in Soviet Ukraine in a most unfavourable light.

A few examples suffice to illustrate this fact: the publication by emigrant circles of O. Povstenko's monograph on St. Sophia's Cathedral in Kyiv and V. Sichynsky's History of Ukrainian

Architecture have prompted the Bolshevik occupants to print a compiled "Survey of the History of Architecture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic"; and the further publication of the "Encyclopedia of Ukraine" ("Entsyklopediya Ukrayinoznavstva") compiled by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Sarcelles (near Paris) has now evoked a decision on the part of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to publish a "Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia" in 16 volumes; the official motives of the Party and the government for this step are explained by I. Pidoplichko, a vice-editor of the entire undertaking, in the periodical "Soviet Education" ("Radyans'ka Osvita," 1958, No. 37). In this article it is affirmed that the first volume of the said encyclopedia will appear in 1959 and a further five volumes every year; every volume is to contain about 600 pages of text and 400 illustrations, as well as 40 pictorial supplements, half of which are to be maps and illustrations in colour; the total number of articles is to amount to about 70,000.

At the same time, the above-mentioned article also reveals the intentions of the actual managers of this undertaking: "Particularly thorough articles are to be devoted to the principal questions of Marxist-Leninist science and learning, as well as to the most important theoretical problems of science and technics, to the exposure of manifestations of bourgeois ideology, revisionism and, *above all, bourgeois nationalism*... In the "Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia" an appropriate space will be devoted to information about the history of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, of the Communist Party in Ukraine... as well as in other countries of the world. A good deal of space will be devoted to the superior people of Ukraine—to the workers of the Communist Party, of the Soviet State and of the Soviet Army... in addition, detailed information will be given on the achievements of the Ukrainian people in the system of socialist construction... on the *brotherly union with*

*the Russian people* and with all the peoples of our fatherland, on the common fight against tsarism and foreign invaders, and on the entire and manysided history of Ukraine, which for many years was falsified and distorted by the *bourgeois nationalists* and other forgers of history"\*).

It is thus obvious that the purpose of the "Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia" is something quite different from the purpose of a normal encyclopedia; it is merely to be a textbook for Bolshevik propaganda and for combatting the powerful ideology and philosophy of Ukrainian nationalism, which is asserting itself in every sphere of Ukrainian national life and which cannot be crushed and defeated either by the Soviet Russian terrorist regime or by the propagandist lies of those who are the actual forgers of Ukrainian history.

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\*) The italics are ours

## THE BOLSHEVIST "REFORM" OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Without wishing to anticipate the general assessment of the educational reform in the U.S.S.R. which, so it has been announced, is to be introduced in 1959, we are, nevertheless, already in a position to visualize clearly, on the strength of a detailed article by H. Yefymenko, the Deputy Minister of Higher Education of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the effect which this reform will have on Soviet Ukrainian higher education. This article, published under the title "The Most Important Stage in the Development of Institutions of Higher Education" (in the Kyiv daily, "Radians'ka Ukrayina," November 20, 1958), naturally begins with the usual Bolshevik boasting:

"Ukraine, like the rest of the Soviet Union, has reached a high level in preparing specialists with a higher and secondary education, and has surpassed the capitalist countries in this respect long ago. In the Ukrainian SSR students enrolled in institutions of higher education constitute 0.8 per cent of the entire population, while the corresponding figure in England is 0.44 per cent, in France 0.35 per cent, and in Italy 0.48 per cent. During the present academic year, the 140 establishments of higher education in the

Republic have an enrolment of 400,000 students, of whom 184,000 are studying without giving up their jobs in industry."

So that is how matters lie! The number of students in Soviet Ukraine is about twice as high as in the "capitalist" countries of Western Europe for the simple reason that about half of them are studying and, *at the same time*, are also employed in Soviet state industry; they thus bear a double burden, but, on the other hand, do not cost the "socialist" state anything at all. The fact that such constant overburdening of 46 per cent of the total number of Soviet Ukrainian students may, and, indeed, is bound to, impair their health most seriously, and, secondly, that the "socialist" state in this way every year loses thousands of future specialists, who, owing to overburdening and its consequences, are obliged to give up their studies, appears to be entirely immaterial. In reality, however, it is by no means immaterial,—on the contrary, it is most desirable, and the Bolshevik regime sees to it that this double burden on the students remains a fixed rule, as indeed the above-mentioned article shows:

"As justly indicated in the theses of the CC CPSU and of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, we can no longer rest satisfied with the present set-up and system of higher education. Life demands reorganization of our schools of higher education, and continued improvement of their work... Reduced to general terms, the propositions stipulate that institutions of higher education should accept first of all young people who are working in industry, or, as stated in the theses, development of higher education should proceed primarily along the line of evening and correspondence education. Students should be enrolled in institutions of higher education as a result of competitive examinations, preference being given to those who hold a higher production position and work in a specialty which can be studied. Students enrolled in professional courses should work in their chosen profession in industry or enterprises for two years, such plants being part of educational institutions. Positions in factories and plants allotted to colleges should always be filled with students. Working in production, students should study in evening or correspondence classes."

Thus, what is regarded in the so-called capitalist countries as a regrettable fact,—namely, that a certain percentage of the students are obliged to study and earn their living at the same time, is a fixed rule in the "socialist" state and, indeed, is not just recommended for the first two years of their studies, but is definitely demanded as compulsory. To quote the above-mentioned article in this respect:

"During the first two terms, students will acquire the necessary working habits and information which will approximate the present first-year requirements—they will have gone through indispensable experience. After that, only in the third year, students will switch to studies detached from production. The program for the first two years should be identical for professional, evening, and correspondence courses. Then we shall be able to enrol students in courses away from jobs, both evening and correspondence school students, and professional students who have not made the grade in enterprises or for some other reasons cannot continue full-time, should be transferred to

evening or correspondence courses. They will activate both study and production work students, and provide an opportunity to select for full-time study such young people who have proven themselves on jobs and in studies, and have been hardened by life."

Not so much hardened by life, but, rather, by the Soviet system of exploitation, which imposes two years of statute-labour on anyone who wants to study—only allowing them to study as a recreation—and describes this measure as "acquiring of the necessary working habits and information." So much for this hypocritical phraseology! It is true that this method of compelling students to work in industry for two years certainly makes it easier for the Bolsheviks to carry out the political selection of future engineers and technicians which they consider so important; but the Soviet regime has plenty of other methods of selection, and the main purpose of the entire "reform" must be sought elsewhere. But let us now see what the above-mentioned article has to say on the subject:

In the third and fourth years we should teach the most complex general theoretical and special subjects. In the fifth year students should be sent for one year's industrial apprenticeship as junior engineers occupying technical positions, with continued evening studies. The sixth year of instruction will be set aside for the study of specialized subjects, and execution and defense of a diploma project or thesis. The increase of studies by one year is justified because this will make the class of graduates of institutions more mature persons."

This is again typically Bolshevik hypocrisy: for the extension of a high school course by one year has, naturally, nothing whatever to do with personal maturity of character; and the disadvantages for the state which arise out of a prolongation of the full technical training by 20 per cent of the whole time, are so obvious that Deputy Minister H. Yefymenko does not venture to mention them at all, except perhaps to minimize them. But he now comes to the actual and ultimate aim:

"Under this system, there is no curtailment of time allotted to theoretical studies, and the time of a student on a job is increased from 4-6 months to three years."

Yes, that is, indeed, the main point: the entire training is slowed down by 20 per cent of the whole time, but technical performance, on the other hand, is increased by 500 per cent,—and this is worth-while. And the state, incidentally, does not need to spend a penny more for this additional exploitation,—quite the contrary, in fact:

"It is also important that under the proposed system of instruction the expense of the state of educating specialists will be reduced by approximately 20-25 per cent, since students will receive state scholarships for three years instead of five, and for the remaining three years they will receive wages in their place of employment."

Unfortunately, no mention is made of whether this system is also to be applied to non-technical specialized training; namely, whether a future doctor, for instance, will have to begin his "studies" by working as an ambulance-man and increasing his medical knowledge in the meantime by

means of evening or correspondence courses. Theoretically this would be feasible, but probably not very profitable: Soviet industry needs a lot of trained workers, but there is little demand for ambulance-men; and, in any case, profitableness is always a most important point in the eyes of the "socialist" state.

Incidentally, a plan of this kind would be regarded in every country of the free West as sheer nonsense and as a drastic means to deter young people from taking up technical studies,—not so much those who are less brilliant, but, rather, those who are less robust, who are simply not able physically to endure the hardships of two years' double overburdening; for the so-called "industrial students" in the West usually work in their spare time, but the Soviet "industrial students," on the other hand, are obliged to work professionally full-time and are only allowed to study in their spare time,—which is a vast difference. In a "capitalist" country a reform in higher education like the Bolshevik "reform" would certainly act as a deterrent, since the trade unions and other workers' organizations there (and partly, too, the state) more or less guarantee the trained worker the possibility to maintain a worthy standard of life without any further technical training; under the Bolshevik regime, however, a higher specialized training offers the only possibility to escape material need to a certain extent, without having to become a Party member; thus, Soviet students, for the sake of their specialized studies, will be obliged to put up with all kinds of statute-labour and unpleasantness.<sup>1)</sup>

In the long run, however, the Bolshevik "reform" in higher education is an enormous waste (and demoralization through unskilled and physical labour) of the best intellectual forces of youth which are ruthlessly exploited by Soviet state capitalism; and this will make itself felt to a very grave degree for years in the future.

As yet it cannot be foreseen whether the said "reform" will be applied to higher education in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) and to that in the so-called "national" (non-Russian) Soviet republics in the same way; it is not out of the question that there may be a *formal* adjustment and equalization, but it is fairly certain that, if this should be the case, the non-Russian higher educational institutions will always be at a disadvantage as compared to the Russian ones, since both their organization and also their contact with the corresponding industrial concerns is of a far more primitive standard (to be correct, is intentionally kept at a lower standard) than is the case in the Russian higher educational institutions. The numerous higher institutions, which, it is true, exist in the territory of the "national" Soviet republics, but are, however, directly under the control of Moscow's central departments, are, of course, an exception; they will, naturally, be allowed to retain their privileges. Which is another step towards the Russification of the non-Russian students in the U.S.S.R.!

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<sup>1)</sup> It is interesting to note that the author of the same article jubilantly affirms that in Soviet Ukraine, in any case, "the extent of correspondence and evening education has increased in recent years considerably, the 1953 figures have been doubled, by 1965 the figure is expected to double again."

Petro Kizko

## A War Psychosis

### The War-Theme in the Literature of Soviet Ukraine\*)

That Moscow's Bolshevik propaganda of the "fight for peace" is merely a piece of bluffing, is proved in a particularly striking way by the fact that the Bolshevik ruling clique is doing its utmost to prepare the masses in the Soviet Union—and also in the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic—for another war. It is consistently affirmed that the victors in the First World war were the Soviets, that the Second World war was, in the first place, a victory for the Soviets and not by any means for the Western Allies, that the U.S.S.R. as far as military strength is concerned is the strongest state in the world, and that the Soviets will remain the victors in the event of another war: such is the war propaganda, which is not only disseminated en masse in Soviet journalism, but also in Soviet literature,—and, naturally, in the works of the Soviet Ukrainian writers of the post-war era, too.

Thus, the fairly well-known Soviet Ukrainian belletrist, Natan Rybak, has published his latest novel "Against The Flashes" ("Blyskavkam nazustrich"), which can be regarded as a model example of Bolshevik war propaganda, in the Kyiv literary periodical "The Fatherland" ("Vitchyzna," of January-February, 1958). Just as all the themes of the Soviet war-prose consist of two main parts,—namely, an account of the obligatory victorious fight of the Soviet troops and an account of the triumphal reception they are given by the population, so, too, Rybak's novel shows two distinct tendencies: in the first place, the victory over the Nazi occupants of Ukraine is supposed to have been won jointly by Ukrainian and Russian soldiers of the Red Army, fighting side by side; and, in the second place, the German population is supposed to have received the Soviets with the greatest admiration and respect since they were worthy victors. The effect of all this is sometimes most comical; for instance, the German Professor Rumler presents a soldier of the Red Army, Nerchyn, with a copy of his scientific work, in which he has written the following dedication: "Humanity was always the banner of true science, and this banner was borne most frequently by Russian science."

Another very characteristic work is the "Tragedy in Three Acts" by Stepan Snihur, "Flaming Hearts" which was published in the Lviv (Lemberg) literary journal "October" ("Zhovten'," of March, 1958). This work depicts the underground fight of the Young Communists (Komsomoltsi) against the German and Roumanian occupants in Bukovina (that part of West Ukraine which was occupied by Roumania from 1918-1940); naturally, the Young Communists fight and die like heroes, and the author's intention—namely, to fill the Young Communists with enthusiasm for war, is perfectly obvious.



Of course, it goes without saying that in all the literary works with a war-theme the Ukrainian national (anti-Bolshevist) fighters are always portrayed as "traitors to their country and their people," and that the fact that they waged a determined fight on two fronts—against the German Nazi and against the Russian occupants, is intentionally ignored; what is even more noticeable, however, is the consistent way in which the Western Allies are calumniated,—above all, the Americans, who are usually portrayed as "false friends" and "capitalistic imperialists." In this respect, too, the above-mentioned novel by N. Rybak is exemplary. Here, a Soviet airman, who has been captured by the Germans, falls into the hands of the Americans immediately after the war, and they try to persuade him by every possible means to act as a spy against the U.S.S.R. The prisoner naturally reacts "in a heroic way":

— "So you think you can threaten me? I was already threatened by the Gestapo, Hitler's hangmen threatened to tear me to pieces,—so you need not think I shall allow myself to be frightened by you..."

Thus, the American authorities who looked after the soldiers of the Red Army who had been captured by the Germany, are identified with the agents of the Nazi "Security Service," and this, incidentally, in a work which was written in 1956 or 1957, that is to say, precisely at a time when Khrushchev was doing his utmost to win the Western powers and, in particular, America for the idea of "peaceful coexistence." But such is the true character of Soviet Russian despotism: to outward appearance, a "fight for peace," but, internally, a systematic attempt to prepare the masses psychologically for a "just" war of aggression.

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\*) The original Ukrainian text of this article was published under the title "Voyenna psykhoza" in the Munich weekly, "Shlyakh Peremohy" (1958, No. 45/246).

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#### DR. SMAL-STOCKY OF MARQUETTE ELECTED HEAD OF SCIENTIFIC GROUP

NEW YORK—Members of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Scientific Association, the oldest Ukrainian Association of its kind and now continuing its work in the free world, elected at its fourth meeting here on Feb. 1, 1959, Dr. Roman Smal-Stocky of Marquette University, Milwaukee, as its chairman.

Taking an active part in the American Chapter of the Association were 57 members and representatives from other Ukrainian organizations.

Also elected to various posts were: Prof. Dr. W. Kalyna, Dr. R. Osinchuk, Engineer R. Kogrynsky, Prof. Dr. W. Steciuk, Prof. Dr. M. Saytsew, Prof. Dr. H. Lushnytsky, Prof. Dr. M. Andrusiak, Prof. Dr. W. Lew, Mr. R. Oleshnytsky, Prof. M. Velychkiwsky, Dr. I. Kedryn-Rudnytsky, Dr. M. Trembitsky, Dr. W. Lencyk, Dr. M. Phylpachak, Prof. Dr. W. Sichynsky, Editor W. Mudry, Prof. Dr. B. Zahaykewych, General P. Shandruk, Engineer O. Hladyshowsky, Dr. W. Snader and Dr. Petryshyn.

## THE 1958 EUROPEAN CONCERT-TOUR OF THE UKRAINIAN BANDURA CHOIR AND THE "ORLYK" UKRAINIAN DANCE ENSEMBLE

As we already reported in our previous edition, the Ukrainian Bandura Choir, under the leadership of the composers and conductors Hryhoriy Kytasty and Volodymyr Bozhyk, and in collaboration with the "Orlyk" Ukrainian Dance Ensemble, under the leadership of Petro Dnistrovyk, set off on a big world concert-tour in October, 1958. Prior to its European tour, the Bandura Choir in October, 1958, gave a number of concerts in the United States and Canada, namely in Cleveland, Buffalo, Pittsburg, Scranton, Hartford, New York, Philadelphia, Newark, Boston, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Detroit and Chicago.

In the course of their European tour the Ukrainian artistes have given concerts in the following countries and towns: Spain (Madrid and Barceolna), France (Paris and other cities), Switzerland (Geneva, Zürich, etc.), Germany (Munich, Frankfort on Main, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Düsseldorf, Mannheim, Hamburg and many other towns), Sweden (Stockholm), Denmark (Copenhagen), as well as Holland (Amsterdam and various other towns), Belgium and England. In this country they have given concerts at Bradford, Manchester, Nottingham, Bournemouth, Bristol and London (Royal Albert Hall), as well as appeared on the TV.

Wherever they appear, the Ukrainian artistes are given a great reception. In the course of the various concerts which they have given, there have been many moving scenes; in Madrid, Barcelona, Paris, Munich, Hamburg, Stockholm and other cities, for instance, the audiences were so carried away by the performance that they refused to leave the hall when the concert was over.

Press notices everywhere stress the high artistic level of the Ukrainian artistes, the excellent quality of their performance and the rich colourfulness of the Ukrainian national costumes. Critics in all the countries in which the Bandura Choir and the "Orlyk" Ensemble have so far appeared are full of praise as regards the performance of the soloists, of the choir as a whole and of the dancers, and point out that they are outstanding representatives of Ukrainian historical and religious folk-songs and of the national dances of the vast Ukrainian ethnographical territory.

The performances given by the Ukrainian artistes are certainly something entirely new for European audiences, all the more so since very little is known in Western Europe about Ukrainian folk-lore. It is thus understandable that many persons who attended the concerts have expressed the hope that the Ukrainian artistes would repeat their tour of Western Europe.

This is the first time that the Ukrainian national instrument, the bandura, which so far was practically unknown in Europe, has been received everywhere with great appreciation, for in a clear and telling way it interprets the soul of the Ukrainian people to the West Europeans,—a people who have succeeded in depicting their tragic history during the past centuries and their grim fight for freedom, above all, against the Turks, the Russians and the Poles, in their stirring and profoundly moving folk-songs, which are now played and sung by the bandurists.

The fact that the Bandura Choir and the "Orlyk" Ensemble have also appeared on the television (in Germany, Sweden and Britain) will enable the European peoples to become better acquainted with Ukrainian national dances and folk-songs.

Since the repertoire of the Bandura Choir and the "Orlyk" Ensemble is extremely large, it is to be hoped that further concerts will be given by the Ukrainian artistes in the near future.

V. S.

### INCREASED PERSECUTION OF RELIGION

The Kyiv daily "Robitnycha Hazeta" (December 4, 1958) has published an article by V. Tancher, Candidate of philosophical sciences, Brazhnyk, representative of Kyiv Scientific-Atheistic Society, and M. Kaniuka, newspaperman, under the title "This Concerns Us All, Notes of Atheists," from which we quote certain passages, the meaning of which is only too evident (note in particular the last sentence!):

"...Religious, and particularly sectarian organizations, are noted for their considerable mobility and alertness..."

It sounds paradoxical, but teams of young patriots who go to cultivate virgin lands in the East are followed by religious preachers. Emissaries of sects have also appeared among young builders of mines in the Donbas. They tried to look no different than the young boys and girls, worked and lived alongside of them sharing all their hardships...

Sectarian communities offer financial aid even to non-members in order to bribe them, gain their good grace and confidence. This is against the law, since it is beyond the scope of religious activity...

Believers are reviving veneration of reliquiae, miraculous icons, sometimes they "discover" springs of holy water, and perform "miracles"...

In our country, believers are actually guaranteed all opportunities to satisfy their religious feelings. Facts show, however, that churchmen and sectarians abuse this right; they are actively propagating religion among non-believers, especially among youth, imbuing boys and girls with religious superstitions...

Atheistic propaganda in the Republic has recently improved..."

D. L.

## A Man Returned from Hell\*)

### An Unbiased Testimony about National Conditions in the Soviet Concentration Camps

At a meeting arranged by the Association of Byelorussians (White Ruthenians) in Great Britain on November 7, 1958, in London, at which numerous Ukrainians, Poles and Russians were also present, Prince Basil (Vasil) Sviatopolk-Mirsky gave a talk, based on his own experiences, about the Soviet Concentration camps in the most northerly part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), that is in the region of the lower reaches of the River Pechora.

Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky was abducted in Vienna in 1946, in a street in the American sector of the city, by agents of the Soviet secret police (NKVD). The reason for this incident, which, by the way, at that time was by no means an unusual occurrence, was that the wife of the Prince was employed as the secretary of General Kern, the Lord Mayor of Vienna, and that his brother-in-law, General Nabokov, as a general of the U.S. Army, held the post of adviser to General L. Clay, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. forces in Germany, in Soviet-American matters.

The Prince was thereupon taken to Moscow, where he spent some time in the notorious Lubianka Prison (for prominent political prisoners), and was then sent to a concentration camp for hard labour on the River Pechora. From 1946 to 1957 he led the life of a political prisoner sentenced to hard labour, as millions of non-Russians are still doing in the U.S.S.R., especially in various concentration camps in the region of the River Pechora.

The statements which the Prince made with a certain grim humour at the above-mentioned meeting actually contained almost nothing new which his Byelorussian compatriots and, above all, the Ukrainians in exile, have not already learned long ago from other and no less credible sources; certain important facts, however, were corroborated, which, when they have been reported by Ukrainians or by pro-Ukrainian Germans, have been regarded with unjustified distrust by the Western press.

For instance, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky corroborated the fact that, of all the peoples subjugated by Moscow, the Ukrainians—as far as he know—constitute the largest percentage of prisoners in the Soviet concentration camps. According to his opinion, the Ukrainians constitute 40 per cent of the prisoners, the Byelorussians 20 per cent, all the remaining peoples of the U.S.S.R. together 35 per cent, and persons from the satellite states 5 per cent. There are only very few Poles in the concentration camps and practically no Russians. In reply to a question put by the representative of the Russian section of the B.B.C., as to whether there are differences of opinion and tensions between the prisoners from West Ukraine and those from Central and East Ukraine,—an allegation constantly made by Russian emigrants, who endeavour to deny an urge to national state independence on the part of the Central and East Ukrainians (that is, those

Ukrainians who since the partition of Poland in 1795 have never been under Austrian and, later, Polish or Roumanian rule, but only under Russian rule),—the Prince said that the Ukrainian prisoners, irrespective of their origin or religious confession or their different social and political convictions, live together in a fine spirit of comradeship; and, he added, the Central and East Ukrainians would as little dream of talking Russian to each other as would the West Ukrainians of talking Polish or Roumanian.

Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky also corroborated the fact that resistance campaigns took place in Soviet concentration camps even in Stalin's day; in 1948, for instance, a big strike broke out in several camps and a large number of prisoners escaped into the wilds of the Ural Mountains (most of them, however, were recaptured later on). The Prince likewise corroborated the fact that terrible repressive measures were taken on a large scale during and after the big resistance movement of 1953, and also that hundreds of Ukrainian women were massacred, when they threw themselves in front of the tanks of the NKVD in the concentration camp at Kingir and were crushed to death. The reason given by the camp administrations for the stricter camp regime which was later enforced, was that the notorious chief of the NKVD, Lavrenti Beria (who in 1953 was overthrown by Malenkov, Molotov and Zhukov, and shot), was a "traitor and Fascist" and that he was to blame for the former "liberalism"(!) of the camp regime.

It was not until 1956 that amnesty was granted to a larger number of prisoners; Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky was then released as a German subject and allowed to return from beyond the Iron Curtain. Exactly a month before his release, he had to undergo a serious operation and his right leg was amputated; it is typical of conditions in the Soviet concentration camps that this operation was performed without an anaesthetic. Since his "release," the Prince has devoted himself to journalism and he is now touring various countries of West Europe for the purpose of holding lectures on the concentration camp system in the U.S.S.R.; he has already held such lectures in Belgium and Spain.

In London, where the Prince's stay was only short (he intends paying another visit to London, however, in the near future), he met Mrs. M. Levytska, whom he has known since 1924, at the above-mentioned meeting and they recalled their common memories of the Ukrainian itinerant theatre in West Ukraine (at the time of the Polish occupation). Amongst the actresses of this theatre was a Miss Valia NN., at that time 22 years old, who was lured into returning to Soviet Ukraine by the general amnesty which was proclaimed by the Soviets for political emigrants. But she suffered for her naivety, however, for Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky came across her, at the beginning of the 1950's, in a concentration camp on the River Pechora to which she had been sent by the NKVD (in those days it was called the GPU) soon after her return to Soviet Ukraine.

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\*) The original Ukrainian text of this article, which has been slightly abbreviated in translation, was published in the London weekly 'The Ukrainian Thought' ('Ukrayins'ka Dumka'), 1958, No. 47-608.

## Borrowed Plumes\*)

*Who is responsible for the anti-Bolshevist national resistance in the USSR?*

The Russian emigrant organization of the so-called "Solidarists," also known by the name of "National Labour Union" ("Narodno-Trudovoy Soyuz," abbreviated to NTS), recently held a congress in Bonn, the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany, at which the heads of the organization affirmed that their efforts as regards propaganda and secret resistance in the U.S.S.R. had begun to bear fruit and that various movements were now in evidence in the spheres to which they had devoted their attention. We should like to ask the NTS to refrain from making vague statements and to give more precise details as regards time and place in this connection. And we should like to advise the Western journalists, who record such boasting, to put the following questions to the leaders of the NTS:

*Which resistance organizations were responsible for the following incidents:*

The insurrection of March 8th and 9th, 1956, in Tiflis, the capital of Georgia (during which the banner of the Georgian Patriarchate appeared side by side with that of the former kings of Georgia; how can this be explained as a "pro-Stalinist" rising?)?

The demonstrations held in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, and in Erivan, the capital of Armenia, on March 12th and 13th, 1956 (not to be confused with the demonstration in Erivan, on May 22nd, in the presence of the French Foreign Minister at that time, M. Pineau!)?

The demonstrations in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic (at the southern extremity of the Ural Mountains) at the end of March, 1956?

The three demonstrations held in Tiflis in April, 1956?

The placards demanding "independence" for Georgia, which were pasted on the walls of buildings in the streets of Tiflis, during the night of May 25th-26th, 1956?

The big demonstration in Kyiv (Kiev) on May 26th and 27th, 1956 (the 30th anniversary of the assassination of the head of the Ukrainian National Republic, Symon Petlura, in Paris), during which Ukrainian workers demanded the "cessation of Soviet imperialism"?

The street rioting in several smaller towns of West Ukraine at the end of November, 1956? (The answer: the partisans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the UPA, were responsible).

The workers' strikes in Chiaturi and Poti (in Georgia) on November 2, 1956, as a manifestation of solidarity with the Hungarian revolt, as well as the students' demonstration at the Opera House of Tiflis on the same day?

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\*) The original French text of this article, which in translation gives somewhat more precise details as regards geographical names, was published in the Georgian monthly "La Nation Géorgienne" (Paris, No. 29, November 1958).

The demonstrations in Tiflis at the end of November, 1957, on the occasion of the visit of the foreign Communist delegations (who had just been celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik October Revolution in Moscow), and, in particular, the big demonstration at Tiflis airport when the Red Chinese delegation departed, during which the crowd of demonstrators demanded that Article 17 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union (pertaining to the right of the Soviet Republics to secede from the U.S.S.R.) should be applied?

The blowing up of a train with a freight of ammunition between Kyiv and Lviv (Lemberg) in the middle of May, 1956, and of a train near Poltava (Central Ukraine) on July 21st of the same year? (The answer: the partisans of the UPA were again responsible.)

Furthermore, for what reasons were the following regions prohibited for all foreign tourists:

The Caucasus from March 9th to April 15th, 1956? (The answer: general riots in Georgia.)

The district of Uzhhorod (in Carpatho-Ukraine, on the Hungarian frontier) from April 27, 1956, to September 1, 1957? (The answer: once again increased activity of the UPA.)

Practically the whole of Ukraine and also Transcaucasia, at Easter, 1958, for a whole month? (The answer: disturbances in the rural areas, the movement of troops entrusted with the task of crushing the disturbances, who, incidentally, did not crush anything, since they joined forces with the collective farmers as they were annoyed at the fact that Marshal Zhukov had fallen into disfavour.<sup>1)</sup>)

Furthermore, why did the 2nd Soviet tank brigade intervene in the streets of Riga, the capital of Latvia, in the summer of 1957? (The answer: increased activity of the Baltic partisans, as well as demonstrations in the streets.)

Why have certain forest areas of the Baltic countries been officially classified as war zones for the past years?

Why did the border-troops in Central Asia receive special decorations in 1956? Was it for the military operations which they had carried out in 1955? Officially, the U.S.S.R. at that time was not at war with any other country.

Which secret organization was discovered in Azerbaijan in October and November, 1956, a fact which resulted in hundreds of persons in academic circles in Baku being arrested? (The answer: the "Azerbaijan Republic," a nationalist organization.)

Which plot was discovered in Turkestan in the spring of 1957, a fact which resulted in a "purge" in high-ranking circles of the Central Asian Soviet republics? (The answer: a plot to carry out a national insurrection.)

And now the question should be addressed to the NTS as to which riots or demonstrations it can boast of inside the Soviet empire, which would not be national and anti-Russian?

<sup>1)</sup> This explanation does not seem very plausible: the non-Russian soldiers of the Red Army had far more serious reasons for being annoyed with the Bolshevik government and the Soviet Supreme Command. (Translator's comment)

Journalists who try their hand at this little party game will find that their opponents are most embarrassed, for anti-Russian nationalism is the black sheep as far as the NTS is concerned. But to try to discover anything other than national (anti-Russian) resistance movements and insurrections in the U.S.S.R., is even beyond the talent of the NTS!

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A. Mykulyn

## Ukrainians in the Virgin Regions of Kazakhstan\*)

In this article we do not intend to describe the "enthusiasm" with which the youth of Ukraine, "in response to the appeal of the Communist Party," is allegedly endeavouring to cultivate the virgin regions of Kazakhstan; this we can confidently leave to the lying propaganda of Moscow and the latter's henchmen inside and outside the Soviet Union. We do, however, intend to quote exclusively Soviet official data, such as is given in the Bolshevik press, about the living conditions in the virgin regions of Kazakhstan,—about the "happy life" of those unfortunate Ukrainians whom Moscow has deported from Soviet-occupied Ukraine to Kazakhstan and elsewhere.

"During the first half of the present year," writes the Soviet Russian daily paper "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" (1958, No. 212), "15,856 settlers and their families have arrived in Kazakhstan from Ukraine. It is evident that, in accordance with the decrees of the Party and the government, one should create suitable living conditions for the new settlers, so that, once they have settled in their new surroundings, they should not think of their native country, and so that all those members of the settlers' families who are capable of working should immediately take part in the collective system of production. In the first place, one should see to it that the erection of dwelling-houses for the settlers is speeded up."

Yes, "one should"! But what do things look like in reality in this respect? The above-mentioned paper affirms that in 1958 the collective kolkhozes of Kazakhstan (note, only the kolkhozes), in accordance with the plans in question, were to build dwelling-houses for 42,000 families who were to move into the kolkhozes in Kazakhstan. But, according to a report in the same paper, erection of these dwelling-houses for the deportees was being carried out "very unsatisfactorily," but the deportations were continuing from month to month. The plan to deport 42,000 Ukrainian families was to have been realized by October 1, 1958, but, as the said paper states, dwelling-houses for the deportees were only being erected very tardily in the kolkhozes in the regions of Aktiubinsk, North Kazakhstan, South Kazakhstan and

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\*) This article has originally been published in Ukrainian in the Canadian weekly "Homin Ukrayiny" (Toronto, 1958, No. 46-495).



Akmolinsk. Of the 1,300 dwelling-houses to be erected in the region of Aktiubinsk, not one had so far been built, in spite of the fact that the settlers were already arriving there; in the course of the past two months alone, so the paper adds, 952 Ukrainian families have arrived there. And of the 1,850 dwelling-houses to be erected in the region of North Kazakhstan, none have been built. In South Kazakhstan only 302 of the 3,600 dwelling-houses planned have been erected, in spite of the fact that 1,200 settlers and their families have already arrived there. Most of the families deported from Ukraine are forced to rent rooms from kolkhoz workers who have been there a long time, or else they are given accommodation in so-called community and production quarters, which actually are nothing but garrets and store-rooms, stables, sheds and barns, roughly built pigsties and poultry-pens, and primitively furnished clubs, etc.

As the "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" mentions in its report, of the 15,856 families from Ukraine who arrived in Kazakhstan during the first half of 1958, 9,527 families have not been supplied with any cattle there and about 12,000 families are living in tents or mud-huts or in other quarters at their own expense. Those who are not in a position to pay for accommodation make themselves crude huts out of any material they can get hold of. Consequently, most of the deportees are asking to be sent back to Ukraine, are refusing to work in the kolkhozes, or are trying to get jobs in the building industry or in other industrial concerns. In the region of Aktiubinsk alone, 1,411 Ukrainian settlers and their families had left their kolkhozes by July 1, 1958...

The agricultural labourers in the newly organized sovkhoses (state farms), to which the farming youth of Ukraine has for the most part been deported, have written the following letter to the paper, "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda": "How long are we to endure this state of affairs? We were promised canteens in the new sovkhoses. When we were resettled, we were promised the very best of living conditions, we were assured that we should be supplied regularly with all the things that we needed and that we should be fed well; we were also promised cultural amenities... But three years of our life in these virgin regions are almost over, and conditions as far as we are concerned resemble those in Krylov's well-known fable "The Swan, the Crab and the Pike"<sup>2</sup>). The "cart" of improvement in our living conditions is still in exactly the same spot and position as it was when first we began to till and cultivate the virgin soil. Three years have already passed and we are still having to use candles for lighting purposes in the brigade trucks<sup>3</sup>), and we are not even kept supplied with these candles. We are obliged to sleep on the floor as we have not been provided with beds. It is not even possible to buy an ordinary razor, let alone blades for a safety razor. The papers we get are a month old. We are still wearing the same clothes in which we arrived here. It is not worth discussing the food question. Canteens were set up in some of the sovkhoses and the farm-workers were even given fairly adequate rations of food, but the canteens were later closed down on account of repairs.

<sup>2</sup>) Who drag the cart in different directions.

<sup>3</sup>) Which are obviously being used as provisional living quarters.

Nobody repairs them, and we are forced to "get hold" of food as best as we can. In fact, with a certain amount of astuteness, one might even manage to live on dried foods alone, but how can one obtain them, if one receives no wage for two and three months at a stretch?"

In view of these facts, it is obvious that any comments on our part are superfluous.

The mills in Kazakhstan—so the paper "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" (1958, No. 214) likewise reports—have already begun grinding the corn of the new harvest. "All the larger mills are now only producing flour of a superior quality..." Yet the Ukrainians who have been deported to the sovkhoses in the virgin regions state (in their letters to the same paper) that there is no flour to be had in the state-owned shops in Kazakhstan. And whenever any flour arrives, one has to queue up at four o'clock in the morning in order to get any. And even that is no good, either, as there is very often no flour left at all by the time one gets one's turn, even though only 1 kilogram per head is sold... On the other hand, however, flour ground from the corn of the new harvest is conveyed day and night by long goods trains and columns of trucks out of the virgin regions of Kazakhstan—obviously to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic or abroad, to the "pro-Soviet" countries, in particular to Red China and to Nasser's United Arab Republic.

"—Maize?—says the director of the Silantyev sovkhos in the newly cultivated district of Ubagan, indignantly,—No, it won't get damaged by frost, we shall have harvested it by then."

Thereupon, the director drives out into the fields in order to see the combine overseer, I.B., and asks him how things are going in his combine.

— All right,—replies the combine overseer.—Things are going quite well, and I've been given three more trucks to take the maize away.

— But why are you taking so long to get the maize harvest in?—asks the director.

— Why? Why?—retorts the combine overseer irritably.—Just you try to reach the quota! There isn't enough fuel for the combine, and they keep taking the trucks away every hour for other jobs. We start at 10 o'clock, but no one brings us anything to eat beforehand, and we lose three hours every time we have a meal.

— I don't see why that should be so,—says the director, greatly surprised.

— It's perfectly obvious why! In other sovkhoses they take breakfast and the main meal for the workers out into the fields by car, but they bring us our breakfast on foot after we've already started work, and we have to walk 5 kilometers to the sovkhos to get a meal. And the food they give us, at that!—You ought to try it yourself! How can anyone fulfil the quotas—with such a badly organized system—and with an empty stomach, to crown matters! And all your book-keepers do, is to write down figures. When one comes to collect one's monthly wage, it's as good as nothing!"

And what about the cultural amenities for the deportees? Certain information on this subject is to be found in the Bolshevik press. The same paper, "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" (1958, No. 219), reports as follows in this respect:

During 1957, the "Kazakhstan State Concert" arranged 2,500 concerts, entertainments and lectures for the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The Ministry of Culture of Kazakhstan also sent its theatrical and concert troupes to the virgin regions, where they gave 12,000 performances. But what does this mean? Do the deportees enjoy all these functions? Not by any means, for the concerts and entertainments were held in the summer months, in the provincial towns or in the central farms of the larger sovkhozes, where only the administrative personnel was present. At that time, however, the deportees were working day and night in the fields, getting in the harvest. In addition, there are about 200 districts in Kazakhstan and about 100 larger centres in each district, which need cultural amenities. One entertainment per year(!) in each centre amounts to 20,000 entertainments; but the "State Concert" and the Ministry of Culture together only managed to arrange 14,500 performances in a year.

The main point, however, lies in the fact that actors and concert artistes only tour the virgin regions in the spring and summer, that is precisely in the hottest season when either sowing or harvesting is in progress. In the autumn and the winter, when there is less work to be done in the fields and the farm-workers have more time to enjoy cultural entertainments, no actors or concert artistes can be persuaded to tour the virgin regions. And this is hardly surprising, seeing that the roads are snowbound, and that there are no clubs with stages and no recreation rooms for the artistes available, and that the audiences are not very interested in the monotonous selection offered by the standardized programmes.

Such is reality as regards the "happy life" of the Ukrainians deportees in the virgin regions of Kazakhstan,—a life which has been organized and arranged by Khrushchev, in order to save Soviet agriculture from disaster and provide the insatiable Russian "elder brother" with bread, by forcing the Ukrainian people to carry out exhausting physical work beyond their strength in a foreign country, far away from their native land.

It is not necessary for us to elucidate the above picture, as presented by the data published in the Soviet press, since it speaks for itself. We should, however, like to add that nowadays both the Russian press and—following its example—also the Soviet Ukrainian press are endeavouring to conceal the fact that the deportation of the Ukrainian farming population to Central Asia still continues. But this fact has been revealed by the above-mentioned Kazakhstan paper, inasmuch as it affirms that during 1958, 42,000 Ukrainian families were to be deported to Kazakhstan. It is, however, very difficult to ascertain how many young Ukrainians (including schoolboys and schoolgirls) were also to be sent there by "voluntary-compulsory means" by the Communist Youth Organization ("Komsomol") and the Party organizations. The fact that such a deportation campaign has been going on the whole time, however was recently revealed by the official press organ of the Communist Youth Organization of the Soviet Union, the "Komsomol'skaya Pravda," which described the "enthusiastic" departure of a whole trainful of young Ukrainians from the Central Ukrainian region of Zhytomyr.

## UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD

### UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY IN THE AMERICAN PRESS

*Editorials, which appeared in various newspapers throughout the U.S.A. in reference to Ukrainian Independence Day are printed in full below.*

#### UKRAINIAN DREAM

At this time 41 years ago, after having been held captive for centuries by the Russian Czarism, the ancient and highly civilized Ukrainian people—who now number about 40 million—reestablished themselves as an independent nation. But their new status, their new freedom, was short-lived. For the imperialistic Bolshevik revolutionists soon moved into their land and subjugated them all over again. Even so, throughout the four decades that have since passed they have maintained their own language and separate identity within the Soviet Union, and great numbers of them still yearn and strive for complete self-rule. In fact, although it has mercilessly repressed them, the Kremlin itself has recognized their special position in many ways, including the arrangement under which their make-believe "autonomous republic" is fictitiously represented in the United Nations by delegation of its own.

As things stand today, of course, it may seem almost quixotic that any of these people should still harbour hopes for real autonomy. But the same used to be said of other independence-seeking nationalities—such as the Irish—and what needs to be remembered in matters of this sort is that the world is always changing. Tyrannies, after all, not only rise, but also fall, and so it is not utterly

inconceivable that the Ukrainians will once again attain—permanently—the liberty they enjoyed for just a little while in 1918. In any event, as one of their spokesmen has written, large segments of them can be counted upon to keep alive their "undying movement" to restore their country to full self-mastery "as a vital and indispensable element in a free Europe and in a free world."

#### —Washington Evening Star HOUSE MARKS BIRTHDAY OF UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC

The 41st anniversary of the independence of the Ukrainian Republic was commemorated yesterday in brief remarks and ceremonies in the House of Representatives.

Rep. John W. McCormack (D-Mass.), House majority leader, and Rep. Daniel J. Flood (D-Pa.), led House members in praise of the Republic, which was gobbled up by the Soviet Union shortly after its independence was declared.

They were joined in their remarks by Reps. Francis E. Walter (D-Pa.), and Rep. Marguerite Stitt Church (R-Ill.). A resolution has been submitted in the Senate by Sen. Prescott Bush (R-Conn.), to have the President proclaim each Jan. 22 a day to honor the Republic's independence.

Earlier yesterday, Flood was host to Lev Dobriansky, Georgetown University professor and chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee, at picture-taking ceremonies. Also attending were McCormack, and Reps. Michael A. Feighan (D-Ohio) and Barratt O'Hara (D-Ill.).

—Washington Post  
and Times Herald

## INSPIRATION OF UKRAINE

The example of the people of the Ukraine in their struggle for freedom is an inspiration to all lovers of liberty. History has few, if any, parallels to the doggedness, pride, stubborn perseverance and heroism of the Ukrainians in the face of overwhelming opposition.

It was 41 years ago today that the Ukrainian people proclaimed their national independence. They were ringed with enemies. Bolshevik armies were pressing in from the North. To the West, deserters and disbanded troops of the defeated Russian army were pillaging, searching for food and shelter and taking it wherever they were strong enough. Czarist columns to the South were fighting vainly to restore the imperial throne. Internally, the Ukraine was divided, with many Bolshevik agents agitating for union with the new revolutionary government of Russia.

It may seem, from today's perspective, that this was no time to try to found a nation. There was no security, either military or economic. Western Europe was at war, Eastern Europe was undergoing a dramatic and terrible social upheaval. But the yearning for freedom had glowed rightly in the souls of generations of Ukrainians, and now it burst into flame in a glory of national pride.

The Ukrainian Republic was doomed from its birth. Its enemies were too many and too powerful, its friends too far away. Yet that brief and hopeful expression of the will of a people to be free set many hearts singing, and the fervor of those times still lives today. In Connecticut, by proclamation of the Governor, and in Hartford by proclamation of the Mayor, today is

being celebrated as Ukrainian Independence Day.

Connecticut is the richer for the infusion of the Ukrainian culture. People of Ukrainian birth or descent, good citizens of this state and this nation, maintain their national traditions, their religion, their fierce devotion to freedom. They are an example to those of us who may become politically lazy, too willing to let others do our thinking or uncritical of attempts to curb our liberties.

An independence day celebrated in memory of a conquered nation has its undertones of grief, but Ukrainian Independence Day is also a joyous occasion, for it recalls a time of heroes who will never be forgotten among the people of Connecticut who bear Ukrainian names.

—*Hartford Times*

## UKRAINIANS MARK INDEPENDENCE DAY

Memories of Soviet barbarism in crushing the Hungarian revolt are still fresh in every mind, and naturally should be. At the same time it is equally important to remember that other independent nationalities have been similarly stamped out by the forces of communism. One of these is the Ukraine National Republic, whose scattered citizens and their children everywhere observe January 22 as Independence Day. For it was on this date in 1918, or 41 years ago, that Ukrainian independence was proclaimed at Kiev. And it was 40 years ago that the Act of Union became effective, uniting Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian National Republic.

As the official statement by Governor Ribicoff points out, Ukrainian independence lived only briefly before

it was battered into the ground by Soviet Communist might. Ukraine historians report that, during the last 40 years, all precedents in cruelty and misrule during the centuries-old martyrdom of the Ukrainians were surpassed under the Russians. They declare that mass murder and the genocidal policies of the Red rulers of the Ukraine have exacted a toll well over 10 million lives. The Soviet-fostered famine in the '30s alone is estimated to have resulted in death for 6 million persons.

But it is the vow of Ukrainian people that despite all subjection and persecution, they will continue to fight until the Ukraine National Republic is resurrected. Residents of Connecticut as well as freedom-loving people everywhere will salute them on their Independence Day, and wish them courage and success.

—*Hartford Courant*

\*

Ukrainian Independence Day proclamations have been issued by many of the leading state chief executives in January. The celebration of Ukrainian Independence is held on January 22. Ukrainian organizations and individuals have approached their respective governmental leaders and have had this date set as Ukrainian Independence Day in proclamations. Also in commemoration of the event the Ukrainian azure and gold flag has flown over many State Capitals and city halls.

Over in New Jersey Gov. Robert B. Meyner issued a proclamation stating that the "The people of Ukraine have withstood successive liquidations by their communist overlords; suffered famine and deportation to slave camps and still kept their national spirit alive."

Governor Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut stated in his proclamation "The free world regrets that Ukrainian independence was short lived, crushed by Soviet Communist might. The free world knows however, that in the hearts of Ukrainians everywhere the desire for independence and freedom still burns."

Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York had this to say in his proclamation: "For a thousand years Ukrainians have kept the flame of freedom alight. As free Americans, treasuring our own freedom, our hearts go out to those who never falter in the struggle to regain their lost liberty."

Governor Michael DiSalle of Ohio had this to say: "On this date Ukrainians in America will reaffirm their conviction that tyranny and despotism cannot long prevail where men believe in, and courageously struggle for freedom."

Mayor Robert F. Wagner of New York proclaimed: "Our fellow Ukrainians today are making this anniversary by reaffirming their belief in freedom for all men everywhere."

Mayor Leo P. Carlin of Newark said: "The Ukrainian people known through the ages for their love of liberty, still strive to retain their freedom and autonomous place among the nations which they are entitled."

Mayor Stephen J. Bercik of Elizabeth, N. J.; "The Ukrainians live in the hope that their nation can be liberated from its communist oppressor. Their aspirations deserve the support and encouragement of freedom loving people everywhere."

In Yonkers, N. Y., Ukrainians marked the anniversary with brief ceremonies at City Hall with Mayor Kirsten Kristensen, and others taking part.

For many years now the 22nd of January is being proclaimed and celebrated in the American cities and states from coast to coast as Ukrainian Day.

It is the day when all Americans join their fellow-citizens of Ukrainian descent in marking the Anniversary of the renewal of the Independence of Ukraine which was solemnly proclaimed by an Act of the Ukrainian Parliament on January 22, 1918 in the capital city of Kyiv.

Moreover, the 22nd of January is a double Anniversary for Ukraine and the rest of the world, for which the fate of Ukraine is today more than ever of crucial importance.

For on January 22, 1919—one year after the renewal of Ukrainian Independence—the reunification of all the Ukrainian territories in one Independent Ukraine State was solemnly proclaimed by another Act of the Ukrainian Parliament in the capital city of Kyiv.

Thus, this year January 22nd, in addition to being the 41st Anniversary of the renewal of the Independence of Ukraine, also marked the 40th Anniversary of the reunification of all the Ukrainian territories in one Independent Ukrainian State.

#### UKRAINIAN-CANADIAN NAMED TO PROVINCIAL TRANSPORT MINISTRY

TORONTO—The Provincial Government of Ontario, Canada has notified the Press and citizenry that Mr. John Yaremko, Canadian of Ukrainian descent, has been nominated Transport Minister of the Ontario Provincial Government.

Mr. Yaremko, very active in Canadian-Ukrainian life, has held other posts in the provincial affairs.

#### YURIY KONOVALETS, DIES IN ROME

Paris.— Yuriy Konovalets, the only son of Col. Eugene Konovalets and Olga Konovalets, nee Fedak, died of cancer on Dec. 19, 1958, in Rome, Italy, at the age of 34. Col. E. Konovalets, former commander of the *Sichovi Striltsi* Corps in Kiev and subsequently head of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), was killed by a Soviet agent on May 23, 1938, in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.

Yuriy Konovalets was born on January 1, 1924 in Berlin. Although he lived away from Ukraine, Yuriy was brought up in the Ukrainian patriotic spirit and spoke Ukrainian fluently. At the age of 17 Yuriy graduated from Chateaubriand College in Rome and because of his special inclinations to the mathematical sciences, he entered the Polytechnical School of Rome. His interest in Ukrainian affairs was rewarded by a trust which his fellow Ukrainian students had in him by electing him president of the Ukrainian Student Club in Rome.

During the war years both his mother Olga and Yuriy passed through a difficult and trying period, and it was at that time that Yuriy developed a serious lung disease which sent him to a sanatorium. Upon recovery Yuriy discontinued his scholastic pursuits, but instead joined the Dutch commercial airline KLM, with which he remained to the last day of his life. In fact, recently he was made manager of the Rome KLM office. But at the beginning of 1958 the malignant disease struck again and despite the best medical care his mother was able to provide, it proved to be fatal.



(Continued from p. 36.)

the fire. When Russia's interests demand, a Pan-Slavist and tsarist becomes a revolutionary and an enemy of the bourgeoisie, but a socialist Bolshevik becomes a supporter of red tsarism and an ally of Asiatic chauvinists.

If we consider the part played by Soviet Russia in Europe's social movements, we realize that its doctrine (like the doctrine of Russian imperialism) only makes a pretence of siding with one or other of the powers fighting each other in Europe; in principle, however, this doctrine adopts a hostile attitude to all that is European and to Europe as a whole. Thus, in former times, socialists and Pan-Slavists in Russia joined forces on the strength of the Muscovite "Obshchina," the peasant community with its system of land as common property. As could already be seen from the conflict of the year 1914 and from that of the year 1917, it is still a question of the conflict of two forms of culture, of two national ideals.

Without wishing to deny either the existence of big social and political conflicts in Europe or the part played by Russia in these conflicts, we are of the opinion that behind all these conflicts there is, above all, a more universal conflict, which has weighed heavily on all the conflicts in Europe that have ensued during the past two hundred years.

Russia has always been the champion and supporter of the Messianist ideal,—this is the primary conclusion which we are bound to reach after studying the above-mentioned material and facts. And the second conclusion which we reach is that Russia has always regarded every stage in her expansion, both before 1917 (Pan-Slavism and Neo-Slavism) and later, too (Bolshevism), as an individual and complete stage in her fight against Europe. Whatever methods have been adopted in order to camouflage this fight and under whatever banner it has been conducted, the essence of the matter at issue has never changed. And bearing this in mind, we must now examine another question, namely the reasons for Russia's fundamental antagonism to Occidental culture. (To be continued.)

- 1) F. Dostoyevsky: "A Writer's Diary."
- 2) K. Leontyev: "The Orient, Russia and the Slav Element."
- 3) A. Pushkin: "Conversation with an Englishman."
- 4) A. Pypin: "Characteristic Features of Literary Opinions."
- 5) V. Lenin: "The State and the Revolution."
- 6) N. Bukharin: "The Programme of the Communists."
- 7) K. Leontyev, loc. cit., p. 108 of the Russian edition.
- 8) Ibid., p. 384.
- 9) Ibid., pp. 433—434.
- 10) Ibid., p. 435.
- 11) O. Miller: "The Slav Element and Europe" (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1877, p. 63.
- 12) Ibid., pp. 99 and 109.
- 13) M. Bakunin: "Letters on Patriotism."
- 14) A. Herzen: "Letters from Italy and France" (in Russian), p. 267.
- 15) K. Leontyev, loc. cit., pp. 28 and 182.
- 16) Strakhov: "The Fight against the West in Our Literature," p. 126 of the Russian edition.
- 17) Leroy-Beaulieu: "L'Empire Russe."




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*Jaroslav Stetzko*

## **American Policy towards the Nations Enslaved by Russia and "The Voice of America"**

The political evolution of the world today seems to be pointing towards the collapse of empires. They are being replaced by the independent states of the formerly dependent peoples. Similarly, nations which have lost their freedom as a result of foreign occupation are regaining their independence. No power in the world is able to halt this process of formation of new independent nations. Latin America experienced a similar process earlier. Whatever the attitude of the great powers with regard to this development may be, it will go on towards its full realization. To resist it, is to hinder the process of the development of mankind.

Having grasped the sense of the present era, Russia is manoeuvring skilfully, announcing in advance her acquiescence to this sweeping movement. On this side of the Iron Curtain, Russia deceitfully pretends to support it, posing in the role of defender of the idea of national independence for all the peoples in the world. The fact that inside her own empire she tries to eradicate national liberation movements ruthlessly and suppresses any aspirations to national independence, does not prevent her from trying to instill into the heads of the enslaved peoples the idea that they already enjoy their independence. This fact shows what importance Moscow attaches to national liberation movements, which she hopes to deceive and exploit for her own ends. However, the contradictions from which the Bolshevik system suffers stand out most clearly in this case. When Moscow raises the problem of the attributes of national independence of the so-called colonial Asian and African peoples, viz., their own government independent from a metropolis, with a separate national army and foreign policy, etc., the peoples enslaved in the U.S.S.R. and in the entire Russian sphere of domination compare their fictitious independence, deprived of the known

and real attributes of political independence, with the deceitful demands raised by Russia for the independence for the so-called colonial peoples. From this comparison the enslaved nations can only draw the conclusion that they do not in fact enjoy real independence. In constantly playing its propaganda tune about independence for the colonial peoples and, particularly, about the attributes of such independence, Moscow cannot help reminding the enslaved nations constantly of her hypocrisy. Thus her propaganda turns against her. From this contradiction Moscow cannot break loose. It is a pity that the psychological warfare campaign on the part of the United States does not avail itself of the opportunity to deepen contradictions of that kind, within the Russian empire. A proper propaganda approach in this sense would also bear fruit among the soldiers of the Soviet Army, among whom the non-Russians are in a majority.

Looking at the world's tendencies in perspective, we find on the one hand the Russian conception—a drive to establish a world Russian empire, a "World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and, on the other hand, the idea of national independence. In this gigantic struggle, final victory, it is our conviction, can only be on the side of the idea of national independence. Should American policy take this truth into account and rally to its defense in practice, then the anti-Moscow potential would be considerably strengthened and victory would come more quickly for the freedom-loving world. A precondition for this is, however, that the United States policy should no longer defend the pro-Russian idea of "indivisibility" of the Russian empire and should also put aside any project of a world government opposed to the concept of a world order based on the national principle. At present, we see a menace in the fact that certain U.S. circles are reluctant to admit the application of the national principle with regard to the nations enslaved in the U.S.S.R. Russian aggressive designs with regard to the Middle East and throughout the world must be met by an all-out support for the idea of the dissolution of the Russian empire into independent and democratic states. When Russia creates difficulties for the Free World in West Berlin, the West must react in an equal measure, and not merely locally in West Berlin. The time is ripe for the United States and other Western powers to proclaim, as a formulation of the policy of liberation, a universal *Declaration of Independence* for the nations enslaved by Russia as well as a *Charter of Rights of Man* which should be identical with the aims of the liberation struggle of the subjugated peoples. This has been brilliantly set forth by Congressman Albert W. Cretella of Connecticut in a draft resolution of July 2, 1958, submitted to the House of Representatives (House Concurrent Resolution 337), proposing that the President of the United States proclaim the historic dates of the restoration of national independence of the nations struggling to free themselves from Russian domination, as days to be commemorated by the people of the United States in the spirit of sympathy and dedication for the victims of Russian imperialism and colonialism. This draft resolution, paving the way for a new approach in the foreign policy of the United States with regard to the enslaved nations and offering speedy victory for the Free World over the forces of Russian imperialism and colonialism, deserves to be warmly welcomed and supported.

\* \* \*

In psychological warfare an important role is played by radio broadcasts, insofar as their contents correspond to the yearnings of the enslaved nations, nations.

The contents of the radio broadcasts of "The Voice of America" (VOA) evoke serious objections. These were raised in his time by the Chief of Information Service of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council in Ukraine, Petro Poltava, Major in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and Member of the Executive Council of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). In his letter to the VOA Poltava criticized the contents of its broadcasts, which avoided and continues to avoid the most important question in the struggle against Russian imperialism and its instrument, Communism, namely, the idea of national independence of the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. Poltava's open letter was sent to the VOA, but has not elicited any positive result to this day. On the contrary, the present trend is to reduce the time devoted to the broadcasts in the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian languages, by half, while at the same time expanding the Russian-language broadcasts by the amount of time thus saved. This bears witness to the tendency on the part of responsible American circles to ignore the problem of liberation of the enslaved nations, and, instead to stake their policy on the dominant Russian people, who maintain the other nations in subjugation. The enslaved nations have impatiently waited for the contents of the broadcasts in their languages to evolve in the direction of a clear support of their aspirations to national independence and state sovereignty and hoped that in the course of time the idea of dissolving the last and the most cruel empire in history, the Russian empire, which at the moment appears as the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, would gain the upper hand. Instead, there are signs that a backward step is about to be taken. The language of the occupying power, the symbol of their slavery and subjugation, is to serve as the medium for communicating between freedom-loving America and the enslaved nations. This much is clear, because, with the reduction of the broadcasting time in their native languages, a greater importance is assigned to the Russians than to the non-Russians, although the non-Russians are numerically stronger, and only they will fight on the side of the West, whilst the Russians will defend the Russian empire exactly as the Germans—and not the Frenchmen or the Poles or the Ukrainians—manned the anti-Allied front during the Second World War. The expansion of the Russian-language broadcasts at the expense of the non-Russian testifies to the false calculation made by the directors of the VOA that they will thus be better able to attract the Russians to the Western side. The West will never be able to give the Russians more than Lenin, Stalin or Khrushchov have given them. The Russians today dictate policy to the entire world, their armies are stationed in Berlin, China obeys their word, even India docilely follows their lead. Surely, they will not heed the VOA and its half-baked contents.

Moscow permits many broadcasts in Ukraine in the Ukrainian language, though not in the Ukrainian national spirit. But now America proposes to speak to the 45-million-strong Ukrainian nation for merely half an hour a day! The United States recognizes the membership of Ukraine in the United Nations as an equal member under international law, but the VOA treats Ukraine as if she were a mere province of Russia. America does not recognize the occupation of the Baltic countries by Russia, but by cutting the broadcasts to them by half an hour in favour of the Russian broadcasts, she shows a *different* face. Surely, in a situation where the Russian imperialists through their minions in Latin America offend the Vice-President of the United States, where Khrushchov is murdering Hungarian patriots, remaining unmoved by American protests, where he incites the people against America e.g., in Middle East or Africa, where on all the fronts of the world the Russian imperialists strike blow after blow against America's prestige and power, surely, then, neglect and ignorance of the enslaved nations can only encourage him to further acts of this nature? Not the Russians, but only the non-Russians can bring down the Russian empire and destroy Communism, just as not the Germans, but the people enslaved by Germany, were the friends of the Allies.

Any reduction in the non-Russian broadcasts is for the enslaved nations a proof of their neglect by America. Let us imagine, for example, a reduction in the Hungarian-language broadcasts after the revolution. This would have been understood as a lesson to the Hungarians, a rebuke for their freedom uprising. After the great upheavals in the concentration camps of Siberia—in Vorkuta, Norilsk, Kinghiri and Taishet—between 1953-56, which were initiated primarily by the Ukrainians, in cooperation with the Balts, such an answer by the VOA can justifiably be regarded as a slap in the face for these nations. Under the wheels of the Russian tanks 500 Ukrainian women prisoners, heroines in the struggle against Russian tyranny, perished in the concentration camp in Kinghiri. Their deaths leave the VOA unmoved.

What psychological and moral justification could possibly be found for such a step? It does, of course, delight the Kremlin. There is no doubt that such a policy will merely confirm among our compatriots the belief that the United States neglects them, that it does not think seriously about national liberation or restoration of their national states, but possibly about some change of regime, or merely halting the further advance of Communism, the instrument of Russian imperialism. We cannot agree with the contents of the VOA broadcasts. We consider them wholly inadequate and unsuitable as regards the aspirations of the nations held in captivity by Moscow, because they do not include the most important idea, namely that of national liberation and national independence. Therefore, the VOA does not fulfill its task. Instead of an evolution towards improving the contents of the VOA, we find even an opposite trend.

The contents of the broadcasts of the VOA, where even to talk about independence is forbidden, must appear as a strange curiosity to the enslaved nations in the U.S.S.R. Moscow speaks unceasingly about the existence of a "sovereign Ukrainian state," the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," as well as about the Byelorussian, Georgian and other states. The VOA



carefully does not. Moscow talks about the independence of Ghana, Malaya, Liberia, etc.; the VOA lacks the courage to put in a word on the necessity of ensuring real independence for Ukraine, Turkestan, Georgia or Byelorussia. This is, to say the least, very odd! Why should our enemies, the Russians, be talking about an "independent Soviet Ukraine," while our friends, the Americans, are unwilling to talk about a real, not fictitious independent, democratic Ukrainian or Turkestanian state? This we are at a loss to understand. The Kremlin itself drops a trump card into our hands; what is needed is to grasp it and capitalize upon it. Why should the Americans not ask: "But where are the armies of those 'independent' countries, where are their diplomatic treaties, their diplomatic representations, their right to secede from the U.S.S.R., etc."? Why should the Americans not say: "We support the idea of a truly independent united Ukrainian or Georgian state, whose attributes should be such that the people have the right of free elections, their own diplomatic representations, full liberty to make political decisions, etc." Why isn't even the presence of Ukraine in the United Nations exploited by Western propaganda, at least by demanding that Russia respect the U.N. Charter? The "Constitution" of the U.S.S.R. is likewise not exploited to ask why the "voluntary" right to secede from the U.S.S.R. has never been used. If Ukraine, Turkestan, Armenia, Georgia, etc. have the right to secede from the U.S.S.R., then this means that they are something different from Russia. Yet, instead of exploiting all this in its propaganda, America is cutting down its broadcasts to the non-Russian nations. It must be remembered that precisely these nations, owing to their geographic location and their uninterrupted struggle against Moscow, provide abundant and varied material for the anti-Communist and anti-Moscow propaganda. Why is then more time being assigned to the Russian broadcasts?

It is worth noting incidentally that parallelly with the increasingly anti-Ukrainian course on the part of Russia, the VOA seems to steer its course correspondingly by cutting the broadcasts in Ukrainian by half. It is to be recalled that in 1953 Khrushchov dismissed Leonid Melnikov from his post as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine for his excessively obvious Russification of Ukraine, in order to disassociate himself, at least in appearance, from his erstwhile "master, Stalin.

It is absolutely essential that the VOA should try to support the aspirations of the subjugated nations as regards the contents of the broadcasts. To cut even these inadequate broadcasts is, in my opinion, a grave mistake. By such tactics as the present one the VOA will create among the subjugated peoples a conviction that the United States is a partner of the new Russian imperialists of a "White" type, like the N.T.S. (Russian Solidarists), as was Hitler in Germany. It is my considered opinion that the VOA has adopted a wrong attitude to the whole problem of the Russian people as well. The Russians have always cultivated a Messianic ideology believing that they are predestined to "bring happiness" to all mankind. At first they propagated "Orthodoxy," and expanded toward Constantinople in order to "liberate" the "Orthodox brethren." Then they invented a "Third Rome" and declared that "there will never be a fourth one." Now they are "liberating" the "proletariat of the world," and the "colonial peoples"; they "defend" Islam and coloured

peoples. They also have concentrated in their Messianic ideology all the traditional deceptive ideas of Panslavism. They have reinstated the state-subservient Orthodoxy of Patriarch Alexis. This Orthodoxy is now as much dependent on the First Secretary of the Communist Party as it was once on the Tsar; it is much the same Caesaro-papism as used to be in vogue in Russia earlier. Democratic ideas cannot be included in the complex of ideas with which the mentality of the Russian people is imbued. This any student of Russian history can ascertain, just as despotic ideas cannot be ascribed to the freedom-loving Americans. Democracy will have to wait long before it becomes one of the Messianic Russian ideas. And should this ever occur, it will only be, as is well known to us, the "people's democracy."

The only position that the West can occupy in psychological warfare, and that includes the VOA, is a consistent and integrated support of the idea of national independence and international equality for all the nations subjugated by Russia, not excluding the independent Russian state within its ethnographic boundaries.

A constant questioning on the radio, through the VOA, every hour of the day, of the well-known attributes of independence of the non-Russian nations, would drive Russia into a cul-de-sac indefensible in psychological warfare. And the repercussions it would have among the enslaved peoples would be tremendous. The United States occupies often a critical position with regard to the British and the French empires. For some strange reason, however, the United States and the VOA take a different attitude when the matter concerns the most cruel and brutal Russian empire. There is no need for the West to be excessively frightened by the Russian nation, because the latter numbers only 80-90 million people, while the peoples enslaved by Russia number 110-120 millions. Why, then, does the VOA not take this fact into account?

Perhaps not many Americans realize the importance of the Uzbek-language broadcasts of the VOA which, incidentally, are also being considered for elimination. It is precisely in Tashkent, capital of the Uzbek Republic of the U.S.S.R., that the Russians have concentrated recently their extremely powerful propaganda broadcasts. From that Moslem area they are sending out broadcasts in many languages and dialects to the millions of Moslems in Asia and Africa.

The Moscow-controlled Ukrainian government in Kyiv has recently augmented its Ukrainian-language broadcasts to two and a half hours a day, by which Moscow is endeavouring to reach some 2,000,000 Ukrainians living in the free world.

The United States Government has been recently advised by a number of American leaders that any cutting of the broadcasting programs in the non-Russian languages weak as they might be, would constitute a great victory for the Russians.

On April 29, 1958, a special memorandum was presented to the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles dealing with the dangers of a "summit" meeting with the Russian Communists and also with the importance of the U.S. psychological warfare instrumentalities, such as the VOA. This memorandum was jointly prepared by the Conference of Americans of Central


and Eastern European Descent (CACEED) and the American Conference for the Liberation of the Non-Russian Nations of the U.S.S.R., embracing a total of seventeen American nationality groups which are thoroughly conversant with Russian Communist ideology and political operations. The memorandum in question was presented to the late Secretary of State J. F. Dulles by a congressional delegation consisting of Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D), Ill.; Sen. H. Alexander Smith (R), N.J.; Rep. Walter H. Judd (R), Minn. and Rep. Michael A. Feighan (D) of Ohio. On July 16, 1958, Senator H. Alexander Smith introduced the said memorandum into the *Congressional Record* with an appropriate introduction.

In the memorandum these American leaders expressed their concern about the VOA, which I share with equal anxiety. They said:

"The press recently reported that the VOA, in the interest of economy, was giving thought to reducing the number of language broadcasts to the Soviet Union, holding out this possibility that since the ruling class spoke Russian the VOA might follow the example of the BBC and thus limit such broadcasts to the Russian language. Such thinking may unintentionally lead to the serious weakening and likely to dissolution of the vital role intended for the VOA. A weak VOA, subject to continuing public attack and suspicion, is unquestionably a primary objective of the Russian Communists. If economy in this vital work is a pressing need and our psychological warfare is to be regulated by the ceiling of budgetary expenditures, then the priority attention should be given to reducing the already overweighted broadcasts in the Russian language so as to make needed provision for more non-Russian language broadcasts to Central and Eastern Europe and Asia."

I might add, incidentally, that in addition to the Ukrainian-language broadcasts and the expansion of the broadcasts in the Moslem languages, Moscow has stepped up its broadcasts in the Arabic by extending these broadcasts to five hours a day.

In view of the tasks of propaganda on the part of the West, as interpreted above, the matter is not one of reducing the broadcasts in the languages of the non-Russian peoples of Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Turkestan, but of expanding their time as well, and this is most important, of correcting and improving the contents of the broadcasts along the lines we have tried to indicate.



## **Ukrainian Struggle for Freedom Concerns Canada**

**SENATOR WALL AND MR. MANDZIUK  
ADDRESS CANADIAN PARLIAMENT IN OTTAWA  
ON UKRAINIAN STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL FREEDOM**

On January 22, 1959, two prominent Canadians of Ukrainian descent, Senator Vasil Wall and Deputy Nicholas Mandziuk, addressing the Canadian legislative assembly, commemorated in their speeches the anniversary of the proclamation of Ukrainian independence (January 22, 1918) and the union of all the Ukrainian ethnic territories in Kyiv (January 22, 1919).

Senator Wall dwelt above all on the effects of the Ukrainian revolution on the Ukrainian people, the setting up of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), its overthrow by the Red Russian troops, the sufferings of the Ukrainian people under the occupation by Moscow, and the unceasing struggle waged by all Ukrainians to free themselves from the Red Russian terrorist regime. "450,000 Canadians of Ukrainian origin are very glad to know that the Canadian Parliament is commemorating this anniversary of Ukrainian sovereignty and of the tragic struggle of the Ukrainian people for the independence of Ukraine," Senator Wall said in the course of his address. At the same time, he warned his audience that much propaganda would be disseminated amongst the Canadian citizens and other democratic peoples for the purpose of assuring them that the peoples enslaved by Red Russia were preparing to celebrate the "glorious" achievements of the "socialist competition," which allegedly represent the crowning point in the successful development of the socialist economy since the Communist revolution of 1917.

Senator Wall stressed the fact that the young Ukrainian state had only succumbed to the blows dealt by the superior forces of the enemy owing to the lack of support on the part of the Western powers. After the liberation struggle, Ukraine was invaded by Red Moscow, Poland, Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia. After World War II, almost all the Ukrainian territories (with but a few exceptions) were occupied by the troops of the so-called Soviet Union. The Red Russians and their Ukrainian puppet government in Kyiv, so Senator Wall added, will continue to affirm that the Ukrainian people gained their independence and freedom with the help of the "happy" peoples of the Soviet Union, above all, with the help of the Russian "elder brother." In this connection, the Russian Communists will refrain from adding that Ukraine under Soviet Russian occupation has been a country of fear,

of political terrorism, of concentration camps, of genocide, of artificially created famines, of religious persecution and of persistent cultural Russification.

Senator Wall reminded the members of the Canadian Parliament that, since the Russian October revolution of 1917, there have, in fact, been two distinct and opposing currents in the Soviet Union; on the one hand, incessant Russian political terrorism in Ukraine and in the other non-Russian countries, and, on the other hand, the constant struggle for national liberation of the subjugated Ukrainian and other non-Russian peoples. He emphasized that Canada, since it enjoyed all democratic rights, must not forget the heroic Ukrainian people. The anniversary of Ukrainian national sovereignty and union, he said, was being commemorated by 2,000,000 Ukrainian refugees all over the free world, and added that the 45 million Ukrainians living under Red Russian terrorism and subjugation were firmly convinced that their liberation would inevitably materialize, since justice was bound to triumph over Russian treachery and lies.

After giving a survey of the Ukrainian situation, the unification of East and West Ukraine as the Ukrainian National Republic and the overthrow of the latter by its aggressors on all sides, Senator Wall said that these events were an indication of the long-awaited process of the gradual disintegration of the Russian empire into its national components. This process, however, was not effected in 1919, and, consequently, the Western democracies gradually became involved in a situation of grave danger, inasmuch as they were threatened by the Russian Communist imperium in its present form. Senator Wall pointed out that the Western free world, by refusing to extend President Wilson's doctrine of the self-determination of nations to the peoples of former Russia who had proclaimed their independence, had saved the Communist October counter-revolution. He added that one could well argue that the Western powers, by supporting such White Russian adventurers as Denikin and Wrangel, the Polish general Haller and others, had helped the Red Russians to crush the democratic movements for national liberation of the peoples of former tsarist Russia and of Ukraine, too; in other words, it might well be said that the anti-totalitarian West had thus helped the Russian Communists to maintain the totalitarian Russian Communist counter-revolution in all the territories of former tsarist Russia; in this way, the Russian Communists had succeeded in reconquering the colonies of former Russia, including the largest and most promising, namely the Ukrainian National Republic, which had ceased to exist on November 20, 1920.

In conclusion, Senator Wall emphasized that the solution of the Ukrainian problem was of tremendous importance for the liberation struggle of all peoples of the Western world and also for peace in the whole world. The Ukrainian people, he said, were fully entitled to express their own free will and to choose their own form of government, which, incidentally, they had done in 1918 and 1919 by establishing a sovereign and united Ukraine that was recognized by many sovereign states and even temporarily by Red Russia (in 1918), too. And this fact, he added, was not a myth, or a case of misguided chauvinism, unrealistic adventurism, or imperialistic bourgeois intrigue, as the Russian Communists were fond of alleging.

The second speaker was Mr. N. Mandziuk. Referring to the commemoration of the great historical events in Ukraine on January 22, 1918, and January 22, 1919, he sharply criticized the Soviet Russification policy in Ukraine. The Red Russian aggressors, he said, had tried to conceal this Russification from the free world and had sought to convince the Western world that the peoples enslaved by Moscow are "Russians." But these peoples, as he rightly pointed out, have no desire to have anything in common with their Russian subjugators. The Ukrainian language, culture, history and traditions are quite distinct from those of Russia. The history of Ukraine goes back two hundred years further than that of Russia, which was not even called Russia in former times, but Muscovy (until the battle of Poltava in 1709, when the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazeppa and his ally, King Charles XII of Sweden, were defeated by the Russian Tsar Peter I). Continuing, Mr. Mandziuk said that Soviet Russian propaganda endeavoured to camouflage the enslavement and Russification of Ukraine by quoting futile watchwords about the "sovereignty" of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and by affirming that Ukraine was a member of the United Nations and had its own constitution, a fact which allegedly guarantees the republics of the Soviet Union the right to secede from the Soviet Union (sic!) and to have their own separate diplomatic representatives abroad. Mr. Mandziuk then raised the question as to whether there were any Ukrainian diplomatic representatives abroad. The answer, he said, was no! In Ottawa, too, there was no official representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; nor, so he pointed out, had such countries as Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia or Byelorussia any diplomatic representatives abroad, since their constitutions merely existed on paper for the purpose of deceiving the free world.

The aggressors in the Kremlin were demanding that the Western powers should withdraw from Berlin, but, as Mr. Mandziuk emphasized, who was going to demand that Khrushchov should withdraw from East Germany, or who was going to put the same demand to Moscow with regard to Poland, Ukraine and Hungary, etc.? "I should like to do so by submitting an appeal to this effect to the free world," continued Mr. Mandziuk.

In conclusion, Mr. Mandziuk expressed his firm conviction that the Russian Communist aggressors would not be able to stop the steady advance of the enslaved peoples towards their ultimate liberation and the setting up of their national and independent states. "The liberated peoples will be, we can be sure of that, our potential allies in our struggle against tyranny of any kind and against the inhuman subjugation of former sovereign peoples,"—were Mr. Mandziuk's closing words.

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Prince Jan Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz

## THE BATTLE OF POLTAVA

(June 27—July 8, 1709)<sup>1</sup>

### The Historical Background

When Moscow, in 1939, in connection with the 230th anniversary of the battle of Poltava held a noisy dress rehearsal, as it were, of the 250th anniversary — due in the year 1959 — of its victory which proved so fatal for Ukraine, it is quite possible that the ruler in the Kremlin at that time, Joseph Stalin, a born Georgian whose real name was Soso Dzhugashvili, recalled the old rumours about the alleged Georgian origin of his predecessor, Tsar Peter I.

These rumours, which, of course, were unproved and unprovable, affirmed that the real father of Peter I was not Tsar Alexis, but the handsome Georgian Prince Archil; and that during the latter's lengthy stay at the Court in Moscow, the last wife of Tsar Alexis, young Natalia Naryshkina, had not been able to resist his passion.

During the many years that have followed since the said "dress rehearsal" of the big jubilee, the idea has been systematically enforced on all the peoples in the U.S.S.R. that Russia is invincible, that all the peoples who are her neighbours can only find happiness and prosperity by uniting with her, and that Russian world domination is unavoidable and inevitable; and the best proof of this is supposed to be the Russian conquest of Ukraine which, introduced by the "voluntary union" of the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 and consolidated by the Russian victory at Poltava in 1709, allegedly formed a bridge across centuries, across the history of the Ukrainian people, across its national mission and political task, — a bridge across which the Russian imperium entered Europe.

On July 6, 1939, the President of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, Professor A. Bohomolets, said at a celebration in Kyiv: "The battle of Poltava meant not only the end of the long struggle between Peter I and Sweden, but also the end

of all hostile attempts to enslave Ukraine. The invasion of Ukrainian territory by Charles XII united all the forces of the Ukrainian people in defence of their country and strengthened their friendship with their brother, the Russian people. The Cossacks deserted Hetman Mazepa, whom they regarded as a traitor to the interests of Ukraine, and joined forces with Peter. The Polish aristocrat, Mazepa, whom the bourgeois nationalists endeavour to represent as a champion of the independence of Ukraine, was in reality an adventurer, an agent of the Swedish aggressors. The victory of Poltava is concrete proof of the invincible strength of the Russian people, as well as of the Ukrainians. It also reminds us of the victory over intervention twenty years ago. If a war should be forced on us again, we shall, under the leadership of the Party and under the wise guidance of Comrade Stalin and in alliance with the Russian and all the other Soviet peoples, conquer the enemies for good, who are obstructing the path of Communism all over the world..."<sup>2</sup>)

As can be seen, this ode to the great imperial unity was made exactly on the lines of the former tsarist celebrations and manifestations, and so, too, was the apotheosis of the world mission of the "third Rome", which, in Communist disguise, is proceeding to carry out its aim of conquering the whole world.

In February 1869, the French publicist, economist and deputy of the Assemblée Constituante, Casimir Théodore Delamare, very fittingly said: "The whole of Europe was conquered together with Charles XII at Poltava. The day after their victory there, the Muscovites for the first time definitely penetrated Europe by seizing possession of Little Russia<sup>3</sup>). This victory seems to them so important that they still celebrate its anniversary even today, whereas other victories have long since been forgotten. And even nowadays, the Ruthenians, who are called "Little Russians", still do not designate the Muscovites as "Russians"; they strive for independence, and the Petersburg government regards them as more dangerous enemies than the Poles... Actually, and history must not forget this fact, those whom we nowadays call Ruthenians were called Rusinians<sup>4</sup>) before the time of Peter I, and their countries were called Russian or Ruthenian (*les Russies* ou *les Ruthénies*) whilst those whom we call "Russians" were called Muscovites, and their country was called Muscovy"<sup>5</sup>).

But however convincing C. Th. Delamare's arguments might be, the Western world in those days already refused to consider them,



just as today, too, it for the most part still refuses to consider them; once it had accepted the theories of Russian historiography, these seemed more familiar and understandable to it than historical truth.

Had there been no Russian victory at Poltava, Muscovy would not have become a Russian imperium, and there would be no one amongst the Ukrainians who would regard this imperium with affection and esteem. Had this Russian victory never happened, Peter I would not have been able to make any alliance plans with the French Regent, Duke Philip of Orleans, — plans which were consolidated in the 19th century and still weigh heavily on French foreign policy even today. In that case, Europe would not have experienced the Muscovite hordes who, under the leadership of 'Suvorov, the "Prince of Italy"<sup>6)</sup>, enslaved Italy and crossed the Alps; nor would these hordes have infiltrated into Warsaw, Sofia and Bucharest and, finally, into Vienna and Berlin, too; nor would they have reached Paris in 1814 and would be dreaming of entering Paris once more.

At the beginning of the 18th century, the whole of Western and Central Europe was involved in war and this fact diverted its attention from events in Eastern Europe. The dynastic quarrel between the Bourbons and the Habsburgs for the Spanish throne became the excuse for Britain, the Netherlands and Piedmont, together with Sardinia, to join forces with the Habsburgs in order to encircle and crush France; and though France did not give in, but, after heavy losses, succeeded in overcoming this crisis in an illustrious way, she was not able to give her ally, the King of Sweden, much help.

Just as in the West France's power evoked jealousy and hostility, so, too, this was the case in East Europe with the powerful Swedish kingdom.

After a long line of vigorous, active and successful generals, a fifteen-year old youth succeeded to the throne in Sweden in 1696. This seemed a favourable opportunity to all Sweden's neighbours to repel Sweden, either by claiming "historical rights" to certain frontier regions of the Swedish kingdom, or by demanding that certain national units should be protected, or simply by endeavouring to appropriate what could be appropriated.

King Frederick of Denmark and Norway thought of renewing the Union of Kalmar, which in 1397 had united the whole of Scandinavia, for own advantage. August II, the Elector of Saxony and King

of Poland, wanted to secure the right of succession as regards his throne which he had obtained by election, and was eager to acquire suitable territories in the Baltic countries for his numerous offspring. Peter I of Muscovy was intent upon appropriating Ingria and Estonia in order to set up a "window towards Europe" in the North. And even Frederick I, the Elector of Brandenburg and later King of Prussia, who was not really an enemy of Sweden, joined forces with them in the hope of being able to annex West Pomerania and the adjoining islands.

Peter I was the soul of this anti-Swedish union, the instigator of this encirclement of Sweden, intended to "preserve the balance of power in the North", which was a most senseless diplomatic idea and one that caused Europe no end of trouble in the course of the 18th century. With typically Russian consistency, he set various "fifth columns" going, caused dissension in the Swedish Diet, made all sorts of promises — for instance, he promised the principality of Kyiv and the Hetmanate of Ukraine to the famous John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, — without having any intention whatever of keeping these promises, and did his utmost to undermine Swedish resistance first of all by a "cold" war and then later break it down for good by "hot" war.

But things turned out quite differently. The youth who had succeeded to the throne of the Vasa dynasty was declared of age before he was sixteen and, within a short time, by commanding his own army and forcing his will on the veterans who had fought under his grandfather — and, incidentally, his knowledge and insight astounded both experienced statesmen and generals, silenced his belligerent Danish neighbour and the latter's Prussian namesake, destroyed Peter's army at Narva and forced August II to declare himself defeated and to renounce his intentions to claim the Baltic countries and Poland.

In spite of the fact that Western Europe was fully occupied with its own wars and troubles, it was truly amazed. The press compared Charles XII to Alexander the Great and extolled him as a noble-minded, talented and gallant ruler. The Duke of Marlborough, Prince Eugène of Savoy and various French marshals, — the most capable and experienced generals of those days — visited Charles XII in his military headquarters.

But further intrigues on the part of Peter I prolonged the war. It continued in Poland as an internal conflict between the adherents

of the newly elected King Stanislas (Stanislaw) Leszczynski and those of August II, whom Peter untiringly helped both with financial and other kinds of support. The war also continued in the Finnish frontier territory, where Swedish forces were constantly harassed by local "partisans," the prototype of the present Communist "Fifth Columns" in the free world. Charles XII was obliged to defend himself on all sides. His successful campaigns in Poland and Saxony involved him for several years in the so-called "Great Nordic War," and it was not until 1707 that he decided to deal personally with his tough opponent in the East.

### **The Campaign to Ukraine**

At the end of the year 1707, Charles XII, who had previously mopped up the Russian and Russian-Polish troops in Poland, advanced via Lithuania and Byelorussia towards Moscow, and in doing so endeavoured to maintain the communication lines with his material bases, namely with the troops of General Krassau in Poland and with those of General Count Löwenhaupt beneath Riga, which also included General Lybeker's that was to besiege the town and fortress of St. Petersburg, founded a short time before by Peter I.

The Russian retreated before Charles' advance and, in keeping with their traditional strategy, set fire to and destroyed everything, so as to leave only devastated regions behind. The Russian high command, for the first time aided by numerous German generals in Russian service, as well as by certain Russian generals who had been trained abroad, endeavoured to emulate the European strategists and tacticians, but fundamentally adhered faithfully to the main Russian strategic principle, which both Kutuzov in 1812 and Stalin in 1941 applied: namely, to wear down the enemy by a rapid retreat in their own vast area and to entice him away from his bases, but only to engage in big battles if their own forces were numerically far superior to those of the enemy, or if there were no other alternative.

But Charles' battle plan was well thought out, and the course which he chose was the simplest and also the most expedient. Furthermore, Charles pursued this course in an extremely skilful way, inasmuch as he forced the Russians, by his rapid movements, to engage in combats against their will. On reaching the Vistula, Charles carried out a surprise attack on and destroyed the right flank of the Russian forces, thus compelling Peter to retreat hu-

riedly to Grodno, where troops numbering about 50,000 were concentrated. Thereupon, Charles, without delay, forced the Russian fortified line along the River Niemen, thus compelling Peter to move the bulk of his forces to the line along the River Dnipro.

All this took about a year, however, since Charles was, incidentally, at the same time also compelled again and again to suppress the tumult in Poland. It was not until June 1708 that he moved his troops from the River Niemen. On June 14, he crossed the River Berezina, on June 25, the River Drush, and on July 3, he defeated Prince Repnin's division at Holovchyn; in this combat, however, he suffered considerable losses, particularly in the cavalry. This gave the Russians a chance to re-group their forces on the left bank of the Dnipro, but, even so, Charles succeeded in seizing the strategically important town of Mohyliv (Mogilev) on the right bank of the river, and Peter's efforts to recapture this town proved unsuccessful.

Charles remained in Mohyliv a whole month; from his headquarters in this town he issued a command to Count Löwenhaupt to join the royal army, with his ammunition and other supplies, without delay, and sent orders to General Lybeker to undertake the siege of St. Petersburg; he also suggested to the Polish King Stanislas Leszczyński that he should push onwards to Kyiv as fast as possible with his Polish troops and those of the Swedish General Krassau, since there was danger of the Polish Crown Hetman Sieniawski, who, together with loyal adherents of King August II, was stationed in Podillia (Podolia), attacking the Swedish royal army from the rear.

