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Bohdan Nahaylo

Ukrainian National Resistance in Soviet Ukraine During the 1920s*

One of the neglected areas in the study of twentieth century Ukrainian history is the national resistance to Soviet rule in the first half of the 1920s. Remarkable both for its scale and duration, it took the form of guerrilla warfare and anti-Soviet activity conducted by a host of armed detachments and underground organizations. This "*Povstanskyi rukh*," or "Insurgent Movement," continued the struggle for national independence long after the regular forces of the Ukrainian People's (National) Republic (UNR) had been pushed out of Soviet-ruled Ukraine. Like the vigorous Ukrainian cultural regeneration of the 1920s, it attested to the rapid growth of Ukrainian national consciousness and assertiveness in the period immediately following the apparent defeat of the Ukrainian national movement in the revolutionary upheavals of 1917-20.

Although Ukrainian national resistance to Soviet rule in the first half of the 1920s, that is in the period after the Civil War ended and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced, has been little studied in the West, there is in fact a considerable amount of scattered information on this subject. It can be found in Soviet and émigré publications of the 1920s, and in the memoirs and other materials left by participants in the Ukrainian national movement and their opponents, as well as by former Ukrainian political prisoners. The theme of Ukrainian anti-Soviet insurgency also crops up frequently in the stories and novels of Soviet Ukrainian writers of the 1920s, for example: in Hryhorii Kosynka's *Anketa*, Mykola Khvylovy's *Bandyty*, Borys Antonenko-Davydovych's *Smert*, and Iurii Ianovsky's *Chotyry shabli*.

* This is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at the conference "Ukraine in the 1920s to Early 1930s," which was held at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on 22-26 June 1987.

Since then, this material has been supplemented by several works produced by both Soviet and Western authors. Soon after Stalin's death, A. Lykholat provided some details of the scale and ferocity of the struggle in Ukraine at the beginning of the 1920s between the Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian national resistance in his otherwise neo-Stalinist treatment of the "destruction of the nationalist counter-revolution in Ukraine."¹ In the West, in 1969 George Kulchycky submitted a doctoral dissertation to Georgetown University entitled "The Ukrainian Insurgent Movement 1919 to 1926." While this unpublished study is rich in detail on the origins of the Ukrainian Insurgent Movement, it provides little information about developments in the years after 1921. After 1970, however, three more Soviet historians, despite their tendentious depiction of the phenomena in question as "counter-revolutionary" and "*kulak* (*kurkul* in Ukrainian) banditism," provided valuable additional information about this later period. They are: O.O. Kucher, in his *Rozhrom zbroinoi vnutrishnoi kontrrevoliutsii na Ukraini v 1921-1923 rr.*;² D.L. Golinkov, in the second of his two-volume *Krushenie antisovetskogo podpolia v SSSR*;³ and, O. Hanzha, in his article "Borotba z kurkulstvom na Ukraini v 1921-1923 rr.," which appeared in the May 1987 issue of *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*.⁴

Several other fairly recent sources also deserve to be mentioned. At the end of 1987, just as *glasnost* was beginning to make itself felt in Ukraine, *Vitchyzna* published a novel by Rostyslav Sambuk that dealt with the Ukrainian Insurgent Movement. Entitled *Ostannii zakolat*, it contained a remarkably candid, by Soviet standards, depiction of the beliefs and dedication of those involved in the opposition to Soviet rule in Ukraine in the early 1920s.⁵ During the 1980s, the memoirs of two participants in the resistance appeared and their accounts, told from different sides of the struggle, are of considerable interest. They are the recollections of former partisan leader Liutyi-Liutenko⁶ and of S. Karin, a Chekist agent who infiltrated the Ukrainian Insurgent Movement.⁷ Last, but not least, the studies of Lenin's secret police, the Cheka, by Lennard D. Gerson⁸ and George Leggett⁹ shed further light on the subject.

This article offers a brief and preliminary account of Ukrainian national resistance to Soviet rule in the first half of the 1920s. Because of the limitations of space, it is not possible to go

into any great detail and the complex contextual setting has to be greatly simplified. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the material presented here will give a better idea of the nature and strength of the Ukrainian Insurgent Movement and the Ukrainian nationalist underground at this time, as well as the methods used by the Soviet authorities to combat and destroy them.

First, a few words about the origins of the Ukrainian Insurgent Movement. Ironically, large-scale peasant resistance, frequently taking the form of guerrilla warfare, first arose in the summer of 1918, during the German-backed, but nonetheless Ukrainian, regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. At a time of continuing social revolution, when land-hungry soldiers from the defeated and demoralized Russian armies were still streaming back to their villages with stolen arms, his regressive agrarian policies and identification with German economic exploitation, fueled peasant discontent and precipitated armed revolts reminiscent of the *haidamaka* risings of the eighteenth century. It was at this time, as Arthur Adams aptly observes, that “ex-colonels, self-styled generals, Cossack *atamany* and *batky* blossomed like roses in this revolutionary summertime.”¹⁰

Skoropadsky's regime was finally overthrown in November 1918 by a general uprising carried out by a motley alliance of Ukrainian insurgent forces. The new Ukrainian government—the Directory—however, was forced to defend the restored UNR against Bolshevik troops, Denikin's White army, and the Poles in the west, while finding many of the numerous Ukrainian insurgent detachments, some of which, like Otaman Hryhoriiv's army, were very large indeed, to be fickle supporters. As often as not these units were susceptible to Bolshevik propaganda and acted as autonomous forces whose allegiance depended on the whims of their otaman. Furthermore, in southern Ukraine, the anarchist leader Nestor Makhno emerged as the leader of a formidable movement that was hostile to the UNR but prepared at times to cooperate with the Bolsheviks.

As it turned out, the Bolsheviks, during their second occupation of Ukraine, or *Piatakovshchina*, soon alienated much of the Ukrainian population with their harsh agricultural policies and hostility to Ukrainian national aspirations. Thus, during the spring and summer of 1919, the number of rural revolts rose and neutral or pro-Soviet insurgent groups turned against the Reds.¹¹

Widespread Ukrainian resistance to the occupation by the Whites, who supplanted the Bolsheviks, further stimulated the growth of Ukrainian nationalism. Significantly, Kucher notes that from the end of 1919 peasant resistance even in the south and south-east corner of Ukraine became markedly "chauvinist," that is, anti-Russian in character.¹²

For the hard-pressed and depleted regular forces of the UNR this development came too late in the day to make much difference. Between December 1919 and March 1920, in what was virtually an act of desperation, they undertook the famous "Winter Campaign" in the rear of the Bolshevik southern front before falling back towards the Soviet-Polish border. In other words, for a time the remnants of the UNR forces themselves acted as a large partisan army.

In view of the UNR government's bittersweet experience with the *otamanshchyna*, did it fully appreciate the potential of the now more nationalist insurgent detachments? Clearly, there was some recognition of the importance of insurgency, for as early as September 1919 a supra-party body to coordinate partisan activity against Denikin—the Central Ukrainian Insurgent Committee, or TsUPKOM—was founded in Kamianets-Podilskyi while the town was held by UNR forces led by Symon Petliura.¹³ However, in his account of the "Winter Raid" published in Kolomyia in 1923, Iurii Tiutiunnyk, a former officer in Otaman Hryhoriiv's forces, who went over to Petliura and became one of his main organizers of the partisan movement, maintains that the UNR army "did not do much as far as organizing the insurgent movement" was concerned. Although some contacts with insurgent detachments were established through messengers and agents, he writes, not enough was done to unify the insurgents under Petliura's command, and that quite a few unsuitable people were appointed to deal with them. In short, Tiutiunnyk argues that at this crucial time period, when taking into account the shortage of people trained to work with the insurgents, the UNR "political centre" failed to utilize fully this important force in its struggle against "Russia."¹⁴

When the Bolsheviks returned for a third time in December 1919, albeit with a nominally more conciliatory attitude towards Ukrainian national feelings, they encountered a rebellious peasantry and met with armed resistance from numerous insurgent detachments. The disarming of the peasantry and the liquidation

of nationalist insurgency, which the Bolsheviks branded as "political" or "kulak" banditism, became an urgent priority for them.¹⁵ Consequently, a revamped Cheka network was set up and attempts made to organize the poorer peasantry against the so-called *kurkuli*, or better-off peasants, and "counter-revolutionaries" by establishing the Committees of Non-Wealthy Peasants, or *komnezamy*.¹⁶

Here, it should be explained more clearly what the Soviet authorities understood by the terms "political banditism" and "kulak banditism." According to Kucher, political banditism encompassed all the various forms of anti-Soviet activity that had a "bandit-like" character. It included the armed resistance not only of wealthier peasants, but also of "bourgeois and landowning counter-revolutionaries," whether Petliurists or White Guards. Kulak banditism, on the other hand, had a narrower meaning. It was restricted to the "counter-revolutionary," that is, anti-Soviet, terroristic activity carried out by the more prosperous peasants, who may, or may not, have had clearly defined political goals.¹⁷

Tiutiunyk claims that because of the poor contacts between the UNR government and the insurgent detachments, many, though by no means all of the latter were confused and even demoralized when, as a result of Pilsudski's agreement with Petliura in April 1920, Ukrainian forces joined the Poles in a joint offensive against the Bolsheviks.¹⁸ Nevertheless, for the Soviet authorities the threat from the Ukrainian insurgents was serious enough. In early May 1920 the head of the Cheka, Feliks Dzerzhinsky, was sent to Kharkiv to take charge of maintaining security in the rear of the Red Army. Within a week he reported to Moscow that "the Polish offensive has turned the entire Ukraine into a boiling cauldron. Uprisings are breaking out all over...." The situation was so serious that Dzerzhinsky decided to remain in Kharkiv for two months longer than planned in order to supervise the strengthening of the Cheka organization in Ukraine and the struggle against the insurgent detachments.¹⁹

According to the Soviet Ukrainian Party historian, M. Popov, it was in the summer of 1920 that the Ukrainian "bandit counter-revolutionary movement" reached its apogee.²⁰ He, Golinkov, and Kucher provide several dozen examples of the Petliurist insurgent units operating at this time throughout Soviet Ukraine. The largest were the so-called Oleksandrivske Insurgent Division,

numbering 15,000 to 20,000 guerrillas, and the large detachments concentrated in the nearby forested area of Kholodnyi Iar in the Chyhyryn district, against which, in October 1920, part of Budenny's cavalry and other Red Army units were thrown; the detachment led by Otaman Holy in the Kaniv district; and the 3,000-strong unit led by Otaman Levchenko in the Zolotonosha district.²¹

Dzerzhinsky requested and received huge reinforcements from Russia of some 50,000 Cheka personnel and crack units of the Internal Security Troops (VOKhR), including cavalry and aircraft, and proceeded to make headway in combatting the Ukrainian resistance.²² A number of insurgent detachments were destroyed and several underground organizations uncovered. For example, the Cheka infiltrated and destroyed the Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine founded in Poltava in May 1920, which was connected with a 200-strong local insurgent unit led by Otaman Vovk. In July 1920 an underground group directing local guerrilla activity was broken up in Ielysavethrad, and the following month another was suppressed in Odessa.²³

All the same, even after the Polish-Soviet armistice was signed in October 1920 and the 25,000 or so remaining UNR troops were forced to cross the Zbruch into Polish-occupied territory, the nationalist resistance to Soviet rule did not abate. Although for the Soviet authorities the defeat of General Wrangel's White forces in the Crimea in November 1921 marked the end of the Civil War, in Ukraine, as was acknowledged that month at the Fifth Conference of the CP(b)U, the "internal front—the struggle against the armed *kurkuli*" remained.²⁴ In fact, as Hanzha puts it, "at the end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921 a wave of *kurkul* risings swept the Right Bank" and "entire districts and even provinces were gripped by banditism..."²⁵

Kucher provides more illuminating information about the scale of the problem that faced the Soviet authorities in Ukraine in 1921. Anti-Soviet insurgency was so widespread that a virtual state of war continued to exist throughout the year in almost every region of the republic. According to contemporary Soviet intelligence sources, in April 1921 at least 102 "bands" numbering from 20-30 up to 450-500 insurgents were known to be operating in Ukraine and the Crimea. By the end of the year 464 such units had been reported. At the peak of the insurgency, in May and

June, Soviet intelligence reported that there were at least 10,000 "political bandits" at large and a further 10-15,000 "bandits" who supported Makhno. During the first year after the Civil War had ended, the insurgents carried out 1,375 raids on various settlements and 259 on Soviet institutions. They killed close to 4,000 people and wounded another 745. Hardly surprisingly, the Soviet Ukrainian government declared in January 1921 that it regarded the struggle against "banditism" to be no less important than the war against the Whites had been.²⁶

Hanzha reveals that what was especially alarming for the Soviet authorities was that the ranks of the insurgent units were swelled by recruits from the poor and middle peasantry.²⁷ In other words, it was not simply the *kurkuli* who took up arms against the Bolsheviks, as most Soviet sources maintain. Attempting to explain how this situation had arisen, he admits that the Bolshevik policy of War Communism in the countryside had led to the growth of peasant discontent. Hanzha also blames the unrest in the villages on the weakening of the economic links between the countryside and the towns as a result of the Civil War, arguing that this had made it difficult for the proletariat to exert an influence over the peasant masses. These conditions, he continues, were exploited by anarchist and "bourgeois-nationalist" parties, whose social base were the *kurkuli*.²⁸ As for precisely who provided the leadership, Popov points out that, as in 1919, so in 1920, the main organizers and instigators of resistance in the countryside were identified as being "the village intelligentsia, especially teachers."²⁹

In January 1921, a special council headed by the military commander Mikhail Frunze was established by the Soviet Ukrainian government to coordinate the pacification of the countryside. Two thirds of the military units used to defeat Wrangel were now deployed against the Ukrainian insurgents and the remnants of Makhno's anarchist movement. Apart from the Red Army and the Cheka, during 1921 some 56,000 members of the *komnezamy*, organized into 750 detachments, were also used against the guerrillas.³⁰ Between January and March 1921, the Cheka conducted 87 operations primarily against the Ukrainian resistance, as a result of which 80 otamans and 4,936 insurgents were killed in battle; 17 otamans and 4225 insurgents arrested; and 28 underground organizations destroyed.³¹

The Soviet authorities also used other methods to weaken and demoralize the resistance. In March 1921 an amnesty was proclaimed for insurgents prepared to lay down their arms. Between January and June 1921, 48 otamans and 1100 partisans gave themselves up; by the end of the year the total of those who had surrendered had risen to 10,000.³² As early as the summer of 1920 the Soviet Ukrainian authorities had attempted to discredit Petliura and the UNR government by holding a show trial in Kharkiv of the Directory's former head of counter-intelligence, Iuliian Chaikivsky, who apparently defected in June 1920 to the Bolsheviks. Incidentally, it is worth noting that former member of the Directory, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, also gave evidence at this trial against Petliura and his commanders.³³

At another show trial in May 1921 in Kharkiv, former leaders of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party "recanted" and condemned the Ukrainian insurgent movement as "banditry." This was the first really major show trial staged by the communist authorities in their vast realm, preceding by a year the more famous trial in Moscow of the leaders of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries. As an attempt to discredit the Ukrainian political and cultural elite that had backed the attempt to establish an independent Ukrainian state in 1917-20, it also foreshadowed the better-known show trial of 1930 in the fabricated case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU).³⁴

At this time Petliura and his officers were attempting to form a unified command structure for the insurgent movement. With this aim in mind, at the end of the Soviet-Polish War, a "Central [Insurgent] Staff" (*Tsentralnyi shtab*) was set up in Lviv headed by Major-general Tiutiunnyk. It included a Polish military liaison officer, which reflected the degree of Polish support.³⁵ The Central Staff divided Soviet-ruled Ukraine into five sections, in which insurgent units and parallel insurgent committees (*povstankomy*) were to be organized from the village level upwards. It despatched numerous UNR army officers and instructors into Ukraine to carry out this scheme. According to Golinkov, the Central Staff was only relatively successful in two of the five designated areas: in the south, in the Odessa, Kherson, and Tavriia gubernias, and in the Kiev and Volhynia gubernias.³⁶

Attempts were also made to form a clandestine insurgent command centre inside Soviet Ukraine. Such a body was finally

established in Kiev in March 1921 under the name of "The all-Ukrainian Central Insurgent Committee," or TsUPKOM. It was headed by Colonels Chepilko, Nakonechny, Hrudnytsky, and Danchevsky. Maintaining contact with the Central Staff, the TsUPKOM set about establishing links with insurgent units and underground organizations. The plan appears to have been to prepare for a general uprising in the summer that would be supported by UNR troops interned in Poland. However, the Cheka managed to learn of the TsUPKOM's existence from captured insurgents and rounded up its members. In August 1921, 39 of them were shot.³⁷

The Ukrainian insurgent movement suffered further reverses during the summer of 1921, when quite a number of guerrilla detachments were smashed and Makhno's movement was finally destroyed. Although resistance was beginning to wane, it was still considerable. Communists in the villages, Popov writes, continued to "live in a state of siege" under constant threat of attack.³⁸ In September 1921, according to Hanzha, there were still 64 large anti-communist units active in Ukraine which carried out 248 raids that month. In October, the number of such groups fell to 50.³⁹ Not surprisingly, after the destruction of the TsUPKOM and other setbacks suffered by the Ukrainian resistance in the summer and autumn of 1921, including penetration of the insurgent network by Cheka agents,⁴⁰ the second "Winter Campaign" launched by Tiutiunnyk in October of that year ended in disaster the following month at Bazar.

Within weeks of the destruction of the TsUPKOM some of its surviving members formed a new underground group based in Bila Tserkva—"the Cossack Council of Right-Bank Ukraine." By September 1921 they had decided to broaden it into an organization that would replace the TsUPKOM. Its leadership consisted of Pavlo Haiduchenko (Honta), Mykola Lozovyk, Mykhailo Symak, and otamans Tykhon Bessarabenko and Ivan Shamulenko (Fedortsiv). The Cossack Council succeeded in forging links with various underground groups and partisan units, and was even able to recruit some local Red Army personnel. In January 1922, it held a conference in Bila Tserkva at which it was decided to prepare for a major uprising in the spring. However, the secret police had had the Cossack Council under surveillance for six months, and, in March 1922, in a skillfully executed operation, the Kiev

region Cheka arrested 600 people in one night, including members of a Petliurist counter-intelligence cell operating in Kiev.⁴¹

In May 1922, some of Tiutiunnyk's men, who had broken out of the encirclement in Bazar and joined guerrilla groups in the Volhynia region, established the Volhynian Insurgent Army (PVA) under the leadership of Afanasii Petryk. This organization was made up of insurgent groups operating in the Volhynia area and also included an underground group in Zhytomyr called "The Committee for the Liberation of the Native Land." It conducted anti-Soviet agitation, issued proclamations, and planned to launch an uprising in the autumn, beginning with a revenge raid on Bazar on the first anniversary of Tiutiunnyk's debacle there. The organization was betrayed and on the night of October 5, 1922, that is, three days before the planned raid, 285 PVA activists were rounded up. The leaders were shot.⁴²

Among other examples of resistance groups that were destroyed in 1922 are the "Kharkiv Gubernia Insurgent Committee," and the 100-strong insurgent detachment of Otaman Hrizny operating out of Kholodnyi Iar. Also, in October 1922 the GPU, as the Soviet secret police was now called, succeeded in luring two leading otamans away from their units and capturing them: Zavhorodny from Kholodnyi Iar, and Haiev; they were active in the Kiev and Bila Tserkva districts.⁴³ According to a GPU report, altogether in Ukraine during 1922, 58 underground Petliurist organizations, 11 White Guardist ones, and one Makhnovist group operating in the Poltava region, were destroyed.⁴⁴

As can be seen, during the early 1920s, in addition to the Ukrainian nationalist resistance, various Russian anti-Soviet groups, mainly White Guard ones, also sprang up on Ukrainian territory. In a number of Ukrainian cities, mainly in the south, underground organizations were formed by the remnants of General Wrangel's defeated forces. In some cases they even formed armed units, or so-called "free detachments."⁴⁵ The most important of the "White" clandestine organizations was the "Kiev Oblast Centre of Action," which managed to exist for two years before being suppressed by the GPU in July 1923.⁴⁶ Also, for several years after the Civil War had ended, the celebrated Russian Socialist Revolutionary and conspirator, Boris Savinkov, sent his

agents into Ukraine and apparently succeeded in organizing at least one armed detachment in the Chernihiv region.⁴⁷

Ukrainian national resistance continued on a diminishing scale into 1923. On the eve of the Seventh CP(b)U Conference held in April of that year, the Ukrainian communist official Mykola Popov wrote: "We have been unable at the present time, in the sixth year of Soviet rule, to suppress political banditism about which the Moscow provinces have forgotten a long time ago."⁴⁸ In the early part of the year the Petliurists managed to form a number of new insurgent units. During the first half of 1923 the partisans carried out 327 raids in which an estimated two and a half thousand men took part. Fearing a major new wave of armed resistance in the summer, the authorities were ordered to step up their campaign against the Petliurist resistance. In April 11 underground groups, mainly Petliurist ones, were destroyed. Some of them were quite large. For example, the Petliurist organization smashed at this time in the Katerynoslav gubernia numbered 138 people, while another, the Bronitsky district insurgent committee in the Chernihiv region, was 220-strong.⁴⁹

The offensive against the Ukrainian resistance movement continued into the summer of 1923. For instance, in the Poltava region, between April and June, seven underground Petliurist groups were destroyed, the last remaining one in the area, according to Kucher, being uncovered as late as August. In September 1923, 56 armed detachments were still active in Ukraine, of which only 13 regarded themselves as political. By the following January the number of such groups had been reduced to 18, of which only three are described as Petliurist.⁵⁰

Gradually, the Ukrainian resistance movement lost not only its soldiers in the field, so to speak, but also its "generals." In the summer of 1922 Colonel Hulii-Hulenko, the Central Staff member responsible for operations in the southern region, was apparently captured in Odessa while on a secret mission and subsequently recanted at his trial.⁵¹

The following spring or summer Tiutiunyk was lured into a trap in a classic GPU operation. Just as with the "White" Russian emigres, the Soviet secret police successfully managed to infiltrate the Ukrainian nationalist underground and to control to a significant extent the communications between the anti-Soviet forces in Ukraine and outside the republic. Like Savinkov, Tiutiunyk was

persuaded by Soviet agents to risk secretly crossing the Soviet frontier in order to revamp the anti-Soviet resistance. On being captured, he appealed to the Soviet Ukrainian authorities for mercy and agreed to co-operate with them. He was amnestied and used to besmirch the Petliurist movement. Subsequently, Tiutiunnyk became one of the countless victims of Stalin's terror.⁵²

By the end of 1923, Hanzha claims, the anti-Soviet banditism of the *kurkuli* had been practically eliminated, and what this meant, he adds none too obliquely, was that their attempt to remain "a political force, which openly opposed Soviet rule," had been defeated.⁵³ Yet he also emphasizes that banditism was only one of the forms that the opposition of the *kurkuli* to the Soviet authorities assumed. He goes on to say that passive resistance from the wealthier peasants continued and that many of them soon learned how to exploit legal methods in order to defend their interests. Some of them even began to call for the creation of separate "peasant unions." On the one hand, he concludes, the better off peasants attempted to exploit NEP for their own ends, and on the other, they did everything possible to sabotage the policies of the Soviet government.⁵⁴

Evidently, Ukrainian resistance in the form of guerrilla and underground political activity was not fully extinguished even in the mid-1920s. Golinkov confirms that "in the years 1922-1925 the Chekists liquidated a few more Petliurist underground organizations and armed bands in the Kremenchuk area, and the Mykolaiv, Kiev, Podillia, Odessa, Poltava, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv gubernias."⁵⁵ Petliura, in his correspondence from this time, indicates that the underground was still active. In a letter of 9 September 1924 to I. Kedrovsky, he wrote that contacts with the underground had actually improved during the last few months and that things seemed to be going well.⁵⁶ In December of the same year he mentioned two new organizations: the "Union for the Struggle for an Independent Ukraine," and the "Ukrainian People's Party."⁵⁷ On 18 April 1926, shortly before he was assassinated, he also referred in a newspaper article written under a pseudonym to a recent speech given by Vlas Chubar, the head of the Soviet Ukrainian government, in which the latter had acknowledged that supporters of Petliura were still "conducting underground work."⁵⁸

A valuable source for assessing the situation in Ukraine between 1925 and 1928 is the Petliurist organ *Tryzub*, which was published in Paris. Each issue of this journal contained a section entitled "Chronicle" that provided the latest information on developments inside the Ukrainian SSR, some of it based on reports appearing in the Soviet Ukrainian press. The publication lists numerous cases attesting to the continuation of various forms of nationalist resistance: insurgency, underground groups, and individual acts of terrorism carried out against Soviet officials, especially in the countryside. As late as 1928 it reports the destruction in the Proskuriv area of a partisan detachment led by a certain Dobrohorsky that had been active since 1921; the existence of insurgent units in the Tulchyn, Berdychiv, Katerynoslav, and Bila Tserkvka districts;⁵⁹ as well as the execution of two insurgents, H. Honcharuk and M. Lomachynsky, who had been involved in a partisan unit that had been active until March 1928.⁶⁰

A number of cases of nationalist resistance during the second half of 1920s are recorded in a collection of indictments issued by courts in the Ukrainian SSR, which were published as a book in Kharkiv in 1928. Perhaps the most intriguing of these is an armed revolt involving over 50 "counter-revolutionaries," which took place in July 1927 in a town simply referred to as "M." Another of the cases mentioned is that of a pro-UNR underground organization (the location is also not revealed) led by Ivan Matrosyn which was uncovered that same year.⁶¹

Quite a few other references to the existence of Ukrainian insurgent detachments and underground groups in Soviet Ukraine in the mid and late-1920s can also be found in other literature dealing with this period. For example, P. Lotarevych provides an account of a resistance group which he claims was active in the Poltava area until 1926.⁶² Hrytsko Siryk mentions an insurgent group in Sivershchyna led by a certain Vashchenko that was active until 1929.⁶³ Semen Pidhainy mentions meeting a former member of a clandestine organization calling itself "Kharkiv" in the second half of the 1920s.⁶⁴ Various other underground groups are mentioned in books by Dmytro Solovei⁶⁵ and Vasyl Pliushch,⁶⁶ and in the testimonies compiled in 1931 by L. Chykalenko in his *Solovetska katorha*.⁶⁷

The controversial case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) and the resistance in Ukraine to collectivization and “dekulakization” fall beyond the scope of this paper. It should be pointed out, though, that apart from the numerous genuine resistance groups discussed above, there was no shortage of criminal bands in this period as well as “organizations” fabricated by the Cheka and GPU. Among the accounts provided in Chykalenko’s book is one given by a peasant from Poltava, who was arrested in 1926. He stressed that wherever five or so Ukrainian farmers would gather, the authorities were sure to concoct an anti-Soviet organization.⁶⁸ This example also underlines how difficult it must have been to conduct underground work in a society increasingly penetrated by the secret police and its informers.

The nebulous but widespread Ukrainian resistance movement in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s is a tragic-heroic chapter in modern Ukrainian history that has been all too often overlooked. Yet, it was as much a part of the process of Ukrainian nation-building in the 1920s as were the developments connected with “Ukrainization.” It is also an important and integral part of the history of the Ukrainian struggle for national independence. This point was not lost on some of the leaders of the next wave of Ukrainian armed resistance twenty years later. One of the commanders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)-North, Colonel Honcharenko, was none other than Leonid Stupnytsky—a former Petliurist insurgent leader in the Volhynia region. Even more telling is the fact that the Commander in Chief of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych, took the *nom de guerre* Chuprynka, after the poet and TsUPKOM member Hrytsko Chuprynka, who was shot in 1921 for his role in organizing the prototype of the UPA.⁶⁹

The purpose of this article was to identify an important “blank spot” in the modern history of Ukraine. Now that Ukraine has become an independent and democratic state and the constraints on historians imposed by the Soviet imperial system have been removed, it is hoped that eventually the true and full story of Ukrainian national resistance to the imposition of Soviet rule in the early 1920s will emerge.

