

*The*  
**UKRAINIAN**  
**REVIEW**



I

**LONDON**  
**1 9 5 4**

UKRAINIAN INFORMATION SERVICE

# UKRAINE



Ukrainian ethnographic territory

Boundaries of Soviet republics and satellites

Contributions to be considered for inclusion in "The Ukrainian Review" should be addressed to:

The Secretary  
Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd  
49, Linden Gardens  
London, W.2.

and marked: "The Ukrainian Review"

Annual Subscription: £1. 0. 0. \$4.00  
Six Months 10. 0. \$2.00

An order form is enclosed in this issue

*Lyovachuk*

# THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

---

Volume I. No. I.

December 1954

---

A Quarterly Magazine

---

Editors: Volodymyr Derzhavyn  
Vasyl Oreletsky

---

Price: 5s a single copy

---

Published by  
The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd  
49, Linden Gardens  
London, W.2.

Telephones: BAYswater 8392  
0140

UKRAINIAN INFORMATION SERVICE





## EDITORIAL

The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain has pleasure in presenting a journal which should serve as a link between the Ukrainian and the English-speaking worlds. The lack of such a medium for deepening mutual understanding and friendship between the two has been felt for some time by many people, and particularly by the Ukrainian community in Great Britain, who had to face the fact that their native country was practically *terra incognita* not only to the general public but also to many of the political and academic circles of the West. Thus the idea of publishing *The Ukrainian Review* grew out of a need for reliable information about an important part of the world and about the nation that inhabits it—Ukraine. The decision to take this step was further prompted by the fact that available information about Ukrainian problems has often been incomplete and liable to distortion by people and groups who, for one reason or another, are biased against the aim of Ukrainian national independence.

Although the Association of Ukrainians is primarily a Welfare Organisation it cannot remain mutely aloof while the present gigantic struggle of ideas and forces continues between the worlds of freedom and slavery. The Association considers it a duty to offer the pages of *The Ukrainian Review* not only to Ukrainian scholars and men of letters, but also to writers on political issues of the day. Matters of Ukrainian culture, history and economic life will receive due attention side by side with burning problems of the national liberation of Ukraine. The leading ideas of the Ukrainian national movement and their embodiment in the present underground liberation struggle in Ukraine under the brutal conditions of Russian occupation will be brought to light. Whenever possible we will publish the writings of members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

which is today the backbone of the anti-communist resistance in Ukraine itself.

Our quarterly will attempt to maintain a fair and realistic approach in revealing the attitude of the Ukrainian national movement towards the changing scene of international affairs, and it will also try to provide a forum for scholars, writers, and politically active men who are alive to the urgent problem of Ukraine. Contributions will therefore be welcomed from those who wish to give their own views on aspects of our national existence and on our struggle for freedom.

The standpoint of *The Ukrainian Review* is that of the overwhelming majority in our nation. It sets before itself the idea of an independent sovereign and unified Ukrainian State, built upon principles of political democracy and of social justice. It will uphold the national idea—which urges the dissolution of the Russian “prison of nations” into free and independent states established within their own ethnographic limits; it will combat communism in all its guises and any other form of totalitarianism; it will stand against historical and dialectical materialism in the name of Christian idealism, defend the personal freedoms and the dignity of man; it will support the Western defensive alliance and work for the inclusion in such an alliance of the liberation movements of those nations which are now enslaved by bolshevist Moscow, thus creating a united anti-communist front by all the forces of freedom. *The Ukrainian Review* wishes to contribute in paving the road to the liberation of Ukraine and of that part of the world subjugated by bolshevism and Russian imperialism, as well as to the release of humanity from fear.

B. Krupnytsky

## CRITIQUE FROM THE UKRAINIAN POINT OF VIEW OF THE TRADITIONAL DIVISION INTO PERIODS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

In its conception of the evolution of the "Russian State", Russian historiography has accepted Kyiv-Rus as the first period in the history of that State. The idea is most clearly expressed in Karamzin's *History of the Russian State*, and it has been adopted by all Russian, and even by the earlier Ukrainian, historical writers.

Karamzin views the history of Russia as the consecutive transition of the centre of that State from one region to another. After the introduction, which is devoted to prehistoric times in Eastern Europe, Karamzin takes Kyiv as the first centre of the "Russian" State, later he proceeds to Suzdal, Vladimir, then Moscow, and finally Petersburg. It is between the Moscow and Petersburg periods that the history of the Russian realm changes into the history of the Russian empire.

Even the Russian historian Professor P. Milyukov, noticed that Karamzin's scheme was not something new and unknown. It was a repetition of the opinion already expressed by Russian scribes in the sixteenth, and Russian historiographers of the eighteenth century and it was based on the dynastical contention that Russian tzars had a claim to the ideological heritage of Byzantium, and to a Russian role of "the third Rome". Therefore, the linking with Kyiv was the indispensable starting-point of Russian history.

Among Russian historians there was one who decided to bind Kyiv together with Moscow by an unbreakable tie. This was Professor Pogodin who, in the year 1856, put forward a theory accord-

ing to which the Russians lived in the Kyiv region in the tenth to twelfth centuries before migrating northward after their utter defeat by the Tartars, their place was then taken by the forefathers of the present Ukrainians, who came from the Carpathian Mountains. Later, A. Sobolevsky went even further than Professor Pogodin and maintained that Russians had lived in Kyiv almost up to the sixteenth century.

This theory of mass migration on the part of Russia consolidated its grip among Russian historians who, naturally, were reluctant to renounce it. Variants of the theory are found in works by S. Solovyev, and also in those of historians who come closer to our times, as Klyuchevsky and Platonov, although its lack of foundation has already been proved not only by Ukrainian but by Russian scholars, for instance Holubev and Vladimírsky-Budanov, as well. The proofs given by the authoritative Kyiv historian V. Antonovych were especially convincing; he demonstrated the incorrectness of the thesis alleging that the indigenous population migrated northward in the mass, its place being taken by a new population from Galicia—because, in reality, the Kyiv region was not depopulated at all after the defeat inflicted by Batu-Khan.

The article under the heading "An Ordinary Scheme of Russian History and the Question of the Rational Compilation of the History of the Eastern Slavs", published by Mykhaylo Hrushevsky in the Petersburg Academy of Sciences' *Articles on Slav Languages and Literature* (first edition) in the year 1904, was a turning-point, certainly from the point of view of Ukrainian historiography. In his article Hrushevsky pointed out the defects of the scheme still prevailing in Russia. First of all, he calls attention to the fact that this scheme combines irrationally the history of southern Ukrainian tribes—the Kyiv state and its social and political structure, law and culture—with the Vladimir-Moscow principality of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as if that principality was a continuation of Kyiv. Hrushevsky—and his thesis was accepted by all Ukrainian historians—argues that the Kyiv state, law and culture were created by one nationality, the Ukrainian one, and the Vladimir-Moscow state by another, the Russian one. The Kyiv period did not pass into the Vladimir-Moscow one, but into the Galician-Volynian one of the thirteenth century which was later incorporated into the Lithuanian-Polish kingdom of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.



The Vladimir-Moscow state was neither heir nor successor of the Kyiv state: it had grown up on its own, and the relations of the Kyiv state with it could be compared, for example, with those of the Roman state with its Gallic provinces which were not a succession of two periods in the political and cultural life of France.

Meanwhile—and this is one of Hrushevsky's principal critical arguments against the traditional division of Russian history into periods—as a result of the use of the Kyiv state as the beginning of the administrative and cultural life of the Russian nation, its history now lacks any beginning. The history of the formation of the Russian nation is also obscure because research upon it only reaches back to the middle of the twelfth century. Because of the fiction of the "Kyiv period", it is impossible to obtain a proper outline of the history of the Russian nation.

Thanks to Hrushevsky it has become clear that the traditional scheme must be recast. Obviously, nobody would deny the fact that, while moving northward, the Kyiv princes also transplanted to Russian soil the social-political structure, the law and the culture shaped by Kyiv's long existence. But, instead of conducting research into the process of the reception and modification of these forms transplanted from Kyiv, Russian historians have simply included them in the inventory of the Russian nation.

We should turn our attention primarily to law. This question is still very problematic. As a matter of fact, the legal bases of the old Kyiv princely code did not take root in Muscovy, but remained more or less strange there. Even Hrushevsky pointed out that the principles on which the institutions of Russian law are based differ entirely from those in the south. And the inclusion of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian law in the "accepted scheme" of the history of Russian law advocated by the Kyiv schools of Vladimirsky-Budanov does nothing to clarify the matter because the Lithuanian state and the Lithuanian-Ruthenian law were in no way connected with Muscovy. Facts prove an organic connection of Kyiv with Lithuanian-Ruthenian law: in Lithuania-Rus one can discover the law of Kyiv primarily as customary law approved and recognised by the legislative acts of Lithuanian grand dukes.

As a matter of fact there was no organic legal connection between the law of Kyiv and that of the North. The basic codes, *Ruska Pravda* (Ruthenian Code), *Pskov Sudna Hramota* (Pskov

Legal Charter), Moscow Sudebniki (Moscow Codes of Law), are, as stated by Professor Maksymeyko, different kinds of law rather than consecutive stages in the development of the Russian—or Muscovite law. *Ruska Pravda* provided the fundamental principles for the law of Lithuania-Rus, and Novgorod-Pskov law and Muscovite law had their own origins which are “unknown to us”.

It is those local origins which should be cleared up by Russian historians and writers of legal history. It is striking that on the north there appeared so rapidly a new type of thrifty and industrious prince with practical common sense and an inclination for despotism, also new social systems differing from those of Kyiv. This may have occurred under the influence of tribal variations since the main body of the Slav population appeared there—according to the Russian archaeologist Spitsin—from the north-west and, undoubtedly, was inter-mixed to a large extent with the Finnish population; or, alternatively, it may have resulted from the severe northern conditions of life.

Unlimited tsarist power reigned only in Moscow, and it had been derived, not only from certain models—as the absolute power of Tartar Khans and the ideology acquired from Byzantium according to which the power of tzars came from God—but also from purely local conditions.

But, in general, Russian historiography did not take the appropriate steps to establish the historical facts. The image of Kyiv as the mother of Ruthenian towns remained too attractive. It is true that the criticism of the “accepted scheme” expressed by Hrushevsky did not remain unheard and without influence. The well-known Russian historian, O. Presnyakov, has drawn a logical conclusion from Hrushevsky’s arguments, notably in his fundamental work *Formation of the Great Russian State: Outline of History of the XIII-XV Centuries* which appeared in Petersburg in 1920.

But Hrushevsky’s influence was evident even in Presnyakov’s earlier basic work *Princely Law in Ancient Rus* (Petersburg 1909). Realising the necessity of the delimitation of the north and the south, this outstanding Russian historian, a disciple of Platonov, here outlines the history of the Russian State, starting with that of the Rostov land of the twelfth century, and proceeding to the Vladimir-Suzdal principality of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries which united all the large individual principalities. Presnyakov

positively rejects Pogodin's theory and its modifications in the works by Klyuchevsky and other Russian historians. He argues that the Princes Yuriy Dolgoruky and Andriy Boholyubsky, who are regarded as the discoverers and founders of the Rostov-Suzdal land, were there confronted with a social-economic and cultural system which was far from being primitive, as usually assumed. That land was colonised by a Slav element earlier, and any mass influx of migrants in the second half of the twelfth century, and especially from Ukraine, was out of the question. The Russian nation had a settled life before that time, and by the end of the twelfth century it had begun to build its own state with growing vigour.

In 1929 a work was published in Leningrad by one of the most outstanding authorities on Lithuania-Rus and early Russian history, Professor M. Lyubavsky, under the title *Formation of the Basic State Territory of the Great Russian Nationality. Colonisation and Unification of its Central Areas*. The book investigates the actual process of colonisation which resulted in the populating of the present Russian nationality. On the basis of historical-geographical material, the author has outlined thoroughly the progressive settlement of Slav colonists who would migrate, primarily, from the lands of Novgorodtsi, Kryvychi and Vyatychi to the basin of the Upper Volga and Oka, and, in addition, the growth of the Muscovite principality and the unification of the Russian territory up to the beginning of the sixteenth century. Both Presnyakov and Lyubavsky seem to have taken, under Hrushevsky's influence, the first step towards reconsideration of the "accepted scheme". They seemed at least to be willing to admit the fact that the historical process of the Russian nation had gone its own independent way, and that this was not a continuation of the process of the Kyiv State, but a simultaneous development. It appeared likely that modern Russian historiography would follow their lead, partially at any rate. But with the advent of the Soviet period it chanced that such constructions were unpopular, and therefore dangerous. The Kyiv period has been appropriated by Russia, and we shall see that even Presnyakov was compelled to keep to the path of the Kyiv-Vladimir-Moscow-Petersburg "accepted scheme" in the university course he wrote on the history of Russia. Thus, in fact, the old scheme has remained valid in the Soviet Union and the Russian "Great Power" thesis prevails.

At the same time, this historical scheme lacks genuine continuity. Even Hrushevsky saw in what is called "Russian history" a com-



petition between several trends: 1. the history of the Russian state, the formation and development of the state and its territory; 2. the history of Russia, that is the history of what occurred on its territory, the history of the "three Ruthenian nationalities; and 3. the history of the Russian nation, its social organisations and cultural life. Russian history thus appears as a confusion of notions, in consequence of which historians have kept either to the line of the Russian State, or of the greater Russian nation, or of Eastern Slavdom.

The method of investigation of the historical process on the basis of certain centres—Kyiv, Vladimir, Moscow, Petersburg—in consecutive succession, must necessarily lead to a levelling out of all national differences in favour of the Russian State and the Russian nation. In this both the Ukrainian and Byelorussian nationalities were included in virtue of their alleged Russian character. Therefore, in the history of the Russian (East European) national historical process as compiled by Russian historians, Ukraine has appeared only as an episode, and Byelorussia has been dropped altogether from the scheme of "Russian" history.

This scheme of centres has actually been an idea of one centre or of one focal point round which the whole historical process has shaped itself. Moscow was supposed to be that centre to which, in one way or another, all the "Russian" (including Kyiv), and later non-Russian "lands" gravitated. The "gathering of lands" was the main mission which Russian historians saw in Moscow's policies.

This ideology of centralisation took deep root in Russian historiography. Russian historians kept themselves in check: they were magnetised by the firm image of Moscow—the third Rome, at least in the framework of Eastern Europe. Their sphere of research was inevitably narrowed because they constantly investigated the same obsolete scheme.

And on this scheme Russia's territorial claims may be said to be based. Having become a great power, ruling one-sixth of the world, Russia was not sufficiently well acquainted with its provinces and outlying districts, if one considers the matter from the historical or from the historico-geographical point of view. Looking over the general courses of history by Klyuchevsky or Platonov, this becomes obvious: lack of vitality, diversity, perspective, the disregard of what is local in favour of what is metropolitan (especially in the



fields of culture), all these become evident in works by those historians who were accustomed to the building up of historical events round a geographic point. There appeared a certain artificiality; the works seemed purposively to conceal those territorial regions and elements of other nationalities which undoubtedly had played an important and sometimes even a decisive part in the history of Russia. Therefore Russian historiography has, in general, remained centralistic, unwilling to differentiate certain historical spheres which called for a new scheme. It is interesting to observe that anti-centralist ideas, territorial, federative ones, were defended only by Ukrainians such as Kostomarov, Antonovych, and Drahomaniv when the East-European historical process was under discussion. In general in Ukraine, the territorial historical school, if it may be so called, distinguished itself by a thorough study of individual Ukrainian and, in part, Byelorussian lands, primarily during the period of independent principalities. This school, directed by V. Antonovych, has produced a series of historians conducting research on these regions as follows: Siver—Holubynsky, Bahaliy; Chernihiv—Zotov; Volynia—Ivanov Andriyashiv; Podolia—Molchanivsky; Kyiv—M. Hrushevsky; Kryvychi and Drevovychi—M. Dovnar-Zapolsky; Smolensk—M. Holubovskiy; Polotsk—V. Danylevych; Pereyaslav—V. Lyan-skoronsky; Kholm—V. Ploshchansky; Turovo-Pynsk—O. Hrushevsky; Volokhiv—M. Dashkevych.

In the works by Dovnar-Zapolsky, V. Antonovych's successor at Kyiv university, there was also evidence of a territorial interest in the study—on the basis of books on food—of the economic history of individual territories or districts, primarily in Muscovy, though less in Ukraine. It is interesting that the territorial approach was more pronounced and extensive in the sphere of archaeology, and in Ukraine there were published archaeological maps of the provinces of Kyiv and of Volynia by V. Antonovych, of Charkiv, by D. Bahaliy, and of that of Podolia, by P. Sichynsky. Later this tendency was also followed by M. Hrushevsky, who, under the Soviet regime, began to publish a series of books, for instance, *Kyiv and its Environs*, 1926, *Chernihiv and the Northern Regions Situated on the Right Bank of the Dnipro*, 1928. Russian historiography did not have so shrewd an understanding of territorial research: it did not consider it necessary to start from the history of a centre or centres, nor to consider the history of lands, territories, individual countries which had fallen, sometimes only temporarily, under the influence of

the Russian State. Not only centralism, "gathering of lands", but just violence, compulsion and the tendency to level and subject everything to Moscow were concealed behind the "accepted scheme".

Inescapably, this restriction of outlook was the final consequence of the scheme, and in their outline of the historical process Russian historians had to realise not ideas of the co-operation and federation of nations, but those of the adaptation of these nations to the demands of a united centre. This one-sided ideology may even reach so far as to endanger the actual historical development of the Russian nation.

---

---

### SOME BOOKS ON UKRAINIAN HISTORY

*A History of Ukraine* Michael Hrushevsky. Edited by O. J. Frederiksen. O.U.P. London New York 1941.

*A History of the Ukraine* Dmytro Doroshenko. Edited by G. W. Simpson. University of Saskatchewan. Canada. 2nd edition. Edmonton, 1941.

*The Ukraine. A History* W.E.D. Allen. London-Cambridge 1940.

*Twentieth Century Ukraine* Clarence A. Manning. Bookmann Associates. New York, 1951.

*Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to XXth Century* Volodymyr Sichynsky. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America Inc. New York. 1953.

*Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times* Oleh Martovych. Scottish League for European Freedom. Edinburgh, 1951.

---

Osyp Hornovy

## In Defence of Truth

### An examination of recent Russian propaganda on Ukrainian history

In addition to physical annihilation and forcible colonisation by Russian elements, an intensified attack upon the spiritual and cultural life of the non-Russian nations included in the Soviet Union has been launched in recent years. This attack surpasses all previous ones in its wide scope and careful detail, and its main aims are to implant a sense of inferiority among the peoples of the non-Russian nations and to breed an attitude of servility on the part of those peoples towards Russia as the "reigning nation", the "elder brother". Russia's ulterior motives in this fresh spate of propaganda are the easier assimilation of those nations; the weakening of morale and will to resist; the removal of the ideological basis of nationalism; and the concealment of the imperialism of the Kremlin behind a screen of "aid" and "leadership" on the part of the Russian nation.

In the service of these aims, a radical revision of history, literature, art, language, the press—in short, of all vehicles of thought—is being carried out. The revision bears the slogan of "a fight against nationalistic distortions" and purports to oppose the influence of Ukrainian historians in favour of Marx and of Lenin. It is also contended that "a great improvement in the artistic and ideological level" of literature, drama and film production is desirable.

It is my purpose in this article to consider critically the revision of history in so far as this concerns Ukraine. It is precisely her history that determines and guides national consciousness in Ukraine, and which inspires young people by the example and the great legacy of their forbears. During the Bolshevik regime, Ukrainian history has been subjected to various "amendments", but those revisions now being carried out must result in a complete loss of objectivity and of realism in historical research.

The first measure taken was the withdrawal from circulation of the book *A short Course of Ukrainian History*, which had been published in 1940, and of the first volume of the *History of Ukraine* designed for higher educational institutions. This work was published in four volumes in 1943, but

neither of these text-books, although already Russianised, were suitable any longer for the changing character of Russian teaching. In particular, the interpretation of the origin of the Ukrainian nation, of the Treaty of Pereyaslav<sup>1)</sup> and of Ukrainian-Russian relations prior to that Treaty, became untenable. For example, the Pereyaslav Treaty is regarded in these books as a "lesser evil" for Ukraine, but an evil nevertheless. Such an assertion cannot be brought into line with the "theory of superiority", the "leading role" and "aid" of the "elder brother", it had to be proclaimed that this assertion was unscientific, non-Marxist—that it was a nationalistic distortion.

The chief editor of both histories, Professor Petrovsky, repents of this "distortion" as follows: "... it is true that in Ukraine in recent years a number of books and articles on history have been published which contain serious mistakes of a bourgeois-nationalistic kind". "It is our duty severely to criticise those deficiencies and mistakes. The historians of Ukraine should raze to the ground Hrushevsky's<sup>2)</sup> theory." *Soviet Ukraine* No. 174. 1946.

