

ARMS OF VALOR

by LT. GENERAL PAVLO SHANDRUK



\$6.00

ARMS OF VALOR

by Lieut-General Pavlo Shandruk

With an Introduction by
Professor Roman Smal-Stocki

The story of the fight of the Ukrainian soldiers for the Independence of their state is one of the most stirring of our century. In ARMS OF VALOR their efforts are recorded by their commander.

General Pavlo Shandruk attained high rank during the War for Independence 1917-1921, and in World War II led the Ukrainian forces as Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian National Army and President of the Ukrainian National Committee.

General Shandruk's story relates much, for the first time, of importance to people interested in the fate of East Europe and the never-ending struggle of the subjugated nations against Russian aggression.

These memoirs are the expression of the distinction and valor of the Ukrainian Army in this fight for freedom.



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
ARMS *of* VALOR

PAVLO SHANDRUK

*Lieutenant General of the General Staff,
Ukrainian National Army*

With An Introduction by
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“Gentlemen may cry peace! peace!—
but there is no peace! The war is be-
gun! Is life so dear, or peace so sweet,
as to be purchased at the price of
chains and slavery?

“Forbid it, Almighty God! I know
not what course others may take: but
as for me, give me liberty, or give me
death!

“I know no way of judging of the
future but by the past.”

PATRICK HENRY

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Introduction

A DISTINGUISHED Ukrainian soldier presents in the following pages the recollections of his rather stormy and eventful life indissolubly merged with the struggle for liberty of Ukraine and all non-Russian nations of the old Russian Empire. This volume includes that period of Eastern European history which is dominated by the establishment of the Russian Communist dictatorship. This fact must be regarded as a watershed of history since it had far-reaching consequences for both European and world history. Up to the present moment it is the cause of the protracted world crisis of our time.

I

The memoirs of General Paul Shandruk start with the last phase of World War I in the east and the outbreak of the revolution in the Russian Empire. This Russian Empire is known in the annals of history as the infamous prison of the subdued non-Russian nations. It is also known as the cradle of the fake "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." This Empire's absolutist regime with its political police and the "Black Hundred" terrorists and specialists in pogroms, was backed by the overwhelming part of the Russians who constituted a minority in their Russian Empire of 42.7 per cent. The 57.3 per cent majority of the population consisted of non-Russian nations long oppressed, persecuted and deprived of all rights by the Russians. Their plight formed the so-called "nationality problems" which, with

its political, cultural and economic ramifications, became one of the decisive causes of the outbreak of the revolution after Ukrainian, Polish, Lithuanian, Finnish, Georgian, Armenian and Turkestanian military formations and revolutionary organizations joined the Central Powers in the war against Russia. With the outbreak of the revolution, started by the refusal of the Ukrainian Volhynian Guard Regiment to fire on the workers in Petrograd, began the immediate disintegration of the Russian Empire and imperial army along national lines, the Ukrainians stimulating all non-Russian nations because their modern nationalism was shaped by Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1687-1709) and Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) who a century ago proclaimed the "new and just law" of George Washington as the ideal of Ukraine. Thus the Ukrainians acted as "the Irish" of the Russian Empire.

The next acts of the historic drama followed in quick succession. After the abdication of the Tsar, the Russian "liberal" imperialists with Kerensky took over the government and began the fight against the demand of the non-Russian nations for self-determination especially of Ukraine. Thus hindering the process of revolutionary democratization inside the Empire, Kerensky attempted to continue the "war for democracy" outside and also started the Brusilov offensive in order not to lose for Russian imperialism the reward promised by the Western allies—Constantinople and the Dardanelles! The German General Staff then decided to send Lenin and his collaborators from Switzerland to Petrograd. Lenin, pretending to "solve the nationality problem," proclaimed "full self-determination including separation" for the non-Russian nations and soon, by a coup d'etat, established the Russian Communist dictatorship. The Russian imperial republic now dissolved into independent national republics of the Tatars (Idel-Uralians), Finns, Ukrainians, Kuban-Cossacks,

Lithuanians, Estonians, Byelo-Russians, Don-Cossacks, North Caucasians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Poles, Latvians, Siberians and Turkestanis (listed according to the sequence of the dates of their independence proclamations). Almost simultaneously at that time the proclamation of President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the idea of the League of Nations came from across the ocean. All these nations mistakenly believed that America would apply Wilson's principles to all of them.

After establishing their dictatorships in Petrograd and Moscow, the Russian Communists immediately shelved their old self-determination slogans. They concentrated on the world revolutionary program of Marxism-Leninism and, opposing the idea of the League of Nations by the organization of the Comintern, they started to attack their democratic neighbor republics. The "international" revolutionary phraseology of the Russian Communists was only window dressing calculated to gain sympathies among the Marxists-Socialists in the West. In reality, however, Russian Communism was, according to the great Russian Christian philosopher, Nicholas Berdyaev, (*The Origin of Russian Communism*, p. 120), "the third appearance of Russian autocratic imperialism, its first appearance being the Muscovite Tsardom and its second, the Petrine Empire." Now, in the first line the Russian Communist imperialists attacked Ukraine which was strategically and economically the foundation of the previous Empire. They also created a "Ukrainian Communist government" in Kharkiv which was backed by an invasion of the Russian Red Army. Thus the government of the Ukrainian National Republic was put in the most difficult situation because since the battle of Poltava (1709) where the champion of Ukraine's liberty, Hetman Ivan Mazepa and his ally, Charles XII of Sweden, were defeated by the Muscovite Tsar, Peter I. Ukraine was degraded to a Rus-

sian-Muscovite colony. All of its war industries (weapons and ammunition) were in modern times relocated outside Ukraine on Russian-Muscovite ethnographic territory, the Ukrainian language by Ukaze of the Tsar eliminated from public life, schools and press, and the Ukrainian cities, the intelligentsia, the old nobility and the Orthodox Church partly Russified. The Ukrainian National Republic now faced with a new attack by Russian imperialism, urgently needed an ally as did the American colonies in their War of Independence against British imperialism (cf. the alliance with the absolute monarchy of France negotiated by Benjamin Franklin in 1778). Ukraine hoped to find this ally against Russian Communist imperialism in the German nation whose great Herder showed a fine understanding of Ukrainian cultural values and whose Chancellor Bismarck once even planned to reestablish the independent "Kievan Kingdom" in order to get rid of the Russian imperialistic pressure on Central Europe, then masqueraded as idealistic Pan-Slavism and Pan-Orthodoxy with its "Moscow the Third Rome" dreams. During the First World War Germany supported the revolutionary organization Union for the Liberation of Ukraine which was under the leadership of Ukrainian socialists. The government of the Ukrainian National Republic consequently trusted Germany, concluded the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty (Jan. 12, 1918) with the Central Powers and invited the German Army into the country in order to gain time for the stabilization of its recovered statehood.

For hungry Germany, after years of allied blockade, peace with Ukraine was a "Brotfrieden," i.e. "Peace for the sake of bread." Coming from a country on the verge of hunger, the German Army in Ukraine did not always behave as guest and ally of the Ukrainian National Government. Alas—the honeymoon between Ukraine and Germany was rather short. Strong reactionary and monarchist

forces were at work; in Germany, as a matter of fact, some of the German dynasties were related to the Romanovs, German and Russian nobles were also closely intermarried, especially in the Baltic countries. Therefore, these forces opposed the socialist-democratic government of the Ukrainian National Republic and its parliament, the Central Rada, and fostered the reestablishment of a Russian tsarist regime and empire allied with the German Reich. Finally, after many conflicts between the Germans and Ukrainians, the Ukrainian parliament was occupied and dispersed by a German battalion. Simultaneously, General Paul Skoropadsky was proclaimed Hetman of Ukraine. He was a former aide de camp of Nicholas II and a descendant of the brother of Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky (1709-1722) who was appointed by Tsar Peter to succeed Hetman Ivan Mazepa.

This German coup d'état was a heavy blow against the organic evolution of democracy in Ukraine. But soon, with the collapse of Germany the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and his political conception also collapsed after a victorious revolution of the Ukrainian national forces headed by the Directory of the reestablished Ukrainian National Republic. The Ukrainian democratic government then got a sad heritage of internal and foreign policy. It was immediately faced by three aggressions and was forced to conduct three defensive wars. In the north Ukraine was again invaded by the Russian Red Army, in the southeast by the Russian White monarchists under General Denikin from the Don backed by England and later under Wrangel in the Crimea. Finally, the disintegration of Austria-Hungary and the proclamation of the West Ukrainian National Republic with Lviv (Lemberg) as a capital and its union with the Ukrainian National Republic into one state had as a consequence a war with resurrected Poland in the west. The worst in this situation was the complete lack of leader-

ship among the victorious Entente powers, their rivalries, a complete lack of a constructive vision for Eastern Europe and above all, a fundamental lack of understanding of what Russian Communism was in reality and what it stood for.

After a loss of much valuable time and precious blood the Ukrainians and Poles realized that both nations had common interests and a common deadly enemy—Russian Red and White imperialism. The Ukrainian National Republic under the leadership of Simon Petlura and the Polish Republic under the leadership of Jozef Pilsudski concluded the Warsaw Treaty and Military Convention on April 22, 1920. It was in this pact that Ukraine was forced by her plight to cede her western ethnographic territories with Lviv to Poland in the hope that they would be granted full autonomy. The last attempt of both nations to keep Russian Communism in its own Russian ethnographic territory soon followed and the attempt was calculated to stop Russia's imperialistic attacks against the non-Russian neighbor nations aimed at the formation of a new Russian empire as an arsenal for the proclaimed world revolution. But the European powers did not grasp the importance of this historical moment, they did not feel the basic common interests of the European civilization against Russian Communism, they did not help Ukraine and Poland. This was especially true of England, the traditional enemy of European unity, which returned to its "balance of power" policy in order that France would not dominate Europe through her allies. The final result of the Ukrainian-Polish War against Russian Communist imperialism was that the allied armies were forced to retreat. Poland subsequently betrayed its Ukrainian ally and was forced to conclude the Treaty of Riga (1921) with the "independent Soviet Ukrainian Republic," a puppet of Communist Moscow. The Red Army, commanded by many former tsarist gen-

eral staff officers, soon invaded the remaining non-Russian national republics carrying the banner of aggressive Russian Communist imperialism. Finally, in 1922-1924 the Soviet Union emerged. This new Russian colonial empire was and is the foundation of the contemporary Russian imperialism. This time it masquerades as an "international movement for the liberation of the working class and peasantry and of all colonial peoples exploited by the Western powers." In this historic struggle between liberty and Russian Communism in the east only Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were able to survive and to preserve their freedom and independence, because the Ukrainian fight against Moscow, waging continuously since 1918, impaired the dynamism of the new Russian imperialism.

The closing act of the drama of this struggle of the non-Russian nations for liberty against the new Russian imperialism, was the first great political emigration from Eastern Europe in 1920-1922. Not only the Ukrainian Government, with its army, political leaders, scholars, writers and their families went into exile to Western Europe, but also the governments or leaders of the Byelo-Russians, Idel-Uralians (Tatars), Finno-Karelians, Don and Kuban Cossacks, Georgians, North-Caucasians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Turkestanis, Komis and Yakuts. They were all fleeing at the very time that the League of Nations in Geneva started its first steps to protect the rights of nations. There was no UNNRA in Western Europe for the emigration at that time and the fate of the political exiles, of the men, women and children, was horrible—hunger, sleeping on streets and in parks, and sickness. The President of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Garigue Masaryk and Marshal Josef Pilsudski will ever be remembered for what they did for the emigres, especially the Ukrainians. But even in the free countries outside the Soviet Union there was no peace

for the refugees. Russian Communism continued a systematic war of annihilation against them by all the traditional methods of the tsarist political police: propaganda, corruption, bribes, kidnapping, provocation, murder and "return home" actions. But the leadership of all Ukrainian parties was so closely knit by the conspiratorial center of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement that all endeavors of the Communists were unsuccessful and the moral health of the Ukrainian emigration remained unimpaired.

The Ukrainian National Government in exile went through a frightful time. The murder of Simon Petlura was a hard blow. Petlura was a socialist and sincere friend of the Jews. A Jew served as Minister for Jewish Affairs in his government. President Petlura's murder taught Russian Communism the lesson, however, that its victims spoke even louder to their nations from the other world than they could have spoken alive. We all kept in mind the motto of nations fighting for their freedom: "a nation not surrendering in defeat—is victorious!" While in exile we continued to fight Russian Communism with the pen, the spoken and printed word, before international congresses and parliaments of the free nations warning them about the true aims of Russian Communism and predicting that as long as this dictatorship was not broken the world would never enjoy real peace.

Above all we analyzed the causes of the common defeat of the non-Russian nations by Moscow. We learned that (a) all the national problems of different non-Russian nations in the Soviet Empire, like in old Russia, were only parts of the general nationality problem of the East and that they all formed one whole; (b) that the successful continuation of our struggle demanded the formation of a common front of all non-Russian nations for common political action, and (c) for common military preparations and actions in the next world war, which Marxism-Lenin-

ism frankly promised the free world. This general staff of the non-Russian nations in exile became the Promethean League of the nations oppressed by Moscow, whose organization was entrusted to me by the Ukrainian government in exile.

Our military circles cultivated a conspiratorial alliance and political conception with Pilsudski's Poland and his old revolutionaries against Russian imperialism because, in our opinion, a free and independent Poland was the basis of the existence of free Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland on the one hand, and of free Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece on the other. We concentrated our political actions at the League of Nations in Geneva and desperately attempted to interest the public opinion of the United States in our causes.

Our small successes were the bills of Senator Copeland in the 71st Congress (1929) providing for diplomatic representatives to the Ukrainian and Georgian Governments in exile, an action blocked, of course, by the bureaucracy in the Department of State.

In the meantime the world situation was changing profoundly. The establishment of the Russian Communist dictatorships of Lenin-Stalin inaugurated the rise of totalitarian dictatorships of Mussolini in Italy and of Hitler in Germany. Totalitarian dictatorship means totalitarian aggression as we already witnessed in the Russian Communist case in Eastern Europe. Thus the Berlin-Rome axis was soon established. Mussolini started to build by aggressions his new empire in the Balkans and in Africa. Hitler left the League of Nations and started German rearmament. The Soviet Union, scared by the Berlin-Rome preparations, became the apostle of "collective security" and, with its insurmountable record of terror and murder, was accepted by the democratic powers in the League of Nations in order to strengthen the League's "moral pres-

tige." Thus did the League of Nations grant Russian Communism moral and international sanction for the previous occupations and annexations of all non-Russian democratic republics which in the 1920's used arms to defend the idea of the League of Nations against the Russian Comintern. It was in this sense that the League of Nations signed its own moral death sentence.

The world returned to its post World War I status—divided into two camps with the axis imperialist powers with a clear program of an action against Russian Communist imperialism on the one side and on the other, the democratic camp of the participants in the League of Nations who had to "guarantee" to its member, the Soviet Union, all the conquests of Russian Communist imperialism since 1920, to "guarantee the inviolability and integrity" of the frontiers of the new Russian prison of nations.

It was evident that the revolution in Eastern Europe, from which the Soviet Union emerged, was a still unfinished process and the following conceptions were elaborated for the approaching events.

The first was the Promethean conception of a dynamic democratic revolution inside the Soviet Union, which would dissolve the Soviet prison of nations and reestablish the democratic republics of the non-Russian nations as a basis for the formation of a kind of Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa with Ukraine, Byelo-Russia and the Baltic States in the West, a Union of Turkic or Mohammedan nations in the southeast and a Siberian Union in the east. The Polish, Baltic, Turkic and Mongolian revolutionaries sympathized with these ideas as did many anti-communists in the West.

Secondly, the Czechs living under constant fear of Germany, worked among the political emigrations for a future Slavic confederation, they believed in the gradual democratization of the Soviet regime and hoped through Car-

patho-Ukraine and Western Ukraine integrated into the future democratic Ukraine to be a part of this confederation and to enjoy its protection against the German "Drang nach Osten." Some French supported this idea, hoping that this confederation would repay France the tsarist loans.

Thirdly, Hitler's conception was the construction of a German colonial empire in Eastern Europe reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

And lastly, the Russian Communist conception of a World Soviet Union through new wars and revolutions was well elaborated and known.

In the cold war of these ideas and conceptions France and Great Britain constantly vacillated, at one time sympathizing with the rights of self-determination of the non-Russian nations while preaching coexistence at other times. But Hitlerism and Stalinism were dynamic forces and the tensions in Europe soon reached a climax.

Poland was the key in this new European constellation. In Poland's hands then was the decision not only of her own fate but of the fate of all non-Russian nations in Eastern Europe and of Europe itself. On the one hand Poland was tempted by Berlin to enter into an offensive alliance against Moscow which surely would have liquidated Russian imperialistic Communism and made Stalin and his gangsters exiles. On the other hand the fantastic successes of Germany, her rearmament, remilitarization of the Rhineland, reunion with Austria, integration of Sudeten-Germany and the colonial plans in the East scared Poland and it accepted the "guarantee" of England in order to remain faithful to her ideals of freedom and the League of Nations Treaty obligations. And the avalanche started. Stalin sold the League of Nations down the river to Hitler with the whole collective security system, non-aggression treaties, Briand-Kellog Pact and so on and the two totali-

tarian dictatorships of Moscow and Berlin (as once did the absolute monarchies of Frederick II of Prussia and Catherine II of Russia) again partitioned Poland and agreed upon a new partition between them of the remaining free East European nations of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechia (Bohemia), Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Greece. The third dictatorship of Rome participated in the deal as a German junior partner.

World War II started. Well understanding that a free and independent Poland was the only real guarantee for the existence of free Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and of the free Central and Balkan European countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece, and that the existence of all these free countries was the condition for a future liberation of Ukraine and all the non-Russian nations under Russian Communist yoke, and that only then a Pan-Europa as a union of free European nations as the constructive ideal of Ukrainian policy could be realized, the leader of the Ukrainians in Poland, the deputy speaker of the Polish Parliament, Wasyl Mudry, appealed to the mobilized Ukrainians in the Polish Army to loyally defend the Polish Republic. The Ukrainian government-in-exile ordered its contract officers in the Polish Army to do the same. Thus, in spite of the fact that the Polish interior policy toward the Ukrainians was disgraceful and stupid, Ukrainians defended the existence of free Poland up to the capitulation of her army. With Hitler on his march toward Lviv was only a battalion of Ukrainian youth who believed in his "anti-Communism." They soon learned the truth, however, that all Western-Ukraine with Lviv, the Piedmont of Ukraine, was ceded by Hitler to Stalin in exchange for the promised millions of carloads of foodstuffs, iron ore, manganese, oil and other products which later constituted the basis for Hitler's victorious

offensive against the West. But the planned invasion of England could not be realized and soon Hitler's eyes were again directed toward the East where Japan was on the way to join the axis.

The anti-German coup d'état in Yugoslavia delayed for more than a month Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. According to the opinion of Ukrainian military men, this delay, because of the approaching fall and winter, reduced Hitler's chances for a speedy victory in the east. But this attack did raise new hopes among some Ukrainians who did not study the first edition of *Mein Kampf*. Using some Ukrainian groups as spearheads and interpreters, the advance of the German Armies and the surrender of the Soviet Armies, consisting largely of non-Russian soldiers, were spectacular. Soon the Germans stood before Lenin-grad, Moscow and in the Caucasus. The victory over the "unconquerable" Maginot Line created a megalomania in Hitler and (against the advice of experts to respect the aspirations of Ukraine and of other occupied nations and to treat them as allies against Russian Communist imperialism) he decided to disregard Ukrainian nationalism completely. The attempt to organize a Ukrainian national administration in Lviv was liquidated and Ukraine was partitioned by Hitler. Western Ukraine became German as an "inheritance" from old Austria. The Dnister Valley and Odessa Hitler presented to Rumania as "Transnistria" while Carpatho-Ukraine had been presented to Hungary earlier. A dark age fell on Ukraine. The Russian totalitarian dictatorship was replaced by the German totalitarian dictatorship. Hitler continued a systematic persecution of any idea of Ukrainian self-determination or human rights and exploited the country economically as a colony, declaring that in the future it was to become the German "Lebensraum"—the territory for the colonization by German farmers. Soon, even the leaders of the pro-German groups

among Ukrainians were interned in concentration camps. Hitler's ideology made Germany unfit for a constructive solution of the nationality problems of the occupied countries in Eastern Europe and dug the grave for Germany in the East. The nationalists went underground, organized guerrilla warfare against the Germans and disorganized the whole hinterland. The collapse of the front soon started especially after the United States supplied Stalin with masses of new war material for offensive actions. Rather late the German command attempted to respect the national ideas of the occupied non-Russian nations but, again, the remnants of the Baltic barons created the "Vlassov conception" which antagonized the non-Russian nations, which were electrified by the news from across the ocean about the contents of the Atlantic Charter and the planned United Nations organization. A new hope was dawning in the West for the victims of Stalin and Hitler and they took this news at face value. They cherished the hope that the United States, after defeating Hitler, would act according to the Atlantic Charter and liquidate Stalin. For this aim they attempted to have national military formations ready for action as allies of the free world.

The second front of the allies in the West, the overwhelming superiority of American airpower, speeded the retreat of the German Armies from the east and Germany's eventual collapse. The second great political emigration from the Soviet Union started with the retreat of the Germans. This emigration was enlarged by the hundreds of thousands of forced laborers brought into the German economy during the war from the east. After Germany's surrender the United States and Great Britain held all the trumps in their hands. They had all the political centers and armed formations of the non-Russian nations for the establishment of democracy and peace in the East but no action followed. Moscow, however, did act because Rus-

sian Communism has principles and a program. The Western democracies soon became aware of the actual results of World War II. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia and East Germany were communized and put behind the "Iron Curtain," while China was lost in Asia. Thus the free world, still having a monopoly in atomic weapons and immense air superiority over the Soviets, betrayed its old allies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and China and with paper-protests permitted Russian imperialism to expand its control over 900 million people.

I frankly confess, as the man responsible at that time for the political and diplomatic actions of the Ukrainian government-in-exile, that in my calculations of the worst possible results of World War II I never expected such a fantastic eventuality as the free world betraying Poland or Czechoslovakia. But that is what happened and an entire conception of Ukrainian policy and the policy of non-Russian nations enslaved by Moscow collapsed, together with the belief in the moral integrity of the West. It is a dangerous business to be an ally of the free world if we compare the present situation of these countries or of Hungary with the prosperity of Germany, Italy and Japan.

But the continuous and uncompromising fight of Ukrainians against Russian imperialism was not in vain. This fight forced Stalin to introduce Soviet Ukraine as an equal member into the United Nations. (In 1920 the U. S. State Department blocked the membership of democratic Ukraine in the League of Nations in Geneva by a Note of Undersecretary Bainbridge Colby.)

One bright spot showed through our tragedy. His Holiness the Pope saved us from extradition to Stalin, an action that was, in fact, promised by the Western democracies to Stalin, who, according to comrade Nikita Khrushchev himself, was a mass murderer and criminal. Another bright

spot was the fact that the United States opened her gates to the "displaced persons." Thus since 1947, we finally can again think and act as free men and citizens of our adopted Motherland.

But there is no peace for the former exiles and the political refugees. Like the period following World War I, Moscow continues its war of annihilation against the political emigrations by provocation, parcels with time bombs, corruption and "return home" propaganda.

II

I pictured here the successive phases of the events in Eastern Europe to which the recollections of General Shandruk give plentiful material in facts, details and unvarnished eyewitness reports.

As a comparatively young captain he was a front fighter and experienced all the vicissitudes and hardships of the war against Russian Communism conducted by the improvised Ukrainian Army units in the worst possible circumstances, often lacking weapons, ammunition and medical care.

Colonel Shandruk was used by the Ukrainian Government and General Staff as a commanding officer in many actions of our war against the Russian Communists and gained among all of us, soldiers and civilians, the highest respect as a disciplined soldier completely dedicated to the cause.

As a general in the emigration he was entrusted by the government-in-exile to the most important key position of Chief of General Staff (in exile) elaborating mobilization plans. In order to keep his military knowledge up to date he entered the Polish General Staff college, joined the Polish Army as a contract officer and fought with and commanded a Polish operational group against the Ger-

mans. As the Polish Army capitulated it also surrendered this Ukrainian general to Germany.

In the last phase of World War II, the Germans finally grasped the cause of their failure in the East and convoked a conference of the leaders of Ukrainian groups in Berlin. The Ukrainian politicians burdened General Shandruk with the task of heading the Ukrainian National Committee and of saving what was still possible to save.

Accepting this mission, he conducted himself with full human and national dignity. He refused any subordination to the Russian Soviet general, Vlassov, and as a skillful bargainer, forced the Germans to recognize the principle of full equality for the Ukrainian nation and the status of an independent nation in the war against Moscow. As a soldier he knew well that Germany was doomed to defeat and that his only task was to save the human material of the Ukrainian political emigration from falling into the hands of Stalin and to transfer it to the camp of the allies. This he did.

As a primary source for the proper understanding of the Eastern problems in World War II and as a primary source for the history of the Ukrainian fight for liberty, General Shandruk's memoirs are of lasting value.

III

These memoirs are not only of importance for historians but above all for students of current political affairs and of current American-Soviet policy. They include the warning of a soldier. It is the same warning this writer voiced, as a scholar, nearly ten years ago in the book *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*. It is a voice of Cassandra. Let us face the facts.

The extent of the decline of American power and moral prestige in the short period of the last ten years from the

status of the victorious and leading nation of the world with a monopoly of atomic weapons and gigantic air superiority to its present level is a phenomenon unknown in history. But, generally speaking, American public opinion is still unaware of what happened. What is even more disappointing is that, with very few exceptions, the leaders of American public opinion still do not understand why America and the rest of the free world have been forced to retreat for the last decade and are losing the war with Russian imperialistic Communism around the world.

The main cause is that our Department of State, for the last forty years, has steadfastly refused to support dynamically the right for self-determination of the non-Russian nations and is working, in fact, up to date with the cliché, elaborated by tsarist and Russian Bolshevik and Menshevik propaganda, of a "homogenous, indivisible Russia."

The nationalist ideologies of the non-Russian nations of the present Soviet Union were shaped and formed by the ideas of the American Declaration of Independence and the principles of Woodrow Wilson. They are children of these great contributions of the American nation to the struggle for a moral order in the world. But since 1920 these children have been abandoned and sacrificed by America to Russian imperialism.

Therefore, continuously upholding the fundamental thesis of Russian imperialism—the "unity and indivisibility of the Soviet Union"—American policy was in the course of time the sponsor and protector of Russian Communist imperialism and by its generous help and participation in Stalin's industrialization during the Five Year plans and later during World War II, American policy contributed at least 75 per cent to the present power of the Russian Communist monster now threatening the whole world including America.

After World War II America again dedicated itself to

the preservation of the Russian colonial empire by refusing to use the deadly weapon of nationalism of the non-Russian nations against the new Russian empire and to promote by deeds the liberation of the non-Russians according to the Atlantic Charter. But on the other hand, America supported with all her power the dissolution of the colonial empires of her faithful allies of Great Britain, France and Holland. Thus Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Baltic States are in chains while Sudan, Ghana and Libya, among others, are free.

In summing up it must be stated that the American lack of understanding for the nationalism of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union and its proper evaluation catastrophically influenced the results of World War II. It is responsible for the tragedy of the oppressed non-Russian nations inside the Soviet Union which again resulted in a tragedy for all the new captive nations—the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia and China. That lack of understanding is finally responsible for the tragedy of the entire free world and the United States herself. Let us be frank: the free world lost World War II.

Whether our fellow Americans wish to admit it or not, America is presently forced to fight her second War of Independence. This time it is against Russian Communist imperialism which is attacking her everywhere and with all possible means for the final realization of a "World Soviet Union."

We, the newest generation of Americans, know it—and we do not intend to participate in "surrender" research. We know that freedom has a higher value than life.

Roman Smal-Stocki

Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
February, 1959.

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Preface

IN THESE recollections of mine, I wish first of all to present to that part of the world which believes in truth and justice, the struggle of the Ukrainian nation for its own national existence—obviously within the framework of my familiarity with circumstances of that struggle, and my insignificant part in it.

It is a fact that during the entire struggle for independence I was a front-line soldier, far removed from internal political interplay, and not fully cognizant of the unfavorable external political circumstances affecting Ukraine, and hence the activities within our higher political circles were not always completely clear to me. Certain events which took place within our Government during the 1917 to 1920 period in particular were, to myself and many of my front-line colleagues, to say the least, not understandable. We were surprised at many happenings, and as we learned later, they were indeed not justified by reasons of state.

All these events, and others in which I took a personal part, are presented by me the way I knew them for fact, or as they appeared to me under the then existing circumstances, or finally, as they exerted an influence upon my work. I try to comment upon my work. I try to comment upon the results and their significance.

In these recollections I make no claim or emphasis to the importance of my role which, incidentally, was not clothed in high responsibility in the events herein discussed. I am, however, fully aware at all times that I never hesitated to give my life for my Country. Neither did I

evade, in spite of being fully aware of the consequences, assumption of political responsibility for heading the Ukrainian National Committee and the Ukrainian National Army at the close of World War II.

It is quite obvious that neither the prominent personages of the Ukrainian political and community life, nor my own experiences or moves, but rather the results of their activities and mine, could be of interest to the world and to students of the history of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation.

The background of my recollections is to be an analysis of circumstances which were favorable or hostile to our cause, and an illustration of world conditions in relation thereto, in order to provide a possibly lucid and impartial picture of political ignorance and politically unjustifiable tendency to refuse to come to Ukraine's aid. In spite of proclaimed ideas of the right of nations to self-determination, the Ukrainian nation bathed in blood was refused material, technical, and even medical aid, and this was one of the main causes of the enemy's victory over us; not our own lack of faith in victory, nor unwillingness to make sacrifices.

One of the problems which I would particularly like to illustrate in my recollections is the matter of mutual relations between our Government and Army with the national minorities in Ukraine, and especially the Jewish minority. Due to the then existing chaos of the revolution, and provocation on the part of the Bolsheviks and their fellow-travellers as well as of the adherents of the Black Hundred, this matter has become highly controversial, particularly in the democratic world which was completely uninformed and detached from Russian reality. On this the Bolsheviks based their assassination of Simon Petlura and Evhen Konovalts. All their ideological adherents and well-paid agents based their provocative propa-

ganda against the Ukrainian nation on this misconception, against its liberation struggle, and even against its high cultural development. The Ukrainian past, its statehood and political power is unblemished, both during its flowering as well as its enslavement. Thanks to numerous books, primarily by Jewish authors (see Arnold Margolin "*From a Political Diary*"—*Russia, Ukraine and America, 1905-1945*, New York 1946), there has recently been a certain amount of sobriety introduced into this controversy, with a cooler appraisal of events, albeit these events are not yet in sufficiently distant historical perspective. The main sobering factor has been, however, the policy of the Bolsheviks themselves, aimed at destruction of the non-Russian nations, first of all the Ukrainians and Jews. This very steadfast policy line of theirs was and is the outcome of the policy of all preceding Moscow governments. During the first years of the Bolshevik revolution, this policy feigned to favor the Jews who were assigned to numerous state positions in which they proved to be unfaltering adherents of great-power imperialist Moscow ideology. This was a surprise to all Ukrainians without exception: how could the Jews, with their great cultural, religious, and historical-political experience fall into the trap so slyly laid for them by Moscow? Trotsky, Kamenev, Kon, Dan, Uritsky, Kaganovich, Yakovlev, Litvinov, Yoffe, Rapaport, Rukhimovich—these are but a few names among those who held responsible positions in Moscow, and who were, in their activities, openly hostile to Ukrainian statehood.

In the text of my recollections, I cite concrete facts of pogrom provocations, the reaction to them, and the truth about the attitude of our Government and Army toward the Jews. I am not trying to conceal sporadic episodes of pogroms staged by our own irresponsible leaders, so-called "otamans," who were immediately punished (often by

death) for their misdeeds. I am not silent, however, also about known to me personally facts of provocative behavior on the part of some Jews who were often the cause of our tactical defeats, leading the Bolsheviks onto our trail in surprise military action. Later they admitted that they were agents of Bolshevik intelligence. The basic policy line of the Ukrainian Government toward the Jews is best proved by the fact that Jews were members of the Central Rada and of the Government. The Minister of Jewish Affairs P. Krasny and his subordinates, Director Bagrad and Mr. Abba Lerner (the latter was my high school classmate), frequently visited our front-line positions where they were received with all honors due cabinet members, and always thanked us for the peace and order behind the front lines.

I shall be extremely happy, if my recollections will form another link in the erection of a complete understanding between the Ukrainians and Jews, two nations severely punished by fate, which made the greatest sacrifices in the struggle for nationhood, and even for the right to be called nations. And who, particularly in Russia, made individual and mass sacrifices on the altar of an alien revolution, and sometimes to the benefit of Moscow imperialism which is hostile to both nations.

Relations with other minority groups in Ukraine were quite smooth.

I hope that my old friend, Professor O. Ya. Choulgine, as member of the Central Rada and Foreign Minister of Ukraine, will clarify this problem completely satisfactorily in his forthcoming book "Ukraine against Moscow."

An encouraging impulse to write these recollections was provided, on the one hand, by this crucial period for all mankind, and particularly for the Ukrainian nation which, in my opinion, should bring the realization of the aspirations of all nations visited by fate; and on the other hand,

in supplement of valuable material written by Ukrainians about our liberation struggle, to shed some light on certain fragments of that struggle and circumstances under which it was waged, unknown not only to the world, but even to many Ukrainians. At the same time I wish to note the work and role of our prominent political and military leaders who took part, and are still active in the political and military struggle against red and white Moscow.

I must state with great regret that in spite of extremely careful collection and preservation of numerous historical documents pertaining to the liberation struggle, I lost nearly everything at the beginning of World War II when, on the denunciation of "our own people" I was imprisoned by the Nazis, and when the Gestapo wrecked my home in Skierniewice (Poland). Other documents and notes were lost in my many wanderings after the war, and some I had to destroy myself, in good conscience.

I wish to thank here all my good friends who helped me in this undertaking, and whose names are listed in the index. I also wish to thank Mr. Roman Olesnicki for graciously taking upon himself the difficult task of translating this volume into English.

I am particularly grateful and happy to note that Professor Roman Smal-Stocki consented to provide a foreword to these recollections. A Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and for many years Minister of Culture of the Ukrainian National Republic who was in charge of our foreign policy, the organizer of the Prometheus League of Nations enslaved by Moscow and its permanent President over a period of 22 years, President of the Supreme Council of Shevchenko Scientific Societies, at present Professor of Marquette University in Milwaukee, Professor Roman Smal-Stocki is exceptionally well acquainted with the circumstances accompanying our liberation struggle. He was also persecuted by the Gestapo. He

knows all the people who worked and work for the Ukrainian cause, he also knows well my work and the course of my life with its bitter moments. His highly objective and accurate appraisal of events and people most certainly adds to the value of my recollections, and should contribute to a deeper and more lively interest of Western readers in the Ukrainian problem.

PAVLO SHANDRUK
Lieutenant-General
General Staff

Trenton, New Jersey

1959

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The Eve and the First Days Of the Russian Revolution

TOWARD the end of 1916 I was in command of the 3rd Battalion, 232nd Reserve Infantry Regiment in the city of Tver. Attached to this battalion was a special company of draftees, numbering a little over 80 men who had completed higher or at least secondary education. I was often surprised at that time and forced to give thought to the somewhat aggressive behavior of those men toward their superiors and non-commissioned officers. Those educated draftees had not as yet completed their basic training and hence could not be appointed to non-commissioned command posts in their company. As a result of my social contacts with them (obviously within the bounds of the existing discipline within the Tsarist Army), I made attempts to get at the cause of their odd behavior through personal talks. From conversations with them I concluded that they had been informed, mostly by relatives visiting them on Sundays and holidays, even from such distant places as Kharkiv or Kiev, that the war would come to an early end with completely unexpected consequences. The men of Ukrainian origin were especially outspoken with me, knowing that I was an Ukrainian, too. In spite of such an attitude on the part of this Company, its commander, Lt. Omelchenko, and I managed to make it take so much training that the commander of the 32nd Reserve Brigade, Gen. Pigulevsky, assembled all battalion commanders and chiefs of N.C.O. Schools of the 42nd Brigade one fall day in order to demonstrate to them the arms and field training of

that Company. I had some experience in this respect because prior to taking over command of the battalion, I had been in charge of the regimental school for non-commissioned officers. My battalion, moreover, despite certain laxity of discipline due to the war and the fact that a majority of its ranks consisted of so-called draftees of the second call (38 to 42 years of age), was awarded first place in the sharpshooting contest of the entire Moscow Military District, then under the command of General Morozovsky. The battalion also received first place in the brigade classification conducted by Gen. Morozovsky's deputy, General Syla-Novitsky, who was of Ukrainian origin. In the regiment, the battalion had the designation "disciplinary," but not in the punitive sense, only to denote its high discipline. Regardless of my rigorous service demands, off-duty I was merely an older colleague to my men and this fact stood me in good stead during the first days of the revolution.

I did not feel alarmed, but out of curiosity at the behavior of my men, I told my regimental commander, Col. Shastin, about it. He immediately decided to dispatch the chief of regimental intelligence to Petrograd to get at the root of the situation. The man dispatched was Lt. Ivanov, and on his return from Petrograd Col. Shastin called a secret officers' meeting and reported that there was a threat of a strike in heavy industry in Petrograd, and even chances of revolution breaking out. It should be noted that the largest arms and munitions plants were located in the Petrograd area: Petrogradsky, Petrozavodsky, Putilovsky, Sestroretsky, Ladozhsky, Continental and others. They were the largest in Russia and considerably increased in size and production since the beginning of the war. Col. Shastin added that the numerous and unreliable Petrograd garrison would also have to be considered, as the Guard Regiments are composed chiefly of Ukrainians. At that point the Colonel cast a meaningful look at me and at Captain I. Mar-

chenko, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 232nd Regiment, who was sitting next to me.

The Tver Garrison consisted of three infantry regiments, an artillery division, a regiment of Don Cossacks and the well-known Tver Cavalry School—a total of about 40,000 men.

For the time being everything went on as before: training, rifle practice and dispatch of marching companies to the Front. Came New Year's and all the traditional celebrations in the regiments were cancelled. Newspapers arrived late, but nothing was to be found in them, due to the censorship, anyway. We knew through "scuttlebutt" that a new Government had been formed, headed by the notorious member of the "Black Hundreds," Goremykin. It is worth remarking that at that time there was a lot of surreptitious but very indignant talk among the officers about the leading role played at the Tsar's Court by the charlatan Grigori Rasputin, who claimed to be able to cure the heir apparent, the Tsarevich Alexis of haemophilia. This was the cause of his hold upon the Tsaritzza; and now Goremykin was Rasputin's protegee. Reports reached us late in February that a group of Russian aristocrats, headed by Prince Yusupov had killed Rasputin; that there were strikes and riots in Petrograd, so far of an economic nature, but that troops sent to put down the strikes had refused to obey orders. On March 4, 1917 Colonel Shastin assembled all regimental officers and announced that revolution had broken out in Petrograd and Moscow and that the Tsar had renounced the throne in his own and his heir's name.

Out of nowhere, like "Phoenix from the ashes" the regiment was suddenly overflowing with all sorts of agitators and revolutionaries wearing leather jackets. They immediately proceeded to establish "Soviets (councils) of Soldiers' Deputies" in all regiments of our garrison, following the example of near-by Moscow. These councils assumed the

role of military authorities and our council removed Colonel Shastin, appointing Lt. Col. Lukashevsky in his place. The men disliked Col. Shastin solely because of his melancholy nature. He was a very liberal and sincere man, and the change in him occurred probably as a result of a serious wound at the Front. Fearful lest the agitated masses of soldiers kill him, I got in touch with Lt. Col. Lukashevsky and took Shastin to a near-by monastery; it was probably during the night of March 5th. I felt safe for the time being, the "Soviets" (councils) of the battalion and of the regiment having "confirmed" me in my position. A noted demagogue and a man without character, Lt.-Col. Pogorelov was "elected" chief of the Tver Garrison. Thus, the entire command of the garrison was completely taken over by the garrison councils. The next day, when complete anarchy reigned in the city, Lt.-Col. Pogorelov appointed me "chief of guards" in the city and I was required to restore a semblance of order. While I was serving in this capacity, however, some provocateurs killed General Chekhovsky who had arrived from Moscow to conduct an inspection on orders of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies (he was probably a brother of the well-known Ukrainian political leader, Professor V. Chekhovsky). The provocateurs immediately accused me of neglect of duty as commander of the guards and arrested me. When reports of my arrest reached my battalion, the men armed themselves with live ammunition and, accompanied by the regimental band, marched from the barracks to the city, to liberate me. Along their march they were joined by the Don Cossacks and the men of the Officers' School. The Garrison Soviet became apprehensive that it might be court-martialled, but chiefly, as I was able to find out later, that I might be proclaimed chief of the garrison, a delegation was therefore sent to me to City Hall where I was being temporarily detained under parole arrest. The purpose was to

talk to me so that I would induce my men to go back to their barracks. Naturally, I was informed that I was free. I went out to my soldiers and told them that I was free and that they should go back without causing any trouble. I went back, however, to my place of confinement where I felt safer, and told the Soviet that I demanded an investigation of the killing of General Chekhovsky and until such an investigation was completed, I would voluntarily remain under arrest. The fact that members of the Soviet tried to induce me to leave for my home made me see clearly that I could save my life only if I remained where I was, under arrest. The investigation was conducted by a lawyer, a classmate of mine from the Aleksievsk Military School in Moscow, Captain M. Ruzhytsky, subsequently a Colonel and Chief Prosecutor of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic. He issued an order for my immediate release. I assume that this entire provocation against me was caused by my attempts to have separate detachments of Ukrainians established out of the Tver Garrison. My Ukrainian colleagues and I had demanded that one of the garrison regiments be made exclusively Ukrainian. Following my release I requested Lt.-Col. Lukashevsky to assign me immediately to the Front, to my own 70th Ryazhesk Regiment which covered a sector of the Front near Dvinsk. That same night I left on a brief furlough. All the officers accompanied me to the station, along with many soldiers from my battalion; but there were also lurking quite a few suspicious-looking people. The reason they did not take a chance and attack me was the presence of a large number of my soldiers.

After my furlough, I joined my regiment at the Front. Here the atmosphere was entirely different, as it would be, facing the enemy. The regiment had a Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, too, but acting merely in an advisory capacity attached to the Commandant, and concerned mainly with

economic matters. I did not have an official assignment because all posts were filled, therefore I remained on special orders of the regimental commander, Col. Soloviev. The Regimental Soviet, however, soon proposed that I be appointed chairman of the Regimental Economic Committee.

A rumor began spreading early in June that an offensive would be mounted on the entire Western Front and on the Caucasian Front at the same time. In this connection on June 12, Dvinsk was visited by the favorite son of the revolution, the Socialist-Revolutionary Prime Minister and Minister of War of the Provisional Russian Government, Alexander Kerensky. Each regiment picked a delegation and Kerensky was to address the delegates. I was in charge of the delegation of my regiment. Over 1,000 delegates from the entire North-western Front assembled in the huge hall of the Dvinsk railroad station. After a fairly long wait, Kerensky finally appeared in the entourage of generals A. Dragomirov, Yu. Danilov, Budberg and others. The first impression was unfavorable: semi-military dress, all hatless and Kerensky in a fatigue cap; earthy-grey face, nervous movements. He began his address: no enthusiasm, only sporadic shouts by demagogues about the heroes of the revolution, appeals to the patriotic feelings of the soldiers and workers (whose only concern at that time was "let's go home, war without annexations or contributions") to defend "our common one and indivisible mother Russia." During his address Kerensky kept losing his false teeth and waving his arms; this detracted from his speech and caused ironic smiles in the audience. He went on like that for about half an hour and I thought that it would certainly not be he to lead Russia out of the chaos of the revolution. When two Non-Coms and I, who were the delegates of our regiment, were leaving the hall I asked them about their impressions. One of them, Sgt. Skidanenko, said: "the

same impression as yours." I understood what he meant.

The so-called Brusilov Offensive started on June 18. But rumors notwithstanding, it was launched only on the Southwestern Front, and faced by the fire of German and Austrian artillery, it broke down on the second day. The offensive was not simultaneous, only in stages, and the attack on the Northern Front began only on July 8th, and ended the same day. After this June offensive, a "fraternization" initiated by the Germans went on on all fronts, with barter trade going on between the opposing lines. For all practical purposes the war was over.

We Ukrainians knew that the Central Rada with Prof. Michael Hrushevsky at its head was functioning in Kiev. It was a kind of parliament with the so-called Secretariat acting as a Government. We had been waiting keenly for someone from among the top leadership of the Ukrainian national movement to visit us and to tell us what we should do. As early as May, we had formed a Ukrainian national battalion out of the 18th Infantry Division and we had our Ukrainian banner. The battalion had over fifteen hundred men, I was in command and Captain Petrenko was my aide. We sent our delegates to the Central Rada in Kiev, but they never came back to the regiment.

In August food shortages became so acute that our regimental Soviet, on the initiative of two Non-Coms from Siberia, decided to send the Committee to Siberia to purchase meat and flour. The Division Soviet took over the idea and appointed me to head the Committee. It took us two weeks to reach Barnaul because railroads were completely disorganized, particularly in connection with the action of General Krimov who was marching on Petrograd at the head of a cavalry corps in defense of the Kerensky Provisional Government. It became known much later that Krimov killed himself and the corps was disarmed by

units of the Petrograd Garrison when they were approaching Petrograd. Kerensky, however, managed to escape from Petrograd.

It was none other than Kerensky, acting as Prime Minister, who opposed the demands of the Ukrainian Central Rada merely to recognize home-rule for Ukraine and he issued an order to halt Ukrainianization of the armed forces at the Front and in the hinterland alleging that this would undermine the defensive power of Russia; this, however, was merely a pretext. The order did not help because there was no power which could be used against the soldiers of Ukrainian and other nationalities who were following the Ukrainian example and emancipating themselves. It was quite natural for the Ukrainian soldiers to follow the voice of national and patriotic duty, but still, there was quite a numerous part who followed the voice of self-preservation and nostalgia. They wanted to go home, and in this they followed the example of the Muscovites who had become completely anarchized and began robbing military and private property, wrecking railroad stations (especially restaurants) and freight cars on the way to their homes. It comes to mind frequently, when I recall those days, that the Communist rulers deliberately permitted the worst instincts of men to get the better of them at that time in order to promote chaos, but right after the revolution the strictest kind of discipline was introduced. All Ukrainian detachments were completely disciplined and because of this fact, both Governments, that of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Russian Provisional, kept receiving requests from cities, towns, villages, factories and railroads to provide Ukrainian soldiers for their protection. Regular pitched battles were frequently joined between Ukrainian and Russian units, or groups of deserters, which always ended in victory of the Ukrainians, but which caused the Muscovites to hate the Ukrainians. On the infrequent oc-

casions of Russian victory, the Muscovite bands usually disarmed the Ukrainians and shot them on the spot. But such incidents passed unnoticed by the Moscow Government and Command and nobody was ever punished.

All sources of Ukrainian memoiristic literature covering that period and historiography indicate that Congresses of Ukrainian soldiers were held in May and June 1917 and sailors of the Black Sea Fleet attended the latter, having hoisted the Ukrainian banner over that part of the former Imperial Navy. The Congresses elected a Ukrainian Military Committee headed by Simon Petlura and recommended that he proceed immediately with the establishment of new Ukrainian military formations and continue to Ukraininize units of the Russian Army. It is significant that Kerensky prohibited these Congresses. Since that time there began formation, albeit on a very small scale, of exclusively Ukrainian units, mainly defensive. Formed in Kiev was the 1st Bohdan Khmelnytsky Infantry Regiment, in Kharkiv the Slobidsky Corps, in Chernihiv and Chyhyryn so-called Free Cossacks; also guard companies and battalions for the protection of important railroad junctions, such as Zhmerynka, Birzula, Koziatyn, Shepetivka and others, against plundering and to force demobilized Russian echelons from the southern and southwestern fronts to pass through northern junctions, by-passing Ukraine. Ukrainianization of the 34th Army Corps began in June; it was under the command of General P. Skoropadsky, later, in 1918, Hetman of Ukraine.

Meanwhile I, and my two Sputniks (fellow-travelers) were in Siberia. Complete order still reigned there and prices in particular were at least 5 times lower than in Ukraine and European Russia. For example: in Kharkiv butter was 9 rubles a pound, while in Barnaul a 50-lb. barrel of export butter cost 40 rubles, i.e. 80 kopecks per pound. Gold rubles were in circulation here, while in Ukraine

they had disappeared a year earlier. We purchased in Novosibirsk and Barnaul 3 carloads of meat, 1 carload of ham and 10,000 lbs. butter and, accompanied by one of my fellow-travelers all this was routed to Dvinsk on special orders of the Tomsk Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. I took advantage of the return trip to visit my wife who was staying with her mother in Kharkiv. This was the end of October, it had taken me three weeks to reach Kharkiv and from there I could not even attempt to get to Dvinsk because the Bolshevik coup d'etat had taken place in the meantime. Early in December the quartermaster of my regiment, Lt. Zhyvotiuk visited me in Kharkiv and told me about events in the regiment and on the front. On orders of the regimental Soviet, the regiment demobilized voluntarily late in September, while the Ukrainian battalion under the command of Capt. Petrenko reached Kiev. Lt. Zhyvotiuk also told me that he had seen Capt. Petrenko in Kiev, and the latter told him that when he had reported to the Secretary of Defense, Lt.-Col. Zhukovsky, asking what he was to do with the battalion which was waiting in railroad cars at the Kiev 2 station, the Secretary replied: "Demobilize. Ukraine is socialist and instead of a regular army we are going to have a militia." Of all the food loaded in Siberia, the regiment received only the ham, the rest was requisitioned in Moscow, said Lt. Zhyvotiuk.

