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Thomas M. Prymak

THE FIRST ALL-UKRAINIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

Ilia Repin's famous painting *Ne Zhdali* ("They did not expect him"), done at the end of the nineteenth century, depicts a ragged stranger, tired and worn out after years of Siberian exile, staggering into the living room of a comfortable middle-class home where his startled wife and children do not recognize him. On the wall, almost unnoticed by the casual observer, hang familiar portraits of the leaders of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian movement, the poets Taras Shevchenko and Panko Kulish. It is this tradition, inspired by the defiant, melancholic verses of Shevchenko, and the sense of tragedy personified in the haggard visage of the returned exile, that forms the psychological and intellectual background out of which the leaders of the Ukrainian Central Rada of 1917 emerged.

On the eve of the revolution, the Ukrainian movement was still predominantly a literary and cultural phenomenon, but important new political and social dimensions were rapidly coming to the fore. As Repin's painting indicates, Shevchenko was already an icon, and the Society of SS. Cyril and Methodius had become a legend. To early democratic thought and federalism were now added feelings for the Ukrainian people as a peasant nation that had lost its townfolk and nobility to the Russian and the Pole. This idea was first suggested by the historian Mykola Kostomarov, a former Cyrillo-Methodian. It was further elaborated in the work of the Kiev professor, Volodymyr Antonovych, and found its fullest expression in the writings of his successor, the historian who became the first president of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the head of the Central Rada, Mykhailo Hrushevsky.

By 1917 Hrushevsky was the unrivaled patriarch of the Ukrainian movement. For his younger contemporaries he personified the ideals of federalism, democracy, and socialism. These ideas formed the basis of the revolutionary democratic parties that united to defend Ukrainian interests in the Central Rada. "The political goal of the Ukrainians," wrote Hrushevsky at the outbreak of the revolution, "is a broad national territorial autonomy for Ukraine within a Federated Russian Republic."[1] Hru-

[1] M. Hrushevsky, *Vybrani pratsi* (New York, 1960). See p. 142 for the essay "Iakoi my khochemo avtonomii i federatsii.' Also see I. L. Rudnytsky, "The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents," in T. Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 186-219, esp. p. 189.

shevsky also took the lead in another direction. "Upon his arrival in Kiev," recalls one of his friends of moderate, more or less liberal, autonomist persuasion, "we, the collaborators of Mykhailo Serhiievych, his true old guard, began to observe, with no little astonishment, that he was no longer with us. He frequented the clubs of the young SRs (Socialist Revolutionaries), began to take council with them, and to surround himself with them, while he spoke with and advised us very little."[2] Hrushevsky could see very clearly that the Ukrainian cause, cultural development, or simple autonomy, was intimately connected with the social predicament of the peasantry. For him, the cause of the peasantry must be the cause of the nation. The agrarian socialism of the Ukrainian SRs seemed to fill this need,[3] and a significant number of Hrushevsky's old friends began to follow him into their ranks.[4] During the months of revolution that followed, the USRs, more than any other single party, left their imprint upon the Central Rada.

The outbreak of the February Revolution had led to the disintegration of organized life throughout Russia, and the Ukrainian Central Rada quickly became one of the many local bodies that attempted to protect a regional and special interest group against the increasing disorder. The new Provisional Government in Petrograd resisted the rise of such innovative institutions and attempted to postpone their legitimization until the convocation of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly. When the central government felt stronger, it cut away at the new institutions and strove to reduce them to its authority, but as its authority disintegrated, the Rada, and other bodies like it, renewed its offensive. In this struggle with the enemies of the Provisional Government in Petrograd, the capital's Soviet, and especially the Bolshevik party, sometimes appeared to be allies of the distant provinces. As a result, the Ukrainian organizations refused to support the non-Bolshevik parties in their condemnation of Lenin's abortive July uprising. Vynnychenko, the head of the Rada's General Secretariat, stated: "One has to admit that if it were not for the Bolsheviks the revolution would not move ahead."[5] Fearing arrest, the leaders of the

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[2] D. Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro nedavnie-mynule 1914-1920*, 2nd. ed. (Munich, 1969), p. 87.

[3] On the program of the USRs, who were the last of the Ukrainian parties to break with their Russian counterparts, see J. Borys, "Political Parties in the Ukraine," in Hunczak, p. 135.

[4] Doroshenko, *Spomyny*, p. 88.

[5] In V. Manilov, ed., *1917 god na Kievshchine* (Kiev, 1928), p. 166, and quoted in R. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 68.

Rada were not entirely averse to an alliance with the Bolsheviks.[6]

On the other side, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were not reluctant to use national discontent in the provinces against Kerensky's Provisional Government. This does not mean that Lenin believed that nationalism, even of "the most refined and purest branch,"[7] could ever be compatible with Marxism. In his well-known polemics in 1913 with the Ukrainian Social Democrat, Lev Iurkevych, who had called for Ukrainianization work among the Russified proletariat of the "South-Western region," he accused Iurkevych of being a shortsighted, narrow-minded, obtuse bourgeois.[8] Lenin saw national oppression as a "consequence" of capitalism. At the same time he defended the progressive role of large, advanced, centralized states that induced the assimilation of various proletariats. Nevertheless, in an effort to further weaken the Provisional Government, in the summer of 1917 Lenin supported the Rada's demands for autonomy.[9] Thus he proclaimed the right of national self-determination. With an unintended irony, he concluded that "only unqualified recognition of this right makes it possible to advocate a free union of the Ukrainians and the Great Russians, a voluntary association of the two peoples in one state."[10]

If Lenin's clever dialectics on self-determination sounded sympathetic in far-off Ukraine, the local Bolsheviks had much more trouble dealing with the geographic, demographic, and social realities that confronted them. The industrial proletariat, from which the Bolsheviks drew their strength, was concentrated on the left bank around the Kharkiv and the Donets regions. The urban population of these areas was largely Russian, as was the population of Odessa and the other centres along the Black Sea littoral. On the right bank, the cities were smaller and had more of an administrative function. Here Jews and Poles predominated. Kiev itself was one of the few major cities with a large ethnic Ukrainian population. But the city had a cosmopolitan atmosphere, possessing Armenian, Greek and Tatar communities beside the groups already mentioned.

These demographic factors played an important role in Ukrainian politics. The Bolsheviks were strongest in the ethnically Rus-

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[6] See V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia Natsii*, 3 vols. (Kiev-Vienna, 1920), 2:59.

[7] V. I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question," (1913) in his *Collected Works*, 4th ed., (Moscow, 1960), 10:28.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[9] See S. Page, "Lenin and Self-Determination," *Slavonic and East European Review* 71(1950):342-58.

[10] Lenin, "The Ukraine," *Collected Works*, 25:91.

sian industrial cities of the east. On the agricultural right bank they were practically non-existent. In Kiev itself, they were very weak, having only two hundred members there at the beginning of 1917.[11] The non-Ukrainian nature of the Kiev Bolshevik organization was evident from the Russian and Jewish names of its most prominent activists.[12] In general, Lenin's followers simply could not compete with the Ukrainian Social Democrats or the USRs, who could speak the local language and were more sensitive to peasant aspirations. "To conduct work under the name of the Russian Bolsheviks," maintained Leonid Piatakov, one of the leaders of the Kiev organization, "is very difficult—it repels the masses from us. If we retain the old name we will always be Russians [*rossiiany*]."[13] Thus, during the course of 1917, the local Bolsheviks were forced by circumstances to make some concessions to national sentiment.

The cooperation between the Central Rada, which claimed to be a kind of territorial "soviet" for all of Ukraine, and the local Bolsheviks was most fruitful in October. At the time of Kerensky's fall, the Kiev Bolsheviks, who had previously been divided on the issue, agreed to enter the Rada. This was an attempt to gain the Rada's support to immobilize the significant Provisional Government forces stationed in Ukraine.[14] The move was temporarily successful, but disputes soon erupted and the Bolsheviks walked out. Their attempt to overthrow the local command of the forces loyal to the defunct Provisional Government was almost foiled when, at the last minute, the Ukrainians came to their aid. In consequence, the Bolshevik units, too, found themselves severely weakened. The Rada proclaimed the establishment of the Ukrainian Peoples's Republic but still did not break off completely from Petrograd. It reaffirmed its commitment to a federal Russia.[15] The soviets of several cities (Katerynoslav, Odessa, Mykolaiv) recognized the authority of the new republic. Only Kharkiv, with its large urban proletariat and strong Bolshevik party, preferred to

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[11] See J. Reshetar, "The Communist Party of the Ukraine and Its Role in the Ukrainian Revolution," in Hunczak, pp. 159-85, esp. p. 164.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

[14] See Pipes, pp. 69-73.

[15] The fullest account is by D. Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy 1917-1923*, 2 vols. (New York, 1954), 1:160, who gives a breakdown of the military power available to loyalists, Bolsheviks, and Ukrainians. The text of the Third Universal proclaiming the Republic is translated in Hunczak, pp. 387-91.

submit more directly to Lenin's new government.[16] The Rada was in power, the Bolsheviks were not. It was at this point that the latter raised the cry for an assembly of an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets.

According to the Bolshevik formula, the Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies performed the functions of constituent assemblies of the new regime. However, there were no formal mechanisms of organization or representation, no standard operating procedures, or means of electing permanent executive committees. Beginning as pressure groups, the soviets were ill-equipped to perform the legislative and executive functions to which the October revolution had called them. In the increasingly revolutionary atmosphere that emerged towards the end of 1917, the Bolsheviks were able to take advantage of this structural disorder to gain control of the permanent presidia. In Ukraine, however, Lenin's party faced an opponent who had for several months used similar tactics with no little success. An organizational confrontation and open struggle for popular support now commenced. This confrontation is reflected in the struggle for influence within the disintegrating armed forces, the worsening of Bolshevik-Ukrainian relations apparent at the peace conference at Brest, and the sharp tone of direct communications between the two parties beginning in November. Within this stormy context, a number of important congresses were held in Kiev. They became the testing ground of public opinion and revealed the complexity of the situation.

While the Bolsheviks were still trying to seize power in Petrograd, the Third All-Ukrainian Military Congress was assembling in Kiev. Its composition revealed the relative strength of the various parties. Some 965 delegates gathered. There were 630 Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries; 101 Ukrainian Social Democrats: three socialists without party affiliation; twenty-three Socialist-Federalists (a liberal party that supported autonomy); thirteen National Revolutionaries (about whom little more than the name is known); eight Bolsheviks; twenty-one Independentists (the most conservative of the Ukrainian national parties); three Confederalists (another moderate grouping); eighty-two without party affiliation; one anarchist; and eighty-two completely undeclared delegates.[17] The weakness of the Bolsheviks was obvious

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[16] Pipes, pp. 115-18; Reshetar, p. 171.

[17] Doroshenko, *Istoriia,* 1:158-59. On the formation of Ukrainianized units and some of the problems that they faced at this time, see V. Kedrovsky, "Ukrainizatsiia v Rosiiskii Armii," *Ukrainskyi Istoryk* 4 (1967): 61-77, esp. 76-77.

from their small numbers. In fact, the USRs, who tried to take the lead in the congress, pointed to whom they considered their most dangerous opponents when they unleashed a strong attack on the conservative Independentists. "Ukraine," declared an USR delegate to thunderous applause, "needs those who will give it land and freedom. Under the flag of the Independentists it will get no land, and the working people will get no freedom."[18] Some leading members of the Rada were then welcomed, and Vynnychenko made a speech in which he called talk of separatism and independence "a provocation."[19] The Congress threw its support behind the Rada and endorsed the federalist and socialist policies for which it stood.

At this time Kiev was also the scene of an All-Russian General Cossack Congress which some six hundred delegates attended. On behalf of the Rada, O. Shulhyn assured the Cossacks that "Ukraine does not demand independence. It demands the same thing the Cossacks do—the right to build its own life independently." But as social questions were raised, the Ukrainian democrats and Cossacks soon found themselves in separate and hostile camps.[20] The implementation of a conciliatory policy toward the Cossacks seemed unfeasible. Perhaps the single most important result of such a policy was to raise Bolshevik eyebrows in Petrograd. This was to become of crucial significance as events unfolded.

A third congress, and one upon which the Bolsheviks concentrated much attention, was the Third All-Ukrainian Congress of Peasants. The ethnic Ukrainian population in the cities was small, but in the countryside the situation was quite the opposite. It was plain to all that the attitude of the rural folk and its organizations was of paramount importance. Though earlier peasant congresses had given their full support to the Rada,[21] disturbing signs of discontent were beginning to surface.

The Third Universal, which had proclaimed the People's Republic, had also outlined some of the most important social reforms to be undertaken by the Rada. Land reform headed the list. Even prior to the projected Constituent Assembly, the Rada had proclaimed the abolition of private estates, the suppression of absentee landlords, introduction of the eight-hour working day,

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[18] Doroshenko, *Istoriia*, 1:159.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*, 1:160.

[21] See I. Vytanovych, "Agrarna polityka ukrainskykh uriadiv (1917-1920)," *Ukrainskyi Istoryk* 4 (1967):22-30.

and state control of industrial production.[22] One of the leading lights of the USRs, the Rada's Minister of the Interior, Pavlo Khrystiuk, later summed up the efforts thus. "The Central Rada clearly set itself the goal of building a real people's state in which political power would rest in the hands of the people, and socio-economic relations would be constructed so as to secure both the spiritual and the material interests of the working masses."

> In the attainment of this goal, the Central Rada (we have in mind its worker-soldier-peasant majority at the head with the Ukrainian socialist parties—the SRs and the left SDs) entirely rejected the idea of following the example of the Western-European republics, although most of them were "Democratic." Because of this, at that time it did not set itself up in the old constitutional ways of the West, with their political-stae forms of "pure" parliamentarianism.[23]

Khrystiuk goes on to explain that the basic mistake of the Rada was a belief in social peace, a belief that the bourgeoisie would not resist. Therefore the reforms were not rushed through; rather, there was an effort at balancing the influence of various classes. All this led to an underestimation of the revolutionary tenor of the masses, and, as a result, the Bolsheviks gained prestige.[24]

The land reform, which was so basic to the Rada's program, was supposed to be a legal, orderly process. An important manifesto explained this to the peasantry and outlined the terms and extent of the reform.[25] The land-hungry peasants, however, were impatient for immediate change. They would not be put off with promises of a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, and this was revealed in the Third All-Ukrainian Peasants Congress of November 1917.

The congress was largely drawn from the same constituancy as the peasant section of the Central Rada itself. It was, in general, sympathetic to the Rada program. However, a number of important grievances were lodged. A resolution on the land question commended the Rada's Third Universal, but expressed surprise at the explanatory manifestos. It urged more energetic reforms, including: 1. immediate action on the formation of Land Committees; 2. immediate nationalization of all lands, forests, and private properties belonging to institutions, cities, monasteries, etc.; 3. abolition of all private ownership of land on the territory of the

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[22] P. Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materiialy do istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii*, 4 vols. (Vienna, 1921-22), 2:56.

[23] *Ibid.*, 2:57.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Text in *Ibid.*, 2:58-59; see also the discussion in Vytanovych, p. 32.

Ukrainian People's Republic; 4. Land Committees to take over all stock and inventories; 5. preservation of small farms as models for future development.

In general, the congress took the Rada under its protection and at the same time viewed it critically.[26]

It was at this time that the Bolsheviks began their campaign for a reelection of the Rada. Recognizing that the Ukrainians had control of the city, the Kiev Soviet, where the Bolsheviks had managed to attain some influence, had acknowledged the Rada as the government of the Ukrainian territory, but demanded that an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets be convened for the purpose of "reconstructing" the Rada.[27]

On the other hand, the Rada could not accept restructuring based upon workers' soviets in the cities of Ukraine, as they represented the interests of the Russian minority. The local Bolsheviks, however, acting upon instructions from Petrograd, persisted in their demands.[28]

The Peasant Congress flatly rejected the Bolshevik proposals. Indeed, how could it accept a plan that, in effect, disenfranchized the entire peasantry? The congress passed a resolution stating that it "protests against such a reelection which, at the present moment, can bring nothing but harm to the Ukrainian working people, and considers that the question of the reelection of the Central Rada will be decided not at the behest of Russian Bolsheviks, but by the Ukrainian working people."[29] The resolution explained that the Rada was being renewed daily to answer the changes in its component organizations.[30] In fact, the congress postponed a session at one point so that delegates could assure the soldiers (who were at that moment the main target of Bolshevik agitation) that the peasantry stood squarely behind the Rada.[31]

The peasant congress had rebuffed the Bolsheviks. But the struggle for popular support had just begun. Throughout November and December, the Bolsheviks and the supporters of the Rada fought for the control of various institutions. On the one hand, the Soviet of People's Commissars and the People's Republic recognized each other and carried on continuous, if strained, ne-

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[26] Khrystiuk, 2:64.

[27] Reshetar, p. 166.

[28] J. Borys, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of the Ukraine* (Stockholm, 1960), p. 171; Reshetar, *loc. cit.*

[29] Khrystiuk, 2:61.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

gotiations.[32] On the other hand, neither side made a serious attempt to peacefully resolve the dangerous differences confronting them.[33] The Bolshevik press stepped up its propaganda campaign against the Rada, and Zinoviev, who was supposed to have come to Kiev for talks, made strongly anti-Rada speeches in a city theatre.[34] The Rada began to cencentrate on aiding moderate Russian socialist groups—Chernov and the Russian SRs in particular—to reestablish some kind of coalition government that would replace Lenin's regime and create a new federation.[35]

It was an axiom of Bolshevik policy that, as far as possible, throughout the territories of the former Russian Empire, all power must devolve upon the local soviets. Because of their structural looseness, these were highly susceptible to the influence of Lenin's party. In the case of Ukraine, however, as in many other areas where ethnic Russians were a minority, Bolshevik plans were frustrated by the existence of bodies that claimed to be the soviets of the locality, yet displayed signs of being independent of, and even hostile to, the Soviet of People's Commissars in Petrograd. Although Lenin's government recognized the Ukrainian People's Republic, it hoped that a congress of the city soviets could bring about the desired restructuring of the main Ukrainian "soviet," the Central Rada. "We propose," announced Stalin to his southern comrades, "that you—Kievans, Kharkivites, men of Katerynoslav, and the rest—must immediately take upon yourselves the summoning of such a congress—of course, together with the Rada. If it should refuse to work together with you in this matter, which seems unlikely—then summon it without the Rada."[36] Throughout November, the soviets of some of the more industrial Ukrainian cities began to put pressure on the Rada for convocation of such a congress.[37]

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[32] See O. Pidhainy, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic* (Toronto-New York, 1966), pp. 403-06, for the negotiations between Stalin and Porsh, the Rada's Secretary of Labour and one of the most left-wing of the Ukrainian SDs. Stalin referred to him as "comrade."

[33] Khrystiuk, 2:68.

[34] Doroshenko, *Istoriia*, 1:203.

[35] The Rada also sent notes to the various new local authorities and non-Russian peoples, including the Don Cossacks, the Kuban, the North Caucasus, Crimea, Moldavia, and Bashkiria. Only the Don Cossacks responded (with a diplomatic mission to Kiev). See Doroshenko, *Istoriia*, 1:204-05 and Pipes, p. 116.

[36] In A. Smolinchuk, *Bolsheviki Ukrainy v borbe za sovety* (Lviv, 1969), p. 197, who cites I. Stalin, *Stati i rechi ob Ukraine* (Kharkiv, 1936), p. 16.

[37] Smolinchuk, p. 196.

The Ukrainian parties had nothing against a congress of soviets in principle, but the timing and the danger of power slipping into the hands of the almost exclusively Russian proletariat led to a solid front of all Ukrainian parties, from extreme left to conservative, against the idea.[38] The Rada itself hesitated. The Kiev Soviet, where the Bolsheviks had twenty-three deputies as against thirty-seven non-Bolsheviks, and which elected a USR, a forthright supporter of a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, as its chairman, refused to take the initiative for such a congress. As a result, an Organizational Bureau was formed by the Bolshevik party itself. Plans were also made for simultaneously holding a regional conference of the Bolshevik party.[39]

As Bolshevik activities intensified, the idea of calling an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets began to gain some adherents in the Ukrainian parties. Bolshevik propaganda concentrated on trying to counterpose the social and the national questions, and this had some effect on the left wing of the USR party. So long as the peasantry was properly represented, it was difficult for the SRs to object to a congress that might further the party's social goals. As early as the end of November, such questions had stirred long and heated debates at a party congress presided over by Hrushevsky. "The left, which was strong in numbers," explains one of the participants, "the so-called internationalist segment of the congress, bitterly criticized the activity of the Central Rada, pointing out that the Rada was carrying out a one-sided policy, putting all its efforts into the national struggle. At the same time, it underestimated the socioeconomic side which would simultaneously threaten national-political achievements. Such criticism found a hearing among a great majority at the congress."[40] In December, the turning point came. Kovalevsky, an SR and leader of the Peasant *Spilka,* urged that an All-Ukrainian Worker-Peasant Congress be held as soon as possible; soon the various Rada factions were organizing to ensure their fullest possible representation. With a large peasant delegation, Rada supporters would have no trouble defeating Bolshevik moves. It would be a moral defeat for Lenin's party, which had initiated the whole matter.[41]

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[38] Khrystiuk, 2:59-60,69; Pidhainy, p. 407.

[39] Pidhainy, pp. 402-03, 406-07, suggests: "The Bolsheviks had obviously not been able to find a responsible body to sponsor the congress." Compare S. Korolivsky, et al., *Pobeda sovetskoi vlasti na Ukraine* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 351-56.

[40] Khrystiuk, 2:65-66, 196.

[41] Pidhainy, pp. 407-08.

The Bolshevik Organizational Bureau worked out a plan of representation highly favoring the town over the country, that is, the workers over the peasants. But a Ukrainian congress that contained no Ukrainians simply would not do. Therefore the scheme provided for the representation of the peasant *Spilka,* probably because there were no small-town, peasant soviets in Ukraine.[42] With some support from disaffected Ukrainian SDs and SRs, with control over the worker soviets of Kharkiv and the industrial basin on the left bank, the concurrent Bolshevik party congress, and the representational system worked out by the Organizational Committee, the Kiev Bolsheviks, too, hoped for a clear, if contested, victory.

The Bolshevik regional executive committee had drawn up a general list of topics to be discussed at the congress (whose date was set at December 3): (1) definition of Ukraine; (2) rule in Ukraine; (3) relations between the centre in Petrograd and the regions; (4) convocation of a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly; and (5) organizational questions. V. Zatonsky, one of the few local Bolsheviks who could speak Ukrainian, was to be chairman.[43]

Unfortunately for the small circle of Kiev Bolsheviks who had initiated the project, things started to go wrong very quickly. Ignoring instructions from Stalin, the Kharkiv and Kryvyi Rih Bolsheviks set about holding a congress of their own.[44] As the delegates from the Rada organizations began to arrive in Kiev, it soon became obvious that they were far more numerous than the Bolsheviks had expected. Finally, the Kiev Party Executive Committee was taken aback by an ultimatum that had at this time been sent to the Central Rada by the Council of People's Commissars.

The ultimatum demanded that the Rada stop disarming—and rearm—the Red Guards and pro-Bolshevik troops in Ukraine. The main point in the message, however, concerned the war that had broken out between the Don Cossacks under Kaledin and Lenin's government. The Don Cossacks had been crossing Ukrainian territory on their way home from the front, and Petrograd considered the Rada's acquiescence in this a provocation. An immediate response was demanded, or "the Council of People's Commissars will consider the Central Rada in a condition of open war against the Soviet government in Russia and Ukraine."[45]

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[42] *Ibid.,* pp. 408-09.
[43] Smolinchuk, pp. 197-98; Korolivsky, p. 352.
[44] See n. 36.
[45] Full text in Pipes, p. 119.

For once the Ukrainian leaders did not hesitate. The Rada's General Secretariat could not very well go about rearming Red guards who were hostile to it. Nor could it stop the massive return of demoralized soldiers across its territory. Halting the Cossacks would violate the national and federal principles on which the Ukrainian People's Republic was based. The ultimatum was flatly rejected.[46]

On the eve of the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Kiev Conference of Bolsheviks met to discuss their strategy. Two attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood crystalized. Some, like Bosh, Aleksandrov, and Piatakov, took a "Luxemburgist" position, which held all Ukrainian national sentiment to be reactionary; others, like Zatonsky, Shakhrai, and Lapchinsky, approached Lenin's position, which tried to use nationalism for revolutionary ends.[47] There was discussion of a new, more Ukrainian-sounding name for the party; but no agreement could be reached. Neither could any agreement be reached on the ultimatum. Some, like Piatakov and the "ultra-centralist" Bosh, stood squarely behind it; others, like Zatonsky and Shakhrai, warned that it would lead to a conflict between the nationalities. With regard to the non-Bolshevik majority that was now envisaged at the congress, the party strategists decided to attempt to split the Ukrainian parties, or, failing this, to walk out. It was also decided to question the credentials of Ukrainian delegates."[48]

The Organizational Committee had vastly underestimated the size of the congress and the number of deputies that the Ukrainians could muster. The attempt to deny *Spilka* delegates their votes failed, as the Committee did not have any Red Guards at its disposal with which to intimidate the visitors.[49] The Bolsheviks could

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[46] Text of the General Secretariat's reply in E. Bosh, *God borby* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1925), pp. 82-84.

[47] Borys, pp. 167-68 and his n. 96 on Luxemburg.

[48] For a full discussion see Reshetar, pp. 169-71; see also Borys, pp. 169-70.

[49] One of the Bolshevik organizers, E. Bosh, the most vocal of the anti-Ukrainian "Luxemburgists," gives the following quaint description of the phenomenon: "The Central Rada . . . from the morning of December 4, began to direct its delegates from the military soviets and the kulak unions in groups of 20-30 armed and drunken men to the mandate commission . . . to get their voting tickets for the Congress of Soviets. Upon the refusal of the mandate commission, the first group replied with violent abuse, refusing to leave the premises, and when the next groups of Rada delegates arrived, they set about wrecking the room; they smashed tables, tore up printed material and tickets, and began to issue the mandates for the Congress of Soviets on their own. The Kiev Soviet of Workers' Deputies

muster only a few score—a hundred at most—out of some two and a half thousand votes;[50] they were lost in the crowds of pro-Rada delegates. The USRs from the *Spilka* were already hostile to the organizers for the attempt at depriving them of their votes, and when Zatonsky opened the meeting he got no further than the word "Comrades," when Arkadii Stepanenko, one of the SR leaders, pushed him aside and opened the meeting himself with the singing of Shevchenko's "Testament" and the anthem "Shche ne vmerla Ukraina."[51] A presidium was then chosen in which the various parties were represented on the basis of the size of their delegations at the congress. Following their contingency plans, the Bolsheviks questioned the credentials of the pro-Rada delegates and claimed that the deciding voice was held by people who had no right to be at the congress. The USRs replied that the congress had been called on the basis of a systematic underrepresentation of the peasantry and also demanded redress.[52] For the time being the Bolsheviks were forced to accept the situation, but, in protest, they refused the two seats on the presidium offered to them.[53] As the meetings progressed, it appeared that the Bolsheviks were more likely to split than the Ukrainian parties. The issue that brought things to a head was the ultimatum of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second day of this First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets opened under strict supervision of Ukrainian military units. Order was kept, but the Bolshevik delegates were not hindered from entering the hall. The presence of Hrushevsky, Vynnychenko, Petliura, Porsh, and almost the entire General Secretariat of the Re-

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did not as yet have the armed force to end this hooliganism." In Korolivsky, p. 357. On the other hand Khrystiuk, also an eyewitness, maintains that the Rada did not put any pressure on the delegates, though it was capable of doing so. See Khrystiuk, 2:69.

[50] Recent Soviet historians claim that the Organizational Committee expected only 500 delegates. Most memoirists say about 2,500 delegates arrived. Bosh cites 1,000; Ivanov, another of the Bolshevik organizers, states that 3,000 arrived. Korolivsky, p. 356, says 2,000 is "close to the truth." Doroshenko, *Istoriia*, 1:219, accepts the "over 2,000" figure, and is most liberal in crediting the Bolsheviks with 150 people in their organization. More briefly, see Pipes, p. 121.

[51] Doroshenko, *Istoriia*, 1:219-20; Pipes, p. 121; Korolivsky, pp. 357-58; all three descriptions, which vary considerably in tone, are based on Zatonsky's testimony.

[52] Pidhainy, p. 411, citing "Otcheti o vseukrainskom sezde sovetov," *Letopis Revoliutsii* I (1928): 267.

[53] Korolivsky, p. 358.

public helps to account for the strict security.[54] There was no doubt that the fate of the Rada depended upon the outcome of the congress. The ultimatum was read to the congress and provoked a storm of protest. One delegate accused the Bolsheviks of "Russian imperialism," and there was a threat to order in the meeting, with apparent danger of physical violence to the Bolsheviks. Then a Bolshevik representative declared that the congress was illegitimate and nothing more than a rally. Piatakov, Bosh, and the "left" Luxemburgist wing of the party left the hall. Shakhrai and Zatonsky, both ethnic Ukrainians, stayed behind. The Kiev Bolsheviks, it seems, had split.[55]

Of the Bolsheviks who remained, Shakhrai was the first to address the congress. His speech was a real attempt to calm the emotions raised by the ultimatum and to win some sympathy for the Council of People's Commissars. He began by assuring the assembly that the ultimatum was a misunderstanding that had to be cleared up without bloodshed. He pointed out that the note recognized the People's Republic and claimed that the proletariat and peasantry of Russia and Ukraine were united. Only the wavering policy of the bourgeois General Secretariat toward the Don Cossacks and the inconstancy of its attitude toward the proletarian revolution were hindering agreement. "At this time of proletarian revolution," he explained, "no one can afford to be in the middle. Everyone must side with either the workers and peasants, or the landowners and capitalists, whose interests are defended by Kaledin on the Don."[56] As Shakhrai went on to criticize the Rada, there were rising protests from the audience, and in the end it was impossible for him to continue. Likewise, Zatonsky, being a prominent local Bolshevik, was immediately recognized by the audience and had hardly opened his mouth to speak when cries of "out with him" echoed through the hall.[57]

On the other hand, speeches by members of the General Secretariat were met with enthusiastic support. Petliura, the War Secretary, had already informed the gathering that Lenin's government had prepared "a stab in the back for the Ukrainian People's Re-

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[54] Doroshenko, *Istoriia*, 1:221.

[55] M. Kovalevsky, *Pry dzherelakh borotby: Spomyny, vrazhennia, reflektsii* (Innsbruck, 1960), p. 439; "Otchety," p. 271, as cited in Pidhainy, pp. 420-21. On Shakhrai's later career and his criticism of Lenin's nationalities policy as expressed in his well-known book *On the Current Situation in the Ukraine*, trans. P. Potichnyj (Ann Arbor, 1970), see Reshetar, pp. 183-84.

[56] Khrystiuk, 2:70-71.

[57] Khrystiuk, 2:70; Pidhainy, p. 421.

public," and that Bolshevik troops had begun operations at the border town of Bakhmach. He requested the support of the congress and stated that "Free Cossack" units were ready to do their duty. "We will not attack," he concluded, "but only defend ourselves."[58]

Of the speeches by the Ukrainian leaders, that of Vynnychenko, the chairman of the General Secretariat, was the most ideological in tone. It directly answered the questions raised by Shakhrai. It also was couched in the same language, for Vynnychenko too belonged to a Social-Democratic party. The Rada leader began by denying that his government was bourgeois, and pointed out that under Kerensky bourgeois Russian leaders had leveled the same accusation at the Ukrainians. Rather the opposite was true. The Rada was the government of workers, soldiers, and peasants, and it was the Council of People's Commissars that had shown itself to be counterrevolutionary in closing down newspapers and abolishing the right to strike. The Bolsheviks rambled on and on about the "bourgeois" character of the Central Rada; but they could not admit that they were fighting it simply as Great Russians. "The General Secretariat," he concluded, "considers it necessary to make use of political class struggle, but not a policy of blood and iron."[59] These words were met with a rousing ovation. Speeches by Porsh, Zolotarov (a representative of the "Bund"), and others followed. All of them were highly critical of the Soviet Government.[60]

On the final day of the congress, Hrushevsky told the delegates that the Rada was willing to resign if the congress desired an immediate election. But he also called the delegates to support the Rada with all their strength.[61] With only two votes against (probably Shakhrai's and Zatonsky's) and nineteen abstentions, the congress passed a resolution supporting the Rada and condemning the ultimatum as an attack on Ukrainian self-determination and a provocation to fratricidal violence. It concluded with an appeal to the peoples of Russia to use every means to avoid "a new disgraceful war."[62] The First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets ended in a complete victory for the Central Rada. The first period of the Ukrainian Revolution ended with it.

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[58] Doroshenko, *Istoriia*, 1:221.

[59] Khrystiuk, 2:71-72.

[60] Doroshenko, *Istoriia*, 1:222.

[61] Doroshenko, 1:223. At this point Hrushevsky announced the issue of a new Ukrainian currency and asked for a display of confidence in it.

[62] Text in Khrystiuk, 2:72-73. See also J. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution* (Princeton, N. J., 1952), pp. 94-95.

While the supporters of the Rada were still celebrating their victory, the Kiev Bolsheviks, who had transferred their headquarters to Kharkiv, formed another All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets with the help of the stronger party organization of the left bank. This group proclaimed a new "government," entirely Bolshevik in composition, which immediately pledged its allegiance to Petrograd. With a hard core of Russian troops from the north, the Bolsheviks began their armed march on Kiev.[63] "In Kiev, on the surface, life went on completely normally," recalled Dmytro Doroshenko in his memoirs, "and the news of the danger looming so closely made no special impression. Everyone was hoping for something. In Ukrainian political circles, people were still under the influence of the congress of "Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies" held in the middle of December."[64] The illusions were dispelled only when Muraviev's motley army of sailors and soldiers from the north entered the Ukrainian capital. The era of public meetings and congresses was at an end; for Ukraine, the violence of the civil war had begun.