## The "Amendments"

Recent amendments to Ukrainian history can be reduced to the following guiding principles:

1. Kyiv-Rus<sup>3)</sup> was not the origin of the Ukrainian nation, but of the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian nations, and the leading part in this early kingdom was played by the Russian nation.

2. The Pereyaslav Treaty, or, as it should be called, "the re-union of Ukraine with Russia" was the greatest good fortune for Ukraine: it corresponded to "the immemorial longing of the Ukrainian nation for union with the Russian nation".

3. Thanks to the "aid", and under the leadership of the Russian nation, Ukraine threw off the yoke of tsarist autocracy and, becoming a member of the Soviet Union, built for itself a socialist state.

4. The history of Ukraine should always be regarded as an inseparable part of the history of the Russian nation; "one should always remember that the basic, most important part... was played by the "elder brother"—the Russian nation". *Soviet Ukraine* No. 174, 1946. And again: "the longing for a union with the Russian nation is a natural phenomenon in the history of Ukraine".

5. That history should be interpreted as a class struggle, particularly as regards Ukraine.

We shall in turn consider all these "amendments", in order to find out what the Stalin imperialists wish to achieve by them, and to assess their importance as mass propaganda.

1. The linking of the history of the Russian nation with Kyiv State—which was, of course, purely a Ukrainian kingdom—was necessary in order to satisfy Russian chauvinistic pride, to glorify Russian history, and to prove the prominence of Russia as a nation. This artificial connection also serves to increase Russia's claim to the leading role through the whole course of Ukrainian history. It is a necessary step in the justification of the annexation of



Ukraine by Russia, this justification being part of the attempt to conceal the course of Russian imperialism from early times to the present day.

2. The Pereyaslav Treaty concluded with the Russian czar by Khmel'nitsky was in reality an ordinary political alliance which had as its object the common fight against Poland. The Bolshevik imperialists call it a "re-union of Ukraine with Russia", and it is worth noting here that the term "re-union" was coined by tsarist historians to explain the annexation of Ukraine by Russia which followed the Treaty. The Russian czars gradually whittled down the clauses of the Pereyaslav Treaty by armed force and mean deceptions until they succeeded in completely enslaving Ukraine. They called this annexation a "re-union" and the realisation of the wish of Ukraine ever since the days of Kyiv-Rus. But according to the latest Kremlin interpretation of these events, it was not the Russian czars who "re-united" Ukraine with the Russian state, but the Ukrainian nation which "voluntarily" united with the Russian nation. Moreover—the "re-union" was its salvation and its greatest good fortune. One need hardly look and see in what that good fortune consisted: it deprived the Ukrainian Cossack Republic of its political rights, enslaved free Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks, ruined that pride of Ukraine—the Zaporozhian Sich<sup>4</sup>)—in 1775, threatened Ukrainian culture and placed the Ukrainian churches under the control of the Russian Patriarch in 1687. Further, it annihilated large numbers of Ukrainian workers and soldiers. This union, then, was an immense economic exploitation, the forcible colonisation of Ukraine with Russian vagabonds, apart from being the complete destruction of the independence of Ukraine, and its utter subjugation. And this was good fortune! A further result was the reduction of the Ukrainian nation to a mere ethnological notion in the second half of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries; and only the creative spirit of Ukraine, the indestructible force of the Ukrainian people that gave Shevchenko to mankind, was able to secure its complete, stormy revival.

3. Russia is attempting to prove that she played a "leading role" during the whole period following the Pereyaslav Treaty. It is, however, so evident that thanks to Russian "help" Ukraine became no more than a colony of the Russian Empire that the Stalin falsifiers of history are at pains to avoid plain words about the embarrassing situation. They do not forget to state that the Russian nation is not responsible for the crimes committed by the czars, and yet they appear not to trouble their heads about the incompatibility of this latter statement with the former one about the "leading role" of the Russian nation.

They do, however, attempt to emphasise Russia's leadership at the time of the beginning of the Russian democratic movement. There are no serious arguments in support of this "leadership", but the "historians" think it sufficient to refer to Chernyshevsky<sup>5</sup>), Byelinsky<sup>6</sup>), and Dobrolyubov<sup>7</sup>). That Shevchenko<sup>8</sup>) was acquainted with Chernyshevsky; that Franko<sup>9</sup>), being unbiased, could speak well of some achievements of Russian thought and its exponents; that Gorky knew Kotsyubynsky<sup>10</sup>), these are the kind of "strong" arguments that bolshevism brings in support of the "friendship" of the Russian and Ukrainian nations. To normal people, who are not carried away by

chauvinism, mere acquaintance, even influence, is by no means a ground for claiming "help" and "leadership". For example, one would never speak—unless one were a Hitlerite racial-maniac—of the "help" and "leading role" of the German nation with regard to the French nation merely on the grounds of the acquaintanceship of a French writer with a German one, even if one of them were known to be influenced by the other. That the Bolsheviks should have chosen just that type of argument proves the weakness of their own case, and reveals the fact that their theory is racial-imperialist. It is not even true that all those enumerated above were real friends of Ukraine; for instance, Byelinsky, who is today regarded as one of the best friends of the Ukrainian nation, used to attack Ukrainian literature in the sharpest way, and sling insults at Hrebinka<sup>11</sup>), Kulish<sup>12</sup>) and Shevchenko.

We may go a little deeper into the writings of Byelinsky in this respect. In May 1841, he published in *Native Memoirs* an article and comment on Hrebinka's *Swallow* and on Osnovyanenko's<sup>13</sup>) *Wooing*; in this he protested vigorously against the introduction of the Ukrainian language into literature. On August 3, 1841, he wrote to a friend as follows: "Now, having read the *Swallow* and *Sheaf*, I realise the whole dignity of borshch, bacon and dumplings..." In 1842, Byelinsky was beside himself with rage over Shevchenko's *Haydamaky*<sup>14</sup>); in December 1847, he wrote in a letter to P. Annyukov<sup>15</sup>), who was in Paris, on the subject of Shevchenko's *Dream*<sup>16</sup>): "Blind belief may make Shevchenko a martyr for freedom, but common-sense should see him as an ass, a fool, a mean man—and also a confirmed drunkard, the fan of vodka and khakhlaty<sup>17</sup>) patriotism. This khakhlaty radical has written two libels—one on the Emperor, the other on the Empress. Having read the libel on the Empress, the Tzar became very angry...; I have not read the libels, and not one of my acquaintances has read them, (by the way, this does not prove they are no good, but shows they are foolish and trivial) but I am sure that the libel on the Empress must be detestable. Shevchenko has been banished to the Caucasus as a soldier. I am not sorry for him: if I were the judge, I should do the same. I have been an especial opponent of these radicals—they are the enemies of every kind of success. One of those khakhlaty swine, a liberal called Kulish (what a name!) has published a history of "Little Russia" in the journal *Little Star*, which is published by Ishimova for children. In this he says "Little Russia" must either separate from Russia or disappear. The censor, Kutorha, who passed it without reading it has been imprisoned. Here is a good example of what those beasts, those foolish liberals, do! I detest these khakhly<sup>18</sup>). Nothing can be done about it, the fools play the liberal in the name of dumplings and varenyky with lard<sup>19</sup>)." (Excerpt from *The Present and Past*. Lviv. 1939)

4. The Russians assert that, under the leadership of the Russian nation, the Ukrainian nation has overthrown the landowner-capitalist system and built a socialist state of its own. We must point out once more that the Ukrainian nation has not built any state under the leadership of the Russian nation—certainly not a socialist state. On the contrary, the Bolshevik party which has assumed the tradition of the tzarist imperialists, being supported by the Russian nation, has caused a renewed enslavement of Ukraine and of the

other nations of the U.S.S.R.; has created a new colonial system of exploitation, and has restored the old Russian Empire which has been given a new name. Therefore those who see in these actions "help" and "friendship" by the Russian nation merely bring that nation into discredit, for all the crimes resulting from that exploitation are thereby ascribed to the Russian nation. It is the Stalinites themselves who do just this.

The Kremlin leaders, in asserting that Russia has played a "leading part" throughout Ukrainian history, hope to convince everyone that Ukrainian history should not be considered as a distinct and independent development, and that therefore to continue the struggle for the independence of Ukraine is to support reaction and is not in accordance with the country's earnest wish to be united with Russia. And further, had it not been for Russia, Ukraine would long ago have been destroyed by the Poles, Swedes, Germans, Turks or by the Entente countries. The even wilder claim, that without Russia there would not have been Kyiv Rus for Ukraine to have "shared" in as a younger partner, nor the Cossack Republic, prompts the question of how Ukraine came to exist at all. And Russian propaganda then reaches its final impertinence—that the idea of an independent Ukrainian state is an invention of foreign agents.

It was "discovered" by the Stalin theorists in the years 1943-44 that Ukrainian history develops in conformity with natural laws—social laws, presumably—and that this development gravitates towards re-union of the Ukrainian nation with that of Russia. This conformity was proclaimed as an enrichment of Marxist-Leninism. The thesis is convenient because it releases one from the necessity of giving proofs: if something develops in accordance with natural laws then it must have been checked empirically, and so there cannot be any further discussion about it. Every Soviet citizen, from the academic historian to the housewife, must believe that it is true. He who may think differently is no Marxist, he is an agent, a traitor to his country.

By this reasoning the annexation of Ukraine by Russia becomes a natural phenomenon, and the fact that Ukraine has been oppressed by Russia is a mere trifle—even were it true. For the Russian nation has not been a "jailor", but the "elder brother". One would think that the Russian nation had been impregnated with the ideas of Marx since the very beginning of its existence, that any understanding of the notion of national oppression has always been quite impossible to it. The Soviet leaders forget that the Russian nation was not only a tool of the aggressive colonial policy of the tzarist imperialists, but also that it was tzarism which trained the Russian nation to oppress other nations, that it demoralised and debased that nation until it became what it is today.

5. It is difficult to understand what is meant by the "class" approach to national history, whether of Russia or of Ukraine. It seems that the approach may be adapted to one's requirements. For among those extolled in this approach there are not only representatives of the oppressed classes, but also reactionary members of the tzarist aristocracy and of the land-owner and capitalist minority, for instance, Ivan the Terrible, founder of the tzarist autocracy, and Peter I, founder of the Russian Empire. In the history of Russia,



the class approach is not essential, and it may be disregarded if it is a matter of Russian greatness and one wishes to win over representatives of the exploiting classes.

As regards Ukrainian history, it is held—according to the Russian “amendments”—that class interests were protected by Vyhovsky<sup>20</sup>), Doroshenko<sup>21</sup>), Mazeppa<sup>22</sup>), and the like. “In protecting the class interests of the groups of Ukrainian officers, or feudal lords, they wished to put a foreign yoke on Ukraine in order to strengthen the position of their own classes, and to be better able to exploit the Ukrainian peasantry.” (*Soviet Ukraine*, No. 177. 1946)

The fact that, after the Pereyaslav Treaty, the Russian tzars colonised Ukraine with princes and noblemen; that they parcelled out the land among retainers; that, finally, being supported by these latter, they completely enslaved the free Ukrainian peasantry; these historical events have, allegedly, nothing to do with class interests and the exploitation of the Ukrainian peasantry. They were the “good fortune” of Ukraine.

But Soviet leaders are not content with saying that Vyhovsky, Doroshenko and Mazeppa wanted to strengthen the position of their class: they even dare to suggest that they wished to put a “foreign yoke” on Ukraine. “Vyhovsky wanted to subject Ukraine to the Polish gentry... Petro Doroshenko to the Turkish Sultanate, Mazeppa, to the lords of Poland and Sweden.” (*Soviet Ukraine*, No. 177. 1946) Only those who wished for a re-union of Ukraine with Russia, who “supported” that re-union, did not want to put a foreign yoke on Ukraine. The absurdity of this is plain. The “foreign yoke” is thus a scarecrow to frighten and stupefy the Ukrainian nation on the one hand, and to slander the outstanding leaders of the Ukrainian fight for liberation on the other.

It may be concluded that the aim of the “class approach” to the history of Ukraine is to depreciate that part which deals with the fight of Ukraine against Russia. It is hoped to excuse all the agents and servants of Russia, to justify the enslavement of Ukraine, to undermine the respect with which the Ukrainian nation treats those national heroes who resisted Russia, and, in general, to eradicate the traditions of this steadfast struggle against Russian imperialism. According to this approach, all those who fought or preached on behalf of the fight against Russia were defending class interests, were anxious for a foreign yoke: they were traitors to Ukraine. Those who aided imperialistic Russia to enslave Ukraine acted in accordance with the “immemorial longing of the Ukrainian nation” and had no desire to put a foreign yoke on Ukraine. And yet a prince or a landowner who cruelly exploited Ukrainian peasants was not “protecting class interests”. An approach no doubt very useful to tsarist Russia, and none the less convenient for the Bolshevik era.

It may not be possible to stigmatise an outstanding figure as a “traitor” because of the immense popularity of that figure. And so, by means of the artful falsification of history, the achievements of that personality must be so presented that they constitute a betrayal. Thus Khmelnytsky, in initiating the Pereyaslav Treaty which led to so disastrous a sequel, is by inference labelled as “the servant of Russia” instead of the great figure-head of Ukraine.



It is fitting to close with a survey of the facts relating to this great leader. In the year 1656 Russia concluded an alliance with Poland at Vilno, and in the following year, Khmelnitsky entered into an alliance with the Swedish King, Karl Gustav X, and the Transylvanian Prince, G. Rakoczi. One does not need to be a historian to see that these facts show that Russia by its Vilno alliance formally and materially betrayed the Pereyaslav Treaty, and that Khmelnitsky regarded the Pereyaslav Treaty as a political alliance—not as a re-union of Ukraine with Russia. Accordingly, when Russia had betrayed his trust, he entered into alliance with Sweden and Transylvania in order to protect the independence of Ukraine from aggression on the part of Poland and Russia, Russia having already revealed its aggressive aims in respect of Ukraine. The historian Petrovsky does not deny these facts. Even following the official line of the Communist Party of Ukraine, he was able to interpret them as follows: "The Vilno agreement raised difficulties in the realisation of Khmelnitsky's plans. However, the great Hetman did not abandon his efforts towards re-union with Russia. He decided, *while remaining loyal to Russia*, to confront the Russian government at the same time with a *fait accompli*, the utter defeat of Poland. And he also attempted to reconcile Sweden with Russia". (N.P. Petrovsky, *Re-union of the Ukrainian nation in a united Ukrainian Soviet State*. 1944)

The renewed tissue of misrepresentation and distortion has but one purpose—to present Khmelnitsky as the loyal friend of Russia. Far indeed from the real world are the thoughts of the Bolsheviks, if they imagine such a fabrication taking root in the hearts of Ukrainians.

(From an article printed in *IDEA AND ACTION*, Vol. V. 10, published by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists.)

## NOTES

- 1) The Treaty of Pereyaslav was concluded in 1654 between Bohdan Khmelnitsky—Hetman of the Ukrainian Cossack State 1648-1657—and the representatives of Alexis, Tzar of Muscovy 1645-1672. The Treaty brought Ukraine under the protection of Russia whilst preserving a great deal of her internal and external autonomy. Khmelnitsky's immediate purpose in agreeing to the terms of the Treaty was to secure a Russian alliance against Poland, from whose rule Ukraine had freed herself in 1648.
- 2) Hrushevsky, Professor Mykhaylo 1866-1935. The most eminent Ukrainian historian. He became, in 1917/18, the President of the Ukrainian Central Rada—the Parliament of Independent Ukraine.
- 3) Kyiv-Rus (also Kiev-Rus, or Kiev State), a kingdom which lasted from the ninth to the thirteenth century in Eastern Europe. It extended over the whole Dnieper basin, reaching the Eastern Carpathians in the West, and Lake Ladoga and the Upper Volga in the North. The city of Kyiv was its great cultural and commercial

centre, and the period of Kyiv-Rus forms the glorious medieval chapter of Ukrainian history. In later centuries the growing ambitious Muscovy began to lay claim to the heritage of Kyiv-Rus. The very name "Russia" by which Muscovy is known today was adopted by Muscovite tzars as a means of glorifying the history of their own obscurely founded state.

- 4) The Zaporozhian Sich was a free Ukrainian Cossack fortress republic established in the sixteenth century on an island on the lower reaches of the Dnieper river, below the famous rapids. The name "Zaporozhe" means "beyond the rapids". The republic was military in character and its adventurous inhabitants were recruited mostly from serfs who escaped from the settled parts of Ukraine which were ruled by Polish feudal lords. The Zaporozhian Cossacks had a fine record of heroic struggle against Turkish and Tartar invaders as well as against the Polish landlords. Its importance was gradually lost during the second half of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, and it was finally destroyed by Catherine II in 1775.
- 5) Chernyshevsky, Nikolas 1828-1889, a Russian writer, journalist and literary critic who was exiled to Siberia for spreading revolutionary ideas.
- 6) Byelinsky, Vissarion 1811-1848, an eminent Russian literary critic, a 'Westerner'.
- 7) Dobrolyubov, Nicholas 1836-1861, a Russian literary critic and publicist.
- 8) Shevchenko, Taras 1814-1861, the greatest Ukrainian poet.
- 9) Franko, Ivan 1856-1916, the most outstanding West Ukrainian writer, poet, scholar and publicist.
- 10) Kotsyubynsky, Mychaylo 1864-1913, a famous Ukrainian novelist.
- 11) Hrebinka, Evhen 1812-1848, a Ukrainian writer, notably of fables.
- 12) Kulish, Panteleymon 1819-1897, the Ukrainian scholar and poet.
- 13) Kvitka-Osnovyanenko, Hryhoriy 1778-1843, one of the first modern Ukrainian writers.
- 14) "Haydamaky" is Shevchenko's greatest epic poem, and depicts a rising of Ukrainian peasants in the 1760's against Polish domination and religious intolerance.
- 15) Annyenkov, Pavel Vasilyevich 1812-1887, a Russian literary critic.
- 16) "A Dream", a satirical poem by Taras Shevchenko which attacks the Russian autocracy and the servility of the Ukrainian gentry.
- 17) 'Khakhlaty', a Russian derogatory name for anything Ukrainian which is derived from 'a khakhol', meaning a hair-cut peculiar to Ukrainian Cossacks.
- 18) 'Khakhly', a Russian derogatory word for 'Ukrainians'.
- 19) "... dumplings and varenyky with lard" describes some characteristic Ukrainian peasant food.
- 20) Vyhovsky, Ivan, Hetman of Ukraine 1657-1659. He defeated a large Russian army at Konotop in the summer of 1659.
- 21) Doroshenko, Petro, Hetman of Ukraine 1665-1676. He formed an alliance with the Turks against the Russians and Poles.
- 22) Mazeppa, Ivan, Hetman of Ukraine 1687-1709. Mazeppa allied himself with the Swedish King Charles XII against Peter I; he was defeated at Poltava in 1709.

## **The Ideological Challenge of the Ukrainian Underground**

### **The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council as operating in Ukraine at present**

Bolshevism, being a synthesis of Russian imperialism and communism, aims at conquering the whole world and subjecting it to the orders of the Russian Bolshevik centre in Moscow. For this purpose Bolshevism proceeds along a road of ruthless force and terror, of genocide, of extermination of disobedient groups and entire nationalities, a road of political and ethnical confusion and disintegration as regards the subjugated nations. The Ukrainian resistance movement, therefore, along with any other organised revolutionary force, must attach great importance to the ideological fight against Bolshevism. On the basis of authentic publications, printed in Ukraine between 1950 and 1953 and distributed over the whole Ukrainian S.S.R., it is my intention to describe the system of ideas of national and social freedom as proclaimed by the Ukrainian liberation movement. It is these ideas that give the Ukrainian people their power to resist the physical, material, and, above all, the ideological aggression of Bolshevism, and to thrust it back. Were they not uplifted by the spiritual power deriving from the great ideals of national and social freedom, the Ukrainian people, in this unequal struggle against an enemy armed from top to toe, would not have succeeded in remaining alive.

#### **I. National self-determination**

Bolshevism has pushed Internationalism, as a camouflaged form of Russian imperialism, into the foreground. The Organisation of



Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.), and the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (U.H.V.R.), i.e. the three organs of Ukrainian resistance, oppose this concept of Internationalism, proclaiming in its stead that idea of freedom which is well established historically, and which is the most progressive of our times—the idea of forming national states within the ethnical boundaries of every nation.

It is clear that, to prevent a revival of Muscovite imperialism, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics must be split up into the number of independent nations that comprise it. In this re-organisation of Eastern Europe, the establishment of an independent Ukraine will be a basic factor. The soil of Ukraine is very rich, and so long as the people of Ukraine are in subjugation, this fertility will cause the exploitation and murder of her people. For this reason, apart from questions of principle, her independence is essential to the peace of Europe.