The Bolshevik coup in Kharkiv was extremely bloody, the Communists executing about 6,000 officers. A local bookbinder, M. Rukhimovich, became head of the garrison. He was subsequently a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, a short and skinny man who distinguished himself by his brutality toward officers. He issued an order requiring registration of all military men and I, naturally, reported, although I became very nervous when the file clerk took

my card to Rukhimovich's office. Officers who were standing in line for registration advised me to flee immediately, but I stayed. A few minutes later the file clerk came back and quite politely asked me to see the commander of the garrison. Mr. Rukhimovich offered me the job of his aide and commandant of the city. This put me in a hopeless position: I could neither refuse, nor accept. After thinking it over for a little while I said that I accepted in principle, but being without experience, I wanted another day for my final answer. Surprisingly, he agreed. Right after I got home I told my wife that she should move to her aunt's while I changed into a private's overcoat and cap and walked to the Lubotyn station, to take a train from there to the city of Lubni where my family was living. I knew that my brother Oleksander, a Captain in the same 70th Ryashesk Regiment and commander of trench mortars, was already there. This was January 1918.

Rumors reached us in Lubni that under the attack of the Bolsheviks pressing from the north and east under the command of Muraviev, the Central Rada had left Kiev and moved to Zhytomir; that Kiev itself was engulfed by a revolt of Bolsheviks and it was being defended by the Slobidsky Corps under the command of Simon Petlura. At that time I knew nothing as yet about the proclamation of complete independence of Ukraine (proclaimed by the Central Rada in Kiev on January 22, 1918). In spite of a severe winter, my brother and I were hiding in a near-by forest visiting the house only at night to have something to eat and most important, to warm up. We always had our pistols drawn in the woods. Sometimes there was heavy firing in the city, and then we would not leave our hideout at all, which was in a stack of hay. Then, at twilight, our sister or mother would come out to us. Every other day the Communists came to our parents' house and inquired about me. My brother and I were hiding out like that for

almost three weeks. Then my brother, for whom no inquiries were made, went home and I stayed in the woods.

By the end of January my brother brought me a telegram addressed to my father. It was from my wife in Kharkiv and its text was alarming. I set out for Kharkiv immediately: first on foot to the railroad station at Romodan, from there some farmers met by chance took me by sled all the way to Poltava and from there trains were still running to Kharkiv. I found out upon my arrival that some armed bandits had come to my wife's apartment and took her to an isolated spot. Her mother followed them from a distance and when she met a Red Army soldier she told him what had happened. He ran after the bandits immediately and ordered them to stop. They let my wife go and started running, but the soldier killed both.

News reached Kharkiv that a delegation of the Central Rada had signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers at Brest, under which Ukraine was to get military aid against the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks in Kharkiv were so absorbed by events and preparations to defend the city, and they had already finished their "purge," so I was left undisturbed, without, however, leaving a house where I was completely unknown. The next news was that German troops were advancing into Ukraine, that they had liberated Kiev with the Central Rada returning there and that Ukrainian troops were closing on Poltava with the Germans. After checking this news, I left one night in the direction of Poltava and then Romodan. Near Solonytsia I was caught in a cross-fire: a battle was going on between Ukrainian troops and Bolsheviks, with the division of Commander Otaman Natiyev attacking, as I found out later. The Bolsheviks pushed a rifle in my hands and dispatched me to the right wing of the battle along with 11 soldiers. When I heard that they were all speaking Ukrainian, I led them away from the fighting line and when we were all alone,

I ordered them to put their arms on the ground and to sit down fifty paces away. I covered them with my rifle. About 30 minutes later all firing ceased at the Romodan station and I saw two trains pull out in the direction of Poltava. The Bolsheviks were withdrawing. Right away we heard the clatter of horses hoofs and we were attacked by cavalry. But when they saw that we were without arms, they stopped and I told them of my adventure. This was a cavalry company of the Zaporozhian Division under the command of Captain Rimsky-Korsakov. There I joined an armored car detachment and was placed in command of an armored car armed with a mountain cannon. I immediately christened the car "Polubotko" the name of a famous Ukrainian Hetman. Colonel S. Merezhynsky was in command of the armored car division.

2

The March on the Crimea

AFTER the fall of Romodan the Reds only defended Poltava, and the Zaporozhian Division took it in the last days of March. The Bolsheviks fled Poltava toward Kharkiv and strongly fortified the western and northern suburbs of that city, putting a particularly strong force in the vicinity of the Lubotyn railroad station. Helped by German artillery, the Zaporozhians captured Kharkiv on April 6. In Lubotyn we found many bodies of sailors of the Black Sea Fleet who had taken part in the defense of Kharkiv. Finally the horrible days of Kharkiv were behind us.

It was very interesting that when Commander Natiyev announced that he would accept volunteers into his Division, only about twenty officers applied, but as usual, a large number of Cossacks joined (former soldiers of the Russian Army, of Ukrainian nationality, will be referred to by the Ukrainian designation "Cossacks"). All officers of Russian nationality who were still alive, were extremely hostile to the idea of Ukrainian independence, in spite of the fact that they sought asylum in Ukraine from the Bolsheviks. They did not, however, consider it their duty to defend Ukraine, preferring to work as waiters in restaurants, ostentatiously wearing their uniforms and medals: whom would they impress by this foolish demonstration? The same phenomenon could be observed again in November and December, even on a larger scale.

Due to the great influx of volunteers, the Germans having prohibited mobilization, the Zaporozhian Division was

enlarged into a Corps, and when we were leaving Kharkiv for the South it took two days for the Corps to embark aboard railroad cars. I mention railroad cars advisedly because at that time warfare was conducted along rail lines, and only cavalry (the Haydamyak Cavalry Regiment under the command of Col. V. Petriv, and the Mountain Artillery Mounted Division under Col. S. Almazov) could effect cross-country marches.

Thus, after two days, we reached the station of Lozova, and part of our Corps under the command of Commander P. Bolbochan was formed into the so-called Crimean group which marched on the Crimea through Oleksandrivske and Melitopil, while the other part marched via Kupiansk and Yuzivka to capture the Donbas industrial region. On orders of Commander Bolbochan, at Lozova station I constructed an improvised armored train from steel coal-hoppers cars, which we lined with pressed straw on the inside, and mounted behind steel plates, also reinforced in back with pressed straw, four machine guns and a three-inch cannon, plus two machine guns in reserve. One machine gun was in front of the train and on one flat car we carried my armored car *Polubotok* to be used on plain roads in case of need. The crew of the armored train consisted of four officers and a number of men, one of the officers being Lieut. S. Han, a member of the Central Rada who would rather fight than play politics. The base of our armored train was to be a troop-train consisting of one infantry battalion, one artillery battery, and one machine gun company under the command of my brother. On April 12 after a forced movement forward I reached Oleksandrivske, dispersing the Reds who offered resistance at every station and mined the tracks. Fortunately they were so inept at mine-laying and my train came at such high speed that the mines exploded behind us. Only once did we hit a pyroxylin charge which twisted the rails; we fixed the

damage in a few hours, however, and the train went on. At that time I found out about the misunderstandings between our troops and the Germans who wanted to treat Ukraine as an occupied country, immediately requisitioning all goods on trains and at stations and shipping them back to Germany, and wanted to issued orders to our armed forces.

At the station of Oleksandrivske we made our first encounter with Austrian troops, they were the Ukrainian Sitch Riflemen (USS) under the command of Archduke Wilhelm Hapsburg, the Ukrainianized Colonel Vasyl Vyshyvany*, but we did not have time to tarry long with them. Toward the evening, as my armored train was nearing Melitopil, looking through my field glasses I saw a barricade and people on the track ahead. Presuming that they were Bolsheviks, I ordered my men to open fire, but thereupon the old Russian tri-color flag was raised over the barricade. We got close and found out that this was a White Guard Russian detachment of Colonel Drozdovsky, fighting its way toward the Don, where a Cossack State of the Don had been established. That state had also been taken over by the Bolsheviks, in spite of the Cossacks' stiff resistance under the leadership of General Kaledin. The Volunteer Army of General Kornilov was supposed to come to Kaledin's aid marching from the Kuban, and the Don Cossacks also expected German help. Colonel Drozdovsky would not let us enter the Melitopil station, of which I informed my commander, Otaman Bolbochan. Drozdovsky's and our parliamentarians finally agreed that Drozdovsky's troops would leave Melitopil the next morning. When we entered Melitopil, we found out that the depot with all surrounding tracks as well as the streets of

* Certain Austro-Hungarian monarchial circles intended to proclaim Archduke Vasyl Vyshyvany—son of Archduke Stephen, a candidate for the Polish throne—as king of Ukraine. Some Ukrainian circles had this intention, too.

the city were covered with mountains of corpses: those were not only of Bolshevik soldiers, but all suspected of aiding them, and particularly Jews.

I was called to report to Otaman Bolbochan at the Melitopol depot. He briefed me on the situation and told me what to do. It appeared that in spite of the protests of the Central Rada and his own, the Germans present here were set on reaching Sevastopol as soon as possible. They wanted to capture its port and docks, as well as the warships based there and we would not allow this, even if we had to use force. Therefore, I would have to accommodate one company of infantry with machine guns on my armored train immediately and set out across the Crimean Isthmus (Perekop), possibly ahead of the Germans who also had an armored train and were reported to be defending the crossing north of Dzhankoy. I was then to proceed to Simferopol and then to Sevastopol where Ukrainian sailors, who had already made contact with us, would help us, and with our appearance again hoist Ukrainian flags over the fort and warships. In order that the sailors know that we were Ukrainian troops, Otaman Bolbochan gave me two Ukrainian flags and ordered them displayed on the armored train.

After consulting my crew I decided to take the armored train across Perekop and through Dzhankoy at full speed, in order to surprise the enemy. To lessen the risk of wrecking the armored train and especially in order to protect the men, I ordered a motor trolley manned by a machine gun crew to precede us by about half a mile. This way we forced our way across Sivash Bay to Dzhankoy, firing heavily all around us. We had no losses, although we were under heavy fire near Dzhankoy. The next day, on the approaches to Simferopol, we encountered a calvary unit of Crimean Tatars who had taken up arms against the Bolsheviks. They told us that the bridge over the Salhir river near Simferopol was mined and that the depot was

heavily manned by sailors who had an armored train and cannon on the track. I advised the Tatar commander to proceed north along the highway and he would meet the Cavalry Regiment of Colonel Petriv going along this highway. The Crimean Tatars, like all the other nations of the former Russian Empire, proclaimed their independence and had a Parliament (Kurultai) and Government, but the Bolsheviks liquidated them in their usual way. The native Tatar population of the Crimea constituted only 22-25% of the total, with about 40% Russians who were on the side of the Bolsheviks. The remaining population were Ukrainians, Greeks and Armenians. The Russian population of the Crimea wantonly killed the Tatars and plundered their property.

When our armored train was getting close to Simferopol, residents of buildings near the station shouted to us that the bridge across the Salhir was mined. Buildings obscured the view of the curve leading to the station for more than a mile, but we took a close look at the bridge and saw that surprisingly no one was defending it, nor were there any traces of mines. Observing the station from behind houses, we saw a real armored train under steam and people running around it. My artillery and machine gun crew were ready to open fire without orders, because if the Bolsheviks were ready to shoot, then the fate of our train could be decided in a fraction of a second. When our train cleared the curve so that our cannon could be aimed, we fired several rounds, but the red armored train did not reply. We continued forward, and then the red train left the station under full steam with sailors boarding it in motion. We stopped at the station for a few minutes and I left a platoon of Cossacks with two machine guns. Our train moved ahead, and although fired upon by red artillery from a distance, we reached the station of Bulhanak by

nightfall. I posted guards on surrounding hills and we rested all night. I returned to Simferopil on the motor trolley and found it occupied by Col. Petriv's cavalry. The local population had given a warm welcome to our commander, Otaman Bolbochan and a present was left for the crew of our armored train by the Tatars, a barrel of "Isabella" wine. I was surprised when Otaman Bolbochan ordered me not to proceed any farther, but to let a German armored train pass and then come back to Simferopil. The German train passed us at dawn proceeding south, but it did not reach the station of Alma because of strong red artillery fire from their armored train and field positions. The Commander of the German armored train, Oberleutnant Schmidt (I met him again in 1944, when he was a Major in the reserve and German "Orts-Komandant" of the city of Skierniewice in Poland) requested help, I ordered my train forward and both our armored trains drove the Bolsheviks away and I returned to Simferopil. There I saw an extraordinary sight: the depot was in the hands of Ukrainian Cossacks manning machine guns and facing them in a circle around the depot were German troops, with machine guns, too.*

The Commander of the German division, General Kosch, had demanded that Otaman Bolbochan withdraw our troops beyond Perekop, but Bolbochan refused to move without orders from our Government. Our orders to move north finally came that afternoon and the Germans began to take over the station. The city, however, was in our hands, as it would take Col. Petriv and Col. Almazov at least twenty-four hours to effect evacuation of their troops. In this confusion—and this is a true story—our Cossacks managed to remove breech-locks from two German machine guns, but Otaman Bolbochan ordered me to return them when we found out that the German machine gun

* See Capt. B. Monkewyshi *On the Traces of Modern Zaporoshians*.

crews would be court martialled for their lack of vigilance and would face the firing squad.

On a siding in Simferopil we found two freight cars full of the finest tobacco in the world, made by the firms Stamboli and Mesaksoudi. Their specialty was the fine and expensive tobacco No. 40 and 60, and their highest grades No. 80, 120 and 140 were supplied to the Tsar's court. My boys brought me several boxes of No. 140 as war booty. I don't smoke myself, but I kept the tobacco in my compartment and offered smokes to my guests: it was the most wonderful aroma imaginable.

Following orders of the Government, the army group of Otaman Bolbochan proceeded to the city of Slavyansk near Kharkiv, in the rear of Col. Sikevych's Operational Group which had the task of clearing the Donbas of reds.

It should be noted that by early May 1918 all Ukraine had been cleared of Bolsheviks and part of our Zaporozhian Corps was stationed east of Starobilsk, while another held the frontier north of Chernihiv, all along with German troops.

3

In the Commandantura of Kharkiv

ON OUR WAY to Slavyansk we were informed that there had been a coup-d'etat in Kiev: with German help, the Congress of Landowners elected General Pavlo Skoropadsky to the office of Hetman of all Ukraine. Within the Zaporozhian Corps, which wished to follow the old tradition of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and generally had democratic leanings, the opinion on the change of Government was divided. Part of the Corps was opposed to the Hetmanate and Col. Petriv was its chief spokesman, while another part believed that the Hetman, being an old soldier, would preserve order in Ukraine. This was imperative in Ukraine at that time due to the Bolshevik threat and it would also be beneficial to curb the overly individualistic Ukrainians. It was also hoped that the Hetman would be capable of dealing with the Germans who had begun to behave like conquerors in Ukraine, and not like allies.

There being no immediate prospects of action for my armored train and mobile artillery, I decided to take a furlough and visit my family in Kharkiv. On arrival in Kharkiv I registered in the local Commandantura. There, I made the acquaintance of chief of the Commandantura office Captain Borys V. Homzyn, a man of high intelligence and culture and, as I was to find out later, a descendant of a noble Ukrainian family.

I asked him whether I could perhaps be assigned to the Commandantura, in view of the fact that fighting operations were finished. After consulting the chief of the inspec-

tion department, Captain of Cavalry M. Dobrzanski (formerly of the 29th Regiment of Dragoons. I met him again later when he was a Lieut. Colonel in the Polish Cavalry Officers' School), Captain Homzyn went to the Commandant, Colonel Anisimov, and the latter assigned me to the Commandantura, with proper notification to the staff of the Zaporozhian Corps.

During the time that I worked in the Commandantura, i.e., from August 23rd to the uprising against the Hetman, there were no events worthy of note. While there, I met members of the Ukrainian National Association (UNS) who were opposed to the Hetman. On orders of the Commandant, I intervened frequently at the German Command in matters of arrests which the Germans made without consulting the Ukrainian authorities, although as a matter of principle these matters were within the competence of the Gubernial Commissar and district commissioners.

It became known in October that the Hetman had surrounded himself with former officers of the Tsarist army and appointed as Prime Minister V. Kolokoltsov, a well-known local leader of the Kharkiv Zemstvo (Zemstvo was a unit of local self-government under Tsarism) and Russian patriot, although a progressive.

Meanwhile the German and Austrian troops, following the defeat in the West and also due to Bolshevik propaganda, began to disintegrate. Their conduct toward the local Ukrainian population, on which they levied a tax in kind, over the protest of the Ukrainian Government, and which they collected ruthlessly, dispatching armed detachments to the countryside and executing recalcitrant peasants; their wrecking of entire villages and restoration of land of the great estates to the landowners; and finally, exportation of huge quantities of *chornozem* (black topsoil) by the thousands of carloads to Germany, all this caused numerous riots and uprisings. The population was

solidly against the Germans and this in turn could not remain without its due influence upon the Ukrainian military, and particularly upon the Zaporozhian Corps. The behavior of the Germans also swayed the feelings toward hostility to them of two Ukrainian divisions, the Synezhupannyky which had been formed in Germany and the Sirozhupannyky which had been formed in Austria, both recruited from among Ukrainians, former Russian prisoners of war. The political organization behind these military formations was the Association for Liberation of Ukraine, known by the letters SVU (Soyuz Vyzvolennya Ukraniny). Because of unrest in these divisions, the Germans partially demobilized them, in spite of the fact that they were excellent fighting units and indispensable for the defense of Ukraine. On top of all this, the Germans arrested Simon Petlura who was already a legendary hero to the whole country.

The gravest political error committed by Hetman Skoropadsky was his signing, along with the Otaman of the Don Cossacks, P. Krasnov, on November 14, 1918, of an agreement in which Gen. Krasnov purported to be representing a "future Russia" promising federation of Ukraine with Russia. Our officer group was the first to find out about this, because the meeting and signing took place at a railroad station east of Kharkiv. This act of the Hetman, unwarranted by the existing political situation, placed the entire conscious Ukrainian community in opposition and the UNS then proclaimed an uprising against the Hetman. Faced with the pressure of public opinion, the Germans released Simon Petlura. To direct the movement against the Hetman and to restore to Ukraine all political rights provided for by the Fourth Universal Proclamation, the UNS elected a Directorate (Dyrektoria) composed of 5 prominent Ukrainian leaders: Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Simon Petlura, Fedir Shvets, Opanas Andrievsky and Andriy Makarenko. They represented all strata of society

and all political trends of the country. The Zaporozhian Corps and all other military units which had been formed by the Hetman Government and even the so-called Serdyuk Division which consisted of the sons of wealthy farmers and was the Hetman's mainstay, all joined the rebels. The Directorate relied in the first days of the uprising mainly on the USS Legion (Ukrainian Sitch Riflemen) which was quartered in the area of Bila Tserkva near Kiev. The USS Legion, aided by demobilized former Tsarist soldiers from the neighborhood, attacked Kiev, defeated the Hetman's volunteer detachments which were composed chiefly of former Russian officers, and on December 15, 1918 the Directorate entered Kiev, the Hetman leaving for Germany.

Since that summer the Bolsheviks had been massing troops on the northern and eastern borders of Ukraine, whose nucleus consisted of alien brigades (Latvian, Bes-sarabian etc.) augmented by Moscow volunteers who proclaimed the motto "Ukraine does not give us bread—let's go to Ukraine after bread." And while the morale of German troops in Ukraine became shaky, the Bolsheviks made contact with German Councils of Soldiers' Deputies and got their promise that the Germans would maintain neutrality during an attack by the Bolsheviks against Ukraine. In return, the Bolsheviks promised the Germans peaceful return to Germany. Early in November large numbers of Bolshevik agitators appeared in Kharkiv, going first of all after railroad workers. With the eruption of the uprising against the Hetman, the great railroad yards of Kharkiv and the locomotive factory were completely dominated by the Bolsheviks. A Soviet of railroad management was set up and it refused to provide transportation which would bring parts of the Zaporozhian Corps to Kharkiv. There was a change in the Kharkiv military command. Prior to the uprising the Gubernial Commander of Kharkiv,

with jurisdiction over all county commands, had been Colonel Myronenko-Vasiutynsky, who was replaced by Otaman P. Truba, Colonel M. Popsuy-Shapka replaced Col. Anisimov as city commander. The personnel of the Commandantura did not change, except that Captain H. Simantsiv became chief aide of Col. Popsuy-Shapka. Simantsiv was a very intelligent and energetic person, a leader of the Kharkiv branch of UNS and by his political convictions a socialist-revolutionary. The only armed force on which both commands could rely, the Gubernial and local, was the headquarters battalion of about 80 men under the command of Captain Havrylenko. I had been appointed chief of the Commandantura's technical department with the task of taking over all transportation means in Kharkiv, primarily the very few automobiles. In this role I made my appearance at the Soviet of the Southern Railroad, accompanied by only two non-coms of the headquarters company. In conversation with the chairman I demanded that orders be issued in my presence providing railroad transportation for units of the Zaporozhian Corps located at Kupianske station and anywhere else where representatives of the Corps would demand. I threatened that upon refusal I would arrest the entire Soviet and place them before a court-martial, with simultaneous appointment of experienced officers to manage the railroad and all stations. I pointed to the window and said: "Look and see that the building is surrounded with our patrols and no one is going to leave this place." I was lucky that none of them took up my challenge because there was not a single soldier in sight, but such a bluff could be pulled off only during those perilous times when human life was worth nothing. My ultimatum was accepted and the chairman of the Soviet issued orders right there in my presence that all commands of Ukrainian military authorities should be complied with. This was an unexpected success, and as a result the very next

day units of the Zaporozhian Corps under the command of Colonel I. Lytvynenko appeared on the streets of Kharkiv. An attempt by the Communized workers to seize the State Bank, the Telephone Exchange and Post Office was nipped in the bud and complete quiet reigned in Kharkiv. Colonel Popsuy-Shapka appealed to Ukrainian students and to the Ukrainian population of Kharkiv to establish units of self-defense in connection with the Bolshevik movement in the city and the approach of the reds from Bilhorod. Several thousand volunteered and the Commandantura organized them. This put us on 24-hour duty and all the sleep we could catch was on chairs.

It was only toward the end of November that we were informed about the "November Coup" in Galicia, where the Ukrainian National Council under Dr. Evhen Petrush-evych seized power and declared the independence of the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZOUNR), i.e. of all Ukrainian territories which had formerly been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Secretariat of Military Affairs under Colonel D. Vytovsky began organizing the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) taking advantage of reserves of the USS Legion as its center. There was no time for organization, however, since from the very first day the Poles, who had a military organization in Lviv, rose against the Ukrainian authorities in arms: this was the beginning of the Ukrainian-Polish war. Ukrainians were now compelled to fight on two fronts: east and west. We in Kharkiv were so absorbed in the struggle against the Bolsheviks that we knew little about events in Galicia, but news reached us soon that the Poles had taken Lviv and that the Directorate, in spite of a shortage of manpower to defend the front against the Bolsheviks, dispatched some units to help our Galician brothers. This was more in the nature of a display of national unity, just as the Galician USS Legion had been helping us politically and militarily.

Meanwhile the Bolsheviks were pushing their way into Ukraine from the north and east. The volunteer self-defense units offered to go to the front lines, but this could not be done for lack of arms and difficulty in organizing supply lines, and of course, there was a great reluctance to send untrained young boys to the front. Nevertheless they did man the defense of several important points and one company was assigned to the chief of the Kharkiv militia. Students also helped in setting up defense posts and barricades which were to be manned by the Zaporozhian Corps. By Christmas the Bolsheviks were already close to Kharkiv. Fighting went on for a whole week, however, and only on December 31 Col. Truba issued orders to evacuate and proceed to Poltava. It was too late to do anything, but nevertheless Col. Truba ordered me to salvage the valuables from the vaults of the Bank. I was given several teams of horses hitched to sleighs and a guard of four officers. The Bolsheviks were already within the city limits. We had hardly finished loading three sleighs when local Bolsheviks opened fire on us from windows and the unloaded sleighs dispersed. We barely escaped with our lives, but managed to transfer everything to a train. Only some of our gallant youths joined the Zaporozhians and withdrew with us. When we were ready to start, we found out that the engineer had disappeared and we lost hope of ever leaving Kharkiv. When I had been in command of an armored train I had handled the throttle several times and volunteered to take the train out in view of the hopeless situation. I went quite slowly, but still I managed to reach Poltava and it was high time, because the Bolsheviks were approaching Poltava from Sumy! During a brief stop in the Poltava Depot, I was called to appear before Colonel Popsuy-Shapka and ordered to take over the command battalion, which was also being evacuated by the same train, from Capt. Havrylenko. According to Commander Truba's orders my unit

would be completed to full strength from all county command companies which were marching toward Poltava. After completion, the battalion was to become a fighting unit in the Zaporozhian Corps as the Independent Zaporozhian Rifle Battalion. To complete its organization, the battalion was moved to the city of Lubni, but it also had combat duty in holding the front toward Romen and keeping a small garrison at the Hrebinka railroad station. Captain Havrylenko was to be either my aide or company commander.

4

1919

Independent Zaporozhian Rifle Battalion

WE ALL left for Lubni immediately and arrived there on January 4. I made a personal check of the personnel and material resources of the battalion: there were no weapons, no food, no supplies of any kind nor people to perform medical duties. Everyone had to scrounge for food by himself, and for lack of uniforms most soldiers wore civilian clothes; only one out of ten men had good shoes. I immediately appointed my brother Oleksander to the quartermaster command; although I was decidedly opposed to any form of nepotism, I had no other choice. Knowing my brother's knack for organization, I knew he would go out of his way to help me. As I have already noted, he had been staying in Lubni and had many friends there; he got in touch with the city administration and they gave him woolen goods for 100 uniforms and overcoats (there was a first-class woolen mill in Lubni, owned by S. Shemet the well-known Ukrainian leader of the land-owner-hetman movement). Local shoemakers received orders for 200 pairs of boots. From military warehouses we were issued weapons, utensils, mattresses, sheets and blankets.

We had to send part of our better-equipped men in the direction of Romen to Hrebinka, a very important railroad junction to us and the Zaporozhian Corps because it provided communication with Kiev. Within a few days we were able to produce a company of over 70 well-dressed and well-armed men which we paraded across the city

making an impression upon the people: respect for us grew immediately and the population felt safe. It is interesting to note here that prior to our arrival in Lubni, a local communist sergeant formed a cavalry company in the village of Tymky, terrorizing Lubni and the entire neighborhood. The city even paid him 100,000 rubles ransom. As garrison commander I ordered a curfew to prevent night robberies and I called upon youth to volunteer for service in the battalion. About thirty local high school students volunteered, among them one Jew, Bukhman. My staff and myself, with part of the battalion, were quartered on a train in the station, as this facilitated better contact with Poltava, Kiev, Hrebinka and Romen. The guard in the direction of Romen was inspected by me daily. Everything looked all right, but my men noticed that some civilians, probably as a result of news coming through "scuttlebutt" were hostile toward them and called them hirelings of the bourgeoisie. There was good discipline and morale in the battalion and this was not to the liking of peasants who had been agitated by the Bolsheviks. Many Bolshevik agents swarmed over the countryside and I had neither the time nor the men to watch for the appearance of hostile agents. It was easy for them to penetrate into the villages in which no authorities were present. Warfare between the Bolsheviks and all Ukrainian Forces was waged along railroad lines: our forces were inadequate and because of winter we very rarely policed the villages, and not even the towns which were situated far from the railroad.

Among others, a classmate of mine from the Ostrih High School (Gymnasium), class of '07, V. Moshynsky, who was a teacher of mathematics at the time in the local girls' high school came to see me. He learned about me from posters and immediately stated that he was a Communist, but a Ukrainian one. He said that he condemned the Russian Bolsheviks' attack upon Ukraine and their un-



1. S. Petlura, 2. General M. Yanchevsky, 3. General M. Bezruchko, Commander of 6th Ukrainian Division, 4. Colonel O. Dotzenko, Aide-de-Camp of S. Petlura.



1. S. Petlura, 2. General V. Salsky, 3. General V. Petriv, 4. Minister I. Ohienko, 5. Colonel W. Slawek, Polish Military Attache, 6. Otaman I. Kobza with Son, in Kamyanets-Podolsky, 1920.



1. Professor M. Hrushevsky, President of Ukraine, 2. S. Petlura, 3. French Military Attache.



1. Colonel P. Bolbochan, Commander of 1st Zaporozhian Division, 2. The Archduke Wilhelm of Austria-Hungary (Ukrainian: Basyl Vyshyvany), 3. Colonel V. Petriv, in Zaporozhe, 1917.

democratic methods and political demagoguery, but that he was certain that the Moscow Bolsheviks would leave Ukraine when the war was over because, he alleged, they had been invited to Ukraine by the Ukrainian Bolshevik Government. He made a proposition to me that I should remain in Lubni on his assurance and join the reds when they come; he said that he knew the reds were in dire need of imaginative and experienced officers. He added that a Ukrainian Red Government was already functioning in Kharkiv and that its members were our classmates and colleagues: D. Z. Manuilsky, H. Lander and Georgi Pyatak, who would certainly welcome me into the ranks of the Ukrainian Bolshevik Army. On my part I reminded him that we were Ukrainians and that at one time in high school we had been members of the Ukrainian "Hromada" which stood clearly aloof from Muscovite political trends. I added that I fully realized that the Bolsheviks would never leave Ukraine voluntarily. At the same time I expressed my surprise at his detailed information of what was going on in Kharkiv. When he saw that his talk had left me unconvinced, on taking his leave he said: "perhaps you are right, we shall see." Indeed, later that year, in August, he was executed by the Bolsheviks for his attitude of opposition in spite of the fact that he had held the high position of commissar of the province of Zhytomir.

Within a few days, a delegate of our Government, Mr. Stepan Skrypnyk* came to me from Kiev with orders to evacuate the county state treasury. He was the first to tell me that Simon Petlura had been designated by the Directorate as commander-in-chief with the title of Chief Otaman of the Armies of the Ukrainian National Republic. Out of the money requisitioned in the county treasury, S. Skrypnyk gave me 20,000 rubles (their value was about

* At present Archbishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in the United States.

500 pre-war rubles) for the needs of the battalion. This was the first sum which gave me an opportunity to purchase a lot of indispensable things, primarily medical supplies, and to pay each soldier 25 rubles.

Within days the battalion was engaged in action. Captain Musiyenko informed me from Hrebinka by telephone that he was engaged in battle with a Bolshevik band which was approaching Hrebinka from Drabova-Baryatynska; the attack of the band was temporarily repelled, probably with great losses, but the Captain feared that he might become surrounded at night because the band was ten times as strong as his forces and fought in full battle order. I took two platoons and immediately left for Hrebinka and, along with Capt. Musiyenko, led an attack toward Drabova: as a result we simply dispersed that company with machine gun fire. I had to reinforce Capt. Musiyenko, however, leaving him one of my platoons, and I ordered him to keep strong patrols on the outskirts of Hrebinka.

That same day an improvised armored train entered the Lubni station quite unexpectedly from the direction of Hrebinka. Capt. Musiyenko could not warn me in time due to a disruption of telephone and telegraph communications which shortly, however, we succeeded in restoring. There were about 30 men on the train under Otaman Myasnyk. At first, it was hard to find out from his words and behavior what he had come for, but his mysterious and bandit-like appearance made me order the battalion to an alert. I ordered half a company with machine guns to proceed from the Theological Seminary in Lubni to the railroad depot. This seemed to cool the enthusiasm of Myasnyk. Meanwhile the Tymky Communist company entered the city and began skirmishing with my patrols. I proposed to Myasnyk that he help me liquidate this Bolshevik band and he put 20 of his men at my disposal. At the same time he declared that he had orders from the Govern-

ment, to take the money from the country treasury, but when I remarked that the money had been taken to Kiev, he became very angry and said that he would have to check this. He immediately recalled his men who were on their way to help my men. It was now quite clear to me that Myasnyk had come to rob the treasury and perhaps also the city and that we were in his way. He left with his armored train toward Hrebinka. I was very much alarmed by the question: who had permitted him to organize an armored train and to roam all over the railroad tracks without any control? This fact alone gave an idea of the complete lack of military and administrative control in our hinterland. We found out later that Myasnyk had taken money from the treasury in Pyryatyn and then robbed all railroad stations on the Yahotyn-Hrebinka sector. After this, his name disappeared from the annals of the liberation struggle completely. He probably joined the Bolsheviks.

We fought a battle with the Bolshevik company of Tymky and liquidated it. We had it quiet for a few days after this. Several boys from the Bolsheviks joined my battalion, saying that they had been pressed into service, and kept by the Bolsheviks under terror. Subsequently, they were exemplary soldiers. It was also quiet on the Hrebinka front.

During those days Colonel Popsuy-Shapka passed through Lubni on his way to Kiev and, naturally, spent some time with me. He informed me that the Zaporozhian Corps was going through Kremenchuk and Znamenka for the purpose of defending that sector and joining our forces which were operating in the Odessa-Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovske-Zaporozha (Oleksandrivsk) region, and that in case of necessity it would cross Rumania into Galicia to join the rest of the Army which, for purposes of reorganization was stationed in the area of Lutsk-Rivne-Proskuriv-Husiatyn. On the advice of the General Staff, Col.

Popsuy-Shapka told me, Commander-in-Chief Petlura agreed that the Army detach itself from the enemy under cover of rear-guards and take a rest and regroup for a counter-attack in the early spring. To keep the Bolshevik hinterland under threat, the Commander-in-Chief left trusted men in many places from which we withdrew with orders to organize insurgent partisan units. Such units, based on forests in the Trypilla area of Kiev province and in the Kovel-Sarny region would keep communications under control. This insurgent-partisan movement developed to such an extent in 1919, that the Bolsheviks could not cope with it. These were really large units, some several thousand men strong and they operated behind Bolshevik lines entirely unimpeded, as for example the group of Otaman Yurko Tyutyunnyk, which was 4,000 strong and was subsequently incorporated in the Army as the so-called Kiev Division. Colonel Popsuy-Shapka also brought me orders from Colonel Bolbochan that my Battalion was being transferred to the command of the Army Staff in Vinnytsya.

Right after Col. Popsuy-Shapka left I was advised by the Army Staff that I must take part in liquidation of a Bolshevik band in the area of Yahotyn. The band would be attacked from the direction of Kiev by the SS Brigade (Sitch Riflemen) under the command of Col. R. Sushko. After liquidation of the band our Battalion was to proceed to Vinnytsya via Berdychiv and there await further orders. The following day the Battalion proceeded on two trains toward Hrebinka, the Company of Capt. Musiyenko joined us, and under cover of two armed trolleys we went on toward Yahotyn. Before we reached Yahotyn we found evidence of battle along the track and learned that Col. Sushko's Brigade routed the Bolshevik band in a surprise night attack and immediately went back toward Kiev, leaving orders for us with the station master to go through

Kiev without stopping to Vinnytsya because Kiev was threatened from the direction of Kruty-Nizhyn. Our trains started and we reached the station of Kiev III (a junction on the left bank of the Dnipro). The picture I saw at this station was horrible: all tracks were filled with evacuation trains, mainly freight trains and the only bridge across the Dnipro could be crossed by trains on an average one train every half hour. The station commandant was Otaman Samusenko who told my aide, Capt. Linytsky, without any hesitation that he would let our trains through before our turn on payment of 100,000 rubles. And to think that such people who were out to make money on the people's misfortune were given positions of trust. This was the same Samusenko who subsequently staged a pogrom in Proskuriv for which he was sentenced to the firing squad by court-martial. Revolution produces odd situations with which the law cannot cope, particularly if it is going on during the tempest of war. I ordered Samusenko's arrest, took over command of the station and in cooperation with the station master I began to untie the bottleneck. It took about 12 hours to check the contents and destination of trains, the number and condition of locomotives, and to coordinate matters with the commandant of the Kiev passenger station on the Right Bank of the Dnipro clear the tracks for smoother communications. Our trains began to move late at night and we reached Vinnytsya after 24 hours.

At that time Vinnytsya was the seat of the Army Staff and I expected to find things to be more orderly. Far from it. Only much later, when I began to understand the laws or lawlessness of revolution, I became aware of my lack of experience and adaptability to conditions of anarchy, and to the ruthlessness of clever people. I never changed my hard soldierly nature which at that time seemed out of place, but actually indispensable, unless one would become

an opportunist and sacrifice the future for the present. Only those who lived through similar circumstances will be able to understand what I mean. Nevertheless I found out that sometimes it was necessary to apply political and psychological flexibility. I never acquired a moral flexibility, even in the face of death. No soldier, and especially the one whom fate calls to a position of high responsibility, should ever try to be "morally flexible," but unfortunately, during our revolution, subsequent difficult times of exile, under new hardships of World War II and finally upon closer contact with the West, I observed many instances of such superfluous flexibility, which nearly bordered on lack of backbone. I have never been able to observe that denial of moral principles would pay off: either to the cause or to the person.

In Vinnytsya I reported to the Minister of Military Affairs, Col. O. Shapoval, former commandant of the 1st Bohdanivsky Regiment in the Zaporozhian Corps. It must be noted that although Col. Shapoval was a member of one of our leftist socialist groups, he proved to be a true statesman. He was a soldier-patriot, a man of firm character who placed military matters above party tactics. After hearing my report, Col. Shapoval ordered a review of my battalion for 7 A.M. the next day, February 8. On a bright cold morning the men appeared for the review in front of the station: four rifle companies, one machine-gun company, one cavalry platoon and units of liaison and supply. We were not full strength, only about 250 men, but trim in appearance and identically uniformed. They were well trained because I had been exercising them during every free moment; even I was impressed by their appearance and awaited the Minister with a feeling of pride. A large group of officers and officials of various ministries immediately gathered around the depot and they all asked what group this was. The most impressive thing about my men was the

fact that they were all wearing steel helmets which my brother, Captain Shandruk procured during our prolonged stay in Kiev. At 7 o'clock sharp I issued the command for a salute by presenting arms and gave my report to the Minister who had come to take the review accompanied by the whole Staff, including Col. M. Kakurin and Otaman Truba. Colonel M. Kakurin, an officer of the Russian General Staff was an advisor to the Minister and a noted expert in military affairs*. I was very pleased to hear from Col. Shapoval and Col. Kakurin that they had never seen such a fine unit before and that I should present the battalion for review by the Commander-in-Chief Simon Petlura the following day. I was given a special citation of the High Command of the Armies of the Ukrainian National Republic signed by S. Petlura. Later, I had a lengthy talk with Cols. Shapoval and Kakurin and Otaman Truba in which I made known the battalion's requirements. All my requests were granted with firm orders issued: the battalion would be completed to full strength in Brailov (the next station west of Vinnytsya), where all command units from Kharkiv already had been dispatched; I would receive all necessary equipment with material for uniforms and footwear (there was nothing ready; everything would have to be custom-made) and finally, a physician was ordered to join the battalion, Dr. Yurko Dobrylovsky. Otaman Truba also gave me 250,000 karbovantsi, in the presence of the Minister, for the battalion's expenses. After completing all organizational work, on which I had to make weekly progress reports, the battalion was transferred to the railroad

*Late in 1919 Colonel M. Kakurin joined the communists and was chief of operations under Gen. Tukhachevsky in the war of 1920 against Poland. He was later a professor of Tactics in the Red Army General Staff and Command College (so-called Frunze Academy in Moscow). It is very unfortunate that after the resignation of Col. Shapoval our military command was unable to enlist the services of Col. Kakurin in our cause. Colonel Kakurin was co-author of a book "Voyna s Belopolakami v 1920 g." (War against the White Poles in 1920.)

junction of Yarmolyntsi with orders to hold this point and to defend the Husiatyn-Yarmolyntsi line. This was an example of real good care of a military unit which had not as yet had an opportunity to prove itself in battle. Probably that same day we left for Brailov via Proskuriv.

5

Surprises at Brailov

IT WAS at the end of the month of February. Cossacks from country command companies from Kharkiv province were indeed waiting for us. We began feverish activity of bringing the battalion to full combat strength. The battalion was then completed as follows: four rifle companies with three officers and one hundred and twenty men in each, machine gun company with three officers and sixty men, six machine guns of which two were on carriages; a cavalry company with three officers, sixty-five men, three portable machine guns and ninety horses; liaison unit with necessary technical equipment for communications up to twenty miles; medical unit and supply unit. The total strength of the battalion was twenty-seven officers, about six hundred men and one hundred and ten horses. I appointed Captain I. Shevtsiv to be my aide; commanders of companies were: Lieut. V. Petriv, Capt. Vodianytsky, Capt. Musiyenko, Capt. Blahovishchensky, Capt. Havrylenko, Capt. P. Moroz (nick-named "Taras Bulba" for his huge physique, he had been a colleague of my brother and myself in the seventieth Russian Regiment). Captain V. Linytsky was battalion aide-de-camp, Capt. O. Shandruk-Shandrushkevych was quartermaster and Dr. Yu. Dobrylovsky was medical officer. The battalion was quartered in empty school buildings near the depot tracks. All tailors and shoemakers of Brailov were hired to make uniforms which were identical from mine down to the ranks. Notwithstanding the severe winter the battalion never missed a day's training.

One day a Jewish delegation from the town headed by the Chief Rabbi I. Feldfix appeared before me and asked that the town be patrolled at night because local bandits were robbing the Jewish population. The railroad depot was nearly four miles away from the town, but I complied with their request and there were no more robberies.

The trains in the station were guarded. One morning at six o'clock, the guards alerted the Company and me aboard the train. We were surrounded by a large number of soldiers armed with hand-grenades who were warning us not to leave the train. It was still fairly dark and difficult to see with whom we were dealing. Within a few minutes, however, my soldiers who were quartering in the school-house came running under the command of Lieut. Petrov, and in turn surrounded our would-be captors. One careless move and we might have a battle on our hands. I came out of the train, ordered my men to lower their arms and asked the strangers who they were and what they wanted. One of the men answered that they were Ukrainian Sitch Riflemen. Their commander came closer and asked me whether I was the man in charge. We now learned that this was a battalion guarding the Army Staff, that this unit was under the command of Lieut. Kmetyk* who had received orders from Chief of Staff Col. A. Melnyk to disarm us because "we were a Bolshevized unit which refused to go to the front." This was a perfect example of disorganization and misinformation, one of the immutable laws of revolution: the Commander in Chief and the Minister of Defense had inspected the battalion and given it a citation, while the Army Staff believed that it was in sympathy with the Communists. I suspected that this was due to an attitude of bias toward me on the part of the Staff Intelligence Service and my suspicion was later confirmed. Together with Lt. Kmetyk I went to the station carrying the Commander in Chief's citation in my hand and

* Subsequently a General in the Red Army.

we called Col. Melnyk on the telephone. Lt. Kmetyk assured the former that the citation was genuine. He stated that this was a case of some misunderstanding and that even if he were to proceed with carrying out the order of disarming us, this could not be done because of the strength and attitude of my battalion. Colonel Melnyk showed himself a gentleman, apologizing to me for the misunderstanding and ordering Lt. Kmetyk to return to Vinnytsya. I requested, however, Col. Melnyk's permission to let both our units search the neighboring countryside for weapons concealed by demobilized soldiers in the villages, in order to protect the people from robberies. We found a lot of arms and even machine guns hidden in haystacks.

Sometimes we had odd situations arising, like after this joint expedition, my battalion quartermaster Capt. Shevt-siv gave Lt. Kmetyk's boys dinner. After they had left, he came to me and told me in a voice of despair: "we fed them, but they took all the spoons with them—what are our boys going to eat with now?"

Several days later, I received orders from Col. Melnyk to proceed with the whole combat part of my battalion to the city of Proskuriv in order to put down the pogroms raging in that city and to arrest the guilty. Identical orders were issued to the Sitch Riflemen Battalion. The pogrom, not only of Jews, but of the entire population, had been staged by "Otaman" Samusenko, the same man with whom we had had trouble in Kiev. Right after we entered the city, the bandits disappeared and we found only a few exotically uniformed "Samusenkists" whom we sent to Vinnytsya under guard. I stepped into the local Commandantura, where I found Captain Kalenik Lessiuk to be in charge (living in the United States since 1922, at present director of the Ukrainian Museum in Chicago, Ill.). He told me that Samusenko, accompanied by several soldiers, had raided the Commandantura, terrorized the crew with hand-

grenades and began a pogrom. Captain Lessiuk did not have enough men to cope with the situation and the local police force went into hiding. Soon after word spread that we had restored order, a delegation appeared in the Commandantura from the City Council, including the Rabbi representing the Jewish population. They thanked us profusely for restoring order and particularly Capt. Lessiuk for keeping the city under control until this latest incident; they even called him "father." We learned later that Samusenko had been arrested on orders of Commander in Chief S. Petlura and a court-martial condemned him to death. It is noteworthy that one of the results of our appearance in Proskuriv was that 8 young Jews, former soldiers of the tsarist army, enlisted in our battalion, among them the wealthy local merchant H. Roytberg. I remember him very well, since I had appointed him to be the liaison man with the Jewish population at the suggestion of my aide. Roytberg, who is at present in the United States, did a lot of good for the battalion, he helped us in getting food supplies and other material, especially medical supplies; he also did a lot for the Jews, calming them in their fright. The Jews were at that time living in terror of exaggerated reports about pogroms. They took extremes for the average and would not believe that anyone would stand up for them. It was a known fact that the Jews kept a good line of communication among themselves throughout the country: they told me that wherever the Reds appeared, they would appoint Jews to all kinds of responsible positions, as city or county commissioners, etc. and require them to deliver all sorts of goods, including such valuables as watches, jewelry and gold; if the commissars were unable to comply with the orders, the Bolsheviks would make them personally responsible. The population was hostile toward those commissars since it was widely believed that the requisitions were ordered for their own personal benefit. The

Bolsheviks strengthened this naive belief through a whispered campaign: this was clear provocation which resulted in pogroms. The Jews used all available means to dissuade their compatriots from collaborating with the Bolsheviks. In a majority of the cases the Reds robbed the Jews and instigated Jewish pogroms.

6

Defense of the Yarmolyntsi-Husiatyn Sector

IT HAD become necessary to move the Government and Army staff west and away from the front-line. Early in March I was therefore ordered to move to the railroad junction of Yarmolyntsi and simultaneously I was appointed garrison commander of an area within a 15-mile radius of Yarmolyntsi. I was to make the area ready for defensive action and to evacuate a huge depot of artillery supplies located at Victoria, about 5 miles west of Yarmolyntsi, to Galicia. When the news spread in Brailov that our battalion was leaving, a delegation of the local populace came to me, headed by the above mentioned Chief Rabbi I. Feldfix. They made a desperate appeal to me to leave a small crew in Brailov to preserve order. There was only one advice I could give the Rabbi: that he should make this request to the Army Staff or to the Minister of Jewish Affairs. Rabbi Feldfix then handed me an envelope with a document written in Hebrew, and lifting both hands high, he said: "Whenever in your life you will find yourself in a position of danger, show this paper to any Jew, and you will be given all possible help by the Jews." *

After the arrival of my battalion at the Yarmolyntsi station, I dispatched two rifle companies and one cavalry

*First of all I asked my liaison officer H. Roytberg to translate the contents of the document for me. He read it, then kissed it and said: "You deserve it, I have observed your attitude toward the populace and particularly toward the Jews." He would not, however, tell us what the document said. No other Jew would tell me its contents either. There were several occasions when the document came in handy. As noted before, H. Roytberg is now living in the United States.

company to the near-by city of Yarmolyntsi and left the rest at the station. I placed a string of patrols all along the eastern line of my command sector. One day a cavalry dispatch rider came galloping to me with a laconic message from Capt. Moroz, commander of the cavalry company, stating that my presence in the city is immediately required. When I came there, Capt. Moroz told me that about two hours earlier a group of 19 riders headed by "Otaman" Bohun had entered the city and began robbing the people. Moroz had surrounded them, disarmed them, and now the robbers were under arrest in the schoolhouse. I summoned Bohun, and he declared with an air of arrogance that I had no right to detain him and his troops, demanding immediate release and return of their arms. When I explained to him that he was a common robber and that according to the laws of war he will be court-martialled, he laughed. I immediately convened a court-martial headed by Captain Moroz and with 2 officers and 2 enlisted men as members. Only Bohun was sentenced to death and the sentence was confirmed by Commander in Chief Simon Petlura within 24 hours. I had a talk with Bohun's group of men and they all enlisted in my battalion. I found them to be very good and disciplined soldiers. As the Ukrainian proverb justly says: "fish stink from the head down."

Soon thereafter Lieut. Fedorchak and Subaltern Fedak from the Chief Command of the Ukrainian Galician Army came to me with a document confirmed by the Army Staff which stated that they were authorized to evacuate the artillery stores from Victoria and that they should load 20 carloads each day. I put the 4th Company under Capt. Musiyenko at their disposal and transferred it to Victoria. I continued to equip my battalion while in Yarmolyntsi and succeeded in obtaining 200 pairs of shoes. Several days later the Army Staff ordered me to transfer the entire battalion to Victoria in order to speed up the evacuation of

artillery stores. I was to turn over defense of the Yarmolyntsi junction to the Haydamak Group under Otaman M. Sereda. The latter appeared the same day and I moved the battalion to Victoria. I saw an extraordinary picture on my arrival at Victoria: Capt. Musiyenko told me that a few hours before a unit under the command of Major Kaspariants (an Armenian by birth, former Non-Com in the Russian tsarist army) arrived there. There were 9 men who placed a 3" cannon in front of the railroad station and Kaspariants personally fired the cannon around a 360° radius all over the distant countryside. When I asked him why he was doing this, he replied: "to keep the Communized countryside frightened." I told him to leave the place immediately and reported the incident to the Army Staff. I never heard of Kaspariants again. This is the kind of behavior we had to contend with, in spite of severe punishment meted out to culprits. These are obviously quite normal occurrences of every revolution. As a student of history, I knew well what went on in France in the late 16th century, in England over a period of nearly two centuries, and again in France during the Great Revolution. The difference was, however, that revolutionary events in Ukraine were more in the nature of purely accidental and quite petty banditism, whereas in the great historical revolutions tens of thousands of people perished, particularly those of another faith, as e.g. Jews. The Ukrainian revolution never assumed the character of mass destruction, as in the Soviet Union, where millions died, including nearly all Bolshevik leaders, and in the artificially induced famine when several million of my hapless countrymen died. In Ukraine, in the 1917-1921 period things were comparatively well under control, mainly thanks to the attitude of our Government and the Commander in Chief, Simon Petlura. Nevertheless, some newspapers in the West, which on one hand were misinformed about events in eastern

Europe, and on the other hand deliberately inspired by Russians, attempted to slander the entire Ukrainian liberation movement, and particularly the Ukrainian Armed Forces for an alleged lack of culture and tendency toward anarchy. It is quite obvious that the newly established Ukrainian Government could not have the same kind of political and diplomatic contacts as the Russians, it did not have financial means for propaganda counteraction which in our materialistic epoch, is actually the only factor of political decision. The Ukrainian Government should certainly have publicized all positive manifestations of the struggle for independence and corrected unfounded falsehoods. In this instance it would have been well to the point to answer both the White, as well as the Red provocateurs in the words of the Ukrainian proverb: "people might believe some of your lies, but not for long."

