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JOURNAL

OF

UKRAINIAN

STUDIES

TENTORIUM HONORUM
ESSAYS PRESENTED TO FRANK E. SYSYN
ON HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY

GUEST EDITORS

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TENTORIUM HONORUM

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SERTA ERUDITA
AB AMICIS COMMILITONIBUS DISCIPULIS

FRANCO SYSYNO
IUVENI SEXAGENARIO

HISTORIAE PATRIAE CULTORI
OBLATA

IN CIVITATE TORONTONENSIUM
MMVII

Tabula gratulatoria

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Dominique Arel
Wawa Baczynskyj
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Marta Baziuk and Taras Koznarsky
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Christina E. Kramer
Marina Kravets
Bohdan Krawchenko
Andrii Krawchuk
Anatoliy Kruglashov
H. H. Krzywucki

Contents

Book Reviews

Books Received

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Preface

Tentorium honorum honors Frank E. Sysyn, our esteemed colleague and cherished friend, on his sixtieth birthday. The title comes from a Latin panegyric to Adam Kysil, a prominent statesman and diplomat in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and a leader of the old Ukrainian nobility, that was published in 1646.[1] It was written by Father Teodozii Baievsky, a professor at the Kyiv Mohyla Collegium, on the occasion of Kysil's entry into Kyiv as the newly named castellan. Baievsky invoked the image of the tent on the Kysil family's coat of arms to praise his family, career, and many services to his fatherland and church. Kysil was, of course, the subject of Frank's groundbreaking monograph on political culture and political thought in early modern Ukraine. In fact, Frank's book began with an epigraph from this very panegyric, a key passage about the struggle of Rus' and Poland for Kysil's loyalty.[2]

This Festschrift is not a panegyric to Frank—or, rather, it is more than that. *Tentorium honorum* is a collection of thirty-three essays by historians from around the world who have worked with Frank in some capacity during his more than three-decades-long career as a scholar, teacher, administrator, and editor. Ranging from the medieval to the modern, the essays bear eloquent testimony to the sheer variety and scope of Frank's intellectual interests and contacts. The bibliography of his works in this volume provides an indication of his own considerable scholarly contribution. The introductory essay, a biographical account by Prof. Zenon Kohut, director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS), Frank's long-time friend and colleague, and one of the editors of this volume, will give readers a fuller sense of Frank's extraordinary trajectory. Indeed, Frank is a leading representative of a generation of scholars who helped define Ukrainian studies in the United States and Canada in the 1970s and continued to expand and develop the field internationally in subsequent decades. His story is, in many ways, the story of the making of Ukrainian studies in the West.

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[1] Fr. Theodosius Wasilewicz Baiewski, *Tentoria venienti Kioviam cum novi honoris fascibus Illustrissimo Domino, D. Adamo de Brusiłow Sventoldico Kisiel Catellano: Nosov: & Capitaneo à Collegio Mohil: Kiov: expansa* (Kyiv: Kyiv Caves Monastery, 1646)

[2] *Rossia Te patrem canit atque Polonia Rossia Te Civem Sarmata Teque suum Lis de Te.* (fol. 7).

This volume could not have appeared without the help of a number of individuals. When we originally conceived this project, Dr. Taras Zakydalsky, the editor of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, agreed to take this volume under his wing. His untimely death in 2007 deprived us of a talented and witty colleague, and we continue to mourn his passing. We were fortunate in those circumstances to enlist the services of three skilled editors who took time from their regular duties to work on this volume: Myroslav Yurkevich, Uliana Pasicznyk, and Yaroslav Fedoruk. Roman Senkus, director of the CIUS Publications Program, kindly stepped in as editor of *JUS* and helped usher the volume through to completion. He and Dr. Serhiy Bilenky assembled the bibliography. Professor Ihor Sevčenko created the magnificent title page modelled on the seventeenth-century panegyric. For all of this, we remain grateful to our colleagues and acutely conscious of our debt to them.

Finally, we would like to acknowledge the CIUS's institutional support for this project. Among other things, that support has made it possible to issue this Festschrift as a special issue of *JUS* and as a separate publication.

Olga Andriewsky, Zenon Kohut
Serhii Plokhy, Larry Wolff

Shaping Ukrainian Studies:
A Portrait of Frank E. Sysyn

Zenon E. Kohut
with Olga Andriewsky

On Friday evening, 2 November 2007, seventy-five colleagues, friends, and relatives of Frank E. Sysyn gathered at Trinity College of the University of Toronto to mark his sixtieth birthday, celebrate his distinguished academic career, and announce the publication of a Festschrift in his honor. It was most appropriate for us to acknowledge a scholar whose work has shaped the interpretation of Ukrainian history, a teacher who has trained a generation of students and scholars, and an organizer of scholarship who has substantially influenced the development of Ukrainian studies. But the story of Frank Sysyn needs to be told not only as a well-deserved accolade, but also to illustrate how Ukrainian studies has developed, how Frank was part of this process, and how he has helped shape and obtain recognition for the field in which scholars of Ukrainian studies work today.[1]

The Many Worlds of Frank Sysyn

Frank was born on 27 December 1946 in Passaic, New Jersey. His father, Frank, was the son of immigrants from Western Ukraine. A veteran

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of World War II, he married Hattie Miller, his fiancée of Dutch- and Irish-American extraction, right after the war and brought her to live in his parents' house in Clifton. Frank's paternal grandfather was an immigrant from Mshanets, a village in the Boiko region near Staryi Sambir. The village was small but had an illustrious pedigree as perhaps the most fully documented rural community in Ukraine, owing to scores of articles about it written by its pastor, the nineteenth-century ethnographer Reverend Mykhailo Zubrytsky. Frank's grandmother had come to America from Trushevychi (near Dobromyl) after World War I and the failed attempt to found a Western Ukrainian state. She had a talent for recounting tales of the old country, and many years later, in the dedication of his monograph on Adam Kysil, Frank would credit his grandmother with awakening his interest in Ukrainian history.

Frank grew up in the Athenia section of Clifton, near Passaic, in a vibrant enclave of Slavic immigrants. Many of these people had arrived from Galicia, Transcarpathia, or the Lemko region before or immediately after World War I. Passaic, in general, was a place where eastern European immigrants established Orthodox, Protestant, Greek Catholic, and Roman Catholic churches as well as Jewish synagogues, which can still be found on virtually every block. It was also a place where issues of religious affiliation, politics, and national identity—the very subjects that would later define Frank's academic focus—were part of the discourse of everyday life. Frank himself grew up to be an excellent raconteur—a talent clearly inherited from his grandmother. Anyone who has spent any time in his company has heard his warm and often humorous tales about life in Clifton, the many characters and personalities who inhabited his neighborhood, and his grandfather's tailor shop, which functioned as a community meeting place of sorts, whose window was for him a wonderful observation and listening post.

By all accounts, Frank was a precocious child and a star pupil. His public speaking abilities were soon recognized by his teachers, who put them to use in many school assemblies. At the age of eleven or twelve Frank began reading the *Encyclopedia Britannica* in the renowned eleventh edition (the first assembled under American publisher Horace Everett Hooper), a gift from his maternal grandfather. He recalls that the encyclopedia's entries on history held a special fascination for him, and he remembers in particular reading the entry on Austria-Hungary very closely. At about the same age Frank read his first book on Ukrainian history—*The Black Deeds of the Kremlin*, a five-hundred page volume of essays and eyewitness accounts written by survivors of the Holodomor of 1932–33 in Ukraine, which left a deep impression on him. In school and later at university, Frank performed superbly and won numerous aca-

demic awards. (He often sings the praises of the Clifton public school system of the 1950s and lauds the rigorous scholastic standards to which he was introduced by his teachers.) In 1964 he graduated from Clifton Senior High School as a National Merit Finalist, recognized as one of the top high school students in the United States, and that fall he entered Princeton University on a full scholarship.

Princeton opened up more new worlds to Frank. He was soon accepted into the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, which offered an elite program of multidisciplinary undergraduate courses that included sociology, politics, history, and economics. Princeton had long prided itself on the quality of its undergraduate education, and for Frank it offered the opportunity to meet, learn from, and work with outstanding scholars and intellectuals. Setting out to earn a certificate in Russian and Soviet studies, Frank took courses with Robert Tucker, Cyril Black, and James Billington, and met George Kennan and Georges Florovsky. He became a research assistant to the sociologist Allen Kassof. Professor Kassof became his senior thesis adviser, and it was he who urged Frank to consider a career in academia instead of law, for which Frank remains grateful to this day.

Princeton also gave Frank the opportunity to expand his knowledge of Ukrainian history and to begin rethinking the Moscow- and Russo-centric approach that informed so much Western academic writing on Ukraine and the Soviet Union. In 1967 he won the McConnell Scholarship to conduct senior thesis research abroad. By this time Frank had become deeply interested in the Soviet Ukrainian revival and dissident movement of the 1960s, the *shistdesiatnyky* ("generation of the 1960s"). The arrest of Ukrainian dissidents had begun in 1965, followed by another wave of arrests in 1967. For his senior thesis, Frank proposed to do a study of the Ukrainian intelligentsia after World War II, building on Yaroslav Bilinsky's *The Second Soviet Republic* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1964).[2]

Formal research in the Soviet Union on Frank's chosen subject was unthinkable, but the McConnell Scholarship did make it possible for him to enroll in a Russian-language course in Leningrad and travel to Kyiv, Odesa, and Baku. While in Odesa, Frank encountered one of the many hidden chapters of Soviet history in a most personal way—he clandes-

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[2] During his thesis research, Frank benefited greatly from reading the *Current Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, a major source to events in Ukraine issued in English translation by the Ukrainian émigré publishing house Prolog. Vyacheslav Chornovil's dissident treatise *Lykho z rozumu* (The Misfortune from Intellect), published in English translation under the title *The Chornovil Papers* (New York and Toronto, 1968), also had a profound impact on Frank.

tinely met with his grandfather's younger sister, Teklia, who, like so many other Western Ukrainians, had been deported from her native village after World War II. In the remote village where she had been resettled some ninety kilometers from Odesa, Frank saw the photograph of his grandfather, his father, his two uncles, and himself at the age of four or five that Aunt Teklia kept on the wall of her house. The photo had been sent to the family in Mshanets just before they were deported. The encounter was a very moving experience, both for Frank and his relatives. Frank's family was elated to meet him, for contacts with the family in America had been severed and lost for years. In the short time they spent together, Frank's relatives described the horrors they had endured under the Soviet regime and Frank was introduced to many of the village's other deportees, who were also eager to tell him about their plights.

When he returned to Princeton, Frank wrote a 350–page treatise titled "The Ukrainian National Movement and Soviet Nationality Policy after World War II," which won the 1968 Woodrow Wilson School Senior Thesis Prize. At about this time, too, Frank wrote a review of a first-hand account of Russification in Ukraine by John Kolasky, a former Ukrainian-Canadian Communist.[3] That was the first of Frank's many reviews of works in Ukrainian studies, which together have greatly enriched study and discourse in the field.

In recognition of his outstanding undergraduate academic record, Frank won a Fulbright Award, enabling him to pursue a master's degree in history at the University of London's celebrated School of Slavonic Studies. The school had a unique complement of specialists who were studying virtually every corner of the Slavic and east European world, however remote or arcane. Its seminar series was presided over by Hugh Seton-Watson, the holder of the chair of history and author of a seminal study on nations and states. For more contemporary topics, Frank also attended lectures at the London School of Economics, where Peter Reddaway was teaching at the time. Frank worked most closely, however, with three other scholars—John Keep, a historian of Russia and later a professor at the University of Toronto; Piotr Skwarczyński, a specialist in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; and Victor Swoboda, an expert in Ukrainian language and literature. Influenced by reading the work of Viacheslav Lypynsky, the founder of the statist school in Ukrainian historiography, Frank wrote his master's paper on the old Ukrainian nobility in the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Research on that topic inevitably led him to study Jakub Michalowski's *Księga pamiętnicza*, a massive nineteenth-

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[3] "John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification*," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (Winter 1968): 369–71.

century publication of historical documents that included the letters of Adam Kysil, perhaps the single most important Ukrainian nobleman of the mid-seventeenth century. That was a very ambitious scholarly undertaking: it meant, for instance, that Frank had to acquire a knowledge of seventeenth-century Polish though he had never studied modern Polish, and that he be competent in reading Latin, which he had last studied in high school.

A chance meeting in London with Renata Holod, then a graduate student in fine arts at Harvard, influenced Frank's subsequent life dramatically. By this time he had become convinced that history rather than law or government service—which he had also considered—was his vocation. Frank had received offers to enroll in Ph.D. programs in history at Stanford, Princeton, and Harvard. He also had the option of continuing on to a Ph.D. at the School of Slavonic Studies itself. As Frank contemplated these choices, it was Renata Holod who persuaded him that Harvard University, where the first chair in Ukrainian studies (in history) was being established at just that time, was the place for him to be.

The founding of the Harvard chair was a remarkable achievement. In the 1950s the request by a group of Ukrainian-American students for Ukrainian language courses at a major American university had been rebuffed because "universities don't teach dialects." It was this incident that spurred these students and others to launch a community campaign to establish Ukrainian studies at the university level and led to the creation of the Ukrainian Studies Fund (USF) to support such a development. The founding of the Harvard chair that came about in1968 was thus the result of a decade-long effort to endow a university chair in Ukrainian studies by the Federation of Ukrainian Student Organizations of America. By the late 1960s the USF had collected over half a million dollars for the project, mostly in small donations from the Ukrainian-American community. The mass participation of ordinary Ukrainians in the undertaking was undoubtedly a reflection of the extent to which they believed that their history and culture were being misrepresented and marginalized by the prevailing academic and popular narratives.

Harvard University's acceptance of the project to establish a program in Ukrainian studies there was due in large part due to the authority of two Harvard professors of Ukrainian background: Omeljan Pritsak, an eminent Turcologist, and Ihor Ševčenko, a renowned Byzantinist. As essential as Professors Pritsak's and Ševčenko's efforts were, however, they could not have succeeded without the support of leading scholars in the Russian, Soviet, and Slavic fields at Harvard, specifically Richard Pipes, Adam Ulam, and Wiktor Weintraub. All three scholars were emigrants from Poland with a refined understanding of the national and cul-

tural complexities of Europe and the Soviet Union. Already in 1954, for instance, Professor Pipes had published a groundbreaking work on nationality issues and the formation of the Soviet Union.[4]

As a graduate student at Harvard, Frank was attracted by the ambitious Ukrainian studies project. It offered the opportunity to study Ukraine in the widest possible context, the prospect of working with some of the leading scholars in the world, and the chance to help create and develop a unique scholarly program and institution. Indeed, Professor Pritsak was insisting on the creation of not one, but three chairs of Ukrainian studies—in Ukrainian history, Ukrainian literature, and Ukrainian philology—within Harvard's corresponding departments of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. He also argued for the creation of a Ukrainian research institute at Harvard as an autonomous institution that would engage in research and publishing and, in effect, serve as a surrogate academy of sciences, free of the heavy ideological restrictions constraining Ukrainian scholarship in the Soviet Union. His philosophy and goals were to promote the highest level of quality of scholarship, to make Ukrainian studies internationally attractive, and thus to put Ukraine and Ukrainian issues on the map, as it were. That aim attracted a whole generation of graduate students, Frank Sysyn among them, who for the last thirty years have constituted the core of academics working on Ukrainian topics in the West.

Frank entered the Ph.D. program in history at Harvard in the fall of 1969. He now jokes that between his studies, travels, service in the National Guard,[5] and the building of the Ukrainian program at Harvard, he effectively missed much of the 1960s and early 1970s. In his first year at Harvard, Frank took a graduate seminar on Russian anarchism with Michael Confino, a visiting professor from Israel, during which he utilized the considerable holdings at Houghton Library to write a research paper on Nestor Makhno; that essay became his first published scholarly article.[6] He studied the "Crisis of the Seventeenth Century" with Franklin

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[4] _The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954, rev. 1964; New York: Atheneum, 1968).

[5] In 1969, during the height of the Vietnam War, military deferments for graduate students were ended and replaced with a lottery system intended to promote equality before the draft. Frank's number was 76; only those with numbers of 250 or higher were reasonably assured of not being drafted. For Frank, like many Harvard graduate students, the alternative was six months of basic training (which postponed his doctoral exams), followed by six years of service in the Cambridge branch of the Massachusetts National Guard.

[6] "Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution," in _The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution_, 271–304, ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, Mass.: HURI, 1977).

Ford, the noted early-modernist, exploring a theme that would become the trademark of his work on the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Frank benefited greatly, too, from Wiktor Weintraub's instruction in early Polish literature. He also enrolled in a seminar with newly tenured Edward Keenan on diplomatics (the study and verification of very old documents). Frank recalls that students in the course were especially excited by Keenan's revolutionary theories on the Kurbsky–Ivan the Terrible correspondence.[7] Frank wrote his seminar paper on the diplomatics of the Kyiv metropolitans, in the process finding that Horace Lunt's course in Church Slavonic stood him in good stead. At one point in the seminar, Frank recalls, he was instructed to read a book in Romanian. When Frank responded that he didn't know the language, Keenan pointedly rejoined, "But you know French, don't you?"

Frank's first encounter with Omeljan Pritsak was no less memorable. A few weeks after arriving in Cambridge, Frank walked over to Professor Pritsak's office and introduced himself. Pritsak first chided him for not coming to see him sooner and then proceeded to give Frank a brief oral exam in history, as was his custom on meeting aspiring academics; subsequently he began giving Frank projects to do, such as translating historical texts. Frank thus became part of the first group of Harvard graduate students in Ukrainian studies, joining Lubomyr Hajda, Orest Subtelny, George G. Grabowicz, Omry Ronen, Richard Hantula, Luba Dyky, and Natalie Kononenko. That group was soon joined by young academics and Ph.D. students from other institutions attracted by Harvard's vibrant academic program, including me from the University of Pennsylvania and Paul Robert Magocsi from Princeton University. This core group was expected to implement Pritsak's ever-expanding grand design for the field. Their cadres were supplemented by other graduate students who participated in the Ukrainian program's activities on a regular basis. During the 1970s and 1980s a subsequent wave of graduate students, including Oleh Ilnytzkyj, Natalia Pylypiuk, Roman Koropeckyj, Victor Ostapchuk, Maxim Tarnawsky, Olga Andriewsky, Borys Gudziak, and Leonid Heretz, joined the Harvard group, as did young scholars from other institutions, including Don Ostrowski, Paul Hollingsworth, and George Liber. Harvard's Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI), formally established in 1973, continually attracted scholars from far and wide. They consistently found encouragement and support from its energetic director, Omeljan Pritsak.

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[7] Edward Keenan, *The Kurbskii-Groznyi Apocrypha: The Seventeenth-Century Genesis of the "Correspondence" Attributed to Prince A. M. Kurbskii and Tsar Ivan IV* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

The first pillar of the Ukrainian program at Harvard was the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies. Inaugurated on 13 October 1970, the seminar met every Thursday afternoon during the academic year, initially at Professor Pritsak's office in Widener Library; once HURI was established in a separate building owned by Harvard on Massachusetts Avenue in Cambridge, meetings were conducted in its spacious seminar room. Attendance was viewed as a sacred duty. The seminar sessions were intended to serve as a academic workshop for graduate students and common meeting place for scholars and students in various fields. Thus seminar topics encompassed all disciplines of Ukrainian studies—history, philology, linguistics, literature, arts, political science, anthropology, sociology, and economics. Over the years an array of internationally renowned scholars spoke at the seminar, drawing an audience from throughout the Harvard community. Summaries of the seminars and the discussions were published in the *Minutes of the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies* (1970–79). Frank was an engaged discussant and frequent presenter at seminar sessions. Beginning in 1976, he also served as the seminar's coordinator.

In addition to his required history courses, Frank attended all new courses offered in the Ukrainian program, including ones in philology such as Kirill Taranowski's course on Shevchenko's *Haidamaky*. He especially profited from a course taught jointly by Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Ševčenko, titled "History of Ukraine to the Seventeenth Century." Frank would later organize the publication of Professor Ševčenko's course lectures as the volume *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century*; it appeared in 1996 and has now been republished both in Ukrainian translation and a revised second edition. Frank also benefited from the expertise of Oleksander Ohloblyn, the well-known historian of Ukraine who, as a visiting professor, taught three courses in Ukrainian history at Harvard ("Select Topics," "Sources," and "Historiography of Ukraine of the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Century").

Another area of Frank's graduate student activity centered on the journal *Recenzija: A Review of Soviet Ukrainian Publications (*1970–79*)*, which the eminent Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Isaievych has recently called "an excellent (and still unsurpassed) periodical devoted to information on and criticism of Ukrainian publications in the humanities."[8] The journal was modeled on the Harvard graduate student publication in Russian history titled *Kritika,* which aimed to engage Soviet scholarship

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[8] Iaroslav [sic] Isaievych, *Voluntary Brotherhood: Confraternities of Laymen in Early Modern Ukraine* (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2006), xxv.

through in-depth reviews of books and analyses of the state of research on specific topics. *Recenzija* was established in 1970, at a time when there was a thaw in Ukrainian intellectual life, but by 1972 a pogrom of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was crippling research and publication in Soviet Ukraine. Frank wrote a number of the journal's in-depth review articles, served as an editor, and helped plan a thematic issue that commemorated the 400th anniversary of Ukrainian printing.[9]

Frank proved to be an active and effective promoter of Ukrainian studies beyond the walls of the university. In 1968, having successfully campaigned to establish a chair in Ukrainian history at Harvard, the USF, led by Stepan Chemych (president) and soon also Bohdan Tarnawsky (executive director), had made a commitment to raise an additional $1.2 million over the next five years to fund chairs in Ukrainian literature and language together with a research institute at Harvard. Hence, through the early years of Frank's graduate career the USF was engaged in a massive fundraising campaign. Harvard's Ukrainian graduate students were quickly enlisted in this effort as a way of demonstrating the success and vitality of the Ukrainian studies project there. It is fair to say that few were as keen or as creative in proposing new fundraising schemes as Frank. Beginning from this time, fundraising for Ukrainian studies would become a hallmark of his career.

When the time came to choose a topic for his doctoral dissertation, Frank decided to focus on cultural and political concepts in the early seventeenth century. With the support of Professors Keenan and Pritsak as his dissertation advisers, he returned to a study of Adam Kysil, begun several years earlier in London. It was an important and unusual dissertation topic, for reasons discussed below. Frank applied to do dissertation research in Poland and Ukraine through the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), founded in 1968. His project was accepted, and he departed for Poland to do research there. Just before he was to go on to Ukraine, Soviet officials threw Frank off the exchange. The year was 1972, when Ukraine's intelligentsia was experiencing yet another wave of arrests and repressions. Frank was later told that the mere mention of the seventeenth-century metropolitan Petro Mohyla in his research proposal was sufficient reason for rejection by the Soviet side. Puzzled IREX officials found it difficult to fathom how anyone could be denied access for such an obscure topic. Frank, of course, understood the problem. He realized that the Soviet authorities were using archival access to influence the research topics American academics chose. The de-

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[9] *Recenzija* 2, no. 2 (Spring 1972); 3, no. 2 (Spring 1973); and 4, no. 2 (Spring–Summer 1974).

nial of access to Soviet archives made him treasure the source material he had found in Poland all the more.

Fortunately Frank was able to spend his entire IREX year in Poland. He was well prepared for such study, having done a field on the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at Harvard with Zbigniew Wójcik, an outstanding specialist of seventeenth-century Polish history who had worked on Ukrainian topics at a time when they were frowned upon in Poland. Professor Wójcik was the first of scores of Polish scholars who would come to HURI for scholarly exchange and cultural dialogue in the 1970s and 1980s. (Similarly Pritsak's close relations with many Israeli academics, above all with Shmuel Ettinger, forged close contacts between scholars working on Ukrainian and Jewish history.) Through Professor Wójcik, Frank also met and worked with Józef Gierowski, Adam Kersten, Aleksandr Gieysztor, Antoni Mączak, Andrzej Poppe, Janusz Tazbir, Maria Bogucka, and other important historians in Poland. This brilliant generation of scholars managed to maintain the integrity of Polish scholarship and engage creatively with French and other Western historiographies. Although ideologically constrained in what they could write about the twentieth century, Polish scholars had a good deal of autonomy when it came to the early modern period, and some of the best minds in Poland were attracted to that field. They became Frank's mentors, not only deepening his understanding of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth but also sharing with him their approach to the craft of history. During that year Frank traveled to Warsaw, Cracow, Gdańsk, Wrocław, and Poznań to visit and use all of Poland's major archives, his search for materials often greatly aided by Polish archivists and librarians.

The Builder

Frank completed and defended his dissertation in 1976 and was appointed a lecturer in history at Harvard (1976–77). Subsequently he was promoted to assistant professor (1977–83) and associate professor (1983–85). Between 1985 and 1988 Frank served as associate director of Harvard's Ukrainian Research Institute. In fact, however, from his first academic appointment in 1977 Frank played a large role in all the institute's scholarly projects. Thus it was at Harvard that Frank's career as a professor and an administrator began.

As a scholar and a teacher, Frank filled a crucial gap in Harvard's Department of History in the 1970s and 1980s. In effect he became the resident expert on east-central Europe, the lands and peoples between Germany and Russia. All the while Frank taught a number of undergraduate courses and graduate seminars specific to Ukraine: "History of Ukraine

to the Seventeenth Century," "History of Ukraine since the Eighteenth Century," "Topics in Early Modern Ukrainian History," and "Topics in Modern Ukrainian History." He also developed a remarkably wide range of additional courses dealing with the history of Poland ("The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth" and "From the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Modern Poland"), the history of east-central Europe ("History of East-Central Europe to 1800"), and to revolution and revolts ("Political and Social Upheavals in Eastern Europe") and nationalism there ("Nation-Building and Nationalism in East-Central Europe"). One of the most popular Harvard courses he created and taught was "The Other Europe: A Cultural History of Eastern Europe," an interdisciplinary offering he taught together with Roman Koropeckyj, then a graduate student in Harvard's Slavic Department.

As his colleagues and former students can attest, Frank quickly proved to be a born teacher and a brilliant lecturer. One of his greatest strengths remains his ability to tackle very complex issues of east European history, apply a nuanced methodology, and yet make the material accessible to a broad spectrum of students. His lectures were and are perceptive, dynamic, and laced with humor. Frank's courses consistently received excellent ratings in the course guides written by and for Harvard students. Olga Andriewsky, my collaborator in writing this introduction and an editor of this Festschrift, recalls that during her time as a graduate student at Harvard in the 1980s

> It was Frank, probably more than anyone, who showed me that Ukrainian history wasn't something small and narrow, and was never done in isolation. Ukrainian history, as presented by Frank, is intimately connected to world history, to all of those big issues, problems, and themes that historians everywhere are concerned with. Frank was working on comparative history more than a decade before it became fashionable. To study Ukrainian history with Frank was to study Polish, Jewish, Hungarian, and Russian history, too. And I can honestly say that I learned more Armenian history than I ever imagined I would.
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> Frank was thinking and writing about heterogeneous cultural and social spaces, minorities, contested identities, resistance and agency long before they became mainstream themes in the academic world. He was deconstructing the grand narratives of history before doing so came into vogue. He was focusing on social history and discussing the lives of ordinary people at a time when the senior historians in the Department of History at Harvard were still debating the value of this kind of approach. To do Ukrainian studies at Harvard with Frank in the

1980s, as it turned out much to my surprise, was to do cutting-edge historical scholarship.[10]

Frank became a caring mentor to a whole generation of graduate students. He served on many of their examination committees. More importantly, perhaps, he spent countless hours offering guidance, dispensing advice, and helping graduate students to navigate the sometimes tricky shoals of academia. Rev. Borys Gudziak, another former Harvard student and now rector of the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, summed up his own experience with Frank thus:

I can say that no historian has taught me more about the craft and no teacher has been more patient with my limitations. At all the most important junctions in my academic life over the past twenty-five years [he has] been present with ideas, counsel, and friendship. [He] has given generous critical attention to virtually all of my texts and grant proposals and provided key advice.... It would be difficult to enumerate all of the ways in which [he has] helped me and the Ukrainian Catholic University. A large number of people spread around the globe are encouraged by a reassuring intuition: "When in trouble you can always count on Frank!" This, too, attests to the powerful influence that [he has] had on the lives of many of us.[11]

As Rev. Gudziak notes, many of Frank's former graduate students have kept in close touch with him, regarding him as both a friend and the *pater familias* of contemporary Ukrainian studies.

Frank also proved to be a very talented, capable, and energetic administrator. In addition to being HURI's associate director and seminar coordinator, he served as an associate editor of the institute's new journal, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (*HUS*), from 1977 to 1995. He also planned Harvard's Ukrainian summer schools, which during the 1970s and 1980s drew hundreds of students, largely from the Ukrainian diaspora, and continue today. Frank was involved in all institute activities, offering enthusiastic support and an array of ideas. The latter seemed to appear constantly, so much so that HURI's ever-competent and patient administrator, Brenda Sens, once suggested that he really ought to be limited to one idea per day.

Frank was especially creative in organizing conferences, planning special issues of *HUS*, and engaging in joint projects with scholars in the Harvard community and beyond. For example, in 1977 Frank and his

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[10] From a testimonial Olga read at Frank's Festschrift evening, 2 November 2007, at the University of Toronto.

[11] From a testimonial by Rev. Gudziak read at Frank's Festschrift evening, 2 November 2007.

colleague then at Boston University, Andrei Markovits, organized a very successful conference titled "Austria-Hungary, 1867–1918: Cultural, Social, and National Movements." The volume resulting from the conference came to be recognized as a seminal work in the field. [12] Similarly, Frank developed close relations with the Yale University scholars Riccardo Picchio, Harvey Goldblatt, Ivo Banac, and Paul Bushkovitch. That collaboration led to a conference at Yale University in 1981 called "Concepts of Nationhood in Russia and Eastern Europe in the Early Modern Period" and, subsequently, a special issue of *HUS* (vol. 10, nos. 3–4 [1986]) devoted to this groundbreaking theme, which Frank co-edited with Ivo Banac. He planned another special issue of the journal marking the 350th anniversary of the founding of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, which also became a standard work in the field.[13] *HUS*, owing in no small part to Frank's efforts, soon emerged as a leading periodical on pre-1800 east European history, with HURI an internationally recognized center in the field.

Two other anniversaries became central to Frank's work at HURI: the fiftieth anniversary in 1982–83 of the great Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33, today known as the Holodomor (literally "torture to death by hunger"), and the Millennium of the Christianization of Ukraine-Rus' commemorated in 1988. Frank was not directly involved in the research aspect of the famine project, but he was very much a part of the planning, organization, and dissemination of its research. In 1980, as the fiftieth anniversary was approaching, the USF proposed to raise funds for scholarly research on the Holodomor. On the advice of Adam Ulam, the Harvard committee contacted the British historian Robert Conquest, an internationally renowned writer and researcher on the Stalin era, to produce a monograph on the subject. At the same time, James Mace, a student of Roman Szporluk and a recent Ph.D. graduate of the University of Michigan, was hired as a researcher. As I noted earlier, Frank had encountered the testimony of Holodomor survivors in his youth, and it was a project that had great meaning for him. He was disturbed by the general silence about the Ukrainian famine in Western scholarship, as well as the refusal or reluctance to even consider the testimony of émigrés who were survivors. He was also incensed by the Soviet denial that that famine had ever occurred and by the attacks on anyone who raised the subject of the millions of people who had been starved to death. At one point a delegation from the Soviet Ukrainian Mission of the United Nations traveled to

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[12] Frank Sysyn and Andrei Markovits, eds., *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, Mass.: HURI, 1982).

[13] *HUS* 8, nos. 1–2 (June 1984).

Harvard to try to dissuade HURI's directors from pursuing the project. Professors Pritsak and Ševčenko and the institute's associates were warned that if the Ukrainian famine project was not shut down, they would not be permitted to work in Soviet archives and libraries. To their credit, HURI's directors refused to be coerced. In 1983 the institute mounted a major exhibition on the Ukrainian famine at Widener Library, and in 1986 Conquest's epochal study appeared.[14]

Publicizing current research on the Holodomor became on ongoing concern for Frank—one that he maintains to this day. In 1995, for instance, he attended an international conference on "Problems of Genocide" in Yerevan, Armenia. The paper he presented there, titled "The Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33: The Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Research and Public Discussion," remains the best analysis of this topic.[15] Since coming to Canada and joining the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS), Frank has been instrumental in organizing a number of talks and conferences on the Holodomor and publishing the resulting papers.[16] He has been closely involved in the planning of the annual academic Famine-Genocide Lectures held under the auspices of the Petro Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine at the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies of the University of Toronto and the Toronto Office of the CIUS. He has also written about the Holodomor's impact on Russian-Ukrainian relations.[17]

The Harvard Project in Commemoration of the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine was another major undertaking, and one that involved Frank's longstanding interest in religious and cultural history. The project's centerpiece—and part of Omeljan Pritsak's grand vision to show the continuity between Kyivan Rus' and later Ukrainian culture—was the inauguration of a very ambitious publishing project called the Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature. Frank was appointed an associate editor of this still ongoing series, which aims to publish the ma-

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[14] Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (London: Oxford University Press; Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press in association with the CIUS, 1986); Oksana Procyk, Leonid Heretz, and James E. Mace, *Famine in the Soviet Ukraine, 1932–1933: A Memorial Exhibition. Widener Library, Harvard University* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard College Library, 1986).

[15] Subsequently published in *Studies in Comparative Genocide* (New York and London: St. Martin's Press and Macmillan, 1999).

[16] See his preface to *The Holodomor of 1932–33: Papers from the 75th-Anniversary Conference on the Ukrainian Famine-Genocide.* Vol. 16, no. 2 (November 2008) of *The Harriman Review*.

[17] "The Famine of 1932–33 in the Discussion of Russian-Ukrainian Relations," *The Harriman Review* 15, nos. 2–3 (May 2005): 77–82.

jor medieval and early modern cultural texts of Rus'-Ukraine, both in the original and in English translation.[18] In 1984, as a way to promote interest in the history of religion on the Ukrainian lands, Frank also launched a series of reprints of important articles by major scholars in the field: a total of fourteen such booklets were published by the USF and widely disseminated as the Millennium celebration approached.[19] Frank also negotiated the creation of a research position dedicated to Ukraine at Keston College's Centre for the Study of Religion and Communist Countries (now the Keston Institute) in Oxford, England, founded in 1969 by Rev. Canon Dr. Michael Bourdeaux, a leading voice for religious freedom in the Soviet bloc. Financed by the USF as part of the Millennium project, the position was assumed by Andrew Sorokowski (1984–88), who conducted research and made a major contribution to popularizing the religious samizdat then emerging in Ukraine through publications in the authoritative periodicals *Keston News Service, Right to Believe,* and *Religion in Communist Lands.*

In many ways the Millennium Project complemented Frank's own scholarship on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ukraine. In the course of his career he has published a number of groundbreaking articles on the role of religion in the early modern period.[20] He has also writ-

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[18] As part of the Millennium project, Harvard sponsored a major international conference held in Ravenna, Italy, in April 1988. The proceedings of the conference were published in *HUS* 12–13 (1988–89).

[19] Bohdan Bociurkiw, *Ukrainian Churches under Soviet Rule: Two Case Studies* (1984); Ihor Ševčenko, *Byzantine Roots of Ukrainian Christianity* (1984); Ivan Hvat, *The Catacomb Ukrainian Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II* (1984); *From Kievan Rus' to Modern Ukraine: Formation of the Ukrainian Nation*—articles by Omeljan Pritsak, John Reshetar, and Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1984); Vasyl Markus, *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine after 1945* (1985); Ihor Ševčenko, *The Many Worlds of Peter Mohyla* (1985); George Y. Shevelov, *Two Orthodox Ukrainian Churchmen of the Early Eighteenth Century: Teofan Prokopovych and Stefan Iavors'kyi* (1985); Omeljan Pritsak, *On the Writing of History in Kievan Rus'* (1986); John-Paul Himka, *The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society in Austrian Galicia* (1986); Omeljan Pritsak, *When and Where was Ol'ga Baptized?* (1987); Frank E. Sysyn, *The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR* (1987); Frank E. Sysyn, *History, Culture, and Nation: An Examination of Seventeenth-Century Ukrainian History* Writing (1988); Andrew Sorokowski, *Ukrainian Catholics and Orthodox in Poland and Czechoslovakia* (1988); George H. Williams, *Protestants in the Ukrainian Lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth* (1988).

[20] "The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine,* 1–23, ed. Geoffrey A. Hoskings, (Edmonton: CIUS; London: Macmillan, 1990); "The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Tradition of the Kiev Metropolitanate," in *Kirchen im Kontext unterschiedlichen Kulturen,* 625–40, ed. Karl C. Felmy (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1991); "The Union of Brest and the Question of National Identity," in *400 Jahre Kirchenunion von Brest,* 10–22, ed. Hans-Joachim Torke (Berlin: Freie

ten widely on more modern topics, such as religion in the twentieth century.[21] Indeed, in the early 1980s, well before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Frank was one of the first analysts to presage the revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.[22]

In 1989 Frank received an offer to head the newly created Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the CIUS at the University of Alberta.[23] In many ways the division between the American and Canadian phases of his career may be termed his "before Ukraine" and "with Ukraine" phases. Glasnost and Perestroika came late to Ukraine, so contacts there were just beginning as Frank left Harvard. Soon after he arrived in Canada, Ukraine became independent (1991). As a result, the field of Ukrainian studies was fundamentally transformed. A major part of Frank's activity in Canada has thus been associated with new opportunities and challenges in Ukraine.

Frank arrived in Edmonton in November 1990 to assume his duties as director of the Peter Jacyk Centre. When CIUS director Bohdan Krawchenko took a leave and left for Ukraine at the beginning of 1991, Frank also became acting director of CIUS. He served in that capacity until January 1993, when I, already in Edmonton as head of the CIUS's new Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, became the institute's new acting director. After the untimely demise of his colleague and friend Danylo Husar Struk in 1999, Frank became head of CIUS's Toronto office. Working closely with Roman Senkus, Marko Stech, Andrii Makuch, and the late Taras Zakydalsky, among others, he has contributed greatly to CIUS projects such as the Internet *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, the CIUS Publications Program, and the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*. In doing so he has enhanced the institute's scholarly profile and worked tirelessly to secure funding for its endeavors.

Universität Berlin); "Orthodoxy and Revolt: The Role of Religion in the Seventeenth-Century Ukrainian Uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth," in *Religion and the Early Modern State: Views from China, Russia, and the West*, 154–84, ed. James D. Tracy and Marguette Ragnow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[21] See "The Eastern Orthodox Church in the Ukraine," *Religion in Communist Lands* 14, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 73–76; "Politics and Orthodoxy in Independent Ukraine," *The Harriman Review* 15, nos. 2–3 (May 2005): 8–19; also five articles published in Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine* (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2003).

[22] In his article "The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR," *Religion in Communist Lands* 11, no. 3 (Winter 1983): 251–63.

[23] Before moving to Canada, Frank took up a fellowship at the Kennan Institute in Washington, followed by a yearlong stay in Germany on a grant from the Humboldt Foundation.

As Frank was contributing to the revitalization of CIUS as a whole, he was also organizing the new Jacyk Centre. Its founding donor, the late Peter (Petro) Jacyk of Toronto, proposed that the new centre's major project be a translation of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, a monumental history of Ukraine published in ten volumes between 1898 and 1937.[24] Frank accepted the idea and set to work. In order to make the volumes accessible to the contemporary English-language reader and valuable even to scholars who could read the original Ukrainian, Frank believed that the Hrushevsky Translation Project (HTP) would also need to be an extensive research project on Hrushevsky and his work, including providing full bibliographic information about the literature cited in the notes, tracing the fate of archival sources, and updating the academic literature pertinent to each volume of the translation. Above all, it meant placing Hrushevsky's contribution within the context of current historical knowledge. All of this required engaging excellent translators, outstanding scholars as subject editors, and a staff of competent editors and specialists for each volume. In short, Frank envisioned the HTP as an enormous scholarly enterprise.[25]

Frank organized and co-ordinated a production process spanning two continents and six countries. He assembled a formidable team of translators, subject editors, content editors, specialists, and consultants. From the outset he has been aided by two very capable editors, Uliana Pasicznyk, formerly at HURI, and Myroslav Yurkevich of the CIUS. Six translators—Marta Skorupsky, Ian Press, the late Bohdan Strumiński, Andrij Kudla Wynnyckyj, Leonid Heretz, and Marta Daria Olynyk—have worked on the history's ten volumes. Numerous scholars have served as specialist editors and consultants, including Bohdan Strumiński, Ihor Ševčenko, Paul Hollingsworth, Simon Franklin, András Riedlmayer, Barbara Voytek, Adrian Mandzy, Maria Subtelny, Martin Dimnik, Victor Ostapchuk, Volodymyr Mezentsev, Robert Romanchuk, and Tomasz Wislicz. Frank has also enlisted the scholars Andrzej Poppe, Serhii Plokhy, Yaroslav Fedoruk, Myron Kapral, Andrew Pernal, Paul

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[24] See Frank E. Sysyn, "Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*," <www .ualberta.ca/CIUS/Jacykcentre/About-Ukraine_Rus.html>.

[25] Judging by reactions to the five volumes already published, Frank's approach to the HTP has been highly successful. See the reviews by Charles J. Halperin in *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1, no. 1 (2000); David Saunders in *European History Quarterly* 28 (1998); Caroline Finkel in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 62, pt. 2 (2001); Brian J. Boeck in *Russian Review* 63, no. 4 (2004); and Paul W. Knoll in *Polish Review* 49, no. 2 (2004). These and many other reviews of the volumes are posted at <www.utoronto.ca/cius/publications/books/hrushevskyv1.htm> and its subsequent Web pages.

Knoll, Paul Hollingsworth, and Yaroslav Isaievych as subject editors. In fact, Frank recruited Serhii Plokhy, since 2008 the Mykhailo S. Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University and one of the editors of the present Festschrift, from Dnipropetrovsk University in 1992 to work on the project. By 1996 Serhii was associate director of the Jacyk Centre and head of the HTP in Edmonton, while Frank has headed its Toronto office. Most of the bibliographic work on the HTP has been done by Andrii Grechylo and his colleagues at the Institute of Ukrainian Archeography in Lviv, headed by Yaroslav Dashkevych. Frank himself has co-edited the five volumes published thus far and written two of the long scholarly essays that serve as introductions to each volume.[26]

Frank's work at the Peter Jacyk Centre has not been limited to the HTP. In the early 1990s he established a monograph series at CIUS Press of important works on Ukrainian history.[27] Recognizing the need to make scholarly work published in the West available to scholars in Ukraine, he also initiated a series, called Ukrainian Historiography in the West, of Ukrainian translations of Western works on Ukrainian history.[28] Frank has continuously been an active organizer of the Jacyk Centre's lectures, exchanges, and conferences.[29] He has also established a collaborative

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[26] For the first English-language volume (1997) Frank wrote the inaugural "Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. In April 1992 the National Endowment for the Humanities, in Washington, D.C., awarded the HTP a grant toward the translation of the volumes covering the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks (vols. 7–10); consequently they have appeared before other volumes. For volume 8 (2002), Frank wrote "Assessing the 'Crucial Epoch': From the Cossack Revolts to the Khmelnytsky Uprising at Its Height," xxxi–lxix.

[27] Ihor Ševčenko, *Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (1996); Iaroslav Isaievych, *Voluntary Brotherhood: Confraternities of Laymen in Early Modern Ukraine* (2006); Paulina Lewin, *Ukrainian Drama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (2008); and Vasyl Kuchabsky, *Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923,* trans. Gus Fagan (2009).

[28] The first publication in this series, called Zakhidna istoriohrafiia Ukrainy, was *Istorychni ese,* 2 vols. (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1994) by the late Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky, the prominent intellectual and professor of history at the University of Alberta (1971–84). The subsequent volumes are my *Rosiiskyi tsentralizm i ukrainska avtonomiia: Likvidatsiia Hetmanshchyny, 1760–1830 roky* (Kyiv: Osnova, 1996); Ihor Shevchenko [Ševčenko], *Ukraina mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom: Narysy z istorii kultury do pochatku XVIII stolittia* (Lviv: Instytut Lvivskoi bohoslovskoi akademii, 2001); my *Korinnia identychnosty: Studii z rannomodernoi istorii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004); Serhii Plokhii [Plokhy], *Nalyvaikova vira: Kozatsvo ta relihiia v ranomodernii Ukraini* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2005); and Bohdan Botsiurkiv [Bociurkiw], *Ukrainska Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva i Radianska derzhava (1939–1950)* (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Ukrainskoho katolytskoho universytetu, 2005).

[29] The most recent example is a conference on Armenian-Ukrainian relations cosponsored with the Manoogian Armenian Chair at the University of Michigan, the Ukrainian

project with Russian and Ukrainian colleagues to publish documents on the Ukrainian Cossacks held in Russian archives,[30] a project headed by his former student, Professor Victor Ostapchuk of the University of Toronto.

The rebirth of historical studies in Ukraine has been a major focus of Frank's activities. In the early 1990s, as director of the Jacyk Centre, he established a program in co-operation with Andrzej Poppe, the noted Polish historian, to fund research visits by Ukrainian scholars to Polish archives and libraries. He wanted young Ukrainian scholars to have the experience he had enjoyed twenty years earlier, learning from Polish historians and gaining access to the vast body of sources in Polish repositories. He was also instrumental in the creation of a new Institute of Historical Studies at Lviv National University, using funds donated to CIUS by Petro and Ivanna Stelmach of Mississauga, Ontario, who in making their gift stipulated that once Ukraine became independent stipulated that once Ukraine became independent the income should be used to fund a program at that university. Recently Frank has expanded the activity of the Jacyk Centre through inauguration of the Petro Jacyk Program in Modern Ukrainian History and Society. Established through a $500,000 donation from Nadia Jacyk and the Petro Jacyk Education Foundation that was matched by the Government of Alberta, the program is a joint venture of the University of Alberta, Lviv National University, and the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. The program has set out to sponsor publication of the academic journal *Ukraina moderna*, establish a Ph.D. program in Lviv on modern Ukraine, and promote projects on twentieth-century history using archival resources and oral history collections in Ukraine and Canada.

Enumerating all of Frank's scholarly activities over the last two decades in Canada is beyond the scope of this essay. He has been involved in many conferences, publications, and research projects dealing with early modern Ukrainian history, Ukrainian historiography and historical consciousness, the evolution of ethnic and national identity among the Slavs, and Ukrainian-Russian relations in the past and present. A few examples should suffice, however, to illustrate the remarkable breadth of Frank's vision, organizational skills, and academic contacts, as well as the depth of his impact on the field.

Catholic University, and the Lviv branch of the Institute of Archeography of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, held in Lviv on 28–30 May 2008.

[30] *Dokumenty rosiiskykh arkhiviv z istorii Ukrainy,* vol. 1, *Dokumenty do istorii zaporozkoho kozatstva, 1613–1620* (Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha, 1998).

One of the very first projects that Frank initiated through the Jacyk Centre was an international conference in 1991 on the Khmelnytsky era, organized jointly with Serhii Plokhy, who at that time was still working in Ukraine. Attended by scholars from North America, Germany, Poland, and Ukraine, the conference took place in Dnipropetrovsk, a city closed to foreigners until the late 1980s, and at a university named in honor of the "300th Anniversary of the Reunification of Ukraine with Russia."

A major on-going project that Frank and I worked on together during the 1990s, in collaboration with Andreas Kappeler of the University of Cologne and Mark von Hagen of Columbia University, was a series of four international conferences on Russian-Ukrainian relations. That project, awarded funding by the NEH in the United States and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Germany, was titled "Peoples, Nations, Identities: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter." It brought together dozens of leading scholars from Canada, the United States, Germany, England, Italy, Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, and Poland. CIUS Press published selected papers from the first three meetings in 2003, and the Harriman Institute of Columbia University issued the proceedings of the fourth.[31]

Frank has repeatedly shown his willingness to assist colleagues in any endeavor of scholarly importance to Ukrainian studies. In 1998 he helped Moshe Rossman, professor of Jewish history at Bar Ilan University in Israel, to arrange the participation of a Ukrainian contingent at a major international conference dealing with the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the Jews. Entitled *"Gezeirot Ta"h*—Jews, Cossacks, Poles, and Peasants in 1648 Ukraine," the conference was hosted by Bar-Ilan University, Israel's second-largest academic institution. A selection of the conference papers, including Frank's contribution on the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the Jewish massacres, were published as a special issue of the journal *Jewish History* (vol. 17, no. 2, 2003), based at the University of Haifa. The volume's editors, Kenneth Stow and Adam Teller of the University of Haifa, hailed the conference and publication as a major breakthrough in discussion and research on this topic, particularly in examining events in comparative ways that take into account the broader context and the varying Jewish, Ukrainian, and Polish perspectives.

Frank's scholarly and organizational activities have long ranged far beyond the CIUS. In the last fifteen years he has been instrumental in the continued development of Ukrainian studies in Germany and the United

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[31] Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen, eds., *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)* (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2003); *Peoples, Nations, Identities: The Russian-Ukrainian Encounter,* vol. 9, nos. 1–2 (Spring 1996) of *The Harriman Review.*

States. Frank's acquaintance with German academia dates from 1989, when he spent the full year as a research fellow of the Humboldt Foundation. Since then he has returned to Germany as a Humboldt scholar on a regular basis. During these sojourns Frank has conducted research and taught at the University of Cologne and established wide contacts with German scholars, including Drs. Andreas Kappeler in Cologne (now at the University of Vienna), Edgar Hösch and Martin Schulze-Wessel in Munich, and the late Hans Torke in Berlin. In this respect he has played no small part in the remarkable growth of interest in Ukrainian history in German scholarship.

Frank's frequent stays in Germany have also given him the opportunity to become involved with the Ukrainian Free University (UFU) in Munich. Established in Vienna in 1921 and soon after transferred to Prague, where it remained until 1945, the UFU was originally staffed by émigré scholars from the Ukrainian People's Republic and western Ukraine. It was revived in Munich in 1946 and officially recognized by the Bavarian government in 1950. With Ukrainian independence in 1991, the UFU had to rethink its mission. Frank has been part of the effort to save the institution and ensure the preservation of its archives and library, based on his conviction that it should be a center of research and a cultural and academic bridge between Germany and Ukraine. He continues to serve the university as a professor, advisor, and dean of the Philosophical Faculty. In these roles he has fostered contacts between German scholars and the UFU and is helping to define a new role for the institution.

Another project dear to Frank's heart is the Ukrainian Studies Program at Columbia University in New York. When Mark von Hagen, then professor of Russian and Soviet history there and director of Columbia's Harriman Institute, began to explore the possibility of creating such a program in the 1990s, Frank offered his full support and assistance. Specifically, Frank persuaded the Petro Jacyk Educational Foundation to fund a visiting professorship at the university. With Frank's encouragement, soon two other American organizations joined the endeavor—the Ukrainian Studies Fund, which began financing a core program, and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the United States, which funded several years of teaching history. Frank has himself taught at Columbia on a regular basis; in particular, he has helped graduate students in the Slavic and east European field to develop a knowledge of Ukrainian studies. The program at Columbia has also served as an important training ground for recent Ph.D. recipients in Ukrainian studies, providing valuable teaching and professional experience at one of the leading centers of Slavic and eastern European studies in the world.

Finally, it should be mentioned that Frank played an instrumental role in organizing the first major international Ukrainian studies conference to be held in Donetsk, Ukraine. As vice-president (for North America) of the International Association of Ukrainianists (MAU) from 2002 to 2005, he worked very closely with the then president, Mark von Hagen, and the organizing committee to plan the Sixth International Ukrainian Studies Congress held in Donetsk in June 2005, in the wake of the Orange Revolution. That congress brought together more than six hundred participants from around the world.

The Historian and Scholar

Though Frank can rightly be considered one of the major builders of Ukrainian studies in the Western world for over three decades, I believe his most lasting legacy will be as a researcher and scholar. The quality and range of his scholarship and academic interests, as already indicated, are truly remarkable. As a specialist on the early modern period, Frank has made major contributions to our understanding of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ukrainian religious and social history, the nature of the Khmelnytsky revolt, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century historical writings, and the defining elements of early modern Ukrainian political culture. His knowledge of primary and secondary sources related to the history of Ukraine, including Polish and Russian ones, is extraordinary. Indeed, his work has often challenged colleagues, especially those who study more modern periods, to revisit their assumptions about the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries by looking more carefully at the evidence. Some of his most penetrating analysis has, in fact, been associated with the publication of source materials. His careful attention to sources, combined with an appreciation for broad general and comparative contexts, has become a hallmark of his research.

Frank's monograph *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* was a groundbreaking work when it was published in 1985, and today it still stands as a prime example of the sweeping scale and sophisticated nature of his approach to Ukrainian history. On one level, it is a biography of a prominent seventeenth-century statesman and diplomat in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth who served as a negotiator between Orthodox and Uniates and between the Polish government and the Cossack Host. On another level, *Between Poland and the Ukraine* represents a major reinterpretation of political culture in that time, as well as a highly original synthesis of two historiographic traditions, the Polish and the Ukrainian. Through charting the course of Kysil's rise in the Commonwealth, Frank examined numerous aspects of that multinational entity and its relation to the various strata of

the Ukrainian lands. In looking at the strains and demands placed on the famous palatine Kysil, he defined what he aptly called the statesman's dilemma. Building on the work of Viacheslav Lypynsky, Frank in effect addressed and analyzed one of the most cherished concepts historians of early modern Poland have held, namely, that of the existence of a *gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*, of which Kysil was often seen as a classic example. Essential to the interpretation of the phrase was the idea that the nobility of Ukraine and Belarus had come to identify primarily with the political "nation" of the Polish nobility (*natio*), and that Ruthenian *gens* represented ethnic origin. As Frank showed in his study, this oft-repeated phrase was not present in any of Kysil's writings or in any contemporary writings about him. Moreover, Frank's examination of hundreds of Kysil's letters and writings, as well as those of his contemporaries, convinced Frank that at this time there was a growing sense of Ruthenian identity in Ukrainian society that deeply influenced Kysil's own thinking. Even though Kysil was a Polish senator and ultimately sided with the government, he was a member and leader of the old Orthodox Ruthenian nobility, saw himself as Ruthenian, and strongly supported the Orthodox and Ruthenian cause. In certain contexts this Ruthenian identity—an allegiance to an ethno-cultural–religious community—clearly transcended estate boundaries.

Frank also discovered in Kysil's writings evidence of an emerging sense of regional identity that served as the basis for a Ukrainian political identity—a notion of *patria,* as Frank later called it, invoking a concept that the eminent early modern specialist John Elliott had employed so effectively in discussions of proto-national sentiments in the context of early modern revolts.[32] For example, Kysil spoke of the four palatinates of Volhynia, Bratslav, Kyiv, and Chernihiv as a Rus' that was a single territorial unit with specific rights and privileges. (The first three palatinates had been part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and were incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland by the Union of Lublin in 1569, whereas the fourth was created in 1635 from lands won from Muscovy.) That sense of territorial identity, Frank suggested, remained alive in the post-1648 "Cossack era" and played a vital role in the political outlook of the Hetmanate.

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[32] Frank paid particular attention to Elliott's "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe," in *Past and Present* 42 (February 1969): 35–56, in writing his own article "Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century: The Role of National Consciousness and National Conflict in the Khmelnytsky Movement," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, 58–82, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS, 1980).

With his book on Kysil, Frank single-handedly resurrected the question of Ruthenian identity (*ruskyi narod*) and raised a number of larger problems and themes he would return to in his later work: how does one define this kind of Ruthenian identity, how were identities cultivated and transmitted from one social and cultural structure to another, and how did they manifest themselves during the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky? As a consequence of Frank's work, these are questions that have also been taken up by a subsequent generation of specialists, including Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, David Frick, Serhii Plokhy, and David Althoen, as well as many historians in Ukraine, especially through the prism of the teaching and scholarly work of Natalia Yakovenko.

Frank moved naturally to the study of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the great Ukrainian revolt of 1648, and the establishment of the Cossack Hetmanate. He has written numerous articles on these topics, which together comprise a major analytical discussion of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. In numerous instances Frank has brought the historical discussions on revolts and the crisis of the seventeenth century to bear on that historical period and, at the same time, made it possible for early modern European specialists to place those Polish and Ukrainian events in a comparative context. He has looked at the structure of the uprising, asking whether it should be considered a "revolution" or a "revolt," and discussed questions of innovation and renovation within it. Frank has provided a new analysis of the social tensions leading to the uprising and has re-examined the Jewish massacres that occurred therein. He has discussed the relation of the uprising to national consciousness and Ukrainian nation building in comparison to other contemporary cases, for instance, that of the Czechs. Of Frank's discussions in this regard, I especially admire the "Discourse on the Present Cossack or Peasant War," his publication and commentary on a source written by a Polish Catholic polemicist and opponent of the Khmelnytsky revolt, which Frank himself discovered.[33] As in so many of his source publications, here Frank provides a masterful and meticulous examination of a source linked to a discussion of major methodological and conceptual questions.[34] Thus, in a

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[33] "Seventeenth-Century Views on the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: An Examination of the `Discourse about the Present Cossack-Peasant War,'" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (hereafter *HUS*) 5, no. 4 (December 1981): 430–66; see also his article "A Contemporary's Account of the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising," *HUS* 5, no. 2 (June 1981): 254–67.

[34] For other such examinations, see Frank's articles "The *Antimaxia* of 1632 and the Polemics over Uniate-Orthodox Relations," *HUS* 10, nos. 1–2 (June 1985): 145–65, cowritten with Paulina Lewin; "A Curse on Both Their Houses: Catholic Attitudes towards Jews and Eastern Orthodox during the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising in Father Paweł Ruszel's

series of smaller and larger articles, as well in his work on Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, Frank has explored various aspects of the Khmelnytsky Uprising.[35] Problems of historical vision, identity, political culture, and continuity sparked Frank's interest in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century history writing and historical thought. Here, too, he sought to bring the historiographic discussions underway among historians of early modern Europe to a Ukrainian topic.[36] His writings, like those by

Fawor niebieski," in *Israel and the Nations: Essays Presented in Honor of Shmuel Ettinger*, ix–xxiv, ed. Shmuel Almog et al. (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History and the Historical Society of Israel, 1987); and "'The Buyer and Seller of the Greek Faith': A Pasquinade in the Ruthenian Language against Adam Kysil," in *Камень Краеѫгъльнъ: Rhetoric of the Medieval Slavic World. Essays Presented to Edward L. Keenan on his Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students* (Cambridge, Mass.: HURI, 1997), 655–70, vol. 19 (1995) of *HUS*; and "Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility's Grievances at the Diet of 1641," *HUS* 6, no. 2 (June 1982): 167–90.

[35] In addition to his articles "Orthodoxy and Revolt: The Role of Religion in the Seventeenth-Century Ukrainian Uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth," "A Curse on Both Their Houses," and "Ukrainian Polish-Relations," noted above, see "The Jewish Factor in Khmelnytsky Uprising," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 43–54, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 1988); "The Khmelnytsky Uprising and Ukrainian Nation-Building," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (hereafter *JUS*), 17, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1992): 141–70; "Ukrainian Social Tensions before the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising," in *Religion and Culture in Early Modern Russia and Ukraine*, 52–70, ed. Samuel H. Baron and Nancy Shields Kollmann (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997); "The Political Worlds of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi," in *Χρυσαι Πύλαι / Златая врата: Essays Presented to Ihor Ševčenko on His Eightieth Birthday by His Colleagues and Students* 2: 197–209, ed. Peter Schreiner and Olga Strakhov, vol. 10, no. 2 (2002) of *Palaeoslavica*; "Yevrei ta povstannia Bohdana Khmelnytskoho," in *Mappa mundi: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats na poshanu Yaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70–richchia*, 479–88, ed. Ihor Hyrych et al. (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo M. P. Kots, 1996); "War der Chmel'nyckyj-Aufstand eine Revolution? Eine Charakteristik der 'großen ukrainischen Revolte' und der Bildung des kosakischen Het'manstaates," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (hereafter *JGO*), 43, no. 1 (1995): 1–18; and "The Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: A Characterization of the Ukrainian Revolt," *Jewish History* 17, no. 2 (2003): 115–39. For Frank's work on the historiography about the hetman and the uprising, see his "Bohdan Chmel'nyc'kyj's Image in Ukrainian Historiography since Independence," in *Ukraine*, 179–88, ed. Peter Jordan et al, vol. 15 of *Österreichische Osthefie* (Vienna: Peter Lang, 2001); "Grappling with the Hero: Hrushevs'kyi Confronts Khmel'nyts'kyi," *HUS* 22 (1998): 589–609; "The Changing Image of the Hetman," *JGO* 46, no. 4 (1998): 531–45; "The Jewish Massacres in the Historiography of the Khmelnytsky Uprising: A Review Article," *JUS* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 83–89; and "English-Language Historiography in the Twentieth Century on the Pereiaslav Agreement," *Russian History* 32, nos. 3–4 (2005): 513–30.

[36] For instance, Frank introduced the discussions conducted in *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe, ed.* Orest Ranum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) to the Ukrainian case.

all Ukrainian specialists outside Ukraine, must be viewed in the context of work done without access to all the sources. While scholars in Russia could edit and publish early modern chronicles and histories, specialists in Ukraine could not, especially after the disbanding of the Archeographic Commission during the attack on "Ukrainian nationalism" in 1972.[37] Hence specialists on Ukraine working in the West did not have available the sources and source studies their colleagues working on Russia enjoyed.

After several attempts gaining access to archival materials by applying for academic exchanges with the Soviet Union, Frank was finally accepted in 1980. At first he was told that during his four- to five-month stay he would not be permitted into any archives or manuscript divisions. When, in response, he threatened to leave, he was allowed a mere five days in the Central Scientific Library's Manuscript Division in Kyiv to examine one manuscript of Sofonovych's history, which was published (by Yurii Mytsyk) only after the fall of the Soviet Union.

From his early days working on *Recenzija*, Frank been interested in early modern Ukrainian history writing and the terms and concepts found there.[38] Aware that colleagues in Ukraine were unable even to publish historical texts and could hardly discuss the histories and chronicles in any broader context, he undertook to do so. In a series of pioneering works, Frank began analyzing early modern sources, posing questions such as how did Ukrainians of the time understand historical continuity, political structures, society; what was their social, ethnic, and cultural worldview; and how were historical narratives constructed and by whom, for whom, and why? In answering these questions, Frank concentrated on a period when chronicle writing was transformed into history writing, largely under the influence of Polish historiography. These writings were usually seen as constituting two waves of literary activity: the seven-

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[37] Until 1991 research on the Cossack chronicles and early modern historiography in Soviet Ukraine was very limited. In the 1921 an archeographic commission was established at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences to publish scholarly editions of the early modern texts; it was disbanded in the early 1930s, after it had published an initial volume of Velychko's chronicle. The commission was resurrected in 1969 but was abolished again after the study of Ukrainian historiography was officially attacked in 1972. The poor state of archeography and of publication of sources hampered study of the texts. In the 1970s and 1980s work in that area was carried on primarily at Dnipropetrovsk State University by Professor Mykola Kovalsky and his students Yurii Mytsyk and Serhii Plokhii (Plokhy); however, despite working on texts such as the unpublished Sofonovych chronicle, they could not address major issues or undertake even the publication of sources.

[38] See his review of *Lvivs'kyj litopys i Ostroz'kyi litopysec'* in *Recenzija* 3, no. 2 (Spring 1973): 27–45.

teenth-century clerical chronicles and the eighteenth-century Cossack histories and chronicles.

As always, Frank cleaved closely to his sources in identifying the concepts used in the texts and their function. He also argued for a nuanced approach to trends in history writing, such as distinguishing among varying currents in clerical history writing of the 1670s represented by Teodosii Sofonovych and the author of *Synopsis* (presumably Inokentii Gizel). As Frank's research showed, in the seventeenth century some Orthodox clergy, even though their primary worldview was religious, wrote and compiled histories in defense of their faith that also enabled the Ruthenian *narod*—nobles, clergymen, burghers, Cossacks, and perhaps even the occasional literate peasant—to understand the past of their community and bolster the significance of a Ruthenian people in a time of cultural and religious conflict. These histories sought to link the Ruthenians then to eleventh- and twelfth-century Rus' and thus to confer on it the same kind of ancient pedigree, authority, and historical legitimacy the other "nations" of the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania enjoyed.[39] Frank also examined the second wave of historical writings that came after the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the emergence of an autonomous polity, the Hetmanate. These early eighteenth-century writings, the so-called Cossack chronicles, were produced primarily by an early modern Ukrainian lay intelligentsia and focused on the more recent past in order to glorify the Cossacks and legitimize their ancient privileges and rights. Frank's study centered on how the political and social changes in Ukraine were reflected in those texts.[40]

More broadly, in his study of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century history writing Frank has been able to outline the emergence and developments of various political and social concepts. One of the most important of these was the significance of *patria*, or fatherland, in early modern Ukrainian political thought. [41] Frank's earlier work on Kysil had revealed the existence of a

[39] See his articles "The Cultural, Social and Political Context of Ukrainian History-Writing in the Seventeenth Century," in *Dall'Opus Oratorium alla Ricerca Documentaria: La storiografia polacca, ucraina e russa fra il XVI e il XVIII Secolo*, 285–310, ed. Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, Europa Orientalis 5 ([Salerno]: Istituto di linguistica, Università di Salerno, 1986); "Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690," *HUS* 10, nos. 3–4 (December 1986): 393–423; and "Recovering the Ancient and Recent Past: The Shaping of Memory and Identity in Early Modern Ukraine," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 35, no. 1 (2001): 77–84.

[40] "The Image of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian Relations in Ukrainian Historiography of the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries," in *Culture, Nation, and Identity*, 108–43, ed. Kappeler et al., 108–43; "The Nation of Cain: Poles in Samiilo Velychko's *Skazanye*," *JUS* 29 (Summer–Winter 2004): 443–55.

[41] See Frank's "Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture," in

strong territorial identity at that time. In his subsequent work he has shown how, after the establishment of the Hetmanate, in the territories that this polity encompassed the concept of Ukraine as fatherland remained an object of loyalty for the elite, and how, through the Cossack chronicles, this allegiance continued to exert a powerful influence on that elite's political imagination up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Frank has also pointed out the influence of the Cossack chronicles on Ukrainian political and national thought in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s. In this respect, he has made a compelling case for a certain continuity of Ukrainian political culture.[42] Just as he had shown that an arbitrary division should not be made between Ukraine before and after 1648, so, too, he has argued against using 1800 as an arbitrary divide, while stressing the importance of the eighteenth century in understanding the political and social concepts of the nineteenth, including those of the "Ukrainian national revival."

Indeed, one of Frank's most important contributions to the study of Ukrainian history lies in his raising the matter of early modern Ukrainian nationhood and the role it may have played in the formation of modern Ukraine. He has illuminated the complexity of early modern concepts of nations and peoples and, in particular, of notions of historical continuity. Frank has drawn from the divergent but rich legacies of Hrushevsky and Lypynsky on the Ruthenian nation and applied them to discussions of nation in the Commonwealth, taking into account recent theoretical works on nation and recent scholarship on the early modern period in Europe. Along the way he has effectively contested the idea, long prevalent in Polish history, that nationhood in the Commonwealth was embodied solely by the *szlachta* (Ukrainian: *shliakhta* 'nobility'), or *naród szlachecki*, and has made a strong case for the inclusion of other social groups, such as the burghers and Cossacks, in discussions of nation. Frank has challenged the assumption that after the Union of Lublin of 1569 nation meant only one *szlachta* nation, or that there existed an all-embracing Sarmatian myth that all nobles of the Commonwealth were

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Mazepa e i suoi successori: Storia, cultura, societa / Mazepa and His Followers: History, Culture, Society, 39–53, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2004); and its revised version in Ukrainian, "'Otchyzna' u politychnii kulturi Ukrainy pochatku XVIII stolittia," *Ukraina moderna*, no. 10 (2006): 7–19.

[42] See his articles 'The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity," *HUS* 14, nos. 3–4 (1991): 593–607; and "The Persistence of the Little Russian Fatherland in the Russian Empire: The Evidence from *The History of the Rus' or of Little Rossia* (*Istoriia Rusov ili Maloi Rossii*)," in *Imperienvergleich: Beispiele und Ansätze aus osteuropäischer Perspektive. Festschrift für Andreas Kappeler*, 39–50, ed. Guido Hausmann and Angela Rustemeyer (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009).

descended from the Sarmatians and thus had a distinctly different lineage from other segments of the population. He has urged us not to be limited by clichés, such as *gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus,* and to look fully at the sources before accepting arbitrary and exclusive definitions of the meaning of *narod.* That approach has been vindicated by recent research showing that this phrase did not occur in the early modern period and that in the Commonwealth during that time, *natio* and *gens* did not have the political-nation/ethnic-origin distinction that those using the phrase since then have attributed to it.[43]

Frank has urged colleagues working on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Polish history not to ignore the significance of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, for that is where the Commonwealth model failed. He has also tried to turn their attention to the Hetmanate—the partial offspring of the Commonwealth—which developed a new model. In the course of his own work Frank has shown that the sources themselves simply do not support many of the categorical views of today, and that, as in the case of Adam Kysil, notions of self-identity, loyalty, and belonging were complicated, contradictory, and changing. Most important, to my mind, is Frank's identification of elements of early modern political culture and political thought—the idea of Ukrainians (Ruthenians, and later "Cossack–Sarmatian–Little Russian Ukrainians") as a *narod* and Ukraine as a fatherland—that eventually came to serve as the basis for a modern Ukrainian identity.[44]

In many ways, Frank's work on concepts of nationhood and national identity in early modern Ukraine and Poland anticipated, by several years, the challenge to the "modernist" orthodoxy that nations are entirely a nineteenth-century invention.[45] Moreover, Frank's scholarship, as already noted, continues to find resonance among a growing number of scholars. One can certainly find echoes of his work in my own writing, as well as that of Serhii Plokhy. This is not surprising, since for over fifteen years we formed a close scholarly group focusing on early modern Ukraine and regularly exchanged ideas and written drafts of our work on this period.[46]

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[43] David Althoen, "*Natione Polonus* and the *Naród Szlachecki*: Two Myths of National Identity and Noble Solidarity,"*Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 52, no. 4 (2003): 475–508.

[44] For the most concise discussion of Frank's views on early modern concepts of nation in the Ukrainian lands and the link between the early modern and modern periods, see his "Constructing and Reconstructing Nations: Reflections on Timothy Snyder's Contribution to the Ukrainian Case," *HUS* 25, nos. 3–4 (2001): 281–92.

[45] In the 1990s this challenge was led by Benedict Anderson, Liah Greenfeld, David Bell, Adrian Hastings, and, most recently, Linda Colley.

[46] This is reflected in Serhii Plokhy's prefaces in his monographs *The Cossacks and Re-*

Finally, any review of Frank's scholarly pursuits would be incomplete without mentioning that since the late 1980s he has also been working on a regional rural history of western Ukraine, focusing on his grandfather's village of Mshanets and the surrounding area. In the mid-1980s, when it was still impossible for Western scholars in Ukraine to conduct interview projects, Frank and his former student at Harvard, Leonid Heretz, began interviewing immigrants from that region who had emigrated to the United States and Canada. Since 1991, when Ukraine became independent, the project has expanded dramatically, for it finally became possible to conduct extensive interviews in the Mshanets area itself. Frank and Leonid are also working with the new Petro Jacyk Program in Modern Ukrainian History and Society in Lviv to publish Reverend Mykhailo Zubrytsky's collected works. Their Mshanets project offers an important and valuable view of history "from below." In this respect, for Frank it represents a logical next step in a scholarly career often spent decentering conceptions of the past through the study of minorities, rural and regional elites, and popular perceptions of national and religious identity.

For now, it is appropriate to end the story of Frank Sysyn here, in his grandfather's ancestral village, where this narrative began. By all measures, Frank's journey thus far has been an extraordinary one. The impact of his remarkable career has been directly felt in five countries and on two continents. Since Frank first began working as a lecturer in history at Harvard in the late 1970s, he has trained two, if not three, generations of graduate students. He has helped develop the two leading institutions of Ukrainian studies in North America, planning, organizing, and instituting numerous programs. He has been instrumental in establishing, developing, and sustaining contacts between historians in the West and Ukraine on both a personal and institutional level; and he has managed and participated in many important international collaborative projects. His work continues to be read and cited by a growing number of scholars. Frank is currently at the height of his academic career. As we congratulate him on his achievements thus far, let us also look forward to even greater accomplishments by him in the future.

Frank E. Sysyn's Scholarly Works:
A Select Bibliography

Abbreviations
HUS   *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*
JUS   *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*
SR   *Slavic Review*

1968

1. "The Ukrainian National Movement and Soviet Nationality Policy." Princeton University Senior Thesis. Awarded the 1968 Woodrow Wilson School Senior Thesis Prize.

2. Review of John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification. The Ukrainian Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (Winter): 369–71.

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Compiled by Serhiy Bilenky and Roman Senkus

Reading the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*:
A Note on the Popular Reception of
Ukrainian History in Late Imperial Russian
and Revolutionary Ukraine

Olga Andriewsky

Even by the standards of Central and Eastern Europe—where, as Kathryn Verdery has wryly observed, a legion of political corpses were brought back to life in the 1990s—the rehabilitation of Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934) in recent years has been rather remarkable.[1] Demonized in the Soviet Union as a "bourgeois nationalist," increasingly marginalized in the Ukrainian diaspora because of his radical socialist politics and voluntary return to Soviet Ukraine, and largely ignored by professional historians in the West for whom much of his work remained inaccessible, this once renowned scholar and political leader was for more than half a century a neglected, if not entirely forgotten, man.[2] It was only in the late 1980s, with the launch of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, an ambitious plan to translate his *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, a monumental ten-volume history of Ukraine, into English (under the direction of Frank Sysyn), that the Hrushevsky revival began in earnest.[3] It gained

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[1] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

[2] There were, of course, some notable exceptions to this general trend. Lubomyr Wynar, the editor of *Ukrainskyi istoryk* (since 1963), almost singlehandedly kept the legacy of Hrushevsky alive in the diaspora through his many publications focusing on Hrushevsky, including his *Seriia Hrushevskiiana*. In 1987 Thomas Prymak published the first biography of Hrushevsky in any language, entitled *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). Hrushevsky's scholarly contributions were also recognized when the first Chair of Ukrainian Studies at Harvard University was named in his honor in 1968. Ironically, however, it was the work of Hrushevsky's fellow historian and political rival, Viacheslav Lypynsky, that was in vogue among senior scholars in the field during the 1970s. This group included Omeljan Pritsak, the first Mykhailo S. Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard.

[3] At the time of this printing, five vols. have been published: 1, 7, 8, 9, bk. 1, and 9, bk. 2, pt. 1. See Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, ed. Frank E. Sysyn et al

considerable momentum in the early 1990s with the reissue in Ukraine itself of a number of Hrushevsky's most important works, including his *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* in press runs approaching 100,000 copies.[4] Publications by and about Hrushevsky, increasingly hailed as Ukraine's "first president"[5] and "greatest twentieth-century scholar," began to fill the enormous void left by the collapse of the Soviet narrative of history. From relative obscurity Hrushevsky has now emerged as a symbol—and legitimating voice—of a new political order.

For all the attention that Hrushevsky has received in recent years, however, there are still many facets of his life and work that remain unexamined. In part this is due to the intricacies of a peripatetic career that spanned five decades, four different political regimes, and numerous academic and political institutions, organizations, and societies; in part it is a reflection of the sheer volume of his writing, both public and personal. The Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine—an institute established and named in honor of Hrushevsky in 1991—is, in fact, currently engaged in collecting and publishing a fifty-volume set of Hrushevsky's *Tvory* (Works).[6] Yet we still know comparatively little, for example, about his writings' broader impact. While we now have a clearer idea of the reception of his scholarship in academic circles during his lifetime, owing in no small measure to the Hrushevsky Translation Project,[7] we have only clusters of assumptions about the people Hrushevsky was, in effect, trying to cultivate—a Ukrainian reading public.

Who read Hrushevsky? How was his work received by "ordinary" readers? What was the nature of the interaction between text and reader? These questions are vital to any deeper analysis of Hrushevsky and the social context(s) in which his work was read. In particular, they are crucial to transcending the authoritarian and often primitive models of transmission, meaning, and audience that remain embedded in so much

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(Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1997–2008); on the project, see <www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/ jacykcentre/HTP-main.htm>.

[4] Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy v odynadtsiaty tomakh, dvanadtsiaty knyhakh*, ed. V. A. Smolii and P. S. Sokhan (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1991–2000).

[5] On the controversy surrounding the use of the title "first president" in reference to Hrushevsky, see R. Ya. Pyrih, "Problemy pidhotovky naukovoi biohrafii Mykhaila Hrushevskoho," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2005, no. 4: 178–89.

[6] Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Tvory: u 50 tomakh,* ed. P. S. Sokhan et al (Lviv: Svit, 2002–).

[7] See, for example, the scholarly introductions to the volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* by Frank E. Sysyn, Andrzej Poppe, and Serhii Plokhy. See also Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

of the academic discussion attending cultural production in late tsarist-ruled and revolutionary Ukraine.[8] In its most extreme version, this approach confers near cult status on Hrushevsky as the "creator" of the modern Ukrainian nation, and thus it discounts the wider network of agents involved in cultural production and ignores the active role of the reader in creating meaning. The concept of audience, in other words, is a key to recovering some sense of the complexity of what it meant—and continues to mean—to "read Hrushevsky." What follows is an attempt to broaden the discussion of Hrushevsky through an analysis of several fragments of empirical evidence concerning the popular reception of Ukrainian history between 1905 and 1917.

Writing for "the People"

Hrushevsky and his contemporaries were, in fact, keenly interested in questions of audience and reader response. The problem of reaching, engaging, and mobilizing a broad reading public in many ways lay at the very heart of the Ukrainian project at the turn of the century. This task was especially complicated in the Russian Empire, where literacy remained an issue and where, even after 1905, when the prohibitions against publishing in the Ukrainian language were relaxed, the authorities continued to erect various formal and informal barriers to prevent the dissemination of Ukrainian publications (and thus to inhibit the emergence of a mass market for such publications).[9] Indeed, several generations of Ukrainian activists—from the

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[8] What I am referring to here is a formalist tendency to treat text as a fixed and objective entity that is disseminated to a passive audience. There is, of course, an entire school of literary theory that focuses on reader response. There is also the more specialized field of audience reception studies. On trends in the latter, see Sonia Livingstone, "The Rise and Fall of Audience Research: An Old Story with a New Ending," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): 5–12; and Shaun Moores, "Texts, Readers, and Contexts of Reading: Developments in the Study of Media Audiences," *Media, Culture and Society* 12 (1990): 9–29. For a rare attempt by a historian of Ukraine to raise the question of the relationship between reader and text, see Serhii Plokhii [Plokhy], "Selianska Klio: Istorychna pamiat ta natsionalna identychnist v Radianskii Ukraini," in *Memuary ta shchodennyky*, ed. Anatolii Boiko and Serhii Plokhii, Dzherela z istorii Pivdennoi Ukrainy 5, bk. 1 (Zaporizhzhia: RA "Tandem U," 2005), 25–27.

[9] By Ukrainian publications, I mean both Ukrainian-language and Russian-language publications about Ukraine that treated Ukrainians as a distinct nationality with a discrete history and culture. Thus the Union of Russian People, a radical right-wing Russian organization, freely used "the Little Russian dialect" in publications such as *Pochaevskii listok* after 1905 in an attempt to mobilize the peasant population, while *Ukrainskaia zhizn*, a Russian-language journal published by the Ukrainian intelligentsia, was viewed with great suspicion by the authorities. See Olga Andriewsky, "The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 1904–12," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991.

"Ukrainophiles" of the 1860s and 1870s to the socialists and democratic liberals of the 1900s and 1910s—devoted a considerable amount of their time trying to circumvent these obstacles in order to reach broad segments of the Ukrainian population.[10] As a populist by conviction, and a scholar for whom the struggle of the masses embodied the real meaning of history, Hrushevsky shared this commitment. The decision in 1898 to publish *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy,* his most important work, in Ukrainian rather than in German or Russian, for example, was in itself revolutionary, a stunning wager on the future of a Ukrainian reading public. It was a faith no doubt fortified by the rapid growth of the Ukrainian national movement in Austrian-ruled Galicia, though, given the existing prohibitions against importing Ukrainian publications from Galicia into the Russian Empire, it was a daring decision nonetheless.[11]

Beginning in 1904, as censorship in the Russian Empire eased and opportunities for publishing began to open up, Hrushevsky actively turned his attention to writing popular history. Over the next few years, even as he continued to work on his scholarly magnum opus, he produced several histories intended for a general audience. In fact, Hrushevsky wrote several different histories for different reading publics. The first, *Ocherk istorii ukrainskago naroda* (Outline of the History of the Ukrainian People), published in Russian in St. Petersburg in 1904, was aimed at an urban Russian-reading intelligentsia. (The survey was based on a course Hrushevsky had taught at the Russian Higher School of Social Sciences in Paris in 1903.) Three subsequent publications were originally written in Ukrainian and directed more specifically towards "ordinary" Ukrainians: *Pro stari chasy na Ukraini* (About the Olden Times in Ukraine; St. Petersburg, 1907); *Pro batka kozatskoho Bohdana Khmel-*

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[10] V. Shirochansky, [Vasyl Bidnov], "K voprosu ob izdanii ukrainskoi nauchnoi populiarnoi literatury," *Kievskaia starina,* 1905, nos. 11–12: 82–85. The memoirs/diary of Oleksander Lototsky and Yevhen Chykalenko, two prominent Ukrainian-language publishers, devote considerable attention to this problem. See Yevhen Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk (1907–1917)* (Lviv: Chervona kalyna, 1931); and his *Spohady, 1861–1907* (Lviv: Dilo, 1925); Oleksander Lototsky, *Storinky mynuloho,* vol. 3, *Pratsi Ukrainskoho naukovoho instytutu XXI: Seriia memuariv* 4 (Warsaw: Z drukarni Naukovoho t-va im. Shevchenka u Lvovi, 1934). David Saunders provides an excellent case study in his essay in the present volume, "The Russian Imperial Authorities and Yevhen Chykalenko's *Rozmovy pro selske khoziaistvo.*"

[11] Even František Palacký, the Czech historian to whom Hrushevsky is sometimes compared, published the first volume of his monumental *History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia* in German rather than Czech (*Geschichte von Böhmen: Grösstentheils nach Urkunden und Handschrifte,* vol. 1, *Die Urgeschichte und die Zeit der Herzogs in Böhmen bis zum Jahre 1197* [Prague: Kronberger, 1836]). Hrushevsky did, however, have the first volumes of *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* translated into German and Russian.

nytskoho (About the Cossack "Father" Bohdan Khmelnytsky; Kyiv, 1909); and *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukrainy* (An Illustrated History of Ukraine; Kyiv, 1911). The latter, undoubtedly Hrushevsky's fullest and most widely read general history, was reprinted repeatedly, four times in 1917–18 alone.[12] But Hrushevsky was not the only nor even the first author to write a popular history of Ukraine. Indeed, the need for such a work had long been recognized and discussed, particularly among members of the Kyiv Hromada, an underground association of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. (Hrushevsky himself had been part of the Kyiv circle until he left to assume the Chair of History at the university in Lviv.) In 1895 Yevhen Chykalenko, a landowner, patron of Ukrainian culture, and Hromada member, had even gone so far as to establish a prize of one thousand *karbovantsi* (rubles) for the best popular history. The prize, established in memory of Chykalenko's eight-year old daughter, who had recently passed away, was to be adjudicated by Volodymyr Antonovych, the noted professor and historian at Kyiv's university, and the editorial board of the journal *Kievskaia starina*. As Chykalenko later explained in his memoirs,

> I regarded a history of Ukraine, even if written in Russian, as the single most pressing [need] … it had to be a one-volume work aimed at a middling reader, someone with the education of an elementary school teacher, for example. We just didn't have any such histories. Of course, we had the works of Kostomarov, but they did not encompass the entire history of Ukraine and were not readily accessible to the general public, because [the articles] were not published separately but rather were scattered among Kostomarov's works on the history of Russia, which, all together, consist of many large volumes.[13]

Chykalenko's efforts notwithstanding, it took more than ten years and a political revolution for the first popular histories of Ukraine finally to appear in print.[14] In 1906 *Hromadska dumka* (Kyiv) and *Ridnyi krai* (Pol-

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[12] This number included a Canadian edition published in 1918 in Winnipeg by *Kanadyiskii farmer.*

[13] Chykalenko, *Spohady*, 164–65. Borys Hrinchenko had expressed similar sentiments in the early 1890s. See his *Lysty z Ukrainy Nadniprianskoi P. Vartovoho (B. Hrinchenka)*, 2d ed. (Kyiv: s.n., 1917).

[14] The prize Chykalenko established was never formally awarded. Half the money was advanced to the historian Aleksandra Efimenko (Yefymenko) when her husband fell ill. When she finally submitted her manuscript, the prize committee declined to publish it until it was substantially revised; the manuscript was returned to her, and she eventually published it on her own (Chykalenko, *Spohady,* 164–65). See the review of A. Ya. Efimenko's *Istoriia Ukrainy i eia naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1907) by M. Zh. (pseud. of Dmytro Doroshenko) in *Ukraina* (Kyiv), nos. 7–8 (1907): 246–49.

tava), two of the newly founded Ukrainian-language newspapers in the Russian Empire, began publishing regular columns on Ukrainian history expressly aimed at a Ukrainian mass market. These articles, appearing as Hryhorii Kovalenko's "Opovidannia z istorii ukrainskoho narodu" (Tales from the History of the Ukrainian People) in *Ridnyi krai* and as Borys Hrinchenko's "Opovidannia z ukrainskoi starovyny" (Tales from Ukrainian Antiquity) in *Hromadska dumka*, were subsequently collected and printed separately as booklets.[15] Almost simultaneously, the Ukrainian publishing house Vik issued its own pamphlet, entitled *Yak zhyv ukrainskyi narod* (How the Ukrainian People Lived).[16] By most accounts, however, the first major work of popular history was Mykola Arkas's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi* (History of Ukraine-Rus'; St. Petersburg, 1908)—a title clearly inspired by Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, the slight discrepancy in the spelling notwithstanding.[17] A former Russian Navy official, wealthy landowner, and cultural activist from Kherson, Arkas had spent several years on the project. As Oleksander Lototsky, one of the publishers, recalled, Arkas's volume had "epochal significance" and served as a model of how to write popular history: "This was the first history written for the broad public, and its popularity in its time was remarkable.... The first edition was printed in 7,000 copies (priced at 1.50 to 3 *karbovantsi*) and sold out in a matter of months."[18] Subsequently Arkas's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi,* like Hrushevsky's *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukrainy,* was republished several times.[19]

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[15] See Vasyl Domanytsky's discussion of recently published popular histories of Ukraine in *Ukraina,* no. 4 (1907): 99–102.

[16] *Yak zhyv ukrainskyi narod: Korotka istoriia Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Vik, 1906).

[17] See, for example, the reviews by V. Pisniachevsky and V. Lypynsky in *Rada,* 22 and 31 August 1908; and L. S. Kaufman, *M. M. Arkas: Narys pro zhyttia i tvorchist* (Kyiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo obrazotvorchoho mystetstva i muzychnoi literatury URSR, 1958.

[18] Lototsky, *Storinky mynuloho,* 3: 148. According to the normally circumspect Lototsky, Hrushevsky's *Illustrated History of Ukraine* never enjoyed quite the same success among "middlebrow" readers as Arkas's volume did. Lototsky's comment was undoubtedly a deliberate dig at Hrushevsky, who had published a savage review of Arkas's work in the October 1908 issue of *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (pp. 121–36). Hrushevsky criticized Arkas's history as "incompetent," "harmful," and "erroneous." A number of prominent Ukrainian activists—including Lototsky and Chykalenko—considered the review to be unfair, offensive, and far too self-interested. On the very complicated relationship between Hrushevsky and Arkas, see V. Ulianovsky, "Mykola Arkas, 'Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy' i Mykhailo Hrushevskyi," in *Istoriia, istoriosofiia, dzhereloznavstvo: Statti, rozvidky, zamitky, ese,* ed. Vasyl Ulianovsky and Lesia Dovha (Kyiv: Intel, 1996), 161–220; and I. Hyrych, "Shche do problemy 'Arkas i Hrushevskyi,'" in ibid., 221–30.

[19] The Ukrainian-language daily newspaper *Rada* had planned to republish Arkas's history in 1909 as a supplement. A revised edition was published in Cracow in 1912, after the

Searching for an Audience, Searching for a Text

Who read these works? How were they received by the "ordinary" readers for whom they were written? Did they even reach their intended audience? For Ukrainian authors, publishers, and activists alike, these were vital questions after 1905. Unfortunately the evidence was—and remains—fragmentary and anecdotal, at best. Circulation, sales, and press-run numbers before 1917 are problematic as indicators of the appeal—or lack thereof—of Ukrainian publications. Indeed, as numerous contemporary sources confirm, local authorities—the end of the Ems ukase notwithstanding—continued to regard all Ukrainian-language publications as seditious by their very nature, and they actively discouraged their dissemination.[20] School boards frequently forbade teachers to read Ukrainian books and periodicals. Clergy and administrative officials were similarly warned. Provincial authorities routinely refused to permit the creation of reading rooms (called *Prosvity*) in the countryside. Rural postmasters and other vigilant officials confiscated Ukrainian publications when they arrived. In the cities, publishers and editors—and sometimes even subscribers—of Ukrainian-language publications were repeatedly harassed.[21] Thus in the Russian Empire until the Revolution of 1917, the notion of an "ordinary" Ukrainian reader remained in many ways more a theoretical proposition than a stable and observable behavior.

Likewise, letters written by readers to individual authors or editors—a source historians often cited to demonstrate the growing popularity of Ukrainian publications—provide only limited evidence of their appeal.[22]

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deaths of the author and editor; it was later republished in the West (1947, 1967). In the 1990s the history was republished four times, and Arkas has earned some recognition in contemporary Ukraine, though it is minor in comparison to the Hrushevsky revival.

[20] For instance, the governor of Poltava gubernia ordered the confiscation of all copies of the Ukrainian translation of the October Manifesto, an official government decree; see *Kievskaia starina*, November–December 1905, 68, 84. On the difficulties of disseminating Ukrainian publications after 1905, see: Chykalenko, *Spohady*, pt. 3, 68–69, 109; B. Hrinchenko, *Tiazhkym shliakhom: Pro ukrainsku presu* (Kyiv: Rada, 1906), 59; V. Prykhodko, *Pid sontsem Podillia: Spomyny* (Lviv: Chervona kalyna, 1931), 207; T. Tataryn, "Ukrainski chasopysy na seli," *Ridnyi krai*, 8 October 1906, 8–9; *Rada*, 2 January 1907; Dmytro Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro davnie-mynule, 1901–1914 roky* (Winnipeg: Tryzub, 1949), 77; and Andriewsky, "Politics of National Identity,"130–48.

[21] The editors of *Hromadska dumka,* the only Ukrainian-language daily in the Russian Empire in 1906, were taken to court eleven times in the course of seven and a half months, and at one point the publication was suspended for a period of nine days. Nine of the eighteen periodicals that began and then suspended publication between 17 October 1905 and 3 June 1907 were closed down by the authorities.

[22] A number of such letters to Hrushevsky can be found, for example, in his personal

"Fan mail," though compelling in its own right, reveals little about the audience. It rarely tells us much about the people who wrote the letters, their reading histories and preferences, or the circumstances under which they encountered a particular text.

Hrushevsky's contemporaries were, in fact, acutely aware of these limitations, and in 1909 a group of Ukrainian activists decided to carry out their own study of the popularity of Ukrainian publications. In one of the earliest known experiments in audience research in the Russian Empire, they conducted a survey of the one group that, ironically, they could most easily contact—Ukrainian political exiles in Siberia.[23] (During the "pacification" campaign of 1906–1909 that followed the Revolution of 1905, some 30,000 people had been exiled or imprisoned for political offences.[24]) They sent out a questionnaire and received 168 responses, almost exclusively from men (159) from the Ukrainian gubernias who had been arrested and exiled to the Far North (Vologda, Arkhangelsk), Siberia (Tobolsk), and the Far East.[25] While hardly a representative sample, in some ways the exiles did exemplify a segment of the population that the urban intelligentsia was seldom able to gain access to freely: they were young (54 percent were under the age of 25, and 91 percent were under the age of 40), primarily peasants by background (74 percent); and relatively poor (74 percent owned fewer than 3 desiatines, or 8 acres, of land). Most had been arrested in 1907 and 1908 (68 percent); they had been exiled for alleged connections to illegal socialist parties (45 percent),[26] "revolutionary agitation" (17 percent), or suspected participation in agrarian disturbances (15 percent). All but 28 of the respondents stated

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archive at the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv: TsDIAK, fond 1235, desc. 1, no. 303, fol. 301.

[23] The results were published by Pavlo Chyzhevsky in *Rada*, 21–23 December 1911, under the title "Zaslantsi-ukraintsi." Chyzhevsky was a member of the Ukrainian caucus in the First and Second Dumas, which included a large contingent of peasant deputies. The survey may have relied on these contacts.

[24] "V gody reaktsii," *Krasnyi arkhiv* 8 (1925): 242; Peter Waldron, *Between Two Revolutions: Stolypin and the Politics of Renewal in Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 62–67.

[25] Of the 168 exiles, 41 were from Kherson gubernia; 31, from Kyiv gubernia; 25, from Poltava gubernia; 19, from Chernihiv gubernia; 10, from Podillia gubernia; 9, from Kharkiv gubernia; 9, from Tavriia gubernia; 6, from Katerynoslav gubernia; and 18, from "elsewhere."

[26] Of these, 45 percent were presumed to have ties to the Socialist Revolutionary Party; 41 percent, to unspecified socialist organizations; and 13 percent, to the Social Democratic Party. Only 3 exiles (4 percent) were accused of belonging to a "Ukrainian political party" (Chyzhevsky, "Zaslantsi-ukraintsi," 21 December 1911).

that they could read;[27] 144 (90 percent) claimed that they could read Ukrainian.

What the study revealed, according to Pavlo Chyzhevsky, the author of the series of articles that appeared in *Rada*, was a high level of Ukrainian national consciousness among the exiles. In response to a question about national identity, 111 (66 percent) of the respondents replied that they considered themselves "Ukrainian"; 32 (19 percent) described themselves as "Little Russians"; 10 (6 percent) self-identified as "Russians" (*russkie*); 9 called themselves "*khokhol*s";[28] 4 stated "other"; and 2 did not reply. Similarly, when asked whether they consciously distinguished between Ukrainians and Russians, 106 (63 percent) said that they did; 16 (9.5 percent) replied that they saw no difference; and 44 (26 percent) gave "an unclear or no answer." As one respondent wrote, he understood the differences because he "knew that Ukraine was once independent of Russia." Among those who self-identified as "Ukrainian," the majority (60 percent) claimed that they had become nationally conscious ("*zrobylysia svidomymy ukraintsiamy*") under the influence of Ukrainian publications;14 percent had been inspired by friends; another 14 percent stated that they had come to the decision independently; and 4.5 percent noted "various reasons." Most had begun considering themselves Ukrainian before 1907, that is, *before* they were arrested and sent into exile. "Several [respondents] began identifying themselves as Ukrainian once they had read the history of Ukraine," Chyzhevsky explained. "And one peasant said that he had been nationally conscious since childhood because his father had told him much about the Hetmanate in Ukraine."[29]

Of course, we must be careful not to put too much weight on the survey's findings. It is not clear, for example, how representative this sample group was among Ukrainian political exiles, who were themselves an atypical segment of the Ukrainian population. Chyzhevsky, unfortunately, did not provide any description of methods; he made no mention of how many questionnaires were sent out and did not give details as to how participants were identified or the settings in which questionnaires were distributed and/or completed. What language was the survey conducted in? Seventy-one of the exiles claimed that they only spoke

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[27] Eight respondents were described as "illiterate" and twenty as semiliterate ("*malohramotni*").

[28] The word *khokhol* is Russian slang for Ukrainians, or "Little Russians," and is often considered derogatory.

[29] Chyzhevsky, "Zaslantsi-ukraintsi," 23 December 1911.

Ukrainian, and twenty-five stated that they only knew Russian.[30] Because of the political sensitivity of the subject, the survey had to be conducted in strict secrecy and, no doubt, many of the details relating to the research could not be publicly disclosed. Without some account of how the study was designed and carried out, however, the significance and scientific value of the findings remain dubious.

Yet, these methodological issues notwithstanding, the survey did yield some useful information for Ukrainian publishers and authors. Among other things, the study confirmed something that publishers had long suspected—the very limited availability of Ukrainian-language publications in the village. When asked what Ukrainian-language publications they had read, 81 (of the 144 participants who claimed to be able to read Ukrainian) mentioned the work of Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian poet (an edition of his *Kobzar* had just been published, in 1906, the first in the Russian Empire since the 1860s).[31] No other author or work enjoyed comparable status. The second most often cited author was Borys Hrinchenko—16 of the political exiles had encountered his work (Chyzhevsky did not specify the titles); 13 had read Hrushevsky; and 10 mentioned Arkas. Very few respondents (3 or 4) were familiar with Ukrainian periodical literature, that is, the newspapers *Rada*, *Ridnyi krai*, or *Ridna sprava*, or the journal *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*. Three had read Gogol (Hohol). Regrettably, Chyzhevsky did not specify whether the replies included what the respondents had read in exile.

Perhaps most importantly, the survey provided a glimpse into the reading tastes and preferences of a predominantly rural population, however skewed the sample group may have been. When asked what they *wanted* to read, Ukrainian history was the clear choice of the political exiles. Seventy-four of the respondents indicated that they would like to read more history; 14 specifically named Arkas; and 11 mentioned Hrushevsky. Ukrainian grammar was a distant second, cited by 38 respondents; 20 mentioned books on agricultural topics.[32] In other words, there was an appetite for Ukrainian history among this group that *predated* the publication of Hrushevsky's popular *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukrainy* of 1911. Few of the political exiles had actually read any Ukrainian history, but the demand for such publications already existed. Here, in short, was an audience in search of a text.

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[30] Ibid., 22 December 1911.

[31] Lototsky, *Storinky*, 3: 129–43. The 1906 edition was published in St. Petersburg in a press run of 10,000 copies; in 1907 a second edition came out in 25,000 copies, of which 16,000 were deliberately priced at 60 kopecks so as to be widely affordable.

[32] Chyzhevsky, "Zaslantsi-ukraintsi," 23 December 1911.

Reading the History of Ukraine-Rus'

Several years ago I found yet another interesting fragment of evidence that sheds some light on the popular reception of Ukrainian history in this period. While conducting research in the Manuscript Division of the National Library of Ukraine in Kyiv, I came across a remarkable source—a diary kept by Kost Fedorovych Kushnir-Marchenko (1877–1958), a Ukrainian "peasant."[33] For historians of Russia and Ukraine, the discovery of personal diaries, letters, and autobiographies written by "ordinary people" during the early Soviet period has been one of the most unexpected and exciting developments of recent years.[34] The very existence, let alone survival, of these sources has come as something of a surprise, for it was a genre of writing that many scholars associated exclusively with elites in prerevolutionary Russia. As Jochen Hellbeck has observed, this assumption has now been shattered by a veritable "flood of personal documents" from the 1920s and 1930s.[35] In Ukraine the search for sources has been led by Anatolii Boiko and his colleagues at the Zaporizhzhia branch of the Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies and the Zaporizhzhia Scientific Society: in 2005, together with Serhii Plokhy, they published *Memuary ta shchodennyky*, a two-volume set of personal accounts of the Soviet era written by peasants in Southern Ukraine.[36]

Like the Soviet-era sources, Kushnir-Marchenko's diary offers a view from "below"—in this case, a peek at "ordinary life" in a Ukrainian village, Moisynets in Poltava gubernia, from one peasant's perspective.[37] What makes the journal exceptional, however, is its sheer

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[33] Kushnir-Marchenko's papers are preserved in fond 133 of the manuscript division of the Ukraine's National Library in Kyiv—Instytut rukopysu, Natsionalna biblioteka Ukrainy im. Volodymyra Vernadskoho (hereafter IR NBUV). They include his unfinished memoirs "Moi spohady ta perezhytky," begun in 1950. It was his extensive work on the local history of the Irkliiv region (formerly in Poltava gubernia, today in Cherkasy oblast) that brought his archives to the attention of the National Library. See, for example, Nadiia Myronets and Ivan Khomenko, "Podvyzhnyk istorychnoho kraieznavstva Kost Kushnir-Marchenko," *Spetsialni istorychni dysstypliny: Pytannia teorii ta metodyky* (Kyiv) 4, no. 2 (2000): 534–66.

[34] See Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on my Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Igal Halfin, *Terror in my Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003); Véronique Garros, Natalia Korenevskaya, and Thomas Lahusen, *Intimacy and Terror: Soviet Diaries of the 1930s* (New York: New Press, 1995); and Mikhail Vostryshev, *Zapiski ochevidtsa: Vospominaniia, dnevniki, pisma* (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1989).

[35] Hellbeck, *Revolution on my Mind*, 4.

[36] *Memuary ta shchodennyky*, ed. Boiko and Plokhii.

[37] Today Moisynets is the village of Prydniprovske in Cherkasy oblast. For this essay I

length and duration: it spans the entire first half of the twentieth century, including a quarter of a century *before* 1917. Indeed, Kushnir-Marchenko recorded his first, very brief entry in 1892, at the age of fifteen ("April 13, Went to church for the Acts of the Apostles"), and he kept writing throughout his life—albeit with some gaps—into the 1950s. Moreover, as a diary rather than a memoir, it is a relatively immediate source, unadulterated by subsequent events, experiences, or reflections. One of his earliest entries simply notes: "July 20. I write what I know. We sold the oxen and bought others." As Kushnir-Marchenko himself later lamented, he began writing his diary spontaneously, with little direction or sense of purpose, guided only by his "very narrow, juvenile worldview" ("po svoiemu duzhe uzkomu ditiachomu [sic] svitohliadu").

Yet this is precisely the value of Kushnir-Marchenko's diary. It is a dynamic account—fragmentary and disconnected—rather than the story of a defined and consistent self. Even the language of the diary changes over time, evolving from an overly formal Russian replete with Ukrainian words to colloquial Ukrainian, and then, in the 1920s, to something approaching literary Ukrainian. More specifically, for our purposes, his diary makes it possible to identify the circumstances under which Kushnir-Marchenko encountered the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. In this way it provides a unique perspective on the popular reception of Ukrainian history and, more broadly, on the nature of the interaction between reader and text.

This encounter was, in fact, quite long in the making. Judging by his own account, Kushnir-Marchenko led a largely tranquil life until 1914. He had attended school—the village of Moisynets, originally a Cossack settlement, had had a parish school as early as 1767 and a functioning zemstvo school from 1871. Thereafter Kushnir-Marchenko settled into the life of a successful farmer, eventually rising to the position of a district peasant official (*volost starshyna*). The "great change," as he described it at the time, was his marriage in 1899, at the age of twenty-two, to Anna Shevchenko. In the same year, he did a one-month stint in the military reserve, serving in nearby Zolotonosha, where his wife was able to visit him on two occasions and bring him food from home. For many years his main concerns centered on the daily rhythms of country life—in his diary he writes of the weather, his livestock, his health, how he slept, what he ate. Going to market or church constituted noteworthy events. A typical entry reads: "Wednesday. I mowed the wheat by the birches and the wife made borshch."[38]

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have concentrated on the diary's first three volumes, which cover the period 1892–1918 (IR NBUV, fond 133, nos. 1–3).

[38] Ibid., no. 2, 9 July 1914.

From his diary and personal papers it is also evident that Kushnir-Marchenko developed a lifelong passion for "local antiquity" (*starovyna*). As a young man he began collecting materials about local history—in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Irkliiv region was a vital Cossack outpost, and until the second half of the nineteenth century it was a center of the carrier trade (*chumatstvo*). He even went so far as to join the Poltava Archival Commission (est. 1903), a public organization for the collection, preservation, and publication of materials relating to the history of Poltava gubernia. Indeed, one of his most thrilling experiences, his diary reveals, was a visit in February 1911 to the Manuscript Division of Kyiv University, where he was able to work with the Rumiantsev census (*Generalnaia opis Malorossii*), an eighteenth-century survey of the territory of the Hetmanate, which, he noted, contained information about Moisynets. That visit to Kyiv, he adds, also included stops at the Contract Fair, "several bookstores," and a memorial service commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's death. Kushnir-Marchenko also met with Professor Nikolai Petrov, a noted authority on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and an honorary member of the Poltava Archival Commission, at the Kyiv Theological Academy, where they "discussed antiquity" ("*besedoval za starinu*"). Attached to his diary is a clipping from an unnamed regional newspaper dating from these years:

> In the village of Moisynets, Zolotonosha county, there lives a former county peasant official, the Cossack K. F. Kushnir, a great lover of local antiquity and a member of the Poltava Archival Commission. He collects various historical information about Zolotonosha county.… He has [collected] much local archival material but, because of a lack of funds, is not in a position to publish them. At present Mr. Kushnir is planning to turn to the Zolotonosha zemstvo with a request for material support for the publication of his work.

Did Kushnir-Marchenko come across Hrushevsky's publications or Arkas's popular history of Ukraine during his visit to Kyiv? Did Petrov, a member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, an organization headed by Hrushevsky at the time, recommend that scholar's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* while they were "discussing antiquity"? Kushnir-Marchenko's diary does not say.[39] The diary makes no mention of any Ukrainian-language publi-

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[39] Volume 7 of Hrushevsky's *Istoriia*, titled *Kozatski chasy do r. 1625*, had just been published in Kyiv in 1909. Interestingly, it included a discussion of the first Cossack settlements in the Irkliiv region. See idem, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 7, *The Cossack Age to 1625* (1999), trans. Bohdan Strumiński, ed. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, chap. 5.

cations at this time—in fact, the words "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" are absent from his diary until after the outbreak of World War I.

In September 1915, when he was thirty-eight, the tranquility of Kushnir-Marchenko's world was abruptly shattered. He was mobilized for war and found himself, as he describes, "u moskaliakh" (in the Russian army), far from home and in the midst of a terrible war.[40] (In 1916, he was stationed near the front, in Volyn gubernia, not far from the Pochaiv Monastery.) The composure and detachment that had characterized his diary entries for so many years suddenly gave way to anguished laments. "Oh merciful God, when will You bring Peace to our land, when will people be able to return to their native homes?" (3 January 1916). He began copying long passages from Shevchenko's *Kobzar* to express his feelings about the war that "the rulers [*tsaryky*] have wrought," about his "captivity," his yearning for his wife, and his unbearable longing for "Ukraine": "Украйно, Украйно! / Ненько моя, ненько! / Як згадаю тебе, краю, / Заплаче серденько ..." (Ukraine, Ukraine! / Mother, My Mother!/ When I think of you, my land, /My heart weeps ...).[41]

The tone and language of Kushnir-Marchenko's diary changed again in March 1917, when he heard "that there has been a revolution in Russia ... that there are new ministers, and that the old ones have been arrested." He recorded the moment in his journal, "We all yelled 'Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!'" For the first time since he had started to keep his diary, twenty-five years earlier, he began to voice political opinions, openly and directly.[42] On March 16, for example, he began to "speak about Ukraine" (*skazav za Ukrainu*) and immediately thereafter was elected to his unit's newly formed soldiers' committee.[43] As he wrote in a later entry: "I spoke about all of Ukraine, how rich she is, how she has been destroyed. I spoke about Shevchenko and asked everyone to try to learn more and

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[40] The war period is covered in his diary's third volume.

[41] This passage is from Shevchenko's "Tarasova nich." Kushnir-Marchenko also cites Shevchenko's poems "Kholodnyi iar" and "V Kazemati," among others.

[42] In 1912, during the first stage of the elections to the Russian State Duma, Kushnir-Marchenko was chosen as an elector from the peasant curia and subsequently attended the provincial convention in Poltava. He later described how the local landowners fixed the selection of the peasant deputies during this second stage, but the account reveals little about his own political views or leanings. See Kost Fedorovych Kushnir-Marchenko, "Yak vybiraly chleniv v Derzhavnu Dumu v 4–tu 1912," IR NBUV, fond 133, no. 59, fols. 1–7.

[43] The committees were formed in response to Army Order No. 1, issued by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on 14 March 1917. See Frank Golder, ed., *Documents of Russian History, 1914–1917* (New York: Century Co., 1927), 286–90; and Alan Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt (March–April 1917)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

love their mother Ukraine. I received applause for what I said."[44] By early May, he reports, his unit had formed a separate Ukrainian committee.[45]

This, in fact, is the context in which Kushnir-Marchenko encountered the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—in the midst of the political maelstrom that had engulfed the Russian army and empire in the spring and summer of 1917. At that moment, for him, like for many thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and sailors, the "Ukrainian Question" was one of the main issues of the day. On 9 July he made the following entry: "Sunday. In the morning I took the horses out to the field and read the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Back at home, I drank tea, read *The Autonomy of Ukraine*, and had lunch. We received news that our division will be transferred to another position; it started to cloud over." It is not clear from the diary whether Kushnir-Marchenko was reading Arkas or Hrushevsky at the time.[46] He did not name the author—it did not seem to matter. The entry, as written, implies that he was reading *the* history, not merely *a* history of Ukraine. It is also not apparent how he obtained the book or whether he had ever come across it before. If so, he had never felt the need to mention it until this moment. Tellingly, he also does not refer to any of the other political literature that was circulating at the front at this time. For Kost Fedorovych Kushnir-Marchenko, the grandson of a free Cossack and a Ukrainian, as he now identified himself, it was the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* that had suddenly, in the summer of 1917, acquired authority and significance.[47]

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The case of Kushnir-Marchenko, like that of the political exiles surveyed in 1909, illustrates a different way of thinking about the meaning

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[44] Fond 133, no. 3, 9 May 1917.

[45] The Ukrainian movement in the army grew very rapidly during the spring of 1917. The first All-Ukrainian Military Congress was held in Kyiv from 5 to 8 May 1917 and included nine hundred delegates representing some 1.5 million Ukrainian soldiers and sailors. The second All-Ukrainian Military Congress took place from June 5 to 10, with two thousand delegates. It not only endorsed the army's "Ukrainianization" but also took up issues of land, popular education, and political autonomy. In fact the Ukrainian Central Rada's First Universal, which proclaimed the autonomy of Ukraine, was announced at the June Congress. See V. F. Verstiuk, ed., *Ukrainska Tsentralna Rada: Dokumenty i materialy u dvokh tomakh*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1996), 535–36 n. 50.

[46] As noted above, the title of Arkas's popular history was *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi,* whereas Hrushevsky's series was titled *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy.* In his diary Kushnir-Marchenko uses the first spelling, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi.* However, given his idiosyncratic and unsystematic orthography, it is not certain that he was reading Arkas.

[47] In January 1918 Kushnir-Marchenko proclaimed "Rik Vozrozhdeniia [sic] Nenky Ukrainy" (the Year of the Rebirth of Mother Ukraine). Fond 133, no. 3, January 1918.

of "Hrushevsky". It suggests that meaning is jointly constructed from the interaction of reader and text, and that the context of reading shapes the way in which a text is translated in everyday life. For Kushnir-Marchenko the reading of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was linked to a specific time and place, to a moment when he was struggling to come to terms with a profound political change and make sense of a radical transformation of his world. Yet Kushnir-Marchenko was neither a *tabula rasa* nor a passive reader. He actively chose the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in the summer of 1917 from a much larger repertoire of public narratives available to him. Moreover, he encountered the text already possessed of a social identity, with his own personal and collective narratives, with his own ideas about the past, however incomplete and unpolished they might appear to us. In this respect the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* did not simply make sense *of* his world—perhaps more importantly, it made sense *in* his world.

In some ways, it might be tempting to conclude that Kushnir-Marchenko's encounter with the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* in 1917 was not terribly different from what happened in 1991, when a whole new generation of "ordinary" readers in Ukraine rediscovered Hrushevsky and Arkas. To do so, however, is to gloss over the profound social and political upheavals of the revolution, the enormous transformations of the Soviet experience, and the radically different condition of contemporary society, where, as Jeffrey K. Olick writes, memory has largely been "separated from the continuity of social reproduction."[48] In 1991 the text may have been "the same," but the readers and their "ordinariness" were not. Understanding what it means to "read Hrushevsky" (or Arkas) thus remains, by definition, an ongoing and open-ended project.

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[48] Jeffrey K. Olick, "Introduction: Memory and the Nation: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations," *Social Science History* 22 , no. 4 (1998): 379.

California Dreaming:
Agapius Honcharenko's Role
in the Formation of the Pioneer
Ukrainian-Canadian Intelligentsia

Jars Balan

The North American continent has provided a haven and a home for many Ukrainian immigrants, among them famous artists, eminent scholars, distinguished churchmen, talented professionals, and prominent political figures. Even on this long list of colorful New World personalities, Agapius Honcharenko stands out as a unique and compelling figure.

Honcharenko was born Andrii Humnytsky in 1832 to a priestly family in the village of Kryvyn, Kyiv gubernia (now Kryve in Popilnia raion, Zhytomyr oblast). From childhood the future California radical was imbued with a strong sense of Christian spirituality and a fierce pride in his Ukrainian Cossack ancestry.[1] After completing his general education at a Kyiv boarding school (*bursa*) and religious training at the Kyiv Theological Seminary, in 1853 he became a novice at the city's ancient Caves Monastery, where he took the monastic name Agapius (Ukrainian: Ahapii).[2] Appointed a personal assistant to Metropolitan Filaret (Amfiteatrov, 1837–58) of Kyiv, he often traveled on church business to villages in the surrounding countryside, where the impoverished conditions of the enserfed peasantry stirred the social conscience of the idealistic young hiero-deacon. Distressed by the morally compromised wealth of the Russian Orthodox Church and the corruption and licentiousness that he witnessed at the Caves Monastery, Agapius developed progressive notions

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[1] An article in a Soviet Ukrainian journal first established Humnytsky as Honcharenko's actual surname: M. M. Varvartsev, "Ahapii Honcharenko—pioner ukrainskoi emihratsii v SShA," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1969, no. 6: 115–19; cited in Ivan Svit, "Khto buv o. Ahapii Honcharenko," in *Almanakh Ukrainskoho narodnoho soiuza na 1970 rik* (Jersey City, N.J.: Svoboda Press, 1970), 132–35. See also Mykola Tavhola, "Andrii-Ahapii Honcharenko. Odyn z naidavnishykh ukraintsiv v Amerytsi," *Kaliendar "Ukrainskoho holosu"* (Winnipeg), 1948, 61–64.

[2] The name derives from the early Christian term for the communal "love" feast that preceded celebrations of the Holy Eucharist when worshippers still met in private homes.

about Christianity and became a committed proponent of the need to reform the church. His increasingly radical worldview was influenced by the revolutionary ideas then circulating within educated circles in tsarist-ruled Ukraine and by the ill-fated Decembrist movement suppressed in 1825, which had important supporters in Ukraine. Agapius was also inspired by the history of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, their democratic traditions, and their spirit of rebellion. His politicization had a distinctly Ukrainian cast, for it was both anti-autocratic and infused with a deeply patriotic concern about the plight of his fellow compatriots under Russian ("Muscovite") rule. These were values that he clung to throughout his life, though he was fated to live most of his adult life away from his beloved native land.[3]

In 1857 Metropolitan Filaret appointed the gifted and restive Agapius resident archdeacon at the Russian embassy church in Athens. There Agapius enthusiastically immersed himself in Greek culture and the archeological richness of Mediterranean civilization. Adept at languages, he became fluent in Greek and simultaneously developing a keen interest in philosophy. He also took advantage of his posting to establish contact with the Russian revolutionary network that was operating from the sanctuary provided by more liberal west European regimes. Having aroused the suspicions of Russian embassy staff, he was subsequently observed posting a letter to associates of the radical journal *Kolokol* (The Bell), then being published in London by Aleksandr Herzen. In February 1860 tsarist authorities arrested Agapius in Athens; but a few weeks later, while in custody in Istanbul, he managed to escape.[4] He would spend the rest of his life a fugitive from Russian imperial justice and a renegade in the eyes of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Soon after making his escape, Agapius made his way to London and became part of the leading revolutionary circles there, keeping the company of Herzen, Nikolai Ogarev, and the Italian patriot Giuseppe Mazzini. Early in 1861 he began using "Honcharenko" as his nom de plume, and later he took the pseudonym as his surname. In England he supported himself by teaching Russian to Greek merchants with commercial interests in Odesa, classifying old coins for the British Museum, and working as a typesetter at Ludwik Czarnecki's print shop. He also edited

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[3] Throughout the many years he spent abroad, Honcharenko followed events in his Ukrainian homeland with great interest.

[4] The incident is described in his fascinating autobiography: Ahapii Honcharenko, *Spomynky* (Edmonton: Slavuta, 1965), 7. Honcharenko was educated and comfortable in the Russian milieu; however, like many other Ukrainians at the time, he used the term "Muscovite" pejoratively as criticism of the imperial Russian regime.

and published the 1551 *Stohlav*, an important text outlining reforms made at a critical sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was then compelled to reprint the document in its entirety.[5]

In August 1861, after the overthrow of King Otto, Honcharenko returned to Greece, and from there he made a sidetrip to Smyrna on the Turkish coast. Upon his return to Greece, he arranged for his consecration, on 25 February 1862, as a hiero-monk in a Greek Orthodox Monastery at Mount Athos. He then traveled on to Jerusalem, narrowly evading rearrest there by Russian authorities. With the help of the Holy City's Latin patriarch, Honcharenko found temporary refuge in the mountains of Lebanon, where he taught at a school operated by sympathetic Jesuits. From there Honcharenko made his way to Egypt, where he got a job selling books, medicine and other supplies to English tourists en route to East India. He also sold copies of a Slavonic edition of the Gospels to pilgrims from the Russian Empire on their way to Mount Sinai. Once again his presence did not escape the attention of local Russian diplomats, who closely monitored former residents and visitors from the tsarist empire, a large number of whom were from Ukraine. In what became a pattern throughout his long life, Honcharenko sought out the company of his fellow Ukrainians, who had formed a tightly knit brotherhood in nearby Alexandria, and kept regularly informed about what was happening back home.

In February 1863 an Ionian Greek in the hire of the Russian consul attacked Honcharenko with a knife as he was working in his kiosk at the Cairo railway station. The incident convinced Honcharenko that he must return to Greece. After he had recuperated, he did just that, in May 1863. A year and half later he resolved to immigrate to the United States to experience the freedom that he saw as the promise of American democracy.

Landing in Boston on New Year's Day of 1865, Honcharenko promptly made his way to New York, where five days later he celebrated a Christmas liturgy at the home of the city's Hellenic consul. He quickly found work teaching Greek to Episcopalian seminarians at St. John's School, gaining invaluable connections within the larger Christian community. He also landed a job as tutor to the children of the Russian consul, who knew him as "Father Agapius" and thought he was a Greek impressively conversant in Russian. As soon as his real identity became known, Russian officials began pressuring their Greek counterparts to distance themselves from Honcharenko, the dangerous "enemy" of tsarist autocracy. An Episcopalian bishop had allowed Honcharenko to use one

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[5] In London Honcharenko shared quarters with Martyn Kholod, whom he described as his best friend and a fellow Ukrainian who had fled Galicia in 1831. See ibid., 7–8.

of his churches for Orthodox services that were attended by Greeks living in the New York area, but after a visit by an aristocratic representative of the Russian government and the Holy Synod in St. Petersburg—who promised money for an Orthodox church and priest if the Greeks disassociated themselves from the rebel Ukrainian cleric—this short-lived ministry effectively came to an end. Honcharenko was denounced as a heretic for criticizing the church, and he was banned from serving as a priest by the Russian Orthodox Eparchy of Alaska and the Aleutians, which claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the entire North American continent.

Subsequently Honcharenko found employment working on a translation of an Arabic edition of the Bible for the New York Bible Society and of a New Testament that was being issued by a Slavic publishing house. He also followed up on his European political connections and made contact with a group of Italian revolutionary patriots in Philadelphia. There he met and fell in love with the daughter of an Italian-American activist, a young schoolteacher named Albina Citti. Though consecrated as a hiero-monk, Honcharenko clearly no longer felt duty-bound to remain celibate. He married Albina in a civil ceremony in New York on 28 September 1865.[6] Remaining a committed if non-canonical Orthodox Christian, he willingly obliged requests to perform clerical services, though he was not under the ecclesiastical authority of any church.[7]

Because the Russian government continued to hound Honcharenko and Albina's family was not happy that she had married an Orthodox priest, the newlywed couple resolved to start a new life in northern California. Before departing for the West Coast, Honcharenko used money he and his wife had saved to purchase a set of Cyrillic fonts with the intention of producing a Russian-language publication in San Francisco. His plan was to distribute the paper among the Russian-speaking populations of California and Alaska—the latter having just been purchased by the United States—and also somehow to get it to the large communities of exiles on Russia's Pacific coast. The idea for this ambitious undertaking

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[6] Honcharenko's justification of his marriage (and criticism of church rules governing priestly celibacy) appeared in a letter he published under the heading "Ukraina Brotherhood" (in Latin script) in *Svoboda*, 28 April 1904.

[7] Honcharenko is recognized as the founding priest of the oldest Greek Orthodox congregation established on American territory, now the Holy Trinity Cathedral in New Orleans. He consecrated the sanctuary site during a missionary trip to Louisiana in April 1865. Despite his non-jurisdictional status, Honcharenko continued to dress and conduct himself as a priest, and he often officiated at baptisms, marriages, and liturgies. He also performed these ceremonies at at hisproperty in Hayward, California, where he had dug a cavelike chapel, adorned it with rustic iconography, and used it for prayer and meditation.

came in part from the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who, after escaping from Siberia, had passed through San Francisco in late 1861 on his way to London. According to Honcharenko, Nikolai Ogarev and Bakunin also subsequently wrote to him with the suggestion that San Francisco would be an excellent place to establish a Russian press and a revolutionary fraternity that could link up with the exiled dissidents in Siberia. In this way, Honcharenko became the first publisher of a Russian-language periodical in the United States, naming it the *Alaska Herald / Svoboda* (Liberty).

Honcharenko published the bilingual Russian-English newspaper from 1868 to 1873, initially with subsidies from the American government. Besides educating citizens of the new territory about their rights and contrasting these with their serflike treatment under Russian rule, the *Alaska Herald / Svoboda* championed development of the Pacific Northwest's rich resources in an equitable and ecologically sustainable manner. The publication also included some Ukrainian content. It spoke out in defense of Alaska's aboriginal and Slavic residents from exploitation by unscrupulous monopolies and vigorously condemned abuses attributed to some members of the American military administration. Honcharenko's criticisms of theAmerican authorities in Alaska and the business practices of the Alaska Commercial Company soon made him powerful enemies and ultimately undermined the financing and distribution of his paper. The Russian Orthodox Church, which relocated its base of operations from Sitka to San Francisco in 1872, contributed to Honcharenko's declining fortunes by mounting a growing campaign to marginalize him politically and socially and thus curtail his influence in the burgeoning Slavic and Greek communities on America's West Coast.

Consequently Honcharenko sold his printing press and English fonts to an American businessman and traveled to Alaska to investigate the possibility of settling there. However, he decided to purchase a fifty-acre farm in the Alameda Hills overlooking Hayward, California.[8] By then he was a familiar figure in the Bay area and the *Alaska Herald* was frequently cited in reports (at times unflattering to him) carried by the San Francisco press.[9] Exhausted by the constant struggle he had waged to

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[8] Honcharenko bought the property from a fellow Ukrainian, Joseph Krushevsky: see *Spomynky*, 18; and Theodore Luciw, *Father Agapius Honcharenko: First Ukrainian Priest in America* (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1970), 95. The site's natural beauty and spectacular view of the Bay area undoubtedly explain Honcharenko's choice and why he lived there for almost forty-three years.

[9] An extensive collection of clippings from the San Francisco press that Honcharenko compiled provides much information about the early years of Alaskan statehood. The collection constitutes the "Alaska scrap book, 1868–1870," vol. 1, in the Honcharenko

keep his paper afloat, Honcharenko withdrew to a very private life as an "unorthodox Orthodox priest," occasional naturopath, and subsistence farmer. Agapius and Albina soon acquired a reputation for innovative husbandry, and from 1874 to 1877 they contributed several interesting letters to the *California Horticulturalist and Floral Magazine*, describing their successful farming practices and experiences with local wildlife.

From this farmstead, named Ukraina in honor of his homeland, Honcharenko reached out to fellow Ukrainian radicals in Austrian-ruled Galicia. At the end of 1893 or beginning of 1894, he began communicating with compatriots there, specifically Mykhailo Pavlyk, Ivan Franko, and other activists involved in publishing the semimonthly socialist journal *Narod* (The People). Through this same circle he came to the attention of the celebrated scholar, civic leader, and political thinker Mykhailo Drahomanov, who, like Honcharenko, was a native of tsarist-ruled Ukraine but lived for much of his life as a political émigré. On 15 January 1894 *Narod* published Honcharenko's article "Kraina kozakiv v pivnichnii Amerytsi, abo Aliaska" (A Cossack Land in North America, or Alaska).[10] In it he argued that Ukrainian Cossacks had been the first Europeans to visit continental America's northwest coast and claimed that many of their descendants eventually settled in Alaska, where some had intermarried with the aboriginal population. The story's dramatic historical assertions and exotic account of Ukrainian Cossacks living in a far-off land created a stir among both Ukrainian and Russian readers of *Narod*.

In March 1894 Honcharenko sent a brief account of his life to Mykhailo Pavlyk in Kolomyia, where it was edited (with input from Drahomanov) and published as his *Spomynky* (Memoirs).[11] The adventure-filled autobiographical sketch, along with the *Narod* article, alerted Galician Ukrainian activists to the presence of a like-minded radical on America's West Coast, contributing to developments that eight years later would lead to an ex-

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Papers at the Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

[10] Translated as "North America or Alaska—A Kozak Country," in Luciw, *Father Agapius Honcharenko*, 55–57; the article was dated 1 January 1894. Honcharenko likely came to the attention of Pavlyk and other Galician Ukrainian radicals when an account of his life was published in 1893 in the New York–based Russian-language journal *Postup*. See Yaroslav Chyzh, "Andrii Ahapii Honcharenko," *Kalendar "Svobody" na zvychainyi rik 1957*, 77.

[11] *Spomynky Ahapiia Honcharenka, ukrainskoho kozaka-sviashchennyka* (Kolomyia: M. Pavlyk. z drukarni M. Bilousa, 1894). Drahomanov recommended that eight pages of text be deleted because he found the content questionable. Somewhat curiously, he described Honcharenko as a "half-Protestant" who would do well not to quarrel with the Holy Synod. Drahomanov also apparently suggested that Honcharenko be encouraged to go to Pennsylvania to teach Ukrainians who had recently settled there. See Luciw, *Father Agapius Honcharenko*, 162–63.

periment in communal co-operative living on Honcharenko's property in California.

Three months after Honcharenko's article about Alaska being a "Cossack Land" appeared in *Narod*, it was summarized in an issue of *Svoboda*, the first Ukrainian-language newspaper published in North America.[12] In the next few years several other items by or about Honcharenko appeared in *Svoboda*, so its readers in the United States and Canada were learning about their California-based kinsman at about the same time that the immigration of Ukrainians to the New World was beginning in earnest.[13] In fact, Honcharenko's debut in *Svoboda* inaugurated his integration into the North American Ukrainian community, for his scenic acreage in the Alameda Hills subsequently became a stopping place for fellow countrymen who found their way to the American West Coast. Honcharenko became especially well known after a group of Galician newcomers—all arriving via Canada—attempted to establish a commune as a socialist Ukrainian brotherhood on his property. Although the venture failed, it added to Honcharenko's legendary reputation and ensured his lasting memory in the Ukrainian diaspora.

The last years of Honcharenko's life were especially difficult ones, and he and Albina had to depend on the charity of neighbors to survive. He died at the age of eighty-four on 5 May 1916, fourteen months after his wife.[14] By then Honcharenko had become a renowned figure throughout the Bay area, and his death was front-page news in its leading newspapers.[15] Eight decades later, in 1997, the California Historical Resources

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[12] The paper made its debut in Jersey City, N.J., on 15 September 1893. See "Se tsikave," *Svoboda*, 13 April 1894.

[13] Items appeared in *Svoboda* on 2 May 1896; 4 June 1896; 23 February 1899; and 31 May 1900. An author signed "O.P." dedicated a laudatory poem to him, titled "Na imenyny Honcharenka," in *Svoboda*, 14 September 1899. Kyrylo Genyk-Berezovsky submitted his first piece to *Svoboda* in January 1897, but given his interest in immigration he probably began reading the paper while still in Galicia.

[14] Their only child, a daughter, had died as a young child. The outline of Honcharenko's life given here serves as context for the story of the commune established on his California farmstead. Writings about Honcharenko (which often quote him) differ, and some critics charge that he fabricated stories about himself, exaggerated his achievements, or suffered from a persecution complex that made him overstate his harassment by Russian authorities. The most comprehensive source of information on Honcharenko is Luciw's *Father Agapius Honcharenko*. An earlier version of this work appeared as Wasyl Luciw and Theodore Luciw, *Ahapius Honcharenko, "Alaska Man"* (Toronto: Slavia Library, 1963). Both of these books are somewhat disorganized and flawed, but they have helped popularize Honcharenko outside the Ukrainian-speaking community. For another summary of Honcharenko's life in English, see Myron Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884–1954* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 17–20.

[15] "Exiled Priest Laid to Rest," *San Francisco Chronicle,* 7 May 1916; and "Pines Drone

Commission designated his ranch and gravesite a state historical landmark, and in May 1999 a cairn and plaque honoring Honcharenko were unveiled there.[16]

First Contact: Tracing the Roots of the California Ukrainian Brotherhood

The origins of the Ukrainian Brotherhood in California can be traced back to Austrian-ruled Ukraine and Honcharenko's initial correspondence with the leading Western Ukrainian socialists grouped around the periodical *Narod*. The rise of Ukrainian national movements in both tsarist- and Habsburg-ruled Ukraine has been well documented by historians, as has the lively political and cultural dialogue that developed between activists on both sides of the imperial borders that had divided the Ukrainian lands for centuries. Honcharenko's interaction with Galician Ukrainian populist leaders was consistent with the broad pattern of communication and co-operation across this divide in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

It seems likely that Cyril Genik (Kyrylo Genyk-Berezovsky, 1857–1925), who would become an important Canadian immigration agent, first heard about Honcharenko while still living in Galicia, from his friend and fellow activist Mykhailo Pavlyk. Later, when already in Canada, Genik would surely have seen Honcharenko's contributions to *Svoboda* when his dispatches from California started appearing there in the spring of 1896. In any case, it was Genik who forged the critical link between the Galician utopian radicals and the aging revolutionary and maverick Orthodox priest.[17]

Chant for Honcharenko, Fxiled [sic] Priest. Tolstoi's Confessor Placed Beside Remains of Wife," *Oakland Tribune*, 9 May 1916. Officiating at his funeral was Rev. W. Johnstone of the Hayward Methodist Episcopal Church; in attendance, too, was Rev. J. Glazko of the Russian Presbyterian Mission in San Francisco.

[16] See Tamara Horodysky, "Pioneer Cleric's Ranch declared Historic Landmark by California Commission," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 14 December 1997.

[17] An account written in the 1930s by Teklia Danys (Danyshchuk), the widow of one of the California brotherhood members, claimed that a Galician village radical named Ivan Dorundiak was responsible for introducing the idea of the commune to several of its future members in Western Ukraine. Dorundiak ostensibly learned about Honcharenko from Genik in Winnipeg during an investigative trip to Canada. According to this version of events, Genik proposed that a "co-operative-commune" be established first in California, since the climate and soil were especially favorable. Dorundiak returned to Galicia and began planning a project called the "Ukrainian-American Commune" or "Co-operative Brotherhood" with like-minded idealists. The utopians even drafted a set of bylaws and produced an illustrated certificate for their proposed agrarian socialist fraternity, signed by Mykhailo Pavlyk's sister, Anna. In fact, however, Dorundiak accompanied

Genik had arrived in Canada with his family aboard the S.S. Sicilia on 22 July 1896. A native of Bereziv Nyzhnyi in the Kolomyia region of Western Ukraine, he had been a village schoolteacher and storeowner with close connections to the leaders of the socialist Radical Party before heading the second contingent of Canada-bound colonists assembled by the emigration activist Osyp Oleskiv (Joseph [Josef] Oleskow, 1860–1903). It was Oleskiv who would later recommend that the Canadian government hire Genik, who was fluent in German and Polish as well as Ukrainian and knew some English, as an immigration agent. Genik originally settled with his family near Stuartburn, Manitoba, but in October 1896 they relocated to Winnipeg so that he could become the first Ukrainian in the Canadian civil service. He would remain a federal employee with the Dominion Lands Commission until 1911, tirelessly helping thousands of his fellow immigrants as an interpreter, guide, adviser, and community organizer.[18]

The editor and author Myroslav Stechyshyn (Myroslaw Stechishin, 1883–1947) later remarked that pioneer-era immigrants viewed Genik as a kind of "Canadian tsar."[19] Stechyshyn, himself a complicated and dynamic personality, is the source of much of the available information about the "Ukrainian Brotherhood" founded on Honcharenko's Hayward-area property. In writing about its origins from a perspective of some four decades, Stechyshyn related:

Osyp Oleskiv on his exploratory tour across Canada in the summer and fall of 1895, before Genik had settled in Manitoba. Dorundiak was supposed to join Genik when he immigrated overseas in the summer of 1896 with the second group of colonists organized by Oleskiv. But there is no record of him having made the trip, and it is likely that various stories got blended and confused in this second-hand retelling of distant events. While it is unknown exactly when Genik started corresponding with Honcharenko about the idea of starting a colony in Hayward, Genik was undoubtedly Honcharenko's first and chief Canadian contact and thus the instigator behind the Ukraina commune in California. Danys's account appeared as "Ukrainska komuna v Kalifornii" in *Kalendar Ukrainskoho robitnychoho soiuzu,* 1936, 52–57. She was not a member of the California commune and so relied on the recollections and diaries of her late husband. It is not surprising, then, that her description is inconsistent with more contemporary and first-hand sources documenting the commune's existence.

[18] See Genik's capsule biography in Vladimir Kaye, *Early Settlements in Canada, 1895–1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, for the Ukrainian Canadian Research Foundation, 1964), 381–82. Also see Orest Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Period, 1891–1924* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991), 170.

[19] Myroslav Stechyshyn, "Ukrainske bratstvo v Kalifornii," *Kaliendar "Ukrainskoho holosu"* za 1940 rik, 112.

When we got to know each other better, Genik once began telling me
that life in Canada was hard, because more than half the year inevitably
involved a battle with nature, with winter. He himself was thinking of
leaving Canada for a warm country, for California. He was even con-
ducting a correspondence on this matter with a Ukrainian in California
who had now been living there for close to forty years. There were sev-
eral other Ukrainians in Canada who were also getting ready to travel
to California, and two had already gone there. Here he mentioned the
name of Yurko Syrotiuk, and I immediately recalled that while still in
the homeland I had read a contribution to *Hromadskyi holos* that had
been written by Yurko Syrotiuk from Ethelbert, Man[itoba]. Genik told
me that it was same man, and asked if I wanted to go to California. I
was in no way tied to Canada, and to be honest, as I had heard a little
bit about Canadian winter and was afraid of it, I said that I'd be happy
to go.[20]

Myroslav Stechyshyn was just nineteen when he arrived in Canada
from the Galician village of Hleshchava, Terebovlia county, in the spring
of 1902. That December he left for northern California to join two other
Canadian families that had already moved to Honcharenko's ranch.[21]
Here is Stechyshyn's account of how Genik recruited him to join the
Ukraina communal experiment:

After that Genik began explaining the plan that was bound up with his
departure for California. The Ukrainian with whom he was corre-
sponding in California was named Ahapii Honcharenko. He referred to
himself as a "Cossack-priest" because he was of Cossack descent and
had been a priest, but had abandoned his priesthood and become in-
volved with the revolutionary movement. Now he had a small piece of
land in California, had become old, was unable to work, and wished for
a group of Ukrainians to settle alongside him. Adjacent to him it was
possible to buy cheap land and establish a Ukrainian colony. The peo-
ple who were thinking of relocating with Genik to California had radi-
cal beliefs and were keen to create a colony where it would be possible
to live freely, without having to conceal their views, and to mutually
assist each other, like the Cossacks once fended for themselves near the

[20] Ibid, 112. *Hromadskyi holos* (Community Voice) was a popular monthly magazine
then issued in Lviv that had strong connections to the Ukrainian Radical Party in Galicia.
It was edited by Ivan Franko (1896–97) and Mykhailo Pavlyk (1898–1903).

[21] Stechyshyn's capsule biography in Mykhailo Marunchak, *Biohrafichnyi dovidnyk do
istorii ukraintsiv Kanady* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Can-
ada, 1986), 608, states that he traveled to California to join the commune with Anna
Budnyk, whom he married in a "socialist ceremony" in Winnipeg in 1908; a wedding
announcement, dated 6 November 1908, appeared in *Kanadyiskyi farmer.* Marunchak
must have confused Stechyshyn with Ferlei, who got married in California in a ceremony
at which Honcharenko officiated.

Zaporozhia[n Sich]. For that reason it was planned to accept only se-
lected and reliable people into the colony. It was proposed that they call
themselves the Ukrainian Brotherhood and regard one another as broth-
ers and sisters.

I liked Genik's ideas and said I would be happy to join the Ukrai-
nian Brotherhood.[22]

The reference to living like Cossacks suggests that no small part of
the conception behind the proposed brotherhood must have been Hon-
charenko's, given his attachment to his heritage as a free Cossack. Most
likely the nationally conscious activists who became members of the Cal-
ifornia commune were also imbued with legends of Ukraine's Cossack
past.

Stechyshyn's recollections, written nearly four decades after the fact,
do not correspond fully with more contemporary accounts of how the
brotherhood got started. Here is how Honcharenko characterized the be-
ginnings of the colony on his land in an account published in 1904:

My dealings with Genik were thus: He learned that in that year [1902] I
was putting up for rent 30 acres of my farm for $2 an acre so as simply
to make enough money to pay my taxes, not to get rich, [so] he sent me
$60 and they came to me—for the sake of his ideas and to learn from
me how to farm California-style: Yurko Syrotiuk with his wife Anasta-
siia, two children, and his father, Danylo; Ivan Danylchuk with his wife
and child; [and] Ilko Stechyshyn and [Taras] Dmytro Ferlei.[23]

Honcharenko went on to describe the developments that, in his view, ul-
timately led to the commune's downfall.

Stechyshyn actually related his own version of the same events in an
article published just a month after Honcharenko's account, in which he
contradicted Honcharenko on numerous points and dismissed the priest
somewhat cruelly as an old fool. Stechyshyn characterized Genik's role
in initiating the Hayward colony thus: "It seems funny that people trav-
eled to California because of Genik's ideas. Surely for such a trip it isn't
necessary to borrow someone's ideas? Everyone who went did so for his
own ideas, while Genik's ideas were, in reality, from some perspectives
diametrically distinguished from ours."[24]

There are similar discrepancies in virtually all of the first-hand docu-
ments pertaining to the existence of the Ukrainian Brotherhood, which

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[22] Stechyshyn, "Ukrainske bratstvo," 112.

[23] As cited in Honcharenko, "Ukraina Brotherhood," 3.

[24] Myroslav Stechyshyn, "Yak 'Svit' poshyvsia v durni," *Svoboda*, 19 May 1904.
Stechyshyn corrected Honcharenko on some dates and details of developments, in an
obvious effort to discredit him.

undoubtedly explains why the various later summaries are often confused and incongruous. For example, the popular historian and journalist Mykhailo Ivanchuk (Michael Ewanchuk) suggested it was Yurii (Yurko, George) Syrotiuk who originally contacted Honcharenko, probably after learning of him from Mykhailo Pavlyk. Apparently Ivanchuk made the connection based on a partial misreading of Stechyshyn's recollections:

> It turns out that Syrotiuk was an educated man who had contacts with Mykhailo Pavlyk and through him established a relationship with Ahapii Honcharenko, intending to join up with his Ukrainian brotherhood in California.... Syrotiuk probably wrote to Galician periodicals about Honcharenko's brotherhood. That brotherhood [must have] impressed [Taras] Dmytro Ferlei (a student at the Kolomyia Gymnasium), because he left Canada for California.[25]

Ivanchuk was correct in concluding that Ferlei first heard about the brotherhood while still in Galicia, since he merely made a stop in Canada and continued on his way to the American Pacific coast. According to Stechyshyn, Ferlei was enticed to come to California by Syrotiuk, who was from the same village and had corresponded with him.[26]

Yurii Syrotiuk (1872–1929) had emigrated to Canada with his father and a brother and sister in December 1896 from the Galician village of Balyntsi, Kolomyia county, Galicia. In Manitoba they established a homestead near Ethelbert. From there Syrotiuk sent a couple of letters to the Ukrainian-American newspaper *Svoboda,* the first being "My ne propadem!" (We will not perish!), published in the spring of 1897. The

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[25] Mykhailo Ivanchuk, "Na Honcharenkovii 'Ukraini,'" *Ukrainskyi holos*, 11 October 1967. Cf. my translation of the original with that in Luciw, *Father Agapius Honcharenko*, 127. In his piece Ivanchuk also speculates that Genik learned about the fugitive Russian monk Stefan Ustvolsky from Honcharenko, who may well have regarded him as a fellow victim of ecclesiastical persecution. Ustvolsky, better known as the controversial Bishop Serafim, was recruited by Genik and two friends to act as the titular head of the Independent Greek Church, founded in Winnipeg in 1903. Lending some credence to Ivanchuk's theory is an article in *Svoboda*, submitted from Hayward and signed "Agapios," that begins with the news that "In San Francisco Greeks are organizing an independent church—the *Independent Greek Church* on the corner of *Folsom* and *Seventh* streets, in a highly visible place near the *United States Mint*. This church will be independent of the Russian Synod; they will get their priest from Athens"("Dopysy," *Svoboda*, 11 June 1903; the italicized words appear in English in the Ukrainian text). Ivanchuk's theory is challenged in a first-hand account of how Ustvolsky got to Canada and became the driving force in the creation of the Independent Church: see John Bodrug, *Independent Orthodox Church: Memoirs Pertaining to the History of a Ukrainian Canadian Church in the Years 1903 to 1913*, trans. Edward Bodrug and Lydia Biddle (Toronto: Ukrainian Canadian Research Foundation, 1982), 33–39.

[26] Stechyshyn, "Ukrainske bratstvo," 120.

submission concluded with a few lines of verse titled "Do bratov haly-chan" (To [My] Brother Galicians), thus earning Syrotiuk the distinction of being the first Ukrainian immigrant to Canada to have an original poem printed in the New World press.[27] A second letter, signed by Syrotiuk and several others, was published in *Svoboda* in January 1899 under the heading "Protest!"[28]

Shortly after arriving in Canada, Syrotiuk married Anastasiia Bilash of Sifton, and they soon started a family.[29] Although he was obviously an energetic and idealistic young man, it seems improbable, on the basis of the written record, that Syrotiuk was the actual catalyst behind the founding of the Ukraina colony. Cyril Genik's age, background, stature, and unique vantage point on the immigrant community make him far more likely to have been the first to seek out Honcharenko with a proposal to start a settlement in the Bay area. While Syrotiuk and Ivan Danylchuk were the first to relocate to Hayward with their families, both Honcharenko's remarks and Stechyshyn's recollections published decades later show that it was Genik who was ultimately responsible for getting the unusual Canadian contingent to the shores of San Francisco Bay.

As Stechyshyn later observed, Genik was a great admirer of the famous Russian anarchist and novelist Leo Tolstoy, who also appears to have been a big influence on Honcharenko. Despite Honcharenko's criticisms of the famous writer—whom he characterized as a hypocrite and claimed to have confessed—Stechyshyn related that when he arrived at Honcharenko's Ukraina he curiously discovered "stacks of Tolstoy's works published in Switzerland." Indeed, it was there that Stechyshyn first acquainted himself with Tolstoy's libertarian Christian philosophy, to whom the bearded Honcharenko bore more than a passing resemblance.[30]

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[27] See "My ne propadem!" *Svoboda*, 27 May 1897. "Do brativ halychan" predates by almost two years the poem "Kanadyiski emigranty" written by an Alberta homesteader named Ivan Zbura, long touted as the first immigrant to Canada to have an original verse composition published in the New World press. Syrotiuk's accomplishment was first revealed in Alexandra Pawlowsky's "Ukrainian Canadian Literature in Winnipeg: A Socio-Historical Perspective, 1908–1991" (Ph.D. diss., University of Manitoba, 1997), 25–26.

[28] See *Svoboda* 26 January 1899.

[29] Vladimir Kaye, *Dictionary of Ukrainian Canadian Biography Pioneer Settlers of Manitoba 1891–1900* [*sic*] (Toronto: Ukrainian Canadian Research Foundation, 1975), 101; here I have corrected some of Kaye's inaccuracies about Syrotiuk.

[30] Stechyshyn, "Ukrainske bratstvo," 118–19. Honcharenko's contradictory attitudes may indicate that by 1902 he was becoming embittered and somewhat irrational. Stechyshyn, with the benefit of hindsight, later concluded that years of hounding by Russian authorities had made Honcharenko delusional and highly suspicious of others.

But in Hayward itself, according to Stechyshyn, it was Syrotiuk who emerged as the brotherhood's leader and the "rock" upon which the commune was built.[31] This role should properly have fallen to Genik, but, caught up as he was in developments then taking place in Winnipeg, he never made it to California (though he had promised Hryhorii Danyshchuk that he and his wife would be joining the group).[32]

Views of how the brotherhood began and whose ideas it embodied sometimes conflict, but what is certainly clear is that Genik and all the others who got behind the undertaking initially believed that they had found a kindred spirit in the aging revolutionary priest.

The Rise and Demise of Hayward's Ukrainian Brotherhood

It is difficult to find many facts about the Ukrainian Brotherhood or to determine the exact sequence of events in its rise and demise. But the available sources do provide some details about its existence.

It seems fairly certain that Syrotiuk and his father, wife, and two young children reached Honcharenko's farm sometime in October 1902.[33] They were followed by Ivan Danylchuk and his young family. A native of the Galician village of Bilche Zolote in Borshchiv county, Danylchuk had immigrated to Canada with his parents in 1897, settling near Riding Mountain in Manitoba, where he began teaching at a Presbyterian-funded school in 1900.

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[31] Ibid, 119.

[32] Danys, "Ukrainska komuna," 54. Mykhailo Marunchak claims that Genik traveled to California to meet with Honcharenko in 1901, a year before the commune was established. See "A. Honcharenko i K. Genyk ta kanadski ukraintsi," in his *Studii do istorii ukraintsiv Kanady* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, 1970–72), 162.

[33] In the article cited above, Marunchak says that the Syrotiuks moved to Honcharenko's Ukraina ranch in May 1902 (p. 170). However, in a first-hand account written less than two years after the commune's failure, Stechyshyn corrected Honcharenko on a number of details and gave October as the month when the first "communards" reached the ranch. He then cites 6 and 12 December 1902 and 18 January 1903 as dates when other commune members arrived, without specifying who and when; see Stechyshyn, "Yak 'Svit' poshyvsia v durni," 2. In "Ukrainske bratstvo," 113, Stechyshyn explicitly states that Syrotiuk and his family were the first to reach California in October, and that they immediately set about converting an abandoned chicken coop into a two-room residence and planting several acres of beans. He also says that Ivan Danylchuk was the second commune member to arrive and that his own arrival at the farm (after Danylchuk's) was followed by that of Taras Ferlei, indicating that it came about a week later. Most importantly, Stechyshyn unequivocally maintains: "Besides Syrotiuk, Danlychuk, and me, only T. D. Ferlei was connected to the history of the brotherhood on Honcharenko's farm" (ibid, 120). From this information it would seem that Hryhorii Danyshchuk got there on 18 January and Hryhorii Kraikivsky probably arrived in Hayward a few weeks later, shortly before the commune was revived on a farm in the Castro Valley.

The following year he married Mariia Kostyniuk, and shortly after the birth of their first child the family left for California.

Myroslav Stechyshyn was next to reach Honcharenko's Ukraina, and Taras Dmytro Ferlei (Ferley, 1882–1947) joined the group just days later.[34] A native of Balyntsi, like Syrotiuk (who wrote letters encouraging him to come to Hayward), Ferlei merely passed through Canada, having resolved to go on to California while still in Europe.

Hryhorii Danyshchuk (Gregory Danys) reached Honcharenko's ranch early in the New Year, following a brief stop in Winnipeg to see Cyril Genik.[35] Hailing from the village of Sopiv near Kolomyia in Galicia, Danyshchuk would eventually settle in San Francisco, where his widow, Teklia, was still living in 1936.[36] The last recruit, Hryhorii Kraikivsky (Gregory Krakiwsky, 1872–1923), apparently arrived at Ukraina when the commune had already fallen apart. Originally from the Galician village of Rizdviany, Rohatyn county, he emigrated to New York in 1891 and then moved to Canada in 1899, first to Winnipeg and then to Vancouver.[37] According to Teklia Danyshchuk, Kraikivsky contributed the largest sum toward the rental of the house and piece of land where the brotherhood tried to regroup after quitting Honcharenko's property in the Alameda Hills.

Problems at Honcharenko's Ukraina farmstead first broke out between Danylchuk and Syrotiuk, judging by the accounts of both Stechyshyn and Honcharenko. What exactly transpired is unclear, but on 12 or 13 January 1903 Danylchuk apparently announced he wanted out of the brotherhood, precipitating a crisis in which Honcharenko sided with Danylchuk. Various allegations and criticisms followed, with Honcharen-

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[34] Marunchak says that Genik helped to pay the cost of getting all of the Ukraina brotherhood's members to California, even taking over possession of Ivan Danylchuk's farm to enable him to go ("A. Honcharenko and K. Genyk," 168, 179). Of course, this underscores Genik's leading role in realizing the communal experiment in Hayward, even if he never actually participated in it.

[35] Unfortunately, Teklia Danys's description of her husband's arrival is badly translated in Luciw's *Father Agapius Honcharenko*, 102, as are parts of other Ukrainian-language documents quoted there. The original account in her "Ukrainska komuna v Kalifornii" states that while Hryhorii Danyshchuk was visiting with the Geniks in early 1903, there was an attempt to recruit him as a priest for the "Serafimite" (i.e., Independent Greek) Church, which was then just about to be established.

[36] In some sources Hryhorii Danyshchuk is identified as Harry Danys or Dennis. See the letter he sent from Berkeley, California, in *Ukrainskyi holos*, 22 June 1910.

[37] See Toma Tomashevsky, "Spomyny pro nashykh narodnykh diachiv-pioniriv, shcho vzhe ziishly z zhyttievoi stseny," *Ukrainskyi pionir* 1, no. 1 (January 1955): 7–8. This source makes no mention of the California colony and suggests that Kraikivsky had traveled to San Francisco intending to signing up there for a job in the Klondike.

ko accusing the brotherhood's members of laziness and Stechyshyn responding that Honcharenko was exploiting them for his own profit.[38] Whatever the case, a major factor contributing to the break-up was surely the lack of a consensus about the commune's nature and goals. Conflicting personalities, age differences, and varying levels of practical experience in working the land also played a role in sowing tensions within the group.[39]

Syrotiuk was the first to leave the property, probably sometime during the second half of January 1903. He went to Hayward, where he rented accommodations and a wagon that he used to convey Stechyshyn and Ferlei into the town on 3 February. Apparently Danyshchuk and Kraikivsky took up residence in Hayward around the same time, and Syrotiuk's brother, Vasyl, also appeared there.[40] They all stayed in Hayward for a month or two and then resolved to rent a ten-acre orchard with a large house in nearby Castro Valley. The property was to serve as the base for a renewed brotherhood, now expanded beyond its original nucleus and with plans to include additional recruits.

At the Castro Valley farm the women and children tended the orchard and garden through the summer while the men and older boys found odd jobs to earn cash to sustain the operation. According to Teklia Danys, the Castro Valley group also eventually included Ferlei's wife, Nataliia Rurak, who followed him to North America from Galicia in the first part of 1903. Danys "believed" Honcharenko married the young couple, and she recalled that Nataliia took over the management of women's duties in the new commune.[41] Ivan Danylchuk returned with his family to Canada, where he became a minister in the Independent Greek Church.

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[38] Cf. Honcharenko, "Ukraina Brotherhood," and Stechyshyn, "Yak 'Svit' poshyvsia v durni"; see also the description of the break-up of the commune in Stechyshyn, "Ukrainske bratstvo," 120. In looking back at events, Stechyshyn also mused that some brotherhood members' inability to get along with Honcharenko's wife may have figured in the commune's downfall.

[39] Teklia Danys speculated that Syrotiuk and Kraikivsky regarded the other members of the commune as "greenhorns" ("Ukrainska komuna," 53–55). As for age differences, in 1902 Honcharenko was seventy, Syrotiuk and Kraikivsky were thirty, Danylchuk was twenty-eight, Ferlei was twenty, and Stechyshyn was only nineteen.

[40] Danys wrote that when her husband arrived he had to sleep in a shed (i.e., the converted chicken coop) on the Honcharenko farm ("Ukrainska komuna," 54). Apparently he got there just as the commune was breaking up, which explains why Stechyshyn did not include him among the members of the original brotherhood.

[41] Ibid., 56. Despite their differences and disappointments, most of the communards apparently maintained more or less cordial relations with Honcharenko after they parted ways. As for Taras and Nataliiaa Ferlei, they eventually had eight children—five sons and three daughters; see "Taras Dmytro Ferlei," in Kovbel, *Propamiatna knyha*, 409–15.

As summer wore on, it became apparent that the new collective's efforts at cultivating an orchard were not going to be a big success. Nonetheless, in the fall of 1903 the brotherhood's core members drafted a constitution for their new fraternity, calling it the Ukrainian Co-operative Brotherhood. The document's preamble acknowledged that Cyril Genik had been the planner of the initial Ukrainian Brotherhood. The members also wisely appended an agreement about what should happen in the event of the project's dissolution: "(1) with the leftover capital, return to Canada, to the province of Manitoba, (2) purchase a piece of a land as feasible, (3) live a peaceful life on it, accumulating wealth, (4) which, as soon as it has reached the sum of $4,500, is to be transferred to the private property of the three signatories or their families in equal shares."[42]

Obviously the members' experience at Honcharenko's ranch had had a sobering effect on them; they also probably sensed that the chances of the Co-operative Brotherhood succeeding were increasingly slim. The adoption of a constitution did not prevent this venture from suffering the same fate as its predecessor. By the beginning of 1904 the Castro Valley project had been effectively abandoned and its supporters had started going their separate ways.[43]

Decades later the Castro Valley Co-operative was characterized as a kind of "collective farm" long before anything similar was established in the Soviet Union. In the opinion of Hryhorii Danyshchuk, despite the suitability of the land for growing grain, garden vegetables, and orchards, the commune was ultimately undone because only a couple of people were willing to do the hard work required to develop the estate. Essen-

Ferlei was also known as "Dempster," an Anglicized adaptation of Dmytro, his middle name.

[42] See Marunchak, "A. Honcharenko and K. Genyk," 174–75. Marunchak says that Stechyshyn and the two Syrotiuk brothers signed the agreement on 16 May 1903, then Ferlei signed, and anyone who formally joined the brotherhood was expected to endorse it. The original of the agreement is in the Marunchak archive; part of it is reproduced in his "A. Honcharenko i K. Genyk," 169.

[43] On 14 January 1904 Stechyshyn, Syrotiuk, and Ferlei sent a letter from San Francisco to *Svoboda* in response to a scurrilous piece about the commune by "T. P." in the American Russophile periodical *Svit*. It challenged some of "T. P."'s claims and concluded by saying, essentially, that what happened with the commune was none of *Svit*'s business. The three men were clearly still living in the Bay area at the time and hoping to resurrect the Ukrainian Co-operative Brotherhood. See "Na uvahu 'Svitovi,'" *Svoboda*, 28 January 1904. Founded in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, in 1897, *Svit* was the official organ of the Russian Orthodox Catholic Mutual Aid Society, which was dedicated to propagating Russian Orthodoxy among Ruthenian Uniates (i.e., Ukrainian Catholics) in the New World.

tially Danyshchuk attributed the initiative's failure to too many bosses and not enough workers.[44]

In the aftermath, Danyshchuk and Stechyshyn worked for a time in the forestry industry of Mendocino County. Stechyshyn remained in the Bay Area until the spring of 1905, when he returned to western Canada. Syrotiuk soon moved to British Columbia. After a brief stint in San Francisco working on the rebuilding of the city after the devastating April 1906 earthquake, Ferlei retraced his steps to Manitoba, where he remained for the rest of his life. Kraikivsky initially took part in the Klondike Gold Rush, but by late 1904 he had settled in Edmonton.[45] Danyshchuk was the sole member to put down roots in California, eventually marrying and making his home in San Francisco.[46] Amazingly, the brotherhood's members all hoped that the brotherhood would somehow still be resuscitated. Danyshchuk and Stechyshyn are said to have written to friends in Galicia after the Castro Valley farm had been disbanded, telling them to hold off coming to California until further notice and not mentioning what had happened.[47]

About the Ukrainian Brotherhood's dismal failure Stechyshyn subsequently wrote:

> In truth, the Ukrainian Brotherhood never really got beyond a scheme, beyond an idea, which wasn't even written on paper or even more or less formally adopted. The Ukrainian Brotherhood didn't have any kind of an understanding, or a constitution, or any sort of bylaws. It's natural that Genik could think about it one way, [and] Honcharenko another, as was [also] the case with Syrotiuk, Danylchuk, Stechyshyn, Ferlei, Hryhorii Danyshchuk, or Hryhorii Kraikivsky.[48]

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[44] As cited in Marunchak, "A. Honcharenko and K. Genyk," 176–77. According to Teklia Danys, the co-operative had a president (Ferlei), vice-president, manager, and supervisors, all of whom were "afraid of getting calluses on their hands." The analogy was made after the disastrous Soviet collectivization campaign, undoubtedly to suggest that the folly of attempting to collectivize agriculture had been tried in California.

[45] Kraikivsky and the Alberta activist Petro Zvarych are the only two Ukrainians known to have gone to the Klondike.

[46] Teklia Danys gave an interesting account of her first meeting with Honcharenko in 1910. See H. G. Skehar, "Pershyi ukrainets v Amerytsi," in *Propamiatna knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Domu u Vynypegu* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian People's Home, 1949), 420–22.

[47] Danys, "Ukrainska komuna," 56. Attempts to attract additional recruits to California continued. Candidates included residents of Pleasant Home, Manitoba (fellow immigrants from Genik's village of Bereziv), who did not leave for the West Coast only because they could not sell their farms. Another potential recruit was Yaroslav Koltek, a native of Balyntsi; he was encouraged to come to Hayward by Taras Ferlei but reached Canada too late, in the fall of 1903. See Marunchak, "A. Honcharenko and K. Genyk," 167, 178.

[48] Stechyshyn, "Ukrainske bratstvo," 119.

Stechyshyn also spoke of the impact of the original brotherhood's failure and about his attempt to apply some lessons learned from the experience to the Castro Valley Co-operative:

> When now, from the perspective of thirty-seven years, I review those events, it seems to me that the transfer of Honcharenko's "Ukraina" to Hayward was the beginning of the end of the Ukrainian Brotherhood, despite the fact that those of us who remained in the brotherhood did not want to reconcile ourselves to this and for months, and even years, maintained the fiction of the Ukrainian Brotherhood and stubbornly tried to revive it. The departure from Honcharenko's farm was our first painful disappointment. It destroyed our faith in the existence of the brotherhood, and subsequent failures simply accelerated the loss of this faith until it was almost entirely killed. I wrote about the brotherhood to the then editor of *Svoboda*, my unforgettable friend Ivan Ardan, and he recommended that I read a particular book about similar organizations and the reasons for their downfall. Under the influence of that book, eight months later I even took to writing something along the lines of an agreement among members of a brotherhood that was supposed to call itself the Ukrainian Co-operative Brotherhood, but things never went beyond the acceptance of this agreement.[49]

As for the irrepressible Agapius Honcharenko, he never stopped believing in the idea of the brotherhood and continued writing to his Canadian friends and encouraging them to give it another try. The dream obviously died hard. As for the young men who did go to California, all of them seem to have been affected positively by the experience, judging by their achievements after returning to Canada.

A Scattering of Seeds: The Lives of the Ukrainian Brotherhood's Members after California

The California brotherhood founded by Ukrainians who came from Canada proved to be a fleeting utopian experiment. Nonetheless it marked a significant chapter in the evolution of the leadership of the pioneer-era Ukrainian-Canadian community. In the wake of the disintegration of the Castro Valley Co-operative, its members—with the exception of Danyshchuk—gradually dispersed across Canada, where each made substantial contributions to various immigrant institutions and endeavors.

Cyril Genik continued to work at his government job in Winnipeg until 1911, playing a key role in several groundbreaking initiatives that laid the foundation for organized Ukrainian life in Canada. In October 1903,

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[49] Ibid., 120.

along with Ivan (John) Bodrug (1874–1952) and Ivan Negrych (Negrich, 1875–1946), Genyk launched *Kanadyiskyi farmer* (Canadian Farmer), the first Ukrainian-language newspaper published in Canada.[50] It immediately became a major vehicle of communication among Ukrainians throughout the country, and it survived as a weekly for more than seven decades. In 1903, too, Genik collaborated with Bodrug and Negrych to establish the Independent Greek Church (IGC), which rivalled and undermined the growth of both the Greek Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Mission for several years. This new religious institution was financially backed by Canadian Presbyterian leaders, who sought to use it to convert Ukrainian immigrants to Protestantism.[51]

In April 1904 Genik's home was the venue for the first Ukrainian theatrical production in Manitoba's capital, which was also only the second presented in Canada.[52] Winnipeg subsequently blossomed into the leading center of immigrant drama in the pioneer era, and Genik arguably deserves recognition as the city's first patron of the Ukrainian performing arts. The amateur stage became a critical tool for recruiting, educating, and mobilizing large segments of Ukrainian-Canadian society under various organizational banners, as well as for helping to finance the work of political and religious associations. Like many activists of his generation, Genik also tried his hand as an author, producing a serialized novel about the immigrant experience titled *Kanadyiskyi rai* (Canadian Paradise).[53]

Genik became increasingly involved in Canadian affairs and a big promoter of the Liberal Party, believing it best served the interests of East European immigrants. By 1906 his efforts on the party's behalf had

[50] "Genik, Bodrug, and Negrych constituted the nucleus of the [Ukrainian] intelligentsia in Canada, whose ranks gradually expanded by 1914 to include between 200 and 250 individuals" (Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 170). With the establishment of *Kanadyiskyi farmer*, the U.S.-based *Svoboda* began losing many much of its Canadian readers.

[51] Over time the IGC's dubious origins, questionably qualified clergy, and increasingly controversial reforms would result in fragmentation and decline within the community. Nevertheless, for several years it had a large following, and it continued to influence the religious life of Ukrainian Canadians into the 1920s. See Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 190.

[52] The play was H. Tsehlynsky's *Argonavty* (The Argonauts); see the review in *Kanadyiskyi farmer*, 12 May 1904. Contrary to what is said in most Ukrainian-Canadian historical sources, the first Ukrainian dramatic performance in Canada was presented in the Beaver Creek colony northeast of Edmonton in 1900 or 1901 In his *Recollections*, 82, Czumer mistakenly says the first play performed in Winnipeg was *Svantannia na Honcharivtsi* (Matchmaking at Honcharivka).

[53] Excerpts from the novel, under the title "Fedko Protsiuk," were serialized in the Winnipeg-based Russophile newspaper *Ruskii narod* (The Russian People), beginning with the 6 May 1915 issue. Apparently the work was never published in book form.

hurt his radical credentials among fellow activists; eventually they affected his reputation within the Ukrainian community at large.[54] Furthermore, after becoming disillusioned with the IGC Genik joined the Russian Orthodox Mission, of which he had once been highly critical, and embraced the Russophile views of its leading Ukrainian adherents. Discredited by these and other actions, he eventually withdrew to the periphery of the turbulent Ukrainian-Canadian political arena, his influence eclipsed by younger and more energetic newcomers. After living with his family for a time in America, Genik returned to Winnipeg, where he died in 1925.

Yurii Syrotiuk moved to Vancouver with his family in 1904, shortly after the collapse of the Ukrainian Co-operative Brotherhood, and worked there as a land agent. In September 1906 he became one of the founders of the Ukrainian Club, a reading room that served as a meeting-place for the city's small but growing Ukrainian population. The following year the same group of activists founded the more politically oriented Borotba (Struggle) Society, which became renowned for its excellent choir, whose members were mostly immigrants from Syrotiuk's native village of Balyntsi.[55]

A few years later Syrotiuk helped to found a chapter of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in Vancouver, but when the party adopted an increasingly internationalist and pro-Bolshevik line he quit the organization and joined the nationalist camp. In 1919 he was responsible for sending a letter protesting the Bolshevik occupation of Eastern Galicia to the governor-general of Canada on behalf of the Ukrainian community of Prince Rupert, British Columbia. After the First World War Syrotiuk moved to Alberta, where he found work as a provincial agronomist and lecturer. He died in 1929 in an automobile accident near Radway, in the Ukrainian bloc settlement northeast of Edmonton.[56]

Like Agapius Honcharenko, Ivan Danylchuk had unconventional ideas about Christianity that frequently proved to be a source of conflict. He was primarily concerned with the social and ethical dimensions of Christian teaching; but he was quite indifferent to church ritual and matters of hierarchical authority. Upon his return to Canada from California, he joined the IGC, and on 17 June 1904 he was ordained by the new church's controversial head, Bishop Serafim Ustvolsky (a defrocked Russian monk). Danylchuk studied divinity at the Presbyterian-run

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[54] Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 240.

[55] Mykhailo Marunchak, *Istoriia ukraintsiv v Kanadi*, vol. 1 (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, 1968), 200–204.

[56] Marunchak, *Biohrafichnyi dovidnyk*, 575.

Manitoba College in Winnipeg and then served as an IGC pastor in a number of prairie parishes. In 1908, while ministering in Portage La Prairie, Manitoba, he and a fellow pastor in Winnipeg dramatically broke with the IGC on the grounds that it was controlled by English Presbyterian leaders. The two men urged their shocked parishioners to return to their ancestral Orthodox or Greek Catholic faiths, and they themselves made a very public crossover to the Russian Orthodox Church. Immediately thereafter Danylchuk relocated to Edmonton, where he worked for a time on the city's first Slavic newspaper, the Russophile *Kanadiiskaia nyva* (Canadian Field), published under the editorship of the Russian Orthodox priest Arsenii Chekhovtsev.[57] In the spring of 1909, under the influence of John Bodrug, who was determined to create a distinctively Ukrainian Protestant movement from the remnants of the IGC, Danylchuk returned to the latter's fold.

Danylchuk subsequently served in several IGC congregations, the longest in Rossburn, Manitoba, and Innisfree, Alberta. Around 1914 he also began publishing poems, stories, and satirical pieces in the Protestant-backed newspaper *Kanadyiskyi ranok* (Canadian Dawn). His disillusionment with the IGC returned, and in 1922 he left it again and went into business in Edmonton manufacturing brooms with another disenchanted former Ukrainian pastor. In the mid-1920s Danylchuk had yet another change of heart: despite an ambivalence toward ritualistic forms of worship, he approached the recently organized Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada (UGOC) and asked to become one of its priests. Accepted with some reluctance, though known as a true Christian and an excellent speaker, Danylchuk was assigned to parishes at Fort William, Ontario, and Calder, Saskatchewan, in 1927–28. However, he was then suspended from the UGOC clergy and later settled in Toronto, where he continued attending services of that church until his death in 1945.[58]

Hryhorii Kraikivsky used the money he made very quickly in the Klondike to establish himself in Edmonton in 1904. Investing in real estate, he successfully rode Edmonton's first economic boom to become one of the city's most prosperous Ukrainian businessmen and played a prominent role in several initiatives that shaped the pioneer Ukrainian

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[57] See the detailed account of Danylchuk's conversion to Russian Orthodoxy in Panteleimon Bozhyk, *Tserkov ukraintsiv v Kanadi: Prychynky do istorii ukrainskoho tserkovnoho zhyttia v brytiiskii dominii Kanadi za chas vid 1890–1927* (Winnipeg: "Kanadyiskyi ukrainets," 1927), 64–67, 70–71.