At that time Charles' Swedish troops numbered about 40 000; Löwenhaupt was to bring him a further reinforcement of 12 000 men, and with King Stanislas and his adherents — Count Potocki, the governor of Vilna, Sapieha, Prince Wisniowiecki (related to Hetman Mazeppa by marriage) — and General Krassau's troops, about 20 000 men were to advance into Ukraine. This was about the same total number of troops that Peter had at his disposal along the Dnipro, — and the Swedes had not forgotten how their young king in 1700 had defeated 50 000 Russians with only 8 000 men at Narva (a fact which lowered Russia's prestige in the whole of Europe very considerably).

It can be assumed that Charles used his one-month's sojourn in Mohyliv to secure provisions of every kind for his army, as well

as to carry on negotiations with the Crimean Tatars and the Turks, and also with Hetman Mazeppa. In the Polish version by Anton Hercyk (of 1756) of Voltaire's "History of Charles XII", we find the following passage on p. 142: "And since one needs insight no less than courage in war, the King reached a secret agreement with the Cossack Hetman Mazeppa, and, since he intended to join forces with him, he advanced into Ukraine, after previously informing General Löwenhaupt of the direction which this campaign was to take; although his troops were obliged for three whole weeks to overcome numerous difficulties owing to the fact that their route passed through many swamps and forests, he did not allow himself to be discouraged; on the other hand, however, the failures of General Löwenhaupt at Lisna (Lyesnaya), of General Lybeker in Ingria and of King Stanislas in Poland caused him considerable anxiety".

The fact that the original route of the campaign (via Smolensk to Moscow) was then changed and that the troops veered south was thus necessitated by the heavy defeats suffered by other Swedish corps and, in all probability, also by a shortage of food supplies. The decision to advance into Ukraine was reached in the middle of September 1708, in Soboliv, immediately after successful combats had been carried out near Dobre and Rayivka (in Byelorussia). The author of the most outstanding work — from the point of view of military history — on Charles' campaign in 1708-1709, a work published in Russian before the first world war, — M. Yunakiv, later a general of the Ukrainian national army, affirms that this veering southwards "was neither in keeping with the conditions of the forces, nor with those of place and time, and was nothing but a very dangerous adventure"7).

On this point M. Yunakiv thus agrees with the military historians of the 19th century, who sharply criticize Charles' campaign to Ukraine. But this campaign it seems, even though it was by no means in keeping with Mazeppa's plans, was prompted by more important reasons, namely as the only way out of a dangerous situation which had arisen out of various misfortunes. The Swedes suffered one heavy blow after another — and most of them were unforeseen. General Lagerkrona, who was in command of the vanguard, lost his way, a fact which held up the campaign considerably. Count Löwenhaupt, who was to bring the King large reinforcements, was defeated by the Russians at Lisna and at Proposk, and, after ex-

hausting combats, joined the King with only 7 000 men left, all of them exhausted and starving, after having lost the whole of his artillery, as well as all his ammunition and food supplies. The civil war in Poland prevented the Swedish troops there from advancing. The Russians, on the other hand, were constantly favoured by fortune, as M. Yunakiv by no means denies, for he stresses the fact, for instance, that their "big results" were not achieved by realizing the "principle of using a victory to advantage" (namely the victory at Lisna), but "thanks to chance", for "the Russian army at that time was not yet capable of realizing the principle of using a victory to advantage to any considerable extent".

On October 21, 1708, after he had already marched into Ukraine, Charles halted his troops at Panurivka, and it was here that the Cossack colonel Bystrytsky, a high official at the Hetman's court and related to Mazeppa by marriage, reached him. He brought the King a letter from Mazeppa, as well as a memorandum for the Swedish Chancellor, Count Piper. By October 24, Charles had already reached the village of Horky, about 10 kilometres away from the important town of Novhorod Siversk. Bystrytsky took the King's reply and that of his Chancellor back to Mazeppa and on October 22 reached the village of Borzna, where he handed them over personally to the Hetman. In spite of its difficult route, the Swedish army advanced fairly speedily, at a rate of 12 kilometres on foot each day; thus, in the two last weeks prior to the offensive (with two days of rest), for instance, it marched about 150 kilometres. In this connection the fact must not be overlooked that the Swedish forces were constantly being harassed by the Russian cavalry.

*(To be continued.)*

#### NOTES

1) The original Ukrainian text of this article — slightly abbreviated in this translation — by the well-known Ukrainian diplomat and historian who died in London in 1954, was published in the London monthly "Vyzvol'ny Shliakh" ("The Path of Liberation"), № 9-10, under the title "Biy pid Poltavoyu".

2) The official organ of Moscow, "Izvestiya", of July 6, 1939.

3) That is to say Ukraine (excluding the western regions).

4) A misunderstanding: there is only an orthographical difference according to the Latin transcription) between "Ruthenian" and "Russian."

5) "A European People forgotten by History" (a Memorandum to the French Senate) — Paris periodical "La Patrie", February, 1869.

6) Tsar Paul I conferred this absurd title on his Generalissimo Suvorov after he had "won his laurels" in Italy and Switzerland.

*V. Shandor*

## **The 20th Anniversary of the Arbitration of Vienna\***

“Although the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed by an international treaty, this autonomy was never introduced until the disintegration of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Carpatho-Ukraine became a Czech colony, to which the Czech government sent its officials en masse; the educational system was partly subjected to Czech influence, and the Russophil element was intentionally supported in order to undermine the Ukrainian national movement, which gradually asserted itself amongst the native population, even though the latter was uneducated and intimidated as a result of centuries of Hungarian rule. Very little was done (by the Czech government) to protect the Ukrainian population from starvation and famine at times when the harvest was poor or when other natural catastrophes occurred. But, even so, Carpatho-Ukraine, in the course of the twenty years that it remained under Czech rule, experienced a great cultural progress: a network of primary schools and Ukrainian secondary schools was set up throughout the country, the Ukrainian press and literature flourished, and there was also a certain progress in scientific research. With the disintegration of the Czecho-Slovak Republic in autumn 1938, the small country of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed itself an independent republic, with the priest Avhustyn Voloshyn at its head as President. Within a

few weeks, the independent state existence of this republic was organized and economic, cultural and educational matters were settled. But the independent Carpatho-Ukrainian state was unable to assert itself against Hungarian aggression, above all since its neighbours were hostile Poland and unfriendly Slovakia and Roumania. Despite the desperate resistance put up by the Ukrainian troops, the Hungarian forces occupied Carpatho-Ukraine in spring 1939 and destroyed all its national achievements, which it had accomplished during the twenty years that it had been part of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and during the brief period of its independence".

(D. Doroshenko, "Istoriya Ukrayiny", New York, 1957, par. 128).

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"Germany has nothing to gain by a long-lasting peace" — such was the conclusion drawn by Hitler at an important secret conference with his military and political associates on November 5, 1937, in Berlin. In the course of this conference a decision was reached to the effect that the further expansion of Germany was to proceed eastward, namely via Ukraine — via this country on the Black Sea which was the gateway to the Near East. Ukraine as a German colony was to play an important part for Germany in the latter's fight with the Western powers. This decision incidentally, also decided the further fate of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, since Hitler in the event of a military campaign to the East would need an effective rear cover. For this reason, the trend and development of Hitler's policy towards Austria and Czecho-Slovakia must be assessed from the point of view of the said conference of November 1937<sup>2</sup>).

At the Munich Conference of the four Major Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany) on September 22, 1938, the unanimous resolution was passed that the problem of the Hungarian and Polish national minorities in Czecho-Slovakia should be solved by the states concerned amongst themselves within three months' time; if not, then this problem was to be solved by a conference of the four Major Powers.

For this reason notes were then exchanged between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, and a definite date for a joint conference was fixed, namely October 9 (in Komarno). The Czecho-Slovak delegation was headed by Dr. Joseph Tiso, later President of the indepen-



dent state of Slovakia (1939-1944); Carpatho-Ukraine (at that time still known officially by the designation "Carpathian Rus") was represented by Dr. Ivan Parkaniy, and Hungary by its Foreign Minister, Dr. Kanya. The conference was torpedoed by Hungary; the delegates failed to reach an agreement on the controversial state frontiers, since the demands made by Hungary were too exorbitant. For this reason, the entire question was left to the arbitration of Italy and Germany.

In the meantime, however, that is between the breaking off of the said negotiations and the subsequent arbitration of Vienna, considerable changes took place in public life in Carpatho-Ukraine. The assertions of the Ukrainians to the effect that there was a camouflaged pro-Hungarian campaign, actively supported by Poland, at work in Carpatho-Ukraine under the guise of the so-called "Russian element" or Moscow-phil element, proved to be correct. But, unfortunately, it took the Czechs twenty years to finally see through the treacherous game of the so-called "Carpatho-Russians".

At the session of the ministerial council in Prague on October 26, the Prime Minister of the autonomus Carpathian government, A. Brodiy, made a proposal which would have been advantageous for Hungary, inasmuch as he demanded that a plebiscite for or against a union with Hungary should be held throughout the entire territory of Carpatho-Ukraine; the Prime Minister of the Czecho-Slovak Central Government, General J. Syrový, thereupon affirmed that Brodiy's proposal was high treason and had him removed from office and arrested. There can be no doubt about the fact that A. Brodiy's provocative proposal was co-ordinated beforehand with Hungarian tactics. Monsignor Dr. Augustin (Avhustyn) Voloshyn was now appointed Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister, and the members of his government included the Ministers of State Dr. E. Bachynsky and Yuliy Revay.

The removal from office and arrest of A. Brodiy came as an unpleasant surprise for Hungary and Poland; and, in fact, crossed their plans regarding the speedy liquidation of the Czecho-Slovak Federative Republic and the setting up of a joint Hungarian and Polish state frontier.

Dr. E. Bachynsky, the authorized representative of the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous government for delimitation matters, called on the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, in Berlin and discussed the said matters with him. Hungary and Poland had

meanwhile undertaken a diplomatic campaign in Germany, Italy, Roumania and Yugoslavia, in order to win over the governments of these countries for the setting up of a joint Hungarian and Polish frontier (that is, for the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary); in the course of his talk with Ribbentrop, Dr. Bachynsky sharply protested against the claims raised by Hungary and stressed that he himself had already had some unpleasant experiences with the Hungarians and that "a Hungarian regime in Carpatho-Ukraine would mean the merciless suppression of the Ukrainian national character"<sup>3</sup>).

On November 2, 1938, the German and Italian court of arbitration, to which the governments of Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary had appealed, convened at the palace of Belvedere, Vienna, the former residence of the famous Prince Eugène of Savoy<sup>4</sup>), for the purpose of settling the question of the Hungarian national minority in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. The members of this court of arbitration included the Foreign Ministers of the two arbiter-states, Ribbentrop and Count Ciano, Foreign Minister Dr. Chvalkovsky as representative of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Foreign Minister Dr. Kanya as representative of Hungary, and Prime Minister Monsignor Dr. Voloshyn representing the autonomous state of Carpatho-Ukraine.

Prior to the decision passed by the court of arbitration, the Hungarians, in the course of private talks, suggested that the whole of Carpatho-Ukraine should be united to Hungary on the strength of a far-reaching autonomy. This suggestion was, however, definitely rejected by Monsignor Dr. Voloshyn.

The decision of the Vienna court of arbitration proved even more unfavourable than had been expected. Hungary received the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine, Uzhhorod, where only 18 per cent of the population were Hungarian, and, in addition, the important towns of Mukachiv and Berehovo; 1 700 square kilometres of Carpatho-Ukrainian territory (i. e. 13.5 per cent of the total area) with a total population of 194 000 were ceded to Hungary by the Vienna court of arbitration.

In connection with the decision of the said court, the first Carpatho-Ukrainian Central People's Council in Uzhhorod issued a manifesto to the people, which contained the following statement: "The authorized representatives of our government were forced to accept this agreement, since our forces are not strong enough to

fight against world powers. This sad news must not cause your nationally conscious sons to despair... The day will come when our whole nation will be united in one state and will be its own master on its own soil"<sup>5</sup>).

The heaviest loss was the cession of the towns of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv to Hungary, a fact which was not in keeping with the initial plan of the German government, as can be seen from the statement made by Ribbentrop to the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky on October 25, 1938<sup>6</sup>).

Furthermore, as a result of the decision of the Vienna court of arbitration, Carpatho-Ukraine was deprived of her communication lines with the rest of the world. The Hungarians were convinced that the government and population of Carpatho-Ukraine would not be able to cope with their communication difficulties and would eventually capitulate to Hungary of their own accord; but this supposition proved false.

Hungary and Poland publicly attacked the young Carpatho-Ukrainian state, which soon after the Vienna arbitration became independent, abroad with all the means at their disposal. The Polish government even went so far in its hatred as to designate the government of Monsignor Dr. Voloshyn as "Bolshevist" in the official notes sent by its Foreign Minister to the embassies of other states. In these same notes various Carpatho-Ukrainian towns were enumerated, in which the Carpatho-Ukrainian government had allegedly caused local "Soviets" to be set up!

If one bears in mind, however, that Hungary and Poland from the outset had concentrated all their diplomatic forces on the destruction of the Carpatho-Ukrainian state, then one is bound to come to the conclusion that the decision of the Vienna court of arbitration can hardly be regarded as a big success for them. But Hungary, as a loyal ally of Hitler, did not cease to hope that it would eventually succeed in subjecting the whole of Carpatho-Ukraine. Hitler, for his part, did not categorically deny such a possibility; on the contrary, in his capacity of "broker" he wanted to get his "commission" on this deal. Hitler's main concern in this respect was to win over Hungary, which at that time was still a member of the League of Nations, to his side completely. For this reason, when Horthy, Imredy and Kanya, in the course of their talks with Hitler on August 23, 1938, stressed that the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine was of primary importance, they were explicitly told by Ribbentrop:

"Those who don't do their share, will go empty-handed". And Hitler corroborated the words of his Foreign Minister by adding: "Those who want to sit at table, must also help in the kitchen". Horthy understood the meaning of these words and affirmed in his answer that Hungary was prepared to do its share. And, actually, Hungary did not waver in its loyalty to Hitler; indeed, as a sign of its loyalty and gratitude, one of the finest squares in Budapest was renamed Hitler Square.

The signatures of the authorized representatives of the states concerned, including that of the Hungarian representative, had hardly been affixed to the protocols of the Vienna court of arbitration when Hungary again began to carry out a new plan of attack against Carpatho-Ukraine. Hungary had realized that it would not succeed in winning over world opinion to its side with regard to the Carpatho-Ukrainian affair; hence it decided to destroy this country by means of armed force.

Less than three weeks after the decision of the Vienna court of arbitration, the Hungarian military attaché in Rome, Colonel Szabo, informed Mussolini that "Hungary" was willing "to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine within the next twenty-four hours" and that it had received the approval of the German government as far as this step was concerned. Mussolini likewise gave his approval and even gave orders that a hundred planes, manned by Italian airmen in Hungarian uniform, should take part in the attack on Carpatho-Ukraine; though he withdrew the help that he had promised in the form of planes and airmen when it transpired that the said Hungarian military attaché had informed him wrongly. Hitler had, in fact, not given his consent at all and did not know anything at all about this plan. Indeed, he was all the more surprised to learn of this Hungarian plan since he had received a written assurance from the Hungarian government that it would not take any steps against the Carpatho-Ukrainian state without Germany's consent. On Hitler's behalf, Ribbentrop handed Mussolini an explanatory statement which included the following sentence: "The Führer is of the opinion that the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary would bring discredit upon the Axis Powers, since Hungary accepted their decision unconditionally three weeks ago".

Later on, however, namely in March 1939, Hitler gave his permission for Hungary to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine without taking the possible "discredit upon the Axis Powers" into account at all.

For, behind the scenes of this political game for Carpatho-Ukraine another player had meanwhile appeared, — namely Stalin. Indeed, it was at the cost of Carpatho-Ukraine and Ukrainian affairs in general that Hitler gained the “friendly neutrality” of Stalin and the chance to make the German-Soviet pact of 1939.

Seen in retrospect after twenty years have elapsed and viewed from the aspect of the international situation which has meanwhile ensued and still continues to exist, the policy of the Hungarians and also of the Poles — both then and now — must be regarded on principle with considerable reservation, not only with respect to Carpatho-Ukraine, but also as far as the Ukrainian fight for freedom in general is concerned. The arbitration of Vienna was merely the prelude to the subsequent tragedy of Carpatho-Ukraine in March 1939<sup>8</sup>). It was the result of the policy to increase their power which was pursued by Hitler and Hungary against the policy of right, as represented by the Carpatho-Ukrainians. The decision of the Vienna court of arbitration set up no historical precedent in international relations and was, in fact, assessed as negative by world opinion.

Hungary and Poland fought the young Carpatho-Ukrainian state with all the means at their disposal, including armed intervention. Later, namely in 1944, both these states fell a victim to the same violence and force which they had used in the case of Carpatho-Ukraine. In the days of the arbitration of Vienna, both Hungary and Poland refused to recognize the fact that the existence of the Carpatho-Ukrainian state was based on the same legal, ethical and Christian principles as was the existence of their own states. The constant fight on the part of the Hungarians and Poles against the right of the Ukrainian nation to an independent state existence was and still is a painful memory to the Ukrainians. But what is equally painful today for Hungary and Poland is the fact that they, too, have been deprived of their national and state right.

Europe has in appearance undergone a radical change in the course of the twenty years that have elapsed since the arbitration of Vienna. The Ukrainian countries — with but few exception — now form a political unity (even though it is one which is not free), a fact which will continue to stabilize the state frontiers of Ukraine. And Ukraine will continue to be the deciding territory should Moscow and the West pit their strength against each other. For this reason, the rest of the peoples of East Europe — in order to safeguard their own national and state interests — must find a positive way

to cooperate with an independent Ukraine. Only genuine cooperation and mutual respect of each other's state rights will guarantee freedom to the peoples of Central and East Europe, will establish a permanent foundation for peace and will set up an impenetrable bulwark against all aggressive claims from the East.

#### NOTES

\*) The original Ukrainian text of this article was published in the Chicago monthly "Ovyd" (1958, № 9-98). Since the article is mainly concerned with the early history of the independent Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic (proclaimed on March 14, 1939, and overthrown shortly afterwards by military force, namely by Hungarian occupation troops), we are prefacing the translation — in order to give a better appreciation of the anniversary of March 14, 1939, which is celebrated by all free Ukrainians — with a short historical survey of the event concerned from Dmytro Doroshenko's work, "History of Ukraine".

2) Hitler also used the problem of the Sudeten Germans in the Czecho-Slovak Republic to advantage and, in the interest of German expansion in the east, included it in the terms of the Munich Agreement.

3) Documents of German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Department of State, Series D, Vol. IV, p. 91.

4) Who, together with the Duke of Marlborough, defeated the French at Blenheim (1704).

5) This naturally applies to the idea, long-cherished by the Carpatho-Ukrainians, of a free union with all the other West and East Ukrainian Countries.

6) Ibid., p. 10.

7) Ibid., p. 156.

8) Although the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic, to begin with, had no fighting forces, the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in this respect was so vigorous and the patriotism of the population so great that, within a few months, a paramilitary organization, the "Carpatho-Ukrainian Sich", was set up, which hundreds of volunteers from Galicia and from the ranks of the Ukrainian emigrants in Czechia and Slovakia, etc., also joined. Although the political and military situation during the open attack carried out by the regular Hungarian army in March was completely hopeless for the Carpatho-Ukrainian troops, the latter heroically defended the capital, Khust, against the superior forces of the enemy until most of them were killed in this unequal battle.

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V. Derzhavyn

## THE SOVIET LANGUAGE-POLICY IN UKRAINE

### 1. General Principles of the Soviet Language-Policy

Since the lingual Russification of Ukraine — the aim of the Bolshevik regime — by no means represents a special isolated case, but is entirely in keeping with the general principles of the Soviet policy adopted with regard to all the non-Russian languages in the U.S.S.R., we should, in the first place, like to discuss these principles before passing on to the concrete, tactically necessitated and thus, to a certain extent, changeable forms which their application assumes, in particular in Soviet Ukraine. The fluctuations and changes in the Soviet language-policy are, on the whole, in keeping with the “dialectic” zigzag course of the Soviet national and cultural policy<sup>1)</sup> in general and can without difficulty be ranged in the historical course of the entire home policy and, in part, of the foreign policy, too, of the Soviet Union. But there are still, even today, a lot of false conceptions in this respect in the West, which are either based on out-of-date reports or else have arisen out of the fact that motives and aims have been ascribed to the Soviet language-policy which hold good in the Western world, but which in the U.S.S.R. are merely used as propagandist watchwords and have neither value nor meaning for the Bolshevik “class ideology”.

A book — in itself worthy of consideration — by Heinz Kloss, entitled "The Development of the New Germanic Cultural Languages from 1800 to 1950" ("Die Entwicklung neuer germanischer Kultursprachen von 1800 bis 1950", Munich, 1952), can in this respect be regarded as a drastic example. H. Kloss not only affirms that "the country which more than any other country seeks to subordinate irrational forces and impulses to the rational — the Soviet Union — has gone a long way in its respect for the languages of less important nations" (p. 11), but also gives as the reason for this allegedly positive attitude on the part of the Soviet regime towards the languages of "smaller peoples", its "understanding" for "social justice". H. Kloss, however, feels obliged to admit that at least the so-called Yiddish language (the language of the Jews of East Europe which is based on a German dialect of the Middle Ages and has absorbed Hebrew and, to some extent, also Slav words) is not an appropriate example of Bolshevik "social justice", since, as he points out, the Soviets in this case obviously applied the policy of "forcible assimilation" (p. 47); but H. Kloss seems to be entirely unaware of the fact that in this respect Yiddish is by no means an exception<sup>2</sup>).

Actually, the languages of the "smaller peoples" are only treated with "respect" — that is to say, tolerated — when their specific and particular character is an obstacle to the formation of larger lingual groups and, thus, an advantage to Moscow's centralization policy of Russification. Thus, for example, the promising attempts to form a common northwest Turkish written and literary language were systematically eradicated by the Bolsheviks, inasmuch as they raised various local lingual variants to the rank of legally recognized "national" languages, even though the variants in question (Kazan-Tatar, Bashkir, Khakas, Shor, etc.) can almost exclusively be regarded as dialects and do not differ more greatly from each other than do, for instance, various Muscovite (or "Great Russian") dialects or, say, High German dialects. But it is in this case a question of preventing the growth of a true and living national language by all the means which a totalitarian state has at its disposal, and for the very reason that the ties of a common language are forcibly broken by an artificial dialectic disintegration: since it is out of question that a national Democratic Republic of Idel-Ural should be allowed to exist (which was proclaimed by the authorized representatives of the Kazan-Tatars, Bashkirs and the Ugro-Finnic peoples



of the central Volga region on November 12, 1917), the Kazan-Tatars and the Bashkirs must not be allowed to have a common and uniform written language, even though their dialects only differ from each other to the extent that the German spoken in Bonn differs from that spoken in Munich.

In principle this is the same language policy of a ruling nation, directed towards the cultural discrimination of a subjugated nation, as was pursued by the Polish state during the period from 1918 to 1939 with regard to the West Ukrainians, which, in order to combat the all-Ukrainian national language, supported the oral and written use of certain minor West Ukrainian dialects (as for example, the Lemkian dialect in Western Galicia), as well as the so-called "Yazychiye", an almost antique sounding mixture of Church-Slavic, Russian and some local dialects, affected especially by the Russophile fragment of the West Ukrainian intellectual classes. A similar attitude was also adopted by the Czech regime during the years 1918 to 1939 with regard to the population of Carpatho-Ukraine.

But the forcible measures which these two officially "democratic-parliamentarian" states had at their disposal were fairly weak and zeal as regards a consistent language-policy was only lukewarm<sup>3</sup>), so that the anti-Ukrainian trends of this policy achieved hardly any or no success at all. The Soviet regime, however, on the other hand, has innumerable cultural and disciplinary forcible measures at its disposal and applies them ruthlessly, — both in the above-mentioned northwest Turkic regions and also in Turkestan, where the dialects of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kirgizstan, etc., which are closely related to each other, are systematically played off against the formation of a national and common Turkestanian written language. In North Caucasia, too, where small peoples only numbering 10 000 to 20 000 have been "favoured" with a "national" language of their own, which — in addition to the official language, Russian, of course, — has the exclusive right to a public, written and cultural existence, all signs of a natural trend to a lingual unification in the larger non-Russian ethnical groups (which continue to exist in spite of lingual disintegration) are likewise systematically curbed and, indeed, may be interpreted as "bourgeois nationalism" (or Pan-Turkism) and counter-revolutionary trends, etc., by the party and the government and punished accordingly.

Considerable importance is attached to the fact that the natural urge to a lingual unification — which, as a result of the intensive

industrialization in the entire U.S.S.R. under Soviet rule, has increased enormously and is still increasing — is used solely to the advantage of the official language, Russian, all the more so since the Caucasian native languages and dialects (with the exception of Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijanian, that is the state languages of the three Transcaucasian “national” Soviet Republics) are nowadays far more divided than was the case in the last century when, during the first half of the same, the Avaric language (numerically the most important language of Northeast Caucasia) and, during the latter half of the century, however, the Georgian language served as a practical means of communication between mountain peoples having different languages. Now, however, the Russian language is endeavouring to assume this role, — that is to say, an entirely foreign language with an entirely different structure, which has nothing whatever in common with the Caucasian lingual mentality<sup>4</sup>) and which, by its obligatory introduction in the role of a practical means of communication, for this very reason threatens to bring about an intensive de-nationalization of the Caucasian peoples in question.

It is thus self-evident that the greater the lingual isolation of individual peoples is, the easier does it become to Russify individual dialects.

A particularly striking example of this policy of “divide et impera” (“divide and rule”) in the lingual sphere can be seen from the way in which the Ugro-Finnic peoples along the middle reaches of the River Volga have been treated. A thousand years ago, they constituted a compact Ugro-Finnic population; now they are three closely related peoples: 1) the Mari or Cheremis north of the Volga (somewhere between Gorkiy and Kazan); 2) the Mordvins, south of the Volga, separated from the Mari by 9) the Chuvash, who speak Turko-Tataric, although they too are of Finno-Ugrian descent.

It is a matter of course for the Soviet regime to make the differences there permanent, even to increase them, and all is done for that purpose. Each of these three peoples was given its “autonomous” puppet government and its own “national” language officially placed on a par with the Russian state language. The interesting point is that the half million Mari had to content themselves with one “national” language, whereas the one and a half million Mordvins were given two: the Soviet government made use

of the fact that there were two slightly different dialects and divided the Mordvins into Erzya-Mordvins and Moksha-Mordvins, in order to make any cultural development on the strength of the native Mordvin language impossible; for whenever a Mordvin cannot make himself understood in his country dialect, he is obliged to resort to the Russian imperial language, — and this he does eventually.

It can thus be seen that the artificial preservation of local dialects is a drastic means of permanent de-nationalization and Russification. The Chuvash language, which is likewise spoken in the central Volga region by one and a half million Finno-Ugrians, would in all probability also have been dealt with in the same way by the Soviet, but since it is a Turko-Tatar language as far as its derivation and structure are concerned and, like all Turko-Tatar languages shows little tendency to split up into dialects, the Bolsheviks were obliged to recognize it as a uniform language. In fact, they had no other alternative in this case.

This brings us to the second characteristic feature of the Soviet language-policy — a feature which makes the whole problem even more complicated, namely its diversity as regards the different kinds of languages. A Turkish language cannot, for instance, be treated or abused in the same way as a Ugro-Finnic language; still less can a non-Slavic language, as for example the Moldavian dialect of the Roumanian language (in Bessarabia) undergo the same changes as, say, Ukrainian or Byelorussian, not to mention the enormous structural differences between the Aryan (Indo-European) group of languages and a number of non-Aryan groups (which to some extent also differ widely from one another).

The Slavic languages of the Soviet Union are being step by step reduced in grammar, vocabulary and phraseology to the level of a poor phonetic variance of the official Russian language. On the other hand, the non-Slavic languages are being submitted to a flood of words and expressions borrowed from Russian; but any serious encroachment on their morphology and syntax would make the language in question simply incomprehensible. For instance, the present position of Kazan-Tatar (spoken in the upper Volga region) is described as follows by one whose mother-tongue it is:

“In the Tartar and Bashkir press, various Russian and other strange words are constantly cropping up, words like “predsedatel” (chairman, president), “vlast” (authority), “verkhovnyi” (supreme), “distsiplina” (discipline), etc. Such words are used not because there

are no equivalents in Tartar, but because the press which is absolutely under the control of the Soviet government and party is really not able to prevent their infiltration. In that way the party seeks to achieve its Russification policy. These words are, however, not taking root among the people"<sup>5</sup>).

The Russian alphabet which was made obligatory at the end of the thirties is most unsuitable, even in its changed form, for non-Slavic speech, for instance for Turkish, Mongolian, Finno-Ugrian, Caucasian, Roumanian, and it is not much better for these languages than the Arabic alphabet which originally had no vowels. On the other hand, it promotes the Russification of the non-Slavic nations most definitely and isolates them from the Osman-Turks of Asia Minor who have gone over to Latin letters, as well as from the other Islam peoples who cling to the Arabic alphabet — quod erat demonstrandum.

Georgians, Armenians and the Jews (who for political reasons were less disturbed till the end of the thirties) are the only non-Slavic nations in the Soviet Union who have been able still to retain the alphabets of their forefathers against Moscow's Russification policy<sup>6</sup>); the Armenians, it is true, at the heavy cost of the apparent "simplification" of their orthography, the object of which is to make it much harder for them to understand their national literature of bygone centuries.

There remains the third main feature of Soviet language-policy, its variation according to its function. By that I mean the functional subjection of all non-Russian languages in the Soviet Union to the official Russian language, — a matter which has been overlooked, not only by the Western world, but also by the majority of the anti-Soviet émigré press, — and consequently their treatment at the hands of the Soviet government and the all-powerful party. The political role of the Russian language as the only generally understood means of intercourse within a consistently totalitarian state is so tremendous that it is hardly possible to grasp the outward-changing attitude of Soviet policy towards the non-Russian language groups, without taking into consideration what one might call the internal language policy of the Soviets towards their own official state language, i. e. Russian.

The chaos of the first years of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution (1917-1920) when on the one hand the equality of all languages of the world was proclaimed, while, on the other, even high func-

tionaries in the Communist Party were in danger of being shot in the streets by Russian soldiers of the Red Army, because they had carried on a conversation that was not in Russian<sup>7</sup>), may be explained by the uncertain attitude of the Russian Bolsheviks towards the Russian literary language itself, which was regarded on one side as a tool of capitalist exploitation, while at the same time it seemed — and really was — practically indispensable.

The following period, embracing the years 1921-1928, may be said to be a time of experiment in linguistics directed at "proletarianizing" the Russian official language and ridding it of its "bourgeois" flavour, that is depriving it of its European values in order to turn it into an unimpeachable tool for Communist class warfare propaganda; simultaneously the non-Russian national languages were experimented with and a certain freedom to develop was "granted" them.

However, as soon as the Russian official language was sufficiently "Sovietized" in one way or another, the "external" language policy was changed, and in 1929 the gradual Russification of the non-Russian peoples and nations began to be tightened up, and that went hand in hand with a ruthless mutilation of their languages. This process has lasted with few interruptions until today.

## 2. Stalin Versus Marr

This — in practice almost completely and in principle unchangeable — destructive attitude of the Bolshevik language policy towards the non-Russian peoples is not in the least impaired by the fact that a good deal has changed in Soviet Russian philology since 1929 and, in particular, since 1950, and, of course, in Moscow's language policy, too, since the former is not only controlled by the latter, but (at least since the 1930's) is completely dominated by it. Indeed, the notorious pamphlet "Marxism and the Problems of Linguistics"<sup>8</sup>), which was published in 1950 under Stalin's name, led to many changes, but not as regards the lingual Russification of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, even though it can be affirmed that, of all the scientific subjects cared for, or merely tolerated, in the Soviet Union, probably none has undergone such far-reaching changes since 1930 as linguistics.

The above-mentioned pamphlet by Stalin possessed, and still possesses, dogmatic validity for every Soviet linguist, down to the most insignificant teacher of grammar or foreign languages (in so far as he does not wish to be stamped as a "people's enemy" and political

criminal); it has not only changed the directives, but also the content of what was understood by the Soviets as philology, and that thoroughly; not, however, methods of the state and party control — that was never done at all. And when Stalin reproaches the “Japhetic” school, — to which he is antagonistic, or, to put it plainly, which he has forbidden, — that it had introduced an “Arakcheyev regime” in linguistics (in Russian this means a senseless and ruthless police regime<sup>9</sup>), he overlooks the fact on purpose that it was the Soviet state and party authorities which not so long ago supported that “Japhetic” school by the systematic extirpation of its opponents.

The matter is as follows: Professor Nicholas Marr, who died shortly before the outbreak of World War II, by birth a Georgian, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences before the revolution and, moreover, a highly meritorious specialist in the field of Georgian and Armenian palaeography and investigation of sources, who in 1920 had not the slightest idea of Marxism (he was all enthusiasm for raising the Georgian literary language to the common language of all Caucasian peoples and tribes), began, in the middle of the twenties, to mix up radical Marxist principles more and more in the “Japhetic Theory” or “Japhetidology” (later called “the New Teaching about Language”) which he had excogitated himself, in order to impress the uneducated heads of the Soviet “cultural policy” and, with their assistance, to rout the recognized historical and comparative science of language as an anti-Marxist and “bourgeois” doctrine. In a few years he succeeded: maintaining that the language, at bottom, was not a national, but a class matter, no tool for mutual understanding, but one for class warfare; all changes in language life took place “by leaps and bounds” (i. e. according to the laws of Marxist dialectics). It was just such arbitrary and irresponsible assertions that procured Marr and his followers, at the time, tremendous esteem among those concerned with “Soviet culture”, although it was clear to everyone with some knowledge of linguistics that Marr’s “theory of language”, disguised as it was in the Marxist phraseology, was only a means to an end and that end was to achieve official recognition for his “Japhetic” phantasmagoria.

It is thus entirely wrong to affirm, as the anti-Communist emigrant press occasionally does, that the “Japhetic Theory” was the Soviet linguistic theory par excellence, the basis of the entire Soviet language policy from 1920 to 1950, “the instrument of the

Russification of all non-Russian languages", as for instance is maintained by Professor Roman Smal-Stocki in his otherwise meritorious work<sup>10</sup>): "... thousands of linguists, philologists and teachers paid with their lives or with years of slave-labour-camp imprisonment for their opposition against this monstrosity of Marr's theory". — That is completely wrong. Although the Japhetic Theory did a great deal of harm to Soviet linguistics by rendering any kind of research into every language (including the Russian) almost impossible for decades, its actual political importance was very small. In Ukraine, for example, it was, until the end of 1931, possible in academic instruction, and occasionally even in the press, to be critical or sceptical of "Marrism"; it is only since the Etymological Conference in Kharkiv, in December 1931, that an official (but purely formal) agreement with the Japhetic Theory has been obligatory for all etymologists and language-teachers. The systematic extirpation of the nationally-conscious non-Russian etymologists and philologists in the entire Soviet Union (which had already begun in Ukraine in 1927) resulted almost exclusively in the impeachment, on pretext or suspicion, of the "bourgeois-nationalist ideology". For that the "Party and Government" did not in truth need Marr's abstruse "Japhetidology"!

In Ukraine the ideological question at issue was not Marxism or Leninism, but a national struggle, particularly as far as human sciences were concerned, and the Soviet police and terrorism adopted to suppress them. For this reason Ukrainian philologists were not dismissed from their positions because they rejected the Japhetic Theory, — as was sometimes the case actually in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), — but they were put into Siberian concentration camps or executed on the political pretext that they were, allegedly, members of the Ukrainian movement of "bourgeois nationalism". Marr's Japhetic Theory was used by Russian Bolsheviks, to a certain degree, as a camouflage for their policy of extending Russian linguistic influence, particularly, as far as the Caucasian and Turkic peoples were concerned; in Ukraine, on the other hand, from the middle twenties onward, measures were not even camouflaged for the extermination of Ukrainian national culture and learning.

But generally, "Marrism", as a purely academic matter had not much to do with the practical language-policy. Although Marr had babbled much nonsense about the "artificial means in order to

accelerate the language-forming process", his only practical suggestion was the above-mentioned motion (published in 1920) that the Georgian language should be raised to the rank of a common means of communication among all the Caucasian peoples and tribes. Characteristically, his "analytical alphabet", invented even before the revolution, was based almost entirely on Caucasian phonetics and was, moreover, made up almost exclusively of Roman (not Russian!) letters. Marr was neither a "fanatical Communist", nor a Russifier, nor even a Russophile. It is a pure arbitrariness when Professor Smal-Stocki asserts that Marr, with his doctrine of the "progressive unification of languages", aimed at the hegemony of the Russian language in the U.S.S.R. Such a thing did not occur to Marr. He was, at bottom, a scientifically educated psychopath — a really monstrous specimen of the well known "mania etymologica", whose pretension was to trace back all the words of all the languages of the earth (by means of fantastic "four original elements") to something Georgian. In order to help these foolish machinations to victory over the hated comparative linguistics he named his "method" dialectic-materialist and simulated an approach to Marxism which, however, remained basically merely phraseological. "Party and Government" let him have a free hand, as they needed someone to combat thoroughly the "capitalist-imperialistic" linguistics of the West; moreover, the Japhetic "New Teaching about Language" was for them a useful substitute for the non-existent Marxist-Leninist philosophy of language, which could not even be constructed. But they had otherwise very little interest in Marr's fancies.

In 1950, however, "Comrade Stalin himself" threw over the whole "Marrist" phraseology, declaring flatly: no, language is first of all a national matter, though sometimes used in class warfare; it belongs neither to the Marxist "economic basis" nor to the Marxist "ideological super-structure", as it usually outlives both; without language there is not human thinking at all (or almost at all), whether class-conscious or not; furthermore the changes in a language come gradually and slowly, there is no such thing as a "language revolution".

It cannot be denied that Stalin's main theses seem to be fairly harmless, if not banal, and, after Marr's eccentricities, sound like a return to common-sense; by the abolition of the Japhetic Theory, many nonsensical ideas, with regard to the general and peculiar principles of the science of language, were eliminated. It is, however,



not so simple as all that, or Stalin would not have had to wait over twenty years before interfering in linguistic theories. On looking at the matter more closely, we see that Stalin's arguments are suited to the present interest of Soviet Russian national policy; yes, language is a national matter, otherwise how could the theoretical "superiority" and practical hegemony of the Russian national language be maintained over other national languages within the Soviet Union and even, to certain extent, outside it? Language, too, has little to do with "class warfare" as in the "classless" Soviet Union today there are many languages; still less can there be any talk of "revolutionary" language-changes, coming by "leaps and bounds", under a regime that is concerned first and foremost with its own consolidation and has no wish to hear of any internal changes at all. Fundamentally Soviet philology remains where it was before Stalin's directives were issued; a handmaid of Russian imperialist national and "cultural" policy, only with slightly altered accidentals.

According to this, Stalin's condemnation of Marrism in no way represents "a pure propaganda in the ideological preparations for World War III", and therefore a sham retreat, as Professor Smal-Stocki wishes, but a decisive victory of Russian imperialist ideology, to which the "Japhetites" have always been a thorn in the flesh and an abomination, over obsolete more or less "internationalistic" and "cosmopolitan" conceptions; to negate that would mean to negate the pre-revolutionary idealistic "nucleus" and purely linguistic composition of "Japhetidology" as well as its close connection with Caucasian philology.

With the dethronement of Marrism, it is true, a great deal of nonsense was dropped. Marr maintained not only that there was a common source for all the languages in the world (an assumption which, in view of the present status of philology, cannot be proved at all!), but also their essential identity: all words in all languages were derived from four "original elements", — "sal", "ber", "yon" and "rosh" — which he claimed to have "discovered" in the Caucasian races! The Caucasian languages, according to Marr, are a peculiarly "primitive" form of human speech, and in consequence every word spoken anywhere in the world *must* be found in the Caucasian languages, too. Marr's etymological "methods" can best be illustrated by the following example: the Ukrainian and Russian word "balyk" (cured sturgeon — obviously borrowed from the

Turko-Tartarian) in "interpreted" to be exactly the same as the word "ryba" (fish — found in all Slavonic languages); according to Marr, inversion of the syllables has taken place (ba, ry — ry, ba), *r* has become *l* (baly) according to a fantastical etymological "rule", and the final *k* is an "ancient Japhetic (that is to say Caucasian) plural termination"! And there are in Marr's works, and in the works of his "school", too, hundreds and thousands of such comical etymological "discoveries"; for instance, the Slavonic word "solnce" (the sun) is declared to be exactly the same as the Slavonic "svinya" (the swine).

That such a phantasmagoria has ceased to be obligatory for every philologist and every language-teacher, may well be called a certain scientific progress. For teaching it is, of course, important, but whether it is so far a renewal of philological studies, may well be doubted. Firstly, Soviet philologists, even in ethnic Muscovite Russia, have been decimated and terrorized to such an extent by twenty years of persecution on the part of Marr and his "school", that most of them do certainly prefer to stick to purely practical tasks, — i. e. compiling elementary text books and more or less useful dictionaries — to burning their fingers at higher philological studies. And it is, of course, even much worse for non-Russian countries and areas occupied by Moscow, for there, in the thirties, on the pretext of their alleged "bourgeois nationalism" tendencies, — that is, quite apart from the "Japhetic" argument, — nationally conscious philologists were systematically sent to Siberian concentration camps or straightaway executed. In Ukraine today, for instance, there are not more than three or four qualified philologists, and they too have very good reason not to do more in such a perilous field than the government demands of them, that is to say, almost nothing really essential.

Secondly, it is more than doubtful whether the Soviet government has any interest in reviving the study of linguistics as such; and there is no question of free, non-politized philology, while even for the "unfree" one the boundaries are severely limited. It is extremely significant that the sensational campaign proclaimed by Khrushchov against the "personality cult" does not appear to have produced any critical review of Stalin's above-mentioned "theoretical-linguistic" pamphlet. From this fact alone one can draw the conclusion that in the field of philology in the U.S.S.R. all has remained as it was in Stalin's day and that solely those branches of Soviet philology

are to profit from the effect of the said pamphlet which can be of direct advantage to the imperialist attitude of the Russian element, as is actually the case as regards the predominantly practical study of the western and southern Slav languages and of various Oriental languages. And Russian (ethnic Russian, that is Muscovite) dialectology also seems to show certain prospects of reviving — since there can be no fostering of the national language in question without serious dialectological studies — but, of course, only in the traditional direction and trend of Russian imperialism.

(To be continued)

#### NOTES

1) The fact that every Bolshevik policy is in principle anti-cultural is not meant to be questioned by the use of the term "cultural policy". Cultural or, rather, anti-cultural activity is by no means the only sphere in which the Bolsheviks do the opposite of what they profess to do.

2) After the revolution of 1905, the Jewish literature, press and theatre in Yiddish showed a very considerable development in Russian-ruled Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, which continued in Soviet Ukraine until the middle of the 1930's; thereupon, a systematic extermination policy was introduced, which was completed after the war. Nowadays, there are neither Yiddish press nor schools in the U.S.S.R.

3) This does not, however, by any means refer to the anti-Ukrainian Polish cultural policy in general.

4) This specifically Caucasian lingual mentality has even had a considerable phonologic and grammatical influence on the Armenian language (Indo-European derivation), and the only Caucasian languages which have not been influenced in this way are the comparatively sparsely represented Turko-Tatar languages.

5) "Azat Vatan" (Munich), 1952, № 3, p. 15.

6) In addition, the peoples who were only "sovietized" during or immediately prior to World War II have also retained their own alphabet, — the three Baltic peoples, the Karelo-Finns (in view of public opinion in Finland) and the Mongols in the so-called "Mongolian People's Republic".

7) In Kyiv, for instance, at the beginning of 1919, as was reported by Volodymyr Zaton'sky, later People's Commissar for Education in Soviet Ukraine.

8) There can be no doubt that work of the then omnipotent and no less "omniscient" Comrade Stalin on this pamphlet was only of a stylistic nature: the expression of the ideas was most probably entrusted to a Marxist-trained philologist. Whether the fundamental ideas originated from Stalin remains open to doubt.

9) Named after Count Alexander Arakcheyev, a Minister of War of Tsar Alexander I, who introduced the notorious system of the so-called military settlements in Russia.

10) Roman Smal-Stocki: *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*. The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1952.

*Yuriy Hryhoriyiv*

## **The Youngest of the Ukrainian Arts\***

Opera and ballet are the youngest of the Ukrainian arts. Song and dance have been a characteristic feature of the life of the Ukrainian people since pre-Christian times, since the days of the Spring songs, the so-called Kupalo and Rusalky songs<sup>2</sup>), ritual round-dances which, in their general features, were still preserved after the baptism of Ukraine. As regards opera and ballet — the highest forms of musical vocal and choreographic art, however, it was not until very much later that they came into being in Ukraine.

Under the tsarist regime the Ukrainians had neither actors who were trained for opera, nor suitable orchestras, nor, in fact, the technical possibilities of producing operas on the stage, especially not since the theatrical troupes were of the itinerant type and not in a position to produce anything so complicated as an opera. And this was no doubt the reason why so musical a people as the Ukrainians, with their melodious language, which next to Italian is one of the most euphonious languages of the world, and with their songs, which since the activity of O. Koshyts<sup>3</sup>) are appreciated in the West, paid so little attention to the artistic genres of opera and ballet.

And yet Ukraine in the initial stages of its operatic art far surpassed Russia and several other Slavic peoples. The first opera to be composed by a Ukrainian appeared in 1774. It was the opera "Demophon" by Maksym Berezovsky, based on the libretto by the famous Italian poet, Pietro Metastasio. For the comparatively simple theme, which depicted the conflict between love and duty, Berezovsky created a majestic music which was a harmonious combination of Italian melodies and motifs of the Ukrainian folk-song.

A little later, the Ukrainian composer, Dmytro Bortniansky (1751-1785), wrote his first three operas; "Alcide" which was performed for the first time in Venice in 1776; this was followed by "Creon", performed in the Teatro dei Benedetti in 1777, and "Quintus Fabius", performed for the first time in Modena in 1779. This composer, too, succeeded in combining Italian and Ukrainian motifs and in reproducing features of the Ukrainian folk-song. Later, Bortniansky composed two more operas, — "The Falcon" (1786) and "The Son and Rival" (or "Stratonice", 1787), both of which were performed at the summer residence of the Tsar, Gatchina (near Petersburg); the second of these two operas was also performed in Moscow in 1947.

All these operas by Berezovsky and Bortniansky, which were equal in merit to the best works of the Italian operatic music prevalent at that time, were never performed on a Ukrainian stage and even today are still practically unknown to Ukrainian audiences. They are preserved somewhere or other in Italian or Russian archives, whereas they would, in a national Ukrainian state, be an outstanding credit to Ukrainian opera as classical musical masterpieces in which world-famous fables are used as the theme.

The subjugation of Ukraine by Russia and the consequent lack of a Ukrainian operatic stage resulted in a long pause in the creation of further operas. It was not until the year 1863 that Semen Hulak-Artemovsky<sup>4</sup>) with his famous opera "A Zaporogian Cossack Beyond The Danube" initiated a new period in the creation of operas by Ukrainian composers.

Soon afterwards, Petro Sokalsky composed his operas "The Siege of Dubno" (or "Andriy Bulba", 1864) and "A May Night", both of them with a theme taken from Gogol's short stories, as well as "Mariya", based on Pushkin's poem, "Poltava". The historian and writer, Mykola Arkas (1852-1909), also composed an opera "Kateryna", which was based on the poem of the name by Shevchenko.

In Galicia during this same period, Anatol Vakhnianyn (1841-1908) composed his opera "Kupalo"<sup>5</sup>), Denys Sichynsky the opera "Roxolana"<sup>6</sup>), and Yaroslav Lopatynsky the opera "A Fairytale Of The Craggs". At the same time, Porfyriy Bazhansky composed his so-called popular operas "Oleksa Dovbush"<sup>7</sup>), "A Wedding" and "The White Gypsy".

These were all works only suitable for performance in small theatres, of varying quality and by no means equal to the standard of opera in the West. On the other hand, however, the works of Mykola Lysenko (1842-1912), who is rightly regarded as the creator of Ukrainian national opera, brought about a considerable change in this musical genre. His monumental opera "Taras Bulba" (based on the story by Gogol), with its depiction of the famous Cossack centre, the Zaporogian Sich, with its mass ensembles, its glorification of the illustrious events of the 16th-17th century, with such passages of the dramatized Cossack epic as for instance the heroic song of the "bandurists"<sup>8</sup>) "Oh, it is not a black cloud that hovers over Ukraine", or the song of Taras Bulba, "Hey, there soars an eagle, hey, there soars a grey...", has become a classical example of Ukrainian opera, as have also Lysenko's other operas, namely "A Christmas Night", "The Drowned" and "The Aeneid".

It was the influence of Lysenko's works that prompted Kyrylo Stetsenko to compose his operas "The Prisoner" and "Iphigenia in Tauris". Mention must also be made of the operas by the composer Synytsia ("The Peasant-Woman"), by Borys Pidhoretsky ("The Kupalo Spark"), by Mykola Leontovych ("A Water-Nymph's Easter"), and by V. Zolotariov ("Khvesko Andyber"<sup>9</sup>) and "The Decembrists"<sup>10</sup>)).

The composing of opera received a strong impetus with the setting up of permanent opera houses in Soviet Ukraine, — in Kharkiv, the capital at that time, in 1925, and in Kyiv and Odessa in 1926. Contrary to all anti-Ukrainian Russian assertions that this was merely a propagandist means of demonstrating the "non-existent" golden age of the national culture of a non-Russian people, there can be no doubt about the fact that the setting up of Ukrainian opera houses, the training of singers in the Ukrainian language and the translation of the libretti of classical and modern West and Central European operas into Ukrainian helped to further Ukrainian culture to a very considerable extent.

With the setting up of Ukrainian opera houses, it became evident that there were very few original Ukrainian operas. Apart from the above-mentioned operas by Lysenko and Vakhnianyn (and those by Berezhovsky and Bortniansky, which were practically unknown), there were hardly any Ukrainian operas which, as far as their musical merit was concerned, could be regarded as equal in standard to the classical works of the West. For this reason, the Ukrainian opera houses began to perform works by foreign composers with Ukrainian themes, namely in a suitably adapted form, as for instance Borodin's "Prince Igor", Tchaikovsky's "The Little Boots", Mussorgsky's "Sorochyntsi Fair", Rimsky-Korsakov's "The Night Before Christmas", and Dragomyzhsky's "The Rusalka". At the same time, however, new operas were hurriedly composed in order to increase the original repertoire. Immediately after the failure of his first work, "The Explosion", Borys Yanovsky wrote the epic opera "A Song Of The Black Sea" with the legendary theme about Hetman Samiylo Kishka and his Zaporogian Cossacks in Turkish captivity. Borys Liatoshynsky composed his opera "The Golden Ring", based on the story by Ivan Franko "Zakhar Berkut", in which he boldly attempted to revive the events in the days of King Danylo of Galicia (middle of the 13th century) by means of modern music. V. Kostenko composed the operas "Karmaliuk"<sup>11</sup>) and "The Carpathians". And the singer and composer O. Chyshko wrote the operas "In The Captivity Of The Apple-Blossoms" (based on the drama of the same title by I. Dniprovsky), in which, in spite of the official Bolshevik trend, a national Ukrainian woman-freedom fighter is portrayed very favourably, and "Warship Potemkin", which had as its theme the revolt of the Ukrainian sailors of the Black Sea against tsarism in 1905.

Some of the old operas were then revived, as for instance S. Hulak-Artemovsky's "A Zaporogian Cossack Beyond The Danube" and M. Lysenko's "Natalka of Poltava"; they were enlarged and performed on a large scale after new arrangements had been written by V. Yorysh, who also composed operas of his own, namely "Karmaliuk" and "Shevchenko". M. Lysenko's opera "Taras Bulba" was even revised and a new arrangement written twice<sup>12</sup>).

In conjunction with a competition arranged by the Soviet government on the theme "Shchors"<sup>13</sup>), three operas were composed, namely by the composers B. Liatoshynsky, Revutsky and Zhdanov. Liatoshynsky won the competition, but the performance of his opera

was a failure (partly because of the mendacious political trend of the work).

Mykhaylo *Verykivsky's* operas "The Captain" and "The Peasant-Woman", both of them based on a story taken from Taras Shevchenko's works, were of outstanding importance in furthering Ukrainian musical culture; both of these operas are of considerable musical merit and contain countless melodies taken from Ukrainian folklore. Indeed, H. *Zhukovsky* later took them as a pattern when composing his two operas "Kateryna" and "Maryna".

Various attempts were also made to compose operas by collective effort. The composers Yuriy *Meytus*, M. *Tits* and V. *Rybalchenko*, for instance, composed the opera "Perekop"<sup>14</sup>) together, and, later on, during World War II, another opera "The Haydamaks"<sup>15</sup>) (1944).

In the meantime, that is to say between the first and the second world war, the operas "Cochra Bar"<sup>16</sup>) by Stanyslav *Liudkevych* and "Dovbush" by Antin *Rudnytsky* had been written in Western

In the post-war years, M. *Lysenko's* opera "The Drowned" was performed in a new arrangement by M. *Verykivsky*. The new opera by Yuriy *Meytus*, "The Young Guards", based on the novel of the same name by the Russian Bolshevik writer, *Fadeyev*<sup>17</sup>), caused considerable comment (and still does). This work has as its theme the Bolshevik subversive activity and diversionism of the "Komso-mol'tsi" (Young Communists) who, during the German Nazi occupation of Ukraine (1941-1944), were active in the Donets Basin under the leadership of a certain Oleh *Koshovy*. The Soviet critics affirmed that this opera represented a "decisive turning-point in the direction of truly realistic, national productive activity" and stressed the "actuality of the design", the "ideal of the aims" and the "subtle patriotic shading of the story". But in spite of the fact that the music is based on the artistic means of expression of traditional national song, this opera, because of its propagandist contents, is of little interest to Ukrainian audiences.

Another opera by the same composer, "Dawn Over The River Dvina", has as its theme the civil war in North Russia during the years 1918-1919. Y. *Meytus* again bases his music on motifs taken from folk-songs and, at the same time, endeavours to reproduce the "spirit of the times"; but he by no means succeed in doing so. The mass scenes, intended to be monumental and to personify the "many-sided picture of the people", are insipid and unconvincing. He does,



however succeed in giving a good musical characterization of the old Russian peasant, Tikhon, portrayed with epic severity, and his daughter Liuba. But his portrayal of the central figures of the Bolshevik camp is a complete failure. Frolov, the commissar, is too schematic and static; so, too, and, in fact, still more so is the young Ukrainian Serhunko, who tries to protect the commissar from being shot by an avenger; and Andriy, the soldier of the Red Army, is likewise insipid. They all resemble puppets in a marionette theatre. It is by no means easy for an artist to strike a sincere note when trying to express the feelings and other mental experiences of a Bolshevik commissar.

The libretto of this opera, which was written by the well-known Russian poet, Vsevolod Rozhdestvensky, reveals a fairly dynamic dramatic denouement, as well as a sharp delineation of the entire conflict and of various individual situations and scenes. But the events are depicted in the declamation rather than in the actions and experiences of the persons concerned. The redeeming feature, as it were, lies in the folklore episodes which have been introduced here and there, in particular the excellent depiction of the wedding ritual with the choral songs.

An outstanding event in the history of Ukrainian opera in the post-war years was the new opera "Bohdan Khmelnytsky" by Kost' Dan'kevych (the libretto was written by the Bolshevik writers Oleksander Korniychuk and Wanda Wasilewska, — the latter is a Polish Communist). This opera is worth discussing here in some detail. In its first version it was performed in Moscow during a "decade of Ukrainian art", in June 1951, but immediately afterwards, together with the well-known poem by V. Sosiura, "Love Ukraine!"<sup>18</sup>), it was declared "ideologically wavering" and was no longer allowed to be performed.

The objections raised by the Communist Party against this opera were formulated in detail by the official Party organ "Pravda" in a special article. It was pointed out that the chief fault of the work lay in the fact that a "deviation from the historical truth had been permitted" in it. This deviation, so it was stated, was in evidence in the opera inasmuch as the main aim of the fight of the Ukrainian people against Polish enslavement was depicted as being the national and political independence longed for by the entire people; the actual and real ideological leitmotif of the work was therefore, it

was stressed, the heroic fight for freedom and not the general endeavour to "be reunited" with Moscow.

Thus, to begin with, this opera was destined to have a sad fate; it was promptly withdrawn from the programme. It was suggested<sup>19)</sup> to the composer that he should revise his work and bring in the conference in Pereyslav as the final scene<sup>20)</sup>. History repeats itself! Just as the tsarist censorship in 1897 had forced the Ukrainian poet Mykhaylo Starytsky to revise his historical drama "Bohdan Khmelnytsky" and to introduce the Pereyaslav conference in his final scene, so now, after a century, exactly the same thing happened in the case of Dan'kovych's opera. After much revision and alteration, the censorship finally approved and the opera was put on the stage again. This performance took place during the official jubilee celebrations of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1954).

The opera commences with an introductory scene which is, as it were, an "overture in persons". The purpose of this scene is to provide the key to understanding the idea of the whole work. The Ukrainian people have risen up in revolt against their Polish subjugators. Neither tortures nor executions can break their striving for liberation. The scene opens with a women's chorus which is based on motifs taken from Ukrainian folk-songs. Not only are sighs and laments expressed in this song, but, as it continues, also powerful male motifs of anger and hatred against the subjugator, motifs of the fight.

A rousing song, full of determination to fight to the end until victory has been achieved, brings this introduction to a close; incidentally, this introduction in its generalizing character reminds one of the prologue to Pashchenko's opera "The Eagle's Revolt" inasmuch as the latter likewise based on powerful choruses.

The next scene is set in the Zaporogian Sich. Cossacks and armed peasants assemble in crowds in order to join the troops of Bohdan Khmelnytsky who are preparing to undertake a liberation campaign in Ukraine. Together with Maxym Kryvonis and other Cossack leaders, the Don Cossacks<sup>21)</sup> also arrive on the scene. A group of grey-bearded "bandurists"<sup>22)</sup> set out for Ukraine in order to exhort the people to revolt by their songs and speeches. Their patriotic song in answer to the farewell words addressed to them by Hetman Khmelnytsky is one of the finest in the whole opera.

In the second act a scene has been added in the new version: the camp of the enemies of the Ukrainians is shown in the castle of the

Polish magnate, Potocki, which is being besieged by Cossack troops. The vigilance of the Poles is lulled by the cunning of a Cossack, Tur, who is sent to them, and after the fortress has been taken by storm in a bold manner, the Cossacks, singing songs of victory, set out to liberate Kyiv<sup>23</sup>).

Against the background of the events of the third act the figure of Khmelnytsky's wife, Helena, who, in keeping with the plot of the libretto, is a tool in Polish hands, stands out clearly, just as does the figure of the treacherous Cossack leader, Lyzohub, who makes libellous accusations against the loyal Cossack colonel, Bohun. The young heroine, Solomiya, who takes part in the armed combats, undertakes to defend the Colonel; her duet with the Hetman is very fine and expressive. Helena's attempt to poison the Hetman fails; this scene is, however, wrongly built up: in order to save the Hetman's life, the old servant, Varvara, knowingly drinks the poisonous contents in the goblet (and dies).

The final part of the opera — the conference of Pereyaslav — is intended to express, by means of its music, the joy of Ukraine at its "reunification" with Moscow. In his depiction of the enthusiasm of the people, however the composer no longer bases his music on the melodies of Ukrainian folk-songs, but on the Russian songs of praise ("Slava"). The idealistic note of the whole work is considerably impaired by manifestation of unnatural delight, in the course of which the Hetman embraces the Muscovite boyar and his officers do the same with the Tsar's envoy. A work which in principle is outstanding thus ends with a spectacle which is somehow lacking in dignity.

In spite of this unsuitable conclusion, which the composer was forced to add under pressure of the government, "Bohdan Khmelnytsky", however, remains the most outstanding Ukrainian opera of the post-war years; it far surpasses such inferior works as, for instance, O. Sandler's "In The Ukrainian Steppes" (based on a drama by Korniychuk and, incidentally, performed without success).

A number of Soviet Ukrainian composers are at present working on new operas; as for example the composer Heorhiy Mayboroda, who has been engaged on his lyric, dramatic opera "Milana" for several years. The libretto, by the woman-writer A. Turchynska, depicts Carpatho-Ukraine at the time of World War II, as well as the fight of the Ukrainian population against the German Nazi occupation. The score, which contains numerous Ukrainian song

motifs, reproduces the musical "local colour" excellently inasmuch as it succeeds in expressing the tonal and rhythmical features and characteristics of Carpatho-Ukrainian folklore. As authorities on music, who have heard fragments of this opera, very rightly affirm, its main quality lies in its expressive musical characterization of the individual figures of the plot. The figures of the peasant Martyn, his friend Vasyl (Milana's lover) and the colourful night-watchman Kozolap are alive and convincing. In order to portray the character of Milana herself, the composer has introduced a number of arias and songs, which effectively — though not always profoundly enough — depict the inner impulses of a young Carpatho-Ukrainian woman, the whole gamut of her feelings and experiences. And though the author has failed to paint a convincing musical picture of the leader of the Bolshevik underground movement, Rushchak, his characterization of the representatives of the national Ukrainian anti-Communist camp — in particular of the village elder, Shybak, with all his passions, sentiments and feelings and his love for Milana — is, however, concrete and extremely expressive.

The composition of the choruses is particularly interesting, for here, as in the scenes depicting everyday life, expression is given to the colourful life of the Carpatho-Ukrainians, the most south-westerly branch of the Ukrainian people.

After its completion, this opera is to be performed in the Taras Shevchenko Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre in Kyiv.

In his opera "Dovbush", Stanyslav Liudkevych<sup>24</sup>), who today is the oldest of the Ukrainian composers, devotes himself to the historic past of the Ukrainian people. Incidentally, he has also written the libretto for this opera. In the course of his work on this subject he has studied countless historical and literary sources, and he uses, above all, all the well-known songs, popular tales and legends about the figure Oleksa Dovbush, who has been heroized in West Ukrainian folklore.

Liudkevych surrounds his hero with a popular, romantic atmosphere and portrays him as the folk-songs and popular tales do, — manly, bold, and destined by almost supernatural means to be the leader of the insurgent peasants (the "Opryshky").

It was already pointed out in the Kyiv Soviet press that the composers and music critics who have heard parts of this work in the piano arrangement or have seen various scenes performed are

convinced that Ukrainian operatic art will be greatly enriched by this new and outstanding work.

Meanwhile, however, the Ivan Franko Opera and Ballet Theatre in Lviv (Lemberg), where the premiere of this opera is eventually to be held, has voiced its criticism of the said interpretation of the character of Dovbush and is demanding that he should be portrayed as an ideal and irreproachable leader, who knows everything, foresees everything, distinguishes himself by the wide range of his political and social views and devotes his entire attention exclusively to the social struggle (that is to the class struggle in the Marxist sense!). In other words, the managers of the theatre, who are naturally only acting in accordance with the general Bolshevik party trend, are demanding that Dovbush should have no personal interests and wishes and should be devoid of all human feelings<sup>25</sup>). To present the character of Dovbush in this manner would, of course, be a contradiction of the historical truth and, at the same time, a disparagement of all Liudkevych's labour and research, on the strength of which he has based his musical characterization of his hero. With the loyalty to principles of a true artist, the composer is endeavouring to defend his conception of the figure of Dovbush; and not only the nature of the performance, but also, and, above all, the musical value of the work naturally depends upon whether he succeeds in evading the transformation of his hero which has been imposed on him from "above".

The composer Yevhen Yutsevych has recently written an opera entitled "Kyrylo Kozhumyaka" ("Cyril the Tanner"), which in its theme is based on ancient Kyiv legends of pre-Mongolian times. V. Kyreyko has completed his opera "Song Of The Forest" (based on the drama in verse of the same title by the poetess Lesya Ukrainka). M. Karminsky is at present engaged in composing an opera entitled "The Bukovinians".

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As far as the quantitative aspect is concerned, Ukrainian ballet is far behind Ukrainian operatic art. The first Ukrainian ballet work was only composed in Soviet Ukraine as late as the 1930's, — the ballet, "The Noble Mr. Kaniowski" by the composer Mykhaylo Verykivsky whom we have already mentioned above. The theme of this ballet is the story of Bondarivna<sup>26</sup>) which is well-known in

Ukrainian folklore. Soon afterwards, Borys Yanovsky, whom we have likewise already mentioned, wrote his ballet "Ferendji", which has as its theme the fight for freedom in India. Both these ballets were performed in Kyiv and Kharkiv. The first-mentioned, the music of which is based on motifs from Ukrainian folk-songs, was the bigger success of the two.

Pylp Kozytsky composed a ballet "Elation", and the above-mentioned West Ukrainian composer Antin Rudnytsky a ballet called "Dniprelstan" (an abbreviated designation for the big Dnipro water-power station), but neither of these works was ever performed.

On the eve of the German-Soviet war, a ballet, "The Lily", by the above-mentioned composer Kost' Dan'kevych, appeared in Soviet Ukraine; it was based on various romantic poems by Taras Shevchenko and contained numerous Ukrainian melodies. During the early post-war years, the ballets, "Dovbush's Scarf" by Anatol Kos-Anatolsky and "The Song of the Forest" by M. (Skorulsky (like the above-mentioned opera of the same by V. Kyreyko, it was based on the drama in verse by the poetess Lesya Ukrainka) appeared. The most outstanding ballet of the post-war years, however, was "Marusia of Bohuslav" by A. Svichynkiv, which was a huge success in Ukraine and was also performed in Moscow in 1951 and 1954 to mark the two "decades of Ukrainian art". The theme of this ballet is taken from the well-known Cossack legend which had already been used in Ukrainian literature on two previous occasions, namely in the poem of the same name by Panteleymon Kulish (1819-1897), as well as in the drama of the same name by Ivan Nechuy-Levytsky (1838-1918), which was later revised by Mykhaylo Starytsky (1840-1904); the oldest literary version is the folk-song of the Cossack era, "Duma<sup>27</sup>) on the Captive Marusia, the Priest's Daughter of Bohuslav". The two authors of the libretto, V. Chahovets and N. Skorulska, have stressed in particular the heroic parts of the story which depict the era of the Tatar incursions into Ukraine and the abduction of the defenceless elements of the population to slavery.

When the ballet opens, the scene is set in the picturesque village of Bohuslav. The joyful celebrations that are being held to mark the engagement of the Cossack, Sofron, to lovely Marusia, are unexpectedly interrupted by a surprise raid on the part of the Crimean Tatars. The men and women of the village, including Marusia, are put into fetters and taken to distant Turkey as slaves. Marusia is

led before a Turkish pasha, who is so taken by her beauty that he tries to seduce her by costly presents and by promising her a life of luxury in his palace.

Marusia now lives in a beautiful room, but in her thoughts she is in her native village and she is merely waiting for favourable opportunity to escape from the pasha's palace which has become a hateful prison to her. When this opportunity presents itself, she courageously kills her master and sets her Ukrainian fellow-prisoners free. At this moment the Cossacks, who have crossed the Black Sea from Ukraine in their small boats, in order to rescue their fellow-countrymen from captivity, appear on the scene. Together with the liberated prisoners, the Cossacks set off in their boats again and return to their native country.

The composer makes lavish use of Ukrainian traditional vocal and choreographic motifs in the music which he has composed for this heroic theme.

Another outstanding ballet of the post-war years is "Rostyslava", the first work of the above-mentioned composer H. Zhukovsky in this musical genre, which so far was new to him. The libretto for this ballet was written by the poetess V. Bahmet. The theme is the struggle of the ancient Ukrainian principality of Kyiv against the hostile hordes from the steppes. The colourful melody in the song of a brave warrior ("bohatyr"), with which the ballet opens, forms the leitmotif for the theme of a freedom-loving people who are determined to defend their freedom. The scenes of the fight against the raiding hordes are closely bound up with the theme of the personal relations between the two central figures of the work, — Yuriy, the retainer and warrior of the prince, and Rostyslava, his beloved.

The reflection of fires on the horizon indicates the deadly danger that is approaching. Filka, a coward and a traitor, guides the enemy to the town by a secret path. Rostyslava is accused of this piece of treachery. The author expresses her spiritual experiences in a dramatic way: she sees a miraculous vision and is shown a magic vale of flowers. Thereupon, she is taken prisoner by the enemy. The symbolic appearance of "Mother Earth" at the moment when the hostile hordes from the steppes are about to carry out their attack gives the defenders of the city new courage, and the fierce battle beneath the city walls ends with a defeat for the assailants, who perish in the waters of the River Rosianka. Rostyslava escapes from

captivity and by a heroic deed exonerates herself from the suspicion of treachery. The city is thus saved, and Yuriy and Rostyslava are welcomed by the people with great joy.

As can be seen from the above, this ballet in many features resembles the famous opera, "The Legend of the Town of Kitezh", by Rimsky-Korsakov. The main value of the work, however, lies in its melodious and colourful music. The above-mentioned song of the brave warrior, the violin solo in the vision scene, and certain dances in the vale of flowers and in the finale are masterpieces of composition. On the other hand, however, certain passages reveal the influence of other composers, as for instance in the vision scene where one is strongly reminded of Tchaikovsky's music, or the scene in the enemy's camp which resembles Rimsky-Korsakov's "Sheherezade" and, to some extent, also Shostakovich's "7th Symphony". In the scene in which Rostyslava is captured by the enemy and in the dances in the vale of flowers the influence of other modern (Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian) composers is likewise evident. In spite of all these different influences, however, H. Zhukovsky has succeeded in giving his work a certain aesthetic uniformity and melodious harmony.

A third outstanding ballet of the post-war years is "Sorochyntsi Fair" by the composer V. Homoliaka. For this work (the libretto of which has been written by V. Tayirov and B. Kamenkovych) the composer uses as his theme the perennially young and romantic story of the same title by Gogol<sup>28</sup>), and his music and choreography reflect both the beauty of the scenery and the picturesqueness of a small Ukrainian town, as well as a colourful picture-gallery of typical characters: the lyrical figures of the young Hryts and Parasia, the hearty peasant couple Cherevyk and Khivria, the grotesque student-son of the priest, the exotic gypsy and the passionate gypsy-girl Hrunia. The composer has succeeded in giving each of the characters an individual musical characterization and, at the same time, reproduces Gogol's incomparable humour, which arises out of certain true-life situations and is stimulated by the romantic whimsicality of the life and fortune of Ukraine one and a half centuries ago.

The ballet opens with a merry overture. The music is to a very considerable extent based on Ukrainian folklore. Individual lyric episodes, as for instance the "pas de deux" by Hryts and Parasia, the graceful dance by Parasia at the beginning of the third act,



the dances by the girls and other ensemble dances are not only masterpieces in composition, but also proof of the composer's aim to transfer the artistic means of popular choreography to the stage in a creative manner. This ballet was performed at the opera house in Stalino.

The new ballet "A Spring Fairytale" by the composer V. *Nakhabin* was also performed at various theatres.

The increasing creative activity of Ukrainian composers in the field of opera and ballet, which has been in evidence during the past years, is very gratifying. The more new operas and ballets are created and the more composers are active in the field of these two artistic genres, the more hopes can one cherish as regards their further development. In this respect the congress of composers of Soviet Ukraine, which was held in Kyiv in March 1956, was of great importance. In the course of this congress, Ukrainian composers were exhorted to compose operas based on the poetic works of Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko<sup>29</sup>), Lesya Ukrainka<sup>30</sup>), and Kotsiubynsky<sup>31</sup>), and the need was stressed to develop the national characteristics of Ukrainian musical culture, which is closely bound up with the Ukrainian language, inasmuch as the latter in its turn influences the rhythm, the inner structure, the composition and the harmonious peculiarities of Ukrainian music. If the Soviet Ukrainian composers use as their themes the stories of Ukrainian classical literature and develop the national characteristics of Ukrainian music, they will undoubtedly be able to contribute to a considerable extent to the development of Ukrainian opera and ballet, in spite of all efforts on the part of the Bolshevik regime to direct these genres in a course which is to Moscow's liking<sup>32</sup>).

The opera season 1956-1957 opened in Kyiv, on September 5, with the performance of M. Lysenko's opera "Taras Bulba", which has, as it were, already become a tradition; the programme for the season in question also included K. Dan'kevych's "Bohdan Khmelnytsky" and the Russian classical operas by M. Glinka, "Russian and Ludmila", which, incidentally, as regards its story belongs to the semilegendary themes of the ancient principality of Kyiv<sup>33</sup>).

Thus, the creative activity of the Ukrainian opera and ballet artists and composers proceeds under the unfavourable political conditions of forcible Russian Soviet occupation and tyranny; it is to be hoped, however, that eventually, in spite of all official and

unofficial instructions and directives on the part of the Bolshevik "party and government", they will succeed in establishing the foundations of this genre of Ukrainian musical stage culture, just as, incidentally, under tsarism that trio of Ukrainian realist playwrights — Mykhaylo Starytsky (1840-1904), Marko Kropyvnytsky (1840-1910) and Ivan Tobilevych (1845-1907) — managed to set up the foundations of national Ukrainian dramatic art. And herein lies the objective value of the creative activity of the Soviet Ukrainian artists of today in their native country enslaved by Russia.

### NOTES

1) The original Ukrainian text of this article, which has been slightly abbreviated in translation, was published in the Hanover almanach "Ukrayina i Svit" ("Ukraine and the World"), № 17, 1957.

2) Kupalo was an East Slavic deity worshipped in connection with the solstice; the "Rusalky" are East Slavic water-nymphs and sprites.

3) Oleksander Koshyts (1875-1944), an outstanding Ukrainian conductor and composer, achieved a unique success when he toured Europe and America (1919-1924) with his Ukrainian National Chorus.

4) A brother of the famous Ukrainian poet, Petro Hulak-Artemovsky (1790-1865).

5) See footnote 2 on Kupalo.

6) A Ukrainian who in the 16th century became the chief wife of a Turkish sultan.

7) The Robin Hood of mediaeval West Ukraine.

8) The bandura is a Ukrainian musical instrument similar to the lute.

9) A hero of the old Cossack songs.

10) The participators of the revolt directed against tsarism in Petersburg and Ukraine (in December 1825).

11) The leader of the Ukrainian peasants who revolted against tsarism, who was killed in 1835.

12) Incidentally, these two new arrangements partly revealed certain Russophil and Communist trends, too, which had no connection at all with art (The Editor).

13) A leader of a Bolshevik group of partisans in Ukraine, who was killed in 1919 whilst fighting against the national Ukrainian army.

14) The village on the frontier between South Ukraine and the Crimea where, in 1920, the Bolshevik Red Army decisively defeated Baron Wrangel's anti-Soviet Russian troops.

15) The Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants who revolted against Polish rule in the 18th century.

16) The leader of the Jews in the so-called Second Jewish War (132-135 A. D., under the Emperor Hadrian).

17) An extremist representative of Stalinist "socialist realism" in literature, who shot himself in 1954 after the posthumous "dethronement" of Stalin.

18) Volodymyr Sosiura (born in 1808), of mediocre talent, but nevertheless a popular poet in Soviet Ukraine, who, during World War II, at the instigation of the Soviet government wrote and published the said patriotic poem, which was only condemned as "un-Communist" by the same government after several years had elapsed (The Editor).

19) This was, of course, in Stalin's day, when disregard of such a suggestion frequently ended in the person concerned being sentenced to death.

20) Which took place in 1654 and at which the confederation of the Ukrainian Cossack state with Russia was decreed.

21) Who were mostly of Russian (Muscovite) origin (this episode is thus in keeping with the Moscow-phil tendency of the work).

22) See footnote 8.

23) An exaggerated patriotic interpolation which is entirely superfluous for the artistic composition of the work (The Editor).

24) For his earlier (pre-revolutionary) work, see above.

25) A typical example of the concrete application of the principles of so-called "socialist realism" in the sphere of fiction (The Editor).

26) According to a popular folk song about the middle of the 18th century, Bondarivna, the lovely daughter of a village cooper, is supposed to have been shot by a Polish magnate, whose wooing she tried to escape.

27) A kind of lyric-epic poem in rhythmical prose which was recited to the accompaniment of the bandura-lute (16th to 18th century).

28) In his famous collection of stories, "Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka."

29) For Ivan Franko (1856-1916) see "The Ukrainian Review", 1956, № 3, pp. 35.

30) For Lesya Ukrainka (1871-1913) see "The Ukrainian Review", 1956, № 2, pp. 34.

31) The outstanding impressionist prose-writer Mykhaylo Kotsiubynsky (1864-1913) also revived West Ukrainian folklore.

32) The unreserved optimism expressed here by the author, by no means seems to be entirely justified; the Bolshevik "party and government", incidentally, does its utmost to allow only those elements of Ukrainian musical culture to find expression which show an ethnographical and folklore trend, rather than a national one, and endeavours to prevent any cultural community with West Europe and America (The Editor).

33) In one of the next issues, the editors of the "Ukrainian Review" intend to publish a special article giving a survey of Ukrainian opera and ballet in 1957-1958 and, as far as possible, in 1959.

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Leonid Lyman

## THE TALE OF KHARKIV

(Conclusion)

### CHAPTER THREE

#### 3.

The city is slowly being strangled by an invisible serpent. There is an atmosphere of decay and death about it. Only yesterday, the radio commenced its programme with a song, "... every propeller breathes the security of our boundaries..." Here and there, Red soldiers walk along the streets and beg for food,—for dry bread; by way of argument, they shake seeds of grain out of their pockets, which they plucked in the fields during combat, and now begin to eat them in the streets of Kharkiv. Most of the menfolk in the city have gone into hiding somewhere, for there is a rumour that mobilization raids are to be carried out and that all the men are to be rounded up.

New propaganda posters have appeared on buildings and walls,—this time printed in bold black letters: "Disgrace and death to traitors and cowards!"—"Kharkiv was, is, and will continue to be Soviet!"

The Germans are near—very near—now. The very atmosphere of the city seems to breathe their presence. Only rash women and small boys venture out into the streets. The pictures of Stalin, that one formerly saw everywhere, have now disappeared. Looting has begun and is in full swing; buildings have been set on fire. The hoodlums of Kharkiv have broken into the clothing warehouse on Blahbaz Market and into the General Food Store and are carrying off everything they can lay hands on. And German leaflets are being dropped over the city again,—“Drive out the Jews!”

Each morning ushers in a new era, gives the city a new aspect and creates the mood for the rest of the day. The first morning, the broadcasting station ceases to operate; the second morning, the restaurants fail to open; the third morning, nearly all the food stores in the city are looted, and the fourth morning, most of the warehouses are raided.

Leonid has been told by a student, whom he happened to meet by chance, that Valentine is in Kharkiv. But where to look for him? And what about the girl that the student mentioned? It surely cannot be Maria! Leonid has no friends in the city now, except Professor Ivanov, whom he has more or less taken under his wing. For Professor Ivanov is as helpless as a child and his existence is unthinkable without the function of the communal dining rooms. The anarchy and confusion which now prevail in the city are a direct threat to the further existence of the Professor, and Leonid has done his utmost to secure enough food for him so that he will be spared starvation during the coming days.

Leonid can hardly believe that any other friends of his are still in Kharkiv, for they have surely all been forcibly evacuated. Valentine? Maria? It is surely out of the question that Maria could still be here,—in Kharkiv, now? It must be some sort of a misunderstanding. There could be nothing to keep her here,—indeed, she cannot possibly be here, now. Kharkiv is no longer Communist and will no longer tolerate Communism.

Leonid hastens home so that he will have more time later on to look for Valentine.

All the suburbs of the city have been torn up by trenches; and barricades, most of them consisting of sacks filled with sand, have been set up at all the street-corners.

In the yard of the "October" confectionery factory, people are emptying a thick fluid out of a vat and putting it in buckets, pots and other utensils, or else into their mouths. The molasses are flowing through the yard and out into the street, where a military car has got stuck in them and cannot get started again.

The street carries Leonid along like a turbulent river. And everywhere one is aware that these are the last days of socialist Kharkiv. New placards are hurriedly being pasted on walls and buildings, but they are no longer intended for the population of Kharkiv. For the masses, Soviet propaganda ceased with the slogan "Disgrace and death to traitors and cowards!" These new propaganda placards are intended for the Germans; they depict a soldier with snow on his uniform and wearing a swastika, and bear the words in German: "German soldiers! Winter will bring death to you! The Russian winter will freeze you to death!"

Imagination races on—it has no limits. Another two or three days and a new, as yet unknown, life will begin. The past was so difficult. And so the desire for a new life overrules the possibilities of new dangers.

Leonid proceeds along Sverdlov Street, but Lopan bridge has already been demolished. Another bridge beyond the Spartacus Hotel has also been demolished, but one can still cross over the ruins, though it is extremely dangerous to attempt to do so. But nothing can stop Leonid.

All around, fires rage and howl; and it is already obvious to Leonid that it is impossible to try to get through to Sumska Street, but some sort of an evil spirit drives him onward.

The main streets are completely deserted. An old woman whom Leonid encounters advises him to return to Stalin Boulevard and to try to get to Sumska Street from there, via the side streets.

The last remnants of the rear echelon, the last guards of Kharkiv, are retreating along Stalin Boulevard. Old men in shapeless coats, with red stars on their caps, sit on top of various bundles on the wagons. No, this is not the Red Army. These are our peasants. The retreating wagons of the Red Army remind one of the Red columns of 1920 which took the first bread from Ukraine, and now, our peasants are carrying out the duties of the Army in paying with their lives. In spite of the red star on their caps and their coats, it is clearly evident that this is our old Ukraine; no, not old, but, rather, traditional, sedate and unchangeable. This is Ukraine, offering its last sacrifice to Communism.

Tevelev Square, once a busy centre, is dirty and empty, save for a few drunken Russian soldiers, who, having decided to finish their campaign here, are lying here and there near the store-entrances, asleep. They no longer have any fears.

Many of the fine, imposing buildings of the city are already engulfed by fire. Hot gusts of air drive along the streets. The fires create an infernal symphony of sound; drops of melted glass from windows fall on to the pavement. And a cry is wrung from the human heart,—Proletariat of all countries, unite and look what you have done!

In this inferno, human beings are drawn to each other, and fear makes people huddle together like sheep. Leonid, too, suddenly finds a man standing next to him, who, though a complete stranger, begins to tell him how, in the past, he built many of the state buildings and how broken-hearted he now is to see them all destroyed by fire. Eventually, he and Leonid walk along the streets together, for the man lives in the suburb of Kholodna Hora and knows which streets are still accessible.

#### 4.

Twenty-nine persons, all residents of the house on Sverdlov Street, have gathered in the cellar. The womenfolk appear to be in charge of the situation. All is silent on the street outside, but suddenly horsemen gallop past in the direction of Kholodna Hora, only to return a little later. A patrol. The silence is broken at intervals by shots. Then, the heavy boots of soldiers resound behind the wall and someone pounds on the gate leading to the house. A command is heard—"No retreat!". Then all is quiet once more. And the silence seems to create a demarcation line between two worlds.

Because he was anxious to find Valentine, Leonid has not gone to visit Professor Ivanov today. And now the Professor will be worried, especially since he is used to Leonid coming to see him punctually. Leonid's sudden

disappearance will disturb him, but, after all, he is to blame for Leonid being obliged to wander about the city at such a dangerous time.

Finally, the silence is broken and, like an avalanche, the street thunders and roars, as the wheels of the war machine dig into the pavement. Then, the noise of the wheels suddenly stops, and the sounds of the footsteps of the first German soldiers on Sverdlov Street penetrate to the people in the cellar. The men try to peep through the window in the cellar, but the womenfolk stop them. The street appears to be in an uproar. But suddenly, someone can be heard speaking Ukrainian in the street. "Now, we, too, will go to meet the Germans," someone whispers in a corner of the cellar.

Groups of people have gathered at the entrances to the houses and are gazing at the Germans with uncomprehending eyes, not knowing how to conduct themselves or whether to fear the Germans or not.

On the second day, when the whole city has been captured by the Germans and the people have overcome their fear and are beginning to appear on the streets again, Leonid decides to try to get through to Professor Ivanov, for by this time the Professor has probably nothing left to eat.

The streets are crowded with German soldiers, who stop all the male passers-by and make them sweep the streets. Later on, they stop others for the same purpose and send those whom they have previously detained away. Other persons are stopped and have their pockets and wallets searched, and the Germans appropriate some of the things in their possession.

Everybody wants to learn something about the new order, and for this reason people try to get near to the loudspeakers in the streets in order to hear the first radio announcements. Some of the German soldiers are pointing with their hands in the direction of the nearby square. The people saunter in that direction and see the body of a man hanging from a tree, on which a tablet has been affixed bearing the words "This man killed a German soldier." Dumbfounded, the people gaze at this terrible sight, say nothing and silently walk away.

Leonid's mood changes swiftly—from expectation and hope to complete disillusionment and anxiety, painful anxiety. "Disgrace and death to traitors and cowards"—and the other aspect of the nightmare—"this man killed a German soldier!"

People come and go. This is the nation, these are the masses, the unprotected masses, without a leader, fragile streams of human likenesses, who for twenty years have been clubbed over the head.

An idea is suddenly born in Leonid's mind: as yet it is not too late to get to the other side of the front; at least they do not hang people in public there. Reason tells him—don't go to see Professor Ivanov, don't try to find Valentine, don't walk round the district near Sumska Street because that is the likeliest spot to meet an acquaintance and Valentine is probably living in that district now, and, possibly, Maria, too.