In order to investigate the veracity of Kaspariants' report about pro-Communist sympathies of the countryside, I immediately dispatched patrols under Capt. Musiyenko to the largest village in the area, the name of which I no longer remember. The patrols came back with quite disturbing reports: the people in the villages were not basically pro-Communist, but there were large numbers of Bolshevik agitators all over. There was a bright side to the reports: the peasants were not inclined to offer resistance to our battalion, saying: "it would be a hard job to fight those boys in steel helmets." That same night, however, Captain Musiyenko disappeared, and there was all reason to believe that he had gone over to the Communists. Special security measures had to be undertaken. The next day I took a motor trolley toward Yarmolyntsi to get a report from Otaman Sereda, and on my way I nearly fell into a Bolshevik trap: they were there, but well concealed and they permitted my trolley to get quite close. I had to hurry and set up defenses around Victoria, as one railroad em-

ployee had found out that night over the telephone from his colleague in Yarmolyntsi that a Bolshevik armored train had arrived there. We blew up all bridges between Yarmolyntsi and Victoria immediately, but the Bolshevik armored train could reach us by artillery fire and we had to move about 1½ miles west of Victoria. For about 3 days the Bolshevik troops did not bother us at all, but we learned later that they had forcibly armed the entire countryside in order to surround us. While we were still in Yarmolyntsi, a Rumanian officer, Lieut. S. Madgi reported to me. He was an artillery man and with his help I organized a battery in Victoria, two 3" cannon mounted on wheels and two more on flat-cars, something in the nature of an improvised armored train. I placed the cavalry company and the battery in Horodok, 2 miles west of Victoria, and I told Capt. Moroz specifically that his squadron was the combat protection for the battery. The battalion was well uniformed and well armed, with a total complement of 700 men; this was a lot at a time when some of our entire divisions did not have more than 400-500 men. I was not surprised when one day, one of many days so full of different and difficult work that I and my officers often slept with our clothes on, and sometimes had to go without sleep for 2-3 days at a time—the battalion was visited for a full inspection by the Commander in Chief accompanied by the Commander of the Chortkiv Military District, Major M. Orobko. The Staff usually transmitted my reports to the Commander in Chief, and the latter, upon inspection, expressed his satisfaction with the condition of my troops and the order prevailing in areas which were under our control. The next day after the Commander in Chief, Simon Petlura left, our battalion passed a difficult trial of battle, unfortunately with heavy and unexpected losses.

Meanwhile the situation on the fronts against the Bol-

sheviks was not rosy at all. Our army was in retreat on all fronts, as I found out from reports coming to me from the Army Staff. The Zaporozhian Battalion and the Odessa Group were retreating in the direction of Tiraspol, and was trying, with the aid of our Government, to be permitted to cross Rumania into Galicia, in order to reach the region of Proskuriv or Volochyska. The Sitch Riflemen Corps and other units attached to it were retreating on the Proskuriv Volochyska line, and the Northern and Kholm Groups were moving toward Sarny and Lutsk. At that time, a thing quite usual under conditions of military failure, all kinds of adventurers began to appear, who were not dedicated to any ideals, but merely sought to satisfy their personal ambition or to gain material profit. Thus, for example, Commander of the Northern Group, Major P. Oskilko* proclaimed himself commander of all military forces of Ukraine and went so far as to put members of the Government under arrest. This certainly contributed to a decline of morale and combat readiness of our troops on the northern front. Another self-styled "Otaman," Volokh, who became commander of the Zaporozhian Corps in some mysterious manner, announced that he was in favor of a communist order in Ukraine and began unauthorized negotiations for an armistice with the head of the Ukrainian Soviet Government, Christian Rakovsky. There was disorganization and demoralization among our troops. The Commander in Chief and the Army Staff made feverish attempts to restore discipline, and they were soon successful, because the masses of the Ukrainian troops were patriotic and understood that adventurous moves were harmful.

Since the very beginning of its assumption of power, the Directorate sought all possible diplomatic means to get help from the victorious Allies in order to continue

* Later murdered by the Communists in Volhynia under Poland 1930.

resistance against the Reds. Delegates of the Ukrainian Government negotiated with Allied representatives wherever possible, particularly in Rumania. This was all fruitless, however, because the Allies were in favor of restoring Russia and their statesmen believed that Russia could be rebuilt on democratic principles. In this they were duped by foreign agents of Moscow abroad who had old contacts with foreign governments. Indeed, it was perhaps difficult to foresee at that time that "Satan is ascending," but we know that the West helped Poland and the newly established Baltic States, the only country refused help was Ukraine, and the whole world, together with the Russians, opposed the struggle of the Ukrainian people. Old Russian diplomats of the Tsarist times, pictured the Ukrainian national movement as Ukrainian Bolshevism. When I had a chance, much later, to become acquainted with memoiristic literature, and primarily that of the Russians, I observed that the Russians were ready to accept the existence of Bolshevik Russia, but of an independent Ukraine—never. The world has suffered much harm because of the Russophile tendencies and political shortsightedness of such political leaders, or rather dictators, as Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and to some extent Winston Churchill. We should always keep in mind that they were the undertakers of the Ukrainian freedom cause and actual creators of the power of Bolshevism. It was not the Germans, who delivered Lenin and Co. to Russia in 1917, but the Allied statesmen, who were the real authors of Bolshevism because they would not help wreck the rule of the Reds and thus contributed to the ascendancy of the Soviet empire. They are responsible for the decline of the power of their nations: France will surely never rise again, and England is slowly following her. There existed, however, sure possibilities of finishing off Moscow imperialism by aiding Ukraine and the other na-

tions, Turkestan, Byelorussia, and others. Instead, we now have rampant Red imperialism which is on its way to conquer the world without even attempting to conceal its plans. While it is true that to err is human, the French have a better saying: "c'est plus qu'un crime, c'est une faute" (mistakes are worse than crimes). To what extent the West was politically and militarily demoralized at the time of the close of World War I is evidenced by the following fact: yielding to the persistent demands of the envoy of the Provisional Russian Government, P. Izvolsky and delegate Paul Milyukov, M. Clemenceau decided to establish a staging area in southern Ukraine near Odessa, for operational aid to the Russian Volunteer Army which assembled in the Caucasus under General L. Kornilov, and after his death of Generals Aleksieyev and A. Denikin and fought the Reds. Four Allied divisions landed in Odessa supported by appropriate naval forces. The divisions were: one French, one Greek and two French colonial. Fighting began between the Ukrainian garrison in Odessa and Russian White Guards which were being organized under Allied protection. The Ukrainian garrison retreated from Odessa, which was immediately attacked by the insurgent group of Otaman Hryhoroyiv 6,000 strong, which not only dispersed the Volunteers, but also forced the entire Allied Corps to flee from Odessa, with the Greek units offering the only real resistance as attested to by memoiristic sources. Unfortunately, Hryhoriyiv was one of the many naive who trusted Moscow. He joined the Bolsheviks and was subsequently liquidated by them.

7

The Struggle of the Ukrainian Galician Army Against Poland

MEANWHILE there was a sad turn of events in Galicia. The so-called Blue Army of General Haller, recruited in America and in France, arrived in Poland 75,000 strong, well armed and equipped. It gave the Poles an edge over the Ukrainian Galician Army which was forced to retreat eastward. The question arose: whither? The Army of the Ukrainian National Republic was already retreating under Bolshevik pressure westward and now there was only a small strip separating the two Ukrainian Armies. In this critical situation, the youthful Galician officers requested their High Command to order a counterattack. The *Galician President* E. Petrushevych appointed General O. Hrekiv as Commander in Chief and ordered a counter offensive. It is hardly believable because it was almost a miracle that the Ukrainian Galician Army, by superhuman effort, broke the Polish front. The supply of ammunition was so scant that after one day's fighting the soldiers were rationed only several rounds per day which could be fired only on clear orders of officers. The Ukrainian Galician Army began its offensive on June 8th, called the "Chortkiv Offensive" and within nine days it penetrated a distance about eighty miles from the Chortkiv-Terebovla-Ternopil to the Stanyslaviv-Burshtyn-Peremyshlany line. The Poles threw in fresh troops and halted the Ukrainian offensive. The Ukrainians' ammunition was exhausted, for although they had captured large supplies from the Poles, it did not

fit their arms. There was a new retreat of the Ukrainian Galician Army which was trying to detach itself from the pursuing enemy in order to redeploy its forces. The Ukrainian Galician Army was quite depleted, by losses, sickness and lack of opportunity for fresh recruitment. The Chortkiv Offensive was, however, of great importance to the operations of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic because it halted the Poles for a considerable time, the latter following the Ukrainian Galician Army at a slow pace and requiring more than three weeks to re-occupy the areas which they had lost, a time of great value to the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic. Now the Ukrainian Galician Army, ready for combat and confident in ultimate victory assembled in the rear of the UNR Army for a joint offensive against the Reds.

The Government of the Ukrainian National Republic was well aware of the difficult strategic position of Ukraine due to the necessity to fight on two fronts and a none-too-friendly neutrality of Rumania. Therefore the Government decided to seek an armistice with Poland, of which we were appraised by reports from Army Headquarters. As far as the political side of this matter is concerned, it must be stated that both the Government of the Western Ukrainian Republic as well as all soldiers were opposed to this, but the strategic position of both our Armies being hopeless, the only way out was to make peace with one enemy and untie our hands for a fight with the other. Negotiations with Poland dragged out fairly long, the Ukrainian delegation doing its utmost to have the demands of the Ukrainian Galician Army and Government taken into consideration. Quite unexpectedly, however, the Allied Supreme Council issued a directive to the Polish Government to take all Galicia under temporary occupation, all the way to the river Zbruch. There was nothing else left to the Ukrainian delegation, but to accept this

condition and to get the Poles to agree to cease military operations so that the Ukrainian Galician Army could cross the Zbruch intact. We also needed territory on which the Ukrainian Galician Army could be deployed, and this had to be taken from the Bolsheviks. The situation was a little more favorable at that time because the Bolsheviks did not attempt to cross the Zbruch and their offensive in Volhynia was completely unsuccessful. The UNR Army began an offensive to gain territory for the Galician Army. In June the UNR Army reached the Kamyanets-Podilsky-Dunayivtsi-Proskuriv line, but with much effort and aided by the Ukrainian Galician Army.

Much later, when I studied the details of the Ukrainian liberation effort, I pondered over the circumstances of the so-called "November Feat" which constituted the beginning of statehood of the Ukrainian Galician territory and was carried out by a small group of Ukrainian Galician patriots. In Lviv itself the group of the "November Feat" did not number more than 1,500 men, most of whom were soliders of advanced years or convalescents without much ability to fight. In reality, Lviv was seized by no more than five-hundred men and the action succeeded only thanks to the determination and superhuman efforts of a small group of officers headed by Colonel Dmytro Vitovsky, who became Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Galician Army and War Secretary. In the countryside the take-over went much smoother because there was no organized counteraction on the Polish side and because the Polish population was very small. We were also filled with admiration and pride at the Galician Ukrainians' ability to organize a strong army within a short period of time and under difficult conditions. It was 80,000 strong in the early days of 1919, a figure easy to quote now, but we must take into consideration the difficulties of mobilization, organization of technical, material and medical equipment,

transportation, etc., all taking place on ruins in which Galicia lay at the end of World War I, being the main theatre of operations between the Central Powers and Russia and changing hands numberless times.

8

Withdrawal across the Zbruch near Husiatyn

THE BATTALION at Victoria was actually surrounded by the enemy, and only one road remained open: the Victoria-Lisovody-Husiatyn railroad, which was continually patrolled by a platoon, on flatcars, and armed with machineguns. The day after Lieut. Musiyenko's disappearance our guard platoons were exchanging fire with the enemy from early morning and were forced to withdraw. We had to break out of the encirclement, and withdrawal was made more difficult because I had only one locomotive. The engineer was a Pole, but we had had an opportunity to find out that he could be trusted, moreover, one day he had asked me directly to let him join his own people if we crossed the Zbruch, and I promised to do so. That afternoon I dispatched the first supply train to Husiatyn, which is west of the Zbruch, and when the locomotive came back, after two hours, everything was ready for immediate departure under the direct cover of my flatcars. I ordered Capt. Moroz and Lieut. Madji to leave Horodok immediately and to march through Lisovody to East Husiatyn where the battery was to prepare the position, with an observation point on a bluff on the east of the river. There were trenches on the bluff from World War I, and although they were facing west, they could be used in the opposite direction. I called Capt. Moroz' particular attention to a wooded defile west of Horodok which could conceal an ambush. Things hap-

pened just as I had feared. First of all, Capt. Moroz started late. The whole battalion was at the Lisovody station when we heard rifle shots, then three mortar shots in the woods, and then all was quiet. Within a few minutes Capt. Moroz and his squadron ran out of the woods in disorder and stopped in front of me; I was with a rear-guard platoon on the road. The battery was missing! But it came in sight after a few minutes, in disorder! As I had expected, the battery had been attacked in the woods by the Bolsheviks, and also probably by neighboring peasants, because it was reported that the enemy was in great force, and our cavalry squadron not only did not defend the battery, but not even itself! Lieut. Madji and several non-coms from the battery were captured, some were killed and some wounded. This was a terrible and unnecessary loss. It was getting dark, and the patrols reported that the enemy was still encircling us, so I gave orders to leave for Husiatyn right away. I removed Capt. Moroz from the command of the cavalry company.

During the night I put patrols around the Husiatyn bridgehead, pushing sentries to the eastern end of the village of Velyky Olkhovets, in order to guard Husiatyn from enemy artillery fire. While doing this I encountered Lieut. Z. Stefaniv of the Ukrainian Galician Army, whose company was guarding the west bank of the Zbruch. The following morning the Bolsheviks approached the line of my patrols and began firing at Husiatyn from two batteries and from an armored train. This was actually the first battle of my battalion. The patrols did not stop the enemy, although we had the support of the UHA artillery firing from positions west of Husiatyn, and we began crossing the Zbruch. I kept only one company, with two machine-guns, in the trenches on the bluff to halt the enemy advance. I stayed with the company to get a clear picture of the situation, but I also observed that my presence was

necessary because the morale of my soldiers was shaky, probably due to the loss of the battery and the apparently overwhelming numbers of the enemy.

Lacking any orders from my high command, I left the company of Capt. Blahovishchensky, in order to put sentries for the night on the west bank of the Zbruch together with Lieut. Stefaniv, and withdrew my battalion to the nearby village of Vasylykivtsi. The whole Zbruch sector, the so-called Third Sector, was held by two Galician battalions with two batteries under Major Martynovych who had his staff headquarters of the Third Sector of Front with the Staff-Quarters in the village of Krohulets. That same evening, Major Martynovych accompanied by his aide, Capt. Penchak came to see me and requested that my battalion man this Sector. He said he would transfer a battery to my command, the 6th, under Captain V. Zarytsky. Soon Major Orobko came to me with identical orders from the Army Staff. He was the commandant of the Chortkiv Military District, and he also brought me an appointment to command the Third Sector with responsibility for the defense of the Zbruch line from Skala to Pidvolochyska. South of my command the Zbruch line was held by a group under Col. M. Shapoval, and north of me the front was held by Otaman Bozhko.

The Bolsheviks did not attempt to force the Zbruch, and I ordered the bridge at Husiatyn to be left intact, just to hold it under heavy fire. One night we made a sortie to the east bank of the Zbruch and took several prisoners. We learned from them that we were faced by the 12th and 13th Volochysk regiments. The front was fairly quiet and I managed to organize a battery with two cannon. Soon thereafter, in connection with a planned offensive to the east, I was given additional troops: the Rybnyk regiment with about 200 men under the command of Colonel Matsak. Pursuant to orders of the Army Staff,

from then my battalion, the Rybnyk regiment, and the 6th SS Battery, formed the so-called Colonel Shandruk Group.

We did not get fresh orders until May 21. New events, however, occurred in the meantime. In the course of re-organizing the Army, Col. V. Salsky was appointed Commander of the Zaporozhian Corps, and Col. P. Bolbochan was transferred to the reserve, to the command of the Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Galician Army. Col. Bolbochan believed that he was being treated unjustly and tried to get back to his command of the Corps. Probably due to the fact that the Zaporozhian battalion was originally part of the Corps, although it had since been detached, Col. Bolbochan came to see me on May 16th and requested to talk to me alone. Col. Bolbochan told me his personal sad story about being removed from his command without cause, and added that the division commanders of the Corps and all of the ranks were clamoring for his return because without him the Corps could lose its historical battle valor. He said that he was being urged to do this regardless of the consent of the Commander in Chief, Simon Petlura. Col. Bolbochan asked me whether he could count on my support. I answered: "I don't think it right to make such a 'coup d'etat' under difficult conditions of war; in my opinion the division commanders of the Corps' units could present the case of the Corps to the Commander-in-Chief through the channel of the Army Staff, suggesting that you should be restored to your command. Regardless of whether the battalion is engaged in battle or not, I shall never take part in an adventure, but I shall be happy if the case is resolved in your favor in a legitimate manner." We learned later, however, that Col. Bolbochan proceeded on his own, taking over the command of the Corps by force and arresting Col. Salsky. The result was an order for the arrest of Col. Bolbochan issued by C.I.C.S., Petlura and a

subsequent court-martial ending in a sentence of death by firing squad. The sentence was duly carried out. He was executed ten days after sentencing.

It should be noted that the institution of State Inspection was introduced into the Army at that time. Its task was the investigation of the political beliefs of the commanders, educational and cultural work among the troops, plus the duty of controlling the quartermaster corps. This innovation was probably patterned after "the most democratic" Bolshevik system, since the institution of political commissars existed only there. In our Army, however, this caused a wave of disapproval among the officer corps, as an alleged sign of distrust in its patriotism. I do not recall who was the author of this political move, but it was clear that it was the work of the political parties then in power, headed by Prime Minister I. Mazepa. In spite of its dissatisfaction and occasional ignoring of the State Inspection agents, the officer corps put up with this unwarranted and unexpected suspicion of disloyalty. It should, however, be stated for the sake of historical truth, that although State Inspection did not perform anything worthwhile, no real harm was done, outside of a few instances of misunderstanding between commanders and Inspection agents who pretended to be political commissars. The Inspection was not needed to watch over matters of loyalty to the state, and it had no time to attend to matters of education of the troops, as they were always on the march or in battle. State Inspection was headed by Col. V. Kedrovsky, a gentleman and patriot who was able to give proper direction to the work of his subordinates, demanding their full support of the commanding officers. My circumstances took a fortunate turn, as the regimental inspector did not interfere at all, while the inspector of the General Staff was my former classmate of the Historical-Philological Institute, Capt. M. Hladky, and the inspector of the Minis-

try of War was my personal friend, A. Pevny. All this turned out to be important to me when I was subsequently appointed commander of the 1st Recruit Regiment in Kamyanets. Anyway, the institution of State Inspection withered away, and was not reestablished in 1920.

9

Attack on Ukraine

ON THE NIGHT of May 23rd I received orders from the Army Staff through Maj. Martynovych to force the Zbruch immediately, and to march in the direction of Dunayevtsi. My neighboring commanders simultaneously began an offensive: Col. Shapoval toward Kamyanets, and Otaman Bozhko toward Solobkivtsi. It was disappointed that this joint action was not put under a single commander, for purposes of coordination. Maj. Martynovych promised to support my attack with two batteries and to put one infantry company with four machine-guns in my reserves. During the night of May 25th I marked the entire front of the group with the help of this company, and knowing the exact location and routine of the enemy, I pulled all my troops into a woods five kilometres north of Husiatyn so as to effect a march in the enemy's rear and encircle his entire Husiatyn Sector. The enemy was caught by surprise and began fleeing after a few shots, so that by 7 A.M., we had liquidated two enemy regiments, taking 150 prisoners, and capturing three cannon, seven machine-guns on carriages, a lot of military supplies and more than forty horses. I ordered the Zaporozhian battalion to place sentries along a sector of five to six kilometres, and the Rybnyk regiment, as reserve to move into the village of Velyky Olkhovets. In the course of these movements there was unceasing fire east of Velyky Olkhovets and liaison-couriers dispatched to the commander of the 2nd company, Capt. Vodyanytsky, did not return. Therefore I decided



Simon Petlura, Ukrainian Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief.



Chief of State of Ukraine Simon Petlura and Chief of State
of Poland Josef Pilsudski, 1920.

to proceed there in person. I was accompanied by Col. Matsak, my aide, Capt. Linytsky and three mounted orderlies. On a hill east of Velyky Olkhovets stood the ruins of a manor destroyed during the war, and the road passed through a deep ravine. When our group came close to the ruins, standing on both sides of the road, we did not see our sentries which were supposed to be there, but instead, from behind a building on the right, a band of fifteen to twenty Reds jumped out and with shouts of "surrender" began to shoot from a distance of about forty to fifty paces. My horse was killed under me and fell over my left leg. Bullets were literally grazing me. I freed my leg with difficulty and immediately drew and cocked my Browning automatic pistol, not wanting to be taken alive. Meanwhile Capt. Linytsky and the soldiers got off their horses and managed to run up the left escarpment, hiding behind the walls on that side and firing at the Reds. This gave me a chance to run up and join them. Under the cover of the ruined walls we managed to get behind the buildings at the north end of the village, but we were met with fire there, too. We found out that it was a patrol in deployment proceeding to take its position among the ruined buildings. Col. Matsak turned his horse around and escaped to Husiatyn where he alerted the reserves. When we were near the city we met the company on its way to rescue us. When I wanted to unload my pistol later, I found that it was jammed. Providence saved me from enemy bullets and probably from my own bullet, too.

A report reached me from Maj. Martynovych in the meantime that neither Col. Shapoval, nor Otaman Bozhko had started their attacks because they had not managed to get ready in time: this was the result of the lack of unified command. We captured the bridgehead, as the offensive was postponed to May 27th. On that morning, pursuant to orders, the group began moving toward Dunayevtsi with-

out opposition. From time to time we heard artillery fire on our right and left. Before Dunayevtsi, near the city of Shatava, the Commander in Chief arrived and after receiving my report ordered the column to rest and informed me about the situation. The new commander of the Skala group, Col. O. Udovychenko, who had replaced Col. Shapoval, had already captured Kamyanets Podilsky and was proceeding toward Dunayevtsi where a battle was in progress. Otaman Bozhko had also forced the Zbruch, but his eastward march was halted by overwhelming enemy forces; the Zaporozhian Corps had dispersed the enemy in the upper Horyn region and was moving on Proskuriv. My group was renamed the 9th Infantry regiment and embodied in the 3rd Infantry Division, the former group of Col. Udovychenko. Other regiments in the Division were the 7th Blue regiment under Col. O. Vyshnivsky and the 8th Black Sea regiment under Col. Tsarenko; the artillery regiment under Col. H. Chyzhevsky consisted of four light and one heavy subdivisions; the cavalry regiment in the Division was under Col. M. Krat. In Dunayevtsi I reported to Col. Udovychenko, whom I had met during my stay in Yarmolyntsi when he was chief of staff of the Slobidsky Corps.

The next day the regiment attacked in the direction of the city of Nova Ushytsya. I was proud and happy to watch the 1st battalion (the former Zaporozhian battalion) deploy in ranks without faltering under enemy fire, as if on maneuvers. I had the opportunity to see the whole battlefield from my command post, but the battalion commander, the experienced line officer Capt. Shevtziv, sent me dispatches on the course of the attack. My 6th battery was firing at the enemy almost from the line of the infantry. The 2nd battalion, however (the former Rybnyk regiment), did not display activity on the left wing of attack and I had to send runners with orders to hasten their move-

ment, particularly since on the sector of this battalion near Zamikhiv the enemy was not active, either. While I was standing at the observation point under an old huge lime tree two kilometers west of Nova Ushytsya, I heard the whine of one of the enemy cannon shots. I had no time to hide behind the tree and the shell fell right at my feet but did not explode. That day the regiment reached Mynkivtsi without much resistance from the enemy.

In the following days the regiment marched forward through Verbovets and Kurylivtsi Murovani in order to take the station Kotyuzhany on the Zhmerynka-Mohyliv line and prevent the enemy from evacuating Mohyliv toward Zhmerynka. The task was accomplished: forty kilometres in three days with fairly heavy enemy resistance. After taking Kotyuzhany I pushed the 1st battalion to Kopayhorod in order to defend Kotyuzhany from the north and east. In Nova Ushytsya, Verbovets, and Kurylivtsi Murovani and all around, the people were out to give us a hearty welcome, with the Jewish population taking part. But when the battalion was entering Kopayhorod in battle order, shots were fired at it from buildings and several men were wounded. I was with the battalion and ordered patrols to leave the city and the battalion to surround it without letting anyone leave the city, because the Bolsheviks could not be distinguished from the civilian population. I was certain that the shots from windows were fired by Bolsheviks who had not managed to leave the city. The patrols searched the city and determined from which houses shots had been fired at us. When we brought those whom we had detained before members of the City Council, the latter stated that they were all local residents. All those detained were young Jews and we found them in possession of arms and ammunition. I held them in the school building and conducted the investigation in person in the presence of members of the City Council, the local

Rabbi, and the pharmacist, who was also Jewish. In answer to questioning all of the detained admitted that they had been shooting. There were about 15 boys and they said that they had been armed by the Bolshevik commandant of the city who persuaded them to fire at us, alleging that we were "Haydamaks" * who would butcher all local Jews! A local Jewish tailor had been the Bolshevik commandant, so it is not surprising that they obeyed him. This was the first instance when I made use of the letter I had from Rabbi Feldfix: when the Rabbi of Kopayhorod read it, he addressed the young Jews very sharply and they all fell to their knees and begged for mercy. We did not even arrest any of them. We only asked that their families take care of our wounded soldiers.

The regiment stopped in the Kopayhorod-Kotyuzhany regions for several days because we learned that the Division could not advance as the 2nd "Zaporozhska Sitch" Division of Otaman Bozhko, which was supposed to have taken Zhmerynka, had to retreat before overwhelming enemy forces first to Bar, and then southwest to Yaltushkiv. The enemy had advanced up to thirty kilometres behind the regiment. When the Bolsheviks brought reinforcements to Zhmerynka with two armored trains, the Division had to retreat all the way to Nova Ushytsya. It should be noted that such a withdrawal, in addition to political and moral difficulties, also created tactical hardships, because all roads led through larger towns and cities situated in deep river valleys (Stara Ushytsya, Kalus, Lozova) parallel to the front and flowing to the Dnister river. With fresh troops of the 41st Bessarabian Division the enemy attempted to destroy our Division, but Col. Udovychenko frustrated all these attempts with adroit maneuvers inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.

In this quite difficult and uncertain situation the well-

* Eighteenth century Ukrainian revolutionaries.

known leader from Bukovyna, Otaman V. Topushchak came to me and told me that he had brought with him from Bukovyna, which had now been occupied by the Rumanians, a whole battalion of very good soldiers to Kamyanets. He wanted his battalion to be attached as an independent unit to an appropriate unit of our Army. The Commander in Chief permitted him to visit the front and to select this unit. He had visited all, including our 9th regiment, without our knowing about it. The Commander in Chief granted his request to be attached to our regiment and now he was asking me whether I would have his battalion under my command. I could only thank Otaman Topushchak for his confidence in me, and his battalion was attached to my regiment in Nova Ushytsya. The battalion consisted of three infantry and one machine-gun companies with additional units and supplies. It was under the command of Captain Zipser, with Lieut. Cantemir as aide-de-camp. There was a total of about 320 men. I was always careful to keep this unit of such fine boys from suffering losses and I ordered them into battle only when it was absolutely necessary. Thus, my regiment unexpectedly grew larger, and in spite of losses which were fortunately not too heavy, now counted over 900 men. At that time the problem of clothing and especially shoes became very acute. We had worn them out in battles and marches! I was helped a lot by the Divisional Quartermaster, Captain Bazylevych, who had set woolen mills and tanneries in motion at Dunayevtsi, behind our lines.

The reinforced "Zaporozhska Sitch" Division finally took Zhmerynka and our Division received orders to go forward and take the Vapniarka railroad junction. This time I was to lead the attack through Kurylivtsi Murovani to Mohyliv. Mohyliv (Mogilev) was being defended by the Nemiya-Serebriy red regiment under Chaban, over 1,000 strong with an armored train and a number of cannon.

Following the bad experience with our 2nd battalion, I put it in reserve and led the attack on Mohyliv with the 1st and 3rd battalions, the 1st having the task of attacking north of Mohyliv and cutting off Chaban's avenue of retreat to the east. We dispersed the enemy after a fairly brief battle and captured seven cannon, the armored train and 200 prisoners. When my troops and I were going down the road to Mohyliv, which lies in a deep valley on the Dnister, Rumanian artillery fired at us from the other side of the Dnister! Captain Zipser immediately dispatched three officers, under a flag of truce, by boat across the Dnister, and they explained to the Rumanian commander of the sector in the city of Ataki exactly who we were. The firing ceased immediately, but we had several killed and wounded. Our delegates brought a report from the Rumanians that they had been informed by Chaban that Mohyliv was being attacked by bandits and that was why they had been shooting at us.

In Mohyliv the local population arranged a banquet reception for the entire regiment, presided over by the President of the City Council and by the Chairman of the County Board, the brothers Dyadynyuk (one of them was the father of the well-known Ukrainian painter and engraver V. Dyadynyuk who enlisted in my regiment as private). The banquet in honor of the officers and myself was held in City Hall, and for the soldiers in schools. The Rumanian commander of the city of Ataki, Major Iovanescu was present at the banquet and apologized in a speech for firing on the regiment. I was told later by the Dyadynyuk brothers that all the guests had been waiting for my speech in great anxiety, hoping to hear that they would be safe from the Bolsheviks and could sleep safely and soundly without fear of excesses. It was evident from the way they reacted to my address that the civic leaders sighed with relief. The City Council offered as a gift to the

regiment 200 complete uniforms with shoes, and the gift was delivered later that fall after I had been transferred to Kamyanets. An old friend of mine and associate from the Kharkiv Command, Lieut. Col. P. Nechytailo, came to offer his services to me in Mohyliv and I appointed him regimental quartermaster because my brother, who temporarily had been holding that position, had been appointed to the Foreign Department of the General Staff and had left for Kamyanets.

After three days in Mohyliv, where I had been collecting intelligence reports from the direction of Yampil, the regiment advanced through Sharhorod and Dzhuryn with the objective of helping to take the station of Rakhny and thus create a barrier toward Zhmerynka for further operations of the Division directed at Vapniarka. The enemy brought in considerable reinforcements, and the Division, which stretched in various directions along a front of sixty kilometres, had to execute difficult maneuvers for over a week in order to hold the region of Dzhuryn-Murafa-Rakhny as a base for future operations toward Vapniarka. Colonel Udovychenko showed great operational ability and defeated the enemy on all sectors. The regiment stopped at the Murafa river line to guard operations of the main forces of the Division and engaged in heavy battles with overwhelming numbers of the enemy pressing from Zhmerynka in the north and from Tyvriv-Krasne in the east.

10

To Kiev

REORGANIZATION of our high command to take charge of both Armies the UNR and UHA, and operational centralization and direction under battle conditions required much of the time and efforts of the Commander in Chief and his Staff. There was now doubt, however, among the soldiers, that by the common effort of both Armies, which were nearly 150,000 strong, we would finally conquer the Bolsheviks. The enthusiasm, however, did not extend beyond a few weeks. It did not occur to anyone, for example, to think of what would happen in the fall, but the Command and the Government did think about it.

Reasons of policy probably demanded centering of all our efforts on Kiev, but strategy looked for contact with the world through the port of Odessa. Politics won, and the bulk of our operations were directed toward Kiev, with safety measures undertaken both to the north and south. The direct attack on Kiev was led by the 3rd UHA Corps and the Zaporozhian Corps as the General A. Kraus Group. On August 30, Kiev was in our hands. Several days later we learned that our forces had again withdrawn from Kiev, and this was a terrible blow to the morale of our soldiers.

We knew from the communiqué of the General Staff that our strategic position was deteriorating in connection with the movements of the "White" Russian army of General Denikin who did not conceal his aggressive plans toward Ukraine and other nations that had proclaimed their separation from Russia. Denikin knew, of course,

that his success over the Bolsheviks was not so much due to the aid of the Western Allies, as to the Ukrainian Army which had dispersed the Reds. Renewed efforts of our Government and Commander to reach an understanding with Denikin by sending two delegations to him were unsuccessful: Denikin proclaimed that his aim was to restore "Russia, one and indivisible" and in the areas of Ukraine which came under his occupation all manifestations of Ukrainian political activities were summarily dealt with. It should be noted that he displayed the same hostility toward other non-Russian people who proclaimed their independence after the fall of tsarist Russia: the Don, Kuban, Georgia, and others. He ordered the execution of noted patriots of these countries, for example, he ordered the hanging of the Kuban patriot V. Kalabukhov. Denikin refused to talk to the Ukrainian delegates and even threatened them with arrest. Renewed appeals of our Government to the Allies were also futile, both to Allied representatives attached to our Command, as well as through our diplomatic representatives in Paris and London. One word from Clemenceau or from Lloyd George could have put an end to Denikin's military adventure, and could also have decided the fate of the Bolsheviks by directing all forces opposed to them in one unified action. But they were still dreaming of restoring great Russia with her profitable and insatiable market. It is hard to understand the working of the mind of Denikin and of the "great" statesmen of that time; they would not look at history, tactics or experience. We can well seek the causes of the decline of England and France in the events of that time.

When the troops of the General Kraus Group were marching into Kiev in parade order on August 31, General Bredov's group of Denikin's "White" Russians attacked our vanguard patrols guarding the bridges across the Dnipro, and broke into Kiev. General Kraus obeyed prior

orders of our Staff and ordered his troops to withdraw to the western part of Kiev and waited for a political solution to the problem of our relations with Denikin. Gen. Bredov, however, took advantage of the situation and pressed the attack against our troops. The General Staff of the Commander ordered a halt to operations both against the Red and White Russians, and to permit the Reds marching from the south to engage the Whites—a very wise strategic move.

11

In Kamyanets Podilsky

AT THAT time I suffered a relapse of my old illness, nephritis, and I was given one week's furlough, by Col. Udovychenko, to rest in bed and get well. On my way to Kamyanets, where my wife was staying, I met the Commander-in-Chief in Verbovets as he was proceeding to the front-line of our Division. After receiving my report about the situation in the Division and finding out that I was going for a rest, the Commander told me that he also wanted to speak to Col. Udovychenko about me. He wanted to transfer me to Kamyanets, the temporary capital, to take command of the 1st Recruit Regiment which was to be formed there and which was to garrison the city as a sort of guard regiment. For two reasons I felt that I should refuse this new assignment: I did not want to leave my brave comrades and soldiers; and I doubted whether Col. Udovychenko would let me go. A decision was difficult as I could not ask the Commander questions about the details of my new assignment. The Commander's aide, Col. O. Dotsenko, however, took advantage of a good moment and whispered to me: "take it, you will have the full support of the Commander and us" (this meant of the Commander's staff). I therefore gave an answer that if I felt better and if Col. Udovychenko would let me take a few of my officers from the regiment, I would be at the Commander's disposition. When I returned to the regiment after a week, Col. Udovychenko, with his usual composure and tolerance, not only con-

sented to my transfer, but even let me take several officers, well knowing that I would pick the best and weaken the staff of my former regiment. My need, however, was also for reliable aides in forming a new and exemplary regiment. So began a new chapter in my life.

After arriving in Kamyanets I reported to the Minister of War, Col. V. Petriv, and received my first instructions: the 1st Recruit Regiment will be under the Minister of War through the Quartermaster-general of the Staff, Staff General S. Dyadyusha, who would have the rights of division commander in relation to the regiment. The regiment would be quartered in the barracks of the former Russian 45th Azov Regiment, where a nucleus of officer and noncom personnel was already available, and Capt. Kolodyazh, an officer of Moldavian descent, was provisional commander. After paying Gen. Dyadyusha a visit, I reported to State Inspector of the Ministry of War, A. Pevny, whom I knew from Kharkiv. I had a hearty talk with him about the appointment of a state inspector for the regiment, and he told me that he would make the appointment after consulting Col. Kedrovsky and Capt. Hladky, state inspector attached to the General Staff. I also visited Hladky and asked him not only for an inspector, but even for a controller, on condition that I could show some initiative and not be stopped over details. The man appointed as inspector was Capt. Harasym Drachenko of the Grey Division. He gave me full support and even defended me from all sorts of whispers coming from various party circles. In my further talks with Col. Petriv and Gen. Dyadyusha I insisted on providing the regiment with food and clothing because under then existing conditions these were of the greatest importance to the soldiers. In this I also had the support of State Inspection.

After a closer look at the personnel of the regiment I appointed Capt. Kolodyazh as my deputy, I placed Capt.

Shevtsiv of the 9th Infantry Regiment in command of the 1st Battalion, Capt Vinnytsky of the 2nd Battalion, and Capt. Sirenko of the 3rd Battalion. Lt.-Colonel Nechytailo, also of the 9th Reg. was my quartermaster and other officers taken by me from the 9th Regiment were Capt. Vodyanytsky, Lieut. Raskin, Lieut. Ovcharenko and a few junior officers. I immediately ordered decontamination of the barracks and all equipment, and preparation of food. The biggest trouble was clothing and shoes, but we managed somehow. The regimental warehouse had plenty of fine pre-war tarpaulin and the Quartermaster-General permitted its conversion to shoes and puttees, and delivered an appropriate quantity of leather for soles and trimming, but would not undertake to set up shoemakers shops. I then applied to the City Council and its Chairman, Mr. Fisher (I showed him the letter from Rabbi Feldfix), agreed to send me a master shoemaker to organize production. My condition was that the shop would be in the barracks of the regiment, for better control. In a few days we had a shop in production, turning out sixty-five to seventy pairs of shoes and puttees a day. The shoes were so good that I saw them being worn by soldiers a year later without much sign of wear! Many state dignitaries, including Prime Minister I.P. Mazepa, came to the regiment and admired the production of shoes—from that time on, I had no trouble in getting funds and goods from the Quartermaster-General. Things were difficult with uniforms which were also in charge of the Quartermaster-General and were supplied primarily to front-line units. Some were assigned to me, but it was still warm and my troops wore heavy white shirts of which there was a plentiful supply as the Bolsheviks, surprisingly, did not take them when evacuating. Because of these shirts, my soldiers were called “our white guards.” There were no difficulties with food and we were soon able to organize an officers’ mess. The

remount Commission supplied us with a number of horses and carts, but we had to repair the wagons ourselves. Lt-Col. Nechytailo helped me greatly in all these undertakings. Our main task, however, was mustering and training troops.

By the middle of September noncoms began arriving every day, and soon thereafter, also recruits. We conducted an accelerated review with the noncoms for a few days, according to rules tried out in the Zaporozhian Battalion. The inspection commission headed by Capt. Drachenko rejected only a few noncoms who were suspected of Communism and they were sent back to the Chief of the Draft District. Recruits came chiefly from the counties of Mohyliv and Ushytsya, 20-year-olds in groups of 40 to 100. Two commissions were set up in the regiment, Medical and Educational, the latter charged with picking out the brighter and better educated boys to the School for Non-commissioned Officers. It was very odd that nearly all recruits, as if by prearrangement, arrived in barracks literally in underwear, sometimes just in a long nightshirt, and barefoot. When asked about this they said that they had nothing else to wear or that that was the way their parents had equipped them. Another order that the boys brought from home was "don't fight Onyky'n" (Denikin) whose troops were just then moving north in Right-Bank Ukraine (Bredov). Gen. Dyadyusha and Col. Petriv often attended field exercises and offered valuable advice. Within ten to twelve days the regiment had 2,000 men who were gradually being put in uniform and intensively trained. The Commander in Chief visited us before the Feast of the Holy Virgin (October 14), and told us that a "solemn swearing in" would take place on the holiday, and the regiment should be ready for it. We even had our own band by then.

On October 14th the swearing in took place. I brought

out the regiment composed of three battalions, although some companies were not full strength because we could not parade those that were still barefoot. The armed regiment marching to the main square with its band made a tremendous impression. Foreign military agents watched the proceedings. Gen. Dyadyusha introduced me to some, and they would not believe that the regiment was actually only three weeks old. The ceremony lifted us all in spirit, especially the beautiful Divine Service and the sermon of Chief Chaplain, Very Rev. Pavlo Pashchevsky.

And now, although the work in the regiment was organized, the worries of my staff and mine were increasing. In connection with the departure of our Armies and the approach of "White-Guard" Russians, desertions from the regiment were growing. We had reports that the Reds had the better of the Whites in battles, and particularly Budenny's mounted group spread fear among the Whites. Our recruits were doubtlessly influenced by the approach of the march to the front-lines while we had only one exercise with live ammunition, and moreover our troops had no winter clothing. Our soldiers also saw thousands of typhoid patients brought to Kamyanets from the front. The noncoms were in this matter "in cahoots" with the enlisted men, therefore I gave orders that one officer of each company must spend the night with his men in barracks. Obviously, Capt. Drachenko and I informed our superiors about desertions and about the situation every day. We had daily talks with the men informing them about the cause of the struggle and tried to make them conscious patriots. I requested Col. Petriv to make a proposal in the Council of Ministers that desertion be made punishable by death, but he was opposed on the ground that such a law would be undemocratic (Col. Petriv was a member of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries). In violation of service procedure I appealed in this matter

directly to the Commander in Chief, and the law was passed. In the meantime I formed several patrols of non-coms commanded by officers and dispatched them to the villages to catch deserters. But if one day fifty boys were brought in, the same night an equal number escaped in spite of all precautions. By early December parents of recruits came from the countryside and simply took their boys home at night. It was no use even to think about applying the death penalty.

Late in November the situation of our armed forces was precarious. Although the enemy did not attack, heavy winter did, and due to a lack of clothing and medical supplies, we had the catastrophe of the "Quadrangle of Death" in the Lubar-Ostropol region. The two united Armies which prior to the attack on Kiev had about 100,000 men under arms and 300 cannon, were reduced by the end of November to 4,000 men still able to carry arms, but unable to fight. The question arises: what happened to the rest? Uncounted thousands were dying of typhoid fever and thousands froze in the open fields. In every peasant cottage there were between ten and twenty sick soldiers, also on floors of schools, and more than 1,000 in a little hospital for 100—all this without medical aid of any kind. All those unnamed heroes begged their comrades in their feverish ravings to shoot them and not leave them to their cruel fate. There was no water and no one to hand it around. There are no words eloquent enough to describe this suffering, and there is no one brave enough to talk about these sacrifices of our heroic soldiers.

The hapless population, chiefly the peasants in the areas of operation of our troops was also decimated by diseases. They came to the aid of our troops not as soldiers but as human beings and showed them unlimited compassion. When, in the spring of 1920, I was preparing for an offen-

sive which we were undertaking together with the Poles, I was located with my brigade in several villages of Nova-Ushytsya county. There I saw entire villages empty of people, and tragic black boards at the entrance saying: "Caution, typhoid wiped out the village." In one village I found the whole family of my good friend A.M. Hamaliya, an attorney in Lubni, who had been escaping to the west with the Denikin troops. They looked like skeletons and I did not recognize them, but they recognized me, told me who they were and then the brigade physician saved their lives.

I have often heard it said that our soldiers also died of malnutrition. This is true only to the extent that there was no one to take care of food supplies, but food was plentiful, there was enough to eat and all kinds of food products could be gotten from the peasants. This proves that in spite of several years' war in Ukraine, in spite of the revolution, in spite of requisitions by the Bolsheviks, Germans and Denikin, the land was still not poor, and the farmers often would refuse to take debased money, but supply food without charge. Organization of food supplies was particularly efficient in the UHA.

12

The Army in the Winter March

THEN came the epic "Winter March." Early in December I received orders to form a battalion out of the remnants of the regiment and to send it to Yarmolyntsi to defend the Proskuriv-Kamyanets line from Denikin's troops. I appointed Capt. Vinnytsky commander of the battalion. He returned to Kamyanets on December 7th with only a handful of officers because all the soldiers had run away. When I received the order, I had explained the situation among the soldiers to Gen. Dyadyusha and warned that this was a hopeless gesture: the soldiers would desert. And so it happened.

On December 2nd the Commander in Chief called me and said that he was leaving to join the Army in connection with the situation at the front, and, leaving me in Kamyanets he hoped that I would keep up the action of holding up the spirits of the officers and men, and wait for spring which "might bring a completely unexpected change of our position." He told me to keep in close touch with the Minister, the President of Kamyanets University, Professor I. Ohienko whom the Government was appointing its chief delegate, and with General Kolodiy who was military aide to Minister Ohienko. At the time I did not catch the meaning of the Commander's words, but they soon came true.

At a conference of the members of the Government and of Army Commanders in Lubar it was decided that the Commander in Chief with some cabinet members,

primarily with Foreign Minister A.M. Livytsky, would seek sanctuary in Poland, diplomatic relations with Poland having already been established, and the Army or the still battle-able parts of it, would go behind enemy lines, in a raid into Ukraine. The Army started on this march on December 6th and this was the historic "Winter March." General M. Omelanovych-Pavlenko was appointed commander of that army, but the real promoter was Gen. Yu. Tyutyunyk.

During that time the UHA found itself behind the lines of Denikin's Army, and the Commander of the UHA, General M. Tarnavsky concluded a truce with Denikin to save the remnants of his troops. For this, General Tarnavsky was removed from his command and put under court-martial by President E. Petrushevych, but the court-martial exonerated him. The new Commander of the UHA, General O. Mykytka was by then caught in a web of circumstances. The UHA was temporarily concentrated in the region of Koziatyn-Haysyn-Khmelnik, and the UNR Army marched in that direction. After re-organization it counted about 3,000 men, nearly barefoot, badly clothed and without ammunition. But they were proven and chosen Ukrainian patriots. The Prime Minister, I. Mazepa was also with the Army.

It is necessary to digress into the future a little, in order to explain what reports on the "Winter March" reached us in Kamyanets, and what were the results of that march. First of all, the appearance of the army behind Denikin's lines so surprised and frightened General Denikin that he was the one to propose now an understanding and common action against the Bolsheviks. The Reds, too, when they found our Army behind Denikin's lines, proposed a truce and common action against "the imperialist, Denikin." Gen. Omelanovych-Pavlenko, however, refused to talk to either, and the Army first fought the Whites, and

then the Reds. The attitude of the population to the Army was favorable because the people had already experienced the rule of both Russian armies. The people supplied the Army with food and men and helped in reconnaissance work. In connection with movements of the Army, a wave of uprisings broke out locally on both sides of the Dnipro, the Army having also made a raid to the Left Bank.

During the long winter months the Army was on the march and fought a series of battles with both enemies, capturing valuable arms from the Denikin troops. When the Reds approached Odessa, which was the supply base of Denikin, even the delegation of the Allies expressed a readiness to negotiate with the Ukrainians, but the Ukrainians demanded transfer of authority in the regions to them, and immediate removal of Denikin troops from the Odessa region. This was in January 1920. The plan was not carried out in spite of Allied consent because Odessa was occupied by the Reds within a few days. Allied ships evacuated most of Denikin's troops to the Crimea which was fortified and placed under the command of General Wrangel replacing Denikin. There were many Ukrainian soldiers in the Odessa region and they made their way to our Army, strengthening it numerically. The Reds tried to encircle and destroy our Army, but due to able maneuvering and action behind their lines our Army survived. Moreover, detachments of the UHA and individual Galicians joined our troops, so that by April its ranks had grown to 6,000 men, including over 1,000 horses.

Meanwhile the Government and the Commander in Chief had begun negotiations with Poland regarding recognition of the Ukrainian Government and aid in the fight against Moscow. The Polish Chief of State, Jozef Pilsudski was just as much aware as we of the threat to Poland on the part of Red Moscow, and, as we learned later from his memoirs, he was at that time looking for allies. Rus-

sian activities, consisting of massing huge troop concentrations along the Polish border demanded immediate Polish action to avert the danger. A Ukrainian-Polish Agreement and Military Convention was signed on April 22, 1920, under which the Polish Army was to march into Ukraine as soon as possible and help liberate Ukraine.

13

Under Polish Occupation

TO GET back to events in Kamyanets: Polish troops entered Kamyanets on December 8, 1919 and moved east along to Ushytsya river to Proskuriv-Shepetivka-Olevsk. In the south they held a line of defense against Denikin, but when pressed by the Reds, Denikin's troops surrendered to the Poles, the latter contained the Reds from advancing along this line any farther. There was no peace under Polish occupation in the Kamyanets region because lower Polish officials started requisitioning goods from the people who replied with sabotage. Officers of the 1st Recruit Regiment paid me frequent private visits and reported on the behavior of Polish authorities. There was a fairly large Polish population in Kamyanets and my Polish neighbors watched the comings and goings of suspicious-looking visitors to my apartment. One night several men of the Polish military police entered my apartment, searched it, and arrested me. When I was being taken into the police car I heard my Polish neighbors say: "That's he." A captain of the Polish military police interrogated me immediately and when I explained why these people had been coming to see me, he ordered my release.