[58] Marunchak, *Biohrafichnyi dovidnyk*, 193. Rev. Ivan Danylchuk should not be confused with the Canadian-born author and Ukrainian Orthodox community activist with the same name.

community in Alberta and beyond. In 1906 he helped to found one of Edmonton's earliest Ukrainian organizations, the Postup (Progress) Reading Society and belonged to the city's important Ukrainian Club. He was also was a member of the Edmonton branch of the Ruthenian National Association (later renamed the Ukrainian National Association), the oldest and largest Ukrainian fraternal-benefit association in the United States. In collaboration with a fellow Alberta activist, Petro Zvarych (Peter Svarich), Kraikivsky was responsible for organizing a Ukrainian convention that drew 200 delegates from across Alberta to the provincial capital on 27 December 1909. The goal of the gathering was to establish a national body that could co-ordinate the activities of the many different Ukrainian organizations that were springing up around the country. Kraikivsky was chosen as the head of the provincial council, whose mission was to lobby the Alberta government for bilingual Ukrainian-English schools and other measures to improve the educational, economic, and political situation of Ukrainian immigrants in Canada.

At the beginning of 1910, Kraikivsky was involved in launching a chain of retail stores called Narodna torhivlia (National Co-operative), which were in part intended to provide training in business for the mostly agrarian Ukrainians who settled Alberta. That same year he also became a shareholder in the Ukrainian Publishing Company launched in Winnipeg to issue the newspaper *Ukrainskyi holos* (Ukrainian Voice); for many years that publication served as the unofficial organ of the emerging Ukrainian-Canadian secular intelligentsia.

Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century Kraikivsky was a leading figure in various Ukrainian organizations in Alberta and a committed member of the IGC in Edmonton and of the Canadian Protestant movement. In 1913 he ran for a seat in the provincial legislature from the Vermilion district east of Edmonton, joining three other Ukrainians seeking election as independents in an effort to have community concerns represented effectively in Alberta's political arena. Kraikivsky took on the incumbent Liberal premier, Arthur Sifton, but his election bid failed, as did that of the other Ukrainian candidates.[59] Always a great believer in the value of education, he contributed generously to the Ridna Shkola (Native School) Society in Lviv and was also a supporter of the Michael Hrushevsky Institute in Edmonton, founded in 1918 as a nondenominational school and student residence.

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[59] Kraikivsky came in a distant third, polling 278 votes to Sifton's 772. Peter Svarich and Michael Gowda were the other two Independent candidates. Andrew Shandro, a Russophile Ukrainian, won election to the Legislative Assembly thanks to the backing of the ruling Liberal Party; he later lost his seat because of his involvement in a scandal.

Like many entrepreneurs in Edmonton and elsewhere, Kraikivsky experienced serious financial loss in the economic collapse that followed the Great War and was forced to work as a laborer for the city's Canadian Northern Railway and in local coal mines to feed his family. Catching a severe cold, he became gravely ill and died in 1923 at the relatively young age of fifty-two.[60]

Of all the members of the Ukrainian Brotherhood, Taras Dmytro Ferlei enjoyed the most successful and distinguished career as a Ukrainian community leader. Soft-spoken and serious by nature, while in Galicia he had briefly been a student at Lviv University and a member of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party. Upon returning to Winnipeg from California, he became active there in the Taras Shevchenko Educational Association (TSEA), founded in October 1906 as a broadly based cultural-educational society. Although he was a product of the Western Ukrainian left, Ferlei was devoted to the cause of Ukrainian independence and the preservation of a Ukrainian identity in Canada. Consequently, when there was an attempt to transform the TSEA into a more expressly socialist organization, Ferlei, and several other members, opposed the move on the grounds that it would make the society too sectarian. The resulting split led in 1908 to the downfall of the TSEA and prompted Ferlei's subsequent evolution away from his early radical romanticism to a more pragmatic and strongly pro-Ukrainian populism. Indeed, he has been described as the Ukrainian leader in Canada "generally recognized as the first to articulate the nationalist orientation."[61]

In 1910 Ferlei became a co-founder and manager of the Ukrainian Publishing Company, which issued the newspaper *Ukrainskyi holos*, the unofficial organ of the emerging nationalist Ukrainian-Canadian intelligentsia. He was also a Ukrainian-language instructor at the Ruthenian Teachers' Seminary in Brandon, Manitoba, and a leading community spokesman during the contentious political debate over bilingual schools. In 1915, following a couple of unsuccessful attempts to win public office, he earned the distinction of becoming the first Ukrainian to be elected to the Manitoba provincial legislature. He served the constituency of Gimli as an independent liberal for five years, and in 1933 he was elected to the Winnipeg city council.

Ferlei was also one of the initiators of the Ukrainian National Home movement, and he served as the head of Winnipeg's flagship Narodnyi Dim (National Home) from its inception in 1913 to 1923, again in 1929,

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[60] See Marunchak, *Biohrafichnyi dovidnyk*, 344. An obituary appeared in the *Edmonton Journal* on 7 May 1923.

[61] Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 245.

and from 1934 to 1947—a total of twenty-five years.[62] The National Homes that were established in urban and rural settlements throughout Canada had a huge impact on the cultural and political life of Ukrainians, especially in the interwar and immediate postwar periods, when they provided a nationalist alternative to pro-Communist Ukrainian Labour Temples. In 1917 Ferlei also became the president of the newly chartered Ruthenian Farmers' Elevator Company, which ran grain elevators and traded in agricultural products across Saskatchewan and Manitoba. At its peak in 1919 it was the largest Ukrainian business enterprise in Canada.

In 1918 Ferlei threw his support behind the creation of the UGOC, setting aside his somewhat sceptical and scientific attitude toward religion in the belief that the community needed a truly independent church to defend and promote traditional Ukrainian values. He helped to raise money for the non-denominational student residences that eventually became affiliated with the UGOC and later served as director of that church's seminary at Winnipeg's St. Andrew's College.

A highly effective organizer and gifted public speaker, Ferlei was recruited in 1921 to become a member of the Central Committee of Ukrainians in Canada, a Winnipeg-based body that strived to provide political and financial support for Western Ukrainians' struggle against Polish domination. Around the same time he became a cofounder, director, and head, for a time, of the Ukrainian Fraternal Society of Canada, an insurance co-operative still in business today. Ferlei died of a heart attack in 1947, leaving an impressive and lasting legacy to Ukrainian-Canadian society.[63]

Even in this talented and highly motivated group, Myroslav Stechyshyn stands out as an important person on the Ukrainian-Canadian political scene in the first half of the twentieth century. After leaving Castro Valley, he remained in the Bay area for over a year, becoming active in its vibrant socialist community and associating with such well-known figures as Eugene Debs and Jack London. In the spring of 1905 Stechyshyn moved to Vancouver, and soon thereafter again to Winnipeg, rapidly emerging as the hub of Ukrainian institutional life in Canada. In 1906 he became a founding member of that city's Taras Shevchenko Educational Society, and in the following year he helped to organize a Ukrainian branch of the Socialist Party of Canada (SPC). Stechyshyn worked at the short-lived left-wing newspaper *Chervonyi prapor* (The Red Flag) and subsequently became the founding editor of its successor, *Robotchyi*

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[62] Kovbel, *Propamiatna knyha*, 117–25.

[63] For testimonies, eulogies, and a description of his large funeral, see ibid, 409–15, 439–42.

narod (The Working People). In June 1907 he was responsible for initiating the Volia (Freedom) Society in Nanaimo, British Columbia, as an affiliate of the Winnipeg-based Ukrainian Socialist Party.

In 1911 Stechyshyn led a faction that broke with the SPC to form the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party. Along with Pavlo Krat (Paul Crath) and Roman Kremar, he was a key figure in the effort to establish a pro-Ukrainian movement on the left that rejected the assimilationist ideology (and Anglo domination) of mainstream socialist groups in Canada. In 1912, having begun to question his own previous and zealous radicalism, Stechyshyn quit the party in a financial and ethical dispute. The following year found him in Edmonton, where he became the editor of Kremar's increasingly conservative and pro-Catholic paper, *Novyny* (The News). Not long afterwards Stechyshyn made another break and moved to Scranton, Pennsylvania, to take over editorship of *Narodna volia* (The People's Will), the organ of the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association, which at the time had a left-of-center orientation. In 1920, having always been a keen supporter of Ukrainian independence, he Stechyshyn served as secretary of the diplomatic mission of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) in the United States, and in the following year he traveled to western Europe in that capacity to meet with Symon Petliura (1879–1926), the president of the defeated UNR. In 1922 Stechyshyn returned to Canada to edit *Ukrainskyi holos*, by then the champion of the newly inaugurated UGOC.

For the next twenty-five years Stechyshyn was at the center of developments in the Ukrainian Orthodox community in Canada. For seventeen years he was a member of the UGOC Consistory, and he also served as a director of St. Andrew's College. As a founder of the Ukrainian Fraternal Society of Canada and its president for ten years, Stechyshyn, together with his brothers, helped to formulate the ideology of and organize the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, a still extant lay association affiliated with the UGOC (now the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada). Until his death in 1947 he also capably represented Ukrainian Orthodox interests in the formation of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (the forerunner of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress), the organizational structure co-ordinating non-Communist Ukrainian community organizations in Canada.[64]

As these biographical sketches show, the Ukrainian Canadians involved in the doomed communal enterprise at Agapius Honcharenko's ranch went on both individually and collectively to have a major impact on the institutional life of Ukrainians in Canada during its formative

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[64] Ibid, 432–34.

phase. However they may have been affected by their experience in California and personal relations with Agapius Honcharenko, none was so disillusioned or traumatized by that stillborn endeavor as to be dissuaded from further efforts to participate in and organize the Ukrainian immigrant community. Indeed, several continued to collaborate on various projects, and they remained informed of each other's activities despite moving and settling in other parts of North America.

Postscript: The Ripple Effect of the California Commune among Ukrainian Canadians

Considering the personalities involved and the commitment that each of them made, it is not surprising that reverberations from the California commune were still being felt in Canada long after the Ukrainian Brotherhood had disbanded and dispersed. For instance, in 1906 *Svoboda* published a couple of letters—one by Vasyl Syrotiuk, Yurii's brother—in which harsh words were directed at Cyril Genik for cynically "misleading" those who took part in the unsuccessful venture.[65] Genik was also accused of having destroyed the members of the brotherhood materially, and even of having sent them to California so as to rid himself of potential rivals. The criticisms were hardly fair, for Genik sincerely believed in the project and invested considerable sums of his own money in it, even though he was unable to take an active part in it.

Later the failure of the brotherhood was used to cast aspersions on some of its members. For instance, a Russophile newspaper published in Edmonton that regularly attacked opponents of the Russian Orthodox Mission (among them Hryhorii Kraikivsky and Petro Zvarych) took the following swipe at Taras Ferlei, who by 1913 had emerged as a leading spokesman for the ascendant Ukrainian nationalist movement in Canada: "That blister Ferlei, the one who sent our people to a commune in California 'where there wouldn't be any widows or orphans,' for money would have sent that most senior blister, the *ataman* Kost Levytsky, or Smal-Stotsky, [the latter] after having stolen 8 million from the peasant treasury in Bukovyna."[66] Clearly, just as Russian leaders in San Fran-

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[65] Parts of this correspondence are discussed in Marunchak, "A Honcharenko i K. Genik," 178–79.

[66] See "'Podvigi' i 'politikerstvo' rutenskikh pikhurov v Alberti," *Russkii golos*, 13 September 1913, 2. The original Ukrainian word *pikhur* means vesicle or blister, that is, something needing to be lanced; the insult is intended to liken the individuals described as "pikhuri" to sores on the body politic. The other politicians referred to are the nationalist leaders Kost Levytsky, the most influential Galician Ukrainian politician at the time, and Stepan Smal-Stotsky, a Bukovynian member of the Austrian parliament. Smal-Stotsky played a major role in organizing reading societies throughout rural Bukovyna;

cisco were well aware of Honcharenko's activities in the Bay area, Canadian Russophiles were equally well informed about the Ukraina commune and the participation in it of their Ukrainophile rivals in Canada. This diatribe was written around the time that Cyril Genik joined the Russian Orthodox Church, which may explain why Ferlei, rather than Genik, was falsely characterized as the commune's initiator.

Ferlei was also the target of a much more sophisticated dig in a church history of Ukrainians in Canada published in 1927, by Fr. Panteleimon Bozhyk, a former Russian Orthodox priest who had defected to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church three years earlier. A native of Bukovyna who had been ordained in the United States by the Russian Orthodox Mission in 1911, Fr. Bozhyk made the following observations about Ferlei in his account of the founding of *Ukrainskyi holos*: "it was said that before he came to Canada in 1907, he was in the United States on the California farm of Hancharenko [*sic*], a suspended Orthodox priest from Great [central] Ukraine, and apparently dabbled in a commune there. Having come to Canada, for some time he nevertheless wore a button on his coat with a portrait of Bakunin, the most prominent Russian revolutionary."[67]

Fr. Bozhyk was obviously trying to discredit Ferlei, who in 1920 played an important role in helping to organize the UGOC, the vigorous new rival of both the Russian Mission and the Greek Catholic Church. Space does not permit discussion of the influence Bakunin's anarchism had on Ferlei or Agapius Honcharenko, but there is no question that radical socialist ideals helped to inspire the members of the California brotherhood, notwithstanding the subsequent evolution of their politics. What is equally certain is that the project had an overridingly Ukrainian character, for all the participants were committed Ukrainian patriots steeped in the romantic Cossack mythology that was also an integral part of Honcharenko's identity.

Honcharenko continued corresponding with Cyril Genik, Myroslav Stechyshyn, Ivan Danylchuk, and Taras Ferlei years after they had left California. Michael Marunchak's archives include the following handwritten letter from Honcharenko to the Edmonton newspaper *Novyny*, which Stechyshyn edited for a time in 1912.

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he also headed a savings and loan society and a union of agricultural credit co-operatives.

[67] Bozhyk, *Tserkov ukraintsiv v Kanadi*, 61. Fr. Bozhyk was a contributor to *Russkii golos* from 1913 to 1916 (when he was serving in Mundare, Alberta) and edited the paper during its last months of publication. However, he did not share the paper's pro-Russian publishers' vitriolic hostility to everything Ukrainian. Indeed, Bozhyk was a committed promoter of the Ukrainian language and culture, though opposed (at the time) to Ukraine's secession from Russia.

My dear publishers of *Novyny,* I received the a copy of *Novyny.* Whoever may know me in your part of Canada, I bless them for their generous heart. I pr[ay] God for the progress and good fortune of your publishing firm. As a pioneer I brought with me the first letters to the New World—and, like Prometheus, I am being pecked at by crows. I published the first page of *Svoboda* ... in 1868 in San Francisco. In the vicinity there live emigrants from Muscovy, but they are Tolstoyan hypocrites cursed by the Lord God, or else Bakuninists—thieves, ruffians. Emigrants from the Austrian Empire are [either "few" or "many"—the handwriting is difficult to decipher] and to these I give the name [another indecipherable word] gypsies-crooks. And I am old and sick, living alone with my ideas about the happiness and welfare of my Native Land.

Devoted to the Sacred Cause,
Ahapii Honcharenko.[68]

Dated 29 September 1913, the letter is noteworthy not only for Honcharenko's acerbic remarks about Tolstoy's and Bakunin's folllowers (belying his own relationship with the two men), but also for its confirmation that he maintained personal contact with Ukrainians in Canada in his twilight years.

Epilogue: The Legacy of the Failed Canadian Experiment in Communal Living in California

Given its short duration and abject failure, it would be easy to dismiss the Ukrainian Brotherhood's experiment in communal living as a curious if colorful footnote in the history of Ukrainians in Canada. However, because of the individuals involved and their subsequent contributions to Ukrainian life in Canada, the Ukraina colony has become part of the lore of the Ukrainian-Canadian pioneer experience.[69]

Certainly it is telling that the maverick Orthodox priest and aging revolutionary Agapius Honcharenko was able to attract several of the best and brightest minds in the first wave of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada to his distant northern California retreat. Some viewed him as a deluded blowhard and crank or an old fool, as both the young Stechyshyn and the Russian Orthodox Church characterized him.[70] Although he

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[68] As cited in Marunchak, "A Honcharenko i K. Genik," 181–82. Myroslav Stechyshyn or the publisher, Roman Kremar, most likely sent the issue of *Novyny* to Honcharenko. The "Sacred Cause" Honcharenko was referring to was undoubtedly Ukraine.

[69] That Honcharenko and the Ukraina brotherhood generated an extensive body of writings by a variety of authors over many decades testifies to the enduring interest the commune's brief existence has had for Ukrainians in both the United States and Canada.

[70] Shortly after Honcharenko's submissions began appearing in *Svoboda,* an attack on

was obviously declining physically and mentally by 1902, Honcharenko nonetheless tried to help create a Ukrainian settlement in the New World based on egalitarian, co-operative, and patriotic ideals, and for that he deserves to be admired. At the same time, the Ukraina colony can be seen as a symbolic link between the first nationally conscious Ukrainian to blaze a trail to North America and the influx of immigrants that followed in the final decades of the nineteenth century. It helps explain why Honcharenko continues to be included in Canadian and American accounts of Ukrainian immigration before the First World War. A complex, often difficult, but always charismatic figure, Honcharenko's role in the commune's quixotic story was effectively his last hurrah as a gadfly and utopian socialist, and a fitting testament to his unflagging determination, Ukrainian patriotism, and visionary zeal.

In many respects, the fate of the communal experiment in California marked the beginning of the end for the agrarian socialist phase in the Ukrainian community's development in Canada. It not only provided a useful learning experience for everyone who took part in it, but also disabused the members of the Hayward brotherhood of their youthful illusions about communal living and initiated their political maturation. Although they all eventually abandoned radical socialism for more mainstream social-democratic, liberal, and conservative ideologies, none registered any lasting regrets about their participation in the venture, and they remained connected with one another through continued involvement in the Ukrainian-Canadian community.

Only one similar project was undertaken by Ukrainian immigrants to Canada, and that was conceived by the ubiquitous Alberta activist Petro

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him appeared in a Russian Orthodox publication: "A certain runaway, a monk, Agapius Gontcharenko, residing not far from the city of Alameda in California, on a farm of his own, which he has named 'Ukraina,' occasionally makes the local population aware of his existence by volunteering the most preposterous items of information concerning Russia and the Russian Government. He has been a contributor to the nihilistic paper *Postup*, in which he published his autobiography; he still is a contributor to the Ukrainophil [*sic*] organ *Svoboda* (Liberty) and other papers hostile to Russia, both European and American. At one time he was very busy intriguing against our Orthodox Mission in San Francisco, especially during the episcopate of Bishop Ioannes, and now, at the close of his days, he apparently is at his old tricks again. Thus he recently stated in the 'Examiner,' that Russian agents are persecuting him, that his life is in danger, that a price is set on his head, and other absurdities. Persons unfamiliar with our country might believe him; therefore we think it necessary to declare that not a soul in Russia takes the least interest in Gontcharenko, and that all that he tells about the persecution he suffers from Russian agents is unmitigated nonsense—the drivelling of a half-crazy old man. Russia will always be glad to make a present of such specimens to anybody that wants them, so as to be rid of the bother of dealing with them at home" ("Our Foes," *Orthodox American Messenger*, 27 December 1896, p. 140 <www.holy-trinity.org/history/1896/>).

Zvarych (1877–1966), who came to know each of the Canadians in the Ukrainian Brotherhood and collaborated with most of them in one organization or another. In his memoirs Zvarych recounts that he had begun corresponding with Cyril Genik before leaving Galicia, and finally met him in person when he arrived in Winnipeg on Easter of 1900:

> Having greeted him, I asked about Bodrug and Negrych, because he [Genik] had also come from Bereziv and knew them very well back home as well as here. He informed me that they had taken out "homesteads" and were farming, but were keen to go in a short while to California, where the land was better and the climate was superior. I pulled out my maps, which he had sent me, and showed him that my contingent from Pokuttia was heading directly to Alberta, where we all wanted to settle together in the same vicinity, some seventy miles east of Edmonton. At the same time I showed him on the map the detailed plan I had prepared as to how our village would look, one which would be called Kolomyia. In the middle of the "township" I had selected Section 16 through which a road would be built, and on both sides I divided 32 ten-acre parcels of land for a farmyard and garden for each settler. In the very center there was going to be a church, a school, a post office, a store, initially a wind- and later a steam-operated mill, and nearby a reading room, blacksmith, cooper, carpenter, shoemaker, and everything [else] that was necessary to make the community self-supporting.
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> My inspector, having examined the map and listened to my detailed explanation, smirked sarcastically and asked, "And where is the tavern, the police station, the jail house? What sort of a Ruthenian village would it be without all these?"[71]

Genik then quashed Zvarych's village in the New World fantasy, telling him that the Canadian government would never allow such a scheme, since each homesteading family was obliged to reside on a quarter-section (160 acres) of land. Of special note in Zvarych's account is the suggestion that others were talking with Genik about going to California in the spring of 1900, perhaps independently of the connection with Honcharenko. In any case, Zvarych's plan never got far. Its only manifestation was a post office and a school named "Kolomea" on lands settled by Zvarych's family and fellow villagers.

It is intriguing to imagine how different the evolution of the Ukrainian community in Canada could have been if Taras Ferlei, Myroslav

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[71] Petro Zvarych, *Spomyny, 1877–1904* (Winnipeg: Trident Press, 1978), 97–98. Cf. Peter Svarich, *Memoirs, 1877–1904*, trans. William Kostash (Edmonton: Ukrainian Pioneers' Association of Alberta and the Huculak Chair of Ukrainian Culture and Ethnography [University of Alberta,] 1999), 101–102.

Stechyshyn, Hryhorii Kraikivsky, Yurii Syrotiuk, and Ivan Danylchuk had stayed in America, as Hryhorii Danyshchuk did. It is unlikely that their absence would have altered the basic course of developments in Canada, but the Ukrainian-Canadian community would undoubtedly have been poorer without their inspired leadership and dedication. And if the commune in California had been successful, one also wonders whether it would have sparked similar attempts elsewhere, perhaps in the interior of British Columbia or on Vancouver Island.

It worth considering, too, what the consequences a successful colony might have had on Ukrainian settlement in America generally and on the Russian Orthodox Church and community in San Francisco specifically. Northern California might have become a major destination for Ukrainian immigrants, attracting incoming settlers away from both Western Canada and the U.S. East Coast. If the talented "Canadians" had stayed in the Bay Area, they would probably have forged a strong Ukrainian presence that might have effectively challenged the influence of Russian institutions in San Francisco, which in the early years absorbed and assimilated many Ukrainians owing to a lack of community alternatives.

In reality, as we know, the Ukrainian commune at Agapius Honcharenko's ranch in the Alameda Hills near Hayward and its successor in the Castro Valley shared the same fate as many of the back-to-the-land projects that mushroomed throughout North America decades later, in the 1960s. Like them, the Ukrainian Brotherhood was an alluring idea that proved impossible to realize. And like the Mamas and Papas' catchy 1966 pop song alluded to in the title of this essay, the West Coast Ukraina experiment became a nostalgia-tinged memory in the personal histories of the activists who lived it, and a singular, if bittersweet, episode in Ukrainian life in the New World.

Fatherland in Russian Culture
(Fifteenth–Seventeenth Centuries)

Paul Bushkovitch

In Ukrainian political culture of the early eighteenth century, the notion
of fatherland, attached primarily to the Hetmanate, had become one of
the main parameters of national and local loyalties. This terminology was
a natural derivative of the use of "fatherland" (*ojczyzna*) in Polish politi-
cal culture, where it occupied "the highest emotional register," both in
writing and in debates in the Polish Diet.[1] This was not the case in Rus-
sia, and it seems to have been Teofan Prokopovych who imported the
notion of fatherland into the Russian political vocabulary. From that
point it took on the meanings and importance normal by that time in Po-
land and western Europe.[2] Nevertheless, "fatherland" was not entirely
new to the Russians. It appears in Russian writings, chronicles, other his-
torical narratives, and epistles from the latter part of the fifteenth century.
It did not occupy the "highest emotional" register, nor was it the most
common way to refer to one's country, but the usage was persistent, and
the occasions on which it appeared are revealing of Russian conceptions
of nation and state. They explain why Prokopovych's innovation was
readily accepted into the mainstream of Russian political values in the
new conditions of Peter's time.

   In Church Slavonic and the language of Old Rus', *otechestvo* and the
variant *otechestvie,* with the meaning of "fatherland," occur from the
beginning. In the earliest Rus' biblical texts they appear as translations of
Greek πατρίς, which from classical times meant "fatherland," was trans-
lated Rus'. Thus the Ostromir Gospel gives "v otechestvii svoem" for
Luke 4:24 ("No prophet is accepted in his own country"), and the Yuriev
Gospel uses *otechestvo* for the previous verse 23 ("here in thy country").
However, there is another possible translation of the Greek, *otchina*,

[1] Frank E. Sysyn, "Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture,"
in *Mazepa e il suo tempo: Storia, cultura, società/Mazepa and His Time: History, Cul-
ture, Society*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2004), 40.

[2] Serhii Plokhy, "The Two Russias of Teofan Prokopovyč," in *Mazepa e il suo tempo*,
333–66.

which, according to Izmail Sreznevsky, more usually means "ottsovskoe, rodovoe vladenie."[3] The two words *otechestvo* and *otchina* are thus not synonyms, but to some extent they overlap in East Slavic texts, at least in Kyivan texts and later ones in northeastern Rus' throughout the Middle Ages.

As far as it is possible to determine, neither the Primary Chronicle (*Povest vremennykh let*), the Laurentian codex, nor the Hypatian codex make use of the term *otechestvo*, but *otchina* is widespread. Linguists disagree about the relationship between the two. Sreznevsky believed that in some passages *otchina* meant "fatherland," but close inspection does not confirm this judgment. Thus in 968 the Kyivans reproved Sviatoslav for seeking and caring for an alien land but ignoring them, his *otchina*, and his family: "ashche ti ne zhal otchiny svoieia, ni matere, stary sushcha, i detii svoikh?" The only other usage in the Primary Chronicle falls under 1097, in the account of the Liubech conference, in which each prince was to take care of his *otchina*, his principality, one of the parts of the *ruskaia zemlia*. Neither of these examples, however, need be read as "fatherland," and "patrimony" seems a more correct reading. V. V. Kolesov sees no cases in Old Rus' texts where *otchina* meant "fatherland." Instead he argues that from the first it meant clan territory, the property or land of one's ancestors, gradually being transformed into the more specific *votchina*. Kolesov attributes the appearance of *otechestvo* with the meaning of "fatherland" to Bulgarian influence in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This explanation has a certain chronological plausibility but does not account for the earlier absence of usage of the word in spite of its presence in biblical and translated devotional texts. Kolesov's only comment on the appearance of the word is to proclaim it "modern."[4]

The only exceptions to these conclusions come, not surprisingly, from Novgorod. In the Novgorod First Chronicle *otchina* occurs many times, referring mostly to the patrimony of the prince. It also refers, however, to

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[3] I. I. Sreznevsky, *Slovar drevnerusskogo iazyka* (St. Petersburg, 1902; repr. Moscow: Russkii yazyk, 1989), vol. 2, pt.1, 830–31, 834.

[4] *Povest vremennykh let*, ed. D. S. Likhachev, 2d ed. (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1996), 32, 110; *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter *PSRL*], vol. 1, *Lavrentevskaia letopis* (repr. Moscow: Yazyki russkoi kultury, 1997), 67, 256–57; *PSRL*, vol. 2, *Ipatevskaia letopis* (repr. Moscow: Yazyki russkoi kultury, 1998), 55, 231; V. V. Kolesov, *Mir cheloveka v slove drevnei Rusi* (Leningrad: Izd-vo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1986), 242–46. The only usage of *otechestvo* in the Hypatian codex is actually *otechestvie*, found under 1178, when Prince Mstislav refuses to come to rule in Novgorod because he wants to fulfill his ancestral duties ("ispolniti otechestvie"), in *Ipatevskaia letopis*, 607 (cf. Kolesov, 245).

the patrimony of the Novgorodians as a whole. Thus in 1398 the Novgorodians complained that the grand prince of Moscow wants to take from the St. Sophia Cathedral and Great Novgorod "prigorody i volosti, nashu otchinu i dedinu."[5] Later texts, Novgorodian or Muscovite, such as the "Life of Alexander Nevsky," though full of the defense of Rus' lands against various enemies, also express the idea of native country, usually just by calling it *russkaia zemlia*, *Moskva*, *Novgorodskie volosti*, or other terms. In all these early texts, in spite of the clear presence of *otechestvo* in biblical texts, lives of saints, and other works translated from the Greek, the preferred term is *otchina*, which seems to mean "patrimony" or "inherited holdings" rather than "fatherland."

The largest complex of relatively early Muscovite texts in which one finds references to native country is, not surprisingly, the literature about the Battle of Kulikovo (1380). But these are not works of the fourteenth century. In spite of attempts to assign early dates to "Zadonshchina," "Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche," "Slovo o zhitii Dmitriia Donskogo," and the various chronicle accounts, none of them can reliably be dated earlier than the mid-fifteenth century, and more likely were written some decades later. It is worth noting, however, that neither the "Zadonshchina" nor the "Slovo" about Dmitrii uses the term "fatherland." In the former, the Muscovite army fights "za zemliu za Ruskuiu i za veru krestianskuiu i za obidu velikogo kniazia Dmitreia Ivanovicha"; in the latter, more equally, for the faith and the Rus' land. In the "Slovo," however, Dmitrii also defends "ruskuiu zemliu, otchinu svoiu." Patrimony remained the basic conception, after faith and the Rus' land.[6]

"Fatherland," or at least *otechestvo*, first appears in the complex of texts around the "standing on the Ugra" of 1480, as well as in other texts describing earlier events but most probably composed in the late fifteenth century. The texts arising from the events of 1480 not only are among the earliest to use the term, but also reveal the complexities of usage. The issues here are not only ones of larger political values and ideology but also of literary genre, occasion, and the origins of the various texts. The most easily datable of these texts is the "Epistle to Grand Prince Ivan Vasilievich of Moscow" from Archbishop Vassian Rylo of Rostov. The epistle is one of the better-known late medieval Russian texts and, among

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[5] *PSRL* 2: 607; *Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis starshego i mladshego izvodov*, ed. A. N. Nasonov (Moscow and Leningrad: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1950), Novgorod's *otchina*: 81, 391, 418, 426; prince's *otchina*: 51, 53–54, 89, 346, 349, 360, 377, 407, 412, 420, 424.

[6] "Zadonshchina," 100, "Slovo," 210, in *Pamiatniki literatury drevnei Rusi: XIV– seredina XV veka*, ed. L. A. Dmitriev and D. S. Likhachev (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1981).

other things one of the first to present the notion of the new Israel in the context of the birth of a state that is more or less Russia, something more than a congeries of northeastern Rus' principalities around Moscow. The epistle, addressed to the prince, is an exhortation to him personally, not to Russians in general or even to the army, to fight the Tatars. Ivan is to "stand for our pious Orthodox faith and defend your fatherland (*svoe otechestvo*) from the Muslims." Like Moses and Joshua, he is to lead the new Israel against its enemies and, like his ancestors, defend the Rus'/Russian land (*ruskaia zemlia*) against the pagans. In all the stream of rhetoric, it is the religious theme that outweighs everything else, including the Russian land. The fatherland here is the prince's, as is to be expected from the genre—an epistle directed at the prince. At the same time, Vassian also declares that when Ivan marches off, he and the whole clergy and people will pray for victory in all the churches "vo vsei nashei otchine."[7] Assuming that *otechestvo* is not simply high style for *otchina*, Vassian sees the Russian land as Ivan's fatherland, but at the same time he still regards it as a patrimony, in this case of all the people, as in the earlier Novgorodian texts.

Northeastern Rus' chronicles of the fifteenth century seem to stick to the idea of defending the faith, the Russian land, and occasionally the prince's *otchina*, without mention of *otechestvo*.[8] The chronicles of the later fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries that do not reflect princely priorities—the "unofficial" or "independent" chronicles, in the terminology of Ya. S. Lure—are the ones that employ the notion of fatherland. Here is the Typographical Chronicle, which reflects the views of the archeparchy of Rostov at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth. In the account of events in 1480 events it exclaims: "O khrabri muzhestvenii synove rustii! Podshchitesia svoe otechestvo, Ruskuiu zemliu, ot poganykh sokhraniti." Do not be like the Balkan peoples—the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks—who lacked sufficient courage "i pogibosha, otechestvo izgubisha i zemliu i gosudarstvo.…"

Exactly the same text occurs in the continuation of the Ermolin Chronicle, also a text of the late fifteenth/early sixteenth centuries. In both cases, not just the texts but also the manuscripts date from that period, and the Ermolin Chronicle is unique in its attention to the Moscow

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[7] "Poslanie na Ugru Vassiana Rylo," in *Pamiatniki literatury drevnei Rusi: Vtoraia polovina XV veka*, ed. L. A. Dmitriev and D. S. Likhachev (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1982), 522, 528, 534.

[8] *PSRL*, vol. 6, *Sofiiskaia pervaia letopis* (St. Petersburg, 1853), 21. In the more church-oriented Second Sophia Chronicle Ivan fights for Christianity; see *PSRL*, vol. 6, *Sofiiskaia vtoraia letopis*, 230 (the text of Vassian's epistle is on 225–30).

merchant and builder V. Ermolin, pointing to an origin not only beyond the princely court but also outside the elite of the clergy.[9] In contrast, the continuation of the princely Moscow Chronicle of 1479 does not include this or any other invocation to the Russians to defend their fatherland. The sixteenth-century princely chronicles, up to the Nikon Chronicle, preserve this reading, without "fatherland."[10]

The third of the texts on Kulikovo, "Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche," dating from the later fifteenth century, likely after the Ugra, and the most widely circulated, is the only one of that complex to use the word *otechestvo*. In most cases the Rus' princes and soldiers fight and die "za zemliu russkuiu, za veru khristianskuiu," but there is one exception. In the tale, Prince Dmitrii places one Foma Katsibei, a bandit, as guard over the Moscow camp on the eve of the battle. Foma sees a great army coming from the east and two shining youths descending from the sky, saying to the approaching warriors: "Kto vy povele trebiti otechestvo nashe?" (Who ordered you to destroy our fatherland?). This vision of ss Boris and Gleb foretells the victory. Prince Dmitrii prays to the Lord, asking him to help him as he did Moses, Yaroslav, and Aleksandr Nevsky when the Latin king [of Sweden] attacked "otechestvo ego."[11] In general, the "Skazanie" has a more complex terminology pertaining to statehood and country than the other Kulikovo tales or the chronicles. It refers to "derzhava tvoego tsarstva," "votchina russkaia," and even "ulus," the latter referring to Moscow in a supposed letter from Algirdas to Mamai.[12] "Rus' *votchina*" is particularly suggestive, since it implies that the patrimony is now all of Rus', a notion appropriate to the time of composition of the "Skazanie," not to 1380.

The first two-thirds of the sixteenth century saw a great outpouring of historical narratives, mainly chronicles and the "Stepennaia kniga." In all these narratives, when Russians are found fighting their enemies, they

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[9] *PSRL*, vol. 24, *Tipografskaia letopis* (Petrograd, 1921), 201; *PSRL*, vol. 23, *Ermolinskaia letopis* (St. Petersburg, 1910), 182. On the chronicles of this period, see Ya. S. Lure, *Dve istorii Rusi XV veka* (St. Petersburg: D. Bulanin, 1994), 18–19, 168–94; idem, *Obshcherusskie letopisei XIV–XV vv.* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1976), 168–240.

[10] *PSRL*, vol. 25, *Moskovskii letopisnyi svod kontsa XV veka* (Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1949), 326–29; *PSRL*, vol. 12, *Patriarshaia ili Nikonovskaia letopis* (repr. Moscow and Leningrad: Nauka, 1965), 200–203; Lure, *Obshcherusskie letopisi*, 242–51. The invocation to defend the fatherland from the unofficial chronicles did, however, enter the Litsevoi Svod along with Vassian's epistle (*PSRL* 12: 202).

[11] Pamiatniki literatury Drevnei Rusi: XIV–seredina XV veka, 168, 170, 186 (Skazanie, Basic redaction).

[12] Ibid., 136, 138.

fight for Orthodoxy, the Russian land/Russia, or the Russian/Moscow tsardom—usually for all three, with Orthodoxy normally in first place and most frequently mentioned. This was the worldview of the New Israel, the nation chosen of God as the only one with the true faith among the infidel Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants.[13] Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was Orthodoxy that occupied the highest emotional register in Russian perceptions of the world and events occurring in it. Fatherland scarcely ever appears in these narratives.

It does not disappear, however, and the occasions on which it occurs suggest that its place in Russian thinking—still considerably lower than Orthodoxy's—may have been somewhat greater than the texts indicate. The texts have a certain bias. The sixteenth-century chronicles, in particular, focus closely on the ruler, his actions, and his alleged statements. Thus the Nikon Chronicle and the texts that precede it describe the years 1533–47 as if all actions of the state were the result of the tsar's command. In the chronicles the four-year-old Ivan IV gives orders to armies and negotiates with ambassadors, all to preserve the etiquette of autocracy. Similarly, Ivan's victory over Kazan is the result of his personal piety and divine assistance rather than of his army's bravery and skill or, indeed, of his own efforts. In this sort of history there is little room for the physical fatherland.

Where the fatherland does appear is in the epistles and occasional rhetorical moments that break up the thread of the narrative. Metropolitan Makarii produced four epistles exhorting Ivan to victory during the Kazan campaigns, and one of them (13 July 1552) asserts that Ivan is to fight the Tatars bravely for the Orthodox Christian faith, "za svoiu tsarskuiu velikuiu obidu i za otechestvo." Note that Makarii says Ivan is to fight for "his own insult" but not for "his own" fatherland but, rather, for the fatherland in general. Another occurrence of the term comes from the *Litsevoi svod*, the illustrated version of the Nikon Chronicle with various additions to the basic text. In this case the account of the birth of Ivan IV includes a "Blagodarenie i pokhvala" probably composed in the late 1570s. In the text, the people (*liudie vsi*) rejoice, for they no longer have to worry who will hold the banner of the Russian tsardom, repel the pagans, and shame the heretics. Now they know who will correct the "iskonnoe v otechestve ego liuboprennoe i gordynnoe o blagorodstve miatezhnoe shatanie."[14] By this time one has to presume that *otechestvo* and

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[13] See Daniel Rowland, "Moscow—the Third Rome or the New Israel," *Russian Review* 55 (1996): 591–614; and Joel Raba, "Moscow—the Third Rome or the New Jerusalem," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50 (1995): 297–308.

[14] *PSRL*, vol. 13, *Nikonovskaia letopis* (repr. Moscow, 1965), 197. Variant reading from

otchina/votchina are separate usages, for Ivan IV repeatedly asserts in his wars with Kazan and Livonia that he is fighting to recover lost parts of his *otchina* or *votchina* but never for his *otechestvo.*[15]

Toward the end of the reign of Ivan the Terrible this tradition breaks off and historical writing continues in different genres and with a greater variety of authors. The usage of the term *otechestvo* varies. Before his death in 1607, Patriarch Iov composed a life of Tsar Fedor along the lines of a saint's life, with little concrete description and much flowery rhetoric. In his accounts of the tsar's conflicts with Sweden and Crimea, the word *otechestvo* occurs often. Thus Iov writes that the tsar came to Novgorod, "svoe otechestvo," to fight the Swedes and recover his "otecheskoe vladenie." Later he parallels *otechestvo* with "svoe tsarskoe dostoianie" (both referring to Novgorod). When the Swedes attack, they hope that when they win Fedor will return to his *otechestvo*—in this case, apparently, Moscow. The attack of the Crimeans leads Fedor to pray to the Lord to help him, as he helped Hezekiah, the king (*tsar*) of Israel, against Sennacherib and the Assyrians (2 Kings 18–19; 2 Chronicles 32; Isaiah 36–37). He needs divine aid, for the Tatars are bragging that they will "razoriti dostoianie tvoe, otechestvo moe."[16] *Dostoianie* means "inheritance," and *otechestvo* is only one of a complex of terms stressing Fedor's inheritance and piety. The Russian land appears in the text, but much less often than the terms for "inheritance." Iov's life of the tsar is thus something of an anomaly, perhaps a result of the desire to stress Fedor's role as the last Riurikovich.

Other historical writings follow different patterns. "Kazanskaia istoriia" and the many narratives of the Time of Troubles—those of Avraamii Palitsyn, Ivan Timofeev, and others—no longer come from the metropolitan of Moscow or the clergy of the Kremlin palace. Their authors are scarcely provincials, but in social terms they come from the middle gentry (Palitsyn) and officialdom (Timofeev). After the election of Mikhail Romanov as tsar, the "Novyi letopisets" was an attempt to return to the older chronicle genre, but it was not widely imitated. On the whole, these newer types of history use the same framework as the chronicles. There are endless references to Russians fighting for Orthodoxy, the Russian land/Russia, and the Russian/Moscow tsardom in many variants. Palitsyn

the Shumilov volume of the Litsevoi svod, ibid., 52, on which see B. M. Kloss, *Nikonovskii svod i russkie letopisi XVI–XVII vekov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), 221–23, who dates the Shumilov volume to 1574–81.

[15] For example, *PSRL* 13: 220 (Kazan).

[16] "Povest o chestnom zhitii tsaria i velikogo kniazia Fedora Ivanovicha vseia Rusi," in *PSRL*, vol. 14 (repr. Moscow, 1965), 7–8, 10–11.

uses the term only once, in the course of describing the False Dmitrii, Otrepev. Allegedly the pope himself wrote on the pretender's behalf all over Europe that the pretender "izgnana togo sushcha ot otechestva." Similarly, "Povest knigi seia ot prezhnikh let" endlessly repeats the story of the struggle for Orthodoxy and Russia, the New Israel, but the concluding verses of the version usually attributed to Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Katyrev-Rostovsky speak of the Troubles as a time when "slavnye rody otechestva svoego otstupili." In one of the epistles that Patriarch Germogen wrote shortly after the deposition of Tsar Vasilii Shuisky in 1610, he exhorted the Russians to be strong in the faith and resist the Poles and the rebels as the fatherland was being destroyed by foreigners.[17]

The end of the sixteenth century and the Time of Troubles also gave rise to more widespread use of the term in official documents, not literary works. In the Conciliar Decision and Charter of Confirmation for Boris Godunov, *otechestvo* occurs several times. The council asserted that it had come together "postavliati svoemu otechestvu pastyria i uchitelia i tsaria," while the charter addresses Tsaritsa Irina, saying that she failed to name a tsar for "vashe otechestvo Rosiiskoe gosudarstvo."[18] One of Vasilii Shuisky's last orders to a local commander tells him to collect the gentry to fight for the fatherland. The term also entered a more mundane, bureaucratic realm—the charter (*zhalovannaia gramota*) granting estates as a reward for service during the Smuta. Between May and July 1610, the last months of his reign, Shuisky issued many such documents, awarding land for brave service "za veru khristianskuiu i za svoe otechestvo polednim rodom na pamiat." The same formula is found in other grants from the early months of the reign of Tsar Mikhail I.[19] In the six-

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[17] O. L. Derzhavina and E. V. Kolosova, *Skazanie Avraamiia Palitsyna* (Moscow and Leningrad:: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1955), 110, 261; [Prince I. M. Katyrev-Rostovsky], "Povest knigi seia ot prezhnikh let," in *Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka*, vol. 13 (St. Petersburg, 1891), 622; *Akty Arkheograficheskoi ekspeditsii*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1836), 287 (no. 169).

[18] *Akty Arkheograficheskoi ekspeditsii*, 2: 14 (no. 6), 20 (no. 7).

[19] Vasilii Shuisky's *gramota* to the commander of Arzamas: "Akty ... Yushkova," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete* (hereafter *Chteniia*), 1898, bk. 3: 313–14; *pomestie* grant of 16 July 1610, ibid., 317; "Akty vremen pravleniia tsaria Vasiliia Shuiskogo," ed. A. M. Gnevushev, *Chteniia*, 1915, bk. 2: 56–60; other grant charters: *Akty sluzhilykh zemlevladeltsev: XV–nachala XVII veka*, 4 vols. (Moscow: Izd-vo "Arkheograficheskii tsentr", 1997–2008), 2: 153–54 et al.; 3: 92–93, 69–70, 115–16, 302–3,; "Drevnie tsarskie gramoty iz sobraniia S. Peterburgskogo Arkheologicheskogo instituta," in *Yubileinyi sbornik Imp. S. Peterburgskogo Arkheologicheskogo instituta 1613–1913* (St. Petersburg: Sinodalnaia tipografiia, 1913), 1–2.

teenth century, such documents contained no mention of the recipient's services, but in the seventeenth century this became a normal part of the grant formula. According to the formula, the estate was to allow the recipient's descendants to remember their ancestors' services to Orthodoxy, the tsar, and the fatherland. Here, at last, the term seems to have entered normal usage.[20] Finally, the usage occurs at least once in the Charter of Confirmation for the election of Tsar Mikhail in 1613.[21]

The entry of the fatherland into the documentary formulas of land grants and the election charters did not mean that it entered any texts with a literary finish. More surprisingly, even those texts that reflect the new learning brought to Moscow from Kyiv in the second half of the seventeenth century do not include the term. Simeon Polotsky does not mention it in his various poetic panegyrics on the tsar, such as "Orel rossiiskii," and in his *Vertograd* the only verses on fatherland tell the reader that the fatherland of Christ and the saints is heaven. Karion Istomin and Ignatii Rimsky-Korsakov, in their homilies to the Russian armies and rulers on the occasion of the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 or on other occasions, do not employ the term "fatherland." In the latter texts the religious dimension, including the idea of Russia as the New Israel, remains dominant. Polotsky introduced some new metaphors (the sun; much play with the symbolism of the eagle), but "fatherland" does not appear.[22]

Thus it remains the case that only in Peter's time does fatherland assume a central place in Russian political and historical writings. But Teofan Prokopovych was neither the first nor the only writer to use the word. He was merely the most important of the Ukrainians in Russia in Peter's time, who as a group seem to have put fatherland into the center of Russian political terminology. The description of the triumphal gates erected by the students of the Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy to celebrate

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[20] Unfortunately the full texts of most such charters of grant are not to be found in the archival registers, but only in the few surviving private archives. See V. B. Kobrin, *Vlast i sobstvennost v srednevekovoi Rossii (XV–XVI vv.)* (Moscow: Mysl, 1985), 19.

[21] The Russians need a tsar after the defeat of the Poles in 1612 because "otechestvo ikh sirotstvuet" ("Utverzhdennaia gramota ob izbranii na Moskovskoe Gosudarstvo Mikhaila Fedorovicha Romanova," ed. S. A. Belokurov, *Chteniia,*1906, bk. 3: 48).

[22] Simeon Polotsky, *Izbrannye sochineniia*, ed. I. P. Eremin (repr. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2004); *Orel Rossiiskii: Tvorenie ieromonakha Simeona Polotskogo* (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvo liubitelei dukhovnogo prosveshcheniia, 1915); Simeon Polockij, *Vertograd Mnogocvětnyj*, ed. Anthony Hippisley and Lydia I. Sazonova, vol. 2 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1996–2000), 473–76; *Pamiatniki obshchestvenno-politicheskoi mysli v Rossii kontsa XVII veka: Literaturnye panegiriki*, ed. A. P. Bogdanov, 2 vols. (Moscow: Institut istorii SSSR, Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1983).

Peter's conquest of Ingria in 1703 characterizes him as "otechestva svoego vserossiiskogo obnovitel." After its reorganization in 1701, the academy was largely staffed with graduates of the Kyiv Academy, so it is not surprising to find "fatherland" among the mass of classical references in baroque dress that made up the verbal ornament of such ceremonies. The academy's prefect, Iosyf Turoboisky, wrote the description for a similar ceremony held in 1704 to celebrate victories in Livonia. He begins by reminding his readers that the gates are not a church but a "politicheskaia, siest grazhdanskaia pokhvala trudiashchimsia o tselosti otechestva svoego," like Peter or the Roman emperor Constantine. One of the images on the gates shows "prekhrabrogo ego tsarskogo presvetlogo velichestva popechenie o otechestve svoem." Elsewhere Iosyf placed a picture of Thrasybulus the Athenian contemplating the distress of his *otechestvo*. Though Iosyf mentions "Russia the new Israel" in his preface to the description, the imagery of the gates is almost entirely classical (Peter as Hercules), featuring the pagan gods, heroes of classical antiquity, and allegories of virtues and vices.[23] It is, as he emphasized, a secular celebration of the victorious Peter. Ukrainians preaching in St. Petersburg in addition to Prokopovych used the same vocabulary. Gavriil Buzhinsky called on the Russian seamen who won the victory at Hangö to rejoice, for they had risked their lives "za otechestvo i gosudaria svoego."[24]

These and other panegyrics on Peter and accounts of his wars and victories are the first Russian texts to use the term "fatherland" with any frequency and in a high, if not the highest, emotional register. Peter's official history of the Swedish war praises him after the Battle of Poltava for acting as a good commander "za liudei i Otechestvo" and later speaks of the Swedes returning to their own fatherland at the end of the war. Petr P. Shafirov's *Rassuzhdenie* (1717) in defense of the Russian cause in the war with Sweden calls the tsar "otets otechestva" on the second page of the work. In his narrative of the history of Russo-Swedish relations, the Russians defend their *otechestvo* during the Time of Troubles, and the Russian ambassadors are compelled to surrender Ingria at Stolbovo to prevent the final ruin of their *otechestvo*.[25] "Fatherland" had become normal usage even in historical narrative.

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[23] "Torzhestvennye vrata, vvodiashchiia v khram bezsmertnoi slavy, nepobedimomu imeni" (1703), in V. P. Grebeniuk, *Panegiricheskaia literatura petrovskogo vremeni* (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), 135; Iosif Turoboisky, "Preslavnoe torzhestvo svoboditelia Livonii," ibid., 150, 154, 157, 165–66.

[24] Gavriil Buzhinsky, "Slovo o pobede, poluchennoi u Anguta," ibid., 233.

[25] *Gistoriia Sveiskoi voiny (Podennaia zapiska Petra Velikogo)*, ed. T. S. Maikova, 2 vols. (Moscow: Krug, 2004), 1: 162, 535; [P. P. Shafirov], *Razsuzhdenie*, in *A Discourse Concerning the Just Causes of the War between Sweden and Russia 1700–1721*, ed. Wil-

"Fatherland," even in its biblical usage, is a secular or, at best, a neutral term. The literary texts we have from Russia from the later fifteenth century to the eve of Peter's reforms reflect a religious conception of the state and the sovereign. Furthermore, they inherit from earlier ages the notion of the state as the patrimony of the prince and the people, which is not quite the same thing as fatherland. Although the notion of fatherland is present in those texts, it is much less common than terms deriving from the dominance of Orthodoxy and the idea of Russia as the New Israel, the chosen of God, or simply the Russian land. As the term *otchina* (in later variants *votchina*) comes to be very specific, both in both legal usage concerning land and in Ivan the Terrible's territorial claims, it seems to fade out of the texts around the end of the sixteenth century. It reappears, however, in the charters of lands granted for service during the Time of Troubles, which suggests (together with the rare literary usages) that the notion continued to exist outside the inflated rhetoric of historical narratives. The appearance of Ukrainian monks in Moscow after 1649 and their reordering of religious practices at court and the culture that supported them did not immediately bring a new conception of politics to Russia and thus did not bring in fatherland as a major focus of loyalty. That remained the Orthodox tsar and his land, the New Israel. Only with Peter's reforms of Russian culture could a new wave of Ukrainian clergy, now reinforced by Russia's direct contact with western Europe, bring "fatherland" into the main vocabulary of Russian political and historical writing.

liam E. Butler (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1973), 16, 19.

Venetian Plans with Regard to Poland and Ukraine in the Mid-Seventeenth Century: Girolamo Cavazza and Alberto Vimina

Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel

Two prominent figures of seventeenth-century Venetian diplomacy, Girolamo Cavazza (1588–1681) and Alberto Vimina (whose real name was Michele Bianchi, 1603–67), spent time in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in connection with the plans of the Most Serene Republic of Venice. The Venetian Republic wanted to obtain military assistance from the Commonwealth, above all to engage the Cossacks in the struggle against Turkey during the years 1650–52.

Girolamo Cavazza[1] came to Poland as an official representative of the Venetian Senate, whereas Alberto Vimina went on a secret mission to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.[2] This was yet another attempt to induce the Commonwealth to take part in the war on the Red Crescent. In the years 1645–47 the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Tiepolo, paid a visit to Poland for that purpose, but his mission also failed to realize the hopes cherished by the Venetian Senate.[3]

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[1] G. Benzoni, "Cavazza, Girolamo," *Dizionario biografico italiano* [hereafter *DBI*], vol. 23 (Rome, 1979), 42–47.

[2] M. Korduba, "Venetske posolstvo do Khmelnytskoho (1650 r.)," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 16, no. 78 (1907), pt. 4: 51–89; R. Picchio and E. M. Manolesso, "A. Vimina e la Polonia," in *Venezia e la Polonia nei secoli dal XVII al XIX*, ed. L. Cini (Venice and Rome: Istituto per la collaborazione culturale, 1968), 121–32; V Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to the XXth Century* (New York, 1953), 89–92; D. Caccamo, "Alberto Vimina in Ucraina e nelle 'parti settentrionali': diplomazia e cultura nel Seicento Veneto," *Europa orientalis* 5 (1986): 233–83; T. Chynczewska-Hennel and P. Salwa, "Alberta Viminy Relacja o pochodzeniu i zwyczajach Kozaków," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 30 (1985): 207–22; Michele Bianchi [Alberto Vimina], *Trumpas pasakojimas apie Lietuvos ir Lenkijos karą su Maskva XVII a. viduryje/Breve racconto della guerra di Lituania e Polonia contro Mosca alla metà del XVII secolo*, text ed. by V. Dolinskas, commentary by A. Tyla, ed. G. Michelini (Vilnius: Lithuanian Museum of Art, 2004).

[3] *Il carteggio di Giovanni Tiepolo, ambasciatore veneto in Polonia (1645–1647)*, ed. D. Caccamo (Rome: Giufré Editore, 1984) (the intro. by D. Caccamo cites the literature on the subject); in Polish historiography: W. Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV*

The very difficult situation in which the Venetian Republic found itself was due to the war that began in 1645 over Crete, the westernmost bastion of the western territory that was to defend Europe against the Turkish menace.[4] The beginning of the conflict, and then of the war, gave no hint of later developments. At the end of September 1644, the Maltese, who were at odds with Venice for a variety of reasons, captured six Turkish galleons carrying pilgrims to Mecca. They then took the vessels to Cretan ports. The Sultan's fleet was originally supposed to be directed against Malta: in fact, the vessels attacked Crete, which was obviously a *casus belli*. Venice had long expected such an attack. In June 1645 the Turks besieged Chania on the northwest coast of Crete. Two months later the port was obliged to surrender, but prior to that the fort's commander, *Sier* Biagio Zulian, blew himself up with the whole garrison. That first heroic episode of the battle for Chania gave rise to many years of fighting in order to keep the island in Venetian hands, as well as many missions to various royal courts in search of assistance. The war for Candia,[5] which began in 1645, ended with its loss to Turkey twenty-four years later, in 1669.

From the very beginning of the struggle for the island, Venice undertook extensive diplomatic activity to gain support against the common enemy of all Christian Europe. Venetian diplomats traveled to England, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and Muscovy, as well as to Persia, which was seriously menaced by Turkey at the time.

Venice sent abroad diplomats of various rank, including ordinary and extraordinary ambassadors; *baili,* who held the title of ordinary ambassador in Constantinople; residents and secretaries. Ambassadors and *baili* were descended from patrician families, while residents and secretaries, though not of noble origin, were recruited from the families of respectable Venetians known as *cittadini* (burghers).[6] One of the most experi-

(Cracow, 1895); L. Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński* (Warsaw: Księgarnia Zakładu nar. imienia Ossolińskich, 1924); H. Wisner, "Litwa i plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV: Rok 1646," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 84, no. 2 (1978): 255–68.

[4] R. Cessi, *Storia della Repubblica di Venezia* (Florence: Giunti Martello, 1981), 625–31; G. Cozzi, "La vicenda politica," in *Storia di Venezia: Dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima, La Venezia barocca,* vol. 7, ed. G. Benzoni and G. Cozzi (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1997), 26–33; A. Zorzi, *La Repubblica del Leone: Storia di Venezia* (Milan: Bompiani, 2005), 658–59; W. Szyszkowski, *Wenecja: Dzieje Republiki, 726–1797* (Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, 1994), 224–30.

[5] Candia (Iraklion, Heraklion), the capital of Crete; its name referred to the island as a whole.

[6] R. Marozzo della Rocca, "Introduction" to *Archivio di Stato di Venezia: Dispacci degli ambasciatori al Senato* (Rome: Indice, 1959), ix–x.

enced diplomats was Girolamo Cavazza, born in Venice on 17 May 1588.[7] The Cavazza family had originally migrated to the Veneto from Germany in the Middle Ages. At first they settled in Padua, where they gradually began ascending the social hierarchy, reaching quite a high position by the mid-fourteenth century. In the sixteenth century one can already trace the public careers of Cavazza's closest relatives: his father, Giovanni, died in Apulia while on an official mission, and his brother Gabriele, the author of *Viaggio a Constantinopoli di sier Lorenzo Bernardo per l'arresto del Lippomano ... 1591*,[8] was secretary of the Senate of the Republic, of various embassies, and of the Council of Ten (*Consiglio dei dieci*).[9] His other brother, Francesco, was coadjutor of the governor of Candia.[10]

Girolamo's family may well have paved the way for his bureaucratic career. He began working at the doge's office as a *straordinario* on 23 July 1607, rising to *ordinario* on 14 August 1612. Because these posts usually involved foreign missions, he spent at least twenty-eight years away from Venice. After returning from his last mission to Poland in 1652, he resided permanently in the Republic.

After many diplomatic missions in Rome, Spain, France, Mantua, Parma, Modena, and Urbino, Cavazza was appointed resident of the Venetian Republic in Switzerland, a post he held from 1623 to 1628. He then spent two years in France, returning to Italy in connection with Venice's efforts to seek protection against the Spanish menace. In the course of the Thirty Years' War, on the southern front, a compromise peace was concluded at Cherasco in Piedmont, by virtue of which the Duke of Nevers became the ruler of Mantua and Monteferrato; part of the duchy was ceded to the rulers of Savoy. Venice could now feel secure against any threat from the direction of Mantua.[11]

On 13 September 1633 Cavazza was promoted to secretary of the Council of Ten, which oversaw the security of the state and decided political matters. In 1643 he went to Switzerland, and two years later he was sent to Malta, where the war for Candia was under way. From Malta, Cavazza was again transferred to France. In 1647 the Venetian Senate, which was chaired by Doge Francesco Molin, sent Cavazza to Munich to

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[7] Benzoni, "Cavazza, Girolamo," 42–43.

[8] The book was published in Venice in 1886 (ed. F. Stefani).

[9] A. Olivieri, "Cavazza Gabriele," *DBI*, 23: 39–41.

[10] Francesco was coadjutor of the *provveditore*, the highest-ranking Venetian official in the territories of the Republic, who also held the post of military governor.

[11] On the Mantuan succession, see R. Quazza, *La guerra per la succesione di Mantova e del Monteferrato (1628–1631)*, 2 vols. (Mantua: G. Mondovi, 1926).

begin negotiations on the "regiments dispersed by the Duke of Bavaria" during the last stages of the Thirty Years' War. His task was to recruit "three to four thousand infantrymen for the requirements of the war against Turkey."[12] As the correspondence with him makes evident, the Senate was satisfied with Cavazza's mission.[13]

In Trent, as Cavazza was on his way back to the Most Serene Republic from his diplomatic mission to Bavaria, he received an order to go to Vienna immediately to see the Venetian ambassador Niccolò Sagredo. This time the final destination of his diplomatic mission was Poland. There his delicate and difficult task, to be undertaken in concert with the papal nuncio, Giovanni de Torres, was to persuade the Commonwealth to fight the "common enemy"—the Ottoman Porte.

According to Venice's extraordinary ambassador to Poland, Andrea Contarini, there were two possible ways to resolve the problem. The first was to revert to the tactic of an earlier envoy, Giovanni Tiepolo, and engage in talks with the king, who would later submit the Venetian proposals to the Diet. The second was to establish direct contacts with the Cossacks. The Venetian Senate had, in fact, dispatched Contarini to attend the wedding of King John Casimir II and Ludwika Maria Gonzaga. On that occasion Contarini took the opportunity to report on the situation in Poland, which had long taken an unfavorable attitude to Venetian plans.[14] In his final report he was critical of Poland's military potential, seeing the Cossacks as the only hope. In his own words, "The people of Poland are indeed by nature quite alien to war and most inclined toward peace and idleness."[15]

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[12] On his way to Germany, in Innsbruck, Cavazza received the "Conditioni capitolate sopra il passagio per li stati del ... arciduca Ferdinando Carlo d'Austria delle genti da guerra destinate al servitio ... di Venetia" (Benzoni, "Cavazza Girolamo," 45).

[13] For example, the secretary of the Senate wrote to Cavazza on 29 March 1650: "Al Secretario Cavazza di Baviera. Col gradimento e sodisfattione solito ricevano il tuo dispaccio de'25." In the same letter he gave the number of votes approving Cavazza's mission: 121 in favor, 2 opposed, and 3 abstentions. See Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Corti, filza 42; Senato I [Secreta], fols. 119–20; page numbers assigned by the present author.

[14] "Relazione di Andrea Contarini, Varsavia, Novembre 1649," in M. M. Ferraccioli and G. Giraudo, "Respublica versus Imperium: Morte di due Repubbliche (Manoscritti riguardanti la Polonia nella biblioteca del Museo Correr di Venezia)," in *Polonia 1795–Venezia 1797: Morte ed Eredità di due Repubbliche*, ed. H. Osiecka-Samsonowicz with the assistance of A. Rabińska (Warsaw: Istituto d'arte Accademia polacca delle scienze [IS PAN] and Centro studi sulla tradizione classica dell'Università di Varsavia [OBTA UW], 2002), 346–47; D. Caccamo, "Introduction" to *Il Carteggio di Giovanni Tiepolo*, 46.

[15] "Relazione di Andrea Contarini," 347 ("Che veramente il popolo delle Polonia è per indole molto alieno dalla guerra, ed inclinatissimo alla pace, ed all'ozio ...").

In spite of the "civil war" in the Commonwealth—that is how the Venetians interpreted the Khmelnytsky Uprising—it was decided to pursue the plan of engaging the Cossacks in the struggle with Turkey. Hopes for the success of those efforts were revived by the Treaty of Zboriv, signed on 18 August 1649; the turn of events in the Commonwealth was then given a favorable assessment. Venetian plans in this regard were congruent with those of the Apostolic See and found support in Poland.[16] At the end of May 1650 Alberto Vimina, an envoy of Niccolò Sagredo, the Venetian ambassador to Vienna, arrived at Khmelnytsky's headquarters on a secret mission.[17] Thus the idea of sending an official resident envoy to Warsaw was conceived after Vimina had already left Venice.

On 12 July 1650 the Venetian Senate voted on the utility of sending Girolamo Cavazza to Poland. There were 121 votes in favor, 28 against, and 8 abstentions. The distinguished Venetian diplomat Giovanni Sagredo, who noted the results of the vote and considered them very important, realized how complicated the situation of the Commonwealth in its struggle with the Cossack rebels was. That was why, in his opinion, some influential senators had opposed the plan to send Cavazza to Poland. Among them were "Signorii Sarii of the Council of Ten, Pesaro, Badower, Valier, Contarini, Correr, and others."[18] Sagredo put this down in his personal notebook as information to think over at home, as it was obviously impossible to copy the contents of all the volumes he needed in full.[19]

On 16 July, however, the Senate voted in favor of issuing diplomatic credentials for Cavazza to be submitted to John Casimir II Vasa, Ludwika Maria, the Commonwealth's Senate, the crown grand chancellor,[20] and the king's brother, Charles Ferdinand Vasa.[21]

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[16] One such Polish supporter was Bishop Mikołaj Wojciech Gniewosz, who was to speak in Venice in December 1649 about military plans involving the use of Polish troops. See Caccamo, "Alberto Vimina in Ucraina," 237–38.

[17] On Vimina's mission, which was supported by the king and Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński, see Korduba, "Venetske posolstvo," n. 2; and Caccamo, "Alberto Vimina in Ucraina," 240–41, 265–71.

[18] G. Sagredo, Politica familiare, miscellanea, MSS Donà dalle Rose N. 449, fol.133r-v.

[19] Ibid., fol. 1: "annotationi, estratti da historie, che mi servivanno per andarle a legger a casa in caso, che non potessi haver tempo di copiare tutti i volume ..."

[20] Jerzy Ossoliński died on 9 August 1650, and the next chancellor, Andrzej Leszczyński, was appointed in December 1650. See *Urzędnicy centralni i nadworni Polski XIV–XVIII wieku: Spisy,* ed. A. Gąsiorowski (Kórnik: Biblioteka Kórnicka, 1992), p. 56, nos. 223, 224.

[21] In the voting on credentials for Cavazza, there were 86 votes in favor, 1 against, and 17 abstentions (Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Corti, Senato I [Secreta], filza 42, fols. 496–517).

Cavazza proceeded from Trent to Vienna, where he received his instructions from the Venetian ambassador. He sent his first letter to his superiors from Cracow on 17 September 1650, and his next letter was sent from Warsaw on 25 September. The last letter he sent from Warsaw, at the end of his stay in Poland, was dated 31 August 1652.[22] Let us hope that Cavazza's correspondence finds an editor because it is of utmost importance, especially for those working on the history of the Commonwealth and its international contacts. It is worth noting here that Venice sent to Poland a very good and experienced diplomat who, when the need arose, did not hesitate to observe military operations at the front. A case in point was the Battle of Berestechko, where Cavazza was informed of the victory by the Italian royal secretaries Sebastiano Cefali and Paolo Doni and by Hieronim Radziejowski, the crown vice-chancellor.[23]

Nine days later, on 9 July 1651, Cavazza himself dispatched a letter from Lublin. He was highly optimistic about the strength and potential of Poland, whose "victorious and powerful troops do not fear anyone might venture to annoy Poland at present."[24] Several days later he related further developments from the king's camp near Kremianets.[25] In his next letter, written from Lviv, Cavazza noted that the issues in which he was involved would be discussed at the next session of the Diet, which was scheduled for October.[26] By August he was already back in Warsaw. Cavazza stayed in Poland for another year, hoping for an end to the Polish-Cossack conflict. In early September 1652 he left Warsaw and returned to Italy.

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[22] For the originals of Cavazza's letters from Poland, see Archivio di Stato di Venezia [hereafter ASV], Dispacci degli ambasciatori, Senato III, φilza 6; fols. 716r-v; Papal Institute of Church Studies in Warsaw, microfilm no. 2 B 9407; seventeenth-century copies in Dispacci Cavazza di Polonia, Biblioteca del Museo Correr di Venezia; and Provenienza Sagredo Collocamento P.D. 359–c (unnumbered pages).

[23] Letters from P. Doni, S. Cefali, and H. Radziejowski from the king's camp near Berestechko, nos. 53–58, fols. 307–41 (together with Cavazza's original letters and copies given to him by the nuncio, G. Torres); fols. 347–50: "Relatione del Cefali: Dal Campo di là da Berestezko a 3 Luglio 1651." On the role of John Casimir's Italian secretaries, see W. Tygielski, *Włosi w Polsce XVI–XVII wieku: Utracona szansa na modernizację* (Warsaw: Biblioteka "Więzi," 2005), 208, 316, and passim (citing the literature on the subject).

[24] Cavazza, letter from Lublin dated 9 July 1651: "quete armi vittoriosi et potenti, non hanno a temere che alcuno s'areschi adesso a molestare la Polonia" (ASV, Dispacci, fol. 344).

[25] Cavazza, letter from Kremeniez (Kremianets), 17 July 1651, ibid., fols. 359–65.

[26] There was no Diet session in 1650. See ASV, G. Cavazza, Dispacci, Lwów, 24 luglio 1651; ibid., fols. 367–69v).

Among contemporary Polish accounts, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł devoted some attention to Cavazza. Under the date of 18 December 1650, during the first months of the Venetian envoy's stay in Warsaw, Radziwiłł wrote:

> After the church service the Venetian envoy, Count Girolamo Cavazza, who was granted an audience at the public meeting with the king, invited its participants to join the war against Turkey. In response the king, the Senate, and the estates promised ply to refer the issue to a fuller session. Not until the Diet concluded its debate did the chancellor reply to him on behalf of the king that carrying on the present war meant nothing other than cultivating the alliance with the Venetian Republic, given that Khmelnytsky had submitted and sworn loyalty to Turkey, and that he would receive the promised reinforcements from the Ottoman Porte. All that remains to us, then, is to fight the Turks; accordingly, if the Republic can support [our] Commonwealth with funds, the troops will be ready."[27]

Cavazza's letter relating the course of the Diet debate is, of course, more extensive than Radziwiłł's brief note. The king invited the Venetian envoy to attend the Senate debate. Cavazza did not fail to relate in his correspondence that a royal carriage was sent to take him there and that he was given a great welcome. He wrote about his meeting with the nuncio and about greeting the king and other Commonwealth dignitaries. The Venetian diplomat complained about the long Diet debates (lasting ten hours a day), which usually ended *con pochi risultati.*

Although it was explained to Cavazza that the Commonwealth was in a difficult situation, there was a debate on the number of soldiers Poland and Lithuania could provide, as well as on the amount of Venetian funding to cover the costs of the war. Mention was also made of the funds promised to King Władysław IV in 1646, when the Venetian envoy Giovanni Tiepolo sought to obtain Poland's support. Cavazza wrote that at that time, given prevailing conditions, Władysław IV had been satisfied with 250,000 Reichstaler per year. He was to receive the same amount in the second year of the conflict.[28]

Cavazza signed the agreement with Poland on behalf of the Republic of Venice. The Commonwealth's signatories were Bishop of Chełm and Pomerania and Crown Grand Chancellor Andrzej Leszczyński; Crown Grand Marshal Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski; Crown Vice-Chancellor Hie-

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[27] A. S. Radziwiłł, *Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce*, vol. 3, *1647–1656*, trans. and ed. A. Przyboś and R. Żelewski (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1980), 275.

[28] See, e.g., Cavazza's letter from Warsaw on the contribution (14 Gennaio 1651, ASV, G. Cavazza, Dispacci, fols. 136–37).

ronim Radziejowski; Crown Grand Vice-Treasurer Bogusław Lesz-
czyński; and Marshal of the Crown Court Łukasz Opaliński the Young-
er.[29]

Interestingly, Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł makes no mention of this
document. even though he had received Cavazza at his residence in late
December 1650. The reason is simple: Radziwiłł had departed from War-
saw before the agreement was signed in January 1651.[30]

The "agreement for future development" consisted of nine points.[31]
The first point expressed the hope that relations with the Cossacks would
be settled and that the joint forces of Poland and the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania would be directed, together with Cossack troops and the use of
armed Cossack boats (*chaiky*), against the "Ottoman states," both on the
Black Sea and on land.

Under the second point, the Republic of Venice promised to continue
fighting the Turks in Candia and Dalmatia, as well as at sea, *con tutto il
vigore*. Point three included specific details relating to Venice's financial
contribution, which was to be paid "to the King and to the Republic" in
the amount of 250,000 Reichstaler. The first half of that sum was to be
paid when the invasion of Turkey began or in the event that the Turks
themselves, or supporting Cossack forces, attacked Poland. The other
half was to be paid to the Polish side four months after the commence-
ment of an anti-Turkish "action." The funds were to be disbursed in War-
saw, Cracow, or Gdańsk, depending on how they were transferred.

Point four provided that the agreement was to be binding until the
venture was crowned by a victory over the Turks and a glorious peace.

Point five stated that the signatories must abide by the signed agree-
ments, armistice, truce, or peace.

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[29] "[H]avendo trattato per parte della Maest à et Repubblica Serenissima sudetta il Rev-
erendissimo, Li Illustrissimi et Eccellentissimi Signori Andrea di Lesno Leszczynski,
Vescovo di Culma et Pomerania, Gran Cancelliere del Regno; Giorgio Lubomirski Gran
Maresciale, Girolamo Radzieiowicz Vice Cancelliere, Boguslavo Cont' di Lesno
Lesczynski Gran Thesoriere, et Luca di Bnin Maresciallo di Corte e per detta Serenissima
Repubblica di Venezia l'Illustrissimo Conte Girolamo Cavazza ..." (ASV, G.Cavazza,
Dispacci, fols. 168v–169); for the Latin version, see "Textus conventionis Poloniam et
Venetiarum Rempublicam inter de confoederatione in damnum turcarum, opera adhibita
exercitus polonici et cosacorum," in *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum historiam
Ucrainae illustrantes (1550–1850)* [hereafter *LNA*], vol. 7, *1649–1651*, ed. Athanasius G.
Welykyj, OSBM (Rome: PP. Basiliani, 1962), 229–32; copy in Biblioteca del Museo
Correr di Venezia, Dispacci Cavazza, P. D. 359c, no. 27.

[30] Radziwiłł, *Pamiętnik*, 277.

[31] See ASV, G. Cavazza, Dispacci; Capitulatione minutata da me che fu approvata da
Signori Deputati, fols. 168–71. As we know, history took a different course.

Point six stressed the need to render mutual assistance both at sea and on land. Point seven included a statement on the co-operation and blessing of Pope Innocent X, who would exert influence through his envoys and through his current nuncio in Poland, as his predecessors had done through Archbishop Giovanni de Torres of Adrianople.

Under the next point of the agreement, it was emphasized that the Holy Roman Emperor and other crowned heads would wish to accede to this alliance and take part in the fight for victory. The ninth and final point specified that the "present terms and conditions and the present alliance are to take full effect upon approval and ratification according to the best efforts of His Majesty and the Most Serene Republic of Venice, and confirmed according to custom."[32]

Cavazza was in frequent contact with the papal nuncio, who reported to him about his talks with the king. Needless to say, the two Italian envoys paid the utmost attention to all that concerned Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks. Also of interest are the reports of their talks with leading representatives of the Commonwealth's political elite. In his letter of 14 March 1651, for example, Cavazza wrote that he had taken part in talks at the royal castle with the king, Crown Grand Chancellor Leszczyński, Crown Vice-Chancellor Radziejowski, Crown Grand Vice-Treasurer Leszczyński, and Marshal of the Crown Court Opaliński. The discussion concerned the anti-Turkish league and relations with the Cossacks; most importantly and quite optimistically, it was believed that the war with the Cossacks would not last much longer.[33]

The Venetian envoy was well aware that his mission was concordant with that of Alberto Vimina to Khmelnytsky in official terms, even though Vimina's mission was secret. He mentioned Vimina in his correspondence and was well informed about the details of his mission by the Venetian ambassador in Vienna.

In his letter of 3 December 1650, Cavazza wrote from Warsaw that "Alberto Vimina left for Italy last Sunday."[34] He would later mention Vimina in connection with accounting for funds obtained for the journey of the secret agent.[35] A study of financial arrangements and gifts distrib-

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[32] "La presente Capitulatione et Confederatione, haverà il suo intiero vigore all'hora che sarà nata provata, et ratificata in ogni miglior modo si da Sua Maestà come dalla Serenissima Repubblica di Venetia; autenticamente secondo il costume" (Cavazza, Dispacci, fol. 171).

[33] "Tutti che parlano di questa guerra de Cosacchi sentono che non possa certamente portarsi alla lunga" (ASV, G. Cavazza, Dispacci, fol. 225v).

[34] Ibid., fol. 85.

[35] Ibid., fol. 293v (Warsaw, 27 March 1651).

uted in Poland and Ukraine might offer valuable insight into the morality underlying diplomatic relations of the mid-seventeenth century.[36]

Cavazza's correspondence includes copies of various documents, letters from third parties, and conditions of peace agreements between Poland and the Zaporozhian Host, which were sent to Venice in Italian or Latin.[37]

His relations with Nuncio Giovanni de Torres, who spent the years 1645–52 in the Commonwealth, are also of interest.[38] In mid-August 1650 Torres informed the Secretariat of State in Rome that, according to news received from Venice, the envoy, Secretary Cavazza, who had been granted the title of *conte del Senato* for the needs of this mission, was soon to arrive in Poland. As Torres wrote, Venice did not confer such a title "on its resident subjects."[39] The nuncio reported on his audience at the royal castle, progress in talks about Commonwealth participation in the struggle with Turkey, and his meetings with Cavazza. He also wrote about Vimina, who was on his way back from meeting with Khmelnytsky, and about hopes of further negotiations with the Cossacks.[40] Torres also mentioned the king's growing dislike of Cavazza, who was demanding so much of his attention that the monarch wanted to abandon all thought of a league with Venice unless it offered the prospect of reining in the Cossacks.[41] Torres's embassy became a "crossing point" for news from Venice, Rome, and Vienna with dispatches from the military front in Ukraine.[42]

The beginning of September 1652 marked the end of Cavazza's stay in Poland and his return to Venice. His last letter from Warsaw was dated 31 August and included, inter alia, news of the departure of Torres and the arrival of the new nuncio, Pietro Vidoni. An incomplete list of the possessions that the Venetian envoy took home has also been preserved.[43]

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[36] ASV, G. Cavazza, Dispacci, fol. 571r-v. (settlements of accounts, March 1652).

[37] For example, "Puncti della Pace et Regolatione de'Soldati Zaporoviensi accordati l'Anno 1651, a 28 Settembre" (ASV, G. Cavazza, Dispacci, fols. 422–24v).

[38] H. D. Wojtyska CP, *Acta Nuntiaturae Polonae, de fontibus eorumque investigatione et editionibus: Instructio ad editionem*, Nuntiorum series chronologica (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum, 1990), 259–60, table 26.

[39] *LNA*, 182.

[40] Ibid., 195–96.

[41] Ibid., 238–39; Varsavia, 18. II. 1651 ("Il Re mi ha detto apertamente in uno di questi giorni, che non vuole altra lega con li signori Venetiani").

[42] Ibid., 241. Cf., for example, an interesting letter (dated Venice, 25 February 1651) from Scipio Pannochieschi, the papal nuncio in Venice (1646–52), to the Secretariat of State in Rome concerning Cavazza and his activity in Poland.

[43] ASV, G. Cavazza, Dispacci, fols. 711–14; his next letter, dispatched from Vienna, is

The Venetian diplomatic efforts ended in failure. This does not mean, however, that those plans were without foundation. According to Zbigniew Wójcik, only a victorious war with the Crimean Khanate and Turkey would have enabled Poland to put an end to Tatar invasions from the southeast, and such a victory might also have made it possible to turn the armed and dangerous Cossacks into a sedentary and less dangerous force.[44] It should also be remembered that several years earlier the Cossacks had taken an interest in plans for a war against Turkey, although it would appear that at that time Venetian diplomacy did not appreciate the strength of their army. Paradoxically, it was not until the Cossacks raised a rebellion against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that Europe took account of the power of Khmelnytsky and his troops.

The missions of Cavazza and Vimina, whose failure obviously cannot be attributed to poor diplomacy on the part of the Most Serene Republic, became a subject of Venetian historiography. In his *Historia della guerra di Candia*, Andrea Valiero, a senator of the Republic of Venice, devoted much space to the Commonwealth during the hard times of the civil war, as the Khmelnytsky Uprising was then termed.[45] He described Vimina's unsuccessful mission and Cavazza's stay in Poland, dwelling on the great hopes that Venice had invested in the Commonwealth. Valiero began his account with Commonwealth developments of the 1640s and ended with the year 1669. In his assessment of Cavazza's mission, he quoted the envoy's opinion and his arguments relating to the impossibility of carrying out the Venetian plans. "It was apparent," he concludes, "that neither the Poles nor the Cossacks wanted to conduct military operations against Turkey."[46]

Cavazza's mission in Poland received a similar assessment from Battista Nani in his book on Venetian history dealing mainly with the first half of the seventeenth century. The Venetians, wrote Nani, spared no expense in fighting their enemy, but unfortunately there was little they could accomplish in Poland. The Diet held long debates, only to be dissolved without having made any decisions. The Poles tried to extort money from the Venetian Republic for their current needs because the nobility, which had to raise troops at its own expense, preferred to avoid

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dated 1 October 1652 (ibid., fols. 715–16).

[44] Z. Wójcik, *Dzikie Pola w ogniu: O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1968), 152ff.

[45] A. Valiero, *Historia della guerra di Candia di Andrea Valiero, Senatore Veneto* (Venice, 1679).

[46] Ibid., 285 ("Dal che si vide, che nè Polacchi nè Cosacchi havevano volontà d'operare contro i Turchi").

warfare and preserve peace. But not everything was to be explained rationally. Nani claimed that "misfortune," which weighed heavily on the course of events, was responsible for the mission's failure.[47]

Offical Venetian historians, as Domenico Caccamo calls them, tried to explain the failure of Venetian diplomacy.[48] We also have Alberto Vimina's in-depth account of the Commonwealth's struggle with Khmelnytsky's Cossacks, *Historia delle guerre civili in Polonia divisa in cinque libri progressi dell'armi Moscovite contro Polacchi: Relatione della Moscovia e Svetia e loro governi* (Venice, 1671).[49]

In the autumn of 1652 Cavazza returned to Venice, where he was generously rewarded for his efforts in representing his country during hard times and in dangerous regions. He was ennobled on 31 January 1653 for his service to Venice and took up residence in the Lioni-Cavazza Palace.[50]

After his return from Warsaw in the autumn of 1651, Alberto Vimina settled in Belluno, waiting to become a parish priest in Pieve d'Alpago, an office he held until the autumn of 1653. During the years 1653–55 he served as a Venetian envoy to Sweden and Muscovy. Vimina later described his diplomatic experiences in his *Historia delle guerre civili*. He died on 11 January 1667 and was buried in a parish church of his town.[51]

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[47] *Historia della Republica Veneta di Battista Nani Cavaliere, e Procuratore di San Marco*, 3d printing (Venice, 1676), 335–37.

[48] Caccamo, "Introduction" to *Il Carteggio di Giovanni Tiepolo*, 48, n. 204.

[49] T. Chynczewska-Hennel, "Najjaśniejsza o najjaśniejszej: Rzeczpospolita w weneckiej litraturze historycznej XVII wieku," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 50 (2006): 191–203.

[50] E. Bassi, *Palazzi di Venezia: Admiranda urbis Venetae*, vol. 1 (Venice: Stamperia di Venezia Editrice, 1987), 375ff. The palace was destroyed in 1857.

[51] Caccamo, "Alberto Vimina in Ucraina," 244–65; Bianchi, *Historia delle guerre civili*, 105–12. The earthquake of 1873 left only the church's bell tower standing.

An Unrealized Project of Irish Colonization in Ukraine (1655)

Yaroslav Fedoruk

Twelve years ago an article I wrote about a project to settle Irish colonists in the Ukrainian lands in 1655 was published.[1] Materials obtained since then have inspired the present article, which supplements the conclusions set forth in my earlier one. During the intervening period I have had occasion to discuss the question of mid-seventeenth-century Irish colonization of Ukraine with Frank Sysyn, who traces part of his ancestry back to Ireland. In one of our conversations he noted a mention of such colonization plans in an anonymous Polish political tract of the period. Since new sources on this subject have come into my hands only occasionally, in the course of research on larger projects, it has taken considerable time to accumulate enough material to warrant a re-examination of my earlier conclusions.

The spring of 1655 was the last period of relative peace enjoyed by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before the Swedish invasion. The Okhmativ military campaign, which led to the de facto defeat of the Polish army and the Tatar Hordes, had just ended, and the hetman of Ukraine, Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648–57), as well as the Muscovite tsar, Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645–76), were planning new campaigns against Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In the north, King Charles X Gustav of Sweden (1654–60) was making extensive preparations for war with Poland, on which the Council of State in Stockholm had resolved following debates in December 1654. The Holy Roman Empire, weakened in the Thirty Years' War, refused to support King John Casimir of Poland (1648–68) with military force, restricting itself to diplomatic mediation between the Commonwealth and Muscovy or Sweden. At the same time Oliver Cromwell, the Lord Protector of England, was strongly importuned by Swedish envoys in London to conclude an agreement with Sweden against the United Provinces.[2] The diplomatic activity of the Polish government in

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[1] "Polski plany irlandskoi kolonizatsii Ukrainy u 1655 rotsi," *Ukraina v mynulomu* (Kyiv and Lviv), vyp. 9 (1996): 31–36.

[2] Michael Roberts, "Cromwell and the Baltic," *The English Historical Review* 76,

the Dutch Republic and England in 1654 was directed toward the formation of a league for the defense of the Baltic region against the aggressive plans of Sweden. Contrary to their intent, John Casimir's actions led to a deterioration of relations between the Kingdom of Poland and the government of Oliver Cromwell.

After the end of the Okhmativ campaign the Commonwealth devoted considerable effort to raising new forces to fend off Ukrainian and Muscovite troops. Under these circumstances, there was talk in Polish official circles about Irish soldiers seeking to enter the service of the Crown army. This is apparent from a letter of 4 March 1655 from the castellan of Wojnicz, Jan Wielopolski, to King John Casimir. A copy of it is preserved in a seventeenth-century manuscript book that Wielopolski compiled. Such books, of the genre known as *silva rerum,* were popular among the nobility; they contained notes on a variety of current events and copies of official and private documents. "I see no other means for a military expedition," wrote Wielopolski in his letter,

> than to levy some thousands of Irishmen (*Irlandczykow*) as soon as possible, who, as I have heard, offered their services to Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord. I see many advantages in this: these people are ready now … if given some respectable commissioner competent in accompanying foreigners, they would come directly under the command of the lords hetmans without delay. And not only could they be used in war, but, knowing them as martial men—this severity of the settlers also hardens their innate characteristics—Your Royal Majesty, our Gracious Lord, might also settle them in place of the Cossacks in those lands [*na mieysce Kozakow w tamtych kraiach osadzic moze w. k. m., p. n. mlciwy*]. This will create a defense and a shield for the fatherland from that side [*munimentum i zaslona od tamtej strony Oyczyznie się uczyni*], and at the same time these [lands] could be the place of [their] recompense. The best of them could be admitted to noble prerogatives … so that subsequently this would create a great obstacle to any rebellion, just as the very difference of nations [would prevent rebellions] as well.[3]

This is not an unreliable report from a military camp, nor is it idle rumor or hearsay, but a letter from an influential Polish official to the king (Wielopolski also took part in diplomatic missions, for instance, as an envoy to Vienna in the autumn of 1656). The letter presents a plan for the recruitment of Irish soldiers to the Crown army, with further settle-

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no. 300 (1961): 415–17.

[3] Main Archives of Older Records in Warsaw, Public Archive of the Potockis, bk. 45, vol. 1, fols. 16–16ᵛ. For the Polish text, see appendix 1 below.

ment on Cossack lands and possible future ennoblement of the most deserving among them. The date of the letter, 4 March 1655, indicates the hope of the castellan of Wojnicz that this problem would be considered at a council of the Senate that was soon to convene in Warsaw. As things turned out, the council debated much more important problems than that of Irish settlers in Ukraine, and the senators demanded that John Casimir convene the Diet as soon as possible.[4] The main unresolved question of Polish foreign policy at the time was that of a peace treaty with Sweden; hence the most important matter for discussion at this council was the formulation of instructions for the Polish plenipotentiary envoy to Stockholm.

Another document—less trustworthy, and sometimes even unreliable in its reconstruction of events—is nevertheless important and deserves attention: a letter whose contents were copied into the well-known compendium of Marcin Goliński, a councillor in the town of Kazimierz near Cracow. On 26 June 1655 his fellow councillor Andrzej Jasowski wrote from Warsaw:

> The Parliament of England, which put its king [Charles I, 1625–49] to death by execution, has also come out against his son [who later ruled as Charles II, 1660–85]. Scotland, or the Scottish land, has risen in support of the prince, as has Hibernia [the Latin name of Ireland] or the Icelanders [*Isliandowie*], who are Catholics. The English, the victors in this war, are driving them out of their own lands, which these unfortunates [the Icelanders], of whom there are two hundred thousand, must vacate along with their wives and children. Of these, there are forty thousand [ready] for battle. Their commander [*oberster*], or captain, came from that country to His Majesty the King and to the Commonwealth, requesting and pleading that the Commonwealth accept them and that they be given a piece of land [*stukę zięmię*] where they might gather and settle. And these forty thousand are declaring their readiness to go against the enemy, wherever the king commands, desiring no payment, but only that they be permitted to stay in the places that they will take from the enemy in that land. The lords and nobles [of the Diet] did not wish to give permission for this, lest they become like the crusaders in Prussia—as their forces increased, they became strong vis-à-vis the Poles.[5]

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[4] The king's proclamation (*uniwersał*) on the convocation of the Diet was issued on 31 March 1655. Cf. Stefania Ochmann-Staniszewska and Zdzisław Staniszewski, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej za panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy. Prawo — doktryna — praktyka*, vol. 1 (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000), 232.

[5] Lviv National Scientific Library, Ossoliński Collection, MS 189/II, fols. 759–60. For the Polish text, see appendix 2 below

Despite its somewhat chaotic exposition, Jasowski's letter basically corresponds in content to that of Jan Wielopolski. Both letters are fairly close in time, dating from the first half of 1655, although Jasowski wrote after the conclusion of the Diet session, which lasted from 19 May to 20 June. His news therefore reflects the rumors circulating in Warsaw after the Diet. Jasowski's letter confirms that the idea of colonizing part of the Commonwealth with Irish settlers (whom Goliński misnames "Icelanders") was fairly current in Warsaw at the time. The letter also makes reference to an Irish envoy to the king and the Commonwealth—an unnamed captain who was supposed to present the colonization scheme to them— and gives the reasons (as Jasowski understood them) why the king and the senators could not agree to the scheme. Their unfortunate experience with the Teutonic Knights had made the Poles skeptical about new foreign settlers. The scope of the colonization project differs greatly in the two letters: Wielopolski refers only to "a few thousand Irishmen," while Jasowski writes about a huge number—two hundred thousand, including forty thousand soldiers. As we shall see below, however, in June the Diet ultimately debated the settlement of only about a thousand Irish soldiers.

A Polish political tract of the mid-1650s provides further evidence of plans for employing Irish military regiments in the service of the Commonwealth and settling them in Ukraine. The context suggests that the tract may have been referring to the same period as that specified in the letters of Wielopolski and Jasowski: "And the Commonwealth could even populate free settlements [*słobody*] with foreigners, especially in Ukraine, involving ever new commanders and granting them [these estates] as their property, as the Irish, good soldiers and Catholics, have already proposed. The Welsh, also a multitudinous nation and Catholics to boot, could quickly be attracted here [for service], for they, like the Irish, are oppressed by the poverty of their homeland. Thus the Commonwealth would be defended by larger numbers of people and would enjoy greater revenue, according to the proverb: 'Wherever there are people, there are taxes' [*ubi populus, ibi obolus*]."[6]

Thus the documents show how some of the Polish authorities looked to Irish settlement as a partial solution to the problem of quelling Cos-

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[6] This proverb refers specifically to the colonization of new lands; the obolus is an ancient Greek coin worth one-sixth of a drachma. Cf. "Rada do poprawy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej" (1657) in *Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy (1648– 1668): Publicystyka–Eksorbitancj–Projekty–Memoriały*, vol. 1, *1648–1660*, ed. Stefania Ochmann-Staniszewska (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1989), no.42, p. 202. In his review of this volume, in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 15, nos. 3–4 (1991): 451, Frank E. Sysyn noted the mention of plans for Irish colonization. For the Polish text, see appendix 3.

sack revolts. Several important points concerning the treatment of the prospective settlers emerge from these texts. The settlers were to be directed to particular regions (the "place of the Cossacks in those lands"), namely, Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv palatinates. They were not to establish military garrisons scattered in various towns but to occupy part of Ukrainian territory *en bloc*. The lands on which they settled were to be regarded as recompense for their service. As good soldiers, the Irishmen could also be inducted into the Crown army "without delay" for use against the enemies of the Commonwealth. Finally, the colonization of free settlements by the Irish, who differed from the Cossacks in religion, was intended to raise a defensive wall "for the fatherland from that side," that is, between the actual territory of the Kingdom of Poland (as the Poles defined it) and the Cossack lands of the three palatinates. The settlement of that territory by two distinct peoples would help secure it against the threat of further Cossack rebellions.

It should be noted that in Poland of that time colonization was generally directed against the Turks and the Crimean Tatars. Settlement of the wild steppe frontier was supposed to prevent invasions of nomadic hordes and devastation of the Commonwealth. But the outbreak of the war with the Cossacks in 1648, which subsequently led them to swear loyalty to the Muscovite tsar in 1654, confronted the Polish-Lithuanian state with a major crisis. A treaty between Poland and the Crimean khan Mehmed Giray IV (1641–44, 1654–66) was concluded in October 1654. Accordingly, the developments of 1655 discussed in this article should be seen as bearing more on the concrete political situation than on the general Polish policy of colonization. The broader political and diplomatic context of Northern Europe, especially England, should also be borne in mind. This will give us better insight into the origins of the Irish proposal to the king and the Commonwealth concerning the settlement of the wastelands of their realm.

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After the conquest of Ireland by Cromwell's army in 1651, that country began to produce a steady supply of recruits for the military forces of many European powers. England's oppressive policies toward Ireland led to the requisition of the lands and properties of Catholics, reducing Catholic estates from 59 to 22 percent of the total between the Irish rebellion of 1641 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688.[7] The mass resettlement (or

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[7] John Gerald Simms, *The Williamite Confiscation in Ireland, 1690–1703* (London: Faber and Faber, [1956]), 195, app. "Catholic Holdings in Ireland in 1641, 1688 and 1703"; Toby Christopher Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland: Government and Reform in Ireland, 1649–1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 11.

"transplantation," as it was called at the time) of the Irish west of the Shannon River, the transporting of Catholics from Ireland into exile and slavery in Barbados and other English colonies in the West Indies, the persecution, imprisonment, and execution of rebels, and the Protestant colonization of the Irish lands were the basic features of England's colonial policy in that country. The Irish Catholic clergy was particularly targeted for persecution, not only because of its opposition to the spread of Protestantism but also because of its role in instigating resistance to English rule and encouraging rebellion.[8] An official who sedulously promoted such harsh measures was Cromwell's son-in-law, Charles Fleetwood, who served as lord deputy in Ireland from 1652 to 1655. In July 1655 the commander of the Irish army, Henry Cromwell, was appointed to Dublin, and in September of that year he replaced Fleetwood as acting lord deputy. For the next two years he pursued a more moderate policy than that of his predecessor.

Because the governance of Cromwell's officials placed a heavy burden on the Irish, the emigration of Catholics from that country to Spain, France, and the Spanish Netherlands became very intensive.[9] The English authorities encouraged this development. "The Priests and Souldiers ... are for the first universally departed the Land," according to a pamphlet printed in 1655.[10] Severe restrictions were repeatedly imposed on Irish Catholics, for example, in June 1654. According to article 7 of the response to the proposals of the governor of Galway, Peter Stubbers, Irishmen who had been resettled to the county of Connaught were forbidden to move to England or Scotland or to engage in commerce there, but they could go "to such foreign parts as they shall desire."[11] However, the status of the new English and Scottish settlers in Ireland remained highly uncertain. Parliament passed an Act of Settlement for Ireland in August

[8] Patrick Francis Moran, *Historical Sketch of the Persecutions Suffered by the Catholics of Ireland under the rule of Cromwell and the Puritans* (Dublin: M. H. Gill, 1884), 258–61. Many documents on this subject appear in *Ireland under the Commonwealth, Being a Selection of the Documents Relating to the Government of Ireland from 1651 to 1659,* vol. 2, ed. Robert Dunlop (Manchester: University Press, 1913), 549, 553, 555–56, 559–60, 625, passim. I thank Prof. Victor Ostapchuk for providing me with a copy of this book.

[9] Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 52.

[10] Vincent Gookin, *The Great Case of Transplantation in Ireland Discussed; Or, Certain Considerations, Wherein the Many Great Inconveniences in Transplanting the Natives of Ireland Generally Out of the Three Provinces of Leinster, Ulster, and Munster, into the Province of Connaught, are Shewn* (London, 1655), 13.

[11] *Ireland under the Commonwealth,* vol. 2, no. 510, p. 432.

1652, but colonization was far from spontaneous: it was encouraged by artificial means and supported mainly by military force.[12]

In the conquered country Irish military units caused a good deal of trouble for Cromwell's Dublin-based government. On the one hand, the English were unable to use them, even outside Ireland, to help propagate the Protestant religion. On the other, the armed Irishmen were a powerful force and potentially a source of support for the Royalists, who hoped to use Ireland as a base from which to launch an invasion of England, as well as to foment rebellion in Ireland itself. There was also the threat of foreign support for the Royalist project. In the course of Cromwell's Protectorate such a threat was first presented by France, and after the conclusion of a treaty between England and France in November 1655, also by Spain. The Protector therefore encouraged foreign rulers he considered allies to levy Irish units for their own military service.

A ruler who recruited many Irish troops for his army after Cromwell's conquest of the island was King Philip IV of Spain (1621–65). In January 1653 a report to the English Council of State noted that thirteen thousand Irish soldiers had been dispatched to the Spanish service since April of the previous year, and new forces raised from among those who had previously revolted against Parliament were to be transported to Spain.[13] In March 1653 the English commissioners in Dublin wrote that Ireland would enjoy greater security and improve prospects for the spread of Protestantism if the largest possible number of Irish soldiers who had rebelled against England could be shipped off to Spain.[14] "The agent of the Spanish Government transferred thousands and thousands of them every month, partly to Spain and partly to Belgium," noted an anonymous author in 1654.[15] In all some thirty-four thousand Irishmen were dispatched for service abroad between 1651 and 1654.[16]

Aside from Spain, Cromwell offered Irish units to other countries, especially Sweden. In early 1655 the secretary of the Council of State, John Thurloe, refused the Swedish ambassador in London, Peter Julius Coyet, permission to levy Scottish regiments for the army of King Charles X Gustav, who was then preparing for war with Poland. It was suggested

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[12] Barnard, *Cromwellian Ireland*, 91; Edmund Curtis, *A History of Ireland*, 10th ed. (Norwich; Jarrold and Sons, 1964), 252–53.

[13] *Ireland under the Commonwealth,* vol. 2, no. 329, p. 310.

[14] Ibid., vol. 2, no. 351, pp. 323–24.

[15] The quotation is taken from the manuscript "Status rei Cath[olicae] in Hibernia hoc anno 1654" See Moran, *Historical Sketch of the Persecutions,* 253 (Moran's translation).

[16] John Patrick Prendergast, *The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland* (New York: P. M. Haverty, 1868), 78.

that the ambassador recruit Irishmen instead of Scots, but Coyet replied that "the Scots were protestants, but the Irish were papists, upon whom ... [Charles X] could not place equal reliance if they should be engaged in the war with principe pontifico."[17] Thus Cromwell preferred Scottish regiments to Irish ones, as he could use them to promote the Protestant cause.

The mercenaries discussed in the letters of Polish officials cited above could certainly be counted among the Irish armed forces hostile to English rule, and Cromwell was well aware that they might seize the first opportunity to rebel against him. It therefore comes as no surprise that traces of the "thousands of Irishmen" Wielopolski and Jasowski mentioned are to be found, on the one hand, in England's relations with Spain and, on the other, in John Casimir's contacts with the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs. Spaniards also served in the Polish Crown army,[18] and it was common practice for whole regiments of Austrian mercenaries, as well as individual officers or instructors of engineering and fortification, to serve in Poland.

Until the autumn of 1654 Protestant England and Catholic Spain were united by a common anti-French orientation in foreign policy. The Franco-Spanish War (1653–59), as well as Cardinal Jules Mazarin's support of the Stuart royal family, which took refuge in Paris,[19] led to close cooperation between Cromwell and Philip IV. Mazarin's sympathy for the Royalists and rebels in England, Scotland, and Ireland was well known in Europe. In the spring of 1653, Prince Rupert of the Rhine, the son of King Frederick I of Bohemia (1619–20) and Elizabeth Stuart, came to France after having spent years as a buccaneer in the West Indies. He was a nephew of the late Charles I and had been a commander of the Royalist forces during the Civil War. When Rupert made his way to Paris in January 1654, Mazarin considered dispatching him to Ireland or Scotland

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[17] Michael Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court, 1655–1656: The Missions of Peter Julius Coyet and Christer Bonde*, (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, University College, 1988), no. 19 (Coyet to Charles X, London, 1 June 1655 O. S.); Michael Roberts, "Charles X and the Great Parenthesis: A Reconsideration," in his *From Oxenstierna to Charles XII: Four Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 133.

[18] Yaroslav Stepaniv [Yaroslav Dashkevych], "Portuhaliia, Ispaniia ta Ukraina (stezhkamy nebudennykh zviazkiv XVI–XVII st.)," *Ukraina: Nauka i kultura* (Kyiv), vyp. 25 (1991): 157.

[19] The family included the widow of Charles I, Henrietta Maria (the eldest daughter of King Henri IV of France [1589–1610]), and her sons, Charles, king of Scotland and later of England, and James. They were expelled from Paris after the conclusion of a peace treaty between France and England in November 1655.

with Royalist and Irish troops to start a war with England.[20] With Anglo-French relations balanced on a knife edge, rumors of war between the two countries were rife in Europe throughout 1654. In March of that year, Mazarin's agents reported that one hundred and twenty English warships were on their way to the French coast.[21] Although relations between England and France are not the focus of this article, even a superficial view of the matter suggests their mutual hostility was bound to drive Cromwell toward a rapprochement with Spain. The Anglo-Spanish alliance was also of indirect benefit to the persecuted Huguenots in France, who sent their envoys to the Lord Protector with the Prince de Condé.[22]

In the course of their war with France, the Spaniards frequently requested military assistance from Cromwell, giving him a good opportunity to dispatch Irish Catholics to that front. As Cromwell saw it, Irish troops fighting for Philip IV of Spain would also be serving the interests of the English Protectorate. The dispatch of thousands of Irish soldiers to Flanders and other lands became a basic feature of his rule in Ireland between 1651 and 1657.[23] Although foreign service was a good way for the Irish to escape colonial dependence on England and the government encouraged them to do so by offering a good salary and privileges, they often became disillusioned and deserted the Spanish service for that of France or the Royalist cause.[24] Moreover, in late 1655 and early 1656 many of them surreptitiously returned to their homeland, presenting Cromwell with the threat of a new revolt and possible foreign intervention in Ireland with the participation of Charles Stuart.[25]

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[20] *Memoirs of Prince Rupert, and the Cavaliers*, vol. 3, ed. Eliot Warburton (London: Richard Bentley, 1849), 418–24; *Ireland under the Commonwealth*, vol. 2, no. 426, p. 373; *A Collection of State Papers of John Thurloe*, vol. 2, *1653–1654,* ed. Thomas Birch (London: Printed for the Executor of F. Gyles, 1742), 6.

[21] Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–1656*, vol. 3, *1653–1655* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1903), 123.

[22] Jacob N. Bowman, *The Protestant Interest in Cromwell's Foreign Relations* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1900), 20–21.

[23] *Ireland under the Commonwealth*, vol. 2, nos. 324, 329, 351, 360, 375, 417, 424, 427, 428, passim.

[24] Ibid., p. 328n.

[25] Ibid., no. 779, pp. 562–63; *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy*, 38 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1864–1947, repr. Nendeln/Lichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1970), vol. 30, no. 171, p. 125. On Charles Stuart's political plans relative to Cromwell's war with Spain, see Pieter Geyl, *Orange and Stuart, 1641–1672*, trans. Arnold Pomerans (New York: Scribner, 1969), 126.

The period leading up to the spring of 1655 (when the idea of settling Irish colonists in the Ukrainian lands began appearing in Polish documents) remained one of complicated relations between England, Spain, and mercenary regiments from Ireland. There were frequent negotiations between Philip IV and Cromwell about the dispatch of Irish forces, and one such agreement involving the transfer of ten thousand troops to the Continent was concluded at the end of 1653.[26] In March 1654 the French envoys in London, Baron Paul de Baas and Antoine de Bordeaux, reported to Mazarin and other officials in France about two English regiments and three thousand Irish troops preparing to set out from England.[27] Cromwell sent written instructions to his commissioners in Ireland to dispatch these three thousand "native Irish" to Flanders.[28] Louis II de Bourbon, the prince de Condé and a leader of the Fronde (1648–53), who had been obliged to seek refuge at the court of Philip IV, represented Spain's interests in negotiations with England concerning Irish troops.[29] There are further reports from the summer of 1654 about the dispatch of several Irish regiments to the port of Saint-Sébastien near Dunkirk: Philip IV held back payment to the English merchants who transported these troops to Flanders.[30] In return for Cromwell's assistance, Spain probably undertook certain obligations with regard to English interests in Dunkirk. Since Mazarin had offered Dunkirk to Cromwell in 1654 in exchange for the conclusion of an Anglo-French alliance, this question was of vital importance to Philip IV.[31]

Thus by the end of 1654, well before Wielopolski's letter of March 1655, large numbers of Irish troops had been brought to the Continent and were at the disposal of allies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. During this same period, however (late 1654–early 1655), Cromwell was slowly changing his policy toward Spain and France. In December 1654 he sent a strong fleet under the command of General-at-Sea William Penn to take over the Spanish colonies of Jamaica and Hispaniola.[32] In the spring of 1655 the Spanish ambassador in London, Don

[26] Wilbur Cortez Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, vol. 3, *1653–1655* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), 394.

[27] Ibid., 3: 219; Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth,* 3: 122;.

[28] Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell,* 3: 219.

[29] Ibid.; Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth*, 3: 122–23.

[30] Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell,* 3: 280, 391, 393.

[31] On Cromwell's interest in Dunkirk and its seizure in 1658, see Clyde L. Grose, "England and Dunkirk," *American Historical Review* 39, no. 1 (1933): 9; and Gerald Malcolm David Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (London: A. & C. Black, 1974), 84, 91.

[32] Cromwell's instructions to Penn are dated 4 December 1654. See Abbott, *The Writings*

Alonso de Cárdenas, was unable to conclude an alliance with England and was finally obliged to leave the country in late October.[33] Under such circumstances, Philip IV hoped to find a new ally in Flanders, and his expectations naturally turned toward Charles Stuart. On 12 April 1656 Philip concluded an agreement with the exiled prince, and Charles was given a command in Dunkirk and Ostend.[34] Under the terms of this agreement, Spain provided four thousand foot soldiers and two thousand cavalrymen to the Royalists for an invasion of England.[35]

Meanwhile England and France made progress toward the conclusion of a mutual defensive and offensive alliance against Spain. It was signed in London on 24 October 1655 O.S. and ratified by Mazarin at the end of the following month.[36] At the same time, Cromwell declared war on Spain.

The circumstances under which the Lord Protector began his war with Spain, as well as the motives involved, first attracted attention in Enlightenment-era historiography and continue to provoke debate among historians even now.[37] Cromwell's shift from a Spanish to a French orientation in the mid-1650s naturally had an impact on the Irish regiments in

and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, 3: 530–32; Frank Strong, "The Causes of Cromwell's West Indian Expedition," *American Historical Review* 4, no. 2 (January 1899): 229–30; and my "Polityka Anhlii i antyosmanska diialnist Danyla Kalugera u 1655 rotsi," *Ukrainskyi arkheohrafichnyi shchorichnyk*, new series (Kyiv and New York), no. 7 (2002): 232–42.

[33] *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court, 1655–1656*, no. XVII, p. 176 (Bonde's report to Charles X, 19 October 1655 O.S.); *Calendar of State Papers (Venice)*, vol. 30, nos. 176, 177, pp. 128–30 (Sagredo's reports to the Doge and Senate, 29 October 1655 N.S.). See also Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers*, vol. 4, *Sept. 1655–May 1656*, 100.

[34] Charles Harding Firth, "Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657–1662," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, new series, 17 (1903): 68; idem, *The Years of the Protectorate 1656–1658*, vol. 1, *1656–1657* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, 1909), 24.

[35] *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court, 1655–1656*, no. XLVII, note 1 (Bonde's register, London, 2 May 1656); James Rees Jones, *Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Edward Arnold, 1966), 35.

[36] Bulstrode Whitelock, *Memorials of the English Affairs: Or, an Historical Account of What Passed from the beginning of the Reign of King Charles the First, to King Charles the Second His Happy Restauration* (London, 1682), 631, 632. See also Sergei Arkhangelskii, "Vneshniaia politika Olivera Kromvelia," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, 1943, nos. 5–6: 50; idem, "Anglo-frantsuzskaia voina s Ispaniei 1655–1659 gody," *Voprosy istorii,* 1947, no. 2: 46–66; Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, 82–94.

[37] David Hume, *The History of Great Britain, containing the Commonwealth, and the Reigns of Charles II and James II*, vol. 2 (London, 1757), 65; Robert A. Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain: A Study of the Spanish System, 1580–1720* (London and Boston; Allen and Unwin, 1981), 136.

the service of Philip IV. The English authorities were at a loss as to how to deal with such a large number of Irishmen who were now prepared to attack them with arms in hand.[38]

The prospect of an invasion of England by foreign powers in league with the Royalists or Irish rebels remained a constant threat during the years of warfare between England and Spain. For example, information to that effect was circulating in the English Council of State in September 1656, and Irish conspirators corresponded with the Royalists to obtain their support for such plans.[39] In letters to his son Henry, Oliver Cromwell often warned of the danger of invasion as a result of conspiratorial dealings between Spain, Charles Stuart, and the Irish.

Mention has already been made of the surreptitious return of Irishmen to their homeland in late 1655. Cromwell later deported many of them, along with Scots, to the West Indies.[40] But large numbers of Irish soldiers returned home after the Treaty of the Pyrenees (7 November 1659), and in view of this the Council of State enjoined the Dublin administration to strengthen its defenses on land and sea.[41] Other Irish soldiers continued to serve in Spain, Flanders, France, Portugal, Italy, and elsewhere on the Continent.[42]

* * *

As the preceding discussion has shown, mid-seventeenth-century Ireland produced a phenomenon unique in Europe—a formidable military force without a state or a refuge in its own homeland. That army was engaged in constant warfare for the interests of foreign European powers. Thus the state of international relations on the Continent in the mid-1650s is a useful background for understanding how some of these Irish soldiers became involved in a plan to colonize Ukrainian territories and dispatched an embassy to the Polish court in the spring of 1655.

The individual who had a license from the Lord Protector to recruit Irish units for the service of the king of Poland in early 1655 was Donagh MacCarthy, Viscount Muskerry. A prominent Irish nobleman, he had

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[38] Moran, *Historical Sketch of the Persecutions,* 255.

[39] *Ireland under the Commonwealth,* vol. 2, no. 872, pp. 620–21.

[40] Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell,* vol. 4, *1655–1658* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), 156 (Cromwell to General George Monck, May 1656).

[41] *Ireland under the Commonwealth,* vol. 2, nos. 1020, 1045, pp. 704, 709.

[42] Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain,* 125; Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659,* 226; Roger Lockyer, *Habsburg and Bourbon Europe, 1470–1720,* 8th ed. (New York: Longman, 1987), 419–20; Moran, *Historical Sketch of the Persecutions,* 55.

been a leader of the Irish Royalist party at the time of Cromwell's conquest of Ireland. In June 1651 he commanded Confederate troops in one of the last battles of the Irish Confederate Wars, waged in the course of the English offensive and siege of Limerick.[43] After the English victory in that battle and the fall of Limerick in November 1651, Lord Muskerry continued to resist the English forces as commander in chief of the Royal army in Munster. But once the last large Irish town, Galway, surrendered to the English in May 1652, Muskerry accepted the articles of capitulation in Munster on 22 June O.S. After the surrender, most of the Irish colonels were permitted to recruit Irish soldiers for service abroad.[44] Thus, according to article 4 of the agreement with Muskerry, he was given "liberty to transport 5,000 men to serve any foreign state in amity with the Commonwealth of England (and shall have liberty to treat with any agent or agents for that end and purpose)."

After concluding the act of capitulation, Lord Muskerry, as he said himself in July 1652, was to go to Spain with a thousand Irishmen.[45] In February 1653 he returned to Ireland in order to recruit military units according to the terms of his surrender, but a charge of murder was brought against him. The High Court of Justice acquitted Muskerry in the following year, and he applied once again to Cromwell for permission to recruit Irish soldiers.[46] At the same time, he sought agents in London "for transportation of such Irish into Flanders or other place pursuant to that agreement." On 25 October 1654 O.S., Charles Fleetwood and the Council of Ireland wrote to Cromwell with a request to approve Muskerry's recruitment, as the departure of such a large number of soldiers from Ireland would do much to help establish peace in that country.[47] In late December 1654 or early 1655 Cromwell granted such a license to Muskerry.[48] The question now was in what part of Europe he would serve with his Irish regiments. Rumors of negotiations between England and King John Casimir of Poland turned his thoughts toward Warsaw.

In November 1654 instructions for the Polish envoy to England, Nicholas de Bye, were formulated at a Diet in Hrodna. John Casimir's

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[43] James Scott Wheeler, *Cromwell in Ireland* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 207–11.

[44] Ibid., 223. These articles were published in *Ireland under the Commonwealth*, 1: 224–27n.

[45] *Ireland under the Commonwealth,* 1, no. 219: 235.

[46] Ibid., vol. 2, no. 520, p. 436.

[47] Ibid., no. 544, pp. 452–53.

[48] "Some weekes since," as John Roche wrote to Thurloe on 4 February 1655 O.S. (Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers*, 4: 500–501).

letter to Cromwell was dated 30 November 1654.[49] The principal aim of De Bye's mission was to convince Cromwell to invade Muscovy by sending a large fleet to Arkhangelsk and to create a league for the defense of the Baltic.

In Paris, Lord Muskerry made an agreement with John Casimir's envoy regarding his service with five thousand Irishmen in the Crown army. The Polish envoy "sent an express to give the king and courte notice thereof, from whom a returne is dailly expected," as Muskerry's servant, John Roche, wrote to Secretary of State John Thurloe on 4 February 1655 O.S.[50] Another record, dated 12 February 1655 O.S., was published in the notes to John Patrick Prendergast's well-known work, *The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland*, compiled from the books of the Lord Deputy and Council in Ireland, which were preserved in the Record Tower in Dublin Castle. "On reading the within petition of John Gould, in behalf of the Lord Muskerry, who has license to transport 5,000 men out of Ireland to the service of any prince in amity with the Commonwealth, praying that while his lord is now in treaty with the Polish ambassador [in Paris] for those men ... they may not be transplanted [to Connaught (?)]: It is ordered, etc.... Dublin, 12 February, 1655."[51]

These, of course, were the facts that found their exact reflection in Wielopolski's above-cited letter of 4 March 1655 from Warsaw. But the mere reception of the Polish envoy in London by no means amounted to recognition of the king of Poland as a "prince in amity with the Commonwealth." The Venetian and Swedish ambassadors in London wrote of numerous complaints by English merchants against John Casimir with regard to the arrest of some of their number in Danzig, interference with

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[49] Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers*, 2: 731. Concerning the observations of English agents on Cromwell's titles in this letter, see ibid., vol. 3, *Dec. 1654–Sept. 1655* (London, 1742), 50, 51.

[50] Thurloe, A Collection of State Papers, 4: 500–501.

[51] Prendergast, *The Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland*, 78, n. 2. Prendergast discovered these books, titled "The Commissioners of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England for the Affairs of Ireland," in Dublin, and Robert Dunlop later published excerpts from most of them in his documentary collection about Ireland under Cromwell's rule. The document of 12 February 1655 was not included in Dunlop's excerpts (see documents for February 1655 in *Ireland under the Commonwealth*, vol. 2, nos. 604–12, pp. 480–83, and indexes). See also reviews of Dunlop's *Ireland under the Commonwealth*, with references to Prendergast's previous work, by Wilbur Cortez Abbott (*American Historical Review* 19, no. 3 [1914]: 611), W. E. Lunt (*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54 [1914]: 333), and Goddard H. Orpen (*The English Historical Review* 29, no. 13 [1914]: 165).

trade, and so on. Finally, in June 1655 the Polish envoy was obliged to leave London without an answer from the Protector about his mission.[52]

Nevertheless, as Andrzej Jasowski's letter shows, the efforts of the Irish colonels were continued in their embassy to Warsaw. The papers of Edward Nicholas, secretary of state at Charles Stuart's court, contain a letter from Paris dated 16 April 1655 that mentions "the Lord Musgray [Muskerry] and old Mr. Bealing [Richard Bellings (?)]" as envoys to Poland.[53]

On 19 June 1655, the day before the Diet session ended in Warsaw, the question of Irish settlement was debated in the Senate. The documents of the Diet—an official record that may be considered reliable—mention a thousand Irishmen who had requested permission (along with their families) to serve the king of Poland. The senators refused them permission to settle in the Commonwealth.[54] Although the number of Irish soldiers mentioned in the official record is much lower than in Jasowski's letter, both sources are concordant on the substance of the Senate debate. The reason for the refusal of the Irish request, as presented in Jasowski's letter, was quite logical: it was difficult to predict whether such a large military force might not establish its own relations with the Cossacks and conduct a policy at variance with that of the Kingdom of Poland. Thus, in June 1655 the Polish authorities closed the question of Irish settlement in the Ukrainian lands.

In November 1655 Lord Muskerry, along with the English royal court in exile, was deported from France.[55] In November of the following year, he is mentioned in the service of Charles Stuart in Flanders with Irish regiments that he had assembled mainly in France.[56]

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[52] *Calendar of State Papers* (Venice), vol. 30, no. 60, p. 46; *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's Court,* 1655–1656, 57–60, 75, passim.

[53] *The Nicholas Papers: Correspondence of Sir Edward Nicholas, Secretary of State*, ed. George F. Warner, 4 vols. (London: Printed for the Camden Society, 1886–1920, repr. New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1965), vol. 2, *Jan. 1653–June 1655*, 256. With reference to the two envoys, the editor comments: "An unrecognizable title, unless Muskerry is meant. 'Old Mr. Bealing' is probably Richard Bellings, historian of the war in Ireland in 1641–1643." For a note on Bellings's diplomatic missions to various European states, see Alfred Webba, *A Compendium of Irish Biography: Comprising Sketches of Distinguished Irishmen, and of Eminent Persons Connected with Ireland by Office or by Their Writings* (Dublin: M. H. Gill and Son, 1878, repr. New York: Lemma Publishing Corp., 1970), 15–16.

[54] Stefania Ochmann-Staniszewska and Zdzisław Staniszewski, *Sejm Rzeczypospolitej za panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy*, 1: 237, 247.

[55] Abbott, The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, 3: 938.

[56] Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers*, vol. 5, *1656*, 588; Firth, "Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657–1662," 70.

The available documents thus reveal a hitherto neglected aspect of relations between the Polish court, England, and Ireland during the Protectorate.[57] They also provide evidence of an unusual initiative on the part of the Polish authorities to mitigate the problem of Cossack revolts by populating the free settlements between the lands of the Polish Crown and Cossack Ukraine. Although the project of Irish colonization did not gain the support of the Diet and was never carried out, it attests to a rare point of contact between Irish and Ukrainian history during the early modern period.

Translated by Myroslav Yurkevich

Appendix

1

4 March 1655. Extract from a letter from the castellan of Wojnicz, Jan Wielopolski, to King John Casimir, with reflections on Irish settlement of the Cossack lands

Copia listu i. m. p. woynickiego do krola j. m-ci na Conuokatyą.
[...] Nie widze expeditionem modum, iako kilka tysięcy Irlandczykow, ktorzy, iakom słyszał, że powiadano, ofiarowali się na słuzbę w. k. m-ci, panu m. mciwemu, iako nayprędzy zaciągnąć. Upatruię ia w tym siła commoda: ludzie iusz gotowi, przes stanowisk, przes niczczenia panstw w. k. m-ci, dawszy im zacnego iakiego y biegłego in tractandis externorum animis commissarza, prosto nie bawiąc się pod regiment ich mciow p. p. hetmanow przyidą. A nie tylko in bello usu illorum bydz mozna, ale znaiąc ich za ludzi woiennych, hoc locorum asperitas hominum quoque ingenia durat, na mieysce Kozakow w tamtych kraiach osadzic moze w. k. m., p. n. młciwy, przes co munimentum i zasłona od tamtey strony Oyczyznie się uczyni, y onym to oraz loco mercedis erit, z ktorych przednieysi mogliby się y ad praerogatiuis nobilitates przypuscic..., co by wielki, iako y sama nationum diuersitas, obicem wszelakim napotym rebelliom uczyniło. [...]

Source: Main Archives of Older Records in Warsaw, Public Archive of the Potockis, bk. 45, vol. 1: (Jan Wielopolski, biecki, bohenski starosta m. p. W Wielicz[c]e d[ie] 5 augusti 1655), fols. 16–16^v. Copy.

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[57] There is no mention of the Irish regiments or their embassy to King John Casimir in articles specifically devoted to Anglo-Polish relations during the Protectorate, such as Józef Jasnowski, "England and Poland in the XVIth and XVIIth Centuries (Political Relations)," *Polish Science and Learning* (London, New York, and Toronto), no. 7 (1948): 50–54 (section on "England and Poland during the Cromwellian Revolution"), and Rajnold Przezdziecki, *Diplomatic Ventures and Adventures: Some Experiences of British Envoys at the Court of Poland* (London: Polish Research Centre, 1953), 95–103.

2

26 June 1655. Extract from Marcin Goliński's record of a letter from Andrzej Jasowski, a councillor of the town of Kazimierz near Cracow, about the mission of an Irish captain to King John Casimir on behalf of forty thousand Irish soldiers wishing to enter the Polish service

1655. Z Warsawy od p. Iasowskiego, raice kazimierzskiego, data 26 iuny do nas do Kazimierza. [...]

Parlament angielsky, ktorzi zabieli swego krolia, dawszi go scziąc, y na sina iego nastąpieli. Przi ktorim kroliewiczu oponowała sie Scocia albo Socka ziemya, takze Hibernia albo Isliandowie, ktorzi są katoliczy. Angielcikowie, ze są wictoramy woyni, wipędzaią ych z ich własnich ziem, ktorzy niebozęta ustąpicz muszą y zonami, y z dzyecmi, ktorych iest na dwakroc sto tyszięczy. Między ktoremi iest 40000 do boiu, ktorich oberster albo kapitan stamtąd przyiehał do krolia i.m. y do Rzeczy Pospolitey, prosącz y suplikuiącz, aby ych Rzecz Posp[olita] raczyła yh przyiącz y aby im dano stukę ziemie, kędibi sie mogli kolokowacz y osadzacz. A te 40 tiszięczy ofiaruią sie zarazęm yscz przeciwko nieprzyiacieliowy, kędy im krol i.m. roskaze, nie hczacz zadni zapłaty, telko o to proszą, aby sie mogli ostacz przi tich miastach, ktorych dostaną od nieprzyiacielia y tey ziemie. Nie hciely na to panowie y sliachta pozwolic, obawiaiąc sie tego, zebi nie bely tak, iako przed tym y krzyzaczy w Prusieh, zmocniwsy sie, nie bely sylny Polakom.

Source: Lviv National Scientific Library of Ukraine, Ossoliński Collection, MS 189/II (Marcin Goliński's compendium), fols. 759–60. Copy.

3

1657(?) — Extract from an anonymous Polish tract arguing the benefits to the Kingdom of Poland of colonizing Ukraine with Irish and Welsh settlers

[...] A nawet mogłaby Rzeczpospolita cudzoziemcami słobody — mianowicie na Ukrainie — osadzić, zaciągając coraz nowych regimentarzów, a te im poseszje dawając, jako się już z tym ofiarowali Irlandczycy, dobrzy żołnierze i katolicy. Walonów także natio populosissima, a przy tym catholica prędko by się tu dała zwabić, bo ich także jako i Irlandów paupertas domi premit. Tak by tedy miała Rzeczpospolita i większą z ludzi obronę, i dostateczniejszą intratę według owego: "ubi populus, ibi obolus." [...]

Source: *Pisma polityczne z czasów panowania Jana Kazimierza Wazy (1648–1668): Publicystyka — Eksorbitancje — Projekty — Memoriały*, vol. 1, *1648–1660*, ed. Stefania Ochmann-Staniszewska (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1989), no. 42, p. 202.

Wilno

- SS. Peter and Paul
- Antokol Suburb
- Upper Castle
- Lower Castle
- Szerejkiszki
- River Wilia
- Mosque
- St. George
- Łukiszki Suburb
- Cathedral
- Castle Gate
- Castle St.
- St. Mary Magdalene Gate
- St. Mary Magdalene
- Skop St.
- Holy Cross (Bonifrates)
- Bishop St.
- St. John
- St. Michael the Archangel
- St. Anne
- SS. Francis and Bernard (Bernardines)
- Bernardine St.
- Lutheran Cemetery & Hospital
- Tatar Gate
- Calvinists (Until 1640)
- Bernardine (Bernardine nuns)
- Bernardine Gate
- Willa Gate
- Willa St.
- St. Ignatius
- St. Catherine (Benedictine Nuns)
- Holy Trinity
- St. John St.
- St. John the Baptist (U)
- Most Pure (U)
- Saviour St.
- St. Peter (U)
- Calvinists (After 1640)
- Holy Spirit (Dominicans)
- Dominican St.
- Phillip St.
- Jopp St.
- Fish Market
- Saviour (U)
- Saviour Gate
- Transfluvial Suburb
- Polock St.
- Calvinist Cemetery
- Troki Gate
- Troki St.
- Synagogue
- German St.
- Jewish St.
- Glaz St.
- Resurrection (U)
- St. Puraseeve (U)
- St. Nicholas (U)
- Saviour/Naleska St.
- Troki Rd.
- Lutherans
- BVM (Franciscans)
- St. Nicholas St.
- St. Nicholas
- Most Shop St.
- Market Square
- Saviez St.
- River Wilenka
- Imbary
- St. Casimir (Jesuit Professors)
- Town Hall
- Subocz Suburb
- Rudniki St.
- St. Joseph (Discalced Carmelite Nuns)
- Horse St.
- Holy Trinity (U) (Basilians)
- Subocz St.
- Subocz Gate
- Rudniki Gate
- Rudniki Rd.
- Horse Market
- Little Market
- Sharp St.
- Holy Spirit (O)
- St. Teresa (Discalced Carmelites)
- Rossa Suburb
- All Saints (Calced Carmelites)
- Sharp Gate
- SS. Joseph and Nicodemus
- St. Stephen
- Medeki Rd.
- St. George (U)

U = Uniate
O = Orthodox

"Ruski człowiek": Muscovites and Ruthenian Identity in Occupied Wilno, 1655–1661

David Frick

Usage in the various languages of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the seventeenth century drew strict distinctions between "Ruthenian" ("*ruski*" and "*Rusin*" in Polish) and "Muscovite" ("*moskiewski*" and "*Moskal,*" or "*Moskwicin*"). In the local context, "Ruthenian" was a term of controversy. In the language of "high culture," represented here by polemical literature, an exclusionary question played a central role: was the term to be applied to the Orthodox or to the Uniates? An either-or choice had to be made: which group was the rightful heir to the Ruthenian religious and political patrimony, and thus to the privileges, offices, and property accorded to Ruthenians in the sacred and secular arenas of the Commonwealth?

The daily usage of living Ruthenians, however—at least in Wilno (Vilnius), the context of these observations—was much fuzzier. The two confessions could be seen as markers of one common identity. Indeed, mixed marriages (Uniate-Orthodox) were frequent enough, and larger human networks—formed through testamentary donations, choice of executors and witnesses of wills, and selection of guardians for widows and orphans, among others—suggest a local sense of Ruthenian identity that, for some (though not all), included both Uniate and Orthodox. And, more importantly, it often stood in opposition to Roman Catholics. But as far as the Muscovite was concerned, all were in agreement: he was "other," definitely not of "us." Never did a seventeenth-century Ruthenian (or Pole) refer to people or things Muscovite as "*ruski.*"

Or so I used to think. The following comments examine four passages from the *acta* of the burgomasters and councilors in which the adjective "*ruski*"—in Wilno usage of a strictly delimited time and context—quite clearly meant "Muscovite." All these texts stem from the period of the Muscovite occupation of the city, which lasted from August 1655 to December 1661.

Wilno under Muscovite Occupation

Muscovite armies conquered Wilno on 8 August 1655. The next day, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich made his triumphal entry and turned the city over to pillage for his troops. Wilno was thoroughly sacked, and many of the citizens who had not yet fled were killed or taken prisoner to Muscovy. An occupying force remained ensconced in the Wilno castles for six and a half years, with some interruptions.[1]

Vilnans of all five confessions—and this included the Orthodox—fled the city if they could, many of them seeking asylum in Königsberg, the capital of nearby Ducal Prussia. Beginning on 16 February 1656 O.S., they came to the elector's palace in groups defined by estates and "nations"—nobles, clergy, magistrates, and burghers separately; a further division was made among the burghers between "Germans" and "Poles." There they affixed their signatures and seals to identical oaths drawn up in Latin, German, and Polish. With these documents they swore loyalty to the Elector of Brandenburg, Duke Frederick William, and neutrality toward the King of Sweden, Charles X Gustav, who was then at war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. A peace treaty between Sweden and Ducal Prussia of 7 January 1656 O.S. had placed this obligation upon asylum seekers from Poland-Lithuania, granting them five weeks within which to take the oath. The signatories to the oath were also to be granted "free withdrawal to their homeland and to their lords."[2]

The city suffered major physical damage in the Muscovite siege and subsequent plundering and fires. Its population was decimated through flight, the fatalities of war, or capture and exile to Muscovy.[3] Still, the city was not empty when the dust settled, and many of those who had signed the loyalty oath in Königsberg in the winter and spring of 1656

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[1] On Wilno during the Muscovite occupation, see Meilus 2000, Meilus 2001, Meilus 2004, Meilus 2005, Meilus 2006, Rachuba 1994, Storozhev 1895.

[2] Moerner 1867, 199–200. The oath is at the center of a recent study by Hienadz Sahanowicz (Henadz Sahanovich, 2003).

[3] Some claim that the pillaging went on for seventeen days (see Rachuba 1994, 65; Meilus 2000, 94; Meilus 2001, 278–79), but a German-language eyewitness account strongly suggests that the tsar limited the rewards for his troops to the more canonical three days (see BCz IV ms. 148, 459–70). On the laws of pillage in war, see Redlich 1956, Howard 1994, Lynn 1993. We find three days of pillage at the end of many battles over cities. Cf. the account of the fall of Constantinople in Runciman 1965, 145–50. Of twenty-three Catholic and nine Uniate churches, only four still stood; all the palaces were destroyed. Many questions remain concerning the demography of seventeenth-century Wilno. Estimates range between populations of 14,000 and 40,000 on the eve of the war. All who have taken part in the debate accept the notion—without much evidence to work with—that the Muscovite occupation cut the figure (whichever one is correct) in half. See Łowmiańska 2005, 217–24; Łowmiańska 1929, 71–78; Tamulynas 1987.

soon began to return to Wilno, laying claim to their properties, re-establishing commerce, and beginning the process of rebuilding. By the summer of 1656 a "temporary" magistracy was functioning and keeping records of its proceedings. The language of several documents, especially the later ones, reveals the hope and expectation of a return to Polish-Lithuanian rule, but the rhetoric also shows an urban society attempting to function by its own long-established procedures—including the central principle of "Greek-Roman" parity in distribution of offices—even if the man holding the office of palatine of Wilno at the time was named "Michaił Siemienowicz Szachowski."

We have two extant volumes containing the *acta* of the Wilno magistracy from the period of Muscovite occupation. The first, relatively well known to the scholarly community, is in the Lithuanian State Historical Archive in Vilnius under the number LVIA SA 5099. It is thus a part of that archive's chronologically organized, though fragmentary, collection. The volume in question contains documents from 1655 to 1663, mostly from the period of occupation, although there are a few documents from before and after that period. The second volume bears a title page that was added later identifying it as a *Register of the* Acta *of the Wilno Burgomasters and Councilors for Six Years, Namely 1657, 1658, 1659, 1660, 1661, 1662, Collected and Bound in One Volume*. It is to be found in the Russian State Historical Archive in Moscow, where it bears the number RGADA 1603.12.14. This volume has been used by few scholars, and it will certainly change our picture of life in the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the period of Muscovite rule.[4]

In order to understand the meaning of the term "*ruski człowiek*" as it was used in the four examples I have found, it will be necessary to place each document in the context of multi-confessional Wilno during the Muscovite occupation. The landscape was unusually diverse: Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists (the "Romans"), Orthodox and Uniates (the "Greeks") had full citizenship rights. The principle of Greek-Roman parity in the magistracy was adopted in 1536, when it referred to the two confessions then on the scene in Wilno—Roman Catholics and Orthodox—but already embraced several ethnicities. By the time of the Union of Brest in 1596, all five confessions competed for Greek or Roman seats, Orthodox and Uniates for the former, Roman Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans for the latter. This situation lasted until 1666,

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[4] Some isolated documents are also to be found in LVIA SA 5097 and LVIA SA 5098. See also Meilus 2005 for a guide to extant sources on wartime Wilno in Moscow's Russian State Library (Manuscript Department, F. 178.4.6916) and St. Petersburg's Russian National Library (Manuscript Department, F.550, B.F. II.85).

when, by royal decree, and certainly in part in reaction to the wars of the mid-century, Roman seats were limited to Roman Catholics, and Greek seats, to Uniates. The other three confessions continued to hold other important offices in secular corporations, beginning with the influential merchants' guild, the *Communitas mercatoria*, which was positioned just below the magistracy.[5]

"Ruski człowiek" x 4

1. Swowoleństwu ruskich ludzi zabiegać będzie

The recipient of the first document, as well as the central figure in the story it tells, was a certain Józef Kojrelewicz, "merchant and burgher of Wilno." He was, in all likelihood, Roman Catholic. In 1639 he entered his autograph inscription in the book of the Brotherhood of St. Anne "the One of Three" at the Bernardines' Church of St. Anne, where he made a promise of annual contributions to the "brotherhood chest."[6] He had some further Catholic connections, among other things through his wife, who was the sister of Marta Janowiczówna, the wife of a Roman Catholic bencher (eventually councilor) by the name of Marcin Kiewlicz. On 21 July 1634 Kojrelewicz was named executor (together with brother-in-law Kiewlicz) of Marta's will; that document instructed them to see to her burial with the Bernardines at Wilno's St. Anne's Church, "in the crypt where my parents also rest."[7] The Kiewliczes were a Roman Catholic family of some importance in the Wilno magistracy before the Muscovite occupation; the name is absent from the postwar record.[8]

Although not a member of the ruling elite, Kojrelewicz seems to have enjoyed a certain amount of respect in Wilno society and to have moved in circles that included non-Catholics as well. On 3 December 1646 he

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[5] For an overview, see Frick 2003, 23–29 and the literature cited there. On the establishment of Greek-Roman parity in the Wilno magistracy after 1536, see Kowalenko 1925–26, 369; and Schramm 1969, 202–204. For the royal decree of 1536 establishing that principle, see *Zbiór* 1843, 53; and Dubiński 1788, 54. For the decree of 1666 limiting seats to Catholics and Uniates, see LVIA SA 5104, 304v–310r, printed in *AVAK*, 299–310. On the *Communitas mercatoria*, see Łowmiańska 2003.

[6] LVIA 1135.4.472, 56r.

[7] LVIA SA 5333, 172r–173v.

[8] Andrzej and Marcin Kiewlicz were members on the Roman side of the first (1602) sexagintavirate of the *Communitas mercatoria*. See Kowalenko 1925–26, 136. Four members of the family went on to hold the offices of town councilor (BUJ, B Slav., 41v and 17v; LVIA SA 5333, 252r-v); burgomaster (LVIA SA 5096, 301r–302r; LVIA SA 5324, 14r); and *lentwójt* (also *landwójt* or *podwójci*), a plenipotentiary of the *wójt*, from the German *Vogt*, who was the king's representative to the municipal government (LVIA SA 5096, 301r–302r).

was named curator (*kurator*, i.e., a legal plenipotentiary for women or clergy, who could not represent themselves before the law) for a certain Maryna Dyszkowska. She was a Szóstakówna, the wife of Teodor (Fiedor) Dyszkowski, and the sister-in-law of Stefan Dyszkowski, who was a "Greek notary" (*pisarz radziecki z greckiej strony*) in the magistracy.[9] The Szóstaks were important members of Ruthenian society in Wilno.[10] Finally, on 12 May 1651, together with the future Roman Catholic burgomaster Mikołaj Rychter, Kojrelewicz witnessed the deed of sale of a house before the court of the Wilno Roman Catholic Chapter.[11] In any event, this was a man of some modest standing in prewar Wilno society, with contacts on both sides of the Greek-Roman divide.

More important for our story, "Józef Kojrelewicz, Burgher of Wilno, together with his wife," headed a list of signatories of a Polish version of the loyalty oath, which he signed in the elector's palace in Königsberg on 23 February 1656 O.S.[12] This particular list of signatories included many Ruthenian Vilnans, which adds to the impression that Kojrelewicz was on good terms with the Ruthenian side of the city.[13] By 20 April 1657 we find him back in Wilno. On that day, the "famous Lord Józef Kojrelewicz, merchant and burgher of Wilno," was "chosen according to the order of Magdeburg Law ... and confirmed by the magistracy" as the legal curator for Walenty Margoński, who was prior of the Calced Carmelites at Wilno's All Saints Church.[14]

Plague would soon be added to the trials of war, and a document of 30 May 1657 contained "Instructions given to the famous Lord Józef Kojrelewicz, *wójt* and burgomaster during the time of the pestilential air of the plague that is afflicting the city of Wilno, who was chosen by the entire magistracy and the commonality of Wilno, as well as to the five colleagues he should choose for himself."[15] The volume of *acta* found in RGADA shows a gap from 11 June 1657 to 19 January 1658, which suggests that those who could left town in an effort to survive the plague. At first, the Muscovite palatine of Wilno, Mikhail Shakhovskoi, attempted

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[9] LVIA SA 5108, 530r.

[10] See below, pp. 146–49.

[11] LMAB F43–220, 918–22.

[12] GStA PK HA EM 111k., Nr. 104, 141r–142v.

[13] Among those on this list whom I can place in Ruthenian circles are Grzegorz Dziahilewicz, Jan Sielawa, Mikołaj Minkiewicz, Prokop Fiedorowicz, Fiedor Stefanowicz, Dorotea Sieńczyłowa, and Roman Kołczanowicz. Most Ruthenians signed their names in Polish, although even in Königsberg a few used Cyrillic.

[14] RGADA 1603.12.14, 77.

[15] It is recorded at LVIA SA 5099, 132r-v, printed in *AVAK* 10, 273–74.

to keep Vilnans from leaving the city, but eventually, after receiving a petition from the "*wójt* ... burgomasters, councilors, benchers, notaries ... and all Wilno burghers," he was convinced to open the gates in exchange for a promise that the citizens would not take up arms against Muscovite forces and would return to the city once the plague had subsided.[16]

Another document suggests that Kojrelewicz perished, perhaps of the plague, while carrying out the duties entrusted to him. Whenever they were forced to leave the city, Vilnans sought means to protect their moveable property, either by entrusting such possessions to religious orders, in the hope that pillagers and thieves would respect the notion of sanctuary, or by hiding them, often buried in the ground in the basements of their houses. On 18 February 1658, shortly after the return of the citizens to Wilno, a certain Anna Prokopowiczówna, widow of Filip Wesełowski, came before the recently reconstituted temporary magistracy to enter a protestation "about the digging up of [her] things" and an inventory of "the things that had been buried in the house when she departed [Wilno], fleeing the [pestilential] air last year," some of which were "among the things of the deceased Józef Kojrelewicz, *wójt* in the time of the of plague (*wójt powietrzny*)."[17]

Plague always brought crime and disorder to cities, as citizens weighed risks to health in staying behind against risks to property left to destruction or theft at the hands of "*luźni ludzie*" (loose people). The chances for theft and destruction were even greater when, as in this instance, plague was coupled with war and occupation. The charge to Kojrelewicz and his five "colleagues" was to maintain order and protect property in these challenging circumstances. The document assumes that the occupying Muscovite forces would not provide that order and protection—perhaps some of the Muscovite elite also fled the city for these months; and, I will argue, the authors of the document—presumably members of the "temporary magistracy" who had just received Shakhovskoi's permission to quit the city— saw among individual Muscovites who had accompanied the occupying troops a potential source of crime.

The "Instructions" contained seven points. The first called for the formation of an infantry unit (*piechota*) of thirty men who, "making their

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[16] See Rachuba 1994, 68; Meilus 2000, 99. The palatine's report to the tsar, which includes the burghers' petition to him, is printed in Popov 1894, 575–76. There we learn that the plague had broken out on 1 May 1657 and that seventy people had died in Wilno and its suburbs by 14 May.

[17] RGADA 1603.12.14, 174–75. On the topic of "found wealth, hidden in the ground or some other place" (as chapter 9, article 30 of the Third Lithuanian Statute had it), see Meilus 2004.

daily rounds, day and night, were to guard houses, shops, and stores." The second gave Kojrelewicz and his "colleagues" the power to judge and punish offenders. Third, they were to make inventories of the property of citizens who had died of the plague and to keep that property under lock and key "until the happy return of the entire magistracy." Fourth, should any of the current "substitutes" now serving as acting magistrates "depart," those remaining "*in vivis* [among the living]" should immediately elect "a trusted, property-owning (*osiadły*), and unsuspect citizen" to take his place. Fifth, they were to make "frequent and daily surveys (*rewizje*)" of all the houses, basements, empty stores, and shops, "so that rogues (*hultaje*), nighttime thieves not hide there and have their gatherings and conspiracies unto people's harm." Sixth, only one gate, the Rudniki Gate, was to be the port of entry to the city; it was to be locked early, and Kojrelewicz was to keep the keys to all the other gates in his possession. Finally, seventh, since it was now spring, and fires had begun to break out in the city and suburbs, "the gentlemen substitutes (*panowie substytutowie*)" were to see to it that "the public [water] pipes remain open for the extinguishing of fires."

It is the first point—the one that established a unit of thirty men for the protection of property—that contains the passage of interest to me here:

> Admittedly, it would have been fitting to have a greater unit for such a large city, but since many people left town without making a contribution to this subscription, the current His Grace Lord Palatine promised to add twenty men from his regiment to this city unit, who will aid this guard and take precautions against the licentiousness of "Russian" people (*swowoleństwu ruskich ludzi zabiegać będzie*).

The passage is interesting for a number of reasons. The "Lord Palatine" in question was the Muscovite prince Mikhail Semenovich Shakhovskoi.[18] Once the Muscovite forces had taken possession of the sacked and depopulated city, the remaining authorities were just as interested in law and order as the magistracy that would soon establish itself. A document of 30 December 1656 (i.e., four months before the outbreak of plague), which bears Shakhovskoi's name and title, reveals just that: at the new palatine's behest, Wilno city authorities conducted an inventory of the property of one Samuel Kalander "in the house of the deceased Lord Marcin Buchner" and in the presence of Zachariasz Bez, Michał Buchner, and Dawid Paciukiewicz.[19] All were Lutherans, except for Paciukie-

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[18] The "legitimate" (from the point of view of the Polish-Lithuanian authorities) palatine of Wilno since no later than 26 February 1656 was Paweł Jan Sapieha (Rachuba 2004, 195), but he was in no position to lend that sort of help.

[19] LVIA SA 5099, 109r.

wicz, who was Roman Catholic, and all but the latter had fled to Königsberg in 1655.[20] Michał Buchner was Kalander's brother-in-law. He would also perish in the plague of 1657, but the extended family, perhaps then still in the Prussian capital, would eventually return to Wilno and figure as prominent Lutheran citizens until the end of the century. The Buchners were at the top of the middling tier of Lutheran society that had gathered in the Glass Street neighborhood.[21] One way or another—and perhaps thanks in part to Shakhovskoi—Buchner family property remained in the family.

Conversely, city authorities thought that life during the Muscovite occupation should and would continue largely according to the old rules. If the Polish-Lithuanian *Sejm* could elect the Muscovite tsar king of Poland, why couldn't the ruling burgher elite of Wilno submit its ancient charter, given to the city by Władysław Jagiełło in 1387 and repeatedly reconfirmed by his successors, for one more reconfirmation by Aleksei Mikhailovich?[22]

This state of affairs and frame of mind sometimes lends the extant record from the time of occupation a sense of schizophrenia for modern readers that was not perceived by those living through these events. The palatine may have been a Muscovite, but that in no way precluded bringing before the magistracy normal complaints and litigation that included Muscovites as their objects. On 7 April 1658, after the return of the temporary magistracy to the city, a distraught Matys Jodeszko, "burgher and maltster of Wilno," came before that body with a protestation against his wife, Anna, alleging that, "transgressing God's commandment in every way, godlessly and shamelessly, in broad daylight, having gone down into the basement with a retainer of the Lord Lieutenant, this identical spouse performed an indecent act (*uczynek nieprzystojny sprawowała*)." Jodeszko went on to complain that "as soon as the regiments of His Majesty the Tsar had come to Wilno, having abandoned the plaintiff and his children, holding intercourse with the lieutenant (*z porucznikiem ob-*

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[20] See the signatures of Kalender, Bez, and Buchner to the loyalty oaths at GStA PK XX HA EM 111k., Nr. 104, 89r, 85v, and 85v. Buchner and Bez appear among the financial supporters of the Lutheran church of Wilno (LVIA 1008.1.42, 41v; 12r, 42r, 57r, 117r). Paciukiewicz was an "elder of the Congregation of the Assumption at the Church of St. Kazimierz of the Society of Jesus" by October 1649 (LMAB F138–1712, 243).

[21] See RGADA 1603.12.14, 288–89 for a document that describes Michał Buchner as "having departed this world last year *sterilliter* [without issue] on account of the plague of the pestilential air." On the Buchners, see Frick 2007a.

[22] See Rachuba 1994, 68–69, for the eighteen points that the Wilno magistracy sent to the tsar for confirmation on 24 May 1658. For the text of a copy of the instructions, see Kraszewski 1841, 120–32.

cując), having appropriated 350 zł in ready money, she engages in drinking bouts day in and day out; she sings ribald songs (*frantowskie pieśni śpiewa*)."[23]

But—to return to the passage from the first "instruction" to Kojrelewicz—what is most curious here is the phrase "*ruskich ludzi*" ("Russian" people). The editors of the text printed in volume 10 of *AVAK* (pp. 273–74) seem to have been unable to believe their eyes. One would, in fact, have expected to see something like "*luźnych ludzi*" (loose people), i.e., non-citizens, those who owned no property in the city and had no fixed legal estate); it was they who were regularly blamed for unrest in times of plague and war. The editors of *AVAK*, unlike those responsible for other contemporary document series (e.g., the *Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*), rarely made "mistakes" of this sort in any of the languages they dealt with, and certainly not in Polish. They decided to print "*różnych ludzi*" (various people), which heads in the direction of *luźnych ludzi* but does not, in my opinion, fit the rhetorical expectations of the genre. In any case, the original text (it still bears the wax seal of the magistracy) quite clearly reads "*ruskich ludzi*."[24]

Three additional similar usages I have found in the volume of *acta* preserved in RGADA have confirmed my original suspicions about what I had long thought a curious *unicum*.

2. Subordynował i naprawił człowieka ruskiego

On 17 July 1658, after the plague had subsided and the magistracy had returned to Wilno, a certain Jan Poradnicz, husband of Regina Pękalska, came before that body to lodge a complaint about a saddler named Jędrzej Harasimowicz, who had a son named Jakub. I know nothing more about any of these people, although the name "Harasimowicz" might suggest that he was a Ruthenian. As was usual in protestations,[25] the accused and his minions had done verbal harm to the plaintiff's honor and physical harm to his "health." This time, as was frequently the case, there was a second act:

> And not being satisfied with this, after such a shaming [of the plaintiff], he "subordinated" [i.e., suborned] and incited a "Russian" man (*subordynował i naprawił człowieka ruskiego*), who, having come to the plaintiff's house, into his chamber, said: "The saddler gave me thirty

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[23] LVIA SA 5099, 184r–185r.

[24] Lithuanian editors of the text based their somewhat loose translation on the version printed in *AVAK*: "neleis *jokiems* žmonėms ["*any* people"] savavaliouti." See Baliulis 2001, 485–86. Only Kraszewski (1841, 118) got it right.

[25] On the rhetoric of the protestation, see Frick 2002.

kopecks to revile you and to beat you up, so you give me more if you don't wish to be beaten and reviled. And if you don't give it to me, you will certainly not avoid this—if not today, then in a while."[26]

For the moment, I would note only the exceptional use of Muscovite coinage in this account—the "thirty kopecks." Most Vilnans, even during the period of occupation, kept records in, and seem to have continued using as currency, the Polish *złoty* and *grosz* (1 zł = 30 Polish gr) or the Lithuanian *schock* and *grosz* (1 *kopa* = 60 Lithuanian gr).[27] Evidently the hired muscle wished to be paid in the currency of his homeland.

3. Naprawiwszy ruskich ludzi

The next text recorded the words of a certain Stefan Kuszelicz. The Kuszeła (Kuszyło, Kuszelicz) family were Orthodox merchants of some importance in seventeenth-century Wilno, although their participation in the ruling elite was minimal. Abraham Kuszeła had been a member of the first sexagintavirate of the *Communitas mercatoria* in 1602.[28] In the years 1636–39 he owned a house at the top of Horse Street's western side, near the bottom of the Town Hall Square.[29] Fiedor Kuszeła then owned a house on the other side of Horse Street farther down toward the city wall. Other documents suggest not only ties of neighborhood between Abraham and Fiedor, but also of family.[30] The Horse Street neighborhood brought together Ruthenians and some Lutherans, who had settled there not far from their church on German Street.

Fiedor's widow, Ewdokia Ihnatowiczówna, signed the loyalty oath in Königsberg on 17 February 1656 O.S. for herself and her son Michał, then apparently a minor.[31] Their names appear, as do those of many Ruthenians, on the *Cantio Polonorum Vilnensium*, the list of "Polish" burghers who signed the loyalty oath in Königsberg. (The categories of "German" and "Pole" seem to have been imposed by Prussian officials and were not necessarily self-identifications.)

The son who interests us here, Stefan, must have been older and on his own by this time. He signed the loyalty oath on the same day as the first exiles, 16 February 1656 O.S., but together with officeholders in the

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[26] RGADA 1603.12.14, 267.

[27] See RGADA 1603.12.14, 202–5, 442, among other passages. On the refusal of Vilnans to use Muscovite coinage, see Meilus 2006, 140.

[28] Kowalenko 1925–26, 136.

[29] BUJ, B Slav., F. 17, 32r, 37r.

[30] LVIA SA 5105, 561r-v; LVIA SA 5107, 73r-v. One document implies that they were, in fact, brothers. See RGADA 1603.12.14, 4614.

[31] GStA PK XX HA EM 111k., Nr. 104, 92v.

magistracy, both "Roman" and "Greek" on the same list.[32] (Their oath, as well as their signatures, were in Latin.) Stefan's recorded career in the magistracy would begin only in 1678, when he first held the office of annual councilor. His presence on this list suggests that he had already been elected bencher, the first rung on the ladder of a career in the ruling elite, before 1655.

Stefan was probably still Orthodox at this point, but he, too, would have to have converted to the Uniate Church after 1666 in order to contemplate a career in the magistracy. He held the office of annual councilor in 1678, 1682, 1685, 1688, and 1691, although he never rose to that of burgomaster.[33] Family, neighborhood, and personal networks place him firmly among Wilno Ruthenians—both Uniate and Orthodox. On 8 February 1663, Stefan would witness, in Wilno, the will of the Uniate councilor Samuel Filipowicz, whose name we also find among the "Poles of Wilno" in the loyalty oaths signed in Königsberg.[34] On 27 August 1664 Kuszelicz took on the duties of guardian for the orphans of the Ruthenian city councilor Jan Antonowicz,[35] and on 7 March 1687 he was named executor of the will of an Orthodox burghess named Katarzyna Wasilewska, who lived in the poorer suburbs around the Horse Market, located beyond the city walls and between the Sharp Gate and the Rudniki Gate. Among Stefan's duties in this last instance was to see to it that Wasilewska was buried at the Orthodox Church of the Holy Spirit, "in the Holy Catholic Orthodox Greek faith" into which she had been born.[36] Kuszelicz was an in-law of some sort of the Orthodox merchant Bazyli Dorofiewicz, who owned the house at the corner of Subocz Street and the Market Square. His many Dorofiewicz in-laws brought him into the thoroughly Ruthenian networks of Subocz Street; some of them had also sought asylum in Königsberg.[37]

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[32] GStA PK XX HA EM 111k., Nr. 104, 100v.

[33] LVIA SA 5324, 20v–22r.

[34] See Filipowicz's signature to the loyalty oath at GStA PK XX HA EM 111k., Nr. 104, 93v. His will was registered twice, at LVIA SA 5334, 58r–62r and LVIA SA 5099, 459r–462v. He had returned to Wilno in the spring of 1662 to find Ruthenian-speaking "witches" squatting in his house in the Ruthenian neighborhood of Subocz Street. The complaint about the witches is to be found at LVIA SA 5333, 287r–89r. Both documents have been printed: *AVAK* 9, 492–96; *AVAK* 10, 282–85; and *AVAK* 20, 360–61. Filipowicz, himself a Uniate, characterized the witches as Ruthenian by the way he reported their speech. On some sociolinguistic aspects of Filipowicz's complaint, see Frick 2005a.

[35] LVIA SA 5102, 551r. The order of names in the record of annual councilors and burgomasters for 1652 (LVIA SA 5324, 17v) suggests that Antonowicz (Antoniewicz) was "Greek," either Orthodox or Uniate.

[36] LVIA SA 5339, 510r-v.

[37] LVIA SA 5104, 377r–378r. BUJ, B Slav., F. 17, 93r. The in-laws among the asylum

Stefan's mother, Ewdokia Ihnatowiczówna Kuszelina, was quite certainly Orthodox, as was probably her husband, and we may suspect they raised their children in that confession. On 14 February 1667, Stefan and his brother Michał (the one who accompanied his mother in their Königsberg exile) brought Ewdokia's will for entry into the books of the Wilno magistracy.[38] In it she left the sum of 1,500 zł to the local Orthodox Church of the Holy Spirit "so that for all time a divine liturgy be celebrated for her soul." Stefan and Michał were accompanied on that occasion by the Orthodox merchant Krzysztof Sokołowski, described as a son-in-law of Kuszelina; since his wife was a certain Maryna Konstantynowiczówna, he must have married one of Ewdokia's daughters from a previous marriage.[39] He had signed the loyalty oath in Königsberg just ahead of his mother-in-law. Brother Michał's first wife, Eudoksja Kryłowiczówna, was also Orthodox: in 1673 he received a confirmation of her funeral and burial at the Church of the Holy Spirit.[40]

In any event, Stefan Kuszelicz was a Ruthenian. Probably he was Orthodox for some significant portion of his life, converting to the Uniate Church in or after 1666. He maintained lively contacts with members of both confessions throughout his life.

Kuszelicz had returned to Wilno from his Königsberg exile by 2 October 1658. On that date he brought a complaint before the temporary magistracy against the Wilno soap boiler Afanas Tosznicki. I know nothing more about him, though the name "Afanas" suggests that he, too, was a Ruthenian. According to Kuszelicz, Tosznicki had "*umyślnie i ze złości naprawiwszy ruskich ludzi*" (purposefully and maliciously incited "Russian" people), who, "*za którym onego takowym ukazem i powodem*" (at his order and instigation) had "seized a horse by force and secreted it away who knows where."[41]

4. Subordynowawszy sobie ruskich ludzi

Finally, we have a protestation brought to the magistracy in late 1661 by Piotr Szóstak. The Szóstaks were members of the Wilno ruling elite

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seekers included Roman Kołczanowicz and Stefan Migura. For their signatures: GStA PK XX HA EM 111k., Nr. 104, 97v, 100v.

[38] LVIA SA 5097, 237r–239r.

[39] His last will and testament is printed in *AVAK* 8, 522–28. It is here we learn that he remained Orthodox throughout his life.

[40] LVIA SA 5103, 509r. Michał would find his second wife, Anna Zaleska, among the Wilno Lutherans who had sought asylum in Königsberg. They married by 1669. See LVIA 1008.1.42, 116r for "Kuszelewiczowa's" contribution to Lutheran finances for that year, and LVIA SA 5338, 452r–453r for her will of 1681.

[41] RGADA 1603.12.14, 300–301.

on the Greek side of the magistracy. Bogdan Szóstak was identified as a Wilno bencher (*ławnik*) in a survey from 1639.[42] Piotr Szóstak himself was still listed as a municipal income notary (*pisarz komerczany* or *pisarz prowentowy*) as late as 1684, an office he had occupied by 1643.[43] Documents from 1667 and 1668 call him a bencher; another from the same year records his advancement to the office of councilor (*rajca*).[44]

Szóstak was the son of Tacjana Brażyczówna and Matwiej Szóstak. He grew up in Orthodox circles and was likely himself Orthodox until a certain point. His cousin, Bazyli Brażyc, son of Dmitr, was buried at the Orthodox Church of the Holy Spirit sometime before 10 March 1649.[45] By 1654 Piotr Szóstak seems to have been the owner of the "Brażyc town house" on German Street. It was there, on 17 July of that year, that city officials, as well as Orthodox monks, came to inventory the estate of a recently deceased Orthodox merchant by the name of Jerzy Parfianowicz Łamanowski. The inventory was conducted at the request of the two guardians Łamanowski had appointed for his survivors, Szóstak and the goldsmith Bazyli Omelianowicz.[46]

Szóstak's wife was Anna Korzeńkowska.[47] A document from 1668 tells us that Szóstak served as curator for Eufrozyna Korzeńkowska (presumably some close relation of his wife), who was the widow of Krzysztof Ihnatowicz.[48] In a document dated 26 July 1669 we learn that the Uniate councilor Aleksander Ihnatowicz was the stepson of Eufrozyna Korzeńkowska.[49] A year earlier, in April 1668, Szóstak and Ihnatowicz had been named curators of the will of the Uniate merchant Teo-

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[42] BUJ, B Slav., F. 15, 20r.

[43] LMAB F251–122, 1r; LVIA SA 5333, 216r-v; LVIA SA 5097, 63r–64r.

[44] LVIA SA 5333, 286r–288r; LVIA SA 5335, 730r–732v; LVIA SA 5103, 620r–621r; LVIA SA 5103, 638r–639v.

[45] For the attestation of the burial, see LVIA 5105, 560r. To unravel the family connections, see LVIA SA 5333, 216r-v; LVIA SA 5096, 208r–209r.

[46] LVIA SA 5097, 63r–64r. Omelianowicz was married to Marianna Sznejderówna, the daughter of a Lutheran goldsmith named Jakub Sznejder, in whose atelier in the Lutheran Glass Street neighborhood he lived and worked. The goldsmiths' guild in Wilno was practically a Lutheran monopoly, but Omelianowicz, whose name points to Ruthenian origins, never appeared among those who gave offerings to the Lutheran church, which suggests that he remained Orthodox or Uniate. On Omelianowicz, see Laucevičius and Vitkauskienė 2001, 252. See also LVIA SA 5104 592r–593v for the Sznejder family and Omelianowicz's place in it.

[47] See documents from 1660 and 1677: RGADA 1603.12.14, 502–5 and LVIA SA 5109, 196–201.

[48] LVIA SA 5103, 620r–621r.

[49] LVIA SA 5107, 75r-v.

dor Kochański, who charged them "most urgently" with seeing to it that "my children remain in Holy Unity." By this time Szóstak and Ihnatowicz were both Uniate themselves: they were "elders of the Brotherhood of the Most Holy Virgin" and the Uniate Church of the Holy Trinity.[50]

Piotr Szóstak may very well have been a recent convert to the Uniate Church. His earlier family connections and other human networks were largely Orthodox, and he was likely among those who converted after 1666 for the sake of a career in the magistracy. On 23 December 1668 (by which time he was certainly Uniate) he witnessed the will of the Orthodox burghess Maryna Kostrowicka, the estranged wife of the councilor and future burgomaster Grzegorz Kostrowicki, who was by then a Uniate.[51]

I have been unable to find any Szóstaks among the asylum seekers in Königsberg. On 5 November 1661, Piotr Szóstak brought a complaint against Łukasz Kuczarski and his wife, Anastazja Kuszelanka. The accused also belonged to Orthodox circles. We have already met the Kuszelicz family. Anastazja's first husband was Stefan Dziahilewicz, and their son Stefan Izaak Dziahilewicz would ask his cousin Stefan Kuszelicz to serve as his legal plenipotentiary.[52] Kuczarski was Anastazja's second husband. Their son was an Orthodox monk at the Monastery of the Holy Spirit in Wilno.[53] Thus the story I am about to recount played itself out within Ruthenian—largely Orthodox—circles.

Szóstak, as we know, had been named guardian of the estate of the Orthodox merchant Jerzy Parfianowicz Łamanowski already in 1654. When he came before the temporary magistracy in late 1661, he complained that Kuczarski and his wife, "after the taking of the city of Wilno [by the Muscovite armies], having arranged for and suborned "Russian" people (*przysposobiwszy i subordynowawszy sobie ruskich ludzi*) in the year 1657, attacked [the little rural estate (*folwarek*) called Waka] *violento modo* [violently], took possession of it, and they took profit from it, and they hold it to this day."[54] Szóstak was bringing his complaint by

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[50] LVIA SA 5103, 635r–636v.

[51] LVIA SA 5335, 730r–732v. The basis for the estrangement—in fact, it was a church-imposed separation—had nothing to do, in her version of events, with confession: her spouse had been both belligerent and negligent in his duties as husband and father. On this case of marital strife, see Frick 2007b. I should also note that in those same years, on 9 February 1667, Szóstak witnessed the testament of the Lutheran merchant Piotr Klet. See LVIA SA 5335, 286r–288r.

[52] LVIA SA 5097, 118r-v, LVIA SA 5107, 73r-v, and see above.

[53] LVIA SA 5339, 53r–54v.

[54] RGADA 1603.12.14, 666. Waka was a village outside Wilno on the road to Troki

virtue of his guardianship over the Łamanowski estate, of which the Waka *folwarek* was a part. Whether or not he had fled Wilno at the beginning of the war, he was back in town by 24 April 1658.[55] It remains a mystery to me why he was so slow to bring his case, unless it was that he, unlike others, saw a benefit in waiting for Muscovite control to weaken.

"Moskal," "ruski człowiek," *and* "Rusin"

The *ruski człowiek* of these documents was a "civilian" but not a citizen of Wilno; he was prone to licence, theft, and thuggery; and—more important—in all but the first example, he was the tool of Vilnans in their nefarious dealings with other Vilnans, most of whom, both plaintiffs and accused, were themselves Ruthenian. That is what lends the sense of moral outrage to the three protestations: a Wilno Ruthenian (or, perhaps better—a Ruthenian Vilnan) had employed an outsider, a *ruski człowiek*, to settle personal scores with a fellow Vilnan during a period of crisis.

I have been able to identify a few Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists who were present in occupied Wilno, which suggests that at least token representatives of the full confessional spectrum had regathered there during the occupation.[56] But a reading of the *acta,* especially the more systematically organized volume preserved in RGADA, also gives the impression that occupied Wilno was disproportionately Ruthenian (in comparison with the pre- and post-occupation demographics). In fact, the city may have been disproportionately Orthodox. In the summer of 1657, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich decreed that any Uniates unwilling to convert to Orthodoxy were to be expelled from the city, and Shakhovskoi communicated the demand to municipal authorities by early 1658.[57]

This large Ruthenian presence is central to my argument that the *ruski człowiek* of these texts was Muscovite. The documents I have cited here were produced by a legal system that still attempted to function accord-

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(Trakai). Its populace was heavily Tatar.

[55] Kraszewski 1841, 132.

[56] See, for example, the registering of documents proving legitimate births and proper baptisms (prerequisites for citizenship) for Catholics and Lutherans at RGADA 1603.12.14, 163–64, 253–55, 263–64. These particular documents were enacted in 1658.

[57] Rachuba 1994, 66; Meilus 2001, 285, 293; *Akty* 1842, 261. Many (though not all) of those who signed the petition to Tsar Mikhail Alekseevich in Wilno on 24 April 1658 requesting a reconfirmation of the city's privileges were Ruthenian. All the Ruthenians must have been at least pro forma Orthodox, although several would convert to the Uniate Church after 1666. Among those we have met, we find the signatures of: Grzegorz Kostrowicki (in Cyrillic), Krzysztof Sokołowski, Stefan Kuszelicz (in Cyrillic), Michał Kuszelicz, and Piotr Szóstak. See Kraszewski 1841, 131–32.

ing to Wilno's old principle of Roman-Greek parity. When Christian Vil-
nans came before that court, they were identified by name, estate, and
profession—never by confession or ethnicity. The form for both plaintiff
and accused in protestations was the same: "Lord Stefan Kuszelicz, mer-
chant and burgher of Wilno," for example. Even in the narrative part of
the complaints themselves, Vilnans rarely identified each other by con-
fession or ethnicity. The three protestations discussed above reflect the
expected usage: a Vilnan (who happened to be Ruthenian but was not
identified as such) had brought a complaint against another Vilnan (also
Ruthenian, but unidentified), alleging evil deeds *and* the employment of
a *ruski człowiek* to help him carry them out.

   The phrase itself jumps out at the reader. No one, as far as I know, ev-
er referred to Wilno Ruthenians as "*ruscy ludzie*" (Ruthenian persons). In
polemical literature, we read of "*Ruś wileńska*" (the Ruś of Wilno) and
"*lud ruski w Wilnie*" (the Ruthenian people [mass noun] in Wilno).[58] In
the pamphlets, but also in legal documents and guild statutes, they were
referred to as people *ruskiej* (or *greckiej*) *wiary* (of the Ruthenian or
Greek faith). They were members of the "*naród ruski*" (Ruthenian na-
tion). They occupied the *ławica ruska* (Ruthenian bench) or *ławica
grecka* (Greek bench) and held the office of *pisarz ruski* (Ruthenian nota-
ry). In the guilds, elderships were allotted to people "*ritus graeci seu ru-
thenici*" (of the Greek or Ruthenian rite), to "*Rusini*" (Ruthenians), and
so on.[59] *Rusin*, yes, but a *ruski człowiek*—never.[60] This was what Vilnans
came, on occasion, to call the Muscovite civilians with whom they
rubbed shoulders during the occupation. It sounds like the answer to the
question of identity that might have been posed to them on the street.
"Who are you?" "*Ruskii czeławiek.*"

   Still, the possibility of confusing a *Rusin* with a *ruski człowiek* sug-
gests that a rethinking of the vexed question of Ruthenianness as it ap-
plied to Wilno burghers may have been one aspect of life during the oc-
cupation. Did Ruthenians and *ruscy ludzie* have anything in common?
We can imagine both Ruthenian and non-Ruthenian Vilnans asking them-
selves this question. A consideration of two passages from the *acta* from
those same years where we find the standard usage of *Moskal* and
moskiewski to refer to the occupiers may help shed some light on the sit-
uation.