## II. The National Idea

The Bolshevik campaign of lies denouncing the Ukrainian movement for national freedom as outmoded and reactionary is countered by the Ukrainian revolutionary movement in its official declarations, where it develops the concept of the national idea, and its political significance. "The national idea", writes P. Poltava, "is the strongest force in history, and all forces opposing it have to surrender whenever a clash occurs. It is precisely this that determines the basic trend of historical development." In opposition to this basic trend, the most reactionary imperialism is sustained by the Russian Bolsheviks. Their disregard of the principles of self-determination involves them in incessant warfare against movements for national freedom organised by the people under their power.

The O.U.N. rejects Bolshevik allegations of "chauvinism", "reaction", "exclusiveness", etc. and argues that the idea of international co-operation is progressive, and is well defined in the United Nations Charter. The ideal of international co-operation, however, cannot be achieved unless the principle of self-determination by the peoples is fully realised. "There can be no question of mutual confidence among the nations so long as there are dominating and dominated people" (P. Poltava: *The Concept of an Independent Ukraine and the Basic Trend of Ideological, Political Development in the Modern World*, 1950. P. 65.).

It is emphasised by many Ukrainian writers that the national liberation movement has a friendly attitude towards all nations, and wishes to co-operate with them all—including the Russian people, once they have established their “own national state within their ethnical boundaries”. Ukraine has no imperialistic aims and intends to establish an independent state only “within the territories primarily populated by Ukrainians”. The movement stands against “great empires that embrace a large number of nationalities”.

In an empire, many peoples are exposed to cultural and political suppression, and a nation must have political independence in order to produce a maximum of creative power and industrial development among its people. Poltava, in support of this last argument, stresses the necessity of mental vigour in a people as an answer to Stalin's plea in 1922 that “economic expediency” called for the integration of the Soviet republics in a Federal State. Mental vigour, dependent upon political freedom, is the prior condition of economic success and not a mere consequence of it.

Russia shows no understanding of the fact that there are no objective obstacles to close economic co-operation between independent states. She stands for a centralised socialist state, to include a great number of non-Russian peoples. But socialism, in almost a hundred years of existence, has not succeeded in ousting the national idea, which is so firmly rooted in the lives of all people that it resists all external pressure. On the contrary, the increasing part played by the broad masses of the people in the historical process tends to increase national consciousness.

### III. Russification

The Russian imperialists are well aware of the importance of the national idea, and are at pains to neutralise it by fictitious statements within the U.S.S.R., and by a false demagoguery wherein the Kremlin appears as the ‘protector’ of the national idea this side of the Iron Curtain. They thus hope to belittle the invincible urge of national revolution movements. The organised underground resistance of Ukraine devotes a series of publications to the exposure of bolshevist deception in this respect, analysing bolshevist theories on nationality problems, and showing that in effect they are genocidal and theoretically untenable.

Moscow seeks to satisfy the urge for independence among the different nations by a sham independence, in accordance with Stalin's

own paradoxical political views: "Social democracy proclaims the right of self-determination for nations . . . , but that does not mean that social democracy is ready to support every kind of aspiration a nation may cherish" (page 18, *Marxism and the Nationality Problem* 1952 Ed.); and on page 20: "A nation has a right to establish an autonomy. It has even the right to secession; that does not mean, however, that it should use that right on every occasion". Moscow therefore establishes states which are formally independent, but subjugated peoples know well enough how to distinguish between formal provisions and actual conditions. The 'independent state' of Ukraine is not independent at all, but merely an administrative unit, without any rights; the 'sovereignty' of the Republics is a mere fiction, a phrase used by the Bolsheviks to mislead their own people and those of the whole world. Neither the Supreme Soviet in the Ukrainian S.S.R. nor its 'government' can act without the consent of the Moscow Central Committee. In *On Guard* 1946, we may read: "The so-called government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. consists of Stalin's agents who have the task of realising his plans for the conquest of Ukraine".

In the pamphlet *The Bolshevik Solution of the Nationality Problem*, 1950, the author, M. Wak, concludes that the U.S.S.R. is nothing but the Russian Empire in a new form, and the oppression of non-Russian nations is not an incidental occurrence, not merely a body of interim measures against various "enemies of the people", but a well-considered development of Lenin and Stalin's planning for the revival of Russian imperialism. "In 1917, the Russian Empire could only be saved by an apparent settlement of what was undermining and destroying it. And that was the problem of nationality." There is the evidence of Stalin himself quoted from his *Proclamations and Speeches on Ukraine*: "The Revolution saved Russia from breaking up"; and who declared, on the occasion of the formation of the U.S.S.R. on August 30, 1922, "Today is the day of triumph of the new Russia over the old . . . Russia has gathered the people of the Soviet Republics around her to give the world an example of a world union of Socialist Soviet Republics".

It is correct to say, then, that the communists have attempted to win the confidence of all people by pretending that each 'republic' has the right of self-determination. As, however, bolshevist practice by no means coincides with the ideals and catchwords proclaimed for export, and as the subjugated peoples not only do not support





*Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.)  
Cleaning Rifles  
Platoon "K"*



*"Freedom to the Peoples, Freedom to the Individual"—woodcut by Nil Khasevych-Beyzot, artist with the U.P.A. Reproduced from an underground leaflet printed in Ukraine (1950)*

the plans for conquest cherished in modern bolshevist form by Russian imperialists, but continue to fight for their own national liberation, Moscow is compelled to depend more and more on the Russian elements, on Russian chauvinism and the imperialist bearers of the idea of a Russian world empire. Among the peoples oppressed by Moscow, idealistic communists are rare indeed.

The Ukrainian underground is always at pains to reveal bolshevism as a means to the further glorification of the Russian people. On May 24, 1945, Stalin toasted the Russian people as "the most prominent nation of all nations belonging to the Soviet Union, the leading power among all peoples". This may be called an official acknowledgement of Russian "superiority" in accordance with which history in the U.S.S.R. is arranged and taught from a purely imperialistic and racial standpoint, in order to convince the Russians of their "progressiveness", their "ability to set up states", their "mission of freedom in Europe and of course for the whole of civilisation", and so on.

But the most deadly method of Russification is the systematic extirpation of non-Russian peoples by physical execution and exile, and by their replacement by Russian 'colonists'. Entire nationalities may be destroyed, as, for instance, the Crimean Tartars and the Chechenes. The Ukrainian people have suffered a particularly cruel extermination. By 1940 the Bolsheviks had destroyed more than twelve million Ukrainians, about seven millions of these by means of the artificial famine of 1932/33. Again, when withdrawing from Ukraine in 1941 before the German advance, the Bolsheviks murdered all the inmates of Ukrainian prisons.

Russification consists in implanting in subjugated peoples a clear notion of inferiority, and then in encouraging in them a slave-like admiration for the Russian people as 'the elder brother' and 'the leading nation'. By inspiring such feelings, Bolsheviks hope to assimilate other nations the more easily, to weaken their spiritual and moral resistance, and to undermine their craving for independence. Such measures as the distortion of national history, the deliberate influencing of literature and the arts, the pressure upon teachers, Russian priority in the Red Army, and the occupying of the more important posts in the Communist Party and the local government departments by Russians, are constantly employed, and are particularly strongly taken in Ukraine, whose national tendencies are only too well known to the Kremlin.



#### IV. Ideological counter-attack

The Russification policy in Ukraine has presented the O.U.N. with the difficult problem of protecting the young people of the nation against Communists and imperialist propaganda. In the educational journal *For the Great Idea*, published by the O.U.N. in Ukraine, an article by B. Ulas in 1952 made many recommendations on the approach to those educated in schools controlled by Communists. These recommendations fall roughly into three sections: first, to emphasise the proud legacy of Ukrainian youth—national history and the heroes of the past—with the object of arousing feelings of patriotism; second, to describe the suffering and losses of the Ukrainian people occasioned by the long aggression and domination by Russia, and to make clear the distinction between the dignity of nationhood and the shame of dependence upon a foreign power; and third, to shake the belief that Moscow is invincible, that the Russians are a 'leading' nation, and thus to demonstrate that loyalty to Ukraine and to its own people is the true path for all young Ukrainians, while allegiance to Moscow, since it involves betrayal of one's fellow-countrymen, is despicable and cowardly.

This latter appeal is also expanded and circulated among all Ukrainian people by the O.U.N. The crimes of tsarist imperialists, now continued by the Moscow Bolsheviks, are enumerated and exposed in all their shameful details. Russian Bolsheviks conquered Ukraine by force of arms, and since then have carried on a policy of total extermination, not only of the independent, political, cultural and economic units of Ukrainian administration, but also of its very nationhood.

Practical hints for a continuous struggle with the enemy are given in an O.U.N. publication of 1948: "Do not speak Russian—Away with Russian in the schools—Everyone in Ukraine should speak Ukrainian. Down with seditious bolshevist propaganda—Bring up your children as patriots and not as janissaries—Have no part with the work of bolshevist agitators—Expose bolshevist lies. Sabotage bolshevist plans and decrees in industry, transport, agriculture, in schools and institutions. Seek contact with the revolutionary underground movement—Spread our revolutionary slogans—Read our revolutionary literature. Take part in the active, organised anti-Bolshevik fight—it is your duty to fight for the national and social

liberation of Ukraine from Moscow—"The grave that the Muscovite oppressors prepare for Ukraine must be their own."

### **V. The O.U.N. stands for democracy and social justice**

The organised Ukrainian underground movement prepares a democratic state to stand against the totalitarian, Muscovite-Bolshevik despotism. Publications of the liberation movement bear the slogans: "Freedom for Nations"; "Freedom for Individuals"; "Freedom for an independent united Ukraine". An underground writer, Ramzenko, declares that Ukraine must be politically independent in order that relations between the state and its organs and the Ukrainian people can be established justly and without violence. Minorities, he holds, must have the same rights as Ukrainians since they have also the same duties. According to P. Poltava, a genuine democracy, free of dictatorship, stands for freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of opinion.

Extensive measures must be taken for the better organisation of the social order in Ukraine. The principle of private landownership guarantees freedom and prosperity in such a country, and every peasant should receive his land as a private possession. The collectivised economy is merely a means of exploiting the peasant and tends to destroy the Ukrainian village. But big landowners must not be re-established in Ukraine, nor must large-scale industrial capitalists be re-introduced. The worker must be able to use his initiative as a free man, and be master of his own workshop. One-family enterprise must be encouraged as especially suitable to the Ukrainian individualist mentality.

### **VI. The spiritual life of Ukraine**

By its entire system, Bolshevism attacks the soul and the life of the Ukrainian nation, and for this reason resistance to it must be offered on all sides. The nationalist movement is not only a social-political, but also a spiritual movement for the rebirth of a nation after years of enslavement.

The movement therefore represents a united front against Bolshevism, and hence attacks Marxism with all its strength. Marx's application of a dialectical materialism alike to natural phenomena and to communal life has only speculative value in either case—it has no foundation in fact. It is a subtly created picture of a development one might like to see, but which in reality does not exist.

However diligently one may seek corroboration of the systems of dialectical and historic materialism, they remain abstract systems; the tragic results of attempts at corroboration are obvious throughout the Soviet Union.

Although Marxism and socialism aim at a nationless world, they have failed to produce any new elements of a non-national community, or to train the proletariat to be internationally conscious. But the western creed of liberal capitalism is also dangerous to society in that its expansion has often furthered the enslavement of nations, and has brought about conflicts between classes within the single nation.

The official enforcement of communal ideologies and dogmas is rejected by the Ukrainian liberation movement which stands for freedom of conviction, faith, speech and thought. The movement thus dissociates itself from totalitarian practices. It is, however, itself inspired by an ideology.

For instance, the O.U.N., the U.P.A., and the U.H.V.R. accept and defend the traditional beliefs and religious practices of Ukraine, upon which the Ukrainian nation as a deeply religious people has built up its life for over a thousand years.

The Christian principles that underlie the liberation movement cannot be refuted; they are especially evident in the literature of the underground movement, in its poetry, prose, painting, sculpture, music etc. The following quotations from U.P.A. songs, and from Marko Boyslav's *Wayward Verse*, illustrate the fighting spirit of the Ukrainians and their faith in the Divinity. "Neither tanks nor cannon can move us to fear. We sing the praises of truth, God, and a new world". "For God, for truth, for sacred Ukraine." "The barbarous enemy shall know that the spirit and not the body decides the battle." "Ukraine will not only liberate herself but will show the world that is ruled by evil the way . . ." "We shall give life a new meaning."

Such songs express the strength of a faith which cannot be vanquished, and the determination "to decide the future", "to conquer death by death." The fight is for idealistic and not for material value—a fight for the freedom of a man's soul, which is fettered in chains; it is revenge for "ignominy and chastisement", for "the honour of a nation which has been trampled under foot".

New literature and new art is being created by the Ukrainian underground movement whose artists and poets are re-educating the people with their revolutionary works. There is the story "Virka"



by M. Perelesnyk, printed in *Olga Besarab; The Bleeding Roses*, by the same writer; the story *One Day* by B. Kalina; *In life and In Battle*, by I. Levytch; *My Revolutionary Marches* by P. Voloshyn Vasylenko, author of a collection of poems called *December Lyrics*, who was killed in action on June 21, 1946 in the Poltava district. The works of this writer have been printed secretly and circulated throughout Ukraine.

Memoirs of insurgents have also been published and widely distributed, for instance *Chronicles of a U.P.A. Battalion*, and the *U.P.A. Chronicles*. Newspapers specially written for children and expressing idealistic and national educational aims are published, and include the children's magazine *Orlyky* ("The Little Eagles").

Christmas and Easter cards show the close connection between the underground movement and the religious faith of the masses. Special vouchers were sold to mark the tenth anniversary of the proclamation of the revival of the Ukrainian State on June 30, 1941, and the liberation movement has within its ranks artists and craftsmen in every cultural field.

## VII. Nature of Ukrainian Nationalism

The most important elements in Ukrainian nationalism have been summed up by P. Poltava in an article published by the O.U.N. They may be stated here shortly as follows:

1. Belief in the Ukrainian Independent United State and the fight for its realisation.
2. Fight for the revival of a positive life in Ukraine, with scope for an individualistic social organisation.
3. Radicalism—the powerful factor of our methods in fighting the occupying Power, and realisation that the most important task at present is the organising of all sections of the people to stand together in the struggle against that Power.
4. The O.U.N. shall derive its main strength from the Ukrainian people themselves, in their determination to win their country for themselves.
5. Anti-Bolshevik fighting forces shall be organised above all on Ukrainian soil, for Ukraine itself is the decisive battleground.
6. Furtherance of the just ideology of free mankind, both politically and economically, in theory and in practice.
7. High moral standards and aims amongst all members of the O.U.N.

### VIII. United front: the A.B.N.


The Ukrainian liberation movement brought about the establishment of a large-scale front among those nations suppressed by Bolshevism and Nazism by means of the "First Conference of the Suppressed Nations of Eastern Europe and Asia" on November 21-22, 1943. At this Conference it was decided that victory for the suppressed nations would be more speedy if such a united front were achieved. The Conference advocated the co-ordination of the national forces of all these nations in order to work out a united course, a single strategy, so that at the appropriate time, simultaneous revolution might occur within all of them. "The newly-founded social order in Eastern Europe and Asia will exclude every form of imperialism and will safeguard the freedom of development of every nation", declared the Conference.

The Conference inaugurated the A.B.N.—Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations—of which P. Poltava speaks thus: "These nations . . . have combined . . . to fight for a common cause. Their joint aim is the overthrow of the Soviet Union in order to establish their own independent national states on its ruins. The Bolsheviks know quite well that the allegation of "moral, political unity among the peoples of the Soviet Union" is a lie".

In order to mobilise this united front, U.P.A. units carried out various incursions into Caucasia, Slovakia, Roumania, Poland, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Prussia, etc. As a result of these activities, the A.B.N. is now the leading political organ for co-operation between the suppressed nations.

The aims of the A.B.N. are expressed in a pamphlet called *Our Watchword—Freedom for Nations and Freedom for Individuals—the most Progressive Watchword in the World*.

Thus the main principles and the central struggle of the Ukrainian liberation movement now find their place side by side with those of many other nations. The principles which animate these suppressed peoples I have tried to make clear in this article, and I have also described to some extent the political aims and social ideas of Ukrainian revolutionaries. It is the rightness of our aims, and the justice of our actions, which bases this liberation movement firmly upon the interests and upon the faith of the masses of Ukrainian people.




Kyiv :



*Pecherska Lavra*





*Kyiv: Memorial to Saint Volodymyr the Great*

# UKRAINE TODAY

## I

R-O

### The West-Ukrainian Village

The years of Bolshevik rule since the second World War have left a deep mark upon the village of West Ukraine. They have been years of forced collectivisation and of mass deportation to Siberia and to other regions of the U.S.S.R.

Deportation and long sentences to forced labour have affected Ukrainian villages particularly painfully since they remove the more thoughtful and forthright of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and peasantry. The Bolsheviks have deliberately carried out this policy in order to annihilate the liberation movement of Ukraine, and to empty West Ukraine of a main source of material and moral support for revolutionary nationalism. The largest deportations took place in the years 1946-47, when 150,000 of the most enterprising Ukrainians were deported to Siberia. Deportations continued in the following years, but not on so large a scale. There are some villages in West Ukraine from which one-fourth, or even half, the inhabitants have been deported. For example, more than half the families of Novosilky in the Yavoriv region were deported, and from the village Tataryniv in the Komarno region one-fifth of the population. On an average, five to twenty families have been deported from every village.

The collectivisation of agriculture in West Ukraine was completed in the years 1950-1951, and in consequence there are today almost no individual farms—occasionally one happens to meet a “private owner”. For instance, in an area containing thirty

villages, there are now no more than two or three individual farms. And what farms they are! They have been deprived of everything that goes to make a farm—even the plots of ground belonging to the hut.

This is hardly the place to speak of the methods by which the Bolshevik government carried out collectivisation. One instance will suffice: the village Murylovychi, in the Yavoriv region, where the villagers offered persistent resistance. The enemy's answer was a cruel one: forty families were deported in 1950-51, two big police raids were carried out against the insurrectionists in the course of which the peasants' property—including their huts and barns—was almost completely destroyed. This example must be multiplied by thousands in order to obtain a true picture of the West Ukrainian village of today.

Fortunately the Bolsheviks have not replaced the deported Ukrainians by Russians but have, in most cases, settled Ukrainians from behind the Curzon Line\* in the vacant homesteads.

The Soviet law about consolidating collective farms has also been a means of the social enslavement of Ukrainian peasants. The consolidation, or merging of several collective farms into one huge "kolkhoz", was carried out in West Ukraine in 1950-51.

### **The population of the village**

Villages in West Ukraine are populated by Ukrainians. Only a very small percentage—not exceeding one per cent—of Poles remains, and then only near the frontiers of Poland. There has been practically no influx either of Russians or of Ukrainians from the eastern regions of Ukraine. If there are newcomers, then these are mostly teachers and the heads of consolidated collective farms.

There has, however, appeared in the villages a new land aristocracy: the Soviet heads of consolidated farms and their assistants. For it is the Russians who normally hold these positions, seldom Ukrainians from the eastern regions, and very rarely local Ukrainians. In 1951-52, by successive decisions of the Bolshevik government, the

---

\* The Curzon Line was Poland's eastern frontier as approved in December, 1919, on the grounds of nationality statistics. In 1921, by the Treaty of Riga, Poland pushed her eastern frontier far east of the Line, thus bringing some six million Ukrainians as well as other nationalities under her rule. The latest demarcation of Russia and Poland roughly follows the earlier Curzon Line.

heads of collective farms of more than one thousand hectares are no longer paid in kind according to the number of their work-days, but they receive a cash payment of one rouble per hectare of land belonging to the farm. A work-day is a unit of work, not of time. It is a piece-rate method of payment by which a certain amount of work counts as one work-day. The payment, in kind and in cash, per work-day, varies according to the yield of the farm.

If collective farms consist of two or three thousand hectares of land it is hardly surprising that their heads are far more wealthy than the bulk of Soviet citizens. Deputy heads of collective farms may receive 30-35 work-days a month; book-keepers and accountants, 30 work-days; agriculturists, team-leaders, farm-managers, 30 work-days; and the divisional inspectors of militia are also well paid. All these receive far more than the farm-worker who does the work, and to whom the farm is supposed to belong.

The most hated class of Soviet officials is that of the "istrebityeli", the destroyers", who also belong to the village aristocracy. Local Ukrainian youth is usually recruited for this service, and there are from three to six of them in every village. Their task consists of protecting collective farms against sabotage and theft. Along with the divisional inspector, they search huts, check documents, carry out raids against Ukrainian insurrectionists and so on. They receive from 20 to 25 work-days a month for their services.