Without much to do, I renewed close contacts with my high school classmates, Dr. B. Matusov and Engineer* H. Lerner who were staying in Kamyanets. The latter was an official of the Ministry of Jewish Affairs, and he told me an interesting story. It seems that in September

* Engineer—graduate of Technical Institute (College).

a complaint reached the Ministry signed by Jews of Mohyliv county which stated that "Colonel Shandruk oppresses Jews, demands money from them under threat of throwing hand-grenades into their homes, forces Jews to make the sign of the Cross and to eat dirt," etc. A secret investigation of the charges was ordered by Minister P. Krasny and conducted by Lerner and a department chief. The result was both surprising and humorous. When the investigators asked the complainants to describe Shandruk, they said: "he is short and wears a red goatee." Lerner told them in the presence of Minister Krasny that this was some kind of provocation because "Shandruk is tall (over six ft.) and has no beard, only an upward-pointed mustache." Unfortunately, nothing more was done about this matter, although I had a fairly good idea about the identity of the person acting under my name.

Late in January 1920, our Foreign Minister A.M. Livytsky came to Kamyanets from Warsaw where he also headed the Ukrainian delegation negotiating with Poland. He called a meeting of responsible Ukrainians to report on the progress of negotiations. I attended the meeting and heard all the people then present who represented all political parties, speak in favor of our Government's bid for Polish military and political aid, provided that our political position was clearly understood by the Poles.

Several days later General Kolodiy asked me to start work on a list of commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the Kamyanets region. The order was issued by our Minister of War, Col. V. Salsky, then in Warsaw, and approved by the Polish authorities. There were immediate complications, however, arising from a lack of coordination: an identical order was issued to Col. O. Shapoval who was also in Kamyanets appointed to command the 2nd Infantry Brigade which he was to form. I offered my services to Col. Shapoval, promising to join

his brigade with all my former subordinates. According to instructions of the Minister of War the brigade was to consist of three infantry battalions, an artillery division and a cavalry company with the provision that with growing enlistments the brigade would develop into a division, and battalions into regiments. In order to work out the details of this matter, Minister Ohienko, acting on the recommendation of General Kolodiy and Col. Shapoval, sent me to Warsaw. The trip was difficult, but very interesting. It was interesting because I went in uniform, on military travelling orders issued by the commander of the 18th Polish Division; General Krajowski, which was holding the front against the Bolsheviks on the Kamyanets sector. It was a hard trip because the passenger coaches were unheated to Ternopil, and we had January weather. My appearance in Warsaw in uniform created a sensation, and Polish officers asked me on the street of what nationality I was. During my two weeks in Warsaw I reported on the military situation to the Commander in Chief and Minister of War. They gave me money for Col. Shapoval and organizational projects.

There I also learned that after I had left Kamyanets a considerable armed force of partisans began operations against the Bolsheviks around Mohyliv. The partisans had been organized by Col. Udovychenko who had been ill with typhoid in December and taken to Odessa. After recovering he reached Mohyliv on his way west. Col. Salsky had plans to give Col. Udovychenko command of the 2nd Division which would include the remnants of the 1st Recruit Regiment as a nucleus of a fourth infantry brigade (this was an organizational innovation because formerly divisions consisted of three brigades). Col. Salsky told me that he would put me in command of the 4th brigade, but the final decision would be up to Col. Udovychenko.

At this time Col. Salsky also informed me about the course of diplomatic negotiations with the Poles in the matter of a Ukrainian-Polish alliance, and noted that Polish parliamentary and party circles were creating difficulties with recognition of Ukraine and engaging Poland in military aid to Ukraine, but that the final decision was in the hands of Chief of State Jozef Pilsudski whose attitude was favorable. Our military Attache to the Polish high command was Col. B. Homzyn, mentioned before, who informed the Commander in Chief on all military matters.

14

The Ukrainian-Polish Alliance

I RETURNED to Kamyanets hopeful and in good spirits. I was being awaited impatiently because everyone wanted to hear about the chances of resuming war against the Bolsheviks. Col. Udovychenko had already received orders to take command of the 2nd Division, he was in Kamyanets and offered me the post of commander of the 4th infantry brigade. The Division was to be composed of the 4th, 5th and 6th brigade, one artillery brigade and a cavalry regiment with all auxiliary units. We expected to reorganize the whole on this pattern soon. I received Col. Udovychenko's offer with enthusiasm. Col. Shapoval was given a diplomatic appointment.

I had to start assembling personnel again, and new troubles began with uniforms, food, etc. Early in April I moved a nucleus of three battalions to Ivashkivtsi-Borsukivtsi where the brigade was to get recruits from a draft of three age groups in the county of Nova-Ushytsya. The commanders of battalions were: 10th—Capt. Kolyadzh, 11th—Capt. Hrabchenko (my colleague from the 232nd Russian reserve regiment), 12th—Lieut.-Col. Bilan, and Capt. Verekhha in charge of the cavalry company. The artillery unit was part of the artillery brigade, and was only tactically under my command, it was commanded by Lieut.-Col. Loburenko. Awaiting supplements, we held daily exercises with the cadres, but even here we had difficulties with lack of arms, particularly machine-guns for technical and tactical exercises. Negotiations between

Col. Udovychenko and commander of the 18th Polish Division, General Krajowski, had little effect, since the Polish Division was short of arms, and in spite of the fact that Polish Chief of State Pilsudski, as we learned later, had issued appropriate orders, they never reached Gen. Krajowski.

We received information that the offensive of Polish and Ukrainian forces was to begin on April 24th. But actually we had still neither enough men nor sufficient arms. Out of the entire cadre of the Division Col. Udovychenko formed a separate detachment under my command, consisting of 350 infantry men and two cannon. Together with the 35th Polish Brigade under Colonel Lados, this detachment began an offensive in the direction of Ozaryntsi (north of Mohyliv) via Verbovets. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment of Col. M. Frolov was proceeding along the Dnister river. This regiment with its commander had left the volunteer army of Gen. Bredov, and joined us. In one day our detachment reached the Vendychany-Ozaryntsi-Mohyliv line where we stopped for mobilization and organization, and the 18th Polish Division continued east. The brigade, quartered in the Ozaryntsi region, was soon supplemented with men, armed and uniformed, and organized. The people of Mohyliv tendered the Division a grand reception, and present were also the officers of the 18th Polish Division with General Krajowski and Colonel Lados. The latter, during an appropriate moment, danced a beautiful Cossack dance to loud applause of all Ukrainians.

On May 6th, the Army of the UNR, in the glory of its legendary Winter March and brilliant victories, entered the Mohyliv regions from the rear of the Bolsheviks under heavy fighting. In this fighting, the Army completely annihilated the 14th Soviet Army in the Rybnytsya-Rudnytsi regions. Lightly guarded and without much

bother from the enemy, the Army rested in Mohyliv-Yampil regions and reorganized into five infantry and one cavalry divisions and two reserve brigades. At that time our Division got back its old name from the previous year, the 3rd Infantry Iron Division because most of its officers, now headed by General Udovychenko, were the same as in 1919, and the men were from the same localities. My brigade was named No. 7.

About the middle of May I received orders from Gen. Udovychenko to proceed to woods about seven kilometres north of Yampil, and there incorporated in my brigade a Galician detachment of Lieut. Yaremych which managed to join us from behind Bolshevik lines. There were 260 men with machine-guns and equipment. This was another manifestation of the comradeship in arms of the UNR and UHA armies. Galician soldiers were joining us nearly every day, many officers among them. I remember well the fine officer Capt. Dr. Hrynevych who was all bedraggled. To me personally this was new proof of the confidence of the Galicians in me, and Gen. Udovychenko said: "you have always been a patron of the Galicians, and when they learned that you were here, asked to be put in your brigade." I attached this unit to the brigade as the 21st battalion and the rest went into the brigade police company.

Our bivouac in this region lasted until May 27th when the Division received orders to march to the front on the river Markivka line, and the brigade was to hold the Myaskivka-Haryachkivka line. On the day of departure, a delegation of Jews of the city of Ozaryntsi came to me and presented me with a scroll which stated, among others: "We, the Jews of Ozaryntsi, never had it so peaceful since the revolution of 1917, as during the time when the 7th Brigade was stationed in our vicinity."

The position of the brigade was at the most exposed

northern wing of the Army and it maintained liaison with the neighboring Polish units. The whole Army front stretched out for over eighty kilometres. News reached us that the 3rd Polish Army, which included our 6th Infantry Division formed from our men who had been held as prisoners of war by the Poles, had captured Kiev, and that our Commander in Chief had been received by the city of Kiev. At first we did not know why we were not advancing east, but early in June it became known from communiques that the Bolsheviks had massed on the southern front opposite the Poles and us, the mounted Army of Budenny in the region of Lypovets. The Polish command had therefore halted the offensive in order to annihilate Budenny on prepared positions. After several attempts, however, Budenny succeeded in breaking through the Polish front near Samhorodok, and the Poles could not stop him in spite of filling the breach with reserves. A retreat began on the entire front from Kiev to the Dnister, but in spite of the Bolsheviks' huge superiority in numbers, they failed to encircle or destroy any of the Ukrainian or Polish units. The situation became aggravated by the fact of desertions caused by our defeat. True, desertions were not on the mass scale of the previous year because the people had already experienced the Bolshevik "paradise," but nevertheless our ranks thinned. When we entered Galicia in our retreat, large numbers of Galicians went home, too. Another, fairly large part of the 5th Kherson Division crossed the Carpathians into Czechoslovakia.

The brigade experienced heavy fighting against overwhelming enemy forces, particularly against the cavalry near Sydoriv (east of Chortkiv) and along the line of the rivers Seret and Strypa, but we fought back without heavy losses. In the Sydoriv region enemy cavalry succeeded in pushing the 21st battalion out of Vasylkivtsi and it managed to hold on only to the western part of the village. We

had to win the position back at all cost because the flanks of neighboring units were threatened. The 19th reserve battalion had orders to recapture Vasylykivtsi, but unfortunately, the commander of the battalion left the village unescorted and encountered enemy cavalry hiding in a land depression before the village. In flight from the sabers of enemy cavalry the battalion rushed back to the village which was only a short way off, but it lost fifteen men, a great loss at the time when the whole battalion had only sixty men. The loss was a blow on our morale, too. At my request Gen. Udovychenko sent a cavalry company from the 8th brigade and two companies of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment from the division reserve to our aid and our cavalry restored the break. Soon, however, the enemy threw in another huge cavalry group and our Division could not hold out. But finally the Cavalry Division came from our reserve, and together we annihilated the enemy cavalry: the Red Cossack Cavalry Division and the Bashkir Cavalry Brigade. This example shows that the enemy was not superior to us. Our Division fought on this front for nearly two weeks, and orders to withdraw to the river Strypa line came only in connection with the situation on the Polish front.

On the last day before withdrawal to the Strypa line the brigade received reinforcements: a full battalion of 250 men of former POWs in Poland trained in a Polish camp under Capt. Trutenko. I left this battalion intact as the 21st battalion, dividing the 21st battalion among the 20th and 19th. Our withdrawal was very slow and during the night our brigade occupied for defense several villages on the east bank of the Strypa, Capt. Trutenko's battalion taking the whole east end of the large village of Trybukhivtsi. Being completely exhausted, I did not personally supervise placing of patrols, expecting that Capt. Trutenko, an experienced World War I officer, would take

care of guarding us for the night. I felt uneasy, however, and my uneasiness was justified: the Bolsheviks attacked Trybukhivtsi during the night and panic ensued. Order was restored, however, when I came to the threatened place with my own men. The battalion held on only to the northern end of the village until morning, and then we crossed to the west bank of the river Strypa. After this event I replaced Capt. Trutenko with Lieut.-Col. Bazylevsky.

To the north, defended by the 1st Zaporozhian Division, enemy cavalry broke through to its rear and threatened our entire front, but there again, the Cavalry Division frustrated the enemy's attempts and inflicted heavy losses on him. Meanwhile the 6th Polish Army which was in operational contact with our Army, withdrew toward Lviv leaving our entire northern wing exposed and this compelled our Command to begin a withdrawal across the Dnister. The withdrawal was completed around August 18th and 19th after heavy fighting. The brigade, which had been covering the Division in its withdrawal, was ordered to the region of Vynohrad-Yaseniv for a rest, and then it was placed on a sector of the front along the Dnister, with the bridge at Nyzhniv as the center of defense. We had only daily exchange of shots with the enemy, but passive defense was not in the plans of Gen. Udovychenko, and during that period of seven to eight days while we were stationed along the Dnister, we made several night sorties across the river and finally secured the opposite bridgehead and our 3rd Cavalry Regiment made a raid as far as Monasteryska.

Under pressure of circumstance and on demand of our prominent high officers the matter of ranks and promotions was finally taken care of at that time. A special commission was appointed under Gen. M. Yanchevsky which compiled a register of the entire officer corps of the Army for the

purpose of determining ranks, and drafted regulations for promotions. I was confirmed in the rank of Captain with full seniority with simultaneous promotion to Colonel for meritorious battle service.

The news reached us only late in August that the Poles had thoroughly beaten the Reds near Warsaw, striking from the river Wieprz against the southern wing of the Bolshevik front which reached from Deblin all the way to Torun. Our Army began preparing for attack and the 3rd Division was moved to the south to Horodenka, where it was to force the Dnister and proceed eastward to capture the line of Skala-Husiatyn. During the course of several nights and under cover of woods our 3rd Battalion of Engineers built planks and pontoons, and in the night of September 15th the 8th Brigade forced the Dnister on pontoons and the 3rd Cavalry Regiment swimming. Enemy sentries were all taken prisoner and the Reds began to retreat in panic. Within four days the Division traversed over 120 kilometers with light skirmishes and crossed the Zbruch again on September 21st. On our own free soil all soldiers not on duty assembled on a hill near Orynin attending Divine Service of thanksgiving for the happy return to the Homeland.

The brigade was in poor condition. In spite of successful attempts to destroy the enemy with the least possible losses to ourselves, our losses accumulated. Some battalions had no more than fifty to sixty men, the 12th had over 100, and the cavalry company had thirty horse. We were hoping that the enemy would not be able to prevent our mobilization of new recruits in the area, and that the Poles would have better opportunities for supplying us with arms. The enemy was retreating in panic and our Command took full advantage of the situation. Although the Bolsheviks threw in fresh troops soon, we realized that regardless of our exhaustion we had to advance as fast as



General Shandruk in 1920 at Kamyanets-Podolsky.



General V. P. Salsky, Minister of War, UNR.



Eugene Petrushevych, President ZUNR.



General M. Tarnavsky, Commander-in-Chief UHA.

possible, taking advantage of our good morale. We had the same thing all over again: battles and forced marches, and organization work.

Unexpectedly, however, reports came in that the Poles accepted the Bolsheviks' offer of a cease-fire, and that they were ready to negotiate peace. General Udovychenko was pressing the attack, to gain as much depth in territory as possible for a "breather" and finally the Division pulled far ahead of the right wing of the front, reaching the river Markivka. Our Division and the newly created First Machine-gun Division constituted the Right Army Group of General Udovychenko.

On October 18th came the end of our fighting job on the front along the river Markivka. We had to stop the fight for the liberation of our Homeland because the Poles had signed an armistice which included the entire front of our Army. The Poles had sent their detachments to the line of our front in order to mark that all this was the Polish front. It was quite clear to me that our struggle against the Bolsheviks, considering Red Moscow's potential, had entered into a new stage of crisis. I kept all the ill omens of our situation to myself in order to lift the morale of my troops in expectation of an early renewal of operations because the armistice was valid only until November 10th. The Bolsheviks, I felt, would not keep any promises made to us. The Poles were unable to satisfy our needs for materiel and supplies. We were particularly short of ammunition for the infantry. Our Command had hopes to recover arms and ammunition from the Rumanians which they had taken from the Zaporozhian Corps during the latter's crossing of Rumania in 1919. Negotiations with the Rumanians ended in their consent to return this property of ours in exchange for sugar which we had available from the Vendychany refinery situated in the region of the 3rd Division. This fact of the Rumanians' trading our

own property should be well remembered. At the time, however, this was the only way we could supplement our stock of arms of which we were in dire need since we had several thousand draftees in our mobilization centers. With these arms, and with all the work of our armorers who cleaned and reconditioned arms and ammunition taken from the population, we had only forty to fifty rounds per man and four to six tapes per machine-gun. Rifles were in such worn condition that at a distance of 100 paces the target would be missed by several feet which I observed personally. Regarding clothing, we were somewhat better off than in 1919.

I went to Kamyanets on November 4th to take care of several matters during a week's furlough, but early in the morning of the 12th H. Roytberg (mentioned before) came running to my house in Kamyanets with the news that he barely escaped from encirclement by a Bolshevik brigade. I left for the front right away, but I could only reach Nova Ushytsya, the front being on the river Kalus line. Gen. Udovychenko was extremely busy with the new situation, but he took time to tell me briefly that early in the morning of November 10th the Bolsheviks attacked in great force of cavalry and infantry our 9th Brigade in the region of Sharhorod, made a deep breakthrough and almost annihilated our Division. My brigade suffered particularly heavy losses being attacked by Red Cavalry on the defense line near Chernivtsi, and the General sent the 8th Brigade to help. All ammunition was spent soon and the brigades held the line with bayonets. The enemy could not take Chernivtsi and went around them. In the night the decimated brigades withdrew to Luchynets-Yaryshiv. Some ammunition was supplied by our Army Quartermaster, but the enemy could not be stopped. The Army Staff dispatched the Cavalry Division against the attacking enemy groups, but it suffered heavy losses and

could not contain the enemy. With ever fresh forces brought in by the Bolsheviks into battle, we could not regroup the Army and hold the enemy. The Army was in full retreat, but the retreat was orderly so as to prevent encirclement and annihilation. The group withdrew to the Zbruch on the Volochyska-Ozhyhivtsi line and was to cross into Poland on terms agreed upon in advance. For the first time in our fight for independence we had horrible losses and nebulous prospects for the future. In talks with my commanders of battalions and from reports of commanders of other divisions I could piece together the whole situation and our operational mistakes which could have been the cause of all that happened. First of all, my conjecture was quite correct that we should not have waited with launching our offensive until the very last minute of the expiring armistice, all the more so since Polish token forces had been withdrawn on November 3rd. In any event, we would have had the initiative, although, naturally enough, one could predict the outcome of such an offensive. The Army Command did not consent to the proposal made by the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, M. Frolov, to create a mobile attack group out of all cavalry units and make a deep raid behind enemy lines in October, at a time when the Bolsheviks were concentrating their forces on our front. This would also have been an action of operational intelligence which was not undertaken, we did not even engage in deeper tactical intelligence. As we learned from intelligence reports of the Army Staff, all intelligence was gathered by agents, a system which is always unreliable. The time of year was against us, but it was just as much against the enemy. In men and materiel, however, the enemy was undoubtedly superior to us.*

* "Ukrains'ko-Moskovs'ka Viyna v dokumentakh" (The Ukrainian-Muscovite War in Documents), by General V. Salsky and General P. Shandruk. Published by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, 1935.

Thoughts were discussed that the Army might go on another winter march, but it was quite clear that neither the relation of forces nor operational conditions would be in favor of such action, the Bolsheviks being no longer busy on other fronts, as was the case in 1919.

According to data of the Army Staff, as of November 10th the Army held a front from the Dnister near Yampil through Bar to Lityn, i.e. over 120 kilometres. Our numbers were: about 14,000 infantry, about 3,000 cavalry, eighty cannon and a few armored cars. Facing us, the Reds concentrated about 25,000 infantry (the 12th and 14th Army) and about 5,000 cavalry with incomparably stronger artillery and with full technical and materiel supplies.* Hence, with our experience in waging war against the Bolsheviks and with our determination we could count on some initial success which could have developed into something bigger in connection with the low morale of the Red troops following the defeat at Warsaw. This, however, is merely conjecture, albeit based on logical analysis.

For 11 days in heavy and unequal battles, the Army was withdrawing westward, under cover of thinning cavalry ranks and machine-guns mounted on carts. Our retreat was also covered by the so-called 3rd Russian Army of General Peremikin, formed in Poland under the auspices of the Russian Political Liberation Committee headed by the well-known Russian political leader Boris Savinkov who recognized Ukrainian independence. The forces of that army were too weak, however, to stop the advance of the Reds. Accompanying Gen. Udovychenko, I just managed to get across a bridge at Volochyska on November 21st at night under enemy machine-gun fire. The Bolsheviks did not gain much booty from us because everything that

* E. Melikov and M. Kakurin, "Voyna belopolakami" (The War against the White Poles), Moscow, 1928.

could be moved (trains, horses, artillery) was moved by us to Polish territory.

The war was over, and in spite of wholly unjustified official optimism, I did not see any prospects of a change in the political and military situation in our favor, I did not see any possibility of a new rise to arms.

15

In Camps for Internees in Poland

AFTER DISARMING, we were directed to various camps, built by the Germans for prisoners of war during World War I. The entire 3rd Division travelled several days in unheated freight cars and arrived in Kalisz (Camp No. 10). The first inspection of the camp left us with the impression that after we would get our quarters in order we would manage somehow—we had managed to survive four years of war under conditions that cannot be described. At first I was appointed camp commandant, but several weeks later the 2nd Volhynian Division arrived in camp and a group Commandant was appointed for both Divisions. After a short rest and primitive organization of the lives of about 5,000 people, we were faced with the problem of occupying such a large mass of men massed together, since it is a known fact that even the most disciplined crowd kept idle is apt to produce spiritual and even physical conflicts. The situation was made more difficult because food was pretty poor, the Polish supply command allotting us about 1,400 to 1,500 calories. Clothing worn by our people was simply in catastrophic condition, even some officers could not get up from their beds of boards for days, having nothing to put on. We started to look for a solution because in addition to going hungry ourselves, lice were eating us. Intervention by our diplomatic representatives with the Polish authorities in Warsaw and appeals to welfare organizations like the Y.M.C.A. and B.R.M.* produced some results: the Y.M.C.A. gave us a

* British Relief Mission.

certain amount of underwear, linen, clothing, shoes and evaporated milk for children (at least 2,000 women and children had been evacuated together with the Army, and soon more children were born in camps). The Poles gradually increased quantity and quality of food and assigned some money for needed medical supplies. But in order to stop feeding idlers, the Poles offered group work, e.g. in sawmills, on large estates, in sugar refineries, etc. Many soldiers took advantage of the offer and thus, the 3rd Cavalry Regiment went to work in the sawmill in Suwalki, and the 20th Battalion to the Bialowiezka Puszcza hunting preserve. We also established various trade schools and shops: carpentry, tailoring, shoemaking. An old officer, Col. Melnykiv was in charge of these in our camp. The Y.M.C.A. organized an embroidery enterprise for the women which provided a modest income for beautiful work. Modest indeed, for example: an artistically embroidered tablecloth with 12 napkins, over which a woman had to work four to five weeks, including long nights with candle-light, fetched only five to six dollars in equivalent Polish currency. In addition, painters' studios were organized and our painters sold pretty paintings which sometimes found buyers out of charitable motive. Selling paintings all over the country created a numerous class of "travelling salesmen" who improved their own and their suppliers' standard of living. This was the material side of the case.

The spiritual side was very well and constructively organized. First of all, each camp built its own church in the barracks from the internees' own funds. In our camp the first chaplain was the Chaplain of the 7th Brigade Rev. P. Pyatachenko, then Chief Army Chaplain Very Rev. P. Pashchevsky, well-known for his patriotic sermons. Later schools of general education were established (grade, supplemental, courses, etc.), and even a high school in which

I taught history, geography and French. This work was conducted by cultural-educational department of divisions under the general chairmanship of our esteemed professor, the Hon. V.K. Prokopovych, former Ukrainian Minister of Education. Lieut.-Col. M. Derkach was in charge of the cultural-educational department in our camp and contributed much time and effort to this work.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks took advantage of the still confused conditions in the young Polish Republic, and in spite of the peace treaty signed in Riga, they organized armed bands which attacked villages across the Polish border, burning and devastating entire settlements. The raids sometimes penetrated to a depth of fifteen kilometres into Poland. General Yu. Tyutyunyk, the well known organizer of uprisings against the Bolsheviks in Ukraine wanted to make the best of this confusion along the border, and got the consent of our Commander in Chief to organize a raid into Ukraine. He assembled a large detachment of volunteers who were willing to organize a rebellion in Ukraine, and he kept these activities secret from the Polish authorities. Preparations were under way in March 1921, but due to the necessity to keep them secret and technical obstacles, the raid was delayed. The rebel group which called itself "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) was able to start from the forests of Podilla and Polissya only late in October, when weather conditions were absolutely unsuitable for such operations. The most important problem was arms and transportation because Gen. Tyutyunyk's plans quite justly called for speedy movement deep into Ukraine, in order to surprise the enemy and prevent possible encirclement. The only chance to capture arms was to stage a surprise attack on one of the border garrisons. The group, divided into two detachments, crossed the border early in November, destroyed Bolshevik defense posts on the border, and captured some arms and

horses. Moving quickly, the main force under Gen. Tyutyunyk's personal command reached the city of Korosten (over 100 kilometres east of the border) within two days. In a surprise attack on the enemy garrison, and after heavy battle, they took the city of Korosten and made it a base for further operations. Gen Tyutyunyk intended to attack Kiev from there, and then turn south in order to join other insurgent groups which were still active in the southern part of Kiev province. If this action had been started at a different time of year, rebellion would probably have spread all over Ukraine where life under the Bolsheviks was very hard, the conquerors repressing all passive resistance and active rebellion of the Ukrainian people. The Bolsheviks, however, took a successful gamble: they threw the cavalry Division of Kotovsky into the fight to encircle Gen. Tyutyunyk, part of the Ukrainian force which was already near Kiev, had to withdraw to the west under heavy snow and cold weather. Enemy cavalry encircled the group completely near the village of Mynky. A part fought its way out, but 359 soldiers were taken prisoner. When our soldiers rejected the Reds' offer to serve in the Red Army, they were tried by court-martial and sentenced to death by firing squad. They went to their death in the city of Novy Bazar singing the Ukrainian National Anthem. Another group, under Col. S. Paliy Sydoryansky which was under enemy attack from the very moment that it crossed the border, luckily fought its way back into Poland. They were interned by the Polish authorities along with the remaining men of Gen. Tyutyunyk's group.

We had a diplomatic mission in Czechoslovakia since 1919, and at its request the Government consented to admit a large number of our scholars and to establish many scientific and educational institutions, as the Pedagogical Institute, Husbandry Academy, Free University, high

school and different courses. There the Ukrainian Civic Committee was headed by the well-known pre-war Ukrainian leader M. Shapoval, a man full of energy, but politically one-sided as a former member of the party of socialists-revolutionaries, and this had a certain effect on his selection of pedagogues and school personnel. Later, M. Shapoval's party fervor became less acute. When news about educational opportunities in Czechoslovakia reached our soldiers, they began to seek opportunities to get there. My soldiers came to me for advice, and I openly advised them to go to Czechoslovakia instead of sitting around in camp wasting time in expectation of a change of the political situation, an expectation I thought entirely unwarranted. The Ukrainian Civic Committee offered advice how to cross the Polish-Czechoslovakian border illegally. The border was crossed in the Carpathian mountains with receiving points set up on the other side. Both governments, the Polish and Czechoslovakian, probably knew about this and kept one eye shut because there was not a single instance of anyone being caught on the border. Thus, first the young people went in large masses to Czechoslovakia, followed by their elders, but by then we had gained the right to travel on passports. One of those who went to Czechoslovakia and graduated from the Husbandry Academy in Podebrady was my former chief of staff, Lieut.-Col. D. Linytsky. My attitude in the matter of the soldiers' departure to study in Czechoslovakia created some unpleasantness for me because our "camp command" wanted to have "an army"—since without an army their ranks were becoming meaningless. For this reason the commanders thought that I was doing "subversive work" and wanted to compromise me. I also wished to go abroad, even to walk west, but during an audience with the Commander in Chief on the occasion of my promotion to General (early in 1925), he prohibited me from leaving

Poland by reason of future possibilities. Hence, with the departure of men for studies and for jobs, life in the camps began more tolerable for the rest, with better food and more clothing available.

Concerning our organized activities it should be noted that on the initiative of General Salsky, the Ukrainian Military Society (UWET) was established, subsequently changed into the Association of former Soldiers of the UNR Army; it existed until the outbreak of World War II, when it was liquidated by the Germans.

At that time I became interested in military literature, and this was the beginning of my modest contributions to Polish military magazines "Bellona," "Przegląd Wojskowy," and "Polska Zbrojna," and to the French magazine "Revue des Deux Mondes." At the same time I conceived the idea of publishing a Ukrainian military-historical magazine in order to preserve our historical and military material and to shed at least some light on the epic of our armed effort. I talked the matter over with Gen. Kushch and Professor Prokopovych and they supported my project. Gen. Kushch became chief editor, and I was secretary. The name of the journal was "Tabor" (Camp), and it was our military-historical journal, and later military-scientific. This publication also existed until World War II. I contributed several dozen articles to it, including a tactical assignment within the framework from a platoon to an infantry regiment. A Course for Staff Officers was founded in our camp on orders of Gen. Salsky, and I taught applied tactics and topography, and also took part in tactical games. The Courses were headed by Staff General, Lt.-Gen. S. Dyadyusha. From among my students I remember Captains V. Shevchenko, A. Shevchenko and P. Orel-Orlenko, I had a very interesting encounter with the last-named later.

When the housing shortage tapered off I proposed that we establish an officers club. It was decorated in Ukrainian

style by our best painters: V. Dyadynyuk, M. Zhukiv and Ya. Shcherbak. Various military adages and sayings of famous military leaders were inscribed on the walls, with a portrait of S. Petlura on the main wall. Under it was the renowned call of Garibaldi to his soldiers.

On their part, the Bolsheviks did not leave us in peace, either. In 1922 a Soviet mission visited the camp several times to talk our soldiers into returning home. Pursuant to the Polish-Soviet agreement it had the right to appeal to the soldiers directly. In our camp all the residents were assembled in the square and in reply to the delegates' call for return to the homeland, there was deep silence, not one came forward and this probably happened in all camps, of which there were seven. The Bolsheviks did not address our soldiers any more. They resorted to a different method: they tempted people individually. We learned later that one of such traitors was no less a person than deputy chief of staff of our Division, Captain Makarenko: he left for Warsaw one day without warning and even took with him part of the staff documents. He began writing letters to officers trying to convince them to go home. There was another case in my Brigade: Lt.-Col. Nechytailo went to take a job in the Carpathians in 1922, but several weeks later he came to me with a letter from his wife and from Otaman I. Kobza. The latter had been temporary commander of the Slobidsky Corps in 1919 and a friend of Nechytailo, as both had been members of the Democratic Peasants Party. The letters urged him to return home immediately because he was assured of a pardon, and his wife with three children certainly needed his help. Lt.-Col. Nechytailo asked me for advice. I told him to weigh the matter very carefully before making his final decision, cautioning him that the Bolsheviks never kept their word, and emphasizing that the report of Mr. Kobza about new favorable conditions under the Bolsheviks in

Ukraine sounded rather strange. Nevertheless, he decided to go. Subsequently we had news that he never even reached his home, but was sent to the concentration camp in Kolyma together with Kobza. The General Yu. Tyutyunyk, mentioned before, the well-known commander of the 4th Kiev Division and leader of a partisan detachment 6,000 strong, who had joined our Army in August 1919 and gained a great reputation in Ukraine, also went home on an individual pardon. At first he was manager of a tannery in the Volga region, but later he was reported to have been executed.

It can be stated generally that during the period to 1926, all our interned soldiers in Poland proved themselves to be of the best caliber in every respect. They kept their patriotic spirit, high morale, and military discipline, based, under existing circumstances, mainly on mutual confidence and respect.

The year 1926 was a turning point in the position of Ukrainian emigres. Marshal Pilsudski came to power in Poland in May. After a few months we felt a changed attitude toward us on the part of official Polish circles. Before that, Chief of the Polish General Staff, General S. Szeptycki told our General V. Salsky: "Get out of Poland, you loafers!" Late in 1926, General V. Salsky presented Marshal Pilsudski with a memorandum in the name of the UNR Government on the necessity: (1) to make military preparations for the future, (2) on the care of our disabled men and old officers, (3) on formal approval of a Ukrainian civic committee to have the right to act throughout Poland and take care of our emigres, and (4) on transfer to our management of the camp at Kalisz, to serve as a home for our sick and older soldiers. All these matters were gradually approved by the Polish authorities. First of all, formal sanction was granted to the Ukrainian Central Committee (U.Ts.K.) with branches in all localities with

a concentration of our emigres. Ukrainian emigres were given legal status and the right to use so-called Nansen passports. The Kalisz camp was transferred to our independent administration and renamed "Ukrainian Station;" other camps were abolished and all emigres unable to work found refuge in it. The U.Ts.K. appointed a Board to manage the Station, consisting of: Gen. Salsky, chairman, Gen. Kushch, his deputy, myself, as chief of housing and administration and Gen. H. Bazylsky, as chief of supply. Within one year we rebuilt nearly all the barracks into separate homes, and modestly furnished. Separate homes were for the men with families, and some dormitories were set up for single men. Gen. Bazylsky was in charge of food, with a special commission elected every six months taking care of the kitchens. At that time I proposed that we conduct courses for chauffeurs at the Station, the proposition was accepted by the U.Ts.K. and funds assigned for the purchase of two used cars and a repair shop. I gave instruction in driving and mechanical repairs. Within two years we schooled fifty-seven chauffeurs and they got their licenses from the Examining Board in Lodz. The U.Ts.K. also received formal license for the Station High School which existed until the outbreak of World War II and had over 250 graduates.

Early in 1928 more requests presented by us were granted by Marshal Pilsudski. Our disabled men were placed on a nearly equal footing with Polish invalids, and after going through examination by a qualifying commission, they were granted modest pensions.

16

Staff of the Ministry of Military Affairs

OUR GREATEST achievement was the establishment, in March 1927, of a completely secret Staff of the Ministry of Military Affairs. The Staff was composed of three sections: (1) Organizational Section; (2) Intelligence; (3) Propaganda. General V. Kushch was appointed Chief of Staff, and I was put in charge of Section one. Gen. V. Zmienko was chief of the 2nd Section and Professor L. Chykalenko of the 3rd. All sections were located in apartments in Warsaw, absolutely unknown to the police, and part of the 2nd Section was somewhere in the eastern border zone. The task of the 1st Section was to prepare the soldiers living in dispersed places to mobilize in one place in the event of a change in the political situation, and to inform them about military affairs and our future needs and possibilities. For this purpose, we had to establish contact not only with groups of soldiers now in civilian status, but even with individual men. We had to prepare mobilization data (mobilization plan and register) considering our position of emigres, organizational data (ranks of individuals, qualifications for jobs), estimate of indispensable arms, technical and material equipment, training material, logistics, etc. For greater secrecy the 1st Section was ostensibly engaged in collection of historical material and its publication, and the tribunes for this were the magazine "Tabor" and a weekly "Tryzub" (Trident)

published in Paris under the editorship of Professor Prokopovych.

On May 25, 1926 on a street in the Montmartre section of Paris, the Bolshevik agent Schwartzbart killed the defenseless Simon Petlura with seven bullets. This coincided with the moment of Marshal Pilsudski's accession to power in Poland. From this it is clear that the Bolsheviks had been keeping an eye on Petlura all the time, but he would not hide, in spite of warnings of our Government and of all our older officers. From the comparison of these events one can reach the conclusion that Petlura was a very dangerous enemy of Bolshevism, primarily because he was the symbol of the nation's political aspirations, and the most popular figure in Ukraine. The Bolsheviks obviously hoped that with Petlura's death there would be a complete breakdown among Ukrainian emigres and of national-political aspirations in Ukraine. They were wrong to the extent that they had to resort to action of physical extermination of the resisting population of Ukraine, by means of the artificial famine of 1932-33. They were wrong again because after Petlura's death, a wide network of conspiracy was established in Ukraine under the name "Soyuz Vyzvolennya Ukrainy" (Association for Liberation of Ukraine), composed of the most select group of idealistic Ukrainian intellectuals under the leadership of Academician professor Serhiy Yefremov. Among emigres, political leadership passed according to the Constitution to one of our most eminent political leaders, the late Prime Minister A.M. Livytsky, no less active in continuing efforts in behalf of Ukraine. All Ukrainian emigres rallied around him in the tragic moment, and he was also the representative of the Association for Liberation of Ukraine in the West.

Schwartzbart was tried in Paris in 1927, free on bail furnished by the Bolsheviks. Nearly all our political leaders,

under A.M. Livytsky, went from Poland and Czechoslovakia to attend the trial. The French court freed Schwartzbart, and we should remember this.

The leading spirit and direct leader of our political activities in the world, and particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia was our new President, A.M. Livytsky, a man of high personal culture, boundless energy, huge erudition and initiative, a man who knew how to appraise current political conditions, foresee them, and properly utilize them. A.M. Livytsky activated the UNR Government, bringing into it, in addition to the eminent Minister of Foreign Affairs, professor A. Choulguine, professor R.S. Smal-Stocki as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in direct charge of all diplomatic activities of the Government in Warsaw, the late professor O. Lototsky, the late professor A. Yakovliv, and others. Thanks to President Livytsky, the B.U.D. (Brotherhood of Ukrainian Statehood) broadened its activities, working as the representation of the Association for Liberation of Ukraine in the West.* I had the honor of being made a member of B.U.D. by the unanimous decision of the members. The B.U.D. functioned as the supreme decisive factor of Ukrainian internal and external emigre politics until the outbreak of World War II, when it was liquidated by the Gestapo.

In August 1927, the Staff of the Ministry of Military Affairs was reorganized. I was made nominal chief of Staff, retaining my position of chief of the 1st Section. Gen. Kushch devoted all his time to the magazine "Tabor," which became a monthly. The 1st Section consisted of several subsections, I headed the subsection of mobilization and organization, Col. A. Kmeta was in charge of training and liaison with "school groups" which were actually mobilization centers; Lt.-Col. O. Vyhovsky kept statistics and personnel files of our officer corps; Major I. Zvarychuk

* B.U.D.—had been organized in 1919-1920 in Kiev.

was secretary of the Section and my assistant. I was in charge of the Section until 1936.

In 1928, we started assigning our officers to foreign armies as contract officers for the purpose of preparing them for senior commanders. Officers were selected during conferences presided over by President A.M. Livytsky and participated in by Generals V. Salsky, V. Kushch, M. Bezruchko, V. Zmienko and myself. We selected people having the best qualifications and relatively young. By 1936 we had assigned fifty-seven officers to the Polish Army in rank from lieutenant to lieutenant-colonel, two officers to the French Army, and one each to the Finnish and Turkish Army. In addition, several officers obtained permission from the Minister of Military Affairs to enroll in private courses for staff officers conducted by General Golovin in Paris. For purposes of secrecy several officers were given aliases. The work and service of those officers was under direct supervision of Gen. Salsky, and all correspondence was handled by the 1st Section. It gives me real satisfaction to state here that the selection of officers was excellent, and, with the exception of two instances, the attitude of the respective foreign commands and their officer-colleagues was the most courteous, particularly in Poland. According to Polish Army regulations, annual reports were issued on officers up for promotion, and those on our officers were so impartial and favorable that I, knowing these men personally, could not have issued any better. Then we also succeeded in getting some of our officers through the Polish High Command and General Staff College, and one of them, Colonel P. Samutyn finished it with exceptionally high grades. On my request, Col. Samutyn was assigned to my Section for three months to help in current work and apply his newly gained knowledge to our Section. Our graduates of the Staff College were assigned to the General Staff. The work of my section, in

addition to current matters and handling correspondence on behalf of the Minister of Military Affairs, produced under my direction some results but unfortunately merely of a theoretical nature. Thus, we made a complete reregistration, including all personal and service data, of about 4,000 officers and about 900 non-commissioned officers. We worked out a mobilization plan with mobilization centers and time schedules for assembling our men and gradual retraining. All programs of training were worked out, based on our experience and Polish, French and German manuals, with our own traditional forms of arms and tactical training intact. I personally worked out a manual-of-arms for the infantry and rules for garrison troops, excising from them old and obsolete forms which we had copied from Russian manuals. Drafts of these manuals were sent to all our centers and to experienced officers for their comments, and all their remarks, with the exception of one officer's who had submitted his highly personalized views, were incorporated in the final text. Later I started on a field-service-manual, but this was never finished. The biggest job was classification of all units, (O.D.B.) from a platoon to an infantry division, with all its component parts, artillery, cavalry, armored units, engineers' detachments, liaison, intelligence, and logistics. We calculated all the necessary funds for arms, uniforms, food, and transportation, and figured norms of pay. The complete draft of this classification was about 350 pages long. As far as I can recall, we also planned formation of light, mobile divisions and our plan called for about 400 officers in each division while Soviet and Polish divisions at the time had each over 600 officers.

No lesser work of organization was performed with the so-called "school groups," i.e. concentrations of our former soldiers. I have already noted that through this organization we were able to keep in touch with nearly all soldiers and as

far as possible we encouraged them to study military literature. Although the Staff had very modest financial means, we equipped each group with a fair-sized military library, chiefly in Polish and Russian, and we kept replenishing these libraries. The total number of our "school groups" in Poland was above seventy, with several more in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, France, and Belgium. Some groups held periodic meetings encouraged by the Staff, and they discussed what they had been reading. Other groups were less active, this depended mainly on the commanding officers in charge. I visited groups that displayed only paper activities and removed commanders of such groups. A tactical assignment published in "Tabor" evoked a lot of interest, but some officers solved the problem in favor of the "Blue" side without waiting for new developments to be published which would influence the situation.

I succeeded in assembling a large military library for our Staff, and as of the time of my departure from the Staff, it had over 400 volumes by such authors as F. Foch, A. Diaz, M. Kukiel, Fuller, Svechin, Kakurin, Sikorski, Stachiewicz and others, and of course, von Clausewitz. All historical-operational and tactical studies published in Polish were supplied to us by the Historical Bureau free of charge.

As I had noted, our daily work was covered under activities of historical research of our recent past. This was done in the Polish Bureau of Military History, whose chief was General J. Stachiewicz, a man highly esteemed by Polish military circles, and who was a very hard worker in spite of his advanced stage of tuberculosis. He was a real gentleman, highly cultured and of profound military erudition and a retentive memory. A former member of Pilsudski's Legion, General Stachiewicz was completely at home with the Ukrainian problem and I never found it difficult to enlist his support of our work. Our rela-

tions were such that shortly before his death he presented me with his portrait, inscribed "To my dear General Shandruk." Staff-Colonel E. Perkowicz was Gen. Stachiewicz's aide. Born in Bila Tserkva in Ukraine near Kiev, he was a true friend of mine and a defender of the Ukrainian cause. He spoke Ukrainian beautifully and had such a command of Ukrainian literature that he could recite from memory Shevchenko's *Haydamaky*, *Kavkaz*, *Zapovit*, and other poems. Due to Gen. Stachiewicz's poor health, Col. Perkowicz discussed many problems with me, and things were all the more easy since he was an experienced field and staff officer. Col. Perkowicz was a man of very strong character and unshaken faith in Ukrainian independence, he preached Ukrainian-Polish friendship and the necessity of an alliance between the two in defense against Moscow. At that time I was preparing for publication my book "The Ukrainian-Muscovite War Documents" edited and published by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, and Col. Perkowicz wrote a special study on the basis of this book. New circumstances existing in 1938, did not permit publication of his work. Subsequently Gen. Stachiewicz's place as chief of the Bureau was taken by Staff-Colonel T. Rakowski, also a fine gentleman and a soldier of great merit. We also had many dealings with the Nationality Division of the Polish General Staff, under direct command of a great gentleman Staff-Colonel T. Pelczynski (later General, Chief of Staff of General T. Bor-Komorowski, Commander of the Polish Home Army/*Armja Krajowa* or AK/during the late stages of World War II). Lt-Col. Charaszkievicz was division chief, and in direct charge of our affairs was Capt. W. Guttrie. We also had dealings with Minister Col. T. Schaetzel, and our Government with the well-known Polish leader T. Holowko. I mention these people because

they had faith in the Ukrainian cause as compatible with Poland's essential interests and did not falter from the straight path of aiding us in our efforts.

Along the line of civilian contacts which I knew well from reports read at meetings of the Board of B.U.D., we also had real friends in the persons of Senator S. Siedlecki, Senator Colonel Adam I. Koc, former Minister L. Wasilewski, director of the Eastern Institute S. Paprocki, and others. Among the younger Polish generation were such adherents of aid to Ukraine in her liberation struggle as the distinguished newspapermen W. Baczkowski and J. Gedroyc. I had ample opportunity to speak with those leaders and I always found them to be uncompromising in their understanding of our cause. Naturally, we also had not so much enemies among the Poles, as people who simply ignored us or considered us merely as "Ruthenians" i.e. as people without a legitimate claim to nationhood. I mention them and their attitude because during the course of my duties I was able to observe them at close range.

At that time the "Prometheus" organization came into existence, uniting official and community representatives of all emigre groups of nations formerly under Russia which proclaimed their independence in 1917-1918, but were again under the occupation of Moscow. Professor R. Smal-Stocki was permanent chairman of "Prometheus" and he made me a member of its Ukrainian division. Under the excellent leadership of Prof. Smal-Stocki "Prometheus" united within its ranks so many active leaders of Moscow-enslaved nations that Moscow made numerous demands of its liquidation upon the governments of Poland and France, where it was most active. In addition to uniting emigre representatives of about twenty-three nations, "Prometheus" found a way to maintain liaison with underground organizations in their respective homelands. The permanent secretary of "Prometheus" was the very active leader from North-Caucasus, Eng. Mr. Baló Bilatti. After

the occupation of Poland, the Germans dispersed "Prometheus" and did the same later in France, but nevertheless it still maintains a representation in the West.

The Polish Bureau of Military History began publication of the Polish Military Encyclopedia in 1934. Its editor was the well-known Polish historian Major Otton Laskowski, and he offered that I take part in composing Ukrainian parts of the Encyclopedia, which I readily accepted. I worked on about eighty articles, of which I mention the most important: Khmelnytsky, Doroshenko, the Battle of Poltava, Cossacks, Konotop, Kuban, Sahaydachny, the Armies of the UNR and UHA, the Chortkiv Offensive, Nyzhniv, Mohyliv Pod., S. Petlura, A. Livytsky, V. Salsky, M. Bezruchko, Yu. Tyutyunyk, etc. All my articles were published in the Encyclopedia without change of my interpretation of facts. The work also served as a cover for my other work.

17

Invitation to the Homeland

IN MARCH 1933 I received a letter without a return address, in handwriting unfamiliar to me, and addressed to the Polish Bureau of Military History. I was very surprised because nobody was suppose to know that I was working there, and those that knew did not have to write since they could speak to me any day. I opened the letter in the presence of my co-workers. It was a letter from Captain Orel-Orlenko (whose name has been mentioned as a student of our Staff courses), who had unexpectedly left for France in 1925 ostensibly to look for work, but as we learned later, he applied to the Soviet Mission with a request to help him get back home. Even before that rumors had reached us that Orel-Orlenko was engaged in subversive work among Ukrainian emigrant laborers in Belgium and France, persuading them to return home. Orel-Orlenko was offered to meet me at the Continental Hotel in Danzig, he gave his address in Danzig and enclosed \$10.00 for my trip. I took the letter to Gen. Salsky and we immediately went together to President Livytsky. After long deliberation President Livytsky came to the conclusion that I should accept Orlenko's invitation and find out what it's all about. President Livytsky also thought that it may be possible that Orlenko wanted my help to get back into Poland having had enough of the "Red Paradise," or perhaps he wanted to come to Poland to work as a Soviet agent. I firmly rejected any idea of seeing Orlenko and Gen. Salsky agreed with me. We also decided that I was

to inform Gen. Stachiewicz about this matter, and Gen. Salsky would inform Col. Pelczynski. Gen. Stachiewicz fully approved my position stating that he saw nothing sensational in an offer to meet a subordinate communist agent, and if the Bolsheviks know about my work, then we should not exclude the possibility of their plan to kidnap me. As is well known, this is what they did with the Russian emigre General Kutiepov who lived in Paris. Of course, I did not answer Orlenko and gave the \$10.00 to charity. Two weeks later I had another letter from Orlenko addressed to my home in which he wrote: "The matter is so interesting that you will surely regret not wanting to see me." This time a conference was held between President Livytsky, Gen. Salsky, Gen. Stachiewicz and myself, and we decided that if I were to consent to the trip to Danzig, the Polish authorities would take steps to guarantee my safety. Again I refused, and again two weeks went by when I got another letter from Orlenko of the same contents. After long persuasion by President Livytsky, I consented to go, but I was guarded by the Polish secret police. This was not a difficult matter for Poland because Poland had a diplomatic representation in Danzig and a military mission. They surrounded the Continental Hotel with plainclothesmen, the room in which I was to meet Orlenko was thoroughly searched, and an agent was placed in the hall. On my trip to Danzig I was accompanied by a non-commissioned officer of the military police who was of adequate physical build to handle any situation.