Notes

1. A.V. Likholat, *Razgrom natsionalisticheskoi kontrrevoliutsii na Ukraine: 1917-1922 gg.* (Moscow 1954).
2. O.O. Kucher, *Rozhrom zbroinoi vnutrishnoi kontrrevoliutsii na Ukraini v 1921-1923 rr.* (Kharkiv 1971).
3. D.L. Golinkov, *Krushenie antisovetskogo podpolia v SSSR*, 2 vols., 3rd ed. (Moscow 1980).
4. O.I. Hanzha, "Bortba z kurkultsvom na Ukraini v 1921-1923 rr.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5(314) (May 1987): 109-17.
5. Rostyslav Sambuk, "Ostannii zakolot," *Vitchyzna*, no.11 (November 1987): 44-139, and no.12 (December 1987): 15-105.
6. Ivan Liutyi-Liutenko, *Vohon z Kholodnoho Iaru: Spohady* (Detroit 1986).
7. S. Karin, "Krakh kontrrevoliutsiinoho okhivistia," *Radianska Ukraina*, 21, 22, 25, 28 July 1982.
8. Lennard D. Gerson, *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia* (Philadelphia 1976).
9. George Legget, *The Cheka: Lenin's Secret Police* (Oxford 1981).
10. Arthur E. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign* (New Haven 1963), 11.
11. See James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933* (Cambridge, Mass. 1983), 34-7.
12. Kucher, 24.
13. M.I. Suprunenko, *Borotba trudiashchykh Ukrainy proty Denikinshchyny* (Kiev 1979), 191.
14. Iurko Tiutiunnyk, *Zymovyi pokhid 1919-20*, 3rd ed. (New York 1966), 80-1.
15. M.M. Popov, *Narys istorii Kommunistychnoi Partii Bilshovykiv Ukrainy* (Kharkiv), 217; Golinkov, vol. 2, 38-9.
16. Popov, 228-9; Golinkov, vol. 2, 46-7.
17. Kucher, 26-7.
18. Tiutiunnyk, 81.
19. Gerson, 87-90.
20. Popov, 247.

21. *Ibid.*, 247; Golinkov, vol. 2, 39-40; Kucher, 29.
22. Legget, 336.
23. Golinkov, vol. 2, 48-9.
24. Hanzha, 110.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Kucher, 8-12.
27. Hanzha, 110.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Popov, 249.
30. Hanzha, 110-1.
31. Leggett, 337; Popov, 252-3.
32. Hanzha, 110.
33. Golinkov, vol. 2, 51-2.
34. *Delo chlenov Tsentralnogo komiteta Ukrainskoi partii sotsial-revoliutsionerov Golubovicha, Petrenko, Lyzanivskogo, Chasnyka, Iaroslava i dr.: Stenograficheskii otchet* (Kharkiv 1921). For a useful short account of the trial, see H. V. Kasianov and V. M. Danylenko, *Stalinizm i ukrainska intelihentsiia: 20-30-i roky* (Kiev 1991): 34-6.
35. *Ibid.*, 135-6; George Kulchycky, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Movement 1919 to 1926," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1969, 256.
36. Golinkov, vol. 2, 135-6.
37. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, 136-40.
38. Popov, 258.
39. Hanzha, 111. One extensive list of insurgent groups operating in Soviet Ukraine in 1921 gives details about close to 60 units. See Sot. N. P-Pa, "Protybolshevytski povstannia na Ukraini v 1921 r.," *Litopys chervonoï kalyny* IV, no. 6 (June 1932): 19-22, and IV, no. 9 (September 1932): 6-7.
40. See Karin's account.
41. Golinkov, vol. 2, 226-31.
42. *Ibid.*, 231-4. Sambuk's novel deals with the infiltration and destruction of the PVA. He appends a contemporary report from a local newspaper about the liquidation of this organization.
43. Golinkov, vol. 2, 234, 236-9.
44. Kucher, 155.

45. *Ibid.*, 31.
46. Golinkov, vol. 2, 181-8.
47. Kucher, 31.
48. Cited by Bohdan Krawchenko in *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (Basingstoke 1985), 101.
49. Kucher, 155-6, 160.
50. *Ibid.*, 156, 161.
51. Golinkov, vol. 2, 242-3.
52. On Tiutiunyk and his capture see Oleh Romanchuk, "Supernyk Holovnoho Otamana," *Dzvin*, no. 7 (561) (July 1991):79-83; and Karin's recollections.
53. Hanzha, 112, 117.
54. *Ibid.*, 112-7.
55. Golinkov, vol. 2, 236.
56. Tsentralnyi Komitet Vshanuvannia Pamiati Symona Petliury v Amerytsi, *Symon Petliura: staty, lysty, dokumenty* (New York 1956), 426.
57. The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the USA, Bibliothèque Ukrainienne Simon Petliura à Paris, *Symon Petliura: staty, lysty, dokumenty*, vol. 2 (New York 1979), 571.
58. Tsentralnyi Komitet, 366.
59. *Tryzub*, IV, no. 33(139)(26 August 1928), 24.
60. *Ibid.*, IV, no. 42 (148)(28 October 1928), 26.
61. B. P. Bomas, (ed.), *Vynuvalni punkty za kryminalnym kodeksom: Zbirnyk zrazkiv kintsevykh chastyn vynuvalnykh aktiv* (Kharkiv 1929), 6-7.
62. P. Lutarewytych, "A Resistance Group of the Ukrainian Underground, 1920-1926," *Ukrainian Review*, no. 2 (1956): 64-91.
63. Hrytsko Siryk, *Fakty i podii* (Toronto 1975), 11-2.
64. Semen Pidhainyi, *Ukrainska inteligentsiia na Solovkakh: spohady 1933-41* (1947), 40-1.
65. D. Solovei, *Holhota Ukrainy* (Winnipeg 1953).
66. Vasyi Plushch, *Borotba za ukrainsku derzhavu pid sovietskoiu vladoiu* (London 1973).
67. L. Chykalenko, *Solovetska katorha* (Warsaw 1931).

68. *Ibid.*, 63.
69. Lev Shankovsky, *Ukrainska armiia v borotbi za derzhavnist* (Munich 1958), 33. During the summer of 1988, *Literaturna Ukraina* published a long profile of Hrytsko Chuprynka, indicating the first efforts to secure his literary, if not political, rehabilitation. It mentioned his involvement with the anti-Soviet resistance. See Mykola Zhulynsky, "Hryhorii Chuprynka (1879-1921)," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 28 July 1988, 6-7.

Георгій Касьянов

Влада та інтелігенція на Україні в роки НЕПу

Українська інтелігенція традиційно відігравала провідну роль у політичному житті суспільства. З початку ХХ століття вона була лідером національно-визвольного руху, вона ж очолила національну революцію 1917 року. В ході цієї революції остаточно визначилися основні ідейно-політичні течії в середовищі української інтелігенції, які поступово визрівали протягом попередніх двох десятиліть. Переважна більшість її додержувалась демократичних поглядів, входила до соціал-демократичних чи соціалістичних партій або підтримувала їх морально. Певна частина дотримувалася ліберально-демократичних поглядів. Були серед інтелігенції і монархісти. Мізерна кількість підтримувала більшовиків або співчувала їм. В результаті представники майже всіх політичних напрямів серед інтелігенції опинилися в роки громадянської війни серед тих, хто явно не співчував більшовикам або вороже ставився до них.

Події цієї війни, які викликали спалах насильства, жорстокості і народних страждань, позначилися на політичних позиціях інтелігенції. Більшість її, залякана постійними репресіями, відійшла від активної політичної діяльності і знаходилася в стані своєрідної політичної депресії, обмежуючись виключно професійною діяльністю при будь-якій владі. Політично активна частина, ворожа радянському режимові, пішла на еміграцію, щоб продовжувати боротьбу з-за кордону. На чужині опинилася також значна частина політично нейтральної інтелігенції, яка не бажала жити в умовах «пролетарської диктатури». Та незначна частина інтелігенції, яка без успіху намагалась організувати боротьбу в підпіллі, безжально знищувалась. Інтелігенти, що входили до різних соціалістичних партій (меншовики, есери, Бунд тощо) на початку 20-х років ще не припинили політичної діяльності, але вона поступово згорталась під тиском більшовицької партії, яка твердо стала на шлях встановлення

однопартійної диктатури. Тиск цей мав репресивний і адміністративно-наси́льний характер. Так у 1920 р. відбувся процес над членами Київського комітету партії меншовиків. Більшість підсудних потрапила до концентраційних таборів.¹ Восени того ж року у Харкові були заарештовані делегати всеукраїнської конференції цієї партії. Меншовиків постійно переслідували у профспілках і на підприємствах.²

Навесні 1921 р. у Києві відбувся показовий процес над членами Центрального комітету української партії соціалістів-революціонерів (УПСР), що з одночасним переслідуванням членів цієї партії на місцях практично паралізувало її діяльність. Зрозуміло, що більшість підсудних на цьому процесі належала до інтелігенції.³

Після організаційного розгрому цих партій більшовики приступили до методичного переслідування їх членів. У листі ЦК РКП(б) всім губернським і обласним комітетам партії від 4 липня 1923 р. з грифом «цілком таємно» пропонувалось не допускати меншовиків до читання лекцій, роботи у вищих учбових закладах, «вилучати» їх з трестів, профспілок, народних комісаріатів тощо. До цієї праці залучались органи Державного політичного управління (ДПУ).⁴ Перелік сфер діяльності, до яких не допускались меншовики, свідчить, що удару зазнавала, перш за все, інтелігенція. Об'єктом аналогічної «роботи» стали члени партії есерів. В результаті протягом 1922–1923 років ці партії фактично розпалися. Певна частина колишніх членів цих та інших політичних партій, хто з ідейних мотивів, хто притосовуючись до дійсності, перейшла до рядів КП(б)У. Для значної частини інтелігенції, яка стала на такий шлях, це була єдина можливість не тільки офіційно займатися політичною діяльністю, а й просто отримати роботу. Наприкінці 1920 р. із загальної кількості членів КП(б)У – 37,9 тис. чоловік – частка вихідців з «непролетарських партій» становила 19,6%.⁵ Велику кількість серед них складали колишні боротьбісти (близько 4 тис.).

У 1921 р. згідно з рішенням X з'їзду РКП(б) була проведена чистка партії. КП(б)У скоротилась на 26%.⁶ З 4000 колишніх боротьбістів у партії залишилося 118. У 1922 році вихідців з «непролетарських» партій в КП(б)У залишалося 4,7 тис. чоловік; майже половина з них за родом занять належала до службовців та інтелігенції. Серед них колишні меншовики складали 40,7%,

праві есери – 16,8 %, ліві есери – 9,7 %, бундівці – 15,1 %, вихідці з інших партій разом (боротьбісти, укапісти, борбісти, анархісти тощо) – 16,7%.⁷

Отже, інтелігенція, яка раніше становила мозок альтернативних КП(б)У політичних партій, тепер або перейшла до комуністичної партії, або зовсім відійшла від політичної діяльності. Багато з тих, що увійшли до КП(б)У, використовувались саме в тих галузях, що потребували досить високої інтелектуальної підготовки. Колишні боротьбісти, меншовики, есери займали керівні посади в Наркоматі освіти, правліннях трестів, банків, були ректорами вузів, редакторами газет і т.п.⁸

Відкрита політична діяльність інтелігенції поза межами КП(б)У припинилась. В середині 20-х років, з остаточним занепадом Української комуністичної партії (УКП), на політичному терені встановилась повна монополія КП(б)У.

Втім, непартійна інтелігенція мала ще деякі можливості для проведення квазіполітичної діяльності в інших громадських організаціях. Наприклад, восени 1922 р. на з'їзді агрономів України частина делегатів виступила за резолюцію про неможливість нормальної роботи при радянській владі.⁹ Антирадянські настрої були поширені серед частини вчителів, особливо сільських; між сільською інтелігенцією взагалі. На початку 20-х років спостігались спроби використати в політичних цілях «Просвіти», кооперативні товариства тощо. Але всі ці канали поступово, протягом першої половини 20-х років, перекривались або репресивними, або іншими «організаційними» заходами влади, тому вже з середини 20-х років інтелігенція потрапила в стан своєрідного організаційно-політичного вакууму. Альтернатива була проста: або займатися громадсько-політичною діяльністю в організаційних формах, дозволених владою (тут можливості вибору були не дуже великими), або не займатися нею взагалі.

Більшість старої інтелігенції обрала другий шлях і стала на позиції політичного нейтралітету. Принцип політичного нейтралітету (тобто невтручання у політику) був дуже популярним серед інженерно-технічної інтелігенції, значної частини науковців, учителів, медиків, тощо. Деякі громадські організації інтелігенції у своїх деклараціях навіть навмисне підкреслювали свою вірність цьому принципові (наприклад, Всеукраїнська асоціація інженерів). Проте й ті з них, щ

створювались під егідою радянської влади і в своїх документах декларували «відданість справі пролетаріату» (інженерно-технічні секції, секції наукових працівників та ін.), на практиці були політично нейтральними. Ця позиція зумовлювалась не відсутністю прагнення до політичної активності, а саме політикою монопартійної держави, спрямованої проти будь-яких позаофіційних форм політичної діяльності.

Втім, нова економічна політика і відносна економічна свобода викликали серед певної частини інтелігенції сподівання політичної лібералізації. Намагаючись сприяти їй, інтелігенція так званого «зміновіхівського» напрямку заявила про свою підтримку радянської влади. (В середині 1921 р. у Празі вийшла друком збірка статей «Смена вех», авторами якої були відомі представники кадетської інтелігенції (Ю.В. Ключніков, М.В. Устрялов та ін.). Ідеї, які викладалися авторами збірки, полягали головним чином у відмові від боротьби з радянською владою, переході до співробітництва з нею без прийняття її ідеологічних настанов.)

Ці настрої розповсюдились також серед частини української еміграції у Відні, Празі та Берліні, в основному серед студентства і частини ліберально настроєної професури, поміж прокомуністично настроєної галицької інтелігенції. Українські зміновіхівці (А.І. Харченко, О.В. Ніковський) примкнули до редакції російської газети «Накануне» (редактори Л.Г. Кірдецов та Ю.В. Ключніков). Восени 1922 року А.І. Харченко виступив у цій газеті зі статтею-декларацією, де викладалось кредо українського зміновіхівства: визнання де-факто Радянської України як єдиної можливої державної організації українського народу, повний розрив і боротьба зі всіма емігрантськими антирадянськими угрупованнями, заклик до повернення на Україну для практичної праці на культурному і господарському терені.¹⁰ Більшість української еміграції поставилася до цієї декларації або негативно, або байдуже: на думку багатьох, її автор занадто тісно контактував з радянськими постійними представництвами; небезпідставно вважалось, що його діяльність фінансується ними.

Більшого поширення зміновіхівство набуло на території України, при цьому, тут воно дещо відрізнялось від російського зміновіхівства. Російська інтелігенція, що зосереджувалась переважно у вузах, йшла в руслі загальних його принципів. Українська національна інтелігенція сприймала зміновіхівство не

тільки як принципову згоду на співробітництво з більшовиками, але й як шлях до національно-культурного відродження України, як умову легальної роботи у галузі національного розвитку.

Ставлення влади до зміновіхівства було неоднозначним. XII Всеросійська конференція РКП(б) (1922 р.) зазначила, що зміновіхівська течія може грати об'єктивно-прогресивну роль, що вона згуртовує ті групи еміграції та російської інтелігенції, котрі «примирилися» з радянською владою і згодні співпрацювати з нею для відродження країни. Конференція закликала членів партії позитивно ставитися до зміновіхівців, зауваживши при цьому, що не можна ні на хвилину забувати про «буржуазно-реставраторські» тенденції цієї течії.¹¹ Це була досить раціональна і прагматична (принаймі, формально) позиція.

Проте на Україні ставлення партійного керівництва до зміновіхівства дещо відрізнялось від позицій центру. «Ці настрої, – писалося в «Известиях ЦК КП(б)У» про зміновіхівство, – сплели собі міцне гніздо серед української професури, серед якої знайшлися елементи, які намагаються активно впроваджувати свої настрої в життя. Вдвічі небезпечніші для Радянської влади ці спроби тоді, коли вони йдуть від українських націоналістів, що спонукало ЦК дати рішучу директиву боротися з вказаним явищем...».¹²

Така позиція щодо зміновіхівства, яка значно відрізнялась від декларацій центральних партійних органів, пояснюється або тим, що поруч з цими деклараціями з центрального партійного апарату надходили таємні інструкції про боротьбу зі зміновіхівством (це тим більш вірогідно, якщо врахувати, що фактичний голова цього апарату, Й. Сталін, був противником зміновіхівства), або позицією частини партійного керівництва республіки, на чолі з другим секретарем ЦК КП(б)У Д.З. Лебедем. Саме він був автором українського варіанту широко відомої акції – висилки великої групи гуманітарної інтелігенції за кордон у 1922 році.

В серпні 1922 р. він так інформував секретарів губернських комітетів партії про суть і характер цієї акції: «ЦК дав рішучу директиву провести арешти і намітити для висилки тих професорів і представників інтелігенції, які явно чи таємно починають протягувати свої зміновіхівські міркування в практику культурної праці у вищій школі та інших радянських установах. З намічених 70 чоловік професорів і декількох лікарів більшість виявляються упертими ідеологами буржуазії,

колишніми членами кадетської партії, які зараз намагалися в новій фразеології проповідувати старі кадетські гасла...».¹³ Якщо в Росії ця висилка спрямовувалась частково проти тієї частини старої інтелігенції, яка дійсно відверто протиставляла себе «пролетарській диктатурі», то на Україні серед намічених до висилки не було відкритих противників влади; це були змінюхівці, які прагнули до співробітництва з нею. Це був захід, безглуздість якого подвоювалась поспішливістю його проведення. Так, в тому ж листі зазначалось, що «...в цьому питанні були зроблені помилки. Багато хто з заарештованих стали жертвами зведення особистих рахунків, а багатьох злісних не заарештували, бо в ДПУ не було відомостей. Тому ЦК запропонував ще раз переглянути списки професорів, поповнити їх тими, що захо-валися».¹⁴

У жовтні 1922 р. цю акцію було закінчено. Близько 70 викладачів вузів і професорів було вислано за кордон (можна вважати, що їм пощастило, якщо взяти до уваги долю тих, хто залишився) та на північ. Д. Лебідь з задоволенням констатував: «зараз настрої серед інтелігенції, в тому числі, професури, що залишилась, можна охарактеризувати – готові служити і не роздумувати».¹⁵

У цьому вислові – «служити і не роздумувати» – полягала вся філософія нової влади в її стосунках з інтелігенцією, філософія творення «гвинтиків» і «приводних пасів» з людей, які мали скласти основу тоталітарної системи. Цим «революційним» заходом – висилкою інтелігенції – змінюхівству на Україні як легальній течії був покладений край.

На еміграцію, в тому числі на змінюхівську її частину, ця акція справила вкрай несприятливе враження; змінюхівство пішло на спад. Секретаріат постійного представництва УСРР в Австрії повідомляв ЦК КП(б)У, що змінюхівський рух як ідейна течія припинив своє існування.¹⁶ Занепаду змінюхівства за кордоном сприяло і утворення у грудні 1922 р. СРСР. Ця подія сприймалась як крок до обмеження державної самостійності України навіть в її більшовицькому варіанті, і це породжувало вичікувальні настрої щодо подальших подій. Від українського закордонного змінюхівства відійшли всі основні літературні сили, які згуртувались навколо В.К. Винниченка та його журналу «Нова доба». Емігрантське змінюхівство не мало впливового лідера, який міг би очолити цей рух. До того ж, у громадській

думці еміграції вкорінилось уявлення про змінювистість як про інтригу радянських закордонних представництв. Нарешті, у 1923 р. група української інтелігенції (що не була змінювистською) на чолі з М.С. Грушевським повернулася на Україну, і це зайвий раз підкреслило безперспективність цієї течії.

У березні–квітні 1924 року в Києві відбувся сфабрикований ДПУ показовий політичний процес над учасниками так званого «Центру дії». Напередодні процесу було заарештовано кілька десятків представників інтелігенції. Під час слідства більшість з них була звільнена за браком доказів. На лаві підсудних опинилося 18 чоловік. Серед них – відомі представники саме змінювистської інтелігенції: професор, академік Української Академії наук М.П. Василенко, його брат К.П. Василенко, професор П.П. Смірнов, адвокат Л.Є. Чолганський та інші. Підсудні звинувачувались у шпигунстві, державній зраді, контрреволюційній діяльності. Під час процесу головне звинувачення – шпигунство на користь Польщі – було фактично скасовано, та й всі інші виглядали досить абсурдними.¹⁷ Під час процесу, що проходив у найбільшому приміщенні Києва – Купецькому зібранні (зараз філармонія), була створена відповідна громадська атмосфера. Проходили добре підготовлені «збори і демонстрації трудящих», які гнівно засуджували «контрреволюціонерів і шпигунів» та вимагали для них жорстокого покарання. Були організовані і відгуки «наукової громадськості»: «шпигунів і зрадників» таврували на сторінках преси викладачі київських, харківських та одеських вузів; з відповідними заявами виступили в газетах академіки А.Ю. Кримський та П.А. Тутковський.¹⁸

Процес викликав численні протести проти переслідувань інтелігенції в СРСР серед емігрантських кіл. 7 квітня до справи втрутився прем'єр-міністр Франції Раймон Пуанкаре, який просив народного комісара іноземних справ СРСР М.В. Чічеріна вплинути на хід процесу і не допустити винесення смертних вироків. Це звернення Пуанкаре було використано на самому процесі як свідчення зв'язків підсудних «зі світовою буржуазією в особі її вождів».

Втім, справа набула небажаного для радянської влади міжнародного резонансу. Прокуратура верховного Суду УСРР переглянула вирок, в результаті чого всім, хто був засуджений до розстрілу (4 чоловіки), замінили вищу міру покарання 10-ма

роками тюрми суворого режиму; іншим жертвам процесу термін ув'язнення було скорочено вдвічі.¹⁹ Наступного року професорів взагалі відпустили на волю. Головне було зроблено: інтелігенція змінівіхівського табору була деморалізована і налякана.

Змінівіхівство на Україні як явище суспільно-політичного життя після цього практично зникло, хоча сам термін «змінівіхівство» ще залишався як політичне тавро. З середини 20-х років воно вже не користувалось і декларативною підтримкою центральних органів комуністичної партії. На Україні ж воно стабільно розцінювалося владою як форма «легалізації непівської буржуазії». Наприклад, 12 травня 1926 року на засіданні політбюро ЦК КП(б)У Л.М. Каганович заявив: «Ми маємо частину інтелігенції, яка легалізована змінівіхівством, але яка у своїй ідеології відбиває ідеологію зростаючого сільського куркуля і міського непмана. На нас чекають великі труднощі саме з цією частиною інтелігенції, котра під видом лояльності до Радянської влади буде намагатися укорінюватися в нашому радянському організмі».²⁰ Каганович трохи запізнився зі своїми висновками: саме ця частина інтелігенції «укорінилася в радянському організмі» ще з початку 20 років; без неї цей «організм» не зміг би нормально функціонувати.

У середині 20-х років українська інтелігенція була остаточно приборкана владою (принаймі, на зовнішній погляд). Частина її безумовно підтримувала радянську владу, не входячи до єдиної існуючої на Україні партії КП(б)У. Переважна більшість додержувалася принципу політичного нейтралітету і не бажала у будь-якій формі втручатися у політику. Певна частина ще пов'язувала деякі свої сподівання з трансформацією влади в бік її лібералізації, хоча найдамоглядніші вже розуміли, що ці сподівання марні. Будь-які політичні виступи інтелігенції були можливі тільки в рамках офіційної ідеології та на її підтримку. «Альтернативних» політичних ідей, програм, тощо інтелігенція висловлювати вголос не могла.

Між тим, за настроями серед інтелігенції пильно стежила партія та її «недремне око» – ДПУ. Агентура останнього постійно інформувала партійне керівництво про настрої в середовищі інтелігенції у зв'язку з тими чи іншими подіями. До ЦК КП(б)У регулярно надси лались огляди політичних настроїв серед різних груп інтелігенції.

Наприклад, взимку 1926 року ДПУ доповідало про зростання антирадянських настроїв серед учителів України в зв'язку з низькою заробітною платнею, злидненням матеріально-побутовим становищем. У деяких районах учителі протестували проти виборів комуністів до керівництва профспілки робітників освіти, мотивуючи свої дії тим, що партія не дбає про поліпшення умов життя учительства. Велися розмови про експлуатацію вчителів радянською владою. У Полтаві готувалися до учительського страйку.²¹ Такий стан справ був в очах партійних функціонерів явним погіршенням ситуації у порівнянні з попереднім роком, коли Наркомат робітничо-селянської інспекції (РСІ) повідомляв, що більш як третина сільських учителів «цілком непохитно стоїть на боці інтересів пролетарської держави, а близько половини додержується нейтралітету».²² Цікаво, що у 1927 році, всупереч наведеним фактам, X з'їзд КП(б)У бадьоро констатував, що «зараз учительство України, беручи в цілому, стало твердо під радянський прапор».²³ Реальність свідчила про інше: наступного, 1928 року, у таємному огляді «політичного стану» учительства, підготовленого для ЦК КП(б)У, про вчителів, які нібито «твердо стояли під радянським прапором» говорилося, що вони «бояться класової боротьби і не бажають втручатися до неї».²⁴

Подібні процеси спостерігалися (у зв'язку зі скороченням штатів у 1925–1926 роках) серед службовців державних установ. Ріст безробіття серед них викликав незадоволення владою, яке загострилося тією обставиною, що в цей час особливого розмаху набуло «висуванство», тобто призначення на управлінські посади «свідомих робітників і селян». Бюрократичний апарат зростав, і скорочення одних на догоду іншим виглядало безглуздом і несправедливим. Антирадянські настрої серед студентської молоді періодично підживлювались примітивно-волюнтаристськими діями влади щодо чисток студентського складу протягом першої половини 20-х років. Наприклад, під час чистки вузів 1925 року від «класово чужих елементів», в Києві спостерігалися студентські протести, які мали антирадянське забарвлення; в київських вузах з'явилися прокламації антирадянського змісту; були спроби організації демонстрацій протесту.²⁵

Коливання політичних настроїв серед інтелігенції залежали від колізій внутрішньопартійної боротьби середини 20-х років. Дускусії в партії точилися довкола найважливіших питань

життя країни, отже певна частина інтелігенції не могла залишитися байдужою до цих подій, хоча інформація про дискусії, яка з'являлася в пресі, була спотвореною і неадекватною реальному їх змісту.

