

The
**UKRAINIAN
REVIEW**



I

LONDON
1 9 5 6

UKRAINE



Contributions to be considered for inclusion in "The Ukrainian Review" should be marked "The Ukrainian Review" and addressed to:

The Secretary
 Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd
 49 Linden Gardens, London, W.2.
 Telephones: BAYswater 8392, 0140

Annual Subscription: £1. 0. 0. \$4.00
 Six Months 10. 0. \$2.00

Cover designed by Robert Lisovsky

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

Volume III. No. 1.

March 1956

A Quarterly Magazine

Editors:
Volodymyr Derzhavyn & Vasyl Oreletsky

Price: 5s a single copy

Published by
The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd
49 Linden Gardens, London, W.2.

CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Jaroslav Stetzko</i> : THE TRUTH ABOUT FREE CHINA	3
<i>Iwan Shevciv</i> : FIRST POST-WAR VICTIMS OF COMMUNISM ...	18
<i>M. Bohor</i> : THE UKRAINIAN UNDERGROUND	26
<i>Olexander Yourchenko</i> : BOLSHEVISM AND "INTERNATIONALISM"	37
<i>Dmytro Donzow</i> : FOR THE SPIRITUAL HERITAGE OF KYIV ...	53
<i>Yuriy Klen</i> : S. SOPHIA	58
<i>Ilarion Holubovych</i> : THE LURKING DANGER	60
<i>Dmytro Donzow</i> : RACIALISM IN RUSSIAN COMMUNIST FILMS	66
<i>Monica Furlong</i> : IN EXILE	73
TARAS SHEVCHENKO	75
I. F. PROF. DR. VADYM SHCHERBAKIWSKYJ: in Honour of his Eightieth Birthday	80
BOOK REVIEW	86
COMMENT	
Michael Jeremijew and Gonzague de Reynold	88
"A Smiling Stalin"	90
Questions submitted to Chiang Kai-Shek by Mr. Jaroslav Stetzko	91
BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN	95
OUR CONTRIBUTORS	96

Jaroslav Stetzko

The Truth about Free China

For the anti-Bolshevist world-front and the anti-Bolshevist world-constitution

On October 9, 1955, I arrived on the island of the freedom and hope of the millions of Chinese who have been subjugated by Bolshevism, on Taiwan, at the invitation of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (A.P.A.C.L.), and in particular at the invitation of the president of the League, the former Minister of the Interior of the Chinese Republic, Ku Cheng-kang, in order to take part in the national celebrations held on the occasion of the forty-fourth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Republic. The Chinese Republic was set up on 10 October 1911 as a result of the national revolution organised by Dr. Sun Yat-sen which led to the downfall of the Manchu dynasty, and it was officially proclaimed in the following year.

The A.P.A.C.L. is the Asian A.B.N.,* the co-ordination centre of the activity of the anti-Bolshevist peoples of Asia, an organisation which in the course of its two years' activity, thanks to the determined attitude of the Chinese sector of the League, has become the main driving force of the uncompromising anti-Communist elements of the freedom-loving peoples of Asia.

The first congress of the A.P.A.C.L. was held in Chinhae (Korea) on 16 June 1954. It was attended by delegates from Free China, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, Hongkong, Makao, and Riukiu. The resolutions passed at this congress are identical with the principles of the A.B.N. That same year other Asian nations joined the A.P.A.C.L. as members, including uncompromising elements of Japan and Pakistan opposed to Communism. At

* Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations: a co-ordinating centre for the national liberation movements and their organisations of the nations now subjugated by Bolshevik Russia. It was set up in 1944, and the writer of this article, J. Stetzko, is President of its Central Committee. — Ed.

present the A.P.A.C.L. is a vital force in the fight against Communism in Asia not only in the ideological and political sense, but, together with the A.B.N., it also aims to contribute to the setting up of an anti-Bolshevist world-front.

At the congress which was held in Taipei on October 18, 1955 and which, incidentally, was attended by leading intellectual and political personalities of Free China, I made a speech in which I stressed the necessity of all the freedom-loving anti-Communist forces of the world uniting. After discussions which lasted several hours, the following resolutions were passed:

- 1) The principle of so-called co-existence is a Soviet manoeuvre which aims to protect the Soviet Union and the entire system of the Soviet regime against the process of disintegration caused by the ever-increasing internal crisis, to stir up dissension among the Western democracies, and to gain time in order to improve the position of the Soviet Union. We must endeavour to the utmost to stir the conscience of the free world and its determination to fight Communism, and we must form a closer union in order to destroy the Russian Bolshevist menace.
- 2) We must resort to all the measures and means in our power in order to support the anti-Bolshevist movement behind the Iron Curtain, and in order to guarantee the right to freedom and independence to all the peoples subjugated by Bolshevism.
- 3) We must found an anti-Bolshevist world-league of nations and we must set up an anti-Bolshevist world-constitution. We must rally and unite all the anti-Bolshevist forces in the world for the purpose of forming a united and common front, which is to liberate the peoples behind the Iron Curtain.

On the same day that these resolutions were passed, the official organ of the Kuomintang, the *Hsin Sheng Daily News*, stressed that it was imperative that "the anti-Communist world front should be set up in accordance with the ideology of the A.P.A.C.L. and the A.B.N.". "This world-front," so the paper added, "shall be directed against the Kremlin despots and against the totalitarian Communist system. The members of this world-union shall exchange reports and experiences in the anti-Communist fight, shall work out a point programme, shall co-ordinate all the steps they take, and shall exhort the subjugated peoples to take part in all such

political campaigns as are called for and shall spur them on to conduct a constant and indomitable fight."

We have succeeded in establishing a common political basis and the uniform and guiding principles for the joint fight of the national liberation organisations of the peoples of Europe and Asia who have been subjugated by Communism and by Russia. I must say with conviction that in the Far East the conception of the nature of the anti-Bolshevist fight, of the ideas by which Communism is to be counteracted, and of the ways and means of liberating the subjugated nations is extremely profound, far-sighted, and quite correct. This applies in particular to Free China, whose enemy is not only Communism but also Russian imperialism, not only the Russian Communist imperium but the Russian imperium as a whole. I was pleased to hear President Chiang Kai-shek make the following statement:

"I know from my own experience", he said, "that the Far East policy of Tzarist and Soviet Russia is one and the same thing".

"The Chinese Communist Party is not the usual kind of political party, but the Fifth Column of the Russian Communist International. The Soviet conquest of Outer Mongolia and the attack on South-east China are based on the principles of the policy of aggression pursued by the Tzarist regime." I was also extremely glad to read the following appeal to the Chinese people in one of Chiang Kai-shek's speeches: "Unite in fighting Communists and Russians and do your share in helping to restore the Chinese Republic. Time will not wait for us; we must therefore consolidate all our anti-Communist forces at home and abroad, in order to ensure a national regeneration and to set up a system of government which shall serve as an example in the reconstruction of our native country. We must conquer totalitarianism, inhumanity, slavery, and subjugation, which are an integral part of Communist tyranny, by the spiritual forces of freedom and brotherhood."

It was of the utmost importance for me to learn the truth about National China, to know for certain how far one can rely on this country and, in particular, on the national freedom movement organised by Chiang Kai-shek, in the fight against world-Communism. And in this respect it was necessary for me to obtain the answer to the question why Chiang Kai-shek had been defeated on the mainland. In this connection we must bear in mind that our countries in Eastern Europe have likewise been overrun by Bolshevism and that we representatives of the fight for freedom of our

peoples are for the most part not living in our native countries, but elsewhere in the free world. In spite of this, however, our cause is right and just, and our ultimate victory is certain.

- 1) The war which Chiang Kai-shek conducted against Japan and which lasted for eight years exhausted the country to a very considerable extent. Instead of actively doing its share in this war against Japan, the Communist Party engaged in subversive activities, political manoeuvres, and acts of sabotage.
- 2) The Kuomintang failed to introduce the social reforms which were urgently needed, despite the fact that the Chiang Kai-shek wing of the Kuomintang constantly stressed the need for these reforms.
- 3) Foreign powers wrongly assessed the internal situation on the Chinese mainland, and, in addition to Russia, the Western Powers, too, supported Mao Tse-tung since they were convinced that he was only an agrarian reformer and not a Communist in the Russian sense. This step was, of course, prompted by the consideration that the two movements, the national and the Communist one, should fight each other, thus preventing the national movement under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek from effecting the consolidation of the whole of China, since in that case a world-power far superior in strength would intervene. This "balance of power" game was not played correctly, and Russia was thus able to stake all on Mao Tse-tung's card and drive the national government off the mainland.
- 4) The co-existence and "people's front" policy introduced by General Marshall, which was upheld in various conferences for ten months, undermined the prestige of the national government. The people regarded the Communists as a gang of criminals. But seeing that Chu En-lai was acting Minister of War in the national government and Chiang Kai-shek conducted negotiations with Mao Tse-tung, the national government lost the support it had enjoyed. Indeed, Communists and Nationalists, criminals and decent-living persons, were already regarded as belonging to the same category.
- 5) The financial help promised the national government by the West was not given, and the financial reform introduced on the silver basis was thus doomed to failure.
- 6) As the national government was in the first place intent upon reconstructing the territory devastated by the war, it neglected

important strategic factors, and, instead of rounding up the irregulars after the successful termination of the war against Japan and assigning them to the regular army, it sent them home, a fact which the Red Army used to good advantage by turning these irregular troops into Red divisions. Instead of abandoning Manchuria and concentrating its forces on the main front against Mao Tse-tung's Red Army, the national government was engaged on fronts which were too far away. Psychological factors played an even more important part than strategic ones, since the war against Japan was conducted on account of Manchuria.


- 7) After the capitulation of Japan the Russians handed over all the Japanese armaments to the Red Chinese army, and the Western Powers ceased to aid the National Army technically and militarily because they insisted on the setting up of the "people's front" government. After the National Army withdrew from the mainland, Mao Tse-tung, with Russia's aid, began to reorganise China according to the plans of international Communist strategy. We should, at this point, like to draw the attention of the Western world to the fact that an entirely new strategic situation will arise once the 2,000 kilometre railway route to Alma Ata has been completed.

In my opinion there is also another reason for Mao Tse-tung's temporary victory, namely, the intellectual élite of China, who have been nurtured on the teachings of Confucius. These contain no metaphysical concatenations, since the Confucian philosophy is a doctrine of ethics and social morals, but not a religion. In this connection it is very likely that materialism was able to exert its destructive influence. It was only when, in everyday practical life, the unnatural Marxist materialistic doctrine was brought face to face with the historical and traditional values of the Chinese, a profoundly idealistic people, that insurmountable and incompatible differences were discovered. The teachings of Confucius and of Marx, the doctrine of Sun Yat-sen, with his world-famous "Three People's Principles", and the doctrine of Lenin belong to two entirely different worlds. In this difference between the theories and principles of the Russian Marxist doctrine and the Chinese Confucian doctrine in everyday practical life lies the primary precondition for a defeat of Communist materialism in China. The incompatible nature of the difference between these two doctrines,


the idealistic Confucian doctrine and the materialistic Marxist doctrine, is, for example, apparent if we consider the following thoughts expressed by Confucius: "Moral law is present everywhere and yet it is mysterious. The simple intellect of the everyday man and woman is aware of moral law. But a wise and even a holy man cannot comprehend it in its greatest profundity. In their profane way the everyday man and woman may fulfil the moral law. But the wisest and most noble-minded man cannot fulfil it in its profundity. The noble-minded man trusts to his powers of reasoning, but he is on his guard against what he cannot see and what he cannot hear. In a state of solitude he is careful, for then what is hidden is most visible and what is secret is most obvious. Once man has achieved a perfect harmony between his soul and Nature, Heaven and Earth remain firm and all things prosper."

This Chinese philosophy now revolts against the unnatural Communist doctrine of Mao Tse-tung. Naturalness and simplicity are united in a wondrous way in the Chinese mentality. And perhaps that is why the materialistic doctrine with its superficial simplicity has managed to falsify the Chinese philosophy of life, which is simple and yet profound, so easily. Unlike the Occidental way of thinking, the Chinese philosophy of life is not based on eternity, but on eternal spiritual growth. For this reason productivity is prized above all things, whilst the power to destroy is never extolled. And herein lies the most vulnerable part of dialectic and historical materialism, which relies completely on its destructive powers. The moment Communism began to assert itself in China, the entire Chinese mentality and creative power, which are based on a five thousand year old intellectual and idealistic culture, spontaneously rose up in revolt against it.

Mao Tse-tung is the advocate and champion of the alien ideas of wars of conquest. By nature the Chinese are averse to this type of war. The only form of conquest to the Chinese way of thinking is seizure of territory for the purpose of cultivating it. Soldiers are only needed when the necessity arises to protect cultivated land and to suppress insubordination. It is thus bound to take a long time for the country to build up a military fighting force. But the victory will ultimately be won by the national traditions of China and not by foreign ideas and their representatives. The innate moral strength of the Chinese people will win the day, for it will defend itself as was, incidentally, the case in the war against Japan. The "punitive expedition", as the Japanese called it at first, developed



*Mr. J. Stetzko, President of the A.B.N. with Mr. Ku Cheng-Kang,
President of the A.P.A.C.L.*



Parade of National Chinese Armed Forces. 10 October 1955.

into a war which lasted eight years and in the end China was the victor. The Japanese, too, had their own philosophy of life, but when it came face to face with the innate Chinese conception of life, it failed to assert itself. The so-called "New Life" conception propagated by the National movement links up with those traditional Chinese moral values which, together with the modern social ideas of Sun Yat-sen, are an effective basis for the victorious fight against the improper Communist plague.

The fact must be stressed that the National government has admitted the mistake it made in the past and has based the fight for freedom on just political and social principles. In accordance with these principles the way to achieve liberation is not by means of a destructive nuclear world war, but by the national revolution for freedom, which is systematically and consistently being prepared in the ideological, political, social, cultural, and military sense by Chiang Kai-shek's government. If we wish to pass an opinion on the so-called provocation of the war by National China, we must first of all rightly assess the national consciousness of this nation, which, numbering 450 million, has never been conquered in an open war, and which firmly believes in its own strength.

In a state of preparedness

I had an opportunity to have a long talk with representatives of the sixteen thousand soldiers of the Red Chinese Army who went over to Syngman Rhee's side in South Korea. Of these, about five thousand had fought against the National government as Communists because they were convinced that Mao Tse-tung would bring about an improvement in the living conditions of the people. When they saw with their own eyes what Mao Tse-tung had actually achieved, however, they deserted him and went over to Chiang Kai-shek's side. The people are no longer fully in sympathy with Mao Tse-tung. The latter has profited by the mistakes made by the National government. As has already been pointed out, the National government has admitted its mistakes and has in every way made good these mistakes in Formosa. Mao Tse-tung will be destroyed by his own mistakes, which are now being cleverly exploited by National Chinese propaganda.

In order to safeguard his position, Mao Tse-tung has already introduced various classes or grades in the army. For example, as far as provisioning is concerned, there are now three grades in the

army: general mess (up to company commander), middle grade mess (the ranks from company commander upwards), and private mess with all sort of titbits for higher ranking officers. In addition, all officers have been listed in a special pay-group. The Red Chinese Army has now been organised on exactly the same lines as the Soviet Army. Leave of absence is only granted in the case of groups of not less than four soldiers. They are obliged to serve in the army for four to five years. Boys and men between the ages of thirteen and seventy were forced to fight in the Korean war. The soldiers had no idea where they were being sent: they were simply detailed for service and had to obey orders. The system of informers, namely political commissars, has likewise been drawn up on exactly the same lines as the system which exists in the Soviet Army. "We export rice, furs, and minerals to Russia from China", the soldiers told me, "and we get cannon from Russia and die for the Russians who are eating our rice". Incidentally, a song is sung in the army which goes,

*"Side by side with Russia,
Side by side with Russia,
Marching to victory,
Marching to victory!"*

"Were it not for the Straits of Formosa," the soldiers added, "the whole island of Taiwan would be full of refugees". And the people on the mainland say, "We shall make less clothes and more footwear in future, in order to give the Marshal's army a fitting reception and present all the soldiers with boots, to enable them to march to Peking as fast as they can".

The soldiers also told me that if, during the Korean War, the Americans had sanctioned McArthur's plan, namely that National Chinese divisions should be allowed on Korea, it would have meant the beginning of the National revolution and thousands of Red soldiers would have gone over to the side of freedom. The soldiers added that, in their opinion, the reason for the unsatisfactory outcome of the war lay in the defensive policy pursued by the U.N.O. McArthur's tactics had been excellent, he had assessed the situation rightly, and had held the key to victory in his hand. By means of loudspeakers American planes had relayed the Chinese national hymns over the Red Army lines, instead of dropping bombs, and, as a result, the morale of the Red soldiers had been considerably undermined. It must thus be admitted that, as re-

gards certain questions, the Americans resorted to the right measures in the Far East.

Liu Shao-chi, the secretary-general of the Communist Party in China, on one occasion stated that cases of armed resistance against the Red regime occur every two minutes. A case of this kind which occurred in the province of Chehuan and assumed dangerous proportions was quelled in 1951.

The 16,000 soldiers of Korea have, to a very considerable extent, strengthened the fighting spirit and the certainty of victory of the 600,000 soldiers of the National Chinese Army in Taiwan. I myself have seen the solemn oaths, written in blood, which thousands of Chinese soldiers have made on returning from Korea, to the effect that they will fight under the National government against Communism until they achieve an ultimate victory.

The military parades which I saw, the soldiers in the barracks, the sailors, and the airmen, all were evidence of the excellent morale of the National Chinese fighting forces, as were, too, the fighting spirit which prevails, faith in victory, discipline, simplicity, modesty, a complete absence of corruption, of excesses, and of exaggerated standards of living. The naval academy is run on modern lines and cadets not only receive a technical training, but are, above all, also trained for psychological warfare. The equipment of the army, navy, and air force is of the most modern American type. Admiral Tsao Chung-chow, the present vice-chief of the naval general staff, informed me of some of the important details concerning the navy and the naval academy. An excellent military spirit prevails in Formosa, which can well be transformed into a fortress and a bridge-head of freedom in the Far East, in the course of the aggressive war of liberation against the Red menace.

The chief factor in the entire war which is being waged at present is a psychological one, namely the attempt to win over the Chinese masses and the soldiers of the Red Chinese Army on the mainland. To this end, leaflets, journals, newspapers, and cartoons are dropped by plane over the mainland, a secret courier service has been organised, illegal organisations and military groups have been established in Red China, and a broadcasting station, which is much more powerful than the Peking station, has been set up. This new station relays its programmes in various languages on the mainland, both by day and by night without a pause, and explains the programme of the National government, which has been carried into effect in Taiwan and is to be realised on the

mainland. All these measures are important preconditions for the mobilisation of the masses on the mainland.

I have made a detailed study of this psychological warfare and of all the institutions which are part of it, and I consider its universal aspect excellent. I do not think there is any likelihood of America abandoning Taiwan, for it is really the most important base and the greatest stronghold of freedom in Asia. Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and all the other steadfast and uncompromising anti-Communist freedom-loving forces in Asia tend to gravitate towards Free China. Taiwan is thus actually more important than it appears.

It is perhaps a fault on the part of National Chinese circles that, from the point of view of propaganda, they are too Chinese, that is to say, that they do not divulge to the Western world sufficient information regarding their actual and their potential strength. Mao Tse-tung, on the other hand has adopted the Marxist Russian methods of propaganda and exaggerates in every respect, a glaring contrast to the somewhat too modest methods of National Chinese propaganda.

Social ideology of National China

In the social sector the National government has likewise admitted the mistakes it made on the mainland, and has introduced far-reaching social reforms in Formosa which are now serving as an example to various other Asian peoples, as for instance to Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. As Prime Minister, the Vice-President Chen Cheng introduced and carried into effect a most progressive agrarian reform in the years 1949 and 1950. The main principles of this reform are as follows:

There are no longer any big landowners in Formosa. No one is allowed to own more private land than he can cultivate himself without employing farm-labourers. The land really belongs to the farmers as their permanent possession. Capital invested in land by the landowners must be transferred to industrial investments in order to promote the development of the industries. The farmers only pay tax to the government and no longer need to pay rent to the landowners. The farmers who buy land are to be allowed to pay off the purchase price over a period of ten years, namely in yearly instalments; these instalments are not to be higher than the rent which they originally paid as tenant-farmers. In this way an

improvement in the standard of living of the farmers, social stability and economic progress are ensured.

Seventy per cent of the social insurance of the workers is paid by the state or by the employer. The workers' dwelling houses, the schools near to the factories, the canteens, recreation clubs, and hospitals, etc. are all equipped in the most modern way, and plentiful meals are served in the canteens to the workers, at cheap prices. The average wage earned by a worker is 600 to 800 Taiwan dollars! (One U.S.A. dollar equals 25 Taiwan dollars)

The most important problem, however, is the agrarian problem, for Taiwan is an agricultural country where rice is harvested three times a year and tea and bananas and other crops are also grown. Since the introduction of the agrarian reform the production of rice has shown an annual increase of 10 per cent, and parents, who were formerly unwilling to send their children to school, now do so gladly. I had a chance during my visit to see for myself the highly modern equipment in the primary schools, as well as the wireless sets and electric appliances to be found in many of the farmers' houses.

In order to strengthen the national consciousness of the people on the mainland, the largest book in the world is at present being printed in Formosa. It consists of 850 volumes with a total of more than 155,000 pages, and deals with the history of the twenty-five dynasties of China. The publisher is Professor Lin Tsiu-sen, who is the head of the publishing firm of the General of the air force, Victor Hwoo. One thousand copies of this book are to be printed. Incidentally, Mao Tse-tung has had various volumes of this historical work burnt.

In order to carry out the reconstruction plan on the mainland effectively and successfully in the future and in order to avoid mistakes, Chiang Kai-shek's government has set up an academic institution for high-ranking officials. Courses are held there by Chiang Kai-shek and other leading personalities for the purpose of training prospective administrative officials, economists, agrarian and social reformers, and preventing a repetition of the mistakes made in the past. This training school is known as the "Yang Min Shan Institute". Courses lasting from six weeks to three months are held there every year and constantly repeated. During each course the class deals with more than thirty questions in writing, namely how to solve various political, social, economic, moral, and cultural problems in a practical manner, to win over the population.

As regards the political situation in Free China, not only the Kuomintang but also other parties are countenanced, with the exception of the Communist party, which is, of course, forbidden; the parties sanctioned are the so-called "Youth Party" and the Social Democratic Party. The former is represented in the government and a seat is reserved for the latter, which at present belongs to the opposition. The lord mayor of Taipei does not belong to any party, and the Kuomintang candidate was unsuccessful in the last election. Women are represented in parliament as enjoying equal rights. Parliament consists of a senate, which convenes regularly, and the National Assembly, which convenes whenever a new president and vice-president are to be elected and whenever a change is to be made in the constitution, in order to ascertain whether the policy to be pursued is approved or not.

Life in general in Formosa is determined by the fight to recover the mainland. The fact is impressed on the people of Formosa again and again that, just as the motherland liberated Formosa from Japanese rule after World War II, so now Formosa must help to liberate the mainland. The people are convinced that, just as Britain managed to hold out alone against the enemy for two years during World War II, so, too, must Taiwan hold out in order to win over the freedom-loving forces in the world for the liberation campaign. The idea is impressed on the population that their country has a unique historic mission and that the colony abandoned by the Japanese is to become a bulwark of freedom and a Chinese Piedmont. When the National Chinese planes carry out their raids on the mainland, when they drop leaflets or make their reconnaissance flights, the youth of Formosa is reminded of the permanent state of war: and, indeed, the 130 thousand young members of the National Chinese Youth Corps are trained in the spirit of the war of liberation. I was present at the celebration held to commemorate the "Day of Taiwan's Liberation", when thousands of young people paraded before the National government, performed plays, and brandished flags in the National colours in order to stress the national spirit of the occasion.

This spirit is not the spirit of cheap militarism, but the spirit of the moral duty to help their subjugated fellow-countrymen to shake off the yoke of slavery. The youth of Formosa is mobilising the youth of other Asian nations, and, together with the uncompromising anti-Bolshevist youth of Europe, Asia, and America, is pre-

paring to set up a world-front against Communism, in order to act as a vanguard in the fight of the world for justice and national independence.

Conditions in Taiwan are to appear as attractive as possible to the Chinese on the mainland, to win the latter's sympathies for the National government. Chiang Kai-shek's government is thus doing its utmost to create such conditions on the island of Formosa that the Chinese on the mainland will long to enjoy these conditions themselves. The terrorist regime of such Moscow agents as Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Chu En-lai, and Liu Shao-chi, and the new, positive, social and political policy of the National government are already bringing about certain results.

I noticed in Hongkong, on the day before the national celebrations, that ninety per cent of the Chinese living there no longer hang out red flags; on the contrary, the majority are on the side of the National government. On festive occasions red-white-blue Chinese national flags are in evidence all over Hongkong, but only a very small number of red Communist flags are to be seen. Incidentally, ninety-five per cent of the Communist trade-union workers of a Red Chinese factory there, which in June 1954 was obliged to dismiss two hundred employees because business was so bad, refused to be transferred to Shanghai, even though they were promised three times as much pay. Two million refugees are the most effective propaganda against the Mao regime in Hongkong.

Thanks to the industries which have been established by Chiang Kai-shek's government, it is now possible to satisfy the social demands of the working classes. The following industrial enterprises play an important part in this respect: the flourishing aluminium works in Taichung, the oil refinery in Kaohsiung, the sugar industry, the big electric power station and the tea research station near Sun Moon Lake, as well as the shipyards in Keelung. Since the liberation of Formosa the production of the above factories and shipyards and the output of the sugar industry has increased very considerably. The most important branches of industry have been nationalised.


Chiang Kai-shek's government tries to act in accordance with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three People's Principles", that is to say, nationalism as the unifying principle of liberation, and no imperialism; social justice and the setting up of a sound, freedom-loving constitution. The Chinese call these principles "San Min Chu J".

As a result of my experiences in Formosa and the observations I made there, I have reached certain conclusions. I am not endeavouring to disseminate cheap propaganda for the National Chinese government, because I am mainly concerned with trying to ascertain the really active anti-Communist elements in Asia in order to destroy the enemy by uniting forces with such elements. I shall never support a cause which might only prove to be a burden in this fight. But this is not the case as regards Chiang Kai-shek's National government. In this case there can be no other alternative for a genuinely democratic, freedom-loving antagonist of Russian Communist despotism. There is no third force among the Chinese people. We must choose either Mao Tse-tung or Chiang Kai-shek, and, in my opinion, there can be no doubt as to which choice we must make.

On 17 December 1941, the day on which the attack on Pearl Harbour was carried out, Chiang Kai-shek made a remark about Japan which I should like to apply in the case of Russia, in view of her insatiable desire, both during and after World War II, to conquer fresh territory: "Russia was thirsty and drank. But she does not know that she quenched her thirst with poison!"

The uncompromising, revolutionary, national liberation forces of Asia, a vanguard to which Free China, Korea, and South Vietnam belong, and the national liberation organisations in Europe of the subjugated Central and East European and Asian peoples, who reject the idea of a compromise with Bolshevism and Russian imperialism and are striving to bring about the disintegration of the entire Russian imperium into national, independent states within their own ethnographical areas, are not only fighting for their own freedom, but also for the freedom of the whole world. Our aims are the same as those of the "Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League", and this is an important precondition for the setting up of a united front of all the freedom-loving nations and peoples in the world. National China agrees with our aims and our methods of liberation, namely by national revolutions. We therefore regard this country as our friend in the fight against despotism, and for this reason we should like to circulate the truth about this country in the West, since the truth is not only our but also National China's mightiest weapon.

Confucius, who lived 551-479 B. C., said, "A noble-minded man expects all of himself, but who is not noble-minded expects all



Mr. Ku Cheng-Kang addressing the anti-Communist ex-P.o.Ws
from Korea 1954.



Chiang Kai-Shek's holiday hotel in the hills.

of others. Because of his humanity the noble-minded man knows no envy; because of his wisdom he knows no doubts; because of his courage he knows no fear."

This is the spirit in which the "New Life" movement is training the younger generation of National China, not merely theoretically as was formerly usually the case, but for practical everyday life. In view of her adherence to these principles, it seems certain that National China will ultimately be victorious.

"ALL ROADS LEAD TO FREEDOM"

This is the name of a Movement which has recently come into being on the initiative of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (A.P.A.C.L.). It has received the full support of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations in Europe—the organisation that co-ordinates the liberation movements in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The aims of this Movement have been set out in a preliminary statement, of which the main points are summarised below:

1. The Movement should take its stand on the principle that the human being naturally seeks freedom and rejects tyranny, and should take every opportunity to impress upon 'enslaved peoples' that a vast proportion of the world remains free, so that they may either escape from their slavery to a freer area, or make every effort in their own countries to throw off the yoke of the despot. Such efforts should be assured of every possible support from the free nations, who should lose no time in guaranteeing this assistance, by the widest use of publicity.

2. Granted that Communism, as instanced in Russia, is a system completely hostile to freedom, every device must be employed to weaken and overthrow it; and as the Asiatic countries combine their energies to this task, the Movement should be able to link up with the liberation movement led by the United States with regard to the Iron Curtain countries.

3. Careful attention must be paid, above all, to the psychological aspect of the struggle against Communism. For instance, the Communist trick of staging the defection of its adherents so that they may be received with trust into anti-communist circles, must be clearly exposed as a method of infiltration.

4. There should be a genuine welcome offered to escapees from behind the Iron Curtain—East and West. There should be no discrimination as to religious belief, nationality, social status, or preference as to the country of refuge; and such differences should be publicised in order to demonstrate the widespread nature of the desire for liberation.

Great emphasis is laid in the statement on the importance of co-ordination of anti-communist action. It is only thus that a sufficiently strong blow can be dealt at the tyrants, and therefore organisation should proceed with special reference to such co-ordination, providing practical channels of approach, planning and joint action among the free nations.

Iwan Shevciv

First post-war victims of Communism

*Tenth anniversary of the suppression of the
Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine*

While the attention of the whole world was turned on events of the war in Germany and everyone in the West was looking with hope towards a peaceful future, behind the Eastern Front there started a new bloodsoaked tragedy: the persecution of the Catholic Church of Eastern Rite in Western Ukraine (Galicia).

Conscious of its new victory, the white tzarist eagle that had become red, one wing touching the Oder and the other the Kamchatka, began to peck at its prey once more, without being disturbed by anyone from the West. The first victim of this Russian eagle was Ukraine and its Catholic Church, as "the enemy of the people", that is, the enemy of Russian political and ecclesiastical expansion to the West.

It was far from being the first time that the blood of Ukrainian martyrs had been shed. In the last line of murderers of S. Josaphat, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian martyr for Union with Rome, we shall find the Russian tzarist court.

Peter I deserved a personal title as executioner of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. With his own sword he beheaded some of the Basilian monks in Polotsk. A real, large-scale and obvious persecution of Eastern Catholics in Ukraine took place when Catherine II became Empress of Russia. She intrigued against and insulted Orthodox Ukrainians in the territories occupied by Poland, playing them off against those of their compatriots professing themselves as Catholics, or Uniats. The persecution of Uniats continued into the 19th. century too, and had its executants in the persons of the tzars: Nicolas I in Volyn, and Alexander II in the Kholm and Pidlashia regions, 1831-1875.

The last assault of tzarist persecutors on Uniats living in Galicia was made during the First World War. Metropolitan Andreas Sheptytskyj was arrested and deported, and a number of clergy and faithful killed or dispersed. The only reason for all these persecutions was the fidelity of Ukrainian Catholics to the Holy See in Rome and the fear of Catholicism of Eastern Rite which offered

a great temptation to many unsatisfied members of the Russian Orthodox Church, itself an instrument of the tzarist regime.

In its time, the Communist regime became scrupulous and faithful legatees of the tzarist attitude towards the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Although permitting the existence of the Russian Orthodox Church, and trying to make of it an instrument obedient to its political aims, the Communist regime could not tolerate the existence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church which was devoted to Rome. Independent of the Moscow Patriarch, the Ukrainian Catholic Church remained a symbol of the unity of the Ukrainian people with Europe and of Ukraine's national independence of Moscow.

During their first occupation of Western Ukraine in 1939-41, the Communists had not had enough time fully to develop their persecution policy. They tried to ruin the Church and the clergy economically by confiscating all their property and by imposing enormous taxes on the use of church buildings which had now become "State" owned. Some scores of clergy and thousands of lay persons were arrested, deported, or murdered in the subterranean cells of many prisons in Western Ukraine. My own relatives were murdered in Zolochiw and Tarnopil prisons, and as a boy of 14, I assisted at the burial of hundreds of people massacred in these prisons in July 1941. Amongst the victims was a crucified priest with his stomach ripped open.

On their re-occupation of the territories of Western Ukraine in 1944-5, the Communists seemed at first to be tolerant towards every religion in the country, including the Catholic Church. "Soldiers and officers attended the religious services; hostile propaganda was imperceptible; profane literature was prohibited. Crucifixes were even allowed in the civil hospitals. Churches were reopened for religious services and religious instruction was permitted in churches. Seminaries were allowed to exist. Not only priests and students of theology were exempted from military service and compulsory work, but even seminarians and ecclesiastical singers and, in some places, Presidents of Confraternities. Churches paid very moderate taxes. It seemed that, following the concessions made to Christianity by the U.S.S.R. in 1941-43 and afterwards, the Catholic Church could now breathe freely under the Communist regime..."*

*) All quotations are taken from the *White Book on the religious persecution in Ukraine*, Rome. 1953.

But when the victory of the Red Army over Germany by the aid of the Western Allies became evident, the Communists started "to clean up" the occupied territories of "enemies of the people". As the first victim of this bloody "cleansing" fell the Hierarchy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

On 11 April 1945, 4 bishops—Mgr. M. Charneckyj, Apostolic Visitor of Volyn, Mgr. N. Budka, Vicar-General of the Metropolitan of Lviv, Mgr. G. Khomyshyn, Bishop of Stanyslaviv and his Auxiliary Mgr. G. Latyshewskyj, with Archbishop Josef Slipyj, Metropolitan of Lviv, at their head, were arrested by the N.K.V.D. and deported to Kyiv, capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. According to the law of the Soviet Union the show-trial of the arrested bishops had to be held at Lviv, before the so-called "People's Court", but the hearing was held in Kyiv, behind closed doors. All the arrested were accused of "diversion" against the Soviet Union and its Government. The Metropolitan Josef Slipyj was, however, also accused of having poisoned his predecessor, Metropolitan Andreas Sheptytskyj!

Without deliberation or reason, Metropolitan Slipyj was sentenced to 8 years of forced labour outside the boundaries of his diocese, in exile. The 80 years old Mgr. Khomyshyn was condemned to 10 years of forced labour, Mgr. N. Charneckyj, "an agent of the Vatican", was condemned to 5 years, Mgr. N. Budka and Mgr. G. Latyshewskyj to 8 years of forced labour each. Thus have they all passed along the same trampled way of the Ukrainian martyrs to exile. The only reason for their condemnation was their fidelity and devotion to the Holy See and their love of their persecuted country, Ukraine.

According to the scanty news that reaches the West through the Iron Curtain, Mgr. G. Khomyshyn died in Kyiv prison in January 1947; Mgr. N. Budka lapsed into a state of semi-consciousness through unbearable suffering and died in an unknown place; while the Metropolitan Slipyj, after serving 1 year of his prison term in Lviv and 7 more in Siberia, carrying out humble duties in labour camps, was called to Moscow where the proposition of breaking with Rome was put to him as the price of restored freedom and rank. Receiving the Metropolitan's definite NO, the N.K.V.D. found him guilty of sending clandestine pastoral letters to his flock in Ukraine, and condemned him to a new term of 17 years of forced labour.

The arrest of the Hierarchy was the prologue to tragedy soon to follow. Great and dreadful panic seized the clergy and the faithful. The Soviet authorities published an order prohibiting all religious ceremonies of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Only those priests might celebrate who were "registered" by competent state officials. In every parish a committee of 20 persons was appointed and charged with the administration of Church property. Then the real aim of the persecution emerged: a few weeks after the arrest of the Bishops, a "Movement" for the reunion of the Greek-Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church was established in Lviv under Soviet direction. The lapsed priest, Gabriel Kostelnyk, was at its head. This group of apostates—two of them later became Russian Orthodox Bishops—was protected by the police and started a propaganda campaign for a break with Rome and "reunion" with the "third Rome"—Moscow.

Some kind of protest against the persecution began among the population and the rest of the clergy. Over 300 courageous priests signed a letter of protest to the Vice-President of the Ministers of the Soviet Union, U.V. Molotov, on 1 June 1945, against the activity of this "Movement":

"After the arrest of the entire Episcopate and a great number of priests of the Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, and in consequence of the prohibition to elect a member of the Catholic clergy as our head, our Church finds itself in a very abnormal situation. This situation is complicated still more by the fact that at Lviv a "Committee for the fusion of the Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church" has been set up.

"Our attitude towards the work of Father Kostelnyk is completely negative. We condemn his activity as harmful, as absolutely opposed to the tradition of the Church, and contrary to the truth proclaimed by Christ: "There shall be but one flock and one shepherd". For this reason it is clear that we can not listen to a voice that incites us to apostasy from the Faith.

"In the present situation, there could quickly develop one of those religious wars which always, as history teaches us, do nothing but harm, not only to the Church but to the whole nation.

"We ask our Government therefore to liberate our Bishops, beginning with our Metropolitan. While awaiting this liberation, we ask the Government to make it possible for us to settle the questions regarding our Catholic Church. Until the liberation of the Metropolitan and the Bishops, we ask that the canonically legal body may administer the whole ecclesiastical province of Lviv.

"We want to believe that the Government will accept our request and will come to our aid, since the Constitution of Stalin guarantees

to all citizens, and thus to us also, freedom of conscience and of religious worship...

"In the name of justice, in the name of the glorious victory of the U.S.S.R., we ask for ourselves, for our people of Western Ukraine, that liberty of ecclesiastical administration which we have enjoyed these last centuries, and to which, according to the Soviet laws, we have a right."

But Molotov and his associates were deaf to this protest. Chaos and the terrorism of the N.K.V.D. drove a small group of priests into the nets of the "Movement". A kind of "Synod", a pseudo-council, took place in Lviv from 8-10 March 1946. Only 204 lapsed priests and 12 laymen were present. Under the direction of the apostate Kostelnyk and of two others, Melnyk and Pelweckyj, the newly consecrated Orthodox Bishops, this pseudo-council "annulled" the Union with Rome concluded in Berest in 1596. It called Rome a "foster-mother", and voted for reunion with the "real mother", the Russian Orthodox Church. A special delegation brought this "joyful" news personally to Moscow and was received by the Patriarch and by the President of the Ministry for religious affairs, comrade Karpow.

Everything about this "reunion" points to political trickery. A small group of priests allowed itself to be terrorised into complicity with Moscow's schemes, but the great majority of priests resisted firmly, preserving unshaken their faith in the only real Church of Christ. From the statement of the newly appointed "Bishop of Lviv", the Russian Orthodox Makarius, it appears that 1111 priests passed into schism, while the rest (about 300 escaped to the West) who numbered about 1500, preferred to choose the chains and deportation or death rather than "free life" and betrayal of Christ.

And one must remember the severe circumstances under which the priests lapsed: imprisonment of the entire ecclesiastical Hierarchy with the consequent disorganisation of the clergy; the organised terror of the Russian Orthodox Church and the draconical methods of the N.K.V.D.; the anxiety of the clergy—for the most part married—concerning the fate of their families; the pressure of the Soviet authorities, denouncing the cause of the people. All this explains the apostasy in terms of political pressure and not of religious conviction.

We quote the words of Mgr. J. Mojoly, the Minutant of Sacred Congregation of Eastern Churches, for the fate of Ukrainian Catholics after this unhappy chapter.

"From persons who left Galicia after these sad events, we learn that the Catholic faith has remained rooted in the hearts of the people, who try as far as they can to avoid showing themselves openly as schismatics (Russian Orthodox), and go to priests secretly who have not betrayed the Church. There is significance in the phrase used on a postcard coming from Lviv: 'We do not go to see George now, because George does not belong to us' — that is, we no longer attend the Cathedral of S. George, because the schismatics have it."

While the Church was going through this tragedy in Ukraine, the work of destruction was carried on in Poland against the wretched remains of the diocese of Peremyshl and the Apostolic Administration of Lemki. According to the Russian-Polish agreement, the Ukrainians who remained to the west of the Curzon line were to be transferred to the U.S.S.R. and the Poles in the U.S.S.R. were to be transferred to Poland. This judgment of Solomon was carried out with violence and utter ruthlessness. Thus the Reverend Bishop of Peremyshl, Mgr. Kotsylovskyj, his Auxiliary, Mgr. Lakota, and other ecclesiastical leaders had to yield to force and were handed over to the Russians, sharing the miserable fate of deportation with the other bishops. In the Ukrainian districts given to Poland, the people were torn from their houses and transferred to the east of the Curzon line; those who remained in Poland were widely scattered, so that it is impossible for them to practise their religion in their own Rite.

In sub-Carpathian Ukraine things took a very similar course. Soviet troops entered that territory in October 1944. A month previously, Mgr. Romzha had been consecrated as Bishop of Mukachiv, a flourishing diocese of nearly half a million people, 281 parishes, 354 priests, 31 institutes, 85 seminarists, 8 convents. The Soviet authorities, to whom this territory was new, wished to gain the favour of the inhabitants and at first took great care not to give offence; they therefore showed themselves friendly towards Mgr. Romzha. Little by little, however, the religious situation changed: Orthodoxy came into action and occupied the Catholic churches, Catholic activities were hampered, the Bishop's protests passed unheeded, and open attacks began against himself and the clergy, accusing them of pro-Nazism and pro-Fascism, while the Vatican and the Pope were declared the enemies of Soviet Russia. The seminary was deprived of every means of subsistence. Priests were shut out of every career. Young people were prevented from attending the churches. The Russian Orthodox Bishop Nestor was sent from Moscow, and he began to organise the Orthodox Church

to the detriment of the Catholic one. Then, as in Galicia, tactics of violence were introduced, but the clergy, encouraged by the Bishop's example of firmness, seldom yielded. It became necessary to remove Mgr. Romzha, and the intrepid Bishop lost his life in a pre-arranged collision. The road was then clear for the Russian steam-roller, and the Catholic diocese was completely destroyed.

In Slovakia there remained the diocese of Pryashiv, in which the great majority of the faithful are Ukrainians. The diocese numbered 321,000 inhabitants, 241 parishes, 311 priests, 54 seminarists. The Russians had occupied this region in 1945, but had had to leave it according to agreement, as it was assigned to Czecho-Slovakia. The vicissitudes of the Catholic Church in that country are known to everyone, but the saddest fate was reserved for the diocese of Pryashiv. The government in Prague, obviously inspired by Moscow, dealt its most violent blow at this defenceless diocese, which had been governed for 25 years by the saintly bishop Mgr. Goidich, aided by Mgr. Hopko as Auxiliary. In February 1949 the Minister Cepicka issued a declaration which foreshadowed the attack. A few days later, the convents were searched and the religious expelled or imprisoned. In 1950 Moscow created three Orthodox dioceses in Czecho-Slovakia, in preparation for the final assault on the diocese of Pryashiv; one of them had its headquarters in that very city, and an Orthodox Russian, Alexis Dechterelev, was consecrated Bishop of Pryashiv. The ceremony was to have taken place in Mgr. Goidich's Cathedral, but he refused to allow it, and that was made the pretext for his arrest. A "Synod" was then convened which proclaimed the rupture with Rome and union with Moscow, repeating that which had been done in Galicia and Rumania with no variation. The war against Catholic priests became more relentless. In January 1951 Mgr. Goidich was condemned after a monstrous trial for espionage and collusion with the enemies of the people, the customary excuses for conviction by the Communists. The Auxiliary Bishop, Mgr. Hopko, was also imprisoned. The Orthodox could now take unopposed possession of the palace and the cathedral of Pryashiv, and of every one of its parishes.

The Ukrainian Church is now completely wrapped in silence. The news that has reached us since the above events has been extremely scanty; but the little that we have heard inspires our hearts with the hope of better days. The outward organisation of the Ukrainian Church has been destroyed, but the faith reigns in the hearts of its people, as is proved by the following quotations:

"The news of Mgr. Kotsylovsky's death on 17 November 1947 reached us in this form: "Last autumn our Father died; as you know, he had a handsome beard and a fine staff". This sad news is now a certainty. He had offered his life as a holocaust. His cross and his bitter chalice are our glory and our pride. We mourn his death, but as Catholics we are comforted amid our tears by the hope that by the grace of God his martyr's death will be a pledge of rebirth for our community, as in the time of Saint Josaphat."

In 1949, a refugee from Galicia brought us this information:

"The clergy that has remained faithful to Rome is more numerous than people think; many are imprisoned or deported to Siberia. Others are working as manual labourers or in factories, in hunger, cold and wretchedness. The clandestine apostolate is carried out more and more. The moral condition of those who signed their adherence to the schism is pitiful and some have lost their reason. The common people hold firm to the faith. In some places no one goes near the schismatic church. Some go long distances to see a Catholic priest."

The following was written from Slovakia last summer:

"The sixty priests who apostatised from the Catholic Faith for various reasons, chiefly on account of their families, are very unpopular. I never thought that, with the grace of God, I should be able to endure such afflictions. You cannot imagine what a consolation it is to know that people are praying for us, that the very painful situation in which we are is meritorious before God. May the Lord grant us salvation and grace: the rest is nothing.

"More recent news brought by a trustworthy person tells us that the persecution of the Church in Ukraine reached its climax in 1952. Caricatures of the Holy Father are to be seen in the streets, at public meetings; the Pope and the Vatican are abused, and Catholic priests called the Pope's spies. The number of priests of the Latin Rite continues to lessen, and their task becomes harder every day. Archbishop Slipyj sent pastoral letters from Siberia from time to time, but when this came to the knowledge of the Soviet authorities, they increased his sentence to 17 years of imprisonment. No one knows where he is at present. Many people declare that they are sure of possessing God in their hearts, and would lead good Christian lives if they were free to do so. Many of the people are baptised, but they are obliged, especially the students, to live like atheists. It is said that in the Orthodox seminaries at Leningrad and Odessa, they are taught how to combat the Christian religion.

"The Ukrainian Catholics are now living under violent persecution. They, who in the past gave proof of their firm attachment to their faith and to Rome, await with confidence the day of freedom and Christian peace. When that day comes, the blood of their martyrs and the sufferings of the whole people will be the brightest glory of their country, bound forever to Rome."

M. Bohor

The Ukrainian Underground

The Principles of its Revolutionary Doctrine

The object of this article is to examine the principles of military doctrine which constitute the basis of the activity of the Ukrainian underground liberation organisation. The subject is not an easy one: even in the case of self-governing peoples the question of military doctrine is difficult, since the constant emergence of new concepts necessitates continual revaluation of all the problems involved, and prevents their inclusion in any unified military theory.

When, as in our case, it is also a matter of secret war, there is added the complication of revolutionary laws. But once the question has been raised, the answer must be pursued. He who forces his way into the dense thicket of conceptions, though he be lost for a time, nevertheless stands a fair chance of finding the way through; while he who halts, appalled, will perish for certain. Our task here is only to examine principles, that is, to seek for general direction and guidance; and thus our analysis will be limited to the fundamental problems of military thinking.

We should begin with a definition of military doctrine. "Military doctrine is a scientifically established conviction on the part of competent national representatives resulting from the concept of the state, the national consciousness, the understanding of modern warfare, and the nation's own ability to employ military forces and other means of resistance against both existing and potential threats". Thus, what is at issue is preparedness for war, the strategy and tactics to be adopted, and the problem of whether the nation will be able to protect itself from some menace and overcome it, and whether, in such an event, anything will be gained by fighting.

In the definition, therefore, there is implied:

1. The attitude of the competent representatives towards the idea of the state.
2. The condition of the national consciousness.
3. The attitude towards war and its modern forms.
4. An estimation of the nation's own forces, and of military forces in particular.
5. The nation's conception of its own strategic position.
6. An estimation of existing and potential enemies.

The solution of these six problems should form a system and provide the outline of a military doctrine. In the case of Ukraine, examination of the revolutionary military doctrine of the Ukrainian underground, operating as it is under foreign occupation, reveals other components proper to that revolution.

For instance, the nation's attitude towards the idea of its own state must necessarily be the starting point of its military doctrine, and this is both a philosophical and a political problem. The Ukrainian underground has formulated it in the platform of the U.H.V.R. — *Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada* (The Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council), and in the works of Poltava, Hornovy and Kuzhil, whose articles have been published in the emigration in a book entitled: *The position of the Ukrainian liberation movement*. The only problem that interests us here is that of the constitutional position of the armed forces in the planned structure of the state, and their relation with other bodies of the executive.

The place of the armed forces

In a republic the supreme executive power may be vested in three different organs which act according to the constitution: 1. the president, in the so-called presidential form of government—as in the U.S.A.; 2. the chancellor, who has the right of decision irrespective of the opinion of his ministers; 3. the council of ministers in a normal democratic republic.

This matter has been regulated in the Ukrainian underground by the provisional order of the U.H.V.R. which provides for a council of ministers. The duties of such a council are carried out by the general secretariat of the U.H.V.R., i.e. by its chairmen and secretaries. The Secretary of War, who is at the same time Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.), conducts military affairs. General Taras Chuprynka was Chairman of the General Secretariat, Secretary of War, and Commander-in-Chief of the U.P.A. The Secretary General reported to the praesidium of the U.H.V.R.—consisting of the president, three vice-presidents and four members—and was responsible for his work to the General Assembly (25 persons). The whole framework of organisation in the Ukrainian underground is based on the two principles, centralisation of leadership and decentralisation of executive power. Such a framework of organisation is advisable, since every organisation of executive power depends upon various factors,

primarily on its tasks and aims, and on the conditions under which it operates, as well as upon the quality of its personnel. In an underground organisation the ordinary standards of rationalisation and purposefulness are complicated by a higher demand for security. In modern theory of management, the functions of management demand at certain stages the fulfilment of these duties:

1. Indication of tasks and aims,
2. Assessment of the situation,
3. Co-ordination of action,
4. Passing resolutions,
5. Supervision of their execution,
6. Administration over personnel and material.

Under underground conditions all these duties should be performed by the General Secretariat, the General Headquarters of the U.P.A., and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.), who between them hold all the executive posts.

In a state the tasks and aims are pointed out by a government which is more or less supported by the population: in a revolutionary organisation one must be alive to those tasks, which must meet the needs of the broad masses of the population and not only express the ambition of certain individuals. The task should not be rigidly formulated, and should anticipate a series of varying opportunities and possibilities.

To size up the situation, which is in general a difficult process, is necessary for the specification of aims and tasks, and the determination of the proper basis for decision. The estimation of the situation is the means whereby the possibilities and alternative sources of action inherent within it may be perceived and grasped; it is not itself the making of decisions.

The hierarchy of tasks

Decision is a creative action resulting from aims, assessment of the situation, and the possibilities existing at a given moment. Decisions are implemented in resolutions, and the method of passing these is laid down in the constitution. Other functions of government mentioned above need no further definition, being purely technical in character.

All students and leaders of underground warfare—Miksche, Mao Tse-tung, Clausewitz, Reymond, Xaver—have satisfied themselves that underground movements arise spontaneously from non-military

formations, under certain social and political conditions, and that, during the expansion of such a movement, the most important problem is the creation of a single organisation, compact in the ideological, political and military respect. The genesis of the armed formations of the Ukrainian underground bears out this conclusion. The provisional framework of the organisation of the U.H.V.R. had to create central organs which would co-ordinate the political, military and economic activity of the underground. The criteria which conditioned the framework of this organisation of the U.H.V.R. as the executive organ of a liberation-revolutionary organisation arose from the conception of the liberation fight itself.

According to Moltke, such a conception takes into consideration in its strategy the political situation and co-ordinates political and military matters. After World War II military science proposed the following names for that conception: "state political strategy", "general strategy", "state policy of defence". During his rule an emperor was the supreme political and military sovereign; there were no total wars; thus the reflections concerned strategic operations rather than the co-ordination of the fight of the entire nation in all spheres of its life. Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini could easily apply such theses because they disregarded the limits of the sphere of their authority. In democratic countries the transition from the state of peace to that of war is as difficult as preparation for war, and in such countries there are in peace-time and in war-time "defence councils" engaged in preparation of the people for war, and these councils rise in war-time to supreme power. The framework of the organisation of the U.H.V.R. resembles such a war cabinet or defence council. The conception of the liberation fight, the "general strategy", is a synthesis of the idea of the formation of a provisional state and of a revolutionary underground.

First, therefore, we should examine those elements of the liberation conception which are included in the general strategy of every state, and it should be noted that the general strategy of every people has its own peculiar characteristics. While the conception of strategy in the military sense is an old idea, the conception of "general strategy", "political strategy", "state defence policy" is new, formed during World War II to define that co-ordination of all aspects of the nation's life required in making use of all resources in preparation for war to be waged by the whole nation. For the sake of clarity, we will only make use here of the term "general strategy".

The general strategy of the underground has been expounded in the platform of U.H.V.R., in its provisional framework of organisation, the resolutions of the 3rd. Extraordinary General Assembly, and the underground publications. According to Admiral Kastex's definition, general strategy includes all problems of warfare—political, economic, psychological and military. In addition, in an underground fight one should consider those revolutionary conditions which complicate the task to be faced.

The revolutionary elements

What additional demands are made by the revolution under the conditions of Soviet rule?

As to policy, this may be said to be of two kinds. The first is a casual policy which seizes every favourable opportunity, in a word—a policy of improvisation; the second is long-term, with a programme of which the political, ideological and social contents are based on a realistic estimate of the spiritual and material strength of the people and of the international situation in relation to that strength. A state can afford to follow the first kind of policy, but in a revolutionary liberation fight a political programme is a prerequisite.

On the similarities existing between war and revolution the Bolsheviks have based their thesis that a capitalist war should be changed into a domestic, civil war. Likewise, the Ukrainian revolutionaries would like to change any war between East and West into a war for the liberation of the Ukrainian people. What is indispensable to utilisation of a world war or of a revolution in the U.S.S.R. is the existence not only of a revolutionary vanguard but also of a constant revolutionary spirit, and a consolidation of the national idea among the broad masses of the people. And this can only be achieved by a continuous and an actual revolutionary fight. The Ukrainian revolutionary underground is of the opinion that "under existing conditions the revolution must be, first of all, social. Revolution is neither a rebellion nor a war against the regime. It is possible only where evolution has been stopped, where internal, structural, social, spiritual and, above all, national problems have accumulated and make compromise impossible". There is a fundamental difference between a spontaneous readiness for revolution, and the organisation and material preparation for it. The people as an elemental force, as the mass, can, at best, play a destructive role and

never a constructive one. If a revolution is to be successful, it must have a conscious stratum, a well-organised movement supported by the majority of the population. This movement must have its ideological, political and social programme and tactics, and these remain close to the heart of the people only if the people are fighting against the occupant and his regime. Under conditions of Soviet rule such semi-legal action is impossible; therefore the most important problem becomes the preservation of the organised underground.

Strategic suppositions

Let us now review all those elements of political strategy which are required by virtue of a state and by revolution. The most important of these elements is the definition of political aims. The platform of the U.H.V.R. reads: "The U.H.V.R. strives for the restoration of the Ukrainian Independent United State in all the lands of the Ukrainian people by means of a revolutionary fight against all the enemies of the independent statehood of the Ukrainian people, and by means of co-operation with all the advocates of such independence". Thus at the present stage of the liberation fight the Ukrainian people aim at severance of the "union" of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the U.S.S.R.; at the restoration of its independence as a state; at re-establishment of the sovereignty of the people proclaimed by the Fourth Universal on 22 January 1918 and by the Act of 22 January 1919; and at the establishment of a sovereign Ukrainian state with a certain political and social order within the ethnographic boundaries of Ukraine.

The provisional framework of organisation and its platform also lay down the means by which these objects can be achieved:

1. By means of revolutionary fight in all spheres of the nation's life;
2. By means of co-operation with all the advocates of Ukrainian independence;
3. By means of the unification of all the political elements, irrespective of their ideology and political membership, which advocate the political sovereignty and political independence of the Ukrainian liberation fight. The political-social platform should only be a basis for unification; it should guarantee the support of the Ukrainian people. The fight for national independence should be independent of the influence of foreign circles;

4. The U.H.V.R. is in Ukraine; it can send its delegates abroad. For the U.H.V.R. is the actuality of the underground movement; it opposes the government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the conception of "a legal government" in the emigration.

From these declarations it is clear that the basis of the political strategy is the necessity for the existence, in the Ukrainian ethnographic lands, of a sovereign, common national body which would lead the fight of the Ukrainian people and counterbalance the oppressive government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. The Ukrainian people carry on a revolutionary fight against the occupant and prepare for the establishment of their own independent democratic government and political-social order which will be approved by a free constituent assembly (the principle of the provisional character of every government, and of the sovereignty of the people).

Thus, the political strategy of the underground is based on the following fundamental laws, rules, statutes, and methods of revolutionary action:

1. By virtue of law (i. e. order and prohibition) the following principles are involved:

a. Orientation on the people's own forces (The authority of the U.H.V.R. originates in the will of the Ukrainian people exposed by the struggle for independence of all active forces of the people);

b. Unity of the Ukrainian liberation underground (the principle of concentration of forces);

c. Uncompromising attitude towards the enemy—a matter of principle;

d. Hierarchic obedience in the framework determined by law and the principles of general strategy (the principle "iustitia fundamenta regnorum", and the principle of purposiveness).

2. By virtue of principle (resulting only from the spirit of law, but giving a freer hand with regard to its application; a guiding principle rather than a law):

a. Co-operation with the nation's allies, and preservation of its sovereignty and the existence of the state.

b. The sovereign body must act in the native country, in order to prevent intervention and diarchy;

c. Only the support of the whole nation can be the pledge of the success of the fight;

d. Sovereignty can only be gained by an armed revolutionary fight.

Besides the law and the principles, there are in political strategy certain rules—of conduct—resulting from cognition of certain facts, statutes and methods of action which, normally, determine action or procedure in individual cases. These include fighting regulations, principles of conspiracy and methods of fighting against enemy agents.

The tasks of the U.P.A.

Against this background of the general strategy of the underground, its task and methods of action, one may consider the question of the role of the armed forces and their fight—the role, that is, of the U.P.A., and later the role of the armed underground. The U.P.A. has been organised as an armed arm of the liberation movement, i.e. a part of the revolutionary whole. In the period from 1944-46, the U.P.A. was faced with the tasks set down below. The period from 1946-47 was transitory, and in 1948 the U.P.A. acted only in the Carpathians, all the other units being disbanded and included in the framework of the armed underground. (See "The Information Bureau of the U.H.V.R.", February 1950). The tasks from 1944-46 were:

1. Protection of the underground movement, and a partial protection of the population (action squads and units based on the territorial principle);
2. By military operations against the occupant—especially against the M.V.D., and the Communist Party—to show the Ukrainian people that its state of being enslaved is a transitory stage, and encourage support for the resistance movement;
3. To demoralise the occupant and paralyse his actions aimed at extermination, assimilation and exploitation of the population;
4. To manifest before the foreign world the desire of the Ukrainian people for an independent life (as instanced in the raids of the U.P.A. abroad);
5. To prepare cadres for the organisation, for the underground and military forces.

Those were the political and strategic tasks determined by the general strategy of the underground. It is clear that they are different from those of a regular army. The U.P.A. considered that the M.V.D. and the Communist Party were its chief enemies, and military underground doctrine considers this a cardinal point since tactics depend entirely on the ascertainment of the strategic aims

and central strength of the enemy forces. How then has the U.P.A. performed these tasks? What is at issue here is not so much the action itself, but its doctrinal and tactical suppositions. There are fundamental differences regarding the tasks which are imposed on two different armed formations, not to mention the differences in the quality of those forces and their methods of action. The following tasks are imposed on regular armed forces:

1. Annihilation of the enemy armed forces ("strategy of annihilation" Vernichtungsstrategie; its most outstanding theorist is Klausewitz);
2. Wearing down the enemy, and compelling him to submit to our will ("strategy of attrition" Ermattungsstrategie; its theorist is Ludendorff);
3. Co-operation with other means of economic, political and psychological warfare for the purpose of the demoralisation of the enemy, causing a civil war, breaking the enemy's fighting spirit ("moral strategy"; its main theorists are Lenin, Fuller, Kastex).

With regard to the U.P.A. one would hardly speak of a strategic doctrine in the military sense, but rather in the political sense. The U.P.A. has, however, military tactics, and two separate tactical periods may be distinguished in its history. The chief characteristics of the first period, which lasted from the end of 1943 to 1946, are the following:

- a. The tendency towards operations by large insurgent units, and towards constant fighting with the enemy;
- b. The tendency towards occupation of large forest zones, and even of whole regions; consequently it became necessary to defend those terrains;
- c. The tendency towards the creation of regular land forces, and application of regular warfare.

Consequently, the actions of the U.P.A. resembled an insurrection, and its military operations a strategic partisan warfare. It should be admitted that those tendencies exceeded the limits of their competence as determined by the general strategy of the underground. This was probably caused by the fact that the psychological attitude of the commanders and soldiers of the U.P.A. was different; they accepted only with reluctance the new tactics of underground fighting and military operations by means of small mobile units. It should be pointed out that the General Headquarters

of the U.P.A. noted this in time and opposed those tendencies; this can be proved by the declaration of the O.U.N. of May 1945 and the appeal of the U.H.V.R. of November 1946. However, those tendencies were displayed up to 1947.

The second stage of the activity of the U.P.A. may be characterised as a tactical partisan warfare. Up to 1948 the U.P.A. acted by means of small units in accordance with the methods of tactical partisan warfare which, as those of strategic partisan warfare, constitute a separate subject, and one that will not be discussed here.

There are few publications on the third period, that since 1948, when the whole underground organisation, with all its cells, was re-formed into armed units whose main fighting aim was self-defence and the preservation of a single centralised underground organisation. In that period, the U.P.A. was a revolutionary underground organisation with purely political objectives.

In this discussion we have limited ourselves to the main principles of the military doctrine of the underground. Other problems, such as estimation of the situation and the consciousness of the population, views regarding war and its modern forms, evaluation of the people's own forces and their potential enemies, are variable elements, and their assessment would be somewhat speculative.

Some special problems

Certain problems stand out among the various elements in our subject, and mention can be made here of a few of these.

The first is how to prepare the people for their liberation fight. Should it be done by attempting to revolutionise the masses, or by militarising them? We maintain that they should be revolutionised, and by revolution we understand "a powerful right hand which will catch the tyrants by the throat", "a spontaneous movement overthrowing everything in the name of its hate of the enemy". Some oppose such propaganda: they demand militarisation of the masses, that is, they want to give revolutionary spontaneity and patriotism a systematic, organised form based on a hierarchic subordination, as in a military organisation.

The second problem is this: to what extent does our foreign policy depend on the geopolitical situation of Ukraine? Geography still influences to a considerable extent the plans of the U.P.A. regarding its strategic terrains and bases.

The third important problem is that of security in the underground. Security is achieved by means of intelligence, counter-espionage, mobility, organisation of the population, and by routine means employed also by regular armies—for example, discipline. The Ukrainian underground has its central organs which perform these duties. Along with the expansion of the resistance movement, the problem of security becomes more and more complicated. Its general headquarters, camps and other institutions must be placed in inaccessible places. All the installations are moveable; they are protected by a special system of guarding and of alarm. Every institution endangered by an action can be quickly evacuated to a new place prepared beforehand. An important part is thus also played by the principles of conspiracy worked out by the underground during its fight.

The problem of security is linked with the problem of a purposeful control of the population to secure its support and loyal co-operation. The Ukrainian underground performs such duties by:

1. Education of the population, giving the purpose of the underground movement, and its national aims;
2. Rejection of those who are disloyal;
3. Organisation of the population in order to secure actual assistance, and this is particularly the work of the O.U.N. (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists);
4. The protection of the population from oppression by the occupant.

The fourth problem is that of cadres. Here individuality and devotion to the cause are the most important factors and influence the framework of organisation of the whole underground. For the revolution needs specialists in political warfare and propaganda, in organisation of underground fight, in partisan warfare, in the problems of security and intelligence, and it needs technical specialists.

Other problems, such as morale and technique—war supplies, arms, signal and medical services—are not complicated and need not be dwelt upon in this article.

Our general conclusion is that the political conception of the U.H.V.R. is sound, and is a fine achievement and organ of the Ukrainian political idea. It is today, and will be in the near future, the guide of the Ukrainian people; and the study and furtherance of this conception is an important duty of the liberation movement as a whole.

Olexander Yourchenko

Bolshevism & "Internationalism"

It may seem axiomatic that Communism, or Bolshevism—if not exactly adequate as a phenomenon of the so-called "scientific socialism" of Marx and Engels and its practical realisation in subsequent historical and geographical circumstance—is at least an ideological deduction from Marxism that remains more or less true to Bolshevik postulates and historic objectives. For the Bolsheviks themselves published, in official declarations, the theoretical principles of the two German socialists of the last century, although these principles had, of course, been duly "developed" and "examined" by the Russian, V. Ulyanov-Lenin, and his successor in office, Djugashvili-Stalin, into an ideological Koran, the only permissible—or, rather, obligatory—conception of life within the boundaries of the Communist state.

One may ask whether contemporary Russian Bolshevism attains to the theoretical claims and demands of German Marxism of the last and current centuries, and whether this Bolshevism has its entire origin in the "scientific socialism" of the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848?

Is it the case that the philosophical, social, political and historical system which originated in the concrete conditions of social development of Western Europe, and which, according to the statement of its creators, had its roots in purely European sources—English political economy, French socialism and German philosophy—is indeed so nigh to the future socio-theoretical re-organisers of Russia, a country on an incomparably lower level of political, social and economic development? Or is it that the system acted at the most as the ideological signpost for the fathers of Russian "revolutionary Marxism"?

First of all we should bear in mind the important fact that the Bolsheviks themselves, while underlining their Marxist orthodoxy, call their ideological faith not simply "Marxism" but "Marxism-Leninism". In this way emphasis is laid upon the new independent contribution made by the Bolsheviks to the Marxist philosophical doctrine. In accordance with an official statement, "Leninism"—to take this term separately—is the Marxism of the "period of imperialism and of proletarian revolutions"; which means that it is, as

asserted by its creators and theorists, an elaboration of Marxist doctrine in the light of the new historical situation after the death of its creators. On the other hand, should one try to denote the doctrine as a whole, then the old name is quite inadequate in the eyes of its Russian followers and their successors. And therefore it appears that there is in question not only a further—in point of time—projection of Marxism, but also a more or less significant revision of its fundamental principles. In studying the Leninist theorists it may indeed transpire that, under a camouflage of “completions”, “further developments”, and so on, of Marxism, contemporary Russian Communism carried out a far-reaching revision of the theoretical structure of the doctrine of Marx and Engels, especially in those sectors that did not harmonise with the objectives, aims and tactics of their Russian “revolutionary” successors. In connection with this revision one may recall the following tenets of modern Communism: the possibility of a socialist revolution “in one country”, the theory of Lenin concerning the “dictatorship of the proletariat” as instanced in the Soviet government, the theory of the so-called “breaking of the weaker link” of world capitalism, the theory of the Communist Party as the “champion of the class struggle”, the “theory” of Stalin that a one-party system is the only form of “dictatorship of the proletariat”, and so on. One cannot deal here with all the changes and additions made by Bolshevik theorists to Marxist dogma, hitherto considered orthodox and inviolable. It is only necessary to stress the point that the leaders and followers of “revolutionary Marxism”—as asserted by Lenin himself—were not inclined to treat Marxist theory as something exclusive and sacrosanct. For Lenin considered an “independent elaboration of Marxist theory” by Russian Marxists as “especially urgent”. His successor Stalin preferred “creative” Marxism to “dogmatic” Marxism and asserted that he must support the former.

Especially interesting with reference to our subject is the innovation of Russian “creative Marxism-Leninism” as a highly gifted deduction by Stalin himself with regard to the “championship by Russia” of world revolution; also the false idea that “only Europe can guide us”, the assertion that the centre of the revolutionary workers’ movement had been transferred to the East during the 19th. and the beginning of the 20th. centuries, and the theses dealing with the leading role of the Russian proletariat, *et cetera*.

The points just quoted briefly above should show clearly enough that the roots of peculiarities in Russian “revolutionary Marxism

do not only lie in conflicting conceptions within the common ideology, but also in the differing sources of German "scientific socialism" and of Russian Bolshevism.

Lenin and his followers have always emphasised the fact that, while being inveterate Marxists, they did not deny the ideological and political legacies of the Russian "pre-Marxist socialists" or "revolutionary democrats"—Byelinsky, Chernyshevsky and others. Lenin saw in this heritage, on the contrary, the national pride of the Great Russians (Muscovites) who to his way of thinking had contributed generously to the "enrichment" of socialistic world thought. The official Party history remarks, certainly with a degree of precaution, on an ideological "dullness" in the "pre-Marxist period". But the part that the latter period played is significant inasmuch that without its contribution "productive Marxism" could not have taken root in Russia.

Sources of non-official Soviet history of Bolshevism prove clearly that the part played by non-Marxist predecessors in the formation and development of Russian Communism was far more important than is admitted by official historians: it was these factors and not the Western conceptions of Marx and Engels that were decisive in the evolution of the doctrine and method of Russian Bolshevism. As Lenin himself confessed, Chernyshevsky's influence upon his own ideology was almost decisive. He admitted also that thanks only to Chernyshevsky, "he first became acquainted with philosophical materialism". It was Chernyshevsky who demonstrated to the future leaders of Bolshevism "what qualities a revolutionary should have, what rules he should follow, how he should gain his ends, by what method he should proceed. In other words, the future methods of Russian "revolutionary Marxism"—the main weapon of Russian Marxism in the struggle for domination and in the organisation of the total subjugation of the peoples of the former Russian empire—was elaborated, first of all, under the direct influence of Chernyshevsky.

In the well-known proclamation *The Young Russia*, published by an underground circle in May 1862, which continued the social-political programme of Chernyshevsky, there were, as stated by a member of this circle, Mitskevitch, many catchwords that have been realised by the October revolution: one may find here the prophecy that Russia would first perform the great task of socialism; here the organisation of collective factories is called for, collective trade advocated, the nationalisation of the land, the confiscation of ec-

clesiastical wealth, the categorical demand for a strict centralised party to complete the revolution. After a successful revolution this centralised party was to lay as quickly as possible the foundations of a new economic and political life by means of a dictatorship; and this dictatorship would regulate election to a national assembly in such a way that no adherents of the old social order could be elected to that body. All these demands were met in the October revolution—with the one exception that there was no proletariat. The ideas and maxims of "classical" Marxism were by no means all realised after the October revolution, and it was noticeable that the Russians were not even attempting to realise them. The principles of *The Young Russia* on the other hand were carried out in their entirety by the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in accordance with the teachings of Lenin and Stalin; for this idea—"dictatorship of the proletariat"—had taken shape in the mind of the founder of Bolshevism under the influence of *The Young Russia* rather than of the Marxist formulae. An active adherent of the "Young Russian" group, Mme Yasseneva, once stated that Lenin always stressed one point of its Jacobin programme when discussing with her problems of taking over power. She added: "I am now more than ever convinced that he was already at that time speaking of a dictatorship of the proletariat". It was Lenin himself, moreover, who "completed" Marx by asserting that the working class does not evolve the essentials of a socialist consciousness in the course of its natural development, but that socialist consciousness must be brought to the proletariat "from without"—an assertion termed as an ideological heresy by the orthodox Marxist Plekhanov. Lenin in fact accepted the whole programme and method of the "Jacobins" but failed to perceive one important element: on what "people" would the promoters rely? And it was in looking for the answer to this question that the future Russian dictator seized upon the idea of Marx. The proletariat, the "grave-digger" of the former social order, a class that would not create a new ideology or a new order, but would be the executor of new ideas brought "from without" by socialist intellectuals. Special appreciation of the non-Russian predecessors of Bolshevism has found its official expression in contemporary Soviet historical doctrine and political theory. A Soviet document of 1947 characterises these pro-Marxist trends amongst Russians as follows: "The higher form of pre-Marxist socialism consisted of the theories of the great Russian revolutionary democrats of

the 19th. century—Herzen, Byelinsky, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov..." In revolutionary effort the great Russian utopians excelled by far the utopian socialists of the West, and, in consequence, "scientific socialism" originating in Germany with Marx and Engels and then "supplemented and enriched" by Lenin in Russia has been conditioned by Russian pre-Marxist socialists rather than by Western historic development. The "Leninism" that originated in Russia and adopted inferences and conclusions of Marx with regard to the development of the capitalist world, together with a certain prognosis of Marxism on the basis prepared by Russian "revolutionary democrats", has become a real and complete "scientific Communism".

Such are, to a certain extent, the features of a conscious or half-conscious historical connection between the Bolshevism of Lenin and its non-Russian predecessors. But far more important for a clear understanding of the spiritual nature of Russian Communism are those phenomena that arise and crystallise within it without being openly recognised and sometimes even being in direct contradiction to it. The Russian—that is, the deeply national—nature of Bolshevism is national in the sense that it originated in the specific conditions of the Russian historical process, and has sources not merely in the Russian ideological processes and movements of the last historical period. Its roots may be found also in the more removed periods, and traced through all epochs of Russian history since the Rostov-Suzdal. It will be appropriate here to cite but a few of the characteristics of Russian national history, making use of the works of the two most prominent Russian intellectuals of our time—Berdyayev and Fedotov.

On the dependence of Bolshevism—as discussed above—upon the "revolutionary democrats" of the mid 19th. century, Berdyayev declares that even Byelinsky "could be considered...as one of the predecessors of Marxist socialism and perhaps of Communism as well". To verify the assertion further one may look at portraits common to the early "enlightener" of the last century and the future "revolutionary Marxist". Berdyayev states: "It is erroneous to believe that the socialism of Byelinsky was sentimental. Byelinsky was vehement...and to a certain extent malicious". One finds in Byelinsky that distinctly developed distrust with regard to the people, the tendency towards leadership and domination of the broad masses despite all propaganda declarations—"The people are

so foolish that they must be led to their happiness by force". Berdyayev is convinced that the political cynic and terrorist Tkachov was a "greater forerunner of Bolshevism than Marx and Engels". In this Berdyayev is supported by Fedotov who takes it for granted that another Russian "Jacobin", the "malicious Nechayev", gave—perhaps unconsciously—to Lenin the impulse "to learn organisational and tactical immorality".

The way for Bolshevism was prepared by those specific circumstances of Russian historical development that brought forth a feeling of submission towards organs of government both among the leading circles and the people of Russia. This resulted from the destruction of all symptoms of Russian civic culture that might have revived inclination to leadership and messianism not directed towards the history or socio-political culture of the Russian people. And this characteristic led Fedotov to believe that the "new Soviet human being was not so much cemented in the Marxist school as produced in the former Muscovite Tzardom, receiving a slight polish at the same time". To look at the generation of the October revolution for a moment: their grandfathers lashed each other in the district courts; they would visit the Winter Residence of the Tsars on 9 January, thus instilling their innate monarchical feelings into the new red rulers. According to Berdyayev, the Russian people had neither political freedom nor freedom of spirit. And this is why a liberal revolution of the bourgeoisie in Russia which would require to be effected by legal means was always a utopia beyond the reach of Russian traditions and prevailing revolutionary ideas, which by virtue of these peculiarities of the Russian political and civil system were always totalitarian, theocratic or socialistic. They were products of that special political and ideological climate of Russian history which "in the Tartar school and in Muscovite service" had created a "special type of Russian human being—a Muscovite type which proved to be the firmest and most obstinate of all changeable phenomena of the Russian national scene throughout all its history". To this inveterate Russian national type, according to the same author, there is peculiar a sense of humanity and servitude on the one hand and of national exclusiveness on the other. His native country is unique in orthodoxy and in its socialism, and takes first place in the whole world: the "third Rome". The Russian human being despises the other, the Western, world; he does not know it, he does not like it and he is afraid of it. His

pathos is not freedom but that Russian "liberty" which is an unlimited arbitrariness without regard to others. His civic awareness is weak, his imperial consciousness but the stronger. This consciousness, Berdyayev says, "was nourished not so much by the interests of the state (apart from the people) as by the thirst for power". It issues from the sense of inequality, eagerness for destruction and violence towards the weak. The Russian national conscience is not acquainted with the "bourgeois virtues that are so highly appreciated in Western Europe and with civic responsibility as well". As Berdyayev believes, the idea of messianism is developed among the Russians in the same degree as it occurs among the Hebrews, and may be followed throughout the course of Russian history up to the era of Communism. For these reasons Moscow is believed to be the "third Rome", the Third International connected with the Russian idea. Communism may be said to be a Russian phenomenon irrespective of the Marxist ideology; the latter impressed Lenin strongly as "the genuine Russian personality with a tinge of Tartar feature", impressed him on the grounds of its messianic idea that, through a mission of the proletariat, could be connected and identified with the Russian messianic idea—and "that is why Leninism-Stalinism is no longer classical Marxism".

Despite this, the leaders of Bolshevism declared Marx to be their ideological example, their ideological guide for the purpose of realising their plans for political and social reconstruction not only in Russia but throughout the world. The reasons for this declaration would be out of place in this essay, but one has already been given—namely, the notion of the proletariat as the principal basis and the "fighting" force of the future social-political revolution upon which the Bolshevik "socialist intelligentsia" could rely. The "revolutionary-democrats" and "Young Russia" sought "their support among the abstractly imagined people", especially among the Great-Russian peasants, *i. e.* among the dispersed masses who had recently been in bondage and were in no way capable of either organised or general and spontaneous action. Lenin pointed out that the intellectual political terrorists were mistaken in this respect when they began to fight against the Tzarist autocracy on behalf of the autocracy of the "revolutionary party". The young Russian proletariat was not very significant but it was numerous enough to represent "masses" and play a parallel role to that of the young

German partisans of Hegel in the *Communist Manifesto*, and thus it was a sheet anchor for the revolutionary ideas and plans of the Russian Jacobins, as was noted by Vladimir Ulyanov, the nobleman of Simbirsk whose elder brother, Alexander, perished in the struggle for the ideas of "Young Russia". And yet, on the other hand, to learn from the West in the matter of purely national interests has been the Russian political tradition since Peter I. This latter "Bolshevik on the throne"—to use the words of Berdyayev—was enraptured with Western patterns and forms of political organisation and at the same time filled with aversion for the earlier forms of Russian state organisation, even of ancient Muscovite customs; and the same tendencies are found in Lenin who remarked on the backwardness of Russia which had led to its being beaten by "the Tartar Khans, Turkish Sultans and Polish landlords". But it would be as great an error to see in this merely external aversion of Lenin to Russia any proof of his international sentiments as to read into the Moscow-phobia of Peter I—the greatest reformer of the Russian state before the Bolsheviks—any indifference or hostility towards the idea of Russia as a great power.

Be this as it may, from all the ideas and philosophical trends of the West advanced in the political and social sphere Lenin chose Marxism—above all, chose its former dogma of an overthrow by force and of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This ideological and allegedly organic connection of Bolshevism with German "scientific socialism" compelled the Bolsheviks to imitate the latter in principle, and for this reason one cannot evade the question as to what is national and what international in Marxism.

K. Marx and F. Engels, pupils of German classical philosophy, are considered to be the first precursors of the notion of internationalism. In 1848 they concluded their first programme-document with words that have since become the sacred formula of this idea. Its nature had to be based not so much on principles of the solidarity and union of peoples—for such watchwords and ideas are not lacking in world history—but rather on instances of the preponderance of social over national and of class over the national in-group. The thesis of the *Communist Manifesto* was designed by the authors to mobilise and organise all adherents of a European social revolution to form one centralised body for purposes of action. And such hindrances to this aim as state frontiers and the instinct of cohesion within the national communities had to be somehow thrust aside.

By inviting the "proletarians of all countries to unite", the authors of the London *Manifesto* were far from wishing to eliminate national problems from their immediate plans or from further perspectives of the world—or Europe. The fathers of German "scientific socialism" did not approve of the international extremism of their friends and followers. Lenin justly emphasises the fact that "the theory of Marx is as far from disregarding national movements as the earth is from the sky".

According to Engels, organisation of political and social life beyond the national framework is impossible. He asserts that as long as national independence is denied a great people is unable to discuss its own inner problems seriously in the light of history. The contention of Marx's son-in-law, Lafargue, that nationality and nation may be merely outmoded prejudices, was refuted by his German father-in-law with great indignation because he could see in such a formula a far from international motive. "My son-in-law", wrote Marx, "does not understand that in denying nationality he is probably showing a preference for the swallowing of nationalities by the classical French nation".

It is, of course, undeniable that these first attempts to realise their plans by the London emigrants—of which the publication of the *Manifesto* was a part—or at least, to prepare a basis for such plans, was made under the conditions and within the framework of the European revolutions of 1848-49, above all of the German revolution. Marx and Engels were on the extreme left-wing of the German revolutionary camp, they promoted and stood for its most extreme watchwords and objectives. It is no secret that this revolution was, above all, a struggle on behalf of the German national ideal, to unify the German people into one state, and that the German radicals of the years 1848-49 were radicals not so much in the social as in the national sphere. It may also be well-known that Marx and Engels remained to the end of their lives adversaries of Bismarck not only because he stood for political conservatism but primarily because he had created the "Little-German" conception of union, with Prussia as the leader while excluding Austrian lands from a unified German state. In this they probably differed most widely from F. Lassalle, the problem of German national unity being fundamental to all their plans for political and social reconstruction. In saying that the proletariat should "organise the unity

of the nation", Marx set an aim whose realisation the weak German bourgeoisie could in no way achieve.

In denying the heretical conception of Lafargue that appeared to him dangerous to the German national revolution, Marx—albeit unwittingly—had no objection to the supposition that the German "classical" nation should play the leading part in subsequent European history. And with truth, for of the three national sources of international "scientific socialism" the Germans were to act as the synthesis without which the whole conception of European social revolution could neither be visualised nor prepared. The national and political formation of the German nation was a preliminary condition not only for the solution of German "internal affairs" but also for the future of socialistic Europe. The conception of a national political re-organisation of itself existed for Engels above all as a problem of national self-affirmation and a right to greatness as a nation. Marx and Engels combatted the national liberation movements of the Slavic peoples of the Austrian Empire in 1848 by terming them as counter-revolutionary, since the Slavic peoples in Austria were rebelling against the interests of European democracy as represented by the German revolution in this respect. The Danube Slavs, according to Engels, should "wait" till the German people were united in one state and, by virtue of their revolution, were democratised in the political respect so that a new social and political order could be brought into being for the Slavs.

The conception of future revolution, so far as Marx and Engels were concerned, started from the provision that such revolution must take place simultaneously in all or in most of the civilised countries. Among these, thought the founders of Marxism, belonged those countries from which they themselves derived their own social theories, the central place being occupied by their native Germany. Marxism originated and developed on German soil. It had to consolidate the German community in order that this community might accomplish its historical task in Europe. It is worth noting that so-called classical Marxism nowhere else except in Russia spread so rapidly as in Germany and in the German-speaking provinces of Austria—not even in England and France, countries of its source. The figure of French socialism was, for example, Jaurès rather than Lafargue, while the British Labour Movement originated, according to Attlee, not from Marx but from the Bible.

For these reasons it may be concluded that the "scientific socialism" of Marx and Engels, appearing and growing as it did

on German soil, was primarily an ideological trend of German social development. This supposition together with the actual political activity of its leaders and adherents in the German political and social scene lead us to assume also that the internationalism of the authors of the London proclamation was itself a phenomenon of German great-power ideology coupled with the notion of German leadership of the "civilised nations", while these latter would also have leading functions with regard to the remaining "uncivilised" world.

Russian Bolshevik-Leninism has been quick to take advantage of these elements in classical Marxism to further its own historical interests; it has extended the mission of "civilised nations"—with socialist Germany in the centre—to devolve on Russia as regards leadership of a reorganised future world that will reach almost to planetary dimensions.

By proclaiming itself the most orthodox revolutionary form of Marxism, Bolshevism has announced its international postulates and watchwords with especial emphasis. Under the cloak of an extreme class internationalism Lenin commenced a certain policy during the First World War: Russian Bolshevism began to oppose so-called "social patriotism", the defection of the major part of the socialistic world movement from the "purity" of international Marxist theory thus providing an absolute defence. Stalin had already emphasised that the workers of the whole world are "above all members of a unique class or family, members of the unique army of socialism". All elements in national and other orders which hinder the realisation of the idea of international solidarity must be removed. All attempts to take as principles of social life the principles of nation and nationality as fundamental to organic human community were blamed as phenomena of anti-proletarian "bourgeois" tendencies and influences which should be mercilessly opposed. "Bourgeois" nationalism and proletarian internationalism are, according to the teachings of Lenin, two hostile watchwords incapable of compromise in that they represent two class camps of the capitalistic world, and express two policies—even two philosophies.

And yet, during this period of the greatest emphasis on international watchwords, Lenin keeps away from extreme international trends in Bolshevism and in world social-democracy (viz. Rosa Luxemburg, E. Bukhanin, Pyatakov, Artem and others who, like Paul Lafargue, denied the existence of the national problem for

"proletarian socialism" by describing it as a "historical relic"). The motives for denial on the part of Lenin of the "national nihilism" advocated by so-called followers of Luxemburg were certainly not the same as those which impelled Marx against his son-in-law. Marx feared that behind these cosmopolitan extremes of the French Marxist there lurked a tendency to place France in the lead of a socialist world instead of Germany. The leader of Russian Marxism was, however, not afraid of being overrun by the German or Polish followers of Luxemburg since Russian Marxism was alive and established in a great power of vast extent. On the other hand, the international conception of the followers of Luxemburg seemed to offer great possibilities to Russian Bolshevism which aimed to gather the broadest possible "masses of workers of all nationalities on the broad basis of a struggle for socialism". The leader of the Russian "revolutionary proletariat" did, however, fear that the proclamation of the principles of "national nihilism" would immediately incite all the national liberation movements of the numerous peoples of Tzarist Russia against his policy. In addition, by directing his future reforms not only against the former political and social order in Russia but also against "world imperialism", that is, against the whole system of the national-political relations of the Western world, Lenin attempted to utilise the immense forces of the liberation movements of the colonial nations. For this purpose, international direction of Leninist Bolshevism includes in its propaganda arsenal the watchwords of national maximalism, such as the right of peoples to self-determination "inclusive of their national separation". It is true that Bolshevik theory tries from time to time to limit this "right" and to subordinate it to the exigencies of international propaganda: "We should not forget," wrote Stalin in one of his letters, "that beside the right of nations to their self-determination there is also a right of the working class to strengthen its power"; and this right is a "higher right". In the event of collision, the first therefore should cede to the latter.

The internationalism of Lenin was, even in its prime, deprived of any cosmopolitan features such as negation of the nation and of nationality as political and social factors. It was as much "supra-national" as the German "scientific socialism" of Marx and the French internationalism of Lafargue. Lenin was profoundly convinced that the "classical"—in this case the Russian—nation would play the leading role in the future international movement. The proclamation of the most extreme international and cosmopolitan

watchwords and principles could in no way endanger the culture and political independence of a great nation provided these watchwords and principles were not promulgated by the active forces of another and greater power. Also the deliberate restriction of the right to national self-determination—in the interests of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", naturally—did not endanger either the statehood or the independence of Russia. The right had hitherto been demanded by people deprived of their own statehood, while the higher right, the right of the proletariat to political power, was always guaranteed for the imperial nation thanks to the independent and dominating position of the latter. Thus the internationalism of the Russian Bolsheviks, no more than the watchword of the German authors "Workers of all countries—unite", was in no way the expression of supra-national trends in social life, but merely an instrument of great power ambitions—in this case those of the Russians, though camouflaged by a form of the national assimilation of smaller and greater nations by the immense national organism of Russia. This inner nature, and, to some extent, hidden aim of Russian Marxism and Bolshevism was skilfully termed "Proletarians of all countries—Russify yourselves!" by the creator of Ukrainian non-Marxist socialism, M. Drahomanov, who declared that the well-known watchword of the *London Manifesto* would sound better in the Russian idiom.

The second quarter of the 20th. century was remarkable for the acute crisis of ideas, or watchwords, concerning internationalism throughout the world. In the Soviet Union, according to Stalin, the national movements of the people of the former Tzarist Empire aiming at liberation and self-determination were far more dangerous for Russia than the Russian "internationalists" prior to 1917 could have imagined.

Under such conditions, and particularly in consequence of the non-arrival of world revolution resulting in the necessity "of building up socialism in one country only", the international-proletarian basis of the Communist empire became small and insufficient. In the 1930's there commenced a thorough revision and revaluation of formerly existing Marxist-Lenin international definitions and slogans. The Bolsheviks themselves began to unmask the ideological and practical principles and aims of Bolshevism. Instead of the idea of the world proletariat the Bolsheviks pushed forward the idea of the "native country". In place of the international

solidarity of the proletariat, "Soviet patriotism" was given first place in Russia. The conception of internationalism itself—not officially refuted—has been interpreted in the sense that the notion of internationalism does not exclude such patriotism but "on the contrary originates from genuine patriotism—from the love of the fatherland, from pride in its famous progressive revolutionary tradition and from hatred of its subjugators". Thus writes a contemporary Soviet citizen. The greatest expert of Soviet state science, P. Vyshinsky, tried to "throw a bridge" between the old international watchwords and the later conceptions of patriotism on the eve of the Second World War: "The fatherland that is the political, cultural and social neighbourhood is the most effective factor in the class struggle of the proletariat...The native country, the fatherland, belonged in the historical sense to the respective people that inhabit it, who develop their culture and defend their independence and freedom".

The historical problems of the proletariat and its own class party acquired another character forthwith. Instead of struggling for international unity among "the workers of all countries", the Communists of Europe and Asia have, before all, to defend the national sovereignty" of their countries, allegedly endangered by "American imperialism". In November 1952, at the XIXth. Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stalin, in addressing the foreign Communists and their political adherents, spoke as follows:

"The banners of national independence and sovereignty have been jettisoned. You and no-one else but you will have to bear these banners because you are the representatives of the Communist and democratic parties; you must carry the banners if you wish to be patriots of your country and if you desire to become a ruling force in your nation".

Especially flagrant are these new forms of Bolshevik political ideology if the so-called "rootless cosmopolitanism" is considered. In 1937 it was held to be a political utopia which could not be attained apart from the internationalist framework, but in 1953 this cosmopolitanism is termed a "reactionary bourgeois ideology that refutes the national traditions and national sovereignty, preaches an indifferent attitude towards the fatherland and national culture". The party "combats cosmopolitanism without mercy" because it "humiliates itself before the rotten bourgeois culture and is unfriendly towards the great Russian culture". It is interesting to note

that the former Russian dominant circles are reproached—not with their nationalistic and imperialistic attitudes—but with their humiliation before the West and their hatred of the Russian people, their great democratic culture, their national traditions. The October revolution of 1917 was declared by the supreme representative of the Soviet state, K. Voroshilov, as a certain Russian national revolution, a political action that had to be taken to save the Empire "from national catastrophe".

But these national and patriotic definitions and watchwords of Bolshevism, like its earlier international formulae, served the same historical purpose: first, to save, then, to strengthen the Russian great power and to realise its aspirations of world leadership. After the decline of the attraction of international watchwords of world revolution, these watchwords were refuted in the non-Communist world; and Bolshevism, the most effective organised force of modern Russian imperialism, has mobilised first of all Russian aggressive nationalism for the purpose of realising its aims. Patriotic watchwords for the non-Soviet peoples had to be merely subsidiary instruments in the struggle against the great forces of the free world.

The old international class conception of a world proletariat as unique and equal in all its national ramifications has been replaced by the idea of a community of "socialist nations"—and also of those marching towards socialism—that are said to have equal rights but not the same political opportunities. A new idea of a "leading nation" has been launched by the Russians; and this leading nation should have the only historical right to universal political and cultural development in the community of the nations of the whole world. Other nations would have more or less limited opportunities for the development of their national life. The great, leading—i. e. Russian—nation must create the greatest values of mankind because the Russians were the first who—not only in consequence of certain historical, economic and political reasons, but also because of certain peculiarities of their national character—created a new and most progressive political and social order. A contemporary Soviet publication concerning V. Byelinsky emphasises the positive role of this prominent Russian of the last century since he alone foresaw the possibility of the Russian nation "creating the greatest culture that has no equal in the world". No nation, even if "socialist", can be recognised as equal in respect of creative potentialities with the great Russian nation because that nation was the first among equal

nations to play a decisive role in extending socialism within the Soviet great power. According to Byelinsky the Russian nation is unique among other Slavic tribes in that it created a strong and powerful state and should accordingly be "at the head of the whole civilised world". The Russian nation created "the most progressive" political and social theory in the world—Leninism. And therefore all nations of the world should "recognise the leading role of the Soviet Union over which rules the Russian nation..."