The meeting took place on June 24. I did not offer my hand to Orlenko on meeting him, and he was so taken aback that he could not find words to start the conversation and I was unwilling to make a beginning. In a two-hour talk Orlenko tried to present to me a picture of national-political concessions to Ukraine by Moscow in the form of a separate government, armed forces, schools, etc., and

from this fact he alleged a need for constructive forces to take part in building "an independent Soviet Ukraine." He showed me an authorization for the talk with me signed by the Soviet Ambassador to France which stated that all propositions made by Orlenko to me will be accepted by the Ukrainian Soviet Government, and Orlenko proposed: I should report to the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw immediately, from there I will be taken to Paris, and then to Kiev. In Kiev my rank of General will be confirmed and I will be appointed commander of the Soviet Ukrainian 23rd Division in Kharkiv (the 23rd Ukrainian Chapayev Division was actually garrisoned in Kharkiv). I should not have the slightest fear that the agreement would not be kept or that I would have any surprises, in the event of my consent, my wife could accompany me, and he was ready to give me \$1,000.00 for expenses right away. To my inquiry whether he had made similar proposals to all Ukrainian generals (there was a total of sixty-three emigre Ukrainian generals at the time), Orlenko replied: "we know whom to approach," and that "the same offer was made to two other generals, but their names or their decisions cannot be disclosed." To end the conversation, I firmly rejected his offer stating that not only I, but all Ukrainian soldiers will gladly go back to Ukraine if the Muscovites (that is the word I used) leave Ukraine and if Ukrainian national authorities take over. Orlenko also made hints that it was not worthwhile to ally ourselves with Poland because Poland "was a seasonal state." I concluded from the conversation that the Bolsheviks really knew about my work in the Staff, and that this was a very important matter to them, since in the event of a conflict between the USSR and Poland, the Ukrainian Army would stand on the side of Poland with its political demands, and then, of course, all Ukraine would rise and fight against Moscow occupation, and this was what they had to

paralyze. In parting Orlenko told me that if I did not want to go to Ukraine, he proposes that I leave Poland and settle in Switzerland, where the Ukrainian Soviet Government will give me full support. During my stay in Danzig, neither I nor the Polish police could find any trace of plans of violence against me on the part of the Bolsheviks, and I returned to Warsaw without incident. The whole conversation with Orlenko was recorded. There were no more attempts by Orlenko or any other Moscow agents to talk to me. Orlenko disappeared from the emigre horizon.

18

In Polish Military Service

IN A TALK with Col. Perkowicz early in 1936 I made a request to attend a course at the High Command and General Staff College, and Col. Perkowicz was simply shocked. Not because he thought this odd or unnecessary, but because he was surprised that I still wanted to study at the age of forty-eight. I really did always have an itch for study, and in 1929 I graduated from radio-technical school (of a military type, under the command of Staff-Major R. Jackowski). Col. Perkowicz made inquiries of the College Commandant, General T. Kutrzeba and chief of the 2nd Department of the General Staff, Col. T. Pelczynski, and the matter was favorably resolved. Early in May I was offered a contract with the rank of Major to undergo a staging training with the 18th Infantry Regiment during summer maneuvers. General Kutrzeba knew me personally from meetings at the Bureau of Military History where he spent much time collecting material for his book published in 1935 under the title "Wyprawa Kijowska 1920" (The Kiev Expedition of 1920). At his request I worked on organizational and operational data about our part in that war, particularly about our 6th Division which marched on Kiev together with the 3rd Polish Army. General Kutrzeba only saw difficulties with my rank because according to regulation, the College only accepted officers between the rank of lieutenant and major. When Col. Perkowicz informed me about this, I replied that a Polish military rank was no obstacle to me. From talks with

officers who graduated from that school I found that its scholastic level was very high and I wanted to increase my knowledge of tactics even at this advanced age. I was particularly impressed with the leading thesis of Polish military doctrine on which was based practical training of officers and ranks, the motto of Marshal Pilsudski: "Strategy and tactics of real situations."

I was sorry to leave the Staff where I put in so much work, but I was glad at the prospect of getting a modern military education.

When I arrived at the 18th Inf. Reg. of the 26th Division, I was being awaited there (Capt. Guttrie had brought the news) and I was met by deputy commander Col. T. Klimecki (General during the war, Chief of Staff of Gen. Sikorski, both killed in an airplane crash at Gibraltar in 1943). For my staging Col. Klimecki assigned me to the 2nd Bat., 18th Inf. Reg. under the command of Staff-Lt. Col. W. Wislocki (later professor of Infantry Officers' School and during the war chief of staff of General Olbrycht's Operational Group). A real gentleman, but very demanding as a soldier, Lt.-Col. Wislocki did not spare time or effort to get me to know all secrets of Polish military art. Several days later the commander of the regiment came back from furlough. He was Col. F. Matuszczak, a Pilsudski legionnaire. He spoke Ukrainian, being a native of Galicia. He was a first-rate tactician and exceptionally intelligent, his peculiar trait was watching without saying a word. For example, he knew by memory all tables of machine-gun firing. After a few days he introduced me to the Division Commander, General T. Kozicki who asked me why I had joined the Polish Army. With my answer "to learn" I placed myself in the right position with him and I was treated as an equal of all the other officers, to my great satisfaction. During the next maneuvers I commanded a battalion defending a position

against enemy attack. I organized the defense in such a way that the commander of the maneuvers, Col. Matuszczak and the arbiters recognized my battalion's right to hold the defensive position all day and only toward night they permitted the enemy to penetrate the battalion's position to a depth of about 200 metres. When I took the initiative to throw the enemy out of his position in a night attack, and succeeded, Col. Matuszczak and Gen. Kozicki praised my initiative during the discussion following. The next time during division maneuvers I commanded a regiment holding a defense line, and all went well. Gen. Kutrzeba, who was acting Army Inspector and in charge of inspecting the 26th Division, was particularly emphatic about the good organization of defense through proper utilization of artillery and reserves.

My social relations were the best, and among others, on motion of Col. Matuszczak, the general meeting of the officers of the regiment awarded me the regimental badge, in spite of the fact that I had been with the regiment for only a few months, and the rules required at least one year's service to be eligible for the badge. After the maneuvers I read a paper to the officers of the garrison (18th Inf. Reg. and 26th Art. Reg.) on the struggle of the Ukrainian nation for independence, illustrating the origin and course of the war of 1920 with graphs. Incidentally, I had the opportunity to show an original map from the Brockhaus & Ephron Encyclopedia (Russian edition of 1869) of political conditions in Europe around 1340 AD in which the city of Moscow did not appear, and the territory along both banks of the Dnipro were marked "Ukraina." In my comments upon the map I stated that neither the publishers nor the Russian censor could be considered pro-Ukrainian, but they could simply not avoid presentation of true historical facts. The deputy of Gen. Kozicki, Col. W. Hulewicz listened to my address, and

then took the floor commenting favorably on what I had said and wishing in the name of those present that the Ukrainian people might "soon become masters of their own home," and that I should be successful in my studies. After the speeches the officers held a banquet in my honor at which Lt-Col. Wislocki made a very warm and sincere speech. I wish to note that among the regimental officers the most erudite and best oriented was Captain Hala, who fell in the Battle of Kutno in 1939.


The regiment returned from maneuvers late in September and I was given a three-week furlough to prepare for the High Command and General Staff College which was to start on November 1st.

Actually, the College did not teach "strategy" only technique of staff service and provided the necessary background for higher studies. Strategy and operations were studied at special courses, maneuvers and games in the General Inspectorate. The course in the College was two years. During the first year we studied tactics of units up to a division, followed by games on maps, maneuvers and studies in the field. During the second year there were studies of operations of combined arms at the operational group level, also games on maps, and then studies and maneuvers in the field, usually with studies of operations from World War I. In addition, during summer courses students inspected fortified installations, arsenals and industrial plants to learn production. Military plants and laboratories in the so-called C.O.P. (Centralny Okreg Przemyslowy—Central Industrial District) impressed me with bold planning and specialization in manufacture of heavy arms, at a time when Poland had been an independent nation for only twenty years.


The first weeks in the College surprised me with the tempo and variety and quantity of tactical and technical terminology which was so rich that it left no time for

homework. Normally Polish officers assigned to the College had several years service as line officers, then required the Officers' Infantry School, and only then could they qualify for the College. I lacked this technical preparation, and had to work very hard for the first few weeks to catch up with them and go along at the required pace. I was already fifty years old, but everything went fine.


I have retained very good impressions from that period of interesting events. During the summer maneuvers in the first year we had so-called skeletal maneuvers. I commanded a regiment, my aide was my colleague Captain Braksal, and the umpire was Staff-Col. Wondolkowski. During a certain tactical situation he asked me what my decision was and what arguments I had to offer. My answer was correct because he made no remarks. After finishing my arguments, the Colonel asked me: "And what next?" I could not see what he wanted, and Capt. Braksal also repeated all that I had said before and could add nothing. Then the Colonel said: "In that case, you gentlemen will stay here, and I will advance because you said nothing about what you are going to do. Naturally, you had to add: and now we shall advance." Such surprises happened often in order to test the students' reaction. Every idea during games or maneuvers had to be related to the umpire, otherwise without his approval no move could be made. This was quite a normal requirement, but people were so tense on maneuvers that sometimes they would forget to relate the decision to the umpire and ask for his acceptance. The faculty of the College was recruited from among the ablest graduates, full of fire and energy, with the most outstanding among them being Staff-Col. Litynski, Staff-Lt-Col. Sabatowski, and Staff-Lt-Col. Werigo. Some of the students were very friendly to me, particularly Capt. (now Col.) M. Tonn, Capt. (now Lt-



Cathedral of St. George (St. Yura) in Lviv.



President in exile of Ukrainian National Republic Andriy
Livytsky (1879-1954)



Professor Roman Smal-Stocki.

Col.) I. Krzyzanowski, Capt. Dr. M. Bereza, and others. All were very pleasant and loyal colleagues.

One winter night a group of students of the Military Command School came to my house and we worked on the solution of a very difficult and complicated group assignment. After solving our problem we had some doughnuts and coffee, and my friends left a little after midnight. Toward dawn I woke with acute pains in my abdomen, and nothing helped me, neither sedatives nor hot packs. Finally my wife called an ambulance from the Army Hospital and I was taken to the Hospital nearly unconscious. After some injections the pain stopped, but my stomach was distended and drugs did not help. The doctors said that I probably had kidney stones and they would operate on me the next day. But I avoided an operation miraculously. I went to sleep in the afternoon, and when I woke up, the pain was almost gone. When I was x-rayed the next day, my kidneys were found to be normal, with no trace of any stones. My attack had been an intestinal block from a twisted intestine which is usually fatal, but in my case it just righted itself.

I completed the College in September 1938 with "good" grades and I was immediately offered a contract of Lieut.-Colonel with the provision that the following March 19th, the traditional day of promotions (Pilsudski's birthday) I would be given a contract of Colonel.

After graduation I returned to the 18th Regiment and took over the position of deputy regimental commander. Life in the regiment was routine until the middle of March 1939, when as a result of Hitler's ultimatum, the regiment along with our and ten other divisions was placed on a footing of mobilization readiness. From that time on I had the duty of directing tactical exercises of battalions and of the entire regiment until our transfer to the Poznan area to man the border on the Kcynia sector. I had to prepare

tasks for each battalion and serve as umpire during tactical exercises because the regimental commander was swamped with administrative work and could only spend one to two hours on inspection from time to time. One day in April, when we held defense exercises of the battalion with live ammunition shot by artillery of the division polygon and took all the necessary precautions, three howitzer grenades fell about thirty paces in front of the deployed infantry and twenty-three men were wounded. As commander I was standing even closer.

By the end of May the regiment was combat ready after reserves had brought it to full strength. Before tensions between Poland and Germany reached the nature of inevitable war, the Ministry of Military Affairs ruled that regimental commanders could grant short furloughs to thirty per cent of the reservists for the purpose of taking care of their family and business affairs. Each case, however, had to be considered individually on its merits. I was appointed chairman of the furlough commission. Being to a certain extent an impartial observer, I found some interesting *things* in this connection: whereas generally speaking the officer corps of the Polish armed forces was full of patriotism and pride of the nation, ready for sacrifice and enthusiastic about the Government's decision to resist German aggression, and properly trained and prepared to engage in war or other military action. These characteristics did not apply to the ranks, and particularly to reserve ranks. It seemed that they placed family interests above all else, and had an acute feeling of being torn away from their families. There were no social security provisions for families of men called into military service and many men told me that their families were destitute. This, of course, reflected upon the reservists' morale who were compelled to weigh duty to country against duty to family, with the latter consideration usually gaining the upper hand

because of their comparatively low intellectual level. All requests for furloughs were nearly without exception certified by officers of the local administration, and we were swamped by hundreds every day. My position in this matter was quite precarious, and I asked to be relieved of that duty.

In my daily work I also found that material and technical equipment of the Polish Army, although of high quality, often lacked in quantity (e.g., anti-aircraft artillery, automatic arms, anti-tank cannon, vehicles, etc.). This was not a surprise to me, with all their sacrifices the Poles simply could not build up a machine to oppose Germany within merely twenty years of their statehood. Polish military circles knew this as well as I, and even the rank soldiers saw it, and felt depressed. In retrospect one cannot resist comparing the situation in 1939 with the patriotism and sacrifice of the Poles during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, when they no longer thought about family, and did not pay attention to technical and material shortcomings, but without food or even water, attacked German tanks with bare hands.

On July 7th the regiment was put aboard trains along with the entire Division and we went to the Poznan region near the city of Kcynia, where the Division was preparing a defense line along lakes under the command of the Divisional Commander, Colonel Parafinski, to whom I was attached as chief of staff. In this work the Colonel and I had good opportunities to appraise the possibility of outbreak of war between Poland and Germany, and the chances of its outcome on the basis of personal observation. I realized that war was unavoidable, and that German technical superiority, especially in tanks and aviation, was overwhelming. In my opinion, the direct outcome of the war looked grim for Poland because the Poles could only oppose German technical equipment with manpower.

During that time we learned that an Allied Mission was negotiating with Moscow for some time, on the alleged premise that the position of the Communists could prevent the outbreak of war. But with negotiations dragging, it became clear to me that the Communists were playing their own game, and that their position will not decide on avoidance of war, but, on the contrary, will contribute to its outbreak. I believed that Moscow offered a graver threat to Poland than Germany even if only because they could not forget their Warsaw defeat of 1920.

Toward the end of July Col. Matuszczak was promoted to deputy chief of the Infantry Department, and Col. Majewski came in his place. My relations with the new regimental commander were the best. In connection with Col. Matuszczak's departure, the officers decided to buy him a farewell gift which was to be performed by a delegation consisting of Major S. Kulczycki and myself. We visited Col. Matuszczak in Warsaw and gave him the present. During our talks he was still quite optimistic and hoped that the attitude of England and France would prevent the outbreak of war. I did not share his optimism, but I had good reasons to keep my thoughts to myself.

Before my return to the regiment, I discussed the possibility of war with my wife, and I asked her to stay close to the other officers' wives who were to be taken care of by the commander of the reserve battalion, Major Kolendowski. When I reached Kcynia I learned that my forebodings were coming true: the Germans began concentrating their forces along the border, and it was clear from this operational concentration opposite the Poznan Army that they intended to split the Pomeranian Army of General Bortnowski and our Army under General Kutrzeba. Full combat readiness was ordered and positions selected for the Division were temporarily manned with small units.

In the midst of this we learned that the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had flown to Moscow on August 23, and within two days had signed some agreement, obviously not in Poland's favor. This was fresh confirmation that Moscow continued playing its dirty game: the Allied Mission could not reach an agreement during months of negotiations, and Ribbentrop was able to do it in two days. His propositions must have been more attractive, and probably suited Moscow's political and strategic plans. I believe that this was the final blow to Polish optimism which had most probably not been shared by the responsible leaders. Poland proclaimed general mobilization on August 29th but several hours later the order was withdrawn under pressure of England. The anarchy this caused in the whole country is beyond words: all roads and railroad stations were cluttered with milling people, and all mobilization points. There was a literal back and forth movement. It was very strange that neither the British nor the Poles considered all the negative possibilities flowing from setting in motion the huge machinery of mobilization and then recalling it. The order and countermanding order produced simply disorder. I could not understand why British military leaders did not explain to umbrella-armed Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that this was one of the chief causes of Hitler's military victory even before he started the war. I could not understand either, why the regiment received two sets of opposite orders and as a result, it abandoned very carefully prepared defense positions and began marching in the direction of Inowroclaw, and then again it was supposed to man a position in the rear of the Division. Regroupings were made during the night, and battalion commanders, following receipt of orders from the regimental commander with whom they had not managed to find a "common language" for the brief period he was in charge,

asked me for explanations. But what could I say, except that the orders issued by the regimental commander were based on orders that he received from the Division, and that every one of them could use his own initiative in carrying out his orders. The maps told me that things were not in order. The most nervous was the late commander of the 2nd Battalion, 18th Regiment, Major Kozubowski, whose task was to establish a bridgehead in defense of the highway leading to Inowroclaw. That night we learned of the contents of Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, in which he enumerated the reasons for declaring war on Poland, and among them was the necessity to end the persecution of the German minority in Poland. This, to my personal knowledge and observation, was a complete falsehood and a provocative accusation: in Poznan province where I was stationed, and where the German minority was quite numerous, I never saw or heard of a single instance of any excesses against the German population. On the contrary, I had the impression that the local Germans were quite openly critical of Hitler.

At dawn on September 1, the Germans started the war, and we felt the brunt of it immediately, being attacked during our march by German divebombers.

19

War

OUR 18th Regiment, less the 2nd Battalion left behind to defend the highway, finally managed to reach Inowroclaw after being subjected to many attacks by German aircraft. We began to prepare to defend the city from tank attack. Col. Parafinski and I chased all over this fairly large city to supervise construction of anti-tank barriers because our troops, tired from the night-long march, did not display sufficient energy. During the day the city was bombed by German planes several times and the Germans had no losses because our anti-aircraft defense was very modest and there was no opposition from the Polish air force at all. Late that night we received orders to move into a forest southeast of Inowroclaw to defend the important highway passing through the forest, Polish reconnaissance planes having spotted large German tank forces moving along this highway. When Col. Majewski and I went on a side road from the forest toward the highway, our driver stopped suddenly and began to back into the forest which was very close to the highway. After crawling back to the edge of the forest we noticed two large objects which we found to be German tanks. Their crews were probably asleep because they had not noticed our car.

That day Col. Majewski received orders directly from the General Staff to send me immediately to the Staff in Warsaw. This was September 3rd, but I could leave only on the 5th using the motorcycle belonging to one of our

sergeants because the regiment had no vehicles and railroads were at a complete standstill under attacks of German aircraft. It took me two days to cover the distance of 130 kilometers to Warsaw: all highways were so clogged with troops, reserves and evacuee civilians that I had to walk most of the way, and push the motorcycle. On the night of September 7th I reached Skierniewice through Kutno and Lowicz. My apartment was locked, and I could not find out either from neighbors or from soldiers in the barracks what had happened to my wife, some believed that she had been evacuated together with officers' families in the direction of Demblin. We started for Warsaw right away. Warsaw was in ruins from enemy bombardment, and streets were bisected by anti-tank ditches. I tried to find President Livytsky and Gen. Salsky all night, but they had all left in the direction of Kholm. At the Ukrainian Committee headquarters I found most senior Ukrainian leaders with Gen. Bezruchko and Gen. Zmienko, but they knew nothing about President Livytsky or General Salsky, and even less about my wife, although I had hoped that she might have come to Warsaw.

At 8 A.M. I reported to the City Command, and at 10 A.M. to Chief of the General Staff, General W. Stachiewicz who only greeted me, and directed me immediately to his deputy, Col. Jaklicz. The latter informed me as follows: the Germans were advancing along the entire Polish-German border spearheaded by strong tank columns, and north of the Warsaw-Kalisz line there were at least two tank divisions in the Army of General Blaskowitz. There was very heavy fighting in the Kutno area, west of Lowicz and in Upper Silesia. All Polish means of communication were disrupted and the Staff maintained only radio contact with its Armies. The Staff was making all possible effort to assemble reserves, halt the enemy advance at least temporarily, and to prepare for a defense of Warsaw

along the Modlin-Zegrze-Zyrardow line. The object was to gain at least a little time before the Franco-British front would become activated. The General Staff was aware of a possible Russian invasion and was planning to organize a defense of Galicia; for this purpose two Ukrainian brigades would be created under my command. For the time being I was to go by car to a forest region east of Praga (suburb of Warsaw), and there with the help of several platoons of Military Police halt the eastward flow of disorganized units of the 1st Polish Army. These units were coming into the area from Pultusk, I was to re-organize them and wait for orders to use them in defense of the Radzymin-Modlin front. This proposition was conditional, i.e. if I did not wish to declare my contract void. According to the provisions in our contracts and oral assurances between our Government and Poland, we had the right to terminate our contracts, particularly in the event of war against Germany. It was unthinkable to be wearing the uniform of a Polish soldier and to take it off at a time of Poland's calamity—in any case I never even considered it, and most of our contract officers stayed in the armed forces and discharged their duty with honor.

During the night several officers under my command assembled about 6,000 men, and they were immediately joined by their officers. We fed them and let them rest for the night. But right before dawn German aircraft bombed and strafed the woods in several sorties, and the men dispersed all over the countryside again. From the accurate and deliberate German attack I had the feeling as though the Germans had been well informed of our assembly in the woods. I dispatched one of the MPs with a report of the happenings to the General Staff, and in return I received orders to proceed to Garwolin which was the location of the reserve battalion of our regiment. There I found Battalion commander Major Kolendowski with a

small staff, waiting for the rest of the battalion. Major Kolendowski knew nothing about my wife and thought that she had left with the entire "officer family" for Kovel and Rozyszcze in Volhynia. I was much disturbed by this news because she could easily fall into Communist hands, but instinctively I had confidence in her calm nature and ability to foresee events.

When a large number of soldiers gathered in the region of Krasnystaw from different units, I was appointed chief of staff of Colonel Bratro who commanded a composite brigade with parts of the 18th Infantry Division and we received orders to capture the city of Kholm, already in German hands. The night operation prepared by me was not carried out because the Germans abandoned Kholm during the night. In the forests of Kholm, Hrubeshiv and Zamostia many soldiers gathered and there I found my teachers and colleagues from the Staff and Command College. Col. Wislocki was there as chief of staff of the 39th Infantry Regiment and at the same time chief of staff of the Gen. Olbrycht Operational Group. I was appointed commander of a group consisting of: Col. Bratro's group (he was already a prisoner of the Germans), Col. Wania's group, Col. Szulewicz's group with an anti-aircraft battery under Lt. Laszkiewicz and Lt.-Col. Gumowski's group.* The task of the group was to defend the region of the city of Krasnobrod to provide cover for evacuation behind the defense line to the south in the direction of Romania.

* Copy (translated from Polish) of Gen Olbrycht's order of September 23, 1939:

No. 85/op. Mp. Sept. 23, 1939, 17:45

Two groups are formed:

1. Under Staff Colonel Duch, composed of units of the 39th D.P. 6 pap. and B/Plot from the Group Command.
2. Under Colonel Szandruk, composed of: Col. Bratro's group, Col. Wania's group, Col. Szulewicz's group, and B/P. Lot of 2nd Lieut. Laszkiewicz and the group of Lt.-Col. Gumowski.

Commander of the 39th D.P.

(-) OLBRYCHT, General of the Army

But this was already September 23, the Germans were entering Warsaw and the Communists were approaching the Lviv-Sokal line. We were between the hammer and the anvil, but I organized a defense of Kransnobrod and fighting there went on for two days. I was in the first line and this gave an opportunity to observe the courage and sacrifices of Polish soldiers, especially officers under my command: one lieutenant badly wounded in the leg did not leave his machine-gun until he had shot all ammunition, and only then consented to my order to be carried to an ambulance. On the other hand, there was also reason to admire the Germans in attack: they marched in combat columns under fire as if on parade. All around us were hundreds of corpses, dead horses, wrecked cannon, wagons with ammunition and supplies, a terrible sight of disaster even to a soldier who had often looked death in the eye before. A notice reached me from Col. Wislocki that Soviet troops were approaching Ostrovets at a distance about twelve kilometers from us, and that I was to attend a conference that night called by Gen. Olbrycht. A fairly large number of officers attended, and after informing us of the situation Gen. Olbrycht offered a way out: to surrender either to the Germans or Russians. There was a heavy silence and I took the floor and stated that surrendering to the Bolsheviks meant torture, and for me certain gallows. A majority sided with me, but some decided to go to the Bolsheviks. The next day we permitted the men to go home, and we officers under the command of Gen. Olbrycht travelled in a column of cars to Ostrovets where we surrendered to the Germans and they transported us to Kielce. There, we were placed in barracks of the 4th Artillery Regiment: several days without food, only "German coffee" once a day, without water to wash in, and sleeping accommodations on the bare floor.

During the battle of Krasnobrod I felt a pain in my neck

behind the left ear, and I probably infected the little wound with soiled hands and it grew to a large swelling. Only on Col. Wislocki's intervention with the Germans in Kielce, I was taken in high fever to a hospital where the swelling was cut, and the doctor extracted a fragment of steel, probably from a grenade. After two weeks I was taken to the Offlag in Breslau, but I was still in the camp hospital under care of a Polish POW physician. Unfortunately, I did not have enough strength to note the name of the physician who performed a real miracle on me. My condition was very critical: I would not eat anything, and I did not sleep at all: I was saved by injections. I was put before a German medical board which, seeing my hopeless condition, released me from camp with permission to return home. The Polish physician even asked me where I should be taken because the chief German surgeon permitted me to ride in an ambulance at my disposal. I asked to be taken back to Kielce, to the home of our Captain V. Zarytsky. The Ukrainian Colonel M. Krat, my colleague from the years 1919-1920 visited me in Kielce. He had been formerly deputy commander of our 3rd Iron Division, and not only an experienced field officer, but a fine gentleman. I told him my fears about the fate of my wife and he offered to go to Skierniewice to look for her. She had, indeed, returned to Skierniewice, and Col. Krat found her there. This was the end of October.

This was the story of my wife. On September 1, the Germans bombed the barracks in Skierniewice, and all who were alive fled to the countryside with Major Kolendowski, and from there, according to plan, toward Kholm. After the bombing my wife sent her maid to the barracks to find out where the officers' wives were, and what she was to do. The barracks were on fire, and nobody was there to ask. My wife went out of the house and after telling a police-

man what had happened, asked for his advice. He immediately sent her a requisitioned buggy, and my wife, accompanied by the maid and her husband who acted as coachman because the owner fled the first night, proceeded in the direction of Demblin and then east. After two weeks of travelling on country roads, she reached Kowel, 400 kilometers from Skierniewice. After two or three days in Kowel the maid's husband came running with the alarming news that the bolsheviks were entering the city. They barely managed to escape because the roads were again clogged with refugees, she then decided to go back to Skierniewice. The Vistula had to be crossed in Demblin over a German-built pontoon bridge and the German sentries refused to let her cross. My wife could not make herself understood to the sentries, but when she showed them a map and pointed to Skierniewice as her home, the Germans let her across. It took two more weeks for her to get back to Skierniewice. Our home had been plundered by the Germans who took all my uniforms and civilian clothes, a large collection of postage stamps, and a sword presented to me by our government with the signatures of President Livytsky and General Salsky on the handle. After the Germans, local civilians completed the looting, including all the furniture, the leader of the looters, as I was told later, being the janitor of a near-by school. In 1945 this janitor was appointed mayor of the city by the Communists. Meanwhile my wife found shelter in the home of a sergeant, and there she was found by Col. Krat. From there they both went to my brother in Lodz with the intention to go to me to Kielce. Things turned out fortunately for us; at that time I had sent a letter to my brother through a young Polish officer who had been released together with me being ill with TB. I wrote in the letter that as soon as I felt better I would join him. The

letter reached my brother just at the time when my wife got there. I found them both there on November 6.

During my stay with my brother where I was still undergoing treatment, I was visited by local Ukrainians, and one of them, Col. Nahnybida told me that there was a Ukrainian officer attached to the German District Command. He was Capt. Professor I. Mirchuk whom we all knew as the Director of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin. My friends decided that it would be a good thing for me to get a letter of recommendation from Dr. Mirchuk to the commander of Skierniewice. I got the letter of recommendation, but when I presented it to the commander in Skierniewice, he shouted at me and asked who gave me permission to appeal to Capt. Mirchuk. True, I was not put under arrest, but the commander rubbed his hands in sadistic joy and ordered me to report three times a day at the commandantura. This reporting prevented me finding any job, and here we were at our wits' end. We received some food from the Skierniewice City Council, headed by a former teacher of the local high school, H. Wittenberg who was of German descent. Soon, however, a new commander was appointed who was a more humane person because he issued orders that Polish officers were to report only once a day, and this was cut to twice a week a few months later.

20

In the Clutches of the Gestapo

I HAD been to Warsaw on January 17, 1940, and on my return home my wife told me with a tone of despair that Gestapo men had come in two cars asking for me, they had searched the whole house, and finally said that I was to report at the Gestapo in Warsaw, Al. Szucha 25, the next day. When I appeared at the Gestapo, I had to wait for several hours, and I noticed that officers of different ranks had been coming out to the waiting room and looking at me closely. Finally some kind of officer appeared and told me to follow him through a barred door to a cellar. In a long hall I saw a long row of people facing the wall. The officer turned me over to a sentry who took me to the end of the hall, made me face the wall in a corner and warned that I must not turn around, if I wanted something I should raise my hand. This was 12 noon, January 18th. I had a wrist watch which was not taken from me, and no search of my person was made. I stood that way until 9:00 P.M. after which I fainted and woke up in a cold cell lying on the floor, there was not even a stool there. It was 4:00 A.M. At eight in the morning I heard a voice in the hall: "Colonel Shandruk, only cold coffee twice a day and 200 grammes of bread, no hot food." In the morning on January 21, I was transported in a prison van surrounded by armed Gestapo men to the Mokotow Prison and placed in a solitary cell on the fourth floor where my first warm soup was served to me. We were fed three times a day in the prison: in the morning a cup of unsweetened lukewarm

grain coffee and 200 grammes of bread, which was bread only by name, the same cup of coffee at night, and at noon a pint of soup made of peas or some kind of grits or peas mixed with dirt. Within a few days I felt terrible pains in my stomach and was ready for another constriction of intestines, but this did not happen, probably because I was lying for hours with my stomach on a hot radiator which burned my skin. This went on until February 21, with death staring at me every day. On February 21, the same van took me back to the Gestapo at Al. Szucha. When I was being led upstairs to the second floor I heard someone cry out in the waiting room below, I turned around and saw my wife. As she told me later, she did not recognize me at first, and then she cried out horrified at my appearance. Because I had turned around the guard hit me over the head with the butt of his revolver. But I felt happy at seeing my wife because I feared that she had been arrested, too. I learned from my wife later that she had been called for an interrogation in my case. I was interrogated very closely until 5:00 P.M., with the subject of the inquiry being my relations with Polish military circles, with special emphasis on the allegation that I had been ordered by the Polish General Staff to organize sabotage on Polish territory occupied by the Germans. I was told to relate always to the hour all my assignments and places of sojourn since September 1st. I told them everything I could remember, particularly about my work in the Staff of the Minister of Military Affairs, its purposes and the reasons why I wanted to study at the Staff and Command College. To the charge that I was ordered to organize sabotage, I replied quite ironically in spite of my tragic position that for that kind of work the Poles have plenty of their own young officers, and do not have to engage an elderly foreigner. I added that even if someone on the Polish General Staff had wanted to make such a ridiculous proposition to me, I

would not have consented. Then I was asked about my relations with some of our officers. After the interrogation I was taken back to prison, but this time by car and without guards. After that I was interrogated at different times at least six times more.

Even after the first interrogation a Polish prison guard came into my cell and gave me the sign to be quiet and offered to take a letter to my wife if she lives in Warsaw. I did not give him any letter out of caution, but I told him the address of our Colonel S. Ivanovych. The very next day he brought me some sugar and butter from Col. Ivanovych and the news that my wife was in touch with the colonel about my case, and that she would soon come to Warsaw again. Several days later the guard gave me a letter from my wife in which she stated very briefly that she was using all means to get an explanation of the cause of my arrest, that she had been interrogated by the Gestapo about me several times, especially about my work in the Polish Army and my relations with the above mentioned officers. So, she was asked the same questions as I. It became clear to me that the change in my treatment came because our testimony did not differ and this must have impressed the investigator.

After another interrogation in the endless row to which I was now being brought without guards, the investigator told me that my wife had also been interrogated several times and that everything in my case was now clear, but that the person who informed on me was supplied ever new petty accusations which must be cleared up because the Ukrainian informer "has pull in Berlin" and they don't want to have to reopen my case once it's closed. Incidentally, they offered to transfer me to a larger cell so that I would not feel lonely, but I refused. Now I could read books from the prison library, the food got better, and my wife was permitted to send me food parcels. On my part,

I asked my wife not to send me food because I could not eat much after my terrible stomach trouble. I was kept this way until the end of April, when I was called to the prison office, my watch was returned to me, and I was declared released. I was taken to the Gestapo from prison and the interrogator had a long talk with me which he called "of a confidential nature." He told me that the informer had been an officer of my acquaintance, who cited as witnesses two other officers, who were alleged to have heard me boast in public on the night of September 7-8 at the Ukrainian Committee headquarters that "the Poles had picked me to perform sabotage behind German lines." But the Gestapo had investigated everything, and through my case they lost all confidence in the informer. Leibrandt was directly responsible for my release. Later, when I reported to President Livytsky, he told me that on the eve of my release he was visited by a high official of the German Foreign Office Herr Leibrandt whom he had known as a landowner in Ukraine. The President told Herr Leibrandt that he would not talk to him because the Gestapo was holding me in prison without cause. At this, Herr Leibrandt went to the Gestapo, studied my case and ordered my immediate release, advising the President.

Incidentally, during my last talk with the investigator he asked me for my opinion on how the war would end. I was completely taken aback with this question coming from a Gestapo man, but I replied without hesitation that I did not know what was now going on in the world, but that the Germans' attitude toward the Poles, about which I knew from reports of the guards, carried the seeds of protracted war in which the United States might take part as in World War I, and that only the Communists would profit from such world turmoil in the final analysis. He answered: "This is all very interesting, but I don't advise

you to tell it to anyone because the Bolsheviks are our allies and you might be reported."

On my way to the station to go back to Skierniewice I stopped at a photographic studio and had my picture taken —I had not shaved once during the entire time of my imprisonment.

21

The German-Russian War

ON MY return to Skierniewice I felt completely exhausted in body and mind: this was the result of my latest experience with trust and its betrayal among men. Everyone was surprised to see me get out of the Gestapo clutches alive, not only my Ukrainian and Polish friends, but even the German Commandantura, and this was probably the reason for more decent treatment of me on the part of the German State Police in Skierniewice. Needless to say, I owed my life and my release primarily to the efforts of my wife and President Livytsky.

The City Mayor of Skierniewice helped me get a job as manager of the local motion picture theater which was run primarily for German soldiers, and only one day a week for civilians. Although this work did not provide enough income to live decently, at least it entitled me to ration cards. Before my arrest the authorities permitted me to occupy my old apartment, but two rooms were requisitioned for billeting German troops. In cold weather we were forced to live in the kitchen, however, since heat was provided only when German officers were in residence. Ration cards entitled us two only to 400 grammes of meat and 80 grammes of butter per month, and the rest had to be scrounged somehow. By far the worst problem was clothing and linen, rations were issued only once a year, and the quality was the poorest, so that they wore out in two months. Polish officials on the County Board helped us a little in this.

I used to go to Warsaw for films and there I learned from Ukrainian sources early in 1941 that the Germans were making ready to start war against the Soviet Union. There was plenty of evidence of this in Skierniewice: we could see the railroad tracks from our windows and I saw thousands of freight cars with men and supplies going east. Early in June the City Commandant asked me to come and see him, and he told me that he had orders to send me to the Government General in Krakow immediately where I would get further instructions. I thought: when are they finally going to leave me alone?

The next morning I was already in Krakow, met at the station by Col. Ivanovych. He told me that the Germans would be going to war against the Bolsheviks soon, and the German authorities asked him to name some Ukrainian political and military leaders who would be willing to establish a nucleus of a Ukrainian National Committee that would subsequently play a certain political role under German rule. Col. Ivanovych had been an Austrian officer and spoke German well; he worked as interpreter for the Gouvernement General in Krakow. It was the Germans who had mentioned my name to Col. Ivanovych along with the name of Dr. Yuriy Lypa. The latter had already gone to Vienna, and I was to follow with Ivanovych if I gave my consent. Ivanovych advised me not to refuse because this might put me in a dangerous spot, and besides, he thought that the Germans would reestablish a Ukrainian State. All this was a big and unpleasant surprise to me. I had witnessed German practices in Poland and I did not have any reason to expect any good German intentions toward Ukraine. I could see that not only would the Germans lose, but what would be the worst for Ukraine, Soviet victory on the side of the Allies; all this would have terrible repercussions upon Ukraine. It would first be a theatre of war, then of German extermination policy fol-

lowing the sincere and spontaneous welcome accorded them as expected liberators, and finally Communist vengeance for this, with awful consequences for Ukraine. I was very much shaken by the thoughtless recommendations of Col. Ivanovych, but having been taught a lesson by informers, I simply kept silent and listened. That same night we left for Vienna where a reservation had been made for me at the *Roter Hahn* Hotel. Many conferences were held with different German generals and colonels, and finally a special "guardian" was assigned to me in the person of Sonderfuehrer Baron Hochstaetter. I did not speak German well at that time although I had taken German for eight years in school, and I saw some hope of extricating myself from this situation by virtue of language difficulties. We finally found out that Dr. Lypa and myself were to form some kind of a committee that would march into Ukraine accompanying the command of the German Armies Group of General Ritter von Schobert which were concentrated in Rumania, and then we were to "help the Germans occupy Ukraine." Several days later we went by cars from Vienna through Budapest to Rumania and arrived at Iasi. We were quartered in the suburb of Patra Neamti. It is difficult for me to describe my feelings at that time: in spite of my belief in German failure, I nevertheless wanted to see them win, hoping that perhaps some "New Bismarck" would emerge who would be able to take care of German eastern policy. I had wishful thoughts of seeing Moscow imperialism destroyed, but German imperialism did not bode well for Ukraine: I had read Hitler's "Mein Kampf."

About June 17, we were transferred to Iasi and I was to be assigned to the operational department of the Group Staff. I was given reports on the situation in Ukraine to read with locations of Soviet troops, and I observed that the German officers had complete faith in victory. I was

hurriedly put into a Rumanian uniform without insignia. At that time I received a call from a Rumanian Colonel Ioanescu, who introduced himself as chief of the Rumanian mission to the Group Staff and began conversation with me in pure Russian. I learned that he was a former Russian officer, Lt.-Col. Ivanov, originally from Kishinev, who had enlisted in Rumanian service. He asked me point blank: what was my job with the German command? I gave him a diplomatic answer, but actually I could not tell him anything positive even if I would because I did not know much myself, and I did not wish to sound critical.

At dawn on June 22nd the Germans started the offensive, and by night we had reports of their tremendous success. Probably the next day Captain Benes of the Topographic Department of the Staff brought me aerial photos of the city of Batum and asked me to translate them into maps, which I did. For several days I had nothing to do, and no one on the German Staff asked me to do anything. I saw thousands of prisoners and I would have gladly talked to them, but I had no authority for this.

Meanwhile I noticed an interesting phenomenon of intrigue among Ukrainians attached to the Staff. There was Captain Puluy who was an Austrian citizen and a former officer of the UHA. He seemed to have an ambition to fulfill in connection with the German conquest of Ukraine. His position was that of captain attached to the information department of the Staff. He brought Lt.-Col. K. Porokhivsky, formerly of the UNR Army into his department; the latter had been living in Bucharest as chief of one of our "school groups," and I knew him from the time of our war. There was thus a clash between two concepts as to Ukraine, Capt. Puluy's and Col. Ivanovych's, with that of the latter relying on Sonderfuehrer Hochstaetter. When I noticed this intrigue I decided to get out of this maze as soon as possible and I told Col. Ivanovych that I wanted

to try and get back home. He was shocked by my proposition and said that matters require my presence in Ukraine, and that Capt. Puluy's intrigues are trifling. However, when I learned from reports that the Germans had already taken Vinnytsya and Vapnyarka, and I was still being ignored, I requested Major Riesen to give me travelling orders to Skierniewice, and to state that I was to return to my former job of theater manager. When Baron Hochstaetter learned of my request, he took me to the railroad station in his car, and on the way told me that there had been a change in the situation, and that now the Germans "don't need either Ukrainian generals or politicians," even as plain advisers. It was clear to me that Berlin must have issued some harsher orders on German policy in Ukraine in connection with their unexpectedly easy victory.

I returned to Skierniewice, and I must admit that I was very happy at such an ending of my adventure. And again, my mission had something to do with the attitude of the German authorities toward me now.

As is well known from the memoirs of numerous Ukrainian observers of the German occupation of Ukraine, the people of Ukraine welcomed the Germans as liberators, but hardly a year passed when the Ukrainians discovered the true face of the Germans and began fighting those "liberators" with armed uprisings and sabotage. My forebodings were, unfortunately, coming true. I had an opportunity to speak to Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine who were serving in the German Army, and when they learned that I was a Ukrainian, they told me, very cautiously at first, about the brutality and terror of the Germans in Ukraine. But when the Germans began their retreat from Ukraine in 1943, Ukrainians fleeing from the advancing Communists painted a true picture of German behavior in Ukraine: they had kept intact the Communist system of collective farming, an institution most hateful to the

Ukrainian farmers; the so-called state farms had merely come under German management and the workers remained on them as slave labor; the Germans took over all factories and plants and subsequently dismantled and shipped to Germany all the machinery and equipment; all Ukrainian educational and cultural institutions were closed down; over 3,000,000 young Ukrainians were shipped to Germany as slave labor; many young men were drafted into the German Army through the so-called UVV (Ukrains'ke Vyzvolne Viys'ko—Ukrainian Liberation Troops); and whole villages were razed and their inhabitants exterminated for late or insufficient deliveries of grain and food requisition quotas. Wherever sabotage took place, usually by Communist agents and provocateurs, it was charged to the local population, which bore the brunt of punishment. This was in accord with Hitler's plans for Ukraine: he destined Ukraine to be the area of settlement of his war veterans. Hitler's policy also pleased Stalin: the more Ukrainians liquidated by Hitler, the less remained for Stalin to liquidate (compare Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in 1956 in which he said that Stalin would have gladly deported all Ukrainians to Siberia, but there were too many of them).

Days passed, however, bringing news about the complete rout and retreat of the Germans on all fronts. The Germans became very angry at the bad news from the fronts, and I experienced it on my person. Early in 1944 I was called to the Labor Bureau and the clerk ordered me to assign two employees of the theater to work in Germany, and I would have to employ a German "Volksdeutsch" woman in their place. The theater employed in addition to myself, two mechanics and two ushers, the latter doubling as porters, it was therefore absurd to demand that I release two employees and take an inexperienced woman in their

place. This is the way I explained the matter to the clerk. Several days later a Polish policeman came to my house and handed me an order of the Labor Bureau signed by the same clerk according to which I was to be escorted to the assembly point for workers going to Germany. On the way to the Labor Bureau we encountered the County Commissioner and Chief of the Labor Bureau (this was a real bit of luck) with whom I was well acquainted. The Commissioner stopped us and asked the policeman where he was taking me, and he showed the order. After looking at the order the Commissioner handed it to the Chief of the Labor Bureau and asked him what all this meant. The Chief answered that he knew nothing about it, took the order and had me released.

On September 1, the uprising broke out in Warsaw and it had certain repercussions in Skierniewice. The local Gestapo chief was assassinated and the clerk of the Labor Bureau who wanted to send me to Germany, too. The Soviet troops were on the right bank of the Vistula near Warsaw, i.e. about 70 kilometres from Skierniewice. Since I had been informed by Polish officers released from German POW camps for poor health and living in Skierniewice that the High Command of the Warsaw Uprising was counting on Soviet help, my wife and I were in danger of being found by the Communists in Skierniewice and decided to flee. This was all the more necessary, since we had to close the theater for lack of films. We received a permit and moved to my brother's in Lodz. President Livytsky was living in Lascek near Lodz where he moved from Warsaw by permission of the Germans. I utilized this opportunity and called on President Livytsky. In a long talk we tried to clarify our Ukrainian emigré policy in connection with the growing possibility of Communist occupation of Poland. President Livytsky was of the opinion that the Polish Government-in-Exile in London

would be able to exert sufficient pressure on the Allies to have the Soviets stay on the other side of the Vistula. The west part of Poland would be occupied by the Allies because, according to Pres. Livytsky, it was not in their interest to permit the Communists get that far into Europe, and they were bound by an agreement with Poland. This argument of President Livytsky was undoubtedly politically valid. But I was of different opinion: I took into consideration that the Allies would want to save their manpower, and hence would not assign the Soviets to a passive role that would free the Germans' hands in the east and cause more loss of life in the west. In addition I believed, in logical continuation of my former conclusions which had all turned out correct, that the Communists, saved from annihilation through the aid of American arms and material, would march on in pursuit of their doctrine of conquest of the world, and it would be odd if they did not seize such an exceptional opportunity. I was also convinced that guided by their materialistic dialectics, the Communists will not make much of possible protests on the part of the Allies, and there is a good chance that they might occupy all of Germany, beating the Allies to the punch. I said: "Doesn't all prior Bolshevik tactics prove that they make the world face accomplished facts?" Even in the first stage of this war they proved it by their attack on Poland with which they had a non-aggression pact, and furthermore, the Americans were well disposed toward the Communists, a fact of which we were apprised from newspaper reports. President Livytsky did not preclude the possibility, based on observations drawn from conversations with other Ukrainians that the Allies might also accept Germany's tacit proposal to cease operations in the west so that they could turn all their forces against the east. I, of course, did not believe in this, as contrary to my other conclusions, and being apprehensive for the President, I

requested him to move west so as to be under the Allies when Germany collapses. President Livytsky had some justified reservations as to this, alleging that the Allies, "in their political knowledge of matters of eastern Europe" could very well turn him over to the Communists, and that keeping his residence in Allied occupied territory would be possible for only a short time. In any case he seemed to be quite preoccupied, without showing any signs of apprehension, and promised to get in closer contact with the Chairman of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Professor V. Kubyovych who had the power to provide evacuation facilities for our people. Since Krakow was already threatened, Prof. Kubyovych had moved with the U.C.C. to Lueben near Breslau.

President Livytsky also informed me that the UCC had given refuge to numerous Ukrainian leaders escaping from Soviet Ukraine, among them the prominent Kharkiv lawyer V. A. Dolenko and his close associates, professors V. V. Dubrovsky and M. O. Verukhiv. Mr. Dolenko had already paid President Livytsky a visit and the latter thought very well of him as a political leader who stood firmly for Ukrainian statehood in the form of UNR. I was advised to meet him.

In Lascek there was also a certain detachment of the German Gestapo with a Ukrainian Lieut-Col. Kryzhanivsky working there. When he learned that I was in Lascek, he came to President Livytsky's home and said that he wished to see me on an urgent matter. He was wearing the German uniform of a Gestapo Lieut.-Colonel. Kryzhanivsky offered me the position of Commandant of a Ukrainian Officers' School with the rank of Colonel, and said that he had been given orders to organize such a school. This spelled new trouble for me, and I did not know how to get out of it. If I were to refuse, it would mean getting involved with the Gestapo through a Ukrainian because

it was clear to me that the whole school project was Kryzhanivsky's scheme to get in good graces with his superiors; acceptance, on the other hand, was beneath my dignity and politically wrong. I replied that when he gets the school organized there will be time enough to talk about my position. This seemed to me the best way out because the Communists were already "at the gates." When I returned to Lodz, there was a message from the Skierniewice City Council waiting for me, requiring my immediate return to Skierniewice because in view of the stabilization of the military position around Warsaw, the City Commandant demanded that I reopen the theater. When I was waiting for a train to take me to Skierniewice from the Lodz station next morning, a Ukrainian messenger in German Gestapo uniform delivered an order from Kryzhanivsky to me which required my immediate appearance before Kryzhanivsky for the purpose of taking over the position of Commandant of an Officers' School with the rank of major. Fortunately, I had with me an old document from General Ritter von Schobert's Staff which I showed to this officer and playing a role of indignation I emphasized that I am at the sole disposal of the Staff and no Gestapo orders apply to me. My wife and I left for Skierniewice right away, a place where Kryzhanivsky's arms did not reach.

The neighborhood of Skierniewice was overflowing with German troops and with refugees from Warsaw, many Ukrainians among them. For the first time I saw among German soldiers men with insignia in yellow-blue colors and the letters UVV (Ukrainian Liberation Troops) on the sleeve. When I approached them and addressed them in Ukrainian, they did not conceal their apprehension of their future. They said that there were enough German troops with sufficient arms to offer resistance to the Reds, but that German soldiers lost all will to fight and left frontal positions at every opportunity. In order to halt this

flight the German command was keeping SS troops in the rear. To my questions about the impression Soviet troops made on them, the soldiers answered that Soviet units go into battle in a disorderly mob which flees before any serious German resistance, but that the Reds never surrender, obviously because they know that the Germans shoot surrendering enemy soldiers. The appearance of Soviet troops, was according to them, horrible: exhausted, hungry, dressed in plundered civilian clothes, barefoot, they beg for a piece of bread, they carry their rifles on strings and the only sign of recognition as Soviet soldiers is a red star on the cap which distinguishes them from bandits. Discipline was lax, and the UVV soldiers thought that if the Germans were willing to fight they could push the Communists to the east with less effort than in 1941. The Soviet Air Force and tank detachments were the power chasing not only the Germans, but also the Red Infantry forward.

Although deep in my heart I felt the satisfaction of seeing my predictions come true, I was faced with the problem of what to do and where to go with my wife. We could easily get into Communist hands because the ability of the Germans to hold the front now seemed quite dubious, but even if we were lucky to evacuate, life in Germany would not be easy with the Germans showing so much hatred for foreigners. And then, even from inside Germany the Communists would either demand delivery of certain people, or go hunting for them. There was no certainty whether any safety could be found under Allied occupation.

