

JOURNAL

OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

Розмова з Іваном Дзюбою

Stefan Kozak: On the Tradition of Cyril and Methodius in Ukraine

Bohdan Somchynsky: National Communism and the Politics of Industrialization in Ukraine, 1923-1928

Bohdan Kordan: Ukrainians in Canada: 1981 Census Profile

Yury Boshyk and Myron Momryk: A New and Major Resource: The Andrii Zhuk Collection at the National Archives of Canada

Book Reviews

25

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ЖУРНАЛ

УКРАЇНОЗНАВЧИХ СТУДІЙ

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Dziuba pix back of contributors



РОЗМОВА З ІВАНОМ ДЗЮБОЮ

На початку березня 1989 р. відомий літературознавець і критик Іван Дзюба перебував в Едмонтоні як член делегації з України, яка відвідувала Канаду і США у програмі Шевченківських читань. Члени редакційної колегії «Журналу» Олег Ільницький, Наталія Пилип'юк і Мирослав Юркевич відбули з ним розмову, а Давид Марплз подав додаткові питання на письмі. Подаємо скорочений і зредагований текст розмови.

Чи могли б Ви розказати про обставини й історію написання книжки "Інтернаціоналізм чи русифікація?"

З задоволенням розкажу. Безпосереднім приводом були арешти 1965 р. Але вже перед цим десь думка про написання такої речі назрівала.

Я ось на що хочу звернути увагу: я ніколи не вважав і не вважаю себе політиком. Але не можу сказати, що випадково я за цю тему взявся. Це пояснювалося тим, що проблеми, про які там йшлося, вже боліли, хтось мусив про це сказати. І я ждав, що хтось із фахівців, хтось із людей, краще за мене обізнаний, це напише. Але чомусь ніхто не писав. Я просто з деяким викликом мусив взятися за це сам, з думкою, що раз ніхто не пише, то я мушу це зробити. Я усвідомлював свою фахову невідповідність, бо розумів, що я ані політик, ані економіст, ані соціолог. Я — літератор, літературознавець, критик. Але взявся, тому, що... хтось мусив про це сказати.

І ще один момент, дрібний може, але якимсь мірою, як не дивно буде для вас звучати, зобов'язаний я Віктору Некрасову. Коли вже відбулися ці арешти (1965 р.), то ми з ним говорили. Він раніше мало був обізнаний з українським рухом, не дуже навіть симпатію відчував до цього. Тут його можна якоюсь мірою виправдати, бо він судив про українську літературу, культуру по тих людях, які тоді очолювали спілку. Тоді Спілка письменників, на відміну від теперішньої ситуації, була силою реакційною. Ну й він відповідно українську культуру, літературу, вважав теж чимсь відсталим, реакційним. Багато людей так мислило, навіть з таких прогрес-

сивних росіян і українців. Але на час тих арештів, він уже багато що зрозумів, і став дуже прихилитися до української справи, і в багатьох наших акціях нас підтримував, багато листів протесту підписував. Серед арештованих уже були люди, до яких він мав велику симпатію. Тому ми з ним разом вирішили якийсь лист протесту написати. Я взявся написати текст. Але коли я почав писати (думав, що це буде невеликий лист) побачив, що треба пояснити оцим людям, в чому суть справи. Багато хто справи не розумів. Протестують українці проти чогось, а проти чого вони протестують — не ясно. Когось арештували — кажуть, за антирадянську діяльність, так чого ж вони цією антирадянською діяльністю займалися? Говорять там про пригнічення української культури, а яке ж пригнічення? Ніхто їм не забороняє говорити українською мовою, хочете — говоріть, не хочете — це ваша справа. Люди не винні в тому, що вони так примітивно розуміли справу. Просто вони не мали глибшого погляду на ці речі, не мали інформації. Видимість життя взагалі деформує сутність і справжні причини тих чи інших явищ. Ці причини не лежать на поверхні, і от власне мені захотілося пояснити, в чому полягають ці причини.

Перший адресат цієї книжки — люди, які не розуміють подій, не розуміють в чому суть невдоволення, скажімо, частини українців. Це було перше завдання. Але не єдине. Бо мені й Некрасову дещо хотілося пояснити. Він для мене уособлював оцю частину інтелігенції, яка може бути доброзичливо настроєна, але через брак інформації ще не має точного уявлення, в чому справа.

А другий адресат — це був офіціоз, офіційні чинники, власне яким і була спрямована праця. Я їм хотів показати, що вони клянуться Леніним, заявляють, що проводять ленінську національну політику, а насправді роблять прямо протилежну справу. Хотів на фактах, на прикладах, довести, що вони роблять не те, чим клянуться. Працюючи над цією темою, я натрапив на матеріали XII з'їзду партії, які справили на мене велике враження, і стали однією з причин написання цієї праці. Ці матеріали були, вони існували, але настільки вже відійшли в історію, були замулені наступними подіями і спотвореннями, що про це ніхто нічого не згадував. Я читав, я був страшенно вражений. Дуже гостро говорилося про те, що власне тривало навколо нас. Всі ті проблеми залишилися нерозв'язаними, там про них гостро і чесно говорилося багатьма делегатами, і це для мене було велике відкриття. Я, так би мовити, хотів цим з усіма поділитися. В тому числі я хотів показати і нашому партійному, державному керівництву, як колись справжні комуністи розуміли це питання, як ставили, до яких

висновків приходили, чого вимагали. Мені здавалось, що це повинно справити велике враження на них самих.

Чи Ви собі уявляли, який буде ефект Вашої книжки?

Ні, ви знаєте, не зовсім уявляв. Зараз я до вашого питання поверну, а тут я хочу сказати, що був і третій ще адресат: це наша більш-менш свідомо українська громадськість, оце коло наше, шестидесятників так зване, люди, які усвідомлювали проблему, які про неї роздумували. Я і з ними хотів поговорити, щоб ми всі краще уявили і суть проблем, і історію. В той час багато було різних підходів, різних поглядів — екстремістські погляди, антикомуністичні. Вони мені здавалися дуже небезпечними і неплідними для розв'язання цих проблем, а тоді були спроби якось в цей бік повести справу. Своєю працею я хотів сказати, навіщо нам дуже щось шукати, хто зна де, і хто зна на кого орієнтуватися, коли погляди, які комуністи в 20-ті роки висловлювали, погляди в останніх працях Леніна, дають платформу нам, дають ключ до розв'язання всіх цих проблем. Оці рішення, так я уявляв, якби були виконані, то ми цих проблем не знали б. Оце я хотів нашим людям, однодумцям, яких об'єднував біль наш спільний, хотів дати не те, що платформу якусь, а сказати, що можна на оцій практичній платформі, перебуваючи в межах комуністичного світогляду, вимагати, щоб діло відповідало слову, щоб те, що записано в конституції реально здійснювалось, щоб те, що уявлялося колись як комуністичний ідеал, не було спотворено, а щоб у житті ми до нього верталися.

Через це, що отаких три адресати було, в моїй праці є і певний різнобій. І стильовий різнобій, і в поглядах різнобій є. Це я самокритично ще тоді усвідомлював. Зараз я бачу, що часом одні речі в одній тональності написані, інші в іншій.

А тепер вертаюся до питання про те, чи уявляв я собі резонанси. Зовсім не уявляв. Ви знаєте, я не оцінював це високо. Я думав, що це перша спроба звертання до цього питання. Я взагалі людина дуже самокритична, я самоїд, так би мовити. Я завжди шукаю гірше в собі, а не краще, завжди знаходжу більше недоліків, ніж якихось достоїнств. Тому я і цим не був дуже ані захоплений, ані задоволений, не уявляв, що воно в нас здобуде такий розголос, що потім буде розмножуватися на машинці, фотоспособом, що так воно піде в люди.

І ще чого я не передбачив, це тих тлумачень, які потім були. Різні люди зовсім по-різному витлумачували. Більшість сприймали,

схвалювали і захоплювалися, але кожен в міру свого розуміння це тлумачив, і кожен свої нюанси надавав. Наприклад, була поширена така думка, мовляв, як він хитро використав Леніна і партійні документи. От здорово — партію її ж, так би мовити, зброєю б'є. Абсолютно широко я говорю, що такі погляди мене сприяли, тому, що для мене це не було ні маскуванню, ні дипломатією, ні якийсь хитрий прийом — це я так думав, так я мислив. Зараз у чомусь я по-іншому вже думаю, в чомусь теж так. Але це для мене було дуже широко, це було моє переконання. Щоб пояснити чому саме так, мені довелося б дуже багато розказувати біографію свого життя. Але коротко суть справи зводиться до того, що я з Донбасу родом, в школі я був комсомольським активістом, дуже затятим таким. В інституті теж я був секретарем комітету комсомолу, Донецького пединституту. Тобто, я цими ідеями жив справді, горів ними, і зараз як згадую, скільки я часу в молодості віддав комсомольській роботі, то мені аж страшно стає. Якби цей час було на щось корисніше повернути! Але я не був таким казенним, ортодоксальним комсомольцем. Я просто в ці ідеали вірив, але й бачив невідповідність поведінки багатьох партійних людей цим ідеалам, і невідповідність дійсності, і я цим обурювався. Багато на цьому ґрунті в мене конфліктів було з начальством своїм. От я, наприклад, такий випадок пригадую. Коли я, як секретар комітету комсомолу, на звітно-виборних зборах робив доповідь, то я відклав у бік заготовлений і перевірений текст. Почав говорити і дуже гостро скритикував дирекцію інституту, партійну організацію, неподобства. Після цього мав великі неприємності: проти мене готувалася справа. Але це був 53 рік. І тут помер Сталін — це мене врятувало. Я широко вірив в усі ці ідеали, і хотів якось поведінку свою, і життя взагалі з ними якось узгодити. Тому конфлікт з офіційними спотвореннями весь час назрівав і був неминучий. В тій чи іншій формі він би рано чи пізно вибухнув.

Як довго ви писали «Інтернаціоналізм чи русифікацію?»

Я це буквально кілька місяців писав — місяців три чи чотири, не більше. Але це писалось в якомусь великому напруженні. Я писав день і ніч, на такому піднесенні якомусь, що потім, коли я написав, знеможений був. При чому основну частину цього часу в мене забрав не самий процес писання.

Писалось це гарячково, і нібито легко лилося, лилося і лилося. Уже десь там наболіло, уже передумано було. А основну частину цих трьох-чотирьох місяців забрало збирання економічної ста-

тики, статистичного матеріалу про книгодрукування. Цього ж у нас не було зібрано. Я тижнями просиджував у Науковій публічній бібліотеці, [читав] бюлетені Харківської республіканської книжкової палати, і по кожній книжці я вираховував, скільки книжок українською мовою, скільки російською, і яких книжок. Оце таким кустарним способом виписував, палички ставив.

З сьогоднішньої перспективи, як Ви розглядаєте цю працю?

Майже все, що там було написано сьогодні говорить вже у нас. Є один тільки момент, до якого ми ще не дійшли — це гостра критика російського шовінізму. Та, яка є у книжці, сьогодні ще не знаходить місця в пресі. Це той пункт, який ми ще не вибороли собі — право критикувати гостро російський шовінізм. Все інше майже говориться.

А яке моє сьогоднішнє ставлення до праці? Тут мені просто здається, що сьогодні я міг би це глибше, краще, переконливіше написати. Бо там є і наївні речі. Вона не рівноцінна. Є таке, з чим я і сьогодні згодний, можу підтвердити, є якісь наївніші речі. Правду кажучи, я не зовсім і уявляю зараз цю книжку, бо після того, як 73-го року в мене все було вилучене, я її не читав. Про неї я суджу по пам'яті покищо.

У 1969 р. Товариство культурних зв'язків з українцями за кордоном видало памфлет п.н. «Що і як обстоює І. Дзюба» за підписом Богдана Стенчука. Чи це справжнє прізвище автора?

Це псевдонім. Я якось не дуже цікавився, хто за цим стоїть. Мені багато говорили всяких версій, імена, але це швидше колективно [написано]. Навіть не швидше, це напевно.

У Спілці письменників відбулася жвава дискусія про Вас і Вашу книжку, а 6 січня 1970 р. "Літературна Україна" звітувала про Ваш виступ перед Президією.

Дискусії, мені здається, не було. Були деякі нагінки, так би мовити, на мене. Головою Спілки був Ю. Смолич, але він не брав у цьому участі. Він у душі мені глибоко співчував, це я знаю, і з його власних слів, і з багатьох інших доказів. Але він не мав можливості й можливості одверто заступитися чи виступити. Він людиною був хворою, слабкою на цей час, і коли така критична ситуація виникала, то він хворів і не приходив на засідання. Тому у всіх цих засіданнях,

де така проробка велася, чи якісь такі рішення ухвалювалися, він не брав участі.

Це ви маєте на увазі 69-ий рік, це коли мене ще обстоювали. Перед цим було засідання правління Київської організації спілки, там майже все правління дуже виступило на мій захист. Агата Турчинська дуже активно тоді виступала на захист, Сава Голованівський, і ряд інших. Я вже всіх не пригадую, але пам'ятаю, що ці дуже активні були. І таким чином майже одностайно правління Київської організації проголосувало проти виключення. Після цього республіканська була зв'язана певною мірою цим рішенням, і теж не могла [виключити]. Там такий компроміс був досягнутий: я засудив використання своєї книжки за кордоном, сказав, що мені це неприємно, і що я цього не хотів, але більше нічого я не говорив на цю тему. Рішення ухильне, компромісне було, щоб залишити мене в спілці, але з надією, що я далі зроблю якісь висновки для себе. Так на цьому і стабілізувалася тимчасово справа.

Яка Ваша загальна оцінка Шелеста і його політики, зокрема в національному питанні?

Тоді, треба сказати, ми його недооцінили. Тоді в першу чергу звертали [увагу] на деякі його недолуги. Часом на перший план виходили анекдотичні моменти: його спроби українізації, коли він українські млини ставив, ресторани українські, те, що він не дуже гарною українською мовою говорив. Мало хто всуť його політики якось вдумувався. Але пізніше стало зрозумілим, що він багато що доброго зробив за цей час. У видавничій справі дещо було зроблено, і в економіці він намагався досягти більшої самостійності, і [були] спроби вийти на економічні зв'язки з країнами соціалістичними. Я знаю, що за його завданням Інститут економіки розробляв питання про деяку переорієнтацію економіки, про недоцільність, наприклад, віддалених перевезень, перерозподілу робітничих ресурсів. При тому всьому, це людина сталінського гарту, сталінської школи, але якась небайдужість до України, до українських справ, якесь розуміння елементарне в нього було, пробуджувалося. Я знаю — це розповідав Володимир Денисенко, режисер фільму "Сон" — що коли вирішувалося питання бути чи не бути цьому фільму, бо там тема України і Шевченка трактувалася все таки трохи незвично, то Політбюро переглядало [цей фільм]. Денисенко оповідав, що Шелест був дуже зворушений фільмом, щось він його душі сказав.

До речі потім, після 73-го року, я працював на авіазаводі

багато років, а Шелест десь в 50-ті — на початку 60-их років був директором Київського авіазаводу. Там про нього дуже добрі спогади були. Потім вийшла не зовсім ординарна його книжка — "Україно наша радянська". До речі, я не знаю, чи це правда, чи ні, але мені говорили, і так багатьма у нас сприйнято, що це була певна спроба відповіді на "Інтернаціоналізм чи русифікацію". Це, мовляв, щоб показати, що нічого подібного, що у нас є Україна, процвітає наша радянська Україна. Не знаю, чи це правда, чи ні.

Після Скрипника у нас партійного діяча такого рангу не було. Чоловік, все ж таки, щось про Запорізьку Січ сказав, і про національну гордість. Це дуже неординарне було.

Перейдімо до сучасних проблем. Чи могли б Ви коротко розказати про труднощі, пов'язані з поширенням ужитку української мови в Україні сьогодні?

Це дуже складне питання. Коротко, сьогодні основні труднощі, мені здається, такі. По-перше, якщо загальніше сказати, це відсутність практичної потреби. Вживання української мови стало справою патріотизму. Хто українською мовою говорить? Або ті люди, які ще не опанували російську, через обставини свого життя, селяни, малоосвічені верстви міського населення, або та інтелігенція, або та частина робітництва, яка прийшла до усвідомлення значення мови. Тобто, [мова стала] справою патріотизму. А мова, яка стає справою патріотизму — це проблематична річ, це дуже небезпечне становище мови. Головне [завдання], це якось добитися того, щоб вона стала потрібною. На цьому зараз основні зусилля зосереджені.

А як це зробити? По-перше, в сферу освіти її впроваджувати, по-друге, в сферу функціонування державних і інших адміністративних установ. Все воно, мабуть, сконцентроване у вимозі державності української мови, яка має велику підтримку сьогодні. По всій Україні підписуються листи. Є десятки тисяч підписів, при чому радісно, що, скажімо, не тільки з Львівської, з західних областей, а із східних областей, з різних міст, в тому числі з Харкова, Одеси, Дніпропетровська, з міст, де б, здавалося, нічого уже і не лишилося [з української мови]. Але насправді є і мова українська, і люди, які її хочуть, і теж тисячі листів приходять.

Куди спрямовуються листи, про які Ви згадуєте?

Спочатку спрямовувались до Спілки письменників. Тут треба

сказати, що наша Спілка здобула великий авторитет зараз серед населення, насамперед боротьбою за українську мову, але також і екологічною своєю позицією, що дуже важливо. Її ініціативи виходять уже за межі мови і культури. Ми дедалі більше розуміємо, що дуже важливо пов'язати мову з загальними соціальними, культурними, економічними питаннями, з питанням суверенітету республіки. Одна із причин трагічного становища нашої мови — це повна втрата суверенітету, починаючи десь з 29-го року. Звичайно, є багато інших причин — винищення інтелігенції, освітня політика, і таке інше, але також і це. Тому ми зараз прагнемо мовне питання пов'язати з усім колом інших питань.

І є психологічний аспект, культурно-психологічний: виховання культури політичної, культури національного самоусвідомлення, побутової культури. Скажімо, багато людей розуміють мову, можуть нею користуватися, але не наважуються. Люди, які приїждять на Україну, і побувають, скажімо, в Києві, чи в інших містах, в них трохи неточне, неадекватне враження складається про поширеність української мови. Вони не чують на вулиці ніде української мови, і думають, що взагалі ніхто вже не вміє нею говорити. Насправді це не так. Той, хто живе в Києві, знає, що є великі групи людей, великі осередки, де користуються українською мовою. Але коли людина виходить на вулицю, вона це залишає десь, і переходить на загальноприйнятну мову. От, припустім, часом у тролейбусі чи в автобусі їдуть люди, хтось стоїть собі, думає, що він тільки тут один по-українському говорить, тому до інших звертається по-російському. А тут же поруч з ним може другий, а там десь третій, четвертий, тільки вони один про одного не знають, бо немає ніяких ні організацій, ні форм життя, які б їх об'єднували, які б усе це виводили на поверхню. От можливо тепер, з утворенням товариств української мови та багатьох інших самодіяльних організацій, люди матимуть можливість елементарно спілкуватись і позбуватись почуття самотності. Бо інколи це почуття до трагічних навіть наслідків приводило таких людей, які думали, що він один українець, що ніхто його не зрозуміє, ніхто більше не є в такому становищі, що він якийсь чи ненормальний, чи якийсь виняток. А коли якісь форми організації існуватимуть, то це і полегшуватиме, і помножуватиме сили. Я кажу, що якби одного разу в Києві, 20% населення на вулиці, в громадських установах, заговорило по-українському, то назавтра заговорило б 70–80%, бо фактично, 70–80% можуть користуватися [мовою], але не можуть переступити оцей психологічний бар'єр.

Які вигляди на те, що мова стане державною?

Мені здається, зараз є перспективи добрі, що українська мова стане державною, але спершу я хотів би сказати про те, чому ми надаємо такого великого значення удержавленню української мови.

Річ у тім, що однією із вирішальних причин денационалізації і русифікації значної частини українського населення було зокрема уявлення про те, що в найближчому майбутньому зникнуть національні і мовні відмінності між народами Радянського Союзу. Поняття про інтернаціоналізм пов'язувалося з поняттям про безнаціональність, мовну і культурну уніфікацію. І хоч у теорії ніхто не доводив ці поняття до такої крайності і прямолінійності, але фактично, в масовій свідомості, це розумілося саме так. І оце ідеологічне і психологічне настановлення на швидке зникнення націй, національних відмінностей, і мов національних, дуже полегшило справу денационалізації і русифікації. Пересічна людина мислила так: якщо ці мови і культури безперспективні, то нема і потреби за них триматися. Чим швидше від них звільнишся, тим ти ближчий, так би мовити, до майбутнього, яке уявлялося тоді.

Сьогодні вже таке уявлення подолане, і про інтернаціоналізм, і про майбутнє. Сьогодні взагалі всі ці перспективи змінилися, але в масовій свідомості отака недооцінка мови і уявлення про її безперспективність лишилася. Тому удержавлення української мови — це, якоюсь мірою, є утвердженням її перспективності, її майбуття. Власне, це той державний захист для української мови, якого всі останні десятиліття бракувало. Це перше, це, так би мовити, психологічний і ідеологічний бік справи. А крім того, якщо українська мова буде проголошена державною, то тим самим держава бере на себе відповідальність за її функціонування. Отже, держава не може робити вигляд надалі, що це її не стосується, що які там процеси не відбуваються, то це, мовляв, стихія, з якою нічого не зробиш, і до якої держава не має відношення. Держава муситиме дбати про навчання української мови, про освіту українською мовою, і таке інше. Оце другий важливий чинник, з огляду на який ми домагаємося удержавлення української мови.

І нарешті, узаконення української мови як державної мусить призвести до того, що державні і політичні установи переходитимуть на функціонування українською мовою, що українська мова буде діловою мовою в органах управління, і що українською мовою функціонуватиме система освіти, що розширюватиметься сфера друку.

Такий зміст ми пов'язуємо з поняттям про державність української мови. Але це не означає, на наш погляд, примусового нав'язування української мови всім сферам населення і кожній особистості зокрема. Власне таке уявлення поширюється або відсталими елементами, або недругами української культури, з тим, щоб залякати російськомовне населення і настроїти його проти українізації. Тому ми важливим своїм завданням вважаємо роз'яснення, що йдеться не про якийсь примус, що кожна людина має право вільно вибирати собі мову, і в побуті якою вона хоче мовою користуватися. І не тільки в побуті, взагалі вона має право користуватися своєю мовою — російською, єврейською, чи якою вона хоче, а статус державності означає поширення функціонування української мови на державні органи, на сферу освіти, одне слово, просто державну гарантію українській мові, щоб українська мова здобула собі такий статус, який мають мови всіх цивілізованих народів.

Яка роль СПУ у виробленні закону про удержавлення української мови?

Спілка письменників України відіграла, можна сказати, вирішальну роль у цій справі. Протягом багатьох років саме спілка наголошувала на ненормальному становищі української мови, звертала на це увагу громадськості, і прагнула добитися якихось поліпшень. В ті роки, коли не було ніякої гласності, не було можливості це публічно обговорювати, постановка таких питань обмежувалася внутрішньоспілчанськими сферами, але поступово ми дістали можливість говорити про це публічно, в пресі, і з кожним роком ми виборювали собі дедалі більші можливості. Тому не можна уявляти цю справу так, що просто дароване було право говорити про це. Письменники багато боролися за це, діставали нагірку, вступали у конфлікти, їх тавровано було. Це я говорю не тільки про 70-ті роки, а навіть і про останні роки. Сьогоднішня ситуація, коли ми вже більш-менш вільно говоримо про свої болі, національні, культурні, мовні проблеми, називаємо цифри, докази наводимо, змальовуємо конкретну ситуацію, пропонуємо якісь заходи, оця ситуація — вона з трудом виборювалася, поступово. І Спілка письменників відіграла велику роль в цьому, і далі відіграє, хоч сьогодні, як я вже говорив, цей рух вийшов далеко за межі літературної громадськості та культурно-мистецької, взагалі, він охоплює різні сфери — і значну частину науково-технічної інтелігенції, частину студентської молоді, частину робітництва —

це досить широкий рух.

Але спілка і далі відіграє велику роль у цьому. Зокрема спілка була одним із ініціаторів створення Товариства української мови імені Шевченка, і програма товариства, великою мірою, вироблялася за участю також українських письменників. І зараз, коли виробляється закон про державність української мови, група письменників входить у склад робочої групи по підготовці цього закону. Справи йдуть так, що, очевидно, буде ухвалений закон, можливо в травні, власне кажучи, планується так що на травень буде підготовлений проект закону. Потім цей проект буде опублікований, буде обговорення його, а вже пізніше Верховна Рада буде ухвалювати рішення, чи ухвалювати його, чи ні. Мені здається, настрої такий, що закон цей буде ухвалений, хоч певна боротьба іде коло різних нюансів формулювань. Є сили, які хочуть цю формулу про державність української мови обставити такими застереженнями і обмеженнями, які можуть, по суті, звести нанівець це формулювання. Але я думаю, що так не буде, що буде чітко і ясно сказано про державність української мови, про її права, про її пріоритет.

Чи Ви розглядаєте СПУ як угруповання, яке домагається змін у рамках теперішньої системи, чи як можливий зародок опозиційного руху, який міг би стати альтернативою до КПУ та уряду?

Я б сказав так: у принципі, Спілка письменників не розглядає себе як якусь альтернативну силу, і взагалі, не тільки Спілка письменників, а переважна більшість тих сил, які беруть участь у боротьбі за національне відродження нинішнє, уявляють собі ці процеси в межах оновлення існуючої системи, існуючої держави, оновлення, повернення до лєнінських принципів, утвердження справжніх соціалістичних ідеалів. Тобто, це — національне відродження — водночас мислиться як і відродження соціалізму, так, як ми його уявляємо.

Є окремі люди, мені важко про їхню чисельність судити, але, мені здається, їх мало, які хотіли б створити альтернативні якісь сили, які заходять так далеко, що можуть і виступати взагалі проти існуючого ладу. По-перше, ці сили дуже незначні, на мій погляд, більшість не підтримує таких крайніх орієнтацій, і навпаки, вбачає велику небезпеку в них, тому, що це може призвести тільки до ексцесів, а якісь позитивні наслідки навряд чи дасть. Може тільки скомпрометувати весь рух, дати тільки підставу для якихось

агресивних заходів щодо нього. Тому, мені здається, що такі сили великої підтримки не дістануть. Але це не означає, що те, що я сказав, що спілка, і що інші сили, які беруть участь в національному відродженні, не розглядають себе як альтернативних партій, це не означає, що вони механічно так утотожують себе з партією і механічно підтримують всі рішення керівних органів. Тут можуть бути якісь дискусії, взагалі, ми так уявляємо, що партія, звичайно, залишається керівною силою в суспільстві, і всі ті зміни, які відбуваються, започатковані партією, але коли в цей рух включається широка громадськість, то вона вносить в це свою енергію, свої думки, різноманіття своїх інтересів. Усе це, звичайно, є певною корекцією до політики партії. Моя особиста думка така: якась опозиція і можлива в нашому суспільстві, і навіть може бути корисною, за умови, що буде не конфронтаційною, а конструктивною. Тобто, вона буде спрямована не на підрив і повалення існуючого ладу, а на використання його можливостей, поліпшення, на оновлення, на розвиток у бік справедливості, гуманності, в бік кращих умов життя для народу, для кожної людини, для кожного народу.

У Польщі й Угорщині зараз говорять про визнання некомуністичних опозиційних партій. Чи подібна реформа, на вашу думку, потрібна в Україні?

Ми знаємо, що в Польщі, особливо в Угорщині стоїть питання про це. В Угорщині, власне, воно вирішене, вже партія сама погодилася з тим, що мусить бути багатопартійна система. Ми це знаємо, але у нас, мені здається, для цього ще умов немає. Почнемо з того, що у нас партія ще не готова на це, і досить гостро реагує на такі ідеї і заклики. Підтримки широкої і визнання вони не дістають. Мені здається, що, мабуть, і немає рації покищо наполягати на такій постановці питання, тому, що в нас далеко ще не використані можливості в межах навіть лібералізації партії досягати якихось результатів. Мені здається, для нас, покищо, неактуальне те, що, скажімо, в Угорщині і в Польщі. І традиції інші, і стан суспільної думки інакший. Хоч, я кажу, лунають ці голоси, і досить, часом, наполегливо лунають. Покищо, мені здається, наполягання, наголошування цього моменту тільки зайві ускладнення вноситиме в ті процеси конструктивні, які можуть відбуватися. Але це не значить, що це питання, можливо через п'ять, чи десять, чи менше, чи більше років якось по-іншому постане.

Недавно створено Товариство рідної мови ім. Т. Г. Шевченка. Як відноситься громадський загал до Товариства?

Товариство дістало широку підтримку серед тієї частини населення, яка уболіває за українську мову, горнеться до неї. Ця частина населення великі надії покладає на товариство, з ентузіазмом великим зустріла його створення. Маса листів ішла. Власне, створене товариство було завдяки масовій підтримці в усіх районах України. Але я не хочу ідеалізувати ситуацію, тому що є інші групи населення, які байдужі до цього. Я не скажу, що товариство зустрічає зараз якийсь великий опір, мабуть ні, таких активних ворогів уже мало, тільки хіба з боку запеклих шовіністів. Але людей байдужих є чимало. Є люди, які не вірять в те, що можна чогось цією роботою досягти. Водночас значна частина населення тягнеться до української мови, відроджується, і ці люди підтримують його.

Як відноситься до нього Комуністична партія України на найвищих щаблях?

Певний час було насторожене ставлення, вичікування, але зараз воно змінилося, і товариство дістало підтримку з боку Центрального комітету. Це було офіційно визнано в привітанні Центрального комітету установчому з'їзду товариства, у виступі секретаря Центрального комітету Єльченка, у виступі заступника голови Ради міністрів Орлика. Так що товариство дістало підтримку, це дуже добре, це полегшить йому можливості розширення діяльності.

На обласних і районних щаблях?

Категорично узагальнювати важко, бо певні відмінності були, навіть індивідуального порядку, залежало просто від рівня культурності тих чи інших діячів. В деяких місцевостях найшла підтримку ініціатива людей, але здебільша ставлення було теж насторожене. Навіть до самого з'їзду товариства, в деяких регіонах діставали такі сигнали, що противилися створенню місцевих відділень товариства, або намагалися створювати такі свої, декретовані, в протигагу тим, які вже виникли з ініціативи самих людей. Але, в мене таке враження, що проведення установчої конференції докорінно змінило ситуацію, і тепер уже скрізь і на всіх рівнях такі товариства діставатимуть підтримку.

Чи Ви могли б сказати щось про представників національних меншостей у товаристві? Як відносяться до товариства і до його програми національні меншості в Україні?

Дуже добре, що ви поставили це питання, було б прикро, якби ми цей аспект справи оминули.

Дуже радісно, що цей процес у нас пов'язаний з відродженням культури і мов інших національностей. В ході проведення установчої конференції Товариства рідної мови це особливо яскраво виявилось. В ній брали участь представники багатьох національних меншостей, виступали з великою симпатією про українську мову, про український рух, і говорили також про свої потреби, а українці в свою чергу говорили про їхні потреби, і висловлювали готовність їм допомагати. І взагалі, я виступав на цій конференції, і своє власне слово почав з того, що найбільш радісне враження — це враження від тієї атмосфери єдності і взаємозацікавлення, доброзичливості й готовності допомагати один одному представників різних національностей, яка панувала на цьому з'їзді. Зокрема виступали представники єврейського культурного товариства в Києві, представники молдаван, греків, корейка виступала з півдня України, українською мовою, страшенно зворушливий був виступ. Представник Львівського товариства друзів української мови і культури, російськомовного, Сокуров, це теж важливий рух, започаткований у Львові, поширюється і на інші міста. В ньому об'єднуються росіяни, які підтримують українську мову і культуру. Ми надаємо цьому великого значення.

Мушу сказати, що ще раніше, деś це було чи в грудні чи в січні, у нас в Києві відбувалося засідання творчого об'єднання критиків київської міської організації Спілки письменників присвячене мовам і літературам національних меншостей на Україні. Воно викликало величезний інтерес, багато народу прийшло, і виступало багато представників різних національних меншостей, таких, про які ми самі не знали, що вони сьогодні ще солідарно так існують і заявляють про себе. Навіть циганський один поет виступив, представник гагаузів, представники багатьох найменших таких національних груп виступали. Це теж була така велика і радісна подія. Я ще хочу сказати, що це, звичайно, не випадкове явище. У цьому є велика закономірність, тому що завжди в періоди, коли пригнічувався український народ у своїх національних інтересах, то пригнічувалися і інші національні меншості. І навпаки, коли

проводилася політика підтримки українського національного життя, піднімалися і інші національності на Україні. Ми знаємо, що в двадцяті роки, в період українізації, велика увага приділялася становищу мов і культур інших малих народів на Україні, існували національні сільради, різні німецькі, болгарські, сербські, грецькі, існували школи багатьма десятками мов. Навіть такими рідкісними зовсім сьогодні, як, скажімо, асирійська. Теж були асирійські школи на Україні. І багато інших. Потім, коли почалася політика нищення української культури, то так само нищилися і культури інших народів. Сьогодні, коли відроджується наша культура, відроджується і культура цих народів, і внас є розуміння спільності наших інтересів, є бажання допомагати один одному. Мені здається, цей процес триватиме, ми, так би мовити, черпатимемо сили у взаємній підтримці. Так само є взаєморозуміння і взаємопідтримка між представниками національної інтелігенції і національно-культурних рухів у практично всіх народів Радянського Союзу.

Яке ставлення до національного питання серед російської інтелігенції?

Тут картина дуже неоднозначна, дуже строката. Краща частина російської інтелігенції розуміє і підтримує нас, але важко сказати, яка її, кількісно, пропорція серед загальної маси росіян. Власне, не тільки інтелігенція. Є, скажімо, робітники російські, службовці, які теж розуміють і підтримують. Я знаю це добре з тих відгуків, які приходили на мої статті у "Вечірньому Києві." Відгуків дуже багато було, і чимало відгуків від росіян, які з симпатією говорять про українську мову. Говорять про бажання вивчати її. Таких людей чимало. Але, статистично важко якось визначити, оскільки цього питання не досліджувалося. А водночас є і протилежні настрої. Не часто, не дуже, але зрідка є дуже агресивні шовіністичні виступи. Я теж, до речі, у своїх статтях у "Вечірньому Києві" писав, цитував листи, деякі наводив приклади. Переважно це люди старшого віку, пенсіонери. В мене таке враження, що це люди, пов'язані з терористичним апаратом сталінських і брежнєвських часів, які відповідно і мислять. Про деяких авторів таких листів і виступів напевно можна сказати, що вони саме такі. От я маю один такий лист, який так і починається словами: "Я лично в 37 году разоблачил большое количество врагов народа. Я вот считаю..." що й зараз вони є, і так далі, в такому дусі. Такі є люди.