Таємні зведення ДПУ про настрої інтелігенції у зв'язку з дискусією з «новою опозицією» (Троцький, Зінов'єв, Каменєв) у 1925–1926 рр. свідчать про значну диференціацію підходів до цієї дискусії серед інтелігенції. Цікаво, наприклад, що національна українська інтелігенція в цілому поставилась до антисталінської опозиції негативно через її «антиселянські» зазіхання, а також завдяки тому, що в пресі з'являлися відомості про нетолерантне ставлення Л. Троцького до українізації. Проте певна частина української інтелігенції вітала сам факт існування опозиції, пов'язуючи з ним сподівання на те, що в протистоянні з цією опозицією ЦК ВКП(б) дозволить існування інших лівих партій.²⁶ Так, один з колишніх лідерів Української партії соціалістів–революціонерів В. Голубович (один з підсудних на процесі 1921 року) казав, що «нам тепер значно ближче до комуністів, ніж до правої української публіки, тому що національний момент зараз вже відпав, і якщо б зараз щось трапилось, то колишніх есерів перестріляли б разом з комуністами».²⁷ Його колега по партії І. Лизанівський пов'язував появу опозиції з кінцем диктатури партії взагалі.²⁸

Дискусія в партії викликала серед частини найбільш кваліфікованої інтелігенції сподівання на розкол ВКП(б), навіть – на її крах. Серед київської професури поширювалися розмови, що в результаті цього розколу «купка кар'єристів, що входить до складу ЦК» позбавиться влади. Серед інженерів чекали повалення Сталіна. Частина інтелігенції, переважно російська, вважала лінію опозиції цілком слушною. Лікарі в Херсоні і Миколаєві висловлювалися на підтримку опозиції; юристи в Луганську і Сумах розповсюджували її видання.²⁹ Зауважимо, що серед самих опозиціонерів на Україні були відомі представники інтелігенції: наприклад, професор, економіст В. Дашковський (ректор Комуністичного університету ім. Артема); деякі співробітники Інституту марксизму у Харкові.

Розгром опозиції поклав край всім цим настроям. Розправа з опозиціонерами зайвий раз продемонструвала стиль взаємин влади з інакомислячими. До цього додавалися численні факти різного роду репресій та утисків щодо тих груп інтелігенції та

окремих осіб, які не приховували своїх політичних поглядів (наприклад, цькування академіка С.О. Єфремова в пресі у зв'язку з його виступом у львівській газеті «Діло» на початку 1929 року; розгром Вільної академії пролетарської літератури на чолі з М. Хвильовим у 1928 році; цькування О.Я. Шумського тощо). Серед інтелігенції запанували настрої політичного нігілізму, виховувався такий бажаний владі політичний абсентеїзм.

Яскравим свідченням панування таких настроїв серед інтелігенції стали події, пов'язані із створенням під егідою агітаційно-пропагандистського відділу ЦК КП(б)У нової громадської організації інтелігенції – Українського товариства робітників науки і техніки для сприяння соціалістичному будівництву (УТОРНІТСО). Ця організація мала об'єднати у своїх лавах найкваліфікованішу наукову і технічну інтелігенцію під гаслами повної підтримки (перш за все, політико-ідеологічної) партії та її діяльності у побудові «світлого майбутнього». Незважаючи на великі політичні аванси ініціаторів створення організації, інтелігенція не поспішала під її прапори. Від УТОРНІТСО, організація якої почалась у 1927 році, відштовхував саме її офіційно-політичний характер. Спроби зробити УТОРНІТСО масовою організацією провалилися саме через те, що кваліфікована інтелігенція, по-перше, не вірила в щирість партійних органів, які патрунували товариство; по-друге, вона просто боялась займатися «політикою» в будь-якій формі. Кістяк УТОРНІТСО склали члени партії; очолив організацію, в якій нараховувалось кілька десятків членів, марксистський історик М.І. Яворський. Що ж до більшості інтелігентів, які мали б увійти до товариства, то їхнє ставлення до цієї ідеї добре ілюструє лист одного з організаторів, хіміка О.І. Черкеса до О.В. Палладіна. Автор листа, який з'ясовував ставлення інтелігенції до ідеї створення УТОРНІТСО, так оцінював погляди своїх співбесідників: «В більшості випадків я зустрівся з явним скептицизмом, із значною мірою сумнівів щодо того, чи справді в умовах сучасного життя можливе існування передбаченого угруповання (УТОРНІТСО – Г.К.). Багато з тих, з ким я розмовляв, вважають, що бази для щирої критики немає. Вважають також, що існуюча вже самодіяльність, щира і спрямована в найкращому напрямку – може бути припинена в кожний момент. Друге, на що вказували, – це на проблему особистої безпеки (в широкому розумінні цього слова). З точки зору ряду колег органи

влади не завжди достатньо вірно оцінюють характер і якість громадських виступів, і той бік діяльності, що передбачається статутом товариства, може дати особливо багато підстав для неправильної оцінки....»³⁰ Отже, інтелігенція не висловлювала палкого бажання брати участь у політичній діяльності, навіть такої, що «благословляється» партією. УТОРНІТСО так і не стала масовою організацією, до того ж, у 1930–ті роки вона також зазнала репресій.

Якщо визначити характер політичних настроїв в середовищі інтелігенції наприкінці НЕПу (кінець 20–х років) – принаймні, тих настроїв, що виходили на поверхню суспільної свідомості, – доводиться констатувати катастрофічне збіднення барв політичного спектру у порівнянні з дореволюційними і революційними роками. Зникли будь–які легальні прояви політичної діяльності, які були б альтернативними більшовицьким. Бажаний політичний нейтралітет інтелігенції, хоча б і зовнішній, був повністю досягнутий. Однак, вже з середини 20–х років спостерігаються спроби влади політично активізувати інтелігенцію у бажаному руслі. При цьому використовувались конформістські кола старої інтелігенції. У травні 1924 року, наприклад, на Восьмій Всеукраїнській конференції КП(б)У була виголошена відозва «До української радянської інтелігенції і радянської громадськості», яку підписали 66 інтелігентів. Поруч із звичайними на той час ритуальними пасажами про відданість «справі робітників і селян» у декларації містилися брутальні нападки на політично нейтральну та емігрантську інтелігенцію: «поруч з цією активістською емігрантською контрреволюційною інтелігенцією лишається по різних запічках на Україні пасивна їхня братія, що заховавши в найдаальших своїх глибинах своєї душі прихильність до класово вигідної для неї ідеології українського фашизму, не втрачає досі надії на її втілення і чекає. Ця пасивна частина теж скрегоче зубами на радянську українську робітничо–селянську інтелігенцію, що приєдналася до радвлади і утворила єдиний класовий фронт з робітниками і селянами України».³¹ Місце проголошення декларації, її стиль та форма свідчать про намагання більшовицької партії розколоти політично нейтральну інтелігенцію, використовуючи при цьому ту її частину, яка фактично стояла на позиціях політичного колабораціонізму. Наприкінці 20–х років, коли почався загальний відхід від прин–

ципів НЕПу та перехід до сталінської колективізації і була висунута теза про загострення класової боротьби, розпочалась відчайдушна боротьба проти політичного нейтралізму інтелігенції, який був проголошений контрреволюційним, шкідницьким і т.п. Партийна бюрократія, яка була ініціатором виховання цього політичного нейтралізму, оголосила йому війну. Від інтелігенції вимагали громогласних декларацій у «вірності справі пролетаріату», примушували її брати участь у різного роду «громадсько-політичних кампаніях» тощо.

В умовах НЕПу, в умовах відносного економічного плюралізму (В. Ленін характеризував це як багатокладність економіки), більшовицька партія, точніше, партійний апарат, були зацікавлені у політичній нейтралізації інтелігенції, що й було досягнуто адміністративно-наси́льницькими шляхами. Майже одночасно почалися спроби «політичного перевиховання» інтелігенції, які наприкінці 20-х років перетворилися на масовану атаку проти політичного нейтралізму. Інтелігенція стала об'єктом політико-ідеологічних маніпуляцій, які поєднувалися з репресіями проти її нонконформістської частини. Наприкінці 20-х років партія перейшла від суцільної деполітизації інтелігенції до її тотальної політико-ідеологічної уніфікації.

Примітки

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Henry Abramson

Historiography on the Jews and the Ukrainian Revolution*

The Ukrainian revolutionary era, filled with both great promise and terrible tragedy, remains one of the most paradoxical eras in modern Jewish history. At the same moment that the leaders of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement attempted to extend unprecedented civil rights to the Jewish population, pogromists operating in the name of that very same movement terrorized hundreds of Jewish and other minority communities living in Ukraine. The historiography on this topic has, for the most part, failed to address properly this incongruity; it has instead focused on either the actions of the pogromists or on the attempts of Ukraine's leaders to protect minority rights by including Jews in government. This unfortunate trend has been particularly prevalent since the 1926 assassination of Symon Petliura at the hands of a Bessarabian Jew, when Jewish and Ukrainian historical scholarship became mobilized to provide evidence at the Paris trial of the assassin. While works published previous to that date tend to grapple with the issues in a forthright and reasonably balanced fashion, works published after 1926 have followed in the main the arguments presented by the prosecution and defense of Petliura's assassin rather than carefully examining the historical record. Recent historiography, however, has shown an encouraging trend towards an honest re-evaluation of the polemics of previous generations.

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In the immediate aftermath of the failed revolution, the major issue of concern to most scholars of Ukrainian Jewry was not the pogroms nor the question of Petliura's personal responsibility for them. The issue of politics was of far greater import to these early researchers, specifically the nature of the split between the Socialist and the Zionist blocs in Ukrainian Jewry, in the debate over *doikeyt*, a Yiddish term meaning "hereness."¹ While the Zionists argued that the ultimate expression of Jewish nationalism could only be realized in a Jewish state in Palestine, the Socialists held that Jewish national aspirations must also be pursued in the Diaspora, with or without a Jewish state. This had implications for the Jewish response to newly independent Ukraine—the Socialists argued that Jews should take complete advantage of Ukrainian offers of "national-personal autonomy," including the creation of the Ministry of Jewish Affairs, while the Zionists hesitated, feeling that the deeper the involvement in the fledgling Ukrainian state, the more energy would be diverted from the building of the Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Nevertheless, all shades of Jewish political opinion agreed that some form of participation with the Ukrainian government was desirable, and fixed organs of Jewish representation in the Ukrainian parliament were established soon after the fall of the tsar. Until the spring of 1919 these organs were led by members of the more moderate Jewish socialist parties; they have left a considerable memoir literature on their experience. The first significant work of this nature was published by Moshe Zilberfarb, who was active in Ukrainian-Jewish politics from the founding of the Central Rada up until the resignation of the Vynnychenko government in January 1918.² Zilberfarb, who was the first Minister of Jewish Affairs in history, concerns himself for the most part with the struggle for leadership amongst the Socialist and Zionist blocs, and how political compromises were negotiated over the composition of the various governing bodies. The subject of antisemitism in the Ukrainian government in particular, and within the population in general, is treated only sporadically. The few pogroms during Zilberfarb's term of office were mainly committed by demobilizing Provisional Government troops on the western front, making them a cause of concern, but not crisis, for Ukrainian-Jewish politics.

Similarly, the memoir of the third Minister of Jewish Affairs Avraham Revutsky [Revusky], is useful for understanding the relationship between Jews and the Ukrainian governments.³ Although Revutsky's activity in the Ukrainian government was mainly in late 1918 and early 1919, he provides an interesting account of the months which connect his memoirs with Zilberfarb's. The issue of pogroms perpetrated by Ukrainian forces became especially important in February 1919, causing Revutsky to devote several chapters to the Proskuriv-Felshtin violence and its aftermath.⁴ The discussion of the pogroms does not dominate his work, however, and in general it follows the pattern set by Zilberfarb, discussing the internal Jewish political concerns of the day. Finally, the memoirs of A. Gumener, a local official of the Kamianets-Podilskyi Jewish community, complete the treatment of Jews in the Ukrainian government with his account of the final period of the Directory's activity in that region.⁵ Gumener's memoirs deal extensively with internal Jewish conflicts.

The Zionist opposition, however, was not silent during this period, publishing in 1920 a major work criticizing the Socialist bloc's policy of heavy involvement in the Ukrainian government.⁶ This work reproduced many decrees which implicated Ukrainian government forces in pogrom activity, particularly concerning the Proskuriv-Felshtin massacres perpetrated by Otaman Semesenko. It is crucial to note, however, that despite this evidence the Zionist bloc did not condemn the Ukrainian government as a whole, and still argued for Jewish participation in the Ukrainian revolutionary movement. The major point on which the Zionist bloc differed from the Socialist was that while the Socialists accepted the position of a Minister of Jewish Affairs, the Zionists argued for a senior civil servant who would perform essentially the same functions. By not sitting on the cabinet this "State-Secretary" would not be so heavily involved in national, extra-Jewish political issues.⁷

With the rise of Ukrainian participation in the growing wave of pogroms during the spring and summer of 1919, the cooperation of Jewish and Ukrainian political parties came to an end. The Zionists moved further and further away from the government while the Socialists contended with the growing success of communism. All of the Jewish Socialist parties split over the

controversy, their left wings joining the Communist movement.⁸ The Soviets welcomed Jewish Socialists who had left the Ukrainian movement and were willing to repent in print, resulting in several prominent figures, such as the Moshe Raves, publishing their memoirs critical of the Ukrainian revolution under Soviet auspices.⁹ Other Socialists, who had not joined the pro-Communist factions of their parties, continued to publish pro-Ukrainian works in the West, notably Solomon Goldelman and Arnold Margolin. While the works of Goldelman and Margolin are not nearly as informative as other sources such as Zilberfarb and Revutsky, they have enjoyed considerable popularity among Ukrainian researchers, probably owing to the fact that they published in other European languages besides Yiddish.¹⁰

The most significant centre of scholarship on the topic was in western Europe, where the noted scholar Elias (Eliyohu) Tcherikower had emigrated. Tcherikower, one of the editors of the pro-Zionist 1920 collection *Di idishe avtonomie un der natsionaler sekretariat in Ukrayne*, had amassed a considerable volume of documents while working in Kiev, including a large collection of papers from the Ministry of Jewish Affairs and a wide assortment of newspaper clippings from the short-lived periodicals of the day. Tcherikower set up the "Eastern Jewish Historical Archive," and continued to collect eye-witness reports of pogroms, intending to embark on an ambitious multi-author study under the title *History of the Pogrom Movement in Ukraine, 1917-1921* including these seven volumes:

- 1) Elias Tcherikower, *Antisemitism and Pogroms in Ukraine in the Years 1917-1918 (On the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations)*, published in 1923.¹¹
- 2) Elias Tcherikower, *The Ukrainian Pogroms of 1919*, published posthumously in 1965.¹²
- 3) Joseph Schechtman, *The Pogroms of the Volunteer Army*, published in 1932.¹³
- 4) Nahum Shtif, "The Pogroms of the Rebels (The Year 1920 in Ukraine—Civil War and Pogroms)," extant only in manuscript.¹⁴

- 5) Jacob Lestschinsky, "The Results of the Pogroms (Statistical-Economic Enquiry)," never completed.¹⁵
- 6) Nahum Gergel, *The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1918-1921*, published in 1928.¹⁶
- 7) "Materials on the History of Self-Defence," never completed.¹⁷

While the series is generally critical of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement, in part stemming from the moderate Zionist approach of most of the authors, it is more balanced than most publications that appeared after World War II. This is particularly evident in Tcherikower's first volume which treats the activity of the Jewish political parties in the Ukrainian governments in great detail, and discusses pogroms perpetrated by all forces in Ukraine rather than focussing exclusively on those perpetrated by pro-Ukrainian forces.

In May of 1926, a Bessarabian Jew named Sholem [Samuel] Schwartzbard [sometimes erroneously called "Shvartsbart"] walked up to Symon Petliura outside a Paris cafe and shot him dead. Although Schwartzbard never tried to hide his guilt (indeed he did not even attempt to flee the scene of the crime), his defence lawyer Henri Torrès adopted a clever line of argument at the trial which took place in October 1927. Rather than dealing with the issue of Schwartzbard's guilt or innocence, Torrès turned the focus of the trial on the murdered Petliura, contending that Schwartzbard was driven to an act of revenge for the pogroms that Petliura had orchestrated during the Revolution.¹⁸ Torrès' argument created the need for a new body of scholarship that supported the allegation, and a group of scholars including Tcherikower and Schechtman quickly assembled a publication that argued for Petliura's complicity in the pogroms. Issued in both English and French, the work published by the "Committee of the Jewish Delegations" proved to be both highly influential and highly effective.¹⁹ Not only was Schwartzbard acquitted, it has coloured decades of Jewish scholarship and even the popular mentality concerning Jews and Ukrainians in the revolution.

The Committee publication heavily relied on both Tcherikower's *Antisemitizm un pogromen in Ukrayne* and the earlier *Di idishe avtonomie un der natsional sekretariat in*

Ukrayne, reproducing many documents in English and French translations from those volumes. Several of the documents, however, were edited tendentiously to support Torrès argument that Petliura was the architect of the pogroms. For example, minutes from a meeting of the Mala Rada in which Joseph Schechtman argued for the establishment of special Jewish self-defence units (December 1917) is reproduced in the "Materials and Documents" section of Tcherikower's 1923 study (pp. 203-4). In this Yiddish language edition, Schechtman's comments are followed by the notes of the recording secretary:

In answer to the question, Petliura, the General Secretary for Military Affairs, confirmed that the pogroms had become quite severe and that the measures taken so far have been insufficient. He was sympathetic to the idea of separate units of Jewish soldiers and special military units for pogrom defence. He also declared that the Secretariat would take the strongest measures against the pogroms, and in the areas where the pogrom activity is the worst, he will send certain military units which may be relied upon.

These remarks of the secretary, which tend to argue against Torrès' thesis that Petliura was responsible for the pogroms, were omitted from the Committee of Jewish Delegations publications. Similarly, other documents, which may have to some degree exculpated Petliura, were not included in the Committee publications.²⁰

For the next sixty years, the vast majority of published works dealing ostensibly with the history of the Jews in Ukraine during the revolutionary years were in fact concerned more with condemning or upholding the 1927 verdict in Paris. Jewish scholars in the West and in the Soviet Union found common ground in their critique of Ukrainian nationalism, and the tenor of most publications lost any moderation which was present in the better works of the pre-Schwartzbard era. Even Pinkhos Krasny, a recent convert to communism and previously the last Minister of Jewish Affairs in Petliura's government, published a stinging attack on Ukrainian nationalism including an open letter sent to Schwartzbard's judges in Paris urging a decision in Schwartzbard's favour.²¹ This historiographic trend, which tended to ignore the positive activity of Jewish representatives in the

Ukrainian government and emphasized instead the pogroms committed by troops ostensibly loyal to that same government (often also ignoring pogroms committed by other forces such as the Whites and the Red Army), was given renewed vigour after the Holocaust, when Jewish historiography examined Ukrainian complicity in war crimes. Petliura had become, in the popular mentality, one in a long line of Ukrainian national leaders and rabid antisemites stretching back to Khmelnytsky. The most vivid example of this popular trend in the West is Saul Friedman's polemic *Pogromchik: The Assassination of Simon Petliura* (New York 1976).

Ukrainian researchers were slow to defend their cause. Despite the fact that some important material had already been published on this issue by Batchinsky, Lewitzkyj, and Specht, as well as the important general works by Khrystiuk and later by Doroshenko, no new publication of significance on Jews in Ukraine during the revolution appeared until after World War II.²² One small collection edited by Pigido in 1956, and another by Dushnyck a decade later, remained the only meaningful contributions to the debate.²³ These works relied heavily on the material published by Goldelman and Margolin, as well as the pro-Jewish laws passed by Petliura, particularly while Krasny was Minister of Jewish Affairs.²⁴ While there is a minimal treatment of the pogroms in these volumes, they are clearly propagandistic in intent and offer relatively little in understanding the deeper phenomena of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the revolution.

In 1969 an important article by Taras Hunczak appeared in *Jewish Social Studies* which signalled the beginning of a new phase in the debate.²⁵ Although Hunczak did not uncover any important new sources, nor did he advance any radically new arguments, he placed the level of debate on a higher plane as he eloquently presented the case for a "reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish relations" in a respected Jewish journal. In the best spirit of adversarial scholarly debate, the journal invited the rebuttal of Zosa Szajkowski, a long-standing proponent of the Jewish interpretation.²⁶ While Szajkowski's impassioned article found several major flaws in Hunczak's argument, he failed to ascend to the generally more academic tone of Hunczak and preferred to write in the language of vendetta and blood-feud (pp. 212-213):

I can easily understand why some people, both Ukrainians and Jews, are eagerly propagating a Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue, although these Jews represent only themselves...I do not doubt that the Ukrainians will easily find a few Jewish allies who are willing to sacrifice the sacred memory of massacred Jewish men, women and children of the Ukraine.

The Hunczak-Szajkowski debate descended to increasingly bitter *ad hominem* attacks in the subsequent volume of *Jewish Social Studies*.²⁷

Although Jewish scholars of Szajkowski's generation might have argued that questioning the Paris decision was in fact a "sacrifice [of] the sacred memory of massacred Jewish men, women and children of the Ukraine," a new generation of Jewish researchers did not agree, examining Hunczak's arguments in greater detail. As most Ukrainian researchers did not have the linguistic ability adequately to evaluate the documents, it took scholars with a strong background in Yiddish and Hebrew to complete the task.²⁸ Recent scholarship has placed less emphasis on Petliura and has examined the period from a broader perspective.²⁹ The pogroms perpetrated by Ukrainian forces are not ignored, however they are placed in the context of the brutal violence of the era as a whole. Furthermore, the activity of Jewish politicians in the Ukrainian parliaments is taken seriously, and examined as a bona fide attempt, however unsuccessful, for a rapprochement between these nationalities. The centre of this revisionist approach to Ukrainian-Jewish relations was in Israel, where the scholars Matityahu Mintz (Minc) and Arye Zaidman produced significant works which challenged the post-1926 Jewish traditional interpretation.³⁰ Research of this nature was also presented at a 1983 conference on Ukrainian-Jewish history held at McMaster University, significantly advancing the state of information on the topic.³¹ The latest contribution to the topic, following in this revisionist trend, is my article, which appeared in a recent issue of *Slavic Review*.³²

The historiographical debate over the experience of the Jews during the Ukrainian revolution takes place within the larger context of the debate on Ukrainian-Jewish relations in general. The issue of Symon Petliura's personal role or lack thereof in the pogroms dominates the literature; many Jewish scholars ignore the

positive experience of Jews in the Ukrainian governments, while many Ukrainians avoid frank discussion of the pogroms. More seriously, this historiographic *Petliurivshchyna* is confused with other traumatic periods in Ukrainian-Jewish history, such as the Khmelnytsky rebellion or the Holocaust, notwithstanding the obvious fact that these events are quite distinct and have far more complex dynamics than the monocausal "Ukrainian antisemitism" or "Jewish Ukrainophobia." If any resolution to Ukrainian-Jewish relations is to be achieved, then each of these periods must be examined in turn, perhaps with a methodology suggested by the Talmud (*Avot* 13b): "There are...[several] characteristics of an idiot, and [the same number] of a scholar...a scholar discusses first things first and last things last; of things he has not learned he says 'I have not learned'; and he acknowledges the truth; the reverse of all these is an idiot."

Notes

1. Ezra Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars* (Bloomington 1987), 43-9.
2. Moshe Zilberfarb, *Dos idishe ministerium un di idishe avtonomie in Ukrayne (a bletl geshikhte)* [The Jewish Ministry and the Jewish Autonomy in Ukraine (a page of history)] (Kiev 1919). The publication bears only the Hebrew year [5]679. Since the Hebrew calendar begins in the fall, it is possible that the work was published in 1920.
3. Avraham Revutsky, *In di shvere teg oif ukrayne: zikhroines fun a yidishn ministr* [In the Difficult Days of Ukraine: Memoirs of a Jewish Minister] (Berlin 1924). I am currently collaborating on an English translation of this work with Professor Sam Revusky and Mr. Moishe Kantorowitz. Wolf Latsky-Bertoldi briefly became Minister for Jewish Affairs shortly after Zilberfarb's resignation; however his memoir deals less with the experience of Jews in the Ukrainian revolution per se and is concerned largely with the pogroms perpetrated by the White Army. See Wolf Latsky-Bertoldi, *Gzeyrat Denikin* [The Decree of Denikin] (Berlin 1922).
4. Two commemorative books published in memory of the pogrom victims of Proskuriv and Felshtin mark the beginning of a new genre in twentieth century Jewish historiography: the semi-scholarly "Yizker-bukh" which became very popular after the destruction of thousands of Jewish communities in the Holocaust. *Khurbn Proskorov*

(New York 5684 [1923/24]); *Felshtin*, Y. Boim and A. Katz (eds.) (New York 1937). Zachary Baker, "Memorial Books as Sources for Eastern European Jewish Local History," paper presented to the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto, 17 January 1992.

5. A. Gumener, *A kapitl Ukrayne: 2 yor in Podolye* (Vilnius 1921).
6. *Di idishe avtonomie un der natsionaler sekretariat in Ukrayne: materialn un dokumentn* [Jewish Autonomy and the National Secretariat in Ukraine: Materials and Documents], M. Grosman, Y. Grinfeld, E. Tcherikower, W. Latsky, J. Schechtman (eds.) (Kiev 1920).
7. M. Postan, "Tsu der shtats-sekretar frage," in *idishe avtonomie*, 20-34.
8. This process is treated in the works of Baruch Gurevitz, "The Bolshevik Revolution and the Foundation of the Jewish Communist Movement in Russia," *Slavic and Soviet Studies* 4 (Tel-Aviv 1976): 3-20; and *National Communism in the Soviet Union 1918-1928* (Pittsburgh 1980). See also Zvi Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU* (Princeton 1972).
9. Moshe Rafe, *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine (evoliutsiia raskol "Bunda")* (Moscow 1920).
10. Goldelman's works include *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine 1917-1920* (Chicago 1968), originally published in Ukrainian; and *Lysty zhydivskoho sotsial-demokrata pro Ukrainu: Materialy do istorii ukrainsko-zhydivskykh vidnosyn za chas revoliutsii* (Vienna 1921), also published in German. Margolin wrote *Ukraina i politika Antanty* (Berlin 1921) English translation 1976; *The Jews of Eastern Europe* (New York 1926); and *From a Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine, and America 1905-1945* (New York 1946).
11. *Antisemitizm un pogromen in Ukrayne 1917-1918 (tsu der geshikhte fun ukraynish-yidishe batsihungen)* (Berlin 1923); a Russian-language version also appeared. Tcherikower's plans for the rest of the series is taken from page 6 of this volume. See also Zosa Szajkowski, "Di geshikhte fun dem itsikn bukh," in Eliyohu Tcherikower, *Di Ukrayner pogromen in yor 1919* (New York 1965): 341-3.
12. *Di Ukrayner pogromen in yor 1919* (New York 1965).
13. I.V. Shekhtman, *Pogromy dobrovolcheskoi armii* (Berlin 1932).
14. "Di pogromen fun di povstantses: Dos yor 1920 in Ukrayne, birgerkrig un pogromen," held in the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York City.