Lastly amongst the village aristocracy are the heads of the village Soviets, with their deputies and secretaries. They receive nothing from the collective farm but a cash payment of 200/300 roubles a month; but they are paid for writing certain certificates, for dismissing workers from the collective farm when they leave to work in factories, and for other similar services. Because of their position, they often accept considerable sums of money as bribes.

How then does the Ukrainian peasant-worker live under the new order? Before he was compelled to work on the collective farm, he was deprived of his land, of his livestock and his stores. A cow and some poultry only was left to him, with the plot of land of about half an acre upon which his buildings stood. From this plot, and in addition to his work at the collective farm from dawn to dusk, each worker has to deliver 40 kilograms of meat, 220 litres of milk or 11 kilograms of butter and 90 eggs a year. He had also until recently to



pay 200/300 roubles in cash, but this tax has now been abolished by a new decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R.

The collective farm worker should complete at least 120 work-days a year, but the following example shows how difficult it is to fulfil the quota: in the village of Z, in south western Ukraine, one had, in order to complete a 'work-day' to load manure on a cart for four days, or else to chop straw with a hand chaff-cutting machine for five days. The peasants rightly call the work-day a "hard" day, for they must do a great deal of work for very little reward. On average in 1953, a collective farm-worker received 1.3 kilograms of grain and 1.3 roubles in cash for a work-day—in a few collective farms 5 roubles. Because of these small earnings, collective farm-workers live very modestly: not only are they short of money but, and what is worse, they are also without sufficient bread.

Thus the Ukrainian peasants cannot even afford necessities, although in recent times there have been sufficient goods in the village co-operative stores, even shoes and textiles which are usually rare in the U.S.S.R. It is true that most of these goods are of poor quality and, compared with prices in the West, that they are very expensive. For example, one metre of white linen costs 8 roubles, a shirt made of similar linen costs 35-40 roubles, and the so-called "Kirzovi" boots cost 200 roubles. Co-operative shops seldom have boots of this kind for they are sold in the state shops of the villages. Thus, in order to buy "kirzovi" boots, the collective farmer must work four or even five months; in order to buy a shirt, for two or more weeks.

Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Ukrainian peasant, in order to protect himself in his pauperised condition against starvation and cold, steals collective farm property whenever he has the opportunity. Stealing such property is not regarded today as a sin, as immoral, by Ukrainians. And in addition to this effort to escape from a tragic situation very many young people of Ukraine try to leave the village and find work in the factories of the towns.

During the summer large numbers of the young people of West Ukraine—particularly young women—leave their homeland to earn extra money in seasonal work. They go chiefly to the Kherson and Mykolayiv regions to pick cotton, and to other regions of the U.S.S.R. for constructional work and lumbering. At the end of the

season, they return to their villages, but they are not contented either with the work they have done, or with the money they have earned.

Despite all these hardships, the population of West Ukraine is not demoralised. The faith of the people in the victory of truth, in God and the Church, and in the Ukrainian independent state, maintain a high standard of morality in the nation. For indeed the Ukrainian liberation movement and the Church are the people's only support.

Today the Russian Orthodox Church is the only acknowledged Church in the land of West Ukraine. It must be frankly admitted that most of the Greek-Catholic priests have been forcibly converted to Orthodoxy. Many older and some young priests refused to be converted, and some of them became teachers, while most disappeared.

In general, then, there are now few priests. There may be only one priest for five or six, or even more, villages. Taxes are imposed on the Church, and, to pay these, money is collected by carol singing and church offertories.

The Bolshevik government does not permit the observance of holy days, but even today the people of West Ukraine keep away from work on these days, as well as on Sundays. Churches where services are held are overcrowded with people from all the neighbouring villages; both old and young alike confess and communicate; and marriages are also contracted in the churches.

Yet it cannot be denied that the ten years of Bolshevik rule have deeply influenced village life. Some of the young people do not attend church, and many drink too freely and lead dissolute lives. The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.) and its army, the Ukrainian Liberation Army (U.P.A.), which now work underground, are particularly concerned to safeguard the morals of the nation and to protect the Church and work for a higher spirit of purpose among young people. The O.U.N. writes and publishes many appeals to the people, many leaflets of information, and distributes these widely in the villages.

---

## II

*Halyna Selehen*

### **National Character of Ukrainian Towns**

There is a widespread belief amongst thinking people in the West that Ukrainian towns are not primarily populated with Ukrainians, but that the inhabitants are composed chiefly of Russians, Jews, and representatives of other nationalities—in short, that Ukrainians make up rather a small proportion of the urban population.

This opinion, though vague and uncertain regarding towns in general, is nevertheless almost a conviction with regard to the larger cities, and the main centres of the economic and cultural life of our country.

Thus, although it is well known that the social mass of the rural population is Ukrainian, one reaches the curious conclusion that in their midst communities have grown up which are non-Ukrainian in character, scattered like islands among the Ukrainian villages, and preserving, somehow, their alien structure. This notion is deliberately fostered by official statistical data, so long as these are accepted without critical analysis and careful examination of the conditions under which they were obtained.

Unfortunately, in attempting such an analysis, the documentary evidence which should be used to check the official records is not available. Our task must therefore be limited to pointing out mistakes that are made in assessing the national structure of Ukrainian towns, and to proving, by indirect methods, an undeniable numerical superiority of Ukrainians in the towns and cities, and their proportionate increase in recent times.

The estimates of nationality in urban populations are arrived at on the basis of the census, which contains questions formulated variously at different times and in different countries. Nationality is normally determined in these ways: first, by objective evidence, and second, by declarations on the part of the people concerned.

Of the objective characteristics by which nationality can be determined, citizenship, residence, and language are the most import-

ant. The latter was employed during the first all-Russian census of the year 1897. The principle of determination by direct question was later applied during all the population counts in Soviet Ukraine, commencing with the second all-Russian one—the first after the Bolshevik revolution—which took place in 1926.

Now it is clear that statistical data based on a census cannot always be relied upon to reflect the real position. A census depends to a great extent upon the good-will of the organisers, upon that of the people questioned, and upon a lack of political bias in the authority which initiates the inquiry. This is particularly vital in the case of states which contain many nationalities, and where there are clearly determined processes of assimilation of the smaller nations, with a lack of balance between these and the ruling power. Under such conditions, the census may misrepresent the national structure of the state, and the numerical strength of certain national groups, particularly of those whose national development is limited because the government's policy serves the interests of the ruling nation.

The statistical data of the all-Russian census of 1897 are a striking example of faulty determination of national elements in Russia's population, especially as regards Ukrainians. The questionnaire used on this occasion did not contain a direct reference to nationality, but it was required to state the mother-tongue, and from this information nationality was deduced.

As far as Ukrainian villages were concerned, the use of the mother-tongue was almost certainly indicative of Ukrainian nationality, but in Ukrainian towns, and particularly in the cities, the situation was quite different. For the structure of those towns was certainly multi-national and mixed, though even in the last decade of the last century the Russians, for example, did not form the majority of their population, as reported by the census of 1897. According to the figures, there were twice as many Russians as Ukrainians, and a certain number of representatives of other nations, consisting chiefly of Ukrainians, was included in the Russian group merely because the Russian language was their everyday language, their "mother-tongue".

Divergence between nationality and the use of the mother-tongue among Ukrainians living in towns at that time shows that a part of the population, primarily officials and professional people, used the official language of administration, that is, used Russian. Of those



who registered in the towns of Ukraine on November 15, 1897, according to language, 60 per cent were Russians, 20 per cent were Ukrainians.

At that time there were only 15 per cent Russians in the villages of Ukraine, the Ukrainians making up the majority with 75 per cent. It therefore appears dangerous to apply the mother-tongue criterion to villages and towns alike—for the former it is accurate, but for the latter it may be misleading.

The census of 1926 has added still further to the misrepresentation of the structure of Ukrainian towns. By this census, people were asked to state their nationality, and these statements were accepted on their face value. They were also asked to state their mother-tongue, and thus the two answers may be compared.

According to this census, there were 20 per cent Ukrainians who used the Russian language. Now by the census of 1897, it appeared that the proportion of Ukrainians in the towns of Ukraine who were speaking Russian was still greater. Thus to the 20 per cent of the town population of Ukraine who spoke Ukrainian according to the census of 1897 should be added roughly 30 per cent of the rest **who**, although using the Russian language, were in fact Ukrainians by birth.

During the census of the year 1926, the Ukrainians who lived in towns also numbered, comparatively, the small figure of 40 per cent, and the Russians 50 per cent. Those numbers, though determined by direct question, cannot be considered correct. Among those who registered themselves as Russians there were not less than 15-20 per cent Ukrainians by birth still under the influence of the Russian language, culture, schools, and so on.

According to the birth-place of townspeople in Ukraine as entered in the census papers of 1926, 75-80 per cent were born in Ukraine. It may be, then, that no essential change in the national structure of towns had taken place between 1897 and 1926. Ukrainian towns remained denationalised in Bolshevik times almost to the same extent as, thirty years earlier, under tsarist Russia. Denationalised, but Ukrainian. This is supported by the first population count carried out—very imperfectly as to method—in Charkiv after the Bolshevik retreat of 1941. According to that census, 70 per cent of the people of Charkiv were Ukrainians, and 80 per cent were those who had been born in Ukraine.

At the time of the 1926 census, most of the townspeople had been born in Ukraine, but between 1926 and 1939 very great changes took place in Ukrainian towns. The census of 1939 shows that a rapid growth of towns and an increase in urban population were characteristic of that period. In 14 years the population of Ukrainian towns increased from about 5 million in 1926 to 11 million in 1939. At the same time the rural population decreased by 5 million—from 24 to 19 million.

During those years the urban population of Ukraine increased in three ways: first, the number of townspeople in existing towns grew; second, new towns and urban settlements were created; and third, the areas of existing towns were extended.

On the first of these, the average annual increase of urban population during this period was nearly 5 per cent, and only 1.5 per cent resulted from natural increase, the rest being supplied by influx of rural population. Charkiv, for instance, shows that the population in the cities increased still further: for the gigantic factories of the former capital of the Ukrainian S.S.R. absorbed almost 90 thousand persons during the year 1939 alone. The statistics of this migratory movement of the population of Charkiv shows that most of the persons who arrived at Charkiv were by birth Ukrainian peasants.

Data from other industrial towns is still more striking. The cadres of industrial workers in the Donetz Basin, previously made up of non-Ukrainians—vagrants coming from central black-soil regions, Byelorussia and other parts and provinces formerly under Russia—have increasingly in recent years been filled up by Ukrainians. Also the influx of Ukrainian peasants into Ukrainian towns was especially rapid during the period of collectivisation, and it has not decreased since then, at any rate not up to the beginning of last year.

The ruin of individual farms caused by forced collectivisation meant that many workers unable to find positions on the collective farms, went to the towns to seek employment in industrial areas. As the Bolsheviks prepared for World War II, Ukrainian industry developed rapidly, gigantic munition factories sprang up in old industrial centres near the existing ones, in places where there was raw material or manpower—for instance, Charkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donbas, Kryvorizhya.

This brings us to the second point, for both the existing and the newly constructed factories needed thousands of additional hands,

and these came, primarily, from the nearby rural districts. Little by little, the kind of employment and the outward appearance of those rural districts around industrial towns changed in character: what had been ordinary villages with rural modes of living became typical labour settlements. Before the new general census was carried out, a series of former villages became towns or urban settlements because of the character of their inhabitants, who now were mostly industrial workers instead of agricultural ones. According to the census of 1926, there were in Ukraine 412 settlements having the qualification of towns or urban settlements, but this number had increased to 650 by the time of the next census.

At the same time, the number of persons who had been born in Ukrainian villages almost doubled in the towns. In 1926, in Charkiv, there were 26 per cent natives of Ukrainian villages, and according to the census of 1941, almost 60 per cent.

The increase, therefore, of urban populations in Ukraine on account of the changing of villages into urban settlements must have increased the number of Ukrainians in the urban population very greatly.

The third way in which urban population was increased was by the growth of towns, which tended to absorb the small villages in their vicinity by compact building schemes on the outskirts. The villages would then legalise their position as part of the town by adjustment of the latter's boundaries. As these villages were populated almost entirely by Ukrainians, their inclusion in the towns must further have increased the population of Ukrainians living in those towns.

These three ways, then, in which urban population increased in Ukraine have resulted in a considerable increase in the percentages of Ukrainians living in the towns and cities of Ukraine. The large masses of Ukrainian peasants which constantly poured into Ukrainian towns during collectivisation completely swamped numerically that small influx of non-Ukrainian population composed of officials, high ranking officers, Communist party leaders, and other personnel appointed by the Soviet government.



### III

A. Mykulin

## **a. Racial Policy of Russia in Ukraine**

The Soviet government, over the radio, has for some time been pressing the Ukrainian population to emigrate, voluntarily and permanently, to the lands of Central Asia and the Far East.

The first announcements were broadcast by radio centres of the West Ukrainian regions on behalf of Regional Resettlement Offices. An announcement made by Drohobych Regional Resettlement Department on January 12, 1954, was followed by similar appeals from the Stanyslaviv, Transcarpathian and Ternopil regions. Every possible argument was used to encourage the population to emigrate, and they were promised considerable economic relief and long-term credit. Finally the announcements were followed by broadcasts on behalf of the Ukrainian Republican Central Resettlement Office.

But this present so-called "voluntary" emigration—in other words deportation—is just one of the regular stages of the general Russian policy of forcible Russification and physical extermination of the Ukrainian nation which has existed for a long time. Even in the reign of the Russian Empress Catherine II, Ukrainians were deported from Zaporozhe and Right Bank Ukraine to the bleak steppes of the Povolzha, Amur and Transcaspian regions. Large numbers of Ukrainians were forcibly deported and condemned to build Leningrad, the Maryinsky canal system, large-scale projects in Arkhangelsk and Vyatka, and the Moscow-Leningrad railway.

Both on the eve of World War II and at its conclusion, the Soviet government carried out mass deportations in Ukraine, and especially in West Ukraine, under threat of arms. This deportation of Ukrainians is not, however, an isolated occurrence: it is closely connected with other political measures taken by the Russian communists against the enslaved nations. The resolutions passed by various Soviet bodies concerning elections, candidates and electors; preparations for the celebration of the 300th Anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty; the drive to bring under cultivation virgin soil



and fallow land in the Far East and in Kazakhstan; and finally concerning the jubilee session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet—all these show the general trend of Soviet policy which aims at strengthening the position of Malenkov and the Communist Party both internally and internationally after the death of Stalin and the liquidation of Beria.

The present mass deportations from Ukraine compare with the genocide of the Caucasian nations committed by Muscovy in 1944. There is this difference that, in war-time, Russia had a certain right, under martial law, to exterminate and deport the Caucasian nations who supported Hitlerism, but this justification, however weak, cannot be applied to Ukraine today. Ukraine with its population of 42 millions is the second state of the U.S.S.R. after Russia, so that open terror and extermination of Ukrainians might have international consequences which are not in Russia's political interests. Also the celebrations of the 300th Anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty would be widely at variance with any forcible deportation of Ukrainians from their country.

In order to justify this deportation of Ukrainians, the Kremlin started a campaign aimed at the cultivation of virgin soil and fallow land in the Far East and Kazakhstan. The deportations thus appear as necessary economic measures to solve the problem of grain supplies for U.S.S.R., and so raise the living standards of the country. The general assembly of members of the Young Communist League in Moscow, held on February 22, 1954, invited representatives of Ukrainian Young Communists, and initiated the so-called voluntary migration of young people to the Far East to help in the cultivation of the virgin soil. Khrushchov, at the February plenary session of the Communist Party, did not speak outright of a mass deportation of Ukrainians, but he emphasised that population must move to uncultivated lands from other regions of the U.S.S.R. And it is the Ukrainian nation that is the real victim of this policy of re-settlement.

*Radyanska Ukraina* ("The Soviet Ukraine") published an article on March 31 on re-settlement under the heading, "A great patriotic affair", which included the following:

"The working masses of Soviet Ukraine have welcomed with great enthusiasm the decision of the party and the government regarding the cultivation of the virgin soil and fallow lands. They



*Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky entering Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, in triumph 1649*



have accepted it as their own responsibility. Tens of thousands of collective farmers, young Ukrainian patriots and other outstanding people, are reporting for emigration..." During the course of the broadcast announcement on emigration, these regions were mentioned: Drohobych, Vinnytsya, Stanyslaviv, Transcarpathia, Zhytomyr, Poltava, Kyiv and Sumy.

But in the announcements the possibility of re-settlement in Southern Ukraine was not mentioned at all: only the Far East.

This matter of the re-settlement of Ukrainians from Ukraine was so important a part of Russian policy that it was also discussed at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in April. The Minister of Finance, Zvyerev, declared that the sum allocated and spent on the re-settlement of Ukrainians had exceeded the budget estimate by 20 million roubles in the past year. Zvyerev did not mention that a sum was allocated for re-settlement in 1955; but it is a fact that a certain sum was allocated.

A series of broadcasts from Moscow and from Kyiv, and also the letters written by re-settled persons to their relatives at home, give glimpses of terrible conditions of life and the heavy forced labour in the re-settled areas. Letters are written cautiously, and broadcasts are full of praise for the "happy" life in the lands of Ukrainian re-settlement; yet the true picture reveals itself in spite of efforts to conceal it.

Re-settlement continues because Russia is determined finally to rid herself of the menace of the Ukrainian revolutionary-liberation movement which mortally threatens the long established Russian policy of imperialism. The re-settlement is planned physical extermination; it is an endeavour to uproot at any price the nationalist spirit and psyche of Ukraine in order not only to enslave Ukraine, but also to deprive the revolutionary-liberation movements of other non-Russian nations enslaved by Russia of future support.

After removing the young people of Ukraine from their native land, their national customs and traditions and the influence of the older generation, Russia will re-educate them in the way she wishes; she will recruit necessary military reserves from them; she will colonise desert lands with them; and in these ways she will uproot the Ukrainian spirit of resistance. Large numbers of Communist Party members, Komsomol (Communist Youth) workers and representatives of the Ukrainian Communist Party are moving into the re-settlement regions to carry out this policy of re-education.



And side by side with this huge measure of destruction of Ukrainian nationhood, Moscow embarked upon the great psychological campaign of the celebrations in honour of the Pereyaslav Treaty—the proof, so she tries to maintain, of the long “friendship” of Russia and Ukraine.

## **b. Pereyaslav Treaty “Gala” Commemoration**

On December 9, 1953, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Ukraine (C.P./S.U.) passed a resolution concerning the celebration of the 300th Anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty between Russia and Ukraine. On that occasion the Central Committee of the C.P./S.U. adopted special assertions—or theses—in which, according to their party line, the whole history of the Ukrainian national fight for liberation and independence is interpreted in the light of Russian plans and policies. In those ‘theses’ Ukraine’s long history has been distorted and falsified, and they have become the guiding beacon for Soviet historians in writing the history of Ukraine as to what shall be included and what omitted.

The celebrations were scheduled for January 9, 1954 but later they were postponed until May. The Central Committee of the C.P./S.U. attached great political-propaganda importance to those celebrations as manifestations of the “friendship” among socialist nations that had emerged in the U.S.S.R. during the building up of socialism.

With this end in view, all the publishing houses were mobilised; official committees for the preparation and direction of the celebrations were set up; exhibitions, socials and discussions were organised; museums were hastily filled with a variety of exhibits in honour of the “reunion”, the proceedings were officially inaugurated and choral and dramatic societies commenced tours throughout the U.S.S.R.

Industry and agriculture made joint plans to further the emulation of socialism, while Russian and Ukrainian firms made a series of

agreements aimed at increasing the productivity of labour, and surpassing their output targets. In Russia and Ukraine a number of administrative measures were taken, for example the creation of the Cherkassy region, the renaming of "Maroseika Street" in Moscow as "Khmelnitsky Street", and the "presenting" of the Crimea to Ukraine by the government of the R.S.F.S.R. (Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics). It was decided to build a Shevchenko university in Kyiv in honour of the "reunion", to construct a triumphal arch, to fix marble memorial plaques in walls, and so on. At the same time, in Russia and other republics of the U.S.S.R., various commemorative "presents" were prepared for the Ukrainian S.S.R. such as inscribed boxes, arms, flags, carpets, pictures and the like.

The celebrations reached their climax at the jubilee sessions of the Supreme Soviets of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. The former was held on May 22, the latter on May 29, 1954.

At both sessions long speeches were made by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P./S.U., Kyrychenko, and the prime minister of the R.S.F.S.R., Puzanov. Both sessions received letters of welcome from the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the R.S.R.S.R. The war minister issued orders for reviews of troops in Moscow and Kyiv, and for salutes of 20 guns in honour of the anniversary in Moscow, Kyiv, Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky, Charkiv, Sevastopol and Odessa.