This, so Leonid now feels, is not a case of class destroying Communists, but of one nation destroying another, or, to be more correct, of persons of one nation destroying persons of another nation. And a nation can be protected against its own destruction not by some class, but only by the

entire nation; there can be no creation of one state of proletarians, a separate state of capitalists and a separate state of landlords. A nation must speak to another nation in the same manner as one person speaks to another.

Just as Leonid is trying to decide whether it is advisable to go to see Professor Ivanov or not, he suddenly encounters one of the lecturers from the Institute, T., quite by chance; they are both on their guard, like two duelists, and both blush and are embarrassed, for the feeling that each of them is a "traitor to the socialist fatherland" is still uppermost in their minds.

"So you are here in Kharkiv—you stayed behind, too—" they both ask each other spontaneously.

Later on in the course of the conversation, T. asks: "Perhaps the Bolsheviks left you in Kharkiv with a special assignment, did they?." And then, he adds that just before the retreat of the Bolsheviks, B., the lecturer of Ukrainian literature, who was most popular with the students, was arrested for bourgeois nationalism. Another shock for Leonid, and the thought passes through his mind—now they are beating us from both sides.

T. tells Leonid that at this very moment all the lecturers, scholars and students are assembling for a meeting in the university. He himself is on his way there, and Leonid now goes along with him. And in the university hall Leonid meets Valentine once more. But they meet as though one had betrayed the other. They walk up and down and talk and sadly gaze into each other's eyes.

Leonid tells Valentine of how he was arrested and, together with a lot more people, taken into the depths of the country, and adds that it looks as though the Germans would like to exterminate the whole population. But Valentine is inclined to be most optimistic and his retort to this is: "If the Germans do not support us, they will never remain here; we shall tear them to bits like paper. So much is simple logic. What we need at present? We need a field of combat, for not being able to fight is the worst condition of all,—it is complete slavery."

Leonid gazes sceptically and dubiously at Valentine, but nevertheless continues to listen to him.

"But to come to the point! Maria is in Kharkiv. She remained here. In fact, she could not escape. To begin with, she was very upset and afraid, but later she calmed down. And now you will probably want to take over the duty of guardian, after thanking me for looking after her during the dangerous days."

"What are you saying?" Leonid stammers. You had the audacity to keep her in Kharkiv? Without her parents? And what will happen to her now? Don't talk nonsense. My fiancée,—fiancée. What the devil do I need a fiancée for now! Not betrothed, but betrayed! Now we have a bloc of Communists with non-party men. Previously, it was dangerous to have any connections with non-party elements; but now it's dangerous to have any connections with Communists!"

"How was I to know that her family are Communists? And what of it, if her parents belonged to the party? And, in any case, is a simple girl like Maria likely to be very interested in Communism?"—Valentine argues.



But whatever they say, it is obvious to both Leonid and Valentine that they are the captives and victims of events.

## 5.

Maria's room has become a meeting-place for friends. Professor Ivanov is speaking to these young people who, for the first time in their lives, have with their own eyes witnessed the horrors of human destruction, and is telling them that the physical sacrifices of the nation can no longer influence their future. There are thousands and millions of us, he adds, and for every hundred who have perished, thousands and millions of more heroic and manlier people will arise and take their place. "My young friends, learn to regard each sacrifice with a heart of stone..."

"You are resorting to hypocrisy, Professor! You are approving of murder!"—Maria bursts out. "You are playing some kind of secret demonic role!"

Leonid tells Maria that it is not her place as a girl to interrupt such a profound conversation.

"Leonid, where did you pick up such vulgarity?" And, turning to Ivanov, Maria asks, "Comrade Professor, haven't I the right to speak up if I wish?"

Leonid, however, retorts, "There are no Comrades any longer,—the Comrades have all fled!"

Later, Maria asks Leonid how he managed to escape from the prisoners' convoy. Leonid is so angry with Maria for asking this question that he swears at her and even demands that she get out of Kharkiv before it is too late, although he knows that this is now absolutely impossible.

Strange to say, the front-line days of Kharkiv have made Professor Ivanov feel more assured and self-confident. For the first time in all the long years of his acquaintance with Leonid, he interferes in the latter's personal conflict, and says: "But, Leonid, what sort of a Communist can a girl like this be?"

Maria, deeply moved by the Professor's sympathy and understanding, asks in a trembling voice: "Why do you accuse me of Communism? I have never read any of its ideological works."

To which Professor Ivanov adds: "A common-sense person cannot be sincere and at the same time a convinced Communist. And, what is more, one should consider facts!"

They all part for the time being and agree to meet at Maria's again at a fixed hour.

\* \* \*

People now walk the streets in crowds as they formerly did in "cultural campaigns." The need to be in a group seems to have seized everyone, like an epidemic; they go from one house to another,—from street to street. Life has not yet been stabilized again, and people have time on their hands.

Leonid is the first to arrive back at Maria's. Later on, Professor Ivanov and Valentine also turn up.

"The full crew"—says Maria, and, getting up from her chair at the table, she begins to speak:

"My friends and you, Professor! Look through this window and see how this steel and concrete Kharkiv has us in its power again, even though only the day before yesterday it lay dead and ready to be trampled on by the feet of the alien army. Comrade Professor, you said yesterday that there are thousands and millions of us and that we, the youth of the country, should believe in the victory of these millions. This is a beautiful and noble idea. We are a numerous people, but not yet great. Forgive me for these words, but I believe that perhaps in two or three generations we shall become great. My friends, we have not seen each other for a long time. I was in Western Ukraine,—Valentine was in Finland. We know now that the Soviet Government did not spare us. The people in Western Ukraine wish to live in harmony with us, like united brothers, but they do not want us to be governed by the Russian people because the latter deprive us of our food, our prosperity, our will and our people. I am only a simple-hearted girl, but the hurricane of war failed to uproot me. I re-name this Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic UKRAINE, which must in future lead its own separate and independent existence like France, Italy, Spain... Let us be the first to raise a toast to the Ukrainian nation, numerous, but as yet not great. To its future greatness!"

"Do you hear what Maria says? Now you have no longer any reason to insult her, have you?" Professor Ivanov asks Leonid.

Maria continues: "In my opinion there is no misfortune which does not end in fortune. Tomorrow we may be separated again, but it is well that we are here together today, for behind us lies a mutual past. Thank you, Leonid, for your insults. But now I will be quiet for I seem to have said far more than the rest of you."

An hour of reminiscences and of conjectures as to what the future will bring then follows until it is nearly curfew-hour and time for the friends to disperse and go home.

Maria closes the door behind the Professor and Valentine and, turning round, looks at Leonid and says: "Now we are alone."

## 6.

Kharkiv wears the garb of dark grey Autumn. In the distance the streets are veiled in mist, and the predominant colour everywhere is a sad grey.

The life of the city seems concentrated on Sumska Street. During the day it is almost impassable, for people throng near the building of the city administration and near the information bureau opposite.

There is still the smell of fires in the air, and, in the distance, smoke can be seen rising from smouldering ruins.

A car with a loudspeaker appears in the street. It is blaring forth music, but the crowd feel more like weeping. Suddenly, the music stops; an announcement is made regarding new regulations, and then the music continues again. "We exhort the entire population of the city of Kharkiv to remain calm." "The city of Kharkiv is now firmly in the hands of the Germans." "Professor Kremarenko has been appointed Mayor of the city. Watch out for new instructions."

In Shevchenko Park, children are chasing the giraffes which escaped from the Zoological Gardens. It is rumoured that some woman or other has slapped a German soldier in the face. "All Jews, from the age of fourteen upwards, must wear a white band with the star of David in blue, on their right sleeve."

"What sort of a star is it, Leonid?"—asks Maria.

The loudspeaker again blare forth music. The friends walk past the Shevchenko Memorial, and Professor Ivanov points out that one must walk carefully, because the German cars rush by at a great speed, regardless of the pedestrians.

"Look, friends. There is our Ukrainian yellow and blue flag. The German flags are different. But why only one?"—Maria wisely remarks. "It is a good thing for our young people to see under what flag we are destined to live."

They walk on. A huge yellow and blue flag has been hoisted on the building of the newly created city administration. The city, incidentally, is still without water and electricity. People have to walk three or four kilometres with buckets to obtain water. The loudspeakers announce that anyone who can supply any information as to where the Bolsheviks have hidden the essential apparatus of the city's electric power station, will receive a high reward.

Most of the people are now retracing their steps in the direction of Dzerzhinsky Square, for new regulations are likely to be announced in a little while.

A huge loudspeaker is blaring forth some sort of jazz music from the balcony of the second storey of the Kharkiv Regional Communist Party Building. Suddenly the music stops, and German soldiers appear on the balcony, leading a man, whose face is covered with a white cloth. The crowd gazes on, spellbound with horror and fright, as the soldiers tie a hang-noose to the balcony. Professor Ivanov, at the front of the crowd, stands petrified. Maria holds on to Leonid's hand and hides behind his back. Like the blades of grass in the vast Ukrainian steppes when the wind sweeps over them, the people all turn their heads away from the horrible sight, as the German executioners push their victim, whose last cry is "Innocent! Mercy!", from the balcony.

**THE END**

## **THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF WRITERS OF SOVIET UKRAINE**

The Fourth Congress of the Writers of the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was held from May 10 to May 14, this year, was merely intended in name to be a reflection of the creative activity, worries, aims and plans of the Ukrainian writers, but as far as the contents of its declarations and resolutions were concerned it could not by any means be described as Ukrainian; and in spite of the fact that it was held in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, it was obvious from the first to the last session that it was not Kyiv that had a voice in the matter, but Moscow. The 177 delegates who convened in Kyiv and whose task it was to represent the 527 members of the Writers' Union of Soviet Ukraine, in reality only had the privilege of reciting the resolutions of anti-Ukrainian and alien Moscow, the centre of the Soviet Russian imperium, and, of course, admiring and praising them accordingly. This undeniable fact was corroborated both by the opening speech of the well-known Soviet Ukrainian writer, Mykola Bazhan, and by the comments of the Soviet press. In the introduction to his "report," M. Bazhan stressed that "a clear and definite programme of the activity in all spheres of life—in the economic, political and ideological sphere and in that of international relations" had been laid down by the 21st Communist Party Congress in Moscow and, in particular, by the theories contained in Khrushchov's speech on that occasion.

All the Soviet Ukrainian writers have to do, therefore, is to accept the said theories "with enthusiasm" and to thank Khrushchov. In fact, the Kyiv daily "Radians'ka Ukrayina" (of March 15, 1959) said as much, quite openly: "The Congress delegates stressed in complete unanimity that the Ukrainian writers—poets, prose-writers, playwrights, literary critics and authorities on literature—were most enthusiastic about the historic resolutions of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the excellent Party document "For the Close Relation between Literature and the Life of the People"<sup>1</sup>) and would loyally serve the Communist Party and the Soviet people with their artistic work and their talent." But not a word

to the effect that the Ukrainian writers in their lectures, debates and resolutions should rely on their own judgment and act on the national interests of their fellow-countrymen in order to promote the welfare of their own Ukrainian people and further the development of their culture.

Thus, in future, too, as was the case so far, the Ukrainian writers are not to be allowed to deviate in the slightest measure from the principles of the so-called socialist realism as laid down by the Kremlin, and the only thing conceded to them in their depiction of Soviet reality will be the "varnish" as it were, that is to say only the glorification of the "achievements of Soviet socialism"; nowadays, one is not even allowed to criticize Stalin. In his lecture, M. Bazhan issued the following admonitions and warnings: "One must designate as an adherent of the revisionists anyone who, in our midst, too, endeavours to paint the history and the present period of socialist society mainly in dismal colours, who tries to exaggerate the negative results of the personality cult and in this way disparages the colossal victories which our people have achieved under the leadership of the Party and with respect to which the role of Comrade Stalin must not be underrated." Nowadays, whenever Comrade Stalin is accused of any crime, Comrade Khrushchov is virtually a co-accused.

In view of the forced onslaught of Muscovite centralism and the Russification of Ukraine, the 4th Congress of the Soviet Ukrainian Writers was a disgraceful spectacle of self-flagellation. The intimidated and terrorized "creators of culture" composed declarations of penance and resolved "to intensify the fight for the ideological exactitude of valuations, for the consistent realization of the principle of the Bolshevik party spirit" (L. Novychenko). And Pavlo Tychyna, the symbolist who was once (1917-1922) so popular because of his talented works, also did penance: "Instead of strengthening the work of Communist training amongst the writers and, in particular, amongst the creative youth, we have weakened it."

And incidentally, P. Tychyna—like M. Bazhan previously—sharply criticized the comparatively young poet Dmytro Pavlychko. To begin with, this surprises one somewhat, for D. Pavlychko in the first place enjoyed the esteem of the "Party and government" because he heaped abuse on the Ukrainian nationalists in his poems; and, what is more, he was the poet who composed the peculiar lines:

*Party, you are my eyes!  
Party, you are my language!*

But then, one day, something entirely unforeseen happened: D. Pavlychko began to enthuse about the famous "Rubaiyat" of the Persian poet Omar Khayyam,<sup>2)</sup> who, incidentally, in the U.S.S.R. has for fairly incomprehensible reasons been "promoted" to the rank of national poet of the so-called Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic; and then Pavlychko even began to imitate the verse of Omar Khayyam and, in fact, even more freely than Edward Fitzgerald had done in the middle of the last century. And now let us hear what P. Tychyna has to say in this respect:

"The sharpness of ethical hearing (!) in the case of our poet obviously failed for a time... Lo and behold, a foreigner, an enemy of our philosophy of life, an enemy of our task of building up Communism, gently tapped on Pavlychko's door... Reticences, allegories and vagueness appeared in Pavlychko's works..."

It is the following lines that have incriminated D. Pavlychko<sup>3</sup>):

*Life without books is a house without windows,  
A prison close and dark as a coffin.  
Through the windows of books the light of freedom streams in,  
And the distant prospect of the future becomes visible.*

— — —

*I cannot feign content like the saints.  
To have a clean shirt—is not enough in life.  
One needs the sun, one needs a match,  
If one is not to write verses in the dark.*

"What does he mean by a match?"—asks P. Tychyna indignantly. "What does he mean by the dark in which we poets allegedly write verse as if we were blind?"

Even though D. Pavlychko may be as zealously obsequious to Bolshevism as, for instance, P. Tychyna or M. Bazhan, the "case of Pavlychko" is nevertheless almost a border-line case of mutual prying and open denunciation, to which the Soviet Ukrainian writers are incited by the "Party and government" and, in fact, forced, if one of them has the misfortune to have expressed thoughts which were not by any means original or anti-Soviet, but were not "optimistic" enough and, to crown matters, were his own.

It is therefore not surprising that, in view of such a fusty atmosphere, Soviet Ukrainian literature is suffering from a kind of cancer, at which M. Bazhan hints in very carefully chosen words: "A levelling down and breaking up of themes, monotony, self-imitation, stereotypes, shallow water." To begin with, one "unifies" the literature of a non-Russian nation by forcing a "socialist realism" invented in Moscow on it, by demanding that it should glorify the "brotherly friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples" and, on the pretext of "combatting the expressions of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," forbids it to show any trace whatever of national peculiarity,—and then one expresses one's indignation at the "stereotypes"! And, incidentally, the "socialist-realistic" verse of M. Bazhan himself is most stereotyped, compared to his original, profoundly emotional, baroque type of poetry of the 1920's.

In any case, it is interesting and significant that the Soviet press no longer makes any attempt to keep the reader, and precisely the Ukrainian reader, in ignorance with regard to the question, for whose advantage and at whose instructions the 177 delegates of the Writer's Union of Soviet Ukraine let themselves be "elected" by the members of the said Union, convene in Kyiv, express their adulation of Khrushchov and of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union and conclude their hypocritical "self-criticism" with a few political denunciations which are directed against their colleagues, who are neither lacking in intention nor in ability to engage in such denunciation activity themselves, but who, more or less by chance, seem to have been lacking in caution. "Cui prodest?" (To whom is the crime in question of advantage?)—is the classical question of Roman law. And to this question the above-mentioned Kyiv daily "Radians'ka Ukrayina" gives a plain and definite answer. In its report on the Congress it clearly implies that the decisive part was played by the Russian writers who were present at the Congress:

"The delegates of the Congress expressed their feeling of profound love, great friendship and gratitude to the workers of the literature of the brotherly Republics, above all, to the Russian writers, whose representatives took the most active share in the work of the Congress."

It is thus perfectly obvious that the so-called Congress of the Soviet Ukrainian Writers was nothing but a carefully staged propagandist performance in which the Ukrainian writers were merely powerless puppets in the hands of Russian Bolshevik imperialistic colonialism.

#### NOTES

- 1) Composed by Comrade Khrushchov, of course!
- 2) Of course, in a Russian translation, of which are a number.
- 3) The English translation naturally does not reproduce the metre and rhyme of the original.

### ***A Pole on Ukrainian Poetry***

A young Polish poet, Bohdan Drozdowski, who is on the staff of the Cracow paper "Zycie Literackie," recently visited Kyiv and published an article in the Kyiv literary periodical, in which he wrote as follows:

"As a child I was already interested in Ukrainian poetry (national poetry). And I can still remember many of the folk-songs which the herdsmen used to sing as we looked after the horses. The songs were as lovely and melodious as the Ukrainian language itself is and they flowed as gently and smoothly as the Dniro in the Spring.

The Dniro! I saw this river, which is the theme of so many songs and poems, for the first time when I flew from Leningrad recently to Kyiv. This river has hundreds of small streams and rivulets, and a vast expanse of water stretched away to the horizon. As I gazed down at it, I felt a hot lump in my throat, as though I had unexpectedly encountered an old acquaintance whom I had never hoped to meet again. "So this is the famous river, the river where the songs have been born that remind me of my childhood!"... "and the winds sigh, the winds blow, and the trees bow down..."... "There is a high mountain, at its foot lies a grove, a green thick grove..."

The words and melodies of these songs are so simple and so lovely that one can still recall them twenty years later, just as I do, for it is twenty years since first I heard them. I am one of the young Polish poets (the young poets in our country are those between the age of 24 and 35) and we are generally reproached with having no ear for music and melody. But that is not correct, for many of the poems written by my colleagues sound as melodious as bells.

But now I should like to say something about Ukrainian poetry, for which I have a deep love. Perhaps my readers will not believe me when I say that the first article which I ever wrote was an article on Taras Shevchenko, and that my first translation from a foreign language was a poem by Taras Shevchenko. In 1949, I called on the editor of the culture column of the Katowice paper "Trybuna Robotnicza," the present well-known reporter of "Swiat," Edward Karłowicz, for the purpose of submitting my first poems to him. He pushed the poems aside and asked: "Have you ever heard of the Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko?" I replied: "Of course I have, but I don't know much about his works." "Here—the editor retorted—take this copy of "Kobzar" and write a leader about him!"—Shevchenko had been dead nearly 83 years. I became so absorbed in his works that I forgot all about my studies and, in fact, got a bad mark in metallurgy, but within a week my article on Shevchenko and two translations of his poems had been published. One of these poems has often been translated into Polish,—*"If I die, then bury me..."* (A famous lyric poem in which he asks that he may be buried where he can gaze upon the vast country of Ukraine, and adds that then the enemies of Ukraine should be driven out of the country.) How proud I was of my achievement! And to this day I regard this as the beginning of my literary career.

During the next few years, I had a chance to get hold of whole volumes of Ukrainian poetry, which were sent to our printing departments. In this way I became acquainted with the poems of Pavlo Tychyna, whose youthful and passionate lyricism captivated me completely. And then I became familiar with the poems of Maxym Rylsky with his feeling for objectivity and space, and, later, with the poems of Mykola Bazhan and Andriy Malushko. Ukrainian poems have played such an important part in my literary activity that a contemporary poet and journalist, Jerzy Walencyk, the author of a volume of poems entitled *"Half-sour Wine,"* on reviewing my volume of poems *"There Is Such A Tree"* (1956), immediately noticed the influence of Taras Shevchenko in one of the poems.

I cannot deny this influence. And why should I? For it is surely a good thing if I have an ear for melodious poetry, especially for such melodiousness as is to be found in profusion in Ukrainian poetry. Should I be ashamed of this?

Ukrainian poems are like beautiful, ripe fruit. One can take one's pick and be delighted again and again by the beauty of the language.

Rylsky's poems, for instance, move me profoundly with their strange emotions and spiritual power, even though the expressions and words are simple, everyday ones: "The scent of the leaves! The mushrooms, the wine



and the apples! The wise housewife has laid all this in for the winter!" Rylsky delights in the scent of the leaves, in the mushrooms and apples like a child that roams through a wood or an orchard for the first time in its life. He conveys to the reader the scents, tastes and colours which he himself has experienced and seems to say: "Behold, you are seeing these miracles for the first time!"

*"Ne'er know I that I so could love!  
With pain, with deathly sorrow.  
Silver willows lean over the Dniro  
And the birch-tree sheds crystal tears..."*

How beautifully these lines are expressed! I think Nature must be the father and the mother of Ukrainian poetry. Every poet honours Nature in his own way with his talent. And even when writing social lyrics, Ukrainian poets frequently use these pictures of Nature.

*"There is nothing I love so much as the breath of the wind,  
The Devil Wind! Accursed Wind!"*

(P. Tychyna)

or:

*"To thee, my Ukraine, I dedicate my first and my last breath!  
I sow the words on your meadows—  
I shall sow the words!  
Grass shall grow and flowers shall bloom.  
And grandchildren shall place a wreath of them on your brow!"*

(Vasyl Ellan)

or:

*"I will tear to pieces these wreaths,  
Bound in times of unrest.  
I will destroy them, burn them to dust and ashes!"*

(Vasyl Chumak)

I do not know what poetic hierarchy there is in Ukraine. Is the poet greatest, who is valued least? Probably the poets look upon each other (as they do everywhere!) as equal,—that is, as less than they deserve! As the Bible says, "A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country." It is possible that this is not correct. I should only like to say that I, as a Pole and a young poet, greatly admire Ukrainian poetry and shall always love it... For this magic power of the finest works in Ukrainian poetry—so a rival of Adam Mickiewicz, namely Juliusz Slowacki, says—is able to turn everyday beings into angels. Many poets of the world would do well to learn this organic bond with life from the Ukrainian poets."

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## ***Afraid of Ukrainian Nationalists***

The Soviet Russian panders and sycophants in Ukraine continue to make a lot of fuss about "Ukrainian nationalism" in their press and propaganda. In practically every meeting or session, the more or less important representatives of the Kremlin in Ukraine attack Ukrainian nationalists and the revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian people. Even the writers and poets living in Ukraine are forced by the Red Russian occupant to criticize and attack the Ukrainian nationalists.

At the last meeting of the Ukrainian writers, many of the speakers attacked the Ukrainian revolutionaries in a most offensive manner. Incidentally, the Soviet Russian sycophant, Liubomyr Dmyterko, who formerly lived in South America, is the leader of this campaign against the Ukrainian emigrants and their leaders. Dmyterko claims to have an expert knowledge of matters pertaining to the Ukrainian emigrants.

Speaking about literary activity in the free countries of the world, in particular in the USA (of course, with intentional misrepresentations of the true facts), Dmyterko actually went so far as to affirm that American writers are not in a position to organize their own literary congresses... because of lack of material aid. He likewise ridiculed the Ukrainian writers and organizations in the USA, too.

Dmyterko appeared to be greatly annoyed at the success of the Ukrainian nationalists in the foreign political sector. He attacked all the Ukrainian nationalists in a most offensive and defamatory manner, in particular President Stetzko for his visit to Formosa and his co-operation with Free China.

"This political bankrupt—so Dmyterko added—sees his political victory in his negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek." After these negotiations, President Stetzko, according to Dmyterko, allegedly addressed himself to the warmongers of the free world with the following declaration:

"We are in no way afraid of a future atomic war. Mankind will not be liquidated by such a war. The fate of our world is in the hands of God. It is more than presumptuous to suppose that without the Will of God, if we are obedient to the Creator (Dmyterko here intentionally omitted the words "and to the Fatherland"—editor's note), we could be subjected to destruction."

After having quoted these words by President Stetzko, Dmyterko exclaimed in a pathetic manner:

"The most stubborn aggressor would be afraid of delivering such a foolish and impudent declaration, because his own people and the peoples of the whole world would condemn him."

The Ukrainian emigrant press commented on the above public appearance of Dmyterko with considerable irony, by stressing that it is not so much the Ukrainian emigrants but, rather, the Soviet Russian sycophants in Ukraine who are afraid of the danger of an atomic war. In spite of constant threats from behind the Iron Curtain, the Ukrainians in the free world will continue their activity, the aim of which is the liberation of their native country from the yoke of Moscow.

## **IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE A. B. N.**

The 4th Anti-Communist Congress of the Inter-American Confederation for the Defense of the Continent (I.A.C.D.C.), which was held from October 12 to 16, 1958, in Antigua (Republic of Guatemala), was not only a huge success, but also marked the beginning of a new period in the consolidation and co-ordination of the world front against Communism and Russian imperialism: the Congress acknowledged the principles of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.) not only virtually, but also quite formally as its own, and in this way accorded to the national and social fight for freedom of the peoples subjugated by Moscow and its henchmen—including Ukraine, too, of course,—a moral support which the Western world had so far never manifested to such an extent. The entire free world has progressed a big step forwards as regards recognizing the true nature of the Communist danger which threatens it.

It is not necessary to go into the lengthy previous history of this epoch-making event in detail here, since an excellent account of the careful preparatory work of the A.B.N. directed towards this end is given in the recently published pamphlet "A.F.A.B.N. Strength" (by Dr. Al. Sokolovych).<sup>1)</sup> We shall, therefore, confine ourselves in this article to giving a brief survey of the main theories of the lecture held in this connection by the President of the III. Commission of the Congress, Dr. Salvador Mendoza (Mexico), since this lecture (entitled "The Present Status of Soviet Russian Imperialism") was decisive for the text of the resolution proposed by the Commission and accepted by the Congress (part of which we shall likewise quote).<sup>2)</sup>

<sup>1)</sup> On the Occasion of the Congress of American Friends of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, September 20-21, 1958 (New York, 48 pp.). This pamphlet contains the following articles and documents: Jaroslav Stetzko: Outline of New Liberation Policy (The Necessity of Co-ordinating the Free World's Policy with the Struggle of the Enslaved Nations; Agreement between the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Republic of China (APACLROC) and A.B.N. (Taipei, October 24, 1955); S. Halamay: American Friends of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations; Agreement between the Inter-American Confederation for the Defence of the Continent and A.B.N. (Munich, September 19, 1957); Agreement between the Stichting Aktivering Geestelijke Weerbaarheid (A.G.W.) and A.B.N. (Hague, October 30, 1957); Report on the Preparatory Conference of the Anti-Communist World Congress for Freedom and Liberation, held jointly by the Inter-American Confederation for the Defence of the Continent and the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (Mexico City, March 20, 1958), together with an Excerpt from Convocation (on the above-mentioned World Congress) adopted by the Preparatory Conference.

<sup>2)</sup> The names of the members of the above-mentioned Commission, who also signed the resolution submitted to the Congress, are as follows:—Dr. Salvador Mendoza (Mexico), President; Dr. Francisco Buitrago Martinez (Nicaragua), referendary; Eduardo Alfonso Figeas (El Salvador); Contador Miguel Angel Rubinec (Argentina); Victor Alegria (Cuba); Dr. Carlos E. Simons (Guatemala), secretary.

In his lecture, the aim of which was "in view of the Congress to put forward a concrete suggestion for effective action as regards the historical, philosophical, political and social problem which Soviet Russian imperialism represents," Dr. S. Mendoza dealt with the following seven points:

(1) "Ideological expansion of Russian imperialism by means of the traditional tactics of infiltration and absorption."

(2) "Forty years of complete seclusion" of the Soviet Russian imperium from the free world: since Soviet Russian imperialism arbitrarily withholds every form of freedom from peoples and individuals, these must "be kept in captivity behind a rigid Iron Curtain to prevent them from having a chance to compare their misery and their life in slavery with the life of any other people."

(3) "Ruthless exploitation of the workers" (in which connection "slave labour is an important point in the entire planned economy of the U.S.S.R.").

(4) "Subjugation of the nations which differ ethnically from Russia, as for instance the Ukrainians, White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), Georgians, etc."

(5) "Mass deportation of the subjugated peoples": "In its persistent, ruthless and baneful struggle to subjugate and destroy the nations that rebel against it, Russia resorts to the notorious means of deportation and of disintegration of the ethnical entities... Russia has, for instance, stopped at nothing—starvation, imprisonment, mass deportation, murder and executions—in order to decimate the brave and freedom-loving Ukrainian nation, a nation on a high ethical, cultural and social level, which numbers over 45 million... As a result of mass deportations, the sorely tried but, nevertheless, still spiritually invincible Ukrainians constitute 45 per cent of the 15 million persons who have been deported to Siberia. And, incidentally, this percentage does not even include the 1 to 1½ million young Ukrainians who have been forcibly mobilized for the cultivation of virgin regions during the years 1957 to 1958... The systematic mass deportation of persons whose only crime is their longing for freedom is a permanent means resorted to by imperialistic Russia in order to nip any hope of liberation and independence on the part of the subjugated peoples in the bud. The ethnographical map of the Russian imperium is proof of the carefully thought-out technique with which these mass shifts of population are carried out in order to prevent all contact with the free world and every possibility of escape—which individual groups of people might attempt in order to gain their freedom. They (the members of the non-Russian nations) are either intermixed, or else are isolated in the heart of the U.S.S.R., far away from the natural frontiers of their countries."

(6) "Ruthless suppression of the liberation movements in the subjugated countries": "On the 23rd of this month, in particular, we commemorate the tragic sacrifice of the Hungarian martyrs who laid down their lives two years ago... Let us enumerate the (anti-Russian) insurrections of recent years—those of the Ukrainians, Lithuanians and other non-Russian peoples, as well as the riots in the concentration camps in Siberia, namely in Vorkuta (1953), Norilsk (1953), Kinghiri (Kazakhstan, 1954), where 500 Ukrainian

women, fighting for freedom, were crushed to death by Russian tanks; nor must we forget the revolutionary campaign carried out by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the workers' riots in Poznan (Poland, 1956)."

(7) "Cold war in the economic sphere"—"the economic war which Russia is conducting even in our free America, by offering presents or financial help, but, above all, by selling (at dumping prices) goods which have been produced by sweating the peoples who have been enslaved."

In his lecture Dr. S. Mendoza also stressed in particular the proposal put to the U.S. Congress on July 2, 1958, by U.S. Congressman Albert W. Cretella, namely that the dates of the national days (celebration of independence) of the nations subjugated by the Soviet Union should be regarded and proclaimed as days of historical commemoration and as days of reflection for the population of the USA,—"as a sign of spiritual solidarity with the victims of Communist Russian imperialism and its colonialism" (as Dr. S. Mendoza very fittingly said). This proposal, which was accepted as a resolution by the U.S. Congress, refers to Ukraine (January 22), Lithuania (February 16), Esthonia (February 24), Bulgaria (March 3), Slovakia (March 14), Hungary (March 15), Byelorussia (March 25), Poland (May 3), Roumania (May 10), Georgia (May 26), Armenia (May 28), Azerbaijan (May 28), East Germany (June 17), North Korea (August 15), Chinese mainland (October 10), North Vietnam (October 16), Czechia (October 28), Latvia (November 18) and Albania (November 28).

"This resolution—so Dr. S. Mendoza added—is intended as an encouragement to the captive nations on the part of the USA, whose Declaration of Independence and solemn proclamation of human rights is to be regarded as a guarantee of the future liberation of the said countries. Our 4th Anti-Communist Continental Congress should likewise proclaim and commemorate these days of independence, these illustrious landmarks in the fate of the free world. The whole of America should spiritually unite with the striving of the peoples enslaved by Russian imperialism to gain their liberation and independence."

In conclusion, we should like to quote the last six points of the resolution adopted in this respect by the Congress of the Inter-American Confederation for the Defense of the Continent:

"The 4th Anti-Communist Continental Congress, assembled in Antigua (Guatemala), resolves as follows:—

- 1) To explicitly and definitely reject every form of coexistence policy or policy recognizing the status quo, which might allow the Russian imperium, in violation of every right, to maintain its rule over the subjugated countries and peoples;
- 7) To endeavour, as an urgent necessity, to help the subjugated peoples to regain their full international and lawful sovereignty; to overthrow the Russian imperium in order to enable new states, completely severed from Moscow's scourge, to be set up in their ethnical territories;

- 8) To recommend all peoples of the free world to sever immediately diplomatic relations with Russia and with the satellite states of the Communist bloc, as well as with those states which are allegedly independent, but are nevertheless controlled by Russia;
- 9) To give definite support to all the national liberation movements in the countries behind the Iron Curtain;
- 10) To recommend all free peoples of the world to declare the Communist parties existing in their territories illegal, since these parties are nothing but agents of Soviet Russian imperialism;
- 11) To spread the text of this resolution whenever and wherever possible, in order to make the masses understand the motives contained therein and to convince the minds and conscience of the free peoples that we must counteract the advance of Soviet subjugation as regards those countries which are still parts of the free world, before we are forced to put a stop to this subjugation—as other peoples are forced to do—by sacrificing ourselves.”

\* \* \*

The great task of the ideological co-ordination of the anti-Bolshevist fight for the freedom of peoples and individuals has, in this way, to a considerable extent been realized; and it is to be hoped that at the forthcoming Anti-Communist World Congress for Freedom and Liberation this task will be completed from the ideological point of view and will lead to positive results in practice.

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**THE TELEGRAM SENT TO THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE USA, DWIGHT EISENHOWER, BY THE HEAD  
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS,  
STEPAN BANDERA, ON THE OCCASION OF THE DEATH  
OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES**

President Dwight Eisenhower  
WASHINGTON

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists sends Your Excellency sincerest condolences on the passing of John Foster Dulles, the great champion of freedom against Russian Communist tyranny.

The Ukrainian people hopes, together with the joint efforts of free and subjugated peoples, to crush Bolshevism and regain independence.

*Stepan Bandera*

OBITUARY

It is with deepest sorrow that  
The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain  
announces the sudden death of

***Dmytro Lewyckyj***

President of the Association, on June 15th, 1959, in the 65th year  
of his life, in St. Mary's Hospital, Paddington.

He was born at Nova Ukraïka, Province of Kherson, in Ukraine, on November 3rd, 1894, and studied at the St. Volodymyr University, Kyiv (Kiev), in the Faculty of Philology. During the Ukrainian War of Independence he served as a Captain in the 4th Kyiv Division of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic.

In 1947, Professor Lewyckyj arrived in Great Britain and settled in Rochdale. In 1954, he was elected President of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, which office he held until he died. In addition to this, he was also the Vice-Chairman of the Ukrainian Central Co-ordinating Committee and Vice-President of the Anglo-Ukrainian Society. He is deeply mourned by his widow, and their son and daughter.

A Requiem Mass was celebrated at The Cemetery Chapel, Gunnersbury Cemetery, W.3. on Saturday, June 20th, 1959, at 9.00 a.m. and was followed by the Funeral at Gunnersbury Cemetery.

*Requiescat in Pace.*

Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain,  
49, Linden Gardens, London, W.2.

### BOOK REVIEWS

*Dmytro Doroshenko. A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY. Olexander Ohloblyn. UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 1917—1956.*

The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., Vol. V-VI, No. 4(18)—1,2(19,20) New York, 1957 (Special Issue), 456 pp.

The biographer of the outstanding Ukrainian historian and politician, Dmytro Ivanovych Doroshenko (1882-1951, who was an emigrant from 1919 onwards), the literary critic, Leonid Biletsky, meanwhile likewise deceased, wrote in his brochure "Dmytro Doroshenko" (published in Winnipeg in 1949) that the work of D.I. Doroshenko is "a great and important page of Ukrainian national history for society, in culture, in politics and science;" and one is bound to agree unreservedly with this opinion. D.I. Doroshenko's younger colleague, Professor Olexander Ohloblyn (who at present holds a post in New York), who in the publication under review directly continues the historiographical work of D. Doroshenko, writes as follows of his notable predecessor:

"D. I. Doroshenko left a huge heritage of scientific and literary works. From 1899 on, he published about 1,000 scientific, academic, scientific-popular and journalistic works on Ukrainian history, historiography, the history of Ukrainian culture, church, literature, the history of Ukrainian cultural and political relations with Western Europe (chiefly with Germany), Slavonic studies and Ukrainian historical bibliography in the following languages: Ukrainian, Russian, Byelorussian, Polish, Czech, Serbian, English, French, German, Italian and Swedish" (p. 405).

"In Ukrainian historiography especially, Doroshenko occupies one of the most prominent places. As the bearer of the finest traditions of Ukrainian historiography of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, he was the first among Ukrainian historians to compile a scholarly outline of Ukrainian history from the earliest times to our own days, not merely as a process of the historical development of the Ukrainian people, but also as a process of the development of Ukrainian nationhood" (p. 409).

It is thus extremely gratifying to know that D.I. Doroshenko's main historiographical work has now also been published in an English translation, namely in a new and excellently revised edition. D.I. Doroshenko's book "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography" ("Ohlyad ukrayins'koyi istoriografii") was published in Ukrainian in 1923 in Prague by the Ukrainian Free University. This book is composed of a course of lectures given by the author at the Ukrainian Free University, first in Vienna in the spring of 1921 and, more extensively, in Prague during the 1921-1922 academic year. During the last decades, Ukrainian historical science made great progress, above all



in emigrant circles (but also in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, before all scientific research in the field of philology and history was ruthlessly exterminated by the Bolshevik terrorist regime during the 1930's, never to revive again, so far): numerous Ukrainian scholars have been engaged in historiographical studies and many problems have been worked out more completely than they were at the time Doroshenko wrote his "Survey." Many details have since been illuminated, many disputable problems elucidated. Therefore a supplementary chapter on the development of Ukrainian historiography from 1917 up to 1956 written by Professor Olexander Ohloblyn has been added.

As regards the contents and the purpose of the book, the author himself writes as follows:

"The purpose of this survey of Ukrainian historiography is to outline the development of scholarly research and study in Ukrainian history. That work, unfolding like a chronicle, begins with the eleventh century, that is, from the time of the first literary monuments in the Ukraine-Rus'. Even the old chronicles show a highly developed sense of national solidarity and loyalty to the state. They are deeply interested in their country's past and show a desire to investigate and to elucidate it and thus relate it to contemporary events. This is characteristic also of all other researchers into the past, from earliest times to the birth of the modern era, when old chronicle writing was replaced by new scientific methods of historical research. The development and popularity of historical studies of one's own ancient history also characterized the Ukrainian national revival which began at the turn of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Therefore the present outline of Ukrainian historiography will deal with the development of Ukrainian national and historical thought" (p. 13).

This naturally does not mean that the author intends to make the development of Ukrainian historiography directly dependent on the process of the evolution and elucidation of Ukrainian national thought,—that would be tendentious and, in any case, entirely impossible to prove. What D. I. Doroshenko intends to do in this case is, from the methodological aspect, incontestable and, at the same time, extremely interesting.

The essence of the problem in question consists in the following points: every historical text—with the exception, possibly, of direct testimony by actual eye-witnesses of the events concerned—is a historical source in a double sense,—namely, as regards what is reported, and as regards the special nature of the report itself; or, in other words, every historical report also reports about its own reporter (that is to say, about his era and his cultural and historical milieu). Thus, for instance, the epoch-making anonymous "History of the Rus'"<sup>1</sup>) in Ukrainian historiography is, according to D. Doroshenko's well-founded opinion, "of very little value as research into the Ukrainian past," but, on the other hand, an excellent source for the

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<sup>1</sup>) "Istoriya Rusov" (1st edition Moscow, 1846); see the "Ukrainian Review," Vol. IV, No. 2 (1957), pp. 24-31.

Ukrainian national and political ideology at the time of its composition, that is the end of the 18th century, and as such is accordingly dealt with in detail and exhaustively in D. I. Doroshenko's "Survey."

The main point, therefore, is to deal with the so-called secondary sources, too, as primary sources for the spiritual and intellectual history of the era in which the work was written and, in this way, to systematically elucidate the inner connection between Ukrainian historiography and the entire spiritual and intellectual—and, in particular, the national and political—life of the Ukrainian people. D. I. Doroshenko's "Survey" is the first and, unfortunately, so far the only attempt in Ukrainian historiography to set up a synthesis of this kind, and it is, thus, very gratifying to know that the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.A. has spared no trouble and no expense to make this masterpiece of Ukrainian historiography available in a revised and supplemented edition to the English-speaking reader and, above all, to West European and American Slavist circles. Like all the rest of D. I. Doroshenko's works, his "Survey" is distinguished by an exemplary objectivity, as well as by a sincere tolerance of opinions of others,—a tolerance which in some cases perhaps even goes a little too far.<sup>2)</sup> In this respect, Professor O. Ohloblyn, who has re-edited and continued Doroshenko's work, likewise reflects his proof of his unparalleled mastery of the bibliography of his subject.<sup>3)</sup>

One of the less satisfactory features of the work is the disproportionately brief way in which the oldest periods of Ukrainian history, that is to say practically all the material which precedes the Cossack Chronicles of the 17th-18th century, are dealt with; in the event of a publication of a new edition of the work, it would thus be essential for the revision of the chapters in question to be entrusted to a special authority on old Ukrainian history (neither D. I. Doroshenko nor Professor O. Ohloblyn is an authority in this field.)

And what would be even more essential—and far easier to realize, would be a revised and supplemented new edition of the English "History of the Ukraine" by D. I. Doroshenko (Edmonton, 1939; second edition, Edmonton, 1941), which, of all the one-volume manuals of Ukrainian history, undoubtedly remains the most adequate.

V. D.

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<sup>2)</sup> For instance, his criticism of the Ukrainian "populistic" (that is, socialist, but non-Marxist) historiographical school, headed by Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, seems in many respects to be far too mild.

<sup>3)</sup> Professor O. Ohloblyn, however, does not seem to be aware of the fact that of the numerous publications by the Ukrainian historian, Dr. Bohdan Kentrschynskyj (Kentrzhynsky), who is an authority on the history of Sweden in the 17th—18th century, a number deal with the history of Ukraine during the same period.

Jaroslav Bohdan Rudnyckyj: Notice biographique et bibliographique et Résumé de sa communication *Recherches dialectologiques en Amérique du Nord*. Publiés par Sever Pop. Centre International de Dialectologie Générale près l'Université Catholique de Louvain, Biographies et Conférences, 13, 1958, 30 pp.

(Jaroslav Bohdan Rudnyckyj: Biographical and bibliographical notice and a résumé of his essay on *Dialectological Research in North America*. Published by Sever Pop.)

It is extremely gratifying for Ukrainian scientific and academic circles in exile to learn that one of their most outstanding representatives, Jaroslav B. Rudnyckyj, has, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of his active and productive scientific work (1933-1958), been honoured by such an important academic institution as the International Centre for General Dialectology of the Catholic University of Louvain, namely by a special publication which is devoted to his academic career and his philological works. And he has certainly deserved this honour and distinction. Professor Dr. Jaroslav Bohdan Rudnyckyj (also spelled Rudnytsky), born in Peremyshl, West Galicia, in 1910, and from 1945 onwards, Professor of Slav Studies at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich (Bavaria), and since 1949 at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg (Canada), has not only achieved outstanding work in the field of Ukrainian linguistics, namely in onomastics and dialectology, as well as in Ukrainian studies in general, but has also in an exemplary way represented Ukrainian philology in the academic world of the West, as can be seen from his active participation in six international and several American and Canadian Slavist and linguistic congresses during the years from 1934 to 1957; in addition, he has for the past ten years been the editor of several series of scientific publications which he himself founded in Winnipeg ("Onomastica," "Slavistica," "Ukrainica Occidentalia," etc.), and in which well-known Slavists from countries all over the world—incidentally, only countries on this side of the Iron Curtain—take an active interest.

When considering the large number of excellent scientific essays and works which Professor Rudnyckyj has produced, one is, however, forced to regret that the material circumstances of an emigrant's life have made it impossible for some of these writings to be enlarged on or their subject-matter expanded still further; for instance, there is only the "Introduction" to a comparative grammar of the Slav languages (Augsburg, 1948) and likewise to a handbook of Slav studies (Munich, 1947); and a grammar of the old ecclesiastical Slav language (Munich, 1947) and a Ukrainian dialectology (Augsburg, 1946) only exist in the form of brief "Outlines," and of so important a scientific work as the etymological dictionary of the Ukrainian language, only four sample pages (Vienna-Leipzig, 1945) have survived the havoc wrought by World War II. In any case, however, the big Ukrainian-German dictionary (Leipzig, 1943) compiled by Professor Rudnyckyj (together with Prof. Zenon Kuzela) retains its lasting value and will no doubt for the next decades continue to be practically indispensable to anyone who engages in Ukrainian

studies; and in the onomastics and dialectology of the Ukrainians in Canada, Professor Rudnyckyj appears to have found a special field of research, with which he has dealt again and again in numerous essays and which will no doubt provide the subject for an outstanding monograph.

In connection with his research in this field, the above-mentioned French résumé of his thesis on *Dialectological Research in North America*, which he submitted to the International Centre of General Dialectology of the Catholic University of Louvain, on May 17, 1955, and in which the following important arguments are advanced and explained, is extremely noteworthy: "The American territory<sup>1)</sup> continues to uphold the claim of complying with the so-called *Koinê*, that is to say a kind of symbiosis of various dialects in one and the same region. Another fact which must be considered is the existence of the so-called provincial and dialectal *enclaves*, brought to American soil by European immigrants. There, they continue to exist in a "frozen" state and do not develop any further. In this way the dialectology of the New World can be divided into two factors as far as the main objects of research are concerned: the symbiosis of dialects and the enclaves of the dialects scattered throughout the territory of Canada and the USA."

It is most appropriate that, simultaneous with this publication, which refers mainly to the linguistic research carried out by Professor Rudnyckyj,<sup>2)</sup> a new treatise of his has appeared, in which he deals with questions pertaining to the history of literature and which thus serves to remind one that in this field, too, he has done outstanding research work. This treatise is entitled "Problems of the Contemporary Shevchenkology" ("Nayblyzchi zavdann'a shevchenkoznastva." Winnipeg, 1958, Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, Series: UVAN Chronicle, No. 16) and also contains an English Summary. An extremely appropriate programme for Ukrainian philology is drawn up and explained by the author. In 1960 and 1961, two centenaries will be celebrated by the Ukrainians throughout the world: the 100th anniversary of the publication of Taras Shevchenko's "Kobzar"<sup>3)</sup> (St. Petersburg 1860) and, in 1961, the 100th anniversary of the death of the great Ukrainian poet. To mark both anniversaries, the author suggests the following actions to be undertaken in 1959 and realized in 1960 and 1961: (1) a jubilee re-edition of "Kobzar" of 1860; (2) a compilation of Shevchenkiana in the West, particularly in Canada and the USA; (3) a compilation and publishing of a grammar and a dictionary of Shevchenko's language; (4) an edition of English, French, Spanish, German and other translations of Shevchenko; (5) a synthesis of the ideological trends of Shevchenko as they were expressed in his works.

1) What is meant is the territory of Canada and the USA.

2) It also contains a French translation of another dialectological thesis by Professor Rudnyckyj, namely his first dialectological work, the article "Dialectological Research on the Spot" (published in Warsaw in 1933). This article contains some interesting information of a methodological nature, but can nowadays, of course, only be considered of value from the historical point of view.

3) "The Lyryst" is the title which Taras Shevchenko gave the more or less complete edition of his poems and epics.

Of these five points, the first seems to us to be untimely: a phototype (or any other) reproduction of the first edition of the "Kobzar" is a luxury which one could only permit oneself if a completely reliable critical and, thus, generally accessible edition of this book were available; and, unfortunately, this is not the case. In our opinion, the best critical edition, the Prague edition of 1940 (by D. Doroshenko and S. Siropolko) is, however, not entirely reliable and, in any case, a bibliophil's rarity (Professor Rudnyckyj only knows of two copies,—one in New York and one in Winnipeg); the Winnipeg edition of 1952-1954 (by L. Biletsky) is extremely questionable both from the point of view of the text and also as regards the commentary<sup>4</sup>); and the almost legendary Gräfenheinich edition of the year 1945 (by J. Rudnyckyj), as far as we know, only exists in two sample copies. And the Soviet editions, which systematically falsify the text, are, of course, entirely out of the question. Under these circumstances, a re-print of the Prague edition or of Professor Rudnyckyj's edition (or, if possible, of both) would be the best one could hope for as regards the anniversary celebrations of 1960-1961; on the other hand, however, a facsimile print of the first edition of the "Kobzar" remains what it is,—namely a lovely and extravagant dream and nothing more!

All the remaining points of Professor Rudnyckyj's programme are most appropriate, and as far as the fifth (and last) point is concerned—"a synthesis of the ideological trends of Shevchenko as they were expressed in his works," its meaning is already illustrated by a previous work, which originates from the same academic circles and, though it only has one of Shevchenko's poems as the object of its research, clearly and concretely expresses the nature and trend of the "ideological synthesis" defined by Professor Rudnyckyj in his programme. The work in question is a monograph by Volodymyr Zyla (more correctly transcribed Zhyla), "Ideological Background of Shevchenko's *Hamaliya*" ("Ideyni osnovy Shevchenkovooho *Hamaliyi*," Winnipeg, 1958, Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, Series: Literature, No. 4, 24 pp.), with an English summary, in which the author formulates the conclusions reached in his critical research, in which he has exhaustively taken into consideration various older works, as follows:

"The poem *Hamaliya* of T. Shevchenko presents one of the finest pictures of Cossack's honor, his love for freedom, and his readiness to liberate his brothers from Turkish captivity. This poem has a deep historical background; it is an open defence of the Ukrainian Cossacks who were dishonored, deprived of Christian ideals, put on the same level as simple knights who fought "for money and drink" by the prejudicial Russian view in Shevchenko's time... Such views are elaborated to deprive the Ukrainian nation of its glorious past and deny the recognition and appreciation it deserves. The poem *Hamaliya* is the Ukrainian answer given by Shevchenko to Russian official views. This poem is in national and historical aspects a strong presentation of the Cossacks' heroic deeds, which promoted freedom for the enslaved peoples and for the Ukraine. The fine literary form and composition of *Hamaliya* serve one purpose: they promote the ideals of liberty, humanity and civic dignity and solve the essential questions of Ukrainian history. Here

Shevchenko proved to be a national poet who knew the Ukrainian national formation, knew the strong and the weak aspects of the Ukrainian spirit and character. He mobilized in this poem all the essential spiritual values of the Cossacks and of the nation as a whole in order to prove that the Russian view was designed to misinterpret the glorious Ukrainian past and to challenge the rights of the Ukraine to nationhood and statehood."

It is, incidentally, gratifying to know that the next (fifth) number of this Literature Series of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN) edited by Dr. M. Mandryka, which is to be published in the near future, is a thesis by the Ukrainian writer and literary critic, Dr. Yar Slavutych, who is well known to our readers; it is entitled "Ivan Franko and Russia" and is to deal with an extremely important ideological aspect of the literary and political activity of the greatest West Ukrainian writer. We are convinced that this subject will be dealt with in the same excellent objective and scientific manner which characterizes all the publications of the above-mentioned series of the UVAN, a fact which, in the first place, is undoubtedly due to Professor Rudnykyj's profound methodological influence.

V. D.

Dr. D. Donzow: *FROM MYSTICISM TO POLITICS*. The League for the Liberation of Ukraine, Toronto, Canada, 1957.

For this book, "From Mysticism to Politics," the Author, Dr. D. Donzow has chosen as motto the words of Charles Peguy: "Everything begins with mysticism and everything ends with politics." Only a mystical faith in the destiny of the nation gives it dynamic force in our age of wars, revolutions and anarchy.

Muscovite Communism and Zionism are two forces that on the basis of their mysticism (Muscovite shamanism and the Old Testament) consider their nations to be "higher," to be "chosen peoples," who are called to play a leading role among other nations.

The philosophy of the democratic "way of life" cannot oppose itself to these ideas, for it lacks mysticism, idealism and dynamism: its principle is appeasement of all aggression.

If Ukraine is to be victorious in its age old struggle against Muscovite messianism, she must return to the mysticism of ancient Christian Kiev, this "city of God's Wisdom" with its cathedral of HOLY SOPHIA, with its legend of St. Andrew the First-called, who prophesied that on the Kiev mountains "God's grace will shine," with its patron, Archangel Michael and his spiritual and wordly sword. She must stand against the anti-Christian forces of materialism and of Moscow, for the triumph of Spirit over matter, for the Truth revealed in the New Testament and based not on the Old Law but on the wisdom of ancient Greece, as is being held by a number of authors whom Dr. D. Donzow cites, as for example: H. Blavatsky, P. Steiner, E. Fox, J. Gillis, Y. White, A. Siegfried, I. Bourrasse, P. Janvier, H. Zielinski and, it goes without saying, the books of the New Testament itself.

Dieter Friede: *DAS RUSSISCHE PERPETUUM MOBILE*. (The Russian Perpetuum Mobile.) Marienburg-Verlag, Würzburg, 1959.

The book "Das Russische Perpetuum Mobile" by Dieter Friede, which was published in March this year, stands out amongst the various works on East European studies that have recently become so numerous in West Germany as a publication that is unique. It is probably the first book since World War II which analyses the problems of the Russian mentality and the historical development of Russian imperialism in such an excellent way. Indeed, it can be regarded as an extremely valuable handbook for all those statesmen and politicians of the West who would like to understand thoroughly the contemporary political aims of Moscow, this eternal brutal and violent power, the sole goal of which has always been and still is today, to conquer and dominate the whole world. An analysis of Bolshevism as an emanation from the mentality and soul of the Russian people throughout centuries and an analysis of the everlasting Russian imperialism, which has always existed independently of the form of government, have on a previous occasion already been presented by another German, De Cusine, who depicts the Russian soul as it really is. Friede's book gives us an account of all the horrors and atrocities of the tsarist regime and at the same time, enables us to compare the former Russian regimes with the present Red Russian terrorist system. The author analyses the conception of foreign policy of the Russian governments of every period and compares it with the contemporary Bolshevik policy. Bolshevism is a realization of the testaments of Peter I, Catherine II and Nicholas II. The facts quoted are corroborated by the conclusions drawn by the author himself, as well as by various statements made by numerous Russian politicians and scientists and also by prominent personalities of the West. The tortures inflicted on the inmates of the Soviet Russian concentration camps and their heroic attitude, as described by the author (who was a prisoner in the concentration camp at Vorkuta in the far north for six years), make a deep impression on the reader. Indeed, we are greatly indebted to the author for revealing the truth about the concentration camps in Red Russia. Incidentally, Friede estimates the number of prisoners in these concentration camps at 20 million and stresses that the majority of them are Ukrainians. A young fanatic and hero, an unknown "Westerner" who went by the name of "Alyosha" and was a prisoner in the same concentration camp as the author, encouraged Friede to write his book. "Alyosha" gave him two letters that were written by Chekhov in 1890 on the life of the prisoners in Sakhalin, and asked him to write a book on the unchangeableness of Russian imperialism in every form,—the Russian perpetuum mobile. Friede also made use of an article by General Fuller, published in the "ABN Correspondence" in November 1957, on the disintegration of the Russian empire. The author points out that the statesmen and politicians of the West do not know the true nature of Russia and consider her to be a monolith, whereas, in reality, this prison of nations called the U.S.S.R. is by no means inhabited exclusively by Russians; on the contrary, more than half the population of the Soviet Union consists of non-Russians

who are eager to rid themselves of Russian domination for good. The Preface by General Fuller should be read by all the statesmen and politicians of the West. The author, incidentally, does not agree with the usual statement that Bismarck was Russophil; on the contrary, the aims of his policy were anti-Russian, as is proved by numerous documents.

Friede points out that the tsars were always opposed to any kind of union of Germany, an attitude which is held by Khrushchov today. Furthermore, Russia always endeavoured to occupy East Prussia, an aim that was realized by Stalin. Friede corroborates his statements in this respect by various documentary data.

He goes on to analyse England's policy, which was always anti-Russian, as for instance at the time of Disraeli, etc., and stresses that England's position was weakened when she changed this policy during the two world wars.

Friede then makes an appeal to the freedom-loving peoples, urging them to unite in the struggle against Russia—the enemy of the West, and in this connection quotes the prophecy of Michelet in 1871.

All nations from the territories enslaved by Russian Communism—the Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Georgians, Turkestanians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Japanese, Koreans and Chinese and, above all, the Ukrainians, will find valuable information and data on the present Red Russian terrorist regime in this book.

Furthermore, the publication is a warning memento to the West, which does not understand the true nature of Russian Bolshevism and, therefore, is not in a position to cure this world evil.

Bolshevism (Leninism, Stalinism, etc.), according to the author, is a purely Russian phenomenon, which reflects the Russian Messianism and nihilism of the 19th century rather than the doctrine of Marx. And these Russian roots of Bolshevism are obvious to anyone who has studied Russian history and Russian literature (p. 13).

The author very rightly affirms that "the strength of Russia lies in the ignorance on the part of the West of the nature of Bolshevism" (p. 22). "The Bolsheviks are genuine Russians—Muscovites,—no matter whether the West likes to admit this fact or not." "Like the Russian Tsars, the secretaries of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. have only one motto, namely world domination by the Russians" (p. 30). "For the past 400 years the Europeans have been providing Russia with arms against Europe" (p. 31). These and other apt reflections are to be found on almost every page of this epoch-making book.

It is true that we also find certain mistakes and errors in this book, partly due to the fact that the author has not an exact knowledge of the whole political complexity in Central and East Europe. Certain terminological designations are incorrect. For instance, the author uses the term "Eastern Poland" instead of "Western Ukraine," and the name Carpatho-Ukraine to mean both the actual territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, as well as the Ukrainian ethnical territory on both sides of the Carpathian Mountains alike. Friede has probably overlooked the fact that the Red Russians in 1939 occupied not "Eastern Poland" but the West Ukrainian territories.



But in spite of these errors, the book should be read by all those who wish to gain a better insight into East European affairs and into the true nature of the present regime in the U.S.S.R.

*Slava Podilskā*

*EN NOTRE AME ET CONSCIENCE. LA VERITE SUR PETLURA.*

Published by the Committee for the Defence of the Memory of Petlura, Paris, 1958. 99 pp.

The Ukrainians living in France have recently published a book that is intended to defend the memory of the head of the Ukrainian National Republic, Simon Petlura, who was murdered by the Soviet Russian agent Schwarzbart in Paris in 1926. Schwarzbart was released by a French court. In February 1958, the defence counsel of the murderer of Petlura, Torres, was allowed to give a programme on the French television in which he recapitulated the legal proceedings at the time in Paris for the purpose of defaming the illustrious memory of Petlura and attacking the Ukrainian liberation movement.

The said book, which has been published by the Ukrainians in France with the support of Ukrainians all over the world, contains countless valuable documents which prove that Petlura had no part whatever in the Jewish pogroms in Ukraine. Ukraine at that time was the scene of a grim liberation struggle, for Russian "white" and "red" armies had invaded vast areas of the country and were carrying out pogroms against the Jews in the territories which they had invaded. Jewish pogroms were also instigated with the help of secretly infiltrated Russian agents in some of the regions that were still under the rule of the Ukrainian national government, which, incidentally, did its utmost to stop these anti-Jewish excesses. The said documents also give the reader excellent information on the Ukrainian legislation dealing with the problem of the national minorities (including the Jewish minority) in Ukraine and prove that the Jews enjoyed the same rights as the rest of the population of Ukraine.

It is a great pity that these documents have not been studied by all Jews, many of whom, unfortunately, have allowed themselves to be influenced by Red Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda. The book also contains facsimiles of the Ukrainian bank-notes on which a Jewish text is also to be seen.

The last article in the book deals with the Ukrainian-Jewish problem. The author stresses that the Ukrainians wish to live in peace and mutual understanding with all the national minorities in Ukraine. It is pointed out that the government of the Ukrainian National Republic granted every possible privilege to the Jews in Ukraine. The Ukrainian people for their part are prepared to continue this policy of tolerance with regard to all national minorities living in Ukraine, whether they be Jews, Poles, Roumanians, Hungarians, Russians or others.

This book should also be translated into English in order to enable English-speaking readers to become acquainted with the countless informative documents dealing with the Jewish problem in Ukraine.

V. O.

*IN QUEST OF FREEDOM, 1918-1958.* Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of Ukrainian Independence. By Walter Dushnyck. Published by The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. New York, 1958, pp. 96.

The author, an outstanding analyst of Eastern European affairs, portrays, with vivid perspective, the complex political events which occurred in Ukraine before, during, and after the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic. By presenting us a short survey of the recent Ukrainian history, Mr. Dushnyck goes back to the Battle of Poltava in 1709 when Ukraine had lost her independence. He presented us a gripping account of the years of Ukraine's independent existence.

The book is divided into the following chapters:

*Introduction* informing the foreign reader on the turbulent past of the Ukrainian people after the fall of Ukraine's independence in the XVIIIth century;

*Part One*: Ukraine before and during World War I;

*Part Two*: The Ukrainian National Revolution starting in March 1917 and culminating with the establishment of Ukraine's independence on January 22, 1918;

*Part Three*: The heroic efforts of united Ukraine to sustain the independence assailed by the White and Red Russians and by other neighbours of Ukraine, above all by Poles and Rumanians, as well;

*The Epilogue* presents us the political situation of the Ukrainians between two world wars up to the present day.

Beside many illustrations the book includes a selected Bibliography and Index.

Mr. Dushnyck stresses that the political and cultural basis for a Ukrainian Nation involved already in the 9th century when independent (ancient) Ukraine, known as "Rus" ("Ruthenia") at that time, became the focal point for Eastern European affairs down to the middle of the 12th century. The Tartar invasion of Ukraine (c. 1240) had united the ancient Ukrainians against their Mongol invaders and resulted in breaking any Ukrainian ties with the ancient Russians who were known as Muscovites for many centuries.

The pre-20th century history of Ukraine was marked by such outstanding Ukrainian figures as the great Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman Mazeppa, the greatest Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko and many others.

The author describes further the great rebirth of Ukrainian culture in the 19th century, with such literary figures as Taras Shevchenko in Greater Ukraine (under the Russian rule) and Ivan Franko in Galicia that belonged to Austria till the downfall of Austria-Hungary in 1918.

The major portion of the book is devoted to the deadly struggle of Ukraine against her Russian oppressor, to the establishment of Ukrainian independence in 1918 and to the new invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Communists. Much valuable information is included in the book with regard to the struggle of the Western Ukrainians against the Poles during the same period and the

subsequent union of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian central territories known as "Great Ukraine."

Mr. Dushnyck quotes Mr. Raymond Lesly Buell, the author of the book "Poland: Key to Europe" (New York-London 1939) who writes of one of the last phases of Ukraine's struggle for freedom as follows:

"Attacked fiercely by Poles and Russians, the Ukrainians strove in vain for recognition at the Paris Peace Conference. The Allies might have been successful in their anti-Russian policy had they supported these claims. But they listened to the Czarist Russians, who demanded the maintenance of the old Empire; they listened to the Poles, who contended that the Ukrainians were under the domination of both the Bolsheviks and the Germans, and that Galicia had formed part of the old Polish kingdom and could not possibly maintain an independent government. When the Polish troops began to move against the Ukrainians, the Peace Conference endeavoured to arrange an armistice, but Poland declined to accept it unless its territorial demands were recognized..."

"Meanwhile, the Allies decided to supply arms not to the Ukrainians but to Admiral Kolchak, who insisted on being recognized as the head of the whole pre-war Russia except ethnic Poland. Crushed between the Poles, the Czarist Russians and the Allies, the Ukrainian governments gave way not only in Eastern Galicia, but in Russia (that is in Great Ukraine—Note of the reviewer) as well, and the peasants in Soviet Ukraine grudgingly accepted Communism..." (p. 70).

When the Nazi armies invaded Ukraine, the Ukrainian resistance to them began to develop rapidly. At the end of 1941 and in 1942 large segments of the northeastern Ukrainian territories seethed with discontent and unrest. Then early in 1943 the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was formed under General Taras Chuprynka. The UPA succeeded in gaining control over a considerable amount of territory. The Ukrainian population supported the UPA to an astonishing degree, providing foodstuffs, shelter and all forms of aid. In 1944 the UPA created the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (p. 81).

At the XXth congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, Khrushchev denounced "Stalinism," disclosing that Stalin had wished to liquidate the Ukrainians as he had liquidated the Crimean Tartars, Chechens and Ingushes. Unfortunately for him, there were simply too many Ukrainians to eradicate.

During the recent Hungarian revolution, the Ukrainian soldiers serving in the Red Army not only refused to fight the Hungarians, but in many instances turned their arms over to the Hungarians and joined them in the freedom struggle (p. 86).

At last Mr. Dushnyck states that there are well over 2,000,000 Ukrainians in the diaspora. They are striving for a common ideal: liberation of their native country.

This book is well worth reading for those students who are interested in obtaining an introduction to the effects of traditional Russian imperialism, which is at present camouflaged by Russian Communist slogans.

V. Oreletsky.

## BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

### TRIAL OF OUN MEMBERS IN RADYVYLIV

A trial in which the accused were members of the OUN—namely A. S. Riznykiv, N. K. Pollak, A. W. Nazarchuk and D. A. Kruchok — began on March 7, 1959, in Radyvyliv, in the district of Rivne, Ukraine. The reason given for this trial was the fact that last year a number of corpses were found in some disused wells. They are alleged to be the corpses of Communists who, so it is affirmed, were murdered by the accused OUN members. Actually, they are the corpses of peasants who were murdered by the NKVD. But as one now needs propaganda in the U.S.S.R. against the activity of the OUN, the true facts in this case are simply distorted. The accused have been subjected to dreadful tortures by the NKVD in order to force them to make the confessions which the NKVD wanted. The trial ended on March 10th. The press report which was withheld until April 23rd stated that the five Ukrainian nationalists were sentenced to death and their property was confiscated.

In an article published in the "Pravda," a secretary of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Volhynia, S. Tovas, affirms that "bourgeois nationalists" are active in Volhynia. He adds that the "foreign capitalist propaganda service is showing considerable interest in Soviet Volhynia," and stresses that certain hostile broadcasting stations are relaying propaganda speeches in the Ukrainian language, which are undoubtedly making a deep impression on some of the weaker elements

of the Republic. Tovas demands that "vigorous measures should definitely be taken against Western propaganda."

### TENSION IN WESTERN UKRAINE

Commenting on recent events that have occurred in various towns of Carpatho-Ukraine, the organ of the German refugees, the "Sudeten-deutsche Zeitung" (Munich), of April 4, 1959, wrote as follows:

"The Kremlin has recently erected a very good network of communication lines in Carpatho-Ukraine. The railway stations of Khust and Uzhorod are being enlarged for military purposes at great speed. These towns are connected with Soviet Russia by means of four railways. Most of the railway transportation from Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Roumania to the Soviet Union is directed via Carpatho-Ukraine.

Since the Hungarian revolution, Moscow has been intent upon keeping this country under control, because unrests and disturbances were also in evidence in Carpatho-Ukraine at the time of the unrest in Hungary. Incidentally, large Soviet Russian military forces were concentrated in Carpatho-Ukraine whilst the revolution in Hungary was being crushed.

At the same time, we should also like to stress the fact that, according to official statements, a marked tension has recently been noticeable and several revolts have occurred in the districts that are situated north-west of the Carpathian Mountains, especially in the West Ukrainian capital, Lviv, and in West Ukraine in general."

To celebrate the 41st anniversary of the Soviet forces, a big assembly was held in Kyiv. The speaker on this occasion, a representative of the political department of the Kyivan military district, issued a warning to the West inasmuch as he affirmed that the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. would defend Ukraine against capitalist aggression even more determinedly than they did in World War II.

Particular attention was paid to the fact that the Party organizations in the Kyivan military district must definitely exterminate all the effects of the "Zhukov idea" for good and that the soldiers must be trained in the international spirit; for this reason, so the speaker stressed, the slightest indication of "bourgeois nationalism" in the armies must be crushed at once.

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At the 4th plenary assembly of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of the U.S.S.R. on February 24 and 25th, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Ukraine stated that a mass campaign for a "voluntary" trip to the farms in Kazakhstan had been carried out amongst the young girls in Ukraine during the previous month.

The girls are selected by the District Committees of the Komsomol, and only such girls are chosen as are suited for settling down on the new farms in Kazakhstan for good and for raising a family. It is intended that these girls should marry the young men who are already living on the farms. ("Communist Selection of the Race," in accordance with Darwin's theory,—the author.)

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In a speech at the 4th plenary assembly of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of the U.S.S.R., Drozdenko announced that in 1959 all school-children from the age of ten onwards would work in the kolkhozes, sovkhoses and factories during their summer holidays. In addition, 50,000 boys and girls would be sent to work on the cattle-breeding stations in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses in order "to catch up with and overtake America." Several thousand young Ukrainians are also to be sent to Siberia and Central Asia in 1959, in order to work there permanently.

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#### CULTURAL LIFE IN UKRAINE

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In 1964 it will be the 150th anniversary of the birth of the great Ukrainian writer and revolutionary and nationalist, Taras Shevchenko.

At the orders of the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow), the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Ministerial Council of the U.S.S.R. have formed a special committee to deal with the preparations and celebrations of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Taras Shevchenko. The writer Mykola Bazhan has been appointed president of this committee, which consists of 32 members, including M. Hrechukcha, I. Krypiakievych, and various other persons.

The committee has been instructed to prepare and celebrate this anniversary in a similar manner to the celebrations held by Moscow to mark the 300th anniversary of the conquest of Ukraine. The propagandist task

of the committee is to prove to the Ukrainian people that Shevchenko was not a Ukrainian nationalist at all, but a Russian revolutionary, who advocated the "lasting union of Ukraine with Moscow."

The film studio in Kyiv recently completed a film entitled "Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky," which gives an account of the life and work of the outstanding Ukrainian writer who died at the beginning of this century. This Soviet Russian tribute to Kotsiubynsky was produced with the assistance of the writer's son, Yuriy, who showed himself unworthy of his famous father by helping the Red Russians to enslave Ukraine.

A graveyard dating back to the 12th century was recently discovered in the castle of the Ukrainian town Peremyshl (now under Polish rule). Several coffins of Ukrainian warriors of the time of the Ukrainian princes, as well as pottery and household utensils have been unearthed.

Following Moscow's example (at the orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.), so-called universities of Communist work and culture are now being set up in Ukraine.

These universities are intended for the workers, kolkhoz labourers and, above all, for Ukrainian youth. Admission is free. It is the task of these universities to instil the "new" Communist culture, an invention of Moscow, into the Ukrainian people. Each university has at least four professorial chairs: science and technics (production experience), Communist culture, literature and art.

In Lviv, Kyiv and Kharkiv, a series of exchange lectures on sociology was recently held by various study groups at the universities. The lectures included subjects such as "The Methods of Nutrition," "Kolkhoz and State Property" and "The Transformation of the Kolkhoz to Communist Property."

B. Bychovsky, D. Phil., gave a paper on "Materialism and Empiric Criticism in the Fight against the Present Philosophy of Bourgeois Nationalism."

The guiding principle of the said study groups is: in what way are the students of universities and colleges to be trained in the Communist spirit?

According to a decree of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party, the pupils of all secondary schools are to be trained in the following subjects in the coming school-year, 1959/60, — "Questions of Soviet Legislation" and "The Food of the School to Live." In this instruction the emphasis is, of course, on the "socialist principle,"—"he who does not work, shall not be entitled to eat!"

The tenth anniversary of the death (March 29, 1949) of the famous Ukrainian bacteriologist, Mykola Hamaliya, was recently commemorated in Ukraine. Hamaliya's ancestors, incidentally, were prominent Cossack nobles. With considerable success Hamaliya fought such diseases as hydrophobia, typhus and cholera. He discovered the virus that destroys the bacteria,—the so-called bacteriophagos. Hamaliya, who was a friend of the famous French bacteriologist, Louis Pasteur, founded the Bacteriological Institute in Odessa in 1886.

The Ministry of Culture of the U.S.S.R. has ordered all kolkhozes in Ukraine to build new schools or to renovate the old ones out of their own income. This expenditure is not provided for in the state budget, but it is planned to ascribe it to the "enthusiasm of the kolkhoz farmers." The income of the individual kolkhoz worker will thus decrease accordingly.

In connection with this year's elections to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., over 200,000 propaganda centres have been organized in Ukraine, where lectures are given on subjects such as the principles of the U.S.S.R., the Seven-Year Plan, Lenin's life, the necessity of catching up with and overtaking America, etc. The lectures are held every evening after 7 p.m., and all the workers and kolkhoz labourers are forced to attend.

#### ECONOMIC LIFE

A conference on agricultural machines was recently held in Kyiv. One of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, O. I. Ivashchenko, presided over the conference, at which it was ascertained that not only do the present agricultural technical methods in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses in Ukraine need modernizing, but also that all the old machines should be replaced by new ones.

The threshing-machines, tractors and other types of agricultural machines at present in use are not adequate enough and, what is more, it takes a large number of skilled workers to operate them, a fact which has an extremely negative effect on agriculture in Ukraine.

According to a report by the state planning department of the U.S.S.R., on February 21, 1959, 64 chemical works are to be built in Ukraine under Khrushchov's Seven-Year Plan. Eleven milliard roubles are to be invested in these works, which are to produce the raw materials needed in the manufacture of plastics, soda, sulphur, acetone and lacquers, etc.

These chemical products will not, however, be used in Ukraine, but will be sent out of the country, to be used in other chemical concerns, most of them in the U.S.S.R. (Ural, South Siberia).

The paper "Radianska Ukraina," No. 45, 1959, states that the output of work in the Donbas was as poor in February as it was in January. Only 99 per cent of the February quota for the production of coal in the Donbas was achieved, and this fact to a considerable extent influences the planning of the Ukrainian metallurgical industry. On an average, only 98 to 98.4 per cent of the quotas for the production of cast steel (cast iron) were reached in Ukraine. It is thus obvious that the workers in Ukraine are not moved by the least enthusiasm to carry out Khrushchov's Seven-Year Plan in five years.

A large percentage of the goods exhibited by the U.S.S.R. at the recent trade fair in Leipzig were produced by the factories in Odessa, as for instance various types of large metal-processing machines and machines-tools, bulldozers, excavators, film and projection apparatus. But each model, incidentally, bore a stamp "Made in the U.S.S.R." instead of "Made in Ukraine"!

## UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD

### CONFERENCE OF UKRAINIAN SCIENTIFIC SHEVCHENKO SOCIETY IN CHICAGO

A Conference of the Ukrainian Scientific Shevchenko Society was held in Chicago on January 3rd and 4th this year. It was attended by Ukrainian scholars and men of learning of other nationalities. The following lectures were held: Dr. J. Sherekh-Shevelov on "Liquidated and Subjugated Linguists," Dr. M. Kulycky on "Unfulfilled Intentions of Ukrainian Scientific Geography," Dr. I. Vytanovych on "Suppressed Scholars Support Fight for Independent National Economy of Ukraine," Dr. Smal-Stocki on "The Defence of Ukrainian Science and Learning by the Ukrainian Emigrants," Mr. I. Koshelivets on "The Present Standard of Soviet Literary Science," and Dr. J. Z. Pelensky on "The Present Standard of Historical Science in the U.S.S.R."

### UKRAINIAN LITERARY WORKS TRANSLATED INTO PORTUGUESE

At the end of November, 1958, two Ukrainian literary works were published in Portuguese in Rio de Janeiro. One of these books is entitled "Contos Ucrânicos" ("Ukrainian Stories") and contains nine short stories by Lepky, Cheremshyna, Stefanyk, Kotsiubynsky, Khvylovy, Yanovsky, Vynnytschenko, Andiyevska and Tarnavsky. The other book is a collection of legends entitled "Legendas" by Vira Vovk. Both these books have been published by this authoress out of her own funds.

### UKRAINIAN EXHIBITION IN MADRID

A Ukrainian exhibition devoted to Ukrainian women and children was opened in Madrid in November 1958. This exhibition, which was organized by the Ukrainian Women's Union, was sponsored by the city of Madrid, that is to say, by the Ministry of Culture and the Department of Archives and Libraries, who also gave their assistance.

The exhibition was commented on most favourably by the Spanish press, television and broadcasting corporations.

### UKRAINIAN SCHOLARS ATTEND CONVENTIONS OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC ASSOCIATIONS IN NEW YORK

At the end of December, 1958, various American academic associations, such as the M. A. A., A.A.T.S.E.E.L., A.N.S., L.S.A., A.D.S., and A.F.S., etc., held their conventions in New York. A number of prominent Ukrainian scholars also took part in the conventions by holding lectures (Bezushko, Lev, Rudnyckyj, Shevelov). The members of the sessions included Hursky, Ishchuk, Pazuniak, Fizer, Vasyleva, Syniavska, Romanenchuk and Shevchenko from the USA, and K. Bida from Canada. Prof. J. Rudnyckyj acted as president at the sessions. Incidentally, this was the first time that a Ukrainian was elected president for the sessions.

Professor J. Rudnyckyj is the author of the periodical publication in the USA, "Onomastica" (published by the Ukrainian Free University), a work which is well-known in American academic circles.



### PRESIDENT OF USA WRITES TO CADET KRAVCIV

We recently reported on the big success achieved by Cadet Mykola Kravciv, who is a son of Bohdan Kravciv, the journalist and editor of the Ukrainian paper in the USA, "Svoboda." The English edition of this paper has now published a letter written to Cadet Kravciv by President Eisenhower, which reads as follows:

"Dear Cadet Kravciv,

I wish to thank you for your letter received a short time ago. Mrs. Eisenhower and I were pleased that you were able to be present at the diplomatic luncheon (December 1958) and we should like to thank you for the service you rendered as adjutant on this occasion. Actually, there is very little difference, apart from age, between the feelings of a young Ukrainian man and those of one from Abile (referring to Eisenhower) who had the good fortune about 44 years earlier to study at the Military Academy in the USA. We both of us owe a great deal to our wonderful country.

With best wishes for your future success and happiness,

Sincerely yours,

Dwight Eisenhower."

### UKRAINIAN HEAD OF TOWN PLANNING DEPARTMENT

The former president of the League of Ukrainian Youth in North America, Vasyl Polevtchak, has been appointed head of the town planning department of the town of Elisabeth.

Mr. Polevtchak, who so far has been employed as construction inspector with the Shell Oil Company in Vernon, takes a very active part in American-Ukrainian life.

### SENATOR JAVITS INTRODUCES BILL TO ERECT SHEVCHENKO STATUE IN WASHINGTON

On Thursday, February 19, 1959, Senator Jacob K. Javits (Rep., N.Y.) introduced a bill in the Senate to authorize the erection on public ground in Washington of a statue of Taras Shevchenko, the great Ukrainian national poet. Taras Shevchenko was a bard of freedom. Early in life he recognized George Washington as the model of a national leader and extolled him to his fellow-countrymen as a true hero, whom they should take as an example in their own aspirations to freedom.

### UKRAINIAN PROGRAMMES BROADCAST BY BUENOS AIRES RADIO

Thanks to the intercession of the society of Ukrainian trade and industry in Buenos Aires, the radio station there has now begun to relay Ukrainian programmes once a week, namely on Saturdays from 7.05 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. The first of these programmes was relayed on March 7, 1959, and was devoted to Taras Shevchenko.

### UKRAINIAN MUSICAL PROGRAMMES

A programme entitled "Ukrainian Music" is now being broadcast every Sunday evening by the radio station "Radio Santa Felicidade" in Curitiba. The programme consists of songs by Lubomyr Maciak, accompanied by his wife, Ija Maciak, also a singer.

These programmes are financed by Ukrainian firms in Brazil.

THE PARIS MONTHLY "KULTURA," No. 3/137, announces that it has recently published an anthology of Ukrainian writers of the years 1917-1933, entitled "The Shot Muse," which has been edited by J. Lavrynenko and comprises 800 pages.

Since most of the Ukrainian writers of this period were shot and some of their works have so far remained unknown, this new publication is extremely interesting and valuable.

ARTICLE ON UKRAINE  
IN "OSSERVATORE ROMANO"

On March 4, 1959, an interesting article was published in the "Osservatore Romano" dealing with the activity of the Reverend Djenoki, the former Apostolic Visitor of Ukraine, and also with the 40th anniversary of the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine.

KYIV AS SEEN BY AN AMERICAN

When the British Premier, Mr. Macmillan, visited Kyiv recently, he was accompanied by a correspondent of the "New York Times," namely Drew Middleton. The latter published an article on the capital of Ukraine in his paper (edition of February

28, 1959), in which he described how a man stepped up to him and his American colleagues as they were taking a walk through Kyiv, said to them "We are your friends" and then quickly disappeared.

Drew Middleton said in his article that Kyiv had made a good impression—in fact, quite a different impression to Moscow—on him and his colleagues, and added that the people in Kyiv were far more friendly than in Moscow. He stressed the fact that there were plenty of goods on display in the shops of Kyiv, but that even so queues were to be seen in front of most of the shops. He and his colleagues were shown various technical innovations in the kolkhozes, but, as he emphasized, they were not taken to see the living quarters of any of the kolkhoz workers.

### THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE ANGLO-UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

On the 27th June, 1959, an Annual General Meeting of the Anglo-Ukrainian Society took place at Champness Hall in Rochdale, Lanc's. Before the meeting, the Mayor and Mayoress of Rochdale, Mr and Mrs. John Mills, received a delegation of the Executive of the AUS, headed by Mr. Auberon Herbert, as well as of the prominent members of the AUS in Rochdale, including, Mr. J. McCann, M. P., Mr. Clegg, the Chairman of the Rochdale Branch of the AUS, Mr. Brown, the Secretary of the Branch, Maj. Fox, Mrs. Telle, and Mr. Muzyka. Later the Mayor opened the Meeting, expressing his pleasure at the fact that the first Annual General Meeting

of the AUS outside London took place in Rochdale, and called upon those present to honour the memory of the late Dmytro Lewyckyj, the Chairman of the Association of Ukrainians in Gr. Britain, who lived in Rochdale for some years.

Mr. Auberon Herbert opened the Meeting and read the letter of apology from Sir Compton Mackenzie, the Chairman, who was in the last moment prevented from attending the Meeting. Those present received very warmly the speech by Mr. J. McCann, M. P., who showed a profound understanding of the needs of the Ukrainian community in Rochdale and in Britain as a whole.

The reports made by the Sec-

retary of the AUS, Miss Vera Rich, and by the representatives of the Branches showed that the Society is growing and developing, and that it has even greater opportunities for realising in future British-Ukrainian mutual understanding and co-operation. The most active branches of the Society exist now in Bolton, Rochdale, Coventry, Nottingham, Bury and London. The newly elected leadership of the AUS consists of the following persons: President: Lady Hesketh; Chairman: Sir Compton Mackenzie; Patrons: Lady Violet Bonham Carter, D. B. E.; Lady Phipps; The Marquess of Lothian; Vice-Presidents: Lady de Hoghton; Lt.-Col. N. L. D. Maclean,

M. P.; Mr. M. Bilyj-Karpynek; Count D. Halka Ledochowskyj; The Hon. J. B. Sandilands; Mr. B. Wall; Mr. A. Kohut; Vice-Chairmen: Mr. Auberon Herbert; Prof. W. Shayan; Mr. C. H. M. Wallwork; Mr. W. Mykula; Mr. D. Bartkiw; Hon. Treasurer: Mr. Henry C. Duckworth; Hon. Secretary: Miss Vera Rich; Members of the General Council: Mrs. M. Rich and Messrs. V. Bender, J. R. Brown, P. Cymbalistyj, J. Hawrych, R. Kaluznyj, A. Kaminskyj, A. Kostyuk, I. Krushelnyckyj, Col. C. L'Esrange Malone, F. M. Newbury, W. Oleskiw, S. Onysko, V. Swoboda, W. Tomkiw, R. Vanston, W. Wasylenko, K. Zelenko.

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# EAST, WEST, AND CENTRE

by

Major-General Richard Hilton, D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C.

The problem of easing East-West tension is much to the fore. Talks at Geneva, talks about "Summit" talks, talks in Moscow by distinguished Western visitors. Now we have talks about an exchange of visits between Messrs Eisenhower and Khrushchov.

Occasionally, through the eddies of hot air which are a by-product of excessive talk, there burst a cold blast of reality to remind us of the existence of a third party to this argument—a party too often forgotten by Western talkers and deliberately ignored by Russia. Between the opposing camps of East and West there live the "captive nations" of Communism, whose influence for world peace could be decisive if Western diplomacy had the courage to use it.

The Hungarian rising and the Dalai Lama's flight from Tibet were dramatic events, which should surely have opened Western minds to the existence of an explosive element within Communist empire. Within the last few weeks two fresh indications have been given—less dramatic perhaps, but even more significant. Khrushchov's anger against Americans over their prayer-week for the "captive nations" was one. The other—the most significant of all—was Mr. Nixon's Warsaw reception.

Remember that Poland is officially a Communist country, an ally of Russia, and a stern critic of American capitalism. Let us also remember that Mr. Khrushchov's own visit to Warsaw recently provoked a reception which was sullenly polite but far from enthusiastic.

Why this astounding contrast, and what does it mean? It means that not even fear of the secret police can suppress the true sentiments of the Polish crowds. It means that Gomulka's government, hovering between "Quisling" obedience to the Kremlin and fear of Polish patriotism, is tending to swing toward the latter as far as it dares to go. There is an increasing strain developing between the bosses of Moscow and the bogus governments which they have established in the captive countries.

\* \* \*

Many Western observers admit this much, but fail to see how Western diplomacy can exploit the fact without precipitating a world war. This fear explains the otherwise inexplicable silence of Western diplomacy concerning the future of the "captive nations." Certainly nobody wishes to start an open war to liberate the captives—not even the more serious thinkers among the captive nations themselves. But a great deal could be done without any risk of detonating the world.