Meanwhile the Germans were preparing to defend Skiernewice, and ordered the entire population to dig anti-tank trenches all around and within the city. My wife and I, because of the work in the theater, had to dig only for four hours every day. The local Polish population began to believe that "the Red Russians are not the same as

during the reign of the tsar, and they will surely bring us freedom," which was probably caused more by their hatred for the Germans than their familiarity with the Russians. It was very dangerous to speak against this favorable opinion of the Russians because one would be subjected to denunciation as a "traitor-Ukrainian," who supports Hitler. By that time food had become so scarce that the cats and dogs in the city were consumed. We went hungry, too, and the commandantura gave us only ration bread (half saw-dust).

The Warsaw Uprising turned our apartment into a transfer point. Many Ukrainians and Poles whom we knew, and some whom we did not know, who escaped from Warsaw and vicinity during the fighting of the Polish Insurgent Army (*Armja Krajowa*) stayed in our home for several days. We shared our last piece of bread with them, and whatever we had from the garden: tomatoes, potatoes, onions, etc. These unfortunate people had not only lost all they had, but nearly everyone had left some relative in Warsaw and they spent whole days meeting trains arriving from Warsaw in the hope that they would see them or at least get some news from Warsaw. Among those refugees was also Colonel Sadovsky, for whom I was later able to get permission to return to Warsaw to look for a grandson.

One day about the middle of October, Col. Mikolay Rybachuk came to us. He was working in the Ukrainian Central Committee in Krakow and Lueben and proposed that I take over the command of a Ukrainian Division within a Corps which will be formed and placed under General V. Petriv. I do not remember on whose authority the offer was made, and I never heard the proposal of forming a Corps mentioned again.

This was also the first time I ever heard about General Vlasov: the City Commandant came to the theater and

Vlassov: the City Commandant came to the theater and gave me a copy of the newspaper "Volya Rossii" (Russian Freedom) which contained an appeal of KONR (Komitet Osvobozhdeniya Narodov Rossii—Committee for Liberation of Peoples of Russia), and other information about the Committee, its purpose and personnel. The Commandant had the naivete to believe that the KONR and its activities could change the situation, and that Vlassov would defeat Bolshevism. I was tempted to ask: what with?



1943, General Shandruk after discharge from German concentration camp



Maj. Gen. M. Krat, Commander of 1st Ukrainian Division, appointed by General Shandruk



Msgr. Augustin Voloshyn, President of Carpatho-Ukrainian
Republic, 1939.



Professor W. Kubyowych, Vice-President of the Ukrainian
National Committee, 1945

22

The Ukrainian National Committee

LATE in November 1944 I received a telegram from Berlin signed by President A. Livytsky, asking me to come over immediately. Before I could pull my thoughts together and plan my trip to Berlin, a messenger came to me with a note from the County Commissioner asking to come and see him right away. When I came in, the City Commandant was sitting in the Commissioner's office, and they asked me if it were true that I was a Ukrainian general, and whether I knew anything about my trip to Berlin. I replied that I was indeed a Ukrainian general and that I had a telegram from my President which I could not quite understand. During the course of a lengthy talk I learned that the Commandant had received orders from his superiors to arrange for my trip to Berlin "with all available comfort" on the express train running between Lowicz and Berlin, which was only for German officials and officers. The Commandant tried to tie in the purpose of my trip with his prior conjectures about Vlasov. Within an hour I had travel orders in my hands and I was taken in the Commandant's car to Lowicz, a station on the route of the express train. By consent of the City Council and Commandant I transferred the management of the theater to my wife.

During my really comfortable trip, I had a whole compartment of a sleeping car, German inspection officers and police officers looked at my papers at least five times during the twelve hour trip and they could not contain

their obvious astonishment at seeing a general (that's what the papers said) who looked more like a beggar than a general.

I found President Livytsky at the Hotel Excelsior as per instruction. After breakfast and a long stay in the hotel bomb-shelter during an allied air raid, the President told me in a long conversation in his room why he had brought me to Berlin. Present during this talk was also Dr. T. H. Olesiyuk, one of the oldest members of BUD and a man of high prestige in Ukrainian politics who was well disposed towards me.

First of all President Livytsky told me that he had thought it advisable to send me a telegram so that I would understand that it was he who was summoning me to Berlin, and not the Germans. Then he told me that there were certain political and military German leaders who did not agree with Hitler's Eastern European policy, but were compelled to keep quiet about it; they were: Alfred Rosenberg, Grand Admiral Raeder, General Brauchitsch, Herr Leibbrandt, Professor Arlt, and others. Admiral Raeder had even left active service for opposing Hitler's Ukrainian policy, and those men were now being given some consideration in view of the hopeless military situation, and they would like to tell the world as well as the Ukrainians and other nations of the USSR that not all Germans were on the side of Hitler. They had respect for the aspirations and power of these nations, and would like to make an attempt to save at least their political leaders and hundreds of thousands of soldiers who believed that they could, with German support, liberate their nations from the yoke of Moscow, and hence they would fight against the USSR on the German side.

President Livytsky obviously believed that the cause of this attitude on the part of those Germans was not so much the interests of the potential allies of Germany, as direct

interests of the Germans. Being German patriots they wanted to gain a sympathetic ear among the Allies for all Germans, and personally they would be treated at intermediaries in a good cause and thus exonerate themselves from possible repressions. I thought that this was quite logical and correct reasoning on the part of the Germans of those circles. President Livytsky was of the opinion, however, that even in the midst of this critical situation the possibility should not be excluded that the Germans might come to terms with the Allies on a cease-fire, and turn all their forces against the Soviet Union. It had become common knowledge that the Germans had put out feelers on this subject through a certain neutral nation. If any of these plans were to materialize, said President Livytsky, it was of utmost importance to establish national political representations: news of this would cause favorable reaction among the masses of Red troops, and this might be the beginning of a renewed fight for our independence. President Livytsky knew from confidential talks with Dr. Arlt, Professor von Mende, and General Leibrandt that someone else might replace Hitler, a person more acceptable to the Allies, and in that case we should not pass this opportunity. Incidentally, in our exchange of thoughts President Livytsky did not really believe in this possibility, but as a politician he could not entirely discount it.

In our further conversation President Livytsky told me that all these matters were the subject of consultations among representatives of Ukrainian political groups invited by him to participate: OUN-B under S. Bandera, OUN-M under A. Melnyk, and the Organization of the Hetmanists. In the existing situation that looked hopeless but was as yet unresolved, President Livytsky did not think it advisable to engage himself or the UNR Government as a party, and hence he came out with a project of establishing a Ukrainian National Committee, something on the pattern

of KONR. During talks with the Germans, however, some difficulties came up: the German spokesmen seemed to be tied to the concept of General Vlassov (KONR) which had the support of Himmler, and hence they wanted the Ukrainian National Committee to be part of KONR. In addition, they felt that the Ukrainian National Committee should be headed by a general because it was easier for generals to agree among themselves. The latter project was along the line of President Livytsky's reasoning, therefore when other candidacies were discounted, he proposed me. Such other candidates were at the beginning: S. Bandera, Col. A. Melnyk, Professor Isaac Mazepa, and General V. Petriv. Various objections and General Petriv's refusal caused the president to offer my candidacy, which was agreed to conditionally by S. Bandera and A. Melnyk, who were to express their final opinion after meeting me personally and learning of my personal views and abilities. Hetman P. Skoropadsky, however, did not consent to any candidates, believing that both for reasons of political expediency as well as his political and military contacts with the Germans, it would be best if he were to head the committee. The matter was thus becoming clear to me and less encouraging because I would be cast in the most unpopular role, and certainly in a dangerous one, to face Allied war considerations, engage in conversations and practical contacts with the Germans whom I did not trust and against whom I was prejudiced, and finally, I would be the object of political play of our own political parties. I was very candid about all this with President Livytsky, but he gave me instructions on how I was to face the various factors if I consented to his proposition. Regarding principal and practical purposes of the Ukrainian National Committee, President Livytsky believed that it should: 1) seek opportunities and ways of saving Ukrainian political emigres and

numerous leaders who managed to flee from the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, and 2) take over from the Germans the care of hundreds of thousands of soldiers of various Ukrainian formations who found themselves within the German armed forces voluntarily or involuntarily, and special attention was to be paid to the Division "Halychyna" which in the event of German surrender could automatically be turned over to the Bolsheviks. President Livytsky said: "Can we permit our brave soldiers who are such a treasure in the Ukrainian cause to perish? As a soldier you must not only understand, but also feel it." He also considered it imperative to discuss with leaders from Ukraine and Galicia the problem of the several million Ukrainian laborers shipped to forced labor in Germany. It would be necessary to find out how many of them do not want to return home and take care of them so that they would not fall into Communist hands. In his opinion, it would be very beneficial to retain as many as possible in the West, at least those who are the most conscious patriots among youth because, in his opinion, events could unexpectedly create favorable conditions to employ them in the interests of Ukraine.

Finally President Livytsky said that he thought it necessary to warn me that even under the existing hopeless and dangerous conditions, there are plenty of irresponsible people who do not realize the burdens and responsibilities of heading the Ukrainian National Committee, and are vying for the position of its chairman; this would be excusable, but these people do not understand the situation, and what is even more sad, they do not realize their own lack of qualifications for the position. President Livytsky mentioned several names, one general among them, and added: "these people are looking for support among Germans for whom and with whom they worked in well-paid jobs as managers of collective or private Polish and Ukrain-

ian enterprises, such as mills, estates, lumber yards, etc. President Livytsky finally asked me to head the Ukrainian National Committee and asked what I thought of it.

Obviously, I was somewhat surprised by the proposition: on the one hand the great faith in me, and on the other, I was wondering that President Livytsky, knowing what I thought of the Germans and their situation, required me to volunteer for this dangerous job without any prospects of benefiting the cause. It took me quite a long while before I could say anything: all kinds of thoughts were fighting inside me; I felt apprehensive of making a mistake, I did not feel experienced enough in political matters, the instinct of self-preservation asserted itself casting doubt upon the need to engage in a hopeless cause, and finally I also felt somewhat slighted for being the last one to get the offer after others had refused. I finally offered the following answer: I did not feel politically experienced to take on such duties; I did not see any hope of any successful results at this last and concluding stage of the war; and that the Ukrainian community which I know very well, will make me a scapegoat for all failures. I added that I fully understood President Livytsky's arguments that I would have to deal with German administrative and military officials, and like it or not, would become an object of their political moves, after all, even with the war lost, Germany was still a great power whose officials treat us as stateless refugees. In the eyes of the Allies my forced collaboration with the Germans will be deemed hostile and to say the least not understandable in the last stage of the war. Finally I told President Livytsky that I did not think I was so much less worthy than the other candidates that the offer should be made to me after all others had refused, and that I had ambitious feelings which were hurt in this instance. President Livytsky gave a brief answer: "I count you among the Ukrainian generals who will obey my

orders without reservation and will carry out even the most onerous duty."

There was a long, hopelessly long, pause in our conversation. Finally President Livytsky proposed that I reserve decision until I talked to other political leaders, primarily to Col. Melnyk, S. Bandera, V. A. Dolenko, and Dr. T. Olesiyuk. He also thought it advisable for me to see representatives of emigres of other nations: Georgians, Byelorussians, Cossacks, and others. I knew well the diplomatic abilities of President Livytsky, he would certainly use his great prestige to get our leaders in a good frame of mind to meet me. In conclusion President Livytsky said: "General, I want you to recall my words of other confidential talks, I always told you that I knew my generals well, and that in case of an important decision they would seek support in my authority, but you alone I could always let go freely because you never deviate and never lose sight of our main purpose. This time I am convinced even more firmly that my opinion of you was well justified. Therefore right now, when I don't know what your decision is going to be, I give you, as the future chairman of the Ukrainian National Committee *carte blanche*: all your decisions will be approved by me." From the last words I saw that I had no means of backing out. President Livytsky added that he understood my disgust with "our own people" through whom I had suffered so much in prison, and that he sees why I have no confidence in the Germans, but I should remember that we are all living for Ukraine and not for ourselves. He assured me that in the event of a threat of my being surrendered by the Allies to the Communists through Allied ignorance of our cause, he and all his political associates would use everything within their power to explain things and help, but he hoped there would be no need for this.

I spent the night without sleep, weighing the needs, possibilities, and consequences.

During the next several days I had long talks with Col. A. Melnyk and his close aides O. Boydunyk and D. Andriyevsky. Col. Melnyk gave me his opinion of the situation without concealing my responsibilities and almost complete lack of opportunities, he stressed internal and external difficulties, but gave his approval of my candidacy conditional on my further attitude. Col. Melnyk was full of his old tact and personal charm and conducted the talk with me with all sincerity and understanding of the situation. This made a very good impression on me. D. Andriyevsky and O. Boydunyk had a somewhat closer look at me and watched what impression Col. Melnyk's explanations were making on me. I saw Col. Melnyk several more times and I always went away satisfied: he never persuaded me to accept President Livytsky's proposition, but always gave me a correct appraisal of the situation. No less interesting was my first, and all subsequent conversations with the nationalist leader S. Bandera. He and all his close aides, and particularly Dr. V. Stachiv expressed their full confidence in me, and S. Bandera approved my candidacy without any reservation emphasizing that by reason of my prior military career he was certain that I would not depart from principles of national and political dignity, and would display a proper military skill.

Came another all-night talk with President Livytsky in the presence of Dr. Olesiyuk. After exchanging thoughts and my report on my impression of the talks with Col. Melnyk and S. Bandera, I gave my consent to begin talks with the Germans, first of all with Professor Fritz Arlt and Colonel L. Wolff. There was no other Ukrainian present during my talk with those two gentlemen. Professor Arlt was interested in my opinion of possible collaboration with Gen. Vlassov and asked me how I imagined the organization

of the Ukrainian Nat'l Committee, i.e. its composition, purposes, and attitude toward Germany. He said that he was well acquainted with my experience in connection with my detention by the Gestapo, and added that in time of war different circumstances may arise which take the lives not only of individuals, but even of peoples and nations. I stated quite frankly that I don't trust Germans in general, and hence I did not see any need for a Ukrainian National Committee nor of its useful work. Dr. Arlt answered that under existing circumstances nothing stood in the way of trying to do something, and that on his part and on the part of those who shared his views he could assure me of full support. "Even in war, positions are conquered one by one" he said, and that I as a soldier should understand this. Dr. Arlt further emphasized that there was another matter that should concern me as a Ukrainian general: the Ukrainian Division. I had learned quite a few details about the Division since my arrival in Berlin, and I could answer Dr. Arlt. I said: "The Division is still called 'Halychyna Division' but nearly all officers are Germans; one can assume that the Germans did not oppose the establishment of the Division hoping to get their mercenaries to work for them, although the men in the Division look upon their ideological purposes from a different viewpoint. The equipment of the Division is so inferior as to be beyond any words of criticism, and what is most important, the Ukrainian community has no idea what further use the Germans wish to make of the Division which, in the sad story of its battle of Brody suffered tremendous losses through the fault of its commander and high command. You, Doctor Arlt, know well that the Division is the flower of the Ukrainian Galician intelligentsia. Is there any possibility of exerting such influence that what happened will not happen again?"

Dr. Arlt answered: "You are mistaken, General, neither in my opinion nor in my intentions, neither in those of the

Governor of Lviv General Waechter and many others, was there any negative attitude toward this matter, and actually, we were the ones who contributed to the formation of the Division. I propose that you, General, have a say in matters of the Division, too. General Waechter and I had been insisting for a long time that the Ukrainians should have their Division, we also thought of a Corps and even of an Army; isn't that in the interest of Ukraine? If you accept our conditions, even if they are not in accord with your attitude, then gradually we shall be able to achieve much more, obviously if you show appropriate diplomatic skill."

I answered Dr. Arlt immediately that my diplomatic skill is only clarity of the position because I was a soldier who did not understand "civilian diplomacy." The Division should be under Ukrainian command, all soldiers of Ukrainian origin who voluntarily or not were dispersed throughout all formations of the German army should be taken out and put in purely Ukrainian national units. A Ukrainian National Army should be formed which would be organized under the Ukrainian national banner, and serve only the interests of the Ukrainian people and swear allegiance to Ukraine. This army should wear traditional Ukrainian uniforms and be under Ukrainian command. But in addition to the Division I had other demands: how could I consent to our leading people such as S. Bandera, Col. Melnyk, Professor R. Smal-Stocki and others being deprived of liberty. Or to thousands of Ukrainian patriots being confined to concentration camps? There should be freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and the other basic human rights, but most essential, the German Government should issue a declaration renouncing any claims to Ukrainian territory. Only on these conditions could we, Ukrainians, and myself in particular, go along with the Germans against the common enemy . . . each fighting for his own national interests. . . ." After a prolonged

silence on both sides, I added: "If we could only turn the clock back to 1941."*

After some thought Dr. Arlt answered: "General, I cannot vouch that the German Government will accept all your terms, but here I can give you some advice: take a close look at the situation and you will see that you could accomplish everything that you desire. No matter how beneficial to Germany, I cannot imagine that Germany would avoid carrying out your demands if you had an armed force. Besides, for the duration of the war you can speak to the Germans on equal terms if you accept the rank of senior German General (Gruppenfuehrer)." I jumped on this, and said: "Me a Gruppenfuehrer? Never!" Dr. Arlt smiled in ironic grimace, and this was the end of our talk. Colonel Wolff proposed diplomatically that we should take all matters which we talked about under consideration.

I had an impression from the first talk that Dr. Arlt was sincere in his offer to help me, but again I doubted whether he would succeed. In any event we reached an agreement that I would submit memoranda outlining in detail my ideas about the purposes, immediate task, personnel, and practical work of the Ukrainian National Committee. Dr. Arlt was particularly emphatic about the need of a clear and even favorable attitude toward the KQNR. I answered that this was out of the question because the Ukrainians were not a nation of Russia, but are engaged in struggle both against Red and White Russia, and that even if I recognized the supremacy of General Vlassov this would be meaningless, since no Ukrainian would support me, but on the contrary, declare that I was a traitor. I myself would consider it treason, therefore there is nothing more to talk about on this subject. I said: "I agree that General Vlassov is the chairman of the *Russian National*

* Compare Juergen Thorwald: "Wen Sie Verderben Wollen" Steingrueben Verlag, Stuttgart 1952, pp. 341-343.

Committee, and I might be, after giving my final consent, the chairman of the *Ukrainian* National Committee. There cannot be even symbolic supremacy."

I reported the contents of this conversation to President Livytsky, Dr. Olesiyuk, Col. Melnyk and Mr. Bandera. Drafting of the memoranda was taken over by Dr. Stachiv and Mr. Boydunyk, in the name of their respective organizations. The following day I received a number of other drafts. Both memoranda drafts were edited by me (I have copies of both to this day), and I deleted the name of Gen. Vlassov from them, substituting for it "Russian National Committee." Following advice offered to me, especially by Dr. Olesiyuk, I consented to include a paragraph to the effect that in the interest of the struggle against the Red aggressors I would coordinate action with the Russian National Committee by an exchange of liaison officers or even delegates. Such exchange was also planned with other national groups. The memorandum was handed to Dr. Arlt through Col. Wolff. I found out through roundabout sources that the last named paragraph constituted an obstacle to legal recognition of the Ukrainian National Committee by the Germans.

Meanwhile I had conversations with Georgian leaders: M. Kediya, A. Tsomaya, M. Alchybaya, Prince V. Andronikov, and others. I discussed my attitude toward KONR with them and they approved my position enthusiastically. The Georgians were the best informed about the German attitude to my proposition, and from information received from me they could weigh the matter from both sides. At that time Dr. Arlt and Colonel Kroeger (the German liaison officer attached to Gen. Vlassov) were making attempts to persuade the Georgians to make me change my attitude toward KONR, and arranged for M. Kediya to meet Gen. Vlassov. Kediya, however, told Gen. Vlassov to his face that he had no reason nor chance to even attempt to talk

to me about this because this would be on the one hand, tactless, and on the other, he approves my stand both on principle and out of practical considerations. Kediya ended his talk with the words: "I would rather have Stalin in front of me, than General Vlassov behind me." I was very much impressed by this attitude of the Georgians. They offered me sincere and friendly support in my work, and I often sought their practical advice. Later I had the opportunity to meet another prominent Georgian patriot, Prince G. Magalov.

The relations with representatives of Byelorussian political groups were no less friendly. My meeting with President R. Astrausky was very instructive to me. He stated openly that he would go hand and hand with me, he would use all his prestige in my support, and that if we were able to form any Ukrainian national military units under the political sponsorship of the Ukrainian National Committee, the Byelorussian National Committee would have its forces join ours. He was also unequivocally opposed to German proposals of any subordination of national committees to the KONR.

At that time I also met the representative of the Don Cossack nation, General Krasnov, a relative of the renowned Don Cossack General P.N. Krasnov. Later, when a command of the Ukrainian National Army was established, our relations developed along strictly military lines. The well known leader of the Don nation's independence movement, the energetic opponent of the KONR, engineer V. Glaskov was enthusiastically happy at the prospect of political cooperation with "the Ukrainian brothers" from the very first meeting with me. He believed that the situation might become favorable to all of us because all nations conquered by Moscow now had considerable armed forces on the side of Moscow's enemy and they could play an important part in liberating their respective na-

tions. There was only one fear he had: with an improvement of the Germans' military position, they might make another attempt to consider the area of Eastern Europe as German "Lebensraum."

It gave me much satisfaction that my attitude gained for me the political and moral support of all nationality groups which were friendly to us. True, I had known many of the leaders and their political ideology and work since before the war in Warsaw. There, the political organization "Prometheus" had been active whose president was Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki and both my friends and myself had been members. It was certainly due to their attitude as well as due to the noble efforts of those patriots that I was able to overcome all the difficulties placed in our way by the Germans. For their own national-political reasons they advised me against resigning my mission of heading the Ukrainian National Committee because in the German interpretation the matter stood thus: once they recognize the Ukrainian National Committee, all other national committees would be recognized automatically. They were in agreement with me about the early end of the war with a completely defeated Germany, but they still believed that it would serve a useful purpose to each establish their own political representation in the form of a national committee which would thus be able to negotiate with representatives of Allied occupation forces in the name of their respective national group of emigres. I believed that this would enable me to speak in the name of a large united multi-national assembly of groups opposed to Russian Communist imperialism. However, as I was to find out to my bitter disappointment later, these were idle dreams. None of us had ever imagined that Allied statesmen, including the Allied Military High Command, had complete ignorance of Eastern European political affairs. It came to light much later after the war that in addition to ignorance, common treason

may have been another factor because in these matters the powers that be lent an ear to willing and unwilling Communist agents.

There was no answer to my memorandum from Dr. Arlt, and I did not know what to do next. There was no sense in remaining in Berlin because the food situation was acute, and in addition, I left my wife in Skierniewice in danger of getting under Soviet occupation, Soviet troops being stationed close to Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula, seventy kilometres from Skierniewice which they could take in one day. President Livytsky had left for Lascek together with Dr. Olesiyuk. On December 14, I requested Col. Wolff to issue travelling orders to me to go to Skierniewice, and I went via Krakow, where I wanted to see the chairman of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Dr. V. M. Kubyovych. My plans were to offer Dr. Kubyovych a position in the Ukrainian National Committee in the event of its organization. I had never met Dr. Kubyovych before. He was, of course, aware of my mission, and when I proposed that he take the position of my first deputy in charge of all civilian matters of the Ukrainian National Committee, he first made an intelligent request for some detailed information: the attitude of our political organizations toward my mission, the results of my talks with the Germans, the future composition and tasks of the Ukrainian National Committee, my attitude toward the KONR, and my plans on the organization of our armed forces. I explained every subject as best as I could, and he gave me his agreement in principle. I was impressed with Dr. Kubyovych's fine manner and erudition, and mainly with his sober and serious approach. I was happy because I believed that his participation in the Ukrainian National Committee would raise its prestige and increase its chances of success. At the same time I did not conceal from the professor my appraisal of Germany's

military situation, and the great responsibility which would fall on the Committee, that is on him, and on me. We agreed that if I would need him in Berlin, I could summon him by telegram. On this occasion Dr. Kubyovych informed me about his initiative in the formation of the Division "Halychyna" based on ideological, political, and practical considerations. He was very apprehensive about the fate of the Division, and believed that there was a need to establish the Ukrainian National Committee, even if its only purpose were to be rescuing the Division.

I arrived in Skierniewice on December 17. There was much tension in the city, in connection with the crossing of the Vistula by Soviet troops in the north and south. It had also been reported that they had made attempts to cross the Vistula somewhere near Demblin. Red aircraft were already bombing Skierniewice and Lowicz. We had to prepare to leave Skierniewice.

I had left my aide Lieut. Stryisky in Berlin and told him to keep in touch with Col. Wolff, and to telegraph me if necessary. I received a telegram from him on December 25, saying that my presence in Berlin is immediately required. I left for Berlin the next day. Leaving my wife in an obviously dangerous situation, and unable to take her with me, I asked her to try and reach Lodz in case of danger, join my brother who lived there, and together proceed westward. I found out upon my arrival in Berlin that there had been no special need for me to come because the Germans had not reacted to my memorandum. In the course of several meetings with Dr. Arlt and Col. Wolff, I did, however, feel a tone of sincerity which had been lacking during my previous stay in Berlin. Dr. Arlt explained to me that the whole matter was being held up by Himmler's deputy, General Berger for the reason that I had refused to subordinate myself to Gen. Vlassov. Dr. Arlt did not give up, however, and continued in his very

active efforts to gain recognition of the Ukrainian National Committee. This was clear evidence of Dr. Arlt's fine character and of his strong pro-Ukrainian convictions. I learned later that he had set in motion all influential German political leaders, and took advantage of the prestige of our Caucasian friends to gain his goal. After my arrival he arranged for a number of meetings for me with important German leaders, so that I could personally convince them of the need of a Ukrainian National Committee and of other national committees. Thus, toward the end of December I came into my first contact with Professor H. von Mende, chief of a division in the Ost-Ministerium and the right hand of Alfred Rosenberg. Dr. von Mende was a very intelligent person and treated me with extraordinary courtesy. I met him a number of times in January and February, which I shall report in chronological order.

On December 31, I had a brief meeting with Counsellor of the Foreign Ministry B. Hilger, a very important person in Ribbentrop's entourage, who asked me to attend a conference in the Ministry on January 3. Hilger was a Baltic German married to a Russian. He had been a high official in the Foreign Ministry of Tsarist Russia and spoke Russian fluently. He subscribed to the idea of a restoration of Russia, and hence he favored the KONR, and opposed the idea of partitioning Russia into national states. This made him automatically an opponent of the Ukrainian National Committee. Prof. Kubiyovych was in Berlin at that time, and I asked him to attend the conference in order to bolster my position. He refused, however, on the grounds that he did not as yet have any official relations with the Ukrainian National Committee because the Committee did not have official recognition.

The conference with Hilger took place in the Foreign Ministry in the presence of several officials of the Ministry. Among them, in addition to Dr. Arlt and Col. Wolff, were:

Counsellor Dr. H. Fischer who spoke several languages, including Ukrainian because he had lived in Ukraine for quite a long time before the war, and Col. Kroeger who was a liaison officer attached to Gen. Vlassov. I was alone and felt completely surrounded in this difficult situation.

Hilger started the talk with clarity and firmness: if I would agree to recognize the supremacy of Gen. Vlassov, the Ukrainian National Committee would be established. I had to explain in a fairly long reply to Hilger (Dr. Fischer was interpreting), what the Ukrainian political position was, that there was a tradition and continuity to our struggle against Moscow, and that Moscow (white or red) had never kept a promise; in this instance I referred to the very enigmatic political creed of Gen. Vlassov expounded in his Prague declaration on Ukrainian sovereignty. I stated that the idea of the Ukrainian National Committee joining the KONR was simply absurd under the given circumstances. I admit that I expressed myself quite undiplomatically. My concluding words were: "No, I will not go for this, and I don't believe any other Ukrainian will consent to recognize the KONR, none of us will even talk about this, no one is willing to go from the Red Moscow yoke under a white one; we are not a nation of Russia, but the Ukrainian nation." To this Hilger replied: "It will not be necessary. General Vlassov already has a Ukrainian section headed by professor Bohatyrchuk, Baydalakov, Forostivsky, Muzychenko, and others. No other Ukrainian National Committee is needed by anyone." This surprised even the Germans, and I observed a certain amount of consternation among them. The talks were discontinued, but Dr. Arlt came up with a diplomatic suggestion that he would continue his talks with me in private. I was very much tempted during this conference to deflate Herr Hilger's pride by referring to Germany's precarious condition, but I was able to contain myself.

The year 1945 did not augur well for me and my Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian friends.

Berlin was bombed so often and so heavily that we never had a moment of quiet. I was living in the Excelsior Hotel in the center of the city, and had to go down to the shelter every few hours and spend a long time in total darkness because all power lines were disrupted. I was even surprised that the Germans were able to repair them so often in spite of the heavy damage. It was probably New Year's Eve when I was sitting out a raid in the subway under Friedrich der Grosse Platz when a heavy bomb fell and I was hit on the head with an automatic ticket dispenser. I was knocked unconscious and carried out into the fresh air. During those moments of waiting thoughts were always entering my head on how easy it was to lose it . . . but still, I wanted to have something to do and occupy me from such thoughts.

I had not as yet had an opportunity to make a call on Hetman P. Skoropadsky, although even before my trip home I had met the chairman of the Hetman's movement (The Association of the Hetman State), the aforementioned Col. B. Homzyn. I had received a letter from Col. Homzyn from Wansee near Berlin on December 8, in which my old friend wrote: "December 7, 1944. Esteemed and Dear Pavlo Teofanovych: Our former relations lead me to believe that I can address you sincerely and directly. So, having heard that you wish to venture into the dangerous sea of politics, or perhaps someone wants to urge you into that swim, I consider it proper to ask you to talk things over with me before making any decision. This might be beneficial to you. If you agree, come to my house because I am in bed and can not go out. I shake your hand. Glory to Ukraine, glory to the Hetman. PS. Please come without any company. I receive only invited guests in my house., Yours, B. Homzyn."

I called on Col. Homzyn on December 9, and although he was quite sick, we had a long talk about the organization of the Ukrainian National Committee, and about the difficult, dangerous, and thankless job of heading it. Col. Homzyn thought that it was detrimental both to the Committee and to myself to engage in such work without political experience. He was of the opinion that I should give up organizing the Ukrainian National Committee because under existing circumstances the only person who could head it was Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, a person with great experience and prestige. I would be offered the command of the armed forces, with Col. Slyvynsky to be appointed my chief of staff (he had been chief of the General Staff in 1918 under the Hetman Government). We weighed all possibilities and I did not conceal my pessimism regarding the prospects for the Committee, even only on behalf of the Ukrainian emigres in Germany, i.e. out of Soviet reach. I therefore stated clearly that I would gladly give up my mission if my resignation would be accepted by President Livytsky, Col. Melnyk and Mr. Bandera. That was all we talked about. I do not know whether the late Hetman had any conversations with the above mentioned gentlemen about the Ukrainian National Committee, but in conversations with me they reaffirmed their previous position as to my candidacy.

On December 29, I requested Lieut.-Col. M. Kalynovych, a man who was close to the Hetman and who also worked in a German governmental agency, to ask the Hetman when I could pay him an official visit. This was agreed upon by President Livytsky, Col. Melnyk, and Mr. Bandera. The Hetman sent me an invitation to visit him at his home in Wansee on January 4, which was the day following my difficult conference in the German Foreign Ministry with Herr Hilger.

I was greeted by Col. Homzyn who took me to the Hetman and made the introduction. The Hetman asked

me about my life under German occupation and then took up the matter of the Ukrainian National Committee expressing generally similar views to those expounded by Col. Homzyn, but he added: "I cannot consent to support the UNC headed by you because you have the backing of Andriy Mykolayevych (President Livytsky), and this will make the Committee soft, but if I were to head the Committee, you would get one of the highest positions in the Army." The only witness to this conversation was Col. Homzyn. Actually, I wished that I could have avoided the dangerous leadership of the Committee. But when it became known that the Ukrainian National Committee was actually established, I was informed in the name of the Hetman that he had issued orders through the leadership of the Hetman Movement that its members were free to take part in the UNC and its branches, and that they were permitted to join the ranks of the Ukrainian Army.

Much later, when the history of the Ukrainian National Committee was the subject of a discussion among emigre groups, a pro-Hetman newspaper in Canada, "Ukrainsky Robitnyk" of April 8, 1949 printed an article signed "M.K." which gave a completely false interpretation of my conversation with the Hetman. I immediately sent a letter to Col. Homzyn about this matter, and when the latter proclaimed his neutrality. I appealed to Professor W. Hryshko, a member of the Hetman organization to take a stand in the matter. Prof. Hryshko and the editor of the newspaper Dr. O. Rusov published a proper clarification. The purpose of the article by "M.K." was to minimize the Ukrainian National Committee and my role in it, and also to place the person of the Hetman in an awkward position as well as Col. Homzyn, who was present during our conversations.

I had another meeting with Col. Homzyn late in January when I informed him about the recognition and organization of the UNC.

23

My Attempts to Rescue My Wife

THERE was a fairly large number of willing and unwilling Ukrainian refugees in Berlin and all over Germany at that time. Most of them were engaged in manual labor, others, as far as they were able, tried to find work in their particular professions, as for example the well-known mathematician, Rector of Kharkiv Technological Institute, Dr. Kh. S. Ryabokin, who worked in German industry and science and won considerable respect. Such experts worked in various institutions and enterprises. In Berlin I made contact with Prof. Ryabokin, M.A. Livytsky, P.I. Zaytsev, M.M. Kovalsky, T. Omelchenko, and others. We held sporadic meetings to discuss the current situation, and organizational matters of UNC.

M.A. Livytsky came to see me in my hotel on January 12, and reported that the radio had announced that the Reds had crossed the Vistula north and south of Warsaw, and that Skierniewice was in danger of being taken. I was apprehensive about my wife and took steps to reach her. It was only on the following day that I was able to get travelling orders to Skierniewice via Lodz. The train left Berlin during the night of January 13-14, but we did not get far: there was an air-raid and the train was kept standing in a woods for several hours. I finally reached Lodz in the morning of January 15,* and found the railroad station wrecked. It took me more than an hour to get to my brother's home because there were no cabs. The city

* It is possible that the dates are not exact.

presented a frightful picture: It had been under Red bombing the day before. It was very cold and the ground was covered with snow. All people seemed to be going west, pulling sleds with their belongings. There were also thousands of marching German soldiers, but they would say absolutely nothing about the location of the front. I had disturbing thoughts about the fate of my wife, but still believed that she might have reached my brother. When I reached his home, she was not there. My brother told me that he had tried to get to Skierniewice two days before, but the train was bombed by the Reds and he barely escaped with his life without reaching Skierniewice. I was trying to figure out what could have happened to my wife: she might have been killed by bombs, or even been taken by the Communists. I went to the German command and found out that Skierniewice had been taken by the Reds the day before and that the front was now 40-45 kilometres east of Lodz.

I spent the night with my brother. At that time Major Ya. Fartushny, President Livytsky's personal aide, came to Lodz from Lascek. We left Lodz on foot: my brother and his wife to Lascek, and I with Major Fartushny to Pabianice where a German commander gave us transportation by truck to the city of Sroda. To tell the truth, I doubted whether I would survive the trip: the temperature was much below zero C° and I had only a light overcoat. We made the trip from Sroda to Poznan by freight train on an open flat-car. This was January 18. All our attempts to get on any train going to Berlin were futile. They were all evacuation trains overfilled with German officials with their families and baggage. I finally showed my document to a German military policeman, and when he saw "Ukrainian General Shandruk" he took us to the train, opened a compartment and shouted to the 20 persons inside to let us in. This way, standing up and completely

squashed, we reached Berlin after 14 hours on January 20, in the early morning. Luckily, Lt. Stryisky had kept my room at the Excelsior, and I threw myself on the bed without a word and slept for ten hours.

Two days later my brother appeared and said that President Livytsky with his family and aides was travelling west to the south of Berlin. The trip of President Livytsky, as I was to find out later, although in hunger and cold, nevertheless had a fortunate ending. I had requested Dr. Arlt several times to do something to help President Livytsky, and apparently he complied.

My attempts to find my wife among the evacuees through Dr. Arlt were also futile.

24

Before The Recognition of U.N.C.

APPROXIMATELY at the middle of January I had the unique pleasure of meeting the famed German cavalry General, E. von Koestring, a former Cavalry Guard General in the Tsarist Russian Army who was now administrative chief of all foreign legions in the German Army: Russian, Cossack, Caucasian, Turkestanian, Byelorussian, etc. The meeting was arranged by Dr. Arlt, and both he and Col. Wolff were present. Actually, this was a dinner, with the General's whole staff taking part. The most outstanding figure after the General was his aide, Captain Hans van Hoerwarth, the present Ambassador of West Germany to the Court of St. James. In brief words, but full of meaning and speaking Russian, the General told me the story of the origin of his legions, and of his part in the campaigns of 1941 and 1942 in Ukraine and in the Caucasus. He emphasized his great respect for those volunteer legionnaires who willingly or unwillingly found themselves incorporated in the German army to fight the Bolsheviks for liberation of their countries. In 1942 he had had nearly one million such men under his command in 1942, a large percentage, or over 180,000 being Ukrainians, the so-called UVV (*Ukrainske Vyzvolne Viysko*—Ukrainian Liberation Troops). They carried the insignia of a golden trident on a blue shield on the sleeve.

I showed a good appetite at the dinner table because I had been going hungry for some time, and the General

noticed this. After dinner the General took me aside, and when we were alone, he told me cautiously that he was a member of an anti-Hitler group and for his outspoken ideas he had been subjected to a lot of unpleasantness, particularly on the part of Himmler whom he considered not only ignorant in military affairs, but altogether a "fool." The General had only words of praise for Dr. Arlt and expressed his belief that I would succeed in organizing the UNC and lead it along the line which I had presented to the Germans so clearly and for which I had gained the respect of many "thinking" Germans. The General assured me of his own favorable attitude, but added that unfortunately, his voice now had only a theoretical meaning. While still at the table, the General had asked me to tell those present my appraisal of Germany's situation. This put me somewhat on the spot, but after a moment's hesitation I told them very clearly that I thought Germany was losing the war, and for this reason immediate possibilities should be explored of an honorable peace with the West so as to avoid a threat on the part of the Bolsheviks who will certainly not want to leave Germany. Naturally, I added, Germany can be expected to recuperate from this terrible catastrophe because the Germans are a hard-working nation, and I pointed to historical examples, and particularly to the consequences of World War I. I spoke Russian, and Dr. Arlt interpreted with some ad libbing of his own, either toning down or emphasizing certain parts of my talk. The General, who knew Russian well, smiled discreetly whenever he noticed differences. The pleasant and free social conversation went on far into the night. My impression of the get-together was one of sincerity, and I had a feeling that it was clandestine. I never had another chance to see the gentlemanly General, but this had given me another opportunity to have Dr. Arlt's sincere friendship toward me confirmed.

Col. Wolff came to see me on January 27, and said: "General, wouldn't you like to talk to General Vlassov? Perhaps you could reach some kind of agreement so that we could advance the matter of the Ukrainian National Committee." I answered: "If Gen. Vlassov still insists on the UNC being part of KONR then I have nothing to talk about with him." According to prior agreement I saw Col. Melnyk the same day, and he approved what I had done, and added quite frankly: "General, you are a soldier without sufficient political and dialectic experience, and Vlassov could take advantage of you." The next day I saw Mr. Bandera who took the opposite view and advised me to try and get to speak to Gen. Vlassov, and to dissuade him from interfering in Ukrainian matters. Mr. Bandera said: "We are not afraid that he might fool you, and we have a duty to speak even to our enemies in order to find out what they want." To tell the truth, my ambition was touched by this, and having been given *carte blanche* by President Livytsky, I felt that I was following the wishes of a majority and called up Col. Wolff to tell him that I consented to see Gen. Vlassov. This meeting was thus held not on my initiative, but either on the initiative of Dr. Arlt who wanted to get the matter of the Committee going, or else on the initiative of Gen. Vlassov himself, either on the advice of Hilger or Kroeger.

I saw Gen. Vlassov on January 30, in a very beautiful villa in Dabendorf near Berlin. Protocol was strictly observed. a large room was simultaneously entered by myself and Dr. Arlt on one side, and by Gen. Vlassov and Kroeger on the other. After the introductions were made the German gentlemen left us two alone.

My first impression of Gen. Vlassov was good: a fine manly type, fairly tall, in a simple military tunic without any epaulettes or other distinctions. During the exchange of our first courtesies, I noticed that Gen. Vlassov had a

very clear and very low voice. After a few minutes a German officer brought in a bottle of cognac and crystal service. Although I don't drink, I had to take one, while Gen. Vlassov kept refilling his own glass. We then proceeded to matters of mutual interest and I tried to talk as little as possible, to give Gen. Vlassov a chance to take the initiative. Finally he put a direct question: why was I opposed to the Ukrainian National Committee becoming part of KONR as an independent unit. He thought this quite feasible, especially since KONR already had a Ukrainian department which would naturally merge with the Ukrainian National Committee. He painted an optimistic picture of the power of KONR and of the Ukrainian Committee as part of it, and emphasized several times that I would be his first deputy not only in military, but also in political matters. After his lengthy excursion along these lines I answered that there was one "little" obstacle in the way of realization of his plans of "unification," viz.: "the Ukrainian people were not a people of Russia, but that Red Moscow conquered Ukraine by deceit, just like tsarist Moscow had done 260 years earlier." Vlassov interrupted me in a great hurry and said that he knew the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations quite well, but all this was a thing of the past, and now we must go along together because we only lose our strength in disunity and hostility, while we need all our strength to cope with Bolshevism, and that all the other national representations had followed the line taken by me. I immediately saw the trap being laid for me and replied that unfortunately Ukraine had been forced to fight not merely the Bolsheviks, but Moscow's imperialism in general, and this line will have to be followed by Ukraine in the future. Gen. Vlassov took a somewhat sharp squint at me from behind his glasses and changed the subject to "personal prospects" for me. I thought to myself "in spite of schooling in Marx-

ist dialectics you are a very naive person to believe that matters of personal ambition could sway me." At that moment I saw that I clearly had the upper hand, and repeated to him what I had already told the Germans: he would go his separate way, and I would go my separate way, but in the interests of the struggle against a common enemy we could coordinate our military activities.*

Gen. Vlassov then seemed to be quite irritated and blurted out that I was wrecking the whole matter at a time of *German* difficulties, and that I may be made to suffer the consequences. "I see that you are a politician," said Gen. Vlassov. This was followed by a long silence because I had not felt any need to answer him. When Gen. Vlassov asked me how I imagined the development of military events, I again saw an attempt to trap me. I answered that he surely knew more about the situation than I, having a Committee and Staff, while I had nothing. My answer seemed to provoke him, or else he had had too much to drink, and he began to talk with enthusiasm that in 2-3 months he would have six divisions and would then march on Ukraine. Here, in spite of the fact that I had been keeping myself under control throughout the visit, I could not contain myself any longer, I jumped up from my chair and asked: "why on Ukraine?" Vlassov answered: "Because material resources are better there and the people are hostile to the Bolsheviks." I answered again that he was mistaken in believing Ukraine to be hostile only to the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian nation was hostile to all Muscovites without exception, and that if he would attack Ukraine, they would fight him, too. Vlassov lost his poise and shouted: "I am going to beat you, and your people." My answer was calm and quiet: "Perhaps you will beat us all, that's what Denikin and Wrangel were trying to

* Cf. "Wen Sie Verderben Wollen" op. cit., "Was Bedeutet Schanddruck?" p. 477.

do." At that Vlassov seemed to be regaining his lost temper and said: "Well, if you don't want to go along, you don't have to. We are not going to argue, and anyway, we had a pleasant conversation." I did not think that the talk was all pleasure to him, but I did not say anything, sensing that this was evidence of his dialectics. Gen. Vlassov finished our talk with the words: "It's good that you at least consent to coordinate our action against the Reds." I emphasized once again that as far as cooperation went, it would be a political and military error to think about a march through Ukraine, and I reminded him that military history recorded all invasion marches on Moscow through the so-called Smolensk Gate, but even if they had all been unsuccessful, this was due to mistakes made by the invaders which General Vlassov would certainly not repeat!

We had been talking for two and a half hours. Vlassov rang, and Dr. Arlt and Col. Kroeger came in. Now I played a smart game: I did not let Gen. Vlassov say anything because I feared that he might try to give a false report about what was said between us, and then we would start arguing; so I was the first to start giving the Germans information on our talk and when I finished, I rose and took leave of Gen. Vlassov and Col. Kroeger. Gen. Vlassov had not objected to my version with one word, but merely added: "What obstinacy!" When we were outside Dr. Arlt smiled and said with irony that we had won, but the victory would be "Pyrrhic."

This was the last time I ever saw General Vlassov, and we never exchanged "envoys," either.

My hotel, the "Excelsior" burned down from incendiary bombs, and I moved to the "Esplanade," but not for long because this one burned down, too. I moved to the hotel "Kant" sharing a room with Otaman T. Bulba-Borovets, and later I was given a separate room. While at the "Espla-

nade" I spoke to the Ukrainian Metropolitan Polikarp (Sikorsky) who told me that the Germans had asked him to give them his opinion of me.

Several days later I learned that Dr. Arlt "had left on business," and I thought this was one of the results of our Pyrrhic victory. Food became hard to come by and my everyday needs were looked after by my aides Capt. V. Serdyuk, and Lieut. Stryisky.

One day in February Col. Wolff came to me and said that the chief of the SD (secret police) Col. Wolff (no relation) wanted to see me. Our Col. Wolff assured me that there was absolutely no danger to me. We went to see the other Wolff together. He looked an intelligent and well educated person to me, and not dangerous at all. He expressed his regret for not coming to me, and also for the brutal treatment that I experienced from the Gestapo in 1940. The conversation finally led to the point that he wanted to hear from my own lips why I refused to co-operate "organically" with Gen. Vlassov. After my explanation in German, which was a hardship on me, Wolff took up the matter of organizing Ukrainian military units in the event of the establishment of a Ukrainian National Committee. I had to make the best of a bad situation and I told him what I thought.

Berlin was under heavy bombing all day February 3, and when the alert was sounded over the radio, I decided to get as far out of Berlin as the subway went—Wansee Station. I met V.A. Dolenko at the station who, together with professors V.V. Dubrovsky and M.O. Vetukhiv was also going to Wansee, where Prof. Dubrovsky's family was staying. We spent the whole day at the station in Wansee, and had plenty of time to exchange ideas about the situation, and particularly about the Ukrainian National Committee. I was particularly struck by the fact that Mr.

Dolenko was asking me all details about my plans to form an army. I noticed the same thing in my talks with Ukrainian and German civilian leaders.

On February 12 and 14, I had more talks with Professor Von Mende who asked me a series of questions about my plans of organization, work, and personnel of the Ukrainian National Committee, and he made notes of all my answers. I saw from this that some high placed person wanted to know the details. Von Mende also asked me what I thought of taking over under the command of the UNC of all soldiers and units of Ukrainians now within the German Army.

On February 19, I had a meeting with Dr. Foehl who impressed me as a specialist in psychology or intelligence, and that his job was to study my person.

Finally on February 21, I saw Dr. Arlt again and learned from him that the matter of recognition of the UNC had entered into a new stage. He told me that a number of official visits and talks were in store for me: with Minister Alfred Rosenberg, State Secretary Steengracht, Dr. Striber, and a number of important persons who would help me not only in the matter of recognition of the UNC, but also in its activities. The most important was that matters of nationalities were being transferred from Col. Sparmann to General Dr. Waechter. Incidentally, Col. Sparmann was a pleasant and very intelligent person. In the modest opinion of Dr. Arlt, all these were favorable omens, although there was no categorical clarity in his words. The very next day Col. Wolff offered me a private apartment near Berlin in the home of a retired general. I took advantage of the offer in order to breathe easier than under constant bombardment of Berlin. The following day Dr. Arlt and Col. Wolff visited me in my new apartment, and Dr. Arlt said with a smile that "for preparatory work or organizing the UNC and the Army Staff" he was offering



Acting for Metropolitan Andrey Sheptycky, Bishop Josaphat Kotsylovsky blesses 1st Ukrainian Division.



Ukrainian Trident in the camp at Rimini, Italy, before tents of the Reserve Regiment of 1st Ukrainian Division.



Archbishop Ivan Buchko among soldiers of 1st Ukrainian Division at Rimini



Ukrainian Camp Church, Rimini, of 1st Ukrainian Division

me two large rooms in a building on Fehrbelliner Platz where Gen. Waechter was already working, and he also had an office together with Col. Wolff. This would make it easier for me to keep in touch with Col. Wolff and himself. When I had a look at the rooms, they looked luxurious under the circumstances then prevailing in Berlin, although they seemed too well ventilated for winter since all the window panes were gone, and the windows were covered with paper!

Later I learned that Gen. Waechter and Dr. Arlt had deemed it necessary for me to meet Himmler's deputy Gen. Berger in order to push the matter of the UNC, and arranged for me meeting him. I don't know what Dr. Arlt had told Gen. Berger about me, but the latter was very cordial in greeting me and expressed his sympathy for my inability to find my wife. I was moved by this attitude. Our talk was brief, without any promises on his part and, so to say, without any finality, but during its course I had an opportunity to tell him that I had actively fought for Ukraine, and would never give up the fight regardless of there being a UNC or not. Soon thereafter Dr. Arlt brought me a very valuable present from Gen. Berger, a Walther automatic pistol with an inscription on a gold handle. I was very sorry to part with it later.