The All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets was to be the last great demonstration of public support for the Rada. The reality of this support is confirmed by the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly that were held about the same time. In these elections, too, the Ukrainian parties easily won in all provinces except Kharkiv.[65] The Congress of Soviets was the last Bolshevik attempt to take over the Rada from within. Held as negotiations between Petrograd and Kiev were already breaking down and with the first military engagements already underway, the congress was the final signpost signalling the achievements of the Rada. It also signalled a change of tactics for the Bolsheviks. "Both in form and in essence," wrote Khrystiuk, "this congress is linked less to the war between the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Rada than to the previous period—a period, so to speak, of the peaceful agitation of the Russian Bolsheviks against the Central Rada."[66] The change signified that the Ukrainians could handily win in the battle of words and in the attempt to affect popular opinion. However, when the Bolsheviks began to employ a combination of propaganda and military force, the shallowness of the Rada's hold on its sympathizers, and on Ukrainian territory generally, became evident.

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[63] See Y. Bilinsky, "The Communist Take-over of the Ukraine," in Hunczak, pp. 104-27 and, more generally, Pipes, pp. 126-30.

[64] Doroshenko, *Spomyny*, p. 213.

[65] Pipes, pp. 122-23.

[66] Khrystiuk, 2:69.

The period of the Central Rada saw real mass nationalism become a factor in Ukrainian history for the first time. But this mass nationalism was still linked more closely to the economic and social demands of various groups, especially the peasants, than to the more intellectual Ukrainophilism of the nineteenth century. The criticism of the Central Rada expressed at the Third Peasants' Congress makes this clear. The neutrality of the peasantry and the collapse of the Ukrainian military effort during the first Bolshevik invasion in January 1918 must be explained within the framework of economic and social factors as well as political and national ones. A combination of Lenin's appealing Land Decree, efficient propaganda, and plain physical force proved to be the power that conquered.

On the other hand, Ukrainian mass nationalism, once aroused, was not to be so easily extinguished. The Bolsheviks were compelled to take it into consideration in their propaganda, and even in their party and state structure. The concessions are liable to seem shallow and perhaps even somewhat unreal in the light of the undeniable collapse of the Central Rada. Nevertheless, the Soviet Ukrainian Republic became a fact, and in the 1920s the venerable Hrushevsky returned to Kiev, where he helped to establish the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The Central Rada and its supporting congresses made themselves felt, even in defeat.

Борис Мартос

ПЕРШИЙ ВСЕУКРАЇНСЬКИЙ СЕЛЯНСЬКИЙ З'ЇЗД

Одною з важливіших подій української революції 1917 року, це — Всеукраїнський Селянський З'їзд. Це був перший з'їзд всеукраїнського характеру, на якому були представлені не інтеліґенти того чи іншого фаху, не якась партія, не якесь випадкове угруповання, але українська селянська маса, тобто 85% населення України. Про якесь штучне представництво не могло бути й мови, бо делеґатів вибирали волосні з'їзди. Делеґати з'їхалися з 9 губерній, і рідко яка волость не прислала свого представника.

Дехто рахує, що на з'їзд приїхало до 2.000 селян. Це неточно: понад 1½ тисячі було делеґатів з рішальним голосом, а крім того майже кожна волость прислала ще одного делеґата, що мав бути на з'їзді, щоб стежити за поведінкою першого делеґата і в разі потреби його заступити, а потім розповісти на волосному зібранні про перебіг з'їзду. Отже всього приїхало біля 3.000.

Вже зранку велика юрба селян очікувала на вулиці перед будинком київського Купецького Зібрання, де мав відбутися з'їзд. Люди, що з'їхалися з усіх закутин України, знайомилися між собою, розпитували один одного. Вигляд у всіх — поважний, обличчя справляють гарне враження. По одежі помітно, що делеґати здебільшого належать до менш заможної частини села, малоземельних або безземельних. Це й не дивно, бо, як показує статистика, біля 75% селян України

Передруковуємо з незначними змінами уривок зі спогадів Бориса Мартоса з рідкісного календаря **Дніпро** (Львів) за рік 1940. Це один з найкращих описів очевидця й учасника З'їзду про настрій українського селянства під час революції і їхнє наставлення до політики Центральної Ради.

Борис Мартос (1879-1977) в студентських роках співпрацював з РУП; тоді став активним членом УСДРП та діячем кооперативного руху на Волині, Кубані і Полтавщині. Брав участь у революції 1905. 1917 року був членом Центрального Комітету Селянської Спілки, головою Центрального Українського Кооперативного Комітету в Києві, організатором Київського Кооперативного Інституту, членом Центральної і Малої Ради та секретарем земельних справ. 1918 року — голова управи Всеукраїнського Кооперативного Комітету. 1919 року — міністер фінансів і голова Ради Міністрів Директорії УНР. 1920 року Мартос виїхав з урядом УНР на еміґрацію і продовжував свою політичну, громадську, освітню й кооперативно-наукову працю в Чехословаччині, Німеччині, Швайцарії і США. Для детальнішої біографії, див. Андрій Качор, "Проф. Борис Мартос", **Ювілейний збірник УВАН в Канаді** (Вінніпеґ: УВАН, 1976), стор. 94-114.

мали менше, ніж 6 гектарів на господарство. А за станом тодішньої сільсько-господарської техніки в Україні, господарство мусіло мати не менше 6 гектарів, щоб з одного боку забезпечити працею членів родини, а з другого, щоб заспокоїти родинні потреби. Отже ¾ українського селянства не було як слід забезпечене землею, а наслідок — хронічне недоїдання.

За статистичними даними полтавського земства, пересічне споживання сільсько-господарських продуктів на Полтавщині, переведене за поживністю на пшеницю, дорівнювало 270 кілограмам зерна на душу річно, тимчасом як пересічне споживання в Німеччині дорівнювало 350 кілограмам. Половина селян багатої Полтавщини споживала менше, ніж 240 кілограмів, бо мала посівної землі менше, ніж 3 гектари на господарство (враховуючи сюди й найняту землю). Третина населення тієї ж Полтавщини споживала пересічно лише 200 кілограмів на душу. Не дивно, що слово „земля" найчастіше чулося в балачках приїжджих.

Поміж селянами можна було помітити й київських інтеліґентів та півінтеліґентів, що переходили від однієї групи до другої, заводили балачки, в чімсь переконували селян. Це — кияни, представники різних московських партій, „Совєта рабочих і солдатских депутатов", „Комітета общественних орґанізацій", „Крестьянскаго союза" і т. п. Чується: „Нада ітті всєм вмєстє", „Центральная Рада вам землі нє даст", „Вайна далжна прадалжаться до пабєднаво канца", „Всє вапроси разрєшіт Всєрасійскоє учрєдітєльноє сабраніє" і т. д. Селяни слухають їх уважно, але в дебати не вдаються.

Нарешті двері Купецького Зібрання відчиняються і вся маса пливе у величезну залю. При вході контролюються посвідчення, делеґати з правом рішального голосу розміщуються на стільцях надолі, їх заступники спрямовуються нагору на хори, іншу публіку не впущено зовсім, в тім московських аґітаторів. Пізніше були допущені на конґрес офіційні представники московських партій, як гості, без права голосу.

Величезна заля — повна. Надолі рядами сидять делеґати, вгорі на хорах, що тягнуться здовж трьох стін, — їх заступники. На подіюмі в президії сидять: Винниченко (тоді ще с.-д.), Христюк (с.-р.), Осадчий (безпарт.), Мартос (с.-д.), Руденко та інші.

Починаються привітання. Від Української Центральної Ради вітає з'їзд її голова — М. Грушевський.

В привітаннях говориться про національне значення з'їзду, про важливість і відповідальність моменту, про завдання з'їзду виявити волю українського народу і т. п. Висту-

пає з привітаннями й декілька селян, досить красномовних; деякі з них мають на собі військову одежу, бо попали в делеґати, приїхавши з фронту додому у відпустку. З'їзд відповідає на привітання гучними оплесками, а на привітання М. Грушевського — могутнім вигуком „Слава Центральній Раді!" Але привітання затягаються, і до президії починають приходити записочки, писані напів-українською, напів-московською мовою, вимагаючи припинення привітань: „Ми приїхали сюди, щоб діло робити, а не привітання слухати". Часом у залі зчиняється гамір. Нарешті президія заявляє, що вже більше нікому не дасть слова для привітання, але з хорів якийсь вояк кричить: „Як? Ви не хочете слухати привітання від салдата з фронту? Товариші, ми проливаємо кров" ... Президія дає ще слово „салдату з фронту", як останнє, і переходить до порядку денного.

З'їзд тягнеться чотири дні. Одно за одним обговорюються важливі питання: відношення до тимчасового уряду в зв'язку з переговорами Центральної Ради в справі автономії України; земельна справа; українізація земських та міських самоврядувань; організація селянства на Україні; вибори селянських депутатів до Центральної Ради. По кожному питанню, опріч референта, виступає цілий ряд промовців, деякі з них повторяють те, що вже говорили попередні, але з'їзд уважно вислуховує кожного, лише коли хто починає говорити зовсім не на тему, з'їзд нетерпеливиться, починаються вигуки незадоволення. Президії припадає багато праці: часто доводиться давати пояснення, заспокоювати розхвильоване зібрання, спиняти промовців і т. п. Люди ще не звикли до зорганізованого обговорення справи: промовець часто починає говорити, не взявши наперед слова, часто навіть тоді, коли попередній не скінчив своєї промови; часом починають говорити двоє разом. Голова зібрання мусить невпинно дбати про порядок. Це втомлює, а тому члени президії головують по черзі.

Найдраматичніший момент — це обговорення питання про федеративний устрій Росії й автономію України. Записалося кількадесят промовців. Дискусія затягається, деякі селяни говорять не про автономію, а про землю. Коли ж голова пояснює їм, що земельне питання обговорюватиметься пізніше, в залі зчиняється гамір, делеґати схоплюються з місць по кілька зразу, заявляючи, що їх післано в справі землі, що це найважливіше питання треба обговорити насамперед і т. п. З великим зусиллям голові вдалося запровадити лад. Деякі промовці (напр., укр. с.-р.) починають натякати на проголошення самостійности України, а Олександер Степаненко (соц. самостійник) цілком отверто виступає з пропо-

зицією оголосити державну самостійність України. Тоді зчиняється страшний рев: кричать делеґати, кричать із хорів їх заступники, розмахують руками, в страшному галасі нічого не можна розібрати. Винниченко, що саме головує, безперестанно дзвонить, намагається щось говорити, але його не чути, потім починає бити дзвінком об стіл, бо язичок від дзвінка вже відлетів. Нарешті, Винниченко, спітнілий та знесилений, сідає на стілець із словами: „Я не можу!" Його заступає Осадчий, щось говорить, розводить руками, але його зовсім не чути.

До мене підходить хтось із президії і каже: „Беріть головування ви, у вас сильний голос". Я підіймаю руку й гукаю: „Тихо!" Крик іще збільшується. Вичікую хвилину, знову підіймаю руку і знову гукаю: „Тихо!" Передні замовкають, крик зменшується; використовую момент і що-сили кричу: „Товариші! Між вами є провокатори, які хочуть зірвати нам з'їзд криком!"

Тоді всі замовкають, а я, знизивши голос, пояснюю, що криком ми вирішити нічого не зможемо, це тільки наші вороги хочуть, щоб з'їзд не вдався, а тому кожен, хто кричить, наш ворог; отже кожного, хто кричатиме, треба зупиняти, прізвище його записувати у протокол, щоб потім повідомити його волость. З місця схоплюється один з делеґатів у військовому й починає щось кричати, але я його перебиваю запитанням: „Як ваше прізвище?" — і він негайно сідає.

Настає сякий-такий спокій. У використовую його для пояснень про потребу спокійного обговорення кожного питання, вказую на необхідність дати висловитися всім, хто бажає; пояснюю, що думка, яку висловив промовець, це ще не постанова, і що справа остаточно буде вирішуватися голосуванням.

Декілька селян зголошуються до слова і заявляють, що вони про самостійність України не хочуть і чути, і навіть загрожують, що залишать з'їзд і поїдуть додому. Я знов їх заспокоюю, вказую на те, що вони не мають права їхати додому, бо ще не розглянуто земельне питання, оголошую перерву і пропоную всім вийти надвір, щоб заспокоїтись. Всі виходять у Купецький сад, але й там, розбившися на гуртки, пристрасно дебатують; члени президії ходять між ними й намагаються заспокоїти.

Ходжу й я від гуртка до гуртка, прислухаюся до розмов, скрізь чую незадоволення: „Пани хотять самостійности, а ми її не хочемо".

Ставлю питання: „Чому ж ви не хочете самостійности?"

Зараз же мене обступає десятків зо два селян, які наперебій вимагають від мене, щоб я не дозволив промовцям говорити про самостійність. А дехто вимагає, щоб після перерви зараз же обговорювати питання про землю.

На мої пояснення, що записано ще кільканадцять промовців і що треба дати їм можливість висловитись, чую голоси: „Якщо ще хтось почне говорити про самостійність, ми повиходимо з залі". Тоді я ставлю питання: „Чому ж ви проти того, щоб Україна була самостійна? Невже ви хочете, щоб українською землею розпоряджався хтось чужий?" Селянин з дуже розумним обличчям каже: „Дозвольте, я вам це поясню, а ви всі слухайте та й скажіть, чи так я кажу. І я, і всі ми хочемо, щоб Україна була самостійна, але тепер про це не можна й казати, бо зараз цього не може бути. Як тільки проголосити, що Україна відділяється, то це значить, що зараз же буде війна з Москвою; а ми всі так уже потомлені війною, всіх нас вона вже так змучила, бо багато з нас було на фронті, а хто на фронті не був, так його сини там були. Отож воювати ми вже зовсім не можемо. Хочете, вірте мені або ні, а якщо буде з Москвою війна, так ніхто з нас на ту війну не піде. Чи так я кажу?" У відповідь з усіх боків почулося: „Так, це саме кажемо й ми". Тоді я спитав: „А чи ви й проти автономії України?" — „Ні, ми не проти автономії, бо автономія може бути й без війни". — Тоді я сказав, що серед тих промовців, які ще не говорили, я знаю багато таких, що говоритимуть не за самостійність, а за автономію, що треба їх уважно вислухати, а що справа вирішиться голосуванням.

Після перерви я знову попрохав усіх спокійно вислухати промовців і не перебивати їх, бо це тільки затягає збори. Насамперед я дав слово кільком селянам. Вони виразно говорили про те, що з'їзд повинен висловитися за автономію і просили, щоб президія не дозволяла говорити про самостійність.

Дальший перебіг обговорення питання був більше-менше спокійний, один чи два інтеліґенти намагалися говорити про самостійність, але кожен раз це хвилювало з'їзд і викликувало незадоволення.

Між іншим, М. Стасюк пропонував негайно оголосити автономію України. Але я висловився, що автономію оголошувати зразу не слід з огляду на ситуацію, і вніс пропозицію про повільне здійснювання автономії і переведення підготовних кроків до скликання Всеукраїнських Установчих Зборів, зокрема про доручення Центральній Раді виробити проєкт статуту автономії України та про федеративний устрій Російської Республіки. Цей мій внесок був прийнятий з'їздом.

На другий денї у „Новій Радї" було надруковано, нібито я нападав на Центральну Раду за те, що вона досі не спромоглася на вироблення такого статуту і взагалі нічого не зробила для підготовки автономії. Це твердження не відповідало дійсності, і я його спростовував перед з'їздом.

Коли прийшло до голосування резолюції і Олександер Степаненко (кооператор, соц. самостійник) вийшов на подію, щоб прочитати резолюцію про самостійність, зчинився такий страшенний крик, що навіть у президії не було чути, що він говорить, тільки видко було, як він розкриває рота. Делеґати посхоплювалися з місць, розмахували руками, передні прибігали до президії з вимогою заборонити йому говорити. Крик тривав доти, доки О. Степаненко не зійшов із подіюму.

Президія змогла заспокоїти делеґатів лише з великим зусиллям. При голосуванні резолюція за самостійність зібрала 19 голосів, 14 повздержалося від голосування, а резолюція за автономію — більше, ніж 1.300. Голоси були точно підраховані, але я пам'ятаю точно лише перші дві цифри. Загальна кількість поданих голосів показує, що дехто з селян справді покинув з'їзд.

В прийнятих резолюціях говорилося про найрішучішу підтримку домагань Центральної Ради перед Тимчасовим Урядом про автономію України; давалося доручення Центральній Раді негайно виробити проєкт статуту автономії України та федеративно-демократичного устрою Російської Республіки; доручалося скликати негайно з'їзд представників інших народів і країв (Дон, Сибір), що домагаються федеративно-демократичного устрою; а головне, вказувалось на необхідність прискорення організації українських територіяльних (краєвих) зборів, тобто фактичного здійснення автономії України. Як підготовні кроки, вимагалося українізації всіх самоврядувань та інших інституцій для підготовлення до автономного ладу на Україні. До Російського Тимчасового Уряду було адресовано домагання, щоб представники українського народу взяли участь у майбутньому світовому міжнародньому конґресі, де б могли поставитися проти розділення українського народу між різними державами.

Це голосування виразно виявило тодішній політичний настрій українського селянства. Дехто з наших журналістів нарікає на Центральну Раду, що вона зразу ж не оголосила самостійности України. Голосування селянського з'їзду показує, що якби Центральна Рада це зробила, цим би відкинула від себе все селянство. Дехто (В. Кучабський) висловлює погляд, що українська маса „штовхала Центральну Раду, щоб в українській національній справі ставити центральному ро-

сійському урядові чимраз ширші домагання" („Діло", 27. III. 1937).

Це абсолютно не відповідає дійсному розвиткові подій. Центральна Рада мала в своєму розпорядженні біля 100 інструкторів, що їздили по всій Україні, відвідували місцеві сходини та з'їзди, бували на селах і ввесь час повідомляли Центральну Раду про настрій мас. Цими відомостями Центральна Рада кермувалася в своїй діяльності. Але це зовсім не значить, що маси підштовхували Ц. Раду. Навпаки, Центральна Рада була готова рішучіших кроків, але ввесь час мусіла використовувати як згаданих інструкторів, так і тодішню пресу для того, щоб насамперед піднести національну свідомість широких мас. Серед членів Ц. Ради було багато гарячих голів, які готові були б проголосити самостійність України, не рахуючися з настроєм мас, але розважлива більшість добре розуміла, що це довело б тільки до компромітації української справи. Голова Центральної Ради проф. М. Грушевський ще в 1900 р. висловлювався за самостійну Україну, але треба було рахуватися з тими матеріяльними й інтелектуальними силами, які були в розпорядженні Центральної Ради, а вони були дуже незначні, а головне — треба було брати під увагу рівень свідомости українських мас у той час.

2. VI. (ст. стилю) перший Всеукраїнський Селянський З'їзд закінчив свою працю, обравши Всеукраїнську Раду Селянських Делеґатів, яка вся ввійшла в склад Центральної Ради, а вже на другий день 3. VI. Центральна Рада прийняла ухвалу про негайну організацію автономного ладу. Вона чекала на резолюції Селянського та Військового з'їздів.

Український Військовий З'їзд відбувся 5-10 червня в кількості 2.308 делеґатів і виніс резолюцію про фактичне переведення в життя підвалин автономного ладу, отже не самостійности, навіть не автономії, а лише підвалин автономного ладу.

Військовий З'їзд закінчився 10 червня; в цей же день Центральна Рада оголосила свій 1-ий Універсал, що його вже була виготовила зараз після Селянського З'їзду. Вона чекала ще моральної підтримки з'їзду наших вояків.

Другим кардинальним питанням Першого Всеукраїнського Селянського З'їзду була земельна справа. В обговоренні її теж взяло участь багато делеґатів. Промовці підкреслювали малоземелля, неможливість виживити родину на 2-3 десятинах, неможливість десь заарендувати землю або найти якийсь заробіток на стороні.

Заразом указувалось на величезні панські маєтки, що знаходилися в польських, московських, німецьких, жидівських, тільки не в українських руках. Наприклад, на самій

Полтавщині герцоґові Мекленбурґ-Стреліцькому належало біля 60 тисяч гектарів дуже доброї землі; на Київщині та на Поділлі тяглися без кінця лятифундії Бродського, Браніцьких, Радивилів, Потоцьких, Любомирських і т. д.

Селяни вимагали передачі землі тим, хто її обробляє власними руками. Дехто з них, ознайомлений із партійними програмами, говорив про конфіскацію земель поміщицьких, манастирських, церковних та про передачу їх у всеукраїнський земельний фонд; інші говорили про скасування приватної власности на землю. Дехто порушував питання про необхідність заплатити бувшим власникам за землю по невисокій ціні, вказуючи на те, що вони також за ту землю заплатили, і на те, що коли їм за ту землю не заплатити, то, мовляв, чим вони житимуть; але остання думка не зустрічала жадної підтримки. Навпаки, цілий ряд селян указував на те, що держава після війни не має грошей, а безземельні селяни, яким має ця земля дістатися, такі бідні, що не можуть заплатити нічого; у багатих селян гроші є, але їм землі давати не треба, бо у них досить своєї. Промовці-селяни говорили приблизно так: „Нащо платити панам за землю, коли вони мають службу, а хто служби не має, то легко може її знайти, бо вони — вчені. А хто старий або хворий, що не може працювати, того повинна утримувати держава". Дехто навіть і з цим не погоджувався, кажучи: „А хто підтримував наших старих та немощних?" Коли хтось запропонував усю землю поділити порівну між тими, хто її обробляє, то кілька промовців висловилося проти цього, бо, мовляв, тоді знову почнуть одні продавати, другі купувати, та й знову „створиться неправда".

Я запропонував, щоб ті маєтки, в яких господарства ведуться зразково (у декого з землевласників урожаї були вдвоє вищі, ніж у селян), не були розділені, а щоб на них створити сільсько-господарські школи або с.-г. артілі з місцевих безземельних селян; але цю мою пропозицію зустріли селяни досить неприхильно, хоч доказів проти не наводили, а просто говорили: „Ми цього не хочемо".

Пізніше я довідався, що з приводу цього велася безглузда аґітація, немов есдеки хочуть зберегти великі господарства, щоб потім повернути їх власникам. Селяни ж головним чином настоювали на тому, що „треба й межі розорати".

Тільки селяни з Карлівки (на Полтавщині), де був великий, добре ведений маєток із цукроварнею й гуральнею, погоджувалися, щоб цей маєток зберегти в цілості й передати його артілі, яка буде складена з місцевих селян. У Карлівці, справді, господарство провадилося потім артільно аж до приходу большевиків.

Не обійшлося й без курйозів. Так, не вважаючи на те, що українські есдеки та есери склали умову не аґітувати одні проти одних, Микола Ковалевський (с.-р.) у своїй промові сказав, наче б то соціял-демократи „хотять, щоб селяни виварились у фабричному кітлі" і що в програмі с.-д. стоїть муніципалізація земель, а це ніби-то означає передачу всієї землі в розпорядження міських управ. Я взяв слово й дуже гостро виступив проти цього демагогічного твердження, вимагаючи від Ковалевського, щоб він сказав, де таке написано (тоді вже була видрукована у „Робітничій Ґазеті" програма української соціял-демократичної партії). Виступ Ковалевського не мав жадного успіху, тим більше, що на з'їзді були й такі селяни, які ще після 1905 р. належали до таємних гуртків, зорганізованих українськими соціял-демократами, й які читали видання українських с.-д. („Селянин") і їх програму знали ще до 1917 р.

Після довгої дискусії була обрана комісія, до якої ввійшли: Аркадій Степаненко (с.-р.), Павло Христюк (с.-р.), Андрій Лівицький (тоді с.-д.) і я. Комісія виробила проєкт резолюції відповідно до думок, висловлених у промовах. В ній говорилося про скасування приватної власности на землю, про передачу всієї землі у всеукраїнський земельний фонд, яким мали б розпоряджати земельні комітети: центральний всеукраїнський, губерніяльні та повітові. Право користування землею признавалося лише за тими, хто її обробляв власними руками.

Резолюцію цю з'їзд прийняв майже одноголосно. Зазначені в ній принципи лягли пізніше в основу земельного закону, що його виробив Генеральний Секретаріят Земельних Справ.

Треба було бачити задоволення селян, коли ця резолюція була прийнята. Дальший перебіг з'їзду був спокійний і дружній. По його закінченні селяни підходили до президії, щоб подякувати й попрощатися. Вони просили, щоб Центральна Рада дбала про переведення постанов з'їзду й обіцяли їй свою підтримку.

До Виконавчого Комітету Всеукраїнської Ради селянських депутатів обрано було 15 осіб. Між обраними були українські соціял-революціонери: М. Ковалевський, П. Христюк, Аркадій Степаненко, І. Пугач, українські соціял-демократи: В. Винниченко, Б. Мартос, А. Лівицький, безпартійні: М. Стасюк, Е. Осадчий. Вони ж увійшли і в число ста делеґатів від селян до Центральної Ради.

Olga Andriewsky

THE TRIUMPH OF PARTICULARISM: THE KUBAN COSSACKS IN 1917

Several days after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas, writes the historian P. Suliatytsky, the local Kuban Cossack leaders gathered informally in Katerynodar to discuss the political situation into which they had so unexpectedly been thrust by events in Petrograd. A Colonel Orekhov summarized the problem concisely when he asked the assembly: "What are we Cossacks to do under the new circumstances, now that His Imperial Majesty is gone?" In answer to the colonel's question, one of the lawyers rose to his feet and declared effusively, "Without His Imperial Highness, Russia cannot survive and will collapse, but the Cassacks will manage!" He suggested that the Cossacks mobilize at once, fortify the northern provincial borders, and declare the secession of the Kuban from the Russian Empire. The idea, observed Suliatytsky, provoked widespread consternation. Only with the speech of a third Cossack, a speech emphasizing the need for "all Slavic people to unite," was the audience finally subdued. On this patriotic note, the meeting closed.[1]

The question that had been raised by the meeting, however, remained open. What *were* the Kuban Cossacks to do now that the Patrimonial State had ceased to exist? Even though a general agreement on the necessity of "all Slavic people to unite" had been reached, the practical implications of this convenient pan-Slavic phrase had not been considered. What was the precise nature of the "Slavic Union" to be? What role would the Cossacks play in it? Moreover, the vague reference to "Slavic people" had revealed an even more basic question confronting the Kuban Cossacks in 1917—the question of primary loyalty. Were they Russians, Ukrainians, Kubantsi, or merely Cossacks? If they could settle the issue of allegiance, the twin problem of administration would be largely resolved as well. But, as the Katerynodar meeting had shown, the Cossacks were completely unprepared to determine either.

Undoubtedly, much of this unpreparedness to supply ready answers to the issues of allegiance and administration can be attributed to the fact that in 1917 these were rather novel problems for the Cossacks, as they were for the majority of the popula-

[1] P. Suliatytsky, *Narysy z istorii revoliutsii na Kubani* (Prague, 1925), p. 74.

tion of the Russian Empire. The Kuban frontiersmen had simply never had the luxury or the need of choosing their "nationality" before. From the time that Catherine the Great had lured a remnant group of Zaporozhian Cossacks to the politically volcanic borderlands of the Kuban until the abdication of Nicholas, the Kuban Cossacks had always been more or less defined by their function in the Patrimonial State. They were Cossacks—a professional military and colonizing force—servitors of the Russian Tsar and tenants of the Russian Empire. In this way, the Kuban Cossacks had been incorporated into the Russian sphere.

But incorporation did not, by any means, signify integration —and herein lies the key to the "identity crisis" that the Kuban Cossacks suffered in the early days of the February Revolution. Partly because of their distance from the actual centers of Russian power, and partly because of their intrinsic value as instruments of foreign and domestic relations, the Cossack communities were allowed to preserve their corporate integrity. The state, in fact, encouraged Cossack caste separateness.[2] It isolated the Hosts geographically by giving them generous land grants in the untamed borderlands; and legally by conferring on them an independent status. Even more importantly, it refrained from meddling in the internal affairs of the Hosts themselves. While the central government reserved the right to appoint the *ataman* of the Host, the effect of the regulation was only superficially felt. The Cossacks were able to maintain their own military discipline, uphold their own traditions, collect their own taxes, and, in general, live their own separate life.[3] Not even the pressing demands of the Imperial regime could disturb the insular quality of Cossack society.

In the Kuban, this practical and psychological self-sufficiency served to promote a spirit of particularism that was already quite strong. The traditions the Kuban Cossacks upheld were those of the *Sich;*[4] the language they spoke was often not Russian,

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[2] When a group of Kuban entrepreneurs approached Stolypin to obtain permission to extend a railroad through the province, the Minister told them that this might be dangerous—because the Cossacks would then be able to receive and read newspapers. One of the men from the Kuban replied to this by saying: "But we will transport lobsters also!" The railroad was eventually approved, but Stolypin's comment vividly illustrates the apprehension of the government about linking communication between the Cossack community and Russia proper. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

[3] Philip Longworth, *The Cossacks* (New York, 1970), p. 269.

[4] The Kuban Host was formed in 1861 by uniting the Black Sea Cossacks, the direct descendants of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, with a small number of Don Cossacks who occupied the northern boundary between

but the vernacular of the Zaporizhzhia; even their *stanytsi* (camps) were named after the ones they had abandoned on the Dnieper River.[5] In short, their entire culture harkened back to the days when the Zaporozhian *Sich* led a more independent political existence. Furthermore, this kind of cultural "other-worldliness" was reinforced by the frontier nature of Kuban life. Located at the base of the hotly contested Caucasus, the Kuban province was at times as susceptible to the influence of its southern adversaries as to those of a remote St. Petersburg. The Circassian jackets that the Kuban Cossacks adopted as part of their uniform reflect this southern influence. In summary, then, three factors—government policy, Zaporozhian traditions, and frontier life—combined to instill in the Kuban Cossack a sense of separate identity with marked regional associations. As Prince Bariatinsky, the noted commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Army, discovered in 1861, their "separateness assumes the air of nationality."[6] Though they served the Russian state and lived on Russian lands, the Kuban Cossacks, it seemed, were not quite Russian.

Nor had this ambivalence been resolved by the massive influx of Russian settlers into the Kuban following the end of the Caucasian Wars.[7] The Caucasian peace had signalled a new stage of economic development in the history of the Kuban and, with economic development of the resource-rich region, the arrival of another wave of opportunity-seeking settlers. Unlike the previous waves of exclusively peasant settlers, however, this migration could not and, indeed, did not desire to be assimilated into the traditional, rural, Cossack society. It included a new, articulate, educated, urban, and unquestionably Russian element—the professionals. While the peasant settlers claimed what little land they could, the new doctors, lawyers, teachers, administrators, and factory workers remained in Katerynodar and other large population centers. Far from leveling social differences, the presence of the *inogorodnye* (outlanders) only stood in relief from Cossack society; the contrasts between the military and the civilian com-

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the Don and the Kuban and who thus came to be called *lineitsy* (linemen). The *lineitsy* spoke Russian and continued the Don Cossack traditions; the two communities did not integrate. And, although the *lineitsy* did participate in Kuban politics in 1917, their role was negligible. For the most part, they allowed the former Black Sea Cossacks to take the lead. D. E. Skobtsov, *Tri goda revoliutsii i grazhdanskoi voiny na Kubani* (Paris, n.d.), p. 30.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

[7] Longworth, p. 255.

munities appeared sharper than ever.[8] Neither group could absorb the other. With the continued support of the Imperial regime, Cossack lands and Cossack privileges endured the insistent demands of the newcomers. The Kuban Cossacks obstinately clung to the exclusive society that had sustained them for so long.

Thus, on the eve of the February Revolution, the Kuban Cossacks found themselves suspended between two worlds—between the provincial world of Zaporozhian traditions and Cossack self-reliance on the one hand, and the imperial world of service and caste privilege on the other. Both were alluring, both commanded loyalties. Together they created a tension that paralyzed the Cossacks at Katerynodar in early 1917. But if the Cossacks lacked an articulate ideology and a firm plan for action, they nevertheless possessed a superior organization. For direction they would have to rely on the same source they had relied on for some 125 years—the central government. In March 1917, the Kuban Cossacks once again allowed the state to take the lead.

The Provisional Government, however, proved to be quite different from the one the Cossacks had been accustomed to dealing with. Here was a government that asserted that "the power of the state should be based not on violence and coercion, but on the consent of free citizens to submit to the power they themselves created."[9] In other words, passive compliance was no longer the order of the day. The new government asked for, and even demanded, vigorous political initiative. And to smooth this transition to self-government, it entrusted provincial and rural administration to the prerevolutionary strongholds of liberalism, the *zemstva*. Governors were replaced with commissars.[10] Public committees sprang up everywhere.[11] Within a matter of a few days and a few decrees, the task of direction was transferred in philosophical, if not practical, terms to the much exalted and little understood "will of the people."

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[8] In 1906-1907, "a wave of liberal idealism was sweeping the educated Cossacks. There was a revival of Cossack self-awareness, a desire to seek political solutions to *their* problems." *Ibid.*, p. 280. I would suggest that this "revival" of Cossack self-awareness was as much due to the large influx of non-Cossacks into the Cossack provinces as to the general political and intellectual climate of the Russian Empire at that time.

[9] Leonard Schapiro, "The Political Thought of the First Provisional Government," in *Revolutionary Russia*, ed. Richard Pipes (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 98.

[10] R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky, eds., *The Russian Provisional Government: Documents* (Stanford, 1961), vol. 1, doc. 219, p. 243.

[11] *Ibid.*, doc. 238, p. 260.

In keeping with the democratic spirit of the moment, the Provisional Government declined to decide the issue of local administration in the Kuban, where no *zemstvo* had been introduced. Instead, it resolved to "leave open temporarily the question of the administrative organ... until... solved jointly with the local public organization and functionaries."[12] So concerned was the government with maintaining its position of neutrality, that it, in fact, appointed not one, but two commissars to oversee the provincial deliberations—one from the Cossack community, the energetic and forceful Kadet, K. L. Bardizh, and the other from the *inogorodnye,* the rather less resolute Katerynodar lawyer, N. N. Nikolaev, also a Kadet, and long-standing member of the Duma.[13] With their mandate from Petrograd, the commissars set about the business of arranging an assembly. A provincial election was called for the second day of Easter, March 31, 1917 (OS).

News of the coming congress was met with great expectations in the Kuban. The need to establish some form of authority was clearly felt. The influence of the old Provincial Government was rapidly deteriorating, while the municipal police had completely disappeared in the wake of the Tsar's abdication.[14] But, perhaps even more than the restoration of order, the congress represented an opportunity for the two major communities of the Kuban to satisfy any political ambitions they might have. For the *inogorodnye,* it was an apparent chance to achieve full civic and economic equality after many years of playing a subordinate role to the Cossacks. For the Cossacks, on the other hand, the congress presented a possibility to resolve their incongruous relationship with the central government, to somehow bring their two worlds more into line. Cossack self-government within the framework of the Russian state—this was the promise that the congress held. Although they had lost their most devoted patron, the Tsar, the Cossacks stood to gain something much more important. Both groups, then, anticipated the democratic experiment with profound optimism. It was an optimism borne of inexperience.