15. Lestschinsky dealt with this topic in the Yiddish press as well as devoting the odd chapter in several of his demographic studies to this topic. For references, see Szajkowski, "Geshikhte," p. 342 note 25.
16. "Di pogromen in Ukrayne in di yorn 1918-1920," *Shriftn far ekonomik un statistik 1* (Berlin 1928): 106-13. An English language version appeared in *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* (New York 1951): 237-52.
17. Szajkowski argues that Tcherikower intended to write this work himself. See Szajkowski, "Geshikhte," p. 343.
18. It is widely asserted by many Ukrainian scholars that Schwartzbard was a Communist agent. This is forcefully disputed by many Jewish scholars, and indeed it is clear that Schwartzbard believed he had sufficient reason to murder Petliura even without Communist assistance. Nevertheless, there are some interesting remarks by officials of both the CIA and the KGB that tend to support the allegation that the Communists arranged the murder. For references, see Taras Hunczak, "A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917-1921" *Jewish Social Studies* 31:3 (New York 1969), 164, note 4.
19. Committee of the Jewish Delegations, *The Pogroms in the Ukraine under the Ukrainian Governments (1917-1920): Historical Survey with Documents and Photographs* (London 1927); Comité des Délégations Juives, *Les Pogromes en Ukraine sous les Gouvernements Ukrainiens (1917-1920): aperçu historique et documents* (Paris 1927).
20. See also Petliura's 28 November 1917 decree condemning pogroms in Tcherikower, *Antisemitizm*, 209. The issue of Petliura's responsibility for the pogroms is exceptionally complex, and an elucidation of the arguments for and against will be presented as a part of my doctoral dissertation, "Jews and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920," to be completed under the supervision of Professor Paul Robert Magocsi, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto.
21. Pinkhos Krasny, *Tragediia Ukrainskogo evreistva (k protsessu Shvartsbarda)* (Kharkiv 1928). His letter is reproduced on pages 65-72.
22. J. Batchinsky, A. Margolin, M. Vishnitzer, I. Zangwill, *The Jewish Pogroms in Ukraine: Authoritative Statements on the Question of Responsibility for Recent Outbreaks against the Jews in Ukraine; Documents, Official Orders, and other Data bearing on the facts as they exist today* (Washington 1919); W. Lewitzkyi and G. Specht (eds.), *Die Lage der Juden in der Ukraine: Eine Dokumentsammlung* (Berlin 1920); Dmytro Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy 1917-1923 rr.*, 2 vols.,

- (Uzhhorod 1932); Pavlo Khrystiuk (ed.), *Zamitky i materiialy do istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii 1917-1920 rr.*, 4 vols. (Vienna 1921).
23. F. Pigido (ed.), *Material Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Years of the Revolution (1917-1921): Collection of Documents and Testimonies by Prominent Jewish Political Workers* (Munich 1956); W. Dushnyck (ed.), *Ukrainians and Jews: Articles, Testimonies, Letters and Official Documents Dealing With Interrelations of Ukrainians and Jews in the Past and Present, A Symposium* (New York 1966).
 24. Krasny's work was published with a tirage of only 2000, and it is possible that the editors remained completely unaware of its existence. Today only two known copies exist in North American libraries; one is in the New York Public Library and the other is at the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto.
 25. Taras Hunczak, "A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917-1921," *Jewish Social Studies* 31:3 (New York 1969): 163-83.
 26. Zosa Szajkowski, "'A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917-1921': A Rebuttal" *Jewish Social Studies* 31:3 (New York 1969): 184-213.
 27. "Communications," *Jewish Social Studies* 32:3 (New York, 1970): 246-63. See also the comment by Joseph Schechtman in "Communications," *Midstream* 15:9 (New York 1969): 59-61.
 28. A very significant exception to this rule is the excellent work by John Hewko, "The Ukrainian-Jewish Political Relationship During the Period of the Central Rada—March 1917 to January 1918," unpublished M. Litt. thesis, Oxford, 1981. Although Hewko could use neither Yiddish nor Hebrew sources, he spent considerable time in the archives of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research (New York) leafing through for the odd Ukrainian and Russian newspaper clippings, with very positive results.
 29. A brief but useful bibliographic overview of the subject in general is provided in Avraham Greenbaum's "Bibliographic Essay," in *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*, John Klier and Shlomo Lambroza (eds.) (Cambridge 1992), especially 380-2.
 30. Matityahu Mintz's publications include *Ha-ma'avak le-shavay: zkhuyot leumiyot u-le-avtonomie ba-kerev yehudi rusi be-ma'avar min ha-meah ha-19 u-ba-meah ha-20* [The Struggle for Equality: The Winning of National Status and Autonomy among Russian Jews between the 19th and 20th Centuries] (Tel-Aviv 1980); "The Secretariat of

Internationality Affairs (*Sekretariat mizhnatsionalnykh sprav*) of the Ukrainian General Secretariat (1917-1918)" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6:1 (Cambridge 1982): 25-42. Mintz also supervised Arye Zaidman's Ph.D. dissertation, "*Ha-avtonomie ha-leumit ha-yehudit ba-Ukraina ha-atsmait ba-shanim 1917-1919*" ["The Jewish National Autonomy in Independent Ukraine during the years 1917-1920"] (Tel-Aviv 1980).

31. Matityahu Minc [Mintz], "Kiev Zionists and the Ukrainian National Movement," *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Peter Potichnyj and Howard Aster (eds.), (Edmonton 1988): 247-62; Jonathan Frankel, "The Dilemmas of Jewish Autonomism: the Case of Ukraine 1917-1920," *ibid.*, 263-80.
32. Henry Abramson, "Jewish Representation in the Independent Ukrainian Governments of 1917-1920," *Slavic Review* 50:3 (1991): 542-50.

ТОРГІВЛЯ НА УКРАЇНІ

XIV — середина XVII століття: Волинь і Наддніпрянина

**упорядники Володимир Кравченко і
Наталія Яковенко**

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Ian A. Hunter

Putting History on Trial: The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33

Few attempts have been made to settle historical controversies by trial process.¹ One such attempt was the International Commission of Inquiry into the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33. In 1988 this Commission convened hearings in Europe, England and New York, heard *viva voce* evidence from expert witnesses and from famine survivors, examining more than fifty volumes of documentary evidence in an attempt to settle what may well be the least known mass tragedy of the twentieth century. This article examines, from a participant's perspective,² the origin, terms of reference, composition, procedure, and final report of the Commission.

The Origin

The World Congress of Free Ukrainians is an organization representing approximately four million Ukrainians living outside the Soviet Union. It was founded in 1967 by delegates representing 230 Ukrainian organizations in twenty countries. At the fourth World Congress in 1983 a resolution was passed to create a special international tribunal to examine the famine of 1932-33. The original Terms of Reference envisaged a tribunal of five jurists "selected by reason of their eminence, independence and impartiality." The number was later expanded to seven. Once selected, the Commissioners held a number of preliminary organizational meetings at which a President (Dr. Jacob W. F. Sundberg, Sweden) and a Vice-President (Professor Joe Verhoeven, Belgium) were selected, they drafted Terms of Reference, appointed General Counsel, and established procedures. A trust fund, administered by an independent trustee, was also established. Having in mind the pithy observation of the U.S. Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Justice H. Jackson, that "the world yields no respect to courts that are merely organized to convict," the trust fund was intended to

create an arm's length relationship between the petitioner (The World Congress of Free Ukrainians) and the Commission.³

Composition

The seven Commissioners, with a brief biographical background, were:

- (1) **President:** Dr. Jacob W.F. Sundberg (Sweden), sometime jurist of the Swedish Court of Appeals and, since 1963, professor of law at the University of Stockholm. Dr. Sundberg was Rapporteur-General of the International Association of Penal Law (Budapest, 1974), a participant at the U.N. Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (Geneva, 1975 and Caracas, 1980), and Swedish Correspondent to the Documentation Centre for Human Rights, Council of Europe (1982-84). Dr. Sundberg, who holds a doctorate in law from the University of Stockholm (1961), has written numerous books and since 1985 has published the annual report "Human Rights in Sweden."
- (2) **Vice-President:** Professor Joe Verhoeven (Belgium) has been, since 1975, professor of law at the Catholic University of Louvain. He holds a doctorate in law and is the author of a number of monographs and articles on international law.
- (3) Dr. Covey T. Oliver (United States), Hubbell Professor of Law (Emeritus) at the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Oliver holds law degrees from the University of Texas (1933), Columbia University (1953), and Southern Methodist University (1974). A member of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, Organization of American States (1963-66), ambassador to Columbia (1964-66), and U.S. Co-ordinator, World Bank (1969), Dr. Oliver is the author of many books and articles on international law and economics.
- (4) Professor Ricardo Levene (Hijo) (Argentina). Dr. Levene (Hijo) was called to the bar of Argentina in 1937, appointed President of the National Court of Appeals

(1975), and a judge of the Supreme Court in 1976. He was the founder and director of the Institute of Penal Law and Centre of Criminology at the University of Buenos Aires. A member of the Law Reform Codification Committee of Argentina (1953-70), Professor Levene (Hijo) is the author of more than fifty books, monographs, and articles in international law.

- (5) Professor John Humphrey (Canada). A former Dean of the Faculty of Law at McGill University, Professor Humphrey is best known for his work as Director of the Division of Human Rights, United Nations Secretariat (1946-66), where he was instrumental in the drafting, and subsequent ratification, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁴ Among his many honors and awards, Professor Humphrey is an Officer of the Order of Canada (1974).
- (6) Professor George Levasseur (France). Professor Levasseur earned a doctorate in law at the University of Paris, and taught at the Universities of Hanoi (1936-38), Grenoble (1938-49), Lille (1949-55), and Paris (1955-70). He has participated in international law conferences in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and the Middle East. He is the author of many legal texts, one of which (*General Penal Law*) is currently in its twelfth edition.
- (7) Professor Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper (England). Colonel Draper received his LL.B. degree (1935) and LL.M. (1938) from the University of London. He was the Senior War Crimes Prosecutor before the British courts in occupied Germany in 1946 and he subsequently prosecuted at Nuremberg. He was legal advisor to the War Office (Ministry of Defence) until 1956. He lectured in law at the University of London and subsequently became professor of law at the University of Sussex (1976). He was Secretary to the British Delegation on the Geneva Protocol (1971-77), and joint author (with the late Judge Lauterpacht) of the *Law of War on Land* and numerous other books and articles. In 1965 Colonel Draper was awarded the O.B.E. "for services to international law."⁵

Terms of Reference

On February 14, 1988 the Commission was constituted, declaring itself an independent body free to set its own terms of reference. The following terms of reference were then adopted:

Whereas there is contention as to the evidence that there was a deliberately planned famine in the Ukraine in 1932-33.

This has resulted in the establishment of the present Commission as an entirely non-governmental body which is based as to structure on the draft statute for Commissions of Inquiry, reported favourably to the International Law Association at its 60th conference held at Montreal, Canada, August 29-September 4, 1982.

With the purpose of inquiring into and reporting on the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine and without restricting the generality of the foregoing to inquire and report upon:

- (1) the existence and extent of the famine;
- (2) the cause or causes of such a famine;
- (3) the effect it had on Ukraine and its people; and
- (4) the recommendations as to the responsibility for the famine.⁶

Procedure

The Soviet Union was the obvious nominal respondent in the proceedings. The Commission took two steps to ensure fairness. On February 13, 1988 the Commission President, Dr. Sundberg, wrote to the Right Honorable Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, promising "an ordered, fair and thorough inquiry" into all issues, and inviting "contribution by appropriate officers, individuals and groups in the U.S.S.R. to the proceedings of the Commission."⁷ Dr. Sundberg further requested Commission access to the archives and public records of the Soviet Union pertaining to the famine.

On March 1, 1988, a reply was received from Mr. Yuri Bohayevsky, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Mr. Bohayevsky lamented "a campaign of malicious allegations and speculation around the so-called issue of 'man-made famine' in Ukraine in 1932-33." This campaign, Mr. Bohayevsky asserted, was sponsored by "Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalistic group-

ings." He enclosed with his letter an article published in *News from Ukraine* by Stanislav Kulchytsky in order "to help you and other members of your Commission to make a fair and objective evaluation of our past." Subsequently, the Soviet Union did not take a direct part in the work of the Commission.

Anticipating that the Soviet Union might choose not to be formally represented at the public hearings, the Commission appointed General Counsel whose responsibilities were based, in part, on L'Avocat Général of the Courts of Justice of the European communities.⁸ Commission minutes noted that the purpose of appointing General Counsel was: "to bring balance to the hearings and add to the integrity of the Commission. The General Counsel is to this extent an opposing party as well as an *amicus curiae*."⁹ The Commission resolved that all proceedings would be conducted in English, although interpretation would be provided. Hearings were open to the public. Evidence was taken on oath. All evidence was transcribed by a court reporter. The proceedings were also videotaped.

Witnesses were called and examined in chief counsel to the petitioner (the World Congress of Free Ukrainians). The petitioner was originally represented by Mr. John Sopinka, Q.C., who, on the opening day of the hearings in Brussels, was appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, necessitating a change in counsel for the petitioner.¹⁰ Witnesses were subject to cross-examination by general counsel, after (or during) which the Commissioners might question the witness directly. Rule 3(2) allowed the Commission to delegate one member to receive evidence. This rule was invoked to receive evidence from Mr. Malcolm Muggeridge in Sussex, England on June 27, 1988 before Commissioner Draper.

The Evidence

The evidence considered by the Commission fell into several categories: (1) *viva voce* evidence of historians, demographers and others qualified to give expert evidence; (2) oral testimony, often harrowing, from famine survivors; (3) books, monographs, and published accounts; and (4) documentary evidence. The documentary evidence, most of it never before assembled, consisted of: (a) Soviet decrees; (b) diplomatic and foreign office documents

from Britain, Italy, and Germany; (c) European newspaper sources; (d) eyewitness accounts of Western journalists; and (e) contemporary press sources.

The Final Report

The Commission's Final Report was released in May 1990. It consisted of a majority opinion, a separate concurring majority opinion (Covey T. Oliver), a lengthy separate opinion concurring in part (Jacob Sundberg), and two partial dissents (George Levasseur and Ricardo Levene (Hijo)). This proliferation of opinions (five from seven Commissioners) makes it rather difficult to extract clear findings of fact in all cases, however there are important points on which the judges were unanimous. The remainder of this article attempts to give an accurate synopsis of the judgements of the four issues originally identified in the Terms of Reference.

I. The Existence and Extent of the Famine:

On the existence of the famine, the Commission was unanimous. All seven Commissioners found that a famine existed in Ukraine (and certain other territories of the Soviet Union) from approximately August 1932 until July 1933. The Commission based this finding on "overwhelming evidence" specifically: (a) testimony of survivors; (b) diplomatic sources, particularly German and Italian consular reports which "refer unequivocally to the famine situation prevailing from autumn 1932 to summer 1933"¹¹; (c) contemporaneous press reports, particularly those of Malcolm Muggeridge and William Henry Chamberlin, then Moscow correspondents for the *Manchester Guardian* and *Christian Science Monitor* respectively; (d) contemporary scholarship, most notably Robert Conquest's ground-breaking study, *The Harvest of Sorrow*¹²; and (e) Soviet sources, "Although for years it was fiercely denied by the Soviet authorities, today the fact [of the famine] is almost universally accepted within the U.S.S.R."¹³

The Commission considered the extent of the famine under three separate headings: (a) duration; (b) geographic location; and (c) number of victims. All seven Commissioners concurred on these findings.¹⁴

Duration

While the fluid nature of events precluded attribution of precise dates, the Commission found as a fact that the famine appeared at the end of the summer of 1932, reached its peak by the beginning of spring 1933, and came to an end in the early summer of 1933.

It is obvious that the famine was a gradual phenomenon. Its precursory signs appeared early in 1932 and were the easily foreseeable culmination of the attacks Stalin launched against the peasantry in general and Ukraine in particular from the end of the previous decade. The successive grain procurements imposed on Ukraine significantly reduced the population's food supplies. A decisive blow was dealt them in July, 1932, when Moscow imposed a quota of 7.7 million tons of grain. Later, this quota was reduced to 6.6 million tons at the demand of the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference. But even this reduced quota was manifestly beyond the capacities of a population which, despite a fairly good harvest, had gradually been reduced to the famine conditions which appeared in Ukraine in early autumn 1932.

From all of the evidence received, it emerged that the famine was at its most terrible in March 1933, even if other dates are sometimes put forward. Sorely tried by the harsh winter and having exhausted the last stores of food which they had managed to save from the requisitions, the peasants starved to death in great numbers. Postyshev's appointment to the post of Second Secretary of the Communist Party in January 1933 seems to have aggravated the situation; it was followed by the reinforcement of the measures directed against the Ukrainian population, and this led to the most appalling sufferings in the early spring of 1933.

Just as it took many months to implement the conditions which brought about the famine, so it took many months before the famine came to an end. Witnesses and experts agree, however, that by the end of April/early May 1933, the grain requisitions were temporarily halted, or at least considerably reduced. Food rations were distributed, though not on a regular basis, to the survivors who were allowed to gather the fruits of the year's first harvests. Famine conditions may therefore be said to have disappeared by the beginning of summer 1933, although it would take years to

mitigate the tragic consequences of more than 10 months of total privation which caused death on a massive scale.

Geography

The location of the famine was a contentious issue. The petitioner contended that the famine, in purpose and execution, was a direct attack on Ukrainians because of stubborn Ukrainian nationalism. However, if the famine was not confined to Ukraine, this thesis was undermined. On geographic location, the Commission found:

The famine was not confined to Ukraine. In 1932-33 it also struck other regions of the Soviet Union, mainly Kazakhstan, the Don and Kuban areas of the North Caucasus Territory, along with the Volga Basin and parts of western Siberia.

Chronologically Kazakhstan was the first area affected by famine. Inhabited for the most part by nomadic herders of Turkish origin, the region showed very early signs of strong resistance to the forced collectivization of agriculture implemented by Stalin. The famine appeared here in the first months of 1932 and apparently caused even greater suffering than in Ukraine. Remember that when they had slaughtered their last cattle to feed themselves and escape official requisitions, these nomads—in contrast to the Ukrainian farmers—could not count on food crops, no matter how inadequate, because they did not grow any.

Generally speaking, the North Caucasus territory experienced a very similar situation to that of Ukraine. The Don and Kuban regions, with a majority of Cossacks, were the worst hit by the famine. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, autonomous Cossack republics were founded in this territory to satisfy the traditionally strong nationalistic sentiments of the inhabitants. These republics were dissolved on July 18, 1923 and the Cossacks were known mandatorily as Russians or Ukrainians depending on their ancestry. Moreover, a policy of Ukrainization was systematically enforced in much of Kuban after 1923. In these territories the measures taken by the Soviet authorities during the famine faithfully reproduced those which were then being applied in Ukraine and seemed to have been aimed at regions with an ethnic Ukrainian majority.

The 1932-33 famine also struck in the Volga Basin inhabited by people of mixed ethnic origins. People of German origin living in the region since the 18th century, and regrouped in the Volga German Republic instituted after the Bolshevik Revolution, seemed to have been particularly affected. It is said that Stalin had always regarded them with deep mistrust bordering on open hostility.

Although the famine was mainly concentrated in Ukraine or in territories with a Ukrainian majority, it is beyond doubt that other regions with different ethnic majorities were among its victims. The famine apparently reached maximum intensity in Kazakhstan.¹⁵

Number of Victims

The Commission concluded that it was impossible to calculate with precision the number of famine victims. In his memoirs (quoted with approval of the Commission), Nikita Khrushchev wrote: "I can't give an exact figure because no one was keeping count. All we knew was that people were dying in enormous numbers."¹⁶

The Commission sees no point in reviewing all the conceivable methods which might be applied and were brought to its attention. It need only observe that, in order to justify their estimates, all the most reliable experts used a demographic method based on an analysis of the results of the censuses carried out in the Soviet Union before and after the famine. Two censuses are particularly valuable in this respect. The first took place in 1926, i.e., six years before the famine began, and recorded 31,195,000 Ukrainians out of a total population of 147,627,900 people in the Soviet Union. The second census took place in 1939, i.e. six years *after* the famine; it recorded 28,111,000 Ukrainians out of a total population of 170,557,100 inhabitants. The population of Ukraine had therefore declined in 13 years by 3,084,000 people; that is by 9.9%. The decline contrasts sharply with the rise of 11.3% in neighbouring Belorussia (a difference of 20.2%) and of 15.7% for the Soviet Union as a whole. The difference of 21.9% in Kazakhstan is even more significant.

Scientific circles in the Soviet Union and in the West maintain that the figures obtained by the 1926 census are too low.

Conversely, the results of the 1939 census are widely taken to be over-estimated. The excess population could be explained by the desire of census officials, for fear of sanctions, to register a population increase of satisfying proportions in the light of progression, deemed inevitable, of a Communist society. It is true that the results of a census carried out in 1937 were destroyed, or at least not published, because they were judged politically unacceptable and its authors were shot for plotting to discredit socialism by an obvious underestimation of the population of the Soviet Union. This precedent certainly incited their successors to act prudently.

The primary data provided by comparison of the censuses must be corrected in relation to several factors, such as the overall population growth rate and the number of victims of dekulakization, before establishing an acceptable evaluation of the number of famine victims.

The Commission does not intend to analyze all these correctives in detail. It is not its role as a Commission of Inquiry to put an end to the controversies to which their utilization might give rise. It is content to observe that the experts are not unanimous about these correctives, and this explains their variable estimates—4.4 million (Maksudov); 4.5 million (Kosinski); 5 million (Conquest); 7.5 million (Mace). Despite the many explanations received on this point, the Commission does not feel able to choose one or another figure. It is clear, however, that the number of famine victims in Ukraine was at least 4.5 million, something which no one disputes. To this figure must be added the famine victims outside Ukraine. These are generally estimated at 3 million, of which 1 million respectively in Kazakhstan and North Caucasus. The 1932-33 famine would therefore have claimed at least 7.5 million victims; this figure may be underestimated and is certainly so in the light of conclusions upheld by some experts.

To the direct victims of the famine must be added all the other victims of Stalin's policies and, in particular, dekulakization, in order to fully evaluate the losses inflicted on the Ukrainian people at that time.¹⁷

II. The Causes of the Famine

The Commission identified three principle causes of the famine of 1932-33: (a) compulsory grain requisitions; (b) collectivization; and (c) dekulakization.

Compulsory Grain Requisitions

Grain requisitions, which constituted a kind of tax on agricultural production, had a long history in the Soviet Union. In the twenties, a Commissariat of Food in Moscow set quotas which farmers were obliged to fulfill and which seldom took account of the actual resources of a local farmer. In 1928 the Soviet government repeated a ruthless policy of forced procurement first applied during the Civil War period. In 1930 the quota imposed on Ukraine was fixed at 7.7 million tons. Because of an exceptionally good harvest, the quota was filled, although little grain was left for storage. The same quota was maintained in 1931, but was not met because of a poor harvest. Nevertheless seven million tons were requisitioned, which seriously diminished the farmer's resources. The same quota was demanded in 1932, which represented more than 50 percent of the annual harvest in Ukraine.

This procurement was clearly disproportionate, and this was stressed in public by Ukrainian leaders such as Stanislav Kossior, Mykola Skrypnyk, and Panas Liubchenko at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference which met from July 6 to 9, 1932. This conference was attended by the two senior Moscow officials in Ukraine, Lazar Kaganovich (a former Ukrainian party chief) and Viacheslav Molotov. The conference resulted in a reduction of 1.1 million tons but even this lowered figure was beyond the capacity of Ukrainian farmers. In the end only 3.7 million tons were collected by the authorities, despite immense efforts undertaken to squeeze the last supplies from farmers debilitated by famine.

The way in which grain requisitions were handled was simple; centrally established quotas were imposed on collective farms (and on the diminishing number of peasants who had temporarily escaped collectivization) with scant regard for the personal needs or resources of the farm. In theory, supplies were to be paid for but the price offered was ridiculously low. In 1933, for example, it came to 4 or 5 percent of the price which was obtainable on the free market. The quotas were fixed in Moscow by a Planning Commission, and additional supplies over and above the quota could also be demanded. Repressive measures were adopted to reinforce the efficiency of the collection process, especially from 1932 onward. The collective farms (*kolkhozy*), as well as individ-

ual farmers, were forbidden to store grain for personal need or to sell grain on the free market until the imposed quota had been handed over in its entirety. Orders were given to search farms to find grain hidden from procurement officers. These searches were carried out with particular brutality. The peasants were forced to pay in kind for any services rendered to them, such as the use of tractors or other equipment and the grinding of grain. Kolkhozy were forbidden to supply their own members until the seed reserve fixed by law had been officially stored.

Initially, quotas were applied to grain, but soon other food (meat, milk, butter and wool) became subject to requisition and seizure. In its Final Report the Commission wrote:

The plainly exorbitant nature of compulsory seizures led inevitably to famine, since the peasants no longer had the food to meet subsistence needs.

The Commission noted that, among other survival strategies, the peasants were obliged to hide as much food as possible and to eat the reserves of seed grain set aside for the next sowing season. Both reactions aggravated their condition.

The fact of hiding grain and food in general gave the authorities a basis for searching people's homes, and this was the occasion for all kinds of abuse and ill-treatment that terrorized the people.

In addition, the total or partial disappearance of the grain stored for seed irrevocably compromised any hope of overcoming such extreme shortages. The authorities used this danger as pretext for increasing the misery of the people in the autumn of 1932.

...The activist methods became more and more brutal from autumn 1932 onwards, as is shown from the great number of depositions admitted by the Commission. House searches to discover hidden food gave rise, in particular, to ill-treatment and humiliation of all kinds. They were usually carried out at night and were accompanied by robbery and destruction of property as well as by physical outrage. The aim was apparently to terrorize the population. The deeper Ukraine was plunged into famine, the more the requisitions were accompanied by abominable acts of violence. The Soviet authorities were informed of these brutalities which, to take one instance, were openly denounced in a letter addressed to Stalin on April 16, 1933 by Mr. Sholokhov, who, however, did not question the very principle of forced procurements. His protest was in

vain, although in his reply, Stalin promised that the authors of senseless acts of violence would be punished, but at the same time he denounced the existence in Ukraine of a campaign of sabotage aimed at depriving the Red Army and the workers of bread.

...While awaiting transportation, the requisitioned grain was stored in warehouses or simply stacked *in situ* near railway stations. As the famine grew worse, the peasants, now totally without food were irresistibly attracted to those stores. It is understandable that the starving tried to steal the food they needed to survive, and even to take possession of it by brute force.

As the disturbances spread, the authorities called in the army to guard the stocks, and the soldiers, usually Russian or at least not Ukrainians, did not hesitate to use their arms to safeguard the procurements. By virtue of the decree of August 7, 1932 on the safeguard of socialist property, provision was made for very heavy penalties, including death and the confiscation of all possessions, against those who tried to get hold of the grain or other food belonging to the state.

From concurring testimonies, it emerges that these warehouses or other stockpiles were literally overflowing with grain which often rotted on the spot despite the dire food shortages of the local population. Perhaps administrative disorganization was at the bottom of this paradoxical situation, but it does suggest the authorities were not so acutely short of the grain amassed as to justify its compulsory delivery.¹⁸

Collectivization

From the triumph of the October Revolution onward, land tenure was a vexed question in the Soviet Union. The abolition of private ownership of the means of production was axiomatic to Marxism, however, the meaning of the phrase "means of production," particularly as it is applied to agriculture, was to prove elusive. For a time the authorities were content to praise collectivization of agriculture but not to impose it. Ten years after the Revolution less than 2 percent of agrarian households belonged to collective farms.

State policy changed in 1928. The adoption of the first Five-Year Plan and the abandonment of the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) were accompanied by a decision to collectivize agricul-

ture by compulsory means. To begin with, the authorities were content to incite peasants to volunteer to join collective farms without forcing them to do so. In the autumn of 1929, collective farms still only included 5.6 percent of rural households in Ukraine and 3.9 percent of Ukraine's arable land. However, in November 1929, the Politburo decided to speed up the process of collectivization. By March 1, 1930 kolkhozy controlled 69 percent of the arable land and 63 percent of the peasant households in Ukraine.

The publication in *Pravda* on March 2, 1930 of a speech by Stalin entitled "Dizziness from Success" marked a pause, occasioned no doubt by the very strong resistance to collectivization and dekulakization in Ukraine. The peasants were given permission to leave the collective farms and they did so *en masse*. But for the authorities this was only a temporary and tactical retreat. At the end of 1930, enforced collectivization returned so that by the end of 1931 it embraced 70.5 percent of all farm households. When the famine broke out in 1932 three-quarters of all Ukrainian peasants were under the kolkhoz regime.