The speeches of Kyrychenko and Puzanov are identical as to their basic contents: both repeat the 'theses' of the Central Committee of the C.P./S.U.; both interlace the history of Ukraine and that of Russia, trying to prove their common character and indivisibility. But in all the speeches special emphasis was laid on the firm friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian nations and of all the nations of the U.S.S.R., and, in addition, on the role of Ukraine in the modern system of the U.S.S.R. and in the age-old aggressive-imperialist policy of Russia.

"The reunion of Ukraine and Russia", said Kyrychenko and Puzanov, "has still further strengthened the position of the Russian state in the international arena, the frontier of Russia has moved far to the south... This has rendered Russia's access to the Black Sea possible."

The enslavement and annexation of Ukraine by Russia has given the Russian imperialistic state an opportunity not only to gain access to the Black Sea, but also to reach the lands of south-east Asia, to endanger Iran and Turkey, to reach Afghanistan and the Balkan Peninsula. At the same time, it has become possible to enslave the Caucasus, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, to annex the Volga region, and to subjugate those of Kazakhstan and the Trans-Ural.

A heavy attack on the Ukrainian national-liberation revolution and Ukrainian nationalists stands out both in the speech by Kyrychenko and in that by Puzanov. By order of the Central Committee of the C.P./S.U. Russia is portraying Ukrainian nationalists as American agents. It is known that during the war of 1917-1921, Russia denounced the Ukrainian revolutionary-liberation movement as an agency of international imperialism and the Entente; during World War II, and again later, she heaped abuse on Ukrainian nationalists, calling them traitors to the Soviet government and menials of Fascism. At the present time, it is necessary and politically convenient to parade Ukrainian nationalist-revolutionists before the eyes of the Ukrainian nation as American agents.

Thirty years of Russia's national policy in Ukraine has not only failed to solve the Ukrainian problem but, owing to the well-organised anti-Russian fight of the Ukrainian nation, Russia has been compelled to adopt various tactical manoeuvres, thus departing from her direct line of policy. The political processes of the masses have not developed in accord with the "reunion" theme, but on the contrary have increasingly favoured that of the independence of their country. As regards their refusal of "union", an important part has been played by the Russification policy of the Kremlin: national oppression, filling up the party and administrative framework with Russians, open Russian racialism in the form of proclaiming Russia proper the "elder brother", destruction of Ukrainian culture and religion; all this has furthered the growth of Ukrainian nationalism which became especially strong after World War II and captured wide circles of adherents among the people.

The celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the "reunion" of Ukraine and Russia has become, so to speak, a curtsy of Russia towards the Ukrainian population. This curtsy is intended as a sign of equality between the Russian and Ukrainian nations. In his speech, Puzanov calls the Ukrainian nation a great nation; he calls



the Russian nation a great nation, too. The Byelorussian nation is now being placed side by side with the Russian and Ukrainian nations. In unison with Puzanov, the Kazakhstan delegation calls the Ukrainian nation a "great brother". It even declares that the Ukrainian nation supplies the Kazak Republic and the Kazak nation with great brotherly cultural, scientific and technical help and with personnel. Thus Russia is already trying to lay a part of the blame for its aggressive-imperialistic actions on the Ukrainian nation and to make it partially responsible for the crimes committed by Russia with regard to the enslaved nations.

The only aim of the celebrations was somehow to convince the world and the nations enslaved by Russia that the fictitious existence of independent national states in the system of the U.S.S.R. is not a fiction. In order to deceive the nations of the U.S.S.R. by false Soviet friendship, Kyrychenko and Puzanov repeatedly emphasised in their speeches the fact that "the Ukrainian nation has already realised its immemorial dream and created a national Ukrainian Soviet state; it has also united all the Ukrainian lands." Undoubtedly, the celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the enslavement of Ukraine indicate a regular planned attack by Russia on the Ukrainian national-liberation revolution and the further annihilation of the Ukrainian nation. At the 19th Congress of the C.P./S.U., Malenkov had already declared: "Our party has kept and will keep as the apple of its eye the unity and friendship of the nations of the U.S.S.R.; it will strengthen the Soviet state composed of many nationalities..." The same was said at the jubilee sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and of the U.S.S.R.: "We shall continue to strengthen the sacred friendship of the Soviet nations—the basis of force and power of our great motherland. However hard the bitterest enemies of our nation—the imperialists and their agents, Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists—may try to sow distrust and hostility towards the great Russian nation, to undermine the firm union and the fraternal friendship of the nations of our country, the Ukrainian nation will not forsake its one right and proved path of long-established friendship with the great Russian nation and all the nations of the U.S.S.R." Nor did Kyrychenko forget to threaten the Western World: "We are far from understanding the strength of the enemy," says Kyrychenko in his speech, "but, as the proverb says 'He who was formerly at sea is not afraid of a puddle.' We are not afraid of any threats. The Soviet nation, the



splendid warriors of the Soviet army and navy, will be able to stand up for their honour, freedom and independence."

The Ukrainian revolutionary-liberation movement has created two especially dangerous fronts for Russia: one of them in domestic and the other in foreign policy. Thus the celebrations of the 300th anniversary aim at the neutralisation of the struggle for independence and the undermining of the liberation movements not only of the Ukrainian and also of other nations enslaved by Russia, in addition to strengthening the internal political front among the non-Russian nations of the U.S.S.R.

Naturally after the celebrations of the 300th anniversary the Central Committee of the C.P./S.U. and the Soviet government will pursue to the utmost their policy of exterminating nationalists who head the liberation-revolutionary movements in the U.S.S.R., camouflaging the maniacal great-power chauvinism of Russia and restoring it to the tzarist great-power pattern, by a show of furthering Soviet-Russian great-power internationalism and the "friendship" of nations under the hegemony of the "elder brother"—the Russian nation.

As a result of its 'unhappy' experience of permitting Ukrainians some cultural freedom in the 1920's, Russia in general now keeps to a permanent line of Russification, concealing this with propaganda about the creation of a united Soviet nation, the building-up of socialism, and the transition from socialism to Utopian communism.

---

As an example of the many Ukrainian protests against the Soviet propaganda campaign concerning the Pereyaslav Treaty, and the illusory Russian 'friendship' for Ukraine, we print, under EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT, an abridged version of the Declaration issued by the New York Branch of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of the U.S.A. This Committee co-ordinates all Ukrainian organisations in the U.S.A.

---



*Count Andreas Sheptytsky: Metropolitan of Halych,  
Archbishop of Lviv*



*Lviv: St. George's Cathedral  
seat of the Archbishop of Lviv*

*Paul Scott-Montagu*

## **ANDREAS SHEPTYTSKY**

### **Christian & Patriot**

1865—1944

Count Andreas Roman Sheptytsky was Metropolitan for 43 years from 1901-1944. He was born of a noble, polonised Ukrainian family, but decided when a young man to devote himself to God and to the Ukrainian people. He entered the monastic order of St. Basil and was ordained priest in 1892. In 1899 he became Bishop of Stanyslaviv, and a year later Metropolitan of Halych and Archbishop of Lviv. He had gained his Doctorate both in Law and Divinity, and was well-known as a benefactor of students and of the Ukrainian arts.

In Stanyslaviv and Lviv, the Metropolitan founded theological seminaries; in Lviv, the Ukrainian Catholic Theological Academy in 1926, the Ukrainian Museum, a hospital and several orphanages.

Andreas Sheptytsky was a member of the Upper House in Vienna, and was elected Vice-Speaker of the Galician Provincial Parliament in Austro-Hungary. After the occupation of Western Ukraine by Russian troops in 1914, he was deported to Russia where he lived in exile until 1917.

During the Polish occupation of Western Ukraine (1919-1939), the Metropolitan protested against the campaign against Greek-Orthodox Ukrainians in the Kholm region. Undaunted by physical disability—the paralysis of his legs—he gave a steadfast lead to all Ukrainian Catholics in the first Bolshevik occupation, 1939-1941, and in spite of his age continued to exhort his people to preserve their faith during the second Russian occupation. After his death on November 1, 1944, the Russian Communists commenced a bitter attack on the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and a ruthless persecution followed.

The Ukrainian Nation has given to the world many great and noble leaders but few have surpassed in true grandeur of character, intellectual eminence, courage, both moral as well as physical, and purity of spirit, that great patriot and father-in-God, Andreas Sheptytsky, Metropolitan of Halych, Archbishop of Lviv, and friend and confidant of Saint Pius X, the tenth anniversary of whose death will be solemnly commemorated by all loyal sons of Ukraine on



November 1 of this year. November 1, the Feast of All Saints, is truly a fitting day to remember one who is assuredly among the great company of the Blessed and who doubtless in God's good time will be officially recognised by the Church as one of her greatest Saints.


Providence had been generous with the gifts it had bestowed upon Metropolitan Sheptytsky for he possessed to an unusual degree all those grave qualities that go to make a born leader of men and nations. Of aristocratic lineage, he had yet a deep understanding of the sufferings and aspirations of the people of all classes, and his warm and paternal sympathies were extended equally to all, no matter what their social status or even religious views happened to be. All men to him were the children of God, and he himself was a Shepherd of Christ's Flock. A Catholic priest of the Eastern Rite, he became perhaps the most famous and respected prelate of that Rite in the whole Catholic Church; he laboured during the greater part of his long life of nearly fourscore years, for the unity of the Christian Church under the Apostolic See, and the freedom and liberty of the Ukrainian people.

The healing of the schism between the Orthodox and Catholic Christians was a cause dear to the heart of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, and the Orthodox found in him a true and sincere friend who was as ready to defend them in days of trial and persecution as he was to protect the members of his own flock. But the Metropolitan was not only a great churchman, he was also a great and courageous patriot. He possessed the highest qualities of statesmanship—prudence, vision, and wisdom—and had he followed a secular career he could not have failed to become one of the wisest and most constructive political leaders in the history of a race that has produced many of Europe's greatest champions of liberty. We Western Europeans—I write as a Briton—know too little of the story of Ukraine, and of what we owe to her as a bastion of Western culture and civilisation. Mgr. Sheptytsky laboured to raise Ukrainian culture to the noble position it had held in the world before neighbours, more powerful and numerically superior, though less civilised, attempted to destroy the very soul of this noble and cultured people. He founded new centres of learning and went on tour in Europe in 1921, explaining his ideas to the Catholics and peoples of the West. His influence extended beyond Europe as far West as Canada and the United States of America. Small wonder it is that both the Russian

tzar as well as the Red dictators of the Soviet Union feared the power and influence of this great and gifted priest and patriot, and attempted by imprisonment and persecution to deter him from fulfilling his mission. Mgr. Sheptytsky, however, was made of the stuff that heroes and martyrs are made of, he was a zealous servant of truth, and neither crowned Romanov nor Red boss could shake his resolute courage in the pursuit of justice and right. His people, a great people with a glorious past, were enslaved by ruthless powerful—but certainly not greater—neighbours, and therefore his life was dedicated to the sacred cause of freeing the Ukrainian Nation from its bonds, so that once again it could take its rightful place in the civilised family of nations, to which by its history and culture it is entitled. It must be readily agreed that the same sturdy race that saved Western Europe from the Golden Horde of Chingis-Khan and Batu, have saved themselves from racial extinction. It is great patriotic leaders like Andreas Sheptytsky who have kept alive and nourished the hopes and aspirations of this valiant and chivalrous people, who in spite of bitter and fierce persecution, combined with subtle and insidious propaganda, have resolutely refused to sink their national identity and become absorbed by an alien race.

Great Ukrainian patriots are living to-day who, inspired by the example of such leaders as Sheptytsky, are as determined and devoted as ever to dedicate, and if need be give their lives, so that Ukraine, the Great Kyiv-Rus of old, may rise again and occupy her rightful place in the community of free nations.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky passed from this life ten years ago, but his spirit and influence remain like a star in the heaven to guide and inspire his people, a visible Moses leading his nation out of the darkness of bondage and subjugation into the light of freedom and liberty.



J. F. Stewart

## **To understand Russia**

WITH A LIST OF RUSSIAN CONQUESTS AND  
AGGRESSIONS SINCE 1436

### **I. The Russian aim at world conquest**

It is a profound mistake to imagine that the Muscovite aim at world conquest is a Bolshevik ideal; it has been a Muscovite aim for the past 800 years, and the methods used many centuries ago were exactly the same as those we have seen used by Moscow in our own time. Russia, or to keep to her real and original name, Muscovy, has been an aggressive and a predatory nation since the dawn of her history.

She has used either one of two methods in her pursuit of conquest, or a combination of both. The first was to make the excuse that it was necessary "to protect the security of our frontiers". The small neighbouring state was then accused of hostility to, and of plotting against, Moscow. The second was to infiltrate fifth columnists to cause unrest and fear, until Muscovy could "kindly step in to restore order"—and stay there.

What has impelled Moscow towards conquest of the world? Some 800 years ago savage hordes from the Far East—Mongols, and Tartars—began the invasion of Europe, attacking in the north through the then comparatively insignificant Dukedom of Muscovy, and in the south by way of Ukraine. The Ukrainians, even at that time a strong, Christian, cultured people with fine traditions of freedom and justice, resisted, halted the invasion, and thus saved Europe. The Muscovites, more wily than the Ukrainians—as they still are today—bowed the knee to the invaders and, especially their ruling classes, intermarried with them, the mixture of Muscovite and Mongolian blood inheriting the Mongol plan of world conquest. But to the older methods there has succeeded a more recent plan, which was used after 1939 in Poland, namely to set up in the

country of the intended victim a small selected party of local Communists, to call this the "Government", and compel it to invite Russian support in ousting the genuine government and then to obey Moscow, thus extending Russian territory.

At the end of this article is a list of Russian annexations since 1436. There were others before that date, notably the unprovoked attack made by the Muscovite prince, Andriy Boholyubsky, on Ukraine in the twelfth century, when he completely destroyed the capital town of Kyiv (Kiev), with its magnificent architecture and other treasures. But the appended list will give some idea of Russian tradition and policy—the object has remained the same and tactics only have changed to suit altered conditions.

It must be emphasised that all the nations conquered by Muscovy were much higher in the scale of civilisation than their conquerors; they had settled governments of their own, for instance, the Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians and others enjoying a freedom and prosperity that the Russians have not yet known.

Unfortunately, the West has throughout been fed with what has passed for Russian history, but which was in truth only Russian propaganda; and today this Russian propaganda is merely more efficient than formerly, and easily deceives those ready to be deceived. Of the last 200 years, Russia has devoted 128 to wars of aggression and only four and a half to wars of defence. And yet Sir Winston Churchill could say, at his recent Washington Press Conference, that Russia merited the sympathy of the world for the brutal attacks made on her over many years and the terrible suffering of her people. If Russia had suffered from wars, they were wars of her own making.

## **II. The myth of peaceful co-existence**

My own interest in matters associated with Russia began early in the 1930's, when I was commissioned by an important London corporation to inspect and to report on huge areas of Soviet Russia by arrangement with her government. I travelled great distances, far removed from the tracks of the tourist and the visitor. I lived for months at a time among peasants as one of themselves and occasionally among Communist "workers", whom I did not like. I thus obtained a knowledge of, and an insight into, actual Russian life and conditions which, probably, few foreigners have been able to gain.



Later, through the inter-war years, my work took me for considerable periods to Finland, the Baltic States and Poland. I spent a particularly long time in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, when I came to know people of all classes from Prime Ministers to the man in the street. Thus I was able to absorb the knowledge that these people had about Russia—a knowledge that was in their blood, inherited from generations of ancestors who had known and felt Russian oppression for centuries. I was also able to compare the immensely higher standard of living in every aspect with that of the ordinary Russian—freedom of the individual, freedom of religion, of speech, of assembly, of the press, the plentiful and cheap food, the prosperity, the higher education and cultural standards—in fact, in those small, peaceful and happy states there was civilisation at its best, while in Russia civilisation—if one can call it so—was at its lowest.

Bearing such facts in mind, I would like here to comment on the question of “peaceful co-existence” which is so much on the lips of all political parties at the moment, and to quote some of the highest Russian authorities on Russian affairs who have dealt with this subject.

Prince Adam Czartoryski, who lived from 1779 to 1861, was a member of the Imperial Court. He was a friend of the Tzar, a confidant of the Grand Duke and also a Russian Ambassador. His Memoirs, from which the following is taken, were published in 1888.

“... the instinct of conquest, they (the Russians) employed artifice and violence by turns, and succeeded with rare ability in augmenting their territory at the expense of their neighbours.

“All the objects which Russia pursues, amounting to nothing less than the subjugation of the greater part of Europe and Asia, . . .” “Russia has gone near to the attainment of her object without Europe having succeeded in stopping her. Peter’s ambition (world conquest) still lies at the bottom of every Russian heart.”

And now there is a later authority, the redoubtable Molotov. In June 1940, at a meeting between himself and the then Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Molotov declared:

“You must finally confront reality and understand that hereafter all the small states will have to disappear. Your Lithuania, as well as the other Baltic states, and not excluding Finland, will have to be incorporated into the glorious family of Soviet Republics. Consequently, from now on, you should prepare the Lithuanians for the introduction of a system which will, in future, whether sooner or later, prevail everywhere in Europe.

"Today we are more than ever convinced that Lenin, our comrade gifted with genius, did not err in saying that the next World War would help us to establish ourselves everywhere in Europe, just as the First World War helped us to establish ourselves in Russia. Now we are assisting Germany, but only in order that this State may not collapse before the popular masses of the belligerents, exhausted by the war, rebel against their governments. Then the German bourgeoisie will immediately become reconciled with their former enemies, the Allied bourgeoisie, in order by a common effort to crush the rebellious proletariat. At that moment we shall come to the latter's rescue by sending well-trained and fresh forces, and I think that on the plains of Western Germany, possibly not far from the Rhine, the last battle will take place between the rotten bourgeoisie and the proletariat. That battle will decide the fate of Europe, and we hope that battle will bring us victory."

About the same time a lecture was given in Moscow to a selected audience of high Soviet officials by Malenkov, the hope, at the time of Stalin's death, of those Westerners who were unaware that Malenkov was Stalin's *alter ego*, and who were ignorant of Russia's age-long march to world conquest.

"The Baltic nations had already been conquered with the establishment of Soviet bases on their territories in consequence of the Mutual Assistance Pact concluded in October 1939. However, the Soviet Union cannot afford to put itself on record as an open aggressor for the purpose of territorial aggrandisement, although it is in its very nature to expand in power and territory."

That is a plain enough intimation of Russian and of Malenkov's intention.

Here is a still later authority, and one of the highest. Maxim Litvinov was possibly the Russian best known to the West in his years as Soviet Foreign Minister, possibly also the most respected.

He died not long ago, and shortly before his death, he gave an interview to a Special Representative of the *Washington Post*. The United States' Government would not allow it to be published until after Litvinov's death, as it would have meant his execution. In the course of answers to questions, he said:

"If concessions were made to the Russians, and they were given all they asked for, it would not mean peace, but would be followed by other demands."

"It would make no difference if war were averted long enough for the younger generation to take over and change conditions, for the younger generation has been educated in the ideas of the old."

"It is not possible for the East and West to live peaceably side by

side, for the Russian concept is that the more territory you have the safer you are, and that means continual aggrandisement."

Litvinov added:

"It always amazes me when I read reports of foreign correspondents saying that the Russian people say this, the Russian people say that. What Russian people? Whom do they see? No one."

He concluded that "we Russians are not to be trusted".

The greatest single success the Russians had in territorial gain and added power for world conquest was, probably, the subjugation of Ukraine. By the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement for mutual assistance in military matters. Moscow interpreted this as a Treaty of Union, the thing furthest from the mind of any Ukrainian either at that time or this. It gave Moscow an excuse for getting a footing in Ukraine, which it quickly enlarged to wholesale occupation. Ukraine then began the fight to regain her freedom which has lasted till today, when it is still going on, and will not cease until the Muscovites are driven out.

### III. Defence or attack in the West?

Here I would like to explain the position of The Scottish League for European Freedom. This organisation was formed in 1943 to continue the work begun and carried on without interruption from August 1939 by one or two friends and myself. I had, on the signing of the Russo-German Pact on August 23, 1939, sensed Russia's aims and knew that the Baltic States and Finland would be the first objectives. We supported Finland when that model country was attacked by Russia, and also the Baltic States when they were forced to agree to "Mutual Assistance Pacts" with Moscow. We knew that it was another move in Russia's world schemes, and we did our utmost to influence public opinion to realise that the conquest of Finland and of the Baltic States would convert the Baltic Sea into a Russian lake. Formerly it was open to the world and controlled by a number of small states whose interest it was to keep it open and who could not have closed it if they had wished to do so. Now, we insisted, Russia could close it when she so decided, and meantime could secretly fortify huge military, naval and air bases in the eastern Baltic lands, from which she could deliver an annihilating attack on this country almost in a matter of minutes. This country could then become a base for attack across the Atlantic. But it was all in vain. The West agreed to hand over the most strategically valuable



part of Finland, the three Baltic states, and the German coast as far as, and including, the great port of Koenigsberg. And then Russian additions to her territory proceeded at an unprecedented rate and she is now, an atheist and destructive power, in the heart of Europe, the cradle of Christian civilisation.