Take, for example, the Ukraine. This huge country, with a population about one-fifth of the entire Soviet Union, enjoys on paper a status almost exactly comparable to that of Canada within the Commonwealth. Both, officially, are sovereign states with a right to secede from the larger conglomeration. Each has the right to representation at U.N.O. and each actually exercises that right. But, as a corollary, each has also officially the right to direct diplomatic representation in the capitals of the world. Herein lies one of many differences between Canada and the Ukraine. The former keeps an embassy in Moscow and allows a Soviet embassy in Ottawa, a fact rendered notorious by the Gouzenko case of 1945. Yet the Ukraine has no such embassies abroad and entertains none at Kiev.

It could not possibly be construed as an aggressive act, or one liable to endanger world peace, if H.M. Government approached the Soviet Government diplomatically with a view to correcting this anomaly. Within the Commonwealth there live large number of Ukrainians, so there is ample justification for direct diplomatic links with Kiev. Either the Ukraine is a sovereign state or not. If not, it is wrong that she should maintain a representative at U.N.O., thus providing Moscow with a bogus extra vote.

The example quoted is only one of many possibilities for exploiting diplomatically the existence of over a hundred and fifty millions of unwilling inmates of the Iron Curtain in the interests of world peace. Every such diplomatic initiative, taken by the West, will encourage sentiments, like those of the Warsaw populace, to an extent which we Westerners cannot realise. The more vigorous these nationalist surges become among the captive peoples, the less secure will be the hold of Moscow and Peking over their respective empires. Khrushchov's anger over a mere prayer-week indicates the touchiness of the tyrants on this point.

Encouragement by the West of legitimate nationalism could be a deterrent to totalitarian aggression even more effective than the H-bomb, besides being morally irreproachable. A monolithic empire under rigid central control is a danger to world peace. An uneasy hold over increasingly boisterous satellites puts would-be aggressors into no fit state to launch a major war.





## A Step Forwards in the Policy of USA

At a press conference on August 5, 1959, President Eisenhower said that he believed in nationalism and supported it for the good of all peoples. On July 18th this year, the President, on the strength of a resolution of the US Congress, proclaimed "Captive Nations' Week" as a manifestation of the solidarity of the American people with the fight for freedom of the nations enslaved by Moscow and Communism. The US Congress and the President of the USA have thus appropriately honoured this fight for independence inasmuch as they are firmly determined not to cease their efforts until all the peoples subjugated by Russia and Communism have regained their independence. The President has been authorised by the US Congress to proclaim "Captive Nations' Week" every year. President Eisenhower was also present at the divine service which was held for the benefit of the subjugated nations; and this combination of political intentions and a religious service is of especial significance in the fight against Moscow's godless imperialism.

The fact that the Congress and the President of the USA have not made the rights of the subjugated nations that are striving for national and state independence dependent upon former state frontiers (not even those of 1939, as was formerly the case so far) is of far-reaching and, possibly, of epoch-making significance. For this shows that leading circles in the USA are beginning to realize that the imminent disintegration of the Russian imperium is a law determined by history. In this way, the conception of the **Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN)** gains in special validity. It is thus evident that the idea which has been represented by the ABN for years and has been propagated at numerous conferences is now beginning to gain the upper hand. This, of course, is only the beginning. It is an ideological and ethical solidarity, but as yet not a practical and political solidarity and not an active support of the national revolutionary fight for freedom, but nevertheless a step forwards to our advantage. Sooner or later the free world, instead of adopting the views and the policy of the American Committee of Liberation (ACL), is bound to accept the **ideas** of the ABN and the demands postulated by it, with which this resolution on the part of the USA, which is undoubtedly very advantageous for the subjugated nations, is in keeping.

The manner in which **Khrushchov** reacted to this resolution has clearly shown up the vulnerable spot of the Russian peoples' prison—namely, its Achilles' heel—which America has touched. The subjugated nations and their fight for their own independence and for the disintegration of the Russian imperium constitute the **decisive force** in the final game in world politics,—a factor which is more important than atomic weapons; for the national liberation insurrections of the

subjugated nations against Russian tyranny are the only alternative to an atomic war,—provided that these insurrections are supported in practice and wholeheartedly by the free world, led by the USA.

This recent gesture on the part of the USA in favour of the subjugated peoples has caused Khrushchov to get into a panic, a fact which he has revealed by launching a hysterical verbal attack against the USA in connection with the said resolution. But all this is comprehensible to President Eisenhower, who has courageously taken this course as the only one by which to save all freedom-loving mankind in its fight against the Russian devil.

One can only hope that the President of the USA will be able to continue to put up a resistance against the evil forces which, as has so far always been the case, will try to oppose this kind of American policy, which is the only right one. When the late John Foster Dulles courageously tried to introduce and pursue a policy of liberation, he was always impeded by secret forces which were at work behind the scenes.

The proclamation of July 18th this year will become a **historical** event in the life of the American nation,—possibly in the life of the whole of freedom-loving mankind, too,—provided that it is followed up with the appropriate practical and political **action**.

Jaroslaw Stetzko

## WHAT AND HOW?

For the goal of liberation of the nations enslaved by Russia to have any chance of success, the Western action directed against Bolshevism will have to develop along **different** lines from those followed up to now. It will have to be based on different political principles, different military and political strategy and to take into account the decisive factor—the **enslaved nations in the U.S.S.R.**

The complex of ideas to counter Bolshevism, as well as the concept of liberation, have been dealt with in previous articles.

As regards the West's policy towards the Soviet Russian empire, there are two possibilities: one, the entire system of Western policy will be basically altered in the sense of a total negation of Bolshevism and the Russian empire—the latter's complete isolation, rupture of every connection with it, its expulsion from the United Nations, with the intensification of a consistent diplomatic pressure and blockade of Russian Communist block and the simultaneous universal support of the national liberation struggle of the subjugated nations. This presupposes taking a decision to help, if necessary, national liberation revolutions militarily in order to disrupt the present Soviet Russian empire and Communism from within. The other possibility is that

the present policy of hesitation and half-measures will be continued. My deliberations follow the first alternative.

The primary objective of Western policy, in my opinion, should be to bring about an all-around coordination of political and military action of the Free World with the national liberation revolutionary formations behind the Iron Curtain. In this respect cooperation between the relevant circles of the West, particularly the United States, with the national liberation movements representatives in exile, who have never been tainted with collaboration with Bolshevism and who are fighting for the cause of splitting up the Russian empire, is a necessity. The principal aim should be: a synchronized and concerted action of the two sides not only in the political, but also in the strategic and military spheres as well.

In case a war should break out, the Free World ought to concentrate its military action on the Russian ethnographic territory. In such a situation the subjugated nations, like Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Turkestan or the Caucasus, will be able to deal on their own with the Russian occupation troops stationed in their territories. With the help of the national uprisings, supported by the West, it would be possible to cut off the Russian troops in Central and a part of Eastern Europe from their bases. The line: the Black Sea—across Ukraine—towards the Baltic Sea area, may be one example.

Without a systematic support of the revolutionary movements behind the Iron Curtain on the part of the West, it would be unwise to expect a sudden explosion there. In order to bring about a collapse of the Russian threat the West ought to render every possible political support to the revolutionary liberation organizations of the non-Russian nations. Nor should technical and material support be lacking. A close contact should be established between the revolutionary underground and the Free World through the national liberation movements representatives in exile. Moscow has at its service Fifth Columns and Communist Parties all over the world and bestows every support upon them, and acknowledges them quite openly. The United States and the Free World have true friends and partners in all peoples behind the Iron Curtain, but unfortunately, do not recognize them! Russia predicts a victory of Communism in the entire world and openly propagates it, while the West is afraid even to hint, for example, that the independence of Ukraine and of the other peoples enslaved by Moscow, lies in its own interests. Khrushchov interferes quite blatantly in the internal affairs of free and sovereign nations. Where is a Western statesman who would ask frankly why there is no independent Ukraine, Byelorussia, Turkestan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, etc.? This is not a question of interference in the internal affairs of a foreign power, because the problem concerns the restoration of independence to nations whose sovereignty has been internationally recognized and some of whom even today are members of the United Nations! The West lacks courage enough to urge, even on the basis of the U.N. Charter, the independence of Ukraine and Byelorussia. Can there be

any offensive policy of liberation at all, when even the common fact, the U.N. status, which Russia has signed, is interpreted to the latter's full and unfair advantage?

The West has to draw practical conclusions for the liberation action from the fact that the Soviet Army is composed of soldiers of various nationalities, to find ways and means to attract them by a corresponding propaganda action from outside and from within to participate in the revolutionary activity aimed at liberation.

In our view the Russian Bolshevik empire should be encircled by offensive centers of action in all the countries adjacent to its sphere of domination in Europe as well as in the Near, Middle and Far East. In this work political formations of the national liberation movements of the subjugated nations, which are active in exile and which so far have not been taken into consideration for these purposes, should be included. However, it must be brought out that not the people of the past, not those who have linked their names with the Bolsheviks and have been discredited among their nations, not the opportunists who are willing to sell their services for money, those who lack the courage to defend their convictions, not the political agents, but the free political partners of the West should be listened to, the people who are bold enough to criticize even the strongest power in the world today, the United States. Such people ought to be given the use of radio stations in order to broadcast according to their nation's interests, without being obliged to submit everytime to a political line dictated from above. They ought to be given the opportunity to maintain contacts with the underground movements within their nations in the home countries. Through them the underground movements should receive every support and their opinions should be heard even if they are sometimes bitter. The situation and the needs of the nations among which they have grown up as revolutionaries are known better by such people than by any outside agencies. The opportunists at one time served Hitler or the Russians, but unfortunately, certain U.S. agencies consider such people the spokesmen of the subjugated peoples today. It would be a great mistake to imagine that money can decide everything.

By the political content of its programs and by the composition of their personnel, neither "Radio Liberation" nor "Radio Free Europe," as the alleged spokesmen of the subjugated nations, correspond to the desires and aspirations of the enslaved peoples. "The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism" is conducting a policy which runs counter to the interests of the nations enslaved in the U.S.S.R. Likewise the political line of "The Institute for the Study of Culture and History of the U.S.S.R.," with headquarters in Munich, Germany, is alien to the enslaved nations.

The anti-Communist action in the Near and Middle East should have been carried out directly by the political representatives of the nations subjugated behind the Iron Curtain, for the simple reason that they know the situation and would have more easily gained confidence

among the local population, as, for instance, if it would have been conducted among Moslems by a nationalist Moslem from behind the Iron Curtain who is now in exile. The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) is prepared to undertake such an action, because it has within its ranks some prominent representatives of Islam. This can be done on the condition that the ABN be free to carry out its propaganda activities, including radio broadcasts, in accordance with its political program with regard to the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain. It would be worth while for the West to try this approach, and we are convinced that, after some time, they would realize how much greater repercussions the action of the ABN would cause in the Russian empire, compared with the activities of the so-called "American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism," "Radio Liberation," "Radio Free Europe," etc. Moscow incessantly attacks the nationalism of the subjugated peoples; it is the force which is the most dangerous for its dominance. Why is the West reluctant to pick up this powerful weapon and use it against Russia? The ABN considers itself the defender of the idea of nationalism of a liberating type and is proud to represent it.

Siberia is inhabited by millions of non-Russians who have come there as deportees, settlers, concentration camp prisoners, soldiers of the Soviet Army. In the Maritime Province (the so-called "Green Wedge") in the vicinity of Vladivostok, bordering on Korea, Ukrainians predominate. A similar situation prevails in the so-called "Gray Wedge" in the south of West Siberia. In the Far Eastern countries, particularly in Korea, it would be extremely advisable to establish special centers for the penetration of this area with the help of radio, propaganda literature, etc., and in general to work out a plan of a military-parachute drop activity in Siberia in case of an armed clash. In planning these measures the emigration from Ukraine as well as from other enslaved countries now settled in Australia should be taken into account, for Australia occupies a prominent position as regards the anti-Communist action in the Far East. To support the idea of Siberian independence would be in the interest of the United States with the aim of eliminating Russia from the Far East. Siberia borders—across the Bering Straits—on Alaska, the United States. From Formosa, where an ABN Mission is located, supported exclusively by the modest means of the Ukrainian emigration, propaganda action can be carried out behind the Iron Curtain, not only by means of radio, but also by printed propaganda. Pakistan lies near the border of Turkestan (U.S.S.R.) and from there, too, penetration of ideas, as well as technical penetration, is possible. In Kazakhstan there are hundreds of thousands of deportees, mostly Ukrainians, some of whom belong to the most reliable anti-Russian underground.

In Turkey, too, a reservoir of people who would be able to penetrate the regions of the U.S.S.R., especially Ukraine and the Caucasus, can be built up. This reservoir, in case of war, can play a particularly important role.

In Berlin an ABN center can also be established and it would have the task of disrupting the Soviet Army as well as manning a radio station of the ABN.

The Russian policy of deportation and dispersion of the best elements from among the enslaved nations should be answered by an idea, an idea which would unite all these fighters in a common front, so that everywhere where they come into contact with other non-Russians who fight for their national independence, they fight united against their common enemy, Russia and Communism. The political concept of the ABN provides a suitable solution to this problem. This is a concept envisaging a common revolutionary front aiming at the propagation of simultaneous national revolutions which should bring about the collapse of the Russian empire and the establishment of national democratic independent states.

The universal attack by Russia and her instrument, Communism, ought to be answered by a correspondingly universal counterattack. Within the broad plan of the encirclement of the Russian empire and its Communist allies, such as Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam, the task of building up a revolutionary force on the territories of the enslaved peoples, such as Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkestan, Bulgaria, Hungary, etc., should be placed in the foreground, and to these countries the activities should be directed. On this score, so far, nothing serious has been done on the part of the United States. The activities of "The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism," "Radio Liberation" or "Radio Free Europe" cannot be considered seriously, for they, as a rule, slavishly adjust their policy to every tactical need of official circles. The policy of liberation cannot be directed by factors of momentary expediency, but should be conducted systematically in a planned fashion, taking into account the situation and the demands in the subjugated countries. It has to be determined by the national liberation centers and organizations of the subjugated nations and coordinated with the competent circles of the Free World, provided that the latter recognize their aims and principles.

The United States and the Free World are, unfortunately, doing exceedingly little for the mobilization of the internal forces of resistance of the enslaved peoples. At the same time the work of the Fifth Columns, of the Communist Parties and the entire subversive machinery of Moscow in the Free World, is carried out systematically and is directed from a single center. Moreover, the attitude of the United States to the objectives of the struggle of the subjugated nations is far from certain. "Non-predetermination" policy propagated by "The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism," or the evidence of cooperation with and support of some Bolshevik collaborators as well as the policy of fighting Marxism with Marxism and the Red Russian empire with the concept of another Russian empire of a "White" type, cannot satisfy the aspirations of the enslaved nations.

In the Middle East, in Asia and Africa Communism is wary of using its proper slogans. Instead it makes use of the national revolutionary and anti-feudal slogans which have nothing in common with Communism as a doctrine. In their strategy, however, the Communists keep to one principle: the "bourgeois" reforms must be introduced and carried out by them, for they hope thus to get themselves into power. Once there, they begin to introduce the proper Communist system: total collectivization and etatization and, remaining true servants of Moscow, they subordinate their country to the Kremlin. Communism in Asia ought to be unmasked as an instrument of Russian colonialism and imperialism. This, unfortunately, is neglected now. Distribution of the feudal estates for private ownership among the working peasants, propagated by the Communists, is not a Communist slogan. Similarly, the idea of national independence, the liberation of the colonial or dependent countries—are not Communist, but national slogans. To oppose these slogans would be unwise. What is, however, necessary—is to unveil what goes on behind the stage, to show that this is an intrigue of Russian colonialism and imperialism, which is a relatively easy matter, because, to give an example, the democratic slogans being as noble as they are, the colonial peoples reject colonialism and imperialism on the part of the democratic great powers.

The connection between Russian colonialism and Communism is evident. It is incomprehensible why the West takes every care to avoid unmasking this connection. Instead it fights a fiction, the so-called "international Communism," which, deprived of support of Russian bayonets, would have survived as just another anaemic doctrine, like anarchism.

This function of unmasking Communism in the areas mentioned above could very well be fulfilled by the representatives of the nations enslaved in the U.S.S.R. and, in general, by the representatives of the peoples subjugated by Russia and Communism, if the United States, on its part, would show a more favourable attitude to the cause of national liberation and would support actively the liberation struggle of the subjugated nations.

The World Anti-Communist Congress for Freedom and Liberation is particularly timely. A Preparatory Conference was held in Mexico City in March, 1958. Representatives of anti-Communist organizations from various parts of the world were present, representing 65 nations in all. Among them were: "The Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League," (APACL), the "Inter-American Confederation for the Defence of the Continent" (Latin America), the "Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) and other well-known anti-Communist organizations. This effort should be given a full and enthusiastic support by the United States and other free countries of the world.



V. D.

## SCHOOL AND RUSSIFICATION

### AN ATTEMPT TO EFFECT THE FINAL RUSSIFICATION OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM IN UKRAINE AND IN ALL THE OTHER NON-RUSSIAN SOVIET REPUBLICS

Article 101 of the State Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic states that "all citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic are entitled to receive schooling"; and, further, that they are entitled to receive "this schooling in their mother-tongue." This Article corresponds to Article 121 of the State Constitution of the U.S.S.R., from which it is, of course, taken.

In addition, Article 49 of the State Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic states that the Republic has its own Ministry which is competent for matters pertaining to national education and which is, of course, only subordinate to the entire government and the Supreme Soviet of the said Republic. The situation is the same in all the other Soviet Republics of the U.S.S.R.<sup>1)</sup>, and accordingly the State Constitution of the U.S.S.R. does not stipulate that there should be a Union Ministry for Education.

The fact that the almighty Nikita Khrushchov at the end of September 1958, at the 11th Congress of the Communist Youth Organization (Komsomol) of the U.S.S.R., and subsequently, at the Plenary Session of the Praesidium of the Soviet Union put forward his "proposals" as regards reforming the schooling system in the U.S.S.R., was thus quite plainly a violation of the Constitution; nevertheless, however, these "proposals" were published as "theses" of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on November 16, 1958, and were also accepted by the Ministerial Council of the U.S.S.R. The two Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were to constitute the next and highest authority.

As far as the said theses are concerned, what interests us mainly at the moment is Article 19, which is worded as follows:

"In the Soviet schools instruction is given in the mother-tongue. This is one of the important achievements of the Leninist nationality policy. At the same time, a serious study of the Russian language is to be engaged in the schools of the Soviet and Autonomous Republics, since this language constitutes a powerful means towards international alliances, towards the strengthening of the friendship of the peoples

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<sup>1)</sup> This, however, only partly applies to colleges and universities and to research institutes; many of them are administered directly by Moscow.



of the U.S.S.R. and their access to the treasures of Russian and world culture. But one must not overlook the fact that in the schools of the Soviet and Autonomous Republics the children are overburdened as regards language instruction. Actually, the children in the national<sup>2)</sup> schools learn three languages,—their mother-tongue, the Russian language and one foreign language. One should therefore consider the question as to whether the parents should not be entitled to decide as to which school, that is to say, which language of instruction<sup>3)</sup>, they want to send their children to. If a child attends a school at which instruction is given in the language of the Soviet or Autonomous Republics, it can, if it wishes, also learn Russian. And, vice versa if a child attends a Russian school, then it can, if it desires, also learn the language of one of the Soviet or Autonomous Republics<sup>4)</sup>. (It goes without saying that one should observe this rule if there are a sufficient number of children to make up a class for instruction in the one language or other...<sup>5)</sup>)

The said text has been formulated in such subtle terms in keeping with all the rules of Bolshevik (and "true Russian") casuistry that its true meaning is only apparent from the last sentence; what is more, without the last sentence all that has been previously said would be nonsense: for, a "Soviet citizen" was never forbidden to send his child to a school in which instruction was given in the language which was agreeable to him,—provided that there was such a school in the town or village in question, or provided that he could afford to send his child to live in some other town or village (or in some other Soviet or Autonomous Republic). In the last sentence quoted above, however, what is meant are no longer already existing schools with a definitely fixed language of instruction, but individual classes to be formed in future in which the language of instruction is to be determined by the "decision" of most of the parents. Thus, it is actually a question not of "choosing" the language of instruction for individual children, but of the language in which instruction is to be given throughout the whole school.

A reader who is not so well acquainted with Soviet Russian conditions might assume—and this is precisely the intention of the subtle formulation of the text in question—that, in view of this "decision"

2) "National" in the Soviet Russian official language is used to mean everything in the Soviet Union that is not national Russian.

3) Our translation is somewhat diffuse, since here, as can also be seen below, it is a case of reproducing the original Russian text exactly.

4) An extremely inexact (perhaps intentionally inexact) term, since the meaning of "the language of one of the Soviet or Autonomous Republics" demands that a Russian child attending a Russian school in Soviet Ukraine, in addition to its Russian mother-tongue, could also learn, "if it desired," instead of Ukrainian, the Byelorussian (White Ruthenian) language or the so-called Moldavian language (the north-east Roumanian dialect which in the Moldavian Soviet Republic has artificially been made the official language), which would naturally be quite unthinkable, even if it were the mother-tongue of its parents.

5) The end of the Article in question is insignificant.

on the part of parents, Russian as the language of instruction might be just as much in danger of being superseded by a non-Russian mother-tongue as vice versa. Not in the least, however! For anyone in the Soviet Union who has only an imperfect knowledge of Russian or none at all, can either only be employed as a "collective farmer" (i. e. future land-worker) for the rest of his life, or else earn a meagre livelihood as an unskilled factory worker; all other professions are closed to him, and a Russian illiterate has relatively greater chances of success. Of course, there are in this respect numerous exceptions, particularly in the case of the older generation, namely in the regions which have been "newly acquired" since 1944 and also in those remote regions which have so far only been sparsely settled by the Russians; as far as the younger generation is concerned, however, there are no exceptions (and, incidentally, neither for Party members).

The fact that children whose parents have decided in favour of a non-Russian language of instruction would only need to learn Russian as an optional subject, would in no way prevent the spreading of Russian; on the contrary, for everyone who is personally acquainted with the Soviet school system knows what significance is attached to optional subjects in Soviet schools: they are neglected as much as possible. Khrushchov's astute idea is, therefore, obviously well thought-out: there might be a lot of non-Russian parents in the Soviet and Autonomous Republics who would send their children to a Russian school for the sole reason that otherwise they would be in danger of only learning Russian, "Lenin's language" (and thus the language of the Bolshevik Party), imperfectly as an optional subject,—a fact for which they might have to suffer for the rest of their lives.

And, on the other hand, it would be an easy matter for a totalitarian government and for an administration which is only responsible to the "Party and government" to limit optional instruction in the non-Russian language of the country in question in the Russian schools to such an extent as seems necessary or desirable to the Party and government"; some pretext or other for doing so could always be found (shortage of teachers, shortage of text-books, lack of time for instruction and lack of classrooms, etc.). Soviet schools—in particular in the non-Russian Soviet and Autonomous Republics—constantly lack so many things that some shortage or other, as far as "undesirable" language instruction is concerned, can always be trumped up with success and even with a semblance of credibility; and that is surely all the "Party and government" needs.

A double blow was thus to be dealt the Ukrainian language, inasmuch as it was, in the first place, so Khrushchov no doubt hoped, to be abolished as the language of instruction in the majority of schools in Soviet Ukraine, and, secondly, was only to assume a very insignificant role as an optional subject there. And this, incidentally, applies to all non-Russian languages alike in all the Soviet and Autonomous Republics of the Soviet Union; there is, however, another

third and important circumstance which would lead to unfavourable consequences, in particular as regards Ukrainian as the language of instruction: whereas there are comparatively few Russian schools in the rural areas in Soviet Ukraine, they are definitely already in the majority in the large (and even medium-sized) towns; according to official Soviet statistics, the language of instruction in 50 to 80 per cent of all the state schools in the towns of Soviet Ukraine is Russian. The realization of Article 19 might thus, within a few decades, result in about the same degree of Russification in the larger towns of Ukraine as was the case under Tsarism. At least, that is what the Kremlin has been hoping.

There are, of course, in the Soviet Union also certain non-Russian Soviet Republics where the percentage of schools at which Russian is the language of instruction is even higher than in Ukraine; for instance, 66 per cent of all the schools in Kazakhstan (as compared to 26 per cent in Ukraine). But in this connection one must take into account the fact that the Ukrainian urban population and, in particular, the educated classes there have already been Russified to a considerable extent on a previous occasion (namely prior to 1917), so that their Russification a second time would have more chance—at least from Moscow's point of view—of proceeding more easily and more rapidly than, say, in Turkestan or in the Caucasus. Moscow in its point of view in this respect, however, seems to be underrating the vast growth of national consciousness amongst the Ukrainian people since 1917, inasmuch as it hopes to lure the Ukrainian people with the bait that their children would in future be less "overburdened" with the learning of languages.

On the other hand, however, the danger which another Russification of the urban population would represent for Ukrainian national culture and for the national existence of the Ukrainian element cannot be compared to its Russification under Tsarism. In those days, Ukraine (that is to say, Central and East Ukraine which belonged to Russia) was a typically agricultural country, the comparatively few branches of industry which had already developed (coal, ores and sugar industry) were located in the rural areas away from the larger towns, and the workers in the towns were by no means numerous and about one-third of them were of Russian origin; nowadays, however, the urban population of Soviet Ukraine, according to the provisional result of the recent census (in January 1959), constitutes about half of the total population. And this fact speaks for itself.

And the main point to be borne in mind,—the Russian language would actually remain compulsory in any case, since Soviet conditions make it compulsory for every "Soviet citizen" who does not want to earn his living by sheer physical strength; the question at issue is, therefore, in reality whether Ukrainian as a language of instruction is for the most part only to be retained as an optional subject in the schools.

Whilst the "lawful" decision of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. was still pending, the Soviet press was mobilized for the "discussion" concerned. During the latter months of 1958, the Soviet press was full of reports on meetings of every kind in all the countries and large towns of the Soviet Union, "readers' letters" from all sorts of pedagogues, other experts, so-called "workers' and village correspondents", as well as leading articles on this subject. But whereas the actual organization aspect of the "theses" was discussed in detail—occasionally, in fact, with a genuine understanding for the interests of pupils and students, the "epoch-making" Article 19 on language teaching and the language of instruction was seldomly and very cautiously touched on: the "Soviet citizen" and in particular those who live in the non-Russian Soviet and Autonomous Republics know only too well what is in store for them if they openly voice an opinion on questions that are connected with the Soviet nationality policy. Of course, there were a few exceptions in this respect. In the Kyiv periodical "Radians'ka Kul'tura" (of December 18, 1958), for instance, it was affirmed—with reference to Lenin's appeal "to oppose all attempts at Russification which seek to make the Ukrainian language (in Soviet Ukraine) of secondary importance"—that "in Ukraine, as in every national (i. e. non-Russian—V. D.) Republic, schools in which the national language is the language of instruction should be given priority". A similar attitude was also adopted by the Kyiv writers who (according to a report in the literary journal "Literaturna Hazeta" of December 19, 1958) at their meeting on this subject, "unanimously expressed the opinion that one should not leave it solely to the parents to decide which language their children should learn as compulsory". Even during a session of the Supreme Soviet Republic (on December 29, 1958), the opinion was expressed that one should "concentrate the administration of all the schools in Soviet Ukraine in one single authority, namely the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic",—that is to say, the so-called special secondary and high schools should be withdrawn from the supervision of the corresponding Ministries of the U.S.S.R. (as, for instance, the Union Ministry of Traffic and Transport).

It is interesting to note that in the course of this "people's discussion" the remarks made in favour of Article 19 of the "theses" were on the whole as meagre and as cautious as those against it. It looks as though the persons who took part in the discussion knew from a reliable source—and such proceedings in a totalitarian state come to the knowledge of the parties interested in an incomprehensible way—that a secret but grim fight was being waged for Article 19 in the leading circles of the "Party and government". Much would point to this possibility; and it does not necessarily need to have been the advocates of the special interests of the "national" Republics, who nowadays have become fairly rare amongst the "upper ten thousand", who would have objected to Article 19: in the first place, it is an established fact that Khrushchov has numerous embittered opponents

who would be only too glad to support any opposition directed against his initiative, provided that such opposition had any prospect of success; and, secondly, in this case the opposition would really have had a chance to prove successful. Even out-and-out supporters of Russification and "true Russian" chauvinists could well have serious misgivings with regard to Article 19: as to whether its application was not premature, not difficult and not inappropriate at the moment? And this partly for reasons of foreign political propaganda: could one venture to deal the fictitious "sovereignty" and "internal independence" of the non-Russian Soviet Republics, particularly of the two represented in the UN, such a blow? What sort of a "sovereign" state structure is it, if it is to renounce its own national language as a compulsory school subject?—But in the sphere of domestic policy, too, the Russian Bolsheviks have on various occasions had such unpleasant experiences with practically all the "national" Soviet Republics that even elementary caution should warn them not to abolish any non-Russian national language as a compulsory subject in Russian schools and not to reduce the number of non-Russian schools with their own national language as the language of instruction in favour of the Russian schools.

The fact that a really grim battle was waged in the highest circles of the "Party and government" as regards Article 19, also seems to be corroborated by the decision reached by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. The law passed by the Supreme Soviet on December 24, 1958, contains only one passage which could be interpreted either way:

"We approve the theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. concerning 'the improvement of schools and further development of the national education "system"."

Thus, nothing definite was actually formulated as regards the special contents of Article 19 of the "theses",—that is to say, neither a definite no was voiced. But if the theses as a whole had been approved, one would imagine that this included the famous Paragraph 19 on the "parents' referendum". The matter was clarified in a speech on school reform delivered before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. by President of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the R.S.F.S.R., **Kairov**. Among other things, he said that a "nation-wide discussion" had "approved the proposal contained in the theses of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers that parents should have the right to choose which school their children should attend and which should be the language of instruction" ("Pravda", December 24, 1958). The fact that Kairov dared make such an assertion makes it evident that he was merely acting on instructions from the "Party and Government".

Nevertheless, this for the time being remained only an interpretation of the law; and the interpretation had no legal validity, but only authority, and this really only for the Autonomous Republics belonging to the R.S.F.S.R. (for Kairov spoke as the President of

an Academy of the R.S.F.S.R.), and not for the far more important non-Russian Soviet Republics. It was thus left to the latter, by means of their own Supreme Soviets, to give the "cadre law" of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., valid for all, a concrete form, apparently according to their own discretion,—whereas in reality the integral acceptance of Article 19 had most probably already been decided in secret by the "supreme leadership" of the Soviet Union. In this way the "Party and government" in Moscow was to gain a double advantage: (1) to carry out their "school language reform" in a most drastic form, without any concessions at all, but not everywhere at the same time, and to cause any possible resistance on the part of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union to split up, as it were; and (2) to thrust most of the responsibility on to the head organs of the individual non-Russian Soviet Republics, which were to raise the contents of Article 19 to the rank of a law apparently "voluntarily".

Exactly this same hypocritical method was, in fact, applied by the Muscovite Bolsheviks two decades ago, in order to enforce Russian as a compulsory language in all the schools in Soviet Ukraine (up till then, Russian had not been compulsory in most of the schools in which Ukrainian was the language of instruction). At that time, there was first of all a decree by the Council of the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "On the Study of the Russian Language in the Schools of the National Republics of the U.S.S.R." (of March 13, 1938), which stipulated that Russian as a language subject was compulsory, but which was, however, kept a secret and was not made public until 1955; and thereupon the Council of the People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine approved this same decree as a law passed on their own initiative (April 24, 1958). It is certainly no coincidence that precisely the same Nikita Khrushchov acted as the "spiritus movens" of the entire machination and brought it to an issue by his notorious speech at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine (in June, 1938),—a speech which constitutes a landmark in the open Russification policy since then in Ukraine and in which he stressed that the Ukrainian people should "strengthen its union with the great Russian people" and demanded that "the results of the activity of public enemies as regards instruction in Russian should be eliminated." Obviously, Khrushchov wanted to repeat the same process this year.

A similar state of affairs, of course, also occurred in other non-Russian Soviet Republics in 1938 (or a little earlier).

But since this decision on the part of the "leading circles" of the "Party and government", which had already been reached in advance, was carefully kept a secret and, so it seems, was not even revealed to the responsible authorities either at once or completely, fairly marked difference of opinion in this respect were expressed in the

Soviet press even after December 24, 1958, however much the "Party and government" had endeavoured to act unobtrusively and to avoid publicity. The official organ of the Tatar Autonomous Republic (which belongs to the R.S.F.S.R.), the daily "Sovetskaya Tatarskiya" of January 3, 1959, reported that parents of pupils in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic (which likewise belongs to the R.S.F.S.R. and is closely related to the Tatar Republic linguistically and ethnically) had already "voted" for a Russian school in place of a Bashkir-Tatarian one, and that they had been censured by the Party Committee of the Tatar Autonomous Republic for infringing the "Leninist nationalities policy".

Finally, on April 17, 1959, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic unanimously passed the law on the "Reform of the School System" and, as regards the contents of the notorious Article 19, in verbal conformity with the above-mentioned "theses" without any limitations whatever; thus, from now onwards, the parents of the pupils are to decide whether Ukrainian or Russian is to be the language of instruction in the school in question, and whether that language of these two which is not the language of instruction is, at least, to retain the role of an optional subject.

This is what Article 9 of the new law states. Elsewhere in the same law it is also stipulated that in future examinations in the Ukrainian language, upon admission to most of the colleges in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, are to be abolished,—a measure which, of course, can be described as logical; for if a language has actually become an optional subject in the secondary schools, then one cannot demand fluency in it as a precondition for admission to a high school or college.

In the remaining non-Russian Soviet Republics the law on the "Reform of the School System" was likewise passed in April and, in March, 1959; it was only in two non-Russian Soviet Republics, namely in Azerbaijan and in Latvia, that the Supreme Soviets of the Soviet Republics in question rejected the contents of the notorious Article 19 of the "theses" and refrained from making any changes as regards the language of instruction and the teaching of languages. At the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Republic which was held in this connection, the Latvian Prime Minister, Berkala, stated as follows: "In discussing the theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Ministerial Council of the U.S.S.R., the inhabitants of Soviet Latvia have unanimously recognized that it is essential that in our eight-class schools the traditional study of three languages—Latvian, Russian and foreign language—should continue."

The decision reached by the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijanian Soviet Republic in this respect was based on similar reasons; but whether Moscow will tolerate such decisions seems extremely questionable. But, in any case, the Latvians and the Azerbaijanians did not want to wait until 26 per cent of all the school-children and 16.5 per

cent of all the schools in their country have Russian as the language of instruction, as has been the case in Soviet Ukraine since 1955-56.

It is, of course, neither a coincidence nor an action prompted by personal motives that, almost simultaneously with the decision of the Supreme Soviet of Soviet Ukraine, Mykola **Bazhan**, a Soviet Ukrainian writer, who according to the official hierarchy is one of the "oldest in rank" (incidentally, also a member of the Supreme Soviet), saw fit to eulogize the Russian language at the 4th Congress of Soviet Ukrainian writers: "We cannot help being alarmed at the fact that in various speeches, articles and verses of some of our literary men certain trends have recently been expressed, which are wrong, harmful and incompatible with the views held by Soviet persons,— trends to separate the development processes of the two related languages, Ukrainian and Russian, from each other artificially and to drive in a wedge between them. We love, honour and study the wonderfully rich language of the Russian brother-people and its inexhaustible and rich culture, which is so closely related to us, and we shall never permit anyone to insult our feeling in this respect or to underrate it."

Surely, there could have been no plainer warning that any kind of action in favour of the Ukrainian language and against the present Russification of the Soviet Ukrainian school system will be regarded as nationalist and counter-revolutionary activity by the authorities and will be punished accordingly. For this reason, the Ukrainian national emigrant groups feel themselves all the more obliged to voice their protest against this attempt to completely Russify the school system in Soviet Ukraine, before the entire free world. On May 7, 1959, a conference of Ukrainian political groups was held in Munich (Bavaria, Germany) for the purpose of discussing the intensified Russification course in Ukraine. Representatives of ten Ukrainian political parties and organizations (as well as a representative of the so-called Executive Organ of the Ukrainian National Council) took part in this conference. The conclusion was unanimously reached that the recent decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic represents a serious menace to Ukrainian cultural life in Soviet Ukraine.

In connection with these discriminative measures to further Russification in Ukraine, the conference unanimously resolved to initiate a large-scale protest campaign amongst the emigrants in the free world against the camouflaged linguistic and cultural subjugation of the nations subjected by Russian Communist imperialism.

An Initiative Committee was elected. It is headed by Professor Dr. Yuriy **Boyko** (who presided over the conference). The conference has authorized the Initiative Committee to carry out the necessary preparations in order to set up an organization centre of the said protest campaign; this centre is to include representatives of both Ukrainian Churches, of political groups and of public and academic institutes. It is planned to set a far-reaching campaign of international significance going.

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Stepan Lenkavsky

## Changes in the Population Statistics of Ukraine

It has taken the Bolsheviks twenty years to decide to hold a census again in the U.S.S.R., for this involved the danger of revealing to the whole world the disastrous consequences of Moscow's genocidal population policy. So far, only the provisional and general results of the census in question have been published; these refer to the total population figures of individual Soviet and autonomous republics and their regions and most of the larger towns, as well as to the numerical proportion of the male and female population and the urban and rural population. All other statistics, in particular those referring to the national population figures, have not been published. They are allegedly still "being worked out by the computation bureaus," that is to say, they are being prepared accordingly and being "corrected" according to requirements.

It is extremely likely that the final results of the census will show certain changes and corrections in the figures published so far. But this fact is hardly likely to change the consequences of the three big population processes which have taken place during the past twenty years and have been substantiated by the data published so far; we are referring to the three following processes:

- (1) the extermination of a considerable proportion of the population of Byelorussia (White Ruthenia), Lithuania and Ukraine;
- (2) the increasing density of population in the large Asian and north European regions of the Soviet Union;
- (3) the considerable increase in the number of towns and in the urban population.

### Facts revealed and concealed by the statistics of the census

So as not to weary the reader with complicated lists of figures, we should in the first place like to classify the main facts according to certain points and then present a survey of the most important problems.

The figures published so far reveal the following facts:

- (1) On January 15, 1959, the total population of the Soviet Union numbered **208,826,000**, as compared to 190,678,000 in 1939; the population of Ukraine numbered **41,893,000**, as compared to 40,469,000 in 1939.

(2) The **population increase** in the entire U.S.S.R. during the past twenty years amounts to **18.1 million**, i.e. 9.5 per cent; in Soviet Ukraine it amounts to **1.424 million**, i.e. 3.5 per cent; in Byelorussia the population has **decreased** by **850,000** and in Lithuania by **165,000**.

(3) A large shift of population has taken place from Europe to Asia and from the central and southern European regions to the north European regions (the figures pertaining to this shift are given below).

(4) Another population shift has also taken place: the **urban population** of the entire U.S.S.R. has increased to **99.8 million**, that is by **39.4 million**, and now amounts to **48 per cent** of the total population; in Ukraine the urban population has increased to **19.13 million**, that is by **5.56 million**, and now amounts to **46 per cent** of the total population.

(5) The male population of the entire U.S.S.R. now only amounts to **45 per cent** of the total population (as compared to 48 per cent in 1939). This proportion is allegedly now being balanced, namely as regards the age-groups that are under 32 years of age. No data in this respect has been published for Ukraine.

(6) The **natural population increase** (i.e. the difference between the annual birth-rate and annual death-rate) in the entire U.S.S.R. has **dropped to 1.75 per cent** (as compared to 2.37 per cent in 1926) and allegedly amounts to **3.65 million** per year; but the figures in this respect which are contained in the "Information Bulletin of the Central Statistical Department" (TsSU) appear to have been cooked by changing and rounding them off.

Marriage statistics in the entire U.S.S.R. are allegedly "at present" at their highest, the annual figure being "over" **2.505 million**, i.e. "over" 1.2 per cent of the total population. The annual birth-rate amounts to "over" **5.22 million**, i.e. to "over" 2.5 per cent of the total population. The annual death-rate amounts to **1.566 million**, i.e. to 0.75 per cent of the total population.

No data pertaining to the marriage statistics and to the birth-rate and death-rate has been published either for Ukraine or for other so-called Soviet Republics.

(7) The population shift within individual Soviet Republics is obscured by the planned migration, which the statistics conceal, that is to say by **deportation** of the native population and replacing them by **foreign settlers**. A clearer picture of this process can only be formed when the data on the national population figures and the natural population increase in the individual Soviet Republics (and regions) is published.

(8) If one does not take into account the migration and colonization processes, however, but proceeds exclusively from the absolute population figures of the individual Soviet Republics, one realizes that the **population increase in the non-Russian Soviet Republics is incommensurable** with that of the pre-war era and, in fact, **differs very**

**considerably** in the individual Soviet Republics: from +52.6 per cent in Kazakhstan to —9.6 per cent in Byelorussia (White Ruthenia).

In spite of the colonization process, the **largest deficit in population** is to be seen in the case of Byelorussia and Lithuania, where the population is 9.6 per cent and 5.7 per cent respectively less than it was in the year 1939. Ukraine shows the **smallest population increase**: an increase of only 3.5 per cent more population than before the war. The **largest population increase** is to be seen in Kazakhstan (52.6 per cent) and Kirgizstan (41.5 per cent), whilst Armenia and Tadzhikistan (37.9 and 33.5 per cent) show a population increase which is above the average. The population increase in six other non-Russian Soviet Republics varies from 11 per cent to 20.8 per cent.

(9) It is interesting to note that the **Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.)** shows a drop in its population increase: 8.2 per cent, which is definitely too little for twenty years. There are, however, two specific reasons for this:

(a) The R.S.F.S.R. constitutes the actual reservoir of the "genuine Russians" who are regarded as trustworthy by the Bolshevik "Party and Government"; they are sent from there in large numbers to the "peripheral regions," in order to govern the latter, to control or to colonize them; and the number of workers, for the most part unskilled, who are sent to the R.S.F.S.R. from the peripheral regions, does not balance this emigration decrease everywhere.

(b) The population density in the R.S.F.S.R., that is in the vast region between Königsberg and Vladivostok (17,000 kilometres!), is extremely unevenly distributed: overcrowding in the central regions and a sparse population in the Taiga forest region of Siberia and in the tundras in the extreme north; and the arithmetical average number which would balance such differences cannot be supplied by concrete reality.

(10) The forcible **incorporation of new territories** in the U.S.S.R. at the end of World War II and during the early post-war years resulted in an increase of 20.1 million in the population of the Soviet Union. No data has been published on Soviet Ukraine in this respect.

And now let us examine the facts that are concealed behind all these figures.

The new distribution of the population in the "Soviet and Autonomous Republics" of the U.S.S.R., which is apparent from this year's census, has resulted in a **change of rank as regards the population figure of individual "Republics."**

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) and Soviet Ukraine continue to rank foremost as the Republics with the largest population. Byelorussia (White Ruthenia) with a population of 8.06 million now ranks fifth instead of third; Kazakhstan (9.3 million) now ranks third (instead of fifth as formerly) and Uzbekistan ranks fourth. In addition, Lithuania (2.713 million) has become

ninth, its former place as eighth having now been taken by Moldavia (2.88 million). The remaining "Soviet Republics" have retained the place which they occupied hitherto.

These changes in the population figures are proof of the big upheaval which the population of the individual Soviet Republics has undergone during the past twenty years. The nature and the dynamic force of this transformation can be seen both from the absolute increase figures of the population and also from the index numbers of the natural increase (in so far as the latter can be ascertained).

Table 1 below gives a survey of the new general data on the population number and our calculation of the increase which has taken place during the past twenty years.

**Table 1**

(The Soviet Republics are listed according to the extent of the population increase; the population figures are given in thousands.)

Soviet Republic	1939	1959	Increase	Increase in %
1. Kazakhstan	6.094	9.301	3.207	52.6
2. Kirgizstan	1.458	2.063	605	41.5
3. Armenia	1.282	1.768	486	37.9
4. Tadzhikistan	1.484	1.982	498	33.5
5. Uzbekistan	6.336	8.113	1.777	20.8
6. Turkmenistan	1.252	1.520	268	20.6
7. Moldavia	2.452	2.880	428	17.4
8. Azerbaijan	3.205	3.700	495	15.4
9. Georgia	3.540	4.049	509	14.0
10. Estonia	1.052	1.196	144	13.6
11. Latvia	1.885	2.084	209	11.0
12. R.S.F.S.R.	108.379	117.494	9.115	8.2
13. Ukraine	40.469	41.893	1.424	3.5
14. Lithuania	2.880	2.713	— 167	— 5.7
15. Byelorussia	8.910	8.060	— 850	— 9.6
Entire U.S.S.R.	190.678	208.826	18.148	9.5

### Uneven Distribution of Population Increase

During the past twenty years the population increase was unevenly distributed as far as individual years were concerned. In so far as one can accept the former births and deaths index numbers which were partly published, the population increase during the war and in the years immediately after the war was so slight that the population figures were only published for the year 1940 and the percentage of the population increase only for the U.S.S.R. (1.34 per cent). For the following ten years, when the losses were highest, the statistics give no index number at all. It is only for the years 1950 to 1955 that the index numbers of the natural population increase per year have been published; they show a fairly stable average of 1.75 per cent for the U.S.S.R. and 1.31 per cent (1.23 per cent for the last three years) for Soviet Ukraine.

This means that the population increase in Ukraine during the first 10 years of the period in question (1939-1949) was extremely low, indeed, in some years there was even a loss. During the past ten years, the increase has been higher, but it has remained stable at a lower level than was the case during the pre-war years. During the past three years (1956-1958) the annual population increase in Ukraine averaged 437,000, as compared to an annual increase of 533,000 during the years 1950-1953 and an annual increase of 750,000 before the war (when the population was far less numerous).

The absolute population figures of the said period have only been published for April 1956. This makes it possible to compare the figures for the last three more productive years with those of the years immediately preceding them. It would, of course, be more natural to compare them with the figures for 1950, but these are kept a secret. Nevertheless, even the inclusion of the figures for the artificially separated past three years gives one a clearer picture of the annual average increase in 1956-1958 inclusive, as compared with that of the years 1939-1955, in the individual Soviet Republics.

During the past three years of the last two decades, the annual increase in the entire U.S.S.R. amounted to 2.875 thousand per year, whereas during the preceding seventeen years the annual increase only averaged 560,000. The corresponding figures for Soviet Ukraine are 431,000 (1956-1958) and 7.7 thousand (1939-1955), for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) 1.431 thousand (1956-1958) and 283.6 thousand (1939-1955), for Latvia 34.4 thousand and 7 thousand respectively, for Esthonia 32 thousand and 2.8 thousand respectively, for Byelorussia 20 thousand increase as compared to 53.5 thousand decrease (1939-1955), and for Lithuania 4.3 thousand increase as compared to 10.6 thousand decrease (1939-1955); in Kazakhstan the average annual increase for 1956-1959 was 267 thousand, for 1939-1955 141.5 thousand.

The actual proportion of the increases and losses was, of course, quite different from what can be assumed from the calculation of the average figures (with the marginal year per April 1, 1956, instead of the more natural one per January 1, 1950); for in certain years the losses in population assumed the proportions of a catastrophic decimation. But even this comparison—which is not in keeping with the actual development—of the past three years with the preceding seventeen years shows the extremely uneven nature of the average increase: irrespective of whether it was large or small in the past three years, it was in most of the preceding years quite insignificant (or even negative).

### Losses in Population are Concealed

In the course of the past twenty years the population of the U.S.S.R. has increased by 18.1 million, that of Soviet Ukraine by 1.424 million. What is the significance of these figures? Is this a large or a small increase? Let us in the first place consider what increase the previous censuses revealed and what the position was in other states at the same time.

The population of the Soviet Union, which in 1926 numbered 147 million, in the course of 12 years (1926-1938) increased by 23.64 million. The increase of a more numerous (190.7 million) population after an interval of twenty years now proves to be 5.5 million less than in 1926, in spite of the fact that, as a result of the Soviet occupation and incorporation of certain regions of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Roumania and Finland, as well as of the entire territories of the three Baltic states, the population of the U.S.S.R. increased by 20.1 million.

Let us now calculate the extent to which the population of the U.S.S.R. should normally have increased in the course of 20 years, without paying too much attention to the losses of the war years, with which, incidentally, Soviet statistics juggle.

We must take as the starting-point for our calculations in this respect the **population of the Soviet Union within the 1939 state frontiers**. If we assume that its annual natural increase in the course of the past 20 years should be equal to that of the years 1926-1938, then it would amount to 1.97 million (1.16 per cent) per year. This is the minimum probable increase, since we have taken as the starting-point for our calculations the population figures for 1926 (147 million) and not that of 1939, which was considerably higher (170.6 million); we have done so in order to take into account the population losses of the war years, as well as the decrease in the birth-rate of the war and post-war years. With such a natural increase, the population of the Soviet pre-war territories should have increased by **39.4 million** in the course of 20 years.

As far as the new "Soviet citizens" are concerned, however, who, together with their countries, have fallen in the hands of Soviet power since 1939, it is hardly possible to calculate their natural increase on the basis of the previous censuses held by their various states and at different times; in this case, we shall have to take as the starting-point for our calculations the minimum natural increase of 1.2 per cent per year. Accordingly, the "**newly acquired**" **population of the U.S.S.R.**, numbering 20 million in 1930-40, would in the course of 20 years have increased to **25.07 million**.

Thus, the hypothetical normal (though the losses of the war years have to a certain extent been taken into account) population increase in the entire U.S.S.R. after 20 years, including the "new population" and their natural increase, would amount to a minimum of 64.4 million; actually—if one is to believe the results of the census in January, 1959,—it only amounts to 18.1 million. There is thus a **deficit of approximately 46 million** for the past 20 years.

### What is the Share of Ukraine in Population Losses?

According to the census of 1926, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had a population of 29.757 million, and according to the census of 1939 (that is to say, taken in its pre-war frontiers), 32.087 million<sup>1</sup>). In view of the disastrous famines and the mass deportations which Ukraine has been obliged to endure in the meantime, however, one cannot include the population increase in question simply as an increase of 2.33 million. This difference of 2.33 million can therefore only be explained by special calculations; for the present, however, we should like to point out that a 2.33 million increase within 12 years (1926-1939) is considerably more than 1.424 million increase within 20 years (1939-1959); the percentage of the population increase thus dropped from 7.8 per cent to 3.5 per cent between 1939 and 1959.

If we take as the starting-point for our calculations the population figure according to the census of 1926 and the minimum coefficient of the natural population increase in the individual Ukrainian regions, the population figures of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic within its frontiers of 1926 (that is, without the Crimea) should at the time of the 1939 census have amounted to at least 36.897 million, instead of 30.960 million as given in the Soviet statistics. As a result of famine and deportations, Soviet Ukraine had prior to the 1939 census already suffered a population loss of at least 5.936 million<sup>2</sup>). Furthermore, as a result of the severance of the autonomous Republic of Moldavia from Soviet Ukraine and the union of the former with the territory taken from Roumania under the designation of the Moldavian Soviet Republic (on August 2, 1940), Soviet Ukraine lost approximately 700,000 of its population. On the other hand, however, approximately 9.4 million persons of the Ukrainian western regions were incorporated in Soviet Ukraine. As a result of these measures, the population of Soviet Ukraine increased considerably in the years immediately after the 1939 census and at that time amounted to 41.027 million—if the Soviet sources can be regarded as reliable<sup>3</sup>). In 1959 the population of Soviet Ukraine allegedly numbers 41.893 million. The population increase would thus only amount to **866,000** within the past **19 years** (1940-1959); on the basis of the drop in the percentage of 1952 (1.34 per cent), **such an increase would only take one year and six and a half months**,—quite apart from the fact that there was a sudden

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1) The population of the Crimea is included in both these figures.

2) All the population loss figures increase still more if one takes as the basis for calculations the percentage of the natural increase, namely 2.0 per cent; but this is no doubt an exaggerated figure. It is true that the actual population losses were higher than 6 million, but not as a result of an allegedly erroneous application of the minimum coefficient of the natural increase, but because the population figure for 1939 (30.96 million) also includes the unclarified figure for the Russian settlers, who were resettled in Soviet Ukraine during and after the big famine of 1932-1933, in order to replace to a certain extent the loss in native population.

3) "The National Economy of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic" ("Narodne hospodarstvo URSR"), Kyiv, 1957, p. 7.

increase in the population of Soviet Ukraine in 1954 as a result of the incorporation of the Crimea.

Consequently, the population of all the territories which today constitute part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic should in 1959 amount to at least **69 million**. The census of 1959 gives the figure of 41.894 million. Thus, the **deficit in the population** of the entire Soviet Ukraine within its present state frontiers **amounts to approximately 27 million for the period 1926-1959**. This amounts to the population figures of a larger average state: Poland, for instance, in 1955, had a population of 27.5 million, Turkey 24.1 million. The Ukrainian deficit in population is more than half that of the entire U.S.S.R. (46 million).

This deficit in population does not mean that all these people have died. The re-settlers—deported and voluntary—who have become domiciled in other Soviet Republics—constitute an unclarified number of this deficit. The Ukrainian post-war emigrants who have gone West are estimated at approximately 1 million (probably an exaggerated figure). Losses in population include the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the numerically unfavourable exchange of population with Poland, and the extermination of the Jews carried out by the Nazi occupants during the German-Soviet war. The former "Reichs Commissar for Ukraine," Erich Koch, was held responsible by the Polish Prosecutor at his trial for the deaths of 4 million persons in Soviet Ukraine; this figure, which was no doubt suggested to the Poles by the Soviets, is hardly likely to be less, but, rather, higher than the actual figure involved. The actual military losses during the Finnish-Soviet war (not very significant) and the losses during the German-Soviet war (3-4 million) must also be taken into account.

#### **Uneven Distribution of the Population Increase of the U.S.S.R. amongst the individual Soviet Republics**

The total population increase in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic within the past 20 years amounts to 1.424 million. This figure is 12.5 times less than the population increase of the entire U.S.S.R. within the same period (18.148 million) and thus only amounts to 8 per cent of the latter, although the population of Soviet Ukraine constitutes one-fifth (20 per cent) of the population of the Soviet Union; thus, calculated proportionately, it should amount to 2.216 million more, namely 3.651 million. Actually, there is no proportion between the population figure and the population increase: in the course of the past 20 years, there was only a proportion of an annual population increase of 10 persons in Soviet Ukraine to an annual population increase of 125 persons in the U.S.S.R. Should this process continue at the same rate in the future, as was the case during the past 20 years, the specific gravity of the population of Soviet Ukraine will decrease 12.5 times more rapidly, in proportion as the population of the entire Soviet Union increases.

This fact is also evident if one compares the population increase in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). The



population of Soviet Ukraine is only 2.8 times smaller than that of the R.S.F.S.R. (in the proportion of 36 to 100), but the population increase of Soviet Ukraine is only a little over one-sixth (15 per cent) of that of the R.S.F.S.R.; there is only a population increase of 10 persons in Soviet Ukraine to every population increase of 63 persons in the R.S.F.S.R.

From this fact the following conclusions can be drawn:

The Bolshevik population policy of decimating and deporting the Ukrainian population, as well as the forcible depression of the latter's natural increase, has caused an unfavourable rate of population increase in Soviet Ukraine as compared to the rate of population increase in the R.S.F.S.R. and also in the entire U.S.S.R. This depression of the specific gravity of the Ukrainian population increase is evident in 1959, inasmuch as to every population increase of 10 persons amongst the Soviet Ukrainian citizens, there is a population increase of 125 persons amongst the Soviet citizens, or, in other words: to every 10 new Soviet Ukrainian citizens, there are 115 new Soviet citizens outside Soviet Ukraine (including 63 Russians and 22 Kazakhs).

This depression of the dynamic force of development of the Ukrainian population is also clearly evident from a comparison with the development of the population of Uzbekistan; although Uzbekistan had almost 6 times less population twenty years ago than Soviet Ukraine (6.336 million as compared to 40.469 million), it has, in the course of the past 20 years, overtaken Soviet Ukraine to a considerable extent as regards the population increase (1.774 million as compared to 1.425 million).

In order to ascertain the specific gravity of the Soviet Ukrainian population increase in the world, however, we should like to list below the index numbers in this respect of the large states which took part in World War II and suffered considerable population losses, and also of one state, which, though it did not take part in World War II, carried on a civil war which involved a considerable loss in population. The following table shows us plainly the meagre nature of the population increase which, as far as Ukraine is concerned, is supposed to be an "achievement" of the past twenty years of Bolshevik occupation:

Table 2

State	Years	Population mill.	Increase per cent
USA	1930-50	27.9	22.4
West Germany	1939-50	8.4	21.3
Poland	1946-56	5.1	20.9
Spain	1930-50	4.4	18.1
Italy	1931-51	6.4	15.9
Great Britain	1931-51	5.1	10.7
U.S.S.R.	1939-59	18.1	9.5
Ukraine	1939-59	1.4	3.5

Soviet statistical departments will be loath to publish such comparative figures, since they plainly show that of all the larger states which during the past 20 years have conducted a war and have suffered considerable losses in combatants and in civilian population in the theatres of the war, the Soviet Union as far as the percentage of the population increase is concerned occupies the lowest place.

Ukraine, which formerly had one of the highest population increases in Europe—up to 783,000 in one year and still 2.37 per cent in 1926—has in the course of the past 20 years of Muscovite Bolshevik genocide “achieved” the fact that its population, together with the Russian colonists settled there and the population of the West Ukrainian territories which Moscow has annexed and “re-united” in slavery, has with difficulty only managed to increase by 1.424 million as compared to the population figure of the pre-war period. Under normal conditions, it would have taken not 20 years but less than 2 years to achieve such a meagre population increase and, in fact, without settling alien Russian colonists in the country. Even if one takes as the basis the diminished natural population increase which, according to the recently published Soviet statistics, in the course of the years 1950-1955 amounted to an average of 501,000 per year, Soviet Ukraine would in the course of 3 (instead of 20) years have achieved a population increase of one and half million.



V. Oreletsky

## Ukraine's Relations with Russia in the Middle of the 17th Century

In order to elucidate the true nature of Russia's diplomatic relations with the Western world in past centuries and, above all, in the 17th century, we should like to quote a few remarks by a well-known Russian historian with regard to the Russian envoys in those days: “From time to time, a Russian ambassador would appear in Europe, but the Moscow officials, who by decree of the government became improvised diplomats, were by no means prepared for the role of observers of European life. These men, without the knowledge of foreign languages, reading with difficulty from their copy-books, word for word, their official speeches, were anxious only not to do or say an improper thing that might compromise the Tsar's honour or expose them to official punishment. They were not disinclined to avail themselves from time to time of the freedom of life to which they were not accustomed, but the manner in which they understood that freedom

provoked the resentment of the chance witnesses of their revelries. In the eyes of the European witnesses this was more than barbarity, it was outright bestiality and filthiness. From pleasures in the European taste, from interests in travels, scenery of Nature, monuments of art, achievements of culture, they were separated by a Chinese wall erected by their own intellectual and moral uncouthness. Wherever they appeared, they carried with themselves their own atmosphere in the literal and figurative sense. The lodgings in which they had stayed had to be aired and cleaned for at least a week. Whenever they appeared in the street, dressed in brocades and silks of red, yellow or green colour, in long coats with tremendously high collars and immensely long sleeves, in fur caps of Asiatic design, a crowd of staring onlookers would gather around them. It was, as it were, a masquerade, a religious procession, an ethnological curiosity brought by an ingenious showman from overseas lands together with crocodiles from the Nile and lions from Africa. When towards the close of the seventeenth century it was realized in Moscow how bad was the impression created abroad by these homegrown diplomats, they began to be replaced by foreigners residing in Russia. The experience and wordly manners of the latter in turn caused the astonishment of European diplomacy accustomed to deal with *grobianitas Moscovitica*\*)

It is obvious from these remarks by a prominent Russian historian and politician that it was extremely difficult to negotiate with this kind of people in the West, and in Ukraine, too. The treacherous policy of the Russian ally towards Ukraine, the barbaric manner of negotiating as practised by the Russian envoys with regard to the Ukrainian diplomats made Ukrainian-Russian relations extremely tense and explosive. We do not wish to deal with the actual negotiations as such, but should like to confine ourselves to discussing the nature of the external relations of Ukraine with Russia until the battle of Poltava in 1709.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Ukrainian-Russian treaty at Pereyaslav in January 1654, both partners proceeded to establish their mutual diplomatic relations. The Russian state of the 17th century entertained its diplomatic relations with foreign states by means of one of its central state institutions, the so-called "Posolsky Prikaz" ("Post of Command for Envoys"). The institution of permanent diplomatic relations was not universally known in the 17th century; this applies above all to Russia. The Russian envoys were sent to foreign countries only from time to time. They received strict written instructions, the so-called "orders" containing text of their future declarations at the courts of the foreign states to which they were sent, and further instructions for their behaviour abroad, etc. These envoys were obliged to send their reports or "copies" to the "Posolsky

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\*) P. Miliukov: "Ocherki po istorii russkoy kultury," Vol. III, pp. 103, 104 (Jan Kucharzewski: "The Origins of Modern Russia," New York, N.Y., 1948. Published by the Polish Institute of Arts and Science in America).

Prikaz" in Moscow. After their duties as envoys were completed, they were obliged to submit a longer report, the so-called "stateynyi spisok." All these documents are to be found in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office and they are a very valuable historical source to students of the history of Russian diplomatic law.

To begin with, relations with the Ukrainian Cossack state were regulated by the "Posolsky Prikaz," but after the Treaty of Pereyaslav Ukrainian-Russian diplomatic relations became so extensive that Moscow decided to set up a special institution for this purpose, namely a new and special "Posolsky Prikaz," which was founded in 1663. This new institution for relations with Ukraine was, incidentally, in no way subordinated to the Russian general "Posolsky Prikaz." On the contrary, it was for a long time under the independent control of P. Saltykov, a nobleman. Since Saltykov at that time was himself a very influential person in Russia, he despised the men who were in charge of the general "Posolsky Prikaz" and did not wish to have any dealings with them.

The competence of the Ukrainian ("Little Russian") "Prikaz" was as follows: the diplomats of Ukraine who were in Moscow at that time were received in the "Posolsky Prikaz." And here, too, all the Russian delegates to be sent to Ukraine received their precise instructions. All the Russian "voivodes" (governors) who were in Ukraine with Russian garrisons used to send their reports, petitions, and despatches, tc. to this "Posolsky Prikaz." And in some cases even citizens of the Ukrainian state addressed themselves to this institution. The Ukrainian "Posolsky Prikaz" was obliged to grant assistance to all those Ukrainians who were either prisoners or exiles in Russia, and Ukrainians who during their voluntary or involuntary sojourn in Russia committed crimes or violated the Russian laws were punished by this "Posolsky Prikaz." Since Russia and Ukraine were two entirely different worlds, there were many such violations on the part of the Ukrainians. For instance, the Ukrainians frequently violated the Russian laws by selling tobacco. The Russians who participated in such transactions were actually punished more severely than the Ukrainians. Whereas the punishment inflicted on the Russians in such cases was to cut off their noses, the Ukrainians merely had their tobacco confiscated and were ordered to leave Russia and return to Ukraine.

Since Russia at that time was devoid of higher culture, the Ukrainian "Posolsky Prikaz" used to buy books in Ukraine and distribute them in Russia.

During the reign of Tsar Peter I the Ukrainian "Posolsky Prikaz" ceased to exist. About 1720 we already find diplomatic documents of the Ukrainian "Posolsky Prikaz" in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office, where they still exist to this day.

It is interesting to note that a special house was established for the Ukrainian envoys in Moscow, and to this day the street in question still bears the name "Maloroseyka" ("Little Russian," i.e. Ukrainian).

In Ukraine there was no special institution for foreign relations. For this reason, it is difficult to give a true account of the reception of and negotiations with the Russian envoys in Ukraine. In any case, Ukraine was not familiar with such bureaucratic institutions as the Russian "Posolsky Prikaz."

It is most regrettable that the Ukrainian diplomatic archives were destroyed with the Ukrainian capital of that time, Baturyn, by the Russians in 1708. The written reports of the Ukrainian envoys in Moscow, Warsaw, Constantinople (Istanbul), Bakhchisaray (Crimea) and other foreign capitals could thus not be handed down to posterity. But nevertheless, a considerable number of diplomatic documents were saved by private persons. Professor L. Okinshevych has, for instance, published various valuable reports by a government official and high-ranking Ukrainian officer,—Ivan Bykhovets (who allegedly was the author of the well-known but anonymous Ukrainian "chronicle of Samovydyets"—eye-witness report of the political events of that time). Bykhovets was ordered by the Ukrainian government to foster special diplomatic relations abroad. According to Professor Okinshevych, the documents written by Bykhovets prove that he was sent in 1665 to the Kalmuck princes ("taishes"), and that this prominent Ukrainian diplomat in 1704 also visited the Crimean Khan. In addition, there are a great many other written reports regarding the same diplomatic journey. They were written in the form of diaries.

In the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian alliance, that is to say immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Pereyaslav in January 1654, the Ukrainians negotiated directly with the Tsar or his deputies, but later on, when Ukrainian-Russian relations became more and more tense and Russian treachery became more and more evident, there was no close diplomatic contact between the two partners of the said treaty of alliance. The differences of opinion and the conflict between Ukraine and Russia could no longer be settled by the Ukrainian Posolsky Prikaz in Moscow, but only by the supreme political representatives of both states.

The subsequent Ukrainian-Russian wars hampered the activity of the Ukrainian Posolsky Prikaz in Moscow until the final blow after the battle of Poltava encouraged the victorious Russians to liquidate this diplomatic central institution for Ukrainian affairs in Moscow for good.

During the reign of the Tsarina Elisabeth (1740-1762), Russian-Ukrainian political affairs were settled by the Russian Collegium for Foreign Affairs.

After a long period of more than 150 years of continued enslavement of Ukraine by Russia, diplomatic contacts between Ukraine and Russia were only established in 1918, namely after the proclamation of Ukraine's sovereignty.

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Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaliuk

## THE VICTORY AT KONOTOP

In commemoration of the 300th anniversary of the great victory of the Ukrainian Hetman I. Vyhovsky over the Russian tsarist realm on July 8, 1659

### The Situation in General

The hetmanate of Ivan Vyhovsky began under most difficult conditions. The internal situation of the Hetman State was at that time<sup>1)</sup> practically desperate, and, in addition, external political events had taken a turn which was unfavourable for Ukraine. It became increasingly difficult from day to day to preserve and consolidate the independence of the Ukrainian state. Every political action on the part of the Hetman in which he relied on his own forces evoked a corresponding reaction on the part of the neighbouring states, which, since they were endeavouring to annex certain parts of the Ukrainian territory, made alliances with each other and joined forces against Ukraine. But the worst of all this was that the forces of the hetmanate were weak, separated from each other as they were by the material offers made by the enemies of the Ukrainian state.

There were in Ukraine at that time three parties, as it were, or, to be more exact, three trends. One party was pro-Swedish and favoured Sweden's policy at that time. The Swedes were not interested at all in annexing Ukrainian territories; on the contrary, a Ukrainian state which by its very existence would already weaken Poland as well as Moscow, was in keeping with their interests. The existence and activity of the pro-Swedish group in Ukraine was, however, determined by the military victories of the Swedish King Charles X Gustavus, and it thus began to lose ground with the beginning of the Swedish-Polish conciliation.

The second party was pro-Muscovite. Its supporters belonged to those circles of the upper class which had no definite political principles and views of their own; that is to say it consisted to a large extent of those Cossack officers who allowed themselves to be bought over for money or for goods. In addition, Moscow carried on a skilful propaganda amongst the rabble and amongst the unprincipled elements of those who were homeless, just as was later the case with Bolshevik propaganda in Ukraine in the years 1917-1918. Since their way of

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1) After the sudden death of the great Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (on August 8, 1657). The footnotes are by the Editor. V.D.

thinking was extremely primitive, such elements were easily influenced by bribery, demagoguery and the phraseology of the Muscovite agents, which was adapted to their mentality. The leaders of this pro-Muscovite party consisted, as already mentioned above, of certain groups of the upper class who put their personal interests before all else. Two of the main leaders were the Colonel of Poltava<sup>2)</sup>, Martyn Pushkar, and the "Koshovy" (Head Captain) of the Zaporogian Cossacks, Yakiv Barabash. They both cooperated closely with Moscow against the Hetman and organized a network of spies for the Muscovite "voivodes" (governors of provinces and military commanders). Furthermore, at Moscow's orders, they also instigated revolts of the rabble and other pro-Muscovite elements against Hetman Vyhovsky.

The third party was pro-Polish. It upheld the view that Ukraine was bound to be subjugated as a result of the alliance with Moscow, since Moscow was not in the habit of observing treaties, was sending its troops to Ukraine and was endeavouring to unify the Ukrainian territories with the Russian ones as regards civil, military and political administration. The pro-Polish party thus suggested a union of the three states—Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine—under the rule of one king.

Having been elected Hetman, Vyhovsky decided to strengthen the position of Ukraine on the lines adopted by his predecessor, Bohdan Khmelnytsky; he was thus obliged to wipe out most radically all insubordination and venality. He made no secret of his intentions, but declared immediately after his election as Hetman: "This Hetman's staff will bring benefits to the good and punishment to the wicked. I shall not curry favour with anyone in the army. The Zaporogian army<sup>3)</sup> must be disciplined."

This declaration by Vyhovsky made all the supporters of Moscow, in particular those amongst the Zaporogians, prick up their ears. With the help of traitors to the Ukrainian interests, strong units of Russian troops unlawfully entered the Ukrainian territories in the winter of 1657 to 1658, and numerous reserve troops from Moscow took up their positions along the frontier in readiness for an attack.

In view of this situation, even the loyal supporters of the Hetman began to be alarmed; the Hetman himself, however, began to take speedy action in order to prevent a new catastrophe and an ultimate defeat. To have started a war at once with Moscow would have led to an invasion of Ukraine by Polish troops, and a war on two fronts would have resulted in an entirely hopeless situation for the Hetman. It was thus imperative to prevent the formation of either one of these two fronts, in this case of the Polish front. In the meantime, subordination in the country itself must be dealt with radically, in order to put up an effective resistance against the enemy who was stronger and more wily. Poland's situation, too, was to be used to advantage, for

2) In the Ukrainian hetman state, individual districts corresponded to the various Cossack regiments.

3) The Zaporogian Cossacks (they derived their name from the rapids of the River Dnieper) had considerable autonomy in the Ukrainian hetman state.

her strength had been greatly undermined as a result of the war with Sweden and she was quite prepared to reach a conciliation with Ukraine.

Of course, there could be no genuine and lasting conciliation either from the Ukrainian or from the Polish side; both states regarded a peace merely as a breathing-space, that is as a "modus vivendi" for a short time. And it was in this idea that Vyhovsky began to seek a way out of the situation which was so critical for Ukraine. In order to carry out this new policy successfully, he decided, in the first place, to get rid of rebellious elements and arbitrary commanders.

In the spring of 1658, Vyhovsky dealt the tsarist realm a serious blow. He destroyed the Muscovite espionage network by arresting a number of its agents, in particular those who belonged to Pushkar's and Barabash's cliques. In the vicinity of the town of Sumy, the Cossack cavalry captain Burliy, who was on his way to the Tsar with secret documents, fell into his hands; and, on the strength of the verdict of the regimental court martial, Vyhovsky's Cossacks hung him on the spot. Thereupon, Vyhovsky advanced with his best troops to attack Pushkar, and, after a fierce battle near Poltava, inflicted a decisive defeat on him. Pushkar was killed and his troops were put to rout and scattered in small units.

Vyhovsky's successes forced the Tsar to become more cautious. The latter now gave orders that the Russian garrisons were to be withdrawn from those towns in Ukraine which were not safe enough from Cossack invasions; with these same troops he reinforced the Russian garrison in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv (Kiev), under the command of Prince Yuriy Boriatinsky. The official reason given for this withdrawal of the Russian troops was that the Hetman had now restored law and order in Ukraine and that there was no longer any sense in keeping garrisons in the towns in question. But it was not long, however, before this hasty withdrawal seemed to the Tsar to have been inexpedient, and already in the summer of 1658 strong Russian units once again took up their positions along the Ukrainian frontiers; and countless Russian regular and irregular detachments marched into Ukraine, plundering the population, setting fire to the villages and spreading chaos and devastation throughout the country.

In the meantime, the political situation in Central Europe had undergone a change. The Swedish-Polish war was over and, accordingly, Ukrainian affairs, too, ceased to be of interest to other European states; they once again assumed the insignificant character of an "internal problem" of Moscow and Warsaw. This fact eventually forced the Hetman to conclude the treaty of Hadiach with Poland (September 16, 1658), which, at least formally, recognized Ukraine as an autonomous part of the Polish-Lithuanian state<sup>4</sup>).

In the summer of 1658, clashes between Russian and Ukrainian troops also occurred. It is true that the Tsar still continued to assure

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
<sup>4</sup>) This treaty was renewed by Poland in 1660, but soon afterwards was finally annulled.








# THE BATTLE OF KONOTOP

(July 8, 1659)

## I. INITIAL POSITIONS



### Legend:

-  Town and Fortress of Konotop
-  Ukrainian Troops
-  Russian Troops
-  Bridge
-  Woods


a. **Ukrainian Troops:**

1. Hulianytsky (Garrison of Konotop)
2. Bohun (Cossack Infantry and Cavalry)
3. Vyhovsky (Main body of Cossack Infantry)
4. Tartar Cavalry.

b. **Russian Troops:**

5. Trubetskoy and Romodanovsky (Main body of the Army)
6. Pozharsky (Cavalry)

II. THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE



the Hetman of his "friendly attitude," but both sides were already preparing quite openly for a decisive military conflict. The position of the Russian forces was extremely dangerous for Ukraine; true, the main troops, under the command of Prince Trubetskoy, were stationed in Putyvl on the frontier, but the vanguard, under the command of Prince Romodanovsky, lay far further south, near Lohvytsia in Ukrainian territory, and, in addition, another Russian army, under the command of Prince Pozharsky, was hastily sent to the Ukrainian frontier. At the same time, a Cossack commander, Ivan Bezpaly, with the consent of Moscow had himself proclaimed Hetman and began to rally the groups who were rebelling against Vyhovsky to his side. The armed forces of the Muscovite commanders and of Bezpaly were far more numerous than those of Vyhovsky. Indeed, the three battle groups under Trubetskoy, Pozharsky and Romodanovsky are said to have numbered a total of 100 000 men<sup>5</sup>). In addition, there were also the Russian garrisons in various Ukrainian towns, Pushkar's former troops which, it is true, had been put to rout, but nevertheless still existed, and Bezpaly's Zaporogian Cossacks.

Vyhovsky now concentrated his forces—regiments and individual companies—in the towns in which no Russian garrisons had been stationed and, in the course of the year 1658, set up a defensive zone along the Ukrainian-Russian frontier; the defensive troops concentrated here were constantly engaged in combats with Russian regular and irregular reconnaissance and diversion troops<sup>6</sup>).

### Preparatory Operations

**The Russian army.** In March 1659, Trubetskoy, with 30 000 men, set up his quarters in the vicinity of the town of Putyvl (on the Russian-Ukrainian frontier). From this position he issued orders to the effect that Kurakin should move his auxiliary troops from Lohvytsia

5) One cannot, of course, accept contemporary data about the strength of troops in East Europe in the 16th and 17th century as reliable; and when several thousands are mentioned, this simply means that to a contemporary in those days the army in question appeared to be extremely large.

6) Since the author, in our opinion, deals with the previous social and political history of the campaign of 1659 far too summarily, we should like to supplement his account with a passage referring to this subject from the work of a well-known Ukrainian historian:

"As regards his home policy, Vyhovsky followed a course which differed from that pursued by Khmelnytsky. The old Hetman had endeavoured to preserve a social balance; he rounded up the masses for the task of building up the state, but he did not allow them to assume an anarchist attitude; he favoured the Cossack upper classes, but curbed their desire to rule. Vyhovsky was convinced that the role of the "rabble" was ended and it was his intention to base the organization of the state on the support of the higher classes,—the Cossack upper class and the nobility. The Cossack upper class had already begun to detach itself from the rest of the Cossacks and to form a special class, and was endeavouring to concentrate the large estates in its own hands and get the farmers and Cossacks of the lowest classes under their rule. Vyhovsky made no attempt to check this rise to power on the part of the upper class, but, on the contrary, tried to strengthen this class by means of aristocratic elements, which still had a fair amount of power, in particular in the Western regions; together with the wealthy Cossacks, the nobility was to form a new class on which the state could rely.—It was this policy on the part of Vyhovsky that led to the

and Bezpaly his troops from Romny (that is from the south, out of the Ukrainian territory) in order to join forces with him. The district of Konstantynovo on the River Sula was fixed by Trubetskoy as the collecting centre for this troop concentration. On April 8, Romodanovsky also appeared there with his troops.

On April 20, 1659, the Russian army began to advance in the direction of Konotop, where the Cossack colonel Hryhoriy Hulianytsky was stationed with his garrison. Konotop was a well-fortified town with fosses, ramparts and old walls. It would have been disadvantageous for Trubetskoy to have left this military base of Vyhovsky's on his flank, and he therefore decided to take Konotop by armed force. No doubt this plan did not seem to him to involve any difficulties: the garrison of Konotop was not strong enough in numbers to resist the Russian troops for any length of time, and it was very unlikely that rapid help on the part of Vyhovsky would be forthcoming.

But before Trubetskoy reached Konotop, however, Hulianytsky attacked the Russian supply column, which was bringing up the rear of the Russian troops and was not adequately protected since there seemed no cause to fear any danger. Hulianytsky's men overpowered the guards and, before the Russians could get help, annihilated the supply column and returned to Konotop.

The Russian reconnaissance units, which were trying to operate in the interior of the country, too, far away from Konotop, encountered the reconnaissance troops of the Cossack colonel Petro Doroshenko<sup>7</sup>), who prevented them from proceeding further inland; the Cossacks generally attacked the Russians unexpectedly and in the course of skirmishes inflicted considerable losses on them since they were better marksmen; by their sudden appearance the Cossacks caused the Russian units to lose their bearings; after a short skirmish, the

outbreak of the social conflict. The upper class, which no longer felt itself restricted by the Hetman, began to suppress the people to an increasing degree by re-introducing the former ground-rent and other imposts and imposing compulsory labour on the peasants. To these measures the masses reacted with riots. The main centre of this insurgent movement on the part of the people was the district of Poltava, a fertile and well-cultivated region, where the people who had recently settled there felt that they were free and independent. When the "new lords" now began to suppress the "common people" there, a strong peasants' revolt broke out immediately and raids were carried out on the estates of the big landowners, on the houses of townspeople and merchants. The watchwords proclaimed by the insurgents were:—renewal of the so-called Cossack freedoms for the "common people"—of the right to distil spirits as they wished, to hunt and to fish, to settle in the Zaporogian district as they wished and to elect the Hetman in an "illicit" (free and classless) Cossack assembly. This people's movement was used to advantage by those of the upper class who were dissatisfied, who were ill-disposed towards Hetman Vyhovsky and wanted to overthrow him,—in particular, by the Colonel of Poltava, Martyn Pushkar, and by the head captain of the Zaporogian Cossacks, Yakiv Barabash. Together, they recruited 40 000 men as troops; the peasant units known as the "Deynekas" ("rod-men"), who were badly armed, but very grim and determined, in particular enjoyed a considerable reputation throughout the country" (Ivan Kholmsky: "Istoriya Ukrayiny," Munich, 1949, p. 220).

<sup>7</sup>) Later Ukrainian Hetman (1665-1676) who, with the help of the Turks, tried to defeat the Polish and Russian forces which were superior in number, without however achieving any lasting success.

Cossacks would then disappear without a trace into the terrain which they themselves knew well. In this way they made it impossible for the Russians to obtain any definite information about Vyhovsky's military preparations. Indeed, Trubetskoy does not seem to have been informed at all in this respect; of the various Russian garrisons quartered in Ukrainian towns, some were located in places that were a long way distant from the Cossack collecting centres, whilst others were blockaded to such an extent that they had no communication at all with Trubetskoy's headquarters.

Trubetskoy had thus no other choice but to advance into the interior of Ukraine with all his forces and possibly encounter Vyhovsky's troops. Only in this way could he hope to co-ordinate his military operations with the so far unused forces of the Russian garrisons, which otherwise, because of lack of communication lines and reconnaissance of their own, would be obliged to remain inactive.

On April 28, Trubetskoy took the village of Lypny (3 kilometres northeast of Konotop) and set up his camp there, which he even began to fortify. On April 29, he advanced towards Konotop with several Russian regiments and sent envoys to Hulianytsky with a letter in which he suggested that negotiations should be held. Hulianytsky, however, replied to this suggestion with rifle fire, and Trubetskoy soon withdrew with his regiments to his camp near Lypny and during the next few days did not undertake any important operations.

**The Ukrainian army.** In the spring of 1659, Vyhovsky was waiting for help from the Crimean Tatars, that is to say from their light cavalry. He had secured the Western frontier of Ukraine against Poland by the above-mentioned treaty of Hadiach, which after some hesitation was also ratified by the Polish-Lithuanian Sejm (Parliament)<sup>8</sup>. Strategically important districts were already being covered by individual Cossack detachments which were carrying on vanguard combats with the Russians; thus, the above-mentioned Colonel Petro Doroshenko and his troops confronted the main forces of Trubetskoy near the village of Sribne, Colonel Vasyl Zolotarenko was carrying out operations in the region of Borzna, whilst Danylo Vyhovsky, the brother of the Hetman, and Pavlo Khmelnytsky were blockading Sheremetev's troops and the strong Russian garrison in Kyiv. In addition, various Cossack detachments were endeavouring—with considerable success—to liquidate Russian garrisons in some of the smaller towns of Ukraine; and the strategically and economically important town of Nizhyn (about half-way between Konotop and Kyiv) was recaptured by the Cossacks.

### **The Siege of Konotop**

From the Cossacks who belonged to the garrison in Konotop and were taken prisoner by the Russians, Trubetskoy learned that the

<sup>8</sup> On the strength of this treaty a Polish detachment was also placed at the disposal of the Hetman; and it actually took part in the campaign of 1659, but since its numbers were only small, its significance was symbolical rather than military.

town was garrisoned with the regiments from Chernihiv and Nizhyn, namely a total of 4 000 Cossacks. The news that the garrison was only manned by such a small number prompted Trubetskoy to try to take Konotop by means of a surprise attack, in order to wipe out this base of the enemy with one blow, as it were.

On the morning of May 5, 1659, several Russian regiments advanced as far as the ramparts of Konotop, filled them up with earth, set fire to one of the main towers on the walls of the town, and, in a mass assault—allegedly more than 10 000 infantry, stormed the town. Hulianytsky assembled all his forces and directed them against the enemy's break-through. He encircled most of the Russian troops that had invaded the town and annihilated them completely; after fierce fighting which lasted until the evening, Trubetskoy withdrew the rest of his troops which had suffered heavy losses.

Next day, Hulianytsky attacked the Russian troops, which were still in confusion after their failure of the day before, inflicted heavy losses on them and destroyed part of the camp and the ammunition depot there. Thereupon, Trubetskoy refrained from carrying out another attack; only individual skirmishes and sorties on the part of the Cossacks occurred during the siege. The Russians, however, busily continued improving and extending the siege-works and siege-engines. On July 9, Hulianytsky carried out a successful surprise attack on the siege lines, destroyed the siege-engines and retired to the fortress again, unmolested.

On the same day, Trubetskoy learned that Vyhovsky's main forces were approaching Konotop and that the Tatar cavalry would be likely to come to the help of the Hetman in a short time. Trubetskoy now gave up the idea of storming Konotop and began to make preparations for a large-scale thrust towards the south. It was his intention to cut off the Tatars from Vyhovsky's forces, defeat them and then proceed to carry out an attack against Vyhovsky's Cossack regiments. But this plan failed. Hardly had Trubetskoy's troops begun to move in a southerly direction from Konotop, when they already encountered the Ukrainian vanguard. Vyhovsky's army, together with the Tatar troops, was already drawn up in readiness for action on the southern bank of the River Sosnivka, 15 kilometres away from Konotop.

The information which Trubetskoy had received about the Tatar troops was undoubtedly true, but it was already out-of-date, for they had already joined up with the main forces of Vyhovsky on July 4, near the town of Smila. On the same day, the Tatars, together with the Cossacks, had encircled an advanced battalion of the Russian cavalry near Shapovalivka and had annihilated it so completely that not a single Russian had managed to get back to the Russian headquarters in order to inform Trubetskoy about the Hetman's advance. Vyhovsky's operational plan, incidentally, consisted in taking the Russian army by surprise, and he had certainly succeeded in doing so.

Some sources state that the Tatar cavalry was 30 000 strong. In that case Vyhovsky's forces with 16 000 Cossacks and several thousand Polish and Moldavian auxiliary troops would have numbered about 50 000,—at any rate, far less than the Russian forces. In reality, however, Vyhovsky's forces were in all probability far less in number. The armies of the Crimean Tatars, in so far as they operated outside the Crimea, never numbered more than 10 000 cavalry (and only cavalry); as a rule, they only numbered 2 000 to 5 000. The fact must be stressed that the numerical strength of the Tatar armies is usually exaggerated very considerably in all Christian sources, since this was flattering both to the allies of the Tatars and to their enemies: the allies could in this way scare their enemies, whilst the latter could in this way either glorify their victory, or else excuse their defeat. Under Tatar rule the Crimea had neither sufficient population nor sufficient means for waging war to send more than 10 000 cavalry into battle at the same time<sup>9</sup>).

### The Battle of Konotop

The terrain which had been chosen by Vyhovsky for the pitched battle was a wide plain south of Konotop, which was marshy and consisted of meadows and swamps, through which a small river, the Sosnivka flowed, which separated the positions of his troops from those of the Russians.