Bolshevism as a philosophical, political and social theory and system has existed for about 50 years. In the course of this period it has undergone many stages of ideological and tactical organisation. Also during this period, the Bolshevik leaders and theorists have proclaimed varying and often contrary principles and "truths" that sustained changes from an extreme internationalism to a vulgar notion of a nationalistic great power. However, in the course of its existence and development as an ideology of political movement and state system, Russian Bolshevism—that had its origin in complicated and conflicting processes of Russia's historical past, and which, in addition, was provided with ideological method from the "scientific socialism" of the German West—has remained right up to the present day the bearer of one principal historic idea, aiming at the conservation and strengthening of a mighty world power with Russia at its head. According to the partisans of the Bolshevik religion, in the achievement of this decisive aim in world history, there would also be realised the ideals of international world Communism, the seeds of which have fallen on favourable soil—on, that is, the idea of universal Russian leadership.

The International Commission against Concentration Camp Practices published a great deal of evidence about repression in Communist China and also about strikes in Siberian camps in its Information Bulletin for August–November 1955. The Report is obtainable from 5 Rue Daunou, Paris 2e.

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

The publishers of *The Ukrainian Review* welcome contributions of articles, poems, and reviews in English from readers of any nationality. They do not wish to confine the contents of the Magazine to one particular viewpoint with regard to the problem of Ukraine.

Dmytro Donzow

For the Spiritual Heritage of Kyiv

As an ugly blot on the conscience of the West there endures even yet the contact of some of its circles with the so-called "Russian Orthodox Church".

Few people in the West realise what role, according to the design of the Kremlin, this "Church" is expected to play, but to some of those few who do understand belongs the journal "*Ecrits de Paris*".* Around this monthly is grouped a small circle of people who wish to stand in counterpoise to the Sartre-Mendes-Picassoist, Russophile and "progressive" bedlam of "modern" Paris.

In a recent issue of the journal there is an interesting article by P. C. Berger, "*La troisième Rome*". The author restates briefly the history of the pre-Stalinist and, in greater detail, of the Stalinist Russian Church. The "concordat", signed on 23 September 1943 in the name of the U.S.S.R. by Stalin and by the Metropolitan Sergius, had a long-term objective: to make the Russian Church an instrument of Muscovite imperialism. The Russian Church, so writes Berger, was never remarkable for a spirit of resistance to the Caesars, but was always at the service of their policies, both external and internal to the Empire. Under Bolshevism this Church had its martyrs, but never declared itself in fight against the Godless regime. Now it bestows its blessing upon this regime—rendering what is God's to Caesar. In his declaration the Metropolitan Sergius, speaking in wartime, stated that although "there exists in Russia anti-religious propaganda, persecution ceased

* Edited by the Société Parisienne d'Édition et de Publication, 354 rue St-Honoré, Paris.

long ago..." Obviously this was untrue, and in giving his blessing to the regime carrying on anti-religious propaganda, the Metropolitan Sergius unwittingly confirmed that very little remained in common between his "Church" and "religion".

After the conclusion of this "concordat" there began a new chapter in the policy of the U.S.S.R. with regard to its Church—the aim of which was to achieve spiritual hegemony, the primacy of the Russian Church in the Orthodox countries beyond the borders of the Soviet empire. The Kremlin wishes to mould Orthodoxy into a new fifth column of imperialism, the "oecumenical column" to use the words of the author. The hierarchy of the Soviet-dominated Church at once grasped the fact that the Godless communist state—even though solely pursuing its own interests—would help the Russian Church to achieve its age-old dream and make the Moscow Patriarch a "Katolikos" of all the Orthodox faithful in Eurasia, Africa and America—for in the latter the author estimates there to be about 1,200,000 people of the Greek Orthodox faith. Archbishop Nikolai Krutitsky, second in rank in the Soviet Church hierarchy (Alexiy having now succeeded Sergius as Patriarch), while travelling through Western Germany, declared "the way towards the community of nations can only be realised through Christian community"—lead, of course, by the Muscovite-Stalinist Patriarch. Developing the idea of Berger, I would add that, while the first slogan of Moscow was "Slavs of all countries unite!", and then "Proletarians of all countries, unite!", it is now "Colonial peoples, unite", while gradually a newer slogan is being formed—"the Orthodox of all countries, unite!" In all cases, naturally, they are to unite under the leadership of Moscow.

The realisation of this plan proceeds slowly and steadily, through the united efforts of the atheistic regime and Godless Church, attended by the criminal indifference or misguided sympathy of some representatives of the Western "élite". Nikolai, who is mentioned above, commenced to busy himself with organising "a system of exchange" between the young Protestant theologians and Russian Orthodox seminarists. Meanwhile the Patriarch of Moscow has under his jurisdiction all Orthodox Churches in the U.S.S.R., and his diocese spreads over eight million square miles. He has already virtually subordinated to himself the once autonomous Churches of Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Byelorussia, Latvia, and Estonia, also the Orthodox Churches of Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Czecho-

Slovakia and Poland. In East Berlin resides the Exarch of the "Third Rome" for "all the Germanic lands", and the Russian Bishop "for the whole of Austria" has his seat in Vienna. Out of four Eastern Patriarchs two, those of Alexandria and Antioch, have recognised the "Patriarch of the Slavs". Under the administration of Sergius six million "reconverted" Greek-Catholics of Ukrainian Galicia and Rumania were handed over to his authority. The final aim of this movement is, writes our author under his pen-name of Berger, "to realise the pretensions of Russian Orthodoxy to oecumenicism—that is, to transfer to Moscow the centre of world Orthodoxy, and consequently to take over the role and importance of Byzantium, thus becoming "the Third Rome". The intention of the Soviet government is to use this force for their advantage, to further their own, likewise "oecumenical", world revolution..."

On the whole, the author has a fair idea of the role of Orthodox Kyiv. He writes thus: "The support of the imperialist tendencies of the Russian Church by the Soviet government clearly stands out in the recognition of the status of the Moscow Patriarch by the U.S.S.R. as above that of the Orthodox Autocephalic Churches of Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine. By the "concordat" of 1943 the Communist state recognised Georgia's right to have her own Patriarch under the Patriarch of Moscow. Two years later the same right was acknowledged for the Armenian Church, which took third place after the Patriarchs of Moscow and Georgia. As to the Ukrainian Church, six centuries older than the Muscovite one, the Communist authorities—as the Tzarist ones earlier—not only denied its ancient primacy, but simply abolished its autonomy. The old strife between Moscow and Kyiv was decided by Stalin in favour of Russian supremacy. Just as in the 17th. century, the Russian state, now Communist, recognises all Orthodox communities except the Ukrainian Church. The latter seems to be, in the eyes of the Soviet government, an inseparable part of the Russian Church, and the Kyivan Metropolitan has been forced to satisfy himself with the rank of Exarch, canonically subordinate to the Russian Patriarch."


So much for the French author, who does not search any deeper into the causes, prospects and meaning of the rivalry between Moscow and Kyiv in his treatment of the problem. In a few words

I should now like to show the importance for Ukraine of this coming "Orthodoxisation" of Bolshevism and the "concordat" of the Russian Church with the devil.

The Russians have learnt from the Tartars the way to weld a horde together into a mailed fist, but they are unable to produce a novel idea. In the material sphere they live on the robbery of alien lands, in the spiritual sphere they live on robbery of foreign ideas. From Byzantium they took the idea of a world empire, from the Czechs the idea of Panslavism, from the Germans (Marx, Engels) the idea of "social justice"—communism, from the French, the idea of the revolution of "sansculottes". For, indeed, the naked instinct of the insatiable Muscovite Moloch, the urge to steal, kill, and appropriate other people's property, the urge of the nation, parasitical as it was, had to be covered up by blinding slogans—which themselves, too, consisted of stolen and distorted foreign ideas. Without these the plebeian would not be attracted to the Muscovite fishhook, and although he permits himself to be taken in (*decipiatur!*), he also "*vult decipi*", wishes to be deceived by such slogans, like the stupid hare which runs in front of you along the track you wish him to take so long as he is pursued by the blinding glare of your headlights. Just as, half a century before the 1917 revolution, the blinding light of "autocracy" began to dim, now the electric bulbs of "Communist revolution" are beginning to fade. The incantations of Kaganovich to the old melody of "Let the thunder of victory roll", are of little importance. He himself knows that he calls in vain, for, if it were otherwise, why do the Bolsheviks rely on the national, rather than the social, revolution in the world outside the U.S.S.R.? Whether "an age and a half" will pass before this process is complete, as the prophets declare in their incomprehensible language, or only "the iron number of years", we cannot say, but the collapse of the whole Babylonian tower of present-day materialist civilisation approaches with gigantic steps. And when this monstrous tower does collapse into ruins and a new life has to be reconstructed, humanity will gaze with renewed admiration at all things spiritual, mystical—such a process has already begun—as at the only guiding star which can lead us out of our contemporary hell. This is felt also by the "magi, seers and priests" both of the Russian government and the Russian Church (Kaganovich, too!). And it is precisely for such an eventuality that they are preparing a new masquerade—to insert for the benefit



*S. Sophia of Kyiv from the South-East
(built 1037)*



*Detail of the HOLY VIRGIN Mosaic (11th. C.)
in the Cathedral of S. Sophia, Kyiv.*

[Reproduced from *Ukrainian Arts*, New York 1955]

of the stupid "hares" new "Orthodox-oecumenical" bulbs into the glaring lamps of the Kremlin... To deceive in its turn that coming enthusiasm of the masses and to direct on to its own rails the urge for the liberation of the Slavs or proletariat, or colonies—that is the essence of the alliance of Bolshevism with Orthodoxy. In this lies also the secret of the intolerant attitude of Moscow to Kyiv which is seen as a fact though without understanding of its causes, by "Ecrits de Paris", especially in the rivalry of those two cities in the ecclesiastical and religious sphere. For a social revolution the Russians needed a Marx; in order that "Mother Russia" should—if the appropriate time arrives—appear in the mask of a "spiritual renovation" of the world, she needs Kyiv: she needs its ancient Pecherska Lavra Monastery, she needs the shrines of old Kyiv, the rich legends associated with her. All this she will steal, just as one of the first Suzdal princes, Andriy Bogolyubsky, stole the icon of the Holy Virgin of Vyshhorod, near Kyiv, and this has now become "our Muscovite one".

That is why, in the plans of Moscow, Kyiv is denied not only ecclesiastical independence, but even autonomy. For without Kyiv the world mission of the Muscovite "Orthodoxy" is a mere utopia. This is properly understood by the Muscovite seers and priests. They also know that, contrary to all ambitious world plans of Moscow, Ukraine time and time again became the centre of Christian Orthodox spirituality and mysticism, and always besides Byzantium there was Kyiv. Just as early Christianity found the best soil for its seed not in Judea, but in the better prepared Hellas, so Eastern Christianity has found the best soil for itself in Ukraine, soaked since early times with the Hellenistic culture which came there through the Pontic lands: not in Shamanistic Moscow, which has only destroyed this Christianity and this Orthodoxy. Moscow crippled the Ukrainian Church of Orthodox Kyiv as much as it could, as it now cripples the Catholic Church in Poland, Hungary, etc. Nonetheless, the Moscow magi know only too well (and if they did not Kaganovich would explain it to them) that when the time comes "that the Babylonian tower of Communism" created by Moscow will fall to ruin, then the thirsty Orthodox East, longing for the spiritual Truth, will turn its eyes towards Kyiv, with its legends, its mysticism, its faith—the faith of Mazeppa, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Sahaydachny, Yaroslav and Volodymyr.

This will be "la lutte finale", "the last and decisive battle" between Kyiv and Moscow for hegemony, for supremacy in the East. For there is no room for two powers.

Looking about for a new deceptive mask, Moscow knows that this last struggle is inevitable. It is necessary that we also should be prepared, our spiritual and our worldly swords ready.



Yuriy Klen

S. SOPHIA

"It is planned to pull down the Cathedral of S. Sophia in Kyiv."

A news item.

"The secrets of the millennium are hidden in the slim S. Sophia, which although pale, grows lighter and higher, like a prayer, into the azure sky."

E. Malaniuk

Let the toll of your bells be drowned by aeroplanes,
Let your walls be pulled down, and on the spot
Which aged years had sanctified in haze,
Let a monument be raised to the era of rot.
Let a soot-soiled skyscraper strike deep roots
Where you now stand, so white and gilded,
Oh lily slim, in a necklace of dew,
Which Yaroslav's wisdom had shielded.
Let modern Pechenegs scrape down from domes
Your sun-burnt gold to plate their horses' brass,
And leave the imprints of their blasphemous toes;
It is but fever spins the spectres thus,
They yet will fade away and melt like snows.
When of glass and concrete they'll found a hall

And the electric whirlwind starts wild dances,
Where now a saintly dusk falls on the floor
And in a drowsy sleep rests old Byzantium—
Know: all this soon will pass into oblivion,
For similarly once of Tartars did we dream;
Again some sorcerer foul spreads forth his charms
And you perceive the visions of not-being.
The true world—for human eyes unseen—
Is weighed in silence by grim seraphims,
Upon their palms, true scales of wordly things,
Cleaving the flames in twain by swiftmess of their wings;
It, like a fruit, grows heavier and mellows,
Filled with the fluid of the unknown breasts,
While the dark juice ferments and revels,
As wine which from God's grapes is pressed.
Like miracle to all there will be once made plain
The essence of each several earthly thing.
The day will break... the world be put in flames,
And husk will drop away from blinded eye.
In holy terror, strangely cut in stone
—As if a window opened on eternity—
Rending apart the curtain of the smoke,
In beauty indestructible, demure,
There S. Sophia in her noble cloak
Grows like a legend into the azure.

Translated by W. Mykula

YURIY KLEN. Pen-name of Oswald Burghardt, 1891-1947,
a prominent Ukrainian poet who fled to Germany in 1931 and
escaped the fate of the many poets liquidated in that year.

Ilarion Holubovych

The Lurking Danger

*When he shows as seeking quarter with
paws like hands in prayer,
That is the time of peril
—the time of the truce of the Bear.*
R. Kipling

At the end of their speeches, the two Russians, Bulganin and Khrushchov have lifted their hands above their heads and shouted: "Long live India and Russia". Now Kipling knew as much about India as any European who ever lived, and the quotation I have chosen as my motto shows that he also knew something of the Russian Bear. The free world is beginning to realise that it is in peril, and when it is the future of the world that is at stake, we must have the courage to face the truth.

The Geneva Conference has failed: the Geneva 'spirit' has faded away as do all spirits; the West has lost all her opportunities since the ill-fated Yalta Conference, all the time the West has retreated—step by step. And now the time has come not only to show strength, but also to realise the source of our danger, for otherwise the Russians will laugh in our faces, being certain that we cannot find any way of halting their offensive. The Russians do not understand polite words with no deeds to support them. When the West went ahead with the N.A.T.O. and with European security they said: "Let us be friends". Today they can boast that they too have the hydrogen bomb, and need no longer fear the West; and, accordingly, they now proceed with a new challenge in Europe, and in the Middle East, in India, Burma, Afghanistan and the African continent. That challenge must be met if the world is to be saved from Communism!

But if Communism is to be combatted, the West must first learn the truth about it from those who have experienced it in practice. The talks about lessened tension and increased contact between East and West were known by the well informed to be but moonshine: and moonshine can be pleasant, but it is a mistake to expect it to be anything except moonshine. A part of this intercourse between East and West may be seen at work in the so-called "White Russian" groups, that is, the post-Revolution emigrants from Russia. And when it is a question of Rus-

sian Communist intentions and policy how can any realistic mind imagine that the problem can be solved or helped in any way by the White Russian emigration. The Russian emigrants have revealed themselves in their true colours so often, have over and over again shown themselves obsessed by the crazy idea of the "indivisibility of the great Russian empire", and yet politicians of high importance still fail to grasp the truth that no Russian—white, pink or red—will stretch out his hand to overthrow that empire—their greatest pride. While on the other hand all the subjugated peoples who have experienced Russian occupation have but one answer for the so-called Council for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia*: "Russia once more? No! Never!" Thus 130 million people, whose national liberation movements are now united in the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations under the leadership of Mr. Stetzko, find themselves unanimous in their hostility to Russian imperialism in all its forms.

In the broadcasts that are made to the peoples of Russia by the B.B.C. and by the "Voice of America" it is unfortunately assumed that there is only one Russian nation. Practically no differentiation is made in the broadcast material in respect of the many peoples who are supposed to listen to the broadcasts. Thus the effect of the broadcasts is to alienate those nations who, though non-Russian and of distinct national culture, are yet under the Muscovite scourge—disguised as it is by the legal form of U.S.S.R. This impression given by the broadcasts coincides with the Bolshevik party's cunningly spread rumour that British and American imperialists would think in terms of world domination and would never dream of real liberation. And could any better method be found by the broadcasters of assisting Russian propaganda and consolidating their empire? Could it be done better? I am convinced that it could not!

The aim of the West is prosperity, peace, trade and compromise with the U.S.S.R.—at any price, even that of the continuous growth of Russian imperialism. The aim of the Kremlin is the continuous extension of Russian domination over countries, souls and bodies. The old Tzarist Russian policy—Moscow the Third Rome, capital of the world—is being realised step by step by the Red Russian regime! And although the British and Americans are aware of the

* A White Russian organisation, supported by certain private American circles.

existence of the red fifth columns, and although they realise how much is done by these, yet they have never recognised the existence of another subtle influence—the imperialism of the old Russian emigrés. Because emigrés are hostile to the government of the Soviet Union it does not mean that they are hostile to the whole policy of that government: as victims of a social revolution, it need not be inferred that they reject the traditional foreign policy of their country. Indeed, historians of recent years have shown how little Russian foreign policy has changed since the days of Peter I; witness also the veneration that the Communists themselves give to the heroes of the once despised Tzarist regime. To assess the views of the emigrés on such matters it is necessary to look carefully at their writings and propaganda, not merely to make use of these as convenient anti-Bolshevik slogans and pamphlets.

And such a review is particularly urgent since many of this white emigration are taking part in official policy making bodies as "experts" on Eastern European affairs. And indeed many of them are, practically speaking, "experts", for as naturalised British and American citizens they have graduated in the Universities, been trained in military institutions, and had the necessary skill and experience to receive high civil appointments in the governments. No-one grudges any of them this success, which is the due reward of talent and hard work. But at the same time, when listening to the personal views of such people, it should be borne in mind that *they may have already become conditioned to the Russian imperialist ideal to such an extent that all their advice is coloured by this bias*. Once aware of bias it can be given its due value, and discounted; it is when one is not aware of it that danger lurks unseen in the very exercise of the mind.

We Ukrainians living in Great Britain as well as the Ukrainians in the U.S.A. know only too well why the British and American Press keeps so absolute a silence about the appalling state of affairs in Ukraine and in other countries occupied by the U.S.S.R. We also know why the English Catholic Press has kept silence about the most cruel persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine. One day editors and under-secretaries and others will wake up to the danger and will offset the advice they have received about the U.S.S.R. by closer inquiries. But by that time too much damage may already have been done both within the U.S.S.R. and in the conditioning of the Western outlook.

Many of the older emigrés and the Russian Church abroad acknowledge Moscow as their supreme Head, and it is well-known that the Russian Orthodox Church has devoted itself to the service of the ruling regime in Russia. The Russian Church first became subservient to the monarchy in the reign of the Tzar Peter I. When the Bolsheviks came to power, the supreme hierarchy of the Russian Church did not object officially to the Soviet regime. In recent years, more and more of the Russian Orthodox Church communities are detaching themselves from their independent head churches abroad and sub-ordinating themselves to the authority of "their mother church in Moscow". The Second Convocation of priests and followers of the Russian Orthodox Church in America, which was held in March 1954, was attended by the Metropolitan Hermogen of Moscow, the right-hand man of Patriarch Alexiy, who was later "unanimously" elected Exarch of Moscow Patriarchate in America. At the beginning of July 1954, Archimandrite Dionisi Luki, head of the Russian Church in Holland, and Archimandrite Mstislav Volonsevitch went to the Soviet Union—the latter describing it as his return to "his native country". Both of them now attempt to persuade readers that "they saw no evidence whatsoever in the Soviet Union of the population being forbidden to practise their religion or being in any way restricted in their religious services! That is what they say! How remarkable that the "rotten" West still believes the tales of persecution! So it is all lies—what we have heard about the arrest of the Ukrainian Catholic Church hierarchy in Ukraine, the arrest of Cardinal Mindszenty, and of Cardinal Wyszynsky of Poland! And the Russian non-Communist bishops can see nothing? Poor men, are they then blind? Or are they simply not telling the truth? But the free world is dependent upon the evidence of such people.

The new patriarchal prayers for Stalin sounded like the old invocations for the Tzar during the invasion of Napoleon—"Let us intensify our prayers for the divinely protected Russian power and for its Authorities, headed by the wise Leader whom the Will of God chose and set up to lead our Fatherland".

Since these prayers, Alexiy and his cronies—master-minded by Metropolitan Nicolai of Krutitsky and Kolomna—near Moscow—the famous "Red Rasputin", have among other things condemned American "aggression" in Korea, denounced the anti-communist Greek government, and zealously supported successive international communist "peace" congresses. Influential Orthodox prelates in

the Patriarchates of the Middle East have been much influenced by their tactics. Undoubtedly, besides the out-and-out communist collaborators, there is now, as in the days when Orthodox churchmen co-operated with Russia's Mongol invaders, a majority of the clergy of the Russian white emigration who co-operate wholeheartedly with the reds; and we need only mention that Moscow sent Exarch Archbishop Boris as representative of the "holy Patriarch of Moscow" in the U.S.A. It does not surprise us Ukrainians when another Russian born churchman, Bishop Nikon, in a letter to the Editor of the *New York Times*, demands that Americans cease to provide support for the liberation of the non-Russian peoples in the U.S.S.R. What a strange thing it is that a churchman should deny the right of freedom to decide one's own affairs! And thus it seems that the Red and White machine of the same Russian imperialism work hand in hand with the churchmen in emigration and those sent by the Red regime.

There is, too, the famous Mr. Kerensky, one of the leaders of the Russian white emigration, who is quoted as saying: "I prefer Russia should even be Bolshevik rather than divided". Suitable advisers, he and his friends, for the fight against Communism! He and many followers, together with a good many unenlightened Americans, only wish to seat themselves in the Kremlin in the place of the Communists, and rule an undivided "Holy Mother Russia".

From the book *Europe since 1914*, by F. Lee Bennis, 2nd. revised edition, published by F. S. Crofts and Co., New York, we learn that it was Kerensky who made it possible in 1917 to transfer to Russia an entire band of well trained communist-Bolshevist agitators and propagandists—from the U.S.A. We read also that, on the application of Kerensky, Trotsky was released and permitted to sail for Russia. Again, that Kerensky made the fatal blunder of postponing the election to the Constituent Assembly from 30 September to 25 November, fatal because it still further weakened the confidence of the masses and played directly into the hands of bolshevik leaders who claimed that "The Provisional Government did not really wish to introduce the long-sought-after popular reforms." It was Kerensky and the former aide of Trotsky, Max Shachtman, who made similar speeches in the University of Chicago on the subject: "Was the Bolshevik Revolution Democratic?" Kerensky agreed with Shachtman—the leader of Trotskyism in the U.S.A.—that "the revolution itself was democratic, and the bolsheviks were able to seize power because they represented the

will of the Russian people". The Muscovite writer, Gorky, said: "Bolshevism is a purely Russian national phenomenon". For another example of co-operation between Russian communists and Russian white imperialists one may turn to the campaign by communist centres and White Russian emigration centres against the A. B. N. (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations), accusing them of being pro-Nazi and not genuinely hostile to the Communists. Such an argument may easily be demolished by an official Communist commentary on the A. B. N. The Czech Communist Party paper, *Rude Právo* on 19 February 1954, said, under the headline "Disintegration continues", that this group, which was working chiefly in the service of American imperialism, was trying to force the yoke of capitalism on the liberated nations! What can those Russian centres and those who abetted them say to this?

But to the question why British and Americans should rely on such circles for information and advice there appears to be no reply. How is the war against the Communists to be won if such information is accepted and such advice followed? *The extent of the inroads of Russian influence becomes increasingly clear, and the power of the Russian experts is strongly reinforced by American ignorance of problems within the U.S.S.R.* Especially is this ignorance striking in respect of Ukraine, for the Red and White menace combines to black out the Ukrainian nation and to ignore the dynamic centrifugal force in the U.S.S.R. that is Ukraine, with its economic potential, Western orientation, and centuries-long fight against Muscovy. Here is an ally for the free world in checking the scourge of Russian imperialism for ever.

In 1864, Michelet used words about Russia which have proved prophetic: "Be cautious; Russia is only exclusive, and only propaganda—".

And in her Christmas message, the young Queen Elisabeth II once said: "Above all we must keep that courageous spirit of adventure that is the finest quality of youth—and of those brave peoples who love freedom more than peace and regard slavery as their hardest torture..."

To return to the motto of this article, we find that another rhyme to "prayer" and "bear" is "beware"! That is the word we offer to the peoples of India as well as to the British and Americans. *Now is the time of extreme peril, the time of the truce of the Russian Bear. And within that peril lies the Red-White menace, the scourge of Russian imperialism.*

Racialism in Russian Communist Films

From the "International" to "God save the Tzar"

That which has no name does not exist for the masses. The Nazis propagated their theory of the superiority of the German race openly, and they are reproached for this by everyone. But the Russians, who have long been convinced of the superiority of their race and who have not spoken plainly about it—instead dressing it up in phrases of international and world mission—do not have racialism held against them except by very few. Yet in fact they possess the quality to a far greater degree than the Germans. After 1945, however, the U.S.S.R., carried away by the successes of World War II, put forward the concept of the "elder Russian brother" and launched extensive propaganda in the speeches of their political bosses, in the newspapers, and in films.

Looking through *Chosen Plays* of the Soviet Goskino for 1950 one finds patriotic films by A. Tolstoi, W. Petrov, P. Pawlenko and S. Eisenstein. The Bolsheviks were very anxious to revive Russian national patriotism—since the Communist version had failed to stir up the Russian masses—and they aimed to show them heroes, their own heroes and not a number of Stalins and Kaganoviches. These they found among the tzars.

For when the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party settled in the Kremlin, they felt quite at home, realising that Lenin and Stalin were of the same genre as their predecessors—Ivans, Alexanders, Peters—with their "opritchniks". Thus the Bolsheviks show them off in films and in novels with the intention of glorifying the dead tzars and in them the continuation of their deeds—theirself, the "supermen" of the superior Russian race.

Thus the above-mentioned films offer an inexhaustible source of information in the study of the psychology of the Russian people, including leaders and "supermen" and also the masses of the people.

In *Ivan the Terrible*, for instance, the author of the film revels in the excitement of showing an elaborate scene of the coronation of the tzar, Ivan, followed by his speech which is worded in a truly Communist manner: "On this day", proclaims the Tzar, "we are crowned to rule also those Russian lands which at present are temporarily under foreign rulers." And no sooner did he strengthen his position than he started to look around for what he could "liberate" to increase his possessions.

Ivan then proclaimed Moscow to be the Third Rome of which "...from today I shall be the only master, I alone..." Such is the ideology that the Russians have indulged in, trying to implant it in all their subjects.

Still more characteristic is the following scene: Instigated by a rival party of noblemen, the mob of Moscovites penetrates into the Tzar's palace. One of the leaders, Gregory, is pushed over by the guards. He is enraged, but, as he lifts his head, he suddenly springs to his feet and jumps back, impressed by what he sees: "the Tzar". At this point there is a producer's note: "Ivan does not move. All his will is concentrated in his look and under this look people fall to their knees." "He who is against the Tzar", threatens Ivan, "will have his head cut off according to the Tzar's Ukase." This is followed by another reaction of the crowd, the people murmur with approval and one young man is heard to say: "Well, our Tzar is very forceful. A tzardom without a whip is like a horse without a bridle." The miraculous effect of the whip on the Russian masses can be seen from the further development of the plot: the same rebel, Gregory, is appointed chief of the tzarist body-guard—a logical metamorphosis. Later on, after defeating a rebellion of Russian nobility ("bourgeoisie") this "people's" tzar organises a "crusade" to conquer the territory of the Kazan's Tartar Khan. With sadistic delight there are presented scenes of the insulting and torture of Tartar prisoners, and, after the surrender of Kazan, Ivan recites once more his "communist" programme: rule without a tyrant at the head would be nonsense; all trade must be concentrated in the hands of the tzar; nobility (i. e. the "bourgeoisie") is to be imprisoned; the land, if someone must possess it, may only be obtained for faithful services rendered to the tyrant.

Amongst other exaggerations, gross excess is shown in the scene in church, where, during a Holy Mass, Ivan shouts to the Metropolitan, "You lie!" and makes a disturbance, breaking the Censer, all this being presented with unmistakable sympathy for the wild man on the throne.

Finally comes the apotheosis—the victory of the tzar-Bolshevik over all the bourgeois of the time and the triumph of—one is tempted to say—Bolshevist rule in sixteenth century Moscow. The rule of this bloody despot is very much like the similar rule of Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchov. The Tzar "surrounds himself with new people, deeply indebted to him, he forms an iron ring of them around himself, of those people who have renounced family, clan, fathers and mothers, who know only the Tzar and carry out his will". Is this band of "opritchniks" not the proptotype of the Communist Party?

Another "superman", another tzar-Bolshevik, is depicted in the film *Peter I*. Here, as in the previous film, the heroes reveal life today in Soviet Russia, but this time they are dressed in German costumes. There is the same Russian "milieu". Tzar Peter indulges in drinking, has his fun, and...builds the Russian Empire. He takes as mistress a Baltic street girl captured in battle by the soldier Fedka, marries her, and enthrones her as Catherine I. And meanwhile the ordinary people are, in the manner of today, driven out to build the kingdom of the new Attila.

Here is the scene: S. Petersburg is built. Two of Peter's followers, Demidov and Shapirov, inspect the work. All round the miserable tents lie the sick and dying. Demidov, in passing, asks "Dying?" "Dying!" answers Shapirov with indifference. Both continue their inspection. One can imagine that Vorkuta actually inspired the making of this scene illustrating the growth of the Empire, historically accurate as it is.

For this barbarism is presented with a genuine sympathy for Peter I and not for the victims, among whom one can recognise Ukrainian Cossacks wearing their characteristic uniforms. For these the "heroes" of the film have only angry words, listened to with great enjoyment by the watching crowd.

The relation of Peter I to the Church is similar to that of Ivan the Terrible in the previous film. After the defeat of Narva, Peter summons everyone, including the monks, to arms and, in reply to their protest he gives the cynical answer, "I myself will pray

for all of you!" Yagushynski, one might say one of the Tzar's "People's Commissars", is made responsible for the enforcement of the order and any monk found loitering is to have his habit removed and be given fifty strokes.

Nor has he any consideration for his own son, whom he kills as Ivan the Terrible also did. It is even worse, because Ivan the Terrible killed his son in the excitement following a dispute, while Peter's act is premeditated, in cold blood. First he orders his men to insult him, later to murder him. Moreover, this barbarism has a genuinely Russian touch—the tears of the crocodile that cries whilst devouring its victim. Peter I asks his son to forgive him and, taking leave of the young man who is going to die by his order, declares he has no ill feeling for him, and kisses him with the kiss of Judas. No wonder, then, that, when guards take away the pregnant wife of the condemned man, he shouts after them, "You are not human beings, you are devils and wild beasts". In the film, however, approval is accorded to Peter I, and all his adversaries are condemned.

The relation of Peter I and other Russians to the outer world is utterly negative. In foreign countries they mock at everything—clothing, food, and so on. In order to glorify all that is Russian even historical personalities are shown in a false light. Mazeppa—in the film—is charged with having suggested to Charles XII that Peter I should be assassinated, to which Charles is said to have retorted that he was still a king and not an assassin. Historical nonsense!

And who has devised these nonsensical scenes? The producers of the Soviet films, the glorifiers of Bolshevism in practice. And the falsifications have all the same purpose—the exaltation of the Russian despots.

II

Not only tzars, but also their faithful followers—for instance Suvorov and Kutuzov—are presented in Soviet films as supermen. It goes without saying that Suvorov is shown as a hero and a victor. But such heroism is likely to arouse deep feelings of repulsion. Take, for example, the scene where an Italian town is surrendered to Suvorov. "The inhabitants", so goes the script, "dressed in their best, fall to their knees before Suvorov, while dozens of French flags are laid in the dust at his feet." This is the outstanding characteristic of the Russian mentality—not a trace of generosity.

Abuse of the vanquished, delight in his downfall, mockery of those whom, in their hearts, Russians know to be superior and more cultured than themselves. Here, in this psychology of the plebeian one must look for the sources and motives of the Russian Revolution.

In addition, all these exploits by the Russian "supermen" are pure fiction. All "Russian" historians and novelists show Suvorov and his army as victors in the Italian campaign against the French Revolutionary Army, at that time fighting Austria in Italy and Switzerland. Nevertheless this was not so. General Massena defeated Korsakov's expeditionary corps, and, when Suvorov crossed the Alps to come to his rescue, Massena defeated him too, so that he was obliged to take the defeated armies home. And this retreat of Suvorov from Italy is represented as a brilliant achievement. As the historical truth could not be completely concealed, the retreat is explained away by the "treason" of the allies (Austrians). Thus the Russians are enabled to remain heroes.

Another such "hero" is presented by W. Soloviov in the film *Kutuzow*. But whereas Suvorov is shown as quarrelsome and aggressive, in the *Kutuzow* film we are shown a sly fox who knows that he and his Russians cannot defeat Napoleon, and who, in this film as in the work of Leo Tolstoy, appears more like a caricature. In a speech in 1931, D. Manuilsky said: "Today we are not yet sufficiently strong to attack...To win, when the time comes, we need a factor of surprise. The bourgeoisie must be lulled to sleep, and in order to achieve this, we must start a great movement on behalf of world peace. Capitalistic countries are stupid and decadent; they will gladly help us in destroying themselves...As soon as they lower their guard, we shall destroy them with our clenched fist." This method, though modified somewhat, is also used by *Kutuzow* in the war against Napoleon. In one scene of the film the old *Kutuzow* is watching his small grandson fighting with a scare-crow that represents Napoleon.

Grandson Can you defeat Napoleon, Grandfather?

Kutuzow (pointing to the scare-crow) This one I can.

Grandson And the real one?

Kutuzow Well, perhaps I can't defeat him, but I could try to outwit him.

Thus the tactics advanced by Manuilsky are applied in the war of 1812, in the film, by *Kutuzow*, already beaten by Napoleon in Europe. Using trickery he intends to mislead Napoleon concerning

the route of his retreat; by trickery, he succeeds in convincing his army that he does not doubt he will be the victor, and, after his army has been defeated near Borodino, he makes a scape-goat of his predecessor, Barklay, accusing him of the wrong tactics himself. He also deceives Tzar Alexander and allows the partisans to falsify the signatures of French Marshals. The writer of the script tries to convince the public that the Borodino battle was won, although the contrary is the truth: Russian armies were defeated, and Moscow was abandoned to the enemy. In addition, he shows the faces of the French soldiers as "filled with terror", and so on.

Mocking at the enemy even for defeats he did not suffer, boasting of successes which were never achieved, deceiving one's own and all foreign people—such are the tactics of this Russian "hero" and of his followers.

What aim do such films pursue, if it is not to instigate a fire of national elation in the Russians, to plant it there, where the international—communist—elation died away, if it is not to use these heroes to arouse declining Russian patriotism? Suvorov instructs one of his men thus: "Take a hero as your example. Watch him, copy his behaviour, catch up with him, overtake him. You are a Russian, you are a favourite of Fortune".

But in vain we look among the Russians for a hero of the European type—as Jean d'Arc, Charles the Great, Napoleon, or Sviatoslav, Bayda Vyshnevetsky, Bohun and Khmelnytsky of Ukraine. The kind of hero in those Russian films is the Russian type—a mixture of the Russian forest hunter and the brutality and cynicism of a Ghenghis Khan. Such a hero is boastful, deceitful, lacking all noble impulses, and he has no reverence for human dignity either in himself or in anyone else. He is a worshipper of bare physical strength without regard for law or duty, a slave of the strong, an oppressor of the weak. The leading men of these films—Ivan and Peter—appear as despots oppressing millions of defenceless serfs of all classes who accept slavery as something quite normal. These despots, with the conviction of the superiority of the Russian race, are aggressors who only talk of patriotism while they think about increasing their possessions.

Were we to try and find a common denominator for these films, we should only find it in the words of the Russian poet who described Karamsin's *History of Russia* thus: "He proves clearly the necessity of the autocracy and the delight of the whip".

Our most important impression is that the portraits of the tzars and their followers in these films are in fact images of the red rulers in the Kremlin. The spirit of the Russian race does not change, and wherever in the films those Russian supermen appear, there every average Russian approves their "achievements" and sees in them his national heroes. One can see from these films as from Russian history itself, how the Revolution of 1917 started with "Down with the autocracy!" and ended with "Long live the autocracy!"—ended with the return of the old Russian, Muscovite, even the Suzdal, traditions.

The Russian press, Russian literature, Russian art—especially Russian drama and films, as well as Russian politics, all are set to one tune: We, the Russians, are a chosen race, a race of supermen. Our mission is to rule over foreign countries and over their gods. These gods and tribes, and, if need be, even millions of Russians themselves, are to be sacrificed to the Russian god when the majesty of our state requires this; for the state is almighty, all-seeing, and infallible.

"The Russian state and its cult," as V. Soloviov wrote, "was the only cult in Russia which knew no atheists." Along with it there flourished the cult of its priests, those "heroes", and on their deeds and their patriotism Russian leaders foster their people, imbuing them with the energy necessary to establish the Third Rome.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

In connection with the proclamation of the independence of Sudan on 1 January 1956, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Mubarak Zaruk, sent a message to the "Foreign Minister" of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic expressing the hope that he would take the necessary steps to establish diplomatic relations between their two countries. The "Foreign Minister" of Ukraine, L. Palamarchuk, replied with a mere greeting and no mention of diplomatic relations. Both letters were published in Moscow's *Pravda*.

Monica Furlong

IN EXILE

Reprinted from "TRUTH" Carteret Street, S.W. 1.,
23 December 1955, by kind courtesy of the Editor.

It was not much good trying to use a star as a clock in Ladbroke Grove, and besides the English would have thought them mad, all of them gazing up into that murky interrupted sky.

At home they would have waited at the door, shaved, washed, dressed in new clothes, alternately gay and solemn. The house would have been cleaned throughout and the table laid, and when the first star arrived over the cornfields they would have gone in to the fire and the feast of the Holy Evening. In England they agreed to start at five.

It was a marathon of a meal. They did not have all the twelve courses that were proper to the feast, but it was still a severe trial for the digestion. First Bohdan handed round the proskura, the same fine wheaten bread that the priest breaks to give to the faithful at the Communion. They spread their slices with honey and wished each other a happy Christmas. Then they went on to the borshch, and to warenniky, the little boiled turnovers filled with sauerkraut or cheese. Presently with their gaiety rising as the vodka lit a small summer flame in each of them, they got to the Holubci, the little pigeons made with flavoured rice and cabbage leaves that the children loved so much.

The eyes of the old Babusia went continually to the empty plate and the vacant chair left for the ghost. When the others were at Mass and when she and young Marijka were asleep, the family spirits would come, the spirits of those who were dead or far away; her husband Mychas who died of a heart attack just before they were due to leave the Ukraine; her daughter Darka who had gone to the United States and did not call herself a Ukrainian any more; her son Roman, whom the Party had taken and tortured and killed as casually as a child might destroy a fly. These would come and see the little cake of wheat left for them on the table and know that they were not forgotten.

The old woman's world had grown not bigger but smaller when, at sixty-eight, she had left the Ukraine for the first time and travelled across Europe to join her exiled son in England. Bohdan and his wife Hala had learned to speak English fluently, if inaccurately. Marijka, since she had started school, spoke English better than Ukrainian. But for the old woman it was too difficult to learn a new tongue, and before the perpetual gunfire of English she was dumb and terrified. In the last months she had found it harder to screw up her courage to leave the safety of their two rooms.

Bohdan and Hala belonged to the exiles' organisation, and argued endlessly over politics and international affairs. They hoped against reasonable hope for a miracle that would overthrow the Soviet Union and restore the Ukraine to independence. In his heart perhaps Bohdan expected to go on packing biscuits at Lyons for the rest of his life, but he spoke continually of his law practice, of friends that were still in the Ukraine, of all they would do when they returned. He was painstaking with little Marijka, making her talk in Ukrainian, telling her stories of Cossacks and of the feudal lords before the Cossacks, substituting folk-songs for the ones she learned at school.

But the old women knew she would never go back, and so she just fingered her memories.

One of them was a favourite with her. It had been at Epiphany seventy years ago, an iron-cold day in a bitter, frozen month. The boys had cut a cross rather lopsidedly out of ice and set it by the well. In the places where the hands would be if a man was really nailed there, shelves were cut in the ice and little red and blue lights were put in. The priest had come to bless the well and had bent down to blow gently on the water in imitation of the breath of God. There had been no wind and the priest did no more than blow very softly through the hole in his lips, but the water had rocked and slapped at the stones as if a bellows were being pumped over the priest's shoulder.

And then her father had taken some of the water and sprinkled everything, the doors and the windows, the stairs and the tables, the barns and the cattle. The Babusia remembered how the drops of water had tickled on her forehead. And she was pleased to think that God had touched her like this, and perhaps through her, her children after her.

TARAS SHEVCHENKO

Born 9 March 1814

Died 10 March 1861

Dedication*)

Songs of mine, O songs of mine
You're a worry to me.
Why do you stand out on paper
In sad rows before me?...
Why did not the wind remove you
To the steppe as dust?
Why did fate not overlay you
Like a mortal child?

For misfortune brought you to this world to mock you,
Tears have flowed... Why did they not drown you,
Wash you to the sea, or lose you in the field?
If so, people would not ask me of my pain,
Would not ask me why I curse my evil fate,
What I seek on earth? ... "No, there is naught to do."
There would be no mocking...

Oh, my flowers, children,
Why did I so love you, why did I caress you?
Is there one heart weeping so throughout the whole, wide
world,
As I have wept for you? ... Perhaps I should have felt it...

Mayhap somewhere is a maiden
With a heart and coal black eyes,
Who will weep above these songs —

* To the *Kobzar*, a collection of eight ballads published in 1840 which brought the poet immediate recognition. "Kobzar" means "Minstrel".

I can wish no more —
 Just one tear from those black eyes
 Lord of lords will make me.
 Songs of mine, O songs of mine!
 You're a worry to me.

* * *

For those loving coal black eyes,
 For the dear black brows,
 My poor heart has worked, has laughed,
 And has poured out verses,
 Poured them out the best it could,
 For the darksome nights,
 For the cherry orchard green,
 For a maiden's love,
 For the spacious steppes and tombs,
 That are in Ukraina,
 My poor heart was sad and would not
 Sing in foreign land,
 Would not 'mid the snow and forest
 Summon to a council
 All the forces of the Kozaks
 With their mace and banners!
 Let the spirits of the Kozaks
 Dwell in Ukraina.¹
 There it's broad and there it's cheerful
 Everywhere you wander.
 Like the freedom which has vanished
 Is the sea-like Dniپر.
 The broad steppe, the roaring rapids,
 And the tombs like mountains;
 There was born and there was nurtured
 All the Kozak freedom.
 With the szlachta and the Tartars
 It sowed all the meadows,

1. Shevchenko constantly varies between treating Ukraina as a word of three syllables, U-krai-na and one of four, U-kra-i-na — Tr.

Sowed the meadows with the corpses,
Till it wearied sowing.
Then it lay to rest, and straightway
Rose the lofty tomb,
And above it a black Eagle
Flies just as a sent'nel.
And about it to good people
Do the Kobzars sing.
And they sing just how it happened,
Beggars blind and poor,
For they know the way but I, I
Only know to weep.
I have only tears for Ukraine,
Since I lack for words,
And all evil — be it far!
Who has failed to know it!
And the man who looks unfeeling
At the souls of people,
May he suffer here in this world
And in that...

From sorrow

I will never curse my fortune,
Since I do not have it.
Let the evil live for three days,
I will keep them hidden,
Keep the great ferocious serpent
Right around my heart,
That my foes may never notice
How the evil smileth.
Let the song fly as a raven,
All around and call,
And my heart, a nightingale,
Warble on and weep
Quietly; men will not notice
And they will not mock it.
Do not wipe away my tears —
Let them flow in torrents
And besprinkle day and night
Foreign fields I know not
Till — until my eyes they cover

With a foreign dust.
So it may be! — What will follow?
Sorrow will not help me.
He who envies a poor orphan,
Punish him, O God!

* * *

Songs of mine, O songs of mine,
O my flowers, children,
I have reared you, have caressed you,
Whither shall I send you?
Go to Ukraina, children,
To our Ukraina,
Quietly, as little orphans,
Here — I'm doomed to perish.
There you'll find a loving heart
And a pleasant greeting,
There you'll find a purer truth
And perhaps some glory...
Welcome, O my darling mother,
Oh, my Ukraina,
Welcome my unthinking children
As your own dear child.

Translated by C. A. Manning

The Dniپر Roars

Moanfully roar the Dniپر's waters,
The stormy blasts in anger blow,
And lowly bend the weeping-willows,
And raise the billows row on row.
The silver moon is re-appearing
Among the clouds that swiftly fly,
Fast like a boat among the billows
From the deep hollows rising high.
The chanticleers are not yet crowing,
To greet the dawning of the day,
Only the owls are hooting weirdly
And yonder ash-trees harshly sway.

Translated by Honoré Ewach

I do not murmur at the Lord

I do not murmur at the Lord,
I do not murmur at a soul,
I fool myself in my despair
And sing as well.

For I will plough
My meadow, my poor, humble field,
This word of mine; a harvest rich
Will come some day from it.

I fool
Myself, my own poor, humble person
And no one else, as I can see.

Be thou ploughed, my humble meadow,
From the top to bottom.

Be thou planted, this black meadow
With the shining freedom.

Be thou ploughed, and well turned over,
Let the soil be levelled.

Be thou sown with seed most fertile,
Watered by good fortune.

Be thou turned in all directions,
Ever fertile meadow.

Be not sown with words unmeaning
But with reason, meadow.

Men will come to reap the harvest
In a happy moment —

Be well worked and be well levelled
Poor and barren meadow.

Do I not fool myself again
With this fantastic word of hope?
I do! But it is better far
To fool myself, my very self,
Than live at peace with my cruel foe
And vainly murmur at the Lord.

Translated by C. A. Manning*

* Professor Manning's translations are taken from *Taras Shevchenko: The Poet of Ukraine*, published 1945 by the Ukrainian National Association, Jersey City, New Jersey.

Prof. Dr. Vadym Shcherbakiwskyj

In honour of his eightieth birthday

Vadym Shcherbakiwskyj was born on 4 March 1876, according to the Julian Calendar, and thus his eightieth birthday falls on 17 March of this year. His birthplace was the village of Shpychyntsi, in the district of Kyiv, where his father was priest of the Orthodox Church. The Shcherbakiwskyj family was highly educated, his father being a well-known figure in the cultural circles of Kyiv, so that the son was habituated from childhood to intellectual companionship. At the same time the household lived in close harmony with the country people around Shpychyntsi who were accustomed to bring their problems and needs to their priest. During holidays from school, Vadym Shcherbakiwskyj did his full share of work in the fields, coming to know his own people intimately, and learning to revere and to recognise those basic values in everyday life from which seclusion too often shields the student.

As a boy, he attended Grammar School in Kyiv and Nizhyn, and looked forward to studying at the University of Kyiv. His intention was to study Archaeology, but there was no Faculty at Kyiv which included the subject and he therefore attended the University of Petersburg and later that of Moscow, reading Physics and Mathematics. During his fourth year, however, the police agent, Zubatowsky, informed maliciously against him, and he was sent back to his native village with orders to remain there for four years. During these four years he was under constant police supervision, and only at the end of them was he able to go to Kyiv University to graduate in Physics and Mathematics and finally to qualify for his Doctorate. He then entered another Faculty—that of History and Philology, and in 1901-2, for his second Doctor's degree, wrote the book *Ukrainian Wooden Churches*. It was in lecturing on this book at the Congress of



Professor Dr. Vadym Shcherbakiwskyj in 1954.

Katerynoslav in 1905 that he established his name as a scholar, and commenced acquaintanceships that were of the utmost value to him in his subsequent academic career.

With his knowledge and understanding of both town and country folk, it was inevitable that the serious young student should have a strong influence upon those among whom he lived. Ukrainian social and cultural interests seldom coincide with those of Russia, and it was plain to the authorities that Shcherbakiwskyj's personality and the direction of his researches were no asset to the Russian regime. In May 1907 he was arrested and kept in prison until Christmas of that year. He was then taken on the first stage of a journey to the Crimea, where the authorities intended to keep him, but one of the professors he had met at the Katerynoslav Congress managed to gain permission for him to leave the country, provided he did so within three days. In December, accordingly, he was brought back to Kyiv, which he left at once and travelled to Lviv, which was then under Austrian rule.

The Austrian government was more tolerant towards the Ukrainian population within the Empire than was the Russian, mainly because Ukrainian influence offset Polish, and prevented the Polish upper classes from becoming too powerful. Professor Shcherbakiwskyj stayed three years in Lviv, during which he held a post at the Metropolitan Sheptytsky's Museum. Here he was able to indulge his love of the arts, and to give rein to his archaeological curiosity. For, on behalf of the Museum, which was one of the main organs of the rapidly growing awareness of the richness of Ukrainian culture, he travelled widely in the country and collected specimens, works of art, pictures and prints of old churches.

In 1876 the Russian government, alarmed at the growth of Ukrainian national feeling, had passed a law forbidding the publication of any book, pamphlet or paper whatsoever in the Ukrainian language in Russian occupied Ukraine. However, in the early years of the present century, books and periodicals in West Ukraine were being increasingly published in Ukrainian, and these had of course never been read in Central and Eastern Ukraine. Professor Shcherbakiwskyj, for his part, wrote many articles for the journals published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, his subjects including "Wooden Churches in Ukraine", "Architecture of other Nations in Ukraine", "The Churches of Boykivshchyna" and "The Ukrainian Arts".

He returned to Kyiv in 1911 and the following year was appointed Director of the Archaeological and International Department of the City Museum. Now he was able to commence serious research in Archaeology, and while in Kyiv he organised the excavation of 600 sites in the Kherson, Kyiv and Poltava regions.

In 1917, following the Revolution in Russia, the independence of the Ukrainian nation was restored, and in the tense events of the four following years Professor Shcherbakiwskyj played an active part. When, after the bitter struggles of the newly established state to maintain its autonomy against the three-sided attacks converging on the country, Ukraine was again occupied by Russia, this time under the Bolsheviks, the Professor was obliged to leave his country once more, and in 1922 he went to Prague.

But if we should ask why he left Ukraine, the answer would not be merely that he went as a political refugee. A far more serious purpose lay in this trained scholar's mind. For, during his early years in his village, he had often spoken with the pilgrims that passed through on their way to Kyiv from many remote parts of Ukraine. And they had told him about the beautiful pictures in their own churches, as well as about the treasures of Kyiv. They had described the fine buildings they had seen on their journey, and as they spoke, the national love and pride in their hearts had found its echo in him, so that he remembered what they told him, storing up the knowledge until he could himself contrive to enjoy those artistic delights for himself. Later on, after his years in Russia, when he returned to Kyiv University, he enquired about those Ukrainian pictures and churches from his Professors. But to his amazement, they could tell him nothing about them. This ignorance on the part of cultured and experienced men struck him as strange, and, with a sound instinct, he began to accept such suspicions as existed that there lay a whole world of information and fact with regard to his native country which was in some way and by some malicious agency concealed from him. The suspicion grew, and his researches in the Poltava county together with what he had seen of Ukrainian culture in Galicia, at last enabled him to challenge the view that the prehistory of Ukraine and Russia was identical, as had been taught him in both Kyiv and the two Russian universities. It must be remembered that at this time, history was taught entirely from the Russian point of view, and the circular issued in 1863 to the effect that no Ukrainian language had ever existed nor did in fact exist, that "Ukrainian" was "bad

Russian spoilt by Polish influence" typified the kind of education that the young people of the Tzarist empire were permitted to receive.

Visits in 1908-10 to Italy and Austria had shown him that there might be more opportunity to consult independent sources outside his own country, and Prague seemed to offer the best prospects. His exile in the West thus held some advantage for him.

In 1922 Vadym Shcherbakiwskyj was asked to lecture, as Professor, at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague which endured until 1945. He was not ambitious for himself, nor did he care about "success" in the official meaning of the word. Ever mindful of the darkness shrouding the origin of his country, he became ambitious for her name and was always ready to undertake any tasks, however humble, that would contribute to the establishment of her intellectual position in the world. Ukraine's history and culture were thus over-riding interests for him. He felt impelled to help his people from abroad, especially during the terrible famine of 1921-22. At that time some foodstuffs were delivered in Ukraine by the American Relief Association and Dr. Nansen's organisations; but this material aid was inadequate, and did little to bring the size and nature of the Ukrainian problem home to the governments of Europe and America.

During these years the Professor's research succeeded in establishing beyond the possibility of doubt the archaeological and ethnological fact that Ukraine had developed in complete independence of "Russia" the name later taken by the small Muscovite state unheard of when Ukraine—as Kyiv-Rus—was a flourishing medieval kingdom, the foremost Christian state in Eastern Europe. Every opportunity of spreading his knowledge of Ukraine's prehistory and her important legacy of pre-Christian tradition and culture was taken by the Professor. He travelled extensively in Europe, lecturing in Sweden, Germany, France, in Belgium and Holland, on a wide range of subjects, a few of which were: "The Hallstatt culture in Ukraine"; "Contemporary pottery painting by the Ukrainian peasant"; "Research into the prehistory of Ukraine"; "A palaeolithic site in Honci"; "Pontine Art"; "Vestiges of pagan religion in Ukraine"; "The Decoration of Ukrainian Easter Eggs and their origin". He also attended many international congresses in Warsaw, Sofia, Brussels, Paris and other cities, and became a Titular Member of the International Institute of Anthropology.

In his work in Prague he collaborated closely with the Czech Professors, Albin Stotski and Niederle, both archaeologists, and the Ukrainian, Professor S. Smal-Stoc'ki, whose son is now Professor in an American University. Prof. Kolessa, Prof. D. Antonovych, and Dr. Matyushenko, well-known Ukrainian scholars, were also in Prague and concerned to further to their utmost the cause of Ukrainian learning and intellectual achievement in every possible sphere.

As he spent year after year in his university work and in lecturing in Western Europe, he was able to see the extent to which Western political and cultural circles, so far from knowing the truth about the separate origins and subsequent history of Muscovite Russia and of Ukraine, had imbibed the official teaching of Tzarist propagandists and regarded "Russia" as a progressive modern power deserving of high praise. He found that the leaders of the Bolshevik revolution were, in some countries, thought of almost as "saints" who had "liberated" their "enslaved people". Apart from the necessity of putting Ukraine "on the map" in her rightful place, therefore, there was the additional and in some ways more formidable task of assisting those antagonistic to Bolshevism to enlighten the rest of the Western people as to the true state of affairs within the Soviet Union. And even if people were ready to accept in their minds the facts of Bolshevik terror and destruction, they were certainly not prepared to take any action against them.

After the Second World War, in 1946, Professor Shcherbakiwskyj left Prague for Munich, where he organised a new Ukrainian Free University to carry on the functions of the one in Prague, now overshadowed by the Soviet Union. He was Professor of Archaeology and a Director of the University during the years 1946-7. In 1951 he was invited to come to London by the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain; and now every day he may be seen on his way to the British Museum Library, still pursuing those studies that have occupied his whole life, and proved so great a tribute to his country.

The Professor has numbered many Ukrainians, well-known in archaeology, ethnology and the arts, among his friends. In particular there was the outstanding figure in the modern period of Ukrainian music, Mykola Lysenko (1842-1912), who lived in Kyiv; also the musician Kryduwsky; the historian and archaeologist, Professor W. Antonovych, of Kyiv; Rylski, father of the poet; and

mention should also be made of the choreographer, Werchovynets, of Poltava.

Music, and especially opera, has been a life-long pleasure of the Professor. He is an authority on Ukrainian embroidery and also on pictures, having a thorough knowledge of the schools of European painting. In the course of his researches, he has built up a wide knowledge of Ukrainian traditions and customs, which vary from region to region, and which reflect the remarkable vitality of the Ukrainian character.

The Professor's most important works are: *The Ukrainian Home*, which is not yet published; *The Shaping of the Ukrainian Nation*; and over sixty published papers and articles, all of which are works of scholarship. In addition, he has written many literary articles and memoirs.

Vadym Shcherbakiwskyj has throughout his life applied the open, tolerant mind of the scholar to the human kaleidoscope before him. He has adhered strictly to the Christian principles jealously guarded by Ukraine through the centuries, and has always met his friends, acquaintances and students with a ready sympathy and a quick understanding of their interests and their aspirations. As Professor he gave unstintingly of his time to his students, and thanks to him many young people were enabled to graduate.

If he should be asked whether he had attained his dearest aim, the Professor would confess that he had obtained what he most desired: penetration of the darkness that had surrounded the origin of his own people, and the complete vindication of Ukraine's claim to independence of nationhood, of mentality, of race and of culture. There will be difficulties, he will admit, in establishing this claim in the eyes of the world; there will be many hardships to undergo; but in the end, the steadfast endurance of a fine, Christian culture, and the innate moral strength of the Ukrainian people, assisted by an essentially Western outlook, will ensure a place for Ukraine in the foremost rank of the European community of nations.

I. F.

BOOK REVIEW

THE BLACK DEEDS OF THE KREMLIN

A White Book. Vol. I.: *Book of Testimonies*. Toronto, 1953, the Basilian Press, printed for the Ukrainian Association of Victims of Russian Communist Terror, XIV, 546 pp.

The title of this collection of anti-Soviet documents may well be described as rather misleading, since the book deals exclusively with the crimes committed by Soviet Russia against the Ukrainians and not with the political misdeeds of Bolshevism as a whole. The book is prefaced by the editor-in-chief, S. Pidhayny, who fittingly stresses that most of the testimonies published in this work have been furnished by people who "were or are peasants, farm labourers, workers, or clerks. Now in a free country they relate their stories of life under the Soviet regime truthfully and simply. They have written their testimonies so that the world might learn not about their past experiences, but also about the similar fate meted out to thousands of their fellow countrymen who had remained in the U.S.S.R. They wrote it in order to warn others, farmers and workers like themselves, not to be misled by communist propaganda". At the same time, however, S. Pidhayny admits quite openly that "the book itself is motley and uneven: the editor's aim has been to preserve as much as possible the original ideas and expressions of the contributors". This would indeed be a most admirable aim, but, unfortunately, the above statement does not apply to the actual tendency noticeable throughout the entire book. Several testimonies have been given a definitely novelistic character, and there is danger of the majority of readers accepting them as purely literary articles, namely as "fiction" (this applies for instance to M. Lazorsky's "The Ship Sails Slowly Away" and to F. Yakymenko's "Where Is My Bread?"), a fact which is likely to detract from the credibility of the entire compilation; and all the more so as no exact dates are given for various incidents mentioned in some of the testimonies (as for example in F. Fedorenko's "Disappeared Without Trace". Moreover, it is extremely regrettable that some of the contributions resemble in style a political leader, and can, therefore, hardly be designated as personal "testimonies"; this applies in particular to most of J. Bahryany's "I Accuse" and to the whole of his contribution entitled "Does The World Hear?". The Editorial Board (of which, besides S. Pidhayny, Prof. I. Sandul and Prof. A. Stepovy were also members) was not too exact when it came to the meaning of the word "testimonies", as can incidentally be seen from the peculiar subtitle of the book, namely "Vol. I.: Book of Testimonies"; for what, indeed, is a "White Book", compiled on the pattern of the publication of diplomatic documents, to contain if not "testimonies"? In addition, the editors for some obscure reasons or other—despite the fact that there are more than enough competent eye witnesses amongst the emigrants—have here and there chosen to substitute "summaries" for direct testimonies on certain questions, as for instance in the case of Yar Slavutych's "Russian Communist

Practice—Genocide on Ukrainian Writers”, P. Wolyniak’s “The Execution of the Artists”, and “The Ukrainian Catholic Church and Communism” (taken from the collection of documents entitled *First Victims of Communism*, published in Rome in 1953). All three “summaries” are certainly excellent, but they break up the general structure of the work as a whole and cannot be regarded as genuinely authentic.

The actual subject-matter of the book is divided up according to the following seven chapters: 1. Concentration Camps, Prisons, and Justice in Communist Russia; 2. Camps of the Deportees; 3. Collectivisation, Liquidation of Kurkul (i. e. the Ukrainian “Kulak”—V. D.) Class and Famine; 4. The Struggle for the Independence of Ukraine, and Liquidation of the Ukrainian Intellectuals; 5. Graves of Mass Murder Victims; 6. The Russian Communist Dictatorship in Practice; 7. Persecution of Religion in the U.S.S.R. (actually this chapter deals exclusively with events in Soviet Ukraine—V. D.).

It cannot be denied that the title of Chapter 6 is not in keeping with a logical division of the subject-matter into the various chapters, since it might just as well be used as the subtitle for the whole book; indeed, this chapter contains no testimony which could not have been included in some other chapter. Even more serious than this formal error is the unequal manner in which various sections are dealt with, due to a lack of general information on the subjects concerned; for example there are no testimonies dealing with the discrimination and disadvantages to which Ukrainians have been subjected in the Soviet Army, despite the fact that the editors could have found plenty of interesting material on this subject in an article by I. M. published in the Munich journal, *Visti Bratstva Kol. Vojakiv* 1. UD UNA (1952, Nos. 12-36).

The English translation by A. Oreletsky and O. Prychodko of the original Ukrainian testimonies is on the whole reliable, though, of course, not entirely free from errors. We are justified in criticising the peculiar fact that the names of the contributors and translators are transcribed according to a different system than are all the remaining Ukrainian names, and this, of course, inevitably leads to considerable confusion.

But apart from faults which apply mainly to the order and documentary value of the compilation, the book is undoubtedly one of the most outstanding works to have ever been published on the subject of the concrete facts of Soviet Russian tyranny in the non-Russian countries of the U.S.S.R. The authenticity of the eye witness testimonies—if one disregards their occasional “belles-lettres” style—cannot be doubted; and the great variety of reports compiled is amazing. The fact that the majority of witnesses are not literary men and women and that their testimonies are thus very different in style—ranging from purely documentary reports to memoirs with a personal touch—certainly has its good points, for in this way the book caters for readers of various grades of education and taste; furthermore, the great variety of the testimonies, both in style and manner, clearly brings out the hatred harboured by all classes of the non-Russian population against the Soviet Russian Occupation regime.

In an “Introduction” to the reports, Professor George W. Simpson (University of Saskatchewan), a prominent authority on and opponent of Bolshevism and a sincere friend of the peoples subjugated by Bolshevism,

stresses that "the particular Ukrainian aspect of Soviet oppression has been deliberately minimised or overlooked" in the Western world: "The Ukrainians were the first non-Russian people to feel the terror and oppression directed from Moscow. That persecution has never ceased." Professor Simpson expresses the hope that "a living, suffering, dynamic people, reflected in their narratives, should not be forgotten by those who think in terms of abstract principles and systems, or by those excessively prudent folk who seek to gain ultimate stability by sacrificing basic principles of humanity and justice.—Thus it will be well worth while for busy and practical people to re-vivify their memory by reading this direct, human documentation of Soviet horror and persecution".

In agreeing unanimously with the thoughts expressed by this outstanding Canadian authority we should like to recommend this excellent volume of documentary reports to all those who are interested in the tragic fate of the Ukrainian people, and should also like to appeal to all our Ukrainian readers to do their utmost to promote the circulation of this book in the Anglo-Saxon world.

V. Derzhavyn



EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT

MICHAEL JEREMIJEW AND GONZAGUE DE REYNOLD

Michael Jeremijew, who was Deputy Director of Studies at the Ukrainian Technical and Economic Institute at Podebrady, Czecho-Slovakia, between the wars, has contributed an article to the symposium, *Gonzague de Reynold*, published in honour of the 75-year old Swiss historian in 1955. Professor Jeremijew pays tribute to the fame attained by de Reynold in his life-time, and to his remarkable vision and impartiality as a historian.

He has also written a short paper, *Quelques aspects du monde russe*, with particular reference to the last volume of de Reynold's latest work *The Formation of Europe* which is entitled *The Russian World*. Commenting on the use here of the name "Russian", Jeremijew points out that since Peter I ordained that the name of Muscovy should be changed and replaced by "Russia"—the name of the ancient Ukrainian state of Kyiv-Rus—historians had had difficulty in finding a suitable word to denote the peoples living within the Empire of the Tsars. Even Voltaire had had to explain that he used the name "Russia" for the inhabitants of this Empire; and the West had fallen into the mistake of regarding these inhabitants as indeed "Russian" which they were not. And yet, he continues, this use of the name "Russia" has only become more confused in our own day. For certain of the peoples of the Russian Empire had recovered, for varying periods, their independence and had sent diplo-

matic representatives to the capitals of Western Europe and elsewhere. The ukase of the Soviet government in 1922 suppressing the name "Russia" except as applied to the Russian Socialist Federative Republic—i. e. Muscovy—had passed without notice from the rest of the world.

Professor Jeremijew then gives a short summary of the four periods distinguished by de Reynold in "Russian" history: the Kyiv-Rus period, that of Suzdal-Vladimir-Moscow, of S. Petersburg, and of Soviet Moscow, each being of distinctive character, and each supplanting the former. And the differences which made their appearance as a result of the destruction of the former one must not be overlooked: for instance, it was after the fall of Kyiv that the Orthodox Church, hitherto closely linked with Byzantium, lost its evangelical character and tended towards the secularism of Muscovy. The Muscovite church thus broke away from its parent church of Kyiv-Rus, which preserved its independence in religious matters. In the seventeenth century the Metropolitan Silvester of Kyiv refused to approve the Treaty of Pereyaslav, which was to have so disastrous an effect on the history of the Ukrainian people. In spite of persecution, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church maintained its own religious character and in 1918 re-established its status of Autocephalic at a congress of the Ukrainian clergy.

The point is well made in the paper that the distinguished Swiss historian has not been misled by current habits of speech and thought in assessing the importance of the history of Ukraine in Eastern Europe. To a freedom-loving people, the story of Mazeppa has made a sufficiently wide appeal to ensure that Swiss scholars both studied and wrote about the circumstances which gave rise to this famous Ukrainian Hetman, and it would add greatly to the security of the West if more attention were paid to the actual historical evidence available on "Russian" affairs.

In this connection it is interesting to read that Jeremijew was introduced to de Reynold at the end of the war, when the historian was about to complete his great book. De Reynold agreed to make a number of corrections in the text, and, in certain instances, to make major alterations which brought the work nearer to modern conceptions of history, and contributed to its impartiality. De Reynold, through this collaboration, became acquainted with Ukrainian history in more detail, and learnt of the main trends in Ukrainian historical thought.

It is noteworthy that de Reynold, who is a practising Catholic, should have paid considerable attention to the fate of the Orthodox Church in Kyiv-Rus, which followed the fate of that ancient state, and had its authority transferred to Moscow. The Orthodox Church of Kyiv-Rus was founded upon connections with Byzantium, and in later centuries turned towards Western Europe and its more settled cultures. It was when Muscovy, which again and again has been subjected to the ideas of Asia, finally, as the seat of the Bolshevik government, superseded the "Russia" of S. Petersburg, that disaster was spelled for Europe.

* * *

"A SMILING STALIN"

Under this title, the *U.S. News and World Report* of 16 December 1955 published a study of Khrushchov through the eyes of a Ukrainian, Mr. J. Gudim-Levkovich, at one time a leading agricultural expert in Ukraine.

Mr. Gudim-Levkovich first met Khrushchov in 1938, when the latter, as Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, had charge of all Ukrainian affairs. Khrushchov might be said to be a pupil of Stalin, fully endorsing his methods, but doing so with a smile—hoping thereby to gain his ends the more effectively. Khrushchov is also more subtle in his use of power; he does not favour mass purges, since these tend to injure administrative efficiency, but he liquidates his supposed opponents a few at a time, which keeps people in constant fear, and enables him gradually to surround himself with trusted supporters.

Khrushchov, though "simple and plain in his outward appearance and in his speech", is "really very smart and shrewd". He is aggressive and yet is well able to cultivate the acquaintance of those he wishes to use. He is patient and can wait for his chance to rid himself of an enemy. It was he who carried out the scorched earth policy in Ukraine as the Germans advanced—he it was, too, who ordered the destruction of Kyiv.

Khrushchov had a primary school education and worked as a miner in the Donetz basin. He later went to evening classes, later still attended an industrial academy in Moscow. He always took pains to educate himself, especially as regards technicalities. He has an excellent memory and retains all that is said to him.

So far as is known, Khrushchov was married, but his wife was deported in 1938 and is rumoured to be still in prison. It is suggested that this event may have been a tactical move on the part of Stalin to appease the peasants of Ukraine, enfuriated as they were by the purges of 1938.

For, when appointed to Ukraine in 1938 to replace Kosior, who had been purged, Khrushchov had continued the purge, and Khatayevich was probably executed on his order. Khatayevich was well educated and popular in Ukraine; he had been second secretary of the C.P. Central Committee in Ukraine and might have been a serious rival to Khrushchov. As he proceeded with the purge, Khrushchov appointed his own followers—for instance, Korotchenko, Korniets and Butenko—to fill the places of those liquidated.

As regards Khrushchov's methods of administration, Mr. Gudim-Levkovich recalls that early in 1939 he found that an error of judgment had been made in planning for one district. The result was that stock had been increased far beyond the point where it could be fed, and almost half had died during the winter. Mr. Gudim-Levkovich wrote confidentially to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian C. P. to report on the situation, addressing the letter to Khrushchov. Khrushchov then sent for him, asking him many questions about the district and as to how he had collected his facts. But he did not change the livestock programme: he said that had been determined by the plan and that the difficulty would compel the farmers to produce more fodder. Probably he argued that if the farmers were forced to feed their livestock on grain and vegetables intended for their own consumption then

hunger would drive them to increase the fodder output. Khrushchov, however, would proceed with a plan no matter how people might be effected by it in practice.

Again, after the pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany in 1939 Stalin issued a directive that Jews were not to occupy important positions. Khrushchov then found he had to remove Jewish party secretaries from their posts, but he did not have an open purge. He was diplomatic over this question, finding excuses to move such secretaries into other jobs.

But when, at the end of the war, the Russians re-entered Ukraine, Khrushchov directed a ruthless purge of all those suspected of aiding the Germans or of being anti-Communist. At first he declared an amnesty, since many of the persons concerned were needed for the administrative machine. But as soon as government control was restored, he ordered their liquidation, and they were shot or deported without appeal.

Thus we see a man who is clever, resourceful, shrewd, forceful, unscrupulous and modelled on Stalin. Humanity does not exist for such a man except as a sort of productive machine which will minister to the future world-domination of Russia. Mr. Gudim-Levkovich first became doubtful about the party line during the time of the compulsory collectivisation in Ukraine. There were more than 1,100 insurrections among the peasants in Ukraine, and Mr. Gudim-Levkovich was personally involved in one of these, seeing for himself the extremes of hatred and violence to which the oppressed peasants were driven. As an agricultural writer during the time of the famine he could hardly fail to note the true facts of that disastrous year of 1933. In 1941 Mr. Gudim-Levkovich ended all connection with the Soviet Union and has since worked for the U.S. Army and the Department of State. He is engaged now in writing a book about his life under the Communist regime.

* * *

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO HIS EXCELLENCY
PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK BY MR. JAROSLAW STETZKO
OF THE ANTI-BOLSHEVIK BLOC OF NATIONS
AND THE PRESIDENT'S ANSWERS THERETO**

(1) Q: Do you share the opinion which the majority of responsible politicians in the west seem to hold, namely, that the Soviets have abandoned their plans to rule the whole world?

A: No matter how the Russian imperialists change their diplomatic tactics, their basic objective of world conquest will never change. The so-called "Geneva spirit" created by the four power summit conference last July completely vanished after the conference of the four powers' foreign ministers in November. The recent visit of Bulganin and Khrushchov to India and Burma brought the Soviet "smiling diplomacy" to an end, and since then Russia has put on her ferocious look once again.

(2) Q: Do you think that the coexistence policy is a practicable means of preventing an atomic war?

A: By "peaceful coexistence" the Russian imperialists mean a kind of coexistence of master and slave. For anyone to seek "coexistence" with them is to surrender to them without a fight. "Coexistence" of the Russian type will not prevent any atomic war, unless we take it to mean collective surrender on the part of all non-Communist countries.

(3) Q: Do you not think it would be possible to put an end to Bolshevik tyranny and thus to avert an atomic war by means of national revolution, supported by the West, in the Soviet sphere of influence?

A: This is the only course which the anti-Communist world should follow. But of course, success will have to depend on the extent of Western support.

(4) Q: Which policy would you suggest to the statesmen of the Western world in order to check the advance of Russian imperialism and to liberate all the nations that have been subjugated by Russia?

A: All that has to be done is to put President Eisenhower's liberation policy into practice.

(5) Q: What is your opinion of the military and political situation in the U.S.S.R.?

A: Russia's military power far exceeds her political power. The maintenance of the latter entirely depends upon the existence of the former. Russia's ultimate aim is to conquer the whole world. She has been building up her own military strength and that of her satellities. This military strength constitutes a grave menace to the free world. The free world must, therefore, be on the alert and must not underestimate the military strength of the Communist world. Russia is a totalitarian state, with a reign of terror. There exists strong resentment among the people against the Kremlin rulers. As internal conflicts also exist, Russia is politically weak. The free world, therefore, must not overestimate her political strength.

(6) Q: Do you think the assumption correct, that the Soviets have resorted to their coexistence policy under pressure of the national urge for freedom of the subjugated nations and under pressure of the economic crisis and the unsettled conditions in the Kremlin?

A: Your assumption is correct, but there are still other factors. Russia has a lot of troubles, both internal and external, to tackle at present. She has to change her tactics in order to get a breathing space. The moment she overcomes her troubles she will change her tactics again. Her present tactics aim at splitting the free world and encouraging appeasement.

(7) Q: What is your opinion of the present situation in Asia in view of the Russo-Red Chinese coexistence policy?

A: Russia, according to her present global strategy, is putting herself on the defensive in the West but, through her Chinese stooges, takes up the offensive in the East. For this reason the Russians might slow down their advances in Europe for the time being. In Asia, however, in spite of their vapid talks of "coexistence", the Chinese Communists will not hesitate to start further aggression whenever they have a chance. The democracies must, therefore, strengthen their mutual defence in Asia.

(8) Q: What is your opinion of the significance of the national liberation movements behind the Iron Curtain, in the world-wide fight against Bolshevism?

A: The national liberation movements behind the Iron Curtain are extremely important to the world-wide anti-Communist struggle. To destroy Communism, two forces must closely cooperate: the democratic forces on this side of the Iron Curtain and the anti-Communist forces on the other. The anti-Communist forces on the other side of the Iron Curtain must, on their part, pivot on the national liberation movements of their respective countries. It is most important that such national liberation movements be given outside support.

(SIGNED)

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

December 1955.

* * *

TAIPEI DECLARATION

On 23 January 1954, 22,000 Chinese and Korean anti-Communist ex-P.O.W.s of the Korean war were finally released, after undergoing innumerable hardships. Their freedom was the result of the determination of the United Nations to implement the principle of voluntary repatriation of P.O.W.s. To commemorate this anti-communist victory, the Chinese and Korean people have agreed to regard 23 January every year as Anti-Communist Freedom Day.

This decision is set out in a Declaration issued by Civic bodies of the Republic of China at a mass rally held at Taipei to celebrate the first anniversary of this Day. The Declaration expresses concern at the growing menace to the freedom of the democratic peoples, exposed as they are to the subtle intrigues and deceitful policies of Soviet Imperialists and Chinese Communists alike, who aim to disintegrate the fighting powers of the free nations "without firing a shot", while at the same time they hasten to prepare for an attack on the islands held by National China.

The Declaration further sets out the objectives of the anti-Communist struggle, which should commence with the liberation of the remaining allied prisoners of war, continue with the liberation of the Chinese mainland, and then concern itself with the liberation of the 800 million people shut away behind the Iron Curtain.

In conclusion, the Declaration points out that freedom is and must be "indivisible"—half the world cannot be free and the other half enslaved. Either freedom or slavery must be chosen by all—"there is neither a third middle road, nor the remotest possibility of peaceful coexistence with the aggressors". "We pledge ourselves," declare the members of the civic bodies, "to work for closer unity and to make greater efforts in the future. By appealing to the United Nations, and particularly to the United States as the leading nation of the free world, to stand firmly against Communist aggression, and by rallying all the forces that stand for right and justice throughout the whole world, we shall make use of popular strength behind the Iron Curtain to pull it down and overthrow the Communist regimes."

Professor E. S. Kirby, Dean of the Economics Department of Hongkong University, has visited China at the invitation of the People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. His report was given jointly to the United States' Association and the University's Economics Society on 9 January 1956 and extracts are published in *Free China Information* (62 New Cavendish Street, W. 1.). The following are points of particular interest:

"Professor Kirby estimates that this particular trip cost China about £5,000, and officials had informed him that about 3,000 other people had been on this sort of tour this year. It followed that the People's Republic had laid out in 1955 about £750,000 or HK\$ 12,000,000 on this type of propaganda alone.

"Professor Kirby said he had lost a small amount of sleep (as a conscientious economist) wondering what they expected to get out of it in return...

"...It was impressed upon the travellers very many times, that the Chinese people want friendliness with all nations and peoples; and above all peace, peace.

"It was useless to point out to them that this was quite a world wide feeling, these days, not least among the British. Their fixed belief was that such an outlook was safely established only in the Soviet Union and in the "other People's Democracies".

"...he had not hesitated to comment that there were a great many soldiers about in China. In fact, he had rarely seen so large a number of soldiers anywhere. They were more frequently seen than the most common of all the slogans "Peace ten thousand years". The next most common slogan was "We shall certainly liberate Taiwan".

"Other untouchable dogmas were that the sole measure of progress was industrialisation, and that the large scale—in industry or agriculture—is ipso facto more efficient and more productive than the small scale. To suggest otherwise was treated not merely as heretical or illogical, but as incomprehensible. Other absolute beliefs were, of course, that there was nothing good or hopeful in the China of the preceding regime, that everything had improved since the Liberation; that foreigners in China, especially Americans, had never done any good in that country, and had been actuated by low motives; that conditions in Taiwan were self-evidently worse than those on the Mainland.

"The danger of all this, Professor Kirby thought, was that anti-foreign feeling and action could in effect be aroused at any time..."

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

MEN OF STEEL

AN AUSTRIAN, REPATRIATED FROM SIBERIA, REPORTS ON HIS
FRIENDSHIP WITH UKRAINIAN PRISONERS

"Yes, he is tall, a little lame, with but one eye, grey-haired, but yet a fine-looking man."

From this description it is at once evident to us that this Austrian, newly returned from Siberia, had actually been with Dr. V. Horbovy in the Muscovite forced labour camps.

"I was arrested by the Bolsheviks," he went on, "in Austria in 1950, and was sent to Aleksandrovsk, near Lake Baykal, on a charge of spying for America. It was there that I met Dr. Horbovy. He was in a concentration camp in Taishet, which lies halfway between Krasnojarsk and Irkutsk, but for some 'delinquency' he was transferred to Aleksandrovsk. There I was with him for five months. Afterwards he was sent back to Taishet, and is still there, being sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment."

"How does he live?" we asked, and the Austrian gave a wry smile. "As one does in a Soviet concentration camp," he said. "And yet the Doctor is in good spirit like the other Ukrainians with me in camp. They are men of true steel. Death holds no terrors for them: on the contrary, it is Death who retreats in fear before their courage. I came to love Ukrainians as my own people, and I gave my word that when freed I would go to them, to those people who think and who fight as these friends of mine are doing in those far-off Siberian concentration camps."

The Austrian paused, then he smiled. "You see," he said, "I have just remembered a joke which I heard from Ukrainians. They used to laugh when they gave me greetings for you, because they could not believe I might be freed, and one Ukrainian said: 'A prisoner was brought to a certain prison, and his companions in the cell began at once to give him messages to take to their relatives when he was free again. 'Yes, good,' answered the newcomer, 'but I have been sentenced to 20 years.' 'Even so,' rejoined a prisoner, 'you will come out first, for I am sentenced for life!'"

"You ask how I lived in prison. I made friends with the Ukrainians because they are the best friends. I took part in their Christmas Eve, and we had 'Kutia' together—the traditional Christmas meal. We sang Christmas carols. Sometimes we had the chance of reading Soviet newspapers, various books, even a Soviet edition of "Kobzar" (A complete edition of the poems of the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko), which my Ukrainian friends told me was falsified. As to the food in the prison, we received 550 grammes of bread, 9 grammes of sugar, 150 grammes of 'Kasha' cabbage and boiled water twice a day.

"The whole prison was divided into brigades, which consisted of 30-40 people. The heads of the brigades were Russian prisoners. Sometimes the prisoners killed them because of their tyranny. 60 per cent of the prisoners were Ukrainians, and these were mostly from western districts of Ukraine. For example, I remember such names as Ivan Brukhnytsky, sentenced for 25 years like Dr. Horbovy, Mykhailo Muzychka, born in 1931 near Lviv or Drohobych. He has tuberculosis. There was Mykhailo Muzychuk, born in 1926, probably coming from Stanislaviv, Martynets from Carpatho-Ukraine, born in 1931, Matskevych from Lviv, who was very ill. Bondarchuk, a theatre director from Kyiv, was there, sentenced to 25 years for anti-Soviet activities as a Banderist*. He was aged about fifty, was in a Vorkuta camp and only brought to the prison at Aleksandrovsk for a short time. All the above were sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment and belonged to separate

* Banderist: popular name for a member of the underground Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera.

brigades. They were put together with criminals. All of them were Ukrainian Nationalists, sentenced for their anti-Bolshevik activities in the underground movement, and were Banderists.

"About efforts to escape—for example in the spring of 1954 three Muscovites prepared to escape. A young Ukrainian, a former member of the underground movement in Ukraine, joined them. I regret I cannot remember his name. They all four escaped but on the way the Muscovites killed the Ukrainian for food. Afterwards the Muscovites were captured and one of them came back to Aleksandrovsk prison. Efforts were made to kill him but he was promptly transferred to another camp. His name was Lazarov.

"I was released and on my way back to Austria I stopped in Kyiv. I wanted to tell the Ukrainians that it is permitted to send the prisoners one food parcel every three months. There are plenty of Muscovites in Lviv, although the town has been rebuilt and enlarged in the European style. Travelling on, near the Czecho-Slovak frontier I saw a few herdsmen on Ukrainian soil. The train chanced to stop, and the herdsmen approached and begged for food. They were clothed in rags and seemed very hungry. The Austrians who were being repatriated with me had some food which they had received from the Austrian authority before leaving for home, and they gave this to the herdsmen. Shortly afterwards some women—mothers of the herdsmen—came to thank us for the bread.

"No, I shall never forget my Ukrainian friends of the Aleksandrovsk prison," the Austrian finished. "I shall always remember them, and I still have in mind the song they taught me:

In a forest dark, amongst the fragrant grass,
A wounded Cossack lies, awake all through the night;
Weaker, weaker and weaker beats his waning pulse,
Quickly the night passes and soon there will be light."

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Dmytro Donzow, Ll. D. One of the leading thinkers of the Ukrainian national struggle for liberation, and author of many books and articles. He is now living in Canada.

Ilarion Holubovych, M.A. Lecturer in Latin at St. Joseph's College, Stoke-on-Trent.

The Rev. Iwan Shevciv. A priest of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in London who studied in Rome.

Jaroslav Stetzko. Was elected Prime Minister by the Ukrainian National Assembly in Lviv on June 30, 1941. On rejecting Hitler's ultimatum demanding the annulment of the Ukrainian Proclamation of Independence, he was arrested 12 July, 1941, and detained at Oranienburg concentration camp till 30 September 1944. After his release he escaped from Gestapo surveillance. Leading member of the O.U.N. (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) and President of the A.B.N. (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations)

Dr. Olexander Yourchenko. Professor of Law at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. He formerly lectured at Kharkiv University.



NOTE

The article "The Ukrainian Underground" by M. Bohor (Capt. Butkowsky) first appeared in Ukrainian in the journal *Do Zbroi*, December 1954.


The
**UKRAINIAN
REVIEW**



II

LONDON
1 9 5 6

UKRAINE



Ukrainian ethnographic territory

Boundaries of Soviet republics and satellites

Contributions to be considered for inclusion in "The Ukrainian Review" should be marked "The Ukrainian Review" and addressed to:

The Secretary
Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd
49 Linden Gardens, London, W.2.
Telephones: BAYswater 8392, 0140

Annual Subscription:	£1. 0. 0.	\$4 00
Six Months	10. 0.	\$2 00

Cover designed by Robert Lisovsky

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

Volume III. No. 2.

June 1956

A Quarterly Magazine

Editors:
Volodymyr Derzhavyn & Vasyl Oreletsky

Price: 5s a single copy

Published by
The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd
49 Linden Gardens, London, W.2.

CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Stepan Bandera</i> : OUR STRUGGLE MUST CONTINUE	3
<i>M. Mykulyyn</i> : THE 20th CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY	8
<i>Roman Dombrowskyj</i> : SOVIET CONCENTRATION CAMPS	11
<i>Hans de Weerd</i> : K. MARX ON RUSSIAN POLICY	19
<i>Slawa Stetzko</i> : UNDERGROUND LEADER	25
<i>Volodymyr Derzhavyn</i> : THE DRAMATIC WORKS OF LESYA UKRAINKA	34
<i>Yar Slavutych</i> : THE POETRY OF MYKHAYLO OREST AND ITS BACKGROUND	43
<i>M. Orest</i> : THE GRAIL	45
<i>Victor Petrov</i> : UKRAINIAN "INTELLECTUAL" VICTIMS OF BOLSHIEVİK TERROR—II	46
<i>A. Mykulyyn</i> : SIBERIAN POWER PLANTS AND THE DEPORTATIONS	60
<i>Vasyl Oreletsky</i> : UKRAINE'S INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS	66
<i>Rostyslav Yendyk</i> : A STRATEGY OF ENCIRCLEMENT	72
<i>Jaroslav Stetzko</i> : FOR A UNITED FRONT	76
BOOK REVIEWS	85
BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN	
The Heroic Ukrainian Women of Kingir	92
Ukrainian Ex-internee on Rome Radio	95
OUR CONTRIBUTORS	Cover

Readers are reminded that personal views expressed in *The Ukrainian Review* are not necessarily endorsed by the Editors.

Stepan Bandera

Our Struggle Must Continue

If we consider our heavy losses, the infinite number of the best sons and daughters of the Ukrainian people who from day to day, from year to year, are liquidated by Bolshevik Russia, we are impelled to ask ourselves over and over again whether the anti-Bolshevik fight is advisable. This question includes not only the problem of the victims of the Bolshevik regime, but the consideration that the revolutionary-liberation fight itself costs heavy losses, the lives of the best Ukrainian patriots. And, further, it is in connection with that fight, and the broad anti-Bolshevik resistance incited by it, that the enemy employs barbarous terrorism and the mass annihilation of our people.

Re-examining our attitude towards the question whether the Ukrainian people should continue to resist and prolong the liberation fight against Bolshevik Russia in spite of losses—we return always to the same affirmative conclusion. In spite of all heavy, painful losses sustained in the past and suffered today, in spite of the appalling methods of Bolshevik oppression and terrorism, we cannot avoid the conviction that the former and present liberation revolutionary fight in its entirety, and the whole anti-Bolshevik resistance of the Ukrainian people, spontaneous or organised, are expedient and necessary because they are the indispensable conditions of the preservation of the basis and development of the Ukrainian nation, of its very existence.

With regard to these problems we must first of all remark on the Bolshevik intentions concerning Ukraine. These are not limited to political and economic sway over Ukraine, to thorough exploitation of all the forces and resources of the Ukrainian people and of the Ukrainian lands; for Bolshevik Russia wants to devour Ukraine and to digest it completely. The Kremlin rulers aim at a systematic destruction of the Ukrainian national substance, at rooting out the entire national content from the life and from the

soul of the Ukrainian people, so that, deprived of national originality, the Ukrainian man, the whole Ukrainian people, should adopt the Russian Communist content and forms of life, and remain always a part of Soviet Russia, of the Soviet Russian people. Russia pursues this ultimate objective consistently and ruthlessly. Realising that it is impossible to digest all the subjugated peoples at once, the Bolsheviks plan far ahead, and aim to achieve this end in a long series of stages.

But it can be seen that comprehensive terrorism and ruthless annihilation of everything and everyone who might stand in the way of the Bolshevik plans in a certain respect, who might resist Sovietisation and refuse or fail to serve the Russian predatory campaign, are fundamental principles of Bolshevik action at every one of these stages.

Knowledge of the ultimate aim of the Bolshevik total offensive and of its ruthless realisation enables us to perceive that the Ukrainian people are faced with an inevitable choice: either to struggle for the very existence and independence of the Ukrainian nation and to carry on the fight come what may, or to surrender, to become reconciled to the extinction of the Ukrainian nation and of Ukrainian culture, preserving only the physical existence of Ukrainians by birth who, along with the resources of the Ukrainian lands, would increase the strength of Bolshevik Muscovy. This "either...or" concerns the whole nation, in all its parts. In view of the systematic realisation of the Bolshevik plans, every Ukrainian will have to choose individually or in common with others: either to yield to radical Sovietisation—which is identical with renunciation of the Ukrainian substance—or to be annihilated.

At every stage of their policy the Bolsheviks offer a certain part of the Ukrainian people this deadly choice between physical extermination in a Bolshevik torture-chamber or national self-destruction as the result of the adoption of the Russian Communist way of life. At every stage the enemy destroys a branch of the Ukrainian national life, Ukrainian spirituality and culture. If the Ukrainian people, or a part of the nation, should try to avoid total destruction by offering no resistance and by yielding to Bolshevik pressure in the hope of rescuing from destruction something of the national well-being and existence, such tactics would be doomed to failure in the Bolshevik system. They might be employed for a certain time, if it suited the Bolsheviks to make good use of them

after their own fashion in order to carry out a part of their programme smoothly and to "consolidate their position". Nevertheless, in its further development Bolshevism would put the screw of its oppressive system on the people in order to enforce complete Sovietisation and denationalisation. Thus the people would not avoid the final "either . . . or", and the postponement of the critical moment would have the result that it would overtake the people when in a completely helpless position. Russian policy with regard to many foreign peoples has given many a significant example in this respect.

Victims of the Bolshevik system of extermination are not only those who oppose and struggle against it, but also those who for some reasons or other do not meet all the Bolshevik requirements and plans, when the attention and pressure of the regime is focussed on them. The Bolsheviks liquidate everyone whom they suspect might be dangerous or inconvenient to them. The realisation of the Bolshevik national, economic, anti-religious, cultural, educational line of policy at various stages and in different fields, with regard to different peoples, proves that the system of ruthless mass extermination of people results from the very nature of Russian Bolshevism and is not a separate, temporal or local phenomenon.

Classifying the victims of the Bolshevik terrorist system among all the peoples enslaved by Russia one sees plainly that most of them are passive victims, people who have been liquidated just because in their nature, in their very existence they were inconvenient to the Bolsheviks, even though they had no intention of struggling against Bolshevism. The nation grieves deeply for every loss at the hands of the enemy, in any case. But as far as the fate of the nation, its protection, its further existence and development are concerned, the influence and importance of the losses sustained in the active fight and resistance offered to the enemy are quite distinct from those of passive people who are liquidated by the enemy.

All active resistance offered to the enemy offensive, all sabotage of and struggle against enemy plans aiming to damage the nation, in any field or any form, help to protect the nation even if it is impossible to frustrate enemy action in some definite field. Hindrance of enemy action is favourable to the protection of national interests and well-being in other fields in that it reduces pressure upon them. Resistance compels the enemy to focus his energies, means, and

attention on a particular aim, at the expense of others, and complicates the whole system of enemy action. The Bolshevik totalitarian system is especially sensitive to every kind of failure in the fulfilment of plans because of the "chain-coupling" of all functions to form a complicated mechanism. Even if the Bolsheviks manage to break the resistance and to annihilate the insurgents in individual instances, this causes them trouble and confusion. The Bolsheviks are then unable to complete their offensive since the recurrent crises and failures are endless. And every failure of the enemy, particularly a failure of plans aimed at strengthening the regime and the oppression of the enslaved nations, prolongs the existence of these as nationalities.