After many years, however, similar views began to emerge in many countries, if not in Britain, and we are now able to collaborate with friends in the U.S.A., Canada, the South American Republics, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Formosa, South Korea, Germany, Spain, Holland, Italy and Greece.

The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (A.B.N.), with headquarters in Munich, is, so far as we know, the only organisation other than our own which works for *all* the subjugated peoples and not merely for one. It was mainly by the efforts of its President, Mr. Yaroslav Stetzko that the collaboration of the subjugated nations was achieved, and I do not know of anyone better qualified to lead it. The name "A.B.N." unfortunately includes the word "anti-", which is misleading, since the organisation has a definitely constructive programme. There are, of course, differences within all the various nations, there are different political parties, but we may ignore all of these distinctions and work together for only one object, the restoration of freedom and independence to *all* the nations under Russian domination with the consequent disintegration of the U.S.S.R. or any other kind of Russian Empire. There is ample space and there are abundant resources in Russia proper to accommodate all the true Russians, and no one will wish to interfere with them.

Meantime, we in Britain are suffering under a crushing burden of taxation to meet a huge sum for the provision of an inefficient defence against any future attack. There is no nation in the world from whom any other nation might expect an attack but Russia, yet our politicians are afraid to mention the name in public for fear of annoying Moscow. But they may gain courage from the remarks made a short time ago by Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, when he stated plainly that Russia was the expected attacker. The Archbishop of York has also made a courageous address on this vital point.

In addition to the direct financial burden carried by us, the whole economy of Britain is being disrupted, our boys are taken from schools to spent two years in the army at the very time when they



should be preparing themselves for earning a living and adding to the future prosperity of their country. They cannot be expected to come back with the high ideals and intentions with which they went away, and in fact they do not. The Russian danger, from which we try to hide our heads, is already doing its destructive work among us.

When Russia attacked Finland in 1939 Mr. Churchill, as he then was, stated that "Communism destroyed the soul of a nation". In his recent Press Conference in Washington he stated that "if I had been supported in 1919 Communism would have been strangled at its birth". So that his opinion of Communism would not appear to have changed. Why, then, does he play into the hands of Tito, a Communist, and attempt to fraternise with Communist China?

The truth is that, in 1919, the British Government under Lloyd George—in which Mr. Churchill was Secretary of State for War, and was, no doubt, the dominant figure—knocked away deliberately that prop on which depended the future safety of mankind. On the disintegration of the Russian Empire at the time of the Revolution of 1917, Ukraine, like other non-Russian peoples in the former Empire, established its own democratic government—in January 1918. It was recognised by Britain and by some of her Allies, and was promised help by Britain in maintaining the democracy. But when Lenin was settled in the saddle in Moscow he sent the reorganised Russian Army to attack the young Republic. It would have been beaten off, but Britain sent substantial help in military equipment and money to help the White Russians who were fighting under Denikin. The help was sent ostensibly to fight the Bolsheviks, but in effect it was used to invade and attack Ukraine. At the same time a large Polish army was trained and equipped in France and, under General Haller, sent to Ukraine. Instead of fighting Bolshevism, Haller diverted his forces against the Ukrainian national army. Not to lose the chance of booty, Rumania also joined in, but only for a limited objective and not in appreciable force. And so the young state, meanly equipped, was fighting on four fronts against armies far superior in number, supplied with the most modern weapons and with unlimited financial resources behind them. Naturally, in the end, the Ukrainian state succumbed, not to the White Russians, whose soldiers deserted in thousands to the Reds, but to the Bolsheviks, and thus Britain helped to place Bolshevism firmly in power in Moscow, with all its tragic consequences. For the

Reds quickly broke up the opposing forces and drove them back whence they came. Had Britain adhered to her promise, had she merely ceased to assist Denikin and Haller, Ukraine, Georgia, and the other re-established republics would have stood firm, Communism would have withered, and it is unlikely there would have been World War II.

This Communism is now "rotting the souls" of the Baltic peoples, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and all the other Russian conquests, by capturing the children—the babies, even—and debasing them with hideous Communist propaganda, they—the coming generations. I am always told by representatives of subjugated nations: "Oh, that cannot happen in my country." I do not believe it. The frightful and unbroken pressure of Communism from babyhood can only lead to one result. The older people who transmit national traditions are dying out, and the young know nothing but what is poured into them all day and every day. In spite of Sir Winston Churchill's optimism, time is on the side of Moscow and not on that of the West. His repeated invitation to Malenkov, his Berlin and Geneva Conferences and the like, play precisely the Russian game which is to gain time to build up strength for the final attack.

And, meantime, Russia fights by deputy her peripheral wars in Korea and in Indo-China. As she condescends to end one of these, she has already another in readiness. The Kremlin knows very well how easily it can deceive the West, and blatantly trades on this insight.

In 1919 Britain had an opportunity to ally not only Ukraine with herself, but many millions of non-Russians enslaved by Russia; she spurned the opportunity, or by this time she would have been a world power at least as great as the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. The same opportunity occurred in 1944, when Germany attacked Russia, and the Ukrainians again set up their independent democratic government. This time it only lasted some weeks, being destroyed first by Germany and then by the Russians who, when they returned, exacted a fearful reprisal on the Ukrainians. They were at this time supported by Britain.

The opportunity now presents itself to the West to have on their side some 200 millions of enslaved people. There are resistance movements in all the enslaved countries, and by far the strongest—due to the size of the population if for no other reason—is in Uk-

raine. But such movements exist in all these nations, and their representatives are collaborating in the A.B.N.

The answer which is always given to any suggestion such as this is that it would mean war with Russia and thus a world war. I do not think this follows necessarily, for about half of the Red Army consists of non-Russians who, if they knew that the independence of their countries was guaranteed, would not fight for Moscow, but would find their way back to their own homelands to fight there. And I would warn America that these non-Russian people would not welcome "liberation" if it means dropping hydrogen bombs on their own lands.

Some Western politicians may delude themselves by the false hope of achieving a "peaceful co-existence" with Russia; but to think they can alter Russian instincts and the age-long Russian policy is an idle dream. The conscience of the West cannot be placated by the exhumation of the Atlantic Charter, and I fear none of the enslaved nations will place much faith in that. It was originally given to the world with a great flourish of trumpets: there was to be no transfer of territory without the consent of its people, and so on, and Russia actually supported this agreement. Very soon afterwards, however, Mr. Churchill was strongly supporting radical territorial changes in Central Europe, involving the handing over of many millions of Europeans to execution, slavery, torture or deportation by Russia. In no single case were the wishes of the peoples consulted.

It was the West that brought an Asiatic power into Europe, and it is the business of the West to release the countless millions they have helped to enslave. We have no lack of knowledge about conditions inside the Iron Curtain: and while in all non-Russian countries there are resistance movements, there is not a sign of one in Russia proper. The U.S.A. is making a grave error in supporting the so-called American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism which is definitely pro-Russian—favouring the preservation of Russian domination over the subject nations—and which would merely help White Russian leaders to abolish the name of U.S.S.R. and step into the Bolshevik shoes under a new label. The non-Russian people are determined never to accept another Russian tyranny, and such an event would mean perpetual internal war and the annihilation of entire peoples.



The Scottish League for European Freedom is not markedly pro-Ukrainian, but it strongly holds that it should be repeatedly emphasised that Ukraine must be freed, after which all the other nations would gain their freedom. Ukraine is the key, and this was recognised by Lenin who saw that his plan for world conquest could not succeed unless Moscow controlled Ukraine. Lenin told the General leading the invading Red Army in the attack upon Ukraine in 1918 that Moscow needed Ukraine's manpower, rich food-growing soil, great oil and mineral resources, as well as the Black Sea coast with access to the Mediterranean for further conquests. He gave the General permission to promise the Ukrainians anything he liked—for Russia would take it all back again once she was in control.

With Ukrainian resources at her disposal, even with all the other subjugated countries "free", Russian dreams of world conquest would quickly revive and could be turned into realities. With Ukraine free and independent, Russia could menace no one.

## APPENDIX

### RUSSIAN ANNEXATIONS AND AGGRESSIONS

- 1436 Solovetsky Islands annexed
- 1463 Yaroslavl annexed
- 1487 Greater Novgorod annexed
- 1510 Pskov annexed
- 1553-4 Many annexations, including Kazan
- 1556 Conquest of Astrakhan
- 1558 Subjection of Byelorussia, conquest of Smolensk
- 1582 Beginning of the conquest of Siberia
- 1617 Partition of Karelia by Russia and Sweden
- 1628 Lena annexed
- 1670 Partition of Ukraine by Russia and Poland
- 1689 Advance to Kamchatka
- 1690 Conquest of Azov
- 1700 Conquest of the territory adjoining Azov
- 1705 Ingermannland taken from Sweden
- 1721 Annexation of Estonia, and Latvia
- " of Oesel
- " of West Karelia with Viborg
- 1714 Annexation of Alaska and Canadian ports
- 1725 Annexation of the western coasts of the Caspian Sea with Baku
- 1745 Annexation of other parts of Finland



- 
- 1750 Annexation of the Aral region  
1772 First Partition of Poland  
Occupation of Byelorussia  
1774 Annexation of the Black Sea from the Don to the Bug  
1775 Suppression of the Cossacks  
1783 Annexation of the Crimea  
1793 Second Partition of Poland  
1795 Third Partition of Poland  
Occupation of Ukrainian territory  
Further occupation of Byelorussia and Courland  
1801 Annexation of Georgia  
1809 Occupation of the rest of Finland  
Occupation of the Aaland Islands  
1812 Annexation of Bessarabia  
1815 Incorporation of Poland  
1828 Erivan and other territories taken from Persia  
1829 Annexation of the Danube Delta and the coast of Caucasia  
1858 Annexation of Amur region  
1860 Annexation of Ussuri region  
1863 Attack on the Tartar Khans and seizure of Chimkent  
1864 Final annexation of Caucasia  
1868 Advance to Turkestan  
Conquest of Samarkand  
Conquest of Bokhara  
1875 Occupation of Chiva-Turkistan  
Occupation of Sakhalin  
1876 Occupation of Khokand  
1878 Annexation of Southern Bessarabia, Batum, Kars and Ardshan  
1881 Subjugation of Turkmenia  
1898 Occupation of Port Arthur and Dairen  
1900 Occupation of Manchuria  
1939 Occupation of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia  
Attack on Finland  
1940 Occupation of other parts of Finland  
1944 Renewed occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania  
Occupation of Western Ukraine  
Occupation of Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary  
1945 Further occupation of Lithuania and Poland  
Annexation of remaining territory in Ukraine  
Foundation of "People's Republics" in Czechoslovakia and Albania  
Yugoslavia, under Russia  
Occupation of East Germany

*Niko Nakashidze*

## **Enslaved Nations' Right to Independence**

### **The non-Russian Nations of the Soviet Union and their status in international law**

The attitude of statesmen of the West towards the problem of the nationhood of those non-Russian nations now included within the Soviet Union is undecided and ambiguous. They hesitate to acknowledge and to proclaim the right of these nations to regain their independent status in the same way as they recognised this right for the Baltic States. And so the solution of the problem is left for the future, for some chance happening, or for changed conditions, to decide.

There are some Western politicians who even go so far as to suggest that the whole problem of these nations is an internal political concern of Russia, and that, as such, it can only be solved with the approval of Russia. For the time being the West contents itself with proclaiming the right of nations to self-determination only in general terms.

What exactly is the status of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union from the point of view of constitutional and international law?

#### **I. Historic Facts**

First it is necessary to recognise certain historical facts. The old Tzarist empire was created with the aid of conquests of foreign countries, and by the subjugation of other nations, many of which are in no way related to the Russians, either by origin, history, language or culture. Particularly it should be noted that all these

non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union had their own states existing for several centuries before either the Russian nation, or the Russian state was formed.

The nations which were compelled to become part of the Tzarist empire—the Finns, the Baltic nations, the Caucasian nations, the Ukrainians, the people of Turkestan, and also the Poles at that time—were conquered by force; after the collapse of the Tzarist empire in 1917 they detached themselves from Russia and once more set up their own states, namely as democratic republics. The process known in international law as the “rehabilitation of the international person” (Jellinek) was thus effected, and these states were recognised by other states which already existed, and have thus become subject to international law.

In none of these states was Bolshevism able to gain ground. Bolshevism has only been successful in Russia, where its supporter and the champion of the Bolshevik revolution was the Russian nation.

At various times the non-Russian countries of the present Soviet Union were overpowered by Russia's military supremacy (in those days the R.S.F.S.R., (the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) and robbed of their independence. Some of these states, as for instance Georgia, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, were recognised *de jure* by Russia.

Forcible seizure cannot be recognised as a state of law, and this principle has been accepted by every state in the civilised world with regard to international law.

## **II. The position in respect of international law**

1. The non-Russian member-states of the Soviet Union have been forcibly occupied by a foreign state, namely Russia (R.S.F.S.R.).
2. From the point of view of international law these states are in the same position as were Holland, Norway, Belgium, etc. during the German occupation, and as are at present Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states under Soviet Russian rule, that is to say completely in Russia's vassalage.
3. The problem of all the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union is thus an international one.

4. The state of these nations had already been recognised and it is therefore not necessary to declare officially once more that they have been recognised.

The question at issue is the liberation of these countries from foreign, that is to say Russian occupation and from compulsory membership of the Soviet Union.

5. Even at the present time non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union are formally and legally sovereign states. Even though this state of law is only feigned for the sake of appearances, these states are nevertheless legally defined as such in the constitution (Paragraphs 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 18a, 18b of the Constitution of the Soviet Union).

6. This legal fact has been corroborated in accordance with international law by the states of the free world, inasmuch as they have admitted Ukraine and Byelorussia to the U.N.O. as members enjoying the same rights as all the other members of this organisation.

7. By reason of this conclusive action all the other non-Russian states of the Soviet Union have also been recognised as such, for they have been forced to become part of the Soviet Union under the same circumstances and are members of the Soviet Union with the same rights and under the same conditions as Ukraine and Byelorussia.

8. The subsequent occupation of other countries by Russia since 1939 has not been recognised by the states of the free world; their liberation from foreign occupation and vassalage and the restoration of their state sovereignty and independence has been proclaimed and demanded by all the states of the free world.

9. Legally and ethically it is nonsense to take 1939 as the year by which to establish the right to restore the independent state.

The claim and the right to freedom of a nation which has been forcibly subjugated and to the restoration of its sovereign state cannot lapse with any one year. The date on which the country in question was occupied is of no importance. If it were, this would be contrary to all ethical, legal and democratic principles.

10. After its collapse or disintegration the Soviet Union will cease to exist as such, and the various member-states will therefore no longer be part of the Union. In any case, they could not continue to be members of a Union which no longer exists.



11. From such time onwards they are independent states.

12. There are no legal objections to this legal fact being corroborated according to the principles of international law. Moreover, this would not be an act of hostility towards Russia, for, according to Paragraph 17 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union, each member-state has a right to leave the Union voluntarily.

13. In keeping with the acknowledged ethical, legal and democratic principles of the civilised world, the right of the non-Russian countries of the Soviet Union to the restoration of their independent states must be recognised without prejudice like the rights of the Baltic and other countries, and must now be proclaimed.

In order to ensure that the Russian empire shall continue to exist, Russia is endeavouring to extirpate these subjugated nations by every possible means and is seeking to reduce the nations to a lower level by re-settling their peoples in far-off districts of Siberia.

If the free world disregards all these facts and sacrifices all the ethical and legal principles which form the basis of civilisation; if, in the erroneous belief that it can ensure the "peaceful co-existence" of the two worlds by making light of the fate of millions of people and of the subjugated nations, it allows itself to be guided by "*sacro egoismo*" and recognises Russia's right of possession over the nations as a vested right then it will bring about its own downfall and will be doomed to destruction.

---

\* \* \*

A new institution of Ukrainian scholarship—the Association for Research into Soviet Theory and Practice in National Problems—has been founded in Munich. There is a provisional presidium of three: Professor Yuriy Boyko, President; Professor V. Oreletsky, Hon. Secretary; and Professor Savytsky, Hon. Treasurer.

The object of this new Association is to organise and co-ordinate the work of all Ukrainian scholars investigating problems of nationalities in the former, as well as the present, Russian empire. The Association is organised by that group of Ukrainian scholars who refused to co-operate with the Institute for Research into the History and Culture of the U.S.S.R., an organisation which is dominated by Russian emigres and sponsored by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism. The organisers wish to offer scholars the opportunity to conduct independent research. The first press conference of the Association was held on August 20, 1954.

# EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT

*D. Donzov*

## "AFTER US THE DELUGE"!

### (The reason why negotiations with Moscow are futile)

A plain and concise answer to this question was given by Mr. John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, when the Berlin Conference ended. He said in effect that it was the main aim of the Russians never to cede territory when once they had established their regime there, and it was in accordance with this principle that they were treating the question of a peace treaty with Germany. At every conference which may be held in the future the Western Powers will encounter the same attitude on the part of Russia.

The history of the twentieth and also of the nineteenth centuries shows plainly enough that whenever Russia has agreed at a congress or conference to cede some of the territory she has annexed, it has only been because she had either been defeated in the war in question or had been threatened by a superior military power. There have been no exceptions to this rule!

It was only Germany's ultimatum at the peace conference in Brest-Litovsk in 1918 that forced Lenin and Trotzky to relinquish their "rights" to the Baltic countries, Poland, and Ukraine. It was only the fact that Poland, Finland, and Ukraine reclaimed their national rights in 1917 and were prepared to fight for their national aims with armed force, if necessary, that forced the Kerensky government to yield.

It was only the British convoys in the Sea of Marmara and the emphatic admonitions of the cabinet of St. James during the Turko-Russian War in 1878 that prompted Russia to surrender the Balkans territory she had annexed and to abandon her Dardanelles aims much against her will at the Berlin Congress.

It was only her defeat in the Crimean War in 1855 which forced Russia to renounce the "Danubian principalities" Moldavia and Walachia.

It was only the fact that Japan had been victorious that forced Russia—at the peace conference in Portsmouth—to withdraw from Korea and Manchuria.

There never have been nor will there ever be any other methods by which to force the Russian international robbers to return the property they have stolen.

Such is the true state of affairs, and now that they have become obvious as a result of history and of events since 1940, it would be interesting to have an answer to the following questions from the people in whose hands lies the fate of the Western World:

1) If the above-mentioned facts were known to the Western negotiators at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, why did they throw open the gates to the heart of Europe and Asia to Russia?

2) If, however, these facts have only been realised now, at so late a date, how do the Western countries propose to force Russia to retreat once more behind the Vistula and Dniro?

3) If the West, however, aims to reach an agreement with Russia by which she is allowed to retain all the territory she has annexed, is this not to overlook the fact that an all-powerful Russia would automatically destroy the Europe of the next generation? Would this not be a cause of "after us the deluge"?

It is the duty of the leaders of the Western world to give their nations a clear and concise answer to these questions.

---

## **UNITED UKRAINIAN AMERICAN ORGANISATIONS COMMITTEE OF NEW YORK BRANCH OF THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA**

### **DECLARATION**

#### **of Ukrainian Americans in New York City and Environs on the Pereyaslav Treaty and the 300 Years Struggle of the Ukrainian People against Moscow Imperialism and the Enslavement of Ukraine**

Red Moscow, continuing the imperialistic aggrandising policies of the Tzars in the seizure of other lands and the enslavement and exploitation of other peoples, called for a large scale celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty. It has used this occasion as a propaganda weapon by presenting the Treaty in a false light, maintaining that 300 years ago the Ukrainian people cemented an indissoluble tie with Russia and forever united with the Muscovite people in a single Russian state.