The Ukrainian army was set up according to the old traditional battle orders: in the centre the main forces under the command of Stepan Hulianytsky, a brother of the commandant of Konotop, on the right flank, as usual, the light cavalry of the Tatars under the command of their tribal prince, Makhmed Girey, in a covered spot about 8 kilometres away from the Ukrainian main forces, and on the left flank, the famous Cossack colonel, Ivan Bohun, whose troops lay in hiding in the thicket which stretched away to the west.

On the morning of July 7, Vyhovsky with part of the Cossack cavalry and Tatar troops (under the command of sub-commander-in-chief Nureddin) attacked a Russian camp which had been pitched not far from Konotop, namely the camp of Prince Pozharsky. The Hetman set fire to the camp, captured a large number of horses and then withdrew again to his positions south of the River Sosnivka.

On the morning of the next day, July 8, Pozharsky, with practically the whole of the Russian cavalry—they are said to have numbered about 30 000, proceeded to advance towards Vyhovsky's central positions. Unmolested by the enemy, he crossed the plain, manned the bridge over the River Sosnivka and pitched his camp on the southern bank. There were now no terrain obstacles between the two armies in the central battle-sector. Trubetskoy and his second-in-command, Romodanovsky, with the main body of their infantry

<sup>9</sup>) For further details in this respect (as well as on the strategy and tactics of the Crimean Tatars in general) see the author's work "The Battles of Khmelnytsky" ("Boyi Khmel'nyts'koho," Munich, 1955).

likewise followed in the wake of Pozharsky's cavalry; they did not, however, cross the river, but began to entrench themselves on the northern bank. The only troops which had been left behind under the fortifications of Konotop were reserve troops, small barrage detachments and camp personnel.

Vyhovsky let his Cossack cavalry dash against Pozharsky's Russian cavalry and hastily retreat again after a short combat. These tactics on the part of Vyhovsky led the Russian commanders to assume that the Hetman wanted to evade a decisive battle with the Russian army because of the latter's numerical superiority. Accordingly, Trubetskoy decided to start a general attack (which, in all probability, had previously not been planned).

Whilst the whole of Pozharsky's cavalry, covered by part of the Russian artillery, advanced, the Cossack troops—under the command of Bohun—on the Ukrainian left flank rapidly moved forward in the thicket, unnoticed, seized the bridge over the River Sosnivka, destroyed it and dammed up the river as best as they could. It now overflowed its banks and flooded a large expanse of the low-lying marshy terrain. Thereupon, Bohun's cavalry, skirting the Russian right flank in a wide sweep, attacked the Russian camp, captured a large number of prisoners and caused chaos.

Pozharsky realized the danger of his position: his right flank had been out-flanked and the terrain was rapidly becoming more and more soggy and impassable for the Russian heavy cavalry. He thus gave orders to retreat, but his troops were attacked from the right with heavy rifle fire by Bohun's infantry. The Russian cavalry was thrown into confusion; it retreated in chaos and floundered in the swamps. At the same time, the Ukrainian main forces in the centre and the Tatars on the right flank launched a mass counter-attack. The Russian main forces, which were still posted north of the River Sosnivka under the command of Trubetskoy and Romodanovsky, were unable to come to Pozharsky's aid since they were unexpectedly attacked from the rear: Hryhoriy Hulianytsky, the commandant of Konotop, assembled all the men and material that were still available after the two months' siege and boldly made a mass sortie.<sup>10)</sup>

Pozharsky's cavalry was thus left to fend for itself; it got stuck in the swamps, was encircled and completely annihilated. Its commanders, Prince Pozharsky, Prince Lvov and Prince Cherkassky, were taken prisoner. When held responsible for the devastation, atrocities and mass murders perpetrated by their troops on Ukrainian soil, they justified themselves with the following words: "God will find those who are to blame, and the army must be rewarded and entertained for its efforts in the campaign." The Cossacks, who were disgusted at such cynicism, thereupon tried them before a Ukrainian regimental court martial, which sentenced them on the spot and had them executed.

<sup>10)</sup> They only numbered 2 500 men altogether. The fact that this courageous force, in spite of its small number, managed to engage the Russian main forces by its determined attack, incidentally proves that the latter were not immeasurably large.



After Pozharsky's cavalry had been completely annihilated, the Ukrainian main forces crossed the River Sosnivka and launched an attack against the troops of Trubetskoy and Romodanovsky. These were now attacked from all sides: in the rear by Hulianytsky and the units of the Konotop garrison, on the right by Bohun's forces, whose rifle fire had brought about the defeat of Pozharsky<sup>11</sup>), on the left by the Tatar troops, and in front by those of the Hetman. After the Russians had suffered considerable losses, their remnants fled in the direction of Putyvl and tried to ward off the enemy, who for three whole days pursued them. The Ukrainian agents of the Russians—Bezpal, Barabash and Voronko—likewise fled with the Russian remnants.

### The Consequences of the Battle of Konotop

The annihilation of the best Russian troops caused somewhat of a panic in Moscow<sup>12</sup>). If Vyhovsky had larger forces at his disposal, he might perhaps actually venture to continue the war on Russian soil, although in that case he would have to leave behind in Ukraine and, in particular, in Kyiv, considerable enemy forces<sup>13</sup>). But the machinations of the Hetman's political enemies amongst the Ukrainians themselves, that is of the supporters of Moscow, were far more dangerous. Whilst Bezpal appeared once more in the Zaporogian Sich and began to recruit troops to fight against the Hetman, Sirko, another leader of the Zaporogian Cossacks, undertook a marauding raid against the Crimean Tatars, the Hetman's allies, who, in order to protect their own country against complete devastation, hastily withdrew practically all their troops from the Hetman's army. Thus, a Ukrainian offensive against the tsarist realm (provided that there had been any plan to carry out such an offensive) was rendered completely impossible: the Hetman's forces, even including the Polish auxiliary troops, which were by no means numerous, hardly sufficed to keep the growing ferment in Ukraine in check, and then only for a short time. The epoch which Ukrainian historians describe as the era of great ruin now began.<sup>14</sup>)

11) "The infantry of the Cossacks destroyed the enemy's cavalry with its rifle fire"—thus I. Kholmsky sums up the course of the battle (*loc. cit.*, p. 225).

12) "It was the first time that the Russian army, after years of victories, had suffered such a blow. The feeling of alarm was so great that the Tsar gave orders that Moscow was to be protected with new fortifications: it was feared that the Ukrainian army might attack the Russian capital. There were rumours that the Tsar's court was to withdraw far eastwards, beyond the River Volga" (I. Kholmsky, *ibid.*, p. 225).

13) "A Cossack corps, under the command of Danylo Vyhovsky (the brother of the Hetman), proceeded to Kyiv in order to attack and destroy the Russian garrison there... But the Russian commandant of Kyiv, Sheremetev, was informed of this plan in time; he advanced to meet the Cossacks with his troops and inflicted a considerable defeat on them near Kyiv" (I. Kholmsky, *ibid.*, p. 224).

14) The political events which immediately followed the victory of Konotop are summed up as follows by I. Kholmsky: "Hetman Vyhovsky was unable to use his victory to advantage: an opposition, organized by Colonel Ivan Bezpal with the help of the Russian commanders, was set up against him. Vyhovsky was reproached with introducing Polish rule anew. Great discontent was aroused by the appearance of Polish troops who robbed the population. A revolt on the part of the people

### Military Comments

The battle of Konotop can be regarded as a striking example of the classical strategical and tactical school of the great Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. This school consisted of Khmelnytsky's senior officers, the participators in his great victories, including Vyhovsky.

We have already related above how Vyhovsky, who could not venture to undertake an open counter-offensive against the Russian forces since they were superior in number, managed to conceal his advance from the enemy, to engage the latter's main forces in Konotop and wear them down by a two-months' unsuccessful siege of a comparatively unimportant base, and, above all, to force the enemy to fight on a terrain which was extremely unfavourable for him. Compared to these tactics, the strategy and tactics of the Russian commanders seem, indeed, extremely primitive and directed solely towards carrying out a frontal mass attack, which, incidentally, only partly materialized: after its initial sham victory, Pozharsky's cavalry lost touch with the Russian main forces and the annihilation of this elite of the Russian army decided the defeat of Trubetskoy in advance, whilst the latter did not resort to any measures worth mentioning in order to come to the aid of his vanguard.

Vyhovsky, on the other hand, used his best troops—Bohun's Cossack regiments and the light cavalry of the Tatars—to advantage in a masterly way, inasmuch as they operated on both flanks in keeping with their arms, decimated the Russian cavalry by the rifle-fire of the Cossack infantry and the volley of arrows of the Tatars, and, thereupon, immediately caused confusion amongst Trubetskoy's infantry by cavalry attacks from both flanks.

And the fact that the comparatively weak garrison of Konotop made its unexpected sortie at the right time and in the right place in order to throw the Russian high command into confusion, does not by any means appear to have been a coincidence, but is, rather, proof of a well-organized tactical co-ordination.

On the other hand, however, Vyhovsky did not assign any complicated tactical operations to the main body of his infantry (in the central positions) and obviously spared it until the frontal general attack on the enemy, who by that time was already disorganized and beaten psychologically. Thus, this part of the Ukrainian army, which was probably numerically the strongest, but qualitatively weaker than the other forces, was actually given the role of a tactical general reserve force.

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against the landowners now began; one of its victims was Yuriy Nemyrych (one of the closest advisers of Vyhovsky), who was killed by peasant rebels not far from the town of Nizhen. The horrors of civil war began to make themselves felt once again. "One village wages war against another, sons wage war against their fathers and fathers against their sons; Babylonian chaos and confusion prevail," one eye-witness wrote. Moscow used this state of affairs to advantage. Trubetskoy assembled his regiments again, marched into Central Ukraine and seized one town after another. Vyhovsky retreated beyond the River Dnieper, tried to put up a resistance, but failed to win over any more supporters for his policy and finally abdicated in October 1659" (ibid., p. 225).

The rapid damming up of the River Sosnivka by Bohun's Cossacks is, of course, a masterpiece in tactics, and it is extremely regrettable that our historical sources do not give us any further details regarding this unusual operation, which from the point of view of military technique can indeed be regarded as unique in a pitched battle.

Summing up, one can affirm that the Ukrainian victory at Konotop is a model example of strategy and tactics, not only in the 17th century but also at all times, namely in two respects: both as regards the optimum use of the special terrain and also as far as the masterly co-ordination of the different arms of the troops, in particular the fire-arms of the infantry and the light cavalry is concerned.<sup>15)</sup>

In conclusion, the fact should also be stressed that there is a certain similarity between the battle of Konotop and the famous victory of Hannibal at Cannae (216 B.C.), in so far as in both cases the side which was numerically weaker succeeded in hedging in the enemy on both flanks with the light cavalry and attacking him from the rear, too, which resulted in huge losses and complete defeat for the enemy.<sup>16)</sup>

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<sup>15)</sup> It is interesting to note, however, that neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians were able to make much use of the field artillery available on both sides. And the heavy artillery of the Russians intended for the siege was not even used to protect the Russian camp.

<sup>16)</sup> The battle of Konotop is also a model example of a victory which, in consequence of internal—namely social—differences in the victor's camp, had practically no political results at all. In his very thorough analysis, "The Diversion of the Koshovy (i.e. the commander-in-chief of the Zaporogian Cossacks) Barabash," the promising Ukrainian historian, Dr. Mykola Fil, writes as follows: "From the accession to power of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky onwards, the antagonism between the ruling upper class of the Cossacks and the so-called common people increased still more than had been the case during the latter years of Hetman Khmelnytsky. The reason lay in the people's hatred and anger towards the ruling upper class which held important posts in the administration of the state and, at the same time, endeavoured to seize possession of even more landed property and make both the farmers and the lower class Cossacks servile. Whereas the ruling upper class—in keeping with the traditions of this age—regarded this kind of policy as a perfectly natural thing and even the Hetman himself could not visualize any other solution of this problem, the lower classes of the population refused to accept this policy since it was a direct contradiction of their own interests.—This antagonism was used to advantage by Moscow, which furthered it still more, on the one hand by supporting the claims of the ruling upper class of the Cossacks to landed property and feudal rights against the peasantry, and, on the other hand, by assuming the role of an alleged protector of the "common people" who were being disparaged by the ruling upper class. The Tsar presented the relations of the Hetman and various other high Ukrainian dignitaries with large estates in Ukraine—and, incidentally, these presents were usually kept a secret from the lower class Cossacks; in this way the Russian government intended to win over the most influential Cossack commander and, at the same time, curb their urge to complete national independence, apparent in those days, as far as possible... On the other hand, however, Moscow carried on a large-scale agitation amongst the Ukrainian population, mainly amongst the peasants and lower class Cossacks, by inciting them to revolt against the Hetman and in particular against the Cossack ruling upper class. Agents were sent to Ukraine, who practically openly exhorted the people to revolt inasmuch as they tried to discredit the foreign policy of the Hetman and, at the same time, endeavoured to persuade the common people that they would be far better off under the voivodes (governors) of the Tsar than under the Hetmanate ("Dyversiya koshovoho Barabasha"—*Schlahk Peremohy*, Munich, 1959, No. 3 and 5).

Vera Rich

## Two Poems of Hetman Ivan Mazepa

In these two poems, which are attributed by tradition to Hetman Ivan Mazepa, we find a picture of the fate of Ukraine, oppressed and over-run by her enemies, and a deep sense of desolation, that can only come from a heart filled with love for Ukraine and her people. In the first, we see the historical cause of the final defeat of the Hetmanate—the conflicts between leaders, ever since the time of the battle of Zhovti Vody (the "Yellow Waters"), the indecision, whether to turn to the Poles, the Turks or the Muscovites for help, and the lack of united effort. In "Woe to the Lapwing," the theme is treated symbolically: there is no hint now of political intrigue, and the oppression of Ukraine is treated in a universal and timeless manner. On the steppe—"the worn pathway" by which so many invading tribes and armies have entered Europe, is the lapwing—Ukraine—whose nest is plundered. The Chumaks, historically, were the salt-traders whose caravan-route crossed the Ukrainian steppes; here they symbolize all those invading armies that have crossed and recrossed the soil of Ukraine.

We find, in these poems, a deep concern with the tragic fate of Ukraine, and a haunting sense of loss that catches perfectly the poet's desolation. It is, perhaps, impossible to know whether these poems are, in fact, the work of Mazepa; what we can say however, is that the author of these poems, had a love for his country and concern for her welfare as deep as the love and concern felt by the great Hetman, and that, a century before the "Eneida" of Kotlyarevs'kyj marks the official beginning of modern Ukrainian literature, we find in these poems a foretaste of the deep patriotism fused with high poetic art that reaches its perfection in the work of Shevchenko and Franko.

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A note on the translation. The present version reproduces the rhythm, and, broadly speaking, the rhyme-scheme, of the original. The language of the poem is rich in archaic words and forms, and I have therefore introduced one or two archaisms in the translation, to indicate the effect which the original produces on a modern Ukrainian reader.

## Hetman Ivan Mazeppa

## WOE TO THE LAPWING

Ah, woe to the lapwing,  
The lapwing unhappy,  
Who reared up her lapwing-chicks  
By the worn pathway.  
And then came the chumaks,  
And gay was their singing;  
They drove off the mother,  
And stole the young lapwings.  
The lapwing wheels round,  
Beats the track with her wingtips,  
She falls on the moist earth,  
Imploring the chumaks:  
"Ah you, you kind chumaks  
You're young still, and kindly,  
Give back my young lapwings,  
For they are still tiny!"  
"Ah you, you kind chumaks  
Should ne'er know good fortune,  
Since all my dear chicks  
From the nest you have taken."

## MEDITATION

All hearts long for peace, yet never  
With one effort pull together;  
Rightwards, this one; left, another;  
All the time—this marvel, brothers!  
Love there is no more, nor concord,  
Since the time of Zhovti-Vody.  
In this discord, all have perished,  
Their own efforts left them vanquished.  
It is time to know, my brothers,  
Not for all to rule o'er others,  
Not for all to know all matters,  
And direct affairs and actions.  
Look upon the ship, consider  
All the people sailing in her;  
One alone, the helmsman, steers her,  
Guides the whole ship with his tiller.  
The poor hive-bee has a queen-bee  
Whose commands she honours only,

Pity, Lord, our Ukraina,  
For her sons stand not together!  
One is dwelling with the heathen,  
He cries out: "This way, good leaders!  
To our Mother's rescue hasten,  
Lest she perish all unaided!"

One for Polish cash is serving,  
—For Ukraine he too is yearning:  
"Thou old Mother, dear-beloved,  
Why so wondrously enfeebled?  
They dismembered you, by ceding  
To the Turks, as far as Dnipro,  
Ever weakening the fortress,  
Till, at last, all power has vanished."

And the third pays Moscow fealty,  
And he serves her with all loyalty,  
And he blames and scolds his Mother,  
Cursing fortune's evil favour;  
"Not to have been born were better  
Than to live in misery ever!  
From all sides they have beset us,  
Fire and sword their plundering weapons."

No-one shows you any honour,  
No-one gives you any favour,  
"Peasant-clods" the name they gave you,  
Threatening that they'd enslave you.  
Why did you not teach your brothers?  
Let them leave you, serve with others?  
Better to have made a struggle  
To repel this bitter trouble."

I, alone, cannot withstand it,  
Poor and weak, I can but clamour:  
"Noble Generals, come, rouse ye!  
Why, sirs, have you grown so drowsy?  
And you Colonels, noble war-men,  
Leave your politics, forget them!  
One and all, join hands together,  
Do not let our dearest Mother  
Longer bear this grim tormenting!  
On and fight; the foe is waiting!  
Prime your fire-arms for their labours,  
Draw unsheathed your sharp-edged sabres,  
Die, then, for your faith, if need be,  
Steadfastly defend your freedom!  
Let this glory shine forever:  
Rights were won by swords' endeavour!"

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Prince Jan Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz

## THE BATTLE OF POLTAVA

(Conclusion)

Hetman Mazeppa left Borzna on October 23, 1708. He thereupon spent a day in Baturyn, the town in which his residence was located, and then, on October 25, crossed the River Seym and halted his troops in the village of Orlivka where the vanguard of the Swedish cavalry, headed by the colonels Helm and Gyllenström, was already stationed. On October 28, he reached Horky where, for the first time, he met Charles.

To judge from the sources available, this meeting was carried out with all the ceremonial that was customary in Europe in those days when two sovereigns met; and this fact alone surely proves that those historians are mistaken, who affirm that the actual conclusion of the alliance between Charles and Mazeppa only took place after the Swedes had marched into Ukraine.

### Mazeppa and Charles XII

In his despatches to France, Stanislas Leszczynski stated that he had been in contact with Hetman Mazeppa since 1703. On the strength of the documents in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this same year is also mentioned by the French historian and official of the said Ministry, Joseph Castanier (A. Tarné). At that time Leszczynski was not yet King of Poland, but this fact does not detract from the credibility of the above-mentioned date, since his long-standing friendly private relations with Mazeppa are also known from other sources. It is likewise an established fact that these relations, fostered and extended through the mediation of Princess Dolska and the Catholic priest Zaleski, at a fairly early date assumed a definitely political character and that they eventually led to the alliance between the Hetman and Charles XII, the ally of the newly elected King of Poland, Stanislas Leszczynski. This alliance, at least as regards its basic terms, must have been concluded a long time before 1708 and kept a secret from the Russians.

As was already mentioned previously, the delays and defeats suffered by Charles XII caused him to abandon the original route of his campaign to Smolensk and Moscow and to veer south, to Ukraine, which was by no means in keeping with Mazeppa's plans, since in this way large Russian troops were inevitably bound to be concentrated on Ukrainian territory, whereas an advance eastwards on the part of Charles would have caused even those Russian detachments to leave Ukraine which were stationed there as scattered garrisons under the command of the governor-general ("voivode"), Prince Dmitriy Golitsyn. But in any case the alliance with Sweden — as Mazeppa's successor, Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, later affirmed in his treatise "The Carrying into Effect of the Claims of Ukraine", written in exile, — guaranteed the independent sovereignty of reunited Ukraine under the joint military protection of Sweden and Poland; relations with Poland were, on the whole, to conform to the Polish-Ukrainian federation tractate of Hadiach (1658), whose authors — in addition to the Hetman at that time, Ivan Vyhovsky (1657-1659) — also included a relative of Mazeppa's, the outstanding Ukrainian statesman, Yuriy Nemyrych, and possibly Mazeppa's father, too.

For this reason, Mazeppa received his Swedish ally in Horky as an independent sovereign, surrounded by the highest dignitaries of the Cossack state and, as Pushkin depicts the scene in his poem "Poltava", "in front of the cavalry lines, to the accompaniment of the martial beat of drums and the shout of welcome in front of the standard and the Hetman's staff of the ruler of Little Russia<sup>1</sup>), whilst "the bold Charles, crowned with useless fame, moved over a chasm."

At that time, however, there was no "chasm" as yet to be noticed. It is true that the Swedish army which entered Ukraine had endured considerable hardships, but it was still strong and was, moreover, trained in warfare. The young King was full of energy and had a number of outstanding generals to advise him. Moreover, there was every hope of help from Poland (8,000 Swedes under General Krassau and over 12,000 Poles under the magnates Visnio-wiecki, Sapieha and Jozef Potocki) and also from Sweden, where new troops numbering 17,000 had been called up.

The ceremonial of this first meeting between Mazeppa and Charles XII (incidentally, the Hetman remained seated when he received the King) completely refutes the tendentious accounts to the effect that the Swedes had distrusted Mazeppa, had been surprised at the small number of troops accompanying him and had



surrounded him with their guards not so much as a mark of respect, but, rather, in order to control his activity.

A year earlier, in September 1707, Mazeppa in his secret despatches to the Swedes had persistently expressed the opinion that Charles should proceed to Smolensk as soon as possible and from there eastwards; since, as he affirmed, in that case it could be hoped that only very few Russian troops would remain in Ukraine and that he, Mazeppa, would then be able to assemble most of the Cossack regiments in Central Ukraine; the reserve collected in Baturyn, his residence, would then ensure the victory of the entire campaign. But Mazeppa was not able to realize this plan, even though his attitude to Charles XII and to Stanislas Leszczynski was sincere and conscientious; the Ukrainian army had remained scattered, since the Tsar demanded the transfer of more and more new Cossack contingents to the central front or to the north; the two Cossack regiments under Omelchenko and Tansky which were distributed along the western bank of the Dnipro and the cavalry regiment of mercenaries under Burlay could not be moved to the east bank of the Dnipro since their progress was impeded by the Russian garrisons in Kyiv, Pereyaslav, Nizhyn and Hlukhiv. The situation in North Ukraine proved particularly fatal, for here the commandant of Starodub, Ivan Skoropadsky, carried out a secret command of the Hetman, worded in vague terms for reasons of stratagem, quite literally and allowed those troops to enter the towns under his command who "arrived there first", that is to say, in this case the Russian troops, who in this way managed to reach the Swedish marching route at many points before the Swedes themselves.

Hudyma-Levkovych and Kartsov affirmed that Mazeppa reached the Swedish camp with 6.000 Cossacks; on the strength of Swedish and Polish sources, which can, however, only be partly verified, Voltaire gives this number as 5.000; and General Yunakiv maintains that it was only 2.000. The figure given by Lelevel, the Prussian envoy at the court of King August II at that time, however, appears to be the most credible, for, on the strength of the despatches of Stanislas Poniatowski (who had represented King Stanislas Leszczynski in Charles XII's headquarters), he wrote to his government in 1709 as follows: "Mazeppa appeared in the royal Swedish headquarters with his most prominent counsellors and commanders, of whom he had eighteen with him, and with 15.000 cavalry, and was received there with great esteem by His Majesty"<sup>2</sup>).

General Yunakiv is thus wrong when he affirms in his above-mentioned work: "Since he was weak and was involved in a struggle between the two strong powers, Mazeppa sought to save himself and his country, Mother Ukraine, by resorting to cunning and duplicity; he did not want to break with the Tsar, but, at the same time, he also fostered relations with Stanislas". — In view of the situation in general, Mazeppa had no other alternative but to do what he did; his main hope had been that Charles would force the Tsar to engage in a large-scale battle with him somewhere near Smolensk or still further eastwards; and then Ukraine would actually have become free. In the meantime, he had at his disposal (in addition to the Cossacks who had accompanied him to the Swedish headquarters) Annenkov's brigade (8,000 men) in Baturyn, as well as about 5,000 men in various places; and the Cossack regiments of Chernihiv, Starodub and Nizhyn, whom General Yunakiv describes as the "most disciplined", had been withdrawn to the north at the Tsar's command. It is therefore not correct to allege that Mazeppa "did not cease to vacillate" (M. Yunakiv); he simply saw himself confronted by insurmountable obstacles which made the realization of his plan impossible.

The fact that he went over to the side of the Swedes resulted, in the opinion of the Russians, in an "unforeseen confusion" (to quote the expression used by contemporaries), and if Charles had not missed his opportunity near Novhorod Siversky, but had marched to Baturyn with the Hetman and his troops, the entire campaign would have taken a far more favourable turn for Sweden and, in particular, for Ukraine. It seems to have been proved with a large degree of certainty that the chief blame for this fateful error — namely, that the Swedes did not immediately hasten to help Baturyn — lay with the Hetman himself.

#### Russian Counter-Measures

There can be no denying the fact that Peter I and his forces acted with considerable vigour. Baturyn was taken by storm as a result of the treachery of an official, Kandyba, and the Cossack officer, Nos, and was ruthlessly devastated, Ukraine was severed in two by the rapid advance of the Russian along the Dniro, and the Cossack regiments and the chief Cossack towns were encircled by Russian troops. For instance, Colonel von Pfelenheim entered the town of Starodub with his Novgorod (i. e. a North Russian) infantry regiment and 400 dragoons and, in this way, forced the

Cossack regiments of Nizhyn and Pereyaslav to surrender. Colonel Kelen seized the fortress and town of Poltava, together with all the supplies stored there, and, subsequently, at the nearest ferry across the Dnipro, in Perevolochna, had all the ships, barges, ferry-boats and other means of transport, which had collected there, set on fire. In Kyiv, the Russian governor-general, Prince D. Golitsyn, with 2,000 infantry forced two Cossack regiments and a cavalry regiment of mercenaries to remain on the west bank of the Dnipro, whilst the Hetman was waiting and hoping for their arrival.

Charles XII was in Ukraine nine months and during that time undertook one campaign to extreme East Ukraine (Slobozhanshchyna, the present region of Kharkiv); but all his campaigns and the Russian counter-moves resemble a tactical game rather than a proper campaign: as soon as the Swedes and Mazepa's Cossacks advanced, the Russians hastily retreated, and as soon as the former remained stationary, the Russians veered round and tried — frequently with success — to annihilate small detachments of the enemy. At the same time, however, the Tsar launched a huge propaganda campaign and equally extensive measures of repression against the Ukrainian "rebels"; not only were the adherents of Mazepa persecuted in a most ruthless way, but the wives and families of the more prominent Cossack officers were arrested as hostages and imprisoned. The military court set up in the Tsar's headquarters in Lebedyn sentenced thousands of Ukrainians to death, mainly persons belonging to the higher social classes, — Cossack officers, aristocracy, wealthy citizens and even members of the clergy. In Hlukhiv, the Cossack representatives who had been forced to assemble by threats, were ordered to elect a new Hetman and it was stressed that they should chose the commandant of Starodub, Ivan Skoropadsky, who, though he had been a supporter and a personal friend of Hetman Mazepa, seemed to the Tsar to be less dangerous than the latter because of his indecision and his irresolute character; and, indeed, he was elected on the spot. At the same time, Hetman Mazepa, at the Tsar's orders, was declared a "renegade" because of his alliance with the Swedish Lutheran "heretics"<sup>33</sup>) and was "anathematized", i. e. excommunicated from the Greek Orthodox Church and solemnly cursed by the priests in all the churches.

The effect of this wave of terrorism was extremely drastic. The population was terrified and people feared for their lives; and it needed great courage and national patriotism to remain loyal to the rightful Hetman, as several of his high-ranking officers and

5.000 Cossacks did, together with 15.000 Zaporogian Cossacks, who, with their "Koshovy" (commander-in-chief) Kost' Hordiyenko, on March 27, 1709, joined forces with Hetman Mazeppa in the village of Mali Budyshchi<sup>4</sup>). Though Mazeppa was deserted by most of his officers and Cossacks, one must, on the other hand, not overlook the fact that in those Cossack regiments, too, which had been forced to fight on the Tsar's side, a large number of men also deserted. At the beginning of 1709, the Zaporogians inflicted a heavy defeat on a large Russian battalion (under the command of General Schaumburg). And on the day that Baturyn was taken by storm by the Russians, about 1.000 Cossacks, that is a considerable proportion of the entire garrison, managed to get through the enemy's lines.

It can thus be seen that up to the battle of Poltava the supporters of Ukrainian independence in no way lost heart or courage, and, accordingly, the Hetman had no reason to regard his cause as lost, even though the whole of Ukraine east of the River Dniπρο for over half a year was a theatre of war, and even though the campaign in question against the Russians to a considerable extent wore down both the Swedes and the Ukrainians, — the latter in particular, since they were, on the one hand, obliged to undertake the supplying of the Swedish army with provisions, and, on the other hand, to conduct a civil war against their own fellow-countrymen, who were forced to fight on the side of the Tsar against the rightful Hetman.

### **The Battle and its Consequences**

After Charles XII had been obliged to break off his winter campaign in East Ukraine mainly for climatic reasons after an indecisive battle at Krasny Kut, he began his siege — in the early summer of 1709 — of the town of Poltava, which was fortified by a strong Russian garrison and where the Swedes hoped to find large supplies of every kind<sup>5</sup>). When the position of the fortress became serious, the bulk of the Russian army advanced to help it. Although the forces of the Tsar were three times as numerous and better equipped than the Swedish-Ukrainian troops (which, for instance, had little field artillery), the command of the latter nevertheless decided to start an offensive battle against the Russians; the main reason for this decision seems to have lain in the fact that over 10.000 Kalmucks (irregular cavalry) were to join the Russian within the next few days, which would have made the already existing Russian superiority as regards cavalry overwhelming.

A particularly bad omen for the battle was the fact that Charles, whom his troops were used to seeing in their front ranks, on this occasion, that is to say on the eve of the battle, during a somewhat rash reconnaissance ride was wounded in the leg by an enemy bullet and was obliged to drive round the battle-field in an open vehicle. And Mazeppa at the time was suffering from an attack of gout, which, however, he tried to overcome manfully.

The battle began on July 8th (June 27th according to the old calendar). The Swedish army, which on the battle-field only numbered 18,000 combatants, with very little artillery, was confronted by 56,000 Russians (and Cossacks loyal to the Tsar), with 72 cannon<sup>6</sup>), who were carefully entrenched in a compact and otherwise favourable position between the River Vorsklo and a large forest (behind the village of Yatskiivtsi). A further 8,000 Swedish soldiers had been left behind beneath the walls of Poltava as defensive troops against the Russian garrison there, as well as the Zaporogian Cossacks, who, in addition, together with smaller Swedish detachments, guarded the communication lines along the River Vorsklo as far as the banks of the Dniro.

The Swedes began to concentrate their troops during the night. The King entrusted Field Marshal Roenskiöld with the supreme command and, to begin with, confined himself to driving up and down in front of his regiments and reviewing the battle from his vehicle. At the beginning of the battle the Swedish cavalry under General Schlippenbach scored such a success that the latter requested the supreme command to let all the cavalry that was still available follow him, since he would then be able to repel the entire Russian front from the flank. But as the result of a quarrel regarding their competence between Field Marshal Roenskiöld and General Loewenhaupt, General Schlippenbach was not given any reinforcements worth mentioning, and this provided the Russian Field Marshal Menshikov (the all-powerful favourite of Peter I) with a favourable opportunity to drive Schlippenbach's cavalry back into the forest and to take Schlippenbach himself prisoner. Mazeppa's Cossacks had little share in all these incidents, since they were distributed on both Swedish flanks. The Swedish cavalry which had been driven back into the forest was no longer in formation, and General Rosen, as well as the King personally, hastened to restore order amongst them and to re-group them.

At 9 o'clock the Tsar moved the bulk of his infantry and gave orders that his artillery was to fire on the second line of the Swedish

regiments. The King's vehicle caught fire and the horses and twenty men of the Life Guards were killed. The King had to be dragged out from under the carcasses of the horses, and the rumour rapidly spread that he had been killed or fatally wounded; however, he had himself carried about on a stretcher amongst the Swedish infantry, which attacked the Russian entrenchments again and again and, to begin with, namely under the command of General Count Sparre, achieved considerable successes. But Menshikov ordered the entire Russian cavalry of the left flank (including a number of Cossack regiments who were loyal to the Tsar) to carry out a mass attack, which was so well-calculated that the entire Swedish right flank was overthrown and most of the Swedish cavalry detachments were encircled and forced to surrender. Thereupon, the Russian cavalry attacked the Swedes and the Zaporogian Cossacks who had remained behind beneath the walls of Poltava and either put them to rout or captured them.

Towards noon, panic began to spread in the Swedish middle sector, too, which was exposed to incessant and heavy artillery fire and was attacked again and again by the enemy's forces, which were superior in number. By this time, Charles' best generals had either been killed or been taken prisoner by the enemy, and the battle was thus lost. This catastrophe was in part due to the rumour that the King had either been killed or fatally wounded, and also to differences of opinion among the Swedish commanders, to the poor morale on the part of certain mercenary troops (mainly Roumanian), but, above all, to the terrible losses which the Swedish forces suffered. (if one takes into account the fact that Charles' forces at Poltava numbered about 36,000, it becomes evident that these losses were extremely serious, for 6,000 of his men were killed in action at Poltava, 9,000 were taken prisoner by the enemy and about 3,000 vanished without a trace. One must certainly admire the discipline and determination of the Swedish army, for General Loewenhaupt (whom the King had entrusted with the supreme command after Field Marshal Roenskiöld had been captured by the enemy) nevertheless succeeded, in incessant combat, in leading back the rest of the Swedish army, numbering 14,000 men in effective formation, as far as Perevolochna on the left bank of the Dniro. On this point the Ukrainian historian, Dmytro Doroshenko, writes as follows: "The Swedes lost the battle of Poltava, but the Swedish army was not annihilated. It carried out an orderly retreat as far as the Dniro, — 14,000 strong. Their commander, Loewenhaupt,

must have lost his head completely to have carried out a kind of plebiscite amongst the soldiers as to whether they were to continue fighting or to surrender — and thus cause the army to capitulate before the enemy”).

Voltaire affirms that Charles gave Loewenhaupt permission to surrender “in order to spare the life of his beloved Swedes”; but it seems that Menshikov’s relentless pursuit of the Swedish troops was the main reason for their capitulation.

In any case, the rest of the Swedish army surrendered to the Russians in Perevolochna, after the King had crossed the Dnipro with a small remnant of his troops, in boats and barges; these troops included General Count Sparre, who had been wounded and whom Charles had conveyed in his vehicle, General Nordhausen with several hundred men of the Swedish cavalry, and Hetman Mazeppa with his entire entourage and 2,000 men of the Cossack cavalry (the majority of them presumably Zaporogians). They all proceeded in forced marches towards the south, to the River Boh (Bug) and the Turkish frontier.

And, as Lord Byron so fittingly says:

The power of the war  
Faithless as their vain victories men  
Had pass’d to the triumphant Czar.

General Yunakiv is right when he stresses that “the victory gained by the Russians at Poltava had immeasurable consequences”.

Sweden as a major power collapsed. Poland lost her political power for good and henceforth became the passive target of the foreign policy of her neighbours. Out of the ruins of these two states the new kingdom of Prussia arose, which subsequently assumed the role of a uniter of the German states. But what was more important, however, — from then onwards, Russia penetrated Europe and began to claim a place for herself amongst the European peoples, on whom the pressure of her anti-European influence immediately began to weigh heavily.

It was at this time that the first political emigration from Ukraine commenced. And in Ukraine itself, the internal autonomy and national sovereignty, which Hetman Mazeppa had so zealously fostered and so dearly paid for, gradually disappeared, a process which was finally completed by the forcible dissolution of the Zaporogian Sich and by the subjugation or expulsion of the inhabitants of this last asylum of Cossack freedom for a period of practically one and a half centuries (1775).

### Mazeppa's Spiritual Legacy

When Pyrrhus, the famous King of Epirus, in 279 B. C. defeated the Romans in the battle of Ausculum, this victory cost him so many losses that the term "a Pyrrhic victory" has become a saying. And the death of Leonidas and his 300 Spartans whilst defending the pass of Thermopylae, on the other hand, from being a defeat became a great heroic deed of the Greek nation. Let us now consider the battle of Poltava from this aspect in order to ascertain whether it was historically *only* a military and political catastrophe.

Inasmuch as this momentous Russian victory over the Swedish and Ukrainian forces consolidated Russian rule in Ukraine for two hundred years and conferred on the Russian imperium a patent for the "European element", it also forced Ukrainian national consciousness to recognize rightly the purely colonial character of this rule and to refuse to make any compromises with it. The Ukrainians at this early date began to realize what the West only succeeded in partly realizing very much later, — namely, that the truly barbarous character of Russian despotism is in no way in keeping with the "enlightened absolutism" of the monarchs of the West, who at least in principle are conscious of their social duties and are responsible for their political actions, but, in the first place, constitutes a necessary form of organization of Russian imperial colonialism. The West rightly realized in the middle of the last century that the Russian imperium is a "colossus with feet of clay"; but that the weakness of this colossus lies, above all, not in its social but in its national composition, that is to say in the incompatibility between the Russians themselves and the non-Russian peoples whom they have been exploiting from the colonial aspect since the 15th century, is a fact which the West has so far, up to the present time, for the most part failed to realize.

Why did Ukraine itself not comprehend this fact earlier, that is to say prior to 1709, instead of fostering the illusion of a "brotherly and true" coexistence with Russia, in spite of all the atrocities and treachery of Peter I and his predecessors? Why did not the majority of the Cossacks and the Ukrainian people rally round the old Hetman Mazeppa in order to protect the state rights of the Ukrainian nation by armed force? The reason was that the memory of the long civil war, of the so-called "era of ruin" from Hetman Khmelnytsky's death (1657) onwards until the abdication of Hetman Doroshenko (1676), still weighed heavily on Ukrainian national consciousness in the year 1708-1709. It was only Mazeppa's



initiative and the battle of Poltava that caused Ukrainian patriotism to assume a definite form, freed Ukrainian public opinion from the stupor into which it had been lulled by the disastrous Russian-Ukrainian "union" of Pereyaslav (1654) and sealed Mazeppa's political testament. By his great historical exploit, Mazeppa courageously revived the tradition of an uncompromising struggle for the independence of Ukraine, — a tradition which had fallen into oblivion since the days of Hetman Vyhovsky (1657-1659).

History shows us that Mazeppa was not a political adventurer and that his sole aim was to establish the complete independence of the Ukrainian state. Apart from his constant efforts to prevent the Tsar and the latter's authorized representatives from interfering in the internal affairs of Ukraine, the Hetman was obliged to do what the Russian protectorate over Ukraine, which had been introduced by the unfortunate Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654), demanded of him, namely, in the first place, to place his troops at the disposal of the Tsar, if necessary outside Ukraine and beyond the frontier territories, too. This latter demand greatly angered the people, as did likewise the economic exploitation to which they were subjected, which, incidentally, together with the taxes paid to the Tsar by his own treasury, the Hetman tried to reduce, — with considerable success.

Another serious divergence between the interests of the Russian empire and those of the Hetmanate lay in the question as to whom the Ukrainian territories west of the River Dnipro were to belong, for under the great Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648-1657) they had constituted an organic part of his Cossack state, but during the above-mentioned "era of ruin" after his death they had been recaptured by Poland and, on the strength of the Russian-Polish treaty of Andrusovo (1667), had been ceded to the Polish state. During the Swedish-Russian war (and, to some extent, also previously) they were actually liberated from Polish rule as a result of the military operations of Mazeppa and his commanding officers, but this fact by no means meant their reunification with the Ukrainian Cossack state; for the Tsar naturally did not want the latter to increase in size and strength, nor did he want to become involved in an armed conflict with the Polish supporters of King August II, who had been overthrown by Charles XII, on account of these official "provinces of the kingdom of Poland". And, in any case, the formal right in this respect was his: his supremacy over Ukraine which had been officially recognized by the Hetmanate

allowed him to grant newly conquered Ukrainian territory to whomever he wished.

By his activity, which was in keeping with that of an autonomous ruler, and in particular by military measures against Russian despotism, Hetman Mazeppa clearly showed once and for all the fundamental incompatibility between the Ukrainian national and the Russian imperial interests, — so clearly, in fact, that the idea of Ukrainian independence, which can only be wrested from the Russian imperium by armed force, never again died out, not even during the period when Ukraine was subjected to the most ruthless subjugation. The fact that the majority of the Cossacks did not support Mazeppa (or were unable to do so), that some of his high-ranking officials betrayed him to the Tsar and that they later, after his death, returned from exile and lived under the rule of the Tsar is immaterial; and it is likewise of little significance that individual Ukrainian ideologists and adherents of Russophilism have since then endeavoured to force their unworthy way of thinking on the Ukrainians (and are still trying to do so unsuccessfully, even nowadays); Mazeppa undoubtedly regenerated Ukrainian national feeling and, once and for all, made it a vital force of the invincible resistance of the Ukrainian people against Russian tyranny.

### The Political Atmosphere

It goes without saying that in the course of the Swedish-Russian war the general discontent in Ukraine increased more and more as the pressure of the yoke of Russian rule on the Ukrainian people; the Tsar demanded more and more men for his campaigns, more serfs for the construction of roads, canals and fortresses, and more money to conduct the war. In his poem "Poltava", the famous Russian writer, Alexander Pushkin, with true Russian prejudice, but nevertheless very impressively, depicts the feelings and sentiments of the Ukrainian people at that time<sup>8</sup>):

Ukraine was rebelling in secret silence.  
The spark had been flickering there for long;  
Those who preferred the grim days of yore  
Set their hopes on a national war,  
They grumbled and arrogantly demanded  
The Hetman should unloose their fetters,  
And impatient in their rash enthusiasm  
They waited for Charles to appear.

And all around Mazeppa resounded  
The rebellious cry: "It is time, it is time

Now is the time for us to involve  
Hated Moscow in a war!"

The above-mentioned Ukrainian historian, Dmytro Doroshenko, writes as follows in this connection: "It has, above all, been ascertained that the entire event (the break with Russia) was by no means an individual action on the part of Hetman Mazeppa, allegedly prompted by some personal motive or other: it was a movement of the entire officers' class, which only elevated the Hetman himself as the main representative of this class and as the supreme head of the Ukrainian state"<sup>9</sup>).

For twenty-two years Ivan Mazeppa was the supreme head of the Ukrainian state and endeavoured to administer this office in a way that differed from that of his predecessors; as Hetman he endeavoured to follow the example of the real monarchs of Europe, whether they were elected ones, such as the King of Poland or the German Emperor, or not. And, indeed, Hetman Mazeppa was a true monarch. Under Mazeppa's rule law and order began to prevail at the court of the Hetman in the administration of the Hetmanate; no longer was anything left to chance. He did not declare like Khmelnytsky, intoxicated by success, that he was the "autocrat of the (Cossack) Rus'", but endeavoured to be one in practice, inasmuch as he insisted that the Tsar, through the mediation of his government agent, should only consult him, the Hetman, and that all the state departments should function on a legal basis and should fulfil their tasks in such a way as to further the welfare of the entire state; he saw to it that all matters were conducted at his Hetman's court in Baturyn in the way they should be conducted at the court of a sovereign ruler, who personifies the dignity of his nation; above all, he furthered cultural matters inasmuch as he extended the school system, protected the monasteries, caused churches to be built and decorated in Ukraine and also gave large donations to churches abroad. He is one of the few Ukrainian Hetmans who succeeded in constantly fulfilling the tasks of a "supreme head of the state" and not merely those of a more or less successful commander-in-chief of the Cossacks, who constantly runs the risk of being murdered or overthrown and exiled.

As a result of his loyalty to the Russian government, he had to pay dearly for all this, and when the burden of Russian "protection"

became unbearable, he reacted in the only logical way in which he could have done.

The outstanding Ukrainian historian, Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, stresses that the "alliance between Mazeppa and Charles XII was concluded at a moment that was critical for the Russian government, when the entire political future of the Russian state was at stake and when it was a vital question for this state to forestall the consequences of this alliance, which might provide the Swedish King with a new and very powerful operational basis and Moscow with an extremely dangerous one".

And it was precisely as the supreme head of the Ukrainian state that Mazeppa acted when he detached himself from the Russian "protection", to which he had, in spite of its serious disadvantages, remained loyal for so long, since he hoped, with its help, to realize his plan of the reunification of the Ukrainian territories, which he could, however, only succeed in doing to a very limited extent. In the "Short Explanation of the Reasons which have prompted or, rather, forced Ukraine and the Zaporogian Army to detach themselves from Moscow's Protection" (a treatise which is closely connected with the treatise written by Mazeppa's successor, Hetman Orlyk, whilst in exile) given by the historiographer of the Ukrainian region of Podillia, N. Molchanivsky, all the reproaches against Moscow, it is true, are expressed in a diplomatic tone, as though it were a diplomatic note which had been previously drawn up, but nevertheless candidly and loyally, as in a warning against a declaration of war. Furthermore, Mazeppa in his speech of October 24, 1708, which he held before an audience of high-ranking officials and officers of the army, criticized the despotic rule of Peter I over the Ukrainian people, whom he regarded as a "senseless herd", and added: "And indeed he regards the members of our nation thus, seeing that he received our envoy Voynarovsky, who complained about the countless atrocities and injustices constantly inflicted on our people by the Muscovite army, and requested that the articles of the treaty should be ratified which were concluded at Khmelnytsky's negotiations<sup>10</sup>) and which he has not yet ratified although he should have done so according to these articles, — with blows and arrest and wanted to send him to the gallows, but for the fact that Voynarovsky managed to escape this fate by fleeing." The reason which Mazeppa gives for his decision is his desire "that our descendants, delivered up to slavery by our negligence, should not raise complaint against us and curse us",

and he affirms that the alliance with Charles XII is "merely a continuation of previous alliances, such as are customary amongst all peoples"; and he closes with the words: "What kind of a people are they who do not think of their own advantage and do not forestall an obvious danger? Such a people because of their foolishness do indeed resemble a senseless animal, and are held in contempt by all others"<sup>11</sup>).

On March 26, 1709, Mazeppa was welcomed in Budyshchi by the Koshovy (commander-in-chief) of the Zaporogian Cossacks, with the following words: "... We thank Your Highness that, as befits the supreme leader of Ukraine,... you have set about liberating our native country from Muscovite slavery"; whereupon the Hetman replied: "Concerned about the fate and welfare of Ukraine, I have guided my country to the best of my ability, and since honour and sincere love for Ukraine command me, I cannot sit back idly and leave this country to the arbitrariness of a subjugator".

Mazeppa thus explicitly declared that there was no contradiction between his government of many years' standing and his decision, which the Russians want to have branded as "treason". M. Hrushevsky quite rightly stresses that "from the point of view of Moscow's policy, all the Hetmans were 'traitors'; the entire Ukrainian policy was one long 'high treason' — from the point of view of Muscovite centralism, against which it fought the whole time".

However, as M. Hrushevsky likewise affirms, "the adverse opinion expressed on Mazeppa by Moscow remained a stigma on his name a long time", and for this reason the spiritual legacy which this great Hetman left to the Ukrainian nation has frequently been underrated. V. Lypynsky, for instance, affirms: "For a long time Mazeppa helped Peter I in his revolutionary activity" — of which there is nowhere any evidence; there is only evidence of the fact that Mazeppa endeavoured to prevent all direct interference on the part of Moscow in Ukrainian life, and this he succeeded in doing on several occasions. Whereas Peter I abolished the Moscow Patriarchate, arranged blasphemous "most drunken councils" under the presidency of a "Prince Pope" (who as a rule was a Greek Orthodox priest) and, whenever divine service seemed to him to be too long, gave the priest a beating, even in front of the altar, Mazeppa had churches built and beautified, gave them donations, safeguarded the rights of the clergy and in every way gave evidence

of his religious attitude; and this fact suffices to make one doubt Mazeppa's sympathy for the "revolutionary" activity of Peter I, which in any case is viewed very differently by different historians. Herbst, for instance, in his "Encyclopedia of Modern History" writes: "In spite of all reforms, Peter remained a barbarian in his habits and moral conduct"; and another historian affirms: "Behind Peter the reformer and progressionist there very soon advances into the foreground, like an elementary force, a savage dazzled by the frippery of Western civilization... Peter raises nihilism to the rank of a state institution"<sup>12</sup>).

What, then, could two so different persons have in common? The Hetman was a highly cultured personality and bound by his origin and his education to certain established traditions and to the preservation of the existing order<sup>13</sup>); the Tsar in almost every aspect was the exact opposite! And for this reason it seems extremely rash to talk about "friendly relations" between Mazeppa and Peter I, which "lasted almost 20 years until the time when their ways diverged so widely"<sup>14</sup>). The burden of politics, which both of them bore constantly, was no doubt the only thing that brought them together from time to time. When Mazeppa became Hetman, he inherited from most of his predecessors, from Bohdan Khmelnytsky onwards, the onerous legacy of the Pereyaslav "Articles" and a Russophilism which, for the most part, was insincere. He himself, who was most certainly neither a Russophil in any sense whatever, nor a supporter of unlimited absolutism, and, moreover, was not afraid of the huge material superiority of Russia, fought this Russophilism, and, at the same time, also skilfully used it to advantage. This was inevitably reflected in his policy in the course of the many years during which he ruled as Hetman, and it is precisely this fact which obscures the picture of history. What some historians describe as "friendly relations" with Peter I or as support of the latter's "revolutionary" activity, was to Mazeppa only a bitter necessity, for the price of which he managed to reunite considerable territories in the West (the present districts of Kyiv, East Volhynia and East Podillia) and in the northwest (the district of Chernihiv) with the Cossack state, and also in the east the so-called Slobozhanshchyna (district of Kharkiv), which, it is true, had been resettled by Ukrainians in the 15th and 16th century, but did not belong to the Hetmanate, although there were prospects of it being incorporated by peaceful means in the Hetmanate. When Mazeppa realized, however, that the Tsar was firmly determined<sup>15</sup>)

to abolish the autonomous status of the Hetmanate and that Russia (as Prince A. Golitsyn fittingly commented) after her possible victory of Sweden intended to seize Ukraine without delay, he began to wage a struggle against Russian despotism most consistently<sup>16</sup>).

It is true that in this struggle Russia gained a material victory, but not a spiritual one, especially not as it resorted to the means of ruthless terrorism for the sake of victory. Genuine or supposed adherents of Mazeppa were persecuted, executed or deported to Siberia; their property was confiscated, and attempts were made to sully the memory of Mazeppa or cause it to pass into oblivion.

But however false and cunning Russian propaganda was, it was unable to crush the idea of an independent and reunified Ukraine, and the fact that it cursed this idea only led to the latter spreading still further. In his manifesto, the Tsar stated that Mazeppa had "made an agreement with Sweden and Poland to the effect that Ukraine in both its parts and all the Cossack armies<sup>17</sup>) were to be united as one independent state and that he himself should become the ruler of this state". This, at least, was the truth.

And whilst the head Greek Orthodox hierarchs in Hlukhiv, the headquarters of the Tsar, were excommunicating Mazeppa, prayers were being said for him in scores of churches and monasteries as their founder or benefactor, — from the Domnytsky Monastery in Chernihiv in North Ukraine to the Monastery of Saint Sabbas in Palestine.

A straw effigy representing Mazeppa was tried by court martial in Hlukhiv; it was hanged on the gallows and was decorated with the imaginary insignia of a "Judas Order"; next to the gallows stood the Hetman who had been "newly elected" at the orders of the Tsar, together with his dignitaries, who no doubt were fully aware of the unlawful nature of their own position. And the person who was probably even more aware of it was the new Hetman himself, Ivan Skoropadsky (1708-1722), an old comrade in arms of Mazeppa and likewise a member of the Ukrainian nobility from the districts west of the Dniipro, who for many years was the Hetman's "General-Osaul" (adjutant-general) and was appointed commandant of Starodub by Mazeppa; although he was one of the few people whom Mazeppa had initiated into his secret plans years before, he did not venture to remain Mazeppa's friend and helper, but was obliged to accept the office of Hetman forced on him by the Tsar and spent the rest of his life obediently signing

documents which the Tsar passed on to him through various Russian brigade commanders — his supervisors and "advisers".

Meanwhile, the rightful Hetman, Mazepa, was forced to go into exile, where a few months later (on September 2, 1709) he died in the vicinity of Bendery (in Moldavia, which at that time belonged to Turkey), after the Swedish generals had given him to understand, with a certain cynicism, that they were no longer interested in the future fate of the Cossacks and of Ukraine. But the Mazepa movement continued to live on, as did the ideal which had become part of the Ukrainian nation as a result of Mazepa's action. As long as he ruled, — in fact, as long as he lived, his nation relied on him; and after his death he left the Ukrainian nation an ideal, which, though it was negated and persecuted by the Russian usurper of Ukraine and his henchmen for many decades, nevertheless regenerated Ukrainian national consciousness again and again and still regenerates it even today.

Dr. D. Donzow once said: "A nation which does not realize its idea goes to ruin". To national Ukraine, this ideal is bound up for ever with the figure of the illustrious leader who was defeated at Baturyn and Poltava.

## NOTES

- 1) That is to say, Ukraine (according to the old Russian terminology).
- 2) B. Krupnytsky: "Mazepa," p. 200.
- 3) Regardless of the fact that the Tsar himself was allied with several Protestant rulers and also had a considerable number of German Protestant officers amongst his troops.
- 4) The Zaporogian Cossacks (who took their name from the rapids of the Dniepro) had their own internal autonomy apart from the Hetmanate, and their foreign policy frequently deviated considerably from that of the Hetman.
- 5) Ivan Kholmsky: "Istoriya Ukrayiny" ("The History of Ukraine"). Munich, 1949, p. 255.
- 6) According to E. Karlson's calculations ("The Battle of Poltava," 1897).
- 7) One must bear in mind that the Swedes were completely exhausted and had neither artillery nor any supplies of gunpowder or provisions worth mentioning left (Editor's note).
- 8) The English translation does not, of course, reproduce the metre and rhyme of the original poem.
- 9) D. Doroshenko: "Narys istoriyi Ukrayiny" ("Outline of the History of Ukraine"), Vol. II, p. 151.
- 10) The reference is to the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654.
- 11) N. Molchanivsky: "Dani pro smert' Mazepy" ("Data on the Death of Mazepa"), 1903.
- 12) Khvedir Umanets': "Het'man Mazepa," 1897.
- 13) "Ivan Mazepa, born in 1644, and in 1687, after the deposition, at Moscow's orders, of Hetman Ivan Samoylovych (1672-1687), elected Hetman mainly by the Cossack military aristocracy, came of a family of the nobility, Mazepa-Koledynsky, who possessed a township of their own, Mazepyntsi, near Bila Tserkva (west of the middle Dniepro). To begin with, Mazepa probably studied at the Kyiv Theological Academy and subsequently at a Jesuit college. He later went to the court



of the Polish King, Jan Cazimir, and at the King's expense was sent to the West in order to study gunnery. He spent several years in Holland and France and was also in Germany and Italy for a considerable time. These travels in West and Central Europe, where he was received at the court of various ruling princes, greatly broadened his education and his insight into human nature. He was fluent in several languages (including Latin and French), he was acquainted with the literature of the West, collected a library of considerable size, was fond of reading Machiavelli, was constantly interested in the international situation and frequently procured newspapers, which in those days were still a rarity... To begin with, he was the royal Polish envoy to the Zaporogian Cossacks and even took part in the campaign conducted by Jan Cazimir across the Dniro to the east (1663-1664), but he later resumed the traditions of his family and took up his residence in the district of Kyiv... He became extremely popular as a result of his patronage of learning and the arts. He assumed the constant patronage of the Kyiv Theological Academy and extended it, both in the material and spiritual sense. Kyiv and various other towns received several new cathedrals and monasteries in the Ukrainian baroque style at his instigation. His name was well-known even in the Near East: at his expense an Arabic translation of the New Testament was printed and he gave the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem costly presents" (Ivan Kholmsky: "Istoriya Ukrayiny," Munich, 1949, pp. 244-245).

14) D. Doroshenko: "Narys istoriyi Ukrayiny" ("Outline of the History of Ukraine"), Vol. II, p. 112.

15) "When the military operations of the Swedish-Russian war began to approach the frontiers of Ukraine, Peter subordinated Mazeppa to the supreme command of his favourite, Field Marshal Menshikov, as if the Hetman had been merely a general and not the supreme head of an autonomous state. Peter sought to effect a unification of all the parts of his huge empire, and the separate constitution of Ukraine was not in keeping with his plans; it was perfectly clear that sooner or later he would liquidate this constitution. Certain indications of his intention in this respect were already apparent; in 1705, for instance, the Tsar, acting on his own authority, issued orders that the two Cossack regiments that had been sent to Prussia were to be regrouped as dragoons, that is Russian "regular" cavalry. The motive given for this was the necessity of war, but the Cossacks regarded such a measure as a violation of their traditional freedoms. Amongst the Cossack officers rumours now spread regarding far greater changes which were allegedly to be introduced: liquidation of the Ukrainian administration, appointment of Russian governors or "voivodes" in that case, and resettlement of the Cossacks in Muscovite Russia, etc.

Such circumstances gave rise to a feeling of insecurity, fear and discontent. Mazeppa endeavoured to clarify these questions in talks and correspondence with the Tsar and his counsellors. The Tsar replied with verbal assurances that he had no intention of violating the ancient rights of Ukraine; in reality, however, subjection became not less, but stronger and stronger. The officers began to bring pressure to bear on the Hetman and demanded that he should ponder on what was likely to be the fate of Ukraine: "We all pray to God for the salvation of the soul of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, for he liberated Ukraine from the Polish yoke; your soul and your bones will, however, be cursed by our children if you abandon the Cossacks of the next generation to such bondage" (I. Kholmsky, loc. cit., p. 244).

16) "Mazeppa had entered into relations with the young Tsar Peter immediately after the latter had come to the throne, had gained his confidence and had succeeded in convincing him of his own plans (the recapture of that part of Ukraine which was ruled by Poland and of the coast of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov). Mazeppa remained a loyal ally of Russia until Peter began to destroy the foundations of the Ukrainian state order; the Hetman then began to look for another political course" (I. Kholmsky, loc. cit., Vol. II, p. 246).—"Mazeppa's efforts to destroy every form of foreign rule in Ukraine were genuine and sincere"—this admission is made by a Russian who was converted to Catholicism, the Jesuit, Father Martynov, in the "Revue des Questions Historiques," 1884.

17) That is, both the Ukrainian Hetmanate and also that part of Ukraine west of the Dniro which at that time was officially still under Polish rule.—"All the Cossack armies" really only refers to the "Sich" of the Zaporogian Cossacks.

REMARKS BY THE CANADIAN MINISTER OF LABOUR,  
HON. MICHEL STARR, ADDRESSING THE  
UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MANIFESTATION

held on Sunday, July 5th, 1959, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada

My Friends:

We are gathered together today to commemorate and to honour the Ukrainian freedom fighters of three hundred years ago.

And as I look over this great assembly, I am happy to join with you in commemorating an event which remains full of meaning to all people of Ukrainian origin or of Ukrainian descent.

But the meaning of Konotop goes far beyond the confines of race or nationality.

That clash of arms, when the fighters of free Ukraine encountered the armies of the Muscovites, more than three centuries ago, retains a powerful meaning for all free peoples and for all who wish to retain freedom.

In our own day this bitter lesson has become clear, that freedom cannot be divided.

Freedom is an indivisible thing that belongs to all men.

As freedom is infringed or diminished anywhere in the world; then, by so much, is freedom lost to all of us.

The freedom fighters of Hungary, the freedom fighters of Poland, were fighting not only for their own freedom, but for all men's freedom.

That is why that long ago battle still speaks in strong and clear accents to all who prize freedom.

And as we commemorate the glorious names of Mazeppa, Khmelnytsky, Vyhovsky, we do so as a free people, saluting fighters for freedom across the centuries.

The figure of Mazeppa, particularly, has been celebrated across the years by great writers in all languages.

His fame has gone far beyond the confines of Ukraine, to all corners of the world.

The conditions of oppression against which Mazeppa fought have not yet been vanquished; but on the contrary, have continued to gather, until today their ominous shadow hangs over the free world.

It may be said that Mazeppa was ahead of his time.

There is no doubt that he was, in perceiving oppression and in raising against it the cry of freedom.

That cry has never been stilled.

It continues to ring out over the land of Ukraine, where the iron hand of oppression continues to grind down any sign of liberty.

In commemorating the freedom fighters of the past, you are also gathered today in honour of those who continue to carry on the fight for Ukraine's freedom.

We who are in Canada enjoy freedom to an extent probably never realized before in history.

Those who have come to this country from Ukraine, or whose parents have come from Ukraine, appreciate and cherish that freedom which we enjoy.

We are united, along with all other Canadians, in our determination to maintain that freedom and to so conduct ourselves, that the defence of freedom will always find us standing on guard.

We are all aware that freedom is not an unchanging thing.

It must be won and then it must be preserved—or it may be lost.

It has been said that eternal vigilance is the price of freedom.

Courage is also counted in the price.

That is the lesson of Mazeppa and the lesson of Konotop.

There is another lesson for free peoples today and it is this —

Freedom can also be lost by lethargy and ignorance and indifference.

In a free country, every citizen has the duty to acquaint himself with what I might term the **machinery of freedom**.

I refer to those democratic institutions which guarantee our freedoms, —

Our Parliaments, both Federal and Provincial, made up of our elected representatives.

Our courts and the dispensation of equal justice to all men, regardless of social or financial standing.

Our systems of education, which ensure that learning is made available to all.

Our system of elected representation, which ensures that the people shall have free choice as to who will make the laws.

The free practice of religion.

In the proper working of these institutions, our freedom lies.

And as we survey the operation of these democratic mechanisms from the municipal council of your city or town, right up to the House of Commons, we see here **the whole apparatus of liberty**.

And as long as the control of this apparatus remains vested in the hands of the people, then shall freedom continue to prevail.

Thus, I say, that we each of us has a duty to participate in these activities, to acquaint himself or herself with the issues of the day, and to be aware of the workings of these democratic institutions.

This great democratic system to which we all subscribe, and to which we all give free allegiance, is not a system imposed by force.

It stands in striking contrast to the iron system of rule from the top which the Soviet today seeks to impose upon the citizens of the world.

In contrast to our democratic system, which responds to the needs of free peoples everywhere, the Soviet system is in direct contradiction to all the basic needs of human nature.

Never in all its history has it been freely embraced by the choice of any people.

It has been imposed by tanks and by bayonets.

It is a rule of force and a rule of blood.

It is the rule of the slave camp, the rule of men made into machines.

In Hungary after ten years of fierce and concentrated indoctrination in the Soviet system, the people rose in revolt.

They preferred to walk against the tanks rather than to embrace so-called Soviet democracy.

And these were not old people, these were the youth, the 'teen-agers, on whom the effect of indoctrination had fallen most heavily.

Such is the power of desire for freedom upon human nature.

Nowhere in the world is there any desire to become voluntarily a part of the Soviet Slave Empire.

I would say that what we need today is a new Mazeppa.

The principles which Mazeppa stood for, the things he fought for, are all such as to raise sympathetic support in the minds of free peoples.

And I say that as long as freedom survives, so long will Mazeppa's principles survive, and so long will his fame remain great among men and among nations.

In closing this brief commemorative address, I would point to an event now taking place which engages the hearts and minds of all Canadians.

I refer to the tour of Canada presently in progress, by Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth the Second, and His Royal Highness, the Duke of Edinburgh.

As one who will have the honour of attending upon Her Majesty for a portion of this tour,—perhaps "visit" might be a better word—I would draw it to your attention as a symbol of those democratic institutions about which I have been speaking.

Wherever they go in Canada, they will be greeted by a people bound to them by freely offered ties of affection and loyalty.

The greetings which they receive will come not only from the hands but from the hearts of Canadians.

This is true, no matter in what part of Canada they may find themselves.

Together they symbolize another of those unique bastions of freedom which are the bulwark of our democratic system.

Finally, may I say this —

Freedom bears many aspects.

I would commend to you all these aspects of our Canadian freedoms, and I would refer to the great objectives of the Canadian League for Ukraine's Liberation, and your hopes that the freedoms which we enjoy here may before long be restored to those millions in Ukraine who also have memories of the freedoms which they once knew and cherished.

Thank you.

# RESOLUTIONS

**adopted by 10,000 people at the Ukrainian National  
Manifestation, held on Sunday, July 5th, 1959, in Toronto, Ont.**

Ukrainians, citizens of Canada and the United States of America, gathered in Toronto on July 5, 1959 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the victory of Ukraine over Muscovy in the battle of Konotop and the 250th anniversary of Hetman Ivan Mazeppa's war against Muscovy, unanimously adopted the following resolutions:

1) The Communist government of the Russian Empire has launched a planned assault, under the leadership of Khrushchov, on the Ukrainian nation, employing the most perfidious methods of merciless terrorism, including physical and spiritual genocide, to extinguish all attempts to gain freedom and statehood for Ukraine.

2) The announcement of the official census figures in Moscow on the 10th of May of this year reveals the reality of genocide practised daily,—the physical destruction of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine, always known in the past for her high birth rate and population increase, has gained only 1,424,000 persons in the last twenty years.

One of the methods of genocide is the mass deportations of Ukrainian men and women and in particular young people to the virgin areas of Kazakhstan and to the scenes of new factory building projects in Siberia.

These deportations in the guise of "voluntariness," have for their aim the biological destruction of the Ukrainian nation in its homeland and the facilitating of the process of assimilation and denationalization of the scattered Ukrainian youth amongst the various ethnic groups, races and tribes beyond the Urals.

3) The systematic attacks on Ukrainian cultural leaders charged with being "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," and the execution in May of this year by a firing squad of Ukrainian patriots in Chervonoarmiysk, to cite but one example, are all indicative of the brutal policy of genocide and Russification practiced by the unbridled Russian colonizers in the Ukraine.

4) The most characteristic illustration of this policy is the shameful ukaze with respect to education passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and put into effect in the Ukraine by an act passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. on the 17th of April, 1959. In accordance with paragraph 9 of this Act, the official language to be used in all schools is to be, in fact, Russian.

5) The enactment of such a law by the Russian occupant government in Ukraine legalizes lawless Russification, and has for its purpose the liquidation of the 42-million Ukrainian nation which, according to the so-called Soviet constitution, allegedly has its own state—the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

6) Before the outward world the Russian government of the Empire, disguising its imperialistic policy under the slogans of World Communism, represents Ukraine as an independent and allied state and a member of the U.S.S.R. But in its internal policy in Ukraine, the Soviet government is barbarically pursuing the most systematic Russification. By Russifying the Ukrainian national culture and the Ukrainian spiritual life, the Bolsheviks hope to be able to transform Ukraine into a "single Russian people."

7) Imperialistic Russia never ceased oppressing the Ukrainian nation. Czarist Minister Valuyev, by the ukaze of 1863, endeavoured to erase the Ukrainian language through his dictum, "There was not, there is not and there shall not be a Ukrainian language." The Ems ukaze of Czar Alexander II was even more cruel. It forbade not only the publishing of books in the Ukrainian language, but even the usage of the Ukrainian language in any form of public entertainment. Similar bans were issued in the years 1881, 1892, 1895 and later, until revolution of 1917. During the Revolution, however, the non-Russian peoples succeeded to destroy the Russian Empire and to restore their own independent national states.

8) Having conquered Ukraine, which had been restored as an independent state by the Act of Independence of January 22, 1918, Russian Bolshevism for the past forty years has waged a ruthless Russification policy in Ukraine. The particular Russian forms and methods to suppress the Ukrainian people, have been frequently changed by Moscow. Their principal colonial goal, however, has always remained intact. The Ukrainian people most actively resisted all those Russification measures. The most recent form of that Muscovite attempt to liquidate Ukraine as a nation, is the cruel mass deportation and genocide of the Ukrainians to the Asiatic regions of the Russian S.F.S.R. This is ironically called by the Kremlin "a voluntary colonization of the virgin areas."

9) The present-day intensified Russification of Ukraine began with the termination of the 21st congress of the imperial Communist Party. Primarily, plans were adopted at this congress for an economic war of the Russian Empire against the Free World, including the United States. Besides, by making legal the lawless policy of Russification and Russian chauvinism in Ukraine, Moscow hoped to check and suppress the national resistance and struggle of the Ukrainian people for their legitimate right to freedom and independence.

10) In expressing our deep indignation over the intensified onslaught of Russia against Ukraine, we citizens of Canada and the United States of America of the Ukrainian descent appeal to our Governments to

stand in defense of the Ukrainian national culture against the general attack of Communist Russia, the successor of Czarist Russia.

The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., which is directing this attack, consistently adheres in its policies to the principles of Russian messianism, according to which the "great Russian people" are fated to deliver to the world their "new ideas" in a World Revolution led by Russia.

11) The imperialistic policy of Communist Russia finds the moral support of the entire Russian emigration. In the United States 23 Russian organizations at their conference on August 2, 1958, adopted a resolution to send an "ultimatum" to President Eisenhower. In this "ultimatum" they demanded that he should not support the liberation struggle of the enslaved nations against Russian despotism. They threatened that if he did, they would side with the Russian people in defence of the Soviet government.

In February, 1959, these organizations issued another protest that they sent to the Government of the United States, in which they again protested against the aspirations of the Ukrainian people to freedom.

12) We believe that the Government of Canada and the United States, as leaders of the world struggle against Communism and for human freedom everywhere, which is threatened by the Russian Bolshevik imperialism under the guise of "World Communism," will find efficacious means to warn the Russian government against its moral and cultural genocide of the Ukrainian nation, initiated by the decision of the Communist Party, April 1959.

13) As citizens of Canada and the United States we deem it proper and imperative to call the attention of our Governments to the fact that the so-called "World Communism" against which the forces of the Free World have been mobilized, is in fact a smokescreen behind which lurks the Russian Bolshevik imperialism, insidiously pressing its attack against the Free World.

**Executive Committee  
of the Ukrainian National Manifestation**

CANADIAN LEAGUE FOR UKRAINE'S LIBERATION,

140 Bathurst St., Toronto, Ont., Canada.

ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF FOUR FREEDOMS

FOR UKRAINE, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

UKRAINIAN YOUTH ASSOCIATION

SOCIETY OF VETERANS OF

UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA).

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**REMEMBER: UKRAINE NEEDS YOUR EFFORT!**

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## U. S. SENATE PASSES "CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK" RESOLUTION

**Editor's Note:** On June 22, 1959 Sen. Paul H. Douglas of Illinois introduced a resolution (S.J. Res. 111) calling for the designation of the third week of July as "Captive Nations Week." The resolution was supported by 18 U.S. Senators: Javits, Moss, Bush, Lausche, Scott, Hartke, Green, Dodd, Humphrey, Hart, Neuberger, Keating, Young of North Dakota, Engle, Curtis, Langer, Morse, and Case of New Jersey.

On July 6, 1959 the Senate passed the bill urging President Eisenhower to designate such a week. Subsequently, the measure was referred to the House of Representatives for a similar action.

The text of the resolution follows:

### Joint Resolution

Providing for the designation of the week following the Fourth of July as "Captive Nations Week."

Whereas the greatness of the United States is in large part attributable to its having been able, through the democratic process, to achieve a harmonious national unity of its people, even though they stem from the most diverse of racial, religious, and ethnic backgrounds; and

Whereas this harmonious unification of the diverse elements of our free society has led the people of the United States to possess a warm understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of peoples everywhere and to recognize the natural independency of the peoples and nations of the world; and

Whereas the enslavement of a substantial part of the world's population by Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of peaceful coexistence between nations and constitutes a detriment to the natural bonds of understanding between the people of the United States and other peoples; and

Whereas since 1918 the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Russian Communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which poses a dire threat to the security of the United States and of all the free peoples of the world; and

Whereas the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led, through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, and others; and

Whereas these submerged nations look to the United States, as the citadel of human freedom, for leadership in bringing about their liberation and independence and in restoring to them the enjoyment of their Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, or other religious freedoms, and of their individual liberties; and



Whereas it is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of these conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive; and

Whereas the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace; and

Whereas it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such peoples through an appropriate and official means the historic fact that the people of the United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and independence. Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and inviting the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities. The President is further authorized and requested to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world.

## ONE OF THE MANY

The following is one of the many telegrams of thanks which were sent to President Eisenhower by the representatives of the enslaved nations:

His Excellency  
Dwight D. Eisenhower,  
President of the U.S.A.,  
White House, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Your Excellency,

On behalf of the Delegation of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations in Great Britain, we wish to express our most sincere gratitude for the proclamation of the Week of Captive Nations which was observed in the U.S.A.

We believe that this outstanding event will be of great moral and political significance for the future developments in international affairs. The awareness on the part of the nations enslaved by the Russian Communist imperialism that they are not alone in their resistance to Bolshevik oppression will strengthen their determination to continue their struggle for human rights and national independence.

The uncontrolled malicious statements made by the Kremlin rulers in this connection are an evidence that the problem of the captive nations is their Achilles' heel.

May God bless you and the American people.

Yours respectfully,

For the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations,  
Delegation in Gt. Britain.

(Prof. R. Ostrowski)  
Chairman.

(W. Oleskiw)  
Secretary.

### THE URBAN POPULATION OF UKRAINE

The information issued provisionally by the Central Statistical Department (TsSU) of the U.S.S.R. on the results of the census held in the Soviet Union on January 15, 1959, contains the following data on the population figures of the large towns and cities in Soviet Ukraine:

#### I. Towns with over 500,000 inhabitants:

Town	Population in thousands		Increase since 1939 in %
	1959	1939	
Kyiv	1,102	847	30
Kharkiv	930	833	12
Stalino	701	466	50
Odessa	667	602	11
Dnipropetrovsk	658	527	25

#### II. Towns with 200,000-500,000 inhabitants:

Town	Population in thousands		Increase since 1939 in %
	1959	1939	
Zaporizhzhia	435	282	54
Lviv (Lemberg)	410	340	21
Kyvyv Rih	386	189	104
Makiyivka	358	242	48
Horlivka	293	181	61
Zhdanov (Mariyupil)	284	222	28
Luhansk	274	215	28
Mykolayiv	224	169	33

#### III. Towns with 100,000-200,000 inhabitants:

Town	Population in thousands		Increase since 1939 in %
	1959	1939	
Dniprodzerzhynsk	194	148	31
Symferopil	189	143	32
Kadiyivka	180	135	33
Kherson	157	97	63
Sevastopol (Sebastopol)	148	114	30
Chernivtsi	145	106	37
Poltava	141	128	10
Kirovohrad	127	100	27
Vinnysia	121	93	30
Kramatorsk	115	94	22
Zhytomyr	105	95	10

A further 24 Ukrainian towns with a population of 50,000-100,000 are also mentioned, but several towns which should normally in 1959 have a population of at least 50,000 are missing from this list, namely Nizhen, Izmayil, Mukachiv, Feodosiya (Theodosia), Uman'

D. A.

## PASTERNAK AND HIS NOVEL

Books, like persons, often seem to have a fate which has apparently no bearing on their qualities and virtues, and this fact strikes us when reading the novel "Doctor Zhivago" by B. Pasternak. This book is at present probably the most popular literary work in the world. A great deal has been and is still being written by literary critics and reviewers in this respect, but so far hardly anyone has undertaken to analyse the work in detail, since people are more interested in the circumstances under which the novel was published and in the author himself.

After having read the original Russian text of the novel, one is bound to have some doubts as to whether the artistic quality of the book is such as to merit the success that it has had. There is no denying that there are many other works and authors in contemporary Soviet Russian literature that are far more interesting than Pasternak and his novel. "Quiet flows the Don" by Sholokhov, for instance, is a work that is far more spirited, fresh and bright than "Doctor Zhivago." And another much-read contemporary novel, "Not by Bread Alone," by Dudintsev is likewise of more significance from the political aspect than Pasternak's novel, since it exposes the rottenness of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union, whereas "Doctor Zhivago" only reflects scenes of the Bolshevik revolution, without, however, attacking the regime itself. The author only went so far as to let his hero say: "The idea of a general perfection, as was understood during October, in no way delights me... because there has been too much blood shed for mere talks."

Wherein, then, lies the great success of Pasternak's work? Undoubtedly, the circumstances under which the novel was published have to a large extent contributed to its success. It is an established fact that the Soviet Russian editors and publishers refused to print the novel; the author thereupon gave the manuscript to an Italian Communist who, in spite of intervention on the part of Moscow, published the novel in a number of languages. Later on, the author was awarded the Nobel Prize, but under pressure of an embittered campaign against him in the Soviet Union he was obliged to renounce this award. All minds were now set at rest, but all the fuss that had been made about the novel was excellent propaganda for it and, of course, also for the author.

In addition, another important feature also played a part in determining the success of this novel. The fact must be borne in mind that the literary style of the author and the characters in his novel are typically Russian, which distinguishes them from any other literary phenomena of our day; though it is very likely that these types may seem rather

specific and exotic to the foreign reader. Pasternak's style as a novelist is typical of the Russian novelists of the 19th century. The book contains many affected sentimental and philosophical digressions, as well as frequently repeated expressions and idioms that were preferred by the Russian intellectuals of the 19th century and seldom heard outside Russia.

The chief character in Pasternak's novel is Doctor Zhivago. He is the son of a manufacturer, who is psychically abnormal and commits suicide. Young Zhivago is very talented and a man of wide tastes and interests. He is interested in philosophy, he writes poems, he studies medicine and becomes a physician. He is extremely popular and is greatly admired by his colleagues and worshipped by the women who love him, as an exceptional personality because of his common-sense, his character and sensibility. But strange to say, he never does anything exceptional. He is always endeavouring to accomplish exceptional deeds; he tries to write exceptional works, but in the end he is ruined professionally, physically and spiritually and dies like any other common mortal.

There is no logic in Doctor Zhivago's strange behaviour, which for the most part seems entirely unmotivated. He acts as if in a trance and as if he were incited by unknown forces. His behaviour towards the women who play a part in his life is strange and most illogical. He is married to one woman, loves another woman and has children by a third woman, and does not like to break off his relations with any of them.

In the midst of the terrible chaos and confusion of the Bolshevik revolution and the civil war, Doctor Zhivago behaves in a rather unusual manner. He does not like the Communists, but he is obliged to give them his service as a physician.

And the behaviour of the other important character in the novel, Doctor Zhivago's sweetheart, Larisa or Lara, is equally strange. She seems to be an angel, a charming woman, a noble character. "When she enters a room all the windows seem to be blown open by unseen forces." All the men fall in love with her, above all, Doctor Zhivago himself. They are all convinced that she is the most distinguished of women and predestined for something great. Thus, the character of Lara, like that of Zhivago, is surrounded with a kind of halo. The love of Zhivago and Lara is described as the "common enjoyment of a bit of this world," as a feeling that elevates them to the "general image" that "in its turn belongs to the beauty of the entity, to the universe." Only the elect are able to love each other in such a way; these were the sentiments which the Russian writers of the 19th century used to express.

The novel does not, however, deny that there are certain less praiseworthy and, in fact, detestable features in Lara's character and behaviour. As a young girl still at school, she loves an old man who was her mother's lover, and is called a sinner, a term much preferred by the older Russian novelists. Having married a man of exceptional

qualities, Lara falls in love with Zhivago. At the same time, however,—though, it is true, only by chance and against her wish—she returns to the old man and shares his life with him. What is more, for the sake of this old man, she abandons her own child and hands it over to a farmer's family. This child is thus brought up in common surroundings and has a hard life. The mother allegedly loves her child, but having failed to find her again, she later dies somewhere in an unknown hotel or in a women's concentration camp in the north.

The husband of Lara, Antipov, is the Bolshevik insurgents' leader, Strelnikov, a man of noble character and great personality. Since he is not a Communist, Antipov is keenly aware of social injustice and, in any case, he hates the rich people who seduce young girls. In the opinion of his formerly seduced wife he is sensitive to "tears and insults," he feels "pride and the necessity for revenge" and he also feels that "in her name and with her lips the whole of our era could be condemned." Antipov is convinced that "Lenin has introduced, for the sake of mercy, a well-trying mercilessness in order to become revenge personified and to annihilate all tradition." For this reason he has become a leader of the Bolshevik insurgents and continues as such until he is hounded down by the Communists. He would like to return to his wife, but fails to find her. On learning from Zhivago that she still loves him, Antipov commits suicide.

And, finally, another important character in the novel is the uncle of Doctor Zhivago, a somewhat mysterious type who is portrayed in a rather vague manner. Formerly a priest, he has renounced his religious mission for the purpose of propagating the revolution. Roaming about like many other Russian revolutionaries, he joins one group after another. Eventually, we find him in the midst of the Bolsheviks. He exercises considerable influence on his associates. But although he is related to Zhivago, he does not succeed in converting the latter to the Communist cause. Although his ideas and moral motives seem somewhat vague to the reader, Zhivago's uncle nevertheless appears as a personification of the Bolshevik revolution, as Pasternak experienced it.

It is interesting to note that all the characters in "Doctor Zhivago" are described as superior and exceptional, but, nevertheless, they make some bad mistakes, commit bad deeds and behave in a manner that is far from correct. In spite of these negative qualities, however, they retain the halo with which the author has surrounded them from the outset.

On reading Pasternak's novel, anyone who is acquainted with Russian literature cannot help but feel that the types portrayed are familiar to him. And, indeed, similar characters are to be found in the works of Turgenev, who depicts the "repentant noblemen," the "superfluous people" and the "Hamlets of the Shchigry district." We are also reminded of the patriotic aristocrats of L. Tolstoy, with their world problems, and of the mystics of the revolution portrayed in the works of Dostoyevsky, the characters of "The Devils" (Besy) and

of the "Brothers Karamazov." Doctor Zhivago also reminds us of Chekhov's philosophizing intellectuals and even of Gorky's vagabonds, who are so rich in ideas. What all these types and characters have in common is that they claim to be exceptional personalities out of the average, who are akin to heroes and saints.

Anyone who reads Pasternak's novel instinctively begins to look for the genesis of these types in Russian literature and is bound to reach the conclusion that these types were formed by the people's conception of the Muscovites (Russians), an image known under the designation "fools for the sake of Christ." Such a type is a kind of psychopath who expresses his philosophical attitude in an ecstasy. He speaks and acts contrary to commonsense. His society, that is the Russian people, nevertheless sees a profound wisdom, the expression of a collective conviction, and even "God's Sign" in his words and deeds. This attitude on the part of the people was adopted by the Russian intellectuals and contributed to the formation of a galaxy of similar types in Russian literature. The image "Fools for the sake of Christ" is a forerunner of the types of Russian heroes and saints,—it is a kind of Russian edition of the "superman."

As far as the characters in the works of the above-mentioned older Russian novelists are concerned, they reflect Russian society and the thoughts and feelings of the people of that time. This cannot, however, be said of Pasternak's characters. They are too schematic; they seem to have been invented rather than taken from true life. Indeed, they seem to be true copies of the literary types of the Russian novels of the 19th century, although they act under the conditions of the 20th century. This impression is also confirmed by the fact that Pasternak's novel deals with the so-called "cursed questions," with the "sign of the epoch," and with the "world's sorrow," etc.; thus, the same themes that one finds in the novels of the older Russian writers. Pasternak also deals with the so-called "Quest of God" ("Bogoishtvstvo"), of which the Russian intellectuals are so proud because they are so fond of quoting passages from the Scriptures and commenting on them.

These exotic features of the Russian mentality and of Russian literature have contributed to a very considerable extent to the success of Pasternak's novel amongst Western readers and even amongst members of the Nobel Prize Committee. In our opinion, it is the above-mentioned qualities, and not the artistic merit of the work, nor the hostile attitude of the author towards the Communist regime, that have made "Doctor Zhivago" so interesting for the West. Even so, however, we feel bound to stress that the problems of the novel and of its characters are a subject for psychiatry rather than for philosophy. It is only from this aspect that one can understand the distortion of the Russian mentality as described in the novel, and only in this way that the many phenomena which have taken place and continue to occur in the literary and social processes in Russia and among the Russians can be explained.

## FIGURES TRUE TO LIFE

### THE CREATIVE ART OF THE UKRAINIAN SCULPTOR GREGORY KRUK\*)

In his studio at the top of a house in the Elisabethstrasse in Munich, the 47-year old Ukrainian sculptor, Gregory (Hryhoriy) Kruk, with skilful hands fashions the figures of his distant native country, Ukraine,—the figures amongst whom he spent his childhood and who are still part of his life today. His works reveal the strength and expressiveness of a man who originally lived in the wide open spaces and who was only cast into the atmosphere of a strange town by chance and temporarily. At the same time, his works also communicate to the beholder something of the living spirit of that world in the East, which is so strange to many people in the West,—a world in which a mighty force waits for its revelation in the future.

As the son of a master potter from Bratyshiv (West Ukraine), near Lviv (Lemberg), Gregory Kruk has inherited much of his skill and talent as a handicraftsman from his father, a fact which is apparent in the expert way in which he uses loam, clay, stone and bronze for his artistic creations. In an exquisite way he endows his material with spiritual qualities. The impression aroused in the beholder is thus not merely one of a superficial aesthetic quality, but he is profoundly moved by these works of art, for they are evidence and expression of a true creativeness.