The Commission described peasant reaction to enforced collectivization as follows:

In Ukraine in particular, collectivization and dekulakization met with very fierce resistance, which could only aggravate the brutality of the procedures used to enforce them. Very many acts of resistance were put before the Commission and bear witness to the extreme hostility towards collectivization and dekulakization. Resistance included such acts as:

- the slaughter of cattle, the destruction of harvest and setting fire to farm buildings;
- the murder of party members and of other officials in the villages;
- anti-kolkhoz demonstrations which often attracted several thousand people and were almost insurrectionary in character on more than one occasion;
- armed local rebellions;
- the revolt of the women who tried to get back their collectivized belongings and to leave the kolkhozes.

...Collectivization was never limited to Ukraine, as this would have been contrary to the basic tenet of Marxist/Leninism concerning economic and social organization.

Nevertheless it seems that it was in Ukraine that forced collectivization was implemented most rapidly, at a pace which was achieved at no other time or place.¹⁹

Dekulakization

The “kulak” (in Ukrainian *kurkul*) was in principle a rich peasant at the top stratum of Ukrainian society, a society which (as in the Soviet Union as a whole) was traditionally divided into three categories: kulak, seredniak (middle peasant) and bedniak (poor peasant). These were, however, loose categories which varied from region to region. Beyond referring to the more prosperous peasants, no precise definition of “kulak” was ever formulated. Nor was there ever a precise census of their numbers though most experts consider that when Stalin took power the kulaks comprised between 3 and 5 percent of the total population of the U.S.S.R.

In Ukraine, the kulaks were at the very centre of social life. It was not that they had a monopoly on wealth, far from it. It was that, in exemplary fashion, they expressed the cultural identity of the Ukrainian people. It was among the kulaks that nationalistic feelings were strongest and most often displayed.

When the Bolsheviks took power, the kulaks became the object of certain specific measures which their prosperity, if not their influence, was supposed to justify. This discriminatory treatment was not systematic prior to 1929. However, in the first months of that year, there appeared sporadic signs of a new policy of systematic elimination of the kulaks, notably in Ukraine, and mainly at the instigation of local authorities. Then, on December 27, 1929, during a lecture on agrarian policy at a conference of Marxist students, Stalin announced his intention to proceed with the “liquidation of the kulaks as a class.” This marked the beginning of dekulakization. It was to be formally instigated by a decree on February 4, 1930, calling for “elimination of kulak households in districts of comprehensive collectivization.”

The Commission examined the impact of this decree.

According to the Politburo resolution (January 30, 1930) distinctions had to be made between three categories of kulaks.

The first category was composed of kulaks who, reputedly active counter-revolutionaries, should be arrested immediately and imprisoned, or, more frequently, shot without any form of trial.

The kulaks of the second category were to be subject to deportation to Siberia or the Arctic regions, after confiscation of their property.

The less prosperous and least influential kulaks formed the third category. Reputedly 'honest,' they were as a rule simply expelled from collective farms, after partial confiscation of their property, and dispersed within the province, where they would be asked either to tend the poorest land or carry out menial jobs.

The criteria for distribution among the categories was particularly hazy, which reinforced the arbitrariness of the authorities.

...It seems that in theory the village Soviets had the responsibility of drawing up lists of peasants to be 'dekulakized' based on plans transmitted by the district authorities, themselves acting on orders from the province, which was controlled by Moscow. These plans, however, appear to have been no more than a total figure of kulaks to be liquidated. Their execution was generally assured by special brigades in which 'activists' played a dominant part. Their assistance was, in particular, shown to be indispensable in organizing mass movements of the population. In these brigades the presence of Russians seems to have been important, as emerges from evidence gathered by the Commission.

There is no completely reliable estimate of the number of victims of dekulakization in the Soviet Union. Basing their figures on Soviet authors, Professors Kosyk and Conquest do, however, put the number of people deported at +/-1,500,000. Making reference to an unnamed Soviet source, Professor Kosyk quotes 240,757 families; the same figure is quoted by Roy Medvedev. In addition 300,000 to 500,000 kulaks were at this time executed in Ukraine.

Dekulakization was a general policy applied to the whole Soviet Union and was never specific to Ukraine.²⁰

Having examined the three principal causes of the famine, the Commission concluded that it was "certainly man-made in the sense that its immediate origin lies in human behaviour—and not,

for example, in climatic conditions or in natural catastrophes, i.e., earthquakes.”

Does this mean, then, that there was a master plan? First, the Commission noted that there is no “necessary connection” between grain procurement, collectivization and dekulakization. Nevertheless all three policies were implemented at the same time and pursued with similar ruthlessness. Whether or not Soviet authorities actually adopted a coordinated plan, of which the famine of 1932-33 was a deliberate component, the Commission could not conclusively determine until Soviet archives have been opened and primary source materials studied. Nevertheless, on the basis of available evidence, the Commission did draw five conclusions:

- 1) It is beyond doubt that Ukraine was severely affected by famine in 1932-33 and that the Ukrainian and Soviet authorities were aware of the dire food shortages of the population.
- 2) Although aware of the famine, the Soviet authorities refrained from sending any relief until the summer of 1933. “They allowed the famine to get a firm hold and cause greater and greater devastation over a period of ten months, without trying to avert its effects.”
- 3) The Soviet authorities adopted various legal measures which amplified the disastrous effects of the famine by preventing victims from finding food or from leaving the region. These measures were (a) the decree of August 7, 1932 on the protection of socialist property; (b) the decrees of September 13, 1932 and March 17, 1933 forbidding peasants to leave the kolkhozy to find other employment unless in possession of a contract guaranteed and approved by the authorities; and (c) the decree of December 4, 1932 creating a system of interior passports which had the effect of forbidding famine victims from moving without official authorization.
- 4) Ukrainian towns and cities largely escaped the famine, as did the rural local authorities charged with carrying out the grain procurements and with implementing collectivization.

- 5) Soviet authorities at the time denied the existence of any famine in Ukraine and, against all evidence to the contrary, persisted in these denials for more than fifty years.

The Commission concluded this section of its unanimous report.

Do the above findings point to a preconceived carefully prepared plan to starve Ukraine? The existence of such a plan appears nowhere in the documents submitted to the Commission and no serious evidence seems to substantiate it, apart from allegations too general to be fully reliable. It is possible that a personality as monstrous as Stalin might have conceived the most insane strategies. However, with the information now at its disposal, the Commission is unable to confirm the existence of a preconceived plan to organize a famine in Ukraine, in order to ensure the success of Moscow's policies.

That no preconceived strategy existed does not mean the famine was merely the accidental outcome of policies unfortunately interacting to annihilate the Ukrainian people. The Commission believes that the Soviet authorities, without actively wanting the famine, most likely took advantage of it once it occurred to force the peasants to accept policies which they strongly opposed. Since famine proved to be a potent weapon, as the events of 1921-22 had perhaps suggested, the authorities soon resorted to it, whatever the cost to the Ukrainian people.

...It is undeniable that the famine extended beyond Ukraine; the Volga Basin and North Caucasus in particular became severely affected by the shortage of food. It is equally clear that the grain procurements, collectivization, and dekulakization were not exclusively applied to Ukraine.

...Does this mean that there was nothing specific about the situation in Ukraine?

This would seem exaggerated. From the mass of testimonies gathered by the Commission, there can be little doubt that the Soviet authorities tried to impose on Ukraine and predominantly Ukrainian territories faster than on other regions, policies devised for all. This conclusion is supported by comparing the situation in each Soviet republic, and therefore precludes any unreserved assimilation of the fate of the Ukrainian peasants to that of the Soviet peoples as a whole. Objective reasons may have justified this par-

ticular treatment, including the fear that Ukrainian 'nationalist deviations' would induce systematic resistance to Moscow's orders. The fact of this particular treatment remains undeniable.

...The Commission does not believe that the 1932-33 famine was systematically organized to crush the Ukrainian nation once and for all; nonetheless, it is of the opinion that the Soviet authorities used the famine voluntarily, when it happened, to crown their new policy of denationalization. It is significant that, generally speaking, the famine in Ukraine spared towns where people were mostly non-Ukrainian; likewise, in the countryside where the famine raged, local officials (Russian for the most part) responsible for the grain procurements, the enforced collectivization of agriculture, and dekulakization, did not suffer.²¹

III. The Effects of the Famine

The Commission's findings on this third Term of Reference are succinct:

The immediate effect of the famine in Ukraine in 1932-33 was to inflict disastrous damage on a formerly wealthy region and terrible sufferings on the Ukrainian people. These are attested by the innumerable famine-related deaths, which are difficult to estimate precisely but were not less than 4.5 million, according to the figures mentioned earlier in this report. These sufferings were compounded by the serious physical and psychological disorders of those who survived malnutrition, some of whom never recovered. Lastly, these sufferings are palpable in the shocking moral degradation caused by the unceasing desperate search for food. Instances of cannibalism brought to the notice of the Commission are reminders of this fact. Even without such extremes, the jealousy, the fights, the informing, the murders or suicides by hanging (numerous according to the witnesses), manifest the immense moral distress of the Ukrainian people.

These sufferings were added to those arising from collectivization, dekulakization, and denationalization, under the aegis of authorities bent upon radically altering the structures of Ukrainian society, so as to make it conform to the requirements of Marxist Communism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Misery was caused by searches, confiscations, arrests, executions, deportations, and all other measures resorted to, which afflicted the Ukrainian

people so traumatically. Events since have demonstrated that the identity of the Ukrainian people survived these tragic ordeals, although they will never be forgotten, and that its representatives seek, as the establishment of this Commission proves, to shed full light on the 1932-33 famine and on the responsibilities arising from it. It is the duty of the international community to assist them in this enterprise.²²

IV. Responsibility

The Commission was an inquiry, not an international court, still less a criminal court. Nevertheless the fourth term of reference required the Commission to formulate recommendations "as to the responsibility for the famine." The Commission subdivided this into the question of (1) legal responsibility and (2) genocide. Whereas the Commission was unanimous in its findings on the first three terms of reference, it was sharply divided on these last two issues.

Majority

The starting point for the majority was that the famine was conclusively proved to be man-made; that is, it did not arise from natural causes such as drought, but from human actions. The Soviet authorities decreed and promulgated measures, the most significant of which was compulsory grain requisitions, that brought about famine. Those same authorities then deliberately withheld food from the famished population and precluded voluntary domestic and international relief efforts. Who were the authorities responsible for these decisions?

These authorities are specifically all those who, at the various organized echelons of Soviet society, carried out those measures that for ten months occasioned a dire shortage of foodstuffs in Ukraine. They are local just as much as central, Ukrainian as well as Soviet. It is evident that the responsibility of the local officials cannot be entirely absolved on the grounds that they acted on the orders and under the control of Moscow. They might not have been able to oppose the wholesale implementation in Ukraine of the measures that resulted in the famine, or even substantially modify them. Some officials vainly did their best, only reaping punishment

meted out to them for insubordination. Nevertheless, it clearly emerges from the evidence put before the Commission that the local authorities did not limit themselves merely to fulfilling orders but, by their behaviour, sometimes aggravated the damaging effects of the measures they applied. In most cases, this turn for the worse stemmed from the particularly infamous circumstances in which Moscow's decisions were enforced; sometimes, however, it originated from the freedom of action of the local authorities to adapt statutorily formulated general criteria to particular circumstances. This was particularly noticeable when it came to labelling persons as kulaks.

...Whatever the considerable role of these local authorities in the enforcement of particular policies, it appears obvious nevertheless that the prime responsibility rests with the central powers. The body of studies and testimonies compiled by the Commission unequivocally confirms this. Nor is the fact surprising. Like all other sensitive questions, collectivization, dekulakization, and grain procurements were masterminded in Moscow.

...All the available material—testimonies, documents, studies—attributes key responsibility to J. Stalin. It is he who first and foremost bears responsibility for the Ukraine famine of 1932-33. It was the outcome of policies which he initiated when he finally seized power in the Soviet Union, after ousting his rivals after Lenin's death. Stalin could not have been ignorant of the famine because it was reported to him many times. He is all the more to blame for refusing to assist the Ukrainian population before July, 1933, trying first to use the famine to impose his policies for good on the refractory peasantry. It is true, as the Commission has already underlined, that there is no irrefutable proof of this monstrous calculation. The fact remains that, for ten months Stalin did nothing to alleviate the sufferings his policies had inflicted on Ukraine, and this is enough to make him carry the brunt of responsibility.

It is reasonable to maintain that this responsibility must be shared by other members of the Politburo. The precise role that these other members played cannot easily be determined. It seems to have been less decisive than one might have expected. At the time, Stalin exercised absolute control over the Politburo. He did not hesitate to eliminate those who tried to oppose him, for instance with regard to dekulakization.²³

The majority opinion mentions other individuals, both Russian and Ukrainian, by name. Nevertheless, they concluded that it is impossible, on the evidence presented, to extend personal responsibility beyond Joseph Stalin.

The term "genocide" came into popular usage after the Second World War to condemn the persecution of Jews and Gypsies by the Nazis. The United Nations unanimously adopted an international convention on genocide on December 9, 1948. Article II of the Convention defines "genocide" as follows:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) killing members of a group;
- (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

From this definition, the Commission extracted three essential elements required for "genocide": (1) a national, ethnical, racial or religious group; (2) an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, this group "as such"; and (3) one or more of the specific acts enumerated in points (a) to (e) of Article II.

The Commission majority had no difficulty in finding the first and third conditions to be "obviously fulfilled." The Ukrainian people constituted an ethnical or national group; "the events of the time easily confirm that the Soviet authorities at least 'killed members' of this group or 'caused serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group'." However, the majority acknowledged that it was more difficult to ascertain the fulfillment of the second condition; namely, the existence of an "intent to destroy" the group "as such." Was there "an intent to destroy" the Ukrainian people?

As the Commission has already said, there exists no serious evidence that the famine was really devised by the authorities to

definitively implement their policies. In this sense, it was not wanted, even if these authorities willed the policies that resulted in the famine. However, it is very likely that Soviet authorities sought, under the direction of Stalin, to capitalize on the famine once it started, which explains why for ten months they left the Ukrainian peasantry to its fate, aggravating by their decisions the havoc wrought by a catastrophic dearth of foodstuffs. While the famine does not seem premeditated, however much the authorities wanted to impose repressive policies, the will to strike the Ukrainian peasantry appears to have existed when the famine broke out in the autumn of 1932. Admittedly, no decisive proof of such an intent exists; a thorough analysis of the Soviet archives would be necessary to confirm or invalidate the latter with relative certainty. Such an analysis is not available to the Commission; however, in view of all the substantiating data, it deems likely that such an intention existed.²⁴

The majority conceded that the famine may not have been directed against an ethnic group “as such.” But it finds that the Ukrainian people constituted a “national” group, whose “nationalist deviation” Moscow was not prepared to tolerate.

The will to denationalize Ukraine was in this respect clearly formulated, even though it did not pursue any racial or ethnic objective. It is likely that its original *raison d'être* was to preserve the integrity of the Soviet Union from any menace and equally to check a national ‘petit bourgeois’ inclination not congruous with the underlying prerequisites of communism. By merely looking at what happened, i.e., at the conditions in which this denationalization was effected and at the scale it assumed, following the people’s opposition, it is hard to believe that the authorities limited themselves to this narrow objective. On the contrary, it is the impression of the Commission that Stalin tried, through the famine, to deal a terminal blow to the Ukrainian nation ‘as such,’ and this attempt sheds light on the enormity of the sufferings endured.

To this extent, and with due regard for the substantiating data supplied it, the Commission deems it plausible that the constituent elements of genocide were in existence at the time.²⁵

The international convention on the crime of genocide did not exist at the time of the famine. However, the majority concluded that a rule of international law may predate its promulgation. While declining to say with certainty precisely when an international rule against genocide originated, the Commission majority "...has no doubt in this regard that this period had already started for quite some time when the 1932-33 famine hit Ukraine...the Commission therefore feels justified in maintaining that if genocide of the Ukrainian people occurred, it was contrary to the provisions of the international law then in force."²⁶

Dissent

Professor George Levasseur dissented on the question of genocide. He concluded that the evidence did not support a conclusion of genocide as defined in the International Convention, nor did there exist evidence of an intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Professor Levasseur also expressed reservations about applying the Convention to events which predated it by nearly two decades. He concluded that the Ukraine famine of 1932-33 was a "crime against humanity." He wrote:

the texts which define that sort of crime speak of: murder, extermination, slavery, deportation, torture, and other inhuman treatments against any civil population. The evidence gathered by the Commission has clearly shown that the crimes committed during the Ukrainian famine were indeed crimes against humanity.²⁷

Professor Covey T. Oliver issued what is styled a "separate statement" rather than a formal dissent. He wrote:

I find that the petitioner did not come to grips with two issues fundamental to the legal *crime* of genocide, whatever its origin; viz., (1) specific criminal intent to destroy Ukrainian ethnicity-nationality and, (2) an exclusive Ukrainian scope of injury through central Soviet operations, Union-wide.

I have no objection to the increasing use of the term 'genocide' as the ultimate stagnation of horrible and utterly indefensible acts, such as a dictator's blood lust; but the *legal* crime is a more

sharply etched reality within the penumbra of outrage. To confuse the shadow with the core legal crime tends to cheapen the latter and threatens unjust applications *of the law*.²⁸

Professor Ricardo Levene (Hijo) concluded that the International Convention on genocide has no retroactive application to events which occurred more than fifteen years before. Professor Levene (Hijo) also dissented from the majority by refusing to make findings of personal responsibility. He wrote:

The perpetrators of the deeds under investigation have not been pinpointed. Throughout weeks of hearings, I have heard very few actual names of persons responsible; all the talk has been of acts, policies and events. Very rarely did it become personal. This is not a tribunal of trial and conviction but of investigation within the confines that have been laid down. But, although we may not be speaking of an international or criminal tribunal, what is certain is that there has taken place an investigation relating to deeds that may be criminal. What we have not had is the presence of defendants or any indictments against specific persons; these deeds have not been cast in a legal mould; they have not been criminally classified. There has been no prosecution and no defence. They have not been given a hearing. There has been no due legal trial. All this limits the scope of this Commission, tribunal, or whatever we care to call it. But, if a reproach of a generic or unnamed kind can be made by this tribunal, it is a reproach that implies both denunciation and an indictment, if the perpetrators of these deeds are notioned, in general, not personalized, for the most part. This is in order to satisfy, albeit partially, the sentiments of a people who saw millions of their own die, disappear and suffer to the point of being wiped off the face of the earth.

We shall therefore refer the conclusions of this tribunal to the judgment of public opinion.²⁹

Conclusion

The pace of change recently in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has meant that, to some extent, the Final Report of the Commission has been overtaken by events. President Gorbachev has admitted the basic conclusions reached by the Commission.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has announced its intention to become a neutral state.³⁰ Historical archives, which will shed more light on the famine, have been opened to Western scholars for the first time. Against this fluid background, it is important to remember that when the International Commission began its work the official position of the Soviet Union, steadfastly maintained for half a century, was to deny that there had ever been a famine in 1932-33.

It may be that the work of the Commission was a partial catalyst to recent Soviet admissions. But the Commission's most significant function was to scrutinize, methodically and objectively, the disparate historical and personal evidence that had been accumulating since 1932. Its central mission was fact finding rather than judgmental. The Commission unanimously adopted these findings as fact:

- 1) that a famine existed in Ukraine (and other adjacent areas) from August 1932 until July 1933;
- 2) that this famine was not brought about by climatic conditions or crop failure or natural disasters, but was the foreseeable outcome of certain policies devised in Moscow and ruthlessly enforced in Ukraine;
- 3) that the three principle causes of the famine were compulsory grain procurements, collectivization, and dekulakization;
- 4) that at least 7.5 million people perished in the famine.

A majority of Commissioners held that Joseph Stalin must bear personal responsibility for a crime of genocide, contrary to the International Convention on Genocide. A minority of Commissioners were unprepared to ascribe personal responsibility or to find genocide legally established.

Beyond shedding any light on a horrible but little known tragedy, the International Commission could serve as a model for the future. In its independent, non-governmental status, with authority to draft appropriate rules of procedure and evidence, the model might be used, with appropriate refinement, to settle other historical and contemporary controversies by quasi-judicial inquiry.

Notes

1. The Nuremberg trials, strictly speaking, are not an exact parallel because individual accused there stood trial on specific charges; see Bradley Smith, *Reaching Judgement at Nuremberg* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Perhaps a closer parallel was the panel of judges which, in 1988, conducted a televised "trial" to investigate the wartime activities of Austrian president Kurt Waldheim.
2. The author was General Counsel to the International Commission of Inquiry into the Ukrainian famine, 1932-33.
3. The Commissioners received a *per diem* for each hearing day, an amount fixed to the equivalent to that received by judges of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (1981).
4. A full history of the origin, negotiations, and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be found in Humphrey, *Human Rights and the United Nations: The Great Adventure* (New York: Transnational Publications, 1983).
5. Professor Draper died on July 3, 1989 prior to the release of the Commission's final report.
6. *International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine: The Final Report*, 1990, p. 2; all subsequent references are cited *Final Report*.
7. Letter, Sundberg to Ryzhkov, February 13, 1988, Commission archives.
8. The powers and responsibilities of *L'Avocat Général* are reviewed in D.V. Valentine, *The Courts of Justice of the European Community*, vol. I (Stephens and Son 1965), 30-1.
9. Minutes of Commission Meeting, February 12-14, 1988, Commission archives.
10. Ms. Alexandra Chyczij acted for the petitioner at the hearings in Brussels and in England; Mr. William Liber, Q.C. acted for the petitioner in the New York hearings.
11. *Final Report*, 13.
12. Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (Oxford 1986).
13. *Final Report*, 11.
14. *Ibid.*, 16-7.
15. *Ibid.*, 17-8.

16. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), 73.
17. *Final Report*, 19-20.
18. *Ibid.*, 26-8.
19. *Ibid.*, 33-4.
20. *Ibid.*, 37-8.
21. *Ibid.*, 49-50.
22. *Ibid.*, 50-1.
23. *Ibid.*, 52, 53, 54-5.
24. *Ibid.*, 59-60.
25. *Ibid.*, 60.
26. *Ibid.*, 60-1.
27. *Ibid.*, dissenting opinion of Levasseur, 4.
28. *Ibid.*, separate opinion of Covey T. Oliver, 1.
29. *Ibid.*, opinion of Professor Ricardo Levene (Hijo), 20-1.
30. *The Globe and Mail*, (17 July 1990), 1.

Yaroslav Harchun

French Loan-words in the Work of 19th Century and Early 20th Century Ukrainian Writers

The modern Ukrainian literary language, as we will term it in this article, gained momentum in the last quarter of the 19th century, mainly in the prose works of writers of post-romantic and non-populist orientation who began to enrich their lexical fund with new borrowings from Western European languages.¹

Clearly, the transfer of new vocabulary is preceded by the transfer of new concepts,² and this obvious fact suggests one of several possible approaches to the classification of loan-words.³

Early modern literary Ukrainian would be the language of authors from Ivan Kotljarevs'kyj to, for example, Panas Myrnyj and others of his time (not all, however: Ivan Nečuj-Levyc'kyj is only one of several well-known "reactionaries" in matters of cultural contacts). We will mention that early period only for the purposes of background information, although, of course, it was not free of borrowings.⁴

The question, to what extent, in the language of an individual writer, borrowed words are used, is inextricably tied to the author's style. Evolution of style might be explained by the need to change the socio-cultural message of the work without drastically changing habitual literary forms and genres. If we go further and look for broader generative links between a given work and the time in which it is written, we also realize that the evolution of style is linked to the dominant literary current of the day. And the appearance of a literary current is conditioned both by a degree of rejection of the previous current and by the social processes that are at work. The latter condition helps explain why the language of Ukrainian/Ruthenian writers on both sides of the Russian-Austrian border began, in the last quarter of the 19th century, to take on large numbers of words from a distant language—French.

When we call French a "distant" language, we have in mind the fact that it was not the language of any neighbouring country and was not in any extra literary contact with the Ukrainian language. In other words, it never served as an alternative means of communication for any significant portion of the Ukrainian population on its own territory. And when we speak of a "significant portion of the population," we think of the varying degrees of diglossia and bilingualism that existed in Ukraine at various times: Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Romanian, Ukrainian-Hungarian, Ukrainian-Russian, and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainian-German. Ukrainian-French bilingualism never existed to such a degree that it could be termed a socio-cultural phenomenon. And Ukrainian-French diglossia, of course, is only a modern occurrence observed in émigré pockets in some Western countries. Thus, when referring to the period under study, we can speak only of individuals who knew the French language and of the influences of neighbouring languages and literatures, which borrowed French words in their own ways. For our present research, two neighbouring languages and literatures are relevant: Polish and Russian. These were the languages and literatures with which Ukrainian writers working on both sides of the Russian-Austrian border were most familiar.⁵

In passing a French word to the Ukrainian language, Polish and Russian take on the role of intermediary languages. This intermediary function is not merely mechanical, or, to put it figuratively, disinterested. The intermediary language gives to the "transit" word its own mark, its own phonetic or morphological "stamp." The picture is further complicated by the fact that very often Polish and Russian acquired their French borrowings through yet another intermediary language. Most often that intermediary language was German.

At the end of the 19th and in the first quarter of the 20th centuries the modern Ukrainian literary language acquired a basic fund of French words which have remained to this day. In the language of Ukrainian writers of that time these French borrowings often had clear phonetic or morphological features of the languages through which they had come—Polish, Russian, or German.

In choosing authors on whose works to base our lexical analysis, we considered such qualities as degree of general erudition

and spheres of literary interests. The authors selected are Ivan Franko,⁶ Myxajlo Kocjubyns'kyj,⁷ Ahatanhel Kryms'kyj⁸ and Lesia Ukrajinka.⁹ Of Ukrainian scholars and lexicographers, most useful for our purposes was Ivan Ohijenko.¹⁰ Ohijenko's stylistic dictionary is particularly valuable because it gives both variants of the Ukrainian literary language of the day—that of Austrian Ruthenia and that of Russian Ukraine. Ohijenko gathered most of the material for his dictionary from early 20th century newspapers published on both sides of the border. For background information we also used the dictionary of Pavlo Bilec'kyj-Nosenko. This first large Ukrainian dictionary published in St. Petersburg and reissued in Kiev¹¹ is interesting mainly because it helps us to see how Ukrainians have ceased to mould, or "ukrainianize" borrowed words. We have in mind here popular moulding, folk etymology and various types of distortion. Popular moulding of this sort can be found in the works of Hryhorij Kvitka-Osnov"janenko. Some of those spontaneously-adapted borrowings were systematized and, at least partly, rejected by Volodymyr Samijlenko,¹² who was both a writer and a linguist.

It may be interesting for readers to see some examples of the words that were being created in Ukrainian during the period of early modern literary Ukrainian, just before the time when foreign words began to be adapted on a rationalized basis. Here is how some of the words familiar to us today sounded at the time:

hul'var (*bul'var*), *kopytan* (*kapitan*), *kušerka* (*akušerka*), *leportuvaty* (*raportuvaty*), *okonom* (*ekonom*), *oxvyčer* (*oficer*), *parsuna* (*persona*), *patret* (*portret*), *prancjuz*,¹³ *xrancuz* (*francuz*), *sekletar* (*sekretar*).

Some formations of this type are still used today: *kumpanija* (*kompanija*), *kumediya* (*komedija*), *haplyk* (*aplike*).

Folk mouldings ceased to play any significant role in foreign word acquisition by the end of the 19th century. Today we meet only some curious remnants of these forms. On the other hand, a different problem remains: competition between two or more different forms of the same word, which came through different intermediary languages. At the end of the 19th century, the number of such variants was considerable. Here are some of them, chosen at random:

avantjura—*avantura*, *bahnet*—*bajonet*, *batareja*—*baterija*, *balans*—*biljans*, *bjudžet*—*budžet*, *deser*—*desert*, *detajl'*—*detal'*,

deviz—deviza, dyversija—dyverzija, eskadron—švadron, etyket—etyketa, gabinet—kabinet, gvarancija—harantija, hazard—azart, hrupa—grupa, kabare—kabaret, kadrelja—kadryl', klas—kljas—kljasa, koljor—kolir, kon'jak—konjak, kotleta—kotljet, nota—nuta, puder—pudra, salja—zal—zala—zalja, valec'—val's, žandar—žandarm—šandar.