Загалом, я б сказав, що сили перебудівні, які за перебудову, в основному вони і підтримують наші культурні і мовні інтереси. А

сили антиперебудівні активно настроєні проти. Основний вододіл іде так, це не тільки серед росіян, а серед самих українців. Прихильники перебудови — прихильники оновлення, вони включають в це поняття поняття оновлення і демократизації і поняття про піднесення української мови й української культури, українського національного життя. А вороги цього оновлення, перебудови, як правило, і проти української мови, культури, національного руху, і так далі. Це основний вододіл, хоч не виключені якісь винятки, і якісь складніші комбінації поглядів. Є, зрештою, люди, які мало обізнані, малокультурні, а є, з другого боку, люди високої культури, які досі не подолали стереотипу про те, що українська культура — це щось нижче, і через своє незнання і ігнорування вони не знають справжніх цінностей української культури, і ставляться до неї зверхньо. Але, от, бар'єри ці ламаються, і дедалі більше людей можуть побачити, якою є реально українська культура в минулому, сьогодні, і повертатися до неї обличчям.

Взагалі на цю тему можна було б багато говорити. Я б хотів тільки відзначити, що часом у цьому наверненні симпатій до українства шкодять самі деякі українці. Тому, що серед нас є люди малокультурні, войовничі, які замінюють войовничістю своєю і надмірною національністю глибину розуміння, такт, і такі люди компрометують справу. Дехто, на жаль, з росіян, чи представників інших націй, судять про українство не по його справжніх представниках, а по отаких найбільш крикливих, галасливих і примітивних людях, і звідси виробляють антипатію. Підстав тут об'єктивних немає, а тільки на отаких суб'єктивних випадкових враженнях.

Це таке на Україні, а щодо Москви і поза межами, наставлення росіян до України, треба сказати, вони традиційно більш толерантні. В мене таке враження. Зараз серед самих росіян досить складна ситуація. Значна частина російської інтелігенції в Москві з прихильністю ставиться до національних відроджень, особливо до того, що діється в республіках Прибалтики. На мій погляд, це найбільш культурна, найбільш передова частина російської інтелігенції. І до нашого відродження вони також з прихильністю ставляться, з інтересом, часом знаходимо там досить конкретну підтримку, в тому, що вони, скажімо, друкують такі речі, які ми не можемо в себе надрукувати. Скажімо, Винниченко і Хвильовий спершу були опубліковані в московських журналах, у "Дружбе народів", а потім вже у нас. Так що там є сили, які з симпатією ставляться до нас і підтримують. А водночас є і люди, сили, які,

знов же ж, необізнані, дуже примітивне уявлення мають, або зверхньо ставляться. А є і такі, що вороже ставляться. От нас дуже тривожить активізація націоналістичного руху, шовіністичного, скажемо, тому що у вас ці терміни по-різному розуміються... У вас, на Заході, націоналізм — це боротьба за національне визволення, а в нас націоналізмом називають негативні явища — національну ворожнечу, прояви нетерпимості до інших народів. Тому ми уникаємо слова націоналізм, і нам не дуже подобається, коли тих, хто обстоює українську культуру чи мову, інколи на Заході називають націоналістами, вкладаючи в це позитивний зміст.

Але це просто до слова, до розрізнення тих термінів. Так от, я кажу, що в Росії останніми роками дуже поширюється шовіністичний рух, який групується, в основному, навколо товариства "Пам'ять", але не обмежується цим. Ми розуміємо тривоги і російської інтелігенції, частини російських письменників, тому що російська мова і культура зазнала тяж значних втрат, та й не тільки мова і культура, російське село в дуже страшному, тяжкому становищі. І культурні втрати у них є свої, є свої болі культурні й екологічні, і мова російська нівелюється внаслідок напливу інонаціональних елементів. Але є серед російської інтелігенції люди, які схильні вбачати в цьому провину іногородців, а не свою власну. Власне кажучи, те, що відбувається, це розплата за ті процеси русифікації, які були. Коли якась нація в ненормальному становищі до інших націй, які в спільній державі живуть, то їй так чи інакше потім доводиться за це розплачуватись і своїми власними втратами. Дехто там розуміє це, а дехто перекладає вину на іногородців. Нас це тривожить, антисемітизм там досить зараз поширюється навколо "Пам'яті". В нас, що приємно, "Пам'ять" не дістає ніякої підтримки. Антисемітські, і антиросійські, і всякі інші отакі настрої, недоброзичливі по відношенні до інших народів, абсолютно не характерні зараз для тих, хто активно включився в відродження української культури. Якщо десь і є такі настрої, то це серед найвідсталіших, найтемніших елементів, але не серед інтелігенції, не серед активних діячів, які обстоюють українську мову і культуру. А щодо Росії, то теж мені думається, що серед російської інтелігенції є таке здорове, доброзичливе інтернаціоналістське начало. Воно, все ж таки, переважає і переможе ті крайнощі шовіністичні, які сьогодні спостерігаються. Вони великої підтримки не знайдуть і поступово себе виживуть.

Якої Ви думки про Українську гелісінську спілку та її "Декларацію принципів"?

Я, по-перше, одверто кажучи, не аж так добре обізнаний з діяльністю Української гельсінської спілки, тому що у нас матеріали її не публікуються. Почасти дещо випадково доходить, і взагалі, тут на заході більше знають про неї, ніж у нас. Тому з якоюсь великою категоричністю і певністю я не можу говорити, хочу тільки сказати, що знаючи декого із цих діячів, я шаную їхню діяльність, їхню громадянську мужність, але далеко не завжди погоджуюся з усіма їхніми поглядами і з їхніми конкретними виступами. Зокрема в мене створюється таке враження, може воно й неправильне, бо я далеко не з усім обізнаний, що вони, все ж таки, підкреслюють момент конфронтації, і нібито якась є зловтіха, коли от щось погане робить радянська влада, щось не вдається. Вони дуже це вип'ячують, і немовби радіють, що, ось, можна допекти, і цим показати, яка погана влада, яка погана система. Мені здається, що так однобічно підходити не можна. Треба якось об'єктивніше і конструктивну якусь позицію шукати. Треба розуміти, що і та ж влада, вона в досить складному становищі, і що вона по-своєму намагається зрозуміти, і якісь потреби навіть задовольнити. Одне слово, мені здається, що треба говорити не з позиції конфронтації, а з позиції взаєморозуміння. Таке моє загальне враження, хоч розумію, що вся інформативна діяльність Гельсінської групи має велике значення, так би мовити, компенсує неповноту нашої гласності. Тому що в нас проводиться політика демократизації і гласності, але ми ще тільки на цій дорозі, до повної гласності ми ще не дійшли.

Як сьогодні виглядає екологічне питання в Україні?

Екологічні проблеми в нас стоять дуже гостро. Антропогенне навантаження на Україні багато вище, ніж у середньому по всьому Союзу. Насамперед, унаслідок нераціональної структури індустрії нашої, переважання видобувних галузей, машинобудівних галузей, внаслідок гальмування розвитку точного машинобудування та екологічно чистих галузей промисловості. В різних регіонах становище різне, але в переважній більшості промислових міст викиди в атмосферу промислових підприємств набагато, інколи в десятки разів перевищують норму. Особливо тяжке становище в таких містах, як Маріупіль, Донецьк, Макіївка, Дніпропетровськ, Дніпродзержинськ, в Одесі досить тяжке екологічне становище, як і в Харкові. Це, мабуть, найважчі в екологічному відношенні регіони. Важке екологічне становище також у Львові, та і в Києві. І в менших

містах досить складне екологічне становище. Зараз велика небезпека і для великих міст, і, часом, для сіл, тому що там побудовано багато дрібних підприємств, екологічно дуже небезпечних, побудованих без відповідних очисних споруд. Оці маленькі, примітивні підприємства районного масштабу інколи навіть небезпечніші, ніж великі підприємства. Бо на великих, все ж таки, хоч якісь спроби захисту й очищення є, а на цих малих часом взагалі ні про що таке не дбають. Тому є багато скарг, тривожних скарг, з боку жителів районних центрів, невеличких містечок. Крім того, велику небезпеку являє хімізація сільського господарства. Тим більше, зараз це питання дуже тривожить населення, зокрема тому, що досі немає ніякого реального контролю. Молодий режисер Вітер зняв документальний фільм по Херсонщині про жахливі випадки отруєння і каліцтва дітей, які вживали неперевірені продукти. Це питання зараз дуже непокоїть нашу громадськість, і є вимоги, щоб поставити під контроль продукцію сільськогосподарську, щоб споживачі самі мали можливість її контролювати.

І ще хочу сказати до цього, що не менш небезпечним джерелом отруєння повітря, ніж промислові підприємства, є у нас автомобільний транспорт. У деяких містах він дає половину і більше викидів в атмосферу. Це тому, що, очевидно, недосконалі конструкції, немає очисних пристроїв у машинах. Хоч був, до речі, прийнятий кілька років тому закон про охорону повітря, він залишився на папері, практично ніхто не застосовує ніяких санкцій до його порушників. Тому ця ситуація екологічна викликає великі тривоги на Україні сьогодні.

Чи робляться заходи проти новобудов атомних електростанцій?

Так, громадськість наша дуже активно протестує проти будівництва нових електростанцій, бо Україна і так ними уже насичена до краю. Покищо вдалося добитися обіцянки, що припиняється будівництво Чигиринської АЕС, яка особливо непокоїла нас, оскільки розташована в центрі України, в історичних місцях, на березі Дніпра, який і так уже до краю сплюндрований. І переглядається питання про будівництво Кримської АЕС, але рішення ще ніякого немає. І наша громадськість, особливо мешканці Києва, добиваються припинення експлуатації Чорнобильської АЕС. Однак, важко сказати, чи вдасться цього добитися, тому що вона продовжує функціонувати.

Вам доводилося бути активістом в українському русі за національно-культурне відродження у 1960-ті роки, а також у 1980-ті. Які, на Вашу думку, різниці між національним рухом в Україні сьогодні і в 1960-их роках, і яке становище цього руху тепер у порівнянні з 60-ми роками?

Взагалі є відмінність велика, і деякі моменти промовляють на користь 60-тих років, а деякі на користь 80-их. Що було краще тоді: було більше віри, може, наївного ентузіазму. Тоді здавалося, що все це можна легко вирішити. І справді, якби тоді протривав цей процес, то багато які питання можна було легше вирішити, тому що не так далеко зайшов розклад, не стільки ще було втрат, і те покоління молоді з великою енергією йшло до оновлення. Але, з другого боку, той процес був настільки швидко придушений, що важко сказати про те, якого розмаху він міг набрати, які потенціальні сили в собі містив.

Сьогодні ситуація інакша. Сьогодні розгойдати, підняти людей важче, тому що більше нагромадилось зневіри, розчарування, апатії. За ці 25 років виросли цілі покоління людей аполітичних, байдужих, часом — егоїстичних, людей, які замикалися в колі своїх особистих інтересів. Їх у цьому звинувачувати важко. Це був природний процес, коли не було ніякого громадянського життя, коли людина не могла в сфері якоїсь суспільної діяльності чесно про себе заявити, коли тільки шляхом фальшу можна було йти. Ясно, що люди від цього відгороджувались, особливо молодь, яка не могла фальшувати, чесна молодь, вона замикалася в собі й жила у вузькому світі особистих інтимних інтересів, втрачала інтерес до всякої громадянської проблематики. І оцю інерцію індивідуалістичну, її важко подолати. Тому зараз менше віри, може більше скепсису, але це тільки на перших порах. По мірі розширення цього руху втягуються все нові й нові кола, хоч на перших порах головною силою були ті ж самі люди, які діяли в 60-их роках, і які зберегли свої ідеали, свої цілі, свої уявлення.

А зараз до них прилучається уже і молодше покоління, і оскільки сьогоднішній рух набагато ширший, порівняно з 60-ми роками, ширші суспільні верстви захоплює в себе, різноманітніші групи населення, і оскільки ширші можливості для публічного висловлення своїх поглядів — велике значення має робота преси, засобів масової інформації — то загалом, мені здається, сили і перспективи сьогоднішнього руху більші, ніж тоді. І мені здається, що коли навіть тоді, за кілька років змогли пробудитися значні

сили, то тепер, коли цей процес більше триває, і ширше йде, загальна його потенція буде набагато більша.

Спостерігаючи процес реабілітації репресованих письменників, бачимо, що більше уваги звертається на письменників 1920-их і 30-их років, а чомусь дуже повільно беруться за письменників і інших людей, репресованих у 1970-их і 80-их роках. Чим це пояснити, і чи є перспективи на те, що ці останні також знайдуть своїх захисників?

Пояснюється це просто, що ті часи дуже близькі до нас. Живі і при більшій чи меншій владі ті люди, які безпосередньо здійснювали репресії тих років. Вони, звичайно, всіляко противляться перегляду цих справ. Це перша і головна причина. Друга причина — це те, що деякі з тих, які були засуджені, репресовані, діють і сьогодні, і часом їхня діяльність, знову ж таки, не подобається, і тому складно представникам влади висловити своє ставлення до них. Якщо виправдати їх у минулому, то доведеться якось виправдувати і сьогоднішню діяльність. Словом, це певні труднощі становить для тих, хто вирішує ці питання. Але я повинен сказати, що сьогодні лунають досить сильно голоси, всюди, про те, що треба переглянути і ці справи, зокрема Спілка письменників неодноразово порушувала ці питання, і в програмі Народного руху України говориться прямо про необхідність переглянути всі ці справи, і покарати тих, хто інспірував і проводив незаконні переслідування. Так що це питання стоїть. Але розв'язувати його, безумовно, важко.

Наприклад, Спілка письменників добивається видання творів Василя Стуса. Цілий ряд письменників за це виступає, і власне вся спілка активно виступає за це. Покищо немає, начебто, принцип-ових заперечень, а, все таки, справа ще не доведена до кінця. Ми сподіваємося, що твори Василя Стуса будуть опубліковані, будуть про нього публікації, але покищо це гальмується. Спілка письменників України, зокрема правління київської організації, на чолі з Іваном Драчем, порушує питання про прийняття до Спілки Івана Світличного, Євгена Сверстюка і ряду інших літераторів, які вийшли на арену в 1960-ті роки. Покищо теж це питання не вирішене остаточно, але є надія, що буде позитивно вирішене. Так що якісь зрушення тут поволі відбуваються, і, мабуть, триватимуть.

Що, на Вашу думку, повинна робити діаспора, щоб сприяти відродженню української мови і культури?

Це широке питання. Тут, мабуть, багато про що подумати і поговорити. Я мабуть всього зразу не скажу, але [наголошу] деякі моменти.

По-перше, мабуть, треба нам безпосередніше контактуватися в популяризації української культури, досягнень української культури і тут на Заході, і в нас на Україні. Треба якось спільно працювати на піднесення престижу української культури і мови, щоб і західна громадськість більше про це знала. Потім, мабуть, треба все ж таки подолати ту певну ізоляцію діаспори, яка сьогодні є, і яка почасти не з її вини утримується. Зараз у нас на Україні змінюється ставлення до діаспори, і треба, щоб ці сприятливі можливості, які внаслідок цього утворюються, були використані, тобто, щоб люди теж доброзичливо ставилися до того, що в нас відбувається, підтримували, були поінформовані, щоб їздили, щоб обмінювалися досвідом. Ми, зі свого боку, мусимо більше розповідати про те, що робиться за межами України українцями у сфері культури, наукових досягнень, може навіть і в сфері економіки. Одне слово, ми повинні подбати про те, щоб показати велику творчу діяльність українців у всьому світі, у всіх сферах життя, від економіки до культури, особливо в сфері культури і мистецтва. Це буде великою підтримкою для українців, тому що збагачуватиме їхнє уявлення про свою культуру, свій народ, свою націю, зміцнюватиме почуття національної гордості, розвиватиме національне самоусвідомлення.

Часом навіть такі елементарні наукові і культурні обміни справляють велике враження на Україні, бо дають можливості українцям бачити, які інтелектуальні сили українські на Заході. Велике б значення мала популяризація мистецьких і наукових досягнень українців з-поза України на території України. Певні можливості відкриваються внаслідок розширення державних зв'язків. Мисподіваємося, що Україна зміцнюватиме, активізуватиме своє представництво і свою діяльність в міжнародних органах, що Україна виходитиме на прямі зв'язки з іншими державами, в тому числі і з державами, де живуть і активно діють українці — по лінії дипломатичній, економічній, культурних зв'язків.

Крім того, певні можливості відкриваються у зв'язку з діяльністю наших громадських організацій, формальних об'єднань, і таке інше. Зокрема, Товариство української мови ім. Шевченка у своєму статуті передбачає зв'язок з українцями закордоном, і мабуть такий зв'язок буде налагоджений. Українці й українські організації закордоном зможуть стати членами товариства. Очевидно, їх будуть запрошувати на різні заходи, які буде влаштовувати

товариство. Товариство має намір організувати свою видавничу діяльність, і пресу, можливо, свою матиме. Не виключене, що тут можлива буде якась фінансова підтримка з боку наукових і громадських організацій українців закордоном. Так само і Народний рух України в захист перебудови, якщо він остаточно оформиться, у своєму проєкті програми велику увагу віддає цьому питанню, налагодженню зв'язків. Можливі спільні видання літературні, художні, видання спільних наукових конференцій, інших таких заходів, які об'єднуюватимуть наші сили.

Очевидно, українці в діаспорі повинні й далі привертати увагу світової громадськості до України, до її проблематики, популяризувати нашу культуру, досягнення. Ми спільно повинні й таке питання порушувати — чомусь досі у нас у Радянському Союзі держава дбає тільки про поширення російської мови закордоном. Цьому питанню приділяється багато уваги, про це преса пише багато, підтримуються закордонні осередки, які ставлять своєю метою вивчення російської мови — але так само, мабуть, держава наша повинна дбати і про вивчення мов інших народів Союзу, це в інтересах престижу нашої держави. Так що ми з свого боку будемо порушувати питання, і діаспора теж, мабуть, підтримуватиме нас у цьому, і теж порушуватиме ці питання.

Оскільки ми слабо поінформовані про Ваше життя після 1973 року, чи могли б Ви розказати на якому становищі Ви перебували, коли Вас знову почали друкувати, і на якому Ви зараз становищі?

Гаразд. На початку 1974 року я працював на Київському авіазаводі, в багатотриражній газеті цього заводу. Я працював там, здається, вісім років, це досить тяжка і виснажлива робота була, яка мало часу залишала для літературної праці. Але я не скажу, що ці роки для мене були пропаші. Я перші роки працював з задоволенням, тому що ця робота давала мені можливість пізнати нові сторони життя, життя робітництва, життя великого промислового підприємства. Там з багатьма дуже цікавими людьми зустрівся я, дуже шкодував, що я не белетрист, а літературний критик. Отой великий життєвий матеріал, який там бачив, він для белетриста був би просто знахідкою. Цікаві люди, характери, долі. До речі, я там переконався, що наше робітництво не таке денаціоналізоване, як звично уявляється. Десь на 80% українці, причому здебільшого українці, які в побуті вживають українську мову. Це дуже цікаве соціальне середовище, і я з одного боку жалкую, що так багато часу для активної літературної роботи було втрачено, але з другого

боку і не дуже жалкую, бо в такому плані життєвих вражень я багато що там дістав.

А потім я залишив роботу на авіазаводі, на цей час мені вже стало легше друкуватися. В перші роки після 1973-74 року мені друкуватися було досить складно, мене бойкотували й ігнорували в органах преси. Кожна моя публікація проходила з великим трудом, і з високої санкції, так би мовити, і десь лише наприкінці 70-их років ситуація уже нормалізувалася.

Коли вас знову прийнято у члени спілки?

В 1980 році. Спершу це було як нове прийняття, нібито. А зараз зазначають, що я член спілки з 59 року, і стараються не згадувати про перерву. Десь з початком 80-их років я більш-менш нормально уже міг публікуватись, а останні роки, можна сказати, абсолютно нормалізувалася ситуація. От я не тільки багато пишу і друкую, але невстигаю виконати всі ті замовлення, з якими до мене звертаються, і українська преса, і російська, московська. Я буквально не встигаю всього зробити, що хочу, і про що мене просять. Цей брак часу для мене зараз основна проблема, і я з великою прикрістю просто згадую, як багато часу в мене втрачено в минулому, тому що, по суті починаючи з 65-го року майже 20 років не було нормального життя. Та й до 65-го року було багато ускладнень, так що втрачено і часу, і можливостей творчих багато, і зараз я прагну працювати якомога інтенсивніше, з величезним навантаженням, не знаючи ні вихідних, ні відпустки, ні дня, ні ночі. Часом це до перевтоми призводить, але треба робити, треба працювати, треба надолужувати втрачене. Я зараз ніде не перебуваю на офіційній службі, а на так званій творчій роботі. Як член Спілки письменників я маю юридичне право бути на творчій роботі, ніде не працювати офіційно. Тобто я пишу, друкуюсь і живу на гонорари. Це має і свої мінуси і свої плюси, трошки фінансове становище часом ускладнює, від заробітків цих залежиш, але зате це дає виграш у часі, якого мені так бракує.

Дякуємо за розмову.

ON THE TRADITION OF CYRIL AND METHODIUS IN UKRAINE

In taking up the question of the tradition of Cyril and Methodius, one must first refer to its distant beginnings, which are both source and unceasing impulse in the development of the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition in general and in Ukraine in particular.

In 860, Constantine (who later took the name Cyril) was commissioned by the Byzantine Emperor Michael to undertake a special mission to the Khazars on the shores of the Black Sea. The imperial emissary took his younger brother, Methodius, along on the journey. After completing the first stage of their trip, the two brothers stopped over in Chersonesus in southern Rus', where amidst the Greek colonists who had been settled there for centuries Christianity had gained its first foothold on Rus' territory.¹ Here also they learned about the customs and beliefs of the tribes living on the banks of the Dnieper, and of St. Clement's death as a martyr. By his skill and discretion Constantine was able to obtain the latter's remains and have them turned over to Pope Hadrian II in Rome.

These facts, especially the delivery of the relics of the Pope and martyr St. Clement, played an exceptionally important role in the subsequent life and activities of the brothers from Thessalonika, particularly in their great missionary undertaking among the Slavs. The political situation in Europe at the time and—a fact not to be underestimated—the desire and readiness of the Slavs to become part of the higher civilization of the Christian world² made the moment a favourable one.

In this context it is easier to understand the full support that the brothers received for their mission, especially the acceptance and authorization of the Slavic language which they developed for the liturgy and permission for the ordination of their disciples as priests. This point is particularly important, for up to this time it had been permissible to say Mass only in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. It was in these three languages that Pontius Pilate had ordered the inscription to be written which was then hung on Christ's cross: Jesus the Nazarene, King of the Jews.

It would be difficult to overemphasize the significance of this development, considering that already in the oldest extant manuscript in the language of Rus', the famous *Tale of Bygone Years*, which was a fruit of the work of Cyril and Methodius, we read:

The Emperor prevailed upon them to undertake the mission, and sent them into the Slavic country to Rostyslav, Sviatopolk, and Kotsel. When they arrived, they undertook to compose a Slavic alphabet, and translated the *Acts* and the Gospel. The Slavs rejoiced to hear the greatness of God extolled in their native tongue. The apostle afterward translated the Psalter, the *Oktoechos*, and other books.

Now some zealots began to condemn the Slavic books, contending that it was not right for any other nation to have its own alphabet apart from the Hebrews, Greeks and the Latins, according to Pilate's superscription, which he had composed for the Lord's Cross. When the Pope at Rome heard of this situation, he rebuked those who murmured against the Slavic books, saying, "Let the word of the Scripture be fulfilled that 'all nations shall praise God'" (*Ps.* lxxi, 17), and likewise that 'all nations shall declare the majesty of God according as the Holy Spirit shall grant them to speak' (cf. *Acts*, ii, 4). Whosoever condemns the Slavic writing shall be excluded from the Church until he mend his ways. For such men are not sheep but wolves; by their fruit ye shall know them and guard against them. Children of God, hearken unto his teachings, and depart not from the ecclesiastical rule which Methodius your teacher has appointed unto you."³

This description by the Rus' chronicler of the beginnings of the "Word of God" in the Slavic language is very interesting source material for the researcher of the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition. By taking into account the description in the excerpt quoted above of the strong opposition to the missionary brothers after their arrival in Moravia both on the part of the Frankish clergy and of the Germanic authorities and priests, we can understand the enormous significance of the achievements of Cyril and Methodius. As a result of these achievements, a cult of both brothers sprang up simultaneously and reached its culmination in the nineteenth century. Official recognition of their services, however, was manifested after the death of Cyril, when the Pope appointed Methodius Archbishop of Pannonia and Papal Legate to the Slavic peoples.

Such, in the most general terms, was the entry of the Slavs into the sphere of Christian culture and tradition. Although we are well aware of the consequences of this event, it is worth recalling that the impulses emanating from this source of culture already had a wider and deeper scope at that time.⁴ This is stressed in the extensive literature on the subject, both new and old, from Lavrov, Ohienko and Lehr-Spławiński to M. Tolstoi, Tsybulka, Łowmiański, and Dinekov. Recently, Aleksandr Naumov referred to it in the introduction to his book, *Pasterze wiernych Słowian* (Shepherds of the Faithful Slavs) (Cracow, 1985), noting the brothers' invention of the

Slavic script, their formulation of linguistic norms for it, and the fact that they gave it the dignity of a literary and liturgical language, initiating numerous translations which were carried out according to a Biblically based theory of sacred translation. Pointing out that by this means the missionary brothers transferred to Slavic literature the genre system of Byzantine literature, which built on the achievements of classical and early Christian poetics and rhetoric, Naumov states:

It was a miracle of the gift of the word—those who had been a non-people became spokesmen of the Good News in their own language. God had chosen the Slavic people, and the joy of having been chosen became the cornerstone of Slavic literature during its first decades, its neophyte period. It can be heard in works from the pens of Cyril and Methodius and of their most faithful disciples (St. Clement of Ochrid, St. Naum, and others), and we find it in the works of Bulgarian, Serbian and Rus' authors on the one hand, and Moravian, Pannonian (i.e., Slovak and Slovenian), Czech and Croatian authors on the other.

Thus the first Slavic literary school came to be, with its typical representative dedicated to the cause of Christianization, enlightenment and the struggle for the spiritual emancipation of the Slavs. He fulfilled the functions of author, preacher, estheticist, moralizer, hagiographer, polemicist, and so on. This body of Church-Slavic literature satisfied every religious, cultural, ideological and social need. The corpus of texts—virtually the whole Bible with a poetic introduction by Constantine, the Byzantine Liturgies and the Liturgy of St. Peter, liturgical poetry, homilies, translations from the patristic literature, hagiography, legal and juridical texts, the theory of the translation of sacred texts, grammatical, rhetorical and polemical treatises—is the achievement of scarcely 20 years.⁵

These considerations make it apparent that the more than one-thousand-year history of Slavic writing rests on a solid and lasting foundation. It was a point of constant reference and comparison; an object of pride and a vital source that reached its apogee during the period of Romanticism. Without it, the Romantic explosion of national and historical consciousness among the Slavs, which was the driving force behind their revival movements and struggles, would not have been possible. Despite varying historical fortunes, it was on this foundation that the Slavs erected their imposing culture, the first centre of which was the Moravian and Bulgarian state, then Kievan Rus', followed by the Balkan Slavs once again and then by Moscow, so that by the nineteenth century the cultural movement embraced all of Slavdom and became the source of the Slavic revival.

Thanks to the Romantic awakening both the Eastern and Western Slavs, Orthodox and Catholic, sensed their close ethnic, historical, cultural, and linguistic ties, a vivid example of which was the popular idea of Slavic unity. It aroused hope for the liberation of the Slavs from foreign captivity, proclaimed the need for the unification of all the Slavic peoples and, by the same token, restored the memory of the Apostles to the Slavs, Cyril and Methodius, who symbolized precisely this idea of unity and brotherhood, as well as the spiritual wealth of the “young nations.”⁶

It is thus no accident that in the nineteenth century there arose numerous brotherhoods based on the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition, among which pride of place should be attributed to the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Kiev, established in 1845–6. The Brotherhood merits this distinction both because of its interesting political, social, educational and religious program and because, in appealing to the achievements and activities of Cyril and Methodius described above, including their stay on the territory of southern Rus', the Kievan Brotherhood began its work in the best Cyrillo-Methodian tradition, broadly conceived.⁷

Its leading idea was Slavdom, research and study of this subject, the propagation of science and learning, and above all the spiritual and political unification of Slavs in a federation based on Christian and republican principles. Each people would maintain its ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious distinctiveness, while the highest authority in the entire federation would be an all-Slavic Parliament made up of representatives of all the Slavic peoples. These general concepts, drawn from the *Statutes, Proclamations and Major Principles of The Brotherhood*,⁸ which constitute the platform and theoretical principles of the Kievan Cyrillo-Methodians, indicate not only the principal goal and the means of its attainment, but also contemporary political and social conditions, as well as links with the thought and ideology of Romanticism (most clearly expressed in *Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu* [The Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People], the most important document of the Brotherhood).⁹

It was, after all, on the wave of Romanticism that the great European movement grew up and gained strength. Through Masonic lodges, numerous organizations and associations, mainly secret and of a political character, it drew into its embrace virtually all the countries of Europe, forming a significant driving force behind contemporary social movements and nation-building processes. The Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius was one such force, and even though it was in the nature of a separate branch of Mazzini's “Young Europe,” its genealogy leads back directly to the Kievan Society of United Slavs of the 1820s, the Decembrist societies, and Polish conspiratorial organizations, especially the Konarski conspiracy and émigré groups such as the Society of United Brethren, whose program, together

with Królikowski's publication *Polska Chrystusowa* (Christ in Poland), had a marked influence on the Kievan conspirators.¹⁰

It is worth emphasizing that Kiev as a major centre of conspiracy was favourable ground for that sort of activity. This refers mainly to the ever vital tradition of liberation movements and autonomist strivings among the Ukrainian people, whose influence on the historical and political imagination of the Romantics was exceptionally important. That atmosphere was intensified by the events surrounding the Konarski conspiracy, by the literary and intellectual movement stimulated by the university, and by the ethnic mix, since Poles, Russians, Jews and smaller numbers of Germans and Bulgarians lived side by side with the Ukrainians. It is not surprising, therefore, that in Kiev the paths of couriers and emissaries from Paris and Petersburg, Rome and Dorpat, Brussels and Odessa, Berlin, Vienna, Cracow and Lviv all crossed. Here, in the circles of the young intelligentsia, the Western revolutionary-democratic press, brochures and books circulated and intermingled quite naturally with the anti-tsarist underground (*zakhaliavna*) literature, which had an old and well-established tradition—primarily in handwritten copies—in Ukraine. Aside from the famous but anonymous *Istoriia Rusov* (History of the Rus' People), this literature consisted primarily of the works of Taras Shevchenko.¹¹

At that time the author of *Kobzar*, "The Dream," "The Caucasus," "The Heretic," and "To the Dead and the Living," which were the gospel of a whole generation, was the most outstanding figure within the group of "Kievan idealists." The latter flocked to Kiev in great numbers during the first half of the 1840s, turning it very quickly into an important centre of the Ukrainian intellectual and revolutionary-democratic movement. After Shevchenko, the most outstanding figures in this circle of young Romantics were the two writers, historians and Slavists Mykola Kostomarov and Panteleimon Kulish. Mykola Hulak, who received his philosophical education in Dorpat, where he also became acquainted with Polish émigré journalism and Konarskiites, and Vasyl Bilozersky possessed amazing energy, breadth of outlook, contacts and political maturity. Opanas Markovych and Dmytro Pylchikov attracted attention by their keen intellect and social commitment. The oldest of the group, Mykola Savych, aroused admiration and was a passionate enthusiast of "French communism," while among the group of students from the University of Kiev, Andruzky, Posiada, Navrotsky, Tulub and Chały stood out.¹²

This was the flower of the young Ukrainian intelligentsia, raised and formed during the great "fever of Romanticism." It is no surprise, therefore, that they were restless, bold, active, enamoured of freedom and justice, and entered easily into various secret connections and organizations. For in these

they felt confident and safe; they discussed vital matters of life, science, literature, philosophy, and especially of society and the situation of the people. Kostomarov recalled that the most frequent subject of their conversations was the “unfortunate fate of Ukraine” and of the Slavic nations in general, but the most exciting question was the “idea of Slavic reciprocity.”¹³

The Cyrillo-Methodian traditions, which occupied such a prominent place in the ideology of Romanticism, were conducive to this interest in and commitment to Slavic questions. These traditions were enlivened and deepened by the direct contacts of the Ukrainian Romantics with representatives of the Slavic movement established during journeys through Slavic lands, so popular at the time, undertaken in order to study the literatures and languages of their Slavic brethren. These contacts were subsequently maintained through correspondence. The current aspirations of the Slavs; their situation; ethnic, cultural, and linguistic interrelations; historical traditions; scientific and folkloric interests: these are the topics most often taken up in the letters of the Kievan “Slavists.” As members of a secret organization, they discerned their mission in the broad dissemination of these ideas throughout society. As teachers of the people, they repeatedly stressed that their symbols and models in this mission were Cyril and Methodius, “the first teachers of the Slavs.”¹⁴

In these letters there was no lack of references to the uniqueness of Slavic culture, especially that of their own people, its tragic history and current state of captivity. Understandably, the fate and future of the Ukrainian people were a subject of special interest and lively discussion among the Kievan Romantics. In his *Istorychne opovidannia* (Historical Tale), Kulish recalled that young people, with their longings and aspirations, were open to everything that was going on around them; they were sensitive to new intellectual currents, as well as to the slogans and trends of the epoch, but above all they were fascinated by the Slavic idea, historicism and folklore and the movement to the people:

Ukrainian songs and the oral tradition of the Ukrainian people inspired our young heads with a redeeming thought—the desire to raise our people out of the darkness that had not allowed its spiritual powers to rise from their fallen state, thereby annihilating that people’s very existence. Amidst this noble youth appeared Shevchenko, and, crying aloud, he sang before the unfortunates:

Світе тихий, краю милий;
Моя Україно!
За що тебе сплюндровано;
За що, мамо, гинеш?

