

# JOURNAL

OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

*Janusz Radziejowski:* Collectivization in Ukraine in Light of Soviet Historiography

Дещо у справі національних меншостей в Польщі

*Romana Bahrij-Pikulyk:* The Cossacks in Gogol's *Taras Bulba* and Kulish's *Black Council*

*Igor Качуровський:* Фальсифікація української літератури в радянських джерелах

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**COLLECTIVIZATION IN UKRAINE IN LIGHT  
OF SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY\***

It can be said that the collectivization of agriculture left a deeper mark on the Soviet people than did the October revolution. It effected basic changes in the economy, the political system and even in the psychology of the Soviet people. Stalinism in the Soviet Union can certainly be dated from the beginning of collectivization. It is no wonder that during the period when the "cult of personality" was exposed, Soviet scholars concentrated their attention on collectivization. Most fruitful were the years from 1956 to the middle 1960s. This article is based on the literature of that period.

Although we are interested primarily in collectivization in Ukraine, we will also have to make use of research relating to Russia proper. After all, the most important decisions were taken outside of Ukraine; and in the way it was organized and implemented, collectivization in Ukraine did not differ radically from that in other areas of the Soviet Union where "class resistance was particularly strong," like the Lower Volga region or the Northern Caucasus. Also, it must be admitted that the courage that Russian scholars like V. Danilov have had to study certain aspects of the subject in depth makes their work indispensable to our present task. For all its reticence in drawing conclusions, Soviet research in this area is stronger than Western research in facts and statistics on the entire country as opposed to individual villages and oblasts. In this article we will concentrate on "total" collectivization and will not deal at all with earlier co-operative efforts, which involved only 1.5 to 3 per cent of the land and were based on Bukharin's view of the agrarian question.

We will examine the following periods: (1) internal party debate on the agrarian question prior to the decision for total collectivization (1926-8); (2) the grain crisis (1927-8); (3) total collectivization (1929-32); and (4) economic and demographic consequences.

F. M. Vaganov's book is an important contribution on the first period. It is devoted to the history of the Bukharin deviation (1928-30), which had a distinct co-operative programme for the

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\* This paper was originally presented at seminars organized by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 8 and 10 April 1980, at the University of Alberta and University of Toronto.

countryside. Vaganov analyzed Bukharin's views by comparing his statements with Lenin's and pointing out the differences between them, even when the statements had to do with loosely related matters and were made at different times. But the book does contain interesting facts. We learn, for instance, that entire party organizations initially supported the "right," while later one hundred thousand members were expelled for belonging to it.<sup>1</sup>

The chief defect of this useful but controversial work is its failure to mention that prior to the decision to collectivize, Bukharin represented the "general party line" and, particularly on the agrarian question, he was the main theoretician defending the party against attacks by the left opposition. Vaganov's book also would have been less ahistorical had it included an account of the debate between Bukharin and the well-known economist (and Trotskyist), Evgenii Preobrazhensky.

In 1924 Preobrazhensky published a work entitled *The New Economics*, in which he argued that agriculture itself could be the only source of industrialization for so overwhelmingly an agricultural country as the Soviet Union then was. In Preobrazhensky's view, industrialization could be accomplished by an "inequivalent exchange" of goods between town and countryside, or, as he put it elsewhere, the exploitation of the countryside. The role of the latter during industrialization would be similar to that of a colony.<sup>2</sup>

Bukharin answered Preobrazhensky in a series of articles. He argued that although the peasantry would make the largest material contribution to industrialization, Preobrazhensky was wrong to propose the exploitation of the peasants. This was unacceptable both ideologically and economically. The countryside, after all, was and would long remain not merely a source of raw materials for industrialization, but also a market for industrial products. For the demand in this market to keep pace with the development of industry, the prosperity of the countryside would have to increase. "Preobrazhensky," Bukharin remarked, "proposes that we kill the hen that lays the golden egg, since in his view feeding it is philanthropy that can be dispensed with."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> F. M. Vaganov, *Pravyi uklon v VKP(b) i ego razgrom (1928-1930)* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 238-41.

<sup>2</sup> E. Preobrazhensky, *Novaia ekonomika*, 2d ed. (Moscow, 1926).

<sup>3</sup> N. Bukharin, *Nekotorye voprosy ekonomicheskoi politiki: Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1925). N. Bukharin, *Tri vstrechi. (K voprosu o nashikh raznoglasiiaxh.)* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1926).

The decision to carry out rapid and total collectivization, which contradicted the earlier political line on the agrarian question, came after the crisis in grain purchases of the years 1927-8.<sup>4</sup> This crisis was a repetition of the 1923-4 crisis, but this time it probably exposed more clearly the discrepancy between the aspirations of the peasants and those of the party.

What interests Soviet historians is why, in what was basically the third bumper-crop year (only in the southern part of Left Bank Ukraine were crops down), grain purchases suffered a severe setback (see Table 1); what caused the breakdown in exports and, consequently, imports? The industrial investments plan had to be cancelled, because needed equipment was not imported for lack of currency. The populations of non-grain-producing areas (e.g., Central Asia) were on the brink of severe shortage, people stood in bread lines for hours, work cattle were slaughtered to make up shortages, food was rationed and so on.<sup>5</sup>

Table 1

Grain Purchases in Two Consecutive Years (in Thousands of Tons)

Years	July	August	September	October	November	December
1926-7	226	767	1424	1540	1560	1505
1927-8	228	998	1382	1074	696	696
Percentage of previous year	100	130	97	70	45	45

Source: A. Lorenz, "Die Stagnation der Sowjetischen Getreidewirtschaft zwischen 1927 und 1929," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1970, no. 3, p. 394.

All historians emphasize that the organizers of the boycott of state grain purchases were the kulaks, who demanded higher grain prices and influenced "certain middle-peasant groups."<sup>6</sup> This makes sense, since all peasants had an interest in higher prices for agricultural products. One should note that the grain shortfall was around 45 per cent, while the kulaks could only

<sup>4</sup> State grain purchases (*khlebozagotovki*) mean the obligatory provision of the state with grain at prices and quantities established by the state.

<sup>5</sup> G. Koniukhov, *KPSS v borbe s khlebnymi zatrudneniiami v strane (1928-1929)* (Moscow, 1960), p. 66.

<sup>6</sup> *Istoriia selianstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1967), 2:124.

supply 20 per cent.<sup>7</sup> Repression, in the form of requisitions, fines and confiscations, certainly extended to all strata of the peasantry, though perhaps in varying degrees.<sup>8</sup>

The historian Sergei Trapeznikov lists the following reasons for the grain crisis: an incorrect relation between industrial and agricultural prices, as had been the case in 1923 and 1924; a lack of industrial goods of interest to the countryside and a concomitant lack of incentive to sell agricultural produce; and the misadministration of the grain purchases programme, which allowed differentiation in grain prices and hence competition among individual purchasers, thus encouraging the peasants to hoard grain when they considered prices too low.<sup>9</sup>

Trapeznikov also points to changes in the agrarian social structure as a reason for the decline of production. The major producers of marketable grain either disappeared (large landowners) or their numbers decreased (kulaks). The number of kulaks decreased from 15 to 5 per cent. The middle peasants, whose productivity in marketable grain was considerably lower, became the majority. In Ukraine in 1926, small-holding peasants made up 30.4 per cent of the peasantry, middle peasants made up 65.5 per cent and rich peasants made up 4 per cent (on the Left Bank — 5.6 per cent).<sup>10</sup>

If it is true that the market production of the countryside at that time was lower (and Stalin was among those who often cited this fact in 1928), then the the politicians' and historians' explanation of the breakdown of grain purchases — as a result of wrecking by kulaks and by the middle peasants under their influence — is wrong. The correct conclusion would be that the Soviet countryside had no marketable grain. And it is also important to note that, as Trapeznikov states, peasant production of industrial crops, which were highly paid by the state, developed rapidly.<sup>11</sup> From this it would follow that it did not pay the peasants to produce grain beyond that required for their own consumption, because grain prices were too low. Moreover, the commodities they needed

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<sup>7</sup> Koniukhov, *KPSS*, p. 47.

<sup>8</sup> In mid-1928 the party renounced these repressive measures in a conciliatory appeal addressed to all the peasants.

<sup>9</sup> S. Trapeznikov, *Leninizm i agrarnokrestianskii vopros*, vol. II: *Istoricheskii opyt KPSS v osushchestvlenii leninskogo kooperativnogo plana* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 55-66.

<sup>10</sup> *Istoriia selianstva*, 2:123.

<sup>11</sup> Trapeznikov, *Leninizm*, 2:32-4.



were not available on the market, because Soviet industrialization gave highest priority to heavy industry, which was of no interest to the peasant.

A Soviet specialist in rural sociology, I. V. Arutiunian, has called attention to yet another aspect of this previously neglected problem. At the end of the 1920s, the Soviet state completely controlled large industry and determined its development. "The conditions of work [in industry], the methods of its organization, the determination of its forms and rate of pay depended on the state."<sup>12</sup> By contrast, the state's influence on agriculture "remained limited"; the state could influence this sphere only indirectly through co-operatives, credit, policy and so on. Therefore, "in spite of tremendous efforts, it was in no position to mobilize the market production of agriculture on behalf of the country's industrialization."<sup>13</sup>

In seeking the rationale for collectivization, we might further recall that industrialization always requires a large number of free hands for work in industry, and that these are furnished primarily by the countryside (hence the problem of finding the means to remove part of the agricultural population from the countryside). Moreover, it requires a large amount of grain and other agricultural products to increase exports that would pay for the importation of technical equipment, to provide raw material for the rapidly growing industry and to feed the swelling urban population. In addition, the limited amount of foreign credit must have been a factor in the sudden decision to collectivize, while simultaneously making its implementation incredibly difficult.

The decision to introduce total collectivization was taken at the Central Committee plenum in October 1928 and confirmed at the sixteenth party conference in April 1929. It was in this period that the decisive struggles with the party's rightist faction took place. Bukharin and his followers called the collectivization plan a "military-feudal method of exploiting the peasant" for the aims of superindustrialization. They accused the party of a theoretical capitulation to Trotskyism.<sup>14</sup> They were accused in turn of advocating a ruinously slow pace of industrialization and of representing the interests of the rich peasants, which were opposed to those of the revolution.

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<sup>12</sup> Iu. Arutiunian, *Sotsialna struktura selskogo naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1971), p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Vaganov, *Pravyi uklon*, pp. 202, 62, 63, 65.

The first five-year plan, adopted at the sixteenth conference of the All-Union Communist Party, anticipated the collectivization of 18 to 20 per cent of the peasant farms and established as the dominant form not the collective farm (*kolkhoz*), but simpler, more rudimentary forms of co-operative labour.<sup>15</sup> Subsequent events would show that those responsible for implementation were not in the least guided by the conference resolutions. "The initiative for total collectivization" was supposed to have proceeded "spontaneously" from the peasants of the Lower Volga region and quickly spread to other areas.<sup>16</sup> The press then began a major campaign to quicken the pace of collectivization. Stalin joined the campaign personally with an article in the 7 November issue of *Pravda*, entitled "A Year of Great Change."<sup>17</sup> The tone of the press became stronger, urging competition to see how fast collective farms could be organized. On Stalin's orders, the press carried no reports of errors, abuses or the great difficulties that resulted from a lack of clear and consistent instructions from the authorities.<sup>18</sup>

Only in December 1929 was a special commission on collectivization established. It attempted to draw up guidelines for the collectivization that had already been in process for six months. The chairman was the minister of agriculture, I. Iakovlev. The resolution drawn up by the commission set deadlines of several years (depending on the region) for completing collectivization, established the form as that of the collective farm, and stipulated that a farmer joining a collective farm would be able to keep in his personal possession a cow, swine, poultry, a modest amount of tools, and a small garden plot. It was anticipated that collective-farm organizers would be paid on the basis of economic achievement — increased production and efficiency.<sup>19</sup> Stalin deleted from the draft of the resolution the section on how much of the collective farmer's possessions were to be collectivized and he shortened the deadline for completing collectivization. He indicated that for grain-producing areas a possible deadline might be the

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<sup>15</sup> V. Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva v SSSR," *Sovetskaiia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia* (Moscow, 1965), 7: col. 488.

<sup>16</sup> M. Bogdenko, "K istorii nachalnogo etapa sploshnoi kollektivizatsii selskogo khoziaistva SSSR," *Voprosy istorii*, 1963, no. 5, p. 22.

<sup>17</sup> Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia," col. 489.

<sup>18</sup> Bogdenko, "K istorii nachalnogo etapa," p. 27.

<sup>19</sup> V. Danilov and I. Ivanitsky, "Leninskii kooperativnyi plan i ego osushchestvlenie v SSSR," *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii selskogo khoziaistva v soiuznykh republikakh* (Moscow, 1963), p. 35.

fall of 1930, that is, a period of six or seven months. This was the deadline for Ukraine.<sup>20</sup>

Thus the local state and party apparatus — deprived of clear instructions, particularly on the methods of collectivization and organizational forms, and at the same time forced to make “great achievements” with extraordinary speed — applied methods of “administrative pressure” and sometimes openly used force in an attempt to group the maximum number of farms into a co-operative at any cost.<sup>21</sup> As Kosior, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, later admitted: “Administrative measures and the use of force, not only against middle peasants but also against poor peasants, became a systematic component of the work not only of *raion* but also of *okruh* party committees.”<sup>22</sup>

Cases of forcible communalization, in which everything, including poultry, was taken by the collective farm, were widespread in both Russia (where 25 per cent of all farms collectivized were *kommuny*) and Ukraine.<sup>23</sup> Peasants who refused to join collective farms were often prohibited from purchasing goods in stores. The peasants responded with a mass slaughter of cattle, which in Ukraine reached “colossal proportions” in the winter of 1930. By 1932, 48 per cent of the cattle, 63 per cent of the pigs, and 32 per cent of the sheep and goats in Ukraine had been slaughtered.<sup>24</sup> According to one historian and veteran of collectivization, the strongest opposition came not from the wealthier rural classes, but from those peasants who had just recently acquired land and from poor peasants who only recently had become middle peasants.<sup>25</sup>

In February 1930, in many parts of Ukraine (as in some regions of Russia), “some of the actions against the collective farms began to grow into actions against Soviet power.”<sup>26</sup> The situation became threatening. On 2 March 1930, Stalin’s article

<sup>20</sup> “Lyst TsK KP(b)U do vsi'kh okruzhnykh i raionnykh komitetiv KP(b)U, 24. II. 1930,” *Istoriia kolektyvizatsii silskoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev, 1965), 2:245.

<sup>21</sup> V. Iakovetsky, *Agrarnye otnosheniia v SSSR v period stroitelstva sotsializma* (Moscow, 1964), p. 327.

<sup>22</sup> *Istoriia selianstva*, 2:151.

<sup>23</sup> I. F. Ganzha, I. Slynko and P. Shostak, “Ukrainskoe selo na puti k sotsializmu,” *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii*, p. 184.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 185-6.

<sup>25</sup> Iakovetsky, *Agrarnye otnosheniia*, p. 326.

<sup>26</sup> *Istoriia selianstva*, 2:151.

"Dizzy from Success" appeared, which betrayed signs of haste and nervousness. Stalin placed the entire blame for events on the rank-and-file organizers, putting them in a very difficult position.<sup>27</sup> Several days later a resolution of the Central Committee appeared that was addressed to all party organizations.<sup>28</sup> The acts condemned in it had also taken place in Ukraine. According to the resolution, middle peasants who had refused to join collective farms had been forcibly "dekulakized," that is, their property was confiscated and they themselves were deported. In some regions, up to 15 per cent of all farms had been thus collectivized, though the kulaks were not more than 4 or 5 per cent of the rural population. Some field workers had behaved with exceptional brutality, coarseness and even criminality towards the populace (confiscation of property, arrests and imprisonment of middle and poor peasants). Communes had been set up instead of collective farms. Markets had been liquidated and peasants forbidden to sell their produce outside of the state grain-purchase programme. At the alleged request of the local populace, churches had been closed. The sharp political reversal that this resolution initiated largely calmed the countryside and, we may assume, rescued collectivization.

Soviet historians treat the subject of dekulakization somewhat separately. There are even publications devoted solely to this subject. According to official data, kulaks in the European part of the Soviet Union made up around 5 per cent of the peasant population; in Ukraine they made up 4 per cent. Statistics on the extent of dekulakization are cited in Soviet works, but they do not appear to be exact. In Ukraine, for instance, two hundred thousand families<sup>29</sup> (about one million people)<sup>30</sup> were supposed to have been dekulakized. Since there were then in Ukraine 4,710,000 peasant farms,<sup>31</sup> this coincides exactly with the established norm of 4 per cent, but it is at variance with the information contained in the above-cited party resolution, which stated that 15 per cent of the rural population was dekulakized.

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<sup>27</sup> Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia," col. 491.

<sup>28</sup> "Postanovlenie TsK VKP(b) ot 14 marta 1930 g.," *Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva. Vazhneishye postanovleniia Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo pravitelstva 1927-1935* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 287-9.

<sup>29</sup> Ganzha et al., "Ukrainskoe selo," p. 183, citing the newspaper *Partrobota v kolhospi*, 1934.

<sup>30</sup> The average size of a peasant family was 4.7 persons; wealthier peasants had somewhat larger families. Trapeznikov, *Leninizm*, 2:30.

<sup>31</sup> Calculated from data in *Istoriia kolektivizatsii*, p. 603.

According to the resolution of 30 January 1930,<sup>32</sup> those to be dekulakized were divided into three categories. In the first category were those guilty of terrorist acts or sabotage, insurrectionists and active oppositionists. Depending on the crime, they were to be either executed or imprisoned, and their families were to be deprived of their property and deported. The second category included the families of persons who were inactive politically, but powerful economically. Their property was to be confiscated, and they were to be deported to remote and uncivilized regions. This category also included family members of those covered by the first category. The third category comprised families that, after confiscation of their property, were deported only beyond the boundaries of their district or village.<sup>33</sup>

The deportations began in January, even before the resolution was adopted. Most of them took place in the winter months. The frequent abuses included the confiscation of all the deportees' belongings, including personal clothing.<sup>34</sup> Deportations continued on and off for two years until May 1932, when the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party made the decision to stop mass deportations. From then on, only individuals could be deported.<sup>35</sup>

The "dekulakized" were deported mainly to remote rural areas, where they were gathered into special collective farms. The state gave financial aid to the deportees in getting settled, building schools and so on. The literature sometimes mentions specific sums given in aid, but without adequate additional information (for example, how many people a certain sum was to provide for); hence they are of little value. The last legal restrictions on dekulakized collective farm workers were removed only in 1947.<sup>36</sup>

In the spring of 1930, the situation in the countryside was under control. A good harvest in 1930 permitted effective crop purchases. The following years were worse. In 1931 the harvest was 83 per cent, and in 1932 84 per cent of that in 1930. The amounts assigned for state purchase, however, were even higher

<sup>32</sup> Bogdenko, "K istorii nachalnogo etapa," p. 31.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31-2.

<sup>34</sup> V. Sidorov, "Likvidatsiia v SSSR kulachestva kak klassa," *Voprosy istorii*, 1968, no. 7, p. 31.

<sup>35</sup> Bogdenko, "K istorii nachalnogo etapa," p. 33.

<sup>36</sup> A. Finarov, "K voprosu o likvidatsii kulachestva kak klassa i sudbe buvshikh kulakov v SSSR," *Istoriia sovetskogo krestianstva i kolkhoznogo stroitelstva v SSSR. Materialy nauchnoi sessii sostoiavsheisia 18-21 apreliia 1961 g. v Moskve* (Moscow, 1963), p. 276.

than before and were acquired by force. As a result, "often all the grain in a collective farm was collected," including that intended as pay for the "labour days" of the collective farm workers and as seed for sowing. In the villages of many regions, "the food situation was extremely difficult," but "Stalin continued to insist on fulfilling plans for the purchase and export of grain."<sup>37</sup> Table 2 illustrates the result of this action.

Table 2  
Grain Production, Purchase and Export for the USSR as a Whole  
and for Ukraine.

The USSR as a Whole.				
Years	Global production of grain in millions of quintals	Grain purchases in millions of quintals	%	Grain exports in millions of quintals
1929	—	—	—	2.6
1930	835	221.4	27	48.4
1931	694.8	228.3	33	51.8
Ukraine				
1930	217.5	76.3	35	
1931	140.7	40.8	30	

Source: V. Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva v SSSR," *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. VII (Moscow, 1965), col. 493; I. F. Ganzha, I. Slynko and P. Shostak, "Ukrainskoe selo na puti k sotsializmu," *Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii selskogo khoziaistva v soiuznykh respublikakh* (Moscow, 1963), p. 199.

In 1930 Ukraine produced 26 per cent of the total Soviet harvest, but accounted for 34 per cent of the state grain purchases. As a result, the following years saw a greater breakdown here than in other regions of the USSR. About 80 per cent of the collective farms did not pay their members for their "labour-days," postponing payment for one and a half to two years.<sup>38</sup> A famine

<sup>37</sup> Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia," col. 493.

<sup>38</sup> Ganzha et al, "Ukrainskoe selo," p. 202.

began. In 1932, probably because of the emaciation of the population, around 8 per cent of the cultivable land in Ukraine was not planted.<sup>39</sup> In January a new method of grain purchasing was introduced; the very low prices were mainly symbolic, and the new method took on the character of a tax.<sup>40</sup> Ukraine did not fulfill its grain-sale quota in spite of the fact that the quota was lowered three times. This situation prompted the All-Union Central Committee to recognize, in a special resolution of 24 January 1933, that the party organization in Ukraine had not discharged its obligations. Pavel Postyshev was appointed to lead the Ukrainian party and was given extraordinary powers.<sup>41</sup>

Stalin blamed all failures of the new system on wrecking by the kulaks who had managed to penetrate the collective farms.<sup>42</sup> It was in this period that he formulated his notorious theory on the sharpening of the class struggle as socialism advances (January 1933). Therefore, special cells of the GPU (Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie, later the KGB) were set up in the political sections of all collective farms to carry out purges.<sup>43</sup> Postyshev directed this activity in Ukraine. From the reports of the political sections of collective farms in twenty-four republics, *krais* and *oblasts* for 1933, we learn that the following numbers were "replaced" (that is, arrested) for wrecking: 30 per cent of all agronomists, 47.3 per cent of all stewards, 34 per cent of the warehouse keepers, 25 per cent of the bookkeepers, and 24.4 per cent of the stable keepers.<sup>44</sup> The worst repression took place in Ukraine, in the Don region and in the Northern Caucasus. Entire villages were deported to the Far North from those areas.<sup>45</sup> Though there is a lack of sta-

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 202-3.

<sup>40</sup> Danilov, "Kollektivizatsiia," col. 494.

<sup>41</sup> The political history of this period is described by Hryhory Kostiuik in his *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror (1929-39)* (New York-Munich, 1960). On the appointment of Postyshev, see p. 27.

<sup>42</sup> Accepting kulaks into the collective farms was strictly prohibited. Among the real sources of the difficulties in collectivized agriculture, in addition to those already mentioned above, was a lack of buildings to house collectivized property. This especially affected animal husbandry, and the absolute number of livestock continued to decrease. The organizational structure of the collective farms was still in flux, with constant changes and reorganizations, "consolidations" and "de-consolidations."

<sup>43</sup> Danilov and Ivanitsky, "Leninskii kooperativnyi plan," p. 57.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

tistics on Ukraine as a whole, historians assert that punishment and repression “flowed as from a horn of plenty” (*sypalis kak iz roga izobiliia*), that in just five months in 1932, 25 to 30 per cent of the agricultural middle management were arrested.<sup>46</sup> In 1933, for example, political sections in Odessa and Donetske oblasts “recommended” (instead of “replaced,” but it still means “arrested”): “49.2 per cent of all collective farm chairmen (*holovy kolhospiv*), 44.3 per cent of all stewards (*zavhospy*) and 32.2 per cent of the brigade leaders (*bryhadyry*) . . . . In Donetske oblast, they recommended 44.1 per cent of all collective farm chairmen, 59.5 per cent of the stewards, 33.8 per cent of the brigade leaders and 28.1 per cent of the farm managers (*zaviduiuchi fermamy*).”<sup>47</sup>

To protect collective farm property and fields from the starving populace, a law was passed providing for the death penalty or ten years’ imprisonment with no chance of amnesty for any attempt at stealing collective farm property.<sup>48</sup>

The famine was no less a misfortune for the people. Here is how this period is viewed by a modern Soviet Russian writer:

A year of hunger moved through the country.  
It was 1933.

In Vokhrovo, the *raion* capital, in the little park by the station, dekulakized peasants expelled from Ukraine lay down and died. You got used to seeing corpses there in the morning; a wagon would pull up and the hospital stable hand, Abram, would pile in the bodies . . . .

Exiled kulaks crawled out of the town of Vokhrovo. These were not the local peasants, who managed somehow, even if on grass, to feed themselves. They straggled out and limped out, barefoot and tattered, out into the icy, piercing wind and freezing rain that heralded winter, over puddles covered with a crisp sheet of ice. Many of them were unable to make the fifteen kilometres [to the village] . . . . They were found on the edges of fields and in the ditches along the road.<sup>49</sup>

The situation began to improve towards the end of 1933, when the state acquired more grain than in 1932; the collective farmers received from two to ten kilograms of grain for a day’s

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<sup>46</sup> Ganzha et al, “Ukrainskoe selo,” p. 200.

<sup>47</sup> *Istoriia selianstva*, 2:188.

<sup>48</sup> *Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva*, p. 423.

<sup>49</sup> V. Tendriakov, “Konchina,” *Moskva*, 1968, no. 3, pp. 37, 40.



labour,<sup>50</sup> and the collective farms had essential stores of seed and feed grain.<sup>51</sup>

The highest achievement was the exceptionally good harvest of 1937, which permits us to evaluate the entire prewar agricultural experience of the Soviet Union. Global grain production in 1937 amounted to 5.8 million poods or 16 per cent more than in 1913 (5 million poods),<sup>52</sup> but that was accomplished with an expansion of 30 per cent in the area under cultivation since 1913 (130 per cent minus 116 per cent). That means that the productivity of one hectare fell in this period by 14 per cent. Moreover, if one considers that the urban population and raw-material needs of industry grew enormously during that period, Soviet historians seem justified in concluding that "the grain problem remained the most severe agricultural problem," that "increasing needs were not satisfied," and that "the party was not able to accomplish the tremendous development of agriculture that had been outlined at the seventeenth congress."<sup>53</sup>

A few words about the demographic results of collectivization are appropriate here. Soviet literature states that migration began to intensify in 1929-30, when collectivization was undertaken. "In those areas where collectivization was most intense, the flow of people from the countryside . . . was greatest."<sup>54</sup> However, the spontaneous nature of this process was a hindrance and caused an excessive fluidity in the new industrial work force. To obviate this, a series of laws regulating migration were passed (2 October 1930, 30 March 1931, 30 June 1931). These laws were to introduce organized methods of recruiting labour power based on agreements between the collective farms and the recruiting agencies.<sup>55</sup> But even these means of limiting spontaneous migration were not sufficient. Therefore, a law passed on 27 December 1932 required all city dwellers to carry passports (personal identification) and to register in their place of residence. Thus, a peasant wishing to emigrate to the city had to apply for a passport in his village and report his destination. He was thus subject to a double control.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Trapeznikov, *Leninizm*, 2:388.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 2:385.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 2:466.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> R. Dadykin, "Chislennost i istochniki popolneniia rabocheho klassa SSSR (1928-1937)," *Istoricheskie zapiski*, no. 87 (Moscow, 1971), p. 36.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 40-41.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

V. Starovsky has cited data on migration during the period in question for the USSR as a whole. By his calculations, during the twelve-year period from 1927 to 1938, the urban population rose by 29.8 million. Rural emigration (18.7 million) accounted for 62.7 per cent of the increase, natural growth for 17.8 per cent, and the remainder, 19.5 per cent, resulted from the reclassification of villages and rural settlements as towns. There are no similar calculations for Ukraine. But what data is available is presented in Table 3.

Table 3  
Population of Ukraine and of Ukrainians in the USSR, 1926-39  
(in Thousands)

Year of the census	Ukrainians in the USSR	Population of Ukraine		Number of Ukrainians in Ukraine					
		Total	Town	Country	Total	Town abs	Country abs	%	
1926	31,195	28,446	5,374	23,072	22,927	2,499	11	20,428	89
1939	28,111	31,785	11,700	20,085	23,362	6,797	29	16,565	71
1939									
-1926	-3,084	+3,339			+435				

Source: V. Kozlov, *Natsionalnosti SSSR. (Etno-demograficheskii obzor)* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 84, 109, 245; V. Burlin and A. Perkovsky, "Zminy v sotsialnoekonomichnii strukturi naselennia Ukrainiskoi RSR (1959-1970)," *Demohrafiia. Dozlidzhennia*, no. 3 (Kiev, 1975), p. 25.

We know that in Ukraine the average annual population growth for the years 1923 to 1927 was 466,900 in the countryside and 181,200 in the towns,<sup>57</sup> or an average of 438,300.<sup>58</sup> That means the exponential growth rate was equal to 1.014.<sup>59</sup> (Use of this rate assumes that the demographic trend will not change much, that living conditions will not be significantly altered, and that

<sup>57</sup> *Istoriia selianstva*, 2:174.

<sup>58</sup> Calculated as follows: In the cities lived 10 per cent of the Ukrainians, in the countryside — 90 per cent. Thus  $0.1 \times 181,200 + 0.9 \times 466,900 = 438,300$ .