We will now, by looking closely at the language of particular Ukrainian writers, attempt to trace the ways of penetration of borrowings and their gradual accommodation.

We will begin with the works of Lesja Ukrajinka. The following of her short stories were considered for our purposes: *Svjatyj večir, Metelyk, Čaška, Žal', Misto smutku, Nad morem* and *Pryjazn'*. Ukrajinka's breadth of subject, richness of theme, erudition and impulse towards innovation make her works particularly fertile ground for such research. Here, then, are the categories according to which we classify her French borrowings.

We begin with socio-political ideas, philosophical currents, and identification of social classes:

arystokrat, arystokratija, baronesa, buržua, demokratyzm, hrupa, lehitymist, oportunist, polityka, šovynist.

In the next category we include abstract concepts linked with new forms of social activity and new aesthetic values:

apatyčno, avventura, avtomatyčnist', avtomatyčno, bezpardonnyj, desperuvaty, doktors'kyj, dyplomovanyj, edukacija, edukovanyj, ehohistka, ekonomnist', ekscentryčno, elehantka, elehantnyj, esencija, hraciozno, impertynencija, intencija, interes, intryhuvaty, ironija, ironično, isteryka, isteryčnyj, vizyt, vul'harnyj, žest.

This category is so large that we will limit ourselves only to the examples cited above. We notice immediately the presence of verbs and adjectives which are of secondary derivation, created out of nouns which were primary borrowings. The mechanism by which borrowings enter a language is such that nouns prove to be the most readily transferable words—both concrete nouns and abstract ones. It is rare for nouns, and verbs or adjectives derived from them, to be borrowed at the same time. Only in the 20th century, with the dawn of the technological age, has it become rather common for verbs to be borrowed without their related nouns: *apretuvaty, forsuvaty, kaptuvaty*. Ukrajinka's verb *desperuvaty*, by the way, was not retained in the language of later decades.

Arts in the broad sense of the word form the third category of French borrowings in Ukrajinka's works. New literary terms are also included into this category. Ukrajinka's actual vocabulary of loan-words in the category of arts is very rich; here are some examples:

akord, akompanement, akt, aktrysa, anons, antrakt, artyst, artystka, bal', balkon, bilet, draperija, estrada, fihura, fotohrafija, frahment, instrument, kontrdans, orkestr, partija (as a musical term), *peizaž, p"jesa, poetesa, poetyčnyj, poezija, polonez, portret, roman, romans, rotonda, šansonetka, sjužet, spektakl', statuetka, strofa, scena, teatr, teatral'nist', tyrada.*

And finally comes the category¹⁴ into which we have included all the varied objects of daily use, objects which appeared with the development of new industries, new trading links and fashions:

abažur, baleva and bal'ova (suknja), bar"jer, batyst, bil'jard, bljuzka, braslet, broška, buduar, buket, danteli, ekipaž, fason, fotel', garderob, hotel', kanapa, kapot, karty, komod, konfitury, korsadž, kostjum, kuafjura, kušetka, neseser, otel', pavil'jon, parasol', parasol'ka, parosolyk, pelerynka, pen'juar, restoran, saše, šal', šapka, šapočka, sofa, vazoška, veranda, vitryna, vizytova [suknja], vol'terivs'ke [krislo], vual', žurnal.

Lesja Ukrajinka's lexicon is one of the richest of any writer working in the period under discussion. The four categories of foreign words we have suggested above are typical for all the other writers considered here. For that reason, we will not take the time to classify their lexicons into these categories; instead, we will look at their French borrowings from another angle.

The next author we will consider is Ahatanhel Kryms'kyj. To discover his lexicon of French loan-words, we turned to his private correspondence. The epistolary genre presents a particular advantage to the researcher of loan-words, for if foreign borrowings are used in such informal writing, this shows that they have become truly fixed in the language. In Kryms'kyj's letters we find a wide range of abstract nouns and names for objects and concepts that differ from those of our previous author.

Kryms'kyj uses a much larger number of adjectives and adverbs created from borrowed nominal stems. This could be explained by the fact that, as a scholar, Kryms'kyj had a greater tendency towards abstract thinking than did Lesja Ukrajinka.

Kryms'kyj was first to introduce many adjectives and adverbs that still, today, form part of the Ukrainian literary language:

adresnyj (stil), brošurovanyj, buržuaznyj, delikatnyj, dramtyčnyj, dramatyзовanyj, ekonomičnyj, en courant, expromptu, formal'no, iljustrovanyj, kolosal'nyj, kompetentnyj, konfiskovanyj, konkursovyj, literaturnyj, material'nyj, moral'nyj, najivnyj, nacional'nyj, nacional's'kyj, normal'nyj, partijnyj, patriotyčnyj, poetyčno, rekomendovanyj (lyst), rekomendujučyj, rekomen-dovano, rekruts'kyj, sektjars'kyj, semestral'nyj (ekzamen), senty-mental'nyj, sentymental'no, sympatyčnyj, special'nyj, teatral'ny, zakulisovyj, žurnal'nyj.

Because the stems of many of the words cited above are clearly Greek or Latin, the problem may arise as to whether they truly are French borrowings or, rather, borrowings from the Greek or Latin. In order to distinguish between Gallicisms and Latinisms or Hellenisms, it is important to make the distinction between etymological and historical sources of borrowings. French is the language in which the majority of modern "internationalisms" were moulded; French is, therefore, the historical source of borrowings of this type into Ukrainian (as well as, Polish, Russian and the entire Central-Eastern European *Sprachbund*). It does not matter in these cases that these Gallicisms ultimately go back to Latin and Greek etymological sources.

Something else we can observe while studying the Gallicisms used by Ahatanhel Kryms'kyj is how these and other word forms became stabilized. Let us consider, for example, the present-day masculine noun form *konvert*. In his letters, Kryms'kyj used several variants of this form: *kovert, koverta*, as well as the presently-accepted *konvert*, which is, from the etymological point of view, a rather dubious form.

Here are a few more examples of Gallicisms used by Kryms'kyj which differ from the present-day forms of the same words:

ažitacija, banket (also benket), zakulisovyj, konkursovyj (also konkursnyj), klasa (also klas), kurrenda (i.e., memorandum, cyrkuljar), rezon (i.e., mirkuvannja), sektjars'kyj.

Overall, however, there are not many large differences between the borrowed variants used by Kryms'kyj and Ukrajinca and the forms that we use today. This is because the usages of these two

writers formed, to a large extent, the basis of today's literary norm.

Another writer whose borrowed words differ little from today's standards is Myxajlo Kocjubyns'kyj, whose short stories *Na krylax pisni*, *Ljalečka*, and *Cvit jabluni* were analyzed for our purposes. Only a handful of his Gallicisms appear in forms that differ from those accepted today:

syl'vetka (now *syluet*), *parasol'* (now *parasol'ka*), *konfitury* (now *džem*, *varennja*), *enerhičnyi* (now *enerhijnyj*), *kartonovyj* (now *kartonnnyj*).

One might be tempted to include among Kocjubyns'kyj's Gallicisms his word *leguminka* (*lehuminka*) (French *les légumes*, meaning vegetables in general). However, the word is Moldavian. Derived from the Latin *legumen*, it means pea or bean soup.

In the works of all the three authors considered above, there are many French words and expressions which have not been adapted to Ukrainian, but are simply written wholly in French, without graphemic substitution. These occurrences provide us with an insight into the process of the gradual "acclimatization" of foreign words. This process generally consists of three stages: foreign insertions > *Fremdwörter* > *Lehnwörter*.¹⁵ Some words remain forever frozen at the first or second stage; others reach the status of fully adapted loan-words, i.e., they become *Lehnwörter*. Here are some examples of words and expressions that are clearly foreign insertions in the works of three Eastern Ukrainian authors studied so far:

à la—nowadays used even with masculine;

adieu—still used as a local colour element; known as *ad'iu* in slang;

"*ansambl'*"—although transcribed, this word is written in quotation marks by A.K.;

distinction—not accepted;

de la bonne société—found in L.U.;

derrière-loge—only *avan-loža* is known today;

esprit—spirit, mood; not accepted;

en courant—not accepted;

expromptu—today *ekspromptom*; Latin-French cross-impact;

grandeur—not accepted;

pince-nez—accepted as *pensne*;

souvenir—written without graphemic substitution by L.U.; now accepted as *suvenir*;
sans gêne—not accepted;
mésalliance—accepted as *mezal'jans*;
mansarde—used unadapted by L.U.; today accepted as *mansarda*;
négligé—unadapted in L.U.; accepted today as *negliže/nehliže*;
néglige; *frou-frou*—not accepted;
polonaise—used unadapted by L.U. as *polonez*;
petits riens—not accepted;
pardon—used as a local colour element nowadays; *pardon*;
passementerie—not accepted;

The borrowed lexicon of Ivan Franko is very rich and variable. For our purposes, we consider one of Franko's novellas, *Perexresni stežky*, which depicts the life of a country lawyer and describes the social relations that existed in Galicia during the last half of the 19th century. This is exactly the sort of material that gives the best results to the researcher looking for the new words which follow upon new ideas and new social relations. The language of commerce of the Galicia of Franko's day was full of German and Latin (polonized or germanized) terminology. Some passages of Franko's novellas are now hard to understand without a knowledge of German, or of the Polish of that time. Examples of folk etymology are also abundant and curious: *adukant* (for *advokat*), *kazeta* (for *gazeta* or *hazeta*), etc. Here is a short list of Franko's Gallicisms,¹⁶ along with explanations when required:

anekdot, *anglez* (costume), *artyst*, *ataka*, *avans* (*službove pidvyščennja*), *avansuvaty* (*rostry na službi*), *bal*, *banal'nyj*, *batareja* (*elektryčna*), *bil'jardnyj* (*pokij*), *bjudžetovyj* and *bjudžetnyj*, *bjurko*, *blondyn*, *brjunet*, *dama*, *debaty*, *dokument*, *dyrektor*, *elev* (*učen'*: never used in Eastern Ukraine), *epizod*, *etjud*, *front* (for *fasad*), *hotel'*, *inspektor*, *interesuvatysja*, *intymno*, *kandydat*, *kapryz*, *kar"jera*, *klas*, *klijentelja*, *koketka*, *kol'ons'ka* (*voda*), *komanduvaty*, *komisar*, *kompliment*, *kondujit* (*službova povedinka*), *kon'jak*, *maskarad*, *mebel'* (sing., sic!), *mina*, *moderno*, *noblesse oblige* (no graphemic substitution), *omnibus*, *parahraf*, *pardon* (no graphemic substitution), *pasyvnyj*, *pledoaje* (*donesennja*: Fr. *plaidoyé*), *pretensija*, *pudry* (pl., sic!, like Galician *poroxy*), *reklama*, *rezjume*, *romansovi* (*pryhody*), *salon*, *sekret*, *sentymentalizm*, *serveta* (not *servetka*), *sfera*, *šef*, *šovinizm*, *skandal*, *skompromituvaty*, *sofa*, *socijalist*, *specialité* (no

graphemic substitution), *sutereny* (l'ox, pyvnycja), *sympatija*, *trotuar* (never *xidnyk*), *teatr*, *temperament*, *vel'on* (today *vual'*), *vizyt*, *zavel'onovana* (*žinka*).

The task of sifting through the literary works of the authors of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries with the sole aim of "fishing out" foreign words is complicated by the fact that first editions of their books are not readily available. There is a danger that generations of editors have introduced changes to spelling according to the norms prevalent in their own day. Such changes could affect our conclusions about both phonologic and morphological aspects of the adaptation of the loan-words. Therefore, only early editions of the works being analyzed are recommended for detailed diachronic studies in adaptation.

A borrowed word is a wonderful tool in the hands of a talented stylist. But borrowings can also be a drag on the language if used without discipline.¹⁷ As they are bound to style, genre and even literary currents, foreign inserted words and phrases, *Fremdwörter*, and *Lehnwörter* go beyond the framework of the linguist's interests, and enter the realm of the literary critic.

Notes

1. Lyrical poetry generally shows a remarkable resistance to borrowings; however, the very sophisticated poetic work of Ivan Franko presents a rare exception to this almost universal rule.
2. In other words, "les mots suivent les choses," Laure Chirol, *Les mots "français" et le mythe de la France en Anglais contemporain* (Paris 1973), 13.
3. For a more detailed discussion, see Y. Harchun, "L'adaptation phonologique et morphologique du lexique d'origine français en ukrainien." Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1987, 12-4.
4. We could not include Taras Shevchenko's fiction into this analysis for an obvious reason: it was written in Russian.
5. Galician writers also knew German. However, their works provide evidence to believe that they introduced only those loan-words from German that had been already accepted by Polish. The case of Bukovynian writers is more ambiguous and deserves special research.

6. I. Franko, *Tvory v 20 tomach*, vol. 12 (New York: Knyhospilka, 1956-62).
7. M.I. Kocjubyns'kyj, *Vybrani tvory* (Kiev: Radjans'ka škola, 1969).
8. A.Ju. Kryms'kyj, *Tvory v p'jaty tomach*, vol. 5 (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1973).
9. L. Ukrajinka, *Tvory v desjaty tomach*, vol. 7 (Kiev: Dnipro, 1965).
10. I. Ohijenko, *Ukrajins'kyj stylistyčnyj slovnyk* (Winnipeg: Volyn', 1978).
11. P.P. Bilec'kyj-Nosenko, *Slovnyk ukrajins'koji movy* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1966).
12. V.I. Samijlenko, "Čužomovni slova v ukrajins'kij movi," in P.D. Tymošenko (ed.), *Xrestomatija materialiv z istoriji ukrajins'koji literaturnoji movy*, vol. 2 (Kiev 1961).
13. In Bilec'kyj-Nosenko's dictionary one can also find *prancjovatyj*-*"zaražennyj veneričeskoju bolezn'ju"* and *pranci*-*"veneričeskaja bolezn'"; francuzskaja bolezn'."*
14. It is, of course, possible to designate dozens of categories by moving in practically any direction: see, for instance, Ch. Pratt, *El anglicismo en el español peninsular contemporáneo* (Madrid 1980), where the author ridicules such descriptions as *justified borrowing*, *unjustified borrowing*, *necessary borrowing*, *superfluous borrowing*, *luxury borrowing*, *borrowing by snobbism*, *incorrect borrowing*, *ill-formed borrowing*, *objectionable borrowing*, *offensive borrowing*.
15. For a further discussion about the degree of adaptation of borrowings, see L. Deroy, *L'emprunt linguistique* (Paris 1980): 223-8; consult also S.I. Oleksijenko, "Pro leksyčno-semantyčnyj rozvytok zapożyčen'," *Movoznavstvo*, 3 (1976): 60-6.
16. For Germanisms in Ukrainian of the same period consult I. Šarovol's'kyj, *Nimec'ki pozyčeni slova v ukrajins'kij movi* (Kiev 1927).
17. One of the earliest scholarly articles treating this interesting question is O. Vočadlo's "Slavic Linguistic Purity and the Use of Foreign Words," in *The Slavonic Review*, 5 (1926): 352-63.

Document

Manifesto of the Democratic Party of Ukraine

Translator's Introduction

The "Manifesto of the Democratic Party of Ukraine" appeared in *Literaturna Ukraina* on May 31, 1990. The text's author is Iurii Badzio, a former political prisoner and now a prominent analyst of Ukrainian affairs. He was asked to draft this document by an initiative group which was at the time preparing the party's founding congress. A footnote to the published text stated that the party's detailed program of action would be developed from the principles outlined in the "Manifesto."

The founding Congress took place on December 15-16, 1990 in Kiev with 523 delegates attending. The party's statutes and several other position papers were adopted. Iurii Badzio was elected head of the national council.

Although the "Manifesto" is a collectively signed document, the text of which went through some revisions before publication, it bears the mark of Iurii Badzio's style, which combines a deliberate, lucid exposition with a passionate commitment to social justice and national emancipation. He has examined the connection between social inequality and national oppression more thoroughly, perhaps, than any other intellectual in Ukraine. From 1972 to 1979 he worked on *Pravo zhyty* (The Right to Life), his magnum opus, which explored the issue from a number of vantage points and went further than Ivan Dziuba's *Internationalism or Russification* (1968) in indicting the Soviet system. Four chapters of the manuscript, comprising 1,400 pages, were completed when it was confiscated and its author arrested in 1979. Badzio was sentenced to twelve years in prison, the maximum possible term under the article. The only charge against him was authorship of the manuscript.

When released, in December 1988, he was one of the last individuals still being held under the infamous "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" article. Badzio ran unsuccessfully in the March 1989 general election. Ironically, he was defeated by Lev Lukianenko, until then one of the longest-serving political prisoners and now Ukraine's ambassador to Canada.

The "Manifesto" is an important and insightful piece. Its analysis of the fault-lines in Ukrainian politics has already proven prophetic in several ways, and his sensitivity to Russian great-power psychology remains acutely relevant. Other aspects of the declaration may, in retrospect, appear naive or dated, nevertheless it is Badzio's (and the Democratic Party's) wish that this and similar documents be translated and discussed. The engagement with informed Western opinion remains a priority.

Myroslav Shkandrij

Manifesto

The pressure of historical circumstances initiated the policy known as perestroika. The country was facing economic collapse. Social difficulties and society's moral degeneration were growing more profound. The threat of third-world status loomed ever larger before the Soviet Union.

The reformers' first intentions were superficial and partial: economic revival through some decentralization of management ("goskhozraschet"), elimination of the most reactionary limitations on civil rights ("glasnost"), weakening the direct assimilatory pressures on the empire's non-Russian peoples (a wider political field for the development of national cultures), liberalization of economic policy to enhance economic profitability, and improvement of the USSR's international image. The planned reforms aimed at superficial modernization of the social system, lending it a more human and civilized appearance, breathing new life into it while preserving untouched the old, anti-popular order's essence: the one-party dictatorship (the CPSU's leading role, i.e., party autocracy) and its corollary, the unitary, single-subject state (the "single state," the "single union state," i.e. the empire).

Life soon smashed this new framework for freedom—a monopoly-party framework with a liberal gilding. The CPSU was compelled to broaden and deepen its reforms; the idea of accelerating the country's economic development was replaced by the concept of democratizing society as a whole.

The totalitarian Soviet system, however, remained true to itself. It attempted to restrict the political order's democratization to a mere separation in the functions of party and state organs of power. Perestroika in the economy was limited to the creation of partial, semi-autonomous forms of management (brigades, leasing, cooperatives) under conditions of centralized planning, and did not affect the essence of production relations, the ownership of the means of production; it did not destroy the state monopoly of economic activity. The national problem was "resolved" through a glib promise to "widen republican powers"; the USSR's national-political order, the unitary state, remained unchanged. Pretensions to the only correct and final understanding of history's mysteries (the ideology of "Marxism-Leninism") remained firm.

"Revolution from above" was, it became clear, a partial reformulation of the old system and clashed with life's real revolutionary requirements. This was and remains the basic reason for contradictions in the official perestroika policy, the half-heartedness of its economic reforms and their consequent ineffectiveness.

The liberal, reformist efforts of M. Gorbachev and his supporters nevertheless have played an important historical role: they have roused and politicized people's civic consciousness, shaken the conservatism of their ideological images, created the psychological and ideational ground for the appearance of self-directing collectives which are ever-more-clearly taking the initiative in affirming democracy, or, on the contrary, in expressing conservative, or even reactionary, aspirations (such as "Interfront," and the Russian "Pamiat"). The political force of the "lower orders" has been formed; the "revolution from below" is gathering momentum. This is precisely why the totalitarian system has once again been compelled to retreat, to capitulate before the idea of a multi-party system and a radical change in production relations (the equality-in-law of various forms of ownership).

It retreated, but did not surrender. Although the CPSU has been forced to accept the expunging of Article 6 from the

USSR's constitution, it still in fact does not recognize its new status as one among other parliamentary parties with equal rights. It still attempts to revive the idea of the Communist Party's messianic role in history, disguising this intention with the word "avant-garde" (a replacement for "the leading role"). The concept of perestroika in the economic system has been formulated as the creation of a "plan-market" economy—an impossible idea, because the systems foundation (economic, in this case) has to be one or the other—either plan, or market. Consequently, a gentler formula shortly appeared, "the regulated market economy," which also reveals a clear leaning toward state-monopoly management.

Finally, in the national sphere the right of the nation to self-determination has been proclaimed, but in its ideology and practice the great-power centre still tramples upon this right. The idea of leaving the USSR, and attempts by republics to do so, is branded by the centre as separatism, giving this concept a negative moral-political flavour and discrediting, in fact contradicting, the constitutional right of republics to the status of independent states.

In today's Soviet Union there are two well-defined basic concepts of social development: the conservative-reformist and the radical-democratic.

The first concept is official. It is represented by the CPSU's platform. Its goal is liberalization, a loosening of the totalitarian system with the preservation of the CPSU as a centralized party and decisive political force, and the USSR as a unitary state, an empire (in the guise of a "renewed federation"). The platform's conservatism comes through most clearly in its ideology—in the declaration of loyalty to communist perspectives.

The radical democratic concept of social change contradicts the essence of the anti-popular system, critically rethinks its ideational basis and strives to found society on the principles of humanism, economic freedom and the unqualified right of nations to self-determination.

Between these two concepts of our future, and beyond them, there exist a large variety of political tendencies: from attempts to revive Stalin's "law and order," to the idea of the free, untrammelled play of individual egoistic interests; from the desired restoration, even formally, of the pre-Bolshevik Russian empire, to the attempted prevention of the "empire's self-destruction"

through rebuilding a "commonwealth of European and Asian republics within the USSR's current boundaries."

The presence of various political forces and positions, including antagonistic ones, can be considered a normal social condition. Only, however, under one condition: that the condition is stable and rests upon a democratic social system, i.e. guarantees and defends an individual's freedom of action.

This is precisely the problem. Our current condition of ideational and political pluralism is unstable and does not signify the peaceful competition of views and the tolerance of citizens. We are living through a transitional period in the development of both society and the state. The party autocracy, that all-encompassing system of ideological, political, social, and national oppression, has been shaken, but not destroyed. The system's foundation and material basis, the party-state monopoly over the means of production—this corner-stone of the captive society—has hardly been touched. Democratic gains are tangible only in the spheres of ideology and civic self-activity, within the bounds of individual initiative. They have been earned by oppositional forces in fierce political struggles.

The efforts to realize the multi-party idea and the national right to self-determination have brought the conflict between the "revolution from above" and "revolution from below" to a critical juncture. The concept of "perestroika" today no longer stands symbolically for the democratic renewal of society; it has become a banner for the official policy—partial reform of the system.

The crisis in the social order constructed on bolshevik principles is profound and all-encompassing. Therefore the conflict between the "revolution from above" and the "revolution from below" will inevitably be resolved in favour of personal and national freedom. Such a result, however, is inevitable only in the historical perspective, as a result of objective processes. A retreat, or a temporary defeat of democracy are possible. Were this to occur, "perestroika" under the pressure of conservatives and great-power supporters, would be rolled back and the conquered freedoms would gradually be more narrowly circumscribed.

The ease and painlessness of the journey to freedom, and its rapidity, depend on the interrelationship of political forces, on the historical wisdom, i.e. progressiveness, of creators and victims of

the old order, and on the level of organization and determination of democratic forces, their ability to propose a convincing project for ending the crisis. The creation of progressive parties, which oppose the CPSU's autocracy and the empire's desire for self-preservation, has been placed on the current agenda by history. It is the only democratic way of practically negating the communist party's dictatorship and building a free, economically-developed society.

Our Social Ideal: Liberty, Justice, Popular Power

We are witnessing a change of social epochs. The ideological, political and socio-economic systems of "real socialism" are disappearing into the past. A radical and total re-evaluation of values is inevitable, and this necessitates an extraordinary reorientation in people's world-view and psychology. A party that aspires to serious participation in the country's political life must have an integrated, theoretically-based understanding of social developments.

The Democratic Party of Ukraine proposes a society with a system of views which to us appear to be a theoretical rejection of the anti-popular, totalitarian order and a project for the construction of a new social system that is democratic and humane.

"Real socialism" grew out of communist theory as developed by K. Marx and F. Engels. The theory divided human history into pre-history and history proper—communist history, called the "realm of freedom" by the creators of "scientific communism."

The "realm" had the following appearance: planned production, the disappearance of trade-money relations and, therefore, of the market (thanks to the elimination of private ownership and the socialization of the means of production). The level of development of productive forces, the effectiveness of management, and the material welfare of society would be so high that one could pass from the exchange of goods based on the value of labour to the free consumption of the social product according to needs (each takes from the common social larder as much as they require). Labour would become an inner requirement of every person; the individual works for the social (common) good as far as he/she is able, i.e. wishes (from everyone according to their abilities). Labour is multi-faceted and ceases to be attached to one

form; the division of labour, including the professional, disappears—"labour is destroyed" (K. Marx). As a consequence of such a social order the alienation of individuals from one another, from the world of objects and society as a whole, disappears. The individual, therefore, is humanized, is able to regain contact with the essentially human. The pressure of material requirements is lifted (since they may always be satisfied, without regard for the quantity and nature of expended productive labour), and life is transformed into the free play of physical and spiritual forces. Society is classless; the state withers away; power over people is replaced by power over things (F. Engels).

The humanist pathos of the communist ideal is evident. However, so is something else: utopianism. "Scientific communism" failed to account for one "detail": the individual is not only a social entity ("a totality of social relations"), but also a biological one.

Communism's ideal, having become the programme of a political movement, caused a great deal of harm and led to the creation of an anti-popular social order. The cause lies not only in the fact that it was intended for West European societies with their high level of economic development, economic freedom, and political democracy. The ideal failed to anticipate the construction of a democratic state.

Democracy assumes the coexistence, interaction, and opposition of two forces, two social subjects: the state (state power) and civil society, the state and the people. According to Marx's theory, the state represents the organization of political power by the ruling class. The proletariat, having conquered the bourgeoisie, expresses the interests of the working masses as a whole; exploitation disappears; society becomes classless; the need for a state disappears; popular self-government becomes total; freedom covers all aspects of life. Hence the paradoxical conclusion: democracy (popular power) is so wide and all-encompassing that it negates itself (as a measure of popular sovereignty over state organs of power). Democracy disappears, dissolves in the self-government of the population. The idea of the state's withering away is a pillar of the communist.

Problems of a social democracy similarly did not figure in the context of the communist utopia. Socialism was simply the earlier phase of communism (not a separate socio-economic formation!),

a transitional (short-lived) stage on the path to a genuine and final "realm of freedom."

In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russian reality, Bolshevism, armed with the ideal of communism, from the very beginning presented a particularly serious ideological and political threat to the country's democratic perspectives. A society of bourgeois economic freedoms with its individualism and its self-generated community practices had still not matured. Democratic traditions were weak, the institutions of political democracy were still embryonic. The spirit of a fetished "Russian statism" (*russskoi gosudarstvennosti*) weighed heavily on people's consciousness and psychology.