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[58] Smotrytsky 1622, 38v/Smotrytsky 1987, 501; Frick 2005b, 302.

[59] LVIA SA 5112, 140r–142r; Łowmiański 1939, 42, 45, 75, 80, 209, 321, 335, 364, 374,
420, 440, 452; *AVAK* 10, 75, 81, 88–89, 209.

[60] Serhii Plokhy (2006, 216–18) notes that in Muscovite usage of the seventeenth century
the adjectival form was used as a self-reference, nouns for the "others" (*russkie liudi* vs.
rusin, liakh, nemets, etc.).

On 26 January 1661 Zachariasz Kanecki registered a protestation against Krzysztof Ihnatowicz. Both were merchants. Kanecki was most likely a Roman Catholic. His father, Piotr Kanecki, who died in 1641, had bequeathed money to the Wilno Dominicans at the Church of the Holy Spirit, asking that requiem Masses be said for his soul.[61] Krzysztof Ihnatowicz, as we already know, was an in-law of Piotr Szóstak and the father of Aleksander Ihnatowicz, both of whom were Uniate by the late 1660s but may have been recent converts from Orthodoxy.[62] Certainly they at least pretended to be Orthodox for some time during the occupation. The accused in this case was also likely Orthodox. Kanecki's complaint is worth quoting at some length:

> In the preceding year of 1660, before the arrival of the armies of His Royal Majesty, during the temporary absence of the plaintiff, having business dealings and an understanding with the Muscovites (*mając handle i konferencyją z Moskalami*), *nullo juris praetextu et sine consensu* [by no pretext of the law and without the consent] of either the plaintiff himself or his Lady spouse, [Ihnatowicz] rented a shop to a Muscovite in the house of the plaintiff near the stalls. Which Muscovite not only held the shop under his management, dealing in various goods, but also kept horses and carts in the house itself and paid the accused for this. And when His Grace Lord Siesicki had burst into Wilno, then the soldiers, having found out about the Muscovite in the house of the plaintiff, did no little harm to the plaintiff [through the loss of] Muscovite goods on account of the accused. But after the departure of His Grace Lord Siesicki, the Muscovite palatine imprisoned the spouse *protestantis* [of the plaintiff], together with our children and the servants and neighbors who were living in the house, confiscated not a few goods worth 1,000 zł., and worked great detriment and devastation in the house. And although the Lord God saw to it that [the Muscovite palatine] did not torture the spouse *protestantis* [of the plaintiff] and did not take her to the Castle (*nie męczył i do zamku nie wziął*), nonetheless the servants were tortured.[63]

This story took place against the background of the increasingly frequent incursions by Polish-Lithuanian forces that would eventually lead to the liberation of the city.[64] Already by 1658 Wilno had become a "borderland fortress" of the Polish-Lithuanian territories conquered by Muscovy, and the Lithuanian troops active in the area were beginning to

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[61] LVIA SA 5102, 627v–633r.

[62] See above, pp. 147–48.

[63] RGADA 1603.12.14, 560–61.

[64] On these years in Wilno, see Rachuba 1994, 69–72.

make "excursions" into the city. By the end of 1659 Shakhovskoi had been replaced as Wilno palatine by the feared and hated Prince Danilo Myshetsky, whose regime was much more oppressive toward the inhabitants and took an interest in them only insofar as they were useful for the defense of the city. Imprisonment and execution of citizens became more common as anti-Muscovite sentiment rose. In this environment, Vilnans could no longer maintain that the city of Wilno was their first allegiance without a careful consideration of whose city it was.

In the spring of 1660 citizens loyal to the Commonwealth informed Kazimierz Dowmont Siesicki—the figure who played a role in the preceding case—of the weakened state of the Muscovite garrison. Siesicki, who was the leader of the troops then stationed outside the city, made his incursion into Wilno on 9 May of that year. He quickly retreated, and retaliations against Vilnans suspected of collaboration with him were severe.

From this time forward the city was under more or less constant blockade by Polish-Lithuanian forces. On 11 July 1660 troops under the command of Michał Kazimierz Pac occupied the city, and the Muscovite company was forced to retreat to the two castles. The standoff lasted half a year. At the beginning of 1661 Grand Hetman of Lithuania Paweł Sapieha arrived with his troops and began launching attacks upon the city. Around 20 October 1661 King John Casimir came to the area and a more concentrated assault on the Muscovite forces began. On 3 December 1661 the Muscovite garrison (which now numbered only seventy-eight) revolted against Myshetsky. The next day John Casimir made his triumphal entry into the Wilno castles. Myshetsky was executed in Wilno's market square on 10 December 1661.

The story told in the protestation cited above took place in the period immediately before, during, and after Siesicki's brief "liberation" of Wilno in May 1660. Ihnatowicz may well have been some sort of business partner of Kanecki's. (Most registered complaints turn out to tell stories that had taken place "in the family"—often quite literally.) The protestation confirms several important things: that Muscovite "civilians" were living in Wilno during the occupation, some of them engaged in commerce; that Vilnans had business dealings with them and shared houses with them; and that Vilnans ran the risk of retaliation from both Polish-Lithuanian and Muscovite authorities if they were not cautious in their dealings with them. And we see here what Vilnans most feared at the moment—being "taken to the Castle," which, under Myshetsky's rule, meant torture and possible execution.

That same fear lay at the heart of the curious story Andrzej Józefowicz recounted on 20 August 1661. On that day he brought a com-

plaint before the magistracy against the Orthodox (later Uniate) magistrate Stefan Kuszelicz, whose acquaintance we have already made.[65] Józefowicz may have been Roman Catholic. A man by that name was an elder of the Brotherhood of the Scapular of the Most Holy Virgin at the Calced Carmelites' Church of All Saints in 1667.[66] The document in question was in fact what was known as a reprotestation. The entry preceding it in the *acta* for the same day had been Kuszelicz's own protestation against Józefowicz.

When Józefowicz got his turn before the judges, he made the following allegation:

> During the public [display of the] guard, [Stefan Kuszelicz] dared and had the audacity to make a tumult and a ruckus. Having grabbed some boy from the area around the city wall, and pretending himself to be a Muscovite (*uczyniwszy się sam wrzkomo Moskalem*), he asked him where there were still Polish people (*gdzieby lud polski zostawał*), and he led him by force to the Castle (*do Zamku*), saying, "come with me to the '*Gorod*' (*do Gorodu*).... And then the aforementioned Lord Kuszelicz went to the Brotherhood House, and when the guard jumped in after him, exiting the house on his own he said about all of this that he had done it as a joke (*że żartem uczynił*).[67]

The "public [display of the] guard" was likely that of the municipal police force administered by the magistracy, although it could have had something to do with the small Muscovite company stationed in the two castles. In any event, in August 1661—Sapieha had been encamped outside the city since the beginning of the year, and John Casimir would arrive in October—it was possible to encounter members of the Muscovite force in the streets of Wilno, but also members of the Lithuanian troops, who were making more and more frequent "excursions" inside the city walls. This situation, which had likely been a part of the city's daily life for some months, must have made Vilnans cautious around strangers, mistrustful of one another, and fearful of reprisals from whichever forces were in control of the city at the moment. Here, too, the central fear was of being taken to Myshetsky's dungeon in the Castle. This was what made Kuszelicz's actions a "joke."

Note that in both these examples Roman Catholic Vilnans had brought complaints against Ruthenian Vilnans—again, neither identified by confession—over their associations with Muscovites. The allegation of "impersonating a Muscovite" suggests—on the part of both actor and

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[65] See above, pp. 144–46.

[66] LVIA SA 5104, 484r–485r.

[67] RGADA 1603.12.14, 648–49.

audience—a distance from the Muscovite, but also an uncomfortable familiarity with him. Kuszelicz knew how to affect a Muscovite accent and introduce Muscovite words into his Ruthenian/Polish (*gorod* instead of *zamek* for "castle"), and the boy knew enough, maybe just enough, to mistake his speech for that of a Muscovite. Accusations of treason lurk just beneath the surface here, and Lutheran, Calvinist, and Orthodox Vilnans would be targets of attempts—largely unsuccessful—to confiscate their property on the basis of the *jus caducum*.[68]

The period of the Muscovite occupation had turned the tables temporarily, and the Orthodox elite now enjoyed the protection of an Orthodox ruler, much as previously it had been the Catholics who had enjoyed that advantage. However, the magistracy continued to function under its old system of power sharing. For a time there may have been a sense that the city was becoming more "Greek" than "Roman," that, for instance, the old calendar was becoming more regularly used. We do, in fact, find an increase in records of private business and legal transactions concluded on dates provided "according to the old calendar."[69] But in spite of the preponderance of Ruthenians at this time, the magistracy itself silently continued to conduct its own business according to the new calendar.

Although we can easily imagine members of the Ruthenian elite exploring what it would mean for their lives if Wilno were to remain subject to an Orthodox ruler, there was no exodus of the "Greek" side of the city with the return to Polish-Lithuanian rule. (And recall that members of the Orthodox elite had figured prominently among the asylum seekers in Königsberg at the beginning of the occupation of Wilno.) The mutual recriminations of Uniate and Orthodox hierarchs soon subsided, and the city's peculiar confessional *convivencia* soon reasserted itself under Catholic rule. True, after 1666 those who contemplated careers in the magistracy had to convert to Roman Catholicism or to the Uniate Church, but Ruthenians found ways around these impediments to social advancement. First, given the weakness of the cities in Poland-Lithuania,

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[68] The *jus caducum* allowed the king to confiscate property and to bestow it upon whom he pleased in two cases: the death of a foreigner without a male heir, and treason committed by a citizen. On the *jus caducum* in Polish Magdeburg law, see Kaczmarczyk 1966, 301, 309. For an apparently successful confiscation of Lutheran property, see LVIA SA 5104, 515v–519v; and LVIA SA 5102, 63v–64v. For unsuccessful attempts to confiscate Calvinist and Orthodox property, see LVIA SA 5097, 101r–103r, 108r–109v; LVIA SA 5099, 257r–260r; and RGADA 1603.12.14, 817–28. Elmantas Meilus (2000, 103) has warned against treating these sorts of royal privileges as sources accurately reflecting the actions of the accused traitors. The king seems to have given them without full knowledge of the course of events, and non-Catholic Vilnans accused of treason successfully fought battles in the courts to hold onto their houses.

[69] RGADA 1603.12.14, 9, 11, 72–73, 203, 313.

attaining the status of magistrate was simply not as attractive as in the cities of Western Europe. Lutherans and Orthodox found other paths to wealth and status. Second, some of the conversions to the Uniate Church may have been *pro forma*, the "price" paid for membership in the ruling elite after 1666.

We find a few Ruthenian social networks that made the expected opposition of Uniates and Roman Catholics to the Orthodox, and we find such networks on both sides of that divide. In these situations the Orthodox tended to think "globally," looking to coreligionists throughout Lithuania when, for instance, they made bequests.[70] And on the other side of this divide, Ruthenian identity was frequently unstable and often led to conversion to Roman Catholicism.[71] But we find many more examples of thinking "locally," an easy linking of Wilno Uniates and Orthodox in one Ruthenian identity that excluded the "Romans" from social networks.[72] Examples of this include mixed marriages, where the men were frequently Uniate (the public face of Wilno Ruthenian identity, especially after 1666) and the women Orthodox (the private face).[73]

When, in 1668, the Uniate merchant Fiedor Kochański charged the Uniate magistrates Piotr Szóstak and Aleksander Ihnatowicz (one of

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[70] In his 1689 will, the wealthy Orthodox merchant Paweł Kossobucki pointedly bequeathed portions of his considerable estate to Orthodox institutions "not in the Union" (*nie w Unijej będące*), in Wilno and throughout Lithuania. See LVIA 610.3.103; LVIA SA 5340, 224r–231v; *AVAK* 9, 508–18.

[71] A good example is the Dubowicz family. The father, Ignacy, made the journey from Orthodoxy to the Uniate Church to Roman Catholicism, in which church his son Stefan also asked to be buried. They were both burgomasters. Ignacy died in 1636, and Stefan, in 1658. (See their wills at LVIA SA 5335, 12r–14v; LVIA SA 5334, 16r–19v; LMAB F43–26609.) Stefan's brother Aleksy was the archimandrite of the Uniate Holy Trinity Monastery in Wilno in the 1630s, 1640s, and 1650s.

[72] The examples are numerous. To cite just one, the Orthodox merchant Kondrat Parfianowicz made provisions for gifts to Wilno Ruthenian institutions only, both Uniate and Orthodox. He gave 50 zł to the Orthodox at the Holy Spirit Church for his funeral and a *sorokoust*; 40 zł to the nuns at that church and 25 zł for its hospital. He gave 25 zł to the nuns at the Uniate Monastery of the Holy Trinity and 10 zł for its hospital. The motivation was partly familial: his daughter from his first marriage, Marusia, was "in the care" of the nuns at the Uniate Holy Trinity, apparently in a kind of novitiate. He settled 1,000 zł. upon her, with the stipulation that, should she depart this world before taking holy vows, 500 zł. was to remain with the Uniate convent, and 500 zł. would be divided among her siblings from Parfianowicz's first marriage. See LVIA SA 5334, 542r–546v.

[73] In addition to the case of Maryna Iwanowiczówna and the magistrate Grzegorz Kostrowicki (see above, p. 148), I can cite that of the merchant Afanas Atroszkiewicz and his wife, Katarzyna Kuryłowiczówna Otroszkiewiczowa (the spelling of Ruthenian names often reflected the vowel reduction [*akanie*] of their spoken versions). The two died within a few months of each other in 1666. See their wills at LVIA SA 5335, 80v–82v and 215v–217v.

whom, if not both, was a recent convert from Orthodoxy) with seeing to it that "my children remain in holy unity," the perceived threat to their identity was most likely not Orthodoxy but Roman Catholicism. Perhaps Kochański had his father-in-law, the burgomaster Aleksander Romanowicz, in mind. He had recently converted to Roman Catholicism from either Orthodoxy or the Uniate Church, an action that had caused some local scandal and elicited numerous complaints, including the one registered with the Wilno magistracy by the Uniate metropolitan of Kyiv, Gabriel Kolenda, arguing that Romanowicz could not legitimately continue to hold office on the Greek side of that body because he was now of the Latin rite (*"ritus latini"*).[74] What Kochański was saying when he expressed his desire that his children "remain in holy unity" was that he wanted them to remain Ruthenian: after all, part of his legacy to them was "a ragged old Ruthenian *Statute* [the Lithuanian law code in its Ruthenian-language version]," "a well-thumbed Ruthenian *semitypikon* [a Greek-rite liturgical book printed in Ruthenian]," and a "Ruthenian psalter, given to the deceased's little sons for study."

The curious use of the term *ruski człowiek* during the occupation to indicate a Muscovite reflects the situation of a mere few years during which Vilnans of all confessions had the opportunity to make first-hand observations of possible links between Ruthenians and Muscovites. What we see in the texts discussed here is a small and local northern variation on what Serhii Plokhy has described as the misunderstanding-ridden Ruthenian-Muscovite encounter that accompanied a "reunification" of Cossack Rus' with Muscovy, in which "neither side ... fully understood what it was getting into."[75] In Wilno the old dispensation (and rhetoric) quickly reasserted itself. At the beginning of the occupation, documents spoke gingerly and impersonally of the recent "troubles" (*trwogi*) that had beset the city.[76] By the end Vilnans were less circumspect in placing blame for the cause of the troubles. On 2 December 1661 two days before King John Casimir made his triumphal entry upon retaking possession of Wilno, Stefan Kuszelicz was once again before the court of the magistracy.[77]

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[74] See Kochański's will and posthumous estate inventory at LVIA SA 5103, 635r–636v and 609r–614r. It is in the latter document that we learn that Kochański was Romanowicz's son-in-law. Kolenda's complaint was enacted in the books of the Wilno bench at LVIA SA 5338, 50r–51v.

[75] Plokhy 2006, 249.

[76] See a document dated 5 May 1657 at RGADA 1603.12.14, 87–88.

[77] RGADA 1602.12.14, 681–82. The document speaks quite clearly about the "regaining" of the Wilno Castle, the cessation of hostilities, and the return of the magistracy. According to Rachuba's sources (Rachuba 1994, 71), the remaining Muscovite force mutinied only the next day, 3 December, and the king entered the city the following day. Perhaps this chronology will need to be revised in light of this document.

This time he was acting as the curator of his Orthodox mother, Eudokia Kuszelina. She was pressing her claim to the estate of her relation, Hrehor Dziahilewicz. She was getting around to pursuing it with some delay, owing to the "troubles and confusion during the rapid and sudden attack of the Muscovite Foe upon the city of Wilno (*w tych trwogach i zamieszaniu za prętkim i nagłym nastąpieniem tegoż Nieprzyjaciela Moskwicina na miasto wileńskie*)."

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Abbreviations

AVAK = Akty, izdavaemye Vilenskoiu arkheograficheskoiu komissieiu, 39 volumes (Wilno, 1865–1915).

BCz = Biblioteka Czartoryskich (Library of the Czartoryski Family, Cracow)

BUJ, B = Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego (Cracow), Berlin collection (manuscripts from the Staatsbibliothek Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz)

GSta PK = Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin)

LMAB = Lietuvos Mokslų Akademijos Biblioteka (Library of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, Vilnius)

LVIA = Lietuvos Valstybės Istorijos Archyvas (Lithuanian State Historical Archive, Vilnius)

RGADA = Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, Moscow)

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Символи адміністративно-територіяльних утворень на західньо-українських землях у 1920–1930-х роках

Андрій Ґречило

Після Першої світової війни, коли вирішувалася доля західньо-українських земель, державами Антанти 1920 р. було запропоновано Статут для Східної Галичини, що мала входити до складу Польщі. Члени уряду Західньо-Української Народньої Республіки намагалися серед інших поправок і критичних зауважень зафіксувати в цьому документі й автономію в гербових справах — право використовувати свої кольори (прапор) і герб[1]. Проте на такі пункти не погоджувалася польська сторона. Зрештою, й погоджені та прийняті пізніше зобов'язання польського уряду так і не були виконані. А вже постановою сейму Польщі від 3 грудня 1920 р. та розпорядженням Ради Міністрів від 14 березня та 17 травня 1921 р. на цих землях було запроваджено новий адміністративно-територіяльний поділ і від 1 вересня 1921 р. утворено три воєводства — Львівське, Станиславівське і Тернопільське[2]. Функції вищого державного управлінського органу покладалися на новоутворені воєводські управління. Воєводства поділялись на повіти, які в Галичині були оформлені ще австрійськими законами 1866 р.[3] За старими законами (з 1889 та 1896 рр.) продовжували діяти міські управління — їх компетенція стосувалася лише вузько місцевих питань (законом від 23 березня 1933 р. було ще більше обмежено права органів місцевого самоврядування та посилено їхню залежність від державних органів)[4]. За Ризьким мирним договором від 18 березня 1921 р. Польща отримала й частину українських земель, які входили раніше до складу Ро-

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[1] Центральний державний історичний архів України у Львові (далі — ЦДІАЛ). — Ф. 581. — Оп. 1. — Спр. 94. — Арк. 41–42.

[2] Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (далі — DURP). — Warszawa, 1920. — No 117. — Poz. 768.

[3] Województwo tarnopolskie. — Tarnopol, 1931. — S. 314.

[4] Ibid. — S. 313.

сійської імперії, а потім — Української Народньої Республіки. Тепер вони увійшли до трьох нових воєводств — Волинського, та частково до Поліського й Люблінського.

Межі нових воєводств не співпадали з межами історичних адміністративно-територіяльних земель ні з часів Речі Посполитої, ні з періоду австрійського чи російського панування. Вже 20 грудня 1922 р. до Президії Ради міністрів звернувся Департамент мистецтва Міністерства віросповідань і громадської освіти з пропозицією скласти для воєводств герби з символів історичних земель, з частин яких сформовані нові адміністративні одиниці[5]. У додатку надіслано й проєкти для Поліського та Білостоцького воєводств. Обидва герби мали напіврозтяті та перетяті щити, у першому полі — герб колишнього Руського воєводства, у третьому — Берестейського, а різнилися тільки символами в других полях: для Поліського — знак Волині, для Білостоцького — Мазовецького воєводства. Проте ці ініціятиви розвитку не отримали. Зрештою, особливої потреби запровадження гербів для нових утворень не було, оскільки і воєводські, і повітові управління використовували печатки з польським орлом. Міські управління подекуди продовжували вживати ще старі довоєнні печатки зі своїми гербами, хоча скрізь польська влада негайно запроваджувала польськомовні печатки — передовсім це стосувалося волинсько-поліського регіону. Деякі органи місцевого самоврядування, які втратили під час Першої світової війни старі печатки та документацію, звертались до архівних установ з метою виясними, які символи чи герби використовувалися раніше у цих населених пунктах. Однак ці звернення мали випадковий характер, а справою впорядкування місцевої геральдики ні державні, ні громадські організації конкретно не займалися. Так, Тернопільське воєводське управління 14 серпня 1925 р. надіслало до дирекції Архіву ґродських і земських актів у Львові прохання про виясними, який герб може використовувати магістрат міста Бродів і який герб може вживати Тернопільське воєводство[6]. Характерно, що в запиті містилася й пропозиція скласти герб воєводства з давніх територіяльних знаків земель, частини яких його тепер формують. У відповіді архіву від 25 серпня 1925 р. (за підписом Г. Полячківни) допускалася можливість використання складного 4-польового герба, в якому в першому полі рекомендовано подати знак Тернополя (у синьому полі срібна 6-променева зірка над срібним півмісяцем), у

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[5] *Kuczyński S. K.* Polskie herby ziemskie. Geneza, treści, funkcje. — Warszawa, 1993. — S. 271–72.

[6] ЦДІАЛ. — Ф. 145. — Оп. 1. — Спр. 107. — Арк. 12–12зв.

другому — герб Белзького воєводства (у червоному полі срібний ґрифон у золотій короні), у третьому — Галицької землі (у срібному полі чорна коронована галка), у четвертому — Поділля (у срібному полі золоте сонце); проте більш слушним вважався варіянт використати міський герб Тернополя як воєводський символ[7]. Були й доволі несподівані ініціятиви. Скажімо, 27 січня 1928 р. з запитом про герб Жовківського повіту звернулася Повітова комунальна ощадна каса, яка хотіла використати цей знак на своїй печатці[8].

13 грудня 1927 р. прийнято розпорядження президента Польщі "Про державні емблеми і барви та про відзнаки, прапори і печатки"[9]. У статті 4 цього розпорядження вказувалося, що для всіх органів місцевого самоврядування встановлюються відзнаки, складені з державного герба, герба воєводства (у якому розташований даний населений пункт) та напису, що відповідає їх назві; міські управління можуть у своїй відзнаці на місці, передбаченому для воєводського герба помістити власний історично обґрунтований символ; містам, відзначеним орденом, а також воєводствам надає герби президент Польської Республіки за поданням Ради Міністрів; герби інших міст затверджує на свій розсуд міністр внутрішніх справ за поданням магістрату та міської ради після узгодження з міністром віросповідань і громадської освіти[10]. Стаття 19 регламентувала використання цих символів на печатках органів місцевого самоврядування (при цьому вказувалось, що ці печатки мусять мати овальну форму)[11]. У статті 26 зазначалося, що на перехідний період (два роки від прийняття розпорядження) дозволяється використання печаток і емблем, що були досі в ужитку[12]. 20 червня 1928 р. Прийнято ще одне президентське розпорядження "Про урядові печатки", де, зокрема, визначались розміри печаток управлінь різних рівнів[13]. Слід зазначити, що окремі пункти цих розпоряджень входили у суперечність із прийнятим 28 серпня 1919 р. декретом, яким заборонялося недержавним інституціям (у т. ч. й органам місцевого

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[7] Там само. — Арк. 13зв.; Державний архів Львівської області (далі — ДАЛО). — Ф. 1. — Оп. 25. — Спр. 607. — Арк. 2.

[8] Національна бібліотека в Варшаві (Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie), відділ рукописів (далі — НБВ, ВР). — Rkp. IV. 5547: Матеріяли Чоловського. — Т. 6. — С. 14–44.

[9] DURP. — 1927. — No 115. — Poz. 980.

[10] Ibid. — S. 1640.

[11] Ibid. — S. 1641.

[12] Ibid. — S. 1642.

[13] Ibid. — 1928. — No 65. — Poz. 593.

самоврядування) використовувати державний польський символ — орел[14]. Крім того, виникли й інші труднощі, про які вже згадувалося: воєводства не мали затверджених гербів, а межі цих нових територіяльних утворень не відповідали межам історичних земель.

Оскільки Львів був адміністративним центром колишнього Королівста Галичини і Лодомерії й тут зосереджувалися основні архівні матеріяли, які стосувалися територій трьох нових воєводств, то справу про їх герби та знаки повітових міст доручили Юзефу Пійотровському, котрий обіймав посаду консерватора пам'яток мистецтва та культури в Адміністративному відділі Львівського воєводського управління. Він підготував довідку про проєкти гербів трьох воєводств, до яких мали увійти історичні символи: для Львівського воєводства — герби Руського, Белзького, Сандомирського воєводств і Перемиської та Сяніцької земель; для Тернопільського — Подільського, Волинського, Руського та Белзького воєводств; для Станиславівського — Галицької, Перемиської та Жидачівської земель[15].

Міністерство віросповідань і громадської освіти 8 жовтня 1928 р. розіслало в усі воєводські управління листи з проханням подати матеріяли про давній герб воєводства чи історичних земель, що формують його територію[16]. Для Львівського, Станиславівського та Тернопільського воєводств це питання було особливо складним, бо вже в наступному листі цього ж міністерства від 30 жовтня 1928 р., адресованому до Воєводського управління у Львові, зверталося увагу "на політичну сторону справи, з огляду на українські барви (синю і жовту), які містяться у гербі давнього Руського воєводства"[17]. Йшлося про герб — у синьому полі золотий лев у короні спинається на скелю, — трактований в Галичині як український національний символ. Політизації питання, мабуть, посприяла й позиція начальника відділу безпеки, який ще раніше, листом від 18 вересня 1928 р., апелював до Пійотровського про політичну проблему й вказував на неприпустимість "композиції лиш історичної, але неприхильної до ідеї польської державности"[18]. Також на політичний аспект при складанні нових воєводських гербів звертали увагу й під час конференції Президії Ради Міністрів і Департаменту мистецтва Міністерства віросповідань і громадської освіти, коли

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[14] Ibid. — 1919. — No 69. — Poz. 416.

[15] ДАЛО. — Ф. 1. — Оп. 25. — Спр. 607. — Арк. 3–4.

[16] Там само. — Арк. 29.

[17] Там само. — Арк. 28.

[18] Там само. — Арк. 26.

мова заходила про "етнографічно мішані території"[19]. Тому вже 7 листопада 1928 р. Пйотровський відсилає до Варшави інші пропозиції: для Львівського воєводства — у червоному полі золота літера "К" під короною (мала уособлювати короля Казимира III, який захопив Львів у середині XIV ст.); для Тернопільського — у синьому полі золота зірка над півмісяцем; для Станиславівського — у синьому полі золота Пилява (хрест з п'ятьма раменами — герб Потоцьких, що був також елементом і міського герба міста Станиславова)[20].

Отримані з місць результати не задовільнили Міністерство віросповідань і громадської освіти. Тому на його звернення під час VI сесії Архівної ради державних архівів, що проходила 19–20 грудня 1928 р., було створено спеціяльну комісію для централізованого вирішення справи з воєводськими гербами[21]. Комісія спершу звернула увагу на необхідність внесення змін до згаданого президентського розпорядження з 1927 р. в частині, щоб знаки місцевого самоврядування не мусили складатися з державного і воєводського гербів, вказуючи на невідповідність цього геральдичним традиціям і на композиційну складність таких символів. Проте бюрократичний апарат не плянував ніяких змін до вже прийнятих актів, і тому комісією було опрацьовано й запропоновано проєкти для всіх 16-и воєводств, які мали відповідати визначеній формі: герб воєводства подавася у великому щиті, а над ним розміщався малий щиток з державним польським гербом[22]. Зокрема, для Львівського воєводства пропонувалося: щит перетятий, у верхньому полі знак Руського воєводства, у нижньому — Перемиської землі; для Станиславівського: щит перетятий, у верхньому полі знак Галицької землі, у нижньому — Жидачівської; для Тернопільського: щит розтятий, у першому полі знак Поділля, у другому — Белзького воєводства; для Волинського: герб Волині у польській інтерпретації з кінця XVI ст. (з накладеним на хрест щитком з орлом); для Поліського: герб Погоня; для Люблінського: щит перетятий, у верхньому полі історичний знак Люблінського воєводства, у нижньому — Холмської землі. Ці проєкти 8 червня 1929 р. Міністерство віросповідань і громадської освіти надіслало до Президії Ради Міністрів. Передбачалося затвердити всі герби воєводств одним розпорядженням. Але з огляду на пляновану адміністративно-територіяльну ре-

[19] Archeion. — 1929. — T. VII. — S. 19–20.

[20] ДАЛО. — Ф. 1. — Оп. 25. — Спр. 607. — Арк. 20–25.

[21] *Kuczyński S. K.* Polskie herby ziemskie. — S. 272.

[22] Ibid.

форму Управління державних архівів у лютому 1931 р. звернулося до Президії Ради Міністрів з висновками про недоцільність узаконювати розроблені проєкти й повернутися до цього питання після запровадження нового поділу[23]. Справа з гербами воєводств знов загальмувалася.

На місцях це питання розвивалося стихійно. У 1929 р. Юзеф Пйотровський підготував своєрідний звіт-пояснення своїх напрацювань, у якому знову наводив пропозиції багатопольових гербів для трьох галицьких воєводств, розглядав варіянти суміщення воєводських символів зі знаками адміністративних центрів, а також пропонував поміщати воєводські герби на грудях польського орла й таким чином вирішити приписи президентського розпорядження 1927 р.[24] Ці ж пропозиції він викладав і в присвячених Тернопільському воєводству виданнях 1931 р., а на титульних листках подав два варіянти герба: (1) щит з чотирьох полів (герби Руського, Подільського, Белзького та Волинського воєводств); (2) щит з польським орлом в оточенні чотирьох малих щитків[25]. Крім того, на цей час спроби впровадити в життя розпорядження 1927 р. Викликали значні протести громадськости, оскільки законодавчим актом фактично вилучалися з використання історичні герби та прапори міст[26]. Різні громадські та наукові організації, особливо зі Львова та Кракова, надсилали критичні листи на адресу Президії Ради Міністрів[27]. Під цим тиском 24 листопада 1930 р. у згадане розпорядження були внесені зміни[28]. Зокрема, зазначалося, що "як виняток міністр внутрішніх справ за погодженням з міністром віросповідань і громадської освіти може дозволити містам, які мають історично обґрунтовані герби, використовувати у своїх відзнаках замість державного герба та герба воєводства (міста) виключно тільки міський герб"[29].

Багато недоречностей було й у інших законодавчих актах. Так, ще у законі від 4 лютого 1921 р. про орден Білого орла передбачався

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[23] Archeion. — 1933. — Т. XI. — I. 82.

[24] *Piotrowski J.* Godła miast powiatowych województwa lwowskiego, tarnopolskiego i stanisławowskiego. — Lwów, 1929. — S. 7–10.

[25] Województwo tarnopolskie. — S. 1, 437–438; *Piotrowski J.* Ochrona zabytków sztuki województwa tarnopolskiego [Odbitka z książki: Województwo tarnopolskie]. — Tarnopol, 1931. — S. 1, 437–38.

[26] Nowe godła, oznaki i chorągwie // Kurjer codzienny. — 1929. — 9 maja.

[27] НБВ, ВР. — Rkp. IV. 5547. — Т. 6. — С. 14–44.

[28] DURP. — 1930. — No 80. — Poz. 629.

[29] Ibid. — S. 1035.

ланцюг для великого магістра ордену, складений з медальйонів, на яких мали бути емалеві герби всіх воєводств[30]. Оскільки справа з гербами не вирішувалася, тому законом від 18 березня 1932 р. Запроваджено новий зразок ланцюга, але вже без воєводських знаків[31].

Ще складнішим виявилося питання про герби нижчого рівня адміністративно-територіяльного поділу — повітів. Хоча ні в давнішій практиці, ні за час австрійського чи російського панування повіти власних гербів не мали, але в Російській імперії таку функцію фактично виконував знак повітового центру. Подібне ототожнення міських та повітових гербів проявилося і при встановленні гербів для міст колишньої Галичини та Лодомерії.

Станом на 1928 р. Львівське воєводство поділялось на 28 повітів (у т. ч. два Львівські — міський і сільський), Тернопільське — на 17, а Станиславівське — на 16[32]. Справа виявлення гербів приспішувалася ще й тим, що з 16 травня 1929 р. у Познані розпочиналася загальнопольська виставка, на якій плянувалося використати емблематику повітових міст для декорування воєводських павільйонів. Юзеф Пійотровський почерпнув частину інформації, використавши австрійський гербовник Карла Лінда[33], частину отримав від міських управлінь як відповідь на надіслані обіжники[34], а для шести міст було опрацьовано нові герби[35]. Характерно, що при розробці нових гербів Пійотровський орієнтувався не стільки на специфіку самого міста, як на характер цілого повіту. 10 січня 1929 р. він надсилає листа до дирекції Львівського земського архіву, в якому пише: "... можна було б комбінувати різні символи, пов'язані з певними історичними подіями, королівщинами, пізнішими власниками і т. п., або також, як часом було, з патронами місцевих парафіяльних костелів. Комбінації такі, особливо з костельними символами, могли б викликати протести, застереження та претензії національних меншин, з яких

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[30] Ibid. — 1921. — No 24. — Poz. 136.

[31] Ibid. — 1932. — No 33. — Poz. 346.

[32] *Maliszewski E., Olszewicz B.* Podręczny słownik geograficzny. — Warszawa, b/r. — T. 1. — S. 700; T. 2. — S. 487, 557.

[33] ДАЛО. — Ф. 1. — Оп. 25. — Спр. 607. Арк. 52–55; *Lind K.* Städte-Wappen von Österreich-Ungarn nebst den Landeswappen und Landesfarben. — Wien, 1885. — S. 11–12; Taf. XIX–XXI.

[34] ДАЛО. — Ф. 1. — Оп. 25. — Спр. 607. — Арк. 13; Спр. 608. — Арк. 4.

[35] Детальніше про це див.: *Гречило А.* Українська міська геральдика. — К.; Львів, 1998. — С. 113–18.

переважно складаються [...] тепер ґмінні ради.... Здається, що найвідповіднішим буде розробити символи,[...] які б підкреслювали найбільш розвинуті промислові галузі кожного *повіту*, та символи, які характеризують його околиці"[36]. Зрештою, Пйотровський згодом і зазначав, що "знаки повітових міст є одночасно й знаками повітів, за винятком Бжозова, де місто й повіт мають свої окремі символи"[37]. До середини квітня 1929 р. всі шість нових гербів затверджено на місцях, після чого протоколи погоджено з повітовими радами та переслано у Львівське воєводське управління для подальшої передачі в Міністерство віросповідань і громадської освіти та Міністерство внутрішніх справ[38]. Малюнки гербів усіх повітових міст (виконані архітектором Л. Ґюрковичем) були передані у Варшаву й у відповідні міські управління. Однак напрацьований у Львові централізований підхід не отримав підтримки в інших регіонах. Скажімо, на Волині залишились у використанні затверджені ще російською адміністрацією герби, тільки замість імперських орлів на них поміщали польські[39].

На початку 1930–х рр. до міністерств почали надходити від різних місцевих управ проєкти гербів. Але низька художня та геральдична якість цих робіт заставила владні структури відмовитись від затвердження місцевої самодіяльности. Вирішено, що малюнки міських гербів будуть виконуватися заново під фаховим наглядом Управління державних архівів та Управління мистецтва Міністерства віросповідань і громадської освіти[40]. Щоправда, й архівні установи не завжди давали компетентні консультації. Прикладом може служити відповідь Головного архіву давніх актів у Варшаві на запит міської управи Ратна, в якій невірно подано опис герба міста (вказано ведмедя замість дикого кабана), внаслідок чого Ратно клопоталося про затвердження помилкового знаку[41].

Цікаво, що чергові зміни, внесені 14 березня 1933 р. до президентського розпорядження від 1927 р., фіксували замість виразу "міські герби" нове поняття — "герби повітових та ґмінних об'єднань територіяльного самоврядування"[42]. Мабуть це

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[36] ЦДІАЛ. — Ф. 145. — Оп. 1. — Спр. 107. — Арк. 20.

[37] *Piotrowski J.* Godła miast powiatowych. — S. 10.

[38] ДАЛО. — Ф. 1. — Оп. 25. — Спр. 608. — Арк. 11, 27, 66–78, 84, 107, 164.

[39] Z rady miejskiej w Kowlu // Wołyń. — 1939. — 15 stycznia.

[40] Archeion. — 1935. — T. XIII. — S. 161.

[41] Державний архів Волинської області. — Ф. 46. — Оп. 6. — Спр. 842. — Арк. 21–26.

[42] DURP. — 1933. — No 29. — Poz. 246.

активізувало намагання повітів також запровадити власні символи. Так Рівненський повітовий сеймик просив уже у травні 1933 р. В. Семковича про допомогу й консультації щодо повітового герба[43]. У липні 1933 р. з Сокальського повіту зверталися з подібним проханням до О. Чоловського, щоб ви888нити, чи мав повіт якогось герба і яким символом користувалося Белзьке воєводство[44]. На цій основі було розроблено проєкт повітового герба, щодо якого Ю. Пйотровський висловив застереження, що "герб Сокальського повіту має, згідно з геральдичною традицією, пов'язуватися радше з гербом повітового міста, а не з гербом колишнього Белзького воєводства"[45]. Сокальські матеріяли направлено 10 січня 1934 р. на розгляд Міністерства внутрішніх справ, відповідь з якого надійшла аж через п'ять років (!). 14 квітня 1939 р. міністерство відмовило Повітовому об'єднанню місцевого самоврядування в Сокалі в затвердженні надісланого проєкту, оскільки теперішні повіти мають інший правовий характер; традиції повітових гербів не було і немає ніяких історичних підстав; Сокальський повіт не був адміністративною "гербовою" одиницею й герба не мав, а використання ним герба Белзького воєводства необґрунтоване; і на цей символ можуть претендувати й інші повіти[46]. Тут же вказувалося, що повіт може отримати новий символ як надання.

Передбачені чинним законодавством надання розпочалися лише з 1936 р., коли 47 міських гербів пройшли процедуру централізованого затвердження, а всього протягом 1936–1939 рр. було прийнято знаки 104 міст, що становило близько 1/6 всієї кількости міських поселень тогочасної Польщі[47]. Кількість міст з українських земель, які отримали герби, не перевищила й двох десятків. Жодне воєводство чи повіт офіційного затвердження символів так і не отримав. Перешкодою якісного проведення геральдичного процесу стала неграмотно складена законодавча база, й політичні спекуляції, й звичайнісінька бюрократична тяганина та некомпетентність. Подальші намагання польської влади запровадити герби для адміністративно-територіяльних утворень у Західній Україні зупинила Друга світова війна.

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[43] Ягайлонська бібліотека у Кракові (Biblioteka Jagiełłońska w Krakowie). Відділ рукописів. — № 9570. — Арк. 275–276.

[44] НББ, ВР. — Rkp. IV. 5547. — Т. 6. — С. 70.

[45] ДАЛО. — Ф. 1. — Оп. 37. — Спр. 2394. — Арк. 3.

[46] Там само. — Арк. 10.

[47] *Pudłowski L.* Heraldyka miejska II Rzeczypospolitej // Polskie tradycje samorządowe a heraldyka. — Lublin, 1992. — S. 114.

A Socialist Army Officer Confronts War and Nationalist Politics: Konstantin Oberuchev in Revolutionary Kyiv

Mark von Hagen

The career of Konstantin Oberuchev (1864–1929) offers a case study of a self-consciously revolutionary and socialist thinker and social activist confronting the dilemmas of wartime and revolutionary politics. This essay focuses on the period in Oberuchev's life when he seemingly had the greatest opportunity to achieve his political ideals for Russia, in particular the time between March and November 1917, when he held positions of considerable political influence in Kyiv, first as army commissar and then as commander of the Kyiv Military District (hereafter KMD).[1] During those months Oberuchev's fate reflected the dramatic transformations in the Russian Empire itself. At the beginning of 1917 he was still in America, living the final year of his several years abroad in political exile for revolutionary activities undertaken while in the service of the Russian imperial army as a relatively high-ranking (staff) officer. He had first been arrested in 1889, shortly after graduating from the Mikhailov Artillery Academy, for taking part in an illegal military-revolutionary organization.[2] Initially held for seven months in the Peter and Paul For-

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[1] For surveys of this period in the English-language literature, see John S. Reshetar, Jr., *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952); and Taras Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), chaps. 1 and 2.

[2] Oberuchev traced his oppositionist career to the military Gymnasium in Kyiv, where he enrolled in 1881. In the spirit of the counter-reforms that began even before Alexander II's assassination, the Ministry of Education conducted a purge of schools under its auspices to rid them of teachers with liberal ideas; in Kyiv this purge also applied to those with Ukrainophile views. The military Gymnasium, however, was in the school network of the Army Ministry; as a sign of solidarity, the director took in many of those dismissed elsewhere in Kyiv. The students saw these teachers as martyrs in a despotic state and encouraged them to persevere in their political criticisms. See Konstantin Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia* (New York: Izd. Gruppy pochitatelei pamiati K. M. Oberucheva, 1930), 14.

tress prison in St. Petersburg, he was then deported to Turkestan, to serve in detention there until his retirement from the military in 1906. Subsequently he lived in Kyiv, writing for military and socialist newspapers and taking part in the co-operative movement and Russian Socialist Revolutionary (SR) organizations, including ones with the goal of penetrating the imperial army. He was certain of having narrowly escaped arrest in 1909, when the police uncovered revolutionary plots throughout the army. In 1913 he was about to take part in a congress of the Moscow Union of Consumer Associations when he was arrested a second time for ties to revolutionary comrades. Oberuchev was sentenced to exile in Olonets province but the sentence was later changed to exile abroad, with permission to return no sooner than January of 1917. He then left Russia for Switzerland.

In February 1917, at the age of fifty-one, Oberuchev returned home from exile to his native Kyiv wholly ready to resume his political activities. There he found employment in the Union of Towns' Committees for the Southwestern Front (Komitet Yugo-zapadnogo fronta Soiuza gorodov). In short order Oberuchev was rearrested by the KMD's commander even though the ban on his return had expired. While he was still under arrest, the new provisional authority, the Executive Committee of the Council of Public Organizations (Ispolnitelnyi komitet Soveta obshchestvennykh organizatsii; hereafter ECCPO), named him army commissar for the large and frontline KMD to the ongoing war on the Eastern Front. In that post Oberuchev functioned as a mediator between the newly proclaimed Kyiv civilian authority, which was recognized by the Provisional Government in Petrograd and actually was a regional version of that proto-state, and the KMD's military authorities. He had served in that post only a short time when General Aleksei Brusilov, the war hero who was commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, promoted him to commander of the KMD—that is, to replace the man who had only recently arrested him. Oberuchev's appointment was delayed by the crisis of the Provisional Government in Petrograd when the minister of war, Aleksandr Guchkov, who belonged to the conservative Octobrist Party, resigned and was replaced by Aleksandr Kerensky, an erstwhile SR. (Guchkov had just recently conducted a purge of the Army to rid it of officers who did suit the new political situation after the tsar's abdication.)

As commissar, Oberuchev was responsible for explaining difficulties to the troops and officers and trying to keep the peace between the two groups, but as commander of the KMD he was more responsible for delivering results, such as getting replacement troops to the front and keeping those troops armed and otherwise supplied. Very soon he felt his au-

thority undermined by the rise of Ukrainian nationalism and the success of Bolshevik propaganda in the ranks. Concluding that his position had become untenable owing to the conflicts over Ukrainianization of the army, Oberuchev requested permission to resign from his post. In September 1917 he came to revolutionary Petrograd with the new assignment of negotiating with the Central Powers about the exchange of prisoners of war. He was taking part in talks in Copenhagen and about to return when the Bolsheviks seized power in the Russian capital. The Bolshevik delegates at the talks invited Oberuchev to serve the new Lenin government and continue his work with prisoners of war, but he refused. He had come to detest the Bolsheviks and saw no common principles on he could work with them. The old soldier died as an émigré, in New York in 1929.[3]

Oberuchev wrote the first version of his memoirs after deciding not to return to now-Bolshevik Russia and having found refuge in Sweden.[4] His efforts to understand the defeat of moderate socialism and the Bolsheviks' usurpation of the revolution provide a broad frame for study of particular cases in which democratization in the army went wrong and why the Ukrainian socialists split from their Russian comrades-in-arms, thereby exacerbating the fragmentation of the initially united opposition forces in early 1917. The army's morale and fighting condition quickly became crucial determinants for the new revolutionary authorities, who were committed to continuing the war in the name of freedom and to the survival of the Russian Empire as a unitary state. Army politics became inextricably bound to the rise of national rivalries and conflicts as newly assertive non-Russians challenged the socialist credentials of their Russian counterparts and the authority to decide military matters that they claimed. Because Oberuchev was in the maelstrom of Kyiv as it was becoming the capital of an increasingly autonomous Ukraine, and because his responsibilities were tied to the decisive Southwestern Front, his account of these months stresses these linkages better than many memoirs

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[3] Oberuchev learned that several of his SR comrades, including P. Rutenberg, the deputy commander of the Petrograd military district, were arrested in the first days after the Bolsheviks' coup, a fate Oberuchev himself might have shared, given his record of conflict with them (ibid., 433).

[4] My essay relies primarily on Oberuchev's own accounts of these turbulent months in *V dni revoliutsii: Vospominaniia uchastnika Velikoi Russkoi revoliutsii 1917–go goda* (New York: Izd. "Narodnopravstva," 1919), hereafter *VD*. He dated completion of the memoirs to 5 December 1917 in Stockholm, where he decided to remain after the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd. This period is treated from a later perspective in his much longer *Vospominaniia*, which also contains some additional details. This second publication was prepared posthumously by a group of former comrades-in-arms, most of whom were fellow émigrés in New York.

do (he attended nearly all important congresses during 1917 in Kyiv, as well as several outside the city, mostly in garrison towns).[5] Within the framework of his own revolutionary politics, he faced conflicts between his identities as a socialist, a military officer, and a patriotic Russian. His decisions, choices, and evaluations were not those of all Russians, or officers, or socialists during this period. But they were also not unique, for many citizens of the new Russia were coming to similar conclusions. However representative he was, or was not, Oberuchev's perspective on the events of 1917 in Kyiv helps us understand that year in a way different from not only Petrograd-centered views but also those of the Ukrainian movement in Kyiv itself.

Oberuchev's Understanding of the Revolution

Oberuchev was one of the many defeated socialists and revolutionaries who tried to understand how the Bolsheviks had shut them out of the political space of revolutionary Russia.[6] He attempted to understand how the initial revolutionary unity and hope for a better future of the first months after the abdication of Nicholas II descended into conflicts and hatred, and how the first generation of revolutionary leaders were supplanted by a new and, in his view, more plebeian set of representatives of Russian society who had trouble thinking for themselves in the confusing circumstances. Oberuchev considered himself a revolutionary and a democrat for most of his life, and he remained committed to those views until his death in 1929. Owing to those political convictions and his organizational activities, Oberuchev was not only sentenced to internal exile in Russia's Turkestan but also expelled from his native land. For him, revolution was a matter of deeply ingrained faith and ultimate justice. Oberuchev was proud of his career as a revolutionary in military uniform and saw himself in the noble tradition of the Decembrists of the 1820s and the later Populists of the 1870s. He lionized the officers of the imperial army who formed military-revolutionary circles, many of whom were

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[5] Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia,* 373. For example, Oberuchev addressed the Executive Committee of the Kyiv Council of Workers' Deputies within a week and a half of its formation; later in the year he attended the opening of the All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress, the All-Ukrainian Military Congress, and so on.

[6] See Viktor Chernov, *Pered burei: vospominaniia* (New York: Izd. imeni Chekhova, 1953), for the perspective of the leader of the SRs; for the Mensheviks, see Pavel Akselrod, *Perezhitoe i peredumannoe* (Berlin: Grzhebin, 1923), and Yulii Martov, *Zapiski sotsial-demokrata* (Berlin, Petersburg, and Moscow: Grzhebin, 1922). For a survey of much of the agonized polemics of the Russian socialist emigration, see Jane Burbank, *Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917–1922* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

expelled and/or arrested. For Oberuchev, military service was in many ways yet another version of the "to the people" ethos held by earlier generations of well-intentioned intellectuals.[7]

As a moderate or perhaps right Socialist Revolutionary who stubbornly insisted on Russia's obligation to win the war against the Central Powers, albeit without annexations or indemnities, Oberuchev found himself in the camp of socialist defensists who opposed the far left of the revolutionary movement,[8] which stood against the war and sought either its immediate negotiated end or Russia's defeat. Most of his experience was with soldiers, officers, and often the workers of wartime, revolutionary Kyiv. In his analysis of the causes of the Bolsheviks' success and the moderates' failure, Oberuchev identified many factors, including the tragic and senseless fragmentation of the new political institutions and newly empowered political parties. The socialists, too, were prone to splintering over fundamental questions of war and power, as he himself acknowledged. The opposition against the autocracy that had formed a united front was replaced by a proliferation of committees and executive committees who claimed to speak with authority for the revolution and asserted the rights of particular constituencies. Oberuchev viewed the committees in a largely positive light during the first months of the revolution, seeing them as crucial in helping the revolutionary citizenry assert its voice and shed its prior timidity before authority. But as they fell sway to Bolshevik influences, he came to believe the Russian population was being misled, if not deceived, by crass appeals to their basest instincts.

Naturally enough, Oberuchev assigned a large measure of blame to the nation's exhaustion and a war incompetently waged by a reactionary

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[7] Oberuchev claimed that for his generation of military cadets, the Balkan Wars of 1876–77, which he saw as a fight to liberate the oppressed peoples of the Ottoman Empire, provided the first models of how the army could serve the people. During that conflict Populists enlisted in the army as orderlies to "help the people" and lighten the sufferings of wounded soldiers, who, after all, were the same peasants the populists had tried to reach in their largely unsuccessful "to the people" campaign. See his *Vospominaniia,* 11–12. Later, when he received his first posting as a commissioned officer, Oberuchev welcomed the assignment to teach illiterate soldiers in his brigade as "cultural-enlightenment work" (ibid, 21–22). On the Populists' ethos, see also Richard Wortman, *The Crisis of Russian Populism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).

[8] Revolutionary defensism, originally defensism, was a left-wing patriotism most evident among primarily SRs and Mensheviks. The socialists deemed German militarism a threat to the cause of revolution and consequently defended the prosecution of the war in the name of "revolutionary Russia." See Ziva Galili y Garcia, "Origins of Revolutionary Defensism: I. G. Tsereteli and the 'Siberian Zimmerwaldists,'" *Slavic Review* 41, no. 3 (September 1982): 454–76; and George Katkov, *Russia 1917: The February Revolution* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 23–37.

and inflexible autocracy. He himself had experienced the pettiness and self-defeating behavior of the Russian wartime authorities even in exile in Switzerland, where together with other Russian émigrés and the help of the Swiss state and society he helped organize relief for Russian prisoners of war in the camps of the Central Powers. Not only did the tsarist officials refuse to allow money that had been raised in Russia to be transferred to the émigré groups, but they eventually stopped paying Oberuchev's pension because of his political unreliability. (Admittedly, the idea of the autocracy paying a pension to a sentenced revolutionary officer while he was in foreign exile already seems generous, but Oberuchev staunchly believed that he was entitled to the pension for his service in the Russian army.) He also acknowledged that his years away from Russia, especially in Switzerland, were critical in his repudiation of the culture of arbitrary arrests that manifested itself among the newly assertive workers and soldiers almost immediately after the overthrow of the old regime. This was one of the unfortunate legacies the old regime bequeathed to its successor.

But it was precisely this enthusiasm for arrests to avenge past wrongs that led Oberuchev to what was perhaps his most important explanation for why the Bolsheviks behaved the way they did in inciting the otherwise "soft" crowd to violent acts against the existing authorities. The strong dose of populism that formed his identity as an SR led him to insist on the fundamental goodness of the Russian people, a goodness he illustrated with several personal encounters. He resisted a revolutionary politics based on class and insisted that the "people" (*narod*) was a concept he could better understand.[9] Even the hardships of war did not exhaust that reservoir of goodness: witness the behavior of the revolutionary soldiers and workers during the first weeks of the new order. Still, Oberuchev's faith in the people was coupled to a belief that they lacked culture, rendering Russia unready for real socialism; for the moment, then, the main struggle had to be for political liberties and a democratic republic to replace the autocracy.[10] This contradictory view of the people led him to a novel theory of why 1917 went so wrong so quickly. The main "instigators," a word he used frequently in describing the organizers of the rabble in revolutionary Ukraine, were in many instances the old regime's former policemen and political agents, who had been dismissed en masse by the new Provisional Government and the revolutionary councils and were therefore disgruntled with the new authorities. It was these unemployed policemen who were among the most enthusias-

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[9] Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia,* 27.

[10] Ibid, 31.

tic new volunteers to the Bolshevik party. And who but former policemen would be so ready to call for summary arrests of the new revolutionary authorities and even worse?[11]

Oberuchev had formed his hostile views of the Bolsheviks already as an émigré in Switzerland, where he recalled hearing Lenin, Trotsky, and Anatolii Lunacharsky speak to socialist circles. With the qualified exception of Lunacharsky and Aleksandra Kollontai, he found the Bolshevik leaders to be narrow-minded, inflexible, intolerant, and fanatical. In Switzerland Oberuchev met a Bolshevik named Yurii Piatakov, whose political career would intersect with his own in 1917 after Piatakov became head of the Bolsheviks in Kyiv. Oberuchev wrote that he "considered and continues to consider him an honest revolutionary."[12] During the war, when Oberuchev took up the cause of helping Russia's prisoners of war, he confronted Bolshevik agitators who opposed his efforts because they wanted Russia's defeat in the war. Part of Oberuchev's intense feelings against the Bolsheviks came from his own sense of revolutionary patriotism; also, he viewed them as traitors and demagogues well before 1917. He resented the Bolsheviks for exploiting the social and political tensions in the country and destroying the national unity that followed the revolution's initial euphoria. While in 1917 the majority view of a possible counter-revolution connected it to the officers or other imperial elites, Oberuchev, like a Cassandra, warned constantly and in vain of the danger of a counter-revolution from the left.[13]

Oberuchev and the Revolutionary Russian Army

Konstantin Mikhailovich Oberuchev was born in Turkestan, where his father was a colonel in the Russian imperial army. He first attended the Kyiv Military Gymnasium and then enrolled in the Mikhailov Artillery School in St. Petersburg; he graduated from the Mikhailov Artillery Academy in 1889, shortly before his first arrest. He became a leading specialist on problems of artillery and published widely in military journals, even while in exile and after retirement. He was also committed to

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[11] *VDR*, 104–6. A source and basis for this theory may have been the unmasking of the first chairman of the Kyiv Council of Workers' Deputies, one Ermakov, as a police provocateur just a month after his election. See Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia*, 373.

[12] Ibid., 409–14. Oberuchev, trying to appeal to Piatakov's "honest revolutionary" side, challenged him about the Bolsheviks' readiness to collaborate with the worst kinds of Ukrainian chauvinists. He had a much more critical opinion of Piatakov's brother, Leonid, who agitated among the soldiers and eventually became head of a Bolshevized Kyiv Council of Workers' Deputies. He saw Leonid as an illustrative example of the most alarming features of Ukrainian Bolshevism (ibid., 413).

[13] Ibid., 395.

the Revolution and saw himself in the noble tradition of officer-revolutionaries dating from the Decembrists' uprising in 1825.[14]

As a socialist Oberuchev advocated the eventual establishment of a militia-type military service in place of the standing army, which European liberals and leftists had associated with despotism and autocracy for much of the second half of the nineteenth century. (The leading European advocate of militias was the French socialist Jean Jaurès.)[15] In the months before the outbreak of World War I, Oberuchev took advantage of his exile in Switzerland to become acquainted with the experience of a country that had successfully replaced its standing army with a citizen militia. He wrote several articles about his observations and was re-affirmed in his socialist faith that such an important reform in civil-military relations was feasible, albeit in a country far more democratic than Russia was likely to be for the foreseeable future.

In the meantime Oberuchev seemed reconciled to the need for regular armies, especially during the global conflict that became World War I. His own complicated feelings of patriotism for Russia led him to apply to the War Ministry in Petrograd for permission to return home and serve in the army's ranks, despite his opposition to the autocracy and even his revolutionary efforts to overthrow it. To no surprise, but to Oberuchev's great disappointment, the Russian authorities refused to honor his request, demonstrating to Oberuchev that even in times of national emergency, the bureaucracy remained narrow-minded and fearful of its own citizens. His feelings of thwarted patriotism became even more painful with the death of his brother on the Eastern Front in February 1915. Since he was banned from direct participation in the wartime effort, Oberuchev directed his energies to joining other Russian émigrés and Swiss officials and citizens in mobilizing support for the relief of Russian prisoners of war. In short, Oberuchev had a very strong sense of duty and readiness to join the fray to support the Russian war effort in spite of the autocracy's mismanagement and incompetence.

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[14] One of his most lyrical invocations of the Decembrists came during a visit in July 1917 to Tulchyn in Podillia gubernia, the seat of the Southern Society's activities and the place where Pavel Pestel drafted the "Russian Truth," perhaps the Decembrists' most famous document. Oberuchev lamented that in the current climate of hatred for all officers, these great revolutionaries and their sacrifices for Russia's freedom had been forgotten. Ibid., 284–85.

[15] See Jean Jaurès, *L'Armée nouvelle: L'organization socialiste de la France* (Paris: L'Humanité; 1915); and my and Sigmund Neumann's "Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* 262–80, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).

These patriotic feelings, combined with his strong sense of the honor of the Russian officers who risked their careers and lives for the Revolution (including himself), rendered Oberuchev very intolerant of deserters in 1917. He considered them cowards and traitors to the revolution. As commissar and commander in Kyiv, he hoped to take advantage of the euphoria and unity of the revolution's early weeks to give shape to a new type of revolutionary, with conscious military discipline among the troops supplanting the harsh and unthinking obedience based on physical punishment under the old regime. He fulminated against Bolsheviks and Ukrainian nationalists for appealing to the basest instincts of the soldiers—self-preservation and a politics of entitlement—instead of inspiring them to defend the new revolutionary regime. (Ironically, the Bolsheviks tried to introduce a similar conscious revolutionary discipline in the early years of the Red Army.)

Although Oberuchev insisted that he opposed allowing politics into the army, his position was less straightforward than it appeared. He believed that the politicization of the army would inevitably lead to military conspiracies, coups, and a praetorian state. He insisted that "an army should be an apparatus for defense of the country from foreign enemies, and nothing more." Accordingly, Oberuchev criticized both the Petrograd military authorities for introducing "political departments" in several districts, and the soldiers' and officers' councils for claiming the right to issue unilateral orders to their constituencies on military matters and agitating among the soldiers on political issues.[16] Although he opposed allowing soldiers to vote in the local elections for the Kyiv city duma later in the year, he insisted on their right to take part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly (elections that did not occur until after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd) and to express their political views "as citizens."[17] Even on this issue Oberuchev's position was inconsistent, since he welcomed the municipal elections as an important educational experience and trial in anticipation of the balloting for the Constituent Assembly, and yet his opposition to the soldiers' participation would have denied them this critical experience.[18] So Oberuchev too, like those he criticized, favored soldiers taking their newly gained empowerment

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[16] Although the councils had promised not to issue any orders or resolution to the troops without obtaining Oberuchev's authorization as commander, that promise was rarely kept, so he found himself continually surprised by decisions over which he had less and less control. See Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia,* 275.

[17] See ibid., 172, 273. Oberuchev complained that the councils had a very open mission of waging political campaigns in the army.

[18] See ibid, 395–99, for Oberuchev's discussion of these elections in the summer of 1917.

seriously, but only as long as their politics were limited to arenas he thought appropriate—another ironic appearance of the formula *postolku-poskolku*.[19] In another episode that betrayed his somewhat opportunistic approach to contemporary politics, Oberuchev described a tour he made of several garrison towns after the disastrous June offensive to learn firsthand the conditions of his troops. He invited the deputy chairman of the Kyiv Soldiers' Council, a Menshevik soldier named Okhrym Task, to help him address the now overwhelming problems of morale and desertion in the KMD.[20]

Oberuchev's observations, judgments, and behavior at that time also illustrate the contradictions of attempting military reform aimed at a general democratization of the army during wartime and revolution. While postponing the militia ideal to a less chaotic future, he initially welcomed the changes in the army that recognized the rights of soldiers and officers as citizens. In a characteristic greeting that reflected the new revolutionary status and image of soldiers, Oberuchev addressed a crowd of disgruntled and disobedient troops as "comrades, warriors [*voiny*], and citizens!"[21] This new form of address signaled the expansion of citizenship to soldiers, as it presumed their revolutionary sympathies and acceptance of the ethos of egalitarianism that "comradeship" asserted. For Oberuchev and the other moderate socialists who served the Provisional Government, such democratization went hand in hand with the expectation that the soldiers would fight for the new regime, even if it was the same old war. After Oberuchev was appointed commander, he found a new ally in his revolutionary defensism in the person of the commissar appointed to replace him in his former position, the Menshevik defensist Ivan Kirienko (Kyriienko).[22]

In the spirit of the soldiers' newly recognized rights, from the first days of the revolution soldiers began electing their own deputies to a

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[19] This formula, which translates "as long as" or "insofar as," was used to describe the terms on which the Petrograd Soviet was willing to support the work of the Provisional Government, namely, as long as it continued to pursue the aims of revolutionary Russia. So, too, Oberuchev cast his relationship with the soldiers, in parallel with the Provisional Government–Petrograd Soviet model.

[20] Ibid., 276. Task had his own history of jail terms and exile, so in him Oberuchev felt he had a genuine comrade.

[21] *VDR*, 90. This happened in mid-September, as Commander Oberuchev was trying to persuade the Poltava garrison to release several officers who had been seized by the soldiers' council.

[22] Oberuchev was reassured by Kirienko's revolutionary biography, which included several years of exile and hard labor. Before his arrest Kirienko (1877–?) was a deputy to the second Duma.

range of organizations that would assert the voice of those bearing arms for the nation.[23] In many units officers and soldiers elected separate councils (*sovety*) and executive committees, though these often held joint meetings. The months of March to November 1917 saw a feverish proliferation of committees to address all possible issues, which contemporaries quickly dubbed *komitetchina*. Soon the committees became the forum for articulating social discontent; soldiers complained about "reactionary" and "counter-revolutionary" officers, while workers suspected all military men of conspiring to overturn "their" revolution. To Oberuchev all these demands and charges reflected the low level of political development of the Russian population, which was demanding all sorts of rights in the name of the new regime but rarely felt any commensurate obligations to defend or otherwise support it.

For Oberuchev as an army commissar, this fissure translated into the conflicts and mutual suspicion that pitted officers against soldiers. Indeed, Oberuchev saw his role as commissar primarily as a political buffer between soldiers and their commanders.[24] Accordingly he devoted most of his career as commissar and, subsequently, commander to resolving disputes over authority in his jurisdiction. The first army elections in Kyiv began with the officers electing their representatives and forming their own executive committee to co-ordinate future political activities in the military. Next the soldiers elected their representatives and formed an executive committee. At this stage there was still enough harmony to permit the officers and soldiers to agree to form a joint Council of Military Delegates of the KMD.[25] But the soldiers' deputies felt as much, if not more, solidarity with the newly elected workers' deputies and maintained contacts with their organizations. Often the soldiers found allies among the workers in their challenges to officers' authority and in their charges of abuse. The workers likewise often found sympathy among the soldiers in their conflicts with employers and factory owners. Before long, soldiers and workers joined forces in a joint executive committee of their representatives, which notably excluded officers from participating in their deliberations.

Yet even this episode of worker-soldier solidarity proved to be fragile and brief. Oberuchev was distressed by what happened during a joint

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[23] The best studies of soldiers' politics during 1917 are Allan Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army*, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980, 1987); and Mikhail Frenkin, *Russkaia armiia i revoliutsiia, 1917–1918* (Munich: Logos, 1978). Oddly, Wildman does not cite Oberuchev's memoirs in his two volumes.

[24] Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia*, 115.

[25] On the executive committees and their relations, see *VDR*, 52–58.

meeting of workers' and soldiers' councils he attended in Kremenchuh, another garrison town in the KMD. The soldiers offended the workers by charging that the members of their council were not in fact genuine workers—that is, that they did not have long-standing ties to factories or other proletarian workplaces and the consequent revolutionary consciousness—but were just avoiding military service under the guise of being workers. The workers, in turn, accused the soldiers of reactionary and even counter-revolutionary politics. Still, the executive committees of the soldiers and workers were able to agree on resisting pressure from above, including from Oberuchev, to release or try an officer, Lt. Col. Smirnov, whom they had been holding for more than three months on merely a vague accusation of "counter-revolution." Oberuchev took this to be another example of the culture of arbitrary arrests the old regime had bequeathed to revolutionary society.[26] It was also a sign of his rapidly eroding authority in Kyiv—and, by extension, Petrograd. Even among the soldiers themselves, each month brought growing polarization; for example, soldiers at the front, at least initially, resented the soldiers in the rear, who began to fear for their lives when they were sent from Kyiv on morale and inspection tours to the front lines. The frontline soldiers, for their part, believed that those in the rear were partly to blame for their own suffering in the trenches while others lived it up.[27]

The most serious threat of the new politics to the army's integrity was the increasing insistence on electing officers and commissars and, by extension, removing unpopular officers by popular vote. This was a form of democratization Oberuchev fought against with all his energy, but largely in vain. He recounts a visit he made to a unit whose council of military deputies had just elected an army commissar, where he defended the authority of the Provisional Government and the army itself to make such appointments. But there an assertive soldier pointedly reminded him that his own appointment as commander of the KMD had come on the recommendation of the Kyiv Council. Oberuchev acknowledged this "democratic" initiative, but he insisted that Brusilov had nominated him and the Kyiv Council had merely lobbied for his appointment with the Petrograd authorities.[28] Still, the soldier had grasped and exposed the slippery slope of the transformation of civil-military relations throughout the country. And Oberuchev was willing to have it both ways himself.

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[26] Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia*, 244–45.

[27] Ibid., 379.

[28] Ibid., 201–202. Esewhere in his memoirs Oberuchev asserts his authority as an official of the revolutionary regime by virtue of having been elected by the Council of Soldiers' Deputies. See ibid., 192.

When he faced arrest by a group of angry soldiers over his insistence that they pay for transportation on city trams or not ride them, a Polish officer (serving in one of the experimental Polish regiments) tried to shame them into obeying their commander, on the grounds that he had been "elected by the soldiers themselves." Oberuchev did not correct them at this moment but managed to avoid arrest and have a heated conversation with the soldiers. It proved impossible for not only Petrograd but also Kyiv authorities to manage the fragmenting of authority through the proliferation of new committees and councils.

In the end, the soldiers' most serious threat to Oberuchev's sense of the limits of democratization was their protest against the war itself and unwillingness to fight it. He recorded the range of ways in which the soldiers expressed their opposition to the unpopular war, most tragically by self-mutilation or simulated sickness or injury.[29] Oberuchev detected what he interpreted as the war-weary soldiers' own version of the defensism that he himself shared with much of the new ruling elites: for the soldiers, defense meant "not a step forward, but no movement backward either." In reply to these attitudes, Oberuchev wrote several articles (published in *Kievskaia mysl*) on the differences between offensive and defensive warfare. The mostly negative reaction he received—"It's fine for you to think about offense when you're sitting warm in the city, but for those of us who have been here three years, it's not something we care to think about"[30]—touched a sore spot in him. For, indeed, Colonel Oberuchev appears never to have taken part in a genuine war, since his career coincided with the largely peaceful years of Alexander III's reign and Nicholas II's early years of rule.

The Ukrainian Soldiers' Movement as a Test of Socialist Federalism

As an SR and a progressive Russian with roots in Kyiv, Oberuchev was in favor of a federalist future for a democratic Russia, in which all nations would have a measure of autonomy and cultural rights.[31] He in-

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[29] Cutting off or otherwise injuring one's fingers was the most widespread method of self-mutilation, lending the nickname *palechniki* (from Russian *palets*, "finger") to this group. Another alarming group of self-mutilators, according to Oberuchev, were soldiers who "consciously" contracted venereal diseases so as to avoid service at the front. See ibid., 201–22, on self-inflicted shooting wounds; and 283–84 on venereal disease.

[30] Ibid., 209.

[31] Besides his attachment to Kyiv, Oberuchev also had strong ties to Vinnytsia, one of his earliest postings as a battery commander. In 1910 he was tried together with a group of other officers who had served with him there; they were all charged with political offenses. See ibid., 279–80.

sisted that among his oldest friends and acquaintances were leaders of the Ukrainophile wing of social democracy and that they largely remained true to their democratic and socialist principles. He reminded his readers of his intervention to bring back to Kyiv the exiled historian and national leader Mykhailo Hrushevsky after his Ukrainian comrades asked for Oberuchev's help.[32] He paid homage to the Ukrainian movement's patron saint, Taras Shevchenko, during a visit as commissar to the garrison in Kaniv, the site of Shevchenko's grave; this last visit in 1917 brought to mind earlier visits to the shrine, including one with his wife, who left a cloth she had embroidered to honor "father Taras."[33] As further proof of his own Ukrainophile sympathies, Oberuchev described an encounter during his administrative exile to Turkestan in the 1870s that he had had with another officer—a Cossack, to boot—to whom he had argued that the imperial government made a serious mistake in banning the use of the Ukrainian language.[34]

Yet it was the extension of the goals of autonomy and self-determination to the Russian army in the form of the Ukrainianization of military units that provoked Oberuchev to resign his post as commander and seek new opportunities in the revolution in Petrograd, away from Kyiv. He came to see his conflicts with the chaotic and, in his view, opportunistic advocates of Ukrainianization as "the most tragic experiences" of his eight months working "for the Revolution." Ukrainianization of the army "was dangerous to the general cause of freedom," he insisted.[35] Just as he accepted the postponement of the militia model to a more peaceful future, so, too, he believed that extensive decentralization and autonomy were premature in wartime conditions: a federal Russia would have to wait. In the meantime he welcomed the removal of discriminatory ethnic and confessional criteria and the extension of civil and political rights to all citizens of Russia. Like most liberals and moderate socialists, he assumed that much of the interethnic animosity of the prewar and war

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[32] Ibid., 310

[33] Ibid., 237–38.

[34] Ibid, 72–73. Oberuchev was quite surprised by the reaction of this Russian officer in Turkestan, who had "gone native" (*otuzemilsia*) to the point that his wife wore a *parandzha*, a Muslim headdress. Instead of the solidarity Oberuchev had expected, the former officer (now an inspector of native schools) countered with a theory of nations—including the Ukrainian—that were dying out and whose demise should not be obstructed by "artificially" encouraging the use of their language.

[35] *VDR*, 93. See also my article "The Russian Imperial Army and the Ukrainian National Movement in 1917," in *The Period of the Ukrainian Central Rada*, vol. 54, nos. 3–4 (Fall–Winter 1998) of *The Ukrainian Quarterly,* 220–56.

years would disappear with expanded access to these rights.[36] He was particularly proud of his efforts as commissar to win permission for Jews to enter military schools, from which they had largely been banned in tsarist times.[37]

From his earliest days as commissar in Kyiv, Oberuchev was confronted with the prospect of "nationalization" of the army, a movement among many non-Russian nationalities to form army units from predominantly one nation. Because Kyiv and the KMD were on the front lines of the war, it was at the center of many, if not most, of these experiments in reorganizing the army. Kyiv was host to Polish units formed earlier during the war and designated as the site for forming Czechoslovak units from prisoners of war, an innovation Oberuchev opposed on grounds of international and military law forbidding the use of foreign prisoners for combat against their native state. He also argued to Gen. Chervinka, a representative of the Army Ministry from Petrograd, that the formation of Czechoslovak units violated the Provisional Government's promise not to annex any territories without approval by popular referenda. Clearly the troops were being used to achieve a military "liberation" of the Czech and Slovak lands from Austria-Hungary.[38] Indeed, Oberuchev deliberately ignored requests to find accommodation for the Czechoslovak units authorized by the Petrograd Army official; he also took pride in his determination to forbid the formation of Czechoslovak units in the KMD during his tenure and in his successful removal of the Polish regiments stationed in Kyiv.[39] His attitude toward the Polish regiments was actually somewhat ambiguous, partly because the Polish regiments were formed of Russian subjects of Polish nationality. Progressive, including socialist, public opinion in Russia had long been accepted the cause of Polish autonomy and independence, so socialists like Oberuchev had a more posi-

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[36] On the new authorities' "blindness" to the national question, see the memoirs of the Georgian Menshevik leader (and member of the Petrograd Soviet and Provisional Government) I. G. Tsereteli, *Vospominaniia o Fevralskoi revoliutsii*, vol. 2 (Paris: Mouton, 1963), chap. 5, esp. pp. 82–87.

[37] Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia*, 215–16.

[38] Ibid., 216. Oberuchev recounts the objections of Germany and Austria-Hungary at the Copenhagen negotiations on POWs held in the fall of 1917 to the Russian practice of recruiting POWs from their states to fight in the Russian army against the Central Powers. Oberuchev refers to a resolution of the Military Council in Petrograd, dated 26 March 1917, authorizing the formation of a division from Czechoslovak prisoners of war (Ibid., 245–49). On the Czechoslovak units, see Joseph Bradley, *The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia, 1914–1920* (New York and Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs and Columbia University Press, 1991); and V. S. Dragomiretsky, *Chekhoslovaki v Rossii, 1914–1920* (Paris and Prague, 1928).

[39] Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia*, 246.

tive attitude toward Polish nationalism than toward similar sentiments among the empire's other nationalities.[40]

Many of Oberuchev's colleagues and superiors did not share his concerns and objections. Nationalist and pan-Slavic sentiments in the High Command, together with a desperate hope that nationalism—even non-Russian nationalism—would be an effective antidote to the even more threatening Bolshevization of the troops, won out over cooler heads advising caution with these experiments. Oberuchev's counterpart in the Moscow Military District, Gen. Aleksandr Verkhovsky, was typical of the pro-Ukrainianization officers. When Oberuchev visited Moscow on the way home from a trip to Petrograd and army headquarters, Verkhovsky assured him that the "most reliable units in his district were the Ukrainian ones."[41] In Petrograd Oberuchev had been unable to get any serious response to his complaints about the chaos of Ukrainianization. Kerensky, who was now serving as prime minister (minister-president) and army minister, was too busy to hear Oberuchev's report about his problems in the KMD. National formations were only one of the military authorities' responses to the crisis in morale and escalating numbers of desertions: the High Command authorized the organization of all sorts of "shock battalions," including a famous women's battalion. Oberuchev objected to all of these on the grounds that they declared a lack of confidence in regular units and disorganized them, since the "volunteers" for the new shock troops were soldiers from existing units or little-experienced Junkers and military cadets.[42]

In Kyiv, of course, the largest such experiment concerned Ukrainian soldiers. The argument for formation of their own units pointed to examples of other national regiments and divisions, especially those of the Poles, who, after all, had a history of anti-imperial uprisings in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During Oberuchev's first days as commissar, Second Lieutenant Mykola Mikhnovsky approached him with an invitation to serve as honorary member of an organizing committee for the "formation of a Ukrainian army." An army lawyer, Mikhnovsky was also a Ukrainian revolutionary and nationalist who would eventually become a political nuisance not only for Oberuchev, but also

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[40] Oberuchev was impressed by a celebration of Polish unity that he witnessed in late March or early April at a POW camp in Darnytsia on the outskirts of Kyiv: there members of the Polish regiment serving in the Russian army joined Polish prisoners from Austria-Hungary and Germany in a joint Roman Catholic mass. See ibid., 249.

[41] Ibid., 322. Verkhovsky would soon become minister of the army.

[42] Oberuchev devotes an entire chapter of his memoirs to these unfortunate—in his view—experiments. See ibid., 245–60.

for the Ukrainian Central Rada's General Secretariat and even subsequent Ukrainian governments. Oberuchev declined the invitation on the grounds that the revolution had done away with the meaningless tradition of honorary titles, but added that he would be honored to serve as an actual working member of the committee.[43] He set some conditions on agreeing to help the committee advance its goals: above all, that the new Ukrainian units be formed of volunteers otherwise ineligible to serve. When and if there was apparent consensus about this, he pledged his support. Little did Oberuchev realize how far these efforts would soon escalate and how fierce his opposition to them would become.

Oberuchev faced the first test of his conditions upon returning from a trip to the front in early May. While at home with his family, he received an urgent phone call from the Executive Committee of the Council of Soldiers' Deputies asking that he immediately come to the Mariinskyi (Empress Maria) Palace in Kyiv, where the committee was meeting to resolve a serious question of political and military authority. Earlier that day a group of nearly four thousand "deserters" awaiting reassignment, led by a staff captain named D. M. Putnyk-Hrebeniuk, had marched out into the street and headed in the direction of the palace to demand recognition as the First Ukrainian Regiment, named in honor and memory of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The Executive Committee had refused their demands, whereupon the "regiment" had appealed to the Kyiv commander, Nikolai Khodorovich, who in characteristically dilatory fashion referred them back to the committee, at which point Oberuchev was called. When Oberuchev got to the meeting hall, he was alarmed by the hostile faces and the fact that many of them had no "Ukrainian national features." He noted that *"bogdanovtsy"* (Ukrainian: *bohdanivtsi,* i.e., soldiers of the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment) had donned yellow-and-blue ribbons in assertion of their Ukrainian loyalties. Oberuchev became convinced that many soldiers who wanted to desert had simply "discovered" a Ukrainian identity as a political cover for their cowardice. (As evidence for his theory, Oberuchev recalled that after Putnyk-Hrebeniuk was eventually arrested by officers of the newly forming regiments and was being sent to the front, he had confessed to Oberuchev that he, too, believed Ukrainian formations were unnecessary!)[44]

The Central Rada was drawn into the conflict. It took the principled position that the formation of a Ukrainian army was premature, but it was nevertheless prepared to acknowledge the Khmelnytsky Regiment as a fait accompli. Oberuchev continued to oppose recognizing the "desert-

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[43] *VDR*, 92–93.

[44] *VDR*, 93–94.

ers" as a regiment, but he also wanted to appeal to a higher authority. He proposed a visit to General Brusilov to resolve the issue, still insisting on his conditions that such a regiment be commanded by serving officers but its recruits be volunteers. He invited representatives of both Mikhnovsky's organizing committee and the disputed "regiment" to meet and discuss matters. The following day, when no one showed up at the train station to accompany him, he proceeded to Brusilov's headquarters alone. The front commander agreed to Oberuchev's proposal and conditions and even consented to the formation of a second, reserve regiment.[45] But once again, despite seeming consensus, Oberuchev's conditions were ignored: officers for the regiments were found, but genuine volunteers were not. Instead the troops were recruited from among deserters from the front and rear units. Not surprisingly, several months later, when Oberuchev, now himself commander of the KMD, tried to fulfill his obligation to send good replacements to the front during the June offensive, he failed. A major reason for that failure, he insisted, was the chaotic and demoralizing components of unauthorized and unregulated Ukrainianization. Any time he sent out an order for a reserve unit to mobilize for the front, the soldiers would call a meeting, elect several representatives, and declare that they would go there only "under the Ukrainian flag."[46]

Oberuchev as an Enemy of the Ukrainian Cause

The process of Ukrainianization in the army took a new direction in early May 1917, when the militant second lieutenant Mikhnovsky and the Central Rada decided to convene the First All-Ukrainian Military Congress to resolve some important issues. That congress took place from 5 to 8 May in Kyiv at the Pedagogical Museum, which now normally housed the Central Rada. As army commissar and a representative of the ECCPO, Oberuchev attended its pre-opening organizational sessions. The experience confirmed some of his fears, especially his conviction that Ukrainian activists were using the cover of "volunteer" Ukrainian military units to promote the creation of a full-fledged Ukrainian army. As a first step the reformers sought to transfer all Ukrainian soldiers and officers serving across the empire back to Ukraine, in accord with the imperial army's policy of extraterritorial recruitment and stationing. Oberuchev recognized that the Ukrainians were split among themselves into two rival camps: the militant—and, in his evaluation, nationally chauvinist—group around Mikhnovsky, and what he referred

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[45] *VDR*, 94–95.

[46] Ibid., 96–97.

to as the democratic tendency, represented by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura. Oberuchev thought it his duty to remind the congress organizers that war was still being fought and that Russia and Ukraine shared common interests in defending themselves from a powerful enemy. But even he could not resist playing to Ukrainian patriotic feelings at the congress when he called on the delegates to stand in the defense of "mother-Ukraine."

Oberuchev was disturbed by several aspects of the congress, including the fact that several of its sessions were closed to outsiders. While acknowledging that some technical military matters under discussion might threaten army security, he nonetheless felt that the secrecy contributed to a rise in distrust between the Central Rada and its counterparts in Kyiv and Petrograd. He was also struck by the sense of empowerment of many delegates, especially those surrounding Mikhnovsky, which he considered inappropriate and dangerous. These delegates openly proclaimed their intent to build a Ukrainian army and expel from Ukraine all *katsapy*, a Ukrainian pejorative term for Russians. When Oberuchev spotted a delegate dressed in a Cossack uniform of the old Zaporozhian Sich era but sporting the insignia of a lieutenant in the Russian army, he asked the colorful officer, named Pavlenko, about his unit. When Pavlenko replied that he was an officer of the "Ukrainian army (*voisko*)," Oberuchev answered, "But there is no Ukrainian army at this time." Lieutenant Pavlenko shot back with a challenge: "You'll see how it will rise and cover all of Ukraine. It exists already, but you just don't see it."[47]

In the end the organizing committee elected a presidium that represented both rival factions; subsequently the "democratic faction" emerged as the victor. Still, the congress's resolutions raised the stakes higher in relations between Kyiv and Petrograd. Claiming to speak in the name of 900,000 "organized [and] armed Ukrainian people," the congress demanded an act from the Petrograd government recognizing the "principle of Ukraine's national and territorial autonomy as the best guarantee" of the rights of Ukrainians and the entire region. The most contentious resolutions bore on "the Ukrainian army." Insisting on the importance of "maintaining conscious discipline, which now is only possible in a people's army" and that the requisite high military morale "can only be raised by some great common, uniting idea," they proclaimed that for Ukrainians it was "the idea of national rebirth." Following that faith, the congress therefore "believes in the immediate consolidation of all Ukrainians [now serving] in the armies into one national army." The congress condemned the army of "the old despotic regime" as "antidemocratic" and wasteful of

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[47] Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia,* 225–27.

national funds; moreover, that kind of army contributed to the "disintegration of the nationalities' moral strength." The congress's resolutions used the language of revolutionary defensism to argue that "nationalization of the army" and, in particular, a Ukrainian national army would restore the soldiers' spirit of resistance and raise morale. They predicted that with the restoration of morale, desertions would recede as a problem, but they also acknowledged that more effort was needed to combat desertion, including engaging the village itself and urging soldiers from the front to write home. They called upon regimental councils and soldiers' congresses to issue appropriate appeals to bring to trial all deserters and those who concealed them. On the issue of the future Ukrainian army, the congress adopted the long-term socialist goal of a people's militia as the only form of military organization appropriate for a free people.

To realize the goal of forming a national army, the congress proposed immediate measures, including separating Ukrainian soldiers and officers serving in military units in the rear areas into separate units, while acknowledging that these measures had to proceed without causing disorganization at the front. They also proposed a similar Ukrainianization of the Black Sea Fleet as the portion of the imperial navy composed overwhelmingly of Ukrainians. They "recognized" the regiment that had been formed a month earlier as the "Bohdan Khmelnytsky First Ukrainian Cossack Regiment" and urged the military authorities to implement the "Instruction on the Ukrainian Unit" that had been approved by the commander in chief (April 4) and the minister of the army (April 6). The Ukrainian language was to be introduced in the newly formed units and in military education and publications. Finally, the delegates authorized the museums of Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities holding ancient Ukrainian military banners to transfer them to a Ukrainian National Museum in Kyiv so that the newly formed units would be able to use these relics as they reformulated their national identities.[48] The congress's final decision was to elect a provisional Ukrainian General Military Commit-

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[48] Excerpts from the resolutions appear in English in Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky, eds., *The Russian Provisional Government 1917*, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 373–74. For the full text in Ukrainian, see V[ladyslav] Verstiuk et al., eds., *Ukrainskyi natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukh, berezen–lystopad 1917 roku: Dokumenty i materialy* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Oleny Telihy, 2000), doc. 117 (pp. 279–84). (This volume also contains numerous documents bearing on the Ukrainian soldiers' movement, many previously unavailable.) The resolutions were given authoritative sanction by their publication in *Visty z Ukrainskoi Tsentralnoi Rady*. The congress also addressed the land question, insisting that a Ukrainian Diet be summoned to consider the specific conditions of landholding in Ukraine and the Ukrainianization of primary, secondary, and higher education.

tee (UGMC) attached to the Central Rada, which would co-ordinate "Ukrainian military affairs" with the Russian General Staff.

In any event, the meetings left the matter of who had the authority to resolve questions of Ukrainianization more unclear than before. In mid-May the new army minister, Kerensky, arrived in Kyiv to visit Brusilov's headquarters. Oberuchev joined a large and seemingly authoritative delegation, which included representatives of the Central Rada, Mikhnovsky's committee, and the UGMC just elected at the All-Ukrainian Military Congress. By this time Oberuchev's condition of only volunteers being accepted as recruits had been jettisoned as unrealistic and irrelevant, and the UGMC's representatives proposed a more active formation policy, though one limited to soldiers in the rear units. Oberuchev agreed, on the condition that the Kyiv and Minsk military districts be exempted owing to their closeness to the front and the threat of confusion that reorganization there would likely present. After this painful consensus was achieved, matters continued more or less as before. Despite the insistence of the Provisional Government in Petrograd that the Kyiv-based Central Rada and its General Secretariat were not to meddle in military affairs, the Rada faced its own political mutiny from Mikhnovsky's committee and the stubborn resistance of Oberuchev as it tried to gain control over the chaos.[49] In several garrisons the demands of Ukrainian soldiers were provoking splits with their "Russian" counterparts, replicating the hostilities the activists of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Soiuz vyzvolennia Ukrainy) faced not long before in German and Austrian POW camps.[50] Reporting on a visit to Uman, where a group of Ukrainian soldiers had elected their own officers, Oberuchev wrote that they were following the ideological lead of a second lieutenant Oberuchev had ordered removed for his harmful "agitation" (among the slogans Ukrainian soldiers shouted were "We will not leave Uman! Let them go back to their Muscovite land! Get out!"). The situation was complicated even more by an order that the entire regiment in Uman be transferred to the front and by another one from the UGMC authorizing the regiment to Ukrainianize.[51]

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[49] *VDR*, 96.

[50] See my article "The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire," in *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building,* ed. Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 34–57.

[51] Oberuchev relates several episodes when he was faced with two "delegations" from units, one claiming to speak for the Ukrainians, and the second representing the non-Ukrainian troops. See his description of a confrontation in Zhytomyr in early July in his *Vospominaniia,* 277–78. On the Uman visit, see ibid., 285–87.

Oberuchev and his companion during the visit to Uman, the soldier Okhrym Task, who was also deputy chair of the Kyiv Soldiers' Council, were unable to resolve this crisis when they were summoned back to Kyiv for the next political-military crisis there: the mutiny of a regiment named after another Cossack statesman, Acting Hetman Pavlo Polubotok. Tsar Peter I had imprisoned Polubutok in the Peter and Paul Fortress in 1723 for resisting his politics and trying to preserve the Hetmanate's autonomy and the privileges of the Cossack elite, making him a martyr to the Ukrainian cause. The mutiny of the *polubotkivtsi* occurred virtually simultaneously with an uprising in July in Petrograd, a largely spontaneous militant demonstration against the war and for the transfer of power to the councils that was blamed on the Bolsheviks. Oberuchev was convinced that the timing of the Petrograd and Kyiv rebellions was not coincidental and saw them as attempted coups d'état directed by the Bolsheviks.[52] He characterized this latest self-proclaimed regiment as a ragtag mob of deserters who were trying to avoid being sent to the front by demanding that they be reorganized into Ukrainian units. He claimed that the unit had first formed in Chernihiv, where the group had called themselves the Doroshenko regiment, after yet another Cossack hetman. Rather than intervening himself, Oberuchev turned to his reluctant partner, the UGMC, which after some false starts managed to persuade the "Ukrainian" troops to relocate to Kyiv. Upon arriving in Kyiv they attracted some two thousand more troops claiming to be eager to serve under a Ukrainian flag. It was this expanded unit that refused to obey an UGMC order to leave their barracks for transfer to the front. Instead, the soldiers decided to take power into their own hands and seized several military objectives, including Oberuchev's official residence. Oberuchev was then visiting the garrison in Uman and so escaped arrest and possibly worse.[53]

The Kyiv Council authorized Oberuchev's deputy commander, General Tregubov, and his chief of staff, General Oboleshev, to organize the "defense of Kyiv" and the removal of this "motley crowd" operating under a Ukrainian flag. In addition, the UGMC also assigned Major-General Luka Kondratovich to help put down the mutiny. The fractured power relations in Kyiv meant that Oberuchev faced an effort by the Central

[52] *VDR*, 98.

[53] In support of his assertion that the Bolsheviks and Ukrainian nationalists had become allies, Oberuchev reported that Piatakov, leader of the Kyiv Bolsheviks, was one of those who entered his house at will during the mutiny (*Vospominaniia,* 292). Elsewhere he noted that one of the two workers—both named Smirnov—sent from the council to tour the front with him was "to some degree seized by Bolshevik tendencies" and sported a "long Ukrainian mustache" (ibid., 378).

Rada's General Military Secretariat to intervene through negotiations with the mutineers. The Khmelnytsky Regiment, the first Ukrainian unit to form at the initiative of its own officers, succeeded in encircling and disarming the unauthorized "regiment" after the Rada's negotiators finally quieted them. Oberuchev had to acknowledge, however, that in such situations his authority was virtually nonexistent.[54]

For Oberuchev the failed coup of the *polubotkivtsi* was a prelude to the disastrous July retreat, or rout, of the Russian army after a three-week offensive ordered by Kerensky. The rushed flight in the face of the advancing German army provoked panic in Kyiv, which was anticipating a mob of rampaging soldiers. Early reports of desperate and brutal soldiers turning on their officers, commissars, and anyone else who stood in their way reached the Ukrainian capital, which began preparing to defend itself from its own soldiers. Oberuchev looked at this July disaster as the beginning of the revolution's second stage in Kyiv, that is, months of increasingly rampant violence and social polarization that would culminate in the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd in October. General Lavr Kornilov, commander of the Southwestern Front, insisted on reintroducing the death penalty at the front, a policy Oberuchev opposed but said he understood at this desperate point. It was all the more disturbing to him that a government of socialist ministers approved such an act. Another consequence of the July rout was the crowds in Kyiv of not only fleeing soldiers but refugees, at a time when the city was already bursting at the seams. Oberuchev ordered the seizure of schools empty for the summer holidays to accommodate some of the new influx of people. Liberals and progressives accused him of "counter-revolutionary" hostility to public education and the Ukrainian cause, for schools were then in the midst of introducing the Ukrainian language. In retrospect, Oberuchev assessed the events of July as the beginning of the civil war.[55]

The Kornilov putsch in August only added to the volatile relations between officers and soldiers, as it unleashed a new wave of soldiers' revenge, with lynchings and other atrocities, across the army (for his "success" during the June offensive Kornilov had been promoted to commander in chief of the Russian army.) The distrust of authority extended to the Petrograd government and its local agents. In the midst of all this, Oberuchev now faced an impossible situation. The Kyiv Council demanded the resignation of Oberuchev's chief of staff, General Obeleshev, whom they branded a "counter-revolutionary." The Kyiv Committee for the Salvation of the Revolution, formed of all major political and civic as-

[54] Ibid., 288–93.

[55] Ibid., 293–98.

sociations, demanded Obeleshev's arrest as one of Kornilov's co-conspirators. Oberuchev admitted that this "Great Russian-Muscovite to his bones" was even more opposed to Ukrainianization than he himself was, and that he had behaved tactlessly with the soldiers' deputies.[56] A council of Ukrainian soldiers in Kyiv passed a resolution of non-confidence in Oberuchev as an enemy of the Ukrainian cause and urged soldiers not to obey his commands. And indeed, when Oberuchev ordered a Ukrainianized battalion to transfer from Chernihiv to Kyiv, the battalion committee expressed solidarity with the Kyiv Council's resolution and refused to obey his orders unless they were countersigned by the General Military Secretariat. Within days similar resolutions were passed in nearly all regiments that had been Ukrainianized, and several demanded Oberuchev's resignation. In fact, Oberuchev had good reason to believe that the General Military Secretariat had insisted that the Provisional Government dismiss him as commander. The Kyiv Council, which he claimed was thoroughly Ukrainianized, also demanded his dismissal. Other telegrams warned him that if he did not leave Kyiv by 14 August, he would be "killed like a dog."[57]

This proved the final straw for the socialist commander: Oberuchev informed his superiors, the Southwestern Front's commander General Nikolai G. Volodchenko, the army minister General Verkhovsky, and Commander in Chief Kerensky, that he urgently desired to resign his post in Kyiv. They tried to dissuade him, but his arguments won them over. Oberuchev could no longer preside over a policy he was convinced was wrong and, in any case, was being implemented without his authority. Among considerations he included in the decision to leave Kyiv was his unwillingness to be branded an enemy of Ukraine's right to self-determination, but in fact he had already become that.[58] Oberuchev sensed that his commissar, Kirienko, attracted even greater hostility from the Ukrainian movement because he was himself an ethnic Ukrainian and once had even been a member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic "Spilka" party. Yet Kirienko, too, opposed Ukrainianization in the army and earned a reputation as an enemy of the Ukrainian cause ("*vrag ukrainstva*").[59] One of Oberuchev's last official duties was to address the Congress of Peoples of Russia, which the Central Rada convened in September in Kyiv to bring together all autonomist and national movements on a platform of federalism. He noted, in particular, two moments at the

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[56] Ibid., 325–31.

[57] Ibid., 324.

[58] *VDR*, 117–19.

[59] Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia,* 335–37.

congress, one a plea by the representative of the Don Cossacks to be viewed not as "counter-revolutionary oppressors" but as freedom fighters, and the second the audience's hostile reception to him personally—the proud but exasperated socialist commander was hissed upon taking the podium. Nonetheless Oberuchev concluded his greetings with a rousing "Long live a free, young Russia! Long live a free Ukraine!"[60]

Concluding Reflections

Oberuchev's sense of military duty, especially when he began serving Russia's first revolutionary regime, increasingly became a trap from which he could not extricate himself. Despite growing evidence (indeed, from the start) of opposition and resistance to the war, despite his own experience of the new government's mismanagement, which he had to contend with in Kyiv, including at the War Ministry of his party comrade Kerensky, and despite the disastrous June offensive, Oberuchev adhered firmly to his defensist politics and insisted on seeing Bolshevik (and Ukrainian) agitation behind nearly every failure. Strangely, he also insisted that the army must remain outside of politics, in spite of his own activities as commissar to bring the army into the political life of the country. Most important, however, is that Oberuchev failed to realize that the war itself had become the number one political issue.

Another political issue that Oberuchev failed to confront personally and outright was his position on nationalism, particularly Russian nationalism. He recounted one episode that provided some insight into his dilemmas, in which a monarchist demonstration in Kyiv bearing the tricolor flag was denounced as counter-revolutionary by leftists generally and Ukrainian activists in particular. He reminded his readers that demonstrations with all sorts of national flags had become commonplace in revolutionary Kyiv, so why should anyone be offended by the appearance of a flag "identified, whether correctly or not, as national Great Russian?"[61] On the one hand, Oberuchev stood up for the freedom to express one's own opinion and a diversity of views; he also argued that having monarchists demonstrate openly was preferable to having them plot all sorts of conspiracies in secret. But he also acknowledged that the fear of "counter-revolution," which in many quarters was expected to come from the army or the former elites of the old regime, was an integral part of the political culture of 1917 and the civil war emerging within society. Still, he appeared to be much more sympathetic to these demonstrations than to those of Ukrainian soldiers, or the Central Rada's demands for auton-

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[60] Ibid., 371–72.

[61] Ibid., 392–94.

omy. Oberuchev's model of Ukrainian-Bolshevik collusion fed his hostility toward the Ukrainian cause and made it difficult for him to support many of the changes in the army that went under the name of democratization.

Oberuchev's political evolution bears comparison with that of another emerging leader in Kyiv at the time, General (later Hetman) Pavlo Skoropadsky, who also found himself in the middle of the fierce struggles over Ukrainianization. (Curiously, in his memoirs, comprising more than 450 pages, Oberuchev fails to mention Skoropadsky even once.)[62] Skoropadsky, too, identified above all with the officer corps that he had been part of during his entire career. Although not by any stripe a socialist, but rather a monarchist on the way to something else, Skoropadsky, too, detested the Bolsheviks with an almost visceral energy and held them responsible for the tragic and murderous decline of the army's morale starting in mid-1917. Skoropadsky even shared Oberuchev's quasi-populist faith in the innate goodness of the Russian and Ukrainian peasant. Where he differed was in his capacity and apparent willingness to cast aside some of his military principles and reluctantly accept the desperate adoption of "the national principle" to combat the Bolshevik virus. Skoropadsky saw his own role in the first official Ukrainianization measures in the KMD as continuation of sorts of his ancestors' roles in organizing Cossack units. Also, Skoropadsky tried to put a positive spin on his efforts, though his own account indicates the host of insurmountable obstacles that worked against restoring the morale of the fragmenting Russian army.[63]

Oberuchev, for his part, remained enough of a socialist to be troubled by certain aspects of the revolution's militarization and by "democratic" institutions' ever-expanding acquisition of the old regime's trappings. He recalled his unease during a visit to a former house of the nobility that had become the address of the executive committees of the soldiers' and officers' organizations, where he found a full unit of sentries on guard duty. A sense of socialist propriety led him to complain about the guards,

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[62] Skoropadsky, in contrast, does refer to Oberuchev in his memoirs, but gives a conflicted characterization of him and fails to assign him a prominent part in his own activities. See his *Spohady: Kinets 1917–hruden 1918*, ed. Yaroslav Pelensky (Kyiv and Philadelphia: Instytut ukrainskoi arkheolohii ta dzhereloznavstva im. M. S. Hrushevskoho NAN Ukrainy, Instytut skhidnoievropeiskykh doslidzhen NAN Ukrainy, and Skhidnoievropeiskyi doslidnyi instytut im. V. K. Lypynskoho, 1995), 61–63.

[63] See my article "'I Love Russia, and/but I Want Ukraine,' or How a Russian Imperial General Became Hetman of the Ukrainian State, 1917–1918," in *Synopsis: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Zenon E. Kohut*, ed. Frank E. Sysyn and Serhii Plokhy (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005), 115–48.

elected representatives of the soldiers who were now performing duties of questionable value that kept them from actual combat at a critical time in the war. The guards were removed, but Oberuchev recalled a similar sense of socialist outrage when he visited Smolny, the headquarters of the Petrograd Soviet, and had to make his way through several levels of bureaucracy to get to where his official business could be conducted.[64] On another occasion he protested against the ECCPO's takeover of the residence of the former empress Mariia Fedorovna, and insisted that it be used instead as a military hospital. His arguments lost out before those who believed that the new organs of authority required dignified and handsome sites where they could exercise their new functions. Yet even in this matter Oberuchev's ambivalence was evident: after all, he had benefitted, too, in having a set of offices at the palace assigned to him as commissar.[65]

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[64] Oberuchev, *Vospominaniia,* 268–70. He laments: "To what degree are we all inculcated with faith in the power of salvation in a soldier's bayonet!"

[65] Ibid., 271.

The Formation of Modern National Identity and Interethnic Relations in the Galician Ukrainian Highlands: Some Findings of a Local/Oral History Project[*]

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The development of East European historiography has been stunted by several disadvantages: a relatively late start in modern academic historical investigation (with a resultant reliance on ready-made models of interpretation generated in and appropriate to Western Europe); the devastating effects of twentieth-century catastrophes on the documentary base; and ideological strictures imposed by political power (not only the obvious example of Communism, but also the national movements). In general this historiography has an elite focus; that is clearly evident in the Ukrainian case, which might seem paradoxical given that the Ukrainian national movement was in effect an effort to build a modern nation on a peasant/ethnographic basis[1] and that the Soviet regime that governed the country for much of the twentieth century proclaimed itself to be a worker-peasant state.[2] The Mshanets project that will be described here is a modest effort to enhance the historical picture by applying the techniques

[1] By this I mean that when the modern national question was posed, the East Slavic majority population of what is today Ukraine could conceivably have been subsumed either into the political nation of the Polish (or, in Transcarpathia, Hungarian) *Herrenvolk* or into the Russian imperial nation; those thinkers who chose particularism as a basis for nationalism were, by necessity, driven to an emphasis on the peasantry.

[2] Marxist-Leninist historiography, obviously, imposes models drawn from a global economic analysis onto local specifics. The founder of Ukrainian national historiography, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, although by conviction a populist, relied almost exclusively on elite sources in his monumental work and imputed his own thinking to the common folk that was the object of his study. Non-Hrushevskian Ukrainian specialists have tended to be explicitly elitist, by way of revisionism.

of local history and oral history, in the hope of gaining a better understanding of developments away from the centers of power and giving voice to those whose stories have been hitherto largely excluded from the historical narrative. The work done to date offers a wealth of material for the elucidation of questions relating to the formation of modern Ukrainian national identity and interethnic relations.

The Scope of the Project

Frank Sysyn and I have been involved in the study of a cluster of villages around the central one of Mshanets (located on the slopes of the Magura, the third-highest peak in the Ukrainian Carpathians, now in Staryi Sambir raion, Lviv oblast) for more than twenty years. But only recently has this project become a major focus of our scholarly work.[3] The main reason we chose to investigate this region is its unusually rich documentary base, for the records of the royal domain of Sambir, of which these villages were a part have been preserved, and from 1883 to 1910 the parish priest of Mshanets, the multifaceted and energetic Mykhailo Zubrytsky, published many works about the history and culture of the region.[4] For the period up to 1900 Mshanets is one of the best-documented villages not only in Ukraine but in all of Eastern Europe, and this unique source base offers the possibility of constructing a detailed local history going back to the sixteenth century. For the twentieth century the written source base is much weaker—the region was too poor to sustain much in the way of newspapers, and most public records were destroyed during the Second World War. For the more recent period we have applied the methodology of oral history (which I first used in 1984, for the study of the 1932–33 famine in Soviet Ukraine) in the hope of being able to extend historical coverage down to the present day.[5] When

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[3] For a more detailed description of the project, see my article "V tini Mahury: Usna istoriia mikrorehionu v ukrainskykh Karpatakh," *Ukraina moderna*, no. 11 (2007): 271–79.

[4] The Petro Jacyk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukrainian History and Society at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv and Lviv National University are planning the publication of a full edition of Zubrytsky's works.

[5] In terms of method, we have generally worked with a questionnaire, as is standard practice in oral history. The questionnaire establishes basic identity (year of birth, family, socioeconomic position, education, etc.) and then proceeds through a set of broad areas of inquiry, such as life and work, culture and beliefs, relations with others—notably the non-Ukrainians once resident in the region—and memory of specific historical events. If the purpose of oral history is "to give voice to the voiceless," an obvious objection might be that the historian imposes his own agenda when he decides what questions are worth asking and thereby sets the parameters of the response; following the lead of others in oral history, we have attempted to mitigate this fundamental problem by devising the

interviewing for the project began in 1986, it was inconceivable to conduct such work in the USSR (it should be noted that Mshanets is located directly on the border with Poland, in a zone that was then totally closed to foreigners). Hence we worked with residents of the United States and Canada who had emigrated from the region (some prior to 1914, a few in the interwar period, and most in 1944). Since the fall of the Soviet Union we have been able to do interviews on location in the region itself.

To date we have conducted approximately a hundred interviews (a more precise figure would depend on how one counts group interviews and fragmentary interviews), divided more or less equally between men and women (though this varies somewhat with the age of the cohort),[6] individuals born in the 1890s through the 1930s, the majority in the 1910s and early 1920s.[7] In terms of educational level, the people we interviewed include a few people with no formal education, a majority who attended primary school in the villages, and several who earned advanced academic degrees. The information we have gathered is skewed along several lines. All but one of our interviewees (a German from Bandriv/Bandrów[8]) are Ukrainian. Therefore our oral history reflects almost exclusively the perspective of the Ukrainian villagers, and all information on interethnic relations is based on how the majority population recalls them. Within the Ukrainian group our pool is heavily tilted toward those with a nationalist or anti-Communist orientation (in part because in 1944 that segment had the most pressing reason to leave and thus was in a position to be interviewed by us in the United States in the 1980s; also, since 1991 local Communists have been somewhat demoralized and not eager to talk to Western interlopers like ourselves). Regrettably, as yet we have not interviewed any prewar Communists or Russophiles (though there were some among emigrants to America when we began our project).

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questionnaire to be as broad as possible, and by altering it as our interviewees brought up issues important to them.

[6] The preponderance of men in the older cohorts is explained in part by the fact that before 1991 more men than women got from the villages to the West. Hence our initial, exclusively émigré pool was skewed in that direction. The younger group includes more women, a reflection of the lower life expectancy of men in the post-Soviet space.

[7] We have yet to interview people born later, mainly out of concern that if we did so there would be no end to our history, because as time goes by end points are pushed further and further forward. When we initiated the oral history, the establishment of durable Soviet rule in the late 1940s would have been a reasonable place to end. When Frank Sysyn began the interviews on site, the collapse of the USSR seemed to be a logical endpoint. In the relatively short time since I was first there, in September 2004, the dramatic events of the "Orange Revolution" seemed to be yet another decisive turning point.

[8] Place-names in present-day Poland are given in transliterated Ukrainian and in Polish.

In terms of coverage, we have gathered the following: oral lore about the distant past, recounting Tatar raids, the doings of local lords, the exploits of the legendary brigand Oleksa Dovbush, and so on; quite a bit of oral tradition and personal testimony (to use the rather cloying terminology current in the field of oral history) about life under Habsburg rule and during the First World War; a great deal of personal testimony about the interwar period, the Second World War, and the re-establishment of Soviet rule; and scattered information about events since then. For the quarter-century between 1925 and 1950, roughly speaking, we have what might be termed "thick coverage." In fact, that period is the core of the oral-history part of our project.

Here I propose to sketch out the villagers' traditional identity and the traditional pattern of ethnic relations, based on written sources and oral tradition. I will go on to show how the Ukrainian national idea took hold in our villages (relying on oral tradition, personal testimony, and written documents), how it affected interethnic relations (using personal testimony), and how a series of cataclysms during the Second World War fundamentally altered the situation.[9]

Origins

The region around present-day Mshanets is rugged mountain terrain with poor soil; it appears to have been sparsely populated until the late Middle Ages. The earliest documented settlement to date seems to be the tiny village of Vytsiv, first recorded in the year 1382. The main colonization occurred around 1500, when the major villages of Grozova (Грозьова), Mshanets, and Mykhnovets (Polish: Michniowiec) were founded in royal domains under the privilege of so-called Moldavian or Wallachian law (*voloske pravo*), a legal arrangement whereby the Polish Crown encouraged the settlement of the Carpathians. Under Moldavian law villagers were allowed to engage in agriculture and pastoralism without being bound by serfdom and under the authority of their own chieftains, who initially bore the grand title of "princes" (*kniazi*). Subsequently this rather favorable arrangement was altered to the villagers' disadvantage. Descendants of the chieftains and their servitors legally assimilated with the general Polish nobility (*szlachta*) but never became lords owed labor by their neighbors. In Mshanets the Crown leased their portion of

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[9]   The oral-history project is at the stage where we are completing the gathering of information. A thorough analysis of that information has yet to be done, so what follows is not a finished work but a preliminary report. Moreover, since transcripts are only now being completed, I do not provide direct quotes from our interviewees or identify them by name. Any unreferenced information can be assumed to be from the interviews, and the reader is asked to rely, for now, on my memory and notes.

land to lords from the outside, to whom the general peasantry was obligated to provide service. Austria took the villages into the *Kammer* (Habsburg household domain) and discontinued the practice of leasing the land. But by the period covered in our oral history, all of this was a distant memory: serfdom was gone, awareness of the old legal distinctions between families had dimmed, and in terms of culture and economic level the peasant society of the region was relatively homogeneous.

On the question of ethnicity, we know for certain that in the nineteenth century the population was East Slavic in language—speaking a dialect of Ukrainian—and Eastern Christian by religion (Orthodox to 1700 and Greek Catholic afterwards). Romanian scholars have asserted that Moldavian law indicated Romanian ancestry, but Ukrainian historians have disputed the attribution. Without rehashing the entire debate, it is appropriate to say that any ostensible Romanian element has been effaced, except for some place-names and family names. However, there are traces of other components in the original mix. South-Slavic roots might account for the farmstead of a Croatian woman (*khorvatka*) near Mshanets, as well as the village's prominent Petrychkovych family. The tradition of the Udych family of Mykhnovets holds that their progenitor was a nobleman who had come from Hungary and entered the service of Casimir the Great. Neighbors of the village of Holovetske believed it to be of Tatar origin, which is not inconceivable given that former Poland-Lithuania took in numerous bands of renegades from the Crimean Khanate. At any rate, for the time that we have ethnographic descriptions and in the period that is covered by the oral history, we are dealing with a mostly agricultural population that is linguistically monolithic, in which various families and villages regard themselves as belonging to the same people.

Until the Second World War the villagers lived alongside members of religious and ethnic minorities. To give a rough sense of the demographics in the period we are focusing on, Zubrytsky wrote that in Mshanets in 1909 there were 181 *gazda,* two Rom, and six Jewish households.[10] It is not known when the first Jewish families settled in these villages. They first appear in legal documents of the eighteenth century, in their usual East European roles of craftsmen, traders and publicans/innkeepers. By Zubrytsky's time they were also farmers, a marked contrast to the general pattern though the same phenomenon was common in the neighboring northern counties of Hungary. We have yet to determine when our local Jews took up farming, but by the time covered in our oral history they

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[10] Unpublished Lviv compilation of photocopied selected materials by Mykhailo Zubrytsky, no. 21, 1.

engaged in trade while also working the land. The local Roma were sedentary and Greek Catholic; in Zubrytsky's descriptions they are attested as farmers and blacksmiths, and in the oral history, as wedding musicians. The latter is in keeping with the well-known East European stereotype, but it should be noted that Roma musicians set our area apart from the rest of Ukrainian ethnographic territory, where they generally did not play at ritual events of the majority population,[11] and draws the area more toward the Carpathian Basin/Greater Hungarian/Balkan zone. An agricultural colony of German Lutherans from the Rhineland palatinate existed at Bandriv/Bandrów, a product of the "enlightened absolutism" that Joseph II founded for the economic development of newly acquired backward territory. Although not really a part of our area's pre-modern landscape, from the perspective of our oral histories the German settlement's presence went back to immemorial ancestral times. In the starkest possible contrast to the situation in lowland eastern Galicia, in our villages there was no settled Polish presence—no magnates on their latifundia and no Polish/Roman Catholic peasantry. Even with the minorities that were present, our area was among the most ethnographically homogeneous in the province.

Traditional Identity

If we are to rely on documents, it would be hard to say how the villagers identified themselves before the twentieth century, in the sense that we have no early records of them saying "We are this" or "We are that." In classifying this population (ascribing identity to it), modern scholars would focus on some combination of religion, language, and socioeconomic function as the useful markers, with different emphases depending on their particular perspective (in East European scholarship, language, equated with nationality, has predominated). The recorded folklore is suffused with traditional Christianity, as are the rather formulaic last wills and testaments that constitute most of the written record of peasant self-expression, but no one makes the positive affirmations "I am a Christian" or "I am a Greek Catholic and that is what sets me apart from others." The local dialect was East Slavic and thereby associated with the Rus' realm, but we have no older documentary evidence of someone calling himself a *rusyn*. On the other hand, in all villages except Mshanets (a special case that will be examined below), people of the interwar generation, during whose childhood the Ukrainian name took hold, maintain that before the First World War all villagers called themselves *rusyny* (or used the adjectival term *rus'ki*) and that the more

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[11] Communicated to me by the ethnomusicologist William Noll.

"backward" (from the perspective of our interviewees) continued doing so into the 1930s. The one marker attested in the documents is a socio-economic one, namely, the word *gazda* from the Magyar, meaning householder/farmer—the equivalent of the Ukrainian *hospodar*//Polish *gospodarz*.[12]

As a traditional positive (as opposed to implicit or unstated) form of identification, the use of *gazda* reveals a number of important facts about the structure of village society, the villagers' sense of self, and their relations to others. First of all, not everyone was a *gazda*: the word referred only to heads of households; others in the immediate family were wives of *gazdy* or their children (an identification that could last well into adulthood). The *gazdy* ran the village, and relations between families went through *gazdy* in what was a very patriarchal society (though it should be noted that the widow of a *gazda* could assume the role of head of household). Surnames, which go back surprisingly far—to the sixteenth century for the petty noble families and well back into the eighteenth for most of the rest—were used exclusively for legal purposes and dealings with outside authorities; within the village *prydomky*, that is, "names attached to the household," that derived from the name or, more often, the nickname of the *gazda* of an extended family, were used to distinguish one Ivan or Vasyl from another. The role of *gazda* was a worthy one, and the farm work he and his family did was useful and honorable. This sense of the dignity in the labor that was the peasant's lot is very important to an understanding of traditional interethnic relations: the *gazda* tilled the soil and raised sheep; the Jew engaged in commerce (as has been noted, local Jews also farmed, but they were not—as far as I know—called *gazdy,* and, more importantly, they were not part of the family relations that bound the peasant community together); the Rom made horseshoes or played the violin at weddings; and the German (not really a part of the traditional structure) lived as a strange sort of super-*gazda*, in a village where the preternaturally tidy houses were all identical and faced the same way. The peasants did not begrudge the others their living—to each his own.

In determining how far identity extended into the broader world, we have to work with later records that might reveal traditional attitudes. It is clear that the Ruthenians/Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia were seen as "our people," since descriptions of trips to Lviv or Peremyshl (Polish: Przemyśl) contain no sense of travel into alien country, except insofar as Poles were encountered along the way. People would sometimes hike the

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[12] It should be noted that *gazda* is used throughout the Ukrainian Carpathians, and not only in the area of our study.

twenty-five miles south to Hungary for matters of business (tobacco smuggling) or pleasure (Hungary is sometimes depicted as a place of mythic abundance and gaiety). Yet Hungary was definitely a very different place, and no one remarks explicitly that its northern counties were inhabited by people whom ethnographers identified as our villagers' close relatives. As for Russia and Russian-ruled Ukraine, the situation is murky. One man from Mshanets who married a woman from central Ukraine while serving in the army in the Great War was disinherited by his father, but later, when they were living in the village, his wife was chosen to be a godmother forty times over. In another case, a central Ukrainian woman who settled in Mykhnovets in as yet undetermined circumstances was called the "Russian woman" (*rosiianka*) to the end of her days in 1941, despite two decades of Ukrainian propaganda single-mindedly asserting the Galicians' total identification with their brethren to the east. In the villagers' traditional view, one can tentatively assert, language and religion *plus* sovereign boundaries delineated the wider world.

Within Galicia our villagers were seen as part of the Boiko subgroup, the definition of which is rather elusive.[13] The Galician Carpathians are divided by ethnographers—and also, to varying extents, by the general population as well—into three zones (or dialect groups, tribes, subcultures—it is hard to be precise): Hutsuls to the east, Lemkos to the west, and Boikosin the center. "Hutsul" (from the Romanian word for "brigand") seems to be the long-standing self-designation of the people to which it refers. The designation is still in general use today, and it is understood far beyond the borders of Ukraine (the Hutsuls enjoy a certain celebrity through much of the former Eastern bloc, owing to their ancestors' striking dress and wild mores). It is difficult to say how far back "lemko" (from the dialectal characteristic of using *lem* instead of *lysh* to mean "only") goes, but it is definitely what the people so designated called themselves in the twentieth century; the usage is understood by everyone in western Ukraine and Poland today. "Boiko" is more problematic, and the origin of the term is itself unclear. The Slovak Slavist Pavel Šafařík derived it from the ancient Celtic Boii and associated it with Bohemia. Others have connected it (for reasons too complicated to go into here) to the mysterious White Croats of the migrations of the ear-

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[13] For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, and the source of the general information below, see Yu. H. Hoshko et al., eds., *Boikivshchyna: Istoryko-etnohrafichne doslidzhennia* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1983). To spare the reader possible confusion, I should note that the common Ukrainian surname Boiko usually has nothing to do with our subject and should not be taken as evidence of connection to our area.

ly Middle Ages. Some have argued that dialectological peculiarities are responsible for the name: some (though not all, or even many) Boikos are supposed to be fond of the interjections "*bo i ie!*" (roughly, "it is so!" or "that's the way it is!") or "*ta ba!*" (English "bah!"). Regardless of its origins, the term is useful in describing broader dialectological realities, and from the point of view of ethnographers and linguists our villages are situated in the westernmost part of the Boiko zone.[14] None of the older written documents contain the term "*boiko.*" However, it is present in the folklore, usually in a humorous context, which is revealing, because in wider Galician usage it has (or had) comical/pejorative associations, akin to those of the American "hillbilly." The interwar generation seems to have taken to it as a regional identity within a broader Ukrainian nation, though I have yet to hear a sensible explanation of what it means. People of that generation simply know that they are Boikos and can tell themselves apart from Lemkos and lowlanders without being able to say just how. The success of the Boiko identity might not have been the result of internal processes, but rather of exposure to Ukrainian scholarly work, in which by then Boikos figured as a part of the Ukrainian national mosaic. The ethnonym Boiko was widely used as a convenient basis for organizing a regional-affiliation society within the broader Galician Ukrainian postwar diaspora in the West. In Ukraine itself, today the term is unknown outside the western regions, and even there younger people do not use (or even understand) it.

The Advent of Modern Ukrainian Identity

In the area under consideration, the formation of a modern Ukrainian national identity follows in its essentials the well-known Galician pattern—namely, the crucial role was played by an activist clergy, which first built up influence among the young through a general program (cultural, economic, political) uplifting the peasantry.[15] In the area we are studying the key figure was Mykhailo Zubrytsky (1856–1919), the parish priest of Mshanets from 1883 to 1910. He initiated a process that other priests would carry on in neighboring villages somewhat later and would, by 1939, result in a peasantry almost unanimous in its Ukrainian identity. Although the cultural aspect of his mission eventually achieved success, Zubrytsky's plans for economic transformation, which would have total-

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[14] Jan. Falkowski, *Na pograniczu łemkowsko-bojkowskiem: Zarys etnograficzny* (Lviv: Nakł. Towarzystwa Ludoznawczego, 1935).

[15] See John-Paul Himka, "Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 21, no. 1 (1979): 1–14.

ly changed interethnic relations, did not succeed, largely because of villagers' conservatism in matters of lifestyle and work.

Before outlining Zubrytsky's work and with it the general pattern of development, it might be worthwhile to sketch out the exceptional experience of the village of Grozova, now officially called Hrozovo (Грозьово). Here, too, the role of an active individual in initiating change was decisive. In Grozova that person was Sygin the Monk, a local man who had gone over the imperial Russian border to Pochaiv in Volyn and returned from the great Orthodox monastery there years later with a zeal to spread Church Slavonic letters and with a wife, acquired on his way home, with whom he proceeded to create the richest family in the village.[16] Sygin was the first person to teach the local peasant boys to read using Pochaiv religious publications, and he set Grozova on the road to Russophilism (*moskvofilstvo,* an identity hostile to the Ukrainian movement and ultimately equating "Galician Rus'" with Russia).[17] Sygin's influence was enhanced by his entrepreneurial energy and the money he donated to the local church and to establish a branch of the Russophile Kachkovsky Society. Grozova's inhabitants continued calling themselves *rusyny* well into the 1930s, by which time all the other villages had gone Ukrainian. Nonetheless, when the Second World War ended many youths from the village joined the Ukrainian nationalist underground, and more than a dozen of them were killed as insurgents. Today Grozova's residents call themselves Ukrainians,[18] but their church is the last remaining parish of the Moscow Patriarchate in all of Staryi Sambir raion. All of the other villages there are affiliated with the Ukrainian "national" churches, the great majority with the ancestral Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

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[16] H. S. Khalak, manuscript history of Grozova (1995), 4–6. This source says Sygin had been in Kyiv (possibly a confusion of the Pochaiv ("Pochaivska") and Kyivan Caves ("Pecherska") monasteries. But in the manuscript of his autobiography Zubrytsky writes that his older contemporary had been in Pochaiv, although some mistakenly thought he had also been in Kyiv. One person I interviewed, who seemed quite well informed, also said this. Zubrytsky also spells the name Segin, making its Magyar cast even clearer (this speaks to the question of the origins of local families).

[17] It should be noted that "*moskvofil*" is a pejorative term Poles and Galician Ukrainian nationalists used. The people in question called themselves "hard Rusyns" (*tverdi rusyny*), that is, Ruthenians firmly attached to the ancestral name "Rus'" and resistant to the Ukrainian orientation. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see Anna Veronika. Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Russland, 1848–1915* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001).

[18] We have yet to do a large enough number of interviews with Grozova's residents to know whether the ethnonym "Ukrainian" took hold in the interwar period or as a result of Soviet nationality policy, which did not make allowances for categories such as *rusyn*.

Grozova's present jurisdictional isolation was brought about in part by a process Zubrytsky initiated. The future priest who would be such an important figure in our area was born nearby, in Kindrativ, Turka circle, in 1856 to a mixed (clerical and petty noble) farming family. In the hand-written autobiography that is the source of much of our information about Zubrytsky, he mentions in passing that at one point in his youth he had been a *moskvofil* but, while still a student, had switched (for unspeci-fied reasons) to the populist "Young Rus'" faction that evolved into a Ukrainian nationalist organization. What is very evident is that like many educated youth of his generation, the young Zubrytsky burned with de-sire to serve his people and advance the cause of the nation. His first am-bition was to be a historian (a typical career for a nineteenth-century na-tionalist), but when he learned that academic positions were hard to come by he decided to become a priest, somewhat *faute de mieux*, as a way of working with the people.

Once in holy orders, Zubrytsky was appointed to Mshanets in 1883. Initially he was an assistant to a quiescent elderly priest, so the parish became really Zubrytsky's. He was able to assert himself fully in 1889 and continued thus to 1910. His initial impression of his flock was one of backwardness and ignorance (the way the mind "enlightened" by moder-nity reacts to those still living in a traditional world), and he soon set out on what became a thirty-seven-year mission to bring these people to the light of national consciousness and progress.

To inculcate his flock with the national idea, Zubrytsky relied not on-ly on his control of the pulpit but also on the written word, including the publications of the Galician Ukrainian Prosvita (Enlightenment) Society. That meant that he had to teach people to read, because except for a few of Sygin's adepts, the villagers were totally illiterate. In the 1890s Zubrytsky was instrumental in establishing a school—the first in our ar-ea; the other villages lagged behind by a decade or more. Hence those who were most open to his influence included the more curious members of the older generation (in his autobiography Zubrytsky writes that he managed to convince only a small number of the *gazdy* to join the Prosvita branch he had organized), but above all the children, for whom going to school was compulsory (despite the best efforts of many *gazdy* to avoid the resulting loss of their children's labor). Without going into detail, it can safely be said that by the end of Zubrytsky's tenure, the youth of Mshanets had been brought under the sway of his nationalism, which included espousing a Ukrainian identity, feeling kinship with the Ukrainians in the Russian Empire, and accepting the Taras Shevchenko and Cossack cults.

The national idea seems to have been inculcated with relative ease, since it built on the traditional Rus' identity (the switch from Rus' to Ukraine nomenclature came gradually for Zubrytsky, as it did for the Galician Ukrainian nationalist movement as a whole). In contrast, the other part of Zubrytsky's program for his nation—economic betterment and material progress—proceeded with great difficulty, because it went directly against the grain of traditional life. Zubrytsky believed that his impoverished flock would never advance materially as long as its pitifully small amounts of cash went to the Jews for petty manufactured goods and drink. Over the years he devised one scheme after another to redirect the flow of capital. Most notably, he organized a co-operative store where peasants could meet their meager consumer needs for matches, salt, and the like. The store became established and survived, but most of the villagers, including some members of the co-operative itself, continued to deal with the traditional Jewish tradesmen—even though, Zubrytsky claims, Jewish prices were higher. Their reasons for not patronizing Zubrytsky's enterprise are quite revealing of prevailing old attitudes: some objected that they did not want their neighbors, namely, those 37 of Mshanets's 185 *gazdy*—to give a rough sense of the portion of adults who were willing to act on the priest's reforms and joined the co-operative—from getting rich at their expense, and they argued that commerce was not fit for *gazdy* ("Isn't he a *gazda* too? Doesn't he have land like the rest of us?").[19]

Another of Zubrytsky's projects involved *malovanky*, the batik/stencil decorations that were put on girls' and women's festive coats in a procedure itinerant Jewish craftsmen traditionally did. Zubrytsky's active mind saw no reason why the village girls could not do this stenciling themselves, and he even went to the trouble of importing a fellow from the lowlands to teach them how. Once again, the response is revealing: parents objected that people would laugh if they saw a *gazda*'s children doing such work. The *malovanky* are in some ways emblematic of the fate of Zubrytsky's economic reforms: forty years later they were still being done in Mshanets by "a Jew from Liutovyshcha (Polish: Lutowiska) who came through the village from time to time."[20] In this plans as in others, Zubrytsky came up against what he called, with a mixture of exasperation and bemusement, "the wondrous conservatism of our people!"[21] The net results of his efforts (and later, those of analogous figures in neighboring villages) was the creation of what might be called parallel structures: modern

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[19] Autobiography, 25.

[20] The interviewee, an exceptionally knowledgeable person, seemed completely unaware that for her grandparents' generation Zubrytsky had made *malovanky* a national issue.

[21] Autobiography, 27.

Ukrainian co-operative enterprises existing alongside the traditional Jewish ones, with the Ukrainian population patronizing one or the other or both, according to predilection and circumstance.

Another of Zubrytsky's projects is worthy of note because it was connected to the first major reform effort that involved all of our villages—the Greek Catholic Church's temperance campaign of the 1890s. In undertaking the fight against alcohol, Zubrytsky was ahead of clergy as a whole, and he seems to have been as much concerned with the economic aspect (he attempted to calculate how much money was squandered on it annually) as the moral one. In his early years in Mshanets, Zubrytsky sought to stamp out, or at least curtail, the various traditional occasions for drinking. For example, people would invite multiple sets of godparents to take part in christenings; each godparent would bring a present, and each one would have to be honored with a toast. Zubrytsky responded to this by decreeing a maximum of four godparents per christening. People reacted to these restrictions by invoking ancestral practice—"This is how our grandfathers and great-grandfathers did it; why should we give it up?"—and occasionally they even remonstrated noisily against their priest. Later, when the entire clergy was ordered to take up the cause, great ecclesiastical and public pressure was brought to bear against such attitudes. During "missions" that gathered entire villages and priests from far and wide, individuals were called out to take the pledge to abstain in an awesome and solemn setting. Apparently drinking did decline, for some of the *korchmy* (taverns; Polish: *karzcmy*) went out of business, though not in Mshanets, where one survived until 1939. The interwar generation seems to have been quite abstemious, but this was probably because of the high prices the Polish state's liquor monopoly maintained. One curious effect of the temperance drive that lasted for some time (until the second arrival of the Soviets) was in the choice of drink. The prewar generation drank slivovitz, a plum brandy, and I had assumed that this was yet another hint at our region's Balkan ties. As it turns out, enterprising tavern keepers had convinced the weak-willed among the new abstinents that partaking of slivovitz would not violate their sacred oath against touching vodka, and so drinking slivovitz instead became widespread.

The Consolidation of Ukrainian National Identity

In Mshanets Zubrytsky set the pattern that would subsequently be followed in other villages as, through educational efforts, an activist clergy took the lead in convincing the peasants of their Ukrainian identity. But the same activists also had limited success in their socioeconomic en-

deavors. For our area overall, this process took place in the aftermath of the Great War and the establishment of Polish rule.

The Great War turned life in our villages upside down, for all healthy adult males were conscripted into the armed forces. Mshanets, with its youth molded by Zubrytsky, contributed several volunteers to Austrian-sponsored Ukrainian nationalist military formations and, later, many more to the Ukrainian Galician Army. The other villages performed their traditional military role under the Habsburg dispensation, providing imperial cannon fodder in the Balkans and Italy, and remained passive during the Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918–19. The Mshanets area itself was occupied by Russian forces from the fall of 1914 to the spring of 1915, when they were driven out in fierce combat. The Russian units in question, Don Cossacks and elements of the famous Savage Division of Caucasian mountaineers, were relentless in their molestation of village women; for years afterward questions of Cossack or Circassian parentage for the cohorts born in 1915 or 1916 would be discussed behind the backs of the individuals concerned. Thus during the Great War all elements of our population were exposed to the big modern world in its fiercest aspect. It is difficult to assess the psychological impact of the experience, but it can reasonably be surmised that here, as elsewhere in Europe, it made some people receptive to ideologies relying on violence. However, as we shall see, in behavior our villages remained very pacific all the way up to 1941.

Among the most important effects of the Great War was the fall and loss of traditional sovereignty. Although the Habsburgs had ruled only since 1772, their time in power had been sufficiently long for the traditional reverence of monarchy—with its inherent limitation of the modern national idea—to become fully attached in the minds of our villagers to the person of the emperor. With the establishment of the Republic of Poland, the question of national identity was posed in an unavoidable way: Poland was a nation-state, and even the most "backward" of our villagers knew very well that they were not members of the Polish nation. Poland exacerbated this negative stimulus to Ukrainian national identity by introducing an official Polish presence in our villages, such as a police station in Mshanets and a number of Polish schoolteachers there and elsewhere, as well as by various discriminatory measures. brought up most often in the oral histories were impediments to higher education in Ukrainian institutions. Yet even when Poland tried to govern in a positive way, it strengthened the Ukrainian national cause. In order to be a respectable state in the era of League of Nations liberalism, Poland was obliged to provide primary education to all, including minorities, and to allow its citizens the free practice of their various religions. In fulfilling

these obligations, the Polish state turned ideological control of our villages over to its mortal enemy, namely, the Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia.

When Zubrytsky began his career in the early 1880s, he was something of an outrider in his own class, but by 1914 Galician Ukrainian educated society as a whole was thoroughly infused with his type of activist nationalism. In the years that followed, that class underwent its decisive formative experience—the supreme exertion and subsequent failure of the "liberation struggles." Subjugated to Poland only by dint of force, the priests and teachers who constituted the rank and file of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were intent on using their access to the peasantry for the purpose of national "enlightenment," in preparation for the great day when the oppressors would be overthrown and the national cause would triumph.

During interwar Polish rule, the pool for Greek Catholic priests and Ukrainian teachers was Galicia as a whole. Most of the cadres assigned to our area were lowlanders rather than from the mountains, but a few were local boys who had received a higher education. In any event, over the course of the interwar years our villages received activist priests who also undertook the type of work that Zubrytsky had done. With regard to education, the paradoxical effects of Polish policy should be noted: it was Poland that first brought universal primary education to the area and achieved general literacy among the younger age cohorts; the school program was obviously designed to inculcate Polish nationalism, but in that it failed abjectly. Schooling was "utraquist," or bilingual, in villages other than Mshanets, where Zubrytsky's work in establishing the school and in inculcating Ukrainian identity had apparently been so successful as to dissuade the new Polish authorities from attempting to establish bilingual schools there. But if "utraquism" was meant to be a halfway house on the road to Polishdom, it had the opposite effect, owing to the Ukrainian component of the curriculum. The only reading material available for school use was national in content and had been created for the purpose of nation building. Thus by its educational policies the Polish state facilitated the progressive development of Ukrainian national identity.

Politicization

The advent and progress of the Ukrainian idea was accompanied by the politicization of the village population. Here, as usual, Mshanets took the lead. Zubrytsky was very active in electoral politics: at one time he even put himself forward, unsuccessfully, as a candidate for the Diet. The

only known "campaign" of his Sich society[22] was a march against the Grozova Russophiles during an election held after the introduction in 1907 of universal manhood suffrage in Austria-Hungary. The other villages were generally more passive. In the region as a whole, the mobilization of significant sectors of the population and creation of durable political structures did not occur until the interwar period.

In politics, as in education, Poland fostered developments inimical to its own interests among the Ukrainian population. The two movements that succeeded in organizing people in our area—first Communism and then Ukrainian integral nationalism—were both dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Polish state. To repeat, the Polish nation-state by its very definition excluded the people we are studying; furthermore, it fanned the growth of radical politics by the revolutionary rhetoric of its founders and by the fact that as early as 1926 it had dispensed with liberal constitutionalism. Conditions under interwar Poland reflected and reinforced the general European movement toward extremism, and it is not surprising that our villages, newcomers to politics, would be caught up in this powerful trend.

Communism was the first to make its appearance. Once again Mshanets set the pattern, and the role of the individual was crucial. One of Zubrytsky's successes was Andrii Voloshchak, a village boy who managed to get a higher education and became a poet. Blinded in battle while serving in the Austrian army, Voloshchak was one of many in Europe driven to Leninism by the experience of the Great War. As a Gymnasium teacher after the war, Voloshchak turned many young people to Communism, including ones in his native village, which he visited often. Over the years that followed, neighboring villages also generated Communist groups; active in that development were people who had been converted to the cause while working abroad in France and Canada. By the 1930s the political and social landscape of our area was marked by a significant and strident Communist presence. At this point two things should be noted: first, the Communists here were very much national in bent—they believed that Soviet Ukraine was the fulfillment of the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people—and their organization facilitated the advance of the Ukrainian idea; second, the fact that the local Communists were all fellow peasants meant that from 1939 to 1941 this area did not follow the urban dwellers of eastern Poland and the Baltic states in making the fatal equation between Jews and Communism.

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[22] "Sich" is the Ukrainian word for a Cossack encampment, but in this context it referred to the Galician Ukrainian version of pre-World War I nationalist paramilitarism along the lines of the Czech Sokol society.

Ukrainian integral nationalism arrived somewhat later. Following the general Galician trend, militant nationalist organizational work did not really take off until the 1930s. The active element were the veterans of the Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918–19, but an even more important role came to be played by youth, that is, the sons of priests or teachers stationed in our villages, or local boys who had managed to become Gymnasium students (following a familiar pattern, educational institutions were then hotbeds of sedition and places of recruitment by revolutionaries). By 1939 the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) had an underground network in our villages, comprised largely of the more active and educated youth.

It might seem that the presence of two extremist and mutually hostile political structures would bode ill for community peace and interethnic relations, but before 1939 the situation in fact remained calm. Our revolutionary activists thought globally but had little to do locally. The Communists had no bourgeoisie worth fighting at home (although they did agitate against the clergy, particularly Zubrytsky's successor, whose exorbitant fees for funerals and the like gave them quite an opening), so they waited for world events to unfold. The OUN, although in genre undoubtedly fascist (to use the term to describe a type of politics characteristic of a certain period, not merely as an imprecation) and animated by an exclusionary vision of Ukraine for Ukrainians, was obsessed theoretically with the Russians and practically with the Poles, but neither group was really present in our villages. The OUN (like Galician Ukrainian educated society as whole) had taken the one great lesson of the recent tragic experience to be that armies decided the fate of nations, so it spent its time and energy in the ideological preparation of cadres for the coming Ukrainian army. Hence politically organized villagers in each faction focused on propaganda work and waited. If they had existed there in a more hot-tempered culture, the OUN and the Communists might at least have fought it out with each other, but the deeply ingrained traditional peacefulness of village life in our area was still strong enough to make that unthinkable and prevent a venomous turn in relations with minority groups. (There was social estrangement between the followers of the two movements, however, and Mshanets, where the Communists were strongest, become somewhat isolated from the surrounding villages.)

As stated at the outset, the focus of our investigation is Ukrainian peasant society (and all but one person interviewed thus far was Ukrainian), but relations with local minorities constitute an integral part of our questionnaire. It is therefore feasible to make some observations about how politicization affected this topic. Owing to space limitations, I will

focus on the Jews, the minority group about which we have the most information. Most important is that until the Second World War the traditional pattern of coexistence seems to have prevailed, not only in socioeconomic function but also in attitudes and interpersonal relations, despite the politicization of much of the population. The Communists espoused an international ideology, and village Jews do not seem to have been sufficiently bourgeois for class prejudice to come into play. The OUN clearly had the most potential for generating enmity, but its obsessions were anti-Russian and anti-Polish , and the thrust of its prewar propaganda was not anti-Semitic (though one can find anti-Semitic strains). The villager who was an OUN member did not blame the problems in his life on Jews but rather on the lack of Ukrainian statehood. In my numerous interviews with the prewar generation, I never heard fulminations against Jews in the villages. Indeed, Jews do not loom large in the oral history, for the interviewees were preoccupied with Ukrainian communal affairs and generally required a direct question to get onto the topic of Jews and other non-Ukrainians. Once prompted, they told numerous stories of individual Jews and their families, and the tone of that information was, for lack of a better term, human, focusing on the distinctive personality traits and foibles that are the main interest of the Boiko raconteur. This is not to say that the villagers existed in some sort of idealized, Americalike utopia where differences are simultaneously disregarded and celebrated. Jews were seen as fundamentally, ontologically different people, but also as people who had always been in the village, and they were accepted as part of the traditional fabric of life.

The Catastrophe

The Second World War was the disaster that irrevocably altered the small world of Mshanets and its village neighbors around the Magura.When the Soviet occupiers arrived in 1939, they were greeted triumphantly by the Communist element and with more positive anticipation than the reader might expect from the non-Communists, the latter apparently by the Ukrainian national rhetoric of the new authorities or hopes that anything would be an improvement over the economy of Depression-era Poland. Under the tutelage of the newcomers (from the general Soviet mix of ethnicities, but mainly Russians and central and eastern Ukrainians), the native Communists established Soviet institutions. In order to do that properly they were required to carry out dekulakization. Dozens of *gazdy* and their families were dispossessed and deported in wrenching scenes that left their extended families and friends with a lethal grievance against the authors of their misery. The main effect of the first Soviet occupation was the introduction of violent divisions into

the majority Ukrainian population. The occupation also saw the first of the demographic transformations brought about by the war: under the terms of the Nazi-Soviet arrangement for Poland, the Germans of Bandriv were simply and suddenly erased from the local landscape as they were resettled in the expanded Reich.

When the Soviets retreated in 1941, there were reprisals against the local Communists, and in some places the recriminations also turned against the Roma, who were accused of having been informers. These killings were the only spasm of communal, frenzied violence. The subsequent elimination of the Jews and remaining Roma was done in an orderly way, and the victims were not killed on the spot. According to the interviews, during the Nazi occupation "the Germans" or "the Gestapo" came and took the Jews away. For two of the villages we have some more specific information. The Jews of Mshanets hid for a time in the Bandriv forest, living on what they could beg from their former neighbors, until someone turned them into the German authorities for a cash reward. In Mykhnovets a peasant woman's help made it possible for at least some Jews to survive. By 1944 the minority groups that had lived in the area for generations had been eliminated.

With regard to the local Ukrainians, the Germans did not attempt to impose direct, day-to-day control. The well-established *gazdy* who had escaped dekulakization took up village offices, and their main obligation vis-à-vis the new sovereign authority was to ensure the payment of heavy taxes in kind (livestock and grain) and, later, a stream of conscripted labor for the German war industry. In effect our villages were self-governing, ethnically monolithic entities in which the modern Ukrainian national idea was supreme. In terms of political organization, the OUN predominated, but by this time it was divided: the Melnyk faction followed a policy of working within and through public institutions, while the Bandera faction attempted to create a clandestine authority structure while generally avoiding confrontation with the Germans. The latter group created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) that would throw itself into the teeth of the returning Soviet power.

The re-establishment of the Stalinist regime required a hellish counterinsurgency that lasted for several years, in the course of which dozens of boys from our villages were killed and many families deported. This trauma, whose effects are still discernable in the interviewees who lived through it, was followed by the truncation of the peasants' small world. In a 1951 border adjustment, Mykhnovets and the villages on the Magura's western slope were assigned to Poland. Their inhabitants were deported to Odesa oblast, where they settled on lands formerly held by German colonists; their places in the village were taken by the few Poles

willing to live in the impoverished mountains and, for a time, by Greek Communist refugees. A very difficult frontier was drawn, leaving Mshanets and Grozova in a cul de sac on the western border of Soviet Ukraine.

Conclusion

This paper has looked at the impact of the modern world and its agents on a traditional society. Ideological action—by Mykhailo Zubrytsky as the harbinger of the modern national idea, and then by the Communists and the OUN as apostles of revolutionary politics based on that idea—succeeded in creating a new identity and politicizing much of the population, but it did not fundamentally alter old socioeconomic realities or the traditional patterns of community interaction and interethnic relations. That level of change came from the outside, through the collision of Stalinism and Nazism.

The national idea Zubrytsky espoused defined Ukrainians in opposition to Russians. With the radicalization of that idea by the OUN, Soviet power was seen as the Russian essence in its purest and most lethal form. The descendants of Zubrytsky's pupils who laid down their lives in the UPA believed they were fighting for the very survival of their nation. The Soviet regime tried to subdue nationalism and visited dreadful violence on the villages, but it did not in any way challenge the Ukrainian national identity of the inhabitants; if anything, it strengthened that identity through a fine educational system that allowed numerous children of the village to make careers throughout Ukraine and thereby establish personal connections with the country as a whole. At the same time the Soviet system attained the goal of material progress, which developed the area's economic and technological infrastructure and provided (with heavy subsidies) the highest standard of living it has known to date. The fall of the Soviet Union has brought both personal and national freedom, but the collapse of the planned economy has removed the material foundations of life in the mountains. As a result the future of our villages looks bleak, as it does for most of the world's peasantry in the modern global economy.

The Last Judgment Icon of Mshanets

John-Paul Himka

On permanent display in the National Museum in Lviv is a Last Judgment icon from the village of Mshanets.[1] It is an imposing work, 190 by 136 centimeters.[2] Moreover, it is one of the oldest surviving Ukrainian icons of the Last Judgment. It is impossible at present to date the icon with precision. Estimates range from the first half of the fifteenth century[3] to some time in the sixteenth.[4]

The Mshanets icon is the third oldest of the extant Last Judgment icons. The oldest is generally called the Vanivka icon, after the Ukrainian name of a village (Węglówka) now in Poland. It is also held by the National

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[1] Inventory number 34505/I–1181. In the literature, this same icon is sometimes mislabeled Mshana. The Mshanets icon has been frequently reproduced: I. Svientsitsky, *Ikonopys halytskoi Ukrainy XV–XVI. vikiv* (Lviv, 1928), plate 51, p. 43, and plate 74, p. 60; Ilarion Svientsitsky-Sviatytsky, *Ikony halytskoi Ukrainy XV–XVI vikiv* (Lviv, 1929), plate 126, p. 85; *Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva v shesty tomakh*, vol. 2, *Mystetstvo XIV–pershoi polovyny XVII stolittia* (Kyiv: Akademiia nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, Holovna redaktsiia "Ukrainskoi radianskoi entsyklopedii," 1967), p. 230, il. 156; Sviatoslav Hordynsky, *Ukrainska ikona 12–18 storichchia* (Philadelphia: Provydinnia, 1973), plate 46; Hryhorii Lohvyn, Lada Miliaieva, and Vira Svientsitska, *Ukrainskyi serednovichnyi zhyvopys* (Kyiv: Mystetstvo, 1976), plates XLVIII–XLIX; V. I. Svientsitska and O. F. Sydor, *Spadshchyna vikiv: Ukrainske maliarstvo XIV–XVIII stolit u muzeinykh kolektsiiakh Lvova* (Lviv: Kameniar, 1990), plates 18–20; David M. Goldfrank, "Who Put the Snake on the Icon and the Tollbooths on the Snake?—A Problem of Last Judgment Iconography," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 19 (1995), plate 6; Dmytro Stepovyk, *Istoriia ukrainskoi ikony, X–XX st.* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1996), plate 52; Vasyl Otkovych and Vasyl Pylypiuk, *Ukrainska ikona XIV–XVIII st.: Iz zbirky Natsionalnoho muzeiu u Lvovi* (Lviv: Svitlo i tin, 1999), 32–33; and Patriarch Dymytrii (Yarema), *Ikonopys Zakhidnoi Ukrainy XII–XV st.* (Lviv: Drukarski kunshty, 2005), p. 245, il. 298, and p. 250, il. 306.

[2] Oleh Sydor, "Reiestr ikon Strashnoho Sudu v kolektsii NML," *Litopys Natsionalnoho muzeiu u Lvovi*, no. 2 (7) (2001): 90.

[3] Dymytrii, *Ikonopys Zakhidnoi Ukrainy*, 245. The best-informed estimate seems to be that of Oleh Sydor, who places it in the second half of the fifteenth century (ibid., 90).

[4] Heinz Skrobucha, "Zur Ikonographie des 'Jüngsten Gerichts' in der russischen Ikonenmalerei," *Kirche im Osten: Studien zur osteuropäischen Kirchengeschichte und Kirchenkunde* 5 (1962): 61.

The Last Judgment icon of Mshanets

Museum in Lviv, but it has rarely been exhibited.[5] Sequentially between the Vanivka and Mshanets icons is an icon owned by the National Museum in Cracow, usually referred to as the Polana icon (after the Polish name of Poliana, a village in Ukraine).[6] The Vanivka and Mshanets icons are the most similar to each other; the Polana icon differs from the others stylistically, especially in its color scheme.

The Vanivka and Mshanets icons both come from the Staryi Sambir region, and it is likely that they were painted in one of the nearby monasteries, perhaps in Lavriv or Spas. Probably villagers commissioned the icons from the monks and then carted them to their villages. Although the icons were large, they were composed of several boards and could be dismantled for the journey. The Mshanets icon was painted on two linden boards.

The Mshanets icon, like the other two older icons, has much in common with Byzantine icons of the Last Judgment[7] and particularly with Novgorod icons.[8] The Last Judgment icons of the Ukrainian Carpathians also have distinctive features.

Like most depictions of the Last Judgment in the Byzantine tradition, the Mshanets icon shows two angels rolling up the scroll of the heavens at its very top center (Is 34:4 and Rv 6:14). The scroll is adorned with a red sun and a white moon. Directly below the scroll is the Son of Man sitting in a mandorla ringed by cherubim and borne aloft by four angels. From the left of the mandorla flows a stream of fire that gains in size until finally it forms the lake of Gehenna near the icon's bottom left. (The left and right in Last Judgment iconography is not the viewer's left and right, but left and right from the perspective of the Son of Man. The right side, generally speaking, is the side of salvation, and the left, that of damnation.) The mandorla is flanked by the Mother of God on the right and John the Baptist on the left. The three figures together constitute the

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[5] The best and most accessible reproduction is in Dymytrii, *Ikonopys Zakhidnoi Ukrainy*, 241–42.

[6] Reproduced in Romuald Biskupski, *Ikony w zbiorach polskich* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Artystyczne i Filmowe, 1991), plate 22 (color); and Janina Kłosińska, *Ikony* (Cracow: Muzeum Narodowe w Krakowie, 1973), 155.

[7] See especially the Mt. Sinai icon from the second half of the twelfth century reproduced in G. Sotiriou and M. Sotiriou, *Icones du Mont Sinaï: Collection de l'Institut Français d'Athènes*, vol. 1 (Athens, 1968), plate 151. A better reproduction is in Kurt Weitzmann, *The Icon: Holy Images—Sixth to Fourteenth Century* (New York: George Braziller, 1978), plate 23.

[8] Especially the fifteenth-century icon held by the Tretiakov Gallery in Moscow, reproduced in color in Kurt Weitzmann et al., *The Icon* (New York: Dorset Press, 1987), 281 (detail p. 280).

deesis or trimorphion. This element appears in all Byzantine-inspired iconography of the Last Judgment. Standing behind the Mother of God and John the Baptist are angels.

In the upper right corner is the heavenly Jerusalem (Dn 7:22, 27; Gal 4:25; Heb 12:22) depicted as a city, among whose structures are turrets and a wall. Before the city stand Jesus, his mother, John the Baptist, and St. Peter. Balancing it in the upper left corner is the defeat of the rebel angels (Rv 12:7–9): angels in a sphere spear devils and drive them toward hell. To the right is Golgotha surmounted by a three-barred cross (with the inscription "King of Glory") and instruments of the Passion (the lance, reed, sponge, and crown of thorns). These scenes are on all three of the old Carpathian Last Judgment icons and on those of Novgorod.

In the next register down sit the twelve apostles in two groups. On the right sit (from right to left) Philip, Luke, Andrew, Mark, Matthew, and Peter. On the left are Paul, John, James, Bartholomew, Simon, and Thomas. Christ had promised the apostles that they would be present to judge the tribes of Israel (Mt 19:28; Lk 22:30), and they appear in Last Judgment iconography throughout the Eastern Christian world.

The apostles are divided by the throne of judgment, also known as the hetoimasia (place prepared). The throne is in the center of the second register. On it is a book open to Mt 11:28: "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." It is much more common for the book to be open to Mt 25:34, as it is in both the Vanivka and the Polana icon. Kneeling to the right of the throne is Adam, and to the left, Eve, interceding for their progeny. The throne with Adam and Eve already appeared in Byzantine iconography. But from the bottom of the throne in the Carpathian icons extends the hand of God, which is an innovation developed originally in northern Rus'. The Mshanets icon has the inscription: "the souls of the righteous in the hand of God" (Wisdom of Solomon 3:1). Indeed, the hand of God is depicted as filled with heads representing souls. The hand of God also holds scales. Some souls gather near the right pan of the scales, while devils swarm the left pan.

In the third and fourth registers on the right, below the first group of apostles, are choirs of saints: female anchorites, male anchorites, monks, and holy hierarchs; below them are saintly women, martyrs, Orthodox kings, and prophets. In the third register on the left stands Moses holding a scroll with the inscription "Moses said: wretched Jews, see whom you have crucified." To his left stand Jews in costumes from the biblical era. This scene has its origins in the gospel of John (5:45–46), but it was elaborated in "The Life of St. Basil the New," a text that greatly influ-

enced Last Judgment iconography in Rus'.[9] Standing near the Jews are other peoples, who are not condemned but represent the universality of judgment. Both scripture (Dn 7:13–14; Mt 25:31–32) and "The Life of St. Basil the New" stipulated that humans would come to judgment organized into groups of peoples. Aside from the Jews, the peoples in the third register are, from right to left, Greeks, Turks, Tatars, Armenians, Moors, Rus', and Germans. In later centuries the peoples in the Carpathian Last Judgment icons became more plentiful and exotic. The motif of the choirs of saints appears already in Byzantine iconography, but the ensemble of Moses and the Jews and the peoples was an innovation of Novgorod.

The middle two-thirds of the icon are taken up by a serpent with rings on its body. The serpent's head is near Adam, biting his heel. The serpent's tail is not visible because it is being swallowed by the two-headed beast of the apocalypse in Gehenna at the icon's far left near the bottom. The serpent is evidently the tempter from Genesis. The rings on his body are tollbooths.[10] In Orthodox tradition, dating back at least to the fifth century,[11] the soul is imagined as traveling after death through various tollbooths, where devils and angels examine its record with respect to specific sins. The idea received its greatest elaboration in the vision of Theodora included in "The Life of St. Basil the New," and it is from there that the motif entered the iconography of northern Rus' and then the Ukrainian Carpathians. In the Mshanets icon there are twenty-one tollbooth rings on the serpent, and at each a devil and an angel are present. Each tollbooth is inscribed with a particular sin, closely modeled on the list of sins in "The Life of St. Basil the New." The tollbooths in the icon, some barely legible, are slander, mockery, envy(?), hatred, rage and anger(?), acquisitiveness(?), empty talk, usury and deceit, vain talk (or perhaps vainglory), love of silver, drunkenness, harboring grudges, gluttony, incantation and poisoning and magic, idolatry and all kinds of heresies, lying with men and infanticide, adultery, thievery, murder, mercilessness, and robbery/assault.[12]

On the left side of the icon, below Moses and the Jews and the peoples, is the resurrection of the dead, a motif common in all Orthodox ico-

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[9] S. G. Vilinsky, *Zhitie sv. Vasiliia Novago v russkoi literature,* 2 pts., vols. 6–7 (1911–13) of *Zapiski Imperatorskago Novorossiiskago universiteta: Istoriko-filologicheskii fakultet* (Odesa).

[10] See Goldfrank, "Who Put the Snake on the Icon."

[11] Saint Cyril of Alexandria, "De exitu animi, et de secundo adventu," in *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series graeca [Patrologia Graeca]* (Paris, 1844–66), 77: 1071–90.

[12] Some of these readings come from Dymytrii, *Ikonopys Zakhidnoi Ukrainy,* 246.

nography of the Last Judgment. In the Mshanets icon the world is represented as a circle. Four angels are trumpeting at different parts of the circle. Within the circle is land, shaped something like a six-leaved clover, and the remainder is water. In the water are fish, crustaceans, a ship, and an enigmatic man and woman. The earth contains a building in the upper left "leaf" of the clover. Most of the other leaves show various animals, including a bear, a wolf, and a serpent, vomiting up body parts. These scenes are meant to depict bodies being made whole again for the judgment. The land also shows heads rising from a grave. A man in the center is perhaps a personification of the earth.

At the far left of the resurrection circle is the prophet Daniel, accompanied by an angel. The presence of Daniel is motivated by the importance of his vision in chapter 7 for the theology and iconography of the Last Judgment. Here Daniel holds a scroll, the inscription on which is only partly legible: "I, Daniel, saw a vision...." Daniel seeing his vision is illustrated in both Novgorodian and Carpathian iconography, but does not have Byzantine precedents. The same is true of the four beasts representing evil kingdoms (Dn 7:3–7, 17; and 8:3–6, 20–24). In the Mshanets icon the beasts are placed on medallions just below the serpent and represent the kingdoms of Rome, the Antichrist, Babylon, and Macedonia.

Just below the resurrection scene is a group of sinners whose necks are chained together. There is a demon behind them, and two demons in front. The inscription reads: "They lead sinners to torment." The scene is known in Byzantine iconography. Below them is the lake of Gehenna. Satan sits inside it, astride the beast of the Apocalypse. He holds the soul of Judas on his lap. This, too, has Byzantine origins.

Just below Gehenna are traditional torments, similar to those found in Byzantine and other Orthodox images of the Last Judgment. Here they are depicted as five circles within a square. A few demons help torment the sinners. The circles represent the unheatable winter, a dark and smelly place, everlasting fire (Mt 25:41), the worm that dieth not (Mk 9:44, 48), and gnashing of teeth (Mt 25:30).

To the right of the traditional torments is another hell modeled on Gothic Last Judgments.[13] This new hell is unique to the icons of the Ukrainian Carpathian region. It also appears on the Vanivka and Polana icons, as well as on most later Last Judgment icons of the region. Inside are naked sinners, mostly hanging and enveloped by flames. Hanging upside down from the top of the new hell is a robber. Below him is a sorceress, her breasts attacked by serpents. Also hanging from the top of the

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[13] See, for example, Vlasta Dvořáková et al., *Středověká nástěnná malba na Slovensku*, photographs by Alexandr Paul st. (Prague and Bratislava: Odeon, Tatran, 1978), plate 40.

new hell is an "accuser and slanderer"; appropriately, he is hanging by his tongue. To his left, hanging from the top, is a person identified as "a thief and a fornicator." In the middle of hell are an envious man and a murderer. At the bottom next to the sorceress is "a usurer and silver lover." To his left is a drunkard; a devil is pouring drink into his mouth. A similar set of sinners can be found in the Vanivka and Polana icons. Over time Carpathian iconographers made this new hell more populous and diversified.

The most interesting figure in the new hell is the tavern maid. She is always clothed, even though all the other figures in hell are naked. Moreover, she is depicted almost identically and in almost exactly the same posture in all three of the oldest Last Judgment icons. At her back is a devil. The origin of the tavern maid is also to be found in Gothic Last Judgments. In fact, the figure of the tavern maid in the Mshanets icon and the two other oldest icons is almost identical to a tavern maid in a fourteenth-century Silesian fresco of the Last Judgment.[14] The tavern maid is not found in Orthodox iconography outside the Carpathians.

On the extreme right of the new hell and to the left of paradise is the almsgiving fornicator, a figure out of a Byzantine tale that was often included in Slavonic miscellanies in the Carpathians in the sixteenth century. The basic story is told in the inscription on the Mshanets icon: "This man gave alms, but he did not give up his fornication." Because of his sin, he feels the torments of hell, but for his almsgiving he sees the delights of paradise. Hence his placement in this and other Carpathian (and Novgorodian) icons—tied to a pillar on the border of heaven and hell, facing paradise.

Paradise occupies the bottom right of the icon. It is represented by a circle containing the Mother of God flanked by the archangels Michael and Gabriel, the good thief bearing a small crucifix, and the three patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, with souls on their bosoms. There are also trees within the circle. Below are the gates of paradise, which are being entered by saints. The gate is guarded by a fiery cherub. St. Peter opens the gate with his keys, while across the gate from him St. Paul holds a scroll with the text of Mt 25:34: "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you." Except for Paul's scroll, this depiction of paradise is typical for Byzantine and post-Byzantine iconography. Some monks flying into paradise are an innovation introduced in Rus'.

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[14] Klára Beneškovská, ed., *King John of Luxembourg (1296–1346) and the Art of His Era* (Prague: KLP, 1998), plate 166.

The most unusual feature of the Mshanets icon is a deathbed scene tucked into the space between paradise, the choirs of saints, and the serpent. Standing beside the dying man is the personification of death. The Mshanets icon is the first of the Carpathian Last Judgments to include the figure of death. Afterwards it was in almost every one of them; but it almost never occurs in Byzantine and Russian iconography. Death in the Mshanets icon has multiple faces on his body and carries a lance, a saw, a scythe, two axes, and an hourglass. This is clearly modeled on Gothic prototypes. The death scene is unique in that it bears an inscription in verse: "Smert vsikh muk okrutniishaia, / vsikh strakhov naistrashniishaia, / kozhdomu sia ia tak iavliaiu / koly ieho zhyvota izbavliaiu." (Death is the cruelest of all torments, / the most frightful of all fears, / to each person I so appear /when I deprive him of life.). Also unique to the icon is the little demon holding a sign at the foot of the deathbed. It reads: "Because he did my works."

Having surveyed all the motifs in the Mshanets icon, I have been led to conclude that not all truisms are false. This icon, with its combination of Byzantine-Novgorodian and Gothic elements, confirms the old observation that Ukraine and its culture lie between East and West.

How Sissi Became a Ruthenian Queen: Some Peculiarities of the Peasant Worldview

Yaroslav Hrytsak

The assassination of Queen Elizabeth (Sissi, 1837–98) was met with grief throughout the Habsburg lands, and Austrian-ruled Galicia was no exception.[1] This is attested, inter alia, by a local Ruthenian (Ukrainian) song recorded in the Buchach region several months after the tragic event. Among its lines are the following:

<div style="text-align:center">

Вона була така добра,
як та рідна мати.
Як тота добра мати
що нас породила,
а царівна добра була,
що край боронила.
Скасувала всі кайдани,
вулиці тай буки,
тай зазнала від ворогів
тяженької муки.
Наша панна цісарівна
є руського роду
тай пішла ся бай купати
в швайцарську воду.
Бодай тота Швайцарія
була ся розпала
була би ся цісарівна
в сім краю скупала.[2]

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The song is full of empathy for the deceased queen and could be regarded as just another example of naive peasant monarchism. What is striking here, however, is the statement that the queen shared the origins

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[1] See, e.g., Larry Wolff, "Dynastic Conservatism and Poetic Violence in Fin-de-Siècle Cracow: The Habsburg Matrix of Polish Modernism," *American Historical Review* 106, no. 3 (June 2001): 735–64.

[2] Ivan Franko, "Zrazok novozlozhenoi nar[odnoi] pisni," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 10, no. 4 (April 1900): 54.

of the peasants who sang the song—that she was of Ruthenian descent (*ruskoho rodu*). This is obvious nonsense, since Elizabeth was a Bavarian German and a Roman Catholic: in other words, nothing in her origins or status even remotely suggested any link with Ruthenian peasants in Galicia.

It is the task of historians to make sense of nonsense. In this case, the only way to do so is to reconstruct the ways in which peasants thought about themselves and the world they were living in. A standard explanation suggests that peasants did not possess an overarchingly broad identity. They identified themselves with the place they were born, their religious denomination, and their occupation ("I am a local, I am Catholic/Orthodox, and I am a peasant"). Peasants allegedly lacked the mental tools that would allow them to identify themselves with a larger world. Their social solidarity focused on their family, and their fatherland literally meant a plot of land they inherited from their ancestors and passed on to their successors in the family. Connections within the family and with the land were regarded as sacred, and transgressing against them was considered a grievous sin. It took long and sustained effort on the part of the state and the intelligentsia to lead the peasants out of their private fatherland and bring them into the ideological one—or, in the words of the renowned Polish social scientist Stanisław Ossowski, from a fatherland with a small "f" into a Fatherland with a capital "F."[3]

Such conclusions were drawn on the basis of field research done in particular areas among certain ethnic groups at specific times,[4] which raises the question of the extent to which those findings can be extrapolated to other societies. Moreover, even though these studies were local, interpretations of them conclude with the universal concept of "traditional society." That concept is thought to explain peasant behavior in Eastern Europe as a whole throughout the millennium extending from their Christianization in the ninth and tenth centuries to the First World War (and, in certain cases, up to the Second World War).[5]

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[3] Stanisław Ossowski, *O ojczyźnie i narodzie* (Warsaw, 1984), 15–46. See also Volodymyr Mendzhetsky [Włodzimierz Międrzecki], "Seliany u natsiotvorchykh protsesakh Tsentralnoi i Skhidnoi Yevropy u druhii polovyni XIX — na pochatku XX stolittia," *Ukraina moderna*, no. 6 (2001): 56–79; and Swietłana N. Tołstaja [Svetlana N. Tolstaia], "Ojczyzna w ludowej tradycji słowiańskiej," in *Pojęcia ojczyzny we współczesnych językach europejskich* ed. Jerzy Bartmiński (Lublin, 1993), 17–22.

[4] Stanisław Ossowski conducted his studies in postwar Silesia, i.e., the German-Polish borderlands, whose population was (and largely still is) characterized by a bivalent (German and Polish) culture and had a strong regional identity that quite often resists definition in clear-cut German or Polish national terms. See Antonina Kłoskowska, *National Cultures at the Grass-Root Level* (Budapest, 2001), 232–33.

[5] Kazimierz Dobrowolski, "Peasant Traditional Culture," in *Peasants and Peasant Soci-*

Recently these interpretations have been challenged by new studies of peasant and borderland societies. These new studies question the idea that the simultaneous possession of two fatherlands, private and ideological, was a privilege of the educated classes and that the imagination of some peasant groups was as narrow and parochial as the established theory suggests.

Austrian-ruled Galicia seems an ideal proving ground for both interpretations. On the one hand, it is considered the epitome of traditional society;[6] on the other, one is hard pressed to find another region that has so much well-preserved and recorded data. The song about Sissi was published by Ivan Franko (1856–1916), who himself amassed rich ethnographic materials and published a three-volume collection of Galician Ruthenian proverbs, one of which contains the term "fatherland" in a broader meaning—"Otechestvo na yazytsi, a v sertsi obluda."[7] To be sure, this single example does not constitute definite proof that peasants had a concept of an ideological fatherland. Moreover, the term itself—the Church Slavonic *otechestvo* rather than the colloquial *otchyzna/ otchyna*[8]—suggests its bookish origins. This derivation is quite understandable, given the Eastern Christian roots of the Greek Catholic Church, which was dominant among Galician Ruthenians. Nevertheless, the incidence of this and other bookish concepts helps correct the notion that peasants thought only in parochial terms. Some of these concepts were derived from the alternative Latin tradition, which enjoyed currency among the educated classes. For example, the proverb "Piznaty durnoho po smikhu yoho" corresponds to the Latin "Per risum multum poteris cognoscere tultum"; "Yedyna lastivka ne robyt vesny" is a literal translation of "Una hirundo non facit ver"; and "Voda kamin tochyt" sounds similar to "Gutta cavat lapidem non vi, sed saepe cadendo." It may of course be assumed that these parallels do not reflect Ruthenian borrowings from Latin per se but, rather, derive from common Indo-European lore. In some cases, however, the fact of borrowing is undeniable—to wit, a vulgar travesty of Cicero's famous line: "Quousque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?"—"Doky Ty budesh, Katery-

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eties, ed. Teodor Shanin (Harmondsworth, 1971), 277–98; Ivan-Pavlo Khymka [John-Paul Himka], "Istoriia, khrystyianskyi svit i tradytsiina ukrainska kultura: Sproba mentalnoi arkheolohii," *Ukraina moderna*, no. 6 (2001): 7–24.

[6] Suffice it to say that Kazimierz Dobrowolski elaborated his concept of "traditional society" (see notes 4 and 5 above) on the basis of his fieldwork in interwar Galicia.

[7] Ivan Franko, ed., *Halytsko-ruski narodni prypovidky*, 3 vols. (Lviv, 1901–1909), 2: 484.

[8] See Michał Łesiów, "Batkiwszczyna, witczyzna, ridnyj kraj. Ojczyzna w języku ukraińskim," in Bartmiński, *Pojęcia ojczyzny*, 93–96.

no, khodyty u nashu kukuruzu sr[…]?"[9] Another example is the proverb "Vono by takoho kazusu narobylo, shcho i ne prypovisty," on which Franko commented: "From the Latin 'casus,' specifically in a juridical sense."[10]

The numerous examples of bookish concepts in Galician Ruthenian folklore illustrate a weak point of the theory of two fatherlands, which is based on the opposition of "high" and "low" elements. Such a situation may have obtained in regions like Polissia or certain localities in the Balkans far removed from centers of high culture. In many if not most cases, however, "low culture" was not the spontaneous creation of a poorly educated or uneducated population. Rather, it was the result of a downward filtering of high culture to the lower classes, which was accompanied by an upward filtering of low culture. The interplay of these processes may have created a modicum of common cultural space in a "traditional" society, in which there was room for a common father-land.[11] Quite often the concept of this common fatherland was articulated as a "holy land."[12]

The concept of Ukraine may serve as a good example here. As a geographical term, it is encountered sporadically in medieval chronicles starting from 1186. In these chronicles there is a clear tendency to use it in the sense of "small fatherland" (*okrainy*, not *krainy*): it was used, inter alia, to denote the southeastern borderland of the Galician kingdom (*Ponyzzia*).[13] The concept of Ukraine as a large fatherland was rather late to emerge, making its appearance in the political culture of the eighteenth-century Cossack state.[14] Folklore collections reveal the persistence of this term in the folk culture of territories such as Galicia, which had never belonged to that state. In the introduction to his collection of Ukrainian

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[9] Franko, *Halytsko-ruski narodni prypovidky*, 2: 246.

[10] Ibid., 2: 237.

[11] Robert T. Anderson, *Traditional Europe: A Study in Anthropology and History* (Belmont, Calif., 1971), 141–51; Leonid Heretz, "Russian Apocalypse, 1891–1917: Popular Perceptions of Events from the Year of Famine and Cholera to the Fall of the Tsar" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1993), 130; Kłoskowska, *National Cultures*, 48; Alexander H. Krappe, *The Science of Folkore: A Classic Introduction to the Origins, Forms, and Characteristics of Folklore* (New York, 1964), 153.