<sup>59</sup> Absolute growth  $438,300 + \text{population (1926) } 31,195,000 = 31,633,300$ . Coefficient of growth  $= 438,300 : 31,633,300 = 1.014$ .

the dynamics of population development of the Ukrainians in Ukraine and outside of it are similar, which is a justified assumption, since the proportion of urban to rural inhabitants among Ukrainians was everywhere the same at that time — about 10 per cent urban.)<sup>60</sup> Calculating the population according to this index in the period between censuses (that is, thirteen years), we can say that in 1939 there should have been 37,374,000 Ukrainians. The difference between this figure and the actual population (28,111,000) represented a demographic loss of 9,263,000.

The demographic loss consists of those who died prematurely (that is, were killed), the children not born to persons prematurely dead or to persons unable to marry or remain married owing to external factors, and those consciously or unconsciously assimilated to another nationality. (Assimilation usually increases in difficult material and moral conditions and during long separation from one's native milieu.)

A closer determination of the relative proportions among these three types of loss does not seem possible on the basis of present data. But in any case, it is impossible to agree with the notion that this decrease in the population (after five years of normal reproduction, 1934-9) can be attributed solely to the assimilation of Ukrainians by Russians. The later demographic history of this people precludes the likelihood of such an explanation.

Collectivization had many further political and structural implications that we must leave aside. Let us only note that the purchasing agencies were organized centrally and operated independently of the local authorities. The later development of agrarian relations constantly strengthened this centralization.

Ukrainians were not the only ones to suffer during this period. But if we speak of collectivization in particular, they surely have the sad distinction of being its greatest victims.

Translated from the Polish by Alan Rutkowski

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<sup>60</sup> V. Kozlov, *Natsionalnosti SSSR (Etno-demograficheskii obzor)* (Moscow, 1975), p. 243.

## ДЕЩО У СПРАВИ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИХ МЕНШОСТЕЙ В ПОЛЬЩІ

The following document, already over three years old, discusses the situation of the Ukrainian minority in Poland. The pseudonymous author argues that the 500,000 Ukrainians living there are subjected to an intensive policy of assimilation: the Polish government often ignores the existence of the Ukrainian minority, referring to Poland as an ethnically monolithic state; the Ukrainian educational system and periodical press are restricted to an unsatisfactory minimum; and prejudice against Ukrainians so pervades Polish society that many Ukrainians hide their nationality to avoid exposure to insult and discrimination in promotions.

The author writes as a member of a vulnerable minority in a country where the government and some elements of the opposition outbid each other in appeals to nationalism. His veracity and the justice of his grievances are beyond question. Yet he does not tell the full story. There are also influential sectors in Polish society that have consistently worked towards a better understanding with Ukrainians, for example, the writers associated with the Paris-based émigré journal *Kultura* and a sizable group of historians in the Polish People's Republic. The democratic section of the Polish opposition (KOR) has pro-Ukrainian sympathies, and the underground Catholic journal *Spotkania* has published several objective articles on Ukrainian affairs. The Ukrainians in Poland certainly enjoy more rights than the Poles in Soviet Ukraine. In short, Polish-Ukrainian relations are somewhat more complicated than the document below would lead one to believe, and considerable effort has gone into their improvement.\*

The essay concludes by advocating a large-scale emigration of Ukrainians from Poland to Canada. This should not be dismissed out of hand. It may be beyond our means to achieve, but we cannot be sure until we actually assess our political, organizational and financial resources. It may seem that we would lose, in the disappearance of a significant Ukrainian population in Poland, a crucial link between Ukrainians in the emigration and in the USSR; but we must also ask ourselves how important such a link has been in the past and how long this link can survive in light of both the assimilation to Polish nationality that our author describes and the measures that the Soviet government has taken and will take to frustrate contact between Ukrainians in Poland and Ukraine. Finally, we must look at what there is to gain in both alleviating the plight of the Ukrainian minority in Poland and expanding and linguistically revitalizing the Ukrainian population of Canada. The problem at least deserves discussion.

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\* See Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980).

Останніми роками, щораз частіше у польській пресі, в працях журналістів, у заявах чільних провідників Польщі чути, що, мовляв, Польська Народня Республіка є країною однородною у національному складі. Найвимовнішим прикладом цього твердження є праця на 256 сторінок польського журналіста Едмунда Яна Османьчика, „Річпосполита поляків”, видана Державним Видавничим Інститутом у Варшаві 1977 року. В цій праці Е. Я. Османьчик на 17 сторінці пише: „Аж четверта формація — а третя Річпосполита — є абсолютно здомінована польською народністю і слушно можна її назвати Річпосполитою поляків”.

Восени 1977 року, на „обжинках” у місті Лешно, чільний провідник польської держави, беручи з рук обжинкових старостів буханець хліба, який символізував цьогорічне надбання хліборобів, між іншим, обіцяв ділити цей хліб так, щоб його було досить „усім полькам та полякам”.

Такі та їм подібні заяви спонукали мене заглянути у доступні мені енциклопедії і подивитись, що це таке національна меншість. Чи українці, які живуть у Польщі, — а їх найменше 300.000, себто 1 відсоток населення, — є національною меншістю, чи ні?

У 10 томі Української Радянської Енциклопедії, на 19 сторінці, є така стаття: „Національні меншості — в капіталістичних країнах національності, які становлять меншість щодо пануючих, пригноблюються ними і перебувають у нерівному становищі. В умовах соціалізму цей термін застосовується до національностей, які не належать до корінної національності, але повністю рівноправні з нею”.

Щож, зовсім ясно та просто. Але я далі не знаю, чи українці в Польщі, які, повторюю, становлять найменше 1 відсоток населення, є національною меншістю чи ні. Якщо держава абсолютно одноманітна у своєму національному складі, і якщо символічний буханець хліба буде поділений тільки між поляками, то, мабуть, українці в сучасній Польщі не становлять собою національної меншости. А може з ними нема проблеми, як ото у вищезгаданій Енциклопедії, то й нема що про них згадувати? Раз вони рівноправні, що їм більше треба? Чи може хтось боронить їм плекати свою мову, культуру? Треба у цій справі сягнути за фактами. Та про них пізніше.

Покищо загляньмо в інше джерело, у Велику Загальну Енциклопедію (Велька Енцикльопедія Повшхєхна ПВН), монументальну 12-ти томову працю, яка вийшла у світ після 1960 року. У 7 томі цієї Енциклопедії на 384 сторінці, між іншим, написано:

“Меншості — групи людей даної держави, які різняться від більшості її громадян своєю національною приналежністю... Виникнення національних меншостей зв'язане з процесами масової міграції (добровільної або примусової), анексією частини території одної держави другою державою, пересуванням границь на підставі міжнародних договорів тощо... Відносини між домінуючими етнічними групами (і владою, яка їх репрезентує) а меншостями викликають у державах, в яких нема монолітного національного складу, численні проблеми та суспільно-політичні конфлікти, у корені яких лежать економічні та класові інтереси, націоналістичні міркування... Відтак регулювання відносин між різними етнічними групами, які живуть у даній державі, становило завше один з важливіших аспектів внутрішньої політики багатоетнічних держав. У теперішній час відрізняють 4 основні типи політичних відносин, які складаються між більшістю і меншістю в державах, які не мають єдиної етнічної структури: 1) інтеграція народу на підставі рівноправності одиниць, що належать до різних етнічних груп (шляхом затирання різниць без дискримінації проти будь-якої з тих груп); 2) інтеграція народу на підставі нерівності шляхом примусового винародовлення національної меншості в обставинах її переслідування (класичним прикладом цього була політика Прусії та царської Росії); 3) етнічний плюралізм на підставі рівності одиниць, що належать до різних етнічних груп (федералістична політика); 4) етнічний плюралізм, що опирається на нерівності та політичній, юридичній і суспільній сепарації груп меншості, які признаються гіршими (наприклад, політика апартаїду в Республіці Південної Африки)... натомість у рамках ООН передбачено загальну охорону прав людини, не зважаючи на расові, мовні чи релігійні різниці.”

Стаття про національні меншості не згадує про національні меншості в Польщі, чи то в Польській Народній Республіці чи в Другій Річсполитій. Є тільки одне речення про те, що в 1934 році Польща відказалась від трактату про охорону національних меншостей та відмовилась від співпраці з Лігою Націй у цій ділянці.

От і далі не відомо, чи є в Польщі національні меншості, а особливо, чи українці, що живуть в Польщі, є національною меншістю. Може 1 відсоток населення це вже не так багато, щоб про нього згадувати. Мабуть так, бо ж у величезній статті „Польска” у 9 томі згаданої Енциклопедії нема ні одного слова про те, що в сучасній Польщі живуть українці. Отже нема і проблеми. Але ж, керуючись принципом аналогії, загляньмо у статтю „Україна”. В одинадцятому томі цієї Енциклопедії, на сторінках 787-8, є навіть відокремлена від за-

гальної статті „Україна” тема „населення”. Там пишеться: „Під оглядом кількості населення Україна посідає 2 місце в СРСР (19% населення СРСР). Більше  $\frac{3}{4}$  населення — це українці; крім них в Україні живуть росіяни (16,9%), євреї (2,0%), поляки (0,9% — переважно в житомирській та хмельницькій областях), білоруси (0,7%), молдавани (0,6%), болгары (0,5%), угорці (0,4%) та ін.”

У статті „Румунія” (том 10, стор. 195) згадана Енциклопедія вказує, що в Румунії, крім корінного населення, проживають також угорці, німці, українці, серби, словенці, болгары, татари, турки, євреї та інші. У статті „Чехословаччина” (том 2, стор. 719) у тій же Енциклопедії написано, що „Серед національних меншостей найчисленніші угорці (біля 3%) . . . крім того німці (біля 1,2%) . . . поляки (біля 0,6%) . . . та українці (0,6%) . . .” У статті „Німецька Демократична Республіка” (том 7, стор. 752) написано: „Населення НДР в 99% становлять німці; в округах Хоцебуж і Дрезно (Коттсбус і Дрезден) живе коло 100 тисяч лужичанів, які користуються культурною автономією.”

Наведені приклади мабуть вистачать щоб доказати, що в Польській Народній Республіці про національні меншості існує принаймні недомовлення. Чомусь на проживання в ній національних меншостей науковці (і не тільки вони) замикають очі. Одначе від замкнення очей проблема не щезне. Як бачимо з наведених статей, навіть 0,5 відсотків населення ця ж Енциклопедія зачисляє до національних меншостей.

Отже, хоч і посередньо, переконаємось, що в сучасній Польщі є національні меншості, принаймні існує тут українська національна меншість. І це незалежно від того, чи про неї згадується офіційно, чи ні. Адже ж ця Енциклопедія, як було згадано вище, поляків, які живуть в Україні (0,9%), зачисляє до національних меншостей.

У 1976 році в Польщі був виданий третій том 4-томової Загальної Енциклопедії (Енциклопедія Повшехна ПВН). У ньому, на 148-149 сторінках пишуть: „Народна Польща, в протиставленні з Польщею міжвоєнного періоду, є однородною державою з національного огляду: на підставі даних, в 1970 р. непольське населення становило 1,5% (біля 450 тисяч). Найчисленніші серед нього: українці та білоруси; крім них в Польщі живуть: євреї, словаки, росіяни, цигани, литовці, греки, німці, чехи. Громадяни, що належать до національних меншостей, мають рівні права з громадянами польської національності у всіх ділянках державного, політичного та економічного життя; мають можливість розвитку влас-

ної культури, в них є власні культурні організації, молодь навчається на рідній мові в спеціальних школах або в навчальних гуртках.”

У вищесказаному явна суперечність: в національно монолітній державі нема національних меншостей, а раз вони є, то нема моноліту.

Це правда, що в межах міжвоєнної Польщі було набагато більше українців, білорусів, литовців, жидів. Однак, на мою думку, українці, білоруси та литовці не були національними меншостями у відношенні до поляків. Це були люди непольської національності, які жили на своїх етнічних територіях, анексованих Польщею. Чи ж поляки, під час німецької окупації, були національною меншістю у відношенні до німців? У такому розумінні в довоєнній Польщі тільки євреї, чехи, німці та інші могли зачислятись до національних меншостей.

Вищезгаданий 3 том Загальної Енциклопедії подає, що „в цьому часі існують 4 типи політичного розв'язування проблем національних меншостей: 1) федеративна багатонаціональна держава, в якій народи і народності зв'язані союзом мають рівні права і автономію в межах їхніх територіяльних одиниць; взірцевим розв'язанням цього типу є федералізм СРСР, який дав народам гарантію не тільки політичної рівності, але також дав змогу зрівняти свою економіку та культуру... 2) багатонаціональна держава (без федеративної структури), яка дає поодиноким народам гарантію національної автономії; 3) однопородня держава, яка гарантує національним меншостям вільний розвиток культури, зберігаючи рівність прав усіх громадян; прикладом однопородньої держави є Польська Народня Республіка, яка веде консеквентну політику зміцнення морально-політичної єдності суспільства та пролетарського інтернаціоналізму; 4) багатовітчизняна держава, яка реалізує політику національної сегрегації та дискримінації народів і етнічних груп — тип, який можна зустріти в деяких капіталістичних державах, а в яскравій формі панує в Республіці Південної Африки (-апартаїд)”.

Значить, у теперішній Польщі є національні меншості, які мають рівні права з громадянами польської національності, можуть розвивати, плекати свою культуру, мову тощо.

Перед тим як перейти до деяких фактів, слід сказати, що автор статті „Національні меншості” в 3-му томі Загальної Енциклопедії допустився помилки: не можна, на мою думку, покликатись на СРСР як приклад розв'язання проблеми національних меншостей на засадах рівноправності. Адже, ко-



ли йдеться про національні меншості, то вони є меншістю у відношенні до головної нації. Згідно з конституцією СРСР союзні республіки є рівноправними республіками. Отже які національності у відношенні до якої є національними меншостями, хоч і рівноправними? А, може, автор мав на думці всі народи у відношенні до росіян? Тоді автор теж не має рації, бо ж навіть теоретично Російська Р.Ф.С.Р. не має статусу держави з головною нацією. Російську республіку в політичних працях називають першою серед рівних. Отже, де тут національні меншості? А, може, автор написав те що думав, а не те що слід було йому написати?

А тепер про українців у Польщі, як про найбільшу групу серед національних меншостей.

Скільки їх у Польщі? У 1957 році я читав в неофіційній нотатці, що українців у Польщі є біля 180-300 тисяч. Офіційних даних нема, тому що переписи населення чомусь не мають рубрики „національність”. Тільки відділи внутрішніх справ можуть знати про кількість українського населення в Польщі, бо в анкетах на видання посвідчення особи (*довід особісти*) є питання про національність. Однак, ці дані не публікуються. Навіть якби ці дані публікувались, то й так це не була б правда про кількість українців у Польщі. Це тому, що (хоч тим, хто не знає обставин у Польщі, і буде дивно) багато українців не признаються до своєї національності. Чому? Про це згодом. В усякому разі офіційних даних нема.

З огляду на історію Польщі — трудно було б і подумати, щоб у Польщі не було українців. Сотки років Польща панувала на українських землях. Шляхом економічних, ідеологічних і політичних заходів, багато століть Польща реалізувала політику польонізації. Багато українців спольонізувалось, серед них багато українських магнатів, як, напр., Ярема Вишневецький, який поборював визвольний рух українського народу за Хмельницького. Багато століть поляки жили пліч-о-пліч з українцями. Поляки з українцями родичалися. Особливо в Галичині, частково на Волині, багато було мішаних родин. Отже, коли прийшов край війни, коли відомо було що Західня Україна залишається при Радянському Союзі, коли прийшла справа евакуації польського населення з Західньої України — багато українців, щоб не розлучатися зі своїми рідними, зголошували себе за поляків і такими вже формально числились у Польщі. Також багато українців подалось за поляків та виїхали в Польщу, щоб тільки не остатись під радянською владою. Не тільки сусіди

знали, що вони українці, але й члени репатріаційних комісій. Якось так було що, не зважаючи на боротьбу поляків та українців що велась під час окупації, люди собі помагали. Життя є сильніше за встановлені людьми права. Не зважаючи на договір між Українською Радянською Соціалістичною Республікою та Польщею про евакуацію поляків з території України в Польщу а українців з території Польщі в Україну, багато поляків осталося в Україні та багато українців осталося в Польщі, а ще більше приїхало українців в Польщу, подаючись за поляків. Це не так уже було тридно: українці з Західної України знали польську мову, а, крім того, серед українських прізвищ є багато таких, що звучать як польські.

Отже, багато українців, що приїхали в Польщу, особливо на її західні землі, не признавались до своєї національності з вищезгаданих причин, а, крім, того, ще й тому, що величезна кількість поляків ще й до сьогодні ототожнює кожного українця з бандерівцями. Зрозуміла річ — жоден українець, що замешкав у Польщі, не дуже хотів, щоб його ототожнювали з бандерівцями. Дійшло до того, що слово „українець” було трактоване як образливе слово. У багатьох випадках суди признавали вину за тим що, на приклад, свого сусіда назвав українцем.

Розглядаючи особові дані багатьох польських громадян, особливо тих, що живуть на західних землях, можна переконатись що велика їх кількість українці, хоч цього вони не признаються. Який же бо поляк має матір, що називається Параска, Ксеня, Оксана, Федора, Ніна, Віра, Люба, а батька, що називається Омелько, Дмитро, Орест, Левко. Отих „поляків” легко впізнати. А скільки є таких українців, що мали матір Марію а батька Івана? Отже, їхні батьки тепер Мар'я та Ян. Особисто знаю українську родину яка колись мала прізвище „Василишин”, а тепер вони пишуться Васілевські. Він з Сергія зробився Юзеф, вона з Олени — Гелена, син з Володимира — Владислав, а донька з Людмили — Люцина.

Багато українців у Польщі польонізувалось: це зрозуміло, коли взяти до уваги що вони не признавались до своєї національності, а в них родились діти, які від оточення знали про українців тільки й те, що українець — це майже звір. Батьки не казали своїм дітям хто вони. Знаю таких, що аж в Канаді сказали своїм дітям хто вони. Скільки в цьому трагедії!

Навіть серед лемків багато молоді польонізувалось, особливо ті, що женились з полячками або виходили заміж за поляків.

Для тих, хто живе у великому місті, то ще сяк так. Але для тих, що живуть в малих містечках та признаються до своєї національності (таких дуже мало), — дуже погано. Одна людина з вищою освітою висловила свою думку на цю тему, мовляв, бути в Польщі інтелігентом і признаватись до української національності — це героїзм. І це правда.

Отже, треба сказати, що не так вже легко говорити про кількість українців у Польщі. Не всі польонізувались.

Якщо приблизні дані говорять про 300 тисяч, то треба це число щонайменше подвоїти а то й потроїти. Це твердження не є перебільшенням.

„Український Календар — 1978” вийшов тиражем 6.500 екземплярів і вже в лютому не можна було його дістати. „Антологія української поезії”, зібрана Ф. Неуважним, вийшла польською мовою тиражем 5.000 екземплярів і не лежала на полицях книгарень ні одного дня. Розійшлась як давно очікуваний бестселер. Ці факти також свідчать про кількість українців у Польщі.

Можна з певністю сказати, що кількість свідомих своєї національності українців у Польщі не менше 500 тисяч.

Прослідкуймо, як розвивають — плекають свою культуру, традиції і мову українці в Польщі.

Перш за все, треба сказати, що тут існують дві середні загальноосвітні школи: одна в Гурово-Ілавецьку, а друга в Лігниці. Точніше кажучи, в Гурово-Ілавецьку існують тільки еквівалентні до польських 4 класи з українською мовою навчання, а конкретніше класи, в яких молодь вивчає українську мову як предмет і при нагоді вчиться історії та географії України. Отже, в Гурово-Ілавецьку існують тільки 4 класи: 1-4. Натомість, в Лігниці існує ліцей з українською мовою навчання. Існує він як самостійна одиниця. Одначе, коли приглянутись до того ліцею ближче, то побачимо, що у тому ліцеї теж тільки 4 класи, собто класи 1-4. В тому ліцеї теж навчання відбувається польською мовою, а українська мова існує тільки як додатковий предмет навчання. В обох, вище вказаних ліцеях, поляки є директорами.

З вищесказаного видно, що обидва українські ліцеї диспонуєть тільки 8-класними приміщеннями, як одиницями, що прийняті польською статистикою при показниках розвитку шкільництва. Підкреслюю: 8-класних приміщень на 500 тисяч українців. Коли б такі самі пропорції мало польське населення, то в середніх школах повинно б воно мати всього тільки 544 лекційних приміщень. Тимчасом, як то подає „Ма-

лий статистичний річник за 1975 рік”, тільки в загальноосвітніх ліцеях в 1975 році було в Польщі 16.100 клясних приміщень. Крім того, в 1975 році в Польщі було 40.852 клясних приміщень, як приміщень середніх професіональних шкіл. Отже, разом в Польщі в 1975 році середні школи мали 56.952 клясних приміщення. Це на 34 мільйони мешканців. А на пів мільйона мешканців українського населення, тільки 8 клясних приміщень. З цього видно, що українці в Польщі мають у 7.119 раз менше клясних приміщень в середніх школах, а кількість українського населення у відношенні до поляків є тільки приблизно у 70 разів менша.

Це не значить, що українська молодь не вчиться в середніх школах. Не йдеться, однак, про це, а про те, що українці в Польщі мають порівняно мікроскопічну можливість навчатися в українських школах.

Обставини в ділянці шкільництва, мабуть, свідчать про можливість розвитку української культури в Польщі взагалі. Однак, для яснішого погляду на життя українців в Польщі, слід вказати на деякі більш детальні факти:

— „Нашого Слова” — українського тижневика, не знайдете у продажу в кіосках. Це значить, що розповсюдження єдиного українського тижневика обмежено адміністративними заходами. Інших українських газет чи журналів в Польщі нема, бо ж „Наша культура” являє собою додатком до „Нашого Слова”.

— Декілька років тому молодий поляк на повітовому конкурсі поезії прочитав глибокогуманного вірша Тараса Шевченка „Полякам” (Ще як були ми козаками . . . ). З того приводу той учень мав багато неприємностей. Підчас лекції професор прочитав йому „нотацію”, при чому кілька разів підкреслював, що, мовляв, недопустимо в Польщі пропагувати українську мову, українську культуру. Так говорив професор технікуму до своїх учнів. Коли мати однієї учениці поскаржилась на таку поведінку професора його директоріві та шкільному інспекторові, то ті тільки плечима знизували.

— Братові автора цих рядків відказано в аванс на вищий державний пост (повітового щабля), коли восвідське начальство дізналось, що він українець. Про це рішення знали також партійні органи та навіть пальцем не ворохнули з цього приводу.

Прикладів можна було б множити на кілька томів. Були і є випадки, коли начальство „радить” урядовцям-українцям: треба польонізуватись або попрощатись з кар’єрою.

Щорозумніші поляки толерують українців, але хай тільки почнеться мова про Львів, то тут вже толеранція та звичайна культура кінчається. Нехай спробує українець сказати, що, мовляв, Львів, це українське місто. Тут зараз підуть аргументи та все „історичні” про те, що не тільки Львів, а й ціле Поділля — до Чорного моря — це Польща. Знаю особисто ніби культурних інтелігентів, в одного мати українка, у другого білоруска, які мені в очі твердять, що, мовляв, українського народу взагалі нема, що це тільки щось посереднє між поляками та росіянами. Спробуйте заперечити, то зразу станете націоналістом, майже провідником націоналістів в Польщі.

Коли українець в Польщі заспіває, навіть в своїй хаті, по-українському — він націоналіст, коли говорить по-українському — теж націоналіст. А взагалі страшенно дивуються, що українці (деякі) офіційно признаються до своєї національності, це, мовляв, може тільки ганьбити.

Погляд усіх, які вміють читати, поляків, а таких майже 100%, на справу українську, на українців взагалі, укшталтований на поглядах Генрика Сєнєвіча на українців. Цей найбільш відомий широким читачам у Польщі письменник, прекрасний письменник, якщо йдеться про форму, українців оцінював не інакше, як „чернь, мотлох, напівдиких, озвірилих, пияків тощо”. Поляки, говорячи сучасною мовою, по Сєнєвічу, це раса панів, а українці — хлопи, з самої природи щось гірше за поляків. Хіба коли українець ополячився, то він заслуговував на те, щоб його поважати, тай то не в кожному випадкові. Такі погляди на українців Г. Сєнєвіч виложив у своїй „патріотичній”, а насправді — шовіністичній праці — у романі „Вогнем та мечем”. Погляди цього роману на українців визнають майже всі поляки.

Ще маленький приклад: У столичному місті — Варшаві — це було. На іменинах головного інженера фабрики зібралось товариство понад 30 осіб: самі інженери та економісти з вищою освітою. Люди, що висказувались прогресивно, критично, що їх відношення до гуманізму людини було незаперечним. Отож, ще перед тим як підняти тост на честь іменинника, чекаючи ще на когось, у свобідній розмові один з інженерів — українець, а товариство знало, що він українець, висказав свою думку жартівливою українською поговоркою: мовляв, „не тратьте куме сили — спускайтеся на дно”. На це один з поляків зареагував: давайте домовимося, щоб тут не було чути української мови. І тут не важне, що відізвася так один з бесідників. Важне в справі є те, що ніхто з при-

сутніх не взяв в захист їхнього ж колеги — українця. Мало того: деякий час коментувалось, що, мовляв, нащо, будучи серед поляків, висловлювати свою думку по-українському.

Таке відношення до українців не поодиноке, воно повсякденне. Тому не дуже треба дивуватись, що українці, які вдома розмовляють по-українському, як тільки вийдуть за поріг своєї хати, вже в коридорі, вже в лішті, на вулиці — розмовляють між собою по-польському. Якщо хтось скаже, що українцям ніхто не боронить говорити між собою по-українському, то це правда, але між формальним правом а суспільною атмосферою, яка оточує українців, є величезна різниця. Різниця ця дає ефект фактичної дискримінації українців в Польщі.

Офіційні органи не протидіють такій атмосфері. Не робиться нічого конкретного, щоб доказати, що, мовляв, українці — найбільший сусіда поляків, сусіда, який ніколи не заграбував польських земель, з якими слід жити, поважаючи один одного. В польській пресі, за дуже малими винятками, українські назви, імена, прізвища, вживаються у спольщеній або русифікованій формі. Приклади: Гулак-Артемовські, замість Гулак-Артемовський, Зенобуш Хмельницькі, замість Зіновій Хмельницький, Романенко, замість Романенко, Береговой, замість Береговий тощо. Однак у відношенні до інших національностей поляки притримуються правильної фонетики. Наприклад, не пишуть Юзеф Брос Тіто, але Йосіп Брос Тіто, пишуть також Антонін Новотни, Йоган Штраус, Янош Кадар, Георгі Димітров, але Подгорни, замість Підгорний.

Це все діється в останній чверті 20 століття, в Народній Польщі.

Зі сказаного вище можна зробити такі висновки:

По перше: Польща проводить інтенсивну політику асиміляції українців.

По друге: Що мають робити ті українці, які не хочуть піддатись процесові асиміляції? Чи мають виїхати — емігрувати в Україну? Адже більшість, якщо не всі українці в Польщі, саме тому опинились в Польщі, щоб не бути в *Радянській* Україні.

Якщо якась група людей не хоче асимілюватись, то треба їй дати вихід: хай, хто хоче, емігрує куди хоче. Такий вихід, здається, був би на руку українцям, а також правлячим кругам Польщі. Правда, це трохи сором'язливе розв'язання проблеми, але ж подібним чином було в Польщі розв'язано питання євреїв.

Отже головний висновок з написаного такий: відповідні організації українців за кордоном, особливо в Канаді і США, повинні звернутись до суспільних та урядових чинників в Канаді чи США про клопотання в доступній для обох сторін формі з метою добитись зі сторони Польщі генерального дозволу емігрувати українцям, куди вони хочуть, а країни, до яких направлялася б еміграція, щоб домогли влаштуватися емігрантам. Хай би така еміграція мала таку ж форму, як остання еміграція євреїв з Польщі, хай би емігранти мали змогу забрати з собою своє майно.

З розмов з тими українцями, що побували останніми роками в США та Канаді, видно, що головний потік еміграції був би скерований на Канаду. Там, розказували, є навіть сенатори — українці. Отже, на мою думку, організації українців в Канаді та США повинні прийняти заходи в своїх урядах про клопотання, про які вище написано.

Придивляючись на проблему українців в Польщі та порівнюючи її з обставинами національних меншостей в інших країнах соц. табору, треба дійти до висновку, що не тільки в Польщі та не тільки у відношенні до українців існує проблема. Від українців, що живуть у Румунії, чути, що там просто дискримінується угорська національна меншість, поляки, що живуть в Україні, в Білорусії та Литві, нарікають на фактичну дискримінацію. Отже, говорячи про українців в Польщі, не можна сказати, що, мовляв, вони надто вразливі, чи, може, перебільшують свою кривду. Це насправді питання важке.

Василь Полтавець  
Варшава, листопад 1977 р.