The creations of this West Ukrainian exile reveal the spiritual maturity and profundity which is born of suffering. Because Kruk himself has experienced the hardship of having to flee from his native country and has had to start life anew as a refugee in a foreign land, he is able to create the refugee child or the refugee woman so true to life that they stir the hearts of all those who have suffered the same fate.

The conservator and head of the French National Museum in Paris, Jean Cassou, who in 1954 bought one of Kruk's sculptures for this museum, wrote of Kruk: "He has pursued his artistic course in spite of all the difficulties and vicissitudes which are characteristic of our age. Though for many years an exile in different places, he has brought his work to perfection,—far away from his native country and from the national qualities which his work reveals. These national qualities have remained alive in his artistic memory and they appear in his works unalloyed and undimmed.

The value of his works lies in their truth, in their striking candour and in a quality somewhat akin to rustic coarseness. And all this is imparted to us, just as a folk-song imparts something of the sun and the clime and the soil in which it has been engendered.

Such simple and genuine truths can only be expressed by an art which is equally simple and genuine,—an art which is based on genuine knowledge and intrinsic originality, an art which, in addition to other qualities, in a very special way reveals the profound feeling of the artist and the positive character of his movements and his expression."

\*) The original German text of this article, written by an anonymous author, was published in the monthly magazine "Der Europäische Osten" (Munich, 1958, № 8.

After completing his studies at the academy of arts and crafts in Lemberg, the artist, who now lives in Munich, spent some years in Cracow, where he studied under Professor Constantin Laszczka and passed his final examination with distinction. He then went to Berlin, where, on the strength of a scholarship which he had been awarded by the German-Ukrainian Academic Institute, he studied at the Academy of Arts. His scholarship lasted until the spring of 1945. In Berlin he attended Professor Alfred Focke's classes for sculpture and plastic art and also studied under Professor Otto Hitzberger. He also acted as the latter's assistant for a time. One of his teachers, incidentally, was Professor Franz Blatschek.

After the war, Kruk was appointed professor at the UNRRA University in Munich. Thanks to the help of Monsignore Butchko, he was later able to engage in six months' research work in Italy. He has so far produced about 100 sculptures.

Exhibitions: In 1946 in Munich, in 1954 in Paris, Gallery Simone Badinier. On this occasion one of his sculptures was bought for the National Museum, Paris. Another sculpture was bought by Professor Hausenstein, the German ambassador in Paris at that time. In 1954 Kruk's works were exhibited in London and Edinburgh. One of his sculptures was bought by the Hon. Auberon Herbert. In 1955 exhibition of his works in New York, where a sculpture was bought for the private collection of Eugene Sumyk. In 1956 exhibition of his works in Bonn. One of his sculptures was bought by Federal Minister Waldemar Kraft, and another by Federal Minister Professor Ludwig Erhard. In 1957, his works were exhibited at the Palazzo Elviotti in Rome. One of his sculptures was bought by Bishop Ivan Buchko. In 1957 the Stenzel Gallery also bought one of his works.

#### AMERICAN PROFESSOR WRITES DRAMA ON HETMAN MAZEPPA

Dr. Edward Larson, Professor of English literature at the State College in Morray, has recently written a drama dealing with the life and struggle of the great Hetman of Ukraine, Ivan Mazeppa. The 250th anniversary of his daring but unfortunate campaign for the freedom of Ukraine against Muscovite tyranny, in which his ally was King Charles XII of Sweden, is being commemorated by Ukrainians all over the world. Prof. Larson's drama, which consists of 3 acts and 8 interacts, deals with the history of the Ukrainian struggle for freedom and independence under Ivan Mazeppa against the tyranny of the Muscovite tsar Peter I, in the early years of the 18th century and with the Ukrainian and Swedish

defeat at Poltava in 1709. Mazeppa fought to save the remnants of Western civilization and democratic tradition in Ukraine, but he succumbed to the Muscovite barbarity of Peter I. Mazeppa, who has become a symbol of the Ukrainian liberation struggle, is the central figure of the drama. He is surrounded by patriotic Ukrainian Cossacks, whose deeds stand out like bright torches against the increasing darkness of Muscovite Russian oppression. It is true, the battle of Poltava was lost, but the cause for which the Ukrainians fought there still lives on in the hearts of all Ukrainians today. The musical background of the drama was composed by Professor Roman Prydatkevych.



**Obituary****PROFESSOR DR. HANS KOCH**

The sudden death occurred on April 9, in Munich, of the well-known pioneer of German research on East Europe, Professor Dr. Hans Koch.

Born in Lviv (Lemberg) on July 7, 1894, he attended the German grammar school in the West Ukrainian capital and subsequently began studying theology and history at the University of Vienna.

During the Great War he served with the 35th Austrian regiment, which consisted solely of Ukrainians, in Zolochiv (Galicia). After the collapse of Austro-Hungary, Koch, who had been decorated six times, placed his services at the disposal of the Ukrainian liberation movement and fought in the ranks of the Ukrainian army against the Russian Communists and other enemies of the Ukrainian National Republic. After the defeat of the West Ukrainian army, he was taken prisoner-of-war by the Red Russians, but was later released on an exchange basis.

From 1922 onwards, he was able to continue his studies once more at the University of Vienna, and he now devoted himself in particular to East European history and Slav studies. Incidentally, in addition to his mother-tongue, German, the deceased also had a perfect knowledge of the Ukrainian language. In 1929, Dr. Koch was appointed lecturer at the University of Vienna for a new faculty of East European history and ecclesiastical history. From 1934 to 1937, he was professor at Königsberg University, and subsequently at Breslau University (1937-1940) and Vienna University (1940-1945). As an officer he again served in the front lines in World War II. When Ukraine was occupied by German troops, Professor Koch did his utmost to alleviate the hard lot of the Ukrainians under German occupation.

In 1952, Professor Koch was appointed head of the East European Institute in Munich. It was whilst he held this office that he produced numerous works both as a writer and as a translator. He published a handbook on the Soviet Union, entitled "Soviet Book," a "History of the Slavs" and, recently, a biographical encyclopedia on politicians, artists and men of learning of the U.S.S.R., entitled "5 000 Soviet Heads." In addition, Professor Koch was the editor of the quarterly review "Kyrios," which is devoted to the ecclesiastical and spiritual history of the East European peoples, and also contributed articles and essays to many other periodicals. Under the pen-name of Hans Winfried Schäfer, the deceased also wrote a number of novels and lyric works.

Some years ago he also published an excellent translation of Ukrainian lyric poetry of the last century. He wrote numerous treatises on Ukrainian history and the Ukrainian Church, etc., and his translation of the collected poems of the great Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko (died in 1861), is outstanding.

Members of the University of Munich, numerous friends of the deceased, representatives of the Federal and the Bavarian State Government, as well as many Germans and Ukrainians attended the funeral of Professor Koch, which took place in Austria, where he had been fond of spending his free time. We shall always honour his memory!

V. O.

BOOK REVIEW

**Clarence A. Manning: Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa.** Bookman Associates, Publishers, "The House of Scholarly Studies," Union Square West, New York 3, 1957. 234 pp.

Professor Clarence A. Manning, an outstanding expert on East European affairs, a prominent member of the Department of Slavic languages of Columbia University, New York, and a great authority on Ukraine (he is also the author of "Ukraine Under The Soviets" and "Twentieth Century Ukraine"), has given us, in the book under review, a valuable study of the heroic figure of Ivan Mazeppa, who symbolizes the striving of the Ukrainians for the independence of their native country throughout the ages up to the present day and whose name has, indeed, become legendary.

The story of Passek, a Polish noble who was a personal enemy of Mazeppa, which deals with the alleged fantastic, amorous adventures of the future Hetman of Ukraine, Ivan Mazeppa, has been retold by many prominent West European writers, above all, in verse by Byron and Victor Hugo, and "it is hardly too much to say that today Mazeppa's ride is the chief event connected with his name in the knowledge of the West" (p. 43). That is why there are as many legendary Mazeppas as there are authors who have retold the love story of the Ukrainian noble, Mazeppa, in various languages. Professor Manning, however, depicts Mazeppa, in accordance with historical records and the literature dealing with his life, not as a legendary figure but as a human being, as a diplomat, statesman, soldier, Ukrainian patriot and patron of Ukrainian art and learning, etc.

After his election as Hetman of Ukraine, Mazeppa realized that the Russian tsars had no intention of observing the terms of the Ukrainian-Muscovite treaty of alliance which had been concluded in the Ukrainian town of Pereyaslav in January, 1654, but, relying on their strong garrisons in Ukraine, were endeavouring to abolish the institution of the Ukrainian Hetmans (sovereigns). Mazeppa's political task was thus by no means an easy one; he was obliged to feign loyalty and devotion to the Russian autocratic Tsar Peter I, whilst at the same time waiting for a favourable opportunity for the final liberation of Ukraine from the Muscovite restriction of her sovereign rights.

This opportunity for the liberation of Ukraine from Russian political, military and economic pressure seemed to have come when the young Swedish King Charles XII declared war on Russia and advanced to Ukraine. On November 4, 1708, Mazeppa summoned his officers and addressed them as follows:

"We are now, thank God, on the right bank of the Desna. Do you think I am leading you to battle against the glorious Swedish army? No, never. We are marching against the hereditary enemy of our people, the Tsar of Moscow, who has sworn to destroy our liberties and to make of us, free Kozaks, the slaves of his house... Let us take vengeance on the Muscovites, let us take vengeance for the great violence which they have used so long against us; let us take vengeance for all their brutalities and their injustices. The hour is come to throw off the hated Muscovite yoke and to make our Ukraine a free and independent country... That is why I decided to go over with you to the glorious King of Sweden, to Charles..." (p. 177).

The united Swedish-Ukrainian armies were, however, defeated by the superior strength of the Russian forces, under the command of Menshikov and Tsar Peter himself, on July 8, 1709, near Poltava. This defeat had disastrous effects as far as Ukraine was concerned. "Gone were all of Mazeppa's hopes. Gone was the power of the Zaporozhian Host. The dreams of the Ukrainians from the time of Khmelnytsky were blasted for good and all, and Peter was free to dispose of the country and the population as he would" (p. 205).

After the defeat at Poltava, the Ukrainian Hetman and the Swedish King sought refuge in the town of Bendery, now in southern Bessarabia and at that time under Turkish rule. Mazeppa set up his headquarters nearby, namely at Varnytsya, and it was here that he passed away on October 2, 1709. "He was dying in exile but he was dying as Hetman... he was recognized as an independent sovereign by all the foes of Moscow. He could feel that he had not lived his life in vain..." (p. 219).

As Professor Manning very rightly states, "few men have received such contradictory verdicts of history as has Ivan Mazeppa. The great romantic poets of Western Europe as Lord Byron and Victor Hugo have written of him in terms of legends that could scarcely have been true. Russians of every school have treated him as a traitor" (p. 224).

Mazeppa has become a symbol to the Ukrainians of their right to an independent state existence of their own. It was he who inspired the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko (died in 1861), as well as the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1917, the organization of the famous Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1943 and the present Ukrainian struggle for independence.

The book contains a certain amount of dramatic suspense and it is definitely well worth reading, since it gives the reader a profounder insight into what is going on at present in Red Russia, that is in the so-called Soviet Union, for the purpose of camouflaging the real Russian imperialist plans, which are aimed not only at Europe but also at the whole world.

V. Oreletsky

**Ivan Vlasovsky: Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.  
Volume I: From the introduction of Christianity to Ukraine  
to the Union of Berestye (988-1596).**

Ukrainian Orthodox Church of USA, New York, Bound  
Brook, 1956. 312 pp.

It is indeed no pleasant picture which the author of this allegedly scholarly representation of the history of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church gives us,—it evokes mournful thoughts both as regards the material which he has compiled from older works in keeping with the historical truth (incidentally, it is significant that there is no bibliography and only a few references to sources) and also the passages in which he, unfortunately, prefers to deviate from this historical truth. And the latter is particularly the case when he depicts anything connected with the relations between the Ukrainian Church and Catholicism. Since the author assumes from the outset that "the Orthodox, idealistic(!), Byzantine East with its more mystical reaction to Christianity<sup>1</sup>) was more in line with the spiritual character of the Ukrainian people than the practical, juridically-minded Roman-Catholic West" (p. 93), he endeavours either to conceal or to minimize all the historical facts which point to the positive relations between the Ukrainian Church and Rome in the 10th-15th century. Thus, for example, the difficult and extremely important question as to how far early Christianity in Kyiv was influenced or, in fact, originally introduced by the Church founded in Moravia by the "Slav Apostles," Cyril and Methodius (which Church, as is well known, was under the supremacy of Rome), is simply ignored by the author (even though the famous Kyivan Glagolitic fragments of a Slav missal of Western type are regarded as extremely important and significant by all specialists in this field); and he likewise completely ignores the no less important problem of the special relations between the earliest Ukrainian Christianity and the West Bulgarian patriarchate of Okhrida, which for a time, during the 9th to 10th century, was under the competence not of Constantinople, but of Rome. It is true that he mentions the fact that in 1020 "Yaroslav the Wise received at his request a metropolitan from Okhrida sent by Pope Benedict VIII" (p. 38), but he makes no further comment in this respect, and leaves it at this.

And now to mention an example of intentional minimization on his part of events which are of considerable importance in the history of the Church. The Kyivan Chronicle in its annals of the year 1051 reports as follows with regard to Yaroslav the Wise: "Having gathered the bishops, he made Ilarion Metropolitan of Rus' in the Church of St. Sophia,"—that is to say, without the consent of the Patriarch of Constantinople. The author comments on this open breach on the part

<sup>1</sup>) The author apparently forgets that undoubtedly the profoundest mystic of the Christian Middle Ages was none other than the Dominican, Meister Eckhart (c. 1260-1327).

of the Ukrainian Church with Byzantium as follows: "Ilarion's elevation is interpreted as a breaking away from Constantinople and union with Rome... the elevation of Ilarion, a Ukrainian, independently of Constantinople constituted Ukraine's answer to Constantinople's 'schism' from Rome—that is the division of the Church which took place in 1054. The elevation of Ilarion, however, took place in 1051, three years before the incident with the papal legates in Constantinople, which led to the division. Clearly it could not have any connection with an event which was to take place three years later" (p. 38).

The author thus relies on the reader perhaps being ignorant of the fact that the ecclesiastical quarrel between Pope Leo IX and the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerullarius, lasted several years until it caused the "incident" of 1054, which by no means "led to the division" (as the author affirms with strange unscrupulousness), but, on the contrary, meant the final breach,—namely mutual excommunication, which is definitely the last step.

The author, however, calmly continues to falsify historical facts: "Historical sources do not even contain a hint of some relations between Ilarion and Rome or of some sympathies toward the Church of Rome on his part" (p. 39). The author is well aware of what the historical sources say in this respect, but he only mentions this—and then only partly—on p. 22, in an entirely different connection so that the reader shall not notice what exactly is involved: "Individual events are sometimes cited by those propagating the thesis of Roman primacy over the Ukrainian Church in those days, to 'prove' that the 'sympathies' of the Ukrainian people lay with Rome. Among these are: the return of papal legates by way of Kiev in 1054 after they had placed the bull of excommunication on the high altar of St. Sophia." And now the author makes a childish attempt to minimize the true situation: "The papal legates could quite safely and freely return to Rome through Kiev and even stay there for a time. The laws of hospitality (and the hospitableness of the Slavs in general, and the Ukrainians in particular, is legendary) alone were enough to assure them a pleasant stay and safe passage" (p. 92).

As it were, a tourist's pleasure trip from Constantinople to Rome via Kyiv! But what the author again intentionally passes over in silence is, of course, the main point: namely that the papal legates not only enjoyed the Kyivan "legendary hospitableness" for months, but also held divine service—naturally according to the Roman ritual—in the Ukrainian cathedral of Kyiv. Can there be a more eloquent proof of whom the Metropolitan Ilarion, who had rebelled against the authority of the patriarchate of Constantinople since 1051, and also Grand Duke Yaroslav sided with in the schism of 1054,—with Byzantium or with Rome?

It is hardly necessary to discuss the contents of this tendentious, pseudo-historical and inferior work any further. *Sapienti sat!*

V. D.

**ARMS OF VALOUR.** By **Pavlo Shandruk**, Lieutenant-General of the General Staff of the Ukrainian National Army. With an Introduction by Roman Smal-Stocki, Ph.D.  
Robert Speller & Sons Publishers, Inc., New York, 1959.  
320 pp.

This work has as its subject the fight of the Ukrainians for their independence and freedom since the outbreak of the Russian revolution in 1917 and the setting up of a free and independent Ukrainian state. In the Introduction it is stressed that the genuine Russians up to the time of the revolution did not constitute the majority of the population of the vast Russian empire; 57.3 per cent of the population consisted of non-Russian nations long oppressed, persecuted and deprived of all their rights by the Russians. The closing act of the drama of the liberation struggle of these non-Russian peoples against the new Red Russian imperialism was the first big emigration from Eastern Europe in 1920-1922. We do not agree, however, with the assertion by General Shandruk that the Polish Marshal Josef Pilsudski did a great deal for the Ukrainian refugees (p. XV). On the contrary, the aim of the Poles (whether rightists or leftists) was to dominate and destroy national individuality of the West Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other peoples. This Polish policy served as a pretext for the Red Russians to "free" all non-Polish peoples from Polish oppression in 1939. Nor do we agree with the opinion expressed by the author that the Czechs wished to give up Carpatho-Ukraine so that it might be incorporated in the future democratic Ukraine and become part of a Slavic confederation that would be a bulwark against the German "urge to the East."

When World War II broke out, the enslaved peoples of the Soviet Union, Poland and Roumania hoped to gain their freedom and independence. But Hitler had ideas of setting up a German colonial empire in Eastern Europe. The Russian and Polish oppressors were accordingly succeeded by the new German occupant. A dark age engulfed Ukraine. Hitler systematically sought to crush any idea of Ukrainian independence and declared that Ukraine was in future to become part of the German "Lebensraum," that is to say, a territory to be colonized by German farmers.

The life and death struggle of the Ukrainians against the danger of annihilation by the Nazis continued throughout World War II. In 1943, the famous Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was founded in Ukraine for the purpose of combatting the German and Russian invaders. It is very regrettable that General Shandruk does not devote appropriate attention in his book to the heroic deeds of this army during the German occupation of the vast Ukrainian territories in 1941-1944. Nor is the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in the capital of West Ukraine, Lviv (Lemberg), in June 1941, mentioned in detail in the book.

It is true that this book, which, incidentally, is lavishly illustrated, contains some interesting data on the unfortunate Ukrainian-German relations during World War II, but this information is not complete and is, to a certain extent, based on the alleged omnipotence of Poland as a decisive political factor in Central and East Europe in the crucial years 1938 and 1939.

W. Luzhansky

**C. A. Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn:** *PARTISANEN. Strategie und Taktik des Guerillakrieges.* ("Partisans. Strategy and Tactics of the Guerilla War.") Verlag für Wehrwesen, Bernard u. Gräfe, Frankfurt/M. and Berlin.

The authors give an interesting account of partisan or guerilla wars, as well as the reasons why they developed to an ever-increasing extent during World War II, and also discuss the methods by which they can be combated, in particular the future Bolshevik-Russian partisans who will take an active part in the third world war. Even in the early days of history and in every part of the world, brief account of such guerilla wars have been given, but this is the first time that the subject of the Russian partisan activity against the Germans during the last war has been dealt with in detail.

Long before the war, the Bolsheviks already began preparing for this type of warfare. In doing so, they used the experience gathered by Mao Tse-tung during the years 1927 to 1937. The book under review gives a detailed account of guerilla tactics, and stresses that the partisans carry out sudden and unexpected raids—like the sting of an insect—and then disappear. In doing so, they co-operate with the regular army and the general staff. The reason for the rapid development of this guerilla warfare, in the territories, too, in which the population was well-disposed towards the Germans at first, is also discussed in detail in the book. At the beginning of the war, the Germans were welcomed as the liberators of our peoples who were subjugated by the Russians, but then the Germans began to behave as new occupants of the territories in question and the population began to hate them. This fact, incidentally, was mentioned by Goebbels in his diary. Everyone in the West will no doubt be interested to hear what Stalin said on one occasion about partisans. "We could never have overthrown Kerensky, had there been no partisans. Because we were successful, the peoples subjugated by Russia supported us, for they hoped that we should liberate them. And this reserve strength which the subjugated peoples represent, must not be ever-looked! They keep silent, but it is precisely this silence which is strength and decides so much. The fact that these peoples live and exist is often hardly noticed, but it must not be overlooked. Do not ignore this fact! If we had not had the foreign peoples to strengthen us in the rear, we should never have defeated such generals as Koltchak, Denikin, Wrangel and Judenitch. When we attacked them, their whole front collapsed. Why? Because these generals only promised a

continuation of subjugation, and for this reason the subjugated peoples welcomed us with open arms, for our banners brought them freedom. In this way, the fate of these generals was sealed. These are the dynamic forces which decide everything. But this fact is easily overlooked since it is overshadowed by our victories!"

The book under review with great precision also discusses the methods to be applied in order to combat partisan activity, and very rightly stresses that in every country citizens who have been influenced by Communist propaganda will fight against their own country in the event of a third world war. The authors point out that in the fight against Russia it is imperative to win over the support of the subjugated peoples, about whom Stalin so plainly expressed his opinion. In this connection, they emphasize in particular the strength and the possibilities of the Ukrainian nationalists and of Chiang Kai-shek's 200 000 partisans.

But the most important thing is to have a motto for this war. It must be a war for liberation from Russian slavery. Since it is obvious that a future war will more or less be a guerilla war on a large scale, it would be advisable to study this book carefully.

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#### NEW PUBLICATIONS ON MOSCOW'S IMPERIALISM IN UKRAINE

The three brochures, which we intend to review in brief below, as far as their contents are concerned form a compact whole, though this was certainly not the intention of their authors (even though they have all been published by the same committee). All three brochures have, above all, the same aim,—namely, to give the Anglo-Saxon reader some clear and concise information on Soviet Russia's imperialistic policy towards Ukraine, without, however, resorting to superfluous propagandist phrases. On no point do the three brochures contradict each other; on the contrary, they complement each other in an excellent way—even though unintentionally, since they deal with different questions, but from the same aspect.

1) The brochure "*The Soviet Union—a New Despotic Empire*," by Dmytro Solovey (published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York, 1958, pp. 12), can be regarded as a good general introduction to the study of the national problem in the U.S.S.R. and, in particular, in Soviet Ukraine. It contains the following chapters: I. General characteristics of the despotic system of the U.S.S.R. under the dictatorship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; II. National discrimination in the Soviet Union; III. Dispersal and Genocide of non-Russian nationalities—characteristic feature of the policy of the Communist Party. — Chapter II, in particular, deserves special mention, for here the author very convincingly explains how "the suppression of the non-Russian nationalities in political, economic and cultural-national relations is accomplished in surreptitious and disguised ways,"



and how it comes about that "the government of Ukraine consists of ordinary agents and officials of the central government in Moscow." The statistical data which is included in this chapter and which refers to the cultural and educational administrative system in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), in Soviet Ukraine and in all the other Soviet Republics of the U.S.S.R. (together) is extremely useful and informative.

Unfortunately, the editorial aspect of the English text of this brochure is by no means in keeping with the excellent features of the contents. As regards the references to English-speaking authors (or to authors whose works have been translated into English)—such as Godfrey Blunden, John Fischer, Dr. Joseph Scholmer, no exact sources are given; one also encounters in the text certain Ukrainian expressions (transcribed) which could easily have been translated into English—as for example, *oblast*, "region"—and which are not even explained; the transcription of Russian words (namely in the bibliographical references) looks most peculiar, since Russian letters are transcribed as if they were Ukrainian ones. And, in addition, there are many orthographical errors in the English text.

On the other hand, however, there are also various errors for which the author himself must be held responsible. It is certainly not accurate to affirm that "in Soviet concentration camps, ... the Ukrainians comprise the overwhelming majority": "the majority," it is true, but not "overwhelming," for there are also a large number of prisoners from the Baltic countries, Caucasians and Turkestanians in these camps. And it is equally inaccurate to describe the Central Committee of the Communist Party as the actual governing body in the U.S.S.R., since this role only fell to the Central Committee of the Communist Party under Lenin's regime, but under Stalin was usurped by the so-called Politbureau and, under Malenkov (and Khrushchev), by the Praesidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party;<sup>1)</sup> and, incidentally, the author contradicts himself by affirming elsewhere, quite rightly, that "unrestricted liberty in the U.S.S.R. exists solely for the leadership of the Central Committee of the CP,"—that is to say, not for all its members, but only for a very small privileged minority. And, finally, it is definitely incorrect to talk about "the Russian Republic—R.S.F.S.R., that is, the Russian people"; for, apart from the fact that state and "people" are only rarely one and the same thing, there are in the R.S.F.S.R. fifteen so-called autonomous Republics and various so-called autonomous regions, whose native population is non-Russian. Incidentally, one of the biggest faults of the whole brochure is that, of all the non-Russian nations of the U.S.S.R., the Ukrainian nation is practically the only one that is dealt with in concrete detail, a fact which is hardly in keeping with the title of the brochure.

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1) The fact that Khrushchev in his last victory over Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich was able to play off the Plenum of the Central Committee against the condemning decision of the Praesidium, was only possible because Khrushchev's opponents never thought of having to reckon with the possibility of such a—formally correct—appeal.

2) "*Colonial Disfranchisement and Exploitation of Ukraine by Moscow*," by Konstantyn Kononenko (published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York, 1958, 30 pp.), is actually an excellent summary of the economic and political contents of the basic scientific work of the same author, entitled "*Ukraine and Russia*" (Marquette University Press, 1958). The author quite rightly takes as his logical starting-point the fact that "when the matter concerns a national entity, in this instance Ukraine, economic phenomena cannot be considered in their abstract meaning or in the aspect of the interests of any other national entity. Each phenomenon should be considered in projection into the plane of direct interests of the given national group which emerge from the very nature of its existence.—Then manifestations of a colonial position will acquire clearly defined aspects. In the realm of economic relations they are:

- 1) Loss of hallmarks of an integrated national-economic organism;
- 2) Loss of sovereignty in the conduct of its own national economic policy;
- 3) Total or partial loss of property rights to national wealth;
- 4) Deliberate dwarfing of the development of some, and one-sided development of other branches of industry;
- 5) Artificial directioning of market relations, and, as a summary result of these:
- 6) Exclusion of a sizeable part of the national income from the national economy, i.e. economic exploitation."

In an extremely learned and clear-sighted way, the author then proves that all these criteria of the economic colonial position apply exactly to Soviet Ukraine, in fact, that they were in principle already fully applicable to Ukraine under tsarist rule,—even though they were at that time not definitely realized. The argument with which the author destroys the legend that the Bolshevik revolution had, at least at the outset, brought the Ukrainian peasantry advantages, is particularly fitting:

"The new system of agrarian conditions which came into being after the revolution, not only did not alleviate the colonial burden carried by the Ukrainian peasants, but increased it in a large measure... As a whole, the Ukrainian peasants spent (in the course of the years 1861 to 1916,—V. D.) nearly 5 billion roubles for land, a huge amount for that time. All this accumulation was lost with the abolition of land ownership. Thus in reality, the land was confiscated from the peasants, and not the landowners. The right of land ownership, won by the Ukrainian peasants in military struggle against the occupying power, Poland, in 1648, was destroyed by Russia's introduction of serfdom, and subsequently, on the occasion of abolition of serfdom, Russia compelled the peasants to buy their own land back, and finally when that land had all been paid for, it was taken away again... earlier, under tsarism, part of the land belonged to the metropolis and its colonizer-landowners, and this placed Ukraine in the position of a colony; now the position of a colony is even more clear, the whole land being owned by an alien power."

One of the outstanding merits of this brochure lies in the fact that the author has omitted certain controversial aspects of his conception of the economic position of Soviet Ukraine and confines himself solely to facts and explanations which have either been proved or can be proved.

3) The brochure "*Destruction of Ukrainian Monuments of Art and Culture under the Soviet Russian Administration between 1917-1957*," by Volodymyr Sichynsky (published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York, 1958, 24 pp.), has been written with the thoroughness and objectivity which is so characteristic a quality of the author, who is one of the most outstanding experts and historiographers of Ukrainian art. Unfortunately, this brochure contains a number of historical inaccuracies,<sup>2)</sup> and, what is even worse, it shows a questionable tendency to excuse the Bolshevik quislings of the Soviet Ukrainian government from all blame and responsibility; they are allegedly merely "docile executants" of the vandalism instigated by Moscow. Yet numerous letters written by the Ukrainian People's Commissar for Education, V. Zatonsky, prove that he played an extremely active part in the destruction of churches in Kyiv in 1934;<sup>3)</sup> and, naturally, he was not the only one of the Ukrainian Communists who was involved on this occasion.

In spite of all this, however, the brochure must be regarded as extremely interesting and informative as far as its particular subject is concerned, and it is to be hoped that the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America will publish further works of this type in the near future.

V. D.

<sup>2)</sup> There was, for example, never such a person as "Hetman Zavadovsky" (p.5); Russian anti-Bolshevist troops neither shelled Kyiv in 1919, nor did they advance as far as Kyiv in 1920 (p.5), and various other inaccuracies.

<sup>3)</sup> See "Nashi Dni" (Lviv), 1943, No. 10.

## UKRAINIANS DEMONSTRATE

As this issue of the "Ukrainian Review" goes to press the Communist Russian dictator and enslaver of Ukraine, Khrushchev, has started his visit to the USA. Ukrainians and people of Ukrainian descent numbering over 1 million individuals are voicing their protest against the brutal tyranny of the regime represented by Khrushchev, the Hangman of Ukraine, and the former accomplice of Stalin's crimes. The Ukrainian Congress Committee uniting all Ukrainian organizations in the USA has proclaimed days of national mourning during Khrushchev's visit. "Daily News" of August 8, 1959 has reported that the Chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee, Dr. Lev Dobriansky, a professor of Soviet economics at Georgetown University, sent a memorandum to President

Eisenhower announcing the attitude of the American Ukrainians to the visit.

Dignified demonstrations of Ukrainians are taking place in many towns in the USA. British press reported on 16th Sept. 1959 that Ukrainians wearing black armbands and distributing anti-Soviet pamphlets could be seen in Washington at the time of the arrival of Khrushchev at the White House. On the same day British TV broadcast a news-item showing a demonstration organised by the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations with Ukrainian participation in New York. Ukrainian Church leaders in the USA have also announced a week of mourning and prayers for the persecuted Ukrainian faithful and Hierarchy in the USSR during Khrushchev's visit.

## Ukrainians in the Free World

### PROFESSOR DR. L. DOBRIANSKY ON "VOICE OF AMERICA" AND SOVIET UNION

On the occasion of his testimony on United States Information Agency fund requests before the Committee in Appropriations, House of Representatives, Professor Dr. Lev Dobriansky of Georgetown University and chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, on April 17, 1959, delivered a significant speech on the policy of the U.S.A. towards the peoples of the U.S.S.R. We quote below some of the most important passages of the speech. Prof. Dobriansky was testifying in support of the request made by the United States Information Agency for funds to establish new transmitters for the "Voice of America" broadcasts to the non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union. Prof. Dobriansky stressed that although many shortcomings and defects continued to exist in the policy and operations of the USIA, the requested funds should be appropriated specifically in order (1) to redress several recent blunderous changes in the "Voice of America" concerning the American broadcasts to these vital and strategic areas in the U.S.S.R. and (2) to expand these broadcasts because of the internal satellite captive status of these non-Russian nations.

The reasons which the speaker offered to justify this position were as follows:

1) Last year some officials in the USIA concocted the bright idea of having the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Turkestanians and Azerbaijanians listen to the American broadcasts either in the language of their captor, namely Russian, or in English. When strong opposition to this plan of alienating these truly natural allies developed both in the Congress and among private groups, the

arguments for curtailing broadcasts in the languages of these different peoples was shifted to the pretext of transmitter shortages and lack of appropriations. The Agency drastically reduced the Baltic and Ukrainian language broadcasts and eliminated entirely the Moslem Uzbek programme to Central Asia.

2) The dimension of activity suggested by the concept of non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. is still appreciated or even recognized by the American Government and people. The incontrovertible facts that (a) over half the population in the U.S.S.R. is non-Russian, (b) almost half of the armed forces in the U.S.S.R. are non-Russian, (c) the so-called Soviet economy is an empire economy thriving on rich captive resources, and (d) the history of every non-Russian nation in this substrata empire is, to present date, one of a struggle for national independence and freedom,— these basic and determining facts continue for the most part to escape the understanding and imaginative thinking of the American policy-makers. The Americans are told, for instance, that it is imperative that they should understand the 100 million Russians better, but they virtually ignore the even greater need for understanding the 110 million non-Russians whose aspirations and history are far more closely related to American traditions and whose unreliability for Moscow has been attested to by countless Russian overseers. To support and extend these aspirations in this peripheral area closest to the very heart of the empire would logically seem to be the highest priority target of American psychological efforts. Instead, the American broadcasts to these non-Russian nations are grossly inadequate in scope and depth for the achievement of this logical end. For example, there are at present no

broadcasts to the 10 million Byelorussians or the 30 million Moslems in the U.S.S.R. As substantiation of the above observations, Prof. Dobriansky submitted for the record an article on the lands and nations in the U.S.S.R.

3) The Americans failure to capture the dominant spirit of these non-Russian nations accounts to a considerable extent for the extreme irony that in Asia and Africa today, Moscow, rather than the Americans, is viewed as the main advocate of national independence, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The one power that itself possesses a vastly extended empire, consisting of these internal satellites within the U.S.S.R. and also the external satellites in Europe and Asia, has by deception seized the role for which the Americans, by tradition and spirituality, are best and honourably fitted. This situation is not only ironical, but incredible and humiliating. Whilst in their naivety the Americans continue to fight the ghosts of "international Communism," "Soviet Communism" and "Marxist ideology," the Muscovites behind these smoke-screens capably apply the borderlands policy of the past try-outs of Muscovy to surpass the imperialist and colonial successes of previous tsars. While people in the United States, like the "Overstreets" who profess to tell the Americans "Why They Must Know About Communism," speak of a "strange new force," "the strangest and most enigmatic in all history," Russian scholars themselves, like Berdyaev and others who experienced this force, long ago thought that Russian Communism is the third form of Russian imperialism, the dominant preceding forms being the Third Rome ideology and Pan-Slavism. Actually, what is truly enigmatic is not Russia but the American trained incapacity to comprehend its imperialism and colonialism within the legalized subterfuge known as the Soviet Union.

In short, further American reverses in the unending cold war—and there are many in the offing—will not be

the result of any missile gap, space lag, fictitious overall economic competition from Moscow, or domestic inflation, all of which are of subsidiary significance to the cold war context. Instead, they will be the direct result of a protracted misconception of the real nature of the enemy, his traditional modes of conspiracy and diplomatic and political duplicity, and his messianism which has existed for centuries. They will also be the indirect result of the American fantastic neglect of the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R., most of whom are the first victims of Red Russian totalitarian imperialism and upon whom the expansion of Moscow's empire is made possible. The present state of USIA's operations regarding the basic area of the U.S.S.R. in the main reflects this neglect. Prof. Dobriansky submitted certain background material into the record ("The Voice of America," an editorial, "The Ukrainian Quarterly," Sept., 1958; "VOA and the non-Russian Nations in the U.S.S.R."); at the same time, he said that he could not stress too strongly the American responsibility to bring about appropriate changes in this paramount respect. American prudent and imaginative activity in this new dimension—the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R.—stands to out-value at far lesser cost the American missiles, American nuclear bombs and other hardware as regards the insecurity of Muscovy in its traditional strides towards world domination.

**THE VERY REVEREND  
CHANCELLOR PLATON KORYNLIK  
APPOINTED BISHOP-ELECT FOR  
UKRAINIANS IN GERMANY**

On April 18th this year, Monsignor Lupi, Chargé d'Affaires at the United States Apostolic Delegation in Washington, announced the appointment of the Very Reverend Chancellor Platon Korynlik, S.T.D., Ph.D., as Bishop-Elect for the Ukrainian Catholics residing in Germany. The ap-

pointment was made by His Holiness Pope John XXIII. Bishop-Elect Kornyliaak has been named Titular Bishop of Castri Martis and Apostolic Exarch for the Ukrainian Catholics in Germany.

Born in Ukraine 39 years ago, the twelfth Ukrainian Catholic Bishop for Ukrainians beyond the borders of Ukraine, was educated in his hometown. He then went to Rome to study for the priesthood.

Shortly after his consecration, Bishop Kornyliaak will depart for his exarchate in Germany, where the Ukrainian Catholics are very numerous.

#### UNREST IN UKRAINE — OPPOSITION TO RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

Bob Siegfrist, well-known American news commentator in the Chicago-Milwaukee area, dealt in considerable detail with the Ukrainian unrest and opposition to Muscovite Russian imperialism in his daily radio broadcast on March 20, 1959. Criticizing the recent Macmillan-Khrushchov negotiations, he said:

"But, whatever domestic trouble Mr. Macmillan suffers is really as nothing compared to that which Khrushchov continues to suffer, despite the fact that he is running a totalitarian state.

"An outstanding example of that basic threat to Khrushchov's continuation in power—the threat to Communism itself—the threat of revolt which Siegfrist discussed in considerable detail as recently as March 5th—this has surged forward to world attention again with the sensational revelation that partisans in Ukraine, where everything Russian as well as everything Communist is deeply hated, have gone in a new rampage against the Khrushchov Communist regime.

"Reports from Vienna tell of how anti-Russian, anti-Communist Ukrainian partisans blew up explosives in the streets of three major cities in southwest Ukraine in a defiant

demonstration of Ukraine's long-running struggle to become an independent state from Russia and from Communism.

"The cities were those in Ukraine of Mukachevo, Khust and Uzhorod, all of which lie in Ukraine's Transcarpathian province which borders on Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary.

"The explosions, fired before midnight, March 14th, eve of the 20th anniversary of the proclamation of a free Carpatho-Ukrainian state, touched off what is described as a "general turmoil," which resulted in unusually strict counter-measures, even for the dread Soviet security police.

"Police reinforcements were hastily summoned from the nearby towns of Stryj and Stanislaviv, an extensive search was conducted for the perpetrators and for anti-Soviet leaflets and posters which the partisans had distributed.

"Their posters, with black borders, were signed with the initials U.P.A., which stands for Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

"The leaflets reminded readers that Augustin Voloshyn, the President of the short-lived free Carpatho-Ukrainian state, had been murdered, with other Ukrainian patriots, by the Red Russians; the Ukrainian population was requested to observe the independence anniversary by staying at home. And it worked: thousands of Ukrainians responded; the streets of the three cities were deserted, while smaller communities held special church services for the partisans executed by the Russian Communists."

We should like to point out in this connection that Carpatho-Ukraine was part of Austro-Hungary until after the first world war, when it was given to Czecho-Slovakia.

On March 14, 1939, the Carpatho-Ukrainians proclaimed their territory an independent state. Soon afterwards, however, Hungary, at that time allied with Nazi Germany, occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. After World War II, it was returned to Czecho-Slovakia and later ceded to the Soviet Union.

## UKRAINIAN STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW

The chair of Ukrainian philology at the University of Warsaw was inaugurated in 1953. Head of the department for Ukrainian studies is Professor P. Zvolinsky; Professor Marian Yakubets has been lecturing on Ukrainian literature, whilst Prof. Fedir Smahlenko, who was invited from Odessa, has recently been lecturing on the contemporary and historical grammar of the Ukrainian language.

The first fifteen students completed their Ukrainian studies in 1955.

Three courses are provided by the department. Three women students will this year complete their studies on the Polish-Ukrainian literary and linguistic problems in the Ukrainian-Polish borderlands.

To begin with, there were not sufficient books available on Ukrainian problems; there are, however, already many old and new Ukrainian works now at the disposal of the students.

The students receive scholarships and live in students' hostels. In order to perfect their knowledge of the Ukrainian language, they are allowed to visit Ukraine.

There are several Polish authorities on Slav and Ukrainian studies at the University of Warsaw who have in all published 150 books on the Ukrainian language.

It is interesting to note that there is a special department at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw and

Cracow which has been entrusted with the task of editing a comparative monograph on the names of the rivers in the basins of the Vistula and Dnipro; in addition, research on Polish-Ukrainian relations is also being carried out. In the near future, the said scholars will re-edit one of the oldest Ukrainian dictionaries, the so-called "Lexicon" by Pamva Berynda. This dictionary was originally published in Kyiv, in 1627, by Berynda, for the purpose of facilitating the study and comprehension of old Slavonic text for Ukrainian students in Kyiv, by interpreting the Slavonic words with Ukrainian words. This dictionary is very important inasmuch as it contains a great deal of interesting Ukrainian folklore. The dictionary was later re-edited twice,—once in 1653 and a second time soon afterwards. It will undoubtedly contribute much to Ukrainian studies not only in Poland, but also elsewhere.

In spite of all this, however, there are still considerable shortcomings as regards the Ukrainian chair at Warsaw University. There is, for instance, no professor to lecture on the history of Ukraine, which is closely connected with Ukrainian philology and with Ukrainian studies in general. In addition, there is no lecturer who is in charge of the practical teaching of the Ukrainian language, and there are also no corresponding courses for the study of the Ukrainian language and literature for teachers outside the Polish capital.

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REVIEW**



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## **STEPAN BANDERA**

**1. 1. 1909 — 15. 10. 1959**

It is with the deepest sorrow and anger that the Ukrainian community the world over has learnt about the assassination of the Leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Revolutionaries), the life-long fighter for the freedom and independence of Ukraine, Stepan Bandera, who died in Munich, Germany, on October 15th, 1959, after being treacherously poisoned by the agents of the Bolshevik Russian imperialism. Stepan Bandera's death is a great blow and an immeasurable loss to the Ukrainian liberation movement which continues its undaunted heroic struggle against the present oppressor of the Ukrainian people and the greatest enemy of all freedom-loving mankind, Russian Bolshevism, in spite of the brutal repressions perpetrated by Moscow and of the shortsighted and unhelpful policy of the West. It is not for the first time that the Kremlin tyrants have sent killers to murder a leader of the Ukrainian national fight for liberty so dangerous to the Russian slave-empire. On May 25th, 1926, the former C.-in-C.

of the Army and Head of State of the Ukrainian National Republic and the political leader of the Ukrainian nationalist emigration, Simon Petlura, was shot by a Bolshevik agent in Paris. On May 23rd, 1938, the predecessor of the late Stepan Bandera, in the post of the Leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Evhen Konovalets, was killed by a Muscovite agent's bomb in Rotterdam, Holland. On March 5th, 1950, the C-in-C. of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Roman Shukhevych (pseud. Taras Chuprynka), was killed by the Russian MGB (political police) troops in a fight near Lviv in West Ukraine. However, the list of all the known and unknown victims of the barbarous Soviet Russian regime continuing the tyrannical policies of Ivan the Terrible, Peter I and Catherine II is so long that it would take volumes of books simply to commemorate them. Stepan Bandera was the latest, but we must unfortunately presume, not the last Ukrainian freedom fighter who fell at the hands of the anti-human criminal gang holding the reins of the Russian monster empire and lashing out against any stirrings of the spirit of freedom. Stepan Bandera devoted his entire life to the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people against Russian-Bolshevist occupation and enslavement.

Born on the 1st January, 1909, at Uhryniv Staryi in West Ukraine, he already began his political activity in his youth when he became a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

In 1940 he was elected Leader of the Organization.

During World War II, the OUN conducted an open armed struggle against the two great powers, Russia and Nazi-Germany, which were engaged in a conflict between themselves and were both trying to annex Ukraine.

This struggle was continued unflaggingly also after the war,—in the first place against Russia.

Stepan Bandera's name became the symbol of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Russian Bolshevik oppressors. For this reason, the Ukrainian resistance fighters became known as the "Banderivtsi."

Under the leadership of Stepan Bandera the OUN proclaimed Ukraine an independent state in 1941. Thereby the national will of the Ukrainian people to achieve their long-desired national aim was once again reaffirmed. Shortly afterwards, Stepan Bandera was arrested by the Germans and imprisoned in the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen, where he remained until shortly before the war ended.

In spite of his arrest, the OUN continued its struggle on two fronts. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was set up under the supreme command of General Taras Chuprynka, established contact with the liberation organizations of other nations enslaved by Russia; a common coordination center was created in the form of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), which now exists as a great and important organization in the free world under the leadership of its President Jaroslaw Stetzko.



After his release from the concentration camp, Stepan Bandera resumed the active leadership of the Ukrainian liberation struggle and remained supreme leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists until his death.

Under his leadership, the OUN attained a great importance as the front-rank fighter for justice, liberty and independence of nations, not only for its own people, but also for all the peoples enslaved in the Russian empire.

Bandera's life was that of a steadfast fighter for the freedom of his country. Living in exile, he maintained constant touch with the underground movement in Ukraine. He showed his nation the course to take and became the bearer of its will and its national aims.

With the death of Stepan Bandera the Ukrainian people have suffered a tragic blow, for they have thus lost one of their best sons.

If one considers his own and the OUN's activity and bears in mind that the enemy knew perfectly well what a danger he and his organization represented for Russian Bolshevist tyranny, one realizes why Moscow was constantly trying to liquidate him.

The enemy has now succeeded in achieving his criminal aim by murdering S. Bandera with poison.

Stepan Bandera was a profoundly religious Christian with a steadfast character and his private as well as his official and social life was permeated with Christian morality. Moreover, his life was devoted to the struggle against anti-Christian and criminal Moscow.

He enjoyed boundless authority in the OUN which he led, as well as general respect and confidence.

The Ukrainians in exile, scattered throughout all the countries of the world, gave him and the OUN every political and material support. Stepan Bandera fell in the struggle that is being waged not only for the liberation of Ukraine and the other nations enslaved by Moscow, but also for the common cause of freedom for the entire civilized world threatened by the Russian Bolshevist imperium. Stepan Bandera died at the hands of the murderers as yet unpunished, but his fight to which he remained true until his death will be continued until the Ukrainian people have regained their freedom.

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**Niko Nakashidze**

(General-Secretary of the Central Committee of ABN, Georgia)

## **Our Loyal Friend**

Inexorable fate has robbed us of Stepan B a n d e r a .

Alarmed, horrified and grieved we whispered: "It cannot be true!" But the terrible news was true after all!

His whole life he went through the fire and hell of a ceaseless fight; he looked death in the face so often and always escaped; but here in this peaceful town, death overtook him.

The ways of Providence are strange and incomprehensible to us. May God forgive us, poor mortals, for our bitterness as we bewail our loss.

The great son of the Ukrainian people, the leader of the national fight, Stepan BANDERA, has been unexpectedly taken from our midst. In these troubled times in the life of the Ukrainian nation, this loss is immeasurable. His name was a symbol in the national fight and throughout Ukraine it was cherished, loved and respected in the hearts of the people.

The manner in which the Communist regime at home and the Soviet press attacked him clearly showed how deeply rooted his name was amongst the Ukrainian people.

If a nation is determined to assert its existence and if its spirit and will are alive and active, then it produces men who show it the right course to take and who lead it to national revolt. And such a man was Stepan BANDERA!

As a young man, together with some of his friends, he took over the leadership of the national fight of his country, when the latter was still divided up between Russia and Poland, and their zeal and patriotism inspired the nation so profoundly that it still continues to wage its unequal fight against Muscovite tyranny even today.

In 1955 the Communist poet, Mykola Sheremet wrote: "You knew Petlura, you served Konovalts; now you are serving Bandera like a faithful dog." This "poem" shows how loyally the people support their national leaders and how willing they are to fight and to die for national freedom.

The day will come when, in a free and restored Ukraine, the bandurists in their songs will praise those men who made their nation great. And the name of Stepan BANDERA will have a fitting place amongst them.

We have lost our loyal friend and fellow-fighter. This is not the first tragic blow which our peoples have suffered in the course of their history, but they have always shown their fortitude in bearing such blows.

Stepan BANDERA's Ukrainian people will live on for ever and his name will live on in them for ever!

We are proud of having stood in his ranks!

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## **DEDICATION**

To the ever-glorious memory of the fallen hero, Stepan Bandera.

How shall I praise thee, speak last words of glory,  
Extol a life-long struggle towards freedom?  
How can my soul thrill to a hero's story,  
A spark of triumph from a land left bleeding?

Long centuries of freedom lie behind me;  
Can England's noon kiss with a wavering star?  
Thy death's a torch — but can its beacon find me  
Like those who mourn for Kruty and Bazar?

Yet, island-safe, we still have not forgotten  
England's last little band on Ashdown Hill;  
A child, I saw my city burned and blackened;  
We may not speak — but blood remembers still.

Accept my praises, then, Stepan Bandera,  
Hero and leader, soul of free Ukraine,  
Sword of our freedom, ally and defender —  
Fallen in war, thy hopes shall rise again.

Our fight is past; accept my dedication:  
Till eagle's claw, sickle, red star and hammer  
Perish, until Ukraine knows liberation,  
All that I am, I'll fight beneath thy banner.

Vera Rich

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(Note: the Battle of Ashdown, 871, A.D. was fought between the Danes, who were occupying all but the south-west of England, and the last remnants of English resistance. The victory of the English marked the turning point in the war and saved England from total conquest).



## AN APPEAL TO FREEDOM-LOVING MANKIND

The murder of the illustrious Ukrainian leader, **Stepan Bandera**, committed by the KGB by poisoning him on October 15th in Munich, cannot fail to arouse the indignation of freedom-loving mankind. Moscow has added another crime to the series of its misdeeds. Once again, the human rights and fundamental freedoms have been violated, which, in the constitutions of the truly democratic states, are assured not only their citizens, but also those who are not citizens of these states,—as is also confirmed by the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic, which states: "Everyone has the rights to life and to physical security. The freedom of person is inviolable."

There can be no doubt about the fact that the murder of Stepan Bandera was committed for political reasons. As leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), an organization which is fighting for the liberation of Ukraine and for the restoration of its democratic state order, he stood in the vanguard of the fighters for the freedom of peoples and individuals. Stepan Bandera's ideas so appealed to the Ukrainian people and to other peoples enslaved by Moscow that his name has become a symbol of the present anti-Russian fight of Ukraine for her state independence and for the freedom of individuals and synonymous with the resistance against the despotic regime in the peoples' prison of the U.S.S.R. Stepan Bandera derived his great moral strength from the profound religiousness that was characteristic of him. The doctrine of Christianity was an inseparable part of his mentality. Faith in God and Christian moral principles determined all his actions; his profound patriotism and nationalism were one with his character and his Christianity.

If it is a question of existence or non-existence for the Moscow imperium, the Russian imperialists do not hesitate to commit a crime; thus, for instance, Bolshevik criminals murdered the head of the Ukrainian state, Simon Petlura, in Paris (May 1926), and his successor in the fight for freedom of Ukraine, Eugen Konovalets, in Rotterdam (May 1938); this is corroborated by recent history, by the events in East Berlin, Poznan or Hungary, or by the ruthless suppression of the revolts of the political prisoners in the concentration camps of Siberia and Kazakhstan,—revolts which were led by Ukrainian freedom fighters, adherents of Stepan Bandera. However inconvenient it might have been as far as Bolshevik propaganda was concerned, to let the leader of the fight for freedom of the Ukrainian people be murdered at a time when the so-called peaceful coexistence and complete disarmament is being propagated,—Moscow nevertheless decided to take this step and, in doing so, thus disclosed that it regards the idea of the fight for the freedom of peoples and individuals as a deadly danger to itself.

On the other hand, however, Moscow used the coexistence atmosphere in the free world to advantage for this murder, since it was convinced that no Western power would wish to disturb the deceptive "peace atmosphere" by opposing the murderers in the Kremlin and rising up in defence of the human ideals of Stepan Bandera and his sacrifice. We, however, still believe that there is something noble and good in Christian mankind and hence we appeal to all those to whom freedom is dear to condemn unreservedly the murder of Stepan Bandera as an act of treachery and also as a flagrant violation of Article 55c of the Charter of the UN, as well as of the Geneva Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 10, 1948, Article 3, which states "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person," and of the European Convention on Human Rights,—and thus as a crime against mankind. Of course, no action can restore this husband and father who has been murdered to his sorrowing widow and children, just as it cannot restore to Ukraine the undaunted fighter for her natural right to lead an independent life of her own amidst free peoples; but the question at issue here is justice, which is indivisible.

Any tolerance towards Moscow's crime is not only identical with discriminating between the highest human values, such as human rights and basic freedoms, but also with supporting the plans of the arch-enemy of freedom-loving mankind, who is seeking to subjugate the whole world to his rule and who wants to see godless Communism triumph everywhere.

At Headquarters, October 24, 1959.

The Presidium of the Units Abroad  
of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).

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**Expose Communist Crimes !**  
**Fight Russian Imperialism !**  
**Support the Liberation Struggle**  
**of the Nations Enslaved by Russia !**

## Stepan Bandera, a Man and a Symbol

(1909 — 1959)

In his article<sup>1)</sup> dedicated to the tragic death and the illustrious memory of the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, Stepan Bandera, the outstanding philosopher of Ukrainian nationalism, Dr. Dmytro Donzow, raises the question as to what reasons there could be for the murder of Stepan Bandera by poison on October 15, 1959, in Munich, after Bolshevik agents treacherously murdered the former leader of the Ukrainian national fight for freedom, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian forces, Simon Petlura (in Paris in 1926), and the founder of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Eugene Konovalets (in Rotterdam in 1938):

"Why has Stepan Bandera been murdered at precisely this moment and why, of all people, he? Because the trip of the "Peacemaker" of the Kremlin, which was so carefully prepared by the Moscow loud-speakers and by the "leftist" Jericho trumpets of the West, ended in a complete fiasco. And because the appearance in the West of this ruthless tyrant sufficed to destroy the entire effect of all the publicity fuss,—and because even the simpletons of the West who were taken in most of all by this publicity drive noticed the devil's claws on the "friendly" outstretched hand of the "peacemaker" and devil's horns over his smiling face. His brutal strength was obvious, and even the notorious Russian cunning failed on this occasion; Satan revealed himself as an evil but unwise beast. The deception failed, the psychological demobilization failed and the "Appeasement" failed... Moscow did not succeed in attaining what it desired to achieve by its promises of peace,—namely that the West should cease the "cold war" and put a stop to all anti-Soviet action on the part of the refugees. And the insecurity of the future continues, and the clique of tyrants are afraid. And it is precisely at such times that the latter find it necessary to chose the spirit of fighting Ukraine as their target,—as was likewise the case in May 1926 and in May 1938."

"And why was Stepan Bandera chosen as the victim,—the man who breathed his last on that fatal day in autumn? ... Precisely because his name since World War II—even from the point of view of his enemies—has become the symbol of the Ukrainian life-and-death struggle against the rapacious Muscovite occupant of Ukraine; precisely because the name **Bandera**, which in the old language meant "banner," at a decisive moment for the further existence of Bolshevik tyranny

1) D. Donzow: "Imya-Symvol" ("A Name is a Symbol"), in "Shlakh Peremohy" (Munich) of November 8, 1959, No. 45/298.

might become a banner under which all the men of courage and honour in Ukraine, disregarding the suggestions of the enemy's propaganda, would unite."

A brief survey of the life of the hero of the Ukrainian fight for freedom will corroborate the fact that the above statements are by no means exaggerated.

Stepan Bandera was born on January 1, 1909, in Galicia (West Ukraine) as the son of a much esteemed and patriotic-minded village priest, who played an active part in the West Ukrainian fight for freedom in 1918-1919 against the armed Polish occupation and for this reason—contrary to all amnesty—was later treacherously subjected to repressive measures and harassed by the Polish authorities (in the spring of 1941 both he and his wife, Stepan Bandera's mother, were deported by the Bolsheviks to East Siberia, where they died a few years later as a result of the terrible conditions prevailing there). In 1927, the year that he completed his studies at a grammar school, Stepan Bandera joined the nationalist Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), which was ruthlessly persecuted by the Polish authorities; in the following year he was already arrested for propagandist activity. During the next few years, from 1929-1932, he was arrested several times, for the young revolutionary, who by this time was studying agronomy at the Polytechnical College in Lviv (Lemberg), was also beginning to occupy important positions in the territorial Executive Committee of the OUN (the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which in 1929 incorporated the UVO) and in 1932 became head of the said Executive Committee and territorial commander-in-chief of the UVO. In the summer of 1934 he was arrested and imprisoned in connection with the successful attempt on the part of the Ukrainian Nationalists on the life of the Polish Minister of the Interior, B. Pieracki, a fierce enemy and persecutor of the Ukrainian people; in 1936 Stepan Bandera was sentenced to death at the notorious trial against the OUN in Warsaw, but the sentence was then commuted to imprisonment for life; it was not until the autumn of 1939, after the collapse of the Polish state, that he was set free.

The dynamic political activity which he then developed led to his becoming the head of the Revolutionary Executive Committee of the OUN, and a year later the 2nd Congress of the OUN elected him as head of the entire Organization. It was in this capacity that he played a decisive part in the proclamation of the restoration of the independence and indivisibility of the Ukrainian State and in the formation of the Ukrainian National Government in Lviv on June 30, 1941; and it was in this connection that he was arrested a week later by the German Nazi occupation authorities and imprisoned in the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen (near Berlin), from which he was not released until September 1944; his two brothers were murdered a year earlier in the notorious concentration camp at Auschwitz (Polish chauvinists and enemies of Ukraine were among those who committed these murders).

After the war, Stepan Bandera was elected Head of the Executive Committee of the OUN at a conference of the OUN which convened in Ukraine in 1945, and in 1953, at the 4th Congress of the OUN, Head of the Executive Committee of the Units Abroad of the OUN; in this capacity he was in charge of the entire activity of the OUN up to the time of his tragic death.

And, what is more,—in this capacity he moulded the political character of the OUN and gave it its proper form of organization. Neither the fact that he was sentenced to death, nor the years he spent in German concentration camps, nor the martyrdom inflicted on his two brothers in Auschwitz could make him swerve from his revolutionary course; he continued to pursue his path unwaveringly, regardless of obstacles or dangers.

He derived his great moral strength from his profound religiousness. Christianity was an inalienable part of his mentality and his entire activity was characterized by his faith in God and by his Christian moral principles. His patriotic nationalism was inseparably united with his Christianity. He was fully aware of the fact that Moscow, the centre of aggressive atheism and totalitarian tyranny, can only be fought successfully if Ukraine once more resumes her historical mission in East Europe,—the fight for Christ against the Moscow anti-Christ. And he fought for this cause not only tactically, but also and above all ideologically, for it was a direct corroboration of his own personal outlook of life and the world in general.

He was not only an outstanding organizer of the national revolution, but also a far-sighted theoretician, whose conception of Ukraine was always that of a nation standing on the common front of all the peoples enslaved by Russia and by Communism; for this reason he was a sincere supporter and a determined champion of the ideas of freedom advocated by the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), in whose foundation and activity he played an outstanding part. The Ukrainian problem was in his opinion a problem which concerns the whole world; he desired freedom and national independence both for his own native country, as well as for all the other peoples subjugated by Russia and Communism.

When the two totalitarian imperialisms clashed on Ukrainian soil in 1941, he courageously decided to wage the two-front fight, the basis of which was provided by the Ukrainian act of state of June 30, 1941. He regarded the national revolution as an all-embracing revival of the entire nation in every sphere of public and private life.

He had the courage to reach decisions and to assume the responsibility in this respect, without casting the blame for possible failures on to others. He was relentless in his attitude towards the national enemy, but he respected every honest and righteous action on the part of Ukrainians whose political attitude differed from his, and he was firmly convinced that at the decisive moment in Ukraine's history all sincere patriots of Ukraine would cast aside their internal political differences and would set the interests of the Ukrainian nation above all else.

He was also interested in the problems of the Ukrainian National Revolution regarding a political programme, and he contributed an important share to the ideological contents of Ukrainian nationalism. His ideas, expressed in various publications and also in his political correspondence, will, once they have been compiled, give a clear picture of his views and his political testament.

His death has dealt Ukraine a heavy blow. Moscow has murdered the leader of the Ukrainian national fight for freedom in the firm conviction that this crime, committed at a time of so-called "peaceful coexistence" and capitulation moods in the West, will not lead to any external political conflicts. But the Free World should realize that the murder of Stepan Bandera will be a "memento mori" for all those who do not support the Ukrainian fight for freedom: Moscow's crime is a corroboration of its determination to prepare itself for a decisive fight with the West in the near future. Will the West comprehend this?

Moscow wasted all its forces in order to destroy Stepan Bandera morally and ideologically and thus deal the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the Ukrainian revolutionary fight for freedom a deadly blow. A torrent of disgusting lies and insidious defamations and accusations,—such were the weapons with the aid of which the Muscovite subjugator endeavoured to kill Stepan Bandera morally in the eyes of the Ukrainian people and of the free world. But Moscow has failed to do so. Not being able to vanquish the leader of fighting Ukraine ideologically, the vile enemy killed him physically.

Moscow is endeavouring to break the Ukrainian spirit and, by taking Stepan Bandera from our midst, believes that the Ukrainian nation will thus be spiritually crushed, overwhelmed by despair, will renounce the ideas of the man who has been murdered and will abandon the national fight for freedom.

Such hopes are futile!—The deceased was the very personification of the ideas of the entire Ukrainian nation, of the ideas which inspire it, of the ideas for which it suffers and for which millions of Ukrainians have already sacrificed their lives. The name of Stepan Bandera has become the symbol of the present anti-Russian fight of Ukraine for state independence and for human freedom. In Bandera's own words: "The enemy has not succeeded in killing the invincible spirit of the fight against evil and violence and for truth and freedom amongst the Ukrainians and the other subjugated peoples"<sup>2</sup>).—"The striving for freedom and truth, a sense of right and a noble-minded idealism, have always constituted the principles of the Ukrainian people and of the individual Ukrainian, and have been and always will be the main forces that guide and govern Ukrainian life and the Ukrainian mentality"<sup>3</sup>).

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<sup>2</sup>) Stepan Bandera: "Ukraine Will Not Become An Ally Of Moscow" (1957).

<sup>3</sup>) Stepan Bandera: "The Prospects of the Ukrainian National Revolutionary Fight for Freedom" (1958).

Yar Slavutych<sup>1</sup>)

## T H E O A S I S

\* \* \*

I regard Thee a phantom oasis,  
A mirage on Sahara's blanched sand,  
And my heart ever turns to the places  
Where Thy white-fronted cottages stand.

From Thy arbors cool breezes are blowing  
Through the land which is sacred to me;  
To Thy face I direct my outgoing  
And my lips burning feverishly.

Now my arms are encumbered like branches  
Overweighed with the fruit of my hope,  
With my dreams to review Thy expanses  
And Thy beauty of Biblical scope.

With the freshness of dewdrops relieve me,  
Quench my thirst with the glitter of rain,  
From the throes of the desert receive me,  
Give me rest in Thy spaces, Ukraine!

\* \* \*

Today there's but a shade of the emotion  
Which urged me to aspire when I was young,  
And memory is a sufficient potion  
To put a drunken passion on my tongue.

So hail! celestial calm, farewell forever —  
Begone before thy fitful hour is done!  
I've lost my steppes, and now my still endeavor  
Has earned the boney cities of the Hun.

But I won't damn — I'm not the man to do it —  
Nor execrate the exile's lonely road.  
It has its compensations; can I rue it,  
This pleasant price for sins against my code?

My shirt is wet; I'll offer no resistance.  
The muse within me can't belie the facts;  
For like the sword of Damocles this distance  
Attracts and threatens, threatens and attracts.

\* \*  
\*

Where I die of homesickness and pining  
Bury me, and heap up foreign loam.  
Russian hangmen my own land maligning  
Will not let you bring my body home.

On the pathway pounded by the ages  
Where the rough-cut rustling oak tree grows  
Place a granite headstone for my wages,  
With a Trident token my repose<sup>2</sup>).

When new liberty will seethe in ferment  
And embrace you in its golden glow,  
Bear me to your steppes for reinterment  
Where your springs of cooling water flow.

Let the native poplar roots reclaim me  
From the soil within the Dnieper's sight.  
Just as for that river they have named me,  
So I've lived for what I reckon right<sup>3</sup>).

\* \*  
\*

My spirit soars with brave and staunch persistence  
Above the fields, and in the shining distance  
The tumuli reflect the gilded sun  
Against the sod where ancient plows have run  
A mask upon the marks of brave resistance.  
My ceaseless soul has sought out the existence  
Of proving relics, dared to feel as one  
The passion and the joyous thrust that spun  
Against the Tartar hordes with mad insistence,  
As horses tore their bits to lend assistance.  
To save the Hetman flag and clarion  
The Kozak front lost many a noble son.

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1) The following four poems are taken from the new book: Oasis. Selected poems of Yar Slavutych. Translated from the Ukrainian by Morse Manly in co-operation with the author. New York, Vantage Press, 1959.

2) Trident: originally a family insignia of Volodymyr the Great (979-1015), a Ukrainian prince. The Trident was accepted as a national coat of arms by the Ukrainian State in 1918.

3) The last lines of this poem refer to the author's surname. Slavutych means son of Slavuta, or "the river of glory." Slavuta has been used as poetic name for the Dniro (Dnieper) since the medieval ages.



Z. Karbovych

## To Meet or not to Meet at the "Summit" ?

The recent acceptance by the United States and its Western Allies of Khrushchov's proposal to hold a "summit" meeting constitutes one of the major defeats suffered by the Western nations in the last few years. Although the immediate reason for the meeting of the heads of the major powers is to be the alleged Russian desire to settle the so-called Berlin problem resulting from the aftermath of World War II, the real cause of the Russian Communist stampede lies in the Russian manoeuvres and manipulations to achieve a "summit" meeting at this time and on the terms dictated by the Kremlin. Such a meeting now, Moscow thinks, would greatly enhance her worldwide prestige and political power. The nature of the Bolshevik Russian regime precludes any permanent settlement.

Coexistence with Russia is a utopia, a dangerous illusion. The West should prepare itself for the worst in its relations with Russia, for a time may come when, in spite of all the "Munichs," it will become impossible not to go to war.

Any calculation based on the possibility of a future political evolution in the U.S.S.R. is false. Only a radical change by means of anti-imperialistic, anti-Communist, national revolutions is possible. The example with Nagy and Maleter is too striking to allow us to foresee any changes for the better, or any alleviation of the situation in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The liquidation of Maleter and his colleagues was expedient in the light of the Russian methods of government, for the forces of resistance had already grown so much that Russia had to resort to the old and well-tried Stalinist methods in the mastery of which Krushchov himself excelled in Ukraine.

A "summit" conference should, in Moscow's plans, bring President Eisenhower to approve of such methods of the Kremlin as were applied in Hungary, and in this way to discredit the leaders of the Free World in the eyes of the subjugated peoples.

And the West can set as little sound hope on so-called National Communism as it can on a "peaceful coexistence" with Russian Communism: for National Communism is a slavery very similar to that of Russian Communism. It can hold out as long as Communism persists in the U.S.S.R. It serves as a bridge for the infiltration of the Russian Communist idea, and as a means for the neutralization of the forces opposed to Russia. It is designed to take place as an ideology in case of a fall of Bolshevism. To rely on "National Communism" means to rely on pro-Russian ideas.

Moscow's policy in the Orient and in Africa can be answered only by an active support of the national liberation movements for independence in the countries subjugated by Russia, and of the nationalist

leaders who represent the anti-Russian underground movements on this side of the Iron Curtain.

An internal revolution in the U.S.S.R. is possible and even probable, if the West will no longer abet the Russian Bolshevik tyranny, but will openly adopt the program of splitting up the Russian empire and the liberation of the non-Russian nations of Europe and Asia. The Western foreign policy-makers have yet to take a definite stand on this matter. If the cause of independence for the enslaved peoples is not advanced, we shall not have to wait long before the West may be overcome by the Russian monster empire. The key to peace and security of the world today are the nations enslaved in or by the U.S.S.R. Without their full independence the West cannot experience a real peace or safety. The Ukrainian people, just as other subjugated peoples, have already overcome the Communist infection and are spreading the word of truth and freedom. They must be supported and assisted, for they hold the key to the future destruction of Russian despotism.

Therefore the West, particularly the United States would be advised to adopt offensive tactics. Not to debate the Russian demands, but to advance their own, in particular the following:

Russian withdrawal from all the countries enslaved by her, both in the satellite countries and in the U.S.S.R.;

To reject all and sundry conferences at the "summit," for their aim on the part of Russia is to obtain a recognition of her gains and of the **status quo** from the West; this would assure a basis for future conquests by Russia. Such conferences would greatly disappoint the enslaved nations, for the latter would have a right to regard the United States as a perpetuator and co-guarantor of their enslavement.

Another aim of such a "summit" conference would be to split the Western alliance, to secure the disarmament of West Europe in order to thus deceive once again the trusting Western politicians and to achieve a kind of a new Yalta at least.

In dragging her satellites to the various conferences, Russia wishes to create the illusion that she is a protector of small nations, of their international equality, whereas in fact, she simply has no desire to be outvoted. It needs no stressing that these satellite countries, including Gomulka's Poland, are not independent at all, but merely dependencies of Moscow and run by the latter's agents. Moscow is willing to give them a vote, but this merely means that she would have three votes instead of one. This obviously is nonsense. In conducting negotiations with each of the Western powers separately, Moscow has uncovered a lack of foresight on their part, for they have managed to manoeuvre themselves into a position in which Moscow was able to attempt to set one power against another. Can one really believe in a "summit" settlement of the dispute between Russia and the West without Western capitulation?

The conflict with Russia seems inevitable, and it cannot be won as long as support for the liberation and independence movements of

the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. and other countries behind the Iron Curtain by the West is not an integral part of its overall policy with respect to Communist Russia. Only with such an unqualified support can we hope to avert the final defeat of the West by Communist Russia, and contribute to the final and irrevocable destruction of the Russian tyranny and everything it stands for.

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## Anniversary

(Written on the occasion of the Rally of the Ukrainian Youth Association, to commemorate the 250th Anniversary of the Battle of Poltava.)

Two hundred and fifty years—and in this night  
A few lost meteors spark their dying fall.  
But no white star blesses the joy-winged feet,  
The flowering cry: "Rejoice, a child is born,  
Freedom is born upon the plundered steppe!"  
Meanwhile, recording devils trim their pens,  
Draw frontiers, and colour in with blood.

Two hundred and fifty years—and who comes now  
To honour you, Mazeppa? Do they speak  
Your name, where statesmen juggle policies?  
Does Europe kindle torches at your tomb,  
Or wreath a gilded laurel round your sword,  
"Long service, Captain of the Frontier Guard!"?  
— Their time must plan the latest Conference.

Not the eternal memory of defeat,  
Not wistful glory in a flame-lit song,  
No exile's dreaming of a dimming past  
Shall crown you with perpetual tragedy.  
Your name the fire-mist of all freedom's stars,  
Your rustless spirit gleams an undimmed blade,  
And forges sabres from our weakest hopes.

Not yet the dawn of armies marching east,  
Frail swords against the multitudes of Hell,  
— The scarlet flowers of war are drowsing still  
Within their furry buds, within our veins.  
Until they burst in splendour on the sky,  
We fight with hopes, with prayers, and with your soul  
Hurl freedom's laughter thundering at defeat.

Vera Rich  
Bradford, 18. 7. 1959

Prof. Dr. Oleksander Ohloblyn

## THE YEAR 1709

### I

The Ukrainian Cossack Hetman, Ivan Mazeppa (1644-1709) spent New Year's Day 1709 at his castle in Hadiach under very unpleasant conditions. The past year had proved extremely unfortunate for Ukraine and for the big plans of the Hetman. What the Hetman had dreaded more than anything else, had happened,—and precisely at a time when he was least prepared for it. Contrary to all Mazeppa's plans and hopes, his ally, the King of Sweden, Charles XII, had been obliged, in his advance towards the enemy in Moscow, to enter the territory of the Ukrainian Cossack state; the theatre of war was thus now transferred to Ukraine. When the Hetman learnt that the King of Sweden had entered the region of Siversk, he said to his adherents with justifiable anger: "Confound him! He has upset all my interests: the Great Russian armies will follow him into Ukraine—to their final ruin and to our undoing."

The main point was that the Hetman was now forced to show his cards at a moment which was most unfavourable for him. Ukraine was not yet ready for the fight for its liberation from the Muscovite yoke. The Ukrainian army was for the most part widely scattered and, moreover, not in the country. The fortresses were not yet adequately strengthened. There was, furthermore, considerable internal political tension as a result of the trial against Kochubey and Iskra, who had betrayed the Hetman to the Tsar and in doing so had been executed. The masses, constantly discontented as a result of being exploited by the Cossack and landed nobility, seemed to be only waiting for a summons to insubordination and rebellion. The far-reaching plans of the Hetman concerning foreign political matters had not yet been completed, and the defeat and death of the Hetman of the Don Cossacks, Konrad Bulavin, who had risen up in revolt against Moscow, had frustrated Mazeppa's hopes of help from the Don Cossacks. And, lastly, he had not been able to secure the support of the Cossacks of the West bank of the River Dnieper in time, and there was no relying on any actual help on the part of the Zaporogian Cossacks,<sup>1)</sup> who had always opposed Mazeppa's policy. The old Hetman knew exactly what it was that he dreaded.

But he had no inkling of what would actually happen, and reality proved, far more dreadful than he had ever imagined. His beloved

1) The autonomous Cossacks of the "region beyond the rapids (of the River Dnieper)", the core of the free Cossack element.

Baturyn, the Ukrainian town in which he had his residence,—with all its state offices, its treasury, state archives, churches and palaces, which Mazeppa had erected, with its library which was so dear to him, with its armoury which was one of the most unique collections in the whole of Europe, with all that the great Ukrainian statesman and patron of culture had built up there in the course of his twenty years' rule,—was ravaged by fire and destroyed by the Russian barbarians. The most distressing loss was that of the entire artillery park, to which the Hetman, an expert on gunnery, had devoted so much interest and attention. "Mazeppa wept bitter tears over Baturyn"—so a contemporary relates,—when, having hastened to the aid of the town, he found nothing but ruins, fires and the corpses of the inhabitants of Baturyn and of those who had defended the town. "This is the beginning of dreadful things to come,"—he said to his loyal helpmate, the Cossack chancellor Pylyp Orlyk.—"I realize that God has not seen fit to bless my plans! . . . Things will all turn out different now: Ukraine, intimidated by the fate of Baturyn, will be afraid to join forces with us."

Tsar Peter I and his commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Menshikov, know what they were about when they destroyed the residency of the Ukrainian Cossack state in so ruthless a way. Hyllenstjerna, who took part in the campaign on the Swedish side, ascertained quite rightly that the destruction of Baturyn had alarmed the whole of Ukraine. "Moscow has caused chaos, Moscow has destroyed Baturyn completely; the inhabitants have been killed, and not even small children have been spared,"—such were the comments to be heard all over Ukraine.

A French diplomat informed his government that the Russian General Menshikov had brought all the horrors of war and revenge to Ukraine, that all Mazeppa's supporters had been executed in a shameful manner, that Ukraine was bleeding to death, that it had been ruined by looting and presented a terrible picture of the barbarism of its conquerors. Russian vengeance on Ukraine assumed its extremest form in inhuman Russian repressive measures, in all the tortures and executions which took place in Hlukhiv and Lebedyn and which were still recounted with horror in Ukraine a century later, and in all the "acts of tyranny and bestial cruelty, which, even to think of them, make one shudder" (as the anonymous author of the "History of the Rus" wrote at the end of the 18th century).

Baturyn's fall and the occupation of the major part of the Cossack state by Russian troops enabled Peter I to scatter the Ukrainian forces. The decree on the "election" of a new Hetman, terrible ritual ceremonies in Hlukhiv and the excommunication of Mazeppa, Moscow's traditional policy of the scourge and the sugar-loaf, the demagogic manifestos of the Tsar, who mendaciously assured the Ukrainian people that "No people under the sun could boast such freedom, privileges and facilities as the Little Russian people<sup>2)</sup>, thanks to the

2) That is the Ukrainian people (according to the official Russian terminology of the 17th-19th century).

grace of our Tsarist Majesty," other assurances to the effect that Mazeppa had gone over to the Swedish side "in order to place the country of Little Russia under the yoke of Polish rule again," and, finally, the Swedish atrocities that were perpetrated against the Ukrainian population,—all this bore fruit: Ukraine and the Ukrainian people were now split up, and, instead of a joint fight against Moscow, a fratricidal war began.

Even Nature seemed to be ill-disposed towards the Ukrainian cause. All over Europe the winter was extremely severe; and even old people could not remember such a cold spell. The cold weather set in as early as September 1708; by November there were 30 degrees of frost. Charles XII himself wrote that "the winter was too severe, the frost was extreme, and many of the enemy's troops and of our troops froze to death or suffered frost-bite on their hands, feet and noses." The cold spell lasted until the middle of February.

Hetman Mazeppa was not a man to resign himself passively to fate; indeed, we have every reason to believe that, in spite of the tribulations and reverses which he had suffered in 1708, he viewed the year 1709 optimistically and hoped anew that the war would be brought to a successful close. At any rate, in 1709 he planned an extensive diplomatic and strategic campaign, the results of which, however, unfortunately only made themselves felt when it was already too late. But this campaign enables us to rehabilitate the year 1709, as it were, and to see in the ruins of Ukraine at that time not only a prototype of subsequent Ukrainian reverses, but also the inevitability of Ukraine's ultimate victory.

And it is precisely this chapter of the history of the year 1709 which is so important for the Ukrainians, that has not as yet been dealt with. In its conception and assessment of the year 1709, Ukrainian historiography for many years followed the course introduced by Russian historiography—naturally, in the opposite direction. The idea to which they both attached most importance was Poltava,—the battle of Poltava; the difference lay solely in the fact that for the Russians it was a victory and for the Ukrainians a defeat. Accordingly, the Russians glorify the year 1709, whilst the Ukrainians mourn it.

This is for the most part due to the fact that there are no Ukrainian state archives available for this period, since they were either destroyed at the time, or perished later on, or, possibly, are hidden away somewhere in Russian or foreign keeping. Nor are any Ukrainian memoirs of that period, diaries or letters available; and one is thus obliged to reconstruct all the facts or, at least, most of them by means of foreign sources, the majority of which are hostile in their attitude to Ukraine. Consequently, very little is known about the activity of Mazeppa's Ukrainian government in the year 1709; and the impression is inevitably gained that not only the executive power of the Ukrainian government in the territory occupied by Sweden, but also its entire political activity ceased to exist.

This was, of course, not so. A number of fragments of documents, which have been ascertained, indicate that the Hetman, after the first (and ineffaceable) impression which the fall of Baturyn and subsequent events made on him, developed an extensive activity in the field of warfare and, in particular, of diplomacy. Modern Ukrainian historiography deserves special credit for having defined the right perspective as regards the historical events of that time. **B. Krupnytsky** very fittingly affirms that "Mazeppa and the Ukrainians who supported him sought a new way out at the moment of what appeared to be a unique favourable European situation. The former allies of Moscow had been obliged to withdraw completely, having been forced to do so by that genius of war, Charles XII; Poland had been captured, and Prussia, which was neutral, did not venture to undertake anything. Austria, France and Britain either tended to take sides openly with the King of Sweden, or else they did nothing which might have counteracted his strategic plans. Turkey was prepared—at least, in the event of a victory—to join the anti-Russian coalition. According to European standards, Charles XII possessed a first-class army, which was well equipped and had been considerably reinforced during its long sojourn in Saxony."

Viewed in this light, the events of the year 1708 in Ukraine were only of local significance.

It is quite likely that Mazeppa at the beginning of the year 1709 also regarded the situation in this light. In any case, it was in 1709 that he finally worked out his large-scale plan to set up a big coalition against Moscow, in which, in addition to Sweden, Ukraine and their western allies, a number of other south and southern European states and peoples were to take part,—Turkey, Crimea, Moldavia, Wallachia, the Don Cossacks, the Kuban Circassians, the Kalmucks, the Kazan Tatars, the Bashkirs and various others. This was indeed an epochal plan—worthy of a great politician, diplomat and statesman—to break Moscow's power and set up an impregnable bulwark against Russian imperialism. Mazeppa alone could have been the creator of such a plan, for he combined the most prosperous era and the experience of European policy with an expert knowledge of and a profound insight into the East European world, and in particular into the world of Moscow and that **Russian element**, whose danger not only for Ukraine but also for the whole of Europe he clearly recognized. Compared to this plan of the union and mobilization of European and even of Asian forces against Moscow, of what significance could the relatively small Swedish army, weakened by severe winters and countless skirmishes, in a foreign and distant land be? And what was more,—under these conditions what did a possible failure on the part of this army mean, seeing that the Hetman was preparing to use all the fighting forces of the West and the East against Moscow and send them into combat!

This plan was neither unfounded nor irrelevant. Mazeppa knew only too well that it was not the Swedes who were the main and most dangerous enemy of Moscow, with whom, incidentally, they might

possibly at some favourable moment reconcile themselves at a round-table peace conference; for decades Mazeppa had studied the development of political events in East Europe and had observed all the national and social insurrections against Moscow, which had from time to time broken out in Astrakhan, in the Volga delta region, in distant Bashkir, and in the neighbouring region of the River Don and which he himself had been called upon to crush by sending Ukrainian auxiliary troops to these regions; he had experienced the failure of one insurrection after another and probably also realized the main cause of these failures; and, accordingly, he was able to realize better than anyone else that only a coalition of all the peoples subjugated or threatened by Moscow could put up a firm resistance to Russian expansion.

On the other hand, the formation of a large-scale anti-Russian coalition would also have been of direct military significance. The loss of Baturyn and of the entire Ukrainian artillery, and, even more so, the fatal rout of the Ukrainian forces as a result of Russian terrorism and cunning, clearly showed the Hetman that even the valiant Swedish army, which, moreover, was practically cut off from its own country, would not of its own strength be able to defeat the Russian army alone, since the latter had the means of waging war and the forces of a large part of Ukraine at its disposal and, what was even more important, could rely directly on its own Moscow base. One must therefore see to it that strategic reserves were formed,—that is to say, a fighting force which would be able to support the Swedish army and perhaps also take its place. Above all, however, all those fighting forces which were at the disposal of various anti-Russian factors in East and Southern Europe must be mobilized: the Zaporogian Cossacks, the Don Cossacks (whose insurgent leader, Ignat Nekrasov, and his supporters were at that time stationed in the Kuban region on the east shore of the Sea of Azov), the Crimea and, of course, Turkey. And it was precisely towards this aim that the main efforts of Mazeppa's policy in the year 1709 were directed; he was really the ideological creator of the East European coalitions directed against Russia in the 18th century, and the subsequent Russo-Turkish war, which ended with the defeat of Russia at the River Pruth in 1711, was the result of his policy.

"Let us not be deterred, brothers, from wading in Russian blood up to our knees"—such were the comments of the Cossacks when they heard of the fall of Baturyn. And Hetman Mazeppa, too, heard these comments.

## II

The first months of the year 1709 were marked by considerable activity on the part of the allies in the strategic and diplomatic sphere. The King of Sweden and the Hetman regarded it as their main task to drive out the Russian army from Ukraine and to transfer their military operations beyond the Ukrainian frontier, namely to Muscovite



Russian territory. But this was not the only task which Charles XII had set himself with his campaign in the Slobodska East Ukraine (the present region of Kharkiv). The King had good reason for attaching particular importance to this campaign, and it was by no means a coincidence that the Hetman and those of the Ukrainian fighting forces that had remained loyal to him took an active part in this campaign. Indeed, it would be hard to understand the purpose of this campaign, if one did not consider the far-reaching plans of the Hetman. There can be no doubt about the fact that it was connected with the organization of a new war coalition against Moscow, in which Turkey and the Crimea were to take an active part. On the other hand, this campaign was to rouse the Don Cossacks and the peoples of North Caucasia and the Volga region to an armed uprising against Moscow. The fears of Peter I that the King of Sweden intended advancing towards Voronezh, the southern base of the Russian fleet, were by no means unfounded. And Mazeppa had good reason for saying to the King, when their troops approached the town of Kolomak: "The war is proceeding very favourably for Your Majesty: we are eight miles from the Asian frontier."

This campaign eastwards on the part of Charles XII and Mazeppa was unexpectedly held up by bad weather. After a severe winter in which there were heavy snowfalls, spring suddenly set in very early, in the middle of February: on February 13th, there were thunderstorms and heavy rains. Extensive floods resulted in serious losses to the army, and it was impossible to advance any further. Meanwhile, the Russian forces that were still stationed in the Ukrainian Hetmanate used the absence of the main Swedish forces to advantage and extended their own garrisons still more.

The main point, however, was that the unsuccessful campaign in the Slobodska Ukraine resulted in the outbreak of a guerilla war against the Swedes. Charles XII regarded the Slobodska as part of the Muscovite state (which it officially was); it was thus "enemy territory" for the Swedes, who, incidentally, had already had plenty of experience in dealing with the population of such countries. The local—**Ukrainian**—population was thus obliged to endure all the horrors of war. Historians unanimously affirm that Charles XII "systematically and intentionally devastated the territory through which his troops passed" (B. Krupnytsky). Naturally, the reasons given for this were considerations of a military nature in connection with the war (destruction of the nearest bases of the enemy). A neutral participator in the campaign (Krman) states that the King "gave orders that towns and villages were to be set on fire, buildings were to be razed to the ground and the inhabitants were to be killed... Thousands of oxen and small cattle perished by fire." The Swedes themselves admitted that they had passed through this territory "with fire and sword." And the consequences were extremely serious for them. "A guerilla war, such as had never before been experienced (against the Swedes), conducted for the most part by the Ukrainian peasantry,

grimly and tenaciously" (B. Krupnytsky), who used the Russian war command extremely skilfully in its own interests, now broke out in the Slobodska Ukraine and in the eastern frontier region of the Ukrainian Hetmanate.