[12] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1988); Adrian Hastings, "Holy Lands and Their Political Consequences," *Nations and Nationalism* 9, no. 1 (2003): 29–54.

[13] *Litopys ruskyi za Ipatskym spyskom*, trans. Leonid Makhnovets (Kyiv, 1989), 343, 375, 432, 434.

[14] Frank Sysyn, "'Otchyzna' u politychnii kulturi Ukrainy pochatku XVIII st.," *Ukraina moderna*, no. 10 (2006): 7–19.

folk songs (1836), Platon Lukashevych claimed that in order to collect songs about Ukraine one had to go to Austrian Galicia. "Who would believe," he wrote, "that a Galician shepherd knows many more songs about the heroes of Ukraine and its history than a settled Little Russian Cossack? He takes pride in the deeds of Little Russians as though they were his own. He rejoices in their joy and longs in his beautiful songs for 'Cossack adventures.'"[15]

As a Ukrainian patriot, Lukashevych may have exaggerated the extent of Ukrainian memory in Galicia, but its existence cannot be denied. It is reflected in numerous songs Franko recorded in his native village. In these songs Ukraine is identified with a distant free land defended by the Cossacks against the Turks, Tatars, and Poles, to which some local young men dare to go, leaving their sweethearts behind.[16] The problem with this folk memory is that it gives us no criteria for identifying the geographical location of Ukraine or the ethnicity of its population. George S. N. Luckyj analyzed close to a thousand folk songs that mention Ukraine. In the absolute majority of cases, Ukraine figures in them as a sacral or mythical concept, not as a historical or geographical one.[17] The only geographical feature that can be identified in them is *Dunai* (the Danube), which constitutes a boundary to be crossed in order to enter Ukraine. If one juxtaposes the area in which these songs were sung (Austrian-ruled Galicia and the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire) and its location vis-à-vis the Danube (north and east of the river), a paradox emerges: the Ukraine of folklore should lie either in the Pannonian Plain or in the Balkans. The paradox can be resolved quite simply: in folklore, *Dunai* does not stand for the Danube but means any great river, sometimes even a flood. And a great river, in turn, has a sacral meaning: crossing it is tantamount to a rite of passage that gives rise to a new identity. By extension, crossing the Danube meant reaching a faraway land and breaking all ties with the old life in order to gain freedom and independence. The "Cossack Ukraine" "on the other side of the Danube" was a transcendental concept, a utopia, a land without "lord, Jew, or Union [the Uniate Church]" ("shcho ne maie pana, shcho ne maie zhyda, ne maie unii").[18]

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[15] [Platon Lukashevych], *Malorossiiskiia chervonorusskiia narodnyia dumy i pesni* (St. Petersburg, 1836), 103.

[16] O. I. Dei, ed., *Kolomyiky u zapysakh Ivana Franka* (Kyiv, 1970), 34; Vasyl Sokil, ed., *Narodni pisni z batkivshchyny Ivana Franka* (Lviv, 2003), 147, 187, 234, 302.

[17] Yurii Lutsky, "Rozdumy nad slovom 'Ukraina' u narodnykh pisniakh," *Suchasnist*, 1993, no. 8: 117–22.

[18] Words of a carol dating from the years 1600–20, as quoted in Mykhailo Drahomanov, *Vybrane ... mii zadum zlozhyty ocherk istorii tsyvilizatsii na Ukraini* (Kyiv, 1991), 23.

However, the modern ethnonym "Ukrainian" does not appear in folk songs and proverbs, most probably because the concept hardly existed in eighteenth-century high culture.[19] It is also absent from the works of Taras Shevchenko, who consciously modeled his poetry on Ukrainian folklore.[20] In the late nineteenth century, when Ukrainian activists in Galicia tried to introduce it to the local Ruthenian peasantry, they encountered a wall of misunderstanding. One of Franko's contemporaries, the Reverend Fylymon Tarnavsky, related a story about a young Ukrainian agitator who urged peasants to call themselves "Ukrainians," not "Ruthenians": "He entered the house of the old *gazda* [master of the house] Mykhailo Kaluzhka and told him he [Kaluzhka] was a Ukrainian. Kaluzhka went to the tavern and asked the landlord, Shaia Wenglar: "What is a Ukrainian?" Shaia Wenglar told him: A Ukrainian means a poor peasant who lives on the outskirts of a village. You, however, are a *hospodar* [master] from the center of the village, so you are no Ukrainian! If I were you, I would sue him for such a great offense."

Tarnavsky concluded his story with the comment: "This shows that the term 'Ukrainian' was not known to many at the time [1897]."[21]

The example of "Ukraine" illustrates the ambiguity of folk geography: on the one hand, it included concepts that could be read as symbols of a "large fatherland"; on the other hand, those symbols were transcendental and could not be identified with any particular geographic locale.

This is not to say that Galician folklore was devoid of terms denoting precise geographic locations. There were many such terms: Cracow, Sighet, Kyiv, Olomouc, Moravia, "the Hungarian lands," "the Turkish lands," and others.[22] In one way or another, they were related to everyday peasant experience: their meager existence obliged them to travel a good deal in search of additional resources. The Habsburg censuses reveal a steady increase in the numbers of Galicians who moved away from their birthplace: ten percent in 1880, fifteen percent in 1890, and twenty percent in 1900.[23] These migrations were bound to leave an imprint on the

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[19] For a few exceptions, see Oleksander Ohloblyn, *Liudy staroi Ukrainy* (Munich, 1959), 185, 217.

[20] See Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj and George Hawrysh, eds., *A Concordance to the Poetic Work of Taras Shevchenko*, 4 vols. (Edmonton and Toronto, 2001).

[21] Fylymon Tarnavsky, *Spohady: Rodynna khronika Tarnavskykh iak prychynok do istorii tserkovnykh, sviashchenytskykh, pobutovykh, ekonomichnykh i politychnykh vidnosyn u Halychyni v druhii polovyni XIX storichchia i v pershii dekadi* [sic] *XX storichchia* (Toronto, 1981), 171.

[22] Dei, *Kolomyiky*, 56, 82, 100, 110, 114.

[23] Krzysztof Zamorski, "Zasadnicze linie przemian demograficznych Galicji w drugiej połowie XIX wieku i na początku XX wieku," in *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo,* ed. Jerzy

peasant worldview, as evidenced in folklore. In any case, peasants drew a distinction between the "Ruthenian land" and the "foreign land" or "faraway country."[24] There is one recorded proverb that can be interpreted as referring to a national fatherland—"Velyka ruska maty" (Great Ruthenian Mother).[25]

The question arises whether the term *rus'kyi/rus'ka* (Ruthenian) could be translated into the language of modern nationalism. The answer would appear to be no. Yakiv Holovatsky stated in 1847 that "In general, every person of the Greek [Catholic] denomination in Galicia calls himself a Ruthenian and calls his fatherland Rus'."[26] He emphasized the religious character of Ruthenian identity, very much in the vein of Michael Cherniavsky in his classic study of traditional Russian myths. Cherniavsky showed that "Holy Rus'" rarely denoted a particular East Slavic territory: rather, it referred to a transcendental, ahistorical Rus' that was identified with Eastern Christianity. That Rus' was alien to the westernized Russian nobility of both the Principality of Moscow and the Russian Empire. It was the East Slavic, Eastern Christian peasantry that monopolized this image for self-identification purposes (reflected, inter alia, in the formula "Ruthenian = Orthodox/Eastern Christian = peasant").[27] The peasants identified themselves in this way until the First World War at the very least, and in some places until the Second World War,[28] when this concept was replaced by modern national (Belarusian, Russian, Ukrainian or, in some cases, Polish and Hungarian) identities.

Austrian-ruled Galicia was the westernmost borderland of the Eastern Christian world. In this region Eastern Christianity came into direct contact with Western Christianity, which made confessional identification much more intensive. Aside from that, this region of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was officially known as the Rus' palatinate (*Województwo ruskie, Ruske voievodstvo*) before it was annexed by the Habsburgs. Owing to lack of research, it is impossible to determine what

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Chłopiecki and Helena Madurowicz-Urbańska, vol. 2 (Rzeszów, 1995), 104.

[24] Dei, *Kolomyiky*, 14, 16, 100, 113.

[25] Hryhorii Ilkevych, ed., *Halytski prypovidky i zahadky* (Lviv, 2003), 11, 91.

[26] Ya. Holovatsky, "Velykaia Khorvatiia abo Halichsko-Karpatskaia Rus'," in *Vinok rusynam na obzhynky*, vol. 2, ed. B. I. Holovatsky (Vienna, 1847), 169.

[27] Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths* (New Haven, 1961), 104–20.

[28] Volodymyr Pashuk, *Zarobitchany Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy: Druha polovyna XIX st.* (Lviv, 2001), 140; David Saunders, "What Makes a Nation a Nation? Ukrainians since 1600," *Ethnic Groups* 10, nos. 1–3 (1993): 111–12; Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), 206–207.

Ruthenian peasants meant more often by *ruskyi/ruska*—their own province or the broader Eastern Christian world. I shall venture only a few remarks here on the basis of proverbs. One of them was "Vid Kyieva do Krakova vsiudy bida odnakova" (From Kyiv to Cracow, the same misfortune prevails). In commenting on it, Franko used modern ethnic terminology: "Dopikaie odnakovo ukraintsiam i poliakam" (It upsets the Ukrainians and the Poles equally).[29] This interpretation implies that Ruthenian peasants imagined their fatherland as a large space—larger, at least, than their own province—with its center in Kyiv. There are, however, similar Ruthenian proverbs in which Kyiv is replaced by Lviv or not mentioned at all.[30] Another proverb mentions Kyiv as a large city but lacks any further territorial identification: "Kyiv ne vidrazu zbudovanyi" (Kyiv was not built at one go). Characteristically, in other versions of this proverb Kyiv is replaced by Lviv or Cracow, and the form of the proverb is reminiscent of the famous Latin maxim "Non uno die Roma aedificata est."[31]

In Galician Ruthenian folklore there are, however, instances in which Kyiv means Kyiv and not any other city. One such instance occurs in a Christmas carol Franko's friend and colleague, Mykhailo Zubrytsky, recorded in the village of Mshanets near Staryi Sambir. The subject of the carol is the St. Sophia Cathedral, the "sacred church in sacred Kyiv" ("v sviatim Kiiovi"). Zubrytsky passed the text of this carol on to Franko, who published it in 1889 in the leading Ukrainian ethnographic journal, *Kievskaia starina*.[32] This publication provoked a lively discussion about the carol's authenticity. Franko himself doubted whether peasants in such a remote locale were aware of Kyiv's existence. A legend about the Kyiv Caves Laura ("tam v Rosyi ie vylyky take misto Kyiv i tam ie naivyshcha na tsilyi svit tserkva i nazyvaie-si Lavra") that was recorded later obliged Franko to reconsider his opinion.[33] It is important to note that both the Mshanets carol and the later legend contained an image of Kyiv as a city of God's mercy[34]—in other words, as the center of Holy Rus'. It is therefore reasonably safe to conclude that the proverbial Kyiv had a double meaning, standing sometimes for any great city (in this sense, it could be replaced by Cracow or Lviv) and sometimes for a

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[29] Franko, *Halytsko-ruski narodni prypovidky*, 2: 252.

[30] Ibid., 302, 370.

[31] Ibid., 252, 302, 370.

[32] [Ivan Franko], "Zamechatelnaia koliadka," *Kievskaia starina* 24, no. 1 (1889): 232.

[33] Volodymyr Hnatiuk, ed., *Halytsko-ruski narodni legendy* (Lviv, 1902), 186.

[34] Ivan Franko, *Zibrannia tvoriv*, 50 vols. (Kyiv, 1976–89), 42: 259, 261.

sacred city, just as the proverbial Danube could mean either any great river or a large waterway with particular sacred connotations.

The easternmost point in the mental geography of Galician Ruthenian folklore was Moscow, or, rather, an epithet deriving from the name of that city (*moskovskyi*) as a synonym of the Russian Empire. This epithet had explicit negative connotations: "Muscovite salary" meant "harsh punishment," while "Muscovite penalty" could refer to any nuisance. Local folklore had another image derivative of Moscow, that of the *moskal* (Muscovite). In some cases the word could be interpreted as meaning a Muscovite soldier, in others, an ethnic Russian, and in a few cases, even non-Christians (e. g., "those Muscovites who are there now, they came from the Tatars" and "the Muscovite tsar converted to Christianity only when he saw a cross in the sky, and with this sign he began to win victories over his enemies").[35] Among the proverbs Franko collected and commented on there is one that reveals an explicitly negative attitude to those educated Galician Ruthenians who identified themselves as Russians: "Katsap katsapom, pase svyni zahalom, lupyt shkiru pazurom" (A *katsap* remains a *katsap*—all he does is herd pigs [and] flails skin with his claw).[36]

This did not necessarily mean that at that point the local peasantry treated Russians as constitutive "others," like they did Poles and Jews: the negative image of a "Muscovite" did not prevent them from welcoming Russian soldiers in 1849 and again in 1914. Ruthenian peasants particularly liked the soldiers' "strong faith"—the way they prayed and fasted fervently. From the 1860s to the 1880s there were rumors that the tsar would soon come to Galicia to expel the Jews, punish the Poles, take land away from the gentry, and distribute it among the peasants. In these rumors, the Romanov monarch figured as the "Ruthenian tsar": it seemed that the peasants made no distinction between "*russkii*" (Russian") and "*rus'kyi*" (Ruthenian). As with their attitude toward Russian soldiers, they were fascinated that the tsar "displays strong faith and behaves that way." [37]

The last point requires elaboration. As noted above, Eastern Christian peasants did not identify their "Rus'" with the modern Russian state or with the Russian nobility. In their understanding the latter were personifi-

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[35] Hnatiuk, *Halytsko-ruski narodni legendy,* 187.

[36] Franko, *Halytsko-ruski narodni prypovidky,* 2: 247. *Katsap,* the pejorative term for a Russian, is derived from "*kak tsap*"(like a billy goat).

[37] John-Paul Himka, "Hope in the Tsar: Displaced Naive Monarchism among the Ukrainian Peasants of the Habsburg Empire," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 7, nos. 1–2 (1980): 125–38; I. Naumovych, "Nazad k narodu!" *Slovo,* 1881, no. 54 (19 [31] May): 2.

cations of the devil and related evil forces that lived off the peasants' hard labor. Only a monarch—a representative of God on earth—could save the peasants from the lords, and between "us" and "them" the monarch was on "our" side.[38] Galician Ruthenian peasants differed from other Eastern Slavs in that they were loyal to two monarchs at once: to Francis Joseph and his family on the one hand, and to the "White Tsar" on the other. By this token, not only the Romanovs but also the Habsburgs were "Ruthenian," which certainly made Elizabeth a Ruthenian queen. One can only guess what hard choices the Ruthenian peasants would have been obliged to make if Austria-Hungary and Russia had gone to war between the 1860s and 1880s—if, in their words, an "Austrian" were to attack a "Muscovite."[39] In the context of the present discussion, it is important to note another point: for the peasants, their large fatherland of Rus' required personification in the figure of a monarch. Without this figure, it was incomplete. Thus Ruthenian identity could exist only as long as there was a monarchy. With the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian monarchies in 1917–18, that identity lost its axis, which could not be said about the image of Ukraine as a synonym of a free land subject to no government.

My analysis of Galician Ruthenian folklore has led me to make a few, very tentative conclusions. But even so, they call for some corrections to the theory of "private" and "ideological" fatherlands. The first conclusion is that before the peasants began moving into an ideological (national) fatherland, their traditional identity was not exclusively local. They had a feeling of belonging to a community larger than their village. It could hardly be otherwise, since both their everyday experience and their religious beliefs made them identify with a larger world. To be sure, their ideas about that world were vague and insufficiently articulate to meet the criteria of modern nationalism, but they did allow the peasants to orient themselves sufficiently (and, at times, most efficiently) in their traditional world.

My second conclusion concurs with the results of Peter Sahlins's classic study of the Franco-Spanish borderlands, in which he calls for a rethinking of what had become the accepted model of the identity of European rural society. In a nutshell, that model is highly reminiscent of

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[38] Heretz, "Russian Apocalypse," passim.

[39] Semen Vityk, "Iz moikh spomyniv pro Franka," in *Ivan Franko u spohadakh suchasnykiv*, ed. O. I. Dei, vol. 2 (Lviv, 1972), 48–49. See also an interesting article by Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "Not Quite Martin Guerre: Notes on People's Politics in the Russian Empire at the End of the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29, nos. 1–2 (summer–winter 2004): 39–45, in which she examines several cases of peasants choosing one monarch over another.

Ossowski's theory: an image of concentric circles in which the growth of national identity implies decreasing loyalty to a locality (village or parish) and increasing attachment to the nation. Sahlins suggests that this circular model be replaced with one of opposing counter-identities, none of which is fixed in a permanent hierarchy: on the contrary, "lower" oppositions can potentially be fused in a "higher" and more generalized opposition. The nationalization of peasants was by no means a top-down process *only*: by choosing this or that identity, villagers made their own "bottom-up" impact on nation building.[40]

In the same vein, Galician Ruthenian peasants divided their identities and loyalties between two general concepts, Rus' and Ukraine, which in some cases were mutually exclusive, and in others mutually compatible. However, both of them were of a transcendental and utopian nature. In this sense, the history of peasant identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was less concerned with the shift from a private to an ideological fatherland than with the replacement of general traditional concepts with modern ones. Getting rid of monarchs—either by assassination, as in the case of Elizabeth, or by dethronement as a result of political crisis—was the *sine qua non* of this replacement. In this sense the First World War and the ensuing collapse of monarchies also marked the beginning of the end of old modes of identification.

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[40] Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, 1989), 110–13.

City Anniversaries:
Lviv, Kyiv, and Lviv Again[*]

Yaroslav Isaievych

Contemporary Ukraine stands out in Europe for its large number of anniversaries officially sanctioned by the national government. Earlier, under Soviet rule, the commemoration of anniversaries was a component of the systematic "education of toilers in the Communist spirit," and an aspect of this in which Party functionaries were particularly active was the counterposing of basically atheistic commemorations to religious feast days. The latter have been revived in contemporary Ukraine, although some Soviet holidays (most notably 8 March) survive; moreover, new secular holidays have been added, mainly patriotic solemnities, often observed with ecclesiastical participation.[1]

Recently comparative studies have begun appearing about the function of public commemorations, including anniversaries, and their social significance as a means of integrating communities at various levels and affirming the particular self-identification of members of such communities. Notably the American scholar Patrice Dabrowski has undertaken an analysis of the role of anniversaries of historical figures and events as an element of Polish nation-building—the bicentennial of the victory of King Jan III Sobieski over the Turks at Vienna (1883), the centennial of the Constitution of 3 May (1891), the centennial of the uprising of Tadeusz Kościuszko (1894), the centennial of Adam Mickiewicz (1898), the five-hundredth anniversary of the victory at Grünwald

[1] Characteristically, it is in Ukraine that the theory of heortology—a special historical discipline dealing with religious feasts and commemorations—is being developed. See M. F. Dmytriienko and Ya. A. Solonska, "Heortolohiia v systemi spetsialnykh istorychnykh dystsyplin: Teoriia, dzherela ta metody doslidzhen," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2002, no. 3: 34–46.

(1910), and the fiftieth anniversary of the January Uprising (1913–14). Festive commemorations became steadily more popular among Ukrainians as well: the reburial of the remains of Taras Shevchenko in Kaniv (1861) and of Markiian Shashkevych in Lviv (1893), the fiftieth anniversary of the abolition of serfdom in Galicia and Bukovyna and the centennial of the publication of Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Eneida* (both 1898). As Dabrowski notes, anniversaries have served to communicate historical information (at times, in more than one version) to a large and diverse public. In a certain sense the ideological significance of past events has been invented or recovered in the process of commemoration.[2]

It is noteworthy that among the national commemorations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as among the imperial commemorations of those days (for example, the three-hundredth anniversary of the house of the Romanovs), there were no public commemorations of city anniversaries. In our time such commemorations are quite infrequent beyond the borders of the post-Soviet lands. Internet searches, at least, yield only a few references of this kind, such as information about the Canadian government's subsidy of $110 million for a commemoration of the founding of Quebec City, as well as anniversaries of the city of Ottawa and of a few American cities of no great size. The marking of anniversaries of small towns is fairly typical for Western Europe, where such commemorations bring residents together and enjoy the support of the local authorities. But the use of anniversaries to politicize the masses or promote national integration, so typical in post-Soviet states and some other countries, is no longer significant for large cities in the West. Here we might mention that President Vladimir Putin of Russia considered the three-hundredth anniversary of St. Petersburg "an event of global significance" and the millennium of Kazan "an event of international scope."[3]

It would appear that the pompous national commemoration of round anniversaries of cities originated in the USSR in 1947: 8 September of that year saw the commemoration of the eight-hundredth anniversary of Moscow, and the choice of year (but not day) was based on the date of the first medieval chronicle record of a place bearing that name. The city was awarded the Order of Lenin, a medal "In memory of the eight-hundredth anniversary of Moscow" was struck for its inhabitants, and an artillery salute and fireworks took place. It is perfectly obvious that the decision to mark the anniversary of Moscow could have been taken by

[2] Patrice Dabrowski, *Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). On this, see Ihor Chornovol, "Natsionalizm ta iuvilei," *Krytyka*, 2005, no. 9.

[3] See <www//300spb.ru; www//kazan1000.ru>.

no one but Stalin, who aspired to give the all-Slavic ideology a Russian/ pan-Slavic orientation.

In the 1950s the Soviet authorities found it quite natural to commemorate the seven-hundredth anniversary of Lviv on the basis of the first chronicle record, as the anniversary of Moscow, which was a century older, had been celebrated on the very same basis. Nevertheless, preparations for the commemoration of the Lviv anniversary did not begin in Lviv but in the Ukrainian diaspora in the West. The most notable evidence of this is the book *Nash Lviv: Yuvileinyi zbirnyk, 1252–1952* (Our Lviv: An Anniversary Collection, 1252–1952), published in New York in 1953. It was also the diaspora that gave rise to the idea of marking the anniversary of Lviv in conjunction with the anniversary of the coronation of Danylo Romanovych in 1953.[4] This relatively modest commemoration of that anniversary by Ukrainians throughout the world was probably what prompted Soviet functionaries to seize the initiative and, accepting the proposal of Lviv historians, to take the first chronicle record of Lviv, dating from 1256, as the basis for marking the city's seven-hundredth anniversary.[5] Given the way in which official mechanisms functioned at the time, there need be no doubt that the Lviv Oblast Committee of the Communist Party could issue a decision on the matter only with the permission of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), which in turn could only act with the approval of the Propaganda Department of the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The final decision on the matter was probably taken late in 1955, when statistical materials on the development of industry and the growth of the network of cultural institutions in Lviv were compiled, probably to substantiate the benefit of marking the anniversary.[6]

The commemoration was postponed until the end of October. In later years, whenever the day and month of a historical event could not be established, October was also frequently chosen as the month in which to

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[4] Stepan Shakh, *Lviv: Misto moiei molodosty. Spomyn prysviachenyi tiniam zabutykh lvovian,* 2 pts. (Munich: Khrystyianskyi holos, 1955), 1: 7.

[5] The mention in the chronicle is quite accidental, stating that a fire in Chełm (Kholm) was supposedly seen from Lviv. In Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* this event is dated 1255; in Leonid Makhnovets's commentary to his Ukrainian-language translation of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, it is dated 1257. Ivan Krypiakevych's arguments for 1256 as the most probable date of the chronicle record are presented in a pseudonymous article by Stepan Biletsky, "Persha istorychna zhadka pro misto," in *Narysy istorii Lvova*, ed. I. P. Krypiakevych (Lviv: Knyzhkovo-zhurnalne vydavnytstvo, 1956), 18–20. According to Krypiakevych, the city was founded several years before the first chronicle record of it.

[6] *Istoriia Lvova v dokumentakh i materialakh*, ed. M. V. Bryk (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1986), 268–74.

hold the commemoration: this gave time for preparation (especially as definitive permission was often granted late) and ensured that the event would take place before the onset of winter. On 27 October, at a session of the oblast and city councils, greetings to the "toilers of Lviv" from the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and from the CC CPU were read out. They began with the statement that "Lviv has played a prominent historical role in the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people against numerous foreign usurpers and for social and national liberation." The place of honor, however, was reserved for the assertion of "firm confidence that the workers, intelligentsia, and all toilers of the city of Lviv, like the Ukrainian people as a whole, will rally even more closely around the Leninist Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government in the struggle for the further development of industry, agriculture, science, and culture, [and] for the successful fulfillment of the grand designs of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and will make a fitting contribution to the cause of building communism in our country."[7] Although nothing was written about this at the time, one of the motives behind the commemoration was the desire to stress that Lviv, which most Poles considered theirs, had been founded not by a Pole, but by a prince of Rus'.[8]

As things turned out, the anniversary publications were put together at the last minute: a survey history of Lviv, prepared by the Institute of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, was submitted for printing on 10 August 1956 and cleared by the censors on 15 October. The commemorations were held only on the city and oblast level. The only lasting reminder to residents and guests of the city about the venerable age of the Galician capital was the Street of the Seven-Hundredth Anniversary of Lviv, which bore that name from 1956 to 1999, when it was renamed Viacheslav Chornovil Avenue.

In requesting their superiors' approval for the commemoration, the local authorities were counting on the opportunity to draw attention to their own merits and probably hoping for official rewards for themselves, or at least for the city. But it was not until 1971 that the city of Lviv was awarded the Order of Lenin "for the great achievements of the city's toilers in economic and cultural construction, [and] in fulfilling the tasks of the five-year plan for the development of industrial production."[9] This

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[7] Ibid., 276–77.

[8] Characteristically, anniversaries of the founding of the city were not marked before 1939, but plans were made for a celebration in 1940 of the six-hundredth anniversary of King Casimir II's Polish conquest of Lviv and all of Galicia.

[9] *Istoriia Lvova v dokumentakh i materialakh,* 318.

was the second order "for the city": on 22 November 1920 Marshal Józef Piłsudski "had honored Lwów" with the *Virtuti militari* cross "for efforts made on behalf of the Polish character of this city and its adherence to Poland." This was in fact an award to the Polish soldiers who had fought against the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918 and its aspiration to establish its rule over all lands inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians.

In contrast to the Lviv commemorations, the motive for the 1,500th anniversary of Kyiv was something of a puzzle not only for Western observers but also for Ukrainians themselves, especially as the rather unconvincing arguments for Kyiv's antiquity made it twice as old as the capital of the Soviet Union. The intention to commemorate the anniversary of the Ukrainian capital officially in 1982 was made public in 1979. The announcement cited a resolution of the Second Plenum of the Kyiv City Committee of the CPU, which emphasized that the preparation and commemoration of the anniversary "would become a celebration of the immutable and eternal friendship of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples,[10] of all the peoples of our Fatherland, [and] yet one more demonstration of the triumph of the Leninist nationality policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state."[11] The Kyiv newspaper *Prapor komunizmu*, which printed the sensational news, was little known outside the capital; the Moscow press carried nothing about plans for the anniversary and their realization, neither then nor later; and in the Ukrainian press the theme was developed—and only gradually at that—almost exclusively by *Literaturna Ukraina* and *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*. Although the resolution on the anniversary was adopted at the lowest possible level, approval in principle must have been granted by authorities much more highly placed than the CPU's Kyiv City Committee. The almost complete silence in the press on this subject throughout 1980 and 1981 lends credence to the assumption that assent to the commemorations was obtained only after lengthy closed-door discussions and consultations.

The first attempt to deduce the probable motives of those who initiated the commemorations was made by the late Prof. Omeljan Pritsak of Harvard University, in an article titled "Behind the Scenes of the Proclamation of Kyiv's 1,500th Anniversary." He maintained that there were very serious reasons for the planned commemorations "because the Party

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[10] At that time the censorship was at pains to ensure that Russians take first place in all such lists.

[11] *Prapor komunizmu* (Kyiv), 1 July 1979, as cited in anon., "Kyiv — misto-heroi, misto trudivnyk," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1979, no. 11: 36.

of Lenin does nothing without careful consideration."[12] In Pritsak's opinion the exaltation of Kyiv was thought up "in order to prevent the concentration of Ukrainian forces in connection with the commemoration of the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine," and the year 1982 was chosen in preference to another one, closer to the millennial date, so as to divert the attention of Ukrainians from the fiftieth anniversary of the great Soviet Ukrainian famine of 1932–33. The article concluded with the speculation that the Moscow authorities had deliberately decided to ascribe the initiative to the CPU, "for if the civilized world shows up the baselessness of the Kyiv commemorations, all the blame can easily be pinned on 'backward Ukrainian nationalists.'"[13] Characteristically, no one in the Ukrainian diaspora doubted that the decision had been dictated by the Kremlin and that there was unanimity on the matter in the Kremlin. Some were even convinced that "Moscow" was trying to diminish Kyiv's age by many years.[14]

Although documents and memoirs on the subject are lacking (at least, they have not been published), present-day students of the question have no reason to doubt that it was all the other way around. It was the Party and state leaders of Soviet Ukraine who promoted the commemorations, largely in opposition to the mood prevailing in Moscow. The leading role was played by Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, first secretary of the CC CPU, who reckoned in such questions with the opinion of Petro Tronko, then deputy head of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and head of the Ukrainian Society for the Preservation of Monuments of History and Culture.[15] At that time the hypotheses of Viktor Petrov, Mykhailo Braichevsky, and several other authors on the origins of Kyiv near the beginning of the first millennium C.E. had become popular in Ukraine.[16]

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[12] Omelian Pritsak, "Za kulisamy proholoshennia 1500–littia Kyieva," *Suchasnist*, 1981, no. 9 (September): 47.

[13] Ibid., 54.

[14] Publications on this subject in the émigré journal *Vyzvolnyi shliakh* and certain Ukrainian newspapers in the West were based on articles by amateur historians in the Ukrainian SSR who maintained that until the official proclamation of the 1,500th anniversary, Kyiv was two thousand years old or even older.

[15] Most societies in Soviet Ukraine were known as "Society... of the Ukrainian SSR" and not "Ukrainian Society...." Permission to establish a society for the preservation of monuments in Ukraine was granted only after such a society had emerged in Russia, where it was called *Rossiiskoe* (not *Russkoe*); hence the analogous name of the society in Kyiv.

[16] See V. P. Petrov, "Pro pershopochatky Kyieva (Do 1110–richchia pershoi litopysnoi zhadky pro Kyiv," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1962, no. 3: 14–21; and M. Yu. Braichevsky, *Koly i iak vynyk Kyiv* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, 1963).

Quite naturally, the organizers of the commemorations wanted the backing of historians and archaeologists for marking two thousand years of the existence of Ukraine's capital. At the time, however, the most recent available works of a number of authors—most notably Petro Tolochko, the leading specialist on medieval Kyiv and director of the ongoing archaeological expedition in Kyiv—established continuity of ethnocultural development in the central Dnipro region, of which Kyiv became the center, not from the beginning of the first millennium C.E., but only from about the sixth or seventh century C.E.[17] Those favoring the commemoration of the 1,500th anniversary of Kyiv were greatly assisted by the fact that such a view had long been maintained by the most influential archaeologist and medievalist in the USSR, Academician Boris Rybakov, who had served for many years as director of the Institutes of Archaeology and History of the Acadamy of Sciences of the USSR. Like other leading Russian medievalists (Boris Grekov, Mikhail Tikhomirov, Vladimir Mavrodin, and others), Rybakov had achieved prominence because of his intellectual struggle against the proponents of the Normanist theory of the origin of Rus'. According to Soviet Russian ideologues, the theory that Normans had founded Rus' had been the basis of the notion that the "people of Rus' lacked historical independence" and allegedly "served as an argument to substantiate aggressive plans against the USSR and the spread of hostile suppositions about the past and present of the Russian people."[18]

Indeed it was Kyiv's role as the center of East Slavic statehood and culture—not that of the Norman Staraia Ladoga or of Novgorod, which had been close to the zone of greatest Norman influence—that Rybakov subordinated to his polemic with the Normanists. In a series of books, articles, and addresses, including a paper he read at a meeting of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, the popular scholar maintained that the origins of Kyiv were associated with the rule of Prince Kyi, which he dated to the late fifth or the first half of the sixth century C.E.[19] From this he concluded that any year falling within those chronological limits could be chosen for commemoration. According to some informed contemporaries, the year 482 was chosen because the leaders involved in the decision wanted to hold the commemoration while they were still in office and thus in a position to defend a date

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[17] P. P. Tolochko, *Istorychna topohrafiia starodavnoho Kyieva* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1972), 42–53; idem, *Drevnii Kiev* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1976), 18–23.

[18] A. M. Sakharov, "Normanskaia teoriia," *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 10 (Moscow, 1967), 349.

[19] B. A. Rybakov, "Gorod Kiia," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), 1980, no. 5: 31–47.

whose legitimacy aroused doubts among scholars and leading CPSU ideologues alike. None of the leading Leningrad and Moscow historians accepted Rybakov's argumentation, although some of them corroborated the archaeological sources most thoroughly analyzed in Tolochko's works. But many, if not most, scholars held to the traditional view then most consistently developed by Mikhail K. Karger and Ivan P. Shaskolsky, that Kyiv became a city in the second half of the tenth century.[20]

Previously, scholarly discussions had ended as soon as the CC CPSU in Moscow issued a concrete directive. But this time there was apparently a lack of unanimity in that CC, for nothing was published concerning preparations or specific plans for the anniversary of Kyiv in such Moscow scholarly journals as *Voprosy istorii* and *Istoriia SSSR* or in the Party journal *Kommunist*. Consequently there is reason to believe that Shcherbytsky did not have the unanimous support of the Politburo of the CC CPSU on the question of the anniversary. Evidently it was only because the most influential of the Soviet rulers at the time, Leonid Brezhnev (from 1977 not only the general secretary of the CPSU but also the prime minister of the Soviet state), expressed himself in less than categorical fashion on the matter that an ironic comment on "anniversary megalomania" could appear in *Pravda*, the official organ of the CPSU. Its correspondent N. Odinets, whose accreditation extended to Ukraine as a whole, printed a rather stinging satirical article in which, without mentioning Kyiv directly, he criticized the desire of "particular cities" to extend their antiquity by relying on naive and incredible legends. Such criticism could have appeared in the party newspaper only with the sanction of the party's chief ideologue, Mikhail Suslov. Even so, Brezhnev did not think it possible to forbid his faithful supporter, Shcherbytsky, to commemorate the Kyiv anniversary in the Ukrainian republic. Moscow even allowed Ukrainian diplomats to raise the question of commemorating the anniversary at the international level. This was facilitated by the fact that the Ukrainian SSR had a formally independent representation at the United Nations and consequently in UNESCO. Thus, on 10 October 1980, on the motion of the Ukrainian SSR, the UNESCO General Conference adopted a resolution proposing that UNESCO member states and international organizations take part in commemorating Kyiv's 1,500th anniversary and popularize it in the media. The resolution "ascribed great importance to the role of Kyiv, which laid the foundations of East Slavic civilization and culture." Charac-

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[20] M. K. Karger, "K voprosu o Kieve v VIII–IX vv.," *Drevnii Kiev*, vol. 1 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1958), 521–22; I. P. Shaskolsky, "Kogda zhe voznik gorod Kiev?" in *Kultura srednevekovoi Rusi*, ed. A. N. Kirpichnikov and P. A. Rappoport (Leningrad: Nauka, 1974), 70–72.

teristically, however, it was only a year and a half after UNESCO had adopted the resolution that the Ukrainian authorities ventured to make it public in an article by the head of the CPU's Kyiv City Committee, Valentyn Zhursky, in *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*. The text of the resolution itself was never published in Ukraine.[21]

The substantiation of the anniversary that was provided for domestic consumption differed considerably from that given at the UN. The May 1982 issue of *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal* shows what the organizers of the commemoration considered their highest priority. This was the anniversary issue, and its cover showed the city's coat of arms as it then was (a shield with a chestnut leaf, a hammer and sickle, and the star of Hero of the Soviet Union), surrounded by inscriptions in a circle—*Киев* at the top, *Київ* and *Kiev* on the sides, and *1,500* at the bottom. The issue began with an article by the first secretary of the CPU's Kyiv City Committee, Yurii Yelchenko, on "The Kyiv Party Organization at the Head of the Struggle of the City's Toilers to Fulfill the Resolutions of the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU."[22] It proclaimed: "An important stage on the road to the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR consists of work on preparations for the 1,500th anniversary of Kyiv under the direction of the CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee, and the Politburo of the CC headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. Preparations for the 1,500th anniversary of Kyiv, which began several years ago, are now in their concluding phase; they are proceeding under the banner of the struggle of all Kyivans for early completion of the plans and socialist obligations for 1982 and of the five-year plan as a whole."[23] Only after this article, which sounded like a parody by that time (the same may be said of other examples of Party publicism), did the journal feature Academician Rybakov's sketch "The Capital of Soviet Ukraine Is Fifteen Hundred Years Old." Subsequent articles of the issue devoted to the anniversary had nothing to do with the dating of the city's origins: "The Participation of Kyivans in Socialist Industrialization," "The Toilers of the Capital of the Ukrainian SSR in the Movement for Improving the Efficiency of Production," and the like. Similar themes predominated among articles published under the rubric "Kyiv Is Fifteen Hundred Years Old" in the course of the anniversary year.[24]

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[21] Since we are unable to cite the resolution itself, its contents are cited according to the account presented in V. A. Zhursky, "Kyiv — stolytsia Ukrainskoi RSR," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1982, no. 4: 68.

[22] *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1982, no. 5: 5–15.

[23] Ibid., 157–58.

[24] For example, "The Participation of Women Workers of Kyiv in the Revolutionary

Scholarly conferences whose titles indicated their dedication to the 1,500th anniversary offered no papers concerned with scholarly substantiation of that date of Kyiv's origins. The only paper touching on such concerns was Petro Tolochko's, presented at an archaeological conference in March 1982, in which he dealt with Kyiv of the sixth and seventh centuries as the administrative and political center of the Polianians.[25]

Articles and papers on the significance of Kyiv's legacy for communist construction and "the education of toilers in the communist spirit" were unavoidable given the influence of Party ideologues, who were alarmed by the "excessive popularization of antiquity and church affairs," to use their jargon. Something of a compromise emerged. *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, edited by the former high-ranking Party functionary Yurii Kondufor, printed mainly boring and absurdly superficial propagandistic texts on the struggle for Soviet power and the achievements of the party; while the past was propagated in the newspaper of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, *Literaturna Ukraina*. Most importantly, medieval subjects were addressed in scholarly monographs and collections. Among the books approved for publication in connection with the anniversary, Petro Tolochko's fundamental study of ancient Kyiv stands out.[26] An issue of the miscellany *Suziria* was also dedicated to the anniversary. Even earlier, the Institute of Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR managed to push through a collection of scholarly articles on the culture and traditions of Kyivan Rus' for publication by the academy's publishing house.[27] Because anniversary publications were published in better-quality editions and there were no particular limitations on their press runs, they satisfied the interest of broad circles of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in historical subjects.

There was a similar situation in the sector to which Lenin referred in his time as "monument propaganda." On the occasion of the anniversary, a Park of Glory was established in Kyiv, featuring a gigantic obelisk to commemorate the role of the hero city in the "Great Patriotic War" against Nazi Germany. Without the erection of this monument and other

Struggle (March 1917–January 1918)," "The Improvement of Kyivans' Standard of Living and Municipal Services in the Period of Developed Socialism," and "V. I. Lenin and the Kyiv Party Organization."

[25] Petr Tolochko, "Novye arkheologicheskie otkrytiia v Kieve," in *Drevnerusskii gorod: Materialy Vsesoiuznoi arkheologicheskoi konferentsii posviashchennoi 1500–letiiu goroda Kieva* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1984), 131.

[26] Petr Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1983).

[27] Ya. D. Isaievych, ed., *Kyivska Rus': Kul'tura, tradytsii. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1982).

purely Soviet places of remembrance,[28] it would undoubtedly have been difficult to obtain permission for the restoration of monuments that annoyed fanatical supporters of atheist propaganda. But cultural activists, like most Kyivans, approved of the reconstruction of the Golden Gate, which was crowned with a church. Officially the building was designated "a pavilion recreating the outlines of the Golden Gate." Liudmyla Ponomariova writes on this subject with great restraint but accurate knowledge: "In the 1970s the restoration of the church was almost impossible, and its construction encountered great difficulties. There were objections to the erection of a cross; not everyone agreed to the restoration of the floor mosaics; and there were many other problems that were not easy for the artisans' collective to overcome. The working group received great assistance from P. T. Tronko and M. Kravets." Until the very end of the project, people wondered whether officialdom would venture to erect a cross above the church or not. And here, one must think, the decision depended mainly on Shcherbytsky himself, who probably had to lay his authority on the line. Unfortunately, a resolution adopted on the occasion of the anniversary to create a large national park of Ancient Kyiv remained in the planning stage.

After the commemoration of Kyiv's 1,500th anniversary in 1982, many encyclopedias and reference works adopted the notion that the city had arisen in the late fifth or first half of the sixth century.[29] In scholarly works, however, beginning with the first year after the anniversary, no one spoke of "fifteen centuries" of Kyiv. Mentions of the city's origins in the time of Kyi and its hypothetical dating to the late sixth or early seventh century were generally made with the reservation that this was Boris Rybakov's opinion.

Quite naturally, the recent anniversary of Lviv was entirely different from the city anniversaries formerly observed under the control of the totalitarian regime and in some instances—Moscow being a classic example—at its initiative and entirely according to its scenario. From the first years of independence there was active discussion of various proposals for the commemoration in 2006 of the 750th anniversary of the first chronicle record of Lviv. Finally, on 22 June 2004, the Parliament of

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[28] Plans made in 1979 to erect monuments to commemorate the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, the reunification of the western Ukrainian lands in a single Soviet state, and the founding of Kyiv, as well as heroes of the Communist Youth League and soldiers of the Dnipro Fleet, were all associated with the anniversary. Most of these projects were never carried out or were completed only after long delays.

[29] See, e.g., *USE: Universalnyi slovnyk-entsyklopediia*, 4th ed. (Lviv: TEKA, 2006), 599; and *Encyclopedia Americana, International Edition*, vol. 15 (Danbury, Conn., 1997), 436.

Ukraine adopted the resolution "On Measures to Support the Socioeconomic Development of Lviv in Connection with the 750th Anniversary of Its Founding."[30] It proposed "that the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Lviv Oblast State Administration, and the Lviv City Council take *prompt* [my emphasis] measures to prepare for and commemorate the 750th anniversary of the founding of the city of Lviv."[31] Not until the final months before the planned commemoration was the most essential restoration work undertaken, thanks to the efforts of the city authorities, certain community organizations, and private firms co-operating with the mayor's office. Some guests at the commemorations noted that in their eyes Lviv's European character was attested not only by the city's architectural ensembles but also by the relaxed atmosphere of the festivities. Contributing notably to this were open-air concerts with the participation of star performers, the Golden Lion theater festival, two hundred master blacksmiths demonstrating their craft in public, and a jousting tournament. The "Lviv—Capital of Crafts" festival on Valova Street featured displays of craftsmanship not only by blacksmiths, but also by weavers, glassblowers, armorers, glaziers, stonecutters, decorators of Easter eggs, and embroiderers; the public saw articles of wood and leather being made.

The official program of the commemoration was opened in the Lviv Opera Theater by the head of the city administration, Andrii Sadovy; his remarks were followed by those of President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine, President Jan Kaczyński of Poland, President Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania, Mayor Valentina Matvienko of St. Petersburg, other guests of the city, and eminent residents of Lviv. Much more than in earlier commemorations, the anniversary became a celebration not so much of the state and its rulers as of the civic community. Emphasis was given to the prominent role of Lviv's inhabitants in the national-liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people and in international co-operation and cultural exchange. A number of speakers stressed the city's multicultural character and its role in bringing Ukraine closer to Europe, of which medieval and early modern Lviv had been a full-fledged member. Viktor Yushchenko noted in particular that as president of Ukraine he was paying respect to the Polish and Lithuanian presence, "creative, inseparable from our life, and unifying in mutual esteem, equality, and regard for past lives." He also addressed words of sincere respect to the Jewish community, which, "according to ancient verity, is reviving its soul on the terri-

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[30] Texts written by historians refer to the 750th anniversary of Lviv, not the 750th anniversary of its founding.

[31] *Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady,* 2004, no. 45: 509.

tory of Lviv"; and in closing he expressed thanks to "all the peoples for whom Lviv has become a native land for their joint instruction on how to form one nation." The president of Poland, too, spoke not only about the meaning of Lviv for the Polish nation (which was, beyond doubt, very great) but also about the city's founding by a Ukrainian prince and about Ukraine's European prospects. The accents were, of course, somewhat different in the speeches of representatives of various countries, but everything described here resonated with the perception of the festivities as a commemoration of a city unique in its polyphonic character, which is vital to the successful integration of Ukrainians into Europe. Since Ukraine is seeking its place on the map of Europe, these European accents of Lviv's anniversary festivities were a conscious, if at times naive, effort to consider the city's past from a non-Soviet viewpoint.

Unlike in 1956, this time scholarly and popular publications were prepared in advance. They included monographs, publications of historical sources, illustrated volumes, and a special issue of the local ethnographic journal *Halytska brama* (no. 142 [2006]). A survey of many, though by no means all, important books and articles on Lviv themes appears in the introduction to the three-volume history of Lviv prepared by the Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. This book, written shortly before the anniversary, is the largest work on the city's past and its cultural legacy to appear to date. The first volume encompasses the period up to 1772, the second illuminates the history of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria—the largest province of the Habsburg Empire—and the third covers the period from the liberation uprising of 1 November 1918 to the city's anniversary. It comprises 1,450 large-format pages, close to 2,000 documentary illustrations, and many city maps, diagrams, and charts.[32]

The anniversary of the first chronicle record of Lviv is only one of the many present-day Ukrainian commemorations, including those of city anniversaries. Scholarly forums were planned for 2007 in connection with the 1,100th anniversaries of the first chronicle records of the cities Chernihiv and Pereiaslav (which the Soviet authorities renamed—not very aptly, in my view—Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi). An example of a scholarly and political discussion on the "correctness" of a city anniversary is the clash that took place in Dnipropetrovsk. Its anniversary was first celebrated in 1976—a bicentennial calculated from the report Governor V. O. Chertkov submitted to Prince Grigorii Potemkin on the

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[32] Ya. Isaievych et al, eds., *Istoriia Lvova*, 3 vols. (Lviv: Tsentr Yevropy, 2006–7). The first volume of the miniature book series Chas Lvova, Yaroslav Knysh's *Lviv: Taiemnytsi kniazhoi doby* (Lviv:Piramida, 2005), is claimed to be the smallest history of the city.

choice of the site for building the city of Katerynoslav. (As it turned out, the choice was a poor one, and in 1784 Empress Catherine II ordered that that new gubernial capital be transferred to the Right Bank of the Dnipro.) In Soviet times it was widely considered that a more substantial factor determining the date of the anniversary would be Leonid Brezhnev's seventieth birthday, which also fell in 1976: there were expectations that the CPSU general secretary, the beginnings of whose Party career were associated with Dnipropetrovsk, would visit the "jubilee city." Although Brezhnev did not come, he awarded "the city" with the Order of Lenin. Dnipropetrovsk officially celebrated its 225th anniversary in 2001 in spite of rather clamorous public appeals from those who preferred an alternative dating of the city's origins—from 1635, when the fortress of Kodak was established (the best-known publications and public statements were those of Yurii Mytsyk, Hanna Shvydko, and Oleh Repan). In his New Year's Eve greetings for 2007, President Yushchenko put the 750th anniversary of Lviv on a par with the "Catherinian" anniversary of Dnipropetrovsk. At the same time, the recently adopted coat of arms of Dnipropetrovsk, whose central section features the emblem of a small Kodak fortification, remains a manifestation of post-totalitarian pluralism.

The large number of anniversaries is less than optimal for the impression they make on society as a whole. On the other hand, the number of local commemorations is increasing at the level of oblasts, raions, and towns, given their importance as a factor promoting the activation of civil society. Unfortunately, along with authentic grounds for anniversaries, fictional ones are becoming ever more common, given the insufficient probity of experts ("If an anniversary is needed, we'll find a reason"). One is also constrained to acknowledge the fact, not especially gratifying to professional historians, that the fantastic constructions of amateurs are often more effective than purely scholarly arguments in stimulating interest in national history and culture.

The question may arise of why anniversaries sanctioned by resolutions of supreme ruling institutions—parliaments, governments, presidents—have become so widespread in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. The answer to this question seems relatively simple. Frequent appeals to the historical past are conditioned, for the time being at least, primarily by the need to find legitimacy for current political actions, that is, to make use of history for political self-assertion. The defining participation of government bodies also testifies to the underdevelopment of civil society. After all, initiatives from above are not essential when the preservation of monuments and the popularization of history are undertaken by the community, private sponsors, and municipal and state insti-

tutions that systematically receive funds for these purposes without the sanction of the supreme authorities in every particular instance. Even so, given that under current conditions in Ukraine official decisions on marking anniversaries, even insufficiently substantiated ones, contribute to preserving the legacy of history and stimulate interest in culture, it must be acknowledged that such decisions are among the positive aspects of the administrative and legislative activity of governing institutions.

Translated by Myroslav Yurkevich

Hans Koch: The Turbulent Life of an Austrian Ukrainophile

Andreas Kappeler

Hans Koch (1894–1959) was one of the few scholars of Austrian origin with a lifelong commitment to Ukraine and Ukrainians. He supported the Ukrainian cause as a soldier, scholar, pastor, intelligence officer, propagandist, and politician. However, during an important period of his turbulent life Koch belonged to the National Socialist Party and served the criminal policies of Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe. On two occasions he became an actor in international politics: first on 30 June 1941 in Lviv, where Koch was the main German negotiator with the OUN(R) group that proclaimed Ukrainian independence, and then in October 1955, when he participated in Konrad Adenauer's visit to Moscow as an adviser and interpreter.

Koch was born in 1894 near Lviv in the village of Kaltwasser (today Kholodnovidka in Pustomyty raion) to a family of German colonists whose ancestors had settled in Galicia in the late eighteenth century. There he attended the Protestant primary school and the German-language Gymnasium. After graduation in 1912, Koch enrolled at the University of Vienna, where he began studying Protestant theology and philosophy. He took part in the First World War as a volunteer and won several medals for bravery. In November 1918 Koch returned to Lviv, "which was besieged by the Ukrainians in a desperate struggle against Poland. Here my postwar destiny caught up with me: mobilization into the Ukrainian [Galician A]rmy and a new war against the Poles and later against the Bolsheviks." Koch continues in his curriculum vitae (written in 1924) that he served as a captain in the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA). "In February 1920, together with the remnants of the Ukrainian army, which had been wiped out by typhus, I was taken prisoner by the Bolsheviks and assigned by the Soviets to the Red Army, as to a Foreign Legion. In the Red Army I participated (under duress, to be sure) in the war against Poland until the Treaty of Riga, when an Austrian mission for prisoners of war came to Kyiv and managed to arrange my demobilization and return home (1921–22)." In

later biographical writings, however, Koch always concealed his participation in the Red Army.[1]

Koch returned to Vienna and sat "in lecture courses as a 'happy repatriate,' having lost seven years of official education but, despite all that, with a great gain: a relatively good knowledge of two new languages, Ukrainian and Russian, and a life experience I would not want to be without today. In Russia and Ukraine I found my field of specialization: the history of Eastern Europe."[2]

From 1922 to 1924 Koch studied East European history, obtaining his doctoral degree with a dissertation on Russian church history supervised by Hans Übersberger. In 1923 he was ordained a Lutheran pastor. He took a second doctoral degree in 1927 at the University of Vienna's Faculty of Protestant Theology, and, in 1929, the *Habilitation* at the same faculty, specializing in East European church history and theology. The three dissertations Koch wrote between 1922 and 1929 were devoted to East European church history from the tenth to the early eighteenth century. In his *Habilitationsschrift* he analyzes the Christianization of Kyivan Rus' (partly on the basis of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's works), arguing that its first Orthodox hierarchy came from the Bulgarian archbishopric of Ohrid. The historical dissertation is devoted to Greek influence on the Russian Orthodox Church from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. In his theological dissertation, the only one published in his lifetime, Koch explores Western influences on Russian Orthodoxy during the reign of Peter I, with special attention to Stefan Yavorsky and Teofan Propokovych. The latter's knowledge of Protestant theology was of particular interest to Koch as a Protestant pastor. In the title of his disserta-

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[1] "Lebenslauf des Doktoranden cand.phil. Hans Koch," Rigorosenakten Philosophische Fakultät der Universität Wien, Universitätsarchiv Wien, Nr. 5901; Personalakten Hans Koch, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Unterricht [AVA U]. See also Akten des Kuratoriums der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg. Prof. Hans Koch, 1934/35 (Bundesarchiv [BA] R/76/I 50), die Personalakten des Prof. Dr. Hans Koch. Kurator der Universität und der Techn. Hochschule Breslau, 1.5. 1937 (BA R 76/I, 50a). For surveys of Koch's life and scholarly activities, see Günther Stökl, "Hans Koch, 1894–1959," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, new series 7 (1959): 117–29 (with a bibliography of Koch's publications, pp. 130–46); Karl Schwarz, "Hans Koch (1894–1959)—ein Landsknecht Gottes aus Osteuropa," *Wartburg-Argumente* (Vienna), ed. Reinhart Waneck, Schriftenreihe Akademische Verbindung Wartburg, no. 3 (1994); and Arkadii Zhukovsky, "Koch, Hans," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 577. For a longer account of Koch's life and career, which does not, however, emphasize Koch's engagement with Ukraine, see my article "Hans Koch (1894–1959)," in *Osteuropäische Geschichte in Wien: 100 Jahre Forschung und Lehre an der Universität*, ed. Arnold Suppan, Marija Wakounig, and Georg Kastner (Innsbruck, Vienna, and Bozen: Studien Verlag, 2007), 227–54.

[2] "Lebenslauf."

tion Koch does not speak, as most Western Europeans did, of "Russian thought," but rather of "East Slavic thought."[3]

Koch acted as a mediator between Ukraine and the German-speaking world not only in this important book but also in several articles. One of them, a well-informed analysis of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) in Soviet Ukraine, was based on a thorough reading of the UAOC journal *Tserkva i zhyttia*. In it Koch concludes that the UAOC is "a purely national church" seeking to develop a Ukrainian national consciousness on the basis of Ukrainian history and the Ukrainian language.[4] In another article he offers a survey of the Ukrainian people and their history for a general audience, presenting the Ukrainians as the second-largest of the Slavic nations, and Ukrainian history as a series of attempts to establish a nation-state. Koch mentions German-Ukrainian efforts to attain that goal during World War I and advocates closer cooperation between Germany and Ukraine.[5] Another topic of his articles of the 1920s, to which he returned in the 1950s, was Ukrainian Protestantism.[6]

In 1932 Koch became a member of the Austrian NSDAP and supported its (illegal) activities in his lectures and writings. In late 1933 Hans-Joachim Beyer, an official of Nazi Germany, confirmed Koch's "absolute political reliability."[7] Factors that predisposed Koch to make a commitment to the Nazi Party were his origins as a member of the *Volksdeutsche* minority in a Polish environment, his early collaboration in all-German nationalist organizations, and his activities as a Protestant diaspora pastor in Catholic Austria and an advocate of *völkisch* ideas.

In the spring of 1934 Koch was appointed full professor of church history at the Theological Faculty of the University of Königsberg (now Kaliningrad). At the same time, his teacher Hans Übersberger, also a

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[3] Hans Koch, *Die russische Orthodoxie im Petrinischen Zeitalter: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte westlicher Einflüsse auf das ostslavische Denken* (Breslau and Oppeln: Priebatsch, 1929); idem, "Die Slavisierung der griechischen Kirche im Moskauer Staate als bodenständige Voraussetzung des russischen Raskol" (Ph.D. diss., University of Vienna), in Hans Koch, *Kleine Schriften zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte Osteuropas* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1962), 42–107.

[4] Hans Koch, "Die orthodox-autokephale Kirche der Ukraine," *Osteuropa: Zeitschrift für die gesamten Fragen des europäischen Ostens* 3 (1927–28): 833–46.

[5] Hans Koch, "Die Ukraine," *Zeitwende: Monatsschrift* (Munich), 1929, no. 5: 60–71.

[6] "Über ukrainischen Protestantismus," *Die evangelische Diaspora. Zeitschrift des Gustav-Adolf-Vereins* (Leipzig) 8, no. 1 (1926): 17–30; 13, no. 2 (1931): 102–10.

[7] Bundesarchiv (BA) Berlin-Lichterfelde, PK/Parteikorrespondenz, vorl. Signatur 1060018440 (Lesefilm G 87, Bild Nr. 2993–2998, 3020). BA (ehem BDC) NSDAP-Gaukartei.

member of the NSDAP, left the University of Vienna for the University of Breslau (now Wrocław), where he was appointed professor of East European history. Thus two politically reliable Austrians filled the gap created by the Nazi authorities' dismissal of most German academic specialists in East European history. In Königsberg Koch met the young Theodor Oberländer, who headed the Institute of the East European Economy.[8]

While in Königsberg, Koch became involved in a political incident. In February 1937 the Polish newspaper *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* published an article alleging his involvement in spreading German Nazi propaganda among Ukrainian political elites in Eastern Galicia. The newspaper made critical mention of his service as a captain in the UHA and his ability to speak Ukrainian. The German minister of education and science, on being informed about the article, asked the University of Königsberg's rector for his opinion. Koch accused the Polish newspaper of Germanophobia, explaining that while he had been in Little Poland on an official visit, he had given a scholarly lecture in Lviv and had also visited his mother there. More embarrassing to Koch was the mention of his participation in the Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918–19, which he had concealed in his C.V. of 1934. He made the excuse that "he had been drafted by the government, together with all other Germans of Eastern Galicia (Ukraine), and had fulfilled his duty of military service in the army of the 'tiny Austrian successor state.'... Since then Ukrainian society has had a natural sympathy for all German participants in the war, including me."[9]

Further evidence of Koch's Ukrainophile commitment is to be found in his obituary of Mykhailo Hrushevsky published in 1935 in the leading German journal of East European history. In it Koch presents Hrushevsky as a symbol of the Ukrainian people, who embodied the union of Cossack tradition with the new national intelligentsia. He gives a well-informed survey of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, "which for decades to come will be *the* historical account of his people, even of East European and world history." Koch concludes that Hrushevsky's "new schema" of East Slavic history, which attacked the thesis of continuity between Kyivan Rus' and Muscovy, now represented "the consensus of

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[8] For the context, see my "Ukraine in German-Language Historiography," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29 (2004): 245–64; and Gerd Voigt, *Rußland in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung, 1843–1945* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994).

[9] Akten des Kuratoriums der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg. Prof. Hans Koch, 1934/35 (Bundesarchiv [BA] R/76/I 50). See also Nachlass Hans Koch. Osteuropa-Institut München, Karton 7, 7a; and Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933–1945)* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1972), 150, 165.

most living German historians of Eastern Europe"—a dubious assertion not only in the 1930s but also after the Second World War.[10]

In 1937 Koch took over the chair of East European history at the University of Breslau from Übersberger, who had been appointed to the University of Berlin. In Breslau, where Koch now became director of the prestigious Osteuropa-Institut, he had to teach the history of Eastern Europe for the first time in his career, focusing on Polish and Ukrainian history.[11] In the 1930s he published some articles on church history, but on the whole his scholarly achievements were rather modest. Nevertheless Koch was acknowledged as a leading German specialist on his subject, a status underlined by the fact that he wrote the short contribution on East European history that appeared in the Festschrift for Hitler on his fiftieth birthday.[12]

In 1940 Koch was appointed to the prestigious chair of East European History at the University of Vienna but did not take it up because of his service in the German army. Since 1939 he had been an intelligence officer in Admiral Wilhelm Canaris's Abwehr II. As director of the Osteuropa-Institut in Breslau, Koch had already given active support to German aggression against Poland by writing several memoranda and collecting information about Poland's infrastructure and leading Polish personalities. He participated in the war against Poland. From the autumn of 1939 Koch and Oberländer served in Cracow as Abwehr officers responsible for Ukrainian affairs. Koch tried to help Ukrainian refugees and prisoners of war: as Volodymyr Kubijovyč mentions, Koch's office was known among Ukrainians as the *Kochstelle*.[13] In 1939–40 Koch was among the organizers of the resettlement of Galician Germans, helping many Ukrainians gain a place on the lists of those who were to be transported.[14]

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[10] Hans Koch, "Dem Andenken Mychajlo Hruševskyj's (29. September 1866–25. November 1934)," *Jahrbücher für Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven*, new series 11 (1935): 3–10.

[11] Publikationsstelle, 153/1083, fol. 1; Parteikorrespondenz; Einzelblätter in: Nachlass, Karton 1, I, 1a; Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, "Das Osteuropa-Institut in Breslau 1930–1940: Wissenschaft, Propaganda und nationale Feindbilder in der Arbeit eines interdisziplinären Zentrums der Osteuropa-Forschung in Deutschland," in *Zwischen Konfrontation und Kompromiss: Oldenburger Symposium "Interethnische Beziehungen in Ostmitteleuropa als historiographisches Problem der 1930/1940er Jahre,"* ed. Michael Garleff (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995), 47–72.

[12] Hans Koch, "Osteuropäische Geschichte," in *Deutsche Wissenschaft: Arbeit und Aufgabe. Festschrift zum 50. Geburtstag Adolf Hitlers* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1939), 24–25.

[13] Volodymyr Kubiiovych, *Ukraintsi v Heneralnii hubernii, 1929–1941* (Chicago: Vydavnytstvo Mykoly Denysiuka, 1975), 59–60, 67.

[14] Hans Koch, "Tagebuchaufzeichnungen über die Umsiedlung der Deutschen aus

After a stay in Sofia, Koch served as a Ukrainian-affairs specialist in the Wehrmacht, in Alfred Rosenberg's foreign-policy office, and in the Abwehr II. Koch and Oberländer organized the military training of the battalions Nachtigall and Roland, composed of recruits who were members of the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. After Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, Koch was sent to Lviv to contact Ukrainian politicians in the city. On 30 June 1941, after the proclamation of Ukrainian sovereignty by a Ukrainian national assembly headed by Yaroslav Stetsko, Koch tried unsuccessfully to convince the Ukrainian leaders to retract the proclamation. During the following days and weeks, he served as an intermediary between Ukrainian politicians and the Germans, advocating the creation of a Ukrainian vassal state after the war. In one memorandum Koch protested brutal German actions against the Ukrainian population, making no mention of the anti-Jewish pogroms the Germans and Ukrainians carried out in the first days of the occupation. But the die was already cast: many Ukrainian nationalists were arrested by the Germans, and on 1 September Ukraine was split into three administrative units. Dreams of a Ukrainian state under German protection vanished.[15]

This outcome was a defeat for Koch and other German Ukrainophiles. He was sent to the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to serve as a Wehrmacht adviser. Little is known about Koch's wartime activities there. He sent several reports about the situation in Ukraine to Berlin and tried to help Ukrainian prisoners of war in Poltava. On one occasion Koch was sent to Rivne, where he negotiated with leaders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. From the summer of 1943 on, he participated in the Stalingrad campaign but avoided its debacle because of illness, which led to his evacuation.[16] Koch did not fall into disgrace after July 1941, as he contended

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Ostgalizien," in *Aufbruch und Neubeginn: Heimatbuch der Galiziendeutschen*, pt. 2 (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Hilfskomitee der Galiziendeutschen, 1977), 181–96.

[15] Roman Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934–1945: Tatsachen europäischer Ostpolitik. Ein Vorbericht,* 2d ed., 2 vols. (Munich: Osteuropa-Institut, 1958), 2: 95–97, 139–42, 173–79, and passim; Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study in Occupation Policies* (London and New York: Macmillan, 1957), 119–22; Philipp-Christian Wachs, *Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1905–1998): Ein Lehrstück deutscher Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, Campus, 2000), 63–83; Torzecki, *Kwestia,* 234–37; idem., *Polacy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: PWN, 1993), 241–72; Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens,* 2d ed. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1997), 44–49, 51–62.

[16] Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 32, 76, 50, 110, 115–17, 209; Otto Bräutigam, *So hat es sich zugetragen ... Ein Leben als Soldat und Diplomat* (Würzburg:

later. In fact, he participated in several conferences of German specialists on Eastern Europe in 1943 and 1944, and in 1943 he was ordered to transport important Kyivan archival materials to Germany.[17]

After the war Koch was dismissed from the University of Vienna because of his political activities in Nazi Germany, and for six years he worked as a pastor in Styria. During this period Koch translated a selection of Ukrainian poetry into German and published an article on Taras Shevchenko, pointing out the motifs of death, love, rebellion, and religiosity in his poetry. In 1949 he was elected a full member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (Philosophy and History Section) in Western Europe. Koch maintained close relations with Ukrainian émigrés in West Germany, especially with the Ukrainian Free University in Munich.[18]

In 1952 Koch was appointed the first director of the Osteuropa-Institut in Munich. In the years that followed he wrote articles mostly about the USSR and Bolshevism, but only a few short scholarly texts. In 1953 he revived the journal *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, which had been founded in 1936 by his teacher Übersberger. Finally, in 1958, Koch obtained a chair at the University of Munich, in the Faculty of Politics and Law. His attempt to return to the University of Vienna as a full professor failed in 1958. Soon after, in April 1959, Koch died of a heart attack.

Throughout his turbulent life in Ukraine, Austria, and Germany, Hans Koch was one of the rare non-Ukrainian Ukrainophiles active in the first half of the twentieth century. In his scholarly and publicistic writings, he advocated a revision of the dominant Russocentric view of Eastern Europe and its history. Koch's political orientation was typical of a group of German and Austrian (and Ukrainian émigré) scholars who collaborated with the Nazi regime in order to support Ukrainian political and cultural aspirations during the German occupation. But their hopes proved illusory. The Nazi regime did not take their plans seriously: for the most part, it regarded Ukrainians as *Untermenschen* and Ukraine as a land whose people and economy were to be exploited. By the time some of them reappeared in Germany as scholars and publicists during the 1950s, interest in Ukrainian affairs had already declined significantly.

Holzner, 1968), 311, 326; Hans Koch, *Kyr Theodor und andere Geschichten*, afterword by Georg Traar (Vienna: Evangelischer Pressverbindung in Österreich, 1967), 249–80.

[17] Schwarz, "Hans Koch," 15–16 (Herbert Krimm's not always reliable reminiscences of Koch's accounts, recorded after 1952).

[18] *Die ukrainische Lyrik 1840–1940*, selected and trans. by Hans Koch (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1955); "Die Gegensätzlichkeit der Gefühle bei Taras Ševčenko," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, new series, 1 (1953): 301–20.

Songwriting and Singing: Ukrainian Revolutionary and Not So Revolutionary Activities in the 1860s

Bohdan Klid

This paper examines the composition and singing of revolutionary populist, patriotic, and nationalist songs by Kyiv-based Ukrainophile students and young intellectuals in the early 1860s. The first part discusses the writing of three songs: two by Anatolii Svydnytsky and one by Pavlo Chubynsky. Svydnytsky was a student at the St. Vladimir University in Kyiv (hereafter Kyiv University) during the years 1857–60, after which he left to teach Russian in a Myrhorod county school in Poltava gubernia.[1] Chubynsky was a law student at St. Petersburg University until the spring of 1861, whereupon he returned to his father's country home near Boryspil, on the road from Kyiv to Pereiaslav, to write his dissertation.[2] Both participated in Ukrainophile activities, which included writing for the St. Petersburg-based Ukrainophile journal *Osnova*, attending meetings of the Hromadas—societies of Ukrainian populist intellectuals in St. Petersburg and Kyiv—and participating in Hromada-sponsored activities, such as endeavors related to popular education, including teaching in Sunday schools and distributing Ukrainian-language popular literature to peasants and city youth.[3]

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[1] On Svydnytsky, see M. Ye. Syvachenko, *Anatolii Svydnytsky i zarodzhennia sotsialnoho romanu v ukrainskii literaturi* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, 1962). He is best known as the author of the first realist novel in Ukrainian, *Liuboratski,* which he completed in 1862 but was not published until 1886.

[2] On Chubynsky, see Dmytro Cherednychenko, *Pavlo Chubynsky* (Kyiv: Alternatyvy, 2005). He is best known as an ethnographer and the de facto head of the Southwestern Section of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society during the years 1873–76.

[3] The texts of the three songs I am discussing appear at the end of this article. The Hromadas were unofficial, and therefore illegal, societies of nationally conscious Ukrainian intellectuals. They served as the organizational vehicles and nuclei of the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire during the second half of the nineteenth century. On their activities in Ukraine and St. Petersburg, see L. H. Ivanova and R. P. Ivanchenko, *Suspilno-politychnyi rukh 60–kh rr. XIX st. v Ukraini* (Kyiv: Mizhnarodnyi instytut linhvistyky i prava, 2000), esp. 154–238.

The second part of this paper examines an episode in late 1862, when a small group of radicals, led by the Kyiv University student Volodymyr Syniehub, went to several villages in Poltava gubernia to teach songs to and sing with peasants as a way of inciting them to rebel against land-owners and imperial authorities in conjunction with the Polish insurrection that broke out in January 1863. Syniehub attended meetings of the Kyiv *Hromada*, knew Chubynsky well, and also knew Svydnytsky.[4]

The Ukrainophile intellectuals associated with the Hromadas are known to have focused on legal activities, such as scholarship, cultural work, and popular education, and to have avoided revolutionary activities. Therefore it is worth examining this seemingly incongruous episode of fomenting rebellion. Moreover, it is intriguing to look at what traditions, influences, events, or conditions of singing and songs may have fostered or spurred the writing of patriotic, nationalist, and revolutionary populist lyrics at that particular time.

These activities became possible and more likely as a result of the far-reaching changes in the Russian Empire that began after the accession of Alexander II in 1855. Early in the new tsar's reign, censorship and other administrative and police controls over the activities of educated imperial society, including those at universities, were relaxed. The universities also began accepting greater numbers of students from social backgrounds other than the nobility. Questions related to the undertaking of fundamental reforms, such as the peasantry's emancipation from serfdom, changes to land ownership and usufruct rights, and other relations between peasants and nobles, including self-government, were discussed fairly openly in print.

Discussions about the types of reforms to be enacted revealed a divide between those favoring conservative, liberal, and even quasi-socialist approaches. In the period leading up to and just after the 1861 emancipation act, tensions and antagonisms between peasants and landowners became more acute. By the late 1850s and early 1860s, major cities in the Russian Empire, and especially the universities there, became fertile areas for the spread of radical ideas among intellectuals and students. In this same period, the national movements of non-Russian peoples were revived or activated. The most notable was the Polish movement, whose leaders launched an attempt to resurrect the Polish state through armed rebellion in 1863. The growing resistance of Balkan Slavs to Ottoman rule throughout the nineteenth century also affected the national senti-

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[4] Syniehub's attempt to incite rebellion is described briefly in Syvachenko, *Anatolii Svydnytsky*, 56—63, and is mentioned in Ivanova and Ivanchenko, *Suspilno-politychnyi rukh,* 199.

ments of non-Russian Slavs. The unification of Italy in the late 1850s and early 1860s also had an influence on the development of national consciousness among non-Russian intellectuals and students.

The leadership of the revived Ukrainian national movement was initially centered in St. Petersburg, where by 1858 a Hromada had been organized. Soon thereafter Hromadas were organized not only in major Ukrainian cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv, but also in the provincial towns of Poltava and Chernihiv. The journal *Osnova*, the first publication to provide a forum for Ukrainian intellectuals and students associated with the Hromadas, began appearing in St. Petersburg in 1861. While the core of the St. Petersburg Hromada was the older generation of "Cyrillo-Methodians," who focused exclusively on cultural tasks, the Kyiv Hromada was dominated by university or former students, mostly at Kyiv University, who were more inclined toward radical views.

By the early 1860s Kyiv had become the center of the Ukrainian national movement. While many Kyiv Hromada members focused on cultural work, such as gathering folk songs and other ethnographic materials and participating in popular education endeavors such as teaching in Sunday schools, some members became involved in revolutionary activities linked to the land question and peasant emancipation.[5] Some also sympathized with or actively supported the Poles before the 1863 Insurrection. For instance, the Russian army colonel Andrii Krasovsky, who attended Kyiv Hromada meetings, was arrested in 1862 for distributing a proclamation to soldiers of the Chernihiv regiment calling on them to disobey orders to quell peasant disturbances. During his interrogation Krasovsky revealed his sympathy for the Polish cause.[6] Pavlo Chubynsky, who attended meetings of the St. Petersburg and later the Kyiv Hromada, also initially sympathized with the Poles.[7]

The question of whether one should support, oppose, or remain neutral toward the Polish national movement or, more specifically, the goals its leaders set vis-à-vis Right-Bank Ukraine, and whether the Poles should take up arms to achieve their goals, was of particular importance to Ukrainian intellectuals and to students at Kyiv University, where there was a large Polish student body. Polish students at Kyiv University supported the claims to Right-Bank Ukraine and Kyiv; this led to a politi-

[5]   Ivanova and Ivanchenko, *Suspilno-politychnyi rukh*, 182.

[6]   See H. I. Marakhov, *Andrii Krasovsky: Borets proty kriposnytstva i samoderzhavstva* (Kyiv: Derzhpolitvydav, 1961); and Ivanova and Ivanchenko, *Suspilno-politychnyi rukh*, 183–89.

[7]   See Ivanova and Ivanchenko, *Suspilno-politychnyi rukh*, 202; and Cherednychenko, *Pavlo Chubynsky*, 15.

cally charged atmosphere that, at times, was characterized by boisterous meetings and arguments between Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian students. These interethnic verbal confrontations stimulated and sharpened a sense of social awareness and national consciousness among the university's Ukrainian students.[8]

The vast majority of Kyiv Hromada members came to oppose the Poles not only because of their claims to Right-Bank Ukraine, but also because the leadership of the Polish movement, especially in the Right Bank, was dominated by the Polish gentry, some of whom were large landowners. In 1861 some *khlopomany*—Ukrainophile Poles and Polonized Ukrainians—led by Volodymyr Antonovych left the Polish student body and joined the Kyiv Hromada. Antonovych, who soon assumed a leading role in the *Hromada*, vehemently opposed Polish plans to organize a revolt in Right-Bank Ukraine and Kyiv.[9]

Some Kyiv Hromada members, however, wanted to take advantage of the upcoming insurrection to foment rebellion among the Ukrainian peasantry so as to achieve radical social changes and even topple the tsarist regime. It is possible, too, that the opposition of many Kyiv Hromada members to the Polish insurrection was tentative. For instance, Volodymyr Pylypenko, an associate of Volodymyr Syniehub, testified after his arrest that many Hromada members actually had a wait-and-see attitude regarding whether an armed struggle would actually break out between the Poles and Russian imperial forces.[10] In this politically charged atmosphere some Hromada members and sympathizers produced incendiary literature, including poems and songs, that were then used as a means of inciting rebellion among the peasantry on the eve and at the start of the armed conflict between the insurgent Poles and the Russian state.

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[8] See Mykhailo Starytsky's memoir, "K biografii N. V. Lysenko," in his *Tvory v shesty tomakh,* vol. 6 (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1990), 403–405. Starytsky notes and briefly describes some of those meetings and how they influenced Mykola Lysenko's developing national awareness. Mykhailo Drahomanov, for his part, wrote succinctly that the "Polish movement had a great influence on my political education" ("Avtobiograficheskaia zapiska," in his *Literaturno-publitsystychni pratsi*, vol. 1 [Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1970], 43).

[9] On Antonovych, see my article "Volodymyr Antonovych: Ukrainian Populist Historiography and the Politics of Nation Building," in *Historiography of Imperial Russia: The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State,* 373–93, ed. Thomas Sanders (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999); and my Ph.D. diss., "Volodymyr Antonovych: The Making of a Ukrainian Populist Activist and Historian" (University of Alberta, 1992).

[10] Volodymyr Pylypenko made this claim during his interrogation by Russian authorities regarding the Kyiv Hromada. See Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv in Kyiv (hereafter TsDIA), fond 473, desc. 1, file no. 20, l. 188 zv.

The writing and distribution of politically or socially charged and even inflammatory revolutionary poetry—not intended for publication—by radical students and the intelligentsia in the Russian Empire was not unusual. Some of Taras Shevchenko's political poems fall into this category. In the political atmosphere of the late 1850s and early 1860s, that activity was quite common.[11] In the late 1850s, for instance, Polish students at Kyiv University composed satirical songs that appeared in handwritten clandestine journals.[12]

Therefore it was not unusual that the Kyiv University student Anatolii Svydnytsky, whom Mykhailo Drahomanov described as having the outlook of a *haidamaka*, composed inflammatory songs.[13] Two songs Svydnytsky wrote at this time were "U poli dolia stoiala, brivonky morhala" (In the field fate awaited, beckoning with her eyebrows) and "Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti, iak kozak v nevoli" (It's been more than two hundred years since the Cossacks were enslaved).[14] Soon after he composed them in 1860, Antonovych commented on their incendiary nature: "In a quiet voice [Svydnytsky] began singing two songs to me I had not heard before, whose contents made such a strong impression that I could not believe my own ears and forgot where I was, where I was sitting, and the people to whom I had been speaking."[15]

In those songs Svydnytsky called on the peasants and Cossacks' descendants to slaughter their enemies and thus liberate themselves from social and national oppression. In "U poli doli stoiala," in which he refers to the killing of Polish *szlachta* in Uman during the *haidamaka* rebellion in the late eighteenth century and its leaders, Ivan Honta and Maksym Zalizniak, Svydnytsky called on the peasants to sharpen their knives, rise up against the landowners (*pany*) and the tsar, and kill their oppressors. In "Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti" he also referred to Zalizniak, but unlike in "U poli dolia stoiala," where social grievances were the reason for his exhortation to kill, he justified his call to violence by Ukraine's national oppression

[11] Syvachenko, *Anatolii Svydnytsky*, 54–55.

[12] See Ivanova and Ivanchenko, *Suspilno-politychnyi rukh*, 172.

[13] Syvachenko, *Anatolii Svydnytsky*, 37–38.

[14] The earliest version of "U poli dolia stoiala" was probably written during the investigation of Syniehub and his compatriots. It was published in H. Marakhov et al, comps., *Suspilno-politychnyi rukh na Ukraini v 1856–1862 rr.*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, 1963), 87–88. The most complete version of "Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti" was published in my article "'Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti': Naipovnishyi variant pisni v zapysi Panasa Myrnoho," *Ukrainskyi istoryk* 34, nos. 1–4 (1997): 230–31.

[15] See V. [Volodymyr Antonovych], "Do biohrafii A. P. Svydnytskoho," *Zoria*, 1886, no. 11 (1 June): 195.

under Russian rule. Svydnytsky decried Khmelnytsky for exposing Ukraine to Muscovite bondage and called on the Cossacks to drop their plows, grab their knives, and kill their enemies, bringing into sharp focus his intense hatred of Russian rule.[16]

The final song we are examining, which became known to tsarist authorities during their investigation of Syniehub and his associates, is what became Ukraine's national anthem—"Shche ne vmerla Ukraina" (Ukraine has not yet died).[17] The author, Pavlo Chubynsky, wrote the lyrics in 1862 during an evening gathering of Ukrainian and Serbian students in a Kyiv apartment he was sharing with Volodymyr Syniehub (among others). According to one memoirist who was present, Chubynsky wrote the lyrics "spontaneously" after hearing the Serbian students sing a patriotic song,[18] probably the hymn "Hej Sloveni,"[19] which was modeled in part on "Mazurek Dąbrowskiego," the current Polish national anthem.[20] Chubynsky's lyrics were first published in early 1864 in the Galician populist journal *Meta*, where they were attributed to Taras Shevchenko.[21]

At that time the tsarist authorities did not know Chubynsky was the author of "Shche ne vmerla," even though he had been placed under police surveillance soon after returning to Ukraine from St. Petersburg.

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[16] In the ninth verse Svydnytsky calls on the Cossacks to strangle their enemies as if they were snakes, to cut and stab them, and then burn their bodies to relieve the stench in Ukraine. See my "'Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti,'" 230.

[17] The version of Chubynsky's hymn Volodymyr Pylypenko recited to tsarist authorities is found in TsDIA, fond 473, desc. 1, file no. 20, ll. 82 and 82 verso. It was published in Cherdnychenko, *Pavlo Chubynsky*, 85–86, but without proper references. A shorter version, which Syniehub recited to the authorities, is found in ibid., ll. 97 verso–98.

[18] See L[eonid]. Beletsky [Biletsky], "Iz vospominanii o P. P. Chubinskom," *Ukrainskaia zhizn*, 1914, no. 3: 55.

[19] "Hey Slovene" was the national anthem of Yugoslavia after 1945, and of Serbia and Montenegro until 2004.

[20] The Polish anthem begins with the words "Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła" (Poland has not yet died). Although the Serbian hymn was Chubynsky's immediate inspiration, the opening line of the Ukrainian anthem mimics the Polish one. The Serbian hymn was sung to the melody of the Polish anthem, and it can be assumed that Chubynsky also intended his lyrics to be sung to this melody. The Galician Ukrainian composer Mykhailo Verbytsky composed the current music to Chubynsky's lyrics in 1864.

[21] See *Meta*, 1863, no. 4: 271–72. Although dated December 1863, this issue actually appeared in early 1864. This version of "Shche ne vmerla" has a third verse, which admonishes Khmelnytsky for giving Ukraine away to the "evil Muscovites." The fourth verse, written in the spirit of Ukrainian pan-Slavism, offers support for the national-liberation struggles of other Slavs, exhorts them to unite their efforts, and admonishes Ukrainians not to be left behind in this quest. The text does not differ significantly from the version Pylypenko recited to the tsarist authorities.

Hence it was probably not the underlying reason why the authorities decided to exile him to Arkhangelsk gubernia in November 1862.[22]

Suspicions about Chubynsky were aroused by what the police and local landowners viewed as suspicious gatherings of young people at his father's country home near Boryspil. One of the visitors there was Syniehub. Informants reported that the Kyiv University students who gathered there "walked around in Little Russian [Ukrainian] garb, sang seditious Little Russian songs, and passed the time in boisterous orgies."[23] In addition to these activities, which could be described as patriotic, the spies also reported that Chubynsky and a circle of followers "were stirring up the peasants against the landowners."[24] Taken together, these accusations, especially those of inciting the peasants (which included attributing authorship of the incendiary proclamation "Usim dobrym liudiam" to Chubynsky), convinced the authorities to exile him.[25]

While the evidence against Chubynsky was largely circumstantial, and the police reports were based in part on exaggerations by neighboring landowners, the same cannot be said of the evidence against Syniehub and his small group of compatriots, who were arrested in April 1863 for sedition. Syniehub and two associates, Volodymyr Pylypenko and Semen Pleshchenko, began agitating among the peasantry in the Poltava gubernia villages of Pylypcha, Nosivka, Korniivka, and Malyi Krupil in late 1862. Pylypcha became the center of their operations after Syniehub made the acquaintance of a local landowner and gubernial secretary, Viktor Pototsky (Potocki), who allowed them to set up their headquarters in his home. From there Syniehub and his small band of revolutionaries, which at times included Pototsky himself, ventured out to hold talks with the peasants, sing along with them, and teach them the words and melodies of "seditious" songs.[26]

In his testimony to the authorities Pylypenko said Syniehub had taught him those songs in Pototsky's house. Each day he and Leonid

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[22] A. [Oleksander] Rusov cites Chubynsky's authorship as the reason for his exile in his memoir "Iz vospominanii o P. P. Chubinskom," *Ukrainskaia zhizn*, 1914, no. 1: 39. Cherednychenko claims Chubynsky's authorship was the main reason for his exile in his *Pavlo Chubynsky*, 84.

[23] Excerpts of the police report are in Volodymyr Miiakovsky, "Istoriia zaslannia P. Chubynskoho," in *Volodymyr Miiakovsky: Nedrukovane i zabute. Hromadski rukhy deviatnadtsiatoho storichchia,* ed. Marko Antonovych (New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1984), 337.

[24] Ibid., 337–38.

[25] Ibid., 335–39; Chubynsky's defense, entitled "Istoriia moiei ssylki," appears on 339–42; and the proclamation "Usim dobrym liudiam" is on 344–45.

[26] Much of the relevant testimony Pylypenko gave is in TsDIA, fond 473, desc. 1, file no. 20, ll. 72–81 verso and 188–200.

Pototsky, Viktor's brother, and Syniehub would approach Pylypcha's young Cossacks and peasants, drink vodka with them, and join them in a *khorovod*.[27] During one such encounter Syniehub advised those assembled "to sing not Muscovite songs but their own," began singing Ukrainian songs, including "U poli dolia stoiala," and tried to convince them they should support the Poles.[28] According to Pylypenko, the purpose of Syniehub's agitation was to attract support for Polish efforts and "draw Russian soldiers away from Poland."[29]

After his arrest and some time in prison, Syniehub was exiled from 1866 to 1869.[30] Chubynsky, too, was freed from exile in 1869; thereafter he headed an ethnographic-statistical expedition in Ukraine and other parts of the empire's Southwestern Land, during which he collected hundreds of folk songs.[31] Also sentenced to exile were other Ukrainophiles, including Oleksander Konysky of Poltava and Stepan Nis and Ivan Andrushchenko of Chernihiv, who may or may not have engaged in revolutionary activities. At times Ukrainophile activities, such as support for the 1863–64 Polish Insurrection, involvement in anti-tsarist activities, and agitation among the peasantry convinced the tsarist authorities to resort to administrative and police measures against individual Ukrainophiles they considered dangerous and to issue the Valuev Circular, which took aim against the entire Ukrainian populist movement by forbidding the publication of Ukrainian-language educational and religious literature. Popular-education efforts in Ukrainian were also curtailed.[32]

The specific events and activities that led to repressive measures against individuals and the Ukrainian populist movement as a whole occurred in the dynamic and politically charged atmosphere of the late 1850s and early 1860s—decades during which the formation of national identity and political and social radicalization accelerated. The Polish national-liberation struggle proved to be a key catalyst in awakening national feelings and patriotism among Ukrainian students at Kyiv Univer-

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[27] A line dance during which songs can be sung.

[28] TsDIA, fond 473, desc. 1, file no. 20, ll. 190–92.

[29] Ibid., l. 189 verso.

[30] See Feliks Kon et al, eds., *Deiateli revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Rossii: Bio-bibliograficheskii slovar,* vol. 1, pt. 2 (Moscow, 1928), 373–74.

[31] The expedition's findings were published in *Trudy etnografichesko-statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v Zapadno-russkii krai,* 7 vols. (1872–79).

[32] On the background and origins of the Valuev Circular, see A. I. Miller, *Ukrainskii vopros" v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.)* (St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2000), 96–115. See also Fedir Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876 r.* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1970; reprint of the 1930 Kyiv edition), xv–xx and 183–204.

sity, primarily in reaction to the Polish movement and its particular manifestations in Ukraine.[33] This led to a parting of ways between Polish and Ukrainian students at Kyiv University as they faced making clear and divergent choices with regard to the Polish national movement. The social questions of the day, related to the terms of the peasants' emancipation and their hunger for land, also led to a rapid sharpening of social awareness among Ukrainian students and young intellectuals.

The prerevolutionary situation of the late 1850s and early 1860s was conducive to Anatolii Svydnytsky's and Pavlo Chubynsky's incendiary populist, patriotic, and nationalist lyrics. Their songs convey the importance of both national and social grievances and reflect the fundamental concerns of most populist students and young intellectuals of that time. They also point to the authors' possible support and encouragement of radical and even violent measures to counteract social and national oppression.[34] The Syniehub affair is an example of how songs were used to incite violence.

This was not the only time that intellectuals taught songs to peasants. In an earlier and unrelated incident, which occurred in the late spring and early summer of 1861, the Ukrainophile artist Hryhorii Chestakhivsky of St. Petersburg, who settled in Kaniv to take care of Taras Shevchenko's gravesite, reportedly taught local peasants *haidamaka* songs and also berated peasants who sang in Russian. Along with teaching the peasants songs, Chestakhivsky also recounted tales about the *haidamaka* uprisings and distributed Ukrainophile popular literature written in Ukrainian.[35] The uniqueness of the Syniehub affair was that he and his compatriots sang songs with the express intent of inciting peasants to rebel, while Chestakhivsky taught the peasants songs with the intent of awakening or sharpening their social and national awareness.

Chubynsky's and Svydnytsky's songwriting and Syniehub's and Chestakhivsky's attempts to use songs to reach out to the peasantry were real instances of Ukrainophiles creating or singing songs to foment rebel-

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[33] See, for instance, Drahomanov, "Avtobigraficheskaia zapiska," 43–44, which describes how his views of Poles changed and what reaction Polish pretensions to Right-Bank Ukraine caused among his Ukrainian compatriots.

[34] One should keep in mind, however, that the norms of poetic license also played a role, in contrast to political pamphlets and other such literature.

[35] See D. F. Krasitsky and K. T. Shevchenko, comps., *Smert i pokhorony T. G. Shevchenko (dokumenty i materialy)* (Kyiv: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk Ukrainskoi SSR, 1961), esp. 102–105 and 111–12. On Chestakhivsky's activities, see also Serhy Yekelchyk, "Creating a Sacred Place: The Ukrainophiles and Shevchenko's Tomb in Kaniv (1861–1900)," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 20, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1995): 22–24.

lion or raise national and social awareness in the early 1860s. But most Ukrainophiles limited themselves to activities that were legal, that is, to cultural and social activities and efforts linked to scholarship and popular education, including undertakings directly related to songs and singing. For instance, many Kyiv Hromada members and other Ukrainophiles earnestly engaged in collecting, studying, and publishing folk songs.[36] While these activities were essentially scholarly in nature, the Ukrainophiles recognized that singing folk songs could also raise national awareness and help build a national identity.[37]

Organizing choirs and singing patriotic songs was clearly an important and effective means of nation building in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Ukraine. Mykola Lysenko, who became a member of the Kyiv Hromada during the period examined here, founded a national school of Ukrainian classical music. He was also a pioneering ethnomusicologist who organized choirs that sang folk songs in Kyiv and other cities in the Russian Empire.[38]

Ukrainian intellectuals and their supporters taught Svydnytsky's "Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti" and Chubynsky's "Shche ne vmerla" to the populace. In the process they struck a responsive chord. After Mykhailo Verbytsky set Chubynsky's lyrics set to music, the song quickly gained popularity in Galicia. Meanwhile peasants in Poltava gubernia apparently picked up and sang Svydnytsky's "Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti" in the 1860s: in 1867 the writer Panas Myrny (pseud. of Panas Rudchenko), who hailed from Myrhorod in that gubernia, recorded the words in a notebook, thinking that it was a folk song.[39] Many years later, in 1901, Ivan Franko commented on the song's popularity in Galicia.[40]

Today Chubynsky's song is Ukraine's national anthem. Meanwhile choirs and folk ensembles throughout Ukraine perform Svydnytsky's "Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti." On a CD of authentic folk songs recorded in Kyiv oblast, in the liner notes the song is described for some reason as being of

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[36] See, for instance, V. Antonovich and M. Dragomanov, *Istoricheskiia pesni malorusskago naroda*, 2 vols. (Kyiv: Tipografiia M. P. Fritsa, 1874–75).

[37] Ukrainophiles also wrote lyrics and composed music to patriotic songs intended for the general populace. The Kyiv Hromada member Oleksander Konysky wrote the religious hymn "Bozhe velykyi, iedynyi" ([Our] One, Great God), which Mykola Lysenko set to music.

[38] See Taras Filenko and Tamara Bulat, *The World of Mykola Lysenko: Ethnic Identity, Music and Politics in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Ukraine* (Edmonton: Ukraine Millennium Foundation, 2001).

[39] See my "'Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti,'" 229.

[40] Ibid.

Cossack origin,[41] and on the disc itself, in the refrain "In prison, under Muscovite guard," the word "Muscovite" has been changed to "Turkish."[42] The song is also featured on a CD by the popular Ukrainian folk-rock group Haidamaky, where the lyrics are also attributed to folk sources.[43]

Song writing and singing can help accelerate or consolidate identity formation, build support for a cause, and inspire action in times of crisis, revolution, and war. They are also effective means of promoting identity and patriotism in more peaceful times. As testimony to this, of the three songs examined here two are still sung today, and one of these two has the distinction of being Ukraine's national anthem.

The Songs[44]

У полі доля стояла ...[45]

У полі доля стояла,
Брівоньками моргала:
З гаю хлопці до мене!
Добрий розум у мене.
Добрий розум в голові,
Гострі ножі у траві.
Гострі ножі аж горять —
На панів та на царя.
Гострі ножі — порада.
Збирай же ся громада!
Гострі ножі точені,
В кровій панській мочені.
Ой мочені, купані,
У городі Умані,
Беріть ножі у руки,

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[41] The eponymous title of the CD is "_I a [sic] vzhe rokiv dvisti, iak kozak v nevoli_": _Zabuti pisni ukraintsiv,_ released in 2005 by Ukrainska dividi kompaniia JRC. The song was recorded in the village of Luka in Kyiv-Sviatoshyne raion.

[42] In the lyrics, which allude to Khmelnytsky bringing Ukraine under Muscovite rule and the Cossacks' loss of freedom as a result, the word "Turkish" makes no sense. But in Soviet Ukraine, singing "Muscovite" with the remaining lyrics unchanged or only slightly modified would probably have resulted in admonishment, if not repression, by the authorities. The more incendiary lyrics Panas Myrny wrote down are also not used here.

[43] "I vzhe rokiv 200" appears on the CD _Haidamaky,_ released in 2002 by Comp Music Ltd. The group does not use the more incendiary lyrics that Panas Myrny recorded.

[44] With my orthographic changes in brackets.

[45] Source: _Suspilno-politychnyi rukh na Ukraini v 1856–1862 rr.,_ vol. 1 (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk URSR, 1963), 87–88.

Давайте муки за муки.
Ми в Умані бували
І про Умань чували,
Про [Ґ]онту і Залізняка,
Про Галайду і Харька.
Цар все п'є та гуляє,
Їздить зайців стріляє,
Дере з вдови, сироти
Для німців на чоботи.

Вже більше літ двісті ... [46]

Вже більше літ двісті,
Як козак в неволі
Понад Дніпром ходе
Викликає долю:
    «Ой вийди-вийди из води —
    Визволь мене, серденько, из біди».

Не вийду, козаче
Не вийду соболю
Хоть рада не можна
Бо й сама в неволі, —
    Ой у неволі у ярмі,
    За московським калавуром у т[ю]рмі.

В т[ю]рмі, у кайданах
Од часів Богдана,
Од ёго самого
В неволю віддана
    Ой ти, Богдане-Гетьмане!
    Запродав ти Україну и мене.

Мене молодую,
Козацькую долю,
Запродав в тяжкую
Московську неволю, —
    Ой у неволю, в кайдани,
    Нерозумний Гетьмане-Богдане!

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[46] Source: Bohdan Klid, "'Vzhe bilshe lit dvisti': Naipovnishyi variiant pisni v zapysi Panasa Myrnoho," *Ukrainskyi istoryk* 34 (1997): 230–31.

Ти вмеръ ... тобі добре
Л[е]жать де л[е]жати;
А встань — подивися
Де Вкраїна-мати
     Де наші коні соколи
     Та де козаченьки, як орли?

На панщині, в плузі,
В великій неволі
Замість того щастя,
Замість тиї долі,
     Ой обступили на округи
     Як ті чорні хмари вороги.

Тяжкі вороженьки,
Ще тяжчая туга
Як вітер пові[є]
З Великого Лугу
     Кинь плуг, козаче, бери ніжъ,
     Та де здибав воріженька, тай заріжъ.

Зроби з серпа спис
А [з] коси шаблюку;
Души вороженька,
Де здибав гадюку
     Ой души, брате, ріж, коли,
     Щоб не смердів на Вкраїні — запали.

Тоді всі святи[ї],
[І] сам Бог святий з неба
Пошлють твою долю
З неволі до тебе.
     Ой Залізняче! Де ж ти? де?
     Промов хоч словечка до людей.

Промов як з-за тебе
Ножі освятились,
Як голови лядські
По майдані котились
     Ой хто не баче, не чує,
     Ой як Москва в Україні панує.

[І]з ратищ козацьких
Серпи покували
А гострі шаблюки
На коси змінили,

А дітей наших всіх на гурт
У [р]екрути не забаром заберуть.

Идуть наші діти
У світ очі дерти ...
Вертайтесь до роду
Не жить — хоть умерти.
    Ой [із] чужої сторони,
    [І сходились] Україну боронить.

Повій буйний вітре,
З лісів та на лози,
Навій добрим людям,
Навій добрий розум.
    Ой повій, вітре, та скажи:
    Козаченьку! не сподівайсь од чужих.

Не надійсь ні на князів
Сини чоловічі,
Бо долі ні волі
Не бачит[и] в вічі.
    Ой Боже слово! зроду врод —
    Нема дужчих и сильніших за народ.

Ще не вмерла Україна[47]

Ще не вмерла Україна,
[І] слава, [і] воля!
Ще намъ, браття-молодці,
Усміхнеться доля!
Згинуть наші вороги,
Якъ роса на сонці;
Запануємъ, браття й ми
У своїй сторонці.

    Душу, тіло ми положимъ
    За свою свободу
    [І] покажемъ, що ми браття
    Козацького роду.
    Гей-гей, браття миле,
    Нумо братися за діло!
    Гей-гей пора встати,
    Пора волю добувати!

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[47] As published in *Meta*, 1863, no. 4: 271–72.

Наливайко, Залізнякъ
[І] Тарас Трясило
Кличуть насъ изъ-за могилъ
На святеє діло.
[І] згадаймо славну смерть
Лицарства-козацтва,
Щобъ не втратить марне намъ
Своєго юнацтва.

     Душу, тіло [і] д.

Ой Богдане, Богдане,
Славний нашъ гетьмане!
На-що віддавъ Укра[ї]ну
Москалям поганимъ?!
Щобъ вернути [ії] честь,
Ляжемъ головами,
Назовемся Укра[ї]ни
Вірними синами!

     Душу, тіло [і] д.

Наші браття Сл[ов'яни]
Вже за зброю взялись;
Не діжде ніхто, щобъ ми
По-заду зістались.
Поєднаймось разомъ всі,
Братчики-Сл[овя'ни]:
Нехай гинуть вороги,
Най воля настане!

     Душу, тіло [і] д.

From Japheth to Moscow: Narrating Biblical and Ethnic Origins of the Slavs in Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian Historiography (Sixteenth–Eighteenth Centuries)

Zenon E. Kohut

> Now these are the generations of the sons of Noah, Shem, Ham, and Japheth: and onto them were sons born after the flood. The Sons of Japheth: Gomer, and Magog, and Madai, and Javan, and Tubal, and Meshech, and Tiras. And the sons of Gomer: Ashkenaz, and Riphath, and Togarmah. And the sons of Javan: Elishah, and Tarshish, Kittim, and Dodanim. From these the coastland peoples spread. These are the sons of Japheth in their lands, each with his own language, by their families, in their nations.
>
> Genesis 10: 1–5

Both medieval and early modern European historiographers traditionally traced the origins of humankind from the biblical Flood and considered the sons of Noah—Shem, Ham, and Japheth—ancestors of everyone on earth: "The sons of Noah who went forth from the ark were Shem, Ham, and Japheth. Ham was the father of Canaan. These three were the sons of Noah; and from these the whole earth was peopled."[1]

Medieval and early modern authors paid particular attention to the status and place of settlement of a specific biblical progenitor. One such formula states that "*Sem ora, Cam labora, Iaffet rege et protege*" (Shem preaches, Ham labors, Japheth reigns and rules) and includes a list of lands settled by Noah's descendants. In describing the distribution of lands, the Bible also assigns the lands of western and northern Europe to Noah's son Japheth, who thus became the most favored candidate for progenitor of all Europeans.

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[1]   Genesis 9: 18–19 (King James Version).

The so-called Danube transfer theory was among the first constructs that took account of the origin of the Slavs. According to this theory, after the mixing of tongues during King Nimrod's construction of the Tower of Babel there was a great migration of peoples. Some came to Europe and settled on the banks of the Danube. All the lands around the Danube were considered the domain of the Slavs.

The "Danube transfer theory" was popular among Byzantine authors, from whom it was borrowed by Kyivan Rus' chroniclers. The *Tale of Bygone Years* in the Hypatian codex describes the origins of the Slavs as follows:

> Upon the demolition of the Tower [of Babel] and the mixing of tongues, the sons of Shem took over the eastern lands, and the sons of Ham, the southern lands; as for the sons of Japheth, they took over the West, as well as the northern lands. [From the sons of Noah] came seventy-two [different] tongues, and the Slavic language [was spoken] in the tribe of Japheth, called Norki, that is, the Slavs. Ages later the Slavs settled around the Danube, where now the Hungarian and Bulgarian realm [is located].[2]

The "Danube transfer theory" grew in popularity and was extensively quoted by Polish, Czech, and Kyivan Rus' authors. In the course of the sixteenth century it was increasingly overshadowed by the "Sarmatian theory," which posited a migration from Babylon to the Slavic lands through Asia to Sarmatia, now equated with the ancient homeland of the Slavs. But accounts of the migration varied, and its sequence was differently presented in those accounts. Thus there was no consensus among early modern European authors on the origins of the Slavs, which were reconstructed on the basis of a combination of biblical genealogy with theories of migration.

Which Son of Japheth?

According to the Russian scholar Aleksandr Mylnikov, the earliest genealogies that identified Japheth as the forefather of the Slavs were written by the German Protestant reformer and historiographer Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560) and the Polish author Jan Długosz (1415–80). They claimed that the first European settler was Alan, a descendant of Japheth.[3] Alan had three sons, the youngest of whom was Negno, who in

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[2] Vasyl Yaremenko, ed., *Povist vremianykh lit: Litopys (za Ipatskym spyskom)* (Kyiv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1990), 9.

[3] A. Mylnikov, *Kartina slavianskogo mira: Vzgliad iz Vostochnoi Evropy. Etnogeneticheskie legendy, dogadki, protogipotezy XVI–nachala XVIII veka* (St. Petersburg: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, 1996), 24.

turn fathered four sons. The elder son, Vandal, became the forefather of the Poles, while the other Slavs were descended from the younger sons.[4] It should be noted that the division of biblical ancestors into elder and younger ones was an important device in the works of medieval and early modern European authors, allowing them to claim the seniority of certain peoples over others.

Długosz, Matthias Mechovius (Maciej Mechowita, 1457–1523), and Marcin Kromer (1512–89) distinguished between "Asian" and "European" Sarmatia. They defined European Sarmatia as the homeland of "Greeks" and "Slavs," identifying Javan, the fourth son of Japheth, as their ancestor. Mechovius and Kromer also considered Riphath, a son of Gomer and grandson of Japheth, the ancestor of those who inhabited the vicinity of the Rithean Mountains, namely the Rus', Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs, Moravians, and Illyrians.[5] Other Polish authors, Bernard Wapowski (1456–1535) and Marcin Bielski (ca. 1495–1575), posited a different genealogy of Slavic origins: Japheth–Gomer–Ashkenaz–Germans and Slavs (see appendix).[6]

The Japheth–Gomer line was also the one followed by the most influential of the early modern Polish authors, Maciej Stryjkowski (ca. 1547–ca. 1593).[7] According to him, after the confusion of tongues at the construction of the Tower of Babel, Japheth's son Gomer left Assyria with his people and went to the Sea of Azov, where he lived among the Cymbrs (*Cymbry*), Goths, and Alans on the shores of both the Azov and the Black seas. Later on, while looking for better lands, the descendants of Gomer settled on the banks of the Dnipro, Volga, Dvina, Buh, Dnister, and Nemunas rivers. Others settled in Cimmeria (between the Don and the Dnister), around the Cimmerian Bosporus, and in the Crimea, where they waged a long war against the Greeks.[8]

It is also worth recalling that early modern authors made extensive use of the works of their intellectual predecessors, often borrowing or omitting certain details. As a result, most of their writings contain several, often contradictory, narratives. Thus the above-mentioned Polish works include elements of another narrative favoring Japheth's sixth son,

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[4] Ibid., 22.

[5] Ibid., 23–24.

[6] Ibid., 25–26.

[7] This conclusion is based on a number on references to Stryjkowski in the works of early modern Ukrainian and Polish authors.

[8] Maciej Stryjkowski, *O początkach, wywodach, dzielnościach, sprawach rycerskich i domowych sławnego narodu litewskiego, żemojdskiego i ruskiego (1575)* (Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1978), 45.

Meshech, as the Slavic progenitor—a narrative that was further elaborated by Stryjkowski and fully developed in subsequent Ukrainian historical writings.

The Rise of Meshech (Mosoch, Moskwa): The Role of Polish Historiography

The first to mention the Meshech lineage was Bernard Wapowski. In a lost history cited by Stryjkowski (1582), Wapowski claimed that the Slavs (whom he calls "*Slawaki*") took their name from the Slavic Lake (*"ozera Slovenogo"*) in the lands settled by Meshech (or Moskwa, as Wapowski calls him), a son of Japheth, which were named after him and became known as the Muscovite lands.[9] The connection between Meshech, Mosoch, and Moskwa was based entirely on phonetic and orthographic similarities—another favorite device medieval and early modern writers employed to incorporate biblical and classical references into their narratives in order to prove authority and antiquity.

The next mention of Meshech/Mosoch occurred in the second edition of Marcin Bielski's *Chronicle* (1564). In the first edition (1554), Bielski had argued for the following line of descent: Noah–Japheth–Ashkenaz (Jaskon, the founding father of the Sarmatians)–Tuiskon–the Poles and the Germans. His primary concern was to establish a common Roman Catholic genealogy including the Poles and the Germans. In the second edition of *Chronicle*, probably edited by his son, Bielski traces the descent of all Slavs from a single progenitor: Japheth–Meshech/Mosoch–the Slavs ("*Slawaki*"), switching from a religious to an ethnic designation.[10]

Up to this point, Meshech had only been mentioned as the common ancestor of all Slavs: it was Stryjkowski who made him a key figure of a historical narrative. According to Stryjkowski, in the year 1830 from the birth of Adam (774 years after the birth of Noah and 175 years after the biblical Flood), King Nimrod sent people to settle new lands. Among them was Madai (the third son of Japheth), the founder of Media and the forefather of the Medes, who migrated to the northern lands of Asian and European Sarmatia and settled there together with the sixth son of Japheth, Moskva (Meshech), the progenitor of the Muscovites. Stryjkowski makes no further mention of Madai and goes on to develop the genealogy of Moskwa (Meshech), who had two sons, Lech and Czech.[11]

[9]   Mylnikov, *Kartina slavianskogo mira*, 45.

[10] Ibid., 25–26.

[11] *O początkach*, 149. In this work Stryjkowski refers to Moskwa in one passage as Japheth's sixth son and elsewhere as his sixth grandson.

In the year 375 after the Flood, Moskwa, "the son of Nimrod and grandson of Japheth," passed away at the age of 270, survived by his four sons, the already mentioned Lech and Czech, as well as Moskwa and Ruś. The sons of Moskwa/Meshech emerged as forefathers of various Slavic peoples: Lech gave rise to the Poles; Czech, to the Czechs; the younger Moskwa, to the Muscovites, and Ruś, to the Ruthenians. Lech's sons (Lytwon, Kaszub, and Samota) were the progenitors of the Lithuanians, the Baltic tribes, the Prussians, and the Samota tribes.[12]

Apparently deviating from the biblical account, Stryjkowski turned Moskwa/Meshech from a son of Japheth into his grandson. He also makes Lech and Czechs Japheth's elder sons, while Moskwa and Ruś figure as their younger brothers. The progenitors of the Lithuanians, the Prussians, and other peoples are younger still—the grandchildren of Meshech and the children of Lech. The moral, as Stryjkowski presents it, is that just as younger children are obliged to respect and obey their elder brothers, the "younger" peoples should respect and obey the "elder," more prominent nations.[13]

The story of Meshech/Mosoch/Moskwa was a minor theme for Stryjkowski, who gave primacy to the Japheth–Gomer line. By the late sixteenth century, however, Polish historiography began emphasizing the descent of the Slavs from Meshech (usually called Mosoch in Polish and Mosokh in Ukrainian historiography) in order to distinguish the origins of the Poles from those of non-Slavic peoples. The Japheth–Javan line obliged the Poles to acknowledge a common origin with the "schismatic" Greeks and even to defer to them as superiors. The Japheth–Gomer–Riphath or Ashkenaz line made them relatives of the Germans or Lithuanians. Furthermore, Polish writers came up with much better biblical references establishing a direct link between the Slavs and Mosoch rather than with Gomer. A citation from the prophet Ezekiel mentions Meshekh (interpreted as Mosoch) and Prince Rosh (interpreted as Ruś) in the same sentence, providing Old Testament "proof" of the ancient lineage of Rus' and its link with Mosokh. The phonetic similarity of "Meshech," "Mosoch," and "Moskwa" enabled the chroniclers to trace Slavic origins to the earliest biblical times, just two generations from Noah himself. Moreover, in the sixteenth century the Poles did not yet feel threatened by Muscovy; hence the construction of a common Slavic lineage in which Mosoch/Moskwa was a key figure seemed a clever way of proving that the Slavs had biblical roots and of establishing their preeminence and superiority to other peoples. Moreover, Stryjkowski's work made Lech and

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[12] Ibid., 150–52.

[13] Ibid., 149, 151.

Czech twins (or equals by birth) and elder brothers of the younger Moskwa and Ruś, thereby asserting the Poles' superiority despite the biblical primacy of Meshech (the elder Moskwa).

Ukrainian Adaptations of Biblical Genealogy

The first early modern Ukrainian work that raised the issue of Slavic origins was the Hustynia Chronicle, which dates from the early seventeenth century. Its author sets out to determine "from which ancestor did [the Slavs] originate."[14]

> Japheth, the third son of Noah … had seven sons. The first of them, Gomer, had three sons of his own: the first one Ashkenaz or Askan, from whom originated all of the German peoples…. Their first king, Tuiscon, reigned over vast lands in Europe, and not only over the German peoples … but also over the Slavs of Sarmatia…. The second son of Gomer was Riphath … descended from Riphath were the Paphlagonians, the Henets, the Enets, the Venedi, the Venethi, the Antes, the Alans, the Roxans, [and] the Roxolanians, who were the Rus', and the Alans, the Rus', the Moskva, the Poles, the Slovenes [*slaviane*], the Bulgarians, the Serbs, all those peoples of one nation and one tongue, which is Slavic.[15]

As for the descent of the Slavs from Meshech, the author of the Hustynia Chronicle initially appears skeptical and largely uninterested. He makes only a brief mention of that lineage, citing no authorities and limiting himself to the observation that, according to some writers, "The sixth son of Japheth is Meshech. He, as some [authors] say, gave birth to the Muscovites and the Slavic peoples, whom I shall discuss below."[16]

Later on, however, the author takes a different tack, providing an alternative genealogy of the Slavs, who are supposedly descended from the progeny of Meshech, and citing the testimony of various ancient and thus authoritative writers. He then goes on to compare theories and establish the credibility of the "lineage of Riphath" over the "lineage of Meshech" on the basis of the authority of previous authors and, probably, his own preferences:

> Some say that the Slavic people originated from Meshech, the sixth son of Japheth, and used to be called the Moschins or Moskva, and from those Moskva people came all of the Sarmatians: the Rus', the Poles, the Czechs, the Bulgarians, and the Slovenes. The ancient chronicler

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[14] V. I. Buganov, ed., *Gustynskaia letopis,* vol. 40 of *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (hereafter *PSRL*) (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003), 12.

[15] Ibid., 148.

[16] Ibid., 147.

Xenophon also mentions the Moschins, calling them an evil and malicious people. Others, who are more learned, say that the Slavs originated from Riphath, the son of Gomer and the grandson of Japheth, and are not so evil as the Moschins. Others again say that [the Slavs] originated from those two peoples, who intermingled and became known as Slavs. They originate from Riphath, the son of Gomer.[17]

Yurii Mytsyk's analysis of the Lithuanian Rus' Chronicle (second half of the sixteenth century), the Ukrainian-language Bobolynsky Chronicle (second half of the seventeenth century), and the Hustynia Chronicle confirms that the "Meshech theory" made its way into Ukrainian historical and philosophical thought gradually over a period of at least five decades.[18] Indeed, one sees the steady growth of the notion of a "Meshech lineage" from the first sporadic mentions in foreign and Ukrainian chronicles into the developed concept presented in the *Synopsis* (1674).

The Synopsis *and the Meshech/Mosokh Theory*

The *Synopsis* was published by the Kyivan Caves Monastery in 1674, again in 1678, and a third time in 1680–81. Following Maciej Stryjkowski, its anonymous author mentions Meshech/Mosokh as a progenitor of the "glorious Slaveno-Rossian people" (*"slaveno-rosiiskii narod"*).

Concerning the origins of the Rus' or the "Slaveno-Rossian people," the *Synopsis* says the following:

The Rus' or, rather, the Rossian people are Slavs as well, for they derive from their ancestor Japheth, and their language derives from a common language. Upon receiving their "glorious" name for their "glorious" deeds in times of old, they began to be called Rossians from the dissemination of their tribes…. Those Rossians received that name in times of old for their broad dissemination and settlement over a large part of the world, in many lands, some on the Black Sea, others on the Tanais or Don and the Volga rivers, and yet others on the banks of the Danube, the Desna, the Dnister, and the Dnipro. That is how all the Greek, Russian, Roman and Polish chroniclers present this…. Thus they are called "Rossian" because of their dissemination [*rossĕianiia*] and differ from other Slavs only in name, but they are of the same tribe, and that is why they are called the Slavic-Rossian or Glorious-Rossian people.[19]

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[17] V. I. Krekoten, comp., *Ukrainska literatura XVII st.* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1987), 148.

[18] Yurii A. Mytsyk, *Ukrainskie letopisi XVII veka: Uchebnoe posobie* (Dnipropetrovsk: Dnipropetrovskyi derzhavnyi universytet, 1978), 13, 75.

[19] Hans Rothe, ed., *Sinopsis, Kiev 1681: Facsimile mit einer Einleitung* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1983), 145–51. The references to "glorious" are, of course, a play on the words "*slava*" (glory) and "Slavs." Thus the Slavs are "glorious" by definition.

The *Synopsis* goes on to say the following about Meshech (Mosokh) and his tribe: "Mosokh, the sixth son of Japheth, is translated from Hebrew into Slavic as 'one who stretches, disseminates, and stretches the bow,' from the dissemination of the great and numerous Muscovian Slaveno-Rossian peoples—the Polish, the Volhynian, the Czech, the Bulgarian, the Serbian, the Croatian, and all others who speak a Slavic language." [20] In this instance "Muscovian" is an adjectival form of "Mosokh," meaning "those who came from the loins of Mosokh," and does not refer to any polity.

Later on the author of the *Synopsis* points out that Meshech was the progenitor not only of the great Muscovite people but also of all the Rus' or Rossian people,[21] and this name is known in all the countries mentioned above whose inhabitants speak one common Slavic language.[22] Although the author continues mentioning other biblical ancestors, such as Asarmod and Riphath, it is Meshech whom he elevates to the status of direct ancestor of all the Slavs.[23]

Both Mylnikov and the historian Iryna Zhylenko consider that the principal motive of the author of the *Synopsis* was to promote the idea of Slavic unity and establish an important role for the Slavs in European history.[24] This emphasis on the common origins of all Slavs was at variance with the accounts of other authors, such as Bernard Wapowski, who differentiated the Slavic peoples on the basis of their religious beliefs and other factors. Although Mylnikov and Zhylenko are basically correct, their interpretation does not suffice to explain the subsequent general acceptance of the "Meshech/Mosokh/Moskva" concept.

In my opinion, the difference between the *Synopsis* and previous Ukrainian works on this subject is best explained by their different objectives. The author of the Hustynia Chronicle focused on the role of Kyiv as the spiritual and cultural center of the Rus' lands within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth—an objective that did not require any development of the notion that Meshech was the forefather of all Slavs. By contrast, the main purpose of the *Synopsis*'s author was to underline the spiritual and cultural role of Kyiv as the center of the Rus' lands within the Muscovite state. His principal challenge was to link the political, his-

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[20] Ibid., 154–55.

[21] By "Rus'" and "Rossian" the author most probably meant the Slavs in general.

[22] *Sinopsis*, Kiev 1681, 12.

[23] Ibid., 152–55.

[24] Mylnikov, *Kartina slavianskogo mira*, 31–32; Iryna Zhylenko, *Lavrskyi almanakh: Synopsys kyivskyi* (Kyiv: Natsionalnyi Kyievo-Pecherskyi istoryko-kulturnyi zapovidnyk, 2002), 123.

torical and cultural traditions of ancient Kyiv with those of the younger Moscow, and emphasizing the "genealogy from Meshech" was one way of solving that problem. The "Mosokh concept," then, is an example of the attempt made in the *Synopsis* to unite the history of the Kyivan and Muscovite lands in the context of a *single historical space*. The Ukrainian clerics were not only assigning Muscovy an important role in Slavic origins but also bringing it into their Slavic "project." After all, the whole point of the work was to show that Kyiv was the foundation of the Slaveno-Rossian people, religion, and culture—a foundation that now required the protection of the Muscovite tsar. By extending Slavic origins to the Muscovite territories, the Kyivan clerics sought to enlist the tsar and his armed forces into a number of their own projects: creating a Slaveno-Rossian tsardom, raising a Slavic anti-Ottoman crusade, and protecting the privileges and wealth of the Kyivan Laura.

The Synopsis and the Muscovite Adaptation of the Meshech/Mosokh Theory

It may appear strange that although Ukrainian clerics ascribed primacy to the Muscovites and Moscow with regard to Slavic origins, the concept of Meshech/Mosokh was long ignored in Muscovy itself.[25] But the Muscovites were suspicious of writings emanating from Poland and Ukraine and therefore dubious about the Meshech/Mosokh theory.[26] In the Bible, the writings of the Greek historian Xenophon, and the Hustynia Chronicle, the descendants of Meshech were portrayed as evil and depraved, "exchanging goods for immortal human souls and copper dishes," and so on. In 1642 the Swedish chronicler and diplomat Petrus Petrejus (Peer Peersson) used those descriptions to depict the Muscovites as strange and evil people who were a constant threat to neighboring lands.[27] Thus, while the Mosokh theory gave the Muscovites primacy when it came to Slavic origins, it also cast them in a negative light.

The author of the so-called Mazurin Chronicle (written sometime between the 1660s and 1690), Isidor Snazin, quotes entire paragraphs from the Synopsis but does not follow the Mosokh genealogy. Instead he adverts to another popular legend widespread in various seventeenth-century chronicles. It concerns the grandsons of Japheth named Skif and Zardan, who settled near the Black Sea and founded "Great Scythia." Snazin then elaborates on their descendants, the Scythian princes Sloven

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[25] Mylnikov, *Kartina slavianskogo mira*, 31.

[26] Ibid., 31–32.

[27] Ibid., 32, 130.

and Rus', who united warring tribes and led them in the mission of settling lands allocated to them by their progenitor, Japheth. Only later does he mention Meshech, who is portrayed as a chieftain of the Muscovites—a cumulative name for the subjects of Sloven and Rus', who lived between the Volga and the Don.[28] Another contemporary Muscovite historian, Ignatii Rimsky-Korsakov, completely ignores the "lineage of Meshech" concept, focusing on the succession of princes and tsars and on the "Orthodox" character of the Muscovite state and its rulers.[29]

Despite this slow start, the Meshech/Mosokh theory gradually made its way into Muscovite intellectual circles. In 1699 a monk of the Afanasev Monastery, Timofei Kamenevich-Rvovsky, utilized the Meshech/Mosokh concept in his work on the origins of the Muscovite and great Slaveno-Rossian people. According to him, the progenitors Sloven and Rus' derived from the "loins of Herod" and were the descendants of Japheth and his son, Prince Meshech, the ruler of Muscovy.[30] Aleksei Mankiev's *Yadro rossiiskoi istorii* (The Nucleus of Russian History, 1715) further developed the Meshech/Mosokh version in Muscovite historiography.[31] Mankiev asserted that Meshech/Mosokh was the patriarch and forefather of the Muscovite, Rus', Polish, Volhynian, Czech, Mazovian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Croatian and other peoples who spoke one common Slavic language.[32] He insisted on the Bible as the principal source for studying the ethnogenesis of the Slavs and was extremely critical of other theories that invoked false gods, animals, or "fictitious" persons as ancestors. He further Russified the theory by referring to Meshech/Mosokh by first name and patronymic, "Mosokh Yafetovich."[33]

Mankiev's work did not, however, popularize the Mosokh concept in Muscovy/Russia. Written in Swedish captivity, *Yadro rossiiskoi istorii* was not published until the 1770s and was soon displaced by the new secular historiography. It was the *Synopsis*, repeatedly published and sold throughout the Russian Empire, that introduced the concept to the Russian reading public. The *Synopsis* was considered one of the most widely

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[28] "Mazurinskii letopisets," in *Letopistsy poslednei chetverti XVII veka,* 1–179, ed. V. I. Buganov, vol. 31 of *PSRL* (Moscow: Nauka, 1968); A. P. Bogdanov, *Letopisets i istorik kontsa XVII veka* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia istoricheskaia biblioteka Rossii, 1994), 37.

[29] Bogdanov, *Letopisets i istorik kontsa XVII veka,* 175.

[30] Mylnikov, *Kartina slavianskogo mira,* 32–33.

[31] Ibid., 33.

[32] Ibid., 33–34.

[33] Ibid., 34.

read books of its time: for example, between 1718 and 1722 an average of eight or nine copies were sold every month.[34]

Meshech/Mosokh in Ukrainian Historiography

By the late seventeenth century the Mosokh concept had reached its apogee of development and popularity in Ukrainian ecclesiastical historiography. Teodosii Sofonovych, who wrote his *Kroinika* in 1672 (two years before the first edition of the *Synopsis*), developed the concept independently.[35] Later works, such as the *Chronograph* by Panteleimon Kokhanovsky (1681) and the *Expanded Chronicle of Rus'* (1681–82), simply incorporated the Meshech concept from the *Synopsis* without further embellishment. By the eighteenth century, however, its influence had begun to decline, mainly because of the appearance of a new genre of secular "Cossack chroniclers." As Anatolii Momryk has noted, the "Cossack chronicles" completely ignored Meshech, focusing instead on overturning the Polish "Sarmatism" theory and replacing it with the alternative concept of a "Cossack Rus' people." In so doing, secular Cossack authors discarded Meshech as a younger (less important) son of Japheth; instead, they referred to Japheth's son Gomer as the biblical ancestor of the "Cossack Rus' people" and claimed the Khazars, Scythians, and Cimmerians as ancestors of the Cossacks.[36] Instead of looking for a common Slavic ancestor, the Cossack chroniclers were searching for one who would link the phonetically similar "Khazars" and Cossacks ("*kozaky*").

This concept already appears in a work by Dmytrii Tuptalo, the bishop of Rostov on the Don, who believed that the Khazars were a people similar to the Scythians who spoke a Slavic (Rus') language. They lived on lands that had earlier belonged to the Cimmerians, who, like the Khazars, were descended from Japheth's first son, Gomer. According to Tuptalo, the Khazars, well known for their glorious and courageous deeds and glorious life, eventually became known as "Cossacks."[37]

The Cossack colonel of Hadiach, Hryhorii Hrabianka, wrote in his chronicle (ca. 1710) that "the Little Rus' people, [also] known as the Cos-

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[34] A. Yu. Samarin, *Rasprostranenie i chitatel pervykh pechatnykh knig po istorii Rossii (konets XVII–XVIII v.)* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta pechati, 1998), 20–46.

[35] See Feodosii Sofonovych, *Khronika z litopystsiv starodavnikh* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1992), 56, 58.

[36] Anatolii Momryk, "Bibliina henealohiia v etnohrafichnykh kontseptsiiakh polskykh i ukrainskykh litopystsiv i khronik (do postanovky problemy)," *Mediaevalia ucrainica: Mentalnist ta istoriia idei* (Kyiv) 5 (1998): 111–18 (here 116).

[37] Zhylenko, *Lavrskyi almanakh,* 142–44.

sacks ... originated from the first son of Japheth, Gomer; after the departure of the ancient Cimmerians from the Cimmerian Sea [Sea of Azov] ... the Alanian Khazars settled on those lands; [they] spoke the same Slavic language and originated from the [same] forefather, Japheth."[38] The "Khazarian" genealogical line was also pursued in the political poem *Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei* (Great Russia's Conversation with Little Russia), written by Semen Divovych ca. 1761–62.[39]

Istoriia Rusov, most probably written at the beginning of the nineteenth century, mentions Sloven, Rus', the Khazars, and Meshech, but constructs its own theory. According to the anonymous author, the Slavic people were descended from Japheth and called "Slavs" after their ancestor Sloven, a descendant of Prince Ross, the grandson of Japheth. The author classifies the Slavs according to their way of life or outward appearance. Thus the Eastern Slavs were called Scythians because of their migratory habits; as for the Southern Slavs, they were called "Sarmatians" after their sharp bird-of-prey eyes and "Rus'" for the color of their hair. Those Slavs were also named after their ancestors—the Rus' after their ancestor "Ross," and the Muscovites after their prince Mosokh, a nomadic chieftain who settled on the banks of the Moskva River and subsequently gave his name to the city and kingdom of the Muscovites, or Rossians. As for the Rus', the bravest and most adventurous of the Slavs, they received the new name "Khazars" from the Greek emperors for helping them in their wars.[40]

As these examples show, the "lineage of Meshech/Mosokh" either disappears from the "Cossack" writings of the 1700s or occupies a marginal place in the broader context of Slavic and Ukrainian-Cossack history.

Conclusion

Early modern historians sought to establish a prominent lineage for the Slavs in general and their own people in particular, which made it necessary to find the closest possible links to the biblical Tower of Babel. To the extent that there was any logic in picking a particular son of Japheth, it lay in the availability of biblical or ancient references, the pos-

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[38] Grigorii Grabianka, comp., *Deistviia prezelnoi i ot nachala poliakov krvavshoi nebyvaloi brani Bohdana Khmelnytskoho ...* (Kyiv: Vremennaia komissiia dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, 1854), 5.

[39] Semen Divovych, "Razgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei," in *Ukrainska literatura XVIII stolittia: Poetychni tvory, dramatychni tvory, prozovi tvory,* ed. O. V. Myshanych (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1983), 384.

[40] *Istoriia Rusiv*, trans. Ivan Drach (Lviv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1991), 36–38.

sibility of identifying a single progenitor of all the Slavs, and the kind of differentiation that a particular author was attempting to achieve (for example, differentiating Slavs from Greeks or from Germans).[41] It was the sixth son of Japheth, Meshech or Mosokh (improperly identified in Slavic sources), who proved particularly useful for meeting these criteria.

The "genealogy from Meshech," which elevates the Muscovites to the status of direct descendants of this biblical progenitor, emerges in the works of Polish authors attempting to find a single ancestor for all Slavs. Such all-Slavic "solidarity" did not prevent these authors from further differentiating the Poles and Czechs as descendants of the elder, more venerable sons of Meshech, while maintaining that the Rus' and the Muscovites were descended from the younger, less respected sons. It should also be noted than in Polish historiography the "genealogy from Meshech" coexisted with other theories and did not constitute the primary narrative.

In Ukrainian historiography of the early seventeenth century, the idea of descent from Meshech was not very popular. The Hustynia Chronicle clearly preferred to trace the ancestry of the Slavs from Gomer—Japheth's first son—and his son Riphath. A decided change from Riphath to Meshech is apparent in the Kyivan *Synopsis*, which should be seen as an attempt on the part of its author to link Kyiv and the Ukrainian lands with Moscow. Thus the identification of Meshech as the Slavs' common ancestor offered a means of unifying two political, historical, and cultural traditions—those of ancient Kyiv and the younger Moscow.

This elevation of Meshech was less acknowledged in Ukrainian secular historiography, which was not so interested in establishing a common tradition with Muscovy. Nor was the "genealogy of Meshech" initially embraced by the Muscovites, who were more concerned about the negative biblical description of the descendants of Meshech than with making a claim for biblical primacy. The popularity of the Meshech concept was secured mainly by the *Synopsis*, which was printed in numerous editions and remained one of the most popular sources on Russian history until the early nineteenth century. That a theory that gives primacy of Slavic origins to Moscow and the Muscovites was first hinted at in German cosmography, taken up in Polish historiography, further developed into a virtual ideology by late seventeenth-century Ukrainian clerics, but subsequently rejected by Ukrainian Cossack writers and then only reluctantly absorbed into Muscovite/Russian imperial thinking, is one of the ironies of the history of early modern historical thought and narrative.

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[41] See the appendix.

Appendix
Biblical Ancestors of the Slavic Peoples According to Various Early Modern Authors

Noah

Shem — Ham — Japheth

Gomer — Magog — Madai — Javan — Tubal — Meschech — Tiras

Askenaz — Riphath — Togarma

Tuiskon

Slavs and Germans
(B. Wapowski;
M. Belski)

Slavs
(M. Belski;
M. Stryjkowski;
T. Sofonovych;
Synopsis)

Elisha

Slavs and Greeks
(J. Długosz;
M. Kromer;
Mechovius)

Slavs
(M. Kromer;
Mechovius;
M. Stryjkowski;
Hustynia
Chronicle)

The Deceitful Gaze: Ukraine through the Eyes of Foreign Travelers

Nancy Shields Kollmann

One of the more remarkable phenomena of the early modern period is the explosion of travel accounts by middle- and upper-class Europeans. From the sixteenth century on, the European reading public exhibited a voracious curiosity for accounts of the far corners of the world, an enthusiasm so energetic that such travel literature crossed the bounds of fact and fiction, imagination and fantasy, with gay abandon in its accounts of the New World or of the exotic East. Surprisingly, included in the exotic East were not only Turkey, the Middle East, or China, but even Poland, Ukraine, and Russia. Even though these lands had many similarities with Europe—Christianity as the dominant religion, peasant-based agriculture, political structures centered around monarchs and landed elites—Europeans saw these lands as alien.

Until about the 1970s, historians of Russia regarded Europeans' travel accounts as basically reliable historical evidence, despite the authors' various biases. Richard Pipes, for example, said of Giles Fletcher's study of late sixteenth-century Russia: "British accounts ... are both more factual and less partisan than the accounts of Germans, Poles, or Italians," although he admitted that "what [Fletcher's book] says of Russia tells us indirectly what Fletcher thinks of England."[1] In more recent decades, however, historians across the board have become more theoretically sophisticated about the subjectivity of travel accounts, and that critical sensibility has been well represented in our field.[2] Two historians—Marshall Poe and Larry Wolff—have advanced powerful paradigms to identify the tropes that shaped early modern accounts of travel to Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and Russia.[3] Their insights have taught us how to read

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[1] Giles Fletcher, *Of the Russe Commonwealth by Giles Fletcher, 1591*, intro. by Richard Pipes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 9, 26.

[2] See two classic texts: Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); and Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

[3] Marshall Poe, *A People Born to Slavery* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Larry

such accounts more critically and demonstrated how treacherous is the ground we tread when we crack the spine of a good travel account to the East.

Poe and Wolff identify two different but complementary sets of tropes that shaped European accounts of lands east of the Elbe. Poe argues that freedom was the chief concern of travelers to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Muscovy. They lamented that the peasants were enserfed, the townsmen were deprived of economic autonomy, the nobility had neither dignity nor parliamentary institutions, and the law offered no formal protections. They declared Muscovy a "despotism" or "tyranny," calling the tsars omnipotent and their people slavish.

Although Poe's work focused on Muscovy, his analysis fits sixteenth-century European travelers to Eastern Europe as well: a British diplomat visiting Poland in 1598, for example, condemned the slavish condition of the Polish peasantry and urban classes. Of the townsfolk he declared: "The Plebian order ... is most base, and contemptible, not only barred from the State, but allso obnoxious to the wronges and insolencies of the gentry" while the peasants "differ little from slaves." Evidencing typical British respect for an open economy of yeoman farmers and tradesmen, he declares "it being a most sure rule, that no state can be riche, where traders and Artisans are wronged and trodden on, they being the silke wormes whereuppon all states grounde theire wealthe."[4]

Larry Wolff brings the story forward to the eighteenth century and broadens the scope, analyzing accounts of travel not only to Russia but also to what in modern times is called Eastern Europe. Here he shows that foreigners' evaluations were no less condescending, but that the terms had changed. Now the focus was less on freedom than on civilization, and less on political and economic structures than on the personal formation of the individual. Wolff, in fact, argues that our modern concept of Eastern Europe as an entity was created in this period, as Europeans, inspired by an Enlightenment drive to categorize their world rationally, described the lands from the Elbe to the Urals in absolute, global terms. He goes so far as to say they "invented" the image of Eastern Europe, sometimes not even relying on eyewitness experience, as in Voltaire's "histories" of Charles XII, Peter the Great, and Catherine II. Their gaze was almost arbitrary in its categorical confidence of cultural differ-

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Wolff, *Imagining Eastern Europe: Eastern Europe on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

[4] Carolus H. Talbot, ed., "Relation of the State of Polonia ..." *Elementa ad Fontium Editiones* 13 (1965): 88, 90, 127. I thank Frank Sysyn for introducing me to this wonderful source.

ences. He quotes the French traveler Segur crossing from Prussia into Poland, for example: "when one enters Poland, one believes one has left Europe entirely, and the gaze is struck by a new spectacle:... a poor population, enslaved; dirty villages; cottages little different from savage huts; everything makes one think one has been moved back ten centuries, and one finds oneself amid hordes of Huns, Scythians, Veneti, Slavs, and Sarmatians."[5]

As Segur's comment indicates, in the Enlightenment travelers' imagined world Eastern Europe differed from Europe because it was not "civilized." If Europe was orderly, Eastern Europe was disorderly, as seen in the peasants' laziness, widespread drunkenness, and rampant sexual license. If Europe was self-disciplined, Eastern Europe was brutal, as expressed in corporal punishment, harsh language, and fighting. If Europeans were clean and polite, Eastern Europeans were dirty, boorish, and crude. We are witnessing here a process of self-definition: through this "encounter" with the "other," Europeans explored and defined what it meant to be European. The more fantastic the account, the more superior it made Europeans feel.

The tropes of despotism and brutality indeed dominate in accounts of this part of the world from 1500 to the late 1700s. But Ukraine, interestingly, serves in such accounts as a sort of foil to prove Poe's and Wolff's generalizations. What elements of civility foreign travelers missed about their imagined "Eastern Europe," they found in plenty in Ukraine.

European travelers in Ukraine in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries underscored two themes.[6] First, they celebrated the Cossacks as free spirits—self-governing, independent, the mirror image of Russia's slavish nobility and autocratic policy—even while admitting that their manners left something to be desired. Guillaume de Beauplan's account of life among the Cossacks in the 1630s and 1640s is the classic text. He describes the Cossacks as brave and skilled, the men and women alike "capable of all arts." At the same time, he describes and gives a certain grudging admiration to their freewheeling, boisterous and raucous nature: "there is no body among them, of what age, sex or condition soever, that does not strive to outdo another in drinking and carousing effectually"; "they are all ingenious enough, but they go no further than what is necessary, and profitable." Seemingly astounded that they do not take advantage of their great talents and natural resources, he finds they care

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[5] Wolff, *Imagining Eastern Europe,* 19.

[6] For an uncritical but comprehensive survey of accounts, see Volodymyr Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to XXth Century* (New York: [Ukrainian Congress Committee of America], 1953).

more for freedom than profit: "Nothing belonging to them is so coarse as their habit, for they are subtile and crafty, ingenious and free hearted, without any design or thought of growing rich; but are great lovers of their liberty, without which they do not desire to live." In an interesting gendered counterpart to male Cossack fighters, Beauplan relates in great detail courtship and marriage customs that accord women and young couples significant autonomy in choosing mates. And, while typical accounts of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Russia condemned the loose sexuality of the populace, especially women, Beauplan avers that the Cossack women remain chaste because of their "fear of publick shame."[7]

Beauplan also underscores the second common trope about Ukraine: that its cities are ancient, beautiful, and filled with churches and schools, and its land is rich and productive. He gushes: "The land is so fruitful, it often produces such plenty of corn, they know not what to do with it."[8] Bernard Connors, penning a geography of the Commonwealth of Poland in the late seventeenth century, echoed these themes. About Galicia he wrote: "it is extremely fruitful in Corn, beasts of all kinds, fish and honey." About Lviv Connors remarks that "This city gives great Encouragement to Learned Men, who are very civilly receiv'd by their Academy, which is supply'd with Professors from that of Cracow. Here is kept a very famous Winter-Fair, whither the Hungarian, Moldavian, and, in time of Peace, Turkish Merchants resort in great Numbers." He notes about Przemyśl that "here is a College belonging to the Jesuits for the Education of Youth. The Citizens are very much addicted to Trade, and have several famous fairs every Year." Quoting a previous traveler, Connors remarks about Podillia that "if these people might enjoy a wish'd-for Peace like the Western Countries of Europe, they would have no reason to envy either the Plenty or Riches of Italy or Hungary." He notes that Vinnytsia is "famous for a Meeting of the Gentry and a Court of justice," and he echoes (perhaps copies) Beauplan in his description of the beautiful ancient churches of Kyiv.[9]

All in all, early modern travelers found in Ukraine a respite from the autocratic power they observed in Russia, the overweening nobility they condemned in Poland, and the dreary world of enserfment and agrarian backwardness they encountered everywhere east of the Elbe. An in-depth

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[7] Guillaume le Vasseur Sieur de Beauplan, *A Description of Ukraine* (New York: Organization for the Defense of Four Freedoms of Ukraine, 1959), 448, 466–68.

[8] Ibid., 447, 448.

[9] Bernard Connor, *The History of Poland in Several Letters to Persons of Quality* (London, 1698), vol. 1, letter 5, pp. 266, 268, 270, 274, 277, 278.

look at the accounts of two travelers who went from Russia to Ukraine a century apart reveals these tropes at work. In both cases, their fondness for Ukraine stood in sharp contrast to their distaste for Russia. We start with Patriarch Macarius of Antioch, who traveled to Moscow in search of alms for his church by way of Constantinople, Moldova, and Ukraine between 1652 and 1660.[10] His journey was chronicled by his son, Paul of Aleppo. Coming from the Ottoman Empire, Paul and Macarius did not arrive with the "gaze" we might expect of European travelers, but they (Macarius through Paul's account) complained of the same ills common in seventeenth-century accounts: despotism and servility.

Religious life in Muscovy dismayed these Syrian clerics. While Macarius admired the piety of some individuals, particularly Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (32–33) and the ascetic monks of Valaam (61), he was oppressed by the regimentation and lifelessness of religious observances. Macarius complained of the rigors of endless church services, expressed his fear of being sent to Siberia for falling short of the mark in his devotions (20–21), and complained of the excessive Lenten fast ("Oh, how we burned with desire for the food of our own country!" [40]). He found the Easter service different from the "tumultuous joy and clapping of hands" (50) of Greek customs. Coming from the diverse Middle East, he even evidences some discomfort with religious oppression. Saving his harshest condemnation for the Poles and noting the Turks' relative tolerance of religions (15), in Muscovy Macarius exhibits some empathy for Muslim captives of war: "They instantly make them Christians and baptize them, with or against their consent.... For nothing could exceed the hatred borne by the Muscovites to all classes of heretics and infidels" (21, 28).

Macarius found life in Russia severe and cruel. He bravely asserted that "no ruler of any other country has attained the degree of good government which exists among the Russians" (34), but clearly he was disturbed by the methods employed. He calls the tsar's criminal law "mercilessly severe" and remarks on bishops' and monasteries' cruel beatings and hangings of peasants for misdemeanors (22). He declares Patriarch Nikon even more feared, and more fearsome, than the tsar himself. Nikon, Macarius relates, has filled Siberian monasteries with "dissolute" clerics exiled for drunkenness, bribery, and other moral infractions (36).

When Macarius and his party finally received permission to leave Muscovy, their reaction was equal parts joy and relief: "My personal anxiety was to quit Moscow before Easter, to escape the sleepless vigils,

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[10] Paul of Aleppo, *The Travels of Macarius, 1652–1660*, ed. Lady Laura Ridding (New York: Arno, 1971). In-text page references are to this edition.

and the overwhelming fatigue endured during the week of the Passion. How could foreigners like us, accustomed to such comforts at home, expect to enjoy any rest or sleep here...?" (84). All in all, Macarius declared Muscovy a land fiercely regimented, harshly severe, and, most interestingly, devoid of life's energy and warmth. "As for jesting and laughter, we became entirely estranged to everything of the kind, for we were strictly watched and guarded.... God deliver us from this constraint and restore us to our beloved freedom and facilitate our return, laden with riches, to our friends and homes!" (27).

Although Macarius returned home with much less profit than he had hoped, he traveled with a happy heart, knowing that they would return via Ukraine: "for during those two years spent in Muscovy, a padlock had been set on our hearts, and we were in the extremity of narrowness and compressure of our minds; for in that country no person can feel anything of freedom or cheerfulness, unless it be the native population. The country of the Kosaks, on the contrary, was like our own country to us" (91–92). Macarius had enjoyed his stay in Kyiv on the way to Moscow. He was dutifully impressed with the rigor of the church services, but particularly happy about the intellectual level of the church in Kyiv. He used the "excellent printing presses" of the St. Sophia Cathedral to print indulgences, noted the widespread literacy of the population, and participated with great fervor in theological discussions with Kyivan clerics on the jurisdiction of the various Orthodox patriarchs (18). All in all, Ukraine served as a foil for Macarius's image of Muscovy: where it was despotic and closed-minded, Ukraine was relaxed and open.

One hundred years later, the British businessman Joseph Marshall described a visit in the summer of 1769 from Moscow to Poland, traveling through Ukraine.[11] Unlike Macarius, Marshall focused not on religion but on the secular, namely, the economy: "the soil, and the cultivation of it, and the state of the peasants" (145). His sensibility was that of the Enlightenment, not of an educated Orthodox cleric. He condemned Russia in terms that echo earlier travelers' preoccupation with freedom and despotism and the Enlightenment's focus on civility and cruelty.

Marshall brought a mercantilist sensibility to his writings about Russia and found much there that frustrated him. He laments that the Russian Empire, despite its vast resources of land and easy river transportation, produces no more revenue than that of England, one-third its size in population (125). He declares that developing agriculture would be the key to increasing Russia's productivity: "no attention to manufactures can

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[11] Joseph Marshall, *Travels through Germany, Russia and Poland in the Years 1769 and 1770* (New York: Arno, 1971). In-text page references are to this edition.

yield a profit equal to a proper cultivation: the wealth arising from it would be far greater, the publick revenue would be much more improved, and population increased in a much greater proportion" (129). But doing so required, in Marshall's view, two important things: population and freedom. Noting that the empire is "badly peopled," he repeatedly praises Catherine II's policy of inviting immigrants from abroad. And yet he ultimately declares that for productivity to boom, "Liberty must be diffused, all slavery of the lower ranks broken through, and every man allowed to become a farmer that pleases" (146).

Marshall replicated the trope of servility that had traveled through such accounts since the sixteenth century. He disdained Russia's enserfment not only for the way it dragged the economy back, but also for the slavish people it created. Like many travelers before him, he terms the Russian government a despotism, calling it "the most absolute in Europe; there is not even the appearance of the least barrier between the will of the sovereign and the people: all ranks are equally slaves to the Empress, not subjects" (142). The result may look like good manners but is really servility: "The Russians have nothing in them that one can properly call civility, but I met with the most perfect obsequiousness and obedience" (149). Finally, he despairs of Russia's economic future as he observes the excessive labor obligations landlords imposed on peasants and the rampant brutality in society. The two soldiers accompanying him "were always ready for giving them [peasants] a blow…. I curbed this licentiousness, which gave me a clear idea of the government of Russia, and at the same time convinced me, that all the Empress's fine schemes for encouraging agriculture must inevitably come to nothing" (151).

Marshall replicates even more familiar tropes when he finds hope for Russia's economic future in Ukraine, both for its natural resources and for its human potential. He glories in Ukraine's wild, open meadows, fertile loam, and grass steppe "up almost to the bellies of the horses." He marvels at stands of timber "which would in England be thought a glorious sight" (162–63). He calls Ukrainians "the best husbandmen in the Russian empire" (168), admiring their crop rotations that restore the soil (165). Approaching the Ukrainian capital "through a beautiful country; great part of it being well peopled and cultivated," Marshall admires—as had Beauplan and Connor before him—its "noble cathedral" and many churches (168–69).

In contrast to the brutality of Russia's government, he finds Ukrainian government admirable, declaring Ukraine, "tho' inhabited by Tatars, as well a regulated province as any county in England" (168). He concludes that "the present race of the Ukraine are a civilized people" (168) and echoes Macarius in declaring Ukraine like home: "I never saw a track of

land that had more resemblance to the best parts of England." Even the weather was welcoming: "Nothing could be more fortunate than the weather for my expedition ... constant azure sky, with warm winds" (172).

Marshall's delight in Ukraine stemmed from his perception that enserfment lay more lightly here than in Russia. He remarks on it repeatedly, developing his theme that "enslaved peasants are utterly inconsistent with a flourishing husbandry" (176): "Much of the good husbandry met with in the Ukraine is owing to the peasants being owners of their lands, and vassalage almost unknown in the province" (176). "Most of the peasants are little farmers, whose farms are their own, with ten times the liberty among them that I any where else saw in Russia" (171). Marshall reflects about the Empress that "it is in her power" to give the lands of Russia "all the advantages which the inhabitants of the Ukraine enjoy. They have, it is true, a noble country, equal, I think, in soil, etc., to Flanders, and almost as well cultivated" (176).

In conclusion, Marshall lectures readers on the unreliability of travel accounts, particularly those concerning Ukraine. "They give such a picture of the state of the country, that one would suppose it possessed by herds of wandering Cossacks, which is utterly inconsistent with the idea of such a state of agriculture as is necessary for making so great a proficiency in the culture of hemp and flax. All these accounts must have been copied one from another, and the first of them at least a century and half old" (178). Marshall laments that no one is hearing about the great changes happening in Ukraine: "The reason must be, the country's being so extremely out of the way of all travelers ... and hence it is that the greatest changes happen in such remote parts of the world, with out any thing of the matter being known. And our writers of geography ... copy each other in so slavish a manner, that a fact in 1578 is handed down to us as the only information we can have in 1769" (179). Declaring his goal to "take notes of his observations with intention to lay them before the world," Marshall concludes with resounding confidence in Ukraine's tremendous economic and human potential.

Marshall, however, surely had his tongue planted firmly in his cheek in so sternly lecturing his readers about the reliability of travel accounts, for he himself, it has been found, never set foot in either Russia or Ukraine; even his identity is not fully established.[12] This detailed, seem-

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[12] See Anthony Cross, "The Armchair Traveller 'in' Catherine II's Russia," in *Rossiia. Zapad. Vostok. Vstrechnye techeniia* (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1996), 317–19; and his *By the Banks of the Neva: Chapters from the Lives and Careers of the British in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 385–86.

ingly authentic account was based solely on cribbing from previous writers and lots of imagination. In so doing, "Marshall" joined a large and often distinguished body of authors who blurred the line between fact and fiction in travel accounts, producing the most popular body of published literature in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[13]

"Marshall"'s duplicity should make us all the more critical of other accounts. Even granting the authenticity of most travel accounts of Russia and Eastern Europe, we must always entertain the awareness that our travelers saw what they wanted to see, turning Ukraine in their "imagination" into a land of freedom and possibility by contrast to the oppressive empires that shaped Ukraine's history. Travel accounts are seductive. They tempt us to believe in them as historical truth, but instead present puzzles of reality and myth. To my knowledge, Frank Sysyn has not devoted particular attention to travel accounts, and yet he brings to all his work the critical sensibility and discernment that they, above all, demand.

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[13] See Percy G. Adams, *Travelers and Travel Liars, 1660–1800* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962); and his *Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Novel* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983).

Ніколай Полєвой і "звичайна схема 'руської' історії" (перша третина XIX ст.)

Володимир Кравченко

У 1830 р., під акомпанемент бурхливих соціяльно-політичних, економічних і національних трансформацій в охопленій романтизмом Европі, ледь не сталася важлива світоглядна революція в загальноросійській імперській культурі. Її "буревісником" став відомий московський журналіст, письменник, історик і палкий романтик Ніколай Полєвой (1796–1846)[1]. Скориставшись із публікації в 1830 р. другого видання "Історії Малої Росії", написаної його співвітчизником, російським істориком і державним діячем Дмитром Бантиш-Каменським, Полєвой виступив на сторінках свого журналу "Московский телеграф" із новою версією історії України та Росії[2], зробивши перший крок у напрямку їхнього розмежування та створення нової, національної концепції російського історичного процесу[3].

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[1] Про історичні погляди Н. Полєвого див.: *Александрова Р. М.* Н. А. Полевой и отечественная историография XIX–XX вв. — М., 2002; *Шикло А. Е.* Исторические взгляды Н. А. Полевого. — М., 1981. Про його літературну діяльність див.: Литературные взгляды и творчество Н. А. Полевого / Отв. ред. А. С. Курилов. — М., 2002; *Полевой Н. А., Полевой К. А.* Литературная критика. Статьи и рецензии. 1825–1842. — Л., 1990; і *Полевой Н.* Материалы по истории русской литературы и журналистики тридцатых годов / Ред., вступ. статья и комментарии В. Орлова. — Л., 1934. Про його ставлення до української літератури див.: *Грабович Г.* До історії української літератури. — К., 2003. — С. 194; *Голубенко Петро.* Україна і Росія у світлі культурних взаємин. — К., 1993. — С. 168, 293; і *Шкандрій Мирослав.* В обіймах імперії. Російська і українська літератури новітньої доби. — К., 2004. — С. 47, 251–252. Про Полєвого в стосунку до української історіографії див.: *Когут З.* Коріння ідентичності. Студії з ранньомодерної та модерної історії України. — К., 2004. — С. 197; і *Velychenko Stephen.* National History as Cultural Process: A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914. — Edmonton, 1992. — С. 92–93, 135.

[2] *П[олевой] Н.* Малороссия; ее обитатели и история (рец. на кн.: *Бантыш-Каменский Д. Н.* История Малой России: В 3 ч. — М., 1830) // Московский телеграф. — 1830. — № 17. — С. 74–97; № 18. — С. 224–57.

[3] Про це можна знайти згадку в деяких моїх публікаціях, зокрема Полевой Микола Олексійович // Українське козацтво. Мала енциклопедія. — К.; Запоріжжя, 2002. —

Окремі елементи нового розуміння російської нації та її історії були закладені Полєвим у новаторській для свого часу "Истории русского народа", написаної в дусі відвертої ідейної опозиції до "Истории государства Российского" офіційного імперського історіографа Ніколая М. Карамзіна. Перші томи книги Полєвого почали з'являтися друком уже наприкінці 1820–х років. Українською історією він спеціально не займався і лише час від часу рецензував нові твори українських письменників. Після політичної опали та закриття журналу "Московский телеграф" у 1834 р., за умов суворої цензури, Полєвой уже ніколи не мав нагоди чи бажання знову повертатися до проблеми українсько-російських стосунків. Виступ із приводу книги вірного послідовника Карамзіна Дмитра Бантиш-Каменського залишається єдиною спеціальною публікацією Полєвого на цю тему. Проте висловлені в ній думки, безпрецедентні в російській історичній літературі, надовго випередили свій час[4]. Серед них варто виділити наступні.

1. Русь — це Росія. Виключне право називатися "чистими русами"[5] і володіти давньоруською історико-культурною спадщиною мають, власне, лише етнічні росіяни, земляки автора. "Справжня" Русь, на думку Полєвого, після монгольської навали залишилася лише на півночі — в Суздалі, Владімірі, Нижньому Новгороді, Ярославлі, Ростові, Москві, Твері, Новгороді, Білоозері, Пскові[6]. Саме тут, як писав історик, руси зберегли в незмінному вигляді свою мову і свою релігію. Завдяки цьому уламок стародавньої Руси водночас став зародком нового утворення, представляючи собою "совсем новый народ, совсем новое образование"[7].

На відміну від стародавніх русів, цей новий народ уже мав етнічну, мовну, культурну та релігійну однорідність разом із самодержавством, які, власне, й забезпечили йому історичну само-

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С. 397; та Концепції Переяслава в українській історіографії // Переяславська рада 1654 року: (Історіографія та дослідження). — К., 2003. — С. 482–483.

[4] До аналізу тексту публікації принагідно зверталися лише окремі автори — див.: *Saunders D.* The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850. — Edmonton, 1985. — С. 186–187 та ін.; і *Bushkovitch Paul.* The Ukraine in Russian Culture 1790–1860: The Evidence of the Journals // Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas. — Т. 39 (1991). – № 3. — С. 356–57. Проте висновки, яких дійшли обидва дослідники, мають дещо суперечливий характер.

[5] *П[олевой] Н.* Малороссия; ее обитатели и история. — № 17. — С. 77. З деякими обмеженнями та ж думка: *Полевой Н.* История русского народа. — М., 1833. — Т. 4. — С. 276–277.

[6] *Полевой Н.* История русского народа. — М., 1997. — Т. 2. — С. 266.

[7] Там само. — С. 202.

бутність[8]. Для. Полєвого остання позначена такими символами, як Іван Каліта, Сєргєй Радонєжский, московський Кремль, Іоанн ІІІ. Правлінням цього останнього завершується початковий, власне російський ("русский") у властивому розумінні цього слова період вітчизняної історії, що починається в часи монгольської навали на півночі Русі[9].

На особливу увагу заслуговує той факт, що Полєвой, на відміну від багатьох своїх попередників і сучасників, не розчиняв "російське" в "слов'янському". Він майже не приділив уваги традиційному для його попередників описанню історії літописних слов'янських племен. "Что нам до славян, истлевшего, гнилого желудя, послужившего зародышем исполинскому древу? Не славянское, а *Русское царство*, не древняя, а *наша* Россия началась в Москве …"[10] При цьому історик зробив спробу розділити "русское" та "российское", зокрема, обстоюючи різницю між "русским" та "российским" ("великоруським") наріччями[11].

2. Малоросія — не Росія. Автор підкреслював, що осередок ("гніздо") Малоросії, "древле не были русскими областями", а Київ "отнюдь не был никогда ее средоточием, как думают"[12]. У зв'язку з "Історією Малої Росії" Дмитра М. Бантиш-Каменського він, зокрема, писав у 1830 р.: "Доныне малороссияне только исповедуют греческую веру, говорят особенным диалектом русского языка и принадлежат к политическому составу России, но по народности вовсе не русские"[13]. "Малороссияне" — "народ, совершенно отличный от нас, чистых руссов. Язык, одежда, облик лица, быт, жилища, мнения, поверья — совершенно не наши! Скажем более: на нас смотрят там доныне неприязненно"[14].

Полєвой не заперечував факту існування зародків "малоросійської" самобутности в київські часи у вигляді елементів майбутньої козаччини[15], гуслярів-попередників українських кобзарів[16] або духу

[8] *Полевой Н.* Обозрение русской истории до единодержавия Петра Великого. — СПб., 1846. — С. XLIII, XLVII.

[9] Див. передмову редактора в: *Полевой Н. А.* История русского народа. — 1997. — Т. 1. — С. 11–12.

[10] *Полевой Н.* Обозрение русской истории … — С. XLV.

[11] *П[олевой] Н.* Малороссия; ее обитатели и история. — № 18. — С. 253–54.

[12] Там само. — № 17. — С. 87–88.

[13] Там само. — № 18. — С. 229.

[14] Там само. — № 17. — С. 77.

[15] *Полевой Н. А.* История русского народа. — 1997. — Т. 2. — С. 205; 1997. — Т. 1 — С. 332; 1830. — Т. 2. — С. 404, 426.

“якогось мандрівного лицарства” з його культом “чести и удаль-
ства”. Проте “... Малороссия, не сделавшись доныне Русью, никогда
и не была частию древней Руси точно так же, как Сибирь и Крым”[17].
Початки української (малоросійської) окремішности історик
пояснював передусім чужими, литовським і польським впливами,
під які потрапили південноруські землі внаслідок монголо-
татарської навали.

“Так рабство, бедствие, печаль и уныние налегли на русский
народ, для которого вскоре погибли южные области — Киев, Черни-
гов, Курск и Галич, более близкие к монголам и другим сильным
соседям. Там исчезла русская общественность, опустели русские
города и селения, пропал русский дух, истребился самый язык
русский”[18]. Після смерти князя Лева і перенесення митрополії з
Києва до Владіміра “... совершенно погибло для Руси то знаменитое
место, где началась первобытная история русского народа. Вскоре
увидим, как утратятся для Руси Галич и Волынь, и чуждое влады-
чество на целые столетия овладеет древними городами Владимирка
и Володаря образует здесь совершенно отдельный, хотя и родной
русским областям народ, с новыми, неслыханными дотоле нравами,
новыми поверьями и — даже новым именем ...”[19]

3. Київська Русь — не Росія й не Україна. Вона взагалі ніколи не
була єдиною, монолітною державою. “Ошибка — думать, что Русь
при Владимире и Ярославе была государство сильное, едино-
державное”, — писав історик[20]. Варяги, на думку автора, з самого
початку заснували на території Руси не одне, а декілька окремих
політичних утворень, які склали своєрідну систему феодальних
російських держав[21]; Полєвой іменував її “федеральним союзом”
володінь, що належали одній князівській сім'ї[22]. Унаслідок цього
Київську Русь часів Ярослава Мудрого автор називав федеративною
державою[23] точно так же, як він називав монархію часів правління
Володимира Мономаха “федеральною”[24]. Спільними для всіх частин

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[16] Там само. — М., 1829. — Т. 1. — С. 207.

[17] *П[олевой] Н.* Малороссия; ее обитатели и история. — № 17. — С. 86–87.

[18] *Полевой Н. А.* История русского народа. — 1997. — Т. 2. — С. 265.

[19] Там само. — М., 1833. — Т. 4. — С. 276–277.

[20] Там само. — М., 1997. — Т. 1. — С. 286.

[21] Там само. — М., 1829. — Т. 1 — С. XLI, XLII.

[22] *П[олевой] Н.* Малороссия; ее обитатели и история. — № 17. — С. 82–83.

[23] *Полевой Н. А.* История русского народа. — 1997. — Т. 1. — С. 357.

[24] Там само. — С. 334. Мабуть знавцям видніше, чи не тут беруть початок уявлення

Київської Русі були лише мова і релігія, але не політичний устрій і не "нравы жителей"[25]. В очах Полєвого цей останній, як сказали б пізніше, етнічний фактор здобув роль важливого історичного чинника й зумовив появу окремих руських князівств[26].

4. Україна ("Малоросія") має свою власну, самостійну історію[27]. Основу її самобутности та окремішности в очах автора складає козаччина, від якої, на його думку, і веде своє походження український ("малоросійський") народ[28]. Ставлення історика Полєвого до українського козацтва було негативним. Він вважав, що козацтво саме по собі було символом боротьби з прогресивною "городовою" культурою і керувалося у своїй діяльності передусім власними інтересами, які далеко не завжди співпадали з інтересами Російської держави[29]. Саме тому Полєвой виступив проти ідеалізації козаків і зображення їх чи то "якимись парижанами" зразка 1789 чи 1830 рр., що боролися за громадянську свободу, чи то "какими-то рыцарями, Баярдами, Пальмеронами"[30].

У публікаціях Полєвого не помітно й сліду теорії "возз'єднання" Русі стосовно України. Головною причиною переходу українського козацтва до Росії він вважав, з одного боку, короткозору, недалекоглядну політику короля Сіґізмунда, що намагався підпорядкувати православне населення римському папі, а з другого — вдалу політику царя Алексєя Міхайловіча, який, скориставши зі слабкости польського уряду, "отнял Киев, увлек к себе Малороссию."[31] Для російського історика українські землі, що перейшли під владу Росії в середині XVII ст., — це "области, отторгнутые победами царя Алексея от Польши"[32]. Він розглядав їх в одному ряду з іншими завойованими територіями, які ніколи не були російськими — Остзейськими областями, Литвою, Фінляндією, Грузією та Білорусією, які раніше ніколи не були російськими: "Мы поступили с ними так,

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М. І. Костомарова про федеративний характер Київської Руси й чи випадковою є символіка того, що він був похований неподалік від Полєвого.

[25] Там само. — С. 287.

[26] Там само. — С. 527; див. також: 1830. — Т. 2. — С. 43.

[27] *П[олевой] Н.* Малороссия; ее обитатели и история. — № 17. — С. 77.

[28] Там само. — С. 92.

[29] Там само. — № 18. — С. 244–45.

[30] *Полевой Н. А., Полевой К. А.* Литературная критика ... — С. 341.

[31] *П[олевой] Н.* Малороссия; ее обитатели и история. — № 18. — С. 240–41; № 17. — С. 84.

[32] *Полевой Н.* Обозрение русской истории ... — С. 65.

как обыкновенно поступают победители с завоеванными землями. Мы обрусили их аристократов, помаленьку устранили местные права, ввели свои законы, поверья, удалили строптивых, сами перемешались с простолюдинами-туземцами, но за всем тем обрусить туземцев не успели ... Они *наши*, но не *мы*" — все це робила Австрія с Богемією та Угорщиною, Англія з Шотландією та Ірландією[33].

Відтак ліквідація козацької державности пояснювалася Полєвим не лише державними інтересами Росії[34], а й історичною приреченістю самого козацтва, яке пережило свій вік. "Жизнь казацкого общества, явившаяся сама собою от обстоятельств XIII века, должна была исчезнуть от обстоятельств XVII-го столетия; казаки не могли уже существовать, когда рука Провидения лицом к лицу ставила Швецию, Польшу, Турцию, Россию, возвеличивала над жребием других судьбу России и готовила в ней представительницу Востока против Запада Европы. В сем случае казаки — только эпизод, блестящий и трогательный; их время *было* и *прошло*, когда они сами не были уже необходимостью"[35].

Для того, щоб оцінити належною мірою ідеї Полєвого, необхідно помістити їх у історико-культурний контекст розвитку українсько-російських взаємин, починаючи з середини XVII ст., тобто з того часу, коли учасникам цього діалогу довелося відповідати на кардинальне питання: "Що таке Росія? Що таке Малоросія?"[36] Саме тоді київські православні інтелектуали знайшли оптимальну для свого часу формулу відповіді на нього, поєднавши уявлення "Повісти минулих літ" із ідейно-стилістичними здобутками польської ренесансної історіографії в знаменитому "Синопсисі"[37]. Цей твір базувався на ідеях історичної єдности слов'ян, а також спільности "слов'яноруських" народів. Символами цієї "нової історичної спільноти" людей виступали біблійний Мосох в ролі слов'янського прародителя, "царствующий град" Москва, Православна Церква,

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[33] *П[олевой] Н.* Малороссия; ее обитатели и история. — № 17. — С. 86.

[34] Там само. — С. 84.

[35] Там само. — № 18. — С. 245.

[36] Докладніше на цю тему див.: *Когут З.* Коріння ідентичности … — С. 133–217.

[37] Про київський "Синопсис" див.: там само. — С. 142–45; *Жиленко І. В.* Синопсис Київський // Лаврський альманах. — К., 2002. — Вип. 2; *Тарнопольська І. О.* Київський "Синопсис" в історіографічному та джерелознавчому аспектах. Автореф. дис.… канд. іст. н. — Дніпропетровськ, 1998; *Миллер Алексей.* "Украинский вопрос" в политике властей и русском общественном мнении (вторая половина XIX века) <http://lib.rus.ec/b/199787>.

церковно-слов'янська мова, правляча династія, але передусім — "верховный и всего народа российского главный град Киев". Це й був той ідейний "посаг", який принесла з собою малоросійська Україна, ідучи до "шлюбу" з Москвою в 1654 р.

Доволі традиційна й компактна формула київського "Синопсису", що вдало надавалася для підручника, майже на століття перетворила його на офіційну доктрину Російського уряду, джерело російського історичного гранд-наративу[38]. У часи правління царя Алєксєя Міхайловіча навіть виник проєкт перенесення всеросійської столиці з Москви до Києва. Крім православної ієрархії та російського уряду, ідея спільної "Русі-Росії" з історичним центром у Києві цілком задовольняла й українську ("малоросійську") козацько-шляхетську еліту. Остання, залишаючи за собою право на частку "Руси", забезпечувала собі історичну та політичну легітимність у Російській державі й одночасно нейтралізувала концепцію завоювання Малоросії, яку обстоювала, всупереч православній ієрархії, частина світської російської політичної еліти[39].

Той факт, що політичною столицею православної імперії став невдовзі Петербург, а не Київ, принципово не вплинуло на основні положення доктрини. Вона лише увібралася в сучасну стилістику та риторику, пройшовши шлях від М. Ломоносова до Н. Карамзіна й включивши в себе, завдяки працям Ґ. Міллєра та Д. Бантиш-Каменського, деякі елементи козацького історичного міту разом із його героїчними подвигами та "ясневельможними гетьманами". Думка про історичну "руськість" Малоросії через її зв'язок із давнім Києвом міцно утвердилася в офіційних російських історичних і географічних "лексиконах" і підручниках другої половини XVIII ст.

Ці вдосконалення, однак, не перетворили домодерну формулу історичної "слов'яно-руської" єдности на новітню національну ідентичність. Термінологічні та концептуальні маркери "слов'яноруськости" залишалися надзвичайно нечіткими, плутаними, а їх використання — безсистемним і непослідовним. Аналіз відповідних історичних текстів кінця XVII — початку XIX ст. дозволяє говорити лише про певні тенденції, натяки на зміни в самосвідомости окремих чи то соціяльних груп, чи то індивідів[40]. Мабуть, тому що

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[38] *Миллер А.* "Украинский вопрос …". — Розділ "Проект «большой русской нации»" <http://lib.rus.ec/b/199787/read#t3>.

[39] *Velychenko Stephen*. National History as Cultural Process … — C. 87, 93.

[40] *Sysyn Frank E.* The Cultural, Social, and Political Context of Ukrainian History Writing 1620–1690 // Europa Orientalis. — 1986. — No 5. — C. 285–310; *його ж.* Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690 // Harvard Ukrainian Studies — T. 10. — No. 3/4 (грудень 1986). — C. 393–423; *його ж.* The Cossack Chronicles and

парадоксальне для сьогоднішнього аналітика поєднання спільности та окремішности українців і росіян для свого часу не містило в собі суперечностей і "пояснювалося" за допомогою суто релігійного постуляту "незлитности та нероздільности".

Чимало російських, так і українських істориків і письменників бачили й розуміли відмінності між обома народами[41]. Деякі російські автори виступали проти козацької історичної мітології, наражаючись на полеміку з боку українських сучасників[42]. Чимало з освічених мандрівників, географів і етнографів фіксували особливості історії, мови, культури, побуту кожного з них[43]. Проте ніхто з цих авторів до Полєвого не зміг сформулювати свої спостереження та відчуття в термінах модерного націоналізму, залишаючись у шкаралупі офіційної, інклюзивної "слов'яноруськости". Властиві для неї гібридні типи подвійної (малоросійсько-слов'яноруської, великоросійсько-слов'яноруської і т. д.) ідентичности, багато "росій", "україн" і навіть боротьба за "право руського первородства" між "Північчю" та "Півднем" Руси — усі ці ознаки реґіоналізму й автономізму старого режиму[44] відповідали потребам суспільства й не суперечили інтересам імперії.