**SUPERHEROES, GENTLEMEN OR PARIAHS?  
THE COSSACKS IN NIKOLAI GOGOL'S *TARAS BULBA*  
AND PANTELEIMON KULISH'S *BLACK COUNCIL***

In the first half of the nineteenth century, under the influence of Romantic historicism, which emphasized the uniqueness of the nation and its past, many works of historical fiction were produced in the Russian empire, including Little Russia, as Ukraine was then called. The writers Fedor Glinka, Vasiliï Narezhny, Orest Somov, E. Aliadin, F. Bulgarin, Iukhim Barshev, Aleksandr Kuzmich, Nikolai Gogol, Panteleimon Kulish and others, about thirty in all, chose the Ukrainian Cossacks as the subject of their historical fiction. Some of these writers — Narezhny (Narizhny), Somov, Gogol and Kulish — were of Ukrainian origin.<sup>1</sup>

There are two kinds of historical fiction: historical romances and historical novels. Historical romances present illusionary worlds in which the heroes remain heroes and succeed in all sorts of incredible adventures and where the action consists of a fantastic succession of events. A "historical" romance presents a contradiction, for "historical" implies a serious interpretation of history, adherence to fact, and the presence of actual historical events and personages, whereas romance idealizes and fantasizes reality rather than interpreting it. Sometimes the term "period romance" rather than "historical romance" is used to describe works that emphasize general qualities of a period instead of actual events.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A study about the Ukrainian-Cossack theme in early nineteenth-century Russian literature was written by Vasyl Sypovsky: *Ukraina v rosiïskomu pysmenstvi (1801-1850 rr.)*, UAN, Žbirnyk istorychno-filolo-hichnoho viddilu, 58 (Kiev, 1928). A recent investigation of this topic, which also looks at this theme in Polish literature, is George Gregory Grabowicz, "The History and Myth of the Cossack Ukraine in Polish and Russian Romantic Literature" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1975). The answer to why these writers chose the Cossacks as their subject lies in Romantic aesthetic theory, which placed a great stress on exoticism. For the Russin Romantics, this exoticism "was found in the near Orient, in the Gypsies living among the Slavs and frequently in the Ukraine." Dmitrij Čiževskij, *Comparative History of Slavic Literatures*, trans. R. Porter and M. Rice and ed. S. Zenkovsky (Baltimore, 1971), p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> C. Hugh Holman, "William Gilmore Simms's Theory and Practice of Historical Fiction" (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1949), p. 88.



The historical novel is different. It focusses on common, everyday, middle-class reality, has a non-heroic hero, a plot that issues from character, and a deromanticizing style. It portrays characters in a detailed, factual and individualized way.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the historical novel has a historical framework in which the manners of the past are described in a serious, detailed manner, and actual historical events, characters and conflicts are depicted. The non-heroic and fictional protagonist, the centre of the narrative structure, is placed within this historical framework.<sup>4</sup>

It was the unhistorical romances of the French writers Alfred de Vigny and Victor Hugo, rather than the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott, that exerted the decisive influence on the Russian writers of historical fiction in the early nineteenth century. Scott's historical novels were very popular at the time, but their structural elements and Enlightenment ideas were misunderstood by his readers and imitators in Russia, who mistook his portrayal of old cultures for an expression of Romantic nationalism. As in the French romances, so too in the Russian, historical truth was subordinated to imagination and intuition.

Gogol wrote several unfinished fragments of historical fiction — “Hetman,” “Neskolko glav iz neokonchennoi povesti” (Several Chapters from an Unfinished Tale), “Krovavyi bandurist” (The Bloody Bandurist), “Glava iz istoricheskogo romana” (A chapter from a Historical Novel), and “Mne nuzhno videt polkovnika” (I Must See the Colonel) — but *Taras Bulba* is his only completed work in this genre. Two editions appeared, the first in 1835, the second, containing many additions, in 1842.

*Taras Bulba* is a historical romance. It has no historical framework; actually, it has no history whatsoever. Instead of portraying the historical and real Ukraine, Gogol presents an “idealized never-never land.”<sup>5</sup> Panteleimon Kulish, one of Gogol's first critics and biographers, was the first to perceptively comment that in

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<sup>3</sup> See Northrop Frye, „The Four Forms of Fiction” and Maurice Shroder, “The Novel as a Genre” in Philip Stevick, ed., *The Theory of the Novel* (New York, 1967); also Edwin Muir, *The Structure of the Novel* (London, 1928) and W. Thrall, A. Hibbard, *A Handbook to Literature*, rev. and enl. by C. H. Holman (New York, 1960).

<sup>4</sup> For an analysis of the structure of the classical Walter Scott historical novel, see Romana Bahrij-Pikulyk, “*Taras Bulba* and *The Black Council*: Adherence to and Divergence from Sir Walter Scott's Historical Novel Pattern” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1978), ch. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Victor Erlich, *Gogol* (New Haven and London, 1969), p. 31.

*Taras Bulba* Gogol displayed "an unusual gift for prophecy into the past."<sup>6</sup>

Gogol was a mythopoeic writer. What he expressed in *Taras Bulba* was his highly personal and complex myth of Ukraine,<sup>7</sup> the sources of which may be traced to a variety of historical, geneological, psychological and sexual tensions.<sup>8</sup> According to George Grabowicz, the Gogolian myth of Ukraine basically consists of the dichotomy between man and woman, each of which represent two incompatible modes of social existence found in Ukraine. The man represents the nomadic life-style of the Cossacks, and the woman represents the agricultural life-style. If either man or woman intrudes in the other's life-style, or if either of the two modes of social existence intrudes into the other's sphere, ruin and destruction ensue. In the Gogolian world, it is always the woman, or the female and agricultural life-style, that intrudes and brings destruction.<sup>9</sup> The only work in which this does not happen is *Taras Bulba*. Here the woman is a threat but she destroys Andrii only. It is the male life-style that triumphs in *Taras Bulba*.

This mythical approach accounts for the flagrant disregard of history in *Taras Bulba*. For example, Gogol wrote that Taras was a character of the fifteenth century and then proceeded to describe the religious conflicts of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Taras Bulba is completely imaginary, and there is not a single historical personage or event in *Taras Bulba*. References to such historical figures as Adam Kysil and Hetman Ostrianytsia are brief and indirect. Moreover, the presentation of the conflict in *Taras Bulba* as an exclusively religious one is inaccurate, for the conflict between the Catholic Poles and Orthodox Zaporizhians was also economic and social.<sup>10</sup>

Turning to the depiction of the Cossacks in *Taras Bulba*, we find this same mythical approach and therefore the same lack of

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<sup>6</sup> Panteleimon Kulish, "Ob otnoshenii malorossiiskoi slovesnosti k obshcherusskoi," in *Tvory*, ed. O. Doroshkevych (Kharkiv-Kiev, 1931), 3:413.

<sup>7</sup> Myth is the "dramatic or narrative embodiment of a people's perception of the deepest truths." W. Thrall, A. Hibbard, *A Handbook to Literature*, p. 299.

<sup>8</sup> Grabowicz, "The History and Myth of the Cossack Ukraine . . .," p. 518.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 495-8.

<sup>10</sup> L. Okynshevych, "Ukraina 1663 roku ta 'Chorna Rada' P. Kulisha," in P. Kulish, *Tvory*, 3:169-85.

historical verity. No town Cossacks are depicted, only Zaporizhians, and no distinction is made between the Zaporizhian Cossacks and the Don Cossacks. The Cossacks are portrayed in a mythical time dimension that overlaps centuries. That is why Taras can deliver speeches in praise of nineteenth-century Russian Romantic nationalism and Slavophilism.

Gogol's preference for myth explains why he used very few historical sources when many more were available. The few historical sources he did use, such as Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan's *Opisanie Ukrainy (A Description of Ukraine)* and Myshetsky's *Istoriia o kozakakh zaporozhskikh (History of the Zaporizhian Cossacks)*, which are primarily descriptions of the life-style of the Zaporizhians, were not used for historical facts but as a source for the description of local colour and manners or as a source of plot motifs. It is this accurate and detailed description of the Zaporizhian manners and milieu that provides the illusion of an existence of a historical framework in *Taras Bulba*.

Gogol's preference for myth also explains why, of all the available historical sources, he favoured the *Istoriia Rusov (The History of the Rus' People)*, a Romantic work characterized by an emotional tone, exaggeration and many literary qualities, but whose historical verity is as dubious as that of *Taras Bulba*.<sup>11</sup> Besides being characterized by a tendency towards fabrication and the presentation of history in terms of such Romantic Cossack heroes as Nalyvaiko, Taras Triasylo, Ostrianytsia and, above all, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, *Istoriia Rusov* also contains many scenes of violence that can compete with the French "école frénétique" that was very popular at this time.<sup>12</sup> It was these Romantic features and scenes of violence that appealed to Gogol. There were some more chronicle-like, more factual, and less anecdotal sections in this work, such as an explanation of the difference between registered and non-registered Cossacks and the descriptions of

<sup>11</sup> The overwhelming impact of *Istoriia Rusov*, its rhetoric, its exaggeration, its description of heroes and violence, is in the tradition of Romanticism. The writers on whom this work had the greatest impact were in fact the Romantics: Gogol, Shevchenko, Kostomarov. M. Vozniak, *Psevdo-Konysky i psevdo-Poletyka: "Istoriia Rusov" v literaturi i nauksi (Lviv-Kiev, 1939)*, p. 18.

<sup>12</sup> The writers of the "école frénétique" "were concerned mainly with the 'underworld of the big city', with improbable criminals, intrigues, and mysteries, in which the naturalistic description of atrocities of every sort constituted the main attraction." V. Setchkarev, *Gogol: His Life and Works* (New York, 1965), p. 138.

treaties. Gogol, however, was not inspired by these sections, and chose instead the more rhetorical and sensational ones. He also took from this work the idea that the religious conflict was the sole cause of the Cossack wars, and some quasi-facts or anecdotes for plot motifs.

The most important sources for *Taras Bulba* were not the few historical sources Gogol used, but the folklore sources, the historical songs and Cossack *dumy* that were available in the collections of Mykhailo Maksymovych, Izmail Sreznevsky, Platon Lukashkevych and Mykola Markevych.<sup>13</sup> They provided a source of plot motifs and exerted a tremendous influence on the style of *Taras Bulba*. Most importantly, the folksongs and *dumy* reinforced Gogol's mythical perception of Ukraine, for folklore and oral literature are themselves "fragments of a dispersed folk mythology."<sup>14</sup> Like myth, folksongs lack chronology and factual references. They strive for totality and synthesis, and provide a sense of immediate experience. The Cossacks of the *dumy* are composite rather than specific figures, and they are indisputable heroes, "who conquer three hundred, six hundred, and even nine hundred of the Tatar enemy single-handedly."<sup>15</sup>

Relying heavily on the *dumy*, Gogol idealized the Cossacks. He focused his attention in *Taras Bulba* almost exclusively on the Zaporizhians. Extensive description of manners is limited to those of the Zaporizhians, and the narration is always from the Zaporizhian side. Also, the Zaporizhians and their exploits are praised in a folk-epic style. There are numerous comparisons of the Zaporizhians to knights, hawks, lions, swift wolfhounds, eagles and oaks.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Gogol used the first two books of part one of Sreznevsky's *Zaporozhskaia starina* (Zaporizhian Antiquities), which he received from him in 1834, and M. Maksymovych's *Malorossiiskii pesni* (Little-Russian Songs), which had been published in 1827. For the second edition of *Taras Bulba* Gogol also used Maksymovych's *Ukrainskii narodnia pesni* (Ukrainian Folk Songs), published in 1834, P. Lukashkevych's *Malorossiiskii i chervonorusskii narodnia dumy i pesni* (Little-Russian and Red-Russian Folk Dumy and Songs), published in 1836, and M. Markevych's *Ukrainskie melodii* (Ukrainian Melodies), published in 1831.

<sup>14</sup> Grabowicz, "The History and Myth of the Cossack Ukraine . . .," p. 512.

<sup>15</sup> Natalie K. Moyle, introduction to *Ukrainian Dumy*, Editio minor, trans. G. Tarnawsky and P. Kilina (Toronto-Cambridge, Mass., 1979), p. 8.

<sup>16</sup> See especially ch. 9 of second edition of *Taras Bulba*. The major source of epic images in *Taras Bulba* was Homer's *Iliad*, but many of

In chapter two of *Taras Bulba* we find the following description of the *Sich*, the Zaporizhian stronghold:

So here is the *Sich*. Here is the nest out of which fly all those who are proud and strong as lions. Here is the source from which freedom and Cossackdom flow over all Ukraine.<sup>17</sup>

And in chapter eight, we read:

They were pensive, like eagles perched on the summits of steep and lofty mountains . . . Like eagles they surveyed the view and their fate, looming darkly in the distance. (p. 31)

Taras Bulba is presented as the greatest of these Zaporizhians, the embodiment of all the Zaporizhian qualities. His presentation is in terms of the Cossack heroes of the *dumy* and the heroes of epics. Like the epic hero, Taras Bulba is compositionally the central figure of the work, "a head taller than all his fellow-actors . . . the sun round which the planets revolve."<sup>18</sup> One of the ways in which Gogol maintains Taras's heroic stature is by painting him in epic images of great strength and size:

When the regimental secretary presented the peace treaty and the hetman signed it, Taras took off his clean sword, a costly Turkish sabre of the finest steel, broke it in two like a reed, and threw the two pieces far away in different directions, saying, "Farewell! Just as the two parts of this sword can never be joined to form one sword, so shall we, comrades, never meet in this world." (pp. 167-8)

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the images referring to flora, fauna, hunting, husbandry and battles are to be found in Ukrainian and Russian folk epic poetry and songs. See Carl R. Proffer, *The Simile and Gogol's "Dead Souls"* (The Hague, 1967), pp. 169 and 170.

<sup>17</sup> Nikolai Vasilevich Gogol, *Taras Bulba*, in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow, 1937), 2:62. All quotations from *Taras Bulba* are from this edition. Hereafter, page numbers will appear in the text following the quotation.

<sup>18</sup> Georg Lukacs, *The Historical Novel*, trans. H. & S. Mitchell (Harmondsworth, 1962), p. 36. The definition of an epic hero in W. F. Thrall and A. Hibbard, *A Handbook to Literature*, p. 175, is "a figure of heroic stature, of national or international importance, and of great historical or legendary significance." One of the problems with Taras's characterization is that it also consists of some comic elements of the *vertep* (Cossack puppet theatre) Zaporizhian, which, when combined with the tragic and epic elements, results in a jarring imbalance. *Taras Bulba* is an uneven work and justifiably relegated to a second-rate status. Gogol's characteristic mixing of styles, which was very effective in his comic works, was unsuccessful in a serious work such as *Taras Bulba*.

When Taras is wounded during the battle in chapter ten, an epic image is used to describe his fall: "Then he crashed to the ground like a felled oak. A mist covered his eyes" (p. 146). Another example of the use of solemn epic imagery to depict Taras is found in chapter eight:

Taras Bulba did not like such words, and he lowered still more over his eyes his sullen black eyebrows, streaked with white like bushes that had grown on the dark heights of a mountain and had been sprinkled with the sharp northern frost. (p. 123)

The narrative structure of *Taras Bulba* is divided into three sub-plots, which are linked by the central and pivotal figure of Taras. These sub-plots, about Andrii, Ostap and Taras, are arranged so that the movement in each leads toward a climax depicting the death of a Zaporizhian. The climaxes are arranged in a rising crescendo of progressively more defiant deaths. Andrii offers no opposition as his father shoots him. Ostap is tortured before his execution and in a moment of weakness cries out for his father. Taras risks his life to answer. He is chained to a tree, his hands are nailed to this tree, and he is set on fire. Nevertheless, he shouts out instructions to his men about the boats on the Dnister River. This three-part climactic structure glorifies Taras, for he plays a prominent role in each of the climaxes, and his death, as the final climax, is the most violent and the most defiant. The title of the work is appropriately named after him, for he is the work's structural centre.

Related to the presentation of Taras as a hero is Gogol's favorite device of hyperbole. In fact, the entire work, its structure and style as well as the protagonist Taras, is one extended hyperbole.<sup>19</sup> The last scene, for example, in which the Zaporizhians fly over the precipice, parallels "the doings of Superman."<sup>20</sup> Taras is portrayed as the greatest of these Zaporizhian superheroes. The heroic exploits of the other Zaporizhians, Mosii Shilo, Kukubenko, Bovdiug, Balaban and his son Ostap, reflect and enhance the qualities of the central hero, Taras, in the same way that a chorus in a choir repeats refrains and contributes to the performance of a soloist.

Violence, which is an inherent part of *Taras Bulba* and of the protagonist's character and deeds, must be seen within the

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<sup>19</sup> Erlich, *Gogol*, p. 52.

<sup>20</sup> Leonid Strakhovsky, "The Historianism of Gogol," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (1953):369.

context of this hyperbolic style. Taras's crime, the murder of his own son, is the greatest act of violence in the entire novel. Yet, it is completely in keeping with the hyperbolic presentation of Taras. Since Taras is not only the embodiment of all Zaporizhian qualities but also a magnification of them, it is appropriate that violence, one of these qualities, also be magnified in Taras. Due to his violent deeds, Taras is referred to as a "monster" by one critic,<sup>21</sup> while another critic points out that "Taras Bulba's present-day counterpart would be a leader of an armed motorcycle gang or a *capo di famiglia* in the Mafia."<sup>22</sup>

Taras, the super-Zaporizhian, possesses not only heroic and epic dimensions but mythical ones as well. In view of the fact that Gogol's approach to the past was in terms of myth, this is not surprising. Taras Bulba is a generalized and composite image of a national leader, of the Cossack hero as he appears in songs and *dumy*. Nalyvaiko, Pavliuk, Taras Triasylo, and Ostrianytsia would all be able to recognize themselves in Taras Bulba.<sup>23</sup> Though Taras is a composite character, the Cossack figure he most resembles is Bohdan Khmelnytsky. A direct connection is never made between Taras Bulba and Bohdan Khmelnytsky, but in the reader's mind, and perhaps in Gogol's subconscious, this link is definitely made. Taras is roughly the same age as Khmelnytsky was when he led the 1648 revolution. Taras's desire to personally revenge the death of one of his sons was also one of the initial reasons for Khmelnytsky's uprising. Finally, Taras's son Andrii is in love with a Polish lady, which can be compared with Khmelnytsky's love for his mistress, Helen, a noble lady of unknown nationality who married Czaplinski, Khmelnytsky's Polish rival. In *Taras Bulba* Taras and Andrii are different figures, but in the *Hetman* fragments, Ostrianytsia is the prototype of both Taras and Andrii.

The presence of this association in the reader's mind and in Gogol's subconscious is not surprising, because Bohdan Khmelnytsky is not just a historical figure. For many Ukrainians, he also functions on the level of collective national symbolism. He is the archetypal Cossack, a national leader of heroic proportions, and

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<sup>21</sup> Edmund Wilson, "Gogol: The Demon in the Overgrown Garden," *The Nation*, CLXXV (1952):522.

<sup>22</sup> Simon Karlinsky, *The Sexual Labyrinth of Nikolai Gogol* (Cambridge, 1976), p. 82.

<sup>23</sup> S. Mashinsky, *Istoricheskaia povest Gogolia* (Moscow, 1940), pp. 137-8. The views of Soviet critics, as for example that of Mashinsky, who describes Taras as "the embodiment of an indomitable thirst for justice" (p. 158), are in striking opposition to those of Western critics.

a symbol of virility: a national variant of the universal strongman archetype. Bohdan Khmelnytsky still functions as a symbol of the super-Cossack figure today as much as he did in the past. In the Cossack chronicles, the *Istoriia Rusov*, and the second cycle of *dumy*, Khmelnytsky is the undisputed hero. Gogol's familiarity with the *dumy* and the *Istoriia Rusov* served to reinforce the Khmelnytsky archetype in his mind.

In *Taras Bulba*, as in his articles on history, Gogol expressed the Romantic view that the historical process is dominated by heroic personalities:

Cyrus, Alexander, Columbus, Luther, Louis XIV, Napoleon—these, according to his scheme, are the landmarks of history. Cyrus forcibly *united* the diverse peoples, Alexander *subjected* the Greeks to his authority. The poor Genoan *destroyed* the trade of Venice. Luther *shattered* the power of the pope. The Dutch control world trade until one extraordinary sovereign undermines it. Napoleon, the giant of the nineteenth century, blocks the path of the English and stuns Europe with his fast movement.

United—subjected—destroyed—shattered; undermines, stuns—this is how Gogol perceives complex historical movements.<sup>24</sup>

Karlinsky summarizes how Gogol approached history in his essays and his historical tales:

What he [Gogol] wanted to achieve was a brilliant synthesis, ablaze with sparkling rhetoric and as unencumbered by facts as possible. History . . . was for Gogol a wide-screen, technicolor spectacle, with a cast of millions, starring bloody conquerors (Attila the Hun and Ghengis Khan held a particular fascination for Gogol) seen as evil magicians who occasionally get their comeuppance at the hands of medieval popes and saints depicted as kindly wizards. Gogol's view of history . . . is obsessed with gigantism—size, distance, volume, numbers are always spectacular, unbelievable, extreme . . . Everything is colorful and swirling and constantly exciting.<sup>25</sup>

*Taras Bulba* is a product of Romanticism. The Zaporizhian Cossacks, and particularly their leader Taras, are presented as Romantic superheroes in a mythical context. *Taras Bulba* is a hymn in praise of the Zaporizhians and their way of life, which is centred on heroism, war, violence and death.

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<sup>24</sup> Vasilii Gippius, *Gogol* (Leningrad, 1924), p. 65.

<sup>25</sup> Karlinsky, *The Sexual Labyrinth of Nikolai Gogol*, p. 51.



Panteleimon Kulish's portrayal of the Cossacks in *Chorna Rada: Khronika 1663 roku* (The Black Council: A Chronicle of the Year 1663) is very different from Gogol's portrayal of the Cossacks in *Taras Bulba*. This is not surprising in view of the fact that *The Black Council* was written at least in part in response to *Taras Bulba*. Kulish wrote that in *Taras Bulba* Gogol "displayed an extreme inadequacy of information on the Little-Russian past . . . we often find the author groping in darkness . . ." <sup>26</sup> and "Whoever wants *Bulba*, let him have it . . . None of that ever took place. If it did exist, it was in a way completely different than he portrays it . . ." <sup>27</sup>

Kulish was very active in Kiev in the Ukrainian revival of the 1840s and was a nationally conscious Ukrainian; unlike Gogol, he was not a "Little Russian."<sup>28</sup> It was also in the 1840s that Kulish began writing historical fiction. His *Mikhailo Charnyshenko ili Malorossiia vosemdesiat let nazad* (Mikhailo Charnyshenko or Little Russia Eighty Years Ago), written in Russian, was published in 1843. In that same year he started *The Black Council* in both Russian and Ukrainian. No one else was writing long prose in Ukrainian at this time. Kulish's arrest in 1847 for his participation in the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, put a stop to all publication plans. After spending three years in exile in Tula, he published another work of historical prose in Russian, *Aleksei Odnorog*, in 1853. He also rewrote *The Black Council*, and it was finally published in 1857, both in Russian and in Ukrainian, with considerable stylistic differences between the two versions. The Ukrainian version will be discussed in this article.

Unlike *Taras Bulba*, *The Black Council* is not a mythical romance, but a historical novel; as such, it possesses a historical framework. It depicts an actual historical event of great importance and several real historical personages. In order to stress the importance of historical verity in his work, Kulish chose the most important historical event of the novel, the black council of 1663 (a gathering of the Cossack rank and file for the purpose of voting out the hetman), for the title of his novel. The events of 1663

<sup>26</sup> P. Kulish, "Ob otnoshenii malorossiiskoi slovesnosti k obshcherusskoi," p. 413.

<sup>27</sup> "Pisma Kulisha k V. V. Tarnavskomu (1855-58)," in *Kievskaiia starina*, 63 (December 1898):358.

<sup>28</sup> For an examination of this phenomenon, see G. S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Sevchenko: Polarity in the Literary Ukraine: 1798-1847*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, VIII (Munich, 1971).

primarily centred on the struggle for the hetmancy between Iakym Somko and Ivan Briukhovetsky. The Pavoloch uprising, another historical event, is also portrayed. There are also references in the novel to such historical events as the council at Kozeltsi, where the Cossack *starshyna* elected Somko as hetman, the Treaty of Hadiach, the defeat of the Polish army at Pyliavtsi and Zbarazh, and the Year of Berest, the year the Poles defeated the Cossacks. Historical personages that appear in the novel as characters are: Briukhovetsky, Somko, Mykhailo Vuiakhevych, Matvii Gvyntovka and Prince Gagin. There are also references to about twenty historical figures, including Pavlo Teteria, Vasyl Zolotarenko, Petro Sahaidachny, Petro Mohyla, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The few factual inaccuracies that exist in this novel, such as the compression of the three-day black council into one day, are of the kind that are admissible in a historical novel.

Kulish made wide use of such historical sources as Bantysh-Kamensky's *Istoriia Maloi Rossii* (The History of Little Russia) of 1822, Mykola Markevych's five-volume *Istoriia Malorossii* (The History of Little Russia) of 1842, and some Polish sources.<sup>29</sup> He had little regard for *Istoriia Rusov* in respect to historical information. Instead, he extensively consulted such Cossack chronicles as "The Chronicle of Hrabianka," "The Chronicle of Velychko" and "The Chronicle of Samovydets" (The Eyewitness Chronicle). In fact, it was Kulish who discovered a manuscript copy of "The Eyewitness Chronicle" while doing ethnographical and historical research. This chronicle became the main historical source for *The Black Council* and the one that furnished Kulish with an insight into the social and economic nature of the Cossack wars.

The social struggle constituting the historical framework of *The Black Council* is between the wealthy, landowning gentlemen-Cossacks, or the *karmazyny* (the rich Cossacks in crimson coats who have replaced the Polish ruling class), and the poor: the

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<sup>29</sup> The Polish sources included the history by Kochowski, the *Starożytności historyczne polskie*, the *Pamiętnik o wojnach kozackich za Chmielnickiego*. Other sources included Kromer's work, *Istoriia izvestii o vznikshei v Polshe unii*, Athanasius Kalnofoisky's *Teraturgema*, *Partikuljarnyi zhurnal of N. D. Khanenko*, Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan's *Opisanie Ukrainy*, *Reestr starym, hetmanskim kleinotam*, Krebsova's memoir *Zapiski o koliivshchine*, *Zródła do dziejów polskich* (II), *Pamiętniki Koniecpolskich*, *Collectanea dziejopisow tureckich* (I), Mikołaj Rej's *Zwierzyniec*, Mikołaj Paszkowski's *Choraowie sarmackie*, the *Pamiętniki Paska*, and the tales of Vuk Karadžić.

Zaporizhians, the peasants and the townsmen. The gentlemen-Cossacks are represented by Somko, Shram, Shram's son Petro, Cherevan and Gvyntovka. The poor are represented by the Zaporizhians Kyrylo Tur, Puhach and Briukhovetsky, the townsman Taras Surmach, and the countless unnamed people whose voices are heard throughout the novel.

One aspect of historical verity in a historical novel is the breadth of portrayal of a society in a particular time. Kulish does this admirably. Besides portraying actual historical figures, town Cossacks, Zaporizhians, townsmen and tradesmen, he also depicts the peasant-mowers, a former Turkish prisoner, Vasyl Nevolnyk, who is now Cherevan's servant, a minstrel who is called the *chолоvik bozhyi* (the Man of God), the nobility, a Polish princess, and a Serbian called Chornohor. In other words, a comprehensive picture of Ukrainian society in 1663 is presented.

Kulich's attitude towards the Cossacks is very different from Gogol's Romantic and idealized presentation. Kulish is analytical and critical. He expresses his criticism through his characters and the narrator. Shram, a wealthy Cossack, spares no insults for the Zaporizhians, calling them "robbers," "sons of the devil" and "damned swamp robbers."<sup>30</sup> Shram's contempt for the Zaporizhians is expressed to Cherevan in chapter five:

The Zaporizhians are no longer what they used to be. When the Poles and their Ukrainian supporters were strangling Ukraine through exploitation, then the best of the townsmen went to the Zaporizhia. But who goes there now? Only wretches, thieves who fear the gallows, and the idlers who are not used to working for their daily bread. They sit there at the *Sich*, those damned men, and all they do is drink. When they've had enough whiskey, they then go to the towns and show off like a piglet on a scale. (pp. 37-8).

Later, in chapter fourteen, while addressing the elders Shram says:

You see, children, whom we have to fight for the hetmancy. Are these wild boars of the Dnipro worthy to be treated as human beings? We shall use our sabres to deal with them. With sabres and cannons we will sober up this drunken mob! (p. 134)

Kulich criticizes the wealthy Cossacks as well. In chapter four, he has the townsmen say:

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<sup>30</sup> Panteleimon Kulish, *Chorna Rada* in *Tvory*, ed. O. Doroshkevych (Kharkiv-Kiev, 1931), 3:37, 77, 81. Hereafter, page numbers will appear in the text following the quotation.

These men think they're lords! That's what it is! They have crimson coats and so they scorn our company!

When he said this, it was as if he had lit a fire. Everyone was set ablaze, for the townsmen had been complaining for a long time before this about the wealthy Cossacks.

"Damn him!" shouted ten men at the same time. "The red coats only want our company in the war against Polish domination."

"You're right!" said Taras. "Why the hell should we pay any attention to them?"