In fact, that singing was the archangelic voice of resurrection. If it has ever been said that a heart was revived, that eyes lit up [...] it was then in Kiev [...] The brothers, joined together by the thread of friendship, regarded Shevchenko as a celestial fire, burning and glowing.¹⁵

The Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius was an expression of the aspirations of a young generation that regarded its activity as an exalted and responsible mission. The Brotherhood was founded on great moral strength, purity of spirit, Christian love, and a dream of the best social order possible, one that would eliminate exploitation, oppression and egoism, guarantee freedom, equality and justice and would be guided in everything by Christian principles.

Bearing these Romantic ideals in their hearts, the Kievan conspirators wished to proclaim them everywhere: among the townspeople and the landowners, so that they too would promote the idea of liberating the people from serfdom, but above all among the people themselves, who, enlightened by this teaching, would seek paths toward their own liberation. This derived from early Christian idealism and fervour, the models of which were the missionary brothers. It was also in keeping with the guiding principle of the Brotherhood: "Understand the truth, and it will make you free."¹⁶

How close to this messianic idea Cyril and Methodius seemed to be in the eyes of the Brothers, who had accordingly chosen them to be their spiritual patrons! Similarly, Cyril and Methodius personified their humanistic and Christian ideals. The same holds true for the above-mentioned idea of Slavic reciprocity that so absorbed the conspirators and whose original conception, along with reverberations of the discussions that preceded the final formulation of programmatic documents, we find in the writings of Kostomarov and Bilozersky in particular. These writings were confiscated by the tsarist gendarmes and commented on later in statements taken during the investigation, which are an interesting source for the study of the history, aims, ideology, and tasks of the Brotherhood.¹⁷

From this point of view, Vasyl Bilozersky's text merits special attention. It was the basis of discussions among the Cyrillo-Methodians leading to the formulation of the Brotherhood's program and plan of action. The point of departure for his reflections was an appeal to the teachings of Christ, for, according to Bilozersky, true Christianity resides primarily in the feelings, hopes and longings of the people, whose driving force is the love of God and, by the same token, love of their fellow man. This is expressed as brotherly love, which is the principal significance of the

revealed Word. But the author does not limit himself to the teachings of Christ, which were compatible with the ideology of Romanticism, nor to the utopian conceptions disseminated by Romantic philosophers, national bards and messianists, including those who professed socialist ideas.¹⁸ Bilozersky also reaches out to the key slogans and achievements of the French Revolution, to the animators of the "Slavic idea," especially Herder and, above all, to the religious mysticism characteristic of Eastern Christianity, which stimulated belief in the need for and possibility of a transformation of people and nations according to the principles of the Christian faith.

This conception is already outlined in the first pages of Bilozersky's programmatic text, where we read:

The religion of Christ gave the world a new moral strength which it had not previously had. The Saviour revealed to people love, peace, freedom, equality for all and the brotherhood of nations, that is to say, new aims indicating to nations the possibility of realizing the idea of the unity of man.¹⁹

However, those who held the power to realize this celestial truth did not fulfill the hopes which the subjugated peoples had placed in them, nor did they sense the goodness which the divine mission had brought into their lives. Eighteen centuries had passed and Bilozersky could still say:

nations are suffering as always in untruth, they are still oppressed; happy are those whose national consciousness is strong and solid enough that no external force can suffocate their spiritual strength. A people can then manage to maintain its identity and tread the path of development. This is the aim toward which every nation ought to aspire, otherwise it will have to suffer under the yoke of captivity.²⁰

The author viewed the history of man and of his own people from this perspective, hence his sensitivity to everything that demoralizes men and nations and deprives them of their rights. A particular domain of such deprivation, oppression and injustice was the author's homeland. He treated the captivity of Ukraine's "Christian people" under the "pagan powers" as the greatest evil in the history of modern nations. The same applied to other Slavs, for Bilozersky was a fervent supporter of Slavic reciprocity. "I doubt," writes Bilozersky,

whether there is a nation which has endured more suffering from evil governments based on paganism than the Slavic nations, which, according to Herder, deserve the respect of the whole world, especially

if their fortune and fate were dependent on their own attributes. And although even today this same system is destroying the soul of the Slavs, still they have already awakened to a new, independent and free existence. This awakening opened before them a new life, revealing to them at the same time the intolerable situation obstructing their development and autonomy. Neither their political independence [he underlines sharply] nor free exchange of thoughts and feelings, nor even their language has any legal defence; everything is condemned to persecution, while lawlessness smothers all.²¹

In this situation the only way out of danger and the only possibility

of restoring the right of the nation is the unification of all the Slavic tribes in one family under the shelter of law, love and freedom. With their hands clasped in friendship, [the Slavs] will be able to defend themselves against any barbarian, to restore their rights and develop in their own lives Christian ideas, realizing them by restoring to life its social basis—religion—and revealing to Europe a new value, making of it a present for her. Just as in the past their [the Slavs'] task was the propagation of work on the land and the development of agrarian civilization and of high moral principles, as well as taming the habits of warrior nations, so now they will appease the souls of nations agitated by bad times, resolving acute social problems and restoring the good which the Saviour indicated.²²

The Slavic ethnocentrism evident here is easily understood; its sources of inspiration and its final result—messianism—are clearly apparent. In attributing that particular mission to the Slavs, Bilozersky appeals not only to religious mysticism but also to historical circumstances associated with the mission of Cyril and Methodius. It was Cyril and Methodius, according to our author, who enlarged Christian Europe by the addition of the Slavic family of nations, which, thanks to its essential qualities, became the most faithful of all to the principles of Christ's teaching, constituting a model of peaceful work, high moral standards and gentle behaviour.

Understandably, in Bilozersky's view it is the Slavs who are the hope of mankind in its situation of progressive decadence, especially those Slavs who are most predestined for this mission and who have received a messianic calling. In this context, it is easy to guess what the aim of the Brotherhood was and in what direction it intended to lead its activity, which was to be based on the following principles:

1. The task of the society is to restore to the Slavic peoples their identities and freedom, in view of which each member ought to aspire

to the dissemination of the idea of freedom based on the teachings of Christ and the rights of the people.

2. This freedom may be attained only by way of the unification of the Slavs in one state, therefore members ought to aspire:
 - a) to come to know the Slavs and the right of each of the Slavic nations to its own existence;
 - b) to arouse love for the Slavs and their nationalities, and at the same time to destroy by all available means any prejudices among the tribes;
 - c) to popularize artistic and cultural monuments and works that arouse the national spirit and the consciousness of mutual brotherhood.
3. Upon observation of zeal for the Slavic idea among his acquaintances, each member can initiate them into the society. However, only those who understand the meaning of the society's activities and aspirations and who have the element of Christianity in their souls and a clear conscience may be informed of the existence of the society.
4. Avoid giving the names of members.
5. To influence people's minds in accord with the tenets of the society and to assist by all available means those who may be useful in the society's efforts to prepare the new order that may come. It is also necessary to influence the minds of women in order to show them the aim of nurturing the Slavic idea in their souls.
6. To aspire to the attainment of the aim in a manner which is solid, exemplary, cautious and calm, in no circumstance to show fear, and not to give people outside the Society cause to suspect that activities or discussions are directed against the existing order.
7. It is necessary to draw near the people, to be concerned about and involved in their education and well-being, and to arouse in them hope in the possibility of a change in the existing order.
8. By all available means struggle against the unjust rights of the aristocracy, and draw attention to those persons who do not belong to it but work for the cause of democracy.
9. Since the essence of the Society is based on Christian love and freedom, it is necessary to endeavour that the principle of equality and dignity of human rights be achieved by means of moderation and peace. Therefore, with this aim in mind, it is also necessary to strive to spread the idea of enlightenment and the teachings of Christ.
10. Members who are known to each other should strive to ensure that they meet at least once a year for the purpose of reporting on their activities.
11. Because the Society is based on Christian principles and has nothing egotistical or lordly in it, it must aspire to restore the rights of the people and to remove everything which is not in accord with human dignity. Each member must aspire to the realization of the Slavic idea,

and at the same time employ all available means with the aim of serving humanity and his own people, and must even be prepared to undergo losses for a worthwhile cause.²³

With this proposal for resolving the national question and the problem of the unity of the Slavs, Bilozersky's vision constituted something of a recapitulation of the intellectual history of the epoch of Romanticism. It began with a call for a return to the principles of Christ's teachings and an apology for the slogans of the French Revolution—freedom, equality and justice—contained in those teachings, which were opposed to the world as it was, full of “earthly squalor,” oppression, violence, deprivation, privilege, and enslavement of people and nations. The program then went on to praise human freedom and national autonomy, as well as a federal union, all of which would guarantee social harmony and stimulate belief in the possibility of making earthly life calm and free from oppression and evil, and would promote a sense of security in all of human society, particularly the Slavic commonwealth.

Naturally, this was to be achieved by the Kievan Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius, whose mission, according to its members, was conceived in relation to contemporary reality, but whose role and significance corresponded to the breakthrough that their spiritual patrons had brought about.

It is in this context, then, that one must examine the Brotherhood's most important document, *Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu*, whose authorship is usually attributed to Mykola Kostomarov, the principal figure among the Kievan Cyrillo-Methodians (although there may have been contributions by Bilozersky, Hulak, Shevchenko and Savych). A unique variant of the Ukrainian messianic program, *Knyhy bytiia* was Kostomarov's attempt to interpret the history of man and his homeland with the aid of the Bible. The author clearly stressed his Christological standpoint—the leading element of every messianic program. Because these problems have been completely passed over in previous studies, particular attention will be paid to them here.

As is well known, the idea of national messianism, which appeared in a great number of forms and variants in the thought of many Romantics, was based on the premise that Christ is directly involved in the universal history of revelation and salvation. In Christian tradition, reflections on the meaning of salvation derive from the conviction that Jesus is the Messiah, i.e., God's answer to the messianic hope of Israel. Thus Christ was not only the “living reality” in the present, but also the object of the vital hope distinguishing His eschatological work.

In this context eschatology appears as God's conclusive intervention in history through the Messiah-Saviour. According to biblical theology,

this is one of the most ancient formulations, in which the faith of the early church finds complete expression. Occupying the central place in the theological thought of the first Christians, it is based on the recognition of two essential elements of the Passion and Salvation of Christ: that Jesus rose from the dead, and that the history of Salvation has never been interrupted. Christ continues to fulfill his role as Mediator in the transition period.²⁴

In this quotation lies the key to Christology as the history of redemption which develops over time. It is evident that in their search for a "universal regeneration" of humanity, the Romantic messianists based themselves mainly on this biblical principle. The differences and discrepancies which figure in their conceptions of their mission were a consequence of competing socio-historical and eschatological perspectives. The conceptions of Fourier and the St. Simonists deserve special attention from this point of view. As "collectivists" they awaited salvation not from great individuals but from the people, the folk,²⁵ an idea that was also clearly expressed—and this is exceptionally important—in Adam Mickiewicz's *Księgi narodu i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* (Books of the Polish People and Pilgrimage), but especially in Mykola Kostomarov's *Knyhy bytiia* (1846).

It is characteristic that in his search for the ways of salvation in history and for the attainment of the Kingdom of God on earth, Kostomarov based himself on the connection between the idea of political federalism—specifically, the concept of a Slavic federation, which was actually closer to the concept of a religious-tribal commonwealth, but with clear political prerogatives and institutions—and the idea of collective growth toward perfection in the spirit of evangelical principles and the teachings of Christ, which were a point of departure in the acquisition of the messianic calling and the attainment of the highest moral values, guaranteeing the ability to rise to the highest level of Christian perfection and truth. According to Kostomarov,

the Son of God came to earth in order to reveal the truth to people so that the truth would liberate the human race.

And Christ taught that all men are brothers, that all must first love God, then one another, while God has the greatest respect for him who gives up his soul for his friends. And whosoever among men wishes to be first should be the servant of all.²⁶

Biblical texts and books of wisdom left their mark here very clearly. A didactic attitude characterizes the social postulates of the *Knyhy bytiia*, which commands its readers to assist the persecuted, unfortunate and oppressed, and indicates at the same time that

Christ Himself set a worthy example: He was the wisest and the most just of men, and so was a King and a Lord, but He did not appear in the form of an earthly king and lord, but was born in a manger, lived in poverty, surrounded Himself with disciples who were not of noble birth or from the milieu of learned philosophers, but simple fishermen instead.

And the people began to recognize the truth, and the philosophers and retainers of the Roman Emperor became afraid that the truth would come out, and after the truth would come freedom, and then it would no longer be so easy to deceive and oppress people.²⁷

Reaching back to the sources of Christian social thought, Kostomarov appealed to its crucial element, i.e., to Christ's proclamation that the poor are blessed because the kingdom of heaven belongs to them and that those who hunger and thirst for righteousness will be satisfied (*Matt.* 5, iii–xi). And so God, who became man, chose as the most appropriate condition for the task of saving all mankind the life of the poor and socially humiliated. He always identified Himself with these people and most often had such people near Him. He sought their confidence and wanted most of all to be understood and believed by such people. And therefore He formulated the deepest truths of His teachings in images and parables wrought from that which makes up the life of the poor, thereby ennobling, as it were, all moral and material wrongs and misery, making them a vehicle of the revelation destined for all people in all times.

It is easy to guess the direction of Kostomarov's Christological thinking: only through the spirit of Christ's teachings can one be liberated from destitution and humiliation, for God, in granting justice to the oppressed and uplifting the burdened, renders them assistance and rights their wrongs by carrying out an act of grace and blessing. Torment and oppression of others, especially the poor, is an insult and a conscious betrayal of God, since, as a contemporary biblical scholar remarks, "he who oppresses the poor offends their Creator," and "he who sneers at a poor man insults his Creator."²⁸

With the fervour of the earliest Christians, the author of *Knyhy bytiia* combats social theories based on oppression, hatred and conquest, and opposes to them evangelical love, seeing in it the fundamental element of human order:

It is not a truth set forth by God that certain ones should rule and become wealthy, while others are held in captivity and contempt; this would not be if the words of the Gospel were obeyed: the lords ought to free their slaves and become their brothers; the rich should share their wealth with the poor so that the poor may also become rich. If there were Christian love in people's hearts that is the way it would be, for if a man loves someone he desires that the other should live as well as he.²⁹

During the epoch of Romanticism hardly anyone besides Kostomarov proclaimed with such zeal that a simple moral transformation would be sufficient to renew human relations, raise civilization to a higher level, and guarantee liberty. What is more, the Ukrainian messianist was convinced that there was no other road to the Kingdom of God on earth than the introduction of the principles of Christian morality both into socio-political life and relations between peoples and states. The highest good for him was the expression in collective life of a solidarity based on active biblical love:

And the Christians lived in brotherhood, they held everything in common, and they elected from among themselves elders, but these elders were the servants of all, because the Lord God said that he who would be first ought to be the servant of all.³⁰

The social ethos which resounds so clearly in the pages of the *Knyhy bytiia* derives from the author's Christological postulates and defines the specific character of a Christian ethics that demands not only a radical break with evil but the exclusion of any evil whatsoever. This explains Kostomarov's fierce indictment of those who break the faith, idolators, kings, the powerful, and those who play leading roles in society for having trampled these principles, thereby reducing humanity to decadence, degradation and enslavement.

Evidence of this is provided by the history of mankind, which, according to Kostomarov, has been marked by decadence since the very beginning. Already

the Roman Emperors and nobles, officials and philosophers came out against Christianity, endeavouring to root out the Christian faith, and Christians perished: they were drowned, hanged, drawn and quartered, roasted, scraped with iron combs, and made to suffer many torments.³¹

Noting their variations in intensity and shifting fortunes, Kostomarov follows these processes through successive historical epochs. He is a

partisan of the view, characteristic of Romantic philosophy, that as the human race fulfills its destiny, it passes through a variety of developmental stages: periods of youth, maturity, and old age. Employing the analogy between the development of all mankind and that of the individual—an analogy introduced by Herder and developed by Hegel—the Ukrainian messianist describes the earliest period of history according to a literal reading of the Bible and of works about ancient Greece and Rome.

He depicts the second era (i.e., the dramatic fate of medieval Christianity) with early-Christian zeal, and without changing his prophetic tone he passes to the next stage, a synthesis of the first two, i.e., the modern era. Its distinguishing features are an intensification and sharpening of conflict, a sharp clash of earthly, temporal concerns with the transcendent, eternal realm, of politics with religion, and a striving for freedom.

Nations are living in the very heat of this struggle, whose character, consequences and ongoing processes appear to be the work of Satan. These did not escape the attention of Kostomarov, who followed them attentively, especially in reference to the Slavic nations, which, he stressed (following Herder), were the hope of Providence for the future rebirth of humanity. But the Slavs themselves, especially the Poles and the Russians, have become corrupt and labour under the yoke of imprisonment imposed by tsars, princes and lords, and are falling deeper and deeper into foreign enslavement.³²

However, in his account of Ukrainian history, Kostomarov adopts an idealistic, at times even megalomaniacal view, which is not surprising, given the system of interpretation he employs. For Kostomarov, Ukraine was the scene of particularly dramatic events as a result of which she lost her independence, becoming an object of plunder for the occupying powers, to be sold to the highest bidder, stripped of her national character, her religion given over to chicanery. Imitating biblical style, Kostomarov writes painfully:

And the lords wished to transform the people into wood or stone, and began to prevent them from going to church to baptize their children, bless their marriages, partake of the Eucharist and bury their dead, all in order that the simple folk be deprived of their humanity.³³

The problem that Kostomarov raises here goes beyond any individual case to attain the universal dimension of human existence, inasmuch as it refers not only to the dimension of love of one's neighbour, but to the entire sphere of human activity. It also refers to upholding the fundamental

truths of biblical revelation, i.e., the Decalogue, whereby all hatred and oppression of one man by another are to be eliminated.

By comparing the views of the Ukrainian philosopher with the Bible and reflections of biblical scholars, we arrive at the conclusion that the author of *Knyhy bytiia* was an ardent votary of the Bible and that he treated his obligations to his fellow man as seriously as his obligations to God: for him, both were inseparably bound together. As a believer and zealous defender of the Ukrainian church, Kostomarov was convinced that religion—and contemporary biblical scholarship also raises this point—

is not only the union of man with God; religion is also the union of man with man... Faith and conduct, religion and life are intimately joined together. One cannot worship God and simultaneously break the moral precepts of the Decalogue. Ethical and religious attitudes are mutually conditioned; any separation of them is contradictory to a biblical conception of religiosity and morality.³⁴

This statement helps to clarify one of the most essential features of Kostomarov's reflections, which are guided by an aim derived from the spirit of Christology. That aim is the attainment of the highest moral values of the people, their defence, victory over pessimism, and the inspiration of his countrymen with the hope and belief that their faithfulness to the religion of Christ, their defence of it, and their struggle for freedom will be rewarded. After all, by the power of Christ righteousness will be brought to the oppressed and the wronged, hence a society that acquiesces in the violation of the principles of Christian morality and social justice cannot go unpunished. Bringing a sharp indictment against the Polish rulers and Russian tsars as those responsible for the misfortunes and sufferings of the Ukrainian people, Kostomarov asserts that all their actions and efforts have not produced the desired result, since Ukraine continues to live:

She has not fallen, for she did not even wish to know of tsars or lords, and if there was a tsar he was not of us, and if there were lords they were not of us, and although it happened that Ukrainian blood gave birth to deformities, at least they did not mar the Ukrainian language with their vile mouths, nor did they consider themselves to be Ukrainians....³⁵

From this point on, the meaning and purpose of Kostomarov's philosophy of history become even clearer. Its root and basis is a philosophy of history that interprets the fate of Kostomarov's homeland as it passes through suffering toward its great destiny. It must also be borne in mind that the fundamental concept of the Romantic philosophy of history

was that of the *Zeitgeist*, i.e., the dominant trend of a given epoch.³⁶ The *Zeitgeist* defines the task which the human race or a particular people is to complete in that epoch, corresponding to a specific phase of its existence, its successive incarnation.

Thus, in Kostomarov's account, the Ukrainian people's heroic history of martyrdom was imbued with profound meaning and provided with a goal—a mission of salvation—which is an act of providential grace and renders visible the presence of God in the contemporary world.³⁷

Kostomarov wanted to be particularly credible to his Slavic brethren, especially in view of his concept of a Slavic federation. This is the source of his idealization of Ukrainian religion and tradition, especially of Cossack society as the most democratic form of rule—a social order in which there were no masters and no slaves, but all were free and equal:

And day by day Cossackdom would grow, and soon everyone in Ukraine would be a Cossack, everyone would be free and equal, and Ukraine would not have over her either tsar or lord, but God alone. The same would come to pass in Poland and the other Slavic countries, which would model themselves on Ukraine.³⁸

But the rulers and lords, jealously protecting their riches and privileges, did not permit this to happen. Moreover, the Slavs, with the exception of the Ukrainians, had already come under the influence of their “older brothers,” i.e., the Germans and the French, and had introduced their own kings, princes, boyars, and lords, thereby destroying their fine age-old patriarchal system and faith:

And although Slavdom suffered and suffers in captivity, it is not to blame itself, for both the tsar and the lords are not of the Slavic spirit but of the German or Tatar [...] The true Slav does not like either tsar or lord, for he likes and remembers none but the one God Jesus Christ, King of Heaven and Earth.³⁹

This inculcation of foreigners and the suggestion that they were the cause of all evil and misfortune is a borrowing from the ideology of the Russian Slavophiles that was meant to allay the mutual prejudices of the Slavs and to raise their self-esteem. Of course, Kostomarov also hoped to stimulate goodwill toward and confidence in his own people. Despite the ordeals of history that had afflicted them with humiliation and suffering, they had managed to survive and maintain their loyalty to the religion of their ancestors and the teachings of Christ. This was a cardinal point for Kostomarov, who held that “by rejecting God human freedom actually

destroys itself. Apart from God a person ceases to be authentically and fully human."⁴⁰

Thus, according to Kostomarov, Ukraine personified the idea of faith and freedom in the modern world. Moreover, it did not know the false gods of business and profit or conduct wars of aggression; on the contrary, it strengthened brotherhood and justice—a point especially stressed by Kostomarov in his interpretation of Ukrainian history. Our philosopher treated his country's past not only as a symbolic history of freedom, but also as an image or figure of the future world order that would be based on brotherhood and the solidarity of peoples.⁴¹ The nation which had suffered persecution and struggled with evil becomes a metaphysical justification of heroism elevated to the highest level of the Romantic hierarchy of values.

The significance of the messianic ethos in this hierarchy is difficult to overestimate. One can see it as

the idea of a Christianization of politics, an ethicization of relations among peoples and the elimination of the right of the stronger. It was on this foundation that the realization of the earthly Kingdom of God was to be based.⁴²

But it must also be remembered that in raising suffering and sacrifice to the highest level, Kostomarov, in evangelical style, compares the suffering and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people with the suffering and sacrifice of Christ. This is an analogy that appeals both to the similarity of their fate as martyrs and to the universal meaning of sacrifice.

Thus was conceived the culmination of Kostomarov's Christological idea, in accordance with which Ukraine was identified with Christ. Like Him, she suffered and was martyred on the cross of history, but she will manifest herself in the conscience of the "spirit of humanity," and her resurrection will lead to a transformation in the spiritual renewal of the world and an era of freedom in human history. Indeed, "Christ the King spilled his blood for the freedom of the human race and left it for all time as nourishment for the faithful."⁴³

But this does not mean that the nation-messiah will consume the blood of Christ in humility and suffering without struggling against its oppressors or calling out loudly for support in fulfilling its missionary role. It will not passively await divine retribution for blood and torment but, radiating an aura of messianic greatness, will summon its Slavic relatives to action. This manifold labour will be undertaken in solidarity in order to create a Slavic federation that will initiate a new social life in a form more perfect than ever before in history, i.e., a union of kindred peoples joined by Christian and cultural tradition, a common idea and a historical mission.

This idea, Romantic in the highest degree, to which Kostomarov gave such an integral formulation, was directed toward the future, for only the future presaged the fulfillment of the greatest Romantic dream—that of an independent homeland and a free Slavic kingdom. Thus, *Knyhy bytiia* is a classic work of Romantic messianism in which religious initiation is coupled with political, while the connecting thread of the work is the philosophical union of Christianity with the idea of freedom.

Thus, among the philosophical-messianic conceptions of the Romantic era there arose this unique variant—a Christological philosophy of history. It was a new prophetic revelation which was also meant to serve as platform for political understanding among the Slavs and to promote the moral improvement of humanity.⁴⁴ In the final paragraphs of the *Knyhy bytiia* the crowning expression of this idea is developed into a Romantic philosophy of action and set forth in an exceptionally artistic biblical style that manifests all the features of a prophetic-messianic message:

Ukraine lies in the grave, but she has not died. For her voice, summoning all Slavs to freedom and brotherhood, has reverberated across the whole Slavic world. And the echo of that voice rang out over Poland when, on the third of May, the Poles determined that there should be no lords but that everyone in the republic should be considered equal. This is what Ukraine desired 120 years ago. But it was not permitted to come to pass in Poland that equality should reign, and changes were introduced whereby Poland was partitioned just as Ukraine had been previously.

And so it had to be, for Poland did not listen to Ukraine and caused the ruin of her sister. But Poland will not fall, for Ukraine will awaken her, Ukraine who does not remember evil and loves her sister as if nothing had ever come between them:

And the voice of Ukraine was heard in Russia when, after the death of Tsar Alexander, there were those who wanted to drive out the tsar and the lords, to create a republic and unite the Slavs in the image and likeness of God, just as Ukraine had wanted to do 200 years ago. But the despot did not permit this to come to pass: some he sentenced to death on the gallows, others to torture in the mines, and yet others to be killed by Circassian knives. And the despot-hangman rules over three Slavic peoples [...] but he will achieve nothing.

For the voice of Ukraine has not become silent. She will rise from her grave and call out to all her Slavic brothers, and they will hear her summons, and Slavdom will arise, and then there will no longer be any tsar, or prince, or baron, or lord, or boyar, or bondsman or serf, either in Russia or Poland or Ukraine or in the lands of the Czechs, Croatians, Serbs or Bulgars.

Ukraine will become an independent republic in a Slavic federation.

Then all nations, pointing to the place on the map where Ukraine is outlined, will say: There is the cornerstone that must be protected, for it is the foundation of the entire structure.⁴⁵

We may assume that the above reflections and quotations faithfully render the conception, character and sublimity of Kostomarov's work. The concluding sentences show the decisive significance of the passage from individual initiation to the collective; the strong bias toward the conviction that man is destined for freedom and a worthy life; that all people ought to love one another as brothers; that the imperatives of faith and brotherhood are the ultimate expression of human sainthood and, finally, that the teachings of Christ and brotherhood should constitute the foundation of society. The collective—like the individual, the national group or the whole Slavic commonwealth—will weather all the storms of history, but but only on condition that it does not deny its own nature, its religion, or its human dignity; that it does not stray from the path of national ideals and rectitude; that it does not break the thread of Christian tradition and does not forget its calling. By respecting these tenets and principles, every society, great or small, will certainly contribute to the development of mankind as it advances toward ever higher "levels of humanity."

Thus, according to Kostomarov, Slavic reciprocity should be based on the principles of faith and love, which flow out of the spirit and content of the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition. The spiritual genealogy of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius reaches back not only in name but by its very deep roots to the activity of the Thessalonian brothers, who are a symbol of unity and faith in a tradition tested over the course of more than one thousand years.

Translated from the Polish by Allan Reid

NOTES

1. N. H. Baynes and H. St. L. B. Moss, *Bizancjum. Wstęp do cywilizacji wschodniorzymskiej*, trans. E. Zwolski (Warsaw, 1964), 325. Among the numerous writings on this topic, the reflections of M. Hrushevsky in vol. I of his ten-volume work, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (Kiev and Lviv, 1898-1936), merit special attention. Recently a great deal of attention was devoted to this question by M. Chubaty, *Istoriia khrystianstva na Rusy-Ukraini*, vol. I (Rome and New York, 1965); A. Welyky, *Z litopysu khrystyianskoi Ukrainy*, vol. I (Rome, 1968); and especially O. Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, vol. I (Cambridge, Mass., 1981).
2. N. Zernow, *Wschodnie chrześcijaństwo*, trans. J. S. Łoś (Warsaw, 1967), 73. See also J. Cibulko, *Początki Chrzescijaństwa na Morawach*, trans. M. Erhardt, C. Piernikarski (Warsaw, 1967), and T. Wasilewski, *Bizancjum i Słowianie w IX wieku. Studia z dziejów stosunków politycznych i kulturalnych* (Warsaw, 1972).
3. *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text*, trans. and ed. S. H. Cross and O. P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 62-3.
4. And also very complicated. See, e.g., H. Łowmiański, *Religia Słowian i jej upadek (w. VI-XII)*, 2d ed. (Warsaw, 1986), especially the chapter "Problematyka chrystianizacji Słowian we wczesnym średniowieczu"; F. Dvornik, *Bizancjum a prymat Rzymu*, trans. M. Radożycka (Warsaw, 1985); and M. Miniąt, *Wierność i klątwa. Losy misji Konstantyna i Metodego* (Warsaw, 1971).
5. *Pasterze wiernych Słowian: Święci Cyryl i Metody*. Texts chosen, translated and edited by A. Naumov (Cracow, 1985), 11-12.
6. In his work *Slavianski prosvetitel Mefodii* (Sofia, 1985), P. Dinekov points out that besides the political situation and the rivalry between the Eastern and Western churches, even then the most important problem in the work of the Thessalonian brothers was the "Slavic question," the problem of Slavic culture and political reciprocity (p. 13).
7. Cf. M. Kostomarov, *Avtobiografiia. Literaturnoe nasledstvo* (St. Petersburg, 1890), 61-2.
8. Since no scholarly edition of the Brotherhood's programmatic documents has yet appeared, I am using the popular edition: M. Kostomarov, *Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu* (Augsburg, 1947). In Polish scholarship a more detailed analysis of the programmatic documents was undertaken by J. Gołąbek, *Bractwo Św. Cyryla i Metodego w Kijowie* (Warsaw, 1935). For more recent work, see S. Kozak, "Knyhy Bytija ukrainskoho narodu Mykoły Kostomarowa i Księgi narodu i pielgrzymstwa polskiego Adama Mickiewicza," *Slavia Orientalis*, 1973, no. 2; idem, "Bractwo Cyryla i Metodego w Kijowie" in *Tradycje Cyryla i Metodego w językach i*

literaturach słowiańskich, ed. A. Bartoszewicz, University of Warsaw Press (forthcoming).

9. These questions have been raised in the literature by many researchers: M. Hrushevsky, V. Shchurat, P. Zaitsev, M. Vozniak, S. Iefremov, W. Miiakovsky and D. Chyzhevsky. For more recent treatments, see the following: G. Luciani, *Le Livre de la genèse du peuple ukrainien* (Paris, 1956); P. Zaionchovsky, *Kirillo-Mefodieskoe obshchestvo* (Moscow, 1959); S. Kozak, *U źródeł romantyzmu i nowożytnej myśli społecznej na Ukrainie* (Wrocław, 1978); T. Komarynets, *Ideino-estetychni osnovy ukrainskoho romantyzmu* (Lviv, 1983); H. Serhiienko, *T. Shevchenko i Kyrylo-mefodiivske tovarystvo* (Kiev, 1983).
10. Cf. V. Shchurat, "Osnovy Shevchenkovykh zviyazkiv z poliakamy", *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, vol. 119–120 (Lviv, 1917). In the present work I am using the edition: V. Shchurat, *Vybrani pratsi z istorii literatury*. With revisions, introductory article and notes by S.V. Shchurat (Kiev, 1963). These problems are also treated by M. Iavorsky in *Narysy z istorii revoliutsiinoi borotby na Ukraini* (Kharkiv, 1927), as well as by the scholars mentioned above.
11. Even before the establishment of the Brotherhood, Shevchenko had achieved fame as the author of such philosophical works as "Haidamaky," "Son," "Kavkaz," "Velykyi liokh," "I mertvym i zhyvym," and "Ieretyk," which had already established his reputation as a poet–prophet and great national spokesman.
12. The list given here enumerates the most active members, but the number of members and sympathizers of the Brotherhood was more than one hundred. Cf., e.g., H. Serhiienko, *Suspilno-politychnyi rukh na Ukraini pislia povstannia dekabrystiv* (Kiev, 1971), 190–91.
13. M. Kostomarov, *Avtobiographiia*, 62.
14. V. Miiakovsky, "Liudy sorokovykh rokiv. Kyrylo-metodiivtsi v ikh lystuvanni" in *Za sto lit*, ed. M. Hrushevsky (Kiev, 1928), 2: 38.
15. Quoted in M. Vozniak, *Kyrylo-metodiivske Bratstvo* (Lviv, 1921), 62–3.
16. *Ibid.*, 77.
17. Unfortunately, not all of these materials have appeared in print.
18. Cf., e.g., A. Sikora, *Prorocy szczęśliwych światów* (Warsaw, 1982) and compare A. Walicki, *Filozofia a mesjanizm* (Warsaw, 1970), and J. Litwin, *Lamennais* (Wrocław, 1973).
19. Quoted in M. Vozniak, *Kyrylo-metodiivske Bratstvo*, 87.
20. *Ibid.*, 87–8.
21. *Ibid.*, 88.
22. *Ibid.*, 89.
23. *Ibid.*, 90–91. For the full text see *Ukraina*, no. 1 (1914): 78–83.

