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Yaroslav Stetzko

A TIME FOR FIRMNESS

In the forum of international politics the year 1954 ended on a sad and dismal note. A wave of faith in "co-existence" with Bolshevism is sweeping the western world, and, unfortunately, even men like Dulles, Eisenhower, and Churchill, who are acquainted with the essence of Bolshevism, are beginning to be full of enthusiasm for the fanciful idea of the co-existence of the world of slavery with that of freedom. It is disheartening to think that, in the face of this disease which is taking hold of the western world, many bold men who perceive it as such are forced into silence. Whilst preparing to launch its next attack on the world which is still free, Bolshevism makes good use of the co-existence obsession at present prevailing in Western Europe and America; it pretends it is willing to exist peacefully side by side with the "capitalist" world, its aim being to subjugate Asia first of all according to a far-seeing plan and then to deal America and the rest of Europe a deadly blow. For instance, the pestilential wave of Bolshevism is now threatening to inundate the rest of Indo-China. Asia is indeed far away from the banks of the Seine, the Rhine, and Tiber, although even Nicholas II and Lenin realised that the way to Paris leads via Peking.

This policy of an alleged co-existence, that is to say, of an externally camouflaged capitulation of the Kremlin, is also advocated by the so-called "Third Bloc" of classical supporters of co-existence, a bloc that is being welded together by Tito and Nehru. All the world knows that Tito's Slovenia can only continue to exist under co-existence conditions. A victory over the U.S.S.R. would inevitably result in the democratisation of Yugoslavia, in its dissolution into national states and in Tito's downfall. For this reason Tito is making every effort to prevent a conflict between the West and Soviet Russia. Those who are farsighted enough will realise that

Tito's break with the Kremlin is extremely advantageous to the latter, since the conflict between the West and Bolshevism has been and will be postponed. The conjecture which is now spreading in the West, namely that Tito went to Asia on the instructions of West-European political circles, in order to dissuade Nehru from pursuing his pro-Communist policy and from further support to Mao Tse-tung, is actually unfounded, especially as Tito himself has always supported Mao, and delegations from his own country have constantly voted for the admission of Red China to the United Nations. And it was surely not just a coincidence that Malenkov recently proposed a toast to Tito's Slovenia. Tito's former quarrel with the Kremlin has not made him friendlier towards the West, but it has thrown the entire policy of the West into confusion and has given it a false trend. The ensuing ideological and political mistakes on the part of the West as regards the peoples subjugated by Bolshevism may, if continued and intensified, have catastrophic results.

It is a well-known fact that official circles in the West have for some time now—and precisely because of the alleged “exemplary” clash between Tito's country and Soviet Russia—been looking for salvation in the national Communist and other “leftist” political trends. The entire anti-Bolshevik struggle is thus being diverted from its true course, and confidence is placed in the Slanskys, the Gomulkas, the new Ukrainian Skrypnyks—who, incidentally, do not even exist now—in, to be exact, revolts led by the chief administrative heads and provincial governors. But no court-revolutions are likely to put an end to Soviet Russia; this can only be accomplished by national freedom insurrections and wars, which, as regards the ideology by which they are prompted, must oppose every form of Communism. The result of the conception which has originated from Tito's revolt is that the official and semi-official policy of the western world, including American Republicans and British Conservatives, is tending to support “leftist” elements, namely those groups among the peoples subjugated by Moscow which most closely approach Tito-ism. For instance, it is no mere coincidence that Nagy, Dimitrov, Rybka, Zenkl, Lettrich, the Russian N.T.S. (National Labour Alliance) organisation, and many of the “leftist representatives” of the subjugated non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union, enjoy the goodwill and confidence of certain official and semi-official political circles, among them right-wing circles,

in the West; this is logically in keeping with that general trend which builds its hopes upon Tito-ism and upon a possible revolution on the part of the "provincial governors", who by the grace of Moscow have advanced to power in the political life of their countries and who will allegedly revolt against this same Moscow in times to come, and who will break with it, just as Tito has done. And the same attitude is adopted with regard to Mao and the European satellites.

Further, the confidence placed by *Radio Liberation* in alleged experts on "Soviet life", in those persons who "know how to speak to the Soviet people" (just as if they were not ordinary persons at all, not just as normal as the people in the West, with normal aims and needs and an immortal soul!), is nothing other than the same "leftist action"; and in this connection neither nationalist nor anti-Marxist representatives even of the most recent emigrant groups are allowed to count as "experts", on the other hand, however, a Marxist, even if he has never read a single paper printed in the Soviet Union in all his life, is still an "expert", inasmuch as his mentality is in keeping with the Communist mentality. The Ukrainian underground publications and those of the O.U.N. (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, the U.P.A. (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) and the S.U.L.C. (Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council¹), which are compiled and published by men who have experienced "Soviet reality" and are fighting this same reality, are for instance not acknowledged as valid, since they are also directed against the Moscow provincial governors. It is true that in one of his recent speeches Dulles, in addition to expressing some peculiar ideas on co-existence, did reveal a certain perceptive faculty when he mentioned attempts to burst the U.S.S.R. asunder from within. Such an idea is right and appropriate; but it is perhaps, after all, nothing but a plaster on a deep-seated co-existence boil—"ut aliquid fecisse videtur" (to make it appear that something was being done in the matter). And, in any case, who would support an attempt to burst the U.S.S.R. asunder from within? The "American Committee", *Radio Liberation*, or possibly the pro-Russian "Research Institute"?

Is there any central anti-Bolshevik organisation in the West which would unite forces with the national underground movements and support them? Where, indeed, can we find a united staff for the "first front", namely for the front that lies behind the Iron Curtain?

¹) Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada (U.H.V.R.)

In a series of talks with the well-known war-theorist of the West, General Fuller, the present writer had an opportunity to discuss in detail with him the question of a possible co-operation and mutual support of the free West and the nations subjugated by Moscow. The result of these talks was a pamphlet published by the Scottish League for European Freedom²). General Fuller formulated his strategic conception of both World Wars in advance, and it would be very regrettable as far as the West is concerned if his present ideas were ignored, as was previously the case. No prophet is accepted in his own country, and Fuller's theories were first adopted and put into practice by men of other countries who had recognised the essential factors of modern warfare in time—for instance, Guderian and Zhukov—before they were at last accepted by the Allies. The strategic conception of the Third World War, as Fuller foresees it, is already being put into practice by the Bolsheviks, whilst official circles in the West look on calmly. How long, one may ask, do they intend to look on?

In any case, the fundamental neutrality of Yugoslavia's strategic position, which can be forecast for some time to come, is a weak spot in Western policy, all the more so as the support given to Tito by the West, namely the support given to national Communism and thus the denial of the cause of the anti-Communist national liberation movements, is arousing bitter feelings against the West among the nations subjugated by Soviet Russia. *The fact that Ukrainian underground circles have informed us that the Ukrainian nation no longer has any faith in a war and does not believe that such an event, even if it should occur, would in any way aid the Ukrainian struggle for freedom, is indeed most significant. And it should be a warning to the West.* It is quite possible that anti-Bolshevik camps—one consisting of the free West, the other of the countries subjugated by Bolshevism—might be set up, their activities running parallel but not co-ordinated and perhaps even partially in conflict. In our day, when wars are based on ideologies, this might lead to tragic consequences, inasmuch as the entire bloc of nations subjugated by Communism and the bloc of Western powers, who are ill-disposed towards us, would be confronted by the ruthless

²) *For what type of war should the West prepare.* Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

fanaticism of a united Communist camp led by Soviet Russian Bolsheviks.

The responsibility as regards such a sequence of events rests exclusively with the statesmen of the West. America has every chance of becoming a standard-bearer in the cause of national and social justice in the West, but only providing that the Americans themselves take an active part in America's eastern policy and ignore the opinions expressed by naturalised "experts" of eastern origin, who are pursuing anything but an American policy.

In view of the deadly Bolshevik menace to the whole world it is both sad and deeply humiliating to watch some statesmen of the West dilly-dallying over the problem of Germany's re-armament. Geneva's capitulation to Moscow and Peking; the surrender of Indo-China, strategically and politically invaluable, to the Communists; France's misgivings as to Germany's re-armament—although France herself is not even in a position to protect her own country against the pernicious influence of Communism; the fact that the French government, acting under Communist pressure, issued a decree forbidding the activity of the A.B.N. (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations) in France; all kinds of obstacles placed in Spain's way to prevent her from assuming a fitting role in present world political affairs; the evident delay in dealing with the question of Japan's re-armament; all these things are unpleasant indications of a defeatism which emanates from the politicians who are responsible for the fate of the world which at present is still free.

As far as Japan is concerned it is no mere coincidence that the government there is at present being taken over by men who have been prisoned in Allied camps. This is the result of Japanese feeling in the face of the Bolshevik menace. Instead of ignoring Japan's feelings and trying to introduce certain alien and pernicious changes in Japanese ways of living, it would have been wiser to treat the Japanese nation with a certain amount of tact, to avoid arousing bitterness towards the West.

All the other peoples who were defeated in the last war and who at that time fought against Soviet Russia, even if they did so under the wrong leaders and under the wrong mottoes, should be re-armed without delay. The nations subjugated by Bolshevism, with Ukraine at their head, Japan, Germany, Spain, and Turkey, are the forces which, together with the U.S.A. and Great Britain, will play a

decisive part in the clash which is inevitable. If they do not unite forces and co-operate, it will be extremely difficult to overcome Bolshevik tyranny. The year 1955 sees the U.S.A. and Great Britain confronted by an exceedingly important task, namely the setting up of a united anti-Communist front of the free world and the subjugated world, on the strength of the equality of rights of all the participators, and the respecting of national and individual freedom.

It is quite possible that the current problem of the liberation of the peoples subjugated by Soviet Russia may be taken into consideration once the Paris Agreements on West Germany's sovereignty and re-armament have been ratified. It is quite possible that the future idea of holding another Four Power conference may be abandoned, without the western world compromising itself once more in the eyes of the nations subjugated by Bolshevism, at whose expense the conference was to reach a "successful" conclusion. But it is likewise quite possible that the deadly disease of the co-existence idea may spread even further, in which case the West will forfeit its chances, whilst the subjugated nations, for their part, will continue to wage their wars for freedom on their own initiative and according to their own plans, without taking the special and exclusive interests of the West, erroneously pre-supposed by the latter, into account.

The 37th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Ukrainian Independence (January 22, 1918) was celebrated by Ukrainian Communities in the free world.

For the first time the Congress of the U.S.A. marked the occasion. Prayers were said in the House of Representatives by the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, Ivan Teodorovych, and in the Senate by Father Mykola Kohut.

In the Brazilian National Congress the deputy, Ukrainian-born Dr. Petro Firman, in an address concerning the Ukrainian colony in Parana, made special mention of this anniversary and spoke of the Ukrainian liberation movement. His address was very favourably received and widely reported.

Veli Kajum-Khan

Crescent Moon and Red Star

The Orient between the Major Powers and Russia

Three major powers confront each other in the Orient—the U.S.A. and Britain on the one hand, Soviet Russia on the other. Japan, which up to World War II pursued a skilful and adaptable policy towards Islam, is no longer in the running. Italy likewise has no longer any influence in the Islamic countries.

Turkey forfeited the sovereign position she had held for centuries as supreme head of the Islamic nations after the first World War. She adopted a neutral attitude in order to avoid giving rise to Russian provocation. During the past decades all her efforts have been concentrated on building up a strong, national state. But the long-standing antagonism between Russia and Turkey still exists. By means of infiltration and propagation of the Communist ideology Moscow sought to create the pre-conditions for military action in Turkey, too. But Turkey was on her guard and tolerated neither the Communist Party nor any other terrorist organisations in her country. She now has an army which is one of the best-equipped, strongest and most modern armies in the Orient. She is entering into firmer friendly relations with other Islamic countries once more. A start has been made in this direction with the recently concluded Turko-Pakistan amity pact, and there is reason to believe that other Islamic countries will join this pact, the purpose of which is to check Russian Communist pressure in the Orient. But all this is still in its early initial stage, and so far there can be no talk of Turkey actively participating in the fight against Communist influence in the Islamic countries.

None of the European countries, with the exception of Britain, has an active part in the fight against Communist activity in the Orient. Since World War II Great Britain, however, has given India, Pakistan, and Burma their independence and has thus to some extent undermined Soviet propaganda. The Suez Canal Agreement has further strengthened friendly relations between Great Britain and the Islamic countries, a fact which was stressed recently by Egypt's prime minister, Abdel Nasser, when he said, "The one big

danger which threatened Egypt and the Near East was a Soviet invasion. Egypt is on the side of the West and as regards the ideological aspects the country is definitely anti-Communist."

British influence in the Orient is still considerably greater than is generally assumed. By fulfilling the national desire for independence the Islamic nations can be won over as friends and in this way, too, Communist expansion can be checked.

In order to counteract Communist activity in the Orient the U.S.A. in particular have, since World War II, occupied themselves with an oriental policy. They refute the Communist radio and press propaganda in the Orient by transmissions of their own, and above all publish reports on the tragic fate of the countries and especially of the Moslem nations that are forced to endure Communist tyranny. In addition, the Western powers also possess information centres in most of the Oriental countries.

The U.S.A. have set up various organisations whose aim it is to fight Communism, as for instance the "Committee for a Free Asia", which has its headquarters in California. This organisation, however, is only concerned with the territory extending from Japan to Pakistan. In addition, Washington has also set up a special broadcasting station, run by another American committee, for the nations that have been subjugated by Soviet Russia. The programmes of this station are transmitted in several languages. So far, however, these programmes have not met with much success among the Moslem nations since they have as their subject only the fight against Communism and not the destruction of the Russian empire and the re-establishment of the independence of the nations subjugated by Russia. According to the opinion held by all the Islamic nations the political trend of these programmes is not wholly in keeping with the demand of the subjugated nations, since the latter are not only fighting against Communism but also for their independence.

The U.S.A. and Britain continue to aid the Asiatic countries against Moscow by giving them credits and economic assistance. As a counter-measure the Russians promptly offered India and various other Asiatic nations their help and promised to assist in the industrialisation of these countries by supplying them with loans and technical aid.

In order to be able to frustrate Russia's expansion aims in the Orient the Western powers are interested in gaining military bases and are intent upon incorporating the Islamic countries in the Western defence community.

As compared with Soviet propaganda, however, the propaganda disseminated against Communism in the Orient by the Western powers is neither concentrated nor active enough. The ways and means of Communist activity in the Orient are manifold. It is true that the major powers of the West are unanimously agreed that the Orient must not be allowed to become Communist. But the Orient is large and its peoples have their own national demands. To fight Communism alone is not enough; the freedom and independence of the Asiatic nations must also be guaranteed. The Islamic peoples are primarily concerned with their independence and equality of rights. And for this reason they are all the more keenly aware of the fact that the West has so far failed to make any declarations of independence and to give moral support to the Moslem peoples subjugated by Russia. They cannot understand why the West—either through its official channels, or through the radio or press, either directly or indirectly—has so far never promised the nations subjugated by Russia their absolute independence. So far, the declarations and memoranda sent to the U.N.O. and the Western powers by the national organisations of the subjugated peoples, as for instance those of Turkestan, and by representatives of the free Islamic nations have not been taken into consideration at all. In order to fight Communism and destroy the Russian empire a clear political trend—namely a charter of independence for all subjugated nations—must be proclaimed and followed.

Moscow on her part proclaims her alleged honouring of the independence of the nations and maintains that the basic principle of her policy is to liberate all colonial and semi-colonial nations from Western imperialism. Such catchwords are bound to confuse many persons, and no doubt this was the reason why thousands of eminent personalities in the Orient signed the Stockholm peace petition of the Communists. Moscow appeared for the cause of the peace for which mankind yearns and accused the Western powers of being warmongers. Such are the methods by which the Communists seek to camouflage their own large-scale preparations for war.

The main task of the camouflaged organisations set up by Moscow in the free world is to win over prominent non-Communist personalities for Communist propaganda. The name of a person of this kind is of more value to the Soviets than hundreds of convinced Communists. These organisations have received instructions from Moscow to carry on their work above all in intellectual and ecclesias-

tical circles in order to gain supporters there. Neither the Russian government nor the Communist Party engages openly in this work. Communist propaganda adapts itself most skilfully to the conditions, desires and demands of the countries in question and misuses the people of these countries for its own imperialist aims.

From time to time Moscow arranges congresses for members of the Islamic clergy who are completely subservient to the Soviets. At an Islamic congress held in Baku in 1942 members of the Islamic clergy declared their loyalty to Moscow. In 1943 and 1948 congresses were held in Tashkent and in 1954 in Ufa. The effects achieved by the proclamations issued at these congresses, which aim to win over the free Islamic nations, are often underestimated by the Western world, all the more so as so-called representatives of Islam take part in various peace conferences abroad and give those present there the impression that the Islamic nations in the Soviet Union enjoy every form of freedom.

The Western powers are of the opinion that Islam and Communism are incompatible opposites, but they overlook the fact that the Soviets advocate religious freedom abroad, whereas in reality, within their own sphere of power, they fight religion. For propaganda reasons and in order to counteract Western ideas of enlightenment a decree was recently issued in the Soviet Union to the effect that religious activity was inviolable.

So far no steps whatsoever have been taken by the West and by Islam to set up a forum for the genuine representatives of the nations subjugated by Russia, in which they can confront the propagandists sent to the Orient by the Soviets in public discussions, and thus reveal the truth as regards the subjugation of the Islamic nations in the Soviet Union and put an end to Communist propaganda in the Moslem countries.

There is no special paper which deals solely with these problems. The only effective paper, read and appreciated in the Orient, is *Milli Turkistan*, which is published by the Turkestan National Organisation and receives no help and no support from the West.

If the Western powers wish to fight Communism in the Islamic countries effectively, then they will obviously have to be more active. It is only due to the natural anti-Communist attitude of the Orient peoples and to the measures taken by the Islamic governments that Communism has so far not succeeded in gaining a footing in the Orient.

Volodymyr Derzhavyn

LITERATURE IN IRONS

Ukrainian Literature under Russian Bolshevism

From a purely theoretical point of view the subject under discussion can be subdivided into two sections: on the one hand, the extermination (execution, imprisonment, deportation) of Ukrainian writers by the Soviet regime, and on the other hand, the extermination of Ukrainian literature itself as a free or relatively free form of public expression of thoughts and feelings; this latter kind of extermination need not necessarily involve physical reprisals directed against the writers concerned, but can be effected fairly successfully in a genuinely totalitarian state by simply confiscating works already printed and systematically censoring those works prior to publication which might not suit the "Party and Government". Such methods are possible in a state in which the technical means for private printing are subject to strict control. A third method relevant to measures directed against a national literature would be the forcible Russianising of the Ukrainian *literary* language. But this third aspect of the problem under discussion can only be dealt with in detail in the course of a general analysis of the whole Soviet policy with regard to language.

As regards the two methods of extermination mentioned above, namely the reprisals directed against Ukrainian writers and those directed against Ukrainian literature, no clear dividing-line can be drawn between them, since both methods are often applied conjointly, though at different times and in a different relation to each other. It is therefore advisable to choose a purely historical mode of survey as far as this problem is concerned. In doing so, three distinct periods of time must be taken into account; these correspond approximately to the years 1921—1925, 1926—1931, and 1932—1939, inasmuch as the main persecution measures adopted in each of these periods aimed to introduce another trend in Ukrainian literature and one to which not much attention had hitherto been paid. On the other hand the measures resorted to from 1939 onwards up

to the present time have only resulted in a slight variation of the condition of Ukrainian literature and in its stagnation. Of course, it must not be overlooked that in each subsequent period those reprisals which had by chance been "omitted" in the previous period were "enforced" most energetically. This historical survey must, however, be introduced by a brief account of the political position of Ukrainian literature prior to 1921 and of its various political trends.

1. Status and position of Ukrainian literature during World War I and during the years immediately after the War

The Ukrainian emigrant press frequently refers to the first half of the twenties as an era of "rebirth" in Ukrainian literature, and since this designation refers exclusively to the literature of Soviet Ukraine, the opinion is expressed in various circles—in particular among socialist and other "leftist" Ukrainian emigrant groups—that the obvious and very considerable revival of Ukrainian poetry and literature during the first half of the twenties was directly connected with the alleged "cultural achievements" of the Soviet regime in the early days of its existence in Ukraine. This, however, is an illusion, produced on the one hand by the fact that the Soviets did not adopt repressive measures against *certain* Ukrainian literary trends until 1921—that is, after Ukrainian armed national and political resistance against Soviet Russian Bolshevism seemed to have been definitely broken—and then only rather hesitantly at first; and on the other hand by the fact that the comparatively free development of Ukrainian literary life from 1917 onwards was in direct contrast to its almost total suppression during the years 1914 to 1916. After the suspension of the general veto on Ukrainian print in the tzarist empire, introduced in 1863 and even more drastically enforced after 1876, Ukrainian literature in the course of the years from 1905 to 1914 had more or less been able to develop normally both in the Russian and Austrian districts of the Ukrainian territories. This development, which had been rapid, was suddenly and forcibly disrupted in the autumn of 1914, when the Russian government used the occasion of the outbreak of the war to proscribe the Ukrainian language once more, on the pretext that this was a "war-time measure", and to set about effecting a systematic extermination of Ukrainian national culture in Galicia, then occupied by Russian troops. This systematic extermination came to an end in the spring

of 1915 with the retreat of the Russian troops from Galicia, but even so literary life in Galicia and in the entire Western Ukraine was hampered in its development during the years that followed owing to the fact that this territory was the scene of World War I, the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1918—1919, and the Polish-Soviet war of 1920.

As far as central and eastern Ukrainian territories were concerned, however, the collapse of the Russian monarchy in February, 1917, meant a revival of Ukrainian national and cultural life, in particular in the field of literature—a revival which was almost dynamic in its force and was in no way restricted. Soviet Bolshevism, which during the years 1917 to 1920 was mainly concerned with asserting itself politically and economically in Ukraine, found itself obliged to refrain from interfering with Ukrainian literature, and this was also the case as regards the national Ukrainian language. It is true that the Soviets shot certain Ukrainian writers, who actively—that is to say “illegally” from the Soviet point of view—opposed Bolshevism, as for instance the well-known lyric poet, Hryhoriy Chuprynka (1879—1922), but such measures were of a purely political nature and were hardly connected with the literary activity of the writers concerned. Of course, even prior to 1921 it had not been possible to publish literary works which were definitely anti-Bolshevist under the Soviet regime; otherwise, however, during the time in question Ukrainian literature as such was not subjected to repressive measures. There seemed indeed to be every reason to believe that the Soviets would on principle continue to refrain from interfering with Ukrainian literary life, and therefore several Ukrainian writers who in 1919 had fled to Western Ukraine in order to escape Soviet Bolshevism, including the famous writers Mykola Vorony (1871—1937?), his son Marko Vorony-Antioch (1904—1937?), Volodymyr Samiilenko (1864—1925), and the woman writer of belles lettres, Halyna Orlivna, availed themselves of the amnesty proclaimed by the Soviets and returned to Kyiv. Their example was followed by a large number of Communist, or at least pro-Soviet, writers from Western Ukraine, as for instance Dmytro Zahul (1890—1937), Vasyl Bobynsky (1897—1937?), Volodymyr Gzhytsky, Antin Krushelnytsky (1878—1934) and his son, Ivan Krushelnytsky, and several others, all of whom were convinced that Ukrainian national literature would have a better chance

of developing under the Soviet regime than under the Polish regime in Western Ukraine. Within a comparatively short time they were, however, to regret their decision most bitterly.

2. Liquidating the so-called "bourgeois nationalists" (1921—1925)

The literature of Ukraine at the beginning of the twenties thus manifested certain "loyalist" political trends, which though few in number were certainly very active and which—with the exception of a few unimportant Communist "Party writers"—were not exactly pro-Soviet, but nevertheless regarded the Soviet regime at the "lesser of two evils", as compared with the definitely anti-Ukrainian policy of the Poles and the "white" Russian counter-revolutionaries; these trends were used by Soviet Bolshevism in the first place in order to fight the "reactionary"—that is to say, simply pre-revolutionary—elements in Ukrainian literature, who from 1912 onwards were systematically branded as representatives of "bourgeois nationalism" and became the subject of agitatory propaganda both in the press and in public political and literary discussions. They were eventually deprived of every opportunity of engaging in literary activity, since, in view of the pressure exerted by the Party organs, no one ventured to print their works, though at first no physical reprisals were directed against them. This demoralising policy was in the first place pursued by the "mass organisations" of "proletarian" ("Hart", 1923—1932) and "revolutionary peasant" ("Pluh", 1922—1932) writers which were founded and vigorously supported by the Communist Party, and also by the literary organisation of the Ukrainian Komsomol (Communist Youth Movement), the "Molodniak". These "mass organisations" were to bring about a "literary mass levy" of working-class and peasant youth, for whom the pursuance of a literary vocation was to be facilitated very considerably and in fact guaranteed. It was of course to be a condition that this youth, which was inexperienced, and completely demoralised as a result of the revolution, without any literary training whatsoever, proved to be the willing tool of Bolshevik propaganda and opposed so-called "bourgeois nationalism" in Ukrainian literature in a ruthless and violent manner.

In this connection it must be stressed that the Bolshevik mentality regards everything as "bourgeois" or "bourgeois-minded" which is not based or does not claim to be based on Marxist ideas, and which

does not manifest itself as "proletarian" by which is incidentally also understood the "rural proletariat"; and if a "bourgeois" attitude of this kind manifests itself in Ukraine, it is promptly and automatically branded as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism". Those who fail to understand why this should be so are thereupon designated as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" and persecuted accordingly. The same principle holds good, *mutatis mutandis*, in all non-Russian "autonomies" and "Soviet Republics" as well as in the "autonomous territories" of the U.S.S.R. This is a reason why two main trends of Ukrainian literature, which were designated as "bourgeois nationalism", were exterminated first of all—though actually they had little in common, save that they both rejected the idea of disguising themselves as "Marxist and proletarian". They did not attempt to conceal their national Ukrainian character, but they were not actively nationalist—in the political sense of the word.

The first victim of this agitational propaganda was so-called "Neo-Classicism", a small but nevertheless talented and highly esteemed group of Kyiv poets, literary critics, and scholars, who from about 1919 onwards had tried to link up Ukrainian literature with West European classicism and who cultivated the rules and style of ancient classicism, the Renaissance and the French Parnassian school. Decried as "alien", "reactionary" "aesthetically exclusive", and "aristocratic", this group was finally silenced round about 1925 and ceased to exist as an actual literary trend. The physical extermination of this group did not take place until much later, when, at the beginning of the thirties, after having been branded for years as a heretic and subjected to enforced silence, the most distinguished of the "Neo-Classicalist" writers, Maksym Rylsky, born 1895, was ignominiously forced to recant his views; since then he has only been in evidence as a blind tool of Soviet Bolshevik propaganda, a fact which has, of course, proved most injurious to his literary talent. Another prominent Neo-Classicalist, Oswald Burghardt (1891—1947) who was of German extraction and who wrote under the pen-name of Yuriy Klen, managed to flee to Germany in 1931. The three other prominent men of Ukrainian Neo-Classicism—Mykola Zerov, born 1890, Pavlo Fylypovych, born 1891, and Mykhaylo Dray-Khmara, born 1889, were sentenced, in the middle of the thirties, on various flimsy political pretexts—actually it was on account of their previous literary activity—to hard labour in Soviet concentration camps in the north or in East Siberia, where they were either executed in

1937 and 1938 or died a terrible death. The fact that they had never actively engaged in politics failed to save them.

It took considerably longer to exterminate another type of "bourgeois nationalism", namely the traditional national democratic trend, which had prevailed to a large extent prior to the revolution; a trend which had been chiefly represented by belles-lettres and literary criticism. This group had fluctuated between traditional realism and a rather timid impressionism, and had been irresolute as regards politics, partly inclining towards moderate socialism, but had, however, been definitely uncompromising in its attitude towards Moscow as far as the national and cultural independence of Ukraine was concerned. Adherents of this trend were silenced in the middle of the twenties by methods similar to those adopted against the Neo-Classicists, save that in this case they were, as democratic "Nationalists", reproached with having pursued a social policy which favoured the Ukrainian "kulak-class" (well-to-do peasantry). The bulk of this Ukrainian pre-revolutionary literature was not exterminated at once, but by degrees, by means of imprisoning and executing its literary representatives, so that some of the older writers of this group managed to evade Soviet reprisals by dying a natural death, for instance Volodymyr Samiylenko, who is mentioned above and who returned to Kyiv after having fled to Western Ukraine, and the well-known novelist, Stepan Vasylenko (1878—1932). Several of the most prominent writers of this group were, on the strength of false evidence given against them, involved in the big political trials of the S.V.U. (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine), staged by the secret police in 1930, and were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Examples of these are the literary scholars, critics and writers, Serhiy Yefremov and Andriy Nikovsky, both of whom later died in prison, the writer Mykhaylo Ivchenko, born 1890, pardoned in the thirties, who died as a result of the hardships he had endured whilst in prison, the aged poetess and playwright, Liudmyla Starytska-Cherniakhivska, (1868—1941), later pardoned, but shot after the outbreak of the war "as a preventive measure". Others, who had long since abandoned all literary activity and thought that their existence had been forgotten, were arrested during the big political purges in the thirties in so secret a manner that it is impossible to ascertain the date of their arrest and the way in which they were "liquidated"; they included the writer and playwright, Hnat Khotlovykh, born 1877, the lyric poets, Mykola Filyansky, born 1873,

and P. Kapelhorodsky, born 1882, and the woman-writer, especially of historical novels, Zinayida Tulub. The playwright, Yakiv Montov, died of heart failure and was thus spared the inevitable fate of being arrested, whilst the poet Todos Osmachka, born 1895, who has been living in exile since 1944, managed to save his life by feigning insanity for several years. The only prominent writer of this group who succeeded in living in retirement unmolested until World War II was the lyric poet, Volodymyr Svidzinsky, 1885—1941, but after the outbreak of the war he was murdered by the secret police “as a preventive measure”.

Since all the works of those authors who were arrested were promptly confiscated and no longer exist save in the special libraries belonging to the secret police, it can be assumed that the present population of Soviet Ukraine knows far less about Ukrainian literature of the years 1900 to 1920 than it does about the literature of the nineteenth century, for though older works are, it is true, ruthlessly censored and “purged” they are nevertheless reprinted again from time to time. As regards Ukrainian literature of the years 1920 to 1940 the situation is even more serious.

3. Liquidation of so-called National Communism (1926—1931)

Among the Ukrainian Communists there were several who, although they approved in principle of the Soviet regime and the Communist Party dictatorship, strongly opposed the tutelage exercised over the allegedly “sovereign” Ukrainian Soviet Republic by the Moscow Party leaders in a more ruthless manner from year to year, and who severely criticised the ever-increasing Russianising of Ukrainian cultural life which was promoted by the government. It was in this “national Communist” spirit that the Party writer, Mykola Khvylovy, 1893—1933, an outstanding essayist and journalist, founded and conducted the “Free Academy of Proletarian Literature” in Charkiv, 1926—1928, with the abbreviated name of “Vaplite”. This institution, owing to his influence in the Party, for a time enjoyed a certain amount of protection. In its publications, in addition to a partly camouflaged and partly open opposition to Soviet Russian Bolshevism as a “perverted” form of “genuine” international Communism which was not in keeping with the Ukrainian national character, it also definitely advocated the preserva-

tion of Ukrainian national and cultural independence, unhampered by Moscow, and vigorously aimed to link up Ukrainian culture with that of Western Europe. On the one hand, national Ukrainian sentiments and ideas on the part of the National Communists "in principle" who belonged to Khvylovy's group, very soon began to supersede the original Marxist doctrines though not in the case of Khvylovy himself, and on the other hand the bulk of the "Vaplite" consisted of nationally-minded Ukrainian writers, who either regarded Communism as something alien or else were definitely hostile in their attitude towards it and merely conducted themselves in a "proletarian" manner in order to camouflage their efforts to oppose the Soviet Bolshevik Russianising of Ukraine. This institution was, of course, only able to exist as long as the Moscow Party leaders, for tactical reasons, allowed national Communist tendencies to prevail in the non-Russian Soviet republics. After a big political and literary discussion which caused a considerable stir in 1927, Khvylovy's views were severely censured by the competent Party organs, the "Vaplite" was forcibly disbanded in 1928, and the literary organisations, the "Literaturny Yarmarok" ("Literature Fair", 1928—1930) and the "Politfront" (1930—1), which were then founded in Charkiv by the "Khvylovists", also met with the same fate. During the years that followed a veritable massacre of "Khvylovists" took place; most of them were arrested during the years from 1931 to 1935 and died in a manner which in most cases was never ascertained, in concentration camps up in the north or in Siberia. Among these were the writers, Mykhaylo Yalovy, Oles Dosvitny, Vasyl Vrazhlyvy, Ivan Dniprovsky, Hryhoriy Epik, Hordiy Kotsiuba, Mykhaylo Maysky, the poets and writers, Oleksa Slisarenko and Mayk Yohansen, and the outstanding dramatist, Mykola Kulish. Khvylovy himself committed suicide and was thus spared the inevitable fate of being arrested. The two most prominent poets of the "Vaplite", Pavlo Tychyna, born in 1891, and Mykola Bazhan, born 1904, as well as the prose-writer, Yuriy Yanovsky, 1902—1954, were spared the fate of their colleagues, probably for reasons of prestige, but for many years they were forced to atone for their "nationalist tendencies" by having to sing the praises of the "Party and the Government", a fact which completely ruined the excellent lyrical talent of the first-mentioned of these three writers. A few other important "Vaplite" writers were also spared, but this seems to have been the result of rather special circumstances.

The fate which befell those literary circles in Kyiv which had in no way been affiliated with the "Vaplite", but had obviously shared the "national Communist" ideas and aims of the latter, was even worse; at the end of 1934 and on most flimsy political pretexts the writers Hryhoriy Kosynka and Kost Bureviy, and the poets, Oleksa Vlyzko, Ivan Krushelnytsky, and Dmytro Falkivsky, were shot; whilst the writers, Valeriyanydymohylny, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, and Antin Krushelnytsky, and the poets, Yevhen Pluzhnyk, Yakiv Savchenko, and Dmytro Zahul were sent to concentration camps up in the north where, within the next few years, they either died of the hardships they were forced to endure or else were shot. It is significant that in all these cases in which reprisals were taken the *personal* political attitude or the former political activity of the victims was disregarded completely; the fact that a literary connection had existed between their writings and the "national Communist" opposition sufficed to seal their fate.

4. Liquidating the alleged remnants of a national deviation (1932—1939)

From 1932 onwards a political paradox was manifest to an ever-increasing degree, inasmuch as Ukrainian writers who had in former times always opposed "Ukrainian nationalism" most decidedly were now proscribed as "nationalists in disguise" and were "liquidated" in one way or other in the northern concentration camps. Indeed, under the tyranny of the notorious N.K.V.D. chief, Yezhov, in power from 1937 to 1939, this became a mass phenomenon in Ukraine. The reasons are questionable. Only in very few cases can there be any suggestion of there having been any anti-Soviet activity on the part of a well-camouflaged nationalist organisation within Soviet Ukrainian literary circles at that time; it can be said rather that there was a mechanical "reaction" of former personal contacts with individual elements of the opposition within the Moscow Party elite, an opposition which had at that time just been finally liquidated by Stalin. It is, however, possible to distinguish certain groups of Ukrainian writers who were systematically exterminated during the second half of the thirties. These groups were as follows:

- 1) All the "re-emigrants" of the twenties;
- 2) Almost all (there were only two exceptions) the political immigrants from Western Ukraine. The reason for this lay in the differences between the West Ukrainian Party and Stalin's clique;

3) All the futurists and their two leaders, who vied with each other, Mykhayl Semenko and Valeriy Polishchuk. The futurists were regarded as being susceptible to "Western" influences.

The majority of those who were subjected to repressive measures from 1935 to 1939 (most of them vanished without a trace after they had been arrested) were, however, writers who had previously been looked upon as a hundred per cent "Soviet men" and had manifested a blind obedience to the orders issued by the "Party and the Government". Of a hundred or so names we should only like to mention a few of the most well-known:

The writers, Ivan Kyrylenko, Klym Polishchuk, Sava Bozhko, D. Buzko, and the Ukrainian Communist, Myroslav Irchan, who emigrated to Ukraine from Canada;

The dramatist, Ivan Mykytenko, who was awarded several prizes in Moscow;

The poets, Mykola Tereshchenko, Andriy Paniv, and I. Vyrhan; the poet and critic, Ivan Kulyk; and critic and writer of fables, Serhiy Pylypenko (the founder and head of the above-mentioned "revolutionary-peasant" literary society, "Pluh");

The consistent "Marxist-Leninist" literary critics, Andriy Khvylya, Volodymyr Koryak, Borys Kovalenko, Vasyl Desniak, Samiylo Shchupak, and M. Novytsky.

It would be utterly false to assume that even a tenth of these literary men, who hated the very mention of national Ukrainian issues ever sought to oppose Stalin's ideas and orders secretly; one can but surmise that Moscow's desire to destroy Ukrainian literature in general became such a hysterical obsession in those years that friends and foes alike were its victims, and every Ukrainian writer was regarded as a suspect while the slightest reason for suspicion was eliminated by simply liquidating the person concerned.

5. The position of Ukrainian literature since the autumn of 1939

Since 1941 there have been no more *physical* victims in Ukrainian literature in the U.S.S.R. It is true that after the war the Soviet press on several occasions carried on an agitatory campaign against "nationalist" or "reactionary tendencies" in recent works by Maksym Rylsky, Yuriy Yanowsky, Volodymyr Sosyura, and various

other writers, but none of those persons has been deported, imprisoned or executed. Indeed, during the years from 1943 to 1946 two poets, Mykola Tereshchenko and I. Vyrhan, Ostap Vyshnya, the humorist—who was at one time very popular in Soviet Ukraine, and who was formerly a “Khvylovist”—and a few less outstanding literary critics and scholars were released from Soviet concentration camps and were encouraged to resume their literary activity in Ukraine. There are two reasons for this apparent “tolerance” on the part of the Soviet regime towards Ukrainian writers.

On the one hand, the Soviets attach considerable importance to winning over literary circles in the “newly acquired” West Ukrainian territories, an aim which would of course not be compatible with repressive measures openly directed against Ukrainian writers and it was for this reason the “liberal era” began in the autumn of 1939.

On the other hand, however—and this is the main reason for the apparent tolerance of the Soviet regime in this connection—the official literature of Soviet Ukraine has been undermined and demoralised to such an extent by the massacres of the twenties and thirties that it can be fairly easily controlled by means of “instructions” and “reprimands” without there actually being any necessity to resort to more drastic measures and to secret police methods. The dark side of the picture, however, is that this official literature, which is blindly obedient to the “Party and the Government” enjoys neither prestige nor esteem among the Ukrainian population and can therefore only have a very limited propagandist influence.

THE SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW

Readers of Professor Derzhavyn's article above may like to know that to the current number (Vol. XXXIII. No. 80) of the above periodical, published half-yearly by the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, Professor Mykola Hlobenko has contributed an article called “Thirty-five years of Ukrainian Literature in the U.S.S.R.” Professor Hlobenko is Professor of Ukrainian Literature at the Ukrainian Free University, Munich.

Taras Shevchenko

Taras Shevchenko is the greatest Ukrainian poet, the first modern Ukrainian poet and, more than any other, the national poet of Ukraine. None has felt her humiliation in his lifetime more deeply, nor expressed the feelings and aspirations of her people in such passionate, burning verses.

He was born a serf in the village of Moryntsi near Kyiv on 9 March 1814. As a boy he showed great artistic talent, and his master eventually sent him to study art at St. Petersburg. There, influential friends and fellow students bought him from his master, and in 1838 gave him his freedom.

He might have become a successful painter. But soon his verses, glowing with passionate love of his native land and with bitter protest against the oppression of his people by Russia, led to his arrest and exile, for ten years, in a Penal Unit in the desert of Kazakhstan.

When the effort of devoted friends at last obtained a pardon for him, he was broken in health and old beyond his years. He died 10 March 1861. Of his forty-seven years he had been a serf for twenty-four, a prisoner and exile for ten, and a free man for thirteen only.

C. K. G.

* * *

Last Will and Testament


When I die, for my grave raise a high mound of earth
In the limitless steppe, where the cornfields rustle and sway
Under the wide sky of Ukraine, dear land of my birth.

Raise it high, on the cliffs rising steep above Dnipro,
Mighty river, roaring down and along and away,
Growling and foaming over great rocks below.

Bury me then. Bury and leave me.

Rouse yourselves! Rise, rise, rise!

Break and burst through the chains that fetter and grieve ye,
In your enemies' blood your new freedom baptise.



Taras Shevchenko (1814—1861)
The greatest poet of Ukraine

When Dnipro has swept our evil enemies' blood
 From our land and carried it down to the far blue sea,
 Then, only then will I leave and take flight to God,
 To pray, and adore him. Until then God will be strange to me.

When you are free,
 When you are gathered in new liberty,
 As in one great, united family,
 With a kind word, quietly spoken, remember me.

Under the Cherry Trees

At home the cherry trees are now in bloom,
 Cockchafers in their branches buzz and boom,
 Girls, walking leisurely in the evening sun,
 Are singing. Ploughmen, their day's labour done,
 Have left the fields and are returning where
 Mothers and wives the evening meal prepare.

Under the cherry trees they sit at meat,
 While in the darkening sky the evening star is rising,
 The daughters serve the men before they eat.
 Mother would chide and guide them with much wise advising,
 But does not persevere to give good counsel long
 When after a few single, liquid notes a nightingale bursts
 into glorious song.

The dusk grows darker. The last faint light has faded.
 Under the cherry trees the children have been put to sleep,
 And sitting by them, as they breathe so steadily and deep,
 Mother's own eyes are soon in slumber shaded.
 Now almost all the world is quiet,
 Only the girls' soft voices, and the nightingale, still
 thrill the night.

English version of these two poems by C. K. Giffey.

(Copyright)

I Care Not

*I care not, shall I see my dear
Own land before I die, or no,
Nor who forgets me, buried here
In desert wastes of alien snow;
Though all forget me, better so.*

*A slave from my first bitter years,
Most surely I shall die a slave
Ungraced of any kinsman's tears;
And carry with me to my grave
Everything; and leave no trace,
No little mark keep my place
In the dear lost Ukraine
Which is not ours, though our land.
And none shall ever understand;
No father to his son shall say:
"Kneel down, and fold your hands and pray;
He died for our Ukraine".*

*I care no longer if the child
Shall pray for me, or pass me by.
One only thing I cannot bear:
To know my land, that was beguiled
Into a death-trap with a lie,
Trampled and ruined and defiled...
Ah, but I care, dear God; I care!*

Translated by E. L. Yoynich Bull

UKRAINE TODAY

C. K. Giffey

Easter in Ukraine

Customs and Traditions of Eastertide

According to the Gospels, our Lord went up to Jerusalem with the disciples to keep the Passover, and to fulfil his mission on this earth. And so Easter, the greatest of all Christian Festivals and the very foundation of the Christian Faith, naturally fell in that part of the year in which the Jews commemorate their ancient delivery from oppression and the prehistoric races of the Mediterranean world had, for countless ages, observed their Spring Festivals.

The entire Christian World commemorates the Resurrection of our Lord on the first Sunday after the full moon following March 21st. According to the Gregorian calendar, which was adopted in the West, this remains the date of the Equinox. Both the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church however have adhered to the Julian calendar, and with them March 21st now falls 14 days later.

The Ukrainian Easter may thus coincide with the Festival as it is kept in the West, or it may miss a full moon, and fall a month later, making a difference of one to four weeks.

In 1950 and in 1953 it coincided with the Western Easter. In 1955 Ukrainians will observe Good Friday on April 15th and their Easter on April 17th, 18th and 19th.

For Ukrainians, Palm Sunday, known as "Willow Sunday" or "Blossom Sunday", is the first day of the Easter Festival. Holy week is known as "Willow Week".

On Willow Sunday, long willow rods and branches are blessed in all Churches. All lightly tap, or touch, their relations, friends and acquaintances with them and say: "Be tall as the willow, bright as the water and rich and fruitful as the earth". Then they drive the cattle out to pasture with the willow wands from their winter stabling, and finally the head of the house plants a willow rod in the ground. If it strikes root and brings forth buds and leaves and flourishes, it foretells prosperity for the coming year.

Holy Week is also called the "Great Week", the "Pure Week", and most often "White Week". All do their utmost to finish the work on the farm that must be done before Easter by the Thursday, for the Holidays start on Thursday morning, and no more work should then be done.

On Maundy Thursday, "Great" or "Pure" Thursday, Services of Our Lord's Passion are held in all Churches. Twelve Lessons from the Gospels are read. After the Service members of the congregation disperse to their homes with lighted candles and try to reach home without these being blown out.

On reaching home they light the fire on the hearth with their candles. Then they burn a cross with it on one of the ceiling rafters, after which the candle is preserved until "Great Thursday" in the following year. If anyone in the family should die during the year, the candle is placed in the hands of the departed.

The candle is often called the "Storm Candle" or "Thunder Candle", for in a thunderstorm it is placed before the icony (the Holy Pictures) in the living room. Prayers are said that lightning may be averted from the house, barns and stables, and destruction from the crops.

As in other parts of the world, traditional Easter customs retain numerous elements of earlier rituals of Spring. In many parts of Ukraine there are remnants of a cult of the dead. In Eastern Ukraine, Maundy Thursday is also called "the Easter of the Dead", for it is believed that the departed gather late that night in the Churches for a service of their own. The children light bonfires "to keep the Old Man warm", whilst in Carpathian Ukraine in the West they go from house to house, collecting "kukutsy"—a kind of chupatti—"for the dead".

On Good Friday no work is done, and in particular the men must not chop firewood, nor must the women spin or sew. In many

Churches no bells are rung that day, but sounding boards are struck with mallets or large rattles shaken. In many places the "plashchenytsya", a picture of our Lord in the Sepulchre, painted on linen and carried horizontally, is taken in solemn procession round the Church.

During the night before Easter Sunday, the young people light a bonfire, often with a flaming torch they have brought with them. The backbone of the fire is a dead tree of yester-year, felled and brought from the forest for the occasion. Later anything that will burn may be thrown into the fire to keep it going, including broken and discarded furniture and gear. The fire is kept burning all night, and the young folk will go straight from it to the Church for Early Service on Easter Morn.

Easter Sunday is the greatest Festival of Spring and many Christian and pre-Christian associations have gathered around it, among the former particularly those of the Annunciation and St. George's Day.

On Easter Sunday "the Gates of Paradise are Open", and the souls of sinners are released from Hell.

The traces of pre-Christian festivals and ritual are many. Some appear related to those connected with Christmas and the New Year. Most of them refer to wheat farming, the cult of the dead, good wishes to the living and to the marriage season. Many ritual songs survive. For Easter is indeed a feast of songs and gladness, in which the entire community takes part. The festivities continue for three days, with the ringing of bells and the music of songs of Springtime and Eastertide.

The young people give the Easter celebrations their characteristic tone. They start their festivities in the open air with Easter Sunday and continue them until St. Simon's Day. At Easter "the Sun comes out to play", as the saying goes in Ukraine, and on Easter morning the shutters are opened before sunrise "to let the Sun into the house". Young girls await the rising of the sun with a prayer in the garden. Any man too, when he first sees the sun on Easter morning, will reverently doff his hat, bow to the East and say a traditional prayer.

Easter Sunday begins with Early Morning Service, followed later by Easter Mass at noon. On the conclusion of Mass the people greet each other with the words "Christ is Risen!" "Verily He is Risen!" is the joyous answer, and they embrace.

A strict fast has been observed, and now, outside the Church, the "Paschal bread", beautifully painted and ornamented Easter eggs—the "pysanky"—and many other kinds of Easter fare are blessed by the Priest. The entire parish has been at Mass, attired in its holiday best, and has brought vessels of water, butter, cream cheese, roast sucking pig, smoked ham, bacon, sausages, and little bags of poppy seed, millet to make porridge, pepper, salt and horseradish to be blessed for the feast.

Friends now exchange Easter eggs, and soon all hurry home with the "dorinnyk", the bundle of food that has been blessed, wrapped in linen, and with vessels of the holy water and anything else that may have been blessed; first they will hallow their home and family and everything within by sprinkling the water to which the Priest has given his blessing.

In Eastern Ukraine all the food brought back from the Church is placed on the table. The head of the family undoes the linen napkins in which the food has been wrapped, cuts off small pieces of the Paschal bread ("proskurka") and of every other kind of food, and gives them to all the members of the household.

In Western Ukraine all first go three times around the house and farm yard, touching the cattle with a piece of the consecrated bread and leaving bread and salt in the manger of each beast, and then go to wish the bees "A Happy Easter". They then return into the house, undo the dorinnyk, held high above the heads of the children, and sit down at table, when the food that has been blessed is served out. The food stays on the table for three days. A piece of the Paschal bread and three decorated eggs are wrapped in linen and are placed upon the stove "for the departed".

As at Christmas and at the New Year, groups of young people and sometimes of children go about the streets on Easter Day to wish a happy Easter to everyone they meet. In the Carpathian Ukraine groups of young men will call on the girls of their choice, exchange painted Easter eggs, do some formal courting and perhaps arrange a dance.

We know from contemporary writings that it was still customary in the middle of the 19th century for people to call upon their friends and to salute the head of the house and his wife with songs wishing them happiness at Easter. The custom survives in a different form in Halychyna in the West, particularly in the town of Yavoriv,

and on the Ukrainian-Byelorussian border, where young men serenade the maidens and the young wives who have married during the past year.

In Eastern Ukraine calls at Easter are now confined to visiting relations and close friends and taking them "kolach", a form of fine white bread, and decorated Easter eggs. In some rural parts the custom of the "Progress of the Poplar" still survives. The girls of the village elect one of their number to be a kind of May Queen. She is called "the Poplar", and her companions lead her through the village, singing songs of Spring, which are called "vesnyanky" or "hahilky".

In Western Ukraine the girls sing Easter carols outside the Churches. Those songs are of very ancient origin. They are of the type of set choruses, accompanied by formal dances with imitative and symbolic gestures, and contain allusions the origin of which has long been forgotten.

For that matter the origin and significance of the decorated Easter eggs, symbols of the germination and renewal of life, which are given and exchanged among friends and lovers, are pre-Christian and indeed prehistoric, as are many of the traditional patterns with which they are decorated.

It is no doubt in connection with the egg as a symbol of the renewal of life that Easter eggs are buried in graves or merely in the ground. Eggs which are buried in the ground for the departed, may later be dug up and given to the poor. One of the Easter customs in Ukraine is indeed connected with remembrance of the dead, for Commemoration Services are held on Maundy Thursday, the last day of Easter (the Tuesday), during the following week and on the Sunday after Easter.

No nation on earth pays more attention to the observance of traditional Easter customs, and nowhere could the dual significance of Easter, of spiritual rebirth and regeneration of life in spring, be more apparent than in Ukraine. For religion plays a very great and real part in the everyday life of her people, and spring in that mainly agricultural country of rich black earth, which a continental climate has bound in snow and ice for four months, vividly symbolises the renewal of life and of the hope of happiness.

A Year of Slavery

Chronicle of major events which occurred in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1954

The acuteness of the national problem in the U.S.S.R., the persistent and fierce revolutionary-liberation fight of the peoples enslaved by Russia, the fiction of the so-called "friendship of peoples", the fiction of Malenkov's promises given at the 19th party congress, have compelled Russia to resort to new means of deceiving and confusing the Soviet population.

In December 1953 Russia planned a decisive offensive against the Ukrainian people under the pretext of the celebration of the "300th anniversary of the reunion of Ukraine and Russia". It is known that later all the enslaved people of the U.S.S.R. had to mark that occasion under the guidance of the "elder brother".

The celebration was planned for home as well as foreign use. In fact, however, by that celebration the Kremlin understood a concealed decisive offensive against the Ukrainian people and, first of all, its revolutionary-liberation movement. Later on the plans of the Kremlin assumed the form of deportation of the Ukrainian population, primarily of the youth, to Kazakhstan and Siberia. In addition, the Russian ideological offensive against the moral and ideological positions of the Ukrainian nationalist movement increased to a considerable extent.

On January 6, 1954, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (C.P.) of Ukraine, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution concerning the appointment of a government committee for the organisation of celebrations marking the anniversary of the enslavement of Ukraine. Simultaneously, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. (and not the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R.!) created a new region, the Cherkassy region, which includes some of the districts of the Kyiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad and Vinnytsia regions. The Cherkassy region was created only because of political, not economic requirements. By Russia's order the town Proskuriv was given a new name, namely, Khmelnytsky:

the Izmail region was liquidated for strategic reasons and annexed to the Odessa region.

The 4th session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. (January 15, 1954) served as a prelude to the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the enslavement of Ukraine; the session considered organisation problems only. In consequence of the session Hrechukha was dismissed from the Presidium of the Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. by means of the so-called "organisational procedure"; he was replaced by Korotchenko.

In the month of January conferences of publishers of local and district newspapers were held all over Ukraine. At the conferences the publishers were reprimanded for unsatisfactory ideological and propaganda work, neglect of the fight against the "bourgeois survivals", dulling "class vigilance", and for improper explanation of "achievements" in Soviet life. In consequence of that, some of the publishers were dismissed from employment, others were transferred to other posts, and still more were certainly deported to Siberia.

Masking its plans of deportation of the Ukrainian population from Ukraine, Russia ordered all the resettlement offices in Ukraine to start a campaign of encouraging and persuading Ukrainians to migrate voluntarily to Siberia, the Altai Mountains and the Far East; at the same time it made preparations for a mass deportation of Ukrainians.

In order to make much ado about the new "socialist" nations in the U.S.S.R., their "indissoluble friendship" and the alleged absence of any fight for national liberation, the Central Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine ordered the members of the Young Communist League to start socialist competitions in all the big mills and factories in Ukraine "in honour" of the 300th anniversary of the "re-union". The Charkiv tractor plant was the first to start a "socialist competition" of this kind.

Along with the socialist competition, Russia carried on an intensive action aimed at filling up machine and tractor stations, state farms and collective farms in Ukraine with inspectors, party directors and party specialists who had been sent on missions from Russian factories and institutions to Ukraine under the pretext of "helping the collective farmers".

A conference of directors of Machine and Tractor Stations (M.T.S.) of the Ukrainian S.S.R. was held in Kyiv; the conference

"revealed" the neglected state of the grain economy, livestock-raising, fodder supplies, stables, and the lack of mechanisation of field work and so on. As usual, the Ukrainian peasantry was the scape-goat in this case.

According to the Russian plan for celebrating the 300th anniversary of the "reunion", a joint session of the Presidia of the Supreme Soviets of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was held in Moscow at which the "elder brother" presented the "younger brother", Ukraine, with the Crimea which the Russians had separated from Ukraine and annexed to the R.S.F.S.R. during the establishment of the so-called U.S.S.R. But during the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the "defence of Sevastopol" it turned out that it was an illusory "present". Russia showed once more that the Crimea belongs to Muscovy, and not to Ukraine.

Having received such a "present", the Central Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine called the 16th congress of Komsomol (Ukraine) which began its session on February 25, 1954. In the speeches delivered at the congress there were indications that Ukrainian youth had been prepared for the party's appeal regarding the fight for "solution of the grain problem" in the U.S.S.R. Thus, the plans for the deportation of Ukrainian youth to Kazakhstan began to come to light gradually. The Komsomol congress revealed that Ukrainian youth joins Komsomol reluctantly, that it is not interested in Soviet life, and that Ukrainian nationalism rummages in its midst. Even Kyrychenko confirmed the vitality of Ukrainian nationalism at the 18th congress of the C.P. of Ukraine which completed its work on March 24, 1954.

Although at this 18th congress Kyrychenko exalted to the skies the "immense" achievements of the Ukrainian S.S.R. under the guidance of the "elder brother", he was unable to conceal the reality: the beggarly life of the Ukrainian population, the collapse of the collective-farm system, the resistance which the Ukrainian people offer to the Russian enslaver. Kyrychenko also furiously attacked the Ukrainian nationalists; he plainly stated that the Ukrainian nationalist liberation movement was continuing to act with an unflinching vigour.

As to the "immense achievement" of the collective farms in Ukraine, the poor crop of last year is the best proof of the falsehood

of the Russian liars in this respect. Even Russia was compelled to reduce the plan of the compulsory grain delivery in Ukraine. But that "reduction" was made by Russia only when Ukraine had already "fulfilled and overfulfilled" the plan of grain delivery.

The main part of the Russian celebration of the 300th anniversary of the enslavement of Ukraine took part on May 9, 1954. The celebration was very loud and noisy; it was attended by thousands of Russian rulers in Ukraine. The Ukrainian population, however, was compelled to demonstrate, to manifest, to sing, to dance before the Russian rulers, and to vow friendship which would last "for ever".

The Russian celebration of the 300th anniversary of the enslavement of Ukraine was completed with the jubilee sessions of the Presidia of the Supreme Soviets of the Ukrainian S.S.R. (May 25, 1954) and the R.S.F.S.R. (May 27, 1954). At these sessions Kyrychenko and the Russian Puzanov delivered endless dithyrambs in honour of the "great" Russian people and its "brother" the Ukrainian people. This marked also the beginning of the deportation of the Ukrainian population from all over Ukraine to Kazakhstan and the Far East. At the sessions Kyrychenko and Puzanov again furiously attacked the Ukrainian nationalists, threatening them with complete extermination.

Having completed the "celebration" and begun the deportation of the Ukrainian population from its native country, the Russian rulers along with Ukrainian janissaries called the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. on June 16, 1954; at the session they *pro forma* debated on the budget of Ukraine for 1954 and approved it. In fact, however, the budget had already been approved by Russia at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of April 20, 1954. Incidentally, the budget of Ukraine confirmed the state of real enslavement of Ukraine because the budget of the city of Moscow alone by far exceeded the budget for Ukraine.

Along with the deportation of the Ukrainian population to Kazakhstan, a purge of Soviet public servants and a reorganisation of ministries and institutions began in Ukraine. A plenary meeting of the Central Committee of C.P. of Ukraine was held on July 2, it was followed (July 6) by a session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R.; at the sessions Korniychuk was dismissed from office as a member of the Presidium of the Central

Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine and first vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. The reasons for the dismissal were not given.

The public servants dismissed from Soviet institutions were compelled to hand in applications "voluntarily" to party committees for transfer to mills and factories or emigration to Kazakhstan. Those matters and problems of trade-union work in the M.T.S. were considered by a plenary session of the Ukrainian Republican Council of Trade Unions on September 1, 1954. At the plenary session it was stated that the Ukrainian workers joined the trade unions with great reluctance, and a series of factories systematically failed to fulfil the plan. The plenary session passed a series of resolutions aimed at raising the exploitation of the working masses of Ukraine.

A conference of agricultural workers was held in Kyiv on September 17, 1954 at which the Russians suggested that Maltsev's method of tillage should be applied in Ukraine. The Ukrainian agricultural workers took up a reserved attitude towards that method, the more so as the Ukrainian population starves and the crop is poor in consequence of various "Russian experiments and the collective farm socialist system".

Having celebrated the 100th anniversary of the defence of Sebastopol and brought to an end various regional and district Komsomol, party and agricultural conferences, the rulers of enslaved Ukraine increased their pressure upon the Ukrainian collective farmers, compelled them to work in the fields and to harvest day and night, and even compelled Ukrainian children—who were supposed to be resting in pioneer camps—to work.

The Soviet press did not mention the bad harvest of the current year in Ukraine at all. On the contrary it praised the "enthusiasm" shown by the peasants during harvest-time, and the transportation of grain from combines to state corn storages. On November 12, the Central Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Council of Ministers, submitted a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in which they stated that the Ukrainian S.S.R. had fulfilled the state plan of grain delivery ahead of time. The report once more revealed Russian lies and falsehood with regard to Ukraine. In his speech delivered on November 6,

1954, during the October celebrations, Saburov stated that, in view of the poor crop in Ukraine, the Supreme Soviet had allegedly reduced the plan of grain delivery in Ukraine, and on November 12 the Russian invaders stated that the robbery had been fulfilled ahead of time.

On December 12, 1954, the Central Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine informed the Central Committee of the C.P. of the Soviet Union that the Ukrainian population had also been robbed of potatoes and vegetables because the Ukrainian S.S.R. had "fulfilled" the state plan of potatoes and vegetables storage. Consequently, Russia doomed the Ukrainian population to serious food shortage in 1954-55.

On December 19, 1954, the Ukrainian population was compelled to elect by "free" voting the people's courts to which agents of the communist party had been appointed in advance.

The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. of December 20 was a Bolshevik New Year's trick; it fixed the date of election to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the local councils for February 27, 1955; we know in advance that during that election 100 per cent voters will "vote" for the candidates of the party.

* * *

The Association of Ukrainian Writers "Slovo" sent a wire from New York to the All-Union Congress of writers in Moscow on December 20, 1954. In their telegram they say that "works by 259 Ukrainian writers were published in the year 1930. After 1938 only the works by 36 of those writers were published". The telegram points out that M.V.D. could answer the congress's question "where and why 223 writers have disappeared from Ukrainian literature".

The presidium of "Slovo" has added the following information to that telegram: "Slovo" has at its disposal a complete list of the Ukrainian writers who have disappeared in the U.S.S.R. and their personal data. Only 7 of them have died a natural death.

The telegram of "Slovo" and their comments to it have been broadcast by the "Voice of America".

‘PROGRESSIVE’ AGRICULTURE?

Russian Myths about the “Progressiveness of the Socialist System of Economy”

Russian collectivism and economic socialisation, especially that of agriculture, is the machinery of a planned robbery of the products of the population of all non-Russian lands of the empire, and a distribution of the spoil among the Russian population, i. e. the population of the parent state of the empire—Muscovy.

This is the essence of the Russian imperial socialist-collective system of economy. Suffice it to recollect and to consider the first five-year-plan of the years 1928-1933, according to which “the producing zone”, Ukraine and the Cossack lands, were supposed to supply 52 million metric centners of grain every year¹⁾ for wiping out the deficit in grain, and thus to provide sustenance for the population of “the regions of the central consuming zone”, i. e. the ethnographic territory of Muscovy.

Before the middle of the 17th century, when only ethnographic central Muscovy was a separate state and an economic organism and neither Ukraine nor the Cossack lands nor any “producing zones” belonged to it, Muscovy still produced on its territory an amount of grain and other food which was sufficient for the maintenance of its population. Along with the development and expansion of the empire the productivity of the Russian ethnographic territory continuously decreased at the expense of the “cheap”—because not hard-earned but robbed—products of the subjugated peoples. This development of Muscovy, the parent state, into a nation sponging on its colonies has been crowned with the system of a special-economic organisation—collectivism and socialism. One should be aware of the fact that, in the natural, climatic respect, the territory

¹⁾ *Five-year plan of the national-economic construction of the U.S.S.R. “Ukraine”, volume III, Moscow. Publishing House “Planned economy”, 1939.*

of today's central ethnographic Muscovy, the territory named "the consuming zone" in the first five-year-plan, is so suitable for agricultural production and relatively so sparsely populated (about 40 persons per square kilometre) that it could produce twice as much grain and other food as is needed by its entire population. For this, however, the agricultural production of that territory would have at least to reach the level of the agricultural productivity and living standards of pre-war Poland, not to mention of other European countries which are highly developed in the agricultural respect (Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and so on). But the process of industrialisation and the impoverishment of the rural population of ethnographic Muscovy by the old imperial policy of supplying the population of the parent state with "cheap bread" and "easy-earned food" continues steadily. The mass migration of the rural population of Muscovy to the towns, which took place on the ethnographic territory of Muscovy between the two world wars, may be considered a phenomenon of far-reaching historic importance. From 1926 to 1939, between the two population counts, the absolute number of the population of the Ryazan, Orlov, Voronizh, Tambov, Penza, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, Smolensk, Yaroslav and Vologda regions and the Mordovian Autonomous Republic decreased by 5,5 million people²). This means an absolute decrease of the whole population of those regions, and the decrease of the rural population is, obviously, still greater because a part of the rural population, having migrated to the towns, remained in those regions. It should be taken into consideration that the majority of the above mentioned regions have very rich soil particularly suitable for tillage; in the time of the Russian tzars they formed a base which supplied the entire population of Muscovy with agricultural products for centuries. The same process of depopulation of Russian villages took place and is in progress throughout Russia, but it does not result in a general decrease of the population of other regions because of the enormous growth of Russian towns—Moscow, Lenin-grad, Gorky, Tula and so on—which has absorbed the rural population.

While the subjugation and occupation of peoples and countries as, for example, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are called by

²) Great Soviet Encyclopaedia. Volume "The Union of S.S.R." OGIZ, Moscow, 1948, page 60.

Russia "liberation", "real sovereignty" and the like, collectivism and socialism are not called by their proper names by her; they are called "a means of increasing the productivity of labour" and "raising the standard of living of the working masses", not what it really is—the machinery for the robbing and exploitation of the subjugated nations for the benefit of the parent state.

In its propaganda Russia usually contrasts its socialist system of economy with the "capitalist" economy of agriculture in the U.S.A. Russia takes the U.S.A. as example because those for whom that propaganda is designed, i.e. the population of the subjugated countries and those European peoples which are prospective candidates for liberation (in Europe), are not well enough acquainted with the situation in the U.S.A.; and it is dangerous to contrast the "progressiveness" of its system of economy with that of European countries because the population of Europe, and to a considerable extent the population of the U.S.S.R., is acquainted with that system.

Therefore, this short outline has as its main object the quotation of some data and facts which unmask Russian propaganda.

Of the total number of inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. which amounted to 170 million in 1939, 115 million inhabitants, or 68 per cent, lived in the country; in the U.S.A., of the total number of inhabitants of the country which amounted to 140 million in 1940, 57 million inhabitants, or 40.8 per cent, lived in the country. Of the whole rural population of the U.S.S.R., 84 million inhabitants—collective farmers, individual peasants, workers and employees of state farms and machine and tractor stations—per entire sown area amounting to 136.9 million hectares³⁾ were directly engaged in agriculture, i. e. one head of the population was directly engaged in agriculture per 1.6 hectares of ploughed land; in the U.S.A., of the whole rural population, 30.5 million people per 131 million hectares of ploughed land were directly occupied with agriculture, or one head of the population occupied directly with agriculture per 4.3 hectares of ploughed land. Thus the amount of ploughed land per head of the population occupied with agriculture in U.S.A. is two and a half times as great as that in the U.S.S.R. This fact refutes the Russian

³⁾ One hectare equals 2.7 acres.

myth about an allegedly higher saving of labour by the socialist method of agriculture.

The general indexes of the productivity of agriculture are as follows: before World War II (1937) the general production of cereal crops in both the countries was thus (in thousands of metric centners):

	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.
Wheat	259,438	237,866
Rye	219,380	12,561
Barley	66,101	47,819
Oats	149,561	166,379
Maize	39,219	671,815
Sum total	733,699	1,136,440

It can be seen that the crop of grain in the U.S.A. is by 55 per cent, or about one and a half times, greater than that in the U.S.S.R., although the area under cultivation in the U.S.A. is a little smaller (136.9 million hectares in the U.S.S.R. and 131 million hectares in the U.S.A.) and the total number of people occupied with agriculture in the U.S.A. is two and half times less than that in the U.S.S.R.

The general indexes of livestock-raising in the U.S.S.R. as compared with those in the U.S.A. are (in millions of heads):

	U.S.A. Average annual sum for 10 years (1935-1944)	U.S.S.R. in 1940
Cattle	71.1	54.5
Milch cows included	25.7	no data available
Sheep and goats	52.8	91.6
Pigs	55.3	25.7
Horses and mules	14.7	17.5
Fowls	448.9	no data available

On the basis of this table it is difficult to draw comparative conclusions in absolute numbers because in American farming the number of cattle is by 16.6 million heads and that of pigs by 27.8

million heads greater, but, on the other hand, the number of sheep and goats is by 38.8 million head smaller than that in the U.S.S.R. But those numerical differences have a further meaning if one takes into consideration the fact that a cow weighs 6-9, and even more, times as much as a sheep, and yields as many times as much milk and meat; every pig gives, on an average, twice as much meat as a sheep. The structure of the livestock is of particular importance: more than one third (36.2 p. c.) of the horned cattle in the U.S.A. consists of milch cows; and in 1941, of the 20.1 million cattle in the collective farms there were only 5.6 million cows, i. e. only one fourth of the livestock.

Such a "trifle" as fowls! In the U.S.A. there are 448.9 million fowls or, on an average, 75 fowls per farmer's family. We have no information on the presence of fowls in the U.S.S.R. If, however, one raises the question whether there are so many fowls in the personal use of the members of a kolkhoz and in the kolkhoz poultry farm as to amount to the ratio of 75 fowls per kolkhoz family, probably none of the readers acquainted with the situation will doubt the truth of the answer: of course, there is neither so great a number of poultry (chickens, geese, ducks, turkeys and so on), nor anything approaching that number.

Thus, although the number of inhabitants of the U.S.A. engaged in agriculture is two and a half times smaller, their productivity is, according to the above quoted data, considerably higher than—at least one and a half times—that in the U.S.S.R.

The third myth spread by Russia is its myth about the "capitalist character" of American agriculture. True, this myth is spread, for the most part, by the Russian gutter press. Publications which want to be treated seriously do not spread the myth. In 1948 *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* pointed out (page 850) that the average area of an American farm amounted to 20.2 hectares in 1935. In view of this area of the American farm one would hardly speak of its "capitalist character".

Before World War II 6 million American farmers were occupied with agriculture; the sown area of a farm amounted, on an average, to 22 hectares. Naturally, the areas and types of individual American farms exhibited considerable differences: from the smallest to the biggest ones—industrial farms. However, the family farm is the basic, and most wide-spread type. The family character of the American

farm may be proved by an analysis of hands engaged in American agriculture.

According to the data of the Department of Agriculture of the U.S.A. the average number of workers engaged in agriculture was as follows:

	1910-14	1935-39	1946
	in thousands		
1. Worker-members of the farmer's family	9,160	8,352	7,864
2. Hired workers	2,892	2,568	2,148
Sum total	12,052	10,920	10,012

Thus one hired worker falls to four worker-members of the farmer's family (the farmer, his wife and children); that is to say, American farming is privately owned farming based on the work of the farmer and his family. The hands hired by the American farmers are auxiliary and, for the most part, seasonal. This may be confirmed by a report of that Department which points out that, on an average, in the years 1944-46 the smallest number of workers hired by the American farmers fell in January (1.5 million), and the greatest in the period from July to October (about 3 million), i. e. the harvest-time.

Here we must emphasize the tendency to variation in the specific weight of hired labour in American agriculture: in the years 1910-14 the number of hired workers in the general field of labour amounted to 24.1 per cent, in the years 1935-39 to 23.6 per cent, and in the year 1946 only to 21.4 per cent; that is while in the years 1910-14 one hired worker fell to three working members of the farmer's family, in the year 1946 one hired worker fell to about four working members of the farmer's family. It should be pointed out that this tendency includes the further crystallisation of American farming as a personal or family farming with a declining weight of hired labour.

By the way, it should be noted that the general process of the decrease of the number of inhabitants of the U.S.A. engaged in agriculture, and, what is more important, the decline of the specific weight of hired labour, is accompanied by an enormous increase in agricultural production which is caused by mechanisation and rationalisation of agriculture. Suffice it to say that there are 2 million tractors in American farming.

We compare Soviet agriculture with American agriculture because Russian propaganda bases its myths about "superiority, progressiveness and preponderance" on that comparison, and, secondly, because both of them are assessed on similar objective bases: both Soviet agriculture and American agriculture, taken as two wholes, are in the initial stage of the exploitation of their natural resources and the cultivation of new arable lands; they have approximately the same population (they had in 1939) and are engaged in almost the same type of agriculture: an extensive grain agriculture with a low yielding capacity, if compared with various types of intensive agriculture. In both American and Soviet agriculture livestock-raising is not yet an organic part of agriculture. Livestock-raising is, to a considerable extent, based on the production of the area under cultivation, and not on pastures and meadows. In both cases manure has not yet become the irreplaceable component which secures and limits the high productivity of agriculture. The productivity of American agriculture is twice, and that of Soviet agriculture three times lower than the productivity of the agriculture of those European countries whose agriculture is more intensive.

The conception "Soviet agriculture" is a myth, an invention of Russian propaganda, because, in fact, there is no such agriculture, as a natural economic whole. There are different natural-historic and cultural kinds of agriculture: in Ukraine and the neighbouring Cossack area, in the North Caucasus, Siberia, the Central-Asiatic area, the Caucasian countries, and the primitive and backward agriculture of Muscovy itself. Between those different types of agriculture there are actually no economic relations resulting from tendencies in their development. They have been forcibly and mercilessly "united" by the Russian empire which carried on its unification economic policy aiming at the forcible establishment of a uniform type of agriculture in those areas to the benefit of the parent state of the empire—Muscovy.

(Passages from the work *Economic structure and economic policy of the Russian empire (U.S.S.R.)*.

Gen. Shukhevych-Chuprynka

Fifth Anniversary of the Death of a Hero

"Still a moment, and your voice will mightily roar over the ruins of the Kremlin, and the unchained mother-earth will write a song of praise in honour of the fighting-columns."

M. Boyeslav¹

The leader of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement, General Taras Chuprynka, Tur, Lozovsky—his real name Roman Shukhevych—died the death of a hero in the village of Bilohorshcha, near Lviv, five years ago on March 5, 1950.

The Ukrainian emigration first learned the news of the death of the leader of fighting Ukraine in October of that year. In the Address of the leader of the O.U.N. (abroad) to all Ukrainians, these words were included:

"Physically, there is no General Taras Chuprynka among us, but, in our hearts, he has not died and will not die, like Mazeppa, Petlyura, Konovalts. His spirit lives and will always live among us as well as in the hearts of his fighters and officers."

"Shukhevych died at Bilohorshcha in order to live as Chuprynka for ever." His name, inscribed in the history of the Ukrainian nation to eternity, will be a torch burning for ever which will illumine the path of present and future generations to the summit of human life, and to the realisation of the ideals of the nation.

Roman Shukhevych became known to all Ukrainians as Taras Chuprynka, the surname he adopted from the distinguished Ukrainian patriot, poet and writer who was arrested and executed in 1922 at Kyiv by the Bolsheviks. At that time, just after the Ukrainian War of Independence, 1918-21, the Ukrainian Liberation Movement was establishing itself underground and the All-Ukrainian

¹) Marko Boyeslav, poet and writer who fought with the Ukrainian underground; author of *Wayward Verse*.

Guerilla Centre at Kyiv, discovered and annihilated in 1922, was the first of its kind. It is fitting that the name of an outstanding figure in this first centre of underground resistance should have been borne by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.) which was the mature outcome of that earlier initiative.

General Shukhevych-Chuprynka served with the Ukrainian guerilla detachments during the second World War, and his men were among those tens of thousands who gathered in the forests of Polessia and Volynia in 1942-3 to carry on their common struggle against Nazi cruelty and repressive occupation and also against those Bolshevik partisans who were parachuted into lands occupied by the Germans.

For the suspicion of Nazi intention which had sprung up amongst Ukrainians with the arrest of members of the Provisional Ukrainian Government²⁾ in 1941 had rapidly grown into a clear-sighted recognition of the diabolical plans of Hitler with regard to Ukraine: national enslavement; terror; complete destruction of many small towns and villages accompanied by inhuman acts at times surpassing those of the Bolsheviks; deportations; incarceration, and wholesale plunder of the Ukrainian peasant. No wonder that large numbers of these long-suffering and unconquerable people formed groups for resistance in the marshes and forests, arming themselves as best they might, and inflicting every possible hindrance and embarrassment upon the German forces of occupation.

But however hardy and determined, disparate bands of fighters are never as effective a striking force as a co-ordinated army, and as many of the guerilla detachments had called themselves insurgents in order to emphasise their aim of liberating Ukraine from foreign rule and to distinguish their activities from those of Red Partisans, a number of commands combined in October 1942 to form the U.P.A. A high command was set up with Major Dmytro Klachivsky as Commander-in-Chief and General Leonid Stupnytsky as Chief-of-Staff. These officers were soon to give their lives in the struggle, and in 1943 General Roman Shukhevych—henceforward Taras Chuprynka—became Commander-in-Chief.

²⁾ As the Nazis moved eastwards, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.) called a National Assembly at Lviv, which elected a provisional government and, on June 30, 1941, re-stated the independence of the Ukrainian State over the radio.

From this time Chuprynka's whole life and energy was devoted to the U.P.A. His personal sacrifices have been great: after the Russian re-occupation his parents and his wife were sent to the Siberian slave-camps, and his children taken away—so far as he knew—to be brought up under Bolshevik influence in Russia. But these disasters only served to strengthen the determination of Chuprynka to free his country from the vile oppressor who, replaced for a few years by an equally vicious and deadly foe, now once more threatened to complete the work of the annihilation of Ukraine begun in 1921.

Towards the close of 1943, the U.P.A., which had itself been helped into being by the O.U.N.³), set up a commission which, after many months of negotiation with representatives of political parties and centres all over Ukraine, convened a Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council—S.U.L.C. This Council held its first Session on the eve of the Soviet re-occupation of Ukraine in July 1944, and revised and adopted a draft constitution by which it became the underground Parliament of Ukraine and the organ of political leadership of the Ukrainian people until the country should be liberated.

General Taras Chuprynka became the Chairman of the General Secretariat of the S.U.L.C. and was appointed Supreme Commander of the U.P.A., which now became subject to S.U.L.C. His position as C-in-C of the Ukrainian forces was thus greatly strengthened.

As a development of this political work, the General, in response to requests by representatives of other nationalities having revolutionary organisations within the U.P.A., called a Conference of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia. The Conference, representing twelve nations and with thirty-nine delegates, adopted the slogan "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual" and drew up an agreed platform. Thus was the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.) born in the very cradle of actual resistance to aggressive occupation.

As a military force, the U.P.A. was by this time recognised as a formidable element in the European war both by Germans and by the returning Bolsheviks. As the Germans retreated somewhat rapidly, the U.P.A. were able to help themselves to large stores of

³) Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, which was formed in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets, and which is now a considerable political influence in the Liberation Movement.

German arms for use against the Russians. Wisely, General Churpynka had expressly forbidden any pacts or negotiations with the retreating Germans, and soon the Red Army soldiers were streaming back into Ukraine.

For a time, however, since these Red Army units consisted chiefly of Ukrainians, the U.P.A. refrained from armed action and aimed at contacting and spreading propaganda amongst their compatriots, incorporating into their own units those Red Army soldiers who decided to fight for their own country. Administrative centres were raided, and N.K.V.D. agents attacked; preventive action was taken to deter re-establishment of collective farms; the transport of grain out of Ukraine was impeded in every possible way, and so also was the deportation of Ukrainians to the Donbas and to remote regions of the U.S.S.R.

Seeing the devastating effects of U.P.A. hostility, the Soviet leaders began, in the spring of 1945, to arrange the deportation of the West Ukrainian population to Siberia and Kazakhstan, and this forced the U.P.A. into open and armed conflict. The Soviet leaders then sent an army under Khrushchov and General Ryassny which fought the U.P.A.—especially in the Carpathian region—for several months when it ceased its action, prevented from wiping out the U.P.A. by the determined and well-trained resistance of the latter, and also by the defection of many of its own soldiers in response to U.P.A. propaganda.

And thus the fighting has continued during the years of the second Bolshevik occupation. Those who have read Major S. Khrin's account of the battle at Lishchava Horishnya⁴⁾ in 1944 and of the raiding parties in Carpatho-Ukraine, South-eastern Poland, and Slovakia in 1945⁵⁾ and other papers and reports coming from Ukraine, need little imagination to picture the incessant complexities and difficulties inherent in such a campaign for liberation as that waged since 1943 by the U.P.A. Such variety of hostile actions, the constant need for concealment of quarters, of ambulance stations, of supply dumps, and so on, calls for exceptional attention to and memory for detail in the Supreme Commander, and also for a

⁴⁾ *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Fight for Freedom.* New York 1954. p. 180 ff.

⁵⁾ *The Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times.* Oleh R. Mar:ovych. 1951, p. 151 ff.



General Taras Chuprynka (Roman Shukhevych)
1907-1950

personal example that can serve as an inspiration to subsidiary leaders throughout the whole army and area of fighting. In face of the reverses that must daily be reported, the constant accounts of the strength and resource of the enemy-occupant, the sudden raised hopes that end in tragedy, the personality of the leader must present an intrepid courage and faith in the final outcome, together with a patience that to the uninitiated might appear as a coldness of temperament or an aloofness of spirit.

Such a man was General Taras Chuprynka. The manner of his death—within a few miles of one of the largest strongholds of the enemy—bears its own witness to his interpretation of his duty. The Bolsheviks so feared and hated the influence and the implacable example of this man that they spent manpower and equipment lavishly in an incessant effort to find him. Finally, during the struggle of U.P.A. detachments against the renewed drive for collectivisation and “consolidation”, his H.Q. bunker was located at Bilohorshcha near Lviv by M.G.B. troops. In the ensuing skirmish Taras Chuprynka was killed. The news of his death, however, was not announced to the world until October 21 of that year.

The sculptor, Michael Cheresniovsky, who fought for the underground in Ukraine for many years, and who finally fought his way out through the Iron Curtain, has made a portrait bust of the General which is not only one of the sculptor's finest works, but which preserves for us the remarkable intrepidity, the inspiration, and the fixity of purpose of the underground leader. For Chuprynka combined the qualities of military leadership with a creative political insight that has enabled the Ukrainian people to find the means and to forge an instrument of political expression even under the rigours of Bolshevik occupation.

Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka was an idealist. He was a revolutionary nationalist, soldier, strategist, political leader and statesman. He led the O.U.N. and the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council in Ukraine in the hardest time of the underground fight. Under his command the O.U.N. engraved its name in Ukrainian history as the only Ukrainian liberation-political organisation which dared to face the enemy in an open fight at a time of national crisis. The O.U.N., in a historic document in 1945, declares:

“We, the Governing Body of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, will remain together with our people on the battlefield

in our war of liberation, on our occupied lands. Shoulder to shoulder together with the revolutionaries and insurgents we shall fight as front-line fighters in our further fight for freedom."

General Taras Chuprynka, the initiator and organiser of the U.P.A., the S.U.L.C. and the A.B.N., faithfully and firmly guarded the highest ideals of the nation and of God until the last moment of his life. He will remain in the heart of the Ukrainian people as a man-symbol, as an embodiment of the spirit of the Ukrainian nation. In our hearts, the hearts of the present generation, his brilliant figure will be the personification of leadership, military command, and the supreme political authority of the state.

The late Taras Chuprynka was succeeded by Colonel Vasyl Koval, and the Ukrainian liberation revolutionary fight will be continued until a victory is won over the enemy. At some future time the liberated Ukrainian people in a Free United Ukrainian State will erect monuments in Kyiv and Lviv to the memory of Chuprynka.

General Taras Chuprynka is dead. "But", wrote Stepan Bandera on the occasion of his death, "his great, strong spirit will remain among us for ever; it calls upon us to continue our persistent fight. Like him, who devoted his life to the freedom of his native country, all of us will spare no sacrifices. He gave us an example: one can and should fight for the great truth even under the most difficult conditions and in an apparently hopeless situation. His name has been linked indissolubly with the most heroic phase of the revolutionary-liberation fight of Ukraine, and this phase will prove a solid basis for the further development of the Ukrainian National Revolution, on its way to final victory. The realisation of the great idea on whose altar the Ukrainian nation has already sacrificed so many of its best sons and daughters, and is offering yet more sacrifices, will at some time be the reward granted by the justice of God. The legion of perfect examples of heroism and self-sacrifice on behalf of the idea will exist in the mind of the nation, and will serve as vanguard in the further developments of the centuries to come. All those who have devoted their lives to the freedom of Ukraine, the known and unknown knights of the sacred cause, stand side by side in that legion of heroes. The memory of the leader, Taras Chuprynka, will symbolise the memory of all the dead heroes of his epoch."

M. O. Myronenko

BUILDING A REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

Can national liberation forces be recruited from the Soviet Army?

There are many national liberation movements among the nations at present subjugated by Russia, and one of the most important problems to be faced by them is to plan the reinforcement of their insurgent troops and the establishment of large-scale armies during the actual course of a future revolution. The formation of the national forces is an essential part of revolutionary strategy.

The basis of the military reorganisation must of course be the liberation movement concerned and all its cadres wherever situated. Beyond these, means must be found to make use of that proportion of the population which is fit for military service—the soldiers, N.C.O's, and officers at present serving in the armies of occupation—and this raises the question of the relation of the national armies of liberation to the armies of occupation in general. The collapse and disintegration of the latter will provide manpower to swell the ranks of the national armies.

The methods to be adopted may be generally described as reformatory on the one hand, and revolutionary on the other. As regards the former, those forces which are to liberate the states must effect certain changes in their armies as they exist as present. In the case of Ukraine we should, given suitable conditions, have to withdraw all troops of Ukrainian nationality from the present Soviet Army, and re organise them in national divisions. The revolutionary method, however, would be to disband the armies of occupation as far as possible by means of the liberation forces.

It is of the first importance that troops removed from armies of occupation should not adhere to the institutions, principles and methods of that army—on the contrary, such methods and principles must be utterly discarded and ignored. Napoleon insisted on these

points in setting up his army, although his task of selecting suitable manpower was comparatively simple, since he merely created a new French army in place of the old one which had in any case been French. But in this particular respect, the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army* (the U.P.A.) may be taken as an instructive example.

It seems unlikely that the setting up of national armies could ever be achieved merely by reformatory methods. However, the manpower of the Soviet Army could undoubtedly be reformed during a time of decay and chaos, of political and moral disintegration and psychological depression, such as would certainly follow after a long and deadly war. Technical reorganisation of an army is comparatively easy, but the re-orientation of its psyche is a more lengthy process, since its mentality develops as a result of experience—and in the event of national wars of liberation, this mentality may be the deciding factor.

If the manpower of an army, from the highest command to the rank and file, is "younger" than that of an enemy, then that army is also stronger. And this quality of being "younger" is the most important striking asset of a revolutionary army. To build up the revolutionary armies, therefore, the old occupation forces must be disbanded as far as possible, and the ranks filled up with new and young recruits, who can be enlisted at the ages of 16 and 17. It must be safe to assume that, in the event of a crisis, all those young men who are fit for active service and who are already in the Soviet Army, will actually be incorporated in their national revolutionary armies. Napoleon's "old" brigade, which after six or seven years' active service consisted of men with an average age of 24-26 years, was originally composed of youths from 16-18.

The large-scale establishment of national armies of liberation will be effected under certain conditions, which can briefly be described as follows: all male, and a certain number of female, members of the population between the ages 18/19 and 45/50—that is, for instance, between 3 and 4 million persons from the whole of Ukraine—will remain drawn up in various detachments of the Soviet Army throughout the U.S.S.R.; a large proportion of Ukrainian

* The U.P.A. was formed in the autumn of 1942 when several thousand armed Ukrainian patriots joined the Ukrainian guerilla detachments operating in the forests of Northern Volhynia and Polesia.

reserves from the older age-groups will form part of the Soviet Army and will be in direct or close contact with Ukraine in the European part of the U.S.S.R. Units of the Soviet Army consisting of younger cadres from Ukraine, which will probably be serving outside the borders of their own country, will not be directly affected by the setting up of the Ukrainian national army, at least not at first. Such units must not, however, be left exposed to any fighting outside their native country. Ukrainian and non-Russian cadres of the disintegrating Soviet Army must be used to form national detachments, as in the years of the revolution 1917-18, and these will carry out raids from the Ural to the Archangel regions, or will even march from Siberia to Ukraine or to their other native countries. Such action would greatly help the cause of freedom, provided that their countries had already formed armies of their own.

While the vast national armies of liberation are being expanded and reorganised, the older age-groups of the Soviet Army involved in the process will only have a relatively small number of senior officers of Ukrainian origin—that is to say, those in command will be few in number compared with the rank and file. In Ukraine, for instance, only youths of 16/17 years of age will have remained outside the Soviet Army. Thus the actual manpower will in no way be in keeping with the requirements of the national revolutions for first-class armies.

It will be useful here to consider those actual requirements:

First, there must be an inspired political and moral faith, and a positive urge towards revolution.

Secondly, the necessity for ceaseless fighting, under the most difficult conditions, demands that even the smallest unit must be self-contained; the co-ordination of the widespread combative measures and the development of reliable individual initiative in tactical operations is essential.

Thirdly, a strict discipline and rigorous economy must be enforced.

Fourthly, allowance must be made for the probability that the national armies would suffer a high proportion of losses, and that they might lose proportionally up to two or three times more officers than a regular army.

Fifthly, the overall staff work and the organisation of the lines of communication—reinforcements, army medical services, training of recruits, bringing reserves up to strength, etc.—are the most im-

portant and responsible tasks in respect of the actual fighting capacity. Any temporary cessation of such activities and of hostilities would prove extremely insidious both for the rank and file of the army and for those politicians who do not think far ahead. Also such occurrences would have a weakening effect upon those recently detached from a regular army, for they would gain the impression that a state of chaos existed which they could neither understand nor remedy.

These essentials of the liberation armies call for a more radical approach to the problem of recruitment than a mere re-enlistment of the manpower now serving in the Soviet Army. Certain standards should therefore be adopted from the first, and certain principles followed in the establishment of the armies.

First of all, as mentioned above, the army must be "young", from the lowest ranks to the commander-in-chief. On this ground alone it is clear that mere reformatory methods will not suffice. In addition, the national armies of liberation must be organised as territorial forces, for in this way the armies will be ensured of political and moral sincerity and unity, and their morale will be safeguarded against the influence of confusion and the demagogic propaganda of the enemy. Thus the most efficient striking power of the troops will be guaranteed. The reorganisation of the Soviet Army as it is at present would not be compatible with these principles, either from the present, or from the future aspect.

The national armies of liberation must form their officers' corps by using revolutionary methods, and in doing so must take into consideration the fact that they cannot rely on the supply of officers from the Soviet Army, either in the number or the quality required, even apart from political considerations. For this reason the commissioned officers must be drawn to an adequate degree from revolutionary soldiers, N.C.O's and officers of proved reliability. Members of the Soviet Army will only be able to join the national revolutionary forces as ordinary soldiers, and the rank which they later receive will depend upon the personal qualities they reveal. Their status in the ranks of the champions of liberation will in no way be dependent upon their holding a commission in the Soviet Army.