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the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity // Harvard Ukrainian Studies. –Т. 14. –No. 3/4. (грудень 1990). — С. 593–607; *Кравченко В. В.* "Росія", "Малоросія", "Україна" в російській історіографії другої половини XVIII — 20–х років XIX ст. // Зб. Харк. істор.-філол. т-ва. — Т. 5 (1995). — С. 3–16; *його ж.* "Малоросія" та "Україна" в часі і просторі вітчизняної літератури др. пол. XVIII — поч. XIX ст. // Осягнення історії: Зб. наук. праць на пошану професора Миколи Павловича Ковальського з нагоди 70–річчя. — Острог і Нью-Йорк, 1999. — С. 318–23.

[41] У цьому відношенні заслуговують на увагу твори І. Болтіна, М. Є. Маркова, Я. Марковича, українського автора "Нового и полного географического словаря ..." 1804 р., переписаного дослівно В. Ломиковським, і деякі ін. Докл. див. *Кравченко В. В.* Нариси з української історіографії епохи національного Відродження: (Друга половина XVIII — середина XIX ст.). — Харків, 1996; *його ж.* "Словарь малорусской старины" 1808 р. та його автор // Схід–Захід. Історико-культурологічний збірник. — Харків. — Вип. 1 (1998).– С. 104–17; і *його ж.* Новый и полный словотолкователь, расположенный в азбучном порядке // Українське козацтво. Мала енциклопедія. — С. 352).

[42] *Кравченко В. В.* "Словарь малорусской старины" 1808 р....

[43] Докл. див. нарис О. П. Толочка в кн.: *Верстюк В. Ф., Горобець В. М., Толочко О. П.* Україна і Росія в історичній ретроспективі. — Т. 1: Українські проекти в Російській імперії. — К., 2004. — С. 266–331.

[44] *Raeff Marc.* Ukraine and Imperial Russia: Intellectual and Political Encounters from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century // Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter. — Edmonton, 1992. — С. 80–81.

Н. Полєвой завдавав удару по цій архаїчній "слов'яно-руській" ідентичності та її історичній мітології з позицій модерного, екслюзивного російського націоналізму. Він зробив першу в російській історіографії спробу розмежувати історичний процес українців і росіян, узявши за основу етнокультурні особливості кожного з них. Фактично історик продовжив ту лінію на розвиток ексклюзивного розуміння російської історії та культури, яка вже простежувалася у творах деяких із його попередників, але вивів її на якісно новий рівень, зумовлений культурою та філософією доби романтизму. Іншими словами, Полєвой зробив спробу деконструкції архаїчної на той час "слов'яно-руської" або "старої руської" домодерної спільноти, використавши одні її елементи (великоросійські) як будівельний матеріал для нової російської національної культури та відкинувши, за непотрібністю, всі інші, в даному разі — малоросійські.

Це й був магістральний шлях у процесі розвитку не лише російської, а й української модерної нації[45], тісно пов'язаний з процесами модернізації, секуляризації та вестернізації православних народів. З цієї точки зору переосмислення та переформулювання українсько-російських взаємин набували вирішального значення для національного самовизначення як українців, так і росіян. Рефлексії на цю тему ніколи не обмежувалися суто академічними чи прагматичними рамками. Фактично вся історія українсько-російських культурних (і не лише) взаємин ранньомодерної та модерної доби під цим кутом зору пронизана боротьбою інклюзивних (домодерних) та ексклюзивних (модерних) тенденцій національного розвитку.

Процес, започаткований Полєвим, не знайшов підтримки ні в суспільстві, ні в урядових колах. Російські традиціоналісти, як і слід було чекати, виступили на захист Н. Карамзіна та Д. Бантиш-Каменського. Історик С. В. Руссов, не чужий зацікавленням українськими сюжетами, у відповіді Н. Полєвому обстоював уявлення щодо "руськости" малоросів і доброї слави "захисників православної віри" — козаків[46]. Українські інтелектуали, включно з П. Гулаком-Артемовським, М. Максимовичем, М. Гоголем, Й. Бодянським, М. Маркевичем, Ю. Венеліним та іншими виявили набагато більшу активність, доводячи пріоритет руськости за своєю батьківщиною та Києвом, наголошуючи на історичних заслугах "православного лицарства-козацтва", шукаючи в українській мові та фольклорі

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[45] *Szporluk Roman.* Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union. — Stanford, 2000. — С. 368–81.

[46] *Руссов С. В.* Замечания на бранчливую статью в 17 и 18 книжках «Московского телеграфа» на 1830 год, помещенную по случаю издания г. Бантыш-Каменским малороссийской истории. — СПб., 1831. — С. 9.

заповітні начала не зіпсованої чужоземними впливами слов'янщини і навіть закладаючи наріжний камінь майбутньої слов'янської федерації "під берлом руського царя". Проте жоден із них при цьому так і не вийшов за межі постуляту про незлитність і нероздільність "південної" та "північної" Руси і лише доповнював своїми працями загальноросійський імперський гранд-наратив.

Найголовніше ж полягало в тому, що ідеї Полєвого рішуче розійшлися з уявленнями та поглядами російської бюрократії, заклопотаної на той час справою нейтралізації "полонізму" та подальшою інтеграцією західніх губерній до імперії після польського повстання 1830 р. У цьому контексті варто порівняти з висловлюваннями Полєвого риторику урядової комісії, яка, розглядаючи "козацький" проєкт малоросійського генерал-губернатора Н. Г. Рєпніна, на початку 1834 р. зауважила: "для блага Империи,... не должны быть терпимы ... отдельные самостоятельные части или *федеральные* (курсив мій. — *В. К.*) соединения провинций на особых правах"[47].

До того ж, сама термінологія ексклюзивного модерного націоналізму виявилася для російських сановників (світських і церковних) незрозумілою та неприйнятною. Звідси висновок творця оновленої імперської доктрини, графа С. С. Уварова про Полєвого: "Он не любит России"[48]. За іронією долі, це було саме те, в чому російський патріот Полєвой звинувачував українця (малороса) М. Гоголя. Звинувачення в «нелюбові до "руськости"» дістане невдовзі й інший романтик — М. Костомаров, дисертація якого про Берестейську релігійну унію, написана в новому науково-культурному дискурсі, викличе підозру в митрополита Харківського Інокентія.

Як відомо, в 1834 р. журнал "Московский телеграф" було закрито, а його видавець потрапив в опалу. Думка про те, що однією з причин цього могли бути "проукраїнські" симпатії Полєвого, принаймні на початку 1830–х років[49], виглядає певним непорозумінням. Офіційна записка, подана імператору з цього приводу С. С. Уваровим, включала в себе довгий список сумнівних із політичного боку висловлювань, які з'являлися на сторінках журналу, і серед багатьох інших — про те, "что еще Разумовский согревал в душе тайную

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[47] Цит. за: *Н. С.* К истории малороссийских казаков в конце XVIII и в начале XIX века // Киевская старина. — 1897. — Кн. 10. — С. 128.

[48] Цит. за: *Полевой Н.* Материалы по истории русской литературы и журналистики ... — С. 482.

[49] *Saunders D.* The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture ... — С. 170, 187.

мысль о свободе Малороссии"[50]. Мабуть, цього замало, щоб говорити про "українські" симпатії Полєвого.

Офіційна доктрина Російської імперії — "самодержавство, православ'я, народність" — сформульована графом Уваровим, фактично містила в собі всі ті компоненти, які проголошував і Полєвой. За одним винятком. У Полєвого це була російська (великоросійська) народність. В Уварова — "просто народність". Проте ця різниця виявилася принциповою. Вона залишала достатньо місця для того, щоб продовжувати культивувати домодерні, інклюзивні форми ідентичности слов'яно-руського ґатунку. Своєю чергою, це означало, що імперська бюрократія не сприймала викликів модерного націоналізму і поверталася до "випробуваної часом" старої доктрини київського "Синопсиса", підфарбованої новою риторикою та злегка модернізованою політичною практикою. "Точка біфуркації" нею була "благополучно" пройдена без утрат.

Маніфестом "нового" офіційного курсу стали підручники з російської історії Н. Ґ. Устрялова (1805–70)[51]. Із другої половини 1830-х років і до кінця правління Ніколая I Устрялов фактично був офіційним імперським історіографом. У 1834 р. він обійняв посаду екстраординарного професора кафедри російської історії Петербурзького університету (до речі, в тому ж році ад'юнкт-професором того ж університету став М. В. Гоголь). У 1836 р. Устрялов захистив докторську дисертацію "О системе прагматической русской истории", втіливши свою "систему" в канонічному тексті нового підручника (1837–41). Це й була "звичайна схема" російської історії, яка повністю відповідала урядовій політиці й нагадувала київський "Синопсис".

Устрялов розійшовся з Полєвим по всіх основних пунктах з історії України та Росії, наведених на початку цієї статті. Устрялов доводив, що Росія як єдина, цілісна держава та нація існувала з часів Київської Руси. Він виступив з позицій "збирання руських земель" стосовно України середини XVII ст., зобразивши Переяславську раду 1654 р., як "союз двух Росій"[52]. Нарешті, ставши офіційним

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[50] *Полевой Н.* Материалы по истории русской литературы и журналистики ... — С. 482.

[51] З останніх публікацій, присвячених Устрялову див.: *Баклова А. В.* Формирование идеи самобытности исторического развития России в работах Н. М. Карамзина, М. П. Погодина, Н. Г. Устрялова. Автореф. дисс. ... канд. ист. н. — Пенза, 2006; *Веркеенко Г. П.* "Любознательный и честный труженик" Николай Герасимович Устрялов (1805–1870 гг.). — Орел, 2005.

[52] *Velychenko Stephen.* National History as Cultural Process ... — С. 99.

експертом в українському питанні, він із цензурних міркувань забороняв негативні відзиви про українське козацтво, навіть якщо вони належали перу такого лояльного історика початку XIX ст., як Максім Берлінський. Найголовніше ж полягало в тому, що Устрялов остаточно інтегрував у загальноросійський історичний наратив "детальний виклад історії України XVI і XVII століття"[53]. Цим самим він продовжив життя інклюзивної, слов'яно-руської трактовки "спільної" історії українців і росіян.

Можна, звичайно, розмірковувати над тим, чи такий курс російського уряду посприяв акумуляції "будівельного матеріялу" для українського модерного, національного проєкту, чи навпаки, загальмував його. В тому, що він загальмував російський національний проєкт, сумніватися не доводиться. В цьому контексті можна погодитися з висновком російського дослідника А. Міллера про обмежений асиміляторський потенціял російського імперського уряду[54]. Недарма в ролі русифікаторів і борців із польськими культурними впливами ним використовувалися найбільш голосисті співці "слов'яноруськости" з числа українських романтиків.

Свого Полєвого українська історична думка дочекалася лише наприкінці XIX ст. Але на цей раз вона випередила російську історичну думку. Сучасник Полєвого Ніколай Погодін своєю полемікою з Михайлом Максимовичем і запереченням права українців (малоросіян) на Київську Русь у середині XIX ст. лише повертався, причому з великою обережністю, до думок свого попередника, проте так і не зумів його повторити[55]. Наступна, після Полєвого, спроба розмежування української та російської історії з російського боку буде здійснена набагато пізніше — лише в 1918 р.[56] Проте й на неї чекатиме доля, не краща за всі попередні.

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[53] *Когут З.* Коріння ідентичності ... — С. 190.

[54] *Миллер А.* Россия и Украина в XIX — начале XX в.: непредопределенная история // Украина и Россия: общества и государства. — М., 1997. — С. 82. Докл. див.: *його ж.* "Украинский вопрос" в политике властей и русском общественном мнении ... На жаль, недавнє англомовне видання книги російського історика. (*Miller Alexei.* The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century. — Budapest, 2003) мені лишилося недоступним.

[55] Блискучий аналіз полеміки Погодіна з Максимовичем див.: *Верстюк В. Ф., Горобець В. М., Толочко О. П.* Україна і Росія в історичній ретроспективі. — Т. 1. — С. 343.

[56] Див. *Новицький В.* Історична праця О. Є. Преснякова і розмежування великоросійської та української історіографії // Україна. — 1930. — Березень–квітень. — С. 55–65.

Наступні покоління учасників українсько-російського діялогу неодноразово повертатимуться до своїх попередників, кружляючи в колі окреслених ними ідей. Через сто сімдесят три роки після публікації Полєвого в Москві буде надруковано книгу під заголовком "Украина — не Россия". Автор її, президент України Леонід Кучма, в передмові напише: "Всем, кому это интересно, я попытаюсь объяснить, прежде всего, что ... русские и украинцы — две отдельные и во многом несхожие нации, каждая со своей культурой, говорящие хоть и на родственных, но отчетливо разных языках, что у Украины серьезное прошлое и, уверен, будущее"[57]. Надія на майбутнє — єдине, що відрізняє ці слова від проголошених Ніколаєм Полєвим. Ось такий діялог "України крізь віки".

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[57] *Кучма Л.* Украина — не Россия. — М., 2003. — С. 11.

Carpathian Rus':
Interethnic Coexistence without Violence*

Paul Robert Magocsi

The phenomenon of borderlands and the somewhat related concept of marginality have become quite popular as research subjects among humanists and social scientists in recent years. At a recent scholarly conference in the United States I was asked to provide the opening remarks for an international project concerned with "exploring the origins and manifestations of ethnic (and related forms of religious and social) violence in the borderland regions of east-central, eastern, and southeastern Europe."[1] I felt obliged to begin with an apologetic explanation because, while the territory I was asked to speak about is certainly a borderland in the time-frame under consideration—1848 to the present—it has been remarkably free of ethnic, religious, and social violence. Has there never been controversy in this borderland territory that was provoked by ethnic, religious, and social factors? Yes, there has. But have these factors led to interethnic violence? The answer is no.

The territory in question is Carpathian Rus', which, as will become clear, is a land of multiple borders. Carpathian Rus' is not, however, located in an isolated peripheral region; rather, it is located in the center of the European continent, as calculated by geographers interested in such questions during the second half of the nineteenth century.[2]

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[1] The conference took place in May 2005 as part of the international research project "Borderlands: Ethnicity, Identity, and Violence in the Shatter-Zone of Empires since 1848," sponsored by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island.

[2] The exact geographic center is near the village of Dilove (formerly Trebushany), in the far southeastern corner of Carpathian Rus', in present-day Ukraine's Transcarpathian oblast. In 1875 the Hungarian government erected a monument there to that effect, and a century later, in 1975, the Soviet government put up a new monument. Both are still standing.

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CARPATHIAN RUS': A BORDERLAND OF BORDERS

MAP 1

Boundaries

XXXXX   Geographic (Baltic-Danubian Pontic watershed)

〰〰〰   Ethnolinguistic (West Slavic/East Slavic/ Finno-Ugric/Romance)

▭▭▭   Religious (Western vs. Eastern Christianity)

▬▬▬   Political (international)

●●●●●   Socio-climatic (northern limit of tomato and grape cultivation)

●●●●●   Carpatho-Rusyn settlement, 1920

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0   25 Miles

0   25 Kilometers

What, then, is Carpathian Rus' and where is it located? Since it is not, and has never been, an independent state or even an administrative entity, one will be hard pressed to find Carpathian Rus' on maps of Europe. In that sense it is like many other European lands—Lapland, Kashubia, Euskal Herria/Basque Land, Occitanie, and Ladinia, to name a few—a territorial entity that is defined by the ethnolinguistic characteristics of the majority of its inhabitants and not by political or administrative borders. Using the intellectual buzz-words of our day, Carpathian Rus' is a classic construct. Some skeptics would even say it is an "imagined community" or, at best, a construct or project still in the making.[3] What we have in mind, however, is something quite concrete: namely, a geographically contiguous territory that, at the outset of the twentieth century (when census data was still relatively reliable), included nearly 1,100 villages and some small towns in which at least fifty percent of the inhabitants were Carpatho-Rusyns.[4] Of the two component parts of the territory's name, "Carpathian" refers to the mountains that cover much of the land surface, while "Rus'" refers to the ethnicity and traditional Eastern Christian religious orientation of the territory's majority East Slavic population, whose historic ethnonym is "*rusnak*" or "*rusyn*." That population will be referred to here as "Carpatho-Rusyn," a term that reflects the group's geographic location and ethnic characteristics.

Carpathian Rus' is a borderland of borders (see Map 1). Through or along its periphery cross geographic, political, religious, and ethnolinguistic boundaries. Geographically the crest of Carpathian mountains forms a watershed, so that the inhabitants on the northern slopes are drawn by natural and man-made communicational facilities toward the Vistula-San basins of the Baltic Sea. The inhabitants on the southern slopes are, by contrast, geographically part of the Danubian Basin and plains of Hungary. Politically, during the long nineteenth century (1770s–

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[3] Benedict Anderson's now well-known concept of imagined communities and its relationship to the post-1989 Carpatho-Rusyn revival is discussed with provocative irony and insight by British and German specialists of central Europe. See Timothy Garton Ash, "Long Live Ruthenia!," *New York Review of Books,* 22 April 1999, repr. in his *History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Despatches from Europe in the 1990s* (London: Penguin Press, 1999), 376–82; and Stefan Troebst, "Russinen, Lemken, Huzulen und andere: Zwischen regionaler Identitätssuche und EU-Ost-Erweiterung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 16 January 2001, repr. in his *Kulturstudien Ostmitteleuropas: Aufsätze und Essays* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2006), 361–66.

[4] All 1,100 settlements (with their various names) are listed in Paul Robert Magocsi, *Our People: Carpatho-Rusyns and Their Descendants in North America,* 4th rev. ed. (Wauconda, Ill.: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2005), 110–206; they are mapped in idem, *Carpatho-Rusyn Settlements at the Outset of the 20th Century with Additional Data from 1881 and 1806,* 2d rev. ed. (Ocala, Fl.: Carpatho-Rusyn Research Center, 1998).

CARPATHIAN RUS': POLITICAL CHANGE SINCE 1918

MAP 2

Historical-political boundaries

to 1918 (Austrian Galicia and Hungarian Kingdom)
1918-1938
1939-1944
1945 – present

Slovakia-Subcarpathian Rus'
Nazi Germany-Soviet Union 1939-1941

Carpatho-Rusyn settlement, 1920

■ District centers in Poland (powiat), Slovakia (okres), and Ukraine (raion)

× Settlements with Rusyn minority self-government, 2009

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1918) Carpathian Rus' was within one state, the Habsburg Monarchy, although it was divided between that empire's Austrian and Hungarian "halves" by the crests of the Carpathians. Since 1918 its territory has been divided among several states: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Slovakia, and for a short period Nazi Germany and Hungary (see Map 2).Carpathian Rus' is located along the great borderland divide between Eastern and Western Christianity, spheres that some scholars have described as Slavia Orthodoxa and Slavia Romana.[5] Most of the region's Rusyn inhabitants fall within the Eastern Christian sphere, although they are in turn divided more or less evenly between adherents of Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy. However, the religious landscape is not limited to Greek Catholic and Orthodox Christians, since traditionally within and along the borders of Carpathian Rus' have lived Roman Catholics, Protestants (Reformed Calvinists and a lesser number of Evangelical Lutherans), and a large concentration of Jews of varying orientations—Mittnaggedim, Reformed, and, most importantly, Hasidim.

Carpathian Rus' is also an ethnolinguistic borderland. All of Europe's major ethnolinguistic groups converge in Carpathian Rus', whose territory marks the farthest western extent of the East Slavic world and is bordered by West Slavic (Poles and Slovaks), Finno-Ugric (Magyars), and Romance (Romanians) speakers. The Germanic languages have also been a feature of the territory's culture, for until 1945 ethnic Germans (Spish and Carpathian Germans) and many Yiddish-speaking Jews lived in its towns and cities and also in the rural countryside.

Finally, there is another border running through Carpathian Rus', which, to date, has received no attention in scholarly or popular literature but is nonetheless of great significance. This might be called the socioclimatic border or, more prosaically, the tomato-and-grape line. It is through a good part of Carpathian Rus' that the northern limit for tomato and grape (wine) cultivation is found. Whereas south of the line tomato-based dishes are the norm in traditional cuisine, before the mid-twentieth century that vegetable was virtually unknown to the Carpatho-Rusyns and other groups living along the upper slopes of the Carpathians. The absence of grape and wine cultivation north of the tomato-grape line has had a profound impact on the social psychology of the inhabitants of Carpathian Rus'. A warmer climate and café culture has promoted human interaction and social tolerance among Carpatho-Rusyns and others to

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[5] The Italian Slavist Riccardo Picchio developed these concepts in his "Guidelines for a Comparative Study of the Language Question among the Slavs," in *Aspects of the Slavic Question*, vol. 1, 1–42, ed. Riccardo Picchio and Harvey Goldblatt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984).

the south. By contrast, those living farther north are apt to spend less time outdoors; and when they do interact in social situations, the environment is frequently dominated by the use of hard alcohol, which in excess provokes behavior marked by extremes of opinion, short tempers, and physical violence. Like all attempts at defining social or national "characteristics," this assessment is based largely on impressionistic observation and therefore is liable to oversimplification.[6] Nevertheless, further empirical research should be carried out to define more precisely the exact location of tomato and grape cultivation, describe the resultant interregional differentiation in food and drink, and, more importantly, determine how those differences affect the social psychology of the Carpatho-Rusyns and other inhabitants of Carpathian Rus'.

Carpathian Rus', therefore, certainly qualifies as a borderland par excellence. How, then, does it relate to the following themes: (1) the use of multiple constructs to define identity; (2) the development of ethnic and national identities; (3) the role of the state; and (4) the historical context of ethnic violence.

Multiple Constructs to Define Identity

Elsewhere I developed a conceptual model for analyzing national movements among stateless peoples that contrasts the idea of a hierarchy of multiple identities versus mutually exclusive identities.[7] The case study to which I applied this model concerned Ukrainians during the long nineteenth century, but I believe it can also be used to understand the evolution of most other stateless peoples in Europe.

I would argue that having multiple identities is the norm for most individuals in developed and developing societies. In other words, each individual has several potential identities from which to choose: a village, town, or city of residence; a region or state; a religious orientation; and a language and/or ethnic group. Some of us also have strong loyalties and identity with the university we attended (there was a time when someone from Harvard was indeed different from a graduate of Yale or Princeton, not to mention a graduate from a state university) or with the

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[6] An early attempt at describing the differences in cuisine and the socio-psychological characteristics of Carpatho-Rusyns is found in Sándor Bonkáló, *A Rutének (Ruszinok)* (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat, 1940), 70–101; English trans.: Alexander Bonkáló, *The Rusyns* (New York: Columbia University Press and East European Monographs, 1990), 57–84.

[7] The conceptual framework was first laid out in my article "The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* (Charlottetown) 16, nos. 1–2 (1989): 45–62; it is fleshed out in greater detail in chapters 25–34 of my *History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 305–457.

clubs to which we belong, or with our sexual preference, especially if it is not heterosexual, or with sports clubs that we may support.

By way of illustration, I share a personal note. I can remember growing up in a part of New Jersey just opposite that state's largest suburb, New York City. Immersed in that environment until I was twelve years old, I had one primary identity. Whenever I was asked about it, I responded that I was a Brooklyn Dodger fan—more precisely, a vicarious Brooklyn Dodger.[8] This was a clear identity associated with certain personality traits that were demonstrably different from those of someone who identified with the rival New York Giants or the hated New York Yankees. My parents and grandparents were all living, and I had no experience of personal loss. The first such experience came in 1957, when the Dodgers left Brooklyn. In a sense, my "national" identity was taken away, not by some governmental decree or by planned ethnocide but by greedy businessmen who saw that a bigger buck could be made by going to a "foreign country"—Los Angeles. My point is that it is perfectly normal for individuals to have more than one identity, and the decision about which one to choose depends on the circumstances in which an answer to the question is needed. Put another way, situational identity is the handmaiden of multiple identities.

For self-proclaimed members of a nationalist intelligentsia, the very idea of multiple identities is an anathema. What in most circumstances might seem a normal phenomenon—such as a pre–World War I resident of Macedonia identifying as a Macedonian and Bulgarian (or Macedono-Bulgarian), or a resident of nineteenth-century Ukraine as a Little Russian (or Ukrainian) and Russian—is totally unacceptable to nationality builders, who feel it their duty to make persons aware of belonging to only a single nationality, in this case Macedonian *or* Bulgarian, or Ukrainian *or* Russian. Hence national identities should not be viewed as part of a hierarchy of multiple loyalties; rather, national identities, and by corollary language use, must be mutually exclusive.

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[8] Lest this example be perceived as idiosyncratic, it should be noted that there is an extensive literature on the Brooklyn Dodger phenomenon in twentieth-century American culture. Many consider the classic work on this topic to be Roger Kahn, *The Boys of Summer* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), but to my mind the best of all is the elegantly written autobiographical essay by a devoted female follower of the Dodger cult and native of Brooklyn, the distinguished American political scientist Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Wait Till Next Year: A Memoir* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997). Others who capture the psychology of "Dodgerness" very well include Peter Golenbock, *Bums: An Oral History of the Brooklyn Dodgers* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1984); Harvey Frommer, *New York City Baseball: The Last Golden Age, 1947–1957* (New York: Atheneum, 1985); and Bob McGee, *The Greatest Ballpark Ever: Ebbets Fields and the Story of the Brooklyn Dodgers* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005).

Much of the history of Carpathian Rus' from 1848 to the present is a story of how the local nationalist intelligentsia has struggled—often in vain—against the natural tendency of the local Carpatho-Rusyn inhabitants to maintain more than one identity, or, in some cases, no national identity at all. In the eyes of the nationalist intelligentsia, such persons are unenlightened, or assimilationists, or, worse still, enemies of the nationalist cause.

The Development of National and Ethnic Identities

Questions regarding national and ethnic identity began to be raised in Carpathian Rus' during the 1830s and 1840s. The year 1848 was an important turning point for those discussions. During the next two decades Carpatho-Rusyns experienced their first national awakening.[9] Theirs was a classic national awakening—albeit on a small scale—of the central and eastern European variety. A small group of intellectuals, what we now call the nationalist intelligentsia, published the first books and newspapers in the native language; they founded organizations, village reading rooms, and schools in which the native culture and language were propagated; and they submitted petitions to the ruling Habsburg authorities calling for cultural and political autonomy based on territorial and/or corporate-group rights.

To be sure, not all members of the intelligentsia—who at the time were mostly priests—favored the idea of promoting the local East Slavic Rus' culture. Many preferred to associate instead with the dominant nationality of the state, which before 1918 meant identifying as a Hungarian or, in the case of Carpathian Rus' territory north of the mountain crests, as a Pole.

As for those who believed in the desirability of association with the East Slavic and Eastern Christian world, the road to a clear national identity remained fraught with obstacles. Like many intellectual leaders among stateless peoples, Carpatho-Rusyn national activists lacked pride and confidence in their own culture. Hence it seemed easier to associate with an already existing East Slavic nationality and language. In essence, during the first national awakening in Carpathian Rus' (ca. 1848–68), national activists proclaimed themselves to be of Russian or Great Russian nationality; they tried to use the Russian literary language in their publications and for instruction in schools; and they tried to convince the

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[9] For details on this awakening, see Ivan Žeguc, *Die nationalpolitischen Bestrebungen der Karpato-Ruthenen, 1848–1914* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965); and my book *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848–1948* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), esp. 42–75.

local Carpatho-Rusyn inhabitants to adopt a Russian national identity. These early national awakeners, led by figures like Aleksander Dukhnovych and Adolf Dobriansky, were partly successful in having a Russian national orientation accepted by the generation that was to follow them. By the 1890s, however, some younger intellectual activists (again mostly priests) argued that Russian was far from the dialects spoken by the East Slavs of Carpathian Rus' and that instead the local vernacular should be standardized and used as the representative language of the region's inhabitants. It was never made clear, however, what that local language should be and what alternative, if any, there should be to the Russian national identity.

The problem of ethnic, national, and linguistic identity became more complex after World War I, when Carpathian Rus' was divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Russian national orientation continued to be propagated by certain local activists, who were joined by postwar émigrés of Russian orientation from the former Habsburg province of Galicia (by then in Poland) and from the former Russian Empire (by then the Soviet Union). Among such émigrés were figures like the "grandmother" of the Russian Revolution, Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia, who considered Carpathian Rus' the last land where the spirit of Russia was preserved in pristine form.[10]

Émigrés with an Ukrainian orientation from Polish-ruled Galicia and from the ethnic Ukrainian provinces of the former Russian Empire also came to Carpathian Rus'. They found a few supporters among local Carpatho-Rusyns, and they also educated many more young people in the belief that the East Slavic inhabitants of Carpathian Rus' were ethnic Ukrainian, that is, the same people as the Ukrainians of Galicia and elsewhere in Ukraine—and certainly not Russians.

Before long some local activists expressed dissatisfaction with the Russian-Ukrainian dichotomy and argued that the East Slavs of Carpathian Rus' were neither Russian nor Ukrainian, but rather a distinct nationality called Subcarpathian Rusyn, Carpatho-Rusyn, or simply Rusyn. The result was that the entire period of what became known as the second national awakening, lasting from 1918 to 1939, was characterized by a fierce ideological rivalry between supporters of three national and

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[10] This attitude was best summed up in the words of another Russian émigré : "I remember with fascination how a few years before the [First] World War I learned that Russians live in Carpathians!... From that moment I felt inside of me an urgent desire to get to ... Subcarpathian Rus', to learn more about this land, to see its people in their everyday life, and to hear a Russian song sung in the Carpatho-Russian land" (Konstantin P. Belgovsky, "Krai russkii—krai nevedomyi: Vpechatlieniia iz Podkarpatskoi Rusi," *Staroe i novoe* [Tallinn], 1932, no. 3: 177).

linguistic orientations: the Russophile, the Ukrainophile, and the Rusynophile.[11]

As we have seen, the Russophile orientation was the oldest, having dominated the first national awakening and persisting through the second. It was the first orientation to disappear, however, so that during the third national awakening, which began in 1989 and continues to the present, there are only two orientations: the Rusynophile and the Ukrainophile.

The Role of the State

Carpathian Rus' has always been part of one or more state structures. Therefore it should come as no surprise that the ruling authorities have always expressed an interest in the question of national identity among Carpatho-Rusyns.

During the last seventy years of Habsburg rule (1848–1918), the attitude of the state went through several phases. The first two decades of so-called Habsburg absolutism were marked by the central authorities' efforts to control and even suppress nationalities having strong political ambitions, such as the Poles in Galicia and, especially, the Magyars in the Hungarian Kingdom. As a counterweight to the Poles and Magyars, the Habsburgs supported the national-enlightenment efforts among the East Slavs of Galicia and the Hungarian Kingdom, including Carpathian Rus'. In 1868, however, the Habsburg authorities reached an accommodation with the Magyars and Poles, who consequently regained their position as the dominant political and social groups in, respectively, Hungary and Austrian-ruled Galicia. This political change had a particularly negative impact on Carpathian Rus' lands in Hungary, where until 1918 the local intelligentsia and school system became subject to a policy of Magyarization intended to eliminate all remnants of East Slavic culture.

The situation changed radically with the collapse of Austria-Hungary in late 1918 and the division of Carpathian Rus' territory between two new postwar states: Czechoslovakia and Poland. Czechoslovakia was especially favorable toward the Carpatho-Rusyns, who, alongside the Czechs and Slovaks, became one of the founding peoples of the new state. Rusyns living south of the Carpathians voluntarily proclaimed their desire to join Czechoslovakia, and at the Paris Peace Conference that desire was confirmed with guarantees for "the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the Czecho-Slovak state."[12] A distinct adminis-

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[11] For details on these controversies, see my book *The Shaping of a National Identity,* 105–87.

[12] *Traité entre les principales Puissances alliées et associées et la Tchéco-Slovaquie* (Paris,1919), 26–27.

trative entity called Subcarpathian Rus' (Czech: Podkarpatská Rus) came into being in the far eastern end of Czechoslovakia. Although the Czechs never fulfilled their promise to grant it autonomy, the province was nominally a Rusyn territory with its own governor and with Rusyn as the official language used in schools and alongside Czech in government administration.

With regard to the national identity of Rusyns and the closely related language question, the Czechoslovak authorities proclaimed neutrality. In practice, however, they supported the Ukrainophile, Russophile, and Rusynophile orientations at different times, as warranted by political circumstances.[13] By the 1930s, when Czechoslovakia was in a desperate search for allies against revisionist Nazi Germany and Hungary, the territory of Subcarpathian Rus' took on a special geo-strategic importance. It was the only direct territorial link to Czechoslovakia's fellow Little Entente allies, Romania and Yugoslavia. Therefore the authorities in Prague gave greater support to the Rusynophile orientation, hoping to consolidate the formation of a distinct Carpatho-Rusyn nationality that would have no political interests beyond the borders of Czechoslovakia.[14]

Notwithstanding the change in government policy, the Russophile and Ukrainophile orientations did not disappear. On the contrary, the Ukrainian orientation continued to increase its grassroots support among various segments of the local Rusyn population, especially young people. So much was this case that during the few months following the September 1938 Munich Pact, when Czechoslovakia was transformed into a federal state and Subcarpathian Rus' finally received its long awaited autonomy,

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[13] For details, see my book *The Shaping of a National Identity,* 191–233.

[14] Czechoslovak rule was successful to a degree in creating a sense of Carpatho-Rusyn distinctiveness. Part of this process was related to the group's ethnonym. The term *Rusyn* had also been used by the East Slavs of Galicia and Bukovyna until at least 1918; thereafter, most Galician and Bukovynian East Slavs adopted the ethnonym "Ukrainian," arguing since then that it is the modern equivalent of the older name "Rusyn.". The Rusynophiles of Carpathian Rus', both during the Czechoslovak period and subsequently under Hungarian rule, used the term "Rusyn" (or "Carpatho-Rusyn," "Subcarpathian Rusyn," and "Uhro-Rusyn") in the sense of a distinct, fourth, East Slavic nationality. Carpatho-Rusyn national specificity was also helped by the appearance of several synthetic surveys propagating the view that Carpatho-Rusyns had a distinct historical, literary, and artistic tradition. See, e.g., Yrynei M. Kondratovych, *Ystoriia Podkarpatskoî Rusy dlia naroda* (Uzhhorod: 1924; 3rd ed., 1930); Evgenii Nedzelsky, *Ocherk karpatorusskoi literatury* (Uzhhorod: Podkarpatorusskii narodoprosvietitelnii soiuz, 1932); [Stepan Dobosh], *Ystoriia podkarpatoruskoi lyteraturŷ* (Uzhhorod: Regentskii komissariiat, 1942); and A. Yzvoryn [Evgenii Nedzelsky], "Suchasni ruski khudozhnyky," *Zoria/Hajnal* (Uzhhorod) 2, nos. 3–4 (1942): 387–418 and 3, nos. 1–4 (1943): 258–87.

the Ukrainian orientation soon dominated the region, which was renamed Carpatho-Ukraine.

Carpathian Rus' territory within interwar Poland fared somewhat differently. The local Rusnaks, who by the outset of the twentieth century had adopted the name "Lemko" as an ethnonym, had at the close of World War I hoped to unite politically with their Rusyn brethren south of the mountains in Czechoslovakia. It was in fact Lemko leaders who first formulated a clear territorial definition of Carpathian Rus' and submitted memoranda with maps to the Paris Peace Conference, calling for its independence or autonomous status within a neighboring state.[15] The Lemko demand for union with Czechoslovakia was rejected, however, by both Rusyn leaders south of the Carpathians and by President Masaryk in Prague. Not wanting to be ruled by Poland, Lemko activists created an "independent" republic that lasted for about sixteen months, until in March 1920 the area was brought under Polish control.[16]

Lemko opposition to Polish rule was quickly overcome—and without bloodshed. During the interwar years the Russophile and Ukrainophile orientations were present in what became known as the Lemko Region of Carpathian Rus'. Ever fearful of the Ukrainian problem within its borders, the Polish government began openly favoring any national orientation among Lemkoss as long as it was not Ukrainian.[17] Initially it preferred those Lemkos who assimilated to Polish culture. For those who did not, the government permitted school programs in which the Lemko-Rusyn vernacular was taught, and it welcomed the Vatican's decision in 1934 to create a separate Lemko Greek Catholic church jurisdiction that was decidedly not Ukrainian in orientation.[18] The result of these efforts

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[15] Anthony Beskid and Dimitry Sobin, *The Origin of the Lems, Slavs of Danubian Provenance: Memorandum to the Peace Conference Concerning Their National Claims* (Prešov: National Council of Carpatho-Russians at Prešov, 1919).

[16] For details on the little-known Lemko Republic, see Bogdan Horbal, *Działalność polityczna Łemków na Łemkowszczyźnie, 1918–1921* (Wrocław: Arboretum, 1997); and my article "The Lemko Rusyn Republic, 1918–1920 and Political Thought in Western Rus'-Ukraine," in my book *Of the Making of Nationalities There is No End,* vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press and East European Monographs, 1999), 303–15.

[17] For details on Polish policy toward the Lemko Region during the interwar years, see Jarosław Moklak, *Łemkowszczyźnia w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej: Zagadnienia polityczne i wyznaniowe* (Cracow: "Historia Iagellonica," 1997).

[18] The new jursidiction was known as the Lemko Apostolic Administration. It was called into being because of the Vatican's concern about the large-scale defections of Lemkos to Orthodoxy. The "return to Orthodoxy" was, in part, a reaction by Lemkos against the Ukrainian national orientation of the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Peremyshl (Przemyśl), of which the Lemko Region had been a part. The Vatican hoped that if they had their own ecclesiastical jurisdiction headed by Rusynophile (and Russophile) prelates, the Lemkos

was the creation of a generation of individuals who believed they were part of a distinct Lemko nationality.

The relatively liberal environment of the interwar years came to end with the onset of World War II. Subcarpathian Rus' was reannexed by Hungary, which banned the Ukrainian orientation, barely tolerated the Russian orientation, and openly supported the idea that the local East Slavs formed a distinct "Uhro-Rusyn" nationality loyal to the Hungarian state. North of the mountains the Ukrainian orientation was given a new lease on life by Nazi Germany, which incorporated the Lemko-inhabited part of Carpathian Rus' into the Third Reich's Generalgouvernement of Poland.[19]

The apex of state intervention in the nationality question was reached at the close of World War II. By 1945 former Czechoslovak Subcarpathian Rus' was annexed by the Soviet Union, while the other two parts of Carpathian Rus' remained within Poland (the Lemko Region) and Czechoslovakia (the so-called Prešov Region of northeastern Slovakia). The Soviet regime resolved the nationality question according to principles adopted by the Communist Party (of (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine in December 1925. Despite what the inhabitants of Carpathian Rus' may have called themselves or believed themselves to be—Rusyns, or Rusnaks, or Carpatho-Russians, or Uhro-Rusyns—they were formally designated as Ukrainians. The use of Rusyn as a nationality descriptor was simply banned. When, in 1948, Czechoslovakia became a Communist-ruled state, within a few years it adopted the Soviet model for Carpatho-Rusyns living in the northeastern corner of Slovakia. By 1951 the Rusyn population there was administratively declared to be Ukrainian. In the decades that followed, the Communist authorities of Czechoslovakia, in co-operation with those local activists who gave up a Russian national identity for a Ukrainian one, introduced a policy of Ukrainianization in schools and cultural life. Those Rusyns who were opposed to such changes generally eschewed all further association with their East Slavic heritage and adopted a Slovak national identity and the Slovak language.[20]

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would feel they were still part of a Rus' rather than Ukrainian church structure.

[19] The Nazis allowed the formation of a Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow, which organized Ukrainian-language schools in the Lemko Region staffed largely by refugee Ukrainian nationalists fleeing from Eastern Galicia after that territory had come under Soviet rule in September 1939.

[20] For details on these developments, see Pavel Maču (pseud.), "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czehoslovakia," in my book *Of the Making of Nationalities There is No End*, 1: 242–89.

The nationality question among the Lemko Rusyns in Poland was resolved by state intervention in an even more drastic fashion. The Lemkos were simply deported en masse from their Carpathian homeland in two waves (1945–1946 and 1947), thereby fulfilling the Stalinist precept "if there's no people, there's no problem" (*net naroda—net problemy*).

The role of the state had a profound impact on the nationality question in Carpathian Rus' once again in the wake of the revolution of 1989 and the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. As part of the effort to overcome the shortcomings of the Communist past, post-1989 Poland, Czechoslovakia, and its successor states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, made it legally possible for people to identify themselves once again as Rusyns in the sense of belonging to a distinct nationality. Consequently, since 1989 Lemkos and Rusyns within Poland and Slovakia are officially recognized in census reports and receive state funds for education, publications, theaters, and other cultural events in the Rusyn language.

Independent Ukraine also styles itself as a post-Soviet democratic republic and does not restrict privately sponsored cultural activity carried out by individuals and organizations in Transcarpathia (formerly Subcarpathian Rus') who espouse the Rusyn national orientation. The government of Ukraine refuses, however, to recognize Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality and instead formally defines them as a "sub-ethnos" of the Ukrainian people.[21]

The Historical Context of Ethnic Violence

Carpathian Rus' has always been in an ethnically diverse part of Europe. To the northwest live Poles; to the northeast, Ukrainians; to the southwest, Slovaks; and to the southeast, Romanians. Carpathian Rus' itself, that is, the territory where Rusnaks/Rusyns have traditionally formed the majority population, has also never been ethnically homogenous. Living alongside Rusyns in villages, towns, and cities have been Magyars, Jews, Germans, Roma/Gypsies, Slovaks, Poles, Romanians, and, since World War II, Ukrainians and Russians. For illustrative purposes let us take one part of Carpathian Rus', the former Czechoslovak province of Subcarpathian Rus'. In 1930 its population of 725,000 was comprised of Rusyns (63 percent), Magyars (15.4 percent), Jews (12.8 percent), Czechs and Slovaks (4.8 percent), Germans (1.9 percent), and

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[21] The official Ukrainian position was formulated in a *Report Submitted by the Ukraine to the Council of Europe Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 2 November 1999*, in particular the appendix, "Ethnic Groups of the Nationalities of Ukraine," 137–40.

others (1.9 percent).[22] There was no less religious diversity, with Greek Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Judaism, Reformed Calvinism, and Evangelical Lutheranism serving one or more ethnic groups. Added to this mix are several Protestant and other Christian sects—Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses—whose numbers have grown rapidly in the post-Communist era.

Such ethnic and religious diversity often led to rivalry and ideological conflict. I have already mentioned the rivalry among the Russian-, pro-Ukrainian-, and pro-Rusyn-oriented intelligentsia, not to mention the displeasure toward all these orientations on the part of those individuals who opted out of an East Slavic identity and favored assimilation with the Magyar, Slovak, or Polish nationalities. The twentieth century was also characterized by frictions between adherents of Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Nearly one-third of the Carpatho-Rusyn population "converted" from Greek Catholicism to Orthodoxy in the decade after World War I. The resultant controversy between the two religious groups was less the result of liturgical or ideological differences than it was over church property. But perhaps the fiercest religious rivalries occurred among Jews, between the various Hasidic dynasties (the followers of rebbes Shapira, Rokeah, Weiss, and Teitelbaum being the most intolerant of each other) and between all the Hasidim, on the one hand, and the secular Zionists, on the other.

The rhetoric the defenders of these various national and religious orientations spewed out was strong, even venomous. Nevertheless, while some scuffles at the individual level may have occurred during public rallies on behalf of a specific national orientation or at protests on the steps of a church or a synagogue, there was never any organized violence pitting one group against another.[23] True enough, pre-World War I Hungarian state officials and local gendarmes acted with disdain toward Car-

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[22] *Statistický lexicon obcí v Zemi podkarpatoruské* (Prague: Orbis, 1937), xv.

[23] The one exception of "ethnically" motivated violence occurred among Carpatho-Rusyns themselves when, in 1930, a local student of Ukrainian national orientation at the Teacher's College in Uzhhorod, Fedor Tatsynets, attempted to shoot the Greek Catholic priest and respected patriarch of the Russophile orientation, Evmenii Sabov. The assassination attempt failed, and the student was briefly imprisoned. Tatsynets was persuaded to carry out the deed by one of his teachers at the Uzhhorod Teachers' College, Stefaniia Novakivska, a radical Galician Ukrainian nationalist, who was head of the recently founded Subcarpathian branch of the underground Ukrainian Military Organization based in neighboring Polish-ruled Galicia. Both Tatsynets and Novakivska were arrested and sentenced to several years in prison. Although local Ukrainophile leaders disavowed the act, it did suggest the extremes to which Ukrainian émigrés from Galicia might go in order to achieve their goals. On the "Tatsynets Affair," see Mykola M. Vegesh, ed., *Vony boronyly Karpatsku Ukrainu* (Uzhhorod: Karpaty, 2002), 522–27.

patho-Rusyns, but there was never any violence between Rusyn and Magyar villagers or townspeople who lived alongside them or nearby. And Carpathian Rus' is perhaps unique in central and eastern Europe in that there has never been an anti-Jewish pogrom of any kind there.

This is not to say that there was never any violence directed against ethnic or religious groups. There was, but in all cases it was inspired and carried out by the state. The worst fate has befallen that part of Carpathian Rus' inhabited by Lemko Rusyns in what is present-day southeastern Poland. During the first months of World War I, the Habsburg government became suspect of an estimated 2,000 to 5,000 Lemkos who, because of their Russophile national orientation, were arrested for alleged treason and incarcerated for most of the war in concentration camps set up in the western part of the empire.[24] Many died there from disease and malnutrition. Three decades later, at the close of World War II, Lemkos, along with other East Slavs in postwar Poland, were slated for resettlement as part of a "voluntary" population exchange with the Soviet Union. About 100,000 were deported eastward to Soviet Ukraine between late 1944 and 1946. Those who refused to go (about 60,000) were forcibly driven from their homes in 1947 and resettled in small numbers in villages and towns of postwar western and northern Polish territories (Silesia, Pomerania) that had belonged to prewar Germany.

There was also state-instigated violence against ethnic and religious groups in those parts of Carpathian Rus' located on the southern slopes of the mountains. Perhaps the first instance occurred on the eve of World War I, when the Hungarian government tried to stop the early stages of the Orthodox movement by arresting some of its adherents and subjecting them to a trial in which religious conversion was equated with treason against the state. It was the Jews in Carpathian Rus', however, who suffered the most at the hands of the state. In 1942 the Nazi administration killed or sent to the Bełżec death camp all Jews living in the Lemko Region. Then, in the spring of 1944, Jews were deported en masse to the death camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau by the governments of Hungary (from Subcarpathian Rus') and Slovakia (from the Prešov Region). As a result, no fewer than eighty percent of the Jews of Carpathian Rus' perished.

As World War II came to an end, it was the Magyars and Germans who became the objects of state violence. In Subcarpathian Rus', which was in the process of being annexed to the Soviet Union, all males of Magyar nationality between the ages of eighteen and fifty were arrested

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[24] The most infamous of the camps was at Thalerhof, a village in Austrian Styria now replaced by a runway of the airport in Graz.

and deported to forced-labor camps in the Gulag. About 5,000 of the 30,000 deported Magyars died while in incarceration. In 1946, by which time Subcarpathian Rus', renamed Transcarpathia, was formally part of the Soviet Union, all ethnic German males were deported to eastern Ukraine or to the Gulag's forced-labor camps. Between 1949 and 1950 the Soviet Union and its ally Communist Czechoslovakia outlawed the Greek Catholic Church and arrested all its bishops and many priests who refused to embrace Orthodoxy, the only Eastern Christian religion sanctioned by the state.

Despite these numerous examples of state-inspired violence in the Carpathian Rus' borderland, at the same time there has been a remarkable absence of inter-ethnic violence. Why is this the case? Possible answers to that question can only be of a speculative nature. I would suggest two factors: socioeconomic status and a common fear of the Other.

With regard to the socioeconomic factor, it should be noted that Carpathian Rus' has traditionally been an economically marginal rural area in which most inhabitants have survived as subsistence-level peasant farmers, herders, and loggers. Industry was virtually non-existent there until the second half of the twentieth century. In contrast to many other parts of Europe, where ethnic groups are in large part associated with certain professions and socioeconomic status, throughout Carpathian Rus' virtually all groups were engaged in agriculture and forest-related work. In other words, all of the region's peoples were equally poor. For example, it was just as common to find Jewish peasant farmers and woodcutters as Jewish proprietors of small retail shops and taverns. Germans and Magyars—the "superior" nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy—were also mostly peasant farmers and woodcutters in Carpathian Rus'.

Perhaps the only exception to this pattern occurred in the easternmost region of Subcarpathian Rus'. During the interwar years of the twentieth century, the Czechoslovak government encouraged nearly 30,000 Czechs to settle in the region and take up posts as government officials, teachers, physicians, businessmen, and other professionals. As an ethnic group the Czechs were clearly associated with one socioeconomic stratum that was quantifiably different (and perceived as such) from all other ethnic groups in the region.

Ironically, the Soviet regime after World War II also contributed to socioeconomic disparity based on ethnic differences. To staff the new industrial plants it built in the region, the Soviets initially brought in managers, technical specialists, and workers from elsewhere in Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union. Almost all these newcomers settled in Transcarpathia's few cities. Some locals may have resented this intru-

sion, since at least in the first years of Soviet rule the newcomers seemed to get the most lucrative jobs and positions in the regional administration and professional spheres. In the end, however, the downturn and eventual collapse of the Soviet economy created a situation in which the economic and social status of the postwar "newcomers" from other parts of the Soviet Union turned out to be equal or worse to that of the locals, who were able to depend on family property in villages and socioeconomic opportunities provided by kinship networks. While it is certainly true that the lack of any correlation between socioeconomic status and ethnic origin may not have eliminated envy on an individual level, it did help to avoid envy and hatred on a group level.

With regard to fear of the Other, at first glance this might be considered to be a factor contributing to inter-ethnic violence. The question here, however, is what, specifically, was the Other who produced fear? There were and still are many ethnic and religious Others in Carpathian Rus'. They are not unfamiliar, since ethnic interaction continually occurred in the workplace, village tavern and store, town market, and through the exchange of mutually symbiotic labor services (Christians cooked and cleaned for Jews on their Sabbaths; Jews operated stores and other services on Sundays). The comfort level on the part of the numerically dominant Carpatho-Rusyns toward other peoples in their midst was also enhanced by their on-going inclination toward maintaining multiple identities.[25]

The Other that all groups feared equally was the state. For people at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale—and this accounts for a significant portion of all ethnic groups in Carpathian Rus'—the state has always been a threat to the individual, whether in its role of collecting taxes or drafting young males into the army. As such, the state was to be avoided as much as possible. In that regard, the Magyar peasant was as fearful and probably as mistreated as the Rusyn peasant by the Hungarian gendarme. In other words, there was no "correct" ethnic identity that, in and of itself, could save one from the wrath of the state. Since, in general, most inhabitants of Carpathian Rus', regardless of their ethnic or religious background, were resentful and fearful of the state, it was diffi-

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[25] To be sure, local Carpatho-Rusyns were not enamored by the treatment they received from Soviet "Russian" officials and bureaucrats in the first years after 1945 annexation, or by the condescending attitude of Galician Ukrainians who considered—and still consider—Transcarpathia their land as much as they do Galicia or any other part of Ukraine. Nevertheless Carpatho-Rusyns who studied the Russian and Ukrainian languages and cultures, and who may have identified themselves in the past or present as Russians or Ukrainians, find it instinctively difficult to dislike fellow Transcarpathians from those ethnic groups.

cult, if not impossible, for the authorities to mobilize one group against another in its periodic campaigns of group-directed violence.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion it might be useful to assess the value of studying Carpathian Rus' in the context of borderlands. If, as many historians and social scientists have argued, east-central, eastern, and southeastern Europe is composed of borderlands characterized by ethnic, religious, or social violence, then is it possible that Carpathian Rus' is unique? I am skeptical about arguing for the uniqueness of any phenomenon, for other scholars can offer counter-examples. Yet even if it is not unique, we might agree that Carpathian Rus' is somewhat exceptional. To understand any norm, one needs to account for and explain the exceptions. If violence is considered the norm in ethnic relations, then Carpathian Rus' may be an example with which other case studies may be compared.

Beyond the Pale? Conceptions and Reflections in Contemporary Ukraine about the Division Galizien*

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While the quest for recognition of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) soldiers as Second World War veterans continues to provoke disputes in Ukraine, the position of former members of the Waffen SS Division Galizien, formed in 1943, is even more difficult. Its members were portrayed in Soviet propaganda as traitors of the worst sort: not only had they joined the German armed forces directly, but they had made common cause with the SS, an organization guilty of some of the most heinous crimes against humanity. This paper reviews contemporary Ukrainian discussions pertaining to the war years to give an indication of the division's current standing in Ukraine and the extent to which it has been embraced within a revised conception of national history in post-Soviet Ukraine. As the title of this paper suggests, the Division Galizien remains, for many, tainted by its collaboration with the German occupation. This paper will examine post-Soviet perceptions of the division and assess whether that situation is likely to change.

Several authors outside Ukraine have produced English-language monographs on the topic, and interpretations differ as to whether the division was simply an effort to form a national army directed solely against the advancing Red Army, or whether it represented a more sinister form of collaboration.[1] The division's official name was 14. Waffen-

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[1] See, e.g., Wolf-Dietrich Heike, *The Ukrainian Division 'Galicia', 1943–45: A Memoir* (Toronto: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1988); Taras Hunczak, *On the Horns of a Dilemma: The Story of the Ukrainian Division Halychyna* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2000); Michael O. Logusz, *Galicia Division: The Waffen-SS 14th Grenadier Division, 1943–1945* (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Publishing, 2000); and the very unsympathetic Sol Littman, *Pure Soldiers or Bloodthirsty Murderers? The Ukrainian 14th Waffen-SS Galicia Division* (Toronto: Black Rose Books, 2003).

Grenadierdivision der SS (galizische Nr. 1). It was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army (1. Ukrainische Division der Ukrainischen National-Armee) in March 1945. The division was formed as the Third Reich belatedly tried to solicit the military help of non-German nationalities (for example, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians and many others) after the defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad. The division's organizer was the Nazi governor of Galicia, Otto Wächter, who worked closely with the chairman of the Ukrainian Central Committee during the German occupation of Galicia, Volodymyr Kubijovyč, the latter seeking assurances that the unit would be used only against the Red Army. Though many thousands volunteered to join the division, its final contingent was around eighteen thousand troops, with three regiments of infantry, one of artillery, and one of training reserves. Many of its members, according to historians, were associated with the Melnyk faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-M), which had been prepared to co-operate with the German occupiers even after the Bandera faction (OUN-R) turned hostile.[2] The term "*galizische*" (Galician) was used because the Germans wished to avoid direct use of the more inflammatory "Ukrainian" and to ensure tighter German control. Attached to the German 13th Army Corps, the division was encircled by Soviet forces near Brody in western Ukraine in the summer of 1944 and routed. It was later reformed and transferred to Slovakia, and in March 1945 the Germans declared the formation of a Ukrainian National Army under General Pavlo Shandruk, to which the division was attached. With the defeat of Germany and the loss of the war in Europe, a large number of division troops fled westward and surrendered to British army in Austria. The POWs spent almost two years in Italy and were eventually permitted to enter the U.K. Subsequently, many immigrated from Britain to North America.[3] The division's members have not been found guilty of war crimes. Indeed, the Canadian government's Deschênes Commission investigated such allegations in 1985 and found no evidence to suggest that division members took part in atrocities, guarded camps, and the like.

In postwar Soviet Ukraine the division was portrayed in uniformly negative terms. Even with the liberalization of the Soviet press in the late 1980s, this image did not change in the mainstream media. One writer in *Pravda Ukrainy*, the long-standing newspaper of the Communist Party of

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[2] See, e.g., John-Paul Himka, "A Central European Diaspora under the Shadow of World War II: The Galician Ukrainians in North America," *Austrian History Yearbook* 37 (2006): 19.

[3] <http://encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\D\I\ DivisionGalizien .htm>

Ukraine, for example, expressed fury in May 1991 at news of the erection of a memorial in the village of Yaseniv, Brody raion, Lviv oblast, that included the names of the division members. The author maintained that the Germans had used the division as an instrument of terror against those who defied German rule, and he cited a chronicle alleging that the division had murdered Polish civilians in the vicinity of Ternopil. The author also claimed that archives revealed the story of a special commando unit from the division that killed 1,500 civilians in Lviv, shot Soviet POWs in Zolochiv, burned the settlement of Olesko, and caused the deaths of three hundred inhabitants. Additionally, he accused the division of rounding up people for slave labor in Germany. All the commanding positions in the division, this same article noted, were held by Germans, and SS chief Heinrich Himmler had expressly forbidden the use of the term "Ukraine" and its derivatives when creating the unit.[4]

Indeed, Ukrainians today appear divided in their views on the division, the motives behind its creation, and whether they were justified. In mid-June 1992 *Literaturna Ukraina* opened the debate by publishing an interview with a veteran of the division, Ivan Oleksyn, then president of the Ukrainian Fraternal Association in the United States and a man known at the time for providing aid to the victims of the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. The interviewer cited earlier comments in the newspaper *Visti z Ukrainy* (Kyiv) from 1979–80, which had referred to Oleksyn as an "SS-ite" and a "Nazi stool pigeon." He then added the following by way of introduction: "Today most of our people know what the UPA fought for. But an understanding of what led Ukrainians into regular military formations needs to be developed." Oleksyn explained that when the war began in Galicia, some people developed the idea of creating the UPA, and others, the division. Both the OUN-M and OUN-R backed the UPA in order to mount a struggle against both enemies (Germany and the Soviet Union). Others believed that since Ukrainians would not receive assistance from other states, it would be impossible to fight on two fronts. They favored forming a military unit within the German army—there was no alternative, Oleksyn emphasized.[5]

As the interview continued, Oleksyn was asked what the SS denotes in Waffen SS Division Galizien. He responded that it did not have that name, but was the First Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army (in fact, it took that name only in 1945) and that Ukrainian troops

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[4] K. Doroshenko, "Pamiatnik fashistskim prikhvostniam," *Pravda Ukrainy*, 25 May 1991.

[5] Yurii Pryhornytsky, "Ivan Oleksyn: Use zhyttia borovsia za Ukrainu. Dyviziia 'Halychyna'. Yak tse bulo," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 18 June 1992.

did not wear SS insignia on their uniforms. Its true goal, in contrast to that depicted in Communist propaganda, was the struggle for Ukraine, to free it from the "Bolshevik yoke." According to Oleksyn, each member considered himself an heir of the mantle of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen of the First World War and had no wish to assist the Germans. Many division troops died at Brody because the Germans retreated after the first engagement, leaving the division to face the Red Army. Toward the end of the war, the division found itself in Austria, close to the border with Yugoslavia. But no one believed it was really the end of the war. Everyone "was convinced" that the United States would refuse to countenance the Soviet takeover of Central and Eastern Europe. After the 1945 Yalta summit, however, people recognized that a new situation had arisen. Subsequently the remaining division members were interned at the large British POW camp in Rimini, Italy.

As for the UPA, Oleksyn said that "we supported it" and that many division members eventually found their way into its ranks. When asked about his and his associates' attitude to Hitler, Oleksyn responded that they did not believe that Hitler could win the war. If matters had developed differently, then the division might have turned its arms against the Germans, except the latter had convinced the Ukrainians that they supported the idea of the liberation of Ukraine. Later, "when we realized that Hitler had other plans," many members went into the UPA and fought on two fronts.[6] The interview clearly stretched the bounds of credibility at times. One wonders how in the summer of 1943 it was possible to believe that Hitler and the Germans supported the concept of Ukrainian independence. By this time both leaders of the OUN were confined in Sachsenhausen, the abortive declaration of independence in June 1941 was becoming a distant memory, and the concept of new collaboration was clearly induced by the changing circumstances of the war, that is, with the Germans retreating and the Red Army advancing rapidly.

An article in the same issue of *Literaturna Ukraina* by another veteran of the division, Vasyl (Wasyl) Veryha, a Canadian citizen, former editor of *Visti kombatanta* (Veterans' News, 1965–74), and author of several books on the history of the Division Galizien, continued the theme. The "insurgency of the '*Halychyna* rifle division'" in the summer of 1943, when Ukraine was completely occupied by German forces and "Red Moscow imperialism," Veryha contended, should be regarded as a continuation of the Ukrainian people's struggle for sovereignty. Young Ukrainians, especially in the western territories, had been educated in the traditions and legends of the "War of Liberation" of 1918–21. In 1941,

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6   Ibid.

when war broke out again, "all Ukrainians," he claimed, sympathized with the Germans. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in the Red Army crossed the border to the German side, believing that the time had come to fight for Ukrainian independence. However, by the end of 1941, according to Veryha, it became clear that an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state was not part of German plans. Ukraine had been turned into an exploited colony under the guise of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, which was administered from the town of Rivne. On 2 February 1943, following the German defeat at Stalingrad, Ukrainians again faced the question "What is to be done?" In the following month the German administration of Galicia took account of the fact that Ukrainians were prepared to take up arms in the struggle with Bolshevism and turned to the Ukrainian Central Committee under Kubijovyč. The Germans proposed to create a Ukrainian military formation, one division in size. While it is true, noted the author, that the Germans made the proposal for their own political ends, leading Ukrainian circles accepted it for their own ideological reasons. A partisan struggle could not continue without a regular army, and Ukrainian leaders—especially veterans of the struggle of 1918–20—maintained that Germany would either have to conclude a peace that allowed it to keep some of the regions it had occupied, or to collapse, leaving behind a chaotic situation in Eastern Europe.[7]

How did Ukrainians respond to this challenge? As Veryha explained, the division was meant to serve as a Ukrainian people's army to restore and strengthen an independent Ukrainian state, on the model of the Sich Riflemen during and after the First World War. At the very least, it was evident that Ukrainians required an armed formation to protect people and property from the Germans and before the possible chaos of a revolution. A request was made to the Germans that the division be used on the Eastern Front against the Bolsheviks, and never against the Western Allies. It was clear, he writes, that the division was not part of the structure of a German New Europe, but operated only in the interests of the Ukrainian people. Ukrainian military leaders, for example, had approved contacts with the Western Allies. The division was met with hostility by the Soviet partisans under Sydir Kovpak and by the Polish Government-in-Exile. However, according to Veryha, young Ukrainians supported it because it was Ukrainian, not because it was part of the SS. Again the question was asked: why the SS designation? Veryha responded that the division was given this name "against the will of the Ukrainians." But it was only a formal title and had no links with Nazi ideology or implications of subordination to the Nazi Party. Officially its title was Waffen SS

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[7] Vasyl Veryha, "Im prysvichuvala velyka ideia … Dyviziia 'Halychyna', iak tse bulo," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 25 June 1992.

Grenadierdivision rather than SS Grenadierdivision, as was traditional for German units. Its soldiers did not have the right to wear the SS emblem, Veryha stressed, and bore the blue-and-yellow colors of Ukraine.[8]

Six months later, on the fiftieth anniversary of the division's formation, *Literaturna Ukraina* returned to the subject with an article by Yurii Pryhornytsky, a Ukrainian journalist and author from Kyiv. Until recently, he observed, little had been known in Ukraine about the division. The association with the Germans was enough to frighten some people, eliciting feelings of righteous anger. But "sooner or later reality will become more ambivalent," he predicted. The division was never part of the German Army, but the question remained whether Ukrainians had taken up arms on behalf of an alien occupier who wished to enslave their country. On the basis of materials published in the West, Pryhornytsky concluded, that question could be answered in the negative. He cited a 1990 brochure published in Toronto and New York that explained the context in which the division was created—the brutal massacre of political prisoners by the Soviets as they retreated in the wake of the German invasion in the summer of 1941; and fear of the ruinous nature of Russian Communism and the harm it could inflict on Ukraine.[9] Thus, while German rule had brought few benefits, some Ukrainians had not wanted to miss an opportunity to create a strong, modern, and well-trained Ukrainian military unit within the German armed forces that could constitute the core of a future Ukrainian army. Pryhornytsky further argued, with reference to the book by Wolf-Dietrich Heike,[10] that the training was also of benefit to the UPA, which used division soldiers as military instructors. Various commissions subsequently investigated the division for potential war crimes, he noted, but none were uncovered. They included the Porter Commission (1947) in the United Kingdom, which resolved that in spirit Ukrainians were anti-fascists. Indeed, the veterans of the First Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army were planning to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of its formation in Toronto, reported Pryhornytsky. While there were people in Ukraine who remained hostile to the veterans, a majority, Pryhornytsky believed, would understand the quiet, restrained remembrance of the anniversary.[11]

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[8] Ibid.

[9] The reference is not cited in full, but it is most likely *Ukrainska dyviziia "Halychyna": Materiialy do istorii* (Toronto: Brotherhood of Soldiers of the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army, 1990).

[10] Heike, The Ukrainian Division 'Galicia'.

[11] Yurii Pryhornytsky, "Shcho ikh velo u dyviziiu?" *Literaturna Ukraina*, 14 January 1993.

Other authors were even more forthright in their defense of the division. In a 1993 article in the Lviv newspaper *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, one author insisted that the division was not collaborationist, but fought for Ukrainian independence. Unlike German SS units, the division did not commit war crimes—Soviet propaganda in this regard was nothing more than the fabrications of a hostile power trying to discredit any force that challenged its authority. Why did they join the Germans? This author concluded that they had no choice. The clash of two imperial powers demanded armed resistance, and "the UPA could not take everyone." The opportunity was therefore taken to train cadres. The division received the blessing of the respected metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Andrei Sheptytsky,[12] and the author tells of one division soldier who saved thirty peasants from German reprisals.[13] Another author writing in the same newspaper later that year demanded the rehabilitation of the division: it was a combat unit, its SS affiliation was a formality, and it did not commit war crimes. Many people joined for patriotic reasons, this author asserted.[14]

Not everyone agreed with this assessment. In Kyiv there was a campaign to ban celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the division. One author, Danylo Kulniak, writing in the nationally distributed newspaper *Ukraina moloda*, deliberately distinguished between the original 14. Waffen-Grenadierdivision der SS (galizische Nr. 1)—which he thought had "compromised itself" as a tool in the hands of the Germans—and the reformed First Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army. The later formation, in his view, was more worthy of Ukrainian national aspirations. As for the Waffen SS division, it had been organized by the "collaborationist" Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow. German attempts to recruit members, this author alleged, had fallen flat, and young people had to be drafted by force. There was a high rate of desertion and a lack of commitment to serve under the German banner. Explaining why there had been so many volunteers, however, the author adds that a majority of recruits *did* believe that they were fighting for the national interests of Ukraine.[15]

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[12] Metropolitan Sheptytsky had been opposed to the OUN for many years. His attitude changed in 1938, when a Soviet agent assassinated the head of the organization. Evhen Konovalets, and Andrii Melnyk, the head of the Orly Catholic Association of Ukrainian Youth, was elected to replace him. See, e.g., Kost Bondarenko, "Istoriia, kotoruiu ne znaem ili ne khotim znat?" *Zerkalo nedeli/Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 29 March–5 April 2002.

[13] Oksana Snovydovych-Maziar, "To chy buly vony kolaborantamy?" *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 8 June 1993.

[14] Yaroslav Yakymovych, "Z zhertovnym stiahom ikh zvytiah," *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 21 August 1993.

[15] Danylo Kulniak, "Esesivska chy 'Persha ukrainska'? Z pryvodu odnoho iuvileiu,"

What should these young people have done? In Kulniak's view, the only true act of patriotism would have been to join the UPA to fight both the Soviets and the Germans. In this way the author denounced both the Ukrainian Central Committee and the members of the OUN-M who collaborated with the Germans, thereby giving impetus to Soviet propaganda and the unfortunate phrase "Ukrainian-German nationalists." (The many examples of collaboration by the OUN-R were conveniently omitted from his critique.) The author then quoted several insurgents who criticized the formation of the division. However, it was now time, Kulniak declared, for reconciliation between the remaining division veterans and those Ukrainians who had advanced from the east but failed to bring democracy, statehood, and well-being.[16]

The attitude of this author might be described as reluctant acceptance of people who went astray. It was a far cry from the position taken by *Za vilnu Ukrainu,* which wrote unabashedly about the heroism of division fighters. In 1994, for example, the newspaper published Ihor Fedyk's vivid account of the Battle of Brody, portraying it as a time when the division's morale was especially high as it launched its defense of the motherland against the "Bolshevik onslaught" (no doubt including Ukrainians who also thought they were freeing their motherland!). During the first hours of its deployment at the front, the division was subject to constant air strikes. On 13 July 1944, as Fedyk explained, the Red Army began its offensive. Between 15 and 18 July, despite heroic resistance, the division was encircled, together with the 13th German Army Corps, near several villages. In each village the conflict continued, and many of the soldiers who fell into Soviet captivity were executed. About 7,000 division soldiers died, and almost 3,000 of those who could not break out of encirclement joined the UPA. A further 3,000 did break out and retreated with the Germans, forming the Second Ukrainian Division on Austrian territory. Fifty years earlier, Fedyk stressed, Ukrainian soldiers had died fighting for the freedom of Ukraine, and their sacrifice was not in vain. "The echo of their valor, enshrined in our memory for fifty years," could now be heard in independent Ukraine.[17]

In a similar vein another Ukrainian-Canadian veteran of the division, Vasyl Sirsky, asserted that patriotism could not be measured by the uniform a soldier wore. The volunteers for the division, he argued, joined up under German auspices because they were conscious of the need to fight for Ukraine. He expressed resentment at the way the UPA was constantly

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Ukraina moloda, 3 September 1993.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ihor Fedyk, "Vystoialy; prorvalysia!" *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 14 July 1994.

glorified at the expense of the division's soldiers. Politicians and professors who seemed "allergic" to the German army, he claimed, should remember that such renowned generals as Myron Tarnavsky and Roman Shukhevych had begun their military careers in German-sponsored units (the former in the Austrian army, the latter in the Nachtigall Battalion). Yet UPA veterans, Sirsky complained, evaluated the division negatively and derided the commemoration of its "martyrs." The seven thousand lives lost at Brody, he believed, had saved the lives of thousands of Ukrainians who managed to flee to the West. This compared favorably with the millions of casualties caused by the actions of the UPA, including the deportations of family members to Siberia. In the 1940s older and more experienced people had doubts about the creation of the UPA, regarding it as tantamount to national suicide. Time had shown that they were correct.[18] This angry diatribe, which took the form of a review of a book about the division by the Ukrainian-American professor Taras Hunczak, thus deepened the debate. The author was not simply asking that division veterans be recognized alongside the UPA as genuine Ukrainian heroes, but rather insisting on the replacement of the latter with the former as more deserving.

These comments echoed an anonymous article that had appeared in *Za vilnu Ukrainu* a year earlier, in August 1993. Explaining the difficulty of organizing Ukrainian military formations in the Distrikt Galizien, the article focused on Volodymyr Kubijovyč, head of the Ukrainian Central Committee and a key figure in the formation of the division. When approached by Governor Wächter, the Ukrainian side, led by Kubijovyč, issued a list of demands: that the division must be used only against the Bolsheviks; that its officers must be Ukrainian; that the name and insignia should be Ukrainian; that the division had to be subordinate to the Wehrmacht; and that its formation had to constitute the first step toward the creation of a Ukrainian national army. However, as the anonymous author noted, the Germans broke this agreement and subordinated the division to the SS. The division's members, the author claimed, were hostile to Nazi ideology, but they faced the prospect of slave labor in Germany if they refused to join.[19]

In another article in *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, Mykhailo Yatsura described Kubijovyč as a Ukrainian patriot who was conscious of German goals and willing to promote a Ukrainian agenda. He was also aware of the expansion of the UPA insurgency in Volhynia and therefore initially cautious about accepting Wächter's proposal to form a Ukrainian military

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[18] Vasyl Sirsky, "Knyha, iaka vymahaie dyskusii," *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 29 July 1994.

[19] "Ishly u bii za svoiu peremohu," *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 7 August 1993.

unit under German auspices. According to Yatsura, Kubijovyč preferred to retain some control over the division's formation and therefore presented his set of demands, which the Germans largely ignored. In Yatsura's account, there was no question that the initiative came from the Germans and that they would probably have attempted to form a Ukrainian division even without Ukrainian assistance.[20]

In recent years there have been further attempts to shed more light on the division and explain the motives of its creators with greater clarity and sympathy. In 2001, Ivan Haivanovych published an article, "Ne nazyvaite 'SS'!" (Don't Call It the 'SS'!) in *Ukraina moloda,* in which he decried the lack of objectivity on this subject in contemporary Ukraine. While the legacy of the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1918 has been publicly acknowledged and there has been a growing understanding of the "OUN-UPA,"[21] the division remains falsely accused of collaboration. Haivanovych argued in favor of situating the division in its proper historical context, stating that the key question is why Galicians volunteered en masse to join it. He claimed that by 18 June 1943 there were eighty-four thousand volunteers. In his view this was a reaction to the repressive policies of the Soviet regime, including mass deportations and the NKVD murders of 1941. Nazi propaganda had some appeal to the population, but there was disappointment over the German failure to recognize an independent Ukraine on 30 June 1941. So why did Ukrainians continue to turn to the Germans? The answer, according to Haivanovych, was that after the Battle of Stalingrad joining up with the Germans was the lesser evil. The article included an interview conducted in 1993 with a former division recruit, Roman Debrytsky, who asserted that the only alternative was forced labor in Germany (an argument discussed earlier). Debrytsky described the war as a tragic period in which Ukrainians had to fight one another. He and his comrades fought with SS weapons, but, he insisted, they remained patriots.[22]

In a follow-up article in *Ukraina moloda* in February 2001, Ivan Krainii claimed that most allegations regarding war crimes the division committed derived from Polish memoir literature. He argued that these sources were unconvincing and called for an unemotional examination of

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[20] Mykhailo Yatsura, "Professor Kubiiovych i Dyviziia 'Halychyna,'" *Za vilnu Ukrainu,* 30 September 1995.

[21] The Kyiv historian and journalist Kost Bondarenko has pointedly noted that the OUN and the UPA were two distinct organizations with very different structures, strategies, and leaders, and that the conflation of the two is unjustified. See Bondarenko, "Istoriia, kotoruiu ne znaem."

[22] Ivan Haivanovych, "Ne nazyvaite 'SS'!" *Ukraina moloda,* 30 January 2001.

the division's legacy. Krainii advanced the case for rehabilitating the division, citing the example of the Baltic countries, where four similar Waffen SS divisions were organized. The public perceived division members as traitors and collaborators largely as a result of Soviet propaganda. Only in 1990 did some émigré memoirs about the division arrive in Ukraine. The most ominous problem, according to Krainii, centered on the two letters "SS." However, he wrote, the division belonged to the Waffen SS and was intended as a battle unit, and members of the Ukrainian Central Committee had insisted that it be a Ukrainian formation. The author interviewed a former member, Volodymyr Malkosh, who revealed he had joined the division because of his strong anti-Soviet sentiments and nationalism. As Malkosh tells it, he had two roads open to him—joining the UPA or the division. He chose the latter because he felt it would be the basis of a future Ukrainian national army and was fearful "warlike neighbors" would lay claim to Ukraine's territory. After the division's defeat at Brody, Malkosh remained in the area of Soviet occupation. He entered the Lviv Polytechnical Institute in 1946 but was arrested when the authorities noticed the Waffen SS ID number tattooed on his arm;he was sentenced to fifteen years in the Gulag.[23] Krainii's account differed notably in the way he described the choices facing Ukrainians in 1943. Whereas other authors had suggested the alternative to joining the division was forced labor in Germany, Krainii maintained the choice was between joining the division or the UPA. Other authors have argued that joining the division enhanced opportunities for ending up in the ranks of the insurgents. Evident here is a political division among rank-and-file nationalists whose long-term goal was an independent Ukrainian state. In other words, those who joined the division were influenced by political leaders with very different views from those of the OUN-R.

This latter interpretation also found favour with Kost Bondarenko, a Ukrainian journalist, historian, and student of Ukrainian nationalism. In a wide-ranging article titled "Istoriia, kotoruiu ne znaem ili ne khotim znat?"/"Istoriia, iakoi ne znaiemo. Chy ne khochemo znaty?" (The History We Do Not Know. Or Would Prefer Not To Know?), published in *Zerkalo nedeli/Dzerkalo tyzhnia* in 2002, he analyzed the formation of the division in the context of the ongoing rivalry between the OUN-M and the OUN-R. The origins of the division dated from 1941, when the Germans announced the goal of establishing the SS Division Sumy, to be recruited from Ukrainian POWs, with further efforts in the Carpathians

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[23] Ivan Krainii, "Za shcho voiuvala dyviziia 'Halychyna'?" *Ukraina moloda*, 7 February 2001.

in 1944.[24] Bondarenko claimed that when German leaders made the decision to create the Division Galizien, they were of the opinion that Galicians and Ukrainians represented two racially different nations. They felt that the former were "practically Aryans," and this myth was the basis on which the division was formed. (Presumably, however, if the Germans intended to establish a division made up of Ukrainian POWs, then the Aryan issue might have been a secondary factor.)

Until the summer of 1944, Bondarenko noted, the UPA was not active in Galicia, where a limited form of Ukrainian administration (the Ukrainian Central Committee) continued to exist. (At the time, UPA military operations were centered in Volhynia and Polisia.) The OUN-M considered that the division afforded soldiers of the future national army a good opportunity to gain skills and experience. The OUN's Bandera faction, on the other hand, resented its creation. The division's top commanders were German, while the troops wore German uniforms with the coat of arms of Galicia (a yellow heraldic lion) and blue-and-yellow insignia. The troops took an oath of allegiance to Ukraine, which, Bondarenko believed, later saved the division's soldiers and officers from retribution: they were found not guilty of war crimes after the conflict. In 1944 the division was almost completely destroyed, and its remnants were transferred to southern Poland and subsequently to Slovakia and Yugoslavia, where they were merged with the Volhynian Self-Defense Legion in the spring of 1945. In April of that year the division's soldiers surrendered to the British in Austria. They were not subject to repatriation because the Western Allies, unlike the the USSR, considered them Polish subjects.

Conclusion

At the time of writing, there have been no serious attempts to revise thinking on the question of the Division Galizien in Ukraine. It remains the most controversial of all the ethnic formations of the interwar and war years, not least because historians, as well as members of the OUN and UPA, insist that the recruits had an alternative. The division was undoubtedly part of the German war effort, whether or not members joined with other motives. The SS appellation would already have had sinister connotations among the population. It seems fair to say that the situation for the young recruits was extremely problematic, with none of the possible options offering any prospect of easy existence. Before long a new option—joining the Red Army—would also become a possibility. On the other hand, the severe criticism emanating from some veterans of the

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[24] Bondarenko, "Istoriia, kotoruiu ne znaem."

UPA also seems unjustified, since UPA insurgents were also prepared eventually to reach a new modus vivendi with the retreating Germans as they faced the advancing Red Army.[25] However, it could be argued that the UPA did not operate as a military formation on the German side and always maintained its independence.

Thus the Division Galizien represented more of a last hope of co-operation with the Germans on the part of the Ukrainian Central Committee and the OUN-M, both of which had favored collaboration and continued to work with the Germans even after the nature of the Nazi occupation had become evident.[26] Undoubtedly, life for Ukrainians under the Generalgouvernement was much more tolerable than in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The question, though, is whether such relative moderation could justify the establishment of a Ukrainian military formation on the German side and on the Germans' initiative, particularly at such a late stage of the war, when it appeared to most observers that a German defeat was simply a question of time. It represented poor judgment and naiveté on the part of Kubijovyč and others, and after more than sixty years the motives of the Ukrainian Central Committee, in particular, seem just as inexplicable as they did at the time. No doubt the debates will continue, but for the present, independent Ukraine, which has recognized a genocidal famine in 1932–33 but failed to reach a consensus on the status of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, is unlikely to embrace the Waffen SS Division Galizien.

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[25] According to a former UPA soldier, Professor Emeritus Peter J. Potichnyj, commenting during the discussion at the Symposium on Ukraine in World War II on 29 November 2006 (cf. n. 1 above), this decision represented a logical choice since the Germans were clearly retreating from Ukrainian territory, whereas the Red Army was regarded as the future and more dangerous occupying power.

[26] On this issue, see, e.g., John-Paul Himka, "*Krakivski visti* and the Jews," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 21, nos. 1–2 (summer–winter 1996): 81–96.

З листування Адама Киселя

о. Юрій Мицик

Адам Кисіль (1600–53) — визначний політичний і державний діяч Речі Посполитої — відіграв як дипломат надзвичайно важливу посередницьку роль в історії Національно-визвольної війни українського народу 1648–1658 рр. Хоча про нього постійно згадували у своїх працях історики України та Польщі, але фундаментальне дослідження його політичної біографії створив тільки в наш час проф. Франк Сисин[1]. Він же, інтенсивно і систематично попрацювавши в архівосховищах різних країн, виявив низку документів та листування А. Киселя і опублікував деякі з них, продовживши кращі традиції української археографії[2]. Думається, що цей доробок Ф. Сисина в подальшому ляже в основу його публікації повного зібрання документальної спадщини А. Киселя, необхідність в якому давно назріла.

Зі свого боку відзначу, що під час пошуку джерел з історії Національно-визвольної війни мені траплялися документи (переважно листи), що належали перу А. Киселя або ж були йому адресовані[3]. Варто навести тут деякі з тих листів А. Киселя за 1648–

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[1] *Sysyn Frank E.* Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil 1600–1653. — Cambridge, Mass., 1985.

[2] *Idem.* Documents of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj // Harvard Ukrainian Studies. — Т. 2. — № 4. (грудень 1978) — С. 500–24; *idem.* Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility's Grievances at the Diet of 1641 // Harvard Ukrainian Studies. — Т. 6. — № 2 (червень 1982). — С. 167–90; *idem.* The Khmelnytsky Uprising and Ukrainian Nation-Building // Journal of Ukrainian Studies. — Т. 17. — № 1–2 (1992). — С. 141–70. Ряд листів від і до А. Киселя були видані українськими археографами, вперше І. Крип'якевичем та І. Бутичем (Документи Богдана Хмельницького. 1648–1657 рр. — К., 1961). Див. також публікації, здійснені польськими археографами: *Szajnocha K.* Dwa lata dziejów naszych. 1646, 1648. — Т. 2. — Lwów, 1869; *Grabowski A.* Ojczyste spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski. — Т. 2 — Kraków, 1845.; Księga pamiętnicza Jakuba Michałowskiego. — Kraków, 1864; і *Rawita-Gawroński F.* Sprawy i rzeczy ukraińskie. — Lwów, 1914.

[3] *Мицик Ю.* Три неизвестных письма Богдана Хмельницкого Адаму Киселю 1649 г. // Советские архивы. — 1982. — № 4. — С. 45–47. Було видано також лист комісарів Речі Посполитої (Адам Кисіль, Миколай Кисіль, Якуб Зелінський) до короля Яна Казимира, писаний 8 березня 1649 р. з Гощі за списком з Державного

1651 рр., які ще не були введені у науковий обіг, щоб прискорити цим майбутню публікацію його епістолярної спадщини А. Киселя.

Нижче наводяться десять листів А. Киселя, в т. ч. чотири у вигляді реґестів. Ці листи Кисіль адресував авторитетним діячам Речі Посполитої: королеві Янові Казимиру, великому канцлеру коронному Єжию Оссолінському, коронному підканцлеру Єронімові Радзейовському, коронному стражнику князеві Александрові Замойському, також кам'янецькому старості (майбутньому великому гетьманові коронному) Станіславові Лянцкоронському, князю Янушеві Радзівілу. Листи, адресовані Киселю писалися генеральним писарем Війська Запорізького у 1649–57 рр. (майбутнім гетьманом України) Іваном Виговським та Станіславом Лянцкоронським, а також незнаним ближче адресатом. Три перші листи у даній публікації стосуються подій 1648–49 рр. Йдеться зокрема про маловірогідні перспективи продовження перемир'я з українськими повстанцями, про місію польського посла-агента Смяровського, про пересилання Киселем листів Богдана Хмельницького, врешті про бунт проти Хмельницького, який підняв на Січі Худолій. У подальших розповідається про дипломатичні взаємини Чигирина з Варшавою, Стокгольмом, Москвою та Бахчисараєм, про початок військової кампанії 1651 р. (битва під Красним, під час якої війська польного гетьмана коронного Марціна Калиновського розбили сили брацлавського полковника Данила Нечая і загинув сам полковник; похід Калиновського на Вінницю; бої на Поділлі). Тут містяться важливі оригінальні звістки, які дозволяють доповнити картину подій Національно-визвольної війни.

Сподіваюсь, що наведені нижче матеріяли будуть корисними не тільки при підготовці видання спадщини А. Киселя, але й всього корпусу джерел з історії Національно-визвольної війни українського народу 1648–58 рр.

Документи

№ 1

1648, березень. — Реґест листа брацлавського воєводи А. Киселя до короля Владислава IV

"... Про те, що діється в Україні, не сумніваюсь, що ваша королівська мость, мій мостивий пан, зволиш мати часті відомості від пана

архіву у Кракові (Ф. "Зібрання Піночі". — № 363. — С. 262–63): *Мицик Ю. А.* Три листи до історії Хмельниччини з архівосховищ Польщі // Доба Богдана Хмельницького. — К., 1995. — С. 265–72. Див. також *idem.* Два публіцистичні трактати про причини Національно-визвольної війни українського народу середини XVII ст. // Український історичний журнал. –1999. — № 6. — С. 122–35.

краківського [М. Потоцького. — *Ю. М.*]. Але що є у мене, найменшого слуги вашої королівської мості, мого мостивого пана, повідомляю …"

Повідомлення про переговори з московським урядом. "Дали мені відповідь, що їхній цар, дуже люблячи свого брата, великого вашого господаря" [Владислава IV. — *Ю. М.*], задля утвердження союзу призначає князя Борисовського [?] [борисівського воєводу (?). — *Ю. М.*] і Подбєльського [?], котрі мають з усім військом іти вам на допомогу проти спільного ворога. Потім прибув князь Борисовський [?], гетьман московський, з Криму — нового великого города, до прикордонного гетьмана, обізвався до мене і усно через присланих бояр сказав, що має 12 тисяч ратних людей царських дворян і понад 16 тисяч драгунів. Щодо цієї відомості, то посилаю оригінал грамоти. Татари, взявши відомість про готовність військ з обох боків і про нашу спільну згоду й пильність, не посміли виконати своїх замислів. Однак військо вашої королівської мості, мого мостивого пана, залишається в Україні, дивлячись на подальші їхні замисли, щоб нам давали знати.

Надійшла скарга від чотирьох воєвод [?]: охтирського, ольшанського, бобрицького і недригайлівського, що з нашого боку не ліквідуються пасіки за межами кордонів, на царській землі. Я відписав їм, дивуючись тому, де це мало б бути, згідно з їхніми листами, адже ми пильнуємо, щоб не були порушені Поляновські пакти.

Я зносився потім з паном краківським щодо збереження миру.

Вчора від тих же московитів, від сівського воєводи, мені була прислана відомість про те, що калмицька орда прийшла з-за Дону до Криму у кількості 30 тисяч. Їхнім вождем є Байчин-тайша. Що нового буде, напишемо: чи з Кримом пішла воювати ця віддалена орда, чи на допомогу кримським, тоді вони підуть або на молдавського господаря або на нас. Я негайно дав знати про це мостивому пану краківському, а цю грамоту посилаю вашій королівській мості, моєму мостивому пану.

Козацькі бунти, котрі здавалось заспокоїлись, начебто знову починаються, про що ваша королівська мость, мій мостивий пан, зволиш зрозуміти з листа його мості пана краківського, також і про те, як зрадник Хмельницький починає чинити якісь конспірації з ордою.

Мова йде також про пана Воронича.

Відділ рукописів Яґеллонської бібліотеки у Кракові. — № 49. — С. 435. Копія др. пол. XVII ст.

№ 2

1648, червня 18. — Гусятин. — Лист А. Киселя до невідомого з викладенням чуток про вбивство турецького султана Ібрагіма I і позиції щодо українських подій великого візира Османської імперії

Nie mogąc się nic pewnego z Ukrainy doczekać, to, co mam, przesyłam. Twierdzą za rzecz pewną, że cesarza tureckiego janczarowie zabili, zaczym wezyr nie wie, co z sobą ma czynić, posłał do chana, aby zaraz nazad powracał.

Nie pomałe dziwują się temu, że na hetmanów, którzy na wskromienie kozaków poszli, nastąpili, koniecznie tedy, aby te strate im nagradzał i rozkazał, aby kozaków wszystkich powiązawszy, do Porty przywiodł, jako rebelizantów królowi swemu, dokładając tego, jeślibyś tego nie uczynił, hardłem zapłacisz. Daj że Panie Boże, aby w skutku samym to było. Spodziewam się co godzina z Ukrainy, gdyżem tam swoich posłał, cokolwiek wiadomości mieć będę, nie omieszkam oznajmić.

ДА у Кракові. — Ф. "Зібрання Русецьких". — № 41. — С. 19. Копія др. пол. XVII ст. Тексту документа передує заголовок, зроблений копіїстом: "Copia listu jeo m. p. starosty bracławskiego z Husiatyna d. 18 czerwca 1648 pisanego".

№ 3

1649 [?], березня 23. — Київ. — Реґест листа А. Киселя королеві Яну Казимиру

1 березня я прибув до Києва. Велике військо йде на Україну. Вся старшина збіглась до Києва. "На Запорожжі був обізвався другий гетьман, якийсь Худолій [Hudoli], і підняв бунт, через що підупав авторитет Хмельницького у черні". Найголовніша їхня вимога — ліквідація унії на Україні. Була рада черні. Перед цим Хмельницький їздив до Переяслава і Києва. Скоро буде нова рада, гетьман буде їх умовляти; чернь вимагала, щоб він прийняв їх до ради. Козаки оточили замок [у Києві]. Гетьман, постерігши заворушення, замість того, щоб їсти у мене обід, наказав осавулам, полковникам і татарам, котрих він мав при собі, розігнати це заворушення. Сам же, тільки відвідавши мене, вирушив назад. На другий день гетьман бачився зі мною секретно і присягався, що ні про що нове не буде зі мною вести переговори. Він залишив при собі 10 тисяч війська на випадок, якщо поляки нападуть. Була вість гетьману про того Худолія, котрий підняв бунт і вчинився другим гетьманом. Через це Хмельницький не хотів суперечити черні. Ті люди, котрих він послав на Запорожжя, хапали бунтівників і приводили їх до Чигирина. Комісарам козаки не хотіли давати провіанту.

Відділ рукописів бібліотеки Чарторийських у Кракові (далі — ВР БЧ). — № 378. — С. 640–42. Копія XVIII ст. з рукопису бібліотеки Т. Чацького. Не виключено, що датування листа у копії є помилковим, оскільки дослідники відносять повстання Худолія до березня 1650 р.

№ 4

1649, квітня 15. — Гоща[?]. — Реґест листа А. Киселя до великого коронного канцлера Єжия Оссолінського

14 квітня до мене прибув пан чернігівський підстолій і виїхав до Хмельницького. Я не маю копії листа і не знаю з чим він їде від короля.

Він має повернутися перед святами, "бо Хмельницький в Чигирині, від котрого вчора мені принесено листа". Тепер з Гощі до Чигирина дороги на півтора тижня, а "там за тиждень, дай Боже, щоб взяв кращу експедицію, якщо їхати назад якнайшвидше, то з Чигирина до Варшави буде два тижні".

Далі йде розповідь про план встановлення миру під час переговорів. Я знаю, що Хмельницький "це обережний птах". Посилаю копії листів Хмельницького до вашої мості, до того ж "і той лист, котрий мені вчора від нього принесено". Якщо Хмельницький буде громадити військо у полях, то треба, щоб королівське військо пішло до Паволочі.

ДА у Кракові. — Ф. "Зібрання Піночі". — № 363. — С. 287–93. Копія др. пол. XVII ст.

№ 5

1649, квітня 24. — Гоща. - Лист А. Киселя до великого коронного канцлера Єжися Оссолінського про мирні переговори з українськими повстанцями.

Jaśnie wielmożny mci panie kanclerzu wielki koronny, wielce mci panie, panie i bracie.

Już tylko cztery niedziele do świątek mamy, aniżeli na ten list mój respons mieć będę od w. m., m. m. pana, za te dnie zostaje dwie niedzieli, o którym czasie już albo na commisią wieżdżać, albo wojska w pola wywodzić potrzeba, przetoż niż de summa rerum (po wielu listach moich) ten list mój do w. m., m. m. pana, pisze i na ostatnie rezolucye oczekiwać będę, tam bowiem już czas nastąpi agendi non consultandi. Zaczynam stąd pisanie moje, albo odprawiony będzie pan Smiarowski, albo zatrzymany, czego się obawiam, gdy znowu z jakiejkolwiek okaziej nastąpiła w Podolu kłótnia, jeżeli zatrzymany będzie, nic wiedzieć nie będziemy. Chmielnicki wpadszy w furyą hostilia molietur, jeżeli też tak discretny będzie Chmielnicki i czerń jego (od której on dependet), że i extra periculorum zostaje pan Smiarowski i odprawiony będzie, że trójga przyniesie jedno albo (co daj Panie Boże) chwyci się tego sposobu, który mu onym conceptem moim (który posłałem w. m., m. m. panu) intimowałem, że wojsko w polach za włością własnych kozaków oddaliwszy się od pospolstwa nie należnego sporządzać będzie i żeby wojsko j. k. m. zbliżyło się ku Pawołoczy, przecież nie będzie, albo też swoją zwykłą subtelnością przydzie, odpisze, że nie mógł dufać ani się tedy oddalić za włości i gniazda [...]* zechce, ani od siebie amovere multitudinem plebis armatae, ani permittet wojska j. k. m. zbliżni się, a to już będzie pewna conjectura wojny nie traktatów albo też jeżeli mu się nie pomieszało, co w ludze z ordą śmiercią Tohajbejową ima premeditatis hostilitatem arripiet occasionem duplici congressu naszych, w Podolu violati armistici i nie tylko odprawi z furią, ale ją zaraz wywrze, bo już przy tak mokrym maju w polach trawy dawno pełno i konie ordzie wypasają się. Nic czwartego sobie obiecować nie możemy, tylko ex his tribus praemissis, jedno jeżeli Pan Bóg wstąpi w serce Chmielnickiego, że się owego pierwszego

sposobu chwyci, już czas będzie zaraz i komissarzów od j. k. m. naznaczonym najdali przed świątkami pułtora niedziel ruszyć się i wojska, jeżeli zaś hostilitas wynurzy się albo jawna, albo skrzyta, że choć łagodnie odpisze, a to tam multitudinem tratiet [?] (co będzie nieomylnym wojny argumentem) już trzeba tejże godziny tak, jaką pisał, mając tu wojska praesto hetmanowi czułemu prevenire i zamieszać pierwy, aniżeli się to mnostwo skupi, te pollisszą plebem i dissipare vires nieprzyjacielskie, racz że w. m., m. m. pan, uważyć te krótkość czasu, już kiedy Chmielnicki czekać świątek będzie, tedy my te dwie z gotowością wystarczyć już będziemy mogli, kiedy jeszcze commissarzów naznaczonych pares negotio bacze, ani wojska, które jest na papierze w computach, widze, ani tego komu by summa rerum polecona była widze, tu mamy któremu by tu już być potrzeba było, praeparanda praeparare et facienda facere, a jeżeli jeszcze lacessiti będąc temu utarczkami wywrą furią i nastąpią potężnie (o co nie trudno).

Ma je⁰ mci pana kamienieckiego pierwej, niżeli pana Smiarowskiego odprawią, w jakiej nas gotowości zastaną, sam w. m., m. m. pan, racz uważyć, aby i ja teraz tu na łasce Bożej zostawą, któremu albo wojsko przed sobą mieć potrzeba, albo samemu do wojska za Horyń retirować się, łecz że to zaraz byłoby znakiem, że albo co myślimy hostile przeciw kozakom, albo się ich boimy, zostawam cum summo periculo na kożdy dzień, obawiając się, strzeż Boże, impetu jakiego od hultajstwa, którem zewsząd circumspectus jestem. To tedy wszystko przełożywszy w. m., m. m. panu, o jaką najprętszą j. k. m. resolutią i declaratią prosze raz [?], co mam sam czynić, czy z teo tu strażnice zjechać i umknąć się, czy spodziewać się wojska przed się, drugi raz prosze, niech w. m. czego się mamy wszyscy my, którzyśmy potracili substantie nasze i ojczyzny, spodziewać, gdyż nie możemy wiedzieć tego, żeby o nas ojczyzna radzić chciała, gdy tak szczupłe widzimy wojsko i niespore posiłki, obiecywano wojsko cudzoziemskie, tego nie słychać, computowano wojska polsk. dwadzieścia kilka tysięcy i to, gdzie jest, nie wiemy, ledwo go tu narachować możemy, pospolite ruszenie propter terrorum przynamniej miało by już i zbliżenie się j. k. m., pana naszego miłościwego, teraz żadne z tej consolaty nie mamy, a już czas to wiedzieć in effectu, bo nie tylko dimensio temporis do świątek tak każe, ale co dzień, co godzina przybiesie od potężnego i fortelnego nieprzyjaciela, wyglądać musiemy, obawiam się tedy, gdy tak szczupłe wojsko słyszemy, że ich mć naszy miłościwi panowie i bracia defensive stawając, siebie tylko chcą fueri, a my, niebożęta, cum nostris patrimonys, nie widząc sposobu recuperowania excludimur słaby, to jest fundament założony, żeby ich mć bez nas zatrzymać mieli, nunc moestram, a nigdy sławną na wszystek świat Rzeczpospolita już to nie Inflanty, niedobrze i bez tych ojczyznie, ale bez nas i ojczyzna nie ojczyzna będzie, wszak już za ten rok jeden jest proba jaka in nervo belli, a zatym i województwo medyetatem podatków rozumiałem, ja tedy, że gdym dał znać na conclusyą sejmu do kozaków, o tak wielkim i nagłym niebezpieczeństwie, iż ojczyzna wszystkie siły swoje poruszyć miała, extrema pericula, extremis nivibus chcąc superare alys, jakoby ordynarum jakie malum vox ordinarius curat remidys. Co to, strzeż Boże, rebelles staną napotym, te nasze zagarnęli kraje i hudoby pewnem, jeżli mi za ospałością ojczyzny dopuści Pan Bóg procedent, ale ja żalem wzniedzione comprimo pioro moje, a kącze

tym pisanie moje, opto non spero, żeby nam miało przyść do tractatów, wojny spodziewać się potrzeba, a zatym exoro supplex majestat j. k. m., m. m. pana, gdy mnie niedostojnego sługe swego utrapionej Ukrainy państw swoich chciał mieć pierwszym senatorem imieniem wszytkich utrapionych braci moich, aby cokolwiek jest wojska pieniążnego, dniem i nocą pośpieszyło i one już temu, komu summa rerum powierzyć chce j. k. m., dać w dispozycyą raczył, commissarze naznaczyć i już ich mieć expeditos a tak bym rozumiał conjungere functionem i rządów wojskowych i traktatu z nieprzyjacielem, gdy bowiem rzecz jest niepodobna, commissarzom już jechać na takie nie tylko connitia i despecty, ale też victae pericula, w jakich ja byłem, ani też to rzecz podobna, aby i wojna inaczej się mogła skączyć, tylko tractatam nihil aequiur, jako Chmielnicki multitudine wszystką kupiąc, na Rozawe ze commissią chce kączyć i wojsko sporządzać, że też j. k. m., pan mój miłościwy, da taką deslaratią, iż poszle commissarzów dwoch, a ci commissare oraz protunc i wojskiem rządzić będą i na te commissią z wojskiem poidom et cantare pares et respondere poiati; zechcą paccatus consilis mieć kozacy commissią deputowawszy z tegoż wojska szirać [starać (?)] się będą i moderować rzeczy, a potem sami concludują, jeżeli też tumultuose następować zechcą, Panu Bogu porzuciwszy krzywde ojczyzny w. m. repellere. Jakiego zaś wodza i commissarza unicum w. m., m. m. pana, wszystka ojczyzny i wszytko wojsko być upatruje, jeżeli w. m., m. m. pan, nie zechcesz ramion położyć swoich, pod ten ciężar dla utrapionej ojczyzny quis est ille, qui temu podołać może? Juro sacrosancte, żem to słyszał z ust Chmielnickiego i wszystkiej starszyny, gdym książęcia je⁰ miłości wojewody ruskiego regimentowi resisticio także do ostatniej krwie chcecie certare kogobyście radzi widzieli, a żebyście już arma ponere chcieli wszyscy clara voce protulerunt je⁰ mci pana kanclerza, gdy będzie commissarzem, a ty drugiem będzie zgoda tegoż i hetmanem być rozumiemy, a że niezmyślany ich mć pp. collegowie dabunt testimonium, lecz że ja nie mam, o czym Bóg Sam widzi i zdrowie skaleczone, gdyby j. mć., pan nasz miłościwy, w. m., m. m. panom, życzyć raczył i w. m., m. m. pan, nie chciał excusować dla ojczyzny i nas utrapionych sług swoich je⁰ mci pan bełzki z w. m., m. m. panem, odprawiłby, da Pan Bóg, szczęśliwie tę occazyą jak wojna ta jezli Pan Bóg dopuści, nie może się tyło tractatom kączyć, tak szczęście jej zawisło in summa prudentio, wodza rozumu, nie furyej potrzeba, wyglądamy tedy gratum nuntium, że j. k. m., pan nasz miłościwy, desideriis et votis nostris satisfaciet, a ja czegom już w przeszłych listach moich nie wyraził, tym terazniejszym jak do znoszenia się według czasu rozmierzonego, już ostatnim wyrazić ośmieliwszy się, jeżeli mie w czym zelus patriae uniosł impetro veniam, a siebie łasce w. m., m. m. panu, oddaje.

W Huszczy die 24 aprilis 1649.

№ 6

1649, червня 10. — с. Ярославичі в кількох милях від р. Горинь. — Лист А. Киселя до кам'янецького каштеляна Станіслава Лянцкоронського щодо мирних переговорів з українськими повстанцями

Dobrej speculatiej i zdrowej rady, to jest fortissimum argumentum, gdy exitus acta probat lubo w krótkim czasie maturescere nie mógli i sam czas późniejszy ich felicitatem comprobat, dobrze za łaską Bożą res succedunt, choć późno zaczęte, a stąd ktokolwiek w. m., m. m. panu, et meo obstitit voto, niech bierze miare jako bezpiecznejsze i szczęśliwej poszli by rzeczy były, gdyby w tę porę, która nam obiema jeszcze pogodnijszą et insta ([?]) zdała się bydź to żniwo zacząć się mogło. Ale podoba mi się w. m., m. m. pana, wysoka confidentia w Boskim miłosierdziu, nie mniej ochotą prudentia et dexteritate dobrze opatrzona przy odwadze zacnych i miłych braciej to wszystko, co czas przeszły uniosł wszechmocną dextera domini et fortis ojczyznie naszej recumpensabit. Jakoż już za łaską Bożą miedzy Horyniem a Słuczą sentim swawoleństwa tego zda się bydź całe uprzątniona ulteriora n[ost]ro est meum w. m., m. m. pp., którym salutem swoje i sławe ojczyzna oddała do rąk intimare consilia, bo przy wysokiej functiej ma w. m., m. m. pana, włożonej przydał Pan Bóg jako fortitudinis tak supremi consily assistentem angelum, życze jednak jakośmy obadwaj i zrazu życzyli przypiąc do Słucza castra, a tam już czekając na dalsze posiłki, ufortificowawszy obóz ustawicznemi czatami, obcinać skrzydła nieprzyjacielowi. W Bogu mam nadzieje, że jakośmy najdowali rebellem ciężkie żale nasze połykają, ultro offerendo pacem, a on nie znał się na szczęściu swoim, tak wejrzawszy P. Bóg na pokorę naszę, da to, że on jeszcze nas z pokojem szukać będzie, bo kiedy tak się uniżyła Rzeplta, że wszystko mimo się puściwszy, aby tylko do dalszego krwie rozlania i zniszczenia nie przychodziło, wszytko czyniła, co rebellis żądał. A przecie nie mogło przyjść (o com się ja, mając to sobie concreditum et commissum od króla j. mci, pana mego, wszystkiemi sposobami, które jeno mógł rozum subministrare) starał do uspokojenia liquet silentibus nobis, a to, a nie insza Boskich wyroków ratio, iż nie chciał Pan Bóg, aby ołtarzów jego świętych, zmazanie hrobów ojców i braciej naszej poruszenie i krwie szlacheckiej nie tylko przelanie, ale też zelżywość, absq ulla vindicta pojść miały, że tedy już się krew leje, sprawiedliwość Boska administrat justitium, a skoro expiata crimina będą, z jakiejkolwiek części uśmierzy Pan Bóg gniew swój świąty, da nam znowu melius et honestius valescere. Temperamentum zwłaszcza, gdy to będzie zachowano ze subiectis parcere et innocentibus a superbos et rebellos karać w. m., m. m. pp., będziecie, summum u mnie tej imprezy exioma, że jako nas nie kozacy, ani tatarowie tłumili, ale crimina n[ost]ra i przed majestatem Boskim delicta, za które ta plaga przepuszczona była na nas tak, gdy teraz in calamitate positi upokarzami się, a servi n[ost]ra insultant wierni, ale Sam Pan Bóg ich hardość, zdradę i złość wyuzdane karać będzie, Jemu to tylko tak Samemu oddać w ręce, Który dał obietnice mihi vindictam, jego retribuam illis, że jednak in hoc bello intestino nikt nie ginie cudzy, tylko swoi sine victus wszystko szkoda nasza, ojcom pogańskim lubo i pożądane

spectaculum, każe rozum, każe summinie zawsze, a zawsze życzyć i szukać pokoju. Posyłam ja w. m., m. m. panu i bratu, do rąk list mój, do Chmielnickiego pisany, śmiem prosić więźnia sprawnego, racz z nim wypuścić ta bezecna i zapamiętała plebs, widzi to, że n[ost]ro sequimurrabilem, ale zawsze życzymy, żeby się krew chrześciańska nie lała, ja zaś w tak zniszczonym zdrowiu moim, że penitus boses medefecerunt i nullum usum, iż mam a to lubo lecto effixus, ani do popielisk moich, oddalam się, ale tu czekając na szczęśliwe progressus ku Słuczy w. m., m. m. panu, zostawam w kilku milach od Horynia, lubo nie w swoim, ale w przyjacielskim domu, życze jako najprędzej do Hoszczy powrócić, a bydź intentus z collegami memi, na refleksią i recollectią Chmielnickiego, jeśli mu ją da Pan Bóg, a za to in mistico, co bywa in fisico, corpore rozerwie się gorączka, a ten człowiek, który teraz freneso careptus ad saniorem redibit mentem, znowu brat mój, j. m. pan chorąży, aby przy functiej commissarskiej nie opuścił i tej powolności, którą tam jest obowiązany. Jeśli tam notitia prior upamiętanie przydzie, aby mi dawał znać, properat pod szczęśliwy regiment w. m., m. m. pana, chorągiew swoje i moje chorągiew do usługi ojczyzny z własnej ochoty consecratam prowadzi. Przy tej że chorągwi mojej ordinowałem pocztę, abym w każdym tygodniu mógł mieć dwuch posłańców de felici progressu w. m., m. m. pana, która consecrasti ojczyznie, wywyszy i błogosławi Pan Bóg victorys i tryumphami, których już i ja cząstką będę, gdy i rodzony mój i ta garstka ludzi moich, w snopie regimentu szczęśliwego w. m., m. m. pana, zostawać będzie. Mnie zaś, że z woli Swej świętej Pan Bóg skaleczonym mieć chciał, pos ten czas prosequar votis, a już do zgody jeśli ją P. Bóg mieć zechce, prowadzić się każe, tym tedy teraz pisaniem moim kończę, siecz, byś mój zacny kasztellanic i kochany bracie, a zawsze chciej pokoju, sic bone cedet opus. Bądź za tym w. m., m. m. panem i bratem, a ja też w. m., m. m. panu, życzliwym zostaje bratem.

10 juny z Jarosławicz.

№ 7

1650, кінець квітня. — Регест листа А. Киселя до короля Яна Казимира

У квітну неділю прийшов лист. Є відомості про зносини московитів зі шведами і козаками, що є небезпечно для Речі Посполитої. У московитів і козаків одна віра, тому "я завжди боявся цієї ліги більше, ніж татарської", але сподіваюсь, що Бог цього не допустить. "До того ж козаки, котрі диригують цим натовпом, добре спілкуються з московитами, а московити з ними. Однак не думаю, що Хмельницький, котрий виконав присягу на підданство, діставши всякі бенефіції, зичивши бути [вірним] вашій

королівській мості, моєму милостивому пану, хоч він був від інших титулований, мав би кинутись на це".

Мова йде про переговори з Хмельницьким, на яких я добиваюсь, щоб він не взяв гору. Я дістав відомість, що московський гонець вирушив до нього. Мій колеґа, пан київський, взявши понад 10 моїх волохів, їде від мене цуґом аж до Чигирина. Мова йде і про царське посольство на чолі з Пушкіним до Польщі: "насамперед це субтельний чоловік Пушкін", треба з ним обережно поводитись, прийняти якнайліпше, але затримати до того часу, коли Хмельницький прийме рішення. Затримати ж під тим приводом, що "пана київського воєводу, через якого всі трактати і кордони ухвалені", зволив ваша королівська мость послати [в посольство]. Як тільки цей лист дійде до вашої королівської мості, то свіжою поштою зволь написати до мене і до Хмельницького у той сенс, що вже ваша королівська мость зволиш покласти на мене і на Хмельницького цілковите заспокоєння України.

ВР БЧ. — № 402. — С. 5–11. — Оригінал (?)

№ 8

1651, січня 23. — Гоща. — Реґест листа А. Киселя до коронного стражника Александра Замойського

Відповіді з Чигирина немає. Я чекаю інструкцій від короля. З Молдавії прийшла відомість, що весілля Тимоша Хмельницького відкладено, молдавський господар дав у заклад свого племінника та декількох бояр гетьману і вони вже в Чигирині. Мене непокоять дві речі: (1) Пириш-аґа [Pieri Aga] виконав присягу Хмельницькому від імені хана, а Хмельницький йому на непорушну дружбу; (2) турецького чауша відправлено відкрито, а угорського посла секретно. Я не знаю, як це витлумачити.

ВР БЧ. — № 1657. — С. 299. Копія др. пол. XVII ст.

№ 9

1651, березня 17. — Гоща. — Лист А. Киселя до коронного підканцлера Єроніма Радзейовського з повідомленням про битву під Красним і загибель Данила Нечая

Niżeli ad adificium przystąpić Gmitto materiam. Posyłam tedy naprzód na list w. m., m. m. pana, respons od ks. metropolity kijowskiego, od Chmielnickiego jeszcze desideratur, posyłam też chirographam literam j. m. pana wojewody bracławskiego. Posyłam i rodzonego pana starosty czerkaskiego, któregom już mało nie postradał, w którym rellacia dostatecznie opisana i o zniesieniu Krasnego i w nim Nieczaja, wszystkich zabaw krwawych a 3tio martis. Posyłam i list z Kijowa ojca pisarza wojskowego i avizy na osobnej karcie, które mnie dziś przyniesiono. To tedy wszystkie przeczytawszy hramoty, zrozumiesz w. m.,

m. m. pan, co się dzieje z nami i z ojczyną, by się mnie godziło powiedziałbym, ale że już nie chcąc rzeć słowa złego nie rzekę i dobrego, milczę a traho alta suspiria et rumpo caelos, aby Pan Bóg wywiodł nas i ojczynę. Już wiosna nastąpiła, już avantagio nasze cessit fortele wszystkie nieprzyjaciela otwierają się. A jesli to prawda, że już Chmielnickiemu przybyła orda, a nam jeszcze nie przybyły supplementa i po tych szturmach mamy cokolwiek w wojsku szkody? W samym Panu Bogu nadzieja, że ta roscecz następująca reprimet hostiles ausus, a nam tym się czasem skupi wojsko, ale chocinyże zdarzy, to Pan Bóg, że się skupi, ordy i tę multitudinem ognistą przełamać, abo u samego Pana Boga rzecz podobna i fortuny j. k. m., albo plus quam cruentum, niepowetowana rzecz tedy u mnie, że ta commissia zaraz z sejmu, niżeli wojsko odkryło się i ogłosią się nasz apparat, nie była przyśpieszona. Teraz diversum tempus diversa ratio. Już wiosna, już posiłki przyszły z Krymu, już i samego hana skoro w polach comysie i wysiarze podeschną wyglądać. A jednak sentio ja z w. m., m. m. panem, przed szkodą nie po szkodzie per pauca non per plura per certiora media pacis quam pers speratam victoriam agetur jeśli ci, którzy krew przełąwają swoję na kożdy dzień tak rozumieją, czemuż nie mamy tak sentire wszystcy ex initiis cruentis et praelidiis, co to za wojna będzie, trzeba ważyć, gdyby tylko już ten zapamiętały człowiek chciał teraz po wysieczeniu i spaleniu Jampola i postąpieniu wojska już za linią redire ad principia i żeby jeszcze w tych dniach, co nie stało się, a że mam obiecano responsy jeszcze od niego i na nie czeka w Kijowie przy ks. metropolicie mój kozak tedy jeśli to ziści [?] tej że godziny poszle w. m., m. m. panu, respons, a teraz w czym wysłałem do j. m. pana hetmana polnego copią listu, posyłam, to rzecz cudowna, że ostremi uniwersałami zakazuje, aby szlachta i szlachcianki w całości zostawali i poblizu liniej i do tych czas jeszcze szmat braciej zostaje, ile krwią prawie pisany list pana Krasińskiego, sługi mego, i inszych z Niżyna [?] posyłam w. m., m. m. panu, jak wiełe tam braciej zostaje na zgubne imię. Więcej już niechce pisać w tej materiej patebunt omnia z tych listów posłanych, których niechcę commentować. Ja wyprawiłem był dwie chorągwie moje proprio sumptu zaciągnione do wojska j. k. m. i na usługę Rzpltej, łecz że owdzie następują trwogi od ordy, wróciłem jednę do siebie, a druga poszła do wojska, sam po staremu jeszcze wychodzić nie mogę.

АГАД. — Ф. "Архів Радзивилів". — Відділ VI. — № 36. Тексту листа передує заголовок: "Copia listu od j. m. pana wojewody kijowskiego do j. m. pana podkancłerzego coronnego de data z Huszcza d.17 martis 1651".

№ 10

1651, квітня 15. — Костянтинів. — Лист А. Киселя до жмудського старости, гетьмана польного литовського князя Януша Радзівіла з повідомленням про битву під Красним і загибель брацлавського полковника Данила Нечая, про підготовку до боїв на Волині

Jaśnie o. ks. m. p. s. żmudzki, m. w. m. p. przyjacielu i dobrodzieju!

Niedawnym czasem otrzymałem był uniwersał od w. ks. m., p. i dobrodzieja, do majętnostki Ostrohladowskiej, która nawet do Corony należy, aby od wojska szczęśliwego w. ks. m., m. m. pana, ochroniona była, aby się nie tylko z przeszłego roku do zawiadowania pułku j. m. p. Pawszy wielki niewczas ta chudoba moja ponosiła i z niej chłopów siła rozegnano, ale i teraz tym bardziej na ostatnią prawie zgubę tej biednej majętności mojej, z której tylko jeszcze i sam troche miałem pożywienia, będąc z inszych wszystkich majętności moich od nieprzyjaciela i od chłopów wygnany. Teraz znowu pułk j. m. pana Kurpskiego z wojska regimentu w. ks. m., m. m. pana, w tejże chudobie mojej postanowiony na ostatnią zgubę moję, abowiem nie tylko, żebym miał mieć już co chleba ztamtąd, ale do ostatku ta majętność przez rozeście chłopów musi być wniwecz obrocona. Proszę tedy ochronę tej chudoby mojej w. ks. m. uniżenie. O progressach wojska naszego coronnego miałeś w. ks. m., m. m. pan, niedawno przez j. m. p. Wolskiego, posłańca swego, listowną i przez j. m. p. Rościdowskiego, towarzysza wojskowego j. m. p. wdy czernihowskiego, i od j. m. p. wdy Bonesławskiego relatią, a tym nie mniejsza miała być od tegoż p. Budowskiego ustna, jeśli chciał o wszystkim dostatecznie i sprawiedliwie powiedzieć, a mianowicie, że przez te nieszczęsne szturmy częste, a z kozaki wojąąc, zdawna mę zwyczajne, niemal naszych ubyło, a jako się w wojsku rachują z łóżną czeladzią do trzech tysięcy zginęło, a nadto ze w ostatku wojska co tu teraz na ten czas już konie barzo zweredzone, przez częste podjazdy i włokity. A że po odjezdzie tegoż posłańca w. ks. m. i p. Rosudowskiego z obozu od Baru ruszyło się wojsko nasze ku Kamieńcowi dalej, przez co tym barziej chłopów na hardo wsadzono. Posyłam copią listu od j. m. p. wdy bracławskiego do mnie w tej materiej pisanej w. ks. m., m. m. panu, z którego się snadnie sprawić raczysz, jakowa sprawa, jakowe niepomylne progressa tu tego wojska na ten czas, daj Boże, aby lepiej było i aby j. mć chcieli inaczej chodzić około tej wojny, kiedy się trochę przejrzeli, niż się teraz odprawowała. Nieszczęsna to głowa jednego Nieczaja hultaja, za którą tak siła poległo braci naszej, na którego albo jeszcze było nie następować, a czekać commissiej, albo przynamniej zgromadzenia posiłków większych wojska naszego, albo gdy to Pan Bóg dał, że onego ubito, przez co wnocy i drużyna jego uląkszy [?] się z fortece z Krasnego, gdy uchodziła, że też ich w polu część ubito. Dosyć było na tym, a zatrzymać się było i dalej nie iść za linią, a przez list oświadczyć to było Chmielnickiemu, jako to z nas niektórych była rada, że po pokoju chcemy i postanowienia Zborowskiego nie łamiemy i za linią nie idziemy i żeby też i ów swoich zatrzymał, a Nieczajowi, jako gwałtownikowi pokoju, to się stało, co P. Bóg kazał. O czem do w. ks. m., m. m. pana i dobr., jako podufałego, więcej nie kyrze [?] się, gdyż i sam wysokim rozumem swoim snadno osądzić możesz. Skoro tedy wojsko nasze od

Baru pomknęło się ku Kamieńcowi, gdzie teraz po kwatyrach w kilku mil jest rozłożone od Kamieńca, w Barze jednak kilkaset człeka przy wozach zostawiono zaraz ile tu chorągwie, które w kilkunastu mil obok tu stali, jako w Czudnowie, w Constantinowie i po inszych miejscach nakoli do kilkunastu chorągwi różnych, tak nowozaciągnionych supplementowych, jako i ochoczych, którzy nie robili, jeno wytrząsali a kominy wybijali ubogich ludzi na puł opuchłych z głodu, z ostatka ich chudoby odzerają, gdy kilka set chłopów i bez kozaków zebrawszy się, gdy na kilkadziesiąt wołochów, takichże szarpaczów, którzy w Piatce, mil dwie od Czudnowa, stali, na ubezpieczonych o południu napadli, którzy że zaraz uciekali, a chłopi też, bydła swoje i fanti niektóre odebrawszy, zaraz nazad poszli, a tamże to było sąsiedztwo bliskie z różnych wsi i miasteczek, a że kilku wołochow, tamże kryjących się po domach, ubito, przeto tym większą trwogę po tych chorągwiach, a żołnierze między sobą uczyniwszy zaraz poszli z chorągwiami nazad i aż do Zasławia mil kilkanaście ztamtąd ustąpili, ża któremi nikt nie gonił, ani żadnego kozaka nie widzieli, bo tak ich P. Bóg karze, że wielkie czynią zdzierstwa ubogim ludziom, a do wojska żadnego nie zażenu, a że teraz przyszła wiadomość, iż kozacy, co się byli zbliżyli do liniej, nazad ustąpili i że ten tu głos, jakoby han miał umrzeć, i sołtan gałga z tatarami, co ich tu było, poszło z nim na posiłek Chmielnickiemu, miał się wrócić do Krymu, przetoż i ci ordinacii i insze chorągwie obracają się ku Czudnowi i tam mają stać i w Constantinowie. Pan Bóg że to wie, jeśli znowu nie dadzą się chłopom wystraszyć, bo tu teraz taka sprawa. J. m. ksdz biskup kijowski, zapuściwszy się na commissią, lubo i dawno temu czas był, jest tu teraz w Dubnie, nie wiem, gdzie się ma obrócić, czy do wojska, czy też poczeka dalszej wiadomości. O zniesieniu się o tej commissiej z Chmielnickim, o które zniesienie się już barzo trudno, ponieważ ta kłótnia te rzeczy już pomierzała j. m. p. wda kijowski z tej commissiej wymawia się teraz, ponieważ jej ich m. pierwej mieć nie chcieli i rady onego służać. Atoli jednak z tym posłał do króla j. m. i sam się tu obiecuje do Huszczy pod Ostrog, a to kilka mil od Dubna, gdzie j. m. ksdz biskup teraz jest, o czem się z sobą będą znosić, a jeśli tak jest i dokona, żeby han umarł, toby jeszcze teraz czas mógł być do jakiegokolwiek pokoju zawarcia, jeśli prętko ich mieć zechcą około tego chodzić, pokiby s tym nowym hanem powtóre nie sprzysięgło kozacy, a tę wiadomości jako udają, że od hospodara wołoskiego przyniesiono do j. m. pana hetmana przez niejakiego p. Budzanowskiego. To też pewna, że Chmielnicki i wszyscy kozacy najbarziej się obawiają od liniej wojska regimentu w. ks. m., m. m. pan, jakoż i nas wszystkich w tem największa nadzieja, daj tylko Boże ich m. m. p. p. wodzowie coronni znoszące się z w. ks. m., m. m. p., i jedno rozumiejąc tak tę wojnę, jeśli nie może być pokój prowadzili, jakoby było z pochwału Bożą, a z dobrym i z ratunkiem prawie tonącej Rzptej naszej, Pana Boga przy tym prosząc, aby w. ks. m. w dobrym zdrowiu chował usługi moje w łasce, etc. Dan z Constantinowa d. 15 april.

АГАД. — Ф. "Архів Радзівілів". — Відділ VI. — № 36. — Копія. Текст листа внесено у табірний щоденник князя Я. Радзівіла під 10 травня 1651 р. і зазначено, що "віддано князю й. м. лист від й. м. пана київського такий".

Political-Personal Intrigue on the Ottoman Frontier in Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Relations with the Porte: The Case of Ramażān Beg vs. Velī Beg

Victor Ostapchuk

One of the more enigmatic aspects of the great Ukrainian revolt that began in 1648 is the foreign policy of its leader, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Mykhailo Hrushevsky presented that policy as a conglomerate of several concurrent and to a large extent contradictory systems. That is, in his efforts to find a place in the international community for the new Ukrainian entity, the Cossack hetman navigated between and within several often overlapping systems of states and powers: an anti-Catholic bloc of Orthodox and Protestant states (Muscovy, Ukraine, Transylvania, Sweden, Moldavia, Wallachia) directed against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; an anti-Ottoman coalition involving Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania—vassal states of the Ottomans—as well as Muscovy, the Commonwealth itself, and even Venice. Yet another system involved Ukraine and the Crimea—with, possibly, the Commonwealth—against Muscovy, the Don Cossacks, and the Circassians. Finally, there was the Ottoman system, in which Ukraine would find a place in the orbit of the Porte, alongside the Crimean Khanate, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania. What makes the international relations of this era so inscrutable is that Khmelnytsky operated within several of these systems at practically the same time. Also, the hetman's international strategies were clearly conditioned by unstable and changing internal and external exigencies. Frank Sysyn has recently proposed looking at Khmelnytsky's elasticities not only in terms of practical politics but also with regard to his use of political and cultural ideology as conditioned by the marginal, frontier status of Cossack Ukraine.[1] In doing so, we need to keep in mind that the hetman was a true son of the multiple frontiers that crossed and

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[1] Frank Sysyn, "The Political Worlds of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi," *Palaeoslavica* 10 (2002): 197–209, esp. 197–98.

converged in Ukraine of his time: the Slavic-Turkic, the Orthodox-Catholic, and the "European"-East Slavic, to name the most obvious ones.

Though there are gaps in our knowledge and understanding of all the directions of Khmelnytsky's foreign policy, arguably the most significant lacunae relate to the southern, Ottoman set of vectors, which included the Crimean Khanate, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania. Moreover, research on this sector has tended to focus on the hetman's relations with ruling elites in the centers, such as Istanbul, Bahçesaray (Bakhchysarai), Iaşi, and so forth. However, the hetman also had frequent contacts with representatives of subordinate levels of power, for example, Tatar *sulṭān*s (princes) and Ottoman *beg*s (governors), contacts in which the lower players were not necessarily mere intermediaries between the hetman and the centers but also, quite often, independent actors as well, ready to subvert the aims and policies of their superiors in their own interests.

Presented here in facsimile, transcription, and translation are three documents preserved in the Topkapı Palace Archive (Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, henceforth TSA) that have to do with such lower-level contacts. They relate to a conflict between two Ottoman officials at the frontier outposts of Özi (Ochakiv) and Qıl Burun (Kinburn)[2] at the mouth of the Dnipro River. A study of these documents sheds light on Khmelnytsky's relations with the Porte, the Crimean Khanate, and, indeed, the large region separating these players, commonly known to the Ottomans as the "Özi frontier" (*Özi serḥaddi*).

The main heroes of our documents are Ramażān Beg (also known as Deñiz/Dengiz Oğlu ["son of Deñiz/Dengiz"] Ramażān Beg), governor (*sancaq begi*) of Qıl Burun as early as 1650 until late 1652, and Velī Beg (also known as Velī Ağa), governor of Qıl Burun from late 1652 for an indeterminate period. The first document (E 3495, henceforth **A**) is a report from an unknown official or, perhaps, a member of the garrison at Özi or Qıl Burun, who is identified only as Aḥmed. The other two documents (E 7604 and E 4749, henceforth **B** and **C**) are reports from the Crimean khan, İslām Gerey III (1644–54).[3] None of the missives has a

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[2] Located at the tip of a narrow sand spit on the left bank of the mouth of the Dnipro and opposite the fortress and town of Özi, the fortress of Qıl Burun (lit. "Hair Point") was the seat of a province (*sancaq/livā'*) comprising both sides of the lower Dnipro area (including the town of Özi itself). Özi in turn (though often in practice Silistre [Silistra] on the Danube) was the seat of a major governor-generalship (*beglerbegilik/eyālet*), roughly comprising the northwestern and western areas of the Black Sea region and containing the province of Qıl Burun.

[3] The documents are of the typical report ('*arż*) type sent by Ottoman military and administrative officials, as well as the Crimean khan, to the sultan or one of his viziers. The honorific formulas of letters and reports by the Crimean khans to the Porte could be very elaborate; this is evident in the rhetorical flourishes of the *inscriptio* at the beginning of

specific addressee, and they could hardly have been intended solely for the sultan, Meḥmed IV (r. 1648–87), who was a child at the time. But given that all three ended up being preserved in the TSA, the former sultanic archive, it is likely that at some point they were delivered to the palace, whether for consideration or deposit. **A** could have been meant for the grand vizier[4] or other high official at the Porte.[5] **B**, judging by the loftiness of the opening *inscriptio*, might have been meant for the sultan, especially given that Crimean khans, thanks to their high standing in the Ottoman hierarchy, typically wrote directly to the sultan. Again, however, an Ottoman vizier, in all likelihood the grand vizier, who was then Tarḥuncı Aḥmed Pasha, and not the young sultan was the actual recipient of the letter.[6] **C**, its even more elaborate *inscriptio* notwithstanding, was not directly intended for the sultan, for the beginning and conclusion have invocations in the name of the Ottoman vizierate; hence the recipient must have been the grand vizier, Tarḥuncı Aḥmed Pasha.[7]

C. On the *'arż*-type document, see my articles "The Publication of Documents on the Crimean Khanate in the Topkapı Sarayı: New Sources for the History of the Black Sea Basin," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6 (1982): 500–28, and "The Publication of Documents on the Crimean Khanate in the Topkapı Sarayı: The Documentary Legacy of Crimean-Ottoman Relations," *Turcica* 19 (1987): 247–76.

[4] Internal politics during the early years of the then child sultan (b. 1642) was one of the Porte's most turbulent. Over the timespan of these documents five grand viziers served: Qara Murād Pasha (21 May 1649–5 August 1650), Melek Aḥmed Pasha (5 August 1650–21 August 1651), Gürci Meḥmed Pasha (27 September 1651–20 June 1652), Tarḥuncı Aḥmed Pasha (20 June 1652–21 March 1653), Dervīş Meḥmed Pasha (21 March 1653–28 October 1654). See İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, 5 (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1971), 38–39. There is also somewhat contradictory information that Siyāvuş Pasha had a short term as grand vizier (21 August–30 November 1651); see Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. 5 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1996), 1518.

[5] It should be noted that although the addressee of **A** is referred to as *sulṭān*, this title was also commonly used to refer to persons of high standing, and hence *sulṭānum*, as it occurs in **A**, can be translated into English as *inter alia* "my lord," as well as "my [Ottoman] sultan." See my article "Five Documents from the Topkapı Palace Archive on the Ottoman Defense of the Black Sea against the Cossacks (1639)," in *Raiyyet Rüsûmu: Essays Presented to Halil İnalcık on His Seventieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students*, 49–104, esp. 53, 65, 68 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Printing Office, 1987), vol. 11 (1987) of *Journal of Turkish Studies*.

[6] For this reason most of the original letters from Crimean khans to the Porte are preserved in the former archive of the sultans (TSA), as opposed to what contains the archives of the grand viziers, today the Ottoman Archive of the Prime Ministry (BOA). See *Le Khanate de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée de Palais de Topkapı*, ed. Alexandre Bennigsen et al (Paris and the Hague: Mouton, 1978).

[7] Documents **B** and **C** have been partly published (brief contents rendering only, without facsimile or text transcription) in *Le Khanate de Crimée*, 196–97. In that volume, document **C** is presented twice: once on p. 196, correctly, as E 4749, and then again on p. 197, with the archival reference code E 4743/2, as if it were a different document. From the

From 1650 until early 1653 Ramażān Beg occurs in the sources as a supporter, perhaps even a close ally, of Khmelnytsky. In late 1650, Ramażān Beg discovered on behalf of Antin Zhdanovych, Khmelnytsky's envoy returning from the Porte, that the substance of a secret Polish embassy headed by Wojciech Bieczyński to the Crimea was a plan to break up the Cossack-Tatar alliance, which was a mainstay of the hetman's war with Poland.[8] In the spring of 1651, on the eve of the campaign that was to lead to the Cossack defeat at Berestechko, Ramażān Beg wrote a letter to the hetman in which he said that Velī Beg—whom he refers to as a "scoundrel of a man"—who was also in Özi/Qıl Burun at the time (then apparently in the role of lieutenant governor [*qa'immaqām*]), had stopped the Tatars from setting out to join the Cossack army.[9]

Document **A**, Aḥmed's letter, lobbies for the removal of Ramażān Beg. It is undated and could have been written anytime in the early 1650s, though, obviously, before the latter was removed from office in Qıl Burun by late 1652.[10] By contrast, although there are no dates in İslām Gerey's letters **B** and **C**, the dates on which they were delivered are indicated on their versos—10 Rebī' I 1063/8 February 1653 and 17 Rebī' I 1063/15 February 1653; they must have been composed a few weeks beforehand, sometime in January 1653. All three documents are presented here in full and can speak for themselves, so here I paraphrase only their main points: Ramażān Beg, who was originally appointed in his position by Bektaş Aġa (see below), was unpopular with the Özi frontier troops and population and bore responsibility for disorder and seditious plots, thievery of horses and slaves, and problems with the Cossacks and Moldavia (he had, for instance, allegedly at various times sent falsified letters to Khmelnytsky). After repeated complaints by the troops garrisoned at Özi, he was replaced by Velī Beg, who was supposedly able to get along with the local soldiery and residents. Rumors of an imminent

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editors' rendering of the contents and description of these supposedly different documents it is clear that they did not realize they were dealing with a single, unique document and that "E 4743/2" in their volume is a mistaken reference. This was borne out by my inspection of E 4743/2 in the TSA: it is indeed a completely different document.

[8] Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, bk. 1: *The Cossack Age, 1650–1653*, trans. Bohdan Strumiński, ed. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005), 133.

[9] Ibid., 231–32.

[10] Information based on a letter from the grand vizier to Khmelnytsky dated 22 Muḥarrem 1063/23 December 1652 (see below), published in Jan Rypka, "Další příspěvek ke korespondenci Vysoké Porty s Bohdanem Chmelnickým," *Časopis Národního muzea* 105 (1931): 209–31, esp. 221, 223.

return of Ramażān Beg to the governorship of Qıl Burun were met with protests by the Özi (and by implication Qıl Burun) garrison troops, who swore they could never get along with him. In **C** there is a reference to a scandal involving the seizure at Özi of several Cossack envoys on their way to the Porte "from the Polish king"—the letter surely meant to say "from the Cossack hetman"—confiscation of twenty thousand gold pieces that they had in their possession, and the envoys' being sold into slavery.[11] This letter denies that Velī Beg was responsible for any violation of diplomatic protocol as, we will see below, Ramażān Beg claimed, and lays the blame for the incident, instead, on Ramażān himself.

It is impossible to corroborate or refute most of the accusations leveled in these writings. After his dismissal Ramażān Beg returned to Istanbul, where, having the advantage of being closer to key decision-makers at the Porte, he continued his campaign against Velī Beg in order to regain his *sancaq*. Among the six Ottoman letters to Khmelnytsky from the so-called Göttingen Codex (plus one from the Czartoryski Library in Cracow) that have been published by the Czech orientalist Jan Rypka, there is one, from Grand Vizier Tarḫuncı Aḥmed Pasha (who held office from 20 June 1652 to 21 March 1653) to the hetman, dated 23 December 1652, that implicitly accepts Ramażān Beg's version of events (and, at the very least, that he was not responsible for the seizure of the Cossack envoys):

> … since [my] coming to the grand vizierate there has been no lack of men coming and going from every direction to the threshold of good fortune [i.e., to the Porte] with letters of subservience (*'ubūdiy-yetnāme*). From you, our friend, neither a letter nor a man has arrived. While waiting for news from your direction explaining the reason for this, it was heard from Ramażān Beg, who was previously governor of Qıl Burun, that when men of yours were coming from your side to the gate of the center of imperial good fortune to display subservience, they were seized in the fortress of Özi and sold. When news to this effect was divulged a thorough investigation and search were carried out, and within one or two days men of yours named Vāṣıl Yūrquvān (Vasyl Yurkovan [?]) and [name left blank] were found. And those in whose

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[11] Indeed these are surely the same as the envoys of Khmelnytsky seized in Özi to which a letter from the Porte refers (see below). It is interesting that here the Cossack envoys are called "spies," as this may be symptomatic of Īslām Gerey's shift away from Khmelnytsky in favor of the Poles and an indicaton that this letter was meant for the anti-Cossack party at the Porte. Of course the 20,000 gold pieces (*altun*), a huge sum of money, intended as a gift for the Porte is also of interest: were they intended to sway the Porte in favor of military intervention on behalf of the hetman's war effort?

hands they were were given their price and they were newly clothed ...
[and] dispatched to you and sent off with this letter of friendship.[12]

What we can be sure of, thanks to Khmelnytsky's letter to the Porte
preserved in an Ottoman translation also in the TSA, written in January
1653—that is, at about the same time as **B** and **C**—is that as far as the
hetman was concerned, Ramażān Beg's version was the truer one of the
said events. This is not to imply the full veracity of Ramażān Beg—we
can be fairly sure that in their mutual struggle neither Ramażān's nor
Velī's prime concern was to provide an honest rendition of relevant
events on the Özi frontier. But what is clear from Khmelnytsky's words
is that until Ramażān Beg was dismissed in late 1652, he was Khmel-
nytsky's man at the vital Özi/Qıl Burun crossroads:

> ... [in the matter of] Ramażān Beg, who was previously the governor of
> Qıl Burun: due to a negative recommendation to our felicitous and
> great master, his majesty, our padishah, his province was conferred up-
> on another. In this matter we write the truth [when we say] that it was
> his [majesty's] slave Ramażān Beg who caused this slave of his [majes-
> ty] to become a slave to his majesty, our felicitous and great padishah.
> We used to have good relations with him here; after he was dismissed,
> the situation became disordered. This slave of his [majesty] had sent a
> man of ours named Vāṣıl (Vasyl) to Özi with some letters, [but] there-
> after Ramażān Beg having been dismissed, our man did not return....
> [And so] together with all of our Host, his [majesty's] slaves, we re-
> quest that his [majesty's] slave Ramażān Beg be granted his own [for-
> mer] province (*sancaq*), for he used to have good relations with us
> here. Since he is his [majesty's] true slave, we place our trust in him.
> As is written above, it was he who was the cause of our becoming
> slaves to our felicitous padishah [and] he has rendered rightful service
> to our fortunate padishah.[13]

Presumably İslām Gerey's claim, in **B**, that Khmelnytsky was dis-
satisfied with Ramażān's alleged duplicity and had communicated this to
the khan was untrue, though anyone who has investigated the hetman's
convoluted international contacts knows that he was not above double-
dealing when the situation merited it. Thus it cannot be ruled out that
Khmelnytsky had at some points "friendly" contacts with the anti-
Ramażān party, including Velī.[14] As to Khmelnytsky's reiteration in the

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[12] Ibid., 220–24.

[13] TSA, E 8548. Facsimile and translation in András Riedlmayer and Victor Ostapchuk,
"Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj and the Porte: A Document from the Ottoman Archives," *Har-
vard Ukrainian Studies* 8 (1984): 453–73, esp. 470–71.

[14] Indeed, in a letter to Khmelnytsky written in 1651, Velī reminds the hetman that he
was at the battle of Zboriv in 1649 and, calling him his "friend and brother," requests that

strongest terms that it was Ramażān Beg who should be credited with his acceptance of Ottoman suzerainty, it can, of course, be either an indication of a very special relationship between the two, or a mere rhetorical flourish. We have no indication whether the relationship was based on political expediency, material interest, personal compatibility, or some combination of these.

The three documents presented here give only a glimpse into an intrigue centered around the governorship of Qıl Burun that not only grew out of a local personal rivalry but also drew in and/or was stimulated by distant outside players—the Crimean Khan, the Ukrainian hetman, perhaps the Moldavian hospodar (Moldavia is mentioned in **A**), and last but not least, certain highly placed individuals at the Porte. In connection with the latter, the statement in **B** that it was originally Bektaş Aġa who grabbed (*alıverüp*, lit. "suddenly took away") the Qıl Burun governorship in favor of Ramażān Beg suggests that indeed the conflict at Özi and Qıl Burun was much more than a local, personal intrigue. At the Porte there was a pro- and an anti-Khmelnytsky party, respectively for and against committing the Ottomans more actively to the hetman's struggle with Poland, including involving the Ottoman, as opposed to just the Crimean, army. Up until August 1651, when he was banished from politics and soon thereafter executed,[15] Bektaş Aġa, former commander of the janissary corps (*yeñiçeri aġası*), was a prominent member of the pro-intervention party, with powerful influence at the court.[16] This, combined with the fact that Ramażān was an ally of the hetman, while in all likelihood Velī was at least once responsible for acting against the hetman's war effort (delaying the Crimean army from proceeding past Özi in 1651) and probably responsible for apprehending Cossack envoys on the way to the Porte, suggests that the Ramażān vs. Velī conflict was part of a struggle between two camps at the Porte. Let us recall that the eventual failure of the pro-Khmelnytsky faction to bring the Ottoman military into the war with Poland meant that the hetman was subsequently forced to

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"if [Khmelnytsky] is to write to anyone, he also write to him" (*Arkhiv Yugo-zapadnoi Rossii* [Kyiv], pt. 3, vol. 4 [1914]: 559–60).

[15] [Evliya Çelebi], *The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman: Melek Ahmed Pasha (15881662) as Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's Book of Travels,* ed. Robert Dankoff (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1991), 89; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi,* vol. 3, pt. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1973), p. 259.

[16] Bektaş Aġa was very influential early in Meḥmed IV's reign; in one document even referred to as "the emperor's adopted father" (Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, 57–58). Reiteration of his pro-Cossack stance can be found in a letter from the hospodar of Moldavia, who, after Bektaş's downfall, stated that he "had adopted Khmelnytsky as a son" (ibid., 417).

make his fateful choice and turn to Moscow for support. That such an important conflict at the Porte would also be played out on the local level on the Özi frontier, where the players were not mere automatons fulfilling the will of the sultan or grand vizier but were able to act in their own interests and/or in those of any particular faction—and thus to affect wider political and military outcomes—is interesting in and of itself. The argument here, therefore, is that certain crucial aspects of both domestic and international affairs on the grand central stage can be properly understood only with the help of documentation stemming from the periphery. Without documents such as the ones presented here, and only those relating to the central figures, we might never fully appreciate the complexities of Khmelnytsky's relations with the Porte. Finally, I refer the reader to the texts of the documents for nuances and atmospherics of political life on this frontier.

Documents

A. TSA, E 3495. Undated (prior to late 1652) From Aḥmed to an unnamed person at the Porte (Sultan Meḥmed IV or the grand vizier, or both; see n. 4).

format: 27.4 x 22.8 cm

watermark: none

invocation: none (top of the sheet cut off)

verso: oval seal (13 x 16 mm) behind and upside down in relation to the signature on the recto (facsimile not available)

هدايت ازلى بر بنده احمد ياور "[may] the eternal spiritual guidance assist the slave Aḥmed"

text:

[1] sa'ādetlü ve 'izzetlü ve mürüvvetlü sulṭānum[17] ḥażretlerinüñ ḥużūr-i sa'ādet-muqarrerlerine envā'-i ḥulūṣ ve 'ubūdiyyet ile 'arż-i bende-i bī-miqdār budur ki Öziye tābi' Qılburun begi olan [2] Ramażān ahālī-i vilāyet ile ve qul ṭāyfasıyla zindegānī üzere olmayub ve eṭrāf ve cevānibe muttaṣıl kiẕb ü dürūġı mutażammın mektūblar gönderüb qazaq ṭarafıyla ve Boġdān cānibi ile [3] mūcib-i iḥtilāl olur mu'āmeleden ḥālī olmayub 'azl olınması serḥadd ahālīsinüñ istirāḥatine sebeb ėdügine 'ilm-i bendegī lāḥiq olduġından ġayri Tatar ḥan ḥażretleri daḥi bu quluñuza mektūb [4] gönderüb mezkūr Ramażānuñ mūcib-i iḥtilāl olur niçe mefāsidinden mā 'adā dāyīmā kārı ol serḥadde at ve esīr sirqa ėtdürmekdür ref'i lāzim ve mühimm olduġını asitāne-i sa'ādete [5] ben-daḥi 'arż eylemişim bu ḥuṣūṣa siz daḥi muqayyed olub mezbūruñ ref'ine ihtimām ve diqqat eyleyesiz deyü i'lām ve işāret ėtmişidi livā'-i mezbūrına Özi serḥaddinüñ emekdārı [6] ve ḥidmet-i 'aliyye edāsına qādir kār-güẕārı olub ahālī-i vilāyet ile kemāl-mertebe ḥüsn-i zindegānīsi olan Velī qullarına 'ināyet ve iḥsān

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[17] This word is written above the blank space to honor the addressee (the so-called *elevatio*).

buyurılmaq ricāsına 'arż olınmışdur [7] kemāl-i lüṭf ve keremlerinden bu bābda verilen 'arż-i bendegī mūcibince livā'-i mezbūr merqūm Velī qullarına ṣadaqa ve iḥsān buyurılmaġla bu qulların memnūn buyurmaları bābında emr ü fermān sa'ādetlü ve mürüvvetlü sulṭānum [8] ḥażretlerinüñdür

bende Aḥmed

translation:
This is the report with [all] forms of sincerity and servility by the worthless slave to the felicity-possessing presence of his excellency/majesty, my felicitous and powerful and generous lord/sultan (*sulṭānum*, see n. 5):

Ramażān, who is the governor (*beg*) of Qıl Burun, which is subject to [the province (*beglerbegilik*) of] Özi, is not on good [terms] with the people of the provinces or the [imperial] soldiery (*qul ṭāyfası*). He sends letters in all directions containing his continuous lies and falsehoods. He does not refrain from acts that cause trouble with the Cossack side and with the Moldavian side. Besides it becoming a part of my servile knowledge that his dismissal would be the cause of comfort for the inhabitants of the frontier, his majesty the Tatar khan has sent a letter to this slave of yours [in which] he communicated and pointed out saying, "The said Ramażān is the cause of disorder. Besides seditious plots, his constant activity is to cause the stealing of horses and captives on that frontier. I, too, have petitioned the threshold of felicity [i.e., the Porte] that his removal is necessary and important. You must also be diligent in this matter. Pay great attention and heed to the removal of the aforesaid." A petition has been made requesting that Velī, slave of his majesty, who is a veteran and skillful official of the Özi frontier capable of performing the exalted service as [governor] and is in perfect harmony with the people of the province, be favored and bestowed with the above-mentioned province. With the granting and bestowal of the above-mentioned province to the said Velī, slave of his [majesty], with perfect favor and benevolence according to the servile petition given in this matter, the order and command in the matter of his [majesty's] making this slave of his happy belongs to my felicitous and generous sultan, his majesty.

The slave Aḥmed

B. TSA, E 7604.[18] From the Crimean khan İslām Gerey III to unnamed person at the Porte (Sultan Meḥmed IV or Grand Vizier Tarḫuncı Aḥmed Pasha, or both; see n. 4). Received in Istanbul on 10 Rebī' I 1063/8 February 1653.
format: 41.5 x 27.5 cm
watermark: crown with six-pointed star and crescent
invocation: Hüve, He (i.e., Allah), 1.5 cm below top edge, 23 cm above text (not shown in the facsimile)
verso: a note in the upper right corner *Tatar ḫandan fī 10 rā sene 63*, "from the Tatar khan on 10 Rebī' I year [10]63 (8 February 1653)"; oval seal (9 x 13 mm) behind and upside down in relation to the *ṣaḥḥ* on the recto: اسلام كراى بنده, [İslām Gerey the slave]

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[18] First published in synopsis form in *Le Khanate de Crimée*, 196–97.

text:

[1] dergāh-i felek-medār ve bārgāh-i gerdūn-veqār türābına ʿarż-i bende-i ṣadāqat-kārları budur ki bundan aqdem Bektaş Aġa Deñiz Oġlu Ramażān [2] demekle maʿrūf olan tevābiʿine Qıl Burun begligin alıverüp serḥadd qulu ile imtizāçları qābil olmaduġından ġayri Özi ḥaṭmānına [3] niçe defʿa sāḥte mektūplar gönderüp kiẕb ve ḥīlelerin ḥaṭmān bu cānibe yazup ve Cankermān qulu daḥi ʿaẓīm şikāyet édüp qurbumuzda [4] olmaġla bu bendelerine ʿarż ve maḥżar göndermeleriyle rikāb-i hümāyūnlarına ʿarż olınduqda Qıl Burun begligi ṭaraf-i hümāyūndan Velī Beg qullarına [5] tevcīḥ ve iḥsān buyu[rı]lup vilāyet ḥalqı ile kemāl imtizāçı olup uġur-i hümāyūnda cān ve başla ḥidmetde iken Ramażān dédikleri [6] mebdeʾ-i fesād tekrār bir alay ḥīleler édüp manṣıba ṭālib olduġın Cankermān ḥalqı işidüp der-i devlet-medāra ʿarż étmişlerdür [7] Ramażān dédikleri ḥaramzāde ile Cankermān ḥalqınuñ bir vecihle imtizāçları qābil ve mümkün degüldür qurbumuzda olmaġla cümle aḥvāllerine vuqūfumuz [8] olup böyle serḥadde ol-maqūle şaḥṣ gönderilmek lāyıq-i dīn ü devlet degül-dür bāqī emr ü fermān der-i maʿdelet-ʿunvānlaruñdur

ṣaḥḥ

translation:

He! (the invocation)

This is the report of his [majesty's] faithful slave to the dust [on the floor] of the court [at] the hub of the universe and of the place of audience [of] dignity and good fortune:

Previously Bektaş Aġa snatched the governorship (*beglik*) of Qıl Burun for [one of] his dependents, who is known as Deniz Oġlu Ramażān. Besides not being able to get along with the *serḥadd qulu*[19] he [Ramażān] several times sent spurious letters to the Özi hetman. The hetman wrote here [about Ramażān's] lies and plottings. Also the soldiers (*qul*) of Cankermān[20] made a serious complaint. When, upon their sending a collective report to this slave of his [majesty's], since they were in our vicinity, [in turn] a report was made [by this slave] to the imperial presence of his [majesty] and Velī Beg was appointed to and invested with the governorship of Qıl Burun by the imperial presence. He [Velī Beg] got along with the soldiery of the province. While he was in the service of the imperial cause, [not even sparing] his own life (*can ve başla* "with his soul and head"), the origin of sedition who is called Ramażān again made a whole array of intrigues. The soldiery of Cankermān heard that he was seeking [Velī Beg's] position and sent a report to the Porte around which good fortune turns.[21] There is no possibility or chance for the soldiery of Cankermān to get along in any way with the bastard who is called Ramażān. With our proximity we are cognizant of

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[19] *serḥadd qulu*—Ottoman frontier-garrison soldiery, which included janissaries, timariot cavalry, and other military groups.

[20] Cankermān—a designation for the town and fortress of Özi, originally used by the Tatars but also found in Ottoman sources along with the name Özi.

[21] This may be a reference to **A.**

all his affairs. It is not befitting of the religion and the state for this type of person to be thus sent to the frontier. The final order and command is the Porte's, whose name (*'unvān*) is justice.

[The above] is correct[ly written] (*ṣaḥḥ*)

C. TSA, E 4749.[22] From the Crimean khan İslām Gerey III to an unnamed Ottoman vizier (probably Tarḫuncı Aḥmed Pasha, see n. 4). Received in Istanbul on 17 Rebīʿ I 1063/15 February 1653.

format: 58.8 x 32.4 cm

watermark: five-pointed crown over shield-shaped coat of arms

invocation: Hüve 1.5 cm below top edge, 24.5 cm above text (not shown in the facsimile)

verso: note in the upper right corner *ḫandan gelen mektūbdur fī 17 rā sene 63*, "a letter coming from the khan on 17 Rebīʿ I year [10]63 (15 February 1653)"; oval seal (9 x 13 mm) behind and upside down in relation to the *ṣaḥḥ* on the recto اسلام كراى بنده, [İslām Gerey the slave] (seal not available in facsimile)

text:

[1] mevqıf-i refīʿ-i celīyüʾṣ-ṣān-i vezāret ve fermān-rānī ve maḥfil-i menīʿ-i müşeyyedüʾl-erkān-i ṣadāret ve kām-rānī lā zāle müʾebbeden biʾt-teʾyīdātüʾr-rabbānī [2] ṣavb-i devlet evbine kemāl-i taʿẓīm ve tekrīmle ẕimmet-i iḫlāṣumuza iltizām olınan duʿā-yi beqā-yi ẕāt-i sütūde ḫiṣāllerine taqdīm ve tevqīrden ṣoñra ʿarża-dāṣt-i [3] muḫliṣ-i ḫāliṣüʾl-bālleri budur ki ḥālā Özi serḥaddinde Qıl Burun sancaqına mutaṣarrıf olan Velī Beg bendeleri ḥaqqında Dengiz Oġlu Ramażān Beg dīvān-i [4] pādişāhīye çıqup Lėh qıralından rikāb-i hümāyūna gönderdükleri qazaqları ṭutup ve ellerinde hediyye ṭarīqı ile gönderdükleri yigirmi biñ altunların alup [5] qazaqları beyʿ ėtdi deyü isnād ėtmiş bu maqūle ḥaramzādeniñ şıdqı ve kiẕbini bilmek qatı āsān degül-midür on günde bir adam Cankermāna gelüp ve gidüp [6] müşkilleri ḥal olınur eger bu vāqiʿ ise Ramażān dėdikleri şaḫṣ kendi ėtmiş olur ol cāsūslar aḫẕ olınduqda Ramażān kendi Qıl Burun begi idi [7] ve cāsūsları ṭutup beyʿ ėtdüren Ramażān Begüñ vekīli olan Qarġalı Meḥmed Aġa ėdügin cemīʿ-i ḫalq bilmişdür ol vaqitde Velī Beg Cankermānda bulınmamışdur [8] aqçanıñ aṣlı da yoqdur eger var ise aqça Ramażān Begde olur dīvān-i pādişāhīde kiẕb ėdüp bir adama isnād ėtdügi içün ol [9] aqçayı Ramażān Begden ṭaleb olınmaq lāzim degül-midür ki bir daḫi bir kimse bu maqūle kiẕb ėtmeye cürʾet ėtmeye bāqī eyyām-i ṣadāret-i ʿuẓmā ve vezāret-i kübrā müʾeyyed bād

ṣaḥḥ

translation:

He! (the invocation)

May the high station of the manifest renown of the vizierate and its [ability to] enforce orders and may the unassailable court of the unshakeable columns and its fortune last forever, supported by divine aid many times afforded. After pre-

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[22] First published in summary translation in *Le Khanate de Crimée*, 196.

senting and honoring with a prayer for the continuation of his majesty, who possesses praiseworthy attributes, [the rendering of which] with perfect glorification and veneration in the direction of good fortune's straight path is demanded by the obligation of our sincere attachment, this is what is submitted by a friend of his majesty who possesses a sincere heart:

Dengiz Oġlı Ramażān Beg has come forth to the *dīvān* of the padishah and concerning Velī Beg, his [majesty's] slave who is now in possession of Qıl Burun on the Özi frontier, imputed that he seized Cossacks sent by the Polish king to the imperial presence, took twenty thousand gold pieces (*altun*) sent by the way of a gift that were in their possession, and sold the Cossacks. Is it not easy to the utmost to know [the difference between] the truths and lies of such a bastard? For, every ten days a man comes and goes to and from Cankermān and all doubts and difficulties are resolved. If this [incident] happened, the person whom they call Ramażān caused it himself. When those spies [i.e., the Cossack envoys] were taken, Ramażān himself was the governor (*beg*) of Qıl Burun. All of the soldiery knows that Qarġalı Meḥmed Aġa—the deputy of Ramażān Beg, who is [actually] the one who caused the spies to be seized and sold—did it. At that time Velī Beg was not in Cankermān. There is also no basis to the [story about the] money. If there is, the money is with Ramażān Beg. Because he has lied before the *dīvān* of the padishah and imputed against another man, is it not suitable that that money be demanded from Ramażān Beg so that a person would not dare to tell such lies again? May the everlasting days of the grand vizierate be strengthened.

[The above] is correct[ly written] (*ṣaḥḥ*)

Document A TSA, E 3495, text on recto

*Document **B** TSA, E 7604, text on recto*

*Document **B** TSA, E 7604, details from verso*
(seal and notice of receipt)

*Document **C** TSA, E 4749, text on recto*

*Document C TSA, E 4749, detail from verson
(notice of receipt)*

Putting Scholarship into Print:
Editing with Frank E. Sysyn

Uliana M. Pasicznyk

My first encounter with Frank as an editor had a tangential connection to scholarship. It was the early fall of 1973, and I had recently joined the staff of the newly established Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University (hereafter HURI), where Frank was a graduate student. One of my responsibilities was to put together a newsletter informing the academic and Ukrainian communities of the institute's activities. One day, as I sat in my office drafting my first issue, Frank sauntered in, looked over to see what I was doing, and pulled up a chair. Within minutes he had commented on every item on my list, emphasized what recent academic and extra-curricular events deserved particular coverage (that year's Harvard Summer School program in Ukrainian studies had just ended), and proposed several topics for future issues, with suggestions on where to find pertinent information. In short order I had been introduced to Frank as an editorial force.

At the time, scholarly publications per se were already a part of Frank's activity. As an aspiring young historian he was working on a review journal inaugurated as part of Harvard's Ukrainian Studies program, honing the high standards that would come to characterize his own scholarly writing.[1] That experience would soon serve him and the program in good stead. As part of their ambitious agenda for Ukrainian studies at Harvard, Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Ševčenko, the directors of the Ukrainian Research Institute, had begun planning publication of a new scholarly journal, to be titled *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. In 1974 Frank was appointed the journal's associate editor, and I joined the *HUS* editorial staff soon afterwards. Our first tasks were to determine what kind of material the journal would publish (articles, review articles, document studies, and book reviews in history, language, and literature) and how

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[1] That periodical, titled *Recenzija: A Review of Ukrainian Scholarly Publications* (9 vols., 1970–79), proved to be an academic training ground for a generation of young scholars.

best to acquire and evaluate submissions. As these decisions were made, renowned scholars from North America, Europe, and the Middle East were selected to join the journal's editorial board. In letters of invitation addressed to these scholars Frank solicited not only their editorial participation and supervision, but also their own contributions to the new journal. With that, Frank's campaign to expand publication of new scholarship in Ukrainian studies was formally under way.

Over the next decade and a half, Frank continued to solicit contributions to *HUS,* organize its content, review submissions, and edit material accepted for publication. Through his initiative a number of special issues of the journal appeared, including Festschrifts honoring his mentors and the journal's founders, Professors Pritsak and Ševčenko, and a volume commemorating the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine.[2] For each of these, as for the journal generally, Frank zealously sought out the contributions of established specialists and talented young scholars alike. He encouraged students and colleagues working in adjoining areas and fields to investigate dimensions of their work that related to Ukrainian studies, thereby expanding scholarly conception and understanding of the field. Research trips abroad and attendance at any academic conference were sure to bring Frank back with ideas about potential new contributors and contributions, earning him the reputation of being the journal's and HURI's quintessential "idea man." Once new submissions materialized, Frank applied his scholarly acumen to critical readings and comments, which often led authors to augment their findings or clarify their ideas. The publication of any *HUS* issue saw Frank at work on the next one and planning those to follow. He also adeptly promoted subscriptions among libraries and individuals alike, regularly traveling to academic and community events with journal copies in tow.

The decade that followed brought Frank north, to the offices of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) in Edmonton and Toronto. In 1990 he became director of the CIUS's new Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the University of Alberta. In that capacity Frank took the helm not only of a new research centre, but also of an ambitious publishing project. In founding the centre bearing his name, the Toronto entrepreneur and businessman Peter Jacyk had stipu-

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[2] *Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak on His Sixtieth Birthday*, vols. 3/4 (1979–80); *Okeanos: Essays Presented to Ihor Ševčenko on His Sixtieth Birthday*, vol. 7 (1983); *The Kiev Mohyla Academy*, vol. 8, nos. 1–2 (June 1984); *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj*, vol. 9, nos. 3–4; *Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe*, vol. 10, nos. 3–4 (December 1986); *Adelphotes: A Tribute to Omeljan Pritsak by His Students*, vol. 14, nos. 3–4 (December 1990).

lated that it undertake the production of an English translation of *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy,* the magnum opus of Ukraine's foremost historian and first head of state, Mykhailo Hrushevsky. The Ukrainian original of Hrushevsky's work was published in ten volumes between 1898 and 1937. By making this fundamental Ukrainian history available to the international scholarly community in English, Mr. Jacyk wanted to expand knowledge of Ukraine and its historical development—a prescient goal, given the political developments that would soon put independent Ukraine on the world map. Organizing the project that would achieve that goal was now Frank's responsibility, and he undertook it with characteristic energy and dedication. Some months later I joined the Jacyk Centre's editorial staff, and the project became our new joint publishing adventure. As acting director of the CIUS, Frank also became involved in its *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* and the publishing program of CIUS Press.

Charting a steady course for the Jacyk Centre's Hrushevsky Translation Project (HTP) posed considerable organizational and editorial challenges. Some decisions had already been made by Bohdan Krawchenko, the former director of CIUS. As a result, Marta Skorupsky of New York and J. Ian Press of the United Kingdom were already at work translating volumes 1 and 2, respectively. But many other matters remained to be decided: translators for each of the other volumes had to be chosen and engaged, scholarly editors had to be found, editorial principles and procedures had to be established, and a publisher had to be selected. Also, crucially, the financial base of the series' preparation and publication had to be secured. As editor in chief, Frank set out to meet these challenges. He engaged additional talented translators, including Bohdan Strumiński, Leonid Heretz, Marta D. Olynyk, and Andrij Wynnyckyj. He secured the service of consulting and scholarly editors, notably Andrzej Poppe for volume 1, which covered prehistory to the early Kyivan Rus' period. He commissioned the compilation of bibliographies of the source materials and publications Hrushevsky referred to for each of his volumes, which proved to be one of the first times a major Western historical project involved scholars in Ukraine. Frank applied to the National Endowment for Humanities in Washington, D.C., for financial support, which resulted in a grant funding the translation of the volumes on the Cossack age. He also launched a campaign to secure individual sponsors and supporters for the preparation and publication of each volume.

Concurrently Frank and I began setting the editorial procedures that would govern the volumes of the HTP. These had to insure the production of a complete, accurate, and academic translation of a work of social, cultural, religious, economic, and political history spanning prehis-

toric to early modern times on a territory connected in varying degrees to the Western, Eastern, Slavic, and Ottoman worlds. There were precedents that could be followed, notably the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* published at the University of Toronto, other CIUS publications, and the Harvard publications in Ukrainian studies. But in important respects our project was unique. We were setting out to produce a translation of a work by an enormously erudite scholar whose sources were written in older and more modern versions of Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, Old Church Slavonic, Latin, and Greek and also included materials translated into these languages from Turkic, Arabic, Semitic, and other languages. Our English translation had to render Hrushevsky's own text and his source references with equal authority, yet it also had to be easily accessible to English readers without any particular scholarly or Slavic background. The project was fortunate to have secured the services of talented translators and consulting editors, but their work had to be reviewed, systematized, co-ordinated, and cast into a final product.

Frank started identifying the required editorial steps. Once a volume was translated, the HTP editorial staff would recheck the translator's work closely against the original, identify concerns and problems, and discuss and resolve them. We would edit the English text for style and consistency, establishing standard translations for historical terms with disparate meanings. We would compile lists of proper names and place-names and verify them. We would list bibliographical references and add important scholarly literature published since Hrushevsky's time. We would compile glossaries and devise maps. In addition to a general academic introduction to the series, each volume would have a comprehensive scholarly introduction that discussed its specific content and defined its place in historiography and Ukrainian scholarship as a whole. All this would require work on multiple levels by editors and consulting editors specializing in different areas, followed by amalgamation of their editorial work and the translations into a final text. The goal of the project was daunting, but its objective was clear: to produce an English version of Hrushevsky's magnum opus, volume by volume, that would put it on shelves alongside major works of European history throughout the world. With that purpose in mind, the preparation of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'* was launched, and work on the HTP continues today.[3]

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[3] Five volumes of the *History of Ukraine–Rus'* have been published to date: vol. 1, *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century* (1997); vol. 7, *The Cossack Age to 1625* (1999); vol. 8, *The Cossack Age, 1625–1650* (2002); vol. 9, bk. 1, *The Cossack Age, 1650–1653* (2005); and vol. 9, bk. 2, pt. 1, *The Cossack Age, 1654–1657* (2008).

In supervising the editing of Hrushevsky's *History,* Frank has developed a characteristic set of procedures. Reading the translated texts in full (usually chapter by chapter), he identifies and points to problems, investigates options, and initiates discussion of possible resolutions by the editorial staff. Once disparate views are aired and debated (occasionally with vehemence and at length), he makes a decision and then sticks by it (barring the introduction of revolutionary new evidence). This is a time-consuming process, but it ensures that the views of coworkers are heard and taken into account. Indeed, Frank has continually challenged those working on the HTP to use our talents and resources optimally, and he has consistently encouraged and appreciated our efforts to produce a top-quality scholarly product.[4]

Editing historical scholarship in translation is a complex and multifaceted endeavor. To cite one example, a recurrent concern in volume 1 of the *History* was how to translate the important term *horod*, which could refer to a fortified stronghold or burg, a fortress, or a town that later developed from these; to complicate matters, the term sometimes appeared alongside its derivatives and semantic partners, *horodok* and *horodyshche*. Confronting the problem, Frank delved into related English-language scholarly literature to check on various renditions of the terms, while I isolated instances of their appearance in Hrushevsky. Putting that data together, we considered each use of the terms, decided their optimal translation in context, set the text aside, and later revisited it to see whether our decisions were sound (thankfully, at the time we did not know that in later volumes the terms would recur with yet other specialized meanings). In volume 7, dealing with the Cossack age, we first encountered the problem of how to render the names and surnames of historical persons whose ethnic origin and national identity were often blurred. Frank established criteria by which this would be decided, in a way that required alternate name forms and, naturally enough, additional investigation and editorial work. As a result, a historical figure who accepted Roman Catholicism, e.g., Janusz Ostrogski, had a different primary name form than his Orthodox father, Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky. In the context of work on volume 8, I recall Frank patiently explaining to me the semantically illogical but factually correct hierarchy of officials in the Polish Commonwealth, among whom the "deputy cupbearer" (*pidchasyi*) was not the subordinate of the "cupbearer" (*chashnyk*), but his

superior. In a complex publishing project the possibility of errors is ever present, and, alas, some slip by to appear on the printed page. Frank is often the first to detect any such error ("Now how did that get by us!?"), but I don't remember his ever dwelling on one. What I do recall vividly are his mild admonitions, usually coming at times when I have queried him yet again whether a certain sentence's meaning is indeed clear, to the effect that a scholarly statement does not always have to be specific, that sometimes its author wants to leave room for *interpretation* and chooses *not* to be precise, and that editors should accept that, no matter what Strunk and White or the *Chicago Manual of Style* prescribes.

Yet, as a scholarly editor Frank himself is nothing less than exacting. Since he is often involved in more than one scholarly project at a time, it would seem that his attention must at times be diffused or diverted from whatever text is not immediately at hand. The reality is quite different. He relishes connecting and amplifying information across scholarly undertakings, and a superb memory allows him to do this readily. Also, in my experience no specifics of a planned publication's content, import, or style are likely to escape Frank's attention. He reads texts quickly but thoroughly and investigates questions similarly. When an answer proves elusive, he promptly and directly contacts the colleague or academic acquaintance who might shed light on the matter. Networking definitely comes naturally to Frank.

Anyone who has worked with him knows Frank E. Sysyn to be a person of profound intellectual curiosity who thrives on gathering and disseminating sound information. He is also an enthusiastic communicator who delights in sharing his own knowledge and ideas and learning from others. As an editor he has used these attributes productively in organizing, supervising, and promoting the publishing of scholarship across a breadth of topics and fields. The publications he has helped to produce speak to the success of those efforts, as do the recognition and gratitude of the colleagues and students who have benefited from his expertise. Indeed, most if not all the contributors to this volume know him as a valued critic, reviewer, and editor of their scholarly work.

In editing with Frank I have learned much about dedication, perseverance, and precision in putting scholarship into print. As he and I both know well, a great deal remains to be done in editing and publishing Ukrainian scholarship in English, including completion of the translation of Hrushevsky's magnum opus. May that body of knowledge continue to grow, and may Frank long continue to be a creator, communicator, and purveyor of scholarly work.

Between Poland and Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky's Dilemma, 1905–1907

Serhii Plokhy

> Пишу Вам по-русски, не умея писать по-малороссийски, и думая, что неприятно Вам будет, если напишу по-польски.
>
> Nevill Forbes to Mykhailo Hrushevsky
> Oxford, 27 June 1911[1]

Most of Ukraine's history since the early modern period has been determined by its location between the two major political, economic, and cultural powers of Eastern Europe—Poland and Russia. Their competition for the "lands in between" naturally involved military, political, and economic dimensions, but our concern here is with culture, particularly questions of religion, language, literature, and history, which became especially pronounced in the nineteenth century, after the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The nascent Ukrainian national movement was profoundly influenced by the clash between Ukraine's two powerful neighbors. Inspired by the ideas of Poland's "great emigration" of the nineteenth century, it also took advantage of the Russian imperial struggle against Polish cultural influence in the wake of the Polish uprisings of 1830 and 1863. Ukrainian activists, who were persecuted in the Russian Empire, found better conditions for their publishing activities in the Habsburg province of Galicia, which was largely controlled by the Poles in the last decades of the nineteenth century. To survive and extend its influence over the Ukrainian masses, the Ukrainian national movement had to make its way between the two East European cultural giants, who regarded the Ukrainians as raw material for their respective nation-building projects. The task facing the Ukrainian national "awakeners" was never easy and

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[1] Nevill Forbes, one of the leading twentieth-century Western experts on the languages, history, and culture of the Slavs, was a reader in Russian at Oxford University when he wrote this letter. For the text, see Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy u Kyievi (henceforth TsDIAK), fond 1235, no. 303, pp. 107–10.

always full of internal contradictions. But without finding the right course between Ukraine's West, represented by Poland, and its East, represented by Russia, the Ukrainian national project would never have come to fruition.