But national liberation, revolutionary fight and anti-Bolshevik resistance do not restrict themselves to defensive, limiting and diversionary activity. Still more important is offensive activity which compels the enemy to change his plans and to make concessions. Although terrorism and extermination are the main means of the Bolsheviks in breaking resistance, these alone cannot achieve the main object of Bolshevik imperialism. In its imperialist campaign Russia needs not only the land of the subjugated peoples and its resources, but also the population. She must have a complete command of the souls, minds, and hands of the subjugated peoples and harness them to the wheels of her own objective. Therefore, while liquidating some people, the Bolsheviks try, with similar persistence, to win, to educate, and to transform others to their own pattern.

In the Bolshevik system, propaganda, which has assumed an unprecedented form and extent, and which exploits every possible means, serves this aim. Propaganda, besides terrorism, is another main instrument of Bolshevism in influencing the enslaved peoples. But even Bolshevik propaganda cannot deceive people by lies and promises *ad infinitum*; it must command concrete facts to which it can refer. Therefore, the Bolsheviks must also, to some minimum degree, provide for the needs and meet the wishes of those peoples. And it is not merely a question of the elementary, traditional, and cultural needs of man, but also the indestructible desires of the peoples which cannot be suddenly deprived of their national life. So-called Sovietisation, that is, denationalisation and Russification, must be enforced progressively because it cannot be achieved otherwise. The Russian imperialist character of Bolshevism must be

concealed during that time, and at least something of national form and content must be tolerated. The Bolsheviks would like to regulate deprivation of the peoples in such a way that they can attenuate more and more the national content of their life, to kill by degrees the national character of the peoples, and to transform them into devoted servants of Bolshevik Russia.

It is the systematic realisation of this plan that is hindered by national-liberation resistance. Intensification of terrorism and increase of acts of extermination reveal, inside the country and abroad, the real nature and aims of Russian Bolshevism, alarm ignorant people, and complicate the perfidious activity of the Bolsheviks. The actual state of affairs is still more clearly revealed by the revolutionary fight and information issued by the underground, which compels the Bolsheviks to comply to a limited extent with the national wishes of the Ukrainian people in other fields—a compliance quite inconsistent with Russia's true wishes. It is natural that the Bolsheviks should try to make good use of all the concessions which they have been compelled to make, and that they should regard them as temporary measures. And they would soon be rescinded if continual national resistance and active revolutionary fight did not keep Bolshevik Russia in permanent suspense as to the realisation of its plans with regard to Ukraine.

Thus anti-Bolshevik resistance and the revolutionary-liberation fight, in spite of the heavy losses and the enemy's victories in the battlefield, successfully contribute to the protection of the life of the various spheres. It is thanks to the death of our fighters that the national character and the prerequisites to the liberation and free development of the Ukrainian people have been preserved.

Kremlin bosses do not like to hear the truth. Clarence A. Manning, well-known American professor of Columbia University, has with his book *Twentieth Century Ukraine* caused a great outburst of anger among Muscovite oppressors in Ukraine and their Ukrainian hirelings like Kyrychenko and others. *Pravda* of 4 March published a short notice about this publication together with a caricature of Prof. Manning, calling him "calumniator" (slanderer), author of "wild inventions and lies", "known falsificator" and so on.

M. Mykulyn

The 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party

The main slogan supported by all the members of the 20th Party Congress was "Back to Leninism! Back to Lenin's doctrine!" In fact, all the speakers repeated precisely what Khrushchov had said in his speech, only in different words. And Khrushchov, who endeavoured to interpret Leninism in a new way and, from the point of view of Marxist dialectics, even tried to revise it according to "new" conditions, in fact merely repeated the ideas which Stalin expressed in the works he wrote. He rejected merely the Stalin cult, but not Stalinist theories as such. The main tenor of Khrushchov's speech was as follows:

1) He did not reject the Marxist theory of the steadily increasing crisis of capitalism, but tried to explain the lack of crises at the present time by the theory that the decline of capitalism does not lead to a technical standstill. He had to resort to this argument in order to cover up the discrepancy between the bankrupt Marxist theory and the obvious facts in the Western world which are a direct contradiction of the former. He therefore demanded that all the benefits afforded by capitalist doctrine and by technics should be used in the "Socialist system". By advocating the idea of peaceful co-existence, Khrushchov seeks to establish a united "proletarian" front, under the leadership of Moscow, for the fight against the anti-Bolshevist Western world.

2) By omitting to mention Lenin's contempt for the Socialist labour parties abroad in his speech, Khrushchov put them on the same level as the Communist Party and regarded them as most useful allies and not as Socialist traitors. This is conscious wooing of those parties, which has as its aim the infiltration of the Western world by Muscovite imperialistic and subversive activities, by means of "pacifism," "anti-militarism", "co-existence", and the "people's front", by supporting Socialist policy directed against "the policy from the position of strength", and by threatening the West that "the workers' class and broad masses of workers in capitalist states would draw definite conclusions as regards this

social order, which results in the peoples of the world constantly being involved in bloody wars", and which is reluctant to hand over its power voluntarily to the Communists.

3) For propaganda reasons, Khrushchov ascribed the present process of the disintegration of the colonial system and the national liberation revolutions in the East to the Russian revolution, but he refrained from mentioning the ideas of democratic nationalism, which spur on the colonial peoples and the nations subjugated by Moscow to fight for an independent state life of their own. Khrushchov has apparently overlooked the fact that the process leading to the downfall of the colonial system is a historical process which would have taken place in any case. Khrushchov's speech, in fact, confirms the present colonial policy pursued by Russia, who relies on her own industry in competing with Great Britain and the U.S.A. Towards the satellite countries Moscow pursues another kind of policy, camouflaged as concrete co-ordination, the centre of which is the heavy industry of the U.S.S.R.

4) The sham "peaceful trend" of the Kremlin's policy which aims to lessen international tension is, according to Khrushchov, "faithful to Lenin's principles".

Of this "peaceful trend" Lenin said, at the 8th Party Congress: "It is impossible for the Soviet Republic to exist side by side with imperialistic states. The ultimate result must be that one or other will be the victor, but before that happens, a whole series of clashes between the U.S.S.R., and the bourgeois states are inevitable. The problem of the existence of the Russian Socialist Republic is the problem of the existence of the revolution—it is the problem of the existence of military strength."

5) By introducing a new interpretation of Lenin's theory of proletarian revolutions, Khrushchov tried to deny the aggressive plans of the U.S.S.R., its interference in the internal affairs of the Western countries, and its "export of revolution" abroad. This interpretation, however, made no mention of Lenin's theory of the "military programme of proletarian revolutions", in which Lenin says, "Wars will only be impossible when we have destroyed, conquered, and expropriated the bourgeoisie in the whole world and not merely in one country... The proletariat, which won in one country and expropriated the capitalists and organised Socialist industry, stands... against the whole capitalist world, and is winning over the oppressed classes in other countries to its side, inas-

much as it stimulates riots in these countries, against the capitalists and their states, and, if necessary, resorts to the help of military forces" (Lenin, Vol. 18, pp. 232-233).

6) In order to falsify Lenin's statement, which says, "as long as capitalism exists, wars are inevitable", Khrushchov introduced the theory of the "possibility of preventing wars at the present time". Thus the Central Committee of the Communist Party will a) gain time, which Moscow now badly needs in order to strengthen the military potential of the U.S.S.R.; b) by its catchwords of "peaceful co-existence" will undermine the world morally and ideologically from within, to the advantage of the U.S.S.R.; c) will increase the authority of the Communist parties in the Western countries as the champions of Muscovite "peace", and will incorporate in the Soviet front, under the slogan, "there is no fatal inevitability of war", the entire population of the world—since who after all, wants a war!—and d) will cover up Moscow's aggressiveness in the eyes of the world by convincing everyone that the U.S.S.R. is a "peaceful" state.

7) By referring to Lenin's theory about the "different forms of transition to socialism including parliamentary fight", and by refuting the necessity of civil war, Khrushchov endeavours to conceal the fact that Russia used military forces in order to subjugate Ukraine, Caucasia, Byelorussia, and other non-Russian states and to occupy the satellite countries during World War II. At the same time, "Titoism" as one of the "different forms of transition to socialism" is rehabilitated and legalised; thus, Yugoslavia is included in the neutral zone which has been created in Western Europe since the neutralisation of Austria. But Khrushchov's interpretation is refuted by Lenin's theory, which says that "in time of severe economic and political crises, class war develops into riots, into open civil war; Marxism has to support the view of civil war." Lenin also refutes the principle of parliamentary fight in his work, "Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautsky".

Khrushchov's revision of Stalinism under the banner of Leninism is nothing but the setting up of the theoretical basis of the "new" Muscovite course in foreign policy. Khrushchov's "peaceful co-existence" does not mean "peace", but is merely a distortion of the Trotsky principle "neither peace nor war". Abolishing the Stalin cult is synonymous with reviving the Lenin cult, in the background of which stands the future cult of Khrushchov with his collective

leadership. Khrushchov has introduced these changes in order to allay the hatred of the population towards the Russian Communist Party.

Abolition of "the cult of personality" has not been thought out for the sake of the Russians themselves, since they cannot do without a dictator.

By criticising Stalin for his suppression of the party leaders' activities and his liquidation of party cadres, but not for his liquidation of millions of non-Russian people, the present collective leadership is endeavouring to rehabilitate itself in its own eyes for its past misdeeds. And, incidentally, only certain factors of Stalin's era are criticised.

Is the 20th Party Congress with its "new" theories really important inasmuch as the question must be raised, as to whether the Western world will once again allow itself to be lured by the bait of the promising Muscovite catchwords thrown from the platform of the 20th Party Congress, or whether the West will now, at long last, begin to give its active support to the anti-Bolshevist ideological fight against Russian imperialism—a fight which is based on the national liberation revolutions of the nations subjugated by the U.S.S.R. and on the vital ideas of the A.B.N.

Roman Dombrowskyj

Soviet Concentration Camps

Their Constant Warning to the Free World

Concentration camps have always been an important part of the communist regime, but nowhere can they be found in such numbers and with such inhuman living conditions as in the so-called "land of socialism"—the U.S.S.R.—where they have become an inseparable part of the social or, perhaps more properly said, of the anti-social order of the Bolshevik regime, from the very beginning serving its rulers a multiple and varied purpose. They were organised with the original intention of isolating the remnants of the owner and ruling classes of the old tzarist Russia—the big landowners, industrialists, merchants, landed farmers as well as higher military and civilian officials who had escaped the "Chekist" bullet in the early days of the Russian revolution—from the victorious but not

too happy and not too reliable proletariat. Beginning thus as a serious obstacle on the path to a classless society and a supranational (Russian) state of the non-existing "Soviet people", the camps soon became a universal instrument of the whole internal Bolshevik policy—national, social, and economic alike—and the answer to all their problems. And as those problems piled up, the ranks of the capitalists in the concentration camps were being constantly swelled by other "enemies of the people"—the "fascists" and "bourgeois nationalists", i. e., by former members of the defeated national armies and underground liberation organisations (S.V.U.—the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, S.U.M.—The Association of Ukrainian Youth), by the intelligentsia of the overpowered national states, by the clergy of all faiths and rites, and by the rebellious farmers and workers—members of the same victorious proletariat who happened to take their proclaimed civil rights and their liberation from the capitalistic yoke too seriously, intending to have a say in matters of "their" workers' and peasants' government or simply to make practical use of their theoretically won personal and national freedom. There were also some sonfused communists, mostly of the non-Russian stock, who thought they could reconcile the teachings of Marx and Engels with the national aspirations of their respective countries and, therefore, did not follow the general line closely enough or, simply, did not serve Moscow as submissively as had been expected. Then, there were scapegoats of the communist system and its failures, ranging from a shop girl sentenced to 5-10 years of "hard labour in the remote regions of the U.S.S.R." for selling "defective production"—odd shoes, for instance, from the government factories (what else could she do?) to a factory director, a president of the Academy of Sciences, or a head of a scientific expedition sentenced for life for having failed to carry out their assigned production plans born in the heads of some ministry officials who had probably never had anything to do with the institutions in question.

But there is another side to the medal. Besides being a remedy for all kinds of political (mostly national) and economic opposition, the concentration camps have served as an enormous massing of unpaid labour forces which has also been assigned a major economic and demographic role in Soviet planning. First of all, concentration camps have been used as the main basis for numerous phantastic economic programmes designed to alter nature itself (the climate, the physical characteristics) of whole Siberian areas, and in particular



Exhumed bodies from a common grave in Vynnytsia where thousands of innocent people were murdered by the Russians 1937-39



*In a courtyard of a Soviet prison in Lviv,
Capital of Western Ukraine, after the retreat
of Russian troops in 1941*

to irrigate the deserts, to drain the immense swamps along the middle course of the Ob River, to build a great network of canals and artificial seas as well as highways, railroads and huge military installations—and all this in the very severe atmospheric and the most wretched living conditions, and, further, without any proper technical equipment. It should be noted that such programmes, the realisation of which would normally require decades even after a thorough preparation—setting up workers' settlements, organising supplies and so on, as well as obtaining modern construction machinery—such were programmes to be carried out at all costs and in the shortest time possible preferably as "five year plan" objectives, in order to demonstrate to the peoples of the "decadent" capitalist world the unlimited possibilities of the communist social order and to prove its superiority over all other forms of society. Of course, the above mentioned experiments, practicable or not, successful or failures, could have been undertaken only at the cost of many millions of human lives and only by a regime which rates human beings below the technical equipment it lacks, regarding them as state owned, a mere part of the communist state economy inherited along with private property—land and means of production—from the reactionary but secretly still revered and imitated tzarist empire. Atrocities of Ivan the Terrible and Peter I, who had built Petersburg on the bones of deported Ukrainian Cossacks, pale when compared with those of their communist successors and disciples who behave as if the word 'tragedy' did not exist in the communist vocabulary, and as if the death of millions were nothing but another kind of statistics. And although officially people have been sent to concentration camps to serve out their sentences, most of them had never stood a court trial. As a matter of fact they have been sent there with the intention of being liquidated, but first they were to be most ruthlessly exploited for the glory of the communist state and the promised blessings of future generations.

In geographical location, the size and the composition of separate Russian concentration camps correspond to the special tasks for which they were intended by the General Management of the Forced Labour Camps Administration, but as far as composition alone is involved, the proved fact is that non-Russian nationalities and especially Ukrainians, who in most cases make up a clear majority, sometimes as much as 60-70 per cent of the total number, prevail everywhere, whereas there are few Russians in the camps

and still less political prisoners. This incontestable fact has a double meaning: (1) That the only massive opposition to Bolshevik national and social oppression is to be found in the non-Russian territories of the Soviet Union and especially in Ukraine where the Bolsheviks have unsuccessfully tried all kinds of old and new means of oppression in order to bring Ukrainian nationalists to their knees, and (2) that recourse to deportation has been taken as the final means of pacifying the country, and in order to settle the vacated places by alien nationalities brought over from the remotest parts of the Soviet Union. This intentionally planned shifting and mixing up of great masses of population of different origin, historical and cultural background and traditions has been done with the view (a) of uprooting people from their natural physical and social surroundings where they proved most resistant to all communist experiments and to break their self-confidence, their spirit of resistance and their national solidarity by placing them in new alien conditions and making them dependent on state assistance for creating the economic basis of their new livelihood; and (b) of sowing distrust and animosity between the remaining indigenous population and the newcomers and thus weakening the whole national front and depriving the underground forces of economic support from the local population as well as their operational bases and secret hiding-places.

The policy of mass deportation, starvation, and imprisonment, although carried out under the pretence of liquidation of capitalistic elements and defence measures against the enemies of the new social order, has certainly been applied in Ukraine chiefly for political reasons, and especially with the intention of erasing all the signs and the memory of the Ukrainian historical past and its former statehood. Here was at last the long awaited opportunity for the Russian imperialists to use the cover of the revolution and, under the pretence of preaching a new philosophy and establishing a new social order which must have of necessity claimed many victims, to organise the destruction of the very foundations of the Ukrainian nation, by the physical annihilation of its spiritual leadership, the intelligentsia and the free independent farmers who were removed from their homes and were scattered throughout "boundless Siberia" with the prospect of perishing in countless concentration camps of forced labour. This was thought to be the right moment for putting into effect an old Russian dream of an amalgamated homogenous Russian state which was to be achieved

by destroying the culture of the Ukrainian and other conquered nations, by falsifying their past history and by denationalising the masses of their peoples. This had already been repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted by such great Russian imperialists as Peter I and Catherine II in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But except for devastating the country and "spilling a sea of blood", as once wrote Taras Shevchenko, the greatest of the Ukrainian poets, who was himself deported to an Asian military fort to serve a 10 year sentence "without the right of writing and drawing", they had not achieved anything. The great Ukrainian nation had proved too much for them. It had been, in the words of the same poet ("The Caucasus"), like the heart of Prometheus that "always revives and always smiles again". It has also proved too strong for the communist henchmen and their concentration camps*). For in spite of the greatest harm and immeasurable sufferings inflicted on the Ukrainian and other occupied nations by the communist regime in the course of its 38 years of existence, they have not reached their main goal: the superseding of the nationally minded population of the non-Russian territories by a standard Soviet citizen who would accept the Soviet Union as his real motherland and his rightful state, giving up all hope of and desire for national freedom and state sovereignty.

But apart from this, the concentration camps themselves have become a problem of the communist regime. For even abominable living conditions and the resulting unheard of death rate in those camps could not prevent the great massing of courageous and resolute people from many oppressed nations in the regions thousand of miles away from the main centres of civilisation. And despite the barbed wire, machine gun towers, and the strictest camp regulations they are not nearly so well in hand as it would appear at the first glance. Everybody knows that such purely technical means of security can prove quite insufficient in times of great spiritual and social unrest or external pressure. We must not forget that behind that barbed wire and those machine-gun towers as well as everywhere outside the camps there are many experienced and devoted fighters who have fought communism and the Russian imperialism in common. They have lost everything there is to lose except hope in the final victory of their cause and in a brighter future for their countries. This is not merely wishful thinking in

*) See Khrushchov's speech at the closed session of the XXth Congress of C.P.S.U.

the part of the author, neither is it a theoretic deduction from hearsay. Such a statement is based on the unanimous and unquestionably reliable evidence of many German and other World War II returnees, many of whom have especially sought out Ukrainian liberation organisations abroad to deliver the messages they promised their Ukrainian fellow prisoners to deliver upon reaching their respective countries. *The Way to Victory* dated 30 October 1955 published the following passage from a German returnee's speech delivered at a meeting of German returnees with Ukrainians in Munich:

"When leaving the concentration camps in Siberia—we pledged our word to our Ukrainian friends on the Taishet route that we should deliver their ardent salutation to their brethren living abroad.

"We are glad to fulfil this pledge here to-day before you, our Ukrainian friends, and to greet you from your friends and your relatives. Even there they are confident of the liberation of their country—Ukraine.

"They know that many Ukrainians are living abroad. Their will and their intention is to free Ukraine from the Soviet yoke. They beseech all the Ukrainians living abroad thus: "Do not stop your work and your fight for Ukraine! You can help us only by your activity." We, German returnees, owe much to the Ukrainians who often helped us in the hard days of our imprisonment. There is no other nation (in the concentration camps) which would be as well organised as the Ukrainians are. The Ukrainian liberation movement goes on in Ukraine in spite of the intolerable conditions. We never met a Ukrainian, man or woman, who did not believe that there will come a time when Ukraine will be free."

"There are millions of Ukrainians in the concentration camps in Siberia", said another German returnee at the Friedland Transit Camp in Germany. "In every special camp (camps for deported political prisoners) they make up 60-70 per cent of the total number of inmates... All Ukrainian political prisoners are absolutely united, and all of them recognise Stepan Bandera as their political leader wherever they may have come from. Even those who have not been deported for membership to the O.U.N. (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) or of the U.P.A. (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) joined the nationalist ranks."

Those and many other reports show clearly that Ukrainians in the Russian concentration camps have not lost faith in their cause, but

have assumed the leadership of and responsibility for the struggle of all other enslaved nations, giving them their whole-hearted support and encouraging them during the time of trial.

We could cite similar statements of German returnees and we could give many hair-raising details about present conditions in the Soviet concentration camps including the description of strikes and open revolts in Vorkuta (Arctic region), Karaganda, Norylsk and other districts. But this has not been the purpose of this article. The conditions in Soviet concentration camps were thoroughly investigated by such competent institutions as the U.N. Economic and Social Commission, by the Kersten Commission of the U.S. House of Representatives, and by many other public and private institutions. This was done in very great detail, and the findings were published, branding the Soviet Union as the land of slave labour and economic, political, and national oppression. It is not in a lack of information about the Russian concentration camps that we should look for the explanation of the strange fact that this all-important weapon against communism has never been fully used in the psychological cold war. It seems rather that the main factors responsible for those serious shortcomings in Western propaganda are careless planning and defective strategy as well as the superficial selection of propaganda material. To our mind, the verified facts about the Russian slave labour camps—their number, the number of prisoners, the percentage of the prisoners in relation to the total of the population of the U.S.S.R., the number of prisoners of other nationalities (to prove persecution of non-Russian nations), the composition according to social status (to disprove the myth about capitalists in concentration camps), the number of clergymen in the camps, the death rate during transportation and imprisonment, the kind of work performed and under what conditions, the camp regulations including kinds of punishment, security measures—this is the information which should be spread the world over and hammered into the heads of the world's population again and again till they clearly see the difference between their own systems and that of the Communist slave-state which is unworthy of civilised man; till they see the difference between the smiles of the Soviet leaders and the conditions of the Soviet peoples; till they can discern the smiling mask of a Soviet diplomat from the hideous face of the Soviet henchman; till they become horrified and run away at the sight of a Soviet agent. In our opinion the knowledge of the Soviet concentration camps should

be widely publicised by all available means: the wireless, television, films, books, and the press—and should be broadcast to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain because in this matter they cannot obtain reliable information from sources of their own.

If we observe, however, the Western attitude towards the Soviet concentration camps, we see that nothing is being done in this matter and nothing is being planned to be done in the near future. First class evidence gathered laboriously and at great expense during the last few years has been shelved in the U.N. and in the U.S. Congress without any prospect of ever being used to serve the cause of democracy. On the contrary, there are many signs that some journalists aim at minimising the significance of the problem, and are inclined to look for and to advertise the supposed change for the better in the conditions in the Russian concentration camps, whereas there has been no essential improvement in those conditions and there were no changes except the ones gained at the cost of the death of thousands of desperate victims killed in an uneven fight, when life became altogether insufferable. Slight concessions were made only to prevent an open rebellion and to get the situation better in hand.

So it is most disconcerting when some Western correspondents choose to judge conditions in the Soviet prisons and forced labour camps on the basis of a fleeting visit to some phoney Potyomkin-kind establishment near Moscow, especially organised and maintained in order to mislead internal public opinion as well as for the benefit of those visitors from abroad who would later on spread the communist propaganda line about the liberalisation of the Soviet regime, linking this amazing phenomenon of the imaginary Soviet change with the last year's Geneva talks and their supposed after-effects on Soviet internal and external policy. It is still more disconcerting that such irresponsible views have been spread despite accumulated and carefully verified facts to the contrary and especially irrespective of the latest testimonies of the German returnees who themselves spent 10 and more years in those prisons and camps. We cannot understand why credit should be given so readily to the staged Soviet fraud rather than to the testimonies of the victims themselves. Or is this being done just for the sake of the "Geneva Spirit" which is in any case dead?

Hans de Weerd

K. Marx on Russian Policy

Now that Karl Marx at last has a statue in London, and when the recent visits of Soviet Russian leaders to Britain appear to portend a new phase in Anglo-Russian relations, it is interesting to read once again what Marx, during his London years, wrote about the nature of Muscovite policy.

For it was none other than Nikita Khrushchov, generally recognised as Russia's new leader, who gave the West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, the following advice last year. At Moscow airport, at the end of his visit, the grand old man sighed philosophically, remarking that after all nobody could know what would happen in a hundred years. Khrushchov, however, had his answer ready: "But one can! Read Karl Marx, and there you will find it."

In Marx's time, as in ours, Western opinion was divided on Russia; but the basic problem was the same:

"But whether we look at Russia from the spiritual or materialist standpoint—whether we consider her power as a palpable fact, or as a mere vision of the guilt-stricken consciousness of the European people—the question remains the same: "How did this power, or this phantom of a power, contrive to assume such dimensions as to rouse on the one side a passionate assertion, and on the other an angry denial that it threatens the world with a renewal of universal monarchy?"¹⁾

The best and the most logical way to solve this problem was to study and analyse history. Marx was also of this opinion, and he devoted so much time to the study of Eastern Europe that this preoccupation became one of the main reasons why his chef d'oeuvre *Das Kapital* was never completed²⁾. Marx's most extensive survey of Muscovite history appeared in "Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century", published in *The Free Press*, London, from 8 August 1856 to 1 April 1857, just

¹⁾ "Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth century" by Karl Marx in *The Free Press*, London, 4 February 1857, p. 203

²⁾ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: *The Russian Menace to Europe*, a collection of articles, speeches, letters and news despatches selected and edited by Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, published George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London 1953, p. 7

that century ago that Khrushchov referred to³). And Marx, who is presented to us by Soviet propagandists as an enthusiastic admirer of everything Russian⁴), drew the following conclusion from his research into the Muscovite past:

"The bloody mire of Mongolian slavery—forms the cradle of Muscovy, and modern Russia is but a metamorphosis of Muscovy⁵)."

About Ivan Kalita, crowned in 1328 as first Grand Prince of Moscow by the Mongol occupiers, Marx wrote:

"His whole system may be expressed in a few words: the machiavellism of the usurping slave. His own weakness—his slavery—he turned into the mainspring of his strength⁶)."

Even more harsh is Marx's verdict on the Grand Prince Ivan III (1462-1505) who cancelled his feudal relation to the Mongol rulers, and wished to make Muscovy the successor of Byzantium, then newly wiped out by the Turks:

"Ivan—this impostor—aped in a more subdued tone the voice of his old masters, which even then still terrified his soul⁷)."

The common, traditional trend of the policies of Ivan Kalita, Ivan III and Peter I was —according to Marx:

"To gain advantage by the treacherous exploitation (*Ausnutzung*) of a hostile power, to weaken that power by the very process of making use of it, and to overthrow it in the end by the very effects produced through its own instrumentality⁸)."

³) Exactly a century before Khrushchov's remark quoted above, Karl Marx covered the Crimean war for the *New York Tribune* (now the *New York Herald Tribune*). His articles contributed to the fall of the pro-Russian British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Palmerston. Marx's articles in *The Free Press* on eighteenth century diplomacy were later reprinted in part as *Secret Diplomatic History*. As some vital statements on Russian history are not included in this book, the author of this article looked up the earliest English texts in the original copies of *The Free Press*. It is hardly to be expected that every translation of German or Russian edition back into English would be one hundred per cent identical with Marx's original English text one hundred years ago.

⁴) Cf. "K. Marks i F. Engels o Rossii i Russkom Narode" by V. M. Kotov, published in German by the propaganda section of the Middle German (Communist) Socialist Unity Party under the title "Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels über Russland und das russische Volk", Dietz-Verlag, East Berlin 1953

⁵) See (1)

⁶) Ibid. p. 204

⁷) *The Free Press*, 18 February 1857, p. 218

⁸) *The Free Press*, 25 February 1857, p. 227

That, he said, is also the policy

"...of modern Russia, much though the name, the country and the character of the hostile power exploited by them may have changed."

Of Peter I, Marx held the opinion that he was

"indeed... the inventor of modern Russian policy but he became so only by divesting the old Muscovite method of encroachment of its merely local character and or its accidental admixtures, by distilling it into an abstract formula, by generalising its purpose, and exalting its object from the overthrow of certain given limits of power to the aspiration of unlimited power. He metamorphosed Muscovy into modern Russia by the generalisation of its system, not by the mere addition of some provinces. To resume: it is in the terrible and abject school of Mongolian slavery that Muscovy was nursed and grew up. It gathered strength only by becoming a virtuoso in the craft of serfdom. Even when emancipated, Muscovy continued to perform its traditional role of the slave as master. At length Peter the Great coupled the political craft of the Mongol slave with the proud aspiration of the Mongol master, to whom Genghis Khan had, by will, bequeathed his conquest of the earth^{9,10}."

Russian tactics and Russian policy do not alter, warned Marx repeatedly. Writing about the Muscovite drive for supremacy in his article on "Traditional Russian Policy" in the *New York Tribune* (12 August 1853), he says:

"But the traditional manner in which Russia pursues those objects is far from meriting that tribute of admiration paid to it by European politicians. If the success of her hereditary policy proves the weakness of the Western Powers, the stereotyped mannerism of that policy proves the intrinsic barbarism of Russia herself."

And in the same article:

"There is no more striking feature in the politics than the traditional identity, not only of her objects, but of her manner of pursuing them. There is no complication of the present Eastern Question, no transaction, no official note, which does not bear the stamp of quotation from known pages of history¹¹."

Some weeks later, Marx complained to his friend Friedrich Engels about Russophile editors in the American and English papers for which he was writing and asked Engels (who often assisted him in journalistic matters) on 7 September 1853 to do something against

⁹) Ibid.

¹⁰) Ibid. pp. 227-8

¹¹) *New York Tribune*, 12 August 1853, quoted by Blackstock-Hoselitz, op. cit. p. 166

"These miserable Russians...now mounting their hobby horse that the Russian nation is thoroughly democratic...¹²."

Concerning the Russian question Engels was in total "communion des idées" with Marx, whom he praised in 1890 in a number of revolutionary papers (among them the Russian exile organ *Sotsial-demokrat*) as follows:

"It has been the contribution of Karl Marx, first in 1848 and repeatedly since, to have emphasised that...the Western European labour parties must of necessity wage an inplacable war against Russian Tzarism. To the extent to which I argue in the same vein I am merely continuing the work of my late friend, finishing that which he was not spared to do himself¹³."

This statement has obviously been forgotten by the "orthodox Marxists" in the West European labour parties of today, who advocate disarmament and the "treat them like gentlemen and they will act like gentlemen" recipe when dealing with Soviet Russians.

Communists and Left-Wing Socialists will say that the fierce attacks of Marx and Engels on the dangerous, reactionary imperialism of Russia only apply to the Tzarist regime. In fact, however, everything Muscovite against which Marx (and Engels) warned—hunger for world domination, deception of the West, Pan-Slavism, oppression of other nations within the Russian empire—are still pursued by the present Russian rulers. And the founders of that policy, Ivan Kalita, Ivan III and Peter I are now national heroes of the Soviet Union. When in the summer of 1934 the Soviet journal *Bolshevik* (now *Kommunist*) wished to reprint Engels' article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tzarism" (from which Engels' praise of the dead Marx is quoted above) Stalin prohibited the inclusion of the essay.

Since Ryasanoff published the *Collected Works* of Marx and Engels in Russian in the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow—that is, up to 1932—Marx's warnings against Russian Imperialism have been omitted in official Soviet publications. And even in Western libraries they are relatively scarce.

Of the Ukrainian problem Marx and Engels understood but little. In their time the Tzarist Minister of the Interior, Count

¹²) *Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels 1852 bis 1862*, edited N. Ryasanoff, translations from the English by Luise Kautsky. Stuttgart, Germany, 1917, Dietz-Verlag. Vol. I. p. XLII

¹³) Cf. Blackstock-Hoselitz, op. cit. pp. 25-55, 242-6

Valuyev, denied that there was such a thing as a "Little Russian language" (1863), and on 18 May 1876 all publications of any kind in that "non-existent" Ukrainian language were forbidden by law. Engels, however, recalled in the essay mentioned above that Miklosich (a Slovene by birth and the greatest pioneer of Slav Linguistics of the century) had said: "The Ukrainians did not really speak a Russian dialect but an entirely separate language." And in a letter to the British paper *Commonwealth* (published 5 April 1866 and inspired by Marx) Engels accused the Tzars of first rousing the "Little Russians" (Ukrainians) against their Polish masters, and then

"when Russian soldiers and Little Russian serfs went together to burn down the castles of Polish lords, merely to prepare for Russian annexation, which being once accomplished, the same Russian soldiers put the serfs (i. e. the Ukrainians—de W.) back again under the yoke of their lords."

During the life-time of Marx and Engels, the national revival which was taking place in the Russian-ruled parts of Ukraine was almost entirely illegal. Among the most remarkable documents of that period were the so-called "Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People", compiled by the Ukrainian Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius which was founded in 1846 in Kyiv. According to B. Yanivs'ky¹⁴) these Books were written by Mykola Kostomarov.

Now it is interesting to know that Marx and Engels were familiar with Kostomarov's writings, at least with some of them. Ryasanoff, the great Marxologist, in his booklet *Karl Marx über den Ursprung der Vorherrschaft Russlands in Europa* (Stuttgart 1909) points to the parallel in Marx and Kostomarov's opinion on the Mongol character of Muscovite autocracy, and finds Marx's condemnation of the Russians even more fierce than that of Kostomarov, who, by his merciless criticism, destroyed the legend of the personal courage of Prince Demetrius (Dmitri,—de W.) Donskoi" (p. 27). The Soviet historian, V. N. Kotov, also¹⁵) states that Marx and Engels studied, among others, Kostomarov¹⁶).

¹⁴) Cf. Kostomarov's *Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People* with a commentary by B. Yanivs'ky, Research Programme on the U.S.S.R., New York City 1954, Mimeographed Series No. 60

¹⁵) As (4), p. 20 (German Edition).

¹⁶) In the *Chronological Extractions of Marx* in the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, no minutes could be found on any work of Kostomarov read by Marx; but, according to information supplied there, the list was not complete, and the Moscow Marx-Lenin-Engels Institute never supplied the missing extractions.

But whether Karl Marx was influenced by Ukrainian historians or not, he must doubtless have been very well aware of the true nature of Russian despotism and imperialism, and also of the stupefying naiveté of some Western "bourgeois" politicians who do not seem to be able to grasp the never-changing nature of Russian policy. He wrote in 1853:

"There is a facetious story told of two Persian naturalists who were examining a bear; the one who had never seen such an animal before, inquired whether that animal dropped its cubs alive or laid eggs; to which the other, who was better informed, replied: 'That animal is capable of anything.' The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing¹⁷)."

¹⁷) *New York Tribune* 14 July 1853, quoted Blackstock-Hoselitz, op. cit. p. 162

PERSECUTIONS OF CHURCHES IN UKRAINE ON U.S. CONGRESS AGENDA

Congressman Mr. Tadeush Machrovicz from the State of Michigan raised the question of the persecution of the Churches in Ukraine in Congress. He stated that in spite of many protests made by the American Government, the persecution of the Church in the countries subjugated by the Soviets still continues and it is doubtful whether the Communists would pay any attention to these protests.

Mr. Machrovicz suggested that the U.S. delegate in the United Nations should raise this problem in the plenary meeting of the U.N. Congressman Machrovicz included in the record of the Congress a memorandum he received, in which it is stated that the Communists have imprisoned 10 Ukrainian Catholic bishops and have completely destroyed 80 per cent of the Ukrainian churches.

Slawa Stetzko

UNDERGROUND LEADER

*To commemorate the sixth anniversary of the death of General Taras Chuprynka, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.)**

March 5th was the sixth anniversary of the day on which the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Lieutenant-General Taras Chuprynka (Roman Shukhevych), was killed in action whilst fighting for the freedom and independence of his Ukrainian fatherland in the fight against Russian Bolshevik tyranny.

Taras Chuprynka is one of those few happy mortals whose name not only goes down in the history of their own nation, but of whom posterity can rightly say that they neither lived in vain nor died in vain.

Relying entirely on his own strength and on that of his loyal Ukrainian followers, and without any external aid whatsoever, he for many years—despite fierce persecution on the part of Russian Bolshevik terrorists—organised the Ukrainian liberation movement and secretly commanded the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which under his leadership became renowned throughout the whole world. And Chuprynka's name will not live on in the history of Ukraine solely as a legend!

Amidst the confusion of our troubled times the news of the death of this great Ukrainian champion of freedom passed almost unnoticed in the free Western world. But when the darkness of tyranny is superseded by the light of freedom for all the nations of the earth, Chuprynka's name will become truly illustrious and will be revered in lasting gratitude not only by posterity in his own native country, but also in Europe.

Why is the name of General Chuprynka of so great historical importance? In order to answer this question it is necessary to give a brief survey of the historical epoch in which Chuprynka appeared on the stage of world politics.

* An address given at the memorial service held by the Fraternity of former U.P.A. Fighters in Munich on 11 March 1956.

On 30 June 1941, the restoration of Ukraine's independence was proclaimed by the Ukrainian National Assembly in Lviv (Lemberg). Chuprynka joined the National Government as acting Minister of Defence. These were troubled and fateful times for the people of Ukraine. Germany, under Hitler's regime, refused to recognise the independence of Ukraine; the leading men of the government and of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists were arrested, and there now ensued the grimmest fight in the history of Ukraine, against two enemies: Hitler's Germany and Russia. Ukraine was involved in a two-front war. Indeed, this was the hardest decision which the leaders of the Ukrainian national liberation movement were called upon to reach. Hitler had conquered practically the whole of Europe; even France had capitulated, *but Ukraine refused to surrender!* The Ukrainian National Government, of which Chuprynka was a member, was the only coalition government in Hitler-ruled Europe of that time which was based on democratic principles. The universal watchword, "Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!", was inscribed on the banner of the Ukrainian liberation movement. And the leaders of this movement had already far-sightedly realised the significance of the present epoch, that is to say, the fact that in the conflict between the imperial and the national idea the future would belong to the latter. But at a time when the second World War was raging, this insight and active support for the national liberation idea, which was suppressed by imperialism, demanded immense sacrifices and even greater courage. The momentous decision itself—to take up the fight against Germany and Russia on two fronts—indicated that here, in the steppes and forests of Ukraine, a new beacon of the underground movement had been kindled. The two biggest imperialisms had clashed in the East and they were now confronted and opposed by the liberation will of Ukraine and the other nations who were inspired by the idea of national and individual freedom.

Even at that time the Ukrainian champions of freedom, headed by General Chuprynka, sent out to the world the following appeal: "Freedom-loving nations and peoples all over the world, unite in the fight against tyranny!"

Chuprynka rejected the idea of forming an alliance with one enemy in order to conquer the other, which was what the Western world erroneously did, joining forces with Beelzebub in order to

drive out the Devil. Ukraine at that time warned the Western world to refrain from pursuing such an alliance policy, but her warning went unheeded.

In 1943 General Chuprynka also took over the leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, the revolutionary organisation of the Ukrainian people which has never, at any time, made a compromise with any opponent of Ukrainian independence. From July 1944 onwards, General Chuprynka was also in charge of the general secretariat of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, the underground government of Ukraine, which still exists and carries on its activity in opposition to the Muscovite agents' government of Soviet Ukraine in Kyiv. This is probably the only case behind the Iron Curtain where not only an organised political force, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, and not only the underground army, the U.P.A., but also an underground government, recognised by the Ukrainians in Ukraine, stands for the fight for freedom and the right of Ukraine to independence.

General Chuprynka knew that the only way to secure a victory is to rely on one's own forces. His ideas held and still hold good for Ukraine in her fight, namely the importance of the national liberation revolution, that is to say the destruction of the Russian imperium from within and its disintegration into independent national states of the peoples subjugated by Russian imperialism, within their own ethnographical boundaries. Chuprynka realised that the common fate which other peoples subjugated by Hitlerism and Bolshevism were having to suffer would unite them. For this very reason he called a conference of the subjugated peoples in November 1943, in the forests of Ukraine, for the purpose of setting up a common anti-Bolshevist front. At the conference he addressed those present and said:

"This conference is not only of importance to us because of what it has achieved today for our fight. It has also convinced us that the matter of a common front of the subjugated peoples is not only absolutely essential, but is also a reality. We have chosen the right way. From today our fight for independence is no longer the isolated fight of a single nation, *but a revolution in East Europe and Asia for the freedom of all subjugated nations and for a new order in this part of the world.*"

In precisely that fighting sector of Volynia, even at that time, there were already various other national combat groups in the

ranks of the U.P.A. as for instance the national groups of the Georgians, Azerbaijanians, Turkestanians, Byelorussians, Tartars, and so forth. An eyewitness gives the following report of a visit which the General paid to these national combat groups:

"The General got into conversation with the soldiers and officers and then gradually directed the talk to political subjects. As on other occasions, the General, thanks to his education, his open-mindedness, and his natural gift of being able to adjust himself to others, immediately created an atmosphere of confidence, genuine soldierly candour and comradeship. In this respect, too, he was incomparable during the conference. All those who met him on that occasion were deeply impressed and felt drawn to this honest and friendly man."

General Chuprynka, thanks to his natural ability for making a synthesis, knew how to combine and balance the military and political factors of the fight for freedom. Without resorting to extremes, he always sought to achieve a proper balance between these two factors in every situation. He had the great gift of being able to understand the wishes of the people. And he also had the insight to include social factors in the universal fight for freedom, in order to intensify the latter. With his armed forces he also defended the people against social and economic exploitation by Russia and Hitler's Germany. With his armed forces he fought against the compulsory resettlement of the Ukrainians in Siberia, against the collective system, against Hitler's deportations of the Ukrainians to forced labour in German factories, and against the compulsory measures enforced to ensure the fulfilment of quotas. He mobilised the people against the Russian so-called people's election for the Supreme Soviets. He adjusted the whole life of the people to the law of an organised and systematic fight against the enemy.

Ukraine was not merely in a state of political ferment, but in a state of conflagration. Hitler's propaganda decried the fight of the U.P.A. as the work of Bolshevik agents. Stalin's henchmen decried the valiant U.P.A., which by 1943 numbered 200,000 men, as "Hitler's mercenaries". Whereas the truth of the matter was that the Ukrainian national liberation movement relied entirely on its own strength and had two enemies, the Hitler terrorist regime and Russia.

When the notorious leader of the Russian red partisans, Kowpak, carried out a raid in Ukraine, his gangs were defeated on the edge

of the Carpathians by Ukrainian insurgents. Chuprynka, who was an outstanding strategist and knew all the tactics of guerrilla warfare, always succeeded in attacking again and again and evading the enemy, even on two fronts.

In order to mobilise the entire Ukrainian nation and also the friendly nations and to win them over for the idea of a universal active fight, Chuprynka, right up to his death, organised the world-famous raids of the U.P.A. In 1949 a U.P.A. unit under the leadership of Commander Lys penetrated as far as Caucasia. In the summer of the same year, a U.P.A. unit commanded by Captain Chmara carried out raids in various districts of Rumania. The unit was given a friendly welcome by the population everywhere. The members of the unit distributed thousands of political leaflets in the towns and rural districts. They held political enlightenment discussions and arranged several meetings. They tried to establish a contact with the Rumanian underground movement, and spent two weeks in Rumania. The Rumanian government then sent out troops equipped with cannon and trench mortars to deal with the U.P.A. unit, but thanks to the timely warning given by the population, the U.P.A. unit managed to retreat into the mountains. The news of this raid by the U.P.A. spread like wild-fire throughout Rumania and, together with the literature which the unit had distributed, helped to strengthen the fighting spirit of the Rumanian people to a considerable degree. Further raids were carried out in Poland, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and even in East Prussia. Together with Polish A.K. (*Armija Krajowa*) units, Ukrainian insurgents stormed the prison and police headquarters in the town of Hrubeshiv and liberated the prisoners.

For propaganda purposes Chuprynka sent one of his famous units to the West. The members of this unit with great daring fought their way through Czecho-Slovakia and even reached Bavaria. The purpose of this action was to draw the attention of the Western world to the ceaseless and steadfast fight of the Ukrainian liberation movement. But the West did not react in the way that Chuprynka had hoped. It advocated co-existence. The Russians, however, have realised how dangerous the Ukrainian liberation movement in joint action with the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.) is and have tried their utmost to master it.

On 12 May 1947, the Soviet Union, Red Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia made an agreement to fight the U.P.A. Red Poland resorted to compulsory measures and resettled the entire Ukrainian

population of the western border districts of Ukraine ("Curzon Line") which had been forcibly incorporated with Poland. But no power in the world was capable of paralysing the Ukrainian fight for freedom. On 29 March 1947, Poland's acting Minister of War, General Walter Swiertchevski, the notorious commander of the international red brigade in Spain, was killed in action whilst fighting against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. In 1944, the commander-in-chief of the so-called "First Ukrainian Front", Marshal Watutin, was killed in action in North Volynia, fighting against the U.P.A.; in 1946, the Russian Army commander, General Moskalenkov, was killed, not to mention the death of the SA Chief of Staff, Lutze.

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the U.P.A. General Chuprynka proudly addressed the soldiers and commanders of the U.P.A. and the members of the Ukrainian national underground movement, O.U.N., as follows:

"Those of you who are today fighting in armed units against the Bolsheviks and those of you who have joined the ranks of the revolutionary underground movement for liberation must realise that these five years of heroic fighting on the part of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the underground movement represent an illustrious epoch in the history of Ukraine. Indeed, there is no more heroic epoch in the whole history of mankind. The heroism of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and of the Ukrainian national underground movement will set later generations in Ukraine an example. The soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Ukrainian revolutionaries will be remembered in the history of mankind like the Spartans. For this reason I exhort you to bear in mind the greatness of the present epoch and not to sully the fame of the Ukrainian resistance movement, as those before you who gave their lives in this fight have not done.

On this day, the anniversary of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, look back with pride on the past five years and reverently remember all those who, by sacrificing their lives, introduced a new epoch. Look proudly to the future in which our new fight for freedom will be crowned with victory."

In addition, General Chuprynka also wrote as follows: "The successes achieved by the U.P.A. have by far surpassed all the expectations of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council and the

Ukrainian people. And these successes have been achieved under conditions hitherto unheard of in the history of mankind."

Wherein lies the strength of the U.P.A.?

Its strength lies in the fact that it is an army of the people, created by the people, and fights for their vital interests, for national and social freedom, for an independent Ukrainian state. Its strength lies in the fact that the Ukrainian people support it of their own free will and that the entire nation fights with the U.P.A. for a common cause. And, in addition, its strength lies in the courage, endurance, and heroism of its soldiers and commanders, in its excellent tactics in guerrilla warfare, and, in particular, in the indomitable will of its greatest commander, the greatest hero in the history of Ukraine during the past decades, General Chuprynka.

What was General Chuprynka's conception of the future new order in East Europe and Soviet Asia? The Russian imperium is to be disintegrated into the following independent national states within their ethnographical boundaries; Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, North Caucasia, Idel-Ural, Turkestan. Karelia is to be returned to Finland, the Baltic States and Siberia are to be severed from Russia and shall likewise become independent, the Cossacks shall have their own independent state, and the Russians shall be satisfied with their ethnographical territories.

General Chuprynka rightly understood the significance of this epoch. He foresaw the downfall of the empires, which we, incidentally, are now witnessing in Asia and Africa. A new dawn shall shine—the dawn of the independent national states of all freedom-loving peoples. *Ex oriente lux!* But not, as the West believes, from the official East, from Russian imperialism and Communism, *but the light from the underground movements of Ukraine and other subjugated nations.* And the fight shall be fought for a moral and religious rebirth, for Christianity and the national idea, for the freedom of individuals and nations, for social justice, for the observance of national traditions, for the free development of the creative powers of all nations by abolishing compulsory and artificial state structures, against Marxism and materialism, against atheism, against imperialism, against Communist despotism and against dictatorship of every kind, against the exploitation of man by the state or by his fellow-men, and for the equality, justice, freedom, and independence of the nations.

Such was the noble conception of a future order for which General Chuprynka fought, and for which he laid down his life, together with his faithful followers, when on 5 March 1950, M.V.D. troops carried out a surprise attack on his headquarters in the vicinity of Lviv in Western Ukraine. Wearing the small cross which he had always worn since his youth, he died for Christianity, for the independence and freedom not only of Ukraine but of all the subjugated peoples and of the whole world. He died in the fight against the Communist and Russian world-criminals.

It is a humiliation for freedom-loving, Christian-minded Europeans that no monuments in honour of those who fought for humanity, God, and freedom are erected in the capitals of Europe, but, on the other hand, Stalin Avenues which made their appearance after World War II in Paris and elsewhere. We have heard of Stalin-grad Station in one Western city and of an Alexander Square in honour of a tyrant, but nowhere in the West have we come across any monuments dedicated to the memory of those who have really defended Western freedom. That great Ukrainian hero and champion of freedom, Simon Petliura, the former President of Ukraine, was murdered in Paris in 1926 by a Russian Communist, and his murderer was acquitted in honour. In 1938, another famous Ukrainian champion of freedom, Colonel Konovalets, was murdered in Rotterdam by a Russian Communist. Nowhere is there any memorial to these heroic champions of mankind, and their names have long since been forgotten by the West.

But the West will have to pay dearly for its ignorance and indifference. Hitler was of the opinion that the events of 30 June 1941, when Ukraine regained her independence, could simply be disregarded as non-existent and invalid. He thought that by disregarding this fact he could win the deadly game with Moscow. Three years later, however, when he was in mortal danger, he sought the help of Ukraine, whom he had previously just disregarded, that is to say the help of the power which could have dealt Moscow a fatal blow. But it was too late.

In 1812, Napoleon, on leaving Russia, told General Colincourt that he regretted not having staked all on Ukraine and not having heeded that appeal of the Ukrainian patriots to join forces with them and fight Moscow together.

"Ukraine has always striven for freedom," said Voltaire, and, indeed, the Ukrainian fight for freedom lives on in the Ukrainian

underground movement and in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. And the most concrete proof of this fact has been furnished by the reports given by German ex-P.o.Ws, who have returned from the concentration camps in Vorkuta, Kazakhstan, and Siberia, where big revolts, strikes, and insurrections have broken out. And Moscow is powerless to subdue these thousands and millions of internees.

The Ukrainians are fighting everywhere: in their own country and in the countries of other subjugated peoples in which they have been forcibly resettled. They are fighting in the forests and taigas, in the factories, in the silver and ore mines in Siberia, in the steppes of Kazakhstan whither Ukrainian youth has been forcibly sent to cultivate new land. They are fighting in East Asia ("Zelenyj Klyn") and in all the countries of the free world where they are living as exiles. Rudyard Kipling rightly said, "And what should they know of England who only England know?"

It was no mere coincidence that, shortly before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party was held in Moscow, the Volynian paper, *The Red Banner*, reported that there were still thousands of insurgents in hiding in the district of Rivne (Volynia) and in other forest districts and that they were refusing to surrender. The article concluded by appealing to the partisans to leave their hiding-places and confess their guilt. They would then be forgiven by "their Soviet country". At the same time, *Pravda* reported that a clash had occurred between Soviet frontier guards and an armed insurgent group, but did not, however, mention the name of the place where this incident happened. This report was, incidentally, also broadcast by Moscow Radio for the whole world to hear, which surely is the best proof that the Ukrainian liberation movement can no longer be suppressed and exterminated and that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists continue to pursue their course unerringly, even though they may adopt other tactics and methods in keeping with any new situation which may arise.

Two different worlds at present stand in conflict with each other. And one of them must inevitably fall, if the other is to continue to exist. We believe in the victory of indivisible freedom and in the independence of Ukraine, for which cause our great commander lived and died.

Volodymyr Derzhavyn

THE DRAMATIC WORKS OF LESYA UKRAINKA

Larysa Kosach-Kvitka (1871-1913), known by the pseudonym of Lesya Ukrainka (that is to say, Lesya the Ukrainian), the daughter of the Kyiv authoress, Olena Pchilka, is the most famous poet of her nation and undoubtedly the greatest dramatist in Ukrainian literature. Famed, too, for her many excellent translations of German and French poetry, she represents the so-called didactic and problematic trend of the turn of the century. In her works she deals with vital problems of moral and social life which, above all in her dramas, she seeks on the whole to solve by means of a pessimistic though definitely heroic attitude to life in general, and a tragic philosophy of volition. Although her dramas met with comparatively little response during her lifetime, they nevertheless represent the original and main source of the freedom-loving "Promethean" attitude which has characterised Ukrainian national life during the past decades and which admits of no compromise in national problems. And her influence, from the ideological point of view, is increasing with every decade, especially since the famous Ukrainian sociologist, theorist of the national problem, and political philosopher, Dmytro Donzow, acclaimed her in one of his best critical essays as the "Poet of the Ukrainian Risorgimento" (1920). Her influence has likewise proved decisive as regards the revival, enrichment, and introduction of fixed rules of poetic language and versification; and we cannot fail to agree with the high tribute paid to her poetic works by Professor Clarence A. Manning (of Columbia University, U.S.A.), one of the greatest Anglo-Saxon specialists on Ukrainian literature, when he says*:

"It was a definite declaration of emancipation of the Ukrainian spirit from the utter dependence upon those literary standards, conventions, and practices that had been borrowed from the masters of the land. It was a clear statement that the Ukrainians as a people, as a European people, had the right to draw upon the total

* In his Preface to the book *Spirit of Flame. A Collection of the Works of Lesya Ukrainka*. Translated by Percival Cundy. Bookman Associates, New York, 1950.



*Lesia Ukrainka
in her eighteenth year*

literary inheritance of the continent and of the ages. At one and the same time, Lesya Ukrainka was pleading the cause of the oppressed nations of all ages and places, and she was emphasising the similarity to them of the Ukraine of her own day . . . All this is beside the fact that she was a master of the art of poetry, a superb technician in literature, and a woman endowed with genius. With her knowledge and appreciation of European literature, she was able to sense the trend of literary development and to implant on Ukrainian soil those devices and conventions that were proving themselves abroad, without injuring her own individuality and artistic talent. She was a learned poet—in the best sense of the word . . . even the most superficial reading cannot fail to disclose the natural talent behind her literary artistry.”

The fact must, however, be stressed that Lesya’s poetic genius did not reach its unsurpassed zenith until the second period of her creative work, namely the period of her dramatic writings. Her previous “lyrical” period, which lasted until the end of the last century, had, however, already enriched Ukrainian lyric poetry with many a poetic treasure, and we should, at this point, like to quote one of her short lyrics (translated by Percival Cundy), which clearly reveals the patriotic theme found in so many of her poems:

*And yet, my mind flies back to thee again,
My country, helpless, sunk in misery!
When I remember thee,
My heart within me sinks from grief and pain.
Mine eyes have seen much outrage and distress,
Yet ne’er have seen a lot that’s worse than thine:
They’d weep thy fate malign,
But shame on tears which flow from helplessness!
Such tears have been poured forth in copious flood;
Ukraine entire could sink and in them drown;
Enough have trickled down—
What use are tears when there’s so little blood!*

But Lesya’s lyric poetry is by no means as outstanding as are her dramatic works; on the whole it is less original than various individual poems would lead us to expect, and the influence of Henrich Heine and Alfred de Musset is often very apparent. On the other hand, of those of her poems which really are original—and, of course, there are a number of such poems—the lyric

poems are all the more peculiar the less "lyrical" they are: reflection, historical reminiscences, and epic narrative play such an important part that the lyric element is usually overshadowed. Indeed, in the most original and shorter poems the definitely "epic" element is as dominant as it is, for instance, in the poems of the members of the French Parnassian school or in Tennyson's poems. An example of this can be seen in Lesya's poem, "A Forgotten Shadow" (with the sub-title "Dante's Wife"), which has been excellently translated into English by Percival Cundy and in which the epic narration is only superseded at the end of the poem by the lines addressed to the comparatively unknown wife of the famous Florentine:

*She shared with him sad exile's bitter bread,
She lit the household fire for him upon
An alien hearth. And, surely, many a time
The hand of Dante, seeking some support
And sympathy, would on her shoulder rest.
For her, life's path was his poetic fame,
Although she ne'er put forth her hand that it
Might be illumined by a single ray;
And when the fire in the singer's eyes
Died out, she covered them with reverent hand.
O faithful shadow! where is then thy life?
Thy personal destiny, thy griefs and joys?
Though history be silent, yet in thought,
I see how many lonely days were spent
In sadness and in dread expectancy,
How many sleepless nights as black as care,
As long as misery, I see thy tears...
And through thy tears into the realms of fame,
As one walks through the dew, swept—Beatrice!*

But the dramatic element is even more apparent and more marked in Lesya's lyrical poems than the epic element. Indeed, a clear line of development can be traced from her lyrical monologues, her dialogised and various other separate "scenes", to her dramas—the acme of her poetic genius. It is, indeed, pleasing to note that more attention is devoted to her dramatic works than to her lyrics in the new collection of English translations of her works by Percival Cundy.

It is, however, regrettable that, though three-quarters of this book is devoted to her dramatic works, not enough emphasis is

placed on certain very important characteristics of her dramaturgical art. Accordingly, this selection of her works does not give the reader a true insight into the tragic element in her creativeness or into her social philosophy. There is no indication of her extremely original treatment of various traditional subjects in European literature, to which she manages to impart a strange quality all her own, as, for instance, in her dramatic poem, *Isolde with the White Hands*, or in her two tragic masterpieces, *Cassandra* (1902-1907) and *The Stone Host* (1912). In *Cassandra*, for example, the tragedy of the Trojan prophetess lies not in the fact that her sinister prophecies meet with disbelief, but rather in the fact that they evoke moral confusion and evil presentiments among the Trojans, thus undermining their courage and causing them to be defeated in battle by the Greeks. "By prophesying disaster you cause disaster"—with these words Cassandra's brother, Helenus, reproaches her. He, too, is a prophet, but he only prophesies things which he considers practical and useful, and is not in the least concerned about the truth of his prophetic art, since, in his opinion, "truth" can only be attained by man by reasoning. The question raised is whether one can wrestle with fate. But Lesya does not supply an answer to this question, for, like the great Greek tragedians and modern tragedians such as Henrik Ibsen, she often prefers to cast a shadow of doubt on ethical conclusions which arise from the plot and to leave the final solution of the problem to the audience or to the reader, as the case may be. This applies in even greater degree to *The Stone Host*, which is really another version of the well-known story of Don Juan's fortunes, although Lesya endows the characters and situations with a profound moral symbolism which, with paradoxical logic, leads up to the social and psychological problem: whether a person can attain the spiritual freedom which Don Juan claims for himself without the outward power which the Commander possesses and exercises. And this "temptation" proves to be Don Juan's spiritual ruin, represented symbolically here by the famous "stone pledge".

Another of Lesya's symbolical dramas—apart from an early work entitled *An Autumn Fairy-tale*, in which the symbolical element is unfortunately reduced to the level of social and political allegory—is her famous *Forest Song* (1911), which, thanks to Percival Cundy's outstanding talent, has been admirably translated into English. Here Lesya's symbolism is of quite a different type and is not burdened with philosophical reflections, for this "fairy drama",

as the poet herself calls it, is a true lyrical drama based on and inspired from beginning to end by themes from Ukrainian folklore. It is certainly a masterpiece of its kind, extremely popular among Ukrainians on account of the wealth of ethnographical material which it contains, and, it is to be hoped, of interest to the Anglo-Saxon reader for the same reason. It must be admitted, however, for this type of literary genre the portrayal of the characters is fairly traditional and the plot rather weak. This may to some extent reveal the inventiveness of the poet, but does not do justice to her dramatic talent. Furthermore, the fact must not be overlooked that the fundamental idea of the love theme (the tragic love of an artist for a fairy) has been borrowed from Gerhart Hauptmann's *The Sunken Bell*, although Lesya has changed the action and has enriched the plot with themes taken from Ukrainian folklore.

The Noblewoman and *Martianus the Advocate* belong, as far as the ideas they express and their psychological structure are concerned, to her most outstanding dramatic works. It is true, however, that neither of these works can be described as scenic, since they are both, as regards their theme, so-called "tragedies of duty", that is to say dramatic "reading plays", in which the psychological conflict is most effectively intensified whilst the actual scenic plot gives little scope for the element of suspense, since, with a sense of duty as the theme, the emphasis is on a moral conflict which can be aroused and intensified, but not caused by external events. It is true that the famous play *Le Cid* by Pierre Corneille is to a very considerable extent scenic, but only because the tragedy of duty is combined with a romantic love-drama, which, however, is not the case in the two above-mentioned Ukrainian dramas. *The Noblewoman* deals with the theme of national duty which is not fulfilled; the theme of *Martianus*, on the other hand, is religious duty which is fulfilled consistently right to the end.

Despite its lack of scenic plot, however, *The Noblewoman* is a masterpiece of Lesya Ukrainka's dramatic art, even quite apart from the fact that it is the only one of her historical dramas which deals with the history of Ukraine (during the tragic period of the so-called "ruin" of the Ukrainian Cossack state during the second half of the 17th century) and emphasises the sharp contrast between Ukrainian culture, which at that time showed Western trends, and Moscow's "Tartar" orientalism. Nowhere in all Lesya Ukrainka's dramatic works do we find a more moving and more perfect picture

Stepan: And why should you reproach yourself, my love?
'Tis fate that's dealt with us so bitterly,
That certainly God must forgive our sins.
Some wipe blood from their wounds, we from our hearts,
Some are exiled, and some in prisons pant,
But we wear chains that are invisible.
Some find a moment's ecstasy in fight;
And we are cursed by dreadful lassitude
And have not been endowed with moral strength
To cast it off.

Oksana : Yes, what you say is true,
But none will ever understand it, while
We still live on. Therefore, it's best to die.
You certainly will live a longer life than I—
So in your hands I leave my testament,
And you can hand it to my family
And friends, if any of them still survive.

Stepan: Alas, 'tis I should say such things to you.

Oksana : No, my beloved, the world has need of you.
There's still a useful work that you can do.
No warrior can you be, but when the fight
Is o'er, you can help the defeated as
You have done many times... Not all the dead
Lie on the field...there's many wounded here...
Help them to stand again...and then, perhaps,
Some time...back in the ranks once more,
They may remember you with grateful hearts...
And if they don't—regret not that you helped.

It is extremely regrettable that, apart from this psychological masterpiece which gives the reader such an excellent insight into the historical problems of the ancient Ukrainian and Russian conflict, Percival Cundy's selection does not contain another of

Lesya Ukrainka's dramas which likewise deals with the 17th century, namely *In the Woods*, which has as its theme the cultural life of the Puritan pioneers in New England and the grave conflict between individual and community, to be more precise, between a "conformist" and a free conception of art; it may well be thought that a historical drama with a theme of this kind would be appreciated by the Anglo-Saxon reader more than, say, *Forest Song* which is based purely on Ukrainian folklore.

To all outward appearance the above-mentioned tragedy, *Martianus the Advocate*, belongs to a whole series of Lesya Ukrainka's dramatic works which take their theme from the earliest days of Christianity. But whereas the rest of these works (the dramas, *Rufinus and Priscilla* and *Johanna, Chusa's Wife*, and the dramatic poems, "The Possessed", "The Field of Blood", and "In the Catacombs") deal with the ethical and social problems of earliest Christianity in a fairly unorthodox and sometimes even paradoxical way, *Martianus* is a purely psychological drama which actually has very little connection with its historical background. This personal tragedy of a Christian advocate who at the explicit order of the Church, at a time when the Christians are being persecuted in Rome, is obliged to keep his faith a secret so that he may be able to defend his fellow-Christians more successfully in the heathen courts, who in this way brings about the apostasy or the ruin of all the members of his family and of his closest friends, and who nevertheless steadfastly remains at his post in accordance with the orders he has received from the Church—all this might just as well have taken place in France during the religious wars or in mediaeval Spain during the persecution of the Jews; and although the historical background of *Martianus* is very carefully made to tally with the history of civilisation during the first centuries of the Christian era, it nevertheless seems to be only loosely connected with the main plot. The latter, incidentally, which includes a number of even more tragic family catastrophes, is too uniform in style; though it must be stressed that of those of Lesya Ukrainka's dramas which have so far been translated into English *Martianus* is the only one which reveals to the reader the poet's exquisite skill in using the so-called "antagonistic dialogue"—a dramatic achievement equal to the keenest logomachy in Euripides or in Ibsen. We may quote as an example a conversation between *Martianus* and his daughter, *Aurelia*, who in her innermost heart

is an apostate and is determined to leave the mournful atmosphere of her father's house:

Aurelia: *I live like hermit in the wilderness...
To make the likeness still more clear, our court
Is strewn with sand, and planted everywhere
With thorny shrubs. A wilderness!*

Martianus: *My child,
What reason can I give you in reply?
Perhaps just this: that in our fellowship
There's many another lovely, Christian maid
Who, of her own free will, lives just like you,
Renouncing worldly joys and luxury.*

Aurelia: *But they do so because of living faith,
While I must perish for a faith that's dead.*

Martianus: *A faith that's dead? A dreadful thing to say!
It cannot be... You do believe in Christ?*

Aurelia: *I do believe, but my belief seems dead.*

Martianus: *What do you mean? This is unnatural!*

Aurelia: *It seems to me that I do not belong
In any world, nor this, nor that to come.*

Martianus: *Aurelia! You pierce me to the heart
With talk like this.*

Aurelia: *Then, Father, I'll be still.*

Two other dramas not mentioned so far, which, however, we do not intend to discuss in detail, are her first work, *The Blue Rose* (the only one of her dramas which is written in prose and which deals with present-day life), and her historical tragedy, *Orgy*, which was published after her death. The latter play—incidentally, full of burning patriotism—is the only historical drama of Lesya Ukrainka which can be described objectively as pseudo-historical, since its Greek and Roman setting of Caesar's day is merely used as an excuse for introducing bitter cultural and political attacks on the Russian Tsarist empire, and this, of course, results in countless anachronisms and historical absurdities, which are always most carefully avoided by the poet in her other works. On the other hand, however, Lesya Ukrainka has succeeded most ably in her numerous dramatic poems in uniting historical or mythical backgrounds with a moral appeal to her own generation and to her

own Ukrainian people. This poetic unity and harmony is, for instance, evident in the two dramatic poems which are based on subjects from the Old Testament—"On the Ruins" and "The Babylonian Captivity", in which she appeals to her fellow-countrymen to put up an active resistance against the Russian Tzarist regime:

*To suffer chains is shame unspeakable,
But to forget them is far worse disgrace.
We have two courses, death or shame, until
We find the path back to Jerusalem.
Let's seek the path back to that holy shrine
As deer seek water in the wilderness,
So that the enemy may never say:
"I have slain Israel, lo, he lies dead!"
And till we find it, let us still fight on
As wounded badger battles 'gainst the pack—
Let not this byword e'er take root and grow:
"The God of Israel sleeps in the sky!"
O Babylon, thou dost rejoice too soon!
Our harps, though on the willows, still give sound;
Tears still flow down the streams of Babylon,
And Zion's daughter still doth burn with shame;
The lion of Judah still doth roar with rage.
O Thou, the living God, my soul yet lives!
Still Israel lives, although in Babylon!*

It is precisely such passionate lines as these which best corroborate the opinion expressed by the above-mentioned translator, an opinion which, incidentally, is also shared by Ukrainian literary critics of our day (outside the Iron Curtain): "She introduced a new psychological attitude in her people's literature unlike the then prevailing one, which was that of looking backwards and sighing over a glorious if sombre past. This, indeed, had been the dominating mood of the successors of Shevchenko, weeping tears of helplessness over what was irretrievably gone. Lesya Ukrainka's attitude, on the contrary, was one of faith in the innate strength of an indestructible nation, and consequently, the compelling necessity of battling on with a firm conviction of ultimate victory."

Yar Slavutych

THE POETRY OF MYKHAYLO OREST AND ITS BACKGROUND

*(An abstract of the dissertation defended
in the University of Pennsylvania, 1955)*

Mykhaylo Orest (born 1901 in Zinkiv, Poltava) is one of the leading contemporary Ukrainian poets in exile. He began writing poetry during the short existence of the independent Ukrainian National Republic, proclaimed on 22 January 1918. However, because Russian Communists subjugated the country, he could not publish his idealistic poems until 1942 when the Russians were forced by the Germans to retreat from Ukraine.

Living under the Soviet regime, Orest spent some four years in prison and concentration camps. Since 1944 the poet has lived in exile in West Germany.

Orest's predecessors are the representatives of the Kyivan neo-classical school which flourished and dominated the literary scene during the twenties, the time of Ukraine's new literary and cultural Renaissance.

Despite the common roots with the Kyivan neo-classicists, Orest developed an original philosophy. Personal sufferings and many tragic experiences of life caused by the Soviet regime and many dramatic events of recent European history introduced him early in his life to the problem of good and evil—the main underlying theme of his poetry. Good and evil, struggling for supremacy in man's life and history, are evaluated by Orest from a viewpoint of his spiritualistic conception of life based on a religious Christian outlook. Man has freedom to choose between good and evil. Thus, he participates in the creation of his own fate, and can not escape his moral responsibility toward the rest of mankind. Consequently,

he is also subject to common guilt for the existence of evil. Despite the fact that Orest sees evil as "the ruler of the world", in his final convictions he is basically optimistic. He calls for regeneration of the human heart under the guidance of divine truth in humility, love and forgiveness.

"A seeker of harmony", Orest adores the purity and beauty of nature. In a meadow or forest, "a healer of the soul", he finds an intimate relation between nature and his soul, establishing an existential unity of beauty and goodness. This largely defines the peculiar mystical essence present in Orest's nature poetry which literary critics sometimes designate as his "pantheism".

Stylistically Orest is a classicist despite the symbolistic feature frequently found in his early poems. Orest's style is organically connected with the content of his poetry: "the wisdom must be the deepest, the taste must be the finest". His classicism is a direct reflection of the universalistic tendencies of his world-view.

Mankind is one, and its cultural achievements belong to all. The poet appeals to humanity: to throw away all barriers to the free cultural intercourse of nations in the name of universal brotherhood. These ideas are specifically stressed in Orest's *Ars Poetica* which can serve as a definite creed for the neo-classical trend in Ukrainian literature.

Together with a few others, Orest can be considered to be establishing the model of modern Ukrainian poetic language. His vocabulary is selective and strictly suited to the meaning of his poetry.

The significance of Orest's creative achievements has not yet been fully appreciated though his great contribution to Ukrainian literature has been generally acknowledged. His volumes of original poems are: *Echo of the Years* (Lviv, Ukraine, 1944), *Soul and Destiny* (Augsburg, Germany, 1946), *The Realm of the Word* (Philadelphia, U.S.A., 1952), *Guest and Inn* (Philadelphia 1952). Besides these the poet has greatly enriched Ukrainian literature with his able translations of German and French poetry: *Selected Poems* by Stefan George (Augsburg 1952), *Selected Poems* by R. M. Rilke, H. von Hofmannsthal and M. Dauthendey (Augsburg 1953), *Anthology of German Poetry* (Augsburg 1954) and *Anthology of French Poetry* (Munich 1954).

M. Orest

THE GRAIL

[1932]

*I'll pass over the distant crest,
Abandon my native vale,
To venture the wayless quest,
To seek for the Light of the Grail.*

*My soul that was shy grew strong,
And shone with a force unknown,
That joy was filling my song,
Where for others a screen is drawn.*

*The breath of flowers benign,
The depth of lake did I feel,
And what set trembling the pine,
And what did the sunset conceal?*

*Years disappeared into space
As shadows of flying midge,
Yet I had not found a trace
Of the path to the Castle's bridge.*

*And over my shining hopes
Sorrow unfolds its veil;
Who'll show me the sunny slopes,
The beacon of heaven—the Grail?*

Translated from the Ukrainian by W. Shayan

NOTE: The poem was published in the second number of the Ukrainian edition of *The Order*.

Victor Petrov

Ukrainian “Intellectual” Victims of Bolshevik Terror

*Part Two**

The trials

At the end of the twenties, on the borderline between the N.E.P. and the “period of building-up a classless society”, there were three big political trials: the trial of the S.V.U., (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine), the Shakhty trial, and the trial of the “Prom-party”. The aim of those trials was, first, to compromise the intelligentsia politically, and secondly, to prove that it was necessary to remove the intelligentsia from all the spheres of action where it had remained during the N.E.P., and accordingly to prove that it was necessary to replace the intelligentsia, which “obstructed the building-up of a socialist society” by means of acts of sabotage, by reliable promoted workers devoted to the cause of the proletariat, by bench-workers, by people with the Party-membership card.

Like all subsequent trials in the U.S.S.R., the above mentioned ones were organised in the “selective” way. 20-30 people were in the dock, while dozens, thousands, hundreds of thousands were kept behind the curtain. After their arrest they disappeared without any mention. Although every Soviet citizen expected that he might be arrested on any day, at any hour, still every arrest would come unexpectedly. The searching of his house was, of course, a mere formality, like the avowal of crimes provided for by articles 58 and 59 and by numerous paragraphs added to them, and only signed later.

What was it that was understood by ‘crime’ in the Soviet Union? Individual guilt was clearly of no consequence at all.

Yevhen Pluzhnyk

We repeat: Individual guilt was of no consequence. Of what special guilt could there be question in the case of Yevhen Pluzhnyk?

*) The First Part appeared in Vol. II No. 4, December 1955.

One of the latest critics writes about Ye. Pluzhnyk that "his three collections of poems belong to the highest achievements of modern Ukrainian poetry. Rejecting the brutal Soviet reality the poet resorted to philosophy, to himself; hence some breath of resignation and pessimism, but that is just a characteristic proof of his creative enthusiasm under conditions entirely non-inducive to poetry.

In his life he behaved cautiously and stood aloof. He was even-tempered, quiet, as if absent-minded. He was rather silent. He was unwell, suffering from tuberculosis. He usually wore an overcoat. He coughed slightly, as if undecided, and stooped.

The collection of his poems under the title *Rivnovaha* (*Equilibrium*) which he had prepared for the press, and which bore the date "Kyiv 1933", remained unprinted because the poet was already arrested by that time. A glance at that collection of poems published in the fourth volume of *Ukrainsky Zasyv* (*Ukrainian Seed*) only ten years later, in 1943, would be enough to show Pluzhnyk's complete indifference to politics.

In the collection there are no attacks on Soviet reality, nor is there any servile flattery. In the years when the disgusting Soviet servility, so typical of the time of Postyshev in Ukraine, flourished, Pluzhnyk made no concessions; he did not flatter anybody. In spite of the fact that writers were faced with the choice "either-or", Pluzhnyk did not exhibit any tendency to Sovietisation. He behaved very correctly and with restraint. He was a poet; was it not enough?..

He believed in his self-sufficiency and in his closed poetical world in which he lived. He has created a series of matchless poems of the narrative genre where pictures and images of the social history of Europe pass in his imagination one after another.

He amused himself with the story of Abelard and Heloise. In dim and exuberant lines he speaks of the candles by Heloise's coffin and about the pale and cold hands of her whom Abelard loved ardently all through his life. He makes one think of Hamlet and Ophelia. He considered himself to be an heir and participant of European culture.

The author could be reproached with some estrangement from life because he had no sense of the future and could not find a place for himself in it, but—with the exception of this—neither the collection *Rivnovaha* nor the poetical activity of Pluzhnyk on the

whole gave occasion to arrest him and still less to sentence him to be shot.

Nevertheless, he was arrested and sentenced. True, they did not shoot him; they commuted the maximum penalty into ten years' exile. But it was only a non-committal play on the dead formulas of "paper" jurisdiction because ten years' stay in the far north, under the hard conditions of the polar climate, dirt and stink of the half-starved life of the people confined in barracks, spelled death for a man suffering from tuberculosis.

After six months' imprisonment on the Solovetski Islands Pluzhnyk died of tuberculosis. The commutation of the death sentence to one of banishment was only a fiction.

Pluzhnyk was liquidated although neither his literary works nor his activity on the whole gave occasion for that. If Europe now, as twenty four years ago, is faced with the menace of a new Bolshevik aggression, and people who do not realise the danger which threatens them find relief in the thought that they have not been active, they should not forget the unhappy fate of Yevhen Pluzhnyk who was only a poet, and nothing else, and who was liquidated nevertheless.

Hryhoriy Kosynka (1899-1934)

The fate of H. Kosynka was no less tragic.

The person, the talent, the psychological motivation behind the act—all this lost its meaning from the moment that the Bolsheviks proclaimed the slogan of class struggle, and the focus of attention was transferred from the individual to the class. The fate of the individual depended upon the class to which he belonged.

The slogan of the liquidation of the "Kulak", proclaimed in the years 1929-30, as a class in the name of complete collectivisation, became at the same time a slogan of the liquidation, the removal from the literary sphere of those writers, to whom the Soviet critics, with the fury of rabid dogs, began more and more persistently with the onset of the thirties to attach the name of "Kulak" or, as it meant in Soviet journalism of that time, "bandit". Let us not forget that such a designation was at the same time a formula for political accusation.

In Soviet criticism at the end of the twenties, the name of Kosynka was always referred to in association with those two epithets. It was a warning which could be interpreted as a threat.

The most talented Ukrainian novelist of the twenties Hryhoriy Kosynka, stepped from his village background directly into the field of Ukrainian literature. He published his first book *Na buryakakh* (*In the Beet Field*) in 1919. At the beginning of the twenties he resembled a village boy; his coat was that usually worn by clerks in rural communities; he was strong, thickset, quick to respond, of an accurate judgment, and had hands which before taking up the pen had known how to handle not only the scythe and the flail, but also the sawn-off shotgun. He carried with him the atmosphere of the steppe, the sun, the night winds, and the sunset glows, from the time of the national war which the people of Ukraine waged against the Bolsheviks during the years 1918-21.

The records of the national war, in which Kosynka was directly involved, determined the contents of his first novels. "Bolshevism is the modern method of enslavement of the Ukrainian people by Russia—this opinion is evoked in the reader by the internal logic of Kosynka's artistic images," writes one of the contemporary critics. In his novel *Temna nich* (*Dark Night*) Kosynka tells us how the village insurrectionists captured a Bolshevik commissar who had come to establish a commune among them, and shot him.

The stormy period has passed by. The sunset glows have receded. The peasant working his soil ploughs up a skull. He has recognised it: it is the skull of a Chinese Khodya who had been killed during the national war by a peasant bullet, had defended the achievements of the proletarian revolution in Ukraine, and given his life for a foreign cause. In complete indifference the peasant kicks aside the Khodya skull. (*Holova Khodi—Khodya's Head.*)

The war is over. The peasant ploughs his soil. But the G.P.U. celebrates its bloody victory over those who were involved in the national war. Those times are described in one of Kosynka's most powerful novels which has, however, remained unfinished, and was not published until recently (*Faust*), about a Ukrainian Faust, a leader of the peasant insurrection against the Bolsheviks, a peasant from Podillya, Prokip Konyushyna. The organ of investigation of the G.P.U. demands that he should confess the place of assembly of the insurgents committee. He is held for months in "a cell cold and wet, and dark as night". He is tortured and beaten, but refuses to confess. "Rest assured", he would say, addressing the wall of his cell, "Prokip Konyushyna has never been a traitor.

I am ready to die like hundreds and thousands of others, but I shall never betray my country. I shall betray nobody, I shall never be a Judas!"

H. Kosynka's novels convey a spirit of hard irreconcilability, the spirit of the national war. They are characterised by a sharp and bold laconicism, a vividness of colour, tonal purity combined with a certain freedom of ornamental and descriptive writing—the peculiarities of style which Kosynka inherited directly from the pictorial village tradition.

Certainly, Kosynka's life under Soviet conditions was difficult, and his position as a writer was precarious. "The censors are displeased with my book! They are very displeased", Kosynka wrote to his wife on 26 October 1924. "In principle they permit this publication, but intend to prohibit *Holova Khodi, Anketa (Form)*, the best of my novels" (9 December 1925). It was the time of the N.E.P. and Kosynka's works were published and appeared in the newspapers.

At the beginning of the thirties, along with the introduction of the process of proletarianisation of literature, when the slogan of unification of literature, though in its first R.A.P. version, had been announced, Kosynka was suppressed. The collection *Sertse (Heart)*, which had already been printed, was withheld by the "Holovlit" at the last moment. Access to the literary sphere was denied to the poet. "One can hardly expect to earn money through writing", wrote Kosynka on 22 October 1931.

Kosynka was beset. The pursuit developed from day to day. "The pursuit, I think, must limit itself, but it seems that I am mistaken". "Nevertheless I am standing ground. I am not losing it, anyone in my position might have lost it long ago", he wrote on 16 April 1932. At that time he earned additional fees by writing film scenarios which were never printed. He became pale, losing his former robust complexion, his features greyed as if covered with the dust of fatigue. Formerly he had been vehement and rough, but if he was now outwardly quieter it was the quiet of a nervous man. His nerves could not tolerate any further strain.

In 1934 an inaugural speech was given by Kulyk at the House of Writers in Kharkiv. Kosynka participated in the discussion following the address. And then he could no longer contain himself. Instead of confining himself to the banality of forced declarations as was the case with others, he burst out into a torrent of

complaints, protests. With sharp and vehement fury he began to speak on the subject: "brother writers, in your destiny there is a fatal something". He spoke about the fact that, under the conditions of a "socialist order", when the individual is held by the throat he is unable to create.

It was not a speech. It was a hysterical outbreak. It was a spasm of hopelessness. It was a cry of despair in the loneliness and emptiness of the dark. The Communists responded to Kosynka's speech with whistles and cries of indignation. From the dark corners of the gallery the writer was greeted with loud cheers.

Soon afterwards, sometime in November 1934, he was arrested. In the verdict were these words:

"The court has ascertained that most of the accused have entered the U.S.S.R. through Poland, and some of them through Rumania, having been directed to carry out a series of acts of terrorism on the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. On their arrest revolvers and hand-grenades were confiscated from the majority of the accused".

The verdict was a "Filkin Document". The whole argument—complete nonsense. None of those who were executed in accordance with the verdict, neither H. Kosynka nor D. Falkivsky, nor O. Vlyzko, nor R. Shevchenko, with the exception of Krushelnytsky and his sons, had ever been in Poland or Rumania. As to the Krushelnytskys, they were the prey of their sentimental trustfulness. They had been Communists and came to Ukraine on the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Mykola Khvylovy (1893-1933)

Literary incompleteness, impure and untidy language, a loose and unbalanced manner of writing, the chaotic blurr, a certain impressionistic vagueness ("in my works there is a drizzle" according to Khvylovy's own statement), prove that we do not know a mature Khvylovy from his writings, that we know Khvylovy only at the initial stage of his creative work.

But, while in an estimate of the work of M. Khvylovy as a prose writer there may be a certain and even considerable difference of opinion, there can be no doubt about the value of Khvylovy as a central figure in the Ukrainian literary movement of the twenties.

To what extent the pamphlets of Khvylovy alarmed his contemporaries may be seen from the words of M. Mohylyansky who

declared at one of the literary discussions: "our impression of Khvylovy's articles was as if we found ourselves in a sultry room where it was difficult to breathe, the windows were opened and the lungs suddenly began to inhale fresh air".

Our impression was that the wind had forced a passage into the house, rushed through the rooms, banged against the windows, the panes rattled, the glass rang. It was a joyful but terrifying experience! . . .

O. Shumsky, a friend and adherent of Khvylovy, describes the stages in the development of "literary discussions during the years 1925-27". "The literary discussion having begun with the speeches of Khvylovy against graphomania and illiteracy in literature, so to speak, with the fight for quality, soon exceeded the bounds of the struggle for organisational principles, between "Pluh" (Plough) —"massovism"—and "Vaplite"—academism—and developed on the level of pure questions of principle (Europe or enlightenment), regarding the prospects of the development of Ukrainian literature and the whole social-cultural process". (See *Bilshovyk Ukrainy, The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, 1927, 11, page 12.)

Khvylovy took the part of those who contemptuously rejected massovism and provincial enlightenment, who spoke in support of the idea of a highly individualised culture elevated to the European level.

In Pantelemon Kulish, Khvylovy found a banner and a name necessary for the exact definition of his attitude. In his collection of pamphlets (1925) under the title *Dumky proty techiyi* (*Thoughts against the Current*) Khvylovy wrote: "as to an ideal revolutionist and citizen, there is none greater than Panko Kulish to be found. He seems to be the only bright source of light shining out of a dark Ukrainian past. He alone may be considered as a real European, a man who most nearly approximates to the type of the western intellectual" (page 53).

This is Khvylovy's central idea. This is what most excited and perplexed him during those years. "Psychological Europe—this is the Europe to which we must orientate ourselves! . . . It is this Europe which will lead our art on the great and joyful way to the world's goal".

And then he outlines his ideas about psychological Europe. "Living man with his thoughts, will, and talents is a psychological category. Living man is public life. The classical type of public

man has developed in the west . . . Consequently one cannot imagine a social criterion without psychological Europe".

This is the conception which was evoked by Khvylovy . . . one cannot accuse it of a lack of continuity. It is—in each of its theses, in every single word—thoroughly polemical, sharply directed against the official party line, and in diametrical opposition to the theoretical principle of Bolshevik doctrine. Khvylovy preached that which the party denied. He emphasised what the party ignored.

It was dangerous to advocate European culture, while in the country the degraded culture of proletarian art was still held in awe, to preach "psychologism" while the official doctrine recognised solely "materialism" and to defend "man with his thoughts, will and talents", while the policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party recognised the "masses" and the "proletariat", and denied the individual. All that meant going against the stream. Khvylovy according to his own statement, "made an attack on the integrity of the Communist party".

Nobody doubted that in proclaiming the slogans "Away from Russia", "As far as possible away from Russia!", "Westwards to Europe!" Khvylovy began a campaign against Russia as the capital of the Soviet Union, "as the centre of the world Communist movement".

The plenary session of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian C.P. of June 1926 passed the following resolution on Khvylovy:

"The slogans of orientation towards Europe, "Away from Russia" and the like, launched in the press are quite impressive . . . those slogans may be a banner for the Ukrainian petit bourgeoisie which is thriving on N.E.P., because by orientation towards Europe it undoubtedly understands a total separation from the fortress of the international revolution, the capital of the U.S.S.R.—Moscow".

Thus, as early as 1926 Khvylovy's belligerent enmity towards the official Bolshevik party line became apparent. He believed in the cultural upheaval and was aware of the material and spiritual degradation introduced by the Bolsheviks into Ukraine. He defended the "individual" and saw the total destruction of everything that was human.

He could not reconcile himself to the fact of the idea that impoverishment and oppression, that the whip of the G.P.U., that the total prohibition of thought, that the annihilation of the intelligentsia, that the exhaustion of the Stakhanov worker, and the

expropriation of the collectivised peasant, that chaos in a disorganised country, that violence, ruin, terror, hunger, fear, and death, that all these may be proof of upheaval, and efflorescence.

The circle round Khvylovy became continually tighter. The slogan of destruction of the peasantry launched by the party in 1928 was also applied to the intelligentsia in 1930. The life of the individual was strictly categorised.

It was the year 1933. Hunger reigned throughout the land. Khvylovy saw with his own eyes the consequences of the collectivisation—introduced by the Party. He saw Ukrainian peasants starved to death in the streets of Bolshevik towns. He saw with his own eyes the tragic death of the village, which Bolshevism had brought even to cannibalism.

At the end of April Khvylovy had recently returned from the country, which he had travelled through, in order to, according to his own ironical statement, "study a new cardinal process of socialist construction—hunger!".

After his return he was continually in a state of internal tension, nervous exaltation, bordering on hysteria and despair. It was clear that things could not continue in this way. One looked about volens nolens for a weapon. Something had to happen. What? He did not know.

G.P.U. raged. Everywhere Ukrainian intellectuals were being arrested. Khvylovy lived in a fever, and his heart was burdened with a feeling of oppression.

Then one morning at the end of April, the quiet of his room was pierced by the ring of the telephone. The call came from the lodging of Yalovy, one of Khvylovy's closest friends. An excited female voice informed him of the unexpected arrest of Yalovy.

The news left him stupified. He turned cold and there was a pain in his heart. Suddenly everything became extraordinarily clear. It had begun! Yalovy was the first! He would be the next!... Others would follow!

At once Khvylovy realised the whole sad prospect that lay before him and his friends. It was not the end... and then at once he realised his responsibility. He had to do everything possible to save Yalovy and the others. He had to do it.

Hard, difficult, absurd days began. Telephoning and silently awaiting the response. Running from one responsible individual to the next. Turning to the central committee. All without results. A week, two weeks, passed by. Khvylovy then realised the com-

plete hopelessness of his efforts, and that night as he deliberated and decided what to do, he did not go to bed. He sat at his desk until morning. He wrote his last letter. As the first trams were heard outside he got up and went into the living room. His wife was still asleep, his daughter Lyuba was getting ready to go to school, and his elderly mother was preparing the breakfast. He greeted them as usual with jokes and kisses. He told them that today he would invite his friends, that tea should be prepared. Then he approached the telephone and called up all his writer friends. He asked them all to visit him that day, to listen to his new work which he had written in his social competition with EPIK.

An hour later O. Dosvitny and Mykola Kulish were at Khvylovy's. Other writers who had been invited were present. All were aware of the unusual mood of exhilaration which Khvylovy was in. He was like someone who had been drinking. And during the tea he seemed more and more to lose control of himself. He took his guitar and with feeling sang several of his favourite songs. All were excited. But all waited with impatience the reading of his new book. Someone reminded Khvylovy about it.

"Of course! Today I will surprise you," he said, jumping up. "It was extremely difficult for me to write this work, but I have understood how the writer must think in this Stalinistic epoch. In this way I was inspired to write this book. Perhaps I shall be able to tell you today how one should write and how one should not write in our times."

With these words he disappeared behind the doors of his study.

His friends waited several minutes in complete silence until Khvylovy should reappear with his new work.

All of a sudden the sharp sound of a revolver shot was heard from the writer's study. In the same instant the others rushed into the study. Khvylovy sat at his desk, his head thrown back.

His dangling arm clutched a revolver. The torn up fragments of his book *Komsomoltsi* (*Members of the Young Communist League*) were littered round his chair. They were flecked with red blood stains.

On the table lay a rectangular piece of white paper, the letter of farewell in which Khvylovy had written before his death:

"The arrest of Yalovy has convinced me that the persecution of Ukrainian writers has begun.

"Let my blood be the proof of Yalovy's complete lack of guilt. . ."

On 13 May 1933 Khvylovy committed suicide. O. Slisarenko was also arrested in May. Soon afterwards. O. Dosvitny and Ostap Vyshnya were arrested and a little later it was the turn of others.

The liquidation of literary organisations

All Ukrainian literary organisations ceased to exist at the beginning of the thirties in one and the same way. They were neither closed down nor dissolved. The Soviet government never resorted to measures which might awaken the idea that they were non-democratic. Ukrainian literary organisations ceased to exist in another manner, so to speak automatically, through the non-participation of their members.

We repeat: none of the organisations was prohibited. The administrative authorities did not interfere with the internal life of the organisations. The freedom to assemble, to speak, and to publish was never infringed upon. All democratic rights were completely guaranteed. As far however as the repression of the members of organisations is concerned it was another matter. They were liquidated not as writers but as counter-revolutionists and class enemies.

Let us not forget: there is no literature apart from class. There is only class literature. In other words, on the one hand proletarian literature, and on the other hand anti-proletarian class hostile literature, i.e. literature which had to be eliminated. As however proletarian literature as such did not exist at all, it meant that without exception, the entire literature was liable to be destroyed.

The slogan of proletarian literature—now, across the perspective of the past years this is quite clearly to be seen—was not a creative slogan, because no proletarian literature had been written. Efforts to give the conception of proletarian literature a positive content, alone through the proletarianisation of the subject matter and of the author, through the actual proletarianisation of the literature, i.e. through the advance of a working proletarian order, ended in failure. All their efforts were in vain. It was pure bluff.

The conception of proletarian literature was not positive but negative, whose real meaning was reached only through contrast, i.e. as a principle of negation. It was precisely that which led to the situation which existed at the beginning of the thirties: the work of a writer was assessed not by literary critics, the success of a

literary work was not decided by the reader, the fate of a writer by no means depended on the brilliance of his works.

The centre of attention was transferred from specific literary character to elements which bore no direct relation to literature, but were linked up with the socio-political class struggle, propagated by the party. Naturally literary methods were controlled by organs of political administration of the state. In this way a departmental approach to literary problems was created.

The raised pistol and the shot in the back of the head were the principles of organisation not only of the whole state system, but at the same time of the literature. In the thirties Bolshevism applied only one universal method of organisation of literary activity: the method of liquidation of the classes which were hostile to the proletariat.

To enumerate the names of the members of any Ukrainian literary group is to mention the writers who were banished, shot, who committed suicide, who died of various diseases in exile, having been unable to withstand the hard conditions of a severe northern climate, or who succumbed to madness. Borys Teneta hanged himself. Hryhoriy Chuprynka, Dmytro Falkivsky, Hryhoriy Koshynka, O. Vlyzko, Ladya Mohylanska were shot. The poet Svidzynsky was burnt alive.