"To hell with the red coats!" shouted the crowd. (p. 30)

The reapers' complaining voices are heard in chapter nine:

"... We'll get rid of you soon, you city pigs! ..." p. 75)

.....  
"Thank God our hands are not yet in chains," shouted two or three others. "We will not be humiliated. Why should one lace his clothes with gold while another man has barely enough to cover himself? Why should one man have so much land that it is all his as far as the eye can see while another man has hardly any land at all? Surely we all fought the Poles together and won our freedom together?" (p. 78)

Several characters in the novel refer to members of the wealthy class in very unflattering terms. Kyrylo Tur calls Cherevan and his family "chicken heads" (p. 163) in chapter eighteen, and Puhach, speaking to Petro in chapter eleven, says: "Oh, so you're the son of that mad priest who meddles in affairs that don't concern him. We'll soon put you all in your place" (p. 100). In chapter ten, Puhach condemns Gvyntovka in even harsher terms and refuses to sit with him, saying, "Only dogs can feel honoured at your place, not honest men" (p. 90).

Often the wealthy Cossacks are portrayed in a very negative light. The Man of God describes how Somko called Briukhovetsky an old dog during a council of generals. Briukhovetsky tries to murder Somko for this insult, so Somko ties him to a pig and makes him ride around Hadiach. The Man of God condemns Somko's arrogance and observes that Somko's behaviour resulted in Briukhovetsky leading the rebellion against him. The most negative portrayal of any character in the novel is in fact that of a wealthy Cossack, Gvyntovka. A total villain, unscrupulous and tyrannical, he has amassed a great wealth by unjust means.

Although both groups of Cossacks are portrayed critically and although neither side is idealized, the wealthy Cossacks fare

better in the end. This is achieved by several means. One of these is the outcome of the narrative. The fictional and non-heroic protagonist Petro, a wealthy Cossack gentleman, triumphs in the end. He settles down on the *khutir* (homestead) Khmaryshche with his wife Lesia. Somko and Shram die, and the Romantic Zaporizhian warrior Kyrylo Tur leaves Ukraine and disappears.

The other means include rhetorical comments and imagery. The narrator, in describing Briukhovetsky and his promises about making all equal, adds sarcastically in parentheses in chapter twelve: "He sure did a good job of making everyone in Ukraine equal" (p. 102). Many such comments and rhetorical adjectives are expressed by the narrator in describing the Zaporizhians, the townsmen and peasants. This tips the scales in favour of the wealthy Cossacks.

Kulish uses many wild-animal images to describe the Zaporizhians. This is in direct contrast to *Taras Bulba*, in which the Zaporizhians are described in terms of edifying epic images. The repeated use of wild-animal images for the Zaporizhians in *The Black Council* creates a negative impression in the reader's mind of the Zaporizhians as fierce, wild and barbaric. Kulish has done this intentionally. Even the names Tur (Bison) and Puhach (Screech Owl) are those of wild animals. Shram refers to all the Zaporizhians as "screech owls" and states that "The Zaporizhia used to be a nest of Cossack knighthood, but now it breeds only wild wolves and foxes" (p. 77). This image of the Sich as a nest was used also by Gogol in *Taras Bulba*. But, whereas for Gogol the Sich was a nest of eagles "out of which fly all those who are proud and as strong as lions," in *The Black Council* this nest is the breeding ground of ferocious beasts.

Noble, epic animal images are used in *The Black Council* as well, but they are reserved for the wealthy Cossacks. During the duel in chapter eight, Kyrylo the Zaporizhian is described by the narrator as a "wild bison," while Petro the wealthy Cossack is described as an "antelope of the steppe" (p. 68). Even though Kyrylo Tur, like Taras Bulba, maintains that the Zaporizhians are eagles, his argument is a weak one, for the force of the imagery is in favour of the settled land-owning Cossacks, not the Zaporizhians.

The comments of the narrator and the outcome of the plot also contradict Kyrylo's statement. The Sich may have been the heart of Ukraine, but this is no longer so in *The Black Council*. Shram states that there used to be knights on the Sich, but "All the knights have disappeared from the Sich. The seeds were all blown away at the time of the war. Only the chaff remains there

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now" (p. 47). Both Shram and the narrator use the past tense in describing the noble and knightly qualities of the Zaporizhians:

The Zaporizhia since time immemorial *had been the heart of Ukraine*. There, on the Zaporizhia, freedom *never died*, ancestral customs *were never forgotten*, ancient songs *were never silenced*. The Zaporizhia *had been* like a spark in an oven. (p. 37)<sup>31</sup>

One senses that the narrator has admiration for the Zaporizhia, but at the same time one senses that the past tense is used because the narrator perceives it as a phenomenon of the past. According to Kulish, who is identical to the rhetorical narrator, there is no longer any room for an all-male Zaporizhian republic and its nomadic anarchism. The society portrayed in *The Black Council* demands homesteads, towns and stable family units. That is why Kyrlyo Tur disappears at the end of the novel. He must disappear, for he cannot adapt to this new, settled, family oriented, agricultural society. The Zaporizhia had once been a glorious romantic place producing vivacious characters and even legendary super-heroes, but its heyday is over. The Zaporizhians are reduced to the status of pariahs, of social outcasts and misfits, in the new society.

It is no accident that the novel ends with a peaceful domestic scene showing the gentleman Petro, a member of the land-owning Cossack class, successfully settled on a homestead with his wife Lesia and his in-laws, the Cherevans. Clearly history is on his side and on the side of his class, the middle-class *khutoriany*, and not on the side of the Zaporizhians, like Kyrlyo Tur. Ironically, it is Briukhovetsky, after his election, who most concisely states this:

Listen you old musty heads! What kind of order do you expect if the Zaporizhian Sich dwells among married people? Do you think all men want to give up women like you old granddads? Well we don't . . . . I have not betrayed you to the Muscovites but I act as I see fit, and your Cossacks don't complain. On the Sich, which is in the wilderness of the steppe, you can live without women, but here in the towns and among people you must get married and settle down. (p. 148)

The *khutir*, not the Sich, triumphs in *The Black Council*. On the social level, the *khutir* represents the settled order as opposed to the Zaporizhian way of life. Kulish understood and accepted the

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<sup>31</sup> The italics are mine. R.B.P.

inevitable movement of history. He made a comment about this in his *Zapiski o iuzhnoi Rusi* (Notes on Southern Rus’):

The truly philosophical mind stands above regrets over the fact that the old passes away, making room for the new. It consoles itself with the belief that all change reveals the movement of life; and life, in moving forward without fail, creates for itself new forms all the time.<sup>32</sup>

Though Kulish realized that the societies of the past, such as the Sich, had to give way to new forms of society, he still retained a nostalgic admiration for them. That is why the Zaporizhian Kyrylo Tur, though by no means the hero of the work like his counterpart Taras Bulba, and in spite of the negative comments about him and the rest of the Zaporizhians, is nevertheless the most interesting character of this novel, just as the Highlanders and pariahs are some of the most interesting characters in Walter Scott’s novels.

Kyrylo Tur is interesting because he is a rounded character; he has “the incalculability of life” about him;<sup>33</sup> he is enigmatic and cannot be reduced to a single idea or quality the way Taras Bulba can. Kyrylo Tur is a fusion of many contradictory qualities, such as passion and asceticism, barbarism and honour,<sup>34</sup> and he never ceases to surprise the reader. The complexity of his character may also be traced to his literary ancestry. He is to a large extent a continuation of the portrayal of the Zaporizhian Shcherbyna in Kulish’s *Mikhailo Charnyshenko*.<sup>35</sup> At the same time he is an amalgam of some of the most interesting characters in Walter Scott’s novels, such as the Highlanders Fergus MacIvor, Rob Roy and Allan M’Aulay, the fool LeGlorieux, the mercenary Dugald Dalgetty, and the gypsy pariah Hayraddin Maugrabin.

Kyrylo Tur is one of the best portrayals of the Romantic noble outlaw hero in Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian literature.

<sup>32</sup> P. Kulish, *Zapiski o iuzhnoi Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 1856), 1:183.

<sup>33</sup> E. M. Forster, “Flat and Round Characters,” in Phillip Stewick, ed., *The Theory of the Novel* (New York, 1967), p. 231.

<sup>34</sup> See Viktor Petrov, “Chorna Rada,” pp. 381-97 in *Panteleimon Kulish v piadesiati roky: Zhyttia, ideolohiia, tvorchist.* I, Zbirnyk istorichno-filolohichnoho viddilu, 88 (Kiev, 1929).

<sup>35</sup> Shcherbyna was based on information about the Zaporizhians contained in Skalkovsky’s “Izustnyiia predaniia o novorossiiskom krae,” in *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveshcheniia*, XVIII (1838):400-599, XXI (1839):100-299. Skalkovsky in turn used the *Rassказы Zaporozhtsa Korzha*.

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Examples of Romantic noble outlaws are Goethe's Gotz, Schiller's Karl Moor, Walter Scott's Marmion, and Robin Hood in oral literature.<sup>36</sup> Kyrylo Tur even has the physical appearance of the pre-Byronic noble outlaw:

The Zaporizhian was a veritable giant. His face was sunburnt, his hair fell back like a horse's mane. His long mustache touched his jacket. His eyes gleamed under dark eyebrows. (p. 38)

Like the other Romantic noble outlaw heroes of European literature, Kyrylo Tur is fiery and passionate, and there is a cloak of mystery about him. Throughout the novel, he is always mysteriously appearing and disappearing and, like all Romantic noble outlaw heroes, he "always pre-empt[s] the stage in the productions in which he appears, even when . . . there are others . . . who have more lines, more action and ostensibly more sympathetic characteristics."<sup>37</sup> Kyrylo Tur is also a rebel and a sceptic, like his literary cousins Moor and Marmion. "As if there's only one straight road on earth?" he asks rhetorically (p. 115). Though his ferociousness and cruelty, like that of all the Zaporizhians in the novel, is portrayed by means of wild-animal images (those of a hawk, a wolf, and a bear), Kyrylo is never cruel by nature. In fact, he on many occasions reveals not only kindness, as when he saves Lesia from Vuiakhevych, but also heroism, when he offers to die in place of Somko. Finally, like all Romantic noble outlaws, Kyrylo has the undying loyalty of his retainers, for he possesses physical courage, the strength of will, and personal magnetism.

It is ironic that Kulish, who presented the most critical and unromantic view of Ukrainian history and the Cossacks of all the historical-fiction writers at that time, at the same time created the most interesting and complex portrayal of the Romantic Cossack hero. Kyrylo Tur is both historically and aesthetically a much better portrayal of the Romantic Cossack hero than Taras Bulba is. Yet, in spite of all his brilliance as a Romantic hero, he is not the hero or protagonist of *The Black Council*, but the pariah figure who does not fit into the new society of the Hetman state.

Kulish, unlike his predecessors, including Gogol, approached the history of Cossack Ukraine analytically. He portrayed it as separate from the Polish and Russian past and was the first to

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<sup>36</sup> For a description of the Romantic noble outlaw in literature, see Peter L. Thorslev, Jr., *The Byronic Hero: Types and Prototypes* (Minneapolis, 1962), pp. 65-83.

<sup>37</sup> Thorslev, *The Byronic Hero*, p. 68.



analyze this period in terms of social and political change. Kulish also differentiated between the different kinds of Cossacks and unromantically portrayed the landed Cossacks and the Zaporizhians as gentlemen and pariahs respectively. *The Black Council* does not praise Romantic Cossack superheroes, whether historical or fictitious, for there is simply no place for Romantic heroes and fantasy in the drab and prosaic world of the Realist historical novel. Even though the Romantic Zaporizhian, Kyrylo Tur, maintains that "Glory will never die and will never be defeated. Cossack knighthood will always exist to spread this glory" (p. 65), the outcome of the novel proves him wrong, for it is he who must leave in the end and give way to the homesteader, the rather ordinary and prosaic Cossack gentleman, Petro.

## ФАЛЬСИФІКАЦІЯ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ЛІТЕРАТУРИ В РАДЯНСЬКИХ ДЖЕРЕЛАХ

Кожен, хто стежить як за поточною пресою радянської України, так і за книжковими появами, має нагоду переконатися, що сучасний читач в Україні ледве чи спроможний скласти повне й невикривлене уявлення про українську літературу; адже він не має можливості здобути знання ані про загальний розмір і розмах нашого письменства, ані про шляхи його розвитку, ані про співвідношення мистецьких вартостей. Вистачає згадати, що з-поміж прозаїків в Україні вилучено або так чи інакше зроблено неприступними для читача Володимира Винниченка, Миколу Хвильового, Валеріяна Підмогильного, Майка Йогансена, Осипа Турянського, Віктора Петрова-Домонтовича, Кліма Поліщука. Не кажу вже про Івана Багряного, який звернувся до прози щойно на еміграції.

Студент, літературний критик, учитель, усі, хто прагне поширювати естетичний світогляд, не мають доступу до таких важливих праць, як „Наука віршування” Якубського, „Природа новелі” Майфета, „Від Мирного до Хвильового” Михайла Рудницького.

У третьому томі чотиритомної „Антології української поезії” київського видання 1957 р. (а цей том мав би охоплювати творчість наших поетів за двадцяті й тридцяті роки) ми даремно б шукали Миколу Зерова, Михайла Ореста, Юрія Клена, Михайла Драй-Хмару, Володимира Свідзінського, Павла Филиповича (себто *шістьох* поетів світового рівня). Бракує там і Якова Савченка, Дмитра Загула, Олекси Слісаренка, Марка Вороного, Лади Могилянської, Олекси Влизька, Костя Буревія, Івана Багряного . . .

З поетів еміграції до згаданої антології потрапив лише Олександр Олесь, але не знайдемо там ні поетів празької школи (Маланюк, Ольжич, Стефанович, Олена Теліга), ні Західньої України (Антонич, Святослав Гординський, Богдан Кравців).

Часом таке „непомічання слонів” доходить до анекдоти: у сухотно-миршавому збірничку сонетів (голосно названому „антологією”) немає сонетів Миколи Зерова . . .

У цій розвідці я спробую, так би мовити, пролити світло на ті методи й засоби, якими керівники над літературою досягають бажаних наслідків, себто витворюють саме той образ українського письменства, який їм потрібний на даному етапі. Хоч усякий поділ — це умовність і спрощення, але під час аналізу літературних явищ без членування матеріялу, без поділу його на групи й категорії, обійтися неможливо. Тож серед українських літераторів — якщо розглядати їхню творчість під кутом зору „дозволености” та приступности для радянського читача — я виділив би такі прошарки:

Перший. Заборонені й оголошені ворогами, що їх вільно згадувати (і то на окреме доручення!) лише з відповідною лайкою. Це Маланюк, Хвильовий, Винниченко.

Другий прошарок. Це покарані забуттям. Ті, що їхні імена не фігурують у словниках та довідниках, а твори не перевидаються. Назву Миколу Філянського, Грицька Чупринку, Спиридона Черкасенка, Михайла Івченка, Кліма Поліщука, Ладу Могилянську. Їх ніби ніколи й не було. Сюди ж належить, за нечисленними винятками, і вся літературна українська еміграція.

Третій прошарок — це „напіврегабітовані, або регабітовані теоретично”. Ті, чиї імена потрапили до словників і довідників, а твори залишилися під забороною. Обмежуся одним з найбільших наших прозаїків — Валеріаном Підмогильним.

На початку 70-х років заплянували були видати його книжку, але до видання так і не дійшло. Декого згадали раз або двічі, опублікували якусь добірку — і на тому скінчилося. Тут можна згадати Володимира Свідзінського, Павла Філіповича, Аркадія Казку, Бориса Тенету.

Нарешті — найвища група літераторів, ті, котрих оточують офіційними почестями, іменують лавреатами, удекорують орденами, а проте серед написаного ними є й такі сторінки, що їх ховають за сімома замками, а звичайному читачеві їх невільно брати до рук, цитувати та згадувати.

Ось, наприклад, одна із заборонених поезій Володимира Сосюри:

В ліхтаревім морі йдуть байдужі люди,  
 І людина кожна — невідомий світ.  
 Я між них блукаю, все шукаю чуда,  
 Все шукаю щастя — уже стільки літ.

Де? В краю якому? В кого запитати?  
О моїх поезій золоті рядки!  
Синіми очима дивляться дівчата,  
Вечора міського зганьблені квітки . . .  
Синіми очима дивляться дівчата,  
І душа синіє, наче місяць той . . .  
Що мені робити вечоре проклятий?  
Ой! . . .  
Суме, мій ти суме, де тебе подіти?  
З каменем на шиї де й коли втопить?  
Розгубились думи — безпритульні діти . . .  
В золоті блакить.  
Поспішають люди, поспішають речі,  
Хто спинився трохи — на панелі гинь.  
На машину-місто задивився вечір,  
Туманіє синь.  
Синь уже темніє. Ніч іде нечутно.  
Та для міста ночі наче і нема.  
В мене на кашкеті зірка п'ятикутна,  
А на серці — тьма . . .

У творах дозволених широко практикуються скорочення, текстуальні зміни та, рідше, інтерполяції — вставлення слів і виразів, котрих не було в первотексті. Нагадаю, що в Тичиніному

„Зразу ж за селом  
Всіх їх розстріляли” —

в останній строфі

Берегло, кадило  
Безневинну січ . . . —

змінено на „берегло, будило . . .”

В іншій поезії Тичини з Бога, що засіває „зерна кришталевої музики”, став „Час”, який виконує згадану божу функцію.

Поруч із цим іде специфічна інтерпретація мистецьких творів. У того ж таки Тичини, поезії, де оспівано національ-

но-визвольну боротьбу України, трактуються, як суто-радянські. Наприклад,

Ой, упав же він з коня  
Тай на білий сніг.  
Слава, слава! — покотилось  
І лягло до ніг.

Сучасний читач в Україні, можливо, й не знає, що червоноармійці могли кричати лише „ура”, а з криком „Слава!” йшли на бій вояки армії Української Народньої Республіки...

Наведу ще такий приклад. Поезія Тичини „На майдані коло церкви” трактується як прорадянська — ще б пак: оспівування революції! Але проаналізуймо її трохи глибше. Виборні отамани („хай чабан, усі гукнули, за отамана буде!”) були тільки в українських повстанців, натомість Червона армія мала не отаманів, а командирів і комісарів, — і то не обраних, а присланих з півночі. Та й церква на початку поезії — як символ національної традиції — і ніч на кінці — як передвісниця неминучої поразки — усе це речі, що їх тяжко пов'язати з більшовицькою революцією. А одначе — в'яжуть...

А під забороною — із творчої спадщини Тичини — лірична заплачка „Пам'яті тридцяти” (про похорон українських студентів, розстріляних більшовиками на станції Крути в січні 1919 р.), деякі твори Рильського із релігійними мотивами (наприклад, „Різдвяний сонет”), поема „Мазепа” Володимира Сосюри (її спіткала доля всіх інших „Мазеп” — див. далі), навіть Бажанові „Сліпці”. Бож у кожного з орденоносних лавреатів всіляких премій були колись молодечі грішки, націоналістичні ухили, невміння перебудуватися або симпатії до розстріляних друзів.

Щодо літераторів, котрих лише толерують, то тут метода вилучення небажаних творів (часто лише тому, що вони — найкращі) виступас у всій своїй силі. Переді мною три книжки з майже однаковою назвою: „Вибрані поезії”, „Вибране”. Всі три — київського видання.

У „Вибраних поезіях” Євгена Плужника бракує двадцятьох речей, що половину з них не гріх зарахувати до шедеврів не лише української, але й світової імпресіоністичної лірики.

У „Вибраному” Миколи Зерова не знайдемо сонета „Чистий четвер”, а також останнього, парапсихологічного сонета із циклу „Параду” (де поет передбачає свою долю).

У „Вибраному” Михайла Драй-Хмари немає ні сонета „Київ” (а це один з найкращих його сонетів), ані колимської поезії „... І знов обвугленими сірниками...”

Дивовижні метаморфози стаються з ідеологічною спрямованістю творчості, приналежністю до певного мистецького напрямку та з місцем у національній, а то й світовій літературі. (До речі: зі світового письменства зникли всі твори про Мазепу: драма Словацького й поеми Байрона та Віктора Гюґо. Сучасний український читач нізвідки не може довідатися про існування таких творів). „Прогресивний”, передовий західний літератор зненацька стає реакціонером, а коли треба, то й фашистом. Так було з Панайтом Істраті, Андре Жідом, Джоном Стайнбеком... Сергій Єсенін спочатку був „куркульським поетом”, потім забороненим автором, за чий твори викидали з вищих учбових закладів, а тепер він — мало не комсомольський поет.

Ще довільніше радянські (звичайно — офіційні!, не самвидавські) літературознавці переставляють акторів з однієї стилевої полицки до іншої. Багаті жнива зібрав в Україні імпресіонізм (у драмі — Леся Українка з „Блакитною трояндою”, у прозі — Стефаник, Коцюбинський, Грицько Косинка, Осип Турянський, Михайло Івченко, почасти Хвильовий, в поезії Олесь, ранній Тичина, Василь Чумак, Євген Плужник...). А оскільки імпресіонізм — як явище літературного стилю — охоплює головно царину іконіки, лише заторкуючи генерику та архітекτονіку, то немає нічого дивного, що дехто сполучив його із символізмом, із реалізмом, із експресіонізмом. Тож коли виникає потреба вшанувати котрогось із адептів імпресіонізму, наприклад, Стефаника, то він відразу стає реалістом, а його імпресіонізм лишається десь побіч, як довісок, отакий собі художній дармовис... І взагалі будь про якого визначного письменника, якого б літературного напрямку він не тримався і яких ідеологічних переконань не був (навіть якщо ці переконання виявляли непримиренність до всієї радянської системи), — вистача, при потребі написати, що, мовляв, творчість його — це складне явище, а життєвий шлях — плутаний і суперечливий, — як за цією магічною формулою він обертається на реаліста.

Маніпуляції з масштабністю літераторів особливо яскраво виступають, коли виникає потреба піддобритись до котроїсь

соціалістичної чи „прогресивної” країни (на зразок Куби). Тоді зовсім посередній кубинський поет Хосе Марті „одним вистрибом” (мов відсталий кентавр у відомому сонеті Ередія) прибивається до гурту великих — до тих, чиї твори виходять у серії „перлини світової лірики”. Я навів цей приклад, щоб показати, що й про світову літературу, а не тільки про свою власну, український читач дістає неповне й викривлене уявлення.

А проте — всі ці випадки — справа відносна. Один може міркувати так, другий — інакше. Та сама мистецька проблема для когось важлива, а для когось — другорядна, і той самий письменник, який комусь видається генієм, в очах іншого — графоман . . .

Але, як ми зараз переконаємося, і *дати* в радянському літературознавстві — за методом діалектичного матеріалізму — можуть змінюватися, або, як кажуть вчені марксистки, „здійснювати стрибок із царства необхідності у царство свободи”. Міняються вони залежно від останньої постанови ЦК, від рішень пленуму правління спілки письменників, а головне — від таємних інструкцій з боку органів держбезпеки . . .

Тут я хочу наглядно продемонструвати цю мінливість, навівши низку дат за радянськими джерелами.

Я взяв двадцять письменників і вісім авторитетних джерел: „Українська Радянська Енциклопедія” (1-е вид.), „Краткая литературная энциклопедия”, показчик „Художня література, видана на Україні за сорок років”, п’ятитомовий біобібліографічний словник „Українські письменники”, збірку „Із поезії двадцятих років”, „Літературний щоденник” Миколи Терещенка, довідник „Письменники Радянської України” 1970 року видання та чотиритомну великоформатну „Антологію української поезії”, видану в Києві 1957 р.

Двадцять письменників (які стали в 30-х роках жертвами так званого „культу особи”) мають у цих джерелах дуже відмінні дати смерті: дехто по дві, дехто по три, а дехто, як, наприклад, Сергій Пилипенко, навіть і по чотири. І відстань між тими датами сягає іноді дев’ятох, а то й десятох років. Крім цих вісьмох головних джерел, автор розвідки використав низку інших, що деякі з них давали іноді цілком несподівані дати, котрі уточнювали або спростовували всі інші. Усі ці одноразові джерела подані в примітках до порівняльної таблиці.

Д ж е р е л а

Письменники	УРЕ*	КЛЭ*	ХЛ*	БВС*	ІПДР*	ЛЦ*	ПРУ*	АУП*	Інші
Бобинський В.	2.1.38	2.1.38	1939	2.1.38	—	2.1.38	2.1.38	1939	
Бузько Д.	18.4.43	—	1938	1938	—	18.4.43	18.10.43	—	
Досвітній О.	23.7.34	9.6.34	1942	23.7.34	—	23.7.42	23.11.34	—	
Елік Гр.	28.1.42	21.1.42	1942	28.1.42	—	28.1.42	листопад 1937	—	3.11.37 <sup>1</sup>
Загул Дм.	1938	1938	—	1938	в кінці 30-х рр.	1938	1938	—	на початку 30-х рр. <sup>2</sup> 1937 <sup>3</sup>
Зеров М.	13.10.41	13.10.41	—	13.10.41	—	13.10.41	13.10.41	—	
Каляник Ів.	10.4.39	—	1939	1939	1938	1939	10.10.39	—	
Кримський А.	25.1.42	25.1.42	1941	—	—	25.1.42	весна 42	—	осінь 41
Кулик Ів.	14.10.41	26.1.41	1937	14.10.41	—	14.10.41	14.10.41	1937	1937 <sup>4</sup>
Куліш М.	1942	1937	1942	1942	—	1942	1942	—	
Панів А.	3.11.42	—	—	1942	в кінці 30-х рр.	1942	1942	наприкінці 30-х рр.	
Пилипенко С.	3.3.43	3.3.43	1937	—	1933	3.3.43	11.7.43	—	
Підмогильний В.	19.12.41	—	1942	19.12.41	—	19.12.41	19.12.41	—	
Плужник Є.	2.2.36	2.2.36	1938	2.2.38	1938	2.2.37	2.2.38	1936	1938 <sup>4</sup>
Савченко Я.	1937	—	—	1937	1938	2.11.37	1937	—	
Семенко М.	24.10.37	24.10.37	1938	7.12.38	1939	7.12.38	3.11.38	—	
Слісаренко О.	3.11.37	3.11.37	—	3.11.37	1934	3.11.37	3.11.37	—	
Чернявський М.	26.11.46	26.11.46	1937	26.11.46	—	26.11.46	28.11.46	1937	
Хоткевич Гн.	8.10.38	8.10.38	1942	8.10.38	—	8.10.38	8.10.38	—	
Шкурупій Г.	25.11.37	—	1943	1943	1943	27.11.37	1943	1943	



\* Скорочення:

- УРЕ — “Українська Радянська Енциклопедія”.  
 КЛЭ — “Краткая Литературная Энциклопедия”.  
 ХЛ — “Художня література, видана на Україні за 40 років”  
 (відп. ред. Г. Кравченко), Харків, 1958.  
 ББС — “Українські письменники. Біо-бібліографічний словник”  
 (Колектив авторів), Київ, 1965.  
 ППДР — “Із поезії 20-х років” (упорядкування А. Костенка), Київ, 1959.  
 ЛЩ — “Літературний щоденник” (уложив Микола Терещенко), Київ, 1966.  
 ПРУ — “Письменники Радянської України” (упорядкували Олег Килимник,  
 Олександр Петровський), Київ, 1970.  
 АУП — “Антологія української поезії”, Київ, 1957.

<sup>1</sup> В російському довідникові “Сценаристы советского художественного кино”, Москва 1972, на стор. 428 стоїть: “Эпик, Григорий Данилович... Умер 3 ноября 1937 г.”.

<sup>2</sup> Дмитро Загул, Вибране, Київ 1961, стор. 53: “Обірвалось життя поета на початку 30-х років...” (з передмови, підписаної іменами Н. Томашук, Л. Чернець).

<sup>3</sup> Збірник “Слово” ч. 5, стор. 252: “. . . І ось, нарешті, на запит старенького батька Зерова, йому відповіли з табору, що ‘Зеров помер у лікарні в 1937 р.’. Відповідь була суворо офіційна і гранично коротка”. (Спогади Софії Зерової, укр. переклад О. Зуєвського).

<sup>4</sup> Ці дати смерті Ів. Кулика та Є. Плужника подано за книжкою “Українська балада”, Антологія, Київ 1964.

Ці дати вимагають деяких коментарів. Точніше: я хочу звернути увагу на окремі пункти таблиці.

Олесь Досвітній умирав — якщо вірити радянським офіційним джерелам — рівно чотири рази. Найцікавіше, що незмінним у кількох випадках лишається число 23, а місяць і рік натомість щоразу міняються. Отож, виходить, що Досвітній у 1934 році вмирав 23-го липня, 9-го червня та 23-го листопада, а в році 1942 лише 23-го липня...

Дата смерті Грицька Епіка подивугідно збігається з такими ж датами Олексі Слісаренка та Павла Филиповича.

А їх усіх трьох, разом із багатьма іншими представниками нашої творчої і наукової інтелігенції — за свідцтвом автора книжки „Українська інтелігенція на Соловках” Семена Підгайного — вивезено із Соловецького табору пізньої осені 1937 року першим українським етапом. Крім Епіка, Слісаренка та Филиповича, тим етапом вивезені: Микола Зеров, Мирослав Ірчан, Марко Вороний (син відомого поета Миколи

Вороного), Гео Шкурупій, Ананій Лебідь, Антін Крушельницький, Василь Бобинський, Клим Поліщук, Кость Котко, Лесь Курбас . . .

В голови „Плуга” Сергія Пилипенка (мабуть, з огляду на його керівну позицію в українській радянській літературі 20-х років!) дат смерти — точнісінько, як в Олеса Досвітнього — маємо аж чотири: 3-тє березня 1943 р., 11-те липня того ж року, рік 1937-й і рік 1933-й (без місяців і днів). Отож, якщо вірити усім цим даним, Сергій Пилипенко на десять років пережив самого себе!