The Ukrainian people, enslaved but indestructible, are not able to express what they know to be historical truth while they remain under the Bolshevik yoke. Therefore, we Ukrainian Americans, some having come to the free land of George Washington many decades ago, others having been born in this country of Ukrainian parents, and still others having arrived here only recently, hereby declare;

1. It is not true that the Ukrainian people united with the Muscovite people in one Russian state through the Pereyaslav Treaty, and in so doing forfeited their independence and statehood, because

a. the Pereyaslav Treaty was nothing more than a military defence pact

concluded between the independent Ukrainian nation and the Moscow Tzar as equals, which was to provide for reciprocal military aid. The Moscow Tzar specifically obliged himself, in return for a large monetary compensation, to aid Ukraine in its war with its western enemy, Poland.

b. the Pereyaslav Treaty in no way affected the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state, and least of all provided for its liquidation. The Ukrainian people after the conclusion of the Treaty remained the sovereign people they had been. Ukraine, after the Treaty, remained separate from Russia and continued to be a free and independent nation with its own ruler—a Hetman, its own government, courts, army, financial system, its own foreign policy, and finally its own separate religious and cultural life. Ukraine and Muscovy continued to abide within their own national borders.

2. the truth is that Moscow did not honour the Pereyaslav Treaty. Through deception and force she broke the Treaty to the detriment of the Ukrainian people and brought them into enslavement.

Moscow falsified the text of the Treaty and her army entered Ukraine ostensibly to help the Ukrainians gain key positions in the war with Poland. In open contradistinction to the pact Moscow in 1656 made an agreement with Poland in Vilna, in 1667 in Andrusov, and in 1662 made final the so-called "eternal peace". After a series of other breaches in the 17th century, the 18th century saw Tzarina Catherine II in 1764 finally negating the agreement of 1654.

It is also true that the Ukrainian people never agreed and will never agree to any kind of common life with the Muscovites in the framework of a single State, regardless of whether this were a Tzarist state, or a part of the present Soviet Union. Such a union would only mean complete suppression of Ukraine with all its material and cultural treasures. It would mean prisons, hangmen, deportation, executions, murders, and mass extermination of the Ukrainian people.

After World War I, Ukraine renewed its independence and statehood. And when once again after long attempts during 1917-1920 Moscow was able to destroy the reborn Ukrainian state and to incorporate Ukraine into the Soviet Union, the struggle was resumed. And it will not cease. Today, the Ukrainian people carry on open warfare with Muscovite Bolshevik tyranny—the enemy of all mankind. It carries on its opposition under the leadership of the famous, heroic Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

Just as White Moscow was not able to break the spirit of the Ukrainian people, so today Red Moscow will not succeed. The Ukrainian people will continue their struggle against Moscow until their will is realised in a free community of nations, in a united, free and independent Ukrainian nation from the Carpathians to the Caucasus.

SO HELP US GOD



V. D.

## CENTENARY OF THE CRIMEAN WAR

One hundred years ago, the allied armies—British and French in support of Turkish—landed in the Crimea and gained a victory over the Russian army in a decisive battle on the river Alma, on September 20, 1854. This victory was not the turning-point in the history of Europe that it might have been, but at least the legend of the unconquerable military power of Russia vanished on that day. The western allies realised for the first time that Russia may not only be forced out of a certain territory by a series of diplomatic and strategic offensives—as on the Danube in the previous year—but openly defeated on the field of battle. The victory of September 20 marked the beginning of the famous Sevastopol campaign. The Russian empire had been preparing for that war for several centuries, but had not taken into account the possibility of waging a defensive, not an offensive, war. The issue was the final partition of the allegedly “sick” Turkish empire, which, thanks to twenty years of the policy of Nicholas I, was exposed to Russian aggression like fruit ready to fall. Relying on British neutrality, and the new French empire of Napoleon III being too busy internally to fight seriously abroad, Tzar Nicholas I decided to fulfil his earlier plan of seizing all the Balkan territory, and reducing Turkey to the status of a satellite. He also relied on the forced neutrality of Prussia and Austro-Hungary who, only just recovering from the social revolutions of the years 1848-49 with Russian military aid, were not likely to be able to interfere with aggressive action by Russia in the Near East. The Russian government officially proclaimed the future war against Turkey as the “Great Eastern War”, and dreamt of “erecting a cross on the church of St Sophia in Constantinople”.

In view of that undisguised attack of Russian imperialism, France and Great Britain managed to mobilise adequate forces, having won over to their cause not only Turkey, for whom resistance to Russian aggression was a matter of life and death, but the Kingdom of Piedmont (Sardinia) which had no concern with the developments in the Near East, but which was already at that time prepared for a decisive fight against Austria-Hungary and the creation of an all-Italian national state. The Russian colossus turned out, as previously, a colossus with clay legs. After forcing the Russian army back from the Danubian terrains, the western allies took the offensive and landed in the Crimea in the middle of September 1854. The battle on the river Alma proved the irrefutable superiority of the Franco-English military forces and compelled the Russians to adopt a strategy of defence based on the naval fortress, Sevastopol.

In what did the military superiority of the western powers consist? From the very beginning of the campaign, Russian historians tried to spread the opinion that the Russian army—which had been “unconquerable” since the time of Napoleon—was defeated only because it was backward in the technical respect. This is, generally, a false assertion. The Russian army was, in fact,

backward in comparison with the Anglo-French one, but this was not the decisive factor. The Russian navy—which utterly defeated the Turkish one in the great naval engagement of Sinop in the beginning of the war—had, in fact, no warships. There were warships in the Anglo-French navy, but they were still so primitive and ill armed that their presence only speeded up the transport of troops, but was not of decisive military importance. Likewise, the assertions that the English and French troops were already armed with what resembled modern rifles, while the Russian army still fired “smooth-bore” rifles—is not historically accurate: the Russian army also had those “spiral-bore” rifles—true, only a small number, 10 rifles for a “sotnia squadron”, i.e. only for expert riflemen (“snipers”, as they are called to-day). The history of European wars clearly proves the fact that better armament facilitates victory, but does not determine it. During the later Russo-Turkish war of the years 1877-1878 the Turkish army was also (thanks to Great Britain) better armed than the Russian; and during the Franco-Prussian war of the years 1870-1871 the French army even had mitrailleuses which were, by no means, a primitive prototype of the present machine-guns. Likewise, during the Russo-Japanese war of the years 1904-1905 the Russians had considerably better artillery than the Japanese because they had just received it from the French munition factories which were the best in Europe.

The great German writer on the history of the art of war, Hans Delbrück, attributes all the military defeats of the Russians during the Crimean war to the fact that the Anglo-French troops were able to manoeuvre and to re-form in the battle-field, while the Russian troops blindly obeyed staff orders given beforehand and were unable to take any initiative during the actual conflict. Formally, this is quite true; but history is more interested in the inner reasons for that incapability of the Russian army: why was it incapable of using its own initiative during the fight? Russian generals were not so foolish as to be unable to change the direction of the front-line on their own initiative and to carry on purely tactical operations; but all of them were oppressed by the question of *responsibility* which every Russian tries to avoid. In the famous battle on the river Alma the Russians had wonderful defensive positions; they also had superior forces and every prospect of “driving the allies into the sea”; but they were incapable of making good use of these advantages; they were even absurd enough to attack the Anglo-French batteries with dragoon and hussar squadrons. The battle on the river Alma was a striking victory of European civilisation over the Russian pseudo-European “training” which only outwardly imitated the technical achievements of European culture, but in fact remained the tool of the Russian uncivilised totalitarian state based on blind obedience. The battle on the river Alma destroyed the legend of the “invincibility” of the Russian army which was made up of many thousands of soldiers, and it actually compelled the Russians to forsake their dreams of a “victorious campaign” against Constantinople and to defend their own fortresses.

## BOOK REVIEWS

### THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY IN THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

Published by: The United Committee of the Ukrainian-American Organisations of New York. New York 1954. pp. 220. Jacket design by Yakiv Hnizdovsky.

This book is a collection of speeches, memoirs, articles and quotations dealing with the heroic Ukrainian Insurgent Army—the U.P.A. The book is a careful inquiry into the origin and the history of an unparalleled underground army which dared to combat both German Nazism and Russian Bolshevism at the same time during the last World War. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the U.P.A. continued a merciless struggle against the new Red Russian invader in Ukraine. It was only due to the combined military effort of Soviet Russia, Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1947 that the strength of the courageous Ukrainian boys and girls serving in the U.P.A. could be reduced and overcome. But the struggle for the liberation of Ukraine has not ceased up to this very day.

Most of the articles and stories included in this excellent publication have been written by outstanding soldiers of the U.P.A. who succeeded in fighting their way from Ukraine into the American Zones in Western Germany and Austria between 1947 and 1950.

Besides the Ukrainian soldiers of the U.P.A. eminent Americans—Professor Lev E. Dobriansky, chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Congressman Michael A. Feighan, Senator Th. F. Green, and Senator I. M. Ives—have contributed to the success of this very interesting book, which deals with the most effective resistance force in Ukraine against Russian tyranny and the enslavement of peoples behind the Iron Curtain. In his Foreword, Professor Lev Dobriansky stresses the fact that “this unfolding chapter of national glory and greatness has by no means approached the apogee of the history that has been in the making these many years in Eastern Europe. The Russian communist enemy is still to be vanquished. The final victory of the forty-five million strong Ukrainian nation and all of its allies in freedom is still to be won” (page 7). Professor Dobriansky is convinced that, as a powerful medium of political warfare, the U.P.A. stands out with brilliance.

Congressman Michael A. Feighan recommends careful reading of the book by every American who is dedicated to the same moral and political principles of justice, freedom, and the right of national sovereignty that were expressed in the American Declaration of Independence.

Professor Lev Shankovsky describes the beginning of the ten years of the U.P.A. struggle—1942 to 1952—against the German Nazi invaders in Ukraine, and stresses the point that “a constantly increasing number of foreign troops consisting of Azerbaijanians, Georgians, Cossacks, Tartars, North-Caucasians, Uzbeks, etc. led to the organisation of separate national legions within the U.P.A. Representatives of these legions were convoked on Novem-



ber 21-23, 1943, for the Conference of the Suppressed Nations of Eastern Europe and Asia (page 26).

Professor Kost Kononenko speaks of the political literature published by the Ukrainian underground and cites above all the work of P. Poltava, who was a Major in the U.P.A., entitled: *The Concept of an Independent Ukraine, and the Basic Trend of Ideological, Political Development in the Modern World*. Major Poltava stated that the struggle of Ukraine for her life as a national state is not something exceptional, or artificially created, but on the contrary "the struggle for liberation of the Ukrainian people forms an organic part of the great historical process which is going on in the entire world" and "from the point of view of this process, a thoroughly lawful phenomenon, evoked by unconquerable and powerful forces working on a world scale" (page 96).

This book contains many illustrations from the life of the heroic U.P.A. soldiers and it may sound as a strong and distant echo from the underground battlefields in Ukraine. We cannot but recommend its careful reading by all those who are interested in Ukrainian, and also in Eastern European, affairs.

V. O.

---

Joseph Scholmer. *VORKUTA* Published by Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, London, at 15/-.

This book is of particular interest to Ukrainians, since there are many thousands of their countrymen in Vorkuta, and there is ample evidence of the readiness of all nationals to fight for liberation from the rulers of the Kremlin, pages 171-176; of a realistic approach to the policies of the West, pages 188-194; and of the actual possibility of rebellion against Soviet power. This latter point is borne out by the astonishing account of the strike in camps 6, 7, 14/16, and 29 at Vorkuta in the months following the death of Stalin.

*Vorkuta* is written with the simple directness that comes from personal experience, coupled with considerable skill in expression. It has been superbly translated by Robert Kee.

It is the story of one of the great Russian slave camps situated well within the Arctic Circle, and is an intimate account of the terrible life there. But it also gives a factual record of how labour is recruited for the great and growing industries which Moscow so proudly proclaims, how that labour is treated, how it is housed, how it is fed(?), how clothed, and how it is speedily starved and worked to death. Many of these tragic people are women and girls, and we read how babies and young children are taken from their mothers and brought up in nurseries and nursery schools, where they are taught nothing that is not atheist and Communist. What are these new generations likely to become? And what will be their effect upon the civilised world?

I often wondered what became of those fine, cultured women I had met in the Baltic States in the inter-war years, after they were seized in their homes on that terrible night of June 1940 by the Russians acting on the special order of Malenkov. They were separated from their menfolk and sent East in scores of thousands and under atrocious conditions. Countless numbers must



have died on the journey to—this Vorkuta and the many other Vorkutas in the Soviet Union. I mention the peoples of the Baltic States only because I knew them so well, but men, women and children from all the other nationalities dominated by Moscow have been treated in the same way, and those not fortunate enough to die are still there—Ukrainans, Georgians, Germans, Slovaks and all others.

From comfortable, happy homes, created by their own hard and unselfish labour, they have been, and are being imprisoned in these frightful camps. Each camp is surrounded by barbed wire fences twelve feet high, with a strip six yards wide fenced off. Inside this space anyone may be shot at sight. Watch towers, placed at short distances all round, are manned with armed guards; immensely powerful arc lights at frequent intervals make night at light as day; low-flying aeroplanes slowly circle the surroundings to watch for any suspicious movement. Prisoners are driven like cattle from their barracks to their work in the coal mines; they work day and night shifts, are starved and over-worked until they drop or die. A very conservative estimate of the number of prisoners in these slave camps is fifteen million men and women. Think of it, you who live in comfort and (temporary) safety in your own home and in your own country.

And why are these tragic men and women of all classes in Vorkuta? Simply because the labour is needed to develop Russia's industries—and mainly war industries—and no one can be persuaded to go to these terrible regions voluntarily. So, like the German doctor who was a prisoner in Vorkuta and who wrote this book, a charge, usually of espionage, is made, and the N.K.V.D.—the Secret Police who are responsible for supplying labour—sentence, without trial or evidence, the unfortunate victim to twenty-five years in a slave camp.

Vorkuta is merely a microcosm of Russia—the whole of Russia may be said to be a Vorkuta.

It is impossible in a short review to select individual instances of the inhumanity these people suffer, and will suffer until they are freed by death, but I would wish all women especially to read this extract from the book:

"One day, on the way back," (from the pit) "our brigades ran into a column of women prisoners... Our guard brought us to a halt and the women marched slowly past. They were dressed exactly like us in dirty *bushlats* and working trousers; they were doing exactly the same work as us, and, like us, they were guarded by soldiers with tommy guns.

"Most of them were young girls whose faces bore the marks of utter exhaustion after their hard day's work. They stared at us, searching for husbands or lovers or brothers and in their looks there was curiosity and sadness and a great longing for the life they knew they would never have." p. 79.

"Vorkuta" is a harrowing book and everyone should now insist on efforts being made to restore these survivors to their own homelands. Freedom should be restored to these same homelands; it can be done even without another world war, and well our statesmen know it. Will every man or woman who reads *Vorkuta* help in this work which is surely set us by God. I seriously suggest the book should be recommended in all churches, and to all Women's Organisations where Christianity still survives.

I would like to record a strange coincidence. While I was reading the last chapters of the book, my daughter came home from church deeply impressed by the sermon, which concerned the stoning of Stephen the Martyr. The text had been: "And Saul was consenting unto his death". The preacher was denouncing the indifference of people to the sufferings of others under oppression. Put Stephen in the place of these prisoners; those stoning him in the place of the Russians, and the West in the place of Saul (Paul), consenting to their death and the parallel is complete. The West is too ready to say, with Cain: "Am I my brother's keeper?"

J. F. Stewart

### Nicolas L. Czyrowsky: WHY A SHORTAGE OF CONSUMER GOODS IN THE SOVIET UNION?

Published by: The American Friends of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, Inc., Ukrainian Division, Newark Chapter, Washington Irving Publishing Company, Newark, N.J. 1954. 42 pages.

The author, Assistant Professor of Economics at Seton Hall University, who is well-known to our readers on account of his excellent book *American Trade and Russian Dominated Countries* (New York 1953. cf. *A.B.N. Correspondence* 1954. No. 3—4) deals in his latest work with a much more comprehensive subject, and one which is not purely economics but is closely connected in many ways with the entire political, social and ideological system of Soviet Russia. If one defines the actual problem, as the author does at the beginning of his work, as follows: "Why should the citizens of such a tremendous and economically rich area have suffered and continue to suffer from a fatal lack of living necessities?" then one may affirm that "the answer to the question is both easy and difficult," for "the answer requires an analytical approach to the Soviet Union and its political system... Thus, causes of the shortage of consumer necessities in the Soviet Union are sometimes very much immediate; but sometimes they are so far removed that it is hard to find any cause and effect relationship."

The author thus deserves all the more credit for the skilful and comprehensive manner in which he deals with this complicated problem, which he does according to the following aspects, which coincide with the titles of the individual chapters of his work: 1. Introduction; 2. Political Background (with several fitting remarks about the "increasing antagonism between the Russians and other nationalities, like the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, and various Caucasian peoples"); 3. Declining Efficiency under Economic Planning; 4. Terrorism; 5. Increasing Expenditure to Suppress Opposition; 6. Doctrinal Compulsion to Expand Soviet Armaments; 7. Unjust Distribution—with a very discerning analysis of the so-called new classes in the U.S.S.R., in which the whole of the "common Party members" are rightly counted as belonging, not to the highest, but nevertheless to one of the exploiting classes. For, in addition to the "military leaders, and members of the M.V.D. formations", "this class represents another instrumentality of the Soviet totalitarian control and enjoys a somewhat adequate social and material level of living"; 8. Complete Destruction of Private Initiative; 9. Economic Exploitation of Satellites

(according to the author's opinion this is not of great economic importance, since "increased military and police forces consume much... without leaving enough for the common proletarian Soviet consumer"); 10. Inefficient International Economic Co-operation ("the recent attempts of Russia to increase her economic co-operation with England and other West European countries represent first of all a political manoeuvre to impair the position of the United States; their basic idea is to help the Russian domestic market"); 11. Wilful Shortage; 12. Prospects for the Future.

The author's predictions are as follows:

"History repeats itself. Exactly thirty-two years ago, during the turbulent period of the initial days of Communism, the uncertain rulers of Russia, Lenin and Trotzky, also attempted to lull the Soviet peoples by the New Economic Policy in order to establish themselves... Similar tactics were employed by Joseph Stalin between 1924 and 1928, until he was fully able to grasp Lenin's heritage. Then, he returned to the ideal of realising communism in full. Now Malenkov, following the footsteps of his predecessors, is striving to appease his subjects until he also gains the full omnipotency to rule them... Hence, basically nothing has changed in the structure and purpose of the Soviet economy, and minor concessions will be repeated as soon as the new rulers find it convenient... This is one of the primary reasons why experts on the Russian situation distrust the recent measures proclaimed to be undertaken in the internal economic life of the Soviet Union."

Special attention must be drawn to the fact that the author by no means under-estimates the highly important economic antagonism between the Russians and the non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union, and continually stresses that "increasing separatist movements alarmed the Russian nationalists, who were all too eager to save the Soviet Union at any price as a new form of Russian Empire. Since that time the communist doctrine and Russian nationalism became inseparably united. Communism could be realised only if supported by Russian political centralisation; on the other hand, Russian political ambitions could be achieved only by using communist agitation and propaganda abroad and communist terrorism for the 'domestic' purpose of the Soviet Union."

I considered it necessary to quote these definitions by the author word for word in detail, since his version is not quite satisfying. The idea that national "separatism" only became powerful in the non-Russian Soviet republics after the latter had been formed, that is to say in the twenties, is certainly basically wrong (as is also the use of the word "separatist" for national liberation movements) and is derived—either directly or indirectly—from Soviet Russia's false propaganda which simply ignores the previous *armed* resistance of the non-Russian nationally conscious populations against the Russian Occupation. It is a well-known fact that this resistance in most cases lasted until 1921-22, and considerably longer in Turkestan. Russia, however, made out that this resistance did not consist in national insurrections but in "bandits' and capitalists' insurrections", and unjustifiably transferred the centre of gravity of the national conflicts to the *legal* activity of the non-Russian "National Communists" (Ukrainian "Khvylovists", Tartar supporters of Sultan Haliyer, Caucasian "Kerimists", Turkestanian "Progressists", etc.) who, however,



never formed a decisive part of the nationally conscious non-Russian population, either quantitatively or qualitatively. Of course, it was much easier for the Soviet Russian Bolsheviks to fight these groups on paper, or by police terrorism, than it was for them to wage war on Ukrainian anti-Soviet partisans or Turkestanian "Basmaches".

It is, however, a question here of the development of the author's thoughts in this connection rather than of his general attitude, and the final conclusions he arrives at accord with historic truth, provided that one stresses those words which should be stressed, as I have done by italicising in the following passages:

*It seemed at first that Russian nationalism was merely an instrument in the hand of the Kremlin determined to create the world revolution. Later on, however, the roles changed, and it appears today that Communist doctrine is used to implement Russian nationalism and to make Russia a dominant power."*

In any case the author deserves credit for having pointed out in a striking manner that "the shortage of necessities has always been more drastic in the various Union Republics than in the Russian S.S.R., since the control of leisure time of the non-Russian citizens of the Soviet Union has always been a more urgent problem for the Kremlin because of the intensive anti-Russian and anti-Red tendencies in those areas". In these arguments, which are in themselves correct, the author, however, obviously under-estimates the importance of the colonial exploitation of the non-Russian Soviet republics.