When the First Kuban Provincial Congress convened on April 13 (OS) in a "somewhat uncomfortable" movie theater[15] in Katerynodar, the prevailing mood was still amicable. A host of orators hailed the some one thousand delegates—Cossacks, *inogorodnye,* and a small contingent of Circassians—with speeches celebrating the revolutionary events of the past weeks; they were

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[12] *Ibid.* doc. 137, p. 161.
[13] Suliatytsky, p. 80.
[14] Skobtsov, pp. 25-26.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

followed, in turn, by a general resolution on the need to carry the European war to its victorious conclusion. Finally, after much fanfare, the assembly turned its attention to the central issue—local government. The Commissar Dolgopolov, a Katerynodar physician who had replaced Nikolaev when the latter quarreled with the city workers' organizations and resigned, submitted a comprehensive plan. According to the proposal, an Executive Committee with administrative powers and a Provincial Soviet with legislative powers would be created. Each body would be composed of ninety representatives—one Cossack and one *inogorodnyi* from every district. In addition, representatives of the various revolutionary organizations, such as the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, would be able to sit on the Executive Committee. But the most crucial point of Dolgopolov's plan, as far as the Cossacks were concerned, was to be found in a footnote. Leaving the repartition of Kuban land to the upcoming Constituent Assembly, it recognized the inviolability of Cossack property. At the same time, the Cossacks were granted the right to conduct their own affairs under the auspices of the Executive Committee and Provincial Soviet. The Cossack sections of these bodies were to be entitled the Military Government *(Voiskovoe Pravitelstvo)* and Military Soviet *(Voiskovyi Sovet)* respectively. Dolgopolov's plan was approved. After a number of declarations by the *inogorodnye* that they "make no claims to Cossack land,"[16] the congress ended on what appeared to be the same note of goodwill it had opened. Because the spring planting season was at hand, most of the delegates quickly dispersed.

Not everyone came away from Katerynodar wholly gratified. Although the congress had revealed a willingness on the part of the *inogorodnye* and Cossacks to agree on a compromise, that compromise, by its very nature, could hardly fulfill all the expectations of both groups. While the *inogorodnye* did gain a measure of political equality that they had never had before, they were confronted at once with the imposing presence of the military community. Because of Dolgopolov's system of proportional elections, the Cossacks were slated to return half of the delegates to the executive and legislative bodies, a half representing less than forty-four percent (1,374,048) of the provincial population.[17] Moreover, it was a half with a superior organization and an iron military discipline. In contrast to the *inogorodnye,* whose loyalties were divided among the many Russian political parties,

[16] Georgii Pokrovsky, *Denikinshchina* (Berlin, 1923), p. 15.

[17] Peter Kenez, *Civil War in South Russia, 1918* (Berkeley, 1971), p. 38.

the Cossacks formed a single faction. Rarely did Kadet or Social-Revolutionary sympathies interfere with Cossack consonance. This unity of purpose was best expressed by one man, who proclaimed: "We are Cossacks, we don't need parties!"[18] If, as a caste, the Cossacks had been politically impotent, as an interest group they were potentially omnipotent. Through sheer corporate strength they posed a threat to the further political and economic advancement of the *inogorodnye*.

The Cossacks, too, did not leave the April congress without a certain uneasiness. Though they had finally escaped the politically stifling atmosphere of Tsarist Russia, the alternative could well prove to be more harmful. The fact that the *inogorodnye* were waiting for the Constituent Assembly to repartition the Kuban land—mostly Cossack land[19]—could have been of no small concern to the military community, despite the ardent assurances of respect for Cossack property rights heard at the Congress. For the Cossacks, their land was their patrimony, earned through generations of military service. It was an integral feature of Cossack society, at times the only feature that distinguished Cossacks from peasants. The allusions to a future repartition could not *but* have alarmed the military men. And, on the whole, their relegation to a mere footnote did not improve matters either.[20] These were ominous signs for the Cossacks, fortelling a radically different socioeconomic status in the new Russian state. Only so long as the *inogorodnye* were willing to continue postponing their demands would a conflict be prevented. In early April 1917 (OS), such a conflict, as yet, seemed distant.

But the Revolution, to paraphrase a famous saying, waits for no one. With the problem of provincial administration more or less settled, the Kuban leaders now focused on the question of rural administration. The Congress delegates, in their haste to return to their offices and their fields, had delayed a decision on this matter until the first meeting of the Provincial Soviet. It was scheduled for June 11 (OS). In the meantime, an *inogorodnyi* lawyer named Turutin, the newly elected chairman of the Executive Committee, journeyed to Petrograd for instructions concerning the creation of lower administrative units in the Kuban.[21] Unlike the Provisional Government of early March, the one Turutin found in May was much more willing, if not more able, to direct the organizational work of the Kuban government. The chairman

[18] Suliatytsky, p. 73.
[19] Kenez, p. 38.
[20] Suliatytsky, p. 85.
[21] Skobtsov, p. 36.

returned home with a basic plan for the introduction of the *zemstvo* in the Russian provinces. He immediately assigned a special committee the task of adapting the scheme to local conditions. And, as the committee prepared to present its project at the June session of the provincial legislature, the *inogorodnye* and the Cossacks had time to formulate their positions on the *zemstvo*. To the discerning eye it appeared that the moment of truth was at hand.

Long before the June meeting, many of the Cossack leaders spoke out strongly against the *zemstvo*. I. L. Makarenko, a fiery Cossack nationalist, published a pamphlet that outlined the past expenditures and accomplishments of the Host administration. Churches, schools, hospitals—all were cited. This administrative expertise, he argued further, should not simply be sacrificed to a revolutionary impulse. In his opinion, the *zemstvo* could not possibly be as effective as the already existing structure.

Cossack opposition to the *zemstvo*, however, went beyond considerations of mere "cost efficiency." For the Kuban Cossacks the *zemstvo* would have meant forfeiting a measure of the practical self-sufficiency that had characterized Cossack society for centuries. It would have meant competing for their interests in yet another democratic arena. Above all, it would have meant a deterioration in their ability to determine the course and quality of Cossack life. In a very real sense, the *zemstvo* came to symbolize the dissolution of the Kuban-Cossack community itself.[22]

What gave this perception its validity and intensity was a marked change in the attitude of Petrograd towards the Cossacks. The first Provisional Government, regarding itself as a "temporary trustee" of sovereignty, had tried to maintain some semblance of the old order.[23] Hence, in early March it agreed to guarantee "the rights of the Cossacks to their land."[24] But by late spring, having fallen victim to its extremist elements, the government began to sound a different note. At the All-Russian Peasant Congress in May, for example, the Minister of Agriculture, the SR Chernov, remarked that "the Cossacks will have to squeeze in... they have large strips of land."[25] Even more to the alarm of the Cossacks, the Minister spoke out in favour of nationalizing *all* land. Rumours of doing away with the Cossack caste altogether began to

[22] Suliatytsky, p. 92.
[23] Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1974), p. 50.
[24] Longworth, p. 288.
[25] Skobtsov, p. 39.

circulate.[26] The Revolution was clearly accelerating at break-neck speed. Unless the Kuban Cossacks could somehow stem the revolutionary tide threatening to sweep away all old forms of life, in a few weeks they would be little more than impoverished peasants —or so they thought. Thus, the *zemstvo* issue became a focal point for the emerging struggle to preserve Cossack integrity.

In reaction to the unmistakable Cossack position, the *inogorodnye* leaders also began to view the *zemstvo* issue in larger terms. The months following the February Revolution had seen little actual progress towards the egalitarian ideal. *Inogorodnye* concessions were not satisfactorily reciprocated. Far from diminishing, Cossack economic and political power had, in fact, shown itself to be on the rise. When the two communities set to the task of organizing their respective provincial administrations, for instance, the Kuban Military Rada, as the Cossack section of the government now called itself, simply co-opted the entire Tsarist Provincial Government.[27] The employees did not even have to move from their offices. Within a few hours, the Cossacks had a smoothly functioning and highly skilled administration. The *inogorodnye,* at the other extreme, had absolutely no bureaucratic machinery to fall back on. Completely lacking experience and an imbued sense of discipline, they spent many weeks attempting to forge some sort of workable apparatus.[28] The organizational period of the Revolution had so far only served to underscore the corporate inferiority of the *inogorodnye* vis-à-vis the Cossacks. And this discrepancy seemed to be growing. In this way, the *zemstvo* issue came to represent for them a greater issue as well. It came to represent the whole tenor of events in the Kuban.

By the time the Provisional Soviet met on June 11, then, feelings on both sides were running high.[29] Ostensibly called to settle the problem of rural administration, the legislative session immediately assumed the character of a hostile conflict. Several *inogorodnye* leaders reproached the Cossacks for their overrepresentation in the government even before the meeting officially opened. But the first real skirmish occurred over the election of a chairman. Both groups put forward their own candidate. The *inogorodnye* nominated the energetic Katerynodar lawyer, D. A. Liberman, while the Cossacks proposed the Ukrainophile, N. S. Riabovol. Supported by a small number of *gortsy* (mountain people), Riabovol won with only a few votes to spare. As ex-

[26] A. I. Denikin, *The Russian Turmoil* (London, 1932), p. 243.
[27] Skobtsov, p. 34.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

pected, the voting had closely followed class lines.[30] The *inogorodnye* and the Cossacks, it appeared, were becoming more and more entrenched.

When the question of rural administration came up, the two groups initiated their assaults. Because the special committee that was scheduled to present its formula on adapting the *zemstvo* in the Kuban had failed to evolve any plan whatsoever, the session of the Soviet quickly degenerated into a general debate over politics and personalities. First, an *inogorodnyi* accused Makarenko, the Cossack pamphleteer, of obscurantism and malicious reaction. Next, Sultan Shakhim-Girei, a leader of the *gortsy* contingent, took the floor and defended Makarenko and his ideas. He was followed by more speakers, alternately attacking and defending the *zemstvo* and Makarenko. To make matters worse, the Cossack chairman, Riabovol, who, more than anyone else, could have played a pacifying role, used his position to interrupt speakers and call recesses when a vote was not going in favour of the Cossacks. The quarrel thus continued for three days. In the end, the members of the Soviet adjourned to form smaller groups. The Military Soviet and the *inogorodnye* held their own caucuses. Under these conditions, it was hoped more constructive plans for a rural administration could develop.[31]

The temporary suspension of the Soviet, however, did little to promote a compromise solution. The proceedings had taken on such vituperative overtones that compromise itself no longer seemed possible. As soon as the assembly reconvened, the *inogorodnye* began to charge the Cossacks with sabotaging the *zemstvo*, with deliberately blocking important political reforms. The tension continued to mount. Suddenly, one extremely agitated *inogorodnyi* rose to his feet and started cursing the Military Government and its leaders. An equally agitated Cossack immediately jumped up and shouted: "Brother Cossacks! They are insulting our chairman. There is no reason for us to be here!"[32] In an amazing display of unity, the Cossacks all promptly filed out. The meeting had come to an abrupt end.

The Cossacks met the next day to decide what to do. At first the thought of a permanent breach frightened both the *inogorodnye* and the Cossacks. Repeated attempts at conciliation were made, but they failed repeatedly. The moderates could not persuade their groups that a rapprochement was at all necessary. Neither side was willing to concede to the other. Sensing that

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

a decision vital to the future of their community was about to be made, hundreds of Cossacks—members of the Executive Committee, Cossack bureaucrats, officers—flocked to Katerynodar. The separatists who had all along pressed for a Kuban government composed only of Cossacks began to gain ground. The split was assuming concrete forms. Finally, in the early hours of June 21, 1917 (OS), the Military Soviet announced that it was taking over the powers of the Provisional Soviet. The functions of the Executive Committee were, at the same time, being transferred to the Military Government.[33] The Kuban Cossacks, in other words, had come into their age-old legacy of Cossack self-government. The "identity crisis" had been at least partially solved.

Within the space of four months, the Kuban Cossacks had come to recognize that they were first and foremost Kuban Cossacks, not Russians. Herein lay their primary loyalty. And, although the Cossacks did not formally secede from the Russian Empire until February, the tension between the provincial world of Zaporozhian traditions and Cossack self-sufficiency on the one hand and the imperial world of Russian service and caste privilege on the other was conclusively resolved. The Revolution had shown that the imperial world was important to the Cossacks only to the degree to which it prolonged the existence of their provincial world. Democratic conflict, social and economic equality, and the *zemstvo* belonged to an intellectual tradition that, when translated into concrete forms, spelled the destruction of the Cossack community. Thus, the Cossacks, for whom the continuation of their culture was never in question, chose to take matters into their own hands, regardless of the consequences. It was, in every sense, an affirmation of the corporate integrity of the Kuban Cossacks, a triumph of particularism.

Viewed from a different perspective, however, it was a hollow triumph. Although they no longer considered themselves Russians, the Kuban Cossacks had yet to settle the question of their own national identity. As a response to a temporary crisis, Cossack particularism might be practicable, but it could offer no long-term solution to the problem of the national allegiance of the Kuban. Victory had been achieved at the expense of the resident majority of the Kuban, the *inogorodnye*. From June 1917 on, the Cossacks would seek to maintain a fundamentally untenable political position: to rule a highly stratified population, over half of which was not sympathetic to the aims and methods of the Cossack government. The very presence of *inogorodnye* who

[33] Suliatytsky, p. 94.

still considered Petrograd the seat of authority would prevent the Cossacks from successfully insulating the Kuban from the "Russian turmoil." And the Bolshevik upheaval in October was to insure that Petrograd events, too, would make their presence felt in the province.

The first signs of that presence came not with the founding of the numerically insignificant Bolshevik cell in Katerynodar in April 1917, but, rather, with the dissolution of the Caucasian front and the subsequent stream of demoralized and bolshevized soldiers passing through the Kuban in the last weeks of the same year.[34] The Bolshevik platform, advocating nationalization of land and power to the soviets, provided a convenient rallying point for the more militant anti-Cossack forces. And the return of a number of bolshevized Kuban Cossacks introduced a new element of dissent into Cossack political life, an element which further undercut the already precarious support for the Kuban government. Under such circumstances, the Kuban Rada found it increasingly more difficult to restore any semblance of order.

Only when the Bolshevik military forces actually advanced into the Kuban, when the "Russian problem" finally and forcefully pressed itself on the Cossacks, did the Kuban government take any steps to salvage its authority. On February 16, 1918, as the Bolsheviks marched towards Katerynodar, the Kuban Rada declared its independence. At the same time, the Rada, proclaiming its affinity to the lands of the old *Sich,* joined the Ukrainian government in federation and, on a different front, reluctantly agreed to cooperate with Denikin's Volunteer Army, a move which the Cossacks hitherto had refused to make.[35] While, on the one hand, professing their right to govern the Kuban, the Cossacks were also admitting their inability to protect that right. In this context, then, the simultaneous decisions to declare independence, join Ukraine, and fight with Denikin's forces were hardly auspicious beginnings for the fledgling state. Rather, they signalled a continuing confusion of identity and the complete bankruptcy of the notion of Kuban Cossack particularism as a political solution to the problems of the Kuban.

The defeat of the Kuban Cossacks in 1917 lay in their failure to evolve a complete concept of nationhood, to somehow translate their feelings of separateness into an articulate idea of nationality that could transcend privilege, tradition, and class interests. Generations of Cossack self-sufficiency had taught the frontiers-

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 129.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

men to rely practically and intellectually on their own social organization. They never became Ukrainians or Kubantsi in the full sense of the word. And, as Denikin was to learn much to his dismay, neither were the Kuban Cossacks Russians. Thus, 1917 was again to see the triumph of Cossack particularism, and 1921—the defeat of the Kuban Cossacks themselves.

Nestor Makuch

THE INFLUENCE OF THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION ON UKRAINIANS IN CANADA, 1917-22

PREFACE

This study, with the exception of two references, is based exclusively on two Ukrainian-Canadian newspapers: *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn*, which became *Kanadiiskyi Ukrainets* in 1919, and *Robotchyi Narod*, which became *Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti* in 1919.

Although one may be apprehensive about gleaning a representative overview from such a limited number of sources, one may claim that this is possible in this case for several reasons:

(1) The two newspapers represent opposite ends of the political spectrum.

(2) *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn* (and *Kanadiiskyi Ukrainets*) was the organ of the Catholic Church. Although figures are hard to come by, one source states there were 200,000 Ukrainian Catholics in Canada by the late 1920s, which made it the largest social group in the Ukrainian-Canadian community.* In addition, a contemporary account of Ukrainian-Canadian society by Myroslav Irchan, a Soviet Ukrainian writer who spent five years in Winnipeg during the early 1920s, claimed that "the only influence [is] exerted by the priests . . . there are many groups and religious sects [in the Ukrainian-Canadian community] . . . but these are only superficial formations with no popular support. The mass of the politically unenlightened and culturally backward farmers and workers are under the influence of the Catholics."**

(3) *Robotchyi Narod* (and *Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti*) was the organ of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP), the most influential party among Ukrainian-Canadian socialists at the time.

This paper omits a serious discussion of the effects of the revolution on the religious divisions originating during this time, since it was felt that the topic was complicated enough and that this omission does not seriously affect the theme of this paper.

INTRODUCTION

The year 1917 marked a watershed in Ukrainian-Canadian history. The chain of events then reshaping the old country would also set Canada's mass of "Galician," "Ruthenian," and "Bukovinian" peasants onto the long and tortuous road that led to what is today known as the "Ukrai-

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* O. Martynowych, "Ukrainian Catholic Clericalism in Western Canada 1900-1932" (unpublished paper, University of Manitoba, 1974), p. 39a.

** Cited in *ibid.*, page v.

nian community." Few Ukrainian-Canadians could claim to have been, in the long run, unaffected. The recency of emigration and the close links to Ukraine through friends and relatives who did not emigrate made the issues raised by the revolutionary period impossible to ignore. One had to take a position, even if it was one of "the hell with it, I'm a Canadian now." It is ironic to note that the same complex set of forces surfacing in Ukraine during this period which reaffirmed the existence of the Ukrainian nation and insured its survival, had the long-term effect of setting the "Ukrainian community" in Canada on the road to disintegration, depletion, and stagnation—culminating in its current "crisis" situation.

1917: WHO ARE THE UKRAINIANS AND WHAT DO THEY WANT

By 1917, over twenty-five years after the first Galician peasants had arrived in Canada, the Ukrainian community in Canada had begun to evolve its own distinct political and social groupings. Led by a small number of intellectuals, radicals, and clerics who had accompanied the 200,000-strong "first wave" of Ukrainian immigrants, the fledgling community was faced not only with the hostile attitude of Canadian society, but also with what seemed to be constant bickering and infighting within its ranks—the growing pains of a differentiating society. The major Ukrainian social, religious, and political currents, such as the Catholic Church and the socialists, were not only hostile to each other but were themselves torn by centrifugal forces. The socialist community had undergone numerous splits during its early years, while forces within the church, which would lead to the formation of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1918, were ready to erupt. In the Ukrainian-Canadian press, around which much of "Ukrainian community" life centered in this period, many articles pleading for unity of action and solidarity amongst Ukrainians in Canada had appeared. By 1917 these appeals gained a new meaning as community activists exhorted the Ukrainian people to unite in order to build a community strong enough to present the "Ukrainian question" at the peace conference that the war's end would bring and to press for its endorsement by a representative of the British Empire.[1]

Any attempts at consolidating the Ukrainian community first had to deal with the problem of overcoming the backwardness and provincialism of the bulk of the Ukrainian population in Canada, comprised mostly of peasants from the economically stagnant provinces of Galicia and Bukovina. Although the intelligentsia, both in Canada and Ukraine, had long exhorted the peasants to shed their "Bukovinian," "Galician," or "Ruthenian" identities and to recognize themselves as part of the

[1] For an illustration of this sentiment, see the editorial in *Robotchyi Narod*, January 10, 1917.

"soporific" Ukrainian nation,[2] their efforts were often not rewarded. The year 1917, with the crest of the national movement breaking in Ukraine, injected them with a new vigour. This was reflected in both *Robotchyi Narod* and *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn*, which carried numerous articles on the national reawakening in Ukraine, vignettes of Ukrainian history, exhortations to "be Ukrainian," and condemnations of Russophilic trends in Canada. In March 1917, both of these newspapers devoted a major portion of one of their issues to Taras Shevchenko on the occasion of the fifty-sixth anniversary of his death.[3]

The "national conciousness" of the Ukrainians in Canada developed because of both external and internal factors. Externally, news that following the March revolution lectures at Kiev University were being conducted in Ukrainian or that the Ukrainian language was being introduced in all government schools in Ukraine[4] evoked such sentiments as those expressed in a letter to *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn* from Vegreville, Alberta. Its author claimed that if "our brothers" in Ukraine had seen to it to leave their descendants an inheritance, i.e., a national identity, then the Ukrainians in Canada, "where we have not seen the hardships of war as in Europe," should see to it to preserve their national "riches" and insure that they leave *their* descendants a good inheritance.[5] Internally. the persecution of the Ukrainians as "enemy aliens" during the First World War and government threats to revoke their citizenship illustrated to the Ukrainian-Canadian population the advantage of being Ukrainian and not "Austrian." The Ukrainians felt that "... all we can do is be sorry that we took this issue [national identity] lightly and that we did very little in the direction of letting our neighbours in Canada know clearly who and what we are: that we are not 'Austrian,' or 'Galician,' or a wild, uneducated people as portrayed by 'our own native' undercover agents, who have sold out and are traitors to our people." [6]

[2] *Ukrainskyi Holos* (Ukrainian Voice), the organ of the liberal intelligentsia, directed most of its efforts in this direction and was a fervent advocate of education as the best route to national awareness. The awareness of its contributors is shown by the use of the term "Ukrainian" in the newspaper's name, even in the first issue published in 1909, as opposed to *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn* (Canadian Ruthenian), the organ of the Catholic church, which became *Kanadiiskyi Ukrainets* (Canadian Ukrainian) only in 1919.

[3] *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn*, hereafter cited as *KR*, devoted the first six pages of its March 1917 issue and *Robotchyi Narod*, hereafter cited as *RN*, the first three pages of its March 16, 1917 issue to Shevchenko. In *RN* this even upstaged coverage of the February revolution. Although 1917 was not an important Shevchenko anniversary, it was only in this year that so much space was devoted to him.

[4] *KR*, May 2, 1917.

[5] *KR*, July 25, 1917.

[6] *RN*, September 5, 1917.

Although most sectors of Ukrainian-Canadian society were becoming increasingly aware of their national identity and its relationship to national oppression in Ukraine, the leftist sector, represented by the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP), quickly developed an analysis different from the rest of the community. It saw the "national question" and the liberation of oppressed nations as "one of the tasks of socialism on the road to the complete liberation of the proletariat of all nations from social and economic oppression." [7] The significance of this fundamentally different point of view would soon become apparent.

The fall of Tsarism in March 1917 sent shock waves across the world. In Canada it electrified the Ukrainian community,[8] made theoretical questions real, and created a fervent optimism for the future:

> The thirty million-strong Ukrainian nation in Russia will now use its native language in its speech, writing, schools, and government. The ignorant grey masses of the Ukrainian working people will now have access to education and, with the aid of their native language, will be able to draw literary nourishment from the storehouse of knowledge.[9]

The Ukrainian press in Canada immediately rose to the task of putting the tumultuous events of the revolution into a proper frame of reference for its readers. *Robotchyi Narod* linked Ukraine to general revolutionary currents, past and present, in Russia and reprinted an article from 1910, "The Russian Revolution and the Ukrainian National Problem," which pointed out that almost all political revolutions involved intense movements of oppressed nations and that, to succeed, the struggle against national oppression had to ally itself with the mass movement struggling to bring about political revolution.[10] *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn* claimed the entire

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[7] *RN*, October 3, 1917. This was part of a resolution on the national question adopted at the Second Congress of the USDP, held in Winnipeg at the end of August 1917.

[8] An indication of this is an incident that occurred in a Winnipeg Russophile Russian Orthodox Church a few days after the March revolution. When during a service the priest referred to Tsar Nicholas, several of the "faithful" protested, saying that "there is no longer a Tsar, it is not necessary to mention him." The incident precipitated a scuffle amongst the parishioners that eventually brought police intervention and several arrests. *KR*, March 21, 1917.

[9] *RN*, March 23, 1917.

[10] *Ibid.* This article originally appeared on December 2, 1910 in *Nash Holos*, a Ukrainian socialist journal. *RN* had carried many educational articles on this question even before the March revolution, including a lengthy serialized article from *Sotsial Democrat*, the central organ of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, entitled "The Socialist Revolution and the Right to Self-Determination." It appeared in *RN* beginning with the February 2, 1917 issue.

world, especially the Ukrainians and the Jews, joyously greeted news of the revolution, and that the "Russian" people now had the power to say whether they wanted a tsar or a republic with a "President of the United States of Russia." Declaring that "Ukraine is free when Russia is free," it called on Ukrainians "wherever they may be" to educate themselves in preparation for the tasks that lay ahead.[11]

In addition to this moral support, Ukrainians in Canada felt it was their duty to come to the material aid of their native land. Already in 1915 *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn* began soliciting donations for a "Postwar Fund" to aid the needy in Ukraine.[12] Suggestions for a different type of aid were also made. An article in *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn* claimed that, although past attempts to organize "Ukrainian battalions" had failed, the time was now ripe for sending direct military aid to Ukraine from Canada.[13] Since President Wilson of the United States was thinking of sending a "Slavic battalion" to Russia via Siberia, its author felt that Ukrainians should capitalize on this opportunity and organize a battalion in Canada to be sent (with the aid of Britain and the United States) to Ukraine, via Siberia, to help build an independent Ukraine and fight the Germans. The author was confident that thousands of Ukrainians, in whom "cossack blood still flows," would come forth and ended his appeal by asking "who amongst us is not a cossack!?" The view he represented, however, was condemned by the more rational elements in Ukrainian-Canadian society:

> When all of Europe is bathed in blood; when a million corpses have fallen without achieving anything for anybody; when in Europe there are already more cripples than healthy persons; when hunger destroys more Ukrainians than war, then you, Ukrainians, send aid, i.e., take those who are still alive and throw them into the heat of battle. When millions of hungry naked cripples extend their hands for bread, then you, Ukrainians from across the sea, send them soldiers. And in Canada, instead of gathering funds for the needy, you gather them for the maintenance of soldiers . . . .
>
> Maybe here in Canada there are great heroes, cossacks with dreams about great campaigns, awards, medals, iron crosses, and so on. But in Ukraine they are dreaming more about peace than about war.[14]

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[11] *KR*, March 21, 1917.

[12] *KR*, August 8, 1917. This fund was deposited by *KR* in a Winnipeg bank account. Since one cannot find published figures stating how much was collected, one may assume that the fund drive was not terribly successful. It was eventually superceded by numerous other funds and fell into oblivion. What was collected was eventually turned over by Bishop Budka to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky when he visited Canada in 1921 to collect funds for orphans in Ukraine.

[13] *KR*, September 26, 1917. There had been attempts to organize "Ukrainian battalions" in the past by Messrs. Gowda, Shandro, and Kremar.

[14] *KR*, October 17, 1917.

Confusion about the forms and means of aiding Ukraine seemed to reign supreme. The more rational understood this to mean financial aid, although they realized that all the donations from Canada to date would not suffice to aid even a single village. The question loomed in the back of everyone's mind, and numerous *vicha* were called to discuss this issue.

The socialists, however, were quite clear on the question of aiding Ukraine. They criticized suggestions for military aid as being misguided, claiming that Ukraine had to be built, not destroyed. It needed people and materials for reconstruction, education, food, clothing, and medicine. A telegram received by the Executive Committee (EC) of the USDP in Canada from the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDWP) in Ukraine claimed that Ukraine needed books, journals, and newspapers and stressed the important role the revolutionary press had to play in the formation of a democratic system in Ukraine.[15] It requested specifically that Ukrainians in Canada provide a printing press and two Linotypes, which were desperately needed but unavailable in Russia at this time. The USDP in Canada responded by setting up a "Revolutionary Fund" to raise the $20,000 required to fulfil the request.

The campaign was unsuccessful owing to insufficient contributions and subsequent events in Ukraine. Yet it was significant, since it demonstrated the possibility for cooperation and interaction between the socialist and the broadly nationalist elements of Ukrainian-Canadian society.[16] The EC of the USDP in Canada attempted to coordinate all Ukrainian organizations in Winnipeg around this issue. Although the reaction to this attempt was by no means overwhelming, support was obtained in the "other camp" from *Kanadiiskyi Farmer*, *Ranok*, and *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn*.[17] This honeymoon was shortlived and soon changed to bitter irreconcilable squabbles as the sequence of events in Ukraine dissolved the basis for cooperation.

The common thread linking, however tenuously, the various sectors of the organized Ukrainian community in Canada was their support for the Central Rada. The Rada's activities were closely followed by the Ukrainian-Canadian press of every political persuasion—its pages were filled with reports of events in Ukraine, information on the Rada, the Rada's proclamations and Universals, and articles sympathetic to the Rada's

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[15] *RN*, October 3, 1917. The telegram was received in June, at which time the "Revolutionary Fund" was started.

[16] The contributions raised by the "Revolutionary Fund" were eventually sent to Ukraine in 1922 to help relieve the famine. See "Spravozdannia z zahalnykh zboriv Ukrainskoho Robitnychoho Domu v Vinnipegu" (Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Ukrainian Labour Temple in Winnipeg), February 2-4, 1922.

[17] *KR* printed the USDP's appeal in its October 31, 1917 issue.

struggle with the Russian Provisional Government. *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn* declared that "Russia must be transformed into a series of republics, joined by common interests and a common good" and expressed the hope that Russia would become a "large Switzerland."[18] The USDP and *Robotchyi Narod* also supported the Rada's program, but understood it in a different context. Only with the Bolshevik revolution did this became apparent.

At first even the reaction of *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn* to the October revolution was mildly receptive, if not cautious. It declared that the Bolsheviks had at least voluntarily declared the right of all nations to self-determination, something that Kerensky had not only not done but had actively fought against.[19] By the end of the year, following the Bolsheviks' "Ultimatum" to the Central Rada and their declaration of war on Ukraine, it realized that the Bolshevik odes about self-determination meant actually only the *right* to self-determination, not the exercise of this right; it declared that the Bolsheviks had no right to speak in the name of all the nations in "Russia" and took a decidedly anti-Bolshevik position.[20]

The USDP and *Robotchyi Narod*, on the other hand, had hoped initially that the Rada would work together with the Bolsheviks. They viewed the Bolsheviks as the true representatives of the revolutionary proletariat, whom "the soldiers, workers, and peasants had no choice but to follow."[21] They had taken Lenin's declaration about the self-determination of nations at face value and were thus confused at the Central Rada's hesitancy to join forces with the Bolsheviks (since both were striving for a better society).[22] They took a pro-federalist and pro-Bolshevik position. When a demonstration took place in Toronto, in early December 1917, against the Bolshevik's call for peace without annexations (which, it was feared, would leave Ukrainians, as well as Czechs, Romanians, and Yugoslavs under Austrian rule), *Robotchyi Narod* denounced the demonstration and condemned the participants as counterrevolutionary collaborators of Kaledin and Kornilov, since they were attacking the Bolsheviks at the same time as the White Generals and "of course the Bolsheviks, under attack from two fronts, from the front and from the rear, will fall."[23] They were thus cast at an early stage in the role of uncritical defenders of the Soviet Union —a role that, in the long run, would be their nemesis.

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[18] *KR*, May 23 and June 6, 1917.

[19] *KR*, November 28, 1917.

[20] *KR*, December 26, 1917.

[21] *RN*, November 21, 1917.

[22] *KR*, December 5 and December 8, 1917.

[23] *RN*, December 12, 1917. The demonstration was organized by the Ukrainian Emigrant Aid Committee, headed by Pavlo Krat and people grouped around *Robitnyche Slovo*, *RN's* archrival in the Ukrainian-Canadian socialist camp.

1918 — MARCH 1919: THE PERIOD OF DIPLOMACY

Once it had sided with the Bolsheviks, the USDP in Canada found that it became necessary to continue supporting them in orded to remain an ideologically distinct representative of the Ukrainian working class in Canada. Having accepted the Bolsheviks' policy of national self-determination at face value, the USDP was led similarly to accept the Bolsheviks' December 16, 1917 "Ultimatum" to the Central Rada. It accepted the claims that the Rada was "bourgeois" and that it was aiding Kaledin in his fight against the Bolsheviks, while at the same time disarming Bolshevik troops and forbidding them to cross Ukrainian territory, and accused the Rada of being counterrevolutionary for its war against the Bolsheviks, "who have constantly defended the right of the Ukrainian nation not only to autonomy but to independence, even when the Ukrainians themselves were not demanding this."[24]

The USDP also accused the Rada of not fulfilling the people's will, not only by not giving them the land they desired, but also by siding with the Polish landlords and industrialists against them. It felt that "the Ukrainian government [the Rada] is not fighting against the current Russian government for the rights of Ukraine, because the government has recognized them. The Bolshevik government merely wishes that the power in Ukraine were in the hands of the Ukrainian workers, peasants, and soldiers."[25] And it concluded that the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian bourgeoisie had taken power and, together with counterrevolutionary elements and Allied commissions, intended to "rescue Ukraine and Russia from the socialist peril."[26]

As the gulf between the Rada and the Bolsheviks widened, highlighted by the Rada's declaration of Ukraine's independence and separate representation at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, the USDP and *Robotchyi Narod* petitioned Ukrainian workers in Canada to make a distinct choice between the Rada and the Bolsheviks. It claimed that the struggle in Ukraine was between the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, representing the workers, peasants and soldiers, and the Central Rada, representing the bourgeoisie. Therefore there was no question whose side Ukrainian-Canadian farmers and workers should take: "Imagine this! On one side the workers' government [Bolsheviks] *gave* the workers full control over all factories and industries, while on the other side the Ukrainian Central Rada *promised* the workers an eight-hour day."[27] The argument that one should not attack the Rada solely because it was Ukrainian was denounced; by this logic, claimed

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[24] *RN*, December 26, 1917.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *RN*, February 9, 1918.

Robotchyi Narod, the Russians should not have made a revolution, since it went against "their" Tsar, "their" industrialists, and "their" Kerensky.