Про поета-символіста Якова Савченка даних не так багато: із вісьмох джерел, якими я користувався, він фігурує лише в п'ятьох. Тому й розбіжність між датами його смерти не така вже велика: частина джерел подає 1937-й рік, без числа й місяця, збірник „Із поезії двадцятих років” називає 1938-й рік, і тільки „Літературний Щоденник” Миколи Терещенка подає точну дату: 2-ге листопада 1937 року. Звертаю увагу, що ця дата різниться лише на один день від смерти Павла Филиповича, Олекси Слісаренка та Грицька Епіка. Збіг вартий того, щоб над ним трохи замислитися . . .

А от у футуриста Михайла Семенка, що його вивезли із Соловецького табору „першим українським поетом” — разом із Филиповичем, Слісаренком і Епіком, дата смерти відстоїть від цих одноетапників уже не на один день, як у Якова Савченка, а рівно на один рік — принаймні так запевняє довідник „Письменники Радянської України”. Тут також є над чим замислитися. 3-го листопада помер також і Андрій Панів — лише рік інший. Що воно за день такий клятий, коли вмирає стільки письменників?

А тепер підсумуємо. Для двадцятьох репресованих письменників радянські джерела подають разом 53 різні дати смерти. Звісно, один-два, нехай три випадки тут можна віднести на рахунок авторського недбальства, редакторської неуважности чи коректорського недогляду. Але ж, боронь Боже, не п'ятдесят три! Які причини такої „різноголосиці”?

В українській еміграційній пресі траплялося мені читати, що, мовляв, під час війни режим у таборах погіршився і тому там посилилася смертність. Але ж про більшість із тих, котрі нібито померли під час війни, інші джерела подають, що дата їхньої смерти — це рік 1937-й або 1938-й. Мені здається, що однією з причин такого „сум'яття дат” слід визнати процес так би мовити, „розукрупнення”. Конкретно: щоб не було занадто густого, занадто разючого накопичення смер-

тей у період сталінського терору, частину дат перенесено на наступні роки (здебільшого це роки війни, лише у випадковій Миколи Чернявського — час повоєнний), або на попередні (як от в Олексі Слісаренка). Характерний щодо цього приклад дає дата смерті Миколи Любченка (псевдонім — Кость Котко). Я не включив його до таблиці, бо в офіційних джерелах маємо лише одну дату його смерті — 1933-й рік. Але в книжці Семена Підгайного „Українська інтелігенція на Соловках” читаємо: „Ще до самогубства Панаса Любченка Микола Любченко якось нарікав на нього. Після смерті Панаса становище Миколи ще погіршало. Його почали викликати до третьої частини.” (Даю невеличке пояснення: Панас і Микола Любченки були родичі. Панас Любченко, визначний партійний діяч, застрілився, разом із дружиною, 1937 року). Продовжую цитату з книжки Підгайного: „Одинокий і засмучений жив він (себто Микола Любченко або Кость Котко — І.К.) у Кремлі (Соловецький Кремль — І.К.). Здається єдиною для нього утіхою була його родина, а надто маленький син, якому писав предовгі вірші-листи, завжди російською мовою. Та й така поведінка не врятувала Любченка, і він виїхав із Соловків разом з багатьма українцями.” Можна припустити, що це був перший український етап, вивезений восени 1937 року із Соловків „у ніч і туман” (як казали гітлерівці при подібних випадках), себто, що з островів етап виїхав, а до суходолу не доїхав... Поруч із перенесенням дати смерті письменника на ті роки, коли він насправді був ще живий, яскравим свідоцтвом того, що ми маємо справу із „пляновим розукрупненням”, може служити зміна років смерті за збереженням дня й місяця або самого тільки дня. Так, я вже підкреслював, що Олесь Досвітній, за радянськими джерелами, раз-у-раз умирав 23-го, лише різних місяців і років. У Дмитра Бузька та Івана Каляника повторюються числа днів, а місяць міняється: в обох випадках був квітень, а став жовтень...

Євген Плужник умирав послідовно: 2-го лютого 1936, 1937 та 1938 років. Рік смерті міняли, але число і місяць лінь було виправити!

Ось ще кілька прикладів такого „розукрупнення”: 18-го грудня 1934 року радянська преса повідомила про розстріл 28-х діячів української культури, до речі, названих чомусь „терористами-білогвардійцями”. Декого з них тепер реабілітовано. Але в довідниках дати смерті поділено: одним поставлено 16-те, а іншим — 17-те грудня. А „показчик” „Художня література, видана на Україні за сорок років” запев-

няє, нібито один із розстріляних, Дмитро Фальківський, помер 1935 року! Мовляв, ніхто не перевірятиме, а радянська преса 30-х років для громадян усе одно неприступна . . .

Українська закордонна преса перших повоєнних років публікувала спогади свідків про спалення живцем групи харківської інтелігенції восени 1941 року: енкаведисти замкнули групу евакуйованих у stodолі, а вночі запалили. Тоді згорів один із найвизначніших українських поетів — Володимир Свідзінський, а інший поет, Олександр Сорока, вирвався з вогню й тікав. Але його наздогнав енкаведист на мотоциклі й застрілив . . . Однак, у сучасних радянських джерелах — очевидно, у пляні „розукрупнення”, подано, що Свідзінський помер 10-го жовтня, а Сорока — 12-го . . .

Але навіть після „розукрупнення”, на роки 1937-1939, себто на період найгострішого терору, припадає — якщо вірити довідникові „Письменники Радянської України” — 46 смертей наших літераторів, у тому числі на 1937 рік — 19. Крім згаданих у нашій таблиці, це — Петро Ванченко, Василь Вражливий, Юрій Вухналь (Іван Ковтун), Юхим Гедзь (в сучасних радянських довідниках: Гедзь, справжнє ім'я Олексій Савицький), Володимир Зорін (Валентин Пащук), Мирослав Ірчан (Андрій Бабюк), Майк Йогансен, Михайло Козоріс, Іван Микитенко, Андрій Михайлюк, Панько Педа, Люціана Піонтек, Мирослава Сопілка, Павло Филипович, Володимир Штангей, Фелікс Якубовський.

Своєю, природною, смертю тоді помер — наскільки нам відомо — лише один Лев Скрипник.

Застерігаюся, що цей підрахунок (46 і 19) далеко не повний. Адже де в кого взагалі не позначено, коли він помер (як, наприклад, Петро Алампієв, Галина Орлівна), а значної кількості загиблих у довіднику просто не згадано. Ось кілька імен: Григорій Баглюк, Гаврош Сірій, Аркадій Казка, Лада Могилянська, Клим Поліщук, Ананій Лебідь, Михайло Новицький, Сергій Єфремов, Людмила Старицька-Черняхівська, Вероніка Черняхівська, Михайло Івченко, Микола Хвильовий.

Якщо ми візьмемо згаданий довідник „Письменники Радянської України” 1970 року видання, то переконаємося, що він найповніший щодо кількості наведених дат (цим, до речі, він корисно відрізняється від показника „Художня література, видана на Україні за сорок років”, де фігурує багато імен, але часто — без дати смерті . . .). Виключивши імена тих, що померли власною смертю, загинули на фронті або в таборі полонених, у згаданому довіднику будемо мати щонай-

менше двадцять тих, про кого відомо, що в тридцятих роках вони перебували за ґратами і ґратами.

При тому — про багатьох із них ми вже маємо, в інших джерелах, інші дати смерті, що саме на ті тридцяти роки і припадають.

А тепер — один приклад. Коли влітку 1941 року бригади окремого призначення під керівництвом Кудрі замінували Київ, вони лишили незамінованим, отже незірваним, один примітний будинок: „Універмаг” на Басарабці. Так він і простовбичив усю війну — один серед грузів. Ви думаєте, це був недогляд? Ні, *завбачливість!* Коли, після війни, до скупчень неповоротців радянські агітатори завозили свою літературу, я побачив знімку з таким, приблизно, написом: „Іде відбудова знищеного фашистськими варварами Києва. На руїнах Хрещатика виростають нові дома...” На знімці, серед румовища баби з лопатами, а за ними — знайомий „Універмаг”...

Отже, я переконаний, що перенесення на роки війни дат смерті розстріляних, доведених до самогубства, замучених голодом, холодом і таборовою працею діячів української культури, котрих не оминуло тодішнє лихоліття, це не просто, висловлюючись радянським терміном „кампанія по розукрупненню” — це заздалегідь заплановане перекладення сталінських злочинів на плечі Гітлера.

Виросте — воно вже виростає! — нове покоління, яке не знатиме, кого, коли, де і за яким звинуваченням знищено. Адже ні причини, ні місця смерті, ні обставин загибелі кількадесятьох жертв культу особи (з поміж українських літераторів) — офіційні радянські джерела як не подають тепер, так і не подаватимуть через десять чи двадцять років.

Студент і школяр старших класів бачитимуть у своїх підручниках і довідниках, що на воєнні роки припадають криваві жнива смерті: ті загинули від бомби першого ж дня війни, той поліг на фронті, той у підпіллі, кого замучили в гітлерівському концтаборі, кого розстріляло гестапо...

І навіть ніхто не підказуватиме, а саме прийде до голови пояснення, що хвилю масової смертності серед наших письменників спричинила війна. Що Олесь Досвітній і Грицько Епик, Юрій Будяк і Дмитро Бузько, Микола Вороний і Георгій Костоправ, Андрій Панів і Микола Зеров, Іван Кулик і Микола Куліш, Сергій Пилипенко і Гео Шкурупій, Валеріян Поліщук і Валеріян Підмогильний, Володимир Свідзінський і Олександр Сорока, Володимир Ярошенко й Антін Крушель-

ницький — усе це жертви війни!, усіх їх, бач, розтерзали кровожерні фашисти в катівнях гітлерівського гестапо.

Були, мовляв, і жертви культу особи, от наприклад, Іван Микитенко, Борис Коваленко, але цвіт нації знищили фашистські окупанти. Найбільшим парадоксом буде те, що про справжні жертви гестапо, як от Олег Ольжич або Олена Теліга, представники того підростаючого покоління ледве чи й довідаються...

## REVIEW ARTICLE

John-Paul Himka

LEONID PLYUSHCH: THE UKRAINIAN MARXIST  
RESURGENT\*

To appreciate what was done to Leonid Plyushch, one must realize how much reading meant to him. His memoirs tell us that as a seventh grader, he did not know how to buy a streetcar ticket because the act of purchase had never been described in books. As a young man he read every noteworthy product of the Thaw and much else besides. His mind was stuffed with Marx and Freud, Saint-Exupéry and Sartre, Oriental philosophy and the theatre of the absurd. His idea of a good time was a month in Moscow with a pass to the Lenin Library. When he became involved politically, it was chiefly in the *samizdat* movement, that is, in the production and distribution of reading matter.<sup>1</sup> Reading became for him a natural function, as indispensable as eating or sleeping. Perhaps even more indispensable. We find him in the aftermath of Arkadii Levin's birthday party, at four in the morning, after consuming who knows how much spirit, pulling out Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* and reading until six in the morning, when the KGB interrupts him. In another instance, we find him whipping out a book to pass a half-hour break in the midst of a KGB interrogation. On the train to Lefortovo prison he approaches the guard and insists: "Give me something to read" (p. 277). At the prison, he confesses, "when I finished reading everything I considered interesting in the library, I took whatever came to hand" (p. 291).

It is in this context, of Plyushch the inhaler of the written word, that we can understand the savagery of what is meant by the stifling of independent thought in the Soviet Union. Plyushch was fed drugs until the mind police had reduced him to the level of consciousness they felt comfortable with. At this point, Tatyana Plyushch notes, "Lyonya asked me not to bring books because he could neither read nor think . . . ." (p. 345).

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\* Leonid Plyushch, *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography*. With a contribution by Tatyana Plyushch. Edited and translated by Marco Carynnyk. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, A Helen and Kurt Wolff Book, 1979. xvii, 429 pp.

<sup>1</sup> "We needed 'politicians,' people who would disseminate *samizdat* . . ." (p. 75).

The existence of these intelligent memoirs is testimony to the resiliency of Plyushch's spirit and mind. If we had not read the last few pages of his book, the chilling, but mercifully laconic, depiction of his mental deterioration ("The only thoughts that remained concerned smoking and bribing the orderlies for an extra trip to the lavatory," p. 325); if we had not known from *samizdat* what effect tablets and fixes full of trifluoperazine were having on the dissident mathematician in the *psikhushka*; if we were ignorant of all this, it would never have occurred to us that this Insatiable Reader, with his insights into science, politics, literature and philosophy, had experienced a long, painful moment of mental discontinuity. It was not even madness, the sometime alter ego of genius, but the death and decomposition of his mind. And his resurrection should warn us that in spite of systematic repression and its counterpart, a cynical despondency, people have a tendency to rise. In fact, the burned-out, scorched earth is the incubator of the phoenix.

The *existence* of the Plyushch memoirs reminds us to look through the apparent stillness to the life that stirs within. The *content* of the memoirs takes us into that life. We have in these four hundred pages the tale of a generation's intellectual search and political struggle. Plyushch lets us experience the awakening of reason among Soviet youth in the late 1950s and early 1960s: how Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin jarred them from their dreams and how the real-life nightmares of people like Solzhenitsyn set them searching for answers in places so incongruous as the classics of Marxism-Leninism and the Bible. No longer could they be satisfied with only such wisdom as came packaged in the latest party directive. Instead, they ransacked the Russian and Ukrainian past, Western culture and religion, on the hunt for answers to "How?" and "Why?" and "Could it happen again?". When they flushed out information they thought was useful, they rushed to pass it on, in the pages of *Novyi mir* and *Literaturna Ukraina* or, when these pages proved to be too confining, in self-published typescripts.

The answer to one of their questions ("Could it happen again?") was revealed to them from on high: "Yes, it *could* happen again; it *was* happening again." The denunciations, the arrests, trials and imprisonment, the police at the door and at the mind, the tanks chewing up the asphalt of Prague, and a novelty: trifluoperazine. Almost imperceptibly the hunt for truth was transformed. It was not a hunt they had joined after all, but war. There were inevitable desertions, but for those who remained in the opposition, the truth was one of their weapons. Typewriters



clacked away late into the night as the *samizdat* movement intensified. People like Plyushch lost or gave up their jobs to commit themselves totally to the struggle. They affixed their signatures to petitions of protest, intending much more by this act than the act itself could ever achieve. They agonized over whether or not to demonstrate — for Shevchenko, for Prague — because they sensed they were too weak (as yet) to risk such a battle. And all the time: *samizdat* and wrestling with vexing problems.

The most vexing problem, judging by how often Plyushch and the movement as a whole return to it, is the nature of Soviet society, and in particular the significance of Stalinism. With regard to the latter, Plyushch begins by ripping off the mask of words. He does not want “a mountain of corpses” to masquerade behind the “thoroughly un-Marxist concept” of “cult of personality.” “Stalinism,” he insists, “was obviously not simply a cult” (p. 40). Because he is “still a Marxist by conviction” (p. 377), Plyushch wants to look deeper than “the leader’s personal qualities.” He wants to investigate what he calls “the class roots of the degeneration of the Revolution” (p. 40). The phrasing is perhaps a bit narrow in conception and doctrinaire in tone, but his meaning is clear enough: there is something fundamentally wrong with the Soviet system since Stalin (it is not mere “superstructure,” “errors”),<sup>2</sup> and only a dig to the social foundations of that system will reveal what needs to be known. Plyushch cannot, of course, in the memoir genre perform such an analytical dig (nor has he done it elsewhere),<sup>3</sup> but he does give us his general view of the situation. He encapsulates his position by calling the Soviet Union both “state capitalism” and an “ideocracy” (pp. 64, 142, 149, 173).

By “state capitalism” Plyushch means that the Soviet state is an “abstract capitalist” that enlists the services of the Soviet bureaucracy. The latter has not yet constituted itself as a completely independent class, though it has a strong tendency to do so. Plyushch does not take us much deeper than that into his analysis and remains at the level of catchwords. Still, a few points should be raised. What is attractive about this conception, even so sketchy,

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<sup>2</sup> The “errors”-in-the-“superstructure” view is defended by Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (New York, 1970), p. 240.

<sup>3</sup> In spite of its promising title and the usual Plyushchian sprinkle of insight, his recent contribution to *Suchasnist* is too impressionistic and methodologically lazy to be the analysis we are waiting for. “Konstytuiuvannia novoi klasy. Formalna lohika radianskoho absurdu,” *Suchasnist*, 1980, no. 4, pp. 45-60; no. 5, pp. 89-101.

is its emphasis on the *state* as the dominant element in the whole Soviet socio-economic formation, intervening in every sphere from purchasing to poetry.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps this is an obvious point, but many other Marxists would feel uncomfortable with a critique that has the state do much more than reflect the goings-on of “the base.” On the other hand, it is hard to know what to do with Plyushch’s “abstract capitalist.” Both words of this phrase have precise meanings in Marxist theory, the tradition to which Plyushch appeals. The logical category of “the abstract” can only metaphorically be used to designate something as “concrete” as the Soviet state, and we need a great many intermediate steps before we can recognize Soviet “capitalism’s” kinship to what Marx had analysed in *Capital*. There are, of course, fuller and more refined versions of the “state capitalism” theory, but I think we would be safe, in Plyushch’s case, to translate his “abstract capitalist” as “impersonal exploiter” — a phrase that may express the truth but illuminates little.

“Ideocracy,”<sup>5</sup> however, seems a totally perverted concept. No “idea” holds power in the Soviet Union. Rather, ideas are slaves. When they are useful, they are put to work; when they are harmful, they are killed; their internal life (their content) is not of the least concern to the masters. Plyushch himself is ambiguous about “ideocracy” in the memoirs. At one point he is pleased to have discovered the concept (p. 173), at another point he makes reservations (“an ideocracy that has become an idolocracy,” p. 64), and at still another point he rejects it: “It is incorrect to call Soviet society an ideocracy, because the idea is dead and the corpse of the idea, the idol, contains concepts far removed from the original meaning” (p. 105).<sup>6</sup> But the chase after “-ocracies” is not very productive.

Plyushch seems to have an aversion to sustained analysis, preferring the search for the magic formula that “explains” the Soviet system. This aversion he shares with the greater part of the Soviet and East-European opposition. It would not stand out

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<sup>4</sup> Plyushch points out that “all property [in the USSR] belongs only to the state and not to the people.” *Rozmova z Leonidom Pliushchem* (Toronto: Dyaloh, [1976]), p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> “Looking [at the Soviet Union] from the political aspect, it is an ideocracy, that is, the rule of ideas, and not people.” *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Plyushch goes on to say: “The omnipotent falseness makes use of truth and lies, the absolute and the relative, the genius of Marx and the paltriness of Khrushchev, the sincerity of youth and the cupidity of the bourgeoisie” (p. 106).

were it not that *Plyushch* stands out. He raises eyebrows and voices, in the postwar Ukrainian and recent Russian emigration and among some dissident circles in the USSR, because — in spite of all that was done to him and to many others “under the banner of Marxism” — he is a self-professed Marxist. Sometimes “Marxism” can be merely a code word for a slavish devotion to the USSR or for a sectarian mentality, but these possibilities are certainly excluded in dissident Plyushch’s case. Whatever else it has been, Marxism has also been a tradition of sustained criticism. The volumes of *Capital*, right or wrong as you please, are a monumental achievement of concentrated analysis. The works of Lenin, flawed or sound, constitute an unrelenting critique of Russian society in almost every aspect. The Soviet opposition needs such “Marxism” today. At its best, Marxism has exposed the manifold connections between culture and economy, class and politics, past and present; and for better or worse, Marxism has also played a role in transforming societies. Again, the Soviet opposition needs such “Marxism” today. And Plyushch, taking the label, must also accept the responsibility. Plyushch himself says as much when criticizing Soviet neo-Marxists: “I think we must delve into matters more deeply. We must elucidate and understand why Communism has been transformed to such an extent: from the brilliant ideals of Marx, Engels and Lenin to the praxis of Stalinism — that’s quite a distance.”<sup>7</sup> And an “abstract capitalist” shedding its “ideocracy” for “idolocracy” does not take us far down the road.

Let there be no mistake, however. If Plyushch is not at his best in the analytical mode, he still strews these memoirs with nuggets of real perception. For instance, who but Plyushch would have realized that Stalin “drank his famous toast to the great Russian people in secret gratitude that it had not overthrown him and put him on trial at Nuremburg” (p. 185)?

Plyushch writes well on the national question in the USSR, combining the perspectives of what is best in the Marxist tradition with his own personal experience and visceral responses. As a child and adolescent he had absorbed all the prejudices fostered by the Soviet establishment. He grew up hating Jews, Gypsies and the Asiatic peoples in his native Kirghiz Republic.

This, too, I hold against the regime: inculcating children with chauvinism, anti-Semitism, and KGBism. It took me, a Ukrainian boy, and made me a Russian chauvinist, an oppressor of Chechens,

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<sup>7</sup> *Rozmova*, p. 7.

Kurds, and Kirghizians, a white racist blinded by his mission as a *Kulturträger*. (p. 9)

The eradication of this unreflective chauvinism did not result from his voracious reading, but from experience, moments of illumination that are recorded in the memoirs. The initial blows to his anti-Semitism:

In the tenth grade I took part in a mathematics competition. The smartest and best-educated boys were Jews. I became friendly with them, and a close relationship with one boy made the first breach in my anti-Semitism. I started to protest when others displayed anti-Semitic attitudes. When I was submitting my application for the university, I overheard two clerks. "Ukrainian? You can tell by her mug that she's Jewish. She won't hide from us. We'll flunk her in the entrance exams!" These words had a profound effect on me. Anti-Semites were running the country. As a private citizen I allowed myself to be anti-Semitic, but the rulers were Communists and had no such right. (p. 13)

The incident that commits Plyushch to the Ukrainian national liberation struggle:

Under the influence of [Ivan] Dzyuba's book [*Internationalism or Russification?*], I began to speak my native language. At first it was difficult, because my active vocabulary was limited and everyone around me was speaking Russian. One day in a shop I asked a young man, in Ukrainian, to hand me a book. "Can't you speak human?" he snarled. The blood rushed to my head, and right then I became a Ukrainian once and for all, the way Soviet Jews fully realize that they are Jews when they are barraged with "anticosmopolitan" or "anti-Zionist" propaganda. Still later such remarks ceased to offend me, because by then I had developed a national pride. (p. 114)

His memoirs burst with accounts of these little awakenings, too many to quote, but not to be passed up. (See, in particular, how Plyushch's infant son figures in a lesson against anti-Semitism, pp. 50-1, and also the meditation on less blatant forms of prejudice, p. 165.)

It is with respect to the national question that Plyushch and his memoirs are the most programmatic and most Marxist. He opposes chauvinism in every form.<sup>8</sup> He uses all the capital of

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<sup>8</sup> See his remarks on Ukrainian chauvinists and a related species ("dumpling-eating villagers"), pp. 116-8.

respect he has won from his readers to invest in a lucid plea for internationalism in the "Afterword." Here he does not evade tricky questions, but confronts both the former Soviet dissident who is enraged to see him "bother with Chile," and Angela Davis, who supported "the trumped-up trials of the socialist opposition in Czechoslovakia." He demands freedom for Jose Luis Massera, secretary of the Uruguayan CP and "most probably a protégé of Brezhnev." He demands an investigation into Massera's case. He wants to know why the police broke Massera's legs. Plyushch is deeply moved that the Peruvian Trotskyist Hernan Cuentas and his comrades, themselves in prison, greeted the news of his release from the *psikhushka* with joy. "How were they to know that I would later support them and not their government, that I would not conduct fascist propaganda?" With Victor Nekipelov, Plyushch sings out: "I curse all the torture chambers of this world, / Be they in Santiago, Athens, or Moscow." The very last sentence of the book, his final, importunate message to his readers, is that "the world is one: both bondage and freedom are indivisible" (pp. 377-9).

Plyushch's is an authentic, reasoned internationalism, and not for a moment does he confuse the real thing with what passes for it in the USSR. The point is obvious to him, and he only makes it parenthetically, but very clearly: "Soviet chauvinists are fond of the notion that Russian nationalism is really internationalism" (p. 118).<sup>10</sup> He is all too aware of national oppression in the Soviet Union to swallow that. He joins the Ukrainian national movement, aids the Crimean Tatar movement, demonstrates against

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<sup>9</sup> From the "Preface": "I should not want my testimony about the reality of 'socialism' to serve as a moral justification for all sorts of fascist scum, because my enemy's enemy is not necessarily my friend. Barbarity is barbarity no matter what its ideological hue" (p. xvi).

<sup>10</sup> The point is an old one in Marxist literature. Frederick Engels vs. Louis Blanc in 1847: "'A Frenchman is necessarily a cosmopolite,' says M. Blanc. Yes, in a world ruled over only by French influence, French manners, fashions, ideas, politics. In a world in which every nation has adopted the characteristics of French nationality. But that is exactly what the democrats of other nations will not accept. Quite ready to give up the harshness of their own nationality, they expect the same from the French. They will not be satisfied in the assertion, on the part of the French, that they are cosmopolites by the mere fact that they are French, an assertion which amounts to the demand urged upon all others to become Frenchmen." Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works* (London, 1975-), 6:411.

anti-Semitism at Babyn Yar, and supports the nations of Central Asia without reservation: "Today when nationalism raises its head in Kirghizia, all my sympathy is on its side, even when it explodes as hatred of the Russian colonizers" (p. 9). He understands this hatred, but is careful himself to draw distinctions. For instance, he is appalled by the retrograde Russian nationalism represented by Ilya Glazunov, painter and champion of "Monarchy, Orthodoxy, truly Russian culture." "Back to Russia, [Glazunov] argued, back to peasants who wear bast shoes, light their cottages with torches, and respect the truncheon." "Poor Russia," Plyushch sighs, "why do you need such patriots?" He reads about Glazunov traveling in the West, "boasting of his assignment to paint a portrait of Brezhnev himself, the master of the Russian people and all progressive humanity." But note Plyushch's conclusion to all this: "These sad and absurd scenes did not prevent me from seeing the 'non-true Russians' — Bukovsky and Sakharov, for example — or from hoping that they would be victorious in Russia" (pp. 185-6).<sup>11</sup>

As to the national question closest to home, Plyushch stands "for democracy and socialism in an independent Ukraine":<sup>12</sup>

The discussions I had and the prewar books I read in Lviv strengthened my belief in Ukrainian independence. The sheer vastness of the territory ruled by the Soviet regime is conducive to bureaucratization, centralization, and cultural and linguistic leveling, and to centripetal militaristic forces that impede democratization. Secession would give an impetus to the struggle for genuine democracy and socialism in Ukraine. The question of Ukraine's future status — cultural autonomy, federal union with Russia, or complete independence — should be decided by the Ukrainian people themselves and not by foreign powers. (p. 190)

The last sentence deserves comment, since it will annoy most older nationalists. They will object to Plyushch's wording, that the "future status" of Ukraine "should be decided by the Ukrainian people themselves." They will say it *has* been decided al-

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<sup>11</sup> There seems to be an allusion here to one of Lenin's last statements on the national question, where he writes ironically of "that really Russian man, the Great Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is." V. I. Lenin, *Last Letters and Articles* (Moscow, 1968), p. 18.

<sup>12</sup> The motto of the Toronto-based journal *Diyaloh*, which is written for the Soviet Ukrainian opposition.

ready: it is independence plain and simple, and even mentioning cultural autonomy and federal union is anathema. I can only say that Plyushch's position is the more realistic. The Ukrainian masses are not yet seething with the demand for independent statehood. They might have been seething so in 1918-20, but neither before nor since. Plyushch is reckoning here with a discomfiting fact, and though he himself is unequivocal about the need for secession, he is not going to delude himself by projecting his consciousness onto the millions of individuals who make up the nation. The mass movement for independence is coming, Plyushch is one of its harbingers, in a *potential* sense it exists already, but it has not yet emerged as a political fact. If one were to offer any serious criticism of how Plyushch formulates his position, it is that he fails to adduce the single most important reason for independence: that for over three hundred years, and even after — in fact, especially after — the formation of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians have been nationally oppressed within Russia. The reserve of trust is simply exhausted. It has reached the point that Lenin talks about, when life together simply becomes impossible.<sup>13</sup>

Plyushch says this elsewhere explicitly,<sup>14</sup> and it is really implied in the memoirs after all. It is implied in the crimes against the Ukrainian nation that he records, and it is implied in his message to the Russian opposition, where he sets the terms for any possible alliance with the Ukrainian movement: "Only when the Russian democrats state their position on the national question unambiguously and without reservations, only when they prove to the other nationalities that they have no intention of being their benefactors or guardians, will an *alliance* with them *in the struggle for democracy* be possible" (p. 190). I have added the emphasis lest the sentence be casually misread as conditions for a union with some new, federal Russia, which is not its intent at all. The statement concerns preconditions for even working together to achieve democracy. Plyushch speaks here further than he goes. In his memoirs we see him allied in practice with a number of Russians active in the democratic movement, whose views on the future of Ukraine leave something to be desired (for example,

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<sup>13</sup> The masses will resort to secession "when national oppression and national friction make joint life absolutely intolerable." V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow, 1960-70), 20:423.

<sup>14</sup> See his open letter to Tatiana Khodorovich: "I myself stand for the independence of Ukraine (and other republics) primarily . . . because of the frightful historical experience of 'reunion' with the Russian state (and not people)." *Kontinent* 9 (1976):261.