24. W. Harrington, *Teologia biblijna* (Warsaw, 1977), 28. See also J. Meyendorff, *Teologia bizantyjska* (Warsaw, 1984), 208.
25. A. Walicki, *Filozofia a mesjanizm* (Warsaw, 1970), 28.
26. M. Kostomarov, *Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu* (Augsburg, 1947), 70.
27. Ibid., 7–8.
28. M. Filipiak, *Problematyka społeczna w Biblii* (Warsaw, 1985), 39.
29. Kostomarov, *Knyhy*, 11.
30. Ibid., 9.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 16–17.
33. Ibid., 20.
34. M. Filipiak, *Problematyka społeczna*, 216.
35. Kostomarov, *Knyhy*, 22.
36. A. Walicki, *Filozofia a mesjanizm*, 9–22 and compare Z. Stefanowska, *Historia i profecja* (Warsaw, 1962), as well as A. Sikora, *Historia i prawdy wieczne* (Warsaw, 1977), and J. Tomkowski, *Juliusz Słowacki i tradycje mistyki europejskiej* (Warsaw, 1984).
37. Compare, e.g., W. Harrington, *Teologia biblijna*, 249, and M. Filipiak, *Człowiek współczesny a Stary Testament* (Lublin, 1982), 66, 95.
38. Kostomarov, *Knyhy*, 18–19.
39. Ibid., 23.
40. J. Meyendorff, *Teologia bizantyjska*, 211–12.
41. Kostomarov, *Knyhy*, 17–18.
42. A. Walicki, “Mesjanistyczne koncepcje narodu i późniejsze losy tej tradycji” in *Ideje i koncepcje narodu w polskiej myśli politycznej czasów porozbiorowych*, ed. J. Goćkowski and A. Walicki (Warsaw, 1977), 98.
43. Kostomarov, *Knyhy*, 8.
44. M. Czajkowski, “Dlaczego etos? Biblijne uzasadnienie norm moralnych,” *Znak*, no. 6, 1985.
45. Kostomarov, *Knyhy*, 23–24.

NATIONAL COMMUNISM AND THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN UKRAINE, 1923-28

During the 1920s two seemingly distinct debates dominated the political discussions of the respective party leaderships in the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) or VKP(b) and the Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukraine or KP(b)U. The first of these debates was concerned largely with opposing models of economic growth as represented by their most articulate spokesmen, Evgenii Preobrazhensky and Nikolai Bukharin.¹ The second discussion, at first glance, involved something quite separate, and revolved around the questions of national autonomy and cultural renewal. This debate took its lead from the policy of "indigenization" (*korenizatsiia*) adopted at the Twelfth Congress of the VKP(b), which committed the party to recruiting members of the dominant nationality in the non-Russian republics, ensuring that party and state organs functioned in the local language, and fostering the development of indigenous culture. In Ukraine, this policy was known as "Ukrainization," and its most consistent proponents as national communists.²

It is difficult to define national communism, since there existed no single, comprehensive platform associated with a recognized party or movement. Rather, this political current embraced a number of individuals and groups associated with politics, economics, literature, historiography and education. For our purposes, national communism can be defined as a school of thought which attempted a national revival based upon a critique of the existing situation: the exclusion of Ukrainians from the state apparatus and administration and from the urban culture of the cities, and the resulting dominance of the Russian bureaucrat over the Ukrainian peasant. National communism posited a way to overcome this reality: a state-sponsored programme of Ukrainization in the fields of culture and politics according to which a new progressive Ukrainian culture was promoted, Ukrainians were encouraged to join the party and state administration, and Ukrainian was to become the daily language of government. All this was meant to overcome the inheritance of tsarist colonialism, which had created a dichotomy between the Ukrainian countryside and the Russian or Russified urban centres. The debate within the KP(b)U concerned the correct

method of proceeding and, subsequently, the pace and timing of this campaign.³

During the mid-twenties, Ukrainian culture was promoted, especially with the appointment of Oleksander Shumsky as Commissar of Education in 1924—an important post that dealt not only with education but also with culture and the process of Ukrainization in general.

In April 1925, KP(b)U First Secretary Lazar Kaganovich sanctioned the extension of Ukrainization within the state administration and the party as a whole. After a year Ukrainization reached its limits; the process was upheld, but attempts by the writer Mykola Khvyliovy and others to counterpose Ukrainian culture to Russian were condemned by the KP(b)U leadership, along with any proposal (existing or fictional) of forcibly Ukrainizing the Russian working class. Shumsky was held responsible and transferred to another post in Moscow within the year.⁴

It would appear that the debates on Ukrainization had little connection with the economic debates that raged within the higher leadership of the VKP(b). Nevertheless, the national communists understood that Ukrainization must have a socio-economic foundation. The precondition of Ukrainizing the party and state organs along with the Russified Ukrainian working class was the transformation of the Ukrainian peasantry into a Ukrainian working class. This could only be accomplished if the republic industrialized and the peasants moved into the cities in search of available jobs. The economic foundations of this process need to be clarified in detail. This article discusses the views of two economists, Hryhorii Hrynko and Mykhailo Volobuiev, who can be said to have articulated the economic platform of national communism, and shows how the problem of Ukrainization affected the industrialization of the Ukrainian republic. Finally, the article outlines how certain contradictory positions contributed to the defeat of national communism in Ukraine. First of all, however, it is necessary to review the basic economic developments of the decade.

The Economic Development of Ukraine during the 1920s

During the period of tsarist colonialism three characteristics defined Ukraine's economic status.⁵ First, the domination of the Ukrainian market by Russian manufactured goods resulted in the elimination of Ukrainian light industry along with any possible development of a native bourgeoisie. Second, capital investment by Franco-Belgian financial associations had developed Ukraine's heavy industry, principally in the areas of ore extraction and refining, as well as semi-processing and manufacture of capital goods. Finally, the Russian state directly appropriated taxation revenues without any complementary expenditures on Ukrainian territory. These factors had major social consequences. Since the Ukrainian peasantry was tied to the

land by its lack of industrial skills, the more skilled Russian labour force migrated into Ukraine's industrial towns and became the dominant component of the urban working class. As a result, national divisions in the class structure corresponded to Ukraine's position within the international division of labour and to the degree of capitalist development in Ukraine.⁶ The Ukrainian peasantry produced grain for export while the working class became increasingly Russian or Russified as one approached the industrial centres of the south-east. This was the heritage of economic inequality that the Ukrainian communists had to overcome.

The Revolution eliminated the role of foreign capital in Ukraine's economic life, but this is not to say that the internal dynamics of the system were radically changed. First of all, the emphasis on the production of grain remained, not so much for export, as the large efficient plantations had been broken up into smaller sections by peasant seizures and agrarian reform, but because Ukraine remained the principal source of grain to feed the major cities with their growing populations.⁷ Secondly, from Moscow's perspective the preconditions of Soviet industrialization required the reconstruction and expansion of Ukraine's heavy industry, resulting in continued neglect of light industry and consumer-goods production. Since Ukraine had little light industry to begin with, this policy condemned her to continue enduring a distorted balance of production.⁸

Two aspects of Ukraine's economic development require consideration: Ukraine's share of total Soviet investment in industry and her role as the prime producer of an agricultural surplus. This article emphasizes industrial policy, since the question of the peasantry and the impact of collectivization have received much more attention from other scholars.⁹

If we examine Ukraine's share in total Soviet capital investment, we discover two distinct phases. During the latter period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), from 1925 to 1928-9, which were the years marking the end of reconstruction and the beginning of new expansion, Ukraine received between 25 and 29 per cent of all Soviet capital investment in "census" or large-scale planned industries.¹⁰ Investment peaked in the first year of the Five-Year Plan (1928-32), then fell dramatically to an average of 20 per cent over the course of the first Five-Year Plan and 18.5 per cent in the second Five-Year Plan (1933-7). Two contrasting tendencies account for this pattern of investment. In the early years of NEP, investments by industrial trusts were under the authority of republican and local organs, not under the strict control of the central Soviet authorities. Furthermore, the leading republic economic organs, the Ukrainian Gosplan (State Planning Commission) and Vesenkha (Supreme Council of the National Economy), assumed greater authority by participating in the preparation of control figures and administering many of the important all-Union trusts located in

Ukraine.¹¹ However, after 1926 many of these powers were curtailed. In 1926 the Soviet Vesenkha was reorganized with the creation of *glavki*, industrial ministries organized on a sectoral basis, which now had the authority to plan capital construction for both all-Union and republican projects. Ukraine's Gosplan was increasingly subordinated to the all-Union Gosplan and in 1928 Ukraine's Vesenkha lost its right to participate in the preparation of control figures and to administer such important trusts as the coal trust, Donvuhil.¹² As a result the share of capital-investment funds controlled by the republican authorities fell from more than 21 per cent in the years 1924–6 to less than 14 percent in 1927–8.¹³

For some time this diminution of local authority had no effect on Ukraine's overall share of investment funds, since the central authorities were interested in developing a heavy industrial base, much of which was concentrated in Ukraine's existing capacity. When the Special Conference for the Restoration of Fixed Capital (Osvok) of the all-Union Vesenkha, headed by Iurii Piatakov, formulated the first draft of the Five-Year Plan in 1926, it recommended that new capital construction be concentrated in Ukraine and the central regions of European Russia, considering investments in the East an unproductive waste of capital resources.¹⁴ Of particular importance were the extractive and primary-processing industries such as coal, iron and steel. The largest project considered in the late twenties was the construction of the Dniprohes hydroelectric power station, which had planned allocations of 34 million rubles in 1927–8 and peaked at 45 million rubles in 1928–9.¹⁵ Furthermore, during the latter half of NEP, Ukrainian economists and party leaders fought a rearguard action, insisting that new industrial projects and major expansions be located near Ukraine's existing industrial sites and the electric power generated by Dniprohes. In April 1929, when Mykola Skrypnyk, the prominent Ukrainian Bolshevik, was at the height of his influence, he was able to persuade the all-Union Vesenkha to establish a third tractor factory in Ukraine besides the ones planned for Stalingrad and the Urals.

A fundamental theoretical tenet of the industrialization drive was emphasis on the manufacture of producer goods in order to provide the basis of future Soviet industrial development and eventual expansion of the consumer sector. In actual fact, industrialization initiated a self-perpetuating process which precluded the expansion of the consumer sector and provided the emerging political elite with a social base consisting of economic administrators, engineers and other technical personnel involved in industry. This stress on the manufacture of producer goods, combined with the above-mentioned reconstruction and expansion of the existing pattern of industry, resulted in the continued domination of the producer-goods sector in Ukrainian industry. Light industry, which had expanded most rapidly in the

NEP period, began to lose its relative share of production. Whereas light industry (or, more exactly, industry associated with the production of the means of consumption) produced half the total industrial output in 1925–6, by 1935 it accounted for only 34 per cent of all production. Since other regions of the Soviet Union had a more balanced industrial structure, the increasing emphasis on the manufacture of producer goods had a lesser effect on the consumer sector, so that the average all-Union share only declined from 55.6 to 42.2 per cent during the period 1928–37.¹⁶

The initial drafts of the first Five-Year Plan (including Piatakov's) were rejected either because of the authors' political "deviations" or because they envisaged decelerating rates of industrial growth in the later years of the plan. Instead the final draft called for increasing tempos of growth and an emphasis on new, massive projects. Once the first Five-Year Plan was implemented, new investment was directed toward the Urals and the central industrial regions. Of the principal industrial regions, Ukraine's planned allocation of capital investment for new construction was the lowest, the majority of its investment capital being devoted to the expansion and reconstruction of existing plants. It was not surprising that Ukraine's share of investment devoted to reconstruction was higher than that of the Urals or the Central Black-Earth Region, since these regions had only a small industrial base before the revolution. The most striking fact was that Ukraine's share of investment for new construction was even smaller than those of the Leningrad and Central Industrial regions, revealing a tendency to direct new investment toward the traditional Russian industrial regions.¹⁷

The republican authorities were in no position to contest the emerging form of industrial production. Not only had the struggle against the United Opposition narrowed the arena of political debate, but the economic crises experienced after 1926 had served as a pretext for the centralization of economic decision-making in Moscow. The share of investment capital under their control dropped as a result of the reorganization that took place during the latter years of NEP. Ukraine's share of budgetary expenditures declined from 24 per cent in the mid-1920s to 12.6 per cent during the first Five-Year Plan, and as a result its contribution to the financing of the national economy in Ukraine declined proportionately: in 1925–6 it stood at 23 per cent, in 1928–9 at 9.0 per cent, and in 1932 the republican budget covered only 5.3 per cent of such finances.¹⁸ Just as investment allocation was centralized during these years, revenue collection was similarly centralized. From 1928 to 1930 the republican authorities received approximately 20 per cent of total revenue collected on their territory, but by 1932 they received less than 10 per cent.¹⁹ During the 1920s the Soviet central authorities appropriated 11–16 per cent of total revenues over

expenditures, but by the end of the decade the centralization of taxation resulted in an appropriated surplus of 23 per cent.²⁰ Given this situation, when the central authorities began to switch their investment priorities from the Ukrainian industrial base to the eastern regions, the republican authorities were in no position to take up the slack. The combination of decreased capital investment and increased outflow of revenue resulted in the extraction of a greater industrial surplus from the territory of Ukraine after 1929.

We can describe the characteristics of Ukraine's economic development as a specific Soviet form of internal colonialism.²¹ Whereas the capitalist form of colonialism in Ukraine was based on the monopolization of the home market by the central Russian industrial areas and the extraction of super-profits from capital investments made by foreign finance capital, the Soviet form of colonialism did not rest on the exchange of commodities, but on the direct administration of economic resources by the central bureaucratic elite. The Soviet regime inherited an internal pattern of underdevelopment, while appropriating the role of foreign capital in industrializing the country. At the end of the Soviet Union's major period of industrialization, Ukraine continued to act as a source of grain, raw materials, semi-processed and specialized producer goods necessary for Soviet manufacturing. In return, Ukraine imported consumer goods and the machinery necessary for the reproduction of the producer-goods sector. It is clear that Ukraine not only received a smaller proportion of new capital investment, but also provided a significant portion of the surplus product necessary for industrial expansion in both the traditional Russian regions and the new projects of the eastern regions. The source of this surplus was not existing industry, which continued to be heavily subsidized, but the population, especially the working class and the peasants, who were super-exploited. The most important means of surplus appropriation was state control over the turnover tax administered through the all-Union budget.²²

The Economic Platform of Ukrainian National Communism

The leaders of the KP(b)U were certainly aware of many of these problems and on many occasions attempted an oblique criticism of the planning practices of the economic authorities in Moscow. The connection between these problems and the controversies surrounding Ukrainization was not directly articulated by the leaders, who left this task to others. Instead, certain basic positions were staked out, while open doctrinal conflicts were avoided. Most party leaders in Ukraine were careful to avoid conflict with the leadership of the VKP(b), condemning Trotskyism in 1923, the United Opposition in 1926 and the Right Opposition in 1929. Nevertheless, even though the majority leadership in Ukraine attacked

Shumsky for his views on Ukrainization, this did not signify that the KP(b)U leaders were slavish followers of the Stalin tendency. They had their own perspective on socialist construction in Ukraine, emphasizing Ukraine's unique economic needs. This emphasis, combined with their adherence to a moderate version of Ukrainization, allows us to elucidate the economic perspective of Ukrainian national communism. It is in this context that the more radical views of Mykhailo Volobuiev and the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) leadership can be placed.

The most important spokesman on economic matters within the KP(b)U leadership was Hryhorii Hrynko. During the Revolution he had been active in the Borotbisty, the left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, whose leadership formed an important autonomist component of the KP(b)U during the 1920s.²³ From 1920 to 1923 Hrynko, as Commissar of Education, laid the foundations of the unique Ukrainian system of education, which emphasized vocational and technical training as opposed to the humanistic perspective of Lunacharsky's all-Union Commissariat of Education. It is important to note that the Ukrainian system embodied many of the educational concerns that were to become so prevalent on an all-Union level during the cultural revolution of the first Five-Year Plan.²⁴ This was one early indication that the Ukrainian party was concerned with the problems of industrialization.

From 1924 to 1926 Hrynko headed the Ukrainian Gosplan before assuming the post of deputy head of the all-Union Gosplan and becoming Commissar of Finance in 1930. At the first all-Union Gosplan congress in March 1926, Hrynko presented an outline report on the Ukrainian economy and enunciated certain basic principles.²⁵ He strongly emphasized the political task of consolidating Ukraine as a Soviet republic by having the all-Union authorities consider Ukraine a national-economic whole. Furthermore, he pointed out that Ukraine possessed all the basic foundations for the growth of the all-Union economy and was also the western cornerstone for future economic ties with Europe and the Near East. Accordingly, capital investment in Ukraine could only have a positive effect on the Union as a whole. Ukraine deserved additional funding: not only had it suffered a great deal during the Civil War, but it needed to resolve the tensions created by agrarian overpopulation. Ukraine's national economic problems could only be solved by taking into account both industrial and agricultural paths of development in a complementary fashion. Thus Ukraine would serve as a model illustrating the Soviet system's capacity to solve the national question inherited from the colonial policy of the tsarist regime.²⁶

But this would not happen if the central planners continued to apply current administrative models of regionalization. The current practice of

Gosplan was to divide Ukraine into two or three administrative regions (*krai*) and ignore her economic unity. The three-tiered system of planning (republic, *okrug* and *raion*) gave too much autonomy to the regional executive committees and thereby impeded attempts to overcome the differences between the agrarian Right Bank and the industrial Left Bank.²⁷

In terms of planning priorities in the industrial sector, Hrynko considered that the central authorities had disregarded important factors. It was unclear whether Dniprohes was to service only the metallurgical industries or whether it was for the use of all the different branches of the economy, especially agriculture and transportation. Furthermore, the traditional industrial regions of Ukraine should be expanded, not because of some local objection to the development of the Urals, but simply because it was the most efficient use of capital resources.²⁸

In the agricultural sector, maintained Hrynko, Ukraine had posted a large increase in the amount of acreage sown, but it was weakly supported on the technical level. Any further intensification of agriculture depended on mechanization. Ukraine faced agrarian overpopulation, especially in the Right-Bank regions where there was large-scale unemployment. Light industry had been mostly located outside Ukrainian territory in the past; now new industries could be located according to rational considerations. The processing of industrial crops gave a quicker rate of return in a time of capital shortage. But if this was the case, then why were pioneering investments in sugar-beet refineries being irrationally placed in the East, outside traditional areas of sugar-beet production and refining? It would be more logical to begin locating agricultural machinery and chemical-refining industries in Ukraine.²⁹

The Ukrainian provinces of Poland suffered from similar problems of agrarian overpopulation. Considering the possibility of revolutionary disturbances in Europe, Ukraine was in a strategic position, for it possessed links with Ukrainians in other countries and could constitute a model of socialist development. Hrynko stressed that on both strategic and empirical grounds it was wrong to view Ukraine primarily as an agricultural region or as a frontier province that did not need industrialization. Ukraine had all the preconditions for the cheap, rational development of industry. Furthermore, there was the importance of establishing closer political ties with the agrarian population of the Right Bank by proletarianizing it, otherwise the region would be susceptible to foreign intervention.³⁰

The basic themes of Hrynko's analysis can be summarized as follows. He began with a methodological point, criticizing the persistent colonial view of Ukraine as an administrative extension of Russia, not an economic unit in its own right. Hrynko did not present this unity as a given, the result of a "national idea," but as a political and social task to be

accomplished by the Communist Party. Its political task was to help consolidate the Ukrainian republic by establishing political links between the Russified Left-Bank proletariat (implicitly of Russified character) and the agrarian Right Bank, with its overwhelmingly Ukrainian peasantry. This could not be accomplished by peasant migration into the industrial centres, but only by the balanced industrialization of all regions of Ukraine. Hrynko was attempting to overcome the traditional Russian practice of viewing Ukraine as an agricultural region and supplier of raw materials. At this time he was concerned not so much with the pace of development as with overcoming past distortions in the balance of industrial sectors. Implicitly, he was criticizing any future plans for inordinately large investments in the East as a waste of capital resources, which could only lead to the exacerbation of social divisions and the reproduction of colonial relations in Ukraine.

Mykhailo Volobuiev's Intervention

Notably absent from Hrynko's discussion was any consideration of the need for further republican control over economic resources. Since the Ukrainian party leadership was not politically able to challenge the Soviet leadership openly on this issue, its only recourse was to struggle for higher levels of investment in Ukraine. When the Ukrainians began to contribute to the all-Union debate on industrialization, their concern for a balanced industrial structure in their republic was brushed aside by the central planners. Accordingly, the Ukrainian leaders focused their arguments on raising the republican level of industrial investment and on the regional location of specific factories. As early as July 1926, the Ukrainian Gosplan's proposals to the all-Union Vesenkha on the levels of industrial investment for all-Union planned industries were higher than many of the estimates prepared at that time.³¹ The KP(b)U leaders' belief that the VKP(b) was amenable to intensive industrialization was confirmed as the debate proceeded. However, their view that Ukraine would benefit from an emphasis on the expansion of the producer-goods sector did not go unchallenged at this time. The most coherent and articulate response to the KP(b)U leadership was made by Mykhailo Volobuiev in his article, "On the Problem of the Ukrainian Economy," published in *Bilshovyk Ukrainy* in January and February 1928. He took up many of Hrynko's themes and developed them in a more radical manner.

Mykhailo Volobuiev was an economist and party activist in charge of adult education and literacy within the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. His position and the official sanction for the publication of his article reflected the fact that his views had a significant following within the KP(b)U. Moreover, much of what Volobuiev stated was not original. The

historians Oleksander Ohloblyn, Mykhailo Slabchenko and Mykola Porsh had already done extensive work on pre-revolutionary Ukraine; Viktor Dobrohaiev had calculated budgetary figures which revealed the amount of surplus taxation revenue appropriated by the central government; and Hrynko had criticized administrative practices in regionalization policy. What Volobuiev did was to synthesize all these components and attempt to provide a theoretical scheme for understanding Ukraine's modern colonial situation.

Volobuiev began his article by attacking the previous methodological practice of the all-Union Gosplan, which divided Ukraine into two administrative regions. With the help of quotations from Hrynko's earlier article, he criticized this form of administrative regionalization as corresponding to the vertical partition of the republican economy that turned it into a series of sectoral extensions of the centre. This policy ignored the horizontal division of the Soviet Union into a complex of national economic forms.³² This theoretical error was symptomatic of the central authorities' inability to understand the specific political tasks of the Ukrainian revolution. The policy of Ukrainization was based on the consolidation of Ukraine into a single economic body by uniting the industrial working class of the Left Bank with the peasantry of the Right Bank. Gosplan's methodological assumption of an undifferentiated economic unity within the Soviet Union as a whole stemmed from an incorrect historical approach to pre-revolutionary economic relations between Russia and Ukraine and from an unclear position on post-revolutionary relations. The importance of Volobuiev's opening remarks lay in his theoretical assertion of the uniqueness of the Ukrainian revolution and its tasks as rooted in the history of its political economy.

Volobuiev developed his argument in a commentary on the statement of the Russian Marxist historian M.N. Pokrovsky that tsarist Russia had not only been a quasi-colony of European capital but had also possessed colonies of its own. Pokrovsky's statement was significant for its omissions: he mentioned only the Asiatic colonies, which had a lower cultural standard and were subject to exploitation by Russia as a source of raw materials. The European colonies that diverged from this definition were left out of account. It had been the mistake of Polish socialism and Luxemburgism in general, argued Volobuiev, to affirm that Russia's European colonies—Ukraine, Poland and Finland—were indivisible parts of the greater Russian economic empire and not true colonies, which invariably lagged behind the metropolitan centre in economic development. Volobuiev considered that colonies of the Asiatic type were still marked by pre-capitalist forms of production and were subjugated by being forced to provide a wider market for the goods of the core states of Western Europe.

These colonies could be transformed into what Volobuiev called "European-type colonies" if they became subject to capital exports from the core nations. The import of capital and the introduction of capitalist social relations would raise the level of productive forces and, more importantly, develop centrifugal tendencies within the colonial relationship. In Ukraine's case, Volobuiev argued that tsarist rule had been unable to transform Ukraine into an ordinary province of the empire; that the introduction of foreign capital and capitalist relations had produced centrifugal tendencies as Ukraine's heavy industry developed; and that Russian historiography had confused possible natural economic reasons for Moscow's dominance with real socio-economic factors.³³ Given Ukraine's inclusion in the world division of labour, the dominance of foreign capital in the past, and the resulting high level of development of productive forces, Volobuiev implied that the Ukrainian revolution and its post-revolutionary tasks could only take a specific national form.

Since Ukraine had been a European-type colony, as distinct from the relatively underdeveloped Asiatic type, the party's economic task was not to raise the level of productive forces under the guidance of the more advanced centre, i.e., Russia, but to overcome inherited tsarist obstacles which prevented the most rational development of a complex of economic sectors in Ukraine.³⁴ The problem was not one of the level of productive forces but of balanced economic growth. It would be wrong, argued Volobuiev, to consider Ukraine's rate of growth the sole indicator of the transcendence of the colonial heritage. Similarly, Ukraine's role could not be one of simply assisting, by means of the transfer of resources, the development of the more backward regions of the Soviet Union. This was the heart of Volobuiev's critique of the leadership's current perspective on industrialization.

Volobuiev also formulated an original contribution to the debate on the possibility of building socialism in one country.³⁵ As a good party member Volobuiev admitted the possibility of building socialism in one country in the face of capitalist encirclement, but disagreed with the definition of the Soviet Union as "one country." He engaged in such semantic quibbling in order to emphasize that in relation to its own market the Soviet Union constituted a complex unity comprised of many national-economic forms. Soviet autarky must therefore prefigure a world socialist system by means of an international embodiment (albeit within its existing political boundaries) of a fair and just division of labour. Having been transformed into a European-type colony, Ukraine possessed a disproportionately developed heavy industry centred on the primary processing of metals, but with rational allocation of resources it could both develop a balanced economic base and contribute to an increased all-Union

rate of growth. By implication, if revolution in Germany were no longer imminent, then Ukraine, with its high level of productive forces, could take Germany's place as a supplier of processed metallurgical products and manufactured goods to the Soviet market. Given the problems of prefiguring a world socialist division of labour and overcoming the tsarist colonial inheritance, both converged into the necessary realization that Ukraine's role within the Soviet division of labour was not one of existing specialization, but rather of embodying a division of labour between integral national economic units, each with its own unique balance of economic resources. Current location policy was not based on the economic potential of individual republics, but on the dynamics of the Russian market as inherited from the tsarist period.

The VKP(b)'s conception of absolute autarky and vertical specialization, and the resulting problem of excessive centralization, could only lead to mistakes and irrationalities, *de facto* decentralization and anarchic planning by local organs. Volobuiev gave examples of several mistakes, the most important of which was the debate on investment priorities between the Donets basin and the Kuznetsk combine.³⁶ Here Volobuiev argued that the case for the Urals rested on ulterior political motives based on the wrong economic foundations.

The last example of discriminatory practice by the central authorities was budgetary policy. It is important to note that Volobuiev's treatment of this problem was restricted to the last section of the article, consisting of six pages in a hundred-page treatise.³⁷ It is likely that Volobuiev considered it a statistical commentary on the more important theoretical considerations and practical problems of investment trends and decision-making. On the basis of figures provided by Dobrohaiev, Volobuiev concluded not only that Ukraine was receiving less tax revenue than it was contributing to the all-Union budget, but also that the Russian republic was benefiting more than other republics. Volobuiev did not begrudge Ukraine's contribution to all-Union construction, but objected to the unfairly large amount of this contribution. Approximately one-third of Ukraine's taxes had been utilized outside the republic in 1923-4, while Russia retained one-third more than its contribution warranted, with the other republics retaining their appropriate shares. Volobuiev's implicit conclusion was that Ukraine was still being exploited under the centralized Soviet system, considering that the period 1923-7 revealed an overall surplus extraction of taxation revenue of 20 per cent on average, a figure comparable to the financial exploitation of tsarist times. Volobuiev concluded by recommending a series of measures, most of which emphasized the importance of strengthening republican economic organs.³⁸

The Fate of Industrialization in Ukraine

Volobuiev's emphasis on increasing the economic power of the republics struck at the heart of the KP(b)U's conception of industrialization and could not go unchallenged by the leadership. Volobuiev's article was accompanied by a response from Andrii Richytsky, whose criticism was more analytical than that of later polemics. Richytsky's background is of interest in itself.³⁹ He had been the author of the memorandum to the Comintern by the Ukrainian Communist Party (Ukapisty), a left-wing group that had broken with the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1920. The group had requested recognition by the Comintern as the only authentic native communist party (to no avail), and Richytsky had used arguments incorporating the concept of colonial revolution in his discussion of the nature of the socialist revolution and the national question. His arguments on the specificity and national character of the Ukrainian revolution foreshadowed those of Volobuiev, making Richytsky the best qualified party representative to reply to Volobuiev. His attack had two themes—the inadequacy of Volobuiev's budgetary figure and his theoretical deviations.

Richytsky criticized Volobuiev's figures as based on incomplete statistical sources which, on the one hand, underestimated the extent of tsarist exploitation and, on the other hand, overestimated the extent of exploitation in the Soviet period.⁴⁰ Dobrohaiev himself had recognized these problems,⁴¹ and Richytsky's critique was probably sound. Nevertheless, Richytsky had to admit that some surplus was being consistently appropriated during the period of Soviet rule. His only escape was to predict optimistically that the problem would be resolved in the near future. In fact, the exact opposite happened, as the statistics previously cited demonstrate.

Richytsky's theoretical criticisms are of greater interest. He immediately fastened on the "Trotskyist" basis of Volobuiev's conception of the Soviet Union as a federation of national economic units. In the political climate of the time, this was a deadly accusation of heresy.⁴² The conception was Trotskyist, argued Richytsky, in the sense that Volobuiev based his arguments on the nature of the world division of labour and failed to realize the importance of the Soviet Union as a single socio-political entity. Volobuiev implied that since Ukraine had become a European-type colony, its entrance into a union with the USSR, composed of many Asiatic-type colonies, along with its separation from the world capitalist market could only be to Ukraine's detriment. Using selected statistics, Richytsky argued that, on the contrary, Ukraine had derived many benefits from its participation in the Soviet system.

At this point, Richytsky digressed to explain that Ukraine's lower agricultural output did not imply that its agriculture was being exploited at

the expense of industrialization.⁴³ The real problem in agriculture was the existence of small, individual plots. Where individual efforts were made, development lagged behind, but where party and state guidance was evident, progress was manifest. Finally, Richytsky criticized Volobuiev's view of the significance of Ukraine's underdevelopment in the production of consumer goods. This was only a characteristic of Ukraine under capitalism: socialism emphasized the dominance of producer-goods manufacture precisely because it was the necessary precondition for the expansion of consumer-goods production.

There are two significant points about Richytsky's criticism. The first is that Richytsky was concerned with Volobuiev's Trotskyism not because Volobuiev was an explicit proponent of permanent revolution—he was strictly involved with the national question—but because Volobuiev's methodology emphasized the structure of the world division of labour, a central element in the Left Opposition's own theory. The problem with Volobuiev was not his conclusions, but the fact that he reopened the Pandora's box of "socialism in one country." Together with his oblique comments (again following Hrynko's examples) about exploiting the national question in Eastern Europe as a means of spreading revolution and extending Soviet rule into the Polish-occupied territories of Western Ukraine, the logic of Volobuiev's argument could lead one to the concept and practice of permanent revolution.

This brings us to the second interesting implication of Richytsky's criticism. For some reason he found it necessary to refute any idea that Ukraine's agricultural surplus was financing Soviet efforts at industrialization, even though this conception was absent from Volobuiev's work. It would appear that Richytsky was attempting to forestall any possible convergence between Volobuiev's concerns about colonialism and Preobrazhensky's theory of "primitive socialist accumulation." The main thrust of Preobrazhensky's theory, as formulated from 1923 onward, was that an eventual disequilibrium would result from the disproportion between the Soviet Union's small industrial base and the dominance of market relations in agriculture. Given capitalist hostility, the Soviet Union could not industrialize by relying on foreign credits and the massive import of machinery and other industrial goods from the West; moreover, there had been a decrease in grain exports after the revolution. The only solution from Preobrazhensky's viewpoint was the appropriation of the surplus product from the peasantry for industrial investment.⁴⁴

Although never allowing themselves to be openly identified with Preobrazhensky's position, such leading party members as Gleb Krzhizhanovsky, the chairman of Gosplan, its economist Stanislav G. Strumilin and, by extension, Hrynko stressed that market relations and

equilibrium should be subordinate to planning efforts and the expansion of industry. Richytsky's criticism appeared to be an attempt to forestall a theory of non-equivalent exchange between Ukraine's agricultural surplus and Russian manufactured goods, which would provide the source of accumulation for the further industrialization of the Russian industrial centres. Richytsky himself admitted that current budgetary arrangements involved the appropriation of a surplus by the central authorities. He only disputed the significance of surplus appropriation and the prospects of its continuation. Given this colonial relationship and Volobuiev's emphasis on the role of an international division of labour operating within the Soviet Union, as well as his proposed remedy of strengthening republican powers, the implicit conclusion of such a theory was that Ukraine's colonial position necessitated a drive for independence, since the strengthening of republican powers would lead to a conflict with the economic plans of the central authorities.

The only group that was able to come to the defence of Volobuiev was the KPZU leadership, which, being based in Western Ukraine, was free from direct political censorship. When the KPZU leaders published their most systematic exposition and defence of "Shumskyism," they posed the problem of Ukrainization as one of industrialization.⁴⁵ As they understood it, the national question had ceased to be merely a peasant problem and had been transformed into that of developing productive forces in the national republics and unifying those republics which had an overwhelmingly peasant character. In other words, Ukrainization was a two-way street: on the one hand, the Ukrainization of the party and state apparatus along with the Russified Ukrainian working class, and, on the other hand, the consolidation of Soviet influence by industrializing the republic, both in existing centres and, most importantly, in areas of agrarian overpopulation. It was the problem of industrialization and its social context which, in the eyes of the KPZU leadership, brought about a correspondence between Shumsky's perspective and Volobuiev's economic critique. Indigenization would overcome the peasant's cultural backwardness and allow the party to put down roots among the Ukrainian peasant masses. Balanced industrialization under republican control was Ukrainization's economic precondition. Both processes were predicated on the concept of Ukraine's national integrity. Other Marxist theoreticians had discussed the nature of national liberation, but the Ukrainian national communists were the first to explore both the economic and sociological implications of a socialist model of development.

Yet most Ukrainian communist leaders were not willing to support the position of Shumsky and Volobuiev. They feared that the logical extension of their views was the promotion of separatist ideas which would take

Ukraine out of the USSR.⁴⁶ They believed that the principles of Ukrainization could be safeguarded and provide opportunities for economic development. In this context the publication of Volobuiev's controversial article allowed Skrypnyk to continue his attack on the more nationalistic communists, such as Shumsky, the KPZU leadership and Volobuiev, while setting the stage for economic arguments supporting further investment and all-Union expenditures in the Ukrainian republic. His attack was directed against those national communists who were openly questioning the institutional and social arrangements that constituted the Soviet internal colonial structure. While their perspective was rejected, individual problems continued to be raised by such prominent party and government figures as Skrypnyk, Hrynko, Mykola Poloz and Mykhailo Katel of the Commissariat of Finance, Akim Dudnyk of the Ukrainian Gosplan, and I.F. Slynko of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs.⁴⁷ Specific victories on investment levels and the location of factories were seen as a vindication of their strategy.