The individual annihilation of Ukrainian writers became a group elimination. What was at issue was not the extermination of individual writers but of whole groups, and what was more of the entire Ukrainian literature. Ukrainian literature as such was destined to liquidation. Thus, one can say that the Ukrainian literature of the twenties and thirties was a literature of those eliminated. The fact that the literary and artistic groups concerned were of "left" or "right" persuasion, "proletarian" or "non-proletarian", whether they consisted of party or non-party members, of panegyric flatterers, or on the other hand of the nobly reserved, whether they proclaimed destructivism or constructivism, futurism or classicism, "vers libre" or the classical sonnet, was of no significance. That was all of no importance. Over everyone reigned the unalterable and fatal law: the law of force to which Bolshevism had given the significance of a social and political formula.

In the process of the consequential development of acts of repression which the Soviet Government had applied to Ukrainian literature, the year 1934 should be designated a critical year.

Everything that had gone before had only an anterior, episodic, or excursive character (for example, the execution of H. Chuprynka, the arrest of Maksym Rylsky, Mykhailo Ivchenko and L. Starytska-Chernyakhivska, in connection with the S.V.U.). The concentrated mass blow was dealt to Ukrainian literature by Bolshevism in the year 1934. The majority of Ukrainian writers and literary organisations ceased to exist precisely in that year.

"Vaplite"

"The Free Academy of Proletarian Literature", abbreviated as "Vaplite" (later 'Prolitfront') was naturally the leading centre of Ukrainian literature of the twenties. It was a literary organisation which had arisen and developed on the initiative, and with the immediate participation of Mykola Khvylovy. It put into practice his slogans for the struggle for creativity and academism, for the development of a European level of Ukrainian literature, against massovism, enlightenment, and an epigonic imitation of Russian literature.

To Vaplite belonged: P. Tychyna, Mykola Khvylovy, O. Slisarenko, V. Yalovy, M. Yohansen, Hordiy Kotsiuba, P. Panch, M. Maysky, H. Epik, O. Kopylenko, I. Senchenko, Yu. Smolych, O. Dosvitny, I. Dniprovsky. Those of them who were liquidated in the years 1933-1934 were the following: Yalovy, Mykola Khvylovy, O. Dosvitny, O. Slisarenko, A. Paniv, H. Epik, Mykola Kulish, O. Vyshnya, M. Yohansen, and others.

It suffices to mention only one of all the members of "Vaplite", Mykola Kulish, in order to grasp with complete clarity what this group meant for Ukrainian literature, and what a heavy blow Bolshevism had dealt Ukrainian literature through the liquidation of "Vaplite".

The plays of Kulish (97, *Narodny Malakhii*, *Myna Mazaylo*, *Patetychna Sonata*) are the highest achievements of Ukrainian dramaturgy of recent decades.

Berezil created by Les Kurbas was in the field of the theatre what Mykola Kulish was in the field of dramaturgy. *Berezil* found in the person of Kulish his dramatist, and Kulish found in *Berezil* his theatre. Kurbas and Kulish united themselves in order to determine the path of modern Ukrainian theatrical art.

Rural intelligentsia belonged to the first rank of the Ukrainian literary movement, which was attaining to European importance. But it was not a process of peaceful integration and systematic

development. It was a process which resulted from the conflict between village and town, the village condemned to death, ("the village is dying out") and the bolshevised town. The conflict between Bolshevism and the Ukrainian village (compare "I" by Mykola Khvylovy) became the prevailing and unique theme of all Kulish's plays from 97 to *Patetychna Sonata*. Precisely herein lies the root of Kulish's artistic style. In their artistic style the plays of Kulish approach expressionism. They are schematic, incomplete, chaotic, and relative. They arise from within. If in comparison we had to name a dramatist with whom Kulish has something in common we would name Chapek.

As to their ideological content the plays of Kulish were a protest of the hurt feeling of the Ukrainian against Bolshevism and an expression of confusion and fear of the dictatorship of the proletariat which destroyed the village. The organs of dictatorship had crushed the writer, but there remained suffering and art, the art which embodied the suffering and the protest of the crushed individual.

Ukrainska Literaturna Hazeta (Ukrainian Literary Journal),
Volume I, No. 2-6, August-December 1955

BOOKS RECEIVED

Voline: THE UNKNOWN REVOLUTION Kronstadt 1921 Ukraine 1918-21.

Translated by Holley Cantine. The Freedom Press, London. Price 12/6.

The Australian Outlook. The Journal of The Australian Institute of International Affairs, 177 Collins Street, Melbourne.

Ecrits de Paris. April 1956. Published monthly, 354 rue Saint-Honoré, Paris 1er.

Het Christelijk Oosten en Hereniging. April 1956. Quarterly Journal of "Het Instituut voor Byzantijnse Studies", Sophiaweg 42, Nijmegen.

Ukrainian Review I. An occasional bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. Augustenstrasse 46, Munich 37. 1955.

Byelorussian Review II. A similar publication to the above.

TARAS SHEVCHENKO AND WEST EUROPEAN LITERATURE

An article by Dr. Jurij Bojko translated by Victor Swoboda and reprinted, by permission, from "The Slavonic and East European Review", with

Selected Poems by Taras Shevchenko

Published by The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, price 2/6.

A. Mykulyn

Siberian Power Plants and the Deportations

"The idea of socialist industrialisation of the country," one reads in the journal *Kommunist* No. 13, 1955, page 20, "is the prevailing idea of the Lenin plan of building up a new society. Lenin repeatedly stressed that the development of heavy industry and the electrification of the country was of the utmost importance..." in order to ensure the economic and military power of the U.S.S.R., in other words, the military and economic potential of the state. In his speech made at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in July 1955 Bulganin once more emphasised Lenin's idea of building up "socialism", the industrialisation of the country; he said that "the general line of policy of the party which gives the development of heavy industry preference over other branches of the economy of the U.S.S.R., was stable in the past and will remain unchanged in the future" *Pravda*, 5 July 1955. Electrification is—besides the production of fuel, oil, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemicals, machines—a component part of the industrialisation of the U.S.S.R. A party-political article on this subject, under the heading "Development of electrical industry is the prerequisite of technical progress", was published in the journal *Kommunist* No. 12, 1955, pages 26-40. Obviously, this is a propagandist article full of Soviet phraseology; but it says: "The realisation of the G.O.E.L.R.O. plan (1920 plan for electrification—A. M.) which provided for the building of 30 electric power stations with the power of 8.8 milliard kilowatt-hours per annum, was a historic event in the technical development of the U.S.S.R.... How small this number seems to be in comparison with the 166 milliard kilowatt-hours of power planned in the year 1955! During the last 25 years, from 1928 to 1953, the power of the electric power stations of the U.S.S.R. increased more than 47 times, and that of the power stations of the U.S.A. only 2.9 times..."

We do not deny the rapid development of heavy industry and electrification in the U.S.S.R. which is achieved by the neglect of

other branches of Soviet industry and by the pauperisation of, first of all, the enslaved non-Russian peoples by Russia. We should like to point out that when the Soviets had not even dreamt of building the "Dniprohes" (which, by the way, was built by an American engineer), in the U.S.A. there was already running the powerful electric power station at the Niagara Falls.

The state of production of electric current is characterised by the amount of electric energy which has been produced, and not by the speed of building electric power stations which might be closed down later. However, the journal *Kommunist* states that the U.S.S.R. is still behind the U.S.A. in the production of hydro-electric energy because in 1953 the U.S.A. produced 516 milliard kw-hr and the U.S.S.R. only 133 milliard kw-hr.

At the July plenary session Bulganin saw himself compelled to admit that the U.S.S.R. was far behind the western world, particularly the U.S.A., in the development and production of heavy industry even during the realisation of the fifth Five Year Plan. The fifth Five Year Plan provided for the production of 45 million tons of steel, and even if the plan were fulfilled or even overfulfilled, the U.S.S.R. would still be behind the U.S.A. by more than half. According to the communist newspaper *Vestnik* (*Herald*) of 3 December 1955 (Canada), the U.S.A. had produced 105.5 million tons of steel by 15 November 1955. According to the probable results of the sixth Five Year Plan announced by Bulganin at the July plenary session, the U.S.S.R. will not produce 60 million tons of steel until the end of 1960.

Obviously, the present level of the industrial capacity of the U.S.S.R. in the field of heavy industry and electric power does not meet the requirements of the speedy increase of the military and economic potential of the U.S.S.R. The Russian-communist government realises that there will be a war between the U.S.S.R. and the western world in spite of all the present "peace" actions of the Kremlin and its propagandist assertions that two different social systems can co-exist. Russia must achieve détente not only in the international field, but also inside the U.S.S.R. She is compelled to this first of all by the struggle of the non-Russian peoples (Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Caucasians, and others) against Russian imperialism, as well as by the need for realisation of Lenin's idea of "ensuring the economic and military power of the U.S.S.R." The speedy building of electric power stations in the East-Asiatic

territory of the U.S.S.R. during realisation of the sixth Five Year Plan will, according to the Kremlin's plan, be one of the "precautionary measures". The July plenary session of the C.C. of C.P.S.U. once more approved the resolutions of the 19th Party Congress and ordered Gosplan (State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.), Gosekonomkommissiya (State Economic Commission), and the ministries of the U.S.S.R. to improve the general state planning of the distribution of the means of production by keeping to the directives of the party concerning the improvement of the geographical distribution of industrial enterprises, and by bringing them near to the sources of raw materials and fuel... "on the speedy development of industry in eastern regions of the U.S.S.R." (*Pravda* 12 July 1955.) In this connection, new powerful electric power stations are also being built in the East-Asiatic territories. According to the information of the newspaper *Trud* (*Labour*) of 23 December 1955 and the journal *Kommunist* No. 12, 1955, page 31, more than 300 electric power stations of large and medium power, among them 90 hydro-electric power stations, were built in the U.S.S.R. during all the Five Year Plans. During the realisation of the fifth Five Year Plan, says the newspaper, the powerful electric power stations at Tsymlyansk, Yushum, Upper Svir, Mingechaur, were put in operation. The Kama, Gorky, Kakhovka, Narva, Knyazha Huba hydro-electric power stations are producing electric current of the first order. The Myronivka, Slavyanske, Kuzbas, and Cherepovets thermo-electric power stations were built during the realisation of the fifth Five Year Plan. The Kuybyshev hydro-electric system will begin to produce electric current in the beginning of 1956; the Stalingrad hydro-electrical network is being built hastily; the building of new hydro-electric power stations on the Volga, Kama, Dniro, Niemen has begun. Thus most of the electric power stations have been built still in the European part of the U.S.S.R.

During World War II Russia learned by experience that Soviet socialist Five Year Plans cannot protect her from war damage, especially if atom bombs are employed. Most of the big industrial enterprises and electric power stations in the European part of the U.S.S.R. were destroyed or shut down during World War II. The development of industry in the deep rear required a long time and placed an enormous strain on the industrial forces. On the assumption that during the future World War the European part of the U.S.S.R., together with the non-Russian peoples enslaved by Russia,

may remain in the enemy's hands for a long time or even be lost by Russia for good, the C.C. of C.P.S.U. sees itself compelled to build new powerful centres of Soviet economy, and also political centres, behind the Ural Mountains, in Siberia.

Looking at the Soviet map representing the development of Soviet industry we see that it tends to the Asiatic territories of the U.S.S.R. On the river Tom the so-called Kuzbas with ferrous metal and coal industry has been built. Non-ferrous metal industry is also developing there. The largest machine-building centre has been established in Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tyumen, Kurgan, Rubtsovsk. Mills, elevators, peeling mills, mechanical bakeries, slaughterhouses, oil-mills, distilleries, sugar refineries, and other factories have been built in the steppes of Altai. Textile industry has also developed there; raw materials which are delivered by the Turksib railway are worked. During World War II the industry of the regions along the Siberian railway line developed at the expense of the factories evacuated from the European part of the U.S.S.R. A new, coke-chemical industry has arisen at Kemerovo. Gold-mining is the main branch of the industry of Eastern Siberia (Yakutia on the Aldan, a tributary of the Lena). Also the different branches of the mining industry have been developed: lead (Transbaikal), graphite (left affluent of the Angara), barytes (Khakasya), mica salt (Usolye), coal (Cheremkhovo Basin). A new town, Igarka, with sawmills and a port accessible to seagoing vessels, has been built on the Yenisei, at seven hundred kilometres' distance from its mouth. The regions of timber cutting and chemical industry are situated in the Krasnoyarsk Territory and on the left affluents of the Angara in the Irkutsk region. The largest centre of machine-building industry in Eastern Siberia are: Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude. In the Far East—besides the military bases—the gold-mining and the coal and light metal industries have been reconstructed. On Sakhalin there is oil-extracting and oil-refining plant. Ferrous metal industry and a powerful war industry have been developed at Komsomolsk. The timber, food supply, and light industries have also been developed; the fishing industry is being developed hastily. The sixth Five Year Plan provides for completion of the building of the Angara-Yenisei combine in Eastern Siberia. Almost 90 per cent of the whole potential Soviet supply of hydro-electric energy, coal, non-ferrous and precious metals, three fourths of the whole output of iron-ore in the U.S.S.R., and large forests are in the Soviet-Asian East, and a considerable

proportion of the arable land of the U.S.S.R. is in Siberia. It is clear that the natural resources, if properly exploited, will considerably strengthen Russia's military and economic potential and her war industry, and her large territories in Asia will protect industry against destruction by the enemy. According to the sixth Five Year Plan, Soviet industry will be further developed primarily in the Soviet-Asiatic East. From the military point of view this is convenient, because the Soviet East, together with North Korea, Mongolia, red China, and now possibly India, will make up a compact strategic military complex.

The Ust-Kamyanogorsk hydro-electric power station on the river Irtysh (Kazakhstan) has already been put in operation, and now the Bukhtarminsk station is being built. The Novosibirsk hydro-electric power station will be built on the river Ob, while the building of many electric power stations on the river Yenisei will begin shortly. The first turbines of the Irkutsk power station on the river Angara will be started in 1956, and the building of the dock of the Bratsk power station on the Angara—which will be the largest one in the world—has already begun. The electric current produced by the Bratsk power station will be transmitted as far as the Irkutsk-Cheremkhovo (south) and Krasnoyarsk (west) regions. The sixth Five Year Plan also provides for the building of many thermo-electric power stations in Siberia. The geological prospect has revealed that coal-deposits in the Soviet-Asian East stretch from the Ural to the Pacific Ocean. It is supposed that Siberia has inexhaustible beds of natural gas and oil, as well as rich deposits of non-ferrous metals. The picture of the future economic regions of the Soviet Asiatic East would, according to the Soviet press, look like this: metallurgical Ural; coal-metallurgical Kuzbas; grain-producing, cattle-breeding, and industrial West Siberia; power centres, enterprises consuming much electricity, coal, timber, and chemical industry of East Siberia, and industrial, kolkhoz, and fishing Far East. The realisation of the sixth Soviet Five Year Plan will require large armies of workers, the more so as most of the natural resources of Siberia are in a state of eternal congelation. Thus it might be supposed that the sixth Five Year Plan is a plan for the transfer of the concentration camps from the European part of the U.S.S.R. to Siberia, for building new concentration camps in the Soviet-Asiatic East, and for new deportations of the non-Russian peoples aimed at control over Soviet Asia. Revealing the fact that atomic electric power stations will also be built, in

other words, that research on atomic energy will be made in Siberia, the newspaper *Trud (Labour)* of 23 December 1955 also reveals Russia's plan for deportation of the non-Russian population to the remote Soviet-Asiatic territories during the realisation of the sixth Five Year Plan. The newspaper says: "It is known that Soviet youth with patriotic enthusiasm went to Altai and Kazakhstan where it is doing its utmost to cultivate the large areas of virgin and fallow land. With the same enthusiasm new groups of youth are now going from every corner of the U.S.S.R. to build the powerful Bratsk HES. The party and the government are confident that Soviet youth with still greater enthusiasm will go to build industrial centres in the large eastern territories of our Soviet native country".

Thus, is it really the building of new Soviet electric power stations in the East-Asiatic territories or the planned extermination of the non-Russian peoples enslaved by Russia? Or are those two purposes combined?

Radyanska Ukraina of 23 February gives the following programme to be carried out in Ukraine during the next 5 years.

"In order to shorten further transfer of coal from Eastern regions into the European part of the country, an increased development of the industry of Donbas is expected. The Donbas basin has to supply 212 mill. tons of coal in 1960. Due considerations have been made in the plan of an adequate exploitation of Alexandrovsk, Lviv, Volynia basin as well as those on the right bank of Dnipro and in Western Ukraine"—i. e. complete exploitation of Ukraine will be still further intensified.

* * *

Pravda Ukrainy 31 March published an editorial under the heading "To increase economising in kolkhozes". From this it can be seen that the new policy still further suppressed kolkhoz workers. For instance in Khmelnytsky district 100 thousand working days were saved. In Kryzhopil district 100 agricultural brigadiers were dismissed and so on. . .

Increase in the productivity of cereals, potatoes, fruit, and dairy products has to be achieved not at any price but "by a minimum of work and means" (*Pravda Ukrainy*).

Slavery methods, Bolsheviks methods: to pay less and to take more.

Vasyl Oreletsky

Ukraine's International Treaties and Conventions

After a long period of Russian tzarist enslavement lasting about 250 years, Ukraine in 1918 once more became independent and subject to International Law, being able to conclude treaties with other states. The Fourth Universal (Proclamation) of the Ukrainian Central Rada (Central Council), as the supreme authority of the newly created Ukrainian National Republic (Ukrainska Narodnya Respublika), was issued on 22 January 1918 in Kyiv, and proclaimed the full independence of the new Ukrainian state in these words: "From today the Ukrainian National Republic becomes the Independent, Free and Sovereign State of the Ukrainian People".

Russia, Great Britain and France were among the first to recognise the Ukrainian National Republic. Great Britain was represented in Kyiv by Mr. Picton Bagge and France by General Tabouis. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey recognised the Ukrainian National Republic in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1918. In turn other states—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Poland, Argentina and the Vatican recognised the young Ukrainian state, and official Ukrainian representatives were sent to Italy, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and other states.

Hard-pressed from all sides, the Ukrainian Rada asked the Western diplomatic representatives in Kyiv for assistance in order to remain in the war against the Central Powers; but apart from promises of assistance to Ukraine no effective supplies were sent to the country for the purpose of continuing the war.

When the German and Russian delegation met at Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace treaty, the situation of the Ukrainian Government was very precarious. The Russians were presuming to speak at the Conference on behalf of Ukraine, so that the Rada was forced to send its own representatives. On the other hand, the

Central Powers were prepared to invade Ukraine in order to obtain grain. It was thus essential that Ukraine should avoid a joint war against the Central Powers and Russia.

1. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

The official delegation sent by the Ukrainian Government to Brest-Litovsk on 12 January 1918 consisted of three young Ukrainian diplomats—Alexander Sevryuk, Michael Lyubinsky and Mykola Levytsky. These representatives claimed, before all else, an unconditional recognition of the Ukrainian state by the Central Powers. The negotiations with the Central Powers did not proceed smoothly, but finally the peace treaty was signed on 7 February 1918. Under its terms, the Central Powers recognised the full independence of Ukraine inclusive of the territories claimed by the Rada and that section occupied by the German armed forces in the war. In a special secret protocol of 8 February, Austria-Hungary undertook to create a new Austrian crown land consisting of Ukrainian Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian parts of North-Eastern Bukovina in which the official language would be Ukrainian. In return, Ukraine was to deliver a million tons of food to the Central Powers.

Further, the Central Powers promised to send all Ukrainian prisoners of war back to Ukraine and to arm them to fight against the Russian Communists. This undertaking was of especial importance to Ukraine since it secured the supply of trained soldiers and military materials so essential to her.

The conclusion of this Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was the first act of the young Ukrainian state in the international arena in the twentieth century. It achieved the international recognition of Ukraine, but it did not bring with it the expected political prestige.

For the Western Allies did not fully understand this action of the harassed Ukrainian Government, and the more unfortunate aspects of the Treaty so far as Ukraine was concerned became clear later, at the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919. The Western Allies failed to support the Ukrainian delegation there in its endeavour to secure independence for the Ukrainian National Republic, and, as a consequence of this failure, Russia, Poland, Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia took advantage of Ukraine for their own profit, dividing territories belonging to Ukraine among themselves. Communist Russia took the opportunity to establish the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

In the meantime, on 29 April 1918, the Hetmanate (Conservative government) was restored in Ukraine, and several conventions were concluded with neighbouring states. The most important of these are cited below.

2. Convention with the Republic of the Don Cossacks.

The Convention was signed in Kyiv on 7 August 1918, and included the following agreements: Articles 1 and 2 fixed the boundaries between Ukraine and the Don-Republic, recognised the mutual rights of citizens in both states, and dealt with matters of free transit, exchange of goods, customs and finance. Solutions were also found for questions arising out of the Donetz Basin, railway traffic, the postal and telegraph services.

3. Convention with the Kuban-Cossacks.

A Convention on similar lines to the one mentioned above was signed on 3 November 1918 at Kyiv with the Kuban-Cossacks, making settlements with regard to railway traffic, military transport, exchange of goods, transit and customs etc.

4. Convention with Georgia.

Signed on 5 December 1918 at Kyiv, the Convention with Georgia referred to the mutual rights of Ukrainian and Georgian citizens in both states, and to trade, transit, navigation—on the Black Sea—the consular service and other matters.

5. Peace Negotiations with Soviet Russia.

These lasted over almost the whole period of the Hetmanate regime and had little success because the Russians had no genuine desire to conclude a peace treaty with Ukraine. The Ukrainians succeeded merely in establishing consular relations with their northern neighbour and historic adversary, and in settling a few matters concerned with the railroad between Ukraine and Moscow. The Russian delegates delayed negotiations since Russia had every intention of invading Ukraine, as indeed she did, by sending the so-called 'Ukrainian' military units—together with Russian red guards—against Ukraine. It should be stressed that 'Ukrainian' red units never actually existed, but were in fact composed mainly of Russian, and other non-Ukrainian elements.

The end of World War I and the political events which followed in Europe, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe, led to the downfall of the Hetmanate, and to the establishment of the Ukrainian Directory in Kyiv and the resumption of the republican form of government in Ukraine towards the end of 1918.

6. Military Alliance with Poland.

Because the Russians were seeking to invade the Ukrainian National Republic, the Ukrainian Government, headed by Petliura, made a military alliance with Poland. This was signed on 24 April 1920 in Warsaw. Under the agreement the Ukrainian Government was obliged to omit all references to Ukrainian Eastern Galicia, which had belonged until 1918 to Austria, and which had succeeded in establishing the West Ukrainian National Republic—an event which had led to a long war between the West Ukrainians and Polish armed forces. These forces had been supported by the strong ally of Poland, France, and a force, on the whole well-equipped, had been sent under General Haller from France to Eastern Galicia, a policy bitterly opposed by the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George.

This military alliance with Poland did, however, secure Polish recognition of the (East) Ukrainian National Republic, and this was the only formal recognition by one of the powers supported by the victorious Western Allies.

Soon after the signing of this treaty of alliance, the allied Polish and Ukrainian armed forces entered the Ukrainian capital Kyiv—7 May 1920—but the Russian red army succeeded in defeating these united forces. Poland initiated peace negotiations with the Russian Communists while the Ukrainians continued the war alone. Thus the Ukrainians in due course succumbed to the Russians, and the Ukrainian army was compelled to seek refuge mainly in Poland and partially in Rumania. This marked the end of the Ukrainian national regime in Ukraine: the Ukrainian National Republic was replaced by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic under Russian control, and this fate was shared successively by Georgia, Armenia and other independent states. Ukraine thus became the first satellite of Russia, enjoying a temporary nominal sovereignty—until 1923—and being permitted to conclude a multilateral peace treaty at Riga in 1921, and other international conventions with several independent states. The following are the more important of the international agreements signed in the name of Soviet Ukraine up to 1923.

a. Peace Treaty of Riga.

This Treaty was signed in 1921 between Poland and the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics. Despite the services of the Ukrainian armed forces to Poland during the joint Polish-Ukrain-

ian war against Russia, the Poles completely disregarded the interests of their Ukrainian ally and no reference to the Polish-Ukrainian alliance was made by the Polish delegation. Not by any means for the first time in the long history of Polish-Ukrainian relations through the past centuries, Poland was ready to compromise with Russia at the expense of Ukraine by dividing conquered Ukrainian territories with her. This unsound type of compromise had always ended in the occupation and domination of Poland at a later date by Russia. Although the Treaty of Riga secured the Eastern boundaries—Eastern Galicia, a part of Volynia, Pidliashia and Polissia with the Kholm-land remaining under Polish occupation—the peace did not endure for long, and in 1939 Poland shared the fate of Ukraine.

With regard to the international status of Ukraine after the establishment of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with the help of the Russians during the first years of the Russian Bolshevik occupation, it should be noted here that this republic sent diplomatic representatives to all those capitals that had earlier recognised the Ukrainian National Republic.

Other conventions concluded with states in the name of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were:

- b. that with Latvia, 25 March 1920.
- c. with Poland, 21 April 1921.
- d. with White-Ruthenia (Byelorussia), in January 1921.
- e. with Austria and Russia, 7 December 1921.
- f. with Germany, an extension of the Treaty of Rapallo, 16 April 1922.

In addition, there were conventions with Turkey, Estonia, Azerbaijan, and other countries.

Since 1923 Ukraine has no longer been subject to the Law of Nations as she was incorporated into the Soviet Union as a federated Soviet Republic, without the right to conclude and sign international agreements. However, during World War II—in 1944-45—Soviet Ukraine again became subject to the Law, for, thanks to the reaction of the Ukrainian population against Russian Communist domination, the rulers of the Kremlin were compelled to grant certain political concessions to Ukraine. Under the constitutional reform of 1944 in the Soviet Union, Ukraine is again able to conclude and sign international agreements, although the privilege

is restricted owing to the divergencies of Russian practice from the formal constitution.

At the Yalta Conference, 7 February 1945, the Russian Foreign Minister, V. Molotov, demanded that Soviet Ukraine be admitted as an original member to the future world organisation of states. He based his claim on the constitutional changes in the Soviet Union in February 1944, whereby the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had gained control of its own foreign policy. Molotov stated further that Ukraine, who had borne the greatest sacrifices during the war, should be allowed to find a "worthy place among the members of the Assembly".

On 10 April 1945, the Ukrainian Soviet Government submitted the following note to the San Francisco Conference:

"The Ukrainian S.S.R., on the basis of its Constitution of 30 January 1937, and the constitutional revisions and amendments adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in March 1944, has recovered the right which it voluntarily ceded to the U.S.S.R. in 1922 to establish direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements with them and to have independent representations at conferences and bodies set up by the latter. This is also in full accord with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and the constitutional acts of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., dated 1 February 1944."

On 27 April 1945, in the second plenary session of the San Francisco Conference, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was unanimously admitted to the United Nations Organisation as an original member. As such, Ukraine has signed several conventions within the United Nations Organisation and with other states, members of this world organisation of states. Also agreements with countries behind the Iron Curtain, referring to matters of all kinds, have been concluded by the Ukrainian S.S.R. There can be no point in quoting those agreements here.

But finally it must be emphasised that the present international status of Soviet Ukraine—as a republic having special constitutional prerogatives within the Soviet Union, at least on paper—characterises Soviet Ukraine as a demi-satellite state of Russia. This is an important point, and it is one that cannot be made as yet on behalf of the other republics included within the Soviet Union.

Rostyslav Yendyk

A Strategy of Encirclement

There is no doubt that the ten-year striving—if one takes into account only the years after World War II—of the free world for peaceful co-existence with Russian Bolshevism has come to nothing. Nevertheless, the free world has not lost hope and continues to seek for ways and means which would help it to achieve its peace-loving object. This continuous and vain striving is grounded in a misunderstanding of the root of the problem which arises because one's own conceptions and desires are taken for historical data and real facts. What is at issue is that responsible statesmen in the free world do not comprehend the very nature of Bolshevism.

The reasons for that lack of comprehension are rooted, in our opinion, in the following:

- 1) In the study of the Russian people as revealed in the classics of nineteenth century Russian literature, and regarding the nation as a good, God-fearing people seeking after truth in its own soul, that is, a pious and peace-loving people.

- 2) In the separation of the historical—traditional—imperialism from the present Bolshevik one through the complete negation of the former and linking up the latter with the expansion of the international idea.

- 3) In Bolshevik propaganda among the free peoples through the Comintern which organises political parties among them. These are, however, secret detachments having for their purpose internal demoralisation, and not the realisation of social slogans along with the national liberation of the peoples of the colonies.

- 4) In the propaganda of a hidden force in the free world which constantly tries to identify Bolshevism with abstract communism in order to preserve an untouched and indivisible Russian empire after its overthrow.

Obviously, victory over Bolshevism depends, first of all, on a precise definition of its nature, on whether we have a clear idea of it. That is to say, we must win a psychological victory over Bolshevism in our souls before coming up against it in the outside world. This will be possible only after dispelling misunderstandings of Bolshevism. Russian thinkers who judged their own people objectively can help us in this. First of all, there is the great visionary, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, who in his *Besny* (*The Possessed*) predicted the coming of a degenerate who would destroy the ideal of mankind "in the name of equality, envy, and . . . digestion", and the philosopher Berdyayev, who saw in Bolshevism a purely Russian phenomenon. Historical facts will also assist us in the task. They show that at the time of the catastrophe and the division of the Russian empire into its component national parts, Lenin found that the only expedient way to its re-integration was through waking up the hidden instincts of the Russian people and through deceitful slogans intended for liberation movements of other nations, in order to bring them into the Russian "channel" again.

The mental comprehension of such things as those we have quoted, must neutralise any propaganda although the power of the latter should not be underrated. Indeed, we have often heard American Secretaries of State assess the nature of Russian Bolshevism rightly; nevertheless, their words have "somehow" melted away in contradictory assertions. This implies, amongst other things, that the Russian white emigrants and their friends in the free world are so strong that they can destroy correct information about the nature of Bolshevism. Therefore, care should be taken to ensure that they are not subjective allies of Bolshevism, and their influence over the course of the struggle should be restricted, even eliminated.

This vagueness about the nature of Bolshevism reigns among the peoples who do not border on Russia. The neighbours of Russia, however, who have been exposed to her immediate aggression during recent centuries, have a clear enough idea of Bolshevism. This concerns not only the European but also the Asiatic nations, first of all the Chinese. It suffices to follow attentively the expressions of the president of the South Korean Republic, Syngman Rhee, to realise that he sees Russia, and only Russia, in the present form of Bolshevik imperialism, the U.S.S.R. That same Russia appears still more clearly in the speeches of the president of the Chinese Republic, Chiang Kai-shek, who declares frankly: "I know by

experience that the Far-Eastern policy of tzarist Russia and that of Soviet Russia are the same. The Chinese communist party is not an ordinary communist party, but the fifth column of Russian communist imperialism. The usurpation of Outer Mongolia by the Soviets and their invasion of North-East China are a continuation of the aggressive policy of the tzars."

These and similar conclusions of the politicians and statesmen who are responsible for the fate of the nations neighbouring on Russia should be supplemented by the statement that the present-day Bolshevism is the *ancient* Russian imperialism *which has reached the zenith of its power*. Today, in a blind fury, it even dares to lay claim to control of the whole world. To be able to fight successfully against this menace to the world we must create a front on a world scale which would correspond to that of Bolshevism, and which would be able to fight against all the open and camouflaged forms of Bolshevism *everywhere*. The more so as in its work, Russian Bolshevism always uses a "suitcase with a double bottom", an outward mask over its inner nature. Those Bolshevik tactics are the same inside the U.S.S.R. as well as in the free world.

Inside the U.S.S.R. Bolshevism advocates the friendship of all the so-called Soviet peoples; in fact, however, there are bloody persecutions in the U.S.S.R., including genocide. Outside the U.S.S.R., it pretends to strive for a peaceful co-existence; in fact, however, it undermines co-existence by the organisation of insurrections and riots in the colonies, or by means of conspiracy, strikes, sabotage, and espionage in the countries of those diplomatic partners with whom it negotiates peace. In other words, the fight against Bolshevism can be successful only if the peoples of the free world would form an opinion of Bolshevism which corresponds to its real nature without any literary illusions and intentional, or unintentional, propaganda lies.

The contact of the A.B.N. (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations of Eastern and Central Europe) with the A.P.A.C.L. (Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League) which was made by the president of the A.B.N., Mr. Jarasław Stetzko, in October last, should be regarded as one of the provident measures which aim at a total destruction of Bolshevism as the spearhead of Russian aggression, and its confinement within the ethnographic territory of the Russian people. Provision has been made for large-scale co-operation

of the two organisations, not only for the drawing-up of a common plan of fight against Russian Bolshevism, but also for the co-ordination of their individual actions. The efforts of the president of the A.B.N., Jaroslaw Stetzko, and the president of the A.P.A.C.L., Ku Cheng-kang, promise to have immeasurably great consequences, because they lead towards co-operation between all *the neighbouring nations inside the U.S.S.R. with regard to the Russian people, as well as those outside the U.S.S.R., with regard to the Russian empire*. Thus a real besetting of the Russian bear in its own den was brought about according to all the tactical rules of hunting. Psychological victory over Russian Bolshevism depends on the success of that close co-operation. It is the prerequisite of its utter defeat, which will also be brought about by concerted action of the national liberation movements of the neighbours of Russia.

The co-operation of the A.B.N. and the A.P.A.C.L. forms the first circle around Bolshevism in its own habitat. It is a firm and faithful defence line against communist aggression and one upon which we can always rely. This circle must be followed by further, second-rank and third-rank, circles which should comprise *all the free peoples of the world*, because the world activity of Bolshevism must stimulate an identical counteraction in the whole world which would paralyse the former in every nook and cranny of the globe. The resistance of the free peoples to Bolshevism and their efforts to destroy it must be as international as Bolshevism which in its campaign aims at enslavement of the whole world.

Now the A.B.N. and the A.P.A.C.L. give the free world a good example of a united and expedient fight against Russian Bolshevism at its present stage. Although the Latin proverb says: "*Verba docent, exempla trahunt*", yet it is also true that examples require discerning people and statesmen who are willing to follow them. To act in accordance with the examples in this instance is to form further psychological defence circles round Bolshevism. It remains to be seen who will undertake this task.

Jaroslav Stetzko

FOR A UNITED FRONT

There can be no doubt that the common aim of the Russian imperialists and Chinese Communists is to put an end to the freedom of the island of Taiwan, in order to destroy the extremely important Asiatic bastions of the free world in the fight against the Russian imperium. Taiwan is a constant "memento mori" for the red Peking government, for Russia's satellites.

The Moscow and Peking governments are constantly endeavouring to extend the sphere of their dominion. If they were certain that an attack on their part on Taiwan would not lead to a world war, they would long since have resorted to this measure. But Moscow is at present not yet prepared for a military conflict with the free world, and there is thus no reason to assume that it will launch a military attack on Taiwan in the immediate future. Moscow and red Peking will continue, in a threatening manner, to talk about their willingness to "liberate" Taiwan, in order to intimidate the free world and, as far as possible, to get a free hand in this respect, but they will not venture to resort to action as long as they are confronted by the firm attitude of the West and determination on the part of the government of Free China.

"Co-existence"

"Co-existence" is a deceptive term which is used for the purpose of lulling the free world into security, undermining its morale, and then subsequently attacking it by surprise. The aim of "co-existence" is to show the peoples subjugated by Russia, who are fighting for the disintegration of the Russian imperium, whatever its colour, into sovereign states within their own ethnographical boundaries, that the free world has approved of the subjugation of these peoples. In this way the suspicion of the subjugated peoples is to be aroused as regards the free world which bargains away the freedom of nations and individuals. The "co-existence" policy aims

to destroy the united and universal front of the entire freedom-loving mankind on this side of and beyond the Iron Curtain. Its purpose is to help Moscow to attack the free world when the opportunity seems ripe to the Kremlin and to exploit the attitude of mistrust and suspicion towards the West on the part of the nations subjugated by Russian imperialism and Communism.

Methods Russia understands

I am of the opinion that the policy of friendship with Russia and the red Peking government which is being pursued by the Indian government is harmful for the Indian nation, since the latter's vigilance as regards the menace of Russian imperialism is thus impaired. Peace can never be maintained if the free world pursues a policy of concessions towards Russian imperialism and its hireling, Mao Tse-tung. Russia will only yield to pressure.

And various examples in history illustrate this fact. The history of the 20th and also of the 19th century proves beyond all doubt that whenever Russia, in the course of a conference or congress, renounced some territory or other that she had annexed, she merely did so either because she had suffered a military defeat or else was threatened by military force if she refused to cede the territory in question, but never for any other reason. It was only Germany's ultimatum at the peace conference of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 which forced Lenin and Trotsky to renounce their claims to the Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine. It was only the fact that Poland, Finland, and Ukraine proclaimed their national rights in 1917 and made it plain that they would, if needs be, resort to military force if their national aspirations were disregarded, which compelled the Kerensky government to yield. It was only the British convoys in the Sea of Marmara and the stern warning of the British Cabinet during the Turko-Russian War of 1878 that prompted Russia during the Congress of Berlin to renounce her Balkan booty and abandon her Dardanelles plans, much against her will. It was only the fact that Japan had been victorious in the war which led to the eviction of Russia from Korea and Manchuria at the peace conference at Portsmouth. And it was only thanks to England's firm attitude that Russia was evicted from North Persia and Greece after World War II.

There never have been nor are there any other methods of forcing the Russian imperialists to cede territories which they have annexed.

Peace can only be achieved if the Russian imperium is disintegrated into independent national states within their own ethnographical boundaries and the Russian state is established solely within the ethnographical boundaries of the Russian nation. Siberia is not part of Russia and must be detached from the latter. The independent states of Ukraine, Turkestan, Byelorussia, of the peoples of Caucasia, Idel-Ural, of the Baltic peoples, and of all the satellite countries in Europe and Asia must be restored once more.

Mao and Titoism

It does not seem to me that Mao Tse-tung could ever become the Tito of Asia. All the more so, since it cannot be assumed that Tito has really severed his connections with Russia and is genuinely on the side of the West. In my opinion, Tito will take sides with Russia should it come to a decisive conflict with Russia. Tito is well aware of the fact that the free democratic West, should it prove victorious in such a conflict, would never permit the despotism which prevails in the Balkan States to continue. Tito is a typical adherent of "co-existence", for the simple reason that he is hoping to land a big haul by fishing in troubled waters—those of the free West and those of despotic Russia. The free world must openly support the cause of the national state independence of the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes as well as the reunion of Macedonia with Bulgaria, in order to win over these peoples for the fight against Communist despotism and imperialist artifices.

The age of empires is past. No one nation may subjugate another. This is the fundamental attitude of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.), which rejects all co-operation with Russian imperialists, whatever their political tendency, and neither co-operates nor will ever co-operate with any Russian group, even though the latter may be anti-Communist, since there is no emigrant Russian political group which is not imperialist in trend.

The source of evil in the world today is not merely Communism, but also Russian imperialism. And Mao Tse-tung is its advocate. In order to keep him interested, Moscow will "allow" him to subjugate Tibet, North Korea, and North Vietnam, just as it allowed Tito to violate the rights of the Croats and Slovenes to compel him to adhere to Moscow even more closely on the strength of their common crimes.

I do not think it likely that Mao Tse-tung will sever his connections with Russia, since such a step on his part would be his ruin.

Basic ideas for victory

The free world must support the idea of independent national states for the peoples of Europe, Asia, and Africa, it must reject imperialism, and, above all, it must advocate the idea put forward above that the Russian imperium, whatever its political trend, should be disintegrated into national states of all the nations within their ethnographical boundaries. The free world must under no circumstances allow an unjust social order to prevail in the countries of Asia and Africa. It must call a halt to every form of colonial policy and every form of feudal social order, and must support the endeavours of the nations to achieve independence; in addition, it must, above all, support the champions of the cause of the national liberation of the peoples in the empires, and also the champions of an anti-feudal and anti-Communist social order, who are striving to restore the just, social and national traditions of all the dependent and colonial peoples of Asia and the entire world. As long as the free world supports the imperialistic ideology in any form whatsoever, it will never conquer Russian imperialism. It is futile to try to fight an unjust ideology by means of some other unjust ideology—especially in our time, in the era of the anti-Communist world-revolution of the nations.

Japan and the West

It would be a mistake to attempt to introduce a social order in Japan which is not in keeping with the national characteristics and spirit of that country—an order which is a complete contradiction of the national and religious traditions of this industrious nation. Moscow and the red Peking government will, of course, try to make Japan adopt India's policy; they will try to buoy Japan up with vain hopes of economic prosperity, and, above all, will try to persuade Japan to play a double game.

Perhaps the wisest thing the West can do is to give Japan back her full sovereignty in every respect and admit her into the family of the nations of the free world who enjoy equal rights. And, incidentally, the past must be forgotten. The West should help Japan to solve her difficult economic problems; it should bear in mind the national dignity of this great nation and should not constantly remind the Japanese nation of its recent defeats, but should adhere to the principle that the age of empires is past and that no nation in the world may subjugate another.

Unity of freedom-loving nations

It is undoubtedly essential that the freedom-loving anti-Communist forces of all the peoples of the free and subjugated world should be united. But I believe that this can only be achieved if the full sovereignty of the nations of the world is recognised, that is to say on the basis of a clear and firm conception of national state independence, and not on the basis of a purely negative and vague anti-Communist ideology. In this anti-Communist world bloc there must be no room for any Russian imperialists, who are only intent upon replacing the Communist regime by a new form of subjugation. Not a single subjugated nation within the U.S.S.R. will join a world bloc directed against Communism if this bloc is not at the same time also directed against the Russian imperium, for it is high time that the latter be liquidated. It is impossible to justify the Russian imperium in an era in which the British, French, and Dutch empires are ceasing to exist. It is impossible to persuade the nations that they should fight against Communism only that they may be forced to put up with Russian imperialists of other political trends or with other conquerors in the future, instead of the Russian red imperialists of today. The nations are not fighting in order to exchange iron fetters for golden ones, but in order to rid themselves of all fetters for good!

It is wiser to have a small circle of advocates of just, national state conception, who are capable of winning over the peoples completely, than a medley of all kinds of anti-Communists who have no clearly defined and positive ideology and no sound ideas on the setting up of a just, social order in the future. Vague watchwords have never yet led to victorious revolutions; on the contrary, revolutionary organisations have always succeeded in stirring and winning over the masses by the dogmatic lucidity of their ideas. The motto of our age must be the fight to bring about the downfall of imperialism. And the national idea is the symbol of our age. Millions will die in the future fight, and in order to justify this sacrifice before God and history these millions must die for the cause of absolute truth, national state independence, social justice, freedom of the individual, and faith in God!

Hitler advanced eastwards in pursuit of his conquest plans, and the revolutionary national liberation organisations of the peoples subjugated by Russia opposed him, regardless of the fact that he was an anti-Communist, solely because no one had any desire to

fight for the German imperium and a new form of subjugation. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.) conducted a two-front war—against Hitler and against Stalin, against Hitler's "New Europe", which was merely a camouflage for the German imperium, and against the U.S.S.R., the Russian imperium.

We warn the free world not to co-operate with the so-called anti-Communist white Russian imperialists, for, at the crucial moment, they will join sides with the Kremlin. At the outbreak of World War II Kerensky affirmed that he was exhorting the West and the Russians to fight on Stalin's side, since it was "better to have a cruel dictator than to help partition the Russian imperium".

It is impossible to unite the imperialists and the nationalist democrats in one bloc, just as it is inconceivable that one should fight for the preservation of the Russian imperium and for its disintegration at one and the same time.

New role for the United Nations

The Western major powers, together with Free China, must see to it that the U.S.S.R. and Communist governments of Moscow's satellites are excluded from the United Nations, and, in doing so, must base their arguments on the principles of the U.N. Charter, which stipulate that those guilty of aggression and genocide may not be members of the U.N. Instead of the aforesaid Communist governments, the authorised representatives of the national liberation organisations and exiled governments of the peoples living in Moscow's sphere of influence must be admitted to the United Nations as members. The representatives of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Turkestan, Czechia, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Rumania, Georgia, the Baltic countries, Serbia, Croatia, Korea, Vietnam, Hungary, and of all the other nations subjugated by Moscow and by Communism must become members of the United Nations, as well as all the other nations and countries, like Japan for instance, which are not yet members of this organisation.

The United Nations must become an organisation for the fight against the Russian imperium and Communism, not an organisation for the "co-existence" of the free states and the subjugated states. It must be reorganised on the basis of equality of rights for all nations, great and small alike, so that the feeling of equality will give all nations the strength to fight in unity for the great

cause: for the freedom and national state independence of all nations, for social justice for mankind, and for a universal freedom for the individual. The United Nations must become a world union whose activity is conducted in the same spirit as that of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (A.P.A.C.L.) and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.).

Trends in Russia—the free world's opportunity

The development of the internal situation in the Kremlin points to the trend to maintain an absolute dictatorship, as has always been the case in the history of Russia, which has never been democratic and whose people have never known freedom, as compared for example with the Ukrainian nation, which for more than a thousand years has advocated the idea of personal freedom and has never set up a despotic regime in its own country.

It is really immaterial whether the Kremlin dictatorship is that of one man alone or of a group of persons. The Communist Party, the personification of Russian imperialism, is in power and continues to remain the actual dictator. The marshals and generals are leading members of the Party and owe their power to the Party. It is completely immaterial whether the absolute ruler is a Party member in civilian attire or in the uniform of a marshal. In any case, he is a member of the Party which dictates. The Soviet Army consists for the most part of non-Russians, that is to say of members of the subjugated nations; only the national Russian element is reliable, and the Soviet Army as a whole, because of its national heterogeneity, is a source of danger to the regime.

The vulnerable spot of the Russian imperium is the national problem, that is to say the revolutionary national liberation aims of the subjugated peoples who are fighting to achieve the disintegration of the imperium into national states. The unnatural Communist social and economic system is steadily being weakened and undermined by radical resistance on the part of the subjugated nations and peoples.

A change in the Kremlin government will in no way influence Russia's relations with the free world, since the constant aim of all Russians is to conquer the whole world. At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party the rulers of the Kremlin criticised Stalin unfavourably in order to deceive the free world and to make it appear as though they had changed for the better, and also in order to throw dust in the eyes of the subjugated nations and to

try and make them believe that Stalin alone was responsible for genocide and despotism. But the fact must not be overlooked that Khrushchov, Kaganovich, and Molotov were governors of Ukraine for many years and that the three of them together murdered more than eight million persons there.

It is characteristic of the rulers of the Kremlin that they criticised Stalin for having falsified the history of the Communist Party and for having wrongly assessed capitalism, etc., but not for having annexed half Asia and Europe nor for having subjugated millions of persons of various nations, nor for the fact that the foreign countries which were occupied and annexed as a result of Stalin's policy were not liberated later on. The theory according to which the proletariat can attain power solely by violence was condemned and Bulgaria, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia were quoted as examples of this theory, but the fact was "overlooked" that the Russian army brought Communist power into these countries by means of their bayonets.

Mikoyan's theory, according to which Communism has come into power in the West as a result of elections, is an admission of the complete bankruptcy of Communism, since a comparison with the "elections" in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Bulgaria is bound to lead to the conclusion that Russia's army will have to be present when the Communists take over the power in the West.

A complete loss of faith in the victory of the Communist revolution was apparent at the 20th Communist Party Congress, and from what was implied in the speeches that were made it is obvious that the rulers of the Kremlin have staked all on the Russian army, on sheer Russian imperialism, and on the hardness of the Russian soldiers. The latter are to effect the "liberation" of the proletariat in the Western countries, just as was the case under Voroshilov's command in Hungary and under Zhukov's command in Eastern Germany, where "free elections" and the "evolutionary" assumption of power by the Communist Party have taken place. This same programme is to be carried out in Italy or France after the Russian divisions have effected an invasion under the command of Koniev.

The Western world must proclaim the big charter of the national freedom and independence of the nations; it must support the revolutionary national liberation movements behind the Iron Curtain; it must support the underground resistance movements politically,

morally, technically, and militarily, and must be ready to intervene actively in every breach which occurs beyond the Iron Curtain in order to widen such breaches and create situations similar to those created by the Russians in Indo-China when they supported Vietminh, or in Greece when they supported Markos. The greatest danger lies in waiting passively and not acting, in the hope that a mutual conflict will put an end to the despotism of the Kremlin.

Instead of idly looking on when Beria was liquidated and whilst confusion reigned after Stalin's death, instead of keeping silent when the German workers in East Germany revolted and the Ukrainian internees in the concentration camps in Vorkuta rebelled, instead of assuming the role of a silent spectator whilst the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian, Turkestanian, or Byelorussian insurgents fight, the West should take an active part in all these processes in order to destroy the Russian imperium from within and, with the aid of the national revolutions of the subjugated nations, should open up the surest way which leads to the destruction of Communism. Instead of helping those units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army who, in their legions, their weapons in their hands, fought their way out of Ukraine and through to Western Germany in order to show the world that Ukraine is in a state of political ferment, the occupation forces of the Western powers put the Ukrainian insurgents in isolation camps in Western Germany.

On this side of the Iron Curtain Moscow only has its Fifth Columns on its side; on the other side of the Iron Curtain, however, the West has whole nations on its side. And all that is needed is a little careful thought on the part of the West and these mighty dynamic forces within the Russian imperium will explode.

We revolutionary nationalists of the peoples of Eastern Europe and Soviet Asia were very pleased to hear Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's conception of liberation—the conception of a national revolution as the only true way to destroy Communism and the Russian imperium without thermo-nuclear weapons or a world war...

BOOK REVIEWS

G. A. Tokaev: *BETRAYAL OF AN IDEAL*. Translated from the Russian by Alec Brown. With an introduction by Sir David Kelly, G.C.M.G. London: The Harvill Press, 1954.

During recent years there have been numerous Soviet Russian functionaries of the military and civil authorities who have "chosen freedom" and, under the protection of the Western powers, are now publishing political revelations about the Soviet regime—preferably in the English language. Of these the former colonel of the Soviet Air Force, Grigory A. Tokaev, who fled to England via West Berlin in 1951 (he spells his name in the Latin transcription Tokaev, which is not, however, in keeping with the Russian pronunciation), is undoubtedly the most striking figure, and a person whose statements appear most credible to the West since they may well be based on authentic sources. Of his own person Tokaev writes as follows: "I spent two years in the Pioneers, six years in the Comsomol, sixteen years in the Party. For fifteen years I belonged to the Corps of Officers of the armed forces, for ten of them I was a leading Party member and a senior reader of a Moscow Academy of the highest rank. With this experience behind me I feel safe in saying that...". If one also takes into consideration the fact that G. A. Tokaev was personally acquainted with such prominent figures of the U.S.S.R. as Bukharin, Ordzonikidze, and Alluluyeva, and that he was not a Russian by birth, but a North Caucasian of the Ossetian national minority, and has therefore no reason to share the specifically Russian imperialistic and chauvinistic attitude towards the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union—which, in fact, he by no means shares—then it becomes obvious that the Western reader, in assessing the author's testimony, is not so much concerned with whether he really is familiar with the subjects he deals with, but solely with the question of his personal sincerity. And one is bound to admit that this book, which, incidentally, is not a piece of political propaganda but a detailed autobiography of the author's life from his childhood up to the year 1935, definitely gives one the impression of having been written in all sincerity.

Yet even the most genuine and subjective sincerity may represent entirely erroneous ideas, and this is precisely what happens in the author's case. From his earliest youth he associated almost exclusively with Communist Party circles; his knowledge of what lies beyond these circles is really only based on hearsay, and he shows no inclination to fill up the gaps in his knowledge of the mode of living and general attitude of the non-party masses of the Soviet Union. Lenin's Communist Party means "everything" to him; what lies beyond it is, in his opinion, behindhand and reactionary, and all the reproaches he voices as far as Stalin and his helpmates are concerned actually amount to one and the same thing, namely that Stalin and his clique, as a result of their greed for power, "betrayed" and distorted the "just and humane" Soviet Communism founded by Lenin, and ruthlessly kindled the imperialistic desires of traditional Russian Messianism, so that a return to "progressive" socialism could only be carried out successfully within the Party itself, by Communists and political sympathisers; all else must be regarded as futile.

Although he was thrown out of the Comsomol and the Party on several occasions because of his oppositionist attitude and activity, G. A. Tokaev remains a Party fanatic who, at first, completely fails to see why candid criticism of the "general line" of the Stalinist regime should be regarded as "opposition".

"I had no conception that my effort to assist the régime by speaking the truth would land me in the opposition"—thus he defines his Party attitude during that eventful summer of 1930; but even later, in the year 1934, after he had experienced and survived imprisonment and physical torture at the hands of the notorious N.K.V.D., his political horizon is not much wider, for he writes as follows:

"We were members of a movement of young people who belonged neither to the Right nor the Left wing deviation, nor to any of the opposition groups known to the Central Committee at that time. Our ideas had grown out of first principles rather than out of the struggle between the Party and the known oppositions. Or perhaps I should rather say that, starting from a variety of points of view, we were still feeling our way towards an agreed policy; we were not yet an opposition, we were the raw material out of which an opposition could be made."

The only change which G. A. Tokaev's wealth of political experience brings about in his attitude is that, whereas at first he had held certain leading personalities responsible for "distorting" Leninism ("for me, it was not the system that was wrong, but only certain individuals"), he now condemns the entire Stalinist regime: "The Stalinist system of centralised State monopoly rejects by its very essence the notion of the individual as a self-organising unit: the individual has value solely in so far as he is part of a collectivised grouping... Outside such groupings a man is *automatically* denuded of all value".

This statement is quite correct, but it should apply to the entire totalitarian system of Communism and not solely to the "scapegoat" of Stalinism; Stalin merely reaped what Marx and Lenin had sown. It is indeed gratifying to note that Sir David Kelly in his "Introduction", which, incidentally, is very reserved in tone, earnestly endeavours to set aright the misplaced ideas expressed by G. A. Tokaev, by writing as follows:

"Colonel Tokaev... makes no secret of the fact that even in 1935 he still retained his early ideas of a democratic Communism; still believed that the collapse of the early Proletarian régime was due to the wickedness of Stalin, and says he would go back to the U.S.S.R. at once if freedom of political parties and discussion were restored¹). To the historian and the psychologist it is infinitely more likely that Stalinism was the true and inevitable development of the Marxist theory which could only be made to work by a realist-autocrat; that the idea of personal liberty is a dogma and an emotion which has no meaning if you once grant the materialist interpretation and the sole right of the community to own the means of production and distribution. The rights of the individual person have no logical basis on

¹) Even under Lenin's actual dictatorship political discussion, except of course within the Communist Party, was tolerated! Which surely proves how little importance Tokaev attached to matters which lay outside the Party sphere—V. D.

Socialist principles and it is humanly impossible to work the system if the right to object is allowed."

Unfortunately, however, Sir David Kelly does not mention the distortions of historical and social truth which are likewise the result of the author's Leninist party fanaticism and apply to the national problems of the Soviet Union. It is true that G. A. Tokaev is not a Russian, and it would be wrong to suspect him of secretly supporting Soviet Russian imperialism. But what difference does it make, if, according to Tokaev's "orthodox" Leninism, there is really no need for national problems to exist in the U.S.S.R., since they were solely created by Stalin's dictatorial supremacy? At least, that is Tokaev's opinion:

"Russia... was the name by which Muscovy, when it became imperialist, called itself. Russia is in fact only a part of the Soviet Union and the Russians only one out of the sixty-three nationalities and two hundred and two peoples officially recognised²). In the springtime of the Revolution there was no apparent reason why these nations and peoples should not live together in equality and freedom; but the same Kremlin imperialist aspirations which concealed themselves under the Tzarist name "Russia" have infected the Soviet State and dissolved the very principles on which the Revolution was founded."

The fact that all the non-Russian nations of the former tsarist realm broke with Moscow precisely "in the springtime of the Revolution" and were only placed under the Russian yoke again by armed force, after years of fierce fighting, and, incidentally, long before Stalin assumed supremacy in the Kremlin, occurred, in the opinion of G. A. Tokaev, "without apparent reason". Those concerned happened to be "bourgeois nationalists", old-fashioned counter-revolutionaries, who failed to comprehend "the very principles on which the Revolution was founded"—in any case, they were "non-party" persons, who, in Tokaev's opinion, do not count at all!

It is, therefore, not surprising that the author regards the entire heroic fight of the nations subjugated by Moscow for their national existence and independence merely as a local rising on the part of non-Russian Communists within the Party itself, that is to say as an "early" form of Titoism:

"One of the greatest weaknesses of the Soviet régime was the centrifugal tendency of the subordinate republics. This was known as "bourgeois nationalism", a phenomenon which had been growing recently (!). The republics had preserved their national aspirations; and if things were going badly—if the Kremlin could not supply a sufficiency of manufactured goods—they believed that independence would bring greater prosperity; but if, owing to the new capital investment and improved distribution (!), things went better, the local heads (!) dreamed of self-sufficiency... there have established themselves in every corner of the Soviet Empire groups of "bourgeois nationalists", "revolutionary democrats", "Bukharinists" and "true Communists", who have gone to earth; the most vital of these in terms of resistance are the "bourgeois nationalists" and nationalist Communists, whom

²) This is, of course, sheer nonsense. The U.S.S.R. (after World War II, too.) does not consist of more than twenty true nations, which have, however, been systematically split up under the Bolshevik regime according to the old principle of "divide et impera".—V. D.

in a general way we might call Titoists. These are on the uprise and in the next two or three years may be expected to resume their activities."

The author thus argues quite logically that there is no "progressive" political life in the Soviet Union outside the Party and therefore no national freedom movement of extra-Communist origin. This is a Leninist distortion of the national fight which is being conducted in the U.S.S.R., and the Anglo-Saxon reader must be on his guard lest he accept such statements as the truth!

V. D.

George N. Shuster: *RELIGION BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN*. Published by The Macmillan Company, New York 1954, p. 281.

The President of Hunter College in New York has published a book illustrating "the struggle for the religious survival of that vast number of Catholic, Protestant and Jewish people living under Communist domination," as we read on the cover of this book. Has the author fully succeeded in presenting us with the "frightening picture of destruction" of the various churches behind the Iron Curtain? May we be permitted to state that he has not. Because by looking in the book we may see that the powerful Ukrainian church organisations, such as the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukrainian Eastern Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine and the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in Greater Ukraine, have been mentioned only very briefly or not at all. We hoped to find a section under the name "Ukraine" or at least under the heading "The Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches". But in vain. Only a few pages are devoted to the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and are included in the section "Poland". The destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, with its great leader, Metropolitan Lypkivsky, and many bishops, is not mentioned at all in this book that "should reveal all the many facets of the Communist pattern of destruction".

This is perhaps due to the sad fact that Western thinking in terms of states is not sufficient for full understanding of events in Eastern European countries, above all in Ukraine and Byelorussia (White Ruthenia). These two nations had declared their independence immediately after the outbreak of the Russian revolution and are struggling in its cause to this day. We must emphasise that many states and nations of the Western World have risen in revolutions, and the large Ukrainian nation of forty million souls will never cease to struggle for the renewal of its independence.

But let us return to the statements of President Shuster. The author writes that "a few ardent patriots among the (Ukrainian) clergy had for a time expected great things of what they assumed would be Nazi policy towards Ukraine" and he believes that "there was some truth in this charge". The author is convinced that the secret Soviet police confiscated all relevant documents, so that it is hard to establish the truth. But Dr. Shuster does not mention in his book how many Ukrainian intellectuals and priests were hanged, arrested or deported to Germany by the Nazis. Between the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the German occupying forces relations were very strained until the end of World War II. The late Metropolitan Sheptytsky protested frequently against the murders and deportations of the

Jewish population in Ukraine and elsewhere. These persistent protests of the Ukrainian Church leader against the terrible persecutions of Jews (and Ukrainians as well) may go to prove that there was no co-operation between the Ukrainian and the occupying Nazi forces. But if there were "documents" of such co-operation between the Ukrainian Catholic clergy and the Nazi forces, the Soviets could have published them years ago.

The whole story dealing with the recantation of Dr. Kostelnyk hardly corresponds to the truth either, and it is regrettable that it should have been published by so prominent an author as President Shuster. All the facts should have been first verified. And it should not have been difficult to do so in view of Dr. Shuster's active participation in international affairs and his work with the State Department. Moreover, he was Land Commissioner of Bavaria for the military government in Germany and is chairman of the United States National Commission for U.N.E.S.C.O. We can be sure that President Shuster had many opportunities for meeting Ukrainians in the U.S.A. (New York) and in Germany for the purpose of verifying any material he wished to publish.

We much regret having to stress the opinion that President Shuster has not presented us with a warranted account of the tragedy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. His statements on this point are incomplete and do not give any adequate idea of the religious persecutions, especially in the Ukrainian territories under red Russian domination. We may express the hope that the author will rectify these failings as soon as an opportunity presents itself to him.

V. Oreletskyj

John A. Armstrong: UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM 1939-1945.
Columbia University Press, New York 1955, pp. 322, with maps.

The author has tried to base his study on widely scattered documentary material and little known sources. One is surprised to read many quotations from the Ukrainian newspapers published in Ukraine and in emigration during World War II. In the Preface, Mr. Armstrong names with gratitude all those important persons and institutions who have been most helpful in providing advice, written material and personal recollections, and among them are many prominent Ukrainians.

By "Ukrainian Nationalism" Mr. Armstrong understands the Ukrainian liberation movement in general. He emphasises the activities of the two nationalist groups in Ukraine itself, 1939-1945, as compared with the weaker liberation movement of the Ukrainian Government in exile, which was represented by the insurrectionary movement under Taras Bulba (Borovets). In dealing mainly with these two nationalist groups, it is clear he regards them as the *spiritus movens* of the Ukrainian national movement during the period of the German occupation of Ukraine in the years mentioned above.

It should however be stated clearly here that in the years 1939-1941 only a very small part of the Ukrainian western territories were occupied by the German Army, while from June 1941 all Ukrainian territories came successively under German control. Two main groups of the Ukrainian nationalists succeeded in penetrating Ukraine despite many difficulties—

arrests, executions, etc.—put in their way by the German authorities. The author points out that the Germans did not wish to set up or support any Ukrainian state, and thus all genuine Ukrainian movements had to be suppressed by the respective German factors. The Germans endeavoured to replace Ukrainians by Russians and other elements which did not support Ukrainian nationalists in their attempt to establish an independent Ukraine. In particular, Ukrainians from the West Ukrainian territories that, until 1939, had been under Polish, Rumanian and Czecho-Slovak occupation, together with the whole Ukrainian emigration scattered all over Europe, were forbidden to enter Ukraine, since they constituted the Ukrainian element most dangerous to the German occupying forces. And all signs of the Ukrainian independence movement in Ukraine were severely repressed by the German *Rechskommissariat* in Ukraine.

On page 25 Mr. Armstrong reminds us that the first major attempt of the Ukrainian nationalists for nearly two decades to liberate Ukrainian soil from foreign rule had failed in 1941, at the beginning of the German occupation.

In the chapter "Ukrainians and Polish Catastrophe" we expected to find the main reasons for Ukrainian-Polish hostility during the first weeks of the German military advance in Ukrainian East Galicia. But we do not find it sufficiently well explained to permit an understanding of the events at the beginning of the German-Soviet Russian hostilities.

It is also difficult for us to agree always with the many statements made by the author on the activities of the two nationalist groups: the Bandera and the Melnyk groups. Documentary material is insufficient during those crucial years. And especially are the difficulties increased by the camouflage the two groups were obliged to adopt in their penetration of Ukraine in order to avoid the executions and arrests which were part of German policy. Because of this camouflage the narrative lacks clarity and detail; but in spite of such errors as there may be, we appreciate very highly the good will of the author in presenting the political situation in Ukraine in 1939-1945. Reading the book, one can picture the real situation not only in Ukraine but also in Eastern Europe generally. And it should be mentioned that many prominent Germans did not agree at all with the ruthless policy of the German occupation authorities in Ukraine.

The author's statements on the subject of the Ukrainian Division are in the main accurate. Further proof that the young Ukrainian patriots in this division were fighting for the noble cause of the liberation of Ukraine, and for no other, may also be found in the arrangement between the British Army Command in Austria at the end of World War II, by which the Ukrainian military units were not repatriated to Red Russia as were, for instance, the Cossacks. This wise deed of the British Command will no doubt contribute to a better understanding between the two great nations when Ukraine is once more a free nation.

Maps are included in the book to illustrate the penetration of the Ukrainian nationalist groups into East Ukraine, in the summer and autumn of 1941, also partisan activity in Northern Ukraine, those places having Ukrainian newspapers from 1941-43, and the regions of East Ukraine. These

maps add greatly to the lucidity of the account of events in Ukraine during the years 1941-43.

Despite the points raised above and some other errors, we are in the main very greatly indebted to the author for this study, which is indeed one of the major works now available on the Ukrainian liberation movement presented by a non-Ukrainian.

V. O.

V. Swoboda: *THE "SLAVONICE" PART OF THE OXFORD HEPTAGLOT LEXICON*. Slavistica, No. 25. Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences. Winnipeg, 1956, p. 60.

We print THE PREFACE by Professor W. K. Matthews, of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, to the above work by a Ukrainian scholar.

"Curiosity in languages other than the Classical characterises the history of European linguistics in the 16th and 17th centuries, and the compilation of multilingual vocabularies appears to have been a favourite way of expressing this curiosity. Among such vocabularies was one based on Ambrosius Calepinus (*Dictionarium undecim linguarum*, Bale, 1605), in which the equivalents of his Latin entries are given in eleven languages, chiefly Romance and Germanic. The Slavonic language figuring in the columns of this book is Polish, and this would seem to have been used by the makers of the manuscript Heptaglot Lexicon (Bodleian MS. Marsh 187) in the elucidation of some of the Latin entries which they took over from Calepinus.

The existence of the Heptaglot Lexicon was rediscovered in 1951 by J. S. Simmons and B. O. Unbegaun (cf. *Oxford Slavonic Papers* II, pp. 125-7). Since then it has enlisted the interest of other students in various linguistic fields, among them J. Deny, G. Nandris, and V. Swoboda, an assistant lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (University of London). The nature of the seven diverse languages of the Heptaglot Lexicon helps to establish approximately the place where the constituent vocabularies were compiled. The presence of such languages as Turkish and Crimean Tartar, Modern Greek and Armenian, Rumanian and 'Slavonic' would suggest *a priori* the territory of the Ottoman Empire. At that time we find the Turks in direct contact not with Russia, but with the Ukrainian Cossacks of Zaporozhya, and we should naturally interpret the heading 'Slavonice seu Russice' in the Lexicon as 'Ukrainian'. Indeed, Mr. Swoboda has examined in considerable detail the 'Slavonic' entries in the Lexicon and has confirmed their Ukrainian character. This part of the Lexicon is printed here for the first time and represents an extract from the author's doctoral thesis, which is to be presented to the University of London in the course of 1956. It figures in the thesis as Appendix I, and Mr. Swoboda's Introduction to it (see pp. 7-13) serves not only as a guide to the Ukrainian vocabulary but gives a summary of his findings, whose details must be sought elsewhere. Meantime we have here a valuable supplement to the 17th-century lexica of L. Zizaniy, P. Berynda, and the anonymous vocabularies in manuscript discovered and described by P. Zyteckij and I. Ohijenko (the Metropolitan Ilarion)."

University of London.

W. K. Matthews.

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

THE HEROIC UKRAINIAN WOMEN OF KINGIR

Word has reached the free world through the report of a released Hungarian physician that in June, 1954, in the Kingir camp of Karaganda, five hundred Ukrainian women faced an attack by Soviet tanks and perished under their tracks. Below is a detailed account of this event based on Dr. Fedor Varkony's report.

* * *

A year before the great uprising, on 16 May 1953, the prisoners of the Kingir camp were fired upon from automatic weapons without any cause, while they were returning from work. This wanton provocation was staged for the specific purpose of discovering among the prisoners those persons who belonged to the underground organisation.

The following day, 17 May, the prisoners refused to go to work and demanded that the guards guilty of the shooting, in which four persons lost their lives, be severely punished. The strike was not well prepared and it was broken in three days. The strike organisers and the more active strikers, 300 in number, were put under investigation arrest. In July of the same year, a woman was killed by shots from a watch tower, for allegedly entering into the prohibited zone. The results were the same as those following the earlier killing of four prisoners.

On 16 January 1954, a male laboratory worker was killed in the D.O.K. compound. The guards dragged the body of this prisoner into the forbidden zone so that it would appear that he was killed while trying to escape. When the prisoners found out about this, they stopped work in all sectors and the guards had to take them back to camp. This time the camp administration again had their way. An M.V.D. detachment was called and it drove the prisoners to work. In this connection there was a new wave of arrests of hundreds of Ukrainians, Russians and Moslems.

On 9 April 1954, many prisoners were taken from the camp to a closed prison without any explanation. On 16 April, a new transport of 600 prisoners, all classified as so-called "criminals" was brought in. This was an unheard-of event in the history of special camps. They were brought from Novosibirsk under disciplinary punishment. During the first days after the arrival of these prisoners, the political internees kept away from them, since they recalled only too well that in the post-war period the common criminals had been encouraged by the M.G.B. to make trouble and to taunt the political prisoners among them. Undergoing a two-week quarantine, the "criminals" lived in separate barracks and did not go out to work. But one day some of the common criminals who were confined to the camp prison dismantled a wall and went out into the prison yard and from there, over a fence into camp point 3 to join their colleagues. Within a few days they beat up several guards, including the warden of this compound, Captain Stadnikov. Neither the M.G.B., nor the operating group were able to do anything about this.

Following May Day celebrations, a delegation of the "criminals" came to us and proposed that we start an open war against the M.V.D. The delegates said that First Lieutenant Byelayev, chief of the operating group, tried to

persuade them to take action against the political prisoners, because, as he said, there were many among them who belonged to an underground organisation and they were preparing an attack against the "criminals". The chief of the operating group was supposed to have assured them that if they were unable to take care of the political prisoners, an M.V.D. detachment would come to their aid.

After lengthy negotiations the "criminals" entered into an agreement with the political prisoners.

On 16 May 1954, at 8 p.m., the political prisoners of point 3, together with the "criminals", totalling 2,500 people, attacked the walls which separated the camp compound and, within about one hour all the prisoners of Kingir, 4,500 men and 3,500 women were "united". At the same time, those under investigation arrest were set "free", about 300 people, including a former Soviet Colonel, Kuznetsov.

On May 17, soldiers of the M.V.D. entered the camp at 3 a.m. and opening fire, killed 76 persons. Drunken soldiers broke into women's barracks and with shouts of "hurrah" stabbed the women with bayonets. After this bloodshed, the dead and wounded were loaded on trucks and taken away.

That night a camp committee was elected from among all nationalities, headed by Kuznetsov. Its purpose was to maintain order in the camp and to present to the command of Kingir a series of demands which were signed on behalf of the camp committee by Kuznetsov.

The answer came two days later. Generals arrived from Moscow: deputy commander of GULAG (Glavnoye Upravleniye Lagerov—Chief Command of Camps), General Bichkov, and deputy prosecutor-general, General Dolgikh.

The men and women called a meeting which resolved not to negotiate with the M.V.D. chiefs, but nevertheless to listen to what the Generals had to say.

At the camp meeting Kuznetsov presented a petition to the Generals demanding to see representatives of the Party Central Committee in Moscow; the punishment of officers and soldiers responsible for what happened on 16 and 17 May; the appointment of a medical commission to perform autopsies of the dead; removal of numbers from clothing and bars from barracks windows; an 8-hour working day; wages in cash; credit of each day of imprisonment to count as the equivalent of three days; release before the expiration of their term of all minors arrested while not of mature age; release of the sick and those suffering from incurable diseases; return of aliens to their homelands; abolition of compulsory settlement after serving of sentence; review of all prisoners' cases; permission to write home once a month; permission to be visited by relatives; that until the arrival of representatives of the Central Committee no prisoners should be removed from the camp; and that the camp committee should not be held liable.

Generals Bichkov and Dolgikh heard the prisoners' demands and immediately made counter-proposals. They said that inasmuch as there was already a Government decree of 24 April 1954, "as from today, numbers are removed from prisoners clothing, bars from barracks windows, an 8-hour day is introduced, one day of imprisonment is counted for three, after a court review all minors will be set free and invalids who have served two-thirds of their sentence, by 15 October all foreigners will be sent home; prisoners

will be permitted to write and receive mail once a month, and to see relatives twice a year. Nobody will be removed from the camp, and the strike committee members will not be held responsible."

The Generals nevertheless asked the prisoners to return to work so that normal life could be restored in the camp, which would give an opportunity to the prosecutors and judges to fulfil their assignment.

It was announced that Lt. Byelayev, Timofiyev and a Lt.-Col. had been arrested.

At a meeting called after this, the prisoners, many of whom were not subject to a reduction of sentence, voted unanimously to return to work.

The next day only service personnel and "criminals" remained in the camp zone and all others went to work. Later the "criminals" were led in front of the guardhouse and then under heavy guard to the station, where so-called "Stolypin" railroad cars were awaiting them. These are special barred cars to transport prisoners, named in honour of the tsarist Minister, Stolypin.

This is how the red generals broke their word.

A few hour later, officers and soldiers entered the empty camp, restored the wrecked fences between camp points and put up signs on the fences: "Do not come near or I shoot".

When the prisoners returned from work, an order was read to them in front of the guardhouse that machine-gunners stationed on towers would fire without warning if anyone came near the fence. In this way the administration wanted to prevent a repetition of an uprising. The M.V.D.s thought that the political prisoners would be afraid to attack through the line of fire.

But to the administration's surprise, about one hour after this announcement, the sounds of a Ukrainian fighting song were heard from the women's compound: "Rank after rank, the partisans come marching...". People attacked from all sides, under fire of machine-guns. It was a terrible sight. Rockets lighted the camp, machine-gun fire sparkled from towers, walls were cracking. Soon the camp was again united.

The prisoners' joy did not last long, however. An M.G.B. detachment entered the camp and repeated what happened on 16-17 May. More than a hundred women and men fell that night, but the rest did not surrender.

On the morning of 20 May, the strike committee presented a petition to the administration that the military be ordered to leave the camp. The demand was complied with at 3 p.m., after dinner. But the M.V.D.s, leaving the camp, took the dead and wounded with them.

Negotiations began which went on for forty days until 26 June. During this entire time the prisoners' demands were announced over loudspeakers. The Ukrainian women distributed thousands of leaflets throughout the camp, they made "grenades" from bottles filled with lime and chemicals taken from the dispensary, they built barricades and tended the wounded. In the meantime men forged "cold arms" from scrap metal and window bars and waited for orders.

On 18 June, a short-wave transmitter was in operation, constructed by the prisoners from parts of electrical and surgical tools. We found out later that our broadcasts were picked up in Alma-Ata and Karaganda.

Meanwhile thousands of troops drawn from various towns were encircling the camp, and planes of the M.V.D. flew over our heads several times each day. All the time, day and night, prisoners stood on guard, men and women taking turns.

On 24 June, General Bichkov gave the prisoners an ultimatum to surrender and leave the camp. He got a reply: "We shall not take one step to leave the camp until representatives of the Party Central Committee come".

At 3 o'clock in the morning of 26 June, seven T-34 tanks broke suddenly into the camp. Women and men poured into the yard facing them. Soldiers appeared from behind the walls. Sixteen hundred soldiers, armed with automatic weapons, rifles and machine-guns went into action on Bichkov's orders. Bottles and rocks went flying. The tanks approached the prisoners at full speed. Then the Ukrainian women, wearing embroidered blouses, which they probably wore to church at home, joined hands, and holding their heads high, marched against the tanks. We all thought that the tanks would stop before the ranks of these defenceless women. But no, they accelerated their mad rush and clashed their steel against the live bodies, carrying out Moscow's orders. You did not hear any shouts, all we heard was the horrible sound of crushed bodies and cracking bones. Meanwhile the soldiers deployed among the barracks shooting and killing whoever they came across. The bloody massacre lasted from 3 to 8.30 a.m.

At 9 a.m. all who were still alive were driven out of the camp and "sorting out" began immediately. 1,600 men were taken to the station with Kolyma as their destination. That night more than 500 women and men had been killed. The bloodstains of these unfortunate victims of communism could be seen on the ground and on the walls for several months.

Over 600 Ukrainian women refused to return and they were also taken to Kolyma, to the death camps.

All the members of the strike committee had to face charges and their fate remains unknown.

In spite of all this, the Kingir uprising was not without results. After the blood bath in which hundreds of courageous people lost their lives, the terror of the M.G.B. in the camp subsided somewhat, and there was some improvement in working conditions and in food rations.

UKRAINIAN EX-INTERNEE ON ROME RADIO

On 28 March of this year, Rome Radio Station broadcast an interview with Prof. Anton Knyazhynsky, a Ukrainian, who was recently released from a Soviet concentration camp and has arrived in the West. We give a short extract of this interview below.

Interviewer: Can you tell us something about yourself, Professor?

Prof. Knyazhynsky: I was born in Austria and am now 62 years old. I spent my youth in West Ukraine. . . In Stanislaviv I was head of the cultural department of the Ukrainian district committee. The last position I held before I was arrested was in Vienna, where I was head of the Ukrainian cultural department. It was there that the Soviets arrested me. Investigation proceedings against me were at first conducted in Vienna and

then in various Moscow prisons. Owing to lack of incriminating evidence the so-called "special jury" of the M.G.B. sentenced me to 10 years hard labour. That was in 1945. I was sent to an "ITL" concentration camp in Siberia, and later, from the end of January 1951, onwards, I was interned in the camps at Oserlag (on the Taischet-Brazk-Lena route), where discipline is extremely strict.

Interviewer: How many Ukrainians are at present interned in Soviet concentration camps, and what is their morale like?

Prof. Knyazhynsky: ... It is impossible to ascertain the number of internees in the Soviet prisons and camps. There is, however, no doubt about the fact that this number is well over 10 millions. The number of Ukrainians in all the camps is more than 52 per cent of the total number of internees. The remainder, that is to say, about 48 per cent, are members of all the other nations in the Soviet Union, and, incidentally, the number of Russian internees is less than 28 per cent. Only a small number of the latter are political prisoners, the majority are criminals. There are very few criminals among the Ukrainian internees. And this fact, of course, is decisive in influencing the morale of the Ukrainian internees. ... The Ukrainians as a whole remain loyal to their high political aims; morally, they have a high ethical standard, and, as regards religion, they are extremely devout. The Ukrainians cannot bear to be degraded and derided.

Mass revolts on the part of Ukrainian internees broke out in Vorkuta, and later on, in Norylsk, in the southern part of the Kemerowo district, and in Karaganda... The Soviet regime tried to stop these strikes, which in some cases developed into open revolts, by using violence. There is already quite a lot of literature on this subject, consisting mainly of memoirs written by ex-internees. I should like to stress the profound religiousness of the Ukrainian internees as a whole, which results in an astounding unanimity when it comes to solving religious problems.

Interviewer: What is the purpose of your visit to Rome?

Prof. Knyazhynsky: I was determined to come to Rome as I felt that it was my duty to the Ukrainian internees to do so... I am very happy indeed to have been received in special audience by His Holiness the Pope, yesterday. And he was very interested indeed in all I told him. In his reply to me, His Holiness said that he knew the "good Ukrainian people". "We send the good Ukrainian people Our apostolic blessing and We pray for a kindly fate for this Our cherished people." Those were the words which His Holiness used.

* * *

A Ukrainian priest came back from Siberia. *Ukrainets-Chas* in its 11th number published an interview with the Ukrainian Catholic priest Mykola Buchko who returned from Siberia. The Reverend Buchko was born in Yugoslavia and, therefore, had Yugoslav citizenship. He was arrested by the Bolsheviks in Miklushevci in 1945 and transferred by plane to the Moscow prison Lyubianka. After a few months he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and sent to the concentration camp in Inti.

In his reports the Rev. Buchko confirmed all news brought by German returnees from Siberia and also said that he knew many other priests who are in concentration camps. He mentioned the names of Canon Kovalsky, Rev. Gorczynsky, Rev. Lopatynsky, Rev. Hlynka and others. He said that (as he was informed) the Rev. Klymenty Sheptytsky, brother of the Metropolitan Andreas, was dead in consequence of the unheard of tasks imposed on him in the concentration camps.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Stepan Bandera. Well-known leader of the Ukrainian underground—the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Was active before the war in Western Ukraine under Poland. After serving part of a life sentence for organising revolutionary acts against Polish oppression, he was released when Poland collapsed in 1939. In June 1941 he organised the attempt to re-establish Ukrainian independence, was arrested by the Nazis and deported to a German concentration camp. He was released in 1944 and has since remained in emigration, playing a leading role in the Ukrainian liberation struggle.

Volodymyr Derzhavyn, Ph. D. Professor of History of Ukrainian Literature and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. The author of many contributions to the study of Ukrainian Literature.

Hans de Weerd. Dutch scholar and journalist living in Amsterdam, and engaged on research into Central and East European politics of the past twenty years.

Andriy Mykulyyn, Major. Leading journalist and expert on Soviet Economy.

Vasyl Oreletsky, Ll. D. Professor of International Law of the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. He is a publicist and editor and a member of the Free Academy of Sciences (U.V.A.N.).

Victor Petrov. Ukrainian Professor of Literature who disappeared in Germany 1946-7. Dr. Petrov's fate is unknown. Under the name "Demontovych" he wrote many books, including *Dr. Seraphicus*.

Jaroslav Stetzko. Prime Minister of Ukraine in 1941. Leading member of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.).

Slava Stetzko. A former member of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and for many years a member of the Central Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations.

Rostyslav Yendyk. Professor at the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. An anthropologist, he is the author of several books.




The
**UKRAINIAN
REVIEW**



III

LONDON
1 9 5 6

UKRAINE



Contributions to be considered for inclusion in "The Ukrainian Review" should be marked "The Ukrainian Review" and addressed to:

The Secretary
 Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd.,
 49, Linden Gardens, London, W.2.
 Telephones: BAYswater 8392, 0140

Annual Subscription: £1. 0. 0. \$4.00
 Six Months 10. 0. \$2.00

Cover designed by Robert Lisovsky

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

Volume III. No. 3.

September 1956

A Quarterly Magazine

Editors:

Prof. Dr. Volodymyr Derzhavyn
and
Prof. Dr. Vasyl Oreletsky

Price: 5s a single copy

Published by
The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd.,
49, Linden Gardens, London, W.2.

CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Niko Nakashidze</i> : THE HISTORICAL NECESSITY OF THE DIS-	
SOLUTION OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE	3
<i>Jaroslav Stetzko</i> : AFTER THE FALL OF AN IDOL	10
<i>Stepan Bandera</i> : KHRUSHCHOV'S POLICY	16
UKRAINIAN PRISONERS' APPEAL TO U.N.O.	21
SYMON PETLIURA	27
<i>Volodymyr Derzhavyn</i> : THE CORYPHEUS OF UKRAINIAN	
LITERATURE	35
<i>Dmytro Donzow</i> : THE CAMPAIGN OF CHARLES XII IN UKRAINE	41
<i>D. Waltscheff</i> : NATIONAL COMMUNISM AS A DIAGONAL	
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST	61
<i>Jaroslav Stetzko</i> : ON FREE CHINESE SOIL	65
<i>Volodymyr Derzhavyn</i> : MODERN UKRAINIAN LYRICS IN THE	
ENGLISH RENDERING	73
FROM THE BOOK "THE MUSE IN PRISON"	78
BOOK REVIEWS	83
BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN	87
UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD	
Free Ukrainian University in Munich	91
News	93
COMMUNIQUE	96
OUR CONTRIBUTORS	Cover

Niko Nakashidze

The Historical Necessity of the Dissolution of the Russian Empire

The decay, or rather the dissolution of the multinational and colonial empires, began as early as the 19th century. Turkey lost all the Balkan countries which then became independent states.

After the first World War, Austria-Hungary and the Russian empire were disintegrated. Turkey lost all the Arabian countries, and Polish territory was severed from Germany. New states were now created consisting of those nations which for hundreds of years had been subjugated to foreign rule.

Nothing happens by accident or chance in history. And the historical process of the decay of the old empires was a perfectly logical historical development.

The nations incorporated in foreign empires had never become reconciled to this state of affairs. They were always conscious of their historical past as civilized nations. The strongly developed national consciousness and national will of these peoples and their consequent urge to attain national freedom played an important part in determining their historical development. And this development was to a considerable extent furthered and accelerated by another historical factor.

The rights of man, championed by Christianity, attained as a result of political and social progress, and recognised by the civilised world, were in the course of time granted to the nations, which represent the natural community of mankind. For man cannot be free if the nation itself is not free.

And in this way, the principle of the nations' right of self-determination was established.

After both the World Wars many of the European, Asian and African peoples asserted their claim to this right and obtained their national freedom. They restored their independent states, that is to say, they set them up anew.

The Russian empire, however, continued to exist as before, but it was no longer confined to its former boundaries since it subjugated other countries and peoples of Europe. Incidentally, the old

Russian tsarist empire, too, was built up on the annexation of foreign countries and the subjugation of foreign peoples.

Most of these peoples are not related to the Russians either by their origin, history, or culture, and many of them not even by their language. They were originally independent nations and their states were already in existence several hundred years before the Russian nation had been formed or the Russian state founded.

Whereas in other empires the foreign peoples possessed certain national, cultural and social rights, the foreign peoples in the Russian empire were completely deprived of all national, political and cultural rights, and every attempt was made to russify them as far as possible.

After the collapse of the tsarist empire in 1917, the Finns, Poles, Baltic and Caucasian peoples, the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Turkestanians, and Cossacks severed themselves from Russia and set up their own states again, namely as democratic republics.

In none of these states did Bolshevism succeed in gaining a firm footing. It was only in Russia that it proved successful, and the Russian people themselves supported and effected the Bolshevik revolution.

The non-Russian countries of the present Soviet Union were at various times crushed and conquered by Russia's superior military power, as was later the case, too, in the satellite countries. And in this way the Russian Soviet imperium, which rules the peoples by means of a brutal terrorist regime, came into existence once more. It is an artificial state structure which has been created by inconceivable violence and coercion and is preserved by the same methods.

The Soviet Union is a Russian continental colonial empire. The Russian tyrants would have the world believe that it is an internationalist, proletarian and Communist union in which the peoples are united voluntarily on the strength of their common interests. Internally, however, it is really a peoples' prison in which man is deprived of all human rights and the nations are constantly threatened by the dreadful danger of all being reduced and degraded to one common level. In its essence it is an ultra-imperialistic state structure. It disguises its imperialistic designs by claiming to be the champion of the rights of the proletariat and the liberator of the latter from capitalist rule. It conceals the fact that it is itself a state of totalitarian and reactionary monopoly capitalism. It stands to reason that

in an empire such as this the people long for individual and national freedom.

A state structure of this kind, by reason of its very character, cannot exist permanently. Its collapse is inevitable; if it were not so, it would be futile to have any faith in progress in this world.

Other empires artificially created by coercive methods have long since ceased to exist. Why then should the Russian empire prove an exception in this respect?

An empire of this kind will always be a menace to the world. A dictatorship cannot be pacific in character since it constantly aims to expand its power and its territory.

The danger (for the free world) is aggravated immeasurably by the fact that Russia has millions of supporters in the free world who, in the interest of the "liberation of the proletariat", are willing to abandon their countries and their peoples to the Russians. They are not merely ideological supporters but soldiers of Russia and, as much, will fight on the side of Russia.

At present, the government and the supreme party leadership of the Soviet Union, with the exception of only a few persons, consists exclusively of Russians who pursue not an internationalist but a Russian policy.

It is a grave error to believe that the problem of the satellite countries could be solved separately, in order to detach these countries from the Russian sphere of influence. This problem is so closely connected with that of the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union that the two cannot be separated.

The Russians will never relinquish their position nor renounce their power in these countries. Nor will the Communist governments there ever agree to Russia withdrawing her aid in these countries, since such a measure would result in the collapse of the Communist regime.

To recognise the right of possession of the Russians over the foreign peoples of the Soviet Union as a vested right, that is to say, to regard their problem as an internal matter which only concerns Russia, would be to deny all the recognised moral and lawful principles of the civilised world. The free world must not recognise a right enforced by violence as legally valid. "*Ex injuria non oritur jus*"!

The non-Russian countries of the Soviet Union have already been recognised as states, for Ukraine and Byelorussia have been admitted to the U.N.O. The question at issue is therefore, as in

the case of the satellite countries, too, the liberation of these countries from the Russian compulsory union.

Certain political circles in the West graciously concede the right of self-determination to our peoples. But they do not need this right since they were formerly nations with states of their own and were forcibly subjugated to Russian rule. It is a question of making restitution for the right that has been violated, abolishing and eliminating violence and injustice, and restoring these nations to their former status.

We are living in an age of mighty national, political and social upheavals, in the age of the disintegration of multinational empires based on force. And this process cannot be checked in any way—not even by cannon or atomic bombs. All the imperiums have been disintegrated and their peoples are now free, but the Russian imperium still continues to exist.

The cynical statements made by Khrushchov and Bulganin, during their visit to India, about the alleged Western colonial powers did not meet with a fitting answer on the part of the West. No one replied, in answer to these remarks, that Russia ruthlessly annexes foreign countries and subjugates the peoples of these countries, and that Russia is a colonial empire. No one mentioned the crimes which Russia has committed and is still committing as far as these peoples are concerned. No one pointed out that Russia's war-booty since 1939 amounts to 18 countries with a total area of 3.2 million square kilometres and a total population of 107 millions, not counting China.

More than a hundred years ago Karl Marx wrote as follows in the *New York Tribune*: "Russia has declared herself for peace and the statements she has made are an expression of her peace-loving attitude... She is prepared to allow the other powers to engage in conferences, provided that they on their part are prepared to allow her to occupy such countries as she desires, in the meantime." And this certainly holds good for present times, too!

The subjugated peoples of the Soviet Union will never understand and reconcile themselves to the fact that, in America, Asia, and Europe, even the smallest nations have independent national states of their own and enjoy complete freedom, whilst they alone are forced to remain under Russian tyranny.

These subjugated peoples are in a state of political ferment and some day they will rise up against their oppressors in a mighty revolt!

We are frequently asked how we intend to achieve our aim. By war? The answer is "no"! We know only too well that in the event of war our native countries would become theatres of war, and we do not wish to see them transformed into devastated and "scorched earth" countries and their population wiped out. But it is not the wish and will of the Western world alone which will decide whether there is a war or not, but the Soviet rulers, and for this reason it is absolutely imperative that we should be prepared for every eventuality. In this respect, the fact must be borne in mind that the Soviet tyrants will designate the war kindled by them as a "war of liberation", that is to say, they will allegedly be fighting for the liberation of the workers from capitalism and for the liberation of the subjugated peoples from colonial rule.

It is our aim and endeavour to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union from within. The free world must, of course, support our peoples in this unequal struggle. It would be disastrous for the free world to assume that the Soviet tyrants have changed their attitude. In this respect, we should like to quote a well-known Swiss paper, which writes as follows: "Moscow is at present trying to canvass for confidence. Mistrust—so it is affirmed by the Communists in their propaganda and repeated mechanically and guilelessly by many non-Communists—is the real evil which poisons international relations and prevents political tension from being eased. It would certainly suit the gentlemen of the Kremlin very well if the West were to abandon its attitude of mistrust towards the Soviet Union and towards the Communist Party's apparatus of conspiracy and power which extends over the whole world! We continue to regard with mistrust a man like Schlüter who has published a few books by Nazi leaders—are we then likely to abandon our attitude of mistrust towards a group of persons who have a criminal past which is unique in the entire history of mankind?"

As long as the Russian Soviet imperium continues to exist, the world will constantly be in danger. It is a serious error to believe that these two worlds can exist in peace side by side, permanently. There is bound to be a clash and an explosion some day, for the Russian imperium and its Russian Bolshevik rulers will never abandon their world conquest plans.

In order to ward off this danger, the subjugated peoples must be afforded every possible support in their fight so that this peoples' prison and empire of tyranny collapses.

We are likewise asked what our plans for the future are and whether we intend to remain as separate states without forming a union with other states. In the first place, the admittedly sound idea of a European federation of states is as yet only wishful thinking, and, in the second place, it will be a long time before this idea can be realised. The regional formation of state alliances is a matter to be decided by the individual nations themselves in accordance with the free resolutions of their parliaments.

Our nations, when they attain their freedom and independence, will join the community of the nations of Europe, that is of the world. It is our desire to occupy a fitting place in the community of free nations in the future, in which case our peoples will fulfil their duties conscientiously.