In Ukraine, as opportunity arises to detach the majority of the Ukrainians from the Soviet forces, the national revolutionary army will have certain organising functions, and also certain military and

strategic needs, since the manpower at its disposal will be considerably less numerically than the actual Ukrainian element in the Soviet Army. A great number will in fact not be needed. During its greatest development and whilst the victorious and decisive battle is in progress, it will hardly require more than 800,000 men, whereas at the time of the collapse of the Soviet divisions and the possible detachment of Ukrainians from the regular army, its possible forces will number 3 or 4 million Ukrainians. This fact is not of importance, since the revolutionary army cannot allot such masses to its units and, moreover, it does not require such large numbers from the military and strategic point of view.

Sooner or later after the collapse of the Soviet Army, the process of its reorganisation will begin in Russia, but that is another question altogether. The process will not endanger Ukraine provided that this country has an army of 800,000 men when the process begins, and that the size of this army can be adjusted in accordance with the development of events in Russia.

The fact must thus be stressed that the idea of detaching the Ukrainians, and also the members of other subjugated nations from the Soviet Army by no means implies that these trained forces of Ukrainians, numbering 3 to 4 million, will be allotted to the Ukrainian revolutionary army. They could, for instance, simply be demobilised, in order to prevent any weakening of revolutionary determination.

We may now sum up the question of the relation of the national revolutionary liberation movement to the Soviet Army. When the Soviet Army is about to collapse through the secession of the various nations from its ranks, and while Ukrainian units are being set up, the national liberation movement must, from the strategic point of view, regard such occurrences as the signal to demobilise the Soviet Army, and this demobilisation must be speeded up in every possible way.

In the course of this demobilisation, the most valuable part of the available manpower must be selected in order to bring the cadres of the national revolutionary armies up to the full required strength; and this selection must be made according both to existing training and fighting ability, and to the degree of revolutionary sincerity and trustworthiness of the manpower concerned.

P. Poltava

OUR PLAN FOR LIBERATION

In 1946 the Ukrainian liberation revolutionary movement in the U.S.S.R. began to change from the form of a wide insurrection to the form of a deep flowing underground movement. Practically, this change of tactics has manifested itself primarily in the following ways: 1) little by little, according to the situation and requirements in individual regions, the units of the U.P.A. (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) were disbanded, and their participants, commanders and fighters, were included in the framework of the underground organisation, the underground network; 2) the whole life of the underground organisation, as well as its work, became carefully camouflaged; 3) contrary to what was done in the time of wide-spread action by the U.P.A. (the main aim of those actions was to prevent the enemy from extending his power beyond regional and district centres), the political-propaganda and political-organisation work was put in the forefront. At present the armed underground work is the basic form of the fight of the Ukrainian liberation-revolutionary movement in the U.S.S.R. The underground organisation is a living force; it meets the demands of a strict conspiracy.

* * *

In connection with that change of the form of fight on the part of the Ukrainian liberation movement, as well as in connection with a lasting "peace" for the world, the Ukrainian community which lives legally is certainly interested in the question: What is our plan of fight in the present situation? What is the practical aim of our underground fight today? What are we trying to achieve under those hard conditions by sacrificing so many of our people?

In outline, in the present situation our plan of fight for the liberation of Ukraine includes the following most important tasks:

1) To maintain our underground organisation in the Ukrainian lands in the U.S.S.R. at any cost and to continue to build it up according to requirements and opportunities;

2) To carry on an enlightening propaganda-political work among the whole Ukrainian people and other peoples of the entire U.S.S.R. through the underground organisation as well as in every other possible way;

3) To organise the resistance of the Ukrainian and, if possible, other peoples of the U.S.S.R. against the Bolshevik oppressors and exploiters in all spheres of life;

4) To carry on armed actions which are absolutely necessary for preventing the occupants from consolidating their hold on our lands, as they wish to do, and for hindering the Russian-Bolshevik criminals and all their menials from committing their crimes with regard to the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian liberation movement without being punished for it.

In short, such is the present plan of our liberation fight.

The liberation of Ukraine, the liberation of the Ukrainian people in the next historical period, depends on how much we succeed in the fulfilment of this plan.

One may ask; Why it is so? Because:

The whole of history teaches us that an enslaved people may make itself free provided it is able to establish a proper liberation organisation made up of its best sons. Such an organisation is absolutely necessary, first of all, for the preparation of a nation-wide insurrection or any other decisive liberation action. It is a well known fact that occupation rule in an enslaved country may be overthrown in this way only, that is, by means of a nation-wide insurrection. Moreover, such an organisation is indispensable because there must be somebody to summon the people to such an insurrection (or any other liberation action) at an opportune moment, lead the people into action, organise the insurrection, direct it, march in its front-line, be its support and spearhead. *If at an opportune moment the people have no organisation to carry on such a fight, they will not make themselves free even under the most favourable conditions.*

The people must have such an organisation on their own territory, and not in emigration.. The emigration may return to its native country only behind the armies of other powers, at the best as an insignificant component part of those armies, even if it should appear there under its own banner. That is to say, at a decisive moment, such as a war against the occupant of its native country, the influence of the emigration over the fate of its own people—

especially if the belligerent powers are completely indifferent to that enslaved people—is insignificant, almost nil. Nor can the emigration exert any influence upon the fate of its own people if the attitude of the belligerent powers, enemies of the occupant, towards the enslaved people is hostile. *The liberation of an enslaved people almost always depends only on what the people are able to achieve on their own territory, in their native country, and not in emigration.*

In the light of what has been said above, it is clear that the existence of the present underground organisation in Ukraine, the existence of our present organised revolutionary underground work, is of particular importance to the Ukrainian people.

Some Ukrainians conjecture thus: "Everything depends on the war against the U.S.S.R. Our people alone (i.e. the underground organisation) are not able to achieve anything".

It is true that today our liberation-revolutionary movement in Ukraine is still too weak to think, under existing conditions, of the overthrow of the Bolshevik rule in our native country by means of our own forces only. It is also true that a war against the U.S.S.R., and especially the war which is being prepared, would considerably facilitate our liberation fight. We do not deny it. *However, it is a gross error to think that a war alone would be enough to liberate Ukraine. Without the existence of an experienced and properly built-up liberation organisation in Ukraine, the Ukrainian people will not make themselves free in case of war.* On the basis of what we said about the role and importance of a liberation organisation in the life of an enslaved people this should be quite intelligible to everyone. The information on the present attitude of the West towards our emigration abroad confirms our conclusion. For the most part, that attitude today is somewhat indifferent to our liberation fight. Having been a stateless people for so long a time, it is today hard for us to gain positions in international life.

Our underground O.U.N. (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) in the U.S.S.R., our revolutionary underground organisation as a whole, is an experienced and fairly well built up organisation in Ukraine today, an organisation which is able to excite the people to a decisive liberation action at an opportune moment, to organise such an action and to direct it. The fact that we have such an organisation in Ukraine today is our great advantage, the great achievement of an enslaved people. This is the surest guarantee of our liberation at the first opportunity.

Therefore, naturally, we consider the maintaining and building-up of that organisation the most important task of our plan of the liberation fight in the present situation. We have tried and shall try in the future to fulfil that task at any price, even at the cost of great sacrifices. We know a voluntary giving up of our plan, or the destruction of our underground organisation by the enemy, would be identical with crossing out our hopes for the liberation of the Ukrainian people in the near future.

But, in order to be able to gain its end at an opportune moment, i. e. to gain a complete national-state liberation of Ukraine, our liberation organisation must secure, especially at the decisive moment of the fight, the support of the broad Ukrainian masses, the whole Ukrainian people. Our liberation organisation will acquire such support, if, on the one hand, our programme meets the needs and desires of the broad Ukrainian masses and, on the other hand, if the Ukrainian masses are well and thoroughly acquainted with our programme and our aim.

As to the former requirement, the situation of our movement in that respect is not amiss. Our programme really reflects the desires and requirements of all strata of the Ukrainian people, its broad masses. This may be confirmed by the numerous statements concerning our programme, which we note every day, and which are made by people belonging to all strata and to various professions in every corner of Ukraine. And this is quite regular: our liberation-revolutionary movement, our O.U.N. in Ukraine, has always lent a ready ear to the desires of the Ukrainian people; it has always been very attentive to its requirements.

The latter requirement: that the broad masses of the Ukrainian people must be acquainted with our end. *It should be stated that our situation in this respect is still quite unsatisfactory.*

This bad situation can be changed only by means of wide, persistent and enlightening propaganda-political work; by means of a courageous and extensive circulation of our underground publications—leaflets, pamphlets, periodicals, appeals and so on—and by means of a proper oral campaign. This work must be carried on not only by the underground organisation, but by all the patriots, all the nationally conscious Ukrainians who live legally within the State.

In view of the importance of this matter to our liberation fight, the propaganda-political work among Eastern Ukrainians and Soviet

subjects in general is considered the second task of our present liberation plan. The force of the action of the Ukrainian people at the next opportune moment depends on the fulfilment of this task. Everybody knows that the victory in our liberation fight, our liberation, itself depends on the force of that action.

Our plan of fight for the liberation of Ukraine also includes the organisation of the resistance of the Ukrainian people to the Bolshevik oppressors and exploiters in all spheres of life. Such a resistance is indispensable; it will prevent the Bolsheviks from the easy and successful carrying out of their plans in Ukraine: political plans (building-up the party, komsomol and so on), economic plans (collectivisation, recruitment to Labour Reserve Schools, state supplying etc.), Russification, propaganda and other plans; it is absolutely necessary for weakening and undermining the Bolshevik rule in Ukraine. It is clear that such a courageous nation-wide, general resistance, a resistance in all spheres of life, would be a serious blow to the Russian-Bolshevik occupants.

It is natural that the underground organisation alone cannot fulfil such a task. That task may be fulfilled only with the participation of the vast masses of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian people must themselves offer a resistance of this kind to the Russian-Bolshevik invaders. The battle front of the fight for the liberation of Ukraine, the front of the fight against the Bolshevik enslavers, cannot be limited to the fight of the underground organisation. It is certainly not sufficient. *The whole people must take part in that fight.* Only in such a case will the liberation of Ukraine be guaranteed. In spite of the terrorist character of the Bolshevik regime, there are still possibilities of such resistance on the part of the ordinary people. One must see them and make use of them courageously and as soon as possible. First of all, it is necessary to offer a firm resistance to Russia's policy of Russification of the Ukrainian people since this policy threatens to exterminate us as a separate people.

Such a fight, such a nation-wide courageous resistance to the Russian-Bolshevik occupants, will not only undermine seriously the force of the Bolshevik rule in Ukraine. It will also prepare the people for the decisive and courageous action to be carried out at an opportune moment. It will, first of all, cultivate such virtues in the people as courage which will enable it to offer resistance to the enemy and to attack him, such virtues as readiness to make sacrifices,

national solidarity, active patriotism, fighting spirit etc. *History teaches us that without such a preparation an enslaved people cannot gain a victory over its enemy, the occupant.*

The armed actions which are being carried on by our revolutionary underground organisation at the present time on its own initiative (we are compelled by enemy armed terrorism to carry on most of those actions; we must defend ourselves and our organised liberation movement) pursue a special, exactly defined, object in our plan of fight. They have for their object, first of all, to punish our most active enemies, the occupants, and their fellow travellers for their crimes as regards the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian liberation movement, for terrorising and cruel treatment of the Ukrainian people, for plunder, for persecution of Ukrainian patriots, for their active measures by arms or propaganda against the Ukrainian liberation movement and so on. Terrorising the Bolshevik menials and their fellow travellers, and preventing them from faithfully serving the Bolshevik oppressors, we defend the Ukrainian population from their highhandedness and arbitrary rule to a considerable extent. Many heads of village Soviets, heads of collective farms and other Bolshevik officials, still conduct themselves decently, only because they are afraid of just punishment by the underground organisation. In this way we also hinder the Bolsheviks in the realisation of their plans aimed at the complete subjugation of the Ukrainian masses on the territory of our intensive actions. Moreover, in this way we also educate the Ukrainian masses in the spirit of revolutionary fight. Every successful assault, every successful sudden attack against the enemy in any of his strongholds, raises the revolutionary spirit of the masses, encourages the Ukrainian people, and strengthens its resistance to the Russian-Bolshevik invaders, making it more active on the front of that resistance. *All that is of particular importance in the plan of development of a liberation revolutionary fight. That is precisely the only way to victory in a liberation fight.*

On the whole, however, it should be stated that the number of our armed actions is smaller now than, for example, in the years 1944-46, at the time of widespread action of the U.P.A. and the mass armed underground activity. Obviously, this results from our present plan of fight. As said above, today we consider the maintenance and further building-up of our underground organisation and

propaganda-political work the most important task. Today armed actions are in the background of our plan of fight.

In spite of all the difficulties which the liberation fight meets in the conditions of the totalitarian and terrorist U.S.S.R., in spite of our great casualties which we are constantly compelled to suffer, we are successfully carrying out our plan of fight.

We have succeeded in maintaining our underground organisation; in some cases we have even built it up. By means of our underground network we have extended an influence over one third of the territory of Ukraine.

We have won much success in our propaganda-political work. More and more Ukrainians from the Eastern regions of Ukraine, as well as people throughout the U.S.S.R., are being informed about our real ends and the true national and social-liberation character of our movement. Our literature reaches every corner of Ukraine, and several republics of the Soviet Union. In the year 1948 about 70 different pamphlets, leaflets, periodicals and works of art were printed in our underground printing establishments in numbers amounting to several thousands. Almost all that literature is designed for the Soviet masses and, first of all, for the East-Ukrainian masses. We constantly hear Ukrainians from the eastern regions of Ukraine, and people from the entire U.S.S.R., approve, and enthusiastically approve, our fight. We often receive letters from Ukrainian patriots from all over the regions of Ukraine, in which they declare their complete solidarity with us and express their readiness to fight actively. We are also devotedly supported in our practical revolutionary work all over Ukraine.

The underground organisation has also won a considerable success in the organisation of the resistance of the Ukrainian masses to the Russian-Bolshevik invaders. Let us mention the boycott of all previous Bolshevik elections, and particularly the elections of the year 1946, by the Ukrainian people on the territory where the U.P.A. was active and where the underground organisation was established, the resistance to collectivisation, the resistance of Ukrainian youth to komsomol, parachute jumps, recruitment to Labour Reserves and so on. It is even difficult to enumerate all the activities. Since 1944 there has been persistent and furious fighting between the Bolshevik oppressors and the Ukrainian masses on the territory covered by the U.P.A. and the underground organisation. This

situation has been largely caused by the work of the U.P.A. and the underground organisation.

Our armed actions are successful, too. A considerable number of Bolshevik bandits and their menials are ambushed and killed by members of the underground organisation. By its actions the underground organisation has supported the West-Ukrainian peasants in their fight against the collectivisation. In consequence of the armed actions of the U.P.A. and the underground organisation, the Bolsheviks are, for the most part, unable to organise parachute jumps; not to mention the obvious revolutionary influence of all these actions on the Ukrainian masses, and particularly upon Ukrainian youth.

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What does the complete realisation of our plan of fight for the liberation of Ukraine depend upon? That is to say: What does the successful completion of that fight depend upon?

Obviously, it depends on many conditions. *One of the most important conditions is the question to what extent the legally-living Ukrainian community supports the revolutionary underground organisation in its fight for the realisation of that plan.*

What support does the revolutionary underground organisation need today?

Let us say in plain words: this support should not be limited to mere sympathy, mere ideological solidarity with the underground organisation. The fight does not depend on mere sympathy; it cannot be strengthened by mere sympathy. Mere ideological unity of the people and the underground organisation is not sufficient for gaining a victory in our liberation fight. *It must be a real, concrete and active support.*

The members of the secret organisation must live somewhere; they must have their quarters. The fight demands that such underground quarters be established in inhabited localities, in buildings; in many regions the natural conditions compel us to this course.

It is the duty of every nationally-conscious Ukrainian, every Ukrainian patriot, to give us, if necessary, an opportunity to establish such quarters at his home. Obviously this bears some risk, but there is no fight without risk. While some patriots risk their lives every day, and they do not risk them because, allegedly, "it is all the same to them", but because it is demanded by the supreme interest of our

liberation cause, other patriots should be willing, at least during a certain period, to stake, at the worst, their property or personal freedom. There is no victory without sacrifices. That victory will be gained, if not only individual persons, but also the broad masses of the people are ready to make sacrifices. In any case, in view of the fact that the members of the secret organisation are skilfully masked today, it is difficult to discover such quarters.

The underground organisation needs material help in the form of money, food, sometimes in the form of clothing, footwear, drugs, and so on.

Especially, the underground organisation needs money. Money is necessary, first of all, for the organisation of printing establishments and their equipment, the purchase of paper, typewriters, stationary in general, the purchase of necessary books, drugs, clothing, footwear and a series of other things. Without money the underground organisation would be unable to carry on its propaganda-political work, and very often it would be unable to hold its ground at all. All the money matters of the underground organisation are strictly controlled by its supreme organs.

The underground organisation needs help on the part of the whole community in the form of various informations from different circles, institutions, mills and factories, from various regions of the U.S.S.R., in all the spheres of Soviet life. Because of the special forms of its fight (the underground mode of life, deep conspiracy) the underground organisation alone is unable to get all the information it needs. Such information is indispensable to a political organisation; it enables it to carry on its work successfully.

The underground organisation also needs reinforcement. It is a well-known fact that tens of thousands of insurgents and members of the secret organisation died the death of heroes during the recent years of the fight. Our people are dying today, too. This is inevitable in a fight. Here and there the underground organisation must reinforce its ranks. This is absolutely necessary to the existence of the underground organisation as a compact and proportionally wide organisation. All the Ukrainian patriots must be aware of that. One must have the courage to join in the hard, but glorious, underground fight in case of necessity; one should have no hesitation in sending one's son or daughter to the underground organisation.

Particularly, we here appeal to Ukrainian secondary-school boys and students. Our underground O.U.N. is a political organisation.

It carries on various political-revolutionary tasks. It would be a great mistake to think that educated people have nothing to do with the underground organisation. Our underground organisation, our liberation underground movement, needs as many educated people as possible. In our organisation such people have a great opportunity to grow and to develop their individualities. In our organisation hundreds of talented young men have grown up and become first-class political revolutionary leaders with a great stock of political and general knowledge, with a great and thorough experience in practical political revolutionary work. Today there is no more honorable work for a young Ukrainian patriot than the active revolutionary fight for the liberation of Ukraine in the ranks of the underground organisation. Today the best way to serve Ukraine is to serve it in the ranks of the underground organisation according to one's knowledge, courage, ardour and persistence. Therefore, let no one hesitate for a moment, if called for that service.

Work aimed at giving information to all uninformed people on the character of our movement, our real ends, should also be one of the ways of supporting the underground organisation. It is not true that there are no possibilities for such work under Soviet conditions. We know by experience that there are those possibilities. Of course, one should proceed very cautiously. One should observe people beforehand and become acquainted with them; this should not be done, except in a suitable situation. Besides, there is still another condition: one should not fear too much; one should not think that every ordinary man must be an agent of the M.G.B. There are a lot of such agents, there is no doubt about that. But, for sure, not all the people in the U.S.S.R. are agents. Many people may be hostile towards our movement just because of ignorance. In fact, however, they may be honest people, perhaps even secret opponents of the Bolshevik regime. It is a great loss to us, to our liberation movement, if a Ukrainian patriot meets such a man, works together with him, is on friendly terms with him, and yet dares not to say a few words of truth about us. This narrows the framework of our propaganda-political work very much; thus, it narrows our chance of success, too. Therefore, it is the duty of every Ukrainian patriot to spread the truth about us, the Ukrainian liberation movement, in every form. Especially the Ukrainian intelligentsia and Ukrainian student

can do much in this respect. It is known that it is hard for our underground organisation to get into the towns, especially the cities, today. It is in towns that most of those people live among whom we should, first of all, carry on our work of enlightenment: Ukrainians from eastern regions of Ukraine and people of the U.S.S.R. in general. One should know how to put stealthily our underground literature at their doors (or to deliver it in another way), to send secretly proper explanatory letters (obviously, anonymous ones and written in a disguised handwriting), to slip into their lodgings various enlightening patriotic books published in Western Ukraine before the year 1939, and so on. As to our underground publications they often do not meet the need in that respect; it is often difficult to get more than one copy of each of them. In such cases such publications, especially leaflets, should be copied by hand and circulated in that form.

We shall win the necessary success in our propaganda-political work only with the help of all nationally conscious Ukrainians who live legally. Every nationally conscious and politically literate educated Ukrainian, every Ukrainian worker and peasant should carry on the work of enlightenment in every possible form.

Finally, to support the underground organisation not only by sympathy, not only by word of mouth, means to be always ready to carry out all the orders and suggestions of the underground organisation and to support it actively in all difficulties which may arise.

If, on the one hand, the Ukrainian patriots—peasants, workers and intelligentsia who live legally—actively support the underground organisation, and if, on the other hand, all the Ukrainian patriots offer a courageous resistance to the Russian-Bolshevik invaders, we shall gain the victory in our liberation fight.

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B. Krupnytsky

TEN CENTURIES OF UKRAINE

A brief summary of Ukrainian history

The earliest records of history disclose tribal differentiation among eastern Slavs. The first state on Ukrainian territory was established by the southern group of eastern Slavic tribes—the Derevlyany, Polyany, Siveryany, Ulychi, Tyvertsi, Duliby or Volynyany—from which the Ukrainian nation arose. The first state—the Kyiv State—was established through the co-operation of the Norman Vikings (Ukrainian: Varyahy) and the indigenous population. To it the Varyahy contributed the Ruryk dynasty and probably also the name Rus, “Ruthenia”. At the end of the 9th century, a prince of the Varyahy dynasty was ruling in Kyiv. Under the Ruryk dynasty the new state, based on Ukrainian tribes and especially on the gifted one named Polyany, expanded remarkably: during the 10th century almost all the eastern Slavic tribes, including those which gave rise to the Great Russians and Byelorussians, were conquered, as well as a considerable number of Finnish tribes in the north. Kyiv attained control of the steppes in the south-east, and gained access to the Caucasus, to the Volga river, to Byzantium and the lower Danube. The political structure and economy of the Kyiv State were markedly influenced by its nobility, in which warriors and merchants were predominant; while its foundation rested firmly upon the agricultural traditions of the Ukrainian people.

The relations of the Kyiv State with Byzantium and with the West were of the utmost importance. During the rule of Volodymyr the Great (980—1015) Christianity according to the Greek rite was adopted from Byzantium. During the rule of Volodymyr’s son,

Yaroslav the Wise (1019—54), Ukraine-Rus (the Kyiv State) became one of the most important amongst European countries and her political and trade relations with them were very close. It was also firmly connected culturally with western Europe, and, through the members of his numerous family, Yaroslav himself had ties of kinship with almost all the outstanding European dynasties—he was even called “Europe’s father-in-law”. The fame of Ukraine-Rus was maintained and furthered also under Yaroslav’s grandson, Volodomyr Monomakh (1113—25) but even by the end of the 11th century there had appeared some indications of decay. The epoch of the hegemony of the Kyiv State among other eastern Slavic peoples, which, as A. Shakhmatov says, had been a brilliant page of Ukrainian history, was approaching its end. The reasons for that decline were various: dissension in the princely family caused by its peculiar system of seniority; separatist tendencies of individual territories, especially Great Russian ones (Suzdal); and aggressions by nomads and Polovtsi who came from the south-eastern steppes to ravage the State.

In the years 1239—40, the Ukrainian lands underwent devastating invasions by new nomads, the Tartars. These turbulent people succeeded in establishing themselves as neighbours, and their depredations hindered and delayed consolidation of the Ukrainian people, necessitating constant and heavy sacrifices in self-defence. As a result, Kyiv and all the most outstanding centres of the Dnipro region lost their importance.

The Kyiv State, however, was inherited by the Galician-Volynian kingdom. Here the Ukrainian state, having united all the Ukrainian lands from the Carpathian Mountains to the Dnieper, reached its greatest power during the rule of Prince Roman (1199—1205), his son, King Danylo (1205—64) and his grandson Lev (1264—1301). It also inherited the social-legal concepts and cultural traditions of Kyiv Rus which were thus able to develop. The epoch of the Galician-Volynian kingdom is notable for the considerable influence of West-European culture over Ukrainian lands. For in those years Ukraine occupied an important position in middle Europe; she was of greater importance than her near neighbours in the west: for instance Hungary, which was rent by anarchy, and Poland, which was as yet in a condition of feudal disunity.

But in the middle of the 14th century the Galician-Volynian State also began to decline. It was undermined by internal intrigues

of the Galician nobility (boyars) who had opposed princely rule since ancient times and who aimed at seizing power—laying claim to the role of West-European feudal lords and barons, and seeking to overthrow Prince Roman's dynasty—and by an alteration in the foreign situation due to the strengthening of Poland and Hungary in the first half of the 14th century, and the establishment of the new and expanding Lithuanian state.

In the middle of the 14th century the Galician-Volynian state was partitioned among its three western neighbours: Poland occupied Galicia, Lithuania took possession of Volynia, the Carpathian lands being already in the power of Hungary.

Once individual tribes were united in one state under the rule of Prince Mendovh in the middle of the 13th century, the Lithuanian principality began to extend its influence, first on Byelorussian, and in the middle of the 14th century on Ukrainian lands. This latter incorporation was in general a peaceful one, and by the end of the 14th century most of the Ukrainian lands were already under the rule of Prince Olgerd Gedyminovych (1341—1377).

The role played by the people of Ukraine in the so-called Lithuanian-Ruthenian state was not altogether unimportant. This state was in fact a common state comprising Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and also Byelorussians. In Ukraine the traditional foundations of the ancient Ukrainian life were not broken, and at first even the Ruryk dynasty remained on its own lands, its princes becoming vassals of the Lithuanian grand duke at Vilno. Later they were replaced by Lithuanian princes of the Gedymin dynasty, and still later by ordinary governors (voivodes). The Ukrainian-Byelorussian culture which had developed in ancient princely times exerted its influence upon the Lithuanian state with its on the whole primitive cultural life. One can see this in the legislation, in the official language—the ancient Ruthenian language, and in the exclusive preponderance of the orthodox faith which was that of the Gedymin dynasty until a later date. In the political respect, the Ukrainian (and Byelorussian) aristocracy was of particular importance; it was made up of former princely and boyar families which had concentrated considerable political power in their hands, being members of the "Council of noblemen" of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state, and holding supreme administrative posts.

The Treaty of Krevo in 1385 was the presage of future changes. Poland and the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state were united by the marriage of Yahaylo, the son of Gedymin, and the Polish queen, Yadviga. Catholic Poland assumed the role of the bearer of civilization in Lithuania and this was furthered by the fact that Yahaylo along with his people had adopted Catholicism.

The situation was radically changed two centuries later. In 1569 there was concluded the so-called Lublin union according to which Lithuania and Poland united in one federal Republic (the personal union of the year 1385 became real) with a common king, senate, seim (representative assembly), foreign policy and so on. Thus all the Ukrainian lands were subjected to Poland, and Ukraine entered upon a new stage of her existence. Immediately after the incorporation of the Ukrainian lands there were indications of a Polish drive towards the east. Polish land-owners began to seize immense latifundia in Ukraine, the Ukrainian aristocracy accepted Catholicism and became Polonised, the peasantry being enslaved. These developments were crowned with the Berest union of 1596 which was concluded by Poland with the help of some representatives of the Ukrainian episcopate, and which had as object the subordination of the eastern Orthodox Church to the Holy See.

Although the Polish State boasted of its civilising mission, it did not know how, or perhaps was unable, to protect and defend Ukrainian lands from the terrible calamity caused by the Crimean Tartar aggressions which were already of long standing by the end of the 15th century. Landowner-administrators (most of whom were Ukrainians by birth) lived in their castles on the border, and left the Ukrainian population of the countryside to organise their own defence. The fight against the Tartars was carried on by those courageous elements—trappers and soldiers—who were known as Cossacks by the end of the 15th century. The Zaporozhian Sich below the Dnipro rapids became their centre in the second half of the 16th century. At that time the Ukrainian Cossacks established a peculiar organisation of their own, something like a knightly order, but with distinct democratic leanings. By their fight against the Turkish-Tartar world they won world-wide fame, especially after their naval raids on the environs of Constantinople under the command of Hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaydachny in the twenties of the 17th century. These raids aimed mainly at the release of Christians captured by the Turks, and at the seizure of booty.

The rapid development of the Cossack organisation was especially evident in the last decades of the 16th and in the early ones of the 17th centuries. Later on, the Cossacks, having divided into 'reystrovyky', soldiers registered in the state service whose centres were at Trakhtemyriv and Kyiv, and independent forces, the 'vypyshchyky', and the 'sichovyky' whose centre was in the Sich and usually situated on an island in the Dnipro, became something like a state within the State. The Cossack organisation managed to assert its rights, although the Polish government either refused to recognise it at all, or recognised it only partially. The whole of Ukraine depended upon the Cossack organisation when it had to defend itself against national, social and cultural oppression on the part of the Poles.

The Cossacks began to rise in rebellion against the Polish Republic towards the end of the 16th century: originally they had the purpose of protecting their class interests; but later on their insurrections reached a national scale.

At the same time the Cossacks joined the defenders of the Orthodox faith and culture and the opponents of union with Rome, the Ukrainian middle classes—made up of townspeople and small gentry who founded fraternities, schools and printing-works, furthered polemic literature and supported their clergy when it was oppressed. Thanks to those elements, and particularly to the Cossacks, Kyiv became a stronghold of Ukrainian culture and orthodoxy.

Later on, the fight became fiercer. It was Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky who managed to liberate Ukraine from the Polish yoke with the help of the Cossacks and of the whole nation in the year 1648. After his brilliant victories of Zhovti Vody and Korsun, he consolidated his power in Ukraine, but still had to wage war for several years because the Polish Republic was unwilling to give up the country which had so greatly enriched its gentry, especially those magnates accustomed to rule in the East.

Making alliances at one time with the Crimea and Turkey, at another with Russia by the Pereyaslav treaty which was concluded in 1654; and having found allies who proved to be more useful to Ukraine, namely Sweden, Brandenburg and Transylvania (and among smaller ones: Lithuania, Moldavia and Wallachia), Khmelnytsky finally completely liberated Ukraine within its ethnographic

frontiers, and even wanted to strengthen the new state by the establishment of a Khmelnitsky dynasty.

The premature death in 1657 of that great Hetman whose activity was, it should be noted, admired by his contemporary, the outstanding English statesman, Cromwell, caused internal disturbances in the state organism which had not yet been consolidated; and it was just this that its neighbours—Russia and Poland—awaited.

The hetmans who succeeded Bohdan Khmelnitsky were of a considerable smaller calibre. Ivan Vyhovsky (1657—1659) and Petro Doroshenko (1665—1676) were the most capable of them: their policy was notable for a constructive line, and even their orientation—in the beginning on Sweden, and later on towards Poland (Vyhovsky) and Turkey (Doroshenko)—had for object the final consolidation of Ukrainian independence, if possible, within those frontiers, and containing those territories, which had been established by Bohdan Khmelnitsky. However, this cannot be said of such hetmans as Bryukhovetsky (1663—1668) who became subservient to Moscow, or to careerists of Right-bank Ukraine such as Teterya, Opara, Sukhoviyy or Khanenko, who gave allegiance to Poland.

In consequence of the mistakes made by hetmans, owing to social antagonisms in Ukraine causing strained relations between the Cossack leaders and the masses, and also in consequence of interference from neighbouring peoples, Poland and Russia came to an agreement to the detriment of Ukraine: a treaty was concluded at Andrusiv in 1667 according to which the Right-bank Ukraine was ceded to Poland, and the Left-bank Ukraine, the so-called Hetmanshchyna¹ (along with Kyiv), remained in the Russian sphere of influence. But this partition caused organised resistance on the part of Ukrainian patriots. Petro Doroshenko, Ivan Samoylovych (1672—1687) and Mazeppa (1687—1709) constantly strove for the unification of Right-bank and Left-bank Ukraine. Right-bank Ukraine, left under Polish overlordship, for a long time fought for its rights and for Ukrainian unity, at one time with the help of Hetmanshchyna and the Sich, at another with the help of its haydamaky² in the 18th century.

¹) A name for all those regions of Ukraine—mostly on the Left Bank of the Dnieper—which came under the rule of the Hetmanate.

²) A rising of Ukrainian peasants in the 1760's against Polish domination and religious intolerance.

The situation in Left-bank Ukraine was consolidated in the time of Samoylovych and Mazepa. In Hetmanshchyna there was formed a Cossack state system on the foundations laid by B. Khmelnytsky, with a hetman as head of the state, but yet a vassal, politically dependent on Russia, and with its own army, administration, finance, courts and so on.

The fact that Russia constantly tried to deprive the Ukrainian autonomous state, dependent as it was on Russia, of its rights, was regarded by Ukrainian patriots as an unbearable yoke. There were many attempts to separate Ukraine from Russia, just as was the case in Ukraine in the first half of the 17th century with regard to Poland. Mazepa was the last hetman who made a bold attempt to throw off the tzarist yoke. His alliance with Charles XII, the king of Sweden who turned out a capable and successful general in the beginning of the Great Northern War, was intended to ensure the final independence of Ukraine.

But this campaign, which had a prospect of success, ended in the Swedish-Ukrainian defeat of Poltava in the summer of 1709; thus, the Ukrainian fight for independence was temporarily given up as lost. It was Mazepa's authority which to some extent prevented the Russian government from depriving Hetmanshchyna of its state rights, though Tzar Petro I himself exhibited such tendencies. But, encouraged by its victories over the Swedes and by the extraordinary growth of its importance in Europe, Russia began now to subjugate Ukraine, achieving this consecutively in the political, cultural and economic fields. The Ukrainian hetmans of the 18th century, Ivan Skoropadsky (1708—1722), Danylo Apostol (1727—1734) and Kyrylo Rozumovsky (1750—1764), had to carry on a policy aimed at defending those rights of Hetmanshchyna of which it had not yet been deprived.

The Russian tzarina, Catherine II, delivered the final blow to the state autonomy of Ukraine. In 1764 the government by hetmans was abolished. In 1781, the actual state system of Ukraine was abolished; the 10 administrative units, regimental military districts, were replaced by Russian administrative institutions and courts; Hetmanshchyna was divided into three provinces, those of Kyiv, Chernyhiv and Novhorod-Siversky, under the guise of a "Little Russian" governor-generalship. In 1783, the separate Cossack army (consisting of 10 regiments) was liquidated; at the same time serfdom was enforced in Ukraine. The same sad fate overtook other Uk-

rainian lands dependent on Russia. In 1765 occurred the abolition of the Cossack-autonomous system of Slobidska Ukraine³, which had been colonised since the middle of the 17th century by Ukrainian refugees from Poland, primarily from Right-bank Ukraine, and which stood under Russian protection. In 1775, a blow was delivered to Zaporozhian Sich which till then had preserved its autonomy, though it was dependent both on Russia, and also for a long time on Right-bank hetmans. Its centre was destroyed, and its inhabitants had to look for another refuge. During the second and third partitions of Poland in the years 1793 and 1795, Right-bank Ukraine was finally annexed by Russia. Thus most of the Ukrainian lands were annexed by the Russian state, except Galicia, Bukovyna and Carpathian Ukraine which passed from Poland to Austria (1772).

The Russian bureaucratic-police system brought Ukraine to ruin in a short time, especially by the enforcement of serfdom in its extreme, Russian form. It affected primarily the impoverished and oppressed masses of Ukrainian peasants who were not able any more to maintain either their village schools, their hospitals for the poor, their homes for the aged and orphans, all of which they still maintained with pride in the 18th century.

But the invincible aspiration for independence played its part. The outside pressure only halted the development of Ukraine, it did not destroy it. By the end of the 18th century there were already indications of Ukrainian national revival, first in the cultural-national sphere (literature in the national language), and later on in the political sphere.

In 1798, the Poltava writer, Ivan Kotlyarevsky, wrote his famous *Eneyida* in the Ukrainian national language. By the end of the 18th century and in the beginning of the 19th century there were already indications of a new attitude, a turning towards what was Ukrainian, ancient, national. Research commenced into the past of Ukraine, folk-songs were collected, attention was paid to national customs. Poltava and Kharkiv were the main centres of that movement (the first Ukrainian university was established in Kharkiv in 1805), and, since the thirties, Kyiv.

Under the influence of West-European ideas brought by the great French Revolution, and later by the romantic movement, freemason's

³) The part of the Eastern Ukrainian steppe in which are the towns of Charkiv, Sumy, Akhtyrka, Izyum and others. This area was developed during the 16th and 17th centuries.

lodges were organised in Ukraine, and in 1823 there was organised the "Society of United Slavs" with its Slavophilism, liberal ideas and a programme aimed at the abolition of serfdom, the implementation of public instruction and so on. According to some sources, there was even a secret Ukrainian organisation which had for an object the independence of Ukraine.

Galicia was awakened by the poet Markiyan Shashkevych who, along with his friends, wrote the well-known *Dnistrova Rusalka* (*Dnister Water-Nymph*) in 1818. The SS. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood was of peculiar importance; it was founded in the forties by the most outstanding Ukrainians of that time: Kostomarov, Kulish, Hulak-Artemovsky, V. Bilozersky and others. The greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, also belonged to the SS. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, and his *Kobzar*, published for the first time in the year 1840, roused Ukrainian hearts from indifference. Pious romanticists, members of the Brotherhood, set before themselves the Ukraine which was to arise as an independent republic in a free alliance with Slavic nation-republics, and to lead them, as was clearly expressed in *Knyha Bytiya* (*Genesis*) by Kostomarov. In addition, their liberal programme contained the ideas propagated by the "Society of United Slavs". That first Ukrainian national action (the organisation of the so-called Decembrists in the year 1825 had only partly been a Ukrainian action) was detected and liquidated by the tzarist government in the year 1847. But in the sixties, when Russia was already compelled to reform its social system and, first of all, to abolish serfdom (1861), the Ukrainian national movement revived again. The so-called 'hromady' (communities) appeared throughout Ukraine; the central, or rather the leading 'hromada' was in Kyiv. In Petersburg former members of the Kyrylo-Metodiy Society began to publish a representative journal, *Osnova* (*Basis*). They were joined by other circles headed by Volodymyr Antonovych which had as object to serve the cause of the common people.

In the seventies this populist movement, which had been suppressed for a certain time by the tzarist government, became a purely socialist movement, and the political programme of Ukrainian patriots of the "south-western branch of the Russian Geographic Society" did not exceed, at that time, the limits of the Ukrainian autonomy in federal Russia.

But even the cruel ukase (decree) of 1876—which was to destroy not only the political but also national-cultural work, even moderate

work for the people and public education, and which included a total prohibition of Ukrainian publications—could not stop the Ukrainian national movement. The work was temporarily transferred from greater Ukraine to Galicia, where, even under conditions of constant struggle against Polish influence in Austria, it was easier to carry on the national work, to establish 'Prosvity' (Societies of enlightenment), to publish newspapers, to cherish science through the "Shevchenko Society of Sciences" which had been headed by the historian Mykhaylo Hrushevsky since the nineties. For (in Galicia) the Ukrainians were represented in the provincial seim (representative assembly) in Lviv and in central parliamentary institutions in Vienna. Political parties had appeared in greater Ukraine and Galicia by the end of that century; their programmes were at one time purely national, at another they were associated with socialist slogans.

World War I delivered another blow to the Ukrainians in the year 1914. The Russian government again intended to destroy the Ukrainian national movement, especially in Galicia which was occupied by Russian troops. But a revolution broke out in the heart of Russia three years later, in 1917. Tsentralna Rada (Central Council) came into power in Ukraine and was supported by hundreds of thousands of patriotic Ukrainians. A Ukrainian national government was also formed in Galicia a year later, after the downfall of Austria. The national spontaneous movement proved to be stronger than the repressions on the part of the government. The Ukrainian national republic as an independent, free and sovereign State of the Ukrainian people was proclaimed in Kyiv by the "Universal" of January 22, 1918. The Ukrainian government proclaimed the union of the Western Ukrainian Republic, comprising Galicia, Bukovyna and Carpathian Ukraine, with the Ukrainian National Republic in St. Sophia Square in Kyiv a year later, on January 22, 1919. A United Ukrainian State, an independent and united Ukraine was to be established; it had already been planned by the founder of the Cossack State, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in the middle of the 17th century. At that moment Ukraine entered upon a new stage of its national struggle; it was fighting for its independence as a state, and not only for its cultural achievements and autonomy, as was the case in the 19th and even in the beginning of the 20th century. That fight did not stop even after the

EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT**PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE****Wishful thinking and reality**

Fear has big eyes...
(Ukrainian folk-proverb)

From time to time people coin a slogan and think they have solved a problem; such is the vanity of human wishfulness. During this year and no doubt during the next one we shall hear again and again the slogan "peaceful co-existence" which has been coined by the Russian imperialists. How pleasant it sounds to the ear—its peaceful touch is very soothing. And how horrid are its alternatives; "war" and "war-mongering" are the counter-slogans.

Wishful thinking and the complete disregard of reality is a common affliction here in Britain. It is a very dangerous disease in which one looks only at the pleasant rosy things, living in illusion, and mistaking this for actuality. It is a mode of imitating the ostrich, or worse, it resembles a man so hypnotised by the venomous gaze of a boa-constrictor that he can do nothing to avert his own death.

Other slogans of Russian imperialism have been "The unity of the Rus-lands", "Protector of Orthodoxy", "Panslavism", and so on. Those who understand a little of this brand of imperialism will know how much it owes to such slogans. But this latest one surely outbids them all in its universal appeal.

Russia's aim this time is to arouse fear in the hearts of all nations, for fear of Bolshevism paralyses the will and induces a willingness to compromise instead of taking any positive or preventive action against Russian aggression. And in any case Russian imperialism has partially achieved its aims for, thanks to the free world, they are now masters of almost half of Europe and a great part of Asia. They know, too, that they can always gain more territory—in Korea or Indo-China—by unprovoked aggression, and their fifth columns—the Communist Parties—are busy everywhere.

Why then should Russia be using such a slogan as "peaceful co-existence"? Does she want to co-exist? If so, why should her propaganda be made up of several obvious falsehoods? For we all know what really lies behind the phrases "people's democracy", "paradise of workers", and the use of the word "freedom" behind the Iron or Bamboo Curtain. Should Mr. Attlee try to convince us that there is religious freedom, for instance, in China, or the "Red Dean" urge that such freedom exists in Russia, we just do not believe them because we have been in Russia and seen the appalling reality—Katyn, Vinnytsia—while thousands of German, Spanish, and Chinese prisoners of war who returned from Korea and Indo-China from "paradise", have different stories to tell. From behind the Communist screen in distant Russia come Frank Kelly, William Piddington, McKenzie, Father Joseph Shynes, Eric Pleasants, Dick Applegate, to tell us the most terrible, but the real, story of life in those remote regions. They relate to us how, in this dreadful world with which we

are supposed to want to co-exist, political freedom, personal liberty, the dignity of the human being, religion are systematically destroyed. In their madness the Communists would even try to destroy God himself.

And how should we co-exist with such a world? For trade with eastern Europe means helping Moscow's war aims; diplomatic relations merely cover espionage and diversion; travelling behind the Iron Curtains—as the evidence of the Petrovs has shown—is merely a means of recruiting new agents for the Communists, and the visits of Soviet sportsmen to the West are only instruments of propaganda. Surely those who have succeeded in escaping from this "paradise" must be the best guides as to the reality of that world.

If, therefore, there is anyone who can explain how our civilisation, based on national freedom, personal liberty and belief in God, can co-exist with an aggressive criminal conspiracy aiming at the destruction of our civilisation and the subjugation of the entire free world, then he should certainly be given the highest reward by our civilisation. If we accept the notion of peaceful co-existence then it is clear there will not be either peace or existence. "Peaceful co-existence" is merely a Communist myth which can be realised only by the complete capitulation of our way of life and by accepting slavery under Russian rule.

Let us look back at the greater Russian myth—that of invincible "Holy Mother Russia", "The Third Rome". This myth has been built up during the centuries, the myth of Russian strength, paralysing and blinding even today the British and American politicians.

The Russian aim was to create a myth of a great, invincible Russian Giant-Monster to whom the free world, in order to appease him and to save their lives, must bring streams of victims.

Europe and the U.S.A. have swallowed so easily this Russian propaganda-myth that they try to prolong their own lives by giving the Great Giant once-free countries piece by piece. It has even escaped the notice of the appeasers that only less than a half of the population are Russians and the rest are non-Russian peoples—45 million Ukrainians, 15 million Byelorussians, and millions of Georgians, Cossacks, and Asiatic peoples who are not Russians, and who long, and many of them fight too, for their independence. But to those under the magic spell of Pan-Russian imperialism such facts are without significance.

And what are the Russians doing in the meantime? At least they recognise the Achilles heel, the "dungeon of nations subjugated by Russia", and from time to time they try very hard to come to terms with these peoples. We know how much trouble Russia has with Ukrainians: the festivities last year to mark the 300th Anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty were simply a means to appease the Ukrainians and to keep Ukraine within the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian Resistance Movement, with its famous Ukrainian Insurgent Army—the U.P.A.—was at one time so strong that the Russians had to conclude a tripartite pact with Poland and Czechoslovakia which aimed merely at the total destruction of the U.P.A. And in spite of the fact that the Soviet forces have had heavy armaments while the Ukrainians have not, yet the Ukrainians remain unconquered.

That is one fight against Bolshevism that is still going on, and what is the free world doing to help those who are fighting for liberty? The western nations blind themselves: they think that in the next world war the non-Russian peoples—Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Cossacks and the rest, will fight for them, for yet another enslavement by another Russian government! And those who think that they will be able to join Russians in order to throw over Communism—and many American circles think thus—are either foolish or exceptionally naive. Where is the Russian who will stretch out his hands to overthrow the greatest pride of every Russian, his own mighty empire?

Russian propaganda urges the non-Russian people within its boundaries that Anglo-Americans are their enemies; and it cannot be denied that there is little evidence to the contrary. A world-wide conspiracy of silence is thrown over the appalling state of affairs in Ukraine, because politicians persist in accepting the Russian myths. The Russian propagandists must surely congratulate them for assisting so kindly with their own task!

Co-existence in weakness means simply absorption: many countries co-existed peacefully with Russia—for instance Czechoslovakia—until the moment arrived, and then the small prefix "co-" was transformed into "sub-". Such is the law of the jungle and of the Kremlin. And against this law the West should form a psychological front with all the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. Not fear but strength should be shown towards Russia—and the powerful potential fifth-columns of the non-Russian nations could provide the West with just such strength.

For we Ukrainians there is nothing to lose but our chains; but the Western World, if it chooses the wrong policy as Nazi Germany did, then that world has everything to lose. Not only freedom is at stake, but the very survival of the nations as nations.

To those in the West who still retain illusions about the aims of Stalin's successor, I should like to quote the words of Malenkov on the occasion of the 32nd Anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, 7 November 1949: "The first World War entailed the Bolshevik October Revolution, the second brought Soviet rule over middle Europe and China, a third will be the grave of the entire anti-communist world".

The televised play "Nineteen Eighty Four" has awakened many people from their wishful-thinking illusions and dreams. They are beginning, some of them, to realise that horrors are not merely dramatic scenes imagined by some writer. "The enslavement of the individual, the brain washing and indoctrination, the false trials and drugged confessions, the remorseless espionage, the callous liquidations, all these are things that have happened and are happening in Communist countries with whom some clever politicians are so anxious to live in 'peaceful co-existence'." It would be better if these people ceased at once to fool themselves and others...

If only the free world, instead of standing by and watching those gallant Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians and all the other nations represented in the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, bleed to death, would stand by their side, and send real help, then at last truth would prevail and there would be some chance of the survival of a world in which freedom was once more a possibility.

But let us ask those who are so willing to divide up free countries, and draw new demarkation lines one question: would they advocate this kind of solution for England? Would they allow a demarkation line in their own country, leaving Cambridge behind an Iron Curtain and Oxford in the free zone?

And, to be practical, what is Russia without Ukraine? She would be a sham, a void shell, a giant with a broken back, who would quickly starve to death. And since this giant is no more than the malicious Giant of Arab mythology—bound to torment and enslave the whole world, nothing evil could befall humanity by his destruction. On the contrary, to destroy the giant of imperialism would be a deed of sense and of justice.

Those who read Russian we would urge to read the editorial article in *Pravda* on December 19 1954. That article will certainly convince them that since December the theory of co-existence is quite dead in Soviet Russia. For the Russians have openly returned to their old crazy ideas of world domination—the ancient myth of unchecked Russian imperialism.

Ilarion Holubovych

RUSSIAN SOUL

The so-called civilised world apparently loses its historical memory. Consequently, it finds it difficult to understand many Russian problems, and among these the strange phenomenon of Russian repentance. Leading off with the "show-trials" of the old Bolshevik guard, and including Beria's repentance, this remains unexplained to the West. True, Western people have already realised that the Russian system of physical, moral and "scientific-medical" torture, including "brain-washing", achieves remarkable success. But is this repentance caused by that devilish system alone?

The mysterious curtain concealing that unexplained phenomenon from the world has been raised by the recent history of Russia, the history of Marxism. However hard one may try to criticise it, it is a matter of fact that the tzarist tormentors of the last century (before the Bolsheviks) were simply "spineless intellectuals" in comparison with the tormentors of the time of Lenin-Stalin-Beria-Malenkov. Following the line determined by the tzars, the Bolsheviks have made considerable progress in this respect. Although the methods of the tzarist masters of the torture-chamber were not as perfect as those of Yezhov, "people's enemies" repented even in their time. One of the outstanding writers of the history of the last reign writes thus about it: "reading the penitential letters of the Decembrists up to Nikolas I, one finds them hard to believe: were they really written by rebels who had been on the point of killing the tzar the previous day. They must have lost their revolutionary spirit immediately after their arrest". Beztuzhev writes: "God's finger and tzar's wrath weigh on me. I feel that I have dissipated my talent for an evil cause, that I could have served my native country and died for my tzar... But the tzar is a "token" of Deity on the earth, and God absolves

those who repent." A bullet pierced his cap in the Senate square; he escaped, strolled about the streets of the capital for the whole night and, finally, "decided to kneel to the tzar". He went to the winter palace and denounced himself and his secret society... Was he compelled by a tzarist Dzerzhinski to do that?

Another Decembrist, Bulatov, as appears in a work by the same author, also made a penitential declaration but "he was so depressed by the fact that the tzar did not believe him that he went mad and smashed his head against the wall of the cell". Another Decembrist, M. Muravyov-Apostol, declared before his death in 1886 that "he has always thanked God for the failure (of the riot) of December 14", that "it had been a non-Russian phenomenon". Having served his sentence (like F. Dostoyevsky) he repented his political aims. Who compelled him to do that? A. Pushkin's conversion was still simpler. He was in sympathy with the Decembrists; he declared that "he would have taken the side of the rebels" if he had been in the capital on the day of the riot. But he underwent a rapid metamorphosis which a poet of that time described thus maliciously:

"He propagated the people's freedom; he summoned God and people for trial... He only tasted the tzarist shchi (cabbage soup) and became a court lick-spittle". He became a boyar of the tzarist autocracy oppressing the subjugated peoples.

The above mentioned author writes these words about his countrymen: "sometimes it seems that there are no revolutions in Russia, only riots: the January, December, Chuhui, Cholera, Pugachev, Razin riots—an everlasting riot of slaves". Further: "we stir, nevertheless; we rebel—we are in an unnatural state, as if we were going head over heels, but, as soon as we begin to cringe, to repent and to give ourselves up to reaction, we become true Russians. We are like vanka-vstanka (a doll with a weight attached which causes it always to recover its standing position): however hard the revolution may try to overthrow us, the reaction sets us upright".

Thus Russia "was set upright" by the tzarist reaction after the revolution of the years 1905-6 when the above mentioned author wrote his work. Thus too it "was set upright" after the revolution of the year 1917, by the Bolshevik reaction. Peter I spoke about the riot of the people-slave: "this rabble can be restrained by brutality only". When the government manifested that "brutality" and cruelly overwhelmed the Pugachev insurgents, the nation-slave licked its tyrants' boots, admired and even loved them, and the Pugachev repented. As soon as this "brutality" fainted or died in the hearts of the rulers (Alexander II, Nicholas II), the slaves would despise and kill them, believing that it was a revolution. Then would come a new government; it would take the lash in hand and drive the rebellious poor once more into an iron cage. Lenin and Stalin were just such leaders of victorious slaves; later, they also drove the latter into a cage... It was always so in the history of Russia. Above—those who would beat; below—those who were beaten; the latter would even rejoice: "hurrah, it is time to beat us". The revolutionist of yesterday would immediately turn into one of the day before yesterday, a slave, and repent, as soon as a firm hand seized him by the scruff of the neck.

Here is the source of not only the Bolshevik, but the Russian phenomenon of repentance. The Russians can rebel against a *tired* force. But their "natural

state" is to be slaves of a *real* force. Wherever they are faced by such a force, they kneel to it; they kneel to their ruler, if he is such a one as Peter I or Stalin, and a foreign ruler, if he is such a one as the Tartar Khan. They kneel and repent. Others who are weak are attacked and worried to death by them.

The West does not understand the mentality of the Russian people, although one can even see it in the face of every ordinary "Russian man": there is something vague, indefinite and undetermined in that face. You never know what he will do after a while: will he kiss your hand, or gnaw through your throat? He does not yet know it himself; he will look closely at you: if you are a sheep, he will fall upon you; if you are a wolf, he will have his tail between his legs. Therefore, every politician who speaks with a Russian about appeasement is in the Russian's eyes a sheep, and he treats him appropriately. It is quite different, if he feels that the politician who stands before him is a wolf or an experienced tamer. He will recoil from the wolf, concealing his anger; he will fight with the wolf, if the wolf attacks him. But one must *really* be a wolf. However, he who only pretends to be a "wolf", he who only whisks his cane and dares not knock the nonsense out of the Russian head will not frighten the Russian who, being sly enough for this, will feel that he has to do with a masquerade. Politicians and diplomats of the Yalta, Teheran, Potsdam, Panmunjon or Geneva brands will not frighten the Russian Vanka much; they will not prevent him from aggression. Neither will it be done by that publicity of whatever is Russian which—to the shame of occidental culture—is now being given by western publishing houses, newspapers, university lecturers and in concert halls. The more the West loses its faith in its mission and cultural superiority, the more Russian arrogance and thirst for expansion grows. And vice versa. Therefore, by the way, the Russian has more respect for Turkey, Spain and even for partitioned Germany than for other nations which only seem to be stronger.

We, in particular, must focus our attention on that Russian mentality. We can defeat Russia, first in our hearts, and later "on our own, and yet not our" soil, only by complete fearlessness, our courageous rejection of whatever is Russian and our resolute assertion of our own Truth.

D. Donzov

* * *

The O.U.N. (abroad) issued in January 1955 a Declaration concerning the representation of Ukraine in the U.N.O.

Suggestions have recently been made in the West that Ukraine and Byelorussia should be deprived of their seats in the U.N.O. It is argued that the Ukrainian S.S.R. is not a government which represents the Ukrainian people, and that Ukraine is not a sovereign, independent state but is, in effect, completely dominated by Russia.

The O.U.N. contends that the country of Ukraine should be treated on exactly the same basis as the so-called satellite countries which cannot be said to have independent governments at present, and that, while the present Ukrainian Soviet delegates should be barred from the U.N.O. their places should be taken by true representatives of Ukraine. Ukraine is a distinct nation and can in no way be said to form part of Russia.

BOOK REVIEWS

Volodymyr Sichynsky: UKRAINE IN FOREIGN COMMENTS AND DESCRIPTIONS FROM THE Vth TO XXth CENTURY

Published by: The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America,
Inc. New York City, 1953. 14/-

This book does not claim to deal fully with the vast material available but rather constitutes a description of the outstanding features for general use. Nevertheless, as Professor Clarence A. Manning correctly points out in his brief but weighty Foreword, the book meets a real demand in the West: "The American people and the entire Western democratic world are slowly but surely becoming aware of the significance of the Ukrainian problem for the future of Eastern Europe and for the entire civilised world. The growing menace of Russian Communist imperialism is opening the eyes of the world to the real situation as it exists within that prison of nations which was once called the Russian Empire and which now embraces even more territory as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics devoted to the glorification and aggrandisement of the "elder brothers", the Great Russians. . . . We therefore owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Sichynsky who has culled from the pages of the past the opinion of travellers acquainted with the details of Ukrainian life for over a thousand years. One and all from the earliest times, these men have noted the difference between Ukraine and Muscovy. They have contrasted the two modes of life, the two national psychologies, and if their remarks prove anything, it is the permanence and the vitality of Ukrainian democracy and culture."

This present book is an enlarged English revision of the author's book in Ukrainian *Chuzhyntsi pro Ukraïnu*, which has run through five editions, and which contains much that was addressed to the interests and habits of the Ukrainian rather than the English reader. It is true that the author has endeavoured to make the quotations speak for themselves, and to give his work the character of a "collection of memoirs, descriptions and comments on Ukraine by foreign travellers and observers, both official and private," as he says in his Preface. On the other hand, however, the selection and arrangement of the matter impresses us as somewhat partial, and this may strike the English reader, accustomed as he is to objective descriptions, unpleasantly. To give one example out of several: Professor Sichynsky deliberately contrasts characteristic Ukrainian and Russian features whenever possible occurring in the same source in order to emphasise more drastically the undeniable difference between those two peoples. But this is sometimes dangerous: it is plain that the extensive quotations from J. G. Korb's *Diarium itineris in Moscoviam Perillustris* (1700-1) have been cited for the sole purpose of showing the hardly flattering descriptions of Muscovite customs and peculiar-

ities, since Korb's description of Ukraine—he had never been there—is insignificant. The same applies to the quotation of Harris Malmesbury's letter of 2 February, 1778, on Petersburg. The author apparently fails to appreciate that going beyond the proper topic in this way may raise suspicion in the mind of the English reader and may cause him to doubt the integrity of the whole work—which would be unjust.

Some negligence in quoting authorities will surprise the Western reader. The source of the quotation from Gamberini's *An Italian traveller who in 1584 visited Ukraine* can be learned neither from the passage on pages 52-3 nor from the appended bibliography. The letter of Voltaire to the Duc de Choiseul, quoted on page 136, "was found by Elias Borshak, Ukrainian historian, in the *Bibliothèque Chantilly* in Paris", and this is no doubt a matter of great interest to the Ukrainian: the Western reader, however, will be more interested in the question as to where the letter can be found in extenso, as it must be missing from collections of Voltaire's letters. But of this nothing is said.

The inclusion in the Preface of the author's views on the Roxolani and Antae, on the so-called Norman-theory, on "the Slavic tribe of Ucrans on the Baltic Sea", and so on, is rather superfluous. Such discussions of the prehistory and early history of Ukraine might be better avoided in popular compilations of this kind. It is also to be regretted that the two introductory parts of the book, the Foreword and the Preface, each give a concise sketch of the history of Ukraine so that the reader finds himself confronted twice with similar matter from more or less the same point of view.

Since Professor Sichynsky is above all an expert on the history of arts, it is not surprising that the arrangement of the book and particularly the selection and reproduction of the numerous illustrations deserve unrestricted praise. But there are some inaccuracies of a historic or philologic nature, mainly in the first chapters. It is not correct to speak of a prehistoric "mixture of Mongolo-Finnic tribes" on what were later Muscovite territories, since Ugro-Finns are not Mongols at all, and the presumably Mongoloid Turks did not start colonising the middle and upper Volga districts before the 14th century. Such confusion is derived from the Polish eccentricities of the last century, when they described everything Ugro-Finnic or Turkish as "Mongol". It is also gross exaggeration to maintain that "Muscovy... accepted only the superficial aspects of the Slavic language and culture from the Kievan centre", since the original (prehistoric) Slavonisation of the Muscovite territories doubtless had its origin not in Ukraine but in the present Byelorussia (White Ruthenia). This is unequivocally proved by the phonetics of the south-Russian dialects, that is, those of Muscovy proper. Moreover it is misleading to say that "the Muscovite princes already had begun the use of the title 'Tzar' in the era of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" (page 102). The semi-official use of that title comes from Ivan III and the official use from Ivan IV, that is about 100-150 years later.

Finally it should be noted the inscription "Fl. Don Ruthenice", quoted on page 46, does not mean "the Don in Ruthenia" but "in Ruthenian", that is, in the Ruthenian language.

Despite these minor shortcomings, however, the work is of considerable interest and value. I hope the English speaking reader will be indulgent even

though he demands a high degree of historical accuracy. The points raised above can be adjusted in a second edition. Undoubtedly, the book deserves a wide circulation. There is particular appeal for the Western reader in the testimonies of Western travellers and diplomats which emphasise the origins and distinctive characteristics of the Ukrainian national civilisation in the course of one thousand years, their independence of Muscovite Russia and their indispensable right to develop freely within an independent and indivisible Ukrainian national State. The book contains many a concrete statement which urges comparison of the Muscovite-Russian policies of the Tzars and those of Soviet-Russian communism today, such as the zeal of the Tzars in repressing any publication and distribution of facts which might be disadvantageous for the Russian empire, for instance J. G. Korb's above-mentioned *Diarium* ("the Muscovite government dispatched special agents to Vienna who bought up all the books and burnt them") or the 1848 Russian translation of Fletcher ("despite the fact that the book passed the official censorship, its sale and circulation were prohibited by the imperial Minister of Education two hours after its publication; even those copies which had been sent to members of the Scientific Society were confiscated"). The continuous tradition of an Iron Curtain, of a methodical cultural repression on the part of the long established and everlasting Russian imperialism can be proved by those historical facts with particular clarity.

V. D.

Massimo Salvadori. THE RISE OF MODERN COMMUNISM

Published by Henry Holt and Company, New York. Introduction by Norman Thomas—January 1, 1952, pp. 118.

Mr. Salvadori tries to give us a very brief survey of the Communist movement in the twentieth century. We find here the history of the Communist movement from its very origins to the end of the first phase of the Comintern, then from 1923 to the end of World War II, and finally the rise of Russian, and of international, Communism since 1945.

Many books, both good and poor, have been published in English dealing with communism. The phenomenon of communism is too new and difficult for many writers to be able to evaluate the events in Eastern Europe and all over the world objectively and without errors. The present author presents us with a keen analysis of the nature of communism and comes to the conclusion that among the factors which have contributed to the rise and success of communism are:

- 1) the economic suffering of large sections of mankind;
- 2) the impression made by this suffering on Marxist intellectuals who form the solid core of the communist movement;
- 3) the chaotic conditions in which many areas of Europe and Asia found themselves after the two World Wars, which enabled small minorities of well-organised and determined communists to seize political power;
- 4) the use of brute force by communists and their disregard for every principle of ethics;

5) an uncompromising attitude which brooks no opposition nor deviation and gives to communism a cohesion and homogeneity unknown to other movements;

6) the promise of the Millenium, coupled with a deep belief in the inevitability of socialism;

7) the ability of present communist leaders to adjust their action to ever-changing conditions; finally

8) the tremendous power and prestige of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine and the Ukrainian problem, their importance for the rise or fall of Russian communism, the recent—and present—struggle of the Ukrainian people and army against the Red Russian invaders in Ukraine are not mentioned in this little book. Only short remarks on pages 23, 57, and 66 are devoted to the Ukrainian people and their struggle against the Red Russian Army in World War II.

Mr. Salvadori has not devoted enough space to the problem of nationalities in the Soviet Union and to their struggle for liberation from foreign oppression. And yet this problem is one of the most important for the development of further events in the Soviet Union: the problem of nationalities is indeed the Achilles heel for Moscow. It is regrettable that many—but not all—politicians and statesmen of Western Europe and America have not perceived this truth, because Communism can be weakened and annihilated only by using the internal struggling forces of the various nations in the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless we should be thankful to the author for his brief and concise publication on the rise of modern communism. He has been close enough to communism to learn about it at first hand: he was long active in Europe and fought as a paratrooper with the British Army in World War II. He has written the book for those who do not know the true nature of Russian Communism and its potential danger in the years ahead. Despite many errors in the appreciation of Communist development and its rise in recent years we recommend careful reading of the book by all those who wish to study Communism.

W. O.

Richard Pipes. *THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION*
Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923

Published by: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1954. pp. 355.

The book presents us with the history of the disintegration of the vast Russian Empire, and the creation on its ruins of a multi-national Communist Empire, known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the book we read how the Russian Communists succeeded in exploiting the nationalism of the peoples of Ukraine, Byelorussia, of the Caucasian and other peoples in Central Asia and the regions of Volga and Ural, for the purpose of seizing power and subjugating other peoples on the borderlands. The main emphasis of the books is on the national movements in these borderlands, and on their

mutual relations with Communist expansion. The author wishes to give the reader an analysis of the role which the national problems played in the last Russian revolution, and the book does not deal with those national groups which separated themselves during the Russian Revolution: the Poles, the Baltic peoples and the Finns.

We find the following chapters in the book:

- 1) The national problem in Russia; the Russian Empire on the eve of the 1917 Revolution; national movements in Russia; the Ukrainians and Byelorussians: the Turkic peoples; the peoples of the Caucasus.
- 2) 1917 and the disintegration of the Russian Empire; the general causes of this; Ukraine and Byelorussia; the rise of the Ukrainian Central Rada, February-June 1917; from July to the October Revolution, in Ukraine; Byelorussia in 1917; the Moslem borderlands, the Caucasus.
- 3) The Soviet conquest of Ukraine and Byelorussia; the fall of the Ukrainian Central Rada; the Communist Party of Ukraine, its formation and activities in 1918; the struggle of the Communists for power in Ukraine in 1919; Byelorussia from 1918-1920.
- 4) The Soviet conquest of the Moslem borderlands; the Bashkir and Tartar Republics, the Kirghiz Republic, Turkestan, the Crimea.
- 5) Soviet conquest of the Caucasus; the Transcaucasian Federation; Soviet rule in the North Caucasus and Eastern Transcaucasia in 1918; the Terek region, Baku; the independent republics, 1918-19; Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia.
- 6) The establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Conclusion.

The author expresses his gratitude to Professor Michael Karpovich who "originally suggested the subject of this study and who has made further suggestions in the course of its writing", to the Russian Research Centre of Harvard University, and to other outstanding persons and institutions. It is very regrettable that we do not find the name of any Ukrainian specialist, either in history or in law, who could have assisted the author to verify the information that is presented, for example on Ukraine and the Ukrainian Revolution in the years mentioned above. For, despite the rich material on Ukraine that is included in the book, there are many errors, maybe distortions, with regard to historical events in Ukraine during those years. We find, for instance, the following statement on page nine: "During the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century, it was still an open question whether the cultural and economic peculiarities of the Ukrainian people would lead to the formation of a separate nation". We should like to recommend Mr. Pipes to read and study the books published in connection with the 300th Anniversary of the Ukrainian-Muscovite treaty of Pereyaslav signed in 1654. The author would perceive from these books, which are published in English, that there existed a Ukrainian nation and state long before the Russian Revolution, and that Ukrainians and Ukrainian armies fought long before 1917 to maintain the independence of Ukraine.

We read on page ten that "for the next thirty years (he is referring to the 19th century) the centre" of the Ukrainian cultural movement "shifted

to Galicia, where it enjoyed greater freedom owing to Vienna's interest in utilising Ukrainian (Ruthenian) patriotism as a counterbalance to Polish nationalism in this province". We wish to state here that Vienna was interested also in utilising Polish nationalism against Ukrainian cultural aspirations. It is generally known in Western Europe and, we hope, in America, that four million Ukrainians in Galicia could not have a Ukrainian university in Lviv (Lemberg), the capital of Galicia, because of Polish resistance to Ukrainian cultural interests, and because of the refusal of Vienna itself to create such a university.

It was not "the superiority of the Ukrainian soil" that assumed a Ukrainian national form independently of Russia, as stated on page fifty-one. One must not restrict the Ukrainian national movement to economic questions. Ukraine has its own history, culture and a glorious past.

The Ukrainian Haydamaky were not "a form of banditry, combining violent anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism with sheer brigandage". The Haydamaky were Ukrainian patriots originating mostly from the lower classes of the Ukrainian population who wished to free the common Ukrainian people from the long Polish oppression.

We do not agree with the statements of the author concerning the "minorities" in the Soviet Union. These "minorities" are peoples with their own culture and a splendid past. The "minorities" constitute more than a half of the population of the entire Soviet Union.

There are other errors connected with Ukrainian independence relating to the years 1918-21 which space does not permit us to mention here.

It should be noted that the book contains many interesting maps and other illustrations.

V. O.

UKRAINIAN PERIODICALS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES

The Ukrainian Quarterly In English. Published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

Ucrania Libre Quarterly, in Spanish. Published by Instituto informativo-editorial ucranio. Buenos Aires

The Ukrainian Bulletin Fortnightly, in English. Published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

Ukrainian Commentary Monthly, in English. Published by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee

L'Ukraine Libre Monthly, in French. Published by Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes "Hromada"

Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart Quarterly, in German. Published by the Deutsch-ukrainische Gesellschaft

UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD

NEWS

On 19 December 1954 the Very Rev. James Christie, S.J. addressed Ukrainians at a celebration in Edinburgh of the tenth Anniversary of the death of the Metropolitan Andreas Sheptytsky.

Father Christie began by referring to the celebration as also marking the Feast of St. Nicolas and the close of the Marian Year. Ukrainians were renowned for the tender love they bore towards the Holy Mother of God, he said, and for centuries she had been invoked as the Queen of Ukraine.

"We, your fellow Catholics, because of our union with you in the Mystical Body of Christ," continued Father Christie, "share with you in your trials. But since we have no direct experience of the cruel persecution that has brought them upon you, much as we may try we can do little more than guess at their magnitude. But Our Lady is fully aware of how they afflict you. You know that. It is the reason why you turn to her with such complete confidence. It explains why despite the wrongs you have endured and are enduring, you come to her today with patient trust to thank her—to thank her even for adversity. For you know that it is in adversity that our faith in God is most surely tested and provoked."

Speaking of the Metropolitan, Father Christie referred to "his unflinching courage in the face of fierce attacks by the enemies of God upon the Church, and by the enemies of your native country on its freedom..." "Indeed", he went on, "so holy a man was he—he who was the close friend of St. Pius Xth—so noble a patriot, that historians are agreed that his very presence in Ukraine was enough to check the worst excesses of the enemies of the Church. His death, or, as some would say, his martyrdom, was as the removal of the last rampart of defence. Certain it is, at any rate, that the present bitter persecution of the Church in Ukraine dates from the day of his death."

"Now you are asked", declared Father Christie, "to serve God in exile, in adversity, and for that reason your last works, your present service, are the more meritorious. The Holy Father himself has said that the intrepid constancy with which the persecuted and exiled Ukrainian Catholics have remained faithful to the Church has won his admiration. Although any other testimony is of incomparably less value, nonetheless it is a joy to be able to add our testimony to the words of the Holy Father. Your reputation here in Scotland redounds to the glory of the Church and brings credit to your country. God-fearing and pious; industrious and law abiding; patient and without rancour; such is the way men speak of you."

"The injustices you suffer will be righted. You know that, and you are content to await God's good time in patience and in charity. But you are not patient because you are powerless. You know that, too, we tend to think of power in terms of guns and bombs. It is human minds that shape history. The real struggle in the world today is at a level deeper than the territories

on which armies are mustered. It is a conflict in the minds of men. That is why we know that the current jargon about "peaceful co-existence" is an empty slogan. Slogans may spare us the trouble of thinking but they cannot spare us from reality. Slogans do not alter facts. No slogans can alter the fact that good and evil are opposed and are dynamic. They cannot exist peacefully together. To cease to resist what is evil is to succumb to evil—to sub-exist with it.

* * *

In February the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Youth Association, uniting patriotic young Ukrainians in many countries of the West, issued an appeal to the youth of the free world to organise a protest against deportations of thousands of young Ukrainians from Ukraine to the so-called new agricultural areas now being developed in Siberia and Kazakhstan.

* * *

The year 1955 is the tenth in the life of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd., which began its activities in January 1946. The tenth Annual General Meeting is being held on March 25th and 26th, and delegates of over 120 branches and groups will attend on behalf of more than 18,000 members.

A concert is being held in the Assembly Rooms at Hammersmith on March 27th to mark the occasion. The Dancing Group "Lehit" from Reading, and "Homin", the Male Voice Choir from Manchester, are taking part in the concert.

* * *

Under the Presidency of Mgr. Ivan Buchko, Mgr. H. van Waevenberg and Prof. I. Mirchuk, the Free University of Munich held a week of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Louvain from 7-12 February this year.

The subjects of lectures and discussions included the legal and diplomatic status of Ukraine; her importance in Europe; the value of the national idea; economic assets and standards of living in Ukraine; the position of Christianity in Eastern Europe, and also the origins of Marxist atheism.

* * *

The Union of Ukrainian Merchants, Manufacturers and Owners of Commercial Enterprises in Argentine is going to organise the first Ukrainian Joint-Stock Company in Argentine, which aims to improve the economic conditions of the Ukrainians in that country. With this end in view, they have already created a Foundation Group, elected a provisional Board of Directors (Volodymyr Savych, Ivan Hryhorashchuk, Dmytro Demchuk, Dr. Volodymyr Palashevsky, Dr. Vasyl Ivanytsky, Teodor Khomyshyn and Mykola Denysyuk), and subscribed the first minimum shares amounting to 261,000 pesos.

* * *

The Ukrainian National University started its work in Chicago in the beginning of October. U.N.U. has made it its aim to impart basic knowledge of Ukrainian studies to young people and the community. The syllabus of

instruction includes: language and literature, history, geography, economic and social science, art and philosophy.

The work of the Ukrainian National University was inaugurated by a lecture by Prof. Yu. Kamenetsky on the subject: *Problems of the nation and state*.

The Ukrainian National University in Chicago has been established by the initiative of the following youth organisations: Athletic Club, Art Club, "The Lions", O.D.U.M., the Organisation of Boy Scouts, the Students' Community and S.U.M.

* * *

An important scientific discovery has been made by the Ukrainian scientist Mykola Ostapyak who arrived in U.S.A. a few years ago and is working at one of the laboratories in Philadelphia. Mr. Ostapyak has ascertained that the serious illness meningitis is caused by a microbe called "virus c".

* * *

Two scientific occasions in which about 30 Italians and above ten Ukrainians participated took place in Rome on October 25 and 26, 1954. This was a session of the Mediterranean Academy and the Ukrainian-Italian Society. The following Ukrainians, professors of the Ukrainian Free University Rector Dr. I. Mirchuk, Dr. V. Oreletsky, Dr. Yu. Studynsky, and the honorary guests Archbishop Ivan Buchko, the rector of the Ukrainian Papal College, the Rev. V. Martynets, the pro-rector, the Rev. Dr. M. Voynar, the adviser, the Rev. I. Nazarko, the Rev. Dr. A. Velyky, Dr. Yu. Melyanyk, Mrs. O. Konovalets and others, and the following Italians took part: Prof. Bassan, Prof. Petite, Prof. Loiden, Dr. Insabato, Dr. Bendioli, Prof. Roccabella, Gen. Box, the deputy Prince Aliata, Ambassador Gianini. There were also representatives of other nationalities there.

At the session Prof. Dr. I. Mirchuk delivered a lecture on "Ukraine as a mediator between the West and the East", Prof. Dr. Yu. Studynsky on "The situation of Ukraine in international law". At the session of the Academy held on October 26 Eng. D. Andriyevsky read a lecture on the political problem of the Black Sea, and Prof. Dr. Yu. Studynsky on "The economic potential of the Black Sea countries".

At a special reception in the "Chess Club" the president of the Mediterranean Academy presented diplomas to Prof. Dr. I. Mirchuk and Prof. Dr. Yu. Studynsky, nominating them members of the Academy.

The Italian press published full reports of the lectures delivered by the Ukrainian scientists.

* * *

A *Ukrainian National Museum and a Library* have been established in U.S.A. The Museum will be in Los Angeles and in New York. Thanks to the patron of the former Museum in Prague, Kalenyk Lysyuk, suitable premises for the Museum have already been obtained in Los Angeles.

The Museum is to be directed by the Scientific and Economic Councils which, by the way, are to be made up of representatives of U.V.A.N., N.T.Sh., charitable institutions, and founders. The property of the Museum amounts to 30 thousand dollars (precious oil-paintings and antique books).

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

THE DEPORTEES IN THE VIRGIN LAND

"We are waiting for you"—write the Ukrainian deportees at Russia's behest from the virgin lands to Ukraine. "We have grown very fond of the new boundless steppes, our new settlements. Come to us... although it is hard to live here..."

Although in their letters to Ukraine the deportees do not explain the words "although it is hard to live here", one can easily find an answer to that in the Soviet press. "The problem of dwelling, life and cultural needs is the most important problem in the virgin lands; it must be solved as soon as possible", writes *Komsomolska Hazeta* (*Komsomol Newspaper*) in its article "The urgent needs of the resettled persons".

HUT-HOVELS MADE OF CANE

The housing conditions in the virgin lands are so bad that in spite of the fair words of the Russian government promising lodgings to the deportees, the deportees are compelled to build hut-hovels of cane, osier and grass for themselves. The deportation, however, is being carried out on such a large scale that all the public collective-farm living quarters and buildings of the Motor Tractor Stations (M.T.S.) in the Pavlodar and North-Kazakh regions of Kazakhstan have been changed into hostels, which are already overcrowded.

Party inspectors compel the deportees to build, without assistance, not only lodgings for themselves, but also official premises for collective farms, state farms and M.T.S. But what to build them of? In order to buy ordinary nails, the deportees must travel from the Pavlodar region as far as the Novosibirsk (nearly 400 miles—Ed.). In the shops of "selpo"—village consumers' co-operative society—cooking-ranges, stove-doors, firescreens, stove-pipes are out of stock. It is no use dreaming of beds, tables, chairs, kitchen utensils, bedsheets, blinds, blankets and so on.

IN A FROSTY WINTER—WITHOUT CLOTHES AND SHOES

The winter in Kazakhstan is sometimes very severe; there are sometimes even 35 degrees of frost there. Thus the winter demands good and warm clothes and shoes. However, in the Pavlodar region one cannot obtain ordinary felt boots, leather boots or good shoes. "Where can our shoes and clothes be mended?" ask the deportees working at the Mykhailiv M.T.S. There are no local workshops; one has to travel 100 kilometres to the district centre in order to have one's shoes or clothes mended.

The barber comes to the M.T.S. only once a month when the deportees insist on it. Butter, sugar, tinned food, peeled grains are only from time to time on sale in the shops of "selpo".

THERE IS EVEN NO WATER THERE

A review of the letters sent by the deportees from the virgin land to the Editorial Office of *Literaturna Hazeta* (*Literary Newspaper*) was published on the first page of that newspaper on October 5, 1954. By the way, the following incident was quoted in the letters:

A tractor hauled a large tank of water from the lake. Women and youths with buckets in their hands surrounded it immediately. Everyone tried to get as much water as possible. Each of them were given only one bucket of water for the whole day. There is not enough water there, and the demand for it increases...

"THIS IS JUST OUR TABLE"

The deportees in the newly organised Bulayev district, North-Kazakh region, gradually move from tents to their own lodgings built by themselves. Everyone tries to furnish his lodging as well as possible, but it is not easy to create convenience and comfort. "How to furnish, if there are no materials", writes a certain Maria Prokopenko in her letter to the Editorial Office. In the "selpo" (village shop) of Bulayevo—which is one hundred kilometres away—only ordinary chairs are on sale. Our own suit-cases and cigarette containers serve us for a table. We place them on two blocks, cover them with a newspaper—and this is our table".

IN A QUEUE TO THE KITCHEN

The deportees write that they do not plaster the walls of their lodgings because there are no materials; it is impossible to get double window frames; the doors are without latches; the windows—without window-panes. It is already October, and there are no ovens in the huts. There is neither firewood nor coal, and it is impossible to buy them. One cannot heat the ovens with straw because they are not adapted to this. It is even impossible to get droppings for heating because they are used as manure. "What to heat with?" complain the deportees. The hostels for youth are not prepared for winter. The eating-houses, kitchens and other premises have not been built. Young people with canteens in their hands stand in a queue to the kitchen. There is not enough bread either in "selpo" or the eating-houses...

AND RUSSIA REJOICES...

However, such a low standard of living does not bother the Russian red boyars and dignitaries; they even call it a "matter of valour and heroism". Certainly, the Soviet press admits that the life of the deportees is hard. But, simultaneously, being enthusiastic about that, it says that it must be an incomparable joy to do patriotic deeds without sleeping and eating enough, without having proper rest. Was it not heroism—shouts the newspaper with enthusiasm—when the deportees faithfully worked in the field, and the brigades were not supplied either with bread or other food or water during the dog-days (thus they were hungry and thirsty—Z. A.)? They had been called upon by the party to do those deeds; for the sake of those deeds they have left their homes, families, friends, wives and children...

THE DEPORTATION CONTINUES

Recently the "elder brother" applied new tricks aimed at impelling the Ukrainian population to migration. The deportees must write letter-invitations to their relatives, acquaintances and other persons in Ukraine. The other day radio Kyiv reported that new deportees from the Mykolayiv, Chernyhiiv, Kherson and other regions of Ukraine were being transported to the virgin land. In the beginning of 1955 60 thousand families-deportees from Ukraine and Byelorussia—will be transported to the collective farms of the northern regions of Kazakhstan.

The extermination of the Ukrainian population, the devastation of the entire Ukraine by the deportation of its population to other regions of the U.S.S.R., continues. The world remains indifferent to the Russian genocide. A new tragedy, a ruthless destruction of the freedom-loving Ukrainian nation of many millions is taking place before the eyes of the democratic West. But in spite of all the horrors and difficulties, the Ukrainian nation firmly believes that it will find some way out of them, and that the truth will have the upper hand in spite of all. This will be guaranteed by Ukraine's incessant fight against the Russian invader.

Z. Alta

(*Shlyakh Peremohy* "The Way to Victory" No. 44 of Dec. 26, 1954). Of the 34423 pairs of shoes received from the Odessa shoe factory—1146 pairs have been graded as second-rate merchandise by the commercial organisations, or returned to the factory as spoilage. This is a good illustration of the quality of Soviet production.

* * *

Besides the known campaign regarding the deportation of Ukrainians to the virgin lands and the mobilisation of demobilised soldiers for the Donbas mines, another Kremlin campaign is being carried on in Charkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and other Ukrainian towns: transfer of clerks—book-keepers, typists, secretaries, accountants, draftsmen and so on—to workshops and brigades for physical work. According to the Soviet press, great enthusiasm and delight are being displayed in this case, too. Thus, in the Charkiv factories the clerks are "voluntarily" declaring their readiness to replace their pens and abaci by shovels, hammers, picks. In the Soviet "paradise" people are forced to do everything and everywhere, without being asked whether they want it or not. The transfer of clerks to workshops and brigades for physical work indicates the serious crisis which is being experienced by Soviet industry because of the lack of hands.

* * *

Under the heading "Letters to the readers", *Radyanska Ukraina* "The Soviet Ukraine" No. 274 of November 21, 1954 has published the following characteristic letter by a teacher from the Zboriv district, Ternopil region, J. Makukh:

The trade network of the Zboriv district, Ternopil region, is working very badly. The shops of the district centre and the village Ozeryany lack the simplest and indispensable things, for example, ordinary lamps and lamp-chimneys. One cannot buy those things in our shops. Recently there were lamps No. 8 in the shops, but there were no fitting lamp-chimneys. There are lamp-chimneys for lamps No. 11 in the shops, but there are no lamps of that size. There were lamps in the shops which must be trimmed with a round wick, but there were no such wicks. Even if one succeeds in buying a complete lamp somewhere, one will not get kerosene.

Just try to buy a wardrobe here! I have already tried for half a year to buy that article at Zboriv and Ternopil, and always in vain".

* * *

At Vinnytsia, Ternopil, Drohobych, Sumy and other regions of Ukraine the so-called urban party conferences are being held, at which the state and the problem of the development of industry, particularly the production of consumers' goods, are being discussed. Although there is much ambitious talk at those conferences, there are also speeches which prove the unsatisfactory state of industry. Thus the Vinnytsia "petty industrial artel (artel is Russian for small production unit) and combined establishments for the service of everyday needs do not fulfil the plan regarding assortment, and they often manufacture wares of inferior quality. For example, of the 150 articles manufactured by the Chkalov artel and taken for examination—97 have been rejected as defective. *Pravda Ukrainy* "Truth of Ukraine" of January 5, 1955. The conference at Vinnytsia has also revealed that the care of the cultural and living conditions of the workers is unsatisfactory. At Drohobych, 27 concerns and institutions have overpaid by over one million roubles in wages in 1954 (The Muscovite emissaries have a good time, indeed!) The party conference at Drohobych has called the attention of the town party committee to the necessity of "a radical improvement of the direction of the Marxist-Leninist education of communists". Besides, it has been stated that in the town the fulfilment of the orders of C.K. K.P.S.S. regarding the political education of cadres is unsatisfactory. That is to say that at Drohobych the question of the communisation of the population is acute. There is a similar situation in other regions of Ukraine.

* * *

THE METROPOLITAN Y. SLIPY

A word comes from behind the iron curtain that the Galician Metropolitan, Archbishop Yosyf Slipy, is still living in grievous Vorkuta; he has allegedly been released from slave labour in the mines and is working as watchman at an institution for aged people, the unhappy victims of the Russian-Communist oppression.

Metropolitan Slipy was imprisoned in 1945 and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment, and later on once more to an additional 9 years imprisonment, because he allegedly had sent his pastorals to the believers in his metropolis in a secret way. But the real reason of the second conviction of the Metropolitan is Russia's fear of his great influence with the population in the event of his return to his metropolis. The Russians are of the opinion that his very

presence among the believers, even in the character of a private person, is dangerous.

Thus being not guilty of anything, Metropolitan Slipy has already suffered in the slave labour camps for 9 years only because he has remained faithful to God, his Church, and his People. The rector of the Stanyslaviv Ecclesiastical Seminary, the Rev. Dr. A. Boychuk, is also reported to have been deported to Vorkuta.

The Ukrainian Congress Committee in U.S.A. has submitted to the Congress of U.S.A. a resolution condemning the religious persecution in the U.S.S.R. The submission has been made by G. Runey of New York. The resolution speaks about Metropolitan Slipy who was arrested and deported to the far north in 1945.

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M. O. Myronenko. A Journalist living in London, editor of the Ukrainian monthly "Dumky", and specialist in Russian economic affairs.

Petro Poltava. Leading journalist in the Ukrainian underground movement, and a member of the S.U.L.C. (Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council). Killed in action in Ukraine 1951.

Yaroslav Stetzko. Was elected Prime Minister by the Ukrainian National Assembly in Lviv on June 30, 1941. On rejecting Hitler's ultimatum demanding the annulment of the Ukrainian Proclamation of Independence, he was arrested 12 July, 1941, and detained at Oranienburg concentration camp till 30 September 1944. After his release he escaped from Gestapo surveillance. Leading member of the O.U.N. (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) and President of the A.B.N. (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations).


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Yaroslav Stetzko

A TIME FOR FIRMNESS

In the forum of international politics the year 1954 ended on a sad and dismal note. A wave of faith in "co-existence" with Bolshevism is sweeping the western world, and, unfortunately, even men like Dulles, Eisenhower, and Churchill, who are acquainted with the essence of Bolshevism, are beginning to be full of enthusiasm for the fanciful idea of the co-existence of the world of slavery with that of freedom. It is disheartening to think that, in the face of this disease which is taking hold of the western world, many bold men who perceive it as such are forced into silence. Whilst preparing to launch its next attack on the world which is still free, Bolshevism makes good use of the co-existence obsession at present prevailing in Western Europe and America; it pretends it is willing to exist peacefully side by side with the "capitalist" world, its aim being to subjugate Asia first of all according to a far-seeing plan and then to deal America and the rest of Europe a deadly blow. For instance, the pestilential wave of Bolshevism is now threatening to inundate the rest of Indo-China. Asia is indeed far away from the banks of the Seine, the Rhine, and Tiber, although even Nicholas II and Lenin realised that the way to Paris leads via Peking.

This policy of an alleged co-existence, that is to say, of an externally camouflaged capitulation of the Kremlin, is also advocated by the so-called "Third Bloc" of classical supporters of co-existence, a bloc that is being welded together by Tito and Nehru. All the world knows that Tito's Slovenia can only continue to exist under co-existence conditions. A victory over the U.S.S.R. would inevitably result in the democratisation of Yugoslavia, in its dissolution into national states and in Tito's downfall. For this reason Tito is making every effort to prevent a conflict between the West and Soviet Russia. Those who are farsighted enough will realise that

Tito's break with the Kremlin is extremely advantageous to the latter, since the conflict between the West and Bolshevism has been and will be postponed. The conjecture which is now spreading in the West, namely that Tito went to Asia on the instructions of West-European political circles, in order to dissuade Nehru from pursuing his pro-Communist policy and from further support to Mao Tse-tung, is actually unfounded, especially as Tito himself has always supported Mao, and delegations from his own country have constantly voted for the admission of Red China to the United Nations. And it was surely not just a coincidence that Malenkov recently proposed a toast to Tito's Slovenia. Tito's former quarrel with the Kremlin has not made him friendlier towards the West, but it has thrown the entire policy of the West into confusion and has given it a false trend. The ensuing ideological and political mistakes on the part of the West as regards the peoples subjugated by Bolshevism may, if continued and intensified, have catastrophic results.

It is a well-known fact that official circles in the West have for some time now—and precisely because of the alleged “exemplary” clash between Tito's country and Soviet Russia—been looking for salvation in the national Communist and other “leftist” political trends. The entire anti-Bolshevik struggle is thus being diverted from its true course, and confidence is placed in the Slanskys, the Gomulkas, the new Ukrainian Skrypnyks—who, incidentally, do not even exist now—in, to be exact, revolts led by the chief administrative heads and provincial governors. But no court-revolutions are likely to put an end to Soviet Russia; this can only be accomplished by national freedom insurrections and wars, which, as regards the ideology by which they are prompted, must oppose every form of Communism. The result of the conception which has originated from Tito's revolt is that the official and semi-official policy of the western world, including American Republicans and British Conservatives, is tending to support “leftist” elements, namely those groups among the peoples subjugated by Moscow which most closely approach Tito-ism. For instance, it is no mere coincidence that Nagy, Dimitrov, Rybka, Zenkl, Lettrich, the Russian N.T.S. (National Labour Alliance) organisation, and many of the “leftist representatives” of the subjugated non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union, enjoy the goodwill and confidence of certain official and semi-official political circles, among them right-wing circles,

in the West; this is logically in keeping with that general trend which builds its hopes upon Tito-ism and upon a possible revolution on the part of the "provincial governors", who by the grace of Moscow have advanced to power in the political life of their countries and who will allegedly revolt against this same Moscow in times to come, and who will break with it, just as Tito has done. And the same attitude is adopted with regard to Mao and the European satellites.