The next day after meeting Gen. Berger I met Gen. Waechter. We had a long talk right there in the presence of Dr. Arlt, Col. Wolff, and Col. Sparmann. During this talk I made a formal formulation of all concepts pertaining to the establishment of the UNC and a Ukrainian Army. I had them put down in writing and quoted them as follows:

1. The Ukrainian National Committee will be recognized by the German Government, the act of recognition to be officially announced by none other than the Foreign Ministry because I was appearing in the name of Ukraine,

as the official representative of Ukrainian political organizations;

2. The UNC will issue its own political declaration, its representatives must have the right to make public appearances and political declarations, and hence the UNC should be treated as a contracting partner of Germany;

3. The UNC is to be the sole official representation of Ukraine in Germany (my purpose was to eliminate the Ukrainian Section of KONR);

4. The UNC should have extra-territorial rights in Germany as the representation of the Ukrainian nation;

5. All civil and military authorities in Germany should respect all acts and documents of the UNC, and they should be considered official documents;

6. The UNC should have the recognized right to enter into relations with political representations of other nations enslaved by Moscow;

7. The UNC demands the right to form a Ukrainian National Army on German territory, and all Ukrainian units and individual soldiers of Ukrainian nationality, voluntarily or involuntarily incorporated in the German Army, should be transferred to the Ukrainian National Army, with all civil and military authorities of Germany aiding the UNC in this;

8. The Ukrainian National Army will serve under the Ukrainian national banner and under its own command, and it will be under the ideological leadership of the UNC. The Army will swear allegiance to the Ukrainian nation;

9. The UNC will have the right to extend legal protection to all Ukrainian nationals residing in German territories as forced labor, and will demand that they be given equal rights with citizens of other nations.

Finally, I added as a point of information that the UNC would seek ways to make contact with the Allied Commands in order to inform them about the UNC and about

the Ukrainian cause; the UNC would find a proper means to proclaim the readiness of the Ukrainian National Army to cooperate with Germany in the struggle against the common enemy—Moscow.

I made a separate and emphatic demand that all soldiers of Ukrainian nationality who are forcibly kept on the Western front and are thus compelled to fight the Allies should be withdrawn from that front immediately and put under orders of the UNC.

I ended with the words: "I can accept the chairmanship of the UNC only on condition of compliance with the last and all other demands."

Perhaps in somewhat changed form, more as give and take, I had already made these demands known previously to Dr. Arlt and Prof. Von Mende, hence Gen. Waechter was prepared for them and showed no surprise, although they were indeed bold considering our position of emigres.

As will become apparent from the Declaration of the German Government, all my demands were accepted, including the right to dispatch a delegation to the Allied Command. More on this later.

After some thought Gen. Waechter replied that he understood my position, and that under existing circumstances that was the only way for me to act, and that he was personally very happy that I had so taken to heart the cause of the Ukrainian soldiers and hence also of the Ukrainian Division "Halychyna" which he had helped establish and for whose fate he felt fully responsible. Further he made a proposition that I should try to find an opportunity to declare at least military cooperation with Gen. Vlassov. I answered that this cooperation would be feasible if Gen. Vlassov would take a positive stand toward the UNC, and that formally this is already expressed in point 6 of my demands, since Gen. Vlassov was fighting for the liberation of the Russian people and had no reason

to be hostile toward Ukraine (personally I thought otherwise then and now).

My interpreters were Dr. Arlt and partly Col. Wolff who spoke Polish very well, they did not omit anything, I noticed this since I had a sufficient command of German. The talk lasted upwards of three hours, and left me completely exhausted, but morally satisfied.

On February 25, Dr. Kubyovych (who had come from Lueben, the seat of the Ukrainian Central Committee) and I were invited to dinner in the home of State Secretary Dr. Striber. Dr. Arlt was present, too. During the talk with Dr. Striber I had a feeling that the situation was already clear because in his opening remarks he mentioned the actual existence of the Ukrainian National Committee.

In spite of these apparent political successes, I went hungry most of the time since the Germans went hungry, too. At that time I consented to the plan of some of my officers, and sent Capt. Serdyuk and Lieut. Martyniuk to Lueben with authority to bring food supplies from there, which had allegedly been evacuated from Krakow. After several days of difficult travel they came back empty-handed. The food was there, but some "important officials" had been passing the buck and finally for lack of railroad cars the supplies fell into the hands of Soviet troops.

After consulting Dr. Arlt I spent time on talks with our own political representatives regarding the personnel of the Board of UNC and plans of its work.

For the period of transition until some kind of staff could be organized, I had to assemble a provisional working staff which was simultaneously the office of the Ukrainian National Committee and the Staff of the Army.

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The Ukrainian National Committee and the Command of the Ukrainian National Army

IN MY negotiations with Col. Melnyk, Mr. Bandera and Mr. Dolenko I stated that I was giving them a completely free hand as far as the personal composition of the UNC Board was concerned because I believed that organizations should send delegates of their own choice. I made it a point, however, that Professor V. Kubyovych would be my deputy. I thought that the Board of the Committee should consist of five members and a secretary: myself as chairman, Prof. Kubyovych as deputy chairman, one member from among new emigres from eastern Ukraine, one representative of OUN(m) and one of OUN (b). Mr. V.A. Dolenko wanted either Prof. Dubrovsky or Prof. Vetukhiv to represent eastern Ukraine, but when both refused, he asked O.P. Semenenko, an attorney from Khar-kiv who gave his consent.

Both fractions of OUN declared that Prof. Kubyovych should be considered as representing western Ukraine, and that their organizations had no candidates for office in the UNC. Their attitude was quite understandable to me. The situation at the front was quite obvious by that time: why take a chance? Moreover, during my last meeting with Col. Melnyk in the presence of Mr. D. Andriyevsky and Mr. O. Boydunyk, the latter asked me: "General, what are you doing at Fehrhelliner Platz?" Obviously, I could just as well have asked him what he was doing there because if he had seen me there, he must have been there, too. That

last talk was quite dramatic, all those present believing that there was no longer any sense in engaging in the activities of UNC: the reds were at the gates of Berlin, and the Allies had crossed the Rhine. The best way out for me would have been to take advantage of the chaos, go west and hide until the Aliles came. There was a great "but" to all this, however. They forgot that I was a soldier with my honor and courage at stake, and that I would not flee or hide. They probably wanted to forget that they had taken part in entangling me in this situation, and that I could not very well, following all the prior talks and attempts, resign and tell Dr. Arlt that Col. Melnyk was withdrawing the mandate given me by the OUN. We could not cut off Dr. Arlt who had done so much for the cause of the UNC even if it were true that politics knows no sentiments . . . I doubt whether these gentlemen gave serious thought to the fact that through its "Himmler's" Germany still had enough power to fight it out and finish all of us, even including Dr. Arlt and General Waechter. I thought it odd that such apparently serious people would lose sight of the fact that we were looked up to and counted on by our friends and allies: the Caucasians, Byelorussians, Cossacks, Turkestanians and others; I don't know how they could forget about the pressing need to save the soldiers of the "Halychyna" Division which was in a precarious position of being threatened with delivery to the Bolsheviks by a capitulating Germany. Our talk ended with Col. Melnyk reserving the right to recall his OUN from participating in the UNC.

A directly opposite stand was taken by S. Bandera of the other OUN group: "full support to the end, whatever it may be." The OUN(b) organization and its members were always full of good will and respect for the cause entrusted in my hands, and gave me their support as long as the UNC existed.

This made me change my plans as to the composition of the governing body of UNC. It would consist of territorial representatives of Ukraine with consideration for a so-called "emigre key," i.e. O. Semenenko would represent eastern Ukraine and new emigres, V. Kubyovych western Ukraine and its emigres, and I the old emigres. This plan was readily approved by V.A. Dolenko and Prof. Kubyovych who gave me all possible moral support in this difficult moment. V.A. Dolenko proposed Mr. P. Tereshchenko, an old emigre to be Secretary.

In spite of everything I felt very badly about being unable to get the advice of President Livytsky because I knew that he was the only person who could give me good advice and needed support. I decided to visit him at the first opportunity. The opportunity came on February 26. President Livytsky greeted me very warmly, heard my detailed report on the situation and finally told me that Mr. Boydunyk had already been to see him and asked that I should be made to change my mind about the UNC. Mr. Boydunyk's main argument was that this might expose Ukrainian political leaders to the danger of being charged with collaboration with the Germans. I replied that two months ago Mr. Boydunyk had not brought the argument of alleged collaboration, although the situation was then just as muddled as today. President Livytsky was in full agreement with me and said: "My soul is always with the soldiers, I also understand their logic and that is why I am now with you; continue doing what you believe to be necessary, but for the sake of tranquility find some way to cut yourself off from dependence on political organizations; I was always of the opinion that politicians should take their lessons in politics from soldiers, you probably remember what Clemenceau said, 'politics is too difficult to entrust it to generals,' but I think that it depends on the individual." I asked President Livytsky to let me take from

his personnel General O. Vyshnivsky (the Commander of the 7th Blue Regiment of 1919 mentioned before) and Major Ya. Fartushny. The President consented and told me to ask them. I found them with ease because they lived in the same village, they consented and came to join me in Berlin soon thereafter.

It should be noted that neither I, nor the UNC had any funds for living expenses or for current disbursements. I had been quietly hoping that the leaders of our political organizations would take care of these matters, and I personally never considered making any requests. Professor Kubyiovych, however, a gentlemen and realist, had not forgotten about financial matters: one day he came to me with his cashier, Mr. A. Mylanych, and handed me 5,000 German marks.

At that time many military men of various ranks began visiting me, and every one of them insisted on seeing me personally. Among them was General M. Omelyanovych Pavlenko, who came from Augsburg and offered his services. I was able to offer this deserving general the chairmanship of the UNC Military Advisory Board, a position that I created just for him, and the General accepted. The General, however, had no money for his fare back to Augsburg, and I had to borrow 500 marks for him from Lieut. Martyniuk.

Dr. Arlt, of course, remembered my financial needs, too, and offered me 20,000 marks through Prof. von Mende. I directed Lieut. Martyniuk to accept the money and to issue a receipt for the amount as a loan for UNC.

After my return from the visit to President Livytsky to Berlin, I talked about the UNC with Dr. Arlt from the angle of new difficulties on the part of Ukrainians, but instead of giving me a direct answer, he said that all formalities leading toward recognition of the UNC by the German Government had been completed, that all my demands had been met, and that a formal declaration of

the act of recognition would take place in the Foreign Ministry according to my request, but it would take a few days to overcome technical difficulties. Dr. Arlt advised me not to wait for completion of formalities, but to finish my organizational work as soon as possible because the situation on the eastern front was perilous. I had an urge to tell Dr. Arlt "too late," but bit my lip in time because he was not responsible for the situation.

I asked Dr. Arlt to help me find Col. P. Samutyn whom I wanted to appoint as the Army Chief of Staff, but without success. In the meantime Col. A. Valiysky came to Berlin, and I gave the position to him. I appointed Major D. Bakum, an experienced officer, to be Chief of the Chancery and Inspection Department. I entrusted supplies to my brother, Col. O. Shandruk-Shandrushkevych, and at his request I made Lt. Martyniuk cashier and quartermaster. Capt. V. Serdyuk and Lt. Stryisky were my liaison officers, and when Major Ya. Fartushny arrived, I made him my personal aide. Gen. O. Vyshnivsky also arrived at that time, and took over military affairs in the UNC as my deputy. I requested Metropolitan Polikarp, then in Berlin, to appoint a military Bishop to the Ukrainian National Army, but since there was no bishop available, he appointed the Very Reverend Protoierey Biletsky as Army Protopresbyter. Attorney Colonel Ruzhytsky, mentioned earlier, became Attorney-General of the UNA.

Many of the officers who now reported to the Staff of our Army had been Ukrainian officers during the 1917-1920 period. Most were now in civilian clothes, but quite a few were in German uniforms and with reduced rank. They simply deserted from their German units feeling sure of protection of the UNC. Those whose rank had been reduced, e.g. former colonels now serving as majors, I ordered restored to their full rank and I had documents issued to them certifying that they were under the command of the UNC. I myself started to work immediately

on establishing insignia for UNA soldiers, and I referred to my work on this subject on the Ukrainian Staff between 1928 and 1936. But here I was faced with insurmountable difficulties: It was impossible to get even our traditional stars, not to mention Ukrainian tridents and ribbons. In determining insignia for ranks I had to face reality: to put them on collars, sleeves, or shoulders. As the Soviet insignia were worn on collars and sleeves, I ordered ours to be worn on shoulders.

I had a lot of trouble in assembling a uniform for myself and finally I had to wear an overcoat of German design because there was no cloth nor time to make a new one for me, or even to make all the necessary alterations to a German coat. On the left sleeve of my coat I had a trident made of yellow cloth. It was also impossible to buy or order a cap, so I wore a simple German military cap decorated with a trident badge which one of my soldiers gave me. Our uniforms, as can be seen from pictures, were traditional, and epaulettes were according to my design drawn when I was still on the Staff of the Ukrainian Ministry of Military Affairs. In addition, I also wore the S. Petlura Cross.

At that time a great number of officers began to report to our Staff, from generals on down; one of them, long retired and inactive, began to talk such nonsense about our attitude toward the Germans and about the need to establish two divisions immediately that I thought he was either a provocateur, or crazy. Delegations began arriving from military and labor camps requesting that camp inmates be drafted into the Army or transferred into purely Ukrainian camps because the Russians were furiously agitating that all should join the ranks of Gen. Vlassov's army, and on the other hand secret Communist agents were telling people not to join anyone because the Red Army would soon liberate them all. Ukrainians in the camps were in favor of joining the Ukrainian forces and this led to fights within

camps and Ukrainians were not sure of their lives. I talked the matter over with Dr. Arlt, and within a few days a fine military camp in Nimek near Berlin was put at my disposal which could hold 3,000 men. There I immediately establish a collection point for the 2nd Ukrainian Division which was at first called the "Ukrainian Anti-Tank Brigade." My plans were to rename the "Halychyna" Division as the First Ukrainian Division when circumstances would permit. All who wished to join the Ukrainian National Army were directed to the Nimek camp, and we had 2,000 men assembled there shortly. Dr. Arlt helped us procure uniforms (unfortunately German), food and arms. I gave orders for Ukrainian national yellow-blue colors to be worn on caps and sleeves, but many soldiers were ready for this and put yellow tridents on a blue background on their sleeves. Colonel of the General Staff P. Dyachenko whom I had appointed commander of the Brigade ordered all soldiers to wear tridents and this was accomplished within a few days. Col. Dyachenko went to work with real vigor and in two weeks the Brigade became a real unit. When I inspected the Brigade I found the soldiers in fair physical condition in spite of their intensive training, and the percentage of sick men declined to an unbelievably low figure.

In a talk with Prof. Kubyovych on March 8, we tried to find a way to legalize the UNC on the Ukrainian part on a wider basis. He proposed that the matter be discussed at a meeting of prominent Ukrainian representatives which he called to Weimar for March 12-14 for the purpose of determining aid to the Ukrainian civilian emigres by the Ukrainian Central Committee, and possible liquidation of the latter, since its functions were being taken over by the UNC. In addition to Dr. Kubyovych, the following took part in the conference: his deputy in the UCC Dr. Kost Pankivsky, a well-known leader and attorney from Galicia, attorney V. Dolenko, Prof. V. Dubrovsky, Prof. M. Vetukhiv, Dr. M. Shlemkevych, Mr. A. Mylanych, Mr.

A. Figol, Dr. Kotyk Stefanovych, Lt.-Col. Bisanz, and others whose names I did not, unfortunately, note. There was probably a total of 16 persons. The meeting first heard my full report on the military situation, and then on organizational matters of the UNC. I put particular emphasis on difficulties arising out of the new attitude of OUN(M), and pointed out that this attitude of the OUN was the result of their best intentions for the good of the Ukrainian cause. I ended my report with the question: "what are we to do?" I think that Dr. K. Pankivsky was the first to speak after me, and he was very emphatic in his demand that all Ukrainian emigres (in Germany and German-occupied areas) give their full report to the UNC. Mr. V. Dolenko, Dr. Shlemkevych and all others who spoke clearly demanded continuation of the work of the UNC, and Prof. Kubiiovych spoke of the need of the existence of the UNC to save our soldiers. There were no dissenting votes, or even doubts. The conference approved my candidacy as President of the UNC unanimously.

At that moment a new conception occurred to me: to eliminate the formal participation of our political parties in the UNC, and to establish the UNC on an anonymous factor, "the Ukrainian community." My new idea had the approval of the UNR government in the person of President A. Livytsky, and of the OUN(B) in the person of its leader Stepan Bandera.

After the conference I went to see President Livytsky who, as I mentioned, was living near Weimar. I gave him my report and presented my new idea to him with which he was very pleased and said: "I knew that you would find a way out." I then presented the problem of the High Command of the UNA: the UNC was to issue a resolution that I was being appointed Commander of the UNA, but I personally, and many of our older soldiers were legalists, and we would like to get an order of my appointment from

the Supreme Command of the UNR Army. President Livytsky promised to do this, and within a few days I received the following order:

“ORDER. To the Army and Navy of the Ukrainian National Republic. No. 8. March 15, 1945.

Re: General Staff: Lieutenant-General of the General Staff Pavlo Shandruk is hereby appointed Commander of the Ukrainian National Army as of March 15, 1945. (Signed): A. Livytsky, Commander-in-Chief; (signed) M. Sadovsky, Major General, for the Minister of Military Affairs; Certified copy of the original: (signed) A. Nosachenko, Lt.-Col. Seal.”

After my return to Berlin Dr. Arlt informed me that on March 15, an official reception would be held in the Foreign Office and State Secretary G. Steengracht was to proclaim and deliver to me the Declaration of the German Government recognizing the UNC headed by me. I wanted Dr. Kubivoyvych to be present at the ceremony, but he had not returned from Weimar.

I wore a borrowed black suit, and Dr. Arlt and Col. Wolff took me to the Foreign Office. There were a number of high military and civilian German dignitaries present, among them State-Secretary of the Propaganda Bureau, G. D’Alken. Dr. Arlt, who wore the uniform of a Lieutenant Colonel, introduced me. Soon State Secretary Minister Steengracht entered the audience hall in full uniform and regalia, and all rose. He approached me and apologized that Minister Ribbentrop could not attend because of illness, greeted me, and standing in front of me read the Declaration and handed it to me. The following is the text of the Declaration:

“Reichsminister Alfred Rosenberg. Berlin, March 12, 1945.

To: General Pavlo Shandruk, Berlin-Charlottenburg. In order to make possible the full participation in the decisive phase of the war against Bolshevism, and to introduce the proper order into national relations in Europe, in the name of the German Government I recognize the acting organ of the national representation of Ukraine formed by you as the Ukrainian National Committee.

I declare:

(1) The Ukrainian National Committee is the sole representation of the Ukrainian People recognized by the German Government;

(2) The Ukrainian National Committee has the right to represent the interests of the future Ukraine, and to manifest same in Declarations and Manifestoes.

After final clarification of the matter of assembling those Ukrainians who are serving in the German Army, I shall make a demand that all Ukrainian units be joined together for the formation of a Ukrainian Liberation Army.

(signed)—ROSENBERG."

Minister Steengracht then added orally, since my demand had been oral, that the German Government consents to my taking immediate steps, with the aid of Dr. Arlt, toward withdrawing Ukrainian soldiers from units on the Western front. He noted with a smile that he was aware of the fact that although such an order had been already issued by the Wehrmacht Command, it was belated because the Ukrainians had already deserted from there.

Without my asking, Minister Steengracht explained that the Declaration of the German Government was signed by Minister Rosenberg because of the division of internal competences in the government.

Wine and canapés were served. I counted the number of people present and found a total of "thirteen," including myself. All offered me congratulations, and the Dr. Fischer

mentioned before paid me the highest compliment when he said in Ukrainian: "You are one of the few who knew how to conquer the Germans without a fight, and your name is mentioned by all Germans." State Secretary D'Alken informed me that the German Radio had already broadcast the news about the UNC, and that questions were coming from all over: "who is General Shandruk?" Minister Steengracht talked with me for a few more minutes and did not hesitate to note that the Germans should rue the fact that they did not have the courage to perform this act in 1941. He did not mention any names, but I understood whom he meant.

After we left, Dr. Arlt said to me: "The Allies have conquered us, but you helped us conquer Hitler."

During the reading of the Declaration I thought again "too late." All the Germans present probably thought the same because now there was no power that could save them, certainly not the UNC, nor all the Committees put together. The only explanation is that Dr. Arlt and Gen. Waechter wanted to exonerate themselves and probably all Germans "before Ukrainian history," and most certainly wanted to save Ukrainian intellectuals, which is true when we consider the personal characteristics of the two men and their part in Ukrainian life. They could accomplish this only thanks to their power within the German nation and because under the existing circumstances there was no one to oppose them.

And so it happened. No one can imagine what went on inside me. I could only say one sentence to Dr. Arlt: "The Bolsheviks are near Kuestrin"—sixty kilometres east of Berlin. Nevertheless this was an event: right after I came to the Staff office I received numerous congratulations from friends and allies, Caucasians, Cossacks, Byelorussians, Turkestanians and others who had also formed their national committees.

26

The UNC and UNA Staff at Work

N^{UMEROUS} urgent tasks awaited the UNC, and it was also clear that some matters would have to be hurried. The greatest obstacle to all undertakings was the situation in Germany: communications and transportation were disrupted to such an extent that it was impossible to move even within Berlin, and more and more time had to be wasted waiting in air-raid shelters.

The most important task was the legalization of the UNC, i.e. drafting and adoption of its charter. I invited the members of the UNC Board to a meeting on March 17: Prof. V. Kubyovych, attorney O. Semenenko and Mr. P. Tereshchenko (engineer), just a handful of us. The order of the day was: discussion of a brief charter drafted by me, appointment of the Commander of the UNA, and drafting of a Declaration of the UNC and appeals to Ukrainian soldiers and civilians. I proposed a number of other matters, such as: discussion of making contacts with the Allies; the problem of evacuating Ukrainian civilians to the west to prevent their capture by the Bolsheviks; the problem of some kind of taxing Ukrainians to raise funds; the problem of press and information; my visit to the 1st Ukrainian Division which, according to reports of the German Command of the Southern Front was supposed to be disarmed and interned as unreliable; the problem of control over the staff of Ukrainian Propaganda headed by Major K. Datsko, etc.

Mr. Semenenko stated that his health did not permit him

to take part in the work of the UNC, and that he must leave for the west within a few days. He proposed that all duties of the Board of the UNC be transferred to me as President of the UNC, i.e. that I should make all decisions and be personally responsible for everything. Prof. Kubyovych and Mr. Tereshchenko joined in this proposition, and the latter added that he was also going west and disappearing in the underground. I asked Prof. Kubyovych how long he was going to stay in Berlin so that I could seek his advice if necessary. The professor replied: "this will depend on circumstances, but certainly not for long."

Decision No. 1 of the UNC Board gave me broad powers, actually full powers without any control, and decision No. 2 appointed me Commander of the UNA with all privileges of a Commander-in-Chief. The members refused to discuss all other problems referring to decision No. 1. After that I did not see either Mr. Semenenko or Tereshchenko, and I had occasion to seek Prof. Kubyovych's advice only a few times.

Soon thereafter, or perhaps it was even before March 15, our political representative in the 1st Ukrainian Division Dr. L. Makarushka came to see me, arriving from Austria where the Division was then stationed at the front. He informed me of conditions there, and I promised to visit the Division soon.

The next problem to solve concerned the Ukrainian press and radio, so as to provide an opportunity to inform the Ukrainians, and our friends and allies, the Caucasians, Byelorussians, Cossacks, and others about the situation and work of the UNC. At that time a Ukrainian newspaper was published in Berlin whose chief editor was Mr. Bohdan Kravtsiv. Mr. Kravtsiv paid me a courtesy call and offered to put the newspaper "Holos" at the disposal of the UNC. I thanked him and asked him to continue publication and to keep in touch with the Army Staff which would supply

him with material. Major K. Datsko,* however, who was chief of "Ukrainian Propaganda" raised the question of taking over the newspaper "Holos" as chief of propaganda activities. Due to the then existing circumstances, the entire UNC existing in my person, I did not have any actual executive power and my whole authority rested on my personal prestige, I was therefore compelled to transfer "Holos" to the UNC Department of Propaganda, and Col. K. Datsko stayed as chief.

During a meeting with our well known novelist Ulas Samchuk, I had offered him the position of chief of the propaganda department of the UNC, but he declined. Even the transfer of this department to the competence of the UNC cost me a lot of effort. We had agreed that Mr. B. Kravtsiv would continue as chief editor, and the name of the newspaper would remain "Holos" with the addition of the words "Ukrainian News, organ of the UNC," but for some unexplained reason there was a change of personnel, and the subtitle "organ of the UNC" was omitted. Editor Kravtsiv came to me complaining that I had "broken my promise," and I had no answer for him. Among the many difficulties the worst was that nearly all our intellectuals with whom I was dealing refused to understand my position. Everyone thought only of himself and had his own demands, they would not understand that this was no time for personal ambitions, but only one duty: to help me. To illustrate the point better, I wish to say that I had issued an order to my closest coworkers that they should come with all minor matters only to Col. Wolff (this was approved by Dr. Arlt). Col. Wolff made conscientious

*Maj. Datsko presented Red Army credentials indicating that he had been proposed for promotion to the rank of Lt-Col. and Colonel respectively.

According to the regulations of the UNC I commissioned him a Colonel, with the provision that his rank would have to be confirmed by the Ukrainian Government.

notes of all requests, but he could obviously do nothing—what could any German do at that time, on the eve of surrender, and with the whole country in ruins? Still, this did not help, and I was being bothered with all kinds of personal requests. Even Col. Wolff, catching a brief moment when we were alone would say to me: “General, don’t your people understand anything?” One can imagine what position I was in.

While I was in Berlin, two issues of “Ukrainian News” came out in two weeks. The first contained the Declaration of the UNC and decision No. 2 on my appointment as Commander of the UNA, but I did not consider it advisable to publish decision No. 1 on transfer of all powers of the UNC to me. The second issue of “Ukrainian News” contained two appeals: “To the Ukrainian Community,” and “To Ukrainian Soldiers.”

The following is the text of the “Declaration of the UNC” which does not contain one word about relations of the UNC with Germany—it required no little courage to come out with it, and no less understanding on the part of the Germans to accept it with tolerance.

“DECLARATION OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

The Ukrainian National Committee has been established by the will of the Ukrainian Community living in Germany and in countries allied with Germany.

The establishment of the Ukrainian National Committee is a new page in the community of Ukrainians who are deeply imbued with a love for their HOMELAND and would like to see it free from conquerors.

The Ukrainian National Committee is the spokesman of these desires of the community and will hold steadfastly on that road which leads to the establishment of a sovereign national state.

Hence the Ukrainian National Committee has under-

taken to organize the Ukrainian National Army which is to renew the fight for Ukrainian statehood. The Ukrainian National Army, in Ukrainian uniforms, under national banners consecrated in previous fights, and under our own Ukrainian command, will be under the ideological and political leadership of the UNC. It will be composed primarily of Ukrainians who are in the German Army, and in other military and police formations.

The future statehood should be built by Ukrainians strong in mind and body, and deeply aware nationally, therefore the UNC will take legal care of all Ukrainian citizens in Germany, of equalizing workers with citizens of other nations, and primarily of giving them the widest possible religious, moral, cultural, and material aid.

Long years of alien borders which divided Ukrainian lands have produced differences in ideas and actions. This must disappear in our common march to a common goal.

The Ukrainian National Committee wishes to accelerate this process of unification of Ukrainian souls not only by means of a wide educational campaign, but also by a unified Ukrainian approach to all matters. In its activities the Ukrainian National Committee will cooperate with National Committees of other nations enslaved by the Bolsheviks who are fighting for their freedom and independence just as the Ukrainians are. The Ukrainian National Committee is staunchly dedicated to carry out the duties imposed on it by the Ukrainian community, to the best of its ability.

It will certainly carry them out if every Ukrainian individual will lend all his power to the common struggle for the common victory.

Headquarters, March 17, 1945. (signed) PAVLO SHANDRUK, LIEUT.-GENERAL, GENERAL STAFF; PROF. DR. VOLODYMYR KUBIYOVYCH; ATTORNEY OLEKSANDER

SEMENENKO; ENGINEER PETRO TERESHCHENKO, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE UNC."

Many people had sent me drafts of the Declaration, but my associates could not agree on any of them in our discussions, I therefore drew my own draft, utilizing the ideas of the proponents to some extent.

I wish to emphasize that neither in the Declaration, nor in Appeals or numerous personal appearances, did I ever even attempt to garb the UNCommittee with any attributes of a Ukrainian government—the Committee was to be only "a spokesman of the wishes of the Ukrainian community," and, of course, an organ of technical aid.

The situation at the front was now threatening Berlin, and I began thinking about the need to move the 2nd Ukrainian Division away.

In order to make the Division purely Ukrainian, I decided to have it solemnly sworn in during an official review. I issued orders to Colonel P. Dyachenko, Commander of the Division that the oath would be administered on March 28, and asked the Very Rev. Biletsky to hold a divine service and swear the men in. I drafted the text of the oath and sent a copy to the Very Rev. Biletsky and to all Ukrainian units with which we were in contact. When I arrived in Nimek at 10 in the morning, the Division stood in full dress on the parade grounds, and the middle of the quadrangle stood a beautifully decorated altar (with flags and tridents) for the Divine Service. After taking Col. Dyachenko's report, I inspected the ranks of the Division (over 1,900 soldiers stood at attention), and in reply to my greetings, the companies answered "Hail Ukraine." Those words sounded like music in my ears, coming from those fine soldiers who had suffered so much. On command of Col. Dyachenko the banner was raised and carried to the

altar by an honor guard. After the service I spoke to the soldiers, and then the Very Rev. Biletsky read the text of the oath, (subsequently the 1st Ukrainian Division took the same oath, too). Each soldier approached the altar, kissed the Cross and Holy Gospel, knelt, kissed the banner and said "I do." At that moment I felt that fate had rewarded me and all those soldiers for all our sufferings and misfortunes. It was an unforgettable sight when each soldier kissed the banner with tears in his eyes, and then saluted me with a position at attention. Neither I, nor any participants in this ceremony would have believed earlier that this could be taking place with Hitler still alive. The ceremony took several hours, and after it was over, Col. Dyachenko invited the Very Rev. Biletsky, Col. Wolff and me to a simple army dinner. At my request we ate together with the soldiers. I thanked Col. Dyachenko warmly for the fine attitude of the soldiers and for the beautiful songs they sang during our dinner. I ordered that the next day should be free of any duties, and I informed Col. Dyachenko that the division should be ready to march soon. Col. Dyachenko's aide and chief of his staff, Lieut. V. Hladych made a very good impression on me. He answered all my questions about the Division intelligently and from memory.

Text of the oath for the Ukrainian National Army:

"I swear to Almighty God on His Holy Gospel and His Living Cross that without regard for life or health, I shall always and everywhere fight with arms in my hands under the Ukrainian National Banner for my people and for my homeland, Ukraine. Aware of my great responsibility as a soldier of the Ukrainian National Army, I swear that I will carry out all orders of my superiors obediently and without question, and that I will keep all service orders secret. So help me God and the Holy Virgin."

Address to the soldiers of the 2nd Ukrainian Division:
"My Soldiers: 28 years ago our fathers took up arms to defend the independence of the Ukrainian State, and to defend our sacred national idea. It was then not our fate to be victorious because not all were united in a single purpose, a single goal. Only for this reason we were overwhelmed by a hundred-fold wave of enemy forces. But even in this apparently hopeless situation we did not renounce our Idea, and we did not bow our heads to the enemy. Many of us went into exile, we did not surrender to the hostile demagoguery about the Soviet paradise and about the brotherhood of nations within it. We continued the fight for liberation. Now you, my soldiers, taking an example from your glorious fathers, have left that paradise, and have here taken up arms in the name of liberating Ukraine from Bolshevik rule. You did not bow your heads to the enemy, either.

Today the enemy has again taken our land and wants to destroy the Ukrainian people to the root. He is sending your dear kinfolk to Siberia, to slave labor, or he drives them to the front lines under the eyes of NKVD detachments.

We have but one road and one goal: to renew the armed fight for Ukrainian freedom and to win. Yes, win—because just to die would be foolish. We want to win, and we shall win.

Representatives of the Ukrainian community have now been given the right to form a Ukrainian National Army. When we go into battle for the liberation of our HOMELAND, we shall not be alone because with us are hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian insurgents who are fighting heroically behind enemy lines, destroying enemy units, communications, and military objects.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army is growing from day to day . We must help them because only the common effort of the entire Ukrainian people will assure

our victory. No one will make a gift of freedom to us. In this struggle the German troops are on our side, and we will be joined by troops of our friendly allies of nations enslaved by the Bolsheviks: Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Cossacks, and others.

We always gave a good example of great sacrifice in the name of the fight for an independent Ukrainian State, and now we, descendants of glorious forefathers must show that we also know how to fight for the freedom of the Homeland.

You have been given the honor to manifest to our allied friendly nations that you are the **FIRST UNIT OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ARMY SWEARING ALLEGIANCE TO ITS NATIONAL BATTLE FLAG.**

You must never forget this, particularly when we shall go into battle for our **HOMELAND** under our Banner consecrated in blood. Remember that your mothers, fathers, and sisters are waiting for you. Our Homeland is waiting for us. And we shall return to it with victory.

Glory to the Ukrainian people, glory to our Homeland, and glory to you, my soldiers."

The correspondent of "Holos" reported. "The silent tension was broken with a powerful response of 'glory' three times after the General's speech, and reached the woods. There was unconquerable courage and sincere joy in the eyes of the soldiers. That is why the steps are sounding so hard in the parade march of the columns, that is why the General is greeted with such a manly sound of the Ukrainian battle-song."

After my return to Berlin I started to work on drafts of an appeal to the Ukrainian community, and an appeal to Ukrainian soldiers, the first to be issued by the UNC, and the second by the UNA Command. Unfortunately, there was no one in Berlin at that time to help me in drafting

them. Only Professor Pavlo Zaytsiv, who visited me by chance, read the drafts at my request and found their contents meaningful.

The "Appeal to the Ukrainian Community" is fairly long, and its full text can be found in copies of "Holos—Ukrainski 'visti" (Holos—Ukrainian News) No. 20/226, Sunday, April 8, 1945, if such copies can be found in Ukrainian libraries. Nevertheless it might be worthwhile to cite here at least the aims and purposes of the UNC. Both appeals had really nothing to do with then existing circumstances, I merely wished to record our inflexible desires and ideological connection between our desires, tasks, and tradition of our liberation struggles.

"To the Ukrainian Community"—. . . the Committee believes that its basic purposes, to which all interests of the community and of the individual should be subject, are the creation of a Ukrainian National Army and cooperation with it of all national political forces which are already opposed to Bolshevism . . .

In addition, we must realize once and for all that we can gain national independence and safeguard it for the future only by force of arms, only by military power.

Realization of this single purpose under existing circumstances of war tension, *will form a basis for the work of a legal Government of Ukraine* along the solution of the following problems:

1. Safeguarding a state order and organization of state and social conditions in Ukraine;
2. Restoration to all classes of the nation of their right to property in land, freedom of work, and personal freedoms;
3. All-round development of national culture;
4. Assurance of absolute equality under the law for all inhabitants of Ukraine, regardless of origin or language differences;

5. Assurance of old-age pensions and disability compensation;
6. Freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, etc.;
7. Giving an opportunity to return to the homeland to those who are abroad against their will;
8. Abolition once and for all of any partition of Ukraine and her people among neighbors, and thus complete unification of all the inhabitants and citizens;
9. Establishment of good relations with neighbors who respect our national independence and who will show goodwill toward a common effort for lasting peace . . .

(Signed by all members of the UNC).

According to this appeal, the UNC was to create a basis for future activities of a legal Government of Ukraine.

"Appeal to Ukrainian Soldiers"

"You have already given up in the fight against the enemy what is dearest to man: home, family, property. But the dearest of all spiritual and material values is freedom. Freedom means free life in a free and independent homeland.

Our forefathers fought for this dearest of all treasures of man and nation: the State.

But you did not cease in the fight since 1917, either. You are fighting with arms, deed, example, and word. You have not been broken by the Siberian tundra, nor by the tortures in Bolshevik jails. There is not, nor there shall ever be such power that could break a Ukrainian.

Here in an alien land, you Ukrainian citizen-soldiers have proved by your work, your will, and by your staunch attitude and unity that the Ukrainian nation will not lay down arms notwithstanding all adversities, until they gain the right to be free in their own sovereign state . . .

The Ukrainian National Committee and the Ukrainian Command appointed by it appeal to you, Ukrainian

Soldiers, to seek all possible means to join the armed ranks of the Ukrainian National Army.

The Ukrainian National Army, as you already know from the Declaration of the Ukrainian National Committee, has one purpose: struggle against Bolshevism for our own nation, for our own sovereign state . . . Alongside our ranks in this struggle are ranks of soldiers of all nations who, like you, know but one sacred motto: for the nation, for the state . . .

Ukrainian Soldiers: the Red enemy brings death and destruction. He is looking primarily for those who have as yet not bowed their heads to him because he is afraid of them, afraid of the power of their spirit, afraid of their faith in victory . . .

Let us remember, however, that the enemy is strong, and therefore complete victory requires: that all without exception join the organized ranks of the UNA, that they have full faith in their national leadership and command; that we prove to the whole world our national, political, and social discipline; and that we are ready at all times to make the greatest sacrifice of our lives, blood, and property.

This is the foundation of our victory.

This is the foundation of our nation and state.

(signed) LIEUT.-GENERAL, GENERAL STAFF, PAVLO SHANDRUK, COMMANDER OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ARMY."

The most burning problem was getting ready to transfer the 2nd Ukrainian Division to the west. Dr. Arlt suggested that I should call on Field Marshal Schoerner, Commander of the Middle German Group of Armies whose headquarters was in Bohemia, and to ask him to include the Division in his Group. I consented, but decided to explain to the Field Marshal that he should not use the Division for combat because it was still organizationally raw, and that only in an extreme emergency could it be used in

battle. In the company of Dr. Arlt I left for the Headquarters of Field Marshal Schoerner on April 2. We travelled by car equipped with a so-called "samovar" i.e. a wood-burning device. The speed was only 15-18 kilometres per hour, and we had to stop for a fresh supply of wood every 100-120 kilometres. The wood was not always dry and this made our trip much longer. We had to pass through Dresden which had been bombed the previous day and was now all in flames. In this instance it was hard to understand the purpose of bombing this center of museums and monuments of old Saxon and Germanic culture. Around noon the next day we came to a railroad station near Zittau, and there in railroad cars and without any camouflage was the Staff of the Army Groups of Field Marshal Schoerner. The Marshal was a neat, tall and square man with a large head, about 60 years old, who asked me rather brusquely what my business was. I introduced myself and explained in a few words that I wanted him to take the 2nd Division of Col. Dyachenko into his Army Group, and if possible not to send it into combat because the men had not as yet fully recovered from their hard life in camps. The Field Marshal's face brightened and he said directly: "And here I thought that you came to give me a political education; are you an officer of the tsarist army?" When I answered affirmatively, he asked me to have dinner with him. The point is that on the trip I had asked Dr. Arlt to characterize the Field Marshal, and I composed a plan of approach: everything was to be said briefly and clearly. During dinner we had an opportunity to talk more sociably and in more detail, the Field Marshal himself began asking about the UNC, the UNA, my plans, and particularly what was to be done with the "Halychyna" Division. I gave brief answers, but to the point, and was helped in this by Dr. Arlt. After dinner, the Field Marshal wished me luck and advised me to see the commander of

the tank corps, General Count G. von Strachwitz right away, since the command of the 2nd Division would be transferred to him. In parting the Field Marshal presented me with a bottle of some supposedly very old and good liqueur which I, on the advice of Dr. Arlt, immediately gave to the officers of the Field Marshal's staff. We went to see General von Strachwitz who was just then convalescing from heavy wounds received in battle with Soviet tank units. The Count and Countess received me very nicely and he promised to satisfy my wishes in full. He ordered one of his aides to take me to a large neighboring village where the 2nd Division would be quartered in school-buildings. I must note here that during Col. Dyachenko's last report to me I gave him very confidential instructions to avoid having the Division drawn into battle at all cost, and to look for an appropriate moment to make contact with the Allies or else to march straight west. I knew that this order was difficult to carry out, but still, under the existing chaos, it might be possible.

When we returned to Berlin we had to face the problem of an immediate evacuation of the Staff and for me to leave Berlin because the Bolsheviks were already fighting in the suburbs. But due to circumstances the Staff was already compelled to carry out the functions of the UNC, i.e. to take care of the Ukrainian civilian population even from camps located far from Berlin, and particularly to take care of wives of soldiers who had joined the 2nd Division. At that time the Quartermaster of our Staff received a loan of 80,000 marks from the German State Bank which had been requested for us by Dr. Arlt and Prof. von Mende. We gave a receipt for it as a State loan to the UNC, and my deputy, General Alexander Vyshnivsky ordered the QM to pay the soldiers' wives 30 marks each. All officers of the Staff and of the 2nd Division were paid 250 marks each, and the men 50 marks. The Berlin office of the

Ukrainian Central Committee had been formally dissolved and all its employees went west, mainly to Bavaria. We started an immediate evacuation of the so-called "heavy" department of the Staff and of some institutions under the UNC, such as newspapers, radio, etc. They were moving west toward Weimar, which it was alleged, would fall into Allied hands. I and the "light" part of the Staff were to go to the 1st Ukrainian Division which was holding the front against the Bolsheviks in Austria, on the Feldbach-Voelkermarkt sector near Graz. Col. Wolff was to evacuate the heavy Staff. Later we learned that there was a general dispersal, and some groups as well as individual Staff officers and employees of the UNC had each to "fend for himself."

Even before leaving Berlin I had a chance to visit a group of our youth who were serving in the anti-aircraft defense of Berlin and vicinity. In Berlin this was an old stone building with "flak" guns mounted on the roof. What is referred to as our youth, were actually children, the oldest boy being only 17, and there were also girls among them. Dr. Arlt accompanied me and I did not even have to ask him to evacuate this and other similar groups from Berlin as parts of the UNA—he promised to take of this himself. In my Staff headquarters I gave an order to gather information about such groups of children and to inform them immediately that they are part of our Army and will be evacuated with our Staff toward Weimar.

In the meantime many other Ukrainian military formations reported that they wanted to join the UNA: Free Cossacks under the command of Col. Tereshchenko (unfortunately they were scattered all over Germany in various detachments, there was a total of over 700 of them); the 281st Reserve Regiment in Denmark with over 5,000 men; the Brigade for special tasks under Commander T. Bulba-Borovets with over 400 men; two infantry regiments

on guard duty in Belgium and Holland totalling about 2,000 men; 3 battalions of MP's; in other words the UNA together with the 1st Ukrainian Division and Reserve Regiment of the Division totalled between 35,000 and 38,000 soldiers. According to German estimates there was a total of over 220,000 soldiers of Ukrainian nationality in the "Ukrainske Vyzvolne Viysko" (Ukrainian Liberation Troops), but among them some may have been non-Ukrainians. In any case if the Germans had thought about it sooner, the UNA could have had over 250,000 soldiers.


The numbers cited included also units of anti-aircraft defense, the history of these children has been very well recorded by Prof. T. Bilostotsky who, together with Prof. Zeleny cared for them on behalf of the Ukrainian Central Committee. Both named gentlemen came to see me at one time and reported on the matter, and I immediately intervened to have all groups of anti-aircraft units transferred to my command, but there was no time to check whether my request had been complied with. Incidentally, there were similar units of children of other non-Russian nationalities whose representatives also asked me to take them under my care (the manuscript of Prof. Bilostotsky is in my possession; it would be desirable to find a publisher for it).

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
On the Way to the 1st Ukrainian Division

ACCOMPANIED by Dr. Arlt I left Berlin on April 7th in the afternoon to visit the 1st Ukrainian Division, going through Prague and Linz. Later, near Spittal (Austria) we were to be joined by General Waechter. Dr. Arlt informed me that Gen. Waechter was to be the representative of the Wehrmacht High Command attached to me, and he was going as chief of the Foreign Office Eastern Department. This time we went by car driven by real gasoline. We were to be followed by trains and trucks carrying officers of my field Staff headed by Gen. M. Krat whom I wished to appoint commander of the 1st Division in place of the German commander General Freytag. Colonel V. Malets was to remain in Prague because I ordered him to form a 2nd Reserve Brigade in Czechoslovakia.


On the way to Prague we stopped at a place where part of Field Marshal Schoerner's Staff was quartered and there I met a prominent German scholar of eastern European problems, Professor Werner Markert. In a long talk with him (he also knew Russian) I learned that his political views were in opposition to the official policy of Hitler and of such henchmen of his like Koch (the unlamented commissar of Ukraine) and Frank (the hated Governor-General of Poland), and for this reason he had sought a face place in the Wehrmacht. He was, to some extent, partial to Rosenberg's views and gave unquestioned sup-




1st LIEUTENANT




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
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
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


MASTER SERGEANT

Designations of Ranks, U.N.A.



General Shandruk's speech on Anniversary of the Battle of Brody. Left, General Krat; Right, 1st Lt. B. Skaskiv, Chairman of the ceremony.



General Shandruk receives report of Commander of SUM (Association of Ukrainian Youth in the U.S.A.) at ceremony commemorating 300th Anniversary of Hetman B. Khmelnytsky, June 1957.

port to Dr. Arlt in his views on the need for independent national states in Eastern Europe and in the Caucasus.

There I also met the well-known Ukrainian patriot and top nationalist leader, Rev. Dr. Ivan Hrynioch. At a modest reception given me all German officers awaited with tension what kind of an attitude toward the UNC and me would be announced by Father Hrynioch. I noticed that Dr. Arlt sighed with evident relief, and all others looked happy when Fr. Hrynioch spoke in perfect German about the usefulness of the UNC and UNA, and about his satisfaction that I was at the head of both. Afterwards in private talks Fr. Hrynioch told me in more detail about the existence and activities of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR) and about the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in action. This was the first time I had heard from a trustworthy source of the existence of organized resistance in Ukraine, and of military and political action of the UPA against both occupying powers of Ukraine. Of course, I had been informed about the UPA while still in Berlin by Commander T. Bulba-Borovets and Dr. V. Stakhiv. Now, from Fr. Hrynioch I learned that the UPA was active along a wide sector of Ukraine: from the Carpathians to Volyn, Podilla, and Kiev provinces, some transient actions taking place even in Left-Bank Ukraine. The UPA had begun its organized action against mass liquidation of the Ukrainian population and plunder of the land by the Germans toward the end of 1942 and in the winter of 1943. The UPA was a real threat to the Germans with 20,000 organized troops even in the early stages. They had a fine reconnaissance service and appeared with immediate retaliation for injustices inflicted upon the Ukrainian population. What heavy battles the UPA had to wage against the Germans is evident from the fact that in a series of clashes with the Germans in Galicia and Volynia early in 1943, the UPA alone lost over 1,500 men.

To cope with the UPA the Germans put several divisions in the area first under Gen. Bach and later under Gen. Pritzmann; tanks and aircraft were used, but still they could not conquer the UPA. The Bolsheviks fought the UPA, too, and resorted to such measures of provocation as to send parachutists behind German lines which would kill and rob the Ukrainian population representing themselves as UPA members. When the Red Army approached Galicia and Volynia the Bolsheviks dispatched a large band of 6,000 partisans under Commander Kovpak deep into the German hinterland. This group penetrated as far as the Carpathian foothills where it was destroyed by the regular German Army and mopped up by the UPA. It is a noteworthy fact that the UPA was joined by many soldiers of the Red Army of non-Russian nationality, as Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, Cossacks, Armenians, and others. The Bolsheviks reoccupying Ukraine were treating the population with increasing brutality with large areas being taken over by NKVD troops, young people suspected of UPA activities were executed and large numbers including many children, were deported to concentration camps in Siberia. Nikita Khrushchev, then First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and Stalin's chief deputy in Ukraine was primarily responsible for these brutalities. When the Germans were retreating from Ukraine, Hungarian and Rumanian troops that had been fighting alongside the Germans, deliberately avoided getting into any conflict with the UPA, and some of their troops even joined the ranks of the UPA. General Taras Chuprynka Shukhevych, a renowned Ukrainian national hero was Commander of the UPA.*

The news I learned from Fr. Hrynioch and his assertion

*Cf. "Brody," collection of articles edited by O. Lysiak, article by Rev. Dr. I. Hrynioch "The Halychyna Division and the Ukrainian Underground," Munich, 1951.

of possible contact with the UPA through his intermediary led me to another idea. I asked Fr. Hrynioch if he knew anything concrete about the real battle-value of the Reds and how long, in his opinion, could the Germans hold out against them. Fr. Hrynioch's answer, however, left no room for speculation. In his belief, the Soviet troops were not capable of firm resistance as proved by the fact that whenever the Germans managing to stage a counter-offensive, the Reds fled in panic. The point, however, was that German troops were already completely demoralized, and hence were unable to offer any resistance. Soviet tanks troops were the best part of the Red Army. We spent nearly the whole night exploring our political and military chances, looking for a way out in view of the impending German surrender. We agreed that both our 1st and 2nd Divisions were in a particularly dangerous spot. Circumstances were all against trying to get the 1st Division fight its way east to the homeland, although we did not reject this concept entirely in the event that there would be no other solution, i.e. if there was danger of the Division being turned over to the Bolsheviks. The contagious calm of Fr. Hrynioch and his realistic appraisal of circumstances and people prompted me to ask him to accompany me on my visit to the Division, particularly since he had contact with a number of officers in the Division. This would be of great help to me if I had to resort to force in removing German officers from command. Fr. Hrynioch consented, and his prestige with some officers in the Division was indeed helpful to me. As I learned later, his general directive to those officers was: "In all matters rely on further decisions of Gen. Shandruk."*

From my talks with Fr. Hrynioch I gained the impres-

* Ibid., detailed information about the UPA can be found in: "History of Ukrainian Armed Forces," chapter on the UPA by Prof. Lew Shankovsky.

sion that in all my moves to save our soldiers I would have the full support of the nationalist Ukrainian circles, and that the idea of salvaging the most important factor for our struggle on behalf of Ukraine—military power—united all Ukrainians. I found this out during my conference in Weimar and it now was confirmed by Fr. Hrynioch.