History demands the dissolution of the Russian imperium. The peoples ruled by Russia also have a right to live their own free life as individuals and nations. Justice demands that this should be so! These peoples must not be forgotten and sacrificed!

If the democratic free world allows itself to be prompted by "sacro egoismo" and purchases co-existence at the price of our peoples, it will bring about its own ruin!

If the West wants to be the loser in the clash with Russia, it only needs approach the peoples of the East with the idea of a federation. Hitler, too, talked about a European union and under this pretext subjugated nations. Napoleon likewise wanted to "unite" Europe. Fichte unmasked this hypocritical idea most thoroughly. And for this reason, Europe as regards its present ideology must take into consideration all the negative factors of past ideologies in this respect, and, in order to win over the East European peoples to the idea of a European unification, must in the first place actively help these peoples to attain complete independence and must leave any decisions pertaining to European integration to the free judgment of the parliaments of these independent states.

It is no good forcing decisions on others! Europe must not be limited to whatever boundaries the Soviet sphere of influence may set up! No tactical considerations can excuse such a policy.

We are of the opinion that the best guarantee of peace and security lies in the membership of all peoples in the United Nations, on the basis of full equality, since in this kind of organisation there can be no clash between regional blocs nor can any powerful state in the course of time forcibly unite the other states and use such a regional structure for the purpose of conducting an aggressive war.

But before these problems of the future can be seriously discussed, the idea that the dissolution of the Russian imperium is inevitable must be accepted, and to this end all the peoples of Europe and the rest of the world must co-operate in joint effort.

Today, Russia is the only colonial empire in the world. In this age of the liberation of peoples, of mighty political and social progress and achievements, Russia alone rules foreign countries and nations and subjects peoples to a most terrible dictatorial regime, under which man is degraded to the level of collectivity and industrial slavery and is deprived of even the most fundamental human rights.

All Russians on this side of and beyond the Iron Curtain, however, are unanimously agreed that this peoples' prison must be preserved.

A nation and its members who subjugate foreign peoples, who refuse to recognise the right of these peoples to independent states of their own, and who advocate the preservation of an empire of violence, cannot be regarded as Europeans or as belonging to Europe, in the free world. The right to restore their independent states is at present only being conceded in Europe to the nations whose countries were occupied after 1939. What crime have the other nations committed, that this right is not conceded to them, too? Since when has the right of individuals and nations to freedom been regarded as being limited by time?

"In the present conflict," as the Archbishop of Cologne, Cardinal Joseph Frings, said, "the question at issue is, who will be the victor, Christianity with its moral and spiritual values, or Bolshevik imposture with its heroes who have attained power by blood and tears and by the inhuman subjugation of mankind, who have cast the Lord aside, and, with fiendish arrogance, have set themselves up as God Almighty."

And if Europe makes compromises with such evil spirits as these, it will never be victorious!

Maybe it is nowadays considered reactionary or undemocratic to quote Bismarck, but, nevertheless, the fact cannot be denied that he was a far-sighted statesman, whose ideas were based on his wealth of experience in life and as a statesman. And it was he who said, "No one will ever be rich enough to buy his enemies with concessions."

And the Western world will never succeed in buying and winning over the Soviets! The free world will be the loser!

Jaroslav Stetzko

AFTER THE FALL OF AN IDOL

What actually happened in the Kremlin a short time ago to make the whole world, as if under a spell, peruse the annals of the mass-murders, or rather the resolutions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the speeches of Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, and other tyrants, and try to discover something extraordinary, revolutionary, and epoch-making in them? Did Mikoyan's words, that this Congress was the most important one since Lenin's death, really have such an effect? Are the murderers in the Kremlin really going to succeed in deluding the Western world to such an extent that Togliatti's words (after his return from Moscow) might prove true: "The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will dominate the world-stage for many years"? "Big Changes", "Consolidation of Collective Leadership", "People's Front in Sight", "Parliamentary Path to Power of the Communist Party", "Policy of Co-existence as Guide for the Future", "Stalin a Murderer in Opinion of Central Committee of Soviet Union Communist Party", "Decentralization in the Soviet Republics"—such are the headlines which appear again and again in the press.

What has actually happened?

On August 23, 1939, the U.S.S.R. made a non-aggression pact and on September 28, 1939, a friendship pact with Hitler, despite the fact that only a short time previously Hitler was described by the Soviet press as the greatest criminal in the history of the world and as the murderer of thousands of workers. But now the situation was suddenly quite different. "The extermination of Hitlerism"—so Moscow's official organ, *Izvestiya*, wrote on October 9, 1939—"has now become a fundamental demand (in the allied West). This takes us back to the Dark Ages when religious wars, which ravaged entire countries, were waged in order to exterminate apostates and infidels... It is a matter of taste whether one respects or despises Hitlerism..."

On November 30, 1939, Stalin stressed the following points in an interview published by the Moscow paper, *Pravda*:

1) It is not true that Germany carried out a surprise attack on England and France, but exactly the opposite was the case;

2) After the outbreak of the war Germany made the British and French governments an offer of peace negotiations, a step which was likewise supported by the U.S.S.R.; but the British and French governments rejected Germany's offer and the efforts of the U.S.S.R.

On October 7, 1939, the Communist London paper, *Daily Worker*, incidentally, wrote, "This war is not a war of democracy against fascism". And the Communist Party of France addressed the following appeal to the population: "Let us unite to fight the imperialistic war..."

Did the clique in the Moscow Kremlin in those days not introduce some "revolutionary" changes? But was there actually any change at all? Moscow's aim continued to remain the same, namely the conquest of the world. The chameleons of the Kremlin always manage to adapt themselves as circumstances demand, in order to deceive the free world as to their true aims.

When Bulganin took Malenkov's place, a "continuous advance of the Army to power" was prophesied, and, in fact, even the assumption of power by a Muscovite Napoleon, namely as a means of safety for the West—just as if it were not all the same whether a military man like Zhukov, as a member of the Politburo—or a "civilian" like Khrushchov, likewise as a member of the same Politburo (or rather, Presidium, to use the present democratic designation) were to advance to the position of dictator and despot! We have not yet forgotten the fact that the word "democracy" was ridiculed in the 1920's by the Stalin clique. And what happened then? Stalin adopted it as a stock-expression along with all the other favourite Communist catchwords and mottoes, and actually affirmed that he himself was the greatest democrat, in fact, a genuine *people's* democrat. There was a "people's front" once before, at least in France, under Léon Blum. But did things change as a result of this front? Were fewer people murdered in the U.S.S.R. in those days? In those happy days of a symbiosis between Socialism and Communism, Edouard Herriot visited Ukraine—and denied that a famine was raging there, even though there were thousands of corpses lying in the streets of all the towns. A collective leadership existed in Lenin's day; and what, we may ask, is the fundamental

difference between Lenin's and Stalin's regime? What would be the purpose of a "return to true Leninism"? By whom and when were the non-Russian nations, including Ukraine, subjugated? At whose command was the conquest march on Warsaw carried out? Is it possible that Lenin had no intention of conquering Poland and did not aim to make Germany or Hungary Communist by force? Of course, it is true that these aims were not achieved until 25 years later, namely by Stalin and thanks to Hitler's folly.

Why, then, has Stalin been criticised so severely? For having falsified history, for having failed to assess the crisis of capitalism rightly, for having spoilt Leninist collective leadership, as well as for having assumed sole power, for having been a dictator, an absolute ruler, a despot... And what did his supporters do as for instance all the governors-general of Ukraine—Molotov, Kaganovich, and Khrushchov? Are not they, the present convinced democrats and champions of "humanity", the ones who, by their joint action, murdered millions of Ukrainians and enforced a ruthless collective system?

In condemning Stalin, have not the Muscovite rulers condemned their own assumption of power, headed by Stalin, in half Europe and half Asia? Have they withdrawn the Russian troops from the non-Russian countries? Have they allowed free elections to be held? Have they done away with concentration camps? Or have they abolished slave labour and forced labour, or given back the farmers their private property? Khrushchov himself is the inventor of the "agro-towns", the worst form of kolkhoz slavery, and of the satrap system, which has resulted in thousands of young Ukrainians being sent to cultivate foreign "new land". He is the oppressor who at present even abolishes the small holdings system and stipulates that the farmers may not even keep a few sheep or a cow if they have not fulfilled their "quotas" in the collective system (or rather, have fulfilled more than their quota). Little attention has been paid by the world press to this measure on the part of the collective leadership, that is to say, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; but it is precisely this measure which implies a further and consistent consolidation of the kolkhoz slavery system, since it stipulates that the size of the holdings (at the most 1 hectare) shall depend on the output per worker in the kolkhoz.

Such, therefore, are the "facilities" which have been granted to the rural population by the collective leaders—measures which, incidentally, were already enforced after the 20th Party Congress.

Mikoyan affirmed that violent revolutions and civil wars are not absolutely necessary in order to enable the proletariat (that is, obviously, the Communist Party) to assume power, since this was achieved in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria by other means—without bloodshed or civil war; and, according to Mikoyan, this proves that the proletariat is capable of assuming power by peaceful means... Incidentally, he fails to mention an "accessory circumstance", namely the occupation of all these countries by the Soviet Russian invasion army.

With an unparalleled cynism, Mikoyan offers the West European states precisely the same prospects, inasmuch as he maintains that the Communists would be able to assume power in these countries, too, by means of parliamentary elections, but he adds "provided that the ruling classes put up no powerful resistance" (that is to say, provided that they allow themselves to be slaughtered). It is obvious that such "free elections" are only conceivable *after* the occupation of the country in question by the Soviet Russian forces. In that case the "proletariat" there actually no longer needs a civil war and not even the enforcement of violent measures. Marshal Konev will see to that!

The hangman of the Hungarian people, Bela Kun, was "liquidated" unjustly, so it is now said; the hangmen of the Ukrainian people, Antonov-Ovseyenko and Kosior, are likewise said to have been decent Communists who "disappeared" without deserving such a fate. But what advantage do we or the West get out of the fact that the Kremlin is now rehabilitating its former satraps who, together with Lenin and Stalin, subjugated us and, with the aid of the Cheka founded by Lenin, decimated our numbers? It is a well-known fact that Stalin adopted many of his ideas from Bukharin, Trotsky, and other persons, and to a considerable extent realized these ideas, but liquidated the originators. Were those whom he liquidated any better than he was?

Considered from the criminological aspect, all the above mentioned assertions are merely sensational and do not alter the essential facts; for the intrinsic nature of the cruel and barbarous Bolshevik Russian mentality cannot be altered and can, in fact, only be overpowered if its physical power is destroyed.

It is interesting to note that the 19th Congress made far more use of "revolutionary" catchwords (for export purposes) than the recent Congress did. In this connection we have only to recall Beria's speech on the national problem of the U.S.S.R., for instance! Beria, the peoples' hangman, who had already caused thousands of non-Russians to be murdered and millions of internees in concentration camps to die a wretched death because they had championed the cause of national freedom, on that occasion stressed the problem of the "nationalities" and their political claims. . . And what about the 20th Congress? Nothing but hackneyed Communist phrases about the "crisis" of capitalism, the colonial peoples, the imminent "lawful" victory of socialism, the priority of the heavy industries—not a single idea or trend that was new! All the ideas expressed were either derived from the anti-imperialist ideology of the former colonial and semi-colonial nations or were merely a repetition of the hackneyed Marxist phrases used by Lenin and Stalin in former days.

Nor is the reconciliation with Yugoslavia sensational news. Had Stalin personally been more compliant, he would have settled up this old account in his lifetime, and, in fact, in exactly the same way as is now the case. Then the West would not have been duped and would not be setting false hopes on Tito's sham national Communism, which is as odious to the nations as "international Communism"; for either there is really no "genuine" national Communism, or else Stalin is the most consistent national Communist in the world inasmuch as his Russian national Communism tallies with Soviet red imperialism.

And the method adopted in order to destroy Stalin's halo is by no means a new and original one. It was Stalin who taught his clique how to blame one's own faults on to people like Trotsky, Bukharin, or Tukhachevsky, and now Stalin's disciples are thrusting responsibility for the faults of their own "collective leadership" on to the dead dictator. Malenkov assures his fellow-countrymen that there will never be a repetition of absolute despotism; in which case a regime of collective despotism will prevail—and it is probably all the same to the victims whether they are hanged by *one* hangman or by several. But let us examine this "democracy" in the Party leadership more closely! The most significant feature about it is not so much the fact that the "collectivist" leader, Khrushchov, in his report on the activity of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, treated Malenkov and

Molotov, both members of the Central Committee like himself, with considerable contempt as being fantasts and ignoramuses, but that there is no opposition whatsoever. There is no majority and no minority; all resolutions are unanimously accepted, just as in the days of Stalin's absolute despotism. And this is what is described as a "democratic revolution in the Party leadership" enforced from above!

No, the most important political events of the past months did not take place at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but somewhere quite different. And these events, which were actually reported by the Soviet press itself (as, for instance, by the "Chervony Prapor", the provincial newspaper of Rivne in Volhynia), were the armed resistance fights in the forests of Lithuania and Ukraine and in Turkestan; and the resistance movements in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which had already increased in strength a long time before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held, are, of course, only to be regarded as a national fight for freedom against Soviet Russian tyranny, and not by any means as a measure to defend the allegedly "reverent memory" of Stalin, a measure which would, in any case, only be possible in the small clique of Stalin's accomplices and hirelings.

The heroic death of the five hundred Ukrainian women-internees, who, in July 1954, in the concentration camp at Kingiri in Central Asia (near Karaganda), allowed themselves to be crushed to death by Soviet tanks in order to protect their fellow-countrymen in the camp who were fighting for the cause of human rights and national honour, has now proved to be no exceptional case, but a significant indication of the everincreasing willingness on the part of the peoples subjugated by Moscow to wage a life and death struggle against Communism and Russian imperialism!

Stepan Bandera

KHRUSHCHOV'S POLICY

Bolshevist propaganda and all its henchmen are endeavouring to spread the belief throughout the world that the 20th Congress of the Communist Party has inaugurated a new and entirely different course of Bolshevist policy. In fact sound distrust, born of bitter experience, rejects all such Bolshevist manoeuvres. But many nations, despite this experience, are still inclined to expect the Bolsheviks to manifest a fundamental change in various respects. Anyone who wishes to form a right opinion on these matters, however, does not need to base his judgment solely on his personal attitude or to wait reservedly for a further and more obvious development of events.

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party and the Kremlin's moves since the Congress, which attest to the change in the course of its policy, are more than enough proof of the direction in which the Bolshevist "collective" dictators are moving. If they are changing the course of their policy, then how and in what respect are they effecting this change? In this connection it suffices to analyse the lengthy report and speech given at the 20th Congress by that "most collective leader", Khrushchov, in which the fundamental principles and direction of the entire Bolshevist policy at present and in future are laid down in a most authoritative and complete way. It is true that the contents of this speech—as is the case with all Bolshevist spokesmen—are for the most part "codified" by means of a phraseology which completely conceals the true meaning. But Bolshevist practice in the course of many years has provided a reliable clue to the real meaning of these hackneyed Bolshevist political phrases. And if we use this clue in order to interpret the documents of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party and recent Bolshevist declarations and moves, then the line of Moscow's policy becomes perfectly obvious.

The aims of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy remain unchanged. The recent Congress of the Communist Party, including Khrushchov's speech, in the decorative framework of assurances as to the "peaceableness" of the U.S.S.R., stated many times over and in

different ways that the aim of the Bolsheviks still continues to be domination over the whole world. The entire Bolshevik policy, foreign and domestic policy alike, is subordinated in every respect and in every sphere to this aim of Muscovite imperialism.

In making long speeches on the inevitable world victory of Socialism-Communism in accordance with the historical development and on its superiority as a doctrine and as a political, social and economic system, compared to all that opposes it, the Communist leaders aim to strengthen the morale of the Communists, to vindicate their actions, and, at the same time, to demoralise and confuse their opponents. The main emphasis, however, is on the expansion of the Communist bloc in co-operation with the destructive Communist forces in the nations which are the target of their attack.

To an ever-increasing extent, the chief aim of the entire economic system and domestic policy of the U.S.S.R. and of the nations which are dependent on Moscow continues to be the setting up of the greatest military power in the world. In order to camouflage their plans in this respect, the Bolsheviks talk about the aggressive aims of the so-called capitalist states.

Khrushchov definitely stated that more favourable conditions for the victory of Socialism have been created in other countries due to the fact that Socialism won the field in the Soviet Union and is now winning it in the countries which boast a people's democracy. It is true that he, too, talked about different forms of transition to Socialism, but, at the same time, he clearly indicated his remedial measures, namely that the other forms are applicable in the case of voluntary capitulation of national forces before the Communists or in the case of complete disintegration of a nation by the Communists. In all other cases where the Bolsheviks are unable to take nations by surprise, by subversive activity or by threats, they intend to resort to the well-known practices of the Bolshevik revolution—"transition to Socialism under the conditions of a fierce class conflict and revolutionary fight".

Elsewhere Khrushchov says that the question of using or not using force in effecting the transfer of a nation to Socialism depends not so much on the proletariat as on the degree of resistance put up by those who exploit the nation in question. According to his statement, the education of the masses and Bolshevik national policy are to be based on the organic union of Soviet patriotism

and proletarian internationalism. This is indeed a pleasing organic union in which aggressive expansion under the watchwords of proletarian solidarity and socialist internationalism constitute the main programme of action of Muscovite Bolshevik imperialism.

In view of this statement all the Bolshevik phraseology about non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, about the separation of the ideological fight from international contacts, and about the peaceful co-existence of countries with different social and political orders, is nothing but idle talk. In order to pull the wool over the eyes of the other nations, the 20th Congress stated that the entire foreign policy pursued by the U.S.S.R. throughout the post-war years has been peaceful and that it must be continued. Thus the "peaceful policy" of the U.S.S.R. has consisted in the subjugation and forcible socialisation of the Central European nations and the Baltic States, in the partition of Germany, the unleashing of Communist wars in China, Greece, Korea, and Indo-China, genocide and the mass-destruction of countless nations, etc. Stalin, too, like Khrushchov talked about peaceful co-existence and affirmed that Communist revolutions would not be exported abroad!

Khrushchov's plan to increase centralism in the economic sector, autarchy, and the consolidation of the Bolshevik-Socialist bloc clearly proves that the Bolsheviks intend to continue their present policy for some time to come. If Moscow were prompted by the desire to eliminate tension and animosity, it would, at least in the economic sector, permit the development of national economies in the Socialist countries, including their normal trade relations with non-Communist states, instead of forcibly tying them down in a one-sided Communist bloc. The programme and main principles of Bolshevik policy and activity, which have as their aim the subjugation of all nations, were already laid down by Lenin who combined the imperialistic trends of tsarist Russia with the Marxist doctrine on the Communist world-revolution. The false endeavours to ascribe the aggressive expansion of Muscovite Communism to Stalin alone are intended as a means of disorientating the nations and undermining their resistance. Bolshevik imperialist aggression was set going at full speed by Lenin and Trotsky from the very beginning of Communist rule. Stalin merely consistently continued this imperialistic process and was, therefore, only the man who realised these aims and plans, but not the originator of Bolshevik imperialist aggression. Thus, the condemnation of the Stalin cult by

no means implies that the Bolsheviks are abandoning their imperialistic plans. Since the collective leaders are afraid that abolition of the Stalin cult might prove detrimental to Bolshevik expansion, they take good care to emphasise their unwavering loyalty to Leninism and to the international tendencies of Communism—which in other words is the same thing as the continuation of Communist subversive activities and other upheavals throughout the world, as well as Muscovite aggression whenever a suitable occasion arises.

No sign of a change can be noticed in the tactics of the present Bolshevik policy as compared to that of Stalin's day, if we consider it as a whole and not merely in its recent stage.

Flexibility and a change of tactics in consistently and constantly pursuing the same aims—this is the characteristic feature of Bolshevik policy, which was firmly established by Lenin and brought to the heights of perfection by his heir, Stalin. In this respect Khrushchov is only following Stalin's example—in particular, when, in continuing the established line of policy, he tries by means of manoeuvres in political tactics to produce the effect of a change in the entire policy.

It was none other but Stalin who, a few years before the outbreak of World War II, introduced the course of "peaceful" Soviet policy. He sent his "peaceful" diplomatic representative, Litvinov, to many foreign countries—a measure which is now being imitated by Khrushchov and Bulganin. The dissolution of the Cominform is likewise merely an imitation of Stalin's trick of dissolving the Comintern, but with less effect, since this recent measure was less drastic and, as everyone knows, mainly introduced on account of Tito. On the other hand, however, neither the Comintern nor the Cominform directed international Communist activities, which were controlled directly by the Kremlin. It was the task of the Comintern and the Cominform to carry out the Kremlin's orders and create the impression that there was an independent international leading body. The Bolsheviks have dozens of methods in stock with which they can produce the same effect, and, furthermore, they never set great store by their hirelings or slave puppets, but can always remove them from the scene in time. Stalin, too, furnished sufficient proof that the Bolsheviks, in the course of their "peaceful policy and non-interference", can unleash civil war with the aid of their Communist agents and military experts, only to withdraw later on when defeat is inevitable.

Why should Bulganin and Khrushchov not follow Stalin's example in the Middle East, by using these various methods! Stalin, whose pupils they were, set them various examples—Spain, Greece, China, Korea, Indo-China, and Persia. A careful study of Bolshevik intrigues and methods in dealing with foreign countries reveals a consistent continuation of one course of policy, which, by resorting to different ways and means, seeks to further the expansion of Muscovite Communism, to disintegrate nations, and to create situations in which it can deal its victims a fatal blow in their most vulnerable spot. Only those who are unable or unwilling to see Muscovite Bolshevism in its true and entire aspect, as it was in the past and is at present, fail to realise the consistent continuity of Bolshevik policy.

A NEW CONTINGENT OF SLAVES IN THE U.S.S.R.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO TRANSFER 500,000 YOUNG
PEOPLE TO ASIA

In the course of the next few years half a million young men and women are to be transferred from large cities of the U.S.S.R. to Asia. In this connection, orders were already distributed and summonses made by the Central Committee of the Communist party and the ministerial council. The Central Committee of the Komsomol has adopted a particular attitude which rejected with firmness any resistance or deviation from "patriotic duty".

The following cities are responsible for the delivery of the people to be transferred: Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Minsk, Tiflis, Erivan. The Kremlin potentates thereby plan not a temporary period of work but permanent settlement. The transfer is to consist, of state officials, the employees of business concerns, school teachers, and so on. They are all to be engaged as factory workers, as miners, in electric works, on the railways, and on the land!

As we have already mentioned, the aim of this new and tyrannical measure is an accelerated development of the war industry and the creation of a new Soviet Nation through the ethnic intermixture and dispersal throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R. in order to preserve Russian supremacy.

Ukrainian Prisoners' Appeal to U.N.O.

Far more moving than the many accounts of conditions in prison camps of the U.S.S.R. is this appeal to the civilised world, printed below, received from Ukrainian internees in the "autonomous" Republic of Mordovia, East of Moscow.

The appeal to the United Nations in the attached letter to Ukrainians in the free world was written on cloth, then worn as part of the clothing of a released internee, and was so smuggled out to the West. The authenticity of the documents translated here is not in question.

The reader will see that the spirit of the Ukrainian prisoners, former members of the Ukrainian Resistance, remains unbroken, their hope for the future of their country undiminished. Perhaps the knowledge, or at least the belief, that their compatriots in the West are gradually convincing the free world of the dangers of the inhuman Soviet system and of the urgent necessity of persuading Russian Communists, by compulsion if necessary, to stop the policy of annihilating the other nations held by a cruel fate within the U.S.S.R.—perhaps it is this that helps to keep the morale of these unfortunate prisoners so high.

An Open Letter

To the United Nations, Division on Human Rights, and to the Entire Civilised World

From the Prisoners in Camps in the U.S.S.R.

We, the prisoners in the Mordovian special camps, wish to bring the following statement to the attention of the entire civilised world.

We, Ukrainians, are in favour of any movement whose aims are freedom and truth; we advocate cultural progress in all walks of life, and we stand behind self-determination for all nations, including the United Ukrainian State.

We have no desire to exaggerate the facts of the situation that has long existed in Ukraine. We do not ask for mercy or pardon. We demand our right to live under laws that should be recognised by the entire civilised world—the world of twentieth-century civilisation. This civilisation has been spearheaded by a number of humanitarian elements, from small groups on up through national leaders. They include the great world-wide organisation, the United Nations.

Our Ukrainian nation, like a number of other nations, has come under the conquering heel of Red Russia. We have been deprived of the basic rights of existence. We have been driven into camps, with severe sentences of from ten to twenty-five years—not for criminal acts, as the Bolsheviks maintain before the rest of the world; not for arson, treason, or murder; but because we, like every freedom-loving people, demand our lawful rights in our own land.

The question therefore arises: Does the civilised world know about the conditions prevailing not only among us prisoners, but throughout our country? Does the civilised world know that, when we have served our sentences, we are exiled to the so-called virgin lands of Kazakhstan, Krasnoyarsk, and the Far North—while they proclaim that it is volunteers and members of the Kom-somol who go out to those areas?

Can the civilised world conceive of Ukrainian sovereignty without a Ukrainian army, and without the Ukrainian people? If Ukraine is sovereign—and she should be—why is there no army composed exclusively of Ukrainians? Why do Ukrainians serve their terms in the army beyond the borders of their country? Why are military units composed of Russians and other nationalities to whom the interests of the Ukrainian people are alien, if not directly hostile, stationed in our country? If we are traitors and if our punishment is just, why were we tried by “peoples” or “military” courts, whose composition is certainly not Ukrainian? Why do we not serve our terms on Ukrainian territory, which was ravaged by the last war and is in need of reconstruction? Why do we have to work at the cultivation of wild, remote lands and forests, when there is such a need for our forces at home?

Does the civilised world know that, over the mass burial sites of the prison camps, new camps and cities are built, canals are dug, and stadiums are erected, in order to obliterate the traces of these crimes? In Abez’ (Komi ASSR), Camps 1, 4, and 5 stand on former cemeteries. At Zavod 5 in Leplya (Mordovskaya ASSR), the first and second polishing shops, the technical laboratory, and the forge were erected on human bones. Does the world know about the mass executions of prisoners who only demanded their rights as political internees? (At Mine 29 in Vorkuta, Attorney-General Rudenko was in charge of the firing squads.) Is it known that, in Kingir (P. O. Box 392, Colonies 1 and 3 Kazakhstan), men and women demanding their lawful rights were charged by four tanks and crushed by them?

Does the civilised world know that Ukraine has suffered starvation for thirty-eight years, in addition to the artificial famine of 1933; that Western Ukraine has been inundated by floods, and that the people have been condemned to death by starvation, with no hope of aid from “humanitarian, peace-loving” Communist Russia? This at a time when millions of tons of grain are exported abroad for propaganda purposes, when all sorts of foreign delegations visit model collective farms (special display models) and factories in the U.S.S.R.

In the postwar period (1945-55), Russia has raised the level of light and heavy industry beyond the prewar level. This was accomplished by a toll of millions of prisoners. Those prisoners raised the issue of improved living conditions—an improvement essential for any creature that breathes air (after between nine and eleven hours of work in the mines, the prisoners were shut up like cattle in close, stinking barracks furnished with the well-known “slop

buckets"). Some of the prisoners were shot, others were crushed by tanks. Many of them received additional sentences of from ten to twenty-five years and were put in jail, where they are to this day.

This is addressed to the civilised world of the twentieth century—a century of education and progress. We feel certain that anyone who reads these lines will experience revulsion and contempt for the "just and humanitarian" Communist Party of Russia and the crimes committed against the nations it has enslaved.

We are not discouraged, because we know that our will for freedom is founded on natural law, and we believe that the entire civilised world will uphold us in our course.

Resolutions

Bearing in mind the foregoing points, we, the prisoners in the Mordovian special camps, have adopted the following resolutions:

I

a. A commission should be appointed for precise verification of the facts as we have stated them: that Attorney-General Rudenko and Deputy Minister of the MVD Maslennikov were distinguished by the cruelty of their conduct in Vorkuta and Noril'sk in 1953, and in Karaganda in 1954.

b. The fact that Camps 1, 4, and 5 in Abez' (Komi ASSR) and Zavod 5 (Mordovskaya ASSR) were built on cemetery grounds should be verified. Similar cases are not hard to find—there are forty-four such camps in this area.

c. We demand that the cemeteries be put in order, that the buildings and plants on them be razed, and that memorials be erected to the dead, as a symbol of perpetual shame to the Red slaveholders. Since members of all nationalities of the world are numbered among the dead, a special international organisation should be established for the purpose of erecting these memorials.

d. We demand comprehensive social security for the orphans, widows, and parents (if they are not fit for work) of these victims of cruel injustice; also for those persons and their families who have suffered complete physical disability in camps and are unable to provide for themselves and their families.

e. Since an entire family is held responsible for an offence committed by one member (they are all subject to exile, deportation, confiscation of property) and a man's grandson as well as his son may suffer because of an act he himself committed, there have appeared castes of "reliables" and "unreliables". The "unreliables" live under constant oppression, persecution and misery. We therefore demand that these people be given back their rights as human beings, that they receive social security, and that they be permitted to return to their countries.

f. We demand that all persons who have served out their sentences be permitted to return to their native lands. We protest against the passing of sentences of up to twenty-five years on a mass basis, because such a sentence is a sentence for life.

g. All persons who underwent a second trial and were then transferred from camp to jail because of their participation in camp strikes or in any other form of mass or individual protest against the violation of their rights as political prisoners should be released from jail and their sentences annulled.

h. All desert lands, pits, mines, and forests that became part of the U.S.S.R. after their discovery or cultivation should belong to the nations whose sons and daughters worked on them and strewed them with their bones.

II

a. We demand the establishment of an international control commission charged with the fair distribution of aid earmarked for underdeveloped countries and for disaster areas (including the U.S.S.R.).

b. We are wholeheartedly in favour of extending aid to all those who need it—regardless of their nationality, religion, race, or political convictions. But we cannot agree that bread should be torn from the mouths of the starving and sent abroad as aid, when it is really for purposes of propaganda. This is done in the Soviet Union, at a time when millions of people are starving.

III

a. Whereas every criminal act against the enslaved nations is perpetrated with the knowledge of the Politburo and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we demand that the entire ruling class of the Soviet Union, be brought before international justice.

b. Yezhov, Beria, Abakumov and others, whose execution was ordered by the security organs in order to deceive people at home and abroad, cannot be held responsible for everything, because crimes against the enslaved nations continue to be perpetrated.

IV

We, Ukrainians, make the following demands on purely national grounds:

a. All Russian nationals shall be required to leave Ukrainian territory. They shall not be permitted to return until such time as Russia abandons her dream of denationalising, assimilating and eventually devouring Ukraine—until she ceases to regard herself as Big Brother. It is a distortion of reality and of historical fact to speak of "the union of Ukraine with Russia". Ukraine has always been cruelly enslaved by Russia.

b. We concede the right of other nationals—unless they have been sent by the Russian Government for aggressive purposes—to live on Ukrainian territory, enjoying equal rights with the Ukrainian people. Russians may live there only when they begin to be governed by general standards of morality.

c. As long as there are armed forces in the world, the only units stationed in Ukraine are to be composed exclusively of Ukrainians and under the command of Ukrainians; all soldiers and commanders not of Ukrainian extraction are to be withdrawn beyond the borders of our country. This also applies to the administrative and security organs of the MVD.

d. Anyone who violates the laws of Ukraine is to be tried before a Ukrainian people's or military court; if convicted, his sentence will be served within the national borders.

Note: We request that the citizens of the world be informed of this letter by the United Nations, Division on Human Rights.

We have signed with initials and pseudonyms, so as to forestall any possible consequences.

[Signed by initials and pseudonyms of five deputies from the women's column and eight deputies from the men's column of prisoners.]

30/IX/55

5. ДРУГОЙ ЛУК

... (The text is a dense, handwritten-style transcription of a document, likely a letter or report, covering the reverse side of a page. It contains numerous lines of text, some of which are numbered or bulleted, and includes a signature at the bottom.)

... (The text continues on the right side of the page, including a signature and possibly a date or reference number.)

Facsimile of the letter addressed to U.N.O.
On the reverse side—facsimile of the letter addressed to Ukrainians
in the Free World

To the Ukrainians in the Free World

DEAR FRIENDS :

We wish to take advantage of this opportunity to tell you briefly what the Bolsheviks say about you—our political émigrés of the last decade—in their so-called lectures and in recent articles in the press. We would also like to give the Ukrainians abroad who are not indifferent to our fate some idea of the conditions prevailing among political prisoners in special Soviet camps since the war.

Lectures on Ukrainian affairs are delivered by important officials in the Mordovian Party, and not by members of the administration of local special camps. The main point in what they have been saying about you is roughly as follows : Although the number of Ukrainian political émigrés in the last decade has been small, the group is torn by dissension and split into many parties. They are politically shortsighted, and they no longer enjoy popularity among their people, whose support they have lost. They are not fighting for anything real—just for the capital letter “U”. The Bolsheviks cite the names of our most prominent political leaders abroad, calling them “the most despicable betrayers of the Ukrainian people”.

Lectures on Ukrainian affairs were recently discontinued. The reason may lie in the prisoners' dignified reaction to the Bolsheviks' tendentious distortion of historical facts. These lectures, held at unexpected times, caused us spiritual anguish. But at the same time, they were a welcome event, because they allowed us to think (correctly, we hope) that our position in international politics had improved and that the Bolsheviks were therefore intensifying their propaganda efforts in the pertinent direction. Political prisoners of other nationalities in the Soviet Union envy us without rancour, and they hope that we did not rejoice in vain.

Among recent printed works attacking us, first place is occupied in the libraries of the Mordovian special camps by the brochures of Halan (*Selected Works*, 1954), of Belyayev, and of M. Rudnitskiy (*Under Alien Banners*). They are permeated with monstrous, unparalleled venom, bigotry, and hatred for everything Ukrainian and non-Communist.

Entire chapters in these libellous sheets are devoted to you, our political émigrés of today. Emphasis is placed on internal disorder, dissensions, the struggle for power, the lust for gain, and political immaturity. Our attitude towards all forms of Bolshevik propaganda is the same. We are convinced that the written and the spoken word in the Soviet “prison of nations” is hopelessly slanted. We firmly believe that, with the benefit of past experience, you will do your duty with honour—a moral duty imposed by the nation upon its political émigrés; that your years in exile will not prove to be time lost; that you are using this time to good advantage; and that you will return to Ukraine with your forces undiminished and with an awareness of all important theories successfully practised in Europe and the rest of the world, so that our nation may benefit from them. We believe that your long sojourn abroad will not diminish your longing for your country and that it will not make you want to live abroad for the rest of your lives.

And now a few words about living conditions among political prisoners in Soviet special camps during the postwar years. The basic features of the Bolshevik prison-camp system have not changed. Almost all of the special camps in areas where the climate is severe (Kolyma, Taymyr, Siberia, Komi, Kazakhstan). Sentences for political crimes vary in length from five years (for a single attempt, as they say in jest, at "suspect" thought) to twenty-five years in so-called corrective labour camps, and from fifteen to twenty years of penal servitude. In the immediate postwar period, famine, unendurably hard labour, and appalling sanitary conditions took a toll of thousands of political prisoners.

Again in 1948 a so-called strict regime was introduced in the special camps. The iron-barred barracks were locked at night. Correspondence was restricted to two letters per year. No one was permitted to keep cash. There were penal barracks. Prisoners were not allowed to wear their own clothes but had to wear prison uniforms with numbers on the back; they were not allowed to take notes from books, to engage in handicrafts, to assemble in large groups, and so forth. All this was coupled with twelve hours at hard labour and a deliberate increase in the work norms.

The unbearable living conditions brought about uprisings in certain camp centres—Vorkuta in 1953, Noril'sk in the spring and summer of 1953, and Kingir (Kazakhstan) in 1954. Over forty thousand prisoners of different nationalities took part in the uprisings. In suppressing them, the enemy used all kinds of weapons, including tanks. At the cost of several thousand comrades killed or wounded, we brought about the abolition of the stricter regime and the introduction of an eight-hour day.

In the last few years the Bolsheviks have paraded their humanitarianism before the world. They issued decrees that also pertained to political prisoners, but most of them were not put into effect on a comprehensive scale (the decree releasing invalids from special camps, the "probationary" release of political prisoners who had served two-thirds of their terms). Following their release from special camps, prisoners can usually expect to be exiled to Siberia for an indefinite period.

In September of this year, an amnesty was declared for political prisoners who had collaborated with the Germans during the war. The official Bolshevik term for our nationalist prisoners is "*Banderivtsi*" or "Ukraino-German Nationalists", and the amnesty does not apply to us—another proof of the perfidy of the Bolshevik system.

For the sake of the truth, we want to say in conclusion that we hold the name, Ukrainian political prisoners, in deep respect and that we have, generally speaking, gained favour and recognition from political prisoners of other nationalities.

God bless you, dear friends. Do not forget us, and keep in mind your return to Ukraine.

Mordovia
5 October 1955

UKRAINIAN WOMEN
Political Prisoners in the
Mordovian Special Camps

SYMON PETLIURA

(In Memory of his Tragic Death on 25. 5. 1926)

During the fierce struggle which the Ukrainian Nation waged for her independence after the First World War, Ukraine became known among her enemies as "Petliura country", the Ukrainian National Movement as "Petliurism" and the Ukrainian patriots as "Petliurists". Seeing that Ukraine was slipping out of their hands her enemies endeavoured to belittle the Ukrainian liberation movement in this way just as in an earlier period their predecessors thought that by calling the Ukrainian patriots "Mazeppists" and the whole movement "Mazeppism", after its inspirer, the famous leader of the Ukrainian Cossacks who fought at Poltava against the Russian Tzar Peter I, they would achieve the same aim. This appellation which in the opinion of the enemy was to serve as a term of abuse became in fact prized by those who had received it. It happened similarly with the new denomination. The only difference was that even before the death of Petliura all manifestations of Ukrainian patriotism and national life, the entire struggle against Communism in Ukraine were closely bound with the name of Petliura. Petliura's personality was a nightmare for all those who raised their hand against Ukraine, for the White Russians who wanted to save the former Empire from its inevitable disintegration and for the Bolsheviks, who saw their way blocked by a formidable barrier composed of Ukrainian nationalism and Petliura's moral strength.

Petliura, was born at Poltava on 22nd May 1879. His father, Basil Petliura, traced his descent from one of those impoverished Cossack families whom the Russian system had pushed down to the lowest strata of the population; he managed his own carriage hire business and earned his bread with difficulty. Having attended a seminary, a secondary school establishment for young men without fortune, Symon was forced to leave it after a few years because of his obstinate nationalism which his teachers-russificators could not tolerate.

Very talented, since his youth he was destined by his parents to enter priestly orders and who knows, perhaps the course of events would have been much different, had Petliura become a priest on completing his studies at the seminary.

Dismissed from that establishment for having shown too courageous an attachment to national traditions and his oppressed country, he had to seek asylum outside Ukraine first at Tiflis, the capital of Georgia and later on in Kuban area where he worked under the direction of a well-known teacher Shcherbyna. Finally he went abroad to Western Ukraine which was then under Austro-Hungarian rule and stayed at first at Chernivtsi in Bukovyna and later on at Lviv where he found an opportunity to follow a course in Ukrainian literature at the University.

About 1905 we find Symon Petliura at Kyiv. He had already tried his hand at journalism and writing, he was collaborating with the Ukrainian journals in Galicia and with those which were permitted by the Russian authorities to appear in Kyiv. He even became the editor of the journal "Slovo" ("The Word").

Burning with indignation against the Russian oppression and influenced by the revolutionary ideas which undermined the then existing order, young Petliura became a member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party. This party composed of active revolutionary elements came into existence after the decomposition of the former Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (R.U.P.).

However, the period of relative toleration when the Ukrainian press could enjoy a certain liberty was soon over. About 1911 almost all Ukrainian journals were suppressed and banned by Stolypin and Petliura was compelled to leave Kyiv, having made acquaintance with Russian political prisons first.

Then he went to St. Petersburg to work as an accountant at a transport firm, and later as an Assurance Society inspector. He devoted all his leisure to the political work in defense of his country oppressed by the Russians. His activity inspired all the Ukrainian societies in St. Petersburg, he was the organiser of many meetings, the stimulator of national activity. Although still young he became noted for his eloquence, This enabled him to appear as a speaker at the side of such orators as Maxim Kovalevsky and to earn their applause. His profound intelligence, his insatiable energy conquered for him the sympathy of all Ukrainians whom fate has brought to the banks of Neva. Even his socialist faith did not alienate from him sympathies of his friends and did not discourage people of different views who felt that this doctrine did not constitute the final aim of his life and that he had always before him an ideal much more elevated and much more sacred...

In 1912 Petliura settled in Moscow and, being unable to continue his Ukrainian publications prohibited throughout the Empire he founded together with M. A. Salikovsky a review in Russian language "Ukrainskaya Zhizn" ("The Ukrainian Life"). Soon he married Olga Bielska, a compatriot who followed him to his temporary exile, for Petliura, living constantly at odds with the Government because of his political activity could not live in Ukraine.

The outbreak of World War I found him in Moscow. For many of the Ukrainian politicians a war against Russia evoked instinctive sympathy. It was obvious that only on the ruins of the Russian Empire an independent, free, national Ukrainian state could arise. Petliura, contrary to some of his colleagues who saw the salvation of Ukraine in the victory of the Central Powers, belonged to those who, both in the press and in speeches, proclaimed their support for the Allied cause hoping that after the victory the change of system in Eastern Europe would be inevitable.

From the beginning of the war Petliura was a military official and an inspector of the Union of Municipalities which organised hospitals, cantines and other auxiliary services. He maintained this position from 1914 till 1917 with a rank equivalent to that of captain and later of a colonel. He worked on the Austrian front and endeavoured to assist Ukrainian population in Galicia and to defend it from unjust Russian exactions and persecutions. He proved himself to be a good organiser, administrator and a manager whom all his subordinates adored and his superiors praised and admired.

In 1917, on the outbreak of the Revolution, he threw himself into the chaos of things and chose a field of activity in which he acquired incontestable fame. Three years spent at the front as a military official, were not in vain. When the Ukrainian Nation, seeing the Russian Empire crumble, awoke to a new life, Petliura began to organise Ukrainian regiments from the Ukrainian soldiers scattered in various units of the Russian army. The military congresses which met during the spring and summer of 1917 at Kyiv elected a Committee for military organisation which chose Petliura as its Chairman. In this function he became a member of the Central Rada, the provisional Ukrainian parliament which during 1917 assumed governmental authority in Ukraine.

This Committee in which Petliura was not only Chairman, but organiser, and administrator as well, has fulfilled a great mission.

It laid the first foundations under the Ukrainian military organisation, awakened the prospects for the formation of the Ukrainian national army and became a patriotic centre which was opposed to all the "revolutionary" follies from which the Rada was not immune.

It is thanks to the influence of the Committee and Petliura himself that the concessions made by the Provisional Government at Petrograd on 16th July were formulated and obtained. Kerensky, Tereshchenko and Tsereteli, the representatives of Petrograd government had to bow before the demands of the Ukrainians for full autonomy. It is therefore understandable that Petliura was called to take over the post of the Minister for Military Affairs when the Ukrainian autonomous government was organised.

Foreign missions of diplomatic and military character were present at that time in Kyiv. Ukrainian independence was recognized *de facto* by Great Britain, France and Rumania, and High Commissioners of these countries entered into relations with the Ukrainian Government. The activities of the Minister for War, Petliura, were observed by them. They saw how this man applied all his energy to the creation of Ukrainian regiments consisting of the soldiers whom the Bolshevik propaganda tried to demoralise. He did everything to maintain the front and to obtain Allied help for the reorganisation of his troops. However, the difficulties created for him by Kerensky's Government and finally the Bolshevik coup in November in Petrograd and Moscow impeded the realisation of his plans.

When the peace negotiation of Brest Litovsk were begun between Soviet Russia and Central Powers, Ukraine declared her complete independence and entered into negotiations as a third partner. Petliura, being opposed to the peace negotiations, resigned his post as Minister for War and took over the command of the army detachments which fought against the Bolshevik troops under the command of Muraviev and Antonov-Ovseyenko who invaded Ukraine in December 1917 and January 1918. During this first Russo-Ukrainian campaign, General Petliura distinguished himself by his bravery and *sang-froid* as well as military knowledge.

He fought as a simple soldier and was seen in the first ranks, rifle in his hand, directing his troops to the assault of the Kyiv arsenal where the Bolsheviks had entrenched themselves.

His popularity grew from day to day in the military circles. The soldiers and officers followed him with enthusiasm. With

sadness they saw him quit the military service in March 1918 when the Bolshevik Russian troops had been chased out of Ukraine.

On the occupation of the country by the Germans he decided to devote himself to social activity without participating in the Government.

Elected President of Zemstvo*) in Kyiv he organised the Union of Zemstvos and Municipalities of Ukraine and became its President, too. He occupied himself energetically with questions of food supply and the reconstruction of the country ravaged by war and anarchy.

Due to the conflicts he had with the German occupation authorities and the part he played in the "National Alliance" in which all Ukrainian opposition rallied itself, he was imprisoned for three months on German orders.

Dissatisfaction among Ukrainian patriots grew and when Hetman Skoropadsky issued a manifesto proclaiming the federation of Ukraine with Russia, it culminated in a revolt.

Soon after leaving prison Petliura placed himself at the head of the insurgents, became a member of the Directory established by the National Alliance, as a supreme organ, and the C.-in-C. of the troops. On December 14 the Ukrainian Republic was proclaimed at Kyiv. Almost at the same time the second Russo-Ukrainian war broke out. The Soviet government, utilizing the confusion in which Ukraine was embroiled launched an offensive and invaded the provinces of Kharkiv and Donets.

Petliura enjoyed at that time immense popularity. His presence was demanded at the front, the chaos which reigned in the country, the accession to power of certain elements of the extreme left, the foreign affairs which were very complicated at the moment when the Peace Conference at Paris opened, the disembarkation of French expeditionary force at Odessa under General d'Anselm, establishment of the new Polish state, demanded his presence at the Directory. When a provisional parliament was convoked in Kyiv he had to be there, too.

One could see this indomitable man apply his energy in all fields of national effort, influence all major decisions, temper the exaltation of the socialists whom fate brought temporarily to power, and direct the external relations which he alone understood, master his army which at that time was ridden with some demoralised

*) Regional self-government board.

elements, formulate and impose on it a national ideal and lead it into an unequal struggle against all the enemies which surrounded Ukraine, arouse finally all the enthusiasm of the Nation and to achieve an indisputable authority over it. That is what Petliura had to do, and he did it.

V. Vynnychenko, the leader of the Social Democrats and Head of the Directory renounced his supreme authority. Successive governments evolved slowly from the extreme left to a point where co-operation with the moderate right became possible. Soon the Ukrainian army formed originally from soldiers who had not known discipline since the beginning of the Revolution, became under the influence of Symon Petliura and his generals and officers of high qualifications whom he knew how to enlist, an army full of bravery and endurance.

More than two months after the resignation of Vynnychenko the Directory was presided in turn by one of its five members. On 9th May 1919 his colleagues chose him permanent President of the Directory. Only a few months later after the reverses at the front against the Bolsheviks and failures in the foreign policy discouraged many of the most persistent, they resigned their powers into the hands of Symon Petliura. At the time when the army was fighting the retreat action against the overwhelming enemy forces, disease, lack of food, ammunition, clothes and supplies, was decimated and in a state of decomposition, when everybody lost courage, when the starved population was resigning itself to their fate, the only hope seemed to remain, expressed with the name "Petliura". The decision of the Government presided over by I. Mazepa and consisting mostly of Socialists, as well as that of the Directory to relegate the supreme authority on the Otaman Symon Petliura as the Head of the State, were acts of national conscience, acts of public safety demanded by the Nation.

Thus this young man, this journalist who thought he was a Socialist and who had been a military official, became by a conscious evolution which the events had perhaps precipitated a professional soldier, army organiser, General, Minister of War, a Statesman, later the most influential man in the Ukrainian National Assembly and finally Commander-in-Chief, President of the Directory of the Ukrainian Republic. A former Socialist he chose in all the programmes that which could serve Ukraine. He became a realist, a politician to whom life had given experience and whom observation of men and things taught to see justly.

The difficulties which he had to overcome during 1919 and in the beginning of 1920 did not discourage him. He managed, with the assistance of General Omelianovych-Pavlenko to preserve the nucleus of the army and the famous winter campaign (6th December 1919-6th May 1920), although he did not follow it himself, was connected with his name because for the soldiers he was a distant inspirer, the adored leader from whom one expected criticism or praise.

The treaty of 21st April 1920 concluded between Poland and Ukraine was a desperate attempt by Petliura to save what still remained of Ukrainian forces. He also hoped that with the help of his Western ally Ukraine would gain recognition and support from the great powers. If, instead of waiting for miracles, the Western Allies had come to the aid of Petliura, had induced Wrangel to advance into Russia proper instead of lingering on the Ukrainian soil without recognising independence of Ukraine, the Bolsheviks might have been beaten. The advance of Petliura and Pilsudski at the head of the united armies could have been a victorious march. The betrayal of Ukraine by her Polish ally in the Treaty of Riga of March 1921 when Ukrainian territories were divided among the occupants, forced the Ukrainian government to go into exile.

The enemies of Ukraine thought that with the defeat of the Ukrainian armies the name of Petliura would fall into oblivion. But those who thought thus did not take into account the sentiments of the Ukrainian popular masses. Time and again insurrections directed against the Bolshevik occupation of Ukraine were connected with Petliura's renown. Living in exile in Warsaw at first, he arrived via Budapest, Zurich and Geneva, where he stayed for a brief period, in Paris in 1924. His moral influence, despite bitter polemics within the Ukrainian political émigré circles, grew considerably. He continued his fight against Moscow at the time when a part of Ukrainian public opinion lost faith and succumbed to Soviet propaganda of alleged transformation of the Soviet regime.

Although realising his great rôle, Petliura always maintained the simplicity and gentility of manners of a former journalist. His personal charm attracted and captivated others and he exercised an irresistible influence on those who approached him, whether they were foreign diplomats, his compatriots or even political adversaries. He always knew what topic for conversation to chose, how to

spread around himself joy when he felt happy and to impose seriousness when he desired it. Towards his intimate friends, towards his entourage, he was always gentle and extremely delicate, avoiding to demand services, being anxious not to disturb anyone and trying to oblige everybody. His broad mind was interested in everything. His main preoccupation was to seek in every question and in every occasion profit for Ukraine. This preoccupation was so strong that almost no one could forget that this man so simple, dressed in grey, with his ironic and soft smile lurking on his lips and in his eyes, was the leader in whom forty million human beings had placed their hopes and their most sacred aspirations.

On 25th May 1926 at the corner of the Rue Racine and the Boulevard St. Michel in Paris revolver shots were fired at Symon Petliura, the Ukrainian hero and Chief of State. He fell bleeding on the French soil on which he sought asylum. It was 2.25 p.m. A few minutes later Symon Petliura died and all Ukrainian hearts sank cruelly wounded by assassin's bullets, too.

The reasons for the crime are clear. Moscow again showed her claws. By killing the symbol of the Ukrainian liberation fight the Kremlin hoped to stifle the struggle itself. The assassin who was caught on the spot of the crime was camouflaged, however, into an avenger of the Jewish pogroms in Ukraine the responsibility for which was completely unjustly ascribed to Petliura by the enemies of Ukraine.

In spite of the evil designs of the enemies of Ukraine the work of Petliura and his idealism survived his death. It inspired those who took up the struggle against the Kremlin tyranny in his stead. As he lived and fell for Ukraine and her better future, so thousands upon thousands of Ukrainian patriots, looking up to the example of his life's path, sacrificed their momentary material welfare and exchanged it for the suffering, struggle and sometimes death, in the hope that the ideal of a free and independent Ukraine would in the end be achieved and a glorious future would open before the Ukrainian Nation.

(An abridged version of the short biography "Simon Petliura" by Jean de Tokary Tokarzewski Karaszewicz, which was published in French in Paris in 1927.)



SYMON PETLIURA
(22. 5. 1879 - 25. 5. 1926)

Volodymyr Derzhavyn

The Coryphaeus of Ukrainian Literature

**To Commemorate the Centenary of Ivan Franko's Birth
on August 15, 1856**

The poet who could merely sit on a chair and make stanzas would never make a stanza worth much. He could not sing the Heroic Warrior unless he himself were a Heroic Warrior too. I fancy there is in him the Politician, the Thinker, Legislator, Philosopher. In one or the other degree, he could have been, he is, all of these.

Thomas Carlyle

In the first place, we should like to give a brief survey of the main literary facts:

Ivan Franko (1856-1916), generally acknowledged as the greatest writer, philologist, and social thinker of Galicia (Western Ukraine), who was also the spiritual father of the modern all-Ukrainian national trend and, as a poet, writer, and critic, was extremely productive and manysided, was, above all, a literary pioneer inasmuch as it was thanks to his efforts that the Ukrainian reader had an opportunity to become acquainted with world literature, and in so far as he introduced and adapted, with considerable artistic perfection, classical and modern West European literary genres in Ukrainian literature, both by his own creative work and by countless translations and essays in the field of literary criticism. Although he was the creator of the Ukrainian naturalist social novel and social drama, in his idealistic poetic works, which, incidentally, later also reveal certain impressionist and, in fact, even symbolist traits, he breaks away from the popular and realistic limits of his original positivism and, in his longer epic poems such as "Mickie the Fox" (which was written in 1890 and is a satiric version of the European mediaeval "animal epic"), "The Death of Cain" (1889), "Ivan Vyshensky" (1900), and "Moses" (1905), reveals an artistic and heroic outlook on life which is firmly based on national consciousness. In its manysidedness, his profound influence on modern Ukrainian thought can be compared to Goethe's influence in German literature, which it undoubtedly equals in extent.

Although it must be admitted that most Ukrainian literary historians and critics, when questioned as to the part played by Ivan Franko in Ukrainian literature, always give the stereotyped

reply that he is Ukraine's second greatest writer after Taras Shevchenko, we do not wish to contest this reply at this point, but it nevertheless contains a profounder significance which must not be overlooked. T. Shevchenko was the prophet of the Ukrainian national revival and his patriotic verses still live on in the heart of every Ukrainian; it is true that he was a great poet, but he was essentially a poet only (that is to say if one does not take into consideration his many achievements in the field of painting, which were, however, by no means epoch-making artistic masterpieces); it was only with some hesitation and not with any real success, in fact, that he tried his hand at prose, and he was, by nature, not particularly interested in philology, publicism, or active politics. Franko, however, was *the* writer "pax excellence", the representative of the entire intellectual culture of his nation who was a master of all the forms of expression of the intellectual and spiritual life of his Ukrainian contemporaries, and, moreover, was capable of guiding the latter and, in the long run, did so. As Professor Clarence A. Manning (Columbia University) has so aptly said, Ivan Franko "as poet, novelist, dramatist, literary critic, scholar, political pamphleteer, and in many another way worked steadily and unflinchingly for the good of his people."

And yet this amazing manysidedness of his creative work was by no means the attitude of polyhistor, nor did it in any way impair the truly individual originality of the encyclopedic personality of this great writer. Ivan Franko always remains true to his own self, a man who bears and is willing to bear the personal responsibility for every word he writes, whether he is concerned with ethnographical research, current problems pertaining to social and national policy, philosophical writings, or with a naturalist portrayal of morals and customs. Not even socialism which was so widespread in Europe during the second half of the past century—apart from a certain ideological influence which it had on his way of thinking in his youth—prompted him to abandon his sense of personal responsibility and his ethical ideals; and as far as Marxist social democracy was concerned, Franko in the later years of his life quite definitely attacked it when, in an autobiographical essay, he openly expressed his uncompromising opposition to every form of dogmatism and to every kind of authoritarian disregard or suppression of the human personality:

"I never belonged to that sect of the faithful who founded their socialistic program on the dogmas of hatred and class warfare,

and I have courage enough amid the sneers and abuses of such adepts openly to carry the standard of a true humanitarian socialism aiming at the ethical, broadly humanistic education of the popular masses for progress and general enlightenment, for personal liberty as well as national, and not for party dogmatism, nor for the despotism of leaders, nor the bureaucratic regimentation of all the phases of everyday life, nor for a parliamentary chicanery to bring in the hoped-for future."

It is, incidentally, amazing how much his fundamental spiritual and intellectual attitude tallies with the attitude of the Anglo-Saxon world—with the high assessment of all individual achievement and opinion, with the rejection of dogmatic teachings or theories, with the manly "attitude to life" which rejects all optimistic illusions and overcomes its pessimism by an unwavering and heroic sense of duty. It would, however, be wrong to interpret this spiritual and intellectual affinity as a direct personal influence. A study of the literature of Western Europe during the past century, for instance, reveals that the writer whose attitude to life in general comes closest to Ivan Franko's is not Balzac or Zola, whose works undoubtedly inspired Franko to write his realistic or naturalist novels and stories, but his great English contemporary, Thomas Hardy, although it seems fairly unlikely that there was any direct influence in this case. As regards Franko's poetic works, however, the situation is different, for here one can definitely say that the English example for Franko's artistic achievement was none other than Byron.

Not, it is true, Byron as the creator of "Don Juan" or "Childe Harold", but as the writer of a somewhat gloomy and manly political and passionate lyric poetry and of dramatic works. And it is very gratifying to know that it is precisely those works of Franko's which reveal an affinity with Byron—namely, the lyric poems of Franko's later period and his longer epic poems—that have been made available to the English-speaking reader, to a limited but nevertheless quite considerable extent, by the literal and artistically perfect translations by that recently deceased prominent authority on Ukrainian poetry, the Reverend Percival Cundy, who, had it not been for his premature death, would undoubtedly have enriched the English store of translated literature with all the most important works of both Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrainka. Nevertheless, the English-speaking reader, thanks to the fact that Cundy's translations of certain poems by Ivan Franko have already been publish-

ed*), now has a chance to read for himself the practically unabridged version of the poem, "The Death of Cain", which as regards its contents (in the epic style) is a continuation of the theme of Byron's play, "Cain", and presents a philosophical sublimation of the ethical and metaphysical problems raised by Byron and proclaims the final reconciliation of Cain to God and the world with an artistic perfection which is all the more impressive since Franko is here giving expression to his own ethical creed:

I will teach
 Them mutual love, persuade them to forsake
 Their enmities, shedding each other's blood.
 I, first of murderers, will thus my sin
 Redeem, by turning man from violence.
 My people, children, all posterity!
 Give up your tears for a lost Paradise!
 I bring you it! The wisdom that I bring
 Shall help you to attain it for yourselves,
 To recreate lost Eden in your hearts!

No less important for an understanding of Franko's entire life-work is his historical poem, "Ivan Vyshensky", in which he presents the conflict between the ascetic religious demands of a love consecrated to God and the humanitarian demands of human love, of love of one's fellow-men and of one's own native country:

The hermit sits
 And cons the letter o'er and o'er
 And spots it with his falling tears.
 "O, hear thy Mother calling thee,
 Ukraine, the land that gave thee birth!
 Thy Motherland with tears calls for
 Her best beloved son to come!"
 Beloved son! Can "son" be called
 A man, who in the darkest hour,
 When foes assail and courage droops,
 Will not fly to his mother's aid?
 Has he forgot those holy words
 Which run: "Who saith that he loves God,
 Yet his own brother doth not help,
 He lies, and doeth not the truth."

*) Ivan Franko: Selected Poems. Translated with a biographical introduction by Percival Cundy. Edited by Clarence A. Manning (Philosophical Library, New York, 1948). All the passages quoted in this article are taken from poems included in the above-mentioned selection.

Of the most outstanding masterpiece of all Franko's works, the Biblical poem, "Moses", which was no doubt to some extent influenced by the "Mort de Moyse" by the French Romanticist, Alfred de Vigny, but reveals a more profound philosophy and exalts the purely psychological motives which prevail in the latter work to a social ethical and metaphysical level, only the last third, which is as profound in philosophy, but not by any means as expressive in poetry as the rest of the poem, is included in Percival Cundy's excellent translation. It is not only true that "in a real sense "Moses" was the culmination of the work of Franko; it marked his first acceptance of the fact that he would never accomplish all on which he had set his heart, to see his people free and happy; in this he won through all the doubts and difficulties that had been his" (C. A. Manning); and, most certainly, "the background of Franko's masterpiece is the experience of Franko himself and his relations with his own people as their spiritual leader after almost forty years of hard work on their behalf" (P. Cundy), but also that the poet in the personal background of this work included all the ideological and political problems pertaining to the leadership of mankind and the historical mission of the nations, and solved these questions through the medium of an attitude to life which, it is true, is resigned as far as immediate success is concerned, but is nevertheless an active and heroic attitude, as the conclusion of the poem unmistakably reveals:

*Like eagle's shriek, above the crowd,
Rang out that shrill and piercing cry;
It rolled and echoed from the mount:
"To arms, and fight for liberty!"*

*An instant—then all will awake
And break their stupefaction strange,
Yet none will know how in a flash
There came o'er them this sudden change.*

*An instant—then a thousand throats
Will Joshua's battle-cry repeat,
And from the sluggish nomads rise
A race of heroes to their feet.*

*Their drumming feet will pound the sand
And make it mud beneath their feet;
Abiram will be stoned to death,
A noose will Dathan's schemes defeat.*

O'er mountains like a bird they'll fly,
 And Jordan's stream be dashed to spray,
 The walls of Jericho like ice
 Will melt before the trumpet's bray.

Thus towards an unknown future, they
 Will march with longing and dismay,
 To pave a highway for man's soul,
 Yet perish on their onward way.

In his conception of art as such and, in particular, of poetic art, this great teacher of his people was likewise a pioneer; we are not so much referring to formal poetic innovations, although in this respect it was precisely Franko who definitely established such forms as the hexameter, the elegiac couplet, the sonnet and the terza rima in Ukrainian poetry, but rather to his conception of the part played by art in social and cultural life, a conception which is most clearly expressed in his terza rima "The Poet's Task" (included in his last volume of poems, "Semper Tiro"—"Always A Learner", which appeared in 1906):

O poet, know: that on the path of life,
 No pearls, no riches, shalt thou ever find,
 Nor shelter from earth's elemental strife.
 O poet, know: thy mission is designed
 For thee to feel man's pains in their extremes,
 Ere thou shalt reach thy goal by heaven assigned.

O poet, know: that in the sphere of dreams,
 Illusions, fancies, shall thy Eden bloom;
 Thy task: to seek therein for vital themes.
 The poet-prophet's gift will thee foredoom
 To lead thy fellows to a Promised Land;
 But yet, to enter it, do not presume.

* * *

Go through life's masquerade with naked face,
 And, like the sage of old, a lantern bear,
 Whene'er thou walkest in the market place.

The soul of things will in its light appear,
 Its rays will penetrate the darkest mass.

Be not a judge to men, but friend sincere,
 Both mirror and restorer. Look and pass*).

*) In the original this final sentence is in Italian, a quotation from Dante: "Guarda e passa".



Ne à Stockholm (1682). Roi jeune et aventureux. Vainqueur des Danois, il écrase l'armée de Pierre le Grand à Narva (1700), les Polonais, à Klossow et fait élire Stanislas Leezinski. Il soumet la Saxe, à Altranstad. Vaincu à son tour par le Tzar, il se réfugia à Bender. Trahi et pris par les Turcs, il s'échappe et regagne la Suède en 1713. Mais la Suède était dans un état si déplorable que toutes ses victoires furent inutiles. Il fut tué à Frederiksha'ld, en 1718.

CHARLES XII,
the King of Sweden

Dmytro Donzow

The Campaign of Charles XII in Ukraine

Charles XII is blamed for trusting to the promises of Mazeppa; the Cossack, however, did not betray Charles XII, but was himself betrayed by unforeseen circumstances, which could neither be anticipated nor averted.

Frederick the Great

The Great Northern War, 1700-21, and the struggle between nations that we are witnessing today, have much in common. Formerly, as at present, one of the main causes of war was the aspiration of Russia to expand to the West. The problems that disturbed political life at that time are also the problems of this century, and among them the political structure of that great geographical complex called "Western Russia", composed as it is of a series of distinct national territories. The study of an epoch so distant, and yet so near, to our time, should have great significance for us. It may protect us from making mistakes and give some indications of the possible solution of those problems which, as already pointed out, were on the political agenda in 1700-1721, and are still there today.

Many critics have represented Charles XII's campaign as a breakneck adventure, and many of them even now try to depict him as a warning example that it is ridiculous to imagine the power of Russia can be broken. Therefore it would be valuable to determine whether Mazeppa's work was foredoomed to failure, or whether he failed—in the words of Frederick the Great—owing to 'unknown reasons', called by the people 'blind fate', and impossible to foresee.

The question is not a purely theoretical one. Upon the answer there might depend the solution of Russian expansionism, whether this has been a steady natural necessity, as often suggested, or whether it could have been brought to a halt in the time of Peter I. Are we here dealing with forces of nature which destroyed the Swedish bulwark, or was its loss an unlucky accident that might never have occurred?

To reach a correct conclusion it is first necessary to see if Charles XII had rightly understood the political situation in Europe and the internal situation in Russia before declaring war as a final resort against Peter I and rejecting the latter's proposals for a peaceful settlement. In other words, were the political conditions at the time suitable for such a war?

Secondly, one must ask whether the Ukrainian campaign was wise from the strategical point of view.

Negative answers to these questions can only confirm the harsh word 'adventure'. Many politicians who are constantly amazed at the rapid growth of Russia into a world power look for the tendency to such growth in the periods previous to the reign of Peter I, and the more they find such tendencies, the further they move from the viewpoint of that time, and the more they wonder at the 'irresponsibility' of Charles XII. How, they argue, was it that the Swedish king did not see at the end of the seventeenth century that which they see so clearly in the twentieth? How could the warlike but small sized nation attempt to destroy the immense Russian power? These politicians, however, have disregarded three considerations. The first is that, even if Sweden were unable to defeat Russia, Charles XII could hardly be expected to know this, when, to make this 'impossibility' probable, it seemed to him and to the rest of Europe necessary to have a Great Northern War. Secondly, the politicians forget that at that time there was no Russia as we know it, but only Muscovy, or the Muscovite State, and further, no-one really knew exactly where this State was. It was to the East from Poland, and seemed at the time to reach somewhere towards India. The Muscovite ambassadors who appeared from time to time in the courts of Western Europe were the laughing stock of the educated and cultured Europeans. Sweden, on the other hand, was a great empire at that time, and it was said by the French that the Swedish chancellor was the axis about which the world turned. And thirdly, the political critics of Charles XII overlook that, even if he were fully conscious of the difficulty of his task, he was faced with the necessity of protecting Swedish national interests by meeting Muscovy in the field of battle. To satisfy Russia by recognising her control of the eastern shores of the Baltic would have lost Sweden that position as a world power which she had held for over a century, and would have placed her in an inferior position among the nations. No country accepts such

a fate willingly, and had Sweden done so, it would have constituted an event unprecedented in history.

Many states, during their existence, have had to abandon the hope of further expansion, and to admit their insufficiency of power, but they have always been compelled to do so "*manu militari*". In this particular case, then, why should it have been otherwise? Charles understood that his struggle against Peter for supremacy had to reach an end, and one of them would have to suffer destruction or become merely an insignificant factor in international affairs. History forced the issue for Sweden in a very cruel way.

Charles had become convinced that resort to war was the inevitable alternative when he said in the Senate: "It is my intention never to begin an unjust war, but also never to end a just war until the enemy is defeated".

This was not youthful chatter, but a shrewd glance forward through the centuries, seeing that it was impossible for two great countries to reign simultaneously over the Baltic Sea. Such clear understanding, which is a tribute to the intelligence of the young ruler, was behind Charles' desire to dictate a treaty with the Tzar of Moscow. It might have been easy for Charles to expel the Russians from Finland, Sweden and Ingermannland, which they had entered in 1703, but a war could not end there. Even if a treaty were concluded with Peter I afterwards, it could only mean a few years' pause in the struggle. Peter I's predecessors had tried persistently to approach the Baltic in the reign of Gustavus Adolphus as well as in that of Charles X, and both kings had turned the Russians back, but such reverses were only temporary. From these examples it was not difficult to reach the conclusion that by a solely defensive war Sweden was unable to defend the eastern shores of the Baltic. The fall of Moscow and the weakening of Russia generally could alone secure the Baltic Provinces to the conqueror for ever.

The policy of Charles XII with regard to Russia was to control the Baltic, and this, too, was traditionally Swedish. It was not an adventurous policy, but rather the opposite, marking the acceptance of the concept of Scandinavia, and the abandonment of the adventurous aims of Charles XII's predecessors who had tried to set their feet on the German shores, and to control the three main German rivers. This former policy would have enabled Sweden to extend her control over all trade in the Baltic. Indeed, a similar policy had been urged on Sweden by Mazarin, but had not at the

time complied with Swedish national and "adventurous" interests, so that Charles XII had deliberately rejected it. His decision to conquer Russia with the help of Mazepa and Turkey was a continuation of Charles X's policy, and not either his innovation or his own idea.

The political situation in Eastern Europe in the seventeenth century was chaotic and unstable. The nations did not as yet control defined territories over which they could rule in complete independence. In political writings of the century the "*équilibre dans le Nord*" so often discussed had no existence in reality, though it endeavoured to appear in different and often contradictory forms. Two tendencies could be seen with regard to this balance: One of them was the plan to build up a defensive barrier against the increasing power of Russia from the countries on the south and west of Moscow. These would have included Sweden, Turkey, and Ukraine. To this combination was sometimes added Brandenburg, Transylvania and Poland. The other tendency was to increase Russian influence in the Baltic and Black Seas, the preliminaries to which were the destruction of the countries—Ukraine and the Crimea—that lay between Russia and her targets, and the maintenance of the treaty between Russia and Poland. This alliance was necessary for Russia as it secured her against flank attacks during her campaign in the Baltic Provinces, and served as a mask to cover peaceful methods of subjugation. During the following centuries this method proved its worth. But the alliance was also advantageous to Poland, whose sporadic attempts to concert with Ukraine against Russia (Treaty of Hadiach 1659) were later abandoned; after 1668 (by the Treaty of Andrusiv which partitioned Ukraine between Muscovy and Poland) the Polish state, then having unfriendly relations with both Sweden and Turkey, began to fall under the influence of her stronger eastern neighbour.

The countries on the east of the Baltic and those round the Black Sea that were threatened by Russia, supported the first political tendency. This is seen not only in the struggle of these countries for their existence, but in various alliances that they, and Sweden, tried to make in order to divert by their combined forces the common danger threatening from the east. It is most clearly apparent in the treaty of 1656 concluded by the Swedish King Charles X and Rakoczy (Transylvania), the Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyj and Brandenburg. Naturally such an alliance weighed against Russia, and in addition it contained plans for the

partition of Poland, then regarded as a permanent ally of Russia. It is interesting that the part of Poland Charles X proposed should be granted to Brandenburg was the same territory that was later taken by Prussia in the Partition of Poland. The trend of Swedish policy pursued by Charles X was adopted by Charles XII in 1700, and it was his intention to combine strategically all factors which, from their geographical positions, could be regarded as opponents of Muscovy. "Clever" perception that the power of Russia is unbreakable could hardly influence his plans, nor the "deep" insight into the possibility of everlasting peace with the Tzars.

Did Charles, who understood the task inherited from his predecessors so clearly, choose a suitable opportunity for his actions? The facts seem to show that he was given no choice by his enemies. He was attacked by these, and, after defeating Denmark, he could have accepted the peace treaty proposed by the Tzar, resorting once more to war after a few years. However, we shall see that Charles was right in refusing the treaty and recognising the necessity of war *à outrance*, and he also selected the right moment to commence hostilities.

The political conditions of Europe were favourable to Sweden at that particular time. France, after the Treaty of Ryswick, was preparing for another war in coalition, and she considered Sweden on her side. Brandenburg had no close relations with Sweden, but she was very far from having them with Sweden's enemies. The Emperor hardly welcomed Sweden as protector of Protestantism in Germany, but at the same time he was too much occupied elsewhere to engage against Sweden. The two great maritime powers, England and the Netherlands, were also on Sweden's side, and, most important, support was secured from the Porte, whose relations with Russia were not at all cordial.

Turkey was apprehensive of the union of Ukraine and Muscovy (1654) and she was prepared—either directly or through the Crimean Khan—to lend any support to the Ukrainians against the Tzar-Protector. In 1650 Khmelnytskyj had actually accepted the supremacy of the Sultan for that purpose. In 1669 a treaty was concluded between Ukraine and Turkey which involved the latter in war with Muscovy. Once more, in 1677, a Turkish army entered Ukraine to help the Hetman, Yuriy Khmelnytskyj, fight against the Tzar, and thus it can be seen that the traditional policy of Turkey was to make common cause with Ukraine against Muscovite Russia.

At the commencement of the Northern War a peace treaty was drawn up between Turkey and the Tzar (3. 7. 1700), but, in spite of this, relations between the two courts were in a state of tension. As in modern times, Turko-Russian relations depend upon the problem of the Bosphorus, and a similar role was played in the time of Peter I by the Straits of the Sea of Azov, and the closely connected problem of control of the Black Sea. In order to strengthen his claim, the Tzar ordered the building of a great fleet in Voronezh and the Sea of Azov. As might be expected, these plans perturbed Constantinople. The Sultan preferred rather to go to war than to permit the Russian ships free entry into "his house" as he termed the Black Sea. Anxiety among the Turks at Peter's intentions to open up the straits of Azov reached such a pitch that they contemplated building a dam, flanked with huge fortresses at both ends that would close them completely. They thought about conquering Georgia so that her shores could not be used to protect the Russian fleet! Discontent in Constantinople was increased by letters and deputations from the Khan of Crimea who saw clearly how rapidly the Tzar was approaching the Crimea from the Dnipro side and also from Azov. For his part, Peter too was for a time in a critical situation: a grand Vizier in 1703, and the Khan in 1707 were prepared to declare war on Russia. The Porte was instigated also to such a course by ambassadors of Sweden, France and the King Stanislaus Leszczynski. The dangers of a declaration of war by the Porte was very near, and on his side the Tzar tried to induce Turkey to go to war against the Emperor by various diplomatic means in order to divert her attention from probable attack upon Muscovy.

Taking into consideration every circumstance, and especially the course of Russo-Turkish relations in the following century, we can conclude Charles XII to have estimated the trends of Turkish policy correctly, and to have expected not only the neutrality of the Porte but even her support. When he brought that country into his plans, even though at a later stage, he must have assessed the tendencies and interests of Turkey as necessarily anti-Russian. That his expectations were not fully realised was certainly not the result of any imprudence of his, as we shall see. As early as 1707 Charles began negotiations with the Porte to gain support against Peter.

Charles' plans regarding Ukraine were also far from fantastic, as the events proved later. Here he intended to strike at the very heart of Muscovy, Moscow.

What was the situation in Ukraine at that time, when Charles XII met his misfortune? At the beginning of the war it was an autonomous Province-Hetmanate which had been for 46 years united in alliance with Muscovy. The Hetmanate did not cover the whole ethnographic area of the Ukrainian nation, but only the two modern districts of Chernihiv and Poltava (including the City of Kyiv) and part of Katerynoslav and Kherson which were inhabited by Zaporozhian Cossacks—a Ukrainian knightly order which had its own independent internal administration under the sovereignty of the Hetman. Ukraine had her own administration, legislative, judiciary, treasury and, what was most important, her own army. The supreme political and military power rested in the hands of the Hetman who was elected for life. It was his duty to provide military help to the Tzar when required, but the Tzar could not dispose of these forces without the Hetman's consent. At the time in question the Ukrainian army was very numerous and highly significant as a striking force: there were 60,000 regular troops, whereas the Tzar of the "whole of Russia" had at his command about 70,000. On 13 October 1703, when a treaty was concluded between Peter and the Polish king, Augustus, it was agreed that the Tzar should send him 12,000 of his soldiers, and that the Hetman would come to his assistance with his army of 60,000.

The Hetman's army gave good service to Peter also. In 1700 there were 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Ingermannland. In 1701 the Ukrainian army took part in the siege of Riga with Duke Repnin. Later on, 20,000 Cossacks, led by the Hetman himself, campaigned in Volynia and reached Lviv, while many thousands were at battle stations in Lithuania and Ukraine. The Ukrainian population itself was hostile towards the Russians. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyj, whose death had interrupted joint action with Charles X against Muscovy, and all the Hetmans after him—according to the words of Peter I "all Hetmans were traitors"—had all concluded treaties and negotiated with one or other of the neighbouring states in order to fight against Muscovy. Ukraine had been, since the Treaty of Pereyaslav, a battlefield for various armies and numerous insurrections, and during Peter's reign, there was little chance of the dissatisfaction in the country subsiding.

In his reforms, Peter did not confine himself to spreading European culture among his subjects: first of all he attempted to centralise Russia, and this was the main cause of unrest and of

hostility to Peter's activities amongst Ukrainians who would scarcely have objected to the Europeanisation of Muscovy. It was Ukraine that, in the seventeenth century, had supplied semi-Asiatic Muscovy with theologians, scientists and printers educated in the European tradition. Dissatisfaction was particularly strong among the Starshyna, the senior army commanders who represented the administrative districts—then organised on military lines—and who had been brought up on the principles of West-European hierarchical society and limited powers of the crown. Their main objection was to the interference of the Tzar in the home affairs of the Ukrainian state. In view of this resentment it is incorrect to regard Mazeppa alone—although he was the most outstanding personality—as guilty of “treason”, since he was influenced by the Starshyna. Like those of Charles XII, his intentions did not issue from his “romantic” nature, but the plans of both of them were deeply rooted in the conditions prevailing at the time. Peter's plans, which were only realised very much later by Catherine II—to abolish the independent Ukrainian army, convert the Ukrainian Cossack forces into dragoons or other Russian army units and to submit them directly to the authority of the Tzar—caused great consternation among leading Ukrainians. In such plans, the Starshyna saw a dangerous threat to the bases of power in their country and to its autonomy. Hatred for Russia was in general strengthened by improper treatment of Ukrainian regiments in the West, South and North, and by the plundering of Ukraine by Russian soldiery. The Starshyna expressed their fears thus to their Hetman: “We pray to God for the soul of Khmelnytskyj who brought Ukraine from the yoke of Poland; and we and our children will curse your soul and your body if you leave us to this slavery after your death”.

But the Hetman was firmly on the side of the complainants. History goes against the facts in its unjust judgment of Mazeppa, who was neither the “black character” described by Russian historians, nor the adventurer. Neither is it correct to allege that he was guided in his actions by purely personal motives. By what personal incentives could a man of sixty-five, unmarried, without issue, have in betraying the Tzar whose favours and confidence he had always enjoyed? Grief for the welfare of the people and longing for the unity of his country, divided at Andrusiv, led the Hetman to join Charles's cause. Mazeppa planned to unite Right-Bank Ukraine (i. e. that part of Ukraine on the right bank of the Dniπρο), which was under Polish rule, with Ukraine-Hetmanate

(Hetmanschyna). This plan was opposed by the Poles and also by the Tzar, who wished this part of Ukraine to be retained by Poland. In the rivalry of Peter and Mazeppa could be seen the old conflict of the two tendencies in the political evolution of Eastern Europe, a conflict which had earlier induced Khmelnytskyj to ally with Charles X. The Starshyna supported Mazeppa's policy, which tended to create favourable conditions for insurrection. The burghers and peasants alike were opposed to the administration of the Russian voyevodas in Ukraine. That Mazeppa based his policy on the wellbeing and best interests of his people is also shown by the fact that it was supported by the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who, from the sixteenth century indentified themselves with all national movements in Ukraine. Charles XII himself could not have been ignorant of all these facts, and the situation was one that created anxieties for Peter also, who could not escape knowledge of the true situation since he constantly demanded information about the "reactions among the unstable Little Russian population" in his correspondence with the Hetman and with the commanders of the Russian army stationed in Ukraine. Naturally enough Charles wished to make use of this state of affairs to further his own aims, especially since these corresponded entirely with those of Mazeppa.

That Charles' assessment of the political situation in Europe and concerning Russia was an accurate one is furthermore supported from the military angle. For it was after defeating Denmark and also Augustus that he drew up his plans for the Russian campaign.

At that time the armed forces at the disposal of Sweden were considerable. An army 35,000 strong, was under the direct command of the king at the end of 1707, while 8,000 soldiers were stationed in Poland under General-Major Krause, in addition to the Polish army. Lewenhaupt commanded 11,000, and in Estonia there was Schlippenbach with his army, in Finland Libecker with 15,000. Russian forces that could oppose the king numbered 58,000¹⁾. And that was all Peter had against the Swedish king, and this when Russia, with a population seven times that of Sweden, had been given by Charles a period of seven years to prepare for war!

After expelling the Russians from Prasnysh and Grodno, Charles went to Smorgon near Vilna in February 1708 and drew up plans for a further campaign. According to these Lewenhaupt was to

¹⁾ There were also another 15,000 under the command of General Bour between Dorpat and Pskov, and 25,000 at Apradsia in Ingermannland.

join the main army from Courland while Libecker was to conquer Ingria and lay siege to Petersburg. The King Stanislaus Leszczynski, who had been put on the Polish throne by Charles, was to enter Poland and join Krassow; later the Lithuanian army was to proceed to Smolensk and the Polish army to Kyiv²).

According to the agreement, Mazeppa was to stir up insurrection in the country as the army approached, and hand over to the Swedes the fortresses of Mhlyn, Starodub, and Novhorod Siversky. He was also to rouse the Don Cossacks, and once all these forces were combined, the Swedish army would go to Moscow. Charles had prepared the plan, which was the only one possible. To march from Smorgon into Livonia, a country already destroyed by the army, was inadvisable, not only for this reason, but also because there was nothing to be gained by occupying the Baltic Provinces. The intention was to conquer Russia and this could only be done in Moscow. The other roads to Moscow—for example, from the north through Tver or Smolensk—were impassable according to eye-witnesses of the campaign, on account of dense forests³). The route from Mohyliv to the east was no better, since it was believed that the Russians were prepared to meet the enemy there. It was also unsuitable, since it soon became obvious that in their retreat the Russians did not cease their policy of plundering and destroying everything even on their own soil, as they had done in Poland and Lithuania earlier. They actually had some reason to suppose that such means were more effective in their own country than elsewhere. From the point of view of provisioning the army the eastern route was very unsuitable. To the south lay Polissia with its marshlands which were even more extensive than they are today. Ukraine, on the other hand, was densely populated and the most fertile country under the rule of the Tzar, and could provide a good halting ground for the badly supplied Swedish army.

²) The Swedish king is blamed for not, after the battle at Narva in 1701, having followed Peter when he turned the campaign against Augustus. It has been forgotten that the latter had relatively a strong army on Swedish soil while Peter was not dangerous at all for the time being. If Charles had pursued Peter further, he might have encountered the danger of being cut off from Sweden by the Saxons and Poles. Victory over Denmark and Augustus, however, would leave him with a free hand for war against Muscovy.

³) See "Relation de la Bataille de Poltava" an appendix to *Histoire militaire de Charles XII* by M. Gustave Adlerfeld. Paris MDCCXLI.

It was these considerations that led Charles—after taking Mohyliv on 18 July and making the attempt to march to Smolensk to cause the Russian army to withdraw from Ukraine and the routes leading to it—to turn at the end of September 1708 towards the country of Mazeppa. Probably Charles hoped to rectify in this way the mistake of failing to build up communications (through Ukraine and neighbouring Poland) with Sweden in his rear, a mistake of which he is often accused, and a task which could not be accomplished by continuing the march to Moscow direct to the east from Mohyliv.

According to Nordberg⁴) Ukraine was a rich country, short of nothing needed to supply the army. Again, Adlerfeld⁵) says that the Swedes found there large and beautiful villages, and could often station up to four regiments in one village. There was much cattle, corn and fodder. The following facts also give an idea of the richness of the country: Mazeppa ordered that 15,000 chetvert (1 ch. equals 2.999 hl. or 5.5 bushels) of corn should be stored in Cheryniv, and the commander of the Russian garrison in Kyiv, Duke Golitzyn, received an order in 1707 to collect fodder for 55,000 horses for one year, and flour and dry bread for 77,000 people for three months. The amount of provisions the country could raise as supplies for an army may be estimated from Mazeppa's march to Volynia in August 1705, when the 40,000 strong army was followed by 1,600 carts carrying provisions for six months. Frederick the Great, in his book *The Principles of Warfare*, calculates that to march from Poltava to Moscow Charles would require to have at least three months supplies, which would be carried on 3,000 carts. From these examples it is easy to see that Charles would have one very important condition for a successful campaign to Moscow. Also the question of making direct contact with Turkey and the Crimea must have figured to some extent in Charles' plans.

That the "sudden" switch towards Ukraine by Charles was not indeed so sudden is shown by the fact that on the Russian side it had been forecast some time previously. About these designs of Charles, Matveyev, Muscovite representative in The Hague had written to his government in August 1707. They also emerge from the proceedings at conferences of Peter and his generals during

⁴) See *Histoire de Charles XII*, by J. A. Nordberg, MDCCXLVII, Vol. II.

⁵) See *Histoire militaire de Charles XII* by M. Gustave Adlerfeld. Paris MDCCXLI, Vol. III.

their retreat from Warsaw towards the Russian frontier (in Bishenkovychi, March 1708). Already in January 1707 the Tzar was aware of the approaching campaign in Ukraine, and on 24 January he advised Mazeppa to fortify Kyiv. Only to later historians was this plan an adventure, those historians who measure the past with the eyes of the present and for whom Poland, Ukraine and Crimea were not, as in fact they were, independent territories, but, as now, part of the Russian Empire.

In view of all that has been said, it is clear that the Swedish king was correct, from the political as well as from the military angle, in deciding in 1708 to conduct his campaign against Moscow through Ukraine, and in his method of rallying his forces against Peter. It remains to enquire how it was that the plans of a leader of genius, drawn up as they were on a satisfactory basis, did not succeed, but brought the Swedish Empire to an end.

The main reason for their failure was that the whole campaign was carried out too late. Mazeppa, when in Poland in 1707 with his army, had conceived the idea of taking part in the drama. In September of that year, he had sent a confidential delegation to the newly elected Polish king, Stanislaus, offering him support as the ally of Charles. The Hetman then declared his intention of killing 7,000 Russian soldiers garrisoned in Ukraine and building a bridge across the Dnipro upon their corpses. The Swedes would cross this bridge when they arrived in his support. Just then the moment was particularly suitable for an insurrection because the Russian army was to the north in Polissia while Prince Menshikov was also away in the country between Grodno and Vilno. Mazeppa's plan was passed on to Charles, and—the Swedish army made its way to Lithuania. The Austrian historian of the eighteenth century, Engel, writes thus in his work on this matter: "The delay was one of the many reasons causing the death at Poltava of the glory of the Swedish name. Because of this delay, Mazeppa was unable to give Charles all the assistance he had offered, although he tried, with great persistence, to fulfil his promise and to join the Swedish king and Leszczynski. If Mazeppa could have acted first, if he had not had to postpone the insurrection to the year 1708—by which time his plans were known, his enemies more agile and the Russian armies in Ukraine more numerous—no one can tell whether there would not now be a ruler of Ukraine from Mazeppa's stock, a great

Swedish Empire on the north, and certainly Suvorov would not have appeared in Warsaw in 1795⁶⁾."

Charles went to Lithuania, and for Mazeppa nothing was left but to join the Tzar in all sincerity or to apply yet more tactics of delay, dangerous and risky as they must be. If he could not help the Swedes actively, then he could do so by waiting for a good opportunity. Mazeppa chose the later, passive course, and here showed himself an experienced pupil of Machiavelli, securing at the same time some considerable advantage for the Swedes. He organised new support in the country, spread agitation successfully among the Cossacks, fortified certain defence centres and filled them up with stores. He tried to maintain his army in Ukraine in defiance of the orders of the Tzar. Naturally enough, it was not possible for him to complete all these designs since his plans could be anticipated before they were fulfilled, and thus be opposed. Also the Ukrainian army was dispersed, more than 6,000 soldiers being sent to Lithuania, 7,000 to Poland to reinforce the other Ukrainian army, 3,000 to Smolensk. In these circumstances it was not possible to commence the prepared revolt: Charles was too far away and the Russians too near, while the Hetman's forces were too small. Men-shikov was near Gomel, and Mazeppa could not go to meet Charles because that would have meant his leaving his capital, Baturyn, as prey to the Russians.

The situation became more and more critical, every day counting dear, and the Hetman urged Charles to come as quickly as possible to Ukraine. Instead, Charles spent a whole month—18 July to 18 August—in Mohyliv. He could not decide whether to wait for Lewenhaupt, who had had orders to join the main army long ago, or to follow the demands of Mazeppa. In his book, Sarauw⁷⁾ writes: "For the first time in his military career, his actions are seen to be marked by helplessness and indecision, which were the causes of all the later losses and disasters. If he had decided at once either to wait for Lewenhaupt or to march to the Cossack country, then matters would have taken a different course." At last Charles did march southwards but the precious days had already been lost. Charles has been attacked for not waiting for Lewenhaupt with the provisions and ammunition he needed. This may have been a

⁶⁾ J. Ch. Engel: *Geschichte der Ukraine*, 1796.

⁷⁾ Die Feldzuege Karls XII. Ein quellenmaessiger Betrag zur Kriegsgeschichte und Kabinettpolitik Europas im XVIII Jahrhundert von Ch. v. Sarauw. Kgl. daen. Kapitaen a D. Leipzig 1881.

mistake, but how much longer could he have been expected to wait for his general? His army was threatened by hunger, and the best he could do in accordance with his main purpose, was to give decisive battle to the Russians, who were avoiding it with admirable forbearance. Should he have retreated once more behind the Dnipro towards Lewenhaupt, to encourage the enemy? But the country there had already been destroyed by the Swedes themselves. If Charles' intention really was to go to Ukraine, then all further postponement would have been fatal. At that time the position of the Russian army left him free to cross the river Sozh and enter the country of the Hetman. Writing about the Northern War, a Russian historian says: "On superficial examination of the fighting experience of the Russian army, Charles had no reason to doubt the fate of the latter⁸⁾." Allowing this, and even admitting Charles' mistake, with all that could have been avoided, there remains no valid argument for the opponents of the Ukrainian campaign. Charles' delay soon exacted its price. When at last it was decided to march to Ukraine, Charles intended to occupy the main strategic points in that country. He sent on his general, Lagerkrona, together with some 3,000 men, in advance and he himself followed with his army on 25 September. Lagerkrona was to occupy the most important point in northern Ukraine, Starodub, and there meet the Hetman's army, but he was forestalled by the Russians, and it was they who entered the city. Sarauw writes: "The Commander of Starodub,⁹⁾ being secretly acquainted with the plans of Mazeppa, was waiting for the Swedes when the Russians came, and he could hardly do otherwise than show his goodwill" and admit them. And thus, through the imprudence of the Swedes, this important defence centre fell to the Russians. Its occupation by the Swedes would not only have given encouragement to Mazeppa's followers, but would have provided the Swedes with supplies and strengthened their position in the country. Not long afterwards came the news of Lewenhaupt's defeat at Lisna. Losses in provisions, artillery and ammunition could not be made good, and in this lay the reason why only 4 out of 32 Swedish canons were able to fire at Poltava. The situation of the Swedes grew worse; to retreat by the same route was impossible. To march to Moscow from Siversk province meant the abandonment of all

⁸⁾ *Works of the Imperial Russian Military-Historical Society*. 4 Vols. Petersburg 1909. Vol. II. Chapter 4. "Northern War" by Yunakov.

⁹⁾ The successor to Mazeppa, the future Hetman Skoropadsky.

fortresses in the rear and was extremely dangerous. The only hope left to Charles, in spite of the delay, was to seek support from Mazeppa. And so he marched towards the small river Desna and was met there in October 1708 by the Hetman's army.

The opportunity had, however, passed. The forces of Mazeppa were scattered, Starodub was lost, Ukraine was full of the Tzar's soldiers, and the defeat at Lisna had lessened the confidence of the Swedish army and increased to the same extent that of the Russians. The Hetman, nevertheless, brought 7,000 men to his ally and protector, a number by no means insignificant when compared with that of the Swedes. He also strengthened defences for the Swedes in Baturyn, assembling his artillery there and building up a great store of provisions, and garrisoning it with the four regiments of his own bodyguard, together with some units of the three regiments of Poltava under the command of Colonel Chechel and General Koenigseck—a Prussian. Baturyn, however, received the same fate as Starodub: Russian armies were nearer to it than those of Charles, and as soon as they heard of Mazeppa's "treachery" they occupied the city, after it had been defended and left in ruins by Mazeppa. Menshikov captured the fortress and massacred all occupants of the city, throwing the bodies into the river Seym in order to spread the fearful news throughout Ukraine. The stores were burnt and Chechel and Koenigseck, both of whom were wounded, were captured and executed. Forty guns also fell into the hands of Menshikov, though without cannon balls. These guns would have been of great service to Charles at Poltava.