This attitude became increasingly reflected in the USDP's outlook on Canadian society. Early in 1918 it derided the trend among Ukrainians in Canada by which, "in the name of a free Ukraine and with the slogan 'to one's own,' every Ukrainian shyster and racketeer cries 'come to me so that not strangers but one's own can fleece you'."[28] *Robotchyi Narod* claimed that the same "vocal Ukrainian patriotic cows" employing this slogan for their own benefit would give nothing but "buttons" to a cause that aided Ukraine directly. It concretely demonstrated its position in early January 1918 by ordering all its members in the Toronto-based Ukrainian Emigrant Aid Committee, which had not announced how it was going to aid emigrants but was collecting money nonetheless, to quit the committee within two weeks or face expulsion from the USDP.[29]

While the USDP felt that the Rada had refused to go beyond the national revolution, it still retained a faint hope that conditions would change and that the Rada would still initiate a social revolution.[30] This hope was shattered when the Rada, hard pressed by Bolshevik advances into Ukraine, concluded a separate peace with the Central Powers, essentially putting Ukraine under German control. The Rada had criticized the Bolsheviks for favouring a separate peace unfavourable to Ukraine. Now its treaty with Germany left it open to charges of doing exactly the same thing. *Robotchyi Narod* harshly attacked the Rada for inviting the Germans into Ukraine:

> Would a truly socialist government have acted this way? A government calling itself the government of Ukraine, at the same time as millions of Ukrainian workers and peasants face death by famine, gives bands of the Kaiser's pillagers 60,000,000 poods of wheat and invites these bandits to plunder and rob their country of everything they can find? Is this the great good that the Central Rada has done for the working people of Ukraine? . . . at the same time the Bolsheviks are not even allowed to *buy* grain . . . .[31]

It expressed fervent hope that the Ukrainian and Russian masses would soon unite in the struggle for revolution in Russia and throughout the world and identified the Rada's unsocialistic policies against the working people of Russia and Ukraine as the basic cause of the Rada-Bolshevik conflict.[32]

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[28] *RN*, January 5, 1918.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] As late as April 10, 1918, *RN* still refrained from passing an absolute judgement on the Rada-Bolshevik conflict. "Whose fault is it that the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Soviet of People's Commissars did not agree? We will learn in the future." *RN*, April 10, 1918.

[31] *RN*, April 19, 1918.

[32] *Ibid.* This expressed the internationalist position of the USDP and *RN*.

The USDP used its position on the situation in Ukraine as a model to gauge its relationship with other Ukrainian groups in Canada. Thus, when the first Ukrainian-Canadian delegation left for Ottawa in February 1918 to bring injustices perpetrated against Ukrainian Canadians during the war to the attention of the Federal government, *Robotchyi Narod* took a very cynical view of the affair. It questioned the validity of having Ukrainians in Canada, predominantly farmers and workers, represented by men like Taras Ferley, Peter Svarich, Hryhorii Slipchenko, and Jaroslav Arsenych, whom it saw as "representatives of the bourgeoisie" and "political manipulators."[33]

The delegation sparked a debate at large on the issue of community representation. *Robotchyi Narod* denounced the delegation for being self-appointed, saying that "neither the government nor the Ukrainian workers themselves will come to see them as representatives of the Ukrainian workers."[34] A strong desire arose within the USDP to reaffirm its role as the representative of the working class before the "bourgeoisie" usurped this privilege. On January 28, 1918, the EC of the USDP had sent a telegram to Prime Minister Borden exhorting the government to stop regarding Ukrainians and other Slavs as enemies of Canada, to free them from wartime registration and internment camps, to resolve the question of conscripted labour, and to disregard the advice of self-appointed leaders and political manipulators from the Ukrainian-Canadian community.[35] These demands were approved on February 12, 1918 by over 1,500 workers attending a worker's *viche* called by the USDP for this purpose.[36] The campaign launched in *Robotchyi Narod* questioning the validity of community representatives reflected only the surface of a much deeper concern.[37] Who would lead the mass of Ukrainian-Canadian workers and farmers—the "bourgeoisie" or the USDP? The Ukrainian community in Canada became polarized over the same issue as Ukraine itself.

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[33] *RN*, February 16, 1918.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] *RN*, February 20, 1918.

[36] *Ibid.* The *viche* also protested the separate peace concluded by the Central Rada with the Central powers, labelling it a "betrayal of the revolution and the interests of the mass of working people in Russia and Ukraine" that "leaves four million Ukrainians under the yoke of Austrian-Polish slavery." It also recognized that the only way to peace was through the formula of the Russian revolution: "No annexations, no reparations, and the self-determination of nations."

[37] This campaign included a letter by a farmer from Wakaw, Saskatchewan, who claimed he had travelled from Prince Albert to Melville asking farmers about Slipchenko, the Saskatchewan delegate. He found that no one had heard of Slipchenko, although he kept reading in Ukrainian newspapers that Slipchenko went to Ottawa "as a delegate of the Saskatchewan farmers." *RN*, April 19, 1918.

The tendency for certain elements of the Ukrainian community in Canada to support leaders merely because they were Ukrainian developed further during the reign in Ukraine of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, who ruled largely by the good graces of the Germans. *Ukrainskyi Holos* took the position that "no Ukrainian should forget that the current government in Ukraine, regardless of its individual composition, is a Ukrainian government, and that Skoropadsky... is a Ukrainian Hetman."[38] *Robotchyi Narod* denounced this position, pointing out that Skoropadsky was chosen not by Ukrainian peasants, but by all kinds of "gentry rabble," and that his government neither was Ukrainian nor did it represent the mass of the Ukrainian people; it was a Russian counterrevolutionary bourgeois government whose interests ran contrary to those of the Ukrainian people. It disagreed with *Ukrainskyi Holos* that "the Skoropadsky dictatorship... will be beneficial for Ukraine because we need the power of an 'iron hand'."[39] A letter to *Robotchyi Narod* developed this sentiment further:

> When the Bolsheviks established their government in Ukraine, in which there were Ukrainians (Kotsiubynsky, Neronovych, etc.), then these newspapers said, out of anger, that this was not a Ukrainian government since it was a workers' government. Yet now with Skoropadsky's government, in which there is not a single Ukrainian but only wealthy lords and enemies of the working people, *Ukrainskyi Holos* and *Novyny* write that one should not forget that this is a Ukrainian government and that to come out against it is a crime.[40]

For the remainder of 1918 and the early part of 1919 the USDP and *Robotchyi Narod* increasingly removed themselves from the mainstream of Ukrainian-Canadian polemical activity. They concentrated more on the dissemination of socialist propaganda and devoted their energy to the construction of a Labour Temple in Winnipeg, for which a concerted fund-raising campaign was initiated. In addition, a rising wave of nativism in Canada created legislation that shut down a number of alien "radical" organizations and newspapers, including the USDP and *Robotchyi Narod*. *Robotchyi Narod* published its last issue on September 28, 1918,[41] and no Ukrainian-Canadian labour newspaper was published until March 22, 1919, when its direct descendant, *Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti*, commenced publication.

The political arena in the latter half of 1918 was dominated by a flurry of "non-Bolshevik" organizational activity. The rise of nativism in Canada necessitated an organizational mediator who could assure Anglo-Canadians that Ukrainian-Canadians were indeed loyal, and the end of the war made

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[38] Cited in *RN*, June 26, 1918.
[39] *RN*, June 19, 1918.
[40] *RN*, June 26, 1918.
[41] For the terms of the prohibition see *RN*, September 28, 1918.

it possible to send material aid to war-torn Ukraine and to intervene at the upcoming peace conference. The latter effort was to be an attempt to ensure that eastern Galicia, the homeland of most Ukrainian Canadians, would not be ceded to Poland, but would be allowed to remain within the Western Ukrainian People's Republic.

The need to unite Ukrainian Canadians in order to establish a basis for concerted coordinated action on issues of mutual concern—which the fate of Galicia certainly was—arose.[42] In November 1918, a Ukrainian Canadian Citizens' Committee (UCCC) was formed in Winnipeg. It declared that

> Through press interviews and other similar means, we must present the cause of our countrymen in Europe before our citizens and our government. We must also send delegates to the Peace Conference to inform the Allied countries' official delegates of the Ukrainian question and to aid the official Ukrainian delegates to settle Ukraine's matters along just principles . . . .
>
> The Ukrainian Canadian Citizens' Committee, in cooperation with different organizations of our countrymen throughout the West, has decided to help . . . the Ukrainian course along the aforementioned lines by sending Mr. George Skwarok and probably Mr. Ivan Petrushevych to Paris.[43]

The committee also established a rather optimistically titled "Quarter-Million Fund" to collect money for the liberation of Ukraine. To encourage donations, fund raisers made references to Czechs, Poles, and other peoples who had collected vast sums of money in the West to aid their native countries.[44]

This attempt at unity was short-lived. The Catholics were adamant about sending both a Catholic and an Orthodox representative to the Paris Peace talks, so that when Osyp Megas, an Orthodox Ukrainian Canadian, replaced G. Skwarok, the Catholic candidate, they were infuriated since Petrushevych was also Orthodox.[45] Coupled with arguments over who controlled the funds being collected, this led to severe infighting within the UCCC and to the formation of the Ukrainian People's Council (UPC), which was elected at the First People's Church Convention, called by Bishop Budka and held between January 29 and 31, 1919 in Winnipeg.[46]

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[42] A private attempt had been made by Bishop Budka, who sent a telegram regarding the situation in Ukraine to President Wilson "in the name of a quarter-million Ukrainian Canadians of whom I am Bishop." *KR*, December 4, 1918.

[43] *KR*, December 4, 1918.

[44] The Poles had, by 1919, apparently collected over $14 million, while the Czechs were supposedly taxing incomes up to 50% to aid their cause. *KR*, January 8, 1919.

[45] *KR*, December 18, 1918.

[46] *KR*, February 5, 1919.

The UPC's objectives were similar to the UCCC's: "the organization of all Ukrainian[-Canadian] elements into one strong organization, inspired by one desire and common goal... the acquisition of full citizenship with all rights, and an independent united Ukraine overseas."[47] Two organizations were thus formed: both were ostensibly representative bodies, both conducted essentially parallel work, and both quickly degenerated into what was to become a trademark of the Ukrainian-Canadian community—internecine strife. Mutual accusations of mishandling funds and of incompetence were the order of the day.

Significantly, the UPC was backed by the Catholic Church and *Kanadiiskyi Rusyn*, while the UCCC was a predominantly Orthodox body supported by *Ukrainskyi Holos*. The secular community could not escape the effects of the tremendous divisions that had torn the Ukrainian-Canadian religious community apart in the summer of 1918 and had created the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Canada. Religious division now took its place next to political division as a full-fledged concubine in the Ukrainian harem of woes.

MARCH 1919-1921: THE PRODIGAL SON SAVES THE DAY

In 1919 the focus of the non-Bolshevik Ukrainian community in Canada fell on Western Ukraine, which was not only completely devastated by the war (having been the scene of many battles on the eastern front) but also in dire peril of being incorporated into a young and ravenous Poland. Although eastern Ukraine was also in a precarious position, it failed to hold the attention of most Ukrainian Canadians as Western Ukraine did, indicating the retention of a strong regional attachment by Ukrainian Canadians to their homeland.

The Peace Conference in Paris completely dominated the year 1919. The Ukrainians in Canada, whose citizenship and civil rights had recently been threatened and violated, were overwhelmed at being able to send delegates to a conference of the major world powers. What exactly the delegation was to do was not quite clear—they were to "aid" the Ukrainian delegation from Ukraine and to act as "advisors" on the Ukrainian question to the Canadian delegation. But this was of secondary importance. Prominent leaders of Ukraine, such as Mykhailo Hrushevsky, were sending direct appeals to the Ukrainian community abroad, claiming that since Ukraine was in turmoil and its educational and political organizations paralyzed, it was forced to turn *first* to the North American émigré community for support.[48] Ukrainians in Canada were beseeched to raise funds

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] For an example of this type of appeal see *Kanadiiskyi Ukrainets*, hereafter cited as *KU*, August 15, 1919. Hrushevsky himself sent these appeals quite regularly, addressing himself directly to the North American Ukrainian community. He also wrote many articles analyzing developments in Ukraine.

for the delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) in Paris and to do all they could to publicize the Ukrainian cause through their press, electoral forums, demonstrations, government representations, and so on. Although the Ukrainian-Canadian community may have approached its task with the best intentions, its organizational inexperience, which was complicated by strong internal factional strife, soon became obvious, and the "Paris delegation" campaign soon became a white elephant.

The issue of having Ukrainian-Canadian advisors in Paris, which had split the community even before they left, further deepened the split from overseas. Basing its position on a letter received in July 1919 from O. Shulhyn, head of the financial commission of the UPR delegation in Paris, *Kanadiiskyi Ukrainets* accused the delegation and its backers in Canada (the UCCC and *Ukrainskyi Holos*) of defrauding the Ukrainian-Canadian public.[49] The Ukrainian delegation from North America was composed of O. Megas and I. Petrushevych from Canada (who arrived in Paris on March 12 and 14, 1919, respectively) and Kyrylo Bilyk and James Hamil from the United States (who arrived on April 7, 1919). Shulhyn claimed that Megas had immediately deeply offended two Galician delegates and argued bitterly with them. Furthermore, he was not able to produce an "authorization" from the Ukrainian community in Canada; therefore the head of the UPR delegation refused to include him in the delegation.[50] Megas resigned on May 1, and his whereabouts after this period were not known to the delegation. The Ukrainian People's Republic paid each member of the delegation four thousand francs per month as a salary and to cover expenses. Shulhyn claimed that Hamil refused this money (although he returned to the USA on June 28), Bilyk and Petrushevych got it throughout their stay, and that Megas had received it until his resignation. Although 11,263 francs had been received from the United States, Shulhyn claimed that nothing had been received from Canada, despite *Ukrainskyi Holos's* special collection for the delegation. *Kanadiiskyi Ukrainets* now demanded to know what had become of this money and other funds collected in Canada, which had been sent, on *Ukrainskyi Holos's* advice, to Megas, who since May was no longer associated with the delegation.[51]

Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti went even further and censured not only the Ukrainian-Canadian delegates but the Ukrainian delegation as a whole. It published a letter by Kindrat Savarynsky, who was apparently in

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[49] *KU*, September 3, 1919.

[50] This was revealed by Shulhyn in another letter, published in *KU*, December 10, 1919.

[51] *KU*, September 3, 1919. Petrushevych, on the other hand, was complimented for being "hardworking, useful, and amiable" by Shulhyn. *KU*, December 10, 1919.

close touch with the Ukrainian Press Bureau and the delegation in Paris, which, it claimed, demonstrated that

> The members of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris are people of "utter incompetence," completely ignorant of politics—bureaucrats who make good money and sit calmly in comfortable luxury hotels, dreaming sweet dreams not about the Ukrainian people but about cosy ministerial posts and ministerial grandeur . . . .
>
> Ukrainians both in Canada and the United States should no longer send money to Bilyk, Savchenko, or Sydorenko, who have done nothing for our cause, but should save all these funds for the future, for the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people from Polish, Russian, Romanian, and Czechoslovakian yokes.[52]

It complained that one group of Ukrainian Canadians, the UPC, was imploring people to send money directly to Savchenko, the financial representative of the delegation, while another group, the UCCC, was collecting funds itself, yet no account was being made of where the money went. "Did the money go to those Ukrainian drones in Paris, or did it remain in the hands of our monetary patriots in Winnipeg—nobody knows!"[53]

The Paris delegation became one of *Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti's* favourite whipping posts. It continued to denounce the delegation's "all expense-paid stay in Paris in luxury hotels" which "in Ukrainian-Canadian terminology . . . means they are doing the people's work."[54] Another letter from Paris made eleven specific charges—everything from the delegates' ignorance of either French or English to far too much energy being devoted to internal squabbles among the delegates.[55] Significantly, the *first* article on the Paris delegation printed by *Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti* was Savarynsky's condemnation (on July 30, 1919), and it continued to publish many more highly critical articles well into 1920. Again, it was incensed that the "Ukrainian bourgeoisie" was not only attempting to pass itself off as the representative of the Ukrainian people in Canada, but was also making them pay for the privilege. No one noticed when the point of no return on the divergent roads of development among Ukrainian Canadians had been reached.

The brightest star above the dark clouds that seemed to continually envelop the Ukrainian Canadians was the Ukrainian Red Cross of Canada. Although throughout 1920 and 1921 numerous telegrams were sent to various government bodies and officials by Ukrainian Canadians protesting against Polish inroads into Galicia, and pleading for a favourable settlement of the "Galician question," the Ukrainian Red Cross was perhaps

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[52] *Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti*, hereafter cited as *URV*, July 30, 1919.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] *URV*, August 13, 1919.
[55] *Ibid.*

the key element in achieving what resembled a concrete form of unity of purpose among Ukrainian Canadians in the immediate postwar period. Significantly, the USDP did not participate.

The Ukrainian Red Cross was formed in Winnipeg on November 26, 1919, largely on the initiative of UCCC members, to raise funds and provide material aid to relieve conditions in Ukraine (which in this context basically meant Galicia).[56] It called on all Ukrainians in Canada to join in the cause, regardless of their political and religious views, and placed the entire campaign into a profoundly emotional framework (which may account for its qualified success) by its portrayal of Ukraine as a mother addressing its children: "My son, my daughter, my children: I am dying from hunger and cold! Warm me, feed me, as I once warmed and fed you."[57] Conditions in Galicia were bad indeed. Figures published in *Kanadiiskyi Ukrainets* showed that, at the war's end, 3,617 schools, 46 churches, and 355,819 buildings were destroyed during the war; over half the land was devastated, while a million inhabitants were starving; the child mortality rate was fifty percent; only twenty percent of the children were healthy, and over 200,000 orphans roamed the land.[58]

The pressing needs of the homeland were great enough to overcome the various quarrels of the non-Bolshevik Ukrainian Canadians, and in January 1920 the Ukrainian Red Cross was reorganized as the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Red Cross, which incorporated both the UCCC and the UPC.[59] By the end of February 1922, the Central Committee had raised, through constant, diligent, and often thankless work, over $50 thousand (which, in the Ukrainian-Canadian community, was no easy task), of which approximately $43,500 was sent to Ukrainians in Galicia, Czechoslovakia, and Austria.[60]

But even the most pressing needs of the old country could not sustain a unified Ukrainian-Canadian community indefinitely. Strain began to show as early as February 1920 in a *Kanadiiskyi Ukrainets* editorial, which deplored attempts by member organizations of the Ukrainian Red Cross

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[56] *KU*, January 7, 1920.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *KU*, December 1, 1920. These figures were compiled by an Inter-Allied Commission.

[59] M. Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians*: *A History* (Winnipeg, 1970), pp. 374-75.

[60] *KU*, March 22, 1922. Galicia received the lion's share ($33,715.23), followed by Czechoslovakia ($8,101.55) and Austria ($1,660.00). The total amount of money that found its way to European Ukrainians from Canada is probably much higher than this, since many people undoubtedly preferred to send money directly to their relatives and friends in order to insure their relief (this is reflected in the numerous advertisements that appeared in the Ukrainian-Canadian press by agencies offering the secure shipment of money).

to control it.[61] By the end of 1920 indications of community mistrust were obvious, and the Ukrainian Red Cross appealed to all those who had little faith in its committee to send money directly to the old country if they felt more secure in doing so.[62] The almost inevitable end came when cooperation, which fluorished briefly again after the committee's reorganization into a "Ukrainian Central Committee" in May 1922, disintegrated by the end of 1922 under the influence of internal dissension.[63]

CONCLUSIONS: IN SEARCH OF THE HOLY GRAIL

One of the major effects of the revolutionary period in Ukraine on Ukrainian Canadians was that it forced them to take positions on several vital issues surfacing at this time. It provided Ukrainian-Canadian newspapers with the bulk of their material, which in turn must have influenced its readers and crystallized emerging analyses of the situation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Canadian was pressured to take a stand on the questions of socialism, who to support in the struggle for hegemony in Ukraine, and whether the national or social aspects of the revolution were more important.

The crystallization of two distinct and mutually hostile worldviews among Ukrainians in Canada was certainly accelerated by events in Ukraine, although they emerged much earlier. A polemical outburst between *Ukrainskyi Holos* and *Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti* in the latter half of 1919 illustrates not only the consolidation of these differing viewpoints but also their content. The polemic originated in an article in *Ukrainskyi Holos*, which claimed that "bread and clothing are not the ideal of man, but ordinary necessities of life. People have other values—their language, culture in general, their aspirations for the future."[64]

Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti agreed that bread and clothing were ordinary necessities of life, but asked *Ukrainskyi Holos* what became of the man,

> ... who through no fault of his own ... becomes unemployed and, as a result, does not have anything with which to buy bread and clothing? Can this man (a worker) think *then* that "bread and clothing are not the ideal of man" and that "people have other values—their language, culture in general" ... or will he say that "they don't feed nightingales with fables" and then run about for days like a dog with his tongue hanging out to various "employment offices" ... to find a "job," and after working for ten to twelve hours per day on a "work faster" basis, come home and begin thinking "about other values," for example, about "culture in general"?

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[61] *KU*, February 11, 1920.
[62] *KU*, December 29, 1920.
[63] O. Woycenko, *The Annals of Ukrainian Life in Canada* (Winnipeg, 1963), vol. 2, pp. 255-56.
[64] Cited in *URV*, September 17, 1919.

> . . . Furthermore, this Ukrainian worker knows that if Ukraine were only free it would be able to establish the best form of government there. This system may be restricted, socialist, anarchist, communist, or anything else one may think of, but he knows that only the Ukrainian working people can create the kind of system that will turn out to be the most practical and the best.[65]

Ukrainski Robitnychi Visti replied to the author that he should not be ashamed to say "capitalist" instead of "restricted" and asked him if he knew that power in a "free Ukraine" under a "restrictive" government would not be in the hands of "the Ukrainian working people," but in the hands of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and its supporters. It also corrected the author by saying that one does not "think of" a political system, but that it arises under specific laws of evolution.[66]

This divergence in beliefs was reflected in the Ukrainian Canadians' support for either the social or national aspects of the revolution in Ukraine. Many were undoubtedly confused by the situation, and one can distinguish the emergence of a polarizing either-or attitude in such statements as "why does *Ukrainskyi Holos* court Ukrainian socialists in Ukraine, when it [*Holos*] comes out strongly against socialism and socialists."[67] This divergence was also reflected in the left wing's total rejection of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie's right to represent them in Canada. It reacted by strengthening itself organizationally in order to be able to represent its own interests—the social issue of "class interests" clearly dominated the "national" issue in Canada. The mere fact that the Ukrainian bourgeoisie was Ukrainian was not enough for the organized Ukrainian workers.

But where this period had the greatest impact was on the unity of Ukrainians in Canada. The years 1920 and 1921 were filled with motherhood appeals lamenting the lack of unity among Ukrainian Canadians and pointing out the disastrous consequences of this for a people as dispersed as the Ukrainians. However, a major obstacle to unity is illustrated by such statements as "when we get rid of the reasons for our disagreement, then we will be united and strong," which stated the obvious but were usually accompanied by "we, from our side, were always in favour of 'unity'."[68] This foreshadowed the attempts of future Ukrainian organizations to settle issues by insisting that the other party was always wrong. Other statements, such as "in Canada we must not be parties and sects,

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[65] *Ibid.*

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *RN*, April 3, 1918. Similar sentiments were expressed in a March 30, 1918 editorial on "The Churches and Socialism" which asked why *KR* courted such socialists as Vynnychenko and Petliura when *KR* itself was anti-socialist.

[68] *RN*, June 15, 1921.

but Ukrainians"[69] are remarkable, since similar statements are still being made today. But "Ukrainian" was never defined, posing an obstacle for unity—was a communist a "Ukrainian," or did one have to be an anti-communist to qualify as one?

Indeed, the question of how to account for the Ukrainian communists in Canada was one that seems to have been expediently sidestepped by the architects of Ukrainian-Canadian "unity" projects. The primary effect of the Ukrainian revolution on Ukrainians in Canada would seem to lie in the consolidation of class conflicts among Ukrainians in Canada. This made the unity of Ukrainian Canadians a fiction from the earliest days and set the stage for later attempts, when the only way to maintain a facade of unity was to ignore the other side of the class fence. Ironically, this class division existed in a community that was predominantly working-class, indicating that not all workers would defend class interests if they felt that the national question was more important than the social question. This split between the "nationalists" and the "socialists" was complicated by the situation in Ukraine in another manner. Conditions for "harmony" were much more conducive in Ukraine than in Canada, since the Soviet Union quickly became adept at suppressing dissonance—through execution or exile. In Canada this was of course impossible. Consequently the two communities were doomed to coexistence and to prolonged attempts at dealing with each other. The "nationalists," however, gained the advantage of being able to replenish their ranks with later emigrations from Ukraine.

The result of this polarization was a three-way loss for the Ukrainian-Canadian community. The socialists were drawn into a policy of defending the Soviet Union at all costs, causing much depletion of their ranks as their membership began to see for themselves that the Soviet Union was developing along lines far from those of a socialist paradise. The nationalists, on the other hand, were drawn into a policy of attacking the Soviet Union at all costs. These mutually exclusive policies channeled a disproportionate amount of energy away from the task of developing the Ukrainian-Canadian community and, coupled with the fact that most decisions came to be made by small elite groups, resulted in a situation where the mass of the Ukrainian-Canadian population was never mobilized. The community sank, self-defeated, into stagnation. Its most crucial loss was of those caught between the two poles. Alienated by the bitter conflict between the socialists and the nationalists and not being particularly sympathetic to either, those in the middle found it was easiest to flow with the current of assimilation and leave the Ukrainian community. And they did.

The crux of the matter is that early attempts at unity in the Ukrainian-Canadian community failed because there was no basis for it. Unity, however, came to be the ideal of the Ukrainian-Canadian community, and

[69] *KU*, November 17, 1920.

when it was finally "achieved" in 1941 in the form of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, it was only by glossing over long-standing feuds and by entirely ignoring the Ukrainian communists. The dissonance was not resolved—it was merely painted over. Thus, Canadian society, unable to detect the nuances of the various groups' positions, expected the "united" Ukrainian Canadians to work in harmony. Upon finding nothing but perpetual turmoil and divisiveness, it has refused to treat claims to unity and representation seriously.

George Y. Shevelov

REFLECTIONS OF A LINGUIST ON UKRAINIAN HISTORY

I could give this talk a little longer title. I could call it "Reflections of a Linguist on Ukrainian History or Why I Am Not an Historian." I know that the majority here are historians and I am afraid that I could suffer the same fate as the hero of a play by Tennessee Williams, in which the young man, who happens to be in the company of girls, is torn into pieces and eaten up by them. But I count on the laws of hospitality since you are in the majority and I, a linguist, am perhaps in an absolute minority or nearly so. I hope that you will accept an outsider as a speaker. Being in this position, I would like to begin with a brief characterization of myself, which, peculiarly, I find was written by Teofan Prokopovych in 1725. I don't mean to say that I am 250 years old (or young, to use the term suggested by Professor Rudnytsky), but I think the characterization applies to me. I quote it first in the original, then in translation:

> И особы ученые не так дерзновенно разглагольствовати обыкли, якоже слѣпыи невѣжи многии. Они охотники, когда ничего не вѣдают, о всем и говорить и писать и препираться. Дивная вещь: откуду бы им так безумная охота?
>
> Learned persons are not used to expounding as impudently as many blind ignoramuses are. The latter are eager to speak, to write, and to squabble about everything, although they know nothing. It is a peculiar thing: where do they get such a mad inclination?

I think this portrays myself speaking about problems of history. So much for the preface, and now on to the introduction (because, after all, we do have to be a little scholarly, don't we?).

The same Prokopovych, writing about how sermons should be composed (and I consider this speech to be quite close to a sermon), recommends beginning with a quotation (which I did!) and then proceeding to a well-known fact of everyday life. The fact of everyday life I have chosen to discuss is the requirement of most universities that all instructors must publish.

"Publish or perish" is a well-known rule. I do not judge this requirement from a practical point of view, but rather philosophically and juridically. Philosophically, I think it implies that pub-

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This is a revised text of the banquet speech delivered at the Ukrainian Historical Conference at the University of Western Ontario on May 31, 1978 in London, Ontario.

lishing should never end. In other words, research will never be completed and we will never know everything. It is a declaration of the insufficiency, the perennial insufficiency, if I may say so, of our knowledge. Now, if you remember, when you appear in court as a witness, you are required to tell the truth, the *whole* truth, and nothing but the truth. It is easy to conclude that philosophically this requirement of the courts contradicts the requirements of university administrations. Because, to believe the latter, one can never tell, let alone discover, the whole truth. Applying this specifically to history, I think we can state immediately that complete knowledge of history is impossible. Does this mean that historical research should be discontinued? I will quote another of my countrymen, an eighteenth-century philosopher, Iakiv Kozelsky. In 1768 he wrote (again I quote first in the original and then in translation):

> Я рассуждая по наукам, в которых мне упражняться доводилось, нахожу, что большая часть из них доведены до такой степени, что уж в рассуждении нужд человеческих и в рассуждении сил человеческого разума не много что важного изобретать можно; а хотя что и есть, то изобретается по большей части от коммерции разных наук; а от одной науки изобретаются по большей части одне маловажные дела, которые причиняют читателям скуку и отвращают их от упражнения и в полезных знаниях.
>
> Judging by those sciences that I have had an opportunity to practice, I find that most of them have been developed to such a degree that, in relation to human needs and faculties, little of importance can still be invented by them. And even if there is something, it is invented mostly through the collaboration of various branches of science, while in one particular branch mostly things of little importance are invented, which bore the readers and even divert them from exercising useful kinds of knowledge.

This statement was made 210 years ago. If we go on and compare things that were said here previously with what Kozelsky stated, we must recognize that history, as knowledge of the past, has important things to say only in collaboration with other branches of science, that whatever it says is limited to the selection of facts, and that this selection is motivated by the historian's goal. However, if we subscribe to this, would we not have to justify all the uses and abuses in history, whether they are perpetrated to promote the cause of the Russian Empire, or of independent Ukraine, or of "Communism"? This, again, is not a new problem. It was confronted by people interested in history at least as early as the seventeenth century. I quote again from a Ukrainian author, Tarasii Zemka, who wrote in 1625: „Истории бо истинна от инуду паче нежели от списателя происходит." (The truth in

history emanates more from elsewhere than from the historian.) But, wisely, he does not say that the truth in history emanates only from elsewhere. He admits that it emanates *also* from the historian. To what extent? When I speak about these things, I do not mean historical falsification, such as certain facts being suppressed or quotations being manipulated or twisted. These are not problems of the philosophy of history, but rather history's criminal aspects. It is true that we do not have police and jails in historical research. (They actually should exist.) My problem is not that; I am interested not in the criminal aspects of historical research, but rather in its philosophical aspects. We are dealing here with the problem of selection of facts. Since we have established that all facts are not recoverable, that they cannot be placed, and, of course, should not all be placed in history, then we are always and inevitably faced with the problem of selection. And precisely because there exists this extremely thorny problem of selection of facts for presentation in history, I am not an historian. And yet, I am keenly interested in history and, in a sense, I am an historian, but in a very special sense indeed. My refuge, my small blissful paradise, is a special kind of history. Fenced from all sides and sheltered from all winds, it is historical phonology.

Here I proceed to what I warned you of in the beginning—to the brief and simplified, but still linguistic, part of my talk. I invite you now to take a look at this island of peace, this fortress of objectivity. Normally its gate opens only after one has mastered certain technicalities, which I will try to spare you as much as I can. Therefore, I will not take you inside this holy of holies. (Rather, I reserve it for myself.) Instead, I shall try to give you a glance through a kind of chink.

An average language operates with roughly thirty to fifty phonemes. This is greater than it seems, because, when they combine with each other, fifty components can produce a very high number of combinations. But not all of these combinations are actually allowed in a language, so that the number is fairly great but not so frightening. At any rate, it is an infinitely small number compared with the proliferation of facts and factors of social life faced by historians. Perhaps a similar limitation was introduced in the study of history by those to whom history was the study of reigning personalities: the number of reigning personalities in a limited period of time is more or less the same as the number of phonemes in a language. Or by those to whom history is nothing but the class struggle, because the number of classes is even smaller than the number of phonemes in a language. With such approaches history is made easy indeed. But in history these are artificial limitations, while in my field, historical phonology, the limitation in

the number of phonemes is natural; it is dictated by the actual conditions of languages. Of course, even there the isolation is not absolute; the phonemic system of a language does not work in a vacuum. Its functioning and development are complicated by geographical factors, by the influence of dialects, of other languages, and, last but not least, by social factors. But, generally speaking, what I said about these things still holds true. Now back to historical phonology and to historical changes in the phonemic system.

We are able to establish, for instance, that in the development of the Ukrainian language *y* and *i* merged into one vowel, *ŷ*; that the sound that we conventionally call *jat'* in Ukrainian became *i*; that the sound that was originally *g* became an *h*-type sound, and so on. These changes can be placed in time, but all this is, of course, only the preliminary research. What is more rewarding and more interesting are the interconnections between phonetic changes and the reasons for these changes. This is precisely the problem for historical linguistics in our time. About fifty years ago these problems were not even raised. Now they are the most essential problems in historical phonology. In other words, instead of the amorphous, atomistic treatment of historical developments in phonology, we attempt now to establish coherence, to find the logic in these phenomena. This has been done so far in a rather tentative way, but it has been done, and it provides some rather interesting insights. I would like now to take you into my ivory—I will not say tower but—laboratory. I will limit myself to one specific problem—one of the most important problems in Ukrainian history—the problem of continuity. Let us see what we can learn about this subject from the experience of historical phonology.

The history of the Ukrainian language proper in its phonological aspects begins with a deactivation of Common Slavic processes. Common Slavic was, in its late stage of development, a language of open syllables, of a limited number of allowed consonantal clusters, and of a rich inventory of vowels (each of which was long or short, the long vowels either rising or falling in pitch). A principle of intrasyllabic harmony was applied, so that palatalized consonants were used with front vowels and non-palatalized consonants with non-front vowels. If we take the proto-Ukrainian stage of language development, we see that some processes still continued along this line, for example, the development of pleophony (*zoloto,* 'gold', *molodyj,* 'young', and so on). This was within the framework of the general line of development of Common Slavic. But, at the same time we find innovations that contravened the very principles of the structure of late Common Slavic. Pitch and quantity distinction was lost in vowels. To be

more precise, quantity was associated with stress. The vowel system was curtailed. Nasal vowels were lost; the vowels that we conventionally call *jers* were lost. A new syllable structure developed; the old rule of rising sonority within a syllable was abandoned. These processes were completed more or less between 1125 and 1150 A.D. I would call this the incubative or formative period in the phonological development of the Ukrainian language.