Alexander Ginzburg).<sup>15</sup> And Plyushch's practice may well be preferable to his theory given the indispensability of democratic reforms for a strengthening of the brutally suppressed Ukrainian movement. What Plyushch seems really to be saying is that Ukrainians will not *sacrifice* their aspirations as a nation, a long *oppressed* nation, for those of all-Russian democracy. For any historically conscious Ukrainian on the left this warning should sound familiar, and not only as the reproach of enemies. It is the spectre of an old and painful problem, but too implicitly posed by Plyushch for us to do more than signal its return.

There are more ghosts haunting Plyushch's views on the national question. If we refer back to the explicit reasons he offers for secession, we will find independence advocated because it *prevents* "centralization, and cultural and linguistic leveling." Plyushch does not comment on this further in the memoirs,<sup>16</sup> but the heresy deserves it. The classical Marxists would have been aghast at this argument. Surely, they would have objected, such excellent things as centralism and cultural unification are arguments *against*, rather than for, independence. Engels would have grabbed Plyushch by the lapel and said, "Listen, 'the bourgeoisie is already carrying out considerable centralization . . . The democratic proletariat not only needs the kind of centralization begun by the bourgeoisie but will have to extend it very much further.'" <sup>17</sup> And Lenin would have added his two cents: "The aim of socialism is not only to end the division of humanity into tiny states and the isolation of nations in any form, it is not only to bring the nations closer together but to fuse them."<sup>18</sup>

So where does this leave Plyushch? It leaves him standing firmly on a piece of ground hallowed by the memory of his political forefathers. Because this is a "deviation" that the Ukrainian left, from Mykhailo Drahomanov<sup>19</sup> to Roman Rosdolsky,<sup>20</sup> has insisted upon. Victims of "centralization," in danger of being "culturally fused" out of existence, the Ukrainian left has doggedly

<sup>15</sup> See Ginzburg's interview in *Suchasnist*, 1980, no. 7-8, pp. 159-62.

<sup>16</sup> But see again his letter to Khodorovich, pp. 259-61.

<sup>17</sup> Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, 6:372-3.

<sup>18</sup> Lenin, *Collected Works*, 22:146. I have altered the translation to make it more faithful to the original.

<sup>19</sup> See *Istoricheskaia Polsha i velikoruskaia demokratiia* (Geneva, 1881), esp. pp. 256-63, 266, 307; and "Perednie slovo do 'Hromady,'" *Vybrani tvory* (Prague-New York, 1937), esp. pp. 122-3, 142.

<sup>20</sup> See his classic study *Zur nationalen Frage: Friedrich Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen" Volker* (Berlin, 1979).



clung to its heresy.<sup>21</sup> From the first, when Ukrainian socialism was yet in its Radical, Drahomanovist phase, the Marxist bones of centralism and assimilation kept getting stuck in its throat. This is why Mykhailo Pavlyk felt obliged to breach good taste by writing the following, in an *obituary* for Marx:

Marx himself had succumbed to such an extent to his centralistic plans that up to the last moment he and his adherents raised the cry "Long live (historical) Poland!" — and they failed altogether to consider, or perhaps they were unaware, that this slogan means nothing less than "Long live the Polish upper classes in Ukraine, Lithuania and Belorussia, exploiting the Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belorussian popular masses" . . . . And among the Russian and German socialists, Marx's famous watchword — "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" — could in fact be replaced by the slogan "Peoples of the Russian and German empires, Russify and Germanize yourselves!"<sup>22</sup>

The Ukrainian Marxists and Communists of the twentieth century (Rybalka-Iurkevych, Shakhrai, Vasylkiv, Shumsky) held much the same positions on centralism and national fusion, though their views were more tactfully argued.

We have summoned these spirits from the past because they point to something curious, at once expected and unexpected: to become a Ukrainian Marxist, as Plyushch has done, is to step into an enchanted circle, into a set of problems with its own long and consistent history. From this arises a further point, which can be put as a question: is Plyushch conscious of the tradition in which he walks, or has he been conducted to the place he now stands by the shades of forgotten ancestors?

The memoirs speak to the question not by what they say, but by their silences; they catalogue, after all, what Plyushch has read, or at least what he felt influenced him. Missing in that catalogue are the earliest Ukrainian Marxists, Mykola Ziber (popu-

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<sup>21</sup> There were, of course, exceptions, such as Dmytro Antonovych of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, for whom the national question was "nonexistent." But while the national nihilism of someone like Antonovych stands out in the history of the Ukrainian movement in general, the Ukrainian left as a whole, Marxist and non-Marxist, has always stood out, within the context of socialist and communist history, for its "nationalist deviations."

<sup>22</sup> "Karol Marx," *Praca*, 10 April 1883, no. 6, p. 21. See also John-Paul Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism: Austria, 1867-1890" (Ph.D. diss., the University of Michigan, 1977), pp. 362-4.

larizer of Marx's *Capital* and Engels's *Anti-Dühring*) and Serhii Podolynsky (who attempted to add proof to Marx's theory of value by applying the laws of thermodynamics),<sup>23</sup> as well as the anti-Marxist socialists, Drahomanov and Pavlyk. Also missing are the Ukrainian social democrats of the period of the Second International (Bachynsky, Levynsky, Porsh, Rybalka-Iurkevych), the left of the Ukrainian revolution (except for one reference to a *novel* by Volodymyr Vynnychenko), the national Communists (Shakhrai the precursor, Shapoval the *marxisant* SR, Skrypnyk the party boss, Iavorsky the historical materialist, Volobuiev the economist) and the postwar Ukrainian émigré left (Rosdolsky, Holubnychy, Maistrenko, Levytsky, Kostiuk).<sup>24</sup> The evidence is overwhelming: Plyushch was completely cut off from the sources of the Ukrainian Marxist tradition. He joined it, but spontaneously and unconsciously.

The prime cause of Plyushch's isolation from the tradition lies in the deliberate policy of the Soviet authorities to eradicate from memory those Ukrainian political traditions that do not serve their purpose. Their vengeance on the deviant left, as is well known, has been particularly vicious. The practice in historiography apes the practice followed by the Soviet police after the occupation of Lviv in 1939: round up the Communists first, then worry about the nationalists. At least Dontsov, OUN, UPA and other manifestations of what the Soviets call "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" can keep up a sorry existence in historical literature as caricature. Not so the left.

Aside from this principal cause of Plyushch's isolation, there are at least three secondary factors. First, of course, is the almost complete disappearance of a Ukrainian left in the 1930s and 1940s. Stalinism so mangled ideology in Soviet Ukraine that little remained in the realm of ideas that could be classified as "Ukrainian" or "leftist" without using these words in a sense completely

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<sup>23</sup> Curiously, the imprisoned Ukrainian dissident Mykola Rudenko also confronted Marx's value theory with thermodynamics, but in order to *disprove* the former. He had not read Podolynsky's work. Serhii Podolynsky, "Liudska pratsia i iednist syly," in M. Hrushevsky, *Z pochyniv ukrainskoho sotsiialistychnoho rukhu* (Vienna, 1922), pp. 186-207. Mykola Rudenko, "Ekonomichni monolohy," *Suchasnist*, 1977, no. 3, p. 59: "The *labour* theory of *value* is without foundation above all because it violates the *law of conservation and transformation of energy*."

<sup>24</sup> The Ukrainian new left, represented by the periodicals *Meta* in English and *Diyaloh* in Ukrainian, is not a part of the tradition that precedes Plyushch.

alien to what Plyushch, and many others, would understand by them.<sup>25</sup> Stalinism also contributed much to the hegemony of right-wing nationalism among the millions of Ukrainians outside the Soviet Union, in Western Ukraine. And to this ideological annihilation must be added the biological. The Soviets themselves, having best access to the victims, perpetrated most of the carnage. But those Ukrainian leftists who the Nazis could find, or those who fell into the hands of militant Ukrainian nationalists, were also heaped on the pile of martyrs. So that Plyushch grew up, quite literally, without access to a living Ukrainian leftist tradition. Nationalist dissidents like Valentyn Moroz were better off in this respect, since they did meet survivors from the OUN and UPA tradition.

A second factor has to do with a fundamental change in the problematic of Ukrainian Marxism in the twentieth century, which in turn reflects a total transformation of Ukrainian society. Even as a Soviet citizen, Plyushch had access, albeit constricted, to one part of the Ukrainian socialist legacy: the part that preceded the formation of the Second International. The works of the Marxist Ziber and the non-Marxists Drahomanov and Franko had been republished in the Soviet Union in bowdlerized editions. Pavlyk and Podolynsky were the subjects of historical investigation. It was permissible to read more by and about these people in the libraries. Plyushch either did not choose to read the early Ukrainian socialists, or did so but did not find them of sufficient interest to mention in his memoirs.<sup>26</sup> This can be explained by the political irrelevance today of much that was crucial to the founders of Ukrainian socialism. The founders operated at a time when the Ukrainian question could still be considered pre-eminently a class question. Ukrainians were overwhelmingly exploited peasants, while the exploiters and oppressors were just as overwhelmingly Russian, Polish and Jewish. Hence Drahomanov could make a central theme in his writings the proposition that consistent "Ukrainophiles" (nationally conscious Ukrainians) had to become socialists and socialists in Ukraine had to become assimilated to Ukrainian culture. But in the twentieth century the Ukrainians underwent a radical alteration of their social structure and could

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<sup>25</sup> The English historian E. P. Thompson, for example: "From my own position, I cannot conceive of any wave in the working-class movement being further to the 'right' than Stalinism." *The Poverty of Theory & Other Essays* (New York, 1978), p. 134.

<sup>26</sup> Franko is mentioned but — like Vynnychenko — as *littérateur* rather than political publicist.

no longer be regarded as a "peasant nation." In the new situation, the early Ukrainian socialists retained great historical interest, but became increasingly difficult to read for answers to current problems. Their arguments with Marxism over the role of the peasantry, their agrarian economics, and their methods of agitating in the village no longer interested the intellectual of working-class origins living in Kiev.<sup>27</sup>

A third factor that helped bar Plyushch from the Ukrainian Marxist tradition concerns only the postwar émigré left. Like the entire postwar emigration, it very quickly abandoned its duty of writing for Ukraine. The leftists who survived or emerged after the war wrote primarily for the emigration and for a wider Western public. Especially when they did the latter, they wrote of things that had little direct relevance to Ukrainians in the USSR and in languages that were inaccessible: witness Holubnychy's excellent study of Mao's dialectics<sup>28</sup> and Rosdolsky's masterpiece, *The Making of Marx's 'Capital'*.<sup>29</sup>

But perhaps we conceive things too narrowly when we say these works are of little direct relevance to Ukrainians in the USSR. Certainly a reading of Holubnychy would have made Plyushch think twice before dismissing Mao and his "simple syllogisms which are repeated like hypnotic formulas" (p. 30). And Rosdolsky would have explained to Plyushch why "the political economy of socialism" had to be as he found it at the university — "thoroughly unscientific" (p. 29).<sup>30</sup> Rosdolsky's book, which is a comparison of *Capital* and the *Grundrisse*, would also have satisfied some of the hunger Plyushch exhibits for the latter in his memoirs.<sup>31</sup> Another book by Rosdolsky, *Zur nationalen Frage*, examines Engels's controversial views on the "nonhistoric" nationalities of Eastern Europe in 1848; an acquaintance with Ros-

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<sup>27</sup> Ziber was not as peasant-minded as the others, mainly because his early popularizations of Marxism were only rarely related to a specifically Ukrainian context.

<sup>28</sup> Vsevolod Holubnychy, *Mao Tse-tung's Materialist Dialectics* (London, 1964); reprinted from *China Quarterly*, July-September 1964. A longer German version appeared in 1962. No Ukrainian translation exists.

<sup>29</sup> Translated by Peter Burgess (London, 1977). The work originally appeared in German in 1968. It has been translated into Spanish, Italian, French and Japanese, but not into Ukrainian.

<sup>30</sup> See "A Seemingly Dogmatic Controversy," in *ibid.*, pp. 552-61.

<sup>31</sup> "A philosopher I knew told me . . . that Marx had written many drafts in preparing *Capital*. He wrote the philosophical part first, the scaffolding for his theory, but in the finished book he eliminated almost

dolsky's research and analysis would have proved very useful when Tatiana Khodorovich and the editors of *Kontinent* dragged out quotes from Engels as ammunition in their attack on Plyushch for his Marxism.<sup>32</sup>

So, after all, these works by postwar Marxists are not completely irrelevant to Ukrainian oppositionists. But even if someone had taken the trouble to distribute a few copies in Ukraine, Plyushch and most of his comrades could not have read them, because there are no Ukrainian or Russian translations and Plyushch to this day still does not know any Western languages.<sup>33</sup> The indifference to Western languages on the part of the Soviet opposition (which, we point out, is mainly composed of *intelligentsia*) restricts access to information and ideas. The opposition is therefore dependent on only three sources of information external to itself: the publications of the regime it opposes, the radio programmes of Western governments, and the (primarily Russian-language) *tamizdat* produced by émigrés. With such an ideologically unbalanced input, it is no wonder that Soviet dissidents appear remarkably naïve when they open their mouths in the West.

This extends also to Soviet dissident Marxists. In the Soviet Union Plyushch was altogether clued out to contemporary debates within Western Marxism. As a result, his memoirs and other statements carry a burden of uninhibited naïvete for otherwise sympathetic Western readers. In particular I have in mind Plyushch's insistence on a Marxist humanism and his infatuation with Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. The *Manuscripts* are one of the most frequently mentioned and most warmly

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all the philosophy and left the scientific part . . . Where is it now, that scaffolding for *Capital*?" (p. 87). The "scaffolding" (*Grundrisse*) has been published in the German original and in English translation, but not in Ukrainian.

<sup>32</sup> *Kontinent* 9 (1976): 231-3, 264-6. A sample of what the editors of *Kontinent* quote at Plyushch from Engels: The Austrian Germans and the Magyars "will take a bloody revenge on the Slav barbarians. The general war that will then break out will scatter this Slav Sonderbund and annihilate all these small pig-headed nations even to their very names." Karl Marx [and Frederick Engels], *The Revolutions of 1848*, ed. David Fernbach, The Pelican Marx Library (Middlesex, 1973), p. 225.

<sup>33</sup> In the "Preface," dated 15 August 1977, Plyushch states: "I had intended to conclude the account with my impressions of the West. But how can I say anything serious, even after I have seen a great deal here, when I still do not know any Western languages?" (p. xvi). According to private communications, the situation has not changed.

endorsed works in the memoirs.<sup>34</sup> His favourite Marx is the Young Marx. He considers ethical questions to be the most fruitful terrain for the development of Marxism.<sup>35</sup> He dedicates his memoirs to “humanitarians” (p. xvii).

All these are justifiable positions. Yet they are affirmed in the midst of an ideological battle to which Plyushch seems oblivious. Since the early 1960s views such as his have come under consistent attack from the French Communist philosopher Louis Althusser and his sympathizers in France and England. And Althusserianism is no minor movement, but by far the most influential and debated trend in Western Marxist philosophy. Althusser *et consortes* exclude the *Manuscripts* from the Marxist canon, define Marxism as “theoretical antihumanism,” and deny that there can be a Marxist ethics (allowing only a Marxist *policy* on ethical questions).<sup>36</sup> And then, with Althusserianism in full bloom, an exiled Soviet Marxist, namely Plyushch, settled in France, in a book destined for immediate translation into French and English, blithely affirms his Manuscriptural Humanism without arguing to the points raised by the Althusserian critique. Without arguing really at all, but rather *testifying* to his convictions. Yes, Plyushch’s testimony counts for much — as that of a victim of what might be termed “practical antihumanism” — but how much better it would have been had Plyushch been aware of the opponents and their arguments, in order to confront them. It is not only against the Soviet police that a humanist, ethical Marxism requires defence.<sup>37</sup>

Closely related to Plyushch’s stress on humanism is his allegiance to what I will call “the politics of self-respect.” Twice in the memoirs Plyushch defines his political motivation in terms of self-respect, as counterposed to “abstract ideas”:

We [that is, Plyushch and his wife Tatyana] had been happy these four years [in the opposition movement]; we had been able to respect ourselves. I was going to prison not for the sake of abstract

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<sup>34</sup> “In my opinion the work of the young Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, has a very great significance, because in this work Marx looks at the further development of society not only from the economic side, but also from the side of a new ethics and new aesthetics.” *Rozmova*, p. 7.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>36</sup> This is the burden of *For Marx*; see esp. pp. 49-86, 219-41. And see above, n. 2.

<sup>37</sup> An explicit defence against Althusser of Marxist humanism is in Thompson, *Poverty of Theory*, pp. 122-62.

ideas, but for the sake of respect toward myself and others. (p. 259)  
 ... The KGB did not understand the essential thing. We were fighting not for an abstract cause, but for our self-respect. (p. 271)

For his wife, too, self-respect was the key; in her own contribution to the memoirs, she wrote:

How can I explain to anyone who has not lived in the "country of victorious socialism" what simple self-respect and a refusal to lie mean in a country where words and thoughts are crimes? The question of how to live arose for Lyonya and me when we first became aware of ourselves as persons. Gradually we formulated the only possible answer: to live with self-respect. (p. 332)

So, for the Plyushches self-respect is the political bottom line.

The politics of self-respect is also part of the ideological baggage of other Soviet Ukrainian dissenters. Its clearest formulation is in the "Manifesto of the Ukrainian Civil Rights Movement" issued by the Ukrainian Helsinki group on 9 November 1977. Here self-respect is contrasted not with abstract ideas, but with concrete achievements:

What have we achieved? ... In any case, this criterion — the achievement of some kind of "visible" results — was one we never made the basis for our activity. From the start we selected a spiritual criterion. Not "What will I get from this?," but "How will I conduct myself in this ominous historical situation ... ?"<sup>38</sup>

The awakening of self-respect is indeed an important moment for oppressed people and the precondition for political struggle. But it is a *first* moment, a symptom that political thought is in its infancy. And for the Soviet opposition the politics of self-respect is an infantile *disorder*, because politics as politics has much more to do with efficacy and goals than with how well one acquits oneself in a tough moral position. "What do we want to achieve and how can we achieve it?" should be the burning questions of the movement. The point after all, especially for Marxists like Plyushch, is to change society — ethically, humanely — but to change it. This should be the political bottom line. One would feel much better if, looking back on their four years in the opposition, the Plyushches had said they were satisfied that they had contributed to the struggle for a just, free and unexploitative

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<sup>38</sup> "Manifest ukrainskoho pravozakhysnoho rukhu," *Svoboda*, 11 March 1978, p. 6.

Ukraine, that is, if they had evaluated their activities in terms of the larger society rather than in terms of personal moral satisfaction.

The politics of self-respect encourages an abdication from the most difficult of political tasks — organizing an effective opposition — in favour of acts of protest that demonstrate one's oppositional virtue, but disregard effectiveness. The Soviet opposition has engaged in many honourable, courageous, self-defeating acts,<sup>39</sup> but it is high time that it concentrated on honourable, courageous acts that lead to victory. For a Marxist it should be clear what these are: acts that expand the social base of the opposition movement, in particular enlisting the working class to fight for its own interests.

Plyushch's views and actions on this score are not free of contradictions. At one point Plyushch implicitly absolves the Ukrainian opposition from the necessity to work among the masses: "The Ukrainian intelligentsia has never been separated from the masses, and it has never occurred to Ukrainian patriots that they are not part of the people" (p. 266). Earlier, however, he had told us: "The Ukrainian patriots . . . worship the masses in the form of an almost abstract, mystical nation, but because of their narrow concern for culture and their indifference toward politics they are nonetheless alienated from the nation, the living people" (p. 240). Another contradiction arises between what Plyushch says must be done and what we actually see him doing in the memoirs. Nowhere in the memoirs does he state his position as clearly and concisely as in his interview with *Diyaloh*:

The principal factor at present in the opposition movement in the Soviet Union is the intelligentsia. I think, however, that if only the intelligentsia comes out against the dictatorship of the bureaucracy, nothing will be gained. The elemental protest of the working class and peasantry against the bureaucracy's domination should be used by the intelligentsia, who, as I see it, must conduct agitation and propaganda among the working class, especially among the youth, who are very close to the intelligentsia in mood and outlook.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Reading one of the most popular genres of dissident literature — reports of trials, persecution and imprisonment — "one can almost arrive at the impression that dissent is really a self-perpetuating vicious circle in which *a* gets arrested and *b* rushes to his/her defense, so *b* is arrested and *c* rushes to his/her defense, and so on well beyond *z* . . ." John-Paul Himka, "A Bibliography of Dissent," *Student*, May 1978, p. 5.

<sup>40</sup> *Rozmova*, p. 13.



Unfortunately, not once in the memoirs do we see Plyushch conducting agitation and propaganda among the working class. The most he manages in fulfillment of his programme is to send to the *Chronicle of Current Events* "three reports about workers' demonstrations in Ukraine which were not published on the ground that they were political" (p. 239).

The discrepancy here between theory and practice may be less of a comment on Plyushch than on the immense practical difficulties of doing effective political work in the Soviet Union. The task before the opposition today, and before its informed supporters in the West, is to develop a strategy for overcoming the objective barriers to expanding the opposition's social base. Only then will there be a prospect for the humanitarian Ukraine Plyushch envisions, free from political, social and national oppression.\*

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\* The transliteration of the surname Plyushch in this article conforms to the spelling of the name in the book under review. (Ed.)

GUIDE TO RESEARCH

ARCHIVAL SOURCES: IMMIGRATION DOCUMENTS  
1896-1914

The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies has recently acquired approximately thirty centimetres of photocopied documents pertaining to emigration from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to Canada between 1896 and 1914. The material, which focusses on Ukrainian emigration from Galicia and Bukovyna and early Ukrainian settlement in Canada, was collected for the CIUS by Dr. Bohdan Kazymyra of the University of Regina.

In 1978 Dr. Kazymyra visited the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Dynastic, Court and State Archives), Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (General Administrative Archives), Kriegsarchiv (Military Archives), Leopoldinen-Stiftungsarchiv (Leopoldine Foundation Archives), National Library and University of Vienna library in Austria, as well as the Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (State Archives), library and archives of the Polish United Worker's Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza), Biblioteka Narodowa (National Library) and university libraries in Warsaw and Cracow in Poland. The material subsequently deposited with the CIUS would seem to represent all documents concerning Ukrainian immigration to Canada still available in these institutions. Some Austrian records, for example, appeared to be incomplete, as a few listed documents could not be located, the Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych were greatly depleted during World War II, and the Kriegsarchiv yielded no pertinent documentation. To ensure supervised storage and use of the CIUS collection, it has been placed in the University of Alberta Archives on loan, together with Kazymyra's preliminary guide, where it can be consulted through Accession Number 80-20.

The collection is organized into two parts. Photocopied archival documents constitute by far the greater and more significant portion, while selected reference materials form a small second section. The documents section is arranged chronologically according to repository: the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Leopoldinen-Stiftungsarchiv and Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych proved to have papers relating to pre-World War I Ukrainian immigration to Canada. Most of the material is in German, although Polish, Ukrainian, Latin, French and English are used occasionally. Assigned a retrieval number, each of over one hundred documents is identified in the Kazymyra guide by addresser and addressee, date and place of issue, a brief content summary, the code of the original repository, and number of pages. The Kazymyra guide has been used to prepare the following description of the collection.

*Documents*

The Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv yielded the greatest number of documents, eighty-two separately identified files or series of files dating from 1897 to 1914. In addition to some internal memoranda, they consist primarily of the correspondence of officials in Vienna with various Canadian government, Catholic and Austrian consulate officials, and with other individuals. A portion of the material describes Ukrainian settlements in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, socioeconomic conditions in which the immigrants lived, and the Canadian economy. The bulk of it, however, is devoted to the religious situation in which Austria's former subjects found themselves. Memoranda and correspondence exist, for example, on Father Albert Lacombe's Galician visit, efforts to procure Greek Catholic priests for Canada, Russian Orthodox propaganda among the Ukrainian immigrants, requests from both French Canadian and Greek Catholic clergy for financial assistance in their work, and the establishment of a Greek Catholic diocese with Nicetas Budka as bishop.

The Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv was able to supply considerably less material on Ukrainian emigration from Austria-Hungary prior to World War I. Covering the years 1900 to 1913, the twenty-six documents consider various emigration issues from an imperial and/or administrative perspective. Reports, correspondence and memoranda dealing with emigration control, increasing departures from Galicia and Bukovyna, seasonal emigration, activities (legal and otherwise) to promote emigration, protection against exploitation, and the undesirable effects of emigration to avoid military service testify to the Empire's concerns and problems created by attractions overseas. The Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv contains relatively few documents relating to the Ukrainians once in Canada. There is, however, some mention of economic hardships and depression facing the immigrants, and a small amount of material on religious matters, but it is generally repetitive of that found in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in greater quantity.

A primary function of the Leopoldine Foundation, which drew its membership from Catholic dioceses throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was to collect funds to aid German Catholic congregations in America. On a much smaller scale it also assisted work among Ukrainian Greek Catholic immigrants in western Canada. The Leopoldinen-Stiftungsarchiv yielded only thirteen documents between 1899 and 1907 relating to the latter, almost exclusively letters from Archbishop Adelard Langevin of St. Boniface requesting or acknowledging financial assistance. The files do not, however, contain any documents originating with Foundation officials.

Only eight relevant documents were to be found in the Archiwum Głównie Akt Dawnych; dated between 1910 and 1914, they are concerned with the last stages of the prewar migration from Ukrainian territories

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in Europe. The operation of CPR agents within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, emigration problems encountered in certain localities, and the activities of the Polish Emigration Society constitute the main areas of focus.

### *Reference Materials*

A limited number of published works in hard copy, photocopy and microform were also included with the collection. Two books, a history of the Leopoldine Foundation<sup>1</sup> and a study of Austro-Hungarian emigration based on original Austrian sources,<sup>2</sup> have been subsequently transferred to the CIUS library. Eight photocopies, primarily articles on Ukrainian immigrants in Canada appearing in the Ukrainian daily newspaper *Dilo*, and the microfilm of eight German- and Polish-language books and pamphlets on Polish emigration, remain with the main collection. Both the photocopied material and titles on microfilm are identified in the preliminary guide to the collection.

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That primary-source material from European archives relevant to Canadian development be made available in this country is important. This particular collection is of natural benefit to students of Ukrainian-Canadian immigration and settlement, but it should also be useful to the general Canadian historical community and to Canadian immigration historians interested in understanding the broader perspective. If they rely solely on records originating with Canadian sources, scholars in both fields have closed the doors on fully appreciating the European dimension of immigration to Canada and western settlement at the turn of the century.

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<sup>1</sup> Gertrude Kummer, *Die Leopoldinen-Stiftung 1829-1914: Der älteste österreichische Missionsverein* (Vienna, 1966).

<sup>2</sup> Hans Chmelar, *Höhepunkte der österreichischen Auswanderung: Die Auswanderung aus den im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern in den Jahren 1905-1914* (Vienna, 1974).

## REVIEWS

VIACHESLAV LYPYNSKY, *TVORY*, volume 2: *Uchast shliakhty u velykomu ukrainskomu povstanni pid provodom Hetmana Bohdana Khmelnytskoho*. Edited by Lev R. Bilas. Philadelphia: W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute, 1980. xcvi, 637 pp.

In this volume, Lypynsky's most important historical monograph has been republished with a Ukrainian translation. It was first published in Cracow in 1912, in Polish, under the title *Stanislaw Michał Krzyczewski. Z Dziejów walki szlachty ukraińskiej w szeregach powstańczych pod wodzą Bohdana Chmielnickiego*. Ivan Krypiakievych, in a review written that same year, remarked: "In the future no student of the Khmelnytsky period will be able to dispense with it, and many of Lypynsky's ideas will become the basis of modern Ukrainian historiography."

The book is divided into two parts. The first part examines the participation of the lesser Orthodox nobility in the Ukrainian Cossack revolt of 1648-57; the second part traces the career of Mykhailo Krychevsky, one of Khmelnytsky's colonels, and gives a detailed account of the Loiv campaign of 1649. Invaluable to students of seventeenth-century Ukrainian and Polish history because of the copious biographical information it contains, Lypynsky's monograph was the first detailed examination of this subject. It remains unsurpassed to this day.

In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between 1569 and 1648, in contrast to developments in western Europe, the power of the King and the central administration progressively diminished, while the power of the great lords, or magnates, increased. The situation was therefore conducive to the continued existence of upper-class brigandage, a social phenomenon that had almost ceased to exist by the middle of the seventeenth century in such countries as England, France and Spain. The endemic aristocratic violence that plagued the Rzeczpospolita was especially rampant in central Ukraine, where the lesser Orthodox gentry and the settled Cossacks were among those who suffered the most. Small landowners with no patron, a weak patron, or only the King as their nominal patron, these men were at the mercy of anyone more powerful.

Living in a society where might was right, the Ukrainians frequently responded to the violence of the nobility with violence of their own. Michał Bobrzynski, the first historian to note this relationship, explained the ferocity of the Ukrainian-Cossack revolts during the first half of the seventeenth century as the inevitable consequence, or riposte, to what he called "Polish anarchy." In his opinion, the "Cossack problem" could have been solved only by a strong monarch who, by taming the gentry and the magnates, would have removed at the same time the root cause of Ukrainian discontent. This idea was later taken up by Lypynsky. But

unlike Bobrzynski, who believed that a strong central monarchy would not only have been able to resolve the "Cossack problem" but would also have been Poland's political salvation, Lypynsky thought that the formation of an independent Ukrainian state was the panacea for all of Ukraine's ills. He argued that this became the Cossacks' objective as of 1649, and that the Rus' gentry who joined the Cossack army were the major advocates of such an objective.