Among Ukrainian activists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, no one was more involved in negotiating Ukraine's political course and formulating its historical and national identity vis-à-vis Poland and Russia than Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934), the greatest Ukrainian historian of the twentieth century and the first head of an independent Ukrainian state (1918). Hrushevsky was born in the Kholm region of the Russian Empire. His father, a prominent Ukrainian pedagogue, was sent to the Ukrainian-Polish borderlands to de-Polonize and Russify the local Ukrainian population in the aftermath of the Polish uprising of 1863. The young Hrushevsky was educated as a historian at Kyiv University, where his professor was the well-known Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908). Antonovych forsook Roman Catholicism for Orthodoxy and abandoned the "high" Polish culture of his home to embrace the "low" Ukrainian culture of the local peasantry and become one of the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement in the second half of the nineteenth century. Upon graduating from Kyiv University, Hrushevsky accepted a position in East European history at Lviv University, where he taught Ukrainian history from 1894 until the outbreak of World War I. During that time he served as president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, founded the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kyiv, and edited Ukraine's most influential monthly of the period, *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk.*[2]

Hrushevsky had been regarded as the leader of the Ukrainian movement by its proponents and opponents in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian Empire alike. What helped him cross the boundaries between the two empires and the two branches of the national movement as easily as he did was that for all the differences in tactics, the movement had a common ideology and long-term goal: territorial autonomy within the respective empires. It was Hrushevsky, the recognized exponent of the Ukrainian cause on both sides of the border, who led it to the achievement of its immediate and prospective goals. Hrushevsky was a villain for Polish and Russian nationalists and a national prophet in the eyes of

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[2] On Hrushevsky's academic career, see Thomas Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Liubomyr Vynar [Lubomyr R. Wynar], *Mykhailo Hrushevskyi i Naukove tovarystvo im. Tarasa Shevchenka, 1892–1930* (Munich: Dniprova khvylia, 1970); and my *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

his followers. His friends were impressed with his ability to withstand continuous attacks from the Russian and Polish nationalist camps. Hrushevsky moved into the public spotlight once he decided to abandon the realm of "cultural" work and began to take part in politics. His insistence on the use of Ukrainian at the Russian Archeological Congress in Kyiv (1899) and his participation in the founding of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party in the same year turned him into a symbol of the Ukrainian national revival. When, in 1906, he joined the Ukrainian deputies of the First Russian Duma, they accepted him as their unquestioned leader and symbol of the unity of Russian- and Austro–Hungarian-ruled Ukraine.[3]

Hrushevsky's main achievement, the separation of Ukrainian history from the Russian as a field of study, turned the Ukrainian historical narrative from a subnational into a national one and immediately plunged the historian into a maelstrom of controversy. The first to attack Hrushevsky were representatives of Polish national historiography, who severely criticized his attempt to construct a Ukrainian national narrative at the expense of the Polish one. The latter continued to include significant parts of the Ukrainian past in both territorial and ethnocultural terms. While the confrontation between Polish and Ukrainian political elites in the Habsburg Monarchy before World War I encouraged the critical assessment of Hrushevsky's works by Polish historians,[4] co-operation between the Ukrainian national parties and Russian liberals in the Russian Empire often shielded him from attack by his Russian opponents.[5] That situation changed in 1917, when Hrushevsky became a principal target of proponents of the all-Russian idea and was deemed the main culprit behind the efforts of the empire's foes to divide "Russia, one and indivisible."[6]

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[3] One of his followers at the time, the future Ukrainian political leader and historian Dmytro Doroshenko, left the following words in his memoirs concerning Hrushevsky's arrival in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1906: "His great scholarly and public services, his extraordinary organizational talent, created great authority and deep respect for him. In our eyes he was a symbol of pan-Ukrainian unification; in those days his word was law for us" (Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro davnie-mynule [1901–1914 roky]* [Winnipeg: Tryzub, 1954], 83); cf. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, 76.

[4] See, e.g., reviews of Hrushevsky's works by Ludwik Kolankowski in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 27 (1913): 348–65; and by Czesław Frankiewicz in ibid., 31 (1917): 174–77.

[5] See a comment to that effect in Andrei Storozhenko's pamphlet on the history of the Ukrainian movement, published under the pseudonym A. Tsarinnyi, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie: Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk preimushchestvenno po lichnym vospominaniiam* (Berlin: Tip. Zinaburg, 1925), repr. in *Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii: Ideologiia natsionalnogo raskola*, comp. M. B. Smolin (Moscow: Moskva, 1998), 161.

[6] See A. M. Volkonsky, *Istoricheskaia pravda i ukrainofilskaia propaganda* (Turin, 1920), repr. in *Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii*, 25–123.

This essay, which grew out of my work in the Hrushevsky Translation Project—the collective effort of an international group of scholars led by Frank E. Sysyn to make available to the English-speaking world Hrushevsky's ten-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—takes a close look at the historian's political writings during the first revolution in the Russian Empire (1905–1907). At that time Hrushevsky tried to chart a middle course for the nascent Ukrainian national movement between Russian liberalism and Polish nationalism, applying different tactics in dealing with these two political currents. In discussing this stage of Ukrainian nation building, in this essay I seek to present a better understanding not only of the role Hrushevsky played in this process, but also of the challenges faced by the Ukrainian national revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

* * *

Hrushevsky was appointed to the Chair of European History at Lviv University in 1894 owing to a deal between the Polish elites of Galicia and the region's Ukrainian populists. Apart from the Austrian government, Galicia's Polish political circles, and the Ukrainian populists there, major actors in the "New Era" were the Ukrainophile leaders of Russian-ruled Ukraine, represented by Hrushevsky's mentors in Kyiv, Volodymyr Antonovych and Oleksander Konysky. They established good relations not only with the Ukrainian populists of Galicia, but also with the Polish political circles there. In the mid–1880s, when Austro-Russian relations were deteriorating, Kyiv's Ukrainophile leaders even attracted the attention of the Austrian imperial government and Polish politicians in Galicia, who were looking for possible allies in Russian-ruled Ukraine in case a war broke out between the two states. Disillusioned with the prospects of a federative order in Russia, Antonovych and Konysky placed their hopes in the creation of a central European federation of Slavic states. They also sought ways to circumvent the restrictions on Ukrainian publications and cultural activity in the Russian Empire, which became especially severe after the assassination of Emperor Alexander II in 1881.[7]

The plans worked out by Antonovych and Konysky on the one hand and by the leaders of the Ukrainophile movement in Galicia on the other envisioned the transfer of Ukrainophile activities from Kyiv to Lviv and

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[7] On Hrushevsky's appointment to the Lviv University position, see Leonid Zashkilniak, "M. Hrushevskyi i Halychyna (Do pryizdu do Lvova 1894 r.)," in *Mykhailo Hrushevskyi i lvivska istorychna shkola* (New York and Lviv: Ukrainske istorychne tovarystvo et al., 1995), 114–37. On the Polish-Ukrainian political agreement in Galicia, see Ihor Chornovol, *Polsko-ukrainska uhoda, 1890–1894* (Lviv: Lvivska akademiia mystetstva, 2000).

the creation of a "Ukrainian Piedmont" in Galicia. Consequently it is not surprising that as soon as the Revolution of 1905 in the Russian Empire made it possible, the historian sought to go beyond his Galician base and began taking an active part in promoting the Ukrainian cause in the Romanov realm. He even applied for a position in Russian history at Kyiv University, but the Russian nationalists who dominated the city's political life did all they could to prevent the appointment of a "Ukrainophile" as a professor. They claimed that his scholarly achievements were difficult to evaluate, as his works were written in the obscure dialect developed by the Galician Ukrainophiles, and that his desire to lecture in Ukrainian would provoke conflicts at Kyiv University. Some authors of anti-Hrushevsky articles even stated that there was no place for him there and that Kyiv, the "cradle of Russia," had never been and would never become the center of an autonomous Ukraine.[8] Nor did Hrushevsky's application benefit from his active participation in the 1907 campaign to establish chairs of Ukrainian studies at universities in Russian-ruled Ukraine. During the first months of 1907 Hrushevsky spoke out in support of the student movement, agitating for the introduction of such chairs and for the use of Ukrainian as a language of instruction. In a long article published in *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, he discussed the teaching of Ukrainian subjects in the Habsburg Monarchy and advocated the establishment of chairs of Ukrainian studies (history, geography, language, literature, folklore, art, and so on) at the universities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa.[9] A tsarist censor posited a direct link between Hrushevsky's article and student unrest at Kyiv University.[10]

Hrushevsky began his publicistic activity in the Russian Empire in the spring of 1905 with several articles advocating the lifting of the ban on Ukrainian publications. He addressed his writings to the broadest possible audience, but his primary target was the Russian government, which

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[8] See Dmytro Bahalii, "Akad. M. S. Hrushevskyi i ioho mistse v ukrainskii istoriohrafii (Istorychno-krytychnyi narys)," *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1927, no. 1 (46; January): 174–75.

[9] See Hrushevsky, "Sprava ukrainskykh katedr i nashi naukovi potreby," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, 1907, no. 1: 42–57; no. 2: 213–20; no. 3: 408–18; and separately, Lviv, 1907. For a Russian translation, see "Vopros ob ukrainskikh kafedrakh i nuzhdy ukrainskoi nauki," in Mikhail Grushevsky, *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros: Stati i zametki* (St. Petersburg: Tip. T-va "Obshchestvennaia polza," 1907), 149–94. Hrushevsky's political writings of the period were reprinted in 2002 in vol. 1 of the 50-vol. edition of his writings being prepared by scholars at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. See Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Tvory u 50 tomakh*, vol. 1 (Lviv: Svit, 2002), 289–544. The research for this essay was completed before the appearance of that volume, which contains references to the original publications of Hrushevsky's works.

[10] Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, 82.

was then giving consideration to lifting the ban.[11] This was a continuation of the campaign that he had begun with demands to legalize the importation into the Russian Empire of Ukrainian-language books published in Galicia, including his own works, especially the first volumes of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. With the first signs of the liberalization of Russian censorship in 1904, Hrushevsky addressed the new minister of internal affairs, Prince Petr Sviatopolk-Mirsky, with a letter in which he tried to turn the anti-Polish sentiments dominant in Russian ruling circles at the time to the benefit of the Ukrainian cause. Concerning the ban on importing the latest volume of his *History* into the Russian Empire, he wrote as follows: "I find it not only painful but, as a Russian subject, simply shameful to see that, for example, my university colleague's book on the history of Poland and Lithuania in the fifteenth century, which appeared at the same time as the fourth volume of my *History*, has been allowed to circulate in Russia without restriction because it is written in Polish, while my fourth volume, devoted to the same Polish-Lithuanian period of South Russian history, has been banned unconditionally, without even an inspection by the censors, merely because it is written in the Little Russian language."[12] The revolution hastened the liberation of the Ukrainian word in the Russian Empire. The prohibition was silently dropped from the new regulations on publishing activities that the tsarist government issued in the spring of 1906. Hrushevsky, like other activists of the Ukrainian movement, had every reason to celebrate.[13]

The language question, however, was only one of the issues on the activists' agenda. Dubbed "the resolution of the Ukrainian question," that agenda envisaged the achievement of territorial autonomy for the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire. With the opening of the First Duma, the situation changed dramatically. The government was no longer prepared to entertain any demands from the Ukrainian movement, and the only hope of resolving the reformulated "Ukrainian question" was to convince the opposition parties in the Duma—the representatives of liberal Russia—to put the national question on their political agenda. The Russian liberals, not the government, became the primary audience of Hrushevsky's articles, although the proponents of Russian nationalism

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[11] See my *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, 54–55.

[12] Draft of Hrushevsky's letter to Sviatopolk-Mirsky in TsDIAK, fond 1235, desc. 1, no. 275, fol. 161ᵛ. Hrushevsky apparently did not know or preferred to ignore the fact that in Russian bureaucratic and nationalist circles Sviatopolk-Mirsky was perceived as a promoter of Polish interests.

[13] On the Ukrainian campaign to lift the ban on Ukrainian-language publications in 1904–1906, see Olga Andriewsky, "The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 1904–1912" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991), 42–78, 114–19.

continued to be the object of his attacks. Particularly worrisome to Hrushevsky were the arguments of the Russian rightists, who were attempting to convince the public that the liberalization of political life would result in the disintegration of the Russian Empire, as the non-Russian nationalities would take advantage of the newly granted freedoms to secede. In the spring of 1906 Hrushevsky traveled to St. Petersburg to advise Ukrainian deputies of the Duma and stayed there into the summer. Through his numerous contributions to *Ukrainskii vestnik*, the mouthpiece of the Ukrainian Club in the Duma, he influenced political debate on the Ukrainian issue in imperial Russian society.[14]

In his article "Unity or Disintegration," published in June 1906, Hrushevsky sought to calm the Russian liberal public. He acknowledged that political independence was indeed the ultimate goal of any national movement, but stated at the same time that "a nationality does not necessarily require political independence for its development." The only way to save the Russian state, according to Hrushevsky, was to adjust it to the demands of the national movements and turn it into a "free union of peoples." Hrushevsky wrote: "aspirations to establish one's own state can only be held in check by the awareness that membership in a given political union offers too many advantages and conveniences. The absence of restrictions on the full and universal development of national forces, the absence of their exploitation by the state for the interests of others or for unproductive ends, is a necessary condition for such consciousness."[15]

For Hrushevsky such conditions could be achieved only through the restructuring of the Russian Empire on the basis of autonomy for its constituent nations—an idea that he put forward in the summer of 1905 in the debate then taking place on the future Russian constitution. At that time Hrushevsky proposed applying the principle of territorial self-government for the Russian Empire's nationalities, a principle that had previously been discussed only in relation to the Empire's Polish provinces, to the empire as a whole. He envisioned the Russian state divided into national regions governed by local diets.[16] Hrushevsky also contin-

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[14] See my *Unmaking Imperial Russia*, 56–61. On the Ukrainian deputies in the First Duma and their activities, see Andriewsky, "The Politics of National Identity," 163–99. Cf. Oleh W. Gerus, "The Ukrainian Question in the Russian Duma, 1906–17: An Overview," *Studia Ukrainica* (Ottawa), 4 (1984): 157–73.

[15] Mikhail Grushevsky, "Edinstvo ili raspadenie?" *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 3 (4 June 1906): 39–51, repr. in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 55–67, here 61.

[16] See Hrushevsky, "Konstytutsiine pytannia i ukrainstvo v Rosii," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 8, no. 6 (1905): 245–58; also separately: Lviv, 1905. An abridged version of the article appeared in Russian translation in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 121–31.

ued promoting the idea of Ukrainian autonomy in three of his articles that *Ukrainskii vestnik* published in the spring and summer of 1906. There he legitimized his demand for the autonomization of the Russian Empire by noting that in the spring of 1905 the congress of Russian journalists had adopted a resolution calling for the decentralization of the Russian state and the organization of its future political life on the basis of self-governing national territories.[17] Hrushevsky also referred to the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia, claiming that what the Ukrainians needed was not just regional autonomy, which might leave them subject to another nationality, but national-territorial autonomy, which could ensure their dominance in a given autonomous unit and guarantee their future national development.[18]

In August 1906 Hrushevsky specifically addressed the issue of the Ukrainian intelligentsia's duty to serve its own people, discussing it in relation to the tsarist authorities' dissolution of the First Duma and the prospects of the liberation movement in the Russian Empire. One of his articles dealing with that theme, "On the Following Day," appeared in the eleventh issue of *Ukrainskii vestnik* on 2 August 1906.[19] Another, "Against the Current," was written for the fifteenth issue of the same newspaper, but it was never published there.[20] Hrushevsky's main purpose was to convince the liberal Ukrainian intelligentsia, which had supported Ukrainian aspirations during the first stage of the revolution, not to abandon that cause during the period of official reaction and repression. He argued that in continuing to work for the liberation of Russia and opposing reactionary government policies, there was no need to forsake the Ukrainian cause. Service to broader goals did not contradict the idea of serving one's own people. Hrushevsky called on the Ukrainian intelligentsia to join the ranks of the Ukrainian movement in its effort to liberate Russia.[21] He argued that

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[17] Hrushevsky also indicated the deep federalist traditions of the Ukrainian movement, although he refused to support his claim for Ukrainian autonomy with reference to Ukraine's historical rights. See Mikhail Grushevsky, "Natsionalnyi vopros i avtonomiia," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 1 (21 May 1906): 8–17; idem, "Nashi trebovaniia," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 5 (18 June 1906): 267–73; and idem, "O zrelosti i nezrelosti," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 4 (11 July 1906): 203–208. These articles were reprinted in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 69–80, 86–92, and 81–85 respectively.

[18] Idem, "Iz polsko-ukrainskikh otnoshenii Galitsii: Neskolko illiustratsii k voprosu: avtonomiia oblastnaia i natsionalno-territorialnaia," in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 195–264.

[19] Idem, "Na drugoi den," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 11 (2 August 1906): 743–48, repr. in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 6–11.

[20] Idem, "Protiv techeniia," in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 1–5.

[21] In this Hrushevsky was quite close to the position taken by Bohdan Kistiakovsky, an ethnic Ukrainian and a leader of the "liberation of Russia" movement who opposed

the alleged sacrifice of the Ukrainian intelligentsia for the benefit of the "all-Russian" cause in fact amounted to a betrayal of the interests of the Ukrainian people and that the long tradition of such Little Russian "self-sacrifice" earned the Ukrainian intelligentsia no respect in Russian liberal circles, while the Poles earned such respect by serving the interests of their nation. Hrushevsky maintained that the tsarist government and Russian progressive circles did not differ greatly in their attitude to the Ukrainian movement, which they saw as naturally subordinate to all-Russian/Great Russian culture and society, intended to serve as building material for the development of both.

The significance of the ideas Hrushevsky expressed in these two articles went far beyond the specific circumstances that the dissolution of the First Russian Duma created. In 1907 Hrushevsky reprinted both articles in *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*. They touched not only upon the enormously important question of the loyalty of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to its own people, without which the Ukrainian movement was doomed to extinction, but also on the inter-relation between Ukrainian, Russian, and so-called all-Russian culture and society. As argued earlier, in his political writings of 1905–1907 Hrushevsky postulated the "Ukrainian question" as part of the national question in the Russian Empire in general, while divorcing it from the "all-Russian" context. That postulate had highly important consequences for the future of the Ukrainian movement, but for the time being the consciousness of the Ukrainian intelligentsia remained predominantly "Little Russian," regarding the Ukrainian people and culture as part of the all-Russian nation and culture. Hrushevsky's strategy under such circumstances was not to counterpose the goals of the Ukrainian and all-Russian (all-imperial) movements for the "liberation of Russia," but to present them as complementary. The Ukrainian movement was too weak to set goals antithetical to those that the Russian liberal intelligentsia pursued, or even significantly different from them.

Hrushevsky adopted a different strategy in dealing with the Polish movement in the Russian Empire. As early as in May 1905 Hrushevsky had raised the alarm about the unequal treatment of imperial Russia's nationalities in connection with an edict permitting the use of Polish and Lithuanian in the secondary schools of the western gubernias.[22] While

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Ukrainian nationalism but believed that Ukrainians could become equal members of the liberation movement if they organized on an ethnic basis. See Susan Heuman, *Kistiakovsky: The Struggle for National and Constitutional Rights in the Last Years of Tsarism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1998), 114–15.

[22] On the Polish political action that led to the issuing of the edict, see Céline Gervais-Francelle, "La grève scolaire dans le royaume de Pologne," in *La première révolution*

welcoming the edict in general, he noted that it was rather limited in scope, excluding elementary schools and languages other than Polish and Lithuanian. Hrushevsky argued that the Ukrainians of the western gubernias were just as entitled as the Poles and Lithuanians to be taught in their own language. He made reference to the opinion of the Imperial Academy of Sciences that the "all-Russian language" was in fact Great Russian, which was foreign to the Ukrainian population of the empire.[23] Hrushevsky considered an imperial policy that helped Polonize the Ukrainian masses not only harmful to the Ukrainians, but also absurd from the government's own viewpoint. He asked the rhetorical question, "Is a Polonized Ukraine less dangerous to Russia than a Ukraine loyal to her own nationality?"[24]

Hrushevsky's sojourn in the Russian Empire in the spring of 1906 and his sharing of the experience of the Ukrainian cultural and political struggle in Galicia with the Ukrainian deputies of the First Duma caused alarm among the Polish political elite in Galicia, resulting in the publication of a number of articles commenting on his visit to St. Petersburg. They implied that Hrushevsky's efforts to strengthen links between Russian- and Austrian-ruled Ukraine were dangerous to the Austro-Hungarian state. Readers were also reminded that the Shevchenko Scientific Society was receiving subsidies from the Galician Diet and that Hrushevsky would do well to remember that the Poles were still masters in Galicia. The authors' real concern was that by disseminating information about the abuses the Ukrainian movement suffered at the hands of the Galicia's Polish masters, Hrushevsky could compromise Polish prospects in the Russian Empire. Hrushevsky, who did not attempt to conceal his dissatisfaction with Polish attacks on him and the Ukrainian movement in general, made the whole story public in St. Petersburg.[25]

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russe, ed. François-Xavier Coquin and Céline Gervais-Francelle (Paris, 1986), 261–98. On the Ukrainian reaction to the edict, see Andriewsky, "The Politics of National Identity," 75–88.

[23] Mikhail Grushevsky, "Ravnoiu meroiu," *Syn otechestva*, no. 73 (12 May 1905), repr. in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 101–103.

[24] Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Bezhluzda natsionalna polityka Rosii," *Dilo* (Lviv), 1905, no. 100 (18 May), quoted in Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, 73. In August 1905 Hrushevsky noted in his diary: "It looks as if there will be reaction and somnolence in Russia, and the Ukrainians are again prepared to lie down on the stove, having obtained nothing, while the Poles are gaining power over them as well. Sorrow overcomes me for our people and foreigners alike" ("Shchodennyky M. S. Hrushevskoho [1904–1910 rr.]," ed. Ihor Hyrych, *Kyivska starovyna*, 1995, no. 1: 15).

[25] Mikhail Grushevsky, "Vstrevozhennyi muraveinik," *Ukrainskii vestnik*, no. 6 (25 June 1906): 331–41, repr. in his *Osvobozhdenie Rosii i ukrainskii vopros*, 149–94.

In 1907, when plans for granting autonomy to the former Congress Kingdom of Poland were being widely discussed in the Russian Empire, Hrushevsky published a number of articles in which he once again discussed the history and current status of Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia, protesting plans to include his native Kholm region in the prospective autonomous realm. Hrushevsky's essay on the issue, "For the Ukrainian Bone (In the Matter of the Kholm Region)," was printed in Ukrainian in the Kyiv newspaper *Rada*, then appeared as a separate brochure, and finally was published in Russian translation in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*.[26] The essay was a response to an article published in December 1906 by one of the leaders of the Polish National Democratic Party, Count Antoni Tyszkiewicz, in the newspaper *Rech*, the organ of the Russian Constitutional Democrats. Tyszkiewicz argued against the tsarist government's attempts to make the Kholm region a separate gubernia, claiming that the whole enterprise had been thought up by Russian nationalist circles and local elites that would benefit from the elevation of Kholm to the status of a gubernial capital. He was certainly right in his evaluation of official intentions: facing the prospect of having to grant autonomy to the lands of the former Kingdom of Poland, the government wanted to save the Ukrainian population of the Kholm region for the "all-Russian" cause. It is hardly surprising that Tyszkiewicz's argument found support from the oppositional Constitutional Democrats, whose representatives argued that the whole issue should be taken out of the hands of the government and submitted for a decision to the State Duma.[27]

Hrushevsky was clearly alarmed that the Polish National Democrats and the Russian Constitutional Democrats might reach an agreement at the expense of the Ukrainians. In his article he rebuffed Tyszkiewicz's argument, pointing out that by playing the pan-Slavic and liberal cards it failed to take into account the interests of the local population, which was neither Russian nor Polish and had the right to a separate national and cultural development.[28] Hrushevsky argued that granting autonomy

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[26] Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Za ukrainskyi maslak (v spravi Kholmshchyny)," *Rada*, 1907, nos. 2–4; also separately: *Za ukrainskyi maslak (v spravi Kholmshchyny)* (Kyiv, 1907). Russian translation: "Za ukrainskuiu kost (vopros o Kholmshchine)," in his *Osvobozhdenie Rossii i ukrainskii vopros*, 278–91.

[27] On the formation of Kholm gubernia, see Theodore E. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 172–92; and Edward Chmielewski, *The Polish Question in the Russian State Duma* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), 117–20.

[28] Hrushevsky's argument in that regard was close to the one Kistiakovsky made in an

to Poland within its ethnic boundaries was a just cause, but not within the boundaries of the former Congress Kingdom of Poland, which included non-Polish ethnic territories. He believed that Russian and Polish policies toward the Ukrainians were intended to promote the assimilation of the Ukrainian population to their respective cultures and societies. Nevertheless, along with a significant number of Ukrainian activists, Hrushevsky continued to believe that there were better prospects for the development of Ukrainian culture under Russian than Polish rule. Once again, the interests of the Ukrainian movement and those of the central government in St. Petersburg coincided on the issue of Polish dominance in the ethnic Ukrainian territories, but this time, unlike after the Polish Uprising of 1863, the Ukrainian activists did not have to hide their true intentions. They no longer presented themselves as proponents of the all-Russian cause. Instead they joined the battle under their own flag.

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A close reading of Hrushevsky's political writings leaves no doubt that during the Revolution of 1905 his main goal, like that of the whole Ukrainian movement, was the achievement of Ukrainian autonomy. The strategies he adopted to achieve it depended on whether he was dealing with Russian liberals or Polish nationalists. In the first case, he subscribed to the broadly defined goals of the democratic movement throughout the Russian Empire, arguing that the "liberation of Russia" required a solution to the empire's national question and the granting of territorial autonomy to the ethnic minorities. By posing the "Ukrainian question" as part of the "national question" facing the empire as a whole, Hrushevsky gave new legitimacy to the Ukrainian demands for autonomy, even as he sought to persuade the Ukrainian intelligentsia within the ranks of the "liberation of Russia" movement that it had not only "all-Russian" but also specifically Ukrainian goals if that movement was to succeed.

The the Polish national movement's self-awareness and political maturity served as an example to the nascent Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire, and Polish activists were important allies in the struggle for federalization. But they were also dangerous competitors in the contest to "nationalize" the empire's western borderlands, and outright enemies of the Ukrainian movement in Austrian-ruled Galicia. As Hrushevsky considered developments in the Russian Empire from the perspective of Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia, he became more alarmed than

article he wrote in 1908 to educate his fellow Russian liberals on the Ukrainian dimension of the Kholm issue. See Heuman, *Kistiakovsky*, 120–21.

his Kyivan colleagues at the prospect of Russia solving its "Polish question" at the expense of the Ukrainians. The introduction of school instruction in Polish in lands where ethnic Ukrainians constituted the majority or plurality of the population would mean further cultural Polonization of the Ukrainian peasantry unless the schools were Ukrainianized, and the official "accommodation" of Polish political and cultural demands, rather than those of the other nationalities, would diminish the national "autonomists'" prospects in Russian politics. If the Kholm region were included in autonomous Polish territory, Polish culture would again become dominant in that traditionally Ukrainian land.

Hrushevsky's proposed solution to the complex political dilemmas that faced the Ukrainian movement in its dealings with its much stronger Russian and Polish counterparts was quite simple. During the Revolution of 1905 he emerged as a formidable supporter and tireless propagandist of the unity of all democratic forces in their struggle for the "liberation of Russia." For Hrushevsky that slogan implied the achievement of territorial autonomy by the non-Russian nationalities. There was no place in this struggle for any separate deals between individual members of the anti-autocratic camp or between them and the government. Hrushevsky believed that the "liberation of Russia" would bring freedom not only to Russia and Poland, but to Ukraine as well.

*The privilege of 1063 for the Abbey of St. Crépy le Grand in Soissons
(Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Collection Picardie, t. 294, acte 38). The
parchment original measures 560 x 312 mm.*

Source: C. Couderc, "Une signature d'Anne de Russie," in *La Russie géographique, ethnologique,
historique* ... (Paris: Larousse, 1892), plate between pp. 473 and 474.

The Autograph of Anna of Rus',
Queen of France

Andrzej Poppe and Danuta Poppe

The partially preserved foundational fresco of the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, painted in 1044–46, shows the family retinue of Grand Prince Yaroslav the Wise facing the throne of Christ. One of Yaroslav's younger daughters, Anna, is among those depicted in this composition.

Royal daughters were usually married off in order of seniority. The year 1051 is considered the date of Anna's marriage to Henry I of France, based on the date of birth of their eldest son, Philip, in 1052.[1] In this connection it is worth mentioning Hugh Capet's unsuccessful efforts to obtain the hand of Anna, a Porphyrogenita sister of Byzantine emperors, for his son Robert, Henry's father. In 987–88 he was beaten out by Volodymyr the Great.[2] The Capetian ambitions to establish matrimonial ties with the Byzantine rulers were realized only by Hugh's grandson, who married the granddaughter of the ruler of Rus' and his wife, Anna Porphyrogenita.

At first Henry had no luck in finding a wife. His betrothal to the underaged Matilda, the daughter of Emperor Conrad II, did not lead to marriage because his fiancée died. Henry married another Matilda, a niece of Emperor Henry III, but she died in 1043, a year after their wedding. A widower at the age of 36, the king had to find a new wife. Although opinions differ, the matchmaking mission he sent to Rus' can be dated as occuring in 1048 and returning in 1049. It consisted of high ecclesiastical dignitaries, including bishops Roger of Châlons and Gautier of Meaux. The retinue accompanying the bride-to-be to France bore gifts from Yaroslav the Wise—relics of St. Clement and his disciple Phoebus that had

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[1] Roger Hallu uncritically amassed considerable biographical material in writing *Anne de Kiev, Reine de France* (Rome: Università cattolica ucraina, 1973), 228; R. H. Bautier put in order in his"Anne de Kiev, reine de France et la politique royale au XIe siècle: Etude critique de la documentation," *Revue des études slaves* 57 (1985): 539–63.

[2] D. Poppe and A. Poppe, "Dziewosłęby o porfirigenetkę Annę," in *Cultus et Cognitio: Studia z dziejów średniowiecznej kultury Aleksandrowi Gieysztorowi w 40–lecie pracy naukowej* (Warsaw: PWN, 1978), 451–68.

found their way to Kyiv from Chersonesus.[3] Henry's marriage to Anna was exceptionally happy, and she bore him three sons and a daughter. The couple's good relations are indicated by the mentions of Anna in the king's documents, as well as by her active participation in France's religious life and ecclesiastical affairs, as attested in a letter from Pope Nicholas II.[4] This happy and tranquil period in Henry's life did not last long. He died on 4 August 1060 at the age of fifty-two.

Contrary to the dynastic tradition of the Carolingians and the first Capetians, the first-born son of Henry and Anna was given a Christian name—Philip—when he was baptized. According to an early medieval legend, the apostle Philip spread the word of God among the Scythians north of the Black Sea. Those Scythians were also identified with the Rus'. It was balanced by the names given to the couple's two younger sons: Robert inherited the name of his grandfather, and Hugh, that of his great-grandfather, the founder of the Capetian dynasty.

One should accept the well-founded opinion that it was Anna who had the decisive influence on the choice of the name Philip, managing to convince Henry to diverge from dynastic tradition in this case.[5] She was guided by Byzantine custom adopted in Rus', according to which the name of a patron saint was conferred at baptism without regard to the temporal name—in this case, that of a prince. The choice of the name of the apostle Philip was also apt because he was venerated throughout the Christian world and churches dedicated to him were built in both Constantinople and Rome.

The name of Henry and Anna's first-born son, which was at once Christian and royal, entered the repertoire of names of the Capetians and, later, other dynasties. Given the context of works about Alexander the Great, which were popular at the time, there may have been a political subtext associated with his father's name—an agenda of uniting the

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[3] Baudouin de Gaiffier, "Odalric de Reims, ses manuscrits et les reliques de saint Clément à Cherson," *Études de civilisation médiévale, IXe–XIIe siècles : melanges offerts à Edmond-René Labande à l'occasion de son départ à la retraite et du XXe anniversaire du C.É.S.C.M. par ses amis, ses collègues, ses élèves* (Poitiers: CESCM, 1974), 315–20. Ludolf Müller is of the opinion that the accompanying retinue included Ilarion, the future metropolitan of Kyiv (1050); cf. his "Eine westliche liturgische Formel in Ilarions Lobpreis auf Vladimir," in *Die Werke des Metropoliten Ilarion*, ed. Ludolf Müller (Munich: W. Fink, 1971), 80–86.

[4] Frédéric Sœhnée, *Catalogue des actes d'Henri Ier, roi de France (1031–1060)* (Paris: H. Champion, 1907), nos. 120, 123; papal letter written by Peter Damiani (October 1059), *Patrologia Latina* 144: 447B–448C.

[5] See Jean Dunbabin, "What's in a Name? Philip, King of France," *Speculum* 68, no. 4 (1993): 949–67.

French lands under one scepter on the model of King Philip, who laid the foundations of his successor's power by uniting the Greek lands under Macedonian supremacy.

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Anna was a young and attractive widow "en âge d'avoir et de donner de l'amour," as a mid-seventeenth-century French historian described her.[6] This is evidenced by an affair she had with Raoul de Péronne, the count of Crépy. In order to be able to marry his beloved, the count accused his wife, Eléonore, of adultery and then staged Anna's abduction and married her, making her his countess. A scandal broke out, and the abandoned wife complained to the papal curia. The ecclesiastical investigation spared Anna herself. After all, having allowed herself to be abducted, she saw to the ratification of the new liaison with a church ceremony, an uncommon event among the aristocracy of those times; only in the late eleventh century did it begin to prefer ecclesiastical marriage.[7]

Of the documents drafted with Anna's participation during her regency on behalf of the underage dauphin Philip, the royal deed of 1063 for the Abbey of St. Crépy le Grand has attracted particular attention because it alone bears the Cyrillic signature, undoubtedly in Anna's hand, АНАРЬИНА or АНАРЪИНА. It appears beneath three crosses, two of which are larger—one inscribed by Baudouin of Flanders, acting as regent, and the other with the monogram of the young king a smaller one made by the queen. In all other documents Anna's signature is limited to her handwritten cross with the scribal annotation "subscriptum Annae reginae."[8]

This document is remarkable in another respect: it does not mention Anna in the text itself. That is no accident, given the notoriety of the scandal at the time. When the document was being drafted in the royal chancery, it was decided to conceal Anna's role in it, most likely under the pretext that the wife of the Count of Crépy was no longer the dowager queen. On the other hand, in the presence of the underage king, who had a strong emotional attachment to his mother, one did not dare object to her signing with a cross. But Anna had no intention of yielding her

[6] François Mezeray, *Histoire de France*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1643), quoted in Hallu, *Anne de Kiev*, 101–102, 181–82.

[7] Korbinian Ritzer, *Formen, Riten und religiöses Brauchtum der Eheschliessung in den christlichen Kirchen des ersten Jahrtausends,* 2d ed. (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981), 52–57; Georges Duby, *Le chevalier, la femme et le prêtre: Le mariage dans la France féodale* (Paris: Hachette, 1981), 40–82, 95–116.

[8] *Recueil des actes de Philippe Ier de France, 1059–1108,* ed. M. Prou (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1908), 47–49 (no. 16); Hallu, *Anne de Kiev,* 169–97.

prerogatives, and, as shown by the document of 1065, she continued to be regarded as queen and guardian of her underaged son.[9] She must have noted the omission of her person in the deed and immediately reacted to that show of disrespect by emphasizing her presence and her right to be there, emphatically and unequivocally. Having marked her cross in the presence of the doubtlessly startled witnesses, with the same pen she almost carved her Cyrillic signature, АНАРЬИНА, into the parchment.

The reconstruction of events proposed here has greater support in the sources than the rather naive supposition that Anna wanted to show off and boast of her literacy, which in turn was supposed to evince the vanity of the crowned lady from Rus'. Anna was not only literate in her native tongue: having spent some fourteen or fifteen years in France and taken part in issuing royal privileges to monasteries and other ecclesiastical institutions, she had also mastered Latin, which is evident from her immediate grasp of the content of the document drawn up in that language. The proud Rus'ian lady, a granddaughter of Volodymyr the Great and Anna Porphyrogenita and a sister-in-law of Princess Gertrude-Elizabeth of Kyiv (who was a great-granddaughter of Otto II), acted as befitted a true queen. It is one of history's abundant paradoxes that a signature with a tinge of scandal, given the circumstances attending it, served after many centuries as proof of age-old friendship and rapprochement between two European nations. At the dawn of the twentieth century the document of 1063 with Anna's Cyrillic signature helped establish a tradition on which the *Entente cordiale* between Russia and France was based. A facsimile was presented to Tsar Nicholas II during his visit to Paris in 1896.

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Anna's signature has evoked particular interest among linguists, both Romanic and Slavic. At least twenty articles have been published on this subject[10] and many apt and helpful observations have been made, but the very reading of the signature must raise reservations. The crucial factor here is the phonetic reading in the word "РЬИНА" or "РЪИНА" of the jer that appears after the letter "Р," inasmuch as it determines the sound of this utterance.

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[9]   *Recueil des actes de Philippe Ier*, 51–53 (no. 18); Hallu, *Anne de Kiev*, 188. On 26 January 1065 Anna accompanied her son to Orléans, and two years later, in 1067, to Melun. This time the chancery did not fail to note on both occasions "*subscriptum Annae reginae.*"

[10] Danuta Poppe and Andrzej Poppe, "Anna regina Francorum: Przyczynek paleograficzny," *Studia i Materiały z Historii Kultury Materialnej* (Warsaw) 71 (2006): 246.

The Cyrillic alphabet has two special letters called jers (ъ, ь), designated as reduced vowels. At the dawn of old Slavic literature, they represented sounds similar but not identical to the vowels *o* and *e*. The importance of the written jer—and there is general agreement on this point—lies in its representation of the eleventh-century Rus' vernacular.[11] Hence it is critical to determine whether the jer in Anna's signature is the back or the front jer.

Anna's signature (see the accompanying reproduction of the document and the detail showing her signature) has often been redrawn, not very accurately for the most part. Paleographic observations are rare and usually superficial and verging on the dilettantish, for instance, when it was claimed on the basis of the letters *N* and *H* that this is a hybrid of Latin and Cyrillic letters, when in fact what we have here is the purest *ustav* based on uncial Greek letters. There was no admission of the possibility that the jer in Anna's signature could be a front jer, even though paleographic analysis of the writing system of those times gives every possible proof of this.

In terms of the shape of the letters, Anna's signature is close to the script of the Ostromir Gospel of 1056–57, but the shape of the front jer is characterized by a longer horizontal stroke (serif) that resembles the shape of that letter in some eleventh- and twelfth-century graffiti on the walls of the St. Sophia Cathedral in Novgorod and in much more numerous local birch-bark inscriptions dating from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.[12] One may therefore conclude that the front jer with an elongated horizontal serif appears more frequently in inscriptions by individuals, which may also be determined by the choice of writing material and implement: it was difficult to produce uniform letters when scoring with a burin on hard material. By contrast, the script of professional scribes, who wrote mainly on parchment with a pen dipped in ink, was characteristically regular. Anna wrote her signature with a pen. The line thickness of the letter ь allows us to deduce that she wrote with an even

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[11] Aleksei Shakhmatov, *Ocherki drevneishego perioda istorii russkago yazyka* (Petrograd: Otdelenie russkago yazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk, 1915), 203; Kristoffer Nyrop, *Grammaire historique de la langue française*, 4th ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1939), § 253 (1st ed., 1904, p. 178); among more recent studies is an article by George Y. Shevelov, "On the So-called Signature of Queen Ann of France (1063)," in his *In and around Kiev* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1991), 44–51. The state of knowledge at the turn of the twentieth century about Anna's autograph is discussed in Simon Franklin, *Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus', c. 950–1300* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 108.

[12] V. L. Yanin and A. A. Zalizniak, *Novgorodskie gramoty na bereste (iz raskopok 1990–1996 gg.)* (Moscow: Russkie slovari, 2000), 208, plate 34.

stroke without raising the pen. Beginning on the left of the horizontal serif, she could have elongated it unduly in a fit of irritation.

It should also be noted that Anna's signature, following Greek and Cyrillic writing practice, ties the words together. This is yet another proof that Anna was fluent in reading and writing Cyrillic. Suggestions that her level of fluency was limited to rendering the Old French "*reine*" or transcribing the Latin "*regina*" (with omission of the elided *g*) by means of a few Cyrillic letters cannot be taken seriously.

Paleography shows that the jer in Anna's signature can be the front jer, dispels the doubts raised in the literature on this question, and opens up new vistas for linguistic research.[13]

The mystery of Anna's unique Cyrillic signature on the parchment of a royal document is thus readily explained. Meeting with the Regency Council, the queen mother, having familiarized herself with the contents of the document, noted the absence of the formula "*subscriptum Annae reginae*" where she was to make the sign of the cross according to chancery practice. She reacted spontaneously. Having crossed out her monogram (the smaller cross on the photograph), she amplified it with the bold flourish of her signature. Differing strikingly in size (72 mm in length) from the minuscule Latin text, it made a substantial point: this was Anna's emotional response to the attempt to eliminate her from the Regency Council and an assertion of her status of *consors regni*, acquired during the lifetime of her royal husband. In light of this, this seemingly curious signature emerges as an important primary source.

Translated by Andrij Hornjatkevyč

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[13] For details, see Poppe and Poppe, "Anna regina Francorum," 239–46. We are indebted to Boris A. Uspensky for pointing out that in the oldest South Slavic manuscripts the shape of the two jers, ь and ъ, is not always differentiated. Worth noting in this regard is the fundamental importance of paleography—an auxiliary discipline so often neglected in university curricula—for philologists and historians.

The Early Modern European "Jewish Woman"

Moshe Rosman

The term "the Jewish Woman," as used in scholarship purporting to portray Jewish women in history, rests on an essentialist assumption that all Jewish women partook of some "essential nature" that conditioned the behavior of each and every one of them. One of the objectives of historiography is to classify phenomena by finding things they have in common, and Jewish women must have been typified by some shared characteristics in order to be included in one class. However, to collapse an entire category into the singular "woman" rather than the plural "women" is to move from typology to stereotype. It means creating a normative, prescriptive ideal rather than describing something that existed in reality, positing what characterized (or should have characterized) women rather than analyzing what they did.[1] In the case of Jewish women it typically consists of extrapolating from what the "dead white males" of Jewish history—rabbis—wrote about what they imagined, or wanted, Jewish women to be like and asserting that this is how "the Jewish Woman" actually behaved.

For example, in the 1940s and 1950s the historian Jacob Katz dared to raise subjects pertaining to Jewish women's lives, such as gender hierarchy, the function of marriage and sexual life, prostitution, and illegitimacy. He was taken to task by his more establishmentarian colleague Hayyim Hillel Ben-Sasson, who valiantly rose up to defend the honor of the traditionally pious, chaste, and noble "Jewish Woman."[2]

Another example is the article "Woman" in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (1972).[3] It presents a history of the ideas and attitudes of Jewish men about the idealized Jewish woman and discusses the status of "the woman" in Jewish law and her role in society from biblical times until the

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[1] Cf. Elisheva Baumgarten, unpublished lecture delivered at the Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History in Jerusalem, 21 June 2005.

[2] For details on this controversy, see Moshe Rosman, *How Jewish Is Jewish History?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 7.

[3] Vol. 16: 623–30.

modern state of Israel (which status and role, it might be added, were largely determined by men). There is no consideration of the behavior of actual women, either as individuals or collectively, or of the historical experience of women in various Jewish communities. Interestingly, this encyclopedia contains no corresponding article entitled "Man."[4] Apparently the encyclopedia's editors would not have presumed to dispose of the subject of men in a single article that did not even describe them and was devoted to the attitudes of someone else toward them.

Instead of a summary of ideas about the ideal woman, what is required historiographically is in-depth research on "Jewish women" that explores their social, cultural, and economic variety and examines their historical reality in many different contexts. Conclusions regarding characteristics or behaviors many women shared can be reached only in the wake of wide-ranging, detailed, and painstaking research. The result will be a range of types of women, not the exclusive, normative "woman." While noting commonalities of situation, behavior, and *mentalité*, such description will be marked by complexity, nuance, and subtlety in place of simplistic pronouncement. Subgroups, exceptional types, and outstanding individuals will all be duly noted.

A step in the process of moving from positing "the Jewish Woman" to describing Jewish women is to take a critical look at some stereotypes. One of these is the ideal of early modern Jewish women as pious, silent, modest, humble, submissive, passive, obedient, and uneducated. Men may have wanted women to be like this.[5] Were they?

An apt contrast to this stereotype is probably the most famous early modern Jewish woman, Glikl bas Judah of Hameln (1646–1724).[6] Glikl was pious. According to her own testimony, during at least some period

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[4]   There is an article called "Man, the Nature of" (11: 842–49), the subject of which is what might be termed "human" nature (although here, as elsewhere, the default choice is the male) as expressed in the Bible and rabbinic literature. In fact, the "Woman" article might more accurately have been titled "Woman, the Nature of."

[5]   For this notion relative to Jewish women, see many of the chapters in *Woman*, ed. Leo Jung (vol. 3 of his *The Jewish Library*) (London and New York: Soncino Press, 1970); the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*; the reference in n. 2; and, in *History of the Jewish People*, ed. Hayyim Hillel Ben Sasson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), see the index s.v. "Woman." Compare similar ideas about other European women explicated in the articles in *Women in Reformation Europe: Public and Private Worlds*, ed. Sherrin Marshall (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), especially the editor's introduction.

[6]   The material about Glikl is contained in her memoirs, *The Life of Glückel of Hameln, 1646–1724: Written By Herself*, ed. and trans. Beth-Zion Abrahams (New York: T. Yoseloff, 1963); see also Natalie Z. Davis, *Women on the Margins: Three Seventeenth-Century Lives* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).

in her life she attended synagogue every day.[7] She was concerned with religious observance and tried to make her children into God-fearing Jews (1–5). However, she is not epitomized by any of the other adjectives mentioned in the previous paragraph denoting women's bystander role in society and culture.

Glikl was educated. As a child she spent some time in a formal school institution. Her memoirs' citation of many edifying stories testifies to both her wide-ranging reading and her learning from the public sermons and lessons of various learned men (14 and *passim*).

While undoubtedly modestly dressed, Glikl had a sure sense of her own worth and was not humble. For example, in recounting the festivities surrounding her eldest daughter's marriage, Glikl had no doubts about the appeal of the principals—her children: "We had no rest all day from the eminent and distinguished visitors who came to see the bride. In truth my daughter was really beautiful and had no equal…. My son Mordecai was then about five years old; there was no more beautiful child in the whole world, and we had dressed him becomingly and neatly. The courtiers nearly swallowed him for very admiration, especially the prince, who held his hand the whole time" (78–79; cf. 64, 67, 139–40).

Glikl also took pride in the conspicuous consumption on display at the wedding: "On the wedding day, immediately after the marriage ceremony, there was a collation of all kinds of the finest sweetmeats, foreign wines and out-of-season fruits. One can well imagine all the excitement!" (78–79).

Glikl's relationship with her husband, Chaim, was characterized by mutual consultation, joint initiatives, and efforts co-ordinated between them, not by passive, submissive obedience on her part: "He took advice from no one but me, and did nothing until we had talked it over" (42). While Chaim was alive, and even more after he died, Glikl engaged in hard bargaining with business interlocutors, and her activity was characterized by decisiveness and advocacy of her own interests, not by meek silence (see, e.g., 56–58, 61–67, 87–90, 110–11, 114, 125). Morerover Glikl was clear-eyed, unromantic, and utilitarian when finding matches for her children and in deciding how much to help them once they were married (e.g., 99, 114–26). Note this "tender" expression of motherly love when her son had difficulty in repaying a commercial loan she had advanced him: "The following morning I went to [my son's] shop with him. There was really a great stock of goods in it. He gave me goods to the value of 3,000 Reichstaler of the money he owed me, at the price that

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[7] *The Life of Glückel of Hameln*, 178–80 (subsequent in-text page references are to this edition).

he had paid. One can imagine the face I made and how it pleased me to have to take goods instead of money, but I only wanted to help my child" (120).

In being assertive, proactive, educated, and unsentimental, was Glikl exceptional? In the words of her biographer, Chava Turniansky, "Not a few of the dozens of women who populate her book were similar to her on many parameters: They also belonged to the nouveau riche aristocracy ... they were also very active alongside their husbands in the economic sphere (some were the main breadwinners); they also ran businesses and supported their families in dignity and affluence after their husbands died. They also knew how to read and write"[8].

In addition to serving as a counterpoint to the stereotype of the quiet, modest, passive, subservient woman, Glikl and some of the women she described undermine another conventional notion about traditional women and the way they fit into society. Deuteronomy 22: 28–29 reads: "If a man comes upon a virgin who is not engaged and he seizes her and lies with her, and they are discovered, the man who lay with her shall pay the girl's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife. *Because he has violated her, he can never have the right to divorce her*" (emphasis added).

This rule that as punishment for his crime a rapist is obligated to marry his victim without the right of divorce is an acute expression of an idea that probably originated long before Deuteronomy and certainly lasted long after it; namely, that in traditional society a formally institutionalized connection to a man was an essential prerequisite to a woman's functioning in social contexts and to the realization of her potential as a person.

Glikl, however, adduced several examples that force us to rethink this assumption. In her book three women appear—Yenta Ganz, Beila (Glikl's mother), and Glikl herself—each of whom consciously chose not to remarry following the death of their first husband (35, 95, 136). It is by now a convention of early modern European historiography that the most autonomous, empowered, and respected women were affluent widows.[9] Glikl understood this and therefore declared, "Matches with the most distinguished men in the whole of Germany had been broached to

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[8]   Chava Turniansky, "The Image of the Woman in the Memoirs of Glikl Hamel" [in Hebrew], in *Eros, Eirusin, Ve-Isurin*, ed. I. Gafni and I. Bartal (Jerusalem, 1998), 189. For the best edition of Glikl's memoirs and generous historical and biographical background material, see Turniansky's Hebrew edition, titled *Glikl: Zikhronot, 1691–1719* (Jerusalem, 2006).

[9]   *A History of Women in the West*, vol. 3, *Renaissance and Enlightenment Paradoxes*, ed. Natalie Z. Davis and Arlette Farge (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1993), index s.v. "Widows," esp. 42.

me, but as long as I could support myself on what my husband, peace unto him, had left me, it did not enter my head to marry again" (149).

Moreover, Glikl was convinced that remarriage would be contrary to the interest of her children. In retrospect, at least, she became of the opinion that for a widow able to support and marry off her children it was preferable to live out her life as an ascetic in the Land of Israel rather than enter into a second marriage: "So I, a sinner, should not have married again but should first have seen Miriam wedded, and then done what was seemly for a good, pious Jewish woman. I should have forsaken the vanity of this world and with the little left, gone to the Holy Land and lived there, a true daughter of Israel" (149).

However, ultimately Glikl did give in to social pressure and the temptation presented by the great wealth of Hirsch Levy, and she married him. From her perspective, the purpose of this marriage was to guarantee economic security for herself and her children (151–52). Her bitter regret, then, when her new husband went bankrupt is understandable. She cried out sarcastically: "I had to fall into the hands of a man and live the shame against which I had hoped to protect myself" (152). Of the expensive engagement gift Levy had given her, Glikl said: "The golden chain became, unfortunately, rope and iron fetters" (161). Thus, in contrast to the stereotype, Glikl, and at least some of the women of her generation, believed that it was not always advantageous to be wed.

Another stereotype concerning women that has taken root and seems to be gaining strength among scholars and the general reading public alike is the notion that the socioeconomic life of East European Jewry (both before and after the Partitions of Poland) was based on the institution of *Eshet Hayil*, that is, married women who supported their families and enabled their husbands to be full-time Talmud scholars. It is commonly claimed today that this was at least the ideal and to some extent the practical norm as well, as if Talmudic gender concepts proffering the rightful social roles of men and women were put into practice by all the "cultural descendants" of the authors of the Babylonian Talmud through to the nineteenth century.[10]

Eshet Hayil certainly existed. The sixteenth-century Polish-Ukrainian sage, Rabbi Solomon Luria ("Maharshal,"1510–74), for example, noted how "sometimes there are women who, as Eshet Hayil, support their husbands, and all of her husband's money is under her control."[11] Similarly,

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[10] See Daniel Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 151–85; and Iris Parush, *Reading Jewish Women* (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 2004), 38–46.

[11] *Yam Shel Shelomoh*, Bava Kama (Jerusalem, 1995), ch. 8, par. 29.

Chava Turniansky (quoted above) found examples of German Jewish married women who were the primary breadwinners for their families.

However, the existence of a custom or an institution among a small sector of the public does not make it a norm, in either practice or theory. A large majority of Jewish women in early modern central and eastern Europe were economically dependent on their husbands. This is readily apparent from the fact that usually a wife's standard of living declined upon her husband's death. Often a widow was forced to take urgent measures to maintain economic viability—selling her home, finding a new husband to support her, giving up the family business. Widows figure prominently on various communities' lists of poor people. Moreover, as a rule, single women found it difficult to support themselves properly and were relegated to low-status and low-paying trades and commerce.[12]

Neither was *Eshet Hayil* a theoretical norm. The Cracow Jewish community record book noted in passing in 1721 "the custom of men and women who always go around searching for their livelihood."[13] That is, the normal expectation was that both members of a married couple were to earn money in the marketplace and contribute to the economic well-being of their household. The available sources indicate that many women were employed in petty moneylending, peddling, tavern-keeping, and the needle trades. Characteristically, they were partners—albeit usually junior ones—in the family economic enterprise. Even an affluent woman was normally in the economic shadow of her husband until he died. Typically, only then, if she had money, could she behave independently. There were a few widowed Jewish women who were entrepreneurial magnates, such as Rashka Fishel and Gitel Kożuchowski, but generally in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in this period *Eshet Hayil* was a marginal phenomenon.

The ideas about women examined thus far have been held by and exerted an influence on researchers and scholars. There were also stereotypes about women that operated in history as part of the cultural baggage of the people scholars studied. Delineation of these stereotypes can contribute to an understanding of attitudes, *mentalité*, and behavior in the past, as well as gauge the degree to which these changed over time.

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[12] See Moshe Rosman, "The History of Jewish Women in Early Modern Poland: An Assessment," *Polin* 18 (2005): 40–41; cf. Tamar Salmon-Mack, "Marital Issues in Polish Jewry: 1650–1800" (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 2002), English abstract on 315–16.

[13] Bernard Dov Weinryb, *Texts and Studies in the Communal History of Polish Jewry*, vol. 19 of Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research (Philadelphia, 1950), 216.

A large portion of old Yiddish literature (sixteenth–eighteenth centuries) disseminated in both German-speaking lands and the Commonwealth was written for "women and men who are like women," an expression from the title page of the *Brantspiegel* (Basel, 1602), a Yiddish moral conduct book. This arresting expression, which has gained wide celebrity thanks to Chava Weissler's work,[14] is a variation on a formulaic phrase found as far back as the Talmud: "women and ignoramuses."[15] This cliché is, of course, also based on a stereotype: that women are ignorant and uneducated, with all that those adjectives pejoratively imply.

This attitude classed women with what was, in reality, the majority of men, but denied them any possibility of acquiring significant cultural capital and joining the cultural elite. It reflected one of two main stereotypes in connection with women that largely determined the cultural view of Jewish women in traditional central and eastern Europe.

First of all, women were "women," expected to participate in the culture as facilitators (while men were performers). In the Talmud it was expressed thus: "Rav said to Rav Hiyya: How do women gain merit? By bringing their sons to the synagogue and sending their husbands to the study hall and waiting for their husbands until they return from there."[16] In the sixteenth century, Rabbi Moses Isserles (d. 1572) put it like this: "A woman is not obligated to teach her son Torah, but if she helps her son or husband study Torah, she shares their reward."[17]

The second stereotype, as noted above, was "women and ignoramuses," used to imply that these types of people were cultural bystanders. They lacked sufficient cultural capital to empower themselves culturally and remained marginal with respect to the cultural elite. Women, then, were thought of both as facilitators and bystanders with respect to the patriarchal culture controlled by men. As bystanders, women were not supposed to be active cultural performers; as facilitators they were indeed performers, but of inferior status.

In the early modern period it is possible to discern a long, slow process of blurring of the genderized cultural boundaries between men and women. As cultural bystanders women were in the same category as many men. Like them, in the early modern period Jewish women had the opportunity to increasingly acquire cultural capital, as attested by the growing Yiddish library of the period that enabled women and unlearned

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[14] Chava Weissler, *Voices of the Matriarchs* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 53; cf. 38.

[15] Babylonian Talmud (BT), Tractate (T.) Megillah 18a, in Hebrew: "Nashim ve-amei ha-aretz."

[16] BT T. Brakhot 17a.

[17] Shulhan Arukh (standard code of Jewish law), Mappah Yoreh Dei'ah 246: 6.

men to be informed and involved, culturally speaking. With respect to women's role as cultural facilitators, the male performers could not allow the cultural gap between them and their female helpmates to grow to the point where the women would not understand the overall meaning of their facilitative activities. It might be very difficult for facilitators who were not conversant with the culture to devote themselves to advancing it. It was therefore necessary to impart more cultural capital to them.

Basically, the expectation that women would be cultural facilitators did not change. Women remained responsible for the physical and spiritual welfare of their families and, in the words of Rabbi Jacob Emden (1697–1776), were expected to "conduct their households in cleanliness."[18] They were supposed to create circumstances conducive to their husbands' economic and religious accomplishments. The *tekhine* prayers women customarily said offer a good example of this. They brim with women's petitions that they might be able to secure the health, welfare, and spiritual and material success of their husbands and children.

However, if the idea of women as facilitators remained, the concept of bystander underwent significant modification. The elite saw women less as bystanders or observers and more as performers. New books explaining religious commandments addressed to women signified a new approach to women's religious lives. Moral-conduct literature presumed to direct women's everyday behavior. Books of *tekhines* constituted something of a women's liturgy, furthered the institutionalization of women's prayer, and gave women a new tool for cultural participation.

There are several signs that in the early modern period women passed from being guests in the synagogue to being participants in it. From the sixteenth century synagogues began to be built with a *weibershul* (women's annex) attached, and from the early seventeenth century synagogues were remodeled or newly built with women's sections that were architecturally integral to the building.[19] With respect to Jewish law (Halakhah), in the sixteenth century (and even earlier) some authorities ruled against the stringent customs (forbidding menstruants to touch holy objects, participate in public rituals, or even attend the synagogue service)

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[18] Jacob Emden, *Megillat Sefer*, ed. Avraham Bick (Shauli) (Jerusalem, 1979), 93.

[19] *Weibershule* had existed in the high Middle Ages but fell into desuetude later on. Synagogues built in Cracow in the sixteenth century, for example, did not have provisions for women's seating. See Edward Fram, *My Dear Daughter: Rabbi Benjamin Slonik and the Education of Jewish Women in Sixteenth-Century Poland* (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2007), 60–70; Carol Krinsky, *Synagogues of Europe: Architecture, History, Meaning* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 28–31; and Rachel Wischnitzer, *The Architecture of the European Synagogue* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1964), 76–124.

that originated in *Baraita De-Niddah*, an early medieval work. In practice these were often applied more broadly and tended to restrict women's presence in the synagogue. Liturgically, in the Commonwealth in the eighteenth century there was a surge in the number of *tekhine* prayers intended for recitation by women in the synagogue. Likewise, at the same time certain traditional women's activities, such as *knaytlach laygen* (measuring candlewick at graves in the cemetery), were transformed from popular customs into ritual acts, quasi-commandments (*mitzvot*).[20]

The trend for women to become more active cultural performers is also reflected in the *tekhines*. A few of them, particularly those written by women, presented women in more important and dignified roles than they filled in real life, such as that of the high priest in the Temple in Jerusalem. Such imaginings seem to be a protest against the routine misogyny found in conventional Jewish text commentary.[21]

Shmuel Feiner has asserted that the liberal reforms that Maskilim proposed with regard to women were not motivated by a maskilic desire to make women as educated and enlightened as men should be. The Maskilim were prepared to upgrade women's cultural capital only to the degree that it would serve to have them fulfill their role as facilitators in the evolving modern context.[22] In the early modern period as well, the granting of more cultural opportunities to women bound them ever more tightly to the culture and better immunized them against the growing alien temptations of the post-Renaissance and post-Reformation world. The change in the female cultural role was a means of ensuring their continuing service to the culture as facilitators, and it actually reinforced the male power elite. Recognition and institutionalization of women's cultural activity was a way to maintain control over them in a changing situation.

In summary, we have noted here five stereotypes of early modern Jewish women. Regarding two of them—that women were passive and subservient and that it was always advantageous to a woman to be attached to a man—my claim is: not necessarily. The stereotype of *Eshet Hayil* describes a marginal social phenomenon in our period and was not the norm. The notions of woman as facilitator and woman as cultural bystander were somewhat dynamic. The changing context of the period made it necessary to enable women to acquire more cultural capital in order to continue facilitating. However, the fact that women were becom-

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[20] Rosman, "History of Jewish Women," 48–49.

[21] Weissler, *Voices of the Matriarchs*, 62–65, 70–74, 77–85, 96–103.

[22] Shmuel Feiner, "The Modern Jewish Woman: A Test Case of the Relationship between Haskalah and Modernity," *Zion* 58 (1993): 453–99.

ing more active as cultural performers clashed with the idea that women should be cultural bystanders. Eventually, this dissonance contributed to a fundamental challenge to the traditional place of women in Jewish culture. While the full ramifications of this challenge were not clear in the early modern period, its trajectory arched into modern times with explosive potential.

The Russian Imperial Authorities and Yevhen Chykalenko's *Rozmovy pro selske khoziaistvo*

David Saunders

Yevhen Chykalenko (1861–1929), agricultural innovator and cultural patron, was a leading Ukrainian awakener of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although specialists have long been familiar with his career,[1] and although his name has reached a wider public in post-Soviet Ukraine,[2] journalists who attended the first showing of a short documentary film about Chykalenko at a festival in Donetsk towards the end of 2005 still professed ignorance of him.[3] Discussion of his life and work therefore looks set to continue.

The present essay details the attitude of a number of agencies of the tsarist government—the censors, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Education—to Chukalenko's most famous publication, a series of pamphlets that came out in Odessa and St. Petersburg between 1897 and 1903 under the collective title *Rozmovy pro selske khoziaistvo*

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[1] Especially owing to the publication of Dmytro Doroshenko, *Yevhen Chykalenko: Yoho zhyttia i hromadska diialnist* (Prague: Vydannia Fondu imeny Ye. Chykalenka pry Ukrainskomu akademichnomu komiteti, 1934); and Yevhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861–1907)* (New York: Ukrainska vilna akademiia nauk u SSha, 1955).

[2] Chykalenko's memoirs have been reprinted in editions by both Valerii Shevchuk (Kyiv: Tempora, 2003) and M. I. Tsymbaliuk (Kyiv: Rada, 1903). Inna Starovoitenko has edited two volumes of his correspondence: *Lysty Yevhena Chykalenka z emihratsiï do Serhiia Yefremova (1923–1928 rr.)* and *Lysty Leonida Zhebunova do Yevhena Chykalenka, 1907–1919 roky* (Kyiv: Instytut ukrainskoi arkheohrafii ta dzhereloznavstva im. M. S. Hrushevskoho NAN Ukrainy, 2003, 2005). Three volumes of his diaries, titled *Shchodennyk*, have come out: the first two, for 1907–17 and 1918–19, were edited by I. Davydko (Kyiv: Tempora, 2004), and the third, on 1919–20, was edited by Vladyslav Verstiuk and Marko Antonovych (Kyiv and New York: Olena Teliha, 2005). He and his family are the subject of a chapter in Yurii Khorunzhy, *Ukrainski metsenaty: Dobrochynnist—nasha rysa* (Kyiv: KM Akademiia, 2001), 55–86. Journal articles about him include idem, "Plekach zeren dukhovnykh," *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 9–15 December 2000; Volodymyr Panchenko, "Ukrainskyi Don Kykhot: 'Holovnyi tkach' materialnoi tkanyny nashoi istorii," *Den*, 20 January 2001; idem, "Yevhen Chykalenko, onuk metsenata," *Den*, 9 November 2002; and Nataliia Hamolia, "Sponsor ukrainskoi spravy," *Kontrakty*, 21 July 2003.

[3] Ihor Siundiukov, "Shchob Ukraina bula Ukrainoiu: Vidbulas premiera dokumentalnoho filmu pro Yevhena Chykalenka," *Den*, 8 November 2005.

(Conversations about Farming). Ostensibly the pamphlets were innocuous, for they dealt with crop rotation, livestock, plants (particularly fodder grasses, corn, and beets), viticulture, and market gardening. Because, however, their author was thought to be politically unreliable, because their subject matter was in the public eye as a result of the famine of 1891–92, because they were cheap and attracted a wide readership, and above all because they were in Ukrainian, the *Rozmovy* came to the special attention of the regime.

Chykalenko became an agricultural expert by a roundabout route. On being expelled from the natural-science section of Kharkiv University in 1883 for Ukrainophilism, he was banned from university towns and other large cities, and in 1885 went to live at his place of birth, an estate called Pereshory in the northwestern part of Kherson gubernia, in Ananiv county not far east of the modern boundary between Ukraine and Transnistria. There, he became a sort of Ukrainian version of Aleksandr Engelgardt, the Russian political dissident who, having been banned from cities in 1871, lived at Batishchevo in Smolensk gubernia and wrote celebrated "letters from the countryside" for a well-known "thick journal."[4]

Pereshory was located in what Halford Mackinder in 1904 called "The Geographical Pivot of History."[5] Struck by the fact that after thousands of years as a land of nomadic pastoralists southern Ukraine had come under the plough, Mackinder drew attention to the geostrategic significance of a shift that had significantly increased the power of the Russian Empire. Chykalenko's interest was less world-historical. Having grasped that the soil of the steppe was fertile but local water supplies were uncertain, with the result that record harvests could be succeeded by dearth, he began employing new agricultural techniques. On account of his new practices, Pereshory came through relatively unscathed when drought led to crop failure over large tracts of the southern Russian Empire in the early 1890s.[6] In his *Rozmovy* Chykalenko offered his methods to the public. The pamphlets were part of an extensive debate in the later Russian Empire about how to regularize the agricultural yields of the lands immediately north of the Black Sea.[7]

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[4]   Cathy A. Frierson, trans. and ed., *Aleksandr Nikolaevich Engelgardt's Letters from the Country, 1872–1887* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

[5]   H. J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *Geographical Journal* 23 (1904), 421–37. Paul Kennedy recently called this publication "one of the most remarkable articles on international affairs that has appeared in modern times"("Mission Impossible," *New York Review of Books*, 10 June 2004, 16).

[6]   Unreferenced claims by Chykalenko are substantiated later in the article.

[7]   The wider debates in which Chykalenko's pamphlets signify come to life in David Moon, "The Environmental History of the Russian Steppes: Vasilii Dokuchaev and the

The way Chykalenko publicized his work was almost certainly more important than the work itself. Unlike Engelgardt at Batishchevo, he did not write about his experience of the countryside in letters to highbrow Russian-language magazines. Or rather, he did so only once, in a Russian-language article for the journal of the Kherson zemstvo, and he quickly understood that it would not reach the readers he had in mind. Instead, he wrote cheap pamphlets for a wider public. When they were first published, the *Rozmovy* cost between six and ten kopecks,[8] which at the contemporary exchange rate was one to two American cents. Although these were not quite rock-bottom prices by the standards of the later Russian Empire,[9] they nonetheless ensured that Chykalenko would have an extensive readership.

The success of Chykalenko's pamphlets was all the greater on account of the language in which he wrote. By the late 1890s the Ukrainian inhabitants of the Russian Empire had been short of reading matter in their native tongue for several decades, for the imperial authorities had maintained a near-blanket ban on Ukrainian-language publications since 1863.[10] The authorities' major concern had been preventing the publication of the very thing Chykalenko wrote—cheap literature in Ukrainian for the masses.[11] How, then, did the Ananiv landowner get around the government's ban? He swrote in his memoirs that he did not find it easy.[12] The archival record both confirms his assertion up to a point and also complicates the early history of his *Rozmovy*.

Chykalenko certainly did not find it easy to publish the first of the pamphlets.[13] In November 1896 censors in Odesa passed his request for

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Harvest Failure of 1891," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 15 (2005): 149–74.

[8] St. Petersburg, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter RGIA), fond 382, desc. 2, file 1844, fols. 11 and 74 (price of the first and last of the "Rozmovy").

[9] Jeffrey Brooks has written about the enormously popular early twentieth-century Russian-language newspapers that cost only a kopeck. in *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular literature, 1861–1917* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 130–35.

[10] On the proscription of Ukrainian-language publishing in the Russian Empire between 1863 and 1905, see especially A. I. Miller, *"Ukrainskii vopros" v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.)* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2000), and Fedir Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876r.* (Kyiv and Kharkiv: VUAN, 1930, repr. Munich: Wilhem Fink, 1970).

[11] This is the main argument of my article "Russia's Ukrainian Policy (1847–1905): A Demographic Approach," *European History Quarterly* 25 (1995): 181–208.

[12] Chykalenko's own account of the *Rozmovy* can be found in his *Spohady* (1955), 186–90.

[13] Except where otherwise stated, the following story of the censorship of the first of

clearance to the Chief Administration for Publishing Affairs (Glavnoe upravlenie po delam pechati) in St. Petersburg, which in turn gave the pamphlet to the St. Petersburg Censorship Committee for a report.[14] On 10 January 1897 the head of that committee, Smaragd Ignatevich Kossovich,[15] reported to the Chief Administration that although the manuscript contained nothing harmful, it had to be banned because the key anti-Ukrainian edict of 18/30 May 1876 (the "Ems Ukase") prohibited all work in Ukrainian other than belles-lettres and historical documents. Five days later M. P. Soloviev, the head of the Chief Administration, informed Odesa of this conclusion.

On 24 January 1897 Chykalenko wrote a long letter of protest to the Chief Administration.[16] "Since 1891," he wrote, "I have been conducting large-scale experiments on my estate of about two thousand desiatine*s* [5,400 acres] in combatting drought by cultivating the fields in accordance with a method to which I was led by the writings of Professor P. A. Kostychev."[17] Since the results had been good, he had explained to the local peasants what he was doing. Those "who experimented in cultivating their fields in accordance with my instructions harvested an excellent crop in the dry year 1896," but those who went on using traditional methods "need loans for food and seed." Chykalenko went on: "This circumstance was noted by the chairman of the Agriculture Department of the Kherson zemstvo in his report on the journey he made to places where the harvest had been poor." In the hope of persuading a larger number of peasants of the validity of his methods, he had written a brochure about them in Ukrainian. On 26 October 1896 he had submitted it to the censorship office in Odesa. The Chief Administration had turned it down without giving a reason, but the reason, he felt, could only have been the language in which it was written, for "My manuscript addresses a specialist, highly technical issue and contains nothing blameworthy." The need for disseminating such work in Ukrainian was clear. Having already published a popular Russian-language article on his methods in the jour-

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Chykalenko's *Rozmovy* is taken from RGIA, fond 776, desc. 21, pt. 1, 1896, file 31, ll. 202, 209, 256, 258, 266–67, 271a-b-c, 272–73.

[14] "The secret 'Ems ukaz' of 1876 ... required all Ukrainian works of permitted categories to be censored twice—locally and in St. Petersburg" (I. P. Foote, "The St. Petersburg Censorship Committee, 1828–1905," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s., 24 (1991): 93).

[15] A "true cynic," according to a memoir in N. G. Patrusheva, comp., *Tsenzura v Rossii v kontse XIX—nachale XX veka: Sbornik vospominanii* (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003), 216.

[16] RGIA, 776/21/I/1896/31, ll. 266–67, the source of all the quotations in this paragraph.

[17] On Kostychev, see I. A. Krupenikov, *Pavel Andreevich Kostychev, 1845–1895* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987).

nal of the Kherson zemstvo, Chykalenko had satisfied himself "that the local peasant population did not understand this article and would not learn anything from it." He therefore wrote his Ukrainian brochure in precisely the way he conversed with peasants, in the same language and even using the same phrases. He concluded by asking the Chief Administration to review its decision in the light of his explanation.

Remarkably, Chykalenko won his case. Censor V. S. Adikaevsky[18] drew up a memorandum for the Chief Administration on official exceptions to the ban on Ukrainian-language publications, and Chykalenko's pamphlet appeared on the list. On 5 February 1897 the Chief Administration informed both the Odesa censors and the author that it had changed its mind.

Exceptions to the ban on publication in Ukrainian were rare.[19] What exactly brought about the happy outcome in respect of Chykalenko's first pamphlet is unclear. He said in his memoirs that he had friends in high places (including the Minister of Agriculture, A. S. Ermolov, who had himself written on the problem of the cultivation of the steppe),[20] but in imperial censorship files there is no evidence of pressure from such people. One is tempted to conclude that in this instance the censors, when pressed, sensed no threat from a work so apparently unpolitical and of such obvious practical worth.

The censors' moderation in 1897 did not stop them from obliging Chykalenko to press them again when he wanted to release a second edition of the first of his *Rozmovy* in 1900. Perhaps sensing that the pamphlet remained controversial, the author submitted the new edition to censors in both Odesa and Moscow.[21] All of them rejected it.[22] This time Chykalenko wrote to the minister of internal affairs.[23] After saying that by now he had been employing the anti-drought methods of Professor Kostychev for several years, that peasants adjacent to his estates in both Kherson and Poltava had imitated his example, and that the results of employing the methods had been good, he pointed out that the first of

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[18] A "living archive" of the Chief Administration (Patrusheva, *Tsensura*, 195).

[19] For a list drawn up in 1900 of Ukrainian-language works that had been permitted, see RGIA, 776/21/I/1900/404, ll. 450–56. Figures on the number and type of Ukrainian works that had been submitted and banned in the previous two years, including figures on exceptions, are to be found in ibid., ll. 457–61.

[20] Moon, "Environmental History," 162.

[21] RGIA, 776/21/I/1900/404, ll. 59 and 103.

[22] Ibid., ll. 153 and 379.

[23] On 29 August 1900 (ibid., 776/21/I/1900/402, ll. 114–16, from which most of the rest of this paragraph is taken).

his *Rozmovy* had been cleared by the censorship in 1897, approved on publication by the Academic Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture, admitted to libraries run by the Ministry of Education, and awarded a silver medal by the Kharkiv Agricultural Society. He now wanted to print a second edition. Since it hardly differed from the first, he could only assume that permission to publish had been denied because the work was in Ukrainian. The work's usefulness, however, was wholly dependent on the "comprehensibility of [its] language" to peasants. "If I had composed the brochure in the Russian language it would have remained incomprehensible to the peasants of southern Russia [Ukraine], since in school [where tuition was exclusively in Russian] they learn only to read, not to understand what they have read." In view of the importance of popularizing ways to cope with drought, Chykalenko believed brochures such as his ought to be published not only in Ukrainian, but also in the German of Ukraine's German colonists, Bulgarian, and Romanian. By issuing a translation of his work, the Bessarabia zemstvo had recognized the value of popularization in Romanian.[24] If the minister were to read his brochure, he would see that it was not harmful but useful. Even the manager of the Kherson Peasant Bank distributed it among his borrowers as "an essential handbook." The second and third *Rozmovy* were already in print, having been sanctioned by the Chief Administration "on the basis of a report about them by the Academic Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture." A second edition of Part 1 ought therefore to be permitted.

Once again Chykalenko won his case. On 11 September 1900, less than two weeks after his letter of protest, he received permission via Odesa for the publication of a second edition of the first of his *Rozmovy*.[25] It was beginning to look as if the imperial authorities were really not very troubled by this instance of writing in Ukrainian. Since, as Chykalenko said himself, the second and third of his *Rozmovy* had already received official approval, and since archival records do not indicate particular hostility on the part of the censors to any of the pamphlets other than the first,[26] one is tempted to argue that the description he pro-

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[24] The Romanian-language edition of the first of Chykalenko's *Rozmovy* appeared in 1899. See Krupenikov, *Kostychev*, 177.

[25] RGIA, 776/21/I/1900/402, ll. 117–18.

[26] Other references to the censorship of Chykalenko's *Rozmovy* include RGIA, 776/21/I/1898/284, ll. 110, 145, 158, 259, and 264–65 and 776/21/I/1902/551, l. 48 (the pamphlet on livestock, 23 February–31 July 1898 and March 1902); 776/21/I/1899/343, ll. 69, 76, 107–108, 125, 350, and 371–72, 776/21/I/1900/404, ll. 269, 298, 366, and 372, and 776/21/I/1902/551, l. 53 (the pamphlet on plants, 23 March–30 November 1899, 27 September–26 November 1900, March 1902); 776/21/I/1901/479, ll. 2 and 7 and 776/21/I/1903/626, ll. 288–89 (the pamphlet on viticulture, 13–19 January 1901 and Au-

vides in his memoirs of obstacles in the path of the *Rozmovy* is rather overblown. Such a conclusion, however, would be hasty, for the censorship administration was only one of the departments of the tsarist government that reviewed the *Rozmovy*. Whereas censors expressed their opinion about them before they were published, other departments took a look at them once they had reached the public domain.

The pamphlets proved popular. A reviewer of the first of them in the journal of the Kherson zemstvo said that, because it was so clear, landowners would read it even if they were already familiar with the work of Chykalenko's mentor, Professor Kostychev. "As for the peasants," he said, "this booklet is their only guide, for all others are inaccessible to them by virtue of their exposition, their language, and their price."[27] Citing this accolade and others, an official of the Ministry of Agriculture said in June 1897 that the first pamphlet "had received very positive reviews in many South Russian periodical publications," that it had virtually sold out within a few months of publication (via the zemstvos), and that the author was preparing a new edition.[28] Not unnaturally, Chykalenko sought to maximize dissemination of his work. His enthusiasm brought him into contact with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Education. Unlike the censors, and despite some signs to the contrary, these bodies tended, over time, to become more rather than less mistrustful of the pamphlets.

On 12 April 1897 Chykalenko wrote to the minister of agriculture from Pereshory to ask him to submit the first of the *Rozmovy* to the Academic Committee of his ministry so that it could be considered for use in the ministry"s educational institutions.[29] The Academic Committee commissioned a report from P. S. Kossovich, a teacher at the St. Petersburg Forestry Institute.[30] The report described how Chykalenko had realized ten years previously in Kherson that "it was necessary to change the cultivation of fallow and also to introduce, apart from eared grains, sowings of grasses, maize, and beets. Thanks to these innovations, he got through the dearth years of 1891 and 1892 more easily than his neighbors, and in

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gust 1903); and 776/21/I/1902/551, ll. 87 and 94 (the pamphlet on market-gardening, late March–early April 1902).

[27] P. Kondratsky, "Selsko-khoziaistvennaia zametka (Po povodu knigi E. Kh. Chikalenko 'Rozmova pro selske khoziaistvo')," *Sbornik Khersonskago zemstva* 5 (1897): 174.

[28] RGIA 382/2/1844, l. 6, specifying, apart from the review cited in the preceding note, reviews in *Poltavskiia gubernskiia vedomosti*, 1897, no. 69; *Yuzhnoe obozrenie*, 1897, no. 91; *Odesskii listok*, no. 124; *Zemledelie*, 1897, no. 14; and *Khoziain*, 1897, no. 12.

[29] Ibid., l. 1; quotations in the rest of this paragraph come from ibid., ll. 4, 7, 11.

[30] Not to be confused with the censor S. I. Kossovich.

general his estate began to make a profit." The official mentioned above who spoke of the pamphlet's popularity added that it had the further merit of being accessible to the common people, the very consideration that usually prompted censors to place Ukrainian publications on the negative rather than the positive side of the ledger. When committee chairman I. P. Arkhipov also expressed approval of the pamphlet, a favorable response to Chykalenko's letter was certain. The committee duly approved the pamphlet for use in "lower agricultural schools" in gubernias where the peasants spoke Ukrainian. It also decided to inform the Ministry of Education that the pamphlet might be useful in state-run primary schools in those provinces. When, in due course, the primary-schools section of the ministry wrote back to say that it was going "to admit the aforesaid brochure into the libraries of the teachers' seminaries, teachers' libraries of primary schools, and free public libraries and reading rooms of those gubernias where the local peasant population speak in the Little Russian dialect," the first of Chykalenko's pamphlets received yet another fillip.

The Ministry of Agriculture went on to solicit and receive the censors' blessing for the Romanian edition of the first of Chykalenko's *Rozmovy*, to treat the second pamphlet equally generously in April 1899, and to approve the reprint of the first of the series in 1901.[31] In 1900, however, some members of the ministry's Academic Committee expressed doubts about the third of Chykalenko's pamphlets. A. A. Shults "observed that in view of the relatively limited dissemination of the Little Russian dialect in the Empire, he felt it would be sufficient to limit permission for Mr Chykalenko's brochure to the lower agricultural schools of those gubernias where the peasant population spoke the said dialect" (i.e., to exclude them from schools run by the Ministry of Education).[32] Everyone agreed with Shults except a certain V. I. Filipev, who held that "the dissemination or non-dissemination of this or that dialect ought not to play a part in the question of judging the merits of a work." In Filipev's opinion, the third pamphlet should be treated in exactly the same way as the first two, "to which," he said, "it is in no way inferior from the point of view of quality." It deserved not only approval for use in lower schools run by the Ministry of Agriculture "in the southern strip of Russia," but also recommendation by the ministry as useful "for the primary schools of the Ministry of Education located in the gubernias of the empire where the local peasant population speaks the Little Russian dialect." But Filipev failed to persuade his colleagues. In its conclusion, the Academic Com-

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[31] RGIA, 776/21/I/1899/343, ll. 14–15 (January 1899); 382/2/1844, ll. 13–37, 52–53, 60–62.

[32] Ibid., l. 48.

mittee explicitly adopted Shults's position: it decided not to recommend Chykalenko's third pamphlet for use in primary schools run by the Ministry of Education but merely to inform the other ministry that it was going to sanction the pamphlet for use in its own schools.[33] In other words, it sought to impose certain limits on the circulation of Chykalenko's work. Furthermore, it seems to have acted in this way solely because of the language in which Chykalenko was writing, for in expressing a certain doubt about the pamphlet Shults said nothing whatever about its content.

On the other hand, Chykalenko's next pamphlet—the fourth, on viticulture—did attract criticism at the Ministry of Agriculture on the grounds of content. M. K. Ballas said that he found it rather difficult to recommend the pamphlet for use in primary schools throughout the empire's "Little Russian" gubernias because viticulture was not feasible in the majority of them. In Kyiv, Poltava, and other gubernias located at around 50ºN, viticulture could be practiced only in circumstances unsuitable for general adoption. Even where it was generally appropriate, Chykalenko had failed to spell out the particular sorts of locale in which it could be introduced. Although Ballas thought the brochure perfectly satisfactory as far as it went and, despite his doubts, was willing to have it admitted to the libraries of the lower schools of the Ministry of Agriculture in the empire's Ukrainian gubernias, the ministry's Academic Committee decided to give this fourth pamphlet only the same lower degree of approval that its immediate antecedent had received.[34]

In 1903 the Ministry of Education joined the Ministry of Agriculture in expressing some doubts about Chykalenko''s work. On January 10 the Primary Schools Department told the Academic Committee of the Ministry of Agriculture that, having received the latter's reports on two of Chykalenko''s pamphlets—the fourth and the second edition of the first—it was not going to make either of them available in its free public reading rooms.[35] Thus official opinion seemed to be turning against Chykalenko. Although, in February 1905, the Academic Committee received a very favorable report on the fifth pamphlet from a teacher at the Uman school of market-gardening and agriculture,[36] it gave it only the same lower degree of approval that the third and the fourth pamphlets had received.[37] Certain imperial agencies appeared to be toughening their

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[33] Ibid, l. 48.

[34] Ibid., ll. 66–68 (March 1902).

[35] Ibid., l. 72.

[36] Ibid., l. 78.

[37] Ibid., l. 79.

attitude to Ukrainian-language publications just as pressure was mounting on the tsarist regime to abandon its negative treatment of Ukrainian culture.

The Russian authorities' handling of Chykalenko''s *Rozmovy* may not seem unduly harsh. Unlike, for example, Nikolai Turgenev's *La Russie et les Russes* of 1847, Alexander Herzen's *Kolokol* of the 1850s and 1860s, and Sergius (Serhii) Stepniak's *Russia under the Tzars* of 1885, the pamphlets did not have to be published in western Europe; and, unlike Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, they did not have to be published in a part of Ukraine beyond the reach of the tsar. They were cleared by the tsarist regime for publication, sometimes sanctioned for use in government-run schools, and always sanctioned for inclusion on the shelves of certain government-funded libraries. Yet the detailed scrutiny to which the authorities subjected them, the hiccups in the censorship process that prompted Chykalenko's letters of protest, and the apparent downturn in some agencies' enthusiasm for the pamphlets after about 1900 illustrate the problems of publishing and distributing Ukrainian-language material in the Russian Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If even Chykalenko's relatively uncontentious pamphlets could give rise to the volume of archival material on which this sketch has depended, it is easy to understand the lengths to which the tsarist regime was prepared to go to keep Ukrainians at bay. To judge by the fact that, on 8 January 1905, Chykalenko added his name to those of many others at the end of a petition calling on the Ministry of Internal Affairs to remove the constraints on publishing in Ukrainian,[38] officials had not succeeded in buying him off by the way in which they treated his *Rozmovy*. He surely agreed with the opinion of his friend Serhii Yefremov that allowing the publication of Ukrainian-language pamphlets on "market-gardening, for example, in bellelettristic form" represented only a very small concession on the part of the tsarist authorities to Ukrainians' needs.[39] In February 1905 Yefremov quoted Chykalenko at length on the way in which denying Ukrainians the right to publish in their native language greatly impaired Ukraine's chances of practical development.[40] Chykalenko was not a red-hot radical. He did not believe, for example, that Ukraine would be best served if the majority of its representatives in the first Russian State Duma of 1906 came from the peas-

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[38] RGIA, 776/21/I/1905/759, ll. 8–10.

[39] Serhii Yefremov, "Vne zakona: k istorii tsenzury v Rossii," in his *Literaturno-krytychni statti* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1993), 31 (originally published in January 1905).

[40] Sergei Efremov [Serhii Yefremov], "Zametki na tekushchie temy," *Kievskaia starina*, 1905, no. 2: 176.

ant estate.[41] But he did believe that reading matter for Ukrainian peasants should be in their own language. A regime that found this position difficult to accept was not well adapted to the needs of its subjects.

[41] A. A. Konik, "Ukrainskie krestiane na vyborakh v I Gosudarstvennuiu dumu," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, 2006, no. 3: 106.

Ukrainian Edmonton: Ethnicity, Space, and Identity in a Canadian Cityscape*

Frances Swyripa

Enclosed in a wrought-iron fence in a downtown alley off Jasper Avenue, the city of Edmonton's main artery and historical heart, stands a huge chestnut tree. Bare-branched and defiant during the long and bitter Canadian prairie winter, in the late spring it is magnificent in full bloom and stands as a leafy green canopy amidst cement and concrete during the city's short summer. A bench strategically placed at the base invites strollers, office workers on their lunch break, and local tree lovers to stop and sit. Perhaps they will read the plaque, installed in 1998 when the decision was made to keep what had become a local landmark, that identifies it as "The Holowach Tree," planted around 1920 by Sam Holowach behind his shop and home. The plaque does not say, however, who Sam Holowach was. In fact he was a Ukrainian immigrant who homesteaded in the growing Ukrainian bloc settlement east of Edmonton but soon abandoned farming for the city. There, first as a tailor and then as operator of his own dyeing and dry-cleaning business, he became one of Edmonton's pioneer Ukrainian entrepreneurs. Sam's son Walter, concertmaster with the Edmonton Symphony Orchestra, had brought the chestnut seed from Vienna, where he had studied the violin. His son Ambrose represented Edmonton for the Social Credit Party in both the House of Commons in Ottawa and the Alberta Legislature, and in 1962 he became the province's first cabinet minister of Ukrainian origin.[1] Preservation and com-

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[1] The Holowach Tree stands south of Jasper Avenue between 105 and 106 Streets. According to the plaque, it was "saved in 1998 with the generous support of the City of Edmonton, the HSBC Bank of Canada, Walter Holowach, 712560 Alberta Ltd., Terra Landscaping Ltd., Davey Tree Services Limited, Edmonton Meat Packing Ltd., and many other generous donors." The catalyst was Earl Andrusiak, vice-president of the adjacent HSBC Bank, who made saving the tree a condition of a loan to build a parking lot on the Holowach property (Earl Andrusiak to Frances Swyripa, 7 December 2008; <http://www .zoominfo.com/people/Andrusiak_Earl_>, accessed 7 December 2008). On the tree's

memoration of the "Holowach Tree" as part of the historical Edmonton cityscape, without any mention of an ethnic element of its history, suggests one of two things. Either it reflected a mainstreaming of Ukrainianness in the identity of Edmonton and Edmontonians that rendered the tree's ethnic associations normal and unremarkable, or it reflected an othering of Ukrainianness that excluded the tree's ethnic associations as negative and/or distracting.

This paper explores the relationship between ethnicity, public space, and identity in twentieth-century Edmonton by examining selected Ukrainian landmarks, past and present.[2] Its goals are twofold: to envision the cityscape as a specifically Ukrainian place, using the built environment and its material culture; and to integrate the Ukrainian ethnic story into the city's dominant Anglo narrative, drawing on reaction to the deliberate Ukrainianizing of spaces that belonged to the citizenry as a whole. How, when, and why visible markers of Ukrainianness were set apart and isolated, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, or embraced and celebrated by the larger city said much about the role of ethnicity in the Edmonton imagination and identity and about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian fact in particular. Broadly speaking, Ukrainians' physical impact on Edmonton and attitudes towards that impact both mirrored and reinforced the group's passage from suspect and marginalized foreigners to full, even privileged citizens with a unique position among the city's ethnic minorities. This entrance into the mainstream and prominence came about in part because of numbers—Ukrainians ultimately represented approximately one-tenth of the city's population—and the resulting political clout, and in part because of the peculiar character of Ukrainian settlement on the Canadian Prairies. At the same time, periodically Ukrainian space in Edmonton continued to be challenged, even in the closing years of the twentieth century, attesting to residual opposition to Ukrainians' officially sanctioned visibility and its implications for power sharing. Such challenges to this one group's access to and claims

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story, see the City of Edmonton Archives (hereafter CEA), Newspaper Clipping Files, "Samuel Holowach"; and *Heritage Trees of Alberta* (Turner Valley: Heritage Tree Foundation of Canada, 2008), 68. Samuel Holowach (the spelling varied) was first mentioned in the Edmonton *Henderson Directory* in 1908, when he was listed as the proprietor of the International Pantorium, living at 528 Kinistino Avenue. His progress in life can be followed in subsequent directories.

[2] On urban ethnic neighborhoods, see, for example, Robert Harney, ed., *Gathering Place: Peoples and Neighbourhoods of Toronto, 1834–1945* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1985); and David Chuenyan Lai, *Chinatowns: Towns within Cities in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), which discusses Edmonton.

on public space also acted as flashpoints for more generalized debate and tensions over the definition of the "Edmonton community" and its boundaries.

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In the early twentieth century only a few hundred Ukrainians, mostly unskilled laborers and domestic servants, joined by a handful of aspiring businessmen and professionals, lived in Edmonton with sufficient permanence to be counted by government census-takers. In 1911, for example, there were 692 Ukrainians, constituting 2.8 percent of the city's residents. Two decades later the number of Ukrainians in Edmonton had increased some sevenfold, but, at 6.2 percent of the city's population, there were not enough of them to keep pace with the increase of its non-Ukrainian population.[3] Many of these individuals, as well as many others who were never counted, spent longer or shorter periods in the city, earning money to support a homestead and its occupants. A major theme in early Ukrainian Edmonton was in fact the type of metropolitan/hinterland relationship that evolved between city and countryside. It affected the role Edmonton played in Ukrainian-Canadian consciousness and decision-making and the way in which the transient Ukrainian presence in the city affected its spatial organization, mentally and physically.

Illustrating the impact of rural/urban interaction on Edmonton's cityscape were two municipal locations near Jasper Avenue, one of which bordered the site of the present Hotel Macdonald, which, when it opened in 1915, immediately entered the ranks of Canada's great railway hotels. The popular labels given the two sites by the Anglo host society, the "Galician Market" and the "Galician Hotel," underscored that Ukrainians and public spaces associated with them were deemed alien and threatening. The pejorative as well as descriptive term "Galician" was applied indiscriminately to immigrants from eastern Europe, and it epitomized all that Anglo-Canadian nation builders considered wrong with those newcomers: immorality and drunkenness, hot tempers, disrespect for women, superstition, and squalor. Although neither the "Galician Market" nor the "Galician Hotel" was in any way an official designation, together the terms served to separate "them" from "us" and left little doubt that in pioneer Edmonton, Ukrainians were outsiders.[4]

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[3] William Darcovich and Paul Yuzyk, eds., *A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891–1976* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980), series 21.244. By 1976 12.6 percent of Edmonton's residents reported Ukrainian origins.

[4] Other "foreign" quarters set apart by the prairie host society included the Slavtowns of coal-mining centres, Regina's Germantown, and, of course, Winnipeg's infamous North End with its large eastern European population. Chinatowns, however, represented the

The "Galician Market," an open space on the edge of the emerging downtown core, was where Ukrainian homesteaders visiting the city parked their wagons, fed and watered their horses, met old friends and acquaintances, and mingled together with Ukrainians living in the city, where together they exchanged news and information about jobs and bought, sold, and traded various goods. But whereas for Ukrainians this space represented a gathering place where they felt comfortable and in control, to Anglo Edmonton it represented a place apart, across whose invisible borders none but potential employers of casual labor and those with goods or services to offer would venture. That the "Galician Market" figured in the physical landmarks of early downtown Edmonton and the mental landscape of its important citizens was confirmed by the local photographer Ernest Brown, whose sense of the historical moment and ubiquitous camera left a remarkable pictorial record of Edmonton's rise from a fur-trading post to a bustling frontier city. The "Galician Market" virtually backed onto Brown's studio, and one winter day in 1903 he made the short walk over to it to record its denizens for posterity: some two dozen men (a handful in suits and overcoats, most keeping warm in sheepskin and felt boots), a couple of young boys, no women. All but the horses munching their hay stared straight into the camera lens.[5]

If Ernest Brown also took photographs of the "Galician Hotel," a ramshackle collection of shacks and makeshift camps along the steep bank that ascended from the North Saskatchewan River to Jasper Avenue, none have survived. A description of the hotel exists, however, in the memoirs of Peter Svarich, a Ukrainian immigrant whose checkered career included a stint in the Klondike during the famed gold rush and unremitting defense of his fellow immigrants against prejudice and discrimination. In 1901, when a railway strike by unionized workers seeking higher wages forced hundreds of Ukrainian "scabs" off the job and the men arrived in Edmonton hungry and penniless, Svarich helped to organize work and accommodation. "There were some old abandoned shacks where we took up lodging," he later wrote. "[W]e moved one or

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ultimate distinction between "them" and "us." Kay Anderson, in "The Idea of Chinatown: The Power of Place and Institutional Practice in the Making of a Racial Category," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 77, no. 4 (1987): 580–98, uses Vancouver to argue that as both physical places and ideas, Chinatowns emerged as racialized constructs of "white" society and governments in the interests of their own cultural hegemony.

[5] Photographs B5583, B5584, Provincial Archives of Alberta (hereafter PAA), Edmonton. The unofficial Galician Market does not figure in Kathryn Merrett's *The History of Edmonton City Market, 1900–2000: Urban Values and Urban Culture* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2001), even as a point of cultural contrast.

two of them to the marketplace, where the Hotel Macdonald is located today, and used them as our headquarters and a storehouse for our flour and other provisions....We [also] built kitchens and stoves among the birches into the upper slope of the riverbank."[6] There could be a no more vivid image of the divisions that rent pioneer Edmonton than the contrast between Svarich's kitchens and stoves standing under trees and the majestic Hotel Macdonald, with its frieze ceilings and panelled wood, the domain of visiting dignitaries and Edmonton socialites, that occupied adjacent space.

Ukrainians also imposed an imprint on the city in the private and distinctly ethnic space they owned and/or controlled. Originally this space identified physical neighborhoods where Ukrainian residences, businesses, and community institutions were concentrated. They began with the old immigrant reception area to the east of the crystallizing downtown core, around Namayo and Kinistino Avenues, and later expanded to the working-class districts of Beverly (coal mining), Norwood (meat packing), and Calder (railway yards) where Ukrainian laborers found employment.[7] Much of the Ukrainian imprint in these areas was readable only to the experienced eye—for instance, bright red poppies, sunflowers, and garlic rather than the ornamental primroses and bluebells of a transplanted English garden. More forcefully identifying Ukrainian space, and differentiating "us" from "them" on several levels, were the Ukrainian names and Cyrillic lettering on the exterior of Ukrainian businesses and halls. One of these buildings was Ukrainska Knyharnia (Ukrainian Book Store) on Kinistino Avenue, acquired by Mykhailo and Dmytro Ferbey in 1914 (in the 1980s it was reconstructed at the historical Fort Edmonton Park).[8] The most visible statement of otherness, however, came from Ukrainians' distinctive onion-domed churches, so different from the piercing spires of French Catholicism or the castellated towers of the English countryside. The modest clapboard building with its single cupola, predecessor to the present imposing St. Josaphat Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral on 97 Street (Namayo Avenue), was another Ukrai-

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[6] Peter Svarich, *Memoirs, 1877–1904*, trans. William Kostash (Edmonton: Ukrainian Pioneers' Association of Alberta and Huculak Chair of Ukrainian Culture and Ethnography, 1999), 185–88.

[7] No study of Edmonton ethnic neighborhoods exists, but Ron Kuban, in *Edmonton's Urban Villages: The Community League Movement* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2005), maps the city in another way.

[8] In 2004 the Ferbey family celebrated ninety years in business. A reporter covering the event learned how the early bookstore served as a focal point for both Ukrainians in Edmonton and farmers from the outlying bloc settlement, who came not only for reading materials but also to hear the news. See *Edmonton Journal*, 18 October 2004.

nian landmark that Ernest Brown's camera captured.[9] Visually this area in the old immigrant reception core would eventually lose most of its identifiable Ukrainian features, to be replaced by the Chinese shops, institutions, and street decorations that marked Edmonton's new Chinatown.

Over the next several decades, but especially in the last quarter of the twentieth century, identification of Edmonton public space as ethnic became both more positive and more official as Ukrainians moved from "outsider" to "insider." The change mirrored a major shift not only in Ukrainian influence and the acceptance of Ukrainians as actors in the Edmonton narrative, but also in broader societal attitudes towards ethnicity. In particular, the rise of multiculturalism in the 1970s spurred city planners, backed by vote-conscious citizens, to commemorate the heritage of various ethnic communities in the names of new streets, subdivisions, buildings, and parks. In 1974, Eleniak Road and Pylypow Industrial were named after Vasyl Eleniak and Ivan Pylypiv, the first Ukrainians to come to Canada, in 1891, who homesteaded east of Edmonton. Interestingly, Eleniak Road and Pylypow Industrial appropriated the pioneer generation's experience in the rural bloc settlement for the neighboring city, symbolically bringing the hinterland into the metropolis, while simultaneously claiming the Ukrainian-Canadian founding story for Edmonton. But in lending their historical figures to the modern Edmonton cityscape, Ukrainians were in no way special: in 1991, for example, Kulawy Drive commemorated three Polish brothers who had served as Oblate missionaries on the Canadian Prairies.[10]

What made Ukrainians special was the nature and uniqueness of the public space with which they became associated and the heated passions it aroused. The first episode involved the renaming in 1976 of the sixty-hectare Mayfair Park in Edmonton's scenic river valley as the William Hawrelak Park, after the city's popular but controversial mayor who had died in office a year earlier. The son of Ukrainian immigrants homesteading at Wasel, Alberta, Hawrelak had been instrumental in carving the park out of a disused gravel pit. His three terms as mayor were punctuated by a provincial inquiry and several legal challenges over shady land deals, one forced resignation, one disqualification from office, and vindication in a final civil suit from the Supreme Court of Canada. That Hawrelak seemed not to appreciate or learn from his mistakes and was regularly re-elected despite them upset the local establishment, and there

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[9] Photograph B3639, PAA.

[10] Heritage Sites Committee, Edmonton Historical Board, *Naming Edmonton: From Ada to Zoie* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2004), 90, 188, 254–55.

were ugly whispers about how an unethical "ethnic politician" was kept in power by the "ethnic vote," with, of course, "ethnic" meaning Ukrainian in this case. There was some truth to the whispers, for Hawrelak received a higher proportion of votes in areas where Ukrainians were concentrated, but he was supported across the city.[11] To a significant extent, the renaming of Mayfair Park after him pitted ethnic Edmonton, exercising its collective muscle for the first time, against old Edmonton and Edmontonians of British origin, who were opposed not only to Hawrelak himself and the confusion that came with the new name, but also to its "foreignness" and the public erasure of their own heritage.

On one side there were the many ethnic organizations—Baltic, Polish, Jewish, Croatian, German, Romanian, and Slovenian, as well as Ukrainian—that peppered the city with petitions to honor the recently deceased mayor. On the other side, there was the indecisive Names Advisory Committee and a split city council, where the final vote was six to five. During an hour-long debate Alderman B. C. Tanner spoke in favor of the motion, insisting that it was time for a WASPish city (and council) to acknowledge Edmonton's multicultural reality. Angry telephone calls, letters, and petitions to city hall, opinions in the *Edmonton Journal*, and a lopsided radio poll suggested that a sizeable segment of public opinion thought otherwise, as would the recurring defacement of Hawrelak Park once the decision was made. Mail sent to Alderman Laurence Decore— himself of Ukrainian background and a vocal proponent of the change— accused him of "ethnic vote buying" and "entering an ethnic conspiracy" with Alderman Olivia Butti (who was of Italian origin) to push for the park's renaming. In assessing this opposition, Decore reached an uncomfortable conclusion and complained publicly of racism.[12] The campaign to restore Mayfair Park failed, amid dour predictions that it would take two generations for Edmontonians to accept or pronounce the new name. But the city's rapidly changing population meant that fewer and fewer

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[11] "Hawrelak Crushes Opponents" screamed the headline for 17 October 1974 in *Edmonton Journal*, which had opposed his re-entry into municipal politics. Hawrelak's 49.2 percent of the vote was more than double that of his next opponent in a seven-way race. As reporter Steve Hume noted, Hawrelak's campaign team "managed to draw on a power base that had lain dormant for almost a decade and to expand it beyond Mr. Hawrelak's traditional stronghold in the city's northeast." In fact Hawrelak took all but some 50 (southwest, Glenora, university) of 360 polls.

[12] On the Mayfair-Hawrelak Park controversy, see, in the CEA: Newspaper Clipping Files, "Parks and Recreation—Facilities, William Hawrelak Park," file 1; City of Edmonton, Planning Department, Names Advisory Committee, minutes, 10, 23 December 1975, 12 April, 29 September 1976, and correspondence, 2 December 1975, 11, 17 March, 14 April 1976; and City Clerk's Department, Public Affairs Committee, A78–68, Box 14 (uncatalogued).

people knew or cared about the controversy surrounding the park, which, over time, became increasingly identified with the Heritage Days festival celebrating Edmonton's ethnic diversity.

In 1983 Laurence Decore became Edmonton's second mayor of Ukrainian origin; he would leave municipal politics five years later for the leadership of the Liberal Party of Alberta. Throughout his career, cut short by his untimely death in 1999, Decore promoted multicultural causes, including specifically Ukrainian initiatives, such as bilingual education in Alberta schools and the establishment of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta.[13] In 2004 he was commemorated by the renaming of a stretch of road extending along Saskatchewan Drive from Groat Road to 99 Street. Designated Laurence Decore Lookout, it offers spectacular views of the river valley and downtown. In contrast to the fuss in 1976 over the name William Hawrelak Park, neither the city's decision and public announcement nor the unveiling of the new signs and central viewing platform created any ethnic-related or other stir. The *Edmonton Journal* applauded the memorial to a man of "vision, intelligence, and eloquence." The Laurence Decore Lookout, proclaimed its leading editorial, "will be a fine memorial to the remarkable man who was mayor of Edmonton, leader of Alberta's official Opposition, a prominent business owner, and a champion of cultural diversity."[14]

Thanks to Hawrelak and Decore, Edmonton's city hall acquired Ukrainian-friendly overtones, at least during the time each occupied the mayor's chair.[15] But the most spirited fight over Ukrainian claims to public space, and thus legitimacy within the Edmonton community, would center around city hall, when a proposal to erect two Ukrainian monuments there sparked debate over who and what should be commemorated on its grounds. For the province's seventy-fifth anniversary in 1980, the Ukrainian Women's Association of Canada commissioned a statue called *Madonna of the Wheat*, which was dedicated to all pioneer women of

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[13] See the relevant passages in Manoly R. Lupul, *The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2005).

[14] *Edmonton Journal*, 13 October 2003. See also, in the CEA: Newspaper Clipping Files, "Parks and Recreation—Facilities, Laurence Decore Lookout"; and City of Edmonton, Planning Department, Names Advisory Committee files, 2003–2004.

[15] The present city hall (1992) has other Ukrainian associations, for it was designed by a Ukrainian former alderman and architect, Gene Dub, who grew up on nearby 98 Street. On Dub's involvement in rejuvenating downtown Edmonton and reclaiming its historical buildings, see, for example, *BizEdmonton*, 20 June–3 July 2002; and *Edmonton Journal*, 30 April 2005.

Alberta. Thus the commissioned work tied Ukrainians to their pioneer heritage and at the same time celebrated a common Prairie experience across ethnic lines. Yet the braids and embroidered blouse of the statue and the sheaf of wheat (a timeless Ukrainian symbol of life and ancestors) she cradled in her arms also tended to identify the pioneer heritage of western Canadians in general with the Ukrainian experience in particular.[16] The second Ukrainian monument outside city hall, unveiled in 1983, marked the fiftieth anniversary of Stalin's artificially created famine in Soviet Ukraine, during which millions of people died. The *Madonna of the Wheat* had in fact attracted little opposition, no doubt reflecting its local subject matter and professed inclusiveness, but the famine monument was another issue. Opponents maintained that it needlessly antagonized the Soviet Union, that public space was inappropriate for imported "foreign" quarrels, and that a memorial to a Ukrainian tragedy opened a Pandora's box, which potentially could overrun city hall with monuments to genocides irrelevant to Canada. Nor did all opposition come from the outside: the local president of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, a Communist organization, also objected to the statue, calling its message anti-Soviet and saying that city hall was a totally inappropriate venue for it.[17]

In 1989 the *Madonna of the Wheat* and the famine monument had to be put into storage during construction of the new city hall. Many Edmontonians took their temporary removal as an opportunity to ensure that they never returned. Some proposed that they be relocated, either to Hawrelak Park, presumably to disappear in its vast grounds, or to a special ethnic heritage theme park, where Edmonton's non-British and non-French communities could have their symbols without imposing them on the citizenry at large. That idea, in the words of one local reporter, "got Ukrainians' pyrogies in a knot,"[18] and the Ukrainian community, collectively and individually, mobilized behind a successful campaign to have the statues restored to their original spots. In presenting their case, Ukrainians argued that as a founding people of western Canada, they had the right to be represented at city hall. They also denounced what they saw as treatment as second-class citizens, pointing to the recently installed statue of Sir Winston Churchill in the adjoining square to counter argu-

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[16] In my *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian-Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891–1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 215–56, I discuss the *Madonna of the Wheat* in connection with female symbols arising from the peasant pioneer immigration.

[17] See *Edmonton Journal*, 14–28 April, 8 May, 20–24 October 1983, 7 December 1989; for the Ukrainian-Canadian Communist perspective, see ibid., 10 January 1990.

[18] Neil Waugh, *Edmonton Sun*, 20 December 1989.

ments that only monuments reflecting local history belonged in a proposed protected area around city hall.[19] The fact that a British prime minister who visited Edmonton once in the 1920s apparently counted as "local" and should resonate with Edmontonians regardless of background underlined lingering prejudices that equated being British with being Canadian. By the same token, the fact that the Ukrainian famine, which postwar Soviet immigrants to Edmonton had personally survived, was perceived as "foreign" underlined the extent to which Ukrainianness remained incompatible with Canadianness.

The most symbolically charged public space in Edmonton, however, was not around city hall but the Alberta Legislature building, the final theater where a Ukrainian presence produced an outcry. When Ukrainians across Canada celebrated the centennial of their immigration and settlement in 1991 and the organized Alberta community debated where best to erect a lasting memorial, it chose to have Ukrainians' contribution to the province recognized where it counted most symbolically, at the provincial Legislature. The most vocal objections to the approved site came from the architect of the recently revamped grounds, who, ironically, also chaired the jury struck to award the commission. John McIntosh disliked both the "ethnic" precedent the statue set for his new grounds and its prominent position near the fountain, preferring what was then Parliament Hill's more exclusive approach of reserving its space for prime ministers and monarchs.[20] *The Commitment* by Edmonton sculptor Danek Możdżeński— packed with objects from Ukrainians' Old World heritage and Prairie pioneer experience—clearly celebrated the first peasant pioneer immigration that settled on the land. Nonetheless it was important to the statue's sponsors that it go in meaningful public space in Alberta's capital, at the very heart of the province, rather than in the original rural bloc settlement east of the city, where its message would be diluted and few would see it.

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[19] In the CEA, see the following from the City of Edmonton, Public Affairs Committee: letter, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 12 December 1989; City Hall Steering Committee Report no. 1 (and enclosures), 10 January 1990; submission, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 10 April 1990; brief, Alberta Association of the Canadian Institute of Planners, 10 April 1990; handouts (including Ukrainian letters) to the Public Affairs Committee, 17 April 1990; and Public Affairs Committee Report, 24 April 1990. On press coverage, see *Edmonton Journal*, 7 and 8 December 1989, 10 and 11 January, 15, 18, and 25 April 1990; and *Edmonton Sun*, 6 October, 20 December 1989.

[20] *Edmonton Journal*, 17 September 1993.

The Ukrainian imprint on Edmonton's public and thus politically sensitive spaces has involved sites that its citizens access and negotiate in common. The Hawrelak Park and statue disputes, in particular, stress how some public spaces are seen as symbolically more potent and thus more significant than others. Who is allowed in and who is kept out defines the legitimate players in the life of Edmonton and Alberta and says which of their experiences and symbols shall matter. After almost a century in the city and province, Ukrainians found that however much they might feel like full members of the larger community, there were still those who disagreed. In the opening decade of the twenty-first century, however, Ukrainians have their park, their statue at the legislature, and their two statues at city hall. Moreover, they are the *only* ethnic group to be represented in this way. How are visitors to the province and its capital, let alone their own citizens, Canadians of Ukrainian descent, and other ethnics to interpret this fact? Perhaps the *Edmonton Sun* reporter was more perceptive than he intended when he maintained during the city-hall controversies that Edmonton's Ukrainians were not "just another club with a tent at Heritage Days," but a "distinct society."[21]

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[21] Waugh, *Edmonton Sun*, 20 December 1989.

Mapping Ukraine:
From Identity Space to Decision Space

Roman Szporluk

Over thirty years ago Frank Sysyn argued that in 1917–18 "a revolution in perception" had occurred—a revolution more important than the political events commonly associated with the period:

> This "revolution" was the acceptance of the idea of an entity with fairly well-defined borders called the "Ukraine," and the self-identification of the masses living in this area as "Ukrainians." This was a revolution in perception, and it brought about a general recognition that Ukrainians were a separate nation. Even the Russians or Poles, who had hitherto viewed Ukrainians as merely a part of their own nations, came to accept this new view.

Sysyn further stated that "by the 1920's the concepts 'Ukraine' and 'Ukrainians' were almost universally accepted" and this happened even though the level of national consciousness among the Ukrainian masses before 1917 was "debatable" and, besides Russians, "Little Russians"—in Sysyn's words, "Ukrainians who believed that they were the Little Russian branch of an 'All-Russian' nation" also "questioned the existence of a Ukrainian nation." [1]

Sysyn's reminder that in 1918 in addition to Ukrainians and Russians there were still "Little Russians" in Ukraine would seem to indicate that the transition from historic Little Russia to modern Ukraine was a prolonged and complex process. Historic Little Russia, an entity that modern historians of Ukraine prefer to call the Hetmanate, had ceased to exist as

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[1] Frank Sysyn, "Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution," in *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution,* ed. Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), 277. Ivan L. Rudnytsky also pointed out that up to 1917 only two intellectual and political currents competed within Ukrainian society: one, "Little Russianism," favored "the union with Russia," and the other, "conscious Ukrainianism," as he put it, "clamored for the maintenance and reactivation of Ukrainian identity" (Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, ed. Peter L. Rudnytsky [Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987], 140). However, Rudnytsky also argued that a Ukrainian national awareness "in an embryonic stage in the form of a 'South Russian' sectionalism, or 'territorial patriotism'" also existed in pre-1917 Ukraine (ibid., 13).

a legal and administrative entity in the 1780s. Yet even at that time, while the Russian Empire was abolishing old institutions and rules, some members of the Hetmanate's elite began imagining a Ukraine that included but also extended beyond Little Russia. Scholars generally agree that the originators of the idea of a modern Ukraine—something greater than Little Russia—were either members of the last generation that lived in an autonomous Little Russia or their immediate successors. Can we be more specific as to where and when this idea emerged?

The rise of modern nations in Europe, not only in "central" or "eastern" Europe, has been a complex and multifaceted, multidimensional process. What Christopher Duggan, the author of *The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796*, says about his subject applies to other cases as well, including Ukraine: "Once unleashed in the 1790s, the idea that "the people" constituted the nation and that the nation should be coterminous with the state was a genie of ferocious power. As the case of Italy suggests, the imperative inherent in the concept of unity could be as disruptive and coercive as it was liberating."[2] One may view other cases, including Ukraine, in the way that *The Force of Destiny* treats Italy. According to Adrian Lyttelton, himself a historian of Italy, Duggan's book "is a history of the national idea, which takes the existence of Italy not as a given but as a problem."[3]

Drawing attention to regularities or similarities in the formation of modern nations does not mean denying or downplaying the importance of special features of any individual case, including that of Ukraine. This essay draws, of necessity selectively, on the work of historians of modern Ukraine and attempts to relate their ideas to other scholars' studies on nations and nationalism in the hope that this approach will encourage placing the Ukrainian case in a comparative, international frame. Nation formation involved, among other things, the formation of a modern standard language and literature, but I will deal with language only briefly and literature will remain outside our purview.[4] Instead I will focus on two problems: first, the political function of the nation's pre-modern history in modern times, and second, the development of a new "identity space"—that is, the "mapping" of the nation's territory.

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[2]   Christopher Duggan, *The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), xx.

[3]   Adrian Lyttelton, "Citizens of the Sponge," *Times Literary Supplement*, 6 June 2008, 7 (review of Duggan's *The Force of Destiny*).

[4]   I discuss these questions with reference to modern Ukrainian nation formation in my article "Publish or Perish: Texts and Peoples." in the Festschrift for George G. Grabowicz forthcoming in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*.

As is generally recognized, all national "awakenings" or "revivals" have critically included the creation of a national history. To prove that a given people is really a nation, its "awakeners" have felt compelled to establish a *national* past. They have emphatically rejected the status of being an "unhistoric nation." However, just as a map is an anticipation of future political realities, so is the writing of history. By its very nature the history of an awakening nation is a critique of the present condition in which it lacks independence. One may go further and argue that in such cases the historian is (to quote Lord Acton) not only "a politician with his face turned backwards,"[5] but also a politician with his face turned *forward.*

For support and clarification of the idea that historical writing sometimes plays a revolutionary or subversive role, I turn to Frank Hearn:

> Rebellion presupposes a viable set of critical categories which enables people to discredit the legitimacy of the present order, legitimate resistance and opposition to this order, and anticipate future, alternative arrangements.
>
> The remembered past is not an objective, historically factual portrayal of the past, rather, it constitutes an imaginative reconstruction of the past....
>
> Accordingly, images of the future provoke, not a denial of the present, but a restructuring of the present in accordance with the organizing principles exhibited in the idealized portrayal of the past. Thus, the future society, the society which "ought to be", represents a synthesis of the mythical past and those features of the present society which are necessary for the actualization of the "good life."[6]

In East-Central Europe the most famous admission recognizing that national history is a way of relativizing the status quo and making a different future at least thinkable may be found in a statement by František Palacký, "the father of the Czech nation" (who earned that title by proving in his monumental history that the Czech nation had existed for at least a thousand years before him). In 1867, as the Habsburg monarchy was being tranformed into Austria-Hungary and the Czechs felt particu-

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[5] John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, First Baron Acton, "Inaugural Lecture on the Study of History," in his *Essays on Freedom and Power* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1956), 46.

[6] Frank Hearn, "Remembrance and Critique: The Uses of the Past for Discrediting the Present and Anticipating the Future," *Politics and Society* 5, no. 2 (1975): 201. But nationalists are not the only ones who make use of the distant past in order to justfy their political programs: Karl Marx admitted that the "awakening of the dead in revolutions served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old" (quoted in David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* [Oxford: Blackwell 1992], 108).

larly disillusioned by Vienna's failure to grant *them* broader autonomy, Palacký said: "We were before Austria and we shall be after Austria." Everyone understood what Palacký meant: thus more than thirty years later, in 1899, Thomas Masaryk, the future founder of Czechoslovakia, wrote to a fellow Czech politician: "The main thing: you worry about Austria! I don't. Palacký said: We were before Austria and we will be after it. But while for him this was only a catchword—I want it to become a fact. (Such facts do happen too.)"[7]

What role did history writing play in bringing about the "revolution in perception" that, according to Sysyn, took place in 1917–18? Were Ukrainian authors practicing criticism of the present and dreaming about the future as they were ostensibly occupied with describing what had actually happened?

In one of his studies on the Ukrainian "national revival" of the early nineteenth century, Sysyn reminds us that writings about the past performed a political function by supporting the national "revivalists."

> The Cossack chronicles/histories of the turn of the eighteenth century were published in the 1840s and 1850s.... Unlike sources from the Muscovite government or the Polish nobility that survived in abundance from the seventeenth century and were published in the nineteenth century, few Ukrainian sources survived.... The Ukrainian revivalists longed for their own voice about the events and found it in *Istoriia Rusov* and the earlier Cossack chronicles. That they discovered manuscripts that had passed from hand to hand only added to the texts' authority among the Romantics. The populist revivalists could at least see them as analogous to the voice of the people that they found in historic songs and *dumy*.[8]

To bring about "a restructuring of the present" and formulate a vision of "the society which 'ought to be,'" it was necessary for Ukrainian "revivalists" or "awakeners" to overcome the legacy of the worlds of "Theologia," "Monarchia," and "Agraria."[9]

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[7] Cited in my book *The Political Thought of Thomas G. Masaryk* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981),110. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the "Ukrainian Palacký," has also been compared to Masaryk. See Serhii Plokhy, *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

[8] Frank E. Sysyn, "The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, nos. 3–4 (1990): 605.

[9] Benedict Anderson connects the rise of modern nations to the decline of what we call here the worlds of Theologia and Monarchia: "nationalism has to be understood by aligning it ... with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which—as well as against which—it came into being.... [T]he two relevant cultural systems are the *religious community* and the *dynastic realm*. For both of these, in their heydays, were taken-for-granted

In the Ukrainian case, overcoming "Theologia" meant transcending the great divide between the Orthodox and the Uniates. As Sysyn recognizes, by the eighteenth century the Uniate church was "to a considerable degree Latinized and Polonized" and "became the instrument for binding Ukrainians and Belarusians to the Commonwealth that some had hoped it would be in the late sixteenth century."[10]

In the Commonwealth, the Uniate church did not remain simply one of the elements supporting the old world of "Theologia," however. In the late eighteenth century, at the dawn of the modern age—the time of the American and French revolutions and the beginning of modern national movements in Germany and Italy—the Uniate church became actively involved in the Polish reform movement, in its work to transform the old-regime society dominated by the nobility into a modern *Polish* nation. Because the reformers wanted the new Polish nation to include people of all social classes and religions, they paid special attention to including the Uniates. On their part, Uniate bishops and lower clergy supported the Polish reform movement. Their service was recognized: shortly after his death, the head of the Uniate church in the Commonwealth, Metropolitan Yason Smohozhevsky (considering his national identity, it would be more accurate to call him Jason Smogorzewski) "was hailed in the report of the deputation [a special committee of the Sejm] as a Polish national hero, demonstrating the perfect combination of 'patriotic loyalty

frames of reference, very much as nationality is today" (*Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised ed. [London and New York: Verso, 1991], 12). Anderson stresses the profound difference in people's perception of the world order in the old and the new age: "These days it is perhaps difficult to put oneself empathetically into a world in which the dynastic realm appeared for most men as the only 'political' system. For in fundamental ways 'serious' monarchy lies transverse to all modern conceptions of political life. Kingship organizes everything around a high centre. Its legitimacy derives from divinity, not from populations, who, after all, are subjects, not citizens" (ibid., 19). While I borrow the terms "Monarchia" and "Theologia" from Anderson, I take the concept of "Agraria" from Ernest Gellner, who located the rise of nations and the emergence of nationalism in the period of transition from "Agraria," under which an overwhelming majority of population lived in the village and worked in agriculture, to "Industria." See Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 171. I discuss Gellner's theory of nationalism and problems with its applicability to East European history in two articles: "Thoughts about Change: Ernest Gellner and the History of Nationalism," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 23–39; and "In Search of the Drama of History: Or, National Roads to Modernity," *East European Politics and Societies* 4, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 134–50.

[10] Frank E. Sysyn, "The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2003), 18–19.

and religious zeal.'"[11] Textbooks and other surveys of Ukrainian history usually mention that after 1772 a church was provided for the Uniates in Vienna. But they rarely, if ever, mention that in 1781, in the presence of the king, who was one of the benefactors, the construction of a Uniate church in Warsaw began.[12] The message of that move was clear: Uniates within the old borders of the Commonwealth were Poles. (It would take more than two hundred years after Vienna and Warsaw to build a church of the same rite in Kyiv.) There is no need to add that not all ethnic Ukrainians or Belarusians within the Commonwealth accepted the church union with Rome or that Right-Bank Ukraine was the scene of a bloody conflict—a religious war of people of the same language and, as we see it now, nationality.

While the Uniate rite was viewed as something compatible with Polish patriotism (though it remained unacceptable to the Orthodox part of the Ukrainian and Belarusian ethnic group in the Commonwealth) in those areas taken by Vienna in 1772, the Uniates (now called Greek Catholics) became the most loyal subjects of "Monarchia," especially after the Austrian emperor launched his own version of a "revolution from above" and offered them a place and a better life under the new order.[13] At the same time, those Greek Catholics in Galicia who were prepared to embrace the ideas of modern nationality opted for the *Polish* cause not only after 1772, but also long after 1795.

If the Greek Catholics or Uniates did not care about the Hetmanate or Little Russia, there were Poles who did. After 1795 some Polish fighters for independence were not only aware of the existence of what they

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[11] Larry Wolff, "The Uniate Church and the Partitions of Poland: Religious Survival in an Age of Enlightened Absolutism," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 26, nos.1–4 (2002–2003): 184.

[12] Ibid., 180. Among those Polish patriots who supported Tadeusz Kościuszko's 1794 insurrection was the Uniate bishop of Chełm, Porfiriusz Ważyński (Porfyrii Vazhynsky). In May 1794 Kościuszko, as chief (*Naczelnik*) of the insurrection against Russia, wrote a letter to Ważyński, who was then heading the "Committee of Public Order" in Chełm. For Kościuszko the prelate was an unquestionable Polish patriot, as revealed in his letter addressed "Do Porfiriusza Ważyńskiego, biskupa Chełmskiego, prezesa Komisji Porządkowej Chełmskiej w Srzedzinie," in *Pisma Tadeusza Kościuszki*, ed. Henryk Mościcki (Warsaw: Państwowe Zakłady Wydawnictw Szkolnych, 1947), 110–11.

[13] See Larry Wolff, "Inventing Galicia: Messianic Josephinism and the Recasting of Partitioned Poland," *Slavic Review* 63, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 818–40. "Throughout the Habsburg monarchy, the decade of the 1780s witnessed the tremendous upheaval caused by Joseph's campaign for revolutionary enlightened absolutism, later labeled Josephinism: the encouragement of administrative centralization from Vienna, the imposition of state control over religious life, the concession of religious toleration, the relaxation of censorship, the partial abolition of serfdom through the legal protection of peasants, and the corresponding assault on noble privileges" (ibid., 822).

called the land of the Cossacks: they even thought of the Cossack nation as their ally against the tsar. One such Pole was Józef Pawlikowski, a close associate of Tadeusz Kościuszko. In 1800 Pawlikowski published a pamphlet in Polish titled *Can the Poles Win Their Independence by Their Own Efforts?* On his mental map everything to the west of the pre-partitions border of Poland was Polish, and, as he put it, everybody knew that Smolensk and Kyiv (which the Poles had lost in 1667) were "old Polish domains." But at the same time Pawlikowski argued that if the Polish struggle of independence were to succeed, it would have to become a part of a broader international coalition of oppressed nationalities—of, in other words, what in the twentieth century would be called "captive nations." Among Poland's allies Pawlikowski included the Cossack nation beyond the Dnipro, that is, Little Russia.[14]

"Territory is not just a background factor in history," wrote Charles S. Maier. This generalization applies to the Ukrainian case as well. Before they could become a modern nation in the sense in which Sysyn and other historians speak about Ukraine after World War I, Ukrainians first had to form their "identity space—the unit that provides the geography of allegiance." They could accomplish this by drawing a map of their imagined homeland, the place where Ukrainians, held together by such criteria as language and history, lived. The task of their new history was to explain why, despite all the tragic conflicts of the past, it was more important for them to be Ukrainian than Catholic or Orthodox. Only after doing that could they proceed to make their identity space "congruent with 'decision space'—the turf that seems to assure physical, economic, and cultural security."[15]

There is no evidence that the Orthodox elites of Little Russia showed much interest in such events as the first partition of Poland, even though it placed ethnic Ukrainians of historic Rus' under Vienna, or that they considered the Uniates in the Commonwealth to be their compatriots. Neither do we find much information on whether Vienna's new Greek Catholic subjects in Lviv or their coreligionists in Podillia and Volhynia, still under

[14] Józef Pawlikowski, "Can the Poles Attain Their Independence?," in *The Crucial Decade: East Central European Society and National Defense, 1859–1870*, ed. Bela K. Kiraly (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1984), 593. For the Polish original, see *Czy Polacy wybić się mogą na niepodleglość*, ed. Emanuel Halicz (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1967), 89. Andrzej Nowak, in *Jak rozbić Rosyjskie Imperium? Idee polskiej polityki wschodniej (1733–1921)*, 2d expanded ed. (Cracow: Arcana, 1999), shows that the idea of an alliance of nations was continued in the Polish political tradition in exile and included Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770–1861) among its prominent advocates.

[15] Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review* 105 (2000): 816.

the Commonwealth, expressed any interest in, or concern about, such events as the abolition of the Hetmanate and the destruction of the Sich. It would take several generations for Ukrainians on both sides to incorporate those events into their *common* national history and place Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Lviv in the same "identity space" on a mental map.

A map is commonly understood to be "a scientific abstraction of reality," wrote Thongchai Winichakul. However, according to him, in the making of Siam "[a] map anticipated spatial reality, not vice versa ... a map was a model for, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent."[16] So to the Hearn argument we can add that maps sometimes do what histories do: they draw a picture of the future and imagine a country long before it appears on the map. Bearing this role of the map in mind, Benedict Anderson, who quotes Thongchai in his *Imagined Communities*, speaks about "the census, the map, and the museum" as "institutions of power."[17]

The Polish freedom fighter in exile had a Ukraine on his map when he looked for allies against Russia. But were there any individuals, Ukrainians or others, in the late eighteenth century who were already imagining a map of *modern* Ukraine—the first map of a Ukrainian identity space that could serve as a model for those who would later want to create a modern Ukrainian nation with its own "decision space," that is, statehood?

Who were the first people to transcend the geographical frame of Little Russia and inject, if only by implication, a political content into an ethno-linguistic group, thereby drawing a new map of Ukraine and, at the same time, making the religious map politically subordinate to the new, ethno-political one? Contemporary writers on the emergence of modern Ukraine have not agreed on this matter. To this writer it seems that the first mental map closely approximating modern Ukraine is to be found in a book titled *Topograficheskoe opisanie Kharkovskago namestnichestva* (A Topographic Description of Kharkiv Vicegerency), published in Moscow in 1788. (It is up to specialists on the period to tell us how representative of contemporary thought the book was.) This *opisanie* contained a section devoted to history, which scholars believe was written by

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[16] Thongchai Winichakul, "Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of Siam," 310, quoted in Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* 173–74.

[17] Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* 163. For a study of how maps functioned as "institutions of power" in matters concerning Ukraine and its neighbors, see Steven J. Seegel, in "Beauplan's Prism: Represented Contact Zones and Nineteenth-Century Mapping Practices in Ukraine," in *Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine,* ed. Dominique Arel and Blair A. Ruble (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 151–80.

one Ivan Pereverzev. Of special interest is what kind of historical background its author decided to provide for a book on the Kharkiv region.[18]

First of all, the *opisanie* located Kharkiv's history within the frame of the history of "Southern Russia" and used this term as a synonym of the Grand Principality of Kyiv. By implication it excluded from the latter the "non-Southern" parts of that principality—in other words, modern Russia and Belarus. (By the way, none of the eighteenth-century figures mentioned in this article, whether in Little Russia or in the Commonwealth, asked about the Belarusians' identity.) The reader was informed that Southern Russia consisted of the regions of a single Slaveno-Russian people ("*oblasti odnogo slaveno-rossiiskogo plemeni*") and that at the time of writing those regions belonged to three states—Russia, Poland, and "the house of Austria."

> Under the name of the former Grand Principality of Kyiv, or Southern Russia, we understand the regions [*oblasti*] of one Slaveno-Rossiiskoe tribe [*plemia*] i.e., people, now belonging to three states:
>   1. Russia—the vicegerencies of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Novhorod-Siverskyi, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, and parts of Kursk and Voronezh,
>   2. Poland—Volhynia, Podillia and Polish Ukraina [*sic*], and
>   3. The house of Austria, the two principalities of Galicia and Lodomeria in Crimson or Red Ruthenia, which were ceded to Hungary in 1772.[19]

According to the author, the Southerners, whom he called *rusiny* (earlier in the chapter he says that the Poles introduced the name), "served Poland" from 1340 to 1650 and consequently became different from the the people of the North: "This fateful separation of Southern from Northern or Great Russia so transformed its inhabitants forever that consequently a seemingly alien nation [*kak budto by inoplemennaia kakaia natsiia*] appeared; from it emerged the Little Russian, Ukrainian dialect as a distinct [*udelnyi*] language of the Slavonic people [*slavenskogo plemeni*]."[20]

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[18] In this context, see *Opysy Kharkivs'koho namisnytstva kintsia XVIII st.*, ed. V. O. Pirko and O. I. Hurzhii (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1991), containing reprints of three "descriptions" of Kharkiv vicegerency, in the years 1785, 1787, and 1788. The passages quoted here were originally published in the 1788 volume. On Pereverzev, see V. O. Pirko, "Ivan Opanasovych Pereverziev i yoho pratsia 'Topohrafichnyi opys Kharkivskoho namisnytstva,'" *Skhid-Zakhid: Istoryko-kulturolohichnyi zbirnyk* (Kharkiv), no. 3 (2001): 39–51.

[19] *Opysy Kharkivskoho namisnytstva*, 17. The author seems to have assumed that Galicia and Lodomeria had been made part of Hungary, which was the official justification for Vienna's participation in the partition of 1772 rather than being placed directly under Vienna.

[20] Ibid, 19.

Despite all their differences, the author wrote, the people of Southern Russia have one thing in common—veneration for the city of Kyiv.

> An informed observer's attention is drawn to the inhabitants of Southern Russia, who are separated from one another by distance, foreign governments, different administrative systems, and civic customs, speech, and even in some cases by religion (the [Church] Union). When they gather for worship in Kyiv from the east—from the Volga and the Don—and from the west—from Galicia and Lodomeria, as well as from places closer to Kyiv, they regard each other not as people speaking a foreign language but their own kin, though very differentiated in speech and behavior, which seems a strange phenomenon to both sides; but in general, all these scattered compatriots [*razseiannye odnozemtsy*] to this day preserve a filial respect for the mother of their ancient homes, the city of Kyiv.[21]

The Kharkiv region, known as the "Land of Free Communes" or, better still, "Slobidska Ukraine," had long maintained close ties in education and church affairs with Kyiv and the Hetmanate, and people regularly moved in both directions. Without ever belonging to Little Russia's "decision space," it thus became a part of a new *Ukrainian* "identity space." Thus Kharkiv vicegerency became a part of the "Southern Russia" that, according to the *opisanie*, included lands under Poland, the Habsburg monarchy, and Russia, and one is tempted to say that the Kharkiv region was the first to be "annexed" by Ukraine so successfully that in the future it would be even called a part of historic Little Russia. (Most famously, Yuliian Bachynsky made this error in his *Ukraina irredenta*, published in 1895.)

<center>* * *</center>

The message implicit in the Kharkiv volume's geography and history was revolutionary for several reasons. First, it claimed that Southern Russia was unlike Northern or Great Russia because it had a different

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[21] Ibid, 18. Because the author chose the designation "Southern Russia" for what, to a contemporary observer, corresponds to the map of Ukraine, let us note that according to V. V. Kravchenko, *Narysy z istorii istoriohrafii epokhy natsionalnoho vidrodzhennia* (Kharkiv: Osnova, 1996), 35–36, at that time "Russian" was sometimes used as a synonym for "East Slavic." But Pereverzev's "map" of Southern Russia was not an immediate winner. As we are reminded by Oleksii Tolochko in his presentation of the thoughts of early nineteenth-century Ukrainian "fellows" and Russian "travelers" on the history-cum-geography of Ukraine, set forth in his "Fellows and Travelers: Thinking about Ukrainian History in the Early Nineteenth Century," in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, ed. Georgii Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008), "The territory we think of today as Ukraine was not so designated at the turn of the nineteenth century" (165).

past (three hundred years with Poland) and consequently possessed a distinct Slavic language of its own. Second, it declared that Southern Russia consisted of the lands of the old Grand Principality of Kyiv, which meant that it was much larger than Little Russia: it included the Kharkiv region but also areas under Austria and Poland. For some reason, it failed to mention that the old Kyivan state had also extended to what became *Northern* Russia. Finally, it clearly stated that the people of Southern Russia were one nation, despite their differences in speech and, even more strikingly for a text written in the 1780s, their division into Orthodox and Uniates.

These ideas were presented well before their time. It is very doubtful that there were any individuals in Lviv during the decade of the 1780s (or later, before the 1830s) who would have placed Lviv in an identity space that included Kharkiv and Chernihiv while excluding it from a common space with Warsaw or Vienna. Yet they were not just utopian speculations: in 1918 and 1919 the Greek Catholics who had turned into Ukrainians fought a war with Poland while declaring, quite in the spirit of the Kharkiv *opisanie*, that Kyiv was indeed their capital.[22]

Compared with the interconfessional integration, Ukrainian nation builders were much less successful in overcoming the legacy of the old world of "Agraria." At the turn of the century the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire were illiterate peasants.[23] Things were not much better in 1917, and this fact played a very significant role in the final outcome, as shown by Sysyn and other authors' contributions to *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution.*

Despite this, one can see confirmation of Sysyn's thesis of a "revolution in perception" in Lenin's treatment of the Ukrainian problem during the revolution and civil war. To fight against independent Ukraine—and he took Ukrainian nationalism seriously, of that there is no doubt—Lenin felt compelled to create his own, alternative Ukraine, the Ukrainian SSR. In it he included territories the Provisional Government of democratic Russia had refused to recognize as Ukrainian, among them the Kharkiv,

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[22] Mark von Hagen shows how tsarist Russia remained committed to the world of "Theologia" when it invaded Galicia in 1914 and fought Ukrainian "separatism" by launching a religious war against the Greek Catholics. See his *War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007).

[23] Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 23: "In the light of the 1897 census 18 percent of Ukraine's population could read, five percent less than the average for European Russia. Thirteen percent of Ukrainians were literate. In the villages illiteracy predominated—91 to 96 percent, depending on the province."

Odesa, and Donbas regions, which were ethnic Ukrainian but had not belonged to historic Little Russia.[24] Ivan L. Rudnytsky, also writing in the 1970s, asserted that while the statehood of the Ukrainian SSR was "a sheer myth manipulated to the advantage of the rulers," a myth becomes a force after it has "entered the consciousness of a people." Rudnytsky thus shared Sysyn's view that the Ukrainian revolution was a success. "The clever manipulators," he prophesied, "may well find themselves someday in the position of the sorcerer's apprentice, unable to master the genie whom they have conjured."[25]

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[24] Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Take-Over of the Ukraine," in *Ukraine, 1917–1921*, 102–27. For Lenin's view of Ukraine in relation to his concept of the Russian nation, see my article "Lenin, 'Great Russia,' and Ukraine," in *Rus' Writ Large: Languages, Histories, Cultures: Essays Presented in Honor of Michael S. Flier on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, 245–60, ed. Harvey Goldblatt and Nancy Shields Kollmann, vol. 28 (2006) of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. For an area-wide survey, see Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914–1923," *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 2d ed., ed. Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1990), 205–46.

[25] Rudnytsky, "Soviet Ukraine in Historical Perspective," in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History,* 467. (This article was originally published in *Canadian Slavonic Papers* in 1972.) There he noted that Stalin, "the perpetrator of unspeakable crimes against the Ukrainian people," uniquely among political leaders during World War II "showed the greatest awareness of the potentialities of the Ukrainian problem. It was in the name of Ukraine, and not of Russia, that Stalin successfully claimed vast territories west of the pre-1939 frontier, thus extending the USSR into central Europe and the Danubian valley" (ibid., 469). We may presume that the author of the Kharkiv *opisanie* would have understood. Pawlikowski would have been shocked, but he might later have realized that what happened in 1991 would have been impossible without the course of 1939–45.

"Отечество" в представлениях украинской казацкой старшины конца XVII – начала XVIII веков

Татьяна Таирова-Яковлева

Вопрос об идеалах казацкой элиты "пост-хмельницкой" эпохи не-разрывно связан с поисками приемлемых форм государственности или автономии, которые мучительно шли в Украине в тот период. Сразу следует оговориться, что речь идет именно о той части старшины, для которой идеалом служила собственная государствен-ность, а не тихое существование в полном согласии с политикой московского царя.

Именно в этом смысле, под влиянием статьи Франка Сысына[1], мы рассмотрим взгляды не "верных" царю старшин — Мартина Пушкаря, Ивана Брюховецкого или Василия Кочубея[2], а их про-тивников, чаще именуемых в российско-советской историографии "изменниками" или "мазепинцами".

Как убедительно показано в статье Ф. Сысына, обращение "отчи-зна" не в контексте Речи Посполитой, а собственно Украины поя-вляется после восстания Богдана Хмельницкого. В 70–80-е годы XVII в. термин "отчизна" становится широко распространенным среди старшин. Его используют не только "городовые" старшины, но и запорожцы, и те, и другие в схожем понимании, т. е. по отноше-нию к Украине, а не к Кошу. Например, знаменитый кошевой атаман Иван Сирко в письме от 26 ноября 1667 г. говорил об "Oyczyznie naszey opłakaney"[3]. Про "отчизну матку нашу" писал 24 ноября 1708

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[1] *Sysyn Frank E.* Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture // Mazepa and His Time. History, Culture, Society. — Alessandria, 2004. — С. 39–53.

[2] Термин "верный" мы употребляем с изрядной долей сарказма, т. к. "верными" царю они оставались только когда им это было выгодно, т. е. — до поры, до вре-мени. Как известно, М. Пушкарь вступил в бой под Полтавой против воли царя, И. Брюховецкий присоединился к антимосковскому восстанию, а В. Кочубей активно поддерживал антимосковское восстание Петра Петрика.

[3] Российская национальная библиотека. Отдел рукописей. — Ф. 971: Собр. Дубровского. — Авт. 152. — № 81.

г. в своем письме к Ивану Мазепе и другой кошевой атаман Запорожской Сичи Кость Гордиенко. При этом он выражал обеспокоенность планами Москвы "дабы оную во область и завладеніе себе взяти умышляет и одобравши в городах украинских своих людей осадити желает, а нашим людем малороссийским незносніе и нестерпиміе здирства и знищенья починивши и зрабовавши в Московщину загнати на вечное тяжкое неволничое мордерство тщится"[4]. То есть термин "отчизна" в представлении Гордиенко объединял такие понятия, как "украинские города" и "люди малороссийские".

Надо сказать, что такое использование терминов "малороссийский" и "украинский" как синонимов (первый появляется примерно с конца 50–х годов XVII в.) было явлением широко распространенным. Например, Юрий Хмельницкий 13 марта 1660 г. в своем письме к киевскому митрополиту писал про "…Украину и другие малороссийские города."[5] Да и сам И. Мазепа в разговоре с дьяком Б. Михайловым 28 марта 1701 г. употреблял как синонимы понятия "Малороссийский край" и "Украина"[6]. И только когда речь шла о Правобережье, Мазепа использовал исключительно термин "сегобочная Украина"[7].

То, что старшина не вполне разобралась с терминологией, по сути, не столь важно. Гораздо важнее то, что понятие "отчизна" в этот период ни в коем случае не ассоциировалось с "Московским государством" или тем более с "Российской империей". То, что такое понимание имело место еще в "домазепинский" период ясно показывает появление статьи Каламакского договора, положивших начало процесса "русификации". Гетману предписывалось не допускать "голосов таких", что Украина является Гетманщиной, а не частью "Их Царского Пресветлого Величества Самодержавной Державы"[8]: т. е. объявлялась борьба именно пониманию под "отчизной" Украины, а не России.

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[4] Российский государственный архив древних актов (далее — РГАДА). — Ф. 124: Малороссийские дела. — Оп. 1 1708. — № 91. — Л. 1.

[5] Памятники, изданные Временною Комиссиею для разбора древних актов, высочайше утвержденною при Киевском военном, Подольском и Волынском генерал-губернаторе. — К., 1898. — Т. III. — № XCV. — С. 434.

[6] Источники малороссийской истории / Собр. Д. Бантыш-Каменским и изд. О. Бодянским. — М., 1858. — Кн. 2. — Ч. 2. — С. 31.

[7] РГАДА. — Ф 124. — Оп. 4. — № 105, 125 и др.

[8] [*Величко С.*] Летопись событий в Юго-Западной России в XVII веке / Сост. Самоил Величко, бывший канцелярист канцелярии Войска Запорожского. — К., 1864. — Т. III. — С. 49.

Существование четкого разделения в представлениях казацкой старшины между "отчизной" (Малороссией или Украиной) и Московским государством нашло свое отражение и в идее "княжества Руського".

В основе появления этого термина лежало довольно смутное воспоминание о временах киевских князей. Еще Б. Хмельницкий именовал себя "князем киевским и руським"[9], а также "єдиновладцем і самодержцем руським"[10]. Под стать ему, Иван Выговский уже в марте 1658 г. заявил о своем желании стать "Великим князем Украины и соседних областей"[11].

Путаность и расплывчатость в ссылках на преемственность дела киевских князей даже в рядах высшей украинской старшины доказывает, что это было лишь попыткой юридического обоснования правомерности создания Гетманщины. Как в начале XVII в., в разгар борьбы за сохранение православной церкви в Украине, идеологи казачества использовали идею защиты православных московским царем, "наследником дела Владимира", точно так же теперь ссылки на киевских князей должны были служить новым политическим реалиям. Несомненно, образование Б. Хмельницкого, И. Выговского и Юрия Немирича позволяло им понимать, что если они хотели претендовать на роль законных лидеров законно созданного (воссозданного) государства, следовало найти юридические лазейки для благовидного объяснения возникновения Гетманщины и их лидерства в ней. Такое обоснование было необходимо для придания законной силы переговорам с иностранными державами и должно было облегчить этим самым дружественным державам пути признания Гетманщины. С другой стороны, идея "триединого государства" Речи Посполитой, в которую "как равный с равными" вошло бы княжество Руськое, представляла собой попытку найти наиболее приемлемую форму автономии Украины.

В разгар начавшейся Руины идея княжества Руського не находит воплощения. Ю. Хмельницкий добровольно от нее отрекается, на первый план выходят задачи преодоления раскола и гражданской войны.

Концепция своей "отчизны" находит гораздо более широкое воплощение у И. Мазепы, особенно в поздний период его гетманства,

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[9] Документы об Освободительной войне украинского народа. — К., 1965. — № 17. — С. 44.

[10] Воссоединение Украины с Россией. — М., 1953. — Т. II. — № 47. — С. 117.

[11] Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes. — Т. IX. — Рим, 1963. — No. 4270. — С. 89.

когда реальностью стало воплощение в жизнь его титула "гетмана обоих сторон Днепра". В своих универсалах начала XVIII в. Мазепа постоянно подчеркивал, что заботится об "отчизне нашей малороссийской"[12]. Ссылаясь на свою власть ("меечи по милости царя царствующих Бога всемогущего и по милости монархи нашего православного его царского пресветлого величества") в "Малороссийской отчизне нашей и во всем Войску Запорожском", Мазепа уделял первостепенное внимание восстановлению гетманской администрации в Правобережье[13]. Важными шагами на пути к этому он считал восстановление переяславской епископии и Трахтемировского монастыря. То есть опять же, Мазепа разделял понятие интересов Украины и России, не считая себя обязанным заботиться об общеимперских. Такое представление полностью вписывалось в общеевропейскую концепцию "государя" начала Нового времени и лежало в основе всей политики Мазепы.

Даже в своем знаменитом универсале к Ивану Скоропадскому от 30 октября 1708 г., уже перейдя к шведам и пытаясь объяснить свой поступок, Мазепа писал об "отчизне нашей Малороссийской"[14]. Тогда же он направил универсалы в города и старшине, заверяя, "что он не для приватной своей пользы, но для общего добра всей отчизны и Войска Запорожского принял протекцию короля шведского"[15].

Эти слова гетман говорил и Пилипу Орлику в памятную ночь, когда он раскрыл перед генеральным писарем свои планы. Мазепа, по словам Орлика, произнес следующую клятву на кресте: "что я не для приватной моей пользы, не для высших гоноров, не для большего обогащения, и ни для иных каких-нибудь прихотей, но для вас всех, под властью и рейментом моим находящихся, для жен и детей ваших, для общего блага матери моей отчизны бедной Украины, всего Войска Запорожского и народа Малороссийского, и для поднятия и расширения прав и вольностей войсковых хочу я это при помощи Божей сделать …"[16]

Мотивация выступления, как защита "отечества" от внешней угрозы звучит и в письме от 16 ноября 1708 г. Данила Апостола своим сотникам и обозному: что с шведами они встают "для защи-

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[12] Архив Института истории РАН (СПб). — Ф. 63. — Карт. 1б. — № 167.

[13] Там же. — Ф. 68. — Карт. 2. — № 156. — Л. 1–2.

[14] Источники малороссийской истории. — С. 173.

[15] Письмо Орлика Стефану Яворскому // *Субтельний О.* Мазепинці. Український сепаратизм на початку XVII ст. — К., 1994. — С. 181.

[16] Там же. — С. 169–170.

щения отчизны нашей от наступления московского"[17]. Более широкое объяснение принятия шведского протектората дал в последствии П. Орлик. По его словам, в основе этого поступка было стремление, чтобы "руський нарід скинув московське ярмо й був вільний"[18].

Именно Орлик внес наибольший вклад в дело разработки терминологии и обоснования обособленности "казацкого народа". Эти его достижения нашли отражение в знаменитой "Конституции" 1710 г.[19] По сути, это единственный дошедший до нас документ, который проливает свет на представления "мазепинцев" относительно "отчизны" и идеальных форм ее существования.

В Конституции Орлик явно намеренно избегает использования терминов "руський" или "княжество Руське". Наоборот, через всю Конституцию главной идеей проходят понятия "вітчизна", "Войско Запорожское" и даже "соборність вітчизни", хотя встречаются также "Украина", "територія нашої вітчизни, Малої Русі" и "соборність Матері-Малороссії". Никакого "малороссийского народа" в тексте не упоминается.

В "преамбуле" Орлик выдвигает неожиданную и смелую версию происхождения казацкого народа — от хазар. При этом он явно отождествляет "хазар" с населением Киевской Руси, так как пишет, что "святу православну віру східного обряду ... войовничий козацький народ уперше й понині просвітився ще за панування хозарських каганів від апостольского Константинопольського престолу"[20]. Происхождение такой версии неясно, так как ничего подобного мы не встречаем ни у Феодосія Сафоновича, ни в "Синопсисе", ни в Густинской летописи, ни в ранних казацких хрониках. Но цель ее прозрачна — не оставить даже никакого намека об общем происхождении русских и украинцев.

Таким же инноваторством Орлика (и его сподвижников) можно считать и обращение к России как к "Московской империи".

Вообще, в Конституции Орлика нашли юридическое обоснование многие понятия, которые расплывчато присутствовали уже на ранних этапах создания Гетманщины и частично воплощались в мазепинский период. Например, обосновывалась необходимость подчинения киевского митрополита Константинопольскому престолу.

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[17] Национальная библиотека Украины им. В. Вернадского. Институт рукописи. — Ф. VIII. — № 2677. — Л. 1–2.

[18] *Возняк М.* Бендерська комісія // І. Мазепа. — Варшава, 1939. — Т. 1. — С. 112.

[19] Перша конституція України гетьмана Пилипа Орлика. — К., 1994.

[20] Там же. — С. 22–23.

Со ссылкой на Зборовский договор 1649 г. Орлик настаивал на границе с Речью Посполитой по реке Случь и декларировал, что "кожна держава постає й існує завдяки непорушності кордонів"[21]. Ссылаясь на пример "самодержавних країн" Орлик отстаивал необходимость "слушного і корисного державному устрою порядку", в котором гетманы не присваивали бы себе неограниченную власть.

Представления Пилипа Орлика об "отчизне" и идеальных формах ее существования, зафиксированные в его конституции, стали логичным продолжением тех идей, которые формировались среди элиты украинской казацкой старшины в период существования Гетманщины. Продолжением и, с другой стороны, — апогеем. Ибос разгромом "мазепинства" реальность существования украинской "отчизны" независимой или автономной от соседей на долгие годы становилась более чем призрачной.

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[21] Там же. — С. 24–25.

Why Did the Polovtsian Khan Boniak Howl like a Wolf?

Oleksiy Tolochko

In the entry for 1097, the Rus' Primary Chronicle describes a strange and bizarre episode involving the Polovtsian khan Boniak. On the night before the battle with the Hungarians, so we are told, the khan performed some magic ritual of fortune-telling.

> ꙗко бъ⁵ полоунощи. и вставъ Бонакъ ѿѣха ѿ вои. и поча въіти волчскъі и волкъ ѿвиса ѥмоу. и начаша волци въіти. мнози. Бонакъ же приѣхавъ повѣда Двдови. ꙗко побѣда нъі" е⁵ на Ооугръі заоутра

At midnight Boniak arose and rode away from the troops. Straightway he began howling like a wolf, till first one and then many wolves answered him with their howls. Boniak then returned to camp and announced to David that on the morrow they would celebrate a victory over the Hungarians.[1]

As indeed they did. The next day a tiny band of three hundred Polovtsians massacred the vastly superior forces of the Hungarian king Koloman (who was said to have gathered a hundred thousand men). The victory was truly miraculous, and, as we are led to infer, owed as much to Boniak's strategic ruse as to his magic.

Khan Boniak—"godless, mangy, a predator"—is among the most colorful "Oriental" characters of the Primary Chronicle and figures prominently in any description of Rus'ian-Polovtsian encounters.[2] The episode in question is also noted in many scholarly accounts, yet commentaries

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[1] *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter *PSRL*], vol. 1, pt. 1 (Leningrad, 1926), cols. 270–71, and *PSRL*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1908), cols. 245–46. The translation cited here is that of Samuel Cross in "The Russian Primary Chronicle," *Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature* 12 (1930): 288.

[2] In Ukrainian scholarship he is prominent as a character in numerous popular legends studied, among others, by Mykhailo Drahomanov and Ivan Franko. See P. Kuzmichevsky [M. Drahomanov], "Sholudivyi Buniaka v ukrainskikh narodnykh skazaniiakh," *Kievskaia starina*, 1887, nos. 8: 676–713 and 10: 233–76; R. L. I., "K rasskazam o Sholudivom Boniake," *Kievskaia starina*, 1891, no. 8: 299–304; and Ivan Franko, "Vii, sholudyvyi Buniaka i Yuda Iskariotskyi," *Ukraïna* 1, no. 1 (1907): 50–55.

on the nature of the khan's performance are scarce, probably because the story seems rather straightforward and unproblematic.

As early as the eighteenth century, Vasilii Tatishchev explained the episode as fortune-telling with the help of birds or animals, a "superstition" well known from ancient records.[3] Following in his footsteps, Nikolai Karamzin called it a "fortunate superstition," almost a trick that was meant to boost the troops' morale and proved effective.[4]

More recently Svetlana A. Pletneva, one of the principal authorities on the history and archaeology of the East European nomads, suggested that Boniak's strange behavior can be explained as a ritual intended to summon the help of his horde's totem, the wolf. She conjectured that the horde known in the chronicle as the "Burchevichi" may have taken its name from a totemic animal (*böri*, a wolf) and that Khan Boniak may have belonged to that horde. She further speculated that in Polovtsian society a khan was not only a military leader, but was also invested with the duties of a pagan priest. The meaning of the performance is then clear: "[Boniak] the khan and priest of the cult of the wolf-protector entreated a victory from wolves who, responding to him, foretold and ensured his success."[5] In a slightly different manner but developing a similar line of thought, Igor Kniazky treated our episode as proof of a deep cultural affinity between the Polovtsians of Eastern Europe and the Turks of old, with their supposed cult of the wolf so conspicuously manifested in Boniak's performance.[6]

Like many other episodes in the Primary Chronicle, this one, whatever its deep religious significance, is believed to have preserved genuine details of the nomads' divination practices. As in many other instances, however, what appears to be authentic and factual may be fictitious and invented. Chances are that Khan Boniak's wolflike howling is yet another cliché borrowed from the chronicle's literary sources.

As Ivan Dujčev demonstrated long ago, wolflike howling—λυκηθμὸς —is a well-established motif in Byzantine authors' depictions of nomadic peoples. The nomads howl like wolves before attacking or in communicating among themselves. In the *Dialogs* of Pseudo-Caesarius, which date from the mid-sixth century, the Slavs communicate in this fashion (ren-

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[3] Vasilii Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Adept, 1995), 254.

[4] Nikolai Karamzin, *Istoriia gosudarstva Rossiiskogo*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1991), 80.

[5] S. A. Pletneva, *Polovtsy* (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), 102. However, the etymology of the "Burchevichi" that Pletneva accepted is spurious. For other possible variants, see Nikolai A. Baskakov, *Tiurkskaia leksika v "Slove o polku Igoreve"* (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 78.

[6] I. O. Kniazky, *Rus' i step* (Moscow: RNF, 1996), 43.

dered in the Slavonic translation as влъческъıи въюще себе взъıваютъ).[7] According to the tenth-century Byzantine lexicon entitled "Suidas" (Ditch), the Avars produced wolflike howling while attacking, as was their custom.[8] Earlier Petr Lavrov noted that in the Slavonic translation of the *Questions and Responses* of Sylvester and Anthony, the expression τη λύκων ὡρογη is rendered as *вълчьскъı выюще*,[9] which is very close to what we have in the chronicle (Бонакъ ... поча въıти волчьскъı).

While it is doubtful that the chronicler was familiar with the texts Lavrov and Dujčev cited, there is a "Byzantine" source, almost certainly utilized in the Primary Chronicle, that develops the same theme of the nomads' wolflike howling. It is the *Vita Constantini* (*VC*), whose eighth chapter relates that when Constantine traveled to the land of the Khazars, he was attacked by the Hungarians, "who were howling like wolves" (нападоша на нь оугри. ıако и вълчьскъı воюще. Хотѧ и оубити).[10]

Although въıти волчьскъı in the Primary Chronicle looks like a direct quotation from *VC* (вълческъı воюще), no textual connection has ever been established between the story of Khan Boniak and that episode of *VC*. Hence an association between them would seem rather farfetched. Yet there is one detail that links both accounts and may have led the chronicler to associate them. Both accounts deal with the Hungarians, to whom special attention was paid in the Primary Chronicle. Elsewhere I have tried to show that the same episode (or, rather, its immediate continuation in *VC*, chap. 9) led to an error in the "geographical introduction" to the Primary Chronicle: the Carpathian Mountains (called "Hungarian" in the chronicle) are identified as the Caucasian Mountains, where the Hungarians lived according to *VC*.[11] Thus the passage in *VC*

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[7] John Geometres, a Byzantine author of the tenth century, described "Scythes" (either Bulgarians or the Rus') in one of his epigrams as barking in doglike fashion See Mikhail Bibikov, "Rus' v vizantiiskoi diplomatii: Dogovory Rusi s Grekami," *Drevniaia Rus': Voprosy medievistiki,* 2005, no.1: 13.

[8] I. Dujčev, "Les témoignages de Pseudo-Césaire sur les Slaves," *Slavia Antiqua* 4 (1953): 193; and idem, "Kŭm tŭlkuvaneto na prostranite zhitiia na Kiril i Metodiia," in *Khiliada i sto godini slavianska pisemnost, 863–1963: Sbornik v chest na Kiril i Metodii* (Sofia: Bŭlgarski khudozhnik, 1963), 115–16. Until recently the title "Suidas" was taken to be the name of the author: see Mikhail V. Bibikov, *Byzantinorossica: Svod vizantiiskikh svidetelstv o Rusi,* vol. 1 (Moscow: Yazyki slavianskoi kultury, 2004), 447.

[9] Petro Lavrov, *Kyrylo ta Metodii v davno-slovianskomu pysmenstvi* (Kyiv: Ukrainska akademiia nauk, 1928), 85.

[10] P. A. Lavrov, *Materialy po istorii vozniknoveniia drevneishei slavianskoi pismennosti,* Trudy Slavianskoi komissii, vol. 1 (Leningrad: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1930), 13.

[11] Aleksei Tolochko, "Ob istochnike odnoi oshibki v geograficheskom vvedenii 'Povesti vremennykh let,'" *Drevniaia Rus'* (Moscow), 2007, no. 3: 107–109.

that includes the "Hungarians, who were howling like wolves" had indeed previously attracted the chronicler's attention.

It is probably also not insignificant that the episode of 1097 is the first mention of the Hungarians after a large gap (the previous mention of them in the Primary Chronicle occurs in the entry for 943, in an account borrowed from the Byzantine chronicle of Georgios Hamartolos).[12] In fact this is the first mention that introduces the Hungarians into the actual history of Rus': previously, they figured only in "legendary" events. This is also the first episode in which the Hungarian king appears.[13]

There is a textual problem here, however. The episode involving Boniak occurs in the so-called "Tale of the Blinding of Vasylko," a separate work written by a certain Basil that was fully incorporated into the Primary Chronicle at some unspecified point during its compilation. Thus the chronicler who consulted the *vitae* of SS Constantine and Methodius and the author of the account of Boniak are believed to have been two different writers (and there is nothing in Vasilii's work to suggest that he knew *VC*). However, as has been noted many times, the "Tale of the Blinding of Vasylko" was the object of editorial incursions on the part of the chronicler following its incorporation, and our fragment may just be one such incursion. The episode involving Boniak, his divination, and ensuing victory over the Hungarians is flanked by identical phrases: it begins with Двдъ ... иде в Половцѣ. и оусрѣте и Бонакъ and ends with Двдъ побѣже в Половцѣ. и ооусрѣте и Бонакъ,[14] which are usually telltale signs of an interpolation.

The 1090s mark some of the Kyivans' initial encounters with the Polovtsians, which were often disastrous for the Rus' princes. A "clash of civilizations" produced the image of savage, brutal, and primitive nomads as almost beastlike creatures. Contemporaries could probably have cited much evidence of that. Chances are that the most striking proof—Khan Boniak's wolflike howling—is nothing but a literary invention.

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[12] *PSRL* 1: 45.

[13] This factor may also have prompted the chronicler to recall *VC*. The only other text that features the Hungarian king is *Vita Methodii (VM)*. Lavrov (*Materialy*, 85) remarked that, from the hagiographic perspective, the episode in *VC*, chap. 8, should be linked with the story in *VM*, chap. 16, concerning the encounter with the Hungarian king. It has been established that *VM* was known and quoted by the author of the Primary Chronicle.

[14] *PSRL* 1: 270, 272.

In Defense of the Truth about the Indomitable Prior Augustyn Kordecki[*]

Zbigniew Wójcik

The 6 May 2001 issue of *Aneks* includes an article by Cezary Leżeński titled "Przeor Kordecki — bohater czy zdrajca" (Prior Kordecki—Hero or Traitor). When it was reprinted in *Angora*, no. 19/411, it bore the additional title "Bohaterską obronę Częstochowy wymyślił Sienkiewicz. Przeor Kordecki był zdrajcą" (Sienkiewicz Made Up the Heroic Defense of Częstochowa. Prior Kordecki Was a Traitor). Considering the author, my reading of this article caused me not only consternation but also great distress. After all, Leżeński is a veteran of the "Gray Columns" and of the Home Army, a member of Solidarity and, what is also immensely important, a knight of the "Order of the Smile," which knighthood, as is well known, is awarded by children. Unfortunately, *Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amica veritas*!

I am not one of those historians who believe that "one should not disturb sacred cows," for such "sacred cows" are often largely artificial. However, Leżeński had no grounds to suggest, much less claim, that the leader of the defense of the Jasna Góra Monastery was a traitor. Even Julian Marchlewski did not go so far as to make such a claim, although he did everything in his power not only to play down the defense of Jasna Góra in 1655 but also to revile it outright.[1] Marchlewski's attitude is hardly surprising given his political views: he subsequently led the Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee and, in 1920, awaited the capture of Warsaw by the Red Army "at the parsonage in Wyszków."

In his article Leżeński repeatedly refers to the work of the outstanding scholar of the history of the Deluge and the defense of Częstochowa, my friend Dr. Adam Kersten (1930–80), a highly erudite, unusually critical

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[1] J. Marchlewski, "Z przeszłości paulinów częstochowskich," *Wolna Trybuna* (Warsaw), 1911, no. 1.

scholar and man of integrity who spent many years studying the problem under discussion. In *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (Polish Biographical Dictionary) Kersten did not hesitate to say something quite different. There we read:

> Kordecki's policy was one of consistent striving to prevent Jasna Góra from being occupied by foreign forces. This was to be attained by the conclusion of an agreement in exchange for letters of safe conduct (*salva guardis*). At the same time Kordecki sought help for the monastery from King John II Casimir [whom he betrayed, according to Mr. Leżeński!] and Polish military leaders. When Swedish forces approached Częstochowa, Kordecki, like most of the monastic congregation, decided on armed resistance to the incursion of Swedish troops. During the siege of the monastery (18 November–26 December), he used every means ... including armed resistance, to prevent the incursion of foreign troops into the monastery.

Stanisław Kobierzycki (1600–65), a contemporary of those events—who was both the palatine of Pomerania and a historian—gives an entirely different depiction of the prior than Mr. Leżeński. "It is truly amazing," we read in the palatine's account, "how a person whose entire life had been spent in the confines of a monastery suddenly gained such experience. He prepared everything for the defense, determined the placement of cannons and troops, leveled the sheds beneath the walls, inspected the workers and guards at night, encouraged the soldiers with words and generosity, kept up the monks' morale, and gave heart to the discouraged gentry when, overcome by fear and doubt, they advised giving up and opening the gates: he resisted and got his way."[2]

If, as Leżeński claims, Kordecki was a traitor, then the same author's other accusation would appear to be a mere trifle. How, then, did this huge falsification come about?

In a work glorifying the defense of the monastery entitled *Nova Gigantomachia*, Prior Kordecki published the text of the letter he sent on 21 November 1655 to the commander of the besieging Swedish forces, General Burchard von der Lühnen Müller (according to Mr. Leżeński's account, the given name of this Swedish general was "Buchad"). The text of this letter, as indeed all of *Nova Gigantomachia,* was for several centuries the only historical source on the events of November–December 1655. The situation changed only in the early twentieth century, when a brief study based on primary sources by the Swedish historian Johan

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[2]   Stanisław Kobierzycki, *Obsidio Claris Montis Częstochoviensis ... ab exercitu Suecorum duce Burchardo Mellero generali legato* (Danzig, 1659), 78–79, trans. from the Latin by R. Bochenek.

Theodor Westrin was published.[3] An essay of his differing only slightly from this work appeared the previous year.[4]

What was the significance of Westrin's essay for historical research on the siege of the Jasna Góra Monastery in 1655? In his work the Swedish historian published a facsimile of Fr. Kordecki's letter to General Müller dated 21 November of that year, the original of which he had discovered in the Swedish Central Historical Archives (Riksarkivet) in Stockholm. The prior also published that letter in *Nova Gigantomachia*, but the two documents differ in certain significant details. In his letter to the Swedish general, Kordecki deleted or attenuated facts that were inconvenient for the history of the siege and for him personally. Inter alia he retouched his obsequious tone toward Charles X Gustav and Müller.

Ludwik Kubala (1838–1918), one of the most popular nineteenth-century Polish historians, took a decisive stand in defense of the prior of Jasna Góra, saying, inter alia, "a man who awakened all Poland with his mighty faith deserves the trust of subsequent generations that all he did and how he did it was necessary and good."[5]

Westrin's opinion of Fr. Kordecki's forgery is certainly of greater importance. The Swedish historian wrote:

> Although *Nova Gigantomachia* is saturated with the hatred of a Polish patriot and a devout Catholic for the enemies of his people and faith, the factual description of the siege has verisimilitude (with the exception of the miracles, to be sure), although some untruths can be shown. Though the documents cited endow the work with supreme historical value, in the sole instance where they could be verified they do not reproduce the original faithfully; nevertheless, they show clear signs of faithfulness to the main narrative. *Nova Gigantomachia* can therefore be considered a good historical source for the detailed study of an episode of war that should not be overlooked in schools, not so much for its military and political significance, *although that too was considerable* [emphasis added], but in view of the status that it had and maintains to this day in the consciousness of Poles and in their literature.[6]

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[3] *Częstochowa klosters belägring af Karl X Gustavs trupper 1655* (Stockholm, 1905).

[4] "Om Częstochowa klosters belägring af Karl X Gustavs trupper," *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1904, no. 24.

[5] Ludwik Kubala, *Wojna Szwecka w roku 1655 i 1656* (Lviv: H. Altenberg et al., 1913), 183.

[6] *Obrona Jasnej Góry w r. 1655*, trans.from the Swedish by Rev. Dr. Ludwik Frąś (Częstochowa: Nakładem OO. Paulinów, 1935), 10.