Both tendencies of Ukrainian national communism were unable or unwilling to confront the problem of mobilizing capital funds required for industrialization. If the proponents of Ukrainian industrialization were not prepared to accept Preobrazhensky's and the Left Opposition's call for increased taxation of the peasantry, then the only alternative for the Ukrainian leadership in attempting to fund large-scale capital projects was for Ukraine to take full control of its resources by minimizing the transfer of any surplus product outside its borders. Their attempt to gain autonomous economic prerogatives, regardless of specific victories on individual projects, became increasingly unrealizable once the first Five-Year Plan and collectivization were announced.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Evgenii Preobrazhensky, *The Crisis of Soviet Industrialization*, ed. D. Filtzer (White Plains, 1979) and Stephen Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (London, 1974).
2. For a good description see James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), Chapters 2 and 3.
3. *Budivnytstvo Radianskoi Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1928) and T. Hunczak and R. Solchanyk, eds., *Ukrainska suspilno-politychna dumka v 20 st.* (n.pl., 1983), 2: 158–87.
4. Mace, 95–111.
5. See, for example, M. Stasiuk, *Ekonomichni vidnosyny Ukrainy do Velyko-Rosii i Polshchi* (Kiev, 1911); M. Porsh, *Ukraina v derzhavnomu biudzheti Rosii* (Katerynoslav, 1918).

6. Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (Oxford, 1985), Chapter 1.
7. E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies, *Foundations of a Planned Economy* (Harmondsworth, 1976), vol. 1; K. Kobersky, *Ukraina v svitovomu hospodarstvi* (Prague, 1933).
8. B. Vynar, *Rozvytok ukrainskoi lehkoj promyslovosti* (Denver, 1955).
9. See, for example, V. Holubnychy, "The Causes of the 1932-33 Famine," *Meta* 2 (1975), no. 2; R. Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow* (New York, 1986); and B. Krawchenko and R. Serbyn, ed., *Famine in Ukraine 1932-33* (Edmonton, 1986).
10. V. Sadovsky, "Problema industriializatsii v narodnomu hospodarstvi" in *Suchasni problemy ekonomiky Ukrainy* (Warsaw, 1929), 1:125-6; Z.L. Melnyk, *Soviet Capital Formation: Ukraine 1928/29-32* (Munich, 1965), 134.
11. B. Vynar, *Ukrainska promyslovist* (Paris, 1964), 49-53; Carr and Davies, 1:386-95.
12. V. Sadovsky, "Piatylitka i narodno-hospodarski interesy Ukrainy" in *Suchasni problemy ekonomiky Ukrainy* (Warsaw, 1931), 1:116; Carr and Davies, 1:380-88, 478-82.
13. Sadovsky, "Problema," 136.
14. V. Holubnychy, "Foreword" in Melnyk, op.cit.
15. Carr and Davies, 1:961.
16. Vynar, *Rozvytok*, 23-4.
17. Sadovsky, "Piatylitka," 100.
18. Calculated from data in *Finansy Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1927), 44-6 and Melnyk, 91, 126, 130.
19. Melnyk, 125-30.
20. As calculated by V. Dobrohaiev in *Heohrafichni rozpodil derzhavnykh i mistsevykh prybutkiv i vydatkiv po okruhakh Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1929); A. Richytsky, "Stan UkrSSr v Radianskomu Soiuzi" in *Budivnytstvo Radianskoi Ukrainy*, 185; and Melnyk, op. cit.
21. The term is borrowed from Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1836-1966* (Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1974), although I do not believe that Hechter's argument is directly applicable to Soviet Ukraine.
22. Melnyk, 90.
23. I. Maistrenko, *Borotbism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (New York, 1954).
24. H. Hrynko, *Narysy radianskoi prosvitnoi polityky* (Kharkiv, 1923) and S. Bailes, *Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin* (Princeton, 1978), Chapter 7.

25. H. Hrynko, "Narys ukrainskoi ekonomiky," *Chervonyi shliakh*, no. 5–6 (1926): 120–36.
26. Ibid., 120–21.
27. Ibid., 122.
28. Ibid., 128.
29. Ibid., 129–32.
30. Ibid., 125–7.
31. Carr and Davies, 1: 299.
32. M. Volobuiev, "Do problemy ukrainskoi ekonomiky" in *Dokumenty ukrainskoho komunizmu* (New York, 1962), 133.
33. Ibid., 137–40.
34. Ibid., 187–8.
35. Ibid., 190.
36. Ibid., 209–14.
37. Ibid., 220–26.
38. Ibid., 227–8.
39. Mace, 77–8, 176.
40. Richytsky, op. cit., 183–6.
41. Dobrohaiev, 121–31.
42. Richytsky, 172.
43. Ibid., 179–80.
44. Preobrazhensky, op. cit. See Filtzer's introduction to Preobrazhensky's essay for a detailed treatment of this question.
45. *Cherez pryzmu marksivskoi krytyky* (Lviv, 1928), 10–12.
46. M. Skrypnyk, "Z pryvodu ekonomichnoi platformy natsionalizmu" in *Budivnytstvo Radianskoi Ukrainy*, 188–93.
47. *Visti*, 17 October 1928.

UKRAINIANS IN CANADA: 1981 CENSUS PROFILE

Some twenty years ago John Porter wrote in his useful volume, *Canadian Social Structure*, that statistics may not be the easiest way to learn about a society, but they do provide an accurate account of what that society looks like.¹ The purpose of this paper is to provide the interested layman and serious student alike with a statistical profile, or, in Porter's words, an "accurate picture" of the Ukrainian ethnic group in Canada during the 1981 census year.² The paper will describe and interpret data pertinent to the study of Ukrainian-Canadian society and, where analysis permits, offer some prognostications on possible future developments within the community.

In profiling the community, several structural features and important areas of social activity have been selected for examination. These include the demography of the group; its immigrant/non-immigrant character; religious composition; levels of linguistic retention/assimilation; educational achievement; labour force activity; occupational structure; and income characteristics. The study sample is restricted to "single-origin Ukrainians." In 1981, census respondents were offered greater latitude in identifying their ethnic roots, including possible "multiple origins." This resulted in the creation of single- and multiple-origin categories.³ In keeping with the intention behind this change in the ethnic classification procedure, the study concentrates on those who elected to identify themselves solely with their Ukrainian heritage. However, relevant observations and analytical comparisons with multiple-origin results have also been made. As for the data, these were derived from published and unpublished sources, particularly customized tabulations.⁴ Discrepancies in aggregations due to confidentiality considerations and sampling error are the only limitations of the data. The reader is therefore advised that the totals described here may differ from other published results, although, if disaggregation is not too detailed, the errors would be small.

Distribution


Historically, the Ukrainian ethnic group has constituted one of the larger non-British, non-French ethnic minorities in Canada. According to the 1981 decennial census, Ukrainians in Canada still maintain a

numerically dominant position in the Canadian population. In 1981, there were 529,615 individuals who declared Ukrainian as their single ethnic origin and an additional 225,360 who indicated Ukrainian to be at least *part* of their ethnic heritage—the so-called Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents. Those who claimed Ukrainian as their single ethnic origin formed 2.2% of the total Canadian population, establishing Ukrainians as fifth in size relative to all other ethnic groups, exceeded in numbers only by the British (the combination of English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, etc.), French, Germans and Italians.

Significant regional differences exist in the distribution of the population across Canada. Figure 1 shows that Alberta leads with 25.8% of the total Ukrainian single-origin population. Ontario is slightly behind with 25.3%, while Manitoba and Saskatchewan follow with 18.8% and 14.5% respectively. This rank-order, however, changes when the single-origin Ukrainian group within each province is treated as a percentage of the total provincial population: single-origin Ukrainians constitute 9.8% of Manitoba's total population; Saskatchewan, 8.0%; Alberta, 6.1%; British Columbia, 2.3%; and Ontario, 1.5%. The majority (30.6%) of Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents, i.e., those who identified Ukrainian as part of their ethnic ancestry, are found in Ontario.

Figure 1

Single Origin Ukrainian Population
by province, Canada, 1981.



The greatest concentration of Ukrainians occurs within the Prairie region. This, of course, coincides with their historic settlement of the area during the early period in the development of the Canadian West. Significant numbers of Ukrainians homesteaded the Prairies both prior to World War I, when the so-called *first wave* of Ukrainian immigration came to Canada, and again after immigration laws were relaxed during the years 1923-9 (the *second wave*). The majority of Ukrainians resident on the Prairies today are descendants of these early pioneers. The 1981 census shows that 91% of single-origin Ukrainians on the Prairies are non-immigrants and that, of this non-immigrant group, 90% indicated the Prairies as their place of birth, a meaningful statistic when the low levels of Ukrainian immigration to Canada since 1954 and the inter-provincial migratory pattern of the group are considered (see below).

The large number of Ukrainians in the province of Ontario (the vast majority of whom reside in the "golden horseshoe" of southern Ontario) is in part a function of the immediate post-World War II immigration of Ukrainian refugees to Canada, the so-called *third wave*. Of the surviving number of immigrants who arrived during the postwar years of 1946-54, 62.1% declared Ontario as their province of residence in 1981. Although the postwar component comprised only 13.9% of the total single-origin Ukrainian population in Ontario in 1981, their impact on Ukrainian population growth in this region is still considerable, given the added numerical weight of their offspring and the offspring of those who have since died. However, in explaining the large presence of Ukrainians in Ontario, a more crucial factor appears to be internal migration. Thirty per cent of the single-origin non-immigrant Ukrainians in the province were born elsewhere in Canada.⁵

Unlike Ontario, both Quebec and the Maritimes have not attracted many Ukrainians; only a small number live outside the urban pockets of Montreal and the Sydney-Glace Bay area of Nova Scotia. British Columbia, on the other hand, has recorded substantial gains in its Ukrainian population and, again, internal migration appears to be the crucial factor operating here. Two-thirds (66.5%) of the single-origin non-immigrant Ukrainians in British Columbia were born in other provinces, notably Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Alberta. In fact, 60.4% of the total single-origin Ukrainians in British Columbia are originally from the three Prairie provinces.


This shift in the Ukrainian population from the Prairies, especially Saskatchewan and Manitoba, has enabled various Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) to increase their share of the total Ukrainian population. Vancouver is an example: 40.6% of Vancouver's single-origin non-immigrant Ukrainians are originally from Saskatchewan and Manitoba alone (see Figure 2). The CMAs of Toronto, Hamilton, St. Catharines and

Windsor have also benefited as a result of the influx of migrants from Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The 1981 Census indicates that former residents of these two provinces constituted 23.3% of the total single-origin Ukrainians in Toronto; 24.1% in Hamilton; 19.8% in St. Catharines-Niagara; and 14.7% in Windsor.

Figure 2

Single Origin Non-Immigrant Ukrainian Population

by selected CMAS showing province of birth, 1981.



Despite the fact that Albertans of Ukrainian extraction have been migrating to British Columbia—18.8% of Vancouver's single-origin non-immigrant population, for example, are former Albertans—the Ukrainian population of both Calgary and Edmonton has continued to grow. Migration from Saskatchewan and Manitoba, again, is essential to understanding this phenomenon. A full 37.3% of the single-origin Ukrainians in Calgary, for instance, are former residents of these two provinces. This out-migration of Ukrainians from Manitoba and relative growth of the Ukrainian population in Alberta explains why Edmonton has replaced Winnipeg as the urban centre with the largest concentration of single-origin Ukrainians.⁶ If this trend is not reversed, it may very well

affect the historical perception of Winnipeg as the centre of Ukrainian life in Canada.

The Ukrainian population shift from the Prairies can be attributed to a combination of factors, including the increasing urbanization and social mobility of the Ukrainian ethnic group, the performance of regional economies, and the advanced quality of life offered in certain urban centres.

Immigration


International migration has long been recognized as an important factor affecting population change. It is not surprising, therefore, given recent levels of Ukrainian immigration to Canada, that it has had little noticeable effect on the growth of the community. Data from the 1981 census indicate that only 14.4% of the total Ukrainian single-origin group are immigrants. Of this percentage, 48.6% arrived prior to 1946, while those who arrived in the period 1946-54 comprised 37.6% of the Ukrainian component. The remaining 13.8%—or 2.0% of the total single-origin Ukrainian population—settled in Canada during the years 1955-81. This latter percentage compares unfavourably with the national immigrant total for the same period, as 68.3% of the entire immigrant population of Canada arrived during these same years—a ratio of nearly five to one. In less abstract terms, since 1971 there have been on average only 285 individuals of Ukrainian extraction who have emigrated to Canada every year. This is a function of the internal political constraints in the Soviet Union, which have largely prevented the emigration of Soviet citizens.

Among single-origin Ukrainians, 44.6% were 19 years of age or younger when they arrived in Canada. This percentage approximates the national figure. Slight but important differences appear, however, when the age-sex structure is decomposed into five-year cohorts and examined in relation to the national all-ethnic origin group. The findings show that there are more single-origin Ukrainians who were infants (0-4 years) or 24-35 years of age at the time of their arrival in Canada. There is also a significant difference in the sex structure of the 24-35-year-old cohort, where males are over-represented. These discrepancies can be explained by the absence of Ukrainian immigration to Canada, the peculiar migratory pattern of the group, and certain demographic characteristics associated, in this instance, with the *third wave* of Ukrainian immigration. These require closer examination.


Because the immigration of Ukrainians to Canada in the recent past has been negligible, the homogenizing effect produced by ongoing immigration does not take place in this case. Theoretically, this should have a twofold effect: a) mortality within the immigrant group should become more pronounced; and b) the special demographic characteristics of any distinct

migratory wave should still remain visible, assuming this element continues to exist in significant numbers. Census data show that mortality has had a considerable effect on the *second wave* of Ukrainian immigration, which settled in Canada during the 1920s. With few exceptions, only the very young from this period of settlement have survived. This partially explains the disproportion in the 0-4-year-old cohort at the time of arrival in the total immigrant component.

Mortality, however, has not affected to the same degree the *third wave* of Ukrainian immigration because of its peculiar age structure. The group was relatively homogeneous in its age composition at the time of its arrival (24-35 years). This was a result of Canadian immigration policy, which, at the conclusion of the war, targeted able-bodied men and women to work as contract labourers in agriculture and heavy industry. Men, of course, were more desirable. Both features—age and sex—have been carried forward in time and appear as distinct characteristics of this postwar migratory group. It also necessarily accounts for the age-sex distortion in the 24-35-year-old cohort at the time of arrival for the entire group.



However, the true significance of the variation in the age structure of the immigrant component at the time of immigration consists in its explanation of the current age structure of the Ukrainian immigrant group. Figure 3, which provides comparative data on the age-sex structure of the Ukrainian immigrant component and the Ukrainian non-immigrant element (single-origin only), shows a disproportionate number of elderly among the immigrants. This is primarily due to the fact that the group is not being replenished by new and younger arrivals. More importantly, what is seen here is the combined effect of aging on the surviving members of the *second* and *third waves* of immigration whose age at the time of arrival has resulted in a certain amount of covariance or overlap in their current age structures. This covariance necessarily means that in 1981 a substantial number of those born outside of Canada should be in the upper range of the age scale. The data corroborate this conclusion, as an overwhelming 82.2% of the single-origin Ukrainian immigrant population in 1981 are found to be 55 years or older.




Although the Ukrainian immigrant component constitutes only 14.4% of the total single-origin Ukrainian ethnic group, the imbalance in the age

structure of the immigrants should have some bearing on the age structure of the Ukrainian ethnic group as a whole. Figure 4 illustrates its partial effect. A comparison of the total all-ethnic origin population with the Ukrainian ethnic minority shows a disproportionate number of elderly in the latter. This, however, is not due entirely to the increased number of elderly within the immigrant component. Other factors, such as fertility, must also be considered. The fertility rate in the case of the Ukrainian ethnic group was estimated to be 1.63 in 1976,⁷ well below the replacement level of 2.1. This would not only have a net negative effect on growth, but also proportionately increase the number of elderly within the group as a whole.

Place of Birth

Data on the birthplace of the single-origin Ukrainian immigrant component shows that the bulk of this immigration was born in the Soviet Union (54.3%) and Poland (24.6%). Certain variations occur, however, when the period of immigration is introduced as a control variable (see Figure 5). Immigration from Poland, for instance, was relatively greater in




the pre-1946 period than in the postwar years. This can be attributed to the large portion of western Ukrainian ethnic territory that was incorporated into the Polish state during the interwar years. Data on immigration from Austria by period of immigration also indicate a disproportionate number of migrants in the years preceding 1946. Again, this can be explained by the old political-territorial configurations that saw Ukrainian ethnic territories fall under the jurisdiction of a foreign state. In this case, the immigrants are those born in the Ukrainian territories which were under Austrian imperial rule prior to 1918 and who came to Canada as children in the *second wave* of Ukrainian immigration to Canada. The age structure of Ukrainian immigrants from this area provides indirect evidence of this: 55% of all the single-origin Ukrainian immigrants from Austria were children or adolescents who arrived in the pre-1946 immigration, i.e., during the 1920s, when Canadian immigration laws were relaxed.

Comparatively speaking, the majority of Ukrainian immigrants who came to Canada in the immediate post-World War II period were born in the Soviet Union and Germany. Those Ukrainian immigrants who indicated the Soviet Union as their place of birth were political refugees who voluntarily or involuntarily left Soviet Ukraine during the war and refused to return at the conclusion of hostilities. The migrants of Ukrainian extraction from Germany, on the other hand, are primarily children of these refugees, as well as children of refugees from Ukrainian territories located in pre-1939 Poland who were born in the Displaced Persons' camps of Germany in the immediate aftermath of the war. The age structure of the latter unqualifiably supports this contention. Of the total single-origin Ukrainian immigrants born in Germany who came to Canada during this period, 69.4% were infants (0-4 years).

Interestingly, in relation to other points of origin, the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians born in the United States who emigrated to Canada during 1955-81 was significantly greater during these years than in previous periods. This must be interpreted in light of the overall decline in the absolute number of Ukrainian immigrants who have arrived from other foreign parts. Since immigration to Canada by Americans of Ukrainian extraction has remained constant over time, a proportional increase in size is not wholly unexpected. The fact, however, that a relative increase is registered for immigrants from such a non-traditional source as the United States points to the diminishing role of Europe and the "homeland" in the physical and social rejuvenation of the group in Canada. The immigration figures for the five-year period 1977-81 are especially telling. Of 885 single-origin Ukrainians who immigrated to Canada during this time (comprising only 0.2% of the total single-origin Ukrainian population), 335 were born in the Soviet Union, while 220 were Americans of Ukrainian heritage.

Figure 6

Single Origin Ukrainian Population Born in Canada
showing province of birth, 1981.



On the issue of birthplace, it should be noted that there were an additional 6,150 multiple-origin respondents born outside Canada who claimed at least partial Ukrainian ancestry. Of this group, 26.3% emigrated from the United States; 17.7% from Poland; 12.4% from the USSR; 10.2% from Germany; and 2.5% from Austria. Ukrainian multiple-origin emigration is demonstrably higher from the United States than from other foreign countries. The dissimilarity in results between the United States and Europe, of course, points to profound differences in the social and historical conditions which have shaped the particular character of the Ukrainian ethnic identity in these areas.

Finally, constriction in the flow of immigration from the home country has also meant that Canada is the birthplace of the majority of Ukrainians in Canada. Data on the provincial birthplace of single-origin Ukrainians in Canada reveals that almost 75% of Ukrainian non-immigrants were born on the Prairies. This will change dramatically in the near future as more Ukrainians abandon the Prairie provinces, notably Manitoba and Saskatchewan, for other parts of the country.

*Religion*⁸


The Ukrainian church has long been an important institutional structure around which the activity of the group has coalesced. It has also served historically as a powerful bar against assimilatory pressures. The Ukrainian church in Canada, however, is currently faced with a crisis. Less than half (48.6%) of the single-origin Ukrainian population belong to either of the two traditional denominations—Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox—and slightly less than half of this group (49.4%) reside in only two provinces: Alberta and Ontario.

The largest absolute concentration of traditional adherents (the combination of Ukrainian Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox) occurs in the province of Alberta. Alberta's primacy may be explained by the disproportionate number of Ukrainian Orthodox faithful in this province, constituting 34.0% of the national total. This compares with 22.0% for Ontario, 16.8% for Saskatchewan, and 15.7% for Manitoba. Manitoba, on the other hand, leads the other provinces in its share of Ukrainian Catholic adherents. In 1981, 26.5% of the total number of single-origin Ukrainians who claimed membership in the Ukrainian Catholic church were to be found in this province. Corresponding percentages for Ontario, Alberta and Saskatchewan were 26.0%, 21.3% and 16.1% respectively.

Manitoba historically has led the other provinces in its share of Ukrainian Catholic adherents, although its lead has diminished over time. Conversely, it has only been since 1961 that Alberta's share of the total Ukrainian Orthodox following has increased. This, however, is artificial, largely because of the loss of adherents (whether through defection or migration) of the Ukrainian Orthodox church in the other provinces. The Ukrainian Orthodox component in Alberta's Ukrainian population has also been decreasing, but at a slower rate. In this regard, it should be pointed out that across all provinces the rates of decline in the recent past for both traditional denominations have been significant.

The following percentages were recorded when the traditional faiths were expressed as a proportion of the single-origin Ukrainian population in each province: Quebec, 61.3%; Manitoba, 57.3%; Saskatchewan, 54.9%; Alberta, 49.4%; Ontario, 47.0%; and British Columbia, 28.0%. The differences reflect the varying degree to which the two denominations are represented among individuals at the top end of the age scale within each province. Of the single-origin Ukrainians in Quebec who were 55 years of age and over, 73.5% claimed membership in one of the two traditional denominations: in Manitoba, 69.5%; Saskatchewan, 68.2%; Alberta, 66.6%; Ontario, 59.7%; and British Columbia, 43.6%. This naturally translates into a significant percentage at the national level: 63% of those 55 or older indicated adherence to one of the two traditional faiths. This

compares, for example, with 41% for the 20-39-year-old component. It means that 59% of all single-origin Ukrainians within this cohort identified themselves with a non-traditional religious denomination or, alternatively, indicated no religious preference—an alarming figure for the churches.



Data on the religious composition of the entire ethnic group shows that fifty-one per cent of single-origin Ukrainians gave their religion as other than Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox. The Roman Catholic (16.5%), United (13.4%); and Anglican (3.7%) churches are the predominant non-traditional denominations. Ukrainian single-origin respondents also claimed membership in a variety of other Protestant and Fundamentalist sects, including Lutheran (1.6%), Pentecostal (1.4%), Baptist (1.4%) and Jehovah's Witnesses (1.3%). Interestingly, 7.9% indicated no religious preference, which exceeds the national figure of 7.4%.

The problem of defection from the two traditional faiths and the general malaise affecting the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox churches in Canada is perhaps best illustrated by the introduction of some cross-sectional variables. Among single-origin Ukrainian immigrants, for example, 72.1% identify themselves as Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox. The corresponding

figure for non-immigrants is 43.3%. This, of course, explains the high concentration of the traditional faiths in the 55-year-old cohort. We recall that a substantial portion of those aged 55 and older are immigrants and, because of their immigrant experience, are more apt to maintain the cultural symbols and institutions with which they are most familiar. But more importantly, as this element passes from the scene and no new immigration arrives in Canada that would be culturally sympathetic to the two churches, a dramatic decline can be expected to occur across the country in both denominations during the next fifteen years.

Language


Language is an integral feature of an ethnic group's cultural and social development. Accordingly, mother tongue and language use are valid measures of the cultural vitality of the community. In the Ukrainian case, comparative data reveal that the number of persons who indicated Ukrainian as their mother tongue fell sharply during the years 1961-81. A negative percentage change of 19% was recorded for this period. In absolute terms, this signifies a decrease of some 69,000 individuals who had declared Ukrainian to be the language first learned and still understood.

Polarity in age structure is the most striking feature of the group that declared Ukrainian as its mother tongue. Although those aged 55 and over constitute only 28% of the total single-origin Ukrainian population, this element accounts for a disproportionate 49% of the individuals who identified Ukrainian as their mother tongue. In Ontario, 30% are aged 55 or older. Because of the substantial number of elderly Ukrainians in Ontario, this cohort—that is, Ontarians 55 and older who indicate Ukrainian as their mother tongue—constitutes a significant 15% of the national Ukrainian-speaking total.

Interestingly, 2.4% of those who claimed Ukrainian mother tongue were not ethnically Ukrainian, while another 4.0% were Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents. Expressed as a percentage of their provincial total, the largest number of Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents who indicated Ukrainian mother tongue occurs in Manitoba (7.2%); Saskatchewan and Quebec follow with 5.9% each. On the other hand, the following percentages (expressed as a percentage of their provincial totals) were registered for those single-origin respondents who indicated Ukrainian as their mother tongue: Quebec, 64.4%; Ontario, 53.2%; Saskatchewan, 51.5%; Manitoba, 50.8%; and Alberta, 43.7%. The frequency of those who identified Ukrainian as their mother tongue in Quebec would suggest a strong degree of cultural cohesion and attachment within the community, pointing to some interesting social dynamics at work within this province.

Figure 8


Population with Ukrainian Mother Tongue
showing home language, Canada, 1981.



To a degree, the results on Ukrainian mother tongue may be viewed as an index of the decline in the Ukrainian language as a social factor in the life of the community and the family. This is further revealed in the data on home language use. Figure 8 shows that only 31% of all those who claimed Ukrainian as their mother tongue used it as a means of communication in the home. A phenomenally high percentage of this group (68%) are aged 55 or older. Moreover, unevenness in the geographic distribution of the group is also apparent, as Ontario leads with 35%, followed by Manitoba with 21%, Alberta with 18%, and Saskatchewan with 15%. In total, Ukrainian home language users comprise only 17% of the single-origin Ukrainian ethnic population in Canada.

The recent and sharp decrease in the number of individuals who claimed Ukrainian mother tongue, as well as the small number of Ukrainian home language users in 1981, can be explained empirically by the combination of a) mortality conditions operating on the remnants of the *second wave* and postwar immigrants, both of whom, being first-generation, constitute a large demographic block of Ukrainian language speakers; and b) the virtual absence of Ukrainian immigration to Canada in the late 1960s and 70s. The

rate of language loss will continue to be dramatic in the immediate future as the effects of mortality take their toll on the core of the postwar immigrants (a group whose age composition is relatively homogeneous) and as immigration levels continue to be negligible. The community in Ontario will be most affected—a function of the fact that the bulk of the Ukrainian postwar immigration gravitated toward the urban industrial centres of southern Ontario—although the Prairie communities, given the evidence cited above, will be prone to similar effects. The rate of language loss will taper off with the disappearance of this cohort, although it will probably continue to be significant if current rates of urbanization and intermarriage remain constant.⁹



Family structure is also important for language retention and use. In 1981, of all marriages involving individuals with Ukrainian mother tongue, only 40% had both husband and wife sharing Ukrainian as their mother tongue (see Figure 9). This, of course, will have a negative effect on language retention, given the enormous difficulty of maintaining language use in families when there is no natural lingual tie between the two partners. For example, in 1981, only 8% of children conceived in husband-

wife families where only one partner indicated Ukrainian as his or her home language used Ukrainian in the home. This compares with 37% in those husband-wife families where both partners shared Ukrainian as their home language. As long as the current rate of intermarriage remains high among Ukrainians, levels of language retention and use will decline.¹⁰





Figure 10 illustrates the official-language structure of the Ukrainian ethnic group. Only 1.1% of Ukrainian single-origin respondents have neither knowledge of English nor French. Table 10 also shows that the official-language structure of the Ukrainian immigrant component differs only marginally from that of the non-immigrant group; a differential of only 5.6% is recorded. All things considered, one should expect a larger percentage spread between the two groups. This can be explained by the composition of the immigrant component. Of the total number of single-origin Ukrainian immigrants in Canada, 48.6% arrived prior to 1946, allowing sufficient time to elapse for these individuals to acquire knowledge of one of Canada's two official languages. This has undoubtedly been facilitated by the fact that most Ukrainian immigrants who have survived from this period were children at the time of arrival.


Data on the socio-economic character of the bilingual (English and French) element in the single-origin Ukrainian population conforms to expectations. For example, those who indicated their ability to speak both of Canada's official languages are concentrated in the upper end of the education scale. Specifically, 17% of all single-origin Ukrainian university graduates with a Bachelor's degree or higher claim to be bilingual. This compares, for instance, with only 4% of those who have some form of post-secondary non-university education, e.g., community college. The widely accepted view that there is a strong positive correlation between level of schooling and occupational status suggests that the incidence of bilingual speakers would also occur more naturally within the management/administration occupation category. The census data substantiate this view, as 13.4% of those single-origin Ukrainians who are engaged in managerial or administrative positions are bilingual.

Interestingly, there are disproportionately more individuals who claimed to be bilingual in the clerical occupation group than in other occupation categories. The high frequency of bilingual speakers among Ukrainian clerical workers can be explained in part by the federal government's position on official bilingualism in the public service sector and the fact that 7.9% of the single-origin Ukrainian labour force is employed in public administration and defence.



Occupation


The occupation structure of the single-origin Ukrainian labour force closely resembles the composition of the national work force with some allowance made for fractional over- or under-representation. The sole exception is in the primary sector, i.e., mineral extraction, agriculture, forestry and fishing (see Figure 11). Whereas 8.7% of the single-origin Ukrainian population earned their livelihood within the primary industries in 1981, only 5.7% of the national total (all-ethnic origins) were similarly engaged. This anomaly can be explained by the disproportionate number of Ukrainians involved in agriculture. Comparative census data show that 7.3% of the single-origin Ukrainian group indicated their occupation dealt with some form of agricultural activity (farming, horticulture, or animal husbandry) as opposed to 4.1% for the entire Canadian population. The disproportionate share of Ukrainians within this sector is not surprising given the strong historical tradition of Ukrainian participation in agrobusiness and production.



Within occupation groups, percentage differences also exist at the level of Ukrainian single- and multiple-origin respondents. Only 4.9% of


Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents were engaged in some facet of the primary sector. This is significantly fewer than for the single-origin group. Equally, some variation occurs between Ukrainian single- and multiple-origin respondents at the clerical level as well as within those occupations dealing with the natural and social sciences, religion and the arts. Comparatively speaking, a higher concentration of multiple-origin respondents are found in all of these occupations. Less pronounced but still visible is the variation within the management, health, and teaching occupation groups: proportionately fewer Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents are in management occupations, while slightly more are in the teaching and health related professions.

Further data on Ukrainian occupation status discloses the not wholly unexpected phenomenon of gender bias. The data reveal that gender is an important determinant of occupation.¹¹ For example, a significant 37.6% of the Ukrainian female labour force 15 years and over (single-origin) are employed in a clerical or related capacity, while only 6.6% of Ukrainian males are found in this occupational category. Similarly, 16.8% of the female Ukrainian labour force are engaged in the service industry, which compares with 7.5% for Ukrainian males (see Figure 13). Moreover,




within the managerial/administrative occupation group a ratio of 3:1 exists favouring males, while only 15.6% of the total Ukrainian labour force (single-origin) engaged in the highly unionized secondary industries are female. It should be pointed out, however, that this imbalance is systemic in nature, appearing at the national all-ethnic origin level as well.

Despite the fact that the occupation structure of the Ukrainian female group follows that of the national female population in its overall direction, comparative analysis does show some discreet variation in the distribution of both groups across the various occupation classifications. As a percentage of their total labour force and in comparison to the national group, Ukrainian females are over-represented in clerical, sales, service, and agricultural occupations, while under-represented in processing, and in medicine and health. The respective differentials are as follows: +1.2%; +1.0%; +1.1%; +1.6%; -0.8%; and -0.8%.



Important differences also exist in the occupation structure of the immigrant /non-immigrant Ukrainian populations. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 14. The immigrant component is significantly over-represented in service, machining, and product fabricating (includes


assembly and repair), while significantly under-represented in clerical occupations. This variance can be explained by the age at the time of arrival of the immigrant component. A disproportionate 42.1% of single-origin Ukrainian immigrants who arrived as adults in Canada are gainfully employed in service, machining, product fabricating and related occupations. Comparatively, this percentage differs radically from that recorded for the immigrant component who arrived in Canada as children or adolescents (21.3%) and whose occupation structure closely resembles that of the non-immigrant group. It points to the rather glaring fact that immigrants who arrive as adults are handicapped, for the most part, by their lack of technical and communication skills. The majority are inevitably funneled into jobs that require little or no skill, explaining both the overall concentration of Ukrainian immigrants in the above occupation groups and why so relatively few are employed in a clerical capacity.



Education

The lack of technical and communication skills among immigrants is to a certain degree a problem of education. The 1981 census shows that the


single-origin Ukrainian non-immigrant group, in relation to its immigrant counterpart, has achieved higher levels of schooling. For example, 16.2% of the non-immigrant element has had some formal university training (degree not necessarily completed) as compared to 10.6% for the Ukrainian immigrant component (see Figure 15). More importantly within the elementary-secondary category, 59.6% of the immigrant component had less than grade nine schooling as compared to 19.4% for the Ukrainian single-origin non-immigrant group. Of the latter, 61.6% were adults at the time of immigration. The economic problems associated with the low entry status of Ukrainian immigrants into the Canadian social structure undoubtedly have prevented many from attaining higher levels of formal education. But one must also consider that the bulk of immigrants were postwar arrivals and that postwar immigration policy was aimed directly at bringing in contract labour to fill the unskilled ranks of the Canadian labour force. This element, therefore, can be seen in part as a result of that conscious policy decision by the Canadian Government.




At issue, however, is the strong positive correlation between occupational status and level of schooling which immigrant status serves to

highlight. The census data demonstrate that the probability is much higher for Ukrainian immigrants with lower levels of education to be in the non-technical, labour-intensive occupations. For example, 18.8% of the Ukrainian single-origin immigrant group with grade nine schooling or less are employed in the machining and product fabricating occupational group. This compares with 9.2% for the non-immigrant group. Likewise, a greater percentage of immigrants with less than grade nine schooling are employed in the service sector in comparison to non-immigrants with a similar level of schooling. The differential between the two groups is 6.7%.

This positive relationship between level of schooling and type of occupation is further illustrated when data for the entire single-origin Ukrainian ethnic group are analyzed. Figure 16 provides a visual sense of that relationship. The results show that Ukrainians with a university education are concentrated in professional occupations; the non-university component works principally in clerical and related occupations as well as in the machining and product fabricating industries; while the greatest portion of those with elementary-secondary schooling are found, again, in clerical, and not unexpectedly in service and primary occupations.