This work includes two useful appendices, of which the first is a very informative "Statistical Illustration of the Standard of Living of the Russian Worker" (4 graphs), whilst the second is a short but carefully selected list of references, which mentions special Ukrainian publications, as for instance the *Ukrainian Quarterly* published in New York.

V. D.

## ART REVIEW

### GREGORY KRUK

Twenty-two works by the Ukrainian sculptor, Gregory Kruk, together with fine examples of Ukrainian embroidery, carving and pottery, have recently been exhibited in London by the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain. Of the sculptures the following has been written:

*The Manchester Guardian*, October 30, 1954. "His large standing nude has a certain grave dignity, but the best exhibits are the smaller statues of washer-woman, peasants, and refugees, which are modelled with a seriousness and a depth of feeling that one sometimes misses in the work of Western sculptors."

*The Art News and Review*, October 30, 1954. "The theme of his most important works is that of the dignity of men and women in the face of hardship and adversity. In the bronze *A Family of Refugees*... we cannot fail to be moved by the sculptor's noble interpretation of this subject so unhappily symbolic of our troubled century.

"The finest work in the exhibition is the large *Youth with a Dove*. The feeling of aspiration implicit in the outstretched arms and the gently rising bird is communicated with a purity and sense of truth that commands respect and admiration."



*The following article replaces, in this number only, further news under the heading "Ukrainians in the Free World".*

## **The Association of Ukrainians in Gr. Britain Ltd.**

The cease-fire of VE-day in May 1945 forecast for the people of Britain a gradual withdrawal of onerous restrictions, and the homecoming of service men and women who for some years had known little, if anything, of family life. But for millions of men, women and children on the battlefields of Europe, this day of seeming victory signified little beyond the chance to pause in the sudden silence and survey an unparelled devastation—not only of buildings, but also, and far more difficult to remedy, of community and family life. Such men and women were faced with the task of creating for themselves some acceptable way of living, often in a strange country, and without the impulse towards perseverance and success that comes from familiar and loved surroundings.

Many nationals, including a great number of Ukrainians, were in the further unenviable position of having fought against both Russia and Germany, and, as the Iron Curtain fell as the death shroud of the independence of Eastern European nations, these people—civilians and ex-combatants—began to be re-settled in Western Europe. In general, up to forty thousand Ukrainians have entered Britain since the war, and at present there are nearly thirty thousand in these islands.

In the early days of this immigration, problem were dealt with as they arose, and many small organisations grew up among Ukrainians. By January 1946, however, the need for co-ordinating this work had become urgent, and the Association was accordingly formed in that month. It was registered as a Charity under the War Charities' Act of 1940, and as a non-profit-making company in December 1947. Its welfare work has extended in scope as restrictions upon employment have been removed, more and more Ukrainians becoming free to choose their own occupations and to settle permanently in Britain. Not the least of the Association's tasks is to translate letters and documents, and carry on correspondence, for those members whose knowledge of the English language is hardly equal to the official complexities of a modern state. In carrying out these and all other duties, the departments of the Association have maintained steady contact with the British authorities concerned with social welfare, and have appreciated the unfailing sympathy and ready help of all of these.

We may take a pile of letters from the outgoing post one day at the Association's Head Offices in London. Amongst the contents of these we would find inquiries about Ukrainians ill in hospital, suggestions as to rehabilitation, and perhaps arrangements for the reception of a patient on discharge into the Association's Invalids' and Convalescents' Home "Sydenhurst" in Surrey. Another might offer advice to a Ukrainian, injured in some way, about applying for insurance or compensation; others contain passports and papers on their way to the Home Office for adjustment, or to a firm of solicitors acting on behalf of Ukrainians in some legal difficulty. There might also be suggestions to Branch chairmen that members should visit fellow-countrymen in

hospital, or maybe newly removed to that district, and negotiations about the buying of a house for the use of one of the Branches.

For since 1951, members of the Association have tendered to concentrate in the industrial towns rather than remain scattered about the country in small groups, as they were when statutory control kept many of them employed in agriculture. And in seven of these towns houses have been purchased to be used as community centres. Full and varied use is made of these properties which are now an important item among the assets of the Association. Libraries of Ukrainian books are housed there, members are enabled to meet frequently and talk in their own language to their heart's content; they may hold meetings of all kinds of literary and sporting societies, run educational courses on liberal and domestic subjects, and offer accommodation to Ukrainians visiting the town from elsewhere in Britain or from abroad.

Amongst these communal activities, the celebrating of religious festivals and national anniversaries is of especial importance. The social and cultural inheritance of Ukraine is so rich that it is essential to the happiness of her people that they are able to preserve the traditions handed down through the centuries. These are expressed above all in their arts and crafts. Indeed, beneath the drab English skies, the colourful costumes and flowing music of the distant homeland assume a significance that is irresistible even to many a British-born concert-goer. The Association has done all in its power to foster these arts, and to facilitate the training and success of Ukrainians in them. And there is no lack of success. Of the many folk dancing groups, for instance, "Orlyk" is the most outstanding, and, with the Ukrainian Male Voice Choir "Homin" from Manchester, has taken part in recent years in the Eisteddfod at Llangollen. But besides these two, other dancing groups and choirs are constantly bringing the varied and highly expressive songs and dances of the country into the concert hall. Among many Ukrainian soloists is Jaroslaw Babuniak, the baritone who has several times sung in the International Cavalcade at the Royal Albert Hall in London, and this year he won a first and a second prize at Llangollen. The baritone, Volodymyr Luciv, of the Rome Conservatoire, who is well-known as a bandura player, delighted the audience at the Albert Hall, Nottingham, at a concert held this year during the Ukrainian Youth Rally in that city.

Those who visited this year's International Handicrafts Exhibition in the Empire Hall, Olympia, will be familiar with three of the Ukrainian arts and crafts: pottery, woodwork and embroidery. Many groups of students throughout the country carry on the traditional methods under the guidance of men and women whose skill was acquired in their native country. There is thus a constant supply of beautiful work available both for display and for sale, and a further opportunity of enjoying its dignity and intricate workmanship will be provided by the courtesy of Messrs Foyle in their Art Gallery next April.

"Sydenhurst" has already been mentioned in connection with the care of convalescents and of those unable to support themselves owing to age or disability. This property at Chiddingfold has thirty-three acres of farm, park and woodland, and provides an excellent site for Children's Holiday Camps—two of which were held this summer—and for Camp Schools of courses in Uk-

rainian Literature, in History, in Economics and other subjects. Similar courses are also held at the Head Office of the Association, and many lecturers and scholars visit Britain from the Continent to take part in them. The Association's Emigration and Visa Section arranges with the Home Office for the admission of such visitors, and also with the Foreign Office for visits to the Continent of Ukrainians living in this country. Considerable numbers of Ukrainians have also wished to re-emigrate to other countries of the British Commonwealth and of the Americas and the Section has facilitated their departure.

In carrying out the diverse duties involved in caring for the needs of its Ukrainian members, as outlined above, it is clear that a great deal of printed material is necessary. The Association has its own Publishing and Bookselling Department, which prepares, publishes and distributes newspapers, booklets on cultural and educational subjects, texts-books for the use of children and information brochures. All these are written in Ukrainian or in English as required. The weekly Ukrainian newspaper *Dumka*, (Ukrainian Thought) has a circulation of four thousand and is, with the addition of newsletters, the chief means of contact between the executive in London and members of the Association. This paper is sent free to all members who are on the Association's books as sick persons.

But what of the structure of the Association itself, whose many departments have been referred to in the foregoing pages? Through long centuries of resistance to foreign occupation and colonisation, Ukrainians have acquired a sense of restraint and of safeguard in administrative organisation. The Association is governed by the Annual General Meeting of delegates from all its Branches, which elects an Honorary Chairman, the President of the Association and a General Council. This Council then elects a Presidential Committee which is responsible for the day-to-day running of business, for the appointment of staff and, under the supervision of the Council, for the practical application of the policies adopted at the Annual General Meeting. Branches, of which there are at present ninety-nine, are formed wherever there are twelve members, each branch electing its own Committee annually. Where there are fewer than twelve members, a group is formed, which applies to become a branch when the minimum membership of twelve is reached. As may be imagined, the Officers of the Association in London, and the Branch Committee throughout the country work in close co-operation with other Ukrainian organisations—such as, for instance, the Association of Ukrainian Former Combatants, and the Ukrainian Youth Association—and with bodies such as the British Council for Aid to Refugees and the United Nations Organisation.

The culture of a country is always closely bound to its religious life, and in Ukraine the two churches—the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (Catholicism of the Eastern Rite), and the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church—have long been the mainstay of the political and moral life of the nation. It is for that reason that these churches have been bitterly persecuted by those occupying powers who wished—vainly—to reduce Ukraine to a mere colony or dependency of themselves. Both these churches are represented in Britain, and the Association is greatly indebted to their help and co-operation in caring for Ukrainians in all parts of Britain.



The Association's activities are financed solely by the subscriptions of its members, and by such donations as are most kindly offered from time to time. It is at all times the aim of the Association to encourage initiative among its members, and to help in the training and maintenance of those who desire to enter the professions, the field of academic or industrial research and the arts. In this respect Ukraine has reason to be proud of the achievements of her people in exile in Britain, and need not fear that the subjugation of the homeland has been able to quench the spirit of self-reliance and enterprise that has characterised Ukrainians for hundreds of years.

---

## UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD

### NEWS

*Homin Ukrainy* of August 21, 1954. On July 22, 1954, Congressman Thaddeus M. Machrowicz of Michigan moved in Congress a resolution entered in the minutes as resolution No. 663. The resolution was seconded by 9 other Congressmen and states that "the countries of Central-Eastern Europe which have been enslaved by the communists must be conscious of the fact that their freedom is an invariable object of our state policy . . ."

In his resolution Congressman Machrowicz drew the attention of other Congressmen to the matter of the liberation of Poland and other satellite countries. Congressman Michael A. Feighan, Ohio, moved an amendment, referring to the materials of the Congress Commission recently collected in Europe concerning genocide. In his amendment Congressman Feighan mentioned 26 European and Asiatic countries, among them Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine, whose liberation is allegedly an object of U.S. policy. This amendment was accepted by the mover; it was seconded by Congressman Ray J. Madden of Indiana.

\* \* \*

A University of Ukrainian Studies is to be established, attached to the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the U.S.A. It is being organised by departments of this Society in co-operation with lecturers of the Free Ukrainian University, the Ukrainian Students' Assistance Board, and the Union of Ukrainian Student Organisations of America. The full course of studies will consist of at least 8 semesters of 4 months, and the course entails three evening lectures a week. The subjects will cover Ukrainian language, literature, history, philosophy, law, journalism, art, economics and geography.

\* \* \*

The Basilian Fathers, a Ukrainian Catholic monastic order, in New York, are to build a school, seven storeys high, with twenty class-rooms. The total cost will be a million dollars, and one hundred thousand have already been collected.

\* \* \*



## Behind the Iron Curtain

### MORE NEWS FROM THE KAZAKHSTAN STEPPES A Moscow correspondent reports on the life of Ukrainian resettled persons in Kazakhstan

From the fact that the Soviet press draws so much attention to the resettlement of man-power in the dry steppes of Kazakhstan, one may conclude that the number of voluntary immigrants in very small. People appear to emigrate there only as a result of pressure—whether administrative, i.e. legal, or political. Many students graduating from agro-technical schools in Ukraine are compulsorily deported to Kazakhstan, and the same fate overtakes many students from trade schools.

To Kazakhstan move also those Russians who are assigned as leaders of the new settlements, collective farms, state farms (they are generally party members), or in order to carry on Russification by marriage with Ukrainian or Byelorussian girls, by opening Russian schools, and libraries chiefly containing Russian books.

Soviet propaganda contradicts itself during Malenkov's rule, as it did under Stalin. It tells of a happy and gay life in Ukraine and simultaneously reports that ever more migrants move from Ukraine to Kazakhstan. Who voluntarily leaves the homeland in which he is living "happily and gaily"?

One should not expect true news from Kazakhstan. However, some information about the real and very hard life of resettled people can be obtained. This comes from the Russian press. Let us consider the report of Yuriy Dobryakov, published in *Sovietskoye Iskustvo* ("Soviet Art") No. 54 under the heading "Meeting in the steppe". The author reports from the town Akmolinsk. It is known that from the town Akmolinsk there starts the huge Kazakhstan steppe, scorched by sun and impassable in spring because of rains.

The report has been written by a loquacious Russian in a comic vein.

"Let us be acquainted," said a man dressed in an overcoat from which the water dripped, his boots muddy up the leg, "I am Vasyl Petrovych Demydenko, agronomist".

"Vladimir Ostroumov, architect", replied his neighbour.

Thus, says the correspondent, two conquerors of the steppe became acquainted with one another: a Ukrainian and a Russian. Ostroumov had brought the plan for establishing the new collective farm, Demydenko became chief agronomist of that farm. They have a business talk: "In how many years can your plan become real and how soon can a farm planned on your system be established here, in this steppe?" "Well, it will take ten to twenty years", replies the Russian carelessly.

We read on: "We stayed in the area where the workers of the collective farm "Enthusiast" were accommodated in tents. For the time being, nothing looks like the plan of Ostroumov. A bare steppe; in the ground there is a pole with a board on which is inscribed "Enthusiast". One of the Ukrainian children happily described this board and pole as a crane which has come to the ground, "without a nest". As to the Ukrainian children in the Yesylsk district of the Akmolinsk region, we read: "One hundred and fifty Ukrainians and Russians

form the main body of "Enthusiast". They have started cultivation of the new lands. The lack of lodging is not important". (in the original: "It does not matter that there are no houses". "Tents have already been constructed in the steppe; they are gradually being inhabited and repaired...")

"What do you do in the evenings?" the correspondent asked the boy Honcharenko.

"We work also in the evenings", he said. When asked later about the life, he admitted "the boys will be a little bored here. In our collective farm there is no library. I wish we had, at least, an itinerant one. We long for books". The above mentioned agronomist Demydenko declared: "As for me, films, books, newspapers and radio are more important than a new house! Apply to the proper authorities: this matter can be no longer delayed". It is easy to realise the moral state of the resettled people in the bare steppe with some gypsy tents, a pole with a board and a Russian agronomist with a plan... of the future—in ten years—yard of the collective farm and village!

And the special correspondent of *Soviet Art* admits at the end of his report: "It is difficult to start a new farm in the far Kazakhstan steppe. The people have hard work to fight the forces of nature... He does not mention either the new cottages promised by Russian propaganda or the enforcement of the resettlement. But the free world has to learn these facts to know that the thousands of sons and daughters of Ukrainian people deported by Russian "internationalism" go the way of Taras Shevchenko who was once deported by Russian tsarism; that Russia has not changed and will not change till it has been dismembered.

D. Dymchuk

## UKRAINE REJECTS ATHEISM

(*Christian Voice* of Aug. 29, 1954)

The Moscow correspondent of *The New York Times*, Harrison E. Salisbury, has dedicated a long article to the intensive anti-religious propaganda in the U.S.S.R. Stating that the propaganda against churches and denominations is being strengthened all over the territory of the U.S.S.R., the American correspondent points out that the new Communist propaganda is directed not only at the Catholic, but also at the Orthodox and other churches. The Communist Party pays attention, primarily, to the fact that youth falls under the influence of the Church, and the whole campaign is carefully planned. This is revealed by the anti-religious articles of the newspapers of communist youth, *Komsomolskaya Pravda* ("Komsomol Truth"), as well as by the lament of the propaganda newspaper of the communist party, *Partiynaya Zhizn* ("Party Life"). This communist organ reproaches the Church with having focused its attention on winning youth over to its side. Solemn and splendid divine services are being held in churches. Furthermore, the churches have intensified their charitable activities and cut down expenditure on candles and other needs for church services. *Partiynaya Zhizn* has even pointed out that "ecclesiastical circles do not spare money for the organisation of good choirs. By such methods they have succeeded in extending their sphere of influence over wide circles of the population and are winning new partisans over to their side..."

The leading article of the newspaper *Radyanska Ukraina* ("The Soviet Uk-

raïne") which was broadcast on August 6, 1954 has become in Ukraine a local echo of the broad anti-religious propaganda in the U.S.S.R. Frightened by the fact that children in Ukraine fall under the influence of the Church, *Radyanska Ukraina* blames "the educational organs, the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian S.S.R." for paying insufficient attention to the education of young people in the spirit of the materialist outlook". The newspaper complains of the fact that, for example, during the last four months the organisation for the extension of political knowledge and science has failed to deliver any lecture on scientific-atheistic subjects in any of the 20 districts of the Poltava region. Particularly, the atheistic propaganda in Western Ukraine is unsatisfactory, in the opinion of the Communist newspaper, "it should be organically united with the unmasking of the criminal activity of the Vatican".

## NEWS

A Soviet *Atlas of the World* has been published. It includes 283 pages of multicoloured maps which comprise the territories of the whole world. The maps are divided into four basic groups: maps of the world, maps of the Soviet Union, maps of foreign lands, and maps of polar regions and oceans. Every union republic and every country of the "people's democracy" has its own separate sheet. The frontiers of the U.S.S.R. are according to their position on June 15, 1953.

The countries of Asia have never been so well represented before in Russian-Soviet publications. For instance there are accurate maps of India and of its northern regions, and those of Indonesia and Indo-China have been drawn in careful detail.

\* \* \*

It is reported that payments of workdays in grain have begun in Ukraine. Only 2 kilograms of grain per workday is being distributed in the Bershtyn district to collective farmers even in the most advanced farms.

\* \* \*

Following the recent decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. concerning the further cultivation of virgin soil and fallow land in Kazakhstan, 188 collective farmers, mechanics and agricultural specialists have recently been deported from the Cherkassy region. Radio Kyiv reports in this connection that "the workers of the Cherkassy region have accepted the decision about further deportations... with a feeling of pride".

\* \* \*

More than 2000 "lecturers" are carrying out anti-religious propaganda work in the Drohobych region of West Ukraine. Anti-religious films are shown after the "lectures". This is a part of the wide campaign of anti-religious propaganda especially active in the western regions of Ukraine.

\* \* \*



*Pravda* has recently published a leading article under the heading: "The moral make-up of Soviet men and women". In this it is stated: "the survivals of capitalism have not yet been rooted out from the minds of the people, and the private-property psychology and ethic are not yet liquidated completely in the U.S.S.R. In addition, we are not secure from penetration into our midst of foreign views and ideas from the capitalist countries encircling us." *Pravda* points out that it is not easy to change the mentality of man and his moral make-up: "As to the difficulty and weight of this task, it would be hard to find its match in the whole of history." The new official Soviet statement results from the present situation in the U.S.S.R., and strikes primarily at those who are sometimes only too ready to maintain that a "new generation" has grown up in Ukraine "which does not exhibit a tendency towards private ownership of property, and which cannot imagine a life without collective farms..."

---

## OUR CONTRIBUTORS

*Volodymyr Derzhavyn*, Ph.D. Professor of History of Ukrainian Literature and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. The author of many contributions to the study of Ukrainian Literature.

*Dmytro Donzov*. One of the leading thinkers of the Ukrainian national struggle for liberation, and author of many books and articles. He is now living in Canada.

*Osyp Hornovy (Osyp Dyakiv)* a Ukrainian underground leader, and author of many articles and pamphlets on current political problems. He was killed in Ukraine fighting Soviet M.G.B. troops in November 1950 at the age of 31.

*Borys Krupnytsky*. Professor of Eastern European History, the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. Author of *The History of Ukraine*.

*Andriy Mykulyn*. A Ukrainian ex-army captain now living in Germany. He graduated in Economics and is particularly interested in politics.

*Prince Niko Nakashidze*. An eminent Georgian politician now living in Western Germany.

*Vasyl Oreletsky, LL.D.* Professor of International Law of the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. He is a publicist and editor and a member of the Free Academy of Sciences (V.U.A.N.).

*R-O*. A report from the underground liberation movement in Ukraine.

*Halyna Selehen*. A Ukrainian sociologist living in Germany. Her special field of research is demography.

*John F. Stewart*. The Chairman of the Scottish League for European Freedom and Hon. Editor of the Foreign Affairs Information Series. He has travelled widely in Africa and Eastern Europe and is very active in international affairs.





TO  
.....

# THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

THE ASSOCIATION OF UKRAINIANS  
IN GREAT BRITAIN LTD.  
49 LINDEN GARDENS, LONDON, W.2

---

I wish to subscribe to THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW *for one year*  
*for 6 months*

and I enclose *cheque*  
*postal order* for *£1-0-0*  
*10-0*

(Please strike out words that do not apply)

NAME.....

ADDRESS.....

.....

.....