I consider it important to cite Westrin's opinion, which in no way entitles some—fortunately, not numerous—historians to an almost complete negation of the siege of Jasna Góra and Fr. Kordecki's deeds.

Leżeński places great emphasis on the silence of contemporaries about the siege of the monastery, which was not broken until his publication abiut the "traitor" and "falsifier" Kordecki. However, following the appearance of Kersten's article, which expressed a similar opinion, two historians, Professor Tadeusz Wasilewski of the University of Warsaw and I of the Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences, established that that was not the case. This is by no means a blemish on the memory of the late Professor Kersten, who wrote that a historian who thinks that after his investigation of a subject no one else will have anything new to say about it should immediately start cultivating flowers instead of studying the past.

It is therefore untrue that the defense of Jasna Góra had no resonance before 1658, that is, when *Nova Gigantomachia* was published. The signatories of the Tyszowce Confederation (29 December 1655!) expressed their decided outrage, which was one of the most important and earliest examples of, shall we say, the gentry and military coming to their senses after going over en masse to the camp of the victorious Swedes not too long before. The confederates stated *expressis verbis* that the Scandinavian invaders, having besieged the monastery, had by the same token violated the freedom of the Catholic religion and raised a sacrilegious hand against a place *of supreme importance not only to the Commonwealth, but even to Christendom* (Orbi Christiano).

Almost twenty years ago, Tadeusz Wasilewski pointed out another interesting and characteristic document.[7] In the manifesto of 2 March 1656 (!) issued by the mercenaries serving in Aleksander Koniecpolski's division in Zambrów, the Swedish aggressors were very harshly condemned for their perfidy, plundering, and oppression. For us, however, this is not of greatest significance as regards the course of events at Jasna Góra in late 1655. The soldiers' most serious charge against Charles X Gustav, then still victorious, concerns his raid on Jasna Góra. In attacking it the Swedish king sought to destroy "Poland's only consolation, the Monastery of the Most Holy Virgin of Częstochowa, where the icon of the Mother of God painted by Saint Luke, famed throughout the Christian world, is preserved ... so as to wipe out the veneration of the Holy Virgin in this Catholic land and thus more easily convert the Polish people to their Lutheran sect."

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[7] Tadeusz Wasilewski, *Ostatni Waza na polskim tronie* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Śląsk, 1984).

That is not all. A lengthy account of the siege of the monastery was published in one of the most important European newspapers, of which there were few at the time—the exceptionally popular *Gazette de France*. This report, dated 4 January 1656 from Głogówek in Silesia, appeared in Paris on 5 February (no. 17 of the *Gazette* for that year). There we read that heavy Swedish attacks, especially in late December, were repelled, as a result of which "ils abandonneront le siège avec quelque precipitation." Would the leading "mass medium" of the day have reacted so promptly to an event devoid of greater significance?

It was with the greatest amazement that I read the section of Mr. Leżeński's article concerning the well-nigh personal relations between Prior Kordecki and King John Casimir: "It cannot be denied that Fr. Kordecki betrayed his lord, King John Casimir of Poland. He was, as we would say today, a collaborator, even though later he would not admit the Swedes to Jasna Góra. But did that make him a hero? Especially as on a previous occasion he had already come out against his king: *in April 1655 he did not fire the monastery cannon on Lubomirski's rebels and locked the gates of Jasna Góra against John Casimir's soldiers, just as he did toward the end of that same year against the Swedes*" (my emphasis).

We learn from this section that in April 1655 Lubomirski's rebels were at the gates of Częstochowa, and Fr. Kordecki, instead of firing at them as renegades, helped the rebels by locking the monastery gates against the soldiers of the hapless king! And before eight months had passed the same perverse, perfidious prior again had to lock the monastery fortress gates against the Swedes! "When Kara Mustafa, the great leader of the Crusaders, marched on Cracow" is the first thought that comes to mind on reading this section.

Lubomirski's Rebellion, a dark page in Polish history, did not precede the Swedish invasion by a few months. It did not begin until 1665, and it lasted until the Agreement of Łęgonice (31 July 1666), that is, ten years after the Swedish siege of Jasna Góra!

In 1655 Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski was one of John Casimir's most fervent and outstanding supporters and acquitted himself nobly during the Swedish invasion. He began the civil war five years after the end of the Second Northern War (1655–60). This can be checked in any Polish history textbook, in every encyclopedia. But why bother? That would only have delayed the writing of Leżeński's "sensational" article.

It is unfortunate that Leżeński did not glance at even a few works dealing with the events at Częstochowa in November–December 1655. Doing so would have expanded his knowledge considerably and saved him from expressing unfounded judgments and opinions.

Here are a few more facts. When dealing with the siege of Jasna Góra, we cannot help but recall the contents of a letter General Müller's deputy, a Czech in the service of Charles X Gustav, Count Vřesovič (familiar from Henryk Sienkiewicz's *Deluge*), wrote at the beginning of hostilities to his monarch from the encampment at Częstochowa on 22 November 1655. There the Czech *jurgieltnik* (stipendiary) expressed his doubts about the prospects of taking the monastery fortress for many military reasons, but above all because such an attack "would be an assault on the Polish soul (*man greifet an der Pohlen Seele*), and it is to be feared—what is most important—that it would be empty and vain." (I quote from Fr. Frąś's translation of the German original in Westrin's work).

No less important testimony comes from the early eighteenth century, that is, fifty years after the defence of Jasna Góra. During the Great Northern War (1700–21), the armies of King Charles XII of Sweden (1697–1718) occupied extensive Commonwealth territories. At one point in the military operations, consideration was given in the royal entourage to the possibility of taking the Częstochowa monastery by force. This idea was abandoned because Karl Piper, the king's chief adviser, reminded him of the "upheaval that took place in Poland, among both the gentry and the clergy, when His Majesty's Grandfather, King Charles X Gustav of blessed memory, tried the same thing" (i.e., the occupation of Jasna Góra).

The significance of the defense of Częstochowa was emphasized years ago by the Swedish military historian Arne Stade[8] and more recently by the Polish military historian Ryszard Henryk Bochenek,[9] as well as by the British historian Norman Davies, who is well known in Poland.[10]

Stade states in his excellent article: "The retreat [from the siege of Jasna Góra] was at the time perhaps the greatest defeat for the Swedes since the outbreak of the war in July, even if the military scope of that failure was rather limited. Its psychological effect and influence turned out to be quite serious, even if one admits that its description in the historical literature has been exaggerated." Such was the response of the Swedish historian to all who tried to deny the significance of the defense of Jasna Góra.

Bochenek wrote a brilliant study, in which he states: "It was the first spectacular military victory over the Swedish army [an obvious reference

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[8] Arne Stade, "Droga Szwedów do Częstochowy - Jasnej Góry," *Zapiski Historyczne* (Toruń) 46 (1981).

[9] Ryszard Henryk. Bochenek, *Twierdza Jasna Góra* (Warsaw: Bellona, 1997).

[10] Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

to Jasna Góra], one that influenced the further course of the war, including the renunciation of obedience to Charles X Gustav by the crown hetmans and the formation of the anti-Swedish confederation of 19 December 1655 in Tyszowce. Belief in the Swedes' invincibility was broken, and uprisings against them began spreading like wildfire." Bochenek expresses the greatest regard for Fr. Kordecki. "It is a paradox," he writes, "that the defense of this fortress [Jasna Góra] was led not by a professional soldier or even a nobleman, but by a humble monk of the Congregation of Pauline Fathers of Jasna Góra, Klemens Kordecki (1603–73), whose monastic name was Augustyn.... He rendered great service in building the fortress of Jasna Góra ... as well as in the technical and military preparations for its defense (1650–55). He heroically defended the Jasna Góra fortress against the Swedes in 1655–56."

The great British historian of Poland, Norman Davies, who, it may be said without hesitation, brought Poland into world history, asserted unequivocally: "John Casimir took refuge in imperial Silesia. The greater part of his army entered the Swedish service. Warsaw was occupied; Cracow was taken by siege; a large number of smaller towns and estates were burned and plundered. Resistance was reduced to the uncoordinated activities of peasant bands and to the miraculous defense of the fortified Pauline monastery of Jasna Góra, on the 'Bright Hill' of Częstochowa."[11]

Leżeński's accusation that Prior Kordecki was a traitor is more ridiculous than revolting. Almost everyone was surrendering to the Swedes: the army, the crown hetmans, the gentry—not only Protestant but also Catholic. Jan Sobieski served the Swedes, and for a long time at that! Nevertheless on 26 May 1656, two months after breaking with the Swedes, John Casimir granted him the high office of crown standard-bearer, which was the first stage of his road to the office of grand hetman of the crown.

The "traitor" Kordecki not only did not break with his monarch but maintained contact with him. The king entrusted him with the protection of the greatest treasure of Jasna Góra—the miraculous icon of the Black Madonna. On the advice of the prior and the Pauline Council, the provincial, Fr. Teofil Bronowski, brought the icon out of the monastery during the night of 7–8 November 1655, that is, immediately before the siege, and took it to Silesia. The icon was hidden in Jędrzej Cellary's castle in Lubliniec, from which it was soon transferred to Głogówek, where John Casimir was in temporary exile. He recommended that the icon be taken to the local Pauline monastery, where, safe from all the fortunes of war,

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[11] Ibid., 1: 450–51.

the icon remained until April 1656. This was a strange example of collaboration between a "traitor" and his king!

Fr. Kordecki had make every effort to save the monastery that was, as the enemy had written, the "soul of Poland." Under the circumstances, the "act of loyalty" to Charles X Gustav that the prior signed was of no substantial importance, either actual or moral.

The weekly *Angora,* which reprinted Leżeński's article, added on its own initiative that "Sienkiewicz made up the heroic defence of Częstochowa." But serious historical research absolutely confirms that the defence was heroic. Sienkiewicz invented a host of other matters and events; after all, he was not writing a scholarly work but historical fiction! Just like Zagłoba, Andrzej Kmicic is a fictional character. He did not touch off the culverin, nor did he lead the king across the mountains from Silesia to Poland. Zagłoba did not free his comrades of misfortune who were being taken to be shot in Birża, and, even worse, Wołodyjowski did not "cut down" Bohun. And so on and so forth. For heaven's sake, we do not study history from historical novels! After all, French pupils and university students do not write examinations on the history of their country based on their reading of the father of historical fiction, Alexandre Dumas!

It is true that the defense of Jasna Góra in 1655 has been overly idealized by some historians, and not only by them. Prior Kordecki has also been idealized to some degree (for instance, by Adam Mickiewicz). I have always been, am now, and ever shall be a resolute opponent of false legends and myths in history. Nevertheless, I wonder what could be worse: myths and legends that have little or nothing to do with so-called historical fact, "black" historical revisionism based either on ill will or on the so-called childhood disease of leftism, or, as is the case here, on shameless ignorance of the history of one's native land.

Translated by Andrij Hornjatkevyč

The Encyclopedia of Galicia: Provincial Synthesis in the Age of Galician Autonomy

Larry Wolff

In 1849 Hipolit Stupnicki's *Galicia*, a "topographical-geographical-historical" account of that province, including a map, was published in Lviv under the auspices of the Ossolineum:. This first edition in Polish was followed by a German translation in 1853; a second Polish edition was issued in 1869. Discussing geography, Stupnicki took the opportunity to express patriotic admiration for the province: "The chief character of the Galician mountains is the wild, romantic, dark primeval forests, and rough stone formations alternate with magical valleys that can compete for beauty with any valleys on earth." Galicia was thus supposed to possess a natural and picturesque geographical coherence. "Nature has formed Galicia to be a grain-growing country," observed Stupnicki in 1849, three-quarters of a century after the partitions of Poland resulted in the creation of Galicia as an Austrian province in 1772.[1] In its origins there was nothing "natural" about Galicia. Yet Stupnicki carefully counted the number of species of flora and fauna that inhabited the province, regretting that he could not precisely count the number of insect species.

In the same spirit Stupnicki also enumerated the relevant ethnographic categories: "No land of the Austrian monarchy is inhabited by such different peoples as Galicia. Poles, Ruthenians, Germans, Armenians, Jews, Moldavians, Hungarians, Gypsies...." He also mentioned the Hutsuls, the Carpathian Ruthenian mountaineers, and the Karaites, the heretical Jews who were guided only by the Bible and rejected the Talmud along with rabbinical Judaism. In spite of such heterogeneity, it was possible to make some human generalizations across the province, and Stupnicki remarked that "the customs of the Galician peasantry are, in the same circumstances, different but collectively still very coarse." This

[1] Hipolit Stupnicki, *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien, sammt dem Grossherzogthume Krakau und dem Herzogthume Bukowina in geographisch-historisch-statistischen Beziehung, mit einer Karte dieses Königreichs* (Lviv: Peter Piller, 1853), 9–10, 13.

coarseness extended to feasting, drinking, and the singing of songs. Thus the collective character of the ethnographically diverse peoples was marked by a coarseness that also corresponded to the province's geography of wild primeval forests. The Krakowiak villagers and the Góral mountaineers, the protagonists of Wojciech Bogusławski's Polish national opera in the 1790s, now appeared in Stupnicki's work as Galician ethnographic types: the Krakowiak with "great suppleness and grace in body movements" and a four-cornered crimson cap, the Góral as a "strongly built, physically agile, inventive, creative, often cunning and crafty breed" in a long collarless shirt.[2] Galician history, according to Stupnicki, could be divided into three periods: a medieval period of rule by Ruthenian and Hungarian princes (981–1340); the Polish period (1340–1772); and the Austrian period (from 1772). Thus Galicia was endowed not only with natural but also historical coherence, retrospectively antedating the Austrian annexation and virtual invention of the province in 1772.

The Cracow newspaper *Czas* reviewed Stupnicki's *Galicia* with interest—"a book with such a promising title"—but pedantically regretted that there were too many mistakes, both historical and topographical. "The geography of our province is something very interesting," wrote *Czas*, "very necessary for educating young people," for providing them with a "national education" (*narodowe kształcenie*).[3] Yet the sort of "national education" that might be provided by a book with such a promising provincial title—*Galicia*—was unconventionally national at best and might more plausibly be interpreted as "non-national"—the word Seweryn Goszczyński deployed in his literary assault upon Aleksander Fredro in 1835. In 1849, even before reviewing *Galicia*, *Czas* had proclaimed its principle of commitment to provincial politics, to Galicia the crownland (*kraj*) rather than to Poland the fatherland (*ojczyzna*): "In the crownland through the crownland (*w kraju przez kraj*), we acknowledge for us as the only true and strong activities, the land as the only natural field for us."[4] The territory was not named, since everyone knew that it could only be Galicia, the "natural field" for the Galicians' political efforts. The slogan "*w kraju przez kraj*" also implied the priority of Habsburg loyalism over the pursuit of Polish independence, for Galicia was created and defined with reference to Habsburg rule. If *Czas* regarded *kraj* as the fundamental domain of its journalistic mission, it was only to be expected that the newspaper would take an interest in Stupnicki's *Ga-*

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[2] Ibid., 18, 24–25.

[3] *Czas*, 3 October 1849.

[4] *Czas*, 22 March 1849.

licia. Provincial topography, geography, and history might provide the contours for a new kind of "national education" that was fundamentally Galician.

Stupnicki's book affirmed the importance and coherence of Galicia as a provincial entity in the aftermath of the failed national revolutions of 1846 and 1848. Intellectual coherence and conceptual unity may also have seemed politically relevant in response to Ruthenian proposals for the partition of the province in 1848. The achievement of Galician autonomy after 1866, within the new political context of Austro-Hungarian dualism, would be accompanied not only by Stupnicki's second Polish edition in 1869 but also by many other works that likewise suggested the meaningful provincial coherence of Galicia. These included an encyclopedia of Galicia, an anthropological analysis of its population, an account of the province "in word and image," and Stanisław Szczepanowski's celebrated sociological study *Poverty in Galicia* in 1888. It was Szczepanowski who would statistically synthesize the "average Galician." What all such works had in common was their acknowledgment of Galicia itself, the provincial entity, as the fundamental unit of analysis: "in the crownland through the crownland." In fact, however, they purposefully sought to construct the provincial coherence they seemed to assume as their premise. Thus Galicia, invented at the end of the eighteenth century by Habsburg policy, became a "natural field" of political and cultural operations in the nineteenth century.

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In 1868 an announcement appeared in Lviv inviting subscriptions to a tremendous work in progress, a multivolume *Encyklopedya do krajoznawstwa Galicyi* (Encyclopedia of Knowledge about the Crownland of Galicia), which was to appear in monthly installments and to cover every aspect of the province, including geography, history, statistics, topography, agronomy, and economy. This ambitious project was basically the work of a single man, Antoni Schneider, who himself stood ready to collect the addresses of interested subscribers as he prepared to write and issue the first installments. In the announcement Schneider wrote of his hopes for "this almost thirty-year labor of mine, in which I have been guided till now only by the fervent and undiscouraged desire to serve the fatherland." He further hoped that his own dedication and "the value of this work" would receive "strong support from the honorable public."[5] In 1868, with the consolidation of Galician autonomy, the notion of a com-

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[5] "Zaproszenie do przedpłaty na dzieło pod tytułem: Encyklopedia do krajoznawstwa Galicyi" (1868), Biblioteka Czartoryskich, Cracow.

prehensive encyclopedia must have seemed plausible, even practical: knowledge about the region (*krajoznawstwo*), the intellectual accompaniment to Galicia's emerging political, administrative, and educational institutions.

Schneider's encyclopedia of Galicia was a Polish project conceived in the Polish language and politically calculated to appear in the 1870s, the first decade of Polish predominance in the autonomous province. Yet the project would founder, producing only two published volumes in 1871 and 1874 respectively, alphabetically covering the letters A and B in Galician lore. The encylopedia would not find the supportive Galician public that Schneider envisioned: in fact, the very notion of a Galician public became increasingly uncertain as Polish predominance in the 1870s called forth the dissidence of increasingly articulate affirmations of Jewish and Ruthenian presences in the province.

Antoni Schneider was born in 1825, the son of a Bavarian officer in the Habsburg army in Galicia. He attended a Gymnasium in Lviv and joined the Hungarians in fighting against the Habsburgs in 1848. But then, renouncing revolution, he entered the Habsburg bureaucracy in Galicia in the 1850s. He worked particularly in the road service, which enabled him to travel around the province. His background inevitably gave him a Galician perspective, even as he associated himself with Polish culture through the literary journal *Dziennik Literacki* in Lviv in the 1860s. There he sought financial support, as well as documents and materials, for his encyclopedia project. In fact he received a free apartment, courtesy of the Ossolineum, a financial subvention from the Galician Diet, and some sponsorship from the *namiestnik* (viceroy) of Galicia, Agenor Gołuchowski.[6] The first volume, appearing in 1871, offered an introductory apologia: "For many years voices have emerged on behalf of a broader description of our crownland, for the purpose of a more accurate recognition of its monuments and characteristics so dear to us. Alongside these voices the progress of national knowledge also requires us to engage in rivalry with the other nations of Europe."[7] Schneider presumed that his public would feel, along with him, a sentimental attachment to Galicia ("so dear to us") and that an encyclopedic account would satisfy "national" ambitions. The name "Poland" was not mentioned, and the very nature of the project seemed to suggest that Galicia itself was

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[6] Wiesław Bieńkowski, "Schneider (Szneider, Sznejder), Antoni Julian," in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 35 (Warsaw: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1994), 571–73.

[7] Antoni Schneider, *Encyklopedya do krajoznawstwa Galicji*, vol. 1 (Lviv: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, 1871), iii; vol. 2 (Lviv: z drukarni J. Dorzańskiego & H. Gromana, 1874).

one of the nations of Europe, the subject of a national knowledge that cried out for representation and publication. The first volume, including the A subjects, included articles on all the Lviv archbishoprics: Roman Catholic, Ruthenian, and Armenian. The second volume, with the B subjects, covered, among many other things, "Baba, babka: a kind of cake"—and the progress from A to B, from archbishoprics to bakeries, suggested that Schneider's eclecticism was undercutting the encyclopedia's systematic conception.

The second volume was in fact the last to appear, but the state archive in the Wawel Castle in Cracow still preserves the massive quantity of materials Schneider assembled for his project, extending all the way from A to Z. The Galician town of Zhuravno (Polish: Żurawno) on the Dnister, for instance, was covered by a file that contained materials in Polish, German, and Latin: notes on Jan Sobieski resisting the Turks in the seventeenth century, documents from the Jesuit college in the eighteenth century, and nineteenth-century newspaper clippings from *Gazeta Lwowska* about the horse market.[8] Schneider's eclectic approach was in some ways conducive to representing the heterogeneity of the province, even as it compromised the coherence of the encyclopedic project.

Schneider had preserved a statistical account of Galicia from 1822, three years before his own birth, carried out under the bilingual (German-Polish) Socratic slogan "Kenne dich selbst / Znaj siebie samego" (Know thyself) with reflections on Galician heterogeneity in German. Who were the Galicians?

> According to descent they are partly Slavs—to which the Poles and Russniaks belong, partly Moldavian, German, Armenian, Hungarian, and Szekler, partly a mix of several peoples, like the Lipovaners, partly Jews, and additionally a small number of Gypsies.... With regard to religion Galicia offers, like the Austrian monarchy as a whole, the image of a great and well-ordered family, in which the father embraces all the branches with equal love and concern, regardless of the difference in their characters and mentalities.[9]

The encyclopedist Schneider seemed similarly all-embracing in his data files. Maria Theresa's Latin declaration upon the partition of Poland in 1772 was accompanied by Schneider's penciled note, looking back to the fourteenth century, on the relevance of "the rights of Casimir the Great to Red Ruthenia." The file on the Jews of Drohobych included Polish documents concerning the *kahal*, the Jewish communal institution,

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[8] "Żurawno," Archiwum Państwowe w Krakowie, Wawel, Teka Schneidra 1782.

[9] "Gedrängte statistische Übersicht des Königreiches Galizien (1822)," Archiwum Państwowe w Krakowie, Wawel, Teka Schneidra 515.

from the period of the Commonwealth, but also German documents from the Josephine period of the 1780s. These documents included correspondence with the government about the regulation of Jewish marriages in Drohobych and proposals for the reform of propination, that is, the leased monopolies on commerce in alcohol.[10]

In trying to understand Galicia comprehensively, Schneider could not fail to recognize the Jewish and Ruthenian aspects of the province that complicated his own predominantly Polish perspective. It was perhaps an impossible project to bring together all aspects of the province in one coherent encyclopedia project, and the intellectual tensions of such a project also reflected the national and religious tensions of the 1870s in Galicia. Having accumulated almost two thousand files of information, but having published only two volumes of the whole encyclopedia and having recognized the indifference of the hypothetical Galician public, Schneider shot himself in 1880.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

In spite of the impressive institutional support of the Sejm, the Ossolineum, and the *namiestnik*, Schneider's encyclopedia of Galicia came to a halt with the publication of the letter B volume in Lviv in 1874. In 1876, however, there appeared in Cracow a very different sort of encyclopedic volume, sharply focused on the coherence of Galicia. Not in the least eclectic in its scope, *Charakterystyka Fizyczna Ludności Galicyjskiej* (The Physical Characteristics of the Galician Population) was a supposedly scientific effort to sum up the province according to the methods and standards of the new and modern discipline of physical anthropology. The authors, Józef Majer and Izydor Kopernicki, were working as part of the Anthropological Commission of the Jagiellonian University and the newly established Academy of Knowledge in Cracow, crucial cultural institutions of Galician autonomy in the 1870s. Majer, who was born in Cracow in 1808, became a professor of physiology at that university and was also the founding president of the academy from 1872 to 1890. Kopernicki, who may have been related to Copernicus, was born in 1825, like Schneider. Majer participated as a doctor in the Polish Insurrection of 1830–31, while the younger Kopernicki took part in the Insurrection of 1863 and settled in Galicia only after the achievement of autonomy. For both men there was clearly an important Polish dimension to their Galician identities and interests. As an anatomist and an anthropologist—indeed, one of the founding figures of the discipline

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[10] "Quandoquidem circumspecto (1772)," Archiwum Państwowe w Krakowie, Wawel, Teka Schneidra 515; "Drohobycz: Żydzi," Teka Schneidra 442.

of anthropology at the Jagiellonian University—Kopernicki dedicated himself to specific studies of Gypsies and highlanders (*górale*). He was also involved in the contemporary projects, led by Oskar Kolberg, for the collection of folklore and folksongs throughout Poland.[11] *Charakterystyka Fizyczna Ludności Galicyjskiej* was, however, very specifically provincial in the boundaries of its research and anything but folkloric in its radically anthropometric emphasis on physical characteristics.

The Anthropological Commission had sponsored this project of "observations on living people," that is, "the provincial population in general" and "the three main component nationalities—Polish, Ruthenian, and Jewish." The study included 5,052 male subjects recruited into the Habsburg army and examined by local doctors, with results made available to the researchers, thus promising a representative cross-section of Galician men. The doctors were supplied with a set of instructions for the necessary measurements to be made. Majer and Kopernicki divided the work of analysis between them, with Majer considering measurements of height, chest circumference, color of skin and eyes, and color and quality of hair, while Kopernicki dealt with the formation of skulls, faces, and noses.[12] This research conducted in the 1870s was intended for the purpose of acquiring more detailed, more accurate, and more scientific knowledge of Galicia in the age of autonomy. Similar sorts of examinations would be carried out in the name of racial science in Galicia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe under the auspices of Nazi Germany during the 1930s and 1940s, when the analysis of racial characteristics for the purpose of categorizing Slavs and Jews and distinguishing them from Aryan Germans would have eugenic and genocidal implications.

On the criterion of height, Poles were found to measure, on average, 160 to 164 centimeters—"precisely the average height of people in general"—while Ruthenians, including Hutsuls, had measurements in roughly the same range. Jews were clearly expected to be different, as attested by the authors' remarks:

> The population of this third nationality in Galicia, though not native but immigrant (*nie rodzima lecz napływowa*) and of a completely different breed (*całkiem odmiennego szczepu*), becomes an interesting and scientifically important subject of research precisely on account of its own

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[11] Jan Hulewicz, "Majer, Józef," in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 19 (1974), 161–64; Stefan Kieniewicz and Paweł Sikora, "Kopernicki, Izydor," in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 14 (1994), 1–3.

[12] Józef Mayer and Izydor Kopernicki, *Charakterystyka Fizyczna Ludności Galicyjskiej* (Cracow: Uniwersytet Jagiełłoński, 1876), 3–6 (subsequent in-text page references are to this edition).

distinctiveness ... for in spite of many centuries of existence in our country, this people, living in villages and little towns—those we dealt with exclusively in our research—did not grow from the earth so as to be able to distinguish themselves by any stamp of the locality. (15, 36)

Many Jews, of course, had been living in Poland since the fourteenth century, as the public in Cracow would surely have known after the attention to Casimir the Great in 1869, when the medieval king's remains were ritually reburied in the Wawel cathedral. The Jews, encouraged to come to Poland by Casimir's policies in the fourteenth century, were not very recent immigrants in the nineteenth century. But Majer and Kopernicki emphasized Jewish transience, of which they took a rather negative view—"avoiding hard agricultural work, and pursuing easier earnings, the Jews moved from place to place"—in order to explain why Jews would not necessarily be marked by regional characteristics. Yet in the end, when the measurements of height were analyzed, Jews turned out to be, on average, exactly as tall as Poles, with both groups only slightly shorter than Ruthenians (36–38).

In the evaluation of skin color each subject was judged as being "white" (*biały*), "yellowish" (*płowy*), or "swarthy" (*śniady*). The researchers then constructed a ratio of fair to dark subjects for each of the three nationalities. Poles and Ruthenians, with a ratio of three to two, were thus shown to be darker than Jews, with a ratio of two to one. For eyes—with each subject's eyes registered as grey, green, blue, or brown—the ratio of light to dark showed a variation among all three nationalities: Poles had the lightest eyes and Jews had the darkest, while Ruthenians were in between. Hair color, evaluated from light to dark, ranked similarly: Poles, then Ruthenians, then Jews (64, 77, 88, 90). Skulls were measured for height, width, and circumference; faces were judged to be short, oval, or long; and noses were evaluated as straight, flat, pug, and hooked. With the "scientific" discovery that Jews had statistically more "hooked" (*garbaty*) noses than Poles or Ruthenians, the researchers felt they had found what they had anticipated from the beginning. The Jews were different: "Jews in this regard are most clearly differentiated from the native population of Galicia, namely by hooked noses." This was expressed as a mathematically quantified conclusion, with the study demonstrating that "the hooked nose is undoubtedly the most statistically important mark of the Jewish type of face" (123, 137, 175). The numerical tables that summed up the whole study gave a positivist representation of the province.

The researchers' racial anthropology may seem preposterous and pernicious in historical retrospect. Clearly, they were inclined to make certain general points about the three nationalities, affirming the similarity

of Poles and Ruthenians (and thus, implicitly, rebutting any Ruthenian aspirations for the partition of the province) and identifying the intractable difference of the Jews, who lived in Galicia but could not be considered "native" to it. Yet perhaps the most important aspect of the study was its underlying assumption that Galicia was a meaningful territorial unit for anthropological analysis in the age of autonomy. Stupnicki had counted the species of flora and fauna and shown an interest in the insects of the province; Majer and Kopernicki analyzed Galicia's human types as natural history made way for modern anthropology. They succeeded, in their anthropological fashion, in representing Galicia as a coherent human domain—marked by differences and variations, to be sure, but composed of interlocking, comparable, related elements. They published their work in Cracow in 1876, the same year that Aleksander Fredro died in Lviv, at the age of 83. In the 1820s he had represented Galician society on stage in his comic dramas; in the 1870s he would scarcely have recognized his own province as reflected in the measurements, ratios, and statistics of physical anthropology.

* * *

Joseph Redlich, in his classic account of the reign of Francis Joseph, emphasized the creative and liberal intellectual endeavors of Crown Prince Rudolf during the the 1880s, the last decade of his life, which would end in the scandalous double suicide at Mayerling in 1889. "About the middle of the eighties, he formed a great literary plan and carried it through with all the temperamental zest native to him," wrote Redlich concerning Rudolf's sponsorship of the multivolume series of books on *Die Länder Oesterreich-Ungarns in Wort und Bild* (The Lands of Austria-Hungary in Word and Image). According to Redlich, "an exhaustive description of the whole realm in all its parts and of all its nationalities was to be produced by the co-operation of distinguished authors and scholars."[13] Already in 1884 the 150–page Galician volume, *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien: und das Herzogthum Bukowina* (The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria), appeared in Vienna in German, with "The Duchy of Bukovina," a separate crownland since 1849, discussed in an addendum of forty pages. The author, Julius Jandaurek, exercised the same impulse to sum up Galicia that had motivated Stupnicki and Schneider. Jandaurek taught German in a Gymnasium in Lviv. His previous publications from the 1870s included texts for teaching German in Galician middle schools. In other words, he was a

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[13] Joseph Redlich, *Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria: A Biography* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 414–15.

teacher whose pedagogical expertise had been rendered somewhat marginal by Galician autonomy, when Polish displaced German as the basic language of instruction in the province. Now, under the special patronage of the crown prince, he would sum up Galicia as an imperial possession for the Viennese public.

Beginning with a "historical overview," Jandaurek related Polish history as Galician history, from "the oldest legends of the Slavs on the upper Vistula," involving Krak, the mythological founder of Cracow, and the beautiful Wanda, who supposedly refused to marry a German prince and killed herself by jumping into the Vistula—an unsettling story, perhaps, for Crown Prince Rudolf.[14] Jandaurek's account of medieval history noted the Polish princes' political weakness and the German settlers' independent prerogatives. The advent of the Tatars in the thirteenth century brought about the "terrible desolation" of Rus', and medieval Halych (Halicz) was mentioned in association with the Hungarian crown, implying a natural continuity from medieval to modern times. Casimir the Great annexed "Halicz (Eastern Galicia)" to Poland in the fourteenth century, and Jandaurek, while rather casually associating "Halicz," "Eastern Galicia," and "Galicia," also affirmed that Russians, Ruthenians, and Poles had always been distinctive peoples in this region. Discussing Jan Sobieski in the seventeenth century, Jandaurek hailed 12 September 1683, the day Vienna was saved, as "the most glorious day of the seventeenth century" (10–16, 26). Indeed, he would have lived through the bicentennial celebration of 1883 as he was writing his book.

Jandaurek celebrated Tadeusz Kościuszko as "the noblest hero of the nation" for resisting the Russian armies in 1794 (30). Kościuszko's heroism, like the glory of Sobieski, was illustrated with pictures, for the series specified Galicia in word and image. Curiously, the "historical overview" of Galicia virtually concluded at the point where Galician history actually began, in the late eighteenth century. The contemporary substance of Galicia, for Jandaurek, lay in its "land and people" (*Land und Leute*), the subject of the next section of the book. Here there were many more illustrations, especially to suggest the diversity of folk costumes to be found in the province. Jandaurek was sentimentally attached to the Galician landscape, whose principal features he presented as the Carpathian Mountains and the great rivers, the Vistula and the Dnister. The Dnister was represented with a romantic image, while the Vistula was fondly described with attention to the harmony between the natural land-

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[14] Julius Jandaurek, *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien und das Herzogthum Bukowina* (Vienna: Verlag von Karl Graeser, 1884), 5–6 (in-text page references are to this edition).

scape and its human features, like the traditional "Galician raftsmen" with their straw hats: "There is life and movement here from first light to the onset of dark night. You see at various distances red fire burning on the rafts, and you hear happy fiddle sounds." Peace came to the Vistula at night, when the moon arose to gaze upon itself in the Vistula-mirror ("*Weichselspiegel*," 37–39).

Concerning ethnography, Jandaurek presented a great variety of Galician communities, with an emphasis on different folk costumes and sometimes common folk culture. Jandaurek generally divided the population into Poles and Ruthenians, but also into peoples of the plains and peoples of the mountains: Mazurs and Krakowiaks, Hutsuls and Boikos. The first image presented not a "Pole," but a "Krakusse" or "Krakowiak" with a plumed cap and embroidered cape (44–45). These were the peasants most devoted to Kościuszko, wrote Jandaurek, and they were famous for their enthusiastic style of singing.

> And who does not know the style of these people, known under the name of Krakowiaks, teeming with energy and lust for life [*Lebenslust*], spread all over the world by the Austrian military bands and distinguishing themselves so favorably from the melancholy style of the other Slavs? Joyously singing, the Krakusse cultivates his native earth, and, singing, he heroically stands up for the same; music and song so rightly characterize his essence; he, too, like the Galizianer in general [*wie überhaupt der Galizianer*], is an excellent rider. When Emperor Francis Joseph gladdened Galicia with his visit in the fall of 1879 [sic], it was mounted troops of Krakusse who, riding boldly, led the coach of the beloved monarch on its excursions in the environs of Cracow. (47–48)

The book included a picture of Francis Joseph in his carriage—in 1880, not 1879—surrounded by Krakowiaks on horseback raising their plumed caps in the emperor's honor. Their gallantry and loyalty were emphasized as aspects of character and custom that were, in some respects—like riding—intended to be representative of "the Galician in general." Jandaurek was committed to representing the diversity of Galicians but also to discovering some general aspects of what it meant to be a *Galizianer*.

The sharp distinction between Ruthenians and Poles was effaced as Jandaurek, assuming a relatively nonpartisan German perspective, explored the more subtle differences between Krakowiacy and Górale (as in Bogusławski's national opera) or between Hutsuls and Boikos. Still, some generalizations could be made about Ruthenians: "The Little Russian people are distinguished in customs and dress from the Mazurs and Górale. The Ruthenian lets his hair grow halfway down his forehead and

combs the rest back, or shaves the head and leaves only, like the Tatars from whom he took the custom, a tuft on top, which rarely occurs nowadays" (54).

Jandaurek thus discerned Tatar Oriental accents amid the heterogeneity of Slavic Galicia. He was interested in physical anthropology, cultural traits, and even spiritual considerations of character: "The Ruthenian peasant is taller and more slender than the Pole. He is by nature also slower and more thoughtful in business. Good-natured and gentle, not boisterous, he nevertheless knows how to avenge injuries done to him, often after a long time has passed. The sad past has marked his whole being with a melancholy aspect and has made him mistrustful and reserved" (55).

For Jandaurek, melancholy was an essential part of the Ruthenian character, in this case implicitly contrasted with the cheerfully singing Krakowiak. The ethnography of Galicia involved multiple anthropological distinctions, undercutting the polarizing political conception of the province in strictly national terms.

"Up to this point, dear reader," wrote Jandaurek, "I have described to you the Galicians [*die Galizianer*] in their exterior appearance; now I want to let you have a look into their souls, into their emotional life, and I believe there is no better way to be able to do that than to make you acquainted with their folksongs, for the Pole and the Ruthenian, rich in song, accompany all of life's occasions with a song" (60). Thus Jandaurek sought to synthesize Galicia's Poles and Ruthenians as Galicians in their souls and emotional lives, as reflected in their folksongs. The apostrophized "dear reader" was clearly neither one nor the other, but perhaps someone with a perspective of civilized and gracious condescension toward peoples whose wealth could be calculated in songs: perhaps the Viennese public, perhaps Crown Prince Rudolf himself. From folksongs it was a natural transition to folk celebrations such as the Holy Evening of Christmas Eve, which Jandaurek associated with pagan Slavic religious occasions. "Now we want to see the Galician Slavs in their folk festivals," he wrote, synthesizing the Poles and Ruthenians as Galician Slavs. Ancient paganism, with its modern survivals, was part of the Slavic legacy that bound both nations together: "The Galician people [*das galizische Volk*] has still other usages originating in venerable pagan times; here and there women still perform the hemp dance on Ash Wednesday in the village tavern so that the hemp will grow well in the coming year" (63–65). Such reflections on Galician folk culture were far from the Polish conception of a historically Polish association with Western civilization. By focusing on peasants and mountaineers as the characteristically Galician people, Jandaurek emphasized the unmodern, even

pagan, aspects of the province and, from a German perspective, the backwardness of Eastern Europe.

Jandaurek's treatment of Galicia's Germans followed this logic explicitly. Though the medieval German colonists had already been mentioned, Jandaurek explained that the greatest number of colonists came in the age of Joseph II, who invited them "so that the Slavic peasant might imitate the advanced culture of the German peasant." Here again the Poles and Ruthenians were synthesized as Slavic peasants vis-à-vis the German colonists. The contemporary German virtues were enumerated as "honesty, inexhaustible industry, loyalty, eagerness to earn a living, uprightness, and a certain degree of good nature [*Gemüthlichkeit*]," as well as "discipline and order." Historically the Germans had not always been so *gemüthlich*; back in the Middle Ages, according to Jandaurek, "the Jews, driven out of Germany by terrible persecution, found protection in Poland." For the Jews of Galicia, the reign of Joseph II was also a "turning point," as they benefited from his spirit of toleration: "and today the Galician Jews enjoy the same constitutional rights as other citizens" (72–73).

Jandaurek regarded the Jews, like the Germans, as distinctive from other Galicians and noted anthropological differences: "The houses of the Jews are distinguished by their construction from the houses of the Christians" (73). In this case, the Poles and Ruthenians were synthesized as Christians, among whom the Germans were also included. At the same time the "Galician Jews" were explicitly characterized as Galician in order to distinguish them from other Jews, and a picture, captioned "Galizischer Jude," brought that figure into the array of ethnographic illustrations in typical folk costume. "The dress of the normal Jew is old Polish: a long black silk coat, black sash, fur cap, stockings, and shoes. This costume is now increasingly displaced by normal town dress. Once all Jews had beards and long locks of hair [*Peissen*] at the temples. Married women cut their hair off and wear a wig." Switching between the past and present tenses, Jandaurek suggested that the Galician Jews were living through a generation of uneven modernization, like Galicia itself: some Jews still dressed in the style of "old Poland" while others were becoming assimilated to modern customs and costumes. Surveying Jewish customs, from Hamantaschen at Purim to the broken wine glass of the Jewish wedding, Jandaurek made clear that the Jews were different from other Galicians, who were, for that very reason, more like one another (75–76).

The last fifty pages of the book offered a sort of guided tour around the province, concluding in eastern Galicia with a visit to the mountain forests, famous for their bandits and bears. The author was being guided

by an old Hutsul, "a mighty bear hunter," who spoke from his own expertise: "'The bear, dear sirs,' he began, with great eyes fixed upon me, 'is not nearly so dangerous as people think. On the contrary, he is good-hearted by nature and harms neither men nor cattle without need. It is only hunger that compels him to go out hunting, and he also shows, when he must, his great cunning and courage.'" (154)

There was a picture of a bear hunter in folk costume holding a long rifle, but no picture of a bear. The Hutsul bear hunter addressed the "dear sirs" of his visiting party, but Jandaurek transmitted that message to a broader public of "dear sirs," the civilized urban public of Vienna, to whom the remote forests of eastern Galicia, full of bears and Hutsuls, must have seemed wild and dangerous. Yet the message was meant to be reassuring in the liberal spirit of Crown Prince Rudolf himself: the bears of Galicia were only dangerous when hungry. In decades past Galicia had been a land of recurrent famines, when not only bears, but also humans, had been hungry and needy, and among the several aspects that synthesized the peoples of the province, that constituted their common condition, poverty would increasingly be recognized as the definitive Galician trait.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

In 1888 Stanisław Szczepanowski published in Lviv a landmark work of economics and sociology, *Nędza Galicyi w cyfrach* (Galicia's Misery in Statistics), which brought numerical data to bear upon the question and showed that Galicia could be considered the poorest part of Europe. Because Galicia existed as a distinct political entity, invented by the Habsburgs in 1772 and maintained autonomously since the 1860s, it was now possible to assess its statistical character across a meaningful and measurable socioeconomic domain. Szczepanowski, however, further believed that, after a century of provincial existence, Galicia possessed a characteristic and disastrous economic tradition of its own. He apostrophized his readers in the preface—"Honorable Gentlemen!"—and urged them to "break free from the Galician tradition but join the Polish tradition." Szczepanowski's argument was historical: Galicia had been separated from Poland by the first partition of 1772 and had therefore failed to be influenced by the inauguration of a Polish civic tradition with the Four-Year Diet of 1788–92 and the Constitution of 3 May 1791 "tending toward the comparability of our society with civilized nations." Galicia lacked the tradition of "civic work" that led to economic development in such nations and therefore inevitably fell farther behind, becoming "the

most unhappy, most oppressed province."[15] Because it was ruled by German bureaucrats from 1772 to 1866, Galicia never had the chance to develop its own tradition of "civic work" and had failed to break with its own socioeconomic past in the twenty years since the achievement of autonomy. In Szczepanowski's view, poverty, underdevelopment, and economic backwardness were so deeply rooted in Galicia that they defined a Galician tradition and therefore the Galician identity. His title would brand the epithet "Galician misery" onto the body of Polish political culture, giving Galicia a tragic economic identity to associate with its cherished political autonomy.

In Szczepanowski's statistical analysis Galicia's diverse peoples were mathematically synthesized into the figure of the "average Galician," whose principal characteristic was neither his nationality nor his religion, nor even his folk costume, but rather his extreme poverty. The average Galician was undernourished and underemployed: "The statistical figures show that the average Galician [*przeciętny Galicjanin*] eats half and works a quarter of [what] a person [should]. We see it equally among our peasants, among our artisans, among our clerks. But if it applies to any and every level of our population, then certainly it applies to the Jews."[16]

In a climate of rising anti-Semitism, there were those who insisted upon the alien nature of the Jews in Galicia and insinuated that Jews exploited Poles and Ruthenians. Szczepanowski, however, argued that Jews were average Galicians, characterized on the whole by the same poverty, misery, and malnutrition as their neighbors.

Nędza Galicyi fully accepted the provincial framework of the age of autonomy and statistically analyzed the province not in terms of national differences, but in economic terms of poverty and backwardness. Szczepanowski's statistical approach permitted him to synthesize the figure of the "average Galician" to represent the impoverished population of the province. He built upon the premise of provincial coherence that Stupnicki, Schneider, Majer and Kopernicki, and Jandaurek had cultivated after the Revolution of 1848, and especially after the 1860s, with the achievement of Galician autonomy. In Szczepanowski's study, Galicia, taken as a coherent statistical whole, discovered its modern identity as a provincial homeland of extreme misery.

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[15] Stanisław Szczepanowski, *Nędza Galicyi w cyfrach i program energicznego rozwoju gospodarstwa krajowego* (Lviv: Gubrynowicz & Schmidt, 1888), v–vii.

[16] Ibid., 125.

A "Portrait" and "Self-Portrait" of the Borderlands: The Cultural and Geographic Image of "Ukraine" in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries

Natalia Yakovenko

As is well known, the name *Ukraina* gives historians a good deal of trouble, for aside from its ostensibly transparent identification with the notion of "borderland" (*okraina*) there are hypotheses according to which it may derive from Common Slavic **ukrajь* and **ukraj*, that is, "separated tract of territory," "country."[1] The lack of appropriate monuments makes it impossible to confirm or deny such meanings in the vernacular, but from the moment the word *Ukraina* and its derivatives reappear in the late fifteenth century (after a few mentions in Old Rus') in the documentation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,[2] its meaning does indeed coincide with the notion of "borderland." These documents's authors, Vilnius scribes, refer to the outlying pre-steppe lands of the state as *ukrainy* and to their inhabitants as *ukrainnyky* or *liudy ukrainni*. At times this notion is also extended to the southern part of the state as a whole: for example, in a letter of 1500 to Khan Mengli Giray of the Crimea, the Lithuanian grand duke refers to the regions of Kyiv, Volhynia, and Podillia[3] as "our borderlands" (*nashi ukrainy*), and a privilege of 1539 for the building of a castle in Kyivan Polissia (that is, fairly distant from the steppe frontier) is justified by the utility of such castles "in Ukraine" (*na Ukraini*).[4]

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[1] Cf. Serhii Shelukhyn, *Ukraina—nazva nashoi zemli z naidavnishykh chasiv* (Prague, 1936), 117–19; Yaroslav B. Rudnytsky, *Slovo i nazva "Ukraina"* (Winnipeg: Ukrainska knyharnia, 1951), 55–57; George Y. Shevelov, "The Name Ukrajina 'Ukraine,'" in his *Teasers and Appeasers: Essays and Studies on Themes of Slavic Philology* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1971), 200 (the text was written in 1951).

[2] See the diplomatic correspondence of the 1490s in *Lietuvos Metrika (1427–1506): Knyga nr 5*, ed. Egidijus Banionis (Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidykla, 1993), 66, 73, 117, 118, 131.

[3] Ibid., 164.

[4] *Lietuvos Metrika: Knyga nr 25 (1387–1546)*, ed. Darius Antanavičius and Algirdas Baliulis (Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidykla, 1998), 114.

Parallel to the "technical term" (*ukraina/ukrainy*) in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the semiofficial name "distant lands" (*zemli daleki*) for these same territories. This synonymous usage aptly brings out the element of cultural marking. What is involved here, after all, is not only the geographic signifier (distance from Vilnius) but also the cultural/ geographic image ("mental space") that took shape at the intersection of geographic knowledge and the "symbolic domestication" of a foreign world.[5] The key problem in the deconstruction of such images is that of the relation between the hypothetical "archetypical image"—the "self-portrait" of a particular territory, so to speak—and the image imposed on it from outside as a kind of metajourney across the domesticated territories that establishes both the tropes of discourse and the repertoire of representative characteristics.[6] The present article is an attempt to define this relation in general terms only, for a detailed analysis would of course require a considerably more extended investigation.

It is worth noting, to begin with, that the cultural/geographic image of Ukrainian territory as perceived by the inhabitants themselves up to the mid-sixteenth century is practically impossible to grasp because of the lack of appropriate sources. After all, the Ruthenian-language monuments of the period still observe the literary conventions of the Old Rus' era, that is to say, the geography of "Ruthenian space" is still usually subsumed under the general notion of the "Rus' Land." For example, the compiler of the Second Cassianian redaction of the Kyivan Caves Patericon (1462) corrects what strikes him as "geographic imprecision"[7] but "does not notice" the disintegration of the "Rus' Land" into a whole series of "lands," which was perfectly apparent by the mid-fifteenth century. To be sure, political changes gradually led to the mention of new "lands," such as those of Kyiv and Podillia, which became well established in the literature; these notions, however, were undoubtedly associated not with a geographic image but with the new potestative status of those territories.[8] Unfortunately, research

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[5]   For a broader discussion of the nature of so-called cultural/geographic images (with an extensive bibliography of literature on this problem dating from the 1970s and 1980s), see D. N. Zamiatin, *Gumanitarnaia geografiia: Prostranstvo i yazyk geograficheskikh obrazov* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2003), 32–54.

[6]   Ibid., 67–68. For the sake of comparison, see also E. V. [Edward] Said, *Oriientalizm*, trans. Viktor Shovkun (Kyiv: Osnovy, 2001), 98.

[7]   For example, he writes "I came to Kaniv" instead of "I came from Oleshnia," which appeared in earlier copies. See D. Abramovych, *Kyievo-pecherskyi pateryk (Vstup, tekst, prymitky)* (Kyiv: Chas, 1991), 10 (a reprint of the 1931 edition).

[8]   Cf. the sound observations on the potestative factor in establishing the names of lands in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in O. Rusyna, *Siverska zemlia u skladi Velykoho Kniazivstva Lytovskoho* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 1998), 35–36. As an example of a

has not yet established when these new names came into use. Nonetheless it is significant that in one of the earliest chancery registers that have come down from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where these names could logically be expected, we do not yet find them. In that book we do encounter an extensive list of properties, dated approximately to 1440, that were distributed to the boyars by the grand duke; analogous properties in Volhynia are identified not by "land" but with reference to towns ("in Lutsk," "in Volodymyr," "in Kremianets," "in Turiisk"),[9] that is, they are associated with the notion most frequently used in the list, that of the *volost* (settled area)—the military and administrative unit from which armed service was to be rendered.

For preliminary purposes, it may be assumed that Podillia was the first to attain the status of "land" in Ruthenian texts. Scholars have assumed that the text of the Tale of Podillia (of the "Podillian Land"), which was incorporated into several so-called Belarusian-Lithuanian chronicles, was compiled in the 1430s.[10] Such a precipitous "career" suggests that this Ruthenian text was influenced by official sources, in which Podillia is established very early as a distinct potestative unit. Mykhailo Hrushevsky considered that the term "Podillian Land," which supplanted the chronicle word *Ponyzzia* (Lowland), was first used in a privilege issued by King Władysław Jagiełło in 1395.[11] In fact, however, the date of first mention should be pushed further back: in 1377 King Ludovic of Hungary, writing to Francesco Carrara and informing him of the transfer of the Podillian Koriatovych princes to his sovereignty, refers to their lands as "the Podillian duchy" (*ducatus Podolie*).[12] The status of "duchy" also appears indirectly in the document of 1395 that has just been mentioned—a privilege issued to Spytko of Melsztyn for the "Podillian Land" (*terra Podolie*), which is granted to him "in full *ducal* right" (*pleno iure* ducali).[13]

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purely potestative definition of a "land" in the fourteenth century, one may adduce a missive of 1352 in which Lithuanian princes ruling the lands of Volodymyr, Lutsk, Belz, and Kholm, "peaceable" vis-à-vis the Polish king, swore loyalty to him. See *Hramoty XIV st.*, comp. M. M. Peshchak (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1974), 30.

[9] *Lietuvos Metrika: Knyga nr 3 (1440–1498)*, ed. Lina Anužytė and Algirdas Baliulis (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos institutas, 1998), 62–65.

[10] V. A. Chamiarytski, *Belaruskiia letapisy iak pomniki literatury* (Minsk: Navuka i tekhnika, 1969), 97–99.

[11] M. S. Grushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo: Istoricheskie ocherki (XV–XVIII v.)* (Kyiv: Tipografiia Universiteta Sv. Vladimira, 1894), 22–24; Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 4 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1993), 88–89.

[12] Buda, 29 September 1377. Cited according to the entry in J. Kurtyka, "Repertorium podolskie: Dokumenty do 1430 r.," *Rocznik Przemyski* 40 (2004), no. 4 (Historia): 151.

[13] Grushevsky, *Barskoe starostvo*, 22.

Presumably it was this early certificate, augmented by the Catholic bishopric created ca. 1386 in Kamianets-Podilskyi, that gave rise to the stable tradition of identifying the "Podillian duchy," "comprehensible" to the Western eye, with those obscure "borderlands" of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—Volhynia and the Kyiv region. Thus, in 1429, informing an unidentified individual about the expected coronation of the grand duke of Lithuania, the papal legate writes that arrangements for this had been made "in the town of Lutsk, located on the border between Rus' and Podillia" (*in Luczica civitate, que inter confinia Russia ac Podolie sita est*).[14] Podillia is also a key identifier in the depiction of this space on sixteenth-century Western maps, where the name "Podolia" generally covers the whole territory between the Dnister and the Dnipro.[15] The same space is represented somewhat more narrowly on a map by the Polish cartographer Wacław Grodecki, *Poloniae finitimarumque locorum descriptio* (Description of Poland and Its Borderlands). The date of its appearance (1558) is approximate, as the first edition has not survived, but it began to circulate more widely from 1570 thanks to its publication in the very first issue of Abraham Ortelius's atlases, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* (Antwerp, 1570). On this map the name "Podolia" is pushed southward, the northern region is marked with the name "Volhinia," and the Dnipro region remains unnamed, although the towns of Kijovia (Kyiv), Kanijow (Kaniv), and Czyrkassy (Cherkasy) are shown.[16]

This symbolization of geographic space by maps on which "Podillia" was identified with the whole sparsely settled territory between the Dnister and Dnipro Rivers determined the perception of the actual space. That is particularly apparent from the relations of the first papal nuncios in the Polish-Lithuanian state. Thus, in 1556 Aloiso Lippomano referred to the trans-Dnipro lands as "bordering on Podillia" (*confini della Podolia*),[17] and in 1565 one of his successors, Giulio Ruggieri, located the

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[14] Rome, 16 August 1429: *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, magni duci Lithuaniae, 1376–1430* (Cracow: Drukarnia Wł. Anczyca, 1882), 856.

[15] Yaroslav Dashkevych calculates that there are more than two hundred such maps. See his "Skhidne Podillia na kartakh XVI st.," in *Heohrafichnyi faktor v istorychnomu protsesi*, ed. F. P. Shevchenko et al. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1990), 155–56. Cf. the reproductions of maps by Marco Beneventano (Rome, 1507), Martin Waldseemüller (Strasbourg, 1511 and 1513), Lorenz Fries (Vienna, 1541), Johann Honter (Basel, 1550), Giacomo Gastaldi (Venice, 1562), and others in the illustrated volume *Imago Poloniae: Dawna Rzeczpospolita na mapach, dokumentach i starodrukach w zbiorach Tomasza Niewodniczańskiego*, vol. 2, ed. Tomasz Niewodniczański (Warsaw: Agencja reklamowo-wydawnicza Arkadiusza Grzegorczyka, 2002), 19, 21, 22, 25.

[16] See the reproduction in ibid., 27, no. 7 (1).

[17] Letter to Giovanni Carafa, written at Łowicz on 22 September 1556, in *Acta nuntiaturae Poloniae*, vol. 3, bk. 1, *Aloisius Lippomano (1555–1557)*, ed. Henricus Damianus

Volhynian town of Ostroh in Podillia (*in Podolia in una terra detta Ostrogo*)—indeed, he did so in a special note entitled "Descriptio Regni Poloniae eiusque provinciarum."[18] In the Kingdom of Poland itself, throughout the sixteenth century, Volhynia received separate identification, but all the lands beyond it were also identified either with "Podillia" or with Kyiv as a city, not as territories of a distinct spatial entity. At the Lublin Diet of 1569, for example, the defense of the borderlands was identified in the imagination of the Polish delegates with the defense of Volhynia and the "Podillian lands" (*Woliniowi y Podolskiem zyemiom*; *Wolynia i granic podolskich*; *krajom podolskim, wolynieckim*).[19] In arguing the need for the annexation of the Kyiv region to the Kingdom of Poland, one delegate expressed his idea as follows: "Kyiv is, in essence, the gate to all the possessions adjacent to it—Volhynia and Podillia" (*Kiiovia fere sit porta omnium illarum ditionum, sibi adiacentium—Voliniae et Podoliae*).[20]

In Marcin Kromer's book, first published in Cologne in 1577—that is, after the transfer of the Kyiv palatinate to the jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Poland—we see clear traces of the "cartographic" image modeled on Grodecki's map (Volhynia and Podillia are shown, but there is as yet no Dnipro region, although a few towns are located there). In enumerating the "extent" (*amplitudo*) of the Commonwealth, Kromer mentions Polissia, Volhynia, and Podillia, but with reference to the Kyiv region limits himself to the observation that "Located on the Dnipro are castles and the towns of Kyiv, Kaniv and Cherkasy" (*Ad Nieprum enim sitae sunt arces et oppida Kiovia, Caniovia et Circassi*).[21]

The introduction of "Ukrainian" terminology into the discourse of the Polish Crown Chancery after the creation of its "Ruthenian" department (the Ruthenian Metrica)[22] in 1570 did not entail the "death of Podillia."

Wojtyska CP (Rome, 1993), 285.

[18] *Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes (1550–1850)*, vol. 1 (1550–1593), comp. P. Athanasius G. Welykyj OSBM (Rome, 1959), 23.

[19] *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima 1569 goda*, ed. M. O. Koialovich (St. Petersburg: Pechatnia V. Golovina, 1869), 165, 193, 197, 250, et al.

[20] Ibid., 403.

[21] Martini Cromeri, *Polonia sive de situ, populis, moribus, magistratibus et republica Regni Polonici libri duo*, ed. Wiktor Czermak (Cracow: Nakładem Akademii Umiejętności, 1901), 15.

[22] For a more detailed discussion, see my article "Choice of Name versus Choice of Path (The Names of Ukrainian Territory from the Late Sixteenth to the Late Seventeenth Century)," in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, ed. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2008), 117–48.

Mentions of it were either embellished with a new signifier (such as "Podillian borderlands" or "all the border castles in Kamianets, Bar, Khmilnyk, Bila Tserkva, Kyiv, and Cherkasy")[23] or, as in the past, Podillia continued to be identified directly with the Dnipro region (*Ukraina*). For example, in a poem of 1607 the Lviv poet Szymon Szymonowicz expressed his concern about Tatar attacks as follows: "Już Podole zniesione, ona Ukraina, / Ona matka żyźności, dóbr wszystkich dziedzina, / W popiół poszła" (Podilia has already been destroyed—this Ukraine, / This mother of fertility, this realm of all good weal / Has turned to ashes).[24]

As we see, the cultural/geographic image of "Podillia," which, thanks to its potestative status, was the first of the Ukrainian territories to take shape as a semantically laden entity, underwent a number of modifications between the fifteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In this regard, its first version—identification with an unknown space between two large rivers (the Dnister and the Dnipro)—undoubtedly represented an external view, while subsequent versions were given greater precision from within by closer neighbors, the Poles, by means of the "disunification" of Volhynia and, later, by the extension of the topos of "Ukrainism" to the lands between the Dnipro and the Dnister.

What content was imparted to this topos by contemporaries who did not live there themselves? As already noted, for Vilnius chancery scribes of the late fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth, the notion of *ukraina/ukrainy* was identified with the southern borderland of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—the "distant lands." From the viewpoint of Vilnius, these locales were considered dangerous because of the neighboring Tatars: in 1546, for instance, exempting the local nobility from contributing to the repair of the Zhytomyr castle, the grand duke explained that as "inhabitants of the borderland" they were subject to continuing material losses because of the Tatars.[25] Aside from the real threat of Tatar raids, there was a long tradition behind the cultural/geographic image of "dangerous territory." After all, the topos of the eastern borderland as a synonym of hidden danger in European discourse had its origins in antiquity and was later strongly inspired by Christian-Islamic

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[23] Compare the materials of the Diet of 1585: *Dyaryusze sejmowe r. 1585*, ed. Aleksander Czuczyński, Scriptores rerum Polonicarum, vol. 18 (Cracow, 1901), 321, 415.

[24] *Pisma polityczne z czasów rokoszu Zebrzydowskiego, 1606–1608*, vol. 1, *Poezya rokoszowa*, ed. Jan Czubek (Cracow: Nakładem Akademii Umiejętności, 1916), 316.

[25] *Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannyi i izdavaemyi Vremennoi komissiei dlia razbora drevnikh aktov* (hereafter *Arkhiv YuZR*), no. 8, vol. 5 (Kyiv, 1907), 41. The same motivation may be encountered in many other privileges of immunity.

conflict.[26] With reference to the Dnipro region, we find such a reflection as early as 1320 in a letter from Pope John XXII to Kyivan Dominicans, in which he associates the difficulties of the Kyiv diocese, which had just been established (*novissimis temporibus*) "on the Ruthenian-Tatar borderland" (*in confinibus Ruthenorum et Tartarorum*).[27] The perception of this territory as vulnerable to Muslim invasion by definition finds expression in countless texts reflecting the view from outside, through the eyes of people who did not live there. So as not to overburden my text with examples, I shall cite only one, and a late one at that, from a publicistic work of 1618 by Krzysztof Palczowski, a nobleman from Great Poland. Arguing the "utility" of the Cossacks for the Commonwealth, he writes: "After all, there is no doubt that if there were no Cossacks there [in the Dnipro region], the Turks would establish themselves there, founding their colonies" (*Bo to nieomylna, kiedyby tam Kozaków nie było, żeby się tam Turcy sadowili aboby colonias deducerent*).[28]

More or less in the mid-sixteenth century, the cultural/geographic image of the dangerous borderland underwent additional specification of a "civilizational" nature, so to speak. On Western maps in particular, this found expression in a new designation, "Solitudo vastissima" (The Least Inhabited Empty Spaces), for the region between the Dnipro and the Boh.[29] (Soon it would triumphantly establish itself in cartography in a more precise redaction, "Campi deserti" [Desert Plains]). Characteristically enough, Polish cartographers, better versed in geographic realities than their Western colleagues, did not identify the "Desert Plains" with Ukraine. For instance, on the well-known Amsterdam map of 1613 by Tomasz Makowski (the so-called Krzysztof Radziwiłł map), those plains are shown below the Dnipro Rapids and marked as "Campi deserti citra Boristhenem" and "Campi deserti infra Boristhenem," while the Dnipro region as far as the Dnipro River itself and its rapids is marked as "Lower Volhynia" ("Volynia Ulterior").[30] However, on Beauplan's *Delineatio generalis Camporum Desertorum vulgo Ukraina cum adjacentibus provinciis* (General Delinea-

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[26] Cf. Said, *Oriientalizm*, 78–87.

[27] N.p., 15 December 1320: *Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lituaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia,* vol. 1, *Ab Honorio PP. III usque ad Gregorium PP. XII (1217–1409),* ed. August Theiner (Rome: Typis Vaticanis, 1860), 162.

[28] Krzysztof Palczowski, *O Kozakach, jeżeli ich znieść czy nie discurs* (Cracow: W drukarnie Macieja Jędrzejowczyka, 1618), no pagination.

[29] One of the earliest instances known to me of the use of the designation "Solitudo vastissima" appears on a map by Andrzej Pograbka (Venice, 1570), who lived in Little Poland. The name covers the territory below Cherkasy between the Dnipro and the Boh (Southern Buh). Variants of this map were included in Ortelius's atlases after 1571.

[30] Cf. the reproduction in *Imago Polonia,* no. 89/1, p. 191.

tion of Desert Plains, Colloquially Ukraine, with Adjacent Provinces), published three times in Gdańsk (1648, 1650 and 1651), the "Desert Plains" are directly identified with Ukraine in the very title of the map.[31]

At present I find it difficult to say who first put the cultural stress on the "uninhabited/deserted" character of the southeastern regions of the Polish-Lithuanian state. My preliminary assumption is that this may have been associated with the birth of "European Sarmatia" in the late Renaissance. In his famous *Weltchronik* (Nuremberg, 1493), the German humanist Hartmann Schädel identified the territory of this "Sarmatia," modeled according to ancient geographers, with the state of the Jagiellonians and defined it as "endless wastelands lying under freezing snow." He also mentions Podillia ("the land located after Rusiia") as a "burned-out place that has become deserted."[32] The text of another German humanist, Konrad Zeltis, written in 1494 as an augmentation of Schädel's chronicle, stresses that the "limit" (*limes*) of Sarmatia is the Don River; that is, it extends "to the very ends of Europe" (*ad Europae usque fines*).[33] Finally, after 1517, "European Sarmatia" made a brilliant career thanks to Maciej Miechowita's *Tractatus de duabis Sarmatiis, Asiana et Europiana* (Treatise on Two Sarmatias, Asian and European), which was published seven times in Cracow, Augsburg, Basel, and Venice in a mere quarter century (1517–42). Sebastian Münster also made use of it in the first two editions of his *Cosmographia* (1544 and 1550).[34]

The image of the "ends of Europe," having become established in the consciousness of the educated Western reader, was associated with obscure territories of some kind near the Dnipro and beyond—at the ends of the earth. In 1556, for example, when the citizens of the town of Ostuni (Duchy of Milan) were honoring the return of Queen Bona Sforza of Poland to her native land, they prepared a commemorative inscription on the entrance gate in which her former realm was called "the Kingdom of Sarmatia and the Empire of the Scythians [Tatars] near the Don and

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[31] See A. B. Pernal and D. F. Essar, "Hiiom Le Vasser de Boplan — viiskovyi inzhener, kartohraf, avtor," in *Boplan i Ukraina: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats*, ed. M. H. Vavrychyn et al (Lviv: Instytut ukrainskoi arkheohrafii ta dzhereloznavstva im. M. S. Hrushevskoho, Lvivske viddilennia., 1998), 19–20.

[32] Cited according to the translation of a fragment in Yu. A. Mytsyk and M. O. Kulynsky, "Istoryko-heohrafichnyi opys skhidnoslovianskykh zemel u khronitsi nimetskoho humanista Hartmana Shedelia," in *Problemy istorychnoi heohrafii Ukrainy*, ed. F. P. Shevchenko et al. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1991), 122.

[33] Cited according to Wojciech Iwańczak, *Do granic wyobraźni: Norymberga jako centrum wiedzy geograficznej i kartograficznej w XV i XVI wieku* (Warsaw: DiG, 2005), 71, n. 13.

[34] Ibid., 96–97.

the Borysthenes" (*regnum Sarmatiae et imperium Scythas ad Tanaim et Borysthenem*).[35] Since the Dnipro, as noted, also marked the Tatar boundary, these territories were of course imagined as "wild"—a space that could be inhabited only by a strange breed of "borderland" dwellers with no definite cultural profile. This, indeed, is how the Zaporozhian Cossacks are characterized in the relations of the first papal nuncios: in 1578 Giovanni Caligari called them "a collective tribe of various nations—Poles, Ruthenians, Hungarians, Spaniards, Italians, etc." (*una gente colettiva di diverse nationi, Polacchi, Russi, Ungari, Spagnoli, Italiani etc.*),[36] and in 1586 Carlo Gamberini, secretary to Nuncio Alberto Bolognetti, added Germans and Frenchmen to the catalogue of "nations" (*Polacchi, Tedeschi, Francesi, Spagnoli et Italiani*).[37]

According to the logic of such conceptions, a "mixture of nations" could only be a mixed bag when it came to religion. But the "Eastern factor" prevailed, so the mixture came down to an image of the Cossacks either as entirely Muslim (as, for example, in André Thevet's *Cosmographie universelle*, published in Paris in 1578)[38] or, to quote the less severe characterization in the *Descriptio veteris et novae Poloniae* (Description of Poland Old and New, Cracow, 1585) by Stanisław Sarnicki, an intellectual born in the Kholm region and educated in Europe, as people "mainly of the Muslim religion" (*religio apud eos magna ex parte Machometana*).[39] With the passage of time, thanks to the heroization of Cossack expeditions against the Tatar and Turkish possessions on the Black Sea coast, Western literature would "rehabilitate" the Cossacks as Christians,[40] but the topos of "mixture" would prove more vital. For example, in his *Histoire universelle des guerres de Turcs* (Paris, 1608), de Bartenon offers his readers the following exotic image of the Cossacks as dwellers "at the edge of Europe": "These people have come of age as laborers, like the Scythians; they have been tempered by all kinds of hardships, like the Huns; they are as warlike as the Goths, as tanned by the sun as the Indians, and as cruel as the Sarmatians. They are lions in

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[35] Mikołaj Radziwiłł "the Orphan" noted the inscription in his pilgrimage diary. See M. K. Radziwiłł "Sierotka," *Podróż do Ziemi Świętej, Syrii i Egiptu, 1582–1584*, ed. Leszek Kukulski (Warsaw, 1962), 232.

[36] *Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantes,* 105.

[37] Ibid., 25.

[38] Dmytro Nalyvaiko, *Kozatska khrystyianska respublika (Zaporozka Sich u zakhidnoievropeiskykh literaturnykh pamiatkakh)* (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1992), 50.

[39] Cited according to Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 7: 389.

[40] See the survey of relevant texts dating from the last quarter of the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century in Nalyvaiko, *Kozatska khrystyianska respublika*, 63–98.

pursuit of their enemy; they resemble the Turks in cunning; they are like the Scythians in fury; they are Christians by their faith."[41]

In Polish literary discourse, as is well known, the "Desert Plains" would become the "Wild Plains" (*Dzikie Pola*), but its "inventors" were not, of course, Western cartographers. It would appear that this notion became a kind of symbiosis between the cartographic image of "desolation" and the habitual use of "plains" as a name for the steppe portion of the territory between the Dnipro and the Dnister. The latter tradition is well displayed in military relations about armed encounters with the Tatars. In 1550, for instance, the hero of the Podillian borderlands, Bernard Pretwicz, who does not yet know the word "Ukraine," tells of the guard details that he posted "on the Plain between the roads" (*na Polu między szlaki*).[42] An analogous notion is employed by an anonymous Pole who, in the mid–1560s, left irate observations in the margins of Giacomo Gastaldi's map *Poloniae et Hungariae nuova tavola*, which was added to a Venetian edition of Ptolemy's *Geography* (1562). Commenting on the errors committed here, he refers to the steppe territories between the Boh and Dnipro as the "Lithuanian Plains," and those between the Boh and Dnister as the "Crown Plains."[43] Nor does the learned Michael the Lithuanian yet know of the "wildness" of the Plains. In his treatise of 1550 *On the Customs of the Tatars, Lithuanians, and Muscovites*, he refers to the "most distant" (*ultimis*) territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as "the lands of Volhynia, Podillia, Kyiv, Siver, and the *plains* regions" (*terras Voliniae, Podoliae, Kijoviae, Sievvier atque* campestres *regiones*).[44]

It was indeed from the components of this topos of "wildness/ mixture," born of the scholar's study, that the new cultural/geographic image of Ukraine and the borderland took shape in the Commonwealth itself. Emerging from the pages of learned treatises into broader use, it underwent correction and modification according to a simpler scheme, becoming charged with emotionally accessible content and examples. From the late sixteenth century, it was Cossackdom that provided the greatest stimulus for this, and it is telling that in observations about it we may discern genuine information cheek by jowl with efforts to fit Cossackdom into the cultural/geographic image of "the ends of Eu-

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[41] Cited in ibid., 98.

[42] Cited according to the text of Pretwicz's note as published by Andrzej Tomczak in *Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości* (Warsaw) 6, pt. 2 (1960): 346.

[43] Ya. Dashkevych, "Pokraini notatky pro ukrainski stepy u 'Heohrafii' Ptolemeia 1562 r.," in *Boplan i Ukraina*, 83.

[44] Cited according to the reprint in *Arkhiv istoriko-iuridicheskikh svedenii, otnosiashchikhsia do Rossii*, ed. S. D. Shestakov, bk. 2b, sec. 5 (Moscow, 1854), 44.

rope," which has just been mentioned. For example, there can be no doubt that the actual ethnic composition of Cossackdom was known to Commonwealth officials, if only from one of the first Cossack registers of 1581, in which recruits from Ukraine and Belarus accounted for eighty-two percent of the total, while the remainder were drawn in small proportions from Muscovy, Poland, and Lithuania.[45] Nevertheless, right up to the 1620s, when the Cossack problem began to be identified with Ruthenian separatism, official sources defined the Cossacks as "steppe rabble" and "a mixture of nations." The confessional profile of that "mixture" had to be hybrid by definition; hence the engagement of the Zaporozhian Host in the conflict between the Orthodox and Uniate Churches[46] drew fairly ironic commentary from their opponents. Thus, accusing Orthodox hierarchs of manipulating Cossackdom, Archimandrite Antonii Seliava of the Uniate Holy Trinity Monastery in Vilnius, who later became a metropolitan, wrote in his polemical brochure *Antelenchus* (Vilnius, 1620) that the Cossacks, as knightly men, deserved the praise of the whole Christian world, but discussions on matters of faith were none of their business for it was not fitting "to dress Cossacks in doctors' birettas" (*Kozaków ubierać w birety doktorskie*).[47] An even more ironic comment on Cossack piety was rendered by a countryman of theirs, the Orthodox Ruthenian Adam Kysil: "reason, piety, religion, liberties, wives, and children—in their [the Cossack rabble's] heads, all this rides with them down the Dnipro" (*ratie, pietas, religio, wolności, żony, dzieci, wszystko to w ich głowie z nimi po Dnieprze pływa*).[48]

Remarks on Ukraine's dubious reputation as a land of license and misrule are not limited to observations on Cossackdom. A characteristic example is the "file of scoundrels" assembled between 1625 and 1639 by Walerian Nekanda-Trepka, a resident of Cracow who never tired of unmasking "false nobles." Not knowing the current whereabouts of one of the "false nobles" he had uncovered, Nekanda simply waved toward the

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[45] Serhii Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 22–23. The basis for this calculation is also discussed there.

[46] Examined in detail ibid., 103–23.

[47] *Antelenchus, to jest odpis na skrypt ... Elenchus nazwany*, cited according to the reprint in *Arkhiv YuZR*, no. 1, vol. 8, vyp. 1 (Kyiv, 1914), 719.

[48] N.p., ca. August 1636: *Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego*, ed. Agnieszka Biedrzycka (Cracow: Societas, 2005), 317. For comments on this text, see Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1985), 80–81; and Plokhy, *The Cossacks and Religion*, 142.

east: "He has gone off somewhere to Podillia, or to *Ukraina.*"[49] It is telling that Nekanda habitually dispatches villains, robbers, horse thieves, and other such types "to *Ukraina,*"[50] treating those lands as if they were beyond the pale of the normal world. Such conceptions are corroborated by yet another response—a complaint of 1640 by an apothecary from the town of Brody against the Bratslav nobleman Stanisław Czarnota, who had publicly abused him. The apothecary characterizes Czarnota's impolite behavior as "a habit of tweaking respectable people" brought from Ukraine (*on pryzjachawszy z Ukrainy ... tu z zwykłości swojej szczypać uczciwe ludzi*).[51]

Finally, it is worth mentioning one more exotic component of discourse about Ukraine among people who did not live there themselves. This was the representation of the borderlands as fabulously endowed by nature, initiated in the last third of the fifteenth century by Jan Długosz.[52] (Scholars associate this topos with Renaissance techniques of imitating Virgil and therefore call it the "myth of Arcadia.") According to Długosz, in particular, the land in Podillia is so rich that there is no need for sowing—grain grows by itself, and the Dnipro near Kyiv has so many fish that they are used as fodder for livestock.[53] Numerous and rather farfetched variations on the vision of Ukraine as a promised land, flowing with milk and honey, are to be encountered repeatedly in the works of Maciej Miechowita (1517), Michael the Lithuanian (1550), Alessandro Guagnini (1578), and others.

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To what extent did the cultural/geographic image presented above coincide with the "self-portrait," that is, the conceptions of those who regarded themselves as "people of the borderlands" about the space they inhabited? The sources, unfortunately, are not rich in such information, but something is to be found nonetheless. As the earliest example, we may cite a declaration of the Volhynian gentry to government inspectors who came to Lutsk in 1545 to describe the castle in that town and the service obligations on noble estates. Realizing that such a census boded nothing good, the nobles refused to provide the requisite data on the

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[49] Walerian Nekanda Trepka, *Liber generationis plebeanorum ("Liber Chamorum")*, ed. Rafał Leszczyński (Wrocław: Zakład narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1995), 302 (no. 1477).

[50] Ibid., 88 (no. 183), 91 (no. 200), 137 (no. 458), 182 (no. 739), 237 (no. 1090).

[51] Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Lviv, f. 24, op. 1, spr. 5, ark. 10ᵛ.

[52] Cf., inter alia, Piotr Borek, *Szlakami dawnej Ukrainy: Studia staropolskie* (Cracow: Collegium Columbinum, 2002), 15–45.

[53] Ibid., 20–21.

grounds that they could not be reduced to the status of the *szlachta* in other lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Their borderland location was used as an argument, but the "border" was presented in their declaration not only as a barrier against the Tatars but as everything beyond Volhynia: the nobles complained that they were living on the "Liakh border," rode to battle against Muscovy, and, finally, that they did not "dismount their horses" whether or not there was a truce with the Tatars.[54] As we see, the "self-portrait" is modeled on the principle of a "besieged fortress," surrounded on every side by "borders," while the inner space—their own territory—takes the form of a self-sufficient entity different from the other territories of the state.

We also encounter the characteristics of such a worldview later. Such content may be discerned in the well-known declaration of Prince Kostiantyn Vyshnevetsky at the Lublin Diet of 1569. Having joined the Kingdom of Poland, Volhynia must obtain special status, for, as the prince argues, "we are a nation of such honor that we yield nothing [*naprzód nic nie damy*] to any nation on earth."[55] Concordant with this declaration is a letter of 29 March 1569 from the rank-and-file Volhynian gentry addressed to the king: after the usual courtesies, they warn the Poles not to force "us, respectable people equal in faith and honor to them in every way," into the Union.[56] The subsequent zealous struggle for "our Volhynian rights,"[57] which lasted until the mid-seventeenth century, clearly confirms this sense of their self-sufficiency. It also seems significant that the Volhynians, who situationally still identify themselves with *Ukraina* from time to time in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, refer to themselves as a separate entity even when involved in a common cause—the struggle against the Union—in which the "Ruthenian nation" presents a united front. They write "in Volhynia, in Ukraine, in Podillia," "throughout Lithuania, Rus', Volhynia, and Ukraine," "all Volhynia and Ukraine," and so on.[58] Finally, as Frank Sysyn has convincingly shown, it was Volhynia in particular that became

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[54] *Lytovska metryka: Knyha 561: Revizii ukrainskykh zamkiv 1545 roku*, ed. Volodymyr Kravchenko (Kyiv: Instytut ukrainskoi arkheohrafii, 2005), 124–29.

[55] *Dnevnik Liublinskogo seima 1569 goda*, 382.

[56] Karol Mazur, "Nieznana petycja szlachty wołyńskiej do króla w dobie sejmu lubelskiego 1569 r.," *Sotsium: Almanakh sotsialnoi istorii* (Kyiv), vyp. 2 (2003): 56.

[57] See Petro Kulakovsky, *Kantseliariia Ruskoi (Volynskoi) metryky 1569–1673 rr.: Studiia z istorii ukrainskoho rehionalizmu v Rechi Pospolytii* (Ostroh and Lviv, 2002), 54–70.

[58] These citations are taken from Meletii Smotrytsky's works *Verificatia niewinności* and *Obrona verificaciey* (both 1621) and *Elenchus pism uszczypliwych* (1622). Cited according to the reprint in *Arkhiv YuZR*, no. 1, vol. 7, pp. 324, 376.

the "fatherland" of Ruthenian regionalism—corporate solidarity and the concomitant ideology professed by the local elite—in the 1630s and 1640s.[59] The stimulus for the gentry's "conceptualization" of its territory as a region with unique characteristics and interests was the formation in 1635 of the Chernihiv palatinate, which was granted the same legal status as that given to the Kyiv, Volhynian, and Bratslav palatinates by the Union of Lublin in 1569. As Sysyn correctly establishes, these palatinates, aside from specific legal and administrative characteristics, also differed from the other lands of the Kingdom of Poland in ethnic composition and dominant confession, which ultimately promoted the formation of two entwined sentiments—regional ("Ruthenian") patriotism and a feeling of cultural and religious commonality, of belonging to the "ancient Ruthenian nation."[60]

Given the lack of appropriate sources, it is unfortunately more difficult to judge how residents of the Kyiv region perceived the land they inhabited. Still, there are grounds for the cautious assumption that they, too, modeled it as exclusive. This is suggested by a series of observations dating from the late sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, in which they reserved the notion of "Ukraine" for their own territory. No one else was admitted to the "Ukrainian club," and all that lay beyond "Ukraine" was considered of lesser value or distant and obscure.[61] Let us compare how distinctively the author of the so-called Kyiv Chronicle (compiled ca. 1616, probably by the Kyiv burgher Kyrylo Ivanovych) represents the region from which the False Dmitrii arrived in Kyiv: "And he came from Volhynia, there is no telling from where."[62] In "Epicedion" (1585), a poem of mourning on the death of the Kyivan castellan Prince Mykhailo Vyshnevetsky, written by his servant Zhdan Bilytsky, the author refers to the Kyiv region as "Poddnieprska Ukraina" (Dnipro Ukraine), whose inhabitants (*poddnieprzanie*) are clearly exalted above the "Volhynians" and "Podillians" because they protect them, as

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[59] For an analysis of the differences between the nature of regionalism in Western Europe and the Commonwealth, particularly Ukraine, see Frank E. Sysyn, "Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility's Grievances at the Diet of 1641," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (1982): 167–71.

[60] Ibid., 172, 174–80.

[61] For a more detailed discussion, see my article "Zhyttieprostir versus identychnist ukrainskoho shliakhtycha XVII st. (na prykladi Yana/Yoakyma Yerlycha)," in *Ukraina XVII st.: Suspilstvo, filosofiia, kultura*, ed. Larysa Dovha and Nataliia Yakovenko (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2005).

[62] Published in V. I. Ulianovsky and N. M. Yakovenko, "Kyivskyi litopys pershoi chverti XVII st.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1989, no. 2: 107–20; no. 5: 103–14; citation in no. 3: 109.

well as the whole kingdom, from the Tatars.[63] It is noteworthy that this territory has its own "center" in the poem—events are localized and described in such a way that the "famous Dnipro" (*sławny Dniepr*; *sławny Borystenes*) is constantly at the center of attention.[64] A similar perception of the Dnipro region as a territory with its own "center" is to be encountered later, in Yoakym Yerlych's diary: if a hurricane arises somewhere, in Yerlych it proceeds directly to Kyiv; if robbers appear on the roads, the author's field of vision takes in only those roads that lead to Kyiv; if a "band of rogues," that is, the Cossack Host, gathers, then the point of departure is again Kyiv, and so on.[65]

It is quite likely that the exclusivity of the cultural/geographic "self-portrait" of inhabitants of the Kyiv region was determined in some measure by the "historical memory" of Kyiv principality. Although there is too little corroboration of this, one should not overlook particular mentions, such as the one in which the petty noble Olekhno Zakusylo declares to the Volhynians in 1595 that he comes from the "Ovruch castle of *Kyiv principality*."[66] Proof of the vitality of the perception of this region as a kind of "extension" of Kyiv principality is also furnished by a later mention in a complaint of 1621 by the Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv, Yov Boretsky, against the hierarchs of the Uniate Church: in substantiating the justice of his claims, Boretsky appeals inter alia to the rights and freedoms of the Orthodox community, which were supposedly ratified by the "constitution of the 1569 union of *Kyiv principality* with the Crown."[67]

Finally, it is clear that a certain role must have been played by the fact that as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century inhabitants of the Dnipro region had begun to be called "Ukrainians" (*ukraintsi*) in soldiers' vernacular, which served in its own way to associate the sym-

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[63] The poem was printed in Cracow in 1585 and reprinted in an appendix to A. V. Storozhenko, *Stefan Batorii i dneprovskie kazaki* (Kyiv, 1904), 163–220. For substantiation of Bilytsky's authorship, see my *Paralelnyi svit: Doslidzhennia z istorii uiavlen ta idei v Ukraini XVI–XVII st.* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2002), 149.

[64] Myroslav Trofymuk, "Ukrainska polskomovna poema 'Epitsedion … Mykhailovi Vyshnevetskomu …' (Dzhereloznavcha studiia)," in *Do dzherel: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats na poshanu Oleha Kupchynskoho z nahody ioho 70–richchia,* ed. Ihor Hyrych et al (Kyiv and Lviv: Instytut Ukrainskoi arkheohrafii ta dzhereloznavstva im. M. S. Hrushevskoho, 2004), 292–93.

[65] Yakovenko, "Zhyttieprostir versus identychnist ukrainskoho shliakhtycha," 485.

[66] Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv, f. 25, op. 1, spr. 46, ark. 118ᵛ.

[67] The text of the complaint was published by Rev. Yurii Mytsyk in *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. T. Shevchenka* 225 (1993): 325–27. Serhii Plokhy (*The Cossacks and Religion*, 158) has also drawn attention to this mention of "Kyiv principality."

bolism of the dangerous borderland exclusively with them. Among early instances of the common use of this word, one may note its appearance in 1607 in the diary of Mikołaj Scibor Marchocki, a soldier born in Little Poland: "came from Kyivan Ukraine, dispatched by Prince Roman Ruzhynsky (Rużyński), with a thousand Ukrainian men [*z tysiącem człowieka Ukraińcow*]."[68] Later there would be more frequent mentions of "Ukrainians," but they would long continue to be associated with catalogues of armed formations that participated in one combat operation or another. Unfortunately, the lack of appropriate sources from the milieu of the "Ukrainians" themselves makes it impossible to determine whether the word was their own name for themselves or imposed from outside.

<p align="center">* * *</p>

To sum up, it seems justifiable to conclude with a good deal of certainty that the "portrait" of *Ukraina* as a borderland differed quite substantially in the perception of those who did not live there from the "self-portrait," that is, the conceptions of "borderland people" about the space they inhabited. What strikes one most clearly is that for the outside observer the cultural/geographic image of "Ukraine" was correlated not with a particular territory, but with the amorphous "ends of Europe." These were marked by the topos of a cultural border beyond which there extended a hostile Muslim East, concrete manifestations of which were discerned in the hybrid population and legitimate "disorderliness," that is, traits that were supposed to characterize lands of dubious reputation by definition. One of the components of this perception is undoubtedly the above-mentioned "Arcadian myth" of incredible fertility—after all, the utopian "happy Arcadia" was supposed to be located somewhere outside the bounds of culturally domesticated space. However, from the perspective of those who inhabited the "borderlands," the space in which they lived appeared, first of all, to be fragmented into self-sufficient units, so much so that they were even closed to outsiders. Secondly, the barrier against the East was perceived here not as a demonized threat, but as a fact of everyday life. Thirdly and finally, the image of their own territory was never associated with "wildness" or "desolation" nor, still less, with a "lost Arcadia."

<p align="right">*Translated by Myroslav Yurkevich*</p>

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[68] M. Scibor Marchocki, *Historia wojny moskiewskiej*, published by the editorial board of *Orędownik* (Poznań, 1841), 9.

Book Reviews

Paul Robert Magocsi. *Ukraine: An Illustrated History.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. x, 336 pp. Forty-six maps, over 300 illustrations. $82.

Currently there are basically two approaches to writing about Ukrainian history. The "national" approach, which concentrates on the history of the Ukrainian people and traces its history across the ages from ancient times to the present, is marked by a certain degree of unity and direction that often stresses the role of the Ukrainian national movement and the spread of Ukrainian national sentiment in modern times. The second, "territorial" approach includes more fully the role of all nationalities that have inhabited present-day Ukrainian territory at one time or another. It gives more space to the various "foreign" state-structures and regimes that have ruled Ukraine in the past. The "territorial" approach lacks the unity and direction of the "national" approach but, in part, makes up for it by its seemingly more inclusive nature. This second approach is the hallmark of Professor Magocsi's various writings, and his illustrated history of Ukraine is a good example of it.

The book consists of forty-six brief chapters, each chapter consisting of a map and four or five pages of explanatory text with illustrations. As stated in the introductory chapter, because the commentary is focused mostly on explaining these maps, the book can be read as a historical atlas Discussions of border changes and other events easily depicted on maps take pride of place in the text, and the illustrations to some degree expand upon the information related by the maps or the written text.

The chronological balance in this book is very even, with equal weight being given to all eras of Ukrainian history. Neither the older periods nor the modern ones are given any special emphasis. The maps are generally clearly drawn and are neither too cluttered nor too sparse; that is, they are easily understood and have just the right amount of detail. The texts do their job of elucidating the maps well, and the pictures seem well fitted and appropriate to their placement in the book. In general, Magocsi has done a good job of synthesizing a great deal of very disparate information and presenting it in a dispassionate and even-handed manner in this relatively small book. Of course, in a project as difficult to produce as this illustrated history, certain problems arise and are apparent even in a volume as professionally put together as is this one.

The first and most obvious problem is that of the illustrations: most of the pictures are lacking in sharpness and clarity. In fact, so striking is the contrast

between the excellently drawn maps and the inferiorly reproduced pictures that this reviewer believes that it might well have been better to change the title of the book to something like "A Historical Atlas of Ukraine with Illustrations." This would have somewhat reduced the expectations of the reader as to the illustrations and accented the importance of the book's strength—its maps. Furthermore, while illustration credits and sources are given at the back, they are in alphabetical order by author or title used, and it is therefore difficult to find the source of any particular picture from the number citation at the base of the illustration. Perhaps this system was used to save space, but it does frustrate anyone wishing to track down a better-quality original.

With regard to desiderata, one significant point can be made: while there is a map showing the various proposed locations of the original homeland of the Slavic peoples, almost all of which include western Ukraine north of the Carpathians, there is no map showing the proposed locations of the original homeland of the Indo-Europeans, who were the Slavs' ancestors, and of many other historically important peoples. Most contemporary specialists on this subject place this homeland at least partly on the territory of present-day Ukraine, that is, in the Pontic and Caspian Steppe region. Other specialists, a minority, place this homeland in Asia Minor across from present-day Ukraine. The recently proposed Black Sea Deluge Theory, which postulates the formation of the Black Sea about 5,500 BC as a result of sudden flooding owing to rising sea levels, somewhat reduces the contradictions between these two theories and directly involves Ukrainian territory. Although it has to do with philology, archeology, and geology, the question of the original homeland of the Indo-Europeans is basically geographical. A map illustrating the various ideas about it and an appropriate discussion would have been a positive and unique addition to this book.

The text reads fairly well, though with the usual dryness and bare factuality that marks encyclopedias, directories, and other reference works. This reviewer found only a few outright mistakes or egregious infelicities. For example, it was not the Russian Imperial Government, but rather the revolutionary Provisional Government, that appointed the historian Dmytro Doroshenko governor of Russian-occupied Galicia in 1917 (p. 195); and with regard to developments after 1945 surely "severe food shortages" is an unwarranted euphemism for famine, (p. 295)! On a somewhat different level is the author's nuanced and careful discussion of the Great Famine of 1932–33. But even here it is rather difficult to accept completely his reduction of famine deaths to non-ethnic "territorial" principles. Try telling a Chechen or a Crimean Tatar that "after all, Soviet policy and death by famine did not make distinctions regarding the alleged or actual nationality of its victims" (p. 246).

On the other hand, Magocsi occasionally makes a point to the advantage of the "ethnic" Ukrainians. For example, his characterization of certain Russian estate owners in nineteenth century Ukraine is very apt: such people, he writes, "were less interested in Ukraine as the homeland of a distinct people, but rather as a special place within the larger Russian Empire.... There they spent their

summer holidays in peaceful rural settings served by local 'Little Russian' peasants, whose loyal service made possible a leisurely and cultured environment in much the same way that slave labor allowed for a similar way of life for 'white folk' in the antebellum United States" (pp. 160–61). Among these estate owners, he notes, were the famous Ignatieff family, part of which settled in Canada after the revolution, where, once again, they came into contact with Ukrainians, most recently not without a certain amount of friction.

In general, Professor Magocsi has produced a carefully written and thoughtfully compiled volume, the first true illustrated history of Ukraine in a great many years and the first of its kind in the English language. In spite of certain infelicities, the publication of *Ukraine: An Illustrated History* is to be welcomed.

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Kevin Alan Brook. *The Jews of Khazaria*. Second edition. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. xii, 315 pp. U.S.$50 cloth, $21.95 paper.

This volume is a slightly revised version of the first edition (1999), with some additions, subtractions, and reorganization. Brook says he wrote this book upon realizing how little there was on the Khazar Jews in Western languages. A perusal of his or Bernard D. Weinryb's bibliography ("The Khazars: An Annotated Bibliography," *Studies in Bibliography and Booklore* 6 [1963]: 111–29 and 11 [1976]: 57–74) reveals that Brook's motivation for writing this book was baseless. The only reason would have been to present original information or interpretations. But all that Brook has done is accumulate a vast number of historical references to the Khazars and briefly mention his study of the Y-DNA of Eastern European Karaite men (p. 231).

The book's title suggests that this is a book about the history of the Khazar Jews and/or of all Jews in Khazaria. But most of the ten chapters discuss the Khazars in general and not the Khazar Jews/Jews in particular. Of the four appendices, "Timeline of Khazar history"' is useful; the other three, "Glossary" (a linguistic garble), "Native Khazarian personal names" (with no indication of names uniquely borne by Jews), and "Other instances of conversion to Judaism in history," are either full of errors or not relevant.

No reader will be satisfied with the plethora of clichés, misformulations, misspellings, inconsistencies, contradictions, unsupported claims, unconfirmed and unconfirmable anecdotes, and citation of secondary non-experts and popularizers (usually in the absence of genuine scholars). Though unable to distinguish between the wheat and the chaff, Brook often passes judgements on many scholarly issues.

Far too many of Brook's remarks are based on the views of incompetent scholars or on no sources whatsoever. For the history of Yiddish—which sup-

planted the probably pre-Ukrainian or Kyiv-Polissian speech of the originally predominantly Turkic-speaking Khazars (we are not told when this may have happened, but it was probably as early as the tenth to eleventh centuries)— Brook relies on the unoriginal theories of Alexander Beider (a student of names and the author of "The Birth of Yiddish and the Paradigm of the Rhenish Origin of Ashkenazic Jews," *Revue des études juives* 163, nos. 1–2 [2004]: 193–244), Maurice Samuel (a popularizer of Yiddish and the author of *In Praise of Yiddish* [New York 1971]), and Benjamin Harshav (a literary specialist and the author of *The Meaning of Yiddish* [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990]). Yet he does not cite Max Weinreich's major source for the history of Yiddish, *Gešixte fun der jidišer šprax* (3 vols., New York 1973).

In chapter 5 Brook assumes that all Jewish travellers recorded between the 750s to the 830s must have been members of the multilingual peripatetic merchant group known in Arabic as the "Radhanites," and that the Radhanites facilitated contacts between Khazar Jews and west European Jewish centers of learning in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (p. 78); however, the Radhanites disappeared in the tenth century. Brook's claim that "it is often suggested that the Khazars adopted religious customs from the Radhanites " is made without citing any supporting references.

Brook notes that "Ashkenazi" Jews lived in France and Italy before reaching Germany (p. 251); but does this mean that French-and Italian-speaking Jews were (are?) (pre-[?])Ashkenazic? He ignores the migration of German Ashkenazim to northern Italy in the fifteenth century and probably to northern France in the tenth to twelfth centuries. Brook's definition of Arabic *Saqlabs* (pp. 3, 68; he means *ṣaqlab* sg., *ṣaqāliba* pl.) cannot simply be glossed 'Slav(s)', because the term long denoted slaves of various nationalities. He includes the Finno-Ugric Meria in a list of Eastern Slavs (p. 55); yet on p. 71 he calls them the Finnic Mari [sic] "tribe". He also calls the Khazars and other Turkic groups "tribes" (see pp. 49 and 220 regarding contemporary populations[!]), but never applies this condescending epithet to Germanic or Slavic groups (which did call themselves "tribes"). It is not clear what he means when he writes that the Slavic-speaking Jews in Kyivan Rus' and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania may have been "the missing link between the Turkic-speaking Khazars … and the Yiddish-speaking Jews of later times" (p. xii). Was this link linguistic or genetic, and what exactly is a link (see also p. 226)?

To speak, as Brook does, of Rjazan' as part of Kyivan Rus' in the early tenth century (p. 74), of the brothers Cyril and Methodius as "saints" in the year 860 (p. 101), or of "Khazarian-Israelite origins" is anachronistic (p. 108). Brook states that "most modern Jews and Karaites" are descended from Judeans (pp. 198, 252); and he also refers to the "Mountain Jews" as "Israelites" (p. 233)! He claims that speakers of Iranian Juhuri arrived in the Caucasus in the fifth to sixth centuries, as their language allegedly reveals to him. (How could Juhuri provide a chronology of migration?) But the group's Iranian pedigree is in some doubt given their retention of Arabic pronunciation norms for the *'ayin* and *ḥet* letters.

By assuming that the existence of Jews outside Palestine must be due to the emigration of Palestinian Jews, Brook ignores two facts: (1) Judaism attracted many proselytes in Europe, Asia, and North Africa prior to the 1200s, when Christianity and Islam became firmly institutionalized (converts probably outnumbered "Palestinian Jews" and their descendants everywhere); and (2) there is no evidence for mass migrations out of Palestine after the Roman destruction of the Second Temple in AD 70. Hence, rather than hypothesizing that the Jews in Kyivan Rus' were either of Judean or Khazar origin (p. 198), it would be best to claim that they had varied Jewish Palestinian and non-Jewish Khazar and non-Khazar origins (as his long appendix of instances of conversion to Judaism suggests). Brook cites an Arabic source that states the Khazars wore a long coat (p. 64); but to write that "these 'full coats' were essentially kaftans, similar to the long gowns worn by Ashkenazic Jews in the nineteenth century" (everywhere? when?) is puzzling, given the lack of pictorial representation. He also declares (p. 174) that Jewish *kaftn* is a borrowing from Polish Christian styles of dress; however, Yiddish *kaftn* is a Turkic or possibly Iranian word, acquired probably from another Slavic language (see, e.g., Ukrainian *kaftan*). Brook agrees with the view that an early eleventh-century Mainz Jew (far removed from southeastern Poland!) mentioned the southeastern "Polish" city of Przemyśl (why not Ukrainian Peremyshl?), but he ignores the scholarly disagreements over identifying the toponym (see Franciszek Kupfer and Tadeusz Lewicki, *Źródła hebrajskie do dziejów słowian i niektórych innych ludów środkowej i wschodniej Europy: Wyjątki z pism religijnych i prawniczych XI–XIII w.* [Wrocław and Warsaw, 1956], 41–44).

On p. xi Brook defines the Khazars as "a Turkic people" (p. xi) and or "predominantly Turkic" (p. 2). Later, however, he contradicts himself and writes that "Khazaria was … a multiethnic society" (p. 36). But why search for Khazar cultural and linguistic traits all over Europe and the Middle East if the Khazars' identity after their conversion to Judaism became "transformed from Turkic to Jewish" (p. 234, see also pp. 167 and 217). In Brook's view, the most interesting aspect of the Khazars' history is their conversion to Judaism in the ninth century (p. xi: why so?), yet his claim that Judaism became the most widespread religion in Khazaria (pp. 36, 49, 53, 110, 164, chapter 6) is mysterious, given al-Mas'ūdī's mention of seven judges in Atil, only two of whom were Jewish (two others were Christian, two were Muslim, and one was a pagan).

Brook cites some Polish place-names in their standard orthography (though occasionally with errors: e.g., *Wroclaw* instead of *Wrocław*). But in his book Ukrainian and Belarusian place names often appear in their Russian(ized) or Polish forms: e.g., *Grodno, Brest* instead of *Hrodna, Brèst*; *Černihiv* also appears as *Chernigov* (p. 198); and Halyč is called *Halicz* (p. 229). He also erroneously claims that modern Bulgarian is most "closely affiliated with Serbo-Croatian and Russian" (p. 14).

To suggest, as Brook does, that "Yiddish acquired some Slavic words and traits … but did not fundamentally become Slavic" (p. 205) reflects total igno-

rance of comparative linguistics. (Does Brook have examples of languages shifting from one genetic affiliation to another?) He identifies a common /n/ in Yiddish *lokšn* 'noodles' and Ukrainian *lokšyna* (p. 206) and raises the question of who borrowed from whom. Jan Karłowicz, the Polish lexicographer, believed that the Polish cognate denoted "Jewish macaroni" (*Słownik wyrazów obcego a mniej jasnego pochdzenia używanych w języku polskim,* 3 vols. [Cracow, 1894–1905]), yet the two /n/s are of disparate origin: Yiddish /n/ is a plural suffix, while Ukrainian -*yna* is a singular suffix.

Brook concludes that if the toponym *Sambata* (in what language?) 'Sabbath, Saturday' comes from Hebrew *šabbat*, "it would confirm that many Khazars in Kyiv honored the Jewish day of rest" (pp. 26, 40). The existence of this "Jewish influence" in Cuman also prompts Brook to talk of intermarriage between Khazars and Cumans in the mid-eleventh century (p. 181). This makes no sense, since Hebrew *šabbat* has entered a host of European and Middle Eastern languages (via Greek, Judeo-Greek, or Latin) whose speakers are Christian or Muslim. Moreover, place-names based on 'Saturday' are often so named because of a Saturday market—forbidden according to orthodox Jewish law (see my *Explorations in Judeo-Slavic Linguistics* [Leiden, 1987], 24–27, for a discussion of a possible Khazar source for 'Saturday' in some Caucasian languages).

Brook's discussion of putative Khazar terms in Yiddish and Old Rus'ian (pre-Ukrainian would be a better term) omits any mention of the possible presence of pre-Russian *kagan* in Jewish family names, especially in Belarus, the Kyiv region, and Volhynia (where Khazars settled); e.g., *Kagán* (with various suffixes; for a detailed discussion of this term in a number of Turkic languages, including possibly in Karaite, see my *Two-Tiered Relexification in Yiddish: Jews, Sorbs, Khazars, and the Kiev-Polessian Dialect* [Berlin, 2002], 525–27, where similar family names among Ukrainians are also discussed).

Regrettably, some germane topics receive little or no discussion in Brook's book. For example, how did the acceptance of Judaism have an impact on the Khazars' traditional Turkic culture (see p. 60)? Brook describes how Khazar coins of the early ninth century bore an Islamic date with the Arabic name *mūsa* (Moses) in place of *muḥammad* (Muhammad: p. 80), which suggests a Judeo-Islamic syncretic culture. Since so-called Jewish culture is primarily identical to the coterritorial (or continguous) peoples from whom the Jews derive, might the Ashkenazic Jews preserve extinct Khazar traditions (just as they do pagan Slavic and Germanic traditions; see details in my *Two-Tiered Relexification in Yiddish*)? This is a topic for future research not mentioned by Brook. The importance of the Khazars in the ethnogenesis of the Ashkenazic Jews has been reduced in this edition, but Brook provides no convincing explanation for his new opinion. There is frequent mention of genetic research among Ashkenazim, but how reliable is this research? It is unclear why Brook eliminated from this edition discussion of my belief that Yiddish provides a clue to the fate of the Jewish Khazars after the destruction of their empire (see my *Two-Tiered Relexification in Yiddish*). Why was Khazaria a taboo topic in the USSR and why do

most contemporary Jews instinctively reject a major Khazar component in the Ashkenazic ethnogenesis? (Brook cites the oral tradition of Khazar descent among some Ashkenazim: see pp. 170, 177, 190, and 193; on the [false] Cossack claim that they descend from the Khazars, see p. 181 and my *Tiered Relexification in Yiddish,* 535–36.) Possible Khazar influences on the Slavs needs much more discussion than what Brook provides.

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Serhii Plokhy. *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008. xix, 391 pp. $77.

Only a senior scholar who has an easy familiarity with an astoundingly broad range of writings could have written this excellent book. Serhii Plokhy, the recently appointed Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University, claims to focus "largely on the development of Ukrainian historiography and its uneasy relations with its Russian counterpart" and survey "representations of the past." In reality he does much more, providing a sophisticated analysis of how Ukrainian and Russian historians have produced both similar and different histories and historiographies; of their intellectual agreements and disagreements, both in response to each other and to ongoing historical developments; and, last but not least, of Ukrainian and Russian history.

Plokhy treats us to in-depth explorations of a variety of issues that have divided and defined Ukrainian and Russian representations of the past. Topics include the role of the Varangians in the establishment of the Kyivan Rus' state; the relationships between the Cossacks in general and Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Hetmanate in particular with Muscovy; the emergence of a Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the role therein of, especially, Mykhailo Hrushevsky; and a variety of contentious Soviet-era issues, such as Sevastopol, the Treaty of Yalta, and their status in the Soviet canon.

In the final section of the book, Plokhy examines approaches to Ukrainian history and suggests a few of his own. He is unhappy with the "national paradigm," which takes the Ukrainian nation as its focus and traces its development through time. He commends scholars such as Paul Robert Magocsi for including other nationalities and ethno-cultural groups in their histories. He then recommends "transnational history": "Probably the most promising approach to the history of Ukraine is to think of it as a civilizational and cultural borderland; a dividing line, but also a bridge between Central and Eastern Europe. Historians of Ukraine uniquely positioned to study the history of their country in its full scope, whether it be the history of Polish, Russian, or Ottoman dominated lands and territories, at different stages in its development."

All these criticisms and suggestions make perfect sense, of course, but they seem to assume that something resembling progress, or improvement, in history is possible. That strikes me as a perfectly defensible proposition, at least in theory, but I am not at all sure just how one can reconcile a belief in better historiography with an approach that seems to reduce historiography to competing representations. One would, presumably, have to have some universally accepted, non-representational method by means of which representations could be judged for value and accuracy. Failing that, who's to say that representation A is any better (or worse) than representation B? On the other hand, if all representations have the same validity, then what remains of history?

The other problem is that in history, as in all the other social sciences and humanities, theories, approaches, and paradigms constantly come and go, enjoying bursts of popularity, sometimes attaining seemingly unchallengeable common-sense hegemony and then fading into obscurity or routine, at which point what seemed ground-breaking at one time appears absurd or commonsensical at a later time. Seen in this light, the currently unpopular and/or discredited national paradigm may be quite dead, or it may just be in hibernation. By the same token, multiethnic perspectives and local history, which strike us as being fundamentally, obviously, and intrinsically "better" than their national predecessors, may just be flashes in the pan. After all, several decades ago, who seriously thought of nations as invented, imagined, and constructed? Who, today, does not believe that? And who, tomorrow, is likely to believe that constructivism is truly all that its current acolytes make it out to be? The same may just hold true for our current obsession with multiculturalism, diversity, borders, empires, and identity, or, for that matter, with rational choice, institutions, globalization, and so on.

Plokhy begins his book by saying that he wants to explore where Russian history ends and Ukrainian history begins. The resulting book gives well-argued answers to where representations of Russian history end and representations of Ukrainian history begin. Who better than a historian of Plokhy's immense breadth and depth to consider at what point, if any, representations of history end and history, if there is indeed such a thing, begins?

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Bohdan S. Kordan. *The Mapping of Ukraine: European Cartography and Maps of Early Modern Ukraine, 1550–1799. An Exhibition from the Archives of the Ukrainian Museum and Private Collections.* New York: The Ukrainian Museum, 2008. 104 pp., 42 maps, mostly in color. U.S. $28.

During the early modern age, that is, from about 1450 to 1800, the production of printed maps of the land we today know as Ukraine went through three distinct

stages. The first stage was dominated by the Renaissance view, which leaned heavily upon classical knowledge of eastern Europe derived from ancient authors, especially Ptolemy. Thus ancient names, such as Scythia and Sarmatia, were used for the country, Borysthenes and Tanais for the rivers Dnipro and Don, and Pontus Euxinus for the Black Sea. Sometimes post-classical sources added to the information available, but in general the classical worldview prevailed. The second stage was opened by the Polish cartographer Thomas Makowski (1575–1620) and especially by a French engineer in Polish service, Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan (1595–1685), who surveyed the country in great detail and drew exemplary maps that were much more accurate and contained a wealth of new material including modern place-names. During this second stage, the name "Ukraine" appeared most frequently on maps of the area. The third stage was initiated by Tsar Peter I (1672–1725), who commissioned maps to be made of his newly acquired territories, and was continued by Russian and Austrian mapmakers after the partitions of Poland, which began in1772 and continued to the end of the eighteenth century. During this period further advances in cartography were made and more detailed maps were printed, but the name "Ukraine" was used less and less frequently, to be replaced by "Russia minor" and its Slavic equivalents in Russian maps that depicted eastern Ukraine, and "the Kingdom of Lodomeria and Galicia" in Austrian maps of western Ukraine. Regional names, such as Volhynia, Podolia, and Russia rubra (sometimes translated as "Red Ruthenia") seem to have traversed all three stages.

The text of the Ukrainian Museum's exhibition catalogue, by Professor Bohdan Kordan of the University of Saskatchewan, concentrates upon the second stage, when the name "Ukraine" appeared most frequently. Happily, this coincided with the so-called Golden Age of European cartography, when professional mapmakers and firms such as Blaeu, Sanson, and later Homman produced some of their most accurate and most artistically pleasing work. During this period the title "Ukraine, Land of the Cossacks" frequently appeared in various forms and various languages. Late in the period the label "Ukraine, Land of the Old Cossacks" also could be found.

Many of the maps reproduced in the catalogue contain inserted "Remarques" on various subjects. These vary from information on the Tatars and their raids into Ukraine to material about the Dnipro Rapids. The ornamental "cartouches" in which the titles of the maps are usually placed sometimes portray interesting scenes and often give us information about heraldry, costumes, weapons, and such. One of the most striking of these is the map titled "Vkrania quae et terra Cosaccorum" (Latin for "Ukraine, which is also the Land of the Cossacks." The curator and compilers of the catalogue chose to reproduce this beautifully ornamented and colored map on the cover as well as in the body of their volume. The curator, Professor Kordan, believes that the attractive cartouche of this map depicts a seated Hetman Ivan Mazepa surrounded by Tsar Peter I and King Charles XII of Sweden, the three major personalities of the Battle of Poltava, which occurred a few years before Homann printed this map. I have some doubt

about this, however, for none of the depicted figures bears any resemblance to what we know of Mazepa, Charles, or Peter. The seated figure sports what looks to be a turban, not a hat, and so is unlikely to be Mazepa; the figure to the left in the triangular hat is too old to be Charles XII; and the figure to the right, with his sword pointed down at the proposed Mazepa, is wearing what looks to be the headgear of a Turkish janissary rather than that of a tsar or a general. Nevertheless, the scene is a striking one that fully reflects the military action Ukraine was seeing during the early eighteenth century.

Many Canadians descended from the first, pioneer wave of Ukrainian immigrants from Austrian-ruled Galicia will be particularly interested in the various maps in which the province of Podolia (Podillia in modern Ukrainian) may be found. The fertile western part of this province, annexed to Austria in 1772, formed the most easterly part of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, from which, as Stella Hryniuk of the University of Manitoba pointed out several years ago, the great majority of the original Ukrainian settlers from Galicia came to Canada. Map 18, titled "Ukrainae pars quae Podolia Palatinatus vulgo dicitur" (A Part of Ukraine that is called Podolia in the common tongue), and map 39, titled "Lubomeriae et Galliciae Regni Tabula Geographica" (A Geographical Account of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria), are particularly important in this regard. The first, a pre-1772 map, clearly shows the town of "Usiatyn" (Husiatyn) on the west bank of the Zbruch River, which later formed the border between the Austrian and Russian empires; but the coloring in the second map, a post-1772 production, erroneously puts the border too far west and seemingly leaves Husiatyn and this part of Podillia inside Russia—a situation that would certainly surprise many Ukrainian Canadians, who know from their family histories that their ancestors came from "Austrian" Galicia. Mapping errors such as these, however, grew less and less frequent with the passage of time and with improvements in geographical knowledge and cartography.

In general, this catalogue is a very attractive addition to the literature on Ukrainian cartography. It nicely supplements recent work by Yaroslav Dashkevych, Rostyslav Sossa, and others. Moreover, it is by far the most attractive and readable of Professor Kordan's four major publications in this field. Although one would have liked to see some discussion of when the name "Ukraine" and other place names such as "Dnipro" and "Dnister" were first used, and a somewhat larger format which would allow larger reproductions and thus more detail on the maps, the commentary is informative, the colors in the volume very successful, and the choice of maps appropriate to the chosen theme. The translations into Ukrainian by Sophia Kachor are also very good. Professor Kordan and his colleagues and editors at the Ukrainian Museum in New York deserve full credit for their effort.

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Serhii Plokhy. *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, reprinted 2004. x, 401 pp. U.S. $176.50.

Le livre de Serhii Plokhy est remarquable par son approche inédite au phénomène religieux en Ukraine pendant le début du Temps moderne. L'auteur reprend ici la notion de la confessionalisation (*Konfessionalisierung*), proposée par Heinz Schilling et Wolfgang Reinhardt. Selon Serhii Plokhy, "confessionalization may be defined as a modern variant of Christianity that came into existence during the Reformation, influencing the religious and social life of early modern Europe on both sides of the Catholic-Protestant divide". Parmi les traits caractéristiques de la confessionalisation l'auteur mentionne "the clear formulation of religious beliefs, the creation of religiously uniform and coherent communities, the reinforcement of church discipline, the formation of a new type of clergy, and the development of close co-operation between church and state" (p. 10–11). Est-ce que la tendance de la confessionalisation était propre pour le développement intérieur de l'Eglise orthodoxe en Ukraine, ou ne s'agit il qu'un défi de la confrontation avec la confessionalisation protestante et catholique? L'auteur semble donner une fois une réponse presque positive à la première question, quand il remarque, que pour l'Eglise ukrainienne qui "had not yet embarked on the process of confessionalization", le rite byzantin et pas la doctrine théologique formaient le plus important élément de son identité (p. 82). Et pour l'Ukraine comme un "pays de marge" classique, situé à la frontière confessionnelle, ce défi devait être plus important que pour certains autres pays orthodoxes. Plokhy souligne l'importance de cet "défi" dans la crise du métropolie de Kiev, et, selon lui, c'étaient les réformes du métropolite Petro Mohyla, qui "helped to set the whole Orthodox world on the path of confessionalization" (p. 97). (Un point de vue très proche fut formulé simultanément par Alfons Brüning, „Confessio Orthodoxa und europäischer Konfessionalismus — einige Anhaltspunkte zur Verhältnisbestimmung", *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 58 (2001) = *Russische und Ukrainische Geschichte vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert. Gedenkschrift für Hans-Joachim Torke*, 207–221.)

Peut-être il est précipité de demander de l'auteur, qui se concentre autour de son sujet, de donner son avis sur la question de l'applicabilité de la notion de la confessionalisation aux autres pays orthodoxes. Mais il trouve lui-même au moins deux occasions pour toucher cette question. Une fois, il compare l'œuvre de Petro Mohyla avec le programme de la réforme ecclésiastique, préparée par les "zélateurs du piété" moscovite — "a program of reforming Muscovite Orthodoxy, which set it on the road to confessionalization by bringing it into line with the practices then prevailing in the Kyivan Metropolitanate and the Greek East" (p. 303). Mais une caractéristique de la réalisation de ce programme n'entre pas dans le cadre du livre de S. Plokhy. Autre fois, en caractérisant le caractère unique de l'engagement religieux des Cosaques ukrainiens, Plokhy

évoque l'incapacité des Cosaques russes de se réunir sous le drapeau de l'Ancienne Foi à la fin du XVIIe siècle (p. 343).

Il faut dire que Plokhy a bien compris un côté de la notion de la confessionalisation, c'est à dire, la revalorisation du facteur religieux, qui ré-devient un des importants facteurs du développement politique et social. D'ici vient la composition du livre — l'auteur commence par un bref exposé de la genèse de la communauté des Cosaques et de leur conflit avec la République polono-lithuanienne ("The Ukrainian Cossacks") et pas par la caractéristique de la crise de la métropolie de Kiev ("The Religious Crisis"). La vision traditionnelle soviétique des causes du mouvement de Khmelnytsky, qui prévoyait la combinaison de l'oppression sociale, nationale et religieuse, est rejetée ici en faveur d'une claire dichotomie — d'un côté, la force décisive des futurs développements, d'autre côté, la crise ecclésiastique. En exposant la genèse de l'union de Brest l'auteur reprend les résultats des travaux de Borys A. Gudziak (*Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* [Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1998) et Mikhail V. Dmitriev (*Mezhdu Rimom i Tsargradom: Genezis Brestskoi tserkovnoi unii 1595–1596 gg.* [Moscou: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 2003]) aussi que ses propres résultats scientifiques.

Les causes internes, y compris la volonté des évêques orthodoxes, sont représentées comme un facteur décisif, si on compare avec l'importance de la pression des autorités séculiers de la République polono-lituanienne (pp. 80–81). Une telle vision, qui trouve beaucoup des preuves dans les sources, n'est pas en même temps sans contradiction avec l'approche de la confessionalisation, qui prévoit la coopération plus étroite de l'Etat avec l'Eglise.

Plokhy décrit la formation de l'engagement religieux des Cosaques, en reprenant l'approche propre à l'historiographie classique ukrainienne (Mykhailo Hrushevsky). Il affirme que jusqu'aux années 1610 une composante religieuse n'est pas visible dans les révoltes cosaques. Deux facteurs ont changé la situation — l'affaiblissement général de l'engagement de la noblesse ukrainienne orthodoxe, surtout après la mort du prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky, aussi que l'émigration du clergé orthodoxe des régions occidentales vers les domaines des Cosaques (p. 108). Le premier succès des Cosaques était la restauration de facto de l'hiérarchie orthodoxe en 1620. Mais, une fois l'hiérarchie orthodoxe fut restaurée, elle commence d'agir selon ses propres vues, parfois pas compatibles avec la vision des Cosaques. Plokhy montre, que les années 1620–1640, marquées par une série des rapprochements des Orthodoxes avec les Uniates, forment en même temps la période de l'éloignement réciproque de l'hiérarchie orthodoxe et des Cosaques — un éloignement, que rassemble bien les relations entre le hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky et le métropolite de Kyiv Sylvestr Kosov. Très intéressante est ici la version de certaines sources polonaises, selon lesquelles la révolte cosaque en 1637–38 n'était qu'une réponse cosaque aux réformes de Petro Mohyla, et un signe de désapprobation de ses réformes (p. 142).

Telles étaient les conditions du départ du mouvement de Khmelnytsky. Avant de commencer de le caractériser, l'auteur introduit un chapitre conceptuel ("Order, Religion, and Nation"). Ici Plokhy définit l'identité ukrainienne grâce aux trois frontières — confessionnelle (qui sépare les orthodoxes et les catholiques), administrative (qui sépare la Pologne de Couronne et le Grand duché de Lituanie) et politique (qui sépare la République polono-lithuanienne de la Moscovie). Par conséquence, les différentes conceptions de l'identité de la "nation ruthène" coexistaient dans la pensée ukrainienne; certaines favorisaient l'identité commune avec les Russes, les autres une identité à part. Plokhy montre qu'en Moscovie, au contraire, l'image du voisin occidental devient à la première moitié du XVIIme siècle assez homogène. Dans le discours moscovite officiel, le ethnonyme "russkie /ruskie" ne fut utilisé que pour nommer les sujets du tsar; quand aux sujets de la République polono-lituanienne, ils étaient nommés "Polonais", "Belorustsy" ou "Cherkasy" (dans le cas, s'il s'agissait des Cosaques) (p. 293). Ici il faut ajouter les expériences, liées avec la participation des Cosaques ukrainiens dans les événements du temps des Troubles (surtout l'expédition de Petro Sahaidachny contre Moscou en 1618) aussi que leur participation dans la guerre de Smolensk (1632–34). La position officielle moscovite signifiait pas seulement les doutes à propos de la pureté de la foi des sujets orthodoxes de la République polono-lituanienne, mais aussi l'absence d'une conscience qu'on appartient avec eux à la même «"nation". Il est un peu dommage que cette analyse du discours officiel des deux côtés n'est pas suivie dans le livre de Plokhy par de brèves remarques sur la réception réciproque des Russes par les Ukrainiens et des Ukrainiens par les Russes dans les deux "cultures populaires".

Par conséquence, si un *(vos)soedinienie* était pensable pour les autorités de Moscou, c'était plutôt une union avec le coreligionnaires qu'une réunion d'une nation divisée. Plokhy affirme que la même logique de la prédominance du facteur religieux était aussi typique pour Khmelnytsky et pour les élites cosaques. Les élites cosaques furent, d'un côté, débordées, par l'ampleur du mouvement social, dont ils devaient diriger, d'autre côté, elles furent surprises par la réalisation rapide de toutes les principales revendications de la révolte (tandis que la logique du mouvement demandait la proclamation des nouvelles et des nouvelles revendications). Ici les revendications notoirement irréalisables, comme, par exemple, l'annulation de l'Union de Brest, étaient très utiles.

Plokhy montre que cette radicalisation du programme religieux de Khmelnytsky posa des problèmes sérieux pour la métropolie de Kiev. Les autorités moscovites reprochaient au métropolite Sylvestr Kosov une manque du zèle pour la cause des Cosaques. L'indépendance ukrainienne signifiait aussi le partage du territoire ecclésiastique de la métropolie entre la République polono-lituanienne et la Moscovie. Pour prolonger d'exercer le pouvoir canonique aux deux rives de Dnipro, le métropolite ne devait pas exagérer dans l'expression de sa loyauté à l'égard du tsar. En même temps les privilèges de la métropolite au rive gauche de Dnipro étaient aussi en jeu. Il ne restait à Bohdan Khmelnytsky que de mon-

trer la volonté de "défendre" les intérêts de la métropolie auprès les autorités moscovites, pour transformer la métropolie — d'abord un acteur de la première importance à la scène politique ukrainienne — dans une structure dépendante du hetman. Cette dépendance du "primat" l'Eglise ukrainienne à l'égard du hetman persiste à travers de tous les changements dans la vie politique ukrainienne, y compris le traité de Hadiatch, quand le métropolite Dyonisii Balaban a suivi la décision du hetman Ivan Vyhovsky (1658). Cette dépendance est vraiment une preuve impressionnante de la confessionalisation.

Il est clair que dans un œuvre d'un tel ampleur l'auteur ne pouvait pas éviter quelques imprécisions. Par exemple, en caractérisant en bref les "zélateurs de piété" moscovites, Plokhy remarque l'influence d'Ivan Khvorostinin aussi que l'influence des poètes de l'école des Bureaux (*prikaznaia shkola*) à ce cercle (p. 303). (Ici l'auteur semble suivre Paul Buskovitch, *Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* [New York et Oxford: University Press, 1992], pp. 136–45.) Tandis que l'héritage littéraire des "zélateurs de piété" reste mal étudié, tous les deux influences ne peuvent pas être excludes. Mais il est difficile de prouver qu'un écrivain aussi contradictoire comme le prince Khvorostinin a directement influencé les "zélateurs du piété" (aussi que prouver le contraire). En revanche, la deuxième remarque de Plokhy — sur l'influence des poètes de l'école des chancelleries — me semble être très intéressante. En passant vers les détails biographiques, il faut remarquer que Andrei Shchelkalov, s'il s'agit des années 1590, n'était pas un simple "clerk" (p. 286), mais le secrétaire de la Douma.

Mais ces petites remarques ne peuvent pas relativiser l'importance de l'œuvre de Serhii Plokhy pour l'étude de l'histoire de l'Ukraine pendant le début du Temps moderne. Bien sûr, l'historien a seulement posé le problème de la relevance de la notion de la "confessionalisation" à l'histoire ecclésiastique ukrainienne; l'applicabilité de cette notion ne peut pas etre approuvé que par plusieurs études spéciales. Basé sur la lecture des sources en plusieurs langues, accumulant les derniers résultats, acquis par la recherche internationale, le livre de Serhii Plokhy est — une qualité assez rare pour les travaux historiens de l'Europe de l'Est — ouvert et passionnant aussi pour les spécialistes de l'histoire "occidentale".

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Giovanna Siedina, ed. *Mazepa e il suo tempo: Storia, cultura, società / Mazepa and His Time: History, Culture, Society.* Allessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2004. 593 pp. €40.

The era of Ivan Mazepa was undoubtedly one the formative moments of Ukrainian history and coincided with what is perhaps the cultural high point of the Hetmanate in general. It is thus doubly fitting that the politics and culture of the

period ("society" hardly figures, in spite of the title) should be the subject of this useful and important volume. The product of a 2002 conference, it reflects the scholarly interests of the moment, with a definite tilt toward the cultural side. Some contributions are mainly antiquarian or tackle specialized themes, but on the whole the volume is unified by its broadly cultural emphasis. That emphasis is not unwelcome, for the politics of Mazepa's Hetmanate are somewhat better known than its culture from pre-1917 and Ukrainian émigré scholarship.

The historical essays in the collection concern mainly political ideas and culture rather than action or institutions, a feature that gives still more unity to the volume. Serhii Plokhy explores what Teofan Prokopovych really meant by "*Rossiia.*" Frank Sysyn, Natalia Iakovenko, and Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel all take up different sides of the political culture of the Hetmanate, mainly of the Cossack elite—investigations that necessarily involve aspects of the vexed question of the heritage of the political world of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Sysyn traces the development of notions of the Hetmanate as a fatherland, while Iakovenko tries to outline the main features of its political culture, that of the elite, and to some extent of the Cossack rank and file. Chynczewska-Hennel is convinced that *starshyna* around Mazepa were largely in the tradition of the Commonwealth, while Iakovenko sees the similarities as superficial. Sysyn is somewhere in between. Larysa Dovha examines political ideas in the sermons of the time, a normally neglected source. Four articles focusing on history (Daniel Beauvois, Iryna Dmytryshyn) and literature (Rostysław Radyszewski, Oleksandra Trofymuk) treat Pylyp Orlyk and his son, both of whom recur in other contributions. Iurii Mytsyk, Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, and Serhii Jakowenko discuss Mazepa's relations with the church as patron and hetman. The picture that emerges from these essays is necessarily complex, varying by time and the social place of the writers. One gets the impression, however, that by Mazepa's time there was little difference between clergy and the Cossack elite. Both professed a patriotism focused on the Hetmanate, a general loyalty to the Russian tsar, and political values derived both from Poland and from the Hetmanate's own recent history.

Many of the literary studies (Natalia Pylypiuk, Lidia Sazonova, Jakowenko, Radyszewski, like the historical ones, rely extensively on the panegyrics of the time, sermons, poetry, and the use of emblems and coats of arms to uncover what the educated elite of the time thought of Mazepa, or at least what it wanted to proclaim in print. Most of the results are predictable Baroque clichés: Mazepa is a brave and victorious commander, pious, just, a Hercules against the infidel. Also rather predictable are the terms of denigration of the Hetman in Russian publications after 1708. Indeed, the imagery is so predictable that it is a pity that the authors did not look further afield for prototypes: were these images universal, and only for monarchs or semi-monarchs? Or did they have some broader application? Of course, not just monarchs but also great noblemen in Poland received much fulsome poetic praise, as did some of Mazepa's contemporaries in the Hetmanate. How different was it from that composed for the hetman?

The essays on the literature of the time give a clear picture of how the elite of the Ukrainian Hetmanate and Russia wanted to portray Mazepa, but they point up only more strongly the absence of the hetman himself in the collection. The only essay to explore his policies and actions in any detail is that of Oleksii Sokyrko on Mazepa's formation of a corps of guards supported by his own resources, separate from the Cossack forces. Many years ago Oleksander Ohloblyn suggested that Mazepa was aiming for increased power over the Hetmanate and not only greater autonomy or eventually independence from Russia. Sokyrko's essay in a modest way supports this hypothesis, and perhaps so do the panegyrics and accounts of cultural patronage. Many lesser issues are also explored in the volume: the archeology of Baturyn, philosophical vocabulary in the Kyivan academy, and others. Many of the contributions to this fine collection are more descriptive than analytic, but then perhaps at this stage of the historiography of Mazepa and his time new material is to be preferred to premature generalization.

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Anna Makolkin. *The Nineteenth Century in Odessa: One Hundred Years of Italian Culture on the Shores of the Black Sea (1794–1894)*. Foreword by Terence J. Fay. Lewiston, N.Y., and Queenston, Ont.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007. viii, 230 pp. U.S. $109.95.

In recent decades, the past and present of Odesa, Ukraine's cosmopolitan Black Sea port and its largest city during much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has been the subject of an impressively large number of studies by Western scholars, from Patricia Herlihy's pioneering history of the city published by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute in 1987 to Tanya Richardson's anthropological study *Kaleidoscopic Odessa* (University of Toronto Press, 2008). The title under review is Makolkin's second book about Odesa, continuing the argument of her *History of Odessa, the Last Italian Black Sea Colony* (Edwin Mellen Press, 2004). In both books Makolkin seeks to highlight the important contribution of the Italian immigrant community to the city's history, a contribution she argues has never before received due attention from scholars. The second volume focuses in particular on the contribution of Odesans of Italian background to the city's cultural sphere, including architecture, painting, sculpture, music, literature, theatre, and circus.

Odesa was indeed unique among the cities in the Russian Empire in having a sizeable Italian community for much of the nineteenth century, and the contributions of this community to the city's cultural history are remarkable. However, Makolkin's monograph is marred by numerous methodological and structural flaws that significantly undercut her mission.

One of the book's biggest problems is the author's selective presentation of historical facts that at times tips into distortion. For instance, she claims that Italians were responsible for Odesa's original plan, but it was in fact designed by Frantz de Voland, a Dutchman. Contrary to Makolkin's claim, there is nothing uniquely Italian about the city's plan, as it has plenty in common with other Enlightenment-era planned cities, from St. Petersburg to Washington, D.C. A reader familiar with the city's history would find it troubling that in the lists of important Odesans of Italian background, Makolkin repeatedly mentions the merchant families of Efrusi and Rodokanaki (Rhodokanakis), which were, respectively, Sephardic and Christian from Greece, as well as Giacomo Quarenghi, the acclaimed St. Petersburg architect. The author dwells at length on the fact that the city's founder and first mayor, Jose de Ribas, was Neapolitan, but he can be counted as Italian only in terms of his place of birth, as his father was a Spanish diplomat serving in Naples and his mother was Irish. Besides, de Ribas's legacy to the city was largely symbolic, as he served as mayor only for three years (1794–97). By contrast, Makolkin only makes one brief mention of the city's most famous mayor, Armand-Emmanuel du Plessis, Duke de Richelieu (mayor in from 1803 to 1814), and never mentions his successor, Count Alexandre de Langéron (mayor from 1815 to 1823). Yet the contributions of these two to the city's development in the early decades of its history, including the hiring of Italians as city architects, far exceed de Ribas's. The impact of the Greek community, no less numerous and influential than the Italian in the early decades of Odesa's history, is also all but erased in Makolkin's narrative, as indeed are all the other ethnic groups residing in the city at the time. In her book Italians appear to have existed in a complete cultural vacuum. Hyperbolically Makolkin claims that "[t]he Italians ... founded and built the port, resort facilities ... foreign trade and shipping, and all major industries" (p. 88) in Odesa.

The book's structural problems are no less serious. The long first chapter is in essence a rambling, digressive essay on the late eighteenth-century Italians as the supposedly sole carriers of the torch of classical civilizations of Greece, Rome, and Phoenicia, of but a tangential relevance to Makolkin's later narrative. Throughout her book the author's writing style frequently slips into impressionistic purple prose, and given the number of misprints and grammatical infelicities, the volume does not appear to have received adequate attention by a copy editor. Examples of questionable statements include the gratuitous assertion that "the Russian nation was the least pious and God-worshipping" in Europe (p. 37), the out-of-place bashing of Western Modernist art (pp. 191–92), and the reductive presentation of medieval East Slavic culture, from the tenth to the sixteenth century, as "the Russian [sic] Dark Ages" (p. 14). Ukrainian readers would be perplexed by Makolkin's simplistic idealization of the Russian monarchs Peter I and Catherine II; in fact, the author's knowledge of Ukrainian culture and history appears to be minimal.

Makolkin's presentation of the contribution of Italians to Odesa's architecture is surprisingly lightweight, consisting mostly of lists of architects' names

and repeated references to a handful of buildings—the present city hall (originally the stock exchange), the city's first opera house, the Greek Orthodox Trinity Church, and the Russian Orthodox Church of St. Michael, which the author repeatedly compares to Rome's St. Peter's Cathedral, while in actuality this church, destroyed by the Soviets in the 1930s (a fact Makolkin neglects to mention, merely calling the church "defunct"), was but a distant echo of St. Peter's and would be more properly described as a scaled-down replica of St. Petersburg's Kazan Cathedral. By contrast, Makolkin's accounts of the history of Italian painting and opera in Odesa are burdened by large amounts of trivia that add little to her argument (such as the names and occupations of various private Soviet-era collectors from whom the Odesa Museum of Western and Oriental Art acquired the artworks she discusses). While from individual biographies discussed in the book we find out that some Italian artists and musicians lived in Odessa as late as the 1930s, the book's concluding chapters do not give an adequate presentation of the changing fortunes of the Italians active in the city's cultural sphere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or of the enduring legacies of the city's Italian culture. In sum, while Makolkin has uncovered some interesting facts about the details of Odesa's cultural life in the nineteenth century and especially of the Italian contributors to it, the overall message of her book is largely reduced to a series of lists and the recycling of well-worn stereotypes about Odesa's "exuberance and breathing in art, culture, beauty, music, the sea, and the sun" (p. 163). For insights into the past and present cultural dynamic of the city the reader, sadly, would need to look elsewhere.

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Yeshayahu A. Jelinek. *The Carpathian Diaspora: The Jews of Subcarpathian Rus' and Mukachevo, 1848–1948.* Photographic essay and maps by Paul Robert Magocsi. New York: East European Monographs, 2007. 412 pp. U.S.$60. Distributed by Columbia University Press.

Yeshayahu A. Jelinek tucks two tales of spiritual pilgrimage into the epilogue of his encyclopedic history of the Jews in Subcarpathian Rus' and Mukachevo, the first major scholarly work on the subject. The study moves from the pre-World War One Hungarian Kingdom of the Habsburg Empire through the interwar Czechoslovak Republic and the Holocaust period to the region's postwar incorporation into Soviet Ukraine and a taste of the current post-Soviet situation. The first journey was taken by an Israeli writer of Subcarpathian ancestry, seeking the story of "her" people (See Dorith Peleg, "Sha'ath ha-karpatim" [Carpathian Time], *Another Trip*, no. 150 (2004): 90–102); the second was taken by the archetype of a bride-to-be from Brooklyn or the Bronx, a great-granddaughter of a Jew from the Subcarpathian town of Rakhiv, seeking the blessing of her ances-

tors on her upcoming marriage (pp. 339–40). The anecdotes highlight the additional purpose behind Jelinek's book as a means of preserving the collective memory of Subcarpathian Jewry and their descendents and of connecting them with their Eastern European homeland.

This is where "diaspora" fits into Jelinek's work, which initially appeared in Hebrew as part of a planned two-volume commemoration project dealing with Subcarpathian Jewish folklore and history, initiated by two Israel-based associations of Subcarpathian Jewry. This understanding of the Jewish diaspora, however, is not the traditional one "that casts East European Jewry only as part of a mythic dispersal from Zion" (the most current example of this trend is Rebecca Kobrin's forthcoming *Jewish Bialystok and Its Diaspora,* to be published by Indiana University Press in January, 2010), but is rather the one at the center of a recent trend in Jewish scholarship that reconceptualizes Eastern Europe as a Jewish ancestral homeland. This English-language version of Jelinek's original text was published as part of the Classics of Carpatho-Rusyn Scholarship series, an entirely appropriate choice considering Jelinek's focus on the significance of the Carpatho-Rusyn environment for the development of the Jewish population there, as well as the relatively high level of interaction between the similarly impoverished and pious Jewish and Rusyn populations.

In a study based primarily on Hebrew, Yiddish, Hungarian, German, Slovak, and Czech-language materials from archival collections in Israel and the United States, Jelinek argues that the Jews of Subcarpathian Rus' "were clearly a distinct ethnic group with its own language and religion, a particular way of life, and a unique history and economic structure" (p. 10). The separate identity of Subcarpathian Jewry was perhaps most apparent in the area of socioeconomic and civic life, as we see in Jelinek's discussion of how shaken Oskar Neumann and Miriam Singer, leaders in the Czechoslovak Zionist movement, were by the poverty, "exaggerated religiosity … welter of superstitions … zealousness, ignorance, boorishness … absence of cultural institutions … [and] medieval conditions" they witnessed during their visit to the region in 1930 (p. 197).

Jelinek points to four primary factors in the formation of a separate Subcarpathian Jewish ethnicum during the Hungarian Kingdom era: the distinct dialect of Yiddish spoken there using the word *fin* ("from where?"), which contributed to their often pejorative designation as *Finak*s (*Finiatsy,* p. 6); the form of Galician-style Hasidism practiced there, combined with the growing influence of Hungarian nationalism and the "intensely pious religious conservativism" brought to the region by graduates of the Pressburg Yeshiva (p. 64); migration into and out of the region, especially from the mid-nineteenth century forward, making Subcarpathia a site of refuge and transit (p. 31); and the forest environment, which "provided Subcarpathian Jewry with a wide array of occupations and sources of income that were not part of Jewish life elsewhere in Europe … [especially including] working the land," (p. 41). In an effective approach to the important question of levels of Magyarization among Jews in Hungary in this period, Jelinek argues that the efforts of the government in Budapest failed

among Jews in Subcarpathia, evidenced by the continuing avoidance of military service by eligible men (p. 103). This reasoning correctly minimizes highly subjective measures of "Magyarization," like linguistic acculturation.

With regard to interwar Czechoslovakia, Jelinek argues that overall it was "a time of social and cultural efflorescence [that] ... made it possible for Jews from Subcarpathian Rus' to replicate their cultural and creative heritage in Israel," (p. 224). Nevertheless, as their poverty deepened, and tensions with the surrounding non-Jewish population grew alongside the continual questioning of Subcarpathian Jewish loyalty to the Czechoslovak state, Jews in the region turned increasingly to Zionism as a vehicle of emigration. This stepped up the intensity of their identification as a separate Jewish nationality in the region, a census declaration option that the vast majority of Jews in interwar Subcarpathia chose.

Jelinek stresses the intention of the Hungarians, both in the period of their return to power in Subcarpathia as a result of the 1939 Vienna Arbitration as well as in collaboration with the German occupiers after 1944, to finally successfully Magyarize the region by clearing the Jews from it. He writes that the Jews were harmful to Budapest's interests because they frustrated the Magyarization process during the interwar period as loyal citizens of Czechoslovakia (p. 320). The Jews of Subcarpathia shared the fate of their coreligionists in Slovakia: their reorientation of loyalty to Czechoslovakia in the interwar period backfired (p. 132).

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O. O. Shubin and A. A. Sadiekov, eds. *Mykhailo Ivanovych Tuhan-Baranovsky: Osobystist, tvorcha spadshchyna i suchasnist.* Donetsk: Kashtan, 2007. 355 pp.

This book is heavy not only because it has so many pages, but also because it is printed on glossy heavy-stock paper. When one lifts it, one undoubtedly feels its intellectual and physical *gravitas*.

In the early twentieth century Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovsky (1865–1919) was a renowned economist in Europe, especially in Germany for his contributions to the problem of business cycles. With the exception of Alvin Hansen, few economists in the United States were probably acquainted with his work. Tuhan-Baranovsky's path-breaking contribution of 1890 was not even published in English until 1954, and even then not in its entirety. By the same token, his other important works, including one published in 1917 on monetary economics, still awaits publication in English translation. There is an extensive literature on Tuhan-Baranovsky's work in Russian and Ukrainian. It is not improbable that, in view of recent economic, especially monetary, difficulties worldwide, we may witness renewed interest in his work on the part of some Western scholar,

who may look to his work for help. However, knowledge of Slavic languages in the West remains relatively poor, and although some of the chapters in this collection provide a good introduction to Tuhan-Baranovsky's ideas, this process will be difficult and slow.

The book was published by the Tuhan-Baranovsky State University of Economics and Commerce in Donetsk (DSUEC). Because this institution has become the center of study of its eponym, it maintains a collection of relevant literature, regularly publishes new work on his life and works, and organizes scholarly events devoted to him. The book under review here contains the on proceedings of a conference held in 2005. DSUEC has even erected a marble statue of him. Oleksandr Shubin, the rector of DSUEC and the book's coeditor, explains why DSUEC published this volume in his introductory article. Although there is no direct relationship between DSUEC and Tuhan-Baranovsky, naming the university in his honor accords it prestige and respect. But one tenuous connection exists: after Tuhan-Baranovsky returned from St. Petersburg to his native Ukraine in 1917, he organized co-operative (productive enterprise) courses in Kyiv. These courses became an institution, and after various administrative changes and designations it was transferred to Kharkiv in 1924 and from there to Donetsk in 1959, where it is now a full-fledged university. Tuhan-Baranovsky's initiative is the reason why the DSUEC was named after him in 2000.

One often hears complaints about difficulties in reviewing collections of articles because of their heterogeneity. By dividing the book into three sections—Personality, Scholarly Contributions, and the Present—the editors have helped readers navigate through the subject. The book is by and large well structured, and the level of scholarship of individual contributions is high. There is no doubt that this book is a substantial addition both to the study of Tuhan-Baranovsky and to Ukrainian economic literature in general. Before we turn our attention to the book's individual chapters, let us consider three matters of general interest. First, the shift away from writing and speaking in Russian to Ukrainian in post-Soviet Ukraine's institutions of higher education and research has been rather slow, and this evident from the fact that eight of the book's eighteen contributions are in Russian. That more than half of the essays are in Ukrainian is, however, a bold step forward, especially when one considers that books in Russian comprise eighty-eight percent of the holdings of the Donetsk Oblast Universal Scientific Library.

Another aspect that deserves mention is the territorial composition of the volume's contributors. Evidently the Soviet approach of relying on the faculty of a given institution is happily diminishing, for half of the contributions are by specialists from beyond Donetsk. This reflects significant progress in the growth of economic scholarship throughout Ukraine, and, of course, the participation of specialists from other institutions usually raises the scholarly level of any given project.

The first part of the book contains four chapters. The introductory chapter traces the history of institutional initiatives associated with Tuhan-Baranovsky, from provisional courses in Kyiv organized amid wartime conditions to today's large, full-scale university. The other three chapters deal with some of his activities before he achieved worldwide recognition as an economist. In a thoughtful article, M. H. Chumachenko attempts to settle the controversy of whether Tuhan-Baranovsky was Russian or Ukrainian and concludes that after the Revolution of 1917 he was a member of the Ukrainian scholarly community. The value of such an exercise notwithstanding, one should nonetheless note that Tuhan-Baranovsky was and considered himself a Tatar. On account of his father's ancestry and his own successes, he was in fact invited to lead the short-lived Tatar republic during World War I, but declined the honor. Nonetheless, the fact that he gave his son a Mongol first name, Dzhuchy, indicates the importance he attached to his Tatar roots.

Chumachenko's discussion of the relationship between Tuhan-Baranovsky and Lenin appears to be a remnant of the Soviet requirement to consider Lenin as the ultimate source for a given line of research and the standard of ideological purity. For that matter, Lenin's name also sustains L. D. Shyrokorad's discussion of Tuhan-Baranovsky as a student, at a timer when he was member of a group led by Aleksandr Ulianov, Lenin's brother. What either discussion is doing in a volume published in 2007 defies explanation. Dzhuchy Tuhan-Baranovsky argues that his father was able to forecast economic developments in various countries successfully by using his business-cycles theory at the very beginning of his career.

Part two, consisting of seven articles, should be the most interesting for students of economic theory. L. P. Horkina's article on the relationship between relevant works by Tuhan-Baranovsky and classical economic theory from Aristotle to the present is an outstanding contribution. The author is an erudite scholar, and her presentation of difficult material is exemplary. Although she discusses the relationship of Tuhan-Baranovsky's work to the development of economics in its historical entirety, her primary interest seems to be the development of the theory of value. A good example of this is her discussion of theories of value as presented by the marginal utility and classical (including Marxist) schools, the differences between them, and the approaches of both Tuhan-Baranovsky and Alfred Marshall in reconciling them. S. M. Zlupko's chapter includes a discussion of Tuhan-Baranovsky's pioneering work on the influence of technological innovations on investment policy and resulting business cycles, an issue that has greatly attracted Western economists. This chapter's recently deceased author made a considerable contribution to Ukrainian economics, and those familiar with it will miss his enthusiasm and purposefulness. M. I. Savliuk draws attention to the originality of Tuhan-Baranovsky's monetary theory, neither gold-based nor completely fiat-money, but determined by the business cycle. This theory is now accepted in many countries of the world. In their chapter V. M. Hrynova and O. Ie. Popov convincingly argue that certain strands of modern

institutionalism theory (e.g., Ronald Coase, John R. Commons, John Kenneth Galbraith) can already be found in Tuhan-Baranovsky's work.

The chapters in part 3 are good in their own right and are distinguished by the fact that their main topics are only loosely linked to Tuhan-Baranovsky. B. V. Burkynsky and D. A. Isachenko's essay on the economic development of Great Britain and its maritime fleet is a good example of such an approach. Another example is the discussion of the development of the dynamic approach in economics by L. V. Prodanova, who devotes only about one of twenty-two pages to Tuhan-Baranovsky's views.

Even a superficial glance at the volume's titles suggests that there is an emphasis on certain aspects of Tuhan-Baranovsky's economic theories (including Marxism), business-cycle analysis, monetary economics, and history of economic thought. But his scholarly interests were much broader, ranging from the theory of socialism and utopian socialism to income distribution, economic history, and the problem of co-operatives, topics that do not receive sufficient attention in this book. M. I. Zveriakov, M. O. Uperenko, and V. H. Hrynchuk do deal with them here and there, Separate analyses of these topics would have been preferable, however, and this reviewer hopes the DSCUEC will include such essays in a future volume on Tuhan-Baranovsky's legacy.

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Jerzy Borzęcki. *The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of Interwar Europe.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. xv, 401 pp. U.S.$55.

Until recently the Riga Treaty has not received the attention it deserves. Even at the time it was negotiated it attracted surprisingly little notice in both the Western press and foreign ministries of the Western powers. Perhaps this neglect derived from the fact that negotiations were long, complex, and, except for a few dramatic moments, largely tedious. Subsequently research proved difficult because the Soviet authorities blocked the access of scholars to their documents on the treaty, and the Polish documents, although accessible, were widely scattered around the world. Jerzy Borzęcki has now gained access and carefully examined many of the key collections and produced an impressive book that fills an important gap in English-language historiography. His book makes a significant contribution not only to Polish, Soviet, and international history, but also to that of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states. It breaks new ground and raises important questions.

One of the key issues that Borzęcki raises is the significance of the Riga Treaty. Although a certain degree of "boosterism" for a neglected subject might be considered necessary, it can be taken too far and undermine a book's credibility. The grandiose title of Borzęcki book, implying that the treaty created inter-

war Europe, reaches for more than can be grasped. Can it be plausibly argued that the Riga Treaty is "the most important Eastern European Treaty of the interwar period" (p. xiii) when compared to other agreements such as the Nazi-Soviet Pact? The fact that nearly all of the treaty's twenty-three articles were not actually implemented as ratified must detract from its significance. Even more implausible is the contention that the Riga Treaty brought stability to the region. The borders between Poland and Soviet Belarus or Soviet Ukraine were among the most turbulent in Europe, with continual raids, infiltration, and smuggling taking place on a grand scale in the 1920s. At the time that the treaty was signed, both Lenin and Piłsudski believed that it provided only a temporary respite before future conflict between their states. Any long-term stabilization seems to owe less to the treaty's merits than to a shift in priorities to internal reconstruction and consolidation in both Poland and the Soviet Union.

Another important issue pertains to the nature of the agreement. The author writes: "The main argument is that the Riga Treaty was concluded on the basis of a compromise" (p. 2). If this statement means to draw attention to the fact that the treaty was no "*diktat*" or "victor's peace" like the treaties of Brest-Litovsk or Versailles, then Borzęcki has made a valid point. However, the concept of compromise is not merely "picayune" (as the author admits), but also vague and slippery. According to the account given in the book, the Poles and Soviets did not "compromise" to the same degree: the Poles invariably backed down from their initial proposals much more than the Soviets. In some of the best cases, Poland, by its own calculation, got roughly a third of the rolling stock and a tenth of the archives and manuscripts it initially demanded. In the worst cases, like the return of gold taken from Poland or religious toleration for Catholics, it obtained virtually nothing. Soviet Georgia even refused to recognize the treaty and repatriate any Poles living there. What ultimately decided the shape of the treaty was not any sense of compromise or fair play, but the changing calculus of power. Poland's humiliation at the Spa Conference of 1920, the Polish victories at Warsaw and the Niemen, the Red Army's victory over Wrangel, the Kronstadt Mutiny, and Poland's alliances with France and Romania played the significant role in the seesaw balance of power in the negotiations. Ultimately the Soviets increasingly improved their bargaining power in this balance, and this allowed them to exert more pressure on the Poles.

The issue of Polish federalism is central to the argument Borzęcki presents. He writes: "The crux of the Riga compromise lay in the exchange of Polish renunciation of federalism for Soviet territorial concessions" (p. 275). This statement contains a slight distortion. While it is true that the Poles gave up plans for federation with Belarus and Ukraine, they did not give up the intention of federating with Lithuania. In fact Poland increased the pressure for federation with Lithuania, culminating in the (failed) Hymans Plan later in 1921. In the Riga negotiations, Poland wanted to secure Russia's disinterest in any future settlement between Poland and Lithuania. Poland similarly exchanged Soviet dominance in Ukraine for Polish dominance in Eastern Galicia, and in Poland swal-

lowed as much Belarusian territory as it could without choking on an excess of minorities. The Soviet agreement to abstain from interfering in Polish-Lithuanian relations was honored as little as was Poland's agreement not to interfere in the affairs of Soviet Belarus and Ukraine. Military, transportation, and ethnic considerations undoubtedly played a more significant role in determining frontiers than did the abandonment of federalism.

In dealing specifically with Ukraine, the author skims over some of the specific issues the Riga Treaty raised, particularly with respect to Polish-Ukrainian relations. The reason why Poland agreed to a separate representation for Ukraine in the peace talks was not an abdication of Polish interest in Ukrainian independence, but a strategy that would encourage Ukrainian independence especially in the hope of an imminent collapse of the Soviet system. In the subcommittees negotiating the treaty, the Polish representatives tried to get both Soviet delegations to specify the differences between Soviet Russian and Soviet Ukrainian citizenship in order to drive a wedge between them. As part of the same strategy, Piłsudski and the Polish military faction proved extremely reluctant to break the Poland's alliance with Petliura because it might prove useful in securing Ukrainian independence in the future. The Polish Foreign Ministry also established consulates in Kyiv and Kharkiv to keep a close eye on developments in Soviet Ukraine and even acted in the 1920s as though Ukraine had a greater degree of autonomy from Soviet Russia than actually existed.

Most of the keen observations and interpretations presented in this book are fair-minded, stimulating, and occasionally provocative. Borzęcki's thorough mining of the archives and careful analysis and interpretation of documents yield much useful information (particularly on the Soviet side.) As he shows, the absence of trust on both sides frequently derailed the negotiations, but it also hindered a satisfactory agreement. The argument that the chief Soviet negotiator, Adolf Ioffe, proved to be a more seasoned and capable diplomat than the chief Polish representative, Jan Dąbski, seems to be borne out by the evidence. But the larger claim that the Soviets were more "clever and skillful" (p. 274) in their diplomacy is questionable, if one considers the suspicion and alarm that Soviet behavior during the negotiations aroused in several of the Soviet Union's western neighbors. As an official in the British Foreign Ministry minuted, "All this information from Riga demonstrates the impossibility of dealing with the Soviet Union or its representatives." The Riga Treaty may not be as important and yet even more complicated than Borzęcki's book shows. Nonetheless historians owe him a debt of thanks for providing the most important and sophisticated book about this necessary, if ultimately unsatisfactory, peace treaty.

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Yurii Mytsyk, ed. *Ukrainskyi holokost, 1932–1933: Svidchennia tykh, khto vyzhyv*. Vol. 5. Kyiv: Vydavnychyi dim "Kyievo-Mohylianska akademiia," 2008. 322 pp.

For the last twenty years, that is, since the late 1980s, inside and outside Ukraine there has been a steady stream of publications on the Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33. In fact, the amount of information has been overwhelming. The collapse of the Soviet Union freed people from the fear of speaking out. This unleashed the publication of reminiscences, recollections, and a host of formerly secret official documents. The study of the Holodomor has advanced a great deal as a result.

Needless to say, long before 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved and Ukraine became independent, the study of the Holodomor, including the collection of testimonies, was carried out outside Ukraine. Volume five of the present series, "The Ukrainian Holocaust, 1932–1933," includes many of those testimonies collected outside Ukraine. These include accounts by some notable people: the German consul in Kyiv Andor Hencke, his wife, his son, and another German diplomat, Hans von Herwarth, as well as those well known to students of Ukraine, such as Petro Hryhorenko, Lev Kopelev, Hryhorii Kostiuk, Ivan Maistrenko, Malcolm Muggeridge, and Ivan Demianiuk, the man mistaken for "Ivan the Terrible" at the Treblinka concentration camp. The volume also includes some documents from the personal archive of one of the pioneers of Holodomor studies in the West, the late James Mace.

The testimonies included here, like so many others published elsewhere, are harrowing stories: death after death, over and over. In this sense, this book offers nothing particularly new, except for details.

What new insights about the famine, then, does this collection provide? Muggeridge's testimony is of great interest. As is well known, he witnessed the Great Famine and wrote about it in the West, whereas his fellow journalist, Walter Duranty of the *New York Times*, kept silent about it and even disputed its existence. In a 1982 interview published here, Muggeridge explicitly stated that Duranty was not merely "the biggest liar" among the journalists in Moscow at the time, but probably "the biggest liar" of all the journalists he had met in his fifty-year career. Duranty, according to Muggeridge, simply sold his soul to gain privileged access to the Kremlin. This, Muggeridge notes, did not bother *The New York Times* (p. 92). Muggeridge also repeated the story told by his fellow foreign correspondent Ralph Barnes, who had succeeded in interviewing a Soviet secret policeman. This agent laughingly answered his question about why the GPU had arrested innocent people thus: "Of course, we arrest innocent people, because only when we do this do other people become afraid. When you simply arrest people who have committed this or that crime, other people will think, 'All right, if I don't commit this or that crime, I'll be safe.' But if you feel that anyone at any time may become a victim of accusation, then you'll truly have a

well-made sense of social discipline." Muggeridge concluded that the Soviet system was based on fear (pp. 88–89).

Many testimonies give some food for thought about the political nature of the Holodomor. In 1933 many Ukrainians ended up fleeing the famine in Ukraine and seeking a livelihood in Moscow. When the internal-passport system was introduced, they were not employed. Numerous Ukrainians were given some bread and deported back to Ukraine (pp. 30, 160). Various testimonies suggest that some villages survived much better than others. Why? Did ethnic German, Bulgarian, Greek, and other minorities fare better than ethnic Ukrainians? According to one testimony from Zaporizhzhia, like Ukrainians, few of them survived the devastating famine (p. 282). As is often suggested, among the officials and activists who took grain from the Ukrainian peasants there were also Ukrainians (p. 147). Lev Kopelev was a Ukrainian Communist "true believer" of Jewish origin. He mercilessly took grain from the hungry peasants, firmly convinced that he was performing his revolutionary duty. Subsequently he became a noted dissident. In a 1981 interview published in this book, Kopelev frankly admitted that he was one of the "criminals" responsible for the Holodomor. However, he does not believe that that famine was planned by Moscow. He contends that there famine caused general panic from the bottom of Soviet society the top, including in Stalin (p. 76).

Like the previous volumes in this series, this collection is deeply moving. Although it does not allow readers to answer important questions regarding the Holodomor (its causes, for instance), it gives us much food for thought. Therefore I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Great Famine of 1932–33 and in Soviet history in general.

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Omer Bartov. *Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine.* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007. xvii, 232 pp. U.S.$26.95.

Prof. Bartov's newest book explores the Holocaust and the disappearing memory of a Jewish presence in Western Ukraine, especially in towns where Jews were the predominant group before the Second World War. His account raises a number of controversial issues: the construction in today's Ukraine of a narrative of national suffering that memorializes the tragic experience of the Second World War without giving adequate space to the Holocaust; the complicity of Ukrainians in the wave of Jewish killings in Galician towns that followed the German invasion in 1941; and the fact that some OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) members hunted down and killed Jews.

The author assumes the role of a traveling reporter as he describes decayed synagogues and cemeteries, faded shop signs, and the gradual disappearance of

physical reminders of a once vibrant Jewish community. The Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies and the Judaica Institute in Kyiv conduct similar work and have already added many Jewish "sites" (both literally and metaphorically—in the sense of emphasizing historically significant moments) to the cognitive map of Ukrainians. Bartov pursues this goal of raising awareness of the Jewish presence in Ukraine. The ethical imperative driving his book is the need to honor victims of the Holocaust adequately, and its travelogue style aims to reach the broadest possible audience with an often discomforting perspective that many readers would rather ignore. Bartov's presentation is provocative and polemical, and his tone is accusatory. However, as a commentary on Ukrainian-Jewish relations, the book fails to construct a satisfying intellectual framework from which to survey and explain twentieth-century history in a part of the world where war followed war, tragedy was piled up upon tragedy, and one population after another was driven out. Bartov's chief complaint is that the new "nationalist" narrative in contemporary Ukraine simplifies the past, but his own narrative also has its glaring omissions and distortions.

Although he challenges Ukrainians to include the Jewish story in their collective history, he himself plays up some stereotypical and reductionist views. Like many other accounts of Ukrainian life, his book pays little attention to the struggle for statehood or to the fact that both the history of anti-Semitism and philo-Semitism need recovering. For example, Bartov describes the Western Ukrainian People's Republic of 1918–19 dismissively as an "ephemeral republic." Its government was first allied to and then fused with the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) that declared independence in Kyiv and was supported by almost the entire population of Ukraine, including most Jews. The UNR immediately granted wider national-cultural autonomy to Jews than any state had done until that time—a policy that was greeted with widespread enthusiasm. This move was the product of a rapprochement of Jewish and Ukrainian intellectuals that had developed over the course of the long struggle for civil rights under tsarism. The UNR's existence was cut short by three invasions by the Red Army, whose troops were largely an invasionary force sent in from Russia. The country was conquered and the anarchy that followed led to a terrible wave of pogroms that badly damaged Ukrainian-Jewish relations. It is worth mentioning, however, that the disciplined troops of the Sich Riflemen, who had been recruited from Western Ukrainians and formed the core of the UNR army, prevented pogroms against Jews on whatever territory they controlled. Jewish volunteers, in fact, served in the army. The revolutionary generation was aware of this philo-Semitic tradition. When officers of the defeated UNR army created the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) in 1929, many knew of this philo-Semitic history and hoped for future support from the Jewish population. Anti-Semitic currents within the OUN developed gradually and became particularly evident in the late 1930s.Statements that some of its leaders made in 1941 no doubt contributed to the fanning of anti-Jewish hatred and may have encouraged some people to begin killing Jews in the early weeks of the German inva-

sion of the USSR. However, it is a mistake to collapse all "nationalists" (including those who opposed the OUN), all OUN members, and all members of the UPA (which began operations in 1943) into one entity and, in this way, to suggest they were all implicated in atrocities. The situation in 1929 differed from that in 1939–41, when Stalin was Hitler's ally, and the years of the German-Soviet war differed from the postwar years. UPA resistance continued until the early 1950s, while the Soviet occupational regime conducted a policy of collectivization, mass arrests, and deportations. The insurgents had their own command structure, and the writings of their two leading ideologists, Petro Poltava and Osyp Hornovy, contain nothing anti-Semitic. They employ the rhetoric of anticolonial national-liberation struggles—one that is now familiar around the globe.

By taking a broad brush to his denunciation of the OUN and the UPA, which he continually links—as Soviet propagandists did for over forty years—and by invariably defining both organizations as Jew-killers, Bartov raises the obvious objections. Does he feel that the Ukrainian struggle for independence was a mistake? If not, then how does he think it should have been conducted? The young men in Western Ukrainian towns and villages were often faced with a set of impossible choices. Should they have joined the Soviets, who considered them all "Banderites" (a term that in Soviet parlance is construed to mean war criminals) and sometimes drove them in the front line against resistance fighters in the hills and woods? Should they have practiced various forms of co-operation or collaboration with Germans? Should they, perhaps, have volunteered for transportation to work as slave laborers in German factories and farms? Or should they have gone into the woods and fought both Nazi and Soviet troops? As wave after wave of violence washed over the country, all choices proved fatal. In many families all males were killed.

Bartov's brief excursions into more distant Ukrainian history are revealing. He appears to deny the legitimacy of the drive for independence not only in the 1940s, but also over the previous centuries, diminishing, even disparaging, the national dimension in Ukraine's history. He uses only the term "nationalist," never "national." As he looks into the past, he describes Symon Petliura's forces in 1919–20 as having "robbed and raped" and their leader as being "remembered for pogroms." Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the leader of the 1648 revolution, is recalled as "the scourge of the Jews" (although on one occasion he is also characterized as "the uniter" of Ukraine). Ivan Mazepa, Ukraine's leader at the time of the 1709 revolt against Peter I, is noted as the leader of a "briefly independent Ukraine." Bartov seems unaware that vestiges of Ukrainian autonomy were still being curtailed late in the eighteenth century. The choice of bibliographical references reveals a similar bias. The inclusion, alongside Henry Abramson's fine scholarly monograph on the 1919 pogroms, of Saul S. Friedman's hysterical and appallingly unbalanced *Pogromchik: The Assassination of Simon Petlura* (1976)—which Bartov describes simply as "a more accusatory view" of Petliu-

ra—only serves to discredit the author's credentials as a commentator on Ukrainian history.

The history of both Galicia and Ukraine in general is constructed according to some tropes of which the author may not be aware. For him the country is a "borderland," the "periphery of Europe." There the people lack historical memory, and their freedom-fighters—it is repeatedly suggested—can really only be described as perpetrators. These tropes play into a long tradition in Russian, Polish, and Soviet history of denigrating the Ukrainians' national aspirations. It is interesting that Henryk Sienkiewicz's *With Fire and Sword* (1888) is included in the bibliography under the rubric of "Polish Romantic Literature." This novel presents Ukraine at the time of the 1648 revolt led by Khmelnytsky as an anarchic borderland inhabited by a half-civilized people, who are mobilized by a drunken, violent leader. Its message is that the country needs the civilizing hand of Poland, which must act with ruthless violence to suppress revolution. This novel was made compulsory reading in Galician schools under interwar Polish rule, and Ukrainian students were forced to imbibe its colonialist attitude at the same time as the increasingly authoritarian Polish state was beating Ukrainian villagers (the policy known as "Pacification") and imprisoning activists. Sienkiewicz's book predictably gave rise to an anticolonial reaction, of which the OUN's formation was a part. If the bibliography in Bartov's book is the only image of Ukrainian history on offer, the reader must inevitably ask whether violence and irrational nationalism are the nation's only claim to fame. There is no rubric there for Ukrainian literature, art, or culture. The reader might therefore wonder whether Ukrainians have a literature of their own, or whether their own self-imaging can be dismissed as not worth knowing.

In 2006 the Metropolitan Opera in New York put on a performance of Tchaikovsky's *Mazeppa* by the visiting Kirov Opera from St. Petersburg. Although in the libretto the hetman of Ukraine makes a number of patriotic speeches, the production was staged in such as way as to demonize this figure, as Russian culture has always done (Mazepa is still anathematized every year in the Russian Orthodox Church and seen by Russians as a heretic, a traitor, and even a war criminal because of his revolt of 1709). As the curtain rose over a picture of Ukraine under Mazepa's rule, viewers were astonished to see in the background an enormous photograph of the railway tracks leading to Auschwitz. Some viewers might have been momentarily puzzled by this anachronism, but they would immediately have grasped the point: "Ah, yes: Ukraine, independence, pogroms, war criminals, Auschwitz …" The trope is so established that at times no one appears to question its relationship to reality. The fact that Russians see Ukrainian independence today in this light, and that Russian high culture broadcasts such a view, appears also to be accepted without any questioning of how this imagery is constructed, or why. Unfortunately, Bartov's book seems unaware of the political context that governs the reproduction of this trope, and he does nothing to distance itself from this kind of cultural stereotyping and historical simplification.

The book's main drawback is this insensitivity to the way the Ukrainian Other is constructed through tropes, language, and metaphor. On the other hand, Bartov is extraordinarily sensitive and defensive on the issue of Jewish complicity in Soviet rule. Only a "small handful" of Jews, he writes, were in positions of power and authority. Jewish collaboration with communism is described as a "myth." One can perhaps agree if Bartov is speaking of 1941. Nazi propaganda heavily exploited that "myth" at the time in order to stimulate anti-Semitism. In the USSR the number of Jews in positions of power had been declining steadily throughout the 1930s, and their participation in the organs of repression during the German-Soviet war was not significantly greater than their percentage in the population. However, the stereotype of the Jewish Bolshevik dates back to the revolutionary years of 1918–20. It was formed then and resuscitated in the 1930s and whenever anti-Semites found it useful. But already in 1919 Moisei Ravich-Cherkassky, a Bundist leader who went over to the Bolsheviks, claimed that Right-Bank Ukraine (west of the Dnipro) would never have been conquered by the Red Army without local Jewish support. As many scholars, including Jewish academics, have pointed out, the Cheka and other repressive organs of Soviet power in Ukraine were full of Jews in 1919 and the early 1920s, constituting, according to some calculations, as much as fifty percent of the Cheka leadership. They were the second-largest group, after Russians, in the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. Ukrainians were the third-largest group in the Party until the latter half of the 1920s. This is the original reality that gave birth to the "myth." As Ukrainians who were nationally conscious (or democrats, or anti-Bolsheviks—Soviet propaganda always lumped them together as "nationalists") left or were driven out of Kyiv, their place was taken by the displaced Jewish population. In 1921 Jews constituted almost one-third of Kyiv's population, a fact that many interpreted as evidence that Jews had been the primary beneficiaries of the defeated independent state. This aspect of history needs some explanation, for otherwise the blanket dismissal of the "myth" by Bartov (and other commentators) looks like avoidance of a sensitive and uncomfortable issue.

My main point has to do with how the author's desired conceptual, ethical, and political goals—with which I am largely in agreement—might best be achieved. The way to deal with the Holocaust and the tragedies of all the "local" people, in my view, is to tell the full story and recognize the suffering of all. In this way one opens up space for a discussion of perpetrators and victims that does not a priori rule out the more complex story that people could be both. Resistance to telling the narrative of the Holocaust is, as Bartov suggests, in some cases partly based on a lingering, or perhaps unconscious, sense of guilt. And the telling of this narrative is partly also blocked by the circulation of new nationalist narratives. One can agree that locally these nationalist narratives have sometimes assumed outrageous, anti-Semitic forms. But these are not the only reasons for a resistance to telling the story of the Holocaust. Ukrainians are today also focused on the legitimate need to tell their own story. They, too, have a long story of victimhood and suffering—one they have long been denied the

right to tell. Even now they have to listen to politicians, journalists, and cultural figures who deny or demean their language, history, culture, and identity. Their narrative of suffering has rarely figured in international consciousness—in films, novels, high, or popular culture. Like every national narrative, it demands discussion, negotiation, construction, and reconstruction with a view to countering dominant anti-Ukrainian tropes.