We reached Prague on April 11. The city had not been destroyed by bombs and presented a near-normal picture. I found quarters in the Adlon, the best hotel in town. My first worry on reaching Prague was to find contact with Professor Roman Smal-Stocki who was under surveillance of the Gestapo. I wanted to consult him about making contact with the Allies, and to acquaint him with the position of the UNC and of the 1st Ukrainian Division. Dr. Arlt promised me on our way to Prague that he would see to it that Prof. Smal-Stocki is freed from surveillance immediately. I got in touch with the Professor by telephone, and he said that he would see me in my hotel. I asked him if he was already completely free, but he had not been informed about this as yet. During the course of our personal meeting the Professor told me that he would try to inform London about the UNC and UNA. He did not conceal his anxiety that there may be a lot of trouble in store for me and the Ukrainian troops because the Allied Military Command was not acquainted with details of European politics, and in particular it does not treat the Bolsheviks with necessary caution, as it does not know Moscow's real aims nor its political game. The Professor advised me to seek immediate contact with the British Command when British troops would get closer to Austria (the 1st Division was on the front-line of Gnass-Gleichenberg-Feldbach, near Graz), and that I should have ready with me a memorandum in English outlining the Ukrainian cause, the necessity for the UNC, and my own brief biography. To my question whether it would be

advisable to seek contacts with the British through Polish liaison officers of Gen. Anders who were attached to major British groups, Prof. Smal-Stocki advised me to utilize all possible contacts, including this one, so long as this could save me and my troops from the Bolsheviks. He thought that Germany would surrender in 2-3 weeks, and this would be a moment demanding extreme caution and at the same time action, so as to get the Allied Command interested in Eastern European problems. Sharp attacks against the Bolsheviks should be avoided because the Allies might react unfavorably.

After my meeting with Dr. Smal-Stocki I asked Dr. Arlt immediately whether he had done anything about freeing the former from Gestapo surveillance. Dr. Arlt had taken care of this matter, and Dr. Smal-Stocki informed me soon over the telephone that he had been invited to the Gestapo where he was very politely informed that he was completely free.

I had to stay in Prague two whole days to talk with various people. The most interesting and the most pleasant was my meeting with the President of the Kuban National RADA military commander, Professor of Engineering V. M. Ivanys. We exchanged views on the position of Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, we both then doubted whether the Bolsheviks would occupy that country. Prof. Ivanys was very apprehensive about the Kuban Cossacks stationed in southern Austria and northern Italy under the command of General Shkuro. He requested me to take Cossack units under my command if an opportunity arose, and on his part he promised that I would get the full support of Cossacks and Ukrainians living in Czechoslovakia. Professor Ivanys was of Ukrainian origin and he taught at the Ukrainian Husbandry Institute.

One day in the lobby of my hotel I was approached by an older and very serious-looking military man with the

insignia of a lion on his sleeve (insignia of the 1st Ukrainian Division), and crosses on his collar, and introduced himself as Canon V. Laba, Dean of Chaplains of the Division. His very first words impressed me that here was a highly cultured and determined person. Canon Laba told me all details about spiritual and religious life in the Division, and emphasized that all 9 chaplains attached to the Division were carrying out the duties of their calling, they stayed in the front lines alongside their troops and stood up for the rights of their men. For this, the German commanders considered them "politically suspect," and enemies of Germany.

Canon Laba told me in detail that the Metropolitan of Galicia, Archbishop Count Andrey Sheptytsky had given his blessing to the initiators and soldiers of the Division, and ordered Bishop Josaphat Kotsylovsky to bless the entire Division before its march to the front. This fact indicated to me that the organizers of the Division acted on serious national and political premises.

During his temporary absence from the Division, Canon Laba appointed Fr. Mykhailo Levenets his deputy. He recommended him to me with the following words: "This is a Soldier-Priest whose courage and wisdom saved a large detachment of the Division surrounded by the Bolsheviks in the Battle of Brody." I thanked Fr. Laba for the information and for the pleasure and honor of hearing from his own lips about the extremely important matter of spiritual life of the Division—I always remembered the words of Suvorov: "Who has not been to war, does not know how to pray." It was to the great merit of the late Metropolitan Sheptytsky and our hierarchy and political leaders that in spite of the anti-religious attitude of Hitlerism, they had succeeded in creating the institution of chaplains in our Division.

I appointed Col. Malets commander of the 2nd Reserve

Brigade and asked him to keep in touch both with Prof. Smal-Stocki and Ivanys. On the other hand, I asked all Ukrainians with whom I had been in touch in Prague to help Col. Malets when needed. The brigade was never formed, as I had foreseen because developments were going on fast.

After two days in Prague we proceeded through Linz and the eastern slopes of the Alps, across the Tauernpass, via Spittal, and Klagenfurt to Voelkermarkt. The road across the Alps was very difficult with the strong sun melting the snow and torrents rushing across roads. Many times we had to push our cars. Finally on April 17 we reached Voelkermarkt. Father Hrynioch remained with his car in Spittal to have some political talks there, but he rejoined us the next day.

28

The 1st Ukrainian Division

BEFORE we reached Voelkermarkt Dr. Arlt issued orders from Klagenfurt to Col. Marx, commander of the 1st Reserve Regiment quartered in Voelkermarkt, to reserve accommodations for me and my staff in the only hotel in that town. On arrival in Voelkermarkt I left the hotel to take a walk and see the town for myself. The first Ukrainian officer I met Lieutenant Roman Tsiolko who contemplated my Ukrainian general's uniform with mystic awe, but introduced himself right away. I asked him what he was doing now and asked him for detailed information about the reserve regiment, and particularly about Col. Marx. When Lieutenant Tsiolko learned who I was, he told me that the reserve regiment had 3,000 men, that Col. Marx and General Freytag (Division commander) disliked Ukrainians for their overt and demonstrative Ukrainian patriotism, and that they had removed all Ukrainian commanding officers to a special officers' reserve company. Col. Marx in particular was the embodiment of Nazi animal instincts bordering on sadism. Accompanied by Tsiolko I went to the reserve regiment to announce my arrival to Col. Marx in person, and to find out what impression he would make on me. Lieutenant Tsiolko announced my presence to the aide who jumped up to greet me, introduced himself, and said that Col. Marx was temporarily away, and would I sit down and wait. A few minutes later Col. Marx came, gave me a glance, and walked into his office. Several more minutes passed, Col. Marx did not

react to my arrival, and I left with Lieutenant Tsiolko who looked confused and frightened. On the way to my hotel I met Captain Lubomyr Maletsky who had been convalescing in Voelkermarkt. He was very cautious in his answers to my questions. Our officers, veterans of 1917-1921, were waiting for me at the hotel, headed by Col. Borys Barvinsky wearing a captain's insignia. They all looked happy to see me, and I in turn ordered them all to change their insignia to the appropriate ranks of our army. This they did, and the very next day appeared before me with their Ukrainian ranks.

General Waechter and Dr. Arlt arrived later in the evening, and I told them about the incident with Col. Marx. I had, of course, made my decision to remove him from his position, but I wanted to explore the ways and means of carrying it out. Both immediately left to see Col. Marx, and when they returned about one hour later, they apologized profusely for his lack of tact, and justified his behavior by the fact that he had been a non-com promoted to officer rank for valor in battle, that he had been severely wounded in one eye and did not see well. I replied that he probably had not lost his hearing, and knew from his aide that I had come to the regimental staff. They asked me to receive Col. Marx who was soon to report to me officially. I did not show my anger, and when Col. Marx came I received him and took his written report about the condition of the regiment. Late that night in a talk with Gen. Waechter and Dr. Arlt I raised the problem of Col. Marx, and told them that I would request Gen. Freytag for his immediate removal. They did not answer me, and I announced that next morning we would visit the Divisional Field Headquarters. I learned from my own men later, who were in charge of radio communications between the Division and Regiment Staff (this was the only communication because communist Yugoslav partisans were systematically destroy-

ing telephone wires running along the river Drava), that General Waechter and Dr. Arlt on one side, and Gen. Freytag on the other, had been conferring all night long.

On April 19, I, General Krat, Gen. Waechter, Dr. Arlt, and Lieutenant Tsiolko whom I appointed my aide, went to visit Gen. Freytag under guard of two armed cars. We came to the Field HQ located in a car on the edge of a woods near a very small hamlet consisting of a few houses. My plans were to appoint Gen. Krat commander of the Division in place of Gen. Freytag immediately, and that is why he came with me. We alighted from our cars in front of a school which served as officers' club. Gen. Freytag was waiting for us, he introduced himself, and gave an oral and written report about the condition of the Division. The General was a fairly corpulent man, and did not make a good impression on me. I had a feeling that he was forcing himself to appear subservient and a good host. He introduced his Chief of Staff, Staff-Major W. Heike. When the General proposed that I should take a rest and eat, I answered that first I wanted to find out about the operational position and more details about the Division (*Ordre de Bataille*, etc.). Major Heike as a good staff officer was ready with maps and papers, and ordered a table to be brought out. Gen. Freytag showed the Division's exact position on a spread-out map, its contacts with neighbors to guard against possible flank attacks with the terrain being much in our favor. He gave an estimate of enemy forces and of his behavior facing the Division. Major Heike supplemented the report with findings of frontal fortifications and their crews, deployment of units and reserves, artillery positions, observation posts, liaison, organization of listening in, organization of a second line of defense, organization of alarm signals, etc. To my question about possibilities of air reconnaissance Gen. Freytag replied that the Army Staff had conducted deep opera-

tional reconnaissance to discover possible concentrations of enemy forces, and that tactical reconnaissance was difficult due to configuration of terrain (hills and woods). I asked that question deliberately to find out whether the Divisional commander understood the possibilities of tactical air reconnaissance. Gen. Freytag supplemented his answer with a very apt assertion that enemy air reconnaissance was observing the frontal feeder roads of the Division only once a day. The next to give his report was the Division quartermaster, a captain whose name I do not remember. He took an entirely different line and wanted to limit his report merely to a few paragraphs of superficial meaning, but I asked him about the status and organization of provisioning, material and technical equipment, organization of sanitary service, plans of possible evacuation or retreat (bridges, roads, transportation, etc.), and about the percentage of effectives in the Division. Major Heike requested permission to take part and gave all detailed information, particularly about the organization of intelligence. I had the impression that the quartermaster knew everything, but being an orthodox Nazi it was below his dignity to report to a man of "inferior race" even if he wore a general's uniform.

After the reports I asked General Freytag the name of the Division in official German listing, and when he replied "14th Division of Grenadier Arms SS," or sometimes "Division Halychyna," I emphasized my words, and said: "From the moment of my arrival the Division will be called '1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army' of which I am the Commander-in-Chief; please announce this in the next Divisional Orders." Gen. Freytag looked with embarrassment at Gen. Waechter and Dr. Arlt who were sitting fairly close to the table, but they discreetly nodded their heads affirmatively—this was nothing new to them, as that problem had been decided in Berlin.

There was a modest tea after the reports, and then I invited Dr. L. Makarushka, who had been present during the reports, to join me in a private talk, on official internal matters. We talked late into the night, and I was given all the details. First of all, Dr. Makarushka informed me about the organization and completion of the Division and its personnel: I learned that it was composed of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the extent of 90%, and a small percentage were former Red Army men, mainly young boys who were Ukrainian patriots and fine soldiers; very few command posts were held by Ukrainians; that all Germans from Gen. Freytag down were treating the Ukrainian soldiers with contempt; that supplies were completely in German hands and that there had been instances of misappropriation, but under Gen. Freytag all German officers and non-coms went unpunished; provisioning and sanitary services were inadequate; the Division had only horse transportation and this impeded logistics; that all instances of the slightest violation of discipline by Ukrainian soldiers were brought before a court-martial instead of superior officers, and so on. Incidentally, Dr. Makarushka, who had been a captain of the Ukrainian Galician Army before and whom I promoted to Major of the UNA on the spot, was very much surprised by the behavior of Gen. Freytag during the report—his swagger and rudeness had disappeared. We talked about the possibility of removal of Gen. Freytag and replacing him with Gen. Krat. For the time being we decided to abandon my proposed coup d'état after taking into consideration the fact that the Division would face unbelievable difficulties if we removed Gen. Freytag, particularly since the Division was surrounded by large units of German troops. Here I must note that in addition to these realistic considerations, I was also moved by my conscience: General Freytag won me with his behavior and report, and I thought that in view of the

early end of the war there would not be any sense to make this change now. I was also bothered by the thought that perhaps our soldiers had been oversensitive in their national feelings. Obviously, I could not pass over one matter lightly: the matter of the Division's part in the Battle of Brody in July 1944.

As far as they were able, Major Dr. Lubomyr Makarushka, and later other officers who took part in that battle, particularly Capt. Mykhailo Lishchynsky and Capt. Martynets, gave me a sad picture of that battle in which the Division suffered unprecedented losses. Without proper air and tank support, in spite of a promise by the command of the 4th Tank Army, the Division was brought into battle at a moment when neighboring German divisions could no longer contain the Reds' attack, and the Division was encircled. In several days' heavy fighting the Division lost nearly 7,000 men out of 11,000. Even at the very start of the battle Gen. Freytag had lost all contact with his regiments, and instead of trying to re-establish such contact, he left to join the Army Staff. At that time our experienced officers, particularly Chaplain-Major Mykhailo Levenets, took over command of individual units and following general directions furnished by Staff Major Heike who valiantly stood his post at the front, succeeded in leading the remaining men out of the entrapment. The total number of survivors was about 4,000 men, part of whom joined the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). The saddest part of Gen. Freytag's behavior was that contrary to military conscience and honor he complained about the behavior of the Division's soldiers, whereas Major Heike* asserts that the soldiers showed miraculous courage, especially in combat against enemy tanks. According to the estimates of Major Heike, out of the 7,000 casualties, at

* Major W. Heike: "Battle of Brody," *Collection "Brody"* Munich, 1951.

least half the number were killed.* This is ample evidence that the soldiers fought with exceptional courage: they felt that they were fighting for their own homeland. Most of the onus for the Battle of Brody fell on Gen. Freytag, and justly so. How odd, then, that when the Division was subsequently reorganized and completed, Gen. Freytag was again in command.

I was billeted in a farmer's house, the Ukrainian national banner with my Commander's insignia was hoisted over the house and Ukrainian soldiers stood a guard of honor. Several days later Gen. Freytag made a request to me that German non-coms should be permitted to stand in my guard. I could not help but accept with good grace. Gen. Krat stayed with me, but when I stood by my decision not to change the command of the Division, Gen. Krat left for the Army Staff in Voelkermarkt.

In addition to my demand to change the name of the Division, I issued a written order to Gen. Freytag that he announce in Divisional orders: (a) how many Germans were serving in the Division, (b) that there were no Russians in the Division, (c) that in the event of German surrender the Division would attempt to fight its way to the Allies, and (d) that those German commanders who are either hostile to Ukrainian soldiers or hated by the latter would be removed from the Division immediately.

Within the next several days I visited all units along the front line. The Germans were surprised at this because Gen. Freytag had never done this. I looked into all details of Divisional activities, and visited the Division Hospital and ambulance points. Chaplain-Major Levenets and Major Makarushka accompanied me on those inspection trips. I complied with the request of chaplains and visited the graves of our fallen soldiers, taking part in memorial serv-

*I lost my own brother in the Battle of Brody, Lieutenant Petro Shandruk.

ices. The graves were well kept with fine crosses on them: the chaplains attended to all this in spite of the fact that the graves were less than a mile from the front line.

I ordered the Division to be sworn in on April 25, the text of the oath was the same as that administered to the 2nd U. Division of Col. Dyachenko. Chaplain-Major Levenets officiated, and the oath was taken on a nice open field surrounded by hills and woods. The following units took part: the 30th Regiment in full complement, since it was in the Division's reserve, and delegates from the 29th and 31st Regiments, and from all special detachments of the Division. Many officers and men had tears in their eyes when they gave the oath, and German officers and non-coms swore the oath along with Ukrainians. General Waechter and Dr. Arlt were present, but not General Freytag, and we did not blame him for it. We had already received Ukrainian insignia ordered from Prague and almost all soldiers wore them. After the oath Father Levenets spoke about the meaning of the oath to all Christians, and I spoke about the need to preserve our traditions of the struggle for independence. Then there was a review, and the earth groaned under the marching step of my dear soldiers. I observed the bright look in their eyes on this sunny day when they turned to me. The look of gratitude in their faces for the right to be Ukrainian soldiers repaid me for all prior anxieties.

On April 26th I asked Gen. Freytag to accompany me on a trip to the Army Staff. I wanted to pay a visit to Army Commander General d'Angelis, but Gen. d'Angelis gave me a message through Gen. Freytag that he would visit me. I met the General the next day, and as with the Commander of the Corps, I took up with him the matter of pulling the Division out of the front line prior to the German surrender. Gen. d'Angelis was in full agreement with my request. He was a very pleasant and sociable per-

son, and invited me to have dinner with him the next day, this did not take place, however, as the General had to leave suddenly under orders.

On April 27th I received a copy of Division Order No. 71 of April 27, 1945* which informed all Division personnel of instructions for the Division as per my orders; the following are the appropriate excerpts from this order:

“III. Instructions for the Division.

1. The Division is and remains a purely Ukrainian armed unit . . .

General Schandruk continues as Commander-in-Chief of all Ukrainian units, including the 1st Ukrainian Division . . .

There are 11% Germans in the Division . . .

There are no Russians in the Division . . .

3. In the event, that following an official German Reich surrender, the Eastern Front is surrendered to Bolshevism, the Division will immediately fight its way as fast as possible to the rear, to the Anglo-Americans . . .

V. Immediate measures.

1. The commanders will order all German personnel who are in strong opposition to the Ukrainians because of special events, to report to be transferred to the Field-Reserve Battalion. Personnel hating Ukrainians or hated by them are not to be kept . . .

Thus, my order had been complied with.

Finally, after I had become acquainted with the position

and status of the Division, I asked Gen. Freytag whether he knew about Col. Marx' behavior toward me. Gen. Freytag showed me a copy of a radiogram to Col. Marx in which the Colonel was sharply reprimanded. Gen. Freytag asked me not to pursue the matter any further.

*The original of this Order has been given by me to the files of the Brotherhood of Soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Division in U.S.A.

On April 29, Gen. Waechter, Dr. Arlt, and I went to Voelkermarkt. I had a radio in my hotel room and I knew that Germany was on the eve of surrender. Gen. Waechter and Dr. Arlt went to Italy to find out about the Cossack Division of General Shkuro and to help him meet me, and discuss the chances of joining his Division with the 1st Ukrainian Division for joint action facing the Allies.

I ordered the Reserve Regiment of Col. Marx to be sworn in on April 30. Col. Marx met me with his report on the field where the Regiment stood at attention in battalions. When I was inspecting the battalions he took command of each and in turn reported every battalion to me, introducing each Battalion Commander in turn. After the inspection came the oath and a review: I found the Regiment no less impressive than the Division.

Nothing happened in the next several days and we were all curious how the war would end. General Shkuro* came to see me on May 2, but during our talks he did not display any desire to put himself under my command or to join me, and in addition, he was quite drunk. He hoped to be able to join the Cossack Corps which was in Yugoslavia under General von Panwitz, and with the help of General Draja Mikhailovich's Chetnik's, the Corps would attempt to reach Greece. I did not think that the Communist dictator of Yugoslavia Tito would let the Cossacks through to Greece, and things did not look too bright in Greece, either, with the struggle against the Communist chieftain Markos Vafiades. In any case, I advised Gen. Shkuro to try and get his division out of the front line facing the Allies even before Germany would surrender. In this, Gen. Waechter and Dr. Arlt would help him.

Captain M. Lishchynsky reported to me on May 2, and

*Gen. Shkuro was given up to the Bolsheviks by the British and hanged in Moscow in 1947 along with General P. N. Krasnov and others.

brought me details about the situation. He had lost his right arm in the Battle of Brody and was now working in the 6th department of the Divisional Staff. In the opinion of his department the position of the Division was critical. He suggested immediate removal of all Germans from command posts in the Division and Reserve Regiment, and replacing them with Ukrainians. Capt. Lishchynsky argued that such a change would facilitate proving to the Allies that the Division was formed for political ends other than German, and that it had only been tied to Germany as long as circumstances forced us. The Captain further explained that the idea had been spreading among soldiers that I should give an order for the Division to disperse, or to break up into small groups, and join fighting units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). I understood the soldiers' feelings, but I said that I had already taken steps to inform the Allies about the UNC and UNA, and that I had personally joined the Division to be with the men at this critical moment as their Commander-in-Chief, although formally, as President of the UNC I could be carrying out my duties far from the Division. I emphasized that we would not impress the Allies by such a move, but on the contrary, we might put ourselves in jeopardy: the Division was still in battle contact with the Bolsheviks, and being surrounded by strong German units, the Germans, with nothing to lose, might let the enemy through our wings for the purpose of taking us prisoner, in this situation very few of us would survive. Moreover, any hostile activity against the Germans would deprive us of provisions. I added that these considerations made me reject the idea of legally replacing all German commanders with Ukrainians.

As far as joining UPA was concerned, we knew that UPA was operating in the Carpathian area at that time, and one had to have a very high degree of imagination to be-

lieve that with heavy concentration of Soviet troops in Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia, soldiers of our Division could, singly or in small groups, reach the Carpathians, about 600 kilometres away in a straight line. If they were to follow roads, were they to go in civilian clothes or in uniform? We could expect the roads to be posted with guards at least every 2-3 miles. Besides, except for a few officers, there was no civilian clothing among our troops. And then the matter of provisioning: we had to face reality, that the German population, tired of war, would not readily feed or hide strangers, when there were already too many German stragglers begging on their way home. Subsequently I heard arguments that the Division had not been withdrawn from the front before the surrender, and that it was the fault of my Army Staff that the Germans had not carried out the promise (of General Freytag) to withdraw the Division prior to the surrender. First of all, this was a promise made not only by Gen. Freytag, but also by the Corps and Army commanders. There can be no doubt about the validity of this obligation: this is clearly evident from Order No. 71, par. 3 (quoted above) about withdrawal of the Division prior to surrender, which provided furthermore that the Division would go west, to the "Anglo-Americans." The only man competent to issue this kind of order was an Army Commander, in this instance General von Balk. The question remaining therefore, was only to get the news of the surrender. As indicated in the next chapter, I learned from General Waechter on May 8, in the afternoon, that a cease-fire would be effective at one minute after midnight, May 8 (actually in the first minute of May 9). It is quite clear that it was impossible to get the Division on the march on such short notice. According to military science based on practice, getting a Division in marching order requires, under normal or peace-time conditions, at least 5 or 6 hours. And here the Division was

stationed in a front line and we had not that much notice. All is easy in words but all is hard in practice, especially in that situation!

As I mention in this connection in subsequent detail, I went to the Division and Gen. Freytag told me that he still had no orders at 8.00 P. M. on May 8. He carried out my ultimatum orders only, and at 3.00 A. M. on May 9, the Division started its westward march. This was just about the minimum required time within which the Division could be set in motion. I wish to emphasize that I saw the German groups which were to relieve our Division moving up toward the front.

Although I had confronted Gen. Freytag with an ultimatum, I was not surprised that he did not have any orders from his superiors: what could a foreign division mean to the German command at that time when the country was going down and they had to think about their own men. General Freytag finally showed me his Army orders, but it was received when our Division was already on the move, probably around 5.00 A. M. German divisions were also moving west, but with the difference that their soldiers were riding on trucks while our Division was marching.

Finally, it was no less surprising to hear the charge that the Staff of the Army had not taken care to see that the Division would be withdrawn from the front. What Staff? In practice my entire Staff consisted of one person, and he had neither communications nor transportation. To speak of any military Staff, one should know what the term means, organically and in function. It is therefore surprising that somebody should not know that at that time my Staff was non-existent. I was lucky enough to be able to commandeer a car. I want to stress that it is easy to engage in semantics, particularly from a position of hindsight. I would therefore not gamble now and get the Division into an even more precarious position. As far as the order

to disperse the Division was concerned this was so ridiculous that I would not even discuss it. How can 20,000 men possibly disappear? And besides, such an order would place me in a position of flaunting the rules of honor, law, and morality, and would serve as a pretext to turn us over to the Bolsheviks. Finally, I said, soldiers must always keep in mind that when they go to war they must be ready to die. I asked Capt. Lishchynsky to tell the men that I was taking full responsibility for them, and that I forbid any further discussions on this subject, regardless of intents of the parties promoting these ideas. I told him that I was ordering him officially to inform all men of my position. At that moment I understood well that my responsibility for thousands of soldiers would hardly be reassuring to them as to their personal safety. They would hardly rejoice even at my death if they knew that they could not avoid it. However, I believed with firm conviction that my decision, taken after careful thought, was fully justified.

Captain Lishchynsky took my words with soldierly seriousness and used all available means to spread this "irregular" order of mine among the troops.

Ukrainian Easter fell on May 3. I gave orders for solemn observance of the holiday, and Capt. Lishchynsky initiated a modest "family feast" for the whole Army Staff with my participation. I was very much moved by this evidence of "community of sentiment" and probably of "community of responsibility" in this difficult period. I attended Divine Service with the entire Staff and the beautiful sermon by regimental Chaplain-Captain D. Kovalyuk touched me to the heart, and I shall always remember it. General Waechter and Dr. Arlt took part in the feast, and I expressed my gratitude for their courtesy.

The next day I had to hurry to the Division at the front because there had been some desertions. The Bolsheviks set up loudspeakers in their trenches and, speaking about the

hopeless position of Germany, asked our soldiers to come over to them right away because after the German surrender the Allies would turn them over to the Soviets anyway. I came to the location of the battalion where desertions had taken place, and addressed the assembled soldiers. One soldier asked for permission to speak, and described in colorful words the inevitable misfortune of those who trusted the Bolsheviks and defected to them—he was a native of eastern Ukraine and had been one of those who escaped from the Communist paradise. There were no more desertions reported to me after that.

A new Army Commander, General von Balk arrived in place of General D'Angelis, and General Freytag suggested that it would be a good idea for me to meet General von Balk and inform him of my decision about the Division; General von Balk knew, of course, that the Division was to be removed from the front, but a courtesy call would do me no harm. I thanked General Freytag for his suggestion, and we visited General von Balk together. He was a complete opposite of General D'Angelis: a curt Prussian, but he received me gracefully and said that he knew about the Division and had already issued the necessary orders, that at the appropriate time the Division would be replaced with a group of German reservists-convalescents, just to mark the front line. The group would arrive to the disposition of General Freytag within a few days. I believe that the battalion of German reservists arrived in our Division reserve headquarters on May 7.

29

The Surrender

GENERAL Waechter came to see me on May 8, in the afternoon, and announced that Grand-Admiral Doenitz who, after Hitler's suicide took over as German Chancellor, accepted the Allies' terms of surrender, and a cease-fire would take effect on all fronts at 0:01 A. M. on May 9. General Waechter said: "Now, General, you are the central figure in the action of saving the Division, and possibly of all of us who are with you." He also said that the British had entered the city of Spittal and were moving toward Klagenfurt. I called for Dr. Makarushka and requested him, as a person with political experience and well acquainted with the history and battle engagements of the Division, to assume the difficult task of going forward and meeting the British and informing them about the UNC, UNA and the Division, and to try and get written orders moving the Division and Army to the rear of the British troops. Dr. Arlt was to accompany him as interpreter, being fluent in the English language.

Several days earlier I delegated Colonel (now General) K. Smowsky with a brief letter to the Polish commander, General Wladyslaw Anders, informing him of the situation and requesting intercession with the British military authorities in the matter of moving the Division to the rear of the British. Col. Smowsky had been a contract officer in the Polish Army before the war and hence it would be easier for him to talk to Gen. Anders. I asked him to deliver my letter to General Anders in person, or, in case

of difficulties, through Polish liaison officers attached to the British command.

I had to go to the Division immediately. I ordered General Krat to head the Staff group, and after receiving news from Dr. Makarushka, to go and meet the British with his reserve regiment. At 8:00 P.M. in company with General Waechter and my aide Lieutenant Tsiolko, I was with the Division. There was some difficulty in crossing the river Drava with Tito's troops holding the roads, but we managed. General Waechter went to Graz to find out about Soviet movements. Gen. Freytag informed me that he did not have any orders to withdraw the Division from the front. In the presence of Chaplain M. Levenets I issued an ultimatum order to General Freytag to carry out withdrawal of the Division by 3:00 A.M., May 9. This was in accord with my calculations that the Division would manage to cross the river Mur (50 kilometres away) that same day. This was a major obstacle because the Soviet air force had destroyed the bridges over this river. I also ordered General Freytag to dispatch anti-aircraft defenses to guard the bridge at Leoben, where the Division was to cross. I warned Gen. Freytag that if my orders were not carried out, or carried out late, he would be put under arrest, and I would personally take over command. Chaplain Levenets watched that my order was being carried out, and informed me at 12 o'clock that units of the Division were getting ready to march. Gen Freytag asked me a peculiar question during our talk: what was he to do with artillery and ammunition? I answered: "The ammunition is to be shot on enemy positions during the night, locks and breeches from cannon should be destroyed or buried, and the men mounted on horses and sent west." The German battalion which was to take our position was late, and General Freytag left only one company in place of each regiment, the companies to leave when relieved. These companies

finally left with much delay. Thus, the Division left the front on time and made a forced march west. Movement was difficult because rain fell and the roads were mired. Passing the moving columns I rode close to Leoben with Gen. Freytag and stopped near the bridge over the Mur until the last group of soldiers marched across. The next day we arrived in Judenburg where we were joined by Gen. Waechter who warned us that a Soviet tank division was moving from Bruck to Judenburg. Near Judenburg we were joined by Dr. Makarushka and Dr. Arlt who brought a written permission for the Division to march to the rear of British troops. The chief of Staff of the British Division told Dr. Makarushka that they were informed about the 1st Ukrainian Division from above (one may presume that this was the result of Prof. Smal-Stocki's intervention from Prague). Leaving Judenburg we learned that during its approach to Judenburg the Division was surprised by a group of Soviet tanks, and had to disperse in surrounding woods until the tanks passed. The Soviets cut us off from part of our equipment, but we did not lose many men. Within several hours the Division reassembled and started on another road to St. Veit and Spittal, where it reached the British zone as I was informed by General Freytag and Colonel Marx. Another column, about 1,300 men, went through Judenburg and found itself in the American Zone because that day the area was divided into a British and American Zone. That group was directed to Tamsweg, and we went there, too; General Waechter, Dr. Arlt, Dr. Makarushka, Chaplain Levenets, General Freytag, and Lieutenant Tsiolko who were all with me. On the way we stopped in the village of Andrâ for the night. When we were to leave for Tamsweg next morning we found General Freytag missing. Dr. Makarushka went looking for him, he found him in the village and was told that he would soon join us. Within a few moments we

heard a shot, and when Dr. Makarushka went to look for Gen. Freytag again, he found him dead, the General had committed suicide. General Waechter, however, took his leave from me and said that he would try to cross the mountains to Italy, where he had friends. We learned some time in 1948 that Gen. Waechter had been interned by the British and died of tuberculosis in a camp. By night-time we reached Tamsweg, and our group of soldiers was there, too. We found shelter in a barn on straw, but the men spent the night in the woods in the open: there was no shelter, not even tents, and nothing to eat. Commander of the artillery regiment Colonel Bayersdorf was with this group, and I offered him to command it. But in the night he abandoned his men and joined some German division. Captain V. Kozak was put in charge of the group. The soldiers now had had nothing to eat for two whole days, and they had eaten their marching (canned) rations during the march. I had to go to the commander of a German corps whom the Americans had appointed regional commander, and requested him for food. He issued two sacks of beans, and for meat—one horse.

We were faced with the problem: what to do next? We decided to go to some higher American command in order to clarify our position since we were neither prisoners nor internees. We were directed through St. Johann-in-Pongau to Bischofshofen, where, on orders of a German liaison officer attached to the American command we were given two rooms in the local hotel. We stayed there for five days. Then Dr. Arlt, with his proficiency in English obtained permission for us to proceed to Salzburg, seat of the American division occupying the area. This command issued a pass to us reading: "Chairman of the UNC General Shandruk and his entourage are free to pass to Aufkirchen, Bavaria." There was obviously no sense in our sitting idle and without any news about the fate of Ukrainians and

of the UNA troops. While still passing through Judenburg, Lieut. Fediv, General Krat's liaison officer came to me, and I gave him a note appointing General Krat commander of the Division. I learned from Lt. Fediv that a greater part of the Division was marching to Spittal through St. Veit, and that the reserve regiment was with it.

We left Salzburg in two Volkswagens and reached Bad Toelz without any difficulty. American sentries checked our papers about once in every 5 or 6 kilometres. Leaving Bad Toelz we were stopped by an American guard and directed to the American command post. Major Makarushka and Dr. Arlt went inside, and when they returned they said: they found two American officers in the room who looked the pass over for a long while and then declared that we would be sent to a prisoner-of-war camp. Another officer came in then, and when he found out what was going on he said in a firm tone that there was no reason to detain us when others had let us come through, and ordered the sentry to see us to the edge of town. We went on, but on Dr. Arlt's suggestion we by-passed Munich so as to avoid possible difficulties in such a big city. We spent the night in Memmingen and finally reached Aufkirch. Many leading citizens from West Ukraine were living around Aufkirch, among them Deputy Speaker of the Polish Assembly (Sejm) Vasyl Mudryj, President of the Dairy Association of Lviv, Dr. Andry Paliy, Dr. Atanasy Mylanych, the editor Mykhailo Dobriansky, and others. After a brief visit and meal with Mr. and Mrs. Paliy, we went to a small neighboring village where the Dobrianskys offered me a room, they had three rooms in a farmer's house. Dr. Arlt stopped in another village and was hired by a farmer as laborer. The problem came up of finding civilian clothes for me, and here with the help of Mr. Dobriansky I turned civilian again. The result of my brief stay in Aufkirch in uniform, and of calling Mr. Mudryj

“marshal” (the title of speaker of the Polish parliament) was that Germans reported to the American authorities that “Marshal Modell” (alleged similarity Mudryj-Modell) was staying in their house, and soon American MPs came to Mr. Mudryj and arrested him. He was released after an explanation, but he missed some things when he got back home.

After a few days' rest I felt a subconscious urge to leave Aufkirch immediately. Mr. Mylanych helped me get a pass from the American command in Kaufbeuren to go to Weimar where, I learned, President Livytsky, some members of the UNC and UNA, were staying. There were also representatives of new emigres (from the time of World War II) headed by attorney V. Dolenko, and Professors V. Dubrovsky and M. Vetukhiv. So I decided to go there and report to President Livytsky and Ukrainian leaders on my activities.

That day when I was getting my pass for the trip to Weimar, I met the same man who denounced me to the Gestapo in 1940, on the street by accident. He looked extremely pleased at the encounter and insisted on my accompanying him to his hotel. In spite of my reluctance due to past experience with him, I went. He was staying in a first class hotel and upon our arrival ordered coffee and wine, and began calling people on the phone. He spoke Russian, to a woman it seemed, and used mysterious code words. This alerted me, I left right away and went to Aufkirch, but spent the night in a different village with Colonel Rybachuk, who lived there. When I thought about the encounter that evening, I decided to leave for Weimar immediately, and I left with Mr. Mylanych at dawn.

Later I learned from the Dobrianskys what happened during my absence. Around 9:00 A. M. of the same day I left for Weimar two cars drew up in front of the house, one with Americans and the other with Russians. They

entered the house, posted a sentry in front, and began questioning Mrs. Dobriansky about me. She told them that I had left, she did not know where I had gone, and she was not obliged to ask me. Then they all went to my room, and found my military cap. The Russian officer picked it up and said: "The cap is of German pattern and this proves that he collaborated with the Germans." At this, Mrs. Dobriansky pointed out that the cap might be German, but there was a Ukrainian trident on it. The Soviet officer looked and said: "A genuine Petlurist bandit." He took my cap and all my papers that I had left before leaving. The following event took place that same afternoon, as reported by our Catholic priest, Fr. K.: "I was walking on the sidewalk in Kaufbeuren and an American jeep drove right into me. I thought that this was accidental and jumped away, but the jeep pressed me against a wall, two American and two Soviet officers jumped out, grabbed my hands, put me in the jeep and took me to the Soviet liaison command. They started beating me up and shouted 'you are Shandruk.' I showed them my clerical credentials, and said that I was not Shandruk, but a priest. They hit me some more and said: 'You are lying, you are Shandruk, and Shandruk can turn into a priest if he wants to.' Then they went out to eat. After dinner they beat me again, and one of the officers picked the military cap from the table, tried to put it on me and said: 'Here's your cap.' But suddenly there was consternation: the cap would not fit my head at all. They looked at each other in surprise, and then one of them said: 'Then you are really not Shandruk.' They let me go with apologies, but as a result of the beating I had to spend several days in bed."

After my arrival in Weimar I delivered a detailed report to President Livytsky, members of his Government, and other prominent citizens invited to hear my report. There, I also ordered the Army Quartermaster to draw a report

on money received for the UNC, to get an auditing committee to check the figures, and to transfer the balance on hand to the UNR Government.* I stayed in Weimar two weeks, and returned to Aufkirch. In my travels I used a Volkswagen, for which I had a permit from the American military authorities. During the two weeks, accompanied by Prime Minister of our Government, Dr. Kost Pankivsky and Dr. Stepan Vytvytsky, I visited several American and British high command posts where we delivered a memorandum on the UNA, and particularly the 1st Ukrainian Division. The memorandum explained the purpose of forming the Division, and emphasized that the men in the Division were natives of West Ukraine and had never been Soviet citizens. It also explained that the UNC, UNA and 1st Ukrainian Division had not been pro-Nazi either ideologically or politically, but had merely been forced by circumstances to be formed on German territory.** In the presentations and memoranda of that time we referred to historical examples of the political and military struggle of other nations to gain independence. Our strongest arguments were those of the recent past; as for example: that J. Pilsudski formed his Legion during World War I against the Russians, while J. Dowbor-Musnicki assembled a Polish force on the Allied side; similarly the Czechs and Slovaks were inducted into the Austro-Hungarian Army, but at the same time they formed a Czech Legion from among prisoners of war in Siberia, and Czech and Slovak units

*About 19,000 DM.

**A booklet "Hanba albo Chwala" (Shame or Glory) by the well-known Polish publicist and former minister Ignacy Matuszewski came out in Jerusalem in 1945. Matuszewski cites arguments of the Ukrainian side, why the Ukrainians were forced to cooperate formally with the Germans against the Bolsheviks: "Don't think that we are cooperating with the Germans for Germany victory. We simply don't want to be in our graves when Britain, America, and Poland are victorious over Hitler. That is why we shall defend ourselves." This indicates that the Ukrainians believed in Allied victory.

fought in France under the brilliant Slovak scientist and soldier General M. Stefanik; during World War II Marshal Petain concluded an armistice (allegedly under threat of force) with the Germans, while General De Gaulle fought on the Allied side. We argued that politics must seek different ways to keep sight of the national interest. As can be seen from our, and especially my own acts, we did everything within our power to draw a line of separation between ourselves and the Germans. It is self-evident that the formation of the 1st Ukrainian Division, organization of the UNC, the UNA, and of the 2nd Ukrainian Division came at a time when there was absolutely no doubt that Germany had lost the war. This means that we were acting with the sole objective of renewing our struggle for independence, or if it came to the worst, not to fall into the hands of the enemy unarmed. Under the then existing circumstances there was hope for a third solution, and I went along the line of taking advantage of it. Moreover, official Nazi Germany was godless, but all Ukrainians taken to Germany against their will, like all Ukrainian people, were deeply religious, and all Ukrainian armed units, as has been stated above, had the official institution of chaplains.

During my stay in Weimar, Colonel Dyachenko, who had a miraculous escape with his officers from death or Soviet imprisonment, visited me and gave me his report. His Division, in spite of all his attempts, was drawn into battle against Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. During several days of rear-guard battles, the Division held out successfully against overwhelming Soviet tank groups, and inflicted considerable losses on them. But anti-tank ammunition ran out and the Division, unsupported by neighboring German units, which, in spite of the firm and heavy hand of Field Marshal Schoerner became demoralized, was finally surrounded. The Division lost more than 60% of


its men, the rest managed to get out of the encirclement, and was taken over by American troops, probably of General Patch's group.


When I returned from Weimar and the Dobrianskys told me how painstakingly the Russians had been looking for me, I decided to go to Italy, to visit the Division which had been interned in Bellaria. I had some news about the Division brought to me from General Krat by Lieutenant-Engineer Yu. Tys-Krokhmaluk. Messrs. Mudry, Paliy, and Makarushka also thought that my continued stay in Aufkirch was dangerous, and that I should move to Munich immediately. They concurred in my plan to visit the Division where my presence could be of some benefit. I went to Munich with Mr. Mylanych who took me to the Ukrainian Relief Committee, of which Prof. O. Korsunsky was Chairman, and Dr. Makovetsky Secretary. Dr. Makovetsky had requisitioning orders for apartments available, and gave me a very comfortable room in a quiet section of Munich, at Waldfriedhof, Rottenbucherstrasse 35. Our leading citizens knew about my precarious financial position, and right after my return from Weimar Dr. Makarushka gave me 10,000 marks for my trip to Italy and for my personal expenses; on his part, Mr. Mudryj gave me another 10,000 marks before my departure to Italy, and Mr. Paliy a like sum. How much that money was worth can be figured out from the fact that we paid between 400 and 650 marks for one can of gasoline on the private market. We were unable to buy gasoline officially, although sometimes the Americans would heed our pleas and give us some gas.

Soon thereafter, travel to Italy was open. I asked Father Levenets to come with me, and applied to Dr. Makovetsky to give me an interpreter. Dr. Makovetsky told me that Mrs. I. Lavrivska spoke perfect English, and advised me to take her. When I asked her husband, he said that he had

SKETCH №1

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nothing against it, if she wants to go. Mrs. Lavrivska, after I explained the purpose of the trip, said: "This is something for me." We left Munich on June 26, going through Kufstein to Spittal, the Headquarters of the British Occupation Forces for Northern Italy. After visiting several offices, we were directed to the Staff of the British Corps near Klagenfurt. We were received by a British Lieutenant-Colonel who asked who we were and what we were looking for. Mrs. Lavrivska told him what I asked her to, he looked at us, and said: "Nice company, an actress, a general, and a priest, please wait." (Mrs. Lavrivska is a famous Ukrainian actress). We were kept waiting for a long time, and I voiced the suspicion that we might be arrested. When, after an hour's wait, two huge British military policemen each over 6 feet tall joined us, everything became clear. A Colonel came out and read to us an order directing us to a camp in Agathenhof near St.Veit "as persons roaming in the rear of the Corps." Then he added: "You are looking for your people, there are many Ukrainians in Agathenhof." And the MPs took us to the camp. They were going at great speed, I was driven in my Volkswagen by their driver, and the rest of our group was in their car. Road signs showed that we were going in the direction of Bruck, and we knew that this place was under Soviet occupation. I was ready to jump from the car if it appeared that the talk about the camp was a subterfuge, but the cars turned into a side road to Agathenhof. There was a large number of Ukrainians in the camp, former slave laborers in Austria. Before the Anschluss the camp had been a resort for Austrian state employees. It was located in beautiful mountain surroundings and did not even resemble camps for internees, so well known to us from barbed wires and pill-boxes. This was quite different. The commander of the camp, a British Major Rutter, took good care of us, and after an investigation during which Mrs. Lavrivska was

quite brilliant, we were released from internment, our Volkswagen was returned to us, and we were given a pass reading: "General Shandruk and company, with Volkswagen No. 58649 are driving by the shortest route to Munich." Unfortunately, we had no gasoline, but the commander gave us one can, and we got another from an officer of our Division who was working for the Americans. His name was probably Doroshenko, in any case, he was a relative of the well-known professor Dmytro Doroshenko.

It should be added that at the beginning of this adventurous trip we stopped at camps managed by the UNRRA, spending one night at a camp in Traunstein where the commander was a Ukrainian priest, Father Fedasiuk. He was a very fine host and gave us food for our trip.

After my return to Munich, I had the opportunity to visit several camps of our imprisoned soldiers, and I brought them some food obtained by our new organization "Ukrainian Sanitary and Charitable Service," under the able management of a very efficient Major, Doctor Thomas Vorobets. Dr. Vorobets also visited the camps on many occasions.

All our soldiers in Germany, and all Ukrainians there were now under the care of Apostolic Administrator, Father N. Voyakovsky, appointed by the Apostolic See. He carried out his duty in complete devotion to the community entrusted to him. I paid Fr. Voyakovsky a visit and requested his aid to clarify the position of our soldiers. Fr. Nikolai Voyakovsky, himself a former officer of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), was most sincerely concerned with the fate of our soldiers, and was doing a great deal for them. In Germany, he personally intervened with the German Cardinal of Bavaria, His Eminence Michael von Faulhaber, and the latter used his high office to present our case to the American and German authori-

ties. Father Voyakovsky also found a way to transmit a letter from me to His Excellency Archbishop Ivan Buchko who was in Rome. In the letter I asked the eminent Prelate to take the soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Division under his protection. Archbishop Ivan answered my letter very soon, informing me that he had already visited the Division which was the object of special interest of various Soviet agencies. In a special audience (at night) the Archbishop had pleaded with His Holiness Pope Pius XII to intercede for the soldiers of the Division, who are the flower of the Ukrainian nation. I had the unique honor of exchanging letters with the Archbishop for a long time, in matters concerning the Division and other Ukrainian matters. In 1948 I had the honor and pleasure of meeting this most popular Ukrainian Catholic Prelate in person.

I learned from the Archbishop and from General Krat that as a result of the intercession by His Holiness, the soldiers of the Division were reclassified merely as confinees, and Bolshevik agents were prohibited to visit their camps. The soldiers themselves had assumed such a firm attitude toward Communist agents that they lacked the courage to face them. The files of the Division show that only a handful of soldiers succumbed to the temptations of the Bolsheviks and went "back home," but nobody regretted their leaving because they were probably either Communist agents or else people of dubious moral character. From subsequent letters received from Rimini, I found out that life in the camps had become normal: cultural and educational groups had been established, all kinds of shops were set up, a regular and a satirical newspaper were printed, there were theatrical and choral groups which made appearances in various Italian cities. Here we shall not go into details about the soldiers' life in Italy: some monographs on this subject have already been written, but a full account of camp life will have to be written by one of the direct participants. In any case I was glad that my

comrades-in-arms, although deprived of their due liberty, were nevertheless out of reach of Communist hands.

Some time in August I learned that the American authorities had arrested Dr. Makarushka and had placed him in a camp somewhere north of Frankfort where some Division soldiers were already confined. This was a great shock to me, to all our friends, and particularly to Dr. Makarushka's family: his wife, with two small children to care for was seriously ill, and died soon thereafter. Dr. Makarushka and the entire group of soldiers were released from camp several months later following a number of memoranda presented by us.

Mr. A. Paliy an engineer, was living close to me in Munich. He came to see me very often, and as Chairman of the Civil Administration of the 1st Ukrainian Division, he was much concerned with the fate of our soldiers. He initiated a number of memoranda about the Division, particularly a memorandum addressed to the Chairman of the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Great Britain, Captain Bohdan Panchuk of the Canadian Army. In January 1946 Mr. Paliy and I travelled to Oldenburg which took us in a very roundabout way covering about 1,100 kilometres spending two nights in an unheated baggage-car, to see another Captain of the Canadian Army, Dr. Kapusta, to ask for his aid in alleviating the fate of soldiers of our 1st Division and clarifying their position.

We learned finally early in 1946 that as a result of these steps taken by us, the Division soldiers would be moved to England and given the status of free settlers. Realization of this plan came, of course, much later.

The text and large number of memoranda submitted by us during that period, either directly, or indirectly (through the UCC, Capt. Kapusta, Capt. Panchuk) to the various High Allied Military Commands and representatives of

governmental and civic institutions, is evident from the fact that one memorandum was submitted to the USFE in 27 copies, and to the REFE through Capt. Kapusta and Capt. Panchuk on August 11, 1945. All memoranda were signed by me as official Commander of the UNA, and by Mr. A. Paliy as Chairman of the Military Council of the 1st U. D. In addition, every memorandum was accompanied by a letter to the given institution, signed by me with full title and rank. Thus, in spite of possible detrimental consequences, I considered it my duty to appear as the person responsible for the fate of the UNA soldiers. Mr. A. Paliy was guided by the same considerations.

Other groups of soldiers of the UNA, particularly those who were confined to camps in Germany, were released from camps and put under the care of Germany as refugees by decision of the Allied Occupation authorities in 1947. It should be added that a considerable number of soldiers did not stay in camps, but had the status of civilians. Their position became quite difficult because they were not admitted to UNRRA camps, and those who were in UNRRA camps were forced to "go back home" (to the Soviet Union) by camp commandants who permitted Communist agents to roam around the camps freely and pick their victims for repatriation. This gave rise to many incidents: soldiers and civilians often escaped from camps or committed suicide to avoid being turned over to Soviet authorities.

In conclusion of this part of my recollections connected with my work as Chairman of the UNC and Commander of the Ukrainian National Army, I wish to state with a feeling of gratitude that the late President A. Livytsky, the Government, political organizations, and Ukrainian emigre leaders freely gave me credit for my activities which, incidentally, never caused anyone any complications. I am

particularly grateful and express my satisfaction with the unselfish support given me by all our soldiers, especially those that were in touch directly with me, as General M. Krat, General O. Vyshnivsky, and Colonel P. Dyachenko. The entire officer corps of the UNA, and particularly of the 1st Ukrainian Division and their men showed exemplary discipline, unquestioned obedience, and stirring examples of confidence in me. I recall with pleasure the propaganda aid contributed to my activities by "instructors of cultural and political information" attached to all UNA units. I appreciate sincerely the aid extended to me in acquainting me with the morale of the Division by Fr. Dr. Ivan Hrynioch, and the spiritual care of Fr. Major M. Levenets. In spite of the passage of a long time since these events took place, I see signs all over and at