The next period lasted roughly from the mid-twelfth to the late fifteenth century. This was a period characterized by disorder on the syntagmatic level; that is, old rules were applied along with new rules. There was apparently no consistency in the choice of the old rule or the new rule. The morphological factor intervened. There was a further reduction of vowels, the stress, as before, did not exert any influence on phonological changes. This was the period of adaptation of the body of the language to the changes that took place in the preceding period. I would call it the adaptive period.

What came after that can be called the consolidation period. Certain fairly symmetrical and consistent laws developed in the language. Palatalization was concentrated in the dentals. The alternation of *o* and *e* with *i* followed the same rule as the alternation of *o* and *e* with zero vowel. Vacancies in consonantal subsystems were filled, so that if we had *k* the sound *g* was introduced; if we had *c* the sound *ʒ* was introduced; if we had *č* the sound *ǯ* was introduced, and so on. Stress became prominent. Hence such phenomena as the change of *o* into *a* in words like *bohatyj-bahatyj,* the development of *ukannja,* and so on. This third period lasted roughly until the late eighteenth century. Our perspective is too short to say whether a new period was ushered in with the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century or whether it was a period of disruption in the language system. The old rules to a great extent became inactive and unproductive. For example, while in old words in a closed syllable *o* and *e* changed into *i,* in new words they did not, so that we have *potočnyj* ('current') and not **potičnyj, slovnyk* and not **slivnyk.* Many rules lost their productivity altogether. Earlier there was an automatic alternation of *v* and *u* at the beginning of a word. This changed, so that, for example, *vprava* and *uprava,* originally one word that automatically exchanged and converted *v* to *u* and *u* to *v,* became two words with two different meanings: one, *vprava,* meaning 'exercise', the other, *uprava,* meaning 'governing board'. It is hard to say why these things happened, whether they were due to the normal process of attrition of old rules or to the powerful Russian influence (and, if so, to what extent). In any case, I would prefer to concentrate on the first three periods. I repeat the names I gave

them: (1) the formative period, (2) the adaptive period, and (3) the consolidation period.

If we look carefully at these three periods, we observe immediately that there is a single consistent line of development. There are no interruptions, there are no breaks; there is essentially one line. If we compare, we cannot but notice that the situation in the literary language was completely different. Here we can observe the succession of various literary languages, the introduction of one literary language that is fairly quckly, in two or sometimes three centuries, abandoned and replaced by another. These are well-known facts, and I shall refer to them briefly. First, in Kievan Rus, Church Slavonic was adopted. Then, in the Lithuanian state, Ruthenian, to use the traditional term, (which was essentially Belorussian) was adopted as the literary language and, parallel to it in a kind of diglossia, we also had a new version of Church Slavonic, which can be labeled Ruthenian Church Slavonic. Then in the mid-sixteenth century a new upheaval took place, and we had a new type of diglossia—the so-called *prostaja mova* 'the vernacular' on the one hand, and a new version of Church Slavonic, which is sometimes labeled Meletian Church Slavonic (because it was regularized by Meletii Smotrytsky), on the other. Then in the eighteenth century we can observe the almost entire loss of the literary language. And then, as if from nowhere, in the early nineteenth century modern literary Ukrainian was introduced.

Now let us return to general history. The drastic changes in the character of the literary language, in its very nature, correspond fairly accurately to the traditional periodization of general Ukrainian history: the period of Kievan Rus, the period of Lithuanian domination, the period of Polish domination, the period of the so-called Hetman state, and, finally, the period of Russian domination in the greater part of Ukraine. We are faced here with the rise and the dissolution of the Cossacks, with the problem (that was discussed at the conference) of recurrent losses and regenerations of the elite, with striking shifts in the very territory of Ukraine and of the Ukrainian language, which had shrunk so drastically by the end of the fifteenth century that it hardly spread beyond the frontiers of Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia, and Transcarpathia, and with the no less incredible *reconquista* of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, when all the old areas of the Ukrainian language and of Ukraine itself were regained, and the nation and its language spread beyond these boundaries. With this approach to the literary language(s) and to the general history of Ukraine, we discover recurrent attempts to "fly" and an equally recurrent "falling down": Icarus, who, in complete collapse, un-

naturally or, should I say, supernaturally always tried again. The choice between unnaturalness and supernaturalness depends on the historian (remember Tarasii Zemka).

The image of Icarus can be presented as proof of the irrepressibility and invincibility of the Ukrainian "spirit"; it also can be presented as proof of the nation's foredoom. In any case, if we return to the myth of Icarus, it should be said that with this approach the history of Ukraine appears to be a combination of two myths—that of Icarus and that of Prometheus. Of Icarus who was also Prometheus, and of Prometheus who was also Icarus. And this would to a great extent be true. The actual question is: is this sequence of downfalls and new *élans* a surface phenomenon, or is it the very substance of Ukrainian history? If we place an emphasis on this phenomenon, do we get to the essence of events? It seems to me that, in trying to establish more essential things behind the superficial ones, to some extent, though maybe not completely, we can agree with Skovoroda. In 1773 Skovoroda wrote:

> Сие есть высокостепенное сумасбродство естли думать, что в наших временах взошло солнце, отворился ключ здоровых вод, изобрѣтена соль. Самонужность есть повсемѣстная и вѣчная. Бог и премудрость безначальны. А то самая дрянь, что вчера с грибами родилось.
>
> It is madness of the highest degree to think that the sun rose, that the source of salutary waters was revealed, and that salt was invented in our times. What is necessary is omnipresent and eternal. God and wisdom have no beginning. And what was born yesterday with the mushrooms is just rubbish.

Are Ukrainian historians not too much preoccupied with the *drjan'* born with the mushrooms? Are they not sometimes like those characterized by Kozelsky, whom I quoted earlier? Here we come to the lesson of historical phonology as compared to the history of the literary language. In historical phonology we saw a single, uninterrupted, long line of development. Not so in the history of the literary language, filled with internally contradictory attempts at tackling the problem of the literary language. The lesson that we may draw from the experience of historical phonology is that we must try to reduce the changing things under our scrutiny to a few essentials, as few as possible, and thus arrive at the permanence that in history is called continuity. (Permanence in history is not static, it manifests itself as continuity.) If we try that, we will, perhaps, be able to overcome the captivity in which we are kept by surface phenomena, and, by the same token, we will achieve, I hope, a greater degree of objectivity in our selection of

historical facts and thus a more adequate presentation of history as such.

I am not speaking of abandoning history for the philosophy of history. Knowing about mushrooms is a useful thing. Long live mycology! I speak about having a philosophy of history behind every venture into history. And I must say that I was very pleased by many of the papers I heard yesterday and today (and specifically by two—Mr. Sysyn's and Mr. Kohut's) because I think they faced these problems and were trying to find solutions to them.

It is time to finish. I apologize for my incursion into a realm of which I am ignorant, as I mentioned at the beginning of my talk. (I hope you remember the quotation from Prokopovych with which I began.) If you found this talk too dilettante or too pretentious, or, especially in its linguistic parts, too boring, or all of these, then take it simply as a lame, abortive, fully camouflaged attempt at advertizing my forthcoming book on the historical phonology of Ukrainian. After all, you did not fail to notice that I had no quotations from authors more recent than the eighteenth century. There were no references to Edward Carr, or Collingwood, or Gilbert Garraghan, or Jack Hexter, or Henri Marrou, or Karl Popper, or William Walsh etc., etc. Not to mention Croce or Hegel. The only modern author to whom I referred was myself, and that is, of course, referring to one of the mushrooms born yesterday. Thank you.

Edward Kasinec

SOME PARADOXES OF UKRAINIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ITS CRITICAL TASKS

It is not surprising that specialists in Ukrainian studies occasionally look with skepticism upon problems of bibliography and documentation. After all, many efforts in this direction came to nothing in the past. Here we might recall the purges of bibliographers in the 1930s, the wartime destruction of the Ukrainian collections in Western and Central Europe, and the fires of the 1960s in the Academy Library in Kiev.[1] Aside from this looming psycho-cultural fact, Ukrainian scholars have not enjoyed the best of relations with the community of librarians and bibliographers in the West. In the United States, for example, some postwar émigrés from Ukraine took on the profession of librarian not as a vocation, but simply as a source of their daily bread. They used their free hours to pursue activities that had little in common with their profession. Their numbers were not commensurate with their achievement. An alienation thus developed between researcher and librarian. Few reference aids were published, and some of those that appeared were flawed by poor bibliographical technique.

Here was the first paradox! Ukrainian bibliographers were *a priori* convinced of the greatness and importance of their culture, but took few steps to convince others of this fact: non-Ukrainian Slavists were simply asked to take their preaching as infallible.[2] Yet, if we look at Ukrainian culture phenomenologically (as something which exists and should be studied for that reason), we can see that vast areas have been overlooked by contemporary Slavists. How, for example, can a student of the 1920s in the Soviet Union ignore the rich Ukrainian serial literature of that period? Hundreds

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This is an abridged version of a paper delivered at a special seminar of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton, December 6, 1978. The seminar was reported by Bohdan Chomiak in "The Crisis of Ukrainian Bibliography," *Student,* February 1979.

[1] For further information, see E. Kasinec, "Ukrainian Historical Sources: Types, Custodial Institutions, and Bibliographical Access," to be published in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica.*

[2] E. Kasinec, "Documentation for Ukrainian Studies: Reflections on the Background, Problems, and Perspectives of the Harvard Experience," *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 2, no. 2 (1977): 91-103. Also published in a modified form as "Dokumentatsiia dlia ukrainskykh studii (na Harvardskomu prykladi)," *Svoboda,* February 10 and 11, 1978.

of serial publications appeared in Ukraine during this decade.[3] In addition to their stimulating contents, such journals as *Nova generatsiia, Literaturnyi iarmarok,* and *Vsesvit* were masterpieces of Soviet Ukrainian graphics. Has not interwar Galicia, too, been seriously ignored? Simply because many recent immigrants to the United States came from Galicia, it was thought that *ipso facto* its modern hitsory was already known and did not require serious investigation. The bibliographer knows that this is not the case. Dozens of important and interesting serials were published during this period, only a fraction of which are available to students in the West. *Dzvony, Dazhboh, Dilo, Kino,* and *Vikna,* to name but a few, are only now becoming available to researchers. Yet we have no indices or keys with which to explore these materials. Still another *terra incognita* is Ukrainian emigration to the United States, the history of which remains in the realm of *philopietism.* The important newspaper, *Svoboda,* is unindexed. There is no bibliography of early Ukrainian-American imprints. As Slavists and Ucrainists residing in the United States we should feel a strong obligation to study the development of Slavic culture in America.[4] Yet how can any serious work be written without a register of the works that were published and read by the Ukrainian immigration? We are only coming to realize that Ukrainian matters can be studied dispassionately. There are many hopeful signs. The political history of the last thirty years has been the subject of quiet discussion; younger scholars of non-Ukrainian descent have entered the field; finally, the creation of new publication organs has permitted things Ukrainian to be discussed outside the channels of émigré politics.

Another paradox is that although Ukrainians constitute the second largest Slavic nation, the holdings of Ucrainica in Western repositories do not reflect this status.[5] Russianists have long been

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[3] A sampling of these publications is provided in the notes to E. Kasinec, "Iu. O. Ivaniv-Mezhenko (1892-1969) as a Bibliographer during His Years in Kiev, 1919-1933," *The Journal of Library History* 14, no. 1 (1979): 1-20; also delivered as a talk at the Harvard Seminar in Ukrainian Studies, December 16, 1976 and summarized in the *Minutes of the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies* 7 (1976-77): 36-38; also cf. idem, *Ucrainica in the Harvard University Library* vol. 2, pt. 1: *Eastern Ukrainian Imprints, 1917-1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).

[4] On this point, see my letter to the editor, *Slavic Review* 34, no. 4 (1975): 881 and "Deiaki dumky pro novu etnichnist i slavistychne bibliotekoznavstvo," to appear in a forthcoming issue of *Ukrainska Knyha.*

[5] The only statistical study still remains M. Ruggles and V. Mostecky, *Russian and East-European Publications in the Libraries of the United States* (New York, 1960).

accustomed to comfortable and easy access to the basic sources in their field. This is no small factor in shaping the structure of Slavic studies. In most major Slavic collections in the United States, Russian-language materials dominate, followed generally by Polish, Serbo-Croatian, or perhaps even Czech. Of course, a partial explanation lies in the fact that the number of scholarly volumes in Soviet Ukrainian book production is continually decreasing, while other materials of value are produced in virtually unobtainable rotaprints. Antiquarian materials of Ukrainian provenance are difficult to obtain, either on the antiquarian book market or even in microfilm. When they appear, the prices are frequently exorbitant. The absence of easily manipulable bibliographies to use as searching tools for lacunae further complicates this situation.

The tragic character of much of modern Ukrainian history has understandably led to a kind of fear, and this in turn has led to the creation of many documentary centers apart from the main channels of academic research. It is of course true that a dozen years ago the academic climate was very different from what it is today, and academic institutions may well have been reluctant to build Ukrainian collections. But times have changed. Surely the creation of separate ghetto-like libraries and archives is not the best direction in which to move. In Canada, the National Archives and Library in Ottawa have become involved in preserving Ukrainian documentation; in the United States the Kennan Institute in Washington is surveying Ukrainian archival material, and the Library of Congress is publishing a survey of its Ucrainica holdings. All of these moves are positive and must be encouraged. Existing Ucrainica repositories in the United States and Canada will eventually be drawn into the network of North American research institutions. This trend is irreversible and should even be accelerated.

It is also paradoxical that the concrete achievements of Ukrainian bibliography are little known. The only synthetic history of "prerevolutionary" Ukrainian bibliography, that by the Soviet scholar I. I. Korneichyk (1971), is a bibliographic rarity. The sole history by an émigré scholar, Volodymyr Doroshenko, was presumably destroyed in Lviv with the second coming of the Soviets to Galicia in 1941. Thus, although some scholars know of the activities of the scholars I. Levytsky, M. Komarov, and E. Pelensky, they know far less of nineteenth-century Ukrainian regional bibliography, and even less of the activities of Soviet Ukrainian bibliog-

raphers in the twenties.[6] The history of Ukrainian bibliography should not be considered only an antiquarian exercise. Knowledge of the existence of reference tools may foster a search for their location: when found, they may even be used.

The technical aspects of Ukrainian bibliography and librarianship are also poorly known. There are no accurate statistics on the annual production of Ukrainian émigré books, although indications are that the number of Ucrainica volumes published in emigration is continually dropping. According to Krawciw's listing, only 183 Ucrainica volumes were published in 1973.[7] Further, who are the best dealers for Ucrainica? What about technical processing? Only recently have people become concerned with the issues of library classifications of Ukrainian books. All of these issues—the structure of the Ukrainian book market, the acquisition of Ukrainian books, their classification and role in general Slavica collections—must be given serious thought.

What are the most essential tasks of Ukrainian bibliography at present? I believe there are six.

1. *Bibliographical Guide*

No sensible traveller would venture to a foreign country without a Baedecker. In a similar way, the reseacher in Ukrainian studies should not remain without a guide to the terrain of his field. Of course, there exists Pelensky's classic bibliography of Ukrainian bibliography, but it is now more than forty years old and is so difficult to obtain that it only recently came into the Ukrainian collections of the Harvard University Library. Further, a bibliography of bibliographies is insufficient for our present needs. What we really require is a guide to research—an indication of the basic bibliographical tools, along with a short history of each Ukrainian humanistic discipline, cameos of the major

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[6] Levytsky was the subject of Paul R. Magocsi's "National Consciousness and National Bibliography in Nineteenth-Century Galicia," which was delivered as the Third Annual Bohdan Krawciw Memorial Lecture at Harvard University, March 23, 1979. Also cf. E. Kasinec, "Istorychnyi rozvytok bibliotechnykh nauk v Sovietskii Ukraini (Skorochenyi tekst dopovidi vyholoshenoi na konferentsii PEKUS-u 1977 r.)," *Svoboda*, August 16 and 17, 1977. The English-language version of this paper was originally delivered at Columbia University and subsequently at the Harvard Seminar in Ukrainian Studies on March 4, 1976, and summarized in the *Minutes of the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies* 6 (1975-76): 61-64.

[7] Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Library, Archives of Bohdan and Neonila Krawciw.

repositories, and essays on the problems and challenges of research in each field. This is a basic requirement for the advancement of Ukrainian studies. Although the elements of the larger mosaic are presently available as individual bibliographic guides and descriptions of individual collections, the larger picture must still be reconstructed.

2. *Ukrainian National Bibliography*

In order to address this issue fully and accurately, one must have access to the full array of Ukrainian national bibliography, from its beginnings in Kievan Rus to the present day. This is an enormous feat both of conceptualization and of simple compilation. Will Ukrainian national bibliography be understood in terms of works published in Ukrainian alone? What of works in Yiddish, Tatar, and Polish published in Ukraine? Some elements in Ukrainian national bibliography are virtually unavailable in the West. Even the currently published *Litopys ukrainskoho druku* is commercially unavailable and can be obtained only through library exchanges. For periods other than the Soviet, such people as Bohdan Romanenchuk, Lev Shankowsky, and Ivan Luczkiw have made important contributions to the history of Ukrainian national bibliography. Alas, the many works of the passionate bibliographer, Ivan Luczkiw, remain in manuscript, while those of Romanenchuk are bibliographical rarities. Other pieces in the larger mosaic of national bibliography are scattered throughout journals and *festschriften.*

3. *Reprinting*

Ukrainian bibliography has a rich past, but its achievements are little known and frequently inaccessible to the serious researcher. This must be remedied. Since reprinting in hard copy or microform is virtually unknown in the Soviet Union, this must be one of our tasks in the West. There is no end to the specific possibilities: F. Maksymenko's classic on the history of local bibliography (1930); V. Kordt's bibliography of travel literature (1926); P. Zlenko's bibliography of the works of Ukrainian émigré scholars (1932); I. Nykyforchuk's bibliography of the works of Soviet scholars on interwar Galicia. Another possibility lies in reprinting items that exist only in galleys in Soviet archives or were never published and remain as card files in Soviet libraries. Extant articles on Ukrainian bibliological serials, the biographies of individual bibliographers, and the history of libraries and archives in Ukraine might be translated into English. This translated material would serve as a temporary surrogate for original research in the field

of Ukrainian bibliology. Problems in the history of Ukrainian book printing and bibliology are frequently looked upon by English-language specialists as existing in a vacuum, without any relationship to events and figures in the rest of Europe.

4. *Theoretical Framework*

Attempts must be made to think synoptically about the issues confronting Ukrainian bibliography. A good start in this direction would be to think about the various categories or genres of Ukrainian serial publications, the basic periodization in the history of Ukrainian bibliography, and the very basic structure of Ukrainian printing and publishing history. In short, a theoretical framework must be established for the constituent elements of a Ukrainian national school of bibliology—namely, printing and library history, history of bibliological work and education, book arts, bookplates, and even bibliophilism.[8]

5. *Information Exchange*

Some of the most important material that presently appears in Soviet Ukraine is issued in printings of under five hundred copies. These publications include bio-bibliographies, indices to various Ukrainian serial publications, and symposia dealing with library history. It is imperative that those libraries in the West receiving these fugitive publications exchange information on their holdings.

6. *Hidden Treasures*

Recent experience has shown that much important material still exists in private hands both in the United States and in Canada. Before the discovery of his collection of books, no one in the Detroit Ukrainian community had heard of Olaf (Onufrii) Murmyliuk.[9] From evidence in his library, Murmyliuk was a committed socialist, a director of amateur theatrical productions, and a distributor of Soviet Ukrainian literature. There are undoubtedly other attics in the United States and Canada filled with books (similar to those of Murmyliuk). In my studies of the Carpatho-Ruthenian community, for example, I cited many examples of the

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[8] E. Kasinec, "Recent Ukrainian Bibliographical Publications: A Brief Survey of Monographs and Archeographic Collections," *Recenzija* 7, no. 2 (1977) : 29-38.

[9] E. Kasinec, "Onufrij Murmeljuk and His Books," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, October 22, 1978.

willful destruction of materials.[10] We simply cannot afford to ignore such collections. They might often contain materials that would serve as surrogates for books in Soviet repositories.

Even while writing these lines, one is aware that much of this might come to nothing. The people who understand the urgency and importance of these problems might be numbered on the fingers of one hand. An evenhanded and unbiased study of Ukrainian culture obviously requires that one have a representative and easily available array of documentation and the bibliographical tools to exploit it.

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[10] E. Kasinec, "The Carpatho-Ruthenian Immigration in the United States: A Note on Sources in Some U.S. Repositories," *Queens Slavic Papers* 2 (1975), reprinted as Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Offprint Series, no. 6; idem, "Carpatho-Ruthenian Publications in the United States," in Richard Renoff and Stephen Reynolds, eds., *Proceedings of the Conference on the Carpatho-Ruthenian Immigration, June 8, 1974* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), pp. 5-20; and idem, "The Future of Carpatho-Ruthenian Studies in the United States," vol. 4, cassette tape released by the Transworld Manufacturing Co., Englewood, N.J., 1975, of a talk delivered on August 12, 1975. Also published in a slightly modified version as "Some Thoughts on the Future of Carpatho-Ruthenian Studies," *Eastern Catholic Life*, January 18, 1976 and reviewed by Robert J. Taft, S. J., in *Diakonia* 13, no. 2 (1978): 168-75.

OLES BERDNYK: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW



"The Azure Blacksmith: Oles Berdnyk".
Woodcut 1978 • Andrij Maday.

The name of Oles Berdnyk has gained prominence in recent years. His books have been translated into several languages. The escalating conflict between the writer and Soviet authorities, however, has resulted in the banning of his works in the Soviet Union. Viewed through a variety of prisms the image of Oles Berdnyk has become somewhat distorted. Some hail him as a fantasy writer of unusual talent. Others dismiss him as a utopian dreamer. Others see him as a deeply philosophical thinker, a free spirit. Still others regard him as an individual of universal concerns, such as evolution, the future of the world, protection of the biosphere, and the defense of human rights.

Oleksander Pavlovych Berdnyk was born in 1927. He joined the Red Army as a volunteer at the age of sixteen and fought at the Soviet-German front from 1943 to 1945. After the war, he studied at the Ivan Franko Theater Studio in Kiev and worked as an actor in various theaters. In 1949 Berdnyk was sentenced to seven years in concentration camps in the Far North. After his return to Ukraine in 1956 he took up writing as a profession. Soon after, his works began to appear in periodicals and in book form.

Most of Berdnyk's early work was devoted to children's literature, adventure stories, and historical fantasy based on mythical and legendary tales. Following the Romantic tradition, he drew upon a treasury of folk elements. Images of fire, dream visions, and bizarre apparitions occurred frequently. Berdnyk's science fiction tended toward a spiritual and psychological, rather than a technological, orientation. Characteristic of his writing is the notion that man's relationship to the universe is one of harmonious interaction, in which man, through the intelligent and prudent use of cybernetics, will eventually control his own evolution.

Through the frequent use of direct address, Berdnyk established a very personal contact with his reader. He encouraged his reader to develop his imagination. In the early 1960s he became head of the "Friends of the Incredible" club affiliated with the popular science magazine, *Znannia ta pratsia*. At one time, his futurological lectures in various cities attracted large audiences, especially of students.

Berdnyk's last three novels, *Chasha Amrity* (1968), *Okotsvit* (1970), and *Zorianyi korsar* (1971), received harsh official criticism. The entire edition of *Okotsvit* was destroyed shortly after printing. *Zorianyi korsar* was published and banned soon after. At the 1973 Congress of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, Berdnyk was publicly criticized for excessive idealism, mysticism, and messianism, and was subsequently expelled. Since that time he has earned his livelihood by manual labour. In addition to living under police surveillance, Berdnyk has been subjected to several comprehensive searches of his home, during which certain personal possessions, including typewriters, private correspondence, and archival materials, were confiscated.

Berdnyk has received a number of invitations to lecture at universities in the West (Rutgers, York, and Toronto) and from the Canadian Teachers' Association. However, his applications for an exit visa have repeatedly been rejected by Soviet authorities.

On August 13, 1976, Berdnyk's books were ordered removed from all libraries and bookstores in the Soviet Union by Order No. 31 of the Main Administration for the Preservation of State Secrets in the Press (see *The Chronicle of Current Events*, no. 47, 1977).

In December 1976, Berdnyk became a founding member of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Observance of the Helsinki Accords and helped to compile information on Soviet violations of human rights and transmit it to the West. Following the February 1977 arrest of the group leader, a fellow poet and science-fiction writer, Mykola Rudenko, Berdnyk became the acting chairman of the Group.

This bibliography was compiled to provide a basic overview of Oles Berdnyk's work in the hope that it will serve as a stimulus to research, as well as to translate, his writings. It is arranged in four sections: (1) books published separately; (2) contributions to periodical literature; (3) reviews of his works and commentaries; and (4) letters and appeals.

A. Books

1. *Poza chasom i prostorom: fantastychni povisti ta opovidannia.* Kiev: "Radianskyi pysmennyk," 1957. 169 pp.
2. *Liudyna bez sertsia: fantastychno-pryhodnytska povist.* Kiev: Dytvydav URSR, 1958. 238 pp. Coauthored with Iurii Bedzyk.
3. *Pryvyd ide po zemli: naukovo-fantastychna povist.* Kiev: Dytvydav URSR, 1959. 159 pp. Illustrated by H. Malakov.
4. *Shliakhy tytaniv: naukovo-fantastychnyi roman.* Kiev: "Radianskyi pysmennyk," 1959. 262 pp.
5. *Za charivnoiu kvitkoiu: fantastychno-pryhodnytska povist.* Kiev: Dytvydav URSR, 1959. 118 pp. Illustrated by H. Malakov.
6. *Strila chasu: fantastychnyi roman.* Kiev: "Molod," 1960. 275 pp.
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Compiled by
Jurij Dobczansky
Library of Congress

PRIMARY SOURCES TO IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT AT THE PUBLIC ARCHIVES OF CANADA

PART III

THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

The collection and distribution of finances by the provincial and federal governments to stimulate economic growth and encourage immigration has been the focal concern of industrialists and politicians throughout Canadian history. Nepotism and corruption have been common and have led to inefficient handling of public funds. The records of the administration and system of accounting reveal where funds were channelled in the hope of achieving a specific end. The documents of the federal Department of Finance reveal the dependency of regional development on national economic growth between 1886 and 1914, which, it was believed, required a steady influx of manpower.

The structure and administrative duties of the Department of Finance at the time of Confederation were determined by events aimed at attaining an efficient system of raising money, collecting duties and taxes, and distributing public funds. The Act creating the Department of Finance in 1869 empowered the Department to "have supervision, control and direction of all matters relating to financial affairs and Public Accounts, Revenue and Expenditure of the Dominion, or in so far as they are not by law, or order of the Governor in Council assigned to any other Department."[1] Although the Act legalized the formation of the department, it did not free it of old problems encountered by its predecessors. The Department of Finance was imposed upon the old administrative structure and system of accounting, while responsibility shifted from the provinces to the dominion.

The method of accounting existing in 1867 was devised in the 1850s. Due to inefficient methods of audit procedure, many discrepancies and anomalies existed in the 1850s in the way public accounts were kept, sources of crown revenue were reviewed, public funds supporting government departments and agencies were audited, and monies to the provinces were reallocated.

Although the Audit Act of 1855[2] was intended to improve audit procedure and to ensure parliamentary supremacy over expenditure, legislative sanction frequently was overlooked. The commission investigating this matter concluded that a comprehensive review was needed, followed by the implementation of a logical and efficient system. Consequently, an amendment to the Audit Act was passed in 1864 to prevent unauthorized

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[1] *Statutes of Canada*, 32-33 Vic., c. 4, June 22, 1869.
[2] *Statutes of Canada*, 31 Vic., c. 5, June 22, 1869.

expenditure.[3] In 1886, attempts to streamline the administrative mechanism were made again. Both the Revenue and Audit Act (unchanged until 1931) and the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board Act (unchanged until 1951) were consolidated.[4]

Despite attempts at ridding areas of corruption and nepotism, inefficient handling of public funds became more prevalent in the latter years of the nineteenth century. Large sums of money were invested in communications and transportation in order to facilitate territorial unity and frontier expansion. Expenditures were greatest in agriculture, water and railways transportation, and canal and road building. The goal was to aid and to encourage settlement and the utilization of land.

The allotment of subsidies to aid expansion and development gave rise to racial and regional particularism, white the coordination of tax systems and financial expenditures faltered. Tension arose between general national interests for economic expansion and local provincial concerns for regional development. Consequently, there was little cooperation and coordination between provincial capital works and dominion fiscal policy. From 1886 to 1914, regardless of the internal problems in the Department of Finance, grants to assist private enterprise, settlement, and regional development were thought to be the necessary stimuli to encourage economic expansion.

The role of the Department of Finance in aiding immigration was terminated officially in 1893, when responsibility for steamship subventions was transferred to the Ministry of Trade and Commerce. However, the department's involvement in issuing and selling Victory Bonds during the First World War, which spurred hostile reaction to recent settlers, extended the department's influence in the social aspects of settlement. Patriotic interests were fused with controlling an unstable economy.

Following World War I, the department's activities in providing funds for settlement diminished. Immigration policy called for redirection. Some interest was generated by the department in the 1930s through the implementation of a series of relief schemes to assist depressed areas; however, it may be assumed that the bulk of the activities of the Department of Finance in the area of immigration and settlement was terminated by 1914.

The Records of the Department of Finance

Steamship-Immigration

Until 1893, the department's greatest role in assisting immigration was the administration of grants to steamship companies servicing Canada, Great Britain, and Europe. Files on subsidies granted to steamship companies carrying cargo, mail and passengers can be found in the Deputy

[3] *Ibid.*, 32-33 Vic., c. 4, June 30, 1864.
[4] *Ibid.*, 49 Vic., c. 28-29, 1886.

Minister of Finance's Registry files, 1882-1917, 36.3 m. (vols. 2999-3364; Reports to Council and to Treasury Board, 1834-1929, 90 cm. (vols. 2578-90); Supporting Documents and Reference Records, Orders-in Council, 1844-1903, 1.5 m. (vols. 2602-51); and Miscellaneous Statements, 1842-86, 1 m. (vols. 2591, 2652-68.[5] The subjects pertaining to the activities of steamship companies transporting immigrants deal with applications for subsidies, the modification of terms of agreement, the treatment of non-fulfillment of agreement, the establishment of terms of agreement (number of trips during summer and winter, standards of accomodating passengers, destination, etc.), financial arrangements, bonuses, the establishment of steamship routes, the renewal of contracts, the purchase of vessels, the conflict of interest between steamship companies seeking contracts, and reports on immigrant traffic to European ports. The key individuals representing steamship interests were C. N. Armstrong for Hausa Steamship Co., Joseph Wood for the Halifax Steam and Navigation Co., and Messrs. Steinmann and Ludwig for the White Cross Line. The involvement of various Consul Generals in seeking subsidies for steamship lines was not insignificant: correspondence of the Minister of Finance and Deputy Minister of Finance with the Austro-Hungarian Consul General, with W. C. Munderloh, the German Consul General in Montreal, with Fred van Bruysell, Belgian Consul General in Quebec, with the Swedish Consul General in Quebec, and with the Norwegian Consul General in Quebec. The department's responsibility for steamship subventions was transferred to the Ministry of Trade and Commerce by the Order-in-Council of December 30, 1892.

Immigration—Other Aspects

The department's other areas of involvement in immigration were the implementation of the settlement scheme for the Crofters and Cottars, aid to Irish paupers, and the handling of the Mennonite loan (responsibility for which was transferred to the Department of Agriculture in 1877). The department was responsible for payments to Sir Alexander T. Galt, the Canadian High Commissioner in Great Britain, for advertising and other services connected with immigration, and to Sir John Rose for work connected with Irish emigration (1881-82), as well as for the handling of funds received from emigration agents in Belgium, France and Ireland. The maintenance of quarantine stations and transportation of some immigrants within Canada was funded by the department. Remissions of duty and capitation tax on the Chinese fell under the department's jurisdiction. This material is located in three series within the records of the de-

[5] Hausa Steamship Co., Furness Line, Halifax Steamship Co., Halifax Steam and Navigation Co., White Cross Line, North Atlantic Steamship Co., Bossière & Cie., Micmac Steamship Co., and S. Cunard Co.

partment. They are: the Deputy Minister of Finance Registry files, 1882-1917, 36.3 m. (vols. 2999-3364); Reports to Council and to Treasury Board, 1834-1929, 90 cm. (vols. 2578-90); and Letterbooks, outgoing correspondence of the Office of the Deputy-Inspector General and Deputy Minister of Finance, 1840-1931, 17.1 m. (vols. 2751-2998). Under the subject heading of "Immigration and Quarantine," additional information may be found in the ledgers of statements of expenditures against appropriation and balance in the Appropriation Balances, 1877-78, 1880-81, 45 cm. (vols. 1574-77); Supporting Documents and Reference Records, Orders-in-Council, 1844-1903, 1.5 m. (vols. 2602-51); and Miscellaneous Statements, 1842-86, 1 m. (vols. 2591, 2652-68).

Land-Railways

The release of land through sale brought in the direct involvement of the Department of Finance. There are numerous references in the Deputy Minister of Finance Registry files, 1882-1917, 36.3 m. (vols. 2999-3364) pertaining to the release of CPR land-grant bonds, the receipt of deposits by various land and colonization companies (e.g., Saskatchewan Land & Valley Homestead Co., Farmers North West Land & Colonization Co.), the receipt of payments for rental of grazing land, the statements of land to the CPR in transfer for certain railway lines, the receipt of funds for irrigation surveys and stream measurements, and advancements for purchases of school land in Manitoba.

Financial statements submitted to the department by land companies, homestead companies, and loan-and-trust companies during 1909, 1914, and 1918 are located in the series, Loan and Trust Companies, 1909-48, 1953-55, 8.3 m. (vols. 1219-1345, 4371). These documents, arranged by alphabetical order within each year, list the companies' capital, assets, liabilities, and investments, and the names of the president, vice-president, and sometimes the lists of shareholders.