The positive relationship between level of schooling and occupational status, however, does not necessarily hold true when gender is introduced as a factor. Census data reveal that 22.3% of single-origin Ukrainian males with some form of university training are located in the management/administration occupation group. This compares with 8.7% for Ukrainian females with a similar level of educational standing. Other significant differences also exist in occupation status at this particular level of schooling. For example, 5.9% of single-origin Ukrainian males with university training are in clerical positions while 13.6% are in the teaching profession. The figures for Ukrainian females are 24.5% and 27.5% respectively. These comparative statistics highlight the play and influence of traditional values within this group which govern social roles according to gender. As a form of social inequality, however, a division of labour based on gender should not be seen as a problem endemic to the group itself but rather symptomatic of its structural occurrence within Canadian society as a whole.¹²




The single-origin Ukrainian ethnic group varies somewhat from the total Canadian population in its educational composition. Figure 18 shows

the results for the highest level of education attained by both the single-origin Ukrainian and total Canadian (all-ethnic origin) populations. The data indicates that Ukrainians are slightly over-represented at the elementary-secondary school level (+2.8%) and under-represented at higher levels of schooling. This is somewhat unusual, since the majority within the Ukrainian ethnic group are born in Canada and the census data show that there is a strong correlation between place of birth and level of schooling. The results can perhaps be explained by the historical legacy of the rural character of the Ukrainian ethnic group, which in the past has impeded its social mobility. In this regard, it has only been recently (the last two generations) that the Ukrainian ethnic group has broken away from its rural setting with its emphasis on agriculture.

Significantly, there is a larger percentage of university graduates among Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents than among those who indicate Ukrainian as their single origin. A substantial difference between single- and multiple-origin respondents also exists at the elementary-secondary school level, there being fewer among the Ukrainian multiple-origin group, whose level of schooling was strictly elementary-secondary in nature.


Figure 19 Single Origin Ukrainian Population, 15 Years and Over, by sex showing participation in labour force, Canada, 1981.



Labour Force Activity


The 1981 census data on labour force activity of the various ethnic groups disclose some interesting results on the labour characteristics of each. For instance, the participation rate—the percentage of the total able-bodied population 15 years and over engaged in some form of labour activity—is higher for certain ethnic minorities than for others. This is true for the Ukrainian single-origin ethnic group whose participation rate (66%) was slightly above the norm (65%).¹³

The higher participation rates recorded by such groups as the Chinese (70%) and Ukrainians (66%) can be attributed to the increased participation of their respective female populations in the labour force; participation was up by approximately nine percentage points over the mean for Chinese females and 2% for the Ukrainian female population. However, despite this relatively higher participation rate among Ukrainian females, Figure 19 shows that, in comparison to males, Ukrainian females still constitute a decidedly smaller percentage of the total Ukrainian work force (single-origin only).



Data on the immigrant/non-immigrant components of the single-origin Ukrainian group also reveal some salient differences in participation rates. The participation rate for the Ukrainian non-immigrant group was calculated to be 70.6% during the census reference week, i.e., the week prior to enumeration used to determine the economic activity of the labour force. This compares with 41.5% for Ukrainian immigrants (see Figure 20). The rate for Ukrainian immigrants, however, has been artificially depressed and can be explained by the latter's age structure. Specifically, the disproportionate share of elderly in the Ukrainian immigrant component means that a significant percentage would be classified as retired workers. Retirement *de facto* excludes this element from participating under normal conditions in the labour market.¹⁴

Unemployment rates are equally important as an indicator of the economic welfare of a population. Comparative data on unemployment indicate that among the largest ethnic groups in Canada, Ukrainians along with Germans and Dutch (single-origin only) have the lowest unemployment rates (see Figure 21). If the gender distinction is introduced, the data indicate that unemployment among single-origin Ukrainian males



was significantly lower (3.7%) than the national rate (6.5%), while single-origin Ukrainian females registered the lowest level of unemployment (5.3%) among all the ethnic female populations. Unemployment, however, was still higher among Ukrainian females than males (a difference of 1.6%), although the percentage spread was not as great as on the national level (a differential of 2.2%).

The difference in the unemployment rates between Ukrainian males and females is due to the occupation structure of each and the effect of the recent economic downturn on certain sectors of the economy. Economic data suggest that the service, primary, and manufacturing industries have been most severely affected by low levels of economic growth. The data on the experienced Ukrainian labour force show that the highest frequency of those who did not work at all in 1980 occurs within the primary, clerical, service and sales occupation groups. Specifically, the primary sector accounted for 21.4% of the total experienced Ukrainian labour force (single-origin only) that did not work in 1980, while the clerical sector accounted for 18.9% and sales for 10.1%. Among the multiple-origin respondents, the respective percentages for these occupation groups (which continued to account for the vast majority in this group who went without work in 1980) were as follows: primary, 7.1%; clerical, 20.9%; service, 27.2%, and sales, 13.6%.


More importantly, within these occupation categories a disproportionate number of those who did not work were females. For example, 87.9% who were previously employed in a clerical capacity and went without work for the entire calendar year (single-origin) were female, while 70.6% in the service sector were also female. This should not be surprising, since our analysis of occupation structure indicates that single-origin Ukrainian females are overwhelmingly concentrated in these two occupation groups. Nevertheless, this is only a partial explanation. It was found that, when unemployment figures were standardized for the various occupation classifications and single-origin Ukrainian males were compared to Ukrainian females, there were proportionately more females than males who went without work during the entire 1980 calendar year in *every* occupational category. This also holds true when Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents are considered.

Interestingly, within the single-origin Ukrainian group, those who worked in the primary sector appear to have been most affected by the downturn in the economy. Of the experienced Ukrainian labour force in this sector 8.0% did not work at all in 1980. Given that a significant element of the Ukrainian population working in this sector was engaged in some form of agricultural activity, it is reasonable to assume that the results are a reflection of the increased incidence of farm bankruptcies. This observation is indirectly confirmed by evidence on income, which indicates that 7.7% of

the experienced single-origin Ukrainian labour force in the primary occupation group had no income in 1980. This component constitutes 35.1% of the total number in the experienced Ukrainian labour force (single-origin only) who declared that they received no income in 1980.

Income

Notable differences among ethnic groups can be found in the 1981 census data on income. Comparative data found in Figure 22, for example,




show that in relation to the national total there are proportionately fewer single-origin Ukrainians at the lower end of the income scale and likewise significantly more in the upper end of the range. The reduced number of Ukrainians who were without income in 1980 can be attributed to the higher participation rate of Ukrainian females. The influence of the latter is clearly demonstrated in the census data. The percentage difference between Ukrainian females and the total female population without income is much greater than between their male counterparts with a similar income status and can only be explained by the increased participation of Ukrainian females in the total Ukrainian work force.

To explain the proportionately greater number of Ukrainians in the upper income brackets, i.e., over \$25,000 (expressed in 1980 dollars), one must turn to the occupational structure of the group. Figure 11 indicates that, as a percentage of their respective totals, there are slightly more Ukrainians in both management positions and the teaching profession than there are in the all-ethnic origin category of the entire Canadian population. Both occupation groups—management and teaching—are important because of their high income status. Consider, for example, that 43% of single-origin Ukrainians in the management occupation category and 39% in teaching and related occupations earned in excess of \$25,000 in 1980. Consequently, the sum of the Ukrainian population involved in both these occupation groups, proportionately greater than that for the national total, should have some bearing on the proportion of Ukrainians in the \$25,000+ income group as a whole.

Of some importance is the variation in income status between Ukrainian single- and multiple-origin respondents. In comparison to Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents, there are proportionately fewer Ukrainians of single ethnic origin who had no income in 1980. A differential of 2.2% exists between the two categories. Likewise, there are proportionately more individuals in the single-origin category who earned in excess of \$25,000 (12.1%) than in the multiple-origin group (10.2%). These findings are somewhat unusual, since results on the educational and occupational character of Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents would suggest that there is some degree of correlation between high socioeconomic status and the tendency to identify the multiple origins of one's ethnic roots, at least among those who indicated partial Ukrainian ancestry.

Within the Ukrainian ethnic minority, significant income differences also exist in the male/female distribution across income groups. Figure 23 clearly illustrates these. The results show, for instance, that a comparatively small percentage of females (as a function of their total number) are located in the \$25,000+ income group. This, of course, should not be surprising, given our earlier findings on the structural economic inequality affecting the female Ukrainian labour force. We will recall, for example, that Ukrainian females form only a small portion of the total Ukrainian group (single-origin only) involved in management and administration—a high-income group. Similarly, while single-origin Ukrainian females constitute 57.9% of the Ukrainian element engaged in the teaching profession (a high-income group as well), only 35.0% of the total share who earned in excess of \$25,000 were female. Table 23 also shows that a disproportionate number fall in the intermediate income range. This can be explained by the equally disproportionate number who are involved in clerical work. As for the large percentage of females who earn less than \$2,000, there can be no question

that, relative to their male counterparts, the higher unemployment rate among Ukrainian females has served to inflate their number in this income group.



Not unexpectedly, differences in income groups for the immigrant/non-immigrant components are also most striking. Although the percentage difference between both single-origin Ukrainian immigrants and non-immigrants who earned in excess of \$25,000 in 1980 is significant (4.7%), the margin increases when immigrant status, i.e., age at time of arrival, is considered. For single-origin Ukrainian immigrants who arrived as adults, only 5.9% had an income over \$25,000. This compares with 13.0% for non-immigrant single-origin Ukrainians.

This result is in large measure a function of the occupational status of Ukrainian immigrants who arrived as adults. Since a disproportionate number of adult immigrants are employed in unskilled or semi-skilled occupations, it follows that income levels would also be lower for this group. This, of course, affects the income standing of the entire immigrant component. Indeed, the average income (expressed in 1980 dollars) of single-origin Ukrainian immigrants is significantly lower (\$11,104) than

that of Ukrainian non-immigrants (\$13,822). Interestingly, the income gap between Ukrainian immigrants and non-immigrants would have been comparatively greater, except that the percentage of the Ukrainian immigrant group with no income (6.8%) is markedly smaller than for its non-immigrant counterpart (11.4%).

Finally, within the single-origin category, the average income of Ukrainian males is significantly higher (\$17,498) than of Ukrainian females (\$8,570). Among Ukrainian multiple-origin respondents, the average income for males was less (\$15,629) than for Ukrainian single-origin males, although considerably higher than that of Ukrainian multiple-origin females (\$8,502). The average income for both sexes in the Ukrainian multiple-origin category was \$12,236. This compares with \$13,354 for both sexes in the Ukrainian single-origin category. The source of the variance in average income between single- and multiple-origin respondents is the high percentage (8.9%) of males within the multiple-origin category who earned no income in 1980.

Conclusion

Some general conclusions can be drawn as a result of this overview. It is clear, for instance, that the general contours of the pattern established in the post-war period of Ukrainian migration from the Prairies to the urban centres of Ontario and British Columbia persist. This will undoubtedly affect the capacity of certain communities to maintain their identities as traditional strongholds of Ukrainian life in Canada or to sustain the vitality which they demonstrated in the past. Montreal's Ukrainian community is an example of the latter problem. It is also fairly evident from the data that the Ukrainian immigrant component plays an important role in defining the cultural and linguistic character of the group. The demographics of this population, however, will have profound implications for the rate of linguistic-cultural assimilation of the group as a whole. With the disappearance of this cohort, the rate of assimilation will increase significantly. Although assimilation will eventually taper off, the effects of endogamy, urbanization, social mobility aspirations, and more generally the "institutional incompleteness" of the community will take their toll.

The socio-economic profile of the group is somewhat mixed. Single-origin Ukrainians are found within all occupation classifications, but are disproportionately over-represented in the primary sector. This can be explained by the increased participation of this group in agricultural activity, which points to the historical bond between Ukrainian ethnicity and the rural/agricultural setting. The urbanizing trend therefore will continue to have some important implications for the retention of Ukrainian ethnic identity in Canada.

The census results on education reveal other salient characteristics associated with social mobility which again highlight possible difficulties in maintaining ethnic identity. Whether in comparison to the national all-ethnic origin results or the results for their multiple-origin counterparts, single-origin Ukrainians tend to be over-represented at the lower end of the level of schooling spectrum and under-represented at the top end. The data suggest that higher levels of education may act as a dissuasive factor in either continuing to identify oneself with one's Ukrainian heritage or in identifying oneself solely with that category. Conclusions drawn at this point, however, would be premature, as any valid assessment will require the gathering of more longitudinal data. This is especially so since the results on income show a countervailing trend, with proportionately fewer single-origin Ukrainians at the lower end of the income scale and a higher percentage at the upper end. This can of course be explained by the labour-force activity of the group (particularly the increased participation of Ukrainian single-origin females in the labour market) and the concentration of single-origin Ukrainians in occupations that generate a high income. But again, notwithstanding this, conventional thinking on the subject suggests that there is a strong positive correlation between income, education and occupation, and the data on education and—to a lesser extent—occupation make it difficult to reach any definite conclusions at this point on the relationship between Ukrainian ethnic identity and socio-economic status.

Finally, this survey shows that some important differences set the single-origin Ukrainian group apart from other groups, most notably their geographic concentration in the Prairie West and their increased participation in the primary sector of the Canadian economy. Yet the results indicate that the Ukrainian single-origin group also shares certain characteristics with its counterparts, the most important of which are the gender- and immigrant-bias factors that determine social roles and economic status. Both features operate at the national level and are reproduced within this group. Although they are not likely to disappear in the near future, the effects of an immigrant-bias factor in the single-origin Ukrainian group may be suppressed because a) that cohort will be reduced in numbers owing to mortality, and b) the pattern of Ukrainian immigration will in all probability not change in the near future.

NOTES

1. J. Porter, "Preface" in *Canadian Social Structure: A Statistical Profile* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967).
2. This study is restricted to an analysis of the 1981 census despite the fact that 1986 data on cultural groups have recently been made available. Dramatic changes in the results recorded between 1981 and 1986 point to the profound effect that the subjective character of the new ethnic-origin question has had on the enumeration of ethnic groups (see note 3 below). A different set of questions is raised as a result, and any comparative analysis of the two censuses would have to focus on these questions, notably the significance of the change in the ethnic-origin definition. The purpose of this paper is to provide a "snapshot" of the Ukrainian community as it appeared at a moment in time.
3. In 1981, the census ethnic-origin question was changed slightly to allow respondents greater latitude in identifying their ethnic origin. Paternal lineage (ethnic ancestry based exclusively on the male side of the family) was no longer used as the criterion determining ethnic heritage and was replaced by the individual's *perception* of his/her ethnic roots. Moreover, in keeping with the subjective bias of the new ethnic-origin question, the respondent could also identify (if he/she so desired) the multiple roots of his/her ethnic ancestry. For example, where parental ancestry was both Ukrainian and Norwegian, the individual could claim both origins as his/her ethnic background. To accommodate those who identified more than one ethnic origin, a special multiple-origin category was created in the 1981 census. For a comprehensive discussion of the redefinition of the concept of ethnic origin, see B. Kordan (with R. Chow), "Ukrainians and the 1981 Census Ethnic Origin Question: A Research Note," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Winter 1985):3-11.
4. Published sources include various catalogues from the Statistics Canada *National Series* product group: No. 92-902 (*Mother Tongue*); No. 92-910 (*Mother Tongue, Official Language and Home Language*); No. 92-911 (*Ethnic Origin*), as well as the publication *Ukrainians and the 1981 Canada Census: A Data Handbook*. Research Report No. 9 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1985).
5. Evidence on Ukrainian inter-provincial migration would suggest that a shift from the Prairies to Ontario and the Pacific coast was occurring as early as 1951. See O. Wolowyna, "Significance of the Rural-Urban Shift in Linguistic Assimilation and Socio-Economic Status of Ukrainians in Canada," in W. Isajiw (ed.), Special Issue: Ukrainians in the Canadian City, *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, vol. XII, no. 2 (1980):17-32.

6. The rank-order of Census Metropolitan Areas—defined as urbanized cores of 100,000 or more—with the largest concentrations of single-origin Ukrainian populations is as follows: Edmonton (63,120); Winnipeg (58,970); Toronto (50,705); Vancouver (29,285); Calgary (18,045); Saskatoon (14,595); Montreal (13,005); Hamilton (11,615); Regina (9,820); Thunder Bay (9,440); St. Catharines (9,395); and Windsor (5,200).
7. Siu-Yung Loh, "Modeling Fertility Patterns in Canada" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 1984), Table 4.4, 72-3.
8. For a more thorough discussion of religious assimilation and the relationship between linguistic and religious assimilation among Ukrainians in 1981, see O. Wolowyna's excellent article, "Linguistic-Cultural Assimilation and Changes in Religious Denominations of Ukrainian Canadians" in D. Goa, ed., *The Ukrainian Religious Experience: Tradition and the Canadian Cultural Context* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1989), 171-88.
9. The reader is also directed to L. Driedger, "Urbanization of Ukrainians in Canada: Consequences for Ethnic Identity," in W.R. Petryshyn, ed., *Changing Realities: Social Trends Among Ukrainian Canadians* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980):107-33.
10. See also O. Wolowyna and D. Iaquina, "Effects of Inter-marriage on Minority Language Retention in Canada," unpublished paper, 1984.
11. For an analysis of the historical occupation structure of the Ukrainian female labour force in Canada, see M. K. Petryshyn, "The Changing Status of Ukrainian Women in Canada, 1921-1971," in W.R. Petryshyn, ed., *Changing Realities*, 189-209.
12. P. Armstrong and H. Armstrong, *The Double Ghetto: Canadian Women and Their Segregated Work* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978).
13. The participation rates for selected ethnic groups in 1981 are as follows: British, 64%; French, 62%; Scandinavian, 65%; German, 67%; Ukrainian, 66%; Chinese, 70%; and all ethnic origins, 65%.
14. The participation rate represents the labour force expressed as a percentage of the total population aged 15 years and older. The total population includes those not in the labour force, i.e., individuals unwilling or unable to offer or supply their labour services under conditions existing in their labour markets. The majority of individuals under this classification would be homemakers, students, seasonal and retired workers.

GUIDE TO RESEARCH

Yury Boshyk and Myron Momryk

A NEW AND MAJOR RESOURCE: THE ANDRII ZHUK COLLECTION AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF CANADA

The Andrii Zhuk collection is one of the most significant archival collections acquired in recent years by the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, one that has taken the efforts of many individuals throughout the world to help find it a secure home.¹ With considerable satisfaction, therefore, we can report that the Zhuk collection has been fully catalogued and is available to qualified researchers. Moreover, the finding aid to the collection will appear as a Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies research report. The finding aid includes both published and unpublished materials and will be of special interest to scholars of history, politics, and literature.²

Zhuk, who was a major participant in the Ukrainian national and social movements of the first four decades of this century, felt an obligation to collect primary and secondary source materials relating to this history. As part of this undertaking, he organized several projects to encourage the writing of memoirs—a hitherto neglected area of Ukrainian intellectual life. Thanks to Zhuk's extraordinary foresight, this is one of the most important individual collections on twentieth-century Ukrainian political history. The archival material it contains will give researchers new perspectives on many aspects of Russian, Soviet, Eastern and Central European political and cultural history.

Andrii Zhuk (1880-1968) was a leading figure in the Ukrainian national movement before the 1917 revolution. His active political life began in 1900, when he joined the first underground Ukrainian political party in tsarist Russia—the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP). Like many of his fellow party members, he came from the most nationally conscious area of Dnieper Ukraine, Poltava province; in contrast to them, however, he was of humble economic and social background, having been born into an impoverished Cossack family that could not support his education beyond the third grade of parochial school.

Zhuk distinguished himself in a wide range of party activities: he wrote and distributed underground proclamations to the peasantry; founded one of the first trade unions, the Union of Ukrainian Railway Employees in Kharkiv (1904); and was a delegate to the first RUP conference in 1901. As a party congress delegate in December 1905, when the RUP was renamed the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party (USDLP), he was elected to the party's central committee as secretary-general: in this capacity he contributed regularly to the party's periodicals.

In 1907, having suffered arrest and imprisonment several times, Zhuk felt it unwise to face the court at a time when severe punishments were being meted out to revolutionaries. Together with other party comrades, including Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Zhuk crossed the border illegally into Austria-Hungary. He was never again to live in eastern Ukraine.

Zhuk preferred Lviv to Geneva and the other European capitals that had become home to many political emigres from tsarist Russia. From 1908 he remained active in the USDLP as a member of its Foreign Committee, maintaining contacts with the party periodical *Slovo* in Kiev and with the Galician Ukrainian Social Democratic Party. By 1912, however, Zhuk was expelled from the party over a disagreement with the leadership on several issues, chief among them the attitude to be taken toward the co-operative movement and his clear support for Ukrainian political independence.

In Lviv Zhuk had become increasingly interested in co-operative affairs. At the Prosvita congress held there in February 1909 he spoke on the role of co-operatives in the struggle for the economic liberation of the Ukrainian masses. Zhuk was convinced that the co-operative movement provided a secure and necessary solution toward that end. However, his endorsement of the movement (subsequently elaborated in his book *Kooperatsiia: teoriia i znachinnia ii dlia nas*) was interpreted by some party members in Ukraine as a heresy and a denunciation of social-democratic principles. In western Ukraine, Zhuk's strong support of co-operative principles led to his appointment as editor of the co-operative periodicals *Ekonomist* and *Samopomich*, a position he held until the outbreak of war in 1914.

His comrades in tsarist Russia were further displeased by Zhuk's support of cultural and enlightenment organizations, such as the Prosvity, and by his articles in *Dilo* and *Rada* (Kiev). The USDLP leadership viewed these activities as too "bourgeois" and therefore compromising for an orthodox social-democratic organization. Zhuk, however, was willing once again to defend his principles and to bear the criticism of his "heretical" views. He felt that political reality dictated a more pragmatic view of the important role these institutions played in the national movement, and that social democrats could ill afford to be ideologically dogmatic at a time when

both Ukrainian culture and the national movement were under siege by the Russian government.

In the end, Zhuk proved to be ahead of his time. In 1914 the party that had earlier expelled him finally expressed support for the co-operative movement, the Prosvity, and the public campaign to introduce the Ukrainian language into the school system.

Zhuk's tolerant political pluralism was mirrored by his political and private friendships. Most of his closest friends from eastern Ukraine were to be found among the socialists and social democrats, among them Symon Petliura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Volodymyr Doroshenko, Mykola Porsh, Lev Iurkevych, Valentyn Sadovsky, Dmytro Antonovych, and Mykhailo Rusov. (Anna Nedilko, a schoolteacher from Nizhyn, also came from the ranks of the USDLP. In 1909 she was released from prison and left for Lviv, where she later married Zhuk.) He was also on very good terms with the radical nationalist Mykola Mikhnovsky; the democratic radicals Serhii Iefremov and Mykhailo Hrushevsky; and the conservative Viacheslav Lypynsky.

The other major point of contention between Zhuk and the USDLP leadership in Ukraine was the issue of political sovereignty: the party supported autonomy but not independence. By March 1911 Zhuk was sufficiently committed to Ukrainian independence to organize a secret conference in Lviv on means of achieving this goal. The participants—Viacheslav Lypynsky, Volodymyr Stepankivsky, Lev Iurkevych, and Volodymyr Kushnir—agreed to begin by establishing contacts with Ukrainian organizations in the Russian Empire. At the same time, they began a program of public information on Ukrainian history, culture, and political aspirations among the European public. To this end, in November 1912 the Ukrainian Information Committee was formed in Lviv with Zhuk as a founding member. Owing to the Balkan wars of 1912-13, international tensions were high and Ukrainian activists tried to prepare for a possible war between Austria-Hungary and its ally, Germany, against the Russian Empire.

With the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914, the Ukrainian Information Committee became the *Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy* (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, SVU). It was established to promote, through practical political work, the idea of an independent Ukraine and pledged itself to co-operate with the Central Powers in the war against the Russian Empire.

The SVU had among its members many Ukrainian political exiles from the Russian Empire. It was headed by a Presidium of four persons, each responsible for separate departments. Zhuk's responsibility was the Central

Bureau in Vienna, publishing projects, and contacts with Ukrainians in Galicia.

The SVU initiated a number of diplomatic activities, established contacts with the Central Powers and neutral nations, and generally assisted Ukrainians in Galicia. It also established contacts with other anti-tsarist organizations and political parties in Europe, including the Bolsheviks under V.I. Lenin. The SVU was given permission to organize separate camps for Ukrainian prisoners of war from the Russian armed forces. There it conducted almost three years of educational work among the Ukrainians. One of its most influential initiatives was to organize, in 1918, two infantry divisions from among Ukrainian prisoners of war that were sent to central Ukraine to aid the independentist forces.

After the outbreak of the Russian Revolution and the establishment of the Ukrainian Central Rada in Kiev, the SVU declared its allegiance to the Rada and continued its work in purely cultural matters. Although the SVU continued cultural activities among Ukrainian prisoners of war, it gradually became less active. The liquidation of the SVU in 1918 was co-ordinated with the establishment of Ukrainian diplomatic representation in the capitals of the Central Powers after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Zhuk played a leading role in assisting these diplomatic efforts. With the arrival in Vienna of Viacheslav Lypynsky, the representative of the Ukrainian Hetman Government, Zhuk was appointed special commissioner in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then, under the new Directory Government, Zhuk was appointed ministerial councillor in charge of the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna. He participated in two Ukrainian diplomatic conferences held during the summer of 1919 in Vienna and in Karlsbad.

The defeat of the Ukrainian forces led to a major exodus of Ukrainians to various parts of Europe. Political activity continued, especially in developing and maintaining a united opposition to Bolshevik and Polish rule of Ukrainian territories. Zhuk was asked to participate in these co-ordinating bodies in exile. In 1920, for example, he was a member of the All-Ukrainian National Rada in Vienna, which soon disbanded. From 1920 to 1930 Zhuk co-operated with the Foreign Centre of the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR). He worked on the newspaper *Ukrainskyi prapor*, published in Vienna and later in Berlin, and contributed to the newspaper *Rada* as well as to Ukrainian newspapers in Canada and the United States.

Zhuk was one of the leading organizers of the Committee for the Defence of Western Ukrainian Lands, established in Vienna in 1922. He worked on the journal *Vyzvolennia* in Vienna, where he promoted the idea

of a separate Galician-Volhynian state. At this time, Zhuk was still close to exiles from tsarist and then Soviet Ukraine. Politically, he was most sympathetic to the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party.

As a professional journalist, Zhuk was for many years on the executive of the Ukrainian writers' and journalists' association, based in Vienna and under the leadership of the poet Oleksander Oles. Zhuk and his wife Anna also took an active part in the life of the Ukrainian community in Vienna.

Although Zhuk was opposed to the communist system of government in Soviet Ukraine, in the 1920s he supported the Ukrainization policies of this government. At this time many Ukrainian exiles shared the same view as Zhuk and several major cultural figures, such as Mykhailo Hrushevsky, returned to Soviet Ukraine. Zhuk was also preparing to return until a Soviet diplomat persuaded him to remain in Vienna, as the future was becoming more and more uncertain in Soviet Ukraine.

Zhuk's literary and publishing endeavours could not financially support him, so he began to make preparations to return to Lviv. The Polish government opposed his return and for a long time refused him entry. However, with the assistance of friends, he was able to return to Lviv in the summer of 1930. Because of the Polish government's "pacification" program directed against Ukrainians, Zhuk was obliged to refrain from overt political activity in order to avoid being imprisoned or deported by the Polish authorities. This threat, however, did not prevent him from playing a leading role in trying to help victims of the 1932-3 famine in Soviet Ukraine.

Zhuk found employment as an administrator of the statistical office of the Co-ordinating Association of Ukrainian Co-operatives (*Reviziinyi soiuz ukrainskykh kooperatyv*, RSUK) in Lviv, the reorganized successor to the pre-war co-operative association. He contributed to the periodicals of the RSUK, among them *Hospodarsko-kooperatyvnyi chasopys*, *Kooperatyvna respublyka*, *Kaliendarets kooperatora*, and the daily newspaper *Dilo*. He also maintained contacts with political exiles from Soviet Ukraine through the mutual assistance and publishing co-operative "Khortytsia." Zhuk worked in the executive of this co-operative and as associate editor of *Kredytova kooperatsia*, the newspaper of the Tsentrobank. Zhuk was also a founder and secretary of the Association of Ukrainian Co-operative Workers (*Tovarystvo ukrainskykh kooperativ*) in Lviv, which brought together co-operative movement supporters and intellectuals.

In 1939, with the outbreak of the Second World War and the arrival of the Soviet Army in Lviv, Zhuk succeeded in escaping to Vienna. During the war, he did not take an active part in politics. He wrote an occasional article for the few Ukrainian periodicals and newspapers published in Nazi-occupied Europe and collected published information on events in Ukraine.

With the arrival of Soviet troops in Vienna in 1945, Zhuk was once again in danger, but the division of Vienna into zones of occupation by the Allied armies allowed him to remain in the American zone. Despite harassment and the forcible seizure of some of his archives by the Soviet secret police, he had maintained custody of the archives of the SVU and all the other Ukrainian political and cultural associations with which he was involved.

Following withdrawal of occupation forces in 1955, Ukrainians in Vienna resumed their normal community life. Zhuk maintained his interest in Ukrainian political and economic matters, contributing articles on Ukrainian historical themes to newspapers and journals, as well as to Professor Kubijovyč's encyclopedia.

Andrii Zhuk died in Vienna on 3 September 1968.

NOTES

1. Those who helped expedite the transfer of this collection to Canada include: Georges Zuk (Vienna); Robert S. Gordon, Walter Neutel, Raymonde Litalien (NAC, Ottawa and Paris); Professor George Luckyj; the late Dariia and Professor Volodymyr Kubijovyč.
2. The Zhuk collection is divided into two parts: archival materials and published (printed and mimeographed) materials. Because of their rarity and close connection to the archival sources, the published materials have been kept as part of the entire collection. It is the largest Ukrainian collection in the Ethnic Section of the Manuscript Division of the NAC, amounting to 210 volumes or boxes of various sizes totalling 23.06 metres. The first 35 boxes (7 metres) contain archival materials, while the remaining boxes contain published sources. Several of Zhuk's files on the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine can also be found in the Volodymyr Doroshenko collection in the archives of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, New York City, as well as the Viacheslav Lypynsky Institute, Philadelphia.

A. Selected Publications about Andrii Zhuk (Arranged alphabetically)

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[Doroshenko, Volodymyr?]. "30 litnii iuvylei red. Andriia Zhuka." *Hospodarsko-kooperatyvnyi chasopys* (Lviv), 16 January (1938):1-2.

Kachor, Andrii. "80-littia Andriia Zhuka." *Novi dni* (Toronto), no. 128 (September 1960):19-21.

Kapusta, M. "80-littia Andriia Zhuka." *Ukrainske slovo* (Paris), 7 August (1960):6.

Panchenko, P. "Redaktor Andrii Zhuk." *Vilne slovo* (Toronto), 15 October (1960).

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REVIEW ARTICLE*

M. A. SAGAIK. *VELIKII GOROD IAROSLAVA*. Ed. N. F. KOTLIAR. Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1982. 96 pp.

In the course of the 1970s and 1980s the historical and archaeological study of medieval Kiev was markedly invigorated by the efforts of the Kiev standing archaeological expedition formed by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1970. The expedition's members have produced a series of interesting books and articles on pre-Mongol Kiev. These publications include monographs devoted to the city's more important areas, among them the citadel (*detinets* of the chronicles), the so-called "Volodymyr's Town," and Podil (the Lower Town).¹

The work under review is devoted to early Kiev's greatest aristocratic district, known in the scholarly literature as "The Great Town of Iaroslav" (*Velikii gorod Iaroslava*), or simply "Iaroslav's Town," built during the reign of Prince Iaroslav the Wise (d. 1054). The Primary Chronicle (*Povist vremennykh lit*) first mentions this part of Kiev in the entry for 1037, in which Iaroslav the Wise is praised for his construction of mighty fortifications (the "Great Town"), including the main city gate (the "Golden Gate"), which protected the area. He is also praised for building St. Sophia's Cathedral, the churches of St. Irene and of the Theotokos at the Golden Gate, and the St. George Monastery.² However, the chronicle does not give the exact date of the erection of these buildings, nor that of St. Sophia's Cathedral (approximately 1037 or earlier?), not to mention the date of the "Great Town's" fortifications. The important question of dating is vigorously disputed in the literature on medieval Kiev, and attracts special attention in studies of Iaroslav's Town.

The works of Kievan archaeologists awakened interest in early Kiev among many Western scholars in the 1970s and 80s.³ Even though Sahaidak's monograph was published seven years ago, the author's major findings are still valid and can serve to stimulate discussion about early Kiev. The book is of particular interest today, given the recent celebration of the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'. The principal church of the

*I am grateful to Professors Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Shevchenko, as well as to the archaeologist Eduard Mühle, for their comments on the first draft of this review article.

Kievan state, St. Sophia's Cathedral, and the residence of the Metropolitan of Rus' were both located in the heart of Iaroslav's Town.

Iaroslav's Town was located to the south of adjacent, separately fortified areas known in the literature as "Volodymyr's Town," "Iziaslav-Sviatopolk's Town," and the "Kopyriv Kinets" (End) of the chronicles. All these areas comprise Kiev's Upper Town, situated on the high right bank of the Dnieper. The Podil, or Lower Town, was located on the low, floodland stretch of the river bank. Iaroslav's Town was the largest (70-80 hectares in area) and most heavily fortified part of the Upper Town. Together with Volodymyr's Town, it constituted the socio-political centre of pre-Mongol Kiev.

In this work, Sahaidak considers the dating of the first settlement of Iaroslav's Town, its topography, fortifications, planning and building in the pre-Mongol period. The work is based primarily on archaeological sources, including material from Sahaidak's excavations. Written sources are also used, including chronicles of Rus', old Scandinavian sagas, and documents of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, as well as graphic sources (e.g., plans and drawings of Kiev from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).

This is the first monograph devoted specifically to Iaroslav's Town in which all currently available sources, especially the results of the latest archaeological excavations, are examined. Generally speaking, this book merits a positive appraisal. Nevertheless, a number of its deficiencies and weaknesses may be pointed out. We shall consider these weak points in the course of our observations, seeking to elaborate and supplement what, in our opinion, are the basic premises of the work.