This is an intriguing interpretation. There is even evidence to suggest that a programme for "restoratio regnum russiae" may have been followed by Khmelnytsky and his closest advisors. But in the final analysis, this evidence cannot substantiate Lypynsky's assertion. Similarly, Lypynsky's claim that the gentry who joined Khmelnytsky were motivated by "revolutionary-national," rather than conservative, social and political ambitions is open to doubt. The provincial lesser gentry who joined the Cossack army during the first years of the revolt were definitely radical in temper, and the great magnates who lorded over the system of licensed anarchy undoubtedly had aroused their indignation. But if their positive ideals are examined dispassionately, it is difficult to find any trace of revolutionary doctrine. On the contrary, like their counterparts in other European countries, these men simply longed for order and security. They thought in terms of a "good-old-days" order and wished to be ruled by a "good king." In his letters to the Tsar and to Rakoczy of Transylvania in 1648, for example, Khmelnytsky clearly expressed his wish to enthrone an autocrat (*samoderzhavets*), that is, a ruler who would rule the entire Polish Commonwealth autocratically but not arbitrarily. Ukrainian political separatism did not emerge really until 1654. Had Khmelnytsky wanted to destroy the Commonwealth or to separate from it before this date, he would have done so in 1652 after his victory at Batoh.

The Ukrainian translation of this welcome edition is well done, and only a few minor errors mar the text. On p. 151 in the third paragraph, for example, the word *jeszcze* (yet) was not translated, while on p. 380 the word *pulkownik* (colonel) was printed instead of the word *buntownik* (rebel). However, only part of the book was translated. There are also other problems. The footnotes and appendices, which contain so much valuable information, have been left in the Polish and German original, something that those who do not read these languages will find annoying. The editors have left out almost all the illustrations that were in the first edition, among them a picture of the Gobelin that Janusz Radziwill commissioned to commemorate his victory at Loiv, and a seventeenth-century woodcut of Maksym Kryvonis. The English synopsis on pages xi-xvi is badly written, and the reviewer can only express his amazement that no one with a good command of English was found to edit it.

In the introductory essay, Lev Bilas provides the reader with an outline of the major trends in nineteenth-century Polish historical thought.

Unfortunately, however, he does not discuss its exact influence on Lypynsky and limits himself only to the following generalization: "There is no doubt that the young Viacheslav Lypynsky became imbued with the ideas of an age which called young Poles to action, to struggle for national liberation, and transposed them to the Ukrainian soil, to Ukrainian history and the Ukrainian question" (p. lxxxvii). Much of the introduction is devoted also to a review of nineteenth-century western-European sociological thought. But here again, its exact influence on Lypynsky is not discussed, while the review itself makes rather tedious reading, as it is unnecessarily overloaded with elementary facts. If this particular volume ever finds its way into the USSR, people there undoubtedly will find this information useful and enlightening. But for the Western reader, detailed explanations of who Dilthey and Pareto were and what they wrote are superfluous.

Lypynsky is an important figure in Ukrainian intellectual history because he was one of the first Ukrainian political thinkers and historians to break with the populist tradition. This crucial development, however, is not treated satisfactorily in the introductory essay. A short description of Lypynsky's characterization of the process of colonization in early-modern Ukraine (pp. lxix-lxxvi) does not constitute an explanation of why he approached Ukrainian history in the way he did. It is hoped that this issue will be treated in one of the forthcoming volumes of Lypynsky's works.

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V. I. BORYSENKO, *BOROTBA DEMOKRATYCHNYKH SYL ZA NARODNU OSVITU NA UKRAINI V 60-90-KH ROKAKH XIX ST.* Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1980. 156 pp. 600 copies.

When an academic publishing house in Soviet Ukraine puts out a limited edition of a soft-cover book, badly reproduced by offset from a poorly typed script, it can usually be taken as a reliable indication that the work is of above-average quality. Borysenko's book is a case in point. The author put together a useful collection of information on primary education in the second half of the nineteenth century. Drawing heavily on archival sources and rare government publications, the study is a welcome addition to the limited literature on an important but neglected topic in Ukrainian cultural and social history.

As is often the case with Soviet Ukrainian publications, the book's long title is somewhat misleading. In its scope the survey does not encompass all of the Ukrainian regions but only the lands under Russian rule, and more precisely, just the three Left-Bank provinces (*gubernii*):

Chernihiv, Poltava and Kharkiv. Nor does the author provide a clear and systematic story of the "struggle by the democratic forces for a popular education." The account of the action of these forces — "workers, peasants and the revolutionary intelligentsia," according to the Soviet historiographical canons — is rather fragmentary and disjointed.

The book is useful mainly for the factual data it contains on such subjects as: (a) institutions of primary education, (b) rudimentary instruction outside the regular school systems, and (c) the role of government and the society in combatting illiteracy. The author gives a detailed description of the school systems organized by various ministries, local administrations, the Orthodox Church, philanthropic groups and individuals. Inadequate finances constantly plagued all of the schools throughout the Empire, but in Ukraine there was the added difficulty created by the prohibition to teach in the Ukrainian language. During the short moments when the Ukrainian language was tolerated, full advantage could not be taken because of the lack of Ukrainian textbooks and qualified teaching personnel. If one adds to this the economic constraints imposed on Ukrainian peasants by widespread land penury, one understands why education in Ukraine remained below the state average and why the Ukrainian provinces appeared among the most illiterate of the Russian empire in the 1897 general census.

The emancipation of serf and state peasants in 1861 created new demands for literacy which the existing schools were not capable of satisfying. At the same time, a more liberal atmosphere encouraged the concerned part of the intelligentsia to seek other avenues of bringing rudimentary learning to the masses. In 1859 Sunday schools were opened, first in Kiev and then throughout Ukraine, to teach the three Rs to the illiterate adult workers as well as to their children who, for one reason or another, could not attend day classes. Existing school libraries were made accessible to the general public, and where there were none, new ones were opened. Permission was secured for public lectures on various topics, ranging from literature to hygiene. These parascholastic activities fared with varying degrees of success, depending on the attitude of the authorities and the support of the society at large.

Borysenko's study becomes less reliable and more simplistic when he examines the reaction to the problem of literacy and primary education of the government and the various segments of the society. He is right to point out that the tsarist government and the reactionary circles feared social upheavals from a rapid spread of education. This explains, at least partly, such repressive measures as (a) the suspension of Sunday Schools in 1862, (b) the Valuev Circular of 1863 forbidding the use of Ukrainian language in schools and in print, and (c) the Ems Ukaz of 1876 banning the importation of Ukrainian books from abroad. But the author does not say a word about the fact that the same government that closed down



the Sunday Schools in 1862 was one of its most ardent supporters in 1859 and 1860, or that there was some sympathy for the use of the Ukrainian language in primary education and in some government documents to the Ukrainian peasantry (e.g., the Emancipation Act) among high government officials. Borysenko's image of the government, the administration and the various segments of the society is static, artificial and lacks the necessary historical dimension. This remark applies to the author's characterization of the intelligentsia, which he divides into bourgeois-liberal and revolutionary-democratic. This division is meaningless, especially with regards to the work done by the students in Sunday Schools and their other endeavors in primary education. When Borysenko places the semi-legal cultural organizations, Hromady, into the liberal camp, he fails to take into consideration those members who had revolutionary leanings.

In summing up, it should be pointed out that Borysenko's work is a useful collection of information, much of it not readily available to most readers. However, the study contains many shortcomings. The collection is incomplete, and the data was selected tendentiously and presented in such a way as to give a distorted, if not outrightly falsified, picture of the cultural and social evolution of Ukraine in the second half of the nineteenth century. All progressive movements in Ukraine are shown to be part and parcel of pan-Russian movements, and led by the Russians. For this reason, rather than analysing the thoughts and deeds of minor Ukrainian activists who are little known but are undoubtedly much more important to the understanding of the subject, the author treats the reader to a rehash of quotations from Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, Herzen and other well-known Russian luminaries. Finally, the book suffers from the lack of critical historical analysis, which can in no way be compensated by the cliched quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Brezhnev.

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RICHARD K. DEBO, *REVOLUTION AND SURVIVAL: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET RUSSIA 1917-1918*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979. 462 pp.

With numerous works having covered the diplomatic history of the Great War and its aftermath, one approaches any recent self-labelled "thorough analysis" with hesitation. What prompted Professor Debo to undertake his "thorough analysis of Lenin's work in foreign policy, at least in so far as it relates to the first year of the Bolshevik revolution" (p. xi)? The author claims that "substantially greater documentation" released from the archives of the major belligerents enabled him "to focus on the

development of Soviet foreign policy itself, rather than viewing it simply as a foil against which other governments pursued their interests in Russia" (p. xii). The reader would assume, then, that this will be a first-hand look into the inside workings of Soviet foreign-policy making.

Although Mr. Debo's intentions and efforts are commendable, his objectives are difficult to attain. The "substantially greater documentation" to which he refers contains relatively little new information about the Byzantine mysteries of Soviet policy making. Moreover, since Soviet foreign-ministry archives remain closed to Western researchers (except to Finns pursuing obscure topics in their past), one can only return to published Soviet documents and studies and hope to find new inspiration between the lines.

Debo's inspiration appears to stem from the writings and deeds of V. I. Lenin, whom the author credits with being the father of Soviet foreign policy, at least in the first year of Soviet power. Overshadowing all other Bolshevik leaders, Lenin's "wisdom" correctly overrode the "emotional" revolutionary romantics like Trotsky, Bukharin and the Left SRs, who failed to make the necessary tactical alterations to doctrine that rapidly changing political circumstances required (p. 298).

Yet Lenin himself, as Debo shows, was not always free of romantic revolutionary delusions. The Bolsheviks based their initial foreign policy on the doctrine of "permanent revolution" — the belief that the fate of the Revolution in Russia depended on its spread to Europe. This assumption had not only been instrumental in the Bolsheviks' rationalization for the seizure of power in November 1917, but it was also the cornerstone of their political platform that pledged to end the war. By the late winter of 1918, however, it was becoming clear that the Revolution was not becoming "permanent." Trotsky's bizarre "no war, no peace" challenge to the German negotiators at Brest-Litovsk signified the bankruptcy of the policy of "permanent revolution." The Revolution was still isolated, the Bolsheviks were still weak militarily, and Germany still appeared indisputably preponderant.

While the situation made even Lenin despair on occasion, the Bolshevik regime was as much fortunate from circumstance as from its wily leadership. The rapidly changing events of 1918, although often unforeseen in the general chaos, played into the Bolsheviks', especially Lenin's, skill in extracting the maximum out of the minimum. The Bolsheviks' fortunes depended largely on their enemies' failure to decide on and execute policies that would hamstring Moscow permanently. A case in point was the dissension between German civil and military authorities over the colonization of Ukraine. By the summer of 1918, Ludendorff's military policy had proved unproductive. Consequently, on the basis of good scouting by Soviet diplomats in Berlin, the Bolsheviks eventually

mitigated the harsh Brest-Litovsk accords by securing the joint exploitation of Ukraine's resources.

Still faced with "the incredibly bitter, deplorable reality" that the "empty phrases" of the romantics could not hide, Lenin told his comrades the new foreign policy would be characterized by "maneuver, retreat and waiting." Since the revolution had not spread yet to Europe, it was important to ensure that the Revolution took root firmly in Russia. Thus, from the "breathing space" granted by Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks could consolidate the central territorial position, purge the counter-revolution and begin building the Red Army. The task for Lenin, then, was "to maintain the revolution, to preserve for it a certain bastion of socialism... until the revolution matures in other countries" (p. 188). The policy of revolution and survival continued successfully during the subsequent years of Soviet power, as the Bolsheviks dealt with the indecisive Entente intervention and with the fragmented counter-revolutionary opposition.

The volume under review, although lengthy and intricate like any diplomatic history, remains a satisfactory achievement. It is worth consulting for facts and interpretation. Nevertheless, it remains unprovocative, and it does not indicate any new directions. Hopefully the author will choose his next topic where his research and writing skills might break new ground.

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IEVHEN SVERSTIUK, *VYBRANE*. N.p.: Suchasnist, 1979. 274 pp.

The leading dissident literary critic in Soviet Ukraine today, Ievhen Sverstiuk owes his reputation primarily to two long essays, one on the novel *Sobor* (The Cathedral) by his contemporary, Oles Honchar, the other on the founder of modern Ukrainian literature, Ivan Kotliarevsky. Both are included in this selection, along with shorter pieces on, among others, Shevchenko and Symonenko, Sverstiuk's final plea before the Soviet court that sentenced him in 1973 to seven years imprisonment and five years banishment, and a memoir on Sverstiuk by Raisa Rosnianska. The volume is a welcome addition to Ukrainian *samvydav* in print. There is, however, another dimension to Sverstiuk's writing that even such a perceptive critic and compiler as Ivan Koshelivets seems to have overlooked. In neglecting to mention in his otherwise excellent introduction the fact that Sverstiuk's seminal essays have appeared in English translation (*Clandestine Essays*, 1978), he seems to imply that Sverstiuk is of interest only to a Ukrainian reader. What could there be in these essays that reveals something new to the non-Soviet world?

First and foremost there is Sverstiuk's revulsion from Soviet pseudo-aesthetics. To be sure, these matters are no longer seriously considered in the West, but few critics take the trouble to expose the pernicious, still lingering influence of Socialist Realism on literature. Sverstiuk does so brilliantly not only in discussing Honchar's novel, but above all in analyzing the perverted use of *narodnost* as applied to Soviet literature and to the search for "positive heroes." "In our country," he writes, "the study of positive experiences is always emphasized, but for some reason no one devotes himself to the study of the negative" (p. 66). It is to the need for a new aesthetic that Sverstiuk devotes many of his pages. In his groupings he oscillates between unabashed recognition of beauty as an artistic principle and the remnants of his socialist upbringing, which suggest that literature must elevate man. To this Sverstiuk adds a forgotten maxim of the 1920s in Ukraine — that art must shock and stimulate. One does not, at first, recognize in these criteria a new aesthetic. Yet Sverstiuk's argument does lead in a very definite direction — away from saccharine Soviet "realism." Moreover, his argument points to a new goal, which to him is the rediscovery of what in the West has long been buried and forgotten. Sverstiuk seeks no formalist, structuralist or other new models. In fact, his approach is rather old-fashioned, for it stresses the importance of the text, of the oral tradition, of language and of meaning. It is no surprise, therefore, that Sverstiuk has turned away from a thin and arid internationalism to his native soil where, as he puts it, "the deeper into the earth, the higher into the sky" (p. 76). It is in these areas, oddly enough, that some Western critics have suggested recently that future aesthetic approaches may lie. Not long ago, in a discussion in the *New York Review of Books*, it was suggested that the only way to save the study of literature is to read it aloud. A similar plea has been made by Helen Gardner at Harvard and by Kildare Dobbs on the CBC's "Anthology." It may be too soon to hope that these sane voices will drown out the cacophony of fashionable critical approaches. Yet, none of us knows what will happen in the post-Marxist, post-feminist and post-structuralist world. Sverstiuk may have the possible advantage of not being familiar with either the latest Western literature or with Western literary criticism. If he has missed something important, he nevertheless instinctively looked where some critics in the West are beginning to look — away from jargon and obfuscation, and towards clarity and simplicity. His own crisp style is the best testimony to the fact that he understood that "we live in a swamp that breeds devils" (p. 91), and that out of this awareness our great need for a redefinition of taste and for sobering discourse is being born.

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## “НЕ ЛІЗЬТЕ, ДРУЗІ В ВОДУ, НЕ СПИТАВШИ БРОДУ!”\*

М. Л. ПОДВЕЗЬКО І М. БАЛЛА, АНГЛО-УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ СЛОВНИК. Київ: Радянська школа, 1974. 663 стор.

Згідно з передмовою, цей словник не є звичайним поширенням видання **Англо-українського словника** з 1948 року, автором якого був лише сам Подвезько, але новою працею, що включає наукову та технічну термінологію і звертає спеціальну увагу на англійську мову американців, яка є відмінною від мови англійців, що на ній рецензований словник базується. Нове видання Подвезька і Балли містить у собі також фонетично-ортографічні таблиці англійської мови, списки власних імен і географічних назв, як також список частіше вживаних англійських і американських скорочень. Букви від **A** до **K** та від **V** до **Z** були опрацьовані Подвезьком, а від **L** до **I** — Баллою. У порівнянні зі словником Подвезька з 1948 року, в якому українські слова поміщені без наголосів, видання 1974 року під тим оглядом є багато краще, бо в ньому виправлено цей непробачний промах.

Хоч словник охоплює багатющий матеріал (приблизно 65,000 слів), ним можуть користуватися з певністю лише ті, що дуже добре володіють обидвома мовами — а у випадку англійської її американським та британським варіантами. А це тому, що словник є дослівно засмічений застарілими, архаїчними та рідко вживаними і не вживаними англійськими словами та зворотами без найменшого позначення щодо їхнього неужитку або рідкого вжитку в сучасній мові. Проте, їхніми відповідниками у словнику є **сучасні** українські слова та вирази! Тому знаходимо в ньому, наприклад, такі архаїчні звороти, як: “it **imports** us to know” (стор. 260); “to make one’s **moan**” (стор. 328 у значенні “жалітися”); “this **speaks** him generous” (стор. 496 — себто, “це **говорить про** його щедрість”); та середньо-англійський зворот “to sleep o’**nights**” (стор. 348), що перекладається сучасним “спати **ночами**”. Крім того, у словнику є також такі архаїчні приєменникові звороти, як: “the table **next** the window” (стор. 341); “in the room of” (стор. 444) в значенні “замість” (по-сучасному “instead of”); та “he met us **without** (замість **outside**) the gate” (стор. 618). Виринає питання: Які були джерела англійської мови, що ними користувалися укладачі словника, коли, крім вищезгаданих прикладів, відповідником виразу “strange woman” на стор. 515 є “блудниця”, а англійське слово “whore” на стор. 614 супроводиться умовним скороченням **заст.** — себто, **застаріле**?! Ці приклади, однак, представляють собою лише кінчик колосального льодовика. Справа з американізмами, яким, мовляв, присвячено дуже багато уваги (бодай таке чи-

\* Вільний авторський переклад з доповненнями статті-рецензії, що появилася в зимовому числі (1978) журналу *Slavic and East European Journal* за дозволом редактора згаданого журналу.

таємо в передмові), не стоїть багато краще. Якщо вірити укладачам, американці далі “часто відвідують — **habituate**” (стор. 238) “доми розпусти — **sporting houses**” (стор. 501), голосують за “**votees**” (стор. 601) у виборах, гостять своїх гостей у “**keeping rooms**” (стор. 285), гордо носять назву “**fox**” (стор. 216) на першому році своїх університетських студій, та ображають один одного терміном “**foozle**” (стор. 213)! (З сучасних українських відповідників на вищезгадані слова відразу видно, що укладачі мали тут на увазі слова **frequent, brothel, candidate, living room, freshman** та **idiot!**) До цих прикладів можна додати ще такі “поточні” американські лексичні одиниці та значення як “**hello girl**” (стор. 245) замість “**telephone operator**”; “**knife**” (стор. 278) в значенні “провалити когось на іспиті”; “**log hut**” (стор. 308) в значенні “в’язниця”; та “**repeat**” (стор. 433), що для укладачів має чомусь значення “студент-другорічник” — себто, “**a sophomore in college.**”

Крім цих огрехів, словник грішить також і різними пропусками і зовсім неправильними та неточними українськими відповідниками. Наприклад, із двох значень англійського виразу “**to make love to smb.**” (стоя. 311) — (1) **pay amorous attentions to**; (2) **have or seek sexual intercourse with** (**The Concise Oxford Dictionary**, 1976, стор. 646) — більш відоме друге значення у словнику зовсім пропущено. (Український переклад звороту “**to make love to smb.**” — **залицятися до когось** — відповідає лише першому маловідомому значенню.) До того, зовсім переочено в словнику деякі найбільш уживані значення сучасних британських та американських слів. Ось, наприклад, не знайдемо в ньому ані українського відповідника до жаргонського значення слова “**jerk**” (стор. 280) — себто **йолоп**, ані українських відповідників до слова “**mutt**” (стор. 366, в значенні “непородна дворова собака”) — себто **дворняга**, та до слова “**outgoing**” в значенні **товариський** (в останньому випадку навіть і саме слово **outgoing** не вміщено в словнику). Але ще більш дивує те, що немає в ньому відповідника до математичного терміну “**pi**”, себто слова **пі**, а натомість знаходимо як одинокий відповідник слово **побожний!** В цьому маловідомому значенні вживається “**pi**” лише в жаргоні шотландських школярів! Щодо зовсім неправильних українських відповідників, то їх у словнику відносно небагато, але, на жаль, їх знову знаходимо у перекладах найбільш уживаних англійських термінів. Наприклад, американізм “**wise guy**” (стор. 236), себто “**smart aleck,**” перекладається у словнику буквально так, що замість правильного відповідника **мудрагель**, знаходимо **розумний хлопець!** Неправильно також перекладено “**grammar school**” (стор. 232) в американському значенні цього терміну, що стає для споживачів словника чомусь “**частиною середньої школи, що включає 5-8 класи!**” До цих разючих помилок треба додати наступні теж непростимі огрехи: 1. “**spelling**” (стор. 497) — (а) “той, хто заміняє когось” та (б) “відпочинок від роботи”; 2. “**undergraduate**” (стор. 579) — “студент останнього курсу”; 3. “**German**” (стор. 266) — “германський” та “германець”; та 4. “**to rob the cradle**” (стор. 433) — “розбещувати дитину”.

На кінець, слід згадати типово слов'янське пропущення означеного та неозначеного артиклів, наприклад, у висловах "to glut market" (стор. 229), "out of job" (стор. 281), "in course of time" (стор. 550) — а також їх появу у висловах, у яких вони в англійській мові зовсім не живаються, наприклад, "line of the battle" (стор. 304), "a man of a nerve" (стор. 340), "on the trial" (стор. 353), "to get out of the bed on the wrong side" — та сподіване число друкарських "чортиків" на книжку такого великого формату: "frok-coat" (стор. 218); "goddess" (стор. 230); "grandfather's clock" (стор. 232); "hard-mouthing" (стор. 241); "hanceforth" (стор. 242); "a thorou [sic!]" (стор. 270); "mot just" (стор. 332) замість "mot juste"; "nine tenths" (стор. 343) замість "nine tenths" у значенні "майже все"; "noctambulizm" (стор. 343); "non-existence" (стор. 344); "parenially" (стор. 378); "prizon" (стор. 411); "exponce" (стор. 495) — та українські: "з грішми" (стор. 261) замість "грішми", що відповідає англійському терміну "in cash", і "зтертим" (стор. 344) замість "стертим".

Однак, найбільше драгує сам факт, що всі ці помилки можна було легко уникнути. Шкода, що в такому, здавалося б, аполітичному ділі, як складання словників, Подвезько і Балла не могли консультуватися зі своїми американськими та британськими колегами, щоб зложити справді достовірний англо-український словник.

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IVAN REBOSHAPKA, *NARODZHENNIA SYMVOLU: ASPEKTY VZAIEMODII OBRIADU TA OBRIADOVOI POEZII*. Bucharest: Kriterion, 1975. 250 pp.

BOHDAN GEORG MYKYTIUK, *DIE UKRAINISCHEN ANDREASBRÄUCHE UND VERWANDTES BRAUCHTUM*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979. 340 pp.

Much of Ukrainian folklore shows an almost overwhelming concern for human fertility and productivity. Not surprisingly, this tendency is best reflected in the rich wedding-ritual corpus, which has become so pervasive a complex that whole clusters of motifs, devices and thematic materials have spilled over, as it were, and influenced the poetics of other genres such as the *koliady* or winter folksong cycle. The links between wedding and winter carol have been noted on many occasions; Reboshapka's work, however, is the first to show that most (if not all) of this interaction is actually one-way in direction. The book is largely theoretical in nature and in its original form served as the author's doctoral dissertation in 1971 for the University of Bucharest's Faculty of Romanian Language and Literature. His particular focus falls on that segment of the tradi-

tional *koliada* corpus that is addressed to unmarried village youth of both varieties. Fifty-one *koliada* motifs are cited and discussed as derived from archaic wedding rituals. Reboshapka designates the traditional wedding-ritual complex as a "grand symbol" (*velykyi symbol*, p. 31) and develops his hypothesis with the support of suitable doses of comparative ethnographic detail from around the world. In the process he shows himself as favoring the camp of ritualists who like to show that all folkloric phenomena are rooted in ritual act and drama. In spite of this bias, the conceptualization of a ritual context (*zvychaievyi kontekst*, p. 225) marks a noteworthy contribution to Ukrainian folkloristics as a factor that promotes the interchange and/or transfer of elements from one ritual to another.

Reboshapka's diachronic bent and marked attention to origins contrasts with the more recent work by Bohdan Mykytiuk on traditional St. Andrew's Day customs. The purpose here is to describe, analyze and interpret the customs and traditions that relate to the St. Andrew's complex and, thereby, to achieve a better understanding of its place in the Ukrainian folk calendar. Like Reboshapka, Mykytiuk sifts through his material, which he separates into sixteen customs, aspects and elements; these are then related to other calendric and non-calendric customs — especially the traditional wedding-ritual complex. Each of the sixteen categories is discussed according to three major considerations: geographical distribution (eastern and/or western Ukraine), dramatis personae (especially their sex and marital status), and the physical locale or setting for the given custom (spinning room, bedroom, and so forth). For Mykytiuk, the St. Andrew's Day complex has two main functions (p. 130): to provide a time marker in the Ukrainian folk calendar, where it serves to announce, so to speak, the onset of the winter cycle in human affairs; and to anticipate, with the aid of its well-developed corpus of courting motifs, the coming season of betrothals and winter weddings. As far as international folkloristics are concerned, these are not terribly exciting insights. For Ukrainian folklore studies, however, Mykytiuk's book is especially important on two counts. First, as a work devoted to an aspect of Ukrainian folk religion, it helps shed more light on an area that Soviet Ukrainian folklorists are loathe to handle in spite of its significance. Secondly, Mykytiuk has included excerpts (in German translation) from his taped interviews on this subject with forty-seven informants. These comments, in the form of primary field materials, constitute almost half of the book and were recorded in Ukrainian colonies found in Yugoslavia (1965-7), eastern Slovakia (1968 and 1971), and among individual Ukrainian informants in West Germany.

Both works are refreshing additions to the growing number of publications in the field of Ukrainian folklore that have appeared outside Soviet Ukraine in recent years. The bibliographies in both items are of



special interest. Reboshapka's listing and introductory survey of relevant literature relies on the work of Engels for anthropological support, but also draws liberally on the writings of such notables as O. Potebnia, O. Pchilka, I. Svientsitsky, F. Volkov, P. Caraman and others whom the Soviets mention from time to time but rarely discuss in any meaningful detail. Mykytiuk's bibliographical resources are, as expected, richer and more comprehensive. These include the writings of such figures as D. Shcherbakivsky, M. and K. Hrushevsky, S. Kylymnyk and Ia. Pasternak, and P. Bogatyrev — all missing in Reboshapka's book.

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PETER KRAWCHUK, *THE UKRAINIAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN CANADA (1907-1918)*. Toronto: Progress Books, 1979. 101 pp.

Peter Krawchuk, a prolific chronicler of the Ukrainian-Canadian left, states his purpose succinctly from the outset: "I hope, in this outline, to some degree to illuminate as objectively as possible, the emergence and development of the Ukrainian socialist movement in Canada...". Although a welcome endeavour in Ukrainian-Canadian historiography, this volume unfortunately neither illuminates nor is it overly objective. Bluntly, the essay lacks both analysis and a viable context.

The author plunges into truncated, select narrative that, by and large, ignores both the old-world and new-world foundations of the socialist movement. There can be no doubt that Ukrainian-Canadian socialism was inextricably intertwined with its east-European roots. Ukrainians brought into Canada a bewildering array of socialist and radical ideas nurtured in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. The erratic development of Ukrainian-Canadian socialism cannot be fully explained without reference to these imported ideologies and the conditions that spawned them. Yet, except for a couple of oblique statements, the old-world origins of the Ukrainian socialist movement in Canada are dismissed.

Instead, the "progress" of the socialist movement is delineated in terms of its efforts to imbue Ukrainian Canadians with "radical consciousness" while, at the same time, striving for "scientific socialism." (The concept is never defined.) The book puts forth the argument that early Ukrainian-Canadian socialism was not "historically-correct." Only after it fell under the orbit of the Bolsheviks and ultimately the Communist Party of Canada was it on the true historical path (presumably to "scientific socialism"). Meanwhile, "till its principles became more clearly defined," the movement contained "those who placed their own egoistic interests above the political and socialist interests of the com-

munity . . .". Divisions and strife rampant in the movement are explained in this context. It is a curious interpretation, leaving the reader somewhat bemused but mostly confused.