The effects of the fall of Baturyn were disastrous. That the Russians had succeeded in taking the Hetman's capital city before either Charles or the Hetman himself could reach it, had an unnerving influence on the followers of both of them. Desertions began, and a group was formed in opposition to Mazeppa. Peter permitted its members to elect a new Hetman—Skoropadsky. Mazeppa's cause became more and more precarious, and even the valuable assistance of the 15,000 Zaporozhians¹⁰⁾ under the command of Hordiyenko who now rose in support of Charles could not save him from defeat.

The Zaporozhians were able to help the Swedes greatly by preventing further similar enterprises on the part of the Russians. But after the defeat of Lisna, Starodub and Baturyn the Russians were

¹⁰⁾ This number is given by Yunakov and Sarauw.

strong enough to fight the divided Swedish and Zaporozhian forces. It rather appears that Charles himself failed to make every possible effort to combine the activities of the Swedes and Zaporozhians. Yunakov's opinion that "the lack of energy and almost complete indifference of Charles XII to his new ally during the Zaporozhian rising strikes the eye" is no doubt exaggerated, but it is true that Charles did very little—or was unable to do anything—to prevent the Russians cutting off the Zaporozhian army. The Zaporozhians were forced to retreat and some thousands of their river boats destroyed, boats that were badly needed later for the crossing of the Dniro near Perevolochna on 29-30 June. But in spite of all, Charles did not abandon his plans. At the end of 1708 he ordered his armies stationed in Germany to enter Poland to join the army of Stanislaus and proceed through Volynia to Kyiv to join him there. He also sent a representative to Turkey to bring the Porte or the Khan of Crimea into the war against Peter. He himself waited for help from Poland or Turkey and meanwhile, after the fall of Baturyn, he crossed the river Desna and, on the advice of Mazeppa, brought his army on to the rich Ukrainian plains of the northern part of what is now Poltava Province, and later to Poltava itself, in order to rest his soldiers. Sarauw contends that the siege of Poltava was undertaken in order to remain in a place halfway between the two directions of the expected help.

But help did not arrive. Instead, in July 1709, came two alarming pieces of news that brought the whole situation to one of despair. One was from Poland, and reported that Stanislaus and Krassow, far from coming to Charles' support, remained in western Poland fighting against Augustus and in disagreement with each other. From Turkey came the sad news that the Sultan had refused to co-operate against Peter. Supplies for Charles' army now began to fail. In July he had moved towards the Dniro, and the army operations prevented the gathering of the harvest by the population of that area. Stores in Lisna, Baturyn and Starodub had been lost, and the supplies remaining round the Swedish positions had been destroyed by the Russian cavalry. In addition, the winter had been an exceptionally cold one, with frosts such as Europe could not recollect for centuries past—even the canals in Venice and the Rhone were frozen. A participant in the campaign wrote: "All this prevented us from utilising the crops and wealth of that beautiful country to the extent that we had hoped¹¹⁾."

¹¹⁾ As Note 3).

Without arms, ammunition or provisions, and misled by false promises of support from Poland and Turkey, harassed by the ever increasing Russian army, the Swedish army was forced to bow to its fate. Charles had no desire to retreat beyond the Dnipro towards King Stanislaus and Krassow. Such a course would have been too risky for the Swedish army on account of its condition, of the unsuitability of the area—with its southwards flowing rivers—and of the increasing mobility of the Russians pressing towards Poltava. No choice was left to Charles, save to engage the enemy in a decisive battle. On 29 June 1709 the fate of the whole campaign was sealed at Poltava.

* * *

The defeat of the Swedish army and the fall of the Swedish Empire occurred as "foreseen" by the critics of the twentieth century.

The solution of the East European question came about as planned by Russia. Peter gained access to the sea, his successors took Poland under their protection and later under their dominion while the threat of Ukrainian independence was also suppressed. Turkey was considerably weakened and Sweden thrown out across the sea. Another solution of the problem in opposition to the one of Peter has been forgotten—another arrangement of the relations of the provinces that in 1914 formed a Russian State. Those who draw conclusions from the facts given above and who claim that Charles' plans were incapable of realisation, should remember the words of Frederick the Great in his book about Charles XII: "One should not judge the value of the plan by the result of the enterprise; and one should refrain from blaming all disasters on to a lack of foresight. Their cause might lie in what people call "blind fate"." Everyone who has carefully examined Charles' campaign can see that success was not impossible. We have seen that Charles did not neglect the supplying and strengthening of the army (Lewenhaupt, Mazeppa) and that in all probability he could count on help from Poland and Turkey. Also Mazeppa, although himself in difficult circumstances, did a great deal on behalf of Charles. He gave him 20,000 soldiers, a number almost equal to the number under Charles' direct command. The Hetman, who was supposed to stop Charles' advance at the river Desna, showed him the way onwards, and thus caused the Russian forces to be moved to the lower Dnipro to fight against the Zaporozhians. Even the heroic defence of Baturyn told to the advantage of the Swedes since in-

stead of ruins they would have encountered a Russian fortress. The soldiers of the Hetman, moreover, were well disposed towards the Swedes—the Ukrainian unit of the Bykhiv garrison in Siversk deserted as soon as the news arrived that the Swedes were approaching, in one night alone, 7-8 July, 200 soldiers left. Three Ukrainian regiments, from Myrhorod, Lubny and Pryluky, failed, in October 1708, to carry out the order of the Tzar to cross the Desna and join the Russian army. A similar attitude prevailed among the population. In August 1708 the Russian General Infant received special orders to intercept carts with provisions sent by the Ukrainian population to the Swedes. In some places, as Zarichanka, the population was armed and fighting with the Zaporozhians against the Russians. In Mhlyn, in spite of the order of the Russian commander, the people did not destroy the granaries and corn but left them for the Swedes. In other places, such as Mayachno, Nekhvoroshcha, and Kaleberda, the towns were destroyed and the people massacred because of the help and sympathy they had offered the Swedes. One can be quite certain that had Charles taken decisive steps in 1708 *he would have won for himself the goodwill and help of the whole Ukrainian population and of the army*. The problem of supplies could have been solved, and the battle of Poltava would have had an opposite result, Charles could then have waited, resting, for assistance from Poland and the campaign would not have ended in Ukraine. General Yunakov gives his opinion on the matter: "The treachery of Mazeppa was of considerable importance. Its negative influences for Russia might have been many, and too great to be foreseen."

When, contrary to all favourable signs, there came the tragic end, the basic faults lay not in Charles' plans or in his political calculations, but merely in that his plans were not fulfilled swiftly, and also in those unforeseen events and accidents that can not be excluded from any plan. This is indeed the case. The support of Loewenhaupt or Mazeppa, so necessary for the success of the campaign, could have achieved much if Charles had not wasted so much precious time in Mohyliv. The Russians themselves claim that Loewenhaupt's defeat could have been avoided and was unexpected. So that purely tactical mistakes rather than insuperable handicaps caused Mazeppa's lack of success. Frederick the Great says: "Charles XII is blamed for trusting to the promises of Mazeppa; the Cossack, however, did not betray Charles XII, but was himself betrayed by unforeseen circumstances, which could

neither be anticipated nor avoided." In addition, Charles could not prevent the heavy frosts during the winter of 1708-9, nor could it be foreseen that help would not come from Poland. These must be added to the "unforeseen circumstances". Neither King Stanislaus nor General Krassow made any great efforts but spent their time in unworthy struggles against local opponents in Poland instead of hastening with help for Charles. Charles again could hardly foresee that Polish money in Constantinople would carry more weight than the interests of the Ottoman Empire. The lack of Turkish aid in 1708-9 was due to local causes, and not to anything that could have led Charles to expect a change in orientation in Turkish policy; and this is shown clearly by the fact that two years later war was declared by the Porte against Peter and the latter was utterly defeated at the river Pruth. Several unfortunate incidents, and also some tactical mistakes which might have been avoided, caused a plan to fail which might very well have been successful.

It is an exaggeration on the part of Engel to say that a Swedish Empire would exist today if Charles had won his campaign. To continue to play a role of world power would have become impossible for Sweden as her neighbours grew stronger, on account of her lack of internal resources and small population. She might, however, have existed as a strong country (perhaps with Norway and Finland belonging to her) a population of fifteen millions and the Baltic Sea as "*mare nostrum*". She could have been a country like Rumania and Bulgaria taken together. The assumption that the growing Russia must possess the shores of the Baltic is not a valid one; for a very long time she badly needed the Dardanelles. Driven out from the Baltic and Black Seas she would have been compelled to look for outlets to the sea somewhere else—possibly in China or India. European history might then have taken a different course. There is no unassailable proof that a small country like Sweden would not have been able to protect and hold a point of world importance like the Baltic Sea, for has not Turkey held the Dardanelles up to the present? Belgium, too, has retained her own territory. To the south a Ukrainian state might have been established, and White Ruthenia (Byelorussia) might have belonged to it. Poland, weakened by such events, would have met the fate planned by Charles X, by Brandenburg and by Khmelnytsky, or would have existed as an independent country. Turkey would have been saved numerous wars with Russia. Muscovy could have

remained within the boundaries of the time of Peter's father, Aleksei Mikhailovich.

It happened otherwise, however. Because of the indecision of one state (Turkey), of the shortsightedness of others harnessed to the triumphal car of Muscovy (Denmark, Poland), or of yet others who looked on at the advances of the Tzar with incomprehensible indifference (England), one of the most daring and most clearly conceived political plans in world history did not succeed. Today it seems that we live in a period of great historical development which was decided 200 years ago in favour of Russia. The solution of the Eastern European question as initiated by Peter I begins now to collapse. A whole complex of territories, beginning with Finland and the Baltic countries, passing through Vilna, Warsaw and Ukraine to the borders of Turkey—territories traversed by the armies of Charles XII—is becoming once more an arena of war and upon it hangs the future of Europe and of Russia as hitherto. History has brought us once again back to the chaos that existed in Eastern Europe before the modern situation. History has brought back to life all those forces that were active during the Northern War, she has shown that the conquered are not dead, and the conquerors not immortal, as the superstitious may imagine. The old chain by which Charles X and Charles XII wanted to tie up Russia and prevent any further increase on her part now begins to rattle, and Kyiv and Warsaw prepare to take the place of Grodno and Baturyn in the period of Charles XII.

Action from outside and insurrections from within these huge territories are the forces which, we hope, will give a different character to the solution of the East European problem from the one desired by Peter I, Nicholas II, Kerensky, Lenin and the whole so-called "democratic" Russia. What, through accident, failed in the eighteenth century might after all succeed in the twentieth.

D. Waltscheff

National Communism as a Diagonal between East and West

A leading Swiss newspaper recently mentioned the possibility of the tension being eased and an understanding being reached between the East and West on the diagonal of the national Communist regime in the Soviet-controlled countries of Eastern Europe. In exchange for the release of these Soviet satellite states from Moscow's controlling power, a fact which, according to the same Swiss paper, is already indicated by the relaxation of the regime there, the West could offer the Soviets a European security pact, incidentally on the basis of the status quo, that is to say with the continued partition of Germany and certainly, too, by postponing the rearmament of the Federal Republic. This Swiss press opinion was by no means expressed at random. On the contrary, it is backed up by various remarks made by responsible politicians of the West who, in all seriousness, talk about definite indications of a "liberalisation" and a "democratisation" of the regime in the East bloc countries. The Western press also does its share in this respect by immediately catching at every incident, however, insignificant it may be, which may well be staged as part of Moscow's plans, and presenting it to the public as proof of a change which has already taken place—much to the joy of the hypocritical "transfigured" Bolshevik leaders in Moscow, of course!

But for all that, so-called "national Communism" as an idea is a contradiction in itself. For, quite apart from the occasional zigzag course of Communist policy and contrary to all the hypocritical speculation with the national idea, Communism has remained true to its aim of destroying the national element of the peoples, in order to reach the "higher stage" of future supra-national society in the sense of world Communism. And Communism must continue to pursue this aim consistently in future, too, even if it seems advisable at the present moment, for tactical reasons, to allow one or two Communist domains a certain amount of independence. A most informative object-lesson on the definitely anti-national line of the Communist system is, for instance, provided by actual political facts both in the so-called Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics

and in Tito's "national Communist" Federative People's Republic, where, even after the break with Moscow, genuinely national trends on the part of the subjected peoples were prevented just as radically and, in accordance with the well-known formula "bourgeois national deviation", were punished just as drastically as formerly. The entire system of so-called national Communism, apart from the granting of certain slight privileges as regards state independence, is in reality merely a device for concealing the Communist system in its undiluted form and with all its godlessness, monstrosities, and barbarity. There is no denying the fact that Comrade Tito can claim credit—the only credit, in fact, that he can claim—for having disseminated the catchword of national Communism in the world and for having furthered its international prestige.

This opinion—and we are well aware of the fact—is entirely incompatible with public opinion in general in the West. Tito's name has recently been the word in every mouth. As the spokesman of the third power of the "neutrals", he journeys to and fro between Buckingham Palace and the Quai d'Orsay, between the Ganges and the Nile, and poses as the promoter of "active co-existence", as the sponsor of progressive "socialism", and as the saviour of world peace. A short time ago he was in Moscow, where he let dense crowds pay homage to him as a kind of Messiah.

Western commentators and certain "Eastern experts", who appear to venerate Marxist dogmas even more than the Communists themselves do, outdo each other in extolling the importance of Tito as the triumphant victor over the law of a monolithic Communist world system, as the vanquisher of Stalin, and as the "driving force of de-Stalinisation", and even go so far as to affirm that the present "collective leadership" in Moscow is now entirely in Tito's hands and that, in fact, all decisions as regards the entire Soviet policy rest with him. Such exaggerated statements certainly help to increase Tito's importance as the agent of an understanding on the basis of national Communism and ultimately facilitate the tricks of the so-called "anti-Stalinists" in the Kremlin.

In any case, what is the position as regards this entire development of events? We do not, of course, want to affirm that Belgrade's break with the Cominform was merely a got-up game and a cunning manoeuvre. But it is most certainly necessary to stress the fact that the so-called "anti-Stalinism" and the new course of Soviet policy should not be interpreted and explained as a cap-

itulation to Tito; on the contrary, these two trends are based on profounder and, as it were, global reasons and considerations, as has already been pointed out at the beginning of this article. It was only because Tito, on the strength of his former position, proved an ideal figure in Moscow's game on the chessboard of this new Soviet policy, that he was included and given a prominent part in this game. It should be perfectly obvious to every clear-sighted observer that he is once again joining in the game of the Kremlin wholeheartedly, in spite of his characteristic protestations that he did not discuss any military alliance or similar agreement at all whilst in Moscow. His change of attitude did not take place at the Belgrade reconciliation, but most certainly prior to this event; thus, Khrushchov's and Bulganin's visit to the Yugoslav capital, despite all outward appearances to the contrary, was by no means a fruitless errand, nor was it an indication of Moscow's capitulation to Tito. The latter returned as the "prodigal son" to the bosom of "Mother Russia", or, to use Tito's words, "to the family of the socialist nations", and, as such, was embraced with fitting emotion.

How futile it is to hope for a genuine change in conditions in the Communist-ruled countries, even after the "de-Stalinisation" and despite Tito's alleged interest in the cause of freedom, is clearly to be seen from the development of events in the Bulgarian People's Republic. Just as in Stalin's day, at the command of the new clique of Soviet leaders and by the usual unanimous resolution of the so-called People's Parliament, Chervenkoff was overthrown as the scapegoat of "Stalinism", despite the fact that he objected to every form of personality cult more emphatically than anyone else, years ago, and explicitly forbade all glorification of his own personality. His place has been taken by Jugoff as a man who stands for the "democratisation" and "liberalisation" of the regime and, incidentally, is rightly designated by the masses as a bloodhound and a Bulgarian Beria. This is the same Jugoff who, as Minister of the Interior, after the coup d'état was responsible for the dreadful massacres which subsequently took place and for this reason had to face the accusation hurled at him in parliament by the intrepid leader of the Opposition, Nikola Petkoff, "You are a murderer, Mr. Jugoff! Your hands are stained with blood!"

The fact that the same state of affairs exists as regards the alleged freedom of criticism in the so-called "national Communist" era, is proved by an extremely severe reprimand which recently

appeared in the official Party organ, *Rabotnitschesko Delo*" and was directed at the chief editor of the government organ, Topentcharoff. This reprimand concluded by emphasising that no kind of criticism whatsoever, discrediting the regime, could possibly be allowed and that the policy adopted by the Party so far would be rigidly and steadfastly pursued in the future, too.

Unfortunately, however, information of this kind as to the real and unchanged state of affairs in the Communist-ruled countries only rarely appears in the Western press. On the other hand, however, plenty of sensational reports are published about such incidents as demonstrations by Czech students, the likelihood of debates being held in the Polish parliament, the non-rehabilitation of Slansky, and so forth—all of which incidents are commented upon and interpreted as unmistakable signs and even proof of the change which is supposed to have taken place, that is to say the emancipation from Moscow's controlling power.

In assessing the development of events since the 20th Party Congress, most people are apt to overlook the fact that Khrushchov in his posthumous condemnation of Stalin made no mention whatsoever of the latter's misdeeds outside the internal Party sphere. This implies that Stalin's regime of terrorism, in so far as it concerned enemies of the Party or foreign peoples and states, meets with the silent approval of Stalin's present successors, who, in fact, have indirectly identified themselves with his madness and his bloodthirstiness on the "external front".

It certainly strikes one as strange that public opinion in the West should be so deeply shocked at Khrushchov's revelation of the fact that even Stalin's closest collaborators were in danger of being executed, whilst the martyrdom of thousands and millions of non-Communist victims of Bolshevism—a martyrdom which continues unabated—apparently no longer makes any impression at all. What appears to carry more weight as far as public opinion in the West at present is concerned, are the deceptive catchwords about the dawn of a new era in the Soviet satellite countries in keeping with an emacipated "national Communism" as the basis for a genuine easing of international tension and for an understanding.

Jaroslav Stetzko

ON FREE CHINESE SOIL

Simplicity and Austerity

What strikes one most of all about life on the island of Taiwan (Formosa) is its extraordinary simplicity and austerity, a complete lack of material pretentiousness, in fact, even a certain indigence. Indeed, it is an atmosphere which is in keeping with a nation that is waging a life and death struggle. Spartan simplicity, and not a trace of corruption, extravagance, or licentiousness. In Taiwan's capital, Taipei, there are no night-clubs—they would hardly be in keeping with the spirit of the tedious war that is being waged for the liberation of the Chinese mainland. The impression one gains in all the administrative departments and institutions is one of great simplicity, in fact, poverty, but extreme cleanliness. It is true that the USA are assisting Taiwan with financial aid, but all funds in this respect are used for armaments and for supporting the mainland in its fight for liberty, and also for the reconstruction of Taiwan, formerly a Japanese colony,—namely for the building and improvement of schools and educational institutions, for the development of industry, and for social welfare purposes. Nowhere are homes furnished as simply—even those of the wealthiest families—as on the island of Taiwan, and anyone who has seen this for himself is hardly likely to believe that Chiang Kai-shek lost the war on the Chinese mainland as a result of the corruption and extravagance of the Chinese upper classes; on the contrary, it can be assumed that corruption on the Chinese mainland was no worse than it is in any Western country.

There can be no doubt about the fact that civil servants in Taiwan are very badly off, for what is a monthly salary of 800 Taiwan dollars worth, if 1 US dollar equals 25 Taiwan dollars! The government, however, provides canteens for all employees, supplies civil servants with foodstuffs, and builds houses for them and their families. Indeed, a spirit of mutual aid and assistance prevails throughout the island. The average worker is, on the

whole, better off than a civil servant. In the workers' canteens a plentiful midday-meal consisting of two courses (as well as fruit) only costs 1.50 Taiwan dollars. The population permanently domiciled in Taiwan, which benefits most by American financial aid, is better off than either the civil servants or the workers, since it controls industry and agricultural production.

The Chinese on Taiwan—but only on Taiwan—thus have a free, national state of their own, in which they live an extremely simple and unpretentious life, and this also applies to the upper classes, too. Great sacrifices are made for the mainland, and three items of expenditure take precedence: support of the national fight for freedom on the mainland, political propaganda abroad, and social reforms on the island itself.

Psychological Warfare

During the big military parade in Taipei the guests who had been invited were presented with several luxuriously bound publications (in English) on China's fight for freedom and social reforms in Taiwan. On the other hand, however, only foreigners in Taiwan drive about in luxurious cars, whilst the Chinese Ministers of State, the President and the Vice-President content themselves with very modest-looking vehicles. The Chinese Broadcasting Station Taipei, which is engaged exclusively in transmitting programmes to the Chinese mainland, possesses the very latest technical equipment, but its offices are more or less only wooden sheds. This broadcasting station has a frequency of 600kc/s and is thus more than three times as powerful as the station at Peking; one hundred persons are employed on the staff. In addition to this station, three other broadcasting stations in Taiwan also transmit programmes to the mainland,—the army, air force, and police broadcasting stations (apart from the Broadcasting Station Taiwan for the population of the island). This station, the "Voice of Free China", can be picked up in West Siberia, and the Communists cannot jam it out without jamming their own programmes, since there is only a difference of a few kc/s in the frequency.

Observation and propaganda flights are carried out over the mainland by members of the Free China air force practically every day, and in the course of these flights a considerable number of anti-Communist leaflets are dropped. According to a report given by the head of the executive committee for psychological warfare, General Chiang Yen-yuan (who is also a member of the executive

committee of the National Party, the Kuomintang), about 500 million leaflets are dropped over the mainland every year. These leaflets are manifold in type, at least as regards their appearance. Some of them, for example, are illustrated or have a title-page which resembles that of certain Communist newspapers; others—of course, apart from their anti-Communist wording—look very much like Red Chinese paper-money or coins. Incidentally, it should be stressed that the parcels of rice dropped by planes of the Free China air force over the mainland, for the starving population there, contain no propaganda messages whatsoever, nor do they bear any indication as to their source of origin, so as not to involve the possible recipients in any political difficulties.

Leaflets are likewise sent from the Pescadores, by means of balloons, far into the interior of the Chinese mainland, or are placed in small bamboo containers, specially made for this purpose, and dropped over certain rivers, where the current then carries them along to places which are difficult to reach by air. On the two smaller islands, Matsu and Quemoy, which are directly opposite red Chinese naval base, Amoy (and which for this reason were constantly threatened and bombed by the Communist forces in 1954 and 55), huge searchlights have been set up which signal national freedom watchwords to the soldiers of the Chinese Red Army and, by means of code messages, maintain contact with the national, anti-Communist partisans on the mainland. Direct contact with the latter is established by means of secret messengers and special commandos.

All this is excellently organised and, in fact, an exemplary way of conducting a psychological war. Would that the West had followed this example, to enable the fighting organisations of the peoples of Europe and Central Asia subjugated by Moscow as well as their authorised representatives on this side of the Iron Curtain to use similar fighting methods along the frontiers of the Soviet Union! But in this respect the Major Powers of the West are wanting in courage, and, incidentally, this is the reason why they made such a fatal mistake during the Korean War and missed the best opportunity of using the national Chinese liberation army against the Communist aggressor. Such an allegedly "risky" action would definitely have had favourable consequences; as it is, however, the 7th American fleet still seems to be protecting the coast of the mainland against the national Chinese army, which is prepared to

carry out landing operations rather than preventing the Communist forces of Red China, which are not well organised, from trying to occupy Taiwan.

Music and the Arts

For twelve hours each day the broadcasting station, the "Voice of Free China", transmits programmes which are intended for the population of the Chinese mainland. Twenty per cent of these programmes consist of music. There are, of course, technical reasons for this; in this way, listeners acquainted with certain tunes can spot the station more easily (in this respect the fact must be borne in mind that modern colloquial Chinese actually consists of many very different dialects). There is another reason, too, why music constitutes a large part of the programmes transmitted by the "Voice of Free China". The old Chinese classical music, so uniform and uncomplicated, yet so difficult for a European to understand aesthetically, still lives on in the heart of every Chinese since it is in complete accordance with the ethical philosophy and conception of life of this nation. This music rejects transitions from one feeling to another and aims to express one single mood throughout the entire composition and to bring this mood to its climax. One thus gains the impression of a complete withdrawal from all worldly thought and action and, accordingly, feels spiritually ennobled.

In the same way, Chinese classical art—which, like the music of this nation, cultivates the 800-year old traditions of the time of the Sung dynasty, although there are, of course, certain modern Western trends among the younger generation of painters—does not depict a whole gamut of emotions in one and the same picture, but attempts to give one single emotion its full artistic and complete expression. For this reason, Chinese classical art culminates in landscape-painting and in the depiction of animals and plants, that is to say, in those things in Nature which are either permanent or are regenerated again and again in the same way. This aesthetical conception of art is undoubtedly closely connected with the ethical philosophy of Confucius, which demands the rejection of all that is accidental and transient and recommends the cultivation of permanent moral values.

This same Confucianism—quite irrespective of any differences of confession since it is not concerned with religious but with purely ethical questions—likewise plays a vital part in determining the entire spiritual life of the people of Taiwan; workers, farmers,

soldiers, artisans, industrialists, businessmen, students, literary men or scientists—all of them regard the totalitarian Communist regime of terrorism on the Chinese mainland as something that is incompatible with the eternal moral laws and, *consequently*, as something transient, at least compared to the five-thousand-year old history of China. For this reason they have not the least doubt, but are fully convinced that the position of Communism in China is hopeless.

Nature and the Rural Population

It is not true that the regime in Taiwan forces the population there to lead a simple and puritanical life; nor is it true that the government there forbids freedom of thought. Of, course, Communist agents and agitators are dealt with accordingly; and, naturally, individual cases of sabotage occur from time to time, especially as the Reds are continually trying to land paratroops on the island, unnoticed, all the more so as Taiwan with its ravines and subtropical forests (some of them virgin forests) is ideal for waging a guerilla war. Not even the Japanese succeeded in combatting guerilla activity there during World War II, despite the fact that they occupied the island with strong forces and have, incidentally, left traces of their fifty years' colonial regime everywhere in Taiwan—bridges, strategic bases, railways and motor-highways, but few schools or community buildings. The architectural style of such buildings is usually Japanese, seldom Chinese, and it is the true architectural style of a colonial regime! And, as a sharp contrast to the police guards who carefully check all the identity documents of those who travel through the strategically important mountainous regions of the island, we find fertile rice fields, evergreen foliage, banana trees, strangely shaped water-melons, vast tea plantations, indeed, a "beautiful island", as the Portuguese called it ("Formosa" in Portuguese means "beautiful", although the Chinese only use the name "Taiwan").

In the mountains we find villages which are still populated by remnants of the native aborigines of the Malay race. They still wear the ancient national dress; the womenfolk smoke pipes, but the young girls are only too pleased to perform their old traditional dances and render their ancient folksongs for the entertainment of tourists, for a modest sum, or to sell the latter cheap souvenirs. Aboriginal tribes are also to be found in the southern part of the island, not far from San Mun Raki where, incidentally, there is

a hotel much frequented by tourists which affords a fine view of the beautiful lake, "Sun Moon Lake" (which reminds one of Lake Geneva and the scenery near Montreux in Switzerland). The aboriginal tribe which inhabits the "Sun Moon Lake" region was first civilized by Chiang Kai-shek, who has a modest summer residence in the vicinity; the tribal chief was appointed mayor of his former tribal district, which now boasts a modern school-building, electricity, and wireless, etc.

Reforms and Future Prospects

The entire social and cultural progress which has already been achieved in Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek's government is almost unbelievable. It is true that certain faults and mistakes (in the sphere of social reform, too) are apparent, but where, in which continent, has a former colonial territory, which endured a foreign military regime for fifty years, ever been transformed within a couple of years into the most progressive country, from the social point of view, in the whole of Asia? It is possible that the industrialists and their incomes should be dealt with less considerately and possibly the taxation and impost system is not entirely satisfactory, but the fact cannot be denied that no one in post-war Europe has so far ventured to carry out such a far-reaching agrarian reform as has been achieved by Vice-President Chen Cheng in Taiwan.

Why then is Chiang Kai-shek hated to such an extent by certain circles in the world? Because of the so-called "social reaction"? And what is the nature of this reaction? Chiang Kai-shek is said to be a reactionary, who is allegedly not interested in the welfare of the uneducated people, but only in that of his big party officials. Yet the fine modern schools which he has built in various parts of Taiwan are not by any means merely "Potemkin villages"; nor can this for instance be affirmed of the primary school at Keelung, which, set amidst hills and lovely surroundings, is provided with playrooms, a courtyard planted with flowers, comfortable tables and chairs, radio sets, large windows, sun-blinds, and water-pipes for cooling purposes, etc. Foreigners may travel about in Taiwan wherever they like (they only need a special permit for areas where military guards are stationed); and it is hardly likely that the government will want to erect buildings of cardboard to show foreigners when they visit Taiwan, like Potemkin did in order to curry favour with Catherine II—not to mention such big concerns

as, for instance, the tea research station, "Yu Chi Tea Experimental Station", at San Mun Raki or the huge electricity power station there, both of which any foreigner may visit and inspect.

Mention must be made of the fact that there are two governments in Taiwan—the national (central) government and the local government headed by a governor of the island. All matters of military and economic importance, as well as all questions pertaining to foreign policy, social and educational reforms, and, of course, to war are dealt with by the central government, which, incidentally, intends to introduce the reforms effected in Taiwan on the mainland, too, later on. The present Vice-President of China, Chen Cheng, who as Prime Minister carried out the agrarian reform in Taiwan, is also the head of the executive committee for the liberation of the mainland, and the whole of China will benefit by the vast experience which he has gained in the course of the reforms in Taiwan.

The entire activity of both governments in Taiwan is, of course, determined by the war. But the life of the entire Chinese nation has for thousands of years been determined by a grim fight for its daily bread. The human and the heroic element are inseparably united in the way of thinking and mode of living of the Chinese people: modesty and pride, simplicity and profoundness of thought, tranquillity and verve, tolerance and fanaticism, faith and an analytical way of thinking, the ability both to concentrate and to relax volition completely (this latter quality is particularly characteristic of the Chinese conception of art). It is these polar qualities in the Chinese character which help us to understand why the national-minded Chinese on Taiwan adhere most steadfastly to their plan to recover possession of the vast mainland with its population of half a milliard from their comparatively small island with its population of ten millions, and why they not only organise and conduct an unparalleled psychological war in a most practical manner, but also plan and carry on a universal fight for freedom and one of the greatest social reforms in the history of mankind.

Perhaps we do not really understand the most essential characteristics of the Asian soul. We have, unfortunately, too often been taught to regard Asia as identical with the Semitic world of the Near East or with Russian cruelty and extremism. In reality, however, the Near East and Eurasia resemble an amalgam of various different (and in part, alien) elements, whereas Asia proper—India.

China, Japan—has not yet revealed its true nature to us. And it seems that Asia, too, has not yet become really acquainted with the European mentality, but only with the mentality of the European conquerors and subjugators...

What will the map of the world look like when modern technical science and a modern way of living rouse the contemplative soul of Asia to action, when Asia's mentality begins to be expansive? Will the mental expansion of Asia and its encounter with the mentality of Europe result in the creation of a new synthesis of moral values, or will these two entirely different but valuable mental worlds merely continue to exist side by side, with both of them adopting homogeneous traits from each other but rejecting heterogeneous qualities? Indeed, would it be possible for two such entirely different worlds, which have been separated for thousands of years and have developed independently of each other, to unite to form a true synthesis? The majesty of the universe consists in its manifold nature; monotony results in stagnation and decay. The universe is truly a harmony of variety.

Volodymyr Derzhavyn

Modern Ukrainian Lyrics in the English Rendering

Yar Slavutych: *The Muse in Prison*. Eleven sketches of Ukrainian poets killed by Communists and twenty-two translations of their poems. Foreword by Clarence A. Manning. *Svoboda*, Ukrainian Daily, Jersey City, N. J., 1956, 64 pp.

Whereas the Ukrainian poetry of the 19th century has, in the course of the past decade, to some extent been made accessible to the English-speaking reader through a fairly large number of versified (and for the most part excellent) renderings of the poetic works of the three most prominent figures of Ukrainian literature of that period—namely, Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, and Lesya Ukrainka, there was so far not even as much as a modest compilation in an English rendering (with the exception of the translations of those works of the last two above-mentioned poets which chronologically already belong to the beginning of the 20th century), which would have given English-speaking readers at least a slight idea of the brilliant phase of Ukrainian lyric poetry during later decades. The compilation which is the subject of this review and which has recently been published by the well-known Ukrainian emigrant writer and man of letters, Yar Slavutych, thus represents the first attempt which has been made to fill the above-mentioned gap and must, therefore, be assessed as such. Incidentally, the author deals solely—that is to say, with the exception of the English rendering of Volodymyr Sosyura's patriotic poem, "Love Ukraine" (1943), which is included in the "Introduction"—with those Ukrainian poets whose literary activity in the Soviet Ukraine belonged to the period from 1920 to 1935 and who were either shot or murdered in some other way under the Bolshevik terrorist regime, during the latter part of the 1930's (or during the early months of the Soviet-German war); but what his compilation lacks in variety, it makes up for in its uniformity of ideas, since, to quote the competent opinion of Professor Clarence A. Manning as expressed in his short "Foreword", it "pictures the wealth of Ukrainian spirit during those years when it was reasonably possible to reveal it and to show the Ukrainian contacts with the Western world of the twentieth century... Yar Slavutych has sought to bring to the American public some knowledge of that great intellectual movement which burst into bloom after the revolution in Ukraine and which continued for about a decade, steadily developing and increasing, until it was ruthlessly crushed and its workers liquidated by order of red Moscow."

It must be borne in mind that Yar Slavutych's anthology is the first step in this direction and, as such, therefore has certain faults. But not, however, as regards the artistic value of the translation itself, which can definitely be described as the best work of this genre to be published in the English language so far. The variety which Yar Slavutych reveals in his translation art is truly amazing, for he succeeds in rendering the works of poets of entirely

different stylistic trends in melodious English verse and, at the same time, preserves their literary characteristics as closely as possible—not only in the case of the so-called “Kievan neo-classicists” (M. Zerov, P. Fylypovych, and M. Dray-Khmara), for whom he appears to have a special preference, and representatives of similar poetic styles (as for instance Y. Pluzhnyk or V. Svidzinsky), but also in his rendering of poems of an entirely different style, namely those of the “neo-romanticists” (D. Falkivsky and M. Antiokh) and of certain poets who reveal a more or less obvious “futurist” or “expressionist” tendency (M. Semenko, O. Vlyzko, and M. Yohansen). Nor can any fault be found with the selection of the individual poems, for they are characteristic and to a certain extent typical of the poets in question. In dealing with the poetic works of Mykola Zerov, the founder of the Ukrainian neo-classicist school, the author might perhaps have done better to choose poems which are of more interest to English and American readers than the historical and topographical sonnet, “To Kiev”, or the semi-allegorical alexandrines, “Aristarchus” (for it is precisely in Zerov’s works that we find a number of sonnets with English and American themes, as for example, “The Story of Henry Esmond”, “Domby and Son”, “Life on the Mississippi”, “Poor Yorick”, “The Door in the Wall”, “Gulliver”, and “The Mysterious Island”). But, of course, twenty-two translations of the poems of eleven gifted or highly gifted poets is only a very small proportion, and in this respect no doubt the “best is always the enemy of the good”.

The author’s choice of the poets themselves, however, certainly calls for criticism. It is true that practically half of the entire collection is devoted to the works of poets who should be included in every Ukrainian anthology—M. Zerov, P. Fylypovych, M. Dray-Khmara, M. Yohansen, and Y. Pluzhnyk, for example. On the other hand, however, in addition to such admirable and noble-minded men as V. Svidzinsky and M. Antiokh—who by no means belong to the best of the best in Ukrainian lyric poetry—the author’s choice of poets includes such “national Communists” and self-seeking parasites of Bolshevik “culture-propaganda” as D. Zahul, M. Semenko, D. Falkivsky, and O. Vlyzko (who are likewise not outstanding as far as their poetic talent is concerned). It is true that they suffered a tragic fate; but this was not the result of any difference in principles or of any opposition on their part to the Bolshevik regime, but solely due to the excesses of Bolshevik genocidal policy in Ukraine, in the course of which, during the latter part of the 1930’s, even zealous or at least perfectly loyal “Soviet subjects” occasionally came to a bad end, especially if they had the misfortune to be Ukrainian writers who, in any case, were regarded as “politically untrustworthy”. If we consult Yar Slavutych’s earlier works on the history of Ukrainian literature (published in Ukrainian)*, we find the names of a number of Ukrainian poets who were shot or otherwise murdered by the Soviet Russian Bolsheviks and who were not only as gifted as Semenko or Falkivsky, for example, but as regards their patriotism and their noble-mindedness (and also as men of culture) surpassed the latter by far; and even if one argues that the poetic works of that valliant

*) “Moderna ukrayinska poeziya”. Philadelphia, 1950; “Rozstrilyana Muza”. Detroit, 1955.

opponent of Bolshevism, Hryhory Chuprynka (shot in 1921), are extremely difficult to render in another language owing to his systematic use of middle rhymes, such arguments can hardly be applied in the case of the outstanding lyrics of such nationally-minded and highly cultured poets as Oleksa Slisarenko (shot in 1937?), Mykola Filyansky or Mykola Chernyavsky (of whom all trace is missing since they were arrested in the middle of the 1930's), or the aged woman-writer Ludmila Starytska-Chernyakhivska, or the greatest authority on Oriental studies in Ukraine, Professor Agatangel Krymsky (both of whom were shot in the autumn of 1941). In omitting these poets from his anthology and giving preference to writers like Zahul or Vlyzko, who are somewhat questionable from both the ethical and the artistic point of view, Yar Slavutych runs the risk of distorting the general picture of Ukrainian poetry under the Soviet regime (namely in the 1920's) to a very considerable extent and of over-estimating the actual influence of Russian post-revolution poetry on Ukrainian poetry, which is particularly noticeable in the works of Semenko and Vlyzko.

The reader will, of course, appreciate the fact that the author devotes a separate and fairly detailed biographical and critical "sketch" to each of the poets included in the anthology and, in addition, endeavours to give the American and English reader a better insight into Ukrainian poetry by means of a special "Introduction" and "Conclusion". He likewise includes in his anthology a list of the writers, artists, and art and literature historians who were murdered or "liquidated" in some other manner by the Bolsheviks, as well as a "General Bibliography". It must, however, be admitted that these sections of the book appear to have been compiled somewhat hastily, for they lack both system and philological exactness. The "General Bibliography" for instance (which includes works and articles in the English language and a few French and German works and articles) is not listed according to alphabetical order, or for that matter, according to any other order or system. The author seems to have collected anything in the above-mentioned languages which he could lay hands on—translations of poetry and prose, political history, works and articles on the history of Ukrainian literature and art, official documents, memoirs, and journalistic material. Naturally, this Bibliography is not entirely without value, but it is so confused as to leave little impression on the reader.

As regards their contents, no fault can be found with the "Introduction" and the "Conclusion", but seeing that they both deal with almost the same subject, it is not clear why this subject-matter has been torn apart, as it were, and transformed into two separate articles.

Incidentally, the biographical and critical "sketches" as well as the list of writers, artists, etc., murdered by the Russian Bolsheviks, actually contain certain errors and inaccuracies. "Mykola Leontovych, composer" and "Mykola Plevako, literary scholar", for example, are listed as "executed"; it is true that the circumstances under which the former met his death are still somewhat of a mystery (he was murdered in the street, at night, by an unknown assassin, and can therefore hardly be listed as "executed"), but as regards the death of the latter it was definitely a criminal case of murder with robbery. Why the author confers the honorary title of "educator" on the Bolshevik satrap

and "People's Commissar", Mykola Skrypnyk, is not clear. And "Mykola Horban, writer" (actually he was, in the first place, a historian and only engaged in the writing of historical novels occasionally), should most certainly not be listed amongst those who were "deported to concentration camps where they disappeared without a trace", for he was never interned in a concentration camp. He was arrested in 1931, and in 1932 was exiled to Alma-Ata and later to Tobolsk, but in both these places he was not actually in captivity, and, in any case, he was set completely free again by 1936 (he later lectured in Tomsk, until the outbreak of the war). Yevhen Kasyanenko was not a "translator", as Yar Slavutych affirms, but a Bolshevik editor and journalist; his wife translated various literary works (incidentally, under his name). Feliks Yakubovsky was not a "literary scholar", but merely a "literary critic" (of the cheapest "Marxist-Leninist" kind).

Similar errors, inaccuracies, and omissions are also to be found in the biographical "sketches". In the one about Marko Antiokh-Vorony, for instance, no mention whatsoever is made of the lengthy period which he spent in exile and of the fact that he later returned to Soviet Ukraine of his own free will. The statement that "the life of Pluzhnyk was unhappy and entirely not conducive to the writing of poetry" is definitely an exaggeration, for his married life was extremely happy. Nor is the author's account of the circumstances under which M. Yohansen met his death by any means in keeping with the account which Yohansen's relatives (now living in exile) give of this incident.

The fact must, however, be stressed that all these biographical inaccuracies are of far less importance than the critical section of the book which, it is true, as far as its style is concerned, sometimes contains sentimental phrases and pathos which are out of place, but as regards its contents on the whole is to the point and attests to the author's discriminating literary taste (though we must admit that we definitely do not agree with his statement that Oleksa Vlyzko was "an exceedingly talented poet", and Yakiv Savchenko "a sensitive critic"). Thanks to the author's extremely objective and reliable aesthetic opinion, this book as a whole seems particularly fitted to serve as an introduction to modern Ukrainian literature for the reader who is not yet acquainted with the latter; and the high artistic standard of the translations gives the book a lasting value. Thus, despite the above-mentioned faults of this work, we are bound to agree with Professor Clarence A. Manning when he says in his "Foreword" that we can "only hope that this volume will receive the attention that it deserves and make the poets whom it includes something more than names to the literary world of America and freedom."

There is no denying the fact that one of the chief merits of this anthology is—as has already been mentioned—that it is particularly fitted "to show the Ukrainian contacts with the Western world of the twentieth century." Yar Slavutych has wisely avoided making his choice of poems dependent on direct political motives. In the comparatively few poems in the anthology which deal with a political theme (one poem by Y. Pluzhnyk and one by M. Antiokh), this theme is completely sublimated from the artistic point of view and is subordinated to the aesthetic rules of the poem as such. Not versified or rhymed political writings, but poetic perfection and individual lyricism, pro-

found meditation, and tender feelings of love, expressed in a modern European poetic form—these are the outstanding qualities of this first compilation of modern Ukrainian poems which will appeal to the English-speaking reader, who will no doubt attach the right value to certain somewhat “expressionist” traits of pictorial expression and rhythmical or poetic licence in the works of such poets as M. Yohansen and V. Svidzinsky. Yar Slavutych even tries to present such a bold and formless “futurist” as M. Semenko in as favourable a light as possible by including his early lyric poem, “The Card”, which, it is true, contains a certain frivolous play on words, but nevertheless reveals an amazing elegance of style and expression:

*I glean the silver of existence
and the occasion
into a card's restricted distance
and complication.*

*Once more the impotent reflection
and sunny tender
supply my error's incorrection
and verbal splendor.*

It would, however, be a grave error to assume that the aesthetic criteria applied in this collection to the choice of poems, in any way impairs their national ideological and patriotic contents. In his biographical and critical commentaries the author gives a full and adequate explanation of the national meaning and political significance of Ukrainian poetry under the Russian Bolshevik regime of despotism and terrorism. Sometimes, it is true, he carries things a little too far in this respect, as for instance when he associates the spread of symbolism in Ukrainian poetry prior to the first World War with the fact that “at the same time the Russian tzarism in Ukraine became more eager to stamp out every trace of Ukrainian thought”*), so that “most of the Ukrainian poets, who accepted symbolism, very often used the so-called ‘Aesopian style’ which provided new possibilities for expressing their longed for national ideas”.—It is true that this was sometimes the case (the “very often” is definitely an exaggeration), but it was not typical, and purely external circumstances of this kind were fairly unimportant as regards the development of symbolism in Ukrainian literature.

Despite such occasional inaccuracies, however, one can definitely say that the author has on the whole succeeded in presenting a true and impressive picture of the national, social and political struggle of Ukrainian literature against Bolshevik usurpation and Russification, and in revealing, in a particularly striking manner, the atrocities of the Soviet Russian genocidal policy in Ukraine in the important national and cultural sphere of poetic creativeness.

*) This statement is not correct, for it is a well-known fact that political conditions as far as the literary and cultural life of Ukraine were concerned improved considerably after the 1905 Revolution.

From the Book
"THE MUSE IN PRISON"

Yar Slavutych's Translations of Poems by Ukrainian Poets
 killed by the Communists

Pavlo Fylypovych
 (1891-1937?)

The shadows trembled, and the clouds met evening.
 I passed on horseback fields and house and light.
 Into the fold the shepherd's herd was streaming,
 But I refused to stay here for the night.

Where is my love and her vivacious singing?
 My only thoughts had something else in view:
 A chilly ocean turbulently swinging
 In grayish distance 'neath a boundless blue.

Then sorrow fell as my unwieldy mantle,
 When I had stayed my horse upon the way.
 No raven took Prometheus to dismantle.
 The darksome night ate out the heart of day.

* * *

'Tis neither the gold, nor odor
 Of incense brought by three kings—
 The song meditating broader
 Foretells the delight of spring.

'Tis always the same, and ever
 The earth will caress a boy.
 Again the fields will be clever
 To grant a harvest of joy.

The air and the plants and rivers
 Together welcome the blue,
 And one to another delivers
 A love both sincere and true.

And Orpheus goes politely
 To charm by his words alone,
 With power daily and nightly
 To give wakening unto the stone.

Volodymyr Svidzinsky
(1885-1941)

*I sent in flight my reedy arrow
With its well tarréd end.
It sang above the lofty bushes
And met the flowers' blend.*

*But there the brainless cattle grazéd,
One creature, lazy meat,
Did trample down my lovely arrow
With sharp and cloven feet.*

*Alas! How zealously I handled
The stalk beloved by light!
With what rejoicing to the sunbeams
I sped my singing flight!*

*O dusky tar! My righteous anger
Boils up with every spark.
Why did I dip this child of summer
In your base pot so dark?*

* * *

*The heaven blue becomes entirely dark.
The south steams up. No sun, no star,
And cloudy billows hang without a spark.*

*It rains afar.
With joy the cuckoo's voices sound.
Am I a child?
I want to climb unto a lofty nest,
Where lightnings ever lie
Like snakes encased in wool and wild.
It rains afar.*

*What can I do?—The rain will come
To spray with pearls the thirsty brownish field,
Disturb a cluster of the trees,
And then
At once, as any dying breeze,
Will with the lightning slowly yield
As meadow's wonder.*

What can I do?—When solemn sound of thunder
Re-echo loud, when everything will sing,
The sun comes in as gay young fellow—
The girl will place her hands asunder
And with all tenderness will bring
A crystal vase with grapes blue-gray and mellow.

Mykhaylo Dray-Khmara
(1889-1938?)

S w a n s

Along the lake where willows' branches dream,
The swans, in silence floating every day,
Do idly splash with beaks the waterway,
And their necks bow like osiers on the stream.

But when the sounding frosts like mirrors beam,
And inlets sleep, recalling flowery May,
The swimmers break the ice as if 'twere clay,
And no shore scares them by its frozen seam.

O fivefold cluster of unconquered bards!
Through storm and snow your mighty singing wards,
Wards off the sorrows, chilly and adrift.

Keep on, o swans! Though servitudes survive,
There stars of Lyre urge you your wings to lift,
Where foams the ocean of exultant life.

* * *

To view this night, to be with you,
Refreshing cool and quiet fields,
And hear how earth beneath the dew
In its despair to anguish yields.

How dead all is! A fragile ice
Untimely hides the heart's desire;
And like hot pearls from starry skies
Fall down the Perseides' tears of fire.

Yevhen Pluzhnyk
(1898-1936)

Night. My boat is a silver bird!
What are words when the heart is brimming?
Not so fast, o my boat! Any path is absurd.
All the world is peacefully dreaming.
Over us, under us glows the starry sphere.
How delightfully there to span it!
And how splendidly thee to cheer,
Lustrous planet!

* * *

A peasant mowed the rye and paused to pull it:
His scythe stuck in a skull's dark-yellowed pate.
For what and who was killed here by a bullet?
Why did he wish his life to abnegate?

Th' impassive mower's on a field of battle
Where now the rye gives out its plenteous grain.
One to manure fell with death's cruel rattle,—
In vain!

The peasant is ungrateful. Angry cutter,
He only mourns the loss of his best scythe.
Then, kicking at the skull, in a loud mutter
"You're scattered!" he announced with hearty writhe.

* * *

Dreams from my heart have I torn:
Branches enfeeble the root.
'Tis not enough to be born—
Life must be well understood!

Possibly, poets are those
Who became gray in their youth.
Dreams, o my fancies of loss,
Dreams, o my visions of truth.

Mykhaylo (Mayk) Yohansen
(1895-1938?)

Daybreak

There is frozen a star with fear
Over the forest
(The moon died long ago)
And shafts of vermillion scream in the east,
While heaven receives a purple round beet,
Which higher and higher climbs
And quickly blows, whistles and falls, entirely glittering
—The morning.

* * *

The fields grew blue with evening's coming,
The river waves on shores were homing,
And so politely
Along the sky white smoke on mute plants
Arose:
The supper's cooking for the woods.
Already evening pushes hither,
Already grasses weep like zither.
Low and quietly
The poets—woodlands
On clouds repose.

Marko Antiokh-Vorony
(1904-1937?)

Her Pathway

(From "The Songs of the Revenge")

Here are the cliff and the weed.
The wind o'er the sands has blown.
An archangel stepped up his speed;
A star has dropped on the stone.
What can I achieve here around
On steppes where barefoot she went?
My knife and my bullet are bound
To meet a revengeful event.
Blood shall repay for the blood,
That she has shed on the ride.
My God, send down an Elysian bud—
Bliss for my righteous bride.

BOOK REVIEWS

Clarence A. Manning: TWENTIETH CENTURY UKRAINE, Bookman Associates, New York, 1952, pp. 243.

Clarence A. Manning, a member of the Slavic Department of Columbia University and a well-known authority on Ukrainian matters has published a valuable and interesting book on Ukraine of the twentieth century. This timely publication reveals to American readers a wealth of facts about Ukraine and her rôle in world politics since the beginning of the present century. After briefly summarising the story of the oppression of Ukraine by the Russian Czars and the struggle of the Ukrainian people for freedom, Manning describes the development and the growth of the recent Ukrainian liberation movement directed against the Communist Russian tyranny. The author goes back several centuries to show the steady Russian endeavour to annihilate and russify the Ukrainian people. It is, therefore, no wonder that Professor Manning was sharply attacked by Kyrychenko at the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. for his criticism of the Soviet national policy in Ukraine (see *Izvestiya*, February 19, 1956) and for his revealing the colonial character of the Muscovite rule in Ukraine.

The publication tells the story of Ukraine since the beginning of the 20th century. It focuses its attention on the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918, on the unification of the Ukrainian lands which formerly belonged to Austro-Hungary and Russia into one state organism in 1919, on the subsequent military occupation of Ukraine by Red Russian armies and the establishment of the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic under Moscow's control. The author then goes on to describe the political situation in the Far Eastern Maritime Area where Ukrainian settlers form a majority of the population (the so-called Ukrainian Green Wedge). Professor Manning also deals with the situation in Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia) where Ukrainian independence was proclaimed in the city of Lviv on November 1st, 1918, and was defended against prevailing Polish invading forces until the summer of 1919. Ukrainian territories occupied by Rumanian and Czechoslovak forces are not omitted by the author. He reviews the political situation there after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October 1918.

On the eve of the Second World War the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine was established, a fact which drew the attention of the entire world to itself in connection with the German military expansion towards the East and West of Europe. Prof. Manning tries to explain the causes of the collapse of the newly created Ukrainian republic and the Nazi policy hereafter in this European sector.

The political situation and the cultural and social life of the Ukrainian displaced persons in Germany and Austria after the World War II are also depicted by the author. Prof. Manning states that the dream of many Ukrainian refugees that they may continue their cultural and political work aiming at the liberation of their country in a body somewhere in the New World proved unrealistic, as there was no single country which was prepared to welcome them as an organized mass. The author stresses finally that "whatever may be the future, Ukrainian society abroad is far more unified than it has ever been".

Some little known facts about the development of the Ukrainian literature are given by Prof. Clarence A. Manning. We find very valuable data on the religious and economic development of Ukraine as well as on the rôle of Ukraine in the East-West conflict. In addition, we find a bibliography, notes and an index which are very helpful.

The author made use of rather rich Ukrainian documentary sources which enabled him to write this very useful work on Ukraine of the present century without at all falling into errors often perpetrated by certain authors writing on East European affairs. The transliteration of Ukrainian names in English is difficult enough and that is why the proper names, such as Kiev, Dnieper (instead Kyiv, Dnipro), etc. are given in their common English form. The lesser known names were given in direct transliteration, as the author himself stresses in the Note on Transliteration. Almost no errors occurred in this book with regard to the historical events in Ukraine within the last 50 years. We ought to be particularly grateful to the author for this publication, because it is a real guide-book on Ukraine for foreigners. Not only the present book, but also *The Story of Ukraine*, *Ukrainian Literature*, and *Taras Shevchenko, Poet of Ukraine* written by the same author ought to be read by all those who would like to know Ukraine and the political situation behind the Iron Curtain better. After all Ukraine is one of the most important bases of the Soviet Russian strength today.

The book *Twentieth Century Ukraine* by Clarence A. Manning is one of the best publications on Ukraine ever written by a non-Ukrainian. That is why it cannot be but recommended to all English speaking readers.

V. Oreletsky

LA CO-EXISTENCE EST-ELLE POSSIBLE? Centre Européen de Documentation et d'Information, Madrid, 1955, pp. 294.

The essays which were read by the intellectual representatives of 17 countries at the Fourth International Congress of the European Centre of Documentation and Information, in Madrid (May 31-June 4, 1955) form the essence of this collective work published in French. It was published with the aim, as it is formulated in the preface by J. I. Escobar Kirkpatrick, Marquis de Valdeiglesias, "to make the Christians think about the great problem of our epoch, about the problem, the prompt and unavoidable solution of which hides the key of the future."

Although the authors of this compendium differ in particular questions, especially in those dealing with practical policy to some extent, the book as a whole preserves its ideal unity by the fact that it not only begins with the text which is dedicated to co-existence policy, "Christmas Message 1954" by Pope Pius XII, but is practically one large commentary on this political attitude of the Roman Catholic Church. Principal questions are dealt with in contributions by George du Bois d'Enghien ('The Factors of Co-existence') and R. P. Gustav Gundlach from the Gregorian University in Rome ('The Attitude of the Christians Towards Co-existence'). The political problems again are dealt with by Professor Giuseppe Vedovato, a member of the Italian Parliament, in 'What Does the Free World Expect From Co-existence?', by Dr. Albert Münst in 'What Do the Soviet Leaders Expect From Co-existence?' and by the French Senator Edmond Michelet in 'What Alternatives Has Europe To Co-existence

Problem?' The articles which are dedicated to historical as well as other specific questions are the following: 'Europe's Past and Future' by Dr. Willy Lorenz, 'Germany and the West' by the Vice-President of the German Bundestag, Dr. Richard Jaeger, and 'The Defence of Europe' by General George Revers. In his concluding address Archduke Otto von Habsburg has tried to formulate "a programme of constructive peace" and thus to summarise the main ideas of the whole compendium.

Although it is not possible to deal more closely with other matter of secondary importance published in the same book, such as extracts from the discussions and articles which have already appeared in print elsewhere, we are bound to state, however, that the whole book despite its theoretical abundance, does not offer any advance either in method or tactics in combatting the Communist and Russian imperialist peril. Certainly, it is gratifying to see that the unscrupulousness of the Soviet "peaceful policy" is doubted nowhere, and to state the unanimous conviction shared by most participants that—as José Maria Arauz de Robles has it formulated in his brief exposé—"the new situation, called "co-existence" does not mean any pause or interruption for the endeavours of the Western and Christian peoples, but presents a possibility to defeat Communism without a necessary violent and total clash of two blocks. It does not, however, permit us to be less prepared for such a clash, for it may well be unavoidable".

So far, so good. But how is it possible to create the possibility mentioned above? By a more strenuous ideological and political fight against Communism, that is to say in more practical terms—against the Bolshevik fifth column in the free world? Certainly this is "conditio sine qua non", but not "causa sufficiens". It is necessary, yet apparently not sufficient, for the final victory. Or is it by the fact that "the peoples still free have to strengthen their right to freedom more than ever" (Vladimir d'Ormesson, French Ambassador to the Holy See)? It sounds very nice, but it applies unfortunately—as the whole contents of the book unmistakably proves—explicitly to the rights to freedom for those countries which have become victims of the Russian tyranny only after 1939, i. e. Eastern Zone of Germany, the so-called satellite states and the three Baltic States.

What can the West do which may directly influence their liberation without attacking the U.S.S.R. either from outside or from within? The book does not give any answer to this question. It moves in a vicious circle, since on the one hand it rejects the idea of a Western "crusade" against Red imperialism on principle, while on the other hand it ignores completely those preconditions under which the huge Russian empire can be disintegrated from within. "Soviet Russia" remains for all authors something homogeneous and monolithic when in reality from the point of view of the nationalities question it is quite the opposite. Among 25 articles which make up the contents of the book one looks vainly for an article, exactly the article which should not be missing, namely: 'What does the so-called co-existence mean for the national liberation struggle of the subjugated peoples within the Soviet Union?'

It is self-evident that such an attitude—we would even venture to say: such a negation of any attitude to the national problem in the U.S.S.R.—is apt to lose any clear insight into the essence of Communism and Russian imperialism.

When, for instance, Mr. Jean de Fabregues, the Chief Editor of *France Catholique*, thinks that the Communist ideology outside the Soviet Union serves

the purposes of the Russian empire and that it is just the contrary inside the Soviet Union—it sounds very witty, but defies all known facts, for must not have the Communist ideology something in common with a systematic domestic policy of russifying all non-Russian peoples in the U.S.S.R.? Finally, it remains unintelligible how can it be regarded as morally right to be so excited over the Soviet subjugation of the so-called satellites at the same time when the Bolshevik subjugation of Ukraine, Byelorussia, the peoples of the Caucasus and Turkestan has been long ago recognised “de facto” and now “de jure” and cannot be questioned?

V. D.

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN**THE SITUATION IN CARPATHO-UKRAINE**

A state of emergency at present exists in Carpatho-Ukraine. No one, except persons who possess a permit issued by the political and military headquarters on the Tolstoy Quay, is allowed to be out on the streets after 10 p.m. Soldiers, who do not have the red stripe on their uniform, are not allowed to leave barracks, since many of them are deserters who belonged to the units which have been sent into the interior of the country. Permits to be out on the streets after curfew are only issued to people who are obliged to work late at night. All the hotels are occupied by Soviet officers. A police regiment from Kyiv is quartered in the castle at Uzhorod and in the neighbouring areas. Colonel Lisenko is the political and military commandant of Uzhorod.

Every evening, the "Black Maria" takes persons who have been arrested from the prison to the trains which leave for the concentration camp Dumen No. II, near Rakhiv.

In the military training centre in the Domaninsky Forest, south-east of Uzhorod, officers of the satellite armies are constantly being trained under the guidance of Soviet officers. The persons taking part in these training courses include Hungarians, Rumanians, Poles, Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, and Bulgarians.

Soviet units of the motorised infantry are stationed at the military training centre in the Radvansky Forest, east of Uzhorod. Their numbers are so large that they cannot all be accommodated in the tent encampment and in the log cabins, which were erected there last year, and many of them have to sleep out in the open.

In the frontier garrison town of Surty on the Czechoslovak-Soviet frontier, the strength of the garrison of the frontier guards has been reinforced by an additional 120 men, 38 horses, and 12 cross-country vehicles. The commanding officer of these special units is a Russian, Grigoriy Novak.

One hundred and forty men of the frontier guards are now stationed at the frontier station in Cierna. Every train arriving there, either en route for the U.S.S.R. from Czechoslovakia or vice versa, is promptly surrounded by guards on both sides. Patrols then go through the train in order to make sure that there is no one hiding in or between the coaches or trucks.

Armoured cars constantly patrol the streets of Uzhorod.

In Preshov in Eastern Slovakia, Ukrainian school-children are constantly being interrogated as to whether they know of any of their acquaintances harbouring deserters from Carpatho-Ukraine.

The alarm-signal equipment and the wire-entanglements along the frontier are still being increased.

* * *

A control commission from Moscow has investigated unsatisfactory state of affairs in Donbas mining region. As a result 40 per cent of mining managers were released on direct order of the Kremlin. What a situation for the Ukrainian Ministry for the Coal Industry when Moscow intervenes directly in its affairs, completely ignoring its presence!

FATHER MYKOLA BUCHKO'S REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN SOVIET
CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Father M. Buchko recently returned to France from the U.S.S.R., after being arrested in 1945 in Myklushevtsi (Ukraine). In February 1945, he was transferred to the Lubianka prison in Moscow. A sentence of ten years' imprisonment was pronounced in November. Together with other prisoners, he was then sent to the camp at Inta, which is located about 200 miles south of Vorkuta. This camp like the other Soviet concentration camps in the same district contained a relatively small number of prisoners, that is to say, about 3,000. Up to 1948 the majority of the prisoners were "criminals", but since then the inmates have been exclusively political prisoners. According to Father Buchko, most of the prisoners, in fact 60 per cent, are Ukrainians; Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians rank second, followed by Caucasians and various other nationalities. There were also some Russians in the camp whilst Father Buchko was interned there, but they only constituted 2 per cent of the total number of internees. Some of them were former members of the Vlasov Army, whilst others were Communists who had fallen into disgrace and had, therefore, been sentenced. Father Buchko said that most of the prisoners were between the ages of 16 and 28, but that there were plenty of old people interned in the camp, too. The Ukrainian prisoners were mostly farmers or workers who had been sentenced for having been in contact with the underground movement. Although not highly educated, they were all, so Father Buchko said, extremely nationally conscious and patriotic.

Near to the camp in which Father Buchko was interned there was a camp which contained four thousand women internees, who were forced to do the same kind of heavy work that the men did. The death-rate which amounted to 60 per cent in 1945 and 1946 dropped during the following years. The most common diseases were skin diseases and dysentery.

Whilst a prisoner, Father Buchko met a number of priests about whose fate nothing was known in the West, including Prelate Kovalsky, the Rev. Lopatynsky, the Rev. Hlynko, and various others. He also learnt that the Rev. Klymenty Sheptytsky, the brother of Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, died during his imprisonment as a result of the heavy work he had been forced to do and unbearable camp conditions.

From time to time, Father Buchko said, the Bolsheviks release those who have served their sentence, but they are never allowed to return to their homes in Ukraine. This applies in particular in the case of the Ukrainians from Western Ukraine. They are forced to settle near the camp where they spent their years of imprisonment and have to continue working as before, only now they are designated as "voluntary" workers and not as prisoners. But the only difference is that they are to some extent paid for their work and live outside the camp.

* * *

At present in the Ukrainian S.S.R. 1090 newspapers are published with a total circulation of 6 million copies. There exist 12 republican, 44 regional, 818 district, 40 factory and university papers, and the rest appears in the mining districts. There are also 74 journals with a total circulation 1,300,000 copies.

UKRAINIAN INSURRECTIONISTS HAVE DERAILED A SOVIET AMUNITION TRAIN

The Belgian (Flemish) newspaper *De Standard* of June 6th of this year reported from Vienna that members of the Ukrainian underground organisation had derailed an ammunition train near Shepetivka which was travelling from Kyiv to Lviv. Many Soviet soldiers who were escorting the train, died as a result of the explosion. Following the event strong units of the MVD who had surrounded the area where the sabotage had occurred, encountered a group of heavily armed Ukrainians towards the South of Shepetivka.

Additionally the newspaper speaks of an increase of activity on the part of Ukrainian insurrectionists in the Lviv and Kyiv regions.

* * *

The plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Ukraine which was held from May the 22nd to 25th not only obliged the Ministry for the Coal Industry to overcome the retarded production of coal, but also the Ministry of Housing to remove the defects in the building of mines and dwellings for workers, the Ministry of Trade to improve the selling of food, the Ministry of Culture to elevate the cultural level, the Ministry of Health to secure the medical care of workers through the distribution of doctors and medical supplies. It is clear that coal production would increase if those ministries fulfilled their tasks. But is it possible to do this under the slavish conditions which predominate?

* * *

THE 300th ANNIVERSARY OF KHARKIV

Kharkiv was founded in the fifties of the 17th century in connection with the war of liberation against the Poles. In the second half of the 18th century it grew to be a large trade and industrial centre, and later it became an administrative centre. In the year 1728 a school for Slavic, Greek and Latin studies was founded which afterwards was transformed into a center of intellectual life. In the year 1805 a university was opened there which produced many great names in Ukrainian culture and science such as Potebnya, Mechnykov, Hulak-Artemovsky and others. In the year 1885 the first Technological institute in Ukraine was founded there, and prior to this, in the year 1873, the Veterinary institute. Kharkiv is today the largest industrial centre in Ukraine with factories making turbines, tractors, motors, agricultural machines, electrical installations, locomotives, automobiles and the like. Kharkiv is of no less importance as a centre of culture. It has numerous theatres, libraries, museums, clubs, etc.

Today the population of Kharkiv numbers 877,000.

* * *

All over Ukraine the campaign for the cultivation of maize which is called the "queen of the fields" is being continued. Bolshevik potentates do not fear the natural lack of warmth but the coolness of the popular attitude, which does not devote enough attention to the planting of maize. The population knows that Moscow is going to ruin the agriculture of Ukraine if it gives the cultivation of wheat only second place.

SOMETHING ABOUT LVIV

The Kyiv newspaper *Pravda Ukrainy* (*Truth of Ukraine*) published an article by its correspondent A. Yashchenko which deals with the present day profile of the city of Lviv and its prospects for further development:

"New building and factories stand out against a background of parks and gardens. Present-day Lviv is an industrial city. The hoisting machines, the steamboilers, the excellent telegraphic installations and electric instruments made there are known throughout our land (i. e. in the entire U.S.S.R.).

The production of buses in Ukraine was first begun this year.

Lviv is already a city of higher educational institutions. Twelve higher educational institutions increase the number of specialists every year. The scientific research institutions and laboratories of the Lviv department of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R. are doing useful work. Seven new educational establishments and ten large student hostels are to be built there

Ancient Lviv has become a city of culture and art! A theatre for opera and ballet, three playhouses and a puppet theatre are there. The construction of a television studio on Prince's Mount which reigns above the city, has begun."

* * *

COLOUR FILM "IVAN FRANKO"

The Kyiv cinema studio is preparing a new and artistic colour film "Ivan Franko". Film actors from Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Chernivtsi as well as from Moscow have been invited to take part in the making of the film. Early in June a group of cameramen of the film studio left for Lviv to continue the production of the film. The contents of the film will, of course, be distorted because, as we have learnt from newspapers and radio, the participation of Ivan Franko in the "revolutionary work and his struggle against Ukrainian and Polish bourgeois nationalists, clergy, emissaries of the Vatican," will be preminent in the film.

* * *

RELATIONS OF THE LIBRARY OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
OF THE UKRAINIAN S.S.R. WITH FRANCE

The public library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R. maintains relations with 20 French scientific institutions and libraries, some of which are: the Institute of Hydrology and Climatology, the National Centre for Scientific research, the French Meteorological Society, The Institute of Welding, The Society for Industrial Chemistry and the like. A permanent exchange of books has been established with them. Recently the library received a series of periodicals, the journal of the French association of Civil Engineers and Electricians, the daily edition of the Academy of Sciences, the Annals of the French Entomological Society, the journal "Chemistry and Industry" and other publications. During recent days 85 monographs and journals were received from France. And correspondingly 130 publications of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R. were sent from Kyiv to the French scientific institutions and libraries.

UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD**FREE UKRAINIAN UNIVERSITY IN MUNICH**

(On the occasion of its 35th anniversary)

The traditions of higher education in Ukraine take their roots in the 17th century when Kyiv flourished as a centre of learning and radiated its influence throughout Eastern Europe. That is why Ukraine, although after the unhappy Treaty of Pereyaslav concluded with Muscovy in 1654 was dominated politically by the latter, nevertheless conquered Moscow culturally. There are many examples of Ukrainian scholars, priests and teachers coming to fill the cultural vacuum in Muscovy at that time. This situation lasted throughout the 17th and even in the first quarter of the 18th century, until about the defeat of the united Swedish and Ukrainian forces under the command of the Swedish King Charles XII and the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazeppa at Poltava by the Russian Czar Peter I. The described phenomenon has its parallel in ancient history when defeated Greece was dominated by Rome in the political sphere, while culturally the situation was reversed.

The centre of higher education in Ukraine at the mentioned time was undoubtedly the Academy founded by the Ukrainian Metropolitan Mohyla in Kyiv. It possessed magnificent buildings and a printing office. It was this Academy which sent many of its students to Moscow to carry on cultural work there. There existed also colleges in the Ukrainian towns Chernihiv and Pereyaslav.

Then followed a prolonged cultural decline in Ukraine due to the oppressive foreign rule. At the end of the 19th century a fierce struggle for a Ukrainian university in Lviv, then under Austro-Hungarian rule, arose between the Poles and the Ukrainians lasting until the outbreak of World War I. The Austrian government in Vienna was obliged to yield to the demands of the Poles not to permit the creation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv (Lemberg). The Poles whose aristocracy wielded considerable power in Vienna feared the strengthening of the Ukrainian elements in Eastern Galicia inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians which would follow on the establishment of a Ukrainian university. In the course of this troubled period a Ukrainian student, Adam Kotsko, was killed by the Poles while another young Ukrainian student, Myroslav Sichynskyi, shot to death the Austrian governor of the then crown land Galicia, the Polish count A. Potocki, in April 1908.

When the Polish Republic came into being and, after bitter fighting, the Polish troops occupied Western Ukraine, the Polish government in Warsaw was obliged to promise an autonomous rule for that area and the creation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv as a result of the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 15, 1923, in virtue of which Eastern Galicia was annexed to Poland. The Polish government, however, did not keep its promise. That is why the Ukrainians founded a clandestine university in Lviv complete with various faculties and departments. Under constant threat of persecutions and arrests by the Polish police Ukrainian professors and students met in secret localities and in cellars where lectures were held. The studies at this Ukrainian secret university in Lviv were recognised by the university authorities in Germany, Czecho-Slovakia and other countries; hence the Ukrainian students of the clandestine university were able

to continue their studies in the respective countries. The secret university existed several years despite Polish persecutions.

The Ukrainian exiles, who left their country after World War I and the Liberation war (1918-1920) founded a number of Ukrainian schools of the university type, such as the Ukrainian University in Vienna (1921), later transferred to Prague, the Ukrainian Polytechnic at Podiebrady near Prague (1922), the Ukrainian Pedagogical School (university type), the Academy for Plastic Art in Prague, the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute in Berlin.

The professors of the Free Ukrainian University took part in many scientific conferences and congresses in Europe, e. g. in Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Sofia, Antwerp, Oxford, Lund (Sweden), Milan, Bratislava, Geneva, Rome and many others.

The library of the University amounted to many thousands of volumes of scientific books and other publications (these were partly confiscated and transferred to the Soviet Union by the advancing Russian armies). The professors of the Free Ukrainian University have published a considerable number of scientific books and publications in Ukrainian and other languages. In addition the Free Ukrainian University has published many scientific compendia that are well known not only among Ukrainians at home and abroad but also in the outside world.

There were 7,702 students registered at the Free Ukrainian University in the first years of its existence in Prague. Besides Ukrainians there were also students of Serbian, Bulgarian, Czech, Jewish, White-Ruthenian, Georgian, Hungarian, Tatar, Croat, Russian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Slovak, Armenian, Dutch, Polish, Ossetin, Slovenian and other descent. The official languages at the University were Ukrainian and Czech (in Prague), Ukrainian and German (in Munich). There were also, and still are, English, French, Czech and other courses.

It should be mentioned here that most of the students of the Ukrainian universities, created during the War of Liberation (1918-1920) in Kyiv and in Kamyanyets-Podilsky, joined the students of the Free Ukrainian University in Prague.

After the establishment of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic in 1938-1939 it was planned to transfer the Free Ukrainian University to the town of Khust on the Ukrainian soil where a special quarter was to be built for the purpose. But the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by the Hungarian army (March 1939) and the subsequent occupation of this Ukrainian territory by the Russians defeated this noble purpose of the then President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic, Mgr. A. Voloshyn, who was later deported by the Russian Communists and murdered.

Many foreign university professors and scientists in Italy, Canada, U.S.A. and other countries have received honorary degrees of the Free Ukrainian University.

Since 1945 the F.U.U. continues its work in Munich. Despite numerous obstacles it has managed to train young Ukrainian students and enabled many Ukrainian scholars to continue their scientific work. The fact that the Free Ukrainian University survived World War II and is now celebrating its 35th anniversary permits the conclusion that it will continue its work despite the difficulties which are inevitable in view of its existence in exile, far from the native country.

THE LEADER OF A PARLIAMENTARY GROUP IN CANADA, MR. G. DREW,
DEMANDS FREE ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE

As the Ukrainian weekly in Munich *Shlyakh Peremohy* of July 15, 1956, reported, the well known leader of the opposition in the Parliament of Canada demanded that the matter of liberation of Ukraine be put on the agenda of the United Nations and that it is more than time for free elections to be held in Ukraine subjugated by Moscow.

This demand has been supported also by other prominent Canadian politicians.

* * *

UKRAINIAN REPRESENTATIVES CALL ON U.S.A. AMBASSADOR
G. D. LODGE IN MADRID

During the International Congress of the European Centre for Documentation and Information in Escorial (Madrid), Mr. Jaroslaw Stetzko and Mr. Volodymyr Pastushchuk called on the American ambassador (U.S.A.) G. D. Lodge who has been known—still as Senator and Governor of the State Connecticut—as a friend of the peoples subjugated by the Russian Communists, and particularly of Ukraine.

* * *

THE PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
ANTI-BOLSHEVIK BLOC OF NATIONS CALLS ON MINISTER ARTAJO

On June 20, 1956, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Mr. Martin Artajo, received in an audience the former Head of the Ukrainian Government and the present President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, Mr. Jaroslaw Stetzko.

The Ukrainian statesman who attended the 5th Congress of the European Centre for Documentation and Information visited many representatives of the political, economic and cultural life of Spain with whom he had a number of talks informing them on the current Ukrainian problems.

* * *

A CHINESE FRIEND OF UKRAINE IN GENEVA

Dr. Yu Tsune-chi, the ambassador of Free China in Spain, attended the Conference of the International Labour Organisation (I.L.O.) at Geneva. The correspondent of the Ukrainian weekly *The Way to Victory* in Munich had an interview with the Chinese representative.

The communism of Moscow—the Ambassador said—is a constituent part of Russian imperialism which is thoroughly hostile to the independence of China. That is why the experience of the Ukrainian and other emigrations that is based on a traditional struggle against the despotism of Moscow is very useful for the Chinese people in their struggle for liberation. Dr. Yu Tsune-chi is quite convinced that the co-operation of the A.B.N. (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations) with the A.P.A.C.L.R.O.C. in the international field and in the sphere of a national-political enlightenment of the Chinese people in their struggle against the foreign domination has great possibilities.

UKRAINIAN-BULGARIAN FRIENDSHIP

The Bulgarians are represented in the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations by the Bulgarian Minister Statev and Secretary of State Valtchev. The Bulgarian king in exile Simeon II and Queen Mother Joanna are true friends of the Ukrainian liberation movement.

At a reception at the King's residence in Madrid two Ukrainians were present: Mr. Jaroslaw Stetzko and Mr. Volodymyr Pastushchuk—both representatives of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations.

* * *

UKRAINIANS IN SOUTH AMERICA

The total number of Ukrainians in South America is about 300,000, most of whom live in Brazil and Argentine.

The Ukrainian Community in Chile numbers about 40 families. All of them arrived in Chile after the Second World War and all of them with the exception of the veterinary doctor Biloskursky and a priest who teaches mathematics at the university, are employed as manual workers. In Paraguay there are about 10,000 Ukrainians. Most of them are emigrants from the Lemky region (Central Carpathians), Volynia, Polissya; some of them have arrived there from China and other countries. In Venezuela there are about 5,000 Ukrainians, most of them new emigrants.

* * *

The Ukrainian emigration in the U.S.A. and in Canada has given special attention to the organisation of Ukrainian museums and archives. Today there are in existence in the U.S.A. archives and libraries of the Ukrainian Scientific Shevchenko Society (N.T.Sh) and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science (UVAN), museums—in Cleveland, Ontario, and Chicago, and cultural-religious centres of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Stamford, and those of the Orthodox Church at South Bound Brook. Besides the so-called Centre of Culture and Education in Winnipeg, in Canada, there exist museums and archives of UVAN in Winnipeg, the Museum of Military History in Toronto and the museums in Edmonton and Saskatoon.

* * *

In the U.S.A. the following Ukrainian credit co-operatives are in active existence: in New York—Federal Credit Co-operative (on Jan. 1st 1954 it had 557 members and 35 branches); in Rochester—Federal Credit Co-operative; in Philadelphia—the Credit Co-operative "Samopomich" (Self Help); in Chester—Credit Union; in Newark—American Ukrainian Savings-Loan Union (In February 1955 its assets amounted to 1,252,587 dollars); in Jersey City—the Credit Co-operative "Samopomich"; in Cleveland—Building Loan Bank, now "Savings Union Parma" (on Jan. 31st 1955 its assets amounted to 8,103,893 dollars); Chicago—Credit Co-operative "Samopomich" and Credit Corporation "Tryzub"; Detroit—Credit Union "Samopomich" (at the end of 1955 it had 1,035 members and disposed of 532,883 dollars savings).

* * *

In Canada there are three Ukrainian orthodox institutes: Petro Mohyla Institute in Saskatoon, St. John's Institute in Edmonton, and St. Volodymyr's Institute in Toronto. There is also St. Andrew's College in Winnipeg. An Orthodox Theological Academy is attached to the College.

* * *

Thanks to the efforts of the Ukrainian Central Representation in Argentina the "History of Ukraine" by Professor D. Doroshenko in Spanish is being prepared for publication; it will be 600 pages in volume and will comprise an index of important dates and names, the Ukrainian national emblem and national flag, and a few ethnographic and political maps.

* * *

On the occasion of the festival of Ukrainian Theatrical Art which will be held in Melbourne in 1957, the cultural department of the Union of Ukrainian Organisations in Australia, (SUOR) announces a competition in the scope of Ukrainian drama.

The thematic material of these works is to be the following: history, liberation struggle, and present-day life in the emigré communities.

* * *

The Columbia University has published in English the work by Professor George S. N. Lutsky under the heading "Literary Politics in Soviet Ukraine".

* * *

Svoboda (Freedom) No. 7. On the occasion of the 35th jubilee of the career as a writer and poet of Roman Zavadvich the Ukrainian community of the city of Chicago has honoured him by a special gathering. Roman Zavadvich has particularly distinguished himself in the sphere of children's literature; he is one of the best known contributors to children's literature.

* * *

B. Soluk, a Canadian film producer, has made a new documentary film: "Ukrainians in North America".

* * *

This year the Sport Club "Trident", Philadelphia, had considerable success not only regarding football but also in other fields of sport. The group of chess players "Trident" has won the championship of Philadelphia, and the netball players likewise secured first place in the first series of games for the SUAST championship.

* * *

In Great Britain there are a number of different Ukrainian workshops for manual trades whose annual turnover amounts to about a quarter of a million pounds. Besides the taylor's, the shoemaker's, the barber's, the watchmaker's, and butcher's shops there are in England also Ukrainian farmers, gardeners, about 25 groceries, and a wholesale grocery. Recently a Ukrainian co-operative "Patria" has been founded in London.

COMMUNIQUE

ON THE AGREEMENT ON CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE ASIAN PEOPLES' ANTI-COMMUNIST LEAGUE, REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (APACLROC) AND THE ANTI-BOLSHEVIK BLOC OF NATIONS (ABN) IN THE FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM AND RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

On October 24, 1955, an Agreement on their common fight against Communism and Russian imperialism was signed in Taipei, Taiwan (Formosa), by the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Republic of China (APACLROC), represented by its President, Ku Cheng-kang, and by the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), represented by the President of the Central Committee of the ABN, Jaroslaw Stetzko.

The Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Republic of China, and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations are agreed that their common objectives are to crush the international communist bloc, annihilate the Russian Imperialism and support those nations enslaved by the Russian Imperialists in Europe and Asia to restore their independence in their original ethnographical areas.

The APACLROC shall do its utmost to assist the aims of the ABN nations to achieve their liberation and to establish independent national states. The ABN shall in every way come to the aid of Free China in the task of recovering the Chinese mainland and destroying the Chinese Communist regime, and shall do its utmost to assist other Asian nations in their struggle for independence against Communism and Russian imperialism.

The movement "All Roads Lead To Freedom", initiated by the APACLROC, shall be supported by the ABN in Europe. In connection with the above-mentioned movement the APACLROC shall support and advocate the "Freedom Manifesto" of the ABN in Asia. At the same time, the fundamental principle proclaimed by the ABN—"Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!"—shall be jointly advocated by both Parties as their common slogan.

Both Parties shall endeavour to strengthen the consolidation of the Asian and European peoples in the fight against Communism and Russian imperialism and to further the setting up of a joint international front on the basis of state independence for all nations.

Various practical measures have been agreed upon with regard to the univesal co-operation of both organisations.

After having been ratified by the competent authorities of both Parties on November 10, 1955, and December 29, 1955, and notes in this matter having been exchanged on April 30, 1956, in Rome, the Agreement has now come into force.

Taipei, Taiwan (Formosa), May 28, 1956

Ku Cheng-kang,

for: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist
League, Republic of China
(APACLROC)

Jaroslaw Stetzko,

for: Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations
(ABN)

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Prince Niko Nakashidze. Leading member of the Georgian National Organisation and Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.)

Jaroslav Stetzko. Prime Minister of Ukraine in 1941, President of the A.B.N.

Stepan Bandera. Renowned leader of the Ukrainian underground.

Prof. Volodymyr Derzhavyn, Ph. D. Professor of History of Ukrainian Literature and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the Free Ukrainian University in Munich.

Prince Jan de Tokary Tokarzewski Karaszewicz. Late Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey (1919-1921) and Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian Government in exile. Died in London in November 1954.

Dmytro Donzow, L.L.D. Ukrainian political writer and editor, author of many works on the dangers of Russian political and cultural Messianism, former head of the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Berlin (1914-1916), of the Ukrainian Press Service in Kyiv (1918) and Press Attaché with the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Bern (1919-1921).

Dr. Dimitri Waltscheff. Former Bulgarian Secretary of State, Member of the Praesidium of the Bulgarian National Front, Head of the Press Bureau of the A.B.N.

The
UKRAINIAN
REVIEW



IV

LONDON
1 9 5 6

UKRAINE



Ukrainian ethnographic territory

Boundaries of Soviet republics and satellites

Contributions to be considered for inclusion in "The Ukrainian Review" should be marked "The Ukrainian Review" and addressed to:

The Secretary
Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd.,
49, Linden Gardens, London, W.2.
Telephones: BAYswater 8392, 0140

Annual Subscription: £1. 0. 0. \$4.00
Six Months 10. 0. \$2.00

Cover designed by Robert Lisovsky

THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

Volume III. No. 4.

December 1956

A Quarterly Magazine

Editors:

Prof. Dr. Volodymyr Derzhavyn

and

Prof. Dr. Vasyl Oreletsky

Price: 5s a single copy

Published by
The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd.,
49, Linden Gardens, London, W.2.

CONTENTS

	Page
J. Stetzko: THE HUNGARIAN OCTOBER REVOLUTION ...	3
V. Derzhavyn: THE SUEZ WAR ...	8
R. Yendyk: IVAN FRANKO AGAINST COMMUNISM ...	13
UKRAINIAN INTELLECTUALS—VICTIMS OF BOLSHEVIK TERROR (Conclusion) ...	17
J. Blokhyn: THE PRESENT AIMS OF MOSCOW'S NATIONAL POLICY ...	26
Y. Boyko: THE THEORY OF THE THIRD ROME IN THE POST-WAR RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH ...	38
H. Vashchenko: SOVIET EDUCATIONAL POLICY ...	55
L. Reinisch: UKRAINE—A SOVIET REPUBLIC (A Radio Play) ...	61
BOOK REVIEWS ...	75
BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN ...	83
UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD	
Llangollen ...	85
News ...	88
CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTATION ...	93

Jaroslav Stetzko

THE HUNGARIAN OCTOBER REVOLUTION

The Legend of the »Mecca of the Proletariat« Scattered to the Winds

The revolution in Hungary is of world-wide historical significance. It has once again revealed Moscow's true character and has disclosed the falsity of "peaceful co-existence" as a tactical manoeuvre on the part of the Kremlin rulers, who are exactly the same imperialist and genocidal murderers as their teachers and masters, Lenin and Stalin, were. Hungary has finished off the so-called de-Stalinization even for people such as Nenni and Bevan. Moscow's soul has been revealed in all its tyrannical barbarity, as never before. Moscow without its mask—this is the meaning of the Hungarian revolution, as far as all the pacifists in the West are concerned.

The unconditional watchword of the heroic masses in Hungary—"Down with the Russians!"—has shown everyone that the question at issue is a most concrete one and that what is at stake is Muscovite imperialism, the Muscovite urge to conquer and subjugate the entire world, the Russian people as *the* pillar and support of this imperialism, not "Soviet imperialism" and not the "Soviet people", which do not exist, but something perfectly obvious, namely the Russians as a nation.

The other watchword of the Hungarian fight for freedom, "Down with every form of Communism", has likewise unsparingly exposed the entire treacherous game of national Communism, which at heart remains an ally of Moscow and will in the end always side with Moscow, since it will never be able to assert itself politically, socially or economically, without Moscow's aid and support; for national Communism, should it retain the collective system (and it will be *forced* to do so in any case, in keeping with its very nature), will be obliged to face the opposition of the peasantry in the immediate future, and for the sake of its self-preservation will be obliged to "appeal" to Moscow for help, which

is what Geroe and Kadar have done. This is an unwritten law which no true Communist can evade. What is more, Hungary has clearly shown that the working classes are by no means in favour of a social Communist programme, whether it be carried out according to Stalin's or to Tito's pattern. The revelation of this truth to the whole world is the heaviest blow Moscow, that alleged "Mecca of the proletariat", has so far suffered. And Moscow will, in fact, never recover from this blow on the part of Hungary, for the myth about Moscow as the "protector of the world-proletariat" has been shattered for all time.

In addition, the attack carried out by the Muscovite armies against the "Workers' and Peasants' Government" of Hungary, headed by the Communist, Nagy, has revealed that ruthless and brutal Muscovite imperialism, which is much worse than the imperialism of tzarist times, is behind all the fine phrases about socialism and the liberation of the working classes. In the eyes of the dependent colonial peoples of Asia and Africa, too, Moscow has exposed itself as an out-and-out imperialist who is not in the least concerned about the freedom of Tunisia or Malaya, but is solely interested in seeing the so-called liberal imperialism of certain Western major powers being replaced by the inhuman imperialism of Moscow, which spares neither women nor children, neither workers nor the poorest peasants.

Hungary has shown that Moscow is not interested at all in "co-existence", but in conquering the world, namely by resorting to the most brutal means. Moscow's regime of terrorism in Hungary has indeed given all the pacifists and advocates of co-existence a nasty shock; in fact, even the most convinced supporters of Moscow were horrified when they realized that Moscow is prepared, if needs be, to destroy the entire world by means of atomic weapons once the time is ripe for its attack—seeing that it did not hesitate to suppress the heroic Hungarian revolt by a cruel and brutal armed force which is unparalleled in the history of the world.

Though events in Hungary may have caused the peoples of the West to change their opinion about Moscow, it is not the fine phrases voiced in the forum of the United Nations which are of the most far-reaching historical significance, but the resolution passed by the International League of the Free Trade Unions in which the free workers of the whole world proclaimed their boycott of the Soviet Union. This was the most fitting answer which

the freedom-loving workers could have given Moscow. Whereas countless employers in the West are intent upon doing business with Soviet Russia, the workers refuse to do so, since they consider business with such a partner as beneath their dignity; they refuse to accept the catchword that one can even do business with cannibals. Moscow has aroused the anger and indignation of the entire working classes who are spiritually and morally sound, and this fact may well play an extremely important and decisive part in the event of another world war, which Moscow will most probably sooner or later try to provoke; for the antagonism of the working classes will result in the complete liquidation of the internal and most dangerous front of the so-called Fifth Columns as the *ideological* representatives of Moscow's policy.

The Hungarian revolution has likewise revealed the enormous forces at work in the soul of a nation, forces undreamt of in the West. It has furthermore shown that a general national revolt can well be carried out in the Moscow-ruled countries and may under certain circumstances be successful. It has proved that the method of preparing a national revolt of this kind should not be in the nature of a mafia in the form of exclusive political circles or conspiracies, but in the nature of an appeal to the people, who then take up arms. The revolution in Hungary was *spontaneous*, a fact which proves that Moscow has neither succeeded in exterminating the national characteristics in the soul of the Hungarian people nor in "re-educating" the youth of Hungary, which has played a leading part in the revolution, in the Communist manner. We have on numerous occasions stressed that our method—that is to say, the method of the anti-Bolshevist fighters for freedom—of preparing an armed revolution of the people should not be in the nature of a conspiracy and should not aim to bring about a "court revolution", but should be a revolt of the masses which should destroy the imperium and its system from within. In this respect our prognostications have been fully corroborated. Neither the youth nor the masses in Hungary have allowed their mental and spiritual outlook to be influenced by Communism, but in their innermost hearts have remained true to their own selves. Neither historical nor dialectic materialism has left any noticeable trace on the national soul of the Hungarian people, and Muscovite imperialism, which kept in hiding behind Marxist doctrines and aimed to Russify Hungary as far as possible, has proved to be powerless from the ideological point of view.

Hungary has given the world a classical example of a revolution in Soviet-ruled territory—without the aid of a vast network of underground organisations (which could easily be wiped out by a terrorist system of government), but with the help of striking and appealing watchwords which reflect the aims of the entire nation and reveal the root of the evil. In this way the youth of Hungary has inspired and won over the entire nation and also the army, which, together with the factory workers, has become the organising force of the revolution.

What Hungary has accomplished is to be regarded as a national war, rather than as a revolution. Actually there has been no indication of a civil war, since no part of the Hungarian people has actively opposed the general revolt. It has literally been a national war against the Moscow occupants, whom not even a fraction of the people has supported. The mere handful of mercenary politicians of the Janos Kadar type, or the few thousands of secret police agents and spies are not worth taking into account, for there are rogues in every nation.

The Hungarian war of liberation lasted about a month and is still going on in the form of a partisan war. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Polish state was liquidated by Hitler in three weeks, though the military superiority of the German forces in Poland was much less than that of the Russians in Hungary! And, incidentally, the Hungarians have for the first time in the history of their country resorted to a *Marxist* remedy against the oppressor—namely, to the method of a general strike. The fact that a general strike, a measure recommended by Marx and Engels as the main weapon to be used against the “capitalists”, is being used successfully, and, we hope, decisively, against a government which calls itself a “Workers’ and Peasants’ Government” and claims to be bringing mankind the “salvation” of socialism, may sound paradoxical, but it is nevertheless true; a national strike directed against Russian imperialism and Communism has proved to be far more effective than all the “humane” lamentations of the United Nations and of the entire West.

A general strike is thus possible within the Soviet sphere of influence, provided that the *entire people* rise up against their national, social and economic oppressor. Never in the history of the capitalistic epoch has there been such a powerful national campaign as that of the Hungarian people against the Kadar government, that is to say against Moscow’s outpost in the West.

And this fight is, of course, in the first place not a social and economic fight, but a *national* fight for the national liberation of the Hungarian working classes, as the representatives and protectors of the whole nation, from a foreign yoke. The Hungarian war of liberation has clearly proved that national subjugation is the root of all evil and the root of the social and economic evil, too. Had Soviet Russian troops not marched into Hungary, there would be no Communist regime there now, for the Hungarian people would have wiped out all the Communist traitors and their mercenary hirelings completely, within a few days' time.