Further, the confidence placed by *Radio Liberation* in alleged experts on "Soviet life", in those persons who "know how to speak to the Soviet people" (just as if they were not ordinary persons at all, not just as normal as the people in the West, with normal aims and needs and an immortal soul!), is nothing other than the same "leftist action"; and in this connection neither nationalist nor anti-Marxist representatives even of the most recent emigrant groups are allowed to count as "experts", on the other hand, however, a Marxist, even if he has never read a single paper printed in the Soviet Union in all his life, is still an "expert", inasmuch as his mentality is in keeping with the Communist mentality. The Ukrainian underground publications and those of the O.U.N. (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, the U.P.A. (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) and the S.U.L.C. (Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council¹), which are compiled and published by men who have experienced "Soviet reality" and are fighting this same reality, are for instance not acknowledged as valid, since they are also directed against the Moscow provincial governors. It is true that in one of his recent speeches Dulles, in addition to expressing some peculiar ideas on co-existence, did reveal a certain perceptive faculty when he mentioned attempts to burst the U.S.S.R. asunder from within. Such an idea is right and appropriate; but it is perhaps, after all, nothing but a plaster on a deep-seated co-existence boil—"ut aliquid fecisse videatur" (to make it appear that something was being done in the matter). And, in any case, who would support an attempt to burst the U.S.S.R. asunder from within? The "American Committee", *Radio Liberation*, or possibly the pro-Russian "Research Institute"?

Is there any central anti-Bolshevik organisation in the West which would unite forces with the national underground movements and support them? Where, indeed, can we find a united staff for the "first front", namely for the front that lies behind the Iron Curtain?

¹) Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada (U.H.V.R.)

In a series of talks with the well-known war-theorist of the West, General Fuller, the present writer had an opportunity to discuss in detail with him the question of a possible co-operation and mutual support of the free West and the nations subjugated by Moscow. The result of these talks was a pamphlet published by the Scottish League for European Freedom²⁾. General Fuller formulated his strategic conception of both World Wars in advance, and it would be very regrettable as far as the West is concerned if his present ideas were ignored, as was previously the case. No prophet is accepted in his own country, and Fuller's theories were first adopted and put into practice by men of other countries who had recognised the essential factors of modern warfare in time—for instance, Guderian and Zhukov—before they were at last accepted by the Allies. The strategic conception of the Third World War, as Fuller foresees it, is already being put into practice by the Bolsheviks, whilst official circles in the West look on calmly. How long, one may ask, do they intend to look on?

In any case, the fundamental neutrality of Yugoslavia's strategic position, which can be forecast for some time to come, is a weak spot in Western policy, all the more so as the support given to Tito by the West, namely the support given to national Communism and thus the denial of the cause of the anti-Communist national liberation movements, is arousing bitter feelings against the West among the nations subjugated by Soviet Russia. *The fact that Ukrainian underground circles have informed us that the Ukrainian nation no longer has any faith in a war and does not believe that such an event, even if it should occur, would in any way aid the Ukrainian struggle for freedom, is indeed most significant. And it should be a warning to the West.* It is quite possible that anti-Bolshevik camps—one consisting of the free West, the other of the countries subjugated by Bolshevism—might be set up, their activities running parallel but not co-ordinated and perhaps even partially in conflict. In our day, when wars are based on ideologies, this might lead to tragic consequences, inasmuch as the entire bloc of nations subjugated by Communism and the bloc of Western powers, who are ill-disposed towards us, would be confronted by the ruthless

²⁾ *For what type of war should the West prepare.* Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

fanaticism of a united Communist camp led by Soviet Russian Bolsheviks.

The responsibility as regards such a sequence of events rests exclusively with the statesmen of the West. America has every chance of becoming a standard-bearer in the cause of national and social justice in the West, but only providing that the Americans themselves take an active part in America's eastern policy and ignore the opinions expressed by naturalised "experts" of eastern origin, who are pursuing anything but an American policy.

In view of the deadly Bolshevik menace to the whole world it is both sad and deeply humiliating to watch some statesmen of the West dilly-dallying over the problem of Germany's re-armament. Geneva's capitulation to Moscow and Peking; the surrender of Indo-China, strategically and politically invaluable, to the Communists; France's misgivings as to Germany's re-armament—although France herself is not even in a position to protect her own country against the pernicious influence of Communism; the fact that the French government, acting under Communist pressure, issued a decree forbidding the activity of the A.B.N. (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations) in France; all kinds of obstacles placed in Spain's way to prevent her from assuming a fitting role in present world political affairs; the evident delay in dealing with the question of Japan's re-armament; all these things are unpleasant indications of a defeatism which emanates from the politicians who are responsible for the fate of the world which at present is still free.

As far as Japan is concerned it is no mere coincidence that the government there is at present being taken over by men who have been prisoned in Allied camps. This is the result of Japanese feeling in the face of the Bolshevik menace. Instead of ignoring Japan's feelings and trying to introduce certain alien and pernicious changes in Japanese ways of living, it would have been wiser to treat the Japanese nation with a certain amount of tact, to avoid arousing bitterness towards the West.

All the other peoples who were defeated in the last war and who at that time fought against Soviet Russia, even if they did so under the wrong leaders and under the wrong mottoes, should be re-armed without delay. The nations subjugated by Bolshevism, with Ukraine at their head, Japan, Germany, Spain, and Turkey, are the forces which, together with the U.S.A. and Great Britain, will play a

decisive part in the clash which is inevitable. If they do not unite forces and co-operate, it will be extremely difficult to overcome Bolshevik tyranny. The year 1955 sees the U.S.A. and Great Britain confronted by an exceedingly important task, namely the setting up of a united anti-Communist front of the free world and the subjugated world, on the strength of the equality of rights of all the participators, and the respecting of national and individual freedom.

It is quite possible that the current problem of the liberation of the peoples subjugated by Soviet Russia may be taken into consideration once the Paris Agreements on West Germany's sovereignty and re-armament have been ratified. It is quite possible that the future idea of holding another Four Power conference may be abandoned, without the western world compromising itself once more in the eyes of the nations subjugated by Bolshevism, at whose expense the conference was to reach a "successful" conclusion. But it is likewise quite possible that the deadly disease of the co-existence idea may spread even further, in which case the West will forfeit its chances, whilst the subjugated nations, for their part, will continue to wage their wars for freedom on their own initiative and according to their own plans, without taking the special and exclusive interests of the West, erroneously pre-supposed by the latter, into account.

The 37th Anniversary of the Proclamation of Ukrainian Independence (January 22, 1918) was celebrated by Ukrainian Communities in the free world.

For the first time the Congress of the U.S.A. marked the occasion. Prayers were said in the House of Representatives by the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, Ivan Teodorovych, and in the Senate by Father Mykola Kohut.

In the Brazilian National Congress the deputy, Ukrainian-born Dr. Petro Firman, in an address concerning the Ukrainian colony in Parana, made special mention of this anniversary and spoke of the Ukrainian liberation movement. His address was very favourably received and widely reported.

Veli Kajum-Khan

Crescent Moon and Red Star

The Orient between the Major Powers and Russia

Three major powers confront each other in the Orient—the U.S.A. and Britain on the one hand, Soviet Russia on the other. Japan, which up to World War II pursued a skilful and adaptable policy towards Islam, is no longer in the running. Italy likewise has no longer any influence in the Islamic countries.

Turkey forfeited the sovereign position she had held for centuries as supreme head of the Islamic nations after the first World War. She adopted a neutral attitude in order to avoid giving rise to Russian provocation. During the past decades all her efforts have been concentrated on building up a strong, national state. But the long-standing antagonism between Russia and Turkey still exists. By means of infiltration and propagation of the Communist ideology Moscow sought to create the pre-conditions for military action in Turkey, too. But Turkey was on her guard and tolerated neither the Communist Party nor any other terrorist organisations in her country. She now has an army which is one of the best-equipped, strongest and most modern armies in the Orient. She is entering into firmer friendly relations with other Islamic countries once more. A start has been made in this direction with the recently concluded Turko-Pakistan amity pact, and there is reason to believe that other Islamic countries will join this pact, the purpose of which is to check Russian Communist pressure in the Orient. But all this is still in its early initial stage, and so far there can be no talk of Turkey actively participating in the fight against Communist influence in the Islamic countries.

None of the European countries, with the exception of Britain, has an active part in the fight against Communist activity in the Orient. Since World War II Great Britain, however, has given India, Pakistan, and Burma their independence and has thus to some extent undermined Soviet propaganda. The Suez Canal Agreement has further strengthened friendly relations between Great Britain and the Islamic countries, a fact which was stressed recently by Egypt's prime minister, Abdel Nasser, when he said, "The one big

danger which threatened Egypt and the Near East was a Soviet invasion. Egypt is on the side of the West and as regards the ideological aspects the country is definitely anti-Communist."

British influence in the Orient is still considerably greater than is generally assumed. By fulfilling the national desire for independence the Islamic nations can be won over as friends and in this way, too, Communist expansion can be checked.

In order to counteract Communist activity in the Orient the U.S.A. in particular have, since World War II, occupied themselves with an oriental policy. They refute the Communist radio and press propaganda in the Orient by transmissions of their own, and above all publish reports on the tragic fate of the countries and especially of the Moslem nations that are forced to endure Communist tyranny. In addition, the Western powers also possess information centres in most of the Oriental countries.

The U.S.A. have set up various organisations whose aim it is to fight Communism, as for instance the "Committee for a Free Asia", which has its headquarters in California. This organisation, however, is only concerned with the territory extending from Japan to Pakistan. In addition, Washington has also set up a special broadcasting station, run by another American committee, for the nations that have been subjugated by Soviet Russia. The programmes of this station are transmitted in several languages. So far, however, these programmes have not met with much success among the Moslem nations since they have as their subject only the fight against Communism and not the destruction of the Russian empire and the re-establishment of the independence of the nations subjugated by Russia. According to the opinion held by all the Islamic nations the political trend of these programmes is not wholly in keeping with the demand of the subjugated nations, since the latter are not only fighting against Communism but also for their independence.

The U.S.A. and Britain continue to aid the Asiatic countries against Moscow by giving them credits and economic assistance. As a counter-measure the Russians promptly offered India and various other Asiatic nations their help and promised to assist in the industrialisation of these countries by supplying them with loans and technical aid.

In order to be able to frustrate Russia's expansion aims in the Orient the Western powers are interested in gaining military bases and are intent upon incorporating the Islamic countries in the Western defence community.

As compared with Soviet propaganda, however, the propaganda disseminated against Communism in the Orient by the Western powers is neither concentrated nor active enough. The ways and means of Communist activity in the Orient are manifold. It is true that the major powers of the West are unanimously agreed that the Orient must not be allowed to become Communist. But the Orient is large and its peoples have their own national demands. To fight Communism alone is not enough; the freedom and independence of the Asiatic nations must also be guaranteed. The Islamic peoples are primarily concerned with their independence and equality of rights. And for this reason they are all the more keenly aware of the fact that the West has so far failed to make any declarations of independence and to give moral support to the Moslem peoples subjugated by Russia. They cannot understand why the West—either through its official channels, or through the radio or press, either directly or indirectly—has so far never promised the nations subjugated by Russia their absolute independence. So far, the declarations and memoranda sent to the U.N.O. and the Western powers by the national organisations of the subjugated peoples, as for instance those of Turkestan, and by representatives of the free Islamic nations have not been taken into consideration at all. In order to fight Communism and destroy the Russian empire a clear political trend—namely a charter of independence for all subjugated nations—must be proclaimed and followed.

Moscow on her part proclaims her alleged honouring of the independence of the nations and maintains that the basic principle of her policy is to liberate all colonial and semi-colonial nations from Western imperialism. Such catchwords are bound to confuse many persons, and no doubt this was the reason why thousands of eminent personalities in the Orient signed the Stockholm peace petition of the Communists. Moscow appeared for the cause of the peace for which mankind yearns and accused the Western powers of being warmongers. Such are the methods by which the Communists seek to camouflage their own large-scale preparations for war.

The main task of the camouflaged organisations set up by Moscow in the free world is to win over prominent non-Communist personalities for Communist propaganda. The name of a person of this kind is of more value to the Soviets than hundreds of convinced Communists. These organisations have received instructions from Moscow to carry on their work above all in intellectual and ecclesias-

tical circles in order to gain supporters there. Neither the Russian government nor the Communist Party engages openly in this work. Communist propaganda adapts itself most skilfully to the conditions, desires and demands of the countries in question and misuses the people of these countries for its own imperialist aims.

From time to time Moscow arranges congresses for members of the Islamic clergy who are completely subservient to the Soviets. At an Islamic congress held in Baku in 1942 members of the Islamic clergy declared their loyalty to Moscow. In 1943 and 1948 congresses were held in Tashkent and in 1954 in Ufa. The effects achieved by the proclamations issued at these congresses, which aim to win over the free Islamic nations, are often underestimated by the Western world, all the more so as so-called representatives of Islam take part in various peace conferences abroad and give those present there the impression that the Islamic nations in the Soviet Union enjoy every form of freedom.

The Western powers are of the opinion that Islam and Communism are incompatible opposites, but they overlook the fact that the Soviets advocate religious freedom abroad, whereas in reality, within their own sphere of power, they fight religion. For propaganda reasons and in order to counteract Western ideas of enlightenment a decree was recently issued in the Soviet Union to the effect that religious activity was inviolable.

So far no steps whatsoever have been taken by the West and by Islam to set up a forum for the genuine representatives of the nations subjugated by Russia, in which they can confront the propagandists sent to the Orient by the Soviets in public discussions, and thus reveal the truth as regards the subjugation of the Islamic nations in the Soviet Union and put an end to Communist propaganda in the Moslem countries.

There is no special paper which deals solely with these problems. The only effective paper, read and appreciated in the Orient, is *Milli Turkistan*, which is published by the Turkestan National Organisation and receives no help and no support from the West.

If the Western powers wish to fight Communism in the Islamic countries effectively, then they will obviously have to be more active. It is only due to the natural anti-Communist attitude of the Orient peoples and to the measures taken by the Islamic governments that Communism has so far not succeeded in gaining a footing in the Orient.

Volodymyr Derzhavyn

LITERATURE IN IRONS

Ukrainian Literature under Russian Bolshevism

From a purely theoretical point of view the subject under discussion can be subdivided into two sections: on the one hand, the extermination (execution, imprisonment, deportation) of Ukrainian writers by the Soviet regime, and on the other hand, the extermination of Ukrainian literature itself as a free or relatively free form of public expression of thoughts and feelings; this latter kind of extermination need not necessarily involve physical reprisals directed against the writers concerned, but can be effected fairly successfully in a genuinely totalitarian state by simply confiscating works already printed and systematically censoring those works prior to publication which might not suit the "Party and Government". Such methods are possible in a state in which the technical means for private printing are subject to strict control. A third method relevant to measures directed against a national literature would be the forcible Russianising of the Ukrainian *literary* language. But this third aspect of the problem under discussion can only be dealt with in detail in the course of a general analysis of the whole Soviet policy with regard to language.

As regards the two methods of extermination mentioned above, namely the reprisals directed against Ukrainian writers and those directed against Ukrainian literature, no clear dividing-line can be drawn between them, since both methods are often applied conjointly, though at different times and in a different relation to each other. It is therefore advisable to choose a purely historical mode of survey as far as this problem is concerned. In doing so, three distinct periods of time must be taken into account; these correspond approximately to the years 1921—1925, 1926—1931, and 1932—1939, inasmuch as the main persecution measures adopted in each of these periods aimed to introduce another trend in Ukrainian literature and one to which not much attention had hitherto been paid. On the other hand the measures resorted to from 1939 onwards up

to the present time have only resulted in a slight variation of the condition of Ukrainian literature and in its stagnation. Of course, it must not be overlooked that in each subsequent period those reprisals which had by chance been "omitted" in the previous period were "enforced" most energetically. This historical survey must, however, be introduced by a brief account of the political position of Ukrainian literature prior to 1921 and of its various political trends.

1. Status and position of Ukrainian literature during World War I and during the years immediately after the War

The Ukrainian emigrant press frequently refers to the first half of the twenties as an era of "rebirth" in Ukrainian literature, and since this designation refers exclusively to the literature of Soviet Ukraine, the opinion is expressed in various circles—in particular among socialist and other "leftist" Ukrainian emigrant groups—that the obvious and very considerable revival of Ukrainian poetry and literature during the first half of the twenties was directly connected with the alleged "cultural achievements" of the Soviet regime *in the early days* of its existence in Ukraine. This, however, is an illusion, produced on the one hand by the fact that the Soviets did not adopt repressive measures against *certain* Ukrainian literary trends until 1921—that is, after Ukrainian armed national and political resistance against Soviet Russian Bolshevism seemed to have been definitely broken—and then only rather hesitantly at first; and on the other hand by the fact that the comparatively free development of Ukrainian literary life from 1917 onwards was in direct contrast to its almost total suppression during the years 1914 to 1916. After the suspension of the general veto on Ukrainian print in the tzarist empire, introduced in 1863 and even more drastically enforced after 1876, Ukrainian literature in the course of the years from 1905 to 1914 had more or less been able to develop normally both in the Russian and Austrian districts of the Ukrainian territories. This development, which had been rapid, was suddenly and forcibly disrupted in the autumn of 1914, when the Russian government used the occasion of the outbreak of the war to proscribe the Ukrainian language once more, on the pretext that this was a "war-time measure", and to set about effecting a systematic extermination of Ukrainian national culture in Galicia, then occupied by Russian troops. This systematic extermination came to an end in the spring

of 1915 with the retreat of the Russian troops from Galicia, but even so literary life in Galicia and in the entire Western Ukraine was hampered in its development during the years that followed owing to the fact that this territory was the scene of World War I, the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1918—1919, and the Polish-Soviet war of 1920.

As far as central and eastern Ukrainian territories were concerned, however, the collapse of the Russian monarchy in February, 1917, meant a revival of Ukrainian national and cultural life, in particular in the field of literature—a revival which was almost dynamic in its force and was in no way restricted. Soviet Bolshevism, which during the years 1917 to 1920 was mainly concerned with asserting itself politically and economically in Ukraine, found itself obliged to refrain from interfering with Ukrainian literature, and this was also the case as regards the national Ukrainian language. It is true that the Soviets shot certain Ukrainian writers, who actively—that is to say “illegally” from the Soviet point of view—opposed Bolshevism, as for instance the well-known lyric poet, Hryhoriy Chuprynka (1879—1922), but such measures were of a purely political nature and were hardly connected with the literary activity of the writers concerned. Of course, even prior to 1921 it had not been possible to publish literary works which were definitely anti-Bolshevist under the Soviet regime; otherwise, however, during the time in question Ukrainian literature as such was not subjected to repressive measures. There seemed indeed to be every reason to believe that the Soviets would on principle continue to refrain from interfering with Ukrainian literary life, and therefore several Ukrainian writers who in 1919 had fled to Western Ukraine in order to escape Soviet Bolshevism, including the famous writers Mykola Vorony (1871—1937?), his son Marko Vorony-Antiokh (1904—1937?), Volodymyr Samiylenko (1864—1925), and the woman writer of belles lettres, Halyna Orlivna, availed themselves of the amnesty proclaimed by the Soviets and returned to Kyiv. Their example was followed by a large number of Communist, or at least pro-Soviet, writers from Western Ukraine, as for instance Dmytro Zahul (1890—1937), Vasyl Bobynsky (1897—1937?), Volodymyr Gzhytsky, Antin Krushelnytsky (1878—1934) and his son, Ivan Krushelnytsky, and several others, all of whom were convinced that Ukrainian national literature would have a better chance

of developing under the Soviet regime than under the Polish regime in Western Ukraine. Within a comparatively short time they were, however, to regret their decision most bitterly.

2. Liquidating the so-called "bourgeois nationalists" (1921—1925)

The literature of Ukraine at the beginning of the twenties thus manifested certain "loyalist" political trends, which though few in number were certainly very active and which—with the exception of a few unimportant Communist "Party writers"—were not exactly pro-Soviet, but nevertheless regarded the Soviet regime at the "lesser of two evils", as compared with the definitely anti-Ukrainian policy of the Poles and the "white" Russian counter-revolutionaries; these trends were used by Soviet Bolshevism in the first place in order to fight the "reactionary"—that is to say, simply pre-revolutionary—elements in Ukrainian literature, who from 1912 onwards were systematically branded as representatives of "bourgeois nationalism" and became the subject of agitatory propaganda both in the press and in public political and literary discussions. They were eventually deprived of every opportunity of engaging in literary activity, since, in view of the pressure exerted by the Party organs, no one ventured to print their works, though at first no physical reprisals were directed against them. This demoralising policy was in the first place pursued by the "mass organisations" of "proletarian" ("Hart", 1923—1932) and "revolutionary peasant" ("Pluh", 1922—1932) writers which were founded and vigorously supported by the Communist Party, and also by the literary organisation of the Ukrainian Komsomol (Communist Youth Movement), the "Molodniak". These "mass organisations" were to bring about a "literary mass levy" of working-class and peasant youth, for whom the pursuance of a literary vocation was to be facilitated very considerably and in fact guaranteed. It was of course to be a condition that this youth, which was inexperienced, and completely demoralised as a result of the revolution, without any literary training whatsoever, proved to be the willing tool of Bolshevik propaganda and opposed so-called "bourgeois nationalism" in Ukrainian literature in a ruthless and violent manner.

In this connection it must be stressed that the Bolshevik mentality regards everything as "bourgeois" or "bourgeois-minded" which is not based or does not claim to be based on Marxist ideas, and which

does not manifest itself as "proletarian" by which is incidentally also understood the "rural proletariat"; and if a "bourgeois" attitude of this kind manifests itself in Ukraine, it is promptly and automatically branded as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism". Those who fail to understand why this should be so are thereupon designated as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" and persecuted accordingly. The same principle holds good, *mutatis mutandis*, in all non-Russian "autonomies" and "Soviet Republics" as well as in the "autonomous territories" of the U.S.S.R. This is a reason why two main trends of Ukrainian literature, which were designated as "bourgeois nationalism", were exterminated first of all—though actually they had little in common, save that they both rejected the idea of disguising themselves as "Marxist and proletarian". They did not attempt to conceal their national Ukrainian character, but they were not actively nationalist—in the political sense of the word.

The first victim of this agitatory propaganda was so-called "Neo-Classicism", a small but nevertheless talented and highly esteemed group of Kyiv poets, literary critics, and scholars, who from about 1919 onwards had tried to link up Ukrainian literature with West European classicism and who cultivated the rules and style of ancient classicism, the Renaissance and the French Parnassian school. Decried as "alien", "reactionary" "aesthetically exclusive", and "aristocratic", this group was finally silenced round about 1925 and ceased to exist as an actual literary trend. The physical extermination of this group did not take place until much later, when, at the beginning of the thirties, after having been branded for years as a heretic and subjected to enforced silence, the most distinguished of the "Neo-Classicist" writers, Maksym Rylsky, born 1895, was ignominiously forced to recant his views; since then he has only been in evidence as a blind tool of Soviet Bolshevist propaganda, a fact which has, of course, proved most injurious to his literary talent. Another prominent Neo-Classicist, Oswald Burghardt (1891—1947) who was of German extraction and who wrote under the pen-name of Yuriy Klen, managed to flee to Germany in 1931. The three other prominent men of Ukrainian Neo-Classicism—Mykola Zerov, born 1890, Pavlo Fylypovych, born 1891, and Mykhaylo Dray-Khmara, born 1889, were sentenced, in the middle of the thirties, on various flimsy political pretexts—actually it was on account of their previous literary activity—to hard labour in Soviet concentration camps in the north or in East Siberia, where they were either executed in

1937 and 1938 or died a terrible death. The fact that they had never actively engaged in politics failed to save them.

It took considerably longer to exterminate another type of "bourgeois nationalism", namely the traditional national democratic trend, which had prevailed to a large extent prior to the revolution; a trend which had been chiefly represented by belles-lettres and literary criticism. This group had fluctuated between traditional realism and a rather timid impressionism, and had been irresolute as regards politics, partly inclining towards moderate socialism, but had, however, been definitely uncompromising in its attitude towards Moscow as far as the national and cultural independence of Ukraine was concerned. Adherents of this trend were silenced in the middle of the twenties by methods similar to those adopted against the Neo-Classacists, save that in this case they were, as democratic "Nationalists", reproached with having pursued a social policy which favoured the Ukrainian "kulak-class" (well-to-do peasantry). The bulk of this Ukrainian pre-revolutionary literature was not exterminated at once, but by degrees, by means of imprisoning and executing its literary representatives, so that some of the older writers of this group managed to evade Soviet reprisals by dying a natural death, for instance Volodymyr Samiylenko, who is mentioned above and who returned to Kyiv after having fled to Western Ukraine, and the well-known novelist, Stepan Vasylchenko (1878—1932). Several of the most prominent writers of this group were, on the strength of false evidence given against them, involved in the big political trials of the S.V.U. (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine), staged by the secret police in 1930, and were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Examples of these are the literary scholars, critics and writers, Serhiy Yefremov and Andriy Nikovsky, both of whom later died in prison, the writer Mykhaylo Ivchenko, born 1890, pardoned in the thirties, who died as a result of the hardships he had endured whilst in prison, the aged poetess and playwright, Liudmyla Starytska-Cherniakhivska, (1868—1941), later pardoned, but shot after the outbreak of the war "as a preventive measure". Others, who had long since abandoned all literary activity and thought that their existence had been forgotten, were arrested during the big political purges in the thirties in so secret a manner that it is impossible to ascertain the date of their arrest and the way in which they were "liquidated"; they included the writer and playwright, Hnat Khotlovyh, born 1877, the lyric poets, Mykola Filyansky, born 1873,

and P. Kapelhorodsky, born 1882, and the woman-writer, especially of historical novels, Zinayida Tulub. The playwright, Yakiv Montov, died of heart failure and was thus spared the inevitable fate of being arrested, whilst the poet Todos Osmachka, born 1895, who has been living in exile since 1944, managed to save his life by feigning insanity for several years. The only prominent writer of this group who succeeded in living in retirement unmolested until World War II was the lyric poet, Volodymyr Svidzinsky, 1885—1941, but after the outbreak of the war he was murdered by the secret police “as a preventive measure”.

Since all the works of those authors who were arrested were promptly confiscated and no longer exist save in the special libraries belonging to the secret police, it can be assumed that the present population of Soviet Ukraine knows far less about Ukrainian literature of the years 1900 to 1920 than it does about the literature of the nineteenth century, for though older works are, it is true, ruthlessly censored and “purged” they are nevertheless reprinted again from time to time. As regards Ukrainian literature of the years 1920 to 1940 the situation is even more serious.

3. Liquidation of so-called National Communism (1926—1931)

Among the Ukrainian Communists there were several who, although they approved in principle of the Soviet regime and the Communist Party dictatorship, strongly opposed the tutelage exercised over the allegedly “sovereign” Ukrainian Soviet Republic by the Moscow Party leaders in a more ruthless manner from year to year, and who severely criticised the ever-increasing Russianising of Ukrainian cultural life which was promoted by the government. It was in this “national Communist” spirit that the Party writer, Mykola Khvylovy, 1893—1933, an outstanding essayist and journalist, founded and conducted the “Free Academy of Proletarian Literature” in Charkiv, 1926—1928, with the abbreviated name of “Vaplite”. This institution, owing to his influence in the Party, for a time enjoyed a certain amount of protection. In its publications, in addition to a partly camouflaged and partly open opposition to Soviet Russian Bolshevism as a “perverted” form of “genuine” international Communism which was not in keeping with the Ukrainian national character, it also definitely advocated the preserva-

tion of Ukrainian national and cultural independence, unhampered by Moscow, and vigorously aimed to link up Ukrainian culture with that of Western Europe. On the one hand, national Ukrainian sentiments and ideas on the part of the National Communists "in principle" who belonged to Khvylovy's group, very soon began to supersede the original Marxist doctrines though not in the case of Khvylovy himself, and on the other hand the bulk of the "Vaplite" consisted of nationally-minded Ukrainian writers, who either regarded Communism as something alien or else were definitely hostile in their attitude towards it and merely conducted themselves in a "proletarian" manner in order to camouflage their efforts to oppose the Soviet Bolshevik Russianising of Ukraine. This institution was, of course, only able to exist as long as the Moscow Party leaders, for tactical reasons, allowed national Communist tendencies to prevail in the non-Russian Soviet republics. After a big political and literary discussion which caused a considerable stir in 1927, Khvylovy's views were severely censured by the competent Party organs, the "Vaplite" was forcibly disbanded in 1928, and the literary organisations, the "Literaturny Yarmarok" ("Literature Fair", 1928—1930) and the "Politfront" (1930—1), which were then founded in Charkiv by the "Khvylovists", also met with the same fate. During the years that followed a veritable massacre of "Khvylovists" took place; most of them were arrested during the years from 1931 to 1935 and died in a manner which in most cases was never ascertained, in concentration camps up in the north or in Siberia. Among these were the writers, Mykhaylo Yalovy, Oles Dosvitny, Vasyl Vrazhlyvy, Ivan Dniprovsky, Hryhoriy Epik, Hordiy Kotsiuba, Mykhaylo Maysky, the poets and writers, Oleksa Slisarenko and Mayk Yohansen, and the outstanding dramatist, Mykola Kulish. Khvylovy himself committed suicide and was thus spared the inevitable fate of being arrested. The two most prominent poets of the "Vaplite", Pavlo Tychyna, born in 1891, and Mykola Bazhan, born 1904, as well as the prose-writer, Yuriy Yanovsky, 1902—1954, were spared the fate of their colleagues, probably for reasons of prestige, but for many years they were forced to atone for their "nationalist tendencies" by having to sing the praises of the "Party and the Government", a fact which completely ruined the excellent lyrical talent of the first-mentioned of these three writers. A few other important "Vaplite" writers were also spared, but this seems to have been the result of rather special circumstances.

The fate which befell those literary circles in Kyiv which had in no way been affiliated with the "Vaplite", but had obviously shared the "national Communist" ideas and aims of the latter, was even worse; at the end of 1934 and on most flimsy political pretexts the writers Hryhoriy Kosynka and Kost Bureviy, and the poets, Oleksa Vlyzko, Ivan Krushelnytsky, and Dmytro Falkivsky, were shot; whilst the writers, Valeriy Pidmohylny, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, and Antin Krushelnytsky, and the poets, Yevhen Pluzhnyk, Yakiv Savchenko, and Dmytro Zahul were sent to concentration camps up in the north where, within the next few years, they either died of the hardships they were forced to endure or else were shot. It is significant that in all these cases in which reprisals were taken the *personal* political attitude or the former political activity of the victims was disregarded completely; the fact that a literary connection had existed between their writings and the "national Communist" opposition sufficed to seal their fate.

4. Liquidating the alleged remnants of a national deviation (1932—1939)

From 1932 onwards a political paradox was manifest to an ever-increasing degree, inasmuch as Ukrainian writers who had in former times always opposed "Ukrainian nationalism" most decidedly were now proscribed as "nationalists in disguise" and were "liquidated" in one way or other in the northern concentration camps. Indeed, under the tyranny of the notorious N.K.V.D. chief, Yezhov, in power from 1937 to 1939, this became a mass phenomenon in Ukraine. The reasons are questionable. Only in very few cases can there be any suggestion of there having been any anti-Soviet activity on the part of a well-camouflaged nationalist organisation within Soviet Ukrainian literary circles at that time; it can be said rather that there was a mechanical "reaction" of former personal contacts with individual elements of the opposition within the Moscow Party elite, an opposition which had at that time just been finally liquidated by Stalin. It is, however, possible to distinguish certain groups of Ukrainian writers who were systematically exterminated during the second half of the thirties. These groups were as follows:

- 1) All the "re-emigrants" of the twenties;
- 2) Almost all (there were only two exceptions) the political immigrants from Western Ukraine. The reason for this lay in the differences between the West Ukrainian Party and Stalin's clique;

3) All the futurists and their two leaders, who vied with each other, Mykhayl Semenko and Valeriy Polishchuk. The futurists were regarded as being susceptible to "Western" influences.

The majority of those who were subjected to repressive measures from 1935 to 1939 (most of them vanished without a trace after they had been arrested) were, however, writers who had previously been looked upon as a hundred per cent "Soviet men" and had manifested a blind obedience to the orders issued by the "Party and the Government". Of a hundred or so names we should only like to mention a few of the most well-known:

The writers, Ivan Kyrylenko, Klym Polishchuk, Sava Bozhko, D. Buzko, and the Ukrainian Communist, Myroslav Irchan, who emigrated to Ukraine from Canada;

The dramatist, Ivan Mykytenko, who was awarded several prizes in Moscow;

The poets, Mykola Tereshchenko, Andriy Paniv, and I. Vyrhan; the poet and critic, Ivan Kulyk; and critic and writer of fables, Serhiy Pylypenko (the founder and head of the above-mentioned "revolutionary-peasant" literary society, "Pluh");

The consistent "Marxist-Leninist" literary critics, Andriy Khvylya, Volodymyr Koryak, Borys Kovalenko, Vasyl Desniak, Samiylo Shchupak, and M. Novytsky.

It would be utterly false to assume that even a tenth of these literary men, who hated the very mention of national Ukrainian issues ever sought to oppose Stalin's ideas and orders secretly; one can but surmise that Moscow's desire to destroy Ukrainian literature in general became such a hysterical obsession in those years that friends and foes alike were its victims, and every Ukrainian writer was regarded as a suspect while the slightest reason for suspicion was eliminated by simply liquidating the person concerned.

5. The position of Ukrainian literature since the autumn of 1939

Since 1941 there have been no more *physical* victims in Ukrainian literature in the U.S.S.R. It is true that after the war the Soviet press on several occasions carried on an agitatory campaign against "nationalist" or "reactionary tendencies" in recent works by Maksym Rylsky, Yuriy Yanowsky, Volodymyr Sosyura, and various

other writers, but none of those persons has been deported, imprisoned or executed. Indeed, during the years from 1943 to 1946 two poets, Mykola Tereshchenko and I. Vyrhan, Ostap Vyshnya, the humorist—who was at one time very popular in Soviet Ukraine, and who was formerly a “Khvylovist”—and a few less outstanding literary critics and scholars were released from Soviet concentration camps and were encouraged to resume their literary activity in Ukraine. There are two reasons for this apparent “tolerance” on the part of the Soviet regime towards Ukrainian writers.

On the one hand, the Soviets attach considerable importance to winning over literary circles in the “newly acquired” West Ukrainian territories, an aim which would of course not be compatible with repressive measures openly directed against Ukrainian writers and it was for this reason the “liberal era” began in the autumn of 1939.

On the other hand, however—and this is the main reason for the apparent tolerance of the Soviet regime in this connection—the official literature of Soviet Ukraine has been undermined and demoralised to such an extent by the massacres of the twenties and thirties that it can be fairly easily controlled by means of “instructions” and “reprimands” without there actually being any necessity to resort to more drastic measures and to secret police methods. The dark side of the picture, however, is that this official literature, which is blindly obedient to the “Party and the Government” enjoys neither prestige nor esteem among the Ukrainian population and can therefore only have a very limited propagandist influence.

THE SLAVONIC AND EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW

Readers of Professor Derzhavyn's article above may like to know that to the current number (Vol. XXXIII. No. 80) of the above periodical, published half-yearly by the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, Professor Mykola Hlobenko has contributed an article called “Thirty-five years of Ukrainian Literature in the U.S.S.R.” Professor Hlobenko is Professor of Ukrainian Literature at the Ukrainian Free University, Munich.

Taras Shevchenko

Taras Shevchenko is the greatest Ukrainian poet, the first modern Ukrainian poet and, more than any other, the national poet of Ukraine. None has felt her humiliation in his lifetime more deeply, nor expressed the feelings and aspirations of her people in such passionate, burning verses.

He was born a serf in the village of Moryntsi near Kyiv on 9 March 1814. As a boy he showed great artistic talent, and his master eventually sent him to study art at St. Petersburg. There, influential friends and fellow students bought him from his master, and in 1838 gave him his freedom.

He might have become a successful painter. But soon his verses, glowing with passionate love of his native land and with bitter protest against the oppression of his people by Russia, led to his arrest and exile, for ten years, in a Penal Unit in the desert of Kazakhstan.

When the effort of devoted friends at last obtained a pardon for him, he was broken in health and old beyond his years. He died 10 March 1861. Of his forty-seven years he had been a serf for twenty-four, a prisoner and exile for ten, and a free man for thirteen only.

C. K. G.

* * *

Last Will and Testament

When I die, for my grave raise a high mound of earth
In the limitless steppe, where the cornfields rustle and sway
Under the wide sky of Ukraine, dear land of my birth.


Raise it high, on the cliffs rising steep above Dniro,
Mighty river, roaring down and along and away,
Growling and foaming over great rocks below.

Bury me then. Bury and leave me.

Rouse yourselves! Rise, rise, rise!

Break and burst through the chains that fetter and grieve ye,
In your enemies' blood your new freedom baptise.

1277



3 in
48 1/2
line

Taras Shevchenko (1814—1861)
The greatest poet of Ukraine

When Dniπρο has swept our evil enemies' blood
From our land and carried it down to the far blue sea,
Then, only then will I leave and take flight to God,
To pray, and adore him. Until then God will be strange to me.

When you are free,
When you are gathered in new liberty,
As in one great, united family,
With a kind word, quietly spoken, remember me.

Under the Cherry Trees

At home the cherry trees are now in bloom,
Cockchafers in their branches buzz and boom,
Girls, walking leisurely in the evening sun,
Are singing. Ploughmen, their day's labour done,
Have left the fields and are returning where
Mothers and wives the evening meal prepare.

Under the cherry trees they sit at meat,
While in the darkening sky the evening star is rising,
The daughters serve the men before they eat.
Mother would chide and guide them with much wise advising,
But does not persevere to give good counsel long
When after a few single, liquid notes a nightingale bursts
into glorious song.

The dusk grows darker. The last faint light has faded.
Under the cherry trees the children have been put to sleep,
And sitting by them, as they breathe so steadily and deep,
Mother's own eyes are soon in slumber shaded.
Now almost all the world is quiet,
Only the girls' soft voices, and the nightingale, still
thrill the night.

English version of these two poems by C. K. Giffey.

(Copyright)

I Care Not

*I care not, shall I see my dear
Own land before I die, or no,
Nor who forgets me, buried here
In desert wastes of alien snow;
Though all forget me, better so.*

*A slave from my first bitter years,
Most surely I shall die a slave
Ungraced of any kinsman's tears;
And carry with me to my grave
Everything; and leave no trace,
No little mark keep my place
In the dear lost Ukraine
Which is not ours, though our land.
And none shall ever understand;
No father to his son shall say:
"Kneel down, and fold your hands and pray;
He died for our Ukraine".*

*I care no longer if the child
Shall pray for me, or pass me by.
One only thing I cannot bear:
To know my land, that was beguiled
Into a death-trap with a lie,
Trampled and ruined and defiled . . .
Ah, but I care, dear God; I care!*

Translated by E. L. Yoynich Bull

UKRAINE TODAY

C. K. Giffey

Easter in Ukraine

Customs and Traditions of Eastertide

According to the Gospels, our Lord went up to Jerusalem with the disciples to keep the Passover, and to fulfil his mission on this earth. And so Easter, the greatest of all Christian Festivals and the very foundation of the Christian Faith, naturally fell in that part of the year in which the Jews commemorate their ancient delivery from oppression and the prehistoric races of the Mediterranean world had, for countless ages, observed their Spring Festivals.

The entire Christian World commemorates the Resurrection of our Lord on the first Sunday after the full moon following March 21st. According to the Gregorian calendar, which was adopted in the West, this remains the date of the Equinox. Both the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church however have adhered to the Julian calendar, and with them March 21st now falls 14 days later.

The Ukrainian Easter may thus coincide with the Festival as it is kept in the West, or it may miss a full moon, and fall a moon month later, making a difference of one to four weeks.

In 1950 and in 1953 it coincided with the Western Easter. In 1955 Ukrainians will observe Good Friday on April 15th and their Easter on April 17th, 18th and 19th.

For Ukrainians, Palm Sunday, known as "Willow Sunday" or "Blossom Sunday", is the first day of the Easter Festival. Holy week is known as "Willow Week".

On Willow Sunday, long willow rods and branches are blessed in all Churches. All lightly tap, or touch, their relations, friends and acquaintances with them and say: "Be tall as the willow, bright as the water and rich and fruitful as the earth". Then they drive the cattle out to pasture with the willow wands from their winter stabling, and finally the head of the house plants a willow rod in the ground. If it strikes root and brings forth buds and leaves and flourishes, it foretells prosperity for the coming year.

Holy Week is also called the "Great Week", the "Pure Week", and most often "White Week". All do their utmost to finish the work on the farm that must be done before Easter by the Thursday, for the Holidays start on Thursday morning, and no more work should then be done.

On Maundy Thursday, "Great" or "Pure" Thursday, Services of Our Lord's Passion are held in all Churches. Twelve Lessons from the Gospels are read. After the Service members of the congregation disperse to their homes with lighted candles and try to reach home without these being blown out.

On reaching home they light the fire on the hearth with their candles. Then they burn a cross with it on one of the ceiling rafters, after which the candle is preserved until "Great Thursday" in the following year. If anyone in the family should die during the year, the candle is placed in the hands of the departed.

The candle is often called the "Storm Candle" or "Thunder Candle", for in a thunderstorm it is placed before the icony (the Holy Pictures) in the living room. Prayers are said that lightning may be averted from the house, barns and stables, and destruction from the crops.

As in other parts of the world, traditional Easter customs retain numerous elements of earlier rituals of Spring. In many parts of Ukraine there are remnants of a cult of the dead. In Eastern Ukraine, Maundy Thursday is also called "the Easter of the Dead", for it is believed that the departed gather late that night in the Churches for a service of their own. The children light bonfires "to keep the Old Man warm", whilst in Carpathian Ukraine in the West they go from house to house, collecting "kukutsy"—a kind of chupatti—"for the dead".

On Good Friday no work is done, and in particular the men must not chop firewood, nor must the women spin or sew. In many

Churches no bells are rung that day, but sounding boards are struck with mallets or large rattles shaken. In many places the "plashchenytsya", a picture of our Lord in the Sepulchre, painted on linen and carried horizontally, is taken in solemn procession round the Church.

During the night before Easter Sunday, the young people light a bonfire, often with a flaming torch they have brought with them. The backbone of the fire is a dead tree of yester-year, felled and brought from the forest for the occasion. Later anything that will burn may be thrown into the fire to keep it going, including broken and discarded furniture and gear. The fire is kept burning all night, and the young folk will go straight from it to the Church for Early Service on Easter Morn.

Easter Sunday is the greatest Festival of Spring and many Christian and pre-Christian associations have gathered around it, among the former particularly those of the Annunciation and St. George's Day.

On Easter Sunday "the Gates of Paradise are Open", and the souls of sinners are released from Hell.

The traces of pre-Christian festivals and ritual are many. Some appear related to those connected with Christmas and the New Year. Most of them refer to wheat farming, the cult of the dead, good wishes to the living and to the marriage season. Many ritual songs survive. For Easter is indeed a feast of songs and gladness, in which the entire community takes part. The festivities continue for three days, with the ringing of bells and the music of songs of Springtime and Eastertide.

The young people give the Easter celebrations their characteristic tone. They start their festivities in the open air with Easter Sunday and continue them until St. Simon's Day. At Easter "the Sun comes out to play", as the saying goes in Ukraine, and on Easter morning the shutters are opened before sunrise "to let the Sun into the house". Young girls await the rising of the sun with a prayer in the garden. Any man too, when he first sees the sun on Easter morning, will reverently doff his hat, bow to the East and say a traditional prayer.

Easter Sunday begins with Early Morning Service, followed later by Easter Mass at noon. On the conclusion of Mass the people greet each other with the words "Christ is Risen!" "Verily He is Risen!" is the joyous answer, and they embrace.

A strict fast has been observed, and now, outside the Church, the "Paschal bread", beautifully painted and ornamented Easter eggs—the "pysanky"—and many other kinds of Easter fare are blessed by the Priest. The entire parish has been at Mass, attired in its holiday best, and has brought vessels of water, butter, cream cheese, roast sucking pig, smoked ham, bacon, sausages, and little bags of poppy seed, millet to make porridge, pepper, salt and horseradish to be blessed for the feast.

Friends now exchange Easter eggs, and soon all hurry home with the "dorinnyk", the bundle of food that has been blessed, wrapped in linen, and with vessels of the holy water and anything else that may have been blessed; first they will hallow their home and family and everything within by sprinkling the water to which the Priest has given his blessing.

In Eastern Ukraine all the food brought back from the Church is placed on the table. The head of the family undoes the linen napkins in which the food has been wrapped, cuts off small pieces of the Paschal bread ("proskurka") and of every other kind of food, and gives them to all the members of the household.

In Western Ukraine all first go three times around the house and farm yard, touching the cattle with a piece of the consecrated bread and leaving bread and salt in the manger of each beast, and then go to wish the bees "A Happy Easter". They then return into the house, undo the dorinnyk, held high above the heads of the children, and sit down at table, when the food that has been blessed is served out. The food stays on the table for three days. A piece of the Paschal bread and three decorated eggs are wrapped in linen and are placed upon the stove "for the departed".

As at Christmas and at the New Year, groups of young people and sometimes of children go about the streets on Easter Day to wish a happy Easter to everyone they meet. In the Carpathian Ukraine groups of young men will call on the girls of their choice, exchange painted Easter eggs, do some formal courting and perhaps arrange a dance.

We know from contemporary writings that it was still customary in the middle of the 19th century for people to call upon their friends and to salute the head of the house and his wife with songs wishing them happiness at Easter. The custom survives in a different form in Halychyna in the West, particularly in the town of Yavoriv,

and on the Ukrainian-Byelorussian border, where young men serenade the maidens and the young wives who have married during the past year.

In Eastern Ukraine calls at Easter are now confined to visiting relations and close friends and taking them "kolach", a form of fine white bread, and decorated Easter eggs. In some rural parts the custom of the "Progress of the Poplar" still survives. The girls of the village elect one of their number to be a kind of May Queen. She is called "the Poplar", and her companions lead her through the village, singing songs of Spring, which are called "vesnyanky" or "hahilky".

In Western Ukraine the girls sing Easter carols outside the Churches. Those songs are of very ancient origin. They are of the type of set choruses, accompanied by formal dances with imitative and symbolic gestures, and contain allusions the origin of which has long been forgotten.

For that matter the origin and significance of the decorated Easter eggs, symbols of the germination and renewal of life, which are given and exchanged among friends and lovers, are pre-Christian and indeed prehistoric, as are many of the traditional patterns with which they are decorated.

It is no doubt in connection with the egg as a symbol of the renewal of life that Easter eggs are buried in graves or merely in the ground. Eggs which are buried in the ground for the departed, may later be dug up and given to the poor. One of the Easter customs in Ukraine is indeed connected with remembrance of the dead, for Commemoration Services are held on Maundy Thursday, the last day of Easter (the Tuesday), during the following week and on the Sunday after Easter.

No nation on earth pays more attention to the observance of traditional Easter customs, and nowhere could the dual significance of Easter, of spiritual rebirth and regeneration of life in spring, be more apparent than in Ukraine. For religion plays a very great and real part in the everyday life of her people, and spring in that mainly agricultural country of rich black earth, which a continental climate has bound in snow and ice for four months, vividly symbolises the renewal of life and of the hope of happiness.

A Year of Slavery

Chronicle of major events which occurred in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1954

The acuteness of the national problem in the U.S.S.R., the persistent and fierce revolutionary-liberation fight of the peoples enslaved by Russia, the fiction of the so-called "friendship of peoples", the fiction of Malenkov's promises given at the 19th party congress, have compelled Russia to resort to new means of deceiving and confusing the Soviet population.

In December 1953 Russia planned a decisive offensive against the Ukrainian people under the pretext of the celebration of the "300th anniversary of the reunion of Ukraine and Russia". It is known that later all the enslaved people of the U.S.S.R. had to mark that occasion under the guidance of the "elder brother".

The celebration was planned for home as well as foreign use. In fact, however, by that celebration the Kremlin understood a concealed decisive offensive against the Ukrainian people and, first of all, its revolutionary-liberation movement. Later on the plans of the Kremlin assumed the form of deportation of the Ukrainian population, primarily of the youth, to Kazakhstan and Siberia. In addition, the Russian ideological offensive against the moral and ideological positions of the Ukrainian nationalist movement increased to a considerable extent.

On January 6, 1954, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (C.P.) of Ukraine, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution concerning the appointment of a government committee for the organisation of celebrations marking the anniversary of the enslavement of Ukraine. Simultaneously, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. (and not the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R.!) created a new region, the Cherkassy region, which includes some of the districts of the Kyiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad and Vinnytsia regions. The Cherkassy region was created only because of political, not economic requirements. By Russia's order the town Proskuriv was given a new name, namely, Khmelnytsky:

the Izmail region was liquidated for strategic reasons and annexed to the Odessa region.

The 4th session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. (January 15, 1954) served as a prelude to the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the enslavement of Ukraine; the session considered organisation problems only. In consequence of the session Hrechukha was dismissed from the Presidium of the Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. by means of the so-called "organisational procedure"; he was replaced by Korotchenko.

In the month of January conferences of publishers of local and district newspapers were held all over Ukraine. At the conferences the publishers were reprimanded for unsatisfactory ideological and propaganda work, neglect of the fight against the "bourgeois survivals", dulling "class vigilance", and for improper explanation of "achievements" in Soviet life. In consequence of that, some of the publishers were dismissed from employment, others were transferred to other posts, and still more were certainly deported to Siberia.

Masking its plans of deportation of the Ukrainian population from Ukraine, Russia ordered all the resettlement offices in Ukraine to start a campaign of encouraging and persuading Ukrainians to migrate voluntarily to Siberia, the Altai Mountains and the Far East; at the same time it made preparations for a mass deportation of Ukrainians.

In order to make much ado about the new "socialist" nations in the U.S.S.R., their "indissoluble friendship" and the alleged absence of any fight for national liberation, the Central Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine ordered the members of the Young Communist League to start socialist competitions in all the big mills and factories in Ukraine "in honour" of the 300th anniversary of the "re-union". The Charkiv tractor plant was the first to start a "socialist competition" of this kind.

Along with the socialist competition, Russia carried on an intensive action aimed at filling up machine and tractor stations, state farms and collective farms in Ukraine with inspectors, party directors and party specialists who had been sent on missions from Russian factories and institutions to Ukraine under the pretext of "helping the collective farmers".

A conference of directors of Machine and Tractor Stations (M.T.S.) of the Ukrainian S.S.R. was held in Kyiv; the conference

"revealed" the neglected state of the grain economy, livestock-raising, fodder supplies, stables, and the lack of mechanisation of field work and so on. As usual, the Ukrainian peasantry was the scape-goat in this case.

According to the Russian plan for celebrating the 300th anniversary of the "reunion", a joint session of the Presidia of the Supreme Soviets of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was held in Moscow at which the "elder brother" presented the "younger brother", Ukraine, with the Crimea which the Russians had separated from Ukraine and annexed to the R.S.F.S.R. during the establishment of the so-called U.S.S.R. But during the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the "defence of Sevastopol" it turned out that it was an illusory "present". Russia showed once more that the Crimea belongs to Muscovy, and not to Ukraine.

Having received such a "present", the Central Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine called the 16th congress of Komsomol (Ukraine) which began its session on February 25, 1954. In the speeches delivered at the congress there were indications that Ukrainian youth had been prepared for the party's appeal regarding the fight for "solution of the grain problem" in the U.S.S.R. Thus, the plans for the deportation of Ukrainian youth to Kazakhstan began to come to light gradually. The Komsomol congress revealed that Ukrainian youth joins Komsomol reluctantly, that it is not interested in Soviet life, and that Ukrainian nationalism rummages in its midst. Even Kyrychenko confirmed the vitality of Ukrainian nationalism at the 18th congress of the C.P. of Ukraine which completed its work on March 24, 1954.

Although at this 18th congress Kyrychenko exalted to the skies the "immense" achievements of the Ukrainian S.S.R. under the guidance of the "elder brother", he was unable to conceal the reality: the beggarly life of the Ukrainian population, the collapse of the collective-farm system, the resistance which the Ukrainian people offer to the Russian enslaver. Kyrychenko also furiously attacked the Ukrainian nationalists; he plainly stated that the Ukrainian nationalist liberation movement was continuing to act with an unflinching vigour.

As to the "immense achievement" of the collective farms in Ukraine, the poor crop of last year is the best proof of the falsehood

of the Russian liars in this respect. Even Russia was compelled to reduce the plan of the compulsory grain delivery in Ukraine. But that "reduction" was made by Russia only when Ukraine had already "fulfilled and overfulfilled" the plan of grain delivery.

The main part of the Russian celebration of the 300th anniversary of the enslavement of Ukraine took part on May 9, 1954. The celebration was very loud and noisy; it was attended by thousands of Russian rulers in Ukraine. The Ukrainian population, however, was compelled to demonstrate, to manifest, to sing, to dance before the Russian rulers, and to vow friendship which would last "for ever".

The Russian celebration of the 300th anniversary of the enslavement of Ukraine was completed with the jubilee sessions of the Presidia of the Supreme Soviets of the Ukrainian S.S.R. (May 25, 1954) and the R.S.F.S.R. (May 27, 1954). At these sessions Kyrychenko and the Russian Puzanov delivered endless dithyrambs in honour of the "great" Russian people and its "brother" the Ukrainian people. This marked also the beginning of the deportation of the Ukrainian population from all over Ukraine to Kazakhstan and the Far East. At the sessions Kyrychenko and Puzanov again furiously attacked the Ukrainian nationalists, threatening them with complete extermination.

Having completed the "celebration" and begun the deportation of the Ukrainian population from its native country, the Russian rulers along with Ukrainian janissaries called the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. on June 16, 1954; at the session they *pro forma* debated on the budget of Ukraine for 1954 and approved it. In fact, however, the budget had already been approved by Russia at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of April 20, 1954. Incidentally, the budget of Ukraine confirmed the state of real enslavement of Ukraine because the budget of the city of Moscow alone by far exceeded the budget for Ukraine.

Along with the deportation of the Ukrainian population to Kazakhstan, a purge of Soviet public servants and a reorganisation of ministries and institutions began in Ukraine. A plenary meeting of the Central Committee of C.P. of Ukraine was held on July 2, it was followed (July 6) by a session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R.; at the sessions Korniychuk was dismissed from office as a member of the Presidium of the Central

Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine and first vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. The reasons for the dismissal were not given.

The public servants dismissed from Soviet institutions were compelled to hand in applications "voluntarily" to party committees for transfer to mills and factories or emigration to Kazakhstan. Those matters and problems of trade-union work in the M.T.S. were considered by a plenary session of the Ukrainian Republican Council of Trade Unions on September 1, 1954. At the plenary session it was stated that the Ukrainian workers joined the trade unions with great reluctance, and a series of factories systematically failed to fulfil the plan. The plenary session passed a series of resolutions aimed at raising the exploitation of the working masses of Ukraine.

A conference of agricultural workers was held in Kyiv on September 17, 1954 at which the Russians suggested that Maltsev's method of tillage should be applied in Ukraine. The Ukrainian agricultural workers took up a reserved attitude towards that method, the more so as the Ukrainian population starves and the crop is poor in consequence of various "Russian experiments and the collective farm socialist system".

Having celebrated the 100th anniversary of the defence of Sebastopol and brought to an end various regional and district Komsomol, party and agricultural conferences, the rulers of enslaved Ukraine increased their pressure upon the Ukrainian collective farmers, compelled them to work in the fields and to harvest day and night, and even compelled Ukrainian children—who were supposed to be resting in pioneer camps—to work.

The Soviet press did not mention the bad harvest of the current year in Ukraine at all. On the contrary it praised the "enthusiasm" shown by the peasants during harvest-time, and the transportation of grain from combines to state corn storages. On November 12, the Central Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Council of Ministers, submitted a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in which they stated that the Ukrainian S.S.R. had fulfilled the state plan of grain delivery ahead of time. The report once more revealed Russian lies and falsehood with regard to Ukraine. In his speech delivered on November 6,

1954, during the October celebrations, Saburov stated that, in view of the poor crop in Ukraine, the Supreme Soviet had allegedly reduced the plan of grain delivery in Ukraine, and on November 12 the Russian invaders stated that the robbery had been fulfilled ahead of time.

On December 12, 1954, the Central Committee of the C.P. of Ukraine informed the Central Committee of the C.P. of the Soviet Union that the Ukrainian population had also been robbed of potatoes and vegetables because the Ukrainian S.S.R. had "fulfilled" the state plan of potatoes and vegetables storage. Consequently, Russia doomed the Ukrainian population to serious food shortage in 1954-55.

On December 19, 1954, the Ukrainian population was compelled to elect by "free" voting the people's courts to which agents of the communist party had been appointed in advance.

The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. of December 20 was a Bolshevik New Year's trick; it fixed the date of election to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the local councils for February 27, 1955; we know in advance that during that election 100 per cent voters will "vote" for the candidates of the party.

* * *

The Association of Ukrainian Writers "Slovo" sent a wire from New York to the All-Union Congress of writers in Moscow on December 20, 1954. In their telegram they say that "works by 259 Ukrainian writers were published in the year 1930. After 1938 only the works by 36 of those writers were published". The telegram points out that M.V.D. could answer the congress's question "where and why 223 writers have disappeared from Ukrainian literature".

The presidium of "Slovo" has added the following information to that telegram: "Slovo" has at its disposal a complete list of the Ukrainian writers who have disappeared in the U.S.S.R. and their personal data. Only 7 of them have died a natural death.

The telegram of "Slovo" and their comments to it have been broadcast by the "Voice of America".

‘PROGRESSIVE’ AGRICULTURE?

Russian Myths about the “Progressiveness of the Socialist System of Economy”

Russian collectivism and economic socialisation, especially that of agriculture, is the machinery of a planned robbery of the products of the population of all non-Russian lands of the empire, and a distribution of the spoil among the Russian population, i. e. the population of the parent state of the empire—Muscovy.

This is the essence of the Russian imperial socialist-collective system of economy. Suffice it to recollect and to consider the first five-year-plan of the years 1928-1933, according to which “the producing zone”, Ukraine and the Cossack lands, were supposed to supply 52 million metric centners of grain every year¹⁾ for wiping out the deficit in grain, and thus to provide sustenance for the population of “the regions of the central consuming zone”, i. e. the ethnographic territory of Muscovy.

Before the middle of the 17th century, when only ethnographic central Muscovy was a separate state and an economic organism and neither Ukraine nor the Cossack lands nor any “producing zones” belonged to it, Muscovy still produced on its territory an amount of grain and other food which was sufficient for the maintenance of its population. Along with the development and expansion of the empire the productivity of the Russian ethnographic territory continuously decreased at the expense of the “cheap”—because not hard-earned but robbed—products of the subjugated peoples. This development of Muscovy, the parent state, into a nation sponging on its colonies has been crowned with the system of a special-economic organisation—collectivism and socialism. One should be aware of the fact that, in the natural, climatic respect, the territory

¹⁾ *Five-year plan of the national-economic construction of the U.S.S.R. “Ukraine”, volume III, Moscow. Publishing House “Planned economy”, 1939.*

of today's central ethnographic Muscovy, the territory named "the consuming zone" in the first five-year-plan, is so suitable for agricultural production and relatively so sparsely populated (about 40 persons per square kilometre) that it could produce twice as much grain and other food as is needed by its entire population. For this, however, the agricultural production of that territory would have at least to reach the level of the agricultural productivity and living standards of pre-war Poland, not to mention of other European countries which are highly developed in the agricultural respect (Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and so on). But the process of industrialisation and the impoverishment of the rural population of ethnographic Muscovy by the old imperial policy of supplying the population of the parent state with "cheap bread" and "easy-earned food" continues steadily. The mass migration of the rural population of Muscovy to the towns, which took place on the ethnographic territory of Muscovy between the two world wars, may be considered a phenomenon of far-reaching historic importance. From 1926 to 1939, between the two population counts, the absolute number of the population of the Ryazan, Orlov, Voronizh, Tambov, Penza, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, Smolensk, Yaroslav and Vologda regions and the Mordovian Autonomous Republic decreased by 5,5 million people²). This means an absolute decrease of the whole population of those regions, and the decrease of the rural population is, obviously, still greater because a part of the rural population, having migrated to the towns, remained in those regions. It should be taken into consideration that the majority of the above mentioned regions have very rich soil particularly suitable for tillage; in the time of the Russian tzars they formed a base which supplied the entire population of Muscovy with agricultural products for centuries. The same process of depopulation of Russian villages took place and is in progress throughout Russia, but it does not result in a general decrease of the population of other regions because of the enormous growth of Russian towns—Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky, Tula and so on—which has absorbed the rural population.

While the subjugation and occupation of peoples and countries as, for example, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are called by

²) Great Soviet Encyclopaedia. Volume "The Union of S.S.R." OGI'Z, Moscow, 1948, page 60.

Russia "liberation", "real sovereignty" and the like, collectivism and socialism are not called by their proper names by her; they are called "a means of increasing the productivity of labour" and "raising the standard of living of the working masses", not what it really is—the machinery for the robbing and exploitation of the subjugated nations for the benefit of the parent state.

In its propaganda Russia usually contrasts its socialist system of economy with the "capitalist" economy of agriculture in the U.S.A. Russia takes the U.S.A. as example because those for whom that propaganda is designed, i.e. the population of the subjugated countries and those European peoples which are prospective candidates for liberation (in Europe), are not well enough acquainted with the situation in the U.S.A.; and it is dangerous to contrast the "progressiveness" of its system of economy with that of European countries because the population of Europe, and to a considerable extent the population of the U.S.S.R., is acquainted with that system.

Therefore, this short outline has as its main object the quotation of some data and facts which unmask Russian propaganda.

Of the total number of inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. which amounted to 170 million in 1939, 115 million inhabitants, or 68 per cent, lived in the country; in the U.S.A., of the total number of inhabitants of the country which amounted to 140 million in 1940, 57 million inhabitants, or 40.8 per cent, lived in the country. Of the whole rural population of the U.S.S.R., 84 million inhabitants—collective farmers, individual peasants, workers and employees of state farms and machine and tractor stations—per entire sown area amounting to 136.9 million hectares³⁾ were directly engaged in agriculture, i. e. one head of the population was directly engaged in agriculture per 1.6 hectares of ploughed land; in the U.S.A., of the whole rural population, 30.5 million people per 131 million hectares of ploughed land were directly occupied with agriculture, or one head of the population occupied directly with agriculture per 4.3 hectares of ploughed land. Thus the amount of ploughed land per head of the population occupied with agriculture in U.S.A. is two and a half times as great as that in the U.S.S.R. This fact refutes the Russian

³⁾ One hectare equals 2.7 acres.

myth about an allegedly higher saving of labour by the socialist method of agriculture.

The general indexes of the productivity of agriculture are as follows: before World War II (1937) the general production of cereal crops in both the countries was thus (in thousands of metric centners):

	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.
Wheat	259,438	237,866
Rye	219,380	12,561
Barley	66,101	47,819
Oats	149,561	166,379
Maize	39,219	671,815
Sum total	733,699	1,136,440

It can be seen that the crop of grain in the U.S.A. is by 55 per cent, or about one and a half times, greater than that in the U.S.S.R., although the area under cultivation in the U.S.A. is a little smaller (136.9 million hectares in the U.S.S.R. and 131 million hectares in the U.S.A.) and the total number of people occupied with agriculture in the U.S.A. is two and half times less than that in the U.S.S.R.

The general indexes of livestock-raising in the U.S.S.R. as compared with those in the U.S.A. are (in millions of heads):

	U.S.A. Average annual sum for 10 years (1935-1944)	U.S.S.R. in 1940
Cattle	71.1	54.5
Milch cows included	25.7	no data available
Sheep and goats	52.8	91.6
Pigs	55.3	25.7
Horses and mules	14.7	17.5
Fowls	448.9	no data available

On the basis of this table it is difficult to draw comparative conclusions in absolute numbers because in American farming the number of cattle is by 16.6 million heads and that of pigs by 27.8

million heads greater, but, on the other hand, the number of sheep and goats is by 38.8 million head smaller than that in the U.S.S.R. But those numerical differences have a further meaning if one takes into consideration the fact that a cow weighs 6.9, and even more, times as much as a sheep, and yields as many times as much milk and meat; every pig gives, on an average, twice as much meat as a sheep. The structure of the livestock is of particular importance: more than one third (36.2 p. c.) of the horned cattle in the U.S.A. consists of milch cows; and in 1941, of the 20.1 million cattle in the collective farms there were only 5.6 million cows, i. e. only one fourth of the livestock.

Such a "trifle" as fowls! In the U.S.A. there are 448.9 million fowls or, on an average, 75 fowls per farmer's family. We have no information on the presence of fowls in the U.S.S.R. If, however, one raises the question whether there are so many fowls in the personal use of the members of a kolkhoz and in the kolkhoz poultry farm as to amount to the ratio of 75 fowls per kolkhoz family, probably none of the readers acquainted with the situation will doubt the truth of the answer: of course, there is neither so great a number of poultry (chickens, geese, ducks, turkeys and so on), nor anything approaching that number.

Thus, although the number of inhabitants of the U.S.A. engaged in agriculture is two and a half times smaller, their productivity is, according to the above quoted data, considerably higher than—at least one and a half times—that in the U.S.S.R.

The third myth spread by Russia is its myth about the "capitalist character" of American agriculture. True, this myth is spread, for the most part, by the Russian gutter press. Publications which want to be treated seriously do not spread the myth. In 1948 *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* pointed out (page 850) that the average area of an American farm amounted to 20.2 hectares in 1935. In view of this area of the American farm one would hardly speak of its "capitalist character".

Before World War II 6 million American farmers were occupied with agriculture; the sown area of a farm amounted, on an average, to 22 hectares. Naturally, the areas and types of individual American farms exhibited considerable differences: from the smallest to the biggest ones—industrial farms. However, the family farm is the basic, and most wide-spread type. The family character of the American

farm may be proved by an analysis of hands engaged in American agriculture.

According to the data of the Department of Agriculture of the U.S.A. the average number of workers engaged in agriculture was as follows:

	1910-14	1935-39	1946
	in thousands		
1. Worker-members of the farmer's family	9,160	8,352	7,864
2. Hired workers	2,892	2,568	2,148
Sum total	12,052	10,920	10,012

Thus one hired worker falls to four worker-members of the farmer's family (the farmer, his wife and children); that is to say, American farming is privately owned farming based on the work of the farmer and his family. The hands hired by the American farmers are auxiliary and, for the most part, seasonal. This may be confirmed by a report of that Department which points out that, on an average, in the years 1944-46 the smallest number of workers hired by the American farmers fell in January (1.5 million), and the greatest in the period from July to October (about 3 million), i. e. the harvest-time.

Here we must emphasize the tendency to variation in the specific weight of hired labour in American agriculture: in the years 1910-14 the number of hired workers in the general field of labour amounted to 24.1 per cent, in the years 1935-39 to 23.6 per cent, and in the year 1946 only to 21.4 per cent; that is while in the years 1910-14 one hired worker fell to three working members of the farmer's family, in the year 1946 one hired worker fell to about four working members of the farmer's family. It should be pointed out that this tendency includes the further crystallisation of American farming as a personal or family farming with a declining weight of hired labour.

By the way, it should be noted that the general process of the decrease of the number of inhabitants of the U.S.A. engaged in agriculture, and, what is more important, the decline of the specific weight of hired labour, is accompanied by an enormous increase in agricultural production which is caused by mechanisation and rationalisation of agriculture. Suffice it to say that there are 2 million tractors in American farming.

We compare Soviet agriculture with American agriculture because Russian propaganda bases its myths about "superiority, progressiveness and preponderance" on that comparison, and, secondly, because both of them are assessed on similar objective bases: both Soviet agriculture and American agriculture, taken as two wholes, are in the initial stage of the exploitation of their natural resources and the cultivation of new arable lands; they have approximately the same population (they had in 1939) and are engaged in almost the same type of agriculture: an extensive grain agriculture with a low yielding capacity, if compared with various types of intensive agriculture. In both American and Soviet agriculture livestock-raising is not yet an organic part of agriculture. Livestock-raising is, to a considerable extent, based on the production of the area under cultivation, and not on pastures and meadows. In both cases manure has not yet become the irreplaceable component which secures and limits the high productivity of agriculture. The productivity of American agriculture is twice, and that of Soviet agriculture three times lower than the productivity of the agriculture of those European countries whose agriculture is more intensive.

The conception "Soviet agriculture" is a myth, an invention of Russian propaganda, because, in fact, there is no such agriculture, as a natural economic whole. There are different natural-historic and cultural kinds of agriculture: in Ukraine and the neighbouring Cossack area, in the North Caucasus, Siberia, the Central-Asiatic area, the Caucasian countries, and the primitive and backward agriculture of Muscovy itself. Between those different types of agriculture there are actually no economic relations resulting from tendencies in their development. They have been forcibly and mercilessly "united" by the Russian empire which carried on its unification economic policy aiming at the forcible establishment of a uniform type of agriculture in those areas to the benefit of the parent state of the empire—Muscovy.

(Passages from the work *Economic structure and economic policy of the Russian empire (U.S.S.R.)*).

Gen. Shukhevych-Chuprynka

Fifth Anniversary of the Death of a Hero

"Still a moment, and your voice will mightily roar over the ruins of the Kremlin, and the unchained mother-earth will write a song of praise in honour of the fighting-columns."

M. Boyeslav¹

The leader of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement, General Taras Chuprynka, Tur, Lozovsky—his real name Roman Shukhevych—died the death of a hero in the village of Bilohorshcha, near Lviv, five years ago on March 5, 1950.

The Ukrainian emigration first learned the news of the death of the leader of fighting Ukraine in October of that year. In the Address of the leader of the O.U.N. (abroad) to all Ukrainians, these words were included:

"Physically, there is no General Taras Chuprynka among us, but, in our hearts, he has not died and will not die, like Mazeppa, Petlyura, Konovalts. His spirit lives and will always live among us as well as in the hearts of his fighters and officers."

"Shukhevych died at Bilohorshcha in order to live as Chuprynka for ever." His name, inscribed in the history of the Ukrainian nation to eternity, will be a torch burning for ever which will illumine the path of present and future generations to the summit of human life, and to the realisation of the ideals of the nation.

Roman Shukhevych became known to all Ukrainians as Taras Chuprynka, the surname he adopted from the distinguished Ukrainian patriot, poet and writer who was arrested and executed in 1922 at Kyiv by the Bolsheviks. At that time, just after the Ukrainian War of Independence, 1918-21, the Ukrainian Liberation Movement was establishing itself underground and the All-Ukrainian

¹) Marko Boyeslav, poet and writer who fought with the Ukrainian underground; author of *Wayward Verse*.

Guerilla Centre at Kyiv, discovered and annihilated in 1922, was the first of its kind. It is fitting that the name of an outstanding figure in this first centre of underground resistance should have been borne by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.) which was the mature outcome of that earlier initiative.

General Shukhevych-Chuprynka served with the Ukrainian guerilla detachments during the second World War, and his men were among those tens of thousands who gathered in the forests of Polessia and Volynia in 1942-3 to carry on their common struggle against Nazi cruelty and repressive occupation and also against those Bolshevik partisans who were parachuted into lands occupied by the Germans.

For the suspicion of Nazi intention which had sprung up amongst Ukrainians with the arrest of members of the Provisional Ukrainian Government²⁾ in 1941 had rapidly grown into a clear-sighted recognition of the diabolical plans of Hitler with regard to Ukraine: national enslavement; terror; complete destruction of many small towns and villages accompanied by inhuman acts at times surpassing those of the Bolsheviks; deportations; incarceration, and wholesale plunder of the Ukrainian peasant. No wonder that large numbers of these long-suffering and unconquerable people formed groups for resistance in the marshes and forests, arming themselves as best they might, and inflicting every possible hindrance and embarrassment upon the German forces of occupation.

But however hardy and determined, disparate bands of fighters are never as effective a striking force as a co-ordinated army, and as many of the guerilla detachments had called themselves insurgents in order to emphasise their aim of liberating Ukraine from foreign rule and to distinguish their activities from those of Red Partisans, a number of commands combined in October 1942 to form the U.P.A. A high command was set up with Major Dmytro Klachivsky as Commander-in-Chief and General Leonid Stupnytsky as Chief-of-Staff. These officers were soon to give their lives in the struggle, and in 1943 General Roman Shukhevych—henceforward Taras Chuprynka—became Commander-in-Chief.

²⁾ As the Nazis moved eastwards, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.) called a National Assembly at Lviv, which elected a provisional government and, on June 30, 1941, re-stated the independence of the Ukrainian State over the radio.

From this time Chuprynka's whole life and energy was devoted to the U.P.A. His personal sacrifices have been great: after the Russian re-occupation his parents and his wife were sent to the Siberian slave-camps, and his children taken away—so far as he knew—to be brought up under Bolshevik influence in Russia. But these disasters only served to strengthen the determination of Chuprynka to free his country from the vile oppressor who, replaced for a few years by an equally vicious and deadly foe, now once more threatened to complete the work of the annihilation of Ukraine begun in 1921.

Towards the close of 1943, the U.P.A., which had itself been helped into being by the O.U.N.³⁾, set up a commission which, after many months of negotiation with representatives of political parties and centres all over Ukraine, convened a Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council—S.U.L.C. This Council held its first Session on the eve of the Soviet re-occupation of Ukraine in July 1944, and revised and adopted a draft constitution by which it became the underground Parliament of Ukraine and the organ of political leadership of the Ukrainian people until the country should be liberated.

General Taras Chuprynka became the Chairman of the General Secretariat of the S.U.L.C. and was appointed Supreme Commander of the U.P.A., which now became subject to S.U.L.C. His position as C-in-C of the Ukrainian forces was thus greatly strengthened.

As a development of this political work, the General, in response to requests by representatives of other nationalities having revolutionary organisations within the U.P.A., called a Conference of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia. The Conference, representing twelve nations and with thirty-nine delegates, adopted the slogan "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual" and drew up an agreed platform. Thus was the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.) born in the very cradle of actual resistance to aggressive occupation.

As a military force, the U.P.A. was by this time recognised as a formidable element in the European war both by Germans and by the returning Bolsheviks. As the Germans retreated somewhat rapidly, the U.P.A. were able to help themselves to large stores of

³⁾ Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, which was formed in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets, and which is now a considerable political influence in the Liberation Movement.

German arms for use against the Russians. Wisely, General Chuprynka had expressly forbidden any pacts or negotiations with the retreating Germans, and soon the Red Army soldiers were streaming back into Ukraine.

For a time, however, since these Red Army units consisted chiefly of Ukrainians, the U.P.A. refrained from armed action and aimed at contacting and spreading propaganda amongst their compatriots, incorporating into their own units those Red Army soldiers who decided to fight for their own country. Administrative centres were raided, and N.K.V.D. agents attacked; preventive action was taken to deter re-establishment of collective farms; the transport of grain out of Ukraine was impeded in every possible way, and so also was the deportation of Ukrainians to the Donbas and to remote regions of the U.S.S.R.

Seeing the devastating effects of U.P.A. hostility, the Soviet leaders began, in the spring of 1945, to arrange the deportation of the West Ukrainian population to Siberia and Kazakhstan, and this forced the U.P.A. into open and armed conflict. The Soviet leaders then sent an army under Khrushchov and General Ryassny which fought the U.P.A.—especially in the Carpathian region—for several months when it ceased its action, prevented from wiping out the U.P.A. by the determined and well-trained resistance of the latter, and also by the defection of many of its own soldiers in response to U.P.A. propaganda.

And thus the fighting has continued during the years of the second Bolshevik occupation. Those who have read Major S. Khrin's account of the battle at Lishchava Horishnya⁴⁾ in 1944 and of the raiding parties in Carpatho-Ukraine, South-eastern Poland, and Slovakia in 1945⁵⁾ and other papers and reports coming from Ukraine, need little imagination to picture the incessant complexities and difficulties inherent in such a campaign for liberation as that waged since 1943 by the U.P.A. Such variety of hostile actions, the constant need for concealment of quarters, of ambulance stations, of supply dumps, and so on, calls for exceptional attention to and memory for detail in the Supreme Commander, and also for a

⁴⁾ *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Fight for Freedom*. New York 1954. p. 18^o ff.

⁵⁾ *The Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times*. Oleh R. Mar.ovich. 1951, p. 151 ff.



General Taras Chuprynka (Roman Shukhevych)
1907-1950

personal example that can serve as an inspiration to subsidiary leaders throughout the whole army and area of fighting. In face of the reverses that must daily be reported, the constant accounts of the strength and resource of the enemy-occupant, the sudden raised hopes that end in tragedy, the personality of the leader must present an intrepid courage and faith in the final outcome, together with a patience that to the uninitiated might appear as a coldness of temperament or an aloofness of spirit.

Such a man was General Taras Chuprynka. The manner of his death—within a few miles of one of the largest strongholds of the enemy—bears its own witness to his interpretation of his duty. The Bolsheviks so feared and hated the influence and the implacable example of this man that they spent manpower and equipment lavishly in an incessant effort to find him. Finally, during the struggle of U.P.A. detachments against the renewed drive for collectivisation and “consolidation”, his H.Q. bunker was located at Bilohorshcha near Lviv by M.G.B. troops. In the ensuing skirmish Taras Chuprynka was killed. The news of his death, however, was not announced to the world until October 21 of that year.

The sculptor, Michael Cheresniovsky, who fought for the underground in Ukraine for many years, and who finally fought his way out through the Iron Curtain, has made a portrait bust of the General which is not only one of the sculptor's finest works, but which preserves for us the remarkable intrepidity, the inspiration, and the fixity of purpose of the underground leader. For Chuprynka combined the qualities of military leadership with a creative political insight that has enabled the Ukrainian people to find the means and to forge an instrument of political expression even under the rigours of Bolshevik occupation.

Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka was an idealist. He was a revolutionary nationalist, soldier, strategist, political leader and statesman. He led the O.U.N. and the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council in Ukraine in the hardest time of the underground fight. Under his command the O.U.N. engraved its name in Ukrainian history as the only Ukrainian liberation-political organisation which dared to face the enemy in an open fight at a time of national crisis. The O.U.N., in a historic document in 1945, declares:

“We, the Governing Body of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, will remain together with our people on the battlefield

in our war of liberation, on our occupied lands. Shoulder to shoulder together with the revolutionaries and insurgents we shall fight as front-line fighters in our further fight for freedom."

General Taras Chuprynka, the initiator and organiser of the U.P.A., the S.U.L.C. and the A.B.N., faithfully and firmly guarded the highest ideals of the nation and of God until the last moment of his life. He will remain in the heart of the Ukrainian people as a man-symbol, as an embodiment of the spirit of the Ukrainian nation. In our hearts, the hearts of the present generation, his brilliant figure will be the personification of leadership, military command, and the supreme political authority of the state.

The late Taras Chuprynka was succeeded by Colonel Vasyl Koval, and the Ukrainian liberation revolutionary fight will be continued until a victory is won over the enemy. At some future time the liberated Ukrainian people in a Free United Ukrainian State will erect monuments in Kyiv and Lviv to the memory of Chuprynka.

General Taras Chuprynka is dead. "But", wrote Stepan Bandera on the occasion of his death, "his great, strong spirit will remain among us for ever; it calls upon us to continue our persistent fight. Like him, who devoted his life to the freedom of his native country, all of us will spare no sacrifices. He gave us an example: one can and should fight for the great truth even under the most difficult conditions and in an apparently hopeless situation. His name has been linked indissolubly with the most heroic phase of the revolutionary-liberation fight of Ukraine, and this phase will prove a solid basis for the further development of the Ukrainian National Revolution, on its way to final victory. The realisation of the great idea on whose altar the Ukrainian nation has already sacrificed so many of its best sons and daughters, and is offering yet more sacrifices, will at some time be the reward granted by the justice of God. The legion of perfect examples of heroism and self-sacrifice on behalf of the idea will exist in the mind of the nation, and will serve as vanguard in the further developments of the centuries to come. All those who have devoted their lives to the freedom of Ukraine, the known and unknown knights of the sacred cause, stand side by side in that legion of heroes. The memory of the leader, Tur, Taras Chuprynka, will symbolise the memory of all the dead heroes of his epoch."

M. O. Myronenko

BUILDING A REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

Can national liberation forces be recruited from the Soviet Army?

There are many national liberation movements among the nations at present subjugated by Russia, and one of the most important problems to be faced by them is to plan the reinforcement of their insurgent troops and the establishment of large-scale armies during the actual course of a future revolution. The formation of the national forces is an essential part of revolutionary strategy.

The basis of the military reorganisation must of course be the liberation movement concerned and all its cadres wherever situated. Beyond these, means must be found to make use of that proportion of the population which is fit for military service—the soldiers, N.C.O's, and officers at present serving in the armies of occupation—and this raises the question of the relation of the national armies of liberation to the armies of occupation in general. The collapse and disintegration of the latter will provide manpower to swell the ranks of the national armies.

The methods to be adopted may be generally described as reformatory on the one hand, and revolutionary on the other. As regards the former, those forces which are to liberate the states must effect certain changes in their armies as they exist as present. In the case of Ukraine we should, given suitable conditions, have to withdraw all troops of Ukrainian nationality from the present Soviet Army, and re organise them in national divisions. The revolutionary method, however, would be to disband the armies of occupation as far as possible by means of the liberation forces.

It is of the first importance that troops removed from armies of occupation should not adhere to the institutions, principles and methods of that army—on the contrary, such methods and principles must be utterly discarded and ignored. Napoleon insisted on these

points in setting up his army, although his task of selecting suitable manpower was comparatively simple, since he merely created a new French army in place of the old one which had in any case been French. But in this particular respect, the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army* (the U.P.A.) may be taken as an instructive example.

It seems unlikely that the setting up of national armies could ever be achieved merely by reformatory methods. However, the manpower of the Soviet Army could undoubtedly be reformed during a time of decay and chaos, of political and moral disintegration and psychological depression, such as would certainly follow after a long and deadly war. Technical reorganisation of an army is comparatively easy, but the re-orientation of its psyche is a more lengthy process, since its mentality develops as a result of experience—and in the event of national wars of liberation, this mentality may be the deciding factor.

If the manpower of an army, from the highest command to the rank and file, is "younger" than that of an enemy, then that army is also stronger. And this quality of being "younger" is the most important striking asset of a revolutionary army. To build up the revolutionary armies, therefore, the old occupation forces must be disbanded as far as possible, and the ranks filled up with new and young recruits, who can be enlisted at the ages of 16 and 17. It must be safe to assume that, in the event of a crisis, all those young men who are fit for active service and who are already in the Soviet Army, will actually be incorporated in their national revolutionary armies. Napoleon's "old" brigade, which after six or seven years' active service consisted of men with an average age of 24-26 years, was originally composed of youths from 16-18.

The large-scale establishment of national armies of liberation will be effected under certain conditions, which can briefly be described as follows: all male, and a certain number of female, members of the population between the ages 18/19 and 45/50—that is, for instance, between 3 and 4 million persons from the whole of Ukraine—will remain drawn up in various detachments of the Soviet Army throughout the U.S.S.R.; a large proportion of Ukrainian

* The U.P.A. was formed in the autumn of 1942 when several thousand armed Ukrainian patriots joined the Ukrainian guerilla detachments operating in the forests of Northern Volhynia and Polessia.

reserves from the older age-groups will form part of the Soviet Army and will be in direct or close contact with Ukraine in the European part of the U.S.S.R. Units of the Soviet Army consisting of younger cadres from Ukraine, which will probably be serving outside the borders of their own country, will not be directly affected by the setting up of the Ukrainian national army, at least not at first. Such units must not, however, be left exposed to any fighting outside their native country. Ukrainian and non-Russian cadres of the disintegrating Soviet Army must be used to form national detachments, as in the years of the revolution 1917-18, and these will carry out raids from the Ural to the Archangel regions, or will even march from Siberia to Ukraine or to their other native countries. Such action would greatly help the cause of freedom, provided that their countries had already formed armies of their own.

While the vast national armies of liberation are being expanded and reorganised, the older age-groups of the Soviet Army involved in the process will only have a relatively small number of senior officers of Ukrainian origin—that is to say, those in command will be few in number compared with the rank and file. In Ukraine, for instance, only youths of 16/17 years of age will have remained outside the Soviet Army. Thus the actual manpower will in no way be in keeping with the requirements of the national revolutions for first-class armies.

It will be useful here to consider those actual requirements:

First, there must be an inspired political and moral faith, and a positive urge towards revolution.

Secondly, the necessity for ceaseless fighting, under the most difficult conditions, demands that even the smallest unit must be self-contained; the co-ordination of the widespread combative measures and the development of reliable individual initiative in tactical operations is essential.

Thirdly, a strict discipline and rigorous economy must be enforced.

Fourthly, allowance must be made for the probability that the national armies would suffer a high proportion of losses, and that they might lose proportionally up to two or three times more officers than a regular army.

Fifthly, the overall staff work and the organisation of the lines of communication—reinforcements, army medical services, training of recruits, bringing reserves up to strength, etc.—are the most im-

portant and responsible tasks in respect of the actual fighting capacity. Any temporary cessation of such activities and of hostilities would prove extremely insidious both for the rank and file of the army and for those politicians who do not think far ahead. Also such occurrences would have a weakening effect upon those recently detached from a regular army, for they would gain the impression that a state of chaos existed which they could neither understand nor remedy.

These essentials of the liberation armies call for a more radical approach to the problem of recruitment than a mere re-enlistment of the manpower now serving in the Soviet Army. Certain standards should therefore be adopted from the first, and certain principles followed in the establishment of the armies.

First of all, as mentioned above, the army must be "young", from the lowest ranks to the commander-in-chief. On this ground alone it is clear that mere reformatory methods will not suffice. In addition, the national armies of liberation must be organised as territorial forces, for in this way the armies will be ensured of political and moral sincerity and unity, and their morale will be safeguarded against the influence of confusion and the demagogic propaganda of the enemy. Thus the most efficient striking power of the troops will be guaranteed. The reorganisation of the Soviet Army as it is at present would not be compatible with these principles, either from the present, or from the future aspect.

The national armies of liberation must form their officers' corps by using revolutionary methods, and in doing so must take into consideration the fact that they cannot rely on the supply of officers from the Soviet Army, either in the number or the quality required, even apart from political considerations. For this reason the commissioned officers must be drawn to an adequate degree from revolutionary soldiers, N.C.O's and officers of proved reliability. Members of the Soviet Army will only be able to join the national revolutionary forces as ordinary soldiers, and the rank which they later receive will depend upon the personal qualities they reveal. Their status in the ranks of the champions of liberation will in no way be dependent upon their holding a commission in the Soviet Army.

In Ukraine, as opportunity arises to detach the majority of the Ukrainians from the Soviet forces, the national revolutionary army will have certain organising functions, and also certain military and

strategic needs, since the manpower at its disposal will be considerably less numerically than the actual Ukrainian element in the Soviet Army. A great number will in fact not be needed. During its greatest development and whilst the victorious and decisive battle is in progress, it will hardly require more than 800,000 men, whereas at the time of the collapse of the Soviet divisions and the possible detachment of Ukrainians from the regular army, its possible forces will number 3 or 4 million Ukrainians. This fact is not of importance, since the revolutionary army cannot allot such masses to its units and, moreover, it does not require such large numbers from the military and strategic point of view.

Sooner or later after the collapse of the Soviet Army, the process of its reorganisation will begin in Russia, but that is another question altogether. The process will not endanger Ukraine provided that this country has an army of 800,000 men when the process begins, and that the size of this army can be adjusted in accordance with the development of events in Russia.

The fact must thus be stressed that the idea of detaching the Ukrainians, and also the members of other subjugated nations from the Soviet Army by no means implies that these trained forces of Ukrainians, numbering 3 to 4 million, will be allotted to the Ukrainian revolutionary army. They could, for instance, simply be demobilised, in order to prevent any weakening of revolutionary determination.

We may now sum up the question of the relation of the national revolutionary liberation movement to the Soviet Army. When the Soviet Army is about to collapse through the secession of the various nations from its ranks, and while Ukrainian units are being set up, the national liberation movement must, from the strategic point of view, regard such occurrences as the signal to demobilise the Soviet Army, and this demobilisation must be speeded up in every possible way.

In the course of this demobilisation, the most valuable part of the available manpower must be selected in order to bring the cadres of the national revolutionary armies up to the full required strength; and this selection must be made according both to existing training and fighting ability, and to the degree of revolutionary sincerity and trustworthiness of the manpower concerned.

P Poltava

OUR PLAN FOR LIBERATION

In 1946 the Ukrainian liberation revolutionary movement in the U.S.S.R. began to change from the form of a wide insurrection to the form of a deep flowing underground movement. Practically, this change of tactics has manifested itself primarily in the following ways: 1) little by little, according to the situation and requirements in individual regions, the units of the U.P.A. (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) were disbanded, and their participants, commanders and fighters, were included in the framework of the underground organisation, the underground network; 2) the whole life of the underground organisation, as well as its work, became carefully camouflaged; 3) contrary to what was done in the time of wide-spread action by the U.P.A. (the main aim of those actions was to prevent the enemy from extending his power beyond regional and district centres), the political-propaganda and political-organisation work was put in the forefront. At present the armed underground work is the basic form of the fight of the Ukrainian liberation-revolutionary movement in the U.S.S.R. The underground organisation is a living force; it meets the demands of a strict conspiracy.

* * *

In connection with that change of the form of fight on the part of the Ukrainian liberation movement, as well as in connection with a lasting "peace" for the world, the Ukrainian community which lives legally is certainly interested in the question: What is our plan of fight in the present situation? What is the practical aim of our underground fight today? What are we trying to achieve under those hard conditions by sacrificing so many of our people?