For financial data on Dominion Lands in ledgers containing the statements of expenditure against appropriations and balances remaining unexpended for the various departments, see Appropriation Balances, 1877-78, 1880-81 (vols. 1574-77).

Records of government land grants to various railway companies (e.g., CNR, Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, Canadian Northern Alberta Railway, Long Lake and Qu'appele Valley Railway and Steamship Company) may be found in Reports to Council and to Treasury Board, 1834-1929, 90 cm. (vols. 2578-90), and in Supporting Documents and Reference Record, Orders-in-Council, 1844-1903, 1.5 m. (vols. 2602-51). These sources also contain the financial transactions between the department and the CPR regarding proceeds from the sale of land bonds, the release of cash security, and the deposit of Credit Valley Railway Certificates.

Books containing various statements of government accounts with railway companies are found in Railway Accounts Statements, 1859-78, 20 cm. (vols. 2593-94). Additional information on Canadian railway systems and their financial records (expenditures, receipts, accounts) and statistical information, as a result of incorporations of subsidiary and affiliated companies of the CNR, may be found in the Minister's Office Correspondence, Dunning, White, Fielding, 1906-39, 90 cm. (vols. 2669-74). Files pertaining to the financing of the CNR, the Canadian Northern Railway, the Calgary and Edmonton Railway, the Qu'Appele, Long Lake, and Saskatchewan Railway and Steamship Company, showing records of subsidies, debenture stock and bonds, trust deeds, acquisition of capital stock, prices and distribution of shares, loans, sinking funds, and payment of interest, are found in the Department of Finance, Central Registry files, 1900-57, 114.3 m. (vols. 1-895, 4360-64), and the Deputy Minister's Letterbooks, J. C. Saunders, Assistant Deputy Minister, 1918-29, 90 cm. (vols. 3502-23, 4370).

In addition to the files of the Deputy Minister of Finance, 1882-1917, 36.3 m. (vols. 2999-3364) as a source to school land financing, the records of Municipal returns and the Ten Day Statements Books contain supplementary material in vols. 2591 and 2652-68. Vol. 2655, "School Land Accounts of the NWT, 1879-1909," is of particular interest for its contents.

Provincial Subsidies

Dominion-provincial fiscal relations are well reflected in the files of the department, particularly in the Reports to Council and to Treasury Board, 1834-1929, 90 cm. (vols. 2578-90). Here we find information on payments to the prairie provinces according to population increases, supplements to districts for election expenses, appropriations to the Dominion Police, special warrants for sums of money to schools, advances to aid municipalities for drainage, construction of bridges, roads, and lunatic asylums, money to repair courthouses, and so on.

Banking

The department was involved in setting up a banking system in the west. Files exist on appointments of Savings Bank Agents, the Assistant Receiver General, and clerks in various prairie towns. Reports of financial inspectors and the opening and closing of various banks are also of interest. With respect to immigration and banking, mention is made of improper banking systems among Italians in Montreal (Banco di Napoli) and Vancouver (Banco Italiana), 1910-13. Files also exist on Ukrainians, Germans, Austrians, and Poles wishing to send money to their relatives in Europe who resided in enemy-occupied regions during World War One. This material is scattered throughout the series, Deputy Minister's Office Correspondence, 1843-1931 (vols. 2744-3364).

The Depression

The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act (1934) was designed to bring relief to farmers threatened with foreclosure during the Depression. The records located in vols. 1349-1458, 32.7 m., consist of claim files, each containing a statement of affairs, copies of correspondence with the creditors, proof of debts, and a copy of the final report of an official receiver.

The Seed Grain Loans Guarantee Act (1938) was designed to assist Alberta and Saskatchewan in financing the cost of seed and seeding operations for the crop of 1938. The records (vols. 1459-61, 30 cm.) deal with claims submitted by a number of banks to the Saskatchewan Government for payments of loans guaranteed by the Dominion Government.

Additional material on financial assistance given to farmers in the 1930s may be located in the Central Registry files, 1900-57, 114.3 m. (vols. 1-899). Information is found in the form of inquiries about seed grain relief, suspense accounts, reports, representations, judgments, regulations, notices and minutes of meetings, and disposal of farm property.

Conclusion

The records of the Department of Finance deal in general with the settler without particular attention to cultural background. Most of the files have been classified according to the financial question dealt with; however, this does not mean that the conduct of certain matters was not dependent on the prevailing social opinion of the day. Often no mention is made of a particular cultural group; however, knowledge of settlement patterns and a recognition of surnames, when combined with the material in the records of the Department of Finance, opens documentation to areas hitherto void of research.

Nadia Kazymyra
Public Archives of Canada

REVIEW ARTICLE

FROM KNAPSACK TO COMPUTER

NONCONFORMITY AND DISSENT IN THE UKRAINIAN SSR, 1955-1975: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY. Compiled by George Liber and Anna Mostovych. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (Sources and Documents Series), 1978. xxxix, 245 pp. U.S. $8.50.

> The commentary . . . contains much more truth than error, but it contains so much error that the only readers who can use it with safety are those whose knowledge extends beyond Mr. Garrod's; though even a student quite ignorant of the subject must discover, if intelligent and attentive, that some things which the editor tells him . . . cannot possibly be true.
>
> A. E. Housman on an edition of Manilius

Some of the most important materials for students of recent Soviet politics and culture are *samizdat* documents. Written in the Soviet Union but not published there because their contents are objectionable to the regime, they range from telegrams and letters to multivolume memoirs and novels and are accessible in the West only when they have been spirited out by clandestine means. The expansion of *samizdat* in recent years is both gratifying and alarming: more and more people are risking harassment or arrest to exercise their right to free speech, but so many documents are reaching the West that no one person can keep track of them all. Skovoroda, it is said, carried all the bibliographical information he needed in his knapsack. The good old days are gone. Bibliographic aids have become indispensable.

Anticipating this need in the late 1960s, Radio Liberty in Munich began to register all the documents it received in the Samizdat Archive, or *Arkhiv Samizdata*. Each item in the archive was assigned an *AS* serial number; many were published in irregular journals, and all of them were listed in a *Register of Documents*, which provided the title, the author's name, the date and place of writing, the length (in double-spaced typewritten pages), and a summary of the contents.[1]

Valuable though it is, the Radio Liberty apparatus is cumbersome and incomplete, for some documents were never routed to it. *Arkhiv Samizdata* is particularly frustrating for the student of Ukrainian *samvydav*: apart from one hundred documents (*AS* 900 to 999), grouped together because of their Ukrainian origin and published in Ukrainian

[1] Lack of funding forced Radio Liberty to halt *Arkhiv Samizdata* in December 1978.

in vol. 18 of *Sobranie dokumentov Samizdata,* the items pertaining to dissent in Ukraine are interspersed with items from all the other dissenting groups in the USSR. *Arkhiv Samizdata* registers over three thousand documents, but the *Register* lacks an index, and one has to search the entire listing to locate Ukrainian items, which are not always identifiable as Ukrainian from the information given about them.

Thus a new need arose for more precise bibliographic tools. Michael Browne was the pioneer. The bibliography of "unpublished writings" that he compiled for his *Ferment in the Ukraine* (London: Macmillan; New York: Praeger, 1971) listed some two hundred items and referred to many others, by mentioning collectively, for example, letters by a particular person written over a specific period. Browne also cited some twenty secondary sources on Ukrainian history.

Now Browne has inspired the young American scholars, George Liber and Anna Mostovych, to enlarge and extend his work. *Nonconformity and Dissent in the Ukrainian SSR, 1955-1975* records 1,242 items, of which 1,046 are comparable to Browne's "unpublished writings" and 196 to his secondary sources. Liber and Mostovych maintain Browne's separation of primary and secondary works as well as his practice of grouping *samvydav* documents by the people who have written them or whom they concern. In other respects, however, they follow the other model that they cite, Jurij Lawrynenko's *Ukrainian Communism and Soviet Russian Policy toward the Ukraine: An Annotated Bibliography, 1917-1953* (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1953). The study of contemporary Ukrainian politics has taken several steps toward becoming a mature and sophisticated discipline.

Liber and Mostovych's organizational scheme is excellent. An annotated seven-page introduction attempts to define *samvydav* and explains the structure of the book, the format of the entries, and the symbols that they use. Then come a four-page list of bibliographic abbreviations, a helpful list of twenty-one political abbreviations, and a list of consulted sources, which occupies nine pages and lists 127 entries, including periodicals, monographs, bibliographies, Western editions of *samvydav,* and one Soviet publication. Of the 127 entries, one hundred are in English, fourteen in Ukrainian, twelve in Russian, and one in French.

The bibliography proper is organized mostly by dissidents' names but also includes such broader headings as "Baptists," "Hunger Strikes," and "Perm Camps." The entries under each heading are in two groups, according to whether they are by or about the given person. Organized in this manner, the bibliography is easy to work with. To find something by or about a person, one looks for the person's name alphabetically as a boldface heading. Additional items can be found by looking in the index. An appendix contains the texts of Articles 62 and 187-1, the two articles in the Ukrainian SSR's Criminal Code most frequently invoked in dissident cases.

What is it that this scheme organizes for us? What, in other words, is *samvydav?* If Liber and Mostovych know, they have not been able to tell us with sufficient clarity. "This bibliography," they announce in the first sentence of their introduction, "deals with the literary manifestations of cultural and religious nonconformity and political dissent in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during the period from 1955 to 1975." *Literary* manifestations? Are letters to the UN and endless lists of persecuted Baptists, the sort of stuff we find so often in *Arkhiv Samizdata,* literature? Two pages later the compilers drop the reference to literature. "This bibliography deals with current political, cultural, national, social, and religious discontent in the Ukrainian SSR," they say. "It registers with annotations the uncensored material circulating in the Ukraine during the years 1955 to 1975, and includes material in Ukrainian, Russian, and English that was later published in the West. The Ukrainian term *samvydav* is used to describe this material, which was duplicated and circulated outside the framework of the state-controlled publishing monopoly." Jargon and tautology aside, that is a bit more precise. But what about the geographic limits in that definition? In the very next sentence the compilers change their minds about registering *samvydav* in the Ukrainian SSR: "The bibliography contains 1,242 entries pertaining to the Ukrainian national movement throughout the USSR." The Ukrainian national movement? Would Baptists and refuseniks, whose writings are included in the bibliography, agree that they are part of the Ukrainian national movement?

And what about "material in Ukrainian, Russian, and English that was later published in the West?" Has the teaching of foreign languages in Ukraine advanced so far that dissidents compose in English? And why do the compilers limit themselves to these three languages and not include, say, French and German? Less *samvydav* has been translated into them than into English, but Moroz, Chornovil, and Osadchyi,[2] to cite several examples, are available and should be recorded in a bibliography. And if only Ukrainian, Russian, and English, then why have the compilers included *Samizdat I* (Paris: Seuil, 1969) in their list of consulted sources? And why is *V z"izd pys'mennykiv Radians'koi Ukrainy* (Kiev: Radians'kyi pys'mennyk, 1967) included? A volume of speeches at the Fifth Ukrainian Writers' Congress in November 1966, it certainly concerns dissent, but it does not meet the compilers' definition of *samvydav* as material "duplicated and circulated outside the framework of the state-controlled monopoly." And how do the compilers distiguish between primary and secondary sources when the latter are defined as "books, monographs, essays, newspaper articles, and other items, written in the Ukrainian, Russian, and

[2] To avoid confusion, all transliterations in this review will be according to Liber and Mostovych's system, which differs on several points from the *Journal*'s.

English languages, which are relevant to the study of nonconformity and dissent in the contemporary Ukraine"?

Enough questions. Let us aver a few things. A serious flaw in the introduction is its failure to explain *Arkhiv Samizdata.* A footnote mentions that Radio Liberty holds most of the *samvydav* in the West and that these holdings are listed in a bibliography edited by Albert Boiter and published in Munich in 1975, but the neophyte has no way of knowing what *AS* numbers are. Seeing "*AS,* No. 1714" after the title and date of an entry, he will check the list of bibliographic abbreviations, discover that *AS* stands for *Arkhiv Samizdata,* look for *Arkhiv Samizdata* in the sources, not find *Arkhiv Samizdata* alphabetically, go through the list item by item, and come upon Boiter's *Arkhiv Samizdata.* This volume could conceivably hold the solution to the mystery of *AS* numbers were it not that some of Liber and Mostovych's entries are identified by *AS* numbers although they were not written, much less received in the West, until after January 1975, when Boiter's volume was published. The conjecture has to be scrapped.

The neophyte's *Arkhiv Samizdata* woes are not over. Liber and Mostovych fail to list for *AS*-registered entries facts of their publication in either of the two Radio Liberty publications, *Sobranie dokumentov Samizdata* or *Materialy Samizdata,* which they do list in their sources. *Materialy Samizdata* in particular merits mention in the entries because it provides access to documents shortly after they are received in the West.

To Liber and Mostovych's credit, the second *Arkhiv Samizdata* problem is one that they expose rather than create themselves. There are discrepancies in *AS* numbers between those cited by Liber and Mostovych and those given in the 1977 *Register of Documents,* an updated version of the 1975 edition. According to the latter, Liber and Mostovych's entries 14, 187, 297, 301, 353, 535, 540, 569, 727, and 844 all belong to *AS* 989-993, which includes protests against the trial of Valentyn Moroz in November 1970. Where Liber and Mostovych have shown *AS* numbers for these entries, they have been 989-993 with the appropriate serial letter (typographical and factual errors aside for the moment). In the 1977 *Register,* however, the same documents form a lettered series under the number 996. Similar discrepancies occur with six documents concerning protests against the arrest of Moroz in 1970. Liber and Mostovych's entries 206, 448, 534, 614, 842, and 862 are identified on the basis of the 1975 *Register* as belonging to *AS* 988, but the 1977 edition includes them under *AS* 992. The Radio Liberty editors, whose work is otherwise polished, do not explain these discrepancies anywhere.

But let us return to Liber and Mostovych's infelicities. No bibliography of this length can escape error, but *Nonconformity and Dissent* burgeons with inconsistencies, omissions, factual errors, careless transliteration and translation, and wretched proofreading. The burgeoning begins in the notes to the introduction. In note 1, the data for Leonard

Schapiro's *The U.S.S.R. and the Future* are "New York: Praeger, 1963," but the sources give "New York and London: Praeger, 1962." In note 4, the publication date for *Ukrains'ka inteligentsiia pid sudom KGB* is 1970, but in the sources it is 1968; the compilers appear here to have given this book the publication date for *Ukrains'ki iurysty pid sudom KGB*, which they have neglected to include in the sources. For Boiter's *Arkhiv Samizdata: Register of Documents*, note 8 gives "3rd rev. ed., Munich: Radio Liberty, 1975," but the sources give "(3rd rev. ed.) Munich: Radio Liberty, (Jan.) 1975."

Difficulties continue to sprout in the list of bibliographic abbreviations. Periodicals are identified in it only by name, and further information is to be found in the sources, but for books the full publication data are duplicated from the sources. Had this duplication, which impedes the visual conciseness so desirable in a list of abbreviations, been pruned, the list would have been shorter by an entire page. The usefulness of the abbreviations is also hampered by errors, some of them evident precisely because of the unnecessary repetition of publishing data. "Ukrainian Herald" should be italicized. "*Ukrainian Review* (London)" should be *The Ukrainian Review. Women's Voices from Soviet Labor Camps* is listed in the sources, and references to the book in the entries are given as "WV," but the abbreviation has been omitted from the list, as has "n.s." ("new series"). The abbreviations also defeat their purpose with "*PSV*." The reference to these special issues of *Posev* should be explained in English, for the benefit of the reader who does not know Russian, as is done for "*DLP*," a special issue of *Vol'noe slovo*.

A bibliography should be either exhaustive or normative, but Part Two, "Select Secondary Sources," is an eclectic reading list with some curious omissions.[3] In the section on literature, for example, several articles by Ivan Koshelivets' are listed but his more fundamental books, *Suchasna ukrains'ka literatura v URSR* and *Panorama nainovishoi literatury v URSR* are not. Nor are Bohdan Kravtsiv's *Poety chumats'koho shliakhu: Nova poeziia na Ukraini* and *Shistdesiat poetiv shistdesiatykh rokiv: Antolohiia novoi ukrains'koi poezii*. All four books deal largely with officially published literature and not *samvydav*, but many of the writers discussed or anthologized in them have experienced political difficulties and are listed in *Nonconformity and Dissent*.

Nor is the heart of the book, "Primary Sources and Soviet Secondary Sources," either normative or, what is worse, complete. We have already discussed some errors and discrepancies in *AS* numbering. Others, though they make excruciatingly boring reading, will be listed now for the record.

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[3] The reference in the introduction to this section as "Part Two" appears to be an atavism from an earlier draft. The term appears nowhere else.

In the Moroz trial series, *AS* 989-993 or 996, Liber and Mostovych have adhered to the earlier numbering. Nevertheless, in entry 14 they cite "9936"; they give *AS* 989-993-J as 989-993-F (569); *AS* 989-993-E as 989-993-C (535); in *AS* 989-993-I they omit the "I" (353); and in entries 540, 187, 301, and 727 they fail to record the numbers for *AS* 989-993-A, -F, -G, and -H.

Liber and Mostovych's entries 465, 1021, 401, 403, and 404 are registered as *AS* 2006-A through -E. 1021 is also recorded as *AS* 1990. The compilers have not, however, noted the annotations in the *Register* and have incorrectly identified these entries as *AS* 2006, 1990, 2006-B, 2006-C, and 1989. They number entry 404 as *AS* 1989, although they have already—correctly—assigned this *AS* number to their entry 402, just two items earlier. In addition, they describe 465 as having forty signatures, but it actually has thirty-eight, and they date 403 20 December 1974 instead of 28 December 1974.

Liber and Mostovych identify both their entries 359 and 1238 as *AS* 509, but this number applies only to the latter. In entry 359 *AS* 509 should be 989. Entries 168 and 169 are identified, respectively, as not having an *AS* number and as having *AS* 1176; this order should be reversed. In entries 309, 475, 583, 638, 692, and 745 *AS* numbers 1559, 1888, 1635, 1526, 1832, and 1816 have been omitted, although they were all assigned and published by Radio Liberty in 1974. Finally, the compilers identify both 394 and 395 as *AS* 1550. This is correct, but the additional information given is not. Entry 394 is said to be nineteen pages long and 395 one page. The *Register*, however, gives their combined length as twenty-seven pages. Yet if Liber and Mostovych are correct in stating that the second document is only one page long, then they are wrong in calling both items essays.

Numerous errors in bibliographical information also mar the book. In entry 9, "1947" should be 1974, and the compilers have omitted an installment in the serialization of the poems mentioned: between "2(1974), pp. 172-176" and "5(1974), pp. 514-523" should appear "3-4(1974), pp. 335-344." In entry 20, an item written in March 1972 supposedly appears in the January 1972 issue of *Suchasnist'*; in fact, it was published in the September 1972 issue. In entry 51, an *AS* document is described as being in Ukrainian, but the *Register* gives the title in Russian, and a subsequent publication in *Suchasnist'* is described in an editorial note as a translation from Russian. The document in entry 150 is dated "after Mar. 1975," but the source cited by the compilers gives the date as "after 1 March 1975," which suggests a much narrower period. In entry 481, we read "v Ukrains'komu RSR," a grammatical error not made in either of the sources cited. In entry 452, "*VSh* [*Vyzvol'nyi Shliakh*] XXII" should be XXIII. Entry 627 is not two but twelve pages long. The date for entry 1017 is not 9 May but 5 September; the source expresses it correctly, and we surmise that the compilers copied the date as "5.9,"

and then failed to reproduce it correctly in words. In entries 742, 743, and 748, the first two are one and the same, and the English-language publication data for 742 apply to 748. In entry 862, "28 1970" should be 28 July 1970. And in entry 932, "Nicolson and Weidenfeld" should be Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Although Liber and Mostovych write that "the bibliography includes only those documents published in the West prior to June 15, 1976," a cursory examination reveals that they have overlooked many items within the limits they have set themselves. Thus the entries for Oles' Berdnyk (104-105) fail to record his children's story *Okotsvit* (Kiev: Veselka, 1975), which was withdrawn from circulation and reprinted in the West, or his collection of poems *Blakytnyi koval'* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1975). The entry for Mykhailo Braichevs'kyi's *Pryiednannia chy vozz"iednannia?* (116) fails to record a Western publication that bears the imprint "V-vo 'Kameniar' L'viv, 1972" or *Annexation or Reunification: Critical Notes on One Conception*, translated and edited by George P. Kulchycky (Munich: Ukrainisches Institut fuer Bildungspolitik, 1974).

The entries for Viacheslav Chornovil and Boris Penson (126-160 and 637) fail to record *Khronika taborovykh budniv* (Munich: Suchasnist', 1976), which includes three documents concerning Chornovil, Penson and Chornovil's essay "Budni mordovs'kykh taboriv," and Penson's article "HULah—s'ohodni." The entry for Chornovil's appeal "Do L'viv-s'koho oblasnoho sudu" (129) fails to mention that a translation was included in an English translation of Mykhailo Osadchyi's *Bil'mo*. The entry for the transcript of Chornovil's trial on 8 July 1966 (132) erroneously states that it is included in Osadchyi's *Cataract*, but entry 133, for Chornovil's closing statement at that trial, does not mention that a translation was included in *Cataract*.

The entries for Ivan Dziuba and Ivan Svitlychnyi (191-217 and 900-908) omit Osyp Zinkevych, ed., *Svitlychny and Dzyuba: Ukrainian Writers under Fire* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1966), which includes excerpts from their writings. The entry for Oles' Honchar's *Sobor* (273) lists an émigré reprint but fails to list the original Soviet edition (Kiev: Radians'kyi pys'mennyk, 1968). The entry for Valentyn Moroz's "Reportazh iz zapovidnyka imeny Berii" (545) fails to list a separate edition (Munich: Suchasnist', 1968), and all the entries for Moroz, as well as the list of consulted sources, fail to record *Bumerang: Tvory Valentyna Moroza*, which was published at the same time and by the same publishers as the listed *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz* (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1974). And the entry for "Kateryna Olyts'ka" (597) fails to record her memoirs, *Moi vospominaniia*, two volumes (Frankfurt: Possev-Verlag, 1971).

The entry for Mykhailo Osadchyi's *Bil'mo* (613) is particularly weak. Since the book is listed in the abbreviations, it should be treated

as any other frequently cited source and given publishing data in the abbreviations and the sources. Instead, the compilers give the data (with minor variations and inaccuracies) in the abbreviations and the entry. In the latter, according to their practice, only the abbreviation should appear. More significantly, the compilers have overlooked two Ukrainian editions (Neufahrn: Doerr-Verlag, 1971 and London: Ukrains'ka Vydavnycha Spilka, 1972) and an English translation: Mychailo Osadchyy [sic], *Cataract: An Autobiographical Outline in Two Parts* (London: Ukrainian Publishers Ltd., 1975).

The entry for Volodymyr Vylehzhanyn (993) cites *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*, no. 34, but overlooks the *Khronika*'s cross-reference to Vylehzhanyn in no. 32. The entries for Avraam Shifrin (1052-1053) omit his *U soviets'kii kativni: Iz svidchen' politv"iaznia* (Jersey City: Svoboda, 1972), and the entry for Leonid Pliushch's essay, "Eticheskaia ustanovka," (1241) fails to mention that a translation was included in *The Case of Leonid Plyushch*, which is listed in other entries.

The list of consulted sources indicates that the compilers have not gone through such émigré newspapers as *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, *Russkaia mysl'*, *Svoboda*, *Novyi Shliakh*, and especially *Ukrains'ke Slovo*, which have published many Ukrainian or Ukrainian-related *samvydav* documents. Nor have the compilers listed a number of Western pamphlets, which often contain excerpts from *samvydav:* Canadian Union of Students, *Report on Intellectual Dissent in Ukraine SSR* (no date, but with excerpts from Ivan Dziuba's *Internationalism or Russification?*, John Kolasky's *Education in Soviet Ukraine*, and *The Chornovil Papers*); *The January 1972 Arrests in Ukraine* (New York: Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, n. d.); *Women Political Prisoners in the USSR* (New York: Ukrainian National Women's League of America and Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, 1975); and Adrian Karatnycky, ed., *Political Prisoners in the USSR* (New York: Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, 1975).

The table of contents, the headings for the entries, the entries themselves, and the index are also flawed by the compilers' perverse handling of given names: some are written out (Valentyn Moroz, Leonid Pliushch); others are restricted to initials (V. Bukovskii, V. Chornovil). G. P. Vins is mentioned some thirty-five times, but his full name (Georgii Petrovich) is never disclosed.

The transliteration of names—both personal names and toponyms—is the great bugaboo of Soviet studies. For Russian names we must choose among at least four widely used systems, each of which admits numerous variations. For Ukrainian names the problem is even pricklier: having chosen a transliteration scheme, we must decide whether to render them via Russian or directly from the original. Amnesty International's decision to transliterate Ukrainian names from their Russian forms in its transla-

tions of *A Chronicle of Current Events* is obviously unsatisfactory, but other publishers have done worse by being less consistent. Thus the recent translation of Andrei Sakharov's *Alarm and Hope* (New York: Knopf, 1978) interchangeably uses *i* and *y* to render palatalized vowels ("Andrei," "Yuri," "Yevgeny") and completely breaks down with Ukrainian names, sometimes Russifying them ("Evgeny Pronyuk," "Aleksandr Sergienko") and sometimes producing hybrids ("Nadezhda Svitlichnaya," "Oleksei Tykhy").

If we decide to render Ukrainian names from Ukrainian, then we must choose between the two current Ukrainian orthographies. They do not differ greatly in the spelling of personal names (*Oleksander* versus *Oleksandr, Leonyd* versus *Leonid*), but they do diverge significantly in the spelling of place names. Personal names present problems of a different order: a place name can be said to be Ukrainian if it occurs in the Ukrainian SSR, but who exactly is a Ukrainian? Many Ukrainians write their *samvydav* appeals in Russian (and sign their names in Russian), and we cannot see their passports to check the item on nationality. And what do we do in the case of Jews living in Ukraine, who are not Russian by nationality but tend to be Russian in culture, or in the case of Baptists, many of whom are "ethnic" Ukrainians but who do not identify themselves with Ukrainian causes? Liber and Mostovych bravely announce that "Ukrainian place and proper names have been transliterated directly from Ukrainian," but they have been confused by the choices among Russian, Soviet Ukrainian, émigré Ukrainian, and English spellings and have produced a mishmash that follows no one system.

We can accept the compilers' argument that Kiev should appear in its "commonly accepted English spelling," but why should a ravine on the outskirts of Kiev be called by its Russian name, Babi Yar, when Kharkiv, a much more widely known place, is given in the Ukrainian? In entries 93 and 94 the compilers cite the Russian form "Cherkassy," but in 223 they give the Ukrainian form "Cherkasy." In entry 174 they confuse Soviet Ukrainian *Dniprodzerzhyns'k* and Russian *Dneprodzerzhinsk* and produce the hybrid "Dniprodzerzhins'k." In entry 589 they refer to a "Volhrads'kyi Region" in the Odessa Oblast. What they mean is Bolhrads'kyi. In entry 1019 Liber and Mostovych again cross Russian and Ukrainian and produce "Nikolaiv" (*Nikolaev* in Russian, *Mykolaiv* in Ukrainian). Coming across the émigré Ukrainian form Rivne, we expect to find other names also spelled according to the émigré orthography. Instead we find "Dnipropetrovs'k" (Dnipropetrivs'ke in émigré Ukrainian), "Donets'k" (Donets'ke), and "Ivano-Frankivs'k" (Ivano-Frankivs'ke). The compilers have particular difficult with the Ukrainian *Kyiv* and *kyivs'kyi*: "*Do Kievs'koho oblasnoho sudu*" (143), "*Protses nad robitnykamy Kievs'koi HES*" (416), "*v Kievs'komu Medinstytuti*" (900), "*Samvydav v Kievi*" (1192), and "*Znyshchennia vitrazhu T. Shevchenka v Kievs'komu universyteti*" (1229).

Liber and Mostovych inflict even greater indignities on personal names. Names of Jews in Ukraine are sometimes given Russian forms—Aleksandr Fel'dman (224-232), Semen Gluzman (243-247), and Boris Kochubievskii (428-437)—and sometimes Ukrainian forms—Oleksander Horbach (275-277), Mykhailo Shtern (799-801), and Raisa, instead of Reiza, Palatnik (626-631). Names of Baptists are treated with equal inconsistency: Sergei Butenko (122), Galina Ogorodnik (594-595), and G. (for Georgii) Vins (955-969), but Nina Rudych (735) and Borys and Tat"iana Zdorovets' (1017). The latter name is impossible in either language: in Ukrainian it should be Tetiana Zdorovets'; in Russian Tat'iana Zdorovets.

Russians are not discriminated against: in a reference to *The Case of Leonid Plyushch* (666) we find "Tat'iana Khodorovich," although there the name is spelled Tatyana; Kronid Liubarskii has his surname Ukrainianized to "Liubars'kyi" (471 and 692); Ekaterina Olitskaia, a Russian who has lived in Ukraine only since her release from the labor camps in the 1960s, appears as "Kateryna Olyts'ka" (597); Grigorii Pod"iapol'skii appears as "Podiapolskii" (399 and 747); and Aleksandr Slinin (824) and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (p. xxxviii) have their names semi-Ukrainianized (or semi-Anglicized, if you will) to "Aleksander." (This spelling is doubly wrong in the latter case. It occurs in a reference to the English translation of *The Gulag Archipelago,* where the name is written Aleksandr.)

Nor do Ukrainians lag behind. Entry 438 refers to a Ukrainian girl from Czechoslovakia who signs her name Hanna Kotsur in Ukrainian and Anna Kocúrovà in Slovak. Forgetting their promise to transliterate Ukrainian names from the Ukrainian, Liber and Mostovych tell us that her name is "Aŕna Kočurová." Lev Hryhorovych Luk"ianenko has his patronymic changed to "Hryhorevych" (486). The Prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR is referred to as "Fedir Hlukh" in some entries (171) and as "Glukh" in others (620). Ievfrosyniia Shchur becomes "Iefrosyniia" (783). Rostyslav Serbenchuk becomes "Rostislav" (1018). The Russification is compensated for by hypercorrection: the surname Zinchenko, which derives from Zinovii, is spelled "Zynchenko" (1039-1041). Confused by Ukrainian and English *y,* Liber and Mostovych write "*Pam"iataiuchy Mykhaila Soroky*" (1052) and twice spell Myhul as "Muhyl" (1197 and index). And they do not bother to distinguish between the Soviet and émigré orthographies: Leonid and Vitalii, but Oleksander.

Liber and Mostovych fare little better when they transliterate Ukrainian and Russian words. On p. xxxi they tell us that there is an *Almanakh Ukrains'koho Narodnoho Soiuza,* but in entry 1123 they change their minds and give us *Al'manakh Ukrains'koho narodnoho soiuzu.* On p. xxxii they refer to a "*Khronika tekuschchikh sobytii.*" In entry 47 they write "*delehatam VI z'izdu SPU,*" although their transliteration scheme requires *z"izdu.* In entry 219 they transliterate a word from Ukrainian as "*Ukraino-*

phobiia." In entry 292 a document is titled "*Ministru zakordonykh sprav URSR.*" In entry 341 they decide that *Datskomu* cannot be good Russian and change it do "*Danskomu.*" In entries 747, 752, and 978 they change Russian *amnistiia* to "*amnestiia,*" and in entry 1195 they tell us that an article is titled "*Rusyfikatsiia technichnykh vydan' URSR.*"

Sometimes mistakes in transliteration are compounded by erroneous translations. Thus in entry 469, an anonymous document titled "*Pershomu Sekretariu Spilky Pys'mennykiv Ukrainy O. T. Honcharu, sekretarium SPU,*" the penultimate word is spelled "*sekretarium*" and then mistranslated: "To the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, O. T. Honchar, and to the Secretariat of the Union."

Other mistranslations stand on their own two feet. *Presledovaniia* is translated as "repression" instead of "repressions" (250-252, 965, and 1037). *Zaiavlenie* is rendered as "appeal" instead of "statement" (278). *Prokuratura* is rendered as "Prosecutor" instead of "Prosecutor's Office" or "Procuracy" (278). A particularly grating mistranslation is "protocol" instead of "record" for *protokol* (282, 520, and 940). *Suprugov Kalynets* comes out as "of the Kalynets' Family" instead of "of the Kalynets' Couple" (355). *Vsemirnaia assotsiatsiia psikhiatrov* is translated as the "International Association of Psychiatrists" in 402 and as the "World Association of Psychiatrists" in 404; both should be "World Psychiatric Association." *Navkolo poeta Mykoly Kholodnoho* (414) is rendered as if he were a Maypole: "Around the Poet Mykola Kholodnyi." The title of Vasyl' Lisovyi's article, "*Krytyka stsiientysts'kykh kontseptsii naukovo-tekhnichnoho prohresu*" (477) is rendered as "Criticism of Positivistic Concepts of Scientific and Technical Progress" when it is a question of scientistic concepts. The title of Mykhailo Masiutko's short story, "*Dzvonarka,*" (524) is awkwardly given as "The Woman Who was a Church Warden," when English has the word "sextoness."

Rozprava (565) is translated as "vendetta" instead of "reprisal." The archaic *proshenie* is rendered as "appeal" (604-607) when "petition" would be more exact, especially in the context of a letter from Orthodox parishioners to church authorites. It is flat wrong to render "*L. I. Pliushch po-prezhnemu v Dnepropetrovskoi SPB*" (677) as "L. I. Pliushch is Again in the Dnipropetrovs'k Special Psychiatric Hospital." Pliushch was there only once, and *po-prezhnemu* means "as before" or "as usual." In "'*Spisok izvestnykh khronike zakliuchennykh permskikh lagerei*' [A List of Known Political Prisoners in the Perm Camps]" (644), "*khronike*" should be capitalized and italicized, and the translation should read "Known to the *Chronicle.*" *Peremeshcheniia* (708) is translated as "Changes" instead of "Transfers." *Sledstvie* (773, 809) is translated as "Investigations" instead of "Investigation." And *Statutovi pryntsypy Ukrains'koho natsional'noho frontu* (937) is translated as "The Principle Statutes of the UNF" when it is a matter of statutory principles.