An important contribution to the study of Iaroslav's Town is the author's conclusion, based on new archaeological findings, that this district began to develop (and was being permanently settled) in the mid-tenth century, i.e., long before Iaroslav's construction (c. 1037) of the fortifications and monumental structures that constitute the "Iaroslav's Town" of the chronicles (p. 5). Long before the publication of this work there was archaeological evidence that the territory of Iaroslav's Town was the site of settlements and burial grounds in the first to fourth and fifth to seventh centuries A. D.⁴ However, no one had previously found archaeological monuments positively linked by cultural continuity and an unbroken line of development to the Iaroslav's Town of the chronicles (eleventh-thirteenth centuries). Such material (tenth-century cultural layers, hoards and remnants of buildings on Reitar Street and at the site of St. George's Church) was discovered in the 1970s by M. A. Sahaidak and Ia. Ie. Borovsky (pp. 5-17).

It must be said that archaeological data on the settlement of the future site of Iaroslav's Town in the mid-tenth century are not in accord with the chronicle evidence. In the entry for 1036, the chronicle states that the site on which Iaroslav built St. Sophia's Cathedral was an unpopulated area beyond the city walls (*pole vne grada*).⁵ On the other hand, these

archaeological findings concur with data on the settlement of the territory of the future Volodymyr's Town (with an area of about ten hectares) in the course of the tenth century. Its fortifications and monumental religious and civic edifices were built by Prince Volodymyr the Great in the 980s and 990s.⁶ Also, Sahaidak's dating of the early settlement of Iaroslav's Town fits well with data from Ia. Ie. Borovsky's excavations on the Kudriavski slopes, which show that this area (i.e., the Kopyriv Kinets of the chronicle), was settled from the tenth century (p. 53). Thus, recent archaeological discoveries have shown that settlement and building activity in the late tenth-century Upper Town was not limited to the territory of Volodymyr's Town, as had been the scholarly consensus until the 1970s.⁷

In considering the formation of Volodymyr's Town and Iaroslav's Town, and when dealing with the socio-economic functions of the population of these central aristocratic zones of medieval Kiev, it is important to note that their construction was accompanied by the demolition of a significant portion, if not the greater part, of existing buildings from the tenth century and the relocation of their original inhabitants to other parts of Kiev. This was undoubtedly made necessary by the mere fact of the construction of monumental buildings and complexes such as the Church of the Tithes (*Desiatynna tserkva*), St. Sophia's Cathedral, the residences of the metropolitan, princes, boiars and voievodas, other churches and monasteries, and town squares such as the "Old Women's Market" (*Babyn torzhok*) of the chronicles.

Thus, for example, the tenth-century cultural stratum and remnants of tenth-century dwellings were uncovered under the substructure of the eleventh-century Church of St. George (p. 17). In central Volodymyr's Town archaeological excavations have traced the remnants of large construction sites and kilns used for the erection of the masonry Church of the Tithes and the palaces of Prince Volodymyr.⁸ It was also discovered that during the period of building activity in Volodymyr's Town at the turn of the tenth century into the eleventh a terrace on the slope of the Old Kiev Hill (*Starokyivska hora*) was inhabited by craftsmen working on these projects.⁹ It is highly probable that they were former residents of Volodymyr's Town uprooted by new construction.

Along with the previous common buildings of Volodymyr's Town, pre-tenth-century fortifications located on the promontory of Old Kiev Hill were levelled in the process of rebuilding, as were pagan sanctuaries after the official acceptance of Christianity in Rus' in 988. Also associated with the building activity of Prince Volodymyr is the erection of the three new palaces whose remnants have been uncovered near the Church of the Tithes.¹⁰ The former princely residences of the tenth century were probably demolished during the construction of Volodymyr's Town.

Thus, in the entry for 945, the Chronicle informs us that one of Princess Olha's palaces was located inside the pre-tenth-century fortress on Old Kiev Hill, and beyond it there was a second palace with a stone hall.

However, by the time the Chronicle was written (at the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries), the same site was occupied by residences of the Kievan boiars Hordiatyn, Nykyfor, Vorotyslav and Chudin, as well as the clerical household.¹¹ They probably occupied the north-west section of Volodymyr's Town from the time of its founding.¹²

P. P. Tolochko has identified the locations of 13 princely and boiar households, mentioned in chronicles of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, within the limits of Volodymyr's and Iaroslav's Towns.¹³ According to Tolochko's research on the social topography of Iaroslav's Town, residences of the aristocracy, churches and monasteries occupied the greater, north-western part of that area.¹⁴ It may be surmised that new construction did not displace older buildings only in the south-eastern part of Iaroslav's Town, near the Liada (*liadskie*) Gate. The remains of such buildings have not, however, been found.

All this shows that the settlement of the common tenth-century townspeople played a minimal role in determining the topography, size, planning, and social composition of both Volodymyr's and Iaroslav's Towns. It may be conjectured that the fortifications of these towns (or districts) were not built to defend previous buildings and include them in the city proper, as was usually done with suburban commoner areas in Rus'. Rather, Kiev's Volodymyr's Town and Iaroslav's Town were built, in keeping with the design of their princely founders, first and foremost as new socio-political centres. They were the best fortified parts of the city, with aristocratic residences, churches and monasteries occupying most of the territory. Many commoners who previously inhabited these areas were displaced. The remnants of the former population, as well as newly arrived tradesmen and artisans, were settled in princely, boiar, and monastic domains, or in separate neighborhoods on the outskirts of the expansive Iaroslav's Town, in part near its Liada and Zhidove gates.

Sahaidak does not date or discuss the historiography of the construction of the masonry St. Sophia's Cathedral. This problem has given rise to a long-standing debate between the supporters of a 1017 dating of the cathedral and their opponents, who argue that the edifice was erected in 1037. Among contemporary Soviet researchers of medieval Kiev the 1017 date is more widely accepted.¹⁵ The question of the foundation of St. Sophia's Cathedral is related to a problem treated by Sahaidak—the date of the fortifications of Iaroslav's Town. If St. Sophia's Cathedral was built in 1017, then the fortifications of Iaroslav's Town must have been erected at the same time, or somewhat earlier. It is obvious that a massive masonry church such as St. Sophia's could not have been constructed in an unprotected area, separately from Iaroslav's general plan for new fortifications. In the middle Dnieper region (particularly in Kiev), which was subjected to frequent raids by steppe nomads between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, masonry edifices were built only in fortified urban areas or in monasteries and castles that had their own defences.

Sahaidak's dating of the fortifications of Iaroslav's Town is based on an old Scandinavian source, the Saga of Eymundr. He surmises that the defensive rampart and gate, supplemented by a moat and wooden fence built by Eymundr's men in Kiev (according to the saga), were in fact the fortifications of Iaroslav's Town. During the siege of Kiev by the "Konungr Burislav" described in the saga, this defensive line, as well as the gate, was not yet finished. According to Sahaidak, their construction was begun between 1016 and 1022, when Eymundr was in Rus'. Yet the author dates the completion of the defences of Iaroslav's Town, including the Golden Gate, to 1037, when they are first mentioned in the chronicles (p. 25).

It should be noted, however, that neither the chronicles nor Thietmar of Merseburg's description of the capture of Kiev by the forces of the Polish king Boleslaw the Bold in 1018 support the view that Iaroslav the Wise began the construction of the defences before that year. Also, Sahaidak's thesis that the huge rampart of Iaroslav's Town, the largest known in Rus', could have been built in the short period of 1016-18 appears dubious. On the other hand, if the construction of the masonry St. Sophia's Cathedral actually began in 1017, then certain other fortifications which preceded Iaroslav's Town may have existed.

In this connection, the remains of a moat discovered by Borovsky in 1973 at 35 Reitar Street, in the south-western part of Iaroslav's Town, are most interesting. Sahaidak connects this moat to the defensive line of Iaroslav's Town in the eleventh-thirteenth centuries and on this basis offers a new reconstructed plan of the area (pp. 50-52, 82). However, such an interpretation of the defences on Reitar Street clashes with the dating provided by their discoverer. Borovsky found tenth-century ceramics at the bottom of the moat and material from the eleventh and twelfth centuries at its crest. In Borovsky's initial opinion, this moat served to defend Kiev in the tenth and early eleventh centuries, before the construction of Iaroslav's Town, then lost its importance and was gradually filled in.¹⁶ Tolochko, however, considers it a natural ravine, not a city moat. Thus, the nature of this "moat" discovered at 35 Reitar Street, as well as the exact date of the fortifications of Iaroslav's Town, remain in dispute.

In the present author's opinion, it is quite possible that the tenth-century settlement on the site of the future Iaroslav's Town may have been fortified during the reign of Prince Volodymyr (980-1015), who erected the fortress Volodymyr's Town. Most probably, Volodymyr also fortified Kopyriv Kinets, the defences of which were uncovered at 6 Kyianiv Street in 1974 and dated to the tenth century.

Sahaidak believes that with the shift of city life to the Podil following the Mongol sack of Kiev (1240) and the construction of the castle on the Kyselivka Hill at the end of the fourteenth century, the fortifications of Iaroslav's Town declined in importance and played no military role until the mid-seventeenth century (pp. 24-7). It should be noted that the great rampart of Iaroslav's Town served as the outer watch perimeter from the fourteenth

to the seventeenth centuries. Thus, the "Description of Kiev and the Kievan Castle" (1552) informs us that "the townsmen are required to stand watch...on the rampart [of Iaroslav's Town] by the Golden Gate."¹⁷

Sahaidak describes the archaeological discoveries made in the early 1980s on October Revolution Square, where the remnants of the Liada (eastern) Gate of Iaroslav's Town were unearthed along with part of a rampart and moat attached to them (pp. 44-6). The discovery of these fortifications has allowed Sahaidak to present a more precise reconstructive plan of the south-eastern defensive line of Iaroslav's Town (p. 82). According to the author, this line extended from the Golden Gate through the area of today's Sverdlov Street, New Pushkin Street and October Revolution Square (p. 46). Sahaidak's plan of the south-eastern fortifications of Iaroslav's Town is almost identical to the earlier reconstructions by M. K. Karger,¹⁸ O. M. Tykhanovych and M. M. Tkachenko,¹⁹ and P. P. Tolochko,²⁰ whose hypotheses have been confirmed by these recent findings. By the same token, the placing of the Liada Gate and related fortifications further west, on the slopes of the Upper Town plateau, as suggested by the plans of D. I. Blifeld and M. Iu. Braichevsky,²¹ has been proved incorrect.

According to Sahaidak, the early eleventh-century builders of Iaroslav's Town were obliged to deviate from the traditional pattern of fortifying the edge of the town plateau because its slopes were already populated (p. 48). However, remains of buildings from the tenth and early eleventh centuries on these slopes have yet to be discovered.

It is hard to say whether Sahaidak is correct in maintaining that a poor topographical location was not the main reason the Mongols broke Kiev's defences precisely at the Liada Gate (p. 48). It is indeed possible that the poor topography of the Gate, located in unorthodox manner at the foot of a plateau, could have been compensated by stronger artificial fortifications there. However, the excavations at October Revolution Square have not provided sufficient evidence to answer this question.

Sahaidak's new reconstruction of the western defensive line of Iaroslav's Town, the placing of Zhidove Gate and the neighboring Kopyriv End, is a significant contribution (pp. 49-55, 82). Sahaidak's plan, based on the latest excavations, renders obsolete the earlier plans of M. K. Karger, O. M. Tykhanovych and M. M. Tkachenko, D. I. Blifeld, M. Iu. Braichevsky and P. P. Tolochko. All these scholars believed that the south-western fortifications extended from the Golden to the Zhidove Gate along Iaroslav's Rampart Street (Vulytsia Iaroslaviv val). New excavations have shown this scheme to have been inaccurate (p. 52).

At the same time, the remains of ramparts and moats from the eleventh and twelfth centuries were uncovered at 36-38 Reitar Street (1978), on Lviv Square under the Trade Building (in 1978-80), on the Kudriavski Slopes or Kopyriv End at Smirnov-Lastochkin Street (1968), and at 6 Kyianiv Street (1974)²² (pp. 50-53). On the basis of these findings, Sahaidak concludes

that the south-western defences of Iaroslav's Town lay further north than was earlier believed. They extended from the Golden Gate along Iaroslav's Rampart Street, not reaching the intersection of Chkaliv Street, and continued along Reitar Street to Lviv Square. Sahaidak places the Zhidove Gate at the intersection of Reitar Street, Osypenko Street and the Great Zhytomyr Road (pp. 52-3).

In Sahaidak's opinion, the fortifications of Kopyriv End did not meet Iaroslav's Town south of the Zhidove Gate, as Tolochko surmised, but north of it. Sahaidak believes that the southern defences of the Kopyriv End extended from the Zhidove Gate toward Smirnov-Lastochkin Street, where they have been archaeologically excavated (p. 53). Thus, in his view, the territory of the Kopyriv End was approximately twice as small as Tolochko argued.²³ According to Sahaidak, the Zhidove Gate of Iaroslav's Town did not lead to the Kopyriv End, as Tolochko believes, but to the field.

We should add that Sahaidak's location of the Zhidove Gate agrees with the chronicles. In the entry for 1151, the Hypatian Chronicle states that the troops of the Kievan prince Iziaslav Mstyslavovych, fending off an attack by the Suzdalian prince Iurii Dolgorukii, stood outside the city walls in front of the Golden and Zhidove Gates.²⁴

Unfortunately, Sahaidak does not deal with the social topography of Iaroslav's Town or the socio-economic activity of its population. He only mentions in passing that Iaroslav's Town was an aristocratic zone (p. 5), where the city's main religious centre, St. Sophia's Cathedral, and the metropolitan's residence were located. Sahaidak also states, in accordance with widely accepted opinion,²⁵ that there was a Jewish neighbourhood near the Zhidove Gate (p. 49).

Iaroslav's Town is remarkable for the fact that this part of Kiev began its development in the mid-tenth century as a suburb that probably specialized in commerce and crafts, as did Podil. At the beginning of the eleventh century, it was transformed by Iaroslav the Wise into a new central aristocratic area, similar to Volodymyr's Town, the old citadel (*detinets*), by the construction of mighty defences and monumental architectural complexes and the settlement of the military and ecclesiastical elite. Iaroslav's Town retained its aristocratic functions until the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols in the mid-thirteenth century. Thus, the socio-economic function of Iaroslav's Town underwent the evolution detailed above from the mid-tenth through thirteenth centuries. Such an expansion of the central aristocratic zone from the old citadel (*detinets*) into neighbouring suburbs specializing in trade and crafts (*pasady*) occurred in many cities of Rus', including Chernihiv, Vladimir on the Kliazma, Halych, Volkovysk, and Riazan during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.

Sahaidak writes that the monumental buildings of Iaroslav's Town—fortifications, masonry churches and palaces—were erected by the grand prince, that is, by the state. The other buildings, of an ordinary character,

were put up by the commoners, who had received land allotments from the prince's voievodas (p. 84). Thus, the author touches upon an interesting question of current scholarship, one which has not yet been fully investigated—that of the nature of land ownership and the organization of city construction in medieval Kiev. It seems that in Sahaidak's opinion the prince was the owner of all land on the territory of Iaroslav's Town between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. The prince carried out construction at state expense and gave land grants to individual commoners who established their households at their own expense. It must be said that even a superficial acquaintance with these questions makes for a picture much more complicated than that sketched by Sahaidak. We shall now attempt to supplement that picture and make it more precise.

As is generally believed, Kiev and its environs had been in the domain (*votchina*) of the Kievan princes since the first Riurikids took power in the city in the late ninth century. The construction of the fortifications of Volodymyr's and Iaroslav's Towns, as well as their monumental religious complexes and palaces—undoubtedly organized by the grand prince, who personified state power—supports the view that both towns (or districts) were built on princely or state land. As noted above, this construction was accompanied by the displacement of the commoner population and the demolition of many of their buildings, as well as the defences predating Volodymyr's and Iaroslav's Towns. The previous dwellers were largely replaced by the princes, boiars, clerics and their retinues.

Before the construction of these towns we know of no households on their sites belonging to the local aristocracy (the "city elders" of the chronicles), as was the case in Novgorod, where local boiars had held large estates in the city since time immemorial. There is only a theory that the masonry St. Sophia's Cathedral was preceded by a wooden church and monastery of the same name.²⁶ These could have been founded and granted a land allotment by the first Christian rulers, Olha or Volodymyr, in the tenth century.

All the available sources (primarily the chronicles) used to locate the households of boiars and princely relatives, as well as ecclesiastical complexes, indicate that they were established in Volodymyr's and Iaroslav's Towns between the late tenth and thirteenth centuries.²⁷ There can be no doubt that they received their land grants for the construction of residences from the grand princes, the original owners of city territory and the founders of Volodymyr's and Iaroslav's Towns. To give an example, the chronicle states in the entry for 945 that the eleventh- and twelfth-century households of boiars such as Vorotyslav and Chudyn and the cleric's estate were located on the former sites of two tenth-century princely palaces.²⁸ Obviously, only the prince could have given these boiars such allotments (the north-western part of Volodymyr's Town) once a new princely residence had been built in the late tenth century near the Church of the Tithes, in the centre of Volodymyr's Town.

Thus, I consider that the prince of Kiev, having built his own new palaces, gave the core of the remaining lands in Volodymyr's and Iaroslav's Towns (including the sites of old princes' residences) as hereditary holdings to the metropolitan of Rus', several monasteries and churches, princely relatives and Kievan boiars, thereby creating new aristocratic districts. Setting up their residences there, the new owners probably displaced the former commoners, as the prince had done by building his palaces and other monumental edifices. The commoners who remained became dependent on the new landowners, whether ecclesiastical or noble, and in time became their craftsmen or servants.

In all likelihood, the question of land ownership in medieval Kiev can be clarified by taking account of the noticeable weakening of the prince's position during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the rising local nobles invited princely pretenders to rule by contract (*po riadu*) and drove out unsatisfactory rulers. The strengthening of the boiar class in Kiev at this time was related to the expansion of its landholdings and property rights received from the princes in Volodymyr's and Iaroslav's Towns during the late tenth and early eleventh centuries.

In medieval Novgorod, real power was held by the local boiar clans, who concentrated land in their own hands from the very foundation of the city in the ninth or early tenth century. Between the mid-twelfth and fifteenth centuries the construction of defences and stone churches was carried out by the boiars, bishop (*vladyka*), monasteries, district communities (*kontsy*), and merchant organizations. During this time, the prince of Novgorod, unlike the prince of Kiev, scarcely participated in these enterprises. Moreover, from the late eleventh century, the prince was not allowed by the local boiars to maintain his residence either within the citadel or even within the territory of Novgorod, but had to build it beyond the city limits in the Riurik fortress.

Such were the characteristic differences in land ownership and in the organization of town construction in medieval Novgorod and Kiev (Upper Town). The questions we have touched upon require more extensive study. It will be necessary to compare data on landholding in both the central and suburban districts of medieval Kiev and in other cities of Rus'. It will also be important to study the nature of landholding in the cities of Rus', the development of the right to such property, and the relationship of urban landholdings to other forms of princely, church, and boiar land ownership.

Here we can supplement Sahaidak's statements on settlement, land ownership and the organization of construction in Iaroslav's Town with the following tentative conclusions.

The Kievan princes held the territory of Kiev and its environs as their hereditary domain from the city's rise in the late ninth century. In the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, they settled common townsmen (*posadskii liud*) on the site of the future Iaroslav's Town and perhaps founded St. Sophia's Monastery with its wooden church, the predecessor of

the masonry cathedral of the same name, and the metropolitan's residence. At the beginning of the eleventh century, Prince Iaroslav the Wise organized the construction of Iaroslav's Town with its fortifications and monumental religious and palatial buildings. At the same time he changed the population, granting most of the land here to the nobles and high-ranking churchmen for their residences, monasteries and churches. The commoners who remained in the households of these powerful landowners probably became dependent on them. On the outskirts of Iaroslav's Town and between the large households, there were also neighbourhoods and streets populated by commoners that probably remained in princely or state possession. Similar commoner areas were called *sotni* in Novgorod.

In general, the Kievan princes had carried out the construction of city fortifications and monumental civic and religious buildings in their domain at their own or state cost. Both nobles and commoners built households on land allotted to them in the city at their own expense. From the late eleventh century, the growing monasteries began construction on their own estates and cooperated with the princes in the building of masonry churches elsewhere. It is possible that Iaroslav the Wise constructed the residence of the metropolitan of Rus' together with the other principal structures of Iaroslav's Town, since there is no evidence of the metropolitan's building activity in Kiev. In other major cities of Rus', the bishops carried out intensive monumental construction at their eparchies' expense, most often in cooperation with the princes and monasteries.

There is no archaeological evidence for an increase in the density of buildings (and, by extension, population) in Kiev's Upper Town during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Nor are there data to suggest that after the construction of Iaroslav's Town (c. 1037) and the neighbouring Iziaslav-Sviatopolk's Town (i.e., the fortified St. Michael's Monastery) in the 1060s the peripheries of the Upper Town grew through an influx of population. The formation of the new districts (the *peredgorodia* of the chronicles) cannot be detected beyond the limits of Iaroslav's Town and Iziaslav-Sviatopolk's Town for the whole period from the mid-eleventh to mid-thirteenth centuries. The present author believes that after the period of intensive expansion between the late ninth and mid-eleventh centuries, both the territorial and demographic growth of Kiev stabilized until the city's destruction by the Mongols in 1240.²⁹

In summary, we must repeat our earlier statement that Sahaidak's work is, on the whole, laudable. The critical observations, additions and elaborations we have made in no way lessen that positive assessment. Certain omissions and weaknesses can easily be explained by the fact that this is the first attempt at a broad historical and archaeological study of the Great Town of Iaroslav.

We should add that the book contains many interesting illustrations: photographs of extant medieval monuments and archaeological finds, miniatures from chronicle manuscripts, plans and drawings of medieval

Kiev, plans of city gates of the eleventh and seventeenth-eighteenth centuries, graphic reconstructions of churches and Sahaidak's reconstructive plan of the whole of Iaroslav's Town.

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Translated from the Ukrainian by Leonid Heretz

NOTES

1. Stefaniia R. Kilievich, *Detinets Kiieva IX - pervoi poloviny XIII vekov* (Kiev, 1982); Konstantin N. Gupalo, *Podol v drevnem Kieve* (Kiev, 1982); Petr P. Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev* (Kiev, 1983).
2. *Povest vremennykh let*, pt. I (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950), 102; *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, ed. and trans. Samuel H. Cross (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), 226.
3. See, for example: Carsten Goehrke, "Einwohnerzahl und Bevölkerungsdichte altrussischer Städte. Methodische Möglichkeiten und vorläufige Ergebnisse," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte*, vol. 18 (1973): 25-53; Johan Callmer, "The Archaeology of Kiev ca. A.D. 500-1000: A Survey," *Figura*, nova seria 19 (Uppsala, 1981): 29-52; idem, "The Archaeology of Kiev to the End of the Earliest Urban Phase," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. XI, no. 3/4 (December 1987): 323-64; Thomas S. Noonan, "The Role of Kiev in the International and Domestic Trade of the Pre-Mongol Era," paper presented at the Third Conference on Ukrainian Economics, Harvard University (October 25-6, 1985); David B. Miller, "The Kievan Principality on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion: An Inquiry into Current Historical Research and Interpretation," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. X, no. 1/2 (June 1986): 215-40; Volodymyr I. Mezentsev, "The Emergence of the Podil and the Genesis of the City of Kiev: Problems of Dating," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. X, no. 1/2 (June 1986): 48-70; idem, "The Territorial and Demographic Development of Medieval Kiev and Other Major Cities of Rus': A Comparative Analysis Based on Recent Archaeological Research," *The Russian Review*, vol. 48, no. 2, April 1989 (forthcoming); Eduard Mühle, "Die Anfänge Kiievs (bis ca. 980) in archäologischer Sicht: Ein Forschungsbericht," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 35, no. 1 (1987): 80-101; idem, "Die topographisch-städtebauliche Entwicklung Kiievs vom Ende des 10. bis zum Ende des 12. Jh. im Licht der archäologischen Forschungen: Einleitung," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 36, no. 3 (1988): 250-376.
4. Mikhail K. Karger, *Drevnii Kiev*, vol. I (Moscow and Leningrad, 1958), 79, 80; Mikhail Iu. Braichevskii, *Kogda i kak vznik Kiev* (Kiev, 1964), 29-87, 148; Petro P. Tolochko, *Istorychna topohrafiia starodavnoho Kyieva* (Kiev, 1970), 36-55.
5. *Povest vremennykh let*, I: 102; *The Russian Primary Chronicle*, 225.
6. Kilievich, *Detinets Kiieva*, 48-9; Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev*, 42.
7. Karger, *Drevnii Kiev*, I, 98-126, 263-84; Tolochko, *Istorychna topohrafiia*, 55-73.
8. Kilievich, *Detinets Kiieva*, 70-77.
9. Petro P. Tolochko and Stefaniia R. Kiliievich, "Arkheolohichni doslidzhennia Starokyivskoi hory 1965-1969 rr.," *Kyivska starovyna* (Kiev, 1972), 5-6, 25; Kilievich, *Detinets Kiieva*, 77-99.
10. Karger, *Drevnii Kiev*, vol. 2 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1961), 72; Tolochko, *Istorychna topohrafiia*, 77-8.
11. *Povest vremennykh let*, I: 40.
12. Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev*, 197, fig. 93.

13. Tolochko, *Istorychna topohrafiia*, 119-29; idem, *Drevnii Kiev*, 196-200, figs. 93-5.
14. Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev*, fig. 94.
15. Serhii O. Vysotsky, "Hrafiti ta chas pobudovy Sofiiskoho soboru v Kyievi," *Starodavnii Kyiv* (Kiev, 1975), 171-81; Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev*, 71-8.
16. Iaroslav Ie. Borovsky, "Arkheolohichni doslidzhennia v "horodi" Iaroslava," *Arkheolohichni doslidzhennia starodavnoho Kyieva* (Kiev, 1976), 93-4; Ia. Ie. Borovskii and M.A. Sagaidak, "Arkheologicheskie issledovaniia verkhnego Kiev v 1978-1982 gg.," *Arkheologicheskie issledovaniia Kiev 1978-1983 gg.* (Kiev, 1985), 58-9.
17. *Sbornik materialov dlia istoricheskoi topografii Kiev i ego okrestnostei* (Kiev, 1874), pt. 3, p. 30.
18. Karger, *Drevnii Kiev*, I, appendix.
19. Ibid., 251.
20. Tolochko, *Istorychna topohrafiia*, 87; idem, *Drevnii Kiev*, 67, fig. 31.
21. See Tolochko, *Istorychna topohrafiia*, 85-6.
22. Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev*, 87-8.
23. See *Novoe v arkheologii Kiev* (Kiev, 1981), 33; Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev*, 185, fig. 88.
24. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, vol. 2, *Ipatevskaia letopis* (Moscow, 1962), 427-8.
25. Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev*, 68-9.
26. P. G. Lebedintsev, "O sv. Sofii Kievskoi," in *Trudy III Arkheologicheskogo sezda*, vol. I (Kiev, 1878), 53; Vysotsky, "Hrafiti ta chas pobudovy Sofiiskoho soboru v Kyievi," 175-6.
27. Tolochko, *Istorychna topohrafiia*, 118-29; idem, *Drevnii Kiev*, 195-200, figs. 93, 94.
28. *Povest vremennykh let*, I: 40.
29. See Mezentssev, "The Territorial and Demographic Development of Medieval Kiev" (forthcoming).

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BOOK REVIEWS

O.V. MYSHANYCH, ed. *UKRAINSKE LITERATURNE BAROKKO: ZBIRNYK NAUKOVYKH PRATS*. Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1987. 300 pp.

The concept of the Baroque was a subject of discussion at the IV International Congress of Slavists (Moscow, 1958) and VI International Congress of Slavists (Prague, 1968), inspiring particularly heated debate as to its applicability to East Slavic (Belorussian, Russian, Ukrainian) literary and artistic developments. The appearance of this volume is, therefore, a significant event in Soviet Ukrainian literary historiography. After a long period of relative silence on the subject, a multinational (Ukrainian, Belorussian and Russian) group of Soviet scholars has produced a volume of studies (15 in all) that by and large eschews polemics, concentrating instead on informative and scholarly examinations of problems relating to Ukrainian artistic culture of the Baroque.

Three of the studies in this academic *silva rerum* treat the problem of the Baroque in the context of literary history and previous Soviet attitudes to this subject. In "Pro ukrainske literaturne barokko," the late I.V. Ivanio outlines the evolution of views on the study of East Slavic and Ukrainian Baroque literature. Briefly mentioning several Western European scholars (e.g. H. Wölfflin, E.A. Curtius) who contributed to early discussion of the term "Baroque" in literary scholarship, Ivanio asserts that Soviet literary historians' reluctance to apply the term to Ukrainian literature was due in part "to the interest in the Baroque by scholars of a formalist orientation [doubtless a reference to D. Chyzhevsky—P.A.R.] and also, in some measure, by nationalist circles of the Ukrainian emigration."

He then proceeds to summarize the contributions of such Soviet scholars as I.P. Eremin, O.I. Biletsky, S. Maslov, and D.S. Likhachev to the rehabilitation of the term in Soviet literary scholarship, as well as to discuss both the general characteristics of the Baroque style and its place in the history of East Slavic literature. In so doing Ivanio points out for the Soviet reader the errors of past criticism, particularly the view of the Baroque as a conservative aristocratic outgrowth of the Counter-Reformation and thus a completely alien intrusion into the history of Ukrainian literature and culture. Agreeing with A. Morozov ("Lomonosov i barokko," *Russkaia literatura*, 1962, no. 3), Ivanio develops this argument further, outlining the extent to which Ukrainian artistic culture is permeated by Baroque esthetics.

The Belorussian scholars P.P. and O.H. Okhrimenko take up this last theme in "Rozvytok i vzaiemoviazky skhidnioslovianskoho barokko," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 13, no. 2 (Winter 1988)

providing an historical survey of the development of the literary Baroque in Ukrainian, Belorussian and, to some extent, Russian culture of the seventeenth century. They point to poetry, oratorical prose (the sermon, polemical literature), and the drama as genres in which the influence of Baroque esthetics is particularly noticeable, providing names of relevant or important authors and works.

In "Ukrainske literaturne barokko v ievropeiskomu konteksti," D.S. Nalyvaiko refines arguments made by D.S. Likhachev that "in some of its variant forms [the Baroque] expressed the ideology of the Counter-Reformation (e.g., the Jesuit Baroque), but in others it expressed the progressive tendencies of the epoch" ("Barokko i ego russkii variant XVII veka," *Russkaia literatura*, 1969, no. 2, p. 21), and by O.A. Anikst that "the Baroque is not the decay of Renaissance unity, but its rebirth in the new conditions of the Counter-Reformation period" (*Renesans. Barokko. Problema stilei v zapadnoevropeiskom iskusstve XV-XVII vekov*. Moscow, 1966, pp. 232-3). Basing his discussion on these two ideas, the Ukrainian author demonstrates the manner in which Ukrainian literature and culture synthesized new genres and esthetic concepts with older traditions in order to transform itself from an isolated, medieval, Greco-Slavonic culture to one modern and open to interaction with other contemporary European cultures. While acknowledging Ukraine's role as a recipient of Western cultural influence, Nalyvaiko is also quick to point out the role of Ukrainian Baroque culture, disseminated by the Kievian Academy, in the cultural transformation of Belorussia, Russia, and the Balkans, a fact documented by historians of the Academy such as Z.I. Khyzhniak in *Kyievo-mohylianska akademiia* (Kiev, 1981), to name but one of several such studies.

The stimulating and informative essay "Zhanr 'vertohradiv' u skhidnioslovianskomu literaturnomu barokko" by L.I. Sazonova is the first of nine studies in this volume dealing with specific questions of Baroque poetics, in this case the topos of the "garden of the mind" (*sad myslennyi*). The Moscow-based Russian scholar surveys the popularity of this symbolic trope against the background of its origins from Plato through the Middle Ages. Particularly interesting is the discussion of the esthetic principles underlying this literary device and their manifestation in the many examples of such collections adduced from Polish, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Russian authors.

In "Kyivskyi shkilnyi teatr i problemy ukrainskoho barokko," L.O. Sofronova outlines the essential artistic features of both "low" and "high" school drama, dialogues and declamations, as well as full-blown independent dramas. The author devotes much attention to dialogues and declamations, describing their poetic structure, subject matter, and methods of staging. She emphasizes the role of antithesis as an organizing principle of both plot and

character, as well as the pre-eminence of discourse over action, and of description over depiction in composition and performance. Concerning school dramas, Sofronova notes that this last feature is found in full-blown plays as well. As part of her examination of “low” Baroque theatre, Sofronova outlines the manner in which high subject matter was treated in works written by mendicant students (*mandrivni diaky*) and demonstrates the similarities of these Ukrainian works to those of the contemporary Polish *sowizdrzał* literature and such Russian works as “The Tale of Misery-Misfortune” (*Povest o Gore-Zloshchastii*) or the “Kaliazin Petition” (*Kaliazinskaia chelobitnaia*). Sofronova concludes her study with brief but provocative remarks regarding the influence of the theatre on the entire spectrum of Ukrainian literature in the Baroque period.

The figure of Ivan Vyshensky looms large in the history of Ukrainian literature and culture of the seventeenth century, but his place in the context of contemporary literature and culture is difficult to determine. In “Deshcho pro tradytsii u tvorchosti Ivana Vyshenskoho,” Iu.V. Peleshenko makes a thought-provoking contribution to our understanding of the sources of Vyshensky’s thought and style. Agreeing with the common view that the polemicist has more in common with Slavic medieval literature than with the Baroque, the author points to Athonite Hesychasm as a source of Vyshensky’s ideas and style. To prove the first point, Peleshenko establishes that Vyshensky was familiar with the works of Gregory of Sinai, one of the fathers of Hesychasm, and argues that the Ukrainian monastic shared the views of the Hesychast movement on the ability of the individual to commune directly with the Deity and on the need for the just man to play an active role in society. In order to document the influence of Slavic ecclesiastical literature on Vyshensky’s style, the author cites typologically similar passages from the Ukrainian monk’s opera and from those of older writers, especially Grigory Tsamblak, a Bulgarian-born adept of Hesychasm and Metropolitan of Kiev (1415-19/20), whose writings were known among the Eastern Slavs.