It would be tedious to recite the omissions and distorted or unexplained statements in this hagiology that mitigate against an objective perspective on the Ukrainian-Canadian socialist movement. Suffice it to note that the long string of slogans, convention resolutions, names and events leaves a myriad of questions unanswered. Why, at a time when the Ukrainian-Canadian proletariat found itself at the bottom of the industrial system, grossly exploited and alienated from the mainstream of Canadian society, living in crowded unsanitary urban ghettos and in isolated railway camps and mining towns, did only a tiny minority support the socialists? Why did Ukrainian socialism graft itself to that of doctrinaire Anglo-Canadian socialism via the Socialist Party of Canada, for example? Why did this union fail? Why was there the constant internal bickering and dissension within the movement? Krawchuk, for instance, states that "in its beginnings this movement was rife with . . . conflicts which weren't always based on ideological differences, but were quite often of an exclusively personal character, reflecting the ambitions of individual leaders who quarrelled over trifles." Yet, these "trifles," which tore the movement asunder, are not dealt with. What of the Krat-Ferley controversy, the Kremar-Stechyshyn struggle, and the Krat-Stechyshyn dispute? All contributed to the uneven and fragmented development of early Ukrainian-Canadian socialism. In the latter case, Krawchuk simply states that it was due to Krat's "intrigues." No further explanation is offered. This hardly suffices, considering that as a result, Stechyshyn, a founding member, left the movement and ultimately employed his journalistic talents to editing the "nationalist" *Ukrainskyi Holos*. Indeed, the list of questions could go on, at least one for every page.

Part of Krawchuk's shortcomings in this volume is his exclusive use of Ukrainian-Canadian socialist newspapers — *Chervonyi Prapor*, *Robotnychi Narod*, *Robotnyche Slovo* and *Nova Hromada*. The reliance on this source material creates imbalance and distortion in the narrative. Events and disputes are one-sided, polemical and often, without additional information, incomprehensible.

If the book has a redeeming feature, it is the little photo inserts throughout of leading socialists. They provide visual relief from the hackneyed, partisan prose.

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*THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SYMPOSIUM.* Edited by Paul R. Magocsi. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1979. x, 197 pp.

In December 1976, in conjunction with American Bicentennial celebrations in Boston, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute sponsored a four-day symposium entitled "The Ukrainian Experience in the United States." The present volume, published in the HURI Sources and Documents Series, contains nine papers read at the symposium, frequently with accompanying introductory remarks, commentary and edited discussion. Other than being "devoted to the historical past and cultural achievement of Ukrainian Americans" (p. v), the papers have no common theme or unity, covering unrelated historical, sociological, linguistic, literary and archival topics. This multidisciplinary, multitopical approach, the broad-sweeping nature of many articles, and the narrow focus of others, leaves the reader with the impression of having skimmed the surface of Ukrainian-American life over one hundred years without probing any one issue or facet in any depth. In general the volume is an exploratory and pioneer attempt at understanding the Ukrainian experience in the United States more fully. Perhaps its greatest usefulness lies in its illumination of the current state of Ukrainian-American studies, identifying problematic issues, deficiencies in data, and themes requiring further research, as well as those areas that already have received considerable attention.

The introductory article is a case in point, for Paul Magocsi, in opening the symposium, addressed himself to "Problems in the History of the Ukrainian Immigration to the United States." On the editorial board of the pending Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups and author of the Ukrainian-American entry, Magocsi used the opportunity to air major questions and difficulties he was encountering in preparing his section. He dwelt at length on three areas in the Ukrainian-American entry he felt to be the "most interpretive and thus the most open to criticism and revision" (p. 3) — religion, intergroup relations, and group maintenance and individual commitment. Magocsi's paper generated a lively discussion and number of suggestions both how to strengthen the encyclopedic article and how to promote research in Ukrainian-American studies.

The only symposium paper directly devoted to a discussion of archival and published documentation on the Ukrainian immigration in the United States was presented by Halyna Myroniuk, who rather laboriously outlined the establishment, operation, extent and content of the Ukrainian-American Collection at the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota. Myroniuk noted that "its [the Center's] major strength lies in the materials relating to the Ukrainian immigration to

the United States and Canada from the end of World War I to the present," and claimed that it was "the largest and richest of its kind," but she failed to place the collection in any larger context.

The least satisfactory chapter in the book was obscurely entitled "The Centenary of the Ukrainian Emigration to the United States," in which Myron Kuropas, Special White-House Advisor for Ethnic Affairs, undertook to describe the "ethnonational metamorphosis" of Rusyn immigrants into nationally conscious Ukrainian Americans. Ambitiously proceeding from Kievan Rus' to the post-World War II Ukrainian emigration to the United States and present situation, the paper lacked substance and became little more than an outline of Ukrainian-American organizational-ideological movements (their being manifestations of the "national will") since World War I. The chapter appeared quite amateurish beside "The Rise of Ukrainian Ethnic Consciousness in America during the 1890s," contributed by historian Bohdan Procko. Limiting himself to a short but critical period, Procko examined the small elite among the early immigrants to the United States that, unlike its compatriots, had a well developed Ukrainian consciousness. He focussed on the central role of the pioneer Greek Catholic clergy, particularly Father Hrushka and his newspaper *Svoboda*, in promoting Ukrainian ethnic awareness, concluding with Hrushka's defection to Orthodoxy and the transfer of the leadership of the movement to the so-called radical priests arriving by the end of the decade.

Sociologist Wsevolod Isajiw of the University of Toronto contributed a paper on "Organizational Differentiation and Persistence of the Ethnic Community: Ukrainians in the United States." It proposed to characterize Ukrainian-American organizations and to "relate their establishment and development to the structure and processes of the American society at large" (p. 79), assuming that organizational differentiation was as much due to exogenous as endogenous factors. Isajiw concluded that it "in and of itself neither contributes to the dissolution of ethnic boundaries nor necessarily retards the assimilation of individuals" (p. 94), and within the Ukrainian-American community has been both an adaptive response to North American conditions and a process of reorganization to find continued viability for the Ukrainian community in the United States. He argued that the largely instrumental church-related or mutual-benefit fraternal organizations dominant prior to World War II tended to be more adaptive to American society and change than have the predominantly expressive political or independent organizations introduced from Europe by the post-World War II immigrants, although their persistence in the United States has been partially a reaction to the unfavorable position with respect to the larger society in which the new immigrants found themselves. Isajiw also suggested that the latter do not seem to satisfy the interest and values of the second generation, which is turning to new

political organizations to influence American society at large and to further its ethnic goals.

Although several papers dealt with aspects of Ukrainian church life, Vasyl Markus (Loyola University, Rome) spoke directly to the theme. "A Century of Ukrainian Religious Experience in the United States" was essentially a sympathetic account of the fortunes of the American Uniate Church (both Ukrainian and Carpatho-Rusyn branches) from its beginnings through its struggle for ritual and jurisdictional independence, internal conflicts and "defections," to current agitation for a Ukrainian patriarchate and controversy between tradition and modernity. Discussion of other religious denominations was largely restricted to their relationship to and effect on Catholic fortunes: for example, the "several defections from traditional Ukrainian Catholicism to both Russian and Ukrainian Orthodoxy, movements which were accompanied by criticism that the former church was not sufficiently national, have produced the desired result" in that "the process of Latinization and deethnization was slowed down" (p. 124). Contending that the major preoccupation of Ukrainian religious aspirations in the United States has been "the issue of self identity and the assertion of cultural-religious values" (p. 126), Markus concluded that the survival of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian church would depend on the retention of its ethnic base and need for distinctiveness, although he mentioned the possible evolution of a future deethnized American Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite.

Two symposium papers examined linguistic and literary issues. Bohdan Strumins'kyj looked at components of current émigré Ukrainian and compared them with contemporary Soviet Ukrainian on the basis of having analysed three narrow sets of data: four articles in *Svoboda*, unidentified radio broadcasts by émigré Ukrainians, and the translations of a newspaper article by an émigré and a Soviet Ukrainian both studying at Harvard. The suggestion that his findings indicated the "current state of emigre Ukrainian" (p. 132) implied that his sample illustrated the "typical" and evoked a challenge from the commentator as to its representativeness. Peripheral statistical data on mother-tongue and language retention among Canadian Ukrainians and the conclusion that language loss appears to have stopped in Canada (p. 140) would have benefited from the consultation of census data beyond 1961; the 1971 Canadian census shows that Ukrainian as a mother tongue declined over the previous ten years. The second paper, delivered by George Grabowicz, examined Ukrainian-language poetry in the United States since World War II. It fell into three categories — works by émigrés writing in Ukraine before the war whose subsequent American output showed no evolution, works by those who began their careers in the "literary renaissance" of the displaced person camps but whose American poetry differed little from that of the first group, and the non-émigré poetry of the New York Group of Poets

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prominent particularly during the late 1950s and 1960s. Grabowicz focussed on the "new directions" introduced by the latter, discussing and illustrating the various unique characteristics of this poetry, but, not having the necessary perspective, without offering his final assessment of it.

The banquet address by Michael Novak, Watson-Ledden Distinguished Professor of Religion at Syracuse University, concluded the volume. In general, anecdotal and often personally reminiscent terms, Novak outlined his views on "The New Ethnicity: The Next Ten Years." A new ethnicity is emerging as a search for a moral vision (drawing on one's heritage) in rebellion against the "Coca-Colanization" of the modern world. To Novak it means it is time for American "ethnics" to repay America for its gifts by making "our own contribution to the life, the ideas, the tempers, the values, the morality and the vision of the United States" (p. 197).

In conclusion, one would not say that the collected papers from the Harvard symposium are "must" reading for an understanding of the Ukrainian experience in the United States. Individual papers offer interesting observations and significant insights into certain aspects of it and stand out as solid scholarship, but others are less informative and enduring. One must, however, credit the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute for its initiative in providing this forum for the examination of different facets of Ukrainian-American life and hopefully stimulating further academic interest and research of it.

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## LETTERS

ДО РЕДАКЦІЇ “ЖУРНАЛУ”:

З великим запізненням дійшла до мене рецензія п. Романа Журби на мою книжку МИНУЛЕ ПЛИВЕ В ПРИЙДЕШНЄ, друковану у час. “Журнал” (осінь 1979, стор. 98-101), і мені здається, що я повинна відповісти на деякі закиди та зауваги рецензента. Але найперше я все таки дякую “Журналові” і рецензентові, що Ви звернули увагу на цю книжку у зливі нових українських видань. Приємно знати, що наші молоді дослідники історії мають деякий інтерес до такого роду видань, як “Минуле...” і навіть бажають їх поліпшити. Отже, я рада, що є така категорія читачів і що є кому критично поставитися до змісту моєї книжки.

Не виділяю я, які закиди в рецензії п. Романа Журби важливіші, а які несуттєві, тож іду вслід за текстом рецензії. І от найперше, що читаю — це закид, чому я не проконсультувалася із спеціалістами-археологами саме в цій ділянці доісторії перед опублікуванням книжки. Раді! Слушно! Може скажете, з ким? Хто в нас є такий фахівець? Може Ви, п. Журба, знаєте? — Я не знаю. Тому, що не було з ким лицем до лица порадитися, я консультувалася з провідними дослідниками Трипілля — неоліту — енеоліту (Т. С. Пассек, С. М. Бібіков, В. Г. Збенович, К. К. Черниш, Т. Г. Мовша, В. М. Даниленко і багато інших), себто з авторами публікацій найостанніших років, та старалася не відходити від їх відкрить-тверджень.

Отож (відповідаю й на дальший закид) відомо мені й про суперечку радянських авторів, — яке було трипільське суспільство — патріархальне чи матріархальне. Та суперечка ще не закінчена, обидва табори орудують ваговитими аргументами. Чи маю я право вибирати? Моя книжка — белетристика, а не наукова розвідка і такі деталі, як рецензент вимагає для книжки цього жанру, — непотрібні. Їх треба якомога уникати, бо відіпхне того читача, для якого це написано, з першої сторінки.

Далі, рецензент згадує, що Хвойка висунув апіорну гіпотезу про автотонність населувачів Придніпрянщини — від Трипілля і до наших днів — і що та гіпотеза сьогодні не має сили, а я, мовляв, сліпо “на ній їду”. Знову ж таки, поза Хвойкою є й інші авторитети, які так само виводять тяглість української екзистенції (не обов’язково біологічної) із часів четвертого-третього тисячоліття до нашої ери, себто трипільських. Я можу послатися на В. П. Петрова “Етногенез слов’ян”, 1972, який саме й починає з трипільців, розшукуючи за археологічними ознаками отой самий етногенез. Не менший для мене авторитет і Б. В. Горнунг (“Из предистории общеславянского языкового единства”, стор. 35), який каже: “Мовні предки протослов’янства... на першому етапі мовного розвитку могли бути тільки серед носіїв трипільської культури, її середнього етапу...”

Чи в моїй книжці так і сказано десь, що українці — **прямі** нащадки трипільців? Такого в книжці не знайдете, але сказано, що між іншими пред-

ками є й трипільці і що їх духова спадщина глибоко закарбувалася у нашій психіці. Цьому присвячено другу частину моєї книжки. І це зовсім інше, ніж те, що приписує мені рецензент.

Далі, рецензент докоряє мені, що я помилково назвала Інститут Археології Української Академії Наук господарем розкопів у Коломийщині протягом п'яти років, з 1934 до 1938. А що цей Інститут заснований лише 1938 року. Маленька довідка з Української Радянської Енциклопедії (гасло: Археології Інститут). Там сказано, що попередня назва цього інституту, заснованого 1934-го року — Інститут Історії Матеріальної Культури (на зразок російської назви) і що він був перейменований на Інститут Археології 1938-го року (за рос. зразком). Отож він, цей Інститут Іст. Мат. Культури, і вислав усі ці роки експедицію до Коломийщини, починаючи з 1934-го року, запрошуючи з Москви й Ленінграду Т. С. Пасек та Є. Ю. Кричевського. Вся група працівників була з українського Інституту. Це я знаю не з енциклопедії, а тому, що я всі ці роки до 1938-го приходила до Інституту Археології (Бульвар Шевченка 14), шукаючи порад і консультації у науковців для своєї повісти “Велике Цабе”.

Зрештою: чи це суттєве? Чи пересічному читачеві так дуже потрібно це знати?

Рецензент закидає мені, що я не включила в мою розповідь довідки про передатування на тисячу років углиб хронології на підставі нового методу  $C^{14}$ . Але ж мені для мого задуму це зовсім непотрібно, це тільки затемнювало б і спантеличило б читача, який хоче мати загальну картину, а не такі деталі. Для мого читача досить, що він матиме уявлення про етапи — початок, розвиток, занепад цієї культури на Україні — і що він власними очима бачить ілюстративний матеріал. Трохи кривдню, що рецензент, шукає недоліків, а не помітив, що я розшукала в емігранційних умовах, без фахових бібліотек, розкидані по багатьох виданнях ілюстрації, затративши на це розшукування багато років. Цього нема кому й оцінити.

Зовсім непотрібно знати читачеві й про “дифузійністів” та їх супротивників. А якщо ж уже говорити про самостійний розвиток металургії в Європі, що це справа пізніших часів для нашого терену. На трипільських теренах не було ж навіть легких до розроблення родовищ. Всі дослідники Трипілля стверджують, що хемічна аналіза мідних виробів, знайдених на трипільських поселеннях, показує, що вони походять здебільшого з Трансильванії, Балкан, рідше з Кавказу.

Що ж до конярства, то в цьому великі успіхи мали одночасні з трипільцями носії стародавньої культури, скотарської, і то в могилах цих сучасників і сусідів знайдено залишки воза, найдавніші на Україні, а не в трипільців. Про це сказано у багатьох працях і не один раз.

Нема вже ні в кого з дослідників заперечення, що хліборобство ширилося з Малої Азії через Балкани. А що вище на півночі від Трипілля мешкали вже неолітні племена, які не знали хліборобства, то як назвати цей



терен — не периферією хліборобського пояса? А чи я цим сказала, що Трипілля було периферією цивілізації? Навпаки, я весь час підкреслюю багатство цієї культури і зрештою — я ж їй присвячую всю книжку!

Про мегаліти західної Європи я нічого не згадую, бо це для мого задуму непотрібне.

Цілком безпідставно закидає мені рецензент, що я не розумію обмежень археологічного методу і що я, нібито, лише даними цього методу орудую. У другій частині моєї повісти я спираюся на українську мітологію, на релігійні обряди, народні звичаї, приказки, імена божеств, корінні слова нашої мови, — все це, на мою думку, підтверджує археологічні відкриття і доводить існування духової спадщини в нашому часі від Трипілля. Це все не “аналогії XIX-го століття”, як глузливо зауважує рецензент, а воно лише зібрано й записано у XIX-му столітті. Заходить же воно в глибину багатьох поколінь: звичаї — то ж релігійні обряди сивої давнини, а слова — символи.

Що ж до моєї з XIX-го століття відсталости, “слідом за Люї Морганом, Марксом і Енгельсом”, мовляв, “хлібороби — матріярхат, скотарі — патріярхат і ніяких більше розмов”, то якраз здобутки археології про це яскраво й розповідають. Які можуть бути ідеологічні уявлення хліборобів, поселення яких засипані жіночими статуетками? А ідеологічні уявлення скотарів? Високі могили з володарем-патріярхом у центрі. Існують багатоступінні форми в процесі переходу від одної ідеології до другої. Над цим дискутують дослідники, але чи треба в моїй повісті це розвалковувати? Воно — добра тема для іншої повісти.

А вже при чому тут згадка про “Київську Русь” у рецензії і про походження цієї держави, то я ніяк не розумію. Я не ставила собі за завдання вийти далі за четверте-третє тисячоліття до н.е. Я тільки раз побіжно вжила вислів “княжі часи”, але ж до Київської Русі були й інші, давніші князівства, наприклад, князь Мал деревлян чи князь Бож у V-му ст. н.е. . . . “Норманська, неонорманська, антинорманська теорії . . .” Це все не має ніякого відношення до моєї теми і я дивуюся: до чого це приплетено?

А вже верхом непорозуміння між автором книжки і автором рецензії оцей вигук: “Це цілковите безглаздя — шукати нашої генеалогії на чомусь такому непевному й далекому, як четверте тисячоліття до нашої ери!”

На це авторці “Минулого . . .” доведеться тяжко зідхнути і вибачитися, що написала таке “безглуздя”. Тільки чого ж це так, що всі народи шукають свого далекого кореня, а нам цього не треба? Попробую сказати інакше, щоб мене зрозуміли: мене не цікавлять династії, державні формації, війни і політичні констеляції, а цікавить той люд, що жив споконвіку на цій землі, що незалежно від займанців і окупацій творив свої вірування, свої міти-філософію, обряди і зберіг їх протягом тисячоліть (160 поколінь, нехай!), свою неповторну своєрідність, незалежно від того, як він тепер зветься.

Наприкінці рецензент песимістично констатує: “Книжка розійшлася із своєю метою — інформувати читача про ранню українську доісторію”.

Я свідомо слабости своєї книжки, бо вона ж, власне, піонерська. І я рада, що звернула увагу молодого історика, та надіюся, що може хоч ця моя недосконалість навіє молодим силам досконаліші твори про наше минуле. Ми не вигулькнули нізвідки в ХІХ-му столітті н.е. Якось минувшина та має бути.

Нарешті, кілька слів в обороні жанру. Бажано, щоб наші рецензенти і критики бачили різницю між працею, виконаною науковою методою — і белетристичним твором, де автор користується здобутками науки для свого індивідуального бачення світу, не обов'язково такого, як каже наука на даному етапі. Белетристичний твір має свої, відмінні від наукового, методи і цілі, побудовані на інших підвалинах. (Напр., зацікавлення, звертання до естетично-емоційної сфери читача, а не до аналітично-логічної, легкість викладу тощо).

От цей жанр я й розробляю у своїх творах, також і в “Минулому...”. А щоб невіри не закидали, що я висмоктала з пальця фактичні дані, то я змушена подавати в кінці книжки джерела.

Справді, чому можна брати теми до белетристичного опрацювання з усіх галузей (психології, математики, фізики, історії тощо), а з археології зась-табу?

Я не претендую на звання науковця за “Минуле...”. Але обстоюю своє право бачити світ у згоді з одвічною українською ідеєю, в Шевченка висловленою звертанням “До мертвих, живих і ненароджених земляків моїх”, а в народній мові втілений у слові **нав'є**, що — те саме.

То я запитую: чи маю я таке право — по-своєму бачити світ, не озирючись на нахмурені брови офіційної науки? І відповідаю: без такого права не буде й творчого вияву.

З пошаною

Докія Гуменна, Нью-Йорк

### Roman Zurba replies:

In as much as the writer states that she did not write a scientific book but belles-lettres, the reviewer, not a literary specialist, was erroneously mislead into thinking that the use of bibliographic citations constituted a scholarly attempt at popularizing (the avowed intent of the writer) material on Trypillia. Mea culpa. I am afraid that even the Library of Congress fell into the same quandary, since they catalogued the book into the GN section (Anthropology) instead of where Slavic belles-lettres are placed (PG). You just cannot trust a book by its cover, nor its contents.

Dear Editor:

There is no music more welcome to the ear of serious writers and, for that matter, translators than critical comments, especially those meant to enrich and improve their work, comments based on facts. Such observations help them see their weak points and draw the necessary conclusions.

It saddens me that this maxim seems to be beyond the comprehension of my critic, Nadia Odette Diakun, who took upon herself the very responsible task of evaluating my English prose version of Ivan Franko's versified story "Lys Mykyta."

She has nothing but acid to offer as criticism. In fact, she does not evaluate, but pontificates and adjuges without showing with pertinent quotations why my version does not fulfill any of the purposes that it is supposed to achieve, such as "entertaining children as a fable, adults as an Aesopian tale, and to satisfy those who wish to see more Ukrainian classics translated." In her view my version "is peppered with errors, weak translation, faulty diction, and translator's intrusion." In other words, my English is far too inadequate for such an undertaking.

To prove this, Diakun starts with accusing me of having used the Russian name *Tsarina* for Queen, not knowing that *Tsarina* is not Russian at all, but English for the Ukrainian *Tsarytsia*. She dwells extensively upon my phonetic rendering of Ukrainian names for animals and finds them not only superfluous, but mispronounced as well.

My purpose for doubling the names was twofold: First, I wished to let English-speaking readers know how it tastes to say "Vovk," "Lev" etc., and, secondly, my desire was to make the names of the characters sound a little more exotic. After all, they do not represent commoners, but a higher class of society — nobility and the royal retinue — who, as a rule, have a string of names trailing them. He who has heard the names of the ruler of Lichtenstein knows to what I am referring. So, in adding Ukrainian equivalents it was only logical to write "keet" to make it sound the way Ukrainians pronounce it. Would not "kit" (as the reviewer prefers) sound like a "whale" in Ukrainian? Whether or not this matter of names is an important issue depends, of course, on one's personal view.

The reviewer goes on to show how terribly weak my work is by quoting the last stanza of the story in Ukrainian and then my translation of it. It suddenly becomes clear why Diakun calls my translation weak and inaccurate: Instead of Ivan Franko, she quotes Maksym Rylsky who reworked Franko's "Lys Mykyta" and introduced into it changes that in many instances fundamentally differ from the original. For instance, Ivan Franko ends his story thus:

Тут кінчиться наша казка.  
Всім, хто слухати був ласка,  
Дайже Боже многих літ.

## Journal

Хай же весь наш сум пропаде,  
А тим, хто нам чинить зради,  
Хай зійдеться клином світ.

Rylsky's version is quite different:

Тут кінчиться наша казка.  
Бубликів солодких в'язка  
Тим, хто слухав, не шумів . . .  
Може, дехто пригадає,  
Що нераз таке буває  
І в людей, як у звірів.

As one can see, Franko does not mention any "solodki bubyky," "sweet cracknels," but, instead, makes reference to God. Any intelligent reader can judge for himself which version is closer to Franko's original.

As further sample of apparent inconsistency, Diakun quotes Rylsky's line: "Hey, Mykyto! De podivsia? Vylizai!" (Song 2, verse 3). I based my translation on Franko's: "Hey, Mykyto! De vin lanets? Vylizai, os ia pislants . . ." The word *lanets* in English means "ragamaffin, good-for-nothing, worthless wretch," which is virtually the same as my "you good-for-nothing bum!"

Finally, Diakun pillories me for my "invented additions" such as, "This stunning revelation caused Tsarina Lvytsia to lean over and whisper something into Lion Tsar Lev's ear." True enough, there are a few expansions like this — one at the beginning of Chapter I, and another in Chapter IV — which have been included in order to make the story more cohesive and smoothly flowing.

One has to realize that this is a prose version of a versified story. In poetry one is compelled to be more conservative with words because the necessity to create rhymes greatly limits one's freedom of expression. In Chapter IV Franko states that Fox plays and converses with his pups without saying what they are talking about. I expanded that particular episode thus:

"The cubs! They were so full of energy, so bright and curious. They never tired of asking questions about the woods, about who lived in them and what went on there. Proud and happy, Fox taught them what to do and what to avoid to survive in this beautiful cruel world. Just as he was showing them how to outsmart a pursuing hound by suddenly turning and racing in the opposite direction, a voice boomed from the woods . . ."

The question is: Does the above "intrusion" make the story sound awkward, is it offensive to the reader, is it a vicious distortion of what

Franko might have had in mind? The response of all other reviewers to date, in addition to comments from a multitude of delighted readers, all attesting to the book's worthwhile contribution to Canadian literature, have convinced me that the answer to this question is a categorical "NO!"

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Volume 4, Number 2, Fall 1979

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Tundra Books, 1978. 148 pp.

Bohdan Melnyk, Toronto

**Nadia Diakun replies:**

Mr. Melnyk is quite right in pointing out that I had been misled by the Rylsky *Lys Mykyta* and thus erred in the citations; this was quite unintentional, and I apologize for any inconvenience that it may have caused.

Nonetheless, I cannot agree with Mr. Melnyk's tenet's regarding translation technique. The issue of translation is much too complicated to be discussed here, and even if it were possible, the issue would draw varied opinions which would not concur.

With regard to a reviewer's reception of a book, I feel that every reviewer has the right to agree or disagree with the author. The final judgement should be left to the reader, and it is the reader's responsibility to glean from reviews and reading in arriving at that judgement.

Dear Editors,

29 September 1980

I thought it may interest your readers to learn about the fate of the Ukrainian philosopher and political prisoner Vasyl Lisovy since the appearance of his article, "A Critique of Technocratic Totalitarianism," in the *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* (Fall 1979).

In July 1979, Lisovy completed the first part of his ten-year sentence, having served seven years imprisonment in corrective labour colonies. He was sent to serve the remaining part of his sentence — three years in internal exile — in Novaia Brian, a small settlement in the Zaigraevsky district of the Buriat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

The many years of imprisonment are known to have taken their toll on Lisovy's health. In early November 1979, his condition worsened, and he was admitted to hospital with jaundice.

While serving his term of internal exile, Lisovy was reportedly constantly harassed by the local authorities. As a consequence of discrimination and obstruction by them, he had difficulty in obtaining a regular job.

## Journal

In mid-June 1980, Lisovy was rearrested and charged under Article 209 of the RSFSR Criminal Code with "parasitism." This is a very vague charge, which may, for example, be applied to people living "on unearned income with avoidance of socially useful work for more than four months in succession for periods adding up to one year."

On 15-16 July 1980, he was tried and sentenced to one year's imprisonment in a strict corrective labour colony. No further details are, as yet, available about his arrest and trial, although it is known that during the first part of 1980 many Soviet prisoners of conscience were rearrested on the basis of false charges. Lisovy is now serving a further one-year imprisonment in the company of ordinary criminals.

A week or so before his rearrest, Lisovy wrote to a friend outside the Soviet Union that his health had slightly improved and that he planned to write a study of legal, economic and moral problems within Soviet society from the perspective of social order and respect for individual freedoms.

Finally, I would like to draw attention to the courageous behaviour over the years in very difficult conditions of Lisovy's wife, Vira Lisova (See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Philosophers in Prison," *Index on Censorship*, November-December 1977, p. 60).

Petrusia Markovska  
*London School of Economics  
and Political Science*

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CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES**

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Edited by Dorren W. Gorsline and Oksana Solovey

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*Editio minor*

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Journal

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In a foreword to *Sovietization of Ukraine*, John A. Armstrong writes: "One of the great achievements of Jurij Borys' book is to have recognized the significance of the complex relationship between Bolshevism and nationalism in the critical Ukrainian arena. The heart of his treatment is comprehensive and original . . . Borys was years ahead of most political scientists and historians working on Soviet subjects in general, to say nothing of those analysing specific national problems."

*Sovietization of Ukraine* originally appeared in Stockholm in 1960 as *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine: A Study in the Communist Doctrine of the Self-Determination of Nations*. The second edition has been revised and illustrations have been added.

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Journal

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By Frances Swyripa

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Edited by Manoly R. Lupul

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All submissions must be typed on 8½ x 11 inch paper and double-spaced throughout. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript. Block quotations and four or more lines of verse from Ukrainian should appear in the original. Otherwise the modified Library of Congress system of cyrillic transliteration should be used.

In general, articles should not exceed 25 double-spaced pages, except where especially justified by extensive documentation, tables, or charts. For purposes of style and footnoting, the University of Chicago Press *Manual of Style* should be consulted. Authors should send a short academic biography with their submissions. Manuscripts will not be returned unless specifically requested and postage provided. The policy of the *Journal* is not to consider articles that have been published or are being considered for publication elsewhere. The editors reserve the right to edit all submissions.

### A TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION (Modified Library of Congress)

а — a	ї — i	ф — f
б — b	й — i	х — kh
в — v	к — k	ц — ts
г — h	л — l	ч — ch
ґ — g	м — m	ш — sh
д — d	н — n	щ — shch
е — e	о — o	ю — iu
є — ie	п — p	я — ia
ж — zh	р — r	ь — -
з — z	с — s	-ий — y in endings
и — y	т — t	of personal
і — i	у — u	names only