Literature provides examples in which the Ukrainian narrative of victimhood and suffering has been combined or interwoven with the Jewish. This is not to suggest that one narrative should eclipse or diminish the other, but to acknowledge that both need telling and that the tellers need to demonstrate an awareness of both. A long string of horrors and atrocities associated with the Revolution of 1917 and the wars that followed, the terror of the 1930s, the famines—especially the terrible Holodomor of 1932–33—two world wars, and Soviet rule in general are only now being revealed. They partially "compete" for attention with the Holocaust largely because these long suppressed tragedies have, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, all become available simultaneously. Their telling need not be treated as a mutually exclusive exercise. By allowing the story of Ukrainian suffering to be told, one in fact makes the narration of Jewish suffering easier (including the story of the complicity of some Ukrainians in the Holocaust). The recognition of all sufferings allows one to respond with unreserved sympathy and understanding to the question: "What about us?" This approach is in fact the one those involved in Holocaust education in Ukraine use. They go one step further by making the point that Ukrainian Jews were, after all, "us," and they insist that all this suffering should be seen as "ours." This is not to suggest the construction of a hierarchy or an equivalence of suffering, nor to deny the specificity of the Jewish genocide, but it is a call to encourage conceptual and ethical frameworks that can activate the values of compassion, fairness, and understanding—the bedrock of Ukrainian culture and of the wider Judaeo-Christian tradition.

The positive side of Ukrainian-Jewish relations has also been lost. The history of philo-Semitism and the Jewish contribution to Ukrainian culture and life need to be better known. "They" often were "us" in the sense that many Jews identified entirely with Ukraine or became "assimilated" into Ukrainian life. This fact is important to note, because it undercuts the rigid separation of the two peoples—an approach fundamental to most anti-Semitic viewpoints, including Dmytro Dontsov's conception of nationalism (which was, of course, never accepted by all nationalists and was challenged even within the OUN). Accepting this point does not "erase" Jewish identity or negate the specificity of Jewish suffering. One could make the case that in fact it is this Jewish-Ukrainian identity that has been thoroughly "erased" from history over the last half-century.

Bartov raises some specific problems, such as property renewal and maintenance. But he does not pursue them. There is no discussion of who owns the property, how transfers can or might be made, who can reasonably be expected to take care of buildings and sites, and how the money could be raised to pay for

their upkeep and development. It would be useful to know how similar problems have been handled in other regions and jurisdictions, and what a successful resolution to some of the situations might look like. From the information presented, it appears that the responsibility for erecting monuments to the past and for restoring buildings is primarily municipal. A great number of monuments of various forms have already gone up since 1991, as the book indicates. Much has already been done in sensitizing the public to related issues. Scholarly and popular books have been published, and conferences and exhibitions have taken place throughout Ukraine, sometimes organized with the participation of the Judaica Institute or the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies. This kind of work is a broad-based effort by scholars, curators, and prominent political and cultural figures to remedy past neglect. These initiatives, which are led by respected and prominent figures in the country's cultural centers, need amplifying, and then— crucially—transferring to the local level, where they can marginalize expressions of narrow-mindedness and prejudice. There is much support for this kind of effort among contemporary authors like Yurii Andrukhovych, Maryna Hrymych, and Volodymyr Yeshkiliev, who represent Ukrainian culture as reflecting diverse histories and traditions, including the Jewish. A narrow-minded politicization of history can be effectively challenged by using the frameworks that these writers sympathetic to multiculturalism elaborate. Their work represents a change from within that has already rebuilt the cultural landscape. It is one of the strongest indicators of a groundswell of opinion sympathetic to the achievement of goals that Bartov outlines. Change, in any case, will have to come from within, and the agents of change will be those individuals who are shaping this discourse of diversity.

Almost all of this knowledge lies outside Bartov's understanding. Instead, he directs the reader's attention to the poor English of inscriptions on monuments and in brochures, to the omission of Bruno Schultz's house from a Drohobych city map, or to the surly behavior of librarians and attendants. It is on the basis of these subjective impressions that Bartov constructs a case concerning the deliberate and sometimes cynical removal of Jews from historical memory.

One of the most revealing sections of the book is the introduction, in which the author sees himself as an intellectual explorer traveling into the "white spaces on the map" to the "black hole that has sucked in entire civilizations," and compares himself to an explorer in a colonial "heart of darkness." After such an inauspicious opening (which echoes all the tropes of the colonial conqueror who finds himself among uncivilized, warring tribes that are unaware of their own history) the reader learns with some relief that Bartov has spent years studying modern German history, in particular the Third Reich, during which time he has become dissatisfied with accounts of how Jews died and now sees the need to also reconstruct the way they lived. His recent interest in this part of the world has drawn him to the realization that "one would not be able to understand the manner in which events unfolded in these towns during the German occupation without tracing back the lives, cultures, coexistence, and conflicts of the different communities that popu-

lated this region for many centuries." Bartov states he is presently writing a history of the town of Butch, tracing its existence from the fourteenth century to "its demise as a multiethnic community during and in the wake of World War II" (p. xv). He asserts his wish to recover the history of the Holocaust in this part of the world and not to let it be "cast away or rewritten in a manner that will serve the goals of those who have inherited the land" (p. xvii). The reader must hope that it is the careful historian who will accomplish this task, and that the persona of the civilizing explorer can be shaken off in the process.

Bartov's book is useful in the way it maps some sites of Jewish history that require urgent attention. Unfortunately the author's superficial and poorly conceived digressions into the region's history and his blindness to contexts diminish the value of *Erased* as an explanatory text.

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Glenna Roberts and Serge Cipko. *One-Way Ticket: The Soviet Return-to-the-Homeland Campaign, 1955–1960*. Manotick Ont.: Penumbra Press, 2008. 208 pp. $24.95.

The Cold War of the 1940s–1990s was characterized by intense propaganda wars between the Eastern and Western blocs. One of the battlefields of this struggle was the competition for the allegiances of ethnic communities, members of which had migrated throughout the globe from national territories eventually incorporated within the Soviet Union.

In *One–Way Ticket* Glenna Roberts and Serge Cipko examine the Soviet Union's Return-to-the-Homeland campaign, launched formally with the establishment of the Committee for the Return to the Homeland in 1955. As early as 1945, through appeals, newspapers, radio broadcasts, diplomatic channels, and congregations abroad of the Russian Orthodox Church's Moscow Patriarchate the Soviet government had been encouraging the return of recent postwar refugees as well as émigrés long removed from their ancestral homeland, regardless of the circumstances or era of their departure. Within Canada the campaign focused on the country's large Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian communities and found some positive resonance therein.

Although these communities had been established in Canada before the rise of the USSR and most of their members could not be thought to be returning to a Soviet homeland they had ever known, it is thought that over five hundred émigrés who came to Canada during the interwar or post-Second World War periods returned to Ukraine, Belarus and Russia between 1955 and 1958 as a result of the campaign, taking their Canadian-born children with them.

The book being considered here, which deals with these events, was inspired by the first-hand encounters of Peter Roberts, third secretary at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow during the years 1957–59, with Ukrainian-Canadian expa-

triates in the USSR who were desperate to return to Canada. Through documentary evidence contained within consular records as well as oral histories with returning individuals and families, the authors have presented a compelling study of hope and tragedy.

This is a chronicle of farmers and workers who left their ancestral lands and traversed the globe in search of opportunities to provide for their families. For a variety of reasons these hopes for a better life were dashed to the point that the returnees forsook their standing and achievements within Canada in favor of a new promised land of egalitarian socialism. Unwittingly however, they placed themselves in the embrace of an unrelenting totalitarian regime.

For returning Ukrainians, there was a perhaps a naïve desire to be full participants in the building up of a unified Ukrainian state, the first such incarnation in the modern history of their people. Instead of any such hopeful achievement, what Roberts and Cipko reveal is a gut-wrenching visage of extreme disenchantment among returnees who took the promises of the Return-to-the Homeland Campaign at face value. Having traveled to the USSR, they found the vestiges of their Canadian status at extreme risk and all attempts to reverse their decision thwarted. The authors expose a picture of desperate, at times near-suicidal individuals crushed by the folly of their decision to relocate to Ukraine. That such a tragic denouement should come to happen within two decades of the genocidal Holodomor and total war of terror against the Ukrainian people speaks to the ultimate and astoundingly cynical effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. Apparently none of these events figured in the considerations of those returning during the 1950s.

This study underscores the precarious circumstances of citizenship status that the returnees faced. They found themselves in a limbo, depending on their prior status in Canada, and whether or not they had surrendered documents to authorities upon entry to the USSR. Naturalized Canadian citizens who accepted Soviet citizenship ceased to be Canadian citizens through a "voluntary and formal" act and were faced by skeptical Canadian bureaucrats who weighed the political views of returnees in determining whether or not to champion their cause: "… they support the Communist point of view on many issues…. Our moral obligation to them is very small indeed. On the other hand, they are probably still Canadian citizens, because their acceptance of Soviet citizenship was not a voluntary act, but was forced upon them by the threat of hardship and want" (p. 129). In their own words, Canadian officials did what they could "to discourage them without being unnecessarily cruel" and refused to convey letters back to family in Canada by way of diplomatic bags, in spite of evidence that such correspondence was otherwise being screened (p. 136). In 1972, when Canadian-born Jim Lenko and Nadia Demidenko went on a hunger strike at the Canadian embassy in Moscow to advance their struggle to return to Canada, the Canadian chargé d'affaires tried to force them out of the embassy and generally did everything he could to discourage them in their fight. This somewhat indifferent, if not hostile, Canadian government and diplomatic corps demonstrated ironically that the Soviet government made it

much easier for Ukrainians to return to the Soviet Union than the Canadian government did for them to return to Canada.

The returnees' oral histories present many fascinating personal stories. Returnee George Moskal became heavily involved with the *Soviet Ukrainian Encyclopedia* publishing effort and the Association for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Living Abroad. Nadia Golik Demidenko and Jim Lenko both developed careers at Radio Kyiv. In 1968 Canadian-born Bill Golik was a Red Army tank commander on the eve of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In order to extricate himself from this untenable situation, he committed insubordination against a senior officer. He would later live in the far eastern Soviet territories along the Chinese frontier in an area inhabited almost exclusively by ethnic Ukrainians.

Roberts and Cipko's study would have benefited from an expanded discussion of the contextual issues of economic exploitation and wartime internment within Canada as possible factors encouraging emigration to Soviet Ukraine. As well, the authors might have expanded upon earlier return-to-the-homeland movements. The phenomenon of the 1940s and 1950s was not the first time that Ukrainians in Canada moved back to their ancestral lands. In the 1920s there was some movement to the newly established Ukrainian SSR by individuals and entire families who accepted at face value the Ukrainianization that characterized much of the republic's first decade. During the interwar period there was also a significant flow of Ukrainians in both directions between Canada and the western Ukrainian territories incorporated within the Polish Republic.

Roberts and Cipko offer a welcome and overdue examination of an intriguing episode in Ukrainian-Canadian history, when hundreds committed themselves to building of a Ukrainian state from within rather than from afar. Perhaps the ultimate emergence of Ukraine in 1991 as a new and independent state on the European stage vindicated their original decision to return to their homeland.

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V. M. Kabuzan. *Ukraintsy v mire: Dinamika chislennosti i rasseleniia. 20–e gody XVIII veka – 1989 god: Formirovanie etnicheskikh i politicheskikh granits ukrainskogo etnosa.* Moscow: Nauka, 2006. 664 pp., 81 tables, name index.

This book presents a sweeping analysis of the Ukrainian population from the early eighteenth century until 1989, and in part until 2001. Using all the available data collected in government surveys and church registers, Vladimir Maksimovich Kabuzan demonstrates how the Ukrainian population grew over time, when it migrated to expand its contiguous territory or to establish its distant settlements, or lost ground to other nationalities in the process of assimilation.

Kabuzan is a specialist in population statistics on nationalities as identified and compiled in published sources and unpublished compendia in the Russian archives. As a senior scholar of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, renamed in 1992 the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, he has researched and mined this detailed data to produce many scholarly articles and some seventeen monographs. The book under review, focusing on the Ukrainians, is the most recent of his monographs.

This book comprises ten chapters of text, including an introduction and a conclusion. Each chapter has endnotes, while the supporting tables are appended after the conclusion. While such an arrangement reduces the number pages, the reader is inconvenienced by having to flip frequently between text, the tables, and the notes.

The introduction sets the stage with a brief definition of the Ukrainians, their origin in place and time, the states that came to incorporate their lands, the emergence of present-day Ukraine, the lack of correspondence between its political and ethnic boundaries, the international border claims resulting from these inconsistencies, and the need to resolve simmering tensions between Russia and Ukraine. It provides a short outline of the political history of Ukrainian lands, from the Rus' principalities, through the annexations of Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and the Habsburg Empire in the west and the Russian Empire in the east, to interwar configurations, the post-Second World War changes, and the post-Soviet states. Moreover, it offers an overview of the implications of these political-territorial changes and policies of the elites on the Ukrainians and their population dynamics.

Chapter 1 provides a thorough review of the literature and sources. Kabuzan's review is not internationally comprehensive, however: and it lacks a discussion of Western authors on the subject and fails to review Ukrainian émigré scholars' studies of changes in the Ukrainian population and particularly of its diaspora populations. The only exception is a reference to Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan's *Creating a Landscape: A Geography of Ukrainians in Canada* (University of Toronto Press, 1989), a book this reviewer presented to Kabuzan in Moscow in 1990. This chapter also gives a detailed outline of the administrative structure of the territories of each of the states where Ukrainians lived as they changed over time. Unfortunately the text is not supplemented by maps, so the reader needs detailed historical administrative maps to visualize the locations and outlines of the administrative units named.

Chapter 2 describes the state and changes in the Ukrainian population in the Russian Empire from the 1720s to the 1760s. Kabuzan uses the archival data of all the population enumerations (*revizii*), including the first (1718–27), second (1743–47), and third (1761–67). Because the Russian population enumerations also identify ethnicity, they were particularly useful. Employing these and other data for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Austrian and Ottoman empires, Kabuzan establishes that within the borders of the Russian Empire in the mid-eighteenth century there resided, respectively, 35, 37, and 41 percent of

all Ukrainians in the world. He also demonstrates that within the broader borders of the Russian Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, there resided in the same enumeration periods 77, 79 and 80 percent of all Ukrainians in the world. This is followed by a detailed description of the distribution and changes in the distribution of Ukrainians by administrative regions in the Russian Empire. The distribution of Ukrainians beyond that Empire and their concentration in different regions is briefly noted.

Chapter 3 reports the state and dynamics of the Ukrainian population in the Russian and Austrian empires in the 1760s to 1790s. For the Russian Empire, Kabuzan uses the archival data of the fourth (1781–82) and fifth (1794–95) population enumerations and many other sources to establish the populations of various nationalities elsewhere. His analysis focuses on the continuation of the settlement of the Ukrainians, along with other nationalities, in the New Russia region of southern Ukraine, the Slobidska Ukraine region of eastern Ukraine (including the southern part of the Central Black Earth region), the Lower Volga region, and the beginning of the settlement of Ukrainians in the North Caucasus region. Details on the changing mix of peoples and explanations for their movement are provided for all the regions. The distribution of Ukrainians throughout their ancestral lands in the Austrian Empire is offered in general terms.

Chapter 4 is much longer and richer in detail. Divided into three constituent parts, it assesses the changes in Ukrainian population in the Russian and Austrian empires from 1795 to 1858. The first part reviews population movement and its causes in areas of prevalent Ukrainian population. The second part provides an assessment by regions of population increase in terms of its two components: natural increase (the excess of births over deaths) and mechanical increase (net migration, or the difference between in-migration and out-migration) in each region. The third part supplies a detailed description of the numbers and the diffusion of the Ukrainian population from 1795 to 1858.

Chapter 5 is rich in detail and complex in structure. Divided into four parts and several sub-parts, it addresses changes in the Ukrainian population in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires from 1858 to 1917 and the migration of Ukrainians and their settlement in the New World. The first part assesses the natural increase of population in the Ukrainian lands, by regions, during the periods of 1861–1900 and 1901–16. The second part analyses the mechanical increase (net migration) during the 1859–96 period in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires and the internal and external migrations from there during the 1897–1917 period. The third part details the changes in the Ukrainian population, by regions, in both empires during the years 1858–97, while the fourth part does the same for 1897–1917.

Chapter 6, entitled the "Ukrainian population of the world in the 1920s–1980s," is thinner than the previous two chapters. The first part assesses the natural increase of the population in Soviet Ukraine and the western Ukrainian regions (under Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania) in the 1920s and the 1930s.

Kabuzan identifies tragic population losses in Soviet Ukraine during the years 1918–22 1932–35 (which he calls "Holodomor"), and war-torn 1941–44, but cannot provide details for the lack of demographic data for those crucial years. He also blames post-Soviet politics for Ukraine's disastrous demographic decline after 1991 (pp. 306, 343). The second part describes migration processes in Ukraine from the 1920s to the 1980s in Soviet Ukraine and in the western Ukrainian regions under Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania) in the 1920s and 1930s before their incorporation into Soviet Ukraine. Both internal and international migrations are discussed. The third part describes changes in the numbers, distribution, and ethnic borders of the Ukrainians from the 1920s to the 1980s. The untitled fourth part is an analysis of the inflow of Ukrainians into Russia, their distribution there and in the other republics of the former USSR from the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries, and the process of their assimilation. Kabuzan devotes only one page of this section to a brief sketch of the distribution of Ukrainians in east-central and western Europe and in North America, perhaps reflecting the lack of his access to Western sources. The concluding two pages of this section discuss political implications relating to the post-Soviet changes.

Chapter 7 focuses on the ethnic (mostly assimilative) processes among the Ukrainian population in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. The first part presents an overview of the question; the second part analyses these processes from the end of the eighteenth century until the 1930s in Galicia; the third part, during the same period in Bukovyna; and the fourth part, in Transcarpathia. The fifth part covers the processes in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Ukraine from the eighteenth century until the 1930s, and on the territory of Ukraine from the 1940s until the 1980s. Stages of assimilation, from religious and linguistic to self-declared ethnic identity, are discussed. Kabuzan ends this chapter with a criticism of the discord between the ethnic and political borders between Russia and Ukraine (notably Crimea). To solve this, he proposes holding public referenda in the contested border areas. Moreover, he condemns Ukrainian government policies that oppose granting the Russian language the status of a second official government language and dual citizenship to Russians in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Russia. Current policies, he argues, isolate Ukrainians in Russia and facilitate their accelerated assimilation (pp. 389–390).

Chapter 8 briefly deals with the ethnic minorities in Ukraine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first part sets the scene with an overview of different nationalities and the identification and demographic trends over time among the most numerous ones: Russians, Poles, Jews, and Germans. After referring to his other works regarding the details on Russians, Jews, and Germans in Ukraine, Kabuzan then provides a major second part, in which he makes a detailed and extensive analysis of the growth of Poles in Ukraine, their interaction with the Ukrainians, and their decline. It ends with a comparison of the roles the Poles and the Russians played in the colonization of the Ukrainian lands and their regional variations, the wane of the Polish and growth of the Russian influence, and the

present political implications of Russian ethnic and linguistic prevalence in Crimea and its importance in the east and south of Ukraine.

The conclusion offers a very brief summary of Kabuzan's sources and findings. The latter includes the changing Ukrainian population growth and its factors over time; Ukrainian population migration and occupation of new territories, some of which became part of present Ukraine while others became part of Russia; the assimilation processes and their acceleration in the twentieth century, particularly in areas where Ukrainians were not a majority; the loss of Ukrainian ethnic lands on the western perimeter to the Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Romanians; the dispersion of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire and the USSR, western Europe, and the New World and their assimilation there; the distribution of Ukrainians around the world in 1989; and changes in the Ukrainian (and Russian) population in Ukraine between 1989 and 2001.

Kabuzan's book is a milestone in the study of the historical population geography of Ukraine. His command of Russian archival sources is masterful, and his use of other official sources is credible. The overview he provides is the most comprehensive to date, though it is somewhat lacking in the use of Western sources and literature. However, Kabuzan's desire to achieve concurrence between ethno(graph)ic and political borders by means of referenda is rather idealistic, while his criticism of post-Soviet Ukrainian government policies is not balanced with any criticism of Soviet government policies that forced the Holodomor or of the current Russian government policies promoting Russification.

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Liubomyr Vynar [Lubomyr Wynar]. *Liubomyr Vynar: Biobibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk (1948–2007).* Lviv, Ostroh, New York, and Paris: Ukrainske istorychne tovarystvo, 2007. 575 pp. Illustrated.

Andrew Gregorovich. *Cossack Bibliography: A Selected Bibliography of the Zaporozhian and other Cossacks of Ukraine, the Don Cossacks of Russia and the Kuban Cossacks.* Toronto: Forum, 2008. 371 pp. Illustrations, maps.

Lubomyr Wynar and Andrew Gregorovich of the University of Toronto in Canada are two important figures in the cultural life of the Ukrainian communities in the United States and Canada. The former is well known as a prominent professor (now emeritus) of library science at Kent State University in Ohio and the editor in chief of the journal *Ukrainskyi istoryk* (The Ukrainian Historian); and the latter is equally familiar to many as a former senior librarian at the University of Toronto, a community activist, and the long-time editor of *Forum: A Ukrainian Review*, a popular magazine published by the Ukrainian Fraternal Association. Over the

course of their careers, both men have published numerous bibliographies and made some real contributions to our understanding of Ukrainian history. In addition to his work in library science, Dr. Wynar has written extensively on the Cossack period of Ukrainian history and on the lives and contributions of various Ukrainian historians, especially the doyen of modern Ukrainian historiography, Mykhailo Hrushevsky. In addition to his bibliographic and editorial work, Gregorovich (Hryhorovych) has tirelessly collected and republished various antique maps of Ukraine, thus throwing much light onto our understanding of the historical geography of eastern Europe in early modern times. Both of these authors are conservative in their understanding of Ukrainian history and tend to accept what students of modern nationalism call a traditional, "primordialist" approach to the nation; that is, they both trace Ukrainian national identity and the very concept of "Ukraine" back many centuries rather than emphasizing the nineteenth-and twentieth-century origins of the concept of a Ukrainian nation. Both men unhesitatingly use the name "Ukraine" with regard to premodern eras. such as that of Scythia and Kyivan Rus'. Thus "ancient Ukraine" and "medieval Ukraine," as well as "modern Ukraine," are all part of their conceptualization and vocabulary. This might seem to be at odds with recent theories of nationalism, which stress the importance of "invented traditions" and "imagined communities," but it does put us in touch with more popular feelings about national history and the right of every people to tell its own story.

The first book under review here consists of the personal bibliography of Lubomyr Wynar and lists 2,253 titles by him and another 841 that evaluate or mention his work. These are followed by an alphabetical index of the titles and an index of periodicals mentioned. Wynar's titles are listed in chronological order with subdivisions made according to genre: first, books and titles appearing under separate cover, then journal, magazine, and newspaper articles, and finally reviews. An archive of 111 very clear and attractive photographs illustrating Wynar's career ((mostly in vivid color) follows.

During the early part of his career, Wynar specialized in Cossack history; his many contributions to this field mostly appear in the first half of the bibliography. Afterwards Wynar put more and more of his energies into his work as the editor of *Ukrainskyi istoryk,* and in the second half of the bibliography his work on Hrushevsky and other Ukrainian historians comes to the fore. Throughout the book, however, a great many announcements, reports, and appeals of an organizational nature fill out the list. These may be of no scholarly value, but they do document the history of the Ukrainian Historical Association, which publishes *Ukrainskyi istoryk,* and therefore are not entirely without interest. Although considerably inflated by these announcements, in general the bibliography is very professionally done and, as far as I can tell, contains very few typographical or spelling errors.

Gregorovich's *Cossack Bibliography* is organized quite differently. It contains a general introduction and sections on previous bibliographies, the origin of the word "Cossack," the history of Ukraine, and the history of Russia. But the

major part of the book is a "Bibliography of Cossack Books, Articles, and Maps." The volume lists 1,556 titles. The emphasis is upon titles in English and other western languages, but there are also many important works in Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian. The central focus is Ukrainian Cossack history and life, but consideration is also given to the Don Cossacks and the other Russian Cossack hosts. The Kuban Cossacks, who are descendents of the Ukrainian Zaporozhians, but today live in the Russian Federation and are considerably Russified, occupy a vague position between Ukraine and Russia; this is reflected in Gregorovich's subtitle, which sets them somewhat apart.

One of Gregorovich's main contentions is that Cossack history can be clearly divided into two parallel but different streams: the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and the history of the Russian Cossacks. In compiling the bibliography, he discovered that with regard to literature in English, the Russian Cossacks are more fully treated in books, while the Ukrainian Cossacks are more fully treated in articles, especially scholarly ones. During his lifetime of collecting on this subject, he managed to view many old titles from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and also came upon many obscure titles from more recent times. They not only treat Cossack history, but also deal with Cossack themes in poetry, novels, music, and even fairy tales. Gregorovich lists works in the various Slavic languages and English translation. He also tries to list certain classic Russian titles that have been translated put into Ukrainian, such as Dmytro Yavornytsky's various histories. The book is graced with a large number of interesting, indeed striking, illustrations and a large number of reproductions of antique maps of Ukraine and maps of Eastern Europe on which the name "Ukraine" appears. Gregorovich's observations about these maps and map fragments are quite useful for the contention that Ukraine was a known and generally accepted geographic concept from the sixteenth to just before the nineteenth century. Although it did to some extent disappear during the course of the nineteenth century, when the land was ruled from Saint Petersburg and Vienna, it was reborn in later times not only as a geographical concept, but also as the name of a country with a national tradition of its own. Gregorovich stresses the continuity of this tradition from former times by reproducing some of the many European maps that prominently display the caption or even title "Ukraine, Land of the Cossacks" or "Ukraine, Land of the Old Cossacks." Thus it is no surprise that the Cossack tradition is so very bound up with early modern Ukrainian history and was revived during the Revolution of 1917–21 and again after Ukrainian independence in 1991. (Titles about all three eras are listed in the bibliography.) This general centrality of the Cossacks in Ukrainian history stands in stark contrast to their position at the periphery of Russian history and society, where they always remained a frontier element. Also, the image of the Cossack as the defender of popular liberty in Ukraine is somewhat at variance with his image as the defender of the autocratic tsar and his empire in Russia proper. Nevertheless, the Cossack name and phenomenon is common to both Ukrainians and Russians, and this is reflected in the attention that Gregorovich pays to both of them.

Of course, there are some titles that Gregorovich missed or chose to omit. These include important ones such as the recent Ukrainian translation of Mykola Kostomarov's great multivolume monograph *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* (Dnipropetrovsk, 2004), and lesser ones such as the articles by the author of these lines, "Kozachka: Cossack Women in History and Legend," "Roxolana: Wife of Suleiman the Magnificent," and "Napoleon and Ukraine," published respectively in the bilingual Ukrainian women's magazine *Nashe zhyttia/Our Life* in March 1995, October 1995, and February 1997. All three of these articles deal somewhat with Cossack themes and even today are the most extensive treatments of their subjects in English.

Unfortunately, there are a number of disconcerting spelling and typographical errors in Gregorovich's bibliography even though he tried to catch these as much as possible. To his credit, Gregorovich added a large number of annotations about various titles. Some of them are more useful than others, and many more could have been added with profit, but in general they do much to improve the usefulness of the book. However, because the bibliography's primary audience, the general English-speaking public, is mostly unfamiliar with the Slavic languages, English translations of the Slavic titles could and should have been added in brackets after the original titles, thereby considerably increasing the book's usefulness and helping to make the annotations more focused.

In general, the two bibliographies considered here are a positive addition to the literature on Ukrainian history. Both of them even extend beyond Ukrainian history in some ways. Wynar's bibliography also lists his many contributions to ethnic studies and ethnic bibliography in the United States, while Gregorovich ventures into Russian history with his treatment of the Russian Cossacks. But their real value lies in the Ukrainian realm. Both bibliographies are the summation of their compilers' life work and are well done, attractively bound, and nicely illustrated. These two veterans of Ukrainian scholarship in the West deserve full credit for their accomplishments.

Thomas M. Prymak
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Verena Fritz. *State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007. 384 pp. U.S. $47.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.

This book provides a useful and nicely detailed analysis of the mechanics of state building in the post-communist transformation, which is a fairly unique historical episode. The lessons drawn here are of more than historical interest, however, for the process is far from complete in the post-communist region and, of course, is very relevant in other parts of the globe. The book's first five chapters set up a theoretical framework explaining what makes a state strong or weak, centered on three dimensions: size, governance capacity, and quality (effectiveness of governing). This framework is elaborated for the particular case

of post-communist states given their recent socialist inheritance, their earlier historical experiences, levels of development, geographic location, and presence or lack of certain institutions. In this framework, special attention is given to fiscal institutions and policy-making, which the author then goes on to use as a prism to elucidate the actual process of state building in the four country cases noted in the title. The remaining seven chapters present the case studies, though the largest weight is given to Ukraine, with four chapters compared to one each for the other countries. While this greater emphasis on one country has merit, it might have been more clearly noted in the title. But that's a minor quibble.

What is particularly commendable is Fritz's decision to focus on the development of fiscal institutions, decision-making, and implementation as a prism through which all or most of the theoretical issues of state building can be observed. Attempting to cover all dimensions of state building would have been a tremendous task, and I concur with her rationale that this would risk losing sight of the key driving forces that determined a more or less successful result. On the whole, the fiscal prism also succeeds in revealing the other important dimensions, such as the historical roots of experience, the role of EU membership efforts, and the impediments to good governance emanating from the new capitalist or, better still, "oligarchic" rent-seeking interests.

Fritz's book provides a uniquely deep and detailed account of the mechanics of state building processes; such an account is not often found in the literature, which is more focused on theoretical elegance. While the richness of the actual events is made even greater by devoting one hundred pages to a single country, why Fritz chose to focus on Ukraine is never made clear. Did she simply have a greater knowledge of Ukraine, or was Ukraine perhaps a better example of her theoretical foundation? That said, the reader does obtain a very good understanding of Ukraine, which is enhanced by Fritz's briefer comparisons with the other three states under consideration. She shows well that although after about 1995 Ukraine was moderately successful in building up a solid fiscal base, Lithuania did this much more quickly and effectively under the incentives of joining the EU club. Russia differed from both and imposed strong fiscal discipline under President Putin's more authoritarian regime.

These achievements of the book are solid, but some significant analytical shortcomings must be noted. A presentational problem, which affects readability, is the excessive treatment of the theoretical framework, suggesting the origin of the volume may have been a doctoral dissertation, though this is not explicitly stated. For the political-science specialists in theories of state building, there is no need for a full hundred pages on this subject, and for non-specialists it is of less interest anyway. Chapter five, in which Fritz applies the theory to cross-country comparisons in the post-communist regions of such statistical correlations as political regime and fiscal deficits, level of development, and corruption, is indeed very interesting and relevant as a background to the country studies. But chapters two through four, on theory, could have been collapsed into one chapter with considerable gain in readability.

The book has two important analytical shortcomings. The first is its extremely limited connection to the economic literature on transition. Granted, Fritz does not claim economic expertise and her main goal is to discuss state building, which very much in the political scientist's domain. But just as economists are rightly criticized for paying too little attention to the politics of post-communism, so too one should be critical of political scientists for giving too little attention to the economic processes. No better example of political-economy issues exists than the post-communist transformation. Had the prism been regional differences or minority or language issues, I would not be making this point. But given the author's choice of the prism of fiscal policy, this is surely too much an economic dimension to not give more attention to the many writings on economic transition. A major missing reference is Robert S. Kravchuk's *Ukrainian Politics, Economics and Governance, 1991–1996* (1999), which focuses precisely on fiscal issues.

Too little on the economy part of "political economy" leads to a second short-coming, concerning the role of the new capitalist "oligarchs": Fritz is right to include this group as a force that slows or impedes transparent and open state mechanisms, but wrong to bring them into her model as a completely exogenous factor, as a sort of deus ex machina that drops into the equation, gums up desirable democratization and state-building processes, and diverts them to its personal interests. True, in one place (p. 120) Fritz does discuss how the rent seeking of vested interests led to budget deficits and inflation, but she fails to recognize that the delay in reforms, including cuts of subsidies and raising energy prices, were the major causal factor in the evolution of the oligarchs. While this is a common fault in much of the literature, many other analysts, including Anders Åslund in an article on this subject in *The National Interest* (2003) and this reviewer (2006), have shown that the oligarch class was an endogenous element. It emerged as a result of extensive delays in fiscal stabilization, of too-partial economic reforms, and, in particular, of non-transparent privatization. There is a circular causation model here (on which, see the *Transition Report 2003* of the European Bank For Reconstruction and Development), and Fritz, admittedly like many others, draws only half of that circle. Her approach and cases would have been an ideal context to describe how Lithuania's quicker fiscal building helped minimize the formation of oligarchs there as compared to Ukraine and Russia.

Two types of "minor" faults can be noted: debatable interpretations and copy-editing errors. I will only illustrate a few of each. On p. 60 (and elsewhere) Fritz perpetuates the erroneous notion that the central European and Baltic state s were lucky to be invited to EU membership while other "former Soviet countries have been excluded." The reality is far more complex, as evidenced by the fact that the Baltic states were not on the early 1990s list of those the EU considered as potential members, and it was only their very determined progress on democratization and economic liberalization that embarrassed the EU to allow them in according to the 1995 Association Agreements. As for evidence of the opposite causation, Bulgaria and Romania were on the list in 1992 but were dropped for some time be-

cause of very poor transformation progress. Thus a country's own resolute commitment was at least as important as the EU's friendliness.

On p.116 Fritz explains Ukraine's lagging evolution as resulting from "the lack of unity and direction from the top [which] led to institutional evolution by muddling through." She is being too kind to the simply renamed Communist leadership. As Fritz states elsewhere, there was considerable continuity in the political and economic "elites," and as the referenced economic literature argues, oligarchs came largely from an insider group. That leads to a different and harsher conclusion: the delays and the rationale that "it takes time to build a state" were quite intentional, providing time to ensure the new capitalist order would be headed by members of the previous Communist elites.

Noting that a World Bank survey "suggests that businesses both in Belarus and Uzbekistan find the state to be less of a problem than in many other CIS countries" (p. 101) is far-fetched at best and reveals either lack of critical judgment of statistics or limited knowledge of these two countries: so little real privatization has taken place there that state and business cannot be easily divided from one another. The possible bias of responses to surveys in such autocratic states is also a factor to be mentioned, including in the sentence on p. 258: "Remarkably, in 2004 trust in public institutions was the highest in Belarus among all countries surveyed." The best commentary on this might be sung in the words of the Beatles: "Back in the USSR."

I also found many copy-editing problems. Some are minor: "reigns of government " instead of "reins" (p. 70) can be forgiven; "Paryadok" instead of "Poryadok" (p. 142) is neither fish nor fowl as transliterations go; "Balcans" instead of "Balkans " (p. 17) is rather more annoying. Beyond annoying for an academic work is the confusion between "principal" and "principle': "the second principle route" (p. 33).

Lest the inventory of shortcomings suggest too negative an assessment, let me finish by saying that the work is a very valuable one and makes a relatively unique contribution in giving such an in-depth analysis of state-building problems. I recommend it highly to those interested in post-communist evolution or in the theory and practice of democratization. I will be assigning it as a secondary text in my course on the political economy of transition and nation building.

Oleh Havrylyshyn
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Ivan Katchanovski. *Cleft Countries*: *Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova.* Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2006. 286 pp. €29.90.

This book adopts an innovative comparative perspective, looking at regional divisions in two countries that are rarely considered together—post-Soviet Ukraine and post-Soviet Moldova. The author does a good job synthesizing a great deal of information about the complex and multifaceted political and eco-

nomic histories of these two countries, reaching back into the pre-communist period, through the Soviet era, and into the present. Katchanovski also places the two case studies into a very broad comparative framework, which ranges from Czechoslovakia to Canada, Belgium, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia (Chapter 2.2)

Cleft Countries draws on a tremendously rich amount of data, ranging from public-opinion polls to surveys, electoral results, and statistics, and illustrates the text with photos, images of coats of arms, and maps. The longest chapter surveys all electoral results in Ukraine and Moldova since both countries became independent in 1991. It outlines the main separatist occurrences in both countries and presents results of surveys on public opinion on issues such as privatization and market reform (Chapter 3.9). Such an approach serves as a counterpoint to studies that theorize extensively yet lack empirical substantiation, as Katchanovski points out on pp. 60–61.

However, this reviewer is left wondering what is new in this book. The main conclusion is presented on p. 232, "that historically based differences explain a significant part of the variation in support for nationalist/pro-Western and Communist pro-Eastern parties and politicians in regions of Ukraine and Moldova." This hardly seems groundbreaking. Although Katchanovski presents an interesting thesis, that political culture is a key factor in explaining the persistent regional cleavages more so than ethnicity, economics, or religion (p. 22), he does not really develop the argument. Nor does he address the key issue of change in political culture. For example, the denizens of Ukraine's Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, and Chernihiv oblasts seem to be changing their voting preferences. In 1998 the three oblasts voted Communist or Socialist, yet by 2002 Nasha Ukraina had made significant gains there and by 2004 they all voted for Yushchenko.

The strength of this book is that it provides a good, detailed summary of the conventional wisdom. It will be of interest to students of the post-Communist states who seek a lucid and readable summary of the main political developments in both states, with a discussion of the historical factors that led to the cleavages still so evident in both of them.

Marta Dyczok
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Gwendolyn Sasse. *The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2007. xvi, 400 pp. U.S.$39.95. Distributed by Harvard University Press.

Taras Kuzio. *Ukraine — Crimea — Russia: Triangle of Conflict.* Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2007. 247 pp. €29.90.

Crimea attracted considerable attention in the 1990s. Many Russian politicians claimed that the city of Sevastopol was legally part of Russia, Ukraine's claims

to part of the Black Sea Fleet were unjustified, and the transfer of Crimea to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 was illegitimate. The situation in Crimea was further complicated by the return to their homeland of large numbers of formerly deported Crimean Tatars and by the hostility the returnees encountered from many of the peninsula's inhabitants. Thus many observers stressed the potential for serious conflicts in this troubled region of Ukraine.

In recent years, however, interest in developments in Crimea has decreased. This is partly a result of developments in the late 1990s (e.g., an intergovernmental agreement—the Black Sea Fleet Accords—was reached in 1997) that appeared to settle the most contentious issues related to the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the fate of Sevastopol. In addition, from the late 1990s onwards the political agenda in Ukraine was dominated by often vicious political intrigues and infighting in Kyiv that drew both domestic and international attention away from Crimea. Last but not least, despite continuing debates concerning the status and situation of the Crimean Tatars, there has been a general expectation that this minority will gradually overcome the socioeconomic challenges it faced in the 1990s and will find its rightful place in Crimea.

Crimea thus appears to represent a "success story" of sorts if it is compared to Abkhazia in Georgia or Transnistria in Moldova, the most prominent so-called ""frozen conflicts"" in the post-Soviet region. However, the situation in Crimea remains far from stable. Crimea's relations with the central authorities in Kyiv are still troubled; Russian politicians (Moscow Mayor Luzhkov being the most prominent example) are still regularly declared personae non grata in Ukraine because of their provocative statements regarding Sevastopol and Crimea; and many Crimean Tatars remain an underprivileged "outsider" group in their homeland. Thus the two recently published books reviewed here are very timely.

On occasion I have been asked to recommend a book that provides a good overview of political developments in Crimea since Ukraine's independence. Finally a book fitting the bill has appeared—Gwendolyn Sasse's excellent discussion of Kyiv's efforts to integrate Crimea and its diverse populations into the Ukrainian polity. Her main aim was to explore the reasons why the underlying tensions noted above did not explode into conflict in this strategically important region. In the process Sasse provides a wealth of detail on a wide range of issues related to Crimea, and her book thus serves as an excellent general introduction to political life in this troubled region of Ukraine.

The book is well organized and well written. As befits a work of this kind (it is a substantially revised version of her doctoral dissertation), its author demonstrates an admirable command both of the theoretical literature on conflict management and of the primary and secondary sources about Crimea. In short, the book provides an excellent survey and analysis of the factors that help explain the absence of significant conflict in this region. There are few revelations in the book, but, for example, Sasse's discussion of the transfer of Crimea to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 represents the most balanced and comprehensive treatment to date of this controversial issue.

When discussing the relative success of Kyiv's policies with respect to Crimea, Sasse could have placed more emphasis on the heavily improvisational nature of these policies and on the important role played by contingent factors that contributed to this success but were beyond Kyiv's control. These include the poor leadership and management skills of Crimea's first and last president, the separatist-minded Meshkov; the way in which Russia's politicians were preoccupied with domestic problems (in particular Chechnya) that prevented them from interfering more actively in Ukraine's domestic politics; and the great restraint Crimean Tatar leaders generally demonstrated even when their community faced considerable provocation.

In addition, Sasse's analysis would have benefited from a more substantial discussion of the political economy of developments in Crimea. For example, there is good evidence that one way in which the central authorities in Kyiv were able to ensure the loyalty of certain local elites in Crimea was through a system of patronage whereby their participation in various form of corruption was tolerated. This system of patron-client relations evolved in tandem with the rapid growth of organized crime in Crimea in the 1990s, resulting in a situation whereby many senior politicians in Crimea, to this day, are considered to have close links with Crimea's criminal underworld. These pervasive networks of corruption and the way in which they have been manipulated to ensure short-term stability in Crimea have played such an important role in Crimean politics that they deserved greater attention in Sasse's book.

Otherwise, there is little to criticize in this book, and I strongly recommend it both to those interested in the general issue of ethnic-conflict management and those who wish to gain insights into the political life of Crimea.

Taras Kuzio has demonstrated a strong and abiding interest in identity/regional issues, nationalism, and security/military and foreign-policy issues in the post-Soviet region and especially Ukraine. Thus his most recent book provides him with an excellent opportunity to develop some of these themes in the particular context of Crimea. In fact, Kuzio is the author of one of the first English-language works to focus attention on Crimea, *Ukraine–Crimea–Russia: Triangle of Conflict* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994), and in his book under review he elaborates further on themes that are already familiar to him.

Kuzio includes some information that is missing from or underemphasized in Sasse's book. For example, in his final chapter Kuzio provides useful details about the activities of Ukraine's security agencies in Crimea, and chapter 5 includes some interesting material that throws light on the impact of organized crime and of corruption on the political scene in Crimea. However, given Kuzio's extensive background and experience with issues related to Crimea and Ukraine in general, the book is disappointing.

Part of the problem is the book's organization. Kuzio's aims were to address the origins of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict over Crimea and explain how interethnic violence was averted. The book's chapters consist of essays on topics relevant to these aims and partially achieve them, but the author does little to tie

these essays together into a cohesive whole; indeed, even the material within individual chapters is sometimes presented in a rather disjointed fashion. The book's introduction is very brief, consisting largely of a description of the chapters to follow, and the volume ends rather abruptly with a discussion of security forces in Crimea. Thus Kuzio makes no effort to provide general conclusions that would help integrate the material in the preceding chapters. The quality of the editing is also disappointing, the author is sometimes inconsistent in providing references, and there are far too many examples of sloppy writing throughout the book.

Much of the material in Kuzio's book will be of interest to those with a strong interest in Crimea, and readers can benefit considerably from some of the author's insights, based on many years of research and writing on Ukraine. Nonetheless, those interested in a well-written and well-integrated discussion of recent developments in Crimea should turn first to Gwendolyn Sasse's book.

As one would expect of academic publications, the books reviewed above are based largely on archival data, information on election results, economic statistics, and so on. This is reflected in their rather dry tone. The authors cannot be faulted for failing to convey effectively a sense of the dramas that have faced many inhabitants of Crimea in recent years, for this was not their intention. However, I would like to conclude this review by reminding its readers that the maneuvering by representatives of Russia and Ukraine to gain and maintain control of portions of the Black Sea Fleet, including threats of the use of armed force, in slightly different circumstances could have led to a serious conflict between the two countries. Crimean Tatars who sold all their property in Central Asia to return to the Crimea often found themselves penniless as a result of very high rates of inflation in Ukraine in the early 1990s, and their attempts to reestablish themselves in Crimea were often accompanied by great suffering and human tragedy. Thus I hope that journalists, writers, and filmmakers, both in Ukraine and abroad, will do their utmost to ensure that the real-life dramas that lie behind the issues discussed in the works reviewed above are brought to the attention of a broader audience.

John (Ivan) Jaworsky
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Stanisław Stępień. *Pomarańczowa rewolucja: Kalendarium i dokumenty wyborów prezydenckich na Ukrainie w 2004 roku.* Przemyśl: Południowo-Wschodni Instytut Naukowy, 2006. 379 pp. 20 zł.

The Southeastern Scientific Institute in Przemyśl enjoys a well-deserved reputation in the field of Ukrainian studies in Poland, particularly for the quality of its research and publications. Since its creation in early 1990, the institute has undertaken a wide range of historical and cultural research, with much emphasis on the history of Eastern Christianity, as well as political analysis. Within the latter area

of study, the so-called Orange Revolution (hereafter OR) undisputedly ranks as one of the most inspiring events of recent times in Ukraine. This study by the institute's director, Stanisław Stępień, deals with the OR's fundamental issues. As it was taking place, his Przemyśl-based think-tank devoted all of no. 10 of its *Biuletyn Ukrainoznawczy* (2004) to what occurred during the months of late 2004 and early 2005 in Ukraine. An expanded version of the calendar of events that originally appeared in that issue is included in Stępień's book.

The political and social upheaval that arose during the 2004 presidential election campaign in Ukraine spurred lively discussions and commentaries and prominent coverage in the Polish mass media, resulting in a variety of editorials and academic studies. Stępień lists the most crucial of them (pp. 351–52). Missing in his list, however, is the very first issue (2006) of *Nowa Ukraina: Zeszyty historyczno-politologiczne* (Cracow), which was devoted almost entirely to analyses of various aspects of the OR.

Stępień's book is a valuable chronicle of this turning point in Ukraine's democratization. His book is particularly effective in presenting popular attitudes and mass psychology in Ukraine and in Poland during those critical days of November and December 2004. Stępień is most persuasive in positing the notion that the OR opened a new chapter not only in the history of the nascent Ukrainian state, but also in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations. The reader sees vividly how the concepts Jerzy Giedroyc, Juliusz Mieroszewski, and Józef Łobodowski formulated acquired their proper significance. Stępień expands his analysis with a complex presentation of the broader international context and of the efforts and actions the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the United States, Russia, and Germany undertook.

In his introduction Stępień claims that during the OR "the Ukrainians had to answer the question: do they want to see their country develop within the well-known framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, or would they prefer to step onto the less known, and even risky, path of integration with European structures and prospective membership in the European Union" (p. 7). He reiterates the popular Polish view that the OR found its supporters among those favorably inclined toward Western Europe, whereas those with pro-Russian, or at least anti-Western, views supported the "Blue camp" of Viktor Yanukovich and the Party of Regions. Yet geopolitical considerations were of secondary importance during the OR. What is more, a careful analysis of the of the election results and the sociological research conducted in Ukraine in their aftermath clearly shows that the divisions between the supporters of Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich fell far from the divisions between the advocates and opponents of Ukraine's integration with the EU. The graph illustrating the election results in the book's appendix demonstrates that during the second round support for Yushchenko in the oblasts of western Ukraine ranged from 80 to 96 percent. In a poll conducted after the elections, 64.6 percent of those oblasts' inhabitants supported pursuing EU membership (see <www.uceps.org.ua/img/st_img/table/803/UCEPS_2006–03–17.pdf>, p. 9). According to that poll, in central Ukraine Yu-

shchenko managed to acquire the support of 63 to 82 percent of the voters, but only 46 percent of the inhabitants there were favorably disposed to the idea of Ukraine's membership in the EU. Finally, in the eastern regions of the country, where voter support for Yanukovich ranged between 68 and 93 percent, the poll found that 45 percent of the respondents had strongly negative attitudes towards Ukraine's EU aspirations. It is indisputable that the poll results demonstrated that the "Orange" electorate was predominantly in favor of European integration. Nevertheless, branding it as pro-EU, and the "Blue" supporters as anti-EU, is an oversimplification.

It could be argued that Stępień offers an overly romantic view of the OR as a battle of good versus evil. On one side of the divide stood the ruthless pact of oligarchic clans and state structures of the Kuchma and Yanukovich camp; on the other side stood the pro-Yushchenko camp. Yushchenko, the opposition candidate, led the rebellious "intelligentsia circles" and "representatives of small and medium enterprises, who refused "to comply with the restrictive tax laws, corrupt bureaucratic procedures, and existence-threatening, power-concentration trends driven by the clans." In Stępień's view, Yushchenko's victory gave its supporters "hope of sustaining individual enterprises, created with so much hardship, and of full participation in economic and political life" (pp. 9–10). Undeniably, Stępień's interpretation of social attitudes is not unfounded. Yet his explanation of the mechanisms that shaped events is only partly accurate. Unquestionably, the OR's driving force did not come solely from society at large, but equally from those oligarchs who had revolted against President Kuchma and his entourage. Those oligarchs took advantage of this crucial moment for any undemocratic regime—when a sovereign hands power over to his successor. Their stake was access to power and ownership. To achieve their goal, it was necessary for them to make sure that the new distribution of power did not elicit an overly severe reaction from the business-clan establishment. It seemed most reasonable to seek consent rather than justice. Therefore one of the OR's principal slogans, "jail for the bandits," was never really pursued because the far-reaching verification of pathological practices accompanying privatization processes was not in the interest of the business and financial circles supporting the "Orange" camp. (The theoretical foundations for an analysis of this very scheme were presented nearly a decade earlier in *Politolohiia postkomunizmu: Politychnyi analiz postkomunistychnykh suspilstv,* by Yevhen Bystrytsky et al [Kyiv: Politychna dumka, 1995], <www.litopys.org.ua/polpost/r2a2/htm>).

By August 2006 a new status quo was already in place in Ukraine. It became evident that there would be no reverting back to the state of affairs that existed before the OR; a return to "Kuchmism" was out of the question. Yet despite earlier promises, no one from the previous regime was brought to justice, no "bandits" were punished, and the oligarchic clans' interests were hardly contained. Power was redistributed between the "Orange" camp, with Yushchenko as president of the country, and the "Blue" camp, with Yanukovich as prime minister. It was precisely in mid-2006 that a journalist wrote an article about

members of the Ukrainian "elite" vacationing in Monaco (see <www.pravda .com.ua/articles/4b1a9bb0667e0/>). There he found that Viktor Medvedchuk— one of the most influential and villainous persons of the Kuchma regime—was staying in the same exclusive hotel as parliamentarian David Zhvania, the "host of Independence Square" and principal manager of the OR and one of Yuliia Tymoshenko's closest advisers This is a highly symbolic portrayal of the background to and consequences of the events Stępień describes.

In analyzing the most important part of Stępień's book, his calendar of events of the OR, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that in its march toward democracy Ukrainian society received significant support from Poland. That was undeniably the case at the level of associations and NGOs. The spirit of freedom embodied in the pro-Orange decorations hanging from various buildings in Kyiv and huge marches, demonstrations, and concerts—there about was shared by many in Poland. At least for a part of Polish society, the OR brought back memories of the "carnival of Solidarity". For several days the slogan: "Kijów — Warszawa: wspólna sprawa" (Kyiv and Warsaw [have] a common cause) managed to unite Poland's political elites. In this regard the role played by Poland's President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and those of his advisers who promoted "round table" talks in Kyiv between the Kuchma camp and the opposition stands out.

Regarding diplomatic efforts undertaken in response to the post-election crisis, Stępień seems to have overlooked several key events that could offer a more comprehensive explanation of the role Poland's head of state played. Stępień mentions the European Parliament's decision of 28 November 2004 to create a special monitoring mission composed predominantly of Polish representatives. He points out that Marek Siwiec headed the mission, but does not underline the fact that after the first round of the presidential elections, at a press conference held in Kyiv, Siwiec stated the observers "did not note a single instance of violation of electoral procedures" (see Wojciech Stanisławski, *Pomarańczowa kokarda: Kalendarium kryzysu politycznego na Ukrainie. Jesień 2004* [Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia, 2005], 16). On the following day, at a conference held at the European Parliament, the head of the monitoring mission tried to disregard the instances where the electoral procedures were violated (p. 17). Those facts are striking, considering that Siwiec is a politician with very close ties to President Kwaśniewski. The In the immediate aftermath of the electoral crisis, Poland's president appealed to European and world leaders not to abandon Ukraine. Nevertheless, the "Orange" opposition" had to wait for some time before he offered any concrete help. The best proof that such help was desperately needed in Kyiv can be found in Yushchenko's letter to Poland's prime minister, Marek Belka, which Stępień mentions (p. 70), yet Stępień disregards the fact that it included a diplomatically phrased request for Warsaw to defend democracy in Ukraine more intensively. It is highly symptomatic, that when tensions in Ukraine were most serious, that is, after the fraudulent second round of elections, Yushchenko asked Poland's former president, Lech Wałęsa, and not Kwaśniewski, to come to Ukraine to help defuse d the crisis (p. 82). On

23 November 2004, well into the night, the Kwaśniewski's advisers sought contact(!) with the advisers of the leader of the "Orange" opposition (p. 41). It seems reasonable to conclude Kwaśniewski had remained passive because he expected the Kuchma-Yanukovich camp to regain control. Only when it became clear that the strength of the mass protests would prevent this did Kwaśniewski change his line and consequently assume the role of mediator.

For accuracy's sake, it must be noted that at on p. 65 Stępień refers to two distinct institutions—the Council of Europe and the European Council— as one entity.

My observations above should be seen only as an effort at constructive debate. Stępień's study is, after all, a highly effective documentary of the most crucial moment thus far in the transformation of Ukraine's post-Communist society and a valuable source to the contemporary history of a country that is particularly important for Poland.

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David R. Marples. *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine.* Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2007. xxii, 363 pp. U.S. \$47.95 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

The construction of national history in post-independence Ukraine has recently focused on two crucial issues—the Holodomor of 1932–33 and the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) in the 1940s. A series of debates have taken place over these two issues, exposing divisions between Western Ukraine, which experienced Soviet rule only after 1939, and the rest of the country. In Western Ukraine the Holodomor has played a crucial role in the way national history is constructed. The OUN and the UPA, which operated here, have often been identified as heroic freedom-fighters. In the rest of Ukraine the role of these issues in Ukraine's national history has been more problematic. Marples identifies Western and émigré scholars and commentators as important players in the debates, pointing out that their accounts were influential in the post-independence period, when the Soviet narrative was rejected and an immediate need was felt for a new conceptualizations. By examining a range of sources—including histories, journalism, and textbooks—the author reconstructs and juxtaposes the different versions of history that have emerged in Ukraine and are jostling for position there. Separate chapters deal with the Holodomor, the OUN during the years 1929–43, accounts of the OUN's early days, the UPA's war with the Red Army, the Ukrainian-Polish conflict during the Second World War, and how new history textbooks have

handled these issues. The focus is on attempts to heroize or demonize Soviet or OUN and UPA forces. Recent moves by President Viktor Yushchenko's government to incorporate both the Holodomor and the OUN and UPA into a revised conception of national history have added an immediate political relevance to the topic.

The strength of Marples's book lies in its ability to survey a range of discourses that clash and interlock at various points. He establishes the ambivalent attitude in the contemporary discourse to these crucial historical events and shows how the debate has evolved. With the opening of archives in Ukraine to researchers and a greater familiarity with Western and "diaspora" interpretations, Soviet mythology has been gradually jettisoned, but a competing orthodoxy has not been established. Marples's book provides a service to the scholarly community by summarizing key texts and arguments and by providing as balanced and dispassionate an exposition of the topic as one is likely to find. The work of Western scholars such as Robert Conquest, Peter J. Potichnyj, John Armstrong, James Mace, Orest Subtelny, Andrew Wilson, Johan Dietsch, Timothy Snyder, Wilfried Jilge, and John-Paul Himka has often framed the key issues. Prominent historians in Ukraine such as Stanislav Kulchytsky and Yurii Shapoval have integrated much of this scholarship into their own narratives. The way this has happened is one of the most compelling stories Marples has to tell.

Some degree of consensus has emerged about the Holodomor, although crucial questions remain unsolved. Kulchytsky, the most authoritative scholar in Ukraine, puts the number of victims at 3 million to 3.5 million, while much larger figures are often used in journalistic and political discourse. Political activism, which includes the adoption of resolutions by governments to recognize the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people, "has preceded the conclusion of the scholarly debate" (p. 303). Marples points out that the most authoritative studies have been written by scholars who do not accept the genocide theory, and that "the lack of serious scholarly studies by those who think otherwise has perpetuated the situation" (p. 305). He indicates, however, that there is ample evidence that the Soviet leadership was aware of the catastrophe and chose to extract all available food from the hungry. He considers that "at least 4 million" peasants starved to death in what was then the Ukrainian SSR.

The discussion of the OUN and UPA, its leaders, actions, ideology, and relations with German forces produces a much more fragmented picture. Marples feels that the campaign to make heroes out of the adherents of the OUN-B (the Bandera faction) or the UPA "can be considered thus far no more than a partial success" (p. 161). The OUN's authoritarian ideology, its partial collaboration with the German military and intelligence before the invasion of the USSR in 1941, and the UPA's elimination of rival groups—particularly the "ethnic cleansing" of the Polish population—have thrown up "too many road blocks." The brutal treatment of the local population by the returning Soviet regime and the amazing scale of the UPA conflict with the Red Army and Soviet security

forces (the number of combatants ranges from tens to hundreds of thousands, and an estimated ten percent of the population supported the insurgents) come out forcefully in recent narratives, as do the horrors of the massacre of the Polish population in Volhynia, which was debated in 2003 and 2004, the sixtieth anniversary of the event. Marples concludes that if a new narrative of national history that includes the struggle for independence during the wartime years is to emerge, then "all aspects of the history of OUN and UPA have to be included, both the heroic and the terrible, no matter how difficult it might be for Ukrainian historians to accept" (p. 234). Some history textbooks and newspaper articles have rejected this sentiment, providing instead a black-and-white version of the past, in which anti-Soviet forces are depicted as freedom-fighters. Heated discussions continue over a number of related issues: how to name the war (the Great Patriotic War or the German-Soviet War); how to characterize the Division Galizien; and how and on what day to commemorate the war. Authoritative narratives have become increasingly sophisticated with the passage of time and reflect the integration of new materials and varied viewpoints. Towards the end of his book Marples spends time on Heorhii V. Kasyanov's views and the main findings of the 2004 Government Commission Report on the OUN and UPA. These draw a nuanced picture (pp. 283–301). Marples describes the latter report as "a bold attempt to come to terms with the complex issues surrounding OUN-UPA," an area in which there have been few dispassionate commentators and sometimes no middle ground (p. 298). This is how he summarizes the report:

> In the first place, the authors of the Report have made every effort to include all relevant information. They do not idealize any of the insurgent or opposition formations, and they cite figures from Soviet archives as part of their source base. In their conclusions, they have tended to exonerate the OUN-B and UPA, and to chastise the OUN-M [Melnyk faction] for its unquestioned allegiance to the Germans, even after the uncompromising nature of Hitler's plans for Ukraine had become apparent. The SS Division Halychyna [Galizien] does not emerge from the survey with much credit and is in fact cited as a collaborating unit, despite the fact that it did not commit war crimes. One key issue surfaces immediately, namely the intentions of the OUN-B and the UPA at various times to work with the German authorities for matters of expediency and in the long-term interests of Ukraine. (p. 298)

According to Marples, the report also implies that the entire nationalist insurgent movement must take responsibility for the Volhynian massacres of 1943 (p. 299). Even these few sentences demonstrate how much of this history remains contentious and unelucidated. The Ukrainians, like many national communities in post-Soviet Europe, still have to deal with these issues in a satisfactory manner, to come to terms with the idea that heroes can also sometimes be criminals, and perhaps to reconcile themselves to the idea that different parts of the country will disagree on how they see the past.

Marples brings together a great deal of research without synthesizing it—a task that at the present time appears impossible. He does, however, illustrate how interpretations in the scholarly community and journalistic discourse have changed. Surprisingly, one voice that is missing from the discussion of the OUN and UPA is that of participants themselves. This appears to be an omission also in the scholarly literature, much of which seems uninterested in their point of view. The OUN and UPA experience is, however, described and documented in a large body of writing. Its propagandists have tried to explain their actions; its intellectuals left wartime memoirs; Ulas Samchuk, an editor of a newspaper under German occupation, described his experiences in two volumes of memoirs and several long novels; and an enormous amount of poetry and short fiction was produced in an attempt to convey the mood and motives governing the actions of those who lived through this period. The part of the Ukrainian population that reads this literature is naturally inclined to a different view of history. Scholars still need to be read and analyze much of this literature before a full understanding can emerge of how people envisaged their place in the national narrative, or how they simply tried to survive.

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John-Paul Himka and Andriy Zayarnyuk, eds. *Letters from Heaven: Popular Religion in Russia and Ukraine.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006. x, 280 pp. $69.

This collection of articles represents a much-needed addition to the literature on the historical study of religious practice in Russia and Ukraine. Offering a series of detailed analyses of "popular religious practice" largely from the early modern to the contemporary period, with most essays focusing on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the book suggests how difficult it is to delineate "popular" from "elite" forms of religion and to separate textual versus oral-inspired religious practices. Indeed, taken as a whole the book offers a critical look at just how closely "Christian" religious practices were influenced by "pagan" traditions and how popular religious practices were similarly integrated into institutionalized Orthodox religious life.

The editors impose little conceptual and categorical uniformity on the essays, which allows for a plethora of opinions to emerge on the meaning of what constitutes "popular" religious practice, the relationship of religion to culture more broadly, and on the geographic framing and naming of the objects of study. Overall the diversity and plurality of opinions and usages that characterize these essays adds to the richness of the text, even if it does make the reader work a bit more to come to his or her own conclusion as to how these concepts should be applied.

The inspiration for this volume was provided by an essay Christine Worobec penned as early as 1994, in which she articulated many of the themes developed in the volume. Her essay on how Russian and Ukrainian peasants practiced death rituals in the late imperial period in such a way as to link the living with the dead illustrates the interpenetration of "high" religion with "pagan" practices. Worobec carefully avoids the binary model embodied in the non-historical concept of *dvoeverie* and, by focusing on the role of demonology in religious practices in rural communities, offers a far more nuanced portrait of the "living religions" of East Slavic peasantries. The article is reprinted here with an updated postscript and paired with Natalie Kononenko's essay on "folk Orthodoxy" in contemporary Ukraine. The juxtaposition of the two essays and of their different perspectives, one historical and the other folkloric, adds relevance to considering the "popular" and "lived" understandings of supernatural forces then and now.

Andriy Zayarnyuk's essay lent the volume its title. He focuses on a series of "letters from heaven" that articulated "popular superstitions surrounding holidays and the personalizing of Sunday and Saturday" and on the polemics these letters generated. (p. 169) Zayarnyuk considers how nationalist-minded intellectuals picked up and used the letters as evidence of folk culture that could contribute to an articulation of cultural differences to define the Ukrainian nation. Because these letters circulated widely among the peasantry, they are also revealing of popular conceptions of virtue. The sometimes critical reactions of the clergy to the letters' "Godly teachings" sheds light on the dynamics shaping a religious worldview and religious practices among the peasantry while popular and professional theology clashed in the late nineteenth century.

Valerie Kivelson and Eve Levin contribute essays of interest on gender, sexuality, and gendered religious practices. Here the gendered dimensions of how sin and virtue (obedience and humility) were articulated and upheld with public sanctions are analyzed and offer some surprises. Orthodoxy, Kivelson argues, took a positive attitude toward the body, the realm of the flesh, and even advocated that the physical world could serve as a vehicle for the divine. She offers some vivid examples of how men and women were both bound by admonitions to humility, piety, and obedience. Furthermore, Kivelson argues, property regimes and inheritance practices gave agency and voice to women on equal footing with men. Levin considers the close links between the ecclesiastical image of St. Paraskeva and the popular cult of veneration as it began to emerge in the medieval period. She argues that the participation of local clergy in rituals to St. Paraskeva, while outside of church norms, contributed to the multiple interpretations that emerged at times, either linking the cult to "pagan traditions" or to Christian traditions as reinterpreted and transmitted through popular culture.

Other religious elements that pertain to Orthodox practice to a notable degree are the focus of other essays. Icons and the visual culture particular to Orthodoxy come in for close scrutiny in the essays by John-Paul Himka, Vera Shevzov, and Sophia Senyk. Together these essays bring our attention to the dynamics shaping the aesthetic styles and interpretative meanings of iconic rep-

resentations of saints and other holy and highly venerated figures. Himka's essay, in particular, provides fascinating illustrations and challenges us to consider the "social elements" present in Ukrainian Last Judgment icons within the context of traditional iconography and theology of the early modern era rather than as raw political commentary.

Miracles are another means of religious practice that draws the "masses" and the clergy together. Roman Holyk considers the role of miracles in peasant religious practice in early modern Ukraine. Paul Bushkovitch addresses specifically how under Peter the Great Russian state and church policy, or "written religious culture" with its biases toward sermon and liturgy, nonetheless still shaped such popular practices as pilgrimages and attitudes toward miraculous relics and icons. Given the participation he documents of elites in "popular" expressions of religiosity, he questions the applicability of the term "popular religion."

Overall, the volume offers a good balance between articles that address religious practices in Ukrainian and Russian lands. The majority frequently make cross-cultural references or incorporate evidence that bridges any kind of ethnic or linguistic divides that current political borders might evoke. The book offers a rich and detailed portrait of informal religious life and how beliefs became manifest in practice particularly in provincial and rural areas. The volume will be of interest to historians, anthropologists, folklorists, and anyone interested in religious practice in the East Slavic regions.

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Catherine Wanner, *Communities of the Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelism.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2007. viii, 305 pp. U.S.$25.95 paper, $76.50 cloth.

Wanner's volume is a surprising and refreshing study of evangelism in post-Soviet Ukraine. It is surprising because in a single coherent and readable work the author chronicles the survival of evangelism in the USSR and its explosion in independent Ukraine while adding texture with informative anecdotal accounts of individuals and communities. Wanner's work is refreshing because it not only details the life of evangelical communities in Ukraine (especially in and around Kharkiv), but is also the first to apply the work of contemporary scholars of religion and secularization to Ukraine. Furthermore, Wanner debunks a number of popular myths: Ukraine's religious scene is much more diverse than most presume, and Ukrainian evangelism does not necessarily see itself as a depoliticized or denationalized player in society. *Communities of the Converted* is not only a valuable resource for students of religious life in Ukraine or of global evangelicalism. It will also serve students of religion in general and those investigating religious responses to secularism.

Wanner's historical reflections provide the reader with insight into the struggles Protestant believers in Ukraine endured during the Soviet period. In particular she demonstrates the similarities and divergences between the two main evangelical communities active there—Baptists and Pentecostals. Although Wanner's anecdotes document the sometimes porous border between these two groups, it is noteworthy that historically Pentecostal communities tended to be less conciliatory to Soviet rule. So for example, in 1945 approximately three hundred Pentecostal communities joined the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (AUCECB), yet "Within a year, a majority of them had withdrawn their memberships, preferring an "underground" illegal existence to a circumscribed and compromised legal one" (p. 57). Similarly Wanner points to a phenomenon that was characteristic of most Christian communities in the USSR: the difference between registered and unregistered wings of the same denomination. Unregistered Baptists shared more in common with unregistered Pentecostals than with their registered confreres. Consequently both Pentecostal and Baptist believers attended the same services. Thus, currently, identifying as a believer or not is more significant than one's denomination (p. 137). Finally, Wanner demonstrates that evangelical believers were as much targets of Soviet repression as were Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish believers. This evidence dismantles the well-publicized conclusions of such high-profile personalities as Jimmy Swaggart, who naively stated in 1986, "I doubt seriously there is an underground church in the Soviet Union.... The churches are open and people can go" (p. 92).

Although public religious life is a relatively new phenomenon in Ukraine, Wanner ably utilizes contemporary scholarly reflections on the processes of secularization. In particular she applies the work of Talal Asad and Danièle Hervieu-Léger to indicate areas of similarity between developments in Ukraine and Western Europe, although she admits "Secularization of the public sphere … evolved gradually and voluntarily over time in Western Europe whereas it was imposed in the Soviet Union" (p. 7). Nonetheless the similarity in the degree of religious freedom (pp. 131ff.) provides a venue in Ukraine for many currents flourishing in West European and North American societies. Similarly, communities and individuals in Ukraine migrate quite facilely into European and North American societies. Globalization is not a one-way street simply bringing the West to Ukraine. Wanner convincingly demonstrates that today Ukraine is as much an "exporter" of religion as it is an importer.

The most startling example of this "export" of Ukrainian religiosity is also a phenomenon that debunks notions of evangelical Christians as denationalized and depoliticized: the Embassy of God church in Kyiv, which Wanner refers to as the "largest evangelical church in Europe," with nearly twenty five thousand members and over three hundred daughter congregations; "at least thirty of them are located abroad, including six in the United States" (p. 211). Founded and still led by Sunday Adelaja, an expatriate Nigerian, this church has committed itself to the social and political transformation of Ukraine. "The Embassy of

God is a highly innovative example of a religious community going global, and yet its heart and roots are very much in Ukraine" (p. 212). According to Wanner, among its more traditional goals the leadership makes "an overall effort to reenchant society" (p. 213). The very public and seemingly influential role that the Embassy of God is currently playing bespeaks a new form of social engagement, unlike that exhibited by the Orthodox or Catholic churches in Ukraine.

The latter two churches tentatively accept the apparent norms of a secular society, which more or less distinguishes religion from the state (President Yushchenko's rhetoric calling for a united Orthodox Church aside). Pastor Sunday and his congregation, on the other hand, see themselves as active and engaged players; they "represent a radical departure from the sharp differentiation of distinct spheres of moral, religious activity and the very profane, often even immoral political world.... [T]he Embassy of God and other evangelical churches are rapidly reversing the 'political quietism' and withdrawal from worldly activities that used to characterize most religious organizations, and especially evangelical ones, throughout twentieth-century Ukrainian history" (p. 246).

Pointing to the Embassy of God, Wanner observes that religion in Ukraine today not only demonstrates its viability, but, more importantly, its ability to fulfill two seemingly opposed functions: by rekindling corporate memory, it binds a group to its common past (a preserving role), but it also offers new possibilities and new frameworks for understanding and action (a dynamic role, a "new universe of discourse" [p. 137]). The story of evangelism in Ukraine today is not only about religion. It is also about a society's transformation from one marked by a broken chain of memory (p. 53) to one that is undergoing massive transformation, not as the passive object of global forces of Americanization or homogenization but as an active participant with those forces. Wanner's study bears witness to one powerful example of individuals and groups in Ukraine reengaging their past and becoming members of national and global communities. It is a compelling work worthy of extensive scholarly attention.

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Paul Laverdure. *Redemption and Ritual: The Eastern-Rite Redemptorists of North America, 1906–2006.* Yorkton, Sask.: Redeemer's Voice Press, 2007. xviii, 421 pp. $34.99.

Founded in southern Italy by Saint Alphonsus Liguori in 1732, the Roman Catholic Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, which includes both monastic priests and brothers, has long been interested in eastern Europe. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Belgian Redemptorists began sending missionaries to minister to the Galician immigrants in Canada's western provinces, who lacked their own Byzantine-rite, Greek-Catholic clergy. The Roman Catholic hierarchy in North America preferred this option to the importation of the

Ruthenians' predominantly married secular Greek-Catholic priests. In 1906 Fr. Achiel Delaere, who had arrived in Canada in 1899, transferred to the Byzantine rite. In August 1913, as the first contingent of Eastern-rite Belgian Redemptorists departed for Austrian-ruled Galicia, an Eastern-rite Redemptorist monastery was founded at Yorkton, Saskatchewan. In 1919 Yorkton became the seat of an Eastern-rite Redemptorist vice-province, which was elevated to a province in 1961 and came to include establishments in the United States as well.

As he readily admits, Paul Laverdure's account of the Eastern-rite Redemptorists' first century in North America is an official history (p. xiii). As such, it carefully traces the order's organizational development, including changes in administration, jurisdiction, and personnel, with frequent reference to statistics. The narrative adheres closely to its abundant archival and other sources, frequently resorting to paraphrase or direct quotation. It is not, however, strictly chronological. This makes for a more engaging and readable text. While the author focuses on the Redemptorists' institutional history, he does not neglect the personal, cultural, social, economic, and political factors that shaped it.

Laverdure positions the Redemptorist project between the forces of cultural assimilation in the New World and nationalism emanating from the Old. Diaspora history, as he implicitly recognizes, is trans-Atlantic. He appreciates the Ruthenian immigrants' fundamental need for a clergy that shared their language, culture, and mentality. He thus recognizes the introduction of numerous native Ukrainian Byzantine-rite Redemptorist priests in the interwar period as a turning point (pp. 149–50). He also situates his story in the context of national tensions and rivalries between Ruthenians and Poles, English and French Canadians, English and Ukrainian Canadians, French and Belgians, and even Flemings and Walloons, as well as the conflicts between those Ruthenians who adopted a Ukrainian identity and those who considered themselves Slovak or Hungarian or chose to remain simply "Rusyn." The author shows how ethnic affiliation and nationalism could interact with religious orientation, for example, in the mass exodus of Ruthenian Greek-Catholics first to the Russian and subsequently to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Ethnic and religious attitudes also interacted in the minds of Canada's English Redemptorists, whose obsessive concern with Protestantism, combined with their condescension towards the Ruthenians, produced ill-advised, even disastrous policies. The Ukrainian Redemptorists' struggle to respect the close connection between religion and nationality, yet avoid subordinating the former to the latter, is recorded with subtlety and nuance.

In documenting the Redemptorists' shifting fortunes, Laverdure cites other psychological factors, such as the perceived prospects of martyrdom after a Redemptorist died saving a colleague from attempted murder. Citing letters of Vice-Provincial John Bala, he registers generational conflict, the influence of the North American Protestant and democratic spirit, and the new socio-cultural atmosphere of the late 1940s and early 1950s, which seemed to conflict with the Redemptorist ideal (p. 188). If in purely statistical terms the order reached a peak in 1963–64, there were already signs of decline during that decade: attri-

tion from religious life among students and teachers, declining professions, and confusion about the role of brothers in a clerical congregation in the wake of the Second Vatican Council. Yet the heroic example of Bishop Vasyl Velychkovsky (1903–73), who had suffered Soviet imprisonment and torture, inspired a new generation of youth, and statistics from the 1970s indicate an upturn.

Indeed, Laverdure shows how wise leadership and prudent administration can halt, and perhaps reverse, seemingly inevitable trends. The Canadian Redemptorists' openness to rediscovering the Byzantine liturgical heritage, developing the role of young adults and women in church life, venturing beyond the confines of the Ukrainian ethnos, and honoring the original Redemptorist ideal by ministering to the urban poor, including indigenous peoples, has apparently revived the order.

At the same time the author's narrative illustrates the dilemmas besetting the Eastern-rite Redemptorists in North America. They were repeatedly forced to choose among their several callings: conducting missions and retreats, serving parishes, living the common (monastic) life, teaching in schools, and publishing. Socioeconomic currents, as well as ecclesiastical ones, prompted frequent closing, reopening, and transfer of monastic and educational institutions, with attendant disruption and disorientation. Added to the instability were severe living and working conditions, particularly in the early years in western Canada: in Jaroslaw, Saskatchewan, for example, sacramental wine would freeze in the chalice during the service (p. 45).

In one respect, the title of this work is slightly misleading: in *Redemption and Ritual* there is not much discussion of ritual, and nearly all of what there is appears in the last third of the book. There is, nevertheless, some attention to Latinization, liturgy, the introduction of the vernacular, and the calendar, all of which were also bound up with the issue of nationality. Ritual is inseparable from theology and is central to the Greek Catholic Church's identity, about which, as Fr. Johan Meijer observed trenchantly in 1977, it sometimes seems confused (pp. 290–91).

One cannot expect a monograph of these dimensions to say much about the lay Ruthenians and Ukrainians to whom the Redemptorists primarily ministered. Yet it does provide some tantalizing glimpses of their character and religious consciousness as viewed by various members of the order. An early Presbyterian account confirms their strong religiosity but weak confessional identity (p. 22).

The maps on pages 42, 180, and 283 barely suffice: more detail on the geography of Redemptorist institutions in Canada would help the reader trace their peregrinations. There are also occasional errors of spelling and grammar. These minor flaws are more than outweighed by the generous scholarly apparatus, which includes two appendices (listing members of the Yorkton vice-province and province and their administrators from 1961 to 2006), an illuminating note on sources, nearly sixty pages of endnotes, a select bibliography, and a thorough index. The publishers are to be congratulated for producing an elegant and handsome volume rich in photographs and other illustrative material.

Laverdure's *Redemption and Ritual* should serve as a model for the modern histories of religious orders. Students of Canadian, Ukrainian, and Eastern Catholic religious history will find it useful and necessary.

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Andrii Danylenko. *Slavica et Islamica: Ukrainian in Context.* Munich: Otto Sagner, 2006. xviii, 460 pp. €75.

Slavica et Islamica is a collection of Andrii Danylenko's previously published essays, mostly in English but also in Ukrainian. They are arranged in four parts, more by theme than by chronology, and are followed by a fifty-page bibliography. The value of this work consists of the author's attempt to shed light on the intricate system of linguistic and ethnic relations between the Slavs and different Muslim peoples and on the formation of the Ukrainian language. Danylenko does not pretend he has all the answers concerning the development and status of the Ukrainian language. Rather, his book helps us to understand the main problems Slavists have confronted in the last century and a half: the frequent lack of factual material, different linguistic ideas, and various approaches to language study and dialectology, the definition of standard Ukrainian, and the like.

Part one, "Out of the Woodwork," first deals with the provenance of the name "Rus'." Danylenko attempts a structural treatment of the Byzantine, Latin German, and Arabic records to "bring into logical unity these three basic sources related to the etymology and early history of the name *Rus'.*" On the basis of cross-linguistic analysis of diachronic connections between consecutive attestations of the term, he concludes there is no comprehensive explanation of its origin. However, given that etymologizing the name brings about nothing but an impasse, Danylenko suggests that structural interpretations of the stemmas for "Rus'" could prove highly effective. Further on he discusses the origin of the ethnonym "Urmane," maintaining that it is likely to have been borrowed from a non-European language. Together with other ethnic designations for the Varangians—"Varjagi" and "Kolbjagi"—"Urmane" is mentioned in both European and non-European sources. Danylenko assumes this fact sheds light on the genesis of Old Rus' chronicle writing. Resorting to Islamic evidence about the appearance of "Němci," the Slavic name for Germans, he exemplifies his assumptions about the possibility of an early (tenth century A.D. or earlier) sociocultural continuum between Christian and non-Christian oecumenes in eastern Europe. He also discusses the provenance of the names of the Dnipro Rapids.

Danylenko reconstructs those names back to underlying Slavic forms and shows that the main problem lies in the difficulty of determining what Slavic language they represent. According to him, though unfortunately not supported satisfactorily (owing to ambiguity in the interpretation of the underlying forms'

phonological structure), they are Proto-Ukrainian, which was spoken in southern Rus', and not hypothetical "Common Russian" or "Common East Slavic."

In part two, "Whither Ruthenia?," Danylenko tackles the long-disputed status of *prostaja mova* and its codification; the language of early Lithuanian Tatar manuscripts; and the distribution and representation of Ukrainian "h" and "g". On the basis of new argumentation, he suggests that *rusьkij jazykъ* and *prostaja mova* should be treated as two stylistically different varieties of one secular vernacular in view of the fact that the former was used mainly in administration and the latter was a result of gradual adjustments in the vernacular system matching the emergence of new, especially learned genres, such as polemical and theological writings, poetry, grammars, and the like. This goes against the view that *rusьkij jazykъ* and *prostaja mova* should be seen as different languages or two chronologically consecutive developmental stages of one language system shared by Ukrainians and Belarusians. According to Danylenko, at the source of *rusьkij jazykъ* and *prostaja mova* was a vernacular system constituting "a particular configuration of Polissian, viz., southern Belarusian and northern Ukrainian features, which genetically were of the same provenance," complemented by fluctuating Slavonic and solid Polish admixtures. The concept of the Polissian vernacular standard offers a new diachronic vision of the East Slavic languages. Analyzing the origin of the Lutheran term "*Gemeinsprache*," Ruthenian *prostaja mova*, Polish *język prosty*, and Lithuanian "*prasty szadei*," Danylenko argues there are no solid grounds for drawing a parallel between them, because they were used in reference to different linguistic systems.

Danylenko maintains that Ruthenian *prostaja mova*, unlike the other terms, designated a vernacular closely related to the socially better-positioned Polish language. As for the language of early Lithuanian Tatar manuscripts, he analyzes a number of them, including one of the oldest—the LU-893 manuscript—and convincingly adduces both linguistic and extra-linguistic arguments to prove that there are no solid grounds for affirming that the manuscripts are based on the Belarusian language. Danylenko has discovered that those manuscripts "show arresting variations in spelling" and that the southern Belarusian and Volhynian-Polissian dialects shared "pure Belarusian features." But he did not find a single purely Ukrainian or purely Belarusian feature and rejects the "anachronistic uses" of the designations "Ukrainian" and "Belarusian." He concludes that the features of various levels of grammar in the LU-893 ms. can be treated both diachronically and synchronically as Polissian. Only later, from the eighteenth century onward owing to certain sociolinguistic changes, did the Lithuanian Tatar texts acquire increasingly more Belarusian features.

Danylenko notes that the distribution and representation of Ukrainian "h" and "g" "has remained a bone of contention between two groups of specialists". After giving an overview of the on-going orthographic debate, he presents historical and dialectal evidence of the use of the above letters, specifying some problems in chronology and interpretation. After comparing a number of controversial arguments, Danylenko assumes "it is not worthwhile treating the or-

thographic fluctuations in the use of "h" and "g", observable in Ukraine since the late 14th c., within the context of the West European/Latin-Polish vs. Byzantine/Russian tradition," thus leaving room for cultural and political predilections.

In part three, "To Be or to Have?," the author discusses the origin and diachronic development of the verb "have" in East Slavic, with much focus on Russian; the possessive perfect in North Russian; the possible emergence of the "Greek accusative," the "new Slavic accusative," and the "Lithuanian accusative" in the impersonal environment; and the origin of Russian *čto za*, Ukrainian *ščo za*, Polish *co za*, and German *was für ein* constructions. Since there have been no incisive studies of Slavic "have" from a developmental perspective, Danylenko tries to fill this gap, challenging the "long-standing traditional view" that Russian preserved its status as a typical *be*-language. He calls Russian a "peripheral" language compared to other Slavic languages, and he argues it can hardly be treated as a "solid *be*-language," because "the history of Russian shows a gradual penetration, originating in antiquity, of the verb 'have' into its linguistic system." Russian therefore represents a twofold split linguistic system that (dialectally or discourse-pragmatically) may exhibit either *be*- or *have*-patterning. As for Ukrainian, Danylenko claims it can also be characterized by a split in possessive patterning, with the use of predominantly *be*-constructions in the east under a possible influence of modern Russian literary norms, and with the prevailing use of *have*-constructions in the west provoked by Polish traditions. This extrapolation leaves no room for the possibility of purely indigenous linguistic developments peculiar to Ukrainian.

Danylenko shows there is a diachronic and typological difference between the "Greek accusative" and "an ostensibly identical accusative case, which developed in the impersonal environment in the Middle Polish, Ukrainian and Belarusian non-agreeing construction". To account for the introduction of what is pragmatically a new accusative case in place of the etymological nominative, he offers a different view: on the basis of morphosyntactic and morphophonemic evaluations, the "Greek accusative" is totally different from the "new Slavic accusative", which resulted from the historical activization of non-agreeing constructions. This goes against the areal interpretation of seemingly identical phenomena. While tackling the question of similarity between Slavic impersonal "syntactic isoglosses" with the accusative case and Lithuanian ones, Danylenko presents new diachronic and dialectal aspects of Lithuanian impersonals as opposed to the Polish, Ukrainian, and Belarusian, and he therefore criticizes the so-called "natural shift" from the nominative to the accusative in the impersonal environment. He suggests that given the influence of Polish on the Lithuanian dialects and literary language, the possibility of the introduction of the accusative case in the impersonal environment of the Lithuanian linguistic system arises primarily from Polish adstratum interference throughout east Lithuanian territory.

Regarding Russian *čto za*, Ukrainian *ščo za*, and Polish *co za,* Danylenko challenges the "mechanistic interpretation" that these Slavic terms are calques of

German *was für ein*. In his opinion they resulted from parallel or independent developments. It is noteworthy that not all Indo-European languages, particularly the Slavic ones, have this construction. According to. Danylenko, it exists only in those languages that followed parallel developmental lines.

Part four of the book, "Rimovъ, Balalajka, and Cossackophilism, deals with the latest revision of *Slovo o polku Igoreve*; Oleksander Potebnia's translation of Homer's *Odyssey*, his views on the Ukrainian language; and the dialectal foundations of Taras Shevchenko's language. Examining the reasons for Edward Keenan's skepticism concerning the authenticity of *Slovo,* Danylenko highlights some serious flaws in Keenan's treatment of grammatical matters—for instance, his preference for "surface interpretation" over "underlying analysis". After his defensive *démarche*, Danylenko suggests that to establish what language the original text might have been written in, it would seem necessary to make the analysis systematic, thereby combining various methods and not just making use of one chronological layer, as Keenan did.

In his article about Potebnia's translation, Danylenko premises his study on George Y. Shevelov's seminal article about Potebnia but expresses a slightly personal view about Potebnia's translation: regarding it as "an attempt to make a populist revolution in the language" in the late nineteenth century would be out of place since we know that Potebnia did not leave a single work, either literary or scholarly, in Ukrainian. Thus Potebnia seems to have acted more as an experimenter than a steadfast normalizer of the literary language. As for the place of the Ukrainian language in Potebnia's linguistics, Danylenko says it "has remained a true *terra incognita*" because it was "divorced from officially sanctioned scholarship in the Soviet Union, where Russian, as in the Tsarist Empire, was cultivated as the official language." While tackling the question of whether Potebnia was "an enemy of Russia or a traitor to the Ukrainian national idea," Danylenko convincingly shows that although his Ukrainian descent was a source of scholarly inspiration for this nineteenth-century linguist, his ethnic sympathies did not turn into nationalism proper. Rather, Potebnia remained loyal to his conception of the organic unity of Russian, based on East Slavic ethno-linguistic diversity in all its layers and manifestations, because he strongly believed the independence of Ukrainian could be measured by the distance between it and one of the adjacent languages.

After analyzing some pertinent scholarly works and several phonetic features found in Shevchenko's *oeuvre*, Danylenko has concluded that the "literary output of this famous Ukrainian poet is one of historical stages in the interplay of the two principal Ukrainian dialect groups, North Ukrainian and South Ukrainian." Therefore Danylenko posits that the formation of the new Ukrainian standard language and Shevchenko's role in its development were complex dynamic processes that are hardly reducible to the history of southeast Ukrainian only.

A few critical remarks should be made. To begin with, the book's title does not completely correspond to its contents: the articles therein are disconnected to a varying degree, and its "Islamica" aspects are discussed only in parts one and

two. The focus of part three is too much on Russian, with too many East Slavic generalizations, and therefore "in that context" one cannot gain enough understanding about Ukrainian. Also, some parts are difficult to comprehend and it is hard to follow some of Danylenko's arguments, particularly in parts one and three. Finally, there are many incongruities throughout the book in the representation of Ukrainian and Russian words and personal names (e.g., on p. 175 Danylenko incorrectly states that the Ukrainian word for "button" is *gudzik,* instead of *gudzyk*).

The most striking mistakes in terms of inconsistency and inexactitude we find in the representations of Russian words. On p. 221 the term *akan'je* is represented as *akanne* (referring apparently to Belarusian); turning the page we find *akan'e* for Russian; while on p. 364 we find *akannja* for Ukrainian. This variation can hardly be seen positively. Since the term is most characteristic of Russian, the consistent use of *akan'je* would make most sense. It should be borne in mind that *akan'je* became a completed linguistic change in the twentieth century and that it contributed to the growing discrepancy between Russian pronunciation and traditional spelling: [*a*] replaced [*o*], and this change characterizes the modern Russian standard. Forms not characterized by *akan'je* are purely dialectal. On p. 280 Russian *što* is represented as *čto* (heard only in some dialects but not in standard modern Russian). In the same vein, on p. 218 *nego* should be spelled *nievo;* and on p. 214 *uexano* should be *ujexano*; on p. 215 *zasejano* should be *zasiejano*; on p. 214 *est'* should be *jest'*, which would also be consistent with *jest''* on p. 218; on p. 214 *xleba* should be *xlieba*; and so on.

Many, if not most, Slavists have "traditionally" tended to overlook such linguistic basics; yet many Western linguists often take for granted such representations, since not all of them speak Russian or Ukrainian though they the data in those languages. It would be expedient to break with this anachronistic tradition so that those who use such data could have a sense of the true phonological difference between related yet so different linguistic codes.

Despite its lack of cohesion and its many misspellings, Danylenko's book can be recommended because of its many interesting ideas and explanations. Though they may not necessarily be logical or correct, they can serve as a basis for future research by methodologically more consistent scholars of the Ukrainian language.

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Laada Bilaniuk. *Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. 256 pp. U.S.$25.95 paper, $68.95 cloth.

This book presents an account of the bilingual situation in Ukraine, a country where institutionalization of the state language has considerably fallen into dis-

array. Professor Laada Bilaniuk has spared no effort to combine scientific thought with an up-to-date description of Ukraine's linguistic pluralism. She shows how the definition of two languages in contact, in this case Ukrainian and Russian, is determined by perduring ideological parameters intertwined with political, economic, and social interests. The book's content is truly valuable, for it sheds light on a unique sociolinguistic situation that is not found anywhere else.

In Bilaniuk's introductory chapter the reader gets a glimpse of her fieldwork experience, the approaches she has taken, her views about language mixing in Ukraine, her knowledge or understanding of certain linguistic or sociolinguistic aspects, and the main focus of her book. There Bilaniuk also specifies her position on some widespread views about Ukraine's heteroglossia. Her primary intention was to examine language ideologies and language politics in Ukraine, based on official policies and the everyday ideas and impressions of people regarding linguistic uses and values. She also examines the history and social implications of mixing and the ideologies of correction, including the symbolic markers of authenticity, culturedness, and social legitimacy.

The first part of chapter 1 is a short overview of independent Ukraine as a country torn between patriotism, Westernization, and the legacy of Sovietness and Russophilia. In Bilaniuk's view, Ukraine's complicated linguistic situation is partly due to the legacy of Soviet language policies, planning, and manipulation. The promotion of Russian cultural and linguistic "superiority" since tsarist times has led to language mixing, i.e., the emergence of a Russian-Ukrainian patois called *surzhyk*. In the process of de-Sovietization, the Russian language has not easily lost its status in Ukraine, for its value has been long ingrained in institutionalized practices and popular attitudes. In the last decade the issues of language values and language status have come to the fore there: the Russian language's prestigious status now has to compete with newly legislated and practiced behaviors favoring the Ukrainian language.

The elevation of Ukrainian has raised to some extent the social status of ethnic Ukrainians. As a result, many of those who used to speak Russian have opted to switch to Ukrainian. This has generated a new concern—linguistic correctness. Bilaniuk argues that judgments and the choice of which language to use have become the key means by which people strive to shape the emerging social order. For instance, criticizing someone's language as impure can serve to undermine their authority. Linguistic purism and the struggle in defense of Ukrainian have brought about another phenomenon—nonreciprocal bilingualism or non-accommodation.

Chapter 2 covers four biographical narratives, which Bilaniuk collected in 2002. These personal stories contain crucial examples of how and to what extent speakers of Ukrainian are marginalized. Bilaniuk argues that the construction of social values and relationships through language is a multifaceted process. The interviews she conducted reflect this to a large extent. Bilaniuk's argument is exemplified by the ideological association (a legacy of the Soviet imperial tradition)

of Ukrainian language and culture with provincialism, lower education, unculturedness, and weakness, while Russian is associated with centrality, better and higher education, high culture, and strength. She states that the attribution of these sociolinguistic features to particular languages or social groups testifies to the process of iconization, meaning that what is attributed is not true but believed, or imagined, or ideologically predetermined. Bilaniuk believes this stereotypical pattern is borne out to some degree in all four of the life histories she presents.

Chapter 3 gives a sense of Ukraine's history; the process of Ukrainian language standardization; tsarist and Soviet restrictions and concerted impositions on using that language; Soviet Ukrainization and then Russification policies, which included especially severe repression and linguistic engineering in eastern Soviet Ukraine; and the status of the Ukrainian language since independence. This chapter helps one understand the huge impact that Ukraine's domination by neighboring states has left on the country's language development.

Chapter 4 discusses the status of *surzhyk*. This "linguistic hybrid" has several variants: according to Bilaniuk, various historical, social, and ideological factors have shaped the emergence of several variants of that patois: an urbanized-peasant, a village-dialect, a Sovietized-Ukrainian, an urban-bilingual, and a post-independence *surzhyk*. She shows that what is at issue is not only the struggle of Ukrainian versus Russian, but linguistic purity and the maintenance of boundaries between these languages. Bilaniuk pays special attention in this chapter to the history of purism and language mixing in Ukraine from the eighteenth century to our day.

Chapter 5 deals with linguistic correctness as a means of according or negating people's status. The counterpoint to correctness is mixing Russian and Ukrainian, and labeling the resulting language as *surzhyk* is a way of discrediting its speakers as unworthy. Bilaniuk explains that this process has been facilitated by the poor institutionalization of Ukrainian in independent Ukraine. Control over the evaluation of language is part of the exercise of social power. Moreover, the degree of awareness and confidence in language use, based on Bilaniuk's observations, can vary considerably from one individual to another. Consequently there is disagreement over what exactly distinguishes *surzhyk* from the standard language and the degree of *surzhyk*'s legitimacy.

Of special interest is chapter 6, where Bilaniuk brings to the fore the status of Ukrainian at the turn of the twenty-first century, post-Soviet language laws, and their slow enactment. She indicates that the status of Ukrainian has definitely risen, but even in the predominantly Ukrainian-speaking western part of the country Russian television, music, and literature still have a significant presence and influence. A new paradigm in language use has emerged: "nonreciprocal bilingual interactions." Non-accommodation has become ever more frequent in urban public life, signifying the reduction in interlinguistic tensions and in overt struggles over the control of symbolic values. The role of English has also become more widespread, visible, and desirable, thus complicating Ukraine's linguistic pluralism. Viacheslav Busel's *Velykyi tlumachnyi slovnyk suchasnoi ukrainskoi movy*. (Kyiv

and Irpin, 2002), p. 1440, is a vivid example of this: it contains a great many anglicisms that have needlessly replaced native equivalents.

In her epilogue Bilaniuk outlines the events of the 2004 presidential elections and Orange Revolution. She shows that by manipulating linguistic issues and following the well-known imperialist pattern of dividing and ruling, Viktor Yanukovich and his supporters have made the most of Ukraine's interethnic differences. This chapter indicates that the language question in Ukraine is far from being resolved: the effect of the long-lasting suppression of Ukrainian is still very strong. The book's appendix presents a comparative table of Ukrainian and Russian words, enabling the reader who does not speak these languages to see a substantial difference between the two linguistic systems.

Contested Tongues is undeniably an important contribution to anthropology and linguistics, specifically on the subject of language contact. It is easy to read, interesting, and gives the reader much to think about. Its material is well organized, and in most cases the chapters' titles reflect their contents. The terminology is generally well selected and appropriately used. My comments below are by no means intended to diminish its import.

In chapter one Bilaniuk should have provided concrete linguistic examples to support some of her statements. Examples based on other bilingual situations are crucial, because they help us to understand the status of heteroglossia in Ukraine and possible future tendencies there. Given that the Ukrainian language is struggling for survival, Bilaniuk should have consulted the approaches to linguistic pluralism of Peter Mühlhäusler (in his *Pidgin & Creole Linguistics* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1986]), Suzanne Romaine (in her *Pidgin and Creole Languages* [London: Longman, 1988])., April M. S. McMahon (in her *Understanding Language Change* [Cambridge University Press, 1994]), and Darrell T. Tryon and Jean-Michel Charpentier (in their *Pacific Pidgins and Creoles: Origins, Growth and Development* [Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2004]), because they elucidate much about different sociolinguistic factors that lead to a language's death (or loss), survival, and progress. In chapter two, while dealing with the association of Ukrainian with the rural sphere and unculturedness based on one kind of narrative, Bilaniuk shows only one side of the coin. She could have collected interviews from western Ukraine as well: they would undoubtedly defy the stereotypical pattern that privileges Russian without any specific reason.

Bilaniuk indicates that some *surzhyk* speakers are conscious of speaking a non-standard form of Ukrainian, while others are not. She shows that many of them believe that Ukrainians in the central and western regions speak an impure kind of Ukrainian (or, as I have observed, they believe it to be a mixture of Ukrainian and Polish), whereas the truth is that those inhabitants simply speak Ukrainian. It is true that a degree of mixing occurs in those regions, but those who speak Ukrainian well, or at least relatively well, are aware of the Russian or Polish borrowings or interferences they use in their speech.

Bilaniuk discusses the issue of standardization from a theoretical and too general perspective. Yet Ukraine represents a special case, where the process of

standardization necessitates the actual preservation of the already existing standard (and not creating a new one) and protecting it from the linguistic chaos brought about by Soviet "bilingualism." Getting rid of the effects of the unnatural linguistic manipulations of the Soviet era is part of this process. The standard aimed for largely reflects the natural norms of Ukrainian at all levels of its grammar and the way many Ukrainians speak, including their various imperfections. But the latter should not be confused with dialectal peculiarities. Because the suppression of Ukrainian was not complete and because of other factors (e.g., the unification of most of Ukraine's territories), the last century can be characterized by the consolidation of a unitary standard language on the foundation of two minor standards: the Kyivan-Poltavian and Galician-Volhynian. It is true that any language changes constantly, but the change is normally very subtle, insignificant, and imperceptible for non-linguists.

Bilaniuk chose to investigate Ukraine's heteroglossia on the basis of general theories of language and social power developed from observations of dominant languages and relatively stable social situations. This approach seems too premature and hardly applicable to the situation of the Ukrainian language, which is far from being the dominant language (or "language of power") in Ukraine owing to the existence of strong sociolinguistic factors that play against it. From a purely linguistic point of view, Ukrainian is developing thanks to those who use it, but it is simultaneously slowly becoming extinct owing to three very powerful factors: (1) laws about its institutionalization have not been enacted properly; (2) Russian dominates in Ukraine's cognitive and cultural space; and (3) the marginalization of Ukrainian speakers by Russian speakers in many parts of Ukraine.

Strangely enough, Bilaniuk seems to be less concerned about the widespread discriminatory attitudes toward Ukrainian than about attitudes toward *surzhyk*. Although the present status of Ukrainian is not completely clear because of the rapid transformation of systems of symbolic values in Ukraine, one thing is apparent: it is still an endangered and socially unprotected language competing with the language of a huge neighbor-state that still wields much power in Ukraine. The Ukrainian language is vulnerable to political change because of rampant linguistic lawlessness; and it is struggling for survival against (post-) Soviet "bilingualism" (i.e., de facto Russification) and not for dominance. Bilaniuk overlooks this important aspect

In her discussion of the myth of the existence of Ukrainian "low or peasant" culture and Russian "high" culture in chapter two, Bilaniuk could have investigated what her interviewees understand by the expressions they blithely use, reflecting thereby the common stereotypes ingrained in the nation's mentality. And when using certain terminology, she should have provided their definitions. Also, while determining what constitutes Russian "high culture," she should also consider its opposite aspect—the ubiquitous use of *mat* (extremely filthy obscenities), from Russia's presidents on down to commoners, including teachers, which is so characteristic of Russian speakers yet non-existent in Ukrainian (see Oleksandr Taranenko, "Ukrainian and Russian in Contact: Attraction and Es-

trangement". *International Journal of the Sociology of Language,* issue 183 [2007]: 119–40). This one example makes us recall that language is a social phenomenon and that every linguistic system reflects the mentality of its speakers and their attitude to reality at all levels of its grammar. An anthropological study should investigate the question of culture in a more profound way or not touch upon it at all.

Transliteration inconsistencies are found throughout *Contested Tongues,* and there are inaccuracies in the representation of Ukrainian and Russian words, especially in the appendix. The book contains a table of two transliteration systems that Bilaniuk uses in the book (the Library of Congress and the International Linguistic) at various times and even mixes. There are also occasional typos and misspellings: e.g., *velosyped* (p. 42) instead of *velysoped; Serduchka* (p. 165) instead of *Serdiuchka*; (p. 165); *buditi* (p. 204) instead of *budite;* and *jida* (p. 206) instead of *jeda.*

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Roksolana Zorivchak. *Bolity bolem slova nashoho.* Lviv: Lvivskyi natsionalnyi universytet im. Ivana Franka, 2005. 296 pp.

It is easy to assign Professor Zorivchak's book to the category of "language culture." It obviously belongs there. But this book more than that. It is a kaleidoscope of observations about the Ukrainian language, which has been in a tough survival mode during more than seventy years of unbridled and unlimited Russification and, in post-Soviet times, subject to the pressures of "glamorous" Anglicization and Americanization. The author's intent is to provide an aid for preserving the Ukrainian language, seeing its richness, and passing it on to future generations.

The book begins with a two-page preface by Lev Poliuha, "Shchyre vbolivannia za ridne slovo." In it Prof. Poliuha summarizes the book's contents and highlights its main accomplishments. The first chapter is preceded by Zorivchak's dedication of her book to her late mother and all teachers of Ukrainian, the tireless "uchyteli-slovesnyky" (p. 9). What struck me when reading her short but important foreword, "Yak tse pochalosia ... Zamist peredmovy," is that there is an invisible line of Ukrainianness along which cultural traditions are passed on to succeeding generations. Zorivchak's mother taught her Shevchenko's poetry, and by the age of five the author was reciting it on stage. My own situation was identical: my mother also taught me Shevchenko's poetry, and at exactly the same age I too was on stage reciting Shevchenko.

Zorivchak's book is a collection or summary of her articles first published in the Ukrainian-American newspaper *Narodnia volia* (Scranton). The first chapter consists of three sections, on lexico-grammatical peculiarities, linguostylistics, and problems of sociolinguistics. Zorivchak continues the Ukrainian tradition of writing about *kultura movlennia* by mentioning her predecessors and colleagues,

including O. Kurylo, M. Sulyma, M. Hladky, S. Smerechynsky, N. Klymenko, S. Yermolenko, Ye. Chak, O. Ponomariv, and O. Serbenska (p. 15).

Combining theory with immediate practical considerations, Zorivchak blends abstractness with concreteness, generalizations, and minute observations. I shall cite only a few examples: "Kudy zh ity kupuvaty? Do kramnytsi? Mahazynu? Sklepu? Storu? Bezumovno, naidorechnishe ity do kramnytsi" (p. 18). Her choices are supported by examples from fiction and her knowledge of the languages from which a Ukrainian word is quite often incorrectly borrowed (in the above quotation, from Russian, Polish, and English). Some of her titles, for example "Yak tse 'my vybihly z tsybuli?'"(p. 22), are funny but also informative. The essay "'V Ukraini' chy 'na Ukraini'" *(*pp. 24–25) precisely answers this burning question. Zorivchak discusses "ekonomiia movlennievykh zusyl"(pp. 26–27), supporting her point, as always, with numerous examples from contemporary Ukrainian. One of the essays is called "Pro pochuttia miry u vzhyvanni zapozychenykh sliv" (pp. 29–30). Considering concrete examples, such as *kolaboratsiia* vs. *spivpratsia* (pp. 30–31), she convincingly shows the advantages of the latter word and the shortcomings and imperfections of the former one. A list of absolutely ungrounded and incorrect English words transplanted into Ukrainian is provided on pp. 31–32.

Zorivchak warns against the excessive use of "i" in words that do not have it: "Ne zavzhdy litera 'i' – oznaka ukrainskosti: inkoly – nehramotnosti." She provides examples: *chitky* should be *chotky*; *blahoslovinnia*, *blahoslovennia*; and *Uspinnia Bohorodytsi*, *Uspennia Bohorodytsi* (p. 53). Zorivchak's explanations are always concise, semantically motivated, and verified: "Semantychna struktura slova 'benket' uzhe samo soboiu vkliuchaie poniattia 'sviatkovist', 'urochystist', i tomu vysliv 'sviatkovyi benket' – tse vzhe zaive bahatoslivia, shcho nikoly ne ye oznakoiu ni vytonchenoho styliu, ni dystsypliny dumky" (pp. 53–54).

Zorivchak explains the differences between *natovp* and *hromada* on pp. 54–55. Quite often even native speakers of Ukrainian do not delve into all semantic nuances and intricacies of certain Ukrainian words, and therefore the role of books such as this one is to help understand and properly use a certain word. Zorivchak's observations are precise and to the point: "Chy mozhna 'zustrichatysia (zustritysia)' bez zustrichi?" (pp. 84–85). She pays close attention to authentic Ukrainian forms, for example, *zavshyrshky*, *zavvyshky*, and *zavdovzhky*, which have quite often been replaced by the Russianisms *shyrynoiu*, *vysotoiu*, *dovzhynoiu* (p. 86). Zorivchak speaks about the unique function of the vocative case in contemporary Ukrainian and its importance (pp. 89–90). She warns against unnecessarily capitalizing adjectives formed from proper nouns, such as *ukrainskyi, anhliiskyi,* and *kanadskyi,* commenting that the incorrect adjective *kanadiiskyi* arose under the influence of the English language.

Most of Zorivchak's essays are based on her reaction to the language of the Ukrainian press in the West and of the impact of English on Ukrainian there. She explains that "Ukrainska mova ne naduzhyvaie prysviinymy zaimennykamy" (pp. 92–93) and "Uzhyvannia pasyvnykh konstruktsii zamist aktyvnykh v ukrainskykh tekstakh – os de interferentsiia rosiiskoi ta anhliiskoi mov vidchuvaietsia osoblyvo rizko" (p. 99). On pages 101–102 we find an important

comment titled "Ne unykaimo pryslivnykiv!" In her section on linguostylistics (pp. 115–161) Zorivchak makes interesting observations that "Use piznaietsia v porivnianni" and about "Bibleizmy v nashomu movlenni," "Zaivyi puryzm u movi," and so on.

Zorivchak pays constant attention to the dynamics of the Ukrainian language, its development, and its improvement: "Oskilky mova bezperervno rozvyvaietsia, razom iz neiu v postiinomu rusi perebuvaie i ii frazeolohichnyi fond" (p. 141). Her subsections "Vid bereznia do bereznia …" and "Pro chudovi litni misiatsi lypen i serpen" will be especially useful for instructors of the Ukrainian language in Canada. "Pro slovo khlib u nashii movi" and "Pro slovo 'volia' v ukrainskii movi" are examples of this.

In Zorivchak's discussion of "Problemy sotsiolinhvistyky" (pp. 162–86), her second essay consists of several parts—"Rozdumy nad prochytanym, pochutym, pobachenym," "Ukrainskyi khudozhnii pereklad u natsiietvorchykh vymirakh," and "Shevchenkove slovo v anhlomovnomu sviti." The third essay in that section, "Zhyttia dukhovnoho osnova," includes citations from Ukrainian and world literature.

The book ends with Andrii Sodomora's afterword and with information about Zorivchak's pedagogical and research activity. I highly recommend it to teachers and students of the Ukrainian language, especially those living outside Ukraine. Unfortunately the book will not be widely available, for only five hundred copies were printed.

<div style="text-align:right">

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Edyta Bojanowska. *Nikolai Gogol: Between Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007. ix, 448 pp. U.S.$68.50.

Edyta Bojanowska's ambitious and thoughtful study could not be timelier. Published as the bicentennial of Gogol's birth was drawing closer, her monograph provides a lucid, powerfully argued antidote to the surge of questionable uses of the writer's legacy that have unfortunately marked this anniversary, particularly in Russia—most evident in Vladimir Bortko's notoriously manipulative film adaptation of *Taras Bulba.* By contrast, Bojanowska's clear-eyed, nonpartisan reading arguably constitutes the most thorough undoing of stereotypes about Gogol's ideology that have dominated much of Russian, as well as Western, Russian-influenced, academic discourse about the writer. At the same time, she is attentive to, if at times respectfully critical of, academic readings of Gogol that have originated within Ukrainian studies. It would not be an exaggeration to call this study a major paradigm shift in Western academic discourse on Gogol.

The theoretical framework of Bojanowska's volume combines the tradition of careful close reading with an engagement with the rich interdisciplinary tradition of Western critiques of imperialist ideology, as well as with the insights of

postcolonial theory and colonial-discourse analysis. Never overloaded with dense jargon or copious references to academic flavors of the month, her text offers a balanced and attentive reading of nationalism as an intellectual discourse as it developed and manifested itself in Gogol's writings. Bojanowska is careful to insist that her subject is not an "archeology" of the author's consciousness; instead, her book "focuses on the nationalist discourse of Gogol's *texts* and avoids the question of his personal national identity" (p. 6, Bojanowska's emphasis). Her principal conclusions are that Gogol's Ukrainian nationalism "ran stronger than is commonly assumed" (p. 5); that his intellectual outlook combined a Russian imperial patriotism manifested in "a civic commitment to furthering the welfare and glory of the Russian realm"; that his Ukrainianness "determined his cultural identity and a sense of ethnic belonging," which "represented his inner refuge until the end of his life"; and that the latter "doomed his civic project of Russian nationalism" (p. 6). In other words, Gogol's writings, in Bojanowska's view, participated in the discourses of *both* nationalisms, and she therefore voices a surprise that while the Ukrainian academic discourse has long argued for Gogol's place within the Ukrainian literary tradition, he is almost never claimed for Ukrainian *nationalism*—a situation she believes stems from an either-or thinking about nationalism as a discourse, since Gogol's participation in the project of Russian nationalism is undeniable. Moreover, Bojanowska boldly states that "Gogol's Russian nationalism does not strike [her] as a deeply felt conviction but, rather, as an artificial aspect of his public persona" (p. 258).

Underpinning this book is an understanding of nationalism "as a discourse of educated elites that articulates the *idea* of the nation" but is "not predicated upon the existence of national political movements or national identity" (pp. 9–10, Bojanowska's emphasis); for her, as for many contemporary theorists, nationalisms precede nations and national identities. As befits a work of discourse analysis, Bojanowska views Gogol's textual legacy "as a palimpsest that records its own becoming rather than a fixed, authoritative end product"; she is highly critical of the tendentious editing of Gogol's texts found in the canonical editions of his works. Bojanowska argues that Ukrainian nationalism followed a Herderian paradigm, where nations are viewed as "organic communities shaped by … geographic settings and linked through culture, history, and language" (p. 37).

By contrast, Russian nationalism has always had a strong emphasis on the power of the imperial state and thus was closer to a Hegelian model; the Russian imperial and national projects thus fused with each other. Within these projects the question of the separateness of a Ukrainian identity has always been a particularly painful issue. As Bojanowska rightly notes, "declarations of Ukraine's synonymy with Russia" rest "less on any factual assessment than on a force of conviction that it was such an excellent idea" (p. 27). However, the case of Gogol's Ukrainian-themed writings, she argues, deserves a more nuanced perspective than is commonly accorded; in Bojanowska's view, they are a complex, potentially subversive case of an interaction between the imperial core and colonial periphery. Seen in postcolonial perspective, she argues, "the language of *Evenings on a Farm* represents an instance of a peripheral patois that invades

the culture of the imperial center" (p. 41), while Rudy Panko's "autoethnographic farce" comes to serve "as a shield for anti-imperial rhetoric" (p. 48) and an accentuation of a separate identity.

Through its discourse of Ukrainian nationalism, Bojanowska argues, "*Evenings on a Farm* … transcends a classic colonial scenario and inverts imperial hierarchies" (p. 76). In general, she offers an impressively thorough and original reading of the *Dikanka* and *Mirgorod* cycles, as well as of Gogol's non-fictional writings on Ukrainian and general history penned in the first half of the 1830s. The year 1836, for Bojanowska, marks a watershed in Gogol's career, as his primary ideological focus shifts from a Ukrainian to a Russian nationalism; however, the latter project came with a lot of pain, frustration, and questionable results.

In the section of her book focused on Gogol's Russian-themed texts, primarily *The Government Inspector* and *Dead Souls*, Bojanowska draws attention to the relentlessly grim portrayal of Russia in Gogol's fictional writings; for him, Russia lacks national character and is defined by the dominance of its huge and corrupt government bureaucracy. Even though for most interpreters of these writings Gogol's primary focus was social critique, Bojanowska argues that the critique is also national. For her *Dead Souls* "makes ample use of nationalistic terms but withholds nationalistic content, offering a grim account of the national status quo" (p. 171). The novel, in the scholar's colorful description, "portrays Russia as a drab, fragmented, soulless realm, inhabited by scoundrels and idiots, as it simultaneously strains to send an awe-inspiring message about Russia's greatness and future potential"; as a result, the text "continuously balances on the edge of parody" (p. 214).

One of Bojanowska's greatest successes in this book is her chapter on the 1842 redaction of *Taras Bulba*, its difference from the text's 1835 version, and its place within the evolution of Gogol's nationalist discourse. She zeroes in on the text's fundamental paradox: this work, the only one in Gogol's fictional oeuvre where the ideology of Russian nationalism is integral to the actual narrative, is Ukrainian in its theme, focus, and background. The novel, Bojanowska argues, served as Gogol's symbolic sacrifice of his Ukrainian nationalism on the altar of the Russian one (p. 256). However, Gogol's text also features repeated instances of subversion and interrogation of the very Russian nationalism it tries to proclaim: as "the nationalist strand of the narrative ends with triumphalist rhetoric, its human dimension features a record of profound losses and moral blindness" (p. 279). Only in the final chapter does the 1842 *Bulba* mute ideological complexities "to summon the spirit of nationalistic apotheosis" (p. 292).

Overall Edyta Bojanowska's book is a stunning achievement that ought to radically alter the course of Gogol scholarship in the West. The book also impresses with its thorough reference apparatus and an admirable lack of misprints and transliteration errors. This volume deserves a wide academic readership, and selections from the text would make for excellent background reading for university courses at a wide variety of levels. I am surprised that the publisher has not released it in a paperback edition. As for the content of the volume, my only regret is that the author at times shies away too much from engaging in a theo-

retical debate. For example, only on the final page of the main text does the notion of the "cultural hybrid" finally surface in the book, while it could have provided an additional powerful tool for her much-needed argument.

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Яр Славутич. *Дослідження та статті. Розстріляна муза — Меч і перо — Українська література на Заході.* Едмонтон: Slavuta, 2006. Два томи в одному: 504, 484 стор.

Яр Славутич — людина фантастичної долі. Він зумів пережити і більшовицькі репресії 1930-х років, і жахливий Голодомор 1933 р. і німецьку займанщину, коли він у лісах північної України організував Чернігівську Січ. Певно, на основі фактів його життя можна було б написати не один захоплюючий роман.

А ще Яр Славутич поєднує в одній особі літературознавця й літератора. Поєднання, яке не часто зустрічається, але яке дає можливість літературознавцю-досліднику не просто віднаходити й групувати факти, систематизуючи і осмислюючи їх, а й «розуміти зсередини», дивитися на них очима творця.

Збірник Яра Славутича «Дослідження та статті» — підсумок багатолітньої наукової праці цього автора. Відкривається вона монографічним дослідженням «Розстріляна муза», в якій розповідається про репресованих українських письменників, починаючи з 1930-х років і закінчуючи останніми роками існування СРСР. Яр Славутич виходить з того, що письменники, зокрема поети, в умовах української бездержавності брали на себе роль національних ідеологів та провідників: «Поети, в першу чергу — допомагали формувати українську націю, свідому власної самобутности. Недарма Маланюк проголосив у своєму "Посланії": "Як в нації вождя нема, тоді вожді її поети"». Тому не дивно, що саме вони зазнали найбільших переслідувань з боку як більшовицьких, так і німецьких окупантів. Найбільші «жнива скорботи» для українських письменників у 1930–1940-х рр. далеко не випадкове. Яр Славутич сам міг стати однією з таких жертв. У 1938 р., будучи студентом Запорізького педагогічного інституту, і вже тоді виступаючи як поет, Яр Славутич опинився у в'язниці за читання віршів О. Олеся та прози В. Винниченка. На щастя, його викупила рідна мати за червінця й продукти.

Над книжкою «Розстріляна муза» автор працював довгий час. Спочатку в 1945–1955 рр. У 1955 р. перше її видання побачило світ у Детройті. Друге видання, яке Яр Славутич доопрацьовував у 1990–1992 рр. з'явилося у 1992 р. уже в незалежній Україні, в м. Києві. При цьому автор зазначав, що далеко не всі втрати задокументовані. На початку 1990-х рр. вказана робота Яра Славутича викликала в Україні значний розголос. Адже в ній

були представленні не лише списки репресованих письменників, а й біо-
графічні нариси про декого з них. Ці письменники в Радянській Україні,
здебільшого, були під забороною і про них тут майже не знали. Незважа-
ючи на те, що книжка «Розстріляна муза» з'явилася більше ніж п'ятдесят
років тому, вона не втратила своєї злободенности.

Не менш цікавою є вміщена в збірнику книжка «Меч і перо», що по-
бачила світ у Києві в 1992 р. Туди ввійшли літературознавчі нариси про
деяких письменників, які, на думку автора, боронили не лише словом, а й
своїми активними діями українську націю. Починається збірка нарисом
«Гетьман Сагайдачний у віршах К. Саковича». Цікавим є дослідження
«Пісня козака Плахти — перша українська друкована балада (1625)». Автор
тут показує, що вже з кінця XVI — початку XVII ст. до нас дійшли поетичні
твори, які мовно майже не відрізняються від сучасних українських творів.
Деякі з них навіть були надруковані. У нас же до сьогоднішнього часу по-
ширена думка, ніби першим друкованим твором українською мовою була
«Енеїда» І. Котляревського. Дослідження Яра Славутича «Пісня козака
Плахти» показує, що такі твори в нас були ще в XVII ст.

Не менше цікавою, але дещо незвичною, є розвідка «Гетьман І. Мазепа
як поет». Автор, спираючись на джерела, показує, що Мазепа був не лише
поетичним військовим діячем, а й мав мистецький хист і залишив після
себе кілька поетичних творів.

У книжці автор приділяє велику увагу творчості Т. Шевченка (тут навіть
вміщено його роботу «поетика Шевченка») та І. Франка. Окремі нариси при-
свячені творчості Г. Сковороди, М. Гоголя, Лесі Українки, В. Винниченка,
В. Стефаника, Б. Лепкого, Б. І. Антонича, Є. Маланюка, М. Ореста, О.
Лятуринської, Л. Мосендза, О. Ольжича, Ю. Клена, І. Світличного, В. Стуса,
С. Караванського та інших. Завершує книжку об'ємне дослідження «Голо-
домор в українській літературі на Заході».

Незважаючи на, здавалось би, різноплановість статтей книжки «Меч і
перо», вона має концептуальну єдність. Суть її пояснює автор у своїй перед-
мові до цієї книжки: «Годиться сказати кілька слів про концептуальність
автора. Хоч вона не виражалася в окремих статтях, усе ж таки протягом
усього часу жила в мені виразна настанова, що символічно засвідчена в
успадкованому гербі власному. Меч — оборона національної літератури та її
питомих особливостей, також насвітлення її стану під царським, опісля під
радянським устроєм. Перо з павича символізує для мене естетичну
категорію нашого письменства, показ його краси й майстерности. Оці дві
риси авторської концептуальности, проходячи рівнобіжно, часто пере-
пліталися в процесі дослідницької праці».

Друга частина книжки «Дослідження та статті» присвячена українському
українському культурному, передусім літературному, життю в Канаді. На
жаль, в Україні про цю літературу знають мало. Тим не менше, як показує
Яр Славутич, вона є багатою і різноплановою. Характеризуючи український
літературний процес у Канаді, Яр Славутич звертається до характеристики

творчости численних українсько-канадських письменників, поетів, драматургів. Його збірник «Українська література в Канаді», де висвітлюються ці питання, є першою україномовною дослідницькою працею на цю тему.

Перебуваючи на еміграції спочатку у США, а потім в Канаді, Яр Славутич викладав як доктор славістичних наук українську мову (переважно для канадських українців). Зрозуміло, його цікавили й суто мовні питання, в т.ч. й функціонування української мови в Канаді. Власне, питання і розглядаються в заключній частині збірника

Загалом, у збірнику багато корисного для себе знайдуть і українські літературознавці і мовники. Але не лише вони. Збірник знадобиться всім, хто цікавиться українською культурою і відчуває до неї причетність.

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Ivan Franko. *Behind Decorum's Veil*. Translated by Roma Franko. Edited by Sonia Morris. [Saskatoon]: Language Lanterns Publications, 2006. 406 pp. $14.95.

Ivan Franko. *Turbulent Times: A Trilogy*. Vol. 1. *Winds of Change*. Translated by Roma Franko. Edited by Sonia Morris. [Saskatoon]: Language Lanterns Publications, 2006. 350 pp. $14.95.

Ivan Franko. *Turbulent Times: A Trilogy*. Vol. 2. *Beacons in the Darkness*. Translated by Roma Franko. Edited by Sonia Morris. [Saskatoon]: Language Lanterns Publications, 2006. 448 pp. $14.95.

Ivan Franko. *Turbulent Times: A Trilogy*, Vol. 3. *Fateful Crossroads*. Translated by Roma Franko. Edited by Sonia Morris. [Saskatoon: Language Lanterns Publications, 2006. 384 pp. $14.95.

The year 2006 was a jubilee year—the sesquicentennial of Ivan Franko's birth. That year a number of scientific conferences were devoted to the great writer; concerts in his memory were held; new editions of some of his works were issued; new studies of his life and works were published; new monuments to him were erected; and the old ones were visited and adorned with flowers and wreaths. But the best and most lasting commemoration that year was, in my opinion, the four volumes of Roma Franko's English translations of Ivan Franko's prose, issued by the small Canadian publishing house Language Lanterns.

The first book of Franko's works translated into English was the 1948 poetry collection *Ivan Franko: The Poet of Western Ukraine,* selected and translated by

Percival Cundy, an English-born Presbyterian missionary in Canada, who taught himself Ukrainian and became one of the pioneer translators of Ukrainian literature, especially of Franko and Lesia Ukrainka. Cundy's detailed and extensive biographical introduction to Franko in that volume remains one of the longest and best such studies in the English language. Since then a few of Franko's novels have been translated into English by Theodosia Boresky (*Zakhar Berkut*), Fainna Solasko (*Boa Constrictor*), and Mary Skrypnyk (*Koly shche zviri hovoryly*, *Zakhar Berkut*); and many of his selected stories have been translated by John Weir, Anatole Bilenko, Zonia Keywan, Cecilia Dalway, Oles Kovalenko, and others. Franko's long narrative poems were translated into English by Adam Hnidj (*Ivan Vyshensky*, *Moisei*, *Panski zharty*, and *Lys Mykyta*), Roman Orest Tatchyn (*Panski zharty, Ivan Vyshensky, Moisei*), Bohdan Melnyk (*Lys Mykyta*), Vera Rich (*Moisei*), and Roman Bohdan Karpishka (*Lys Mykyta*). His selected poems have been translated by Percival Cundy, Waldimir Semenyna, John Weir, Constantine Andrusyshen and Watson Kirkconnell, Mary Skrypnyk, Michael M. Naydan, Orysia Prokopiw, and others. Thus Franko's most important works, both in poetry and prose, are now available in English translation. With Language Lanterns' publication of the four volumes under review, Franko has become the Ukrainian writer most widely translated into English.

Language Lanterns was established in 1996 by two then recently retired sisters in Saskatoon, who set themselves the goal of preparing and providing English translations of Ukrainian literature for a wide reading audience. One of the sisters, the late Sonia Morris (1933–2007, née Stratychuk) was educated at McGill University, the University of Saskatchewan, and Columbia University; she taught for over thirty years in the College of Education at the University of Saskatchewan, where she served as assistant dean and head of the Department of Educational Psychology. Her younger sister, Roma Franko (no relation to Ivan Franko), studied at the universities of Saskatchewan and Toronto (Ph.D. in Ukrainian literature, 1990); for many years she taught Ukrainian and Russian language courses and Ukrainian literature and served as head of the departments of Slavic Studies and Modern Languages and Literatures at the University of Saskatchewan. Until her death Sonia Morris served as Language Lanterns' editor and business manager. Roma Franko selected and translated all of the works they published.

Language Lanterns debuted with six volumes of short fiction by Ukrainian women writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first two books in this series, containing stories by Olena Pchilka and Nataliya Kobrynska and Dniprova Chaika and Lyubov Yanovska respectively, appeared in 1998. Volumes 3 and 4, containing stories by Olha Kobylianska and Yevheniya Yaroshynska and Hrytsko Hryhorenko (pseud. of Oleksandra Sudovshchykova-Kosach) and Lesya Ukrainka, followed in 1999. The last two volumes in that series were published in 2000. That "feminist" series was followed by three volumes of stories by contemporary Ukrainian writers—a children's book by Yaroslav Stelmakh, a collection of short stories by Anatoliy Dimarov, and a book of prose about the 1932–33 famine-

genocide in Ukraine by Dimarov, Yevhen Hutsalo and Olena Zvychaina (2002)—and two volumes of stories by Ukrainian male authors of the years 1880–1920 (2004).

The large number of books that Sonia Morris and Roma Franko issued in just one decade is astonishing—more than the total literary output in English translation by Dnipro Publishers in Kyiv! The two sisters' productivity and perseverance is a splendid testimony to what private initiative, a far-sighted plan, and industrious dedication can accomplish. All of the translating and editing were labor of love for them: they not only did all of their work without compensation, but also financed the whole enterprise. Inspired by their example, private donors contributed smaller sums, and Roma Franko's sons funded the printing of one of the Franko volumes. Language Lanterns has also received publication grants for some of its volumes from the Ukrainian Canadian Foundation of Taras Shevchenko (Winnipeg); the Ukrainian Community Society of Ivan Franko (Richmond, British Columbia); and the Ukrainian Studies Foundation of British Columbia (Vancouver).

As is well known, nowadays book publishing is not always a lucrative business, even for established mainstream publishers. Books, like any other product, need to be widely advertised and promoted; yet such publicity is expensive and does not always produce the desired result in terms of sales. In addition, most libraries have undergone serious reductions in their book-buying budgets and have been forced to be more selective in their purchases. Under such conditions, it is unrealistic to expect that any small publishing house specializing in translations Ukrainian literature would have a chance of survival were it not for personal and institutional subsidies. Yet, Language Lanterns is not just a publishing enterprise, but also a philanthropic institution. Besides providing free labor and their own money to run Language Lanterns, Sonia Morris and Roma Franko donated, handled, and mailed gratis sets of their translated volumes to sixty-seven American and forty-eight Canadian university and college libraries, seventy-eight public libraries in Canada, and forty-three libraries and institutions in Ukraine at their own expense.

All four of the books under review here are good-sized. They contain Sonia Morris's brief introductions and glossaries, and Roma Franko's translations of Ivan Franko's novels *Dlia domashnoho ohnyshcha, Osnovy suspilnosty, Velykyi shum, Perekhresni stezhky, Lel i Polel,* and *Ne spytavshy brodu* and his short stories "Hryts i panych," "Rizuny," and "Heroi po nevoli." If one considers that Language Lanterns issued over ten other volumes of Ukrainian short fiction before 2006 (again, all of them translated into English by Roma Franko), which included seven stories by Ivan Franko (three in *Passion's Bitter Cup* [2004] and four in *Riddles of the Heart* [2004]) and that two forthcoming volumes will include eight other short stories by him, one can appreciate what a great contribution Roma Franko and Sonia Morris have made to Franko studies in the English language. Although her husband, Stefan, is not a direct descendant of the great

writer and scholar, Roma Franko's dedication, discipline, and productivity as a translator is reminiscent of her famous namesake.

Roma Franko's translations differ somewhat from the earlier translations of Ivan Franko's prose. Soviet publishers published only stories that dealt with the life of peasants and workers, preferably those that were revolutionary in spirit and reflected some aspect of the class struggle. By contrast, most of the works in the four volumes under review depict members of the middle class, intelligentsia, nobility, and mercantile class in nineteenth-century Habsburg-ruled Western Ukraine, a multinational society comprised of Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, and, to a lesser extent, German-speaking Austrians.

Behind Decorum's Veil contains two novels: *For the Home Hearth* (a translation of *Dlia domashnoho ohnyshcha*) and *Pillars of Society* (*Osnovy suspilnosty*). Both titles carry an obvious irony. *For the Home Hearth* is surprisingly timely, and the reader who knows Franko only from what he read and was taught while attending Ukrainian Saturday school will be greatly surprised by this suspenseful crime story dealing with an international prostitution racket. It is not populated by peasants or factory workers, but by Austro-Hungarian military officers and their wives. Franko originally wrote the novel in Polish in 1892 while working as a journalist for the Polish daily *Kurjer Lwowski*. That text was not published during his lifetime. But Franko also completed a version in Ukrainian, which was first published in 1897. The two versions have minor differences; both are in the fullest edition of Franko's works, *Zibrannia tvoriv u p'iatdesiaty tomakh,* vol. 19 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1979), 7–143, 353–486.

Pillars of Society is another crime story, but one based on a real event: it is about an impoverished lady of the manor who was accused of plotting the murder of a rich priest who was her lover. Her trial in 1889 attracted considerable attention and became a sensation throughout Galicia. Franko attended the trial as a correspondent for *Kurjer Lwowski* and used what he learned there as subject matter for his novel. The journal *Zhytie i slovo* published it in eleven installments beginning in 1894. But Franko never completed the novel.

Winds of Change, the first volume of *Turbulent Times: A Trilogy*, contains the 90–page novella "Hryts and the Young Lord" ("Hryts i panych "), the stories "The Cutthroats" ("Rizuny"), and "The Involuntary Hero" ("Heroi po nevoli"), and Franko's 148–page novel *The Raging Tempest* (*Velykyi shum*) These works depict social conditions in Galicia in the years 1846–48, including serfdom and its abolition, the insurrections of the 1840s, the struggle for national rights, and the beginnings of democratic reforms in the Habsburg Empire. Of special interest is the portrayal of interethnic relations, such as the Polish nobles' attempts to gain the support of Ukrainian peasants in their plans for their insurrection. In his introduction to a collection of these works published in 1903, Ivan Franko emphasized their historical background but also the differences between a historical study and a belletristic work. A writer may use historical documents, but a work of art must have its own life and the writer must depict the human soul in all its struggles, passions, triumphs and defeats. Franko's successful and dramatic por-

trayal of his heroes and their actions makes it easier for the reader to understand what transpired in Western Ukraine during those turbulent years.

Volume 2 of the trilogy, *Beacons in the Darkness,* contains two novels: *Unknown Waters (Ne spytavshy brodu)* and *Lel and Polel (Lel i Polel).* Franko never finished *Ne spytavshy brodu,* but parts of it were published during his lifetime and later reconstructed and published as a unit in 1927. A story about a Ukrainian man in love with a Polish woman, it depicts the relations between Polish landlords, the educated sons of Ukrainian peasants, and Jewish merchants in Galicia. Franko originally wrote *Lel and Polel* in Polish for a literary competition sponsored by the newspaper *Kurjer Warszawski.* The journal *Zoria* rejected the Ukrainian version in 1888, and it remained unpublished until 1929. The novel's first part deals rather effectively with two urban juvenile delinquents who end up in prison. The rest of the novel less convincingly depicts their actions as mature Ukrainian patriots who end up competing for the love of the same woman.

Volume 3 of the trilogy contains *Fateful Crossroads (Perekhresni stezhky),* a 361-page novel set in a late nineteenth-century Western Ukrainian city. Its dramatis personae are a young Ukrainian bachelor who has opened a law practice in the city; the mayor, who is an assimilated Jewish doctor cum Polish patriot; a shady courthouse clerk who tortures and abuses his wife; the lawyer's Ukrainian peasant clients; a Ukrainian village priest; the Polish landlord being sued by the peasants; a building custodian cum informer; an Orthodox Jewish financier; an Austrian county clerk; a lord marshal and a judge, both of whom speak German and represent the authorities; and a mystery woman from the young lawyer's past. There is suspense, romance, intrigue, and murder. The novel has a clear ideological bent: it shows a smart Ukrainian intellectual in his fight to promote social justice by educating illiterate and ignorant peasants. Though written in 1900, it reads well and retains its appeal in translation a century later.

In all of her translations, Roma Franko uses contemporary colloquial English, occasionally introducing, in parentheses, an English translation of a foreign phrase or an untranslatable Ukrainian expression. Occasionally she abbreviates or breaks up sentences. Sometimes she omits an entire paragraph—e.g., in *Behind Decorum's Veil,* p. 91, where Franko cites the names of the old streets of Lviv.

Here are some examples of Roma Franko's translation style:
"[H]is brisk, assured movements bore witness to the military discipline that had become part and parcel of his very being" (in the Ukrainian original the passage reads: "bystri i pevni rukhy svidchyly pro viiskovu dystsyplinu, shcho vviishla, tak skazaty, v krov i nervy");
"'Humbly reporting, captain. I am here'" ("Melduiu pokirno, pane kapitane, shcho ya ye");
"A very strict military type" ("Duzhe hostra sharzha");
"And did you drink any whiskey?" ("A horilku pyv?");

"And he was filled with a desire to flee still farther from the world, to leave behind all vestiges of civilization" ("I vin zabazhav shche dali vtekty vid svitu, zdychity zovsim");

"But Lady Olimpiya was already going about her morning routine" ("A pani Olimpiia tym chasom uzialasia do svoiei tualety").

Words or names that Sonia Morris felt required explanation are marked with asterisks, which refer the reader to the glossary at the end of each volume. It would have been helpful if Morris had indicated the sources of the translated texts, because there are textual differences between the various editions of Franko's works. For example, "She had ordered ... from the tenant farmer, a Jew who leased the manor yard along with the cattle" is a translation of "I os vona zamovyla u zhyda, shcho orenduvav dvirske pole vraz iz khudoboiu," found in Franko's *Zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 19. In contrast, the same sentence in the 1960 New York edition of Franko's works has "v pakhtaria" instead of "u zhyda." There are other occurances of "u zhyda" in the 1979 Kyiv edition but not in the 1960 edition, where "v kramaria" and "sobi" appear instead. As for "Oh, he's a sly fox! He's a Jew, right? Well, that's to be understood," again translated from the 1979 edition ("O, se khytryi lys! Pevno, zhyd? Nu, rozumiietsia!"), this passage is not in the New York edition.

In my opinion, Roma Franko should have rendered all Polish and German names in their proper Polish or German forms rather than transliterating them from the Ukrainian. Hence Anelya should have been Aniela; Yuliya, Julia; Redlikh, Redlich; Hirsh, Hirsch; and Shternberg, Sternberg. But her attempts to provide rhymed verse translations of some Ukrainian folk songs (side by side with the originals) are commendable. The same is true of her translations of some Polish and German folklore. However, printing the original Polish documents on pp.135 and 249–50 of *Winds of Change* seems superfluous to me: the book is, after all not a historical treatise but a work of fiction, and her translation would have sufficed.

Language Lanterns publications can be ordered on-line from www .languagelanterns.com, www.ukrainianbookstore.com, and www.amazon.com. They can also be purchased from various bookstores in Canada, the United States, Australia, and Britain and several Ukrainian-Canadian community institutions. For a list, see www.languagelanterns.com/order.htm.

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Marta Tarnawsky
Philadelphia

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Maksym Rylsky. *Autumn Stars: The Selected Lyric Poetry*. Translated, with a translator's introduction and notes, by Michael M. Naydan. Introduction by Maria Zubrytska. Lviv: Litopys, 2008. 300 pp.

The appearance of a volume of translated Ukrainian poetry is an extraordinary publishing event. There are not very many such events, so any new volume merits serious attention. Michael Naydan is one of very few individuals with the

inclination, skills, and resources to undertake such an exploit, and he deserves recognition for his accomplishments in this field.

Maksym Rylsky was a wonderfully melodious lyric poet, the kind who readers are prompted to speak of in terms of a divinely endowed talent rather than hard work and training. Like a character in an animated fairytale, Rylsky seemed to speak in poetic garlands whenever he wrote something. That is, of course, merely an impression. Rylsky actually worked very hard at his poetry. By the time he died at the age of sixty-nine in 1964, he had produced over thirty-five books of poetry. His output included not only his own lyric verse, but also many very successful translations into Ukrainian, among them his famous translation of Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz*.

Autumn Stars contains seventy-eight poems from eight collections published between 1910 and 1929 and eleven more poems from various periods of Rylsky's life. This bilingual, Ukrainian-English, volume evokes a mixed response. The overwhelming majority of the poems are short: only five of them are longer than a page. Of the five, only one, "Zhaha"/"Thirst," is truly an extended meditation (in this case, on the horrors of the Second World War). The rest keep to the lyric timbre that is natural to Rylsky's voice and dominates in this volume, in keeping with its subtitle, "The Selected Lyric Poetry."

What specific criteria were applied to justify the restriction implied by the definite article in that subtitle is unclear. A selection of only eighty-nine from what must be hundreds, if not thousands, of poems Rylsky composed in his lifetime is necessarily subjective. The poems Naydan selected to translate do not elicit any particular objections. His explicit choice to favor Rylsky's earlier works, written before the poet's fateful decision to save himself and to hew to the Stalinist Party line, may indeed leave out some interesting works, but attenuating his "politically incorrect" poetry is a time-honored tradition among those who cherish this author's dulcet harmonies. To Rylsky's disadvantage, his later political poetry was overplayed in Soviet times, and the pendulum has now naturally swung in the opposite direction. The small selection under review here is not the place to canonize a new, untested balance.

The depreciation of Rylsky's political poetry in this volume has not left the reader with an apolitical poet. On the contrary, the introductory essays, one by the translator and a second by Maria Zubrytska, focus precisely on the political tribulations in Rylsky's life. Naydan's brief essay emphasizes Rylsky's arrest in 1931 and the terror in which it left him for the rest of his life. Zubrytska's more substantial introduction develops a comparison between Rylsky's early and late poetry, between his purely lyric verse and his political servilism, and, as Zubrytska puts it, "between the world of the creative imagination and the other not very appealing world of reality" (p. 18).

With this volume in hand, the reader may well wonder what all the fuss is about, since by and large it includes only the earlier lyrics. The discussion of Rylsky's political works is not substantiated by a broad selection of his later poetry, so the reader is left with a description of the author based on criteria and

poems that are not actually in the volume. Moreover, a hidden assumption here implies that Rylsky's stature as a poet is somehow enhanced by his political suffering. In fact, of course, poetry is not properly measured by its political orientation or by the suffering of its creators. Rylsky's reputation is deservedly large because he is a master of sound and form, and not because of the themes he chooses, be they political demagoguery or his more usual focus on happiness in life's joys, awe at nature's beauty, and quiet recollection of emotion.

The success of the translations in this volume varies largely in accordance with the technical complexity of the melodic composition of the original. Naydan keeps close to the words and meanings of the originals, but Rylsky's strength is sound and meter, not semantics. English lyric poetry often uses the enormous depth of the language's lexical base to capture the tenderness and finesse that other languages can achieve with sounds and syntactic flexibility. That approach is not evident in these translations. The reader of this collection will get a good sense of Rylsky's themes, but only a distant echo of the wonderful sound of his poems.

This volume is the work of a Ukrainian-American translator and a publisher in Ukraine. It is certainly welcome news that publishers there are interested in presenting the hidden treasures of Ukrainian literature to a wider audience that does not read Ukrainian. But a publisher who is not attuned to the culture, language, and business climate of the target market has a difficult assignment. The ideological focus and occasional mistake in English here (as evidenced by the unnecessary definite article in the title and elsewhere, as well as other errors) are symptoms of a publishing venture that is not quite up to the very difficult task of publishing lyric poetry.

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Bohdan-Ihor Antonych. *The Grand Harmony*. Translated, with an introduction and notes, by Michael M. Naydan. Lviv: Litopys, 2007. 118 pp., 8 color plates.

In the early years of a very brief but productive career, Bohdan-Ihor Antonych, one of the most original Ukrainian poets of the twentieth century, produced a collection of religious poems entitled *Velyka harmoniia*. But it was not published during his lifetime and did not appear until 1967, thirty years after his death and outside his Ukrainian homeland. In the obscure and opaque world of Antonych's creativity, these poems were doubly unusual. They were explicitly Catholic rather than generally spiritual and philosophical, as was the mature Antonych's usual flavor. They were unusually colloquial and prosaic, showing less of the metaphoric and symbolic pyrotechnics that characterize his mature work. Yet, youthful and tentative as they may be, the poems in that collection are Antonych beyond a doubt. Their deceptively simple language masks a

wealth of complex ideas that merge, as the late Danylo Husar Struk once put it, the "celestial with the subterranean."

This small volume is an English translation of all forty-five the poems in Antonych's *Velyka harmoniia* by Michael Naydan, perhaps the most prolific translator of Ukrainian poetry into English. The volume contains the Ukrainian original texts and his translations on facing pages. Since all of the poems are short and fit on a single page of print, the translations are always immediately adjacent to Antonych's texts, allowing the reader to compare the translations easily with the originals for a more complete and enjoyable poetic experience. Naydan has also given the reader an introductory essay (in both English and Ukrainian) about the poems, in which he categorizes them as metaphysical poetry. The designation is apt, though certainly not ineluctable. Antonych's poems, like those of Herbert, Donne, or Ukraine's eighteenth-century baroque poets, are often fashioned around unusual wit and extended metaphorical conceits, particularly regarding death. Unlike his earlier counterparts, however, Antonych firmly anchors his works in a more stable foundation of traditional religious imagery and rituals. As Naydan points out, all five hymns from the Latin Mass are present among the titles of the collection, as are such other traditional Catholic elements of music or prayer as the *Confiteor*, *Litania*, *Mater Dolorosa*, and *Deus Magnificus*. What further distinguishes Antonych's metaphysics is the constant, modern, and modernist attention to poetic creativity. He finds his harmony and praises his God on the hammered strings of his *kedrovi husla*, his cedar dulcimer.

Naydan's brief introductory essay gives his own, very personal and subjective, reading of Antonych's work. This is understandable, since Antonych is such a complex and difficult poet. But a more general essay introducing the Ukrainian poet to the English reader would not have been out of place. In his essay Naydan also focuses on the link between the images in the poems and a series of allegorical paintings by the Polish artist Jan Matejko that hang in the Assembly Hall of the Lviv Polytechnical Institute (now a university), where Antonych would have seen them. Eight of these works, which blend ancient mythology with Christian symbols, are reproduced in this volume. The potential link between them and the poems deserves further examination and analysis.

Naydan's translations of the poems themselves concentrate on an accurate rendering of the words and images in the text. This usually inventive (and occasionally controversial) translator has chosen here to restrain his poetic fancy in order to release the hidden symbols and devices of Antonych's religious motifs. Where an accurate translation would still not convey the full sense of the original (as in the poem "The Green Holy Day"), Naydan has provided informative footnotes. This yields a poetry that is, like the original, simple and ordinary in its vocabulary and tone while being suggestive and inspirational in its images and sensibility. In "Credo" (p. 97) and "Amen" (p. 47) the result is a pleasing, accomplished poem.

Elsewhere Naydan has resolved difficult issues of translation with good strong efforts and varying degrees of success. Antonych's laconic simplicity is sometimes more than it seems, as in the poem "Naivnist"/"Naïveté" (pp. 68–69). Naydan has admirably rendered the childish voice and the deceptively plain questions it asks, but his English cannot reproduce the deliberately confusing grammatical complexity, the doggerel rhythm, and the overly insistent rhymes of the original. The task, no doubt, is greater than the English medium will bear without a wholesale rewriting of the poem, and the translator has done his best to balance semantic accuracy with aesthetic correspondence. In the poem "Resurectio" (p. 57), this balance between meaning and sound unfortunately tips too far toward meaning. The single syllables of the English "Bells peal" cannot replace the sonorous disyllabic tones of "Dzvony hraiut," and the assonance that reverberates along with the resurrecting soul in Antonych's Ukrainian is not quite as audible in the English translation.

These are the usual tribulations of the translator's art, and Naydan has suffered through them with honor and dignity for the greater enjoyment of the reader. And although the collection does not contain a table of contents (as it should), the reader will likely return time and again to its many pleasing and inspiring poems, both in translation and in the original.

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Yuri Andrukhovych. *The Moscoviad.* Translated by Vitaly Chernetsky. New York: Sputen Duyvid, 2008. 185 pp. U.S.$14.

Yuri Andrukhovych is a Ukrainian postmodernist writer who was born in 1960 in the western Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk. He gained his popularity and reputation for creating works spiced with witty sarcasm and irony in the 1980s, in the years of glasnost, so he is associated with the generation of writers who are known as the *visimdesiatnyky* (the Eighties Generation). Andrukhovych is the patriarch of the Bu-Ba-Bu trio of writers, which he, Viktor Neborak, and Oleksandr Irvanets established in 1985. The group's name comes from the words *burlesk* (burlesque), *balahan* (farce), and *bufonada* (buffoonery), and Bu-Ba-Bu is known for its members' carnivalized, comical, and ironic interpretations of the sociocultural problems of the collapsing Soviet empire and the transition to a young, independent Ukraine.

Andrukhovych's 1993 novel *The Moskoviad* is not an exception to this literary tradition. It comprises a burlesque and buffoonery-inspired description of one day in the horrific adventures a Ukrainian poet, Otto von F., experiences in the collapsing Soviet capital of Moscow, and of the farcical activities of the KGB, whose goal is to restore the decaying Soviet empire's former imperialistic power and glory. Like Andrukhovych's other novels, *Moskoviad* has been widely read and discussed in Ukraine and beyond. This horror novel, as we shall call

it, has been translated into Russian, German, and now English. Vitaly Chernetsky's English translation exposes the reader to life in the decaying imperial capital via an ironic and satiric depiction of the social, economic, cultural, and ethical problems Andrukhovych constructs through his creative use of the Ukrainian language and his erudite knowledge of world history and culture.

The author's refined interweaving of the semantic, syntactic, and stylistic richness of the Ukrainian language results partly in a humorous representation of the characters in the literary dormitory at Moscow University, and partly in a devastating satire of the moral values of the crumbling empire. To immerse the reader in the atmosphere of dormitory life, Andrukhovych interweaves slang and colloquialisms into the fabric of the novel. He employs slang for specialized rooms in the dorm: for example, *peredbannyk* for the tiny room just before the communal showers, *kaptiorka* for the maintenance and janitor's room, and *sapozhok* for the two adjoining rooms, the inhabitants of which have to share a bathroom. The translator selects the transparent analogy "antechamber" (p. 15) for *peredbannyk*, the descriptive equivalent "the janitor's room" (p. 19) for *kaptiorka*, and the combination of a literal translation with descriptive translation "the so-called 'boot,' two adjoining rooms (p. 10) for *sapozhok*. The literal translation "boot" should have retained the grammatical *realia* that is expressed by virtue of the Ukrainian diminutive suffix *"-ok."*

Chernetsky recreates the buffoonery of the dormitory atmosphere by virtue of correlative semantic equivalents for the unconventional language. For example, in his dream conversation with an imaginary interlocutor, the king of Ukraine Olelko the Second, Otto von F. explains which of the king's deeds would not "remain forever in the golden tablets of universal and human memory," resorting to the rude idiomatic expression "*i tse do dupy,*" which Chernetsky renders by means of the equally rude expression "And this too is crap (p. 11).

Andrukhovych mocks the literary types who inhabit the Moscow dorm, calling them *tuteshni personazhi* ("the local characters," p. 6) who drink, curse, fight, sell, and buy. They are engaged in everything but literary activity. Andrukhovych resorts to wordplay expressed by the lexemes *kinets* and *chlen,* the slang meaning of which designates the male reproductive organ. By doing so, he ridicules the process of selection to the best school of writers in the empire. The humorous effect of the pun "*vony pysmennyky, ta shche i z 'usoho kintsia' Radianskoho Soiuzu*" (p. 5) is difficult to understand in Chernetsky's translation, "they are writers, indeed 'from all ends' of the Soviet Union" (p. 6), owing to the fact that the word "end," unlike "*kinets,*" lacks the meaning of "penis." The similar humorous effect of playing on the word "*chlen*" is observed in the statement "*osoblyvo zh pryvabliuie tsykh findiurok poverkh somy, de meshkaiut bahati chleny. Maietsia na uvazi, chleny bratnikh pysmennytskykh spilok.* It is retained in Chernetsky's translation, "the seventh floor especially attracts these creatures, for it is populated by rich members, I mean, members of brotherly writers' unions" (p. 24), because the polysemy of the English noun "member" incorporates both the meaning of an individual in a group and of a penis.

Andrukhovych attacks the problem of alcoholism in the Soviet empire with witty and biting satire and the use of vivid metaphors, metonymy and allusions. For example, the act of drinking beer in the bar on Fonvizin Street becomes "*odna z bliuznirskykh mes, apokaliptychna zabava dlia horlianok i sechovykh mikhuriv*," which the translator renders by corresponding metaphors and metonymy: "a sacrilegious mass, apocalyptic entertainment for throats and bladders" (p. 35). Andrukhovych employs biblical allusion in his ironic description of the multifarious cohort of the beer drinkers: "*prykhodiat farysei ta sadukei, azartni hravtsi, knyzhnyky, vbyvtsi ta sodomity, kulturysty, lykhvari, karlyky*." The satirical effect developed by the allusion is successfully realized in Chernetsky's translation despite the use of a descriptive equivalent, "arrive Pharisees and Sadducees, gamblers, and bookish types, murderers, sodomites, bodybuilders, usurers, dwarves" (p. 31)." Instead of "bookish types," however, the biblical nature of Andrukhovych's allusion dictates the use of the semantic analogy "scribes," which Chernetsky could have found in many verses of the Gospel (Mathew 7:29; 17:10; 23:2, Luke 5:30; 6:7, Mark 2:16; 3:22, the Book of Acts 4:5; 23:9, and elsewhere).

A distinct peculiarity of Andrukhovych's prose is the use of German and Russian in the linguistic fabric of the novel. From time to time Otto von F. uses German expressions in his thoughts. The author transliterates them with Cyrillic letters, for example, "*Teper aine kliaine tsigarette*." Chernetsky replaces them with the original German phrases, for example, "Now eine kleine Cigarette" (p. 69), in order to transplant the humorous effect that the author creates due to the foreignness of German in the Ukrainian narration. Transliterated Russian phrases occur in Otto von F.'s many conversations with his Russian colleagues, his lover, KGB officers, people in the beer bar on Fonvizin Street and the "Snack Bar" that is between the New Arbat and the Old Arbat, and the pickpocket who is later revealed to be a KGB agent. The use of Russian transliterated phrases contributes to the realistic depiction of Otto von F's adventures in Moscow, where visitors from every corner of the Russian empire are strictly required to speak Russian.

Unfortunately this Russian milieu is not recreated in the translation and results in a homogeneous language situation. It is the reader who chooses which language the characters of the novel speak. Either Ukrainian or Russian is spoken in the collapsing imperial capital. Both variants are contradictory: denizens of the capital of the Russian empire would not humiliate themselves by speaking the language of one of its colonies; and, secondly, being a true patriot of Ukraine, Otto von F. speaks Ukrainian while temporarily belonging to Moscow's literary elite. Chernetsky has chosen to neutralize the realistic effect of the use of Russian in the translation. This may be one of those unavoidable losses that occur in any translation. Chernetsky partly compensates for this with information about the novel's setting.

On the whole, Chernetsky's translation successfully recreates the spirit of the Ukrainian literary tradition of buffoonery in which Andrukhovych created his novel. It retains most of the semantic, syntactic, stylistic, and pragmatic virtues of the novel's language and reveals the grotesque of the banquet of Bacchus,

which serves as a funeral feast for the empire that "doomed itself to disintegration" because it "betrayed its drunks" (p. 37).

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John D. Pihach. *Ukrainian Genealogy: A Beginner's Guide.*
Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies
Press, 2007. xviii, 272 pp. $64.95 cloth, $39.95 paper.

In times past, genealogy was most often the special pursuit of the aristocracy and the upper classes. They were the first people in Europe to take family names and pass them on to their heirs, and they were the first to trace their ancestries through many generations, often for practical reasons having to do with inheritance. But with the social, economic, and cultural changes that came with the commercial and industrial revolutions, literacy spread among various social classes, and interest in genealogy gripped a wider and wider social spectrum. Today even the most humble social classes evince some interest in this once esoteric science.

Among Ukrainians and their descendents in North America, genealogy is the preoccupation of a large number of people who otherwise have very little knowledge of their ancestral Slavic culture. Certain Ukrainian Canadians and Ukrainian Americans of the third, fourth, and fifth generations know little of their immigrant ancestors, less of their ancestral language, and even less about where their families originally came from. But once an interest in genealogy is sparked, the learning process begins and interest in all these things grows. John D. Pihach's *Ukrainian Genealogy* is clear evidence of this. It touches upon Canadian history, Ukrainian and east European history, the administrative and ecclesiastical languages of the ancestral Ukrainian lands, and even onomastics. In reading or even perusing this book, one gets a good introduction to the rich and varied culture of one's Ukrainian ancestors and how their descendents came to live on the Canadian Prairies or in the American Midwest.

The book begins with an introductory chapter explaining how one can begin finding out about one's ancestors. Obviously it starts with home and the questioning of elderly survivors from the older generation. Pihach presents the reader with sample questions that one can ask these survivors and also leads us to where one can find others with similar genealogical interests. He provides the names and addresses of various genealogical societies and other useful information. He then proceeds to give a brief history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian immigration to Canada and the United States. From there he turns to the family name and its meaning and importance for the genealogist. Then come immigration records, ship lists, and such. This reviewer found the discussion of the Canada's wartime National Registration of 1940 to be quite useful, for this registration asked about birth dates, marital status, children, places of birth, nationality,

and, very important indeed, the year of immigration. Once that year has been determined, it is much easier to find the ship upon which one's ancestor(s) came to Canada. Then, of course, come church records, which can give birth, death, and marital information. These are of great use both in Canada and in the country of origin.

Throughout the book, the author gives examples of various documents and instructs the reader about to how to interpret them. This can be a very complicated process involving several different languages—Ukrainian, Polish, German, Latin, Church Slavonic, and Russian. For those who trace their ancestry to Bukovyna and Transcarpathia, Romanian and Hungarian also may come into play. The next important matter is "Locating the Ancestral Home," and the author instructs the reader about where to find appropriate maps and how to read and interpret them. Like personal names, geographical names changed with political changes, and several different languages may be involved. The author gives examples of how military and taxation ("cadastral") maps may be used. Unfortunately I found no discussion of Stella Hryniuk's very useful map of southeastern Galicia before 1914. This map locates every town, village, and hamlet of the five counties of southern Podillia, from which the majority of people from the first and largest, pioneer wave of Ukrainian immigrants came to Canada. The map is reprinted as the endpaper of Hryniuk's *Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia, 1800–1900* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1991), which is, in fact, listed in Pihach's bibliography.

Another large and important chapter deals with local history and its importance for genealogy. The emphasis here is on Western Ukraine, especially Austrian-ruled Eastern Galicia before 1914. Various encyclopedias, handbooks, and guides are listed, and their contents are described. These include everything from the famous sixteen-volume Polish geographical encyclopedia of 1880–1902 to Volodymyr Kubijovyč's detailed *Ethnic Groups of South-Western Ukraine* of 1983. However, two very useful guidebooks are missing: Mieczysław Orłowicz and Roman Kordys, *Illustrierter Führer durch Galizien* (Vienna and Leipzig: Hartleben, 1914; repr. 1989) and *Przewodnik po Województwie Tarnopolskiem z mapą* (Ternopil: Nakładem Wojewódzkiego towarzystwa turystyczno-krajoznawczego, 1928; repr. in the 1990s). These two titles are filled with useful geographical, economic, and historical information; the latter volume discusses individual villages and is especially useful for the many Ukrainian Canadians who trace their origin to the Ternopil region, which before 1914 saw the most intense Galician out-migration to Western Canada. These volumes are useful even to those with just a rudimentary knowledge of German or Polish.

Finally, *Ukrainian Genealogy* contains three useful appendices. The first discusses the various languages and scripts used in Ukrainian genealogical documents from Church Slavonic to Gothic; the second lists sources and societies that are of use to those who trace their origins to modern Ukraine but are not of Ukrainian ethnic ancestry; and the third lists various Web sites of use to the

Ukrainian genealogist. A very thorough thematically organized bibliography completes the volume.

Two additional titles that may be of interest to the Ukrainian genealogist were published as *Ukrainian Genealogy* was going to press and could not be included in the bibliography. These are my article "Identifying Slavic Surnames," *East European Genealogist* 12, no. 1 (2003): 7–18, which gives pointers on how to distinguish Ukrainian from Polish, Russian, and other Slavic names and attempts to outline regional differences; and Małgorzata Nowaczyk's *Poszukiwanie przodków: Genealogia dla każdego* (Warsaw: Państwowy instytut wydawniczy, 2005), which is directed at common folk rather than gentry and contains much information of use to the Ukrainian genealogist who traces his or her ancestry to Western Ukraine under the Poles.

In general, John Pihach has produced a very useful and interesting volume. It can be read or perused with profit not only by genealogists but also by anyone wishing to find out more about his or her Ukrainian background. Although some of the terminology, the excurses on languages, and the documents in foreign languages may be a bit daunting at first, with a little persistence they become clearer and more understandable and will undoubtedly eventually be of use even to the uninitiated. The illustrations, tables, and maps are clear and nicely reproduced, and the volume as a whole reflects the many years of research and work in the field that the author has done. He is to be congratulated upon the publication of this attractive book and can be assured that it will be widely read among the more than a million Canadians of Ukrainian background and by many Americans of Ukrainian background as well.

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Zygmunt Bychynsky. *Kliuch zhuravliv.* Biographical introduction by Jars Balan. Afterword by Myroslav Shkandrij. Glossary. Lviv, Edmonton, and Toronto: Literaturna agentsiia "Piramida" in cooperation with the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2006. 804 pp. $49.95. Distributed by Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press.

After Illia Kyriiak finished publishing his three-volume *Syny zemli* (1939–45), an observer writing under the pen name Aramis felt, not without a certain amount of relief, that, with the publication of this weighty epic, the "pioneer" era in Ukrainian-Canadian literature had surely come to an end and that authors of Ukrainian belles lettres in Canada were now free to embark upon a more "normal" course of development. (See Aramis, "Kanadiiski pioniry," *Zhyttia i slovo* (Waterford, Ont.), no. 1 (1948): 96–100, esp. 99.) However, with the present posthumous publication of Zygmunt Bychynsky's substantial novel titled *Kliuch zhuravliv,* which may be translated as "A Flight of Cranes," we have a

kind of throwback that necessitates re-examination of this assumption. Written over a period of fifteen years, *Kliuch zhuravliv* lay dormant in manuscript form long after its completion in 1945 and was not published until six decades after the author's death in 1947.

Bychynsky's effort to fictionalize the early history of Ukrainian settlement in Western Canada feeds on his considerable experience with the written word (as a journalist, playwright, short-story writer, biographer, translator, and editor) and on his rich career as an active participant in the affairs of his community. From a general perspective, *Kliuch zhuravliv* offers a fairly predictable version of the rags-to-riches saga that dominates a certain genre of writing. (The formulaic structure of such story-telling was suggested long ago by Ivan Ohiienko in his review of Onufrii Ivakh's novel *Holos zemli* [Winnipeg, 1937] in *Nasha kultura* [Warsaw], no. 10 [1937]: 413–14.)

With his bride in tow, the book's protagonist, Oleksander "Sandyk" Fedak, leaves his native village in the Old Country and moves to Canada to begin a new life as a homesteader. As expected, the usual struggles and hardships ensue. With much perseverance these are overcome, things get better, and, thanks to Sandyk's superior qualities as a civic-minded, respected, and natural-born leader, his home in the so-called Ukraina colony thrives. Along the way, a large cast of assorted characters enlivens the narrative while Sandyk learns English, gets a nickname ("Sandy"), enters politics, raises a family, and encourages his children (all born on the farm) to go to school and enter the professions. Thankfully, to escape his burden of perfection, Sandyk gets to visit the Rockies and recharges his batteries, so to speak.

In the idyllic world of Bychynsky's Ukraina colony, man and nature are inseparable, but then this primal bond starts to crumble in the face of change and "progress." Slowly but surely the age-old reverence for mother earth fades away, and the land becomes just another commodity. In a prophetic mood Sandyk muses about a future when Canada, like his homeland, will also face the pressures of over-population. But without any fuss or resistance, the situation entraps the hero, and benign resignation brings closure when, in the final chapter, an aged but contented Sandyk makes a sentimental trip back to his native village in the Old Country. As the autumn wind "sings" its gentle requiem and migrating cranes cry out above, Sandyk dies peacefully under the barren boughs of an old pear tree that he and his father had planted long ago.

To be sure, there are many lessons to be learned from reading this book, and these, apparently, are largely a reflection of Bychynsky's personal views on religion, assimilation, and many other issues that confronted the early Ukrainian Canadians. (Jar's Balan's meaty introductory essay offers plenty of clues in this regard.) In spite of its heavy overlay of social history, the book's primary intention is literary in nature. Unfortunately, the writing lacks the kind of subtlety, style, and sophistication that seasoned literati such as Ivan Ohiienko once expected and appreciated (see, for example, his "Movne probudzhennia ukrainskoi Kanady," *Ridna mova* [Zhovkva] 5, no. 12 [1937], cols. 465–68). Its structure is

too episodic and bears a choppy narrative composed of sudden disruptions, a characteristic that Paul Robert Magocsi once observed in Carpatho-Rusyn literature, which perhaps reflects the author's unsuccessful attempts to have his work serialized in the form of installments in the Ukrainian press of his day. Moreover, the pervasive use of cutesy dialogues and theatrical monologues suggests that this novel's thirty-three chapters (each with its own title) actually constitute a long performance piece composed of a cycle of interconnected playlets, a protracted melodrama scripted to suit the rather commonplace tastes that dominated Canada's early Ukrainian immigrant stage and its audience. And finally, although Bychynsky wrote in Ukrainian, at times he thought in English—a confrontation that mars the quality of his prose. As I have noted elsewhere (see my "The Art of Intrusion: Macaronicism in Ukrainian Canadian Literature," *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 16, nos. 3/4 [1989]: 763–69), bilingualism is seldom used to advantage in modern literature.

From beginning to end, in this particular piece, the oral nature of Ukrainian folklore shapes the language, while agrarian folkways drive the action; in fact, no single page is bereft of proverb, saying, mannerism, custom, belief or ritual. See, for example, Bychynsky's extended lament in prose (pp. 116–120), which is meant to express the agony of leaving his Old Country roots and features a forlorn Sandyk in conversation with the hallowed land of his birth. There are, of course, several taboos (or are they literary conventions?) that sanitize this ideal configuration: in Bychynsky's borderline utopia no one makes homebrew (although alcoholic drinks abound), robotic housewives slave to please their families, privies do not exist, and incest is unimaginable. (As far as "oral" literature is concerned, the subject of incest was never absent from the narrative repertoire of Ukrainians on the Prairies. As late as the 1960s, I was able to record several ballads on this topic.) On occasion, however, the squeaky-clean members of the Ukraina colony do succumb to the realities of such things as old-fashioned anti-Semitism (p. 648), spousal abuse (p. 331), mental illness (pp. 188–92, 343–47), greed (p. 474), deception (p. 749), mixed marriages (pp. 579–80), overheated sex drives (pp. 267, 306, 415), rape (p. 267), murder (p. 493), and suicide (p. 506).

Distinguishing departures from the literary norms of Bychynsky's era emerge when he dips into the popular culture of his times to craft his narrative in ways that are reminiscent of Hollywood scenarios. Indeed, the reader does get to witness fights and a drunken brawl, seemingly inspired by the cowboy westerns that once titillated moviegoers everywhere. Other moments mimic the techniques of classic cinematography: the writer's pen becomes a camera lens that zooms in and out or highlights the silence when lovers' "eyes meet." And could it be that the film *Earth* by Ukraine's legendary filmmaker Oleksander Dovzhenko, with its glorification of mechanized collective agriculture under the Soviets, inspired Bychynsky to have his novel feature happy communal harvest operations and anthropomorphic threshing machines?

Although the storyline often seems trite and overly heroic, such drawbacks are more than compensated by Bychynsky's obvious love for the Canadian steppe. The prairie backdrop, "with all its wonders" (p. 520), provides a landscape where headlights turn falling snowflakes into "fluttering butterflies" and golden eagles circling high above become "tsars of the steppe swimming through the air over an endless sea of green" (pp. 148; 167). His fondness for prairie flora and fauna covers everything from wild grasses to playful gophers; his countryside is stunning at all times of the year; and his sun, moon and stars are more than touch-ups on a pretty canvas. All this pastoral sentiment undoubtedly draws much of its potency from the Ukrainian language itself, a gender-sensitive medium with built-in poetics that readily lends itself to the imaginative expression of life in all its manifestations.

There are, then, four overlapping dimensions to this work: historical, literary, ethnographic, and didactic. The final result is an uneven, antiquated period piece dependent on a provincial aesthetic and grounded in a story that's become too familiar. Paradoxically, however, these limitations also underline the book's undeniable value as a resource for scholars, a handbook to be consulted on a myriad of topics. (In this regard, a detailed subject index could have served to capture a host of nuances that are rarely found elsewhere.) After all, given Bychynsky's credentials, this work of interpretive fiction does stand as a form of credible documentation, and its insights are ready to advance scholarly interest in things Ukrainian-Canadian. Consequently those who labored to salvage and publish *Kliuch zhuravliv* deserve many words of thanks and appreciation.

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Canadian Slavonic Papers
Revue Canadienne des Slavistes

An Interdisciplinary Journal Devoted to Central and Eastern Europe

Canadian Slavonic Papers (CSP), founded in 1956, is a quarterly, interdisciplinary journal of the Canadian Association of Slavists, publishing in English and French.

CSP is devoted to problems of Central and Eastern Europe. It is a forum for scholars from a range of disciplines: language and linguistics, literature, history, political science, sociology, economics, anthropology, geography and the arts. This is the only interdisciplinary scholarly outlet for Slavists in Canada and one of the major journals in the field in North America. It has an international readership and subscribers.

All articles submitted to *CSP* are subject to blind refereeing. Only previously unpublished manuscripts that are not under consideration by another journal are considered.

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An interdisciplinary journal devoted to the study of ethnicity, immigration, inter-group relations, and the history and cultural life of ethnic groups in Canada. Issues also include book and film reviews, opinions, immigrant memoirs, translations of primary sources, an "ethnic voice" section, and an index.

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J. Rick Ponting and Linda J. Henderson. "Contested Visions of First Nation Governance," vol. 37, no. 1, 2005.
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All submissions should be in Microsoft Word 2000 for Windows and have minimal formatting—12-point Times Roman font, one-inch margins, paragraph returns and tabs, and italics (in book and serial titles and foreign words) only. Please do not add any other coding, styles, right or full justification, superscript letters, small capitals, headers, footers, page numbering, double letter-spaces between words or after periods; or blank lines.

Articles should not be longer than 7,500 words, including the notes. In the text, please provide all Cyrillic quotations in the original script. The footnotes (do not use endnotes) should include the names of authors or editors as they appear in the work cited (do not substitute initials for full first names); the title and subtitle, separated by a colon; and, in parentheses, the place of publication, the publisher's name, and the year of publication. A tab should separate the text of the note from the footnote number preceding it. For further information regarding footnotes, please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

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А	A	Н	N
Б	B	О	O
Б	V	П	P
Г	H (Ukrainian), G (Russian)	Р	R
Ґ	G	С	S
Д	D	Т	T
Е	E	У	U
Є	Ye in initial position, otherwise ie	Ф	F
		Х	Kh
Ж	Zh	Ц	Ts
З	Z	Ч	Ch
И	Y (Ukrainian), I (Russian)	Ш	Sh
І	I	Щ	Shch
Ї	Yi in initial position, otherwise i	Ы	Y
		Э	E
Й	Y in initial position, otherwise i	Ю	Yu in initial position, otherwise iu
К	K	Я	Ya in initial position, otherwise ia
Л	L		
М	M		