In outline, in the present situation our plan of fight for the liberation of Ukraine includes the following most important tasks:

- 1) To maintain our underground organisation in the Ukrainian lands in the U.S.S.R. at any cost and to continue to build it up according to requirements and opportunities;

2) To carry on an enlightening propaganda-political work among the whole Ukrainian people and other peoples of the entire U.S.S.R. through the underground organisation as well as in every other possible way;

3) To organise the resistance of the Ukrainian and, if possible, other peoples of the U.S.S.R. against the Bolshevik oppressors and exploiters in all spheres of life;

4) To carry on armed actions which are absolutely necessary for preventing the occupants from consolidating their hold on our lands, as they wish to do, and for hindering the Russian-Bolshevik criminals and all their menials from committing their crimes with regard to the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian liberation movement without being punished for it.

In short, such is the present plan of our liberation fight.

The liberation of Ukraine, the liberation of the Ukrainian people in the next historical period, depends on how much we succeed in the fulfilment of this plan.

One may ask; Why it is so? Because :

The whole of history teaches us that an enslaved people may make itself free provided it is able to establish a proper liberation organisation made up of its best sons. Such an organisation is absolutely necessary, first of all, for the preparation of a nation-wide insurrection or any other decisive liberation action. It is a well known fact that occupation rule in an enslaved country may be overthrown in this way only, that is, by means of a nation-wide insurrection. Moreover, such an organisation is indispensable because there must be somebody to summon the people to such an insurrection (or any other liberation action) at an opportune moment, lead the people into action, organise the insurrection, direct it, march in its front-line, be its support and spearhead. *If at an opportune moment the people have no organisation to carry on such a fight, they will not make themselves free even under the most favourable conditions.*

The people must have such an organisation on their own territory, and not in emigration.. The emigration may return to its native country only behind the armies of other powers, at the best as an insignificant component part of those armies, even if it should appear there under its own banner. That is to say, at a decisive moment, such as a war against the occupant of its native country, the influence of the emigration over the fate of its own people—

especially if the belligerent powers are completely indifferent to that enslaved people—is insignificant, almost nil. Nor can the emigration exert any influence upon the fate of its own people if the attitude of the belligerent powers, enemies of the occupant, towards the enslaved people is hostile. *The liberation of an enslaved people almost always depends only on what the people are able to achieve on their own territory, in their native country, and not in emigration.*

In the light of what has been said above, it is clear that the existence of the present underground organisation in Ukraine, the existence of our present organised revolutionary underground work, is of particular importance to the Ukrainian people.

Some Ukrainians conjecture thus: "Everything depends on the war against the U.S.S.R. Our people alone (i.e. the underground organisation) are not able to achieve anything".

It is true that today our liberation-revolutionary movement in Ukraine is still too weak to think, under existing conditions, of the overthrow of the Bolshevik rule in our native country by means of our own forces only. It is also true that a war against the U.S.S.R., and especially the war which is being prepared, would considerably facilitate our liberation fight. We do not deny it. *However, it is a gross error to think that a war alone would be enough to liberate Ukraine. Without the existence of an experienced and properly built-up liberation organisation in Ukraine, the Ukrainian people will not make themselves free in case of war.* On the basis of what we said about the role and importance of a liberation organisation in the life of an enslaved people this should be quite intelligible to everyone. The information on the present attitude of the West towards our emigration abroad confirms our conclusion. For the most part, that attitude today is somewhat indifferent to our liberation fight. Having been a stateless people for so long a time, it is today hard for us to gain positions in international life.

Our underground O.U.N. (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) in the U.S.S.R., our revolutionary underground organisation as a whole, is an experienced and fairly well built up organisation in Ukraine today, an organisation which is able to excite the people to a decisive liberation action at an opportune moment, to organise such an action and to direct it. The fact that we have such an organisation in Ukraine today is our great advantage, the great achievement of an enslaved people. This is the surest guarantee of our liberation at the first opportunity.

Therefore, naturally, we consider the maintaining and building-up of that organisation the most important task of our plan of the liberation fight in the present situation. We have tried and shall try in the future to fulfil that task at any price, even at the cost of great sacrifices. We know a voluntary giving up of our plan, or the destruction of our underground organisation by the enemy, would be identical with crossing out our hopes for the liberation of the Ukrainian people in the near future.

But, in order to be able to gain its end at an opportune moment, i. e. to gain a complete national-state liberation of Ukraine, our liberation organisation must secure, especially at the decisive moment of the fight, the support of the broad Ukrainian masses, the whole Ukrainian people. Our liberation organisation will acquire such support, if, on the one hand, our programme meets the needs and desires of the broad Ukrainian masses and, on the other hand, if the Ukrainian masses are well and thoroughly acquainted with our programme and our aim.

As to the former requirement, the situation of our movement in that respect is not amiss. Our programme really reflects the desires and requirements of all strata of the Ukrainian people, its broad masses. This may be confirmed by the numerous statements concerning our programme, which we note every day, and which are made by people belonging to all strata and to various professions in every corner of Ukraine. And this is quite regular: our liberation-revolutionary movement, our O.U.N. in Ukraine, has always lent a ready ear to the desires of the Ukrainian people; it has always been very attentive to its requirements.

The latter requirement: that the broad masses of the Ukrainian people must be acquainted with our end. *It should be stated that our situation in this respect is still quite unsatisfactory.*

This bad situation can be changed only by means of wide, persistent and enlightening propaganda-political work; by means of a courageous and extensive circulation of our underground publications—leaflets, pamphlets, periodicals, appeals and so on—and by means of a proper oral campaign. This work must be carried on not only by the underground organisation, but by all the patriots, all the nationally conscious Ukrainians who live legally within the State.

In view of the importance of this matter to our liberation fight, the propaganda-political work among Eastern Ukrainians and Soviet

subjects in general is considered the second task of our present liberation plan. The force of the action of the Ukrainian people at the next opportune moment depends on the fulfilment of this task. Everybody knows that the victory in our liberation fight, our liberation, itself depends on the force of that action.

Our plan of fight for the liberation of Ukraine also includes the organisation of the resistance of the Ukrainian people to the Bolshevik oppressors and exploiters in all spheres of life. Such a resistance is indispensable; it will prevent the Bolsheviks from the easy and successful carrying out of their plans in Ukraine: political plans (building-up the party, komsomol and so on), economic plans (collectivisation, recruitment to Labour Reserve Schools, state supplying etc.), Russification, propaganda and other plans; it is absolutely necessary for weakening and undermining the Bolshevik rule in Ukraine. It is clear that such a courageous nation-wide, general resistance, a resistance in all spheres of life, would be a serious blow to the Russian-Bolshevik occupants.

It is natural that the underground organisation alone cannot fulfil such a task. That task may be fulfilled only with the participation of the vast masses of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian people must themselves offer a resistance of this kind to the Russian-Bolshevik invaders. The battle front of the fight for the liberation of Ukraine, the front of the fight against the Bolshevik enslavers, cannot be limited to the fight of the underground organisation. It is certainly not sufficient. *The whole people must take part in that fight.* Only in such a case will the liberation of Ukraine be guaranteed. In spite of the terrorist character of the Bolshevik regime, there are still possibilities of such resistance on the part of the ordinary people. One must see them and make use of them courageously and as soon as possible. First of all, it is necessary to offer a firm resistance to Russia's policy of Russification of the Ukrainian people since this policy threatens to exterminate us as a separate people.

Such a fight, such a nation-wide courageous resistance to the Russian-Bolshevik occupants, will not only undermine seriously the force of the Bolshevik rule in Ukraine. It will also prepare the people for the decisive and courageous action to be carried out at an opportune moment. It will, first of all, cultivate such virtues in the people as courage which will enable it to offer resistance to the enemy and to attack him, such virtues as readiness to make sacrifices,

national solidarity, active patriotism, fighting spirit etc. *History teaches us that without such a preparation an enslaved people cannot gain a victory over its enemy, the occupant.*

The armed actions which are being carried on by our revolutionary underground organisation at the present time on its own initiative (we are compelled by enemy armed terrorism to carry on most of those actions; we must defend ourselves and our organised liberation movement) pursue a special, exactly defined, object in our plan of fight. They have for their object, first of all, to punish our most active enemies, the occupants, and their fellow travellers for their crimes as regards the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian liberation movement, for terrorising and cruel treatment of the Ukrainian people, for plunder, for persecution of Ukrainian patriots, for their active measures by arms or propaganda against the Ukrainian liberation movement and so on. Terrorising the Bolshevik menials and their fellow travellers, and preventing them from faithfully serving the Bolshevik oppressors, we defend the Ukrainian population from their highhandedness and arbitrary rule to a considerable extent. Many heads of village Soviets, heads of collective farms and other Bolshevik officials, still conduct themselves decently, only because they are afraid of just punishment by the underground organisation. In this way we also hinder the Bolsheviks in the realisation of their plans aimed at the complete subjugation of the Ukrainian masses on the territory of our intensive actions. Moreover, in this way we also educate the Ukrainian masses in the spirit of revolutionary fight. Every successful assault, every successful sudden attack against the enemy in any of his strongholds, raises the revolutionary spirit of the masses, encourages the Ukrainian people, and strengthens its resistance to the Russian-Bolshevik invaders, making it more active on the front of that resistance. *All that is of particular importance in the plan of development of a liberation revolutionary fight. That is precisely the only way to victory in a liberation fight.*

On the whole, however, it should be stated that the number of our armed actions is smaller now than, for example, in the years 1944-46, at the time of widespread action of the U.P.A. and the mass armed underground activity. Obviously, this results from our present plan of fight. As said above, today we consider the maintenance and further building-up of our underground organisation and

propaganda-political work the most important task. Today armed actions are in the background of our plan of fight.

In spite of all the difficulties which the liberation fight meets in the conditions of the totalitarian and terrorist U.S.S.R., in spite of our great casualties which we are constantly compelled to suffer, we are successfully carrying out our plan of fight.

We have succeeded in maintaining our underground organisation; in some cases we have even built it up. By means of our underground network we have extended an influence over one third of the territory of Ukraine.

We have won much success in our propaganda-political work. More and more Ukrainians from the Eastern regions of Ukraine, as well as people throughout the U.S.S.R., are being informed about our real ends and the true national and social-liberation character of our movement. Our literature reaches every corner of Ukraine, and several republics of the Soviet Union. In the year 1948 about 70 different pamphlets, leaflets, periodicals and works of art were printed in our underground printing establishments in numbers amounting to several thousands. Almost all that literature is designed for the Soviet masses and, first of all, for the East-Ukrainian masses. We constantly hear Ukrainians from the eastern regions of Ukraine, and people from the entire U.S.S.R., approve, and enthusiastically approve, our fight. We often receive letters from Ukrainian patriots from all over the regions of Ukraine, in which they declare their complete solidarity with us and express their readiness to fight actively. We are also devotedly supported in our practical revolutionary work all over Ukraine.

The underground organisation has also won a considerable success in the organisation of the resistance of the Ukrainian masses to the Russian-Bolshevik invaders. Let us mention the boycott of all previous Bolshevik elections, and particularly the elections of the year 1946, by the Ukrainian people on the territory where the U.P.A. was active and where the underground organisation was established, the resistance to collectivisation, the resistance of Ukrainian youth to komsomol, parachute jumps, recruitment to Labour Reserves and so on. It is even difficult to enumerate all the activities. Since 1944 there has been persistent and furious fighting between the Bolshevik oppressors and the Ukrainian masses on the territory covered by the U.P.A. and the underground organisation. This

situation has been largely caused by the work of the U.P.A. and the underground organisation.

Our armed actions are successful, too. A considerable number of Bolshevik bandits and their menials are ambushed and killed by members of the underground organisation. By its actions the underground organisation has supported the West-Ukrainian peasants in their fight against the collectivisation. In consequence of the armed actions of the U.P.A. and the underground organisation, the Bolsheviks are, for the most part, unable to organise parachute jumps; not to mention the obvious revolutionary influence of all these actions on the Ukrainian masses, and particularly upon Ukrainian youth.

* * *

What does the complete realisation of our plan of fight for the liberation of Ukraine depend upon? That is to say: What does the successful completion of that fight depend upon?

Obviously, it depends on many conditions. *One of the most important conditions is the question to what extent the legally-living Ukrainian community supports the revolutionary underground organisation in its fight for the realisation of that plan.*

What support does the revolutionary underground organisation need today?

Let us say in plain words: this support should not be limited to mere sympathy, mere ideological solidarity with the underground organisation. The fight does not depend on mere sympathy; it cannot be strengthened by mere sympathy. Mere ideological unity of the people and the underground organisation is not sufficient for gaining a victory in our liberation fight. *It must be a real, concrete and active support.*

The members of the secret organisation must live somewhere; they must have their quarters. The fight demands that such underground quarters be established in inhabited localities, in buildings; in many regions the natural conditions compel us to this course.

It is the duty of every nationally-conscious Ukrainian, every Ukrainian patriot, to give us, if necessary, an opportunity to establish such quarters at his home. Obviously this bears some risk, but there is no fight without risk. While some patriots risk their lives every day, and they do not risk them because, allegedly, "it is all the same to them", but because it is demanded by the supreme interest of our

liberation cause, other patriots should be willing, at least during a certain period, to stake, at the worst, their property or personal freedom. There is no victory without sacrifices. That victory will be gained, if not only individual persons, but also the broad masses of the people are ready to make sacrifices. In any case, in view of the fact that the members of the secret organisation are skilfully masked today, it is difficult to discover such quarters.

The underground organisation needs material help in the form of money, food, sometimes in the form of clothing, footwear, drugs, and so on.

Especially, the underground organisation needs money. Money is necessary, first of all, for the organisation of printing establishments and their equipment, the purchase of paper, typewriters, stationary in general, the purchase of necessary books, drugs, clothing, footwear and a series of other things. Without money the underground organisation would be unable to carry on its propaganda-political work, and very often it would be unable to hold its ground at all. All the money matters of the underground organisation are strictly controlled by its supreme organs.

The underground organisation needs help on the part of the whole community in the form of various informations from different circles, institutions, mills and factories, from various regions of the U.S.S.R., in all the spheres of Soviet life. Because of the special forms of its fight (the underground mode of life, deep conspiracy) the underground organisation alone is unable to get all the information it needs. Such information is indispensable to a political organisation; it enables it to carry on its work successfully.

The underground organisation also needs reinforcement. It is a well-known fact that tens of thousands of insurgents and members of the secret organisation died the death of heroes during the recent years of the fight. Our people are dying today, too. This is inevitable in a fight. Here and there the underground organisation must reinforce its ranks. This is absolutely necessary to the existence of the underground organisation as a compact and proportionally wide organisation. All the Ukrainian patriots must be aware of that. One must have the courage to join in the hard, but glorious, underground fight in case of necessity; one should have no hesitation in sending one's son or daughter to the underground organisation.

Particularly, we here appeal to Ukrainian secondary-school boys and students. Our underground O.U.N. is a political organisation.

It carries on various political-revolutionary tasks. It would be a great mistake to think that educated people have nothing to do with the underground organisation. Our underground organisation, our liberation underground movement, needs as many educated people as possible. In our organisation such people have a great opportunity to grow and to develop their individualities. In our organisation hundreds of talented young men have grown up and become first-class political revolutionary leaders with a great stock of political and general knowledge, with a great and thorough experience in practical political revolutionary work. Today there is no more honorable work for a young Ukrainian patriot than the active revolutionary fight for the liberation of Ukraine in the ranks of the underground organisation. Today the best way to serve Ukraine is to serve it in the ranks of the underground organisation according to one's knowledge, courage, ardour and persistence. Therefore, let no one hesitate for a moment, if called for that service.

Work aimed at giving information to all uninformed people on the character of our movement, our real ends, should also be one of the ways of supporting the underground organisation. It is not true that there are no possibilities for such work under Soviet conditions. We know by experience that there are those possibilities. Of course, one should proceed very cautiously. One should observe people beforehand and become acquainted with them; this should not be done, except in a suitable situation. Besides, there is still another condition: one should not fear too much; one should not think that every ordinary man must be an agent of the M.G.B. There are a lot of such agents, there is no doubt about that. But, for sure, not all the people in the U.S.S.R. are agents. Many people may be hostile towards our movement just because of ignorance. In fact, however, they may be honest people, perhaps even secret opponents of the Bolshevik regime. It is a great loss to us, to our liberation movement, if a Ukrainian patriot meets such a man, works together with him, is on friendly terms with him, and yet dares not to say a few words of truth about us. This narrows the framework of our propaganda-political work very much; thus, it narrows our chance of success, too. Therefore, it is the duty of every Ukrainian patriot to spread the truth about us, the Ukrainian liberation movement, in every form. Especially the Ukrainian intelligentsia and Ukrainian student

can do much in this respect. It is known that it is hard for our underground organisation to get into the towns, especially the cities, today. It is in towns that most of those people live among whom we should, first of all, carry on our work of enlightenment: Ukrainians from eastern regions of Ukraine and people of the U.S.S.R. in general. One should know how to put stealthily our underground literature at their doors (or to deliver it in another way), to send secretly proper explanatory letters (obviously, anonymous ones and written in a disguised handwriting), to slip into their lodgings various enlightening patriotic books published in Western Ukraine before the year 1939, and so on. As to our underground publications they often do not meet the need in that respect; it is often difficult to get more than one copy of each of them. In such cases such publications, especially leaflets, should be copied by hand and circulated in that form.

We shall win the necessary success in our propaganda-political work only with the help of all nationally conscious Ukrainians who live legally. Every nationally conscious and politically literate educated Ukrainian, every Ukrainian worker and peasant should carry on the work of enlightenment in every possible form.

Finally, to support the underground organisation not only by sympathy, not only by word of mouth, means to be always ready to carry out all the orders and suggestions of the underground organisation and to support it actively in all difficulties which may arise.

If, on the one hand, the Ukrainian patriots—peasants, workers and intelligentsia who live legally—actively support the underground organisation, and if, on the other hand, all the Ukrainian patriots offer a courageous resistance to the Russian-Bolshevik invaders, we shall gain the victory in our liberation fight.

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B. Krupnytsky

TEN CENTURIES OF UKRAINE

A brief summary of Ukrainian history

The earliest records of history disclose tribal differentiation among eastern Slavs. The first state on Ukrainian territory was established by the southern group of eastern Slavic tribes—the Derevlyany, Polyany, Siveryany, Ulychi, Tyvertsi, Duliby or Volynyany—from which the Ukrainian nation arose. The first state—the Kyiv State—was established through the co-operation of the Norman Vikings (Ukrainian: Varyahy) and the indigenous population. To it the Varyahy contributed the Ruryk dynasty and probably also the name Rus, “Ruthenia”. At the end of the 9th century, a prince of the Varyahy dynasty was ruling in Kyiv. Under the Ruryk dynasty the new state, based on Ukrainian tribes and especially on the gifted one named Polyany, expanded remarkably: during the 10th century almost all the eastern Slavic tribes, including those which gave rise to the Great Russians and Byelorussians, were conquered, as well as a considerable number of Finnish tribes in the north. Kyiv attained control of the steppes in the south-east, and gained access to the Caucasus, to the Volga river, to Byzantium and the lower Danube. The political structure and economy of the Kyiv State were markedly influenced by its nobility, in which warriors and merchants were predominant; while its foundation rested firmly upon the agricultural traditions of the Ukrainian people.

The relations of the Kyiv State with Byzantium and with the West were of the utmost importance. During the rule of Volodymyr the Great (980—1015) Christianity according to the Greek rite was adopted from Byzantium. During the rule of Volodymyr’s son,

Yaroslav the Wise (1019—54), Ukraine-Rus (the Kyiv State) became one of the most important amongst European countries and her political and trade relations with them were very close. It was also firmly connected culturally with western Europe, and, through the members of his numerous family, Yaroslav himself had ties of kinship with almost all the outstanding European dynasties—he was even called “Europe’s father-in-law”. The fame of Ukraine-Rus was maintained and furthered also under Yaroslav’s grandson, Volodymyr Monomakh (1113—25) but even by the end of the 11th century there had appeared some indications of decay. The epoch of the hegemony of the Kyiv State among other eastern Slavic peoples, which, as A. Shakhmatov says, had been a brilliant page of Ukrainian history, was approaching its end. The reasons for that decline were various: dissension in the princely family caused by its peculiar system of seniority; separatist tendencies of individual territories, especially Great Russian ones (Suzdal); and aggressions by nomads and Polovtsi who came from the south-eastern steppes to ravage the State.

In the years 1239—40, the Ukrainian lands underwent devastating invasions by new nomads, the Tartars. These turbulent people succeeded in establishing themselves as neighbours, and their depredations hindered and delayed consolidation of the Ukrainian people, necessitating constant and heavy sacrifices in self-defence. As a result, Kyiv and all the most outstanding centres of the Dnipro region lost their importance.

The Kyiv State, however, was inherited by the Galician-Volynian kingdom. Here the Ukrainian state, having united all the Ukrainian lands from the Carpathian Mountains to the Dnieper, reached its greatest power during the rule of Prince Roman (1199—1205), his son, King Danylo (1205—64) and his grandson Lev (1264—1301). It also inherited the social-legal concepts and cultural traditions of Kyiv Rus which were thus able to develop. The epoch of the Galician-Volynian kingdom is notable for the considerable influence of West-European culture over Ukrainian lands. For in those years Ukraine occupied an important position in middle Europe; she was of greater importance than her near neighbours in the west: for instance Hungary, which was rent by anarchy, and Poland, which was as yet in a condition of feudal disunity.

But in the middle of the 14th century the Galician-Volynian State also began to decline. It was undermined by internal intrigues

of the Galician nobility (boyars) who had opposed princely rule since ancient times and who aimed at seizing power—laying claim to the role of West-European feudal lords and barons, and seeking to overthrow Prince Roman's dynasty—and by an alteration in the foreign situation due to the strengthening of Poland and Hungary in the first half of the 14th century, and the establishment of the new and expanding Lithuanian state.

In the middle of the 14th century the Galician-Volynian state was partitioned among its three western neighbours: Poland occupied Galicia, Lithuania took possession of Volynia, the Carpathian lands being already in the power of Hungary.

Once individual tribes were united in one state under the rule of Prince Mendovh in the middle of the 13th century, the Lithuanian principality began to extend its influence, first on Byelorussian, and in the middle of the 14th century on Ukrainian lands. This latter incorporation was in general a peaceful one, and by the end of the 14th century most of the Ukrainian lands were already under the rule of Prince Olgerd Gedyminovych (1341—1377).

The role played by the people of Ukraine in the so-called Lithuanian-Ruthenian state was not altogether unimportant. This state was in fact a common state comprising Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and also Byelorussians. In Ukraine the traditional foundations of the ancient Ukrainian life were not broken, and at first even the Ruryk dynasty remained on its own lands, its princes becoming vassals of the Lithuanian grand duke at Vilno. Later they were replaced by Lithuanian princes of the Gedymin dynasty, and still later by ordinary governors (voivodes). The Ukrainian-Byelorussian culture which had developed in ancient princely times exerted its influence upon the Lithuanian state with its on the whole primitive cultural life. One can see this in the legislation, in the official language—the ancient Ruthenian language, and in the exclusive preponderance of the orthodox faith which was that of the Gedymin dynasty until a later date. In the political respect, the Ukrainian (and Byelorussian) aristocracy was of particular importance; it was made up of former princely and boyar families which had concentrated considerable political power in their hands, being members of the "Council of noblemen" of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state, and holding supreme administrative posts.

The Treaty of Krevo in 1385 was the presage of future changes. Poland and the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state were united by the marriage of Yahaylo, the son of Gedymin, and the Polish queen, Yadviga. Catholic Poland assumed the role of the bearer of civilization in Lithuania and this was furthered by the fact that Yahaylo along with his people had adopted Catholicism.

The situation was radically changed two centuries later. In 1569 there was concluded the so-called Lublin union according to which Lithuania and Poland united in one federal Republic (the personal union of the year 1385 became real) with a common king, senate, seim (representative assembly), foreign policy and so on. Thus all the Ukrainian lands were subjected to Poland, and Ukraine entered upon a new stage of her existence. Immediately after the incorporation of the Ukrainian lands there were indications of a Polish drive towards the east. Polish land-owners began to seize immense latifundia in Ukraine, the Ukrainian aristocracy accepted Catholicism and became Polonised, the peasantry being enslaved. These developments were crowned with the Berest union of 1596 which was concluded by Poland with the help of some representatives of the Ukrainian episcopate, and which had as object the subordination of the eastern Orthodox Church to the Holy See.

Although the Polish State boasted of its civilising mission, it did not know how, or perhaps was unable, to protect and defend Ukrainian lands from the terrible calamity caused by the Crimean Tartar aggressions which were already of long standing by the end of the 15th century. Landowner-administrators (most of whom were Ukrainians by birth) lived in their castles on the border, and left the Ukrainian population of the countryside to organise their own defence. The fight against the Tartars was carried on by those courageous elements—trappers and soldiers—who were known as Cossacks by the end of the 15th century. The Zaporozhian Sich below the Dnipro rapids became their centre in the second half of the 16th century. At that time the Ukrainian Cossacks established a peculiar organisation of their own, something like a knightly order, but with distinct democratic leanings. By their fight against the Turkish-Tartar world they won world-wide fame, especially after their naval raids on the environs of Constantinople under the command of Hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaydachny in the twenties of the 17th century. These raids aimed mainly at the release of Christians captured by the Turks, and at the seizure of booty.

The rapid development of the Cossack organisation was especially evident in the last decades of the 16th and in the early ones of the 17th centuries. Later on, the Cossacks, having divided into 'reyest-rovyky', soldiers registered in the state service whose centres were at Trakhtemyriv and Kyiv, and independent forces, the 'vypyshchyky', and the 'sichovyky' whose centre was in the Sich and usually situated on an island in the Dnipro, became something like a state within the State. The Cossack organisation managed to assert its rights, although the Polish government either refused to recognise it at all, or recognised it only partially. The whole of Ukraine depended upon the Cossack organisation when it had to defend itself against national, social and cultural oppression on the part of the Poles.

The Cossacks began to rise in rebellion against the Polish Republic towards the end of the 16th century: originally they had the purpose of protecting their class interests; but later on their insurrections reached a national scale.

At the same time the Cossacks joined the defenders of the Orthodox faith and culture and the opponents of union with Rome, the Ukrainian middle classes—made up of townspeople and small gentry who founded fraternities, schools and printing-works, furthered polemic literature and supported their clergy when it was oppressed. Thanks to those elements, and particularly to the Cossacks, Kyiv became a stronghold of Ukrainian culture and orthodoxy.

Later on, the fight became fiercer. It was Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky who managed to liberate Ukraine from the Polish yoke with the help of the Cossacks and of the whole nation in the year 1648. After his brilliant victories of Zhovti Vody and Korsun, he consolidated his power in Ukraine, but still had to wage war for several years because the Polish Republic was unwilling to give up the country which had so greatly enriched its gentry, especially those magnates accustomed to rule in the East.

Making alliances at one time with the Crimea and Turkey, at another with Russia by the Pereyaslav treaty which was concluded in 1654; and having found allies who proved to be more useful to Ukraine, namely Sweden, Brandenburg and Transylvania (and among smaller ones: Lithuania, Moldavia and Wallachia), Khmelnitsky finally completely liberated Ukraine within its ethnographic

frontiers, and even wanted to strengthen the new state by the establishment of a Khmelnitsky dynasty.

The premature death in 1657 of that great Hetman whose activity was, it should be noted, admired by his contemporary, the outstanding English statesman, Cromwell, caused internal disturbances in the state organism which had not yet been consolidated; and it was just this that its neighbours—Russia and Poland—awaited.

The hetmans who succeeded Bohdan Khmelnitsky were of a considerable smaller calibre. Ivan Vyhovsky (1657—1659) and Petro Doroshenko (1665—1676) were the most capable of them: their policy was notable for a constructive line, and even their orientation—in the beginning on Sweden, and later on towards Poland (Vyhovsky) and Turkey (Doroshenko)—had for object the final consolidation of Ukrainian independence, if possible, within those frontiers, and containing those territories, which had been established by Bohdan Khmelnitsky. However, this cannot be said of such hetmans as Bryukhovetsky (1663—1668) who became subservient to Moscow, or to careerists of Right-bank Ukraine such as Teterya, Opara, Sukhoviý or Khanenko, who gave allegiance to Poland.

In consequence of the mistakes made by hetmans, owing to social antagonisms in Ukraine causing strained relations between the Cossack leaders and the masses, and also in consequence of interference from neighbouring peoples, Poland and Russia came to an agreement to the detriment of Ukraine: a treaty was concluded at Andrusiv in 1667 according to which the Right-bank Ukraine was ceded to Poland, and the Left-bank Ukraine, the so-called *Hetmanshchyna*¹ (along with Kyiv), remained in the Russian sphere of influence. But this partition caused organised resistance on the part of Ukrainian patriots. Petro Doroshenko, Ivan Samoylovych (1672—1687) and Mazepa (1687—1709) constantly strove for the unification of Right-bank and Left-bank Ukraine. Right-bank Ukraine, left under Polish overlordship, for a long time fought for its rights and for Ukrainian unity, at one time with the help of *Hetmanshchyna* and the *Sich*, at another with the help of its *haydamaky*² in the 18th century.

¹) A name for all those regions of Ukraine—mostly on the Left Bank of the Dnieper—which came under the rule of the Hetmanate.

²) A rising of Ukrainian peasants in the 1760's against Polish domination and religious intolerance.

The situation in Left-bank Ukraine was consolidated in the time of Samoylovych and Mazeppa. In Hetmanshchyna there was formed a Cossack state system on the foundations laid by B. Khmelnitsky, with a hetman as head of the state, but yet a vassal, politically dependent on Russia, and with its own army, administration, finance, courts and so on.

The fact that Russia constantly tried to deprive the Ukrainian autonomous state, dependent as it was on Russia, of its rights, was regarded by Ukrainian patriots as an unbearable yoke. There were many attempts to separate Ukraine from Russia, just as was the case in Ukraine in the first half of the 17th century with regard to Poland. Mazeppa was the last hetman who made a bold attempt to throw off the tzarist yoke. His alliance with Charles XII, the king of Sweden who turned out a capable and successful general in the beginning of the Great Northern War, was intended to ensure the final independence of Ukraine.

But this campaign, which had a prospect of success, ended in the Swedish-Ukrainian defeat of Poltava in the summer of 1709; thus, the Ukrainian fight for independence was temporarily given up as lost. It was Mazeppa's authority which to some extent prevented the Russian government from depriving Hetmanshchyna of its state rights, though Tzar Petro I himself exhibited such tendencies. But, encouraged by its victories over the Swedes and by the extraordinary growth of its importance in Europe, Russia began now to subjugate Ukraine, achieving this consecutively in the political, cultural and economic fields. The Ukrainian hetmans of the 18th century, Ivan Skoropadsky (1708—1722), Danylo Apostol (1727—1734) and Kyrylo Rozumovsky (1750—1764), had to carry on a policy aimed at defending those rights of Hetmanshchyna of which it had not yet been deprived.

The Russian tzarina, Catherine II, delivered the final blow to the state autonomy of Ukraine. In 1764 the government by hetmans was abolished. In 1781, the actual state system of Ukraine was abolished; the 10 administrative units, regimental military districts, were replaced by Russian administrative institutions and courts; Hetmanshchyna was divided into three provinces, those of Kyiv, Chernyhiv and Novhorod-Siversky, under the guise of a "Little Russian" governor-generalship. In 1783, the separate Cossack army (consisting of 10 regiments) was liquidated; at the same time serfdom was enforced in Ukraine. The same sad fate overtook other Uk-

rainian lands dependent on Russia. In 1765 occurred the abolition of the Cossack-autonomous system of Slobidska Ukraine³, which had been colonised since the middle of the 17th century by Ukrainian refugees from Poland, primarily from Right-bank Ukraine, and which stood under Russian protection. In 1775, a blow was delivered to Zaporozhian Sich which till then had preserved its autonomy, though it was dependent both on Russia, and also for a long time on Right-bank hetmans. Its centre was destroyed, and its inhabitants had to look for another refuge. During the second and third partitions of Poland in the years 1793 and 1795, Right-bank Ukraine was finally annexed by Russia. Thus most of the Ukrainian lands were annexed by the Russian state, except Galicia, Bukovyna and Carpathian Ukraine which passed from Poland to Austria (1772).

The Russian bureaucratic-police system brought Ukraine to ruin in a short time, especially by the enforcement of serfdom in its extreme, Russian form. It affected primarily the impoverished and oppressed masses of Ukrainian peasants who were not able any more to maintain either their village schools, their hospitals for the poor, their homes for the aged and orphans, all of which they still maintained with pride in the 18th century.

But the invincible aspiration for independence played its part. The outside pressure only halted the development of Ukraine, it did not destroy it. By the end of the 18th century there were already indications of Ukrainian national revival, first in the cultural-national sphere (literature in the national language), and later on in the political sphere.

In 1798, the Poltava writer, Ivan Kotlyarevsky, wrote his famous *Eneyida* in the Ukrainian national language. By the end of the 18th century and in the beginning of the 19th century there were already indications of a new attitude, a turning towards what was Ukrainian, ancient, national. Research commenced into the past of Ukraine, folk-songs were collected, attention was paid to national customs. Poltava and Kharkiv were the main centres of that movement (the first Ukrainian university was established in Kharkiv in 1805), and, since the thirties, Kyiv.

Under the influence of West-European ideas brought by the great French Revolution, and later by the romantic movement, freemason's

³) The part of the Eastern Ukrainian steppe in which are the towns of Charkiv, Sumy, Akhtyrka, Izyum and others. This area was developed during the 16th and 17th centuries.

lodges were organised in Ukraine, and in 1823 there was organised the "Society of United Slavs" with its Slavophilism, liberal ideas and a programme aimed at the abolition of serfdom, the implementation of public instruction and so on. According to some sources, there was even a secret Ukrainian organisation which had for an object the independence of Ukraine.

Galicia was awakened by the poet Markiyan Shashkevych who, along with his friends, wrote the well-known *Dnistrova Rusalka* (*Dnister Water-Nymph*) in 1818. The SS. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood was of peculiar importance; it was founded in the forties by the most outstanding Ukrainians of that time: Kostomarov, Kulish, Hulak-Artemovsky, V. Bilozersky and others. The greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, also belonged to the SS. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, and his *Kobzar*, published for the first time in the year 1840, roused Ukrainian hearts from indifference. Pious romanticists, members of the Brotherhood, set before themselves the Ukraine which was to arise as an independent republic in a free alliance with Slavic nation-republics, and to lead them, as was clearly expressed in *Knyha Bytiya* (*Genesis*) by Kostomarov. In addition, their liberal programme contained the ideas propagated by the "Society of United Slavs". That first Ukrainian national action (the organisation of the so-called Decembrists in the year 1825 had only partly been a Ukrainian action) was detected and liquidated by the tzarist government in the year 1847. But in the sixties, when Russia was already compelled to reform its social system and, first of all, to abolish serfdom (1861), the Ukrainian national movement revived again. The so-called 'hromady' (communities) appeared throughout Ukraine; the central, or rather the leading 'hromada' was in Kyiv. In Petersburg former members of the Kyrylo-Methodiy Society began to publish a representative journal, *Osnova* (*Basis*). They were joined by other circles headed by Volodymyr Antonovych which had as object to serve the cause of the common people.

In the seventies this populist movement, which had been suppressed for a certain time by the tzarist government, became a purely socialist movement, and the political programme of Ukrainian patriots of the "south-western branch of the Russian Geographic Society" did not exceed, at that time, the limits of the Ukrainian autonomy in federal Russia.

But even the cruel ukase (decree) of 1876—which was to destroy not only the political but also national-cultural work, even moderate

work for the people and public education, and which included a total prohibition of Ukrainian publications—could not stop the Ukrainian national movement. The work was temporarily transferred from greater Ukraine to Galicia, where, even under conditions of constant struggle against Polish influence in Austria, it was easier to carry on the national work, to establish 'Prosvity' (Societies of enlightenment), to publish newspapers, to cherish science through the "Shevchenko Society of Sciences" which had been headed by the historian Mykhaylo Hrushevsky since the nineties. For (in Galicia) the Ukrainians were represented in the provincial seim (representative assembly) in Lviv and in central parliamentary institutions in Vienna. Political parties had appeared in greater Ukraine and Galicia by the end of that century; their programmes were at one time purely national, at another they were associated with socialist slogans.

World War I delivered another blow to the Ukrainians in the year 1914. The Russian government again intended to destroy the Ukrainian national movement, especially in Galicia which was occupied by Russian troops. But a revolution broke out in the heart of Russia three years later, in 1917. Tsentralna Rada (Central Council) came into power in Ukraine and was supported by hundreds of thousands of patriotic Ukrainians. A Ukrainian national government was also formed in Galicia a year later, after the downfall of Austria. The national spontaneous movement proved to be stronger than the repressions on the part of the government. The Ukrainian national republic as an independent, free and sovereign State of the Ukrainian people was proclaimed in Kyiv by the "Universal" of January 22, 1918. The Ukrainian government proclaimed the union of the Western Ukrainian Republic, comprising Galicia, Bukovyna and Carpathian Ukraine, with the Ukrainian National Republic in St. Sophia Square in Kyiv a year later, on January 22, 1919. A United Ukrainian State, an independent and united Ukraine was to be established; it had already been planned by the founder of the Cossack State, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in the middle of the 17th century. At that moment Ukraine entered upon a new stage of its national struggle; it was fighting for its independence as a state, and not only for its cultural achievements and autonomy, as was the case in the 19th and even in the beginning of the 20th century. That fight did not stop even after the

Ukrainian national governments of Petlyura and Petrushevych had been compelled to leave their native territory. That fight continued in the twenties, at least in the form of defending Soviet Ukraine as a separate, though federated, State of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the Galicians carried on their fight against oppression on the part of the new Polish state to which the Allies had ceded Western Ukraine.

This fight in the East is going on; it has even become a "problem of today" after the actual annulment of the autonomy of Soviet Ukraine. It is being carried on in a different form, while not only the fate of the East and of Europe, but that of the whole world, is being decided upon.

A copy of the *Ostroh Bible*, the most famous memorial of Ukrainian civilisation of the 16th century, was found by Dr. Stepan Bozhyk in the Planton Moratus Museum in Antwerp, Belgium, last year. This is a very rare and precious discovery because until now only four copies of the *Ostroh Bible* were known; they are in the care of the Washington National Library, Metropolitan Ilarion in Canada, the British Biblical Society in London and the University Library at Upsala, Sweden.

EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT**PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE****Wishful thinking and reality**

Fear has big eyes...
(Ukrainian folk-proverb)

From time to time people coin a slogan and think they have solved a problem; such is the vanity of human wishfulness. During this year and no doubt during the next one we shall hear again and again the slogan "peaceful co-existence" which has been coined by the Russian imperialists. How pleasant it sounds to the ear—its peaceful touch is very soothing. And how horrid are its alternatives; "war" and "war-mongering" are the counter-slogans.

Wishful thinking and the complete disregard of reality is a common affliction here in Britain. It is a very dangerous disease in which one looks only at the pleasant rosy things, living in illusion, and mistaking this for actuality. It is a mode of imitating the ostrich, or worse, it resembles a man so hypnotised by the venomous gaze of a boa-constrictor that he can do nothing to avert his own death.

Other slogans of Russian imperialism have been "The unity of the Rus-lands", "Protector of Orthodoxy", "Panslavism", and so on. Those who understand a little of this brand of imperialism will know how much it owes to such slogans. But this latest one surely outbids them all in its universal appeal.

Russia's aim this time is to arouse fear in the hearts of all nations, for fear of Bolshevism paralyses the will and induces a willingness to compromise instead of taking any positive or preventive action against Russian aggression. And in any case Russian imperialism has partially achieved its aims for, thanks to the free world, they are now masters of almost half of Europe and a great part of Asia. They know, too, that they can always gain more territory—in Korea or Indo-China—by unprovoked aggression, and their fifth columns—the Communist Parties—are busy everywhere.

Why then should Russia be using such a slogan as "peaceful co-existence"? Does she want to co-exist? If so, why should her propaganda be made up of several obvious falsehoods? For we all know what really lies behind the phrases "people's democracy", "paradise of workers", and the use of the word "freedom" behind the Iron or Bamboo Curtain. Should Mr. Attlee try to convince us that there is religious freedom, for instance, in China, or the "Red Dean" urge that such freedom exists in Russia, we just do not believe them because we have been in Russia and seen the appalling reality—Katyn, Vinnytsia—while thousands of German, Spanish, and Chinese prisoners of war who returned from Korea and Indo-China from "paradise", have different stories to tell. From behind the Communist screen in distant Russia come Frank Kelly, William Piddington, McKenzie, Father Joseph Shynes, Eric Pleasants, Dick Applegate, to tell us the most terrible, but the real, story of life in those remote regions. They relate to us how, in this dreadful world with which we

are supposed to want to co-exist, political freedom, personal liberty, the dignity of the human being, religion are systematically destroyed. In their madness the Communists would even try to destroy God himself.

And how should we co-exist with such a world? For trade with eastern Europe means helping Moscow's war aims; diplomatic relations merely cover espionage and diversion; travelling behind the Iron Curtains—as the evidence of the Petrovs has shown—is merely a means of recruiting new agents for the Communists, and the visits of Soviet sportsmen to the West are only instruments of propaganda. Surely those who have succeeded in escaping from this "paradise" must be the best guides as to the reality of that world.

If, therefore, there is anyone who can explain how our civilisation, based on national freedom, personal liberty and belief in God, can co-exist with an aggressive criminal conspiracy aiming at the destruction of our civilisation and the subjugation of the entire free world, then he should certainly be given the highest reward by our civilisation. If we accept the notion of peaceful co-existence then it is clear there will not be either peace or existence. "Peaceful co-existence" is merely a Communist myth which can be realised only by the complete capitulation of our way of life and by accepting slavery under Russian rule.

Let us look back at the greater Russian myth—that of invincible "Holy Mother Russia", "The Third Rome". This myth has been built up during the centuries, the myth of Russian strength, paralysing and blinding even today the British and American politicians.

The Russian aim was to create a myth of a great, invincible Russian Giant-Monster to whom the free world, in order to appease him and to save their lives, must bring streams of victims.

Europe and the U.S.A. have swallowed so easily this Russian propaganda-myth that they try to prolong their own lives by giving the Great Giant once-free countries piece by piece. It has even escaped the notice of the appeasers that only less than a half of the population are Russians and the rest are non-Russian peoples—45 million Ukrainians, 15 million Byelorussians, and millions of Georgians, Cossacks, and Asiatic peoples who are not Russians, and who long, and many of them fight too, for their independence. But to those under the magic spell of Pan-Russian imperialism such facts are without significance.

And what are the Russians doing in the meantime? At least they recognise the Achilles heel, the "dungeon of nations subjugated by Russia", and from time to time they try very hard to come to terms with these peoples. We know how much trouble Russia has with Ukrainians: the festivities last year to mark the 300th Anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty were simply a means to appease the Ukrainians and to keep Ukraine within the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian Resistance Movement, with its famous Ukrainian Insurgent Army—the U.P.A.—was at one time so strong that the Russians had to conclude a tripartite pact with Poland and Czechoslovakia which aimed merely at the total destruction of the U.P.A. And in spite of the fact that the Soviet forces have had heavy armaments while the Ukrainians have not, yet the Ukrainians remain unconquered.

That is one fight against Bolshevism that is still going on, and what is the free world doing to help those who are fighting for liberty? The western nations blind themselves: they think that in the next world war the non-Russian peoples—Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Cossacks and the rest, will fight for them, for yet another enslavement by another Russian government! And those who think that they will be able to join Russians in order to throw over Communism—and many American circles think thus—are either foolish or exceptionally naive. Where is the Russian who will stretch out his hands to overthrow the greatest pride of every Russian, his own mighty empire?

Russian propaganda urges the non-Russian people within its boundaries that Anglo-Americans are their enemies; and it cannot be denied that there is little evidence to the contrary. A world-wide conspiracy of silence is thrown over the appalling state of affairs in Ukraine, because politicians persist in accepting the Russian myths. The Russian propagandists must surely congratulate them for assisting so kindly with their own task!

Co-existence in weakness means simply absorption: many countries co-existed peacefully with Russia—for instance Czechoslovakia—until the moment arrived, and then the small prefix "co-" was transformed into "sub-". Such is the law of the jungle and of the Kremlin. And against this law the West should form a psychological front with all the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. Not fear but strength should be shown towards Russia—and the powerful potential fifth-columns of the non-Russian nations could provide the West with just such strength.

For we Ukrainians there is nothing to lose but our chains; but the Western World, if it chooses the wrong policy as Nazi Germany did, then that world has everything to lose. Not only freedom is at stake, but the very survival of the nations as nations.

To those in the West who still retain illusions about the aims of Stalin's successor, I should like to quote the words of Malenkov on the occasion of the 32nd Anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, 7 November 1949: "The first World War entailed the Bolshevik October Revolution, the second brought Soviet rule over middle Europe and China, a third will be the grave of the entire anti-communist world".

The televised play "Nineteen Eighty Four" has awakened many people from their wishful-thinking illusions and dreams. They are beginning, some of them, to realise that horrors are not merely dramatic scenes imagined by some writer. "The enslavement of the individual, the brain washing and indoctrination, the false trials and drugged confessions, the remorseless espionage, the callous liquidations, all these are things that have happened and are happening in Communist countries with whom some clever politicians are so anxious to live in 'peaceful co-existence'." It would be better if these people ceased at once to fool themselves and others...

If only the free world, instead of standing by and watching those gallant Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians and all the other nations represented in the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, bleed to death, would stand by their side, and send real help, then at last truth would prevail and there would be some chance of the survival of a world in which freedom was once more a possibility.

But let us ask those who are so willing to divide up free countries, and draw new demarkation lines one question: would they advocate this kind of solution for England? Would they allow a demarkation line in their own country, leaving Cambridge behind an Iron Curtain and Oxford in the free zone?

And, to be practical, what is Russia without Ukraine? She would be a sham, a void shell, a giant with a broken back, who would quickly starve to death. And since this giant is no more than the malicious Giant of Arab mythology—bound to torment and enslave the whole world, nothing evil could befall humanity by his destruction. On the contrary, to destroy the giant of imperialism would be a deed of sense and of justice.

Those who read Russian we would urge to read the editorial article in *Pravda* on December 19 1954. That article will certainly convince them that since December the theory of co-existence is quite dead in Soviet Russia. For the Russians have openly returned to their old crazy ideas of world domination—the ancient myth of unchecked Russian imperialism.

Ilarion Holubovych

RUSSIAN SOUL

The so-called civilised world apparently loses its historical memory. Consequently, it finds it difficult to understand many Russian problems, and among these the strange phenomenon of Russian repentance. Leading off with the "show-trials" of the old Bolshevik guard, and including Beria's repentance, this remains unexplained to the West. True, Western people have already realised that the Russian system of physical, moral and "scientific-medical" torture, including "brain-washing", achieves remarkable success. But is this repentance caused by that devilish system alone?

The mysterious curtain concealing that unexplained phenomenon from the world has been raised by the recent history of Russia, the history of Marxism. However hard one may try to criticise it, it is a matter of fact that the tzarist tormentors of the last century (before the Bolsheviks) were simply "spineless intellectuals" in comparison with the tormentors of the time of Lenin-Stalin-Beria-Malenkov. Following the line determined by the tzars, the Bolsheviks have made considerable progress in this respect. Although the methods of the tzarist masters of the torture-chamber were not as perfect as those of Yezhov, "people's enemies" repented even in their time. One of the outstanding writers of the history of the last reign writes thus about it: "reading the penitential letters of the Decembrists up to Nikolas I, one finds them hard to believe: were they really written by rebels who had been on the point of killing the tzar the previous day. They must have lost their revolutionary spirit immediately after their arrest". Beztuzhev writes: "God's finger and tzar's wrath weigh on me. I feel that I have dissipated my talent for an evil cause, that I could have served my native country and died for my tzar... But the tzar is a "token" of Deity on the earth, and God absolves

those who repent." A bullet pierced his cap in the Senate square; he escaped, strolled about the streets of the capital for the whole night and, finally, "decided to kneel to the tzar". He went to the winter palace and denounced himself and his secret society... Was he compelled by a tzarist Dzerzhinski to do that?

Another Decembrist, Bulatov, as appears in a work by the same author, also made a penitential declaration but "he was so depressed by the fact that the tzar did not believe him that he went mad and smashed his head against the wall of the cell". Another Decembrist, M. Muravyov-Apostol, declared before his death in 1886 that "he has always thanked God for the failure (of the riot) of December 14", that "it had been a non-Russian phenomenon". Having served his sentence (like F. Dostoyevsky) he repented his political aims. Who compelled him to do that? A. Pushkin's conversion was still simpler. He was in sympathy with the Decembrists; he declared that "he would have taken the side of the rebels" if he had been in the capital on the day of the riot. But he underwent a rapid metamorphosis which a poet of that time described thus maliciously:

"He propagated the people's freedom; he summoned God and people for trial... He only tasted the tzarist shchi (cabbage soup) and became a court lick-spittle". He became a boyar of the tzarist autocracy oppressing the subjugated peoples.

The above mentioned author writes these words about his countrymen: "sometimes it seems that there are no revolutions in Russia, only riots: the January, December, Chuhui, Cholera, Pugachev, Razin riots—an everlasting riot of slaves". Further: "we stir, nevertheless; we rebel—we are in an unnatural state, as if we were going head over heels, but, as soon as we begin to cringe, to repent and to give ourselves up to reaction, we become true Russians. We are like vanka-vstanka (a doll with a weight attached which causes it always to recover its standing position): however hard the revolution may try to overthrow us, the reaction sets us upright".

Thus Russia "was set upright" by the tzarist reaction after the revolution of the years 1905-6 when the above mentioned author wrote his work. Thus too it "was set upright" after the revolution of the year 1917, by the Bolshevik reaction. Peter I spoke about the riot of the people-slave: "this rabble can be restrained by brutality only". When the government manifested that "brutality" and cruelly overwhelmed the Pugachev insurgents, the nation-slave licked its tyrants' boots, admired and even loved them, and the Pugachev repented. As soon as this "brutality" faded or died in the hearts of the rulers (Alexander II, Nicholas II), the slaves would despise and kill them, believing that it was a revolution. Then would come a new government; it would take the lash in hand and drive the rebellious poor once more into an iron cage. Lenin and Stalin were just such leaders of victorious slaves; later, they also drove the latter into a cage... It was always so in the history of Russia. Above—those who would beat; below—those who were beaten; the latter would even rejoice: "hurrah, it is time to beat us". The revolutionist of yesterday would immediately turn into one of the day before yesterday, a slave, and repent, as soon as a firm hand seized him by the scruff of the neck.

Here is the source of not only the Bolshevik, but the Russian phenomenon of repentance. The Russians can rebel against a tired force. But their "natural

state" is to be slaves of a *real* force. Wherever they are faced by such a force, they kneel to it; they kneel to their ruler, if he is such a one as Peter I or Stalin, and a foreign ruler, if he is such a one as the Tartar Khan. They kneel and repent. Others who are weak are attacked and worried to death by them.

The West does not understand the mentality of the Russian people, although one can even see it in the face of every ordinary "Russian man": there is something vague, indefinite and undetermined in that face. You never know what he will do after a while: will he kiss your hand, or gnaw through your throat? He does not yet know it himself; he will look closely at you: if you are a sheep, he will fall upon you; if you are a wolf, he will have his tail between his legs. Therefore, every politician who speaks with a Russian about appeasement is in the Russian's eyes a sheep, and he treats him appropriately. It is quite different, if he feels that the politician who stands before him is a wolf or an experienced tamer. He will recoil from the wolf, concealing his anger; he will fight with the wolf, if the wolf attacks him. But one must *really* be a wolf. However, he who only pretends to be a "wolf", he who only whisks his cane and dares not knock the nonsense out of the Russian head will not frighten the Russian who, being sly enough for this, will feel that he has to do with a masquerade. Politicians and diplomats of the Yalta, Teheran, Potsdam, Panmunjon or Geneva brands will not frighten the Russian Vanka much; they will not prevent him from aggression. Neither will it be done by that publicity of whatever is Russian which—to the shame of occidental culture—is now being given by western publishing houses, newspapers, university lecturers and in concert halls. The more the West loses its faith in its mission and cultural superiority, the more Russian arrogance and thirst for expansion grows. And vice versa. Therefore, by the way, the Russian has more respect for Turkey, Spain and even for partitioned Germany than for other nations which only seem to be stronger.

We, in particular, must focus our attention on that Russian mentality. We can defeat Russia, first in our hearts, and later "on our own, and yet not our" soil, only by complete fearlessness, our courageous rejection of whatever is Russian and our resolute assertion of our own Truth.

D. Donzov

* * *

The O.U.N. (abroad) issued in January 1955 a Declaration concerning the representation of Ukraine in the U.N.O.

Suggestions have recently been made in the West that Ukraine and Byelorussia should be deprived of their seats in the U.N.O. It is argued that the Ukrainian S.S.R. is not a government which represents the Ukrainian people, and that Ukraine is not a sovereign, independent state but is, in effect, completely dominated by Russia.

The O.U.N. contends that the country of Ukraine should be treated on exactly the same basis as the so-called satellite countries which cannot be said to have independent governments at present, and that, while the present Ukrainian Soviet delegates should be barred from the U.N.O. their places should be taken by true representatives of Ukraine. Ukraine is a distinct nation and can in no way be said to form part of Russia.

BOOK REVIEWS

Volodymyr Sichynsky: *UKRAINE IN FOREIGN COMMENTS AND DESCRIPTIONS FROM THE VIth TO XXth CENTURY*

Published by: The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc. New York City, 1953. 14/-

This book does not claim to deal fully with the vast material available but rather constitutes a description of the outstanding features for general use. Nevertheless, as Professor Clarence A. Manning correctly points out in his brief but weighty Foreword, the book meets a real demand in the West: "The American people and the entire Western democratic world are slowly but surely becoming aware of the significance of the Ukrainian problem for the future of Eastern Europe and for the entire civilised world. The growing menace of Russian Communist imperialism is opening the eyes of the world to the real situation as it exists within that prison of nations which was once called the Russian Empire and which now embraces even more territory as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics devoted to the glorification and aggrandisement of the "elder brothers", the Great Russians. . . . We therefore owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Sichynsky who has culled from the pages of the past the opinion of travellers acquainted with the details of Ukrainian life for over a thousand years. One and all from the earliest times, these men have noted the difference between Ukraine and Muscovy. They have contrasted the two modes of life, the two national psychologies, and if their remarks prove anything, it is the permanence and the vitality of Ukrainian democracy and culture."

This present book is an enlarged English revision of the author's book in Ukrainian *Chuzhyntsi pro Ukraïnu*, which has run through five editions, and which contains much that was addressed to the interests and habits of the Ukrainian rather than the English reader. It is true that the author has endeavoured to make the quotations speak for themselves, and to give his work the character of a "collection of memoirs, descriptions and comments on Ukraine by foreign travellers and observers, both official and private," as he says in his Preface. On the other hand, however, the selection and arrangement of the matter impresses us as somewhat partial, and this may strike the English reader, accustomed as he is to objective descriptions, unpleasantly. To give one example out of several: Professor Sichynsky deliberately contrasts characteristic Ukrainian and Russian features whenever possible occurring in the same source in order to emphasise more drastically the undeniable difference between those two peoples. But this is sometimes dangerous: it is plain that the extensive quotations from J. G. Korb's *Diarium itineris in Moscoviam Perillustris* (1700-1) have been cited for the sole purpose of showing the hardly flattering descriptions of Muscovite customs and peculiar-

ities, since Korb's description of Ukraine—he had never been there—is insignificant. The same applies to the quotation of Harris Malmesbury's letter of 2 February, 1778, on Petersburg. The author apparently fails to appreciate that going beyond the proper topic in this way may raise suspicion in the mind of the English reader and may cause him to doubt the integrity of the whole work—which would be unjust.

Some negligence in quoting authorities will surprise the Western reader. The source of the quotation from Gamberini's *An Italian traveller who in 1584 visited Ukraine* can be learned neither from the passage on pages 52-3 nor from the appended bibliography. The letter of Voltaire to the Duc de Choiseul, quoted on page 136, "was found by Elias Borshak, Ukrainian historian, in the *Bibliothèque Chantilly* in Paris", and this is no doubt a matter of great interest to the Ukrainian: the Western reader, however, will be more interested in the question as to where the letter can be found in extenso, as it must be missing from collections of Voltaire's letters. But of this nothing is said.

The inclusion in the Preface of the author's views on the Roxolani and Antae, on the so-called Norman-theory, on "the Slavic tribe of Ucrans on the Baltic Sea", and so on, is rather superfluous. Such discussions of the prehistory and early history of Ukraine might be better avoided in popular compilations of this kind. It is also to be regretted that the two introductory parts of the book, the Foreword and the Preface, each give a concise sketch of the history of Ukraine so that the reader finds himself confronted twice with similar matter from more or less the same point of view.

Since Professor Sichynsky is above all an expert on the history of arts, it is not surprising that the arrangement of the book and particularly the selection and reproduction of the numerous illustrations deserve unrestricted praise. But there are some inaccuracies of a historic or philologic nature, mainly in the first chapters. It is not correct to speak of a prehistoric "mixture of Mongolo-Finnic tribes" on what were later Muscovite territories, since Ugro-Finns are not Mongols at all, and the presumably Mongoloid Turks did not start colonising the middle and upper Volga districts before the 14th century. Such confusion is derived from the Polish eccentricities of the last century, when they described everything Ugro-Finnic or Turkish as "Mongol". It is also gross exaggeration to maintain that "Muscovy... accepted only the superficial aspects of the Slavic language and culture from the Kievan centre", since the original (prehistoric) Slavonisation of the Muscovite territories doubtless had its origin not in Ukraine but in the present Byelorussia (White Ruthenia). This is unequivocally proved by the phonetics of the south-Russian dialects, that is, those of Muscovy proper. Moreover it is misleading to say that "the Muscovite princes already had begun the use of the title 'Tzar' in the era of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" (page 102). The semi-official use of that title comes from Ivan III and the official use from Ivan IV, that is about 100-150 years later.

Finally it should be noted the inscription "Fl. Don Ruthenice", quoted on page 46, does not mean "the Don in Ruthenia" but "in Ruthenian", that is, in the Ruthenian language.

Despite these minor shortcomings, however, the work is of considerable interest and value. I hope the English speaking reader will be indulgent even

though he demands a high degree of historical accuracy. The points raised above can be adjusted in a second edition. Undoubtedly, the book deserves a wide circulation. There is particular appeal for the Western reader in the testimonies of Western travellers and diplomats which emphasise the origins and distinctive characteristics of the Ukrainian national civilisation in the course of one thousand years, their independence of Muscovite Russia and their indispensable right to develop freely within an independent and indivisible Ukrainian national State. The book contains many a concrete statement which urges comparison of the Muscovite-Russian policies of the Tzars and those of Soviet-Russian communism today, such as the zeal of the Tzars in repressing any publication and distribution of facts which might be disadvantageous for the Russian empire, for instance J. G. Korb's above-mentioned *Diarium* ("the Muscovite government dispatched special agents to Vienna who bought up all the books and burnt them") or the 1848 Russian translation of Fletcher ("despite the fact that the book passed the official censorship, its sale and circulation were prohibited by the imperial Minister of Education two hours after its publication; even those copies which had been sent to members of the Scientific Society were confiscated"). The continuous tradition of an Iron Curtain, of a methodical cultural repression on the part of the long established and everlasting Russian imperialism can be proved by those historical facts with particular clarity.

V. D.

Massino Salvadori. *THE RISE OF MODERN COMMUNISM*

Published by Henry Holt and Company, New York. Introduction by Norman Thomas—January 1, 1952, pp. 118.

Mr. Salvadori tries to give us a very brief survey of the Communist movement in the twentieth century. We find here the history of the Communist movement from its very origins to the end of the first phase of the Comintern, then from 1923 to the end of World War II, and finally the rise of Russian, and of international, Communism since 1945.

Many books, both good and poor, have been published in English dealing with communism. The phenomenon of communism is too new and difficult for many writers to be able to evaluate the events in Eastern Europe and all over the world objectively and without errors. The present author presents us with a keen analysis of the nature of communism and comes to the conclusion that among the factors which have contributed to the rise and success of communism are:

- 1) the economic suffering of large sections of mankind;
- 2) the impression made by this suffering on Marxist intellectuals who form the solid core of the communist movement;
- 3) the chaotic conditions in which many areas of Europe and Asia found themselves after the two World Wars, which enabled small minorities of well-organised and determined communists to seize political power;
- 4) the use of brute force by communists and their disregard for every principle of ethics;

5) an uncompromising attitude which brooks no opposition nor deviation and gives to communism a cohesion and homogeneity unknown to other movements;

6) the promise of the Millenium, coupled with a deep belief in the inevitability of socialism;

7) the ability of present communist leaders to adjust their action to ever-changing conditions; finally

8) the tremendous power and prestige of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine and the Ukrainian problem, their importance for the rise or fall of Russian communism, the recent—and present—struggle of the Ukrainian people and army against the Red Russian invaders in Ukraine are not mentioned in this little book. Only short remarks on pages 23, 57, and 66 are devoted to the Ukrainian people and their struggle against the Red Russian Army in World War II.

Mr. Salvadori has not devoted enough space to the problem of nationalities in the Soviet Union and to their struggle for liberation from foreign oppression. And yet this problem is one of the most important for the development of further events in the Soviet Union: the problem of nationalities is indeed the Achilles heel for Moscow. It is regrettable that many—but not all—politicians and statesmen of Western Europe and America have not perceived this truth, because Communism can be weakened and annihilated only by using the internal struggling forces of the various nations in the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless we should be thankful to the author for his brief and concise publication on the rise of modern communism. He has been close enough to communism to learn about it at first hand: he was long active in Europe and fought as a paratrooper with the British Army in World War II. He has written the book for those who do not know the true nature of Russian Communism and its potential danger in the years ahead. Despite many errors in the appreciation of Communist development and its rise in recent years we recommend careful reading of the book by all those who wish to study Communism.

W. O.

Richard Pipes. *THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION*
Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923

Published by: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1954. pp. 355.

The book presents us with the history of the disintegration of the vast Russian Empire, and the creation on its ruins of a multi-national Communist Empire, known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the book we read how the Russian Communists succeeded in exploiting the nationalism of the peoples of Ukraine, Byelorussia, of the Caucasian and other peoples in Central Asia and the regions of Volga and Ural, for the purpose of seizing power and subjugating other peoples on the borderlands. The main emphasis of the books is on the national movements in these borderlands, and on their

mutual relations with Communist expansion. The author wishes to give the reader an analysis of the role which the national problems played in the last Russian revolution, and the book does not deal with those national groups which separated themselves during the Russian Revolution: the Poles, the Baltic peoples and the Finns.

We find the following chapters in the book:

1) The national problem in Russia; the Russian Empire on the eve of the 1917 Revolution; national movements in Russia; the Ukrainians and Byelorussians: the Turkic peoples; the peoples of the Caucasus.

2) 1917 and the disintegration of the Russian Empire; the general causes of this; Ukraine and Byelorussia; the rise of the Ukrainian Central Rada, February-June 1917; from July to the October Revolution, in Ukraine; Byelorussia in 1917; the Moslem borderlands, the Caucasus.

3) The Soviet conquest of Ukraine and Byelorussia; the fall of the Ukrainian Central Rada; the Communist Party of Ukraine, its formation and activities in 1918; the struggle of the Communists for power in Ukraine in 1919; Byelorussia from 1918-1920.

4) The Soviet conquest of the Moslem borderlands; the Bashkir and Tartar Republics, the Kirghiz Republic, Turkestan, the Crimea.

5) Soviet conquest of the Caucasus; the Transcaucasian Federation; Soviet rule in the North Caucasus and Eastern Transcaucasia in 1918; the Terek region, Baku; the independent republics, 1918-19; Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia.

6) The establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Conclusion.

The author expresses his gratitude to Professor Michael Karpovich who "originally suggested the subject of this study and who has made further suggestions in the course of its writing", to the Russian Research Centre of Harvard University, and to other outstanding persons and institutions. It is very regrettable that we do not find the name of any Ukrainian specialist, either in history or in law, who could have assisted the author to verify the information that is presented, for example on Ukraine and the Ukrainian Revolution in the years mentioned above. For, despite the rich material on Ukraine that is included in the book, there are many errors, maybe distortions, with regard to historical events in Ukraine during those years. We find, for instance, the following statement on page nine: "During the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century, it was still an open question whether the cultural and economic peculiarities of the Ukrainian people would lead to the formation of a separate nation". We should like to recommend Mr. Pipes to read and study the books published in connection with the 300th Anniversary of the Ukrainian-Muscovite treaty of Pereyaslav signed in 1654. The author would perceive from these books, which are published in English, that there existed a Ukrainian nation and state long before the Russian Revolution, and that Ukrainians and Ukrainian armies fought long before 1917 to maintain the independence of Ukraine.

We read on page ten that "for the next thirty years (he is referring to the 19th century) the centre" of the Ukrainian cultural movement "shifted

to Galicia, where it enjoyed greater freedom owing to Vienna's interest in utilising Ukrainian (Ruthenian) patriotism as a counterbalance to Polish nationalism in this province". We wish to state here that Vienna was interested also in utilising Polish nationalism against Ukrainian cultural aspirations. It is generally known in Western Europe and, we hope, in America, that four million Ukrainians in Galicia could not have a Ukrainian university in Lviv (Lemberg), the capital of Galicia, because of Polish resistance to Ukrainian cultural interests, and because of the refusal of Vienna itself to create such a university.

It was not "the superiority of the Ukrainian soil" that assumed a Ukrainian national form independently of Russia, as stated on page fifty-one. One must not restrict the Ukrainian national movement to economic questions. Ukraine has its own history, culture and a glorious past.

The Ukrainian Haydamaky were not "a form of banditry, combining violent anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism with sheer brigandage". The Haydamaky were Ukrainian patriots originating mostly from the lower classes of the Ukrainian population who wished to free the common Ukrainian people from the long Polish oppression.

We do not agree with the statements of the author concerning the "minorities" in the Soviet Union. These "minorities" are peoples with their own culture and a splendid past. The "minorities" constitute more than a half of the population of the entire Soviet Union.

There are other errors connected with Ukrainian independence relating to the years 1918-21 which space does not permit us to mention here.

It should be noted that the book contains many interesting maps and other illustrations.

UKRAINIAN PERIODICALS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES

The Ukrainian Quarterly In English. Published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

Ucrania Libre Quarterly, in Spanish. Published by Instituto informativo editorial ucranio. Buenos Aires

The Ukrainian Bulletin Fortnightly, in English. Published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

Ukrainian Commentary Monthly, in English. Published by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee

L'Ukraine Libre Monthly, in French. Published by Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes "Hromada"

Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart Quarterly, in German. Published by the Deutsch-ukrainische Gesellschaft

UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD

NEWS

On 19 December 1954 the Very Rev. James Christie, S.J. addressed Ukrainians at a celebration in Edinburgh of the tenth Anniversary of the death of the Metropolitan Andreas Sheptytsky.

Father Christie began by referring to the celebration as also marking the Feast of St. Nicolas and the close of the Marian Year. Ukrainians were renowned for the tender love they bore towards the Holy Mother of God, he said, and for centuries she had been invoked as the Queen of Ukraine.

"We, your fellow Catholics, because of our union with you in the Mystical Body of Christ," continued Father Christie, "share with you in your trials. But since we have no direct experience of the cruel persecution that has brought them upon you, much as we may try we can do little more than guess at their magnitude. But Our Lady is fully aware of how they afflict you. You know that. It is the reason why you turn to her with such complete confidence. It explains why despite the wrongs you have endured and are enduring, you come to her today with patient trust to thank her—to thank her even for adversity. For you know that it is in adversity that our faith in God is most surely tested and provoked."

Speaking of the Metropolitan, Father Christie referred to "his unflinching courage in the face of fierce attacks by the enemies of God upon the Church, and by the enemies of your native country on its freedom..." "Indeed", he went on, "so holy a man was he—he who was the close friend of St. Pius Xth—so noble a patriot, that historians are agreed that his very presence in Ukraine was enough to check the worst excesses of the enemies of the Church. His death, or, as some would say, his martyrdom, was as the removal of the last rampart of defence. Certain it is, at any rate, that the present bitter persecution of the Church in Ukraine dates from the day of his death."

"Now you are asked", declared Father Christie, "to serve God in exile, in adversity, and for that reason your last works, your present service, are the more meritorious. The Holy Father himself has said that the intrepid constancy with which the persecuted and exiled Ukrainian Catholics have remained faithful to the Church has won his admiration. Although any other testimony is of incomparably less value, nonetheless it is a joy to be able to add our testimony to the words of the Holy Father. Your reputation here in Scotland redounds to the glory of the Church and brings credit to your country. God-fearing and pious; industrious and law abiding; patient and without rancour; such is the way men speak of you."

"The injustices you suffer will be righted. You know that, and you are content to await God's good time in patience and in charity. But you are not patient because you are powerless. You know that, too, we tend to think of power in terms of guns and bombs. It is human minds that shape history. The real struggle in the world today is at a level deeper than the territories

on which armies are mustered. It is a conflict in the minds of men. That is why we know that the current jargon about "peaceful co-existence" is an empty slogan. Slogans may spare us the trouble of thinking but they cannot spare us from reality. Slogans do not alter facts. No slogans can alter the fact that good and evil are opposed and are dynamic. They cannot exist peacefully together. To cease to resist what is evil is to succumb to evil—to sub-exist with it.

* * *

In February the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Youth Association, uniting patriotic young Ukrainians in many countries of the West, issued an appeal to the youth of the free world to organise a protest against deportations of thousands of young Ukrainians from Ukraine to the so-called new agricultural areas now being developed in Siberia and Kazakhstan.

* * *

The year 1955 is the tenth in the life of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd., which began its activities in January 1946. The tenth Annual General Meeting is being held on March 25th and 26th, and delegates of over 120 branches and groups will attend on behalf of more than 18,000 members.

A concert is being held in the Assembly Rooms at Hammersmith on March 27th to mark the occasion. The Dancing Group "Lehit" from Reading, and "Homin", the Male Voice Choir from Manchester, are taking part in the concert.

* * *

Under the Presidency of Mgr. Ivan Buchko, Mgr. H. van Waevenberg and Prof. I. Mirchuk, the Free University of Munich held a week of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Louvain from 7-12 February this year.

The subjects of lectures and discussions included the legal and diplomatic status of Ukraine; her importance in Europe; the value of the national idea; economic assets and standards of living in Ukraine; the position of Christianity in Eastern Europe, and also the origins of Marxist atheism.

* * *

The Union of Ukrainian Merchants, Manufacturers and Owners of Commercial Enterprises in Argentina is going to organise the first Ukrainian Joint-Stock Company in Argentina, which aims to improve the economic conditions of the Ukrainians in that country. With this end in view, they have already created a Foundation Group, elected a provisional Board of Directors (Volodymyr Savych, Ivan Hryhorashchuk, Dmytro Demchuk, Dr. Volodymyr Palashevsky, Dr. Vasyl Ivanytsky, Teodor Khomyshyn and Mykola Denysyuk), and subscribed the first minimum shares amounting to 261,000 pesos.

* * *

The Ukrainian National University started its work in Chicago in the beginning of October. U.N.U. has made it its aim to impart basic knowledge of Ukrainian studies to young people and the community. The syllabus of

instruction includes: language and literature, history, geography, economic and social science, art and philosophy.

The work of the Ukrainian National University was inaugurated by a lecture by Prof. Yu. Kamenetsky on the subject: *Problems of the nation and state*.

The Ukrainian National University in Chicago has been established by the initiative of the following youth organisations: Athletic Club, Art Club, "The Lions", O.D.U.M., the Organisation of Boy Scouts, the Students' Community and S.U.M.

* * *

An important scientific discovery has been made by the Ukrainian scientist Mykola Ostapyak, who arrived in U.S.A. a few years ago and is working at one of the laboratories in Philadelphia. Mr. Ostapyak has ascertained that the serious illness meningitis is caused by a microbe called "virus c".

* * *

Two scientific occasions in which about 30 Italians and above ten Ukrainians participated took place in Rome on October 25 and 26, 1954. This was a session of the Mediterranean Academy and the Ukrainian-Italian Society. The following Ukrainians, professors of the Ukrainian Free University Rector Dr. I. Mirchuk, Dr. V. Oreletsky, Dr. Yu. Studynsky, and the honorary guests Archbishop Ivan Buchko, the rector of the Ukrainian Papal College, the Rev. V. Martynets, the pro-rector, the Rev. Dr. M. Voynar, the adviser, the Rev. I. Nazarko, the Rev. Dr. A. Velyky, Dr. Yu. Melyanyk, Mrs. O. Konovalets and others, and the following Italians took part: Prof. Bassan, Prof. Petite, Prof. Loiden, Dr. Insabato, Dr. Bendioli, Prof. Roccabella, Gen. Box, the deputy Prince Aliata, Ambassador Gianini. There were also representatives of other nationalities there.

At the session Prof. Dr. I. Mirchuk delivered a lecture on "Ukraine as a mediator between the West and the East", Prof. Dr. Yu. Studynsky on "The situation of Ukraine in international law". At the session of the Academy held on October 26 Eng. D. Andriyevsky read a lecture on the political problem of the Black Sea, and Prof. Dr. Yu. Studynsky on "The economic potential of the Black Sea countries".

At a special reception in the "Chess Club" the president of the Mediterranean Academy presented diplomas to Prof. Dr. I. Mirchuk and Prof. Dr. Yu. Studynsky, nominating them members of the Academy.

The Italian press published full reports of the lectures delivered by the Ukrainian scientists.

* * *

A Ukrainian National Museum and a Library have been established in U.S.A. The Museum will be in Los Angeles and in New York. Thanks to the patron of the former Museum in Prague, Kalenyk Lysyuk, suitable premises for the Museum have already been obtained in Los Angeles.

The Museum is to be directed by the Scientific and Economic Councils which, by the way, are to be made up of representatives of U.V.A.N., N.T.Sh., charitable institutions, and founders. The property of the Museum amounts to 50 thousand dollars (precious oil paintings and antique books).

THEIR RETURN ON THE 21st

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN**THE DEPORTEES IN THE VIRGIN LAND**

"We are waiting for you"—write the Ukrainian deportees at Russia's behest from the virgin lands to Ukraine. "We have grown very fond of the new boundless steppes, our new settlements. Come to us... although it is hard to live here..."

Although in their letters to Ukraine the deportees do not explain the words "although it is hard to live here", one can easily find an answer to that in the Soviet press. "The problem of dwelling, life and cultural needs is the most important problem in the virgin lands; it must be solved as soon as possible", writes *Komsomolskaia Pravda* (*Komsomol Newspaper*) in its article "The urgent needs of the resettled persons".

HUT-HOVELS MADE OF CANE

The housing conditions in the virgin lands are so bad that in spite of the fair words of the Russian government promising lodgings to the deportees, the deportees are compelled to build hut-hovels of cane, osier and grass for themselves. The deportation, however, is being carried out on such a large scale that all the public collective-farm living quarters and buildings of the Motor Tractor Stations (M.T.S.) in the Pavlodar and North-Kazakh regions of Kazakhstan have been changed into hostels, which are already overcrowded.

Party inspectors compel the deportees to build, without assistance, not only lodgings for themselves, but also official premises for collective farms, state farms and M.T.S. But what to build them of? In order to buy ordinary nails, the deportees must travel from the Pavlodar region as far as the Novosibirsk (nearly 400 miles—Ed.). In the shops of "selpo"—village consumers' co-operative society—cooking-ranges, stove-doors, firescreens, stove-pipes are out of stock. It is no use dreaming of beds, tables, chairs, kitchen utensils, bedsheets, blinds, blankets and so on.

IN A FROSTY WINTER—WITHOUT CLOTHES AND SHOES

The winter in Kazakhstan is sometimes very severe; there are sometimes even 35 degrees of frost there. Thus the winter demands good and warm clothes and shoes. However, in the Pavlodar region one cannot obtain ordinary felt boots, leather boots or good shoes. "Where can our shoes and clothes be mended?" ask the deportees working at the Mykhailiv M.T.S. There are no local workshops; one has to travel 100 kilometres to the district centre in order to have one's shoes or clothes mended.

The barber comes to the M.T.S. only once a month when the deportees must wait for him. Butter, sugar, tinned food, peeled grains are only from time to time on sale in the shops of "selpo".

THERE IS EVEN NO WATER THERE

A review of the letters sent by the deportees from the virgin land to the Editorial Office of *Literaturna Hazeta* (*Literary Newspaper*) was published on the first page of that newspaper on October 5, 1954. By the way, the following incident was quoted in the letters:

A tractor hauled a large tank of water from the lake. Women and youths with buckets in their hands surrounded it immediately. Everyone tried to get as much water as possible. Each of them were given only one bucket of water for the whole day. There is not enough water there, and the demand for it increases...

"THIS IS JUST OUR TABLE"

The deportees in the newly organised Bulayev district, North-Kazakh region, gradually move from tents to their own lodgings built by themselves. Everyone tries to furnish his lodging as well as possible, but it is not easy to create convenience and comfort. "How to furnish, if there are no materials", writes a certain Maria Prokopenko in her letter to the Editorial Office. In the "selpo" (village shop) of Bulayevo—which is one hundred kilometres away—only ordinary chairs are on sale. Our own suit-cases and cigarette containers serve us for a table. We place them on two blocks, cover them with a newspaper—and this is our table".

IN A QUEUE TO THE KITCHEN

The deportees write that they do not plaster the walls of their lodgings because there are no materials; it is impossible to get double window frames; the doors are without latches; the windows—without window-panes. It is already October, and there are no ovens in the huts. There is neither firewood nor coal, and it is impossible to buy them. One cannot heat the ovens with straw because they are not adapted to this. It is even impossible to get droppings for heating because they are used as manure. "What to heat with?" complain the deportees. The hostels for youth are not prepared for winter. The eating-houses, kitchens and other premises have not been built. Young people with canteens in their hands stand in a queue to the kitchen. There is not enough bread either in "selpo" or the eating-houses...

AND RUSSIA REJOICES...

However, such a low standard of living does not bother the Russian red boyars and dignitaries; they even call it a "matter of valour and heroism". Certainly, the Soviet press admits that the life of the deportees is hard. But, simultaneously, being enthusiastic about that, it says that it must be an incomparable joy to do patriotic deeds without sleeping and eating enough, without having proper rest. Was it not heroism—shouts the newspaper with enthusiasm—when the deportees faithfully worked in the field, and the brigades were not supplied either with bread or other food or water during the dog-days (thus they were hungry and thirsty—Z. A.)? They had been called upon by the party to do those deeds; for the sake of those deeds they have left their homes, families, friends, wives and children...

THE DEPORTATION CONTINUES

Recently the "elder brother" applied new tricks aimed at impelling the Ukrainian population to migration. The deportees must write letter-invitations to their relatives, acquaintances and other persons in Ukraine. The other day radio Kyiv reported that new deportees from the Mykolayiv, Chernyiv, Kherson and other regions of Ukraine were being transported to the virgin land. In the beginning of 1955 60 thousand families-deportees from Ukraine and Byelorussia—will be transported to the collective farms of the northern regions of Kazakhstan.

The extermination of the Ukrainian population, the devastation of the entire Ukraine by the deportation of its population to other regions of the U.S.S.R., continues. The world remains indifferent to the Russian genocide. A new tragedy, a ruthless destruction of the freedom-loving Ukrainian nation of many millions is taking place before the eyes of the democratic West. But in spite of all the horrors and difficulties, the Ukrainian nation firmly believes that it will find some way out of them, and that the truth will have the upper hand in spite of all. This will be guaranteed by Ukraine's incessant fight against the Russian invader.

Z. Alta

(*Shlyakh Peremohy* "The Way to Victory" No. 44 of Dec. 26, 1954). Of the 34423 pairs of shoes received from the Odessa shoe factory—1146 pairs have been graded as second-rate merchandise by the commercial organisations, or returned to the factory as spoilage. This is a good illustration of the quality of Soviet production.

* * *

Besides the known campaign regarding the deportation of Ukrainians to the virgin lands and the mobilisation of demobilised soldiers for the Donbas mines, another Kremlin campaign is being carried on in Charkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and other Ukrainian towns: transfer of clerks—book-keepers, typists, secretaries, accountants, draftsmen and so on—to workshops and brigades for physical work. According to the Soviet press, great enthusiasm and delight are being displayed in this case, too. Thus, in the Charkiv factories the clerks are "voluntarily" declaring their readiness to replace their pens and abaci by shovels, hammers, picks. In the Soviet "paradise" people are forced to do everything and everywhere, without being asked whether they want it or not. The transfer of clerks to workshops and brigades for physical work indicates the serious crisis which is being experienced by Soviet industry because of the lack of hands.

* * *

Under the heading "Letters to the readers", *Radyanska Ukraina* "The Soviet Ukraine" No. 274 of November 21, 1954 has published the following characteristic letter by a teacher from the Zboriv district, Ternopil region, J. Makukh:

The trade network of the Zboriv district, Ternopil region, is working very badly. The shops of the district centre and the village Ozeryany lack the simplest and indispensable things, for example, ordinary lamps and lamp-chimneys. One cannot buy those things in our shops. Recently there were lamps No. 8 in the shops, but there were no fitting lamp-chimneys. There are lamp-chimneys for lamps No. 11 in the shops, but there are no lamps of that size. There were lamps in the shops which must be trimmed with a round wick, but there were no such wicks. Even if one succeeds in buying a complete lamp somewhere, one will not get kerosene.

Just try to buy a wardrobe here! I have already tried for half a year to buy that article at Zboriv and Ternopil, and always in vain".

* * *

At Vinnytsia, Ternopil, Drohobych, Sumy and other regions of Ukraine the so-called urban party conferences are being held, at which the state and the problem of the development of industry, particularly the production of consumers' goods, are being discussed. Although there is much ambitious talk at those conferences, there are also speeches which prove the unsatisfactory state of industry. Thus the Vinnytsia "petty industrial artel (artel is Russian for small production unit) and combined establishments for the service of everyday needs do not fulfil the plan regarding assortment, and they often manufacture wares of inferior quality. For example, of the 150 articles manufactured by the Chkalov artel and taken for examination—97 have been rejected as defective. *Pravda Ukrainy* "Truth of Ukraine" of January 5, 1955. The conference at Vinnytsia has also revealed that the care of the cultural and living conditions of the workers is unsatisfactory. At Drohobych, 27 concerns and institutions have overpaid by over one million roubles in wages in 1954. (The Muscovite emissaries have a good time, indeed!) The party conference at Drohobych has called the attention of the town party committee to the necessity of "a radical improvement of the direction of the Marxist-Leninist education of communists". Besides, it has been stated that in the town the fulfilment of the orders of C.K. K.P.S.S. regarding the political education of cadres is unsatisfactory. That is to say that at Drohobych the question of the communisation of the population is acute. There is a similar situation in other regions of Ukraine.

* * *

THE METROPOLITAN Y. SLIPY

A word comes from behind the iron curtain that the Galician Metropolitan, Archbishop Yosyf Slipy, is still living in grievous Vorkuta; he has allegedly been released from slave labour in the mines and is working as watchman at an institution for aged people, the unhappy victims of the Russian-Communist oppression.

Metropolitan Slipy was imprisoned in 1945 and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment, and later on once more to an additional 9 years imprisonment, because he allegedly had sent his pastorals to the believers in his metropolis in a secret way. But the real reason of the second conviction of the Metropolitan is Russia's fear of his great influence with the population in the event of his return to his metropolis. The Russians are of the opinion that his very

presence among the believers, even in the character of a private person, is dangerous.

Thus being not guilty of anything, Metropolitan Slipy has already suffered in the slave labour camps for 9 years only because he has remained faithful to God, his Church, and his People. The rector of the Stanyslaviv Ecclesiastical Seminary, the Rev. Dr. A. Boychuk, is also reported to have been deported to Vorkuta.

The Ukrainian Congress Committee in U.S.A. has submitted to the Congress of U.S.A. a resolution condemning the religious persecution in the U.S.S.R. The submission has been made by G. Runey of New York. The resolution speaks about Metropolitan Slipy who was arrested and deported to the far north in 1945.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Volodymyr Derzhavyn, Ph.D. Professor of History of Ukrainian Literature and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. The author of many contributions to the study of Ukrainian Literature.

Dmytro Donzov. One of the leading thinkers of the Ukrainian national struggle for liberation, and author of many books and articles. He is now living in Canada.

Ilarion Holubovych. M.A. Lecturer in Latin at St. Joseph's College, Stoke-on-Trent.

Veli Kajum-Khan. President of the National Turkestanian Unity Committee, and former Chairman of the Council of Nations of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of nations.

Borys Krupnytsky. Professor of Eastern European History, the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. Author of *The History of Ukraine*.

M. O. Myronenko. A Journalist living in London, editor of the Ukrainian monthly "Dumky", and specialist in Russian economic affairs.

Petro Poltava. Leading journalist in the Ukrainian underground movement, and a member of the S.U.L.C. (Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council). Killed in action in Ukraine 1951.

Yaroslav Stetzko. Was elected Prime Minister by the Ukrainian National Assembly in Lviv on June 30, 1941. On rejecting Hitler's ultimatum demanding the annulment of the Ukrainian Proclamation of Independence, he was arrested 12 July, 1941, and detained at Oranienburg concentration camp till 30 September 1944. After his release he escaped from Gestapo surveillance. Leading member of the O.U.N. (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) and President of the A.B.N. (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations).



The
UKRAINIAN
REVIEW



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In the June issue of "The Ukrainian Review" the underlining of the photograph of the wooden church at Busovysko mis-stated the date of the church, which is XVIIIth. century.

Jaroslav Stetzko

The Pilgrimages to Peking and Belgrade

The Trinity of World Communism

It is no mere coincidence that the same delegation from Moscow, which last year went on a pilgrimage to Peking, has this year visited Belgrade. On both occasions the delegation was headed by the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Khrushchov, a fact which indicates beyond all doubt that the questions at issue were not merely confined to inter-state relations with Red China and Yugoslavia, but also concerned the solution of certain fundamental problems in the reciprocal relationship of the three main centres of Communism. It is true that Yugoslavia, compared to the Soviet Union or to Red China, is a relatively slight factor as far as its sphere of influence is concerned, but as an example of an unprecedented moral and political case it must be regarded as important.

We know that the U.S.S.R. has tried to lay down the law everywhere, but its attempts to do so in Yugoslavia and previously in Red China have not been successful. This fact, however, is not of any decisive importance as far as the international political function of Communism and the further development of Russian imperialism are concerned. Even in the event of an open conflict between West and East, the existence of Tito's Yugoslavia would contribute towards the confusion of the West as regards the course and nature of the psychological war, rather than to the success of a genuine liberation policy.

The fact that Khrushchov and Bulganin, upon arriving at the airport in Belgrade, promptly took the blame for the breach with Tito themselves, and in doing so made Beria the scape-goat, may quite possibly indicate that they had already reached a secret agreement with Tito before ever they set off for Belgrade.

In the event of a war, Tito will by no means be anxious to see the West victorious, since the existence of his regime depends for

the most part on the further existence of the U.S.S.R. The position of the United States, however, as far as the Yugoslav riddle is concerned, has now become extremely complicated; if Tito has already definitely gone over to Khrushchov's side, then the U.S.A. by continuing to provide Tito with aid would actually be helping Moscow; if the U.S.A. on the other hand discontinue their aid to Tito, such a step might prove disastrous for America's policy and would most probably drive Tito to join forces with the Soviets. Paradoxical though it may sound, to help or not to help in this case seems to be equally dangerous.

Even if Tito has not reached a secret agreement with Moscow and should refrain from doing so in the future, he will, with Moscow's blessing, now busy himself as the champion and advocate of "active co-existence" which definitely aids the present trend of the Soviets' foreign policy.

It is very doubtful whether a development of this kind would be in keeping with the interests of the West! The present Russian endeavour to set up a "neutral zone," which, beginning with Finland and Sweden, would extend via Germany, Austria, and Yugoslavia as far as Egypt and India and would quite possibly also include Italy and even France, is a deadly menace to the West. The Kremlin is obviously seeking to set up a new "Cordon Sanitaire" for itself, after the model of the Versailles Treaty, save that in this case the "cordon" would now be located 500 miles further westwards.

Any concessions which Moscow might make to the satellite countries by withdrawing the Soviet troops, but retaining the Communist governments, would never really ease the tension in the international political situation. Even if the Moscow Bolsheviks were to sanction or put up with a "National Communist" variant in all the countries which now have a Communist government, these countries would after all, like Peking and Belgrade, still continue to be dependent on Moscow, and at the critical moment would be more closely allied to the Soviet Union than to the West.

And what is more, the emancipation of these states from their position as satellites might, to a certain degree, even prove advantageous to Moscow; for statements such as those made by Red China's Minister of War, for example, at the Warsaw Conference, namely that in the event of conflict the population of China, numbering 600 millions, would support the U.S.S.R., might well, since they are statements which are made voluntarily and by a

sovereign power, be far more important in aiding the consolidation of the Communists' position and assisting Red propaganda than the parrot-like speeches made by Cyrankiewicz, Zapotocky, or by other Moscow puppets.

The West, however, is seriously mistaken if it hopes to achieve a political success, too, in the Communist satellite countries, in the course of "active co-existence," by active trade relations and increased economic influence. The Communist regimes of these countries and their trade and industrial corporations, either camouflaged as co-operative or not, will be astute enough to carry on trade on a large scale with the West and, at the same time, use the economic and financial means obtained in this way to consolidate the Red regime and suppress any resistance, and will then, at the critical moment, join forces with the Soviet Union. Western trade relations with Red China would, it is true, diminish the latter's economic dependence on the Soviet Union, but would not result in Red China's political severance from the Kremlin.

The existence of two or even three main centres of Communism does not by any means denote a weakening of the same, but, on the contrary, under the present circumstances might consolidate Communism even more. By using clever new catchwords, as for instance "People's Republic of China" or "Balkan Federation," Soviet Russian imperialism might even decoy and mislead the free world more successfully than by direct action on the part of Moscow, whose practices so far are, in any case, of bad repute.