Nonconformity and Dissent has not had the benefit of conscientious copy-editing. Liber and Mostovych split infinitives with abandon, cavalierly dispense with apostrophes in the possessive cases of numbers—"sentenced ... to 15 days imprisonment" (346), "sentenced ... to ten years deprivation of freedom" (357)—and have the odd habit of joining adverbs and past participles with hyphens—"officially-published works" (p. xix), "this arbitrarily-laid claim" (944). A copy editor should also have paid attention to the grammar: "Written from a prison in the Ukraine, Dovgan pleads for the reopening of monasteries and seminaries in the USSR." (The name in this entry, 1239, should be Dovgan'.)

Liber and Mostovych are shaky about the distinction between *that* and *which:* "*'Litera, za iakoiu tuzhat'* [The Letter Which People Yearn For]" (13); "A refutation of an article which distorted the trial of V. Moroz" (15); "Criticizing an article which slandered I. Dziuba ..." (822); "Two complaints about an article which slandered Karavans'kyi's past and distorted the contents of his essays" (368). Their grasp of *while* is also uncertain: "While condemning the excesses and abuses of the Stalinist past, the Twentieth Congress ... inadvertently encouraged many individuals to question the contradiction between the rights guaranteed by the constitution and current Soviet practice" (p. xvii). The annotation for entry 577 states that the "English P.E.N. Club" elected Moroz an honorary member of "their" organization. And there is a reference to a "Citizen's Committee" when it is a question of more than one citizen (168).

Liber and Mostovych have not escaped the pervasive and pernicious influence of social-science terminology. "The Repression of Believers," as a translation of *Presledovaniia veruiushchikh* (965 and 1037), suggests that churchgoers have psychological problems. The primary meaning of "repression," after all, is still the exclusion of unpleasant or unwelcome thoughts from conscious awareness, whereas *presledovanie* means "persecution" or "victimization." Grievances, in *Nonconformity and Dissent,* are "reactions against... manifestations of Russian chauvinism" (p. xviii); poems receive "an unfavorable reaction in official circles" (634); the Shevchenko Prize is "the most prestigious annual literary prize in the UkrSSR" (11), and people are called "individuals" with alarming frequency. This statistical, depersonalized approach also appears in such entries as 696, where Ukrainians are said to comprise not more than half, but "over 50%" of all political prisoners in the Mordovian camps. The compilers are particularly inconsistent in their use of numerals: "3 years" (48); "four years" (99); "N. Karaziia, a class-2 invalid" (25); "lists of class-2 invalids" (388); "invalid of the 3rd category" (907).

The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute is notorious for the lassitude with which it publishes accepted manuscripts. Liber and Mostovych did not escape this indignity: although their introduction is dated September 2, 1976 and galleys were available in June 1977, *Nonconformity*

and Dissent was not published until the late spring of 1978. These many months were obviously not used for proofreading, and the book abounds with misprints. A glaring example is the peculiar punctuation in entry 1042 (no quotation marks added): "'29 veresnia"—den' voskresennia mertvykh". The heading of the section on China in the secondary sources does not appear exactly the same way in the introduction (p. xxi) and where it figures as a heading (p. 218). In entry 1095 a title appears as "*Pytannia natsional'noi polityky* SRSR"; no author is given for 1186, and there is no indication that the article is by the author of the previous entry; in the index, one of the entries for "Podiapolskii" does not apply to him. Was the index checked, item by item, against the bibliography?

Other misprints include: Golubievs'ka (p. ix), Harbaziuk (p. ix), Natal'ia Karaziia (p. x and 388), "Sučasnist" c. V. (xxxviii), Zietgeschichtlicher (xxxix), *Pokutnyks* for *Pokutnyks* (125), *Visty z Ukrainy* (239, 759), Ogirtsov (397), Balitmore (411), Mykytoych (418), Schevchenko (419), Chyzhk for Chyzhuk (420), riznikh (461), Kosyginia (605), Holovi Spilku pys'mennykiv (614), Bourdeux (620), Ivana-Frankivs'koi oblasti (621), v Europe (639), Ob"edynennykh (657), Sapeliuk for Sapeliak (693), Amesty (747), Tverdokhebov (752), zashchiti (813), Presidium as a transliteration from Russian (814), *Cementary* (869), Yakitia (969), Zinadia (987), po sostolaniiu lanvarla 1975 g. (987), Ukranians (1048, 1143), L. Popadiuk for Ievhen Popadiuk (1144 and index), Chlenukorrespondentu (1238), and Myzaka (index).

The publishers would also do well to pay more attention to the durability of their publications. Legibly designed and printed on good paper, *Nonconformity and Dissent* is available only in an expensive paperback edition, the binding of which cracks after a dozen thumbings.

The omissions and errors that we have catalogued—by no means exhaustively—cannot all be blamed on the compilers, who diligently searched seven of the major libraries in the United States, at each of which they received staff assistance. Rather the omissions must be blamed on the difficulty of studying a field where little systematic work has been done. Liber and Mostovych have gone a mile and the student of contemporary Ukrainian politics is in their debt. Let us hope that HURI will go a second mile with them and allow them to reissue their bibliography in a revised, updated, expanded, and more solidly bound edition.

Beyond that, however, a third mile remains to be traveled. "The great question during the coming decade (as it was during the corresponding decade of the last century) is how the authorities in Moscow are going to respond to the growing challenge of a multifarious opposition movement both in the metropolis and in the borderlands." The ideological disarray has increased since the late Max Hayward wrote these words in his introduction to *Ferment in the Ukraine*. Ukrainian *samvydav* has become an alternate press, a medium for the religious, social, and political problems that are building up with increasing fury as the aging Kremlin

oligarchs cling to their power with more desperate measures. Since the demise of *Arkhiv Samizdata*, inadequate though it was for Ukrainian *samvydav*, no one centre has been systematically studying nonconformity and dissent in Ukraine. Serious thought, then, must be given to establishing a properly financed and well-staffed information centre that will assemble, catalogue, and cross-refer—on computers if necessary—the *samvydav* that originates in Ukraine and the responses and references to it that appear in the West. Without such precise documentation Ukrainians will have neither a past to study nor a future to call their own.

M. H. and M. C.

REVIEWS

TRADUCED AGAIN

IVAN DRACH, *ORCHARD LAMPS*. Edited and introduced by Stanley Kunitz. Illustrated with woodcuts by Jacques Hnizdovsky. New York: The Sheep Meadow Press, 1978. 71 pp.

> It seems a detestable joke that the "national poet of the Ukraine" —kept a private in the army for ten years, and forbidden by the Czar to read, to draw, or even write a letter—should not have for his pain one decent poem.
>
> Randall Jarrell, *Poetry and the Age.*

> The poems—at least as translated here—fit neatly within the image-oriented tradition that has lately dominated one camp of American poetry. Mr. Drach's work may represent a new contribution to his native poetic tradition, but for the reader who can read him only in translation, this volume offers only some striking imagery and unfamiliar scene-setting in the service of a very familiar poetics.
>
> Jonathan Galassi, *The New York Times Book Review*, March 11, 1979.

Total translation, we agree, is impossible. A poem, a line from a poem, and even a single word from a poem cannot be transferred from one language to another. The operative example is *pain*: resounding with want, the word makes a radical demand that no Anglophone hears in *bread*. More than a mirror, a passive representation of reality, a poet's language is a world image, a world, and a word unto itself. And yet translation is vitally necessary. Our culture is built upon it, and the sharpness of the translator's tools is—or ought to be—a public concern. Who of us has the skills to read Homer, Li Po, Dante, Goethe, Rimbaud, and Pasternak in the original? Responding to this need—and to the example of Ezra Pound, that indefatigable assimilator of foreign modes—English and American poets of this century have translated widely and well. "The period from Rossetti to Robert Lowell," observes George Steiner, "has been an age of poetic translation rivalling that of the Tudor and Elizabethan masters. In range of linguistic response it has clearly surpassed the sixteenth century."

Strangers begging at the door, Ukrainian writers have rarely been welcomed to the celebration. Even by comparison with the other literatures of Eastern Europe, which often come into the Anglo-American purview shamefully late, Ukrainian writing has fared badly. Lyric poetry, often touted as the richest genre in Ukrainian literature, is no exception. Few and far between, the translations have been most often manufactured by people with little sense of poetic language or of what is genuinely dis-

tinctive about Ukrainian writers. The Western reader has been given neither sturdy trots nor elegant transfigurations of the Ukrainian "classics." A Mandelstam, a Miłosz, a Holub, a Popa, or even a Voznesensky book in translation is a literary event. Englished, Symonenko and Teliha move in a saccharine and pious limbo. No wonder Jarrell did not know that he was maligning Shevchenko.

The publication of Ivan Drach's *Orchard Lamps* augurs a departure from the practice of rendering Ukrainian poetry into Victorian verse. The energies of the New York Group dissipated or rechanneled, Bohdan Boychuk, founder and most active member of the group, has turned his attention to persuading American poets to translate their Ukrainian peers. Recruiting Stanley Kunitz and a cohort of younger writers and repaying them with translations of their work into Ukrainian, Boychuk has launched Bohdan Ihor Antonych's *Square of Angels* and Drach's *Orchard Lamps* and is preparing a collection of Mykola Bazhan's poetry and an anthology of thirty Ukrainian poets from Tychyna to the present. Unaided by public donations or government subsidies, one man is accomplishing what full-fledged institutions have been unable to: presenting Ukrainian writers in translations that need no apologies.

Stanley Kunitz is eminently qualified to supervise the Drach undertaking. He has been called "the finest American poet of the postwar period," and he has wide experience in teaching, editing, and translating poetry. He has taught at Yale, Columbia, the New School, Brandeis, and Bennington; he has edited the Yale Series of Younger Poets and *Twentieth-Century Authors*, and he has produced fine versions of Akhmatova and Mandelstam. His poetic sensibility is attuned to Drach's. "Poetry," Kunitz has said, "is a metamedium—metaphoric, metamorphic, metabolic. It articulates shifts of being, changes and transfers of energy."

Kunitz's collaborators—Daniel Halpern, Paul Nemser, Mark Rudman, and Paula Schwartz—are young writers who have published both original work and translations. (Nemser and Rudman translated the Antonych book, and Halpern is the editor of the poetry journal *Anteus*.) Accustomed to thinking of poetry as a counterculture set against the Establishment, the translators have selected twenty-seven poems written largely before Drach succumbed to the blandishments and bludgeonings of the Party. Begun in a workshop taught by Kunitz at Columbia, the translations are attributed to particular translators, but the entire manuscript has passed through many hands and is "the end-product of intensive group discussion and criticism." The resulting volume has been fastidiously illustrated by Jacques Hnizdovsky and published by the Sheep Meadow Press, a bold venture to publish four important but commercially unviable books a year.*

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* Drach's poetry has been translated before, of course: manuscript translations circulated in the United States in 1966, when Drach read his

"Intuition is a blessing, but it is better to combine it with clarity of understanding," Kunitz has stated. The dictum has not always been observed in *Orchard Lamps*. Although Jaroslav Rozumnyj first proposed the project and supplied some literal drafts, and Ivan Fizer and Yuriy Tarnawsky provided biographical and critical data, Kunitz's introduction is much too sketchy for the reader who knows nothing about the traditions in which Drach works, and the transliteration of Ukrainian names is Russified and inconsistent: "Prince Vladimir's park," "Dnieper," "Telizhenci" (for Telizhentsi), "Schevchenko" (twice), "Babi Yar," "Hordij," "Tetiev," "Andrei" (for Andrii), and "Peter" (for Petro).

Small but invidious mistakes have crept in. Drach's poem about Babyn Iar opens and closes with a flatly repeated date: "22 червня 1966 року о 5 годині вечора." (In later editions the year has been dropped.) The translation renders this as "July 22, 1966 at five in the afternoon," thus obscuring Drach's meaning. The speaker passes by the ravine exactly a quarter of a century after the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, which placed the world squarely on the road to Babyn Iar.

A more serious point is the translators' approach to the translation itself. Writing in this journal about the Antonych translations, Paul Pines remarked that "there is a style in contemporary poetry, a poetic, that derives from the increased activity in translating modern writing. The style I'm referring to is one in which images are placed on the page at the expense of the sinuous quality of language itself." Intent on transposing Drach from an alien tradition into their own, the translators have not bothered to reproduce his meters, rhymes, alliterations, or verbal play. They have centred on his images and sidestepped what Kunitz delicately calls his "romantic drift toward afflatus and murkiness." The ending of "Balada pro heny," titled "Dialogue of the Genes" in *Orchard Lamps*, provides an example:

І коли ти заснеш на руці,
Я здригаюсь з твого лебедіння:
Лебедіє сльоза на щоці
В чорен смуток свого коріння,
Рудіє руда голова,
Лебедіє чужі слова,

---

poetry at various universities, and at the Spoleto Festival of Two Worlds, to which he was invited in 1967; *Four Ukrainian Poets*, translated by Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak and Danylo Struk and edited by George Luckyj (New York: Quixote, 1969) contains a fair sampling; *Soviet Literature* (9, 1968 and 4, 1969) published several translations by Dorian Rottenberg, one of which found its way into *Fifty Soviet Poets*, compiled by Vladimir Ognev and Dorian Rottenberg (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969); and *Modern Poetry in Translation*, no. 9 (January 1971) contains five poems.

Крізь закоханий теплий сміх
Лебедіє заснулий гріх,
Либонь, має на це права,
Лебедіє свої слова:
"Ich liebe dich! Ich liebe dich!
Лебідонько . . .

Even now, asleep in my arms
your history moves through your lips.
Tears fall from your cheeks,
to their dark source.
Words mumbled, a language I don't know,
your red head reddening . . .
Perhaps it's your right to say this:
"Ich liebe dich! Ich liebe dich!"
Little swan . . . .

Sometimes the pruning becomes radical surgery. Titles are added or changed, and lines, stanzas, and even entire passages are mercilessly rearranged, condensed, or discarded. An example of such simplification is provided by "Slovo," "The Word":

Візьми його. Не дай на зваду славі,
А по-спартанськи — босим на мороз.
Туге од сонця, чорноличаве —
Воно провисне буйним гроном гроз.
І в тому одчайдушному розгоні
Затям собі і стверди це життям,
Що слово — з музики, з її гірких агоній,
І мати слова — скрипка. Це затям.

Take this word. Don't let glory
corrupt it. Let your life prove
the word is born of music.
The mother of the word is the violin.

Writing in 1964, Ivan Koshelivets observed that "Drach entered Ukrainian poetry only for a short time, but as a genuine poet who cannot be compared with anyone else . . . If perchance he does not return to poetry as his former self, the existing system will have committed one of its greatest crimes against Ukrainian culture." The remark was prophetic. Drach has been cajoled and hectored into siding with the regime against the young dissenters who were arrested in 1966 and 1972. Obediently "rebuilding" himself, he has been rewarded with assignments to write poems about Siberian construction projects and versified lampoons of "bourgeois nationalists." Like Tychyna, Drach halted his own development after a brief flowering.

Orchard Lamps gives us neither successful American poems nor reliable literal versions of the poetry that made Drach what he was. The range of linguistic response in the book is too narrow for either task. Once possessed of a seemingly inalienable vision and an intuitive musical phrasing, Drach has been made into a speaker of battered and ironic fragments; manipulated into self-betrayal by his Soviet mentors, he has now been pounded and milled by his American friends as well. The poet anticipated them:

Somewhere on the floor of my nights
a white candle burns
a wind blew and couldn't put it out
a bull charged and couldn't put it out
a horse galloped with a silver mane
a tank crept by on its toes
a plane opened its blue umbrella
they couldn't kill the flame

Somewhere on the floor of my nights
a white candle burns.

M. C.

IHOR KAMENETSKY, ED., *NATIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCESSES OF MODERNIZATION IN THE USSR.* Series in Issues Studies (USSR and Eastern Europe), no. 1. Littleton, Colorado: Libraries Unlimited, 1977. 246 pp.

Nineteenth-century liberal and socialist theorists believed that, as a result of industrialization, urbanization, and an integrated world economy, the differences among nations, especially in multiethnic Eastern Europe, would disappear. In the twentieth century, however, the processes of modernization and development have accentuated rather than hindered the evolution of national identities and nationalism—not only in developing countries, but in advanced industrial ones as well. *Nationalism and Human Rights* attempts to investigate the correlation between Soviet socioeconomic development and its effects on the national identities of the non-Russian population of the USSR.

The book contains essays by Professor Ihor Kamenetsky and Jurij Borys on the theoretical antecedents of the current Soviet nationalities policies; by Peter Vanneman and Oleh S. Fedyshyn on the rise of dissent in the USSR since Stalin's death; by Borys Lewytzkyj on the ethnic composition of the social structure of the fifteen Soviet republics; by Thomas Remeikis, Stephan M. Horak, Micheal Rywkin, Zvi Gitelman and Peter J. Potichnyj on modernization and national identity in, respectively, the Baltic region, Belorussia, Central Asia, and among the Jews and the Crimean Tatars; and by Vasyl Markus on the persecution of the Ukrainian

Orthodox and Uniate Churches. Yaroslaw Bilinsky contributed two articles: one describing Russian dissident views of the Soviet nationality question, the other analyzing the recent purges in the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). Rein Taagepera and Ralph Michelson provided an interesting, if not provocative, essay comparing the Soviet treatment of the Khakassians with the American treatment of the Navajo Indians.

Lewytzkyj's essay, an independent synthesis of the results of Zev Katz's *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*,[1] and Bilinsky's analysis of the interrelationship between the post-Shelest purges in the CPU and the Soviet government's policies of Russification are the best studies in this collection. (The editor, however, should have translated Lewytzkyj's article from the German). While most of the essays were informative and well written, *Nationalism and Human Rights* did not transcend the weaknesses of its component parts, as exemplified by Kamenetsky's and Borys's essays.

Kamenetsky's essay, "Marxism-Leninism and German Conservative Revolutionary Thought," and Borys's essay, "The Question of Political Development and Nationalities Issues in Russian and East European Political Theories," provided a very incomplete survey of the antecedents of the current Soviet nationalities policies. The first author, for example, did not discuss or analyze the views of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Karl Kautsky, or Rosa Luxemburg on the national question in Eastern Europe.[2] Despite his title, the second author also totally ignored the East-European contribution to the national question. He did not mention the theories of Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Rosa Luxemburg, the position of the Jewish Bund, or Lev Iurkevych's criticism of Lenin.[3]

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[1] Zev Katz ed., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York, 1975).

[2] For a good, although uncritical, survey of their views, see Charles C. Herod, *The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought: The Concept of Nations with History and Nations without History* (The Hague, 1976). Marx's views were sympathetically treated by Solomon F. Bloom, *The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx* (New York, 1941). The best study of the Marxist interpretations of Eastern Europe remains Roman Rosdolsky, "Friedrich Engels und das Problem der 'geschichtslosen' Volker (Die Nationalitaetenfrage in der Revolution 1848-1849 im Lichte der 'Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung')," *Archiv fuer Sozialgeschichte* (Hannover, 1964) 4: 87-283.

[3] See Karl Renner, *Die Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen* (Leipzig-Vienna, 1918); Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitaetenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1907); Rosa Luxemburg, *The National Question: Selected Writings*, ed. H. B. Davis (New York, 1976); Henry J. Tobias, *The Jewish Bund in Russia from Its Origins to 1905* (Stanford, 1972); and L. Rybalka [Lev Iurkevych], *Russkie sotsial-demokraty i natsionalnyi vopros* (Geneva, 1917; reprint ed., Munich, 1969).

Both essays suggest that Lenin's Bolsheviks were the only Marxist political party east of the Elbe with a position on the national question. The authors, moreover, ignore not only the non-Russian Marxist parties, but also the evolution of views on the national question among the Bolsheviks themselves, as well as the emergence of national communism and the indigenization (*korenizatsiia*) programs in the non-Russian republics during the period of the New Economic Policy (1921-27).[4] In neglecting these currents and how they related to the Soviet internal and external situation, the authors failed to explain the complexity of the evolution of the Soviet nationalities policies since the Bolshevik seizure of power. In order to better represent this evolution, they might have investigated the Hegelian roots of the Marxist view of Eastern Europe, the division of Eastern Europe into "historical" and "nonhistorical" nations, the conflicts between the ideology of internationalism and the vested interests of the German and the Russian revolutionary parties in retaining their political hegemony in Eastern Europe, and the interrelationship between Soviet economic and nationality policies.

Thus, on the whole, this collection of essays was poorly conceived and edited. It employed such fashionable terms as "nationalism," "human rights," and "modernization," but it did not define them exactly, nor were they properly integrated within each essay. The theoretical explanations of these terms were weak and their interrelationships were not at all convincing. The collection, moreover, had no clear focus: it attempted to combine general surveys on the national question with more specialized articles on modernization and national identity in the non-Russian republics, but it did not succeed in establishing and maintaining a common point of reference. With the exception of the essays by Lewytzkyj and Bilinsky, the surveys were too general and did not offer any new interpretations. Unlike Zev Katz's pioneering work, *Nationalism and Human Rights* did not provide a very thorough investigation of the interrelationship between modernization and nationalism in the USSR.

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Columbia University

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[4] See Baruch Gurevitz, "National Communism in the Soviet Union, 1918-1928" (Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 1973); George S. N. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934* (New York, 1956; reprint ed., Freeport, N.Y., 1971); Alexander G. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927* (New York, 1957); and Ivan S. Lubachko, *Belorussia under Soviet Rule, 1917-1957* (Lexington, Kentucky, 1972), pp. 80-92.

MYKOLA KHVYLOVY. TVORY V P'IATOKH TOMAKH. Volume 1. Compiled, edited, and annotated by Hryhory Kostiuk. Baltimore-New York-Toronto: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers and Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile, 1978. 436 pp.

Khvylovy has been somewhat neglected by émigré Ukrainian scholars and totally ignored by Soviet scholars. No unbiased study or collection of his works has been published in the Soviet Union since the 1930s. For most emigres, Khvylovy is either not palatable as a writer or suspect for his political pamphlets; for the Soviets, he is nonexistent, an enemy of the Revolution, an embarassment. While émigré critics label him a communist, Soviet critics label him a bourgeois nationalist. Few writers have merited such a paradoxical characterization. Neither has either group of critics thoroughly examined Khvylovy's prose as literature. Instead, his prose has always been viewed from the perspective of his politics.

The appearance of the first of five projected volumes of Khvylovy's works is certainly welcome. For the first time all of Khvylovy's prose, pamphlets, poetry, etc., will be accessible to the student and the casual reader of Ukrainian literature. To date, the only texts available since the 1930s were *Valdshnepy* (Neu Ulm, 1952), *Stories from the Ukraine*, edited by G. S. N. Luckyj (New York, 1960), *Piat opovidan* (Toronto, 1975), and occasional reprints of one or two stories in various anthologies.

Unfortunately, there are minor but most annoying faults in this text. Numerous typographical errors not corrected in the final copy, misplaced footnotes, orthographical changes of original texts, omission of notes, misleading and erroneous information in the annotations, and inconsistencies in format make reading somewhat difficult.

We are informed by the editor's preface that there are three cycles of pamphlets, namely, "Kamo hriadeshy," "Dumky proty techii," and "Apolohety pysaryzmu." The editor, Hryhory Kostiuk, contends that the literary-critical and publicistic essays written in various journals and not included in these pamphlets compose a fourth cycle (p. 12). But he does not elaborate whether this fourth cycle is chronological; neither does he note its relationship to the first three cycles, and the reader is not told which criteria were applied to validate this categorization. Kostiuk notes that the 1927 three-volume edition of Khvylovy's works is followed to the letter, although the contents have been changed and expanded in the 1978 edition (p. 13). His division of Khvylovy's prose into periods as noted in the preface (p. 13) is later contradicted in the lengthy introductory article (p. 47).

The factual inconsistencies in the introduction are accompanied by misplaced footnotes.

The section of Notes, which was intended as annotations to texts, is incomplete; many references to events and allusions in the texts remain

unidentified, for example, the two-line verse on page 157. (This verse is a Russian *chastushka,* a two-line or four-line folk verse, usually humorous and topical, perhaps bawdy, sung in a lively manner.) The entire section lacks an organized format. There is no standardization: names are listed surname first, and then given name without a separating comma, or, in the case of the misspelled Arkadii Liubchenko (p. 421), by given name first and then surname; dates of birth and death vary in type font and are sometimes incorrect (Poincaré's correct date of death is 1934, not 1930 [p. 426]). Latin transcription of names is either incomplete (Martinez Sierra should read Gregorio Martinez Sierra [p. 435]) or incorrect (Adolf Thier should read Louis Adolphe Thiers [p. 426]).

The note on *Daphnis and Chloe* (p. 434) contains erroneous information and is incomplete. *Daphnis and Chloe,* a bucolic idyll in prose, was translated into French by Jacques Amyot in 1559. Amyot, however, is known more for his translation of Plutarch's *Lives* (Vies des hommes illustres), which was translated into English by Sir Thomas North in 1579. The latter supplied Shakespeare with material for his Roman plays; there is no connection between Shakespeare's *A Winter's Tale* and *Daphnis and Chloe* as noted in the annotation. The source material for *A Winter's Tale* was Robert Greene's *Pandosto* (1588).

If the reader is puzzled by the annotation at the bottom of p. 425, which refers to words on p. 150 in the text as a borrowing from Shevchenko, then he can take heart knowing that they are at the very top of the page ("Ia tak ii, ia tak liubliu . . . ").

Regarding the language, Kostiuk notes that in the texts "the language of Mykola Khvylovy, in the broadest sense, we leave unaltered" (p. 14). The only editorial intrusion, he points out, are textual changes made to conform to contemporary orthography. One can argue that the language of Khvylovy's prose is not that far removed from contemporary Ukrainian and that textual tampering is hardly justified, particularly if the editor's intention is to make this a critical edition. In certain cases, as this reviewer will point out, such alteration is criminal.

Since the editorial changes are far too numerous to be listed in their entirety, only a sample will be illustrated. In "Kit u chobotiakh," one finds *bliuza* for *bluza* (p. 154) and *tykhenko* for *tykhesenko* (p. 164). If one wished to examine the poetic prose of the texts, one would find that the change of *plakaty* to *pliakaty* (p. 160) altered the assonance and onomatopoeic effect.

A metrical change occurs in "Pudel" (p. 348), where the original *lvynoiu hryvoiu* (two dactyls) has been changed to *levynoiu hryvoiu* (a hypercatalectic amphibrach + a dactyl); this would be a crucial change for a poetic reading of the text.

The author's mimicry of character speech is lost on p. 358: *sam ia i kamisar, i kamunist* has been changed to *sam ia i komisar, i kamunist.*

Oftentimes the graphic separation of letters in words to emphasize a quality, e.g., *s h y r o k i*, which has been changed to *shyroki* (p. 158), is ignored in this edition.

If these omissions, errors, and intrusions are not enough to annoy the critical reader, then one can examine the unquestionably unaesthetic book jacket and cover.

Nevertheless, this publication of the first volume of a collected edition of Khvylovy, one of the most important Ukrainian writers of the twentieth century, is an achievement despite its faults. One can only hope that the future much awaited volumes will be given greater care.

Nadia Odette Diakun
University of Toronto

PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI, *THE SHAPING OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY: SUBCARPATHIAN RUS', 1848-1948*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978. xiii, 640 pp. $25.00.

The history of the Rusyns of Subcarpathian Rus, a borderland people of Slavic origin who belonged to the Hungarian section of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the latter's demise in 1918 and were subsequently incorporated into the new Czechoslovak Republic of the interwar years, has been neglected by Western scholars.[1] Paul Magocsi's comprehensive study, an extension of his Ph.D. thesis and several seminal articles,[2] suc-

[1] For a comprehensive guide to the historiography concerning Subcarpathian Rus, see Paul R. Magocsi, "An Historiographical Guide to Subcarpathian Rus'," *Austrian History Yearbook* 9-10 (1973-74): 201-65. Reprinted in Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Offprint Series, no. 1 (Cambridge, Mass., n.d.).

[2] "The Development of National Consciousness in Subcarpathian Rus', 1918-1945" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1972); "An Historiographical Guide to Subcarpathian Rus' "; Moi vrazhennia z podorozhi po Iuhoslavii,' *Nova dumka* 3, no. 8 (Vukovar, 1974): 116-118; "The Political Activity of Rusyn-American Immigrants in 1918," *East European Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (1976): 347-65. Reprinted in Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Offprint Series, no. 13 (Cambridge, Mass., n.d.); "The Problem of National Affiliation among the Rusyns (Ruthenians) of Yugoslavia," *Europa Ethnica* 34, no. 1 (1977): 5-8; "The Role of Education in the Formation of a National Consciousness," *East European Quarterly* 7, no. 2 (1973): 159-65; "The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovakia," *Slavic Review* 34, no. 2 (1975): 360-81. Reprinted in Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Offprint Series, no. 3. (Cambridge, Mass., n.d.).

cessfully attempts to remedy in part this situation by concentrating upon the development of national consciousness among the Rusyns, a phenomenon common to all the national groups of Eastern Europe and the territories of the former Russian Empire. With regard to the profusion of historical works about Subcarpathian Rus written in east-European languages, the monograph in question makes a significant contribution in its refutation of the romantic national and historical myths perpetuated by the historians of both Ukrainophile and Russophile orientations.

In dealing with approximately a century of embryonic national development beginning in 1848, Magocsi chooses to focus upon the social group vital to the development of national consciousness among truncated peasant societies, the intelligentsia. "The role of the intelligentsia to record the history and traditions of a given ethnic group, codify its dialects into a literary language, and transform an individual's awareness of his relationship to a neighboring villager, valley-dweller, or co-religionist into a consciousness of unity on a wider, 'national' level" (p. 3) was complicated in the case of the Rusyn intellectual elite not only by the socio-economic backwardness of Rusyn society, but also by its geographical position as a borderland group vulnerable to the influences of several national orientations. In addition to the endogenous Rusyn culture, the Subcarpathian Rusyns were exposed to Slovak, Czech, Galician Ukrainophile, Hungarian, and Russian cultures. Confronted by these alternatives, the latter three in particular, the members of the Subcarpathian intelligentsia naturally became splintered in their search for a national identity. One's allegiance to a particular national orientation was determined by both internal and external circumstances. Thus, after an introductory first part, Magocsi discusses the various national orientations among the Rusyn intelligentsia by examining those factors normally associated with the embryonic, cultural, and intellectual phase of national development, namely, historiography, language, literature, the formation of cultural organizations, education, and the church. This section is supplemented by an extensive appendix of eighty-one pages. Unable to view the developmental cultural phase in isolation, part three focuses upon the political environment affecting Subcarpathian Rus from the local, national, and international perspectives.

Magocsi concludes that, because of the various internal and external circumstances, four national orientations, the Rusynophile, Ukrainophile, Russophile, and Magyarone, competed for acceptance among the members of the Subcarpathian Rusyn intelligentsia. The so-called era of Subcarpathian Rusyn national revival, begun in 1848, was quickly nipped in the bud by the forceful Magyarization attempts of the Hungarian government after the 1867 conclusion of the *Ausgleich*. Continuous assimilationist policies, supported by the Greek-Catholic Rusyn hierarchy until the disastrous events of the First World War, naturally precluded the success, although not the existence, of the other national alternatives. The dissolu-

tion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire did, however, terminate the Magyar language schools, which had not yet permeated the Rusyn countryside, thereby guaranteeing the disavowal of the Magyarone orientation among the majority of the intelligentsia in favour of either the Rusynophile, Russophile, or Ukrainophile orientation. All three orientations were neither foreign to the culture of the area nor the demands of the international political reality. Magocsi's contention that the Subcarpathians may have identified more with the Ukrainians who "were for centuries downtrodden by the Russians, Poles, and Turkic peoples of the steppes, and . . . [their] unenviable position, which was sometimes interspersed with glory-filled Cossack rebelions . . . than [with] powerful, imperial Russia . . . " (p. 275) does, however, ring of coloured Ukrainian national sentiment.

From the inception of the Czechoslovak Republic to the turbulent period of the Second World War, the intelligentsia was unable to unite behind one national orientation because of their own national and social prejudices, plus the vacillating nationality policies of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments. The final definition of the national ideology of Subcarpathian Rusyn society as Ukrainian in the late 1940s was not determined by the national intelligentsia, although the Ukrainophile orientation gained many supporters at the end of the 1930s, but, with the inception of Soviet rule, by a political regime.

As the first monograph in a projected series to deal with other borderland national groups, including the Galician Ukrainians, Macedonians, and Luxembourgers, which were exposed to the influences of other cultures, Magocsi's work sets a high standard for the forthcoming volumes. Comparisons of the national revivals among these peoples will result in the addition of a new chapter to the growing study of nationalism in general. As for the use of Magocsi's methodological and organizational principles in the other studies, there is one obvious flaw. The development of national consciousness among these groups was affected not only by the nature of their geographical position and subjection to various political regimes and cultural stimuli, but also by their socioeconomic composition. Although the direct relationship between economic change and nationalism, the former a quantifiable variable, the latter unquantifiable, has not yet been surmised, it is clear that the one must not be viewed without the other. An expansion of Magocsi's cursory comments about the socioeconomic status of Subcarpathian Rusyn society into an entire section of its own may have illuminated various interesting factors, including the lack of modernization and, consequently, urbanization until fairly recently, which aided in impeding the task of the intelligentsia and in retarding the development of a national identity.

Christine D. Worobec

YURIY TARNAWSKY, *MENINGITIS*. Published in May 1978 by the Fiction Collective at the English Department of Brooklyn College and distributed by George Braziller Inc., New York. Hardcover edition, $8.95; softcover, $3.95. 158 pages.

As a student and long-time *afficionado* of innovative literature, with a taste for the unconventional and the outrageous in art, I picked up my copy of Yuriy Tarnawsky's recent prose offering with more than interest. For I knew Tarnawsky to be a member of the "New York Group" of writers and poets—touted as the avant-garde of contemporary Ukrainian literature—and thus looked forward to reading something more challenging and daring than what I had encountered many years ago in *literatura* classes at Ukrainian school. My sense of anticipation was further heightened when I stumbled across the following passage in a random scanning of the book:

> Eventually George is to get know the woman very well. He'll have the following dream about her for instance. He and the woman are about to have intercourse. She lies down on her back. She gets herself ready for the intercourse. This consists of her doing something between her legs. George is already naked. He gets on top of the woman. He faces her. His penis is already erect. George inserts the middle finger of his right hand and his penis inside the woman's vagina. He feels a sharp pain in his finger and penis. The pain is like that from striking something sharp. The pain in the penis is like that of a penis striking teeth during fellatio. George yells. He pulls out his penis. He feels around the vagina with his finger. He finds an object there. He pulls it out. He looks at it. It's a pair of dentures. They're joined together somehow. George is angered by the object. He finds what the woman has done stupid.