The Bolshevik capture of political power in the name of an ideal—the "realm of freedom"—ideologically justified the anti-democratic practice of the new rulers. Social conditions were unable to neutralize the "anti-state" impulse of communist theory. Democracy—both political and social—disappeared not only in ideology, but also in practice. Bolshevik "war communism" was not a tactic, not an enforced adaptation of the economy to civil war conditions, as it had been interpreted over decades by the ideologists of "real socialism." It was an attempt to realize the communist ideal with its "social equality" (levelling), distribution economy and "anti-state" (anarchist), anti-democratic direction. ("Anti-democratic" in the sense that democracy is a limitation of freedom; communism is complete and consistent freedom.) The proletariat was the class expression of this ideal. The staunchest advocate of the proletariat's interests, its intellectual, moral and organizational representative in the communist ideal was the "party of a new type" (Lenin's teaching). The dictatorship of the proletariat becomes in actual fact—and quite logically, according to theory—the dictatorship of the party.

Historical reality played a cruel joke on the idealistic (and, simultaneously, vulgarly materialistic) projects for a future "realm of freedom" designed by the proletariat's ideologists. Living people shaped society according to their vital interests. The party dictatorship created its own political infrastructure. The power of the idea gradually became the power of an office; a new bureaucracy was in formation. Attempts to organize the new social life on the principles of direct democracy, without representative

democracy (the idea of societal rule, the rule of soviets from separate social strata) turned out to be unsuccessful and impractical. There was a short period of undefined responsibilities when the soviets and the Bolshevik party shared power. This ended with the decisive victory of the party, which steadily, ever more widely and concretely, became a power and an organization controlling all social life, i.e. became state power. In essence a single party state apparatus was being formed (which also assimilated the apparatus for economic management). It had two branches: a formal party apparatus and a formal state apparatus. The higher power over society as a whole, i.e. state power, belonged to the party apparatus. The ideological expression of such a situation was the idea of the CPSU's leading role; its juridical expression was Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR.

When private ownership over the means of production is destroyed, the economic and political realms grow into one another, and a citizen's political status simultaneously defines the socio-economic nature of their position. Political power also becomes a direct economic subject of society.

Having gained a monopoly of power and become an anti-democratic, corporate organization, the CPSU was thereby transformed into the collective owner of the means of production. It therefore lost the character of a party and was transformed into a new ruling social class. The process was completed at the end of the twenties and the beginning of the thirties; 1929 could be considered the high point. The final defeat of the intra-party political opposition at this time was the last political brush-stroke in the new socio-economic picture of human history. Society fell into two antagonistic classes—the "party" and the "people." The CPSU's ideology and the USSR's Constitution (from 1977) fix precisely such a structural division of Soviet society.

"Real socialism" as a socio-economic system accomplished the principles of the communist ideal's "earlier phase," its "socialist idea": planning and the state regulation of the economy, the absence of the market, the weakness and formal character of trade-money relations, a state system of social security, distribution and supply instead of buying and selling at real prices, etc. Therefore, from the economic point of view (and this is definitive in characterizing the social order) there is no basis for speaking of a deformation (degeneration) of socialism by the

“command-administrative system”; the system was genuine, “pure” socialism. Grounded in state-party monopoly ownership of the means of production a political system arose on the feudal principle of class privilege—the CPSU’s privilege of governing society. Therefore the party-state “real socialism” could with greater justification be called feudal socialism.

And what is “humane, democratic” socialism? Is it at all possible?

Life’s contemporary demands, its objective economic laws are pushing the CPSU steadily toward a real market economy with its complexities and equality-in-law of various forms of ownership—state, private, and mixed—and also toward a competitive struggle between these forms. Only this will provide a way out of the economic crisis and create an effective economic order. It is, however, a description of contemporary capitalism’s economic basis. Denationalization (privatization) of the means of production, the liquidation of the party-state monopoly of ownership, the freedom of individual economic activity, the establishment of a proportional relationship between the state and private ownership according to the vital needs of successful economic management—all this is a question of historical inevitability for us and an urgent practical demand of the present day. The convergence with capitalist economic reforms is obvious.

In the political sphere “real socialism,” having made an attempt to democratize itself (the policy of “perestroika”), also turned toward capitalism, toward “bourgeois democratic” forms in both theory and practice. The principles of democracy are one, and they can affirm themselves only on the terrain of economic freedom.

The DPU considers that the categories “capitalism” and “socialism” are outdated, have lost their historical content, present an inadequate reflection of reality and disorientate the consciousness of citizens.

Democratization, the destination of “real socialism,” its demonopolization (ideological, political, economic), the decentralization of the administrative system, the growing role of private, cooperative, share-holder enterprises, the establishment of a mixed economy—all this will inevitably change the socio-class structure of society, will give birth to the problem of economic relations between owners from various social groups, will redefine the

problem of social relations between owners and hired labour, will demand a flexible, multi-faceted and effective socio-economic state policy. In contemporary economically-developed democratic countries the linear division of society into owners and hired labour is not made, and economic relations between them do not bear the character of a categorical "black-white" contract between social collectives—"capitalists" and the "proletariat."

The DPU will strive to ensure that Ukrainian society, on its path to economic and political freedom, does not repeat the experience of primary capitalist accumulation with its acute social antagonisms and unchecked private ownership egoism. The dismantling of today's economic system, the creation of a market economy has to be accompanied by the development of a social security mechanism.

The DPU, while defending people's freedom of economic activity, stands for a humane social policy and strives to express the ideals of social justice and harmony. Therefore, it logically adheres to the world socio-democratic movement, and continues traditions of Ukrainian social democracy. The social order which we wish to establish, we call popular. Such a definition has a political, a social and an economic justification.

In the economic sphere Ukraine's progress, its way out of the economic crisis will, in our opinion, follow two routes:

1. freedom for individual economic self-activity;
2. a fundamental rebuilding of the structure and character of the national economy, the creation of a new, progressive, technical system of material production.

The transfer of agricultural production to the tracks of economic freedom does not signify an immediate "disbandment" of collective and Soviet farms. First, suitable legal, psychological, and economic conditions have to be created for farmers to freely leave the collective farms and take up successful private agriculture.

The DPU supports the right of everyone who wishes to maintain a farm to obtain an allotment of land at no cost for lifetime utilization with hereditary rights.

By virtue of greater production autonomy and an adaptation to the needs of the market economy, a number of collective and state farms will be capable, for a while, of increasing their economic efficiency. As a rule, however, collective forms of

management can be effective and apt only as voluntary creations "from below," as the initiatives of independent managers (cooperators, share-holding groups and other production unions for the purpose of marketing, processing agricultural products, agricultural-technical education, and the like). From its earliest appearance to the present day collective farm ownership has not been collective, but simply a type of state ownership.

The real democratization of the political system will create favorable conditions for the cooperative movement's development, the growth of its economic efficiency, a broad privatization (in individual and collective forms) of small and middle-scale industry, the service sector, commerce and so on. Share-holder enterprises appear to us as the form of management which will alleviate the social effects of removing the means of production from state forms and will also successfully create a market economy in heavy industry.

Productive forces in Ukraine are in a state of devastation; the level of deterioration of the means of production is very high; the economy's structure is archaic and ecologically unsafe.

The industrial society with its technical gigantism and excessive urbanization has upset the world's ecological balance, created an environment dangerous for the health of humanity, whose very physical existence is threatened. The objective historical need has arisen to reorient economic development, to direct it towards humanization and conservation, toward a responsible view of nature.

The technical foundation for the new, progressive civilization, which can be called a humanitarian-ecological one is a computerization of material and spiritual production. A new society is being born. Its most general socio-economic characteristics are decentralized production, the development of small and middle-scale enterprises at the cost of industrial giants. As a consequence, we have a weakening of the urbanization process, a development of agriculture, the growing role in production of small labour collectives, including the family.

The DPU considers that the Republic's natural and human resources, its intellectual and cultural potential give Ukrainian society the possibility of creating a new economic system and of becoming a world leader in economic progress. This requires a maximal and effective mobilization of material and spiritual

forces in the Ukrainian Republic, something that is possible only under conditions of Ukrainian state independence.

The proposed principles of Ukrainian society's economic renaissance are particularly relevant today in a country with such agricultural spaces and such an ecological catastrophe. We see our future in the preservation, rebuilding and development of Ukrainian agricultural civilization, united with a responsive, ecologically safe industry that is informed by science, that develops for humanity's benefit and not for its own. This will provide the economic basis for the Ukrainian nation's profound historical identity.

The DPU considers that the foundation of a democratic Soviet political order must be built on the overthrow—in ideology and practice—of the CPSU's privileged status and the creation of a multi-party system. The law ought to guarantee equal rights for political parties, freedom of speech, of information, of the press, of belief, of all forms of democratic self-activity and self-expression among citizens. The DPU views its chief interest and activity as the propagation of ideological freedom and democracy, the practical participation in an elaboration and acceptance of relevant legal propositions, the active struggle against undemocratic phenomena.

The DPU supports all democratic expressions of the independent civic movement; it considers that a political union is the highest manifestation of a citizen's social consciousness and self-activity. We are for cooperation with all forces and individuals who encourage society's democratization, including democratic forces in the CPSU. The DPU is free from ideological sectarianism in its attitude toward the Communist Party and will support any of its liberal initiatives. At the same time we do not disguise our view of the historical fate that awaits the Communist Party. As a result of the democratization of society, the Communist Party will steadily lose the characteristics of a social class (a process that has already begun) and will face the necessity of reforming itself into a genuine party, i.e. a voluntary union of citizens, participation in which does not give its members any economic, social or political benefits. In such a situation the motivation for entry into the party will be an individual citizen's conviction. Insofar as the idea of communism has exhausted itself historically, it is becoming ever clearer that the ideological ground is being cut from beneath the

Communist Party. This circumstance, and to an even greater extent moral considerations, will push its thinking members to break from their party. The criminal heritage in the CPSU's historical activity is excessively great for any honest person to feel comfortable in its ranks, while recognizing it.

In national life and international relations the DPU will, through its activity, create an atmosphere of harmony, mutual understanding, mutual respect, and cooperation, defending the national interests of people from all backgrounds. History has left us as its heritage a large burden of international misunderstandings and prejudices. The affirmation of democracy, the securing of human rights for all of whatever nationality, the satisfaction of cultural needs for Russians, Belorussians, Jews, Crimean Tatars, Hungarians, Poles, Bulgarians, Greeks, Moldavians, Gagauzes, and all other nationalities of Ukraine, the rebirth of their languages, schools, churches, cultural centers—all this will certainly lighten the burden of inter-nationality alienation, will bring about more harmonious, settled relations and work for the moral-political consolidation of Ukrainian society. The DPU considers that free development of national cultures in the Republic will enrich the spiritual life of all Ukraine's population.

The DPU respects the national dignity of all peoples, is against national nihilism, the propagation of racism and national exclusivity, chauvinist and discriminatory views aimed against any nation. It considers that the myth of the Ukrainian people's antisemitism, created by various Ukrainophobic forces is false and demeaning to our national consciousness. In the society to which we aspire there can be no room for antisemitism, for disrespect toward any nation.

Among other nations who live in the Republic a sympathetic attitude toward the national rebirth of the Ukrainian people and its legitimate desire for state independence will foster and enrich the democratization process. It will create favourable conditions for a healthier economy, the elevation of the material and spiritual welfare of the whole Ukrainian people. The DPU will do its utmost to ensure that all republican nationalities are convinced that Ukraine's state independence corresponds to their vital interests.

We attach particular significance to the development of education, science and culture, and the satisfaction of society's spiritual needs. The contemporary technological world has placed

people in conditions of extraordinary psychological strain and ecological danger, has created powerful mechanisms for humanity's alienation from itself and nature. Education, science, and culture are first to be summoned in the counter-struggle. Our primary need here is for a humanization of the educational, cognitive, and spiritual-creative life of society, the freeing of education, science, and culture from ideological dogmas and administrative arbitrariness in government organs, a consolidation of the spirit of free-thinking and the critical assimilation of humanity's intellectual heritage—all resting on a foundation of democratic values and humanism.

In today's conditions there is a growing need for science's analytical activity in all spheres. The DPU is for freedom in scientific enquiry, for making the development of fundamental science a priority, for raising the scientist's prestige in society. For Ukrainian sciences such problems as the strengthening of material support, the radical renewal of cadres and organizational structures, the overcoming of artificial isolation from the world scientific community caused by the "centre," and the establishment of direct contacts with science abroad are particularly urgent.

National oppression, which has weighed upon the Ukrainian people for centuries, has slowed, structurally deformed, and creatively impoverished the development of our education, science, and culture. A renaissance and a catching up with more fortunate nations who are leading the way will require conditions of special support for the development of Ukrainian education, science, and culture. They can be created only by a committed, nationally-responsive state policy. Such a policy can only be realized by an independent Ukrainian state.

Although a secular, non-religious organization that supports the separation of church and state, the DPU understands the great spiritual force of religious consciousness and feeling. It not only defends freedom of faith and the equal rights of confession, but supports the religious rebirth of nations, considering such a rebirth both a serious factor in and an inevitable result of society's democratization. This ought to guarantee believers not only the freedom to celebrate religious rites, but also the freedom to propagate a religious world-view and religious teachings.

Good will, tolerance in relations between atheists and faithful is a sign of spiritual health and a high cultural level within both groups. The DPU unites in its ranks both atheists and believers; ideological intolerance on the grounds of atheism or religion is not compatible with membership in the DPU.

For seven and a half centuries, from the time of the Tatar-Mongol invasion, the foreign threat, like the sword of Damocles, has hung over Ukraine; the people, the nation has faced the question of survival.

At the end of the twentieth century another still more terrible sword, related to and a product of the first, has been raised over Ukraine: will Ukraine survive physically? Will the Ukrainian people save themselves from the ecological catastrophe which has already stepped across the threshold of our historical home?

A state program is required to lead Ukraine out of the ecological crisis. It should set two goals:

1. saving people suffering from "ecological" illnesses and improving the general population's health, and
2. removing the sources which give rise to the danger and create an environment that threatens human health.

The second part of our programme aims in particular at a moratorium on the further development of atomic energy in Ukraine, the shutting-down of the Chornobyl Atomic Energy Station and of all RBMK-type reactors as unreliable in construction, the reappraisal of industry's structure in the light of ecological requirements, the primacy of ecological over economic considerations, a new ecologically-justified socio-economic policy, a developed system of ecological education, and strict control (by both state and independent community bodies) of the quality of food products and the living environment.

For the physical survival of the Ukrainian people a particularly strong economic base and particularly favorable political and psychological conditions are necessary. The creation of such conditions and such a base will be possible only in a democratic society and an independent national state.

The Goal—State Independence for Ukraine

A nation's liberty, like an individual's, is an absolute value and does not require explanation or justification. However, we cannot ignore the fact that part of humanity exhibits a prejudice toward the national feelings and interests of the Ukrainian people.

Ukraine—the people and the territory—are in a catastrophic situation.

National self-awareness is incomplete and deformed. The national consolidation of the people is incomplete. Opposition can still be sensed between various ethnographic zones on Ukrainian territory. Linguistic Russification has made deep inroads; over large areas of the Republic, in Eastern Ukraine, it has produced an artificial division of the population into a Russian-speaking city and a Ukrainian-speaking village. The colonizing population migration created by Moscow's great-power policy has produced and continues to produce changes in the ethnic and social composition of the population in Ukraine which do not favour Ukrainians. The rulers of society are to a significant extent alienated from the national interests of the Ukrainian people. The nation has been infected with janissarism and mankurtism, a historical amnesia, which complicates and dehumanizes inter-human and inter-ethnic relations.

The social and cultural atmosphere in Ukraine created by the state policy is clearly provincial. The press, radio, television, cinema, and book-publishing have a regional character compared to the Russian centre. Not being a fully enfranchised subject of international law, Ukraine has a correspondingly underdeveloped information service. This impoverishes the Ukrainian public's information base. Ukrainian culture has lost its integrity. The prestige of the Ukrainian name has been lowered. The cultures of Ukraine's national minorities have been ruined.

The economy is on the verge of complete exhaustion; it is inefficient, socially and ecologically dehumanized, structurally and functionally deficient, and lacks any future.

The natural environment has been destroyed to the point of posing a real threat to the physical existence of the Ukrainian people. Radiation poisoning has given birth to a new reality, an increased death-rate in the Republic's population.

Such a state is the product of many centuries of foreign domination and the lack of equal jurisdictional status within the USSR's structure. Politically, economically, and culturally the Ukrainian SSR was and remains a colony of "all-Union" ministries and bureaus who from their metropolitan situation also cause Russian society many historical ills.

The primary cause of all our national problems, the threatening situation in which Ukrainians and the whole population of Ukraine find themselves, can be found in the lack of our own independent state. A tragic sign and symbol of our national oppression can be seen in the Chornobyl catastrophe.

There is only one path to survival and a guarantee of human living conditions—national freedom. National freedom is possible for us only in the form of an independent state. An independent Ukrainian state is life's historical requirement, an objective requirement for the Ukrainian nation and for the entire population of Ukraine.

Why?

History is created by people. External freedom comes of spiritual freedom, the understanding of one's rights and the need to live freely and with dignity. Unless it becomes aware of its right—both juridical and moral—to state independence, unless it works for the realization of this goal, the Ukrainian people will not be able to raise itself psychologically, to wash itself of the feeling of dependency, of second-ratedness, which adheres like a sticky sediment that has accumulated throughout centuries of national oppression.

The same can be said for the Russians.

Unless they force themselves from "their" (in reality others') republics, in particular from Ukraine, they will not be able to rid themselves of the "older brother" complex, a complex which reveals itself particularly markedly in dealings with Ukrainians and Belorussians.

The democratization of Ukrainian and Russian society requires the appropriate psychological and ideational ground: a developed sense of internal freedom, equal rights for individuals and nations. Propagating the right of national self-determination, including the constitutional right of constituent republics to leave the USSR's structure, propagating the idea of state independence for the people as a programmatic demand of the civic move-

ment—the political position, if considered without prejudice, is constructive even within the official ideology of perestroika. It supports mutual understanding between peoples, and therefore, an improvement in international relations.

An objective factor—territorially, economically, and culturally Ukraine is a self-sufficient entity and in every sphere of life is capable of acting alone effectively in an equal but independent relationship with the world. Why should she deny a part of her sovereignty in favour of the sovereign centre? The expediency of such behaviour cannot be explained by assuming its voluntary nature.

Quite the contrary—the centre, as a national-state Russian organism, is completely captive to the overpowering historical inertia of the colonizing advance on Ukraine and Belorussia; it strives to assimilate them politically, economically, and ethnically.

Two opposed and intransigent tendencies have met in East Slavic history: the Ukrainian and Belorussian drive for state independence and the imperial-Russian striving to retain Ukraine and Belorussia in a condition of subjection within their state structure. There is no middle-road in this conflict. Half-freedom is an unstable condition; stabilization can and must occur only on the ground of freedom.

The Soviet epoch in Ukrainian-Russian international relations (relations between “sovereign” Soviet republics!) is also a history of the struggle between these two tendencies.

During the reformist retreat of the totalitarian system the great-power tendency, true to form, continues to play a crafty game, turning history to its benefit. Thus during the “anti-cult” thaw there arose the concepts of a “single Soviet people” and a “new historical community of the peoples.” Theoretically they completely negated the right of Soviet nations to self-determination, the constitutional right of union republics to quit the USSR.

Today’s “renewed federation” of the official perestroika has a similar political content and sense.

A federation is not a union of sovereign states. Its constituent parts, being in some degree autonomous, i.e. self-governing, are bound by the general state (federal) laws and do not have priority over the centre’s powers, nor their right to quit the federal structure. All federal states known to the world are of this character

(the USA, FRG, CzSFR, Yugoslavia and others). Contemporary Russia is also correctly termed a federation.

Stalin not only realized his plan for Russia's "autonomization," he made a fiction of any autonomization of the "union republics." The Russian empire was renewed almost to its fullest expanse, even though formally, declaratively, the "union republics" did not lose their status as sovereign states.

If one is to be guided by constitutional interpretations of the USSR as a union of sovereign republics, who have the right to leave the union, then the Soviet Union has to be called not a federation but a confederation. Neither the 1922 agreement (ratified in 1924 as the Constitution of the USSR), nor the 1936 Constitution called the USSR a federation. The definition of the USSR as a state built upon the principle of "socialist federalism" first dates from the Brezhnev constitution of 1977. The first Soviet constitution (1918) was a constitution of the "Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic" which was understood as covering the former Russian state. The "Russian Soviet Republic" was defined as a "federation of Soviet national republics." The right of republics to leave the union federation was not recognized.

Today's idea of a "renewed federation" aims at preserving the great-power gains of Soviet Russia and legalizing Stalin's plan for its autonomization. Defining the Soviet Union as a federal state would be a step backwards compared to the current constitutional status of the USSR. The clearest expression of the centre's reactionary tendencies in national policy during the perestroika period can be found in the introduction of a union presidency and in granting Russian the status of an official language. Everything points to the fact that a modern buoy guides the political vision of great-power supporters: the preservation and strengthening of the USSR as a state analogous in structure to the USA and the FRG, i.e., a state that is politically homogeneous. There is no doubt that this would be a Russian state, that its historical will would be expressed by the centre.

The legislative actions of the centre in constructing a "renewed federation," the repressive great-power attitude of official Moscow toward the national self-determination of Soviet republics—the Baltic ones in particular—support the conclusion that national liberation cannot be achieved by the USSR's nations while they remain within the imperial state union.

The state independence of the USSR's peoples is not only a progressive requirement in national terms, but in generally democratic and socio-economic ones too.

Two basic forces have created an anti-popular, totalitarian social system in the USSR and brought it to today's ecological, economic, and national crisis:

1. the social egoism of the one-party dictatorship (CPSU)
2. the national egoism of Russian great-power policy.

"Real socialism" established itself as a socio-economic formation in which the political and economic interests of the ruling class (the bureaucracy) grew into one another. The class itself was formed historically on the basis of great-power imperialism. The victory of Stalinism was simultaneously a socio-political and a national one; thanks to it, Russian took up a dominant position in the USSR's structure and in essence renewed its pre-Bolshevik imperial status.

The widening of the republics' sovereign rights, their movement on the path to state independence narrows the centre's administrative powers over the economies of the USSR's peoples and, therefore, weakens the socio-economic cohesion of the ruling class, shakes its monolithic nature, brings communists—in particular non-Russians—closer to their own people and in so doing gives an impulse to the party's social stratification, to the democratic election of its spiritually healthy forces. The clearest example of such a perspective is in the Baltic countries.

The current attempt to reform the Soviet economy will be successful only if it reaches revolutionary proportions, i.e. introduces a market. However, in the Soviet Union a market can appear only as the result of a radical political—including a national-political—democratization of the society and country. This process is producing an organic growth and strengthening of the republics' economic subjectivity; they are inevitably striving for economic independence.

The enterprise and the republic—these are two fully-fledged agents of the market. If the party-state apparatus resists the liberation of the former, the great-power apparatus wishes to prevent the liberation of the latter. The inevitability of democratizing the economy and the imperial centre's unwillingness to give up political and economic power over the non-Russian republics are a

dramatic contradiction in perestroika's official policy. A charmed circle of unfreedom which has to be broken. Today this means one thing for Ukraine—full state independence, leaving the USSR.

The democratization of the Soviet Union threatens Russian great-power politics in a more real and direct manner than the autocratic pretensions of the CPSU. If great-power politics refuses today to retreat once more, the policy of democratic reforms is doomed. The consequences would be catastrophic for Russia also. The problem of state independence for the USSR's peoples carries within it yet another important aspect of democratization. Until now the CPSU, according to Article 6 of the Constitution, has had responsibilities for the whole society, i.e. state (government) responsibilities. However, it was and remains, not even a federal organization, but a unitary one. Therefore, its political status as the real state power failed to envisage the autonomy of union republics even formally. From the viewpoint of constitutional law this is as fundamental a contradiction in Soviet society's political system as is the contradiction between the leading role of the CPSU and the full powers of the Soviet of Popular Representatives (between the second and, according to the current edition, the sixth article of the USSR's Constitution). The CPSU's efforts to preserve its all-union monolithic (unitary) nature is a product of its great-power calculations; it contradicts the sovereign state status of republics and the desire of their peoples to state independence. The unitary political nature of the USSR, which rests on a party foundation (through the CPSU) creates enormous difficulties for the democratization of the Soviet Union's economic and political systems, for the liberty of nations to determine their own fate.

The view has been expressed that without democracy a free Ukraine is impossible. Today we would supplement this idea with this formula: without a free, independent Ukraine the democratic perestroika of Soviet society is impossible.

The objection has been raised that Europe is going through a turbulent process of integration, of economic and political unification, and this process follows objective laws! This argument is an old ideological fairy-tale of great-power supporters. Yesterday it was called something rather different: the objective process of the internationalization of peoples, the drawing-together and fusion of nations.

Firstly, at the basis of Western Europe's contemporary integration lie big business interests engaged in a competitive struggle in the international market. The needs of the Soviet economy are completely opposite; it requires decentralization, which is impossible without a national-political decentralization. One cannot create a market in the USSR outside these current political realities.

Secondly, Western Europe's contemporary integration does not lead to the loss of national economic, political and administrative subjectivity. This status is something we have yet to acquire. As a concept, and also from a historical perspective, a united Western Europe is a confederation, i.e. a union of independent states. In order to become members of such a union, the Soviet republics have to become independent.

Thirdly, the Western European societies possess economic, political and cultural integrity (especially linguistic) and are sufficiently "saturated." Therefore the free movement of capital and of the labour force will not fundamentally touch the national-historical status and position of nations.

The opposite holds in the Soviet Union; integration in the current situation threatens all peoples in the country except Russians with ethnic assimilation and setbacks in the struggle for national freedom. In any case, in Western European countries the problems associated with inter-ethnic relations have already appeared, born of the free movement of the labour force. The republics and the governments of Western Europe do not have an unambiguous and uniform attitude toward integration.

State independence for Ukraine does not signify economic isolation, autarchy, the rupture of economic relations with Russia and other republics of today's USSR. It is a question of translating these relations into an equal partnership and objective economic laws. This is the only way to the economic revival of both Ukraine and Russia. The socio-economic and spiritual salvation of Russia lays in removing from its shoulders the heavy, exhausting burden of "bringing joy" to other peoples, and in directing its historical energy into the economic development of its own land. If that occurred, the Russian non-black earth region would not be an economic wasteland.

The DPU calls for a democratic, evolutionary path to the state independence of Ukraine and imagines future Ukrainian-Russian

state relations as the good neighbourly coexistence of two independent, democratic societies. This perspective is capable of weakening or even completely removing the edge from the problem of individual human contacts between Ukraine and Russia in the process of Ukrainian state self-determination and in future democratic relations with Russia.

A peaceful, unforced course to the state independence of Ukraine would entail a gradual, but decisive widening of the boundaries of freedom, a movement from received notions to the psychological assimilation of a new, higher level of independence, from the already-achieved to new victories in the struggle for freedom. This is not a philosophy of "small deeds," but a realistic and principled politics of national liberation. Principled since it does not hide its goal and method of achieving it. Therefore we consider the ideological liberation most important. The right of nations to self-determination is an international juridical principle for the democratic solution of national questions, and leaving the USSR is our constitutional right. Our psychological liberation is taking place on this entirely legal ideological ground. It is the first requirement of our practical liberation: political, economic, and cultural.

The idea of a "new union agreement" on federal principles is speculation, and highly dangerous for the national freedom of the USSR's peoples. The law passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union concerning the procedure for a union republic leaving the USSR is unjust and tendentious in a great-power manner. In today's demographic and political conditions, formed as a result of lengthy subordination to Russia, a referendum encompassing the Republic's whole population would indicate the national will of the founding nation in far from all occasions. Most importantly, the law is invalid because it was accepted not by the subjects of the agreement (the republics), but by a supra-republican state organ in which representatives of the ruling nation, who constitute a majority, imposed their will on other members of the "union."