As long as the Soviet Russian imperium continues to exist as the stronghold of world Communism, subsidiary sources of Communism will be able to exist in other countries. It is only when the main centre and source in the U.S.S.R. has been destroyed and that country has been disintegrated into independent national and democratic states, that the elimination of the Communist regime of Mao Tse-tung and of Tito will no longer present any problems.

Neither co-existence nor atomic war should be adopted as the watchword of our times, but a definite and steadfast policy of liberation, which will help the nations at present enduring the Red yoke of Moscow, Peking, and Belgrade, to attain their freedom. Otherwise the Western world will be in danger of becoming utterly confused and of being completely taken in and led astray by hypocritical and crafty catchwords, which are inspired either directly or indirectly by Moscow and are disseminated throughout the world.

D. Donzow

HUGO'S "MAZEPPA"— THE SYMBOL OF UKRAINE

Like Lord Byron, Victor Hugo was one of the leading personalities of literary romanticism in the nineteenth century. The son of one of Napoleon's generals, he travelled in his youth through many countries—such as Italy and Spain—noted for their romantic charm. Regarding himself as an enemy of "le petit Napoléon", he left France after the coup d'état of 1851 and spent twenty years abroad as a political emigrant. The great French poet retained always in his heart a passionate love of liberty and hatred of oppression. He worshipped everything strong, heroic and mysterious, so it is not surprising that he was attracted by the personality of the great fighter for freedom, Hetman Ivan Mazeppa*, standing out as it did from the fluctuating background of history, of nature, and of the national character of Ukraine.

In the first place, the age of Mazeppa in the eighteenth century was certainly not remote history: at that time Mazeppa's Ukraine and his Cossack followers were still living forces, active factors in contemporary political affairs. In the second, Philip Orlyk the father, and his son, were still diplomatically active in Europe. In the nineteenth century, Mazeppa and his country were already legendary; it was a vivid tale of a heroic nation which sought to block by the very bodies of its people the path of the Muscovite hordes; it was a nation ready to sacrifice everything in the name of freedom, a nation throwing out a bold challenge to the power of which Europe was already becoming frightened. And it was this elemental strength of Ukraine and of her genius, her youthful tenacity, that fascinated the romantic poets of the West.

Hugo's poem, written in 1828, suggests a musical symphony. There is emotion and rhythm. For content Hugo uses the well-known history of the boisterous youth of the future Hetman. Mazepp-

*) **Mazeppa, Ivan.** Hetman of Ukraine 1687-1709. He started his career at the court of the Polish King, Jan Casimir, and later served the Ukrainian Hetmans Petro Doroshenko and Ivan Samoylovych. He worked unceasingly to strengthen his own power and the international position of Ukraine. He allied secretly with Charles XII of Sweden and in 1708 openly sided with Sweden. The Zaporozhian Cossacks joined him but were defeated at Poltava in 1709.

pa, while a page at the royal court in Warsaw, was involved in a number of love affairs—as was his wont until his old age. The French poet takes for his poem one of the youthful Mazeppa's gallant adventures: victim of the vengeance of an outraged husband, his dress ragged and torn by sabre thrusts, Mazeppa's body, covered with blood, is lashed prone on the back of a wild horse snorting fire from its nostrils, striking sparks with its hoofs. The crack of the whip, the noise and jeers of the crowd, and the terrified horse bolts into the void. The rider is exposed to death at each instant, dragged by the thorns of wild scrub, chased by beasts of prey. He is on his way to death. At least, it would appear so. And yet his fate was written differently: he was saved from this death by the Zaporozhian Cossacks and he lived to become their Hetman.

The poet sees Mazeppa and his horse as the symbol of Ukraine, her tragic path across rivers, through blockade and ambush to the freedom of a glorious future. Fate slings Ukraine over the precipice, to destruction, and it seems she can never rise again from the mire; and yet she does rise up once more.

Hugo first describes the vehement luxuriousness and the glamorous nature of Ukraine. His description of her physical nature is similar to that in *The Tale of Igor's Campaign*¹), or in the stories of Storozhenko²), or passages from Hohol³), when these writers paint the steppe or the Dnipro during a storm. Ukraine in her menacing aspect can be found in such poems of Shevchenko⁴) as *The Dnipro Roars and Moans, Like a Red Serpent, The Cool Ravine*, and so on. There are the rivers flowing with blood, the graves filled with Cossack corpses, the roar of the Dnipro cataracts, the threatening surroundings against which the nation has to fight for its existence.

In Hugo's poem, the horse races with its prostrate rider through this green and dry ocean of the steppe. They pass through valleys, gorges, over withered, fallen trees, rivers, swamps—to disappear in the wide, burning and unpeopled desert. They pass old demesnes studded with the ruins of castles, and now they are followed by a horde of wild horses while above them swirls a flock of birds. It is day, and to the south the sun burns upon their skin, the scorching roof of the sky presses down upon the rider, and red blood from the gaping forehead stains the yellow sand and desert soil, as the blood of the gladiator would spill in the sand of the arena.

They gallop through the night, clouds dim the stars, the ear is rent by the howls of the wolves as they pursue the fleeing prey, by the hoot and the screech of the owl.

They gallop onwards one day and another and a third, as in a final journey to the grave urged on to the utmost speed. Finally, after three days and nights of the uninterrupted onrush accompanied by the shrill calls of the birds, the horse falls, his stumbling hoofs strike fire from the bare rock. Mazeppa, bathed in blood, flung prostrate on the ground, watches the swirling mass of eagles around his head as they halt. The greedy beak swoops down to steal the eyes drowned in tears.

Yet suddenly all is changed. The end is not yet come; the future of the victim is not to be as his enemies schemed. Today he is on the threshold of death. So let it be! But the day will come when this living corpse that was doomed and dragged to his death will prove himself a powerful, vigorous man, whom Ukraine will acclaim as her leader. The day will come when the booty now snatched from the preying eagles will be refunded by sowing the fields with the corpses of the enemy. The lost prey will don the haughty garb of the old hetmans⁵⁾, knights will cluster round him, a whole nation will rally to him, and follow him.

Here Hugo presents an image of the most peculiar feature of Ukrainian nature and Ukrainian history: their sudden and unexpected changes, rapid flights from the abysses of abandonment to the very heights of glory, or conversely. It is the enigma of the steppe; the mystery of the great expanse of Ukraine—some would say, the curse of her vastness. To those wide plains forced their way the Avars, Polovtsi, Pechenegs, Huns, Tartars and Goths⁶⁾. Thither, too, have penetrated Poles and Muscovites⁷⁾. As they sank into the sweet honey of the black earth where, it appeared, lived humble, peaceful folk, there suddenly loomed up this mysterious, this delusive steppe and its very spaciousness frequently became their downfall. In the peasant jungles of Ukraine, in the midst of the peaceful village idyll, the would-be occupant was often surprised by sawn-off rifles and bombs, partisans and fires. Recall how Sienkiewicz⁸⁾ writes of the Ukrainian steppe in his book *By Fire and Sword*. He describes it as a land of mysterious elemental power, full of uncertainty, of fearful, lurking disappointments, a land of awe and of something terrifying, ominous. During the recent war a similar account appeared in a German newspaper. A German soldier described how a mysterious fear had seized him in the steppes beyond the Dniro: "The eyes could find no object upon which to rest in the boundless distance. And everything under the Ukrainian sky comes unannounced. The bright sunshine, the



Hetman Ivan Mazepa

mild air from the south, the breezes, the clear blue sky lulls one to sleep. But suddenly there appears on the horizon a small cloud which grows rapidly bigger and bigger as it approaches. Thunder sounds above one's head with a mighty roar, and there comes the rain. But after a time it passes, no one knows where, and the golden rays of the sun dry and warm once more the rain-washed steppe."

In that country the people also are unpredictable. Could the executioner foresee that from that murderous journey Mazeppa would rise to the very heights of glory? And once more, was it not believed in 1921 by Ukraine's enemies that she was already on the gallows and all that remained was to drop the trap? Yet twenty years later, when these enemies were forced to leave the country, seeing the gloomy, sardonic faces of the Ukrainians at the stations, they said: "We have tried to educate these people for twenty years, and yet we travel here as if in a foreign country." Fettered, prostrate and gory, as was Mazeppa hurtling to death on the back of his horse, Ukraine sprang up suddenly in full strength, ready to fight, to avenge, to live.

Thus these extraordinary features of our history—the unforeseen falls and unheralded rebirth have been embodied by Hugo in the fate of Mazeppa and of his Ukraine. The following words cannot fail to apply to the future not only of the Hetman but also of his native country:

Chaque pas que tu fais, semble creuser sa tombe,
Enfin le terme arrive, il court, il vole, il tombe,
Et se relève roi!

It is this fearful cycle of our history which haunts the dreams of Shevchenko, the chimerical motif in Ukrainian history, the token of her tragedy and of the indestructible power of her people. We find therefore similar moments in the work of both these outstanding literary men. Hugo depicts the tying up of Mazeppa by his enemies, his writhing in his bonds, the fruitless efforts delighting his murderers, the eagles wheeling, hovering over the lifeless body, the vast conspiracy of people, beasts, sky and earth against him. But in spite of all he rose again. And no foreign power but only his would rule over his native soil. Thousands were to follow him to the bloody feast of revenge for insult and contempt. And he would in time drive out those beasts of prey, who sought to filch away his eyes, to the booty of his slain enemies.

Many similar features appear in the work of Shevchenko. Recall, for instance, "Wars and military quarrels there were once; now

all has passed; there remain only the vermin who devour and corrode the body of the nation and seem about to destroy it utterly." And yet, "Roaring and growling is heard. The indomitable Cossack will rush in, will shatter the throne, tear up the porphyry, smash up your idol, your holy idol will be no more and you will perish with it. You will remain but stinking refuse, human vermin." Or, in *The Night of Taras*⁹), "Ukraine grieves as a lost child. No-one succours her, the Cossacks perish". And in this last hour so near to destruction "came the voices of Nalyvayko, Pavluha, Triasylo¹⁰) in that night of gore which famous has become." The precipice that spelt death has led to glory. Again, in *Haydamaky*¹¹), the Polish Confederates¹²) swarmed over Ukraine and started to despoil her. They ruined, murdered, burned churches. The haydamaks meantime had their knives blessed and once more in the hour of the deepest despair the time of retribution was near at hand.

At Scutari¹³) the Cossacks awaited death, but instead came counter attack. "Called out Hamaliya: Brothers, we shall live, wine we shall drink and fight the janissaries." Or to recall Shevchenko's words from the poem *The Cool Ravine*¹⁴): "To this Ravine no path can be detected where Zalizniak roams, waiting for Gonta¹⁵). Do not rejoice then, modern hangman, for in the day of requital "you will meet your punishment and a new fire will spread out from the Cool Ravine." As it has done in 1917 and 1943¹⁶).

With an extraordinarily acute intuition the French poet has conveyed just this remarkable feature of Ukraine and her people—their indestructibility, their ardour, and the tragic readiness to rise up again from the very path of death. It is this immortality of the spirit of the nation which drives to the extremes of madness every enemy occupant that Shevchenko in *The Great Tomb*¹⁷) represents by the symbol of the crow, the evil genius of Ukraine. When every possible action had been taken against the Cossacks, punishments akin to those of ancient Egypt had rained upon them, their 'devilish' Sich had been destroyed, even then they remained alive and forceful. Is not this unquenchable passion, this immovable vitality of the nation symbolised in the person of Hugo's Mazeppa? Another French writer wrote that Ukraine was pursuing her historic role "with an open wound on her body." And does not the mad galloping of Mazeppa's horse, with the prone rider, hunted by wild beasts, nigh to death, remind us of the whole course of Ukrainian history throughout the ages?

Hugo pictures the wild galloping of the Ukrainian Centaur as a bizarre "funeral gallop" where droves of wild horses replace mourners and instead of funeral dirges there are the shrill cries of the hawks and the howling of wolves. Is not this the eternal music of the evil spirits who haunt Ukraine, who lead her towards doom, and who cannot perceive that the resurrection of their prey will bring revenge and due requital?

And yet the significance of the poem lies even deeper, and contains a greater truth. A nation which desires liberty must pass through martyrdom without losing faith. It must be able to stake everything, to play with Fate, "faire banco", in the spirit of heroism. The second part of the poem presents another aspect of the tale of Mazeppa, for here he appears as a Centaur—the symbol of a man who, as leader of a nation, is the guardian of its destiny and who is securely fettered to its fortune. We are told in the poem that when a hero who is watched over by God is by God's ordinance inescapably tied to his fate, to the "violent courser", then this is no ordinary fate. Thus too the nation to which the hero is bound has no ordinary destiny. The symbol of that Fate, the genius of the nation, is in Hugo's poem Mazeppa's horse which carries away the rider crucified on its back, his eyes turned towards the sky—into the realm of fantasy far beyond the limits of the real world. The horse with flaming wings and hoofs of steel seems to burst through the gates of the world of the senses and bring the tired and thirsty rider to those waters of the "eternal river" in distant starry space where dwell the moon, the rings of Saturn and the comets with their flaring manes. He is carried into that eternal world over which God rules, a world where great souls and great projects are born before they descend to earth, where the fire of Prometheus used to burn to illumine the dark night with the grandeur of thought, with heroic ideas, or, as the Zaporozhian Cossacks¹⁸⁾ used to say, "with undying glory".

One finds the same symbolism in Shevchenko, who also looked to the fantasy world of historical and cosmic ideas for his inspiration. To Shevchenko would come "the souls of the righteous" from that world beyond to converse and to advise. They came from among the legions of the Archangel Michael, and were to him "the noble host" "in golden robes" or the souls of unrevenged ancestors who brought into his "humble orphan's cabin" the throb of their great souls, the light of their ideas, the flames of their faith. Shevchenko sends his thoughts "where the world ends to roam above

the clouds," and up to the very sun. He sends them to the moon, "to sing aloud that song which the moon herself whispered to him," to bring down upon the earth the flame of the truth revealed to him by Eternity.

Comparable images appear in Hugo's poem. Mazeppa was made to see everything that existed in this mysterious world; his prophetic vision reached out to those endless horizons, which "*éclairaient étranges à ses yeux reluisants*". In his eyes there will appear reflections of strange things "*comme il sera brulé d'ardentes étincelles*". "These sparks will flare up into fire, and tumultuous thoughts—only conceivable by angels and devils—will be born within him." Above, in the unearthly regions of phantoms and images the one chosen by Fate seeks his path in communion with the Supreme Power.

To tread that path he must be aware, as is Hugo's hero, that above him "*son Dieu s'étale*," feeling the presence of God above him. He has to fall in love with his daring dream so intensely that he will be able to spurn his life, and be prepared, as Shevchenko was, "to enter hell" in the service of his inspiration, to pass through the hell of suffering, "to be crucified for it." For even this hell "love will transform into a Paradise" says the poetess Lesia Ukrainka to her Muse, because one would become "as steel forged in that hellish fire," "a new man." As such a new man, indeed, rises Mazeppa from his hell of suffering after he has endured the strange race on the wings of merciless Fate, bound by unseen chains to the historic genius of his nation as he was bound to his horse—his eyes roving over the starry sky, and gleaming with the fire that burns only in the eyes of heroes and prophets. And such men are followed through sufferings, struggles and triumphs by disciples, by the faithful, and by whole nations, as if under some spell.

To fly above the clouds, to burst through the gravitational pull of the earth, to drink the healing water of the unceasingly flowing "*fleuve éternel*" that creates giants from among human beings. To arise once more living and strong from the tomb in which neither people nor nations can immure him.

Thus Hugo conceives the Ukrainian nation and likens her to an apocalyptic horse that meets all obstacles with muscles of steel, with fire in his blood, with flaming wings issuing from his back.

This picture once more resembles those of the Ukrainian poets. Shevchenko speaks of a man, Halayda¹⁹), who is prepared to fly—to grow wings and reach the sky. Wings are only attributed to

inhabitants of another world, of the Musa-dream, flying above like an eagle, blowing with fire"—those same "fiery wings," "ailes de flamme," of Hugo.

Like Hugo's rider Pegasus, she knows not that "for good or ill" she is driven forward by the violent force of her dream. She is like the storm that cannot be quelled, because she has wings she must fly. She needs "neither fears nor faith" since for her "the madman seizes freedom to rush into an obscurity in which he will die or from which he will rise to glory."

It is clear from the Gospels that what is sometimes regarded as madness among men may be wisdom in God. And does not the "mad song" of Lesia Ukrainka compare with the wild horse of Mazeppa? Does it not present the symbol of the uncontrollable energy of the frenzied youthful temperament of a great nation? For without this there is no hero, no escape from the everyday world, from "darkness, foulness and slavery." It is the symbol of a nation that in its headlong dash will soon fall to its grave and — "se relève roi" — will rise again in the purple of glory.

A more important suggestion in Hugo is his revelation that the way to glory is the way of the Cross. Only he who has gazed into the eyes of death can rise from death. Is not the terrible flight of the Ukrainian Centaur symbolic of the sufferings of the nation, of her path to Golgotha?

All the elements of the latter appear here: the torture of Mazeppa, the jests and mockery of the "bourreaux tout joyeux," the blood upon the face and body of him who is deserted by all; the yelping of the wolves like the shouts of the crowd for his crucifixion.

Thus has the horse brought Mazeppa to his true objective in spite of hawks, devils, thorns, thickets, in spite of all that has laboured to destroy the life of the Ukrainian Centaur. People and nations alike, made of such noble metal, give a challenge to fight by their nature, by their bearing, to all that is impure. And they also receive such added power that they are able to play the great game of history itself. They either will be victors or they will die: never will they be slaves.

What of Mazeppa's defeat at Poltava²⁰? For the Ukrainian nation this battle has a significance similar to that of the ending of Christ's life on the Cross for our entire planet. For poets, composers, artists, painters, historians, have glorified all over Europe the genius of Mazeppa, of the conquered hero, and they have not been moved either by his ally the King of Sweden, or by his con-

queror, Peter I. For all these outstanding men the conqueror was less real, less meaningful, than the conquered. Hugo, Byron (*Mazeppa*), Gottschall (*Mazeppa*), Franz Liszt (*Mazeppa*), Vogüé (*Le Roman Russe*), Horace Vernet (*Mazeppa*), Voltaire (*Histoire de Charles XII*), have given the name of Mazeppa the flaming halo of a hero who, in the name of freedom, raised his sword against a force before which the whole of Europe trembled, a sword that, imperishable, even today reaches out its menace from beyond the grave. Not without reason was it that during the Third Republic the Palais Bourbon, the parliament hall in Paris, was decorated by Mazeppa, the work of Horace Vernet, appearing there as an immortal symbol of the eternal spirit of freedom that breaks the fetters of slavery.

The final verse of Hugo's poem is a paean to the glory of the human spirit, its winged courage, and the heroic heart of man; and at the same time giving praise to the unbounded Promethean spirit of Ukraine, the spirit of the steppe and of its knight without fear or stain.

In this way our much slandered elemental character inspired Hugo to write his great poem. Some people, our countrymen, may be charmed with the idyllic picture of the steppe with its "ponds and cherry orchards"; others may be intrigued by "progress" by which the people "like slaves lie down at the feet of the machine." And all those who long for "peace and order"—even if it were under a foreign despot—may curse our seemingly "anarchic" steppe and yet all that is strong, heroic, great, the very state, has grown up there, reached its manhood, fought and shed its blood upon this steppe, the steppe of Sviatoslav, Igor, Bayda-Vyshnevetsky, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hordienko²¹), Shevchenko. It was our element which moulded character, sturdiness, discipline, asceticism, faith in God—and the fighting spirit of the flower of our nation, by means of which millions of our peaceful "sowers of buckwheat" were welded into one nation. The steppe was for Ukraine as the sea was for Britain: a creative force and school of bravery and heroism. No sophist of an "idyllic 'Little Russia'" can change the truth of this fact, however much the Russians and Poles in unison with some of their Ukrainian servants may labour to accuse the steppe of anarchism, just as no-one can shake the greatness of Nelson or of Jellicoe by calling them pirates.

Foreigners—like Hugo, Byron, Liszt, Vernet, Merimée, and others, did not seek their inspiration from the thatched cottages, folk dances, arts, but from the mysticism and romanticism of the steppe

in the elemental power of the Cossack period, as well as in the ancient Kyiv-State epoch.

Nor was it a coincidence that the French author of *Mazeppa* was enthralled by this more mysterious element of Ukraine, and like Franz Liszt in his symphonic poem, touching strange strings, produced new melodies, disturbing, enveloped in the charm and mystery of the awe-inspiring climate of Ukraine, her legends, history, strivings, the inexhaustible energies of her people, her heroism, her romantic fascination, and, above all, her unconquerable fighting spirit in the name of freedom.

NOTES

1) "Tale of Igor's Campaign" the most outstanding monument of early Ukrainian literature, a manuscript copy of which was discovered by the Russian Count Musin-Pushkin in 1795. In character the poem closely resembles "Le chanson de Roland".

2) Storozhenko, Oleksa 1805-1874. The Ukrainian writer.

3) Hohol, Mykola 1809-1852. Known as Nicholas Gogol, one of the greatest satirists of world literature and a Ukrainian who wrote in Russian. Many of his early works have Ukrainian themes.

4) Shevchenko, Taras 1814-1861. The greatest Ukrainian poet, who aroused Ukrainian national consciousness and the desire for political and social liberation of Ukraine.

5) Hetman. From the German "Hauptmann", and since the end of the seventeenth century the highest officer of the Ukrainian Cossack army camping below the Dnipro rapids. The Hetman was elected by the military rally.

6) The Avars, a Turkic, nomadic tribe, in the sixth century penetrated the Ukrainian steppe from the Caucasian region and organised a powerful empire in the Danube region which was destroyed in the wars with the Franks at the end of the eighth century.

The Polovtsi, Kumans, Kypchaks, a people of Turkic origin, appeared in the Ukrainian steppe after the Pechenegs in the second half of the eleventh century.

The Pechenegs, nomads of Turkic origin, lived in the Ukrainian steppes in the tenth and eleventh centuries. They were finally defeated by Prince Jaroslav the Wise in 1036, and moved westwards.

The Huns, a nomadic Turkic people, after destroying the Gothic empire of Hermanarich in 375 A. D., dominated the lowlands between the Volga and the Danube.

The Tartars were originally a Mongol tribe, but since the spread of the empire of Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century the name began to include the Central Asiatic Turkic people as well. In 1240 they invaded Ukraine and for several centuries raided and laid waste Ukrainian lands.

The Goths, a Germanic people, migrated in the second century A. D. from the region of the lower Vistula towards the Black Sea and founded a powerful state c. 250 A. D. (Ostrogoths). Defeated by the Huns in 357 they lived for some time in the middle Danube region, and invaded Italy in 493 under Theodoric.

7) The Poles first gained a foothold in Ukraine in 1340, when Casimir the Great invaded Galicia and captured its capital, Lviv.

Muscovites acquired the opportunity to interfere in Ukraine's internal affairs in 1654 after the signing of the Treaty of Pereyaslav—a military alliance between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Tzar Alexei.

8) Sienkiewicz, Henryk 1846-1916. Polish writer of the historical novels "By Fire and Sword", "The Deluge", "Quo Vadis", etc.

9) "The night of Taras" a historical poem by Shevchenko dealing with the rising of Ukrainian Cossacks under the leader Taras Triasylo in 1630 and their defeat of the Polish Hetman Koniecpolski.

10) Nalyvayko, Severyn was a Ukrainian Cossack chieftain active at the end of the sixteenth century. He was captured and tortured by the Poles and became a national hero.

Pavlyuha, or Pavlyuk, his real name Karpo Hudzan, a Ukrainian Cossack chieftain who led a rising against the Poles and was defeated in 1637.

Triasylo, Taras—see note 9.

11) Haydamaky, a popular movement in Right Bank Ukraine in the eighteenth century against Polish domination, social oppression and religious intolerance. The main risings were in 1734-36, in 1760 and in 1768.

12) Confederates were alliances of Polish gentry for political purposes.

13) Scutari. Captive Cossacks were imprisoned here according to Shevchenko's poem "Hamaliya", which describes a Cossack raid to liberate them.

14) "The Cool Ravine" ("Kholodnyi Yar"). A rugged wooded country near the town of Chyhyryn, former capital of Khmelnytsky's Cossack state. Haydamaky used to gather there and it was eminently suitable for a partisan base. In 1919-22 Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik partisans operated there, and in 1943 it was one of the centres of anti-German and anti-Russian partisan activities.

15) Zalizniak and Gonta, leaders of the rising of Haydamaky in 1768.

16) These dates refer to the Ukrainian national struggle for independence 1917-21, and the rise of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1943.

17) "The Great Tomb". A poem by Shevchenko where the symbol of "the great tomb" represents the imprisoned freedom of Ukraine, and the crows who guard the tomb symbolise "evil".

18) Zaporozhian Cossacks—Ukrainian Cossacks living "beyond the rapids" on the river Dnipro.

19) Halayda, Yarema is a character in Shevchenko's "Haydamaky".

20) The battle of Poltava in June 1709 took place between Tzar Peter I on the one hand and King Charles XII of Sweden and Hetman Ivan Mazepa of Ukraine on the other.

21) Prince Sviatoslav. Ruler of the Kyiv State 960-972, he led campaigns against the Volga Bulgars, Khazars, Bulgarians and Byzantium and was killed in battle against the Pechenegs.

Prince Igor (Ihor) fought against the Polovtsi in 1168.

Dmytro Bayda-Vyshnevetsky built the Sich, a fort in 1550 on an island in the Dnipro and fought the Tartars. See note 18.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of Ukraine 1648-57, liberated Ukraine from Polish rule and concluded the Pereyaslav alliance with Muscovy.

Hordienko, Kost. Chief of the Zaporozhian Cossacks from 1701, he joined Mazepa in 1709 against Tzar Peter I.

W. K. Matthews

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE

To English readers interested enough in Ukrainian to learn the language, the best advice must surely be that they should make use of a sound grammar like that of G. Luc'kyj and J. B. Rudnyc'kyj and practise the spoken language with their Ukrainian friends. But to such readers as have not yet reached this urgent stage of interest, and are nevertheless not incurious about the language, perhaps these few observations may be helpful.

We assume that our readers have no previous knowledge of Ukrainian, but may have heard that it resembles Russian, and is therefore to be called a Slavonic language. To say that a language is Slavonic or Germanic or Romance means that it is included along with other similar languages in a closely related group showing certain recognisable features. The two nearest Slavonic cognates of Ukrainian are White Russian (now sometimes called Byelorussian) and Russian, and the group to which all three belong is known to philologists as the East Slavonic. Geographically our three East Slavonic languages are distributed in such a way that Ukrainian and White Russian occupy the south and west and Russian the north and east of the continental bulge of Europe. Each language is distinct and has its own literature, and its recorded history reaches back to about the twelfth century, when each of them appears to have existed as a characteristic local dialect with its habitat centred in Kyyiv (Ukrainian), Smolensk (White Russian), and Novgorod the Great (Russian). The name 'Russian' (and in mediaeval Latin documents 'Ruthenian') was used indifferently of all three dialects at first, and their outward unity was due to the political authority of Kyyiv in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and more particularly to the levelling influence of Old Church Slavonic (an artificial form of Old Bulgarian in its Thessalonican variant), which had provided

the Principality of Kyiv and its provinces with an alphabet and a literary language. This literary language, as used on East Slavonic territory, was never pure Bulgarian, but from the start represented a compromise between Bulgarian and East Slavonic, with the second element very much to the fore from the twelfth century onwards. After the destruction of the Principality of Kyiv in the early thirteenth century by the Tartars (Mongols), the East Slavonic area lost its political cohesion, and a line of cleavage was established between Russian on the one hand and White Russian and Ukrainian on the other. The two last-mentioned languages came under the 'western' influence of Lithuania-Poland and remained under that influence until the seventeenth century, when the territory in which they were spoken was annexed by Russia. During this long period they followed a different line of development from Russian, and for over two centuries White Russian was the official language along with Latin in the eastern provinces (White Russia and Ukraine) of Lithuania-Poland until it was displaced in the sixteenth century by Polish, for Lithuanian had never been more than a local language and was not reduced to writing till the same century. In spite of foreign influences, modern Ukrainian is the lineal descendant of the colloquial 'Russian' or 'Ruthenian' of the Principality of Kyiv. The claim of Russian to descent from the written language of Kyiv is historical, because Kyiv was the original centre of East Slavonic political and literary culture. The Russian of Moscow and St. Petersburg (more recently Leningrad) goes back to the language of Novgorod the Great and the Vladimir-Rostov-Suzdal group of principalities, in which the later Muscovy has its origin. Therefore the descent of Russian from the language of Kyiv is oblique rather than direct, whereas Ukrainian is the modern representative of that language.

So much for the historical background. Let us now look at Ukrainian in relation to its nearest 'relatives' White Russian and Russian. From what we have learnt so far, we may expect Ukrainian to have more in common with White Russian, its northern neighbour, than with Russian, its north-eastern neighbour, and we shall find that this is so. But before we make our comparison of the three languages, it is very necessary for us, as English-speakers, to make another comparison first, viz. between West Germanic and East Slavonic. English, we have been told by philologists, is a Germanic (earlier called a Teutonic) language, that is, it is 'related' as a language to German and Dutch. The three languages have

a great many features in common; but, as we shall discover later, English is not so close to German as Dutch is, and that means that the place of English in the West Germanic group is about the same as the place of Ukrainian in the East Slavonic group. Of course our comparison of Germanic with Slavonic is not altogether adequate, because the individual members of the former have diverged among themselves more than the individual members of the latter. The speed of linguistic development has been much greater in Western than in Eastern Europe, and generally the further east you go in this continent, the more conservative the languages tend to become, and we shall even find that German as an 'eastern' type of West Germanic is distinctly more conservative than English.

We shall begin our comparison here by choosing a text which exists in all six languages. This text will be a passage from St. Luke's Gospel (ix, 12-13). The three West Germanic languages—English, Dutch and German—will first be compared, and then the three members of the East Slavonic group—Ukrainian, White Russian, and Russian—in an approximately west-to-east order.

Our passage reads:—

(a) And when day began to wear away, there came the twelve and said unto him, Send the multitude away, that they may go into the towns and country round about, and lodge, and get victuals; for we are here in a desert place. But he said to them, Give ye them to eat.

(b) En de dag begon te dalen, en de twaalfen, tot hem komende, zeiden tot hem: Laat de schare van U, opdat zij, heengaande in de omliggende vlekken en de dorpen, herberg nemen mogen, en spijze vinden; want wij zijn hier in eene woeste plaats. Maar hij zeide tot hen: Geeft gij hun te eten.

(c) Aber der Tag fing an sich zu neigen. Da traten zu ihm die Zwölf und sprachen zu ihm: Lass das Volk von dir, dass sie hingehen in die Märkte umher und in die Dörfer, dass sie Herberge und Speise finden; denn wir sind hier in der Wüste. Er aber sprach zu ihnen: Gebt ihr ihnen zu essen.

The passage we have chosen is in an old-fashioned language in each case, but that will not interfere with our present purpose. What we have to bear in mind is not the quality of the language used in illustration, but the difference between sound and letter, for the two are not identical even in the most 'phonetic' spelling.

The pronunciation is at best suggested by the spelling, as we shall see by comparing the spelling with the pronunciation of the word 'day' in the three languages, viz. *day*: *dag*: *Tag* with *dei*: *dax*: *tak* (here *x* is like Scots *ch* in 'loch'). With this in mind we shall be prepared for other 'surprises' because of the historical differences between speech and writing. Besides differences of pronunciation, we can study differences of form, for instance, by comparing the last sentence in our three versions, viz.

Eng. give ye them to eat
 Du. geeft gij hun te eten
 G. gebt ihr ihnen zu essen.

Here we notice that 'give' and 'to eat' are root forms, whereas Dutch and German have 'marks' or indices for the imperative plural (*—t*) and for the infinitive (*—en*). Also there are differences between the languages in syntax or the arrangements of words, for instance,

Eng. that they may ... lodge and get victuals
 Du. opdat zij...herberg nemen mogen en spijze vinden
 G. dass sie Herberge und Speise finden,

where we find Dutch and German placing the direct object before the verb in dependent clauses.

The differences in sounds, forms, and word-arrangement, which we have found above, are counterbalanced by great similarities in the essential root-words (e.g. *to*: *tot*: *zu*, *let*: *laat*: *lass*, *find*: *vinden*: *finden*, *the twelve*: *de twaalven*: *die Zwölf*), which very obviously point to a common origin.

Turning now to our three East Slavonic languages, we shall find that they show an even greater resemblance among themselves, and yet obviously this is not enough to justify their being called dialects, as the philologists of the Russian Empire were apt to do. This 'historical' notion that Ukrainian, White Russian, and Russian are dialects of one and the same language is ideally true only if we think of them as ramifications of a common East Slavonic type. It is certainly untrue to say, as the Russian scholar A. A. Shakhmatov and his predecessors have said, that Ukrainian and White Russian are dialects (*narechiya*) of Russian. Soviet scholars have not made the same fundamental mistake, although the prerevolutionary attitude dies hard, for we find even Soviet scholars laxly using the term 'Great Russian', which implies the contrasted conception of Ukrainian as 'Little Russian', an admittedly obsolete term.

Let us examine our Scriptural passage in its Ukrainian, White Russian, and Russian versions in that order. Inevitably we shall represent all three not in their native Cyrillic spelling, but in a systematic English transliteration.

(a) Den' zhe pochav nakhylyatys'; prystupyvshy zh dvanadtsyat', skazaly yomu: vidoshly narod, shchob, pishovshy kruhom po selakh ta khutorakh, vidpochyly y rozdobuly kharchi, bo my tut u pustomu misti. Reche zh do nykh: dayte vy yim yisty.

(b) Kali-zh dzyen' pachaw zykhodzits', dyk prystupili da yaho dvanadtsatsyora i havaryli yamu: adpraw narod, kab yany payshli w vakalichnyya syoly y vyoski nachavats' i dastali yes'tsi, bo my tut u pustym myestsy. Alye yon skazaw im: vy daytsye im yes'tsi.

(c) Den' zhe nachal sklonyat'sya k vecheru. I, pristupiv k nemu, dvanadtsat' govoriли yemu: otpusti narod, chtoby oni poshli v okrestnyya seleniya i derevni nochevat' i dostali pishchi; potomu chto my zdes' v pustom meste. No on skazal im: vy dayte im yest'.

Here we must observe that our English transliteration is not altogether adequate, because we use the same letter *y* for three distinct sounds, viz. two types of vowel and a uniform type of consonant. The Ukrainian vowel *y* is roughly like the English *er* in 'letter', and the White Russian and Russian *y* are like the first part of the diphthong in the Cockney pronunciation of 'soon' or like the *u* in the North Welsh pronunciation of 'Cymru' (Wales). The consonant *y* is the same as *y* in English 'yet'. Other features of our transliteration must also be explained: the apostrophe indicates the 'softened' pronunciation of a consonant (e. g. *n'* is like French *gn* in 'oignon'); *zh* is approximately the *s* of 'pleasure', and *w* is the sound represented by this letter in 'wait'. We observed in dealing with the West Germanic languages that pronunciation and spelling did not always coincide. The same observation is also pertinent here, especially with regard to Russian, the least 'phonetic' language of the three, which has no unstressed *e* and *o*, and replaces them with [i] and [er] in pronunciation: thus *nochevat'* 'to spend the night' is pronounced *nerchivat'* (cf. English *e* in 'begin' and *o* in 'offend').

The similarities between our three Slavonic languages will be apparent at first sight as well as their differences, and it is the varying proportion of the like and the unlike that determines the characteristic features of each language. As we are concerned here mainly with Ukrainian, we shall make it the centre of our com-

parisons. In sound it differs markedly from both White Russian and Russian because of its comparatively 'hard' articulation, which means that its consonants, unless they are followed by *i* or *y* (consonant), are pronounced as 'normal' or unmodified sounds. Another Ukrainian phonetic feature is the pronunciation of unstressed *o* as *o*, whereas White Russian and Russian agree in confining this pronunciation to the stressed vowel (cf. Ukr. *pochav* 'began' with W. R. *pachaw*), and a third feature is the presence of the characteristic vowel *y*. Among consonants, *h* is shared by Ukrainian with White Russian, whereas Russian has only *g*, and the two western types of East Slavonic have *dz*h (like the English *j* of 'joy'), which is almost unknown to Russian. But the stressing of the three languages is identical in character, being not only irregular in distribution but variable in the paradigms. This does not mean however that the same words are stressed in the same way in the three languages, for the differences of stressing are very considerable (cf. Ukr. *pochav*, W. R. *pachaw* with R. *nachal*).

In their forms the three languages agree in possessing a varied system of declension, whose details coincide at some points (cf. Ukr. *yomu* 'to him' with R. *yemu*), and a system of conjugation, which emphasises aspect against tense or, in other words, is more interested in contrasting completion and duration in actions and processes than in merely indicating differences of time. Moreover the historical past tenses in the three languages have been replaced by a part participle (e.g. Ukr. *pochav*, W. R. *pachaw*, R. *nachal*), which change for gender and number (cf. masc. pl. *skazaly* 'they said' with masc. sing. *skazav* 'he said' and fem. sing. *skazala* 'she said'). But Ukrainian differs from the other two languages in having developed a new future tense, and thus has partly restored the tense system. The formal derivation of this tense is still quite clear (e. g. the compound tense *budu znaty* 'I shall know' has the alternative simple tense *znatymu*, which is compounded of *znaty* 'to know' and *mu* 'I have')

The word-arrangement of East Slavonic also shows similarities and differences. Let us compare, for instance:

Ukr.	reche zh do nykh: dayte vy yim yisty
W. R.	alye yon skazaw im: vy daytsye im yes'tsi
R.	no on skazal im: vy dayte im yes't'.

Our Ukrainian example uses the phrase *do nykh* 'to them' in the first clause of this sentence, which is composed of an indicative

and an imperative construction: White Russian and Russian prefer the plain dative plural (*im*) here. The imperative part also implies a different attitude to placing for emphasis (cf. Ukr. *dayte vy* 'you give' with W. R. *vy daytsye*, R. *vy dayte*). These are random observations bearing on our examples, and it can be imagined that they constitute a very small fraction of the sum-total of differences. One of these is so peculiar that it seems to me desirable to mention it. I have dealt with it in more detail in my recent article 'Lithuanian Constructions with Neuter Passive Participles' (*Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXIII, 81, London, 1955). It is a common construction in present-day Ukrainian and has no parallels in either the White Russian or the Russian literary language, though it has been found in some North Russian dialects and exists in literary Polish. The following sentences will illustrate it: *stoptano naykrashchyi kvitky* 'the loveliest flowers have been trampled down' (literally 'it has been trampled down loveliest flowers') and *het'manom Ukrayiny bulo proholosheno Pylypa Orlyka* 'Pylyp Orlyk was proclaimed Hetman of Ukraine' (literally 'as Hetman of Ukraine it was proclaimed Pylyp Orlyk'). The lack of concord between subject and verb and the isolation of the latter is remarkable in an East Slavonic literary language.

We have done no more in this article than to point out within the well-known framework of sounds, forms, and word-arrangement, which philologists and grammarians call phonetics, morphology, and syntax respectively, some of the characteristic features of Ukrainian, and we have tried at the same time to place this language among its immediate 'relations' by comparing it with English in its relation to other West Germanic languages. In other words, we have proceeded from the known to the less known.

UKRAINE AND THE UNITED NATIONS

On the question of the exclusion of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic from the United Nations

The suggestion was made by Senator Lodge, chief delegate of the U.S.A. to the United Nations, that the Soviet republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia should be excluded from the committee of the United Nations since they are satellites of Soviet Russia. This has given rise to lively discussion in which, however, the actual state of international affairs is frequently overlooked.

It is a known fact that Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc. are recognised severally as members of the U.N., but the British Commonwealth as such is not a member; similarly, France but not the "French Union" is recognised as a member; nor was the so-called Dutch-Indonesian Union, which was not finally disbanded until 1954, represented in the U. N. although the Netherlands and Indonesia were. The membership of the U.S.S.R. (but not of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the R.S.F.S.R.) and of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics in the U.N. is thus, in the first place, an anomaly which, from the point of view of international law, is obviously irrational, and can only be explained on the grounds of Roosevelt's and Churchill's actual capitulation to the demands of Stalin. In this connection the latter was pursuing the practical aims of gaining three Soviet votes in the general assembly, the possibility of the delegation of the U.S.S.R. having the right of control as regards the other two Soviet delegations, and, above all, the purely external and immaterial satisfaction of Ukrainian national feeling, which, of course, from the point of view of formal international law, should not be taken into consideration.

If one regards the problem not merely formally but more profoundly, according to the principles proclaimed by the United Nations themselves, one is bound to admit that representation in the U.N. meaning of the word refers to states or "nations", and not to state or government systems; for example, Poland, Yugoslavia, China are to be represented in the U.N. and not the "people's democratic" Poland or Tito's "federative" Yugoslavia, not the so-called Republic of Czechoslovakia, and not even National China. Thus, neither the present social and political state system of a country, nor the fact that such a system has been officially acknowledged, is decisive. The fact that Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Germany, and Japan are not represented in the U.N. is not connected with the various social and political constitutions of these countries at present, but solely with their defeat in World War II.

Thus, in principle, the nations themselves and not their governments are acknowledged as members of the United Nations. Accordingly, Ukraine is, therefore, a member of the U.N. and not merely and specifically the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and its pseudo-government in Kyiv, which cannot by any means be designated as a "Ukrainian" government, as, for instance, it would have been quite erroneous to describe Quisling's pseudo-government in Oslo (1940-1945) as a "Norwegian" government. Just as the Poles have no Polish government in Warsaw but only a "Warsaw administration," the Ukrainians have no Ukrainian Soviet government but only a "Kyiv administration"—one of Moscow's agencies, which has to carry out all the instructions received from the Kremlin.

In all three cases it is not a question of the social and political regime as such, but of the fact that it is only an instrument of the foreign military occupation power. Ukraine is not responsible for any measures taken by a "government" of this kind—and not for any possible declaration of war against America on the part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, for this would be a declaration of war against America by the U.S.S.R., which had merely been carried out technically by Moscow's agency in Kyiv. On principle, the Ukrainian nation has nothing whatsoever to do with this agency, and the puppet role of the latter is no concern of the Ukrainians. Any change in Moscow's present Communist regime within the Soviet imperium would, in this respect, be of little importance.

Since Ukraine, and not the puppet state of the "Ukrainian Soviet Republic", should by rights be represented among the United Nations, the actual representation of Ukraine by a "Soviet Ukrainian"

pseudo-delegation must most definitely be rejected. The fact that such a pseudo-Ukrainian Muscovite agency is tolerated on the committee of the U.N. is bound to give the world an erroneous conception of a "peaceful co-existence" with the Soviets. The anti-Bolshevist press of the Ukrainian underground movement and of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (the U.P.A.) has rightly summed up the situation as follows:

"The policy pursued by Moscow's Bolshevik government and by its Ukrainian agency has nothing in common with the actual will of the Ukrainian people... The so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic—like all the other so-called Soviet republics—as regards its character is not an "independent state of the Ukrainian people" (as the Bolsheviks hypocritically maintain), but an ordinary type of administrative system, and the usual type of unlawful government of the Bolshevik imperium... The so-called sovereignty of the Soviet republics is merely fictitious, and is part of a great deal of nonsensical talk by means of which the Bolsheviks seek to delude the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the whole world, and which has not the least practical significance. Neither the "Supreme Soviet" of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nor its "government" are authorised to act independently without the consent of the Moscow central committee" (see P. Poltava in *The Information Bureau of the U.H.V.R.*, 1950, No. 7, and elsewhere).

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is, therefore, not a state of the Ukrainian nation; such a state only exists in the form of an underground state, headed by the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (U.H.V.R.) and protected by the armed force of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.). The mission of the Ukrainian political émigrés, namely to represent this national independent and revolutionary Ukraine, runs counter to the defence of the "internal national rights" of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. To support the idea that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic should be represented in the U.N., is the same thing as to acknowledge the legality of the Bolshevik agency government which, as Moscow's tool, exterminates the Ukrainian nation and decimates it by deportations. The Ukrainians refuse to recognise any representation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in the U.N., but they are prepared to recognise a representation of Ukraine; they object to a "Soviet Ukrainian" delegation on the committee of the U.N. demanding that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic should be excluded, that its place on the committee should be taken by Ukraine, and

that the national representatives of the latter should be acknowledged as members.

It is obvious that suggestions made by some people in the U.S. that the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics should be excluded from the U.N. are based on very different pre-conditions; they refer to Ukraine and Byelorussia as such and erroneously compare their status to that of Texas or Pennsylvania. But this does not mean that the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians should allow themselves to be manoeuvred into a false position from which they would then have to defend the "right" of the Soviet republics in question to be represented in the U.N. in common with the Bolshevik agency of the Moscow government; for it is obvious that the latter, by officially sanctioning the setting up of ministries for foreign affairs in all the Soviet republics of the U.S.S.R. and of the corresponding war ministries, in this—naturally fictitious—way is scheming to substantiate its application for admission of these republics to the U.N., and from its own position on the committee of the U.N. in the paradoxical role of a champion of the national rights of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union, will then play off the latter against alleged "American imperialism."

The possible exclusion of Ukraine and Byelorussia (which, incidentally, seems very unlikely) would in the long run not be of much avail against these worn out propaganda lies and tactics. Our anti-Bolshevist propaganda must set itself much more radical and material aims: the exclusion of the U.S.S.R. and all the Soviet republics and satellite states from the U.N., since, according to the statutes of the U.N., aggressors, murderers of nations, subjugators and mass-extermimators of mankind cannot be members of the U.N.; furthermore, the inclusion of all the national states that have ever been occupied and subjugated by the Russian imperium, and recognition of their national representatives as members of the U.N. Our anti-Bolshevist work of enlightenment must deal with the problem of the membership of the "Soviet Ukrainian" and "Soviet Byelorussian" delegations on the committee of the U.N. not as an isolated and special case, but in connection with the problems of all the nations subjugated by Bolshevism, that is to say in connection with the importance of the internal disintegration of the Soviet Russian imperium, an event which alone can guarantee the world a lasting and a just peace.

From the point of view of formal international law, as was touched on above, the actual validity of the latter in practice should

not be vainly over-estimated. It is quite another matter to use certain formal concessions—by means of which Moscow is endeavouring to neutralise the revolutionary fight for freedom of the nations it has subjugated—for propaganda purposes and for the benefit of those nations; and it is also quite another matter to attempt to quote a basis in international law for the “legality” of certain (or of all) Soviet republics, and thus, of course, to a very considerable extent to blame the national interests of the subjugated nations of the Soviet Union for most of the misdeeds committed and still to be committed by the Kremlin. It would be both unwise and futile to attempt to imitate the ambiguous attitude of the Polish imperialists, who acknowledge the terms of the Yalta agreement as far as the Oder-Neisse Line is concerned, but not as regards Western Ukraine. This would be merely compromising oneself politically in the eyes of public opinion in the West. The Ukrainian claim to Lviv (Lvov, Lemberg) is not based on the Yalta agreement, but on the fact that it happens to be a Ukrainian town—a fact of which, incidentally, not only Sir Anthony Eden, but also Lord Curzon, were well aware. And similarly, the Ukrainian claim to a national representation, and one that has nothing to do with the Kremlin, on the committee of the U.N. is by no means based on Stalin’s persistence or Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s complaisance at Yalta, but on the historic past and on the present existence and fight of the Ukrainian nation, on the Ukrainian National Republic of the years 1917-1918 and 1919-1921, on the Ukrainian Hetmanate of 1918, on the Ukrainian government of 1941, on the present Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (U.H.V.R., since 1944) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A., since 1943), and finally on the present universal anti-Bolshevist fight of Ukraine for the moral ideals recognised by the West. We can confidently leave the question of finding a basis in international law for the fictitious “sovereignty” of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the latter’s would-be representatives, to the puppets and hirelings of the Kremlin. No compromise with Bolshevist ideas, based on international law, has so far proved to be either an honour or an advantage to anyone.

STATEMENT BY THE ORGANISATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

Below we reprint from "Shlyakh Peremohy", "The Way to Victory", No. 7, 13 February 1955, a Statement concerning the representation of Ukraine in the U.N.O. which was made by the Governing Body of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.) Abroad.

In connection with the suggestion to exclude the Ukrainian S.S.R. from the U.N.O. in a re-organisation of that institution, and in view of the various reactions this has caused in Ukrainian political circles abroad, the Governing Body of the Foreign Branches of the O.U.N. makes the following statement:

1. Ukraine has been enslaved by Bolshevik Russia; it has been occupied by Russian-Bolshevik armies, police, administrative and party machinery.

However, the Bolshevik enslavers have failed to destroy the national consciousness of the Ukrainians, the ethnical, spiritual, cultural and economic peculiarity of the Ukrainian nation which distinguishes her from Russia, nor have they succeeded in breaking her aspiration for independence.

The general resistance of the Ukrainian people to the Bolshevik enslavement and their continual liberation-revolutionary fight for absolute independence furnish telling evidence of their will and unquenchable desire for liberation from the Russian rule, for the destruction of Bolshevism and the restoration of the sovereign Ukrainian state, with a just social order based on Christianity and democratic principles.

2. The so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is neither a sovereign nor a real Ukrainian state, and its government is neither a legal nor an actual spokesman of Ukraine; it does not express the will of the Ukrainian people; it is only an agency of Bolshevik Russia forced upon Ukraine; it has for its object the enslavement of Ukraine.

The fact that the Bolsheviks have given the Ukrainian S.S.R. and its government the form of a Ukrainian state and government is one of Russia's concessions; it is Ukraine's firm aspiration for independence that has compelled Russia to make such concessions; in this way Russia tries to persuade the foreign world that Ukraine has, allegedly, voluntarily joined the U.S.S.R. and agrees to its policy, and to make Ukraine jointly responsible for Bolshevik crimes and aggressive actions against the free world.

3. The foreign political actions of the so-called government of the Ukrainian S.S.R., carried out on behalf of Ukraine and to Russia's tune, are illegal; they are not binding upon the Ukrainian people and the independent Ukrainian state.

Those illegal and non-Ukrainian actions include, among other things, the involving of Ukraine in Bolshevik political and military pacts and actions aimed at the establishment and expansion of the communist system all over the world, as well as endangering the security and independence of other peoples.

4. The representation of Ukraine in the U.N.O. by the delegation of the so-called government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. is not only illegal but pernicious to Ukraine, her prestige, and the cause of freedom of peoples.

In their foreign policy the Bolsheviks make good use of the participation of the so-called Ukrainian S.S.R. in the U.N.O.: they strengthen their positions and actions in that forum and deceive the world's opinion by maintaining that Ukraine has, allegedly, voluntarily joined the Bolshevik bloc as a sovereign state.

5. The representations of all the communist "governments" of the so-called satellite countries, which (governments) are not sovereign but forcibly set up by Bolshevik Russia and dependent upon it, should be excluded from the U.N.O., and their seats should be reserved for genuine national delegations, spokesmen of the non-falsified will of these peoples.

The attitude of the U.N.O. towards the matter of Ukraine and other non-Russian nations, which have been forcibly annexed to the U.S.S.R., and their representation in the U.N.O. should be identical to its attitude towards the matter of the representation of the so-called satellite countries.

The fact that all the peoples of the Soviet bloc are in the same situation, the fact that all of them have been enslaved by the Russian-Bolshevik empire, and that the communist governments forced upon them are agencies of the Moscow centre, should serve as a criterion in that matter.

The unequal attitude of the U.N.O. towards individual nations, according to the different dates of their enslavement by Russia and on the basis of formal differences which have been created by the Bolsheviks because of tactical considerations and which are contrary to the actual state of affairs, is unjust and wrong. It results from the fact that the West accommodates its policy to Bolshevik tactics aimed at a gradual subjugation of new countries.

6. If the representatives of the so-called government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. are excluded from the U.N.O. because they do not represent the legal government of the Ukrainian state, and if, at the same time, in the U.N.O. a seat is reserved for the real representative of an independent Ukraine, this will be a just and a right act.

For the same reasons, the U.N.O. should deprive the government of the U.S.S.R. of the right to represent Ukraine or to conclude any international legal acts on her behalf.

January 1955

Ilarion Holubovych

QUO VADIS BRITANNIA..?

*You can fool some people all the time,
You can fool all the people some of the time,
But you can't fool all the people all the time...*

Many of the Ukrainian exiles living in Britain have asked themselves the same question over and over again: Why is it that all the reds, pinks, fellow-travellers, fifth columnists, perverse liberals and all kinds of intellectuals and left wing socialists label as "fascist liar", "warmonger" anyone who attempts to tell Britons or Americans the truth about Russia as a country of slavery, and expose the Russian propaganda of lies? We think the answer may lie in the Communist habit of making anything and everything conform to the need of the Soviet situation at any given time.

The energy of the Ukrainian Political Emigration in revealing the real aim of Russian propaganda, making it quite clear that it is the Russians themselves who are the only real threat to world peace, is provoking the Russians almost to madness. The Russians are trying to persuade all Ukrainians to go back to Russia by making them the most beautiful promises and declaring that they await their return "with open arms." Leaflets and papers sent recently to Ukrainians in Britain and elsewhere are written in this way. But the Russians must have forgotten that these good sons and daughters were earlier called traitors, fascists, capitalists, spies, and so on; the Ukrainians, however, have good memories, they do not forget so easily, and they know only too well why it is that the Russians are so anxious to get them all back to Russia. The mere existence of these free groups of Ukrainians is a great menace to Bolshevik propaganda, based as it is upon such silly and self-evident lies as "people's democracy," religious freedom" or "workers' paradise."

In this way Russian propaganda has endeavoured to produce a deliberate black-out of Ukraine. We know well enough why the Russians are doing this, but it is difficult for us to understand why some circles of the democratic world—some of them even Catholic—are doing precisely the same. Simply to black-out a nation of forty-five million, because the Russian Cominform has decided to

kill or stifle anything that might reveal to the world something of the truth about the Soviet Union! Moskva locuta, causa finita...! But everything that can possibly be done to wake up the conscience of the free world in the task of removing that artificial black-out of Ukraine, that will we do, whether the Russians like it or not. We will disclose everywhere and at all times the truth about the Russian conspiracy of falsehood that is being constantly spread about the Western world. And yet, again, there are policies of that Western world that we cannot easily understand, such as, for instance, why there should be so many people in Great Britain who advocate the chopping up of the British Commonwealth by giving freedom to every nation within it, when at the same time those very people are doing their utmost to help Russia achieve her aim—the preservation of the “one undivided Russia”? Has the Western world two ways of measuring justice towards subjugated peoples?

Russian propaganda in the meanwhile tries to instill fear into the very hearts of democratic peoples, to break down their morale, corrupt their youth and intellectuals of all kinds, to disrupt their economies, and by these means to achieve their ultimate goal—conquest of the world. In Russian eyes Britain is the only obstacle in Europe to the achievement of this aim, and therefore she must be destroyed by any available means. Whether the British people believe this or not makes no difference to the truth.

It is hardly to be expected that the Russians will tell the Western world about their intentions. Instead, they try very hard to create the notion of a “New Look,” viz. that theirs alone is the “peace-loving country” while all the rest are war-mongering, fascist, rotten with capitalism. They also attempt to persuade all the free countries that the horrors of a new world war will be much worse than Communist world-domination, so that it would be better to give up their freedom and accept the Communist way of life as the lesser evil. Thus we hear hysterical cries in Britain and the U.S.A. to stop all production of nuclear weapons at once. Unfortunately we do not find in these resolutions any demand to stop the atom bomb from being prepared in the U.S.S.R. In this Russian-sponsored campaign is it not strange that the U.S.S.R. is never mentioned? We can remember Mr. Molotov’s boasts that Russia had the hydrogen bomb! How hard they try to terrify the British peace-loving people with their pre-fabricated tales of the complete destruction of our entire civilisation in a new world war. This tale is only good enough for the “rotten West” — we can recall what happened

to Malenkov who preached the same "silly story" to the Russian people.

For the version of the future war given to the Russians is quite different. The next war is to bring disaster; but this disaster is not for the Communists, only for the Western world. And by making a few comparatively non-important gestures Russian propaganda is now launching a new major lie: that "something" has changed in Russia. But if there has been a change, why the drawing of the dark curtain which has masked the crude realities of the exploitation and enslavement of the conquered peoples? Why bring to mind Lenin's apt exhortation: "We must use any ruse, dodge, trick, cunning, illegal method, concealment, veiling of the truth..." Is this not the Russian counterpart to the "big-lie" theory of Hitlerism? And since no-one today believes any longer in the old story of "Good old Joe" the Russians are busy preparing some new bluff about "the good gallant soldier Zhukhov".

Thus we now hear a great deal about the new 'changed' Russian attitude, about the New Look, the "charming smiles' conferences," Russian good-will and humanity and so on. Who bothers then that from time to time the world is shocked by the day-to-day brutalities which the Russians and their satellites commit daily—scandalising public opinion in the West. What about the shooting down of American planes, or of the Israeli Constellation airliner with the loss of 58 lives? Some people call it "wanton disregard of human life and of the elementary obligation of humanity." Those who still possess their humanity and sense of reality call it by its proper name—cold-blooded murder!

Russian propaganda still paints rosy pictures of the happy life in the U.S.S.R. but these are daily refuted and distorted by eye-witnesses who have managed to leave this paradise, and from them we hear quite a different story. We hear of the realities of the treatment of American and British soldiers in captivity or in the Arctic concentration camps; about the fate of British wives, and recently of Mrs. Phyllis Sispera. We Ukrainians cannot forget the Russian saying that "the best Englishman is the dead one...", or the boast that "We will not repeat Hitler's mistake; we will attack England with everything we possess, and then the whole of Europe will be ours..." It is right that the British should know what the Russians really think about them.

Amongst other things, the Russians are trying to create the notion that there is religious freedom in Russia. Russian "Church-

men" are visiting many countries, saying that religion flourishes in the Soviet Union. These churchmen come with stories of tolerance and of peace. Even the British know what to think about the reports of the "Red Dean" of Canterbury, but we never thought that these Russian "churchmen" would be accepted as the true representatives of the Church. I possess a picture of the Patriarch of Moscow, Alexei, as the people of the U.S.S.R. see him. On one side is the picture of Alexei, clad in Patriarchal robes with a cross in his hands, and also there is on the back another picture of Alexei, with the terrible face of a N.K.V.D. hangman, and in his hands, instead of a cross, are two "nagens"—Russian pistols. I should say this gives a good idea of what the Russian people think of their religious leaders. Besides, we must add that no Church leader exists in Russia today who has not been examined and passed as "sound" by the secret police, that no bibles have been printed since 1927, that no one under the age of 25 is allowed to be received as a member of the Church, and finally that church leaders are "instructed" to use their positions to foster propaganda for peace—on religious pretexts and of course on Russian terms. How then can the statements of Russian Church leaders be accepted at their face value—when there is in fact no true religious freedom in Russia or the satellites? The fate of the Ukrainian Catholic Hierarchy, the fate of other prominent Catholic Church leaders, is proof that no true Church can exist freely in the U.S.S.R. And on the very same day that the Russian churchmen were received by the Primate of England, a Russian broadcast, quoting Lenin, said: "We do not believe in God, because we know that the clergy, big landowners, and the bourgeoisie used to speak in the name of God in order to enforce their rule of exploitation." Even more significant is the following: "From the point of view of Communist reality, anything is ethical and moral that promotes the building of Communist society. Everything that hinders it is unethical and amoral." This may sound peculiar, but at least it is frank.

Let us consider for a moment that Russian fraud—the Russian-sponsored "peace congresses" organised throughout the world. We can all remember the Helsinki "appeal". Few, however, could not see that the real aim of this "peace" congress was to split the West. Separating America from her allies was the main goal of the 1486 delegates to the world peace congress in the final plenary session in the Exhibition Hall, Helsinki. These peacemakers seemed to have

forgotten what happened in Korea or Vietnam; they simply forgot who the aggressor was. What an appalling slip of memory!

There has followed the "Summit" conference of "charming smiles" in Geneva with its "magnificent achievements." Again we know well what was the main objective of these talks: to persuade the Americans to leave Europe, so that Russia can dominate the Continent, including Britain. Given a neutral Germany, Russia would withdraw her forces across the river; the British would withdraw theirs across the sea, and America hers across the ocean. By this simple operation Europe would be at the mercy of the Communists! For all these conferences which are supposed to ease tension merely give the time that Russia needs to prepare for the final assault on Western civilisation. When the Russians are ready, they will not wait for a minute even, a new and terrible "Pearl Harbour" will shock Britain, and there will be war whether Britain wants it or not. We pray only that Britain is prepared for that moment, for the Russian fleet has, after all, access to all British ports, and time enough to make all the maps needed for the final attack.

Today half of the world is free while the other half is enslaved; what is going to happen is that either the whole world will be free or the whole will be enslaved. The truth is as simple as that. And day and night Communist dupes and fellow-travellers, fifth columnists, with members of the Communist Party, repeat parrot-like the same barren lies and accusations against the West, against their own countries, protesting, of course, that "we stand aloof from politics." This phrase itself is grim proof of the extent to which these unfortunate "peace-makers" have been made tools of the Communist propaganda machine. We heard recently a bold statement by a British statesman that the British Communist Party is neither British nor Party, and those who still believe in such a cause should read what one of the prominent French Communists has to say on the French Communist Party in his book *L'Affaire Marty*. Many fair-minded people who have learnt the truth about the world-wide conspiracy of the crime aiming at the crazy idea of world-domination by the Russian imperialists, have left this criminal company rather than be its accomplices.

There is yet another method used by the Russians in their work to make Moscow the "Third Rome" — mistress of the world. There has been a wave of sudden strikes in Britain, and if one peers beneath the conspiratorial activities of the Communist Party factions in all important sections of British industry, one can see the chain that

links the unspectacular meeting in a café with the Kremlin, where Russia's Politburo meets. Decisions taken in Moscow which affect the "international working class" are relayed to the Vienna headquarters of the World Communist organisation. From Vienna a communication network relays decisions and advice to every National Communist Party, and because their latest advice is to create trouble in the transport industries, we need not be surprised at all these strikes in Britain. What is surprising is the kind of utterance the Russian traitors whisper into the ears of British workers, sayings like, for instance, this: "sooner may the state break than we will break our strike..."

The work of the Communists is always perfectly disguised, but in whatever trappings it appears, given the will, it can be detected. And this brings us back to the theme of this article. Someone at some time will open out the map of Europe, and discover who is the real menace and threat to the peace of this continent. And then the whole moth-eaten propaganda of lies and deception will begin to fall to pieces. The naked truth will be revealed and exposed plainly before the British people. The Russian political image of the "invincible giant" will be proved to be a giant with feet of clay; Russian imperialism may then be recognised and checked for ever. People will learn that Russia—the dungeon of nations—has been fed for centuries by the Ukrainian lands which are the richest in Europe, and that without Ukraine, Russia will be starved out of her menacing policies. Ukraine—long called the granary of Europe—needs badly those manufactured goods that Britain can produce, and in fair trade Ukraine could supply Britain with all the food and raw materials she lacks. No other country—and certainly not the highly industrialised Russia proper—in the world could offer such opportunities of reciprocal trade to Britain. Britain has always been ready to help those who are persecuted, and one day she will realise that she, too, has been deceived for centuries. It is, after all, not possible to "black-out" a nation of forty-five millions living in territories twice as big as Britain, and to disregard entirely her political aspirations just because it may be convenient to do so at present. A British politician said once: "Even if there were no Ukraine, we would have to create one to check Russian imperialism." But, thank God, Ukraine does exist, and may He speed the future day of good relationship between the Ukrainian and the British peoples. For the sake of the safety of both nations, this day should come very soon.

V. Derzhavyn

Significance of Bandung

The Afro-Asian Conference and the danger of a new colonialism

The fact that the conference of twenty-nine Asian and African states which was held in Bandung, Java, at the end of April, was a world event of considerable importance was unanimously admitted by the entire press of the free world; but as regards the deeper significance of this inter-continental conference, the first of its kind, from which the "white man" was excluded, there is much difference of opinion, and it is precisely the most wide-spread opinions that seem to pay least attention to the true character of the conference. This is mainly due to the fact that the conference, which was convened by the neutralist major powers of the Colombo Pact (India and Indonesia) with considerable support from Red China, abandoned in the course of its sessions a large part of its original aims. This fact was hushed up and partly remedied in the final resolutions, so that the conference might appear one in which all the participants had common interests. The most vital points in Asia's present problems—Formosa, Indo-China, Korea, and the possibility of Red China being admitted to the United Nations—were purposely passed over in silence in the resolutions, even though all these problems were dealt with in detail in the actual discussions; various other important factors were likewise omitted or concealed, but, on the other hand, much time was devoted to certain decisions, which would not of themselves have necessitated such a large-scale conference, since they had already been formulated as a "conditio sine qua non" of participation in the conference and were in no way influenced by the discussions that were held. For this reason it is necessary to distinguish between the resolutions decided upon by the conference in accordance with its programme, the resolutions which it actually decided upon contrary to the original intentions of its initiators, and the facts which came to light in the course of the conference but which were not explicitly mentioned.

The aims which the Conference had set itself

When the governments of India and Indonesia organised the conference (and in this respect they were assisted unreservedly by Burma and Afghanistan) they saw as its aim an impressive proclamation of the supposed unified front of the Asian and African nations against the colonialism and imperialism of the "white man" — who was thus to be branded as Enemy No. 1 — and at the same time (and from this point of view entirely logically) the fraternisation of all the "peace-loving" coloured nations with the Communist states of East Asia, namely Red China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, who for their part were to give some indication of their own "peaceableness". At least, that was Pandit Nehru's conception of the conference; it is, of course, at present impossible to say for certain whether Chou En-lai and his Communist satellites agreed to this programme unreservedly from the outset or whether, in the first place, they harboured hopes—on the strength of a "peace within the precincts of Asia"—of being able to persuade the conference to sanction their increased action against Formosa and South Vietnam. In any case, a kind of inter-continental "peoples' front" was to be formed against the white imperialists, and psychological pressure on a large scale was to be exerted on those "coloured" states guilty of a direct or indirect alliance with N.A.T.O. (Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Jordan, Libya) or with S.E.A.T.O. (the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam), and, of course, on Japan. Communist aggression and infiltration in Asia, on the other hand, were to be justified as the "lesser evil" or no evil whatsoever.

In order to bring about such a manifesto of the "unified front" against the West it was, of course, necessary to ignore certain militant anti-Communist opinions in Asia and to overstep the limits of international tradition and diplomatic etiquette in distributing the mandates. Neither National China (Formosa) nor South Korea received an invitation, since there could be no hope of Syngman Rhee's government being willing to compromise (it is fairly obvious that no invitation could thus be extended to North Korea). In order to persuade most of the Moslem countries to attend the conference, Israel had to be excluded from the list of countries invited (India and Burma objected to such a measure for some time, but in the end their objections were over-ruled), and the Moslem countries had to be coaxed with promises of a resolution which was to be directed specifically against Israel; such a resolution was

actually passed, to the effect that—and this was surely a Utopian demand—Israel should withdraw its frontiers to the demarcation line established by the U.N. Commission in 1948, though this does not appear to have much connection with the actual aims of the conference. In view of what has been said above, it is hardly surprising that the initiators of the conference considered it necessary to strengthen “anti-Western” opinion not only by inviting the Gold Coast (which at present is still in the transition stage between a colony and an autonomous state), but also by including certain political parties, “with an advisory vote”, from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

As compared to all this lavish organisation and propaganda, the concrete results of the conference must be regarded as fairly meagre. Apart from the general talk about the “establishment and promotion of friendly and neighbourly relations” and the “treatment of social, economic and cultural problems” (which would not have required an inter-continental conference in order to be worked out bilaterally), the only other important points discussed were the above-mentioned disparagement of Israel, Egypt’s demand to France to grant Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia their independence and the right of self-determination without delay, a condemnation of the racial policy pursued by the Union of South Africa, and, finally, a bilateral agreement between Red China and Indonesia. According to the latter all the Chinese living in Indonesia must opt for either Red Chinese or Indonesian nationality within the next two years, a measure which is obviously a mockery of the fundamental rights of mankind, since the majority of the Chinese now living in Indonesia fled there to escape from the Red Chinese terrorist regime, and will thus either be handed over to Chinese Communism or else will be obliged to put themselves in the hands of the definitely pro-Communist government of Indonesia.

As regards the general condemnation of “European and American” colonialism and imperialism, the conference, as will be seen below, took rather an unexpected turn when it came to this important and decisive question.

The Resolutions passed by the Conference

The representatives of those Asian countries which are directly or indirectly allied with either N.A.T.O. or S.E.A.T.O. were not merely content with defending their natural rights to self-protection against the danger of Communist invasion, but also took the offensive

by unmasking the colonial and imperialist nature of Soviet Russian and, in fact, Communist expansion, unsparingly. They affirmed that Communism, which was temporarily regarded as a welcome ally by some of the nations with colonial and semi-colonial status who were fighting for their national independence, would, after the emancipation of these nations, soon be regarded as an enemy who threatened their newly-won freedom once again and even more dangerously than the old colonial imperialism had done, since Communism is a form of imperialism which could never be thrown off and which would never forgo its claims of its own free will.

The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir Kotelawala, reproached the Soviet Union with pursuing an imperialist policy in Eastern Europe, and affirmed that it was questionable whether the European states of the eastern bloc (in this connection he mentioned Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, the three Baltic states, and Poland) were anything other than colonies of the Soviet Union. He pointed out that "the wolf of Communist subversive activity in the sheep's clothing of peaceful discussions" was engaged in exactly the same activity outside Europe, and added that most of the countries in Asia had realised from experience that the local Communist parties regard themselves as agents of the Soviet Union and of China.

The Prime Minister of Iraq, El-Djamali, was no less sparing in his condemnation of Communism, which he described as a "materialistic religion" which sows hatred among classes and nations; Communism, he added, is "a new form of colonialism which is much more dangerous for all of us than former (European) colonialism."

And finally, the Prime Minister of the Philippines, Carlos Romulo, warned the delegates against the danger of a new anti-European and pro-Communist racialism: "One of the greatest responsibilities as far as we Asians and Africans are concerned is to see that we do not fall into any racial traps; and that is precisely what will happen to us if we oppose the prejudice of the white race against us with our own prejudice against the white race—for the simple reason that it is the white race."

The national, religious, and cultural subjugation of the Asian "subjects" of the Soviet Union was at least touched on during the conference, inasmuch as all the members of the conference were supplied with memoranda on this subject. A special article elsewhere in this journal has been devoted to one of these memoranda*).

*) Page 42 below.

As a result of all these heated discussions, the "anti-imperialist unified front" planned by the Communist and their "voluntary satellites" proved a big fiasco. The final resolutions of the conference condemn "the existence of colonialism in every form in many parts of Asia and Africa"—an expression which each member of the conference could interpret according to his own personal opinion and which only makes a pretence of concealing the fundamental and irrevocable partition of the free Asiatic world into pro-Communist and anti-Communist states. The theory expressed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, namely that "every state has a right to self-defence, if necessary within a defence community which includes several states," was adopted almost word for word in the final declaration, contrary to Nehru's "co-existence policy," which is definitely opposed to the formation of regional defence communities.

The antithesis between Communism and anti-Communism and between a policy of enslavement and a policy of liberation has thus proved stronger than all ill-feelings based on historical and racial differences, and in this respect General Romulo was quite right when, in the course of a press interview, he described the conference as a striking success for the free world. Nehru was obliged to witness the collapse of his "pan-Asian" plans; nor did Chou En-lai by any means win the day, for he was obliged to adopt an attitude of diplomatic complaisance. Communist and pro-Communist propaganda against the alleged "colonial imperialism" of Europe and America failed to achieve its aims in this assembly which was to be of decisive importance for the whole of Asia.

Facts which the Conference intentionally concealed

There was such a thing as the colonial imperialism of the "white man," and all the remnants of this imperialism have by no means as yet been liquidated, but they are, after all, only remnants. On the other hand, however, there is still such a thing as totalitarian Communist imperialism which, in the countries that it has subjugated either by deception or by armed force, asserts its power more ruthlessly than in any colony. And, unfortunately, there is also much evidence of the fact that the nations which have become sovereign during the past decade are very prone to misuse their newly-acquired freedom and independence in order to pursue an imperialist policy as far as their neighbours are concerned—and in this respect the "coloured" races of today are no better than the

Europeans of yesterday, as can be seen from Egypt's claims to Sudan, India's claims to Kashmir (based on the strange reason that a Hindu dynasty formerly reigned there), Pakistan's claims to the territory of the Pathans, who regard themselves as an Afghan tribe, and so on, ad infinitum. Indonesia, too, aims to acquire colonies, and for this reason is attempting to assert its claims to Dutch New Guinea, that is to say to the territory of Papua, whose population is entirely alien to the Indonesians from the racial, cultural, and religious point of view; and Indonesia can apparently think of no better reason for its claim than that a Malayan prince tried in vain to set up his realm on the west coast of New Guinea a thousand years ago. And the great Afro-Asian conference in Bandung even went so far as to support this peculiar claim, unreservedly!

Neither European nor Communist imperialism can be successfully defeated by nations that resort to an imperialist policy of their own in this way. On this point, however, the Bandung conference unfortunately remained silent.

The Turkestanian Memorandum

Anti-Soviet activity at the Conference in Bandung

Mr. Rusi Nazar, the representative of the Turkestanian Union in the U.S.A., took part in the Afro-Asian Conference, and on 7 May 1955 he handed a Memorandum to the President.

While attending the conference, Mr. Rusi Nazar noted that the Communist members of the conference had not succeeded in persuading the representatives of the various nations to adopt a hostile attitude towards the Western powers. On the contrary, the majority of those attending criticised Soviet Russian colonialism and imperialism very severely, and objected to the subjugation of Turkestan and the other nations which have been incorporated in the Soviet Union.

On the first day in full session, Mr Rusi Nazar handed copies of the Memorandum to all those who had assembled for the session. Many of the delegates were greatly impressed, and gave vent to strong anti-Bolshevik feelings in their speeches. Particularly impressive speeches were made by the representative of Iraq, Prime Minister El-Djamali, by Prime Minister Kotelawala of Ceylon, by the delegate of the Philippines, Romulo, and by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohamed Ali. The latter described the enslavement of Turkestan and Kazakhstan as a typical example of Soviet imperialism.

On the second day of the conference Mr. Rusi Nazar arranged a press conference which was attended by 150 newspaper correspondents from all over the world. The ideas expressed during this conference in the presence of the journalists met with considerable response in both the Indonesian and the Western press, and to a very considerable extent helped to intensify the anti-Soviet attitude of the members of the conference. Even those delegates who officially adopted a neutral attitude revealed to Mr. Rusi Nazar, in the course of private conversations they had with him, that they were on the side of the nations subjugated by Bolshevism, and stressed the necessity of supporting these nations.

EXTRACTS FROM THE MEMORANDUM

Your Excellency!

The representatives of the peoples of Asia and Africa have gathered today at Bandung, a city which until recently was the centre of the Indonesian independence movement. The purpose of their meeting is to discuss problems related to the destiny of the peoples of Asia and Africa, and to confer on such an important question as measures to be taken in the struggle against the remnants of the colonial system which are still to be found in some areas of these two continents. Unfortunately, the representatives of the Turkistani people, a people which has played an important role in the progress of mankind in the past and which will undoubtedly do so again in the future, cannot take part in this historic Afro-Asian conference at which the future of the peoples living in these two continents will be discussed. Their places will remain empty.

Those who organised the conference cannot be blamed for this non-participation of the Turkistani people. The blame must be put on the colonial system which still exists in certain regions of Asia.

Colonial imperialism has enslaved a number of peoples in Asia—the Turkistanis, the Volga-Ural Tartars, the Azerbaijanians, Georgians, North Caucasians, Kalmyks and Crimean Tartars—turning their beloved homeland into colonies of the most dangerous colonial imperialism in the history of mankind—the Communist imperialism of Moscow. This imperialism is particularly

dangerous because it does not content itself with economic exploitation of the countries of which it has taken possession through bloody war and oppression, but because it also claims these countries to be "inseparable parts of Russia."

Through the centuries, Muscovy expanded and grew at the expense of neighbouring states. One people after another lost its independence and fell victim to Moscow's imperialism. Annexing the surrounding Russian principalities to Muscovy in the beginning of the 16th century and strengthening them militarily, Ivan the Terrible began to wage aggressive war against his neighbours. His plan of aggression was first of all to conquer and occupy one by one the small Khanates to the east which had their origin in the Golden Horde. In 1552, after four years of war, Ivan the Terrible took Kazan, the capital of the Kazan Khanate which he annexed to Muscovy. He ordered the men to be killed and made the women, girls and children his slaves. Not content with this, the aggressor attacked the Khanate of Astrakhan which he occupied in 1556. He continued to expand to the east, taking possession of the Nogay mirzas and the Siberian Khanates in wars of expansion. Towards the beginning of the 18th century, Russia reached out her talons to the west and south and occupied the Crimean Khanate in 1782.

To conquer the Caucasus, Russia waged war for fifty years, shedding rivers of blood. The Russian historian, Fedeyev, wrote: "War with the Caucasian mountain peoples requires a big army of us (280,000 men). With such an army we could have marched from Egypt to Japan."

With the intention of conquering the heart of Asia, Turkistan, Russia began military operations against that area in 1717. Her wars of aggression ended in 1884 with the annexation of West Turkistan to the "prison of nations." Russia's basic idea, however, was not to limit herself to the conquest and exploitation of Turkistan, but to expand her dominion to what is today Pakistan and India, touching the Indian Ocean, thus establishing her hegemony over the world. In other wars, Russia intended to realise the political testament of Peter I in which he had stated: "it is essential to come as close as possible to Constantinople and Eastern India—whoever possesses those will rule the world."

For this reason the Tzarist rulers transformed Turkistan into a military base against Asian countries by creating two local military Districts, one of the Steppe (Oct. 21, 1863) and the other of Turkistan (June 23, 1876). At the same time the remaining free states of Turkistan, the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva were converted into Russian satellites and the direction of their foreign affairs was taken over by the Tzar.

The enslaved peoples, did not abandon their struggle against the aggressive colonial imperialist. They did not cease fighting to regain their freedom and independence. The uprising of the Volga-Ural Tartars under Qara Saqal, Bulat Batur and Salavat Batur; the struggle of the Caucasian peoples under their great Imam Shamil against the aggressors; the insurrection in Turkistan led by Aptabacibaj Abdurahmanbek; the defence of the Gok-tepe and the uprising of Dukci Eshan are living examples of the uninterrupted struggle for freedom and independence of the enslaved peoples, which in its turn saved other nations of Asia from falling into the hands of Moscow's imperialism.

To crush the liberation movements of the enslaved peoples, the cruel aggressor resorted to the most ruthless methods of terror. In this he followed Tzar Nicholas' dictum—"Bend your neck or perish."

It should be noted that the colonial wars waged by the Russian Tzars did not improve the living conditions of the Russian people in the slightest degree. On the contrary, the aggressive wars placed ever heavier burdens and difficulties upon the Russian masses. As a result, the Russian people rose up against the Tzarist regime.

The fall of the Tzarist regime filled the enslaved and oppressed peoples with joy and gave them new hope. The nations which had freed themselves from Tzarist colonial slavery, the Azerbaijanians, North Caucasians, the peoples of the Volga-Ural areas, proclaimed their independence during the period of revolution, 1917-18.

In Turkistan, the cradle of the Turks, two governments were formed in 1917—the Alash Orda Government and the Turkistani National Government (Kokand Autonomous Government). Thus the historic struggle of the oppressed peoples for liberation from Russian imperialism was finally crowned with success. In a short time the national governments of the independent republics were able to set up their state apparatus on a democratic foundation, to rebuild the economy which had been destroyed during the war and revolution, and to implement land reform and set up a national school system.

Unfortunately, these young independent democratic republics were not granted a long life. The Communists, who had staged an anti-democratic counter-revolution in Petrograd and had assumed power in October 1917, sent the plundering Red Army against the young national states to recover the former Tzarist colonies. The Communist aggressors did not content themselves with seizing the territories of the Alash Orda and the Turkistani National Government. Without declaring war they also forcibly occupied the Emirate of Bukhara (Sept. 11, 1920) and the Khanate of Khiva (1919). In annexing the Moslem state of West Turkistan, which covers an area of 3,933,000 square kilometres and which is rich in natural resources such as iron, silver, gold, coal and oil, and which has a population of some 17 million people, Communist imperialism strove to establish hegemony in Asia and, proceeding from this base, to transform the whole of Asia into its colony.

But the peoples of Asia who have fallen victim to Moscow's Communist imperialism have not surrendered to the enemy. The Volga-Ural "war of pitchforks and scythes," the partisan movements in the Caucasus, and particularly the so-called "Basmach" movement of the *beks*, which began as an armed movement for independence after the destruction of the Turkistani National Government (the Kokand Autonomous Government) by the Bolsheviks, are living testimony that these peoples have not surrendered to the Communist imperialism of Moscow.

The movement of the Turkistani *beks* grew into a general uprising of the people against the enemy. On April 15, 1922, the people succeeded in proclaiming the Turkistani National Moslem Republic in Samarkand. But the aggressive Communist colonial imperialist took barbarous measures to crush the struggle for the liberation and independence of the oppressed Asian peoples and to establish their own rule. The Kremlin imperialists ruthlessly

followed the maxim: "If the enemy does not surrender, let him be destroyed." Millions of sons of the peoples fighting for their liberty and independence became victims of the Communist colonial terror.

The oppression and sufferings which the enslaved peoples had experienced under the Tzarist colonial imperialists were as nothing compared to what they were made to undergo by the Communist colonial imperialists.

Representatives of the free peoples of the Asian and African continents!

The twentieth century is the century of the liquidation of colonialism. It is the century of national liberation. In recent times a number of Asian and African peoples have thrown off the yoke of colonialism. The U.S.A. has granted independence to the Philippines. Britain was obliged to recognise the independence of Pakistan, India and Burma. Libya has joined the family of independent countries. As a result of long years of struggle, the people of Indonesia have won their independence. The fact that these peoples have won their independence has instilled pride and hope in our enslaved peoples still suffering under Communist imperialism's yoke.

There is no doubt that the peoples of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, the North Caucasus, the Volga-Urals, and of West Turkistan, who are suffering under Moscow's communist imperialist oppression, and the people of East Turkistan who are enslaved by the Peiping Communist aggressors, as well, will regain their independence and create their own independent states.

We, the sons of the oppressed peoples, ask you, the representatives of the free peoples of Asia and Africa, to give us your moral support in our struggle for liberation and independence. If these enslaved peoples cannot gain their independence, if they remain colonies of Communist imperialists—your independence is also threatened.

In the name of the participants in the armed struggle for the independence of Turkistan, I express the hope that you will extend your attention to our just cause.

Former Officer of the Turkistani Legion
Rusi Nazar

"CO-EXISTENCE"

Current Ukrainian press circles suggest that one of the purposes of the "hand of friendship" popularly supposed to be extended towards the West by Russia is to cause the nationals of countries subjugated by Russia to abandon hope of help from the West. Should Russia and the West "co-operate", runs the argument, it is allegedly futile for those fighting to liberate their countries to expect support against the Soviet enslavers from outside the U.S.S.R.

A. Mykulyn

Trends in Soviet Militarism

Hatred against the Western World is propagated in the U.S.S.R. as an official doctrine of the socialist system. This hatred is not concealed from the Soviet population at all; on the contrary, it is employed as a dogma in the education of the Soviet population and of the Soviet army, appearing openly in Soviet propaganda and permeating this both inside and outside the U.S.S.R. In spite of the sensational and noisy declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the red-Russian government concerning the peaceful "co-existence" of two different systems, the Soviet army is being steadily prepared and trained for a strategic attack, not defence, on all the countries of the world. The present international tension between the U.S.S.R. and the Western World has reached a deadlock, and it may be that no conferences of the big four or three, no "peaceful" and "friendly" declarations made by both sides, no tokens of loyalty and no diplomatic action aimed at clearing up controversial points—no co-operation of both the "opposite" systems will be able to prevent an armed conflict between the Western World and the U.S.S.R. High political and diplomatic posts sometimes hinder their holders from estimating situations realistically and practically, but this is a mistake never made by Russian diplomats, and it is necessary for the West to demonstrate its military, not only its diplomatic, substance before the eyes of the Russian imperialists, and to speak to them from a position of strength. An armed conflict can be postponed by procrastination, but it may come and the main point is who will attack first. The past and present diplomatic actions of the Western World and its projects for the future are by no means an indication that the Western World will be the first to take the initiative and to surprise Russia. If, however, one believes the peaceful declarations of the Kremlin, the resolutions of the World Peace Council (agents of Communist Russia), the present campaign aimed at the collection of signatures for the appeal of the World Peace Council, the speeches delivered by Gromyko at the London conference for the preparation of disarmament, and other clumsy tricks of the Russian Empire,

one has the impression that Russia will not be the first to start a war either. But this is mere illusion. In fact, while lulling the vigilance of the Western World, Russia is speedily preparing a strategic attack on the West. While two years ago Soviet military thought was faced with the dilemma whether the U.S.S.R. should attack the West first or prepare and wait for an attack, today the General Staff of the Soviet army feels confident that he who attacks first will gain the victory in any future world war. And so the General Staff of the Soviet Army is careful to have plans ready by which it may surprise the West and outstrip the capitalist world.

A long, comprehensive article on this subject has been published by the Soviet military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) No. 70, 1955. Its author, P. Rotmistrov, marshal of the armoured forces, is a well-known and outstanding worker in the War Ministry of the U.S.S.R. Thus the article by Marshal Rotmistrov officially expresses the opinion of both the War Ministry of the U.S.S.R. and the General Staff of the Soviet army. It also guides the body of officers, the scientists, the military academies, and the whole Soviet army over questions of the future world war.

Marshal Rotmistrov says: "Soviet military science, the marshals and generals of the army, the whole army and the body of officers should not forget the fact that, considering the present state of equipment of the army and navy and the existence of such means of fighting as the atom and hydrogen bombs, the suddenness of an attack is an ever-efficacious factor. Suddenness of attack is the most important element of warfare and may decide the issue of the war. The outcome of the future war may completely depend on who will be the first to employ this element of suddenness."

Military history has repeatedly ascertained that thanks to surprise attack the aggressor always gains the upper hand. In his pamphlet *Who decides the issue of the war?* the Soviet military scientist, M. Taranchuk, says frankly that thanks to her surprise attack employed during World War II, Germany succeeded in invading the countries of Western Europe, and in putting the Soviet army in so awkward a position that the U.S.S.R. had to strain to the utmost to deprive the enemy of the superiority he had won by his surprise attack in 1941. This idea is being developed by the General Staff of the Soviet army, who hold that at the present moment a surprise attack is not only possible, but may even be counted on by the U.S.S.R. over its enemy—i.e. the Western World—as one of the determinants of war.

The General Staff of the Soviet army does not deny the fact that the Americans also take into consideration the necessity of a surprise attack and a Blitzkrieg or even a super-Blitzkrieg. "Naturally, we are also taking it into consideration," says Rotmistrov, "therefore we say frankly that, having employed a surprise attack and made use of atom and hydrogen bombs, we may not only achieve a decisive success in the beginning of the war, but win a sweeping victory."

The military articles published by the collection "Soviet Military Science" of the years 1954-5 also persistently put forward the opinion that the Soviet army must not only be prepared for a surprise attack by the aggressive imperialist forces of the Western World, but employ such an attack first.

"The paramount importance of surprise attack in future war is so obvious that the Soviet army should at any time be ready to carry out an order of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, and to inflict a smashing defeat on the enemy if circumstances require it. But it will only be possible provided the Soviet forces are already very vigilant and prepared not only to frustrate but to prevent all the intentions of the aggressors, and to annihilate them." Thus the general of the army, V. Petrov, writes in his military pamphlet.

However, in the opinion of the Soviet General Staff, surprise attack is not the only determinant in winning the victory. The Soviet General Staff and the War Ministry of the U.S.S.R. also take into consideration the possibility that their surprise attack may be prevented by the Western World or, if it is carried out by Russia, may fail to achieve the desired success. The military scientists say that in their military operations the Soviet strategists must always imagine themselves in the position of the enemy's strategists; they should not forget the fact that bourgeois military science and strategists do not deny the paramount importance of ever-effective military factors. "There have never been bourgeois or Soviet military commanders who would not take into consideration the strength and power of their rear, the number and quality of their divisions, the equipment of their army, the officers' talent for organisation, the power of military economy, the soldiers' fortitude—those always efficacious military factors which decide the issue of war," says the General Staff of the Soviet army.

In the opinion of Soviet military specialists, the superiority of the Soviet army over armies of the Western World, and the superiority

of the U.S.S.R. over Germany in the last war, lay in the fact that the U.S.S.R. was in the economic and moral respect stronger than Germany, and has remained so. Besides, according to Soviet strategists, in World War II the immense areas of the U.S.S.R. contributed much to the defeat of the German army in the east. Treatment of the subject "The immense areas of the U.S.S.R. and their military importance in World War II and the future world war" is being put to the fore in scientific strategic and tactical works by Soviet strategists. The subject "The immense areas of the U.S.S.R. and partisan warfare in the future war" is also being treated elaborately. Attention, too, is being focused on the immense areas of Siberia and the Soviet territories in Asia. The General Staff of the Soviet army covers all territories from the Eastern Zone of Germany to Red China, Mongolia, Korea, and Vietnam as its territories. Soviet strategists point out that the immense areas of the U.S.S.R. will enable them to "draw" the enemy into the heart of the country, to expose him to partisan attacks and sabotage, and that those immense areas will become as it were a safe air-raid shelter protecting people from atom and hydrogen bombs.

The present building up of heavy and light industry, the concentration of strategic material reserves, the accumulation of military potential, are being carried out by the General Staff of the U.S.S.R. in different points of the immense areas of the U.S.S.R. distant from each other. In general, the Soviet territories in Asia are wrapped in mystery, but it is an open secret that behind the Ural Mountains the Soviets have built up their heavy industry, an industrial triangle, Magnitogorsk-Karaganda-Kuzbas, which will be sustained by the grain of the virgin lands of Kazakhstan. Moreover, powerful plants and electric power stations are being built on the Lena, in the environs of Irkutsk and Yakutsk, on the River Angara, on Lake Baikal, on the Igarka, Yenisei, the rivers Irtysh-Ob, the Amur, and so on. Obviously, Russia is there occupied not with "peaceful construction" but with building plants which will at some time produce arms.