V.P. Kolosova’s study, “Funktsii virshiv v ukrainskykh starodrukakh kintsia XVI—pershoi polovyny XVII st.” provides an overview of the heraldic and emblematic poems appearing in prose works between 1580 and 1650, examines their relationship to the text which they accompany, and discusses their significance for the book as a product of the printer’s art. She concludes that the function of such verses in the printed text was twofold: as an integral part of the text this poetry was employed to praise the maecenas who sponsored publication of the work (heraldic verse); to expand and explain the contents (emblematic verse and verse prologues); and to allow the author to address the reader, summing up the arguments of the work (verse epilogue). When set off from the rest of the text by their form,

placement on the page, or typeface, the verses served as part of the ornamental decoration of the entire publication.

An essential feature of Baroque poetry was the literary conceit or *conchetto* by which the artist sought to surprise or astonish his reader or listener. In "Barokkovyi konseptyzm poezii Lazaria Baranovycha," R.P. Radyshevsky documents the significance of this esthetic principle for one of the most important figures in Ukrainian letters and church life of the seventeenth century. By extensive analysis of Baranovych's Polish verse against the background contemporary esthetic theory exemplified by the writings of Maciej Sarbiewski and others, Radyshevsky demonstrates the manner in which *concettismo* constitutes the underlying principle of Baranovych's artistic imagery in verse and prose.

The esthetics of the Baroque and their relation to the views and early writing of Feofan Prokopovych are addressed by T.Ie. Avtukhovych in "Kyivskyi period tvorchosti Feofana Prokopovycha i barokko," in which he argues for the essentially Baroque nature of Prokopovych's esthetic views and for the Baroque nature of his tragicomedy *Vladymyr* (1705). Concerning the former, Avtukhovych points out the binary nature of Prokopovych's thought (which he identifies as typical of the Baroque frame of mind) and his delight over the works of Tasso as but two indications that the Ukrainian poet stood closer to the Baroque than to Classicism. In assessing *Vladymyr*, Avtukhovych argues that many elements of this work reflect the esthetics of Baroque and not Neo-Classical drama. Among the most important of these features are: the simultaneous presentation of three levels of meaning and content (historical, philosophical, and political); the use of a mixed genre (tragicomedy); the employment of contrast (binary thought) in constructing the primary conflicts and characters; periphrasis to introduce off-stage action; and the use of dance and the chorus.

The culture of the Baroque, like that of the Renaissance before it, was international, owing largely to the use of Latin as a scholarly and literary idiom. Thus, what was written in one part of Europe was accessible to anyone, anywhere, who could read the language, stimulating thought and creativity by persons far removed from each other. In "Ivan Velychkovsky—perekladach," I.P. Betko investigates the Ukrainian poet's translations of the Neo-Latin English epigrammatist John Owen (ca. 1563-1622) to demonstrate exactly this type of cross-cultural enrichment. Drawn by the wit and artistry of Owen's verse, Velychkovsky sought to acquaint his Ukrainian reader not only with its content, but also with its style, thus enhancing the creative potential of his native tradition. Betko amply demonstrates Velychkovsky's success by comparing his Slavonic translations with their Latin source. The author shows that Velychkovsky approached his task creatively, adhering closely to the original poem where

possible, but also adapting and reworking the text to fit the spirit of the Ukrainian literary language and tradition of his time. The result is a revealing example of both the influence on Ukrainian Baroque literature of a geographically distant source and the virtuosity of Velychkovsky as poet-translator.

The eighteenth century saw the demise of the Ukrainian Baroque and the birth of modern Ukrainian literature. In "Tvorchist Ioasafa Horlenka i deiaki pytannia ukrainskoho literaturnoho barokko," N.M. Poplavska perceives the glimmerings of such changes in the "Bran chestnykh sedmy dobroditelei..." (1737) by Ioasaf Horlenko (1705-54). The author points to a free treatment of elements drawn from Scripture and the endowing of allegorical figures of the Vices, Virtues, and saints with realistic human characteristics as representing elements of low literature that stand out in relation to the otherwise traditional Baroque features of this work. To Poplavska these features signify the beginnings of changes (the growth of realism) which resulted in the birth of modern Ukrainian literature.

Cultural changes of another sort, from the medieval to the Baroque hagiographic tradition, concern Iu.A. Isichenko in "Drukovani vydannia Kyievo-Pecherskoho pateryka iak iavlyshche ukrainskoi barokkovoii ahiohrafii." This perceptive and interesting study examines the transformation of the text of the Kiev Caves Patericon as it passed from its original manuscript text to the printed editions of the seventeenth century. The author argues that these changes reflect the difference in outlook between the medieval and Baroque periods in Ukrainian literature and culture. For example, the medieval bookman considered the Patericon an integrated, unified text, not an collection of short religious tales. The seventeenth-century editors considered each narrative an independent work and therefore divided narratives into discrete texts, each with its own title. The artistic unity of the original was thereby radically changed. Seeing the Patericon stories as factually accurate narratives rather than moralistic parables, the editors changed their order. They grouped together texts which, in their view, described events that had occurred contemporaneously or sequentially. Moved by this same striving for historical accuracy, the editors included materials drawn from chronicles which added new details and perspective to the extant narratives. They also introduced entirely new *vitae* (Antonii Pechersky, Nikon, and Nestor the Chronicler, among others) into the canon of the Patericon. Moreover, they adduced Biblical parallels and allegorical symbols that served to expand the meaning of the text, as did didactic introductions and conclusions. All these features of the printed texts of the Patericon may be traced to the esthetic of Baroque hagiography as it developed and transformed churchly prose in seventeenth-century Ukraine.

Isichenko's essay is followed by an example of the Baroque sermon in "Do istorii ukrainskoi barokkovoï uchytelno-oratorskoi prozy. Kazannia Ihnatiia Oksenovycha Starushycha na pohrebi kniazia Ilii Sviatopolk-Chetverte[y]nskoho" by V.I. Krekoten. This contribution is a scholarly publication of the text of the eulogy together with a detailed and annotated introduction. The sermon is an example of Ukrainian Baroque funeral oratory and reflects not only the rhetorical devices typical of the genre, but also the spirit of the times. As Krekoten puts it: "...he [Starushych] used to the best possible advantage the opportunity to express the demands and hopes of the 'Mohyla party' in relation to the rest of the Orthodox magnate families and to paint the "image of a positive hero," worthy of being an example of appropriate life behaviour for Ukrainian-Belorussian Orthodox aristocrats." The publication of this work is all the more significant in that it survives in only five known printed copies.

The seventeenth century saw important changes in music as well as in other aspects of Ukrainian society and culture. Two articles in this miscellany discuss such developments. In "Slovo i muzyka v XVII st.," N.O. Herasymova-Persydska examines the changing relationship between musical and verbal art in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the effect of these changes on the interpretation or meaning of the lyrics, as well as on the development of Ukrainian versification. Basing her remarks on liturgical texts, particularly the so-called *kanty*, the author notes that until the sixteenth century the structure of ecclesiastical music corresponded to that of the verbal text, i.e., the melody corresponded to each syntagma and other smaller syntactic units, but not to a single word. The introduction of ever more complex melodic lines altered this one-to-one relationship significantly. Individual words and syllables could be emphasized to evoke nuances of meaning and emotion not possible under the older system. Concomitantly, the stresses of each individual word or group of words were taken into account. This change gradually undermined the syllabic system of versification prevalent in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ukrainian literary verse, preparing the ground for the radical changes in versification which took place in the eighteenth century.

The Baroque achieved perhaps its greatest and most enduring effect in the visual arts, including engraving and book illustration. In "Slovo i iliustratsiia. Osnovni rysy barokko v ukrainskii hraviuri," D.V. Stepovyk outlines ten fundamental artistic features of Ukrainian Baroque book illustration: 1) use of a wide variety of artistic tropes, among them periphrasis, allegory, metaphor; 2) employment of a system of images combining mythological figures with elements drawn from the real world; 3) the tendency for book ornamentation and illustration to attempt the fullest possible expression of the central idea or action of the verbal text;

4) multiplicity of subject matter in a single engraving; 5) a tendency for the elaborate framing ornamentation on title pages or frontispieces to overpower the central image or title; 6) a system of positive and negative symbolic or allegorical figures; 7) the development of a "panegyric" engraving or plate designed for the presentation copy or printed edition of such occasional verse; 8) restrained use of the dynamism of movement, massivity of form, sharp contrasts and tension; 9) great complexity of detail; 10) use of an accompanying verbal text in verse or prose to explain the meaning of the plate or engraving. In discussing each of these features, the author explains not only their nature, significance, and ties to Western European art, but their uniquely Ukrainian features as well. For example, Stepovyk contrasts the more pronounced Western Baroque dynamism, massivity of form, sharpness of contrast, and tension with their more restrained Ukrainian counterparts. He closes this study by remarking that the Baroque did not change the national essence of Ukrainian art, but only its external form, by which means it raised the esthetic values of the Ukrainian people to a higher artistic plane. (It is unfortunate that the author did not elaborate on the meaning of this last assertion, for such a banal statement undermines the effect of an otherwise stimulating and informative piece.)

The Baroque period is one of the most important in the history of Ukrainian culture, for it witnessed a flowering in the fine arts, letters, and scholarship. After a long period of negative assessment of the Baroque by Soviet scholars, this volume of essays addresses some of the issues and problems connected with the period in a positive light. The authors of the studies provide generally interesting and at times quite stimulating analyses of the problems they choose to discuss. But as they often are the first to point out, there is much more to be done. Let us hope that this effort is only the first of many successful ones.

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UKRAINSKA SHEKSPIRIANA NA ZAKHODI [UKRAINIAN SHAKESPEAREANA IN THE WEST], vol. 1. Edited and compiled by Yar Slavutych. Edmonton: Slavuta, for the Ukrainian Shakespeare Society, 1987. 96 pp.

This jubilee volume, celebrating thirty years of the Ukrainian Shakespeare Society, is confidently marked volume 1 in the hopes that
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subsequent issues will soon follow. Unfortunately, the mixed fortunes of the Society in the past three decades and, more unhappily, the unevenness of this particular volume, put such a venture, however much desired, into serious question.

A great interest in Shakespeare in nineteenth-century Ukraine (especially by the writer and poet Ivan Franko) produced a Shakespeare society of sorts, which, although not formalized, was responsible for funding translations of some of Shakespeare's most famous works. With the death of Franko, the idea of such an association faded. Although Shakespeare was frequently played on the boards of Soviet Ukraine, no society was formed, in part, perhaps, because of the see-saw reputation of all Western writers, and the mixed purposes to which their works were put.

Well into the twentieth century, a number of then émigré Ukrainian scholars, who were later to achieve fame as Slavists in the West, discovered that they shared an enormous enthusiasm for the work of Shakespeare. Thus in 1957, well after the upheaval that World War II brought them, Dmytro Chyzhevsky (who became its first president), J. B. Rudnycky, and Ihor Kostecky founded the Ukrainian Shakespeare Society (*Ukrainske Shekspirivske Tovarystvo*) at the University of Heidelberg. Despite their great desire, plans for an annual periodical (one of the subjects of the first meeting) never materialized, although individual scholars affiliated with the Society continued to produce scholarly studies of translations of Shakespeare's works.

Under its second president, Constantine Bida, a major contribution to Ukrainian Shakespeareana appeared when Bida's doctoral student, Oksana Prokopiw, published her revised dissertation, *The Ukrainian Translations of Shakespeare's Sonnets* (University of Ottawa Press, 1976).

Unquestionably the most active period of the Society has been under the leadership of Yar Slavutych (1979-), who, since 1980, has organized annual sessions of the Society within the framework of the Canadian Learned Societies. With the volume under review, the dream of past presidents to initiate a periodical dedicated to Ukrainian Shakespeareana is, at long last, achieved.

Volume I attempts to reflect the great variety of interest in Shakespeare and his works by Ukrainian scholars and poets. Divided into three segments, part one includes seven articles (by Petro Odarchenko, Valerian Revutsky, Volodymyr Zyla, Mykola Palij, Bohdan Chopyk, J. B. Rudnycky, and Yar Slavutych — all scholars teaching in North America); part two translations (of selected sonnets, songs, apocrypha), and poems about Shakespeare, or on Shakespearean motifs; part three presents a brief history of the Society, and, perhaps the most valuable part of the book, a bibliography of Ukrainian Shakespeareana in the West.

While the book is a useful overview of Ukrainian Shakespeareana of the past three decades, its scholarly value is not even. Part one is strongest in articles on translations of Shakespeare. Yar Slavutych's comparative study of Ukrainian translations of the "To be or not to be" soliloquy is the best in this section, showing a detailed knowledge of both the Shakespearean and Ukrainian texts, as well as a poet's sensitivity to the nuances of translation. Volodymyr Zyla's balanced, objective analysis of Teodosii Osmachka's translation of *Henry IV* is, unfortunately, marred by the introduction, which contains some errors of fact (Shakespeare's purported subtitle to this play), and by its simplistic examination of the historical background to the works. Petro Odarchenko's article on Shevchenko and Shakespeare, while interesting, presents nothing new; it is a summary of already available information without any deeper analysis of the attraction Shakespeare's works had for the Ukrainian romantic poet Shevchenko. Odarchenko himself is overly dependent upon recent Soviet works by Shapovalova and Vanina. The dark, negative, cruel and macabre that apparently interested Shakespeare, according to Palij, are claims hardly substantiated in his article. Bohdan Chopyk's metrical study of sonnets and sonneteering in Ukrainian poetry is familiar ground; it says little, however, about Shakespeare, except that his sonnet style is still being imitated today. By contrast, Valerian Revutsky, in his short article, makes a real contribution to Ukrainian Shakespeareana by examining early stagings of Shakespeare, particularly perhaps the most innovative production in the history of Shakespearean staging in Ukraine, Les Kurbas's *Macbeth* (1920).

While the first segment of this volume suffers from a frequently popular tone (Odarchenko, Palij, occasionally Zyla), part two suffers from a curious organization. It begins with an odd choice: Oleh Zujewskyj's translation of "A Lover's Complaint," about which Hallet Smith in the Riverside edition of Shakespeare remarked, "If it is by Shakespeare, it neither detracts from his achievement, nor adds anything to it." "A Lover's Complaint" is followed by some excellent translations of selected sonnets (Sviatoslav Hordynsky, Oleh Zujewskyj, Sviatoslav Karavansky, Ihor Kosteckyj, Vasyl Onufrienko, Yar Slavutych, Ostap Tarnawskyj), which, more logically, should have come first. *The Passionate Pilgrim*, another apocryphal work, long ago accepted by scholars as the work of various authors, should have been grouped with "A Lover's Complaint." Yar Slavutych's translation of excerpts from *The Rape of Lucrece*, a magnificent effort, and the only such attempt to date, seems oddly sandwiched by the two apocryphal poems.

The volume as a whole seems to suffer from haste and a lack of attention to detail, both substantive and technical. On the substantive side, there are such oddities as the translation of *The Phoenix and the Turtle* into

"Feniks i cherepakha" (i.e., turtle as reptile rather than turtle-dove), the mysterious reference to a death-mask of Shakespeare (in the bibliography), the inclusion of at least one non-Shakespearean title (*The Harrowing of Hell*) in the bibliography, and, in its attempt to be up-to-date, a reference made to the 1987 meeting of the Society (with an incorrectly cited paper title) before it had actually taken place. On the technical side, at least two styles of footnotes appear in the text, occasional typographical (including a misspelling of Shakespeare's name) and transliterative errors (Fishbury instead of Finsbury Fields). Finally, translations appear without the original English titles, thus frequently confusing the reader.

Yar Slavutych's work as popularizer of Shakespeare, both as scholar and as poet, is prodigious. Unfortunately, the volume often attempts to reach too broad a Ukrainian audience and, as a result, includes popular, already well-known information, rather than attempting to break new ground. As to the concern Slavutych has with moving Ukrainian Shakespeareana onto a broader stage, it is unfortunate that only one article in the whole volume (Revutsky's) appears in English. If a second volume is contemplated, the editor should consider making available to the English reader at least an English summary of the articles, otherwise Ukrainian scholars will merely be talking to themselves.

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ANNA RECZYŃSKA. *EMIGRACJA Z POLSKI DO KANADY W OKRESIE MIĘDZYWOJENNYM*. Biblioteka Polonijna, 17. Wrocław: Polska Akademia Nauk, Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, 1986. 223 pp.

This study of Polish emigration to Canada between the wars is also significant for its discussion of the parallel process affecting the Ukrainian minority which then inhabited land belonging to the Polish state. This aspect of Reczyńska's book is the subject of the present review. Her study is based on the extensive literature of the subject and on both Polish and Canadian archives. Its five chapters discuss the causes of emigration to Canada, the statistics and structure of this phenomenon, Polish and Canadian emigration policy, the Polish-Canadian shipping dispute, and the emigrants' voyage across the ocean. Each chapter includes significant observations on Ukrainian affairs.

Discussing the causes of emigration from Poland to Canada, Reczyńska stresses the low standard of living in the old country on the one hand and the drawing power of Canada on the other. She describes the myth of Canada as a land of riches, which affected Ukrainians, among others, and the myth of Polish and Ukrainian ability to do well in Canadian conditions. Reczyńska points out the attraction of Ukrainian communities in Canada, especially given the failure to establish a Ukrainian state after World War I. "For many immigrants," she writes, "there existed in Canada the possibility of continuing political activity which was forbidden in Poland."

The most important achievement of the study in question is its exhaustive statistical analysis. Reczyńska's critical examination of official Polish data (from the Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Canadian immigration statistics, as well as estimates in the literature on this topic, reveals numerous faults and obscurities. The skillful analysis of emigration from the denominational and ethnic point of view (pp. 69-82) deserves careful reading. For the years 1926-82, Polish lists of emigrants to Canada showed 35.5 per cent Greek Catholics and 9.2 per cent Orthodox for a total of 44.7 per cent. This figure includes Ukrainians and Orthodox Belorussians (and perhaps also a small number of Russians). The small number of Polish Greek Catholics and Poles who belonged to the Orthodox church must have been balanced by the equally small number of Ukrainian Roman Catholics and Protestants. Comparison of data on denomination, language and place of birth of the emigrants has allowed the author to achieve a high degree of accuracy in her findings. After establishing three possible versions of the ethnic composition of emigrants born in Poland, she accepts the estimate which shows that in the years 1918-39 Ukrainians were the most numerous ethnic group emigrating from Poland to Canada. They comprised 40.4 per cent of the whole, i.e., 59,500 people, while Poles comprised 29.4 per cent, Jews 14 per cent, Germans 7.8 per cent, Belorussians 7.4 per cent, and others 1.0 per cent. These figures reflect the fact that most emigrants to Canada came from south-eastern Poland (the *województwa* of Ternopil, Lviv and Volyn), where the greater part of the population was composed of Ukrainians.

Reczyńska's study also offers new material about the Belorussian, German and Jewish emigrants. Particularly noteworthy is her estimate of the size of the Belorussian emigration, the first in scholarly literature. Minorities (especially Ukrainians) comprised a much larger percentage among emigrants from Poland to Canada than might be supposed from the ethnic composition of the state (Ukrainians made up between 13.9 and 16.2 per cent of the population). In addition, Ukrainian emigration to Canada was not proportional to the group's average migrational mobility, which was the lowest among ethnic groups in Poland. In searching for the causes of this

state of affairs, Reczyńska finds them mainly in the Ukrainian tradition of emigration to Canada, the attraction of existing Ukrainian centres in Canada, and the correspondence between what Ukrainian settlers had to offer and Canadian immigration policy.

The book also provides assessments of the age, sex, profession and education of the Canadian emigrants. There is reference to reemigration, in which Ukrainians played a large part, especially in the 1920s. In Reczyńska's opinion, factors affecting reemigration might include "battles fought at this time on Ukrainian lands and efforts to create an independent state." The author briefly notes Ukrainian efforts to organize emigration to Canada. The role of Osep Oleskiv is worth mentioning, as are those of the Society for the Protection of Ukrainian Emigrants in Lviv, the Society of St. Raphael in Winnipeg and the initiatives of Bishop Nykyta Budka. On the basis of documents of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Immigration and Colonization in Ottawa, Reczyńska states that in 1924 this dignitary of the church in Canada wanted to organize, with the help of Polish and Canadian authorities, the emigration of approximately ten thousand Ukrainian farmers from Galicia. This issue is probably linked with the plans of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky concerning Ukrainian settlement in Canada and his journey there in 1921, which is not mentioned in the study under discussion.

Reczyńska's information about periodicals published in Lviv on Ukrainian emigration is incomplete. In addition to *Ukrainskyi emigrant* (Ukrainian Emigrant, 1927-39), which is mentioned in the study, one should also mention a fortnightly periodical of the same name, which began publication in 1922, and its continuation, *Emigrant*, which began in 1923. In the year 1929 *Russkii emigrant* (Russian Emigrant), probably a pro-Russian competitor of the above periodicals, was published. Unfortunately, except for issues for the years 1927-39, it has proved impossible to find the above-mentioned titles, which explains their absence from the book.

Reczyńska concentrates mainly on the attitude of the Polish authorities to Ukrainian emigration, and there her achievements are unquestionable. She demonstrates the lack of a consistent emigration policy with regard to minorities, although there was a large number of ideas and opinions which were never put into practice. She bases her discussion of this problem on archival materials, although it would also have been possible to find many interesting articles in the press, especially in *Wychodźca* (Emigrant) and *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* (Illustrated Daily Courier). She states that immediately after the First World War the Polish authorities attempted to halt Ukrainian reemigration (secret instructions on this issue were still held by Polish consulates in Canada in the 1930s). Subsequently the authorities supported Ukrainian emigration from Poland, although more with good

intentions than organized activity. In the emigration of Ukrainians the authorities saw the weakening of a minority hostile to the state, combined with the prospect of land passing into Polish hands. On the other hand they feared the strengthening of anti-Polish feelings among Ukrainians in Canada. In 1924 the Polish Consul-General in Canada, Józef Okołowicz, presented a plan for increasing Ukrainian emigration from Poland to Canada so as to "decrease the undesirable elements in Małopolska who hold anti-Polish attitudes and provoke national antagonisms" (Okołowicz's words). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not take any initiative at that time, but the regional authorities in the south-eastern areas proceeded according to his ideas.

Polish representatives in Canada did not feel up to political action among the Ukrainian exiles, although here we must add that this type of action occurred sporadically in the case of other Polish institutions such as the Roman Catholic church. In 1935 the Polish Oblate J. Łopuszański was active in Cooks Creek, Manitoba, continuing the work of his order among Ukrainians which had been initiated in Canada before the First World War. Such missionary activity corresponded to the neo-Uniate action carried out on a large scale among Orthodox Christians in Poland during the inter-war period.

Reczyńska's work is notable for its objectivity and precision of judgment. She treats the problem of national minorities dispassionately, with attention to factual accuracy. Minor faults include the neglect of certain sources (such as the works of the Soviet specialist on Ukrainian emigration to Canada, A. M. Shlepakov). The author may, however, be excused for not carrying out further research in the Ukrainian press and Ukrainian memoirs. Although this would have enriched her sources, it would probably not have significantly altered the interpretation. Among minor issues one should mention that Canadian Ruthenian-Ukrainians also came from Yugoslavia. However, the number of immigrants from this area was small, and this is probably why they were overlooked by the author.

All in all, this study deserves high praise, not least because of its contribution to research on Ukrainian immigration to Canada. It is welcome news that Anna Reczyńska's book has attracted the attention of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario in Toronto, which intends to publish an English translation.

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COMMISSION ON THE UKRAINE FAMINE. *REPORT TO CONGRESS. INVESTIGATION OF THE UKRAINIAN FAMINE 1932-1933*. United States Government Printing Office, 1988. xxv, 524 pp.

The staff of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine have performed a valuable service in producing this volume, approximately half of which is taken up with eyewitness accounts of the horrifying events in the Ukrainian countryside in 1933. The book can be seen as a sequel and indeed takes the story one stage further than Robert Conquest's monumental *Harvest of Sorrow*, published two years earlier. In an Executive Summary of the findings of the Commission, sixteen points are listed. Of these, the most startling and controversial are the following: point 14, that the famine was a Ukrainian affair, rivalled in its intensity only by the famine in the ethnically Ukrainian region of the North Caucasus; and point 16, that Joseph Stalin "and those around him" committed genocide against Ukrainians in 1932-3.

Indeed, Soviet historians, who are increasingly vocal about the events of the Famine, have already taken issue with these two points. Writing in a January 1989 issue of *Literaturna Ukraina*, for example, Stanislav Kulchytsky remarks that the findings of the Washington Commission are inconclusive. Specifically, he can find no evidence of "ethnocide" against Ukrainians. The point is a difficult one. It should not detract from the remarkable human document that this volume represents. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that critics might seize upon these two findings as the main weaknesses of the book. The key question is: how does one define genocide? It is not answered fully by the Ukrainian Commission. It may not have been analyzed satisfactorily in the entire context of the twentieth century.

The facts are bleak enough. Eyewitness after eyewitness recalls the bleak days of the famine: the arrival in villages of officials who would search for grain with pointed sticks. Many of the accounts begin with the revolutionary period and continue into the Second World War. They indicate organized terror against the Ukrainian villages, as the hapless population was reduced to eating the bark from trees or to cannibalism and the like. The Famine Commission accepts Dr. Conquest's figure of 7 million famine victims in Ukraine. Two Soviet scholars have of late suggested a higher figure of 8 million (Iurii Shcherbak, the Ukrainian writer/physician and Roy Medvedev, the noted historian).

The Commission examines the non-Soviet scholarship on the Ukrainian Famine, post-Stalinist Soviet historiography, Soviet press sources, historical fiction, the Famine outside Ukraine, and the American response to the Famine. Its work is admirably thorough, lucid and concise. This is an objective study. When criticisms appear to be merited, the Commission does not shrink from them, witness the condemnation of what

appears to be almost a callous indifference to the suffering on the part of a British Sovietologist. The summing up of recent Soviet accounts is also very useful, although of late it has become almost an impossible task to keep pace with them, such is the plethora.

Yet one turns again and again to the eyewitness accounts. They are presented in full down to the last stutter. And herein lies their main value. In their unpolished frankness, they reveal the pain that these victims have felt over five long decades of official silence on the part of Western governments. That the Famine was known to the Italians is plain from the appendices from the Royal Consulate of Italy in Kharkiv at the end of the volume. Why would Western governments and the Western media prefer to believe Walter Duranty of *The New York Times* rather than official diplomatic channels? One might ask why that respected newspaper continues to this day to hang the picture of its dubious Pulitzer Prize holder on the wall of its offices.

James E. Mace and his team of researchers have begun what one hopes will be many future studies of the Ukrainian Famine. With the assistance of Dr. Myron Kuropas, they point out, the Famine is being accepted into school curricula in the United States. One hopes that the same thing will occur in Canada. When the Commission began its enormous task, the Soviet Union was still refusing to disclose that there had even been such an event as a Famine in Ukraine. Since late 1987, the archives on the topic have been open to Soviet historians. The results thus far have not been terribly impressive, yet the Famine is at least on the discussion table.

As a result, it is conceivable that the Famine Commission and Soviet historians could work together to promote further study of this epochal event. Even the question of ethnocide/genocide, which seems to be the most important problem for future debate, would surely benefit from archival research. At the present time, it must remain a moot point amid the tragedy of the events of 1932-33. Dr. Mace and company have taken the Ukrainian Famine out of its mythical past and shown it to be a grim, stark reality. Their work is far from over, but they have made an excellent beginning.

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Osyp Zinkewych and Oleksander Voronyn, ed. *MARTYROLOHIIA UKRAINSKYKH TSERKOV. VOL. 1: UKRAINSKA PRAVOSLAVNA TSERKVA*. Toronto and Baltimore: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1987. 1207 pp.

This first volume of a planned four-volume martyrology of the Ukrainian churches is in fact the second to appear, being preceded by a volume on the Ukrainian Catholic Church (reviewed in *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1). It is a collection of documents both in the strict sense, such as official church and government declarations, and in the broader sense: essays, letters (including some by Metropolitan Lypkivsky and Volodymyr Chekhivsky), reminiscences, excerpts from contemporary journals (particularly *Tserkva i zhyttia*), photographs, and reproductions of various publications and of letters and manuscripts. Many of these have never been published before. Among the archives from which they are drawn are those of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) in Bound Brook, New Jersey; the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences (UVAN) in New York; the publishers, Smoloskyp; and various personal archives. The purpose of the volume is to collect the most important documentary sources for the history of the persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox and their various churches in the present century.

As Metropolitan Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) comments in his foreword to the book, it is impossible to recount the entire martyrology of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Too many witnesses are dead; too many documents remain inaccessible. At the same time, one must agree with his conviction that it is important to salvage at least some of the facts.

In his introduction to the volume, Professor Arkadii Zhukovsky (Arcadie Joukovsky) makes a number of points that give some structure to this mass of facts and materials. In his view, the overriding theme of the history of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the twentieth century has been the principle of autocephaly. This point, which is borne out by the documents, helps to explain the difficulty of separating the church's history from that of the Ukrainian independence movement. But Professor Joukovsky also notes that Ukrainian governments have not always paid sufficient attention to church matters. The Central Rada of 1917, considering religion strictly a private matter, neglected to establish a secretariat of cults. In its indifference to religion, contends Professor Joukovsky, the Rada left the way open for reactionary, Russian-oriented church circles to influence the course of events. By contrast, the Hetmanate and the Directory understood the importance of religion and helped to promote Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly.

The documents are divided into eleven sections, each preceded by a brief preface. Taken together, these prefaces, while somewhat repetitive, provide a good summary of the recent history of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. In places, however, the analysis is thin: Moscow's persecutions of Ukrainian church activists, for example, cannot plausibly or usefully be explained by mere "hatred" for Ukraine.

The sections themselves are in chronological order interrupted, however, by sections on certain discrete topics. Thus, sections on the rebirth of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the sobors of 1921-30 are followed by one on the ideological bases and organization of the church, while those on its life and activities from 1921 to 1936 and on the Soviet persecutions precede a section on Ukrainian Orthodox in Poland and Romania. A separate section is devoted to Russian church imperialism from 1981 to the 1970s; this is followed by a particularly important section on Ukrainian Orthodoxy during World War II. There is a gap in the chronology from 1944 to 1960. The section on the persecution of church and believers in the USSR from 1960 to 1984, while not concerned with any specifically Ukrainian churches, is appropriate here in that it traces Ukrainian Orthodox currents within the Russian church. It documents the struggles over the Pochaiv monastery and the cases of Fr. Vasyl Romaniuk and Lev Lukianenko—both open adherents of the UAOC. The short tenth section, on public statements in defence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and believers, is followed by a summary of the status and losses of the various Orthodox churches in Ukraine from 1913 to 1986.

The documents are followed by a chronology of events from 1917 to 1986 and a most useful 38-page bibliography. Next there are some twenty pages of photographs of twentieth-century martyrs, an index of personal names, and an index of names and events. There is also a list of illustrations and reproductions of documents.

The documents in this collection are varied, often revealing, at times touching. Those from the early years of the UAOC evoke the elation and creativity of the religious and cultural revival, as well as the insecurity, pressure, and fear that plagued it. The writings of the autocephalist leaders give the lie to accusations that the UAOC was a merely political grouping with no genuine spiritual motivation. While its connection with Ukrainian nationalism emerges clearly from these documents, it becomes equally clear that to call it a "cover" for nationalism is a crude oversimplification: there was a deep and intimate tie between Ukrainian patriotism and a genuinely Christian revival that cannot be so easily reduced.

The documents are also valuable in that they provide a microscopic picture of Orthodox life in Ukraine. They show concretely what is meant by those overused words "martyrdom" and "persecution." Particularly relevant

to the situation of many churches today are the documents illustrating the UAOC's attempts to find a *modus vivendi* with the Bolshevik regime in the 1920s. These show the inherent difficulty of church relations with a militantly atheist state.

A laudable contribution of this volume is the inclusion of data on the Orthodox churches of Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of which contain substantial numbers of Ukrainians. Furthermore, the Polish church played an important role between the world wars in preparing the ground for the rebirth of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1941-2. For students of the current scene, the information on the large number of Ukrainians in the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church is particularly useful.

Like Volume II of the *Martyrologhiia*, this book contains many photographs, which make the reader's image of church life that much more vivid. In addition to the standard portraits of hierarchs and clergy, there are photos from the anti-religious campaign and from the labour camps of the 1930s.

Perhaps most striking, however, is the eleventh section, which includes a register of some 500 Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchs, priests, monastics, and laymen killed or exiled between 1917 and 1985. This is the martyrology proper. Its tragedy is compounded by the fact that it is far from complete: not even the names of all the bishops of the UAOC in the 1930s are known (p. 906).

Yet if these documents evoke a sense of tragedy, they also create a sensation of mystery. For documents cannot fully explain the remarkable growth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the 1920s, nor its explosive revival during World War II after an apparent demise in the mid-thirties. The fate of Ukrainian Orthodoxy may yet take some unexpected turns.

Thus, this book is more than a martyrology. It serves also as a record of the ideological, spiritual and organizational life of modern Ukrainian Orthodoxy. As a reference work, it is indispensable to the student of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It should also prove useful to those concerned with church life in the USSR and with Soviet history in general. For most such readers, an English translation would be welcome. But the most important task has been accomplished: a substantial part of the history of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the twentieth century has been preserved.

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а — a	ї — i	ф — f
б — b	й — i	х — kh
в — v	к — k	ц — ts
г — h	л — l	ч — ch
г — g	м — m	ш — sh
д — d	н — n	щ — shch
е — e	о — o	ю — iu
є — ie	п — p	я — ia
ж — zh	р — r	ь — -
з — z	с — s	-ий — y in endings
и — y	т — t	of personal
і — i	у — u	names only

FORTHCOMING ISSUES

Issue 26 of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, edited by Ralph Lindheim and Edward Burstynsky, will be a Festschrift for George S.N. Luckyj.

With issue 27, Summer 1990, the *Journal* will take on a new editorship and editorial board. David Marples will be managing editor, and the *Journal* will focus predominantly on current issues in Ukrainian and Ukrainian Canadian studies. The Summer 1990 issue will contain the following articles:

Bohdan Krawchenko, "National Memory in Ukraine: The Role of the Blue and Yellow Flag."

Alexandra Kruchka Glynn, "Vera Lysenko: Portrait of a Ukrainian Canadian Writer."

Myroslav Shkandrij, "Prague as a Resource for the Study of Ukrainian Literature."

Anna Makolkina, "The Dance of Dionysos in H. Khodkevych