Obviously, what was in store for me would be centuries away from Franko, Kiriak, and contemporary Soviet realism, and for that I was instantly grateful. With considerable optimism I turned to the first story—suspiciously titled "A Day in the Life"—and settled into a comfortable chair with visions of Beckett, Kafka, and Gogol at his insane best, dancing in my receptive head. My enthusiasm, however, proved to be shortlived, for I began experiencing problems concentrating almost immediately, and reading soon became something of a chore. By the time I was halfway through the book, I had lost all interest in it and was reading only because of my responsibilities as a reviewer. Occasionally, my curiosity would be roused by some reference to things Ukrainian—the main character in most of the stories is a postwar émigré, and as Ukrainians are rarely encountered in English fiction he had novelty appeal—but this, I suspect, was a purely subjective response attributable to my partisan upbringing. Increasingly, I found myself thinking about what was wrong with the

book rather than wondering about what was going to happen next. Pinpointing the problem proved to be a frustrating task.

It all began promisingly enough, and this no doubt contributed to my eventual disappointment. The title, *Meningitis*, sounded on an appropriately dramatic note and did exactly what a good title is supposed to do—it attracted the attention of potential readers. I had many enquiries about the book from people who happened to see my copy. Unfortunately, however, this initial curiosity was soon ground under by the relentless prose. The opening lines of the first story, which establish both the tone and the stylistic pattern of the rest of the book, illustrate the problem of Tarnawsky's technique:

> Jim Morrison woke up. It was quiet in the house and outside. It was dark. Jim Morrison didn't know what time it was. It was a few minutes after three in the morning in reality. Jim Morrison didn't know why he'd awakened. That is he hadn't been awakened by a noise or dream. He lay still for a few seconds. He lay on his back. He felt wide awake. There was no stuffiness in his head as is usual after sleeping. It was as if Jim Morrison had been awake all along. He then sat up. He threw back the blanket. He stood up on the bed. There was a window above the bed. The window was wide. It was short. It was high up. There was a blind on the window. The blind was made from bamboo slats. Jim Morrison pushed back the blind.

And on it goes, with detail being added to detail without the relief of either a single comma or a paragraph break. Although this monotonous regularity of style produces some interesting results (it obviously shows how absurd everyday life can be), it drives one to distraction when it is sustained for over one hundred and fifty pages! It's boring to look at and has all the music of a high-speed dentist's drill. The repeated stops and starts got to be so annoying that I began ignoring the sentence breaks and reading through the periods run-on fashion. My resentment grew in proportion to the frustration that mounted with each story. It got to the point where I had to force myself to finish the book.

This may just be what Tarnawsky wants his reader to feel, but I somehow doubt it. Why anyone but a masochist (or a reviewer) would want to submit to that knid of torture without some kind of a reward is beyond me. And even the irritation subsides to a dull throb that one learns to ignore in time. But I suspect that the effect that Tarnawsky was trying to achieve is quite different from that which I just described. Some comments on the jacket cover by an unidentified interpreter of the style hint at what was intended:

> The reality in Yuriy Tarnawsky's book is broken down into simple sentences wherever possible. These are like the flat surfaces in a cubist painting. Time and space are reduced to their elemental units. The unit of language is the sentence and not the phoneme or even the word. In the reader's mind, the elements are linked, become

> rounded, organic; lacunae are filled out, and life is recreated. Language has accomplished the work of the five senses. A literary work is simulated life.

The reference to cubist painting is most revealing, as American writers have been trying to write the way Picasso and Braque paint since the early part of this century. Tarnawsky's prose reads like a computerized cross of Gertrude Stein and Ernest Hemingway, and therein lies the failure of the technique of *Meningitis*. It is obviously an attempt to apply a questionable theory to description rather than approaching the problem from the other side and evolving the theory from experiment. Hence, it seems pedantic, academic, and lacks the spark of original genius.

How accurately *Meningitis* simulates life is another problem worth discussing. One could certainly argue at great length with the assertion that the sentence is the unit of language, as Tarnawsky clearly assumes. But the really questionable claim that the book seems to make concerns the following, which is also taken from the jacket cover:

> Actions as well as shapes, colors and textures form patterns. Events are as immobile as the weave of a fabric. A geometric design acts by existing. Our mind notes all patterns down and stores them away. The mind craves for patterns. It arranges everything in patterns. Patterns reduce the amount of information required for describing something. The patterning process of the mind, then, is like the packing of numbers in a computer to reduce storage. Similies, metaphors, and other images help to form patterns where the dull rational mind sees none.

That patterning played an important part in the writing of *Meningitis* is undeniable; one must also agree that it produces the static effect described above. But does pattern exist outside of the rational mind, which organizes experience in terms of sequence and frequency? Is it not the dull rational mind that gives us the ability to see pattern? The references to geometric designs, numbers, and computers is interesting, for it is this conception of pattern that obviously underlies both the structure and the technique of *Meningitis*. Which is to say that it is dull, dry, and mathematical, not to mention stiflingly rational. What about rhythmic patterns that lull the waking mind and allow us to slip into subconscious states? The arbitrariness of Tarnawsky's prose works against this kind of an effect by boring instead of hypnotizing, and by lurching and halting instead of flowing through time. It was no surprise to learn in a biographical note accompanying the book that Tarnawsky has a degree in engineering and has worked in the computer industry. His book reads like an exercise in logic.

But there are other problems besides those of structure and style that contribute to the failure of *Meningitis*. The majority of them are summed up in the main character in most of the stories, a mildly neurotic, mostly boring, middle-aged émigré named George. There is no need to

describe him at any great length, because he's just like a thousand other characters you've probably already met in modern fiction. About the only thing that differentiates him from that angst-ridden herd is that his neuroses have an east-European twist to them. That he should also be a writer, on top of a dozen other clichés, is just another example of Tarnawsky's uninspired approach to literature. So is the stale sixties odour that pervades much of the book and is conveyed by a beach house named Mellow Yellow, a story titled "A Day in the Life," and a character named Jim Morrison. Perhaps other readers will enjoy the nostalgia, but I, for one, am tired of petit bourgeois anti-heroes with hang-ups about baldness, bad breath, and sex. Surely, we've gotten beyond all that into a deeper perception of what plagues twentieth-century man.

About the attitudes implicit in Tarnawsky's portrayal of women, I will say very little. except that they deserve scrutiny from a feminist point of view. The fact that one chapter has a subsection titled "God is a Woman" should be indication enough that the author is asking for a feminist response; being a male attempting to cope with the women's movement myself, I feel such an analysis is beyond my capabilities at this point in time.

What might have redeemed all of this banality is a sharply defined sense of humour about the human condition. But the tedious landscapes of Tarnawsky's characters' lives are unrelieved by any serious attempts to make us laugh either ironically, mockingly, or in a slapstick manner. What *Meningitis* desperately needs is a dose of Woody Allen; instead, the few dry bits of humour get smothered by other details and defused by the monotone prose.

Having vented my frustration and disappointment with the book, only one thing remains to be said about the experience. Although I would not bother to read *Meningitis* again, I certainly would have another crack at Tarnawsky's prose. Because what he is doing is very important to literature, namely, seeking new ways to create with language, rather than staying with the tried-and-true methods. The former involves risk, the latter demands craftsmanship; both have a place in the literary world. I prefer to go with the pioneers like Tarnawsky, even if their trail leads to failure. Others reject this route a priori. Whatever your preference may be, you can be sure of one thing: Yuriy Tarnawsky will still be taking the less travelled road. At the moment he's working on his Ph.D. in linguistics . . .

H. Hryhoriak

LETTERS

February 23, 1979

Dear Editors,

I have tried to collect as much information as possible on Ukrainian publications within Australia, and while doing so have gathered additional information which might be useful to you and at the same time give you an insight into the structure and functioning of the Ukrainian community in Australia.

In answer to your first question "How would I describe Ukrainian Studies in Australia," are you referring to studies through the Australian education system, or through the studies conducted by the local Saturday schools run by Ukrainian communities? In both areas I can only state my personal opinion, although I was involved in the first area as a member of a committee set up by the local Ukrainian Association to investigate the possibility of having the Ukrainian language accepted as a matriculation examination subject in South Australia. This occurred about the middle of 1972, and after some 18 months of correspondence and various visits and consultations with individuals and organizations, Ukrainian was accepted as a matriculation subject and was the first Slavic language to be examined by the local examination committee. The official teaching of this began in 1975.

About the same time another group in the State of Victoria approached their Matriculation Board and was also successful—courses in Ukrainian commenced in that State in 1975. I understand that it is only very recently that Ukrainian has been accepted as a matriculation subject in the State of New South Wales—yet this particular State has the largest number of Ukrainians.

And that is the sum total of the teaching of Ukrainian within Australia through the education system. No teaching of the subject is undertaken in the States of Western Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, or the Northern Territory, nor is Ukrainian offered in any state at the tertiary level.

As far as teaching Ukrainian through the Saturday schools, of which there are many, I would imagine that it would not differ very much from the Canadian system. There is, however, some standardisation and control over the whole network by the supervisory body (Ukrainska Tsentralna Shkilna Rada), which sets up and maintains certain uniform standards of teaching Ukrainian throughout Australia.

There has been great concern among many members of our community regarding the fact that Ukrainian studies at the tertiary level are not available in Australia. Two organizations have been formed with a view to correcting this situation. The first, Ukrainian Studies Foundation in Australia, aims to establish in one of the Australian universities a Department of Ukrainian Studies, a very ambitious plan. A campaign for the funding of this began a few years ago and a sum of approximately

$100,000.00 has now been raised. The above two organizations, in conjunction with the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Germany, and under the direction of Prof. J. B. Rudnyckyj, have conducted some summer courses in Ukrainian Studies during 1978 at Macquarie University, New South Wales, and at Adelaide University, South Australia, in 1979.

The second, the Ukrainian National Foundation in Australia, aims to collect larger sums of money for the purposes of investment, using the income to subsidize all worthwhile projects, including lectureships, and thus at all times to have complete control over funds. I understand, however, that so far the fundraising has achieved very little.

You may be aware that nearly all active Ukrainian life in Australia is centered around the few major cities and I would list them in an order of priority as follows: (1) Sydney, New South Wales; (2) Melbourne, Victoria; (3) Adelaide, South Australia; (4) Brisbane, Queensland; (5) Perth, Western Australia; and (6) Canberra, Australian Capital Territory. Sydney and Melbourne have more than one community organization, but Adelaide, Perth, and Canberra have only a single organization.

In my opinion it would appear that at present not much can be done about the tertiary situation, but much can be done at other levels. For example, here in Adelaide, the Department of Further Education is interested in introducing the teaching of the Ukrainian language provided a sufficient number of people are interested enough to warrant the initiation of such a course. The University of Adelaide Language Laboratory, which has a whole department specializing in the teaching of languages, has expressed an interest, again providing that a sufficient number of interested students of the right type can be found. They seem to favour a type of course which would extend over a three-year period, beginning with basic work, extending through intermediate and more advanced levels.

The University of Adelaide Radio Station, on which we broadcast our weekly two hours of Ukrainian programs, has also expressed an interest, but such a course must be suitable for radio broadcasting with supplementary notes, and must, necessarily, have a sufficient number of interested students.

Overall, the situation today looks better than it did, say, ten years ago. It appears to me that the Canadian idea of Multiculturalism is gradually taking hold in this country also. For example, we have received some government funds towards a number of Ukrainian organizations. The South Australian Government has recently established a Bureau of Ethnic Affairs; The Radio Broadcasting Commission has issued a licence for the establishment of a new Ethnic Broadcasting Station in South Australia; these are small but positive moves in the right direction, which are solely due to the pressure exerted by various ethnic groups.

Yours sincerely,

Teofil Sudomlak
Renown Park, South Australia

January 19, 1979

Dear Mr. Huytan:

I appreciate your review of the English translation of my father's *Ukraine and Policy of Entente* (*Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 5 (1978): 96-98), with its scholarly adductions of the relevant bibliography. A few remarks should be in order, however, so as to straighten out a few misapprehensions in that review, namely:

You do not mention the publisher's name. The book was published by myself, as stated plainly in the introduction (p. IV, line 17 from top). The reasons for this option are given in the same introduction (p. III). Were you to read the introduction with care, you would have gained a truer perspective of the subject. Were you to view the book, the times, and the author within the total context of the epoch, you would not feel "impatient" with the transliteration of the Ukrainian names.

In your statement of the reasons for attitudes of "the West" to the UPR (p. 97) you do not take into account that a certain school of diplomatic thought intended to assign Ukraine to Poland, as an auxiliary, so to speak, and that Ukrainian separatism could have weakened that assignation.

Sincerely yours,
Lubow A. Margolena

WHITHER THE JOURNAL?: OUR READERS' RESPONSE

INTRODUCTION

To find out what sort of person reads the *Journal* and his or her opinion of it, a questionnaire was sent to our subscribers in July 1978. Respondents were free to remain anonymous or use their name. They were asked to provide information about their sex, age, country of birth and of residence, education, and occupation. Since most of our readers are of Ukrainian origin, respondents were asked how many generations they were removed from Ukraine, whether they ever took Ukrainian courses and at what level, whether they were professionally involved in "Ukrainian studies," and whether they subscribed to any other journals in Ukrainian, Soviet/East European. or ethnic studies. To gauge the size of the *Journal*'s reading audience, subscribers were also asked how many people read their copy of the *Journal.*

After providing this personal data, respondents were asked several questions concerning the contents of the *Journal*: which sections they read with the greatest interest; what sort of articles they would like to see more of; their opinion of articles on Ukrainian-Canadian topics and articles in the Ukrainian language; their opinion of the overall quality of the *Journal,* the *Journal*'s success as a student forum, and whether it should remain as such; and whether the *Journal* should be more or less scholarly. Several questions regarding technical matters were also asked.

The general purpose of the questionnaire was to find out whether the *Journal* appealed to our readers and what could possibly be done to better reflect their interests. Respondents were free to comment further on anything they felt was not covered by the questions.

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Before the questionnaire was mailed out, the distribution of our subscribers by country was analyzed. Of a total of 804 subscribers at the time of mailing, the breakdown was: Canada—64.5 percent; USA—21.6 percent; Australia—8.5 percent; Great Britain—1.99 percent; Germany—0.62 percent; France—0.37 percent; Italy—0.25 percent; Belgium and Romania—0.12 percent each. Significantly, almost two-thirds of our subscribers lived in Canada, and over one-fifth lived in the USA—together 86 percent of the total. Since the vast majority of Ukrainians in the West live in North America, this is hardly surprising. Almost one-fifth (19.5 percent) of our subscribers lived in Toronto, the city where the *Journal is* based; this percentage was almost as high as the total percentage of our U.S. subscribers. Another 10.2 percent lived in Edmonton, the center of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the *Journal*'s publisher; this was more than the percentage of all our Australian sub-

scribers. Thus the two cities of Toronto and Edmonton accounted for almost one-third of our subscribers.

A further breakdown of subscribers by Canadian province was done. Almost one-third of our subscribers (30.2 percent) lived in Ontario, the province in which Toronto is located. 13.31 percent lived in Alberta, in which Edmonton is found. The percentages for the other provinces were, in decreasing order: Manitoba—6.8 percent (6.1 percent in the city of Winnipeg); Quebec—6.7 percent (6.3 percent in the city of Montreal); Saskatchewan—4.6 percent (2.9 percent in the city of Saskatoon); British Columbia—2.7 percent (1.9 percent in the city of Vancouver); Nova Scotia—0.75 percent; New Brunswick—0.12 percent.

We can thus say that the overwhelming majority of our subscribers lives in North America, mostly in Canada. As a rule, they live in large cities. The largest concentrations of our US subscribers live in the major areas of Ukrainian settlement—the states of the industrial north and northeast: New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Massachusetts, Ohio, and so on, in decreasing order. The low number of subscribers in the USA and Australia indicates that the *Journal* does and should have room to expand its subscription base there. This should probably hold true for Great Britain, the other English-speaking country of settlement by Ukrainians, as well. At the time of mailing, the *Journal* had no subscribers in South America or Asia.

RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Of 804 questionnaires sent, only 191 were returned. Although the rate of response, 23.8 percent, is rather low and may or may not be representative of our subscribers as a whole, the results do provide some interesting data, assuming that the respondents are the bulk of our "serious" readers and hence primarily the ones at which the *Journal* is aimed. Even though the response rate was only a quarter of the total, some of the responses were so heavily one-sided that they may be assumed to be representative of our subscribers as a whole. The questions have been paraphrased below, and the responses have been converted into percentages.

Personal Data

1. Age group: 15-20—1%; 21-30—30.9%; 31-40—23.6%; 41-50—16.2%; 51-60—13.1%; 61-70—10%; 71+—4.2%; no response—1.6%.

2. Country of birth: Canada—37.7%; Ukraine—33%; Germany—9.42%; USA—8.9%; England—3.14%; Australia—2.6%; Poland—2.1%; France—1.57%; other—4.2%; no response—0.5%.

3. Country of residence: Canada—65.4%; USA—26.2%; Australia—5.8%; England—2.1%;other—1.1%.

4. Number of generations removed from Ukraine: one—45%; two—10.9%; three—8.9%; four—1.1%.

5. Education: primary—0%; secondary—4.2%; higher (university)—36.7%; higher postgraduate—59.7%.

6. Occupation (by general classification): professionals—60.2%; students—13.1%; business executives, owners, managers—7.3%; retired—6.3%; unemployed—4.2%; office workers—2.1%; salespeople—1.1%; skilled workers—0.5%; other—1.1%; no response—4.7%.

7. Those having taken Ukrainian courses: 81.2%.
Level: primary—17.5%; secondary—34.4%; higher—34.4%; higher-postgraduate—12.3% (percentage only of those who have taken Ukrainian courses).

8. Those professionally involved in Ukrainian studies: 25.1%.

9. Those subscribing to other journals in Ukrainian, Soviet/East-European, or ethnic studies: 43.46%.
Top five: *Suchasnist*—35; *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*—25; *Slavic Review*—18; *Canadian Slavonic Papers*—15; *Ukrainian Quarterly*—14 (number after name of journal indicates number of subscribers).

10. Number of other individuals reading subscriber's copy: none—48; one—48; two—33; three—13; more than three—13 (number of respondents in each category).

Reader Response

1. Section of the *Journal* read with the greatest interest: 31.4% replied that they read all of it. The other sections were read in the following order, from greatest to least interest: (1) history; (2) politics; (3) literature; (4) Ukrainian-Canadian topics; (5) reviews; (6) articles in the Ukrainian language; (7) surveys and reports; (8) art; (9) guides to research.

2. More articles preferred in the following areas, in decreasing order of priority: (1) politics; (2) history; (3) Ukrainian-Canadian topics; (4) literature; (5) Ukrainians in the diaspora; (6) sociology and art; (7) guider to research; (8) reviews; (9) translations.

3. Those who prefer articles dealing with Ukrainians in Canada: more—51.3%; fewer—13.3%; as is—7.8%; no response—23%.

4. Those who prefer articles written in Ukrainian: more—37.2%; fewer—14.7%; as is—18.9%; even balance—0.5%; no response—29.32%.

5. Those who consider the overall quality of the *Journal*: very good—37.2%; good—48.7%; adequate—8.9%; poor—1.1%; no response—4.7%.

6. Those who consider the *Journal* successful as a forum for graduate students: yes—80.6%; no—5.8%; no response—14.6%.

7. Those who prefer more articles by non-students: yes—62.3%; no—24.6%; indifferent—2.1%; no response—10.5%.

8. Those who think Ukrainian-language quotations in English articles should be translated: yes—49.7%; no—42.9%; no response—8.4%.

9. Those who think the *Journal* should be: more scholarly—30.9%; as is —30.4%; less scholarly—13.6%; not more scholarly—8.9%; no response —14.7%.

10. Those who like the design and format: yes—94.8%; no—2.1%; no response—3.6%.

11. Those who liked the art reproductions: yes—83.3%; no—2.1%; no response —13.6%. Those who think they should be continued: 77.5%.

12. Those who considered submitting to the *Journal*: an article—39.7%; a letter—7.3%.

13. Those aware that the *Journal* is published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies: 89.5%. Of these, those whose interest in the other activities of the Institute has increased by reading the *Journal*: 65.2%.

14. If the *Journal* became a quarterly, those willing to pay a higher subscription: yes—86.9%; no—4.7%; undecided—1.05%; no response—7.9%.

CONCLUSIONS

The majority of our subscribers are the inhabitants of large North American cities. Almost a third of the respondents to the questionnaire, the largest single age group, was between the ages of 21 and 30. We can assume that almost all of them were born, raised, and educated in the West. We can also safely assume that many, if not most, of the second largest group of respondents, those between 31 and 40, were also raised and educated in the West. It seems, then, that the *Journal* is most popular with the postwar generation of young adults of Ukrainian origin who were raised, educated, and live in the English-speaking countries.

Still, over 43 percent of our respondents were over the age of forty; most of them were probably born in Ukraine. The older the age group of respondents was, the lower the rate of response. This is probably the pattern for subscribers as well. After all, the *Journal* is primarily an English-language publication: we can assume that the younger the person, the more he or she would tend to read English-language articles.

Yet, being Ukrainian is probably important for most of our subscribers. Indeed, 45 percent of our respondents were one generation removed from Ukraine, that is, they were the offspring of parents born in Ukraine, who constituted the next largest group of respondents—those born in Ukraine, at 33 percent. Together these two groups, which we can assume is comprised predominantly of ethnically conscious Ukrainians, constituted 78 percent of the respondents.

Almost all of the respondents—96.4 percent—had postsecondary educations; almost two-thirds (59.7 percent) had postgraduate degrees. This figures is almost identical to the largest occupational category—60.2 percent of the respondents were professionals. In general, therefore, our respondents, if not our subscribers, are well educated.

The fact that most of the respondents were well educated ethnically conscious Ukrainians made the fact that most of them (81.2 percent) had taken Ukrainian courses not very surprising. What was surprising was that almost half (46.7 percent) had taken these courses at the postsecondary level, that is, outside the framework of weekend and evening community schools. More surprising was the fact that one-quarter of the respondents claimed to be professionally involved in Ukrainian studies. This would probably not be the case for our subscribers as a whole.

When asked to provide the names of other journals they subscribe to, many of the respondents listed Ukrainian newspapers and magazines. These were not included in our calculations as they were not journals in the fields of Ukrainian, Soviet/East-European, or ethnic studies. 43.46 percent of the respondents stated they subscribed to other journals. Heading the list was *the* Ukrainian-language journal in the West, *Suchasnist*, with thirty-five subscribers. The next four most popular journals were all English-language journals: *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, *Slavic Review*, *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, and *Ukrainian Quarterly*. Over half of the respondents (56.5 percent) did not subscribe to any other journals. Why, then, did they subscribe to the *Journal?* Was it because it was a new journal, because it was in the English language, because it was Canadian, because they felt a moral obligation to subscribe, or some other reason? Only time and the growth or decline in subscriptions will tell.

Responses indicate that the *Journal* should have at least three times as many readers as it does subscribers. We estimate that the *Journal* has a reading audience of at least 3,000 people, most of these being immediate family members of subscribers.

We were pleased that 31.4 percent of the respondents read the *Journal* from cover to cover and found all of it interesting. When asked to number the other subject areas from greater to lesser interest, the remaining respondents indicated that articles on history and politics were read with the most interest. Our findings are based on numbers and check marks, which many respondents used intead of numbers; check marks were totalled as a gauge in order not to invalidate such responses. History and politics also headed the category of what articles respondents would like to see more of. This, again, is hardly surprising, since most of the respondents, as conscious Ukrainians, prefer to read about their history and politics, which is relatively little discussed in the English language and tendentiously presented in Soviet and other East-European publications. Ukrainian literature is also relatively little known. It placed third on the list of most widely read articles, together with articles on Ukrainian-Ca-

nadian topics. This latter statistic, again, is not surprising, since 64.5 percent of our subscribers are ethnically conscious Canadians, most of whom would like to know about the history and culture of their ethnic group in Canada. 51.3 percent of the respondents even wanted to see more articles on Ukrainians in Canada in the *Journal*. This tendency will probably not change until our subscription base expands outside of Canada, especially in the USA and Australia. In any case, our respondents indicated that they would also like to see articles about Ukrainians around the world; this is especially the case with our non-Canadian subscribers.

It seems that most of our readers read Ukrainian. Well over half of the respondents preferred to have at least one article per issue in Ukrainian, which is what we have now. The largest group of respondents, 37.2 percent, preferred to see even more articles in Ukrainian in the *Journal*. This again confirms our hypothesis that most of our subscribers are ethnically conscious Ukrainians, who would thus not be opposed to reading some portion of the *Journal* in Ukrainian.

Most of the respondents (86 percent) judged the overall quality of the *Journal*'s contents good to very good. Most respondents (62.3 percent) seemed to want the *Journal* to open its pages to non-students and wanted the *Journal* to go beyond being a student forum, which they (30.6 percent) thought the *Journal* has succeeded in becoming. Most of our student respondents, however, preferred the *Journal* to remain a student journal first and foremost.

Whether Ukrainian-language quotations in English-language articles should be translated was not resolved: 49.7 percent said yes, 42.9 percent said no, thus giving the yeses an unclear majority.

The majority of our readers seem to like the present level of the *Journal*. 30.4 percent of the respondents indicated this; others, if anything, would want it to be more scholarly (30.9 percent indicated this). Only 13.6 percent of the respondents stated that they wanted the *Journal* to be less scholarly. These responses, of course, are valid only if one assumes the *Journal* is essentially scholarly now.

The overwhelming majority of respondents liked the design and format of the *Journal* and the art reproductions in past issues. 89.5 percent knew it was published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies; two-thirds indicated it had increased their interest in the other activities of the CIUS. Most respondents were willing to pay a higher subscription rate if the *Journal* appeared more frequently.

Altogether, our respondents suggested that the *Journal* publish articles on almost every conceivable Ukrainian-related topic: Ukrainian church history and contemporary religious problems, the economy of Ukraine, film, music, language problems (Russification, Polonization, Anglicization, dialecticization, lexical misuse, orthography, etc.), Ukrainian "unity" in the West, subject bibliographies, contemporary Soviet literary and cultural developments, monitoring Soviet publications, the effects of bilin-

gualism and intermarriage, interviews with cultural and political personalities and Ukrainian scholars, memoirs, embroidery, philately, folklore, philosophy, even dynastic ties with the west-European monarchy and the VD rate in interwar Galicia.

The editors, of course, would like to receive as many articles on as many Ukrainian-related topics as possible, and they welcome all potential contributions. Our readers should understand, however, that the *Journal* can only publish what it receives and it is our contributors who shape the contents of the *Journal*. 39.7 percent of our respondents (72 individuals) stated that they had considered submitting an article to the *Journal;* 7.3 percent (13) said they had thought of writing a letter. We were quite surprised by this response, for few, if any, of these people had actually submitted anything. Therefore, although we appreciate our readers' suggestions, we must emphasize that the *Journal* is based primarily on voluntary contributions, and its contents reflect what the contributors choose to write about. All that the editors can do is make sure that the contents of each issue reflect the readers' interests in a general way by selecting articles that deal with the more popular subject areas, as indicated by the readers' responses, over those that do not.

Reader response is important in guiding the editorial policy of a journal. We therefore thank all those individuals who responded to our questionnaire, and also for the many good wishes and congratulations we received. We were pleased that most respondents enjoyed reading the *Journal*. Now we have a better idea of who reads the *Journal* and what direction it should take.

We would like to repeat our request to readers to contribute: send us your letters, comments, suggestions, information, and especially articles. Help us build and improve the *Journal*. Help increase our circulation: mention the *Journal* to your relatives, friends, and acquaintances; urge them to subscribe; encourage them to write to us for an examination copy; buy gift subscriptions for your relatives and friends. The more readers we have, the more contributions we might receive; the more contributions we receive, the better the *Journal* will become.

COMMENTS

Following are some open comments from our respondents, which we have selected to give our readers an idea of the types of suggestions and interests that have been expressed. They also reflect generational interests.

Age group 21-30

1. Canadian researcher: "What I like in particular about the *Journal* is that most articles can appeal to readers of various backgrounds. To date, I have not found any that were so area specific that they would interest only a very limited audience. I would like to see that continued—

i.e., articles that invite *all* readers—it's a good way of introducing people to different subject areas."

2. British student: "Perhaps we should see the *Journal* not as a forum simply for graduate students, but for all those who have some semblance of a Ukrainian identity and who want a fresh and inspiring journal on Ukrainian themes."

3. Canadian student: "As a Ukrainian Canadian who has lost his ancestral past, ... I would ... like to see articles involving Ukraine yesterday and today ... especially where controversy exists ... how the controversies affect Ukrainian Canadians and their attitudes and opinions."

4. US student: "At last we have a journal ... aimed at the college-educated reader as well as the graduate student! ... The *Journal* ought to focus on contemporary issues, in contrast to *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, which reaches into the past ... There is a need for critical bibliographic surveys ... material on Ukrainians in Brazil and Argentina, especially in the area of oral history .... Contemporary Soviet Ukrainian literature deserves to be examined more carefully."

5. Australian lecturer: "... information on the current status and problems of Ukrainians in the diaspora ... [is] very important ... because in Australia ... [we] feel more acutely the isolation from the mainstream of Ukrainian activities ... objective information plus unhindered discussion of the problems and successes of Ukrainian life throughout the world is of great interest to myself and many of my generation—to reduce the level of ignorance, which is undesireably high."

6. Canadian teacher: "The *Journal* fills a void .... However ... it is a bit too dry to have a wider readership .... If it could be a bit more visual and allow more design space to ART ... more people would LOOK at it, if not actually read it .... Also young artists would have a legitimate forum to have their works discussed and reproduced .... this is a necessity and an obligation on the *Journal*'s part to the advancement of culture."

7. Canadian researcher: "A list of registered thesis topics might be helpful to researchers, students, etc." [Any volunteers?—Ed.]

8. US student: "The editors should ... realize the main problem ...: not all graduate student essays or theses are worthy of publication ... [which] brings into question the *Journal*'s existence. The *Journal* could further its aims by concentrating on guides to research, by publishing a list of Ph.D. candidates, their addresses, and topics of their theses in Ukrainian studies, and become some sort of medium of communication .... I find the emphasis on Canadian-Ukrainian studies ... downright parochial."

9. Canadian lecturer: "The *Journal* should also encourage articles from other sources ... established academics and others ... to ensure a reasonable pool of good articles."

Age group 31-40

1. Canadian doctor: "Most articles . . . are written in a style for a very few academics that is boring reading. I want to know more about Ukrainians in Canada and why they were so disliked when they came here and why it hasn't changed. Why did my forefathers hate Jews? Why are there two churches for Ukrainians [?] . . . How about some very early history . . . in a readable style?"

2. US teacher: "historical content with the perspective of how we Ukrainians are today; how has Ukrainian history and thought molded us today."

3. Australian pharmacologist: " . . . develop a definite leaning . . . at present it [the journal] seems to have an eclectic character . . . . "

4. Canadian professor: "Only grad students can make this journal a forum for themselves . . . if more communication and commentary on issues relevant to graduate studies are included . . . . "

5. Canadian professor: "The *Journal* . . . . cannot survive as a journal of graduate Ukrainian studies—to few students . . . . [It] ought to change its nature—more like *Encounter* or *Survey* . . . . For professional academics . . . [its] nature discourages contribution."

Age group 41-50

1. Canadian librarian: "an annual selection of the best articles in Ukrainian published . . . as a separate issue in English translation."

2. Australian technician: " . . . directives . . . by specialists . . . [where] there is an urgent need for research . . . A chronicle of events among Ukrainians in different countries including Ukraine. Some space given to 'Letters to the Editor.' Include more shorter articles, try to get larger involvement through smaller contributions."

3. US city planner: "A new journal should not be an imitation of *Suchasnist.* Also, it would be good to have a journal by and for young people, not a student bulletin board (*stinna hazeta*)."

Age group 61-70

1. Born in USA: " . . . more should be written about what is happening to Ukrainians and their children in Canada and the USA . . . and why . . . . Why are we losing first and second-generation Ukrainians and how can we get them back."

2. Canadian born in Ukraine: "I am interested in the political views of youth . . . their interest in Ukrainian history, the struggle for independence, their attitude to contemporary events in Ukraine . . . . Give young left-wing Ukrainians the opportunity to explain what value they see in communism for the welfare of the Ukrainian people, how they excuse the crimes . . . committed in the name of communism . . . . "

3. Canadian born in Ukraine: "In general, the *Journal* more than just appealed to me, even despite its cleverly disguised somewhat 'leftist' tendency .... Expand considerably the review section ... not only solid book reviews, but also short notes. This is necessary, moreover, since other journals ostentatiously ignore Ucrainica, especially that published in Ukrainian in the diaspora."

R. S.

An Errata List for the Fall 1978 issue:

P. 26, footnote 3, l. 5 should read: "1922; Boris Rogosin ..."

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All submissions must be typed on 8½ x 11 inch paper and double-spaced throughout. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript. Block quotations and four or more lines of verse from Ukrainian should appear in the original. Otherwise the modified Library of Congress system of cyrillic transliteration should be used.

In general, articles should not exceed 25 double-spaced pages, except where especially justified by extensive documentation, tables, or charts. For purposes of style and footnoting, the University of Chicago Press *Manual of Style* should be consulted. Authors should send a short academic biography with their submissions. Manuscripts will not be returned unless specifically requested and postage provided. The policy of the *Journal* is not to consider articles that have been published or are being considered for publication elsewhere. The editors reserve the right to edit all submissions.

A TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION
(Modified Library of Congress)

а	—	a	ї	—	i	ф	—	f
б	—	b	й	—	i	х	—	kh
в	—	v	к	—	k	ц	—	ts
г	—	h	л	—	l	ч	—	ch
ґ	—	g	м	—	m	ш	—	sh
д	—	d	н	—	n	щ	—	shch
е	—	e	о	—	o	ю	—	iu
є	—	ie	п	—	p	я	—	ia
ж	—	zh	р	—	r	ь	—	-
з	—	z	с	—	s	-ий	—	y in endings of personal names only
и	—	y	т	—	t			
і	—	i	у	—	u			