In the cultural sphere Ukrainian state independence can and must be achieved as soon as possible. No posturing, no supra-republican administrative forces and organs ought to interfere in the Republic's cultural policy or define the fate of our national culture. The DPU stands for the immediate pronouncement of the

complete independence of Ukrainian cultural institutions from Union administrative organs.

In the political sphere the state sovereignty of Ukraine during the transitional period to full independence will be defined by the principle that Union laws become valid on the territory of the Ukrainian Republic only after their ratification by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, and the validity on Ukrainian territory of earlier accepted Union laws which encroach upon or limit the Republic's sovereignty, harm its interests, can be annulled by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. There cannot be two sovereignties on one and the same territory.

The DPU is for the immediate active development of independent international contacts between Ukraine and other countries of the world, including the republics of the USSR, for an independent policy of the Ukrainian Republic in the international arena.

The legal basis for Ukraine's economic independence ought to be provided by a law concerning sovereign power of the Ukrainian Republic over its territory, air and water space, natural and economic resources. An independent financial and banking system and its own national currency are necessary conditions for the economic revitalization of Ukraine, for the creation of a republican market.

A law concerning citizenship in the Ukrainian Republic should be one of the first legal acts of a nationally responsible Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. It ought to become one more guarantee of the Ukrainian Republic's sovereignty in the demographic, social, and politico-economic spheres, and ought to protect the ethnic stability of the Ukrainian people on their historical territory.

The arms industry and the armed forces in general are a branch of life which will demand the most delicate and protracted efforts on the path to Ukraine's state independence. Our optimism here stems from the idea that the democratization of the Soviet Union is not only a deep internal historical requirement, but also an external one. It is part of the global process of the democratic alignment of countries as a precondition for world peace.

The DPU considers that the strengthening of Ukraine's sovereignty over its armed forces must begin with the creation of a republican army, i.e., the formation of armed units in Ukraine only by selection from the Republic's territory. Initially the

Ukrainian army would remain a constituent part of the USSR's armed forces, but its use outside the Republic's boundaries is allowed only with the permission of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

The DPU defends equal civil rights for all the population of Ukraine, without regard for the individual's nationality, and advocates the free historical development of the national minorities in Ukrainian society and unites in its ranks citizens of all nationalities.

The USSR is a state construct that arose and survived through the use of violence. Its territory is so large, that by virtue of this fact alone the society as a political monolith becomes ungovernable. A mechanical union of varied geographical, national-historical, socio-psychological, and cultural entities, the Soviet Union is not capable of existing on the principles of democracy and freedom as an integral state.

The unity of humanity and the interdependence of countries is today a reality of daily life. Under such conditions the stability of the world is possible only if its component parts are autonomous and act accordingly, harmonizing their interests with those of others. In the light of these historical demands of the day, the utopianism of Lenin's view that social progress (Lenin identified it with socialism) would be accompanied by the creation of ever-larger states, becomes evident. History bears witness to and offers as prognosis the opposite tendency. World integration on the basis of democracy and humanism (the only integration we can accept and justify) does not contradict, but actualizes the freedom of peoples' national self-determination, the creation of independent national states. Excellent testimony to this can be found in the political revolutions of Eastern Europe, in the exit of Eastern European countries from under the protection of a "strong centre" and their confirmation of state sovereignty. Superpowers are a constant threat to the destabilization of international relations.

An independent Ukrainian state is an objective need of social progress in both the world and the internal (USSR) dimension.

Our historical will to life and liberty was never extinguished. Today it requires new efforts, including organizational work. One example of such efforts is the creation of the DPU.

We are inspired by the ideals of peace, humanism, liberty, and democracy. We aspire to be equal among equals and free among the free; to be free both as a society and as a nation.

Note: This manifesto will serve as the basis for developing a concrete programme of activity for the Democratic Party of Ukraine in the immediate future.

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Reviews

Iaroslav Hrytsak. "...*Dukh shcho tilo rve do boiu...*": *Sproba politychnoho portreta Ivana Franka* ["...The Spirit that Propels the Flesh to Battle...": An Attempt at a Political Portrait of Ivan Franko]. Lviv: Kameniar, 1990. 176 pp.

This is not a volume of *frankoznavstvo*, at least as we have come to know (and be bored by) it. This is a refreshing little book that can be read with pleasure and profit. It bears the strong imprint of a creative encounter with Western historiography on nineteenth-century Galicia and it also reintegrates much of the valuable pre-Soviet literature on Ivan Franko's life and times. It is a book, in short, that makes good use of the intellectual possibilities opened up by the present political conjuncture in Ukraine. The current situation in Ukraine is never far from the author's mind. On the very cover of the book is a picture of a demonstration in Lviv: a sea of blue and yellow banners surrounding the massive statue of Franko across from the university. And the last, provocative chapter—entitled "Who Is Franko for Us?"—deals with a vexing question: how should Ukrainians now view a figure who was used as an icon by the old Soviet regime and who championed a cause, socialism, that is today largely discredited in Ukrainian public opinion?

But the book is not a political tract. It is a serious historical interpretation of Franko's political thinking and activities, focussing on the period from the 1870s through the 1890s. Although bereft of footnotes, this is clearly a work grounded in much diligent research. Particularly well done is the interpretive description of Franko's position between and relations with the national populists (*narodovtsi*), on the one hand, and the more doctrinaire radicals (Mykhailo Drahomanov and Mykhailo Pavlyk), on the other. Inevitably, here and there some errors of fact have crept in, and there is certainly room for disagreement with some of the assessments (e.g., the very negative evaluation of the Austrian "predator" [*khyzhak*, p. 9] and of the "Habsburg yoke" [p. 18]). On the whole, however, Iaroslav Hrytsak has written an engaging, generally balanced and informative account

of Franko the political animal, which can be recommended to all who wish to rediscover the great Galician writer and activist.

John-Paul Himka
University of Alberta

Catherine Andreyev. *Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and Emigré Theories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. xiv, 251 pp.

This is the revised version of a Cambridge doctoral thesis written under Professor Leonard Schapiro's supervision. The study is based on a broad range of archival and printed sources as well as on interviews with over forty individuals (including the author's father) who were involved with the *Russkoe Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie* (ROD) in one form or another.

Roughly one third of Andreyev's book is devoted to a description of General Vlasov's life and career up to his capture in July 1942 and of his subsequent experiences in the Third Reich. While well-balanced and highly readable, this section of the book offers little that is new and contains a number of factual slips. The major, and most valuable, part of Andreyev's study deals with the outlook and programs of the ROD as well as with its interaction with various Russian émigré groups in Nazi-dominated Europe. She also reproduces, in three appendices, the text of the so-called Smolensk Declaration (December 1942), Vlasov's open letter, "Why I decided to fight Bolshevism" (March 1943), and the Prague Manifesto of November 1944.

In her opening remarks Andreyev reminds us that not only the Soviet authorities but also many historians in the west have treated Vlasov and his followers as villains, calling them "traitors," Nazi hirelings, and so forth. In her review of what the ROD did and what it stood for, Andreyev presents a plausible case that Vlasov himself and most of his associates should be seen primarily as Russian patriots who wanted to rescue their country from the evils of Stalinism, and that their collaboration with the Germans was half-hearted and, in the final analysis, unavoidable. She notes as well that, in contrast to the counter-revolutionary outlook prevailing among the hundreds of thousands of people who had left Russia in the years immediately following Lenin's

triumph, Vlasov and most of his closest associates were prepared to acknowledge the legitimacy and value of certain Soviet institutions and concentrated their fire instead on the abuses that had crept into the system under Stalin.

According to Andreyev, Vlasov initially did not realize that Hitler, with racist and imperialistic objectives in the east, would time and again overrule those military and civilian functionaries of the Third Reich with whom he had first come into contact after his capture and who, for a variety of reasons, seemed to favour a more "moderate" policy towards Russians and other Slavs. By the time he recognized the true nature of Hitler's regime, it was too late to extricate himself and his followers from the German web. All he managed to do was to circumvent some particularly obnoxious Nazi demands, including those calling for a strong anti-Jewish stance in the ROD's propaganda.

Read in conjunction with Joachim Hoffmann's *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee* (Freiburg: Rombach, 1984/2nd ed. 1986), Andreyev's book is likely to become the standard reference work on an important movement whose leading figures were hanged in Moscow in August 1946.

Ulrich Trumpener
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Rohatynska zemlia. Zbirnyk istorichno-memuarnykh, etnohrafichnykh i pobutovykh materialiv. vol. 1. Edited by Uliana Liubovych et al. NTSh, *Ukrainskyi arkhiv*, vol. 50. New York, Paris, Sydney, Toronto: Tsentralnyi komitet "Rohatynshchyna," 1989. 998 pp.

For a number of years now the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the diaspora has been involved in an ambitious and important project that has not received adequate recognition from the scholarly community. I have in mind the publication of dozens of regional almanacs in the series *Ukrainskyi arkhiv*. The regional almanacs primarily concentrate on Galicia in the first half of the twentieth century, reflecting the interests and experience of the compilers, largely post-World War II emigrants from Western Ukraine.

A recent addition to the series is a volume devoted to Rohatyn county. As is typical for the series, the volume is massive, almost a page for every square kilometre of the territory with which it is concerned. It is richly illustrated, with interwar photographs, colour plates, and decorations from liturgical books published in Striatyn in the early years of the seventeenth century. The contents teem with variety: a history of the region from earliest times to 1939, memoirs of the war years, regional songs, sketches of such interesting local personalities as Roksoliana or the composer Borys Kudryk, accounts of wedding preparations, reports of organizations, reminiscences of school days. The almanac can provide one with many, many hours of entertainment as well as enlightenment.

Volumes such as *Rohatynska zemlia* constitute a unique source of knowledge about Western Ukraine in the first half of this century. Together these volumes amount to a monumental collective memoir of Galicia as it was before Sovietization, an attempt to preserve the memory of a cherished world destroyed. They provide detailed information on economic, social, religious, cultural, and organizational life in towns and villages across Galicia, especially in the 1920s and 1930s; they also record in some detail the experiences of at least the early years of World War II. Social and cultural historians of interwar Galicia will find these volumes of immense value. In fact, they have a wider significance for the general social and cultural history of interwar East Central Europe, because very few regions can boast the sort of memoiristic and other documentation that has been lavished on the counties of Galicia by this series of almanacs.

The volume on Rohatyn has been very well edited. The editors unearthed and reprinted many fascinating items from obscure periodical sources; many of the original contributions are also of high quality. There is a detailed summary of the contents in English (pp. 925-52) as well as name and place indexes.

John-Paul Himka
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D.P. Krvavych and H.H. Stelmashchuk, *Ukrainskyi narodnyi odiah XVII—pochatku XIX st. v akvareliakh Iu. Hlohovskoho* [Ukrainian Folk Dress of the Seventeenth—Beginning of the Nineteenth Centuries in the Watercolours of J. Głogowski]. Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1988. 269 pp.

Recent publications of the Rylsky Institute for Art Studies, Folklore and Ethnography have appeared in a new format. Many deal with folk dress and textiles. The book under consideration here, produced out of the Institute's Lviv Division, examines Ukrainian dress as represented in the paintings of Jerzy Głogowski. The publication differs from most books in the field for three reasons; it focuses on an early time period (the 1830s); it deals with various social strata; and a great deal of primary data is presented directly to the reader. These are very positive features of the book.

Głogowski was born into a Polish family in Lviv only a few years after this area was incorporated into the Habsburg Empire. He enjoyed a long career in the Galician Building Directorate at a time when artistic styles were changing and the architectural face of the province was undergoing major renovation. His work as a painter, however, yielded more lasting results. Some 1700 of his watercolors and ink drawings are found in the archives of the Stefanyk Library in Lviv. Over 350 of these works depict Ukrainian subject matter, primarily portraits of anonymous individuals with a decided focus on their clothing. The core of the present work consists of 218 reproductions from this material.

Though a few of Głogowski's images are copies from other paintings, the vast majority were made from direct observation as he traveled throughout Eastern Galicia. Most are dated from the last few years before his death in 1838. The age of the paintings is very significant because most sources for clothing in Ukraine date at least two or three generations later. Diachronic studies of the nineteenth century are important because this period corresponds with the large-scale introduction of factory fabrics and garments, as well as a significant decline in rural isolation.

Głogowski's images include some passportization and originate in many locations across the province. They are grouped in the book according to geographical criteria. People from the city of Lviv and environs are depicted in the first such chapter, followed

by images from the northwestern corner of Ukrainian territory. Next are grouped pictures from the Carpathian regions, Pokuttia, and western Podillia respectively. The geographical organization is valuable because it illuminates various processes of change. Combined with available information from the later nineteenth century, the Głogowski data illustrates how certain innovations appear first in the city, then spread to the nearby villages, and only later to more distant regions.

Whereas typical studies of Ukrainian "folk" dress deal only with village clothing, this book gives rare insights into the dress of townsfolk and upper classes. Fortunately, the Soviet editors chose not to halve the collection and reiterate worn slogans of upper class preciousness opposed to the revolutionary masses. Indeed, this publication offers an uncommon opportunity to study some of the cosmopolitan influences in Ukrainian folk dress.

One serious flaw in the book is the omission of a critical appraisal of the paintings' validity as ethnographic data. Stelmashchuk touches on this subject superficially on p. 64 and seems to conclude that they are absolutely dependable. Such cursory treatment of a major methodological point would be unthinkable in other fields of folklore studies. The famous *Rusalka Dnistrovaia*, for example, originated in the same time and place as Głogowski's works. The relationship of its texts with actual oral tradition is the subject of repeated investigation. Scholars agree that some sections of the text are quite folkloric while others are largely products of the compilers' imagination. Though the attention to detail in the paintings suggests that Głogowski's intentions were primarily ethnographic, this issue is taken far too lightly in the present publication.

Other negative aspects of the book are the colour distortions in the reproductions and the apparent editorial practice of "touching up" the original images. Also, Stelmashchuk footnotes his text very sparsely, and his bibliographic sources are quite limited. Some of the cited works are themselves based on secondary sources and contribute very little to the authority of his argument. As is unfortunately common in Soviet Ukrainian ethnographic publications, the scholarly apparatus is deficient in this book. We are not told, for example, the catalogue or access number to the Głogowski collection in the Stefanyk Library. The absence of an

index, list of plates, and separate bibliography is more than a simple matter of inconvenience.

In spite of these methodological and technical weaknesses, the book remains a welcome addition to the available corpus of Ukrainian material culture studies. Its strong points are hopeful indicators of improvements to come.

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Lubomyr Luciuk. *A Time for Atonement: Canada's First National Internment Operations and the Ukrainian Canadians, 1914-1920*. Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1988. 32 pp.

Between 1914 and 1920 the Canadian government interned 8,579 male "aliens of enemy nationality" including 99 Bulgarians, 205 Turks, 312 persons of "miscellaneous" origins, 2,009 Germans (1,192 unnaturalized German residents of Canada and 817 captured German seamen) and 5,954 Austro-Hungarians. While the last group included Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Poles, the majority, perhaps as many as 5,000, were Ukrainians. In addition, 81 women and 156 children, among them members of 50-60 Ukrainian families from Montreal, accompanied the men and were provided with food and quarters in two of the nineteen internment camps established during these years. Luciuk's pamphlet, based on a brief presented by the Civil Liberties Commission of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee to the Standing Committee on Multiculturalism of the House of Commons in 1987, tries to bring these injustices to public attention. Although the author reproduces a number of interesting photographs and refers to several archival documents, he has failed to consult important secondary sources* and is unfamiliar with the contemporary Ukrainian-Canadian press. As a result, the

* Desmond Morton, *The Canadian General: Sir William Otter* (Toronto 1974), 321-64; Marilyn Barber, "The Assimilation of Immigrants in the Canadian Prairie Provinces, 1896-1918: Canadian Perspectives and Canadian Policies" (PhD dissertation, University of London, 1975), chapters VI-IX.

pamphlet tends to confuse rather than to illuminate a complicated and controversial issue.

Particularly striking is the author's failure to mention that *only* those Ukrainians who had emigrated from enemy states and had not become naturalized British subjects (i.e., those who were still Austrian nationals rather than Canadian citizens) were classified as "enemy aliens," required to report to the police if they had lived within twenty miles of a major urban center and subject to internment. Canadian-born Ukrainians, Ukrainians who were naturalized British subjects and all Ukrainian natives of the Russian empire (Britain's and Canada's wartime ally) were *not* classified as "enemy aliens," forced to report to the police, uprooted, dispossessed of their property or interned (as was subsequently alleged by the author of the Civil Liberties Commission Report).^{*} All the evidence at hand suggests that the few naturalized Ukrainians who were interned on the orders of ignorant and/or prejudiced local officials were released once the appropriate authorities were apprised of their status.

Just as remarkable is the author's failure to place internment operations within their historical context and to indicate that almost all interned Ukrainians were young, single, propertyless, unemployed migrant labourers, labour activists and strikers, or members of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USPD). By 1914 most Ukrainian homesteaders had been naturalized, because nationalization was a prerequisite to obtaining a homestead patent. As a result, they were not subject to internment and in many rural districts the war years were a period of unprecedented economic prosperity and cultural efflorescence. Ukrainian migrant labourers, on the other hand, who came to Canada for brief periods to earn money on railway construction, in the mines, and in the forest industries, had neither opportunity nor the desire to be naturalized. When war broke out many, already unemployed as a result of the depression that gripped Canada from the fall of 1913 through the spring of 1916, were trapped in Canada. During the months that followed, many others were fired as "patriotic" employers and labourers from allied states (including some

^{*} "And who says time heals all?" *Globe and Mail*, 28 October 1988; "Ukrainian Canadians present demands," *Globe and Mail*, 29 October 1988.

Ukrainians from the Russian empire) demanded their dismissal and internment. When large numbers of these unemployed, destitute, and hungry men tried to enter the United States in search of work, the Colonial Office in London, fearing that they would drift back to the European front via neutral America, insisted that they be detained in Canada and suggested that "under war conditions" it would be proper to compel them to "labour at public works" in exchange for food and shelter. Consequently, most Ukrainians were interned while trying to cross the American border or because municipal councils, which were unable to provide relief, insisted that they represented a threat to civil order. There is also evidence that at least some hungry and unemployed Ukrainian labourers sought to be interned and that others were not eager to be released in 1916-17 when a revitalized economy and a serious labour shortage obliged the government to parole virtually all Austro-Hungarian (but not German) internees into the custody of employers who promised to pay current wages.

Luciuk's suggestion that "enemy aliens" were made out to be "dangerous foreigners" without ever having left the camps is completely unfounded. In 1917-19 the growth of labour militancy in Canada and the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia led the Canadian government to turn its attention from "enemy aliens" to "radical aliens"—strikers, labour activists and socialists—who were interned on the pretext of being "dangerous foreigners" and "Bolsheviks." In Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, Timmins, Copper Cliff, Winnipeg, and parts of rural Alberta, branches of the USPD were raided, files, libraries and publications were seized, printshops damaged or confiscated, members arrested, and the unnaturalized interned. In September 1918 the USPD was the only Ukrainian organization outlawed, the Ukrainian socialist press was banned for six months (four and one-half months longer than the non-socialist press) and interned socialists and strikers constituted most of the Ukrainians deported in 1919-20. Most Ukrainian community leaders, who launched few protests in 1914-16, remained silent during this second wave of internment. Indeed, there is evidence that several socialists, including Tymofei Koreichuk, a founder of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in Bukovyna who died of tuberculosis in one of the camps, were interned because of denunciations made by "respectable" Ukrainian community leaders.

Ambiguity and exaggeration characterize the discussion of conditions in internment camps. Luciuk does not mention that German internees (mostly middle-class individuals) were kept in "first class" facilities and exempted from physical labour because the 1907 Hague Convention, which governed POW camps, stipulated such a regimen for officers and civilians "of a standing considered to be equivalent to the officer grade." Nor does he mention that the work of "road-building, land-clearing, wood-cutting, and railway construction" performed by Ukrainians and other "Austrians" in Canada's hinterland regions was precisely the type of back-breaking labour that they had performed prior to internment. If some internees were driven to the limits of their endurance, kept under constant surveillance, denied access to newspapers and mistreated by guards, others exerted themselves little, established reading clubs, put on plays, and were visited by Ukrainian priests. Most of the 67 "Austrians" who perished were victims of tuberculosis, contracted years earlier in the old country, or of the 1918-19 influenza epidemic, and only one "Austrian" committed suicide. For the sake of perspective it should be remembered that thousands of Ukrainian labourers were killed, maimed and mutilated during these years because of employer negligence.

Finally, Luciuk's attempt to create the impression that internment had a devastating long-term impact on many Ukrainian Canadians is also unfounded. The RCMP officer who observed in 1941 that many Ukrainian Canadians lived "in fear of the barbed-wire fence" was referring to the Ukrainian National Federation which was composed overwhelmingly of interwar immigrants who had no memories of internment. If some UNF leaders experienced such fears in 1941 it was because 35 Ukrainian-Canadian Communists were behind barbed wire and UNF leaders who had expressed sympathy for Nazi Germany prior to 1939 were being kept under surveillance by Canadian authorities. The American intelligence agent who reported in 1944 that "Ukrainian Canadians are still under a handicap resulting from their experiences in the First World War" was not referring to internment. He was referring to the unfortunate consequences of Bishop Nykyta Budka's ill-considered pastoral letter of July 27, 1914 urging Ukrainian immigrants, especially re-

servists, to return to the old country and take their place beneath the banners of "our peace-loving Emperor Franz Joseph."

Although Canadian internment operations during the First World War were not on the same grand scale as during the Second World War (when more than 20,000 Japanese Canadians—men, women, and children; old and young; firm and infirm; employed and unemployed; Canadian-born, naturalized Canadian citizens and Japanese nationals—were permanently uprooted, separated from loved ones, dispossessed of their property, compelled to perform physical labour and forcibly dispersed across Canada or deported at war's end), they certainly deserve more scholarly attention. Luciuk's pamphlet, however, is not a reliable introduction to the issue, nor does it provide an agenda for further research and study.

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Ludmilla Bereshko [Fran Ponamarenko]. *The Parcel from Chicken Street and other stories*. Ivan Ostafiychuk, illus. Montreal: D.C. Books, 1989. 196 pp.

"No, a parcel is not ordinary thing," (p. 54) and that is especially true in the case of *The Parcel from Chicken Street*. Fran Ponomarenko has put together a special package. "It's not just a collection..." (p. 54) of stories. As each page turns, the reader is not so much reading, but rather hearing Bereshko tell the stories. Her voice is inviting. It is like visiting with an old friend. The taste of hot tea and poppy seed cake and the smell of borsch all seem real. Everyone knows a baba like Bereshko, and that is what makes this book so comfortable.

The introduction states that Ludmilla Bereshko "was born on the banks of the Dnipro River, some time around the first revolution, either in 1905 or 1909, into a khliborob family" (p.13). However, despite the interesting biographical details presented, Bereshko is actually a persona used by Fran Ponomarenko. The stories have been gathered from conversations and happenings which took place around her over the years. For this reason, Ponomarenko does not claim to be the author but instead refers to herself as the "compiler."

Ponomarenko has carefully arranged the seven stories in the collection so that every emotion is touched. As Bereshko's voice speaks, the reader cannot help but be moved by the complete range of human experience which she conveys. The characters whom she introduces come across as real. They have existed in every Ukrainian community. The rivalry, gossip, generational conflicts, and the various other situations are a part of life in any immigrant neighbourhood.

But this collection is more than a book of stories. Other reviewers have, for the most part, missed much of the substance behind the stories, as well as Bereshko's subtle social and political comments. True, the narrative is entertaining to the point of holding the reader spellbound, and the ample inclusion of humour delights. But the laughter should not obscure the fact that the characters are survivors of war, deportation, political terror, and the atrocity of the Great Famine. These Ukrainians have learned to toss out philosophical phrases and respond with wit, although they still carry the scars of horror that are the tears in their souls.

It would not be fair to state that any one of the stories is better than the rest, since each story is like a specially chosen gift. Everything fits and no one has been left out. There is plenty of variety but, at the same time, the selections are in an order which neatly ties the whole work together and delivers Bereshko's concerns effectively.

For example, "Pale Beaks" is the perfect lead-in to the final piece, "Letters from Home." In "Pale Beaks" the tone becomes more serious. The young people devise a plan to "go deep behind the iron curtain, to East Berlin and bring out—or should I say—*smuggle* out—Arkady Tokar's sweetheart, a teacher from Odessa," (p. 152) but the plan dissolves because of the Chornobyl disaster. At this point, Bereshko's story touches the heart of every Ukrainian:

That last week in April, when Chornobyl was burning, I will never forget it. Here in Montreal, we listened to the radio all day, sat on pins and needles as they announced which way the winds were blowing, how the evacuation was going. And today, three years after, we still don't know everything... (p. 159)

The speculation of the aftermath in the years to come is chilling. Bereshko wonders what will happen to the children and the animal life: "How long will it be before the water and soil are clean again? Will it be within our memory?" (p. 160). Bereshko goes on in "Pale Beaks" to remind us that "art was tied to politics whether she liked it or not," (p. 161) and advances Domka's son's prophecy, "In five years, he said he doesn't think there will be a wall in Berlin" (p. 173). Bereshko's reply, "I don't know. I wish it were so. What next? No passports I suppose?" (p. 173) subtly leads the reader to ponder further what is to become of Eastern Europe and, more specifically, Ukraine. The final story, "Letters from Home," serves as a powerful afterword. Each letter invokes a particular aspect of the history of the Ukrainian people, and the pain of separation which is felt by a scattered group. Also of significance in this selection is the note of irony in the letter dated "26.11.1954." When Bereshko finally hears from her family, her nephew Marko explains that they could not answer any letters before this time because "the address of where the letter is going must be Russian" (p. 176). The issue of the right to use the Ukrainian language has long been a sensitive one. The irony is that Bereshko is telling her stories in Montreal, where, of course, all signs must be in French. Is Bereshko telling us that some situations are not so different after all?

In *The Parcel from Chicken Street*, the inclusion of Ukrainian expressions and quotations ties together the Old and New Worlds. The setting of a Ukrainian immigrant community in Montreal, instead of the usual prairie setting, stimulates the awareness that Ukrainians have settled all across Canada and links the Ukrainians of Quebec and Eastern Canada with their cousins in the West by showing that they share common experiences and a Ukrainian spirit which is still very much alive.

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ПРОБУДЖЕНА МУЗА

Ігор Калинець

«Пробуджена муза» — це перше видання, яке охоплює майже половину поетичного доробку Ігоря Калинця, відомого українського поета, будителя національного відродження у Львові 1987-89 рр. До цього видання ввійшли вибіркові твори із 8 збірок першого періоду творчості поета (від дебюту 1965 р. до ув'язнення в половині 1972 р.), таких як «Вогонь Купала», «Відчинення вертепу», «Віно для княжни» та інших.

Поет-експериментатор, Ігор Калинець, за словами Івана Світличного, «виступає як справжній реаліст, мужній громадянин, що не витворює для себе й інших солодких, але все ж химерних ілюзій, а має відвагу сміливо дивитися правді в вічі й називати речі своїми іменами, хоч яка гірка для нього ця правда, хоч які страшні ті імена.»

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В 1992 році в Дніпропетровську розпочав діяльність науково-дослідний центр історичного факультету Дніпропетровського університету та Дніпропетровського управління Служби безпеки України. Мета центру - дослідження та публікація документів з архівів колишнього ЧК-ДПУ-НКВС-МДБ-КДБ України. Це поки що єдиний на Україні проєкт, реалізація якого надасть можливість дослідникам, а відтак широкій науковій громадськості дістатися до джерел, позначених грифом «таємно» та «цілком таємно». Реалізація проєкту стала можливою завдяки підтримці народного депутата України, начальника Дніпропетровського управління СБУ, генерала Володимира Слободенюка.

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translated by

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
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


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