The course which the Hungarian revolution has taken has clearly shown that the non-Russian troops of the Soviet Army are by no means eager to fight against the liberation movements of other nations. The many "deserters", in particular amongst the Ukrainian soldiers of the Soviet Army, the Soviet tanks which fired not on the insurgents, but on the enemy, and the rumours which have been spread intentionally among the detachments of Soviet soldiers to the effect that they were to be used not against Hungary, but on the Suez front—all these facts imply that a war against a national revolution is extremely unpopular in the Soviet army, too.

The Hungarian war of liberation has evoked an enormous response on the part of all the peoples subjugated by Moscow. Hungary has proved that Moscow is weak internally and that even a spontaneous revolt by the people against its terrorism and tyranny could be successful, provided that it were carried out simultaneously and in co-ordination by the subjugated peoples. In that case it would be possible to destroy the Russian imperium from within without needing much help from the West. A new spirit is beginning to inspire all the peoples subjugated by Moscow, who are gradually realising that they, too, possess weapons—like the soldiers of the Hungarian army, who used their weapons not against their own fellow-countrymen, but against the latter's oppressors.

The Hungarian national revolution against Moscow has not been in vain; on the contrary, it represents a huge step forwards on the path to the liberation of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. Moscow will never be able to recover from this moral blow. Not even the Sovietophil Indian socialists and not even Jawaharlal Nehru, often acting as Moscow's foreign policy tool, venture to justify the action of the Bolsheviks in Hungary.

We consider it futile to waste words of indignation against the Western powers, which have actually left Hungary to her fate. In our opinion the present government circles of the Western powers are not fitted to represent their peoples, but are merely opportunists and unscrupulous "pacifists"; but we leave it to their own peoples to pillory them, which they will no doubt do in the near future.

Events in Hungary have likewise corroborated a statement which we have made on several occasions—namely that an atomic war can be avoided if the free world actively and effectively supports national wars of liberation and national revolutions within the Bolshevik sphere of influence. If this were the case, a revolutionary chain reaction would make itself felt throughout all the countries subjugated by Moscow and would destroy the Soviet Russian prison of nations from within. Whether political circles in the West learn a lesson from events in Hungary or not, at least the Hungarian October Revolution has not been in vain. The Bolshevik "October Revolution" in 1917 brought darkness, slavery, and death to the world; the Hungarian war of liberation in October, 1956, represents an impetus to vast, constructive changes in the whole world and introduces a new chapter in the history of the world and in the history of Eastern Europe and Ukraine, too.

Prof. V. Derzhavyn

THE SUEZ WAR

War operations in the Suez Canal Zone only lasted a couple of days and have now apparently been discontinued as a result of a cease-fire order and the withdrawal of British and French troops. As a matter of fact, the whole thing happened so quickly that there was hardly time to get used to the word "war", and, moreover, the official designation was simply "police action". The situation was similar in the case of the Korean War—it, too, was officially designated as a "police action", since it takes two states, who conduct a war against each other, to make a proper war. Against whom were the United States and the United Nations conducting a war in Korea? The answer was never officially declared, but it was in any case known to the whole world—namely, against Communism.

And as regards Suez the case is a similar one; war was not waged on Egypt as a state and still less on the Egyptian people; in any case, what has that ruthless tyrant Nasser to do with the interests of the Egyptian people? Just as little as Hitler in former days had to do with the interests of the German people! Was war by any chance being waged on Arab imperialism, that is to say against the idea of a Great Arab empire "from Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf", an idea which Nasser has on several occasions stressed in his propaganda? This brings us nearer to the truth, for there can be no doubt about the imperialistic aims of Egypt's dictator. But if we were to describe the military conflict in the Suez theatre as a clash between two forms of imperialism—West European imperialism and Arab imperialism, we should to a certain extent be getting nearer to part of the truth, but still not to the complete and profoundest truth.

In connection with the military operations of the West European allies it is, of course, very easy to talk about colonialism, materialistic interests, racial fanaticism, etc.; with remarkable candidness Sir Anthony Eden publicly admitted that Great Britain intended to keep the Suez Canal, which is so important for her vital interests, open, even by armed force, if needs be—and Great Britain is quite within her rights in doing so. But the actual starting-point for war operations was not the unlawful seizure of the Canal by Nasser, but the attack carried out by Israel on the Egyptian territory east of the Canal, in the course of which the Israeli forces advanced as far as the Canal within a few days.

This step was indeed a formal violation of the law of nations on the part of the state of Israel; but quite apart from the motives which prompted this step, it gave the Western allies a legally incontestable reason to occupy the Canal Zone, especially since the fact had always been stressed in all international agreements concerning the Suez Canal that Great Britain and France would reserve the right to occupy the Canal Zone should war operations occur in its immediate proximity. Whatever the U.S.A. or the United Nations may have to say on the matter, right remains right; and since the Israeli forces pursued the remnants of the Egyptian army as far as the eastern bank of the Canal, the West European

troops were not only acting within their rights in carrying out a military occupation of the Canal Zone, but were, in fact, doing their duty. It is an established fact that Great Britain and France sent the two belligerent states, Egypt and Israel, an ultimatum asking them to cease hostilities; Israel accepted this ultimatum, but Egypt did not. Thus, the entire pressure of the Western forces was bound to be directed against Egypt's military bases.

There is therefore no denying the fact that, from the legal point of view, the military operations carried out by the Western allies against Egypt were entirely justified, even if one regards the state of Israel as the actual instigator of the war; this, however, is not true. Ever since it was first founded, the state of Israel has constantly been in danger of being attacked and exterminated by its Arab neighbours; indeed, the members of the Arab League have never concealed their intentions in this respect, but have quite openly informed the whole world in their drastic propaganda that they would destroy the state of Israel completely, once they had the necessary material strength to do so. In the meantime they sent hundreds of fanatics who had been incited to hostility—ruthless murder commandos—into Israeli territory, every week and sometimes every day, for the purpose of attacking peaceable farmers, murdering women and children, carrying out assassinations by planting concealed bombs, and setting fire to buildings. It was only natural that the Israelis should retaliate by punitive expeditions and by assaults on Arab frontier guards. The purely military success of the Israeli troops could, of course, only produce a moral effect; but this state of affairs continued for years, since the Western powers did not want to intervene effectively and the United Nations were not in a position to intervene effectively.

With the delivery of modern weapons by the Soviet Union to Egypt and other Arab countries the situation became acute; and as the Israelis, despite their urgent requests, failed to obtain modern weapons, which would have been adequate in quantity and quality, from the West, they were forced into a very difficult position, namely to defeat the enemy before he had time to learn how to use the modern weapons with which he had been supplied. And this was Israel's only chance of saving its independent national state from being destroyed. Israel took this chance; it was prepared to fight, it fought and was victorious. On the Sinai peninsula the Egyptians lost the greater part of their forces who were to some extent trained; the Egyptian navy and the Egyptian air force suffered losses of up to 75 per cent; the heavy tanks of Czechoslovak origin used by the Egyptians were driven back, in the course of massed fighting, by the old-fashioned tanks of the Israeli troops and retreated as fast as they could across the Suez Canal. There is an old story which goes back to the days of the Spanish colonisation of South America about a tribe of Red Indians, whose warriors managed to get hold of a dozen Spanish muskets; they slung them over their shoulders and sallied forth to fight the Spaniards, firmly convinced that victory would be theirs because they possessed a few Spanish muskets. And that is exactly what happened to the Egyptians, too.

Every private individual is entitled to resort to the use of weapons if his or her life is seriously threatened, and the same applies in the case of every nation. So much for the legal aspect of the question.

In addition, the fact must not be overlooked that the state of Israel is a part of European culture, a European culture, a European bridge-head in an alien world which is obsessed by fanaticism, demoralised and stirred up by Communist propaganda and which has adopted a violent hatred of everything that is European as its creed; and it is precisely Great Britain that has strong political, economic, and above all cultural ties—to some extent as a result of their common faith in God and the Bible—with Israel.

The objection may be raised that these world events are not directly connected with the national interests of Ukraine and should, therefore, not be discussed in our journal. But in our atomic age the world has, as it were, been compressed within a relatively small area, for one cannot visualise any political world events which would not have important consequences for the entire population of the world; and precisely the political consequences of the Suez war are enormous.

1) The most unexpected result of the Suez war has been the re-established national unity of France. After ten years of internal party political disunion, which paralysed all action on the part of France's foreign policy in advance, France has now been united over the Suez crisis. The only persons who voted against the government resolution in the French parliament were the Communists, who have thus finally and completely isolated themselves. Even the "extreme rightists", the so-called "Poujadists", who had received strict orders from their leader to vote against *every* government resolution, were not united on this occasion and they will most probably not be able to restore their party unity again. Apart from the Communists, France is now united in her foreign policy, and a united France will once more become a European major power, in fact a world power. The fact that the entire stock of pacifist and neutralist slogans at present produce no effect whatsoever in France, not even on the left wing of the socialist party, is of the utmost significance as far as the fate of the whole of mankind is concerned.

2) The United Nations have in a striking manner revealed themselves as what they have always really been; a purely fictitious bureaucratic institution which is no good and which, from the time it was founded, proved a useful medium for Soviet propaganda and during the past months, since the mass admission of pro-Communist and Russophil Asian and African members, has developed into a discussion club where the Americans and the Soviets carry on senseless debates—or, maybe, do something even worse. The fact that the Americans and Soviet Russians together wanted to censure Britain, France and Israel is such a paradox that it exceeds even the wildest flights of imagination.

Incidentally, it is obvious that, of the "warmongers" in the free world—that is to say, apart from the Soviets and other types of Communists—it is precisely America whose unfortunate foreign policy has provided the decisive reason for the outbreak of the Suez war; in the first place by refusing to finance the Egyptian Assuan dam, and in the second place, by refusing to assist Israel with arms even though the Soviets were supplying weapons to the Arabs in huge quantities; and in the Suez crisis the Americans have supported their West European allies in such a manner that all peaceful intentions on the part of Great Britain and France were condemned to failure from the start.

3) The Eastern counterpart of the United Nations, the Arab League, has likewise revealed itself as what it was in the year 1948, at the time of the war between Israel and the Arabs; namely, as a pretentious discussion club which boasts of its alleged military strength, but is incapable of effective action. It is frequently affirmed in the Western pacifist press that the Anglo-French attack on Egyptian bases was a "colonial operation in the classic style of the 19th century"; actually, however, it is the governments of the Arab countries that are behaving in a manner that can only be described as the "classic" manner of the 19th century; whether these governments are represented by feudal absolute rulers or by dictators who have been installed as a result of some military putsch or other—they are all alike, inasmuch as they rely on words instead of on deeds and are not even capable of fulfilling their mutual obligations. All they are capable of doing is to boast of their alleged "nationalism", to exploit their own fellow-countrymen most ruthlessly and to give "Western colonialism" the blame in this respect. All the assurances they make only hold good in so far as this is necessitated by the course of events—inshallah!

4) The existence of the state of Israel is most definitely ensured. The Israeli forces have won the so-called "second round" and will try, of course, to retain what they can from Sinai. A firm barrier, which, incidentally, is resistant to all Soviet Russian influence, may have been thus set up between the African and Asian Arab countries.

5) Which of the major states will remain the victor in the Suez war is as yet uncertain; but there is already *one* victor, Israel, and also *one* vanquished, namely the Soviet Union. The naive faith of certain countries in the omnipotence of Soviet assistance has been rudely shattered—and probably for good—by the energetic action of the Western allies. The Suez war has clearly proved to the whole world the truth of the arguments which we, the anti-Communist emigrés—not only the Ukrainian but all the anti-Communist emigrants with the exception of the Russians—have advanced again and again, arguments which the West has refused to heed. The U.S.S.R. is a colossus with feet of clay; it hardly defends itself against the anti-Russian national movements of the peoples subjugated by Moscow, movements which are a destructive factor as far as the integrity of the Soviet Union is concerned. The help which the Soviet Union promises the Asian and African nationalists, who either rightly or wrongly are fighting against the West, is nothing but a pack of lies; the sole purpose of such promises is to spread Communist propaganda among the masses who are politically disorientated and who in any case, in the event of a real clash, would be left in the lurch by their Moscow "protectors" at the latter's discretion.

There can, however, be no doubt about the fact that Sir Anthony Eden chose an inopportune moment for his Suez operations, for the attention of the world was thus diverted from events in Hungary and, what is more, incidents in Hungary and Suez have been falsely linked up with one another. He should have taken this step either earlier or much later, since the impression has been created from the point of view of propaganda that he was trying to make the most of the difficulties encountered by the Soviet Union in Hungary in order to gain a cheap advantage for his own country.

What strikes one most, however, is the fact that Eden discontinued his Suez operations on the second day, after receiving a threatening note from Bulganin. Why did he start these operations at all if, for some reasons or other, he had not the courage to continue them to the bitter end?

It is obvious that the West is not in a position to help the Hungarians, but at least the opinion of the entire world would have been unanimously on the side of the Hungarians had not Eden, by his Suez operations, actually helped to make the Bolsheviks appear in a more favourable moral light in the eyes of the Asian peoples, since the latter have no idea as to what motives prompt the crafty moves of the Bolsheviks.

The opinion that Eden was trying to relieve Hungary by attacking the Bolshevik Nasser support, is not to be taken seriously, for it was not a second Bolshevik front on the Suez Canal which was attacked. In any case, it was obvious from the start that 10 million Hungarians would not be able to assert themselves against the huge Soviet Union. And Eden did not launch a direct attack against Moscow, but against a distant territory from which Moscow, as was the case in Korea, could still have detached itself. The British government has made itself even more ridiculous in the eyes of the Asian and African peoples now that Eden has retreated from Suez.

Even though on the one hand Britain was justified in attacking Moscow in Suez, the time and the manner of this action and the hesitancy shown by Britain have, on the other hand, helped to strengthen Moscow's position in Asia and Africa rather than weaken it. And for this reason the present balance of the Anglo-French operations in Suez is a negative one for the anti-Bolshevist front, since Eden's measures in a great cause have been rather petty.

Rostyslav Yendyk

IVAN FRANKO AGAINST COMMUNISM

This year, the entire Ukrainian nation on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that is to say the Ukrainians in Ukraine and those in exile, celebrated the centenary of the birth of that gifted Ukrainian writer, poet, scholar, publicist and champion of the national and political rights of the Ukrainian people, Ivan Franko (1856-1916). His literary works alone comprise twenty volumes, whilst his entire writings including his correspondence comprise over a hundred volumes. His influence on the development of Ukrainian culture and literature in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was enormous, and there was literally no field in which his genius was not active and in which he did not create lasting values.

It is a well-known fact that the Russian Bolshevik overlords apply two methods in particular in order to subjugate captive peoples: 1) they exterminate all national traditions belonging to these peoples and set up their own, genuinely Russian tradition as an example to be imitated; 2) they falsify and distort the ideas expressed by the great thinkers of these peoples and if they fail to obliterate the moral and intellectual influence of such men on their fellow-countrymen, then they introduce their own alien ideas surreptitiously. What has happened in the case of so many Ukrainian writers and thinkers, has now also happened in the case of Ivan Franko.

The falsification of the intellectual and spiritual legacy of this Ukrainian genius by the Russian Bolsheviks during the centenary celebrations revealed three distinct trends: 1) he was represented as having been a friend of the Russian imperium and the Russian people; 2) he was represented as having been an ardent supporter of the union of the Ukrainian and the Russian state; and 3) he was represented as having been a Communist-minded Marxist.

Every genius must be regarded in the light of the era in which he or she was born, lived and worked, and this applies in the case of Ivan Franko, too. The positive and negative aspects of the era concerned are reflected in the work and character of a genius. On the other hand, however, a genius always tries to cast

off the fetters of the transient present and seeks to create permanent values, inasmuch as he outgrows his own era and overcomes it by means of his own individual characteristics. The more he succeeds in doing so, the greater does his significance for future generations become. And an example of this is Ivan Franko's attitude towards socialist doctrines. His description of a possible future Communist state conforms exactly to what is now grim reality, even though his conception of such a state was purely visionary: "This supreme power of the state would above all weigh heavily on the life of every individual. All personal expression of will and thought would be suppressed and would cease, for the state would regard it either as harmful or unnecessary. Education, which would have as its aim the training not of free human beings, but only of convinced members of the state, would develop into a destructive system of intellectual elimination. Man would grow up and live in complete intellectual dependence and under the complete control of the state, conditions which do not even prevail in the absolutist police states of today. The state would indeed be a huge prison."

It is obvious from these words that Ivan Franko was not and could not be a friend of Communism. He regarded the idea of freedom in the personal and national sense as man's most precious possession. It is true that during his youth he was a "socialist", but he supported not socialist ideas in the doctrinarian sense, but only socialist methods in the fight against the feudalism of the Austrian state, that is to say against the feudalism of the Polish landowners with their huge estates, who exploited the Ukrainian peasants so ruthlessly. The ideas he supported were really only the watchwords of his generation in the fight for social and national liberation, ideas which permeated the entire 19th century.

Under no conditions whatsoever could the bard of freedom and convinced enemy of every form of slavery glorify, far less accept the idea of the Russian state. As a historian he was well aware of the serious consequences which the Treaty of 1654 with the Muscovites had had for the Ukrainian nation. He in no way separated the past and present from the future, and probably no other writer in the literature of the world has censured tzarist Russia as violently as he did in his satirical poem "Russia".

Not Russia as the ideal of a state, not fraternization between those who had been enslaved and their murderers and gaolers, but sovereignty and self-assertion were the ideals which inspired this

gifted poet and thinker. His longing finds its noblest expression in the poem "Moses" (1905), which is one of the finest works in the literature of the world. The poem begins with a prologue in which the poet asks whether the Ukrainian people will be forced to languish in slavery for ever. He mentions all the talents and gifts of the Ukrainian people, their spiritual, intellectual and moral wealth, and then expresses the hope that "the day will come when the Ukrainian nation, purged by the fire through which it has passed, will take its place among the free peoples". The sorrow of the poet at the failings of the people and their political position, the powerlessness of their leader in the face of the disobedience of the people, who refuse to follow him and reject his advice and remain in the desert instead of going into the land of milk and honey and founding a state of their own, doubt and despair, sorrow and joy, anger and clemency, hatred and love—all these emotions are expressed in the poem and form a monumental unit. It is not surprising that the Ukrainians regard this poem, "Moses", which depicts the fate of the Hebrews after their flight out of Egypt, as the legacy and creed of the poet, who in their eyes is their national prophet.

There is no denying the fact that Ivan Franko devoted his whole life to the ideals of truth and freedom. In all he did and said he revealed a sincerity and perseverance which only the greatest and noblest men possess. For this reason, one must not, when analysing his spiritual and intellectual legacy, take into consideration those works of his which were more or less prompted by the circumstances of the age in which he lived, but solely those works which have a lasting value and indeed are immortal, for they alone were created out of the profoundness of his great mind and soul. And, undoubtedly, his two poems, "Russia" and "Moses", belong to this category.

Space does not permit us to deal at length with the fundamental ideas which Franko expressed in his other poems and other fields, in particular in that of science. In any case, numerous works have already been written and more will no doubt be written in the future about this aspect of Franko's work. Suffice it to say that Ivan Franko was one of those great and noble minds who sacrifice their whole life to fighting for the highest ideals of mankind and for the idea of freedom for individuals and freedom for nations.

Ukrainian Intellectuals—Victims of Bolshevik Terror*

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE LITERARY ORGANISATIONS

»Lanka-Mars«

In 1934, that fateful year for Ukrainian literature, not only the "Vaplite-Prolitfront" (a Kharkiv literary organisation), but also another no less important Kyiv literary organisation, the "Lanka-Mars", was liquidated. The "Lanka-Mars" was as important for Kyiv as the "Vaplite-Prolitfront" was for Kharkiv; it included in its ranks the majority of writers in this town, the most important of whom were the following: Yevhen Pluzhnyk, Dmytro Falkivsky, Mykola Tereshchenko, Todos Osmachka, Hryhoriy Kosynka, Mykhailo Ivchenko, Valerian Pidmohylny, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, Borys Teneta, Volodymyr Yaroshenko, Hr. Brasiuk, Dmytro Tas (Mohylansky), Maria Halych, and various others.

With the exception of Maria Halych, a talented writer whose works were written in the lyrical impressionistic style cultivated by Stefanyk and Kosynka and who, although not persecuted, was obliged to keep silent for decades, all the other members of the "Lanka-Mars" were persecuted. Mykhailo Ivchenko was one of the first to be arrested, namely in connection with the trial of the S.V.U. (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine); other members were arrested soon afterwards (as for instance, Dmytro Tas), and the majority of them in 1934. In December 1934, two members of the "Lanka-Mars", Hryhoriy Kosynka and Dmytro Falkivsky, were executed.

The December executions were carried out in chronological order, namely after the assassination of Kirov. Although, according to official reports, Red terrorism was intensified as the government's retaliation for Kirov's death, actually those persons who were executed in December, 1934, were arrested much earlier. In fact, the victims of this retaliation were determined and selected beforehand. It was merely an ostentatious gesture on Moscow's part to connect these persecutions and executions with the Kirov affair. The carefully calculated schemes of dictatorship, the timing of executions and the algebraic plans of class conflict operated independently of any additional circumstances.

*) Conclusion from No. 4, 1955, and No. 2, 1956.

The »New Generation«

In addition to Kosynka and Falkivsky, the names of Oleksa Vlyzko and Kost Bureviy also appeared on the list of writers executed in December, 1934. This fact indicates that the list was drawn up according to the principle of representation; that is to say, every literary organisation was represented on the list by two members—two members of the "Lanka-Mars", two members of the "New Generation".

On what grounds was Vlyzko shot? He did not have an anti-Soviet past like Kosynka. He did not take part in the armed fight against Soviet rule during the peasants' guerilla war; nor did he give critics any cause to designate him as a "Ukrainian nationalist bandit". Moreover, he did not translate any literary works from Latin and thus did not manifest the "bourgeois" attitude of a poet who detaches himself from reality. It is true that he wrote a polemical article directed against Samiylo Shchupak, the Communist critic, for the "Nova Generatsia" ("New Generation"). But this was hardly sufficient reason to warrant his execution. It was, however, affirmed in literary circles in Kyiv that precisely this clash with Shchupak was the direct cause of Vlyzko's arrest.

Similar incidents were likely to happen all the time. The petty Soviet potentates—one-day caliphs in the stories of the "Arabian Nights", which were being re-enacted under Soviet conditions, where nothing was impossible—were busy enough trying to give all personal quarrels the appearance of a class conflict. But in the flood of terrorist action they themselves perished, together with those whom they sent to their death. Whether it is true or not that Shchupak was responsible for Oleksa Vlyzko's death, the fact remains that he himself was executed within a year of this event.

O. Vlyzko was deaf and dumb, and it attests to his great strength of mind and spirit that he was able to suppress his own feelings and to endow words which to him were soundless with a sonorous quality for others. Though himself limited to visual perception, he succeeded in finding a source of sound creation in himself. Though sound to him was something purely abstract, his verses, as E. Malaniuk stresses, reveal "an unbelievable wealth of harmonious and musical sound".

Kost Bureviy (1888-1934), an authority on the theatre, a dramatist, publicist and literary critic and the author of several monographs on the history of the theatre and art, wrote for the "Nova

Generatsia" ("New Generation") under the pseudonym of Edward Strikha. He was arrested in 1923 in connection with the trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries. He stood on trial for six months. In 1934 he was again arrested and executed. His historical work, "Pavlo Polubotok", published abroad after World War II, deals with the "friendly" state relations between Ukraine and Moscow. Mykhaylo Semenko suffered the same fate as the writers of the "New Generation"—Bureviy, Vlyzko and Shkurupiy—though a little later. It was he who first introduced futurism in Ukrainian literature. He was far more of a doctrinaire than a writer. In any case, he was much more interested in setting up a doctrine of literary destructivism and in the possibility of playing the part of a dictator in his own group, even though it was only a small one, than in creative literary work as such. He blindly copied Soviet political reality, where destructivism, abstract doctrines and the principles of group exclusiveness were valued more highly than independent creative work.

The »Neo-Classicists«

The end of this case did not by any means imply the cessation of repressive measures. On the contrary, it meant the beginning of another trial. At the end of March, 1935, the case of the "Lanka-Mars" ended, and on March 28, 1935, sentence was pronounced on Pluzhnyk. One month later, at the end of April, Mykola Zerov was arrested. He was the first of the "neo-classicists" to be arrested, and his arrest was followed by that of Pavlo Fylypovych in the summer and of Mykhaylo Dray Khmara on September 5th of the same year. In addition to these three "neo-classicists", others also suffered the same fate; Anatol Lebid was arrested for the second time and the young poet, Marko Vorony, the son of Mykola Vorony, and a certain fellow-worker at the Historical Museum, namely the person who provided information about the "organisation", were also arrested. On the basis of the depositions made by the latter, so it is said, the whole case was a put-up show. The "objectivity" of these depositions was stressed by the fact that none of the above-mentioned persons had ever had anything to do with him. This also applies in the case of Marko Vorony, who had never had any contact with the "neo-classicists". Indeed, the names of Lebid and Vorony were added to the list of victims by way of compulsory selection.

It is true that there were some other "extras"—unimportant persons who were useful solely for the purpose of completing the fictitious "organisations", since every organisation had to have an adequate number of members. These persons could not take any steps to verify this fact and protect themselves against the allegations of the Russians, and no one inquired into the matter. The other facts were examined on the basis of this fact and the final conclusions drawn on the membership of certain persons in the organisation. On the same basis the final conclusion was drawn regarding participation in the "terrorist nationalist" group, which was allegedly led by Prof. Mykola Zerov and included among its members, in addition to the "neo-classicists", Pavlo Fylypovych and M. Dray Khmara, the above-mentioned fellow-worker of the Historical Museum and also Marko Vorony, Anatol Lebid and various other persons.

The methods applied in their case were those used in neuropathy, which aim to convince the patient that exactly the opposite is true. A man was accused of things which were obviously absurd. He was then forced to admit them against his will, against his conscience, his moral principles and standards, against his intellect and his imagination.

Day after day, night after night, Professor Zerov was forced... forced? No, they tried to convince him that the department of the INO (Institute for People's Education) of which he was the head was not a department at all, but only a group of criminals, conspirators and murderers camouflaged by its legal name, and that friendly relations among poets was not a personal friendliness and not a friendship of poets, but a form of conspiracy, a union of terrorists, a code and a secret way of action.

Night after night, the conscience of the victims was gradually weakened. He was deprived of his sense of reality, assiduously, cruelly and inevitably.

Professor Zerov was a great authority on Latin, a brilliant poet and an excellent translator. He translated the ancient Roman poets—Virgil, Horace and Catullus. Was this fact not sufficient reason to demand that he should admit that his work was counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet and that he had terroristic plans! What inference can be drawn from the fact that a poet translates Catullus and Virgil? Obviously, that he does not take the themes for his creative poetical activity from Soviet reality! Does it not mean that

he is trying to escape from or rather refuse to recognise Soviet reality! And what is the significance of this non-recognition when judged as a political act? It is an act against Soviet authority, an act of denying the latter, which like any other political act and any other political denial finds its expression in propagandistic activity, in the winning over of followers, in the setting up of an organisation, in subversive activity, sabotage, espionage, and finally in the height of terrorism.

An accusation of "Ukrainian nationalism" led to an accusation of "espionage", of contacts with foreign intelligence services and also of "terrorism". These three types of accusations were closely connected, the first being the basis for the other two. To plead guilty was equal to exposing oneself to the danger of the death sentence.

As early as 1926, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Ukraine passed a resolution according to which the "ideological work of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the neo-classicists type" was to be considered as aiming "to satisfy the Ukrainian bourgeoisie's interests which grew", thanks to the NEP*). Like other decisions reached by the Central Committee, this one, too, was of a directive nature. And according to this resolution, Zerov's sonnets and his translations of Greek and Roman poets must be considered not as a valuable cultural achievement on the part of the Ukrainian people, but as an expression of the NEP spirit.

The main question at issue lay not in the never committed crimes provided for in these resolutions nor in the concrete offence of each accused, but in the general line of Bolshevik policy which had as its aim the liquidation of Ukrainian culture and the physical destruction of the Ukrainian intellectuals.

»Western Ukraine«

In the December lists of the writers who had been shot during the year 1934, Western Ukraine was represented by the family of the Krushelnytskys. The Krushelnytskys engaged in Communist activity in Halychyna (Galicia), where they edited a pro-Soviet paper, *Nashi Shlakhy* ("Our Ways"). Later, they went to Kharkiv, where they were arrested and shot. Other persons concerned were persecuted and deported, including Dmytro Zahul, the most brilliant of the group of poets of "Western Ukraine", who, during

*) New Economic Policy.

the existence of the "Muzahet" (a pre-war literary organisation), together with Yakiv Savchenko, represented symbolism in Ukrainian literature, further Vol. Atamaniuk, V. Gzhytsky, V. Gadzinsky, P. Kozoris, Pavliuk, Dmytro Rudyk, and Vasyl Bobynsky.

The fate of Vasyl Bobynsky, a poet, who together with R. Kupchynsky, Y. Shkrumeliak and O. Babi was on the editorial staff of the "Mytusa" (a West Ukrainian literary organisation), was a particularly tragic one. In trying to escape from the clutches of the Polish police, he hoped to find safety and security in the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Victimisation Continues Unabated

Is the list of Ukrainian writers who were murdered complete if we mention the names of those who belonged to the "Vaplite", "Lanka-Mars", "New Generation", "Neo-Classicists" and "Western Ukraine"? Most certainly not! To compile a complete list of writers who were the victims of Bolshevik terrorism would be an endless task. Indeed, it would be equal to the task of compiling a bibliography of the Ukrainian writers of the second and third decade of 20th century Ukrainian literature.

Party Men

No one was safe. Neither genius nor age nor even membership of the Party was a guarantee. In the 1930's the Party membership card ceased to be a protective measure against death. We have already mentioned the names of the Party members who belonged to the "Vaplite" and were liquidated: Khvylovy, Yalovy, Dosvitny; Serhiy Pylypenko, the founder and chairman of the "Pluh", was shot. Borys Teneta, who belonged to the "Lanka-Mars" group, committed suicide. Mykola Lubchenko (Kost Kotko) was liquidated.

Though a man might enjoy the status of a Soviet potentate, this fact was no guarantee for the security of his personal life as an individual. Of the rank and file aspirants to the Bolshevik "Chair of Marxism and Leninism", A. H. Senchenko, thanks to P. Postyshev's proposal, was appointed chairman of the newly founded Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine (SRPU), which took the place of the former organisation of V.U.S.P.P. Once again it was a case of a man's career in Soviet life being comparable to the "Arabian Nights". Senchenko's star waxed and waned. Waned? In the U.S.S.R. this meant that the persons in question was liquidated.

Even orthodoxy could not save such "leaders" of "proletarian literature" as Iv. Mykytenko, Iv. Kyrylenko, V. Desniak (Vas. Vasylenko), Borys Kovalenko and Evhen Shabliovsky. In this respect the fate of Iv. Mykytenko was especially typical. At the end of the 1920's and beginning of the 1930's Ivan Mykytenko was without rivals. His official position in Ukrainian literature may perhaps best be compared with the present position of O. Korniychuk. Like the latter, he was a dramatist. Together with Kirshon, Mykytenko determined the main trend of the Soviet theatrical repertoire of those days. He visited Spain during the civil war there. He headed a delegation of writers at one of the Party congresses. He was one of the most important personalities in the U.S.S.R. But despite this fact he left home one day, disappeared and never returned. Various rumours were circulated as regards his disappearance. There were rumours about his suicide, about his escape, about a corpse found in the Sviatoshyno Forest near Kyiv which was never indentified, and finally about his having been deported for fifteen years. "A faithful son of the Church"—the word "Church" is here used to mean the Party and its political ideology—Mykytenko was "cremated" like the "heretic" and "schismatic" Khvylovy.

The Bolsheviks selected the more talented and gifted writers, but at the same time they did not entirely overlook the rank and file, to whom the designation "graphomen" was applied as a compliment. Of the good-for-nothing and unworthy literary hooligans who speculated with their Party membership cards for a long time, the writer Antin Dyky suffered the common fate. Like other victims he was suppressed and crushed under the fist of Yezhov.

The Septuagenarians

The writers of the younger generation, "contemporaries of the October Revolution", and the writers of the older generation, up to seventy years of age the so-called "Septuagenarians", Ivan Steshenko, Mykola Vorony, Mykola Filyansky, Yuriy Budiak, Evhen Tymchenko, L. Starytska-Cherniakhivska, and Ahatanhel Krymsky, all met the same fate—some of them earlier, some of them later, but their fate was always the same.

Writers who were born in the 1870's did not cross the threshold of the year 1917. The revolution relegated them to oblivion and excluded them from the literary process. They played no part

in the Ukrainian literature of the 1920's and were replaced by the writers of the younger generation. This measure was introduced as a matter of course, and yet they were liquidated in the 1930's when "pensioners" became the object of the "class conflict".

Poets wrote poems and put them in drawers; they wrote novels and hid them in boxes. For whom did Zerov translate the "Aeneid"? For whom did Khotkevych write his "Shevchenko" and "Dovbush"? Silence, benevolence and solitude were the only ideals left to them. "Three pleasures my powerful possession—solitude, work, silence", said Volodymyr Svidzinsky.

Unified

It must be stressed that this process of liquidation as regards the Ukrainian writers was only one aspect of the policy of the Communist Party as far as Ukrainian literature was concerned. It was closely connected with another process, namely that of unification, in which two stages are clearly recognisable; the first stage, the V.U.S.P.P. (Vseukrainska Spilka Proletarskykh Pysmennykiv), the All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers, up to the adoption of the April resolution of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in 1932, and the second stage of the "Union of Soviet Writers", from 1932, after the aforesaid decision, up to the present time.

The adoption of the Central Committee resolution on literature in 1932 meant that the Party itself took over complete control of literature. The watchword of the "proletarianisation" of literature was rejected and replaced by another watchword of "Sovietisation".

The writers who in the previous stage had been excluded from literary activity on account of their non-proletarian origin were now included in the Union. But this step towards "democratisation", like the rejection of proletarian watchwords, in no way meant the easing of pressure. On the contrary, it was in 1933 that the wave of repressions reached an unheard of level; control over writers was intensified, the atmosphere became unbearable, and the organs of state security began to interfere in literary matters.

The practice of administrative interference from above, the setting up of a literature programme by the Politburo, and the taking over of complete control of literature by the higher organs of the Party were realised during this stage. "Literary activity" ceased to be a "liberal profession", a profession of personal choice and individual initiative. To cease writing was as dangerous and

suspicious as to continue writing. When a writer ceased writing he was accused of sabotage. To write and to write according to the directives of the central organs of the Party became the writer's duty, a duty which he could not evade. "I will" no longer existed. A writer's work became an obligatory social task or rather a Party or state obligatory task which was controlled by the central organs of the Party and the state.

A writer was obliged to be the promoter of orthodoxy. Truths which were not recognised by the "Church" as dogmas must find no place in his work. The creative work of Soviet writers must be a creation within the framework of "orthodox truths". This unification of writers from the organisational point of view was complemented by a unification of themes and ways of portrayal. The impressionist free selection of theme was superseded by the anti-psychological and anti-individual absolutism of centralised portrayal and a single theme: Stalin, Kirov, Party... "hero"... the same unchangeable theme. This central figure must appear absolute and the literary style used to portray him is accordingly universal and hierarchical in trend.

The functional destiny of the individual is determined from above. The place of the individual in society is determined by the central organs of Party and state. The personality of an individual, his initiative, his personal attitude do not count at all.

Today, "a prisoner at Kolyma"—tomorrow, a position in a Narkom (Narodny Kommissariat—the People's Commissariat). Today, a position in the Narkom, the holder of an order, a member of the Supreme Soviet, the owner of a personal car—tomorrow, a deportee, a toiler of the soil—a mere nobody. Pseudo-writers fill up the ranks of the Ukrainian writers. The talented writers have been liquidated and their place has been taken by pseudo-writers. The Ukrainian literature of the 1930's in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is Soviet literature in the Ukrainian language; it is disciplined and stifled literature with limited themes determined by Party directives; it is the product of artificial experiments. Cut off from its national soil, it resembles a pseudo-literature, an artificial creation—the result of the destructive policy of Bolshevism.

*From the publications of the Independent Ukrainian
Association For Research of National Problems in
Soviet Theory and Practice*

J. Blokhyn

The Present Aims of Moscow's National Policy

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union revealed a number of tendencies in the Soviet way of thinking, tendencies in the home and foreign policy of the Communist Party which developed more fully after Stalin's death, but were to some extent already recognizable before that event. It would, however, be a grave error to maintain that these tendencies have already assumed a definite and final form. The atmosphere in Moscow and also in the government centres of the various republics and in the capitals of the satellite states is still one of development and, to some extent, of uncertainty. For this reason, the situation before and after the 20th Party Congress must be regarded with extreme wariness.

Despite this fact, however, it is possible even at this stage to recognise a number of factors, phenomena and symptoms which indicate a change in the national policy of the Party. In any case, it is obvious that the national problem played an important part at the 20th Party Congress; in fact, it was the main problem even when it was not mentioned or was intentionally avoided.

In spite of solemn assurances regarding the coalescence of the forces of the socialist world, in spite of bold assertions regarding the possible victory of the Communist camp over the forces of the free world by means of coexistence, and in spite of an optimistic faith in the immense possibilities of Communist propaganda, obvious signs of anxiety were evident in the speeches made by the Soviet bureaucrats. Questions which greatly worried the members of the Congress were the course which the fight for power among the leading men of the Party will take (this problem was covered up by eager demands for a collective leadership), the enormous bureaucratism of the Soviet system, and the low production level in certain economic sectors, above all in agriculture.

Last but not least of all these difficulties was the national problem. Although there was a lot of talk at the Congress about the "amazing achievements" of Soviet national policy, the announcement over the Soviet Radio, at the same time, about an amnesty for the Ukrainian partisans, who are still leading an illegal existence, was almost symbolical; for this announcement was an official Soviet admission that eleven years after the end of World War II Ukrainian armed resistance against Muscovite occupation still continues and has not yet been finally broken.*)

A representative of the Ukrainian Communist Party bureaucracy, P. Tychyna, writing about his impressions of the 20th Party Congress, put things fairly plainly when he said:

"We must not forget that the enemy's propaganda always counts on the least steadfast in our midst, on the most irresolute and on those whose outlook on life is immature. We must increase our vigilance and must never for one moment tire in our fight against the thrusts carried out by the representatives of the hostile ideology and their hangers-on, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" (P. Tychyna, "Under Lenin's Mighty Banner", published in the paper "Radyanska Ukraina", Kyiv, April 29, 1956, No. 101 [10 539], p. 4).

The Lithuanian, Snehkus, also felt called upon to speak his mind at the Congress about the "remnants of bourgeois nationalism" against which the fight must be continued ("Pravda" February 18, 1956, No. 49 /13 712/, p. 8). This same opinion was likewise expressed in the statements made by the delegate, Mzhavanadze, with regard to Georgia ("Pravda", February 18, 1956, No. 49 /13 712/, p. 4). And the delegate of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, though he stressed the "exemplary solution" of the national problem in Uzbekistan, could not conceal the significant fact that the Uzbek farmers *en masse* sabotage the main branch of the economic exploitation of Uzbekistan, namely the cultivation of cotton.

Highly significant events occurred in the U.S.S.R. during the first half of March this year, namely the riots in Tiflis, Gori, Rustava, Kutaisi, Baku and other towns, which began as demonstrations against the government and developed into mass anti-Russian insurrections.

And it is interesting to note that inner processes of discontent, suppressed by terrorism, now sought to break through by means of explosions. This break-through may, as regards the form it

*) "Chervonyi Prapor", of February 11, 1956.

assumed and its ideas, be somewhat crude, but it definitely proves that the attempts of the Kremlin to create "a uniform Soviet nation" by Russification have suffered a serious setback, just as did the excesses of the Tzarist advocates of centralization. And even the "enlightened" advocates of Russian centralism and colonialism, the leading functionaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, realise this fact.

Hints at Revision of Nationalities' Policy

A feeling of uncertainty in the face of the national aims of the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. resulted in various members of the 20th Party Congress hinting in somewhat nebulous terms that the national policy was to be changed and mentioning corrections of a tactical nature, which are now in evidence in the introduction by the Soviet regime of a general return to Leninism and a de-Stalinization process. Actually, this change of tactics was only touched on fairly briefly at the Congress itself. Numerous assurances were, however, made to the effect that the national entities would not be abolished in the epoch of socialism, but that, on the contrary, the nations would "enjoy a new prosperity" from the state, cultural and economic point of view (this was also affirmed in the Stalinist era, but in those days the preservation of "national individuality" was stressed and no mention was made of the economic sector). Voroshilov drew the attention of the members of the Congress to the fact that the power of the supreme organs of the Union and autonomous republics should be consolidated ("Pravda", February 21, 1956, No. 52, p. 6); and the question of the necessity of a de-centralization in favour of the national republics was brought up again and again. Mikoyan affirmed that it would be wiser to let the history of the "Ukrainian socialist state" be written by "Ukrainian Party comrades" instead of by Muscovite comrades as hitherto, "who had tackled this job, but who would perhaps have done better to let it alone" ("Izvestiya", February 18, 1956, No. 42 /12 040/, p. 3).

The Russian phraseology used during the Congress omitted to include mention of the superiority of the "elder brother", the Russian people, to the other nations of the U.S.S.R., a designation which during the past decade has been a characteristic feature of Russian propaganda. Only one or two Russians (as for instance Shepilov) mentioned Russian revolutionary Messianism during the Congress. It was left to the delegates of the national Communist

parties to emphasize the supremacy of the Russian people, which accordingly they did (the Lithuanian, Snehkus, the Bulgarian, Chervenkov, and various other delegates).

The speeches made at the Congress consisted for the most part in ambiguous statements and hints and allusions. Khrushchov delved into the past and presented a statement made on a certain occasion by Lenin, regarding the different paths of the individual nations to socialism. The present leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union endowed Lenin's words with the significance of a political principle, a fact which, in view of the present interests of Soviet international propaganda, is comprehensible. Nevertheless, in raising this statement of Lenin's to the rank of a theory, Khrushchov was obviously not extending its meaning to cover the nations of the U.S.S.R. Even though there is no explicit objection to seeing "individual paths to socialism" as far as the Ukrainians, Georgians, and Uzbeks, etc. are concerned, there is also no substantiation of any right to this prospect for the non-Russian nations. Khrushchov did not affirm that any nation had been created in the U.S.S.R., but he did talk about "Soviet patriotism", without, however, defining what exactly he meant by this—a "Soviet patriotism" which only concerns the entire Union or one which in particular concerns the national republics, too.

Khrushchov's proposal to found an economic commission of the Nationalities Council of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. was no less ambiguous. Even though the general ideas in connection with which this proposal was made were intended to imply that the rights of the republics were to be extended, the direct motive which prompted Khrushchov to insist on the necessity of founding an economic commission was based primarily on his desire to have an organ that would be capable of checking national economic needs with the aid of the criterion "in the interests of the Soviet Union as a whole" (See Khrushchov's report, section 4: "Some Aspects of our Nationalities Policy", published in "Radyanska Ukraina", February 16, 1956, No. 40 /10 478/, p. 2). One cannot help but gain the impression that the nationalities problem is so complicated that it was quite beyond the comprehension of the political leaders at the 20th Party Congress.

The newly aroused national sentiments and interests of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. may easily cause a conflagration, and the correct representation of the colonial dependence of the Soviet republics—even though it only seeps through in fragments from

abroad—serves to aggravate the internal political menace considerably; in any case, one is bound to come to this conclusion of one's own accord if one reads through the reports of the Party Congress carefully. A number of delegates who appeared at the Party Congress as representatives of the various republics expressed their indignation at the reproaches voiced by the free world with regard to the nationalities policy of the Kremlin. Molotov thereupon pointed out that it was impossible not to reckon with the "containment" and in particular the "liberation plans" of the West, but he tried to minimize the danger in this respect by assuring his audience that these plans were fictitious ("Izvestiya", February 21, 1956, No. 44 /12 042/, p. 2). Kyrychenko resorted to the typically Russian method of polemical calumny when referring to Professor C. A. Manning's book, "Twentieth Century Ukraine", which discloses the colonial character of Moscow's policy towards Ukraine ("Izvestiya", February 16, 1956, No. 40 /12 038/, p. 3). Tovmasyan in the usual Soviet polemical style expressed his anxiety at the fact that the Americans were supporting the Armenian independence movement ("Izvestiya", February 19, 1956, No. 43 /12 041/, p. 2); the representative of the Communist Party of Tajikistan attacked the opinions expressed by Olaf Caroe in his book on the Soviet Asiatic republics, in which he describes the tyranny which prevails there ("Izvestiya", February 17, 1956, No. 41 /12 039/); the representative of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Snehkus, and the Estonian delegate, Kabin, objected to the joint declaration issued by the President of the U.S.A., Eisenhower, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Sir Anthony Eden, regarding the Baltic States ("Pravda", February 18, 1956, No. 49 /13 712/, p. 8, and "Izvestiya", February 19, 1956, No. 43 /12 041/, p. 1).

All these statements and speeches were intended to look like systematically planned measures against the foreign factors which support the freedom aims of various peoples. It is hard to believe that these speeches were intended for the outside world; it was inconsistent with such an intention that the note on which the discussions were held was constantly abusive and that no attempt whatsoever was made to substantiate the invectives directed against recent foreign publications on Moscow's nationalities policy by means of arguments. Special mention must be made of the fact that not once during the Congress was the fear voiced that Western propaganda might influence the Russian people. Attention

was concentrated on protecting the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. from being influenced by the Western hemisphere.

The Party Congress has thus brought no important changes as regards the nationalities policy, but it did reveal that there is no little anxiety at the steadily increasing differences between Moscow and the national republics. In order to divert the hatred of the subjugated peoples from Moscow as the centre of the Russian imperium, Novosibirsk was made the administrative Party centre of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. This maybe is the greatest concession to the national movements of the subjugated peoples, but even so it does not alter the situation. The Soviet Union continues to remain a centralized imperium in which the leading part and political, economic, and above all intellectual and cultural supremacy are the prerogatives of the Russians and their historical tradition.

But life in all its grim reality goes on, and national discontent is not abating; on the contrary, it even proved a new source of worry to be centre of the imperium a few weeks after the Party Congress. And this fact prompts the political leaders to try to think up new concessions to the non-Russian nations, but, of course, only such concessions as will not upset the balance of the foundations of the Russian imperium.

Revision of History

A very interesting commentary on the revision of the nationalities policy pursued so far by the Party is provided by this year's March edition of the Moscow journal, "Voprosy istorii", which incidentally, endows the ideological attitude of Russian Communism with many new nuances.

In the leading article, entitled "The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Tasks of the Party in Historical Research", it is stressed that the drawing up of the Party programme in the nationalities question has "not" been elucidated "quite correctly" during the past decades ("Voprosy istorii", 1956, No. 3, p. 6.); deviations from the Leninist nationalities policy are some of the main errors of the leaders of the Party and of the country since the end of the war, which are mentioned (*ibid.*, p. 10). What these deviations are, is not stated in the article in question, but the author draws the reader's attention to the fact that Lenin "untiringly trained the workers and all the working population in the spirit of proletarian interna-

tionalism . . . , that he definitely opposed the chauvinism of major powers and local nationalism and sharply censured the nationalist vacillations and errors of the "Bund"*) and of the Caucasian federalists and the Ukrainian social democrats, etc. He relentlessly unmasked the chauvinism of the Russian reactionaries and bourgeois parties and, above all, their anti-Semitism, which was extremely hostile towards the proletariat". Here we already find in an indirect form a condemnation of the anti-Semitism which to a certain extent was cultivated by the Party in the post-war years. For the first time after a number of years stress is laid on the allegedly determined fight conducted by Lenin against major power chauvinism. It is an established fact that Lenin's phraseological "fight" against this type of chauvinism already vanished from the Soviet political arena at the beginning of the 1930's. The introduction of this phraseology in the present situation is perhaps proof of the fact that obstacles are being placed in the path of the obviously demonstrative forms of Russian nationalism and of Stalinist racial policy. That this mention of the major power of Russia is not a chance one, can be seen from various other articles in the Soviet press, in which the formula, "fight against major power chauvinism and the local nationalists" is likewise revived. What strikes one most when mention is made of the errors and vacillations of the "Bund", of the Caucasian federalists and the Ukrainian social democrats, is the changed tone; in Stalin's day national trends in socialism were designated as treachery and corruption or were branded with similar emphatic and absurd epithets.

The process of making the history of the nationalities as primitive as possible, a process carried on by the Stalinist school, has reached its extreme limits; it has transformed this history into so elementary and simplified a propaganda that even the commonplace historiography of the Leninist type, which is at present resorted to, appears to be the acme of omniscience.

It is a well-known fact that the time has now come in the U.S.S.R. for the rehabilitation of those Communists who were persecuted by Stalin. This rehabilitation process is, however, carried out with considerable caution, especially as far as the former national Communists are concerned. The journal "Voprosy istorii" calls the former national Communist, Skrypnyk, an "old functionary of the Bolshevik Party and of the Ukrainian Soviet govern-

*) Jewish Social Democratic Party in pre-revolutionary Russia.

ment" and also mentions his "various false conclusions in the national question" (ibid., p. 140).

But even the rehabilitation of Skrypnyk brings the Bolsheviks face to face with considerable difficulties. It is an established fact that Skrypnyk ventured to support the idea of the severance of the ethnographical Ukrainian territories of Kursk and Kuban from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and their incorporation in the Ukrainian S.S.R.—territories which the "elder brother" has retained for himself right up to the present time. Skrypnyk likewise had the courage to prove that the Red Army had become a means of Russifying the younger generation. And this old Bolshevik also had the courage to affirm that Ukrainian literature at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century was spiritually closer to the West than to Russia. During the latter part of his life these views were typical of Skrypnyk. It will not be easy for the Soviet historians to list them in the category of "various errors" and it is at present impossible to say in advance what methods they will resort to in order to get out of this difficult situation.

The article by V. V. Pentkovska, "Lenin's Role in the Founding of the U.S.S.R.", which is published in the journal, "Voprosy istorii", is extremely informative as regards the emphasis laid on the "new course" in the national problem.

Whereas in earlier works dealing with the founding of the U.S.S.R. Stalin was promoted to the rank of creator of this union, the leading role is now assigned to Lenin and he is now idealized in much the same way as Stalin was formerly idealised. The article hints at the fact that Stalin to some extent supported Russian major power chauvinism and stresses that in the Stalinist programme of the theories about the state "there was no indication that a deviation towards Great Russian chauvinism was the main danger" ("Voprosy istorii", p. 23).

Pentkovska mentions a number of facts—partly derived from the official Party archives—and these facts reveal certain new traits of the Russian major power chauvinism of the Party which, as the authoress herself remarks, aimed to "revive an indivisible Russia".

Pentkovska follows the trend of proving that Lenin devoted great attention to the national problem and that it was thanks to his insight into this problem that the territory of the former Russian imperium could be transformed into the U.S.S.R. But even the

facts which the authoress mentions prove that Lenin had the innate mental outlook of a Russian imperialist, who, even before the realisation of the formal political unity of the U.S.S.R., regarded the bureaucratic political apparatus in Kharkov, as in Leningrad and Moscow, as part of the autocratic state (*ibid.*, p. 21). The authoress, in diverging from her actual task, has obviously mentioned facts from which it can be seen that the idea of a federation was not exchanged for the idea of a union by Lenin, but as a result of the pressure of the Communist bureaucracy of the individual national republics, which were unwilling to accept Moscow's centralist measures (See for instance the quotation from the archive IMELS, p. 22).

»Great Power« Chauvinism Rebuked

The article by A. M. Pickmann, "The Conflict between the Caucasian Mountain Peoples and the Tzarist Colonizers", which is published in the same number of the journal, "Voprosy istorii", criticizes the Soviet Russian chauvinist account of the history of the national fight for freedom of the Caucasian peoples under the leadership of Shamil'.

In attempting to find an orderly arrangement of ideas for an account of the history of Caucasia, the author turns to the opinions expressed by Marx, Engels and Lenin: "The Communist Party teaches one to respect the fight of the subjugated peoples for their state sovereignty and national independence. In recent years, however, there have, in a number of cases, in the account presented of the history of the peoples of Caucasia been deviations from the Marxist and Leninist interpretation of these questions. Contrary to historical facts and contrary to historical sources, certain historians represent the fight of these mountain peoples as being a reactionary phenomenon. M. Bagirov started this distorted account of the movement of these mountain peoples in his essay, "A Study of the Character of the Movement of Muridism and Shamil'". A false account of the character and nature of the movement of these mountain peoples is likewise given in various other publications and essays and also in the history books used in the secondary schools. In none of these publications is the fact taken into consideration that the movement of these mountain peoples under the leadership of Shamil' (1834-1859) occurred at a time when Tzarism was the all-powerful policeman of Europe and the main pillar and support of a feudal reaction. The fight of these mountain

peoples undermined the power of Tzarism and thus encouraged the forces of the 1848 revolution in Europe, the fight for freedom of the Hungarians and the Poles and of various other national freedom and revolutionary movements. In assessing the importance of this phenomenon in those days, we must in the first place consider the interests of the revolution in Western Europe and in Russia. V. I. Lenin pointed out that in the years from 1848 onwards these general interests (of democracy—A. P.) were above all to be seen in the fight against Tzarism. And it was precisely for this reason that Marx and Engels supported the fight against Tzarism”.

Only as recently as a few months ago such a statement in any Soviet publication would have been impossible, for those chauvinist centralist principles were binding which having been introduced decades ago, were eventually definitely and most emphatically formulated by Stalin on the occasion of the 800th anniversary of the founding of Moscow, in 1947, and were elevated to the rank of a dogma, according to which all historical phenomena of the past centuries were assessed from the point of view of their value for the formation of a great centralist imperium. A centralized imperium of this kind was regarded as a “historic salvation”, for it allegedly provided a large-scale basis for the leading part of the Russian proletariat and the Russian people in the October Revolution.

The present new attitude reverts to Lenin who, after Marx and Engels, saw in Russian Tzarism a “policeman of Europe” and regarded the consolidation of a centralist Tzarist Russia as a danger for the processes of the world revolution. Despite the contradictory nature of both points of view, Soviet historical science nevertheless conforms to a uniform principle of methodology; it carries out its investigation of historical phenomena and facts solely in accordance with the nature of the aims which have been set by the Kremlin for the future. Stalin’s doctrine saw this future as a world victory on the part of Russia and the Russian people, who as the most progressive people in the world will lead mankind to Communism. Instead of only stressing the pre-eminence of the Russian people and their national predestination, Lenin’s ideology emphasized above all the internationalism of the Russian proletariat and its willingness to show the world an example of the revolutionary fight, and thus stressed Russia’s Messianic mission. Russian nationalism in the Leninist form was

nearly always most carefully disguised, and it is therefore not surprising that we see in the present complicated, internal situation a reversion to Lenin in the national policy.

Pickmann affirms that the theory adopted so far, of describing the fight of the Caucasian mountain peoples against Tzarism as reactionary, was artificial and was based on a misrepresentation of facts and on unscrupulous and incorrect quoting from historical sources.

In his article he quotes abundantly from Russian pre-revolutionary publications which prove that the conquest of Caucasia by Russia was carried out in accordance with the latter's genocidal policy and by applying the most ruthless and barbarous methods. He quotes the following passage from a Russian special publication, "The 50th Anniversary of the Conquest of Western Caucasia and the End of the Caucasian War", which appeared in 1914: "Russia's fight against the mountain peoples of Western Caucasia was of an exclusive nature and consisted in conquering the country and immediately resettling its inhabitants... The very fact that fighting operations in Western Caucasia removed some of the Caucasian tribes from the historical map(!) and even wiped out all memory of them(!) is proof of the grave significance of this last phase of the Caucasian war". (The exclamation marks are Pickmann's.)

This statement and a number of concrete examples which Pickmann introduces in this connection do not however prevent the editor of the journal from adding a special remark to this article, namely: "The progressive results of the union of the peoples of Caucasia with Russia are obvious. It would, however, be wrong to proceed from this fact and describe the national movements as reactionary, which is what certain authors have done; each one of such movements must be examined from the point of view of concrete historical facts" (p. 8).

Not only does Pickmann in his violent attack on the representatives of the Stalinist course disclose the falsification of the history of Caucasia and produce a number of significant examples of Russia's colonial policy, but he also tries to make his readers believe that the Caucasian peoples did not hate the Russians but Russian Tzarism; he quotes a passage which affirms that the mountain peoples "are prepared to fight against the Russians to the bitter end" and adds in parentheses "that is to say, against

Tzarism" even though there is not the slightest proof that these mountain peoples resorted to any kind of abstract differentiation between Russian Tzarism and the Russian people. It is a well-known fact that the Russian soldiers conducted themselves bravely in Caucasia and were rewarded for their services and their steadfastness in the fight by the government. It would indeed be strange if, under these circumstances, the mountain peoples had tried to differentiate between the Russian generals—the representatives of the Tzarist bureaucratic system of war—and the Russian soldiers as representatives of the Russian masses. The history of the fight in Caucasia was determined by purely nationalist factors, and as far as the principle of class conflict in Bolshevik historiography is concerned, this fact represents a serious obstacle which it can only surmount by falsifying historical facts. In an eloquent manner Pickmann reveals the misrepresentation of the factual aspect of Caucasian history in earlier Soviet publications, but he himself also cuts the historic past according to a pattern, though it is no longer the Stalinist but the Leninist pattern.

We have intentionally dealt with the articles in the journal, "Voprosy istorii", at some length, since they illustrate the entire process of the revaluation of the nationalities policy of the U.S.S.R.

The pressure of the present political situation and the pressure of the consolidation of the national consciousness of the subjugated peoples is clearly evident in the articles which are of a theoretical nature.

The masters of the Soviet Party theory are anxious to create the impression that the Party is kindly disposed towards the movements of the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. Actually, however, they are casting about for new means to consolidate the imperium and, with this end in mind, are trying to modernize Russian centralism with the aid of the ideas of Leninist internationalism.

Prof. Yuriy Boyko

The Theory of the Third Rome in the Muscovite (Russian) Orthodox Church After World War II

The more recent emigrants, that is to say those who lived in the Soviet Union up to the outbreak of World War II and, in particular, those of them who, in the 1920's, witnessed the ruthless terrorism against the Church and the desecration and defilement of sanctuaries and shrines—these emigrants, we should like to stress, are truly amazed at the change which has now taken place in the Soviet attitude towards the Church. Indeed, the present situation in the religious sphere of life in the Soviet Union must seem to them to be a fantastic miracle which does not fit in at all with the real state of affairs in the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, however, events clearly indicate that the Russian Orthodox Church during and since the war has advanced from its persecuted position to the status of an important factor of public life in the Soviet Union. From being persecuted itself, it has now become a persecutor by basing the foundations of its power on the persecution of those national Churches which have continued to retain their purely and fundamentally religious character and are an expression of the religious consciousness of their peoples.

The destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church in Ukraine, of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Galicia, in Carpatho-Ukraine and in the district of Priashiv, the liquidation of the Roumanian Greek Catholic Church, the arresting of priests in Bulgaria in 1948, the forcible spreading of orthodoxy in Hungary, etc.—all these measures are not merely a put-up show, but an attempt at expansion on the part of the Russian Church, which builds up its power on the blood and tears of the Christians, inflicts martyrdom and sufferings on them, and forces true religion to continue its activity in secret.

Even in the year 1918 the Russian philosopher, N. Berdyayev, wrote as follows:

“Russian history has called an entirely exclusive phenomenon into being: a complete nationalization of the Christian Church which designates itself as the world Church. Ecclesiastical nationalism is a characteristically

Russian phenomenon. Our orthodox churches are completely permeated by it. And even the present ruling Church is influenced by this nationalism.”*)

These words of the famous Russian philosopher, expressed at the beginning of the October Revolution, are an extremely apt characterization of the firmly established Russian national religious consciousness and, moreover, provide the key to a right understanding of the position of the Muscovite Church at that time. One other point must, however, be added to Berdyayev’s statement, namely that the Russian Church has never been as nationalized and secularized as it is at the present time, now that it is working hand in hand with the Bolshevik regime.

For many years the Russian Church, despite the fact that its doctrine was banned and its priests and its true believers were persecuted, fought persistently for recognition on the part of the Communist government, not merely in order to obtain an advantage, but because it was firmly convinced of the necessity of “rendering to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s”, until it finally—under wartime conditions which were extremely difficult for the Soviet government—forced the Soviets not only to recognize it, but also to grant it certain legal rights as regards its activity.

In our article, “The Church in the U.S.S.R.” (Calendar-Almanach “Vidrodzhennia”, Buenos Aires, 1951), we pointed out how cunningly the Russian Church hierarchy, in view of the events of the war, managed to make itself indispensable to the government by playing a very active part as a spiritual and moral factor in the realization of war aims. Nor has the situation changed since the war. The patriarchate, which thanks to the powerful autocracy has firm control of the ecclesiastical system, pays particular attention to the political needs of the moment and to the political tasks of the Party and in every way praises and supports these aims by endeavouring to persuade the faithful to fulfil their “patriotic duty” most zealously. The obvious thing about the attitude of the patriarchate in this respect is its anti-ecclesiastical nature, that is to say its purely Russian ecclesiastical nature. There is no other way of describing the pastoral letter of the Patriarch, for instance, on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution and in particular the words dedicated to the world’s greatest tyrant, Stalin, and his government:

*) N. Berdyayev, “Russia’s Soul”, in the collection “The Fate of Russia”, Moscow, 1918, p. 10.

"Gather together in prayer for the Russian Empire, protected by God, and for its government headed by its wise leader, who has been chosen and appointed by the Divine Will to guide our native country on the path of God's pleasure and salvation" ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1947, No. 11, p. 5).

The Communist ruling class on its part is not indifferent as far as this service towards its ecclesiastical hierarchs is concerned. Indeed, it was an irony of fate that the materialist and atheist Stalin was forced to express his approval of the extension of theological training. And the Patriarch of Moscow and "of all Russians", Alexey, plainly said as much in a speech he made on the occasion of a ceremony held at the Leningrad Theological Academy ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1946, No. 10, p. 28).

Such was the position in the year 1946 and is still the case nowadays, perhaps even more so. Matters have now reached such a state that well-known representatives of the Russian Church are now regarded as representatives of the entire country. For instance, at a reception held in June, 1955, by the Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., Bulganin, in honour of the Indian Premier, Nehru, not only Russian representatives and numerous Soviet dignitaries were present, but also the Patriarch Alexey and the Metropolitan of Kolomna and Krutitsy, Nikolay ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1955, No. 7, p. 67).

At present, the Russian Church, which has offered the Russian Soviet state its services, enjoys official support in every respect and also receives fairly large subsidies from the exchequer of the U.S.S.R. The large-scale international activity of the Moscow Church, constant trips abroad, the reception of numerous delegations from various countries, celebrations involving lavish expenditure, big investments of capital for the repair of churches and monasteries not only in the Soviet Union, but above all abroad (about fifty shrines and churches were in need of repair in Palestine alone), and "brotherly gifts" to the Eastern patriarchates—all this involves huge sums of money, but the Church modestly keeps silent about the source from which it derives this money; only now and again does it hint at the "self-sacrificing spirit" of the faithful. But even so, however, information about official support, as for instance in the case of the rebuilding of the Orthodox Church in Vienna, seeps through the headlines of the official organ of the Moscow patriarchate.

In order to demonstrate the "prosperity" of the Church in the U.S.S.R. and to satisfy the curiosity of numerous foreign delegations, various churches and religious shrines of historical value were restored to the patriarchate and financial aid was granted for the erection of a number of new churches. Special attention was paid to certain edifices, as for instance the Patriarch's Cathedral, the Trinity Church at Sergyevsk, near Moscow, which has become such a magnificent monument of Muscovite church architecture that it arouses the admiration of all foreign delegations, whatever their political attitude towards Moscow may be.

The Soviet Russian railways and the tourist bureau in Moscow most assiduously comply with the wishes of the patriarchate by taking foreign guests to certain specially chosen spots and pointing out to them the miracle which has taken place in the religious life of the U.S.S.R. The official Soviet film company has during the past years shown films of various religious celebrations, as for instance the enthronement of the Patriarch in 1946 and the 500th anniversary of the Moscow Autocephalous Church in 1948.

The relationship of the Church to the Soviet state is very flexible one and reveals two aspects—an internal and an external one. Within the U.S.S.R. it is only the fight against the Church as an institution that has ceased, whilst the fight against religious convictions and the dissemination of atheist propaganda is still continued by the state.

Members of the Party and of the Komsomol (the Communist youth organisation) is regarded as incompatible with religiousness; those who perform clerical duties are automatically excluded from these organisations. At the same time, however, the "Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", secretly financed by state funds, is published for the purpose of convincing other countries of the freedom of religious opinion in the Soviet Union. In some of its articles the Journal even attempts to explain certain phenomena from the idealistic and philosophical point of view. Meanwhile the leading Soviet functionaries believe (or at least pretend to believe) in the ultimate victory of materialism in the future, whereas the leading men of the Church continue to believe in the victory of the eternal Russian principle, namely orthodoxy. This is an antithesis in Soviet life, but it is an imaginary rather than an actual antithesis, for the religious idealism of the Russian Orthodox Church goes hand in hand with a disposition to approve of all the practical consequences resulting from the dialectical

materialism of the Party, of all the aims and measures of the Soviet home and foreign policy, of all the crimes and of the mental outlook of the Party and the government. Muscovite orthodoxy has done its utmost to help the Kremlin to realise all its political plans.

In making this compromise with the government, the Russian Church of today represents the worst kind of the so-called "concord", that is to say harmony between the Church and the State. And it is precisely this "concord" which is an important traditional and characteristic feature of the theory of the Third Rome. Once we realise the existence of this feature in the Russian Church, we can fully comprehend the fundamental idea of the entire theoretical conception of the Third Rome, a conception, which though it is at times concealed, has experienced its regeneration in the present Russian orthodoxy and has assumed very flexible forms.

The "concord", this unpleasant characteristic of Russian orthodoxy, is always accompanied by the special emphasis on the purely religious aspect of the internal life of the Church, by the discussion of theological problems, by a careful preference for sermons on subjects from the Gospels, and by undisguised efforts to foster monastic asceticism and emphasize the "splendour" of divine service. The Patriarch is above all anxious to create an atmosphere of prayer in the churches. To this end, he insists that the old versions of hymns and chants should be reintroduced and that electric lighting in front of the pictures or statues of saints should be limited to a minimum, since a dim light in a church is more conducive to pious feelings.

But at the same time as these efforts are made to arouse the mystical feelings of the faithful and whilst prayers are murmured in a reverent whisper, the holy edifices resound with loud exhortations to render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, namely to serve the policy of the Soviet Russian "Caesar" unconditionally.

Thus the Russian Church has countless religious hypocrites among its members, who are all the more dangerous since they are not so much concerned with the promotion of their own interests, but with the expansion and consolidation of the power of Russian imperialism.

The quintessence of Russian orthodoxy lies in the fact that it does not characterize itself by revealing its own spiritual nature, but by comparing itself with other Churches. This attitude of the Russians is very aptly expressed by the Sofia Metropolitan, Stefan,

in his fawning study of Russian orthodoxy, in which he compares it with "juristic practical Catholicism", with "abstract Protestantism" and even with "Eastern Greek doctrinarian orthodoxy". Metropolitan Stefan sets Russian orthodoxy above all other Christian Churches as the union of the earthly with the celestial, the union of mysticism with the practice of sacrifice ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1948, No. 8, p. 14).

The Bulgarian Metropolitan has thoroughly comprehended the typically Russian quality of Muscovite orthodoxy. Russian orthodoxy does not regard its oecumenical sphere as existing in the unity of all orthodox Churches, but it looks upon the Russian Church and Russian orthodoxy itself as being oecumenical. Since Russian orthodoxy strives to encompass all religious doctrines, it aims to envelop all the orthodox Churches in the world as well as the whole of world Christianity with its omophorium. According to the opinion expressed by the Patriarch Alexey, orthodox piety is exclusively a quality of the Russians and represents the fundamental characteristic of their unbroken spiritual strength ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1955, No. 2, p. 22). To the attempts of the Old Catholic theology to establish a connection with Russian orthodoxy, the "Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate" answers as follows:

"It is not correct... to assume that the Orthodox Church is merely one aspect of life or that it is merely one note in the full chord of Christianity; orthodoxy contains the entirety of Christian life, fractions of which are also contained in the other confessions... For this reason the words of the appeal addressed by the heads and representatives of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church to the Christians of the whole world, in July 1948, are profoundly true... namely, that the restoration of the unity of all the Christian Churches can only be achieved by establishing a closer relationship between them and the orthodox Churches, the doctrine of the latter, the form of the divine service of the other aspects of Christian life" ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1955, No. 4, p. 78).

The organ of the Moscow Patriarchate thus stresses the exclusiveness and the Christian predestination of orthodoxy without, however, mentioning the fact that it was the Russian hierarchy itself which, at the above-mentioned Moscow Congress in 1948 forced all those present on that occasion to adopt its attitude in the fight against a large number of orthodox Churches which were disposed to take part in the oecumenical movement.

The idea of the priority of Russian orthodoxy among all the other orthodox Churches was most plainly expressed by the Bishop

of Mukachiv-Priashiv (Carpatho-Ukraine), Volodymyr, in 1945, when he said,

"One must admit that of all the orthodox peoples of the Eastern Church, only the Russian people can occupy the foremost position at the head of all the Slav orthodox Churches."

The Muscovite Church dignitaries are only too ready to make use of the representatives of other Churches for the purpose of extolling the mighty Russian orthodoxy, and they give them plenty of opportunity to affirm that the present Muscovite Church is the Third Rome. On the occasion of his visit to Moscow in 1948, the Metropolitan of Lebanon, Elias, addressed a pastoral letter to the Patriarch which extolled the Muscovite Orthodox Church:

"Your people are God's chosen representatives. The entire history of Russia is eloquent proof of the fact that, when the country was undergoing hard times and inner turmoil and when it was invaded by foreign races, the great and noble Russian people asked God's Grace, in order to protect the security of the towns and the widely scattered frontiers of Russian territory.

How often did presumptuous and bold enemies, such as Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Charles XII, Napoleon, and various others, try to conquer Russia and subjugate her people; on countless occasions the soil of this orthodox country was stained with the blood of its loyal sons; but all this failed to break the power of the Russian people and failed to shake their faith in the justness of the principles they defended.

I am overjoyed at being in Moscow, which as the heir of Byzantium has assumed the lead in orthodoxy.

Moscow is a centre not only of political and economic but also of religious life."

As can be seen from these statements, the Metropolitan, Elias, regards the entire East European territories, that is to say Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Balkan countries as Russia. The Russian people are God's chosen representatives, an imperial people, and for this reason the Metropolitan sees only this people in his mind's eye. And this is precisely what the present Communist official and orthodox Moscow needs.

As far as Moscow is concerned, the important thing at present is to lull the consciousness of other peoples by the enchanting and glorious myth of the monolith of Russian orthodoxy, to stifle the groans of the enslaved peoples by loudly proclaiming the noble mission of the people who are allegedly God's chosen representatives, to conceal the large and dangerous cracks in the structure of the Russian imperium from the rest of the world, and to subjugate the peoples outside the Soviet Union by tempting them with Russian orthodoxy, which in this way, paves the way for further

political aggression. And this task is fulfilled by the pastoral letters, proclamations and writings of numerous influential non-Russian dignitaries of the Church (whose will is governed by the Moscow patriarchate by various ways and means). In this connection it is interesting to note the impression gained by the Rumanian church delegation, headed by the Patriarch Nikodim, which visited Moscow in 1946.

These guests, who were by no means ignorant of Russian affairs, outdid each other in singing the praises of the land of "milk and honey"; they affirmed that neither in London, Paris nor Rome were there such magnificent treasures of historical significance as in Moscow. Once they had comprehended the mechanism of the mutual relations between the Church and the government in the Soviet Union, they devoted their attention to paying homage to the government and in particular to Stalin:

"The culture and civilization which have been achieved and perfected in the Soviet Union under the leadership of the government with that genius, Generalissimo Stalin, at its head, are on such a high level that they arouse the enthusiasm and admiration of the whole world" ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1946, No. 11, p. 17).

But not all enthusiasm is expressed under pressure of circumstances. It is an extremely regrettable fact that more and more naive persons are to be found who, on arriving in the Soviet Union, are taken in by the great show of hospitality, which is in reality staged for their benefit, and by the over-eager enthusiasm of the patriarchate and who, on returning from the Soviet Union, regard Soviet Russian reality in a new and most favourable light.

The idea of the Third Rome in the Orthodox Muscovite Church of today is assuming the form of a dogmatic and canonical opposition to the other non-orthodox Churches; the main aim is to attain supremacy over the other orthodox Churches, but the Muscovite Church conceals its true intentions by means of a feigned "humility". The opposition of the Muscovite Church is most apparent in its relations with the Roman Catholic Church. It is prompted by Russian Church traditions and by the knowledge that Rome, in particular, definitely opposes the intellectual aggression at present carried on by Russia. For this reason, the patriarchate constantly resorts to polemical argument directed against Rome. Above all, it reproaches the Roman Catholic Church with always having based its action on politics. The Vatican, so the rulers of the Russian Church maintain, has become submerged in worldly mat-

ters, it has turned away its eyes from Heaven and has become the organiser of the anti-Communist fight in the world.

Catholic universalism is likewise attacked by the orthodox Russians; Catholicism allegedly denies the national patriotism of the peoples, whereas the Russian Church is the advocate of the national and autocephalous principle. The Russian Church, however, keeps silent about the fact that it helped the Soviet government during the last World War to suppress the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which had been re-established once more, and that it (the Russian Church) is at present making preparations to suppress the Finnish Orthodox Autocephalous Church under the pretext of the consolidation of the political relations between the U.S.S.R. and Finland.

The head of the Moscow Theological Academy, Bishop Hermogen, endeavours to support his reproaches directed at the Catholic Church regarding the violation of national sovereignty with quotations from the Bible, a fact which clearly proves the platitude of the arguments advanced by the head dignitaries of the Russian Church: "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (St. John, XV, 13).

"As everybody knows, a sound patriotic spirit and one's attitude to one's own native country is based on this commandment of Our Lord. Contrary to the teachings of Christ, Rome (the Catholic Church) sanctions the obliteration of patriotism from the consciousness of its faithful" ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1947, No. 12, p. 21).

The Russian hierarchy most violently attacks the institution of the papal system and affirms that the dogma of the Pope's infallibility is incompatible with the Christian spirit.

In trying to emulate the Holy See, the Muscovite Church even resorts to blasphemy, for it compares the Moscow Patriarch, Alexey, to Jesus Christ. And the atmosphere of divine service in Moscow even reminds the Belgian Archbishop, Alexander, of the early days of Christianity:

"Just as in those days people thronged round Christ and gazed upon him in awe, so, too, the same thing now happens in the presence of the Holy Patriarch, who is inspired by the Holy Ghost."

In keeping with the idea of the Third Rome, the Patriarch is represented as a being surrounded with a halo of sacred, mystical holiness, in order to make the Christian world regard him as an even greater spiritual authority than the Pope.

In its desire to break the power of the Catholic Church, Moscow pursues the aim of separating the Catholics from the Vatican and affirms in this connection that it is not fighting Catholicism as such, but papacy; it stresses that it is willing to cooperate with the Catholics provided that the latter do not serve the worldly aims of the Vatican ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1950, No. 12, p. 52).

And hypocritical prayers are even sent up to Heaven, asking God to enlighten the Catholic hierarchs and show them the way to salvation ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1948, special edition, p. 25). The Muscovite Church believes in the future subjugation of Catholicism under the Orthodox Church (A. Shapovalov, "Triumph of the Orthodox Faith", in the "Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1946, No. 10, pp. 34-43).

An uncompromising attitude towards the Catholic Church is one of the fundamental principles of the theory of the Third Rome. During recent years, this theory has to a considerable extent been revised and linked up with the older Russian church traditions and has, to some degree, been adapted to the requirements of the present political tasks of the Soviet Russians. It is probably no coincidence that none of the leading representatives of the Russian Church undertakes to analyse this theory systematically, for it is propounded and propagated not as a doctrine, but as a presentiment, as a myth or vision of the future; it is expressed in exalted allusions or quite simply in catchwords during religious ceremonies or on the occasion of some general political event in the Soviet Union. The purpose of this theory is not only to attract the Western world, but also to produce a certain political effect at home and serve as a spiritual stimulus to the Russians, a people who in all social classes are more imbued with the feeling of a Messianic mission than any other people in the history of the world.

As regards the subjugated peoples of the U.S.S.R., the purpose of the theory of the Third Rome is to excuse and glorify Russian imperialism and its genocidal crimes. These acts of terrorism, it is affirmed, are the attendant circumstances of progressive centralization, and an attempt is made to surround and conceal atrocities with a nimbus of religious mysticism.

The Russian Church condemns the relation between the Church and the State in the West as "engaging in politics, yet at the same time it boasts of its own "predestined affinity with the Rus-

sian people" and of the services it renders as regards the historic tasks of the Russian state.

When the Patriarch Alexey was decorated with the Order of the Red Workers' Banner by the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., he replied to the salutation of the government as follows:

"By placing all our forces at the service of our native country, we, the servants of the Church, are fulfilling the legacy of our beloved dead ones, the loyal functionaries and great patriots, who have left us an example of boundless love for their native country."

On another occasion the Patriarch mentions the patriotic deeds of the saints of the Russian Church—Peter, Theodosius, Cyprian, Theognost, Alexey, Iona, Philip and Hermogen ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1955, No. 2, p. 22). The historic unity of the people and the Church is traced back to the traditional assertion that the Russian people are God's chosen representatives and of all the peoples of the earth have been ordained to fulfil this mission.

The entire scheme of the history of Russia is traced back to the theory of the Russian people as God's chosen representatives. The first beginnings of the historical development of the Eastern Slavs, in the days before there could be any talk of the forming of a Russian nation, are likewise included in the triumphal procession of the Russian historical idea. This scheme of Russian history was most clearly explained in a letter by the Patriarch's exarch in America, addressed to the Moscow Patriarch. This significant document was signed not only by numerous high dignitaries of the Russian Church, but also by 480 faithful:

"By God's mysterious Providence the Russian people were ordained to serve the Christian faith, to guard its purity and to be its custodian and its herald.

Even in the early beginnings of the history of our people, chosen by God's Grace, we see the Hand of God; in earliest times our Church, despite the fact that it had to fight against false doctrines and heresies, succeeded in preserving its unity for eight hundred years.

But then the first schism occurred, when the Eastern hierarchies condemned and excommunicated the Roman Bishop, Pope Nicholas I. It is no coincidence that the year 862 is regarded in history as the year which saw the birth of the Russian state.

In those days, when the sun was overcast in the West, God chose a new centre for the Holy Faith in the far north and entrusted His future sons with a great and noble mission.

In the course of its constant fight against Western heresy and Eastern heathenism the Russian Church consolidated its power. Inseparably linked with the Church, the Russian people likewise fought and consolidated

their power. Whilst the Church guarded and protected the Russian national idea and the spirit of national patriotism by inspiring the Russian people with fresh courage in times of trouble and temptation, the people, too, on their part made the Church richer by giving it high priests (who were in many cases martyred for their faith), princes, who were true believers, pious monks, "pious fools for the sake of Christ", and many other saints chosen by the Grace of God.

The last five hundred years of the independent service of the Russian Church are inseparably linked with its fostering of the spirit of self-sacrifice for the Holy Faith."

The Archbishop of Bialystok, Timofey, appears to be adding a commentary on this scheme of history when he affirms that the Christian idea of liberation is in the blood of the Russian people, as can be seen from the Russian wars of liberation on the Balkans and the last war against Germany ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1948, No. 8, p. 19).

It is well-known fact that the toast which Stalin proposed on May 9, 1945, in honour of the Russian people as the finest people of the U.S.S.R. released a whole flood of publications in Soviet Party literature, in which the character of the Russians was glorified and their superiority to all other peoples in the Soviet Union was extolled. This note pleased the representatives of orthodoxy immensely; they adopted it themselves and gave it their own personal touch, inasmuch as they affirmed that the finest traits in the Russian national character had been developed thanks to the influence of the Russian Church (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1948, No. 8, p. 17).

This same opinion was also voiced by the Patriarch Alexey. He affirmed that the Russian people were victorious in the last war because they were ordained by God to be so and because the Church gave its blessing to a just war ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1955, No. 8, p. 30).

Here the Russian Communist idea of the priority of the Russian people is combined with the Church's conviction that the Russian people are God's chosen representatives.

There can be no doubt about the fact that the idea of the Third Rome displays its pathos in the vision of a universal world victory of the Russian spirit and of Russian orthodoxy.

"The desire for salvation is in our case not limited to the confines of our home, our family or our people, but it embraces all peoples—one might say—the whole world."

This is what the Patriarch Alexey affirmed on the above-mentioned occasion. Archbishop Antonius (Marchenko) assures us with

certainty in his reflections that the Russian Orthodox Church in its method of action represents a progress in history, provided that it does not confine itself to moral and educational tasks among the Russian people, but extends its mission under the national state sign of St. Cyril and St. Methodius beyond its frontiers and as far as the vast Slav world, and, in fact, launches a global spiritual attack. Archbishop Antonius concludes his reflections with a perfectly plain and emphatic, old Muscovite watchword: "Moscow is the Third Rome; there will never be a fourth" ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1946, No. 9, p. 56).

In his article entitled "The Spread of Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church", High Priest E. Kovalevsky most enthusiastically emphasizes the mission of Russian orthodoxy. In affirming that the national framework is too narrow for the scope of orthodoxy, Kovalevsky makes an exception, however, for the Russian people, that is to say for a universal people, a super nation! The main task of this fiery preacher is to prove that only a nation with global spheres of influence, in this case, of course, the Russian nation, can be a worthy representative and advocate of universal orthodoxy.

Orthodoxy in Kovalevsky's opinion is an immeasurable spiritual treasure, in so far as it is Russian, for the entire world can be encompassed by its essentially Russian quality. To quote Kovalevsky himself:

"In keeping with its character the Orthodox Church is a world Church. It cannot be classed as belonging to any one individual epoch or to any one individual nation; nor can it be limited to any one certain psychic type of consciousness. It constantly overflows beyond its borders like a cup that it too full; it extends into the distance like the spring floods in Russia.

Even the two largest empires of the world, the ancient Roman Empire, which was rightly described as an oecumenical realm, and the sixth part of the world, the Russian Imperium and its heir, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—this huge family with so many peoples, which can more aptly be designated as a world rather than as a country—are far too small for the scope of orthodoxy!... A tremendous yearning for distance, a yearning which can be compared to the rapid spread of forest fires, prompted the Russian Church from the very beginning of its existence to spread not only to the Slav peoples, but also to the many different tribes of European and Asiatic Russia, namely as far as Irkutsk and Vladivostok. Not finding repose there, however, it moved on still further. At the beginning of the 18th century it established the first Orthodox Church in China, the Church of St. Sophia, of "Divine Wisdom". Towards the end of the 19th century the Russian Church

came into contact with the Land of the Rising Sun and aspersed Japan with the holy water of orthodoxy. From here it crossed the Pacific Ocean and inspired the hearts of the inhabitants of the Aleutian Islands and of North America. But never before has the Orthodox Church, so powerfully and in the form of its Russian representatives and with a "heart overflowing", given such proof of its infinite, all-embracing oecumenical love as at the present time" ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1946, No. 10, p. 48).

These enthusiastic words do not, however, reveal the true reflection of the triumphs of Russian orthodoxy, for the latter, despite its extensive activity, has never achieved any outstanding victories; these fine phrases do, however, indicate the recent impulse of the Messianic idea in Russian orthodoxy, which, supported by the world claims of the Communist Kremlin, now more than ever sets its hope on the brilliant prospects of its attack. This desire for expansion has also seized that apostate priest of Ukrainian Catholicism, Kostelnik, who has gone over to Russian Orthodoxy and who on one occasion affirmed that the first Christian millennium was "Greek", the second "Roman", whilst the third millennium would be "Slav". The word "Slav" was no doubt used for the sake of appearances, for obviously what is meant are the "Russians", who are at present liquidating the national elements in the Orthodox Churches of the Slav peoples and, above all, of the Ukrainian people.

Strange to say, the Soviet Russian mission zeal hardly reveals any characteristic and profound idealistic and spiritual quality at all; for this reason one can hardly say that Russian orthodoxy has enriched the world with spiritual values. What does, however, surprise one is the servile repetition of the Russian Slavophil vision, the rebirth of the Khomyakov ideas, and the put-up show of the old Christian sincerity and friendship, which is, of course, obviously connected with practical calculations as regards the political aims of the U.S.S.R. However primitive Russian Messianism may be, there is no denying the fact that its church propagandists possess a certain fine psychological intuition, a certain skill in taking into account the social psychology of various classes of the population in the countries concerned and, above all, the longing for the naive and pure simplicity of the watchwords of early Christianity. The present representatives of the Russian orthodox mission imitate early Christianity in this respect with a skill which is masterly and with a cynicism which is incomparable.

They eagerly delve in the Bible and they frequently misuse quotations from this source in order to justify the policy of the Soviet government; in fact, they turn the words of the Bible into a coat of mail to protect the biggest traducers of the Bible.

An obvious example of this is the large-scale campaign for peace which is carried on by the Russian Church in accordance with the principles of the Communist Party.

Western theologians and priests, who are captivated by the kindly smile of the Metropoiltan of Kolomna and Krutitsy, Nikolay, who is the real leader of Soviet ecclesiastical foreign policy, frequently lose all sense of reality. They refuse to realize that there is another side to Russian orthodoxy, apart from this smiling facade—the side which is sinister and hostile towards the Western world, obsessed by hate, and prepared to destroy the spiritual achievements of the West as soon as a more favourable distribution of forces affords an opportunity to do so.

In connection with this other side of Russian orthodoxy, which the representatives of the West frequently refuse to see, it seems fitting at this point to mention the reflections of Bishop Ignatius Bryanchaninov, which were written as early as 1875 and were already published in the "Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate" as a positive contribution in 1948:

"May God's Will be done to us. The European peoples have always envied Russia and have sought to inflict harm on her. It is perfectly evident that they will continue to persecute this system in the future, too. Let us pray to God Almighty to protect the spiritual and moral strength of our people, the Orthodox Faith. The Holy Elders of the Russian Church prophesy an amazing development and expansion of power for Russia" ("Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate", 1948, No. 11. p. 16).

Regarded in this light, the Western world is a constant source of evil to Russia in the past and in the future; the Russian Church on the other hand is a powerful weapon with which to overcome the West and set up a great and powerful Russian community. Russian orthodoxy is at present a grave spiritual and political danger to the West. Indeed, in certain countries of the West it already has its own ardent advocates among the West Europeans, as for instance the orthodox Abbot, Dionysius Chambot, a Frenchman by birth, who was invited to Moscow from Paris to attend the 500th anniversary celebrations of the Russian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. We quote his words on this occasion:

"I have come here today as the representative of a minority which, after having gone over to the Orthodox Faith, is now striving to revive the old tradition of worship which was done away with a thousand years ago as a result of the Western schism. Our task is a very difficult one, for we, who have professed our new faith, are obliged to live in those countries in which religion, as a result of this schism, is in a state of decay and we are obliged to carry out our task as missionaries among peoples completely impoverished as regards all spiritual values.

Despite this fact, however, we are firmly convinced that we, as members of the great Russian Orthodox Church, which alone has preserved all the values of true Christianity, shall have a chance to retrieve all we need from this treasury . . . As yet our numbers are not very large, but we firmly determined to devote our entire lives to the fulfilment of this task and to dedicate our energies and our forces to this service" (*"Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate"*, 1948, No. 10, p. 4).

It is obvious from these words that it is not orthodoxy in general, but national Russian orthodoxy, which the French accept as oecumenical, that is spreading to France. And it consolidates its position with the aid of the idea of the Third Rome, an idea which not only places Russian orthodoxy before the religious consciousness of the West, but also sets the entire Russian clergy over the European peoples.

An equally apt example of the expansion of Russian orthodoxy is the activity of an Englishman (a British subject), the priest and monk who goes by the name of Augustine. He is in charge of a parish in Switzerland which belongs to the Russian Church and consists of Swiss and Russian members. Augustine, who is an Englishman by birth, affirms that one can be a subject of a Western country and at the same time a member of the Russian Church; he also maintains that religion in the U.S.S.R. is not in a worse position than religion in the West, with the difference that Moscow looks after religious interests in a proper manner.

These individual advocates of the Russian Church in the West are, however, not as dangerous as the attack of the idea of the Third Rome, an attack which is launched by Moscow itself—for the idea of the Third Rome is readily accepted by large circles of the Western Anglican, Protestant, Old Catholic and other faiths.

More and more people in England are beginning to accept the idea that the Anglican Church can be linked up to some extent with Russian orthodoxy. The idea of a "union" between the Anglican Church and the Russian Orthodox Church is gaining more and more supporters among the priests in England. In June

1955, a delegation of Anglican priests was received in the U.S.S.R. with as much pomp as if—and that was how one of the delegates himself put it—all priests in England were equal in clerical rank to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

The promotion of relations between representatives of the Anglican Church and ecclesiastical representatives of the U.S.S.R. is already bearing fruit from the political point of view:

“Anybody who is not convinced that coexistence with the U.S.S.R. is dictated by sound common sense, should carefully examine the state of his own mental powers”,

is what Dr. Supper explicitly affirms (“Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate”, 1955, No. 2, p. 60).

During the past years, the Russian Orthodox Church has achieved a big success in the Federal Republic of Germany, where it has gained a group of supporters headed by Mrs. Hildegard Schaefer, a member of the Bureau for Foreign Affairs of the Protestant Church, and the Dean of the Theological Faculty at Bonn University, Prof. Iwand.

During March and April, 1955, the delegates of the Moscow patriarchate, headed by the Metropolitan Nikolay, visited West Germany and were welcomed with open arms. 150 clergymen from the Rhineland assembled in order to hear the Metropolitan's lectures. At the Theological Faculty of Bonn University the Metropolitan not only held a lecture, but also spent the whole day in pleasant conversation with the students and professors. The Dean of the Theological Faculty described the visit of the Russian delegation as a historical event, the results of which could not as yet be ascertained.

The visit of the delegation to the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Professor Heuss, lasted forty-five minutes. The delegation toured the entire Rhineland and visited various centres of German ecclesiastical life, and, to the satisfaction of all concerned, received a most cordial welcome everywhere.

It was stressed on both sides that the promotion of closer ecclesiastical relations between the two countries represented a promotion of closer relations between the Germans and the Russians. But all this spells imminent danger, and the entire intellectual elite of the Western world would do well to bear this fact in mind most seriously.

Prof. H. Vashchenko

SOVIET EDUCATIONAL POLICY

The problem of the present state of education in Ukraine and of the educational programme and achievements in this field is a vital one. The education of youth has always been a highly important factor in every country since it plays a decisive part in determining the political strength and ensuring the cultural development of the younger generation. Since all Bolshevist information in the press, including information on cultural matters in the U.S.S.R., is of a propagandistic nature and largely unreliable, we do not intend to quote any statistics on the number of schools and school children in the U.S.S.R. We should like to confine ourselves only to the remark that the number of those who can read and write is comparatively far greater now than in "pre-revolutionary" times; this number increased most after the introduction of compulsory education in the primary schools, and later on in the secondary schools.

We should like to deal in more detail with the aims which the Bolsheviks want to achieve in culture and education, with the most important changes in the "general line" of the Communist Party in this field, and with the influence which these changes have had on the school system in Ukraine. Before dealing with these questions, however, we should like to mention the fact that up to 1930 there was a certain difference between the educational system in Soviet Ukraine and that of the U.S.S.R., although the basic principles were common to all the republics of the Soviet Union. After 1930 this difference ceased to exist. The main aim of the Bolsheviks in the field of education is clearly formulated in Paragraph 12 of the Programme of the Communist Party which was published in 1920. It is stated in this paragraph: "In the field of education the Communist Party aims to complete the task which the October Revolution began; this is the transformation of the school from the tool of the bourgeoisie into the tool of the complete abolishment of class differentiation, into the tool of the Communist regeneration of society. During the dictatorship

of the proletariat, a period which will ensure the complete realisation of Communism, the school should not only be a guide as regards the principles of Communism in general, but should also direct the proletariat's influence on the semi-proletarian and even on the non-proletarian part of the working masses from the ideological, organisational and educational point of view and with the aim of training and preparing the generation in readiness for the task of setting up Communism for ever". ("Programme and Statute of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks", 1937, p. 18.)