"The immense areas of our native country," says Marshal Rotmistrov, "the dispersion of the population, the industrial centres, and all the means of production, will play a more important role in the future war than they played in World War II. We shall be able to organise speedily and to restore our military economy deep in our rear, to concentrate the necessary forces, and annihilate the enemy."

The third determinant, after the surprise attack and the immense areas of the U.S.S.R. is, in the opinion of the General Staff of the Soviet army, the moral steadfastness of the soldiers of the Soviet army and the inconsistency and lack of a spiritual idea among the soldiers of the armies of the Western World. In the opinion of Soviet strategists, along with the increase of the technical armament of the army, and the use of atom and hydrogen bombs, the importance of man himself does not decrease; on the contrary it increases.

The strengthening and implanting of aggressiveness, an implacable hatred against the enemy, communist fortitude, and fanatical patriotism toward the Soviet in the minds of Soviet soldiers are today the basis of political and fighting morale in the Soviet army. The outstanding political workers of the Soviet army say: "What idea and fighting spirit can the imperialists implant in their armies when they start a war against the U.S.S.R., against the socialist community which has proved its superiority over the capitalist world during the 37 years of its existence? The Western armies will refuse to fight for American monopolies and capitalist interests. The war against Germany has proved once more that, although Germany was a strong and well-armed power, training and strict discipline could not compensate for the fighting spirit which the German soldiers lacked."

Today the political workers and officers of the Soviet army are required to implant in the minds of Soviet soldiers courage, fearlessness, a disdainful attitude towards death, ability to bear the burden of war under conditions of atomic warfare, to sustain their individual fighting spirit, and to gain the victory by their fight.

The manoeuvres of Soviet troops which took place in the autumn of last year, the winter manoeuvres, and especially the Arctic manoeuvres, were in fact preparations for a surprise attack on the Western World. During the manoeuvres all the three Soviet factors were employed: surprise attack, immense areas, and steadfastness of fighting spirit.

Military science teaches us that one should obtrude one's will upon the enemy and compel him to fulfil it. Today both sides, the Western World and the U.S.S.R., are faced with the cardinal problem of who will be the first to attack. The indications are that Russia will be the first to attack. The irresolution of the West, and its weakness in manifesting its military-strategic will may exact a fearful cost.

I. Bandura

The Problem of Land-ownership in Ukraine

The solution of this problem resembles the solution of a mathematical equation with many unknown quantities, as for instance: a) the time when Ukraine will be liberated, which is of particular importance, b) the population we shall have at that time, c) the movables and immovables which will be left in Ukraine (agricultural implements, live stock, agricultural industry, and the like), d) the sown area, e) to what extent Ukraine will be devastated during its liberation, and the like. In the absence of all such information we could not approach towards a more or less correct solution of the problem, but on the basis of the information we do possess, it is possible to sketch the outlines of future land-ownership in Ukraine. Certainly, it is too early to speak of a new land-ownership code, but we should work up this subject at least in general outlines in order to have a notion of the future forms of land-ownership in the liberated Ukraine.

The peasants are labourers, and not proprietors of the land; all the agricultural products and implements belong to collective farms which are managed by the state. There is no personal property there. One cannot either sell or bequeath the land, one's own grange, or the products of collective farming. First of all, the greater part of the crop must be delivered at a very low price, and the rest can be distributed among the labourers according to the work-days fulfilled. On an average, 400-800 grammes of cereals and two roubles in cash are paid for one work-day. The state pays 40 kopeks for 1 pood of rye and 60 kopeks for 1 pood of wheat or 3.5 kopeks for 1 kg, and sells bread to the labourers at the price of 1 to 1.5 roubles for 1 kg. This miserable budget enables the peasant to lead only a bare existence, and the exploitation of the people who have no rights exceeds all bounds. The state makes 2 to 3 thousand per cent out of many agricultural products. The slogan "The land for the peasants" is realised in this way.

This form of collective farming is very convenient for the state exploitation of a people and fitted to the exploitation of peasants

because the organisation of labour is based on coercive measures. Nobody has the right either to quit his job or to change his abode, certainly not to move to another region. Nobody is entitled to take products of his own work for his own consumption at any price because this is regarded as "squandering and theft of state property" for which people are sentenced to 10-20 years' slave labour in Siberian camps.

The tillage of land not one's own and the rigorous coercive measures spoil man's pleasure in his work; none of the peasants is interested in it, but works because it is necessary to work in order to keep alive. One cannot compare the tillage of one's own land with that in collective farms where there is often bad organisation and irresponsibility which is not met with on privately owned farms. The low wages humiliate man and destroy his aspirations to complete his work.

A large percentage is made up of state farms which are based on other principles. Many of them include areas from 10,000 to 100,000 hectares (1 hectare = 2.47 acres) and produce different sorts of agricultural products, as, for instance: sugar beet, cotton, cereals, cattle, and the like. Those are the so-called agricultural factories where the worker gets only his wages and buys the necessary goods at state shops. Those farms are managed by the state. Owing to the low wages, those farms are also managed unsatisfactorily, and some of them have even been losing. The fact is that unqualified persons are often directors of those farms and have brought them near to ruin, although the farms had the best soil and were not obliged to pay any taxes. This does not mean that such farms are unprofitable. If their economy were well organised, they could yield very high profits.

No wonder that, having a thirty five years' experience in agriculture, the communist party has finally come to the conclusion that the state of agriculture is unsatisfactory and, by order of Secretary General M. Khrushchov, has set about cultivating the virgin soil in Kazakhstan, previously uncultivated not for want of workmen, but because poor and unprofitable. It should be realised that this development is only a means to get rid officially of the undesirable nationalistic youth in Ukraine and Byelorussia which may become a serious menace in the event of a new war. It is a new method of extermination and the settling apart of the enslaved peoples in the communist Babylon.

Ukraine is in a position to develop its agriculture because it possesses the best soil in the world. This is shown by the words of the outstanding soil scientist Vasyl Vasylovych Dokuchayev who wrote as early as 1880: "the black earth is dearer to Russia than oil and coal; it is dearer than gold-mines and iron-mines; it constitutes the eternal inexhaustible Russian wealth". (Selected Works, Volume 3, page 325). But Ukraine's wealth consists not only in its black earth, but also in its natural resources, its rivers, and, in general, its favourable geographical location.

According to Professor V. Kubyovych's information, on 1 January 1939, Ukraine (together with the Crimea, Kuban, Kholm region, and Pidlyashya) included an area of 932,100 square kilometres with 54,200,000 inhabitants of whom 15.7 millions or 29 per cent were townspeople, and 38.5 millions or 71 per cent were villagers. In recent years, along with the development of industry, this ratio between the townspeople and the villagers changed, and now the rural population constitutes 60-65 per cent or approximately 32.5 millions.

Landed property in Ukraine includes the following:

- a) arable land — 68 per cent or 63,382,000 hectares
- b) forests — 12 per cent or 11,186,000 hectares
- c) meadows, pastures — 14 per cent or 13,049,000 hectares
- d) others, poor — 6 per cent or 5,593,000 hectares

In the year 1916 land-ownership in Ukraine was as follows:

- 1) farms of more than 10 hectares constituted 30 per cent of all land and were owned by 10 per cent of the wealthy population;
- 2) farms of up to 3 hectares formed 6 per cent of all land and were owned by 35 per cent of the poor;
- 3) farms comprising from 3 to 10 hectares amounted to 64 per cent of all land and were owned by 54 per cent of the middle peasants.

Obviously, the farms in different lands of Ukraine were not of equal size. In Right-Bank Ukraine¹⁾ and Podolia the farms were small, in Left-Bank Ukraine²⁾, Kuban, and the Crimea they were large.

Considering the above mentioned types of landed property and the approximate number of inhabitants which has considerably

¹⁾ To the right of the River Dniro, i. e. West and Central Ukraine.

²⁾ Eastern Ukrainian lands.

changed since then and may change in the future, one should take into account an expedient allotment of land which would strengthen the state and improve the standard of living of the population. The farms should be divided in two groups: a) state productive farms and b) farms producing foodstuffs differing from one another in size and kind of farming, namely: the first group would have allotments up to 25 hectares and include 50 per cent of the rural population; the second one—from 7 to 10 hectares, and would include the other 50 per cent. The state farms would have to contain a part of the arable land, forests, meadows, and pastures as well as poor lands and barrens which, on the whole, would constitute nearly 10 per cent of the whole area. Those lands should be devoted to farming of general, state importance, as for instance, seed growing, sugar-beet production, cattle breeding, and the like, which would help to improve privately owned farms and to develop the agricultural industry. The general scheme of land-ownership appears thus:

According to our former calculations, in Ukraine there will be started more than 5.5 million farms (1.5 million large farms and 4 million middle-sized ones), with different types of landed property, including 77,410,000 hectares, and the rest, 13.8 millions, will belong to the state farms. Obviously, not all the lands are of the same quality. Therefore, they should be evaluated before being allotted because, for example, 5 hectares of black earth are worth a great deal more than 10 hectares of poor land.

The large state farms will be employed as sources of agricultural production and the conversion of products where modern machines will be profitably employed, and which will supplement the public funds. They will also include agricultural Experimental Stations which will give new cultures that will be reproduced, as seed, by the state farms. The large forests, as state forestries, as well as new afforestations must be under the control of the state even if they are to be managed by privately owned farms or co-operatives.

The existence of large, privately owned, productive farms will make it possible to manage them more economically and conveniently, to make good use of expensive and complicated machines, to bring down the price of products, and to offer them in large quantities. Pre-revolutionary practice showed that farms up to 25 hectares were very profitable because most of them were owned by great families who were in a position to make use of all the achievements of modern agricultural engineering.

Medium-sized farms up to 10 hectares of land must contain a higher percentage of intensive cultures. Most of them must be situated in suburban zones which would be able to supply the urban population with fresh vegetables and fruit. Agricultural Societies for Common Tillage of Land and Co-operatives for sale and conversion of products would have an opportunity to play their part in the organisation of work in such farms. This will also depend on the trend of development of the agricultural regions of Ukraine which differ from each other as to their natural-climatic conditions. The line of development of agriculture will depend on them. The following economic regions have evolved in Ukraine so far: 1) sugar industry region, 2) grain-growing region, 3) cotton-growing region, 4) potato-grain-growing region, 5) region of technical crops, and the like.

Another important question concerning the allotment of land is whether people should obtain land gratis or buy it. In our opinion, considerable amounts of money will be necessary for putting in operation the state machinery. Therefore, it would be a mistake to allot the land gratis. The land should be sold at moderate charges and paid for by instalments during several years. The farmer will appreciate the land he has paid for more than land received as a present from the state. Obviously, any retrocession of land to former land-owners or their successors is out of the question, and all Ukrainians who wish to till the land must obtain it according to the general principles.

Along with the development of agriculture, it will be necessary to develop the industry which will employ the rest of the population.

At the beginning, during the building of mills and factories, it might be necessary to allot personal plots of land attached to mills and factories where the workers could garden in their spare time, or to start factory-farmsteads which would contribute to the solution of the workers' housing problem.

It would be desirable to work out the fundamental principles of the land code in detail and bring it to the notice of the entire Ukrainian émigré community; our native country should be informed, at least over the radio, of the main problems of the agrarian policy.



Ivan Franko 1856-1916

IVAN FRANKO **1856-1916**

Poet, publicist and scholar

The renown of Ivan Franko and his high qualities both as a public figure and as a literary leader of Galician Ukrainians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should not be allowed to obscure the constant material and professional difficulties that beset him all through his life. The beauty of his poetry, the maturity of his thought and his sureness of judgment were the outcome of genuine scholarship and talent inspired by a love of nature and of the homely life of his native countryside, a love sturdy enough to withstand the challenge of political and social scorn. For Franko was the outstanding figure of the progressive movement amongst Ukrainians in Galicia—then ruled by Polish landlords under the aegis of the Austrian Empire—and his dogged disregard of misfortune in the cause of the enlightenment of his people earned the admiration of all Europe.

Ivan Franko was born in 1856, during the last years of Shevchenko's imprisonment in Siberia. His father was a peasant farmer and the village blacksmith of Nahuyevychi in the County of Drohobych. Ivan was the eldest of three sons and at the age of six he attended school in a neighbouring village, lodging with his mother's brother who was tolerably well-educated. Two years later the boy went to the Basilian Fathers' school in Drohobych and in due course passed on to the Gymnasium there for the full eight years of study. Hard work, a fine memory and an unerring taste for the "best" in his reading enabled him to lay the foundation of his literary reputation while still at school.

Ivan's father died in 1865 and his mother married again. One of the firmest influences in his life was the friendship that then began with his step-father, and which lasted even after the death of his mother and his step-father's re-marriage.

It may have been the early changes of scene that developed the boy's keenness of perception both as regards the everyday work of farm and forge and the complexities of human nature. For Ivan Franko's poetic vision is strongly tempered by humanism, and it was his accurate and truth-loving observation of the world and its ways that led him steadily from the romanticism of his earlier years to the realistic insight of the later.

By the time Franko left Drohobych for the University of Lviv in 1875 he had already shown himself master of the three languages—Polish, Ukrainian, and German—and had presented work to his teachers in both verse and dramatic form. One sonnet had been printed. He had also a large collection of folk-songs which he had written down and by which he was strongly influenced in favour of the Ukrainian tradition as against the Polish social order and culture.

Franko's feeling for the people and the land of his birth is expressed with unsurpassable delicacy in a passage from *The Death of Cain* (below) where the outcast Cain is approaching the village of his childhood. The landscape is of course different, but the description is permeated with a glowing warmth that comes from the poet rather than from the charming, sunlit scene.

At the age of seventeen, Franko had written a sonnet to Kotlyarevsky (below) who had in 1798 published a burlesque of the Aeneid in Ukrainian. This had been the first literary use of the living Ukrainian language and the example had been followed by some writers in Great Ukraine—that part of Ukraine dominated by Muscovite Russia. In view of the warmth and ease of Franko's sonnet it is not surprising that he himself wrote mostly in Ukrainian all his life, and endeavoured in every possible way to present it as worthy of the highest forms of written expression.

Soon after his arrival in Lviv, Franko joined a society which published a fortnightly paper, and from this time on he was forced to find in journalism not only the means of awakening the national consciousness of his people, but also his livelihood and, later, that of his family. The student periodical for which Franko wrote published many articles and letters by the Ukrainian patriot Michael Drahomanov who had lost his professorship at Kyiv on account of his democratic ideas. Drahomanov was now living in Geneva and devoting much of his time to the encouragement of his fellow countrymen in the development of the Ukrainian tongue and culture.

Franko and many of his fellow workers on the editorial staff were arrested in 1877 and imprisoned for their connection with Drahomanov. The main importance of this episode for Franko and his friends lay in the fact that it effectively destroyed their hopes of scholastic careers, and left them to face the problem of earning a living in some field other than the one for which they were most fitted. In 1880 Franko was again arrested on suspicion, and this time ordered to return to his birthplace. A shocking journey while feverish resulted in a serious illness and bitter depression from which he was fortunately rescued when one of his prison associates, becoming anxious on his behalf, sent a friend to find him.

This period thus marks the real beginning of Franko's life-work in political journalism, only superseded in his later years when literary achievements enabled him to live in some little comfort. In the political confusion of the times, when the Polish rulers of Galicia—then including also those districts of western Poland round Cracow—had to pay their dues to Austria by the exploitation of the Ukrainian peasantry, when Ukrainians looked either to Austria for protection against the Poles, or to Muscovy for delivery from Poland and Austria, Franko saw in the future the possibility of a re-united Ukraine which would be bonded neither to Poland nor to Russia. But before such a dream could become true, the hard task of educating the Ukrainian countryfolk in citizenship and responsibility and of inspiring in them the clear desire for their independence as a people loomed before him in the years ahead. With this high purpose in mind Franko was able to hold himself aloof from doctrinaire "class-conscious" and "class-warring" Marxist socialism and to place his trust in the true way of social democracy and the participation of the masses in solving the problems of their own future. The poems *Hymn* and *The Pioneers* printed below express the fervour of Franko's belief in the power of man for progress and liberty, and his lifelong hatred of any kind of oppression. Among his novels *Zakhar Berkut* (1883) gives a stirring picture of a man of the people, secure in instinct and reason, standing for the rights of justice and deliberation against a would-be despot.

In 1886 Franko visited Kyiv, where he married Olha Korunzynska and returned with her to Lviv. In this year the beautiful poem *Idyll*—the first part of which is printed below—was written. Forced to provide for his family, he worked on the staff of the *Lviv Courier* for ten years although his sympathies were not with this paper. In

spite of this, he published in 1889 *The Death of Cain*, perhaps his finest philosophic achievement in verse. In 1889, too, he was imprisoned once more, and it was typical of those times that neither he nor those arrested with him were ever able to find out the reason for their detention. By now his writing had become almost completely realistic, and such stories and fables as he wrote for children were based on a practical, sober moral outlook.

The journals edited by Franko were doomed to ultimate failure in the repressive atmosphere of an occupied territory. But the long years of struggle, of ceaseless writing, of tireless appeal to the people led at last to the honour of the poet and publicist. The Hapsburgs, fearing the nationalism of the Poles, became more lenient towards the Ukrainian lands of Galicia, and although Franko's application for the Chair of Literature at Lviv was vetoed by the Polish authorities, yet at the turn of the century Ukrainian literary activities were allowed more freedom and Ukrainian leaders received some public recognition.

In 1897 the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv formed a committee to publish a monthly, and for ten years Franko was in fact editor of this magazine. In 1898 his twenty-five years of literary activity were celebrated in the city, and in 1904 he was granted an honorary doctorate by Kharkiv University. His masterpiece *Moses* appeared in 1905, and from this time he devoted himself almost entirely to scholarship, editing translations, writing critical essays and generally seeking to establish Ukrainian literature on a solid basis of classical reprints and historical research.

At this peak of success in his life, Franko was attacked by the paralysis which killed him eight years later, in 1916. As the illness advanced, Franko, whose urge to work never left him from his earliest to his latest years, continued to write, dictating to his son when no longer able to use his hands. In 1913 his forty years of literary life were celebrated and the Shevchenko Society granted him a regular pension.

In the midst of the First World War, living alone, since members of his family had had to leave for Great Ukraine or were serving in the army, Franko died in Lviv, mourned not only by Galician Ukrainians but by his countrymen wherever they were and are now to be found throughout the world. His birthday, 15 August, is always reverently commemorated.

POEMS*

Lines from

The death of Cain

[1889]

Such were Cain's thoughts, as with a hurried step,
His heart brimful of longing for his kind,
A love unquenchable in its deep warmth,
He went straight for the village. Now and then
He stumbled, had to stop to catch his breath,
But ever hastened on. His old heart throbbed
And fluttered like a bird's while to his mind
A throng of old, forgotten memories
Came rushing in, when from behind a hill,
A thin, blue cloud, he saw the smoke arise
From human habitations. Like a child,
He ran full speed right up the slope and stood
A long time on its crest to feast his eyes
Upon the sight he saw, a hundred times
More lovely than the glimpse of Paradise.

A superb landscape! In the background lay
A mighty sheet of water, looking like
A mirror, blue and crystalline. Its shores,
Adorned with rich, luxuriant green, thrust out
Long fingers far away into its depths
And seemed to plash therein or to admire
Their beauty pictured in the mirror clear.
And, near at hand, the hills, with forests clothed,
Divided, like a mighty girdling wall,
This tranquil spot from all the world.

And lo!

There in a quiet bay, some distance from
The shore, upon the water, like a flock
Of ducks, the village lay. Upon stout poles,
Plunged deep into the water's bed, there stood

* Translated by Percival Cundy and reprinted from the book *Ivan Franko*, edited by Clarence A. Manning, by kind permission of the publishers, The Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 East 40th. Street, New York City.

Low cottages, wattled and thatched with reeds,
 With jutting eaves, and all by bridges linked.
 Smoke curled up from the roofs. The women in
 The cottages to one another called.
 Light skiffs plied to and fro upon the lake,
 And fishermen were dragging heavy nets;
 They shouted, pulled their oars, whilst in the sun
 Their barbed harpoons reflected back the light.
 And, opposite the village, on the shore,
 There stretched a grassy sward on which a swarm —
 But not of honey-bees or buzzing flies —
 A swarm of village children played. The sun
 Shone on their naked bodies, tanned and brown.
 Their silvery voices rang, the light breeze blew
 And tossed about their black and gleaming locks.
 Some ran about full tilt while others played
 Or skipped in circling dance. Another group
 Were gathering shells along the water's edge,
 And some there were who practised with the bow
 And tried their skill at targets, while the rest
 Were gathered round an old greybeard who sat
 Upon a stone and plucked a rude harp's strings,
 The while he sang.

Kotlyarevsky

[1873]

A mighty eagle on a snowy height
 Sat gazing all around with his keen eye,
 When lo, he started upwards towards the sky
 And on his splendid pinions took his flight.
 His sweeping wing brushed off a cloud of snow;
 It fell and started other clods downhill;
 They gathered force and strength and size until

An avalanche went roaring down below.
 So Kotlyarevsky happily once spoke,
 Began to sing in our Ukrainian tongue —
 Though what he sang then seemed to be a joke,
 Yet in it lay an earnest great and strong.
 That spark did not die out amongst our folk,
 But blazed and warmed us all ere long.

Hymn

[1880]

The eternal spirit of revolt,
The spirit which moves men to fight
For progress, liberty and right,
Still lives, nor has it shot its bolt.
The Inquisition's rack and boot,
The mercenaries trained to shoot,
The tyrant's guns and cannon balls,
The tzarist bans and prison walls,
The traitor and the spy—all they
Have failed to take its life away.

It is not dead—this very hour
'Tis more alive. Though it saw light
A thousand years since, yet in might
It onward moves by its own power.
In growing strength, without delay
It hastens where it sees the day.
It sounds a trumpet to awake
Mankind to follow in its wake,
And millions gladly join its train
Whene'er they hear that thrilling strain.

That spirit's voice is heard today
In huts of those who till the soil,
In factories where workers toil,
Where tears and misery hold sway.
And everywhere that voice resounds,
Men's tears are dried, their heart rebounds,
Misfortunes fade, new strength is born
To fight again. No more they mourn,
But strive to win a better fate
For children's sake, ere 'tis too late.

This living spirit of revolt,
Of progress, liberty and right,
Shall not retreat before the night,
Shall nevermore be brought to halt.
In ruins evil round us lies,

The avalanche's rush now dies —
In all the world there is no force
That can avail to stay its course,
That can put out the vital spark
We now see glimmering in the dark.

The Pioneers

[1878]

I saw a vision strange. Stretched out before me lay
A measureless but barren, open plain. And I,
With iron chains on hands and feet, stood in array
Before a granite mount which rose up, towering high,
With other thousands—captives, fettered the same way.

Deep lines of pain and grief were etched on every face
Yet in the eyes of all the flame of love still burned.
The fetters clung to each with serpent-like embrace,
And every back was bent, each face was downwards turned,
For all seemed bowed beneath a burden of disgrace.

A mighty iron sledge I saw in every hand,
And sudden from the sky a voice like thunder burst:
"Break through this rock! Let neither cold nor heat withstand
Your toil! In spite of danger, hunger, cold, and thirst,
Stay not, for yours it is to smash this granite band!"

At this we all as one our sledges raised on high;
A thousand thundering blows crashed down upon the rock.
On every side we saw the shards of granite fly,
The rock crack off in blocks. With ceaseless, desperate shock,
We hammered on with strength that nothing could defy.

Like roaring cataract or battle's bloody din,
Our sledges kept on thudding with exhaustless might,
New footholds every moment we never failed to win.
Though many a one of us fell crippled in the fight,
We onward pressed, for naught could shake our discipline.

Yet each of us well knew he should no glory reap,
Nor would man's memory requite our toilsome pain,
That long before our seed along that road would sweep,
Ere we could break a path and make it smooth and plain,
Our bleaching bones would lie beside it in a heap.

We had no thirst of glory in our hearts to slake,
 For we were neither knights nor heroes seeking fame.
 Mere slaves we were, but such as freely, gladly take
 Their bonds as self-made slaves in freedom's glorious name
 The pioneers who toil a new highway to break.

And all held firm belief that by our strength unfurled
 We'd rend the prisoning rock, the granite wall defy;
 That by our mortal strength, though we to death were hurled,
 Yet after, with our bones, we'd pave a road whereby
 New life and hope might come into this sorry world.

And every one knew too, that in the world we'd left
 Behind us for these chains and sweat and toil forlorn,
 Were mothers, sweethearts, weeping wives and little ones bereft,
 And friend and enemies, who, pitying or in scorn,
 Cursed us and our emprise and feared the dreadful cleft.

We knew it and at times, bowed down in sore distress,
 Our hearts would almost fail as sweet remembrance came.
 Yet neither tears nor pity nor great weariness
 Nor curses ever made us falter in our aim —
 Nor sledge dropped from our hands beneath the awful stress.

We march in close accord, for each the purpose owns
 To form a brotherhood, each with a sledge in hand.
 What though the world forgets, or even us disowns!
 We'll rend that prisoning rock, we'll pave a broad new strand!
 New life shall come to man, though it come o'er our bones!

Lines from

Idyll

[1886]

Long years ago this was. Two children small
 Were trudging bravely, hand in hand, along
 A path that from their village led across
 The lowland meadows, gay with flowers, under
 The summer sun.

The elder was a boy
 With ruddy cheeks, blond hair, and deep-blue eyes.
 A stick he carried in one hand and 'neath
 His arm, close hugged, a loaf of bread.
 His ragged hat with flowers was adorned.

Yet 'twas the girl that led him on the way,
Though younger far. Her eyes, like thorn-buds black,
Glowed like two red-hot coals and glances swift
Darted at all around. Her plaited hair
Swayed like a mouse's tail. A tiny strand
Of ribbon red was twisted in the plait.
Some cooked potatoes in a kerchief tied
She swung, and underneath her arm she bore
Some sprays of green pea vine with pods thereon
Still hanging.

What makes song live?

[1884]

Each of the songs I've sung
Took from my life a day,
'Twas something which I lived,
Not just a written lay.

Each line of every song
Was part of my own brain,
The thoughts, they were my nerves,
The sounds were my heart's pain.

What moved that soul of yours
Was my own heartfelt grief;
What throbbed within the song
Were tears which brought relief.

For this my soul is strung
Like strings upon a harp,
Each passing touch, each blow,
Wakes tones now sweet, now sharp.

It matters not what flows
Of good or ill therein —
In song there only lives
What life itself puts in.

Olexa Woropay

Traditions of Harvest-time

When the last of the harvest had been gathered in Ukraine, the girls and women gleaned the fields, and with the ears of wheat and rye they wove a wreath. As they worked they sang traditional songs of the good harvest and the joyous work of the fields, and, when the wreath was finished, "The song of the wreath," addressed to the owner of the land just harvested.

*Permit me, dear master, in your barn to rest,
I have been long out here in the field,
I heard the songs of the sun and tempest.
I will not lie for long in the barn,
But go back to the field and bring a fine yield.*

The last two lines refer to the rye and wheat which were soon to be taken back for the winter sowing.

In Podolia the girls would weave a large bouquet of wheat in addition to the wreath. This bouquet was very interesting: five bunches of wheat were taken, and each bunch woven in such a way that it formed a large petal; the five petals were then put together to form a huge flower. When finished, the prettiest girl was chosen to wear the wreath and carry the flower. She was then the Queen of Harvest Home, and, with the wreath and flower, she headed a procession of the girls and women towards the farm. As they marched they sang joyfully:

*Our village is gay and merry,
For the wreath we carry
Is not of gold, but of wheat and rye.
Pour out the wine, for we are dry...*

On arrival at the farmstead they stopped before the house and sang:

*Come out, master, we softly call,
And from us our wreath please buy,
Lots of money to us give;
The weavers of this wreath must live,*

*As the girls while gleaning no wine did drink
When the wreath hangs high on the wall, we think,
For us a barrel of wine so high
Of wine clear as the morning sky.
We hope, dear master, we are not too bold,
Remember our wreath is better than gold.*

The farmer then came out, and smilingly accepted the wreath and the flower. He invited them all into the house, where tables were laid with white cloths and piled high with good food and wine. The feast began; the girls and women ate and drank, and sang:

*We have reaped the wheat and rye,
And we wait for next year's yields.
As many stars as are in the sky,
So many stooks will be in the fields.*

The "table song" of the reapers combines thanksgiving for the harvest with the theme of a wedding. If the wreath and flower were carried by an unmarried girl, then all the guests would ask her to take the wreath to the Church as a symbol of her future bridal wreath.

After the dinner all the guests went outside where there was music playing, and they danced and sang and enjoyed themselves until very late, it might be all night.

The wreath and flower of Harvest Home were always blessed with the fruits and vegetables in the Church on Spassa¹) Day (Harvest Festival), which is held on 19 August. The wreath and flower, now sacred, were kept for a year until the following Spassa Day, when they were threshed, mixed with the newly threshed rye and wheat, and sown in the fields to bring a good harvest.

There is, however, another feast connected with harvest—the feast of Makoveya²) and the first Spassa, or "Spassa on the water".

On the morning of this day—14 August—all the women and girls used to go to Church wearing their festive national dress and carrying many autumn flowers: yellow and bronze marigolds, corn-flowers and the best of the ripened poppy heads. In the Church the flowers were blessed, taken home and put behind the icons until the following spring when the poppy seeds were sown in the garden.

¹) Spass: folk name for the Feast of the Transfiguration which in Ukraine coincides with Harvest Thanks-giving.

²) Makoveya: folk name for the Day of the Maccabees.

In the belief that their hair would become more beautiful and plentiful, the girls used to weave the dried, holy flowers into their plaits on the feast of the Annunciation.

There was also the ceremony of blessing the waters. A large cross was first decorated with autumn flowers, and blessed by the priest. Then one by one the congregation would go to the cross and take a flower from it, these flowers being carefully preserved as it was believed they had great curative powers. Until the 18th century, in Kyiv, capital of Ukraine, it was the custom for all the citizens to go to the river Dnipro for the ceremony of blessing the autumn flowers. The Archbishop took water from the river for the blessing, doing this to commemorate the coming of Christianity and baptism by the river in the 10th century. The men were expected to appear for this sacred ceremony wearing the parade dress of the Cossacks.

People who were ill would bathe in the river either when the morning star was shining, or after the water had been blessed.

On Makoveya Day a sweet cake called "shuliky" should be eaten. This is very tasty and contains much honey and poppy seeds.

There is a folk anecdote that is told when shuliky is put on the table: One Makoveya Day a "Mosskal" (to a Ukrainian every Russian is a Mosskal whether he hails from Moscow or not) called at the home of a Ukrainian. Hospitable as always, the Ukrainian invited the traveller to dinner and for dessert that day shuliky was served. The Mosskal had never seen this before and he looked at it with suspicion.

"What is this?" he asked.

"Shuliky, of course!" replied his hostess. But the Mosskal had never heard the name before and, misunderstanding, thought she had said "Kulyky"—a swamp bird. He sprang to his feet and shouted:

"Kulyky, kulyky! it shall fly out of the window." And he flung the shuliky out of the window.

"What are you doing, Mosskal?" asked his hostess, "why don't you taste it? It is sweet."

The Mosskal tasted; he liked it very much and, running to the window, shouted:

"Kulyky, kulyky, fly back again, my basin is empty!" And so the foolish Mosskal had no shuliky on Makoveya Day.

Although apples, pears and plums are ripe long before 19 August, the older people would not eat them before that day—Harvest Festival. For legend says that on this day in Heaven, an angel appears and gives apples, pears and plums to all the children except those whose mothers and fathers have eaten fruit before Spassa Day. To these children the angel says:

“For you I have nothing, because your mother have eaten your apples.”

In this legend is the idea that children are responsible for the actions of their parents—a notion frequently found in Ukrainian folklore.

Before Spassa Day there is a two weeks' fast, which legend holds to be a continuation of the Lenten fast. When God first made the fast of Lent it was of nine weeks duration. The saintly Fathers besought Him to divide the fast into two parts because it was very hard for people to fast for so long a period. God consented, making the Lenten fast of seven weeks in spring time, and the other two weeks to be observed at the end of summer, before Spassa. So Ukrainians should keep this fast in exactly the same way as the Lenten one.

On the morning of Spassa Day everyone should go to Church carrying new baskets filled with apples, pears and plums together with pots of honey. All this food will be blessed, and afterwards fruit will be eaten for the first time after dinner.

Thus Spassa Day closes the series of agricultural celebrations. Now Frost, whom S. Onufreus stunned on 25 June is beginning to recover. The folk proverb says:

“Have your gloves ready, Spass is coming”, and this means that any night now may be frosty. For after this Day it is autumn time.

EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT

RUSSIA'S MOUNTING FEVER

In the olden days, at the end of the nineteenth century, one could find in a new calendar photographs of the same tsarist ministers that one had seen the previous year, and the year before that. But since the beginning of the twentieth century ministers have appeared and disappeared like film stars; after falling into disgrace with the tsar, they would collapse or be killed by an assassin.

Whenever this rapid change of ministers came, people would shake a gloomy head and they would not prophesy prosperity for the regime.

What then should one prophesy from the present rapid succession of Bolshevik great men—Stalin, Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchov?

We are living in an age of increased speed. In the U.S.S.R. this accelerated tempo is striking evidence of the embarrassing situation of the Russian Empire. First, the tempo of its territorial growth. How slow the tempo was in the first decades of tsarism! After the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state was established, it took Russia 300 years to decide to cross the Lithuanian-Ukrainian frontier (in the middle of the seventeenth century). After Pereyaslav it took Russia one hundred and fifty years to regain the frontiers of the year 1914, established in 1815 in Europe. But five years, from 1941-45, were sufficient to jump to the Elba and almost to the gates of Constantinople. The tempo of Russia's expansion in the East is more or less similar.

Is this evidence of an enormous growth in Russia's strength? On the contrary! Only what has grown for a long time, and what is hard to come by, endures for long. What is easily gained is easily lost. The marathon race of the Red Army, which in the years 1943-45 swallowed up immense areas, resembled the gallop of horses which have taken fright and which the coachman can scarcely hold. The areas were large but covered with potholes, ditches, thickets; they were not at all suitable for a military advance; the going was hard in Finland, in Ukraine, still more difficult in Hungary and hardest of all in China. This process of swallowing up territories will, sooner or later, cause the Russian stomach to burst. The Kremlin has bitten off more than it can chew. The Russian troika "three horses harnessed abreast" continues to gallop: but, I repeat, the coachman does not yet control the bolting horses.

And why should I think it to be so? Because degeneration of the Bolshevik leading caste is also proceeding at an increased speed in respect of stability and of purpose.

The first aristocracy, the Moscow-Suzdal one—which was descended from the Kyiv Ryurikovychi and which had been Russianised as the German dynasties were acquired in England and in the Balkans—remained in existence right up to the time of Tzar Ivan Grozny. By "opritchnina" this tsar laid the foundations for a new "élite"—the nobility that governed the Empire for the much shorter time of 300 years, and the whole nineteenth century saw the speedy degeneration of that caste, both morally and ideologically. As early as the time of Shevchenko the caste was made up of court toadies

and menials, and these have been wonderfully depicted by the poet in his poem *Dream*. This process is proceeding at a considerably increased speed among the Bolshevik "élite", too. The "old Bolshevik guard" was made up of "high-principled gangsters" who placed the realisation of their "idea" of general robbery ahead of their personal well-being, and sometimes even of their lives. Now there is a change. Now the Soviet nobility, the members of the Party, have run to fat. They are placing money, positions and comfort ahead of everything else. The first months of World War II made it plain that those mean souls—the prop of the regime—tried, first of all, to save their own miserable existences, and that they are apt to become excited too easily. It is already a caste of "self-seekers" who are still gangsters at heart. Yet without any signs of the gangster "steadfastness." During the last twenty-five years the Bolshevik "nobility" has become degraded to that stage of degeneration to which the tsarist nobility had sunk after two hundred years. An accelerated tempo!

The ideological degeneration of that caste is also proceeding at an increased speed; it is becoming sterile in that respect. The Russian Empire has always lived from crisis to crisis. A despotic regime was required to exploit the occupied territories and to hold the subjugated peoples in subjection. But this regime destroyed every stimulus to work, and the Empire's economy was choking. Then it became necessary to give "freedoms", some "reforms", and to introduce a New Economic Policy. As soon, however, as this "liberal" policy began, separative forces began to gain the upper hand, and the Empire was threatened by ruin. Thus it became once more necessary to resort to the policy of "Yezhov's gloves".

And so in the days of tsarism this fluctuation lasted over long periods of time. The regime of the "sergeant major", Tzar Nicholas I, lasted thirty years. The regime of his son, the "tzar-liberator," the "epoch of great reforms", lasted twenty-six years. The "reaction of Alexander III", thirteen years, the "autocracy" of Nicholas II, ten years, and his constitutional epoch, twelve years...

Look at the accelerated tempo of the similar, though not identical wavering of the Bolshevik regime! Military communism, Lenin's N.E.P., Stalin, Yezhov's era, "freedom of religion," Beria's "liberal" gestures, Malenkov promising to favour the reproduction of consumers' goods before that of heavy industry, and finally Khrushchov's "backwards again." All this is not planned manoeuvring, the former "one step backward, two steps forward"; rather it resembles the aimless leaping of a crazy beast. And all in so short a period of time, if compared with the similar—not identical—leaps of the tsarist regime aimed at salvaging the Empire! It calls to mind the distraught rushing to and fro of people, when dazzled or drunk, awakened during a fire and unable to gather their wits and find the way out.

For these reasons "the changing of the guard" in the Kremlin is proceeding at an increased speed; it is often accompanied with the assassination of the chief khan. Such things also happened under the tsars, but not so frequently. For example, in the period from 1801 to the downfall of tsarism, only three tsars—Paul I, Alexander II, and Nicholas II—did not die a natural death; this was over 117 years. And how many Soviet khans have been liquidated during the 37 years of Bolshevism, since the time of Lenin! This also is an

indication that the stability of the regime is weakening, and that the Bolshevik "élite" is degenerating at an increased speed.

The above-mentioned sudden transitions from N.E.P. to "Yezhov's gloves," and the constant rapid changes of khans in the Kremlin, show that it is hard for the Russian "élite" to create new ideas and to provide new people who would have authority, at least over their own gang. Even the Russian emigration which formerly supplied the "new guard" with ideas—Herzen, Plekhanov, Lenin—is strikingly barren in the ideological respect. This concerns the tzarophile emigration, the democratic one as well as the new, allegedly anti-Bolshevik, one.

The impression is given that the ship is on fire, and on the bridge there is a scrimmage between those who want to be captain, but who do not know how to salvage the ship. And what is most important, no one of them has an unquestionable authority over his own gang. In view of these conditions, the Russian 'Vanka' who has mounted so high will fall down soon, and his empire will tumble in ruins like the empire of Attila and the Mongols. The empire will fall to ruin in a much shorter time than that required for its building up. What has been amassed by robbery during several centuries will go to pieces within a few years. What has been gained by plunder in a few years will be lost within a few months. An accelerated tempo!

This will be the final solution of Pushkin's dilemma: the "Slavic rivers" will not "meet in the Russian sea," but the sea will "run low," dry up.

Of course, there will be circles in the Occident which will try to save the life of the dying monster with the aim of converting it to their own faith. But, in falling to pieces, the Russian tower of Babel will drag down those circles, too, the Russophile circles which believe in its illusory strength and underestimate the living force of nations, first of all that of Ukraine, and it is this force that will destroy the Russian monster.

Certainly, the decaying monster which was mortally wounded in the years 1941-45 may still make many leaps; like a wolf at bay, it will wound and kill many a hound although it is doomed. Then finally a hunter will come and will cut its throat.

All that is necessary is the hunter. The events of the years 1914 and 1917 when, instead of fighting against doomed tzarism and Kerensky, the leaders of Ukraine took an oath of allegiance to them, must never come again. Fortune's wheel will turn once more, and this time we must snatch at it, and hold it firmly in our grasp.

Dmytro Donzow

CHANGING SCENES IN THE KREMLIN AND FALSE HOPES IN THE WEST

The false hopes entertained by the West, namely that clashes might occur among the various rivals in the Kremlin after Stalin's death and that the West could then adapt its policy to the course of events in Moscow and, in doing so, simply ignore the freedom aims of the subjugated nations, deprive the West of its best prospects of settling the present international crisis by liquidating Soviet Russian despotism from within. The foreign policy of the Bolsheviks on the other hand, however, continues to remain an extremely active one, both as regards the Fifth Columns in the West and the provocation and exploitation of "colonial" peripheral wars.

In addition, the favourable comments made by certain Western statesmen as regards some of the tyrants in the Kremlin, who are at loggerheads, are likely to undermine the fighting morale of the subjugated nations, who cannot be expected to allow themselves to be slaughtered for no purpose, whilst the West looks on indifferently, as was the case, for instance, during the worker's revolt in Berlin and during the resistance which was put up by the prisoners in the concentration camps in Vorkuta. Incidents such as these make the revolutionary resistance forces and organisations behind the Iron Curtain wonder whether all their sacrifices and their fight might not be used by the major powers of the West solely as an easy means of bargaining with the Soviets, so that the latter refrain from further intervention, or to guarantee a co-existence status, or possibly to obtain economic advantages.

Meanwhile, the question at issue in all the fights which are carried on in the Kremlin by Stalin's successors is, above all, concerned with which of the claimants shall obtain full dictatorial powers. It is not, as is often assumed, a question of fundamental ideological differences or of a dispute between the "Party" and the "Army". For this reason it is a matter of secondary importance whether the victorious Party man in this case belongs to the civil or the military Party hierarchy.

The supreme command of the Soviet army, incidentally, is composed of Party members who are just as "loyal" as those who hold the top posts in the civil administration or in the Party or trade unions. Thus the bold hopes and expectations which the West is wont to base on every personal change which takes place in the Kremlin are for the most part futile.

For this reason the attitude of indecision adopted by the West and, above all, the latter's frequent coquettish behaviour towards certain prominent men of Moscow can only lead to a stabilization of the Bolshevik regime and can neither support the Soviet ruler who happens to be in power against his rivals nor can it help to overthrow him. This was seen most plainly in the case of Malenkov, when neither the approval expressed by the West nor the latter's genuine capitulation in Geneva proved effective or of any use. The final effect achieved was that the Western powers, by their ill-timed complaisance towards Moscow, compromised themselves in the eyes of the subjugated nations.

It is entirely wrong to hope that a possible court-revolution or a praetorian revolt in the Kremlin might bring about a genuine and radical change of course in Bolshevik foreign policy. The latter will invariably continue to support the aims of a camouflaged social and revolutionary world imperialism, though it may, of course, from time to time adopt certain tactical variations which are intended to deceive the West and promote the Bolsheviks' cause.

For this reason, any government crises in the Kremlin must, at best, only be regarded as favourable attendant circumstances, but never as a trump card with which to eliminate the Bolshevik menace. The main prerequisite is still an active policy of liberation, which must recognize and effectively support the aims of the subjugated nations to attain their national freedom and independence. And the fundamental principle of such a policy must be based on a universal conception of freedom and justice for all peoples of the world.

J. S.

"BOURGEOIS NATIONALISM"

The patriotic feeling of the Ukrainian people which the Bolsheviks contemptuously call "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism", continues to give the Russians no rest in spite of their grandiose talk about having eradicated it. While the case of Sosyura's "nationalistic deviation" and the repentance in his poem *Love Ukraine!*, and the execution of Okhrymovych, the Ukrainian patriot and active fighter against the Bolshevik tyranny, are still fresh in the public mind, circumstances once more compel the Bolsheviks to intensify their fight against Ukrainian nationalism.

At the end of 1954 all the radio stations of Western Ukraine made a great noise about the fifth anniversary of the death of Halan, who had been killed by the Ukrainian underground on account of his officiousness with regard to the great men of the Kremlin. In connection with this, the writer Yuriy Smolych was directed to write a book under the title *The enemies of mankind and those who fawn upon them*. In this book the author heaps abuse on the Ukrainian underground because of its fight against the Soviet regime. It is worth noting that, in quoting a series of trials against members of the underground which took place in Lviv, Stryi, Drohobych, and Chortkiv, the author unintentionally states that the revolutionary fight is being carried on steadily.

But, apparently, a mere book abusing Ukrainian patriots was not enough. The menace of a revival of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" under the conditions of Soviet terrorism, which slackened a little after Stalin's death, was so great that the Kremlin rulers decided to make a decisive attack upon it. Ukrainian writers were ordered to write a series of poems and satiric works whose task was to attack and ridicule Ukrainian nationalism. We learn from the journal *Dnipro* No. 1. that Sosyura, who had written the wonderful patriotic poem *Love Ukraine!* was compelled to write a collection of worthless, lame verses under the title *For Peace*. Likewise, Rylsky, Tychyna, Malyshko, Bazhan, Oliynyk, Voskrekasenko, and others were ordered to create a false idea of Ukrainian patriotism in the eyes of the population.

Their satires are feeble, the writings are full of vulgarisms and forced epithets which have to compensate for clumsy form and ill-chosen contents.

"A. Malyshko is unmasking the yellow-blue* dogs with towering fury and anger," says *Dnipro*, and quotes the following paltry verse as illustration:

Knitting her brows Zirka is waiting for a war as if for a miracle,
Such a person as you see there is not an ordinary beast, but a
nationalistic dog.

They have also attacked the outstanding Ukrainian historian, Hrushevsky, and Petlyura, the leader of the anti-Bolshevik fight during the revolution. The latter is alleged not to have done anything in his life-time but sell Ukraine to the German Emperor and to Poland. In his satire *The Mercenaries* Sosyura has exceeded the plan because he gives no rest even to Mazeppa. He says: "If there had been no Mazeppa, his 'damned descendants' would not exist." Thus, having unmasked several generations of "nationalists" and predicted their early ruin, Sosyura automatically reveals the real task of the wide campaign against Ukrainian nationalism, which was caused by the

* The national colours of Ukraine.

vitality and popularity of its ideas and actions among the broad masses of the population. "The poem by Sosyura," says *Dnipro*, "warns people against political apathy, because there are individuals like wolves in sheep's clothing walking about amongst us."

The shadow of Ukrainian patriotism has always hung over Bolshevism. This patriotism, love of country, is living in the hearts of all Ukrainians, irrespective of whether they live in the native country or in the emigration, and the Bolsheviks try in vain to sow seeds of discord among them and to disgust them with the Ukrainian underground. The Bolsheviks show themselves unable to compete with the great ideals of freedom, equality and brotherhood which together make up the content of the Ukrainian liberation movement.

TO THE SOVIET "LIBERATORS"

*Who's seen the worst from Russia
Has witnessed sick'ning shame;
But when lips prayed: Make this the worst!
Your blacker vileness came.*

*Old fights when emptying quivers
Led to those crowded graves,
Men came and sail'd up rivers,
Fled back with loot and slaves.*

*They took away but boatloads
To feel the lash's pain;
But you now steal in trainloads,
Again...again...again.*

*They fed the Crimean slave mart
With wares that never failed;
But that was only slavery's start,
Now nations whole you've gaoled.*

*Children and ag'd might have the luck
'Neath master's roof to lie;
You cast them in an open truck
Beneath a snowing sky.*

*And if they cannot work, why care
If human flesh decay?
In better lands men would not dare
To kill their beasts that way.*

*Stand there while dying children cry
And at their pleadings sneer —
But somewhere in the watchful sky
There is a God — to fear.*

Malcolm Stirling

BOOK REVIEWS

W. W. Kulski: *THE SOVIET REGIME—COMMUNISM IN PRACTICE*
Published by: Syracuse University Press, 1954, p. 807.

"Much has already been talked and written about the communist evil, but relatively few Americans are aware of the life behind the iron curtain"—says the editorial note to the monumental work by W.W. Kulski, Professor of International Law at Syracuse University. One might supplement these words by stating that the numerous works published about the U.S.S.R. up to date have not only failed to draw a clear picture of life behind the iron curtain, but have even obscured and misrepresented it, causing confusion to readers. And why? Because most of the "specialists" who have written them are either Russians by birth or former pupils of Russian teachers who, under the influence of the latter, have informed American and British readers about the situation in the Soviet Union from "the united and indivisible" imperialist point of view. This "scientific" analysis of the Soviet complex has lasted many years, and its influence on the formation of American political opinion on East-European problems has been fatal. According to that analysis, the conception of the U.S.S.R. was synonymous with the conception of Russia not only in the imperial, but also in the national sense. No wonder that under the influence of their Russophile complex and their Russian advisers the Americans made a series of cardinal mistakes when they were obliged to take certain concrete measures with regard to the organisation of an anti-Bolshevik front; those mistakes have already resulted in grave consequences and may bring to nought all their efforts if they are not speedily corrected.

Undoubtedly, regarding practical measures towards removal of the Russophile influence, very little has so far been done in the U.S.A. True, numerous Russophile advisers of American political circles on Soviet problems have already been put in the shade and do not play the important part they did until recently. There is also indecision in the field of the national problem. However, a complete change of front is not to be expected yet. Such a change has already begun to show itself among scientific research circles in the U.S.A., where many alterations have been made. The influence of the Russian or Russophile scientists who had a monopoly in forming scientific research opinion on the U.S.S.R. has weakened considerably. The bookshops are selling more and more scientific works from different university centres which try to analyse objectively the situation in the U.S.S.R., especially with regard to the national problem in its historical as well as contemporary aspect.

The Soviet Regime—Communism in Practice is a basic work on the Soviet Union, particularly on the question of national problems, and the estimate of Russian imperialism and the role it has played in forming today's U.S.S.R. after association with the international ideas of Marxism. As is patent from the title, the work deals with the problem of life in the Soviet Union at the present, that is, from the end of World War II until now.

The author maintains that Russian nationalism is the basis of the Soviet regime. "The concept of Soviet patriotism includes three distinct notions:

Russian nationalism, loyalty of non-Russian citizens to the Soviet State and complete devotion to the same State on the part of all "progressive" foreigners (communists)...A non-Russian Soviet citizen is not expected to indulge in bourgeois nationalism; this is the privilege of the Russian citizen." With these words the author begins his analysis of Russian nationalism in the chapter of this title. The author rightly considered this chapter as the key-chapter. Without it, it would be impossible to understand the whole complex of other phenomena of Soviet life which are especially complicated and misrepresented if one approaches them from the position of pure international Marxist communism, as often happens in the case of students of Bolshevism. The chapter on Russian nationalism, which is rich in citations from original sources—as, indeed, is the whole work—gives us exhaustive information on the tendencies in the development of Russian nationalism in the U.S.S.R. during the last decade. Since 1945, when Stalin drank to the health of the Russian people, a real orgy of Russian chauvinism has been enacted in the Soviet Union. The original materials concerning the subject have been compiled and worked out by the author in individual sections of the book with special care. On the basis of those materials, the reader can form a clear picture of the real complexion of the Soviet regime, not falsified by various Russophile pseudo-specialists.

The author lays special emphasis on the policy of Russification which is being pursued by Russia in the non-Russian republics, and on the colonial dependence of those republics. "The Party 'Russia first' attitude makes one wonder what its policy is towards that other half of the Soviet population, those people who have not had the privilege of being born of Russian parents. Are they encouraged to be proud of their countries of birth—Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and others? The Party clearly says no." The author maintains that in the non-Russian republics not only the policy of Russification is being pursued, but that the Soviet regime is exhibiting a clear tendency to liquidate those countries as separate national units, and to annex them to the Russian people. This is illustrated by Stalin's definition of a nation, according to which only that people which can boast of the following four fundamental factors has the right to be called a nation: common language, common territory, common economic life and common national culture. If any of these four factors is missing, the people ceases to be a nation.

"The community's lack of territorial habitat makes the Soviet Communists refuse to Russian or satellite Jews the right to call themselves a nationality. Community of economic life or of mentality is liable to all sorts of interpretations which might imply danger to the non-Russian nationalities, some of which might be declared one day to be part of the great Russian nation." Many people in the West are under the illusion that after Stalin's death there was a considerable change for the better in the Soviet Union, particularly as to the national problem. Professor Kulski denies this thesis and maintains that, on the whole, Stalin's successors continue to pursue his policy, that is, the policy of Russian nationalism.

The author says further that the Russian-Bolshevik chauvinists consider the problem of Ukraine to be the most menacing one. "The Party seems to be particularly sensitive to the potential danger of the national aspirations

of the Ukrainians..." Therefore the fight against Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism" goes on uninterrupted. This is substantiated by citations from various Soviet sources. Adducing the small nations as examples, the author reveals the separatist tendencies and aspirations of the non-Russian nations, and the Soviet policy of Russification. Thus the work completely denies the assertions of the American Russophiles and their Russian émigré advisers that Soviet communism is an international, non-Russian, and even anti-Russian phenomenon, that the national problem in the Soviet Union plays a secondary role, and that the fight against Bolshevism should aim only at the liquidation of communism, not at the liquidation of the Russian Empire.

The problem of the legal position of the individual non-Russian republics of the U.S.S.R. is one of the problems treated in most detail. Discussing the position of the autonomous republics of the Russian federation, the author says: "The long list of autonomous national units may produce the impression that the national problem of Russia has been solved on the basis of a federation of its many nationalities, each of which enjoys freedom of cultural and administrative life. This optimistic picture is blurred by the Constitution itself, which grants enormous powers to the federal government." This point concerns all the so-called federal republics. According to Professor Kulski this impression is a fiction which has no relation to reality. Analysing the constitutional rights of the individual republics, as compared with the actual state of affairs, demonstrates from Soviet materials that the Soviet Union is in fact a centralised Russian state in every sphere of life.

The author also considers the other problems of Soviet life which concern the Party and its attitude towards the West: the relation of the Soviet citizen with the Soviet State, the judiciary, the enslavement of individuality, the position of the workers and the peasantry, the problems of the collective farms, the joint leadership after Stalin's death, and so on. We have deliberately lingered over the problem of Russian imperialism, and of nationalities, because these appear for the first time to be treated objectively in the numerous American works on the Soviet Union. It is thus something of a duty to emphasise these matters, and should not be taken to imply that we do not appreciate other problems that are discussed at length in the work, and which stand out the more clearly against the background of the just treatment of the national problem.

The lack of historical balance in the estimation of the Soviet complex should be considered the weak point of this book. Soviet life today is made to seem like a separate question, as if existing by itself. A historical background would to a certain extent complete the general picture of today's U.S.S.R. and explain many problems which sometimes appear a little blurred. For instance, Soviet imperialism and Russian nationalism today would be easier to understand against a setting of tendencies in the development of Russian history. However, in those chapters of the work where the author does try to intersperse historical explanations, these prove somewhat colourless, and in places even erroneous. One should not confound ancient Russia with the Muscovy-Russia of later years and consider the adoption of Christianity from Byzantium the reasons for the hostile attitude of Muscovy-Russia towards the West. The author, who is by birth a Pole, should know that the

attitude of Kyiv-Rus towards the West was never hostile, and that living together with the Poles in a common state, the Ukrainians, the descendants of the Rusychi, were constantly under the influence of western civilisation. The assertion that Russia's hostility to the West resulted from its indignation at the fact that the West had left it to the mercy of the Tartars is also wrong. It has been ascertained even by Russian historiography that the Tartar domination over Russia was not very severe. This can be proved by the fact that this domination was liquidated almost peacefully, and that the Russian tzars even during the Tartar domination did not attach much importance to it and behaved like sovereign rulers. The present Soviet hostility to the West is the typical Old Muscovite hostility, and it has nothing to do either with ancient Russia or with Byzantium.

However, this deficiency in the work is insignificant in comparison with the merits of the whole work. The book, as said above, throws limelight on to the situation in the Soviet Union, and it is desirable that Western political circles should assume the theoretical considerations put forward as the basis for their conceptions of the liberation of Eastern Europe.

M. S.

COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF UKRAINE

Special Report No. 4 of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session (Union Calendar No. 929, House Report No. 2684, Part 7), United States, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1955, VIII, 36 pp.

On the strength of the vast amount of personal evidence collected in America and Western Europe between November 30, 1953, and December 3, 1954, the "House Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression and the Forced Incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R.," usually designated as the Kersten Committee, which is well-known for its uncompromising anti-Bolshevist attitude and at the same time, for its remarkable political and historical objectivity, has, in addition to its "Summary Report" (House Report No. 2684, Part 16), also published a series of supplementary monographs, of which the booklet entitled *Communist Takeover and Occupation of Ukraine*, is undoubtedly one of the most outstanding as regards contents and composition. This booklet offers the reader much more than its title would seem to indicate, for it presents a brief but extremely concise account of Ukrainian and Soviet relations in their main aspects and manifestations during the years from 1917 up to the end of 1953. Certain gaps—and, incidentally, there are very few—are, of course, unavoidable on account of the nature of the subject matter, since the Committee has confined itself strictly to the evidence given by eyewitnesses in order to guarantee the authenticity of the contents of the booklet. This no doubt accounts for the fact that, though the booklet contains extremely vivid and drastic descriptions of the famine which was artificially created by the Kremlin in Ukraine in 1932 and

1933 and of the mass grave of Vinnytsya, no mention whatsoever is made of the famine which was also caused by Muscovite Bolshevism in the southern districts of Ukraine in 1921 and 1922, or of the mass graves in the vicinity of Odessa which are not so well-known (a report on this subject by the German war correspondent, Max Hartmann, was published in Ukrainian in the weekly periodical which appears in Munich, *Shlyakh Peremohy*, in Nos. 16, 17, 20, and 21, 1954). On the whole, however, the reader is bound to admit that this booklet, which consists of evidence obtained from about two thousand different witnesses, presents a complete and uniform picture of Soviet terrorism, Russification and demoralisation in Ukraine.

"The purpose of this report," as the introduction states, "is to telescope the essentials of the history of Ukraine and its people, including the period of Communist takeover and occupation of that nation." Accordingly, the first two chapters of the booklet (*History of Ukraine; The Ukrainian Revival*) give the reader a brief but nevertheless extremely accurate survey of the past history of the Ukrainian nation. The contents are then divided up according to the following chapters, the titles of which serve to indicate the general manner in which the Ukrainian and Soviet problem is dealt with: The Rise of the Ukrainian National Republic; The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Meaning of Communism; Militant Communism; The New Economic Policy; Ukrainization; The End of the New Economic Policy; The Famine of 1932-1933; The Attack on Ukrainian Culture; The Prison Camps; The Yezhovshchyna, 1936-37; Vinnytsya—the "Ukrainian Katyn"; The First Occupation of Western Ukraine; The German-Soviet War; The Russian Communist Return; The Church Policy; Postwar Ukraine; Postwar Culture; Latest Developments.

Owing to restricted space the names of the witnesses and verbatim quotations are only mentioned in important cases, as for instance in connection with the statements made by Lavrynenko and Prochik about the famine of 1932-33, with those made by Pushkar about the inhuman way in which prisoners in Soviet prisons were treated in 1936, and in connection with the extremely informative account "on the fate of the Ukrainian writers," given by Hryhori Podolyak: "In 1930 there were active in literature 246 writers, of these, 7 died a natural death, 1 escaped abroad (since he was of German nationality), 173 were arrested or deported, 16 were shot, 4 committed suicide, 11 disappeared without a trace (that is to say, they were done away with secretly), and 34 remained free to write, and these...became the willing mouth-pieces for Moscow" (p. 23).

A verbatim quotation from the evidence given by Father Ivan Hrynyokh, a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (the U.H.V.R.), who testified before the Committee on the subject of organised resistance in Ukraine, 1943-1953, is particularly interesting:

"The Ukrainian resistance was organised not only on political lines but also in the form of armed resistance, in the form of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.). The Ukrainian population takes part and constitutes the liberation movement for the entire Ukrainian nation. All the Ukrainian people fight for the same aims and motives as do their own armed units of the U.P.A. In no other way could one explain that after 9 years following the conclusion of the world war there is still a political and armed resistance in

the Ukraine, a political and armed resistance which received no assistance from other sources, and must rely solely on the assistance of its own people..." (p. 29).

Certain incidents and events have, of course, not always been given the same detailed treatment. Only on one occasion is a certain tendency in this respect in evidence, namely as regards Pavlo Skoropadsky's hetmanate, which is disposed of in the following eight lines:

"This (that is to say, clashes between the Ukrainian Central Rada and the German Occupation authorities) provided the excuse for the formation of a counter-movement headed by Gen. Pavlo Skoropadsky. On April 28, a German detachment raided the Rada on various charges despite the protest of Professor Hrushevsky. Then on April 29, Skoropadsky called for the overthrow of the Rada. A descendant of the old Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky, he proclaimed himself Hetman of the Ukrainian State and announced the introduction of a conservative regime. The Rada had to submit but almost none of the older statesmen took part in the new government" (p. 10).

That is all the report has to say on this subject; it then goes on to give an account of the overthrow of the hetmanate, but makes no mention of Hetman Skoropadsky's domestic and cultural policy or of the fact that he was actually supported by many of the industrialists, landowners, and wealthy farmers, who had grown tired of the radical and, for the most part rather futile, socialist catchwords and experiments of the Central Rada. The report does not even mention the fact that this was *the only* Ukrainian government during the years from 1917 to 1921 which never sought to reach an agreement with Bolshevism.

On the whole, however, there are only a few unimportant factual errors to be found in this excellent booklet. It is, for instance, erroneous to maintain that "the (Soviet) Government (of 1920-22), despite its atheistic principles, encouraged the formation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church" (p. 15)—"tolerated" would be the correct word to use in this connection. On the same page reference is made to the first (since 1917) Moscow Patriarch Nikon, but his name was actually Tikhon; General Vatutin, the Soviet Russian general who was fatally wounded by National Ukrainian partisans in 1944, was, it is true, a commanding officer of the army, but not (as is affirmed on page 31) a marshal. On page 12 there is a serious typographical error, inasmuch as the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine is referred to as the U.K.P. instead of the K.P.B.U.

There are also some translation and transcription errors in the booklet; for example, the expression "militant Communism" is used instead of "military Communism," "kurkuls" instead of "kulaks" (when referring to the "entire Russian Empire"), and "John Hrynoch" instead of Ivan Hrynyokh.

These errors, however, do not detract from the value of this objective and informative book considered as a whole, for it definitely fulfils its noble purpose to "help the American people to understand better the nations and people enslaved by Communism and thereby to more fully appreciate the true nature, tactics, and final objectives of the criminal conspiracy of world communism" (p. V).

V. D.

UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD

ARCHBISHOP IVAN BUCHKO — GUARDIAN OF UKRAINIAN EXILES

His Grace Archbishop Ivan Buchko, D. D., Apostolic Visitor of Ukrainian Catholics in Western Europe, came to Britain in August. Since 1947 he has visited Britain annually, and is a guest beloved of all the Ukrainian communities in this country. The Archbishop took part in the Jubilee Congress of "Obnova"—the organisation of Ukrainian Catholic graduates and students which was held in London from 13-17 August, and also attended the World Congress of Catholic graduates and students—"Pax Romana".

The visit of the Archbishop was an outstanding event, and was marked by great celebrations. Particularly will it be remembered by the children, who formed part of the ceremonies of welcome, greeting the Archbishop with flowers and cries of "Vitaj Vladiko" (Welcome, Excellency). Archbishop Buchko preached at Pontifical High Mass during his visits to many towns of Britain, and from this personal experience of their spiritual guardian the Ukrainian exiles gained much in moral courage and in faith and hope for the future.

For Archbishop Ivan Buchko has worked long and tirelessly on behalf of his countrymen. He was for many years Bishop Suffragan to the great Metropolitan Andreas Sheptytsky in Lviv, and after the Second World War, unable to return to his own land, he became the voice of the silenced Ukrainian Church, representing Ukrainian Catholics and the Ukrainian nation at the Holy See.

Ivan Buchko was born on 1 October 1891 in the village of Hermaniv, Lviv district, West-Ukraine. He attended the village school and later the Gymnasium in Lviv. In 1910 he commenced his studies in philosophy and theology in Rome, at the Papal University "Gregorianum". He entered Holy Orders in Rome on 21 February 1915.

For over a year during the First World War he was one of the Principals of the Ukrainian Seminary in Kromeruz, Moravia. When the Ukrainian lands were freed at the end of the war he returned to Lviv. As priest, Principal, and also Rector of the Institute of S. Josaphat, he carried out many official duties. He witnessed the rebirth of the Ukrainian state and later had to endure the occupation of West-Ukraine by Poland.

Father Ivan Buchko founded a Lower-Grade Seminary for candidates for the priesthood, and served as its Rector for many years. When the Ukrainian Catholic Academy was founded in Lviv, he became Professor of Dogmatic Theology. His exemplary life as priest, his intellectual attainments and his organising and administrative ability were observed by the Holy See, and on 20 October 1929 in Rome he was consecrated Titular Bishop of Kada and Bishop Suffragan of Lviv. He returned to Lviv and continued to assist the Metropolitan. He organised five pilgrimages—three to Rome, one to Lourdes,

and one to the Eucharistic Congress in Budapest. Perhaps his greatest achievement was the celebration "Ukrainian Youth for Christ" which took place in Lviv in May 1933 on the 19th. centenary of the Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ.

In the spring of 1939, Bishop Ivan Buchko was instructed by the Holy See to visit mission stations among Ukrainian emigrants in South America, and on 15 August he arrived in Rio de Janeiro. Everywhere he was joyfully and sincerely welcomed. He went from Brazil to Argentine, returning by Uruguay, and it was on this return journey that he heard of the occupation of West-Ukraine by the Russian Bolsheviks and the commencement of renewed persecution and oppression.

Bishop Buchko carried out his work with even greater energy when this sad news of his homeland reached him. He visited the United States and was for a time Suffragan Bishop to the Ukrainian Philadelphian Exarchate. On 6 September 1941 he left the U.S.A. for Rome, and thus it was that from the Gianicolo Hill he saw both the fall of Italian Fascism and of German Nazism.

At the end of the war about twenty thousand Ukrainians were in Italy, and their care was entrusted to Archbishop Buchko. His never-failing interest and moral support were freely given to these exiles, and particularly to the Ukrainian prisoners of war in camps at Rimini. Since 21 November 1946 the Ukrainians of twelve European countries have been under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop; he visits these countries annually, and is especially concerned with the education of Ukrainian youth. He founded the Lower-Grade Seminary for Catholics in Loury, France, and has ordained many priests at the Ukrainian priestly college in Rome, and also at the Ukrainian Catholic Seminary at Kulemburg, Holland. He secured the protection of all schools in the prison camps at Rimini, where 220 diplomas and several hundred Certificates of Matriculation were granted. The Holy Congregation for the Eastern Church, which supervised the schools, established student centres in Louvain, Belgium, and in Madrid.

Archbishop Buchko is not only a religious leader but is well-known and revered in all fields of Ukrainian life. He donated funds to preserve Ukrainian institutions such as the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the Ukrainian Free University, and many others. In 1951 he was raised by the Holy See to the rank of Assistant to the Papal throne, and given the title of "Count of Rome" by the Vatican. In 1953 he was nominated Archbishop. It is on his initiative that Pope Pius XII, through a decree of the Holy Congregation of Rites, has enabled the process of the beatification of the late Metropolitan Sheptytsky to commence.

All Ukrainian Catholics in exile give thanks to God that the life of this guardian of Ukrainian exiles was spared, that he might lead them firmly towards the time when their country, Ukraine, will be once more free for their return.

A. Mychalskyj



Archbishop Ivan Buchko

A DAY OF UKRAINIAN CULTURE IN BONN

On May 24th, the German-Ukrainian Herder Society arranged a very impressive "Day of Ukrainian Culture" in Bonn, the most important feature of which was an exhibition of works by two Ukrainian artists living in exile, namely the sculptor Gregor Kruk, and the painter Severyn Borachok.

The "Day of Ukrainian Culture" opened with a press conference, which was attended by numerous representatives of the German and Ukrainian and foreign press, and concluded with a memorable meeting in the evening, in the course of which prominent German and Ukrainian speakers gave addresses on the subject of German and Ukrainian cultural relations and the significance of the latter, as conceived by Herder, for the fate of Europe. During the evening the famous Ukrainian singer, Eugenia Zareska, who has given recitals all over the world, captivated the audience with her beautiful voice.

The programme published on the occasion of the "Day of Ukrainian Culture" contained an introduction by Professor Dr. Gerhard von Mende, in which he writes as follows:

"All artistic creativeness—if it is not to be destroyed in the struggle for existence—requires the favourable atmosphere of friends or of a state or private patron. The artist is likely to find both of these most readily among his own people, from whose life he derives his creative ideas and whose most eloquent representative he often is. This essential native background is lacking in a country to which an artist is exiled. Ukrainian art during recent years has not enjoyed the protective patronage of its own state, nor has it a chance to exchange ideas freely in public, a factor which is essential for the promotion of artistic talent. Ukrainian art shares the sad fate of its people, and its tendency to depict sorrow, suffering, and heroism seems to me to be the expression of this fate. Ukrainian art in its own country is forced to submit to the rules and regulations of a totalitarian and alien state, or to keep silent; Ukrainian art in exile is forced to struggle hard in strange surroundings and alone, without the support of its nation, in order to assert itself."

Further highlights of the "Day of Ukrainian Culture" were in evidence in the press conference which was opened by the chairman of the press and information service committee of the German-Ukrainian Herder Society, Franz Gaksch, member of the Bavarian Parliament. After a talk given by the chief editor of the *Suchasna Ukraina*, Volodymyr Stakhiv, a lively discussion ensued on the subject of "co-existence".

The art exhibition was opened by Professor Dr. Mirtchuk, who, in his address, praised the merits of the works exhibited and said that the artists in question had made a name for themselves not only in Germany, but also in England and France. Numerous prominent representatives of political and intellectual circles in Bonn attended the opening of the exhibition. A special room was devoted to an exhibition of over a hundred different editions of the Ukrainian emigrant press from all parts of the world. Incidentally, the public was deeply impressed by this exhibition.

The main feature of the evening meeting, which was opened by the president of the German-Ukrainian Herder Society, Erwin Mittich, consisted of two lectures, one given by a German, namely Federal Minister Waldemar Kraft, and one by a Ukrainian, Dr. A. Figol, both of them dealing with German and Ukrainian fellowship. We take the liberty of quoting the following extract from the interesting lecture given by Federal Minister Waldemar Kraft, who dealt with his subject-matter in a most profound and earnest manner and expressed his deep appreciation of the cultural mission of the Ukrainian nation:

"The most important task of the German-Ukrainian Herder Society is, in my opinion, to foster the feeling of mutual sympathy and to promote the understanding of each nation for the way of thinking and living of the other, to learn to comprehend the national aims of both peoples, and, above all, to help to pave the way for a common European future...

"Thus we have one great and common aim. We must apply all our strength and energy to the task of regaining our native country. And this is a task which can only be achieved when all free people are united in their desire to overcome the limits imposed by exaggerated nationalism and egoism, to pull together, to recognise their mutual enemy, and to establish intellectual and cultural power, social security and economic strength in Europe, which will inevitably bring about the downfall of the Kremlin in the long run...

"All those of us who have learnt the value of freedom during our enslavement must realise that every individual, every national group, and every nation has the right not only to possess a native country, but to live and work in it in freedom...It is likewise our great and common task to make this right to a native country and to self-determination the basis for a universal and internationally valid law of nations."

THE FIRST UKRAINIAN SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE IN MUNICH

The Independent Ukrainian Association for Research into Soviet Theory and Practice concerning National Problems held its first scientific conference in the hall of the German University of Munich earlier this year. The conference was opened by the President of the Association, Professor Y. Boyko, and by the Secretary, Professor V. Oreletsky.

Professor Boyko gave the first lecture on "The Russian historical roots of Bolshevism." He underlined that the implications of this subject are particularly important since they form the basis of the whole activity of the Association. Western scholars do not pay sufficient attention to the problem. Among Ukrainians only Dr. D. Donzow, and Sciborskyj in *Stalinism* have tried to elucidate it. The Russians have complicated the question rather than clarified it. Dostoyevsky has depicted the type of Russian revolutionary tending towards Bolshevism, unmasking the narrowness of his spiritual attitude, the stubborn combatting of God (bohobornytstvo), and the pathological spirit of messianism. Merezhkovskyi tried in *Cad of the future* (*Griadushchyi Kham*) to present the trends in and adherents of

Bolshevism as a phenomenon of the Russian spirit. The Russian philosopher Berdyayev in *Philosophy of Life* and *Philosophy of Inequality* mercilessly described Russian Bolshevism, although later, in *Russian Idea*, he softened his contention by stating that Bolshevism is only a transitional phase in Russian history. Dan saw the Constitution of Stalin as a step forward to democracy, and, taking an opposite view, Fedotow finds a connection between the practice of Lenin and the Russian way of life.

The lecturer pointed out that Marx had looked for the success of his teaching in the industrial countries and not in Russia. But it turned out otherwise. The Russian apologists of Marxism were at the same time his Russifiers. It is interesting that Herzen, who was ignored by Marx and Engels, is now highly appreciated by Russian Bolsheviks.

Professor Boyko stated his disagreement with the suggestion that Russian Bolsheviks only began to push forward purely Russian problems in the thirties. He cited examples from the life of Lenin, Gorky and Gladkov, whose activity was closely connected with Russian nationalism. He also stressed that Soviet internationalism amounted to a new variety of Russian messianism, since it was also a continuation of the Russian spiritual traditions of the 19th and 20th centuries. It was thus a skilful camouflage for Russian nationalism. He pointed out that the impersonality of Russian historical development, and the automatic actions of the broad masses, have found full expression in Bolshevism; also that totalitarianism and nihilism, as well as the sudden anti-religious movement, are phenomena of Russian origin. The lecturer concluded by saying that Russian spiritual forces are scarcely strong enough to oppose Bolshevism.

General Curate the Rev. Prelate Petro Holynskyj, in the second lecture which was called "The Muscovite (Russian) Orthodox Church as the bearer of the imperialistic policy of Moscow in the world" (read in German) characterised the whole development of the religious idea in Russia as an instrument used by Russian official policy to strengthen the Russian Empire. He approached his subject from the historic point of view, stating that the Russian Orthodox Church aimed at the destruction of other non-Russian Churches, especially in Ukraine, and had established new episcopates in order to Russify non-Russian elements.

The prelate went on to describe the part now played by the Russian Church in Russian world policy, and gave numerous examples.

The third lecture, "The principal features of Soviet national policy," was given by the Italian Professor A. Giannini of Rome, President of the Italian-Ukrainian Association in that city. He emphasised the policy of force used by Moscow towards other nations, including the satellite states. He went on to analyse Soviet practice in all nationality matters pertaining to the subjugated or satellite peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and also of Asia.

Major-General Nicholas Kapustianskyj read the fourth lecture, which was called "The national policy of the Bolsheviks as suitable for strategic war preparations". He said the key to Bolshevik victories was to be found in Lenin's conception of national policy with its propaganda catchwords of the national and social liberation of peoples, coupled with the military doctrine of the Russian Red Army which had adopted Lenin's strategy of decomposition—

a merciless reign of terror and unprecedented exploitation. The propaganda value of these Red Russian catchwords had, however, carried little weight with the national armies of 1917-20. It is perhaps not sufficiently widely known that the Ukrainian national army hindered the invasion of Rumania and Hungary by the Red Army in 1919, and it is much to be regretted that this fact was not understood at the time by the Western European states.

The lecturer commented on the military forces of the Soviet Union and of China. He declared that only a far-reaching liberation policy on the part of the Western World towards the subjugated peoples behind the Iron Curtain and full scale support for the revolutionary movements within the Soviet Union, as well as in the satellite states, could weaken seriously the Soviet hinterland and demoralise the Red Army, thus accelerating the final victory of the Western World over Communism.

Professor L. Rebet then read his lecture on "The origin of the Ukrainians, Russians and White-Ruthenians (Byelorussians) as commented upon in contemporary Soviet theories." He stressed the fact that Soviet theory endeavours to serve Russian imperialism by asserting that these three peoples should be considered common successors of the ancient Ruthenian—Kyivan—State; in other words that these peoples are masters of the present Soviet Union. Of course, the leading part is played here by the Russians themselves. This theory is false, since the above peoples developed independently of one other.

A lecture on "Stages in the development of Soviet Russian Imperialism in 1941-51" was given by Mrs. O. Sulyma, a high school teacher. She showed how the Russians endeavour steadily to strengthen their imperialistic policy within the Soviet Union, and are obliged to face difficulties, particularly in Ukraine. Four stages in this policy were distinguished by the lecturer: the first stage included liberalism in national policy and utilisation of national feelings on behalf of the struggle against the Germans, July 1941—August 1946. However, the increasing Ukrainian nationalism became a menace to the very existence of the Soviet Union. The second stage, August 1946—January 1949, was characterised by the sudden strengthening of the Soviet Union as a Russian great power and by combatting all Western influences, at the same time emphasising the superiority of the Russian nation and its culture over the whole world. The third stage comprised the years 1949-50 and was marked by fierce antagonism to cosmopolitanism. This period eased the situation in Ukraine in so far that many Soviet-Russian officials who combatted Ukrainian nationalism were recalled from Ukraine. The fourth stage, 1951-53, saw the encouragement of the formation of new socialist nations in order to Russify them more easily—since, for instance, in Ukraine Russification had been such a failure. A fifth stage, since the end of 1953, is characterised by the inner struggle between leading circles of the Kremlin. These circles have been trying to win the support of national forces for their own ends.

"The post-war evolution of Soviet ideology which marks a strengthening of the Russian imperialistic complex," was the title of a lecture given by Professor P. Holubenko. The lecturer stressed that the evolution of Soviet ideology aimed at spreading and strengthening the Russian 'great power'

complex excludes any kind of democratisation of the Soviet administration and any increase in the freedom of peoples within the Soviet Union. Communist dictatorship and totalitarianism are the only forces that can support the existence of the Soviet Union. Thus the disintegration of the Soviet-Russian empire and the liberation of peoples must be the only objective which can morally purify the Russian people from the crimes of Russian imperialism.

In a lecture on "The Soviet Union and Austria," Dr. Jurgens von Hehn stressed that the Kremlin, in opposition to Great Britain, tried to establish an independent Austria so that this state might the more easily be exploited during the time that Britain was trying to form a Danubian federation.

Professor Dr. R. Wierer lectured on "The decline of Russophile tendencies among the Czechs," emphasising that the present Soviet-Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia had greatly cooled the pro-Russian attitude among Czechs.

Professor Glovinsky spoke about "The exploitation of the virgin lands as a means of strengthening Soviet policy in economic and national problems." He pointed out that the Russians are trying to gain more arable land behind the Urals and to produce better conditions in Kazakhstan and in Central Asia in order to forward emigration of the Slavonic population to those areas. These measures are mainly directed against China, but emigration of Ukrainian youth to those territories may also weaken elements in Western Ukraine which are dangerous to the Russian occupant. The economy of Ukraine as a whole is being damaged by the compulsory emigration of young Ukrainians to the above mentioned territories.

Professor B. Krupnytsky gave a lecture on "The Soviet history of mutual relations between Ukraine and Muscovy according to comments of the scientists of the Kremlin." In his lecture he analysed the work published in 1954 on the Treaty of Pereyaslav concluded between Ukraine and Russia in 1654, in three volumes, edited by the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow. The comments on the Treaty had been dictated by the Kremlin in order to falsify Ukrainian history in accordance with the single aim of proving that Ukrainians had always wished to be united with Russia in a common state.

Professor V. Oreletsky lectured on the national policy of the Kremlin as presented by the Institute for the Research of the History and Culture of the Soviet Union, which is materially supported by some American circles willing to co-operate with Russian refugees. The lecturer declared that there is little or no objective truth in the publications of the Institute, but that they consist entirely of what may be described as mere scholasticism.

NEWS

The Committee for Study of the Ukrainian Emigration in America attached to U.V.A.N. has begun its work of collecting materials concerning the history of the Ukrainian emigration in the U.S.A. It has called upon the community to help it in collecting old calendars, newspapers, programmes, memoirs, and various documents which would assist in compiling a history of the Ukrainian emigration in the U.S.A. which will soon celebrate the centenary of its existence.

The Stoke Branch of the League of Ukrainian Women, affiliated to the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, has sent an appeal to the British Press and to Women's Organisations in Great Britain, for help in protesting against the deportation of thousands of Ukrainian women to the slave labour camps of Siberia and Kazakhstan. The new wave of terrorist activity which is forcing thousands of Ukrainian wives and mothers, bereft of husbands and children, to leave their native land and undergo the harsh conditions of the "virgin lands" calls for the immediate attention of the West. Lack of proper housing, over-long and exacting hours of work, poor and insufficient food, are mentioned especially, and reference is made to the indifferent attitude of those in the West, who, knowing of such conditions and such large-scale genocide, stand by and take no action against the perpetrators of these crimes.

* * *

In Britain the Ukrainian Dancing Group "Orlyk" and the Ukrainian Male Voice Choir "Homin"—both of the Manchester Branch of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain—are adding another successful year to their record.

"Orlyk" visited the Malvern Festival in May and also took part in the Civic Festival in Cork in that month. Members of the Group were warmly welcomed in both towns, and press reports spoke very highly of their dancing. The Group gave a concert in London before leaving for France and Italy. In France "Orlyk" took part in the International Festival of Folklore at Nice, and then danced in Livorno, Florence and Pescara in Italy. Returning to Britain, the Group competed at the 8th International Dance Festival in Edinburgh and won the championship. Of their performance at the Ukrainian concert organised by the Scottish Regional Council of SUB *The Scotsman* wrote:

"The Scots have ever a soft spot for a brave and freedom loving people, and when that people adds gaiety and colour to the courage, the sympathy is all the deeper. Gaiety is certainly the keynote of their dancing, and it was a delight to watch the light, quick movements of the men, notably in their Ukrainian Cossack sword dance...The girls were quite as vivacious and looked charming in their wide-sleeved white dresses richly embroidered in colour... One could not but sense the delight that they and the other performers brought to the large Ukrainian community in our midst."

"Homin" competed at the International Eisteddfod at Llangollen and was awarded second prize in the Folk-song contest. The Choir was lead and conducted by Jaroslav Babuniak who also had an outstanding personal success. He was awarded the first prize for playing the bandura in the folk-instrument class, a first prize for Bass solo, and a second prize for Baritone solo. His song accompanied by the bandura was broadcast by the B.B.C. in full.

* * *

The programme of the 36th Eucharistic Congress which took place in July in Rio de Janeiro, the capital of Brazil, included special celebrations in the Byzantine Rite. The Ukrainian Catholics who form the largest group of all the groups of believers of the Byzantine Rite participating in the

Congress, organised the Day of the Byzantine Rite. Ukrainian ecclesiastical circles inform us that Ukrainians from all the countries of America participated in the Congress. The last Eucharistic Congress, as is well-known, took place in Barcelona in the year 1951.

* * *

The Silver Jubilee of "Obnova"—the Ukrainian organisation of Catholic graduates and students—was marked by a Congress held in London. The occasion also commemorated the thousand years of Christianity in Ukraine, for in 955 Princess Olha of the Kyivan State was publicly baptised. "Obnova" was founded in 1930 in Lviv with the purpose of educating Ukrainian students in the spirit of Christian religion and morality.

The Congress took place from 14-17 August. Pontifical High Mass in the Oriental Rite was celebrated in the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Saffron Hill, E. C., by Bishop Hermaniuk, Coadjutor to the Exarch for the Ukrainians of Manitoba. The Apostolic Delegate, Archbishop O'Hara, presided at the celebration, and with him was Archbishop Buchko, Apostolic Visitor to the Ukrainians in Western Europe. The Apostolic Delegate read a message and a blessing from the Holy Father, and—as reported in the *Catholic Herald*—"spoke of the glorious Christian tradition of 'this noble people', more glorious than ever today when Ukrainians in the Church of Silence are giving 'such a magnificent account of themselves, fighting and dying for the Faith'."

* * *

The Association of Ukrainian Engineers in Philadelphia, U.S.A., which has 50 members, recently celebrated the fifth anniversary of its activities. The Association organises weekly gatherings, evening-parties, dances, and the like. 99% of the members are working in different technical spheres. Three have become university professors—Professor Dr. Andrushkiv is teaching mathematics in New Jersey, Dr. Eng. B. Hnatyuk is professor of aviation in Notre Dame University in the State of Indiana, and Dr Eng. O. Makar is professor of geodesy and mechanics in S. Louis University in the State of Missouri. Zynovii Dybuliak was chosen as chairman of the new Executive Committee at the last General Assembly of the Association.

* * *

The first Congress of the Ukrainian Christian Movement was held on the 30/31 May at Louvain in Belgium, with Professor Dr. I. Mirtschuk presiding. Delegates were present from Germany, Great Britain, France, Holland, and Austria.

Dr. Janiv, in an opening speech, summed up the work of the Movement, and outlined its proposals for the future. An evening session was devoted to discussions on the draft constitution, which was amended and finally approved.

Dr. W. Janiv was elected President of the Movement, with a deputy in each member country. The General Secretary is I. Siletskyj, and the members of the Executive Committee are as follows: Prof. Dr. I. Mirtschuk, Eng. P. Zeleny, Prof. Dr. J. Hynylevych, Prof. I. Holubovych, Mme. O. Pavlovska, Mr. M. Dorozhynskyj, Mr. V. Federonchuk, Dr. W. Konrad, and Mr. O. Kushpeta.

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

WARSAW TRIAL OF O.U.N. MEMBERS

Three death sentences, one life sentence, 15 and 12 years in prison—such was the verdict of the Polish Military Court in Warsaw.

The Warsaw Radio and the Polish newspaper *Zycie Warszawy* dated 29 July 1955 released the following statement:

"A court trial against the members of the spy ring liquidated by the organs of Public Security took place before the Military Garrison Court in Warsaw on the 27th of July, 1955."

On the defendants' bench were seated: Zbigniew (Myroslav) Kaminskyj from the Yaroslav district, province Riashiv; Peter Hoysan from the Sianik district, province Riashiv; Bohdan Lycholat without a fixed residence; Wolodymyr Nyz from the Lubacziv district, province Riashiv; Eugene Ptashnyk without a fixed residence; Mykola Boychuk (Tadey Sokolowskyj) without a fixed residence; Mykhailo Zwiek from the Hrubeshiv district, province Lublyn."

"The defendants were recruited from the former members of the U.P.A. (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)."

"All defendants with the exception of Mr. Zwieck were in possession of radio-transmitters, fire-arms, poison, and instructions, and were brought to Poland by various routes with the intention of spying and sabotage."

"After examining the accumulated evidence, the Military Garrison Court in Warsaw sentenced Myroslav Kaminskyj, Peter Hoysan, and Bohdan Lycholat to death; Eugene Ptashnyk and Mykola Boychuk to life imprisonment; Wolodymyr Nyz to 15 years in prison, and Mykhailo Zwieck to 12 years in prison."

Trying to conceal the ideological aspect of the trial and the real role of the defendants—as fighters-revolutionaries of the armed Ukrainian underground of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.), the Polish Communist "judges" indicted them of espionage for foreign intelligence, banditism and similar crimes taken from the vocabulary of the Russian M. V. D.

But in spite of all the abuse and defamation they could not conceal the truth about the defendants being members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.).

Already in 1954, i. e. immediately after their arrest, the Polish press wrote, on 20 May, that from 1945-1947 Kaminskyj, Hoysan, and Nyz had belonged to the U.P.A. Detachments that operated in the south-eastern districts, that is, in the Ukrainian territory which had been incorporated into the Polish Communist State on the basis of the Russian-Polish treaty of 1947. Later, fighting their way through Poland and Czecho-Slovakia they crossed in to West Germany. In July 1951 Kaminskyj and three other members of the Ukrainian Underground returned through Czecho-Slovakia to the Ukrainian occupied territory in Poland.

Lycholat, after having ended training in Germany, returned illegally to Poland. "Among the prisoners", wrote the Press Service of the Polish Military

Mission in Berlin, "there is also a long standing member of the armed detachments (U.P.A.), Peter Hoysan, who, under the name of "Woron", operated in 1945-47 in the region of Lisko and Sianik. In 1947, together with his detachment, he crossed Czecho-Slovakia and arrived in Germany. Woldymyr Nyz from the Dykiv Staryi, district Lubacziv, was also a member of the U.P.A. in 1947. Afterwards he lived in Poland, and in 1950 he went abroad. Eugene Ptashnyk, a radio technician, kept contact with the O.U.N. by means of a radio transmitter."

"The defendants, according to the information of the Polish press of that time, were in the possession of the following materials for revolutionary action: 17 pistols, a great quantity of ammunition, for radio-transmitters, codes, special photographic cameras, chemicals for invisible writing, organisational instructions, documents, reports, and various currency."

This information was released in 1954 by the Polish Communist press in Warsaw and Berlin.

Having undeniable evidence that the defendants were Ukrainian revolutionaries, members of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists fighting for the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke, and leading the revolutionary movement on the Polish territory in connection with the occupation of the Ukrainian borderlands by Communist Poland, the Military Court in Warsaw intentionally defamed them as foreign agents in order to prevent the truth about the struggle of the Ukrainian and many other subjugated peoples, among them also the Polish people, to spread throughout the Free World. This truth would strengthen resistance among the enslaved peoples and would threaten with annihilation not only the Polish Communist puppet government, but their master and tutor—Moscow—as well.

RELEASED FROM RUSSIA

Recently a Ukrainian news correspondent chanced to meet a Spaniard, Major Palacios, who belonged to the group of 286 Spanish war prisoners released by the Soviet administration last year. This group was made up of people of varying categories: former communists, idealists and convinced republicans who first fought against national defence and later asked their great ally, the U.S.S.R., for asylum; sailors and state officials who had been commanded to the U.S.S.R. and who, after the Reds were finally defeated in Spain and the Spanish ships in Soviet ports confiscated, were forcibly retained by the Bolsheviks. But the majority of this group had been war prisoners, members of the Blue Division which was defeated near Volchov in 1943.

Major Palacios held the highest rank among these repatriated soldiers and was their natural leader. He is now about 40 years old, and he left Spain, his parents and fiancée, in 1941 when a lieutenant. After 13 long years of hard living and homesickness he returned to find his former fiancée a widow with three children. He married her and is happy, or so he says. But his past experiences have left deep marks upon him. He is retrospective, speaks little and dislikes to talk about his captivity. He is working on his memoirs

of Soviet concentration camps. However, he agreed to give some little general information for publication.

"After my arrival in Spain," said Major Palacios, "it was difficult to believe my dream was realised and I was home. I had lost all hope of return, and our release was a mere miracle that occurred during the short interval between Stalin and Khrushchov. I hope our colleagues who remained in the Soviet Union will have a similar opportunity.

"While serving in frontier units and as a war prisoner, I crossed the whole of the U.S.S.R. I have been near Leningrad, in Byelorussia, near Moscow, in Ukraine—altogether 20,000 kilometres. Wandering from prison to prison and from camp to camp and vice versa I learned a great deal. For example with the instinct of the terrorized prisoner we were able to distinguish a Ukrainian from a Russian among our guards. Ukrainians were more human and friendly towards us; they helped us often. I was struck by a deep, hidden hatred in Ukrainians against Russians. Knowing this, I asked the Ukrainians, while working with them, whether they were Russians. They answered me angrily that they were not Russians but Ukrainians. With a sort of enthusiasm they said that Ukrainians and Russians were not the same. Unfortunately we could not fully understand their explanations on this point as we did not know anything about the mutual relations of Ukrainians and Russians up to the present time."

Asked whether he had been long in Ukraine, Major Palacios went on: "Yes, I was in the prison of Kharkiv for two years, and also in a camp in the Donets Basin. The country impressed me as potentially very rich. It might even surpass in percentage output the U.S.A. The state authorities take from Ukraine 40% of harvest directly as "postavka", while 12% is taken for M.T.S. and 7% for other needs of the state. In addition the kolkhoz members pay the state mills for grinding. In view of this, I was not surprised that Ukrainian wheat producers were eating brown bread and very little even of that.

"When in Kharkiv prison I heard that 300,000 tons of wheat were exported to France, and I wondered how the Ukrainian population was still able to take risks and help us.

I had heard about the Bandera Movement (Major Palacios refers to the Ukrainian underground as "los Banderas") after the war in the concentration camps in Russia. We knew that the organisation had blown up the Moscow-Berlin express at Tchernaja Koshka, somewhere in Byelorussia. The assailants wore military uniform and had three trucks. We knew 'los Banderas' caused the Bolsheviks much serious damage; prisoners, civilians and even soldiers in our guard used to speak about them. But during the last months of 1949 I was in Kharkiv prison along with ordinary criminals and political prisoners, and there I became acquainted with 'los Banderas' themselves.

"It is true they did not ever stay for long; they were interrogated, sometimes tried, sent to the transition points and then to forced labour. They might be sentenced for 10 or even more years. They were usually good-humoured, even gay, and curiously enough did not show any signs of breakdown. I made some real friends among them.

While I was in Kharkiv prison one could feel some special tension. At nights, the city was completely still. It was said in prison that there were some attacks—political ones, made by 'los Banderas'.

For there are means of communication in spite of secret police. I do not know whether the people in Ukraine hear transmissions from radio Madrid, but I know they listen to American broadcasting. When we were able to contact each other during work I heard different versions of American news bulletins. It is not important that there are not many radio sets, it suffices if some one has heard the news, and then it is passed through the whole people.

You ask what is my view of the chances of the underground? As far as I could discover, the movement is certainly strong. The population is living under bad conditions and is dissatisfied, but at the same time the state machine is very strong: there are huge Russian garrisons, guards of state police who are competent. The underground needs more active support on the part of the West, but on my return I find not so much indifference to your Ukrainian cause, but rather an almost complete lack of information about it. The co-existence policy may succeed in damaging the insurgent movement."

Our correspondent thanked the Spaniard for the information and welcomed him back to Spain. Major Palacios assured him that he would write the full truth about his experiences in his memoirs which he hoped to publish next spring.

NEWS

The young Polish writer, Jacko Bochenski, has published his *Record of a journey through the U.S.S.R.* in the Warsaw literary weekly *Literary Review*.

Having visited the ironworks "Zaporizhstal" and the State farm "Ukrainka" near Kharkiv, in his "itinerary" Bochenski is delighted with the achievements of the Soviet technique. At the same time, however, he adds: "from what I have said about advanced technique, advanced agriculture, modernized factories, one should not draw the wrong conclusion that the whole technique is thus... Although I stayed in the country for a short time, my stay was sufficient to see the contradictions. I was surprised at the water-supply in the stalls for calves...but I was told that there was no water-supply in dwellings..."

The Polish poet, who is delighted with Soviet construction, first of all with the new towns which are springing up where "there was recently arable land," completes his "itinerary" with the following words: "But it seems to me that in those beautiful towns there are living people who for some reason are ill-suited to them. They look too poor in comparison with the magnificence of the towns..."

* * *

In 1954 the Derzhpolitvydav "State Political Publishing House" in Moscow published a voluminous book by A. V. Lykholat, consisting of 656 pages, under the title *Utter defeat of the nationalistic counter-revolution in Ukraine (1917-1922)*. It consists of new Russian-Bolshevik lies about the liberation fight of the Ukrainian people. Thus, a passage of a review of this book in *Radyanska Ukraina* reads: "Trying to preserve their domination at any

price, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists used to sell Ukraine either to the German Emperor or to the American, English, and French imperialists or to bourgeois Poland"... Surely the author of the book, its commentators, and the Moscow publishers should know that the Ukrainian people and its vanguard, the nationalists, have always fought against all the occupants of Ukraine, and for an independent state of their own, similar to that of all the free countries of the world.

The assertion that the ideology of the Ukrainian "bourgeois" nationalists was favoured only by "the exploitative classes—the bourgeoisie, the landowners, and the kurkuls—"peasant capitalists exploiting hired labour"—is also a lie because it is generally known that the Ukrainian national-liberation fight for the independence of Ukraine has always relied on the broad masses of the people.

The book by Lykholat and the comment on it also represent falsely the facts about Tsentralna Rada "Central Council," Hetman Skoropadsky, and the "Petlyura Directorate"; they include all these in the Russian-Bolshevik conception of the "kurkul-nationalistic banditry."

It is interesting that the book and the comment on it call Englishmen, Frenchmen, Americans and others, "foreign imperialists" who, allegedly, often used Ukraine as a base for their imperialist objectives, and the Russians who, expanding their empire, oppressed Ukraine for centuries, allegedly used to give "a brotherly helping hand" to Ukraine. It is a purely Russian, Bolshevik, dialectical logic: if I do evil, it is a good thing; if you do good, it is an evil.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

I. Bandura. A Ukrainian expert on agronomy living in Argentina.

Volodymyr Derzhavyn, Ph. D. Professor of History of Ukrainian Literature and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. The author of many contributions to the study of Ukrainian Literature.

Dmytro Donzow. One of the leading thinkers of the Ukrainian national struggle for liberation, and author of many books and articles. He is now living in Canada.

Ilarion Holubovych. M.A. Lecturer in Latin at St. Joseph's College, Stoke-on-Trent.

W. K. Matthews, M. A., B. Com., Ph. D., Professor of Russian Language and Literature in the University of London; Head of the Department of Languages and Literature at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. He edits *The Slavonic and East European Review* published by the School, and is the author of numerous articles and verse translations, etc. He is an Hon. Member of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain.

A. Mychalskyj, D. D. Priest of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, who studied in Rome and now lives in Britain.

Andriy Mykulyn, Major. Leading journalist and expert on Soviet Economy.

Jaroslav Stetzko. Prime Minister of Ukraine in 1941. Leading member of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations.


Olexa Woropay. Ukrainian journalist living in London. Author of *The Ninth Circle*.

ERRATA

Page 15, note 5, line 1. For 'seventeenth' read 'sixteenth'.

Page 16, note 11, line 3. For '1760' read '1750'.

Page 16, note 21, line 4. For '1168' read '1185'.



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N. Polonska-Wasylenko

THE PRINCESS OLHA

First Christian Ruler of Ukraine

c. 945 — c. 964

In the history of Ukraine the tenth century is of especial interest. It was an age when the foundations of the Ukrainian state were laid; when under the leadership of the Kyiv princes—or grand-dukes—the process of the unification of all Eastern Slavic tribes was developing; when Norse conquerors changed quickly into Ukrainian rulers of the Kyiv State; when the Christian religion replaced the cults of pagan gods, and the Church was united with the State for many years to come. All these processes developed with astonishing speed, and every ruler in that century played an important part in the early history of Ukraine.

In a central position among these rulers both in respect of importance and of chronology stands the majestic personality of the grand-duchess Olha. In order to appreciate the role of Olha in the history of Eastern Europe one should glance at events in Ukraine when the death of Duke Ihor in 945 raised his wife to the throne of the Kyiv Grand Duchy.

During the early years of the tenth century the dukes Oleh and Ihor fought continuously to create a powerful centralised state with Kyiv as its centre. One after another the Slavic tribes submitted to the Kyiv Duke, and their tribal chieftains were either killed in battles or forced to acknowledge the authority of Kyiv, and pay tribute to the Duke, who ruled them and held courts with the help of his high officials and members of his suite. Oleh, whose name was linked with many legends as well as historical facts, fought mainly against Byzantium, and as a result of his victory a trade treaty—preserved in one of the Ukrainian chronicles—was signed with the Greeks. By that treaty the Kyiv State was granted very favourable trade relations with Byzantium.

Ihor succeeded Oleh in 913 and was already a more vital personality. He continued Oleh's policy of subordinating the Slavic tribes and also opened the route to the Black Sea, reaching the trans-Caucasus. Amongst many wars led by him was one against the Pechenegs, who, helped by Byzantium which feared the growth of Ukraine, were destroying Ukrainian settlements on the coast of the Black Sea and harassing trade caravans on their way south. Ihor wished to establish his rule along the Black Sea Coast and therefore aimed to end Greek colonisation of the Crimea. This attempt led to renewed war with Byzantium and brought no advantages to Ihor. In the year 944 a further trade treaty of great importance was concluded, and in this Ihor's state was characterised as follows: there were "prominent princes" subordinated to Ihor—perhaps Volodyslav and Peredyslav who signed the treaty with Ihor were such princes—while others still had Viking names; a considerable number of his followers were Christians and, as they were mentioned first, their status was by no means inferior to that of the pagan who signed. "The ones who were christened" were sworn on a cross at S. Ilya's, while those who were not christened attested their willingness to carry out the clauses of the treaty by laying down their naked swords and other weapons: "let he who breaks the treaty be cursed by God and Perun (the pagan god of thunder)", says the final clause of the treaty.

The chronicle does not mention any uprisings in Ihor's dukedom, although these would appear quite natural in a state not completely united and which stretched from Novhorod to the Black Sea; in addition, the population of the state was of varied origin, with the Varangians as the suite of the Duke and the upper social class, and it was a time when religious differences were beginning to emerge into the open. That all was not well in Ihor's dukedom is clear from the catastrophe with which his reign ended, and this is described in great detail in the chronicle.

In 945 Ihor travelled with his suite to collect duties from the tribe Derevlyany. After gathering considerable quantities of provisions from them, he was later persuaded by his wife, Olha, to visit the region once more for further supplies. This time the tribe rose and savagely killed the Duke together with his followers. He was survived by Olha and his son Sviatoslav, a minor.

The leadership of the young state that was only just beginning its life in the flames of struggle and wars was taken over by a

woman, the widow of Duke Ihor, and all the Ukrainian tribes submitted to her authority. This fact is worth some consideration. In the days of the Middle Ages when, throughout Europe, physical strength and military prowess were regarded as the highest virtues, and when the first rulers of Ukraine—then called Rus—had been warriors, there appeared a woman of appealing beauty and “wiser than all other people”, in the words of the chronicler, physically weak however and no soldier; and yet the state submitted humbly to her.

Involuntarily the thought arises that great must have been her moral strength and personal authority on the one hand, while the culture of tenth century Ukraine must have been advanced for the rule of a woman to be accepted in this way.

Nothing is known of the Duchess Olha's married life except that she was presented with the village of Vyshhorod by her husband, and that her representatives took part in the signing of the trade treaty of 944. These facts serve to throw rays of light into the darkness of the century, and seem to show that the status of women in the Kyiv state was rather high, especially as some other women and their representatives are also mentioned in the treaty.

The young Duchess was faced by difficult and complex tasks, and the first of these was to avenge the death of her husband, murdered in so ruthless a way by the Derevlyany. Such revenge was required by the unwritten moral code of those times which bound all kinsmen of a murdered person. This law of revenge was so deeply and firmly embedded in the customs of the population that even after thirty years of Christian teachings of love and forgiveness the great Ukrainian Prince Yaroslav the Wise dare not prohibit its practice. He did limit, however, the range of kin who were not only permitted but obliged to avenge a murdered parent or relative. It was only after a further twenty-five years that Iziaslav and Vsevolod, sons of Yaroslav, and their boyars (nobles) were able to abolish the law of revenge and substitute fines. Slowly and with many hindrances the instinct of personal revenge began to die away under the influence of the Christian religion. For this reason it is not possible to view the atrocities and refined tortures applied by Olha to the Derevlyany in revenge for the murder of her husband from the standpoint of present-day morality. A chronicler, a Christian monk, enumerates the tortures without so much as a single word of misgiving.

In this chronicle account there are many interesting facts: first of all the Derevlyany sent envoys to Kyiv to ask Olha to marry their own duke, Malo, but Olha had them thrown into a grave and buried with earth. She then suggested they should send other representatives consisting of "noble people", and these she had burned in a "bath". Finally she invited the Derevlyany to take part in ceremonies connected with her husband's burial, and members of her suite encouraged them to drink to excess, afterwards killing some five thousand men by the sword. All this did not, however, satisfy her thirst for revenge, and she herself went north to punish the rebellious tribe. She captured many towns and villages, including Korosten, near to which her husband had been killed. From its people she exacted a "small tribute", a bird—pigeon—from each yard (house); she then had burning twigs tied to the legs of the birds who, released, returned to their houses and set them on fire. After that she imposed a "great tribute" on the tribe, and only then did she consider her revenge to be adequately fulfilled. In the eyes of contemporaries the complexity and atrocity of the revenge matched the loss sustained by the Duchess.

In this story, later recorded by the chronicler, the Duchess Olha appears to us as a woman performing her sacred duty in avenging her dead husband. Later, we see in her someone who breaks with pagan traditions and initiates new ones for the nation. According to the earliest Ukrainian chronicles the Kyiv dukes had made war uninterruptedly for sixty-six years, starting with the coming to the Kyiv throne of Duke Oleh—fixed by the chronicler as the year 879. These wars subdued kindred tribes, fought neighbours and increased the Kyivan territory. The wars had given meaning and purpose to their lives and had held their whole attention. But all this changed during the reign of Olha. For the almost twenty years of her rule, 945-964, she lead no wars at all. Her whole energy was absorbed by internal politics, and for the first time the chronicle dwells in detail on her administrative activities. She toured her immense state in person—mention is made of her presence on the River Desna and the River Msta. She founded new villages, new towns and new centres for regional administration. She was the first Ukrainian ruler to fix the amounts of the tributes exacted from subordinate tribes and these are called in the chronicles *ustavy*, *uroky*, *obroky* and *dani*. In this she may have been motivated by the disaster that had occurred to her husband when he tried to take too high a tribute from the Derevlyany.

According to the chronicle the tribute was divided into three equal parts: two parts went to Kyiv, the capital and main centre of the state, while the remaining one was retained for Vyshhorod, Olha's own town and property. The important point here is the attempt to systematise not only the collection of the tribute but also its distribution and use. It reminds us of the distribution of the national income in ancient Rome into "fiscal" and "private"—the former being destined for the needs of the state and the latter for the upkeep of the Imperial Court. Another important feature of the chronicle is the mention of the hunting regions established by Olha throughout the country round the rivers Dnieper and Desna.

In the tenth century trade was the main source of income for the Ukrainian state economy. Oleh's main attention in the famous treaty of 911 had been given to trade relations with Byzantium. Ihor's military expeditions to the trans-Caucasus and against Byzantium had also had the establishment of trade relations and the safeguarding of markets for Ukrainian exports as their main purpose. The first place amongst exports from Ukraine at that time was held by furs—beaver, fox and so on. In the tenth and eleventh centuries furs were in high demand everywhere, especially among the Arabs, in Byzantium, and in Western Europe. The dukes took their tribute in furs, and the fell of a weasel was a measure of money for a long time. It was for this reason that the establishing of special hunting regions by the rivers had so great an importance, while it also defined the duke's rights to certain hunting areas and thus eliminated possible causes for quarrels with neighbouring tribes. Hardly less interesting is the introduction of special markings on trees containing bee-hives, and it is worth noting that apart from furs, an important export was wax, sold universally in Western Europe. The Bavarian custom law of Rafelstadt, dating as far back as the middle of the ninth century and confirmed again in 916, mentions merchants from Rus who "brought wax to Bavaria". This shows how precious a product wax was, and the *znameni*—the marks on trees with bee-hives—guaranteed ownership of the trees. Such examples show how manifold the activities of Olha were, how she penetrated into all departments of her state. It should be remembered that it is hard to realise the heroism shown by the Duchess in travelling from Kyiv to Novhorod, to Polissia and other remote places in her territory. Roads in the tenth century

are difficult to imagine, leading as they did through dense forests and swamps. There is an instance in the biography of Theodosy Perchersky, who had to travel from the Izyaslav palace to the Kyiv-Pechersky Monastery. Both of these places are now within the confines of the city of Kyiv, but that journey was described by the Pateryk Pechersky as "hard" and "troublesome", and we can deduce from this something of the hardship that attended the travels of the Duchess Olha which extended for hundreds of kilometres, in summer and in winter. It is not surprising that the inhabitants of Pskov preserved her sledges as souvenirs for over a hundred years. And it should not be forgotten that, in addition to such hardship, she was travelling through the territories of newly subdued tribes where uprising and skirmishes were more than likely. And yet, undaunted by such considerations, the Duchess toured her dukedom in person escorted only by a small suite. Such journeys were probably not undertaken by Oleh or by Ihor—for there is no mention of them in the chronicles of the time.

The greatest single event of Princess Olha's activities we may consider to be her acceptance of the Christian faith. As mentioned above, it is clear from Ihor's treaty with Byzantium that there were many Christians in Ukraine in those early days; there was a Christian church and a priest attached to it. There were also Christians among the higher social classes of society and at Olha's court. But, nevertheless, her acceptance of Christianity remained her private affair, and she did not succeed in making Christianity a state religion. The time was not yet ripe for this. Many students of Ukrainian history attempt to find out where Olha was converted. The chronicle says that it was in 955 in Byzantium, but it has been conclusively proved that she only visited Byzantium once, in 957. So it would seem either that she was in Byzantium twice, or, as is more probable, that she was christened in Kyiv. In either event, it had far-reaching effects upon the development of the young state: not only did she give her subjects an encouraging example, but she also elevated her country into the family of cultured European states. Only as a Christian ruler could she undertake the many diplomatic activities which marked the whole period of her rule.

In the year 957, then, the Duchess Olha, ruler of a great and powerful state, visited Byzantium. Her visit to Constantinople in 955 is more or less legendary, but that of 957 is established historical fact. It has been described in detail in the Emperor



The Princess Olha, ruler and saint of Kyiv-Rus

Constantine Porfirorody's work *Of the Ceremonies of the Court of Byzantium* and included descriptions of her arrival in the city, the reception at the Emperor's palace, the banquet, and so on. But in this otherwise detailed account there is no mention of the Duchess having been christened there. On the contrary, many remarks point to her having arrived in Constantinople as already a Christian.

Olha arrived with a large suite: she was accompanied by her niece, twelve princesses, twenty envoys, interpreters, a military detachment, and, most important of all, her personal chaplain, Gregory. The audience was held in a sumptuous hall: the Emperor and his wife were sitting on golden thrones surrounded by golden peacocks. At the moment when the Duchess entered the hall, a hidden orchestra started to play, the golden lions supporting the thrones roared, and the peacocks spread their golden tails. At the same time the thrones of the royal couple were raised in the air by means of golden chains.

The whole ceremony made so immense an impression on the members of the delegation that they repeatedly fell on their faces. The only person who did not in any way lose her dignity was the Duchess Olha who merely inclined her head slightly before the Emperor. Twice she was entertained at banquets, which in itself shows she was a Christian since court rules of Byzantium did not permit the royal family to sit at the same table as pagans—and Olha was certainly seated at the royal table. According to the traditions of both countries the Emperor and the Duchess exchanged gifts.

Unfortunately, the Emperor Constantine made no mention of the affair which forced the ageing Duchess to undertake so long and dangerous a journey, though we may assume these to have been momentous. It appears from the Ukrainian chronicle that the Duchess was by no means satisfied with her reception in Constantinople. In the first place she was obliged to wait for a long time in the port of Suza before being allowed to enter the city, and then was accorded no greater honours than were given to representatives of small nations. Fully conscious of her dignity as the ruler of a large and powerful nation, she resented the slight deeply, although she did not show her dissatisfaction at the time. However, a year later, when envoys arrived at Kyiv from the Byzantine Emperor, she ordered them to wait at Pochaino—then the port of Kyiv—in order to take revenge for her own enforced wait at Suza.

In the year 958 Olha sent envoys to the German king, Otto I, at that time the most powerful of all German rulers and destined shortly to be crowned Emperor of the western Roman Empire. German chronicles, the so-called Hildesheim Annals, have preserved an account of the arrival of the Ukrainian envoys. They relate how Duchess Olha—called "Princess Elena" in the Annals—asked King Otto to send a bishop and some priests to her country. In 960 the monk Libutius was appointed Bishop of Ukraine, but he fell ill and died in 961. He was replaced by Adalbert, who arrived in Kyiv at the end of 961 or early in 962, but failed to achieve anything and returned to Germany without founding a Roman Catholic mission. It is not easy to determine the reason for the failure: it is possible that Olha's views changed, or that the exchange of envoys served other purposes in addition to the establishment of a mission. The important point is that Otto I, in spite of Adalbert's evident failure to found the mission, received him very kindly and gave him a large reward, which seems to indicate that he was quite satisfied with the advantages resulting from the diplomatic visit to Ukraine.

We do not know precisely the aims of these two diplomatic actions of Olha, the visit to Constantinople and the dispatch of envoys to Otto the Great. They appear to have been essential for the further development of the Kyiv state. Olha was the first of the Ukrainian rulers to have diplomatic links with the two most powerful emperors of contemporary Europe, divided as it was into two parts controlled respectively by Byzantine and German emperors. And these links were not formed as a result of alliance in war, but in times of peace and with deliberate purpose. The son of Olha, Sviatoslav, did not, in later years, avail himself of his mother's experience and example, and, on account of his Balkan policy and the occupation of Bulgaria, he severed the existing relations with Byzantium and discontinued those with the western Roman Empire. It was Olha's grandchildren who re-established the old connections and promoted new ones.

Olha also failed to influence her son to become a Christian. To his mother's insistence, Sviatoslav replied that he feared to become the laughing-stock of his army—for he was a great soldier, and was known as the Conqueror. This answer reflects high credit on Olha who, becoming convinced of the superiority of the Christian religion, accepted it openly as her own and was not afraid that others would mock at her on account of her beliefs.

The Princess died in 969, or early in 970. In her last will she asked that she should be buried according to Christian rites. She was later proclaimed a saint by the Christian church.

Such was the life of this prominent woman, ruler and Christian. We do not know much about her, but even the sparse information contained in chronicles and in the reports of contemporaries contrive to give a fine picture of a beautiful and wise princess who had succeeded in initiating a new age under the difficult conditions of the Middle Ages. The lack of adequate information was in those early times partly replaced by stories and legends, some of which even found their way into the chronicles.

The wisdom of Olha, strongly emphasised by the legends, is fully borne out by all her actions. She it was who was first among Ukrainian rulers to dedicate all her strength and ability to the establishment of order within her state, and to the establishing of diplomatic relations with powerful European empires. It is interesting to note the story in the chronicles of the support given by Ukrainian nobles to the wish of Volodymyr the Great to become a Christian: they praised his intention on the ground that his grandmother, Olha, "the wisest of all people", had during her life embraced the religion.

As such she remained in the memory of her people, and thus we too see her with the eyes of the mind—as a great princess of Ukraine, a great Christian, and as a saint of the Christian church.

*This article is written in commemoration of the 1000th.
Anniversary of Olha's baptism in 955 which introduced*



the 1000 years of Christianity in Ukraine.

Veli Kajum-Khan

Moscow and the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet "Nationalities" Policy Since Stalin's Death

The "nationalities" question is the most sensitive and vulnerable spot of the Soviet rulers. At the recent international conferences in Delhi and Bandung, Moscow once again declared that the nationalities problems in the Soviet Union had been solved. To what extent there is any truth in such a statement, and whether Russian policy has changed at all in favour of the non-Russian peoples, remains to be shown in this article on the strength of Soviet data.

As everyone knows, the Soviet Union consists of numerous peoples and nations who all have their own culture, language, and history, and belong to various religious faiths, as for instance the Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist faiths. These peoples—the Esthonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Cossacks, Georgians, Azerbaijanians, Armenians, North Caucasians, Turkestanians, Tartars, Kalmucks, and various others—who together number a population of over 120 millions, have nothing whatsoever in common with the Russians. Many of them were not deprived of their independence until after the Bolshevik revolution and after World War II. For the past decades an extremely bitter fight, conducted both openly and by underground means, has been going on between Russia and the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union.

The anti-colonial and anti-tzarist attitude of these non-Russian peoples proved an important factor when the Bolsheviks assumed power. For this reason the latter promised to solve the nationalities problem in accordance with the demands of these peoples, and they proclaimed the freedom, equality, and inviolability of these peoples' territories. But once the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power they merely transformed the tzarist centralised and united empire into an allegedly federalist Soviet state and set up a one-party system. In fact, it was only the outward form of the regime which was changed. On the one hand, the federalist Bolshevik system placed the non-Russian peoples once more under Russian rule, and, on the other hand, the myth of a "Soviet Federalism" has served useful propaganda purposes outside the Soviet Union, namely in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The basic principle on which Stalin's nationalities policy was based was a ruthless fight against the independence aims and the national consciousness of the non-Russian peoples. Whilst Stalin was in power, political purges were the order of the day throughout the U.S.S.R. "Soviet patriotism" and "socialist internationalism" were, in Stalin's opinion, synonymous with the absolute authority of the Russian hegemony and the theory of the alleged superiority of Russian culture and the Russian language. Under Stalin's leadership Russian nationalism flourished as never before.

Actually, not only Communist Russians, but also Russian opponents of the Communist regime support the myth of a "Greater Russia", and proclaim the alleged supra-national mission of the Russian nation. They all visualise a "Greater Russia".

After Stalin's death, when a fight for the supreme leadership of the Soviet Union broke out once more among his successors, various tendencies as regards the solution of the nationalities question, which had already been in evidence at the 19th. Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1952, again came to the fore and led to an open clash between Beria and the clique in support of Malenkov. Beria upheld the theory that the Party had adhered to the Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policy and had thus "gained a complete and final victory over chauvinism as manifested by major powers, over nationalism, and bourgeois cosmopolitanism". Beria stressed that the standard of living in the non-Russian Soviet republics was in many respects higher than in Italy, Turkey, and Persia. He criticised tsarist colonial policy which, he said, had set up an intricate network of Russian officials in the subjugated countries. He talked about chauvinism as manifested by major powers and was actually referring to "Greater Russia".

This "new course" announced by Beria produced considerable effects in all the non-Russian Soviet republics, and various opinions were expressed which so far had been regarded as out of the question by the Central Committee. Russification in its exaggerated form was described as a violation of the Party's principles. *Pravda* reported that active national trends were already in evidence in Ukraine, Caucasia, the five Soviet republics of Turkestan, and elsewhere.

The clique who supported Malenkov and advocated the idea of a Greater Russia, however, attacked Beria and demanded that the national movements in the republics of the Soviet Union should be dealt with unsparingly.

In the course of the Kremlin leaders' fight for absolute dictatorship Beria was overthrown; he was decried on account of his nationalities policy and was accused of having fostered the dissension between the Russians and the peoples of other nationalities. Moscow, incidentally, had long been aware of the fact that the chauvinist attitude and the presumptuousness of the Russian officials in the republics of the Soviet Union had even aroused the indignation of Party members who were natives of these countries. After Stalin's death the new rulers in Moscow were determined to find ways and means of remedying this state of tension. Beria was therefore accused of having fostered the dissension and of having tried to claim credit for the Party's relaxation policy for himself, in order to win over the Party cadres in the republics of the Soviet Union to his side. Beria was likewise accused of having planned to assume the leadership of the Party and the state by degrees, as early as 1952, at the 19th. Party Congress, which was held five months before Stalin's death.

Beria's term of office was merely a short transition period. Under Malenkov and later under Khrushchov the old Stalinist Party principles were again enforced. In the first place, all Beria's friends in the republics of the Soviet Union were removed from office. The Moscow rulers thereupon increased the number of fighting forces in the non-Russian territories of the Soviet Union. And it was significant that the manoeuvres of the Red Army, which were held in these territories intentionally, began on the anniversary of the very same date on which these nations had, since 1917, either proclaimed their independence or been deprived of it. In this way Russia sought to demonstrate her power and show the non-Russian peoples that she was in a position to suppress all national movements.

Incidentally, the alleged right of self-determination of the non-Russian nations is interpreted in such a way as to imply that they agreed to their incorporation into Russia of their own free will. It is nowadays considered reactionary to talk about a tzarist occupation. For this same reason Moscow went to considerable trouble to falsify the treaty concluded between Russia and Ukraine three hundred years ago, in order to make it appear as though the Ukrainian nation had joined forces with Russia of its own accord.

The Russians are convinced that they are a "cadre nation" and the "representatives of a higher culture". Any criticism to the

contrary is regarded as a violation of Party principles and is punished accordingly. According to Moscow, the non-Russian nations should only be conscious of the ties which exist between them and Moscow. All other ties which exist between them and neighbouring nations, and are for the most part based on a common culture and religion and on national characteristics, are suppressed by Moscow. Thus, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism for instance, which are active movements in the Turko-Mohammedan republics of the Soviet Union, are regarded as a menace to Moscow's central power. Moscow is afraid lest these ideas might become effective, since these nations, as a result of their experiences, regard Communist dictatorship as identical with Russian domination. Moscow admits that many of the Communist intelligentsia of the Soviet republics of Turkestan and Azerbaijan would even be willing to accept the ideas disseminated by the above-mentioned movements. In fact, one Soviet newspaper wrote as follows: "The corrupt ideology of Pan-Islamism is as great a menace to the Eastern republics as the ideology of the hirelings of the Vatican is to the Western republics".

The Russification of the non-Russian countries is partly effected by legal means, namely in accordance with the Party decrees issued at the end of 1953. A new kind of colonisation was begun under the motto of "The Cultivation of Kazakhstan", that is, North Turkestan "and Siberia". Thousands of young Communists and ex-servicemen of the Red Army were sent to these regions, allegedly in order to cultivate millions of hectares of land there. And this campaign is still in full swing. Actually, Moscow's aim in this respect is to Russify the territory in question to an ever-increasing degree, a fact which aroused considerable hatred and hostility on the part of the population towards the new arrivals. The Kremlin, however, cunningly tries to thrust the responsibility for this campaign on to other nations by resorting to compulsory resettlement measures, and is now sending Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, and members of other non-Russian nations to North Turkestan and Siberia. For this same reason the newly founded villages and kolkhozes there are given Ukrainian names, as for instance Kyiv Sovkhoz, Ukrainian Sovkhoz, Georgian Sovkhoz, etc. The native population is thus to be deluded into believing that the settlement campaign is not a Russian measure, but a campaign for which all the Soviet nations are responsible. According to the Ukrainian Soviet press, however, the youth of Ukraine is refusing to take part in this campaign and is trying to evade the resettlement measures.

By means of this campaign Moscow aims to obtain cheap manpower for the cultivation of hitherto uncultivated territory, to poison the friendly relations of the non-Russian nations among themselves, and to undermine the political strength of the population of Ukraine and Caucasia. The Ukrainians and Caucasians who have been resettled to other countries are now being replaced by Russians, whose job it is to spy on the people and check up on their political attitude. In this way Moscow—by “lawful” means—is carrying out its Russification process in all the non-Russian countries. In addition, the former soldiers of the Red Army who have been sent to the territories which are to be cultivated can be mobilised again at once, should there be the slightest indication of a national rising on the part of the native population. According to the orders issued by the Party, all the settlers who have been sent to Kazakhstan and Siberia are to make their home there and start a family, so that it will make it impossible for them to return to their own country.

Furthermore, persons from Soviet Uzbekistan and Soviet Turkmenistan, which border on Persia and Afghanistan, are being resettled to other territories and are being replaced in their own country by Russians. In this way Moscow aims to sever the cultural and religious ties which exist between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and their Islamic neighbours, and to ensure that the frontier regions are populated by trustworthy Russians.

Recently, Moscow has on various occasions referred to the “great and powerful Uzbek and Turkoman nations”, who manifest their affinity with their fellow-countrymen in Persia and Afghanistan, a fact which no doubt implies that the two peoples of Turkestan are laying claim to the northern regions of Persia and Afghanistan which are inhabited by Turkestanians. By this indirect means the Russians are trying to threaten the Persians and Afghans into recognising the present state of affairs in the U.S.S.R., since this is the only way in which these two nations can be sure that their present frontiers will be safeguarded.

Clearly the nationalities question remains unsolved. Under the motto of Soviet patriotism a new type of colonialism is being enforced in all the non-Russian Soviet republics and in all the satellite states. Nothing whatsoever has changed in this respect since Stalin's death; the rulers of the Kremlin may change, but the fundamental policy of the Communist Party in Russia as far as the nationalities question is concerned has remained unchanged.

Victor Petrov

Ukrainian "Intellectual" Victims of Bolshevik Terror

Acknowledgement: This is the First Part of an Essay by Victor Petrov translated from the manuscript now in the possession of the Byelorussian literary critic, Anthony Aramovich, who is living in Munich, West Germany. We are greatly obliged to him for enabling us to print it in our magazine. The Second Part will be included in a later issue.
Editors.

The Bolshevik Revolution which broke out on 7 November*) 1917 has, according to the official Communist Party nomenclature, been called the Proletarian Revolution. This should mean that a definition of the October Revolution, besides noting the chronological event, should also include a social reference. But of what kind? Should it imply that the purpose of revolution was to solve the principal social problems, improving the living conditions of the working people, and eliminating social injustice and social oppression?

In one of H. Kosynka's stories, written in the early twenties, a Ukrainian farmer complains as follows: "It would seem that now the government is ours, and the order is ours, but yet all is as it used to be before. We rid ourselves of the great lords, but there were bred many small ones that suck people's blood. You plough and you do not see any better days. There was the Tzar—we had to work; the Soviets have come—we have to work, and the "lords", clad in silks, stroll in their gardens as they used to do".

The farmer whose complaints H. Kosynka recorded at the time knew as did millions of other farmers, that he had been cheated. But the complaints were in vain. The famine in the Volga district in 1921, the organised famine in Ukraine in 1933, terror, concentration camps, misery during every year of Soviet rule, are the best proofs that Soviets have never cared and have never intended to care, not even in the least degree, for the improvement of the lot of the working man. To care for him has never been a part of Soviet social policy.

*) In the Julian Calendar, 26 October.

Lenin mocked maliciously at such "magnanimous illusions". He believed he could in very short time build up a Communist state by means of decrees and paper work, but he did not believe in social justice as the basis of a social order. Bolsheviks have never had a weakness for magnanimity.

Mankind! This has been provided for neither by statute nor by programmes of the V.K.P.(b)—Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (bol'shevikov), the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). Not the abolition of social evil and the removal of social oppression but, on the contrary, their intensification, not a change in the process characteristic of capitalist society but, on the contrary, its development to the utmost and to its final fulfilment—this is how bolshevism has understood its historical mission as the destroyer of capitalism.

At the root of this political doctrine there lies an illusive and atrocious thesis that only through anti-social measures would it be possible to achieve social improvement. The "social" has been reserved for future generations while the diet for the present one is the "anti-social". What the future is to be is a question of belief; as to the present—the peoples under Soviet rule have lived in anti-social conditions of misery, oppression and constant fear.

The Soviet Government and the farmers

M. Khvylovy, who during the civil war took an active part in the armed struggle on the side of bolshevism, later wrote a passionate story about a Ukrainian Communist who killed his mother—Ukraine. From a different aspect and in a different interpretation this story has been the fruit of the same moods of the masses as are pictured in the story by H. Kosynka: "It would seem that now the government is ours, and the order is ours, but yet all is as it used to be before".

The characteristic trait of all bolshevist slogans is their ambiguity. While denying magnanimity as a political principle, the bolsheviks have at the same time readily used the magnanimous credulity of the masses. Bolsheviks have always been matchless masters at the art of juggling with slogans. They have never been pacifist, but they proclaimed the slogan "Peace for the Cottages" in order to seize power, and, after doing away with the palaces, they altered "War on the Palaces" to "War for war against hovels".

Bolsheviks have never approved of socialist land reform. However, with the slogan "Land for the Working People"—of the

Socialist Revolutionary Party—they assured themselves of support from the farmers at the most critical time of the struggle for power, 1917-21. In the following period they suddenly gave this slogan quite a different meaning, using it against the so-called kurkul (kulak). The main thesis of bolshevik social policy towards the farmers has not been improvement in their economic situation, but its aggravation; not the granting of land, but its forfeit; not strengthening them as a social class, but their destruction and conversion into landless, economically insecure farmers—i. e. changing them into proletarians, changing them from owners of the 'means of production', land, buildings, vehicles, into industrial workers who possess no property and who work as hired labour.

As a matter of fact, there is nothing new in this. In enforcing the policy of proletarianisation of the farmers, and their economic expropriation, thus achieving a concentration of property, bolshevism merely fulfilled the social order of the capitalist world, all these processes being leading tendencies of the capitalist social order. Bolshevism took over the anti-social functions of capitalism with respect to farmers, with this difference, however, that in capitalist society they were purely economical in character, whereas in bolshevik society they have been the political and administrative means applied by force on farmers by the Communist state. It must be added that this forced proletarianisation and expropriation were accompanied by mass forced resettlement and physical extenuation.

In official language this bolshevik policy has been called the "Liquidation of the Kurkul (i. e. wealthy farmer) as a social class, on the basis of the collectivisation", but in actual fact it embraced all farmers, since the dispossession of the "kurkul" was not applied only to him but to all others farmers as well. Thus the land has been taken away not only from the more wealthy, but from all, regardless of their social status and social security.

The Soviet social policy towards farmers has not been one of social peace, but of social war. It has been directed against the farmer, and has been a policy of terrorism and destruction without exception or pity. Violation of elementary human rights has become a method, and terrorism a principle. There have been no limits to Soviet atrocity nor to Soviet rage in dealing with farmers. So, when we speak of the ruinous factor in bolshevism, we have in mind not only the sum total of all repressions, expropriations, deportations and executions applied to farmers, even not only the organised

famine of 1933 which was a result of that policy, but the very being and purpose of bolshevism itself: for the foundation of bolshevism is, not acknowledgement or acceptance, but negation, not the creative spirit of peace, but the destructive influence of negation designed to become universal.

In the first place, bolshevism has not given its theses "abolition of classes" and "establishment of classless society" any cultural or economic meaning, but the literal and concrete sense of physical annihilation. Towards its classless society strode bolshevism through an ocean of blood. The slogan of destruction was interpreted in the merciless and hideously bare sense of the word. Bolshevik social policy was anti-social in character.

Millions of farmers become victims of the slogan "Liquidation of the Kurkul as a Class", which hid a broader meaning behind its outward form. As the result of this policy in many villages, and sometimes in whole regions of Ukraine, there were no farmers left at all: some were repressed, others deported to Siberia, others again died from starvation or emigrated to towns, some simply ran away. The picture of ruined Ukraine contained in the so-called "Food Books" of the Muscovite State of the seventeenth century was to be seen in Ukraine of the twentieth century. The rural population of this agricultural country that had once been a grain store for almost the whole of Europe was starving round the doors of the town bakeries. Desperate cases of cannibalism occurred, houses were nailed up with boards. Future research workers compiling the "Food Books" of the thirties of our century will note down that as a result of the liquidation of the "kurkul" and of collectivisation, there were, in some villages of Ukraine—for example, the Uman district—none of the farmer families left at all, and the villages had to be repopulated by bringing farmers from Vynnytsia district and from Podillya. They will further note that, in Kyiv district, the farmer families that survived the famine of 1933 were not allowed to stay in their own houses, for a proletarianised farmer could not be left in his father's house. The feeling for property, the links with the homestead, were rooted out systematically and completely.

The notion of one's own home has become out-dated in Ukraine.

Bolshevism and the "Intellectual"

Soviet policy with regard to the intelligentsia did not differ from that applied to farmers. The slogan "Proletarianisation of the Farmer" was supplemented by that of "Proletarianisation of the Intelligentsia".

This meant that the intelligentsia as a separate social group should be abolished, and the proletariat should fill the vacant place. The difference between the manual worker and the intellectual worker should be destroyed.

The epoch of spiritual rebirth which had replaced the Middle Ages advanced learning and science. Physical strength became opposed by intellect, violence by education, and all-embracing dogma by knowledge and the will to criticise and probe. Education, not birth into a social class, or wealthy class, began to determine the social position of the individual. With education, a person might cross social barriers. The process of historical development led to the formation of a separate social class—the intelligentsia, which, in turn, led to a sharp division of the population into manual and intellectual workers. It may be said that the next and most important problem to be solved in our epoch, the twentieth century, is the removal of the differences and contrasts between physical and intellectual work.

Attempts of the bolsheviks to solve this particular problem were typical of their method. They incorporated brutality, atrocity and a chaotic haste. The enlightened way of solving this problem by means of the gradual extension of education, applied by the democracies, was opposed by the typically bolshevik way of imposing administrative regulations by and on the initiative of the party and organs of the state. The removal of contrasts between manual and intellectual worker was replaced simply by the removal of the latter. The elimination of contrasts ended in the destruction of the intelligentsia. Thus was the policy towards the intelligentsia the same as that applied to farmers: repressions, mass resettlement, mass extinction.

Proletariat summoned to replace intelligentsia

The process of the removal of educational differences between the proletariat and the intelligentsia, or the proletarianisation of the latter, began in the early years of the existence of the Soviet regime. The first step was Lenin's decree of 1919, annulling all diplomas, scientific degrees, titles, school certificates, and so on. It was maintained that proletarian origin should replace education, intellect, and experience. Skilled labour was not taken into consideration at all.

It was Lenin who advanced the thesis about the cook called to manage the state. And not only the state, but art, literature,

scientific research, trusts, factories and the like. People with party membership cards—on account of their membership alone—were appointed directors of mills, collective and state farms, meteorological stations, bacteriological institutes. They were bank managers and directors, judges, captains of ships, commanders-in-chief of entire fronts. It mattered not who they might have been yesterday or who they might be tomorrow: he who was once a machinist was appointed manager of a laundry and bathing establishment; or again he might be the director of an opera house; tomorrow he might probably be sent to supervise the delivery of agricultural products, and, later on, to head some geological or archaeological expedition of the Academy of Science. The individual was losing his identity. He was becoming an impersonal function of the party machinery, mechanically moved from one section of the social life to another. Nobody saw any objective reasons why the holder of a party membership card should do one job rather than another: the individual was supposed to be universal, and, this being impossible, he became nothing.

It may be noted that the former machinist, locksmith, or turner, now appointed director of a big trust or mill or scientific research institute might hardly be able to sign his name. Yet he was obliged to direct the establishment without any professional education or training. Some standard phrases from the party literature and some technical terms picked up at random was all he had in place of intellectual and scientific equipment. Naturally, he followed the line of least resistance. Conferences and speeches were substituted for work: presiding over assemblies and meetings covered his helplessness in administration and his ignorance in management.

If one pictures a country for its first fifteen years following its destiny without competent managers, with bogus directors and foremen in industry, science, art and even the army—then that was the U.S.S.R. The country was decapitated. The legendary image of S. Dennis entering the city carrying his head in his hands is the best illustration of the situation in the Soviet Union after it lost its intelligentsia. The director of a trust, a mill, or a scientific institution studying elementary mathematics with the help of a teacher in the morning, and lecturing about the philosophy of Hegel before an audience consisting of professors and engineers at the evening meetings of his political club—of which he was the head—was considered a normal occurrence that surprised no-one.

And there was no risk the bolsheviks would not run: factories and mills produced rubbish; research institutes published rubbish, economy deteriorated and so did financial affairs—big sums being spent to no purpose; budgets and bureaucracy grew together; the population starved; battles were lost; and yet the principle triumphed, the principle of party leadership.

Social descent and the number of one's party membership card to be inserted in columns of personal questionnaires left little room for blanks on education, professional training and experience in one's job. A university student in his first or second term who became rector of that very institution would occasion little surprise, nor would an engine driver appointed director of the Academy of Science, Institute of Archaeology, or a person with small attendance at evening courses heading the Institute of Ukrainian Folklore of the above-mentioned Academy.

Disdain for practical knowledge and respect for amateurism became principles. A modest gardener from Kozłow, Michurin, was hailed as a pillar of science. Ciolkowski, an amateur and dreamer, building space ship models of sheet iron in his mansard room, was declared scientifically competent. Academician Vavilov, a botanist of world-reputation, was, on the other hand, opposed by a nobody, Maria Demchenko, while agronomist Lysenko, without any intermediate degrees, was made a full member of the Academy of Science and appointed Director of the Peter Rozumovsky Agricultural Academy. And there have been no results upon bolshevik social policy: in one of his speeches Molotov mocked at the projected taming and domestication of foxes, while at the same time the agronomist Tsarin was praised for his proposition to cross wheat with other plants.

The scheme to destroy Ukrainian intellectuals

Every social and political slogan in the Soviet Union has been an appeal to bring about destruction of some kind. No political measure of the Soviet Government has ever been enforced other than by means of mass terrorism—Katyn and Vynnytsia were not exceptions, but the rule. Mass shootings have been a characteristic of the times. Terrorism and politics in the Soviet Union have become synonymous. But nowhere have these ruinous tendencies of bolshevism appeared more clearly and with such inevitable finality than with regard to Ukrainian intelligentsia. From the very beginning of

the Soviet State and ever since that time bolshevism has been engaged busily destroying Ukrainian intellectuals—planning the destruction in gradual waves and with inexorable intent. With the exactitude of a perfect mechanism the huge Kremlin mincing-machine has worked on the thousands, tens of thousands, and hundreds of thousands of persons who have incorporated within themselves the spirit, the intellect, and the conscience of the Ukrainian people. From the most outstanding to the ordinary, from the ingenious creator, the politician, philosopher, writer, scientist of world repute to the most humble, passive and indifferent white-collar employee with no pretensions whatever, political or otherwise, and independently of whether they were representatives of the older generation and were active before the Revolution, or whether they were the younger ones, born after the Revolution and bred, educated and raised by it—the Ukrainian “intellectual” of any age, social origin, conviction and relation to the Soviet Government, has been doomed.

Tens, hundreds, thousands of good, high sounding names worthy of the highest praise and esteem—archaeologists, historians, linguists, musicologists, ethnologists, folklorists, specialists in musical folklore, lexicographers, dialectologists, specialists in Ukrainian syntax, editors of literary magazines, pedagogues, jurists, translators from ancient and modern languages, copyreaders, bookkeepers, agronomists, veterinaries, teachers, film producers, cinema operators, playwrights, professors, assistant professors and lecturers, librarians, poets, novelists, painters, photographers, architects, all these people of varied standing and varied profession, all of them representatives of Ukrainian cultural and administrative life, met the common fate: imprisonment, deportation, and death.

To be continued.



Hans de Weerd

"OPERATION KEELHAUL"

The "repatriation" of anti-communist P.o.W's and refugees by the West

The tragic history of the forcible repatriation of hundreds of thousands of anti-Communist persons from the peoples of the Soviet Union to that State by the Western Allies during the years 1944-47 has now come into prominence for the second time since the end of World War II.

The first time that one was led to recall the fate of over two million Soviet citizens, sent back in 1945, was during the truce talks that ended the Korean war, while the outbreak of the "Geneva climate" in this year of 1955 is the second.

Since the Civil War 1917-21 (the Revolution and the Wars of National Independence) it has been the constant aim of Soviet Russia to spread—both at home and abroad—the idea that the Soviet Union is a monolithic power owing to the overwhelming support of all or nearly all its citizens. It is in accordance with this that the Soviet Union has now commenced a new offensive to get rid of the anti-Soviet emigration, and that the Kremlin tried, during the last war, simply to deny the very existence of anti-communist "collaborators". For when the invasion of Western Europe was being prepared in Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (S.H.A.E.F.), Western officers asked the Soviet delegates what was to become of the Soviet citizens who were captured in German uniforms and who had been fighting against the Kremlin and its then allies. To this enquiry, as later related by General Deane in his book *The Strange Alliance*, "the Russian representatives at Eisenhower's headquarters replied that the question would not arise since there were no Russians so serving".



Turkestani anti-communist volunteers captured by the French in Amiens
(By courtesy of the Imperial War Museum)

After the war, however, the German General Koestring, who was in charge of the "eastern volunteer units" declared that there were more than one million of such people. And they were by no means only "Russians"—but Ukrainians, White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), Caucasians, Cossacks, Turkestani, etc. In spite of the disastrous policy of Germany in the occupied areas, and towards P.o.W's and "Ostarbeiter", all these volunteers considered Russian Communism to be their most dangerous enemy, the one who should be defeated first.

The Soviets took the matter of "collaborators" very seriously, and the Supreme Soviet issued a Ukase against them on 19 April 1943. The West, on the other hand, did not concern itself much. Although the Soviet representatives at Eisenhower's S.H.A.E.F. had denied the existence of anti-Communist volunteers, the Western Allies—even before Yalta—started to return these forcibly, when they fell into their hands. From the United Kingdom, before the beginning of the Crimean Conference, Britain sent back 10,000* while she sent 7,500

* Cf. *The New York Times*, 17 March 1955.

from the Mediterranean, as was revealed by Eden to Molotov at Yalta. The United States extradited at least 2,600 "Ostfreiwillige".

This latter figure is derived from a Yalta document which was not among those published in March of this year. It is a note from the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, to Nikolai Novikov, the Soviet chargé d'affaires ad interim, and dates from 1 February 1945, a few days before the opening of the Yalta Conference. Grew expresses the opinion that the detaining power has no right to "look behind the uniforms", so that Eastern citizens captured in German uniforms are to be treated as German P.o.W.'s unless they themselves desire otherwise. Grew also reminds Novikov of the numerous aliens (among them enemy citizens) in the U.S. Army and consequently also among American soldiers in German P.o.W. camps.

At the time Grew made this attempt to combine acting in accordance with principles of international law and loyalty towards America's war-time ally, there had already been an exchange of notes between the Kremlin, London and Washington in order to reach interallied agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war. The matter had been introduced at the Moscow Conference of October 1944 by the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden.

On the second day of the Yalta Conference, Anthony Eden had again approached both Stettinius and Molotov on the same point. To Stettinius he contended that it would strengthen the Western position at Yalta if the Anglo-Saxons put forward concrete repatriation proposals to the Russians, as the matter was becoming urgent since the Red Army was now rapidly approaching German P.o.W. camps in which thousands of American and British subjects were held prisoner. To Molotov, Eden wrote saying that the conclusion of a repatriation agreement at Yalta would be a very happy result of the conference.

The American and British Chiefs of Staff conferred on the repatriation question on 7 February, 1945. They did not pay overmuch attention to the views of Mr. Grew, thinking these to be essentially diplomatic rather than practical considerations for military leaders. Grew himself, who was kept informed in Washington about the progress of the talks, sent on this same day a message to his chief, Stettinius, requesting him to bear in mind five points. According to the Geneva Convention of prisoners of war, pointed out Grew, the U.S.A. was bound to grant protection to Soviet

citizens captured in German uniforms. He then drew Stettinius' attention to the "traditional American policy of asylum". Another of the five points raised by Grew concerned the people whose territories had been seized by the Soviets in 1939 and 1940 — among whom were millions of West-Ukrainians. The following day Stettinius waved aside Grew's arguments, and declared that all in Yalta were of the opinion

"that it would not be wise to include matters regarding the protection of the prisoners of war convention and Soviet citizens in the United States in an agreement which covers primarily the exchange of prisoners liberated by Allied Armies as they proceed into German territory. In regard to 'claimants' (Ostfreiwillige demanding protection — de W.) despite the fact of the danger of Nazi retaliation, we believe that unless we reach prompt agreement on this question there will be serious delays in the release of our prisoners of war."

This message shows the extent to which the West trusted its war-time ally, and the sacrifices they were prepared to make in order to preserve appearances at home. What is most interesting for the purposes of this present article, however, is the fact that the Yalta agreements on repatriation of prisoners of war did not contain any clause concerning the use of force in the event of those coming under it not wishing to return to their "Socialist Fatherland".

On the final day of the Crimean Conference, 11 February 1945, both the United Kingdom and the United States signed a repatriation treaty with the Soviet Union. Lt.-Gen. Gryzlow signed on behalf of the Kremlin Government, Admiral Archer and Lt.-Gen. John R. Deane for Great Britain and the U.S.A. respectively. The treaty was not, however, officially published at that time. The State Department issued some notes to the press the next day, and only published the full text of the agreement a year later, as we shall see. In Britain *The Daily Telegraph* of 13 February 1945 carried the text, but without the names of those who signed it. To the best of my knowledge no official British publication or release of this important document has taken place up to the present day.

There is still the unsolved question of whether there were rules for the carrying out of the treaty. There are indications that there were, although these are themselves vague. As to the result, little difference was made, for, in spite of the fact that the Yalta agreement did not specify forcible repatriation, the latter policy was simply continued, having commenced before the treaty.



*Cossacks of the Pannwitz-Corps, captured by British troops, ride to the
assembly point in Carinthia, May 1945
(By courtesy of the Imperial War Museum)*

In several instances, the leaders of volunteer units, both German and East European, and, moreover, leaders of National Committees, besides German officials, endeavoured to contact allied army, and other, authorities before VE-Day in order to convince them of the vital necessity of keeping the substance of the anti-communist liberation organisations of the peoples of the Soviet Union out of the grip of Stalin's henchmen. In some cases, survivors can tell us something of those talks. Generally speaking they had little success in spite of the strenuous efforts made. Only the commander of the First Ukrainian Division (of the Ukrainian National Army) met with success, most of his soldiers being former Polish citizens.

The collapse of Germany was the signal for repatriation—both voluntary and forced—on a very large scale. About three million Soviet citizens were overrun by the Russians themselves, while nearly two and a half million fell into the hands of the Western Powers. A careful study of Allied, German and Soviet data shows that more than two million people were repatriated from territories West of the Iron Curtain, and that probably about four hundred thousand managed to escape repatriation in some way or another.

It is almost impossible, however, to arrive even at rough percentages for those who returned voluntarily or who were extradited by force. Nor has any research up to the present succeeded in reaching an estimate of how many of the above-mentioned two and a half millions were "eastern volunteers". At the end of the war there were certainly not as many as one million of these anti-Bolshevik fighters in the West, since many had fallen in battle since 1943 and many had been captured by the Soviet forces.

Any complete or nearly complete list of cases of forced repatriation is also impossible. From time to time new cases come to light. A few months ago, for instance, co-operation between an American historian and the writer of this article revealed the following heart-breaking incident:

Two hundred anti-communist volunteers from the Soviet Union had successfully resisted attempts to drive them into a repatriation ship on the west coast of America. They were sent to Fort Dix in the State of New Jersey, and heavily armed guards drove them once more into transports. Aboard another repatriation ship, this time on the east coast of America, they at once started a furious riot and managed to destroy the engines with their bare hands. The ship being then unable to leave port, the volunteers were brought back again to Fort Dix. There drugs



Captured Pannwitz Cossacks throw away their arms in the Drau valley, Austria
A British guard looks on
(By courtesy of the Imperial War Museum)



The memorial statue in the Drau valley, Austria, to those Cossacks forcibly repatriated, many of whom died resisting removal or committed suicide. The statue was erected by Cossacks who survived and escaped. Services of commemoration are held at the spot. The banner on one of the wreaths reads: "From the group of Cossacks at Spittal-am-Drau"

were mixed by a sergeant in the coffee of the unfortunate prisoners, and while in a deep, coma-like sleep they were sent back to Stalin and his henchmen. As stated above, this case is merely one among many others.

The most widely known story is that of the forced repatriation of about 60,000 Cossacks from the Drau valley in Austria, which was carried out by British troops in May-June 1945. There were many old emigrants among them—for instance, the famous Cossack ataman, statesman, writer and General, Pjotr Krassnow—and several who bore high British decorations from the time of the Red-White



The Soviet (left) and British (centre) Commanders at Judenburg-on-Mur, Austria, where captured Cossacks were passed from British into Soviet hands

civil war. Thanks to documents published by a surviving ataman, Nau-
menko (now in the U.S.A.) nearly every detail of this case is known.
The 'technique' was to convey the impression that there would be no
talk of extradition to the Soviets*. One of the officers taking part in this
action, in his Btn. memoirs published in 1947, devoted only a few words
to the real tragedy, and then dwelt at length upon the fine qualities of
the thousands of Cossack horses left by the 'repatriated' men. Another

*) For the benefit of those who have not heard about the tragedy in the Drau valley, we recall that the Cossacks of the Domanow-Krassnow and the Pannwitz groups were induced to gather and hand in their arms at spots near the river. They were then unexpectedly handed over to the Soviet authorities. Many committed suicide rather than meet the sure fate awaiting them at Bolshevik hands, and the memorial shown in the picture opposite was erected to the honour of all these anti-communist fighters. — Ed.

officer, Mr. Oswald Stein, after eight years had passed, wrote, in the representative *Army Quarterly*, about the repatriation of eastern volunteers and used these words, as astonishing as they are typical :

"Finally, there is the unhappy case of those who took up arms and fought on the side of the enemy against their own country and her allies. They may have been actuated by local patriotism taking the form of separatism; by racial, religious or political ideologies, or merely by a desire to save their skins under enemy pressure, or even by greed of gain. Whatever their motives it is hard to see how in such cases forcible repatriation can be avoided, or, indeed, why it should be avoided. Even when their motives were pure, these men fought against their own country and against their country's allies. Their action may well have prolonged the war, cost extra lives and caused untold suffering. Moreover, the obligation of a country to its allies seems here to be paramount and inescapable.

Political passions are apt to blind the eye of reason. But the whole of this problem is surely one where the solution must come from the cool head combined with the warm heart."

As already mentioned, this statement appeared, not in 1945, but in 1953. It is quoted here without comment beyond that it mirrors the mentality which cost the lives of untold thousands of people who had the courage to fight oppression. To prevent misunderstanding, it may be added that it was certainly not only anti-communist volunteers who resisted repatriation: thousands of "Ost-arbeiter" also sought to escape being sent back, some with success. But even "easterners" who fought *against* the Germans and who distinguished themselves in allied armies were sentenced to death, even though their record was known. Here is such an instance:

The Turkestanian Tinio, a "very reliable patrol leader" in the 92nd. U.S. Infantry Division in Italy, who, together with his group "on more than one occasion occupied a sector of the front on the Appenines" was sent back to the Soviets by his commander, General Almond—who was the very man to utter the above praise of Tinio. General Almond acted thus "with the complete conviction that this meant Tinio's 'certain destruction and that of his group'", just because he considered the order to be "a routine understanding" and believed "that was the general policy that was followed". As to his last remark, General Almond was only too accurate: General McNarney, Deputy Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, who questioned General Almond about Tinio and his unfortunate group, was the same man by whose order Brig.-Gen. L. S. Ostrander signed the Pentagon's order to General Patch (C.-in-C. 7th. U.S. Army) on 20 December 1954,

to use force against people unwilling to be repatriated. During the four months (since 25 August 1945) that General Patch had waited for this reply, he had suspended the use of force until further notice. Not only General Patch, but several other senior allied officers, had to reject the wish of volunteer unit commanders to surrender with all their men to the West rather than be caught by the Soviets.

Of General—later Marshal—Alexander, McNarney's superior, it is stated by several sources that he had concluded a special agreement in Vienna on 23 May with the Soviet High Command in the Balkans concerning the forced delivery of Cossacks and other anti-communist East Europeans in the Drau valley to the Russians. S.H.A.E.F. had already embarked on a policy of forced repatriation in April 1945, as was revealed many years later. Once Alexander had been the adjutant of old Pjotr Krassnow, but at the time he had the latter extradited (although in the Yalta agreement there had been no mention whatsoever of old emigrants) Alexander was adjutant-general to H. M. the King of England. In a few cases only allied soldiers showed a heart, and acted against the principle "Befehl ist Befehl" which—it should be remembered—was not acceptable as an excuse from those who were shortly to be tried as War Criminals at Nuremberg. In one such case a young British soldier is said to have wept like a child when he had to take part in measures against the 'repatriants'. Another—I was informed—had remarked: "That's their way to death". In many cases this is what it was, death coming slowly perhaps, and sometimes very suddenly—through execution or suicide before reaching the Soviet Union.

Vainly the old German General Koestring tried—and he knew it was in vain—to open the eyes of his allied interrogators to this grave problem. He said:

"... we Germans have surely—through stupidity, insatiability and ignorance—destroyed the greatest 'capital' that ever existed in the whole world for the fight against Bolshevism. You will not now understand me if I tell you that you have destroyed this 'capital' for the second time during the last few weeks. Not only in the materialistic sense, but also in the souls of all those who placed their hopes on your help and understanding—after they had been let down by Germany. It may well be that you will call desperately in the very near future for what you have now destroyed."

But forced repatriations went on and on. They were continued well into the year 1947. When Cardinal Tisserant in the Vatican

heard of the proceedings and was also shown a copy of the Yalta agreement, he uttered a fierce and courageous protest. He added: "It will compromise me, but the world must know of these things". A few days later, in March 1946, the State Department released the full text of the Yalta agreement. Forced repatriation continued, but it was then known to all that the agreement contained no reference to the repatriation of people living west of the pre-September 1st. 1939 Soviet frontier, nor of the extradition of old emigrants, nor of the use of force against those who could not be tricked by the lures of the various Soviet repatriation missions. The exact words used by some of these missions' officers are quoted here:

"All that you have said (about higher standards of living in the West — de W.) were true earlier, but are not any more. You cannot imagine how everything has changed, but you will soon see."

"A minority ... are responsible for terrorising the majority into rejecting repatriation. ... This minority must be got rid of."

"The Soviet Government does not blame you for your errors and full pardon awaits you. Your families, kinsmen, friends and homeland await you. The Soviet Government will not take revenge, will not ask repentance."

Hand in hand with Soviet repatriation officers (among them the M.V.D. General Michailov now heading the East Berlin Repatriation Committee with the same aim and the same arguments) worked not only allied military, but also civilian, personnel. As soon as the United Nations' Relief and Rehabilitation organisation established itself in liberated France, the officials were taught how to spot 'war criminals'. Under Fiorello Laguardia, successor as U.N.R.R.A. Director to Lehmann, a secret order, 199, was issued with the aim of speeding up repatriation, if necessary using force. But in spite of the fact that—to quote O'Donnell in *The Saturday Evening Post*, 6 June 1953 — "nobody carried out this harsh directive with more fiendish delight than ... fellow-travellers in ... U.N.R.R.A.", people like Lehmann pretend they have never even heard of such events.

On several documents which are relevant there is still a leaden security ban. Thus for instance on that numbered 383.7-14.1. in the Historical Records Section of the U.S. Army in Alexandria, written on 1 September 1948, and bearing the title: "Forcible Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens—OPERATION KEEL-HAUL" The official code-name of this 'operation' comes from an

old naval punishment in Britain and the Netherlands whereby delinquents were hauled under the ship's keel and generally emerged from the water more dead than alive.

It was the Korean War or, rather, the truce talks that ended it, which suddenly brought the question of forced repatriation into the centre of attention. After long negotiations with the Mao-Chinese and Communist North Koreans, the United Nations decided that this time there should be no forced repatriation. Some American magazines started to carry the story which is the subject of this article, but on 26 October, after a publication in *Newsweek* on this question, the U.S. Foreign Secretary, Dean Acheson, declared before the United Nations:

"It was quite unthinkable to the United Nations Command that it should use force to drive into the hands of the communists, people who would be resisting that effort by force."

He drew attention to international practice in this field, including Soviet peace treaties and the surrender ultimatum to the German General, von Paulus, in Stalingrad. Nothing was contained in all this, said Acheson,

"which would lead one to believe that a prisoner of war must be forced at the end of a bayonet, fighting, perhaps dying, to go back where he does not want to go."

To cut a long story short, there were no forced deliveries to the Reds in Korea. 100,000 out of 170,000 men in P.O.W. camps refused to go back. And then, a few days later, a Dutch Professor of Byzantine Studies, Prof. Dr. Lud. Grondije, asked frankly in the columns of the Amsterdam newspaper *De Telegraaf* why the West now granted to Asiatics what had been refused to Slav Europeans in 1945. He described the Cossack expulsions in the Drau valley, then seven years past, and demanded that there should be an international committee of investigation. He added that the names of those responsible could easily be found out. His article was the first of its kind in the Western, non-émigré, press. Hitherto only emigrants' periodicals had written about what was described by an American historian, in a book appearing that same year, as an 'indelible blot'.

Research then started in earnest. The following year, several people in various countries probed into the story. But it was this

year of 1955 that was to bring a whole range of events connected in some way or another with the tragic expulsions of 1944-47. First came the attempt by the British M.P., Captain Henry Kerby, to put



Captain Henry Kerby, M.P. tried to put questions on forcible repatriation in the House of Commons

questions before the House of Commons relating to the mass expulsion of anti-communist easterners. His enquiries were, however, not dealt with. In the same month of February the New York Representatives in the American House, Albert Bosch, succeeded in launching a Resolution which, when finally accepted, will result in a Special Congressional Investigation Committee in Forced Repatriation. Its predecessor, the Katyn Committee, had performed a like task, but on a matter in which the Soviets alone were to blame. The man who inspired Bosch's resolution, the journalist and historian, Julius Epstein of New York, had also campaigned for the Katyn Committee. In March 1955, when the greater part of the American documents on the Yalta Conference were released and published, Epstein discovered omissions in them, and succeeded in obtaining from Mr. John Foster Dulles the text of an unpublished diplomatic note (referred to on page 27 above). The same Mr. Dulles was warned from many quarters that the following clause signed by him in February 1954 in Berlin, while preparing the Austrian



Congressman Albert H. Bosch, M.C. New York, introduced a Resolution in the House of Representatives



Julius Epstein, New York journalist, determined to obtain an investigation

Peace Treaty, would bring untold suffering and death to thousands of eastern refugees in Austria, among them survivors of the 1945 expulsions!

"No relief shall be given by Austria to persons who refuse to return to their native countries, if these persons fought on the side of the enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers, or voluntarily collaborated with the enemies of these Powers, or engaged in hostile activities against their countries of origin, as well as against any of the United Nations or are members of organisations and groups which encourage Displaced Persons not to return to their countries of origin."

For the second time danger to those concerned was averted: the West dropped the clause and the Soviets changed their tactics. In East Berlin a Repatriation Committee was set up which, by letters, radio broadcasts, and a press-organ, is trying to lure anti-communist Soviet citizens back into the arms of their henchmen. After the Geneva Conference and the visit of Dr. Adenauer to Moscow, the Kremlin played a new trick and announced the umpteenth 'amnesty'. In this the Communist rulers confessed openly for the first time before the whole world that there had been several categories of anti-communist military volunteers during the 'Great Fatherland War'. A careful study of the Amnesty Declaration shows, however, that no amnesty is granted for—among other—acts conflicting with Article 58-2 of the Soviet Criminal Code. This Article deals with "armed rebellion", particularly with the intent forcibly to remove some part of Soviet territory from the sphere of Soviet influence. In the best M.V.D. jargon, these words stand for the national struggle for liberation of those non-Russian countries which were first conquered by Tzarist Russia and then, for the second time, by the Soviet Russian Red Army. Thus it applies to Ukraine, White Ruthenia (Byelorussia), Caucasus, Turkistan, and all the rest.

Recent developments in the repatriation issue show clearly how vitally important it is to be well-informed on contemporary and practical affairs, to spread information on urgent questions, and to protest loudly and incessantly when an outspoken voice can be of influence. Otherwise, the cost would be high in human life and in political disaster.

M. O. Myronenko

The Growth of Ukrainian Industry

The industry of Ukraine, as it stands today, is merely the means of supplying raw materials and semi-finished goods to the industry of Muscovite Russia—industry, that is, in the true sense of the word.

There are in Ukraine no factories for manufacturing steel goods, there is neither a building nor a textile 'industry', and there are none of those highly specialised branches of modern industrial undertakings—cars, aircraft, precision tools, and so on. Ukrainian industry and its output of finished goods only meets the needs of the population and of the national economy to a very small degree. It was noticeable, while travelling on the tramways in Ukraine, that the manufacturers of the older tramcars were mostly Belgian or other foreign firms, while Muscovite firms—Kolomensk, Metyshenketo—were already supplying the new ones. Similarly, any man who has worked on the railway in Ukraine can remember that the heavy machinery of the railway depots, the communications, the signals, the telegraph and electric equipment were not produced by local firms in Ukraine, but either by some foreign firm or supplied from Muscovy. Teachers find that all materials for school-work—microscopes, balances, drawing and geometrical instruments, bear exclusively the trade-marks of Muscovite factories. What carpenter or technician holds in his hands even the most simple tools—saw, knife, axe, hammer—produced by Ukrainian industry? For the most part all such things are manufactured by Muscovite industry. The ordinary citizen of a nation of forty-five millions may not notice that in Ukraine there exists, for example, not even one factory unit for the production of watches for everyday use.

It would be true to say that the network of railway transport, taken as a whole, in Ukraine is typical of the industrial development of the country and of its total economy. It has changed little since 1917, and taking into consideration the population and the territory, it is four to six times smaller than the networks of Ger-

many and France, not to mention Great Britain. Since 1917, Moscow has constructed about three thousand kilometres of railroad in Ukraine, mainly in the Donbas region (Moscow-Donbas) for the import of coal and steel from Ukraine. As in 1917, Ukraine still lacks highroads, and it is impossible to speak of any development in road transport—there are only ten thousand cars of all kinds in Ukraine, as compared with one-half to two or three millions on the roads of those countries approximately equal in size to Ukraine, such as Germany or France. Three-quarters of the Ukrainian population, in its everyday life, knows nothing of asphalt, stone pavements, or ferro-concrete roads. Over one-third of the population of Kharkiv was in 1940 without footpaths or paved streets—and those who knew Kharkiv need only call to mind the districts of Osnova, Kholodna, Lysa Hora, Pavlyvka and others. What about Poltava, Chernihiv, and many other towns? And “Industrial Donbas” with its ‘capital’ Stalino, where, in place of footpaths, several hundred metres of main road were laid with thin, rotten planks along which only one person could walk, balancing like an acrobat (and even that was not possible in the old streets). The roads were covered, in fine weather, with a thick layer of dust, and after rain they were impassable on account of the black, sticky, elastic mud.

Moscow has certainly built and improved the network of Donbas in order to accelerate the import of coal into Moscow; and by the side of this well-equipped railway network with its automatic signalling system, there emerges from his poor hut the unfortunate labourer, to tramp along the dusty road to work. Such a disparity is a very normal and natural state of affairs in the Muscovite organisation for the extraction of raw materials from Ukraine, but it can hardly form the basis, either socially or economically, of Ukrainian national industry.

And it is the founding of such a national industrial life for Ukraine that is particularly important to us. First we have to accept the fact that, as shown above, what passes for ‘industry’ at present in Ukraine is fundamentally an organisation for the obtaining and transportation of raw materials out of the country. Ukraine has not even the beginnings of an output of finished goods, manufactured from her own resources of raw materials. In order even partially to satisfy the needs of the population, therefore, the whole economy of Ukraine requires re-shaping—most urgently as regards the

building industry—to allow raw materials to flow into her own factories, and to develop all important branches of modern output from the basic processes to the diversity of specialised production.

For this task a huge amount of capital must be mobilised for the development of industry and transport, for the expansion of towns and urban economy. For one should not forget that in Ukraine over two-thirds of the population is still living in villages, and that all the Muscovite stories about 'industrial Ukraine' are but stories: whether Ukraine is industrial or agricultural depends upon the occupation of the population.

One of the most urgent problems in Ukraine is that of recruiting workers into new industrial units that do not exist at the moment. For instance, Ukraine has today 300-350 thousand metallurgical workers, who produce so great a quantity of raw material that, in order to turn it into the required finished goods, Ukraine would have to find about 700-800 thousand skilled hands. There are now only 200 thousand, and these only semi-skilled. Further, Ukraine needs about 500 thousand skilled textile workers, and has at present only a tenth of that number. Over all it may be said that, to develop the national industry of Ukraine, industrial workers must be increased by $2\frac{1}{2}$ -3 millions over the present figure.

Such a process would require time, not only for obtaining the necessary capital and equipping industrial units, but also for the development of socio-economic conditions necessary for the successful achievements of industry. And it must be recognised that, as a politically separate state, Ukraine would have immediate need of many industrial products. Where would Ukraine find aircraft for her first squadron? Where equip the essential passenger air-line between Kyiv and Odessa? For Ukraine has no factory nor plant to produce aircraft engines. How would the outworn telephone apparatus be replaced by the post-office when no telephones are manufactured in Ukraine? And until production of such articles is initiated in Ukraine where are we to buy them—in Moscow, London, Washington, Paris, Berlin, Stockholm or Brussels?

Moscow's accusing cry 'Bourgeois nationalism' means 'being a hireling of Anglo-American capitalism'. We will find a clear answer to give Moscow to that charge, and will be clear in our own minds too. For as long as the state of Ukraine is separated and isolated by Moscow in an economical sense, as long as Muscovite "Pobiedy" and "Zis-e" push out our Ukrainian trade-marks, Muscovite cars push

out German Mercedes, British Morris, French Chevrolets, Italian Fiats, and so on, Muscovite utilitarian cloth pushes out good English wool, and we are not able to process into material in our own factories our own wool and cotton, or the cotton bought in Egypt and the wool from Australia by Moscow for Muscovite industry, paid for by Ukrainian wheat, coal and manganese.

The first modern Muscovite car-factory in Nizhni-Novgorod (today called Gorshchki) has been built by American Ford. It is possible that Ford will also build the first car-factory in Ukraine, for example, in the region of Mariupol, Zaporizhzhya, or Kryvyi Rih. This Ford factory will be as good as that built in Moscow. Moscow may say that the car-factory in Gorshchki is 'socialist', but when Ford builds one in Kryvyi Rih, then it will be a 'capitalist' one. Yet Moscow has not become "treffy" because of the capitalist Ford factory.

A complementary problem, which is hardly technical or economic but social, is that of the elimination of social slavery in the social system—the 'industry' introduced by Moscow. For the social relationships introduced in industry by Moscow are best described as a system of slave work, and these must be abolished and replaced by free work with its essential component—earned wages. Earned wages are the only real measure of the social and economic relationship of the worker to the undertaking he furthers. This means that all social and economic relations will have to be based on the principles called by Moscow 'capitalistic'; existing industry, and the industrial enterprises which will be developed in Ukraine independently of Moscow, will rely on private ownership, and the worker should find his rewards approximately equal to those in other 'capitalistic' countries.

But how is this to be achieved? How can industry in Ukraine be de-nationalised and turned over to private ownership? How, in place of the present mass of Muscovite socialist, parasitical administrations, can be established private Ukrainian concerns, able to organise and to direct production by millions of workers, earning such wage-rates as will keep them in the factories when they are no longer—as today—kept there by force, by means of prison sentences for absenteeism, concentration camps and terror?

The capital of Ukrainian industry consists entirely of that remnant of unexported products that has been unlawfully appropriated by Muscovites from Ukrainian workers, technicians and engineers.

These should be returned to the owner—that is, to the producer. All the industry of Ukraine, irrespective of size, purpose and nature—apart from certain strictly public services (mail, telegraph, to some extent railways) must be returned through a system of shares to those people who, in the day of Ukrainian liberation, are in those branches of industry—the workers, engineers, technicians, etc. As soon as possible, the free exchange of shares should be facilitated so that industrial capital may move naturally, and so that the industrial capital distributed among members of the industries may change hands, resulting in the emergence of producers, managers, and private owners from the mass of people who received an equal social 'start'.

The present complex of works, technicians, engineers and other personnel should yield hundreds of thousands of industrial entrepreneurs, contractors and managers by a process of natural selection. This 'milieu', aided by the return of industry to private ownership, should give rise to large numbers of middle-sized private undertakings, with the necessary middlemen.

In this way, in the development and rebuilding of the social and economic system of the nation—with the Ukrainian town now an indispensable component in the spiritual and social life of the nation—we hope to resurrect Ukrainian individualism and personal self-respect, destroyed as it has been by the enemy, and to re-establish these qualities as an integral part of European culture and history.

By courtesy of the Ukrainian paper "Dumky"

PROTEST AND APPEAL

The Scottish League for European Freedom has appealed to all Christian Churches in Britain and the British Commonwealth to join in protest against the proposed visit of Bulganin and Khrushchov to Britain next March. Such an invitation, the League urges, under the signature of its Chairman, Mr. J. F. Stewart, is a condonation of the atrocious crimes committed by these two men throughout their public careers.

The appeal lays special emphasis on the inhuman crimes against the Ukrainian people, citing Vynnytsia in detail, and also points out that there is no end to the atrocities taking place among the Eastern peoples, by which "many sincerely Christian peoples are now perishing through planned annihilation by these men, who epitomise the Kremlin".

Yuriy Boyko

The Russian historical roots of Bolshevism

Life urgently demands from us an explanation of the phenomenon of "Bolshevism", what it consists of, what is its historical basis, and whence it derives its vital force. It is only by outlining the solution of this basic problem that we can decide on the manner in which Bolshevism can be studied in connection with Soviet facts and reality.

When we consider the subject, "The Russian Historical Roots of Bolshevism", we are confronted by a vast amount of material which so far has not been examined in detail by anyone.

West European and American men of learning have only occasionally touched on the subject. Such works as the monograph by Prof. Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki of the University of Milwaukee, entitled *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*, are happy exceptions. Neither have Ukrainian scholars so far achieved anything in this respect. The only writings which deserve mention in this connection are the articles written by D. Donzow, in which there are some excellent observations, and the pamphlet entitled *Stalinism* by M. Sciborskyj.

The Russian element in evidence in the mental make-up of Bolshevism is for the most part tendentious, and obscures rather than elucidates the subject: though it must be admitted that there are one or two interesting cases in which the authors, for some reasons or other, have endeavoured to achieve a certain amount of objectivity.

The outstanding Russian philosophers of the past century and of the beginning of this century who analysed the character of Russian intellectual life, in particular in the revolutionary sector, on numerous occasions foresaw the consequences of this mental attitude on the part of the Russian revolutionaries. Dostoyevsky, in particular, whose powers of discernment and judgment were extremely keen, succeeded in giving his readers an excellent psychological study of the type of Russian revolutionary who was heading towards Bolshevism¹). Hatred of the revolution whetted Dosto-

¹) F. Dostoyevsky: *The Possessed*.

yevsky's analytical faculties, and though his Stavrogin, his Shigalyov, and his Verkhovensky manifest certain exaggerated traits he nevertheless succeeded in drawing the attention of his readers to these symptoms, which at that time were still in the course of development. In an excellent manner Dostoyevsky depicts the narrow mental attitude of the Russian revolutionary, the precursor of Bolshevism—his fanatical adherence to dogma, to which he would like to adjust the world, his atheist principles, according to which man was to supersede God. In his heroes Dostoyevsky shows us the crazy world of Messianism which inspires the revolutionaries.

On reading Dostoyevsky we find in his mental complex an intricate web of feelings, experiences, and ideas which leads us directly into the sphere of the peculiar mental make-up of Bolshevism. Dostoyevsky foresaw many things which caused him to shudder, and similarly we, too, shudder at his mental vision. He himself, by his own mentality, helps us to understand the phenomenon of Bolshevism. In this respect Dostoyevsky paved the way for the Russian author, Merezhkovsky, who, in connection with the attempt on the part of the Bolsheviks to assume power during the December uprising of 1905 in Moscow, undertook to depict the intellectual aspect of Bolshevism in his sketches, entitled *Cad of the Future* (*Gryadushchiy Kham*) and to forecast the future development of Bolshevism. Indignant at the events of the revolution, Merezhkovsky described Bolshevism as the expression of an unwholesome mental attitude on the part of the Russians, drew attention to the sources of Bolshevism, and interpreted the meaning of the pictures painted by Dostoyevsky²). ,

During the turmoil of the revolution, when feelings of sorrow, of having been outraged, and of hatred still smouldered in the hearts of the representatives of the social classes that had left the country, no one paused to consider the future political consequences which this union of Bolshevism and the Russian soul might have. Thus the books written by Berdyayev at that time are now of considerable interest. Berdyayev examined the nature of Bolshevism in his books, *Dostoyevsky's Philosophy of the World*, *The Philosophy of Inequality*, etc.

During the early years of Communism Berdyayev ruthlessly exposed the morbid Russian mind in Bolshevism. In the year 1923 he wrote as follows:

²) D. Merezhkovsky: *Polnoye sobranie sochineniy*, Vol. 13. Moscow, 1914.

"Only by simple humility and remorse and by stern self-discipline of its mind can the Russian nation attain a new life and a spiritual rebirth. Only in this way can the Russian nation regain its spiritual strength. The renunciation of Messianist aspirations should strengthen the national mission of Russia³⁾".

Later, however, Berdyayev was less severe in his criticism and designated Bolshevism as only a partial expression of the Russian soul. This is evident in his work, *The Russian Idea*, which appeared in Paris in 1946. Here Berdyayev sets himself the task of tracing the logic of events in the history of Russia and of examining the ways of intellectual self-fulfilment of the Russian people. A certain amount of attention is devoted to the subject of Bolshevism in every section of the book, and the author mentions—though, it must be admitted, in a biased way—the potential and dynamic elements in Russian intellectual life of the 19th and 20th centuries which later create Bolshevism. Here Bolshevism appears to be a temporary stage in the historical development of the Russian people which is to be logically surmounted by the development of the Russian mentality.

In Berdyayev's opinion the elements which are opposed to Bolshevism are to be sought in the "realm of the Holy Ghost" among the Russians, in Russian idealism and in Russian orthodoxy. In describing these—in his opinion positive—qualities of the Russian soul Berdyayev is an impressionist, though he rightly comprehends the historical preconditions of Bolshevism and in doing so relies on actual facts.

Towards the end of his life Berdyayev held the opinion that Bolshevism is the expression of Russian Messianism, though in a distorted form. He now regards Messianism as a permanent quality of Russian historical consciousness and Bolshevism as its historical form. This subjective treatment of Bolshevism deprives historical and philosophical writers of their power of discerning the misanthropical nature of the phenomenon concerned. The fact must not be overlooked that Berdyayev remained a Russian imperialist, and for this reason it is futile to look for any indication in his works of the Russian chauvinism of the Bolsheviks.

Berdyayev decided in favour of Bolshevism towards the end of his life, and this is characteristic of the Russian writers who criticize Bolshevism.

³⁾ N. Berdyayev: *Mirosozertsanie Dostoyevskogo*, p. 194. Prague, 1923.

In his book, *The Origin of Bolshevism* (*Proiskhozhdenie bol'shevizma*), published in New York in 1946, the well-known Russian writer, Mensshevic F. Dan, quite openly idealises the Kremlin rulers and expresses the conviction that they will help Russia to assert her historical role in the world.

Dan completely fails to understand the true nature of the Soviet regime, as can be seen from his statement to the effect that the Stalinist Constitution of 1936 represents a step forward in the direction of democracy. There are certain accurate statements in his book which show the connection between Bolshevism and the fundamental traits of the Russian mentality, but on the whole the work gives the reader an entirely false impression of Bolshevism. Both Dan and Berdyayev are examples of the intellectual capitulations of Russian emigrants in the face of the present Moscow regime, and for this reason their works cannot be accepted as a basis from which to proceed if one wishes to examine Bolshevism. The only material in their works—and in the case of Berdyayev more so than in the case of Dan—which is likely to be of use to anyone who wishes to examine the misanthropical nature of Russian Sovietism objectively, are certain statements and observations here and there.

Of all the Russian writers who criticize Bolshevism G. Fedotov deserves to be mentioned as the most outstanding. He attacks the idea of Russian imperialism and regrets it as an evil which represents an obstacle to the normal development of the Russian nation. Thanks to his clear-sightedness, Fedotov is in a position to elucidate the connection between Leninist Communist theory and practice and the fundamental factors of Russian history. He makes the following important statement in his work:

"All the minorities (i. e. national minorities — J. B.) see in their detachment from Bolshevism their severance from Russia, that has created this Bolshevism. The Russians who advocate a Greater Russia fail to understand this attitude, since they are of the opinion that we are all equally responsible for Bolshevism and that we should all enjoy the fruits of our common errors, even if it is true that the Russian party has absorbed all kinds of revolutionary and predatory elements from all the nations of Russia, though not to an equal extent. The Russians were for the most part the ideologists and founders of the party. Bolshevism established itself in Petersburg and Moscow without a struggle; there was hardly any civil war worth mentioning in Russia proper, whereas the border-countries, on the other hand, put up a fierce resistance against Bolshevism. Some factors in the tradition of

Russia proper were more favourable to the growth of Bolshevism than any other soil of the imperium—and these were serfdom, the peasants' communal system of the "Obshchina", and autocracy⁴).

The fact that the above statement was made by a Russian is important. But Fedotov only expresses such and similar thoughts in passing, as it were, without troubling to lay a foundation for them. Although he breaks with the traditions of Russian imperialism, he fails to go the whole length and does not realise the extent to which imperialist tendencies have permeated Russian intellectual life and, in particular, Russian literature, which Fedotov regards as the "Conscience of the World".

On studying those Russian works which deal with the intellectual sources of Bolshevism, we are bound to discover that Russian scholars and writers have for the most part elucidated the subject in question in a very imperfect, one-sided, and sometimes tendentious manner.

We are thus confronted by the task in all its complicated entirety. In the course of this short essay, however, we shall only be able to outline the solution of a few important problems pertaining to this extensive subject.

Mention must above all be made of the fact that Marxism found its first adherents among the Russians, sooner than anywhere else outside Germany. Marx was hardly very pleased at this, and, in fact, he voiced his opinion in this respect with ill-concealed irony⁵). Naturally, he expected his ideas to be adopted in the first place by the "capitalistically mature" nations, where, in his opinion, the problem of the proletarian revolution was the question of the day; for this reason he was considerably surprised at the success which his ideas met with in barbarous Russia and he thus regarded his Russian supporters most warily. They, on the other hand, were full of enthusiasm for him. Annenkov was greatly interested in Marxism; the "Petrashchevets" Speshnyov was absorbed by the *Misery of Philosophy* by K. Marx⁶), and in his letter to Marx at the end of the 1840's and beginning of the 1850's, Sazonov, the proselyte of Marxism, again and again stresses his devotion to Marx and his ideas, and suggests the joint publication of a journal⁷).

⁴) G. Fedotov: *Sud'ba Imperiy*, Novy Zurnal, 1947, XVI. p. 169.

⁵) P. Sakulin: *Russkaya literatura i sotsializm*, I. p. 247. Moscow, 1924.

⁶) P. Sakulin, op. cit. p. 254. See also *Sbornik: Iz istorii russkoy filosofii*, XVIII-XIX vekov, p. 306. Moscow, 1952.

⁷) P. Sakulin, op. cit. p. 270.

Even in those early days the definitely Russian element in Marxism, which much later comes to the fore in Bolshevism, was evident. Sazonov tended to simplify things; he combines the nihilistic Russian attitude and his Marxist faith; he is most decidedly an anti-individualist, and advocates barbarism as a counterbalance to European civilisation. In his opinion Marxism is destined to play an important part above all in the Orient, among the Slav nations and the nations of Central Asia. He suggests plans for an international federation of the Communists of France, Germany, and Italy, in order to realise "ideas for the future" "almost without a struggle".

At the same time Sazonov supports Herzen's idea of the peculiar historical development of Russia, and the significance of the peasants' communal system, the "Obshchina" which is to serve as the basis for the future social order. He is most enthusiastic about Communist radicalism and compares it with Christianity.

Neither Sazonov nor various later adherents of Marxism received any support from Marx. This fact, however, did not deter a number of Russians, during the 1860's and the 1870's, from openly showing their interest in Marxism and declaring themselves to be Marxists⁸⁾. In doing so they endowed Marxism with a definitely Russian element. At first the Russian revolutionary democrats and later the extreme revolutionary elements of the national trend, the so-called "Narodnichestvo", were fond of quoting the ideas and even the complete works of Marx and Engels. Chernyshevsky's periodical *Sovremennik* gave Engels' work, *The Position of the Working Class in England*⁹⁾, a most enthusiastic reception, and in 1865 the journal, *Russkoye Slovo*, published an abbreviated translation by Tkachov of K. Marx's work, *A Criticism of Political Economy*, which, according to a statement by Marx himself, aroused a "storm of enthusiasm" in Russia. But the first Russian adherents of Marxism, or rather its apologists, also Russified it and more or less combined it with revolutionary democratic, and later national, convictions. This prompted Engels to remark in the conclusion of his essay, "Social Conditions in Russia", that Russia was not yet ready for Marxism. He stresses his belief that the proletarian revolution will first of all spread to the West European countries with a highly

⁸⁾ *Iz istorii russkoy filosofii, zbornik statey*, p. 315. Leningrad, 1951; *Perepiska K. Marksa i F. Engelsa s russkimi politicheskimi deyatelami*, Izd. 2-oe, 1951.

⁹⁾ *Sbornik*, op. cit. p. 302.

developed capitalism and will triumph there, and that it will subsequently be the turn of Russia, where the victory of socialism will be facilitated since

“part of the population there has already adopted the intellectual results of the capitalistic development and thus, during the revolution, Russia will be able to accomplish the reconstruction of its social system almost at the same time as the West does¹⁰⁾”.

The energetic fight waged by Marx and Engels against the eclectic combination of Communism and Russian revolutionism delayed the process of the Russification of Marxism, and when, in 1883, the group “Liberation of Work” (“Osvobozhdenie Truda”) declared itself to be social democratic, it first of all, in a polemical manner, opposed all branches of the national movement, the “Narodnichestvo”, a fact which, of course, did not prevent this group from maintaining a close intellectual contact with Russian revolutionary traditions. For a long time, however, the international character of the social democratic movement was manifested, at least outwardly, the West European intellectual roots of Marxism were stressed and efforts were made to preserve its orthodoxy. For a considerable time the Russian Marxists, and in particular the Bolshevik wing, devoted themselves with fanaticism to the task of fighting to preserve the orthodoxy of Marxism. And it is in this fanatical blind adherence that we see the true Russian national characteristic, the adherence to the letter which was so typical of the Raskolniki's of the 17th. century. This blind adherence was also typical of the Slavophiles. Granovsky describes this characteristic of the Slavophiles as follows:

“The entire wisdom of humanity was exhausted in the works of the holy fathers of the Greek Church which were written after its severance from the Western Church. We can only learn it; but we cannot add to it. Kireyevsky expresses this in his prose and Khomyakov in his poetry¹¹⁾”.

In the works of Marx all wisdom was contained, so his fanatical adherents affirmed, and nothing could be added to it. Plekhanov and later Lenin adhered to this principle enthusiastically. The latter, however, was destined to utter various ideas which are in keeping with Russian characteristics; at first he did this unconsciously and sought to conform to the letter. Later on, both he and Stalin were

¹⁰⁾ *Perepiska*, op. cit. p.291.

¹¹⁾ E. Andreyevich: *Opyt filosofii russkoy mysli*, p. 114. Petersburg, 1909.

canonised and raised to the rank of saints, and their ideas adapted to the mentality of their Russian adherents. And although Lenin endeavoured to make his ideas depend on those propounded by Marx and Engels, Bolshevism nevertheless, either consciously or unconsciously, as far as the Russification of Marxism was concerned entered upon the course which Sazonov, Utkin, Tkachov and other early Russian Marxists had prepared for it.

The Russian character with its tendency to universality and its claims to a world revolution was regarded as dangerous by Marx. Whilst Marx dreamt of the world-role which the German workers' movement was to play, Bakunin, who took part in the revolutions in Vienna, Prague and Berlin, in France, Italy, and Spain, and not only became the Red phantom of Russia but also of the whole of Europe, was already opposing his ideas.

For many years Marx's interest was concentrated on his controversy with Bakunin. Incidentally, he also hated Herzen, whom he called a "half-Russian", though he believed that Herzen was a "genuine Muscovite" and ridiculed the latter's remedy for "rejuvenating Europe by means of the whip and an unlimited introduction of Kalmuck blood¹²⁾". Engels, too, ridiculed Herzen. He affirmed that Herzen resorted to his "Obshchine-Socialism" in order to show up his "sacred" Russia "in a more glaring light" and in contrast to the degenerate West, and in order to rejuvenate and reinvigorate this degenerate West, if needs be by armed force. "The Russians possess those things which neither the degenerate French nor English, despite all their efforts, are able to achieve¹³⁾". Engels scoffs at the Utopian socialist ideas propounded by Herzen.

The attitude of the Bolsheviks, on the one hand, and the attitude of Marx and Engels, on the other hand, towards Herzen are thus contradictory. Lenin regarded Herzen as one of the greatest thinkers of the day and stressed Herzen's interest in the class-warfare of the proletariat and in the Marxist International, and affirmed that the proletariat could realise the significance of the revolutionary theory from Herzen's example¹⁴⁾. Lunacharsky regards Herzen's works as a "curative spring" which sparkles in the sun.

¹²⁾ *Perepiska*, op. cit., p. 293.

¹³⁾ *Perepiska*, op. cit., pp. 285-286.

¹⁴⁾ V. Lenin: *Pamyati Herzena*, Soc., Izd. 4, XVIII, pp. 9-15.

"Herzen—he says—appears to us so full of youth and beauty that he truly is a hundred times more living and a hundred times more in keeping with the fiery background of our revolutionary times than the many corpses of our literature of the fairly recent past¹⁵⁾".

The various opinions held by the classicists of Marxism and Bolshevism about Herzen are very interesting, since they show us the Russian characteristic of Bolshevism and the close ties which exist between the latter and Russian cultural traditions.

Neither Lenin nor Lunacharsky object to Herzen's Russian socialist Messianism. Indeed, Lenin himself after a time strikes a Messianist note, though, at first, only softly, as the echo of former national experience, as the belief that the Russian nation is destined to be the champion of the world-revolution, after it has broken asunder the weakest link in the chain of world-imperialism.

During the early years of the revolution Lenin still endeavours to remain an orthodox Marxist; he is of the opinion that the revolutionary wave will sweep all Europe after it has passed over Russia, and he believes that the Russian revolution will only be victorious if it joins forces with the victorious German proletariat. But life destroys theories. Bolshevism establishes itself in one sixth of the world. The world-revolution is postponed indefinitely, and the longer it is postponed, the more the forecasts made by Marx and Engels, about the vanguard-role of the capitalistically developed countries in the so-called proletarian revolution, appear as Utopian ideas. Since they are aware of this fact the Bolsheviks now open all the sluices which they had so far kept closed, and the waves of the Russian intellectual tradition now inundate Bolshevism and radically change its appearance, which so far had, in any case, manifested genuine Russian traits.

There is a story that Bolshevism did not ally itself with the Russian patriotic idea until the 1930's. Those who affirm this would like to regard Bolshevism as a universal and international phenomenon, and they try to make it appear as though its alliance with Russian patriotism is merely a tactical manoeuvre and not the expression of its inmost nature. Such an opinion reveals either complete incompetence or gross tendentiousness. The only truth in such an opinion is that Bolshevism in the past wanted to appear international.

¹⁵⁾ A. Lunacharsky: *Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen*. Sbornik: *Herzen v russkoy kritike*, p. 194. Moscow, 1949.

Berdyyev was quite right when he said of Lenin, "he was a typical Russian with certain Tartar traits¹⁶⁾". One of Lenin's closest friends, Zinoviev, wrote as follows after the death of the leader of the October Revolution:

"He was a Russian, one might say, from top to toe. He was the incarnation of Russia, and he knew it and felt it. Despite his long exile and the many years during which he lived the life of an emigrant, he personified the Russian mind and soul. When he was living in Cracow, about four and half miles away from the Russian frontier, he frequently used to drive to the frontier in order to "breathe Russian air¹⁷⁾".

Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, smiled sympathetically at Lenin's yearning for Russia—during his residence in Cracow—and affirms that he became a "terrible nationalist¹⁸⁾".

In his essay, *The National Pride of the People of Greater Russia* (*O natsional'noy gordosti velikorossoy*), Lenin found a formula to combine the international catchword and his nationalism. He is proud of the democratic element in Russian culture and stresses its value, thus ensuring his nationalism, as seen from the point of view of a doctrinarian of the world-revolution, a legalised and "progressive" place. This does not however mean that he feels himself in any way bound to observe this formula. When in his work, *What Is To Be Done?* (*Chto delat'?*), he mentions the general importance of Russian literature as a whole and is not merely dealing with one of its branches, he maintains his former point of view as regards this literature. He continues to regard Pushkin as his literary idol, even though the democratic branch of literature cannot be ascribed to the latter.

In the hands of the Bolsheviks internationalism became the most skilled and the most modern tool of nationalism. Even in the first decade of our century the Bolsheviks made use of internationalist principles for their own national Russian interests, inasmuch as they condemned the formation of separate organisations of the proletariat of the subjugated nations in their national social democratic groups (as for instance the Jewish and the Ukrainian groups). The proclamation of the right "to national self-determination until severance", though, incidentally, it was stressed at the same time that it was not advisable to make use of this right since

¹⁶⁾ N. Berdyyev: *Russkaya ideya*, p. 250. Paris, 1946.

¹⁷⁾ G. Zinoviev: *V. I. Lenin*, p. 159. Leningrad, 1925.

¹⁸⁾ N. Krupskaya: *Vospominaniya o Lenine*, p. 107. Moscow, 1931.

it would not be in the interests of the national unity of the workers, was a most cunning method to preserve the fundamental structure of the Russian imperium.

These skilful and astute tactics, however, are not an invention on the part of the Bolsheviks, but are already in evidence in Herzen's works which were written during the 1860's.

There can be no doubt about the fact that during the early years of the Soviet regime the international catchword was widespread and played a much more important part in Bolshevik phraseology than it did later on. But even in those days there was striking enough proof of the Russian imperialist consciousness of the Bolsheviks. In those days that staunch Bolshevik and national Communist, Skrypnyk, despite the fact that he possessed considerable authority in party circles, fought in vain for the incorporation of the Kuban territory and the ethnographical Ukrainian districts of the province of Kursk into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; in those days Gorki, after his return to the Soviet Union from Capri, seized the opportunity to defame the Ukrainian language publicly when he affirmed that it was useless to translate his works into Ukrainian since everyone could understand them in Russian. The Ukrainian writer Slisarenko showed considerable courage in venturing to object to Gorki's attitude; in fact, his protest later cost him his life.

In those days the author of the well-known book *Cement*—Fedor Gladkov—expressed his definitely imperialistic views during his visit to the "Vanguard" commune in Zaporizhyya, as follows:

"Why revive the pre-Peter period?" he said, "why galvanise the Ukrainian language, which is already covered with dust? All this only delays the progress of socialist construction. The Ukrainian writers are endeavouring to compete with the Russian writers, but all they do is to imitate them¹⁹."

And finally, those were the days in which Brashnjov's novel, *In the Smoke of the Pyre* (*V dymu kostrov*), which described conditions during the civil war of 1919, appeared in Moscow in the series of publications entitled, "Library of Proletarian Writers". In this novel Ukraine is represented as a libertine, as a hotbed of counter-revolutions, where the members become most enthusiastic about the re-writing of signboards in the Ukrainian language, and, in a paroxysm of hate, the author depicts scenes showing the Russians taking revenge on the Ukrainians.

¹⁹) Misyachnyk *Zhyttya i Revoliutsiya*, 1929, II, p. 95.

We are of the opinion that these few examples suffice to show that Bolshevism has never detached itself from its Russian nationalism and that its international catchwords have been nothing but a kind of mimicry.

Those who regard the internationalism of the Bolsheviks solely as mimicry, however, have failed to comprehend it completely. Their internationalism is allied to Russian Messianism, and herein lie the fundamental causes of the Russian element in Bolshevism. Messianism, the historical mission of the Russian nation in the world, is the fundamental trait of the Russian mentality throughout the centuries and finds its fulfilment in Bolshevism. In the year 1909 the Russian historian and philosopher, Andreyevich, declared that it is a permanent and mental characteristic of the Russians to regard themselves as social beings of a "higher type", to believe that they will be the first to realise the ideal of equality and brotherhood, that they will do so sooner, better, and more easily than other nations, and to maintain that Russian life offers all the necessary preconditions to enable them to realise this ideal²⁰). In 1923 Nikolas Berdyayev wrote as follows in his book *Dostoyevsky's Philosophy of the World*:

"Russian Messianist consciousness is derived from the idea of a "Third Rome", it can be traced throughout the 19th. century, and culminates in the works of the great Russian philosophers and writers. This Russian Messianist idea continues to exist until the 19th. century, but its tragic fate becomes apparent. Imperialistic Russia had little resemblance to the "Third Rome", for here—to quote Dostoyevsky's words—the Church was paralysed and its position was one of degrading dependence on the Tzar. The Russian Messianists now turned to the "Heavenly Jerusalem", since they had no Jerusalem of their own. They hoped that a new kingdom, the millennium of Christ, would be created in Russia.

And then the Russian imperium fell into decay and the revolution followed; the strong fetters which had bound the Russian Church to the Russian State were torn asunder. The Russian nation tried to set up a new kingdom on earth. It substituted the "Third International" for the "Third Rome". But the consciousness of those who realised the Third International likewise manifested peculiar Messianist traits. They imagined that they were carrying the torch of the East which was to light up the path of those people who were living in the "bourgeois" darkness of the West. Such is the fate of the Russian Messianist consciousness, a fate which is apparent not only in the case of the monk, Filotey, but also in the case of Bakunin²¹)".

²⁰) Andreyevich: *Opyt filosofii russkoy mysli*, p. 38.

²¹) N. Berdyayev: *Mirosozertsanie Dostoyevskogo*, pp. 188-189.

Berdyyayev is quite right when he makes this affirmation. In the course of the 19th. century the belief of the Russian people in their divine mission, a belief which continued to exist as an ecclesiastical and religious complex, was secularised and permeated various spheres of Russian intellectual life. Both the extreme reactionaries and the extreme revolutionaries were Messianists. Doomed to an inevitable fate, Messianism was heading for its pathetic manifestations. And, strange to say, even in the highest stage of its national pathos it resorted to catchwords about national self-denial.

This is already apparent in the works of the socialist visionary and mystic, Petchorin, of the 1830's, who writes:

"How sweet it is to hate one's native country and wait impatiently for its destruction! And to see in the destruction of one's country the dawn which heralds a general rebirth!... I shall burn your twin-eagles and your very foundations and shall do what Herostrat did, but my fame will be even greater!²²⁾"

Petchorin only wanted to burn his native country, guarded by the two-headed eagle, so that it should become more famous and that the morning-sun of his country should shine on the whole world.

Surely there is already a hint of the Bolshevik philosophy of the world in his words! The only difference there is lies in the fact that the Bolsheviks are definitely practical-minded and that their Messianism is realistic and calculated to be materially advantageous to the champions of this Messianist consciousness.

In their practical application of this idea the Bolsheviks adopt the idea propounded by Byelinsky, who affirmed that the Russians are the heirs of the world, since, as regards their many-sided characteristics, they adopt all kinds of characteristics from various other nations and combine these²³⁾. The Bolsheviks are notorious imitators of Pogodin, who was even more practical-minded than Byelinsky, and who, during the 1830's, tried to arouse the enthusiasm of the Tzarist regime for his vision of Russia as a world-power, and propagated Pan-Slavism as a means of ruling the world. He affirmed that Russia was destined to rule the Slav world, but that it was loath to do so since it was so modest, and added that life, however, demanded that it should do so since it was the greatest Slav nation.

²²⁾ P. Sakulin, op. cit., p. 103.

²³⁾ V. D. Byelinsky: *Sochineniya*, I, 1919, p. 449.

"Hence the miracle that Russia rules one-ninth of the world!" Enormous riches will be found in a Russia which rules the Slav world. Pogodin goes into ecstasies about the future aspect of this power, which, concentrating on one aim and guided by the will of the Russian Tzar, is to confront Europe which has been disintegrated by conflicts.

"I ask you, is there anyone who is a match for us? Is there anyone whom we cannot force into obedience? Does not the political fate of Europe and hence the fate of the world rest with us, if we wish to determine it? ... My heart leaps for joy—oh! Russia, my country! Thou, thou alone, art destined to complete and achieve the progress of mankind!²⁴⁾".

When we consider the Soviet peace-propaganda of today, which is closely connected with the propaganda that the Kremlin star shall shine on the whole world, we are undoubtedly reminded of the Slavophile Khomyakov, who said that the Russian nation was peace-loving, but nevertheless destined to be the ruler²⁵⁾. What a striking combination of convictions!

The Bolsheviks reject Dostoyevsky as a reactionary, and very few ideologists of Bolshevism are acquainted with his works. But in the logical course of national development it was precisely the Bolsheviks who were destined to comprehend and imitate the grim and misanthropical nature of Dostoyevsky's universalism, intuitively and instinctively.

Dostoyevsky, the reactionary, who appeared to carry on the evolution idea of his intellectual opposite, Byelinsky, was an out-and-out chauvinist; he hated the various nations and disseminated the idea of the universal mission of the Russians. Russia, he says, has for a whole century been living not for its own interests but for those of Europe. A Russian can only be a genuine Russian if he becomes a European, for it is only then that he fulfils Russia's main task—to reconcile and combine all the nations.

"Yes, the importance of the Russians is all-European and world-wide", he says. "To be a genuine Russian can mean and does mean... to be the brother of all men, a universal man, as it were".

Dostoyevsky on numerous occasions stresses this idea of brotherhood and brotherly love for all mankind. But, as Merezhkovsky very aptly remarks, this brotherhood and this brotherly love is very

²⁴⁾ A. Pypin: *Panslavizm v yego proshlom i nastoyashchem*, 1913, pp. 87-89.

²⁵⁾ N. Berdyayev: *Russkaya ideya*, p. 49.

suspicious. In our opinion these insistent brotherly caresses are of the same type as are described by Alexander Blok in *The Scythians*:

"Are we to blame if your skeleton is crushed by our heavy, tender paws?"

Dostoyevsky had a passion for the cultural past of Europe—its piles of ruins. He talked of his love for Europe as though it were a task, and he treated it like a programme which elevated him, on the waves of ecstasy, into the realm of the divine mission; but in reality he hated Europe with all his soul, and he believed and hoped that the proletariat would destroy Europe. He was of the opinion that the Germans were a people with no future, and that the French would destroy themselves, and affirmed that "it is futile to mourn for such people".

He was convinced that Europe would be inundated by Russia. In his divided feelings towards Europe, in his preachings about the brotherhood of nations in which he conceals his hatred of these same nations and his predatory greed, Dostoyevsky is the precursor of Bolshevism. And yet he has a strange effect on the Bolsheviks, for he reveals the pathology of the nihilism of the Russian revolution, the pathology in which Bolshevism recognises itself.

The revolutionary democrat, Serno-Solovyovich, whom Lenin greatly esteemed and regarded as one of the precursors of Russian social democracy, was likewise a Messianist. He had visions of Russia conquering the world and becoming supreme, a plan which was to be made possible by rounding up the masses for social and state tasks. And just as the Bolsheviks nowadays draw up Five-Year Plans, in order to "catch up with and overtake" the other nations, so, too, Serno-Solovyovich in the past drew up a twenty-five-year plan which was to ensure Russia the highest position in the world²⁶).

Bolshevism thus reveals various aspects of the Russian Messianist consciousness: on the one hand, many of its monstrosities; on the other hand, the Russian Messianist consciousness which is at the root of the chief Bolshevik menace to mankind.

Another organic defect of the Russian soul is likewise concealed in the totalitarian quality of Bolshevism. Lenin and his successors have merely disclosed and augmented it, and have realised that which had long lain hidden in the Russian nation. It is precisely this same defect which filled Pogodin with enthusiasm in the 1830's

²⁶) V. Romanenko: "Filosofskie vzglyady N. A. Serno-Solovyovicha" Sbornik: *Iz istorii ruskoj filosofii XVIII-XIX v.*, p. 212.

and about which he wrote in his report to the Russian government. In his opinion the Russian imperium was the expression of the highest form of harmony; all the various forces form one single mechanism, which can be simply and successfully operated by one hand, namely by the hand of the Tzar, who with a single movement of his hand can start this mechanism and give it a certain direction and a corresponding speed. This mechanism is inspired by one feeling alone²⁷). These words reveal the author's enthusiasm for an imaginary perfection of the totalitarian system, which during the 19th. century—that is to say in the days of the Tzar—was still not quite attainable, but which eventually became reality under the Bolshevik system with one-man dictatorship and its alarming “unity of thought” of the Russian nation.

Entire generations, both of reactionaries and revolutionaries, have striven to realise this totalitarian system. The Russian intelligentsia always thought in terms of totalitarianism; monkish fanaticism constantly narrowed down and simplified its consciousness.

“One must never permit foreign ideas”, wrote “pro-Western” Ogarov, “conviction is not a personal matter, but a general gain²⁸)”.

The Slavophile Kireyevsky regarded the “Unity of Thought” as the noblest quality of the Russian people:

“There had always been a large number of monasteries scattered throughout the vast country of Russia”, he wrote, “and these served as the source of enlightenment. From here the light of self-confidence and of learning emanated, evenly and uniformly, to various tribes and principalities²⁹)”.

Byelinsky regarded the totalitarian self-confidence of the Russians as a national fate, and wrote as follows:

“Life is a mouse-trap and we are the mice. Some of us manage to seize hold of the bait and escape from the trap, but the majority of us perish and have perhaps only smelt at the bait... Let us therefore drink and enjoy ourselves, if we can; today belongs to us, for no one listens to our lamentations! There is only one universe, and we are only silhouettes, the waves of the ocean—there is only one ocean, but there have been many waves, there are and will be many waves in the future³⁰)”.

²⁷) A. Pypin, op. cit., pp. 87-89.

²⁸) *Iz istorii russkoy fil.* XVIII-XIX v., p. 144.

²⁹) G. Plekhanov: *Sochineniya*, XXIII, p. 190.

³⁰) J. Boyko: “Visarion Byelinsky i bolshevizm”, *Ukrains'ky Samostiynyk*, 15. 7. 1952, No. 25 (126), p. 3.

This surely is the origin of the historical consciousness of the Soviet Russian man, who has resigned himself to being a "silhouette" and a "wave of the ocean".

And here we encounter an important characteristic of Russian history, a characteristic which has been in evidence in particular under Bolshevism. The administrative course of development in Russian history and its impersonal aspect had already been emphasised by Klyuchevsky.

This idea is stressed in particular by Andreyevich, in his work, "Characteristic Features in the History of Russian Literature of the 19th. Century", where he writes as follows:

"Russian history has actually never (with the exception of a few rare and striking cases) given a person freedom, either as regards personal work or initiative. "Personality" has always been held in fetters and has been confined within narrow limits, in ignorance, in humble devotion, and in slavish subjugation. Countless numbers have defended the country against the approaching enemy, and conquered and colonised vast territories. In Russian history we see, above all, the tedious and silent work of the masses, who do not count their sacrifices or trouble themselves with thoughts of these sacrifices, who dig graves for the masses so that other masses can walk over them. It is the eternal repetition of the living bridge, which a well-known artist has depicted: a pit filled with soldiers and the artillery rolls over their heads³¹)".

These significant words were written in the year 1902, and they came true in the Soviet Union during World War II.

In their mechanisation of man and in the manner in which they have misused man for their own aims, the Bolsheviks have gone to even greater lengths than Dostoyevsky ever imagined. Those who saw with their own eyes the hordes of emaciated, famished, and confused creatures, who, with the stupidity of locusts, swarmed into Ukraine in the spring 1943, in order to launch an offensive against the Germans—those who saw them, as they pushed forwards, silently and resigned to their fate, only to be mown down by cannon fire as blades of grass are mown down by a scythe—those who saw all this will fully realise the extent to which the Russian totalitarian system has already mechanised men and, in keeping with the Russian tradition, has trained them to abandon their instincts of self-preservation completely. Masses trained in the spirit of totalitarianism and ruled by a psychological complex are a grim and dreadful spectacle, which stands in front of the gateway to the future like a ghost.

³¹) E. Solovyov (Andreyevich): *Ocherki po istorii russkoy literatury XIX v.*, p. 96. Petersburg, 1902.

In the course of Russian history there have hardly ever been any personalities who manifested an initiative of their own. On the contrary, Russian history has to a very great extent practised despotism. The tyrant is the opposite pole to the amorphous masses, which can only obey a tyrant. A superman, who is omnipotent, rules the masses. The mysticism of the deification of the people's leader resembles the deification of the Tzar, but it has been more forcibly impressed on the masses.

Paradoxical though it may seem, another factor of Russian historical collectivism is likewise of decisive importance. In former days the Slavophiles announced their distrust of the personal "ego", and they were only prepared to recognise mass-mentality which, in their opinion, was more powerful than individual mentality.

Later on, the "nationals" (Narodniki) exaggerated this idea until it became the deification of the mujik, or simple peasant. To become one of the people was, in the opinion of the active supporters of this idea at that time, to endeavour to find national wisdom. Bolshevism has adopted this tradition of paying homage to mass-mentality to the detriment of individual mentality—with the exception of the dictator, of course!

Bakunin, as though he foresaw future events, affirmed that despotism is most powerful if it is based on a false representation of the people. And this has actually been proved correct in the Soviet democracy.

Space and time do not permit us to describe other truly Russian characteristics of Bolshevism in detail. One of these characteristics is the nihilist attitude which, as far as the Russian thinkers of the 1860's were concerned, "Bazarov", Pisarev, and others, was merely a theory and a manifestation, but has become a grandiose social practice with the Bolsheviks. The enthusiasm shown for the reflexology of the 1920's is merely a continuation of Bazarov's experiments with frogs. The restriction of literature exclusively to "socialist realism" is merely a continuation of the daring utilitarianism manifested by Pisarev, who considered that boots were of more value than Shakespeare's works.

The anti-religious, materialistic attitude of Bolshevism is not merely a continuation of Marx's theory, namely that "Religion" means "Opium for the Masses".

Recent Soviet investigations reveal that some of the conspirators of the December Revolt had already taken an anti-religious catchword as their motto. The anti-religious attitude of the Russians was

frequently accompanied by a form of hysteria which reminded one of the Russian "klikuschestwo". And the anti-religious attitude of Byelinsky and Bakunin was of the same nature; a similar type of hysteria was manifested for a time by the Bolsheviks in their religious policy, inasmuch as they allowed the instincts of the fanatical masses, who reviled all that was holy, free play. This fanaticism is re-echoed today in the fact that the Church is only allowed to exist on sufferance by the state.

The Bolshevik philosophy of the world contains various peculiar characteristics of the Russian soul and of Russian historical and psychological experience. Bolshevism can be likened to a magnifying glass which, when it unites various rays of the Russian philosophy of the world in one concentrated beam, is capable of setting the world on fire. Russian self-confidence shows up most perfectly in the prism of Bolshevism and reveals its dangerous and destructive elements. Bolshevism is in fact a manifestation of the Russian mentality, and this mentality in its destructive perfection, represents a terrible danger for the entire world.

Even though certain individual elements of the Russian mentality and of Russian culture may exercise a certain power of attraction on persons of the West, one must not overlook the fact that such bait contains a poison, which can only have the effect of nectar when it is not taken in concentrated doses.

There are, however, other elements in the Russian mentality which lead one to hope that seeds of a kind other than those of Bolshevism may some day flourish on this soil. Russia needs the aid of all the forces of mankind as a whole, in order to purge itself and be restored to health.

EDITORS' NOTE

We greatly regret that, owing to an oversight, the article "Bolshevist Third Rome" in Vol. II, No. 2 of *The Ukrainian Review* was published under the name of Professor Dr. I. Mirtschuk without his knowledge. The article contains material from research conducted by Dr. Mirtschuk, and was published in *Christian Voice* of 7 January 1955. Dr. Mirtschuk wishes to state that he does not consider this article suitable for publication in *The Ukrainian Review*.

S. U. B. 1946-55

Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain

This is the tenth year that the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain has been working on behalf of Ukrainian exiles in all parts of Britain. At first it was concerned mainly with the welfare of Ukrainian E.V.W.'s and P.O.W.'s as they arrived in this country, but gradually its activities were widened to cover all aspects of Ukrainian national community life.

In previous articles on S.U.B.—in Vol. I. No. 1 and Vol. II. No. 2 of this journal—the day-to-day work of the Welfare and the Organisation Departments, the Visa Section and other divisions was described. The pictures shown in the following pages are intended to illustrate the life of members rather than to give any account of the functions of S.U.B.

It should first be said that the work of the many Branches—at one time there were 300—and of the General and Regional Councils is entirely voluntary, and the achievements of the past ten years are greatly to the credit of members who have generously given almost the whole of their spare time, after their normal day's work in industry. That the Head Office staff have not lagged behind is shown by the words of one "old-timer": "At the beginning of my work for S.U.B., I had to work from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. or later, as did almost everyone in S.U.B. at that time". For some of the staff perhaps things have not changed very much.

Membership at its peak reached the figure of 25,320, but during the last few years, after restrictions were relaxed, many re-emigrated to join relatives



The General Council of S.U.B. at the Annual General Meeting in March 1954

and friends in other countries, particularly Canada and Australia. The number of members at the present time is 18,361.

The present Ukrainian House in London was bought in 1947. Altogether the Association owns twelve houses. All the finances of S.U.B. are raised by members' subscriptions, and by voluntary contributions to special funds, such as the Mutual Aid Fund, The Invalids' Fund, Ukrainian Children's Fund, and others.

At the Ukrainian House in London is also the Publishers' and Booksellers' Department, which arranges the writing, publishing and distribution of text books, magazines, and a weekly newspaper, *Ukrainska Dumka*. The Bookshop also obtains books published in Britain and abroad for members of S.U.B.

* * *

THE CHILDREN OF UKRAINIANS

As Ukrainians settled down and many of them married, provision had to be made for giving the children some knowledge of the traditions of the homeland, Ukraine. Schools for small children to attend at week-ends have been opened by many Branches. Trained nursery and infant teachers give their spare time to this work, many books are written for children in Ukrainian, and for the older ones there are—besides schools—choirs, dancing groups, sports clubs, the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guides movements.



A Ukrainian week-end school at Wolverhampton



Tea-time at the school



The Ukrainian school at Reading



One of the earliest camps held at "Sydenhurst"



Ukrainian Boy Scouts and Girl Guides at "Sydenhurst"

In the summer Children's Holiday Camps are held in the grounds of "Sydenhurst" in Surrey. Teachers and nurses come from the Continent to help those from Britain to organise the Camps and teach the children. Most of them give up their summer holiday to this work, and the Visa Section of S.U.B. is especially busy during the summer months.



*Dancers of the
"Orlyk" Children's
Group at
Manchester*



The Children's Festival at Bolton in October 1954, in which children from nine Branches took part, and a ballet specially written for the children was performed



The Children's Choir of the Bolton Branch

UKRAINIAN HOME




In 1949 the large house "Sydenhurst" at Chiddingfold was purchased by special subscriptions by Ukrainians for use as an Invalids' and Convalescents' Home. Finely placed on the brow of a hill, 11 miles south of Guildford, this extensive property of 33 acres has proved a real home, not only for those who are unable to work and maintain themselves, but also to those recuperating after illness or urgently in need of quiet holidays.



Sydenhurst: Farm buildings and gardens are attached, and corn, vegetables, fruit and poultry help to maintain the Home with wholesome food

(By kind permission of The Sport and General Press Agency, Ltd., 2/3 Gough Sq., E. C. 4.)



(above)

It is pleasant, in summer-time, to sit on the verandah at "Sydenhurst" and watch children learning their national folk-dances on the lawn

(below)

Archbishop Ivan Buchko, the Apostolic Visitator to Ukrainian Catholics in Western Europe, being welcomed by residents of "Sydenhurst" with the traditional "bread and salt"



THE UKRAINIAN CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS FESTIVALS

The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain has always worked in close co-operation with the two Ukrainian Churches—the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church.

As soon as groups of Ukrainians arrived in Britain, they set to work to make churches for themselves, and Festivals and National Anniversaries are faithfully observed, the dates being kept according to the Julian Calendar.



A Ukrainian church in an army hut in an E. V. W. camp near Doncaster.
The corrugated iron roof of the hut can be clearly seen



A group of children
at Bury ready to set
out carol singing



Ukrainian children in Bury in national costume leading the annual Corpus Christi procession

(opposite)

The Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, Archbishop Polykarp, among children at "Sydenhurst". Archbishop Polykarp died on 22 October 1953, and was succeeded as Metropolitan by Archbishop Nīkanor

UKRAINIAN ARTS

During the ten years of S.U.B. many Choirs and Dancing Groups have been formed to preserve and spread knowledge of Ukrainian Folk Songs and Dances. In addition to providing concerts for Ukrainians, many Choirs and Dancing Groups have taken part in International Festivals. Praise for the talent of singers and dancers, and interest in Ukrainian folk songs and dances, have been widespread and many successes have been gained in amateur competitions.



The Manchester Branch Male Voice Choir "Homin" and the "Orlyk" Dancing Group, also of Manchester, have an outstanding record of public successes. Here they are, with other friends and competitors, at the International Eisteddfod, Llangollen, in 1951



"Trembita" — the Oldham Mixed Choir



"Orlyk" were superbly welcomed and entertained at Cork, Eire, this year when they danced at the Civic Festival



The Folk Dancing Group at Cannock, Staffordshire 1949



The Male Voice Choir of Stoke-on-Trent. With members of the Choir is the then Catholic Bishop of Birmingham

Exhibitions of the sculptures of the Ukrainian, Gregory Kruk, have been held in London, Cardiff, Hull, and Scotland. Embroideries, wood carving, pottery, and "pysanky" have been shown many times in London and in the provinces, and have aroused much admiration and comment amongst visitors to the exhibition halls.



"Pysanky", the traditional Ukrainian Easter eggs

UKRAINIAN STUDENTS

The Students' Assistance Board, affiliated to S.U.B., makes grants of fees and maintenance to Ukrainian students attending universities in Britain and elsewhere. Below is a group of four students—three graduated in Science, another in Economics, and a third, after graduating in Arts, became a teacher.



*Three Ukrainian university students, with a friend (left).
They were supported by the Students' Assistance Board and,
later, by Archbishop Buchko.*

SPORT

Members of S.U.B. have over twenty-five Sports Clubs and chess is also very popular. Matches are played between British and Ukrainian teams in football and chess, and also in Volley Ball—a game, however, which is more popular on the Continent than in Britain.



One of the earliest Ukrainian teams in Britain, at Sleaford, Lincs



The Bradford Branch football team in 1953



The Bolton Branch volley ball team photographed with their British opponents

Stepan Deremenda

OUR UKRAINIAN CHRISTMAS

Ukrainians adhere to the Calendar of Julius Ceasar, by which Christmas Day falls on 7 January and the New Year on the 14th. The Christmas season is rich in customs, but it is not in any way commercialised—no articles such as turkeys become victims of speculation—and benevolence and charity flourish at this time.

Christmas is preceded by S. Nicholas' Day — 19 December — on which presents are exchanged—and not on Christmas Day. Especially in the schools, they are distributed ceremonially by S. Nicholas, assisted by angels, from the stage to an assembled audience, perhaps following the performance of a play. Parcels addressed by friends and relatives are given out and those who are poor receive gifts from some society or charity; meanwhile the Devil hands sticks to the “naughty” children in the audience. The occasion is one of great hilarity and good humour.

The Christmas festivities themselves are a family affair, and the most important is the celebration of Christmas Eve. For Ukrainians there is little Christmas shopping but a great deal of Christmas cooking!

On the Eve, as soon as the first star appears over the horizon—and the sky is remarkably clear on most Christmas Eves—the whole family gathers round the Christmas table. There is a large Christmas-tree illuminated with candles and this provides decoration for the whole room. The eldest member of the family then brings in a sheaf of corn and places it under the Ikon in the far corner of the room, saying the words: “Christ is born”. “Glory to Him”, reply the rest of the family.

After all those present have knelt down to whisper their prayers, they take their places at the table. The father hands round the *prosfora* — pieces of blessed bread — expressing wishes appropriate to each member of the family in turn. The table is always laid with an extra place, which represents those who are gone.

The meal commences with the carol “Boh Predwichnyi”, while a large candle is lit on the table, which is laid for twelve courses, and this must stay lighted until it has burned through.

Straw is laid on the floor, and some hay placed under the tablecloth, for everyone remembers that from the harvest comes the livelihood of them all.

The first course consists of *Kutia*, which is made of wheat, boiled, but preserved in its natural form, and served with honey and poppy seeds. The father of the family throws spoonfuls of the *Kutia* up to the ceiling, and if it sticks there, the omens are good for the following year's beekeeping.

The courses are interspersed with choral songs, and proceed usually as follows: *borshch*, with mushrooms and dumplings; fish — from the rivers — brawn; *holubtsy* — cabbage leaves with rice in the shape of pancakes, and baked in oil in the oven; *varenyky* — which resemble Cornish Pasties, and are stuffed with rice, meat and potatoes; *pyrohy* — rolls with potatoes inside, served with cheese and cream; and so on, until the twelfth course is reached.

When the meal is over, the family breaks up according to age. The oldest members sit by the fire and tell tales and legends connected with Christmas-time. The youngest ones jump about and roll in the straw, often imitating the noises of broody hens. In this they are encouraged by their parents in the traditional hope that the chickens will thrive the next year, and fall broody early in spring. Young unmarried women go outside with cutlery and rattle it to start the dogs barking—an old superstition saying the prospective husband will come from the direction of the barking. The young men might play a joke on the girls by imitating the dogs and so misleading them.

At adolescence comes one of the most important roles of the festival—to pass from house to house giving Nativity plays. Some of these may be arranged on behalf of some charity, or just performed for their own benefit. There are a great number of such plays, the main ones being *The Star*, *the Kings and the Shepherds*, *The Bear*, *the Shepherds and the Jew*, *The Nanny Goat*, *the Jew and the Shepherds*, and similar titles. All of them are part of traditional folk-lore and no book is used.

One of the most interesting beliefs associated with Christmas Eve is that no-one should approach the stables, for the domestic animals and poultry talk on this night with human voices about the good or ill treatment they have received from their masters during the year. If one should dare to listen to this conversation it is said he may be punished by sudden death. This tradition underlines the importance of sympathy with one's dumb companions.

Christmas Day begins with early service in the Church, but, apart from organised choral singing during the day, nothing very

remarkable occurs. There will be four choirs going round singing ancient Ukrainian carols on behalf of the church and different charities—one choir of married men, one of bachelors, one of married women, and one of unmarried girls and women.

The New Year is closely connected with Christmas-time. Early in the morning small boys go "seeding": they come into the house and recite wishes, throwing corn on to the floor. The most popular wish runs as follows: "Seed drop, crop rise and grass grow nicely, for luck, for health, in this New Year; may you have better luck than in the last year". This old rhyme has a strictly pagan reference, dating from the time when the country was purely agricultural.

Next arrives the postman, who gives New Year greetings, and receives a "tip"; he is followed by the chimney-sweep, dressed in his working clothes, smeared in soot, and bringing a Calendar.

On the Manor the grooms used to dress a colt in beautiful ribbons and bells, and cover him with a fine blanket. They led him into the porch of the Manor house, recited good wishes, and received presents. Similarly the cowmen adorned a bull and the swineherds a pig. Later there would be a dance in the Manor for all those connected with the estate.

January 19 is a "Jordan" Day. It is usually the coldest day of the year, and the ice is at its thickest. By the village bridge the river is prepared for procession, and a Byzantine Cross—some eight feet tall—is hewn out of the ice and decorated. After Mass, the people go to the river in procession to bless the water, candles are lit and churches bells ring.

There is a special service for the occasion: at a given moment boys release pigeons as symbols of the Holy Spirit, and these circle round the river for a time. The waters are then blessed by dipping glowing candles in them, and those present fill up their cans with the blessed water. On reaching home, the water is sprinkled on house and farm buildings to "keep away devils" and a little should be drunk before the next meal. The rest of the water is carefully preserved, as it is thought to have curative powers both for human beings and animals.

The day after this ceremony is the last of the Christmas season. The straw and hay is cleared out from the house floor and burned in the garden, and by an old pagan custom, the men used to make a straw mannikin, set it alight and cast it on the river, as a symbol of the god of frosts and winter, who was thus insulted, burned and generally ill-treated.

EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT

A. Mykulyn

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE POLICY OF THE KREMLIN

A short time ago the attention of the world was focused on the conference of the Four Powers in Geneva, at which statesmen tried to decide the fate of the world. In fact, however, they did not make any special decisions: each made a generalised, widely circulated declaration. According to the newspaper reports of correspondents in Geneva "Bulganin, Eisenhower, Eden, and Faure came into personal contact with each other", as if they had not known one another before the Geneva conference! In view of the conditions prevailing in the U.S.S.R. prior to Geneva, we can argue with force that Russia had agreed to participate in the conference, not because the Kremlin wishes for world peace, but because of her domestic problems. The economic crisis in the U.S.S.R. is so serious that all the present actions of the Kremlin in the international forum are provisional manoeuvres aimed to strengthen the internal position of the country. The long speeches of the Kremlin rulers at endless plenary sessions of the Communist Party, their juggling with economic statistics, the assurances to the population about the 'improvement' of its material position and of the progressiveness and unmatched superiority of the so-called system over capitalism, all these aim at the concealment and smothering over of the real economic conditions no less than at the deception of the wider world. One should guard against wishful thinking and imagining that U.S.S.R. is a country where there are no accomplishments and no progress. Such an opinion would be not only incorrect but even pernicious. But the true economic conditions are contrary to the official communiqués which appear from time to time in the columns of the Soviet press as corollaries to the 'fulfilment' of the so-called state plans for developing the national economy of the U.S.S.R.

Shortly after the death of Stalin, the Kremlin leaders, headed by Malenkov, set about solving the grain problem, although at the nineteenth party conference in Stalin's presence, Malenkov declared that the grain problem in the U.S.S.R. had already been definitely settled. Yet not only has it not been solved, but it is extremely serious. This does not mean that the U.S.S.R. has no bread for the population: there is bread, but not enough; and, in addition, the critical problem of the output of grain has serious consequences on the accumulation of military-economic reserves for a possible war. To solve the grain problem a number of special measures have been taken, and some of the employees of Gosplan—the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.—have been accused of planning the cereals and fodder crops badly with intent to sabotage. It has also been ascertained that livestock-raising has deteriorated greatly, and permission has even been granted to raise a small quantity of livestock and poultry once more on the personal plots of land belonging to individual members of collective-farms. At the same time as these adjustments were made, the government began the large-scale removal

of Soviet peasants—first of all, of Ukrainians—with the avowed purpose of cultivating virgin soil and the creation of new state farms in such areas. This campaign is being carried on continually, although it is not mentioned in Soviet press. It is in character that in the virgin lands it is state farms, not collectives, that are being established. That is to say, all the grain produced belongs to the state, the workers receiving ordinary wages in cash or in grain—the distinction is immaterial. Thus are combined the aims of removing the enslaved peoples, chiefly Ukrainians, the neutralisation of the national liberation movements threatening the Soviet Union, and the solution of the grain problem. But there is also a further aim: Kazakhstan is today turning not only into a Russian grain base, by which Ukraine may be if necessary replaced, but also into an industrial base. Soviet heavy industry, especially coal and ferrous metals, is being gradually transferred to Kazakhstan, while non-ferrous metal industries are being developed behind the Ural, Kuzbas and Magnitogorsk. In 1955 we see that the capital investment in heavy industry of the European part of the U.S.S.R. decreased considerably. Evidently the Kremlin does not lose sight of the fact that, in spite of the Geneva conference, the European economic potential of Soviet Eastern Europe might be lost, including the projected developments in the coal industry in Western Ukraine, and she is creating the necessary grain and industrial areas in the Asiatic territories, which are particularly convenient on account of the liaison with China. The existence of large rivers in the Asiatic territories enables Russia to construct powerful hydro-electric power plants.

It is undeniable that, in the industrial and military respect, the U.S.S.R. is one of the most powerful countries in the world and yet it may seem that the policy of the "iron hand" has been abandoned. Trying to emerge from its negotiations with flying colours, the Kremlin will, for the time being, make certain concessions. One should note that during the last half-year very little has appeared in the Soviet press about the harvest in the virgin lands. There is only the C.S.U. report of the first half of 1955 which in "On the fulfilment of the state plan" says that more than 26 million hectares (one hectare=2.47 acres) of virgin land have been ploughed up and sown, that 300 new state farms have been started, and that it is planned to cultivate 28-30 million hectares in 1956. On the other hand the whole Soviet press, especially that of Ukraine, is full of reports of the Ukrainian harvest which, this year, Russia aimed to gather in within 10 days. 150 thousand combine operators and tractor drivers, as well as many motor transport columns, were sent to Ukraine from Russia to gather in and transport the grain to state granaries.

According to the reports in C.S.U., the area under rye increased this year by 11 million hectares over that of 1954 which in turn increased by 3.6 million hectares over that of 1953. This increase was caused by virgin soil cultivation. 17.9 million hectares were sown with maize, that is, 13.6 million hectares more than last year. The area under sugar beet in 1955 increased by 180 thousand hectares over the year 1954. But sugar-beet cultivation in the U.S.S.R. is unsatisfactory, according to the conference of sugar-beet growers, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. on further increase of sugar-beet growing in Ukraine, the republican confe-

rence on increasing the productivity of sugar-beet growing in Ukraine, and the regional conferences of sugar-beet growers which were held in the first half of 1955.

It is interesting to note the series of conferences held on the economy of Ukraine during January-June 1955. To mention some of these: regional conferences of cattle-breeders; conferences of agricultural workers in single collective farms; plenary sessions of the regional committees of the Party; regional conferences of builders; a republican conference of hemp growers and flax growers; a republican conference of workers in the coal industry of the Ukrainian S.S.R. on the financial encouragement of collective farmers to increase output by the efficient planning of farm-work; a conference of steel foundry workers; a conference of ferro-concrete and concrete workers, of the heads of the building departments and transport-industrial departments of the regional committees of the Party on increasing the acreage under maize, and so on.

At the January plenary session of CK KPSS Khrushchov had put the question of speeding up the development of heavy industry in the U.S.S.R. point-blank. CK KPSS considers that Soviet industry, rather than the grain problem, is the basis of the military potential of the U.S.S.R. Yet in order to solve the grain problem, Khrushchov raised the question of maize and pressed forward the cultivation of the virgin soil in Kazakhstan. One may say a maize fever has taken hold of the U.S.S.R. This is intelligible because maize has a higher productivity than other cereals, and yields a great deal of alcohol—used in the manufacture of synthetic rubber; besides, maize is very good fodder, and may be consumed by the population in the place of the grain required by Russia for its military reserves and for export. Maize fever has affected the U.S.S.R. to such an extent that acreage under maize has been increased at the expense of that under other cereals.

The report of C.S.U. contends that livestock in the first half of 1955 increased over the same period of 1954, but it has not increased at all if one looks closely at the position of livestock in Soviet collective farms. Livestock-raising has either remained on the same level as 1954 or has even decreased. C.S.U. reports that the number of pigs in the first six months of 1955 decreased 2 per cent. C.S.U. also tries to convince the population that there are great numbers of modern machines in Soviet agriculture, but for several months of the year the Soviet press has been complaining about the poor state of agricultural engineering and of the inefficient use made of it. Agricultural engineering has been alleged to be worst in the following regions of Ukraine: Sumy, Kherson, Zhytomyr, Ternopil, Stanyslaviv, Zaporizhya, Mykolayiv and Chernykhiv.

Turning to Soviet industry, it was noteworthy that at the plenary session of CK KPSS last December, the main speech was delivered by Bulganin himself, under the title: "The tasks concerning further development of Soviet industry and technical progress". He pointed out the defects of Soviet industry, yet at the plenary session the following July, he announced that the fifth five-year-plan was completed in four years and four months. This does not appear to correspond with the facts as stated in the reports of C.S.U. Bulganin pointed out that Soviet industry was still very backward

compared with American, and gave very careful attention to the increase of the productivity of labour and its organisation in industry. According to his statement, in 1954 the specific weighting of non-mechanised labour in the Soviet coal industry amounted to 44 per cent, in timber 68 per cent, in building 69 per cent, and in ferrous metals 35 per cent. This proves that, in spite of the Bolshevik boast of advanced technique, the mechanisation and organisation of labour in the U.S.S.R. lags behind that of many foreign countries. In 1954 the waste of work-days caused by faulty organisation amounted to 44 thousand, but 11 thousand work-days were fulfilled over and above the planned rate of labour.

We see from the report of C.S.U. that Soviet industry in all its branches fulfilled its plans. But, we may ask, when did it not fulfil them, according to reports? It is not convenient to Russia for political reasons to inform the world that Soviet economy has failed in any way. C.S.U. declares that the number of workers and officials increased in January-June 1955 while the productivity of labour increased 7 per cent over the same period in 1954. We do not learn anything about any increase in wages, and may assume these to have remained at the 1954 level. Bulganin has said that the productivity of labour should always outstrip increase in wages, and one sees little sign of any intention to improve conditions of life among the population. There are only the usual "re-organisations" in the course of which tens of thousands of party members have been sent to Ukraine "to manage the collective-farms", many secretaries of party organisations have been discharged, tens of thousands of members of the Young Communist League and other youth organisations have been sent to Donbas to work in coal-pits and help Ukrainian coal-production out of a grave crisis.

Recently there has been a serious riot in the Sumy region. Its objects have not been announced, but it would seem that it arose out of the ruthless exploitation of Ukraine by Russia, and was provoked by Ukrainian revolutionary nationalism. The rebellion was so strong that even Radio Moscow could not pass it over in silence.

In general, it would seem that in spite of the endless stream of regulations, reports, conferences and the like, there is intense anxiety among the Kremlin leaders about the efficiency of Soviet economy. The attitude of friendly neighbourliness towards the West, while it can hardly correspond to any genuine change in policy, is probably designed to cover up deficiencies and to give the impression of strength rather than weakness. The West has contended over and over again that only the strong can "afford" to be generous. The fact that the Soviet press no longer writes about "the sharks of American capitalism" does not mean that the matter has been abandoned, for such talk now appears in the Soviet military press. There is no evidence that Russia has in any way changed its aggressive plans: it has only changed its tactics. It is struggling to liquidate the international economic difficulties, to strengthen the military and economic potential, and when sufficiently strong it will no doubt proceed with those expansionist aims which are the very essence of all Russian political thought.

A NEW COAL BASIN IN UKRAINE

During recent years, brief remarks might often be read in the Soviet Press concerning the mining of coal in the western districts of Ukraine—in the Lviv and Volyn basin. It has been, however, difficult to obtain more precise information about the mining of coal in this new region, since, as is known, no such coalfields had been discovered before the war. Only comparatively unimportant seams existed, and these were not economically worth exploiting; yet it would appear that the Soviet geologists had discovered a very important seam. *Radianska Ukraina* on June 15th. published a long article by I. Shulika, head of the technical management of the concern (Kombinat) "Ukrzakhidshakhtbud". In this article I. Shulika wrote: "It is expected that, by 1960, the new basin will have produced so much coal that it will equal half the coal mined in pre-revolutionary Russia"—that is to say, 18 million tons (the production of the whole of Russia in 1913 amounted to 36 million tons, including 25½ million tons from the Donbas basin). It seems unbelievable. Even if a big coalfield has been found, it is difficult to imagine that coal-mining could develop so quickly, because, according to "The Construction of Mines"—an article in *Radianska Ukraina* on 18 May 1955—seven years are, on an average, necessary in the U.S.S.R. to construct one coal-mine. However, one still has to accept this surmise as possible. In spite of it, we have as yet no further information about the resources of coal in this basin. We have learned from *Pravda Ukrainy* (15 June) that mines are under construction (and other undertakings connected with them) in the Velekomostiv and Sokal districts. A new town is being built, in the district of Sokal, with foundations extending over 200,000 square metres of ground—which, under Soviet conditions, means a town of 50,000 inhabitants. In Sokal and Chervonohrad there are factories for the production of structural steel having an output of 10,000 cubic metres. The town of Chervonohrad is developing especially quickly. The article also says that Nos. 1, 2, and 3 mines have begun to function in Klerev and Novovolynsk and the newspaper prints a photograph of No. 1 mine, remarking that the population of this town has about trebled itself. The development of this new region began, presumably, in 1950 when the first four mines were built in the Novovolynsk district; by 1952 six more mines were under construction. The mines are built very quickly—more quickly, I. Shulika claims, than in Donbas.

There was much preparatory work to be done, without which the development of the coal industry would not have been possible. On this subject I. Shulika writes: "four electric trains, with a power of 12,000 kilowatts, have been built, and are already in operation. In the course of two years 60 kilometres of railway track have been laid, an asphalt high-road, and also special roads leading to the mines have been constructed. In Novovolynsk, during the first two years, 53,000 square metres of living accommodation have been built, as well as 6,784 square metres of public buildings such as theatres, clubs, etc." He continues: "In the same basin scores of workmen's settlements with beautiful houses and necessary accommodations have risen up. In 1953, the Klesev granite quarries, with a production of 10,000 cubic

metres of stone and gravel a year, were handed over for development. A Novovolynsk tile factory produces 27 million tiles a year; a gravel quarry has been opened, factories for processing timber, oxygen factories and other necessary undertakings have been built."

The Lviv-Volyn "stone and coal" industry probably belongs to the Ministry of Coal of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (not to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) for there are some indications of this in the article by I. Shulika. Donbas has given this new basin its experts—engineers and technical workers, skilled builders, etc. It is certain that I. Shulika attempted to show that the basin was being built with the help of the whole U.S.S.R. in order to accentuate in some way the help of "the elder brother", but he could only say that "structural mechanism came from Leningrad and the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R., and structural timber from Byelorussia". The technical, scientific management of this new basin is in the hands of the Donetz scientific, investigatory Institute of Coal Industry and the Institute of Mining Affairs of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R., to which I. Shulika refers by saying that they give little or no help. The workers for the construction of the basin and the industry combined with it are recruited from the local villagers, since the western districts of the U.S.S.R. are the most highly populated agricultural districts of the U.S.S.R.; these recruits are very quickly made into skilled workers in order to cope with the plans drawn up by the government for the development of this basin. Such is the information available concerning this development in the western districts of Ukraine, while for some reason the full facts are kept secret by the Soviet government. We are not quoting "successes" in various works, as these give no additional information, but it is mentioned that the building industry is lagging—no doubt an attempt to find a culprit for the lack of housing—and there are "great delays in handing the works over for use".

Nevertheless there is sufficient information to give some idea of this new Ukrainian coal basin. The discovery of this district will be of great importance to the national economy of Ukraine. Thousands of agricultural workers of western Ukraine will find work in the industry developed here, and this may help to solve the problem of those who are not needed in agriculture. The new industry will certainly be the foundation of an industrial area in West-Ukraine. Up to now it has been more economical to import coal for the use of Galicia and Volynia from Silesia rather than from Donbas, in view of the transport costs.

The new industrial region will also change the centre of the Ukrainian industry, which until now concentrated on the Donbas and the region enclosed by the Dniipro bend. This will be of great strategical importance for the independent Ukrainian state, since Russia must always be regarded as a potential enemy, and this basin is situated just at the furthest point from the Russian frontier. We should expect the region to be so rich as to change the economical face of the western districts of Ukraine, for otherwise the Bolsheviks would not have built it up so speedily. From a strategical point of view, it would have been far more convenient for them to have developed the Siberian and Ural stone-coal basins.

E. Sh-za

THEY CONFESS

The Soviets see themselves compelled to admit the uselessness of the virgin lands

In an article by the honoured scientist of the Kazakh S.S.R., M. Baranov, under the heading "Ways and means of raising the fertility of the virgin lands", the newspaper *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Kazakh Truth) No. 224 of September 21, 1955, the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Kazakhstan, has frankly, and for the first time since the beginning of the "Attack on the virgin soil", admitted the uselessness of the virgin lands for yielding even an average harvest. The author of the article, M. Baranov—it is apparently an official voice—says that every region of Kazakhstan has its peculiar climatic conditions. But all of them are united by a common regular property: "in the vegetation-season the soil is deficient in humidity which is indispensable for obtaining regular and rich harvests of cereals".

In another passage of his article the author says that in many sections of the virgin land this year's produce was 2 to 2.5 hundred-weights per hectare; thus, a little more than the seed sown per hectare. If, however, one considers the expenditure of human, mechanical, and other energy, the so-called "cultivation of the virgin soil" costs the Soviets too much.

It would be interesting to know who in the U.S.S.R. will now be responsible for this successive failure of the experimentation on agriculture. As is well-known, it is Nikita Khrushchov who "invented" the virgin and fallow lands as well as maize. Will Khrushchov follow Malenkov as one who also knows nothing of agriculture, although he has taken the party agricultural courses?

"I DON'T WANT TO LIVE LIKE A SAVAGE IN THE VIRGIN LAND,
AMONG WOLVES"

Komsomolskaya Pravda (Komsomol Truth) of 3 September 1955 quotes the following letter of a Ukrainian who quit his job in the virgin land and came back to the Mykolayiv region in Ukraine:

"How do you do, comrade director! Mykola Oleksandrovych Chernetsky, former labourer in the virgin land, sends you his kindest regards. Please settle accounts with me and send me immediately all my documents because I do not want to be employed in your state farm; I have decided to return home. I have passed through the ten-year school; I should learn and benefit my native country, and not live like a savage in the virgin land, among wolves... Consider the fact that I was not recruited, but came of my own accord; I have received only 431 roubles for the ticket and a payment in advance for one month; thus you have no business to delay the settlement of accounts..."

The secretary of the committee of the Komsomol of the state grain farm Tsilyunny "Virgin" in which Chernetsky had been employed, a certain Mykhail Lazarev, along with his assistants, abused Chernetsky and wrote an article for *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. In order to suppress Chernetsky's true

words, Lazarev calls him a coward and liar. "Are the enthusiasts who go to the virgin lands and deserve the love and respect of the whole nation, savages?" Lazarev yells with anger. "What recruitment is he talking about? All the young people go to the virgin lands with enthusiasm..." But at the same time Lazarev cannot conceal the miserable life Ukrainian exiles are leading in the virgin lands. Lazarev states that the deportees are still living in tents, and that there are difficulties because there is a shortage of dwellings and lack of co-operation, and "labour is not always assessed and paid-for properly".

From The Times, 6 October 1955

BERLIN, OCT. 5

The United States mission in Berlin stated to-day that six Soviet citizens—a married couple, their two children, and two single men—had sought asylum in west Berlin last week. All were refugees from Russia who had lived at Munich until recently, and were persuaded by Russian broadcasts and letters from home to return to the Soviet Union.

Only a few days in east Berlin, under the care of the Soviet consulate and the recently established Soviet "committee for the return to the homeland," had convinced them that all promises of good treatment and complete freedom were merely bait to use them for intelligence purposes. An officer of the M.V.D. security forces carrying a submachine gun escorted them to the Soviet border. Two of the three men were asked to return to west Germany to report on the activities of Russian émigré organisations.

The family of four were told that they could not go to their former home in Moscow, and that their destination would be decided after they had entered Soviet territory. All the adults were made to broadcast over the committee's own transmitter in east Berlin to persuade others to come, and some were asked to write letters to relatives in the west. All the adults were closely questioned about émigré groups and individuals in west Germany, and exhorted to write out lists. One of the returned men was made to sign a prepared statement accusing another Russian in Munich of murder.

We wish to publish an amended report of the Congress of the Ukrainian Christian Movement held on 30-31 May 1955 at Louvain. Elections to the Presidium were: President, Rector Prof. Dr. I. Mirtschuk; Secretaries, Dr. S. Bojick and Count D. Halka-Ledochowsky; Vice-presidents, Mr. I. Siletsky and Mgr. H. Oshchypko. Congress elected the following to the Executive Committee of the Movement: President, Docent Dr. V. Yaniv; Vice-presidents, Prof. Martynets, Eng. O. Melnykovich, Count D. Halka-Ledochowsky, and Dr. Popovich, being Chairman of the Movement in Germany, France, Great Britain and Belgium respectively; Secretary, Mr. I. Siletsky; Committee members, Mr. R. Danilevych, Mr. J. Pryshlyak, Mgr. H. Oshchypko, and Dr. M. Konovalets. Elected to the General Council were: Dr. S. Bojick, Dr. D. Buchynsky, Mr. M. Dorozhynskyj, Dr. V. Federonchuk, Prof. I. Holubovych, Prof. Dr. J. Hynylevych, Mr. M. Kapusta, Mr. Kret, Dr. W. Konrad, Mr. O. Kushpeta, Prof. Dr. I. Mirtschuk, Mrs. O. Pawlowska and Prof. Dr. P. Zeleny; Control Organs (Auditors): Prof. Dr. P. Sawicky, Prof. M. Tomasiwska, Dr. M. Zayats and Mr. I. Kyziv.

REVIEWS

Ivan Majstrenko :

BOROT'BISM. A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism. Translated by George S. N. Luc'kyj with the assistance of Ivan L. Rudnytsky. Edited by Peter Dornan.

Research Programme on the U.S.S.R., Studies on the U.S.S.R., No. 9, New York, 1954, XVI, 326 pp.

In the "Foreword" by the translator the latter rightly stresses the fact that "the history of Ukrainian left wing socialism, that is, of the parties and groups which accepted the 'Soviet platform', is one of the least explored aspects of the Ukrainian Revolution". Moreover, it cannot be denied that an objective study of this subject has a certain political value at the present time, inasmuch as it represents an explicit warning to beware of the usual tactics of the Bolsheviks, a warning to "those in the world today who still entertain pious hopes for the success of leftist deviation within the Soviet sphere".

On the other hand, however, it must strike every unbiased reader as rather strange that the Ukrainians are mentioned in this respect as the persons who allegedly still entertain such "pious hopes". Indeed, Mr. G. S. N. Luc'kyj adds, "Mr. Majstrenko has achieved a remarkable degree of detachment from the political issues which still inflame his compatriots".

We do not know whether Mr. Majstrenko has definitely abandoned his "national Communist" convictions of former days; indeed, to judge from his own publications during recent years (in Ukrainian), the above statement appears rather questionable. Nor is it at all clear to whom Mr. Luc'kyj is referring when he talks about Mr. Majstrenko's "compatriots". As far as we know there is not a single national-Ukrainian emigrant group anywhere in the free world which believes in the possibility of co-operation with Soviet Communism (as the Borotbists did), and it is precisely of Mr. Majstrenko's colleagues who hold the same political views as he does and support the paper *Vpered* that one might affirm that they manifest certain sympathies for national Communism—a handful of would-be politicians whose opinions go unheeded by Ukrainian emigrants. And, in any case, every form of Ukrainian national Communism behind the Iron Curtain was radically exterminated twenty years ago.

It is likewise regrettable that the same "Foreword" also attempts to absolve the Borotbists from all blame as regards their betrayal of the nation, and in this connection the author resorts to various arguments which are suprisingly naive, as for instance the following:

"There can be no doubt that the splintering of the forces of the young nation hastened the downfall of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic and facilitated the re-establishment of Muscovite control in a new form. But it is also undeniable that the partisans of the 'Soviet platform' were

sincerely convinced that they were serving the true interests of their country, and that, within the limitations and aberrations imposed by their philosophy, they energetically defended Ukrainian statehood and finally paid for their efforts with their lives".

This would imply that the Borotbists were not traitors, since they themselves did not regard their action in this light! Of course, we do not need to go into the subjective and personal motives of their political attitude, here; the motives were naturally different in the case of different persons, and it would, indeed, be hard to credit Panas Lyubchenko (who, as president of Soviet Ukraine shot himself on August 30, 1937, in order to evade his inevitable arrest) with having had any ideal motives. On the other hand, however, the actual betrayal of the Ukrainian national state by the Borotbists cannot be excused by the fact that they attached more importance to the social interests of the Ukrainian nation—and, incidentally, they were entirely wrong in their conception of these interests—than to the national interests of the Ukrainians, and for this reason allied themselves with the Russian arch-enemy of Ukraine.

Apart from these political aberrations in the "Foreword" (for which Mr. Majstrenko was perhaps only responsible to a limited extent), the book, with the exception of a few passages, appears to have been written fairly objectively; we say "appears", since the book is composed for the most part of personal reminiscences or of documents and publications which, throughout the entire West, are probably only to be found in the private files of the author himself (references to accessible works of history are naturally few and far between) and for this reason a competent investigation of the data contained in the book will probably only be possible after decades have elapsed. The arguments which the author bases on earlier studies (as for instance in the two introductory chapters, "Historical Antecedents" and "Origins of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, Predecessor of Borot'bism", and also in Chapter 3, "The Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1917") are, however, trustworthy and objective as regards the data they contain; for instance, he makes no secret of the fact that "by the end of the 19th. century the Ukrainian revolutionary movement bore the stamp of Russian revolutionary thought", and that "the leaders of the 'Ukrainian Social Democratic Union' (the 'Spilka'), like the Borot'bisty and Ukapisty who were to follow them, failed to realise that by becoming dependent upon the Russian parties they had lost their freedom of action, especially in one vital sector—the national liberation of Ukraine".

The actual account of events which the author gives and which ends with the spring of 1927—that is to say, with the final "liquidation" of the Borot'bist elements in the Communist Party of Ukraine—is crammed with authentic documents and quotations, and to complete the text there are a number of appendices in the form of memoirs, biographies, and documents, which are, no doubt, extremely valuable for the historiography of the period concerned. And yet the book as a whole is hardly itself a historical work, but rather a collection of sources for future historiographers. The author obviously lacks the interest and ability to investigate the causal connections without which there can be no study of history, and whenever he abandons

his matter-of-fact treatment of his subject, he becomes vague and confused. A striking example of this is seen in his treatment of the question as to why the government of the Ukrainian Central Rada was overthrown by the Bolsheviks in December 1917 and January 1918:

"The failure of Holubovych's government to halt the advance of the Bolsheviks into Ukraine can be explained by 1) the inadequacy of the Rada's reforms, 2) its feeble administrative structure and the absence of a standing army, 3) the Russification of the Ukrainian towns, 4) the greater military potential of the Russians,*) 5) the unemployment and famine in Russia which prompted an attack on rich Ukraine, 6) the presence in Ukraine of Russian armed forces which had been fighting on the German front and which were therefore in the rear of Ukrainian units fighting against the Bolsheviks, and 7) the absence of natural geographical boundaries between Ukraine and Russia. In addition to these factors, the Central Powers virtually placed Ukraine in the position of an occupied country, preferring rather to aid Ukraine through the employment of their own troops than to release the Ukrainian units of the Austrian army or the Ukrainian prisoners-of-war in Germany."

Eight "reasons", therefore, are given, most of which, however, can only be regarded as "favourable circumstances", whilst the actual and most obvious reason is omitted, namely the international and socialist attitude of the political leaders of Ukraine at that time, which, from the outset, made it impossible for an active and consistent fight to be conducted against Bolshevism.

Despite all this, however, the book in question is one of the most comprehensive, detailed, and reliable works on the history of the "local support given to the Bolsheviks in Ukraine", a support which, by its very betrayal of the country, contributed to a considerable extent to the Soviet Occupation of Ukraine during the years from 1917 to 1921.

V. D.

*) A statement which is incorrect. According to all the testimony given by witnesses, the Bolshevik "Armies" at that time only numbered a few thousand actual combatants, at the most.

INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND OCCUPATION OF THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS OF THE U.S.S.R.

Eight Interim Report of Hearings before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, 83rd. Congress, 2nd. Session (under Authority of H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438). United States, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1954, XII, 370 pp.

This book, which belongs to the series of documentary reports and eye-witness testimony collected and published by the Kersten Committee, is undoubtedly of considerable value and importance, containing as it does material gathered by the subcommittee which has devoted itself in particular

to the "facts surrounding Communist aggression in the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union". As the Chairman of this subcommittee, the Hon. Michael A. Feighan, quite rightly stresses, "the people of the free world know of the tragic enslavement of the once free and independent nations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Very few know the story of the Communist enslavement of the other non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. ... The Communist propaganda line in the United States... indeed, has been very successful in putting across the idea that the U.S.S.R. is a nation, and that all the people in the Soviet Union are Russians—great or smaller Russians. From the evidence presented to our committee to date, it is my opinion that the success of the Communist propaganda line in the United States on this point has deluded a great many people, and, in addition, has kept from public attention the most potent vulnerabilities of the whole Red colonial empire... It is my hope that our committee can in a large measure offset the damage done over a period of many years by the Communist propaganda line concerning these non-Russian nations" (p. 81).

The testimony of about fifty witnesses which is published in this book refers to Bolshevik policy in Armenia, Azerbaijan, the three Baltic states, Cossackia, Georgia, Idel-Ural, North Caucasia, Turkestan, Ukraine, and White Ruthenia (Byelorussia). "It was in these nations—so the Preface points out—that the Communist techniques for subverting nations and holding them in ruthless colonial bondage were developed and in large degree perfected. They began with the liquidation of the intelligentsia of each of these non-Russian nations, then moved to the collectivisation of all phases of life and concluded the cycle by establishing the absolute police state in which no one, including the masters themselves, is safe from arrest. Along the way the Communist attained perfection in performing all the major crimes against humanity, including: arrest without cause in the dead of night, torture chambers, mass deportations without trial to the barren regions of Siberia, extermination camps, transfers of whole populations, manmade famines, wholesale massacres, and genocide" (p. IX-X).

Considerable space is also devoted in the book to testimony about the "systematic destruction of all religion—Protestant, Orthodox, Catholic, Jewish, and Moslem". "The clergy were the first to be eliminated, then the active laity, then the churches and mosques were converted into stables and granaries, and finally the children were taught to ridicule and inform on their parents if they mentioned God or religion. Any organised religion allowed to exist within the U.S.S.R. is completely subservient to Communism. In addition the masters of the Kremlin have gone to elaborate ends in an effort to infiltrate, confuse, and control organised religion in the free world" (p. X).

More than half of all the eyewitness testimony contained in the book has been furnished by Ukrainians, and we find accounts by a number of competent and prominent personalities among the Ukrainian national emigrants, as for instance Prof. Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, Rev. Dr. Ivan Hrynyokh, Prof. Mykola Kovalevsky, Mykola Lebed', Semen Pidhayny, Prof. Fedir Pihido, Rev. Volodymyr Pylypets, Archbishop Mystyslav Skrypnyk, Ihor Zhurlyvy, and Prof. Yakiv Zozulya. Although the participation of the organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalist Revolutionaries seems to be unfairly belittled, the

book represents an almost perfect documentation of the comprehensive account of facts which is presented in Special Report No. 4 of the Kersten Committee (*Communist Takeover and Occupation of Ukraine*, cf. our review of this pamphlet in the September issue of this journal, Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 80-82). It is, however, regrettable that several of the more lengthy written statements, as for instance those by Miss Kateryna Dniprova, Dr. Matviy Stakhiv, and Prof. Ivan Vovchuk, have not been included, but have only been mentioned in brief. Nevertheless, the testimony contained in the book is such that it gives the reader a fairly complete picture of the disastrous cultural and genocidal results of the Bolshevik invasion and occupation of Ukraine during the years from 1918 to 1945. The short survey by the Hon. Michael A. Feighan, entitled "Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Fight for Freedom" (pp. 140-141), is an excellent supplement to some of the testimony and provides the reader who is not so well acquainted with the subject under discussion with useful information.

The testimony given by non-Ukrainian authorities, since these latter are less in number, is, of course, more fragmentary. Nevertheless, some of this testimony is extremely interesting and informative and of historical value, as for instance the testimony given by the President of the Council of the Byelorussian (White Ruthenian) Democratic Republic in exile, Prof. Mikola Abramchik, by the President of the National Association of Georgians in the U.S., Leon Dumbadze, by the former Minister of Defence and Commanding General of the armies of the independent Republic of Armenia, Dr. Kanayan, by the nephew of the former President of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, Zahid Khan-Khoysky, by the Deputy President of the Lithuanian American Council, Prof. Anthony J. Rudis, by the President of the Byelorussian (White Ruthenian) Congress Committee of America, Dr. Mikola Stors, by the former District Attorney for the court of Vilna, Jonas Talalas, and by various other persons.

At the same time it must, however, be stressed that the testimony of less well-known and entirely unknown persons which the book contains is likewise of considerable historical value by reason of its authenticity, and one cannot fail to agree with the final words expressed in the Preface, namely that "The witnesses who participated in these hearings have made a major contribution for a better understanding of the nations and peoples of the U.S.S.R., the vast majority of whom, according to sworn testimony, are the greatest enemies of the Communist conspiracy".

V. D.

Read
UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM
1939 - 1945

BY JOHN A. ARMSTRONG


Published 1955 by The Oxford University

Press at £2.0.0.

Also published 1955 in Canada, U.S.A., India and Pakistan



*Mykola meets Petro, who
has found success and wealth
and now returns to woo
Natalka*



*Natalka with Petro outside her village home in the
Poltava district*

NATALKA POLTAVKA: Colour-film of the Ukrainian Folk Operetta by Ivan Kotlyarevsky and by Mykola Lysenko, made by B. Dniprov and Ye. Tchaika

Ukrainians in Great Britain have recently had the pleasure of seeing the colour-film *Natalka Poltavka*, which was awarded the Medal of Honour at the International Film (Amateur) Festival at Cannes, France.

The film was made by B. Dniprov and Ye. Tchaika who, in addition to producing it, also played three roles between them.

The libretto was written by Ivan Kotlyarevsky in 1820 and the music is by Mykola Lysenko, the Ukrainian composer who lived 1842-1912, and who wrote settings of hundreds of Ukrainian folk-songs besides much orchestral and chamber music. In the film, the music is finely played by an orchestra led by G. Robert while the choral numbers are led by T. Dratvinsky.

The story of *Natalka Poltavka* is as follows: Natalka is the daughter of a well-to-do farmer in the region of Poltava who falls in love with an orphan, Petro, who is without means. Her parents object to the match, and Petro leaves their village to seek his fortune.

During the next four years Natalka's father dies, leaving his wife and daughter very poor. Nothing is heard of Petro. Vozny, a rich, elderly man in an influential administrative position, presents himself as a wooer. Natalka tries to find excuses for she believes Petro will return, but her mother is in favour of the marriage and finally Natalka yields. On the day of betrothal, however, Petro is back in the district and a chance acquaintance tells him the news. He hurries to Natalka's home, and contrives to see her although the festivities are in full swing. Their love becomes evident, and the sight of the young couple standing together is sufficiently moving to sober Vozny, already mellow with feasting. Petro, seeing that Natalka's engagement is accepted by the guests, then presents her with the money he has made so that she shall not be a penniless bride, and signifies his departure. Natalka refuses to accept the money when she is to wed another, and Vozny, who is not without humanity, withdraws his proposal of marriage, and gives Natalka her liberty. Petro and Natalka receive the blessing of their relatives and the villagers arrive to take part in the happy day of reunion. The scene is one of singing, dancing, and rejoicing in the traditional Ukrainian way.

The setting of the film is the slowly undulating and well-watered Ukrainian countryside of Left-Bank (Eastern) Ukraine. The long summer grasses, the golden, heavy-eared wheat, the spring blossom, brilliant masses of summer flowers, and the solid thatched houses against sheltering bands of trees—these pictures have their own quiet emphasis apart from the human comedy played out against them.

And it is essentially a human comedy. The roles, whether principal or subsidiary, are of whole people, not typified 'characters'. The mother, for example, is not the parent whose will is 'imposed', but the woman whose instinct sets the restricted life of poverty and loneliness against that of the busy housewife with an assured position in the community. Her 'persuasion'

of *Natalka* consists in the casual talk over the daily chores, occasionally accentuated by strong feeling, rather than in theatrical pose or gesture. The same sincerity of action and expression is as noteworthy in the peaceful chats in the cornfield and the fishing boat as in the rollicking quips of the betrothal feast and the comical efforts of the Mayor—one of the guests—to prolong the delights of the vine after the sight of Petro and *Natalka* together in the garden has dispelled its occasion.

One might almost wish for a break in the continuity of the setting at the end of the film when the wealth of movement in "*Hopak*" seems ready to burst from the small space in which it is danced. So realistic is the production of this film that one is surprised when the villagers suddenly appear all ready in their festive clothes, and finds oneself wondering whether they had already been invited to the earlier betrothal.

Natalka is well and convincingly acted by Ye. Tchaika, her part being doubled by the lovely soprano voice of I. Kisselhof. And here no praise can be too high for the vocal recording—the work of P. Petrenko—which permits the songs to reach us clear and true from the sound-track.

Of the other principals B. Dniprovy as Petro and also as Vozny played throughout with assurance and appropriate change of mood from the comic to the tragic. M. Majacky as the mother was excellent and her songs were beautifully sung by V. Dratvinska. The Mayor, played by V. Dechtiariw, was the most conventionalised of the characters, and supplied a welcome burlesque, while the happy-go-lucky and kindly Mykola was ably presented by T. Majacky.

Of the colour it can be said that on the whole it was tonally rich, harmonious and pleasing throughout. The characteristic changes of sunshine and cloud shadow in Ukraine were conveyed by rather too sudden changes of the predominating colour-tone so that too abrupt a difference in the appearances of persons and objects occurred, and rather too frequently during one short scene. Such contrasts are, however, technically extremely difficult to achieve, and as they are essential to the film this point must not be laboured.

That the film presents a convincing, charming picture of rural Ukraine cannot be doubted, and the delight of the audiences which flocked to see it in many towns of Britain was unmistakable. To undertake a film of this kind with little financial backing, in a foreign country, and with the supply of national artists limited by exile needed courage and unusual vision: its success both in competition with others, and in affording wide-spread pleasure is a high tribute to the producers and to all those who were associated with them.

M. R.

AN EVENING WITH UKRAINIAN HISTORY

During my years as a hospital volunteer I found the usual fare for wards to be detective stories, light thrillers, simple and melodious music.

"But, as you say, Ukrainian patients must be very different..." said a medical friend to me on hearing that an archaeological lecture, given by a fellow-countryman of theirs, Dr. Hocij from the Ukrainian Free University, Munich, had evoked widespread keenness at the Ukrainian Convalescent Home at Chiddingfold, Surrey.

At the time of the lecture a Holiday Camp was being held in the grounds for the Scouts organised by the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, and a number of teachers and helpers had come over from the Continent to organise the camp and to give instruction in the Ukrainian language and history, and in traditional singing and dancing. All these visitors together with patients, Ukrainian workers in British industries on holiday, and the domestic staff of Sydenhurst attended the lecture, which concerned the early Ukrainian culture of Kyiv-Rus—a state founded in Eastern Europe before the Norman Conquest of Britain, and while all surrounding territories were still the scenes of tribal barbarism.

Across the whitened wall of an old carriage shed Ukrainians could see the battle-smashed spears and other weapons of their forebears on slides showing finds from a garrison's last rally against raiders from the East. They heard also how the then reigning Pope had called Ukraine "the wall of Christendom", the only true warrior dyke which had held back the ruinous Tartar hordes of the early thirteenth century from Western Europe, and the West was saved in this way from those Eastern raiders who reduced the lands they overran to the same waste that the earlier Attila and other barbarians left as they swept into the Roman Empire.

UKRAINIANS IMPROVE ON BYZANTINE ART

The Ukrainians took Byzantine art and gave it spine. Ordinarily, mosaics lend themselves to feebleness of looks and pose, but, with the artists of Kyiv-Rus, as shown in the evening's slides, there was a strength, a stance, a character, and almost the painter's gift for catching realistic detail such as wind-blown hair.

How the Russians have robbed Ukrainian art! One saw a view of one of the finest churches of Kyiv, a city that had some 400 churches and more than six markets when Moscow was little more than a cluster of hutments. Curving finely, a dome rose commemorating the Ukrainian hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who upheld and loved traditional Ukrainian faith and ecclesiastical art, drove out Polish armies and landlords, and established his people's rights to their own soil. Once more the great Ukrainian building came on to the screen—this time in the ruins left by the Russian campaign of godlessness in the 1930's. On the following slides were artistic treasures from the ruin, labelled as Russian and looted off to Moscow.

In contrast to Russia who hastens to claim the great works of others as her own, Professor Hocij, like other Ukrainian thinkers, acknowledges the

debt Ukraine owes to the free cultural mixing which is now barred by "iron curtains". Jewish teachers had given much to those working to beautify S. Sophia in Kyiv for Ukraine, and some Ukrainian artists learned and borrowed from the Italian school. Learning and many Grecian and mixed-blooded teachers had come to Ukraine, by way of what are now Turkish, Bulgarian and Rumanian coasts, from old Byzantium. For Byzantium was, as the Ukrainians called it, Tzarhorod—Emperor's Town—capital of an emperor strong enough to bring order upon his seaways, liberal enough to permit new teaching, with other valuable wares to flow freely inland from the harbours.

The wonders of the Kyivan-Rus mosaics followed on the screen in rich succession. Setting themselves to find naturally coloured stones where many would have been content to paint, adding to the difficulty as well as to beauty of their work by using an astonishing number of tiny fragments, thinking not merely how to make their creations beautiful in an everyday setting, but even finer if caught by a sun, in these ways Ukrainians gave toil and thought to their mosaics. Whether as artist or workman, the thoroughness of the Ukrainian is paramount—and remains today a characteristic of the nation.

Listening to the lecturer, I recalled the short story by Ukraine's Kuprin I had re-read in the train. The furniture with all the florid over-decoration of the Russian decadence style, the jeers of a hectoring Tzarist big-wig from what was to become the leading Soviet state—Russia proper—jeering at the idea of learning from or tolerating that same Ukraine who had so much to give to Eastern Europe, and whose people could teach Russians today many virtues besides a fitting modesty.

Malcolm Stirling

Ukraine

Archaeological expeditions: Early in June a scientific expedition of the Institute of Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R. left Kyiv to conduct research at the palaeolithic site near Mezon village in the Chernihiv district. Accompanying the scientists from the Institute of Archaeology were research workers from the Institute of Zoology and several officials of the Kyiv State Museum.

This year the Institute is undertaking nine expeditions in which scientific research workers from Kyiv and Kharkiv Universities and from several historical and geographical museums of the U.S.S.R. will collaborate with the geologists from the Academy of Sciences.

Among the excavated sites to be visited is that of old Kyiv of the time of the dukes Volodymyr and Yaroslav; of the ancient town Olvia within the present Mykolayiv district; of an ancient settlement on the River Desna, and another in the Crimea, both of which date from the Stone Age; and also of the ancient Slav settlement in the Cherkassy district.

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN**TELL OUR FRIENDS THAT WE CARRY ON THE FIGHT!**

Under this heading, a personal message from Ukrainians in Soviet prisons, *Ukrainets Chas* (*Ukrainian Times*) of 16 October gives the account of an interview between a Ukrainian journalist and two Frenchmen recently released from Soviet prison camps. The Frenchmen asked specially to be allowed to contact Ukrainians, and although they were in hospital and their visitors were restricted because of their poor health, a Ukrainian reporter was permitted to visit them for a short time.

These two Frenchmen were imprisoned with Ukrainians for about five years and came to know them intimately. It is of special interest that one of them was actually confined in the same cell as the son, Yuriy, of the famous Ukrainian underground leader General Taras Shukhevych-Chuprynka. The General, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army from 1943 until he was killed in action in 1950 in Ukraine, was the implacable enemy of Bolshevik Russia, and his skill as organiser and administrator together with his courage as a soldier have made him a legendary and revered figure to all patriotic Ukrainians. A short account of his life appeared in Vol. II. No. I. of *The Ukrainian Review*.

Yuriy, with his mother and four-year-old sister were taken away by the Bolsheviks in 1945, since when nothing had been heard of these "cruel enemies of the invincible Soviet Union" as they were called by the Russians. His story, as told by the released French prisoner, M. J., is briefly as follows:

Shortly after the war the Bolsheviks removed to some unknown destination the Commander's wife, son and daughter. On the way the children were taken away from the mother and placed in an "orphanage" at Stalino in Donbas. The mother was sent to some forced labour camp and the children knew nothing about what had happened to her.

Yuriy in spite of his youth proved impervious to influence. Although in 1946 he succeeded in finding some of his relatives he was again arrested in 1948 and imprisoned in Kyiv, and the well-known N.K.V.D. tactics, which aim at re-educating a youth into a "Soviet citizen" and at erasing from his mind all thoughts of his country, Ukraine, were applied to him. He was given solitary confinement, and "persuasion" by beatings, hunger, promises of release, and so on in order to achieve this end. His father meanwhile was carrying on the fight of the Ukrainian people against Soviet Russia, and the Bolsheviks tried to force Yuriy to write a letter to his father begging him to cease fighting against them.

Their argument ran thus: "If you agree to this, we will release you. You are young, and have your life before you. You will be sent to study; you will work for Ukraine. But if you do not consent to write, your father will die, and so will you also, here in prison. Never will you look upon the world again".

But Yuriy refused to write to his father, and showed the Bolsheviks that the Shukhevych family are all of one kind. He preferred to reject the Bolshevik offers with contempt and anger, and to endure the tortures and hardships. At that time he spent 90 days in the punishment cell. Once he planned to escape: when fetching his meal he attacked a guard with a bucket, but other guards came and subdued him. He then received 15 days in the punishment cell and came out with broken ribs. Until then he had not received either trial or sentence, but after this episode he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment by the "court". His attitude remained unshaken after his sentence, and he regarded his captors—henchmen of Moscow—with the same open hate as they showed towards him. "The wolf-cub" he was called in prison—a significant recognition of the unbreakable spirit inherited from his father.

He is now 22 years of age. He has grown up in prisons and labour camps. The Bolsheviks have no accusation to make against him save that he did not become a janissary, but remained faithful to his people. As might be expected his health has deteriorated and he suffers from tuberculosis. Deliberately he was confined in a cell occupied by people with infectious diseases. On frosty days he is unable to walk even in the prison yard, since his shoes are worn out and he has hardly any clothing.

Yuriy's sentence is due to expire in 1958—if the Bolsheviks dare to let him go. He heard in 1953 that his mother was in the Mordovian A.S.S.R., while her sister, Yuriy's aunt, was in Kazakhstan, in Dzambul'ska Oblast, both of them being ill, poorly clothed and existing on the inadequate Soviet "rations". Their sentences are due to end in 1958 also.

In M. J's words: I was in the same cell as Yuriy for nearly five years. He came to us when he was eighteen, now he is 22. We were good friends: he asked me to teach him French and Spanish".

* * *

("Bamboo" curtain)

COMMUNIST "BROTHERHOOD"

*From the statement by G.K.C. Yeh before the General Assembly
of the U.N. 21 September 1955.*

"...Let us now turn to the domestic situation in the Chinese Mainland. In the first three years of Communist occupation of the mainland, a staggering total of more than 20 million innocent men and women were slaughtered under the guise of land reform and suppression of counter-revolutionaries. The brief spell of comparative moderation that followed proved to be only a prelude to another orgy of blood-letting. The inhumanities perpetrated today on the mainland constitute a crime of genocide of unparalleled magnitude, to which the civilised world cannot remain indifferent.

The nature and extent of this reign of terror can be gauged from a report made by Miss Shih Liang, so-called Minister of Justice in Peiping to the Communist National People's Congress on July 29, 1955. According to this report, from January 1954 to May this year, the "People's Courts" of all levels had dealt with a total of 364,604 cases of counter-revolutionary activities..."

From The Daily Telegraph, Friday 14 October 1955

FRIEDLAND CAMP, West Germany, Thursday.

Hundreds of Russian* anti-Communist partisans fought a gun battle with M. V. D. (Security Police) forces in September, 1949, in a vain effort to storm a prison near Minsk, a German returning from Russia said here to-day.

Ernst Konicho said he arrived at Orsha prison near Minsk a few days after the attack and was told about it by both Germans and Russians who were held there. He said the prisoner believed that about 50 men were killed on either side.

"The prisoners saw and heard the fighting and hoped that at any minute they would be free. The partisans must have failed to realise that the guards inside the prison could call for help by telephone from a large M.V.D. contingent near by."

Konicho was told that the partisans, equipped with Russian arms, swooped from the surrounding woods at night and killed or injured guards outside the prison. They reached an inner yard and were fighting other guards when the M.V.D. troops arrived to drive them out.

Later the prison guard was reinforced and M.V.D. troops swept the woods to mop up remaining partisans. Konicho said there were about 1,000 prisoners, 100 of them Germans, in Orsha at the time.

* i.e. Byelorussian — Ed. *Ukrainian Review*

NEWS

The All-Union Conference devoted to questions of epics of the Eastern Slavs was held 23-28 June in Kyiv. The Ukrainian M. Rylsky lectured on "The Purpose of Research in the field of the Ukrainian Folk Epic and Ukrainian Historical Songs", while F. Lavrov—also from Ukraine—took as his subject: "Authors and Performers of the Ukrainian Epic". During the Conference the delegates were able to hear the oldest Ukrainian folk songs and instruments performed by Mowtchan, Guz, Perepelynyk, and others.

* * *

A national conference of the theatre was recently called in Kyiv by the Ministry of Culture of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Ukrainian Association of Theatres. The principal speakers and lecturers were I. Kiselov, W. Kharchenko and I. Kurylenko. A plenary session of the Association of Composers was also held recently. This was dedicated to questions of the development of operatic art, and the following new operas were discussed: *The Star over the Dvina* by G. Meytus, *Mylana* by H. Mayboroda, and *Kyrylo Kojumiaka* by E. Youtsevych.

* * *

Nazar Stodola a new colour film based on the play of that name by the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, has been released by the Kyiv Kinostudio. The film was produced by W. Ivchenko and the music composed by P. Polyakov.

* * *

The Ukrainian Studio of Documentary and Chronicle Films is preparing a full-length film called *The Soviet Ukraine*. The authors of the script of Andriy Malysenko, Alexander Mykhailovych and Mykyta Chumylo.

* * *

A conference of artists from the western districts of Ukraine was held in Lviv this year. Some 200 painters, sculptors and other artists were present. At the same time an exhibition of paintings of the West Ukrainian artists was organised in the halls of the Lviv picture-gallery.

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In its leading article under the heading "Let us increase communist activity" *Radyanska Ukraina* (Soviet Ukraine) No. 215, of 10 September 1955 adduces interesting facts as an example of communist "democracy", party "operative leadership", and the rights of a Soviet worker. The newspaper writes:

"Thus, within a half-year the manager of the trust Stalivuhillya "Stalin coal", comrade Belentsev, displaced 43 per cent of the section bosses and 15 per cent of the mine bosses. In the trust Snizhnyananratsyt managed by comrade Hrekov—53 engineers and technicians, among them 26 section bosses, were displaced this year..."

In a word, it is like the chess-board: chess-men are thrown away one after another, pawns, the best men, and knights. The party is the king, and it disposes the chess-men as it pleases.

* * *

Radyanska Ukraina on 16 August invented a new technical term to denote "socialist" constructions: "bearded" constructions. That means constructions whose building has lasted dozens of years, and which have a "beard". There are many such constructions, particularly in the town Khmelnytske and in the whole Khmelnytske region. The newspaper describes this building in the following words:

"The construction of business premises in the regional centre has lasted ten years ... More than eight million roubles worth of public money have been spent on its construction. Especially scandalous is the fact that tens of thousands of roubles are being spent on the capital and current repairs of a construction which is not nearly ready yet. It has not yet been built, and is already in need of repairs."

* * *

Deposits of oil and natural gas have been discovered in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Ratchenko deposits of oil have been discovered near Myrhorod, Poltava region. The exploitation of the liquid fuel has begun. At the present moment the Solokhsko-Dykansky, Zachepyliv, and other districts are being prospected for oil.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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Hans de Weerd, Dutch scholar and journalist living in Amsterdam, and engaged on research into Central and East European politics of the past twenty years.

Veli Kajum-Khan. President of the National Turkestanian Unity Committee, and former Chairman of the Council of Nations of the Anti-Bolshevik-Bloc of nations.

M. O. Myronenko. A Journalist living in London, editor of the Ukrainian monthly "Dumky", and specialist in Russian economic affairs.

Victor Petrov, Ukrainian Professor of Literature who disappeared in Germany 1946-7. Dr Petrov's fate is unknown. Under the name "Demontovych" he wrote many books, including *Dr. Seraphicus*.

Professor Natalia Polonska-Wasylenko Ph. D. Eminent Ukrainian historian, former lecturer at Kyiv University and member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