Far greater successes were achieved by the diplomatic activity of the allies. We should at this point like to stress that without Mazeppa the position of the Swedes in Ukraine would have been catastrophic and their further fight against Moscow completely hopeless and, in fact, impossible. Although the failure of the campaign in East Ukraine (in February 1709) was bound to depress the governments of Turkey and of the Crimea, Mazeppa nevertheless succeeded not only in keeping their interest in a coalition alive, but also successfully continued to conduct negotiations with them in this respect. Various Ukrainian missions to the Crimea and the relations to the Sublime Porte which were fostered by Mazeppa in the spring of 1709, safeguarded the southern flank of the anti-Russian fight and helped the Swedish cause even after the catastrophe of Poltava.

The greatest success of Mazeppa's policy in the year 1709, however, lay in the fact that the Zaporogian Cossacks joined forces with him. The Zaporogians formally recognized the supremacy of the Hetmanate, but throughout the entire period of Mazeppa's rule as Hetman had definitely opposed his government, which they accused of pursuing a national (Russophil) and social (in favour of the large landowners) policy that was hostile to the interests of the Ukrainian people. On several occasions they had actually risen up in open rebellion against the Hetman's government; and they had always supported the various actions of the Cossack officers' corps of Poltava, which was opposed to Mazeppa. Moreover, the leader of the Zaporogian autonomists, the military head of the Zaporogian territory at that time, Kost Hordiyenko, was also personally ill-disposed towards Mazeppa. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Zaporogians, to begin with, viewed Mazeppa's campaign with considerable distrust; and it was only after some time that the brutal conduct of the Russian military administration in South Ukraine, the terrorism of the Russian troops in the Ukrainian Hetmanate, the influence of the insurgent Don Cossacks and of the Crimea, and, above all, the skilful tactics of Mazeppa, who had meanwhile reconciled himself with the opposition group of Poltava, brought about a decisive change of feeling amongst the Zaporogians.

From then onwards, the fight between Mazeppa and Peter I for the Zaporogian territory entered upon a new phase. On March 1, 1709, the Tsar informed his right-hand man, Field Marshal Menshikov, that someone should be sent to the Zaporogians who "was cleverer, since one must be active there not only with one's sword, but also with one's mouth." But the Russian mission, which also included a representative of the newly elected Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky and a representative of the clergy, the abbot of Mezhyhiria Monastery, Irodion Zhurakovsky, failed to achieve any success; and the Zaporogian "rabble" actually cursed the abbot and the representative of the false

Hetman and threatened to drown or burn both of them. Moscow had lost the game. The envoys of Hetman Mazeppa, however,—the Supreme Judge Vasyl Chuykevych, the Kyivan Colonel Kost Mokiyevisky and the General Staff officer Fedir Myrovytch—were given quite a different reception by the Zaporogians. On March 12th, the Zaporogian Council definitely decided to support Hetman Mazeppa and to send a delegation to him and to the King of Sweden.

On March 27, 1709, Hordiyenko and his delegation appeared before Charles XII, and next day a treaty was concluded in the village of Velyki Budyshchi between Hetman Mazeppa and the head of the Zaporogians, on the one hand, and between the latter and the King of Sweden, on the other hand. On the strength of this treaty the Zaporogian Cossacks joined the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance, and the King of Sweden promised not to conclude any peace treaty with the Tsar before Ukraine and the Zaporogian territory had been liberated from Russian supremacy.

This was indeed a big triumph for Mazeppa's policy,—a triumph which might actually make good the loss of Baturyn and of the northern regions beyond the Dnieper. A large part of the Ukrainian territory was thus now reunited under the rule of the Hetman,—several regions this side of the Dnieper, the Zaporogian territory and thus also the whole of South Ukraine. This latter fact was particularly important, since in this way the communication lines with Poland, on the one hand, and with Turkey and the Crimea, on the other hand, could be maintained and protected. What was even more important, however, was the fact that the Hetman had at last overcome the perpetual Zaporogian opposition and had won the support of the "asylum of Ukrainian freedom" which exerted so powerful an influence on the masses throughout Ukraine. It was thus not surprising that this action on the part of the Zaporogians called forth an insurrection against Moscow on the part of the Ukrainian population,—an insurrection which immediately included extensive regions of central Ukraine (for instance, practically the whole of the Poltava district) and the regions on this side of the Dnieper, as well as part of the Slobodska Ukraine, and represented a grave danger for the Russian army; no wonder that the Russian General Renne said in a report to Menshikov: "A flame is leaping higher and higher here, which must be extinguished."

But it was the diplomatic and military help given by the Zaporogians that was of paramount importance. Thanks to their intercession, the Hetman—and through him, the King of Sweden, too,—succeeded in reaching an understanding with the Crimean Khanate regarding help from the Tatars; and Turkey, too, now began to regard the prospects on both allies more optimistically. And, finally, it became evident to everyone that the eight thousand Zaporogian Cossacks, who were well-acquainted with the terrain in which the war operations were about to take place, were not only regarded by the Hetman as being equally as important as his own **Ukrainian** troops, but also that they might quite possibly influence the entire development of the war.

As a result of the union of the Zaporogians with the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance, the problem of Poltava was thrust into the foreground. Mazeppa had long since drawn the attention of Charles XII to the special importance of this citadel and of this trade centre at the junction of the main routes to Zaporogia, the Crimea and Turkey, to West Ukraine and Poland, to East Ukraine, to Moscow and the Don. There were powerful Ukrainian autonomist circles in Poltava. "Poltava has never been steadfast, and no good can now come of this,"—such was the comment made at the end of 1708 by a supporter of Moscow, the commander of Okhtyrka, Ossipov, who added a warning to the effect that there were "friends of Mazeppa and Orlyk"<sup>3)</sup> there. Peter I was also well aware of the importance of Poltava and already in December 1708 he had it occupied by a strong Russian garrison. Were Poltava to continue to remain in Russian hands, this would be a threat to new war operations on the part of the allies. In addition, they needed Poltava as a base in order to organize a new campaign; and, on the other hand, with Poltava as their base, they would be able to wait for the arrival of the troops of the Polish King Stanislaw Leszczynski and the Swedish troops of General Krassau, which were operating in Poland, as well as for the final union of Turkey and the Crimea with the anti-Russian coalition.

But this carefully worked out plan was not a success. The Swedes, who advanced as far as Poltava at the beginning of April, were not able to take it by storm and were obliged, on May 1st, to start a regular siege of the strongly fortified town; and this siege dragged on and on, mainly because the allies had not enough heavy artillery. King Stanislaw and General Krassau were fully occupied fighting against the Russophil magnates' party in Poland and, in addition, were prevented from hastening to the aid of the Swedish King by Russian troops that had remained on this side of the Dnieper. The Turks and the Crimean Tatars were still waiting to see what the further course of events would be. Meanwhile, the guerilla war against the Swedes in Ukraine assumed alarming proportions in the spring of 1709. In his diary Krman writes as follows: "The position of the Swedes is very sad, and something even worse can be expected every day. The population here... threatened the Swedish camp-followers whenever they could and even made life unsafe for the troops. The peasants, who lay in hiding in the forests, tried whenever possible to capture booty from the Swedes. The Swedes had intended starving Poltava into surrender, but they themselves were gradually weakened by starvation."

The Swedes retaliated against these partisan campaigns by resorting to ruthless repressive measures. "Reprisals led to resistance and resistance to further reprisals, and so it went on and on" (B. Krupnytsky). The siege of Poltava and the guerilla war prevented the King of Sweden from helping the anti-Russian revolt in the south of the Ukrainian Hetmanate, and it was crushed by Russian troops. And on

<sup>3)</sup> Pylyp Orlyk, the confidential secretary-general (chancellor) of Mazeppa, who after the latter's death became his successor as Ukrainian Hetman in exile (1710-1742).

May 14th, a Russian battalion commanded by Colonel Yakovlev, who was supported by the Cossack Colonels Kandyba and Galagan, annihilated the ancient centre of Ukrainian autonomism—Sich, the military and administrative centre of Zaporogia; the Zaporogian Cossacks who were captured were ruthlessly massacred.

This was the next catastrophe after Baturyn and it really decided the fate of the entire campaign. From then onwards, the Russian army definitely took the initiative. The Swedes failed to capture Poltava and were obliged to fight the main battle in a strategical and tactical position which was most unfavourable for them. But the destruction of Sich had even more fatal consequences for Ukraine. With good reason the Zaporogians had affirmed seven years earlier that if the Russians should ever drive the Zaporogian army out of Sich, then "all Ukrainian people will surely become Moscow's slaves for ever, which is what the Moscow empire has been wishing for a long time and is trying to achieve by all sorts of means."

The Russian imperialist legend has, by means of the official nebulosity, surrounded the battle of Poltava (on June 27, 1709, and, according to the modern chronology, on July 8) with such a halo that even the simple and generally known facts which determined the Russian victory over the Swedes in advance have sunk into oblivion. In the first place, the Swedish army was obliged to fight this battle at an extremely unfavourable moment: the King, who had been wounded during nightly reconnaissance, was actually hardly able to command his troops. In addition, the tactical position was extremely unfavourable for the Swedes, who were drawn up between the fortress of Poltava and the entire Russian army and were forced to split up their forces. And, lastly, the actual proportion of the fighting forces was as follows: 50,000 Russians against about 25,000 Swedes; 72 Russians and four Swedish cannon were fired in this battle, in which the Zaporogians tried in vain to rescue the Swedes out of their hopeless position by their bravery. The superior strength of the Russian artillery decided the issue of the battle; and this was the fatal consequence of the loss of the Ukrainian artillery which had been destroyed at Baturyn.

The further course of events is well known. Instead of retreating to the Crimea, the Swedish army surrendered at Perevolochna on the Dnieper (on June 30). Charles XII intended moving to Podillia (Podolia) in West Ukraine with a small military retinue, in order to join the troops of the Polish King Stanislaw and the Swedish General Krassau there; but at the advice of Mazeppa he went to Turkey; accompanied by some of the Cossack officers and a battalion of Zaporogians, Mazeppa and Hordiyenko also moved to Turkey with him. And it was here, in a foreign country, that Hetman Mazeppa died (during the night of the 22nd of September in the same year),—a man who "put everything in the world that might have been dear to him in the background and even his life, in order to set his native country above all else and liberate it from the yoke of Moscow" (P. Orlyk).

"Its victory on June 27th",—so the Ukrainian historian, M. Hrushevsky, writes—"not only gave the Russian Tsarist empire a definite ascendancy in East Europe, but also led it to the course of imperialism,— of a policy of expansion and of new conquests and annexations again and again,—for two whole centuries."

This was written in the year 1909. But the Moscow imperium continues to reap the fruits of its victory at Poltava even today.

### III

Poltava was a catastrophe for the Ukrainian state. But is this all that can be said about the **historical** significance of the year 1709? Or did it perhaps give Ukraine and the Ukrainian people not merely the sad sight of ruins and graves, but also a clear vision of the future victory? Ukrainian historiography of former times—and like it, large circles of the Ukrainian people—regarded the events of 1709 amid tears and thus failed to perceive the constructive elements which remained preserved under the ruins of the state ideas of Hetman Ivan Mazeppa, or were born in that sea of blood with which the Ukrainian people had to pay for their defeat. A historian should regard things from another aspect, too. For the catastrophe of Poltava in 1709 not only turned over the page of Ukrainian history which began with the epochal victory of the great Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky over the Poles (in 1648), but also introduced another page, or, rather, several other pages, on which, in addition to the great sufferings of the Ukrainian people, their countless historical successes are also described.

We know little about the activity of Hetman Mazeppa and his exile government in Turkey; details in this respect are unknown. On the other hand, however, we know very well what the subsequent consequences were in this respect,—strategically, diplomatically and ideologically. Of course, one must not underestimate a certain feeling of depression which must have overwhelmed the old Hetman, who was sick and, in fact, already a dying man,— and even more so his comrades; the situation in Ukraine was far too difficult and their personal fate was far too depressing. Driven out of their native country, ruined materially, without families and relatives, who had become the victims of the arbitrariness and vengeance of the Russian victors, these men were, in addition, also threatened by the dreadful danger of extradition, which the Russian government was trying to effect by every means available. Former disagreements and differences between the Cossack officers' corps and the Hetman, as well as between the Ukrainian Hetmanate and the Zaporogians were bound to be revived again, namely in an aggravated and distorted form as a result of the privations and hardships of life in exile. Nevertheless, Mazeppa's adherents refused to surrender. Incidentally, the war was by no means over; the Swedish forces were not by any means exhausted, and the firm decision of their courageous King to continue the war against Russia and her allies led the Ukrainian exile government to hope for better days. And, what was more, this government was now able to act openly without having to conceal its state and political plans.

The most important point was that the Ukrainian problem was now officially raised in the international forum. The Ukrainian exile government attached particular importance to its action as regards foreign policy, and there can be no doubt about the fact that the guiding principles of Ukrainian international policy, which were later, during the Hetmanate of Pylyp Orlyk, so clearly in evidence, were already laid down during the lifetime of Hetman Mazeppa. On the other hand, however, the Ukrainian problem, both in the sphere of international political action as well as in the field of international public opinion, as in Bohdan Khmelnytsky's day, ceased to be an internal affair of a foreign state, that is to say of the Russian state, and in this way entered a broad European course. This was for the most part furthered by the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance; and it was not for nothing that all the more important documents of the Mazeppa exiles clearly stressed that Ukraine in making an alliance with Sweden had solely renewed the tradition of the old foreign policy of the great Hetman Khmelnytsky.

Viewed in this light, the Russian government was merely a "usurper of Ukraine," as was formulated in writing by Orlyk in 1712, when he stressed that "however great the atrocities committed by Moscow might be, they do not give the Russians any legal right to Ukraine; on the contrary, the (Ukrainian) Cossacks have international and natural law on their side, and the main principles of this law also include the one that is worded: the people always have the right to protest against such subjugation and to restore the application of their ancient rights, whenever they have an opportunity to do so."

This was really the end of the policy of "Pereyaslav" and the revival of the Ukrainian national state idea, which had been obscured as a result of the treaty of Pereyaslav (concluded between Hetman B. Khmelnytsky and Tsar Alexey in 1654).

This general conception as regards state and international policy, which was restored as a result of the new political position of Ukraine and its exile government, was bound to influence the natural crystallization process of Ukrainian state and political thought. The Ukrainian exiles were obliged to find—both for themselves and, in particular, for the outside world—a formula of state self-determination and norms of a state order, which, in keeping with the actual proportion of the Ukrainian political forces, would link up the traditional idea and form of the Ukrainian state with the system of the political state order in the countries of West Europe, that were leading powers at that time. The constitution adopted in Bendery (in Moldavia) in the year 1710, an unforgettable and memorable document of Ukrainian political thought, which defined the Ukrainian state as a class-monarchy (Hetmanate), was the result of the considerations and discussions which had been the main subject of the attention and interest of the Ukrainian exiles in 1709.

The year 1709 brought the birth of Ukrainian political emigration and also of that emigration whose activity helped to maintain the state autonomy of Ukraine practically until the end of the 18th century (until 1781-1782).

Petro Kizko

## THE IDEOLOGICAL FIGHT IN THE SOVIET UKRAINIAN LITERATURE OF TODAY

A fierce fight is being waged in Soviet Ukrainian literature by Moscow-orientated Bolshevism against what it calls ideological, nationalist, revisionist, cosmopolitan and other "deviations." After an interval of a truce, which was to a certain extent "liberal," during the war between the Soviet Union and Germany, this fight was again resumed with renewed vigour.

As early as August 24, 1946, a decree was already issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine "on misrepresentations and errors in the illumination of the history of Ukrainian literature" in the "Outline of Ukrainian Literature" collectively compiled by the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. This decree was directed against "lapses into bourgeois nationalism in the science of literature" and in this connection "expressions of a foreign and pernicious ideology in the works of individual writers" were exposed and condemned. In the first place, the said "Outline" was reproached with having "neglected to show the great and productive influence of Russian culture and literature on the development of Ukrainian culture and literature." This implied that the Soviet Ukrainian literary scholars and authorities on the history of the culture of Ukraine had rejected the conceptions forced on them by Moscow and that Ukrainian literature and culture could never have developed at all without an affinity to and the help of Russian literature and culture.

In 1944 the popular Ukrainian poet Volodymyr Sosiura (born in 1898) wrote a poem "Love Ukraine . . .," which was published by the Soviet press without any objections, was reprinted on various occasions and even translated into Russian; after the war, however, it was decried as "an ideologically unsound work." In a leading article in the Moscow Party organ "Pravda" the poem was sharply criticized for "grossly distorting" the "idea of Soviet patriotism, the idea of the friendship of the (Soviet) peoples." This, in turn, implied that V. Sosiura had dedicated his poem to Ukraine as such without taking into consideration the relations of Ukraine to the "Union" of



the Soviet Republics or to Moscow,—that is to say, from the Moscow point of view, “outside time and space;” for the poem did not contain a single word about the “friendship of the Soviet peoples” (as the Russian Bolsheviks interpret it), about kolkhozes, sovkhoses or factories. It was precisely the fact that Sosiura’s poem is purely a lyrical Ukrainian poem without any kind of political propaganda at all, that annoyed the Moscow Bolsheviks most; and the “Pravda” emphasized with considerable indignation that an enemy of the Soviet regime might just as well have put his name under such a poem.

For a time, too, the famous Ukrainian poet Maksym **Rylsky** (born in 1895) was also reproached with “nationalist deviations,”—incidentally, not for his poems, but for his prose reminiscences of pre-Soviet Ukraine and its individual representatives, which were fairly true to life and were written with considerable feeling; for in his poems, M. Rylsky—since he was the only poet of the Kyivan “neo-classical” trend who managed to escape arrest and physical “liquidation” in 1933—pays homage to the strictest “Party line” and to the entire hypocritical phraseology of Moscow’s “socialist realism.”

In 1957 the young Ukrainian poet Mykola **Hirnyk**, whose literary career only began in the post-war years, published his satirical poem “The Bark-Beetles” in the Kyivan literary monthly “Vitchyzna” (“The Fatherland”); in this poem he actually criticized the parasitic Bolshevik Party leaders who during the war calmly acquired “fat bellies” in cushy posts outside the danger zone and were now parading them in Kyiv; of course, he did not launch a direct attack against the Party men, but criticized them as the “new Philistines,” a pseudonym conferred on them. But this did not help him much; he was sharply censured in the Soviet Ukrainian press and was himself branded as a “petty bourgeois Philistine.” The dramatist Vasyl **Mynko** fared similarly on account of his comedy “Silence Prohibited,” which was published at about the same time and in which he ridiculed ignorant and unscrupulous Party functionaries, who had been entrusted with leading posts in the kolkhozes by the chief Party organs and were not even able to tell the difference between barley and oats. The play was withdrawn from the programme of the Ivan Franko Theatre in Kyiv, allegedly in order to be “revised.” Incidentally, the very title of the play—“Silence Prohibited”—is characteristic and expresses the gist of the matter, since a Soviet—and not only a Soviet Ukrainian—writer is in duty bound to praise the Bolshevik regime at any price and must not create the impression by keeping silent that he perhaps does not approve of something or other.

That the non-Russian writers in the Soviet Union and, in particular, the Soviet Ukrainian writers are actually far worse off than the Soviet Russian writers is corroborated by the fact that there has not been the slightest indication in Soviet Ukrainian literature since the death and “dethronement” of Stalin of any “thaw,” which might be in keeping with the brief but nevertheless not entirely unreal “liberalization” of Soviet Russian literary conditions during the years 1955-1957; on the

contrary, any suggestion of a possible "change in course" is severely censured in Soviet Ukraine by the Bolshevik literary critics. In this respect the "prominent" Soviet Ukrainian literary critic, Leonid **Novychenko** (who was actually awarded a Russian literature prize for his book on the works of the famous Ukrainian poet Pavlo Tychyna, "Poetry and Revolution"), for instance, expressed the following opinion in his article "Literature and the Present" (published in the March 1958 edition of the Kyivan literary monthly "Dnipro"):

"One must not pass over indifferently the direct or disguised challenge of individual literary men who try to make out that the fight... against nationalism, cosmopolitanism and other expressions of the hostile ideology is wrong and unnecessary... Certain comrades... have even expressed the opinion that the entire complicated and prolonged fight, particularly during the years from 1946 to 1951, was entirely unfounded, superfluous and unnecessary..."

In November 1958 the Party leaders in Soviet Ukraine decided that it was necessary to convene a special writers' conference in order to discuss once more the problems of how to combat "ideological deviations" in literature. The Kyivan "Literary Gazette" ("Literaturna Hazeta") of November 25, 1958, stressed that "the problem of the ideological purity of our literature was one of the most important problems which were discussed in all seriousness and in principle at the Conference." Below, a few extracts from various speeches that were held on this occasion:

Mykola **Bazhan** (a well-known writer, at that time chairman of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, and a member of the secretariat of the Writers' Union of the U.S.S.R.): "The Soviet writers must fight actively against the pernicious expression of the ideology of our enemies—above all, of the revisionists and nationalists... We have always rejected revisionist, nationalist trends and shall always do so."

Andriy **Malyshko** (a fairly popular writer): "The Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, those paltry hirelings of imperialism, are now endeavouring to disguise themselves with various revisionist petty ideas. We must intensify our fight both against nationalism and against revisionism."

Vasyl **Kozachenko** (the chief editor of the above-mentioned monthly "Vitchyzna"): "The editorial department of the journal "Vitchyzna" has not shown much taste in publishing L. Pervomaysky's "A Fairy tale" in one of its numbers... The journal has also acted too hastily in printing the poems by V. Shvets and P. Doroshko."

And the opinion voiced by the weekly "Literaturna Hazeta," to the effect that the Communists had "severely criticized the attempts of some of the (Soviet Ukrainian) literary men to depart from the present and lead literary creativeness astray," probably refers to the same thing.

The "ideological deviations" of the above-mentioned writers are thus explicitly branded as "class-hostile,"—just as in Stalin's day. And this same opinion was also expressed by the official "representatives" of Soviet Ukrainian literature before the Moscow Bolshevik central authorities,—namely by those two "prominent" men, Mykola

**Bazhan** and **Pavlo Tychyna**, who immediately after their return from the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (which they attended as Ukrainian delegates) plainly stressed the "necessity" of intensifying the fight against "hostile bourgeois ideology" in literature still more:

"We must criticize comrades who lapse into errors more severely from the ideological aspect" (M. Bazhan).

"It is necessary to expose the bourgeois ideology constantly and to fight against our most dangerous enemies on the ideological front" (P. Tychyna).

What is, indeed, the nature of the said "expressions of the most dangerous ideological deviations"? At a first glance they appear to be fairly harmless. **Leonid Pervomaysky** (born in 1908 and, incidentally, not a Ukrainian by birth), who has been writing poetry for many years and throughout his entire past has always been particularly loyal to the "general line of the Party," writes in his above-mentioned poem "The Fairytale," which has caused so much uneasiness in the leading Bolshevik circles of Soviet Ukrainian literature, that he has spent the entire fifty years of his life looking for the fairytale-truth which he has dreamt of, but has never been able to find it; instead of this fairytale, he has only had stones thrust into his hand "in the dark wood" (this, according to the Bolshevik interpretation, is the symbolical way in which he designates the entire Soviet Union). Naturally, the poet is now reproached with professing to look for a "fairytale-truth" at all: and it is stressed that the "truth" is already personified in Soviet reality, and that the "fairytale" has long since been outstripped by Soviet economic progress,—by waterworks, canals and sputniks. In this case, therefore, the simplest pessimistic attitude to life as such appears to have been assessed as anti-Soviet and highly dangerous from the political point of view.

An even crasser example is the case of the young poet **Vasyl Shvets**. In his poem "Between Wind and Rain," which was published in the Kyivan literary journal "Vitchyzna," he has depicted a fairly primitive domestic tragedy: a "Soviet citizen" deserts his mistress and their little daughter, **Khyma**, and vanishes without a trace<sup>1</sup>), but suddenly returns again twenty years later, repents of his "recklessness" and asks to be forgiven; but **Khyma**, who has meanwhile grown up in the family of her stepfather, angrily and indignantly turns on him and tells him that any betrayal is despicable and unforgivable.—That is about all there is to the poem.

And wherein lies the poet's "ideological deviation"? In the fact that the repentant "traitor" is a Soviet general! If he were an engineer or a professor, everything would apparently have been all right and there would have been no need to accuse V. Shvets of a "hostile" trend; but the "honour of a military uniform"—particularly when it is that of a general—is just as inviolable in the Red Russian imperium

1) Something which appears to happen fairly often in the U.S.S.R. It is true that the Soviet police is on the whole omniscient and omnipotent, but is seldom used to clear up such entirely "unpolitical" cases as these.

as it was more than a hundred years ago in the tsarist empire under the rule of Nicholas I.

A regime which deems it necessary to have this kind of thing declared "ideologically dangerous" must, indeed, feel that it is internally weak!

The fact that Bolshevik literary critics look for "ideological deviations" in such a naive and clumsy way, is really grotesque; but they have plenty of reasons for doing so. For instance, the compiled work "The Day of Poetry" ("Den' poeziyi," Kyiv, 1958), in which 120 Soviet Ukrainian writers participated, contains a poem by Sava Holovanivsky, a fairly well-known "proletarian" writer, which is entitled "The Operation" and apparently depicts the painful consequences of a surgical operation, but, in all probability, to judge from its intentionally mysterious note and symbolical structure, deals with something quite different,—namely, "ideological" operations which are performed on Ukrainian literature by the Bolshevik literary critics and censors; and the operators on the Soviet brain have promptly recognized themselves in the "doctor-boas" depicted by the writer. However trivial such ideas may seem as the starting-point for a political satire, they nevertheless prove that the literature in Soviet Ukraine, in spite of immense official and unofficial pressure and terrorism, has no ideological affinity with Soviet Ukrainian literature and continues to evidence a certain minimum of national anti-Bolshevik feeling.

## The Judicial Murder of Members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Volhynia

According to a report in the "Robitnycha Hazeta" of April 24, a session of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was held from March 7 to 10th, 1959, in Chervonoarmiyske, in the district of Rivne. It is interesting to note that the most prominent representatives of Soviet Ukrainian judicature took part in this session, namely the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, F.K. Hlukh, the Public Prosecutor of the Republic, D.Kh. Panasiuk, and numerous well-known lawyers. The accused were the following members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN): N.K. Bondarenko, A.S. Rieznikov, G.K. Polak, D.A. Kriutchko and A.V. Nazartchuk. They were charged with the murder of Soviet citizens in the Ukrainian western regions during

World War II. All the accused were sentenced to death and their property was confiscated. The sentences have already been executed.

The said report stresses the fact that numerous meetings were held in this connection by the population of Volhynia and that the public in West Ukraine showed considerable interest in this trial. The alleged crimes with which the accused were charged were committed at least seventeen years ago, so that the question obtruded itself as to why the regime has now suddenly decided to carry out its judicial murder. It can be assumed that this monstrous trial was held in order to intimidate the population, a fact which can undoubtedly be regarded as proof of an increased nationalist activity in these regions.

## **JOINT STATEMENT by Ukrainian Political Groups**

The present state of affairs in Ukraine proves that the Russian imperialists banded together in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Khrushchov are continuing their attack on the Ukrainian nation. Indeed, in view of the lawful and unlawful, passive and active resistance of the Ukrainian people, the attack conducted by the colonizers is increasing in intensity.

As a result of the policy of the Russian imperialist colonizers, Ukraine, where the percentage of the population increase was formerly high, now only shows an increase of 1,424,000 for the past twenty years, a fact which clearly indicates the prevalence of constant genocide and the extermination of the Ukrainian people during the fourteen years after the war, too. One of the Russian means of exterminating the Ukrainian people is the mass deportation of Ukrainian men and women to the so-called "virgin regions," a method which is camouflaged as an allegedly voluntary decision and which has as its sole purpose to disperse Ukrainian youth among the medley of peoples in Central Asia, in order to facilitate the process of Russification. The systematic suppression of the resistance put up by the Ukrainian intelligentsia, above all, however, of that of the writers, scholars in the sphere of culture and the youth of Ukraine, as well as the execution of Ukrainian patriots in the town of Chervonoarmiysk in May this year, are proof that the colonizers are once again trying, by ruthless terrorism, to put an end to the fight of the Ukrainian people for their freedom and for the national independence of Ukraine.

At the same time, the process of destruction and extermination is also being intensified in particular in the sphere of language and culture. The Russian imperialist colonizers are strengthening their positions as regards the Russification process by numerous measures of a disguised administrative character, as well as by public decrees, the aim of which is to reduce the possibilities of development as far as the national culture is concerned.

There are, for instance, secret regulations which make it impossible for the Ukrainians deported to the so-called "virgin regions" of Central Asia to obtain publications in the Ukrainian language, thus forcing them to read only publications which appear in the Russian language.

And the law on the school system—in particular Article 9 of this law—which was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. at the order of Moscow on April 17th this year is obviously an unprecedented attack on the primary and natural rights of every people.

The fine phrases about the “magnanimity of the Leninist national policy,” which accompanied the passing of this law, by no means disguise its true purpose, namely the Russification of the school system in Ukraine.

In every state the language of the people of this state is the compulsory language of instruction in the state schools, and for this reason this fundamental and vital principle is never questioned in any country in the world. In the non-Russian republics of the U.S.S.R. which are subjugated by Moscow and, above all, in Ukraine, this vital principle is, however, disregarded. **Instead of protecting the rights of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine, the government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. has declared the Ukrainian language a non-compulsory language of instruction in the schools of Ukraine.** The law provides all the preconditions to guarantee that **only the Russian language** shall actually be the compulsory language of instruction in Ukraine.

Immediately prior to the above decree, the so-called nation-wide discussion of Khrushchov's draft, which aims to limit the rights of the non-Russian peoples, took place throughout Ukraine. Those who took part in this general discussion stressed explicitly and in every case the necessity of allowing the Ukrainian language to remain the compulsory language of instruction in the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian schools in the Ukrainian S.S.R. But in complete disregard of this unanimously and openly expressed opinion, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. adopted this ignominious law and accordingly opposed the vital interests of the Ukrainian people, thus stressing its own slavish dependence on Moscow.

Ukrainian parents were formerly able to allow their children to attend Russian schools, but the government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in the person of its supreme authority has never yet so far forced the Ukrainians to consider the question as to whether they should learn the Ukrainian language.

**The decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. constitutes a moral pressure on the Ukrainians which is directed towards the Russification of their children;** this moral pressure is all the more dangerous since in a totalitarian state it is, as a rule, accompanied by police measures. In this way the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. is forcing the Russian language on the Ukrainian people as the only means of preserving contact with the cultural treasures of the world. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. has thus lowered the value of the Ukrainian language and has assigned to it the role of a local factor only.

In following the events in Ukraine, the Ukrainians living in the democratic world are full of admiration for the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people who, under the most difficult conditions, are defending the right

of the Ukrainian language in the schools in Ukraine. In these troubled and serious times, all the Ukrainians living beyond the frontiers of the Russian Bolshevik imperium consider it their sacred duty to help subjugated Ukraine.

United in their joint counter-action and by making use of all the possibilities which the countries in which they are living have to offer them, these Ukrainians are anxious to organize a world opinion which is favourable for their native country and to draw the attention of the world to the enslavement of Ukraine by Moscow and to the persecution of the Ukrainian language and culture.

On the strength of the existing connections, the Ukrainian political organizations shall endeavour to carry their protest campaign into the forum of the international, political, social and professional organizations (such as the United Nations, UNESCO, etc.). The attention of the public all over the world shall be drawn to the peculiarities of the so-called Soviet democracy, to the character and danger of Russian imperialism and to the present phase of the Soviet nationality policy, which consists in **disguised forms of an organized and systematic genocide of the Ukrainian nation, in a new intensification of police terrorism, as well as in the growing persecution of the Ukrainian language and culture.**

The joint conference of Ukrainian political groups appeals to all Ukrainian institutions in the free world—whether they be of a religious, public, scientific or professional, etc., character—to organize in all the countries in which they are domiciled large-scale campaigns to defend the national rights of the Ukrainian people.

This resolution was adopted on June 1, 1959, by the following Ukrainian political organizations:

**Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council  
Units Abroad of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists  
(Revolutionaries)**

**Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Solidarists)**

**Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad**

**Union for the Liberation of Ukraine**

**Ukrainian Hetman Union**

**Union of the Lands of United Ukraine (Peasants' Party)**

**Ukrainian National Democratic Union**

**Ukrainian National State Union**

**Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party**

**Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (Forwards)**

**Ukrainian Christian Movement**

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V. D.

## A False Political Analogy

It is some years since the well-known American "expert on Soviet affairs," George F. Kennan (in the influential political journal "Foreign Affairs") compared the political position and significance of Soviet Ukraine in the U.S.S.R. with that of a North American state—for example, Pennsylvania—in the U.S.A. This peculiar analogy, which completely disregards the official state constitution of the Soviet Union as well as the actual balance of power in the totalitarian Soviet Russian imperium, and, in particular, the historic past of Ukraine and its fight for national state independence, that has been going on continually since 1917, and which does not even take into consideration the presence of the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Republic in the United Nations, is exactly in keeping with the views of all the supporters of the idea of a "sole indivisible" Russia in the USA and of all the American advocates and promoters of the Russian allegedly anti-Communist imperialism and chauvinism, and it has been repeated in different variations by certain prominent US politicians: Senator Wiley described Ukraine as the "Soviet Texas," and Henry Cabot Lodge, the head of the American delegation in the UN, even referred to it as the "Massachusetts." We shall deal with the "Texas formula" in more detail later on; the reason for the choice of Pennsylvania or Massachusetts is perfectly evident: these two former British crown colonies, which are two of the "original thirteen states" that in 1783 proclaimed the independence of the newly created Union, with their capitals Philadelphia and Boston and their oldest Anglo-Saxon settlements, which date back to the first half of the 17th century, constitute the actual stronghold of American national culture; they are the "most American" states in the whole of North America, and the idea that they should "detach" themselves from the USA is completely senseless,—just as senseless as, in the opinion of G.F. Kennan and H.C. Lodge, it would be for Ukraine to detach itself from the Russian imperium (whether the latter is Soviet or not). The two above-mentioned American statesmen were thus not concerned with setting up some historical analogy, however questionable the latter might be, but solely with showing up the national claims of the Ukrainian "separatists" as completely unfounded and ridiculing them as sharply as possible.

But the time is now past when leading American politicians could content themselves with simply rejecting the just national and state claims of the non-Russian peoples, who were deprived of their freedom by Russia before the first world war, too, as "ridiculous." What the various references (purely propagandist in character and devoid of all concrete significance) to Ukraine (or possibly Georgia) made by



Dean Acheson and certain other persons who were responsible for American policy at the time, failed to change, has now been placed in an entirely different light by the introduction of "Captive Nations Week," which the US Congress has made an act of state. One cannot, of course, at present foresee whether this proclamation on the part of the US Congress (and the President of the USA) was meant wholly seriously or as a means of exerting diplomatic pressure on the Soviet government, and in how far words will be followed by deeds, namely by practical measures in this respect; at the same time, there can also be no doubt about the fact that there are very influential—and not merely "private"—political circles in the UCA who are prepared to oppose the possible realization of the principles on which the proclamation is based, tenaciously and systematically; be that as it may, however, the fact that the US Congress has in principle recognized the right of the non-Russian peoples subjugated in the Soviet Union to freedom and independence, can no longer be belittled as something "entirely senseless," and the era of frivolous "Ukraine-Pennsylvania formulas" in the Kennan style is definitely over.

Indeed, this can be seen from the polemic remarks made by none less than Nikita Khrushchov himself, which were published in the above-mentioned political journal "Foreign Affairs" (and which were also reprinted in the "New York Times" of September 3, 1959) and with which the Russian dictator hastened to oppose the said proclamation by the US Congress. The passage in question in Khrushchov's article (entitled "Peaceful Coexistence") is worded as follows:

"The American Senate and the House of Representatives recently saw fit to adopt a resolution which calls for the "liberation" of the socialist countries allegedly enslaved by Communism, and, what is more, of some of the federated Republics which are part of the U.S.S.R. The authors of the resolution demand the "liberation" of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkestan, and even of a certain "Ural territory"<sup>1</sup>). I should not be speaking the whole truth, were I not to add that the adoption of this abortive resolution is regarded by the Soviet people as a provocative action. I personally agree with this opinion. It would be interesting to see how the authors of this resolution would react if the Mexican parliament were to pass a resolution demanding that Texas, Arizona and California should be "liberated from American enslavement." Apparently they (the authors of the resolution) have never considered such a question, and this is extremely regrettable. Comparisons sometimes help one to comprehend the essence of a matter."

<sup>1</sup>) What is meant are the national rights of the Bashkirs, Kazan-Tatars and various other smaller Ugro-Finnic peoples (in the central Volga region), who united to form the Federated Republic of Idel-Ural at the end of 1917; this state was forcibly disintegrated by the Soviet Russians in 1918 into half a dozen small so-called "autonomous" Republics, which were all incorporated in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) and were obliged to endure an unconditional Russification.

There is thus no longer any mention of one of the "old" Anglo-Saxon States: on the contrary, emphasis is placed on the relatively more recent territorial acquisitions of the USA. When the above-mentioned American senator compared Soviet Ukraine to the State of Texas, he was probably only thinking of the southern position of Texas, the fertility of its soil and its importance for the entire economy of North America; Khrushchov, however, based his comparison on entirely different starting-points, namely on very peculiar ones.

There can be no denying the fact that the American territories referred to by Khrushchov, that is to say the present States of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and California, were only ceded to the USA by Mexico in the year 1848 as the result of the defeat suffered by Mexico in the war,—in short, were "captured" by the Americans. Incidentally, the importance of this historical fact is greatly lessened by the fact that Mexican sovereignty in these vast territories, which were only sparsely settled by Red Indian nomads (inherited from the Spanish viceroyalty of Mexico without military action), was for the most part only nominal and that the actual Spanish-Mexican acquisition of territory was confined almost exclusively to a few bases near to the Atlantic or Pacific coast (as for instance, San Antonio, San Francisco, Los Angeles).

Nevertheless, it was a conquest on the part of the USA, which was followed by intensive colonization. And Khrushchov's argument is based on the assertion that the Russian behaved in exactly the same way in the Baltic countries, Caucasia and Turkestan and, previously, in Ukraine and Byelorussia.—"In order to have the right to demand from us Russians the renunciation of the ethnically non-Russian parts of the U.S.S.R., the USA should in the first place have given back to Mexico all the territory south of the River Arkansas and of the 40th parallel"—such is the political "equation" formulated by Khrushchov, with which, of course, all the Russians beyond and also on this side of the Iron Curtain completely agree. But is this equation correct?

No, it is completely wrong; and not merely—at least not in the first place—because the American methods of acquiring territory and of colonizing a country are as different from the Russian methods as is the American treatment of prisoners-of-war from the Soviet mass graves in Katyn and Vinnytsia. The principle at issue is something far more important than the historical question as to whether the Spanish-Mexican part of the population of Texas and California, etc., was unlawfully wronged as a result of the American acquisition of territory, or to what extent it suffered a disadvantage in this respect<sup>2</sup>). It is not a question of the rights of the dead, but of those of the living. And as regards the "historic" rights of the present Republic of Mexico to Texas, they are no different from the "historic" rights of present-day Spain to Mexico itself: both are completely illusory (as are all "historic" rights or "rights to natural frontiers").

<sup>2</sup>) In order to be fair we shall not discuss the question as to whether the original inhabitants of the country, the Red Indians, lost or gained anything as a result of the American acquisition of territory.

Thus, the premises in Khrushchov's "equation" are fundamentally wrong: as far as the American citizens of Spanish-Mexican origin are concerned, who live in the States of Texas, Arizona and California (irrespective of whether their ancestors or they themselves hail from Texas, etc., or, as is frequently the case, only emigrated to these states from Spain or some country of Latin America much later), the question can only be formulated as follows: do these American citizens no longer want to be American citizens, but citizens of an independent (autonomous or independent) Spanish-American state structure? And since there is not the least indication of any such aims<sup>3)</sup>, it is unnecessary to discuss this question any further.

But what is the position as regards the non-Russian (or, according to the Soviet Russian terminology<sup>4)</sup>, "national") "Soviet Republics" or "autonomous" Republics and regions in the U.S.S.R.? Surely one cannot affirm that there are no indications of any national and state aspirations there, and, at the same time, appeal to the entire Soviet press to fight the "remnants" of the so-called "bourgeois nationalism," which has refused to allow itself to be exterminated during the forty years of Bolshevik violence and tyranny. Why? Because the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, the Turkestanians, the three Baltic peoples and the four Caucasian peoples, etc., happen to be **nations**, who inevitably, as is natural in the case of every nation, with but few exceptions, strive to attain their political, social and cultural independence, whereas ninety-nine per cent of the American citizens in Texas, Arizona and California, though of different national descent, surely regard themselves as persons of American nationality. The North American States are not former national state structures which have been reduced by a foreign conqueror, by means of armed force, to the puppet-like, colonial, vegetative position of the allegedly "national" Soviet and autonomous republics, in order that they may supply the Russian colonial trade system with their products and raw materials and Russian imperialism with cannon-fodder.

The most fitting answer which could have been given to Khrushchov's "Texas-Ukraine formula" was supplied to him personally by the national representatives in the USA of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union enslaved by Moscow when, by their mass demonstrations on the occasion of his American "tour," they enlightened not only him, but also—and this is even more important—the American public to the effect that the "Soviet Republics" of Georgia in Trans-Caucasia has as little in common with the American State of Georgia as, for instance, the social work of the American trade unions has with the "socialist construction work" in the Soviet Russian prison of peoples.

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<sup>3)</sup> Otherwise the second question should be formulated as follows: what, on the other hand, is the attitude in this respect of that part of the population which is not of Spanish descent?

<sup>4)</sup> It is typical of Soviet Russian mendacity that in the U.S.S.R. everything is designated as "national" that is not nationally Russian,—just as if nationally Russian were *eo ipso* "international"!

## Bolshevism and the Brahmin Bull

Recent events in Tibet and on the Sino-Indian frontier must have proved quite a shock to Premier Nehru of India. Shocks of this sort can have a salutary effect, if they shatter illusions built on wishful thinking. Such a shock was Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938, though even after Munich the foolish hope of peaceful co-existence with Nazi Germany still persisted in many quarters.

Unfortunately Mr. Nehru, too, still clings to an outmoded idea—the idea of peaceful co-existence with Communism. He refuses to face reality and to see clearly that India is next in the Communist-inspired plan for world conquest.

He would do well to ponder the saying of Lenin, that "the road to Paris leads through Peking and Calcutta." How ominous the words are today, in the light of the present world situation!

The real struggle for supremacy between Communism and Democracy is taking place, not at Geneva, but in Asia, and the protagonists are China and India.

And yet India's leader seems not to be awake to the situation. Perhaps he will never awake. Already he is called "the Benes of Asia"—and we all remember the fate of poor President Benes of Czechoslovakia in 1945, when he tried to come to terms with Communism.

China is already busy changing the map of India. How long will it be before the attempt is made to translate these pictorial annexations into reality? We have already heard of the Chinese plan to "liberate" the border states of Bhutan, Sikkim and Ladakh from Indians.

It is true that the memory of Chinese crimes in Tibet will not easily fade from the minds of enlightened Indians, and will make more difficult the spread of Communism in India. But there are factors which favour Communism—hunger and poverty and misery, its traditional breeding ground.

These are the factors which were mainly responsible for putting the Communists in power in the State of Kerala at the last All-India elections in 1957.

Not long ago thirteen American experts published a report about the acute food shortage in India. Their findings make alarming reading. In 1966 there will be 480 million people in India and, at a very conservative estimate, a food deficit of 28 million tons yearly.

Unless, of course, something is done about it. Food production will have to be increased by about one-third of today's production if it is to meet the demands of the rapidly growing population.

The experts propose a number of reforms, and even dare to tackle the problem of the "sacred cows." India has over 200 million cattle. These animals, however, are sacred. They are allowed to graze freely, and it is forbidden to kill them or eat them. So far from easing the food shortage, they merely aggravate it by their own requirements.

The proposal is to reduce drastically the numbers of these uneconomic beasts by sterilisation. But whether age-old prejudices can be overcome is another matter. Of one thing we can be sure: the Communists would have scant respect for Hindu religious scruples, whether about sacred cows, or about human birth-control, or about any other matter affecting material prosperity.

Another proposed remedy is the extension of peasant co-operatives and cheap credit facilities for the peasants, who now have to borrow from unscrupulous moneylenders. But that can be done only if India is offered large-scale credit by the United States. (In the meantime India accepted a large economical aid from Russia!) And that, again, is another matter.

Vice-President Nixon said not long ago that what happens in the near future in the economic field in India would be much more important than the question of Berlin. It is of vital importance that India should match China's progress, if Communist ideas are not to prevail throughout Asia.

Yet in China in the last ten years the tempo of economic development is said to have been three times greater than in India. Food production in China has increased by 100%, in India by not even 50%.

When we consider the immensity of the issue at stake—the prevention of the impoverishment and Communisation of a vast subcontinent—it is astonishing that every promising measure is not resorted to at once.

Is it possible that America and the West will fail to heed the words of Lenin himself. "The road to Paris leads through Peking and Calcutta"? Or that sacred cows will be allowed to contribute to the fulfilment of his words?

I. Holubowycz

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**FREEDOM-LOVING PEOPLE  
AND NATIONS OF THE WORLD,  
UNITE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST  
BOLSHEVISM AND RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM!**

Lev Shankovsky

## **Propagation of the Ideas of Freedom by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)**

Even in its preliminary stages the struggle of the UKRAYINSKA POVSTANCHA ARMIYA (U.P.A.—the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) was not limited to guerilla warfare in the most literal sense of the word. It has always carried on its struggle in a double way. The "military" struggle of the UPA aims at inflicting maximum damage to the apparatus of occupation by conducting operations which range from sabotage and terrorism to guerilla warfare occasionally reaching the proportions of regular war. Such operations conducted by highly mobile, highly equipped forces of the smallest size, used successively at numerous points of Ukraine, weaken and disorient the enemy and undermine his morale as they do not permit him to feel himself master in the occupied territory.

A few facts only to indicate the effectiveness of this kind of struggle: it was in a campaign against the UPA in 1943 that General Victor Lutze, chief of Staff of Hitler's S.A., perished; it was the UPA which in 1944 ambushed the staff of Soviet General Vatutin, mortally wounding him; in May 1946 UPA men attacked the convoy of Col. Gen. Moskalenko, one of the high-ranking officers of the MVD, and killed the general and several officers of his staff, and finally, in March 1947, Lt. Gen. Karol Swierczewski, Vice-Minister of Defence of Poland (the "General Walter" of the Spanish Civil War) perished at the hands of the UPA. According to incomplete reports as of January 1, 1951, over 35,000 officers and non-commissioned officers of the MGB and MVD (Soviet Security Forces) have fallen since 1945 in the fight against the UPA.

However, the military struggle of the UPA should not be regarded as an aim in itself. It is rather an armed spearhead of a widespread Ukrainian 'political' struggle, which seeks a decision—under favourable circumstances if possible, but a decision. This decision is the overthrow of Bolshevism and the establishment of a sovereign united Ukrainian state on its ruins.

The striking force aiming at this decision should not be reckoned merely by its present strength. It is the conception of the Ukrainian liberation movement that this decision can only be reached by the revolutionary-liberating struggle of the widest popular masses, aiming

at its full-scale development in a national-liberating revolution. Three hundred years ago such a revolutionary process among the Ukrainian masses led to a victorious rebellion under Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who was able to establish a Ukrainian Kozak Sovereign State (1648). According to the conception of liberty through revolution, the revolutionary movement has to be based on the people, to permeate every facet of their life, to oppose to the hostile goals of the enemy the ideals of national-political, social-economic and cultural-spiritual revolution and to develop revolutionary sentiment based on the enthusiasm of the masses for the cause of liberation and their willingness to struggle actively for its realization. If such sentiment is developed, if the broadest masses of the people give their full support to the struggle and the minds of men are converted to its creed, the revolutionary movement of the masses becomes a gigantic power able to enter into the final stage of the struggle for liberation.

At the present stage of the struggle the 'political' activities of the UPA aim at saturating all phases of Ukrainian life with Ukrainian ideology and at opposing the hostile goals and efforts of the Soviet occupants. The UPA prevents the enemy from blunting the morale of the Ukrainian people and supports its faith in the cause of liberation. It spreads the revolutionary ideas to make the Ukrainian people and other enslaved peoples of Central and Eastern Europe ripe for national-liberating revolution. It concentrates, therefore, on the struggle along political and propaganda actions and resorts to military operations purely in the way of defensive or supporting tactics.

It is believed by many that it is impossible to conduct any political struggle within the Soviet Union. The history of the Soviet rule in Ukraine has demonstrated that not for a moment have the Ukrainians bowed to the Soviet occupant. The Ukrainian political struggle against the Soviets ranged from national opposition within the ranks of the Communist party to revolutionary underground actions by secret political organizations. Sometimes it took the form of a struggle to preserve the cultural, national or religious traditions of Ukraine. Now and then it took the form of resistance to the Soviet economic measures and, especially, to Soviet attempts at forced collectivization.

Of course, many years of UPA experience in the anti-Soviet struggle have also proved that the struggle against the Soviet colossus is possible. Repeatedly the UPA prevented the Soviets from realization of their political plans. Under conditions not experienced by mankind until now, the UPA waged and still is waging an entirely successful struggle against the Kremlin. Until 1949, all measures against the UPA failed, and as proof of this I refer to an official proclamation signed by Lt. Gen. M. Kovalchuk, Minister of Security of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in Kiev. Dated December 30, 1949, and addressed to the Ukrainian underground, General Kovalchuk's appeal promised full pardon to those Ukrainian insurgents who would surrender; it promised them free choice of habitation, and above all, the return of their families from exile in Siberia. It admitted that thousands of

Ukrainians, particularly the Ukrainian youth, following the orders of the "American-British warmongers," were still hiding, and that they were disrupting the "tranquil" life of the Soviet state.

Two conditions are necessary to conduct a political struggle within the Soviet Union. First, the fighting force must be composed of true idealists, ready at every moment to sacrifice their lives for the cause they are fighting for; secondly, the population must give their full support to the fighters.

Both conditions have existed in the case of the UPA. The UPA fighters have proved that they have devoted their lives to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people look with pride and veneration at those who have forged the most heroic epoch of Ukrainian history. At the same time the UPA has secured considerable support of the Ukrainian population and this fact even leaked out through the "Iron Curtain." "There is scarcely a family in Ukraine (The author of the article in the "Neue Zeitung" means the Western Ukrainian territories.) which does not have a man with the partisans; no village which does not help and hide the partisan fighters when they suddenly appear only to disappear like ghosts," wrote "Die Neue Zeitung," an official American newspaper in Germany, on Oct. 21, 1948. It must be stated clearly that this picture corresponds to the actual conditions in Ukraine. Without great popular support the UPA could not have existed and operated and could not have withstood the pressure of such military powers as Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia at the peak of their military might. It could do that without any external aid and, I must say, it was a hard task for its opponents to cope with a mass movement which existed nowhere and everywhere. During the post-war years, the MGB and all the excellently trained security forces of the Soviet Union have been trying to cope with the UPA, hunting and searching, but without desired result.

It must be emphasized that the UPA has been able to exist and operate because its ideas reflect the desires and wishes of the entire Ukrainian people. It is because of this identification that the UPA has continually been able to inflame the Ukrainians and mobilize them for the struggle against the Soviets. To make clearer, let us consider several points. The UPA has no atomic weapons. It has few weapons at all. But it has strong ideas able to move the people. In the field of ideology the arms of the Soviet regime are far inferior to those of its opponents—the Ukrainian insurgents. The ideas of the UPA please the broadest masses of the Ukrainian people, and therefore, they are ready to fight for their realization. What are these ideas?

The ideas of today's liberation movement of Ukraine, the ideas of the UPA, are the ideas cherished by the Ukrainian people since their subjugation by Moscow. Today's liberation struggle is merely the continuation of that centuries-long struggle the Ukrainian people have been waging to win their freedom. Everytime there was an upheaval in Europe, in 1648, 1709, 1848, 1914-1918, 1939 and 1941, the Ukrainians responded to it and sought to obtain their liberty and



freedom. Their prolonged struggle has assumed clear-cut objectives: the establishment of a sovereign Ukrainian state and the union of all Ukrainian lands under it. It is a firm belief among the Ukrainian people that an independent Ukraine will be able to cope more adequately with the problems of the social-economic, national-political and cultural-spiritual needs of the Ukrainian people than could any alien power ruling them by force. And the Ukrainians know that in many ways the Russian rule over Ukraine has surpassed all the indignities forced upon the enslaved peoples in the darkest corners of the world and, therefore, desire to rid themselves of Moscow and its genocidal practices once and for ever.

The Ukrainian people are fully conscious of the great preponderance of the Soviet force in the technical field and know that they alone are much too weak to cope with such a power as the Soviet Union to achieve their liberation. Therefore, the Ukrainian people not only seek allies but have succeeded in finding them. It is one of the ideals of the UPA that all peoples enslaved by Moscow should fight together for liberation. This ideal found practical expression in 1943, when the UPA was waging a two-front war against Hitler and Stalin and when the representatives of 13 peoples of the Soviet Union held a congress and issued a manifesto. They called for an implacable fight against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia and stated that only the complete defeat of Germans and Russians would open the road to freedom and peaceful life in Eastern Europe. Since the end of World War II, the circle of natural allies of the Ukrainian people has widened as the whole of Central Europe became subjugated by Soviet Russia. Today we find the underground liberation movements throughout the area between the Baltic and Black Sea and from the Carpathian Mountains to the Caucasus and Turkestan. These liberation movements are the allies of the Ukrainian people and one of the principal aims of the UPA is to organize, encourage and strengthen these forces which will play an important role in the final outcome of the common struggle.


Thus, at the present stage, the liberation struggle is carried on more with 'ideas' than with arms. Accordingly, the UPA conducted a widespread propaganda campaign by printing or mimeographing hundreds of underground publications: newspapers, reviews, pamphlets, booklets, proclamations, posters, postcards, cartoons, illustrations etc. There was a substantial literary output—novels, poetry, drama, satire, historical memoirs, editions for the youth, etc. There were military manuals and economic books. All this illegal literature is directed against Soviet ideology, against forced imposition of an alien culture and thinking. And, although this literature is technically very simple, it is none the less the most striking proof of the efficiency of the UPA organization. The scope of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation can be measured by the number of Ukrainian underground publications printed or mimeographed in Ukraine. Besides, the copies of this underground literature which have been received in the West are the most reliable source about the Ukrainian liberation movement and its aims, and, from

this point of view, they are highly recommended to everyone who desires to know what 40 million Ukrainians have been attempting to do.

Among the media of the political propaganda of the UPA, a considerable part is played by illustration. Nearly always this illustration is made from woodcuts which have become the chief medium of underground illustration. The reproduction from the woodcut has become a close second to the oral agitator in the role of underground propagandist, instructor and guide of the people. Cheap in price, produced in great quantities, close to the hearts and the minds of common people, the reproduction of the woodcut has proved to be an effective substitute for a booklet or leaflet. Such reproduction distributed en masse have been looked at, talked about and absorbed by foe and friend. Sometimes, they have been used as means of illustrating underground publications, or have found their application as a summarization of the printed text in leaflets. In such a case, the illustration appears in the middle or beside the printed text. No doubt that such an illustrated leaflet is able to move the feelings and to produce the desired effects.

In these pages we present some specimens of Ukrainian underground woodcut printings. They were done in Ukraine, in 1947-1950 by an outstanding Ukrainian artist and his disciples. The original reproductions were brought to the West, in 1950 by one of the many groups of Ukrainian insurgents who fought their way 700 miles through Poland and Czechoslovakia from Russian-occupied Ukraine to the U.S. zone in Germany where they surrendered to the American authorities.

The woodcuts of Mr. Nil Khasevych and his disciples are before us. They are valuable documents telling us that the Ukrainian people are still struggling for liberation. They tell us that while the entire world in deadly fear of World War III is deluding itself by trying to appease Bolshevism, the Ukrainian people together with millions of other peoples behind the Iron Curtain are already engaged in war against the force which now endangers the world. The symbol and the instrument of this struggle is the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. At a time when the Western world is threatened as never before, it seems tragic to us that the democratic world has not awakened to the significance of this struggle.



## Nil Khasevych — Artist of the Ukrainian Underground

### A biographical Sketch

Born in 1906, the son of a village clerk in a little village of Volynia, this part of Ukraine which later, together with Galicia, became the cradle of the UPA, Nil Khasevych had a hard boyhood. There was little that was joyous about life in a big, poverty-stricken family of a small farmer who from time to time performed some minor ecclesiastic office in a local Orthodox church. At eight years of age, little Nil suffered an accident which crippled him permanently. While riding with his mother in a cart to a neighbouring town an oncoming train struck him as they crossed the tracks. The mother was killed instantly while Nil, severely injured, was taken to the hospital. The surgeons saved his life but a leg was lost.

The accident and death of his mother were terrible blows to the little boy, but loss of his leg paved the way for his art career. His injury made it certain that he would never become a valuable labourer in his father's fields. He felt useless at home, an unnecessary eater of bread which was so scarce. The father, however, had no intention of allowing him to live in idleness and tried to give him an education. The odds were against the boy; the First World War came with all its hardships and his native Volynia became a battlefield for the million-men armies of the great powers. The Ukrainian Liberation War (1917-1921) followed. Volynia was ceded to Poland (1920), and conditions remained unsatisfactory for getting a regular education.

In 1926 Khasevych registered at the Academy of Arts in Warsaw. There he studied painting and later graphic arts. The Warsaw Academy was a good art school, and he progressed rapidly despite the fact that he had to make up the defects in his early education. In 1932 he finished the course and received the diploma of an art teacher. But being a Ukrainian, he could not hope to get an adequate position in a school. So he began specializing in woodcutting and Ukrainian calligraphy.

The years after finishing the Academy were devoted almost exclusively to graphic arts. Soon Khasevych became a master of Ukrainian letters and of ex-libris. He became acquainted with the latest developments in this field and this resulted in an award in 1937. He won

the third prize at the International Exhibition of Woodcuts in Warsaw (1936-37) for four book plates. As a prize-winner he became known in artistic circles, and this encouraged him to develop his speciality and to produce some excellent works in the 1937-1939 period.

The hour when Khasevych attained artistic maturity was one of the most pregnant in the history of Ukraine. It was the time when two great powers again contended for Ukraine. Neither of them was willing to grant any concessions to the Ukrainian people and the latter, not willing to submit, sought to take advantage of the conflict. The Ukrainians organized the force of their own—the UPA (Ukrayinska Povstancha Armiya—Ukrainian Insurgent Army)—which fought the Nazis in World War II and the Russians after the war with the aim to win national freedom and independence for Ukraine.

Along with thousands of other Ukrainians, Nil Khasevych found his way into the UPA in 1943. We are able to show some of his woodcuts made in the underground from 1947 to 1950. In them we can see how his engravings in wood have helped disseminate the ideas for which the UPA was fighting. As an artist influenced by his surroundings, Khasevych expressed in a realistic manner the deeply-felt experiences of the Ukrainian people under Soviet subjugation. His woodcuts, including subjects of every sort from illustrations of underground publications to satirical pieces, have a direct, almost primitive realism which strikes in a truly incomparable manner at the enemy of the Ukrainian people. As an underground artist he undertook and completed his series of designs for the underground almanac *Fighting Volynia*, mostly with highly-wrought landscape backgrounds of his native land. A portrait series belongs to his group. A series of productions entitled "Collectivization" is an indictment of the Russian kolkhoz system forced upon Ukraine—the land of individual landholders. His satirical pieces are clear and incisive answers to Soviet myths. Of course, we can show only a small part of his production here. All of the specimens were brought from Ukraine by UPA soldiers who fought their way through Poland and Czechoslovakia into the U.S. Zone of Germany in 1947-1950.

A large number of Khasevych's designs were engraved by his pupils: "Artem," "Svyryd," and "Myron." Sometimes their engravings are from Khasevych's sketches, and in some cases they are entirely executed by them though Khasevych's supervision is visible in their work. The fact that Khasevych supervises a sort of an art school in the underground is a tribute to him and the movement.

In a letter written by Nil Khasevych to his friends in this country, he wrote the following: "The Russians know who is hiding under the alias of D. Bey, but my fellow-countrymen don't know. I want them to know. I want the world to know. I've lost everything, and I cannot lose more than my life. However, as long as a spark of life remains, I shall fight the enemy of our people. I cannot fight them with arms, so I fight them with my burin and carver. And I, a cripple, am fighting them at a time when many strong and healthy men the

world over doubt that such a fight is even possible. I want the world to know that the fight is possible and that we Ukrainians fight."

Nil Khasevych's underground life must have been extremely hard since he lost a leg in an accident while a boy. But the fact that the UPA was able to make it possible for him and his group to work is perhaps the most striking proof of its efficiency. It is proof of how deep-rooted the UPA is within the Ukrainian people. It is the Ukrainian people who give the underground fighters food and shelter and it is the Ukrainian people who make possible for our artist and his men to unfold free artistic activities in a country of non-existent "free art" and of the artists being only humble servants of the Soviet propaganda apparatus. Thanks to this support by the Ukrainian people the activities of the Ukrainian underground under Soviet have reached a scale that has exceeded all expectations.

In a struggle carried on in secrecy all names of the underground fighters including those of the underground leaders must remain secret and have to be substituted by assumed names or even numbers. If we disclose the real name of this underground artist, it is because he himself desired it and the Supreme UPA Command in way of an exceptional measure approved his request and allowed to disclose the real name of D. Bey, of Bey-Zot—an alias under which Nil Khasevych is known in Ukraine. Like thousands of other underground fighters Nil Khasevych was aware of his predicament and he knew that he had to expect no mercy, no "beau geste" on the part of the rulers in the Kremlin in case the hunting bloodhounds of the Soviet police found him and put an end to his daring artistic activity. But as every artist Nil Khasevych was proud of his artistic work and signed his woodcuts with his own initials (N. Kh., N. Khas.). He was anxious to preserve his work from danger of possible destruction and made necessary steps to send some of his reproductions abroad.

Khasevych can proudly look back upon all the long years of his underground artistic activity. He has contributed much to the spreading of the UPA's ideas in Ukraine. The Ukrainians the world over look with pride at his incomparable work. But we think that the people in the West should also become acquainted with his work, for people like Khasevych are fighting Soviet Russia—the implacable enemy of Western civilization.

**Lev Shankovsky**

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WOODCUTS BY NIL KHASEVYCH



FOR INDEPENDENCE!



GLORY TO UKRAINE!

GLORY TO HEROES!

За що ти борівся?



„...Не за Україну,  
А за її ката довелось пролить  
Кров добру — не чорну; довелось  
запить  
З московської чаші московську  
отруту”.

(Т. Шевченко. „Кавказ”).

“... Not for our Ukraina, —  
But for her hangman, they made you shed blood,  
Not black blood — but good, and you drank your reward  
From a Muscovite chalice of Muscovite poison.”

(T. Shevchenko: “Kaukasus”)

FOR WHOM DID YOU FIGHT?









A FAMILY OF REFUGEES  
Overleaf: THE BELLRINGER

Professor Volodymyr Zalizetsky

## *Gregory Kruk*

### NOTE

This article on the life and work of Gregory Kruk is an extract from a monograph by Prof. Dr. Volodymyr Zalizetsky, an art historian.

Unfortunately, this monograph has so far not appeared in print as no one has been prepared to financially support its publication.

The Editor.

It is no doubt most fitting to begin with the story of his life as he himself has narrated it to us in his modest way, for seldom has a biography in its form and contents been so identical with the work of an artist as in the case of Gregory (Hryhoriy) Kruk. Both the biography and the work contain a message of gentle melancholy and sweet consolation,—they both express the same “smiling heartache” as our Ukrainian folksongs.

Kruk narrates as follows:

“My grandfather Ivan and my father both engaged in the potter’s craft. (The Ukrainians are famed as the oldest and most skilled potters in Eastern Europe.) They used to fashion household utensils out of clay by hand, ornament them, bake them and then sell them at the fairs in the neighbouring small towns.

My father used to have a lot of trouble with Grandfather Ivan on such occasions, for as soon as the latter had sold their wares, he would go into a tavern and spend all the proceeds on a merry drinking bout.

Grandfather had never sent my father to school and the latter had taught himself reading and writing, and, in fact, very passably indeed.

Grandfather was not particularly fond of my father and used to call him a “spoil-sport” because he refused to sit drinking with the three toppers Ivan, Antin and Mykhailo Kruk.

Father used to read the lessons at church and at home he would read the Acts of the Apostles, the Gospel and the Psalms aloud in a singing voice. In addition, he knew all the tropes and responses and everything else that formed part of the Greek Catholic service by heart.

In his youth Father worked in Grandfather's pottery, but after his marriage he was obliged to start his own business, otherwise he would not have been able to keep his family. He lost his first wife and his small seven-year old son Oleksa very soon. Maria, the daughter of this marriage, still lives with my mother in our native village Bratyshiv. Father told me that it was only because his aged mother was so insistent that he eventually decided to get married a second time. A woman was needed in the household. There were two sons of this second marriage,—my younger brother Ivan and myself, Hryhoriy. The outbreak of the first world war interrupted Father's work as a potter and he was called up for service in the imperial army. His military service proved extremely useful. He spent this period in Vienna, Budapest and Zhovkva (East Galicia). He returned home in better physical condition than he had been in when called up and, what was more, had learnt the German language in the meantime. In addition, he had also had an opportunity to compare our life at home with standards in the West.

Soon after his return, my easy-going Grandfather died and Father in his sober and industrious way took over the business and the workshop. Thus he could afford to send my little brother Ivan and me to school.

My father would constantly say to my mother: "Listen, old girl! Our children are not going to be allowed to look after the cattle of the Polish lords and to get into the habit of sitting about in taverns like all our grandfathers did. They must get to know town life, they must be sent to high school!" My father also continued to educate himself; he never missed a public meeting and was a member of the Ukrainian cultural society "Sich" which had been founded by Cyril (Kyrylo) Trylovsky. He frequently went to meetings addressed by the leaders of our people,—the impetuous Ivan Makukh, the slow and deliberate Pavlyk and, above all, the gifted politician and writer and apostle of our people, Ivan Franko,—all of them men who wanted to free our people from Polish chaos and Russian tyranny.

At home he would repeat what these men had said at the meetings. We used to stand listening to him, open-mouthed and with shining eyes, even though we hardly understood what he was talking about. But even what is not always understood is moulded and nurtured in an incomprehensible way and takes root and continues to ferment.

Even when I was still quite small, I used to help my father and was overjoyed whenever I managed to make and shape small figures out of the soft clay, whose feel I loved so much.

The first person whose attention was attracted to my drawings and figures was the teacher, Vasyl Lukasevych, and it was he, too, who advised my father to send me to the arts and crafts school in Stanyslaviv,—which he did. In addition to his pottery, Father also worked as a mason. He used to go round to the farm-houses and install the big wide stoves on which one can comfortably hold one's winter-sleep and which are a combined bake-oven and stove. He not only installed stoves for the farmers, but also for the Jews and for "gentle-

men of every faith." In addition, he used to carve the frames for the icons in the village churches and he even painted the pictures of the icons in oil. Father used to boast that he had learnt this art in Vienna when he served there as a soldier, together with painters and wood-carvers. Later, when his hands grew shaky, he abandoned this handicraft, or, rather, it abandoned him. So he began to devote himself to herbalism. And in this art he soon became even more famous than in his former arts. Indeed, he was famed not only in all the towns nearby, but also in the neighbouring districts. His patients were not only sick sheep, cows, pigs and also farmers, but even educated people, teachers and priests, came to consult him from near and far. He was famed most for his remedies against poisonous adder bites. Seldom did one of his patients who had been bitten by an adder die. Though, incidentally, I later learnt that although such bites are poisonous, they are very rarely fatal.

Mother and Father were not entirely satisfied with my course at the arts and crafts school, for they had higher ambitions for me. They would have liked me to have studied to be a "real gentleman" or at least a "village schoolmaster," or possibly even a "Reverend Father," for such professions were the acme of ambition in all the farmers' families in our district.

In the summer vacation I used to come home and help Father in the workshop. This fact aroused considerable approval on the part of the villagers, who used to say: "Just imagine, just imagine! His son wears a tie and trousers tailored in the town-style, but he's not ashamed of his simple home-life or of manual work."

Whenever we were fixing a stove somewhere, Father would tell me all about his experiences in life whilst we were getting on with our work. I profitted a great deal from all that he told me and even today I can still remember most of the things he told me, and I often act according to his wise precepts.

Later, when I was studying at the art academy in Cracow, I became acquainted not only with Ukrainian literature, but also with the famous literature of other countries. But even so, the talks I had with my father proved more instructive and far more valuable than all the wisdom I later acquired out of books,—just as a spring in a forest refreshes one far more than does a water-tap in a school-corridor.

Amazed, I would often say to my father: "Father, you don't read any profound books and yet you have a profound wisdom."—"My son,—he would reply—you, too, must rely on the wisest teacher of mankind, Nature. Learn to read Nature, for if you love her, she will love you, too, and will reveal her secrets to you. Don't all scholars and all illiterate persons, all lords, Jews and peasants draw from this same source—Nature?"

Mother used to call us "the philosophers," and sometimes she would summon us to a meal with the words: "Come on, my philosophers, come and feed,—the meat's getting cold!"

My father was very pious and never missed going to church on Sundays and feast-days. His sense of humour cured the sick and cheered the healthy up. He was of a kind, gentle and peaceful disposition. No beggar was ever turned away from our door. But he was also capable of hating. Thus, he was full of contempt for the military rabble, the police and the tax-collectors who were very importunate towards us Ukrainians in the Polish state. "Don't you dare ever think such uniform is nice or ever want to wear it," my father would say to me with an angry look.

Sometimes he would say to me, "Hryhoriy, you are not suited to be a farmer, for you have talent and one must not bury such a gift. But some day you will be all alone in the world, without anyone to give you advise and help. But you will have a living example before you in our country,—the example of a very clever and very very practical-minded people,—the Jews. I'm nearly sixty, but in all my life I've never come across a Jew who would have become a blacksmith. And has ever a Jew joined the army of his own free will? If a Jew has the misfortune to be called up, he promptly sees to it that he gets assigned to the office or to the supply depots where he gives out either clothes or tinned meat. Hryhoriy, your health is not by any means robust and you must not undertake heavy physical work; and if you are determined to overtax your eyes, then at least use them to gaze at beautiful sights and not at empty trash!"

My father was also very musical, and it was therefore only natural that, being a genuine Ukrainian, he knew hundreds of folksongs. Very often, when we were returning home from some fair or other, as for instance from Nyzhniv, and we came to a Catholic church by the wayside, in which someone was playing the organ, my father, deeply moved, would seize hold of my hand and together we would step inside the church. Father would cross himself in the orthodox manner and would then listen spellbound to the majestic sound of the organ. Afterwards, when the magic of the moment was over and we were out on the road again, he would then say: "What a pity it is that we have no organs in our churches; the organ is such a noble instrument and converts the heathens."

After I had completed my studies at the Cracow Academy under Professor Liashchko, Mr. Bohdan Lepky and Mr. Stanislaw Tilia, museum director, got me a place at the Berlin Academy. That was from 1936 to 1937. At that time Professor Ivan Mirchuk was head of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin, and Professor Zenon Kuzela was his right-hand man. From this Institute I received a scholarship to study at the Berlin Art Academy. Professor Focke and Professor Hitzberg were my teachers, and it is to them that I owe my guiding principle: "First of all be a human being, and then become an artist!" During World War II, that is in 1939/40, my brother Ivan joined me in Berlin and we lived together. He was a decorator's journeyman. Ivan was kind, obliging and modest and had never cherished any ambition to study.

Before the war ended, Ivan and I managed to pay a visit to our native village and see our dear parents once more,— and even then we seemed to have a presentiment that it would be the last time we should see them. What tears of joy we all wept at seeing each other again after so many years, and how sad our parting was under tragic omens! It was 1944/45 and the fighting fronts everywhere were collapsing. We said goodbye to our parents, never to see them again.

When we got back to Berlin we felt immediately that we could not stay there any longer. The attempt to assassinate Hitler had taken place and the S.S. were resorting to drastic measures; the people of Berlin were putting up barricades along the elegant Kurfürstendamm "in order to repulse the Allies from here." What was the point of us Ukrainians remaining in this witches' cauldron! After a short respite, we decided to move on to Munich.

To begin with, life in Munich was difficult. But Ivan and I nevertheless succeeded in starting a small shop and even planned to start a second food shop later on. Then I was employed for a year as a teacher of sculpture and drawing at the UNRRA University (department of architecture). When this institution ceased to exist, I went back to selling goods in the shop with my brother Ivan. I even managed to save up enough money to take a little trip to France, Italy and England. How I should have liked to have satisfied my longing to visit Greece, Spain and, above all, Egypt,—Egypt, the cradle of the most monumental sculptures of all times,—but the sudden death of my dear brother, who had always been my helpful, loving and understanding Maecenas and who had always taken a greater joy and pride in my successes than in his own, came as a dreadful blow to me and to the hopes that I had cherished. His little son Maksym, who was born out of wedlock, is now in my loving care.

My modest works,—those which I have created so far and those which, with God's help, I hope to create in future— are dedicated to the memory and the love of my dear parents. Even today, I still see their calloused hands—hands that were ennobled by many years of hard and heavy work—raised to the sacred icon in fervent prayer to God, for a better future for their children.

My father was born in 1869. A short time ago, my mother wrote and told me that he passed away six years ago. Mother and my sister Maria are still living in our native village and are "enjoying kolkhoz life."

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Such a biography and such a family picture are the best introduction to the work which we now intend to discuss. Kruk is undoubtedly a man of unique and strongly marked personality. Naturally, even the strongest artistic personality cannot and, indeed, should not try to

detach itself from the powerful influence of its surroundings. The important point, however, is whether such a personality still remains unique and individualist.

Kruk, who came from the European East, was educated in the West and the West has become his home by choice. Kruk naturally combines all the Western influences he has experienced; there are touches of Barlach, Millol, Rodin, Bourdeille and of ancient Egypt in his figures. His art is concrete, not abstract. Considerable importance is attached to such a distinction, which is regarded as vital and interesting. But can this drastic comparison between "abstract" and "concrete" or "objective" really be upheld? Is there not in every objective work, in so far as it is really a work of art, something abstract that is more or less apparent? We have in this respect only to think of symmetry, the medial section, stylization, simplification, exclusion, triangular construction, fan-composition, diagonals and secret quadratures,—all of them invented principles of systematic abstraction. On the other hand, however, in the same case of the abstract we have only to think of the way in which objective associations again and again attract and fascinate us and lead us back to prototypes in Nature. Kruk is always concerned with the object; he is never anti-naturalist, but in some of his works he is gently prompted by constructivism or cubism, and in such cases one has the feeling that he is the co-national of the Ukrainian Arkhypenko and that the cradle of the Roumanian sculptor Brancusi was not so far away from his cradle. The "Western Byzantine" Rouault says: "The eye comprehends, the mind orders, but the heart feels." And it is the heart that plays an important part in the case of Kruk. The East tends rather to the extreme abstract, to the superhuman.

The word "interesting" is derived from "interesse" (inter=between, esse=to be). And it is undoubtedly topical and "interesting" nowadays to stand between the modern "isms" or between the abstracts and Nature. But the life between, the state of existing between the European East and the European West, as all we Ukrainians are experiencing it, is, in my opinion, of even more vital interest. Forty-five million Ukrainians are East Slavs and all the Ukrainians occupy a position *sui generis* among the Eastern peoples. Our country was always the East-West bridge on which all the decisive migrations and changes between Asia and Europe, between the Ural and the mouth of the Danube, were enacted. We are as different in character from the Russians living north of us as, for instance, the French are from the Germans. Just as Nietzsche of necessity felt himself attracted to the Russian Dostoyevsky, so it was the fate of our Ukrainian Gogol (Hohol) to feel attracted to Molière. The Russian Dostoyevsky was inspired by the prophet Jonah in the Cathedral of Bamberg, whom he undoubtedly found "extremely fierce" and "very stimulating." But it was St. Theodore in the Cathedral of Chartres, kindly and gentle, to whom our Gogol prayed. If one examines the Ukrainian and Russian icons, one even finds amongst these hieratic, Byzantine, stiff and unreal faces a trait of friendly and natural corporeality in the case of

the Ukrainian icons, which would never have occurred to the strictly dogmatic Russian monastic painters. The Ukrainians are indeed a product of their southern climate and of their black earth, which freely and lavishly bestows its bounties on them and never threatens to fail them. Thus, the Ukrainians have no reason to distrust their kindly Creator, who rarely inflicts catastrophes upon them. If a Ukrainian quarrels with his neighbour, then it is only because his life would be devoid of any suspense otherwise. But auto-dramatization of his life must be taken far less seriously than the tragedy in which the Russian, wrestling with life, is involved and fettered, for the Russian is constantly forced to defy new and almost insurmountable attacks by his inner and external nature, which continually threatens and punishes him. In the case of the Russian, love, humility, servility, anxiety, terror, fear, self-destruction, cruelty, anger, atheism and fanatic piety often exist side by side, sitting, as it were, like black and white birds on one and the same branch of their tree of life. The Ukrainian, however, is stimulated by the harmonious twittering and trilling of the speckled birds which make their nest in his tree of life and which derive their joy in living precisely from their different natures. Of course, there are sometimes demonic whirlpools and sad moods in the Ukrainian character and frequently the bird of death croaks, too. But this state does not last long, and soon all is happiness and harmony once more.

And it is in such a life between that Kruk's sculptures live. At a first gloomy glance we are spellbound by these earthy, reproachful, bowed figures—those who have been cast off by fortune and whose gaze is one of grim primitiveness, whose faces are half concealed and only hinted at and pursue us like a stony nightmare. But at a second glance we notice to our relief, however, that the cripple with the heavy head bent at right angles has such a determined look on his face that his head, thrust forward like a battering-ram, will assert itself, and we are no longer frightened for his sake. We notice with a smile that the ringing Sexton has been moulded "as a whole" in the form of a bell and that there is something extremely comical about his paws which are far too weighty for this office of bell-ringer. The refugee woman, who refuses to part with all the rubbish that she carries so rapaciously, is only to blame herself when she collapses and cannot proceed any further. The woman hoeing, with her bloated face, who looks as though she had been carved out of Egyptian granite, is monumental as a typical everyday old woman. The insolent street arabs, with their crossed legs, are also a grotesque upper-statement, "immortalized" in Cubist forms. There is something roguish about all these figures. Not to mention the women relieving themselves, shaking their skirts out and turning round smiling to see if they have been observed! And the Galician Jews, gazing blinkingly into the sun with eyes blinded from the ghetto,—praising their wares—a hen which they are holding under their arm. These are all Gogol stories, invented by the harmless humour of our people, a humour which makes the unbearable so much easier to bear. And when one beholds Kruk's



sensual maidens, who go to meet life so carefree and are only attired in their buxom beauty, one is bound to take the creator of this colourful world, the potter's son, Kruk, the great Ukrainian sculptor, to one's heart.

But he is also serious and deeply religious (as for instance in the "Boy with Dove"). He is man of keen perception and a psychologist (as for instance in his portraits). He has a roguish humour and makes fun of himself and the world, but at the same time he can be deeply moved by the sufferings of others and can give us consolation. He is a clown and, at the same time, a philosopher. He is open-minded towards the whole world, but, at the same time, closely bound up with his Eastern origin. He is thoughtful and intellectual, but, at the same time, a thoroughbred peasant (as for instance in his drawings). His *joie de vivre* inspires us, too, and carries us along. And for this reason Gregory Kruk is to us unique and irreplaceable. We know from where and from whom he has derived all these qualities. And that is why we love him.



### The Atelier of Gregory Kruk

In clear Bavarian light, bronze, clay, and plaster  
Clothe the incarnate ghosts of memory,  
Freezing the rainbows, spun of tears and laughter,  
To grey and white stone immobility.

Old Cossack, washer-girl, or Jewish pedlar,  
Bold shapes, firm chiselled from a childhood dream;  
Time's clock has stopped its hands — no western meddlers  
Can dare rewind their backward-pointing gleam.

Yet these are no grim death-masks of a nation,  
Museum-labelled figures of a past;  
Hands mould firm flesh, eyes spark an inspiration,  
Love plants a soul — and there stand bold at last

Not nerveless wraiths to mock the wistful dreamer,  
But vital living forms of Ukraina.

Vera Rich






ORPHAN BROTHERS



YOUTH WITH A DOVE  
Overleaf: HEAD OF A CHILD.



YOUNG GIRL WAITING

D. Shaldiy

## The Crises in Soviet Ukraine's Economy

N. Khrushchov opened his speech at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with the following words: "Inasmuch as our people have realized the policy of the industrialization of the country, they have under the guidance of the Party and its Central Committee, whose leader Stalin was for many years, achieved profound changes. Inasmuch as they have surmounted all the obstacles on their path, and have crushed the opposition of the class enemies and their agents,—the Trotskyists, the rightist opportunists, the bourgeois nationalists and others, our Party and the entire Soviet people have achieved historical victories and have set up the socialist order of society. . ."

Khrushchov then went on to speak about the so-called "copious development of the industry of the U.S.S.R." and affirmed: "The bourgeois economists endeavour to prove that at a certain stage the slowing down of the industrial development of the U.S.S.R. is inevitable. This is nothing but an attempt to assess socialism according to the analogy of the capitalist economy. In reality, capitalism creates insurmountable barriers for the development of the productive forces and the rate of the growth of industry begins to drop. Socialism, however, creates all the necessary conditions for the constant growth of the productive forces. . ."

With these statements Khrushchov tried to disguise the true state of Soviet economy, in which significant processes in the nature of crises are constantly taking place,—processes which Moscow carefully conceals from the Soviet-ruled population and from the Western world; and, taken as a whole, Khrushchov's entire speech consists solely of a lot of boastful talk about "achievements and surpluses," "copious development," "peaceful economic competition," "enthusiasm of the Soviet people" and "faultlessness of the wise Party leadership," etc.

The "theories" contained in Khrushchov's speech were already published on the eve of the conference of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. last year. And the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, M. V. Podhorny, also adhered to these "theories" when he held his directive speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine (in the middle of January, 1959). Following Khrushchov's example, Podhorny also painted the present state of economy in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in extremely rosy colours and adroitly passed over all its crises in silence.

If one is to believe the statements made by Khrushchov and Podhorny, Soviet Ukraine fulfilled the plan for 1958 within a shorter time than was fixed and its population has "developed a general people's competition" in order to ensure the successful realization of Khrushchov's Seven-Year Plan. According to Podhorny's statements, Soviet Ukraine in the course of 1958 fulfilled 103 per cent of the plan for gross production and in general achieved 10.6 per cent more production than in the year 1957. The quota set as regards lowering the prime cost of production was also fulfilled by a surplus and, accordingly, over 1.5 milliard roubles were saved beyond the amount fixed in the budget. As regards agriculture, too, Soviet Ukraine fulfilled the fixed quotas by a surplus, and in gratitude for this fact Moscow conferred the Lenin Order on no less than 15 regions of Soviet Ukraine and on its authorized emissaries there. All these Moscow decorations, at any rate, corroborate the fact that Ukraine occupies an extremely important position in the entire economy of the Soviet Union. Calculated according to the individual branches of production, the specific gravity of Ukraine in the entire economy of the Soviet Union in 1958 amounted to the following percentages: cast iron 51 per cent, steel 40 per cent, hard coal 43 per cent, coke 53 per cent, gas 32 per cent, coal combines 96 per cent, and sugar 70 per cent.

As can be seen from Khrushchov's speech, the specific gravity of Ukraine in the economy of the U.S.S.R. will increase considerably in the course of the Seven-Year Plan. The gross production of Ukraine in 1965, as compared to that of 1958, is to increase by 77 per cent, including an increase of 82 per cent in the so-called "Group A" (manufacture of means of production, i.e. machinery, workshop tools, raw materials, semi-finished products) and an increase of 67 per cent in the so called "Group B" (production of consumption goods). The average annual increase in gross production is to amount to approximately 8.5 per cent, 1 per cent in 1965 being equal in value to 3 milliard roubles.

Such a great burden as this, which Moscow imposes on subjugated Ukraine, according to Podhorny, will "not exceed the strength and energy of the Ukrainian people"; allegedly, "the working class, the collective farmers and the intelligentsia of Ukraine have achieved a grandiose growth of industrial and agricultural production, thanks to the brotherly help of the great Russian people."

According to Podhorny's statements, 500 large industrial enterprises have been opened in Soviet Ukraine during the past three years, including 140 coal-mines, 16 iron ore mines, 11 blast furnaces, and a number of steel smelting-works and rolling mills, etc.; consequently, the production of cast iron has increased by 22 per cent, that of steel by 28 per cent, that of rolled metal by 30 per cent, and that of iron ore by 25 per cent.

In reality, however, the actual state of Soviet Ukrainian economy is by no means as rosy as is painted by Podhorny, Kal'chenko, Korotchenko and other deputies of Moscow in Ukraine. This fact,

incidentally, was recently mentioned by the Yugoslav press (namely the Belgrade paper, "Borba"), which stressed the existence of a grave chronic crisis in the industry of the U.S.S.R., especially in the industry of Soviet Ukraine. The Moscow paper "Pravda" (of January 26, 1959) was highly indignant at this assertion and wrote in reply: "In its articles dealing with the Soviet Seven-Year Plan, the Yugoslav press intentionally misrepresents the real economic state of the socialist camp."

Indications of crises in Soviet Ukrainian economy have constantly been in evidence,—even from the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan onwards. To begin with, they appeared to be local; but in the course of time they became a universal phenomenon and finally reduced Soviet economy to such a condition that Moscow was forced to abandon its Five-Year Plans, to be carried out at an intensive speed, and to go over to a Seven-Year Plan.

Although Khrushchov stated at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the change introduced in industrial management had already produced very good results, Kal'chenko was obliged to admit at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine that even after the above-mentioned change a complicated and many-graded structure of the planned work was still being adhered to in Soviet Ukraine. In Dnipropetrovske (formerly Katerynoslav), for instance, a motor tyre factory with a big capacity is at present being built, which is to be finished by 1960 and is to produce as many tyres as fell to Soviet Ukraine's share in 1958 out of the funds assigned to that country. But the "Sovnarkhoz" ("economic council") of Dnipropetrovske is making a poor job of the construction of this factory. Last year, several million roubles of the investments intended for this project were not utilized properly. Expensive installations were imported and obtained for the factory, but they were left lying out in the open to rust. This equipment should already have been set up in the various departments of the factory, but the building firm only received the technical documentation at the end of 1958. Of the 39 concerns of the chemical industry which, according to plan, were to be started last year in Ukraine, only 22 have so far been opened. This applies mainly to the "Sovnarkhozes" of the regions of Luhanske, Dnipropetrovske and Kyiv. The main reason for the non-fulfilment of the capital construction in the chemical industry sector, however, lies in the faulty coordination of the work of the "Sovnarkhozes" of the individual regions, on the one hand, and of the state planning commission (Gosplan) of Soviet Ukraine, on the other: the "Sovnarkhozes" carry out their work as they like, and the Gosplan is constantly in arrears with its documentation. In 1958, the "Sovnarkhoz" of the region of Kyiv only fulfilled 83 per cent of its quota as regards the building of chemical concerns, that of the region of Luhanske 85 per cent. And the situation is about the same as regards the "Sovnarkhozes" of the regions of Dnipropetrovske and Stalino. Even at the beginning of 1959, all the factories already operating in



Ukraine still did not know what and how much equipment they were to manufacture for the chemical industry, although the total programme for the manufacture of chemical equipment for the year 1959 had already been raised by 50 per cent. Naturally, the chemical equipment has not yet been manufactured, although, according to the plans for 1959, it should already be operating in the actual chemical production.

Moscow, however, regards local industry in Soviet Ukraine as something of secondary importance. Moscow's main concern is that those industries, which are directly under the supervision of the central organs of the Soviet Union and of the individual Soviet Republics and not under the control of the regional "Sovnarkhozes," should fulfil the planned quotas and supply the concerns of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) with raw materials and semi-finished products. For this reason, Moscow neglects the local industry of Soviet Ukraine, which should cover the material needs of the Ukrainian population, and, indeed, in many towns and districts this local industry is hardly developed at all. It does not fulfil the quotas and, moreover, produces goods of poor quality, for which there is little demand on the part of consumers. Nevertheless, in 1958 practically all the bakery production in Soviet Ukraine was turned out by the local industry, as well as 60 to 80 per cent of the goods used for cultural needs and up to 80 per cent of the building material (a fact which shows clearly how much the population must feel the chronic backwardness of local industry). In the regions of Dnipropetrovske, Mykolayiv, Sumy and Kherson, one-third of the local industry failed to fulfil the production quotas in 1958, and the corresponding deficit in production is calculated as amounting to 250 million roubles. And in the remaining regions of Soviet Ukraine the position as regards local industry is similar.

The position in the Ukrainian metallurgical industry, in particular as regards its supply of raw materials, is no better. Thus, one of the most important problems at present, which has arisen in connection with the crises in Ukraine's economy, is the speeding up of the construction of metallurgical processing combines, as well as the expansion of the mines and open cast workings which should supply the metallurgical industry with raw materials. A shortage of ore in the metallurgical industry has, for example, forced the factory "Kryvorizhstal" to substitute waste-products from the blast-furnace process for the ore needed; during the past two to three years, this factory has used one and a half million tons of waste furnace-dust in order to make up for the shortage of 1,400,000 tons of iron ore. The fact that waste-products containing a high percentage of the iron ore needed by the blast-furnaces are thrown away, however, proves that the metallurgical plants are not only not utilized to their own full and planned capacity, but also that they are constructed with a low coefficient of productivity. And, in addition, the constant spurring on of the workers to fulfil the quotas and to fulfil them by

a surplus, results in careless processing of the iron ore in the furnaces, that is to say, the quality of the work deteriorates. This is the case not only in the "Kryvorizhstal" factory, but also in many other metal works, above all in those located in Stalino, Alchevske, Kramatorske and Konstantynivka.

Gas is still hardly used at all in the Ukrainian metallurgical industry, even though coke as fuel in the blast-furnace process is almost five times as expensive as gas, and in spite of the fact that in the West coke has long since been replaced by other fuels, mostly by gas. Owing to the fact that the gas industry in Ukraine has not been developed sufficiently, the Ukrainian metallurgical industry is now seriously feeling the shortage of coke, for a considerable disproportion as regards supplies has ensued between the coal raised and the chemical coke industry. The coal industry is not in a position to supply the chemical coke industry adequately, and the latter, in its turn, is not in a position to supply the metallurgical industry with sufficient coke.

In accordance with the Seven-Year Plan, the main emphasis in Ukraine is to be on the development of the heavy industry,—above all, the ferrous and non-ferrous metals industry, the mining and ore industry, the chemical, oil and gas industry, the power industry and, partly, too, the engineering industry. In order to carry out these plans, a number of industrial concerns are to be built. But the main difficulty lies in the fact that in Soviet Ukraine the building industry, as a result of Moscow's economic system, is far too overburdened, particularly in the regions of the big capital investment building as, for example, in Kryvorizhzhia, the Donets Basin (Donbas) and in the western regions. But this fact is not taken into account either by the Gosplan (State Planning Commission) of the U.S.S.R., or by the Gosplan of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which is controlled by the former. And, incidentally, it is precisely with regard to the planned expansion of the heavy industry that the Gosplan of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic shows itself to be unable to cope with its task. The speeding up of the rate of building and a reduction in the prime costs of same depends to a considerable extent on the technical documents being supplied in time; at present, however, the actual work of planning is divided up in such a way in Ukraine that a single building or assembly firm which builds a factory may receive the documents concerned from 20 or more planning departments, and the plans are drawn by the planners of either the Republic in question or the Soviet Union.

And the supplying of Ukrainian economy with products of various kinds and with raw materials is no better. This process is carried out by the so-called "Glavsybys" (chief administrative departments for sales), which are to be found all over Soviet Ukraine and throughout the U.S.S.R. As a result of this system, delivery of an order takes a very considerable time. The "Sovnarkhoz" of the region of Kharkov, for instance, received the production plans for the industrial concerns



under its control in March, 1958, but did not receive the plans stating the concerns in the U.S.S.R. from which it was to obtain the necessary semi-finished products and raw materials, until the middle of December, 1958. In accordance with the instructions of the Gosplan of the U.S.S.R., a Ukrainian compressor factory began its serial production of high pressure ethylene compressors; the pumps and electric motors needed for the production process were to be supplied by various factories in the R.S.F.S.R. But the Ukrainian compressor factory never received the said pumps and electric motors, since, as it later transpired, they were never even ordered. Consequently, hundreds of ammoniac compressors, worth 7 million roubles, were left lying about in the yard of the factory, half-finished and not fit for use.

As a result of such manipulations on the part of the Gosplan, a so-called "leading" concern frequently becomes a "backward" one, as it were, overnight. In accordance with the "extensions of the rights to local planning" proclaimed by Khrushchov, every industrial concern draws up its own production plan for the next year and submits it to the Gosplan. If it is approved by the Gosplan, the concern in question begins to work according to its plan from the New Year onwards. But about the middle of the year or towards the end of the year, the concern receives a so-called "detailed" plan from the Gosplan, which very often includes far more than was contained in the plan drawn up by the concern; if the latter is not in a position to fulfil this "detailed" plan, it is promptly classified as a "backward" concern. If, on the other hand, the Gosplan wishes to remove an industrial concern from the category "backward" and make it a "leading" concern, it only needs to reduce the production plan of the concern; the latter then fulfils its plan with a surplus and, accordingly, receives a decoration, the Lenin Order. Such practices prompt the management of the concern to keep their production reserves a secret during the drafting of the original production plan, in order to be able to use them should the Gosplan—as is frequently the case—impose a considerably extended "detail" plan on the concern.

For several years now, there has been some talk in the U.S.S.R. of cutting down and reducing the expenses of the engineering, technical and administrative apparatus, but so far nothing much has been done in this respect. The check on and calculation of the labour-efficiency and wages continues to be very much neglected. Industrial workers in Soviet Ukraine, as throughout the U.S.S.R., are divided into six categories: (1) workers, (2) engineering and technical workers, (3) employees, (4) assistant workers and operatives, (5) industrial guards, and (6) fire brigade. The check on the labour-efficiency and wages of all six categories is carried out by the planning organs. In order to save on the wages of the administrative apparatus, the Ministry of Finance checks every concern in this respect and determines the number of persons which it may employ as its administrative apparatus. Incidentally, the category "employees," in accordance

with the recent directives from Moscow, is regarded as "undesirable" in industrial concerns and is frequently subjected to personnel cuts. The category "engineering and technical workers," on the other hand, is not subjected to such personnel cuts, and persons belonging to this category may only be transferred from the administrative apparatus to a department of the concern (and keep the same status if transferred). In order to protect its employees against "cuts in personnel," that is against dismissal, the management of the concern records them under various fictitious designations and includes them in the category of engineering and technical workers; for instance, an ordinary book-keeper is frequently entered on the personnel list under the designation foreman, mechanic or draftsman, etc. There are millions of such false mechanics in the U.S.S.R., and the Muscovite ringleaders are wont to boast of the constant increase of their numbers at their various Party conferences and congresses; but the true nature of this questionable process is so well known that it is impossible to try to conceal it completely, and even the Soviet press occasionally criticizes it very sharply. The Kyiv Party periodical "Komunist" (1959, No. 1), for instance, writes as follows in this connection: "On this basis the false idea is formed that the increase in the number of engineering and technical workers is the result of the improved organization of the production process"—and very rightly points out that in concerns with a highly organized standard as regards the production process the percentage of engineering and technical workers should, on the contrary, decrease.

Of course, this artificial increase in the industrial technical cadre as a result of the fictitious "technization" of the surplus of other employees is not connected in particular with Ukraine's economy,—it is, rather, a phenomenon which is fairly equally distributed throughout the entire Soviet Union; but it naturally contributes its share towards the chaotic disproportion between the official figures and the actual state of Soviet Ukrainian economy and in this way proves most plainly how incapable of overcoming this disproportion the Soviet planning and control organs are.

On the other hand, however, the internal reason for the unsatisfactory conditions in Ukraine's economy and for the increasing indications of chronic crises lies in the political subjugation of Ukraine and in the resultant liquidation of its economic independence by Moscow. Moscow affirms that the said crises are caused by "forms of expression of the nationalist remnants in the human consciousness"; in reality, however, they are not "nationalist remnants," but resistance movements on the part of the Ukrainian people against the Muscovite occupants and oppressors. In the economic sphere this resistance is manifested above all in the so-called "localism," that is to say, in the patriotic efforts to maintain the interests of the individual economic regions of Soviet Ukraine in the face of the economic interests of the entire Soviet Union and, primarily, of the R.S.F.S.R. (that is of Russia). The activity of this Soviet Ukrainian "localism" also includes the non-

fulfilment of the cooperative delivery plans for the R.S.F.S.R. (and other Soviet Republics), as well as the efforts to get as much as possible out of the Soviet Union budget for Ukraine. This "localism" is manifested in the emphasis on the national characteristics of Ukraine and in the use of those funds which were intended for the concerns of an all-Soviet type located in Ukraine, that is for industry according to the Soviet Ukrainian standard.

Nowadays Ukraine is an industrial and agricultural country with a high standard in heavy industry, but it suffers from serious economic disproportions, which will also continue to remain under Khrushchov's Seven-Year Plan. In addition to the disproportions already mentioned above, there is, for instance, a serious disproportion between the steel and cast iron production. In the R.S.F.S.R. the steel production is constantly obliged to overtake the cast iron production, in order to strengthen the military potential of the U.S.S.R.; in Ukraine, on the other hand, the steel production is constantly overtaken by the cast iron production, since Ukrainian cast iron has to be delivered to the armament factories in the R.S.F.S.R. as a semi-finished product. An equally big disproportion is also in evidence in the Ukrainian engineering industry, namely as regards specialization and cooperation. For instance, two motor works (the one in Lviv and the one in Zaporizhzhia, formerly the agricultural machinery factory "Komunar") are only to start production in the course of Khrushchov's Seven-Year Plan. Tread-covers for motor tyres have so far been imported by Ukraine from the R.S.F.S.R., and it is only this year that construction has begun on a tread-cover factory in Dnipropetrovske, even though the Kharkiv tractor works have been producing tractors on wheels, which need rubber tread-covers, for years.

Although Ukraine would be perfectly able to meet all the demands of Ukrainian industry with its own production, it is forced by Moscow to import and export far more technical products and machinery than would be necessary in the case of a normally balanced economy in an independent state.

It is at present difficult to foresee the extent to which Khrushchov's Seven-Year Plan will be fulfilled in Ukraine; it can, however, already be ascertained without a doubt that all the disproportions which exist at present in Ukrainian economy will continue to exist under the Seven-Year Plan and will, in fact, increase and be aggravated still more. The national fight for freedom of Ukraine will likewise continue, in spite of all Moscow's efforts and hopes to "re-train" the Ukrainian people and, in particular, the youth of Ukraine in the course of Khrushchov's Seven-Year Plan and "to guide them to Communism." As has been the case so far, this fight will in the future, too, be conducted in the economic sector, as well as in all other spheres of Ukrainian national life and, in particular, on the political and cultural front.

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Andriy Mykulyn

## **The System of Electrification in Ukraine During the Years 1959-1965**

If one examines the official Soviet "Control Figures of the Development of the Economic System of the U.S.S.R. for the Years 1959-1965"<sup>1)</sup>, one notices that they provide for an accelerated development of the power industry of the U.S.S.R. envisaging the expansion of big thermal electricity works and hydro-electric power stations. Since Ukraine in the whole Russian-Bolshevist industrial complex supplies the huge metallurgical and armament factories of the so-called Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) with raw materials and semi-finished products, and the newly erected factories in Siberia and the Far East with finished goods in the form of machines, Moscow has been obliged to devote its attention to the expansion of the power industry in Ukraine. This is necessitated above all by the fact that in Ukraine, which has huge industrial resources available and several branches of industry and agriculture that are of leading importance in the entire Soviet imperium and extremely necessary for Russia, the production of electric power has always lagged far behind the general needs of Russia.

On January 1, 1958, there were 28 large electric power stations in Ukraine, each with a capacity of 50 000 or more kilowatts, which produced 82 per cent of the whole power in Soviet Ukraine. In addition to these large power stations, there are more than 18 000 small electric power stations operating in Ukraine, which each have an average capacity of 137 kilowatts. They produce electric power, the cost price of which varies from 0.35 to 2 roubles per kilowatt hour according to state prices. Whereas the 28 large power stations are operated by 17 000 employees, the total number of workmen, employees and engineering and technical staff employed in the smaller power stations, which, incidentally, do not produce more than 18 per cent of the total amount of electric power in Ukraine, amounts to 10 000. The existence of such a large number of small and unprofitable electric power stations is obviously due to the fact that Moscow so far neglected the expansion of the electric power network in occupied Ukraine. Russian propaganda makes a lot of fuss in the press about

<sup>1)</sup> Moscow, 1958.

the erection of the "big" water-power stations in Kakhovka, Kaniv and Kremenchuk in Ukraine, but actually these power stations will not solve the problem of the electric power industry in Ukraine. For instance, at the beginning of 1959, there were electric cables with a voltage of 110 or more kilovolts only in the districts of Donbas, Dnipro region, Kharkiv and Lviv (Lemberg), and in the Crimea; they do not cover more than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. In 1958, there were only 0.77 kilometres of cable with a voltage of 110 kilovolts to every 1 000 kilowatts of the electric power stations operating in Ukraine.

In order to "adjust" the production of electric power to the needs of Ukrainian industry, Moscow has in its Seven-Year Plan been obliged to concentrate its attention on the expansion of the electric power stations in Ukraine, since, otherwise, the state of Ukrainian industry would very seriously hamper the output of the factories in the R.S.F.S.R. In keeping with Khrushchov's Seven-Year Plan, it is intended—in addition to the expansion of the above-mentioned water-power stations at Kakhovka, Kaniv and Kremenchuk—to build a number of efficient thermal electric power stations in Ukraine, which are to use the fuel available on the spot. The various fairly big local reserves of fuel are to be used for this purpose: the coal basins of Donets (Donbas) and Lviv-Volhynia, the gas in Poltava and the oil in Stanyslaviv. Coal will be the main fuel used for the thermic electric power stations; it is true that large oil and natural gas deposits have recently been discovered in Ukraine, but although these types of fuel are much cheaper and more satisfactory for use in electric power stations, in keeping with Moscow's colonial policy oil and gas are only to be used in such a measure as to meet the economic needs of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), but not those of Soviet Ukraine.

In keeping with the said Seven-Year Plan, electric power consumption in Ukraine in 1965, as compared to 1958, is to be apportioned in the following percentages:

	1958	1965
Industry .....	67.5	61.4
Electric power stations' own needs .....	13.2	14.0
Communal and domestic needs .....	10.2	10.8
Building industry .....	4.9	2.3
Agriculture .....	2.8	6.9
Railways .....	1.4	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0

At present, the planning departments of Moscow (and not those of Soviet Ukraine) are already working out on centralized lines the plans for the distribution of the new thermal electric power stations, which are allegedly to be built during the years 1959-1964. According to these plans, the requirements of the economic regions of Stalino,

Voroshylivhrad (Luhanske), Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kher-son as regards electric power are to be met by the new thermal power stations, which are to use the Donets coal such as the Starobeshiv thermal power station. It is also planned to expand the hydro-electric power stations in Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro region and Luhanske. The economic region of Kharkiv is to obtain its electric power from the thermal power station that is to be built at Zmiyiv.

The West Ukrainian regions are to obtain their electric power from the thermal power stations that are to be built in the coal basin of Lviv-Volhynia, primarily from Dobratvin station. No decision has as yet been reached as regards the provision of the economic regions of Kyiv, Odessa and Vinnytsia with electric power. There is a project to erect a thermal power station in the territory of the region of Kyiv, namely in those areas where deposits of brown coal have been found; but this would involve an expenditure of 500 million roubles, and it would be much cheaper to obtain coal from the Donbas area.

As regards the agriculture of Ukraine, however, it is planned to electrify 52 per cent of the collective farms (kolkhozes) in 1959 and to carry out the complete electrification of all the collective farms by 1965; by 1965, 85 per cent of the kolkhozes are to be supplied with electric power by state electric power stations, 10 per cent by the electric power stations of the kolkhozes themselves, and 5 per cent by the hydro-electric power stations belonging to the kolkhozes. In this way, practically all the kolkhozes in Ukraine will by 1965 be completely dependent on the state from the economic point of view, too; they are to become "national property," the aim of this measure being to prevent any activity on the part of the anti-Bolshevist resistance movement of the Ukrainian farmers against the Russian occupation authorities.

In order to realize Khrushchov's plans with regard to the electric power industry in Ukraine, it is also planned to liquidate most of the smaller electric power stations there and to let the factories in question and the kolkhozes be supplied with electric power by the state hydro-electric and thermal power stations. In addition, up to 3 000 kilometres of the railway network in Ukraine are also to be electrified. It is hardly necessary to stress the obvious fact,—namely, the extent to which all these projects and plans for the development and expansion of the electric power system in Soviet Ukraine reveal the real interests—both economic and political—of the Muscovite occupants of Ukraine.

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Olha Mussakovska

### ***Ukrainians in Present-Day Poland***<sup>1</sup>

The frontiers of Poland have changed considerably since World War II. In spite of this fact, however, there were still more than one and a half million Ukrainians in the territory beyond the so-called Curzon Line, that is in the territory of Communist Poland, in the regions (voivodeships) of Riashiv (Polish: Rzeszow) and Lublin.

As soon as the war was over in 1945, the Poles, aided by the Soviet Russians, promptly set about liquidating the Ukrainian element in Poland. The Ukrainian Catholic Church, in particular, was exterminated. Its high dignitaries were extradited to the Soviet Russians and their subsequent fate is well known. Most of the Ukrainian Catholic priests were either deported to the East or else imprisoned in Poland and in this way gradually exterminated; some of them changed their place of domicile by settling in Poland proper, in Silesia or Prussia, and later became assistants to Polish priests there. The records of the Ukrainian diocese of Peremyshl (Polish: Przemyśl) were confiscated by the Polish authorities and are at present kept at the Polish Catholic University of Lublin.

With the help of the Soviet "Mission" and the Polish police and army, a brutal and ruthless campaign of evicting the Ukrainians from their own ethnical regions and resettling them in the East, in Soviet Ukraine and, then, in 1947, to the West, mainly to Pomerania, Silesia and East Prussia, was thereupon started. Valuable data on these deportations, which were conducted in so barbarous a manner, was at the time published in the bulletins of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and was also used by Beskyd-Tarnovych in his book "At the Scenes of the Conflagrations of Trans-Curzonnia" ("Na zharyshchakh Zakerzonnia," in Ukrainian). In the articles which the West German

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<sup>1</sup> This report was submitted by the writer at one of the sessions of the Congress of the Federation of the Ukrainian Women's Organizations (on June 24-25th, 1959).

press published on this resettlement campaign it showed itself well-disposed towards the Ukrainians; the Ukrainian free press (in exile), however, unfortunately only published very little on this subject. The Warsaw Ukrainian paper "Nashe Slovo" ("Our Word") of July 20, 1958, contained some interesting information on the session of a commission of the Polish competent department for questions pertaining to the districts of Riashiv and Lublin, namely official reports on the eviction and resettlement of the Ukrainians. 260,000 Ukrainian families were evicted from the Riashiv district and resettled in Soviet Ukraine, whilst 17,000 were resettled to West and North Poland; if one takes as an average four persons to a family, 1,040,000 persons were therefore deported to the East and only about fifteen times less persons to the West. According to the same reports, 9,479 Ukrainian families, i.e. 36,918 persons, were evicted from the Lublin district and resettled to West and North Poland; the number of persons deported to Soviet Ukraine is, unfortunately, not mentioned.

In order to make these districts, which had always been Ukrainian, Polish, Poland settled the so-called Gurals<sup>2)</sup> on the deserted farms, by letting them take over the latter either for nothing or for a very small charge. Most of the villages which were formerly Ukrainian, however, were either partly burned down (in particular in those districts in which the UPA conducted its military campaign), or came to resemble a wilderness. Here and there, churches—monuments of Ukrainian culture—that have survived the devastation stand isolated as silent evidence of the past; all the movable property of the churches has been confiscated or taken to the East. In some of the villages the churches are actually used as granaries by the collective farms.

As a result of this official and forcible resettlement which was carried out on the strength of an agreement between Moscow and Warsaw, Poland was apparently transformed into a mono-national state; for the Ukrainians who were left there were forced to deny their nationality, in order to save their physical existence, and many of them, unfortunately, began to bring up their children in the Polish spirit. Fortunately, however, this state of affairs did not continue very long. After Stalin's death (1953), Gomulka took over the government of Poland in 1956, and in certain respects the Communist regime was now relaxed somewhat and a so-called "thaw" set in. The Ukrainians now began to assert their rights which had been violated. Incidentally, there are at present about half a million Ukrainians in the Polish state.

In June 1956, the Polish government convened a Ukrainian Congress in Warsaw. At this Congress the Polish Minister Jarosinski admitted that the Polish government had done the Ukrainians a great injustice in evicting them from their own native territories and added that it now promised to make good this injustice. But it was already obvious at this Congress that Jarosinski's promise in this respect was nothing but empty talk; for when the Ukrainian delegates present at the

<sup>2)</sup> A Polish tribe of the Carpathians.



Congress began to demand that the Polish government should allow all the Ukrainians who had been ruthlessly, illegally and forcibly evicted from their native districts in 1947 and resettled in Poland, to return to their native districts, Jarosinski affirmed that there would be no mass-return; the reason he gave was that if one allowed all the Ukrainians in Poland to return home, one would have to resettle the Polish settlers now established on their farms to the West, a fact which might cause economic chaos and eventually lead to a famine<sup>3</sup>). Accordingly, so Jarosinski declared, only those Ukrainian families were to be allowed to return to the eastern territories of Poland whose farms were not yet occupied by Polish settlers. But after this Congress in Warsaw only very few Ukrainian families were actually allowed to return to their native districts: of the 106,000 persons deported to West and North Poland, so far only about 5,000 families have returned home; if one reckons four persons to every family, then the number of persons who have returned home does not even amount to 20 per cent of the number of persons deported.

Immediately after the Warsaw Congress, however, the Ukrainian expellees began to file applications en masse with the competent authorities for permission to return home; when they realized that only very few persons were being given this permission, large numbers of them began to go back to their native districts without permission. Thereupon, the Polish Communist administration began to resort to repressive measures against persons returning home without permission; these measures consisted in the first place in refusal to advance grants to the persons who returned home to enable them to start running their farms again, and, if all else failed to be effective, in forcible deportation a second time, which naturally meant the final ruin of the persons concerned.

Eventually, however, in March 1958, the Polish government passed a law, according to which the Ukrainians who wished to return home were to "buy back" their former farms from the state. This is how one interprets and practises "compensation" in the case of the Ukrainians!

At the above-mentioned Warsaw Ukrainian Congress in June, 1956, the Ukrainian Community Cultural Society (USKT) was also founded, and it has meanwhile established its branches (the so-called "svitlytsi") in various towns and villages in Poland where there is a large Ukrainian population. These branches are, however, under strict state control, and the main organ of the USKT, the above-mentioned Warsaw paper "Nashe Slovo" is, of course, edited in the Communist spirit. If one looks through its editions of the year 1958, however, one cannot fail to notice a strong emphasis of the interests of the Ukrainian language and, in particular, of those of the Ukrainian school system, which is

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3) Obviously untrue, since, as was pointed out above, not more than 10 per cent of the Ukrainian expellees were deported to North and West Poland, whereas the majority was deported to Soviet Ukraine.

comparatively new in Poland since it only came into being there in 1956. A lack of educated Ukrainians is particularly noticeable in Poland and for this reason the Ukrainian community devotes its whole attention to the development of the Ukrainian school system. According to the reports published in the "Nashe Slovo," there were 165 primary schools in Poland during the school-year 1957-58, at which 3,000 pupils were taught in Ukrainian<sup>4</sup>). The shortage of teachers is the main obstacle to the development of the Ukrainian school system; for this reason, training courses for Ukrainian teachers have been hurriedly arranged, in addition to the courses held in Warsaw.

Apart from these courses, Ukrainian colleges for the training of future teachers are also being established. According to reports in the "Nashe Slovo," there are in Poland three Ukrainian colleges,—namely two normal general colleges in Peremyshl and Zlotoryja and a five-year pedagogic college in Bartoszyce; and, in addition, there is also a two-year teachers' training college in Stettin (Polish: Szczecin). There is a department for Ukrainian philology at Warsaw University.

Viewed as a whole, this is, of course, very little; but if one takes into consideration the fact that as recently as four years ago there were officially 'no' Ukrainians at all in Poland, whereas today there are not only Ukrainian primary schools but also high schools, as well as a possibility to study Ukrainian, then this seems to indicate a considerable tenacity on the part of the Ukrainian people. There are, of course, still a large number of Ukrainians in Poland who refuse to admit their nationality because they are afraid of Polish chauvinism and who do not venture to send their children to Ukrainian schools.

As regards the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Poland, however, so far only about 16 parishes have been restored,—mainly in the west, in Poland proper and in the former German regions. On the other hand, the diocese of Peremyshl continues to remain closed, and the building of the Ukrainian Catholic church in Sianik (Pol.: Sanok) was recently handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church.

Here in exile one can form an idea of the life, the standard of living and the needs and wants of the average (more or less educated) Ukrainian family in Poland, from private letters or from accounts given by individual travellers. The standard of living is extremely low, particularly in families where there is only one person working, and poverty usually prevails in families in which there are several children. The average salary (or wage) is only just sufficient to keep oneself frugally in food, but not enough to pay for heating, lodging and clothing. That is why all the private letters received from Ukrainians in Poland constantly ask for worn clothes and shoes and also medicines to be sent. The lot of old women who are on their own and have no means of obtaining the things they need, is particularly tragic. Their only hope is that their fellow-countrymen abroad will be able to help them.

<sup>4</sup>) Which is, of course, a ridiculously small number seeing that there are half a million Ukrainians in Poland.

The Ukrainian expellees who return to their native villages are also greatly in need of help, not only in order to build up their ruined property again, but also to restore their parishes; for there are numerous villages where Ukrainian Catholic services are permitted, but where the church itself has been destroyed, or where—as in North and West Poland—there has never been a church.

Help is also needed by the children who attend Ukrainian schools, as well as by the Ukrainian students, who in Communist Poland number about three hundred; it is precisely they who are endeavouring to draw attention to the Ukrainian problem in Poland and are devoting themselves to the national and cultural task with youthful zeal. In addition, help is also needed by educated persons with large families and, of course, by the aged and sick who are all alone.

The Ukrainians in the USA have shown great sympathy with the distress of their fellow-countrymen in Communist Poland and have hastened to help them. In Canada and the USA the organization "Defence of Lemky<sup>5)</sup> Region" ("Oborona Lemkivshchyny") has been renewed and now has 19 branches in various States of the USA. Over 600 Ukrainian families in Poland have received financial aid from this organization. But this aid can only be accorded to a limited extent, since it is of a private nature, and the efforts of the said organization to establish direct contact with the Polish government have been thwarted by the counter-action of a Russophil organization which calls itself the "Lemko Society" ("Lemko-Soyuz") and carries on anti-Ukrainian propaganda on behalf of Moscow by means of its paper "Karpatska Rus"<sup>6)</sup>.

In addition, the Ukrainian Women's Organization in America has in the course of the past two years sent parcels containing worn clothing and shoes to certain addresses. This does not sound very much,—but let us consider an answer, for instance, which I received from a lonely person: after expressing her gratitude for the parcel sent her, she writes that she was deeply moved upon receiving it since, firstly, it proved that there was still someone in the world who was thinking of her (her own family has been deported to the East), and, secondly, it arrived at Easter.

Such parcels are thus of importance as spiritual aid and support to the Ukrainians in Poland. But this alone does not suffice. From now onwards, the entire federation of the Ukrainian women's organizations will be determined to take part in this relief work for the Ukrainians in Poland in order to support the Ukrainian schools, aged women who are all alone and the sick.

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<sup>5)</sup> The Lemky are the Ukrainian tribe which has advanced furthest towards the West and has suffered most as a result of the Polish deportations.

<sup>6)</sup> It has always been the policy of the Polish government (even before World War II) to support the comparatively small number of Russophil elements amongst the West Ukrainian population.

## EDITOR'S NOTE:

Recent violent clashes in Pomerania clearly show how determined the Ukrainians, forcibly deported to the north and west provinces of the present Polish satellite state, are to fight for their return to their native districts, and what methods are resorted to by the Communist administration and government of Poland to keep down the deportees by armed force "within the limits of the law."

A West German press organ of the German refugees and expellees from Poland, the "Pommersche Zeitung" ("The Pomeranian Newspaper"), reports as follows in its edition of August 29, 1959:

**Greifenhagen on the Oder** (from our special correspondent). Last week, the picturesque village of Bahn (Polish: Banie) in the district of Greifenhagen (Polish: Gryfino, south of Stettin), was the scene of stormy demonstrations on the part of the Ukrainians who have been resettled in the districts of Greifenhagen and Pyritz (Polish: Pyrzyc) by the Polish government. The meeting was, to begin with, intended to be a meeting of the members of the Ukrainian Community Cultural Society (USKT), but soon developed into a protest demonstration against the Polish authorities in a manner such as has never yet occurred in Pomerania since World War II. An eyewitness reports as follows:<sup>7)</sup>

"Not 200 to 300 persons, as is usual, but about 1,400 appeared at the meeting of the Ukrainian Society, the purpose of which was to discuss cultural matters. For this reason, divine service was first of all held on the square in front of St. Mary's Church in Bahn. In his sermon the Ukrainian priest appealed to the Polish authorities to "treat the Ukrainian minority in a Christian way and not to allow any acts of violence to be committed."

The meeting was opened in the morning—likewise in the open air—by Wit Drapich, the secretary of the Stettin district executive committee of the Polish Communist Party. He exhorted the Ukrainians to form agricultural collectives and promised them Ukrainian schools and cultural organizations in the villages concerned **if they did so**. The crowd thereupon promptly responded with jeers, since the agricultural collectives recommended by him are merely a new form of kolkhoz and, as such, meet with the opposition of the farmers everywhere; in addition, he also made the mistake of bringing pressure to bear on the Ukrainians by promising them the cultural autonomy, to which according to the law they are already entitled, only if they formed kolkhozes. As was later ascertained, the Ukrainians had in any case only come to the meeting in Bahn in order to protest against their resettlement in East Pomerania and against the humiliating manner in which they are treated as compared to the Polish population. The Communist administrative and Party authorities had no inkling of their intentions and were thus taken completely by surprise; and when

<sup>7)</sup> Certain unimportant details have been omitted in our translation of the eyewitness report.

Drapich's arrogant speech met with jeers, cries of rage and shouts in unison "No kolkhozes!", they simply dispersed as fast as they could, and so, too, did the Communist leaders of the USKT. The crowd thereupon stormed the platform; and a Ukrainian announced through the microphone that the protest meeting was now declared open, an announcement which was received with great applause.

The crowd thereupon asked various Ukrainians to act as the presiding committee of the meeting. Numerous speakers in turn then delivered addresses from the platform. To begin with, complaints were voiced about the unsatisfactory way in which the Ukrainian settlers are supplied with foodstuffs, consumption goods, building material and tractors, etc., and finally it was pointed out that the Polish Communist government had not kept any of the promises which they made the Ukrainian deportees. In answer to the question put by one speaker: "Do you want to starve in the kolkhozes again as you did before 1956?", the crowd shouted "No, never!"

The presiding committee put down the demands in question on paper; they were then read out to the crowd once more and met with enthusiastic approval; and most of the persons present thereupon signed them. One of these demands was worded as follows: "We object to material and cultural rights being dependent on the formation of Ukrainian agricultural kolkhozes! We demand that there shall be no obstacles to the return home of the Ukrainians to other regions of Poland and that no one shall be punished for returning home!"

This resolution was to be presented to the district authorities in Stettin.

In the meantime, however, Wit Drapich had already alarmed police administration in Stettin. When the fact was corroborated that about one and half thousand persons were taking part in the "illegal" meeting, the chief Party authorities in Stettin, who had meanwhile been notified by the police, began to have doubts as to whether the police would be able to deal with the situation and, accordingly, got in touch with the army. A big detachment, consisting solely of Polish soldiers, was thereupon hurriedly sent from the frontier not far away to Bahn. Firing into the air, Polish tanks chased the Ukrainians off the main street of the village, but when they reached the square in front of St. Mary's Church they encountered a dense crowd which refused to budge. After a lot of shouting and threatening on both sides, the Polish officer in command gave orders that the tanks were to drive into the crowd. Many of the demonstrators were injured, either seriously or slightly. The crowd now split up into individual groups; but when the soldiers got out of the tanks in order to scatter the rest of the demonstrators and arrest their "ringleaders," they were pelted with stones. Some of the demonstrators then made for empty houses, where they set up barricades and put up a fierce resistance against the troops,—with weapons, too, which some of the demonstrators had managed to snatch from soldiers during the early stage of the tumult and confusion (these weapons, incidentally, were only handed over

later on, when the officer in command threatened to shoot all the Ukrainians who had been arrested, on the spot, if the weapons were not surrendered). A long and fierce combat raged in front of the building of the dairy at the Brücksee, which had been seized by the demonstrators and was then encircled by Polish troops and attacked by tanks and machine-guns twice. The reason for this combat was that the text of the Ukrainian resolutions had been taken to the building of the dairy, and, what was more, they contained the signatures of about 1 000 Ukrainians, which would have been a welcome booty for the Polish police.

After the dairy had been attacked twice by the Polish soldiers, the demonstrators who were trying to defend the building surrendered,—but only after they had burnt all the lists containing signatures.

Over 600 persons were arrested, but 450 of them were released after interrogation. At present, there are still 130 Ukrainian demonstrators in prison in Stettin, including all the "ringleaders" (at least, that is what the Polish authorities affirm). Nothing is as yet known as to the nature and the contents of the charges which are to be preferred against them."

So much for the report of the eyewitness, who, unfortunately, does not attempt to give even an approximation of the number of Ukrainians wounded in the street fighting, which was undoubtedly very considerable. In conclusion, the above-mentioned West German paper stresses that the Ukrainians forcibly resettled in former German territories after World War II constitute the "most unruly element" of the entire population of the Polish satellite state, since they are constantly determined to return to their native country, and since the collectivization of agriculture which is at present about to be carried out in the district of Stettin will inevitably provide a new source of even fiercer disturbances.

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## OBITUARY

### **Dr. Michael O. Vetukhiv**

(25. 7. 1902 — 11. 6. 1959)

Dr. Michael O. Vetukhiv, was born on July 25, 1902, in Kharkiv, in the Ukraine, as the son of Prof. Oleksiy Vetukhiv, ethnographer and specialist in folk-lore.

He graduated from the University of Kharkiv and from the Kharkiv Agricultural Institute in 1923. Later he became Head of the Department of Genetics and Selection of the Ukrainian Research Institute of Animal Husbandry, head of the Genetics Laboratory of the Ukrainian Institute of Experimental Genetics, professor at the Kharkiv Veterinary

Institute of Kharkiv University, professor at the Poltava Agricultural Institute between 1923 and 1933, Professor at the Moscow Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Institute, head of the Department of Veterinary Genetics of the All-Union Institute of Experimental Veterinary Science in Moscow between 1934 and 1941, Rector of the University of Kharkiv and participant in the Ukrainian movement for independence between 1941 and 1943. Dr. Michael O. Vetukhiv was arrested and tortured by the Gestapo and transported to Poland.

Dr. Vetukhiv came to the United States in 1949, and was a founder of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States in 1950. He attended the International Genetics Congress in Italy in 1953, the International Genetics Symposium in Japan in 1956, the International Zoological Congress in London in July of 1958, the International Genetics Congress in Montreal in August of 1958.

His research work before 1949 was concerned with the heredity of various characteristics in agricultural animals, chiefly those of practical importance. His publications included "Methods of Improvements of Agricultural Animals Based Upon Genetic Methods," *Visnyk S. H. Nauky, Kharkiv-Kyiv*, 1928; "The Blood Groups of Cattle," *Zbirnyk naukovykh prats, Holovnauka, Kharkiv*, 1930; "Investigation of the Natural Resistance of Agricultural Animals to Tuberculosis," *Zoo-tekhnika, Moscow*, 1941.

After 1949 prof. Vetukhiv published a series of investigations on the genetics of heterosis (hybrid vigor) conducted on *Drosophila* fruit flies. These investigations dealt largely with studies of how inherited characteristics in a living population change with the passage of time. His publications since 1949 include "Viability of Hybrids Between Local Populations of *Drosophila Pseudoobscura*," *The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 39, 1953; "Genetics in the U.S.S.R.," *Academic Freedom Under the Soviet Regime*; "Contemporary Soviet Science," *Report on the Soviet Union in 1956*; "Further Changes in Soviet Policy on Genetics."

Dr. Vetukhiv's publications in various specialized journals number close to 100 and have appeared in Ukrainian, Russian and English.

Dr. Vetukhiv was President of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, a member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, of the American Society of Naturalists, of the Genetics Society of America, of the Society for the Study of Evolution and of other research establishments.

He was Professor of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich and the Ukrainian Technical Institute (UTHI).

Ukrainian Science lost in him one of its most prominent representatives.

**BOOK REVIEW**

**J.B. Rudnyckyj: Canadian Place Names of Ukrainian Origin (in Ukrainian).** Third edition. Winnipeg Ukrainian Academy of Sciences; Series: Onomastica, 1957, 89 pp.

This book has been carefully revised and it is twice as large as the first edition, which was published in 1949. A laborious delving into archives that took ten years of diligent work, and long journeys throughout Canada and conversations with many old Ukrainian settlers in various regions of Canada have all contributed to this edition.

The first Ukrainian immigrants arrived in Canada towards the end of the last century, that is about 1891 or earlier. Since those days, Ukrainian emigration to Canada has steadily increased and has, in fact, never ceased. The Ukrainians who have settled in Canada have for the most part come from the Ukrainian western territories which were formerly under Austro-Hungarian rule, from Galicia, Bukovina, and, to a certain extent, from Carpatho-Ukraine (although the main bulk of the emigrants from the latter Ukrainian territories has gone chiefly to the USA).

According to the 1951 census, there were at that time 395 043 Canadians of Ukrainian origin; this number must, however, have increased considerably as a result of the subsequent immigration of the Ukrainian displaced persons from Germany and Austria. Since most of the Ukrainian immigrants were farmers and had always been employed in agriculture, they settled as a rule in the areas that were suitable for agriculture. And since they settled in compact groups, they gave Ukrainian names to the newly founded villages and small towns. The government of Canada has recognized most of these names officially and has listed them on maps, in directories and so forth.

In the foreword to his book, Professor Rudnycky states that there are about 180 Ukrainian names of post offices, villages, railroad stations, church squares, etc., in Canada. The author has listed all these place names alphabetically, with a brief account of their history and geography, as well as their etymology. Place names which have not been officially recognized are marked by an asterisk.

According to Yar Slavutych, U.S. Army School (reprinted from "Names," No. 4, December 1958), the majority of Ukrainian place names in Canada can be divided into two categories: 1) transplanted toponymics, e.g. Zbarazh, Brody, Borshchiv, New Kyiv, Kolomea, Poltava, Kharkiv (meaning the names of the Ukrainian cities), Bukovyna, Sich, Ukraina (from the names of regions in Ukraine and the whole country), Dnipro, Zbruch, Stryi (signifying the names of rivers in Ukraine), and 2) transferred names such as Kulish (from the name of a well-known Ukrainian writer of the 19th century), Mazeppa (derived from the name of the famous Ukrainian Hetman), Petlura



(the name of the head of the Ukrainian Directory after the first World War), Sirko (from the name of a prominent Ukrainian Cossack leader of the 17th century), Franko (a famous Ukrainian writer), Khmelnytsky (from the name of the greatest Ukrainian Hetman and liberator of the 17th century), Shevchenko (from the name of the greatest national Ukrainian poet), and many others.

The author has listed the place names according to a clearly arranged system; the Ukrainian forms and their corresponding transliterated English forms (the latter are at present used officially).

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**Jaroslaw Stetzko: THE KREMLIN ON A VOLCANO. Coexistence or Liberation Policy?** Foreword by Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. Introduction by Dr. Nestor D. Procyk, Chairman, American Friends of ABN, Inc. Edited by the American Friends of the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations, Inc., 617 Humboldt Parkway, Buffalo 8, N.Y., USA. 56 pp.

Mr. Jaroslaw Stetzko, former Prime Minister of Ukraine and President of the Central Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), has here presented us with a very valuable book on the Russian Bolshevism that he himself has experienced at close quarters. The gist of the book is that the Free Nations are faced with a very important world problem which must be solved by the Free World; this problem is Soviet Russian imperialism, which endangers the whole world. The author discusses all aspects of this problem in a logical and masterly way.

Dr. Procyk stresses in his Introduction that Mr. Stetzko is a recognized authority on Soviet Russian matters, and adds that his objective has been to enlist and unite the support of all thinking people behind the movement to liberate all nations dominated by Communism and Russian colonial imperialism.

The book has been published in the form of a dialogue (questions and answers), no doubt for the purpose of making the contents easier to understand and more interesting for foreign readers.

Mr. Stetzko emphasizes above all that the anti-Communist movement behind the Iron Curtain is very strong because the populations of the countries there are maintaining completely negative attitudes towards the Communist regimes, and this is particularly true in the case of the Ukrainian people (p. 7).

As proof that the resistance is very active, Mr. Stetzko not only cites the overt outbreaks in Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Ukraine, but also stresses the fact that there are numerous proofs of large-scale resistance and strikes in concentration camps all over the Soviet Union (p. 8).

He is, moreover, firmly convinced that the national liberation revolutions behind the Iron Curtain are the only alternative to an atomic war. "If the free world is afraid of an atomic and nuclear war and will not start a thermonuclear Armageddon against Russia, then it must elect the only alternative it has: the support of the national independence movements of the peoples enslaved by Russia... To hope that a "political evolution" within the Soviet Russian empire would lead to a gradual disintegration and collapse of Soviet power is sheer wishful thinking, leading to disaster" (p. 25).

On page 48 the author stresses that "the nationalism of the enslaved nations is the most powerful weapon of which the West can effectively avail itself in its never-ending struggle against Communist Russia. But amazingly, the West seems to be unaware of the existence of these potent forces behind the Iron Curtain." Mr. Stetzko then adds: "During World War II the Ukrainian underground (the OUN, the UPA and the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council) waged an unparalleled struggle against both the Nazis and the Bolsheviks, and yet the West failed to recognize these forces" (ibid.).

The author concludes his book by quoting from the book "Global Strategy" by British Air Vice-Marshal E.J. Kingston-McClough, namely: "The enemy here considered is not simply embodied in an ideological threat but rather it is the State called Russia, that is, Russia as a power: a Russia expanding and desiring to extend her sphere of influence: a state posing as the symbol of all manner of ideals. It is Russia as a fighting force, an organized community, and a power or state in the most autocratic and absolute sense with which we are concerned" (p. 56).

Mr. Stetzko's book is an excellent guide for all those who wish to study the Soviet Russian problem more closely.

V. Luzhansky

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## BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

### CONFERENCE OF THE UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF UKRAINE

The first conference of the newly organized Union of Journalists of Ukraine took place in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, at the end of April this year. According to the Soviet Ukrainian press, the conference was attended by 300 delegates representing the newspapers and journals of the Republic, broadcasting and television stations. At present, the members of the Union number 3,162.

It was reported by the Soviet press that the conference discussed the new tasks of the Seven Year Plan and the constructive tasks of Communism. It is thus obvious that the conference was conducted in the usual Soviet Russian style and that its aim was to embellish Communist reality by propaganda phrases. In fact, problems pertaining to the intensification of Party slogans amongst the broad masses of the population of Ukraine were also discussed on this occasion.

It is therefore not surprising that the delegates were eager to avoid discussion of such questions as information based on facts or news comments, as for instance criticism of the shortcomings in politics, economy and culture. Such criticism is, of course, one of the most important tasks of a journalist, but it can only be voiced under a political system in which freedom of expression without fear of punishment by the authorities exists.

The role of the journalist in the Soviet Union differs very greatly from the role of his Western colleague. All a Soviet journalist has to do is to propagate the Party slogans. At the beginning of the said conference, the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party stressed that the press and the journalists should devote all their attention and energy to intensifying the propaganda of ideological slogans and to the educa-

tion of the toiling masses, especially of the youth, in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism.

A few of the delegates (for instance, from the Union branch organization in Odessa), in particular, Kihitov, ventured to criticize the material published in the press, especially as regards economic and Party items, as boring, but on the whole most of the participators were as enthusiastic as they usually are at Communist meetings. It was moreover obvious that the Ukrainian journalists—or, as they are called by the Communist paper "Pravda Ukrainy," the explorers of new trends and fighters for the Seven-Year Plan—are giving an excellent performance in the role for which they have been cast by the Party authorities.

This was most apparent during the discussion dealing with "the danger of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." At the same time, the eternal friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples was stressed and praised by most of the speakers. On the other hand, of course, the real danger of a thorough Russification of the entire Ukrainian cultural life was not discussed by Moscow's obedient servants at the conference. According to a law that has recently been passed, parents are to be allowed to decide whether their children should learn Ukrainian or Russian as the language of instruction in the schools in Ukraine. This allegedly democratic way of deciding the language problem in Ukraine signifies, however, that at least all Russian and other non-Ukrainian children in Ukraine will probably choose the Russian language as the language of instruction. The Ukrainian language will therefore not be compulsory for all children in Ukraine as a language of instruction. The journalists of Ukraine apparently fail to realize the danger involved by such

a measure and continue to repeat parrot-like the old slogans about the great danger of Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism."

All this shows that the delegates at the conference passed over all the urgent problems of the grim reality in Ukraine in silence, since they were afraid to speak openly about the fanatical Russian chauvinism in Ukraine.

On the other hand, however, the allegedly outstanding achievements of the Ukrainian press were praised at the conference. In this connection the newspaper "Radyanska Ukrayina" (Soviet Ukraine) wrote: "In Ukraine there are 3,000 newspapers—central, regional, municipal, etc., — with a circulation of eight and a half million copies. Of these, 2,800 newspapers are published in Ukrainian." At the same time, however, no mention is made of the fact that the number of copies printed in Ukrainian is much lower than that of the Russian newspapers in Ukraine. Circulation of the Ukrainian newspapers will probably decrease during the next five or six years as a result of the Russification campaign in Ukraine and because a large number of young persons in Ukraine will no longer have a command of the Ukrainian language.

#### SOVIET UKRAINIAN PRESS NOT PERMITTED IN OTHER SOVIET REPUBLICS

The Kyiv daily "Radyanska Ukrayina" of March 25, 1959, complains in an article entitled "Periodicals should be delivered on time" that Soviet Ukrainian newspapers and periodicals frequently disappear in a mysterious manner on the way to other Soviet Republics (and, in particular, to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic),—without wanting to admit that it is actually a case of a systematic campaign on the part of certain chauvinists amongst the Russian authorities, who are determined to withhold the Ukrainian press from the Ukrainian part of the population in the Russian and other Soviet Republics. The said article states:

"... P.V. Kosteniuk from the Komi Autonomous Republic complains that having subscribed to 'Radyanska Ukrayina' for six months, he did not get it in January at all, and since February 1, he has been getting another newspaper to which he did not subscribe.

Workers complain that some communications officials fail to deliver newspapers and magazines to subscribers on time.

During the past two months alone, the editors of the magazine 'Perets' have received hundreds of letters from outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic written by subscribers who report that they do not get the magazine...

Unfortunately, these are not isolated cases... I.M. Motyvylo from Khanty-nevsk, Irkutsk region (Siberia), and M.M. Mykhayliuk from Karaganda (Kazakhstan) write that they sent subscriptions to 'Radyanska Ukrayina', but do not receive it. V.V. Konyk from the city of Omsk (Siberia) and P.M. Symak from Chelyabinsk region (Ural) write that they do not get their subscribed 'Perets.' M.I. Matiytsev from Krasnodar region (Kuban') does not get the magazines 'Komunist Ukrayiny' and 'Perets'."

#### UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLIC METROPOLITAN JOSEPH SLIPYJ DANGEROUSLY ILL

It has been learnt from a reliable source that the health of the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in subjugated Ukraine, Archbishop Joseph Slipyj, has deteriorated very seriously during the past few months. In spring this year, the Metropolitan was at death's door as a result of all the ill-treatment and hardships which he has suffered in Soviet Russian concentration camps. It was stated on April 1st this year that his state of health had become so serious that he had addressed a farewell message to his faithful believers.

Incidentally, all the tortures and ill-treatment which the Metropolitan has been obliged to endure have failed to break his moral and spiritual strength.

### UKRAINIAN WORKERS BADLY PROVIDED FOR

In an article entitled "To Make Things Easier and More Convenient," which was published in the Kyiv daily "Radyanska Ukrayina" on March 12, 1959, H. Zahadchenko sharply criticizes the obvious shortcomings of the ever-increasing "socialist" public catering system in Soviet Ukraine:

"... There are still not enough dining rooms. Reports of the Ministry of Trade give a seemingly high figure of 23,400 enterprises of public food dispensing enterprises. But if we look behind these figures, the picture changes completely. The point is that dining rooms, restaurants, tea rooms, cafes and lunchrooms constitute less than half of the total number of public eating places. There are only about 10,000 of them. The rest are merely counters. If we consider that there are nearly 45,000 inhabited localities in Ukraine, it becomes clear that the network of public eating places is still very, very thin.

But this is not all. Out of that small number of eating places a large majority are plant and factory cafeterias, located within the enterprises and accessible only to their employees. And where is the rest of the population going to eat?

Officials of the Ministry of Commerce say that there are eating places for the general public which they can use.

But there are extremely few such places, only about 10% of the total. In addition, their location is not convenient. They are located mostly in central parts of cities, and as a rule there are none in suburbs or mining towns.

At the present time about 12% of the population of Ukraine uses public eating places. The seven-year plan calls for an increase to 51% in the cities and 12% in the countryside, and in Kyiv and Kharkiv for the entire population.

The goal, as we can see, is not little. And in order to cope with it,

we must first increase the number of public eating places considerably.

During the seven-year plan, 11,700 dining rooms, restaurants, cafes and lunch-rooms are to be built in the Republic. During this year, 700 such places are to be opened.

There is some mystery about opening new public eating places. Every year a certain number is opened, and a certain number closes. Last year, for example, 643 new eating places were opened, but the net increase was only 506. What happened to 137? It seems that they were closed. We must finally stop this harmful practice..."

### THE CASH WAGE-SYSTEM— A NEW MEANS OF EXPLOITING THE UKRAINIAN FARMERS STILL MORE

The transition to a wage-system by which the kolkhoz farmers are to become wage-earners is at present in progress in the entire Soviet Union. At the moment, there is considerable chaos in this sector, caused by various factors. Discussions regarding the fixing of quotas have shown that the kolkhoz bureaucracy and the privileged class of agricultural specialists are endeavouring to obtain specially privileged wage-tariffs for themselves. Several reports on this subject have appeared in the Soviet Ukrainian press. The "Kolhospyk Ukrayiny," No. 4 of April, 1959, published an article entitled "Payment of Labour in the Kolkhozes" by the economic expert, I.A. Zhuravel, in which the example of a leading kolkhoz in the district of Kherson is quoted as the practical way in which this problem should be solved:

"All jobs connected with the cultivation of the land have been divided into four categories, which correspond to four wage-groups. In the first category the wage is 8 roubles if the quotas are fulfilled, in the second 9 roubles, in the third and fourth 11 and 12 roubles respectively. All horticultural jobs are classified as a 5th and 6th category, in which the wage

is 15 and 16 roubles respectively if the quotas are fulfilled. In cattle-breeding the wage-scale is as follows: milk-maids receive 9 roubles per cow in summer and 20 roubles per cow in winter for every 100 litres of milk with the prescribed fat-content, and, in addition, 73 roubles for a calf up to the age of 20 days; 5 roubles are paid for attention to the mating of the cattle at the right time. Women pig-breeders are paid according to the live weight of the young pigs: 17 roubles up to 10 kilograms, 20 roubles for 10-14 kilograms and 34 roubles if the weight exceeds 14 kilograms. In addition, they receive 3 roubles 60 kopecks a month for looking after the sows. Women pig-breeders who look after young pigs of 2 to 4 months old receive 2 roubles for every 10 kilograms increase in weight and 48 roubles for every 100 kilograms increase in weight in the case of fatted pigs. Trained women pig-breeders, receive an additional increment amounting to 10 per cent of the average wage of the women pig-breeders in their kolkhoz.

The higher wage categories apply to the personnel operating agricultural machines. Thus, for example, the 7th category applies to tractors on wheels, the 8th to caterpillar tractors and machines with trailers, the 9th to S-80 type of tractors and motor-vehicles. In group 7 the wage paid if the quotas are fulfilled is 35 roubles, in group 8—40 roubles and in group 9—56 roubles. Persons who operate trailer machines are paid according to the 6th wage category, that is to say 16 roubles for every quota fulfilled. Tractor drivers who operate the trailers of their tractor themselves receive an additional 15 per cent of their wage tariff. The mechanics of the tractor brigades receive 10 per cent more than the average wage of the tractor operatives of the brigade; drivers of motor vehicles are paid according to ton-kilometers.

The kolkhoz overseer receives a wage of 1,800 roubles per month, 75

per cent of which is paid monthly and the remainder after the entire plan for his kolkhoz has been fulfilled. This remaining amount is, of course, not paid if the plan is not fulfilled. The wage received by the head agronomists, zoologists, veterinary surgeons and engineering mechanics corresponds to 75 per cent of the wage of the kolkhoz overseer, that of the head book-keeper to 80 per cent of the latter.

The wage paid to the brigade-men of the so-called "complex brigades" depends on the work achieved by their units; the basis of calculation in this case is the production achieved per 100 hectares of cultivated area. At the same time, it has been stipulated that this wage in no case should be less than 50 per cent of the wage received by the kolkhoz overseer.

At the end of the year, the kolkhoz workers receive a share of the net profit of their kolkhoz, which is divided up in proportion to their wage.

The kolkhoz members will in future, too, continue to be supplied by the kolkhoz with food-stuffs and fodder for their private stock of cattle. The amount supplied to them will, however, depend on whether the quota of working-days has been fulfilled and will be charged according to the state cost-prices."

The said article stresses that the situation in the kolkhozes has changed considerably as a result of the transition to the cash wage-system. It is pointed out that it is no longer necessary to fix a compulsory minimum of working-days for the kolkhoz workers, since everybody now tries to earn as much as possible; and all the quotas are fulfilled by a surplus.

The primary aim of this new wage-system to increase labour productivity by introducing a graded tariff, is obvious. It is likewise perfectly evident that the new wage-system will, in the first place, secure good wages for the agricultural specialists and will force the kolkhoz workers to improve their qualifications.

### ANTI-SEMITIC PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET PRESS UNDER THE PRETEXT OF THE ANTI-RELIGIOUS FIGHT

The Bolsheviks refuse the Jews the right to be regarded as a nation!

The persecution of the Jewish religion is being prepared propagandistically by the Soviet press.

A 62-page brochure by K. T. K. Kichko, entitled "The Jewish Religion," has recently appeared in the series of publications of the "Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge" in Ukraine. It is a second edition of a re-edited and expanded brochure by the same author, which appeared in 1957 under the title "The Jewish Religion, Its Origin and Its Character." The first edition ran to 39,700 copies; this new edition runs to 43,200 copies and is thus a "best seller" in the above-mentioned series of publications. Even brochures on Lenin or on the Seven-Year Plan do not exceed an average edition of 22,000 copies. This fact alone proves that the "Party and Government" of Soviet Ukraine are interested in activating the fight against the Jewish form of worship. A study of the subject matter and, in particular, a comparison of the additions and alterations introduced in the second edition of the said brochure shows only too plainly that this is a case of disseminating anti-Semitic propaganda openly under the pretext of a "scientific settling up" with the Jewish religion.

In the first place, the theory is advanced that Judaism (the designation applied to the Jewish religion in the Soviet Union), Zionism and the Jewish nation are closely connected with one another. Just as the Russian tsars in their day invented a uniform formula, "orthodoxy, absolutism and the national element," so, too, the Jewish bourgeoisie, it is affirmed, has astutely identified the Jewish nation with "Judaism." The author of the brochure has doubts as to whether there really is such a thing as a

uniform Jewish nation (!). On one passage he writes: "In keeping with the doctrine of Judaism, the Zionist leaders, together with the Jewish preachers, try 'to prove' that the Jews of all countries constitute a 'uniform Jewish nation'." This "dangerous" theory would result in all the Jewish political trends, which in their programme support the Jewish nation, being regarded as part of the "reactionary Zionism." Kichko relegates to this level not only the Jewish bourgeois parties, but also the Jewish workers' organization "Bund" and even the attempts of Jewish Communists to found a Jewish Communist party (JEWCP) during the October revolution. He comments on all these attempts as follows: "It was an open attempt, under Communist guise, to obtain more extensive legal possibilities for the active propaganda of the ideology of Judaism, Zionism and 'Bundism' amongst the Jews."

Another trend which is apparent in the said brochure is to show that Judaism and Zionists always went hand in hand with the most reactionary forces in the world, including Hitler and the anti-Semites, in order to achieve their aims with regard to Israel. As proof of this fact the brochure mentions the trial of the 72-year old Jewish emigrant from Hungary, M. Grünwald, who in 1953 was tried by a court in Israel on a charge of having collaborated with the Gestapo. In the course of this trial it allegedly transpired that a Zionist of the name of Kastner had been collaborating with the Gestapo and the leaders of Horthy's Hungary in order to obtain the necessary permission to enable the wealthy Jews to emigrate from Hungary. After these facts came to light, Kastner was murdered by an agent of the Israeli secret police. Kichko further affirms that another Zionist, Nossig, at that time eighty years of age, also collaborated with the Germans in Warsaw during World War II, and was subsequently killed by the Jewish population. He goes on to say that

prior to the war the Zionists in Poland and in other countries collaborated with anti-Semitic parties (1) and even organized fighting units (1) against the Jewish workers.

It is interesting to note that Kichko's brochure does not contain a single reference to the mass murder of the Jewish population in Ukraine during the Hitler regime.

Another trend in evidence in his brochure is the attempt to prove that "Judaism" does not pursue any religious aims, but that it is a political movement which is led by Israel and by Western imperialist circles and which aims to use to advantage "the religious freedom in the Soviet Union" and to change the synagogues into bases of anti-Soviet propaganda.

It can also be seen from the brochure that the regime has already taken various administrative measures against the Jewish religious communities in Soviet Ukraine. The activity of the synagogues and religious communities were restricted and rigidly controlled. Various rabbis were tried on charges of allegedly being in possession of illegal collections, of having violated economic laws, etc.

The brochure further affirms that the adherents of the Jewish faith decided to carry on their worship illegally and founded illegal religious organizations, the so-called "Minians," for which they even tried to rally young persons.

It is an established fact that the Soviet government practices a widely varying policy in the religious sector. There are, for instance, certain ecclesiastical organizations which, to a certain extent, are favoured by the regime, as for instance the "All-Russian Orthodox Church," as well as some sects and religious communities, which enjoy a similar status. On the other hand, however, there are various sects and religious communities which are regarded as hostile to the state and are combatted by the security organs. These include, for instance, "Jehovah's Witnesses," who, according to the official Soviet language, are described as an "American espionage organization." So far, the Jewish religious communities had a similar status to that of the sects which are to a certain degree tolerated. But Kichko's brochure shows a marked tendency to combat them as groups that are hostile to the state.

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## UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD

### REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ANGLO-UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

It is one of the most remarkable features of the Anglo-Ukrainian Society that, during the last seven years, it has managed, at one and the same time, to be an organ of cultural exchange, an opportunity for social contact between the English and their Ukrainian guests, and, most important, a kind of unofficial diplomatic organization that tries to make known in this country the Ukrainian cause and viewpoint, and to explain, when possible, to the Ukrainian community in this country, the more puzzling features of the way of life of their hosts.

Since the Annual General Meeting of the Society, last June, the A.U.S. has been carrying out these aims with increased vigour. Our activities during this time fall sharply into three periods. The first, from the Annual General Meeting until the end of August, being the summer holiday season, there was little activity, save for summer outings to various beauty spots (one may mention in particular the Bolton Branch visit to the Lake District, when the English members of the Branch were very proud to show to their Ukrainian friends a place equally rich in scenic beauty and literary association), and one or two lectures. This period closed with



a recital on gramophone records in London of the operetta "Natalka Poltavka," and the departure of the General Secretary to Germany, where, in the course of her holiday, she gave a lecture on "The Problem of Anglo-Ukrainian Relations," which, naturally enough, evoked a good deal of discussion of the work and aims of the Anglo-Ukrainian Society.

The second period was dominated by the British General Election. No less than five members of the A.U.S. were standing as Parliamentary candidates, two of them (Col. N. L. D. Maclean, — Conservative — and Mr. Jack McCann — Labour) being elected. During this time, our Rochdale Branch organized a "Three-Party Conference," which was well-attended by the Ukrainian population of the town, who seemed very keen to know more about the somewhat complicated workings of British Party Politics. On the eve of the Election, a reception was held in London, to welcome Dr. Röder, the Chairman of the German-Ukrainian Society. We were very pleased to have this opportunity of hearing more about a Society whose aims are parallel to our own, and to compare our methods of work.

Almost immediately after the Election came the news of the tragic death of Stepan Bandera. The Anglo-Ukrainian Society, naturally, wished to associate itself with the general mourning of the Ukrainian community. The General Secretary and the London Branch Secretary, Mrs Magdalen Rich attended the funeral to represent the Society, and, unofficially, to represent the English nation, since, naturally, no official representative could be sent by the Government. The General Secretary was asked to make a short speech at the grave-side. In her speech she praised the late Stepan Bandera for the devotion to the ideals of liberty and love of country that are so dear to both the English and Ukrainian nations. She also said, that in defending Ukraine against Russian Communism, Bandera had, in fact,

been defending the whole free world, including England.

The immediate concern of the Society is now to make known to the Government, Press and public the truth about the new "Russification" policy in the schools of Soviet Ukraine. We do not hope that we can force the Government to take any active steps in this matter, which, after all, they are bound to consider, officially, as an internal problem of the Soviet Empire. Nevertheless, we feel that in making our case known, we can give the politicians further information about the truth behind Khrushchov's Summit Smiles, and that, even if they cannot act officially, this new knowledge may influence them in whatever decisions they take regarding relations with the U.S.S.R.

To summarize: the last five months have been a period of considerable growth and activity on all sides: Social, Cultural, and Political. Although, at the present time, all social life has been brought to a sharp halt, the Society is not inactive: on the contrary, we are using this period of mourning, as a time of increased political activity, and preparation for the future expansion of the Society.

Vera Rich

(Hon. General Secretary).

Note. The Anglo-Ukrainian Society wish to take this opportunity to thank the Editors of *The Ukrainian Review* for publishing this report in their pages. We hope to be able to publish regular reports in future numbers of *The Ukrainian Review*. If any readers are interested in further information about the aims and work of the Anglo-Ukrainian Society, they are invited to write to "The General Secretary, The Anglo-Ukrainian Society,

78, Kensington Park Road,  
London, W.11."

### FIRST RECITAL OF UKRAINIAN POETRY IN ENGLISH

On May 28, 1959, the Anglo-Ukrainian Society presented, for the first time in this country, a Recital of Ukrainian Poetry in English translation at Caxton Hall, Westminster. It was produced by Professor Wolodymyr Shayan, who also delivered an introductory lecture, and Miss Vera Rich, a young poet, well-known to the readers of *The Ukrainian Review* for her translations of Ukrainian poetry in recent issues of this magazine, and also for her article "The Caucasus" of Shevchenko (U.R., 1959, No. 1, pp. 45-8).

This Recital has to be acclaimed as the first of its kind in England, and also as one of the many signs of a new departure in the activities of the Anglo-Ukrainian Society, of which, incidentally, Miss Rich has recently become the Hon. Secretary.

Altogether, twenty-two items were presented, most excellently read by Miss Rich, Mrs. Magdalen Rich, Miss Elizabeth Russell, and Messrs Arthur Fenlon and Napier Russell. Miss Rich announced and briefly introduced each item, giving its place in Ukrainian poetry and explaining its theme, allusions, and origin.

Various trends and periods of Ukrainian poetry were reflected in the selection; the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, was represented by three shorter poems and by "The Caucasus," one of his most important works; six poems by the second greatest poet, Ivan Franko, of West Ukrainian origin, were presented, and the third classic, the greatest Ukrainian poetess, Lesya Ukrayinka, was represented by two extracts from her dramatic poems. Other poets were mostly represented by one poem. Yudiy Fed'kovych, a Hutsul poet, was another one from the 19th century; the rest were poets of this century: the modernist Oleksander Oles', the neo-classicists of the Kyivan school of the 'twenties: Pavlo Fylypovych, Mykola Zerov, Mykhaylo Dray-Khmara,

and of the 'forties: Yuriy Klen, Mykhaylo Orest; the Lemko poet Bohdan Ihor Antonych ('thirties), and the classicist of the Praha school of the 'twenties-'thirties Oleh Ol'zhych (son of Oleksander Oles').

Most of the translations were by Miss Rich (nine items, as yet unpublished, excepting "The Caucasus" [cf. U.R., 1959, No. 1, pp. 49-53, and a reprint by the Anglo-Ukrainian Society as a broadsheet]; it is to be hoped that all of these will appear in print one day), and by Percival Cundy (seven items from Franko and Lesya Ukrayinka); the other six poems were translated by Professor Shayan, Florence Randal Livesay, Yar Slavutych, and M.C. (cf. U.R., 1957, No. 3, pp. 18-19).

The first part of the Recital ended with "The Caucasus," which was the highlight of the programme. This extremely difficult poem, very successfully translated, was presented in dramatised form, the lines being divided among "the Poet," "the Russian," "Chorus Leader," and "Chorus;" this novel and original form of production brought out very poignantly and threw into relief the emotions and ideas of the poem. The performance of Arthur Fenlon ("the Russian") was particularly excellent. The concluding item in the second part was a scene from Lesya Ukrayinka's "Forest Song," with its dialogue between Mavka and Lukash (Elizabeth and Napier Russell), which was extremely moving in its lyricism. Also it is impossible not to mention the deep, heartfelt emotion of Mrs. Rich in her reading of the second extract from Ivan Franko's "The Passing of Serfdom."

All those who were present at the Recital would agree that sincere thanks for an enjoyable and memorable evening are due to the organisers: Professor Shayan, and to Mrs. and Miss Rich especially, who gave much time and selfless effort to make it a complete success.

V. Svoboda

### UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC EXARCH IN GERMANY

The installation of Bishop Platon Kornylak as Exarch for Ukrainian Catholics in Germany took place on September 20, in Munich, Germany.

The ceremonies of the Byzantine-Rite were held at the Church of the Theatine Fathers. Presiding was Archbishop Aloisius J. Muench, of Fargo, North Dakota, now serving as the Papal Nuncio to Germany. Bishop Kornylak was born in 1920 in the Ukrainian province of Northern Bukovina, then a part of Rumania but now included in the Soviet Ukraine.

The youngest of his scholteacher father's large family, he attended a classical secondary school in Chernivtsi, the provincial capital.

In 1939 he went to Rome to study for the Catholic priesthood. He was ordained in 1945 as a Byzantine Rite Priest and in 1948 he received a Doctorate in Philosophy at Rome's Gregorian University. He was sent to the United States that same year and in 1950 joined the staff of the Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral in Philadelphia, where he served as Archdiocesan Chancellor from 1952 to 1959. In Philadelphia Mgr. Kornylak worked closely with Ukrainian Catholic student and intellectual groups such as "Obnova" (Rebirth).

Before this assignment was made, Bishop Ivan Buchko, the Apostolic Visitator to Ukrainian Catholics in Western Europe, who preached the sermon at Bishop Kornylak's installation service, was able to minister to the Ukrainian people in Germany only on a part-time basis. Now Bishop Kornylak can devote all his efforts to the spiritual and material welfare of the Ukrainian Catholics in Germany. More than half of the approximately 20,000 Ukrainians forced by Soviet Russian oppression to remain in Germany as emigres are Byzantine Rite Catholics who acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope but have church services similar to those of their Ukrainian Orthodox fellow-countrymen.

### COMMEMORATION ANNIVERSARY OF HETMAN MAZEPPA OF UKRAINE

As a fitting commemoration of the famous Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa and the heroic deeds which he achieved for Ukraine, ten lectures on his life and work were held in New York during the period from January to April this year. These lectures, which were part of a big anniversary programme in which a number of Ukrainian organizations, societies and corporations participated, were held in various halls and districts of New York. The various lecturers dealt with a great deal of new material and numerous hitherto unknown facts and, above all, cast an interesting light on the activity of the great Hetman in the political, national, military and cultural spheres. We should like to give the following short survey of the lectures which were held in this connection.

1) On March 10th, Professor M. Andrusiak held a lecture in the house of the Scientific Shevchenko Society, in which he dealt with the manysided life of the Hetman and gave his audience various interesting details regarding faked letters supposed to have been written by Mazeppa, which tried to compromise the Hetman in the eyes of the Polish and Muscovite Russian court.

2) In his lecture on Ukrainian art in Mazeppa's day, which he held on January 24th in the Ukrainian American Institute, Professor D. Horniatkevych stressed the important part played by the Hetman in furthering the Ukrainian baroque style, which became the starting-point for the golden age of all Ukrainian art.

3) On January 30th, Professor W. Sichynsky held a lecture in the Ukrainian Literary and Artistic Club, in which he discussed important problems in the life and work of Mazeppa and mainly quoted non-Ukrainian sources in this connection. In particular, he refuted certain legends about the romantic adventures of Mazeppa as a young man and stressed the significance of the campaign

of 1705 and the union of the part of Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnipro with Galicia under Mazeppa's government, and also gave his audience some interesting details about the numbers of the Ukrainian forces at Poltava.

4) Professor A. Moskalenko chose as the subject for his lecture, which he held on March 7th in the house of the 2nd branch of the Organization for the Defence of Four Freedoms of Ukraine (O.O.C.S.U.), the "Historical Basis for the great Veneration and the Symbol of Hetman I. Mazeppa." and in this connection discussed the so-called Nordic War, the defeat of Moscow and the significance of Mazeppa as a symbol for the disintegration of the Russian imperium.

5) In his lecture entitled "Mazeppa as Portrayed in the Works of Shevchenko," which he held in the house of the Shevchenko Society, Professor M. Andrusiak compared the historical factors with the attitude adopted by the great Ukrainian national writer towards Mazeppa. In the discussion which followed, Professor Tershakovets then analysed Shevchenko's poem "The Monk" (which deals with the activity of the Cossack leader Paliy).

6) On April 4th, Dr. B. Rzepecky held a lecture "Mazeppa and the Present" in the 64th branch of the "Union of Ukrainian Women in America" (in the Ukrainian National House). He discussed incidents in Mazeppa's diplomacy which are comparatively little known and Mazeppa's relations with the Swedish King Charles XII, which were established through the mediation of Princess A. Dolska. At the same time, he also stressed the great significance of Mazeppa and his supporters for the present generation of Ukraine.

7) In his lecture "Foreign Opinions on Mazeppa," which was arranged by the "Zarevo" Society and was held on April 18th in the Ukrainian America Institute, Professor W. Sichynsky gave his audience extensive information on the opinions—which have been handed

down to posterity—of those prominent foreigners who knew Mazeppa personally, in particular prominent Swedes, Frenchmen, Danes, Germans, Englishmen and others. These ancient records about Mazeppa differ very considerably from similar Muscovite Russian reports on Mazeppa. In these West European sources Mazeppa is described as an extremely intelligent, talented and venerable person, as a great patriot and defender of the rights of his fellow-countrymen.

The personality of the great Ukrainian Hetman today still arouses the interest and attention of foreign scholars, writers and poets as it did during the past two hundred years.

#### CONFERENCE OF YOUNG UKRAINIAN SCHOLARS IN NEW YORK

A "Conference of Young Ukrainian Scholars" was held in April this year at the headquarters of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York.

The Conference was opened by Dr. Volodymyr Kalyna, who outlined its purpose.

Dr. Volodymyr Bilaniuk, member of the faculty of Rochester University, spoke on "The Contemporary Situation and Future Tasks of Nuclear Research."

Dr. Stephen Halamay of the Ukrainian Technical Institute, New York City, chose as the subject of his lecture, "Some Economic Problems of Ukraine's Asiatic Neighbours."

Other speakers were Volodymyr Petryshyn of Columbia University on "The Method of Moments in the Solution of Operator Equations"; Oleh Fedyshyn on "The Ideological Background of the German Campaign in 1918"; Dr. Joanna Mirchuk-Ratych on "New Trends of Pedagogic Philology based on West's Word Frequency Count"; Dr. Yaroslav Pelensky of Kings College, Pa., on "New Journals of Historic Studies in the U.S.S.R.", and Dr. Vasyl Markus on "New Journals of Law Studies in the U.S.S.R."

## TWO CONGRESSES OF UKRAINIAN WORKERS IN METZ

The Ukrainian Free Trade Union abroad was called into being in France fifteen years ago. During the years between the two world wars, there was no Ukrainian trade union abroad, and hence social problems of the Ukrainian working class could not be solved satisfactorily. The trade union movement of the Ukrainian working class only began to develop towards the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 under fairly difficult conditions. About 4,000 Ukrainian workers in France joined the Ukrainian workers' organization in order, in this way, to bring about an improvement in their social and legal position.

On May 9 and 10th this year, two congresses of Ukrainian workers were held in Metz,—the 4th Congress of the Ukrainian Free Trade Unions and the 9th Congress of the Union of Ukrainian Workers in France. The Ukrainian workers' rally opened on May 9th, in the hall of the Metz Town Council, in the presence of many Ukrainian guests from France and other countries (in particular from Great Britain and Belgium) and various non-Ukrainian guests. Prominent foreign guests included the Mayor of Metz, Raymond Mondon, the former French Minister, J. Alders, the member of the administration of the Catholic syndicates in Holland, Mr. Jean Kulakowski, the secretary of the European organization of Christian syndicates, Mr. Hainz, and many others.

In their speeches the above-mentioned guests stressed their sympathy and admiration for the achievements of the Ukrainian workers and for the aims of the Ukrainian people who are struggling to attain their freedom.

Congratulatory messages were sent to the congresses of the Ukrainian workers by the Bishop of Paris, Monsignor Ruppe, the secretary-general of the Polish Confederation, L. Rodowski, as well as by various Ukrainian organizations in Germany,

representatives of the Ukrainian organizations in France, the A.B.N. and the Ukrainian weekly "Schlach Peremohy," both in Munich, the international confederation of the Christian syndicates, and the representative bodies of both Ukrainian Churches (Catholic and Orthodox) in France and Germany, etc.

During the congress the following commissions engaged in active work: the commission for matters pertaining to organization, for propaganda, for finances, for professional training, for international relations and for the drafting of resolutions. New directives for the future activity of the Ukrainian Free Trade Union and new programmes were worked out.

The newly appointed executive committees of the two organizations include many prominent persons. Both organizations are again headed by the well-known leader of the Ukrainian workers in France, Mr. Ivan Popovytch.

## GENERAL MEETING OF THE SHEVCHENKO SOCIETY IN EUROPE

The third General Meeting of the Shevchenko Society was held in Sarcelles near Paris on April 12th. Reports on the activity of the organization were read by various officials of the society, and a new executive committee was elected for the coming year.

In the course of the meeting, three lectures were also held: 1) "The History and Structure of the Soviet Ukrainian Academy of Sciences" by Professor Dr. Shumovsky; 2) "The Designation Rus" by Professor O. Shulhyn, and 3) "The Dislocation of the Ukrainian Population during the years 1926-1956" by Professor V. Kubyiovych.

## UKRAINIANS PLAN ERECTION OF SHEVCHENKO STATUE IN WASHINGTON

Americans of Ukrainian origin, citizens of the USA and their friends intend to erect a statue of Shevchenko, the greatest national poet of Ukraine, in the American capital, Washington.

On February 19, 1959, Senator Jacob K. Javits introduced in the US Senate a Joint Resolution authorizing the erection on a public site in Washington of a statue of Taras Shevchenko, to commemorate the death of this great Ukrainian poet and spiritual leader, who was inspired by the great American ideals and tradition to fight against the imperialist and colonial occupation of his native country, Ukraine, by Russia. The Resolution, introduced as S.J. 54, was referred to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration.

A month later, on March 17, 1959, Congressman Alvin M. Bentley, introduced in the House a Joint Resolution authorizing the erection of the said statue in Washington. The Resolution, introduced as H.J. Res. 311, was referred to the Committee on House Administration.

Shevchenko died in 1861 after his long Russian captivity and was buried near the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv. Ever since his tragic death, his grave has been a place of pilgrimage for all Ukrainians.

**DR. G. B. KISTIAKOWSKY,  
UKRAINIAN-BORN SCIENTIST,  
NAMED SPECIAL ASSISTANT  
TO PRESIDENT**

Washington. — Dr. George Bohdan Kistiakowsky, Ukrainian-born scientist and Professor of Chemistry at Harvard University, (Cambridge, Mass.), was named on May 28th as a special Assistant to President Eisenhower in the field of science and technology, replacing Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., who resigned the post to return to teaching and research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

Named to the \$21,000-a-year post, Dr. Kistiakowsky, a member of a prominent Ukrainian family which played an outstanding role in the cultural-scientific life of Tsarist Russia and later in the anti-Communist and Ukrainian movements, has held important political positions during the existence of the independent Ukraine before the Communist conquest. His

father, Prof. Bohdan Kistiakowsky, was a well-known Ukrainian sociologist and Professor of the University of Kiev and member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. His uncle, Dr. Ihor Kistiakowsky, was Minister of Interior in the government of Hetman Paul Skoropadsky. Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky is a member of the Taras Shevchenko Scientific Society and other Ukrainian organizations in the free world.

Born on November 18, 1900, in the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, Dr. Kistiakowsky has resided in the U.S. since 1926. He received his American citizenship in 1933 and has been a professor in Chemistry at Harvard University since 1938.

Academically, the Ukrainian-born scientist has won top honours. He has specialized in research in the fields of kinetics of gas phase reactions, structure of polyatomic molecules, thermo-chemistry of organic compounds, enzymedatalyzed reactions and detonations waves, and has written 150 articles to scientific journals and a book on his special field.

He has been a member of the National Academy of Sciences since 1941 and of the President's Science Advisory Committee since 1957. He did his first American work at Princeton from 1926 to 1930 before going to Harvard, and won his Doctor of Chemistry degree at Berlin University in 1925 after enrolling there in 1921 following internment in Turkey and the Balkans.

**REQUEST THAT UKRAINIAN  
BE TAUGHT IN MANITOBA  
HIGH SCHOOLS**

At the annual convention of the Teachers' Society, which was recently held in Manitoba, Canada, it was urged that the provincial department of education should introduce Ukrainian in Manitoba high schools as an optional foreign language and that it should be recognized as an entrance subject by the University of Manitoba.

## Protest Meeting in London Against Russification of Ukraine

On Monday, November 30th, 1959, the Anglo-Ukrainian Society held a meeting at Caxton Hall, London, S.W.1., to discuss the new Russification drive in Soviet Ukraine, particularly as regards education.

In the absence of Sir Compton Mackenzie, Chairman of the Society, the Chair was taken by Professor W. Shayan, who, in his brief introduction, spoke of the long struggle of the Ukrainian nation for recognition and independence. The main speech was made by Professor P. Yuzyk, of the University of Manitoba, who treated the theme of Russification from a historical point of view, demonstrating that in this matter the Kremlin is continuing the centralizing policy of the Tsarist regime. Mr. V. Svoboda, who is an Assistant Lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in the University of London, then spoke of the individuality of the Ukrainian language, and the significant role played by Ukrainian literature in fostering patriotism during the revival of the Ukrainian national spirit during the last century. It is their language, he said, that binds the Ukrainian people together, and makes them a nation. Therefore the new Soviet "Decree on Strengthening the Ties between School and Life, and Continued Development of Public Education in the Ukrainian S.S.R.," which is nothing less than a disguised attempt to reduce the Ukrainian language to an optional subject of secondary importance, is a blow against the whole ideal of Ukrainian Independence.

The General Secretary of the Society, Miss Vera Rich, then read a draft resolution, condemning the new policy, and pledging the Society to support in any way possible the opposition to this new Decree which was being offered by the population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. This resolution was vigorously applauded and accepted without discussion.

Among the guests at the meeting was Mr. C.A. Smith, the founder of Common Cause, who stressed the need for making the truth about conditions in the Soviet-dominated countries better known to the people of Britain, since such publicity was one of the most effective means of combatting Soviet oppression.

The following is the text of the Resolution adopted at the Meeting:

### RESOLUTIONS

We, the members of the Anglo-Ukrainian Society, and sympathizers of the cause of a free and independent Ukraine, who are gathered here tonight, (at Caxton Hall, London, S.W.1., Monday, November 30th, 1959,) having considered the recent reform of the educational system of the Soviet Union, hereby declare:

Behind the theoretical facade of the State Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which states that: "All citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic are entitled to receive schooling in their mother-tongue," and behind the official Soviet

declarations of equality and tolerance for the national cultures of the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R., Russifying imperialistic pressure has been brought to bear of late and is still being brought to bear on the educational system of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

We declare that the: "Decree on Strengthening the Ties between School and Life, and Continued Development of Public Education in the Ukrainian S.S.R.," passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on April 17th, 1959, in spite of the opposition offered to it by the Ukrainian people, expressed, for example, by the protests in the Soviet Ukrainian press of Ukrainian writers, scholars and workers, can only be interpreted as a further discriminatory measure against the Ukrainian language as a language of instruction in the schools of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

We note section 9 of that Decree, which gives all parents of school children in Ukraine the right to choose which schools their children should attend, and what should be the language of instruction in the school in question. We emphasize that at the same time it suggests very strongly that they should give their preference to the Russian language, "since the Russian language is a powerful tool of relations among nations, of strengthening friendship among the nations of the U.S.S.R., and of making available to them the treasures of Russian and World culture."

Therefore, we can only interpret this Decree as an attempt to exert pressure on the millions of parents in the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the intention of making them renounce their own national language as a compulsory school subject.

Furthermore, we wish to express our deep concern about the fact that in the schools of the so-called "sovereign" Ukrainian S.S.R. which enjoys the membership of the United Nations, the national language of the Ukrainian people should be reduced to the status of an optional subject of secondary importance.

We therefore resolve that, in accordance with our Statutes to "uphold the historic rights and age-old European culture of the Ukrainian nation" to join the Ukrainian people in Ukraine in their continuing opposition to the discrimination against their nationality, and give them our whole-hearted support in their just and persistent struggle for the rights of freedom of worship, civil right, freedom of thought, free development of their culture, literature and language and to National Independence.

We find it most fitting that we should all join with them at this time when they are reasserting once more their belief in the inalienable right of the Ukrainian people and all freedom-loving peoples to live in peace and freedom and to develop their culture and institutions in a free and undisturbed manner, as a member of a family of truly democratic nations.