The aims of the Bolsheviks in the field of education are likewise laid down in the book, "The Primary School", published in 1950. "The Soviet School trains the builders of Socialist society, devoted to Lenin's and Stalin's party which leads our people to Communism. The Soviet School, since it is guided by the policy of the Party and the Government, trains highly educated builders of Communism, equipped with the theories of Marx and Lenin, and brings up the younger generation in the spirit of Communist morale, in the spirit of creative Soviet patriotism and Soviet national pride. The Soviet School brings up the younger generation in the spirit of Stalin's friendship among the nations of the U.S.S.R., in the spirit of respect towards all nations which fight for their liberation from capitalist and colonial slavery". ("The Primary School, a Teacher's Handbook", 1950, p. 17.)

The aims of education have thus remained the same throughout the entire period of the U.S.S.R.'s existence. Its primary aim is to train people to be humble tools in the hands of the Communist Party in its fight for world domination.

It is only the means of achieving this aim which have changed during the forty years in which Communist rule has prevailed. The system and organisation of education and also educational plans and programmes have from time to time been changed. In addition, the Central Committee of the Communist Party in July, 1936, passed a resolution on the "Pedologicheskie izvrashchenia v sisteme Narkoproza" ("Pedological Distortions in the System of the People's Commissariat of Education"). As a result of this resolution, the science of pedagogy as applied to the physical and psychological development of children was now omitted from the educational programme. Tests to determine children's ability and intelligence were likewise dropped from the educational programme, as the Communist Party regarded such tests as an indication of the

bourgeois tendency to discriminate against the children of the workers. Such famous scientists as Blonsky who, at the beginning of the October Revolution, were highly respected by the Bolshevik authorities, were accused and put on the retired list, whilst many pedagogues were arrested and deported to concentration camps.

Important changes in the field of education in the U.S.S.R. and in Soviet Ukraine were introduced during World War II and in the postwar years.

Latin was introduced in the secondary schools, the final school-leaving examination was re-introduced, and, as had been the custom in tsarist times, the best pupils were awarded premiums in the form of gold and silver medals. In addition, a resolution providing for the separate education of boys and girls in the secondary schools was passed. This resolution has only partly been carried into effect owing to a shortage of school buildings. The main efforts of the Bolsheviks, especially in Ukraine, were however directed towards emphasis on the technical science. The idea of stressing the technical aspect, namely the linking up of theoretical education with practice, was introduced by Marx, who based his theory on the ideas advocated by the English socialist, Robert Owen. In his "Zametki na Tezisy Krupskoy" ("Remarks on Krupskaya's Theses"), Lenin also dealt with the realisation of this theory in the Soviet schools.

Practical measures to achieve the realisation of this idea were introduced by the Bolsheviks continuously up to 1937. The main emphasis in the educational process lay on the practical task which had to be coordinated with theoretical knowledge. But this experiment led to negative results. The educational standard in the schools dropped considerably when theoretical education was only considered to be of secondary importance. The Central Committee therefore decreed on October 5, 1931, that this type of school system should be abolished and the system of theoretical learning was again introduced. From then onwards, the main factor in the Soviet school system was theoretical education and, accordingly, in 1937 the People's Commissariat of Education did away with the school factories.

After World War II the idea of emphasizing the technical sciences in the Soviet school system was introduced once more and considerable efforts were made to put this idea into practice. In order to understand this change in the educational policy of the

Bolsheviks one must consider the process of discrimination between the various social classes which is going on in the U.S.S.R. This process began as early as the 1920's. The dictatorship of the proletariat, under which the revolution was carried out and the way of living in the U.S.S.R. was determined, became the dictatorship of the Communist Party, or to be more precise, the dictatorship of its dictators. Within a relatively short time the social community was divided into two unequal parts: on the one hand, the Party men who had all the power and all the privileges from the material point of view, and, on the other hand, the terrorized masses of non-Party persons who had no rights whatsoever.

As early as the 1920's, the Party men already began to adopt a disparaging attitude towards those persons who were not members of the Party and who were frequently designated as the "non-Party rabble" by the former. In the course of time this division of society in the U.S.S.R. widened still more and even the Party men among themselves began to differentiate between "higher" and "lower" persons. Moreover, the position of the workers and the peasants deteriorated still more until they finally became slaves without any rights at all. This process has become particularly noticeable since World War II. There are Party men, especially those who hold the big positions in the government, who, in addition to their privileged position as Party bosses, have at their disposal large estates, luxury villas, high salaries and so on. Well-known Soviet scientists, writers and artists who are trusted by the Party and receive considerable premium enjoy a similar position in the U.S.S.R. The ordinary Party men, as for instance the secretaries of district committees, etc., enjoy less privileges which are, nevertheless, still considerable enough. The Party men want to make these personal privileges the possession of their descendants. There is thus in the U.S.S.R. a process of social class formation in progress—the formation of a special social class of leaders. At the top of the social scale there is the Soviet aristocracy, namely prominent Party personalities, whilst at the bottom of the social scale there are the slaves without rights, the workers and the peasants. The education of youth and in particular the emphasis placed on the technical aspect of education should help to perpetuate such a situation in the U.S.S.R. This system of education is applied in the schools which are attended by the children of workers and peasants. The essence of this system lies in the fact that a major part of the educational programme is devoted to practical work

in the field of agriculture and in the factories. In the schools which are attended by the children of prominent Soviet personalities the main emphasis is on theoretical learning. The aim of this system of education is to prepare the children of Party men and of the Soviet intelligentsia for their future task later on as Party men and members of the intelligentsia, and to train the children of the workers and kolchoz peasants to be workers and kolchoz peasants, too, later on. It is true that they may rise to be chairmen of kolchozes, brigadiers or managers of tractor stations, but their activity and their social status will be limited to the kolchoz. The emphasis on the technical education of children in the rural areas is further intensified by sending them to work in the kolchozes during the summer holidays, by sending the children from secondary schools to work in the Donbas area, and by sending thousands of young persons to the "virgin land" in Asia. The youth of Ukraine in particular is the victim of this Bolshevist policy. In this respect the Bolsheviks are trying to achieve a twofold aim, namely to reduce the Ukrainian population in number in order to undermine its national strength, and, at the same time, to weaken its cultural level so as to reduce the number of highly intelligent persons who would be capable of taking charge of the political and cultural life of the nation.

These tendencies on the part of the Bolsheviks in the field of education incidentally also explain why the late pedagogue, Anton Makarenko, the author of "Pedagogichna poema", is now extolled to such an extent. In the settlements which he founded for homeless children he emphasized productive work in agriculture and in the factories as the most important factor in education, whilst theoretical learning was regarded as being only of secondary importance. Since World War II these ideas have been propagated most assiduously by the Bolsheviks, who extol Makarenko as a genius and the most famous pedagogue of the U.S.S.R. His works have been published in seven volumes (more than 4,000 pages) and are circulated among pedagogues.

As regards the education and cultural level of children of prominent Soviet personalities, the Bolsheviks aim to educate such children to be leaders of the masses, to equip them with the necessary theoretical knowledge and to train them to fight for world domination. One of the means of achieving this aim is the organisation of boarding-schools, where youth, separated from out-

side influences, is educated under the guidance and supervision of specially selected Party pedagogues. These boarding-schools to a considerable extent resemble the pre-revolutionary grammar schools, the officers' cadet schools and institutes reserved solely for the aristocracy, where the children of court dignitaries were brought up. As can be seen from comments in the Soviet press, the prominent Bolshevik personalities, including Nikita Khrushchov, are well aware of this resemblance, but it only attracts them all the more.

Thus, the Bolsheviks having destroyed Tzarist Russia are gradually reverting to it again in various spheres of social life, the only difference being that Bolshevik Russia is very much worse than Tzarist Russia.

UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC METROPOLIS IN CANADA

The Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church in Canada has recently been reorganised as a Metropolitanate by the Holy See. The New Metropolitanate, with its seat in Winnipeg, is divided into four dioceses. The youngest Bishop in Canada, Mgr. Maksym Hermaniuk, has been nominated the Metropolitan and raised to the rank of an Archbishop. The Apostolic Exarchs, Mgr. Nil Savaryn, Mgr. Izydor Boretsky and Mgr. Andriy Roboretsky, have become Bishops Ordinaries, and their exarchates permanent dioceses.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church has now two Metropolitans, Mgr. Yosyf Slipyi, imprisoned in a Soviet concentration camp and the newly nominated Mgr. Maksym Hermaniuk in Canada.

Ukraine—a Soviet Republic

A Radio Play

by LEONARD REINISCH

of the Bavarian Broadcasting Company

Molotov : "The thirtieth anniversary of Soviet rule in Ukraine is a memorable day for the Ukrainian people and for all the peoples of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian people were the first to follow the Russian people on the path to Communism. The important historical fact in this connection is that, by following this Soviet course, the Ukrainian people were able to realise the dream that they had cherished for centuries: they created their own Ukrainian national state and thus laid the foundation for a new and truly illustrious epoch in their history. Under the star of Soviet rule a genuinely socialist people's state thus came into existence—Soviet Ukraine, which joined the harmoniously united family of the Soviet peoples. The thirty-year old history of Soviet Ukraine is imbued with the determined fight of the Ukrainian people for the consolidation of Soviet power and also for an economic and cultural revival."

2nd Speaker : Molotov's words on January 26, 1948, make the recent history of the Ukrainian people sound so harmonious and so simple. This is the day on which Communism celebrates the thirtieth anniversary of a decisive victory, in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, the oldest town of the Soviet empire. January 1920 brought the beginning of the end of independent democratic Ukraine, the beginning of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

Woman-speaker : Only a few persons in the West will recall that for four years—from 1917 to 1921—the Ukrainian people fought to preserve a state of their own. Left in the lurch and forgotten by the West, the Ukrainian people, after a deadly fight for freedom, fell under the dominion of the Red Tzars and this dominion has continued for practically forty years.

Molotov : "The founding of Soviet Ukraine is also of considerable international significance."

2nd Speaker : That was how Molotov put it. And Clemenceau, the famous French statesman, writes in his memoirs :

2nd Quotation-Speaker : "Tiredness and apathy overcame Europe at a time when it should have been doing its very utmost to support Ukraine and deal Bolshevism a mortal blow."

Woman-speaker: In those days as at present, the much-quoted saying held good for the policy of the West, namely that there were no experts on Russia, but only various degrees of ignorance.

And Ukraine was regarded as an inseparable part of Russia.

Alternative Speaker: The Ukrainians were only known by the name of "Little Russians" as the southern race of the Russian peoples, and by the name of "Ruthenians" as a people in Austro-Galicia and Bucovina who were related to the Poles.

2nd Speaker: How else could one otherwise explain the assertion made by a well-known German newspaper in that fateful year of 1917:

1st Quotation-Speaker: "The Ukrainian question consists of a translation of the Bible and of the leading articles written by a certain Dr. Paul Rohrbach."

2nd Speaker: The Free Ukrainian University in Munich recently conferred the honorary title of Dr. on this same Paul Rohrbach. He was one of the few Germans who, before the first World War, already recognized the unsolved nationalities problem of the so-called Russian peoples in the tsarist empire. He supported his views by quoting examples in the history of the Lithuanians, the Poles and the Russians.

1st Quotation-Speaker: "He who possesses Ukraine is lord of the East. He who possesses Kyiv can conquer Russia."

Woman-Speaker: The country of Ukraine has been given many names; people call it the "Great Meadow" and think of the steppes in bloom in the springtime; it is also called "The Granary of Europe", a name which conjures up visions of the "Chernozem", the black earth district, and the huge grain-elevators along the coast of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov; it has been designated as the "Arsenal" of the East, a name which makes one think of the huge coal deposits of the Donets Basin, the iron-mining district of Kryvyi Rih, and the heavy industry of Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk. And it has also been called "The Italy of the East, for the sun shines as fiercely as it does on the shores of the Mediterranean, and on the Crimea cypress trees and cedars rear their tall crowns to the sky and figs and almonds ripen; and Kyiv, like Rome, reveals the thousand-year old culture of its people in its cathedrals and palaces; and the dark-haired Ukrainians are of a happier disposition than their more melancholy Russian neighbours in the north. Even the streets have a different appearance than those in the north,—broad streets, lined by low houses which are decorated with stucco-work and painted in delicate shades of yellow, pink and blue, and remind one of houses in Italy or the South of France. Ukraine is also called "The Land of Sweet Songs", for no people in the world possess as many lovely folksongs as the Ukrainians do.

BANDURA CHOIR.

Woman-speaker: And yet this nation, numbering 45 million people, whose native country, situated between the Carpathian Mountains and the glaciers of the Caucasus, is larger than France and Italy together, has been living under foreign dominion for hundreds of years. It is the largest nation of Europe that has no state of its own. In an old poem the Ukrainians are likened to a bird that has built its nest in a busy street and is thus often startled and lives in a state of constant uneasiness. The history of Ukraine provides plenty of proof of this fact.

1st Speaker: More than a thousand years ago the Ukrainians founded the first state in Eastern Europe—the Grand Duchy of Kyiv. About the year 1000, the rulers of this state adopted the Christianity of the Church of the Eastern Rite which had been created in Byzantium. Kyiv, the “Mother” of “Ruthenian cities”, vied with Byzantium and Rome in established its fame as the most beautiful city of the world. Kyiv was situated at the junction of the big trade-routes between the West and the Far East, between the Nordic countries and Asia Minor. Many Kyiv merchants had branch-establishments in Regensburg. And the Grand Duke, Yaroslav the Wise, was related to most of the ruling royal families of Europe by marriage.

Woman-speaker: The greatest epoch in the history of Ukraine ended with the invasion of the Tartars. The name “Ukraine” means “borderland”—Europe’s borderland separating it from Asia. When in 1240 Batu Khan destroyed this shield of Europe, Galicia, the Western part of Ukraine, for a time managed to preserve a state of its own. After the retreat of the Tartars in the 14th century, the Lithuanians gained control of the whole of Ukraine. They did not, however, attempt to change the old Ruthenian language or the old-established Byzantine culture. This was left to the Poles, who, after their union with Lithuania at the end of the 16th century, conceived and developed the idea of a state—a historic Greater Poland—extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, an idea which has continued up to the present time.

1st Speaker: The Lithuanians and the Poles were not in a position to protect the East Ukrainian territories against the systematic raids carried out by the Tartars. The latter from their centre on the Crimea harassed these districts to such an extent that the population was forced to organise a system of self-defence. The Kozaks now formed a kind of order of knighthood for the purpose of protecting the frontier.

2nd Speaker: A lasting monument to the memory of the Kozaks—the name simply means “free warriors”—has been set up by the Russian or rather the Ukrainian writer, Nikolay Gogol*), in his novel, “Taras Bulba”. He describes the significant part played by the Kozaks and the Kozak way of life as follows:

*) Ukr. Mykola Hohol.

Gogol: "Under the lax rule of the Poles, the Hetmans, whom the Kozaks had elected from among their own people, transformed the various individual settlements into military units and proper administrative districts. The army thus formed was not a regular standing army; such a thing was unknown in those days. But in the event of war or a general insurrection, all the soldiers could be rounded up in a week's time and could be on the spot, completely armed. The only pay they received from the King of Poland was one ducat. In a fortnight's time the army was drawn up ready for battle more efficiently than would have been possible under any recruiting system. Once the campaign was ended, the warriors returned to their fields and acres or to their settlements on the banks of the Dnieper and occupied themselves with fishing or trading, brewing beer and liquor, and leading the life of free Kozaks. Foreigners had all good reason to be amazed at the unusual ability of the Kozaks; there was not a trade that they did not understand. They distilled spirits, worked as smiths and locksmiths, and, what more, they were experts in the art of drinking and feasting."

1st Speaker: It was not long, however, before the Kozaks devoted their energies not only to warding off the raids of the Turks and the Tartars, but also to protecting the population against Polish oppression and to defending religion against the conversion efforts of the Catholic Church. This Kozak era led to a Ukrainian national revival and in the Kozak Republic the Ukrainian people once more possessed their own state, in which their individuality and love of freedom found expression. For in this republic everyone enjoyed equal political and social rights. The Hetman was the highest official, but it was only in times of war that he had dictatorial powers. There still exist today countless "dumy"—historical ballads—which tell of the heroic deeds of the Kozaks and their Hetmans.

BANDURA CHOIR.

1st Speaker: Bohdan Khmelnytsky, whom the Ukrainians called the "Saviour of the Motherland", won independence for his fellow-countrymen in the fight against Poland. He tried to protect the state by making treaties with his neighbours. In the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 he made an alliance between the Ukrainian state and the Russian state under the Tzar of Moscow. Even though this personal union was only a very loose one, it rapidly led to the end of Ukraine's state independence:

Alternative Speaker: Peter the "Great" decreed the union of the "Russian" peoples and gave the Ukrainians the name of "Little Russians"; the autonomous rights of Ukraine were restricted to an ever-increasing degree and under Catherine II were finally abolished; a Russification process now began which reached its culmination in the prohibition

of the writing and printing of works in the Ukrainian language; serfdom put an end to the old traditions of the free Ukrainian peasantry.

2nd Speaker: Whilst Catherine the "Great" was engaged in eliminating the last remnants of Ukrainian independence, Johann Gottfried Herder wrote in Weimar:

1st Quotation-Speaker: "Ukraine will become a new Greece. The beautiful sky of these people, their happy disposition, their musical nature, their fertile country will one day awaken. . . Their frontiers will extend to the Black Sea and from there throughout the world."

Woman-speaker: But at first it looked more as though the Ukrainian people were going to be absorbed by the Russian nation. And many foreign men of learning accepted the Russian theory that the Ukrainian language was merely a peasant dialect. Indeed, in this Russian propaganda the lingual frontier played the part of a Russian "River Main Line" and the South Russians might be described in this case as the Bavarians of the Tzarist empire.

1st Speaker: It was only in the Ukrainian territories which, after the partitions of Poland carried out at the end of the 18th century, had passed under the control of Austria that a Ukrainian revival movement could be formed. Lviv, (Lemberg) in fact, became the Piedmont of the Ukrainian people. Whereas in the Tzarist empire social advancement involved going over to the Russian side completely, in Austrian Galicia a Ukrainian intelligentsia was formed. Philologists proved that Ukrainian was much more closely related to the southern Slav languages than to Russian; for the first time, translations of Ukrainian works of literature—in particular, the poems of Taras Shevchenko—appeared in the German language; it was even planned to found a purely Ukrainian university in Lviv, but Russia objected:

2nd Quotation-Speaker: "The founding of such a university in Lviv is regarded by Russia as a casus belli."

Woman-speaker: According to Russia, therefore, a reason for war. But in Galicia, too, the Ukrainians had to face the opposition of the Poles to their future political plans. The Poles cherished the hope of setting up a Greater Poland, but this was unthinkable unless they gained possession of Ukraine. In addition, much of the land in Ukraine was owned by Russian and, above all, by Polish nobility, who were well aware of the fact that a future Ukrainian state would in the first place introduce a land reform.

1st Speaker: The first World War proved the turning point in the history of East Europe. When in March 1917, the Petersburg Guard Regiments, largely composed of Ukrainians, forcibly overthrew the Tzarist regime, the revolution soon spread throughout Russia. In Kyiv a

Ukrainian Central Rada took over the government of the country and proclaimed the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. More than 100,000 persons took part in a great demonstration in Kyiv's famous street, the Khreshchatyk, singing "Ukraine Still Lives!"

UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM OF 1917.

Woman-speaker: But it was too soon to rejoice!—Russia was still at war with the Central Powers. And in the interior of the country the fight for power continued unabated between the bourgeois, the Tzarist, and the revolutionary troops. But the Bolsheviks who emerged as the victors were determined to set up an "indivisible Russia". What good was it, therefore, that England and France had meanwhile recognised the government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic!

Alternative Speaker: At the end of 1917, elections were held: in Russia the Bolsheviks gained a majority, but in Ukraine they only gained 10 per cent of the total number of votes. Despite this fact, however, the Bolsheviks by an ultimatum demanded that the Communist regime should be introduced in Ukraine; they set up their own government in Kharkiv in opposition to the Ukrainian government in Kyiv, and, after the latter had rejected the ultimatum, declared war on the young Ukrainian Republic. The war with the Central Powers came to an end at the end of 1917: at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky and Lenin represented Russia whilst Ukraine was represented by a delegation of the Central Rada; in February 1918, the Central Powers signed a peace treaty with this delegation; at the same time, however, the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, was seized by the Red Army.

1st Speaker: As allies, the Ukrainian and the German troops drove Lenin's forces out of the country. But it was not long before differences arose between the Ukrainian government and the German military authorities. By abolishing the large estates the Ukrainian government had aroused the enmity of those who had been expropriated, and these persons now sought to obtain a favourable hearing from the German military leaders and, in fact, eventually succeeded in doing so. German troops forcibly dissolved the Ukrainian Rada, and, under German military protection, General Skoropadsky was installed as Hetman of Ukraine, though he was obliged to flee to Germany when the German troops withdrew from Ukraine.

2nd Speaker: In November 1918, the Ukrainian Republic was once more established, and, in fact, larger than before, for with Austria's collapse the West Ukrainian territories proclaimed themselves a part of the new Ukrainian state:

2nd Quotation-Speaker: "From today onwards Galicia, Bucovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine are united with Ukraine. The long-cherished hopes for which the best sons of Ukraine have lived and died will be realised. From this day onwards there is one indivisible and independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic."

2nd Speaker: But the country was surrounded by enemies. In the north the troops of the Red Army were advancing and Lenin had instilled into them the following motto:

3rd Quotation-Speaker: "The fate of the world revolution will be decided in Ukraine."

1st Speaker: As far as the Red Army was concerned it was both a fight for their daily bread and a fight against General Denikin's White Russian forces, which had been drawn up in the southeast part of Ukraine. Denikin, however, was also an enemy of Ukraine, for, aided by the Western Powers, he was not only fighting against the Bolsheviks, but also for the cause of an indivisible Russia.

And in the west Polish forces were advancing with the intention of seizing Galicia for their new state.

Woman-Speaker: In view of this hopeless situation, the Ukrainian government renounced some territory and made an alliance with Poland. All attempts to obtain the support of the Western Powers failed, for the latter were on the side of the White Russian troops and could not understand why the Ukrainians should be fighting for freedom against the Reds and the Whites. With the help of the Ukrainian troops Pilsudski defeated the Bolsheviks at Warsaw, but then he shared Ukraine with them and recognised the Ukrainian Soviet Government.

2nd Speaker: Lenin rightly affirmed in 1921:

3rd Quotation-Speaker: "We owe our victory to good fortune and to Europe's mistakes."

Woman-speaker: Lenin who, in the first place, wanted to dispose of all the nationalities problems by referring to them as "linguistic music", learned a lesson from the struggles concerning Ukraine, namely that he should, at least for the time being, consider the national demands of the non-Russian peoples.

Alternative Speaker: Soviet Ukraine, the second largest republic of the Union and the most important republic because of its wealth of natural resources, was even allowed to set up its own diplomatic representations.

2nd Speaker: The Communist Party was to be the only binding link between the two governments in Moscow and Kharkiv. Incidentally, Kharkiv, the Communist centre during the fight against the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, continued to remain the capital of Ukraine until 1934. The treaty of December 20, 1920, resolved that:

2nd Quotation-Speaker: "The governments of the Russian and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic have agreed to enter into a federal alliance on the basis of the right of self-determination of the peoples and on condition that the partners recognise each other's independence and sovereignty."

1st Speaker: Actually, the independence of the individual Soviet republics was already abolished in 1923 by a Union Constitution. It is true that this Constitution recognised the equality of rights of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and declared that the individual Republics had the right to sever their connection with the Soviet Union at any time, but, at the same time, it also stipulated that the laws and decrees of the Moscow Union Government were to hold good even if certain individual republics should not agree to such laws and decrees.

Woman-speaker: In that same year of 1923, however, the so-called Ukrainisation policy was introduced. Ukrainian became the official language and, as such, was also used in the army; the setting up of Ukrainian schools was encouraged, and a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was founded. Ukrainians who had emigrated abroad were invited to return and, indeed, many of them did so.

1st Speaker: It was Ukraine's happiest era since the famine of 1921, which had been the outcome of the troubled state of the country after the war. The Communist Party did not particularly assert its influence, since not even two Ukrainians in every thousand were members. On the other hand, however, the Party tried to recruit new members among the Ukrainians beyond the Roumanian and Polish frontiers by drawing attention to the peaceful conditions in Ukraine, and Ukrainian national art was exported for propaganda purposes.

1st Speaker: In our day the Ukrainian Communists have often been called the Tito-ists,—and for a good reason. With the introduction of the Ukrainisation policy in the years prior to 1930, an "Away from Moscow" movement began to spread among many of the functionaries of the country. The leaders of this movement were the Commissar for Education, Skrypnyk, and the writer, Khvylovy.

2nd Speaker: Khvylovy was very outspoken in expressing his views:

2nd Quotation-Speaker: "We all know the big ideas of the proletariat without being guided by Moscow. We must not orientate ourselves according to the centre of philistinism, namely Moscow, but according to the Europe of Goethe and Darwin, of Newton and Marx."

2nd Speaker: And he made no secret of the fact that he distrusted the Ukrainisation policy:

2nd Quotation-Speaker: "the Russian internationalists talk about the right of self-determination of the peoples. But at the same time, they are of the opinion that Ukrainian culture is nothing but an intrigue on the part of the former Austria. Their so-called cosmopolitanism is nothing but a cloak for their own zoological nationalism."

Woman-speaker: But Stalin did not overlook these remarks. With the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan in 1927, he began to deal with the stubborn people in the south. The new catchword now was: Uk-

rainisation or industrialisation, and with this catchwords the decision was already reached in favour of the expansion of the heavy industry. Stalin's big aims, however, also presupposed unlimited control over the peasantry, which meant fighting the kulaks and enforcing collectivisation.

1st Speaker: Even during the eras of the manorial system and serfdom the Ukrainians had never given up the old Kozak tradition of free peasants. The Russian "Mir", the communal property of land, was unknown to them. The setting up of the kolchoz system was thus likely to meet with far more resistance than in the north. And for this reason Stalin resorted to the method of starvation in order to break the opposition of the peasants.

Woman-speaker: Famines were nothing unusual in this land of steppes. Poor harvests in this densely populated country had frequently resulted in thousands of persons dying of starvation. But the famine of the early 1930's was a different kind of famine; it was a political famine, one that was organised and artificially created.

Alternative Speaker: In 1929 the deportation of the "kulaks" to North Russia began, and 200,000 farms were joined together and converted into kolchozes; in the late autumn of 1932 all food reserves in Ukraine were seized by the administrative authorities and exported. A forced famine was now introduced; and, at the same time, an order was issued forbidding all foreigners to enter the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

Woman-speaker: Even so, it was not possible to keep this terrible catastrophe in the history of the Ukrainian people entirely a secret. Relief measures were discussed in the League of Nations; eminent ecclesiastical dignitaries and statesmen offered to help, and the international Red Cross placed large quantities of foodstuffs at the disposal of famine-stricken Ukraine. But Stalin brusquely turned down all offers of help. And this fact caused some Communists—such as Arthur Köstler and Theodor Plivier—to lose faith in the Party.

2nd Speaker: No one will ever be able to ascertain exactly how many persons died of starvation during the famine, but the number is estimated as between 5 and 8 million. The official population statistics for Soviet Ukraine show a loss of population of 3.2 million during the years from 1926 to 1939. And Ukraine, incidentally, was the country with the highest birth-rate in the world.

Woman-speaker: It was now that Hitler for the first time became Stalin's ally, for his assumption of power diverted the attention of the West to Germany; the distress of Ukraine was forgotten—and later on, no one any longer believed that such conditions had really existed. Twelve years later, at Yalta, Stalin admitted to his allies that this fight against the peasants had been a far bigger undertaking than the fight for Stalingrad.

1st Speaker: Stalin's terrible victory over the peasants also meant the end of the Ukrainian "Tito-ists". Skrypnyk and Khvylovy committed suicide, and trials and purges followed. The Stalin Constitution of 1936 destroyed the last remnant of independence which the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had had. And, in addition, the persecution of the Church and of religion now began in all grimness. The pious population sought solace and comfort in secret in the Church which had become a "Church of the Catacombs". The old "Prayer for Ukraine"—which during the period of Ukraine's independence was the second national anthem—was the expression of the people's powerless plea: "O God, the Only Lord, the Mighty Lord, Save Our Ukraine!"

2nd Speaker: But the Ukrainians in Poland, Rumania, and Czecho-Slovakia were dissatisfied with their lot, too.

Alternative Speaker: The Ukrainians took vengeance for the chauvinism manifested by the Poles towards the 6 million Ukrainians, by attempting to assassinate two Polish Presidents.

The watchword in Rumania was that one million Ukrainians must be won over to the side of the Rumanian people within one generation.

It is true that in Czecho-Slovakia the cultural life of the 700,000 Carpatho-Ukrainians there was furthered, but, on the other hand, the political leaders of these Ukrainians could always reproach President Masaryk with the fact that he had not kept the promise of a national autonomy which he had made before the founding of the state, in Scranton.

1st Speaker: However short-sighted their policy might be, these three states in reality were also faced by the prospect of being crushed between the two millstones in the East and the West. Hitler and Stalin were both of them arming as fast as they could. Against each other? In all his speeches Hitler constantly talked about German settlement space in the East; whilst Stalin to an ever-increasing degree was trying to fuse the peoples of his realm into a single Soviet nation which would be able to resist every attack and would be the support and pillar of the world revolution.

Woman-speaker: In August 1939, the two dictators made a non-aggression pact. A month later they divided Poland between themselves. The Red Army entered Lviv, the Ukrainian town which for practically 20 years had been Polish. The subsequent elections brought the desired overwhelming majority for the one party listed. The new National Assembly assumed office by "requesting" to be admitted to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, a request which was granted.

1st Speaker: Whilst Hitler was waging his wars in the West, the North and South, Stalin, too, was trying to make the most of every opportunity which presented itself. In an ultimatum to Rumania in the summer of

1940 he demanded the cession of Bucovina and a large part of Bessarabia. In view of the fate which had befallen Finland, the Rumanians realised that it would be wisest not to offer any resistance. The plebiscite and the subsequent union were again effected according to the "Polish example".

2nd Speaker: On June 22, 1941, Hitler began his campaign against Stalin, his ally for the past two years. Three months later he captured Kyiv, and after a further two months German troops occupied the entire territory of Ukraine.

Woman-speaker: In many towns and villages the Ukrainians welcomed the German soldiers with flowers as they passed through, and offered them bread and salt, the ancient symbol of hospitality. A week after the campaign began, namely on June 30th, the independence of Ukraine was proclaimed in Lviv. Once again the Ukrainians believed that they had achieved the aim of their national desire and longing—an independent state of their own. But Hitler had other plans.

Alternative Speaker: The government and the leaders of the Ukrainian independence movement were removed; the "Reichskommissariat Ukraine" under the notorious Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, was formed; 800,000 Ukrainians were deported for work in Germany; state property and practically the entire industry and agriculture was confiscated by the Reich as "enemy property"; high schools and universities were closed.

1st Speaker: The question was at that time raised in the West as to whether a skilful policy on the part of Hitler in Ukraine would not have led to the war in the East being decided in his favour. But, of course, this question was superfluous from the very start. The doctrine of the Slav underdog did not want allies but slaves. Erich Koch, who was soon known as the hangman of Ukraine instructed his staff as follows:

1st Quotation-Speaker: "If I should come across a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting down at the same table with me, I must have him shot."

2nd Speaker: This was reported by the Commissary-General of the Crimea, Frauenfeld, in a letter to Hitler's headquarters. He himself objected emphatically to Koch's policy, but it was too late to remedy matters:

Frauenfeld: "The treatment inflicted on the Ukrainians, in view of its consequences, can only be described as dreadful and catastrophic.

For instance, the recruiting of Ukrainians for the purpose of working in Germany. These measures have been carried out in such a manner that the population cannot help but compare them to the Bolshevik deportations to Siberia. The whole gamut of Arab slave-trade methods used in past centuries in dealing with the African negroes was applied—from internment in camps surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements, and barred transport-trucks to surround-

ing and raiding villages and recruiting persons in the middle of the night. And then, in addition, there are the humiliations suffered by these persons in Germany at their place of work and the degrading obligation of having to wear the word "East" stitched or painted on their clothes, etc. . ."

2nd Speaker: In the same letter he also objected to the closing down of the schools in Ukraine:

Frauenfeld: "The Ukrainian and in particular the woman are extremely eager to increase their knowledge and one frequently heard them remark: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were obliged to starve, but at least we could learn something. But under you Germans we are not even given a chance to learn anything. Which proves that you are our enemies even though we welcomed you as friends and liberators.'"

1st Speaker: The reaction of the Ukrainians to this inhuman treatment soon made itself felt. A partisan army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which consisted of more than 200,000 armed soldiers took up the fight against the brown commissars.

Alternative Speaker: In May 1943, SA Chief Victor Lutze was seriously wounded by men of the armed resistance whilst travelling through Ukraine. A short time afterwards he died of his injuries in Potsdam. By the summer of 1943 the German administrative authorities were forced to limit their activity to the towns; the rural areas were already in the hands of the insurgents; three German offensives against the Ukrainian liberation army proved futile; the partisans had their own postal, broadcasting and press service; they even convoked a National Assembly which drew up a constitution of Free Ukraine.

Woman-speaker: Stalingrad proved the turning-point in Hitler's Eastern campaign, and for more than two years Ukraine was the grimdest battle-field of World War II. Towns and industries were destroyed and the country was devastated. But wherever the Red Army advanced as the conqueror it was faced by the same enemy that had confronted Hitler: the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Despite all threats and promises this army continued its fight above all in Western Ukraine. But it was a hopeless fight, for in Yalta Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill reached an agreement regarding the policy to be adopted after the war and also concerning the fate of Ukraine.

1st Speaker: Stalin informed Roosevelt and Churchill that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was an independent state just like the U.S.A. or Great Britain, and that for this reason it must have a vote of its own in the "United Nations", and so too must White Russia and the Russian Soviet Republic. He drew their attention to a constitutional amendment of the year 1944, according to which these three Soviet Republics were allowed to have military forces, foreign ministries, and diplomatic representations of their own.

2nd Speaker: Thus, the Soviet Union had three votes instead of one in the United Nations, and Stalin did not hesitate to allow Soviet Ukraine to have its own coat-of-arms and its own national anthem.

THE SOVIET UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM.

Woman-speaker: In 1945 the Ukrainian Soviet Republic received the territories which until 1939 had belonged to Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, but were inhabited by Ukrainians. It was taken for granted that the population there approved of this measure; Poland was compensated for her loss of territory at the expense of the territories of East Germany. Only those persons who were deported to Germany were allowed to decide themselves as to their future fate. Large numbers of them did not return, but tried to start a new life in the West and, above all, in America.

1st Speaker: Stalin entrusted Nikita Khrushchov with the task of governing Ukraine. The latter had already proved his worth in the fight against the nationalist deviationists before the war, and in his new post he was now confronted by a number of extremely difficult tasks: the fight against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; the collectivisation of Western Ukraine; the purging of the Party and the administrative authorities of all nationalists; economic reconstruction; measures to counteract the famine of 1946.

Woman-speaker: The famine, which was the result of the war and poor harvests, was checked, above all, by the aid given by the U.N.R.R.A. As regards economic reconstruction a new policy was now adopted: the Republic of wheat and coal, ores and electricity, was now placed at a disadvantage and neglected in favour of the districts beyond the Ural; the strategic lesson which the war had taught the Russians and their distrust of the Communist trustworthiness of the Ukrainians found expression in this manner, and even more plainly in the purges which were carried out:

3rd Quotation-Speaker: "We must adopt drastic measures against all those persons who are suspected of idealising the past and of stirring up bourgeois nationalist ideas anew."

2nd Speaker: According to Khrushchov's own statements, in the summer of 1946 two-thirds of all the leading local Party functionaries were removed from office and only one in three of all the supervisors of the machine tractor stations was allowed to remain in his post. More than one-third of the local Party secretaries was forced to resign from this office.

1st Speaker: But the most serious problem was the incorporation of the Western territories. For it was here that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army continued its fight and met with the support of the population. Its fighting base was the Carpathians and from here units of the army undertook raids into Slovakia and East Poland. When in 1947 the Polish Vice-Minister of National Defence, Swierczewski, was killed

by members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union made a tripartite agreement to suppress the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. But not even this measure could put an end to the fight of these Kozaks of the 20th century.

2nd Speaker: In 1950 Stalin instituted an order for the fight against the partisans, and in the same year the Soviet news agency TASS reported:

3rd Quotation-Speaker: "The armed opposition in Western Ukraine has been eliminated."

Woman-speaker: But this news was solely a confirmation of the death of General Chuprynka, the leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, who had become almost a legendary figure. And trials and press reports later on continued to corroborate the fact that there was still armed resistance on the part of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) against collectivisation.

3rd Quotation-Speaker: "National in form, Communist in content!"

1st Speaker: This general rule of Stalin's for the Soviet nationalities policy was intended to lull the national trends which had been aroused anew by the war. Western visitors reported that in the large towns—in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa for instance—all of them towns with almost a million inhabitants—the only language one heard was Russian and one had the impression that the younger generation regarded the Ukrainian language as a thing of the past, as a backwoods language only fit for peasants. As was the case after the big purges of the thirties, now, too, practically all the leading positions in Soviet Ukraine were held by Russians.

2nd Speaker: The year 1954 was declared a commemoration year for the entire Union to mark the three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav. And to mark this occasion the Russian Soviet Republic had a big present in readiness: the Crimea was incorporated in Ukraine:

3rd Quotation-Speaker: "The handing over of the Crimea to Ukraine is an act of friendship, proof of the unlimited confidence and love of the Russian nation to Ukraine."

Woman-speaker: At Pereyaslav in 1654 the Kozak republic—this republic of free peasant warriors, who recognised no master other than themselves save God—made a personal union with Russia. Is it likely that such a valuable "present" as the Crimea will help the Ukrainians to forget how much they have lost as a result of this former personal union with Moscow and as a result of being degraded to one and the same level as the Russian after the Russian revolution?

We can rest assured that in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, too, the desire for a free and independent Ukraine still continues to be an idea which will bear fruit in the future.

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM OF 1917.

BOOK REVIEWS

Voline: *THE UNKNOWN REVOLUTION*. (Kronstadt 1921—Ukraine 1918-1921.) Translated by Holley Cantine. Freedom Press, London, 1955, VIII, pp. 270.

This book is a translation of a part of the comprehensive work in French, "La Revolution Inconnue", by the famous anarchist, Voline (his real name was Vsevolod Eichenbaum and he died in Paris in 1945), who played a considerable part in the civil war in Ukraine during the years 1917-1921 and acted as "ideological adviser" on the staff of the Ukrainian anarchist and partisan leader, Nestor Makhno (died in exile in Paris 1935). Since the book deals in particular with those revolts in which Russian or Ukrainian anarchists played either an active or a decisive part, it more or less resembles an apologia of the anarchist movement during the early years of Soviet rule and a general settling up of accounts with Bolshevism as a whole from the ideological point of view, and it is precisely in this latter respect that the book is of permanent value, especially as it contains a wealth of interesting documentary matter. On the other hand, however, the political and social attitude of the author is hardly worth discussing in detail; it is as utopian and naive as if Voline had never spent a number of years amidst the turmoil of a civil and national war; and he does not appear to have learnt any lesson at all from his experiences in this respect. It is not so much that he is lacking in a thorough knowledge of his subject; on the contrary, once he casts aside his anarchist doctrine he frequently reveals an excellent objective, social perceptiveness. For instance, he sums up the national situation in Ukraine prior to the Revolution as follows:

"By reason of its exceptional richness, and also because of its geographical location, Ukraine has at all times been a particularly tempting prize for neighbouring and even distant countries. For centuries the Ukrainian population, ethnographically mixed but very much united in its firm desire to safeguard its liberty and independence, experienced wars and struggles against the Turks, the Poles and the Germans, and particularly against its powerful immediate neighbour, the Great Russia of the Tsars... Certain parts of Ukraine never allowed themselves to be wholly subjugated, as has happened in Great Russia. Their population always preserved a spirit of independence, of resistance, of popular rebellion. Relatively cultivated and refined, individualistic and capable of taking the initiative without flinching, jealous of his independence, warlike by tradition, ready to defend himself and accustomed, for centuries, to feel free and his own master, the Ukrainian was in general never subjugated to that total slavery—not only of the body but also of the spirit—which characterised the population of the rest of Russia" (p. 75-76).

Voline also admits quite frankly that there was never really any native Bolshevik "Revolution" in Ukraine, but only a forcible military Soviet Russian—that is to say a nationally alien—occupation.

"While in Great Russia the revolution was brought into the orbit of the Communist state quickly and without difficulty, the process of statification and dictatorship met with considerable obstacles in Ukraine. The Bolshevik "Soviet

apparatus" was installed primarily by military force" (p. 79). — "... the whole activity of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine was a pure usurpation, imposed by force of arms, a usurpation that they did not even try to conceal" (p. 98).

But of what use are such occasionally correct statements to the author, if he is convinced that—in keeping with the internationalist doctrine of anarchism—there should not be a national fight for freedom, and that there has, therefore, never been such a thing! The "international" attitude actually only serves to camouflage Russian imperialism and its desire for conquests and is, thus, in the end of advantage to the latter—and Voline's book is a striking example of this fact, since it completely ignores all national problems and differences within the Makhno movement and finally professes adherence to a "Russian Makhnovism" quite openly, even though it is perfectly obvious from Voline's own sources and material that the national factor in Nestor Makhno's partisan army was not only predominant, but as a rule was almost exclusively Ukrainian. But the author regards every national factor as something "radically evil" which should not exist at all in an orthodox anarchist movement.

The "Makhnovism" he talks about was, however, by no means "orthodox", neither in the anarchist nor in any other social sense. It consisted of fairly varied and heterogeneous social elements, and even though the Ukrainian peasantry—in its fight both against the reactionary imperialism of the White Russians and the red Soviet Russian imperialism of the Bolsheviks—constituted the main body of the said partisan army, it was precisely this bulk of the Makhno movement which remained fairly indifferent to all "ideological" principles. It is true that Makhno's "ideological staff" was very active in disseminating anarchist propaganda, but this propaganda was merely tolerated by the partisans, and there is little evidence to show that it really proved decisive at any time for the course of events. In Chapter VII ("Positive Work in Free Ukraine"), Voline does his utmost to extol the social political system of the "Free Workers' Soviets", introduced by Makhno in the Ukrainian territories which were more or less permanently occupied by him; it is supposed to have been a purely anarchist solution of the social problem, since "according to the insurgents, the Soviets should be absolutely independent of all political parties; they should be part of a general economic system based on social equality, their members should be real workers, should serve the interests of the working masses and obey only their will, and their initiators should not exercise any power".—It is perfectly obvious that an Utopia of this kind could never even have existed in name only, if it had not actually been based on the purely military and personal power of Makhno himself, as the dictatorial commander of his partisan troops who was not answerable to anyone.

The actual situation as regards the so-called "social equality" in the territories occupied by Makhno is perfectly obvious from Voline's own statements. On p. 160 he quotes the "Declaration" signed by the "Revolutionary Military Council of the Makhnovist Insurgent Army" on November 5, 1919, in Katerynoslav (nowadays called Dnipropetrovsk), which states:

"All Socialist political parties, organisations and tendencies have the right to propagate their ideas, theories, views and opinions freely, both orally and in writing. No restriction of the Socialist freedom of speech and press will be allowed, and no persecution may take place in this domain."

To which Voline adds his spectacular commentary :

"They spoke here of Socialist parties and other organisations not because they wanted to keep these rights from the non-Socialists, but only because in the midst of a popular revolution the rightist elements were not active. There was not even any question of them. It was natural that the bourgeoisie would not dare, in the circumstances, to publish its press, and that the printing workers, masters of the printing houses, would flatly refuse to print it. It was therefore not worth speaking of it(!). The logical accent(!) fell on "all" and not on "Socialist". If, nevertheless, the reactionaries succeeded in printing and publishing their works, no one was disturbed by it. For, in the new situation, this did not represent any danger" (p. 160).

Surely this is a strange logic; the "non-Socialists" were denied freedom of speech and press on the pretext that they were not active, and at the same time it was stated that any possible violations of this prohibition would only be tolerated as long as they "did not represent any danger". Which all amounts to the fact that, whether they are harmless or not, the "rightist elements" are not to be allowed any freedom of speech or press for the simple reason that "all Socialist parties" are nothing but—or are to be nothing but—all parties in any case.

Equally cynical—according to Voline's opinion—is the attitude of the Makhnovists towards Symon Petliura's Ukrainian National Army; the "Petliurist authorities" are reproached with having allowed the Makhnovists, despite the fact that they had made a "neutrality pact" with the latter in September, 1919, to be encircled by Denikin's White Russian troops*)—but at the same time the author openly admits that it was precisely at this time that the Makhnovists had just started a large-scale propaganda campaign among the Petliurists and had "published a pamphlet entitled "Who Is Petliura?", in which the latter was unmasked as a defender of the privileged classes and an enemy of the workers" (p. 146). A fine "neutrality", one cannot but remark!

What are the political conclusions to be drawn from Voline's book? The author himself has formulated them drastically enough. After the final proscription of the Makhno movement by the Bolsheviks in November, 1920, the author, who had meanwhile been arrested, had a political talk with Samsonov, the chief of the Secret Operations Section of the Cheka at Kharkiv, at that time :

"I told him straight forwardly I thought the behaviour of the Bolsheviks towards the Makhnovist movement was treacherous.—"Ah," he replied with animation, "you call it treacherous? That only demonstrates your ineradicable naiveté. As for us, Bolsheviks, we see it as proof that we have learned much since the beginning of the Revolution and have now become really skilful statesmen. This time we did not let ourselves be victimized. When we needed Makhno, we took advantage of him, and when we had no further need of his services, and he began to be something of a nuisance, we got rid of him completely" (p. 204-5). To which there is surely nothing to add! V. D.

*) Other sources of military content do not corroborate this accusation. Incidentally, the fact should be stressed that Voline, who is not particularly interested in the course of purely military events, is in this case relying mainly on the out of date book by Peter Arshinov, "The History of the Makhnovist Movement".

THE BLACK DEEDS OF THE KREMLIN—A WHITE BOOK. Vol. II *The Great Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933*. Published by DOBRUS (The Democratic Organisation of Ukrainians Formerly Persecuted by the Soviet Regime) in U.S.A., Detroit, 1955, pp. 712.

The first volume of the book was published by the Canadian branch of the Ukrainian Association of Victims of the Soviet Russian Terror known under the name SUZERO, and served as documentary evidence to the Committee on Communist Aggression that was headed by Representative Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin U.S.A. The second volume of the Black Deeds of the Kremlin was edited in the form of a white book by the Democratic Organisation of Ukrainians Formerly Persecuted by the Soviet Regime—DOBRUS—and is devoted entirely to the subject of the well-known famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933. The American journalist W. H. Chamberlain, who witnessed the terrible Red-Russian terror in Ukraine, describes this tragedy of Ukraine as "organised famine".

We should like to explain here that the organisations DOBRUS and SUZERO pursue the same aims and are part of the World Federation of Ukrainian Former Political Prisoners and Victims of the Soviet Regime; they are eager to furnish first-hand information on the theory and practice of Russian Communism with regard to the enslaved peoples in the Soviet Union, above all in Soviet Ukraine.

The second volume of the above great work presents a mass of documents that are unknown in the Western world and deals with innumerable crimes committed intentionally by the Communist Russian rulers in Moscow.

The illustrative material came from the archives of the above-mentioned Ukrainian organisation and from Ukrainian patriots living in U.S.A. and Europe.

The casualties of the man-made famine in Ukraine stress the deadly struggle between the Communist Russians and the Ukrainian peasants, practically the entire Ukrainian people, striving for liberty and national independence.

It is quite impossible to quote here all the grim facts we find in the White Book and that have been presented by many eyewitnesses. That is why we are compelled to quote at least a few most important examples connected with the great famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933.

Mr. Petro Dolyna who himself witnessed the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine collected some material among the Ukrainian Displaced Persons living in the UNRRA and IRO camps throughout Western Germany and who saw the atrocities of the Russian terror in Ukraine at the above-mentioned time.

Illustrating the organised famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933 as a political weapon of Moscow against the independent Ukrainian farmers, the author cites an eyewitness as follows:

"In the centre of the village, close by the ruins of the church, which had been dynamited, was the village bazaar. All the people one saw had swollen faces. They were silent, and when they talked, they could hardly whisper. Their movements were slow and weak because of swollen arms and legs. They traded in cornstalks, bare cobs, dried roots, bark of trees and roots of water plants. This assortment of trade provided these people with a diet, a diet that was incapable of saving them from death, but merely prolonged their suffering a little longer" (p. 69).

Mr. Dolyna states that the Soviet-Russian government did nothing in the face of the catastrophe. It simply denied any existence of the famine.

While the Soviet Russian press did not mention the existence of the famine in Ukraine, the Western press commented on it in almost all countries, including U.S.A. The Kremlin cynicism may be seen, for instance, from the statement of the Russian Communist Party paper *Pravda* of July 20, 1933. We find there the following statement:

"The official Austrian newspaper, "Reichspost", has printed on its first page an article entitled "Mass Death Stalks Russia" in which it is stated that millions of Soviet citizens in the Volga regions, Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus have died of starvation. This vulgar slander, this dirty invention about famine in the U.S.S.R. has been cooked up by the editors of "Reichspost" in order to divert the attention of their own workers from their hard and hopeless situation."

The tragedy of famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933 filled the press of the world with reports. The Paris daily *Le Matin* (December 31, 1933) wrote:

"The systematically organised famine has as its objective the destruction of a nation whose only crime is that it is striving for freedom"...

The *Daily Telegraph* of September 9, 1933, commented on the famine in Ukraine as follows:

"Pilate took water and washed his hands. Is this the attitude the British people are to take, when they are told about things they find hard to believe in the year 1933. The famine started when the authorities took all the grain away from the people. Children under 14 were the first to feel the pangs of hunger. Only the strongest are managing to resist, the majority are dying. It is a long time since there have been dogs, cats, not to mention poultry in the villages..."

We wish to quote finally the well-known American daily the *New York Herald Tribune* of August 21, 1933; its Moscow correspondent, P. B. Barnes, described the terrible situation in Ukraine in the following terms:

"New censorship measures exclude accredited foreign correspondents from those regions of the U.S.S.R. where conditions are unfavorable."

The author of the above chapter is quite right when he states that the famine as a means of fighting the so-called class enemy is the most outstanding characteristic of the famine in Ukraine in 1932 and 1933. It must be stressed at the same time that the famine was not accidental, unforeseen or caused by circumstances beyond human control. It bears all signs of a planned measure to break the resistance of the peasants.

Mr. Dubynets Ivan is the author of the further chapter entitled "The Great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933". He describes the crimes of Moscow on the basis of the testimony of numerous eye-witnesses in various regions and villages of Ukraine. He states that there was no famine in Russia because there was an abundance of Ukrainian grain there. In many places the Russians had replaced the Ukrainian hunger victims. The deserted farmsteads were resettled by Russian peasants specially sent there from the Bryansk region. Thus Ukraine was reoccupied and the collective farm system could be consolidated. After the devastation of Ukraine by means of a man-made famine, swarms of experienced Communists were sent out to the villages for the purpose of organising the collective farms.

Stalin confessed himself that he had far more trouble with the stubborn resistance of the Ukrainian farmers than with Hitler and his mighty war machinery.

The work *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin* is very valuable; it shows the pattern of the enslavement and extermination of non-Russian peoples within the boundaries of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states. The Western world knows almost nothing of the struggle which is being carried on behind the Iron Curtain, especially in Ukraine. Recent events in Poland and in Hungary prove that peoples enslaved by the Russian imperialists will rise one day. And in order to understand the movements of the broad masses under the Soviet rule better it would be advisable to study *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin*.

V. O.

THE KEY TO THE RIDDLE

George Kennan: *RUSSIA LEAVES THE WAR*. Princeton, 1956.

It is now almost forty years since the Russian Revolution and the entrance of America into World War I. During all these years the United States government despite its ardent espousal of the cause of self-determination and its willingness to support the efforts of many different peoples to secure independence has never taken any definite action on behalf of the Ukrainians or the other non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire or the U.S.S.R. This contradiction has aroused a great deal of criticism and amazement and there have been many and varied efforts to explain it.

In large part the answer has been given by George Kennan, the leading American exponent of containment and a foremost supporter of the unity of Russia, in his most recent book, *Russia Leaves the War*, the first of a series of three volumes on Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920. His answer is one of the first clear studies of American foreign policy toward Russia-U.S.S.R. and it revives those stories which were current at the time of the events in question. It reopens the old domestic controversies as to the real policy of President Wilson and the underlying reasons why American popular sentiment turned against the League of Nations which Wilson had sponsored.

To appreciate the situation at the time, it is necessary to remember that for decades the United States with its support for the "open door" in China had opposed the attempted dismemberment of China in every way. It recognised the unity of that country and was against the system of treaty ports and the establishment of spheres of influence;

On the other hand American interest in World War I was concentrated almost entirely in Western Europe. The government and the people followed with keen interest the changing fortunes on the Western front and the development of the German submarine campaign. They paid relatively little attention to the Eastern Front and took an interest in the affairs of Austro-Hungary only as an afterthought and under the pressure of such men as Thomas G. Masaryk, Ignace Padarewski and the colonies of Czechs and Poles in the United States. Then as the time came for American entrance into the war, there came the Russian Revolution. What was to happen next?

Mr. Kennan says very frankly: (p. 28) "Wilson was a man who had never had any particular interest in, or knowledge of, Russian affairs. He had never been in Russia. There is no indication that the dark and violent history of that country had ever occupied his attention. Like many other Americans, he felt a distaste and antipathy for Tzarist autocracy as he knew it, and a sympathy for the revolutionary movement in Russia. Precisely for this reason, the rapid degeneration of the Russian Revolution into a new form of authoritarianism, animated by a preconceived hostility toward western liberalism, was a phenomenon for which he was as little prepared, intellectually, as a great many of his contemporaries."

"While Wilson was largely his own Secretary of State insofar as the formulation of policy in major questions was concerned, he shared with many other American statesmen a disinclination to use the network of America's foreign diplomatic missions as a vital and intimate agency of policy".

Also "The period of time to which this volume is addressed was one in which Wilson was showing the first signs of that fatigue and strain that were to affect him increasingly in the remaining years of his presidency." (p. 29).

The result of this attitude of the President is reflected in a series of commissions and constantly quarreling and trying to thwart one another. This would have been comic, had it not been so thoroughly tragic. The American Ambassador in Petrograd, David R. Francis, had less influence with the American government than the American Red Cross Mission under William Boyce Thompson and later Colonel Raymond Robin who was strongly for the aiding of the Bolsheviks, the members of the Creel organisation, the Office of War Information, etc.

There is no evidence that there was ever any attempt to assess the meaning of the attempts of the Ukrainians and other peoples to leave the Russian Empire. The government listened only to the Russian Ambassador, Boris Bakhmeteff and such sources as it wished to hear of which happened at the moment to catch the ear of President Wilson or Colonel House, his unofficial representative. At this point Mr. Kennan ignores completely the hidden influences that were exerted through social channels by the representatives of the old regime either on the administration or on Congress.

Wilson was interested only in the formation of a League of Nations and the introduction of a new order. He gave no attention to the application of his principles of self-determination to Eastern Europe and in fact at the time of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (with which the volume ends). He even "voiced discontent with the Brest talks only because of their bilateral nature, which ill fitted his own dream of a general peace settlement" (p. 372).

When Francis with a shrewd exhibition of common sense suggested on January 9, 1918 that the United States should extend "simultaneous recognition of Finland, Ukraine, Siberia, perhaps Don Cossacks Province and Soviet as de facto government of Petrograd, Moscow and vicinity" (p. 397), his attitude was treated with more or less scorn in Washington, since it cut directly across that noble and theoretical conception that the President held as to how he was to assist the Russian people to secure their democratic liberties.

Thus throughout the entire period, President Wilson remained without any tangible guide for the actual treatment of Russian conditions. He never attempted to equate facts and theories and the mistakes which he made in the very beginning were repeated again and again and served only to nullify the wiser efforts of the more intelligent men in the field and the aspirations of the peoples involved.

The volume reveals the complete separation in Wilson's mind of the virtue of self-determination, a necessary part of the new order which he wished to introduce into human affairs and the struggles of the various non-Russian peoples to secure that same self-determination. Wilson was never conscious of this contradiction which played into the hands of both the Russian imperialists and the Communists. Then when the Communist government was in the saddle, the old tradition of Russian unity was revived and it has played its part in preventing any realisation of the truth. Wilson's Point Six which spoke only of the Russian people has maintained itself to the present time with disastrous results not only to the oppressed peoples of Russia but to all of Eastern Europe and a large part of Asia.

This book is a startling indictment, well documented, of American policy and it is the more emphatic, because its author still maintains the same position as President Wilson and under the guise of realism, is preaching the same destructive policy as that indicated by the idealism of President Wilson. It is a warning that both roads are equally capable of serving the ends of injustice and tyranny. It stresses the need for a new reassessment of the conditions in the U.S.S.R. and the attempt to form a common policy for the West based upon the true realities and not the continuation of a theoretical policy which ignores at will unsatisfactory facts and declines to extend liberty to people who are fighting for it and are prepared to make the best use of it for the good of humanity.

Princeton, 1956

Clarence A. Manning

DEATH OF ARCHBISHOP BASIL LADYKA

Archbishop Basil Ladyka, Exarch-Ordinary for the Ukrainian Catholics of the Winnipeg Diocese, Canada, died Sunday, Sept. 2, 1956. He had been bed-ridden for many months prior to his death.

Born on Aug. 2, 1884, in the town of Drohobych, Ladyka was 72 years old at the hour of death. On Aug. 1, 1903 he entered the St. Basil Order and began his theological studies at the Grand Seminary, Montreal, Canada. On Aug. 4, 1912 he was ordained to the Sacred Priesthood by Bishop Soter Ortynsky. He was consecrated on July 14, 1929.

The late Archbishop was a zealous leader of the Ukrainian Canadian Catholic Church, establishing it firmly. It was he who organised the missionary work of uniting the nearly 500 Ukrainian Catholic parishes in Canada. Though known to be sickly, the late Archbishop Ladyka dedicated his life for God and country, serving his people in their spiritual needs.

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN**UKRAINIANS HELP HUNGARIAN INSURGENTS**

Moscow sent its best tank divisions into Hungary in order to suppress the Hungarian people. The soldiers of these divisions were mostly Russians and the Kremlin relied on them in trying to preserve the Soviet prison of nations. Among the soldiers of these divisions there were, however, a certain number of Ukrainians and sons of other nations subjugated by Moscow. Some of them, during the fighting in Hungary, went over to the side of the insurgents in order to fight side by side with the latter against the Muscovite occupant and oppressor.

Various Austrian newspapers have quoted instances of the Ukrainians in the Soviet Army ranks joining the fight of the Hungarian insurgents. And the German newspaper, *Münchener Merkur*, of November 2nd, in an article entitled "The Nation Lost Its Fear of Death" writes as follows:

"The Hungarian Communist political police fired at the demonstration which consisted of thousands of persons, all of them unarmed. Suddenly, one Ukrainian could endure this no longer; he was reminded of the chains, not the chains of his tank but the chains which the proletarians on whom he was to fire were trying to cast off. It must have been so! For the towers of three tanks suddenly veered from "12 to 6" as they say in tank language, that is, to the opposite side, and three commanders gave the order to fire, not at the demonstrators, but at the units of the Hungarian Communist political police. The members of these units who were killed died from the shots fired by the Red Army. It was the most heroic deed in the history of this Soviet regiment and the worst short circuit of party religion".

To these comments by the above-mentioned German and also Austrian newspapers we should like to add that this heroic deed was the expression of the national spirit and consciousness of the Ukrainians who have been forced to belong to the army of the oppressor. It is moreover obvious proof of the fact that the Ukrainians and sons of other subjugated but freedom-loving nations, who have been forced into the Soviet Army, are always prepared to turn against the Muscovite oppressors and refuse to act as the tool of the barbarous, ruthlessly cruel aggressor, Moscow.

* * *

In accordance with the resolution of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. concerning the establishment of special exclusive boarding-schools at which the children of the leading Communist ranks are to be educated, schools of this type have now been opened in all twenty-six districts of Ukraine (*Radyanska Ukraina*, Sept. 22, 1956). It is significant that children of high-ranking Communist functionaries have arrived from central districts of Russia to attend these schools in Ukraine. It is assumed that, once they have finished their education at these schools, they will remain in Ukraine for party political activity.

* * *

It was ascertained on October 1, 1956, that the Donbas area had failed to reach the monthly quota fixed for the amount of coal to be mined. It was stated at various conferences held by the mines management that fluctuation

of labour in the Donbas area amounted to 89 per cent of the total number of workers available. Young Ukrainians who have been deported to the Donbas area by order of the Party frequently quit their place of work and, without permission, return home. Many of them have been arrested by the Soviet police and brought back to Donbas (*Molod' Ukrainy*, Sept. 28, 1956).

* * *

In its edition of September 28, 1956, the *Radyanska Osvita*, the press organ of the Ministry of Education of Soviet Ukraine, affirms that there is a shortage of school-books in Ukraine this year. The publishers *Radyanska Shkola* (Soviet School) were to print 105 different kinds of school-books with a total of 29 million copies, but actually they have only printed 12.7 million copies. However, all these school-books are merely translations from the Russian language. None of them have been written by Ukrainians, since the permission of the Ministry of Education of the U.S.S.R. would be necessary in this case and it is impossible to obtain this permission as the writing of school-books is centralised in Moscow.

* * *

The *Izvestiya* (No. 202) has announced that in connection with the development of a new industrial centre in Eastern Siberia twenty thousand young persons have been transferred there from Ukraine for permanent settlement. A further thirty-two thousand are expected to be sent there in the near future.

* * *

In a recent speech Zarudny, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (Communist Youth League), stated that in the course of this year 270 thousand persons, most of them from Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic States and Caucasus region, had been resettled to the Far East and Kazakhstan in order to work on building projects for new industrial enterprises there. He pointed out that it would, however, be necessary to transfer another 500,000 young persons and added that the majority of the young persons who enlisted "voluntarily" for the "transfer" came from Ukraine and from other Soviet Republics. (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 200.)

* * *

A group of Indian engineers who completed their studies at technical schools in Moscow last year have now arrived in Zaporizhyya, where they will attend practical courses. Later on they will return to India where they will co-operate with Soviet engineers in constructing new industrial plants. (*Pravda Ukrainy*, No. 228.)

* * *

General meetings of employees and workers are at present being held regularly in all the factories, kolkhozes and industrial enterprises in Ukraine. The Party secretaries and various other Party men deliver speeches in which they stress an increased productivity of work in connection with the 39th anniversary celebrations of the "October Revolution". The Party representatives "recommend" fulfilling the 8 hour-day quota in seven hours so as to be prepared for "the change over from an 8 hour-day to a 7 hour-day" next year. (*Radyanska Ukraina*, No. 227.)

UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD

**LLANGOLLEN
1956**

As we start to go up the Valley of the River Dee by coach from Manchester, or change to the Welsh branch line at Ruabon, we leave our modern world of crowded cities for an older one, a world of easier, slower pace, of song and dance in little valleys among wooded hills and steep, rocky mountains. Here life moves more slowly, and we seem to have slipped back 100 years or more.

Where the valley opens out lies Llangollen, a busy little Welsh market town of 3,275 inhabitants, gaily beflagged under the blue sunny sky, teeming today with visitors from many Continental countries, from England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Channel Islands, from Eire and from the United States. Among them are Choirs and Folk Dancers, exiles of other nations, who have been offered a home from home in Britain and have returned British hospitality by hard work, exemplary conduct, and by their colourful Folk Arts and Crafts. Estonian and Latvian as well as our Ukrainian "Orlyk" dancers have come to compete on the Wednesday of International Music Eisteddfod Week.

Outside the station, where the little train puffs to a stop by the rushing waters of the Dee, is a very large banner, in the white and green of Wales, with "Groeso i Cymru", to welcome all Llangollen's visitors to Wales. It marks the attitude of the people of the town and valley to their visitors from many nations and from all parts of Britain. Everywhere they are met by smiles, by friendly interest, warm hospitality, and keen appreciation of the many splendid kinds of national dress, among which "Orlyk's" exquisitely embroidered Ukrainian costumes are perhaps the very finest.

This year's International Music Eisteddfod has been a special occasion, as it was its Tenth Anniversary. When the Festival Grounds was cleared late on the Wednesday afternoon 1,010 more people had paid for admission than on the same day in 1955, the record year so far, when some 56,000 visited the Eisteddfod field. Again, both for the Competitions and for the Evening Concert, every reserved seat in the great Marquee, which holds 8,000, had been sold long ago.

This has been our Ukrainian Folk Artists' sixth visit to Llangollen. In 1950 "Orlyk", the Manchester Ukrainian Folk Dance Group, which that magnificent dancer and choreographer, Petro Dnistrovyk, had formed in January 1949, competed for the first time with a team of four dancers and two musicians. They were placed sixth. In 1951, with a full team of twenty dancers and musicians, they gained fourth place. Then, in 1952, they were awarded Second Prize. Losses among members of the Group, due to re-emigration and other causes, were replaced. In 1954, "Orlyk" tied with several others for fifth place. This year, with a finer team of dancers perhaps than ever before, they were placed fourth.

Our splendid Manchester "Homin" Choir of 35 male voices, founded by that outstanding conductor and magnificent bass voice Yarema Hordiy, first went to Llangollen in July 1951 and, at their first appearance in Wales — that country famous for its Choirs and, in particular, its Male Voice Choirs—

tied for Second Prize. In the following year they were awarded Second Prize outright. They competed again in 1953 and 1955 and on the latter occasion, under Jaroslaw Babuniak, once again won Second Prize—this time among 27 competing Choirs.

Jaroslaw Babuniak himself was awarded First Prize for his exquisite play on the "bandura", the foremost national instrument of Ukraine, in 1954 and 1955 and, in the latter year, First Prize for Bass Song and Second Prize for Baritone Song as well.

We had hoped that "Orlyk", who had gone as honoured guests to take part in International Festivals in Eire in 1954 and 1956, at Nice in Fourteenth July Week 1955, and subsequently in Festivals at Leghorn, Florence and Pescara and who, as competitors, won the International Festival Challenge Cup at Edinburgh last summer and Second Prize at Agrigento in Sicily in February last, would once more gain a Prize at this year's Llangollen International Eisteddfod. To be placed fourth out of 25 competing teams, the cream of Britain's and of Continental Europe's Folk Dancers, with 93 marks out of a possible 100, is however a satisfactory result.

We cannot quarrel with the award of First Prize to the Basque dancers of St. Sebastian, with 97 marks, and of Second Prize to another Spanish Team from la Corunna. The dancing of both was inspiring and seemed to us near perfection. That the Czecho-Slovak Group were awarded 95 marks and placed third was a disappointment to many. This became evident when the results were announced, and it appears that the public had expected "Orlyk" to be placed third. If our dancers had not fully merited such applause in any case one might have thought that the quite exceptional enthusiasm that their magnificent performance met with at the Evening Concert was a spontaneous expression of public sympathy at their defeat for third place in the morning.

It seemed to the writer that the Czechs lacked finish and style, that their exuberance was uncontrolled, that the movements of their arms and some of their steps were ragged, and some features of their presentation, such as their whistles, crude. Their music however was excellent.

This may well have played its part in the award. Our music was not up to its usual level. It may have been felt that the accordion was too international an instrument to form the backbone of musical accompaniment for Ukrainian Folk Dances and, in particular, that the "garmoshka" is too much associated by men from Eastern Europe with the oppressors of Ukraine. The dulcimer (tsymbaly) of which we have an amateur artist of outstanding quality in Mychajlo Kupchak at Edinburgh, would be a magnificent alternative. But there was no dulcimer, and two violins and one drum were not enough. After the music we had heard from "Orlyk" on earlier occasions they sounded thin.

The music will have had its effect on the Jury. In her remarks before announcing the awards, Miss Karpeles, the Senior Adjudicator, particularly praised the music of the Czechs. But she also very warmly praised "the beautiful posture and bearing" of our Ukrainian Dancers. Miss Karpeles further said of "Orlyk" that "their dancing was always light, that it was thrilling, and working up to an exciting climax". She praised "the continuity" of their dances and said that they "never lost their rythmical quality, and that they always gave the impression of "dancing well within themselves".

Without wishing in the least to belittle the performance of any other Team, as that of the three splendid French Teams of l'Ecole Ventadour, of the Breton Group from Rennes and of the graceful Provençales from Marseilles, all three of whom were awarded 88 marks, of the Birmingham Morris Dancers, with 87 marks, or of "De Knupduukskes" from the Netherlands who, to us, appeared to give a perfect example of the true Folk Dancing of Dutch fishermen and their wives and sweethearts but only gained 83 marks, we would say that a proportion of "Orlyk's" competitors may have more leisure for their preparatory work and for travelling than "Orlyk". This may well apply to the Czechs, who were able to stay the entire week of the Eisteddfod and again to take part in the Saturday Night Concert.

The members of "Orlyk" might be expected to feel the strain of their great effort at Llangollen. They are working men and women who did a hard day's work on Monday. On Tuesday morning, July 10th, they travelled to Llangollen and had final rehearsals. On Wednesday morning they again rehearsed certain steps. They were to be ready for their Competition shortly after 1 p.m., but the programme had got badly out of hand, and their performance was not called until a quarter to four. Their presentation on the stage had been televised, and then there was another televuew in the open. All day everyone within reach seemed to want their autographs and to take their photo. Then about 9.30 p.m. they danced again at the Evening Concert. Next supper, and then—to keep expenses to this Association as low as possible—they boarded their coach at 11 and returned to Manchester by night, to be back at work on Thursday morning. "Orlyk" or "Homin" do this every year, and anyone who weighs the expense of sending our Folk Artists to take part in International Festivals and Competitions, where they spread knowledge of Ukraine, her traditions and achievement, should bear in mind the unselfish devotion with which our Teams, year after year, cut expenses as far as they are able.

Llangollen expresses its warm Welsh welcome in devoted service. The many workers at "Reception", the Hospitality Committee, the Secretariat, the Eisteddfod Council and Executive Committee, Finance and Grounds Committees, and the host of Stewards, Interpretors and other members on the Eisteddfod Ground all give their untiring and highly efficient services for nothing, year after year. The work is not confined to Eisteddfod Week, but involves months of careful preparation and detailed organisation.

An acknowledgement is due to Messrs. Hughes of Welshpool, the Caterers who supply very good meal and pleasant service at reasonable cost. Helpings are generous, and they are always ready to serve a meal at unforessen hours when the programme has gone agley, provided warning is given.

The International Music Eisteddfod is the result of private and communal effort. It was initiated more than ten years ago by a local schoolmaster, one of a class who have been among the guardians of Welsh culture and tradition and the leader of Welsh thought so often. He was given enthusiastic and generous support by private people and by Association of lovers of the Folk Arts. Funds were raised, and the popularity and the success of the Eisteddfod have grown year by year. The Llangollen International Music Eisteddfod is a typical example of Welsh, and of British, individual and communal effort.

It is a pity that our Ukrainian competitors have no time to get more than a glimpse of Llangollen and its lovely surroundings. East of the little town rises the hill crowned by the ruins of Castell Dinas Bran, the stronghold from which the defenders of North Wales kept watch to meet the attacks of Angles and Saxons and, later, of the Norman Marcher Barons.

The view from Dinas Bran is beautiful. Far to the West, in magnificent grandeur, rises Mt. Snowdon, the heart of the old Principality of Gwynedd—the mountain on which the last of the great champions of Wales, Owen Glyn Dwr, found an unknown grave.

C.K.O.B. Giffey

* * *

UKRAINIAN WORKERS EXPRESS THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH HUNGARIAN INSURGENTS

The Federation of Ukrainian Free Trade Unions has sent a special message to the Federation of Hungarian Christian Syndicates abroad stating that the Ukrainian workers in the free world as well as the entire Ukrainian people express their solidarity with the fight of the Hungarian workers and the whole Hungarian nation against the common enemy of all freedom-loving nations—imperialistic Moscow.

* * *

PROTEST MEETINGS

On September 19th, a protest meeting was held in Luton (Great Britain) at which Ukrainians and members of various other nations protested against the concentration camp system in the U.S.S.R. A large number of English persons were also present at this meeting, in the course of which letters written by prisoners which have been received from behind the Iron Curtain were read out and various resolutions were adopted. The newspaper, "Pictorial", published a lengthy article in this connection, in which extracts from the speeches and letters were quoted.

* * *

YOUTH CONGRESS

The 6th Congress of the S.U.M. (Spilka Ukrainskoyi Molodi—Ukrainian Youth Association) in the U.S.A. was held in New York on November 17th and 18th, 1956. Questions which were dealt with in particular at the Congress were the subject of the Educational Councils, the problem of the younger generation and the importance to be attached to the education of youth. Within the past two years the Central Committee of the S.U.M. in the U.S.A. has bought a big estate valued at 50,000 dollars, which is now being used as an educational centre. Several youth centres also possess large houses of their own. These youth centres cultivate Ukrainian art and have their own orchestras, theatres and choirs. This year a big youth rally was organised in Chicago. President Eisenhower greeted the young Ukrainians assembled on this occasion and wished them success in their work. Greetings and good wishes were also sent by Vice-President Nixon and by various governors, congressmen and senators. These messages, together with telegrams received from Formosa and articles published in the American press, show that a wide contact has been established.

* * *

On November 25th the Ukrainian Committee for the Defence of Persons Persecuted for National, Political and Religious Beliefs in the U.S.S.R. held a meeting in Munich. National representatives of all the subjugated countries were invited to take an active part in this meeting, in the course of which resolutions were passed which have in the meantime been sent to the United Nations. In these resolutions those present at the meeting requested that the demands of the prisoners in the Mordovian concentration camps, as formulated in their open letter to the United Nations, should be supported and carried into effect. In this way all the Ukrainians and members of other nations who attended the meeting expressed their solidarity with their fellow-countrymen who are forced to endure the Bolshevik yoke.

* * *

On September 21, a protest meeting was held in La Luvier-Hainault, Belgium, at which the subject under discussion was the protection of the prisoners in the Soviet concentration camps. The Belgian newspaper, *Echo de Centre*, published an article on this meeting and reprinted the entire text of letters written by prisoners and also the resolution which were sent to Belgian social and political organisations and prominent personalities.

* * *

UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE'S DELEGATION VISITS MR. DULLES

On September 19th Mr. Dulles received a delegation of the Ukrainian Congress Committee which consisted of 12 members. Mr. Dulles discussed America's foreign policy at the present time and also answered various questions raised by the members of the delegation.

* * *

THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE U.S.A.

The third Congress of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was held in Chicago from September 11 to September 14. It was attended by 86 parochial representatives, 4 bishops, 75 priests, 64 lay representatives and several representatives of organisations connected with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Johannes, who has been a bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for 35 years, presided over the Congress. It was stated in the course of the Congress that in future it would convene every five years.

* * *

The third Congress of the Bratstvo UPA (the Association of former Ukrainian Insurgents) was held in Germany on August 29th and 30th. The patron saint of this Combatants' Association is St. George the Conqueror. All the former insurgents now living in Germany were present and those who live in other countries sent their delegates to the Congress. Mykola Fryz, who lives in Paris, was elected chairman and Vasyl Zbrozhyk (Germany) secretary.

* * *

Wasyl Dziuba, a Ukrainian and a member of the House of Representatives for Manitoba, was elected mayor of Winnipeg on September 24th. He is the second Ukrainian to be elected mayor in Canada, the first being Mr. Havrylyak, the mayor of Edmonton.

The Ukrainian Students Centre in Louvain, Belgium, this year celebrates its 10th anniversary. After World War II countless Ukrainian students living abroad had no possibility whatever of studying. Archbishop Ivan Buchko, however, came to their aid and succeeded in obtaining a subsidy from the Holy See for the Ukrainian students. As early as 1946 a house was placed at the disposal of the Ukrainian students. This Ukrainian students centre met with the sympathy of the Belgian university authorities and in 1947 a "Belgian Committee of Help for Ukrainian Students" was founded. During the academic year 1955-56 the centre had 26 students, 23 of whom passed their examinations to the satisfaction of the entire Ukrainian society.

* * *

UKRAINIAN SCHOOLS IN BELGIUM

On August 30th the Ukrainian Cultural and Scientific Association held a teachers' conference. According to the reports delivered at this conference, there are 18 "Ridni Shkoly" (Ukrainian national private schools), with a total attendance of 288 children, in Belgium.

* * *

The Ukrainian Academic Society which has its headquarters in Paris has started a series of lectures. The first of these lectures was held on November 1st by Prof. M. Hlobenko and dealt with "The state of culture in Soviet Ukraine at the present time".

* * *

Taras Habora, a young Ukrainian musician living in Canada, was awarded first prize at the Vienna State Conservatory and was appointed to the position of conductor at the Vienna Academy of Music.

* * *

The Ukrainian Congress Committee has decided to coöperate in the development of the American Museum of Immigration. It has undertaken to collect exhibits which will give visitors to the museum an insight into Ukraine's contribution towards the general development of American life.

* * *

Maria Harasymovich, a student of Little Flower Girls' High School in Philadelphia has been awarded a prize for the best essay on Missionary subject. This prize, in the form of a scholarship, entitles the holder to a four years' course of study at a college.

* * *

The Ukrainian Central Representation in Argentina is at present engaged in publishing Dmytro Doroshenko's work, "Istoriya Ukrainy" ("The History of Ukraine"), in Spanish.

* * *

A Ukrainian department was opened at the Military School of Languages in Philadelphia in September 1955. This school has been in existence since 1946 and trains students to be fully qualified interpreters. Special books were printed,

in keeping with the American method of training, for the Ukrainian department. Their purpose is to acquaint the student with Ukrainian history, literature, culture and customs, etc.

* * *

On November 10th and 11th a Congress of former students of Lviv (Lemberg) University was held in New York. The main aim of this Congress was to mark the 700th anniversary of the founding of the Ukrainian town of Lviv, the capital of Western Ukraine, and at the same time to establish contact with all former students of Lviv high schools and colleges.

* * *

Prof. D. Zalozetsky, the famous authority on puppet-shows who has done much valuable work in this field and enjoys considerable esteem in German art circles, returned to Germany in September and is now engaged in making a film in Frankfurt.

* * *

500th EDITION OF "UKRAINIAN THOUGHT"

The weekly newspaper, *Ukrainska Dumka* (*Ukrainian Thought*), which is published in London and is the organ of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, on September 25th issued its 500th edition.

* * *

A new Ukrainian Catholic Bishop, Josyph Shmondiuk, was consecrated on November 6th. He will assist Archbishop Constantin in Philadelphia.

* * *

The biggest Brazilian political and economic journal, *A Vision*, recently published an article on a new type of wheat, entitled "Wheat Kamakrania". This type of wheat has been cultivated by a well-known Ukrainian scientist, Dr. Luka Zabolotny.

* * *

The Belgian authorities have begun to enter the Ukrainian nationality of the Ukrainian settlers in Belgium in the latter's identification papers.

* * *

The first Ukrainian engineers' company in Toronto was founded in August 1956. It was organised by Ukrainian engineers, new emigrants and Ukrainians born in Canada. The company's nominal capital amounts to 600,000 dollars, of which 300,000 dollars are in common shares and 300,000 dollars in preference shares. The value of each share (common and preference) is 100 dollars. Joint shares in the company may also be held by several persons, thus enabling a person to buy a share according to his means.

* * *

Dorota Kozak, a Ukrainian girl living in Canada, took part in the Olympic Games in Australia. She was a member of the Canadian sprinting team.

CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTATION

Freedom for Nations!

Freedom for Individuals!

**DECLARATION OF O.U.N. (UNITS ABROAD)
ON THE NATIONAL LIBERATION REVOLUTION
IN HUNGARY**

The heroic revolt of the Hungarian people against their subjugation by Russian imperialism, by the Communist system and by a regime which is alien to their nation has evoked admiration, respect and sincere sympathy all over the world. All peoples and nations who value freedom and the heroic endeavour to protect noble national and human ideals are wholeheartedly on the side of the Hungarian revolutionaries.

The Presidium of the Units of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad wish to express the feelings of the Ukrainian people, in particular of their national revolutionary liberation movement—the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)—and to convey to the leaders of the Hungarian national liberation revolution, to all its heroic fighters and to the entire courageous Hungarian people their sincerest greetings and brotherly wishes for Hungary's victory and complete liberation in the very near future.

Russian predatory imperialism and its tyranny in its present brutal form of Bolshevism is the greatest enemy not only of Hungary, but also of Ukraine and all freedom-loving peoples. By their national revolt the Hungarian people have shown that they definitely oppose Communism. Leninist and Stalinist Communism with its principles and still more so on the grounds of its practices and methods has revealed itself in Hungary, too, as a destructive and tyrannical system. The Communist regime and its party in Hungary as in all the other countries by Bolshevism play the part of Russian Bolshevik hirelings for the purpose of exploiting and subjugating their own fellow-countrymen. They try to destroy religion, to eliminate Christian morals and laws from the life of the peoples, to do away with the idea of the family as a unit, and by means of a complete social, economic, political and intellectual enslavement of the individual, to subjugate all peoples as the helpless slaves of Kremlin despotism and to conquer the whole world.

The fight for freedom of every nation against Russian imperialism and Communism is the common cause of all freedom-loving peoples. Every expansion and consolidation of Bolshevik dominion in any country whatsoever represents a loss for the freedom-loving world. Every victory on the part of any nation whatsoever over the enemy of mankind is a step towards the victory of freedom, truth and justice in the whole world.

Awareness of the indivisibility of the anti-Bolshevist fight for freedom and justice and brotherly feelings for the liberation movement of our neighbour, Hungary, evoke in the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation movement the ardent wish to contribute to the utmost towards the victory of the Hungarian national revolution and towards the complete liberation of Hungary.

Mutual support and assistance in the common anti-Bolshevist fight can be achieved most effectively by each nation continuing its own fight on its own front and intensifying this fight at the right time. The anti-Bolshevist fight of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Movement requires complete concentration and employment of all the forces available. The Ukrainian fight for freedom, which since World War II has been in evidence above all in the revolutionary political and military activity of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), continues in spite of the greatest sacrifices and in spite of the indifference of the Western powers. Together with the anti-Bolshevist resistance put up by other peoples, it has to a very considerable extent helped to undermine Bolshevism from within and to weaken the ruthless Stalinist course.

Hungary is not alone in her heroic fight. The further intensification of the revolutionary fight of Ukraine and the other peoples, as a response to the Hungarian national revolution, will prevent the Bolsheviks from crushing this revolution.

The Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists addresses itself with an appeal to the soldiers of the Soviet troops that have been called in to crush the Hungarian revolt not to carry out the vile orders of the Bolsheviks and not to fight against the Hungarian champions of freedom, but on the contrary to help them in every way, to go over to the side of the insurgents and to fight in their ranks against Bolshevism and for the freedom of the nations and the individual.

The Units of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad (OUN) declare that they support and are wholeheartedly on the side of all action which has as its aim moral, political, military and any other kind of help for the liberation revolution of Hungary.

The Units of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad (OUN) would welcome and support the formation of military units consisting of volunteers from various nations, who would take an active part in Hungary's fight for freedom and under its banner would fight for the freedom of the nations and the individual against Bolshevist tyranny.

Long live the victory of the Hungarian national revolution!

Long live independent Hungary, liberated from Soviet occupation and from Communist tyranny!

Long live the heroic Hungarian insurgent fighters for the liberation of the nation!

Long live the joint anti-Bolshevist liberation front of the nations!

October 27, 1956.

THE PRESIDUM OF THE UNITS
OF THE ORGANISATION
OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS ABROAD

TO THE ORGANISATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

We, the undersigned, wholly support the demands made by the prisoners of the Soviet concentration camps, which have reached us by various ways and means, as well as the demands expressed in the Open Letter of September 30, 1955, by the prisoners of the Mordovian special camps, and the testimony given by other witnesses, which refer to the entire Muscovite policy of destruction in Ukraine and the other countries subjugated by Moscow, and, in particular, the demands made in connection with the persecution of the Church.

We, the representatives of the enslaved peoples who are living in freedom, address the following appeal to the United Nations and to the entire freedom-loving world :

I) WE PROTEST

before the entire civilized world and the United Nations against the barbarity and cruelty hitherto unheard of in the history of mankind; against the extermination of peoples which Moscow has practised for centuries; against the existence of concentration camps and slave labour camps in the U.S.S.R.; against collective punishment, a method which has been traditionally applied by Moscow; against mass murder; against the enslavement of human beings by the totalitarian and despotic regime the persecution of religion and the destruction of the churches; against the destruction of culture and cultural monuments; and, above all, against the cause of all injustice—the brutal destruction of the sovereign state of Ukraine and of the states of other peoples by Muscovite Bolshevik aggression—which has made Moscow's crimes against foreign peoples possible.

II) WE ACCUSE

the government of the U.S.S.R., the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the M.V.D. and the C.G.B. (Committee for State Security) of grave crimes against mankind and against the national rights of the individual peoples, of constant violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations on Human Rights, as laid down in the Preamble: I, §1, 2, 3; II, §2, Art. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; IV, §13, Art. 16 and in the Articles of the Declaration of the United Nations on Human Rights: 3, 4, 5, 6, 15(2), 18, 19, 20(3).

III) WE THEREFORE DEMAND

1) that conditions in the concentration camps in the U.S.S.R. and in its satellite states be examined; that the persecution of the Church, the entire Muscovite anti-human and anti-national policy, and the statements made in the Open Letter of September 30, 1955, by the prisoners of the Mordovian special camps, be examined;

2) that the U.S.S.R. be censured and condemned for her Muscovite Bolshevik methods of enslaving peoples and individuals, for the violation of the right of the peoples to self-determination and their state sovereignty, for her interference in the internal affairs of other peoples and states, for the provocation of civil wars and unrest throughout the whole world, and for the persecution of the Church;

3) that the government of the U.S.S.R., the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the M.V.D. and the G.G.B. be sued before an International Tribunal and be condemned, at least from the moral point of view;

4) that all concentration camps and slave labour camps be dissolved and that all political prisoners and all innocent persons who have been sentenced in the U.S.S.R. and in the latter's satellite states be released and be allowed to return to their native countries and towns;

5) that the persecution of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, as a result of which the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, the Metropolitan Yov Boretzky, and many other high ecclesiastical dignitaries died as martyrs, be investigated;

6) that the Metropolitan Joseph Slipy and all the bishops, priests and faithful of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, who defended the Christian faith and the rights of their Church, be released and allowed to return from exile;

7) that a special commission of the United Nations be set up for the purpose of inspecting concentration camps and slave labour camps in the U.S.S.R. and the satellite states; likewise for the purpose of investigating the persecution of the Christian, Mohammedan and other religions and their faithful in the Communist sphere of influence, and for the purpose of introducing freedom of religion and conscience.

8) We demand that Ukraine and other countries subjugated by Moscow be represented in the United Nations Organisation by national representatives and not by Muscovite agents.

9) We demand that the United Nations proclaim a Great Charter of the Sovereignty of all Nations of the World and, in particular, that this organisation restore national state sovereignty in Ukraine and in the other countries in which it was destroyed by Moscow in spite of the Charter of the United Nations. Only such a measure could guarantee the realisation of a democratic state order in our countries and peace and security in the whole world.

Ukrainian Committee for the Defence
of Persons Persecuted for National,
Political and Religious Reliefs in the
U.S.S.R.*)

*) The Members of this Committee are the representatives of 37 Ukrainian political, scientific, cultural, social women and youth organisations in Germany.

In the Olympic Games which have recently taken place in Melbourne Ukraine was not represented, although a number of sportsmen of Ukrainian nationality were among the Soviet contingent. The following memorandum has been sent by Ukrainian organisations in Australia to the Olympic Games Committee protesting against Russian policy of preventing Ukraine from being represented at that great international sporting event.

MEMORANDUM

Between 22nd November and 8th December, this year, the XVIth Olympiad will take place. As you know, the so-called Soviet Union has announced her participation in the Games. However, few know the truth about the Soviet sportsmen—whom do they represent and what is the real reason for their participation in the 1956 international Games.

We, Ukrainians in Australia, who not so long ago were able to observe Soviet Russian sport and politics at close range, would like, on behalf of all free Ukrainian organisations behind the Iron Curtain, to draw your attention at this appropriate time to the following facts:

1. According to Olympic rules, the Soviet Olympic athletes would not be classed as amateurs but rather as professionals. In order to achieve its ambition to be "the masters of sports" the Soviet Government fully maintains and trains its athletes. Consequently, the only real occupation and the only real source of income of these Soviet "national amateurs" is training for and participation in competitions. It is unnecessary for the free world of today to cancel the Olympic Games because of the invasion by these pseudo-amateurs, but this aspect should be clarified.

2. Although, theoretically, sport has nothing to do with politics, in practice politics have a great deal to do with sports. In the middle thirties many sporting idealists became convinced that they had succeeded in making Hitler adopt the Olympic ideals. 3 years later they saw their mistakes when Hitler showed that his real objective was world conquest.

The analogy is clear. No Soviet action is undertaken without calculation and political planning. For 35 years they avoided the Olympiad, firstly because their sportsmen were still below world standard and secondly because the Games could not yet serve their political aims. After exhaustive trials, the Kremlin launched its campaign of conquest in the world of sport, at Helsinki in 1952. Although they did not dominate the Games, Soviet athletes placed the U.S.S.R. among the foremost sporting nations and thus boosted Soviet propaganda.

Their brilliant victories in this year's Winter Games at Cortina d' Ampezzo only strengthened their determination.

Some see this as pure efforts in the field of sport. Soviet victory in 1956 Olympic Games is the sole reason for their participation in them. Success at the Games would result in colossal prestige for the Kremlin and so be of immense propaganda value.

Firstly, false propaganda made by the Soviet government among their enslaved peoples would tend to prove that Soviet youth have best facilities for development, and so the rest of the world does not enjoy a standard of living comparable with that of the U.S.S.R. On this side of the Iron Curtain, a Soviet Olympic

victory would prove the superiority of the Communist system over so-called "Capitalism".

3. It must be kept in mind that whilst the Soviet Russian team is competing with other nations for Olympic honours, whole nations such as Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, North Caucasus, Turkestan, Armenia, and others are slaving under inhuman oppression.

In this memorandum we are not trying to smear indiscriminately Soviet athletes since they are enlisted from many enslaved countries and many of them are men of clean hands and clear consciences. However, we are taking part in a festival in which Soviet athletes are competing with the sole purpose of strengthening and extending a system of murder and bloodshed, terror and force.

4. Ukraine and Byelorussia are not amongst the many countries participating in the XVIth Olympiad. Nevertheless, Ukraine and Byelorussia are represented in the U.N.O. and are classed as independent countries. But in sport these countries have been forced to compete under the Russian flag. It seems rather strange that Ukraine with her fifty million population is not representing herself. There can be no doubt about the ability of our sportsmen since at Helsinki they won 6 medals for Russia.

In 1945, because Russia needed additional two votes in the U.N., she simply maintained that Ukraine and Byelorussia had the status of independent states. In Melbourne again, in the present Olympics, Russia needs more points for victory, not votes; therefore the independence of both countries is forgotten and their athletes represent Soviet Union or, in other words, Russia. Could anyone imagine Great Britain forcing any member of the British Commonwealth of Nations to compete in athletics for Great Britain, not to say for Australia or Canada.

Yet Russia is capable of doing so.

Summarising all these reflections based on facts, we, Ukrainians in Australia, in the name of all freedom-loving Ukrainians and Ukrainian Organisations in the Free World, ask:

a) Not to allow U.S.S.R. athletes to take part in the Olympic Games in Melbourne as the Russians follow a subversive system of genocide, murder, bloodshed, force, and the violation of human rights and of rights of nations. Russia does not respect anything, from the Commandmen's down to the Olympic rules, or any rules, or rights which are accepted and observed in the whole civilized world.

b) Allow all other representations or delegations of nations which are enslaved by Russia to participate: Ukrainians, Byelorussians Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Georgians, Armenians, Turkestanis and others, who would be entitled to represent their own countries.

Finally we wish to draw your attention to the fact that those who support Kremlin in the pursuance of its aims, would also support the abolishment of the Olympic ideal, and substitution of Soviet Russian Spartan Games.

*The Ukrainian Delegation of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc
of Nations (ABN) for Australia and New Zealand.
Association for the Liberation of Ukraine in Australia.*

*Ukrainian Youth Association in Australia.
Young Ukrainian Nationalists in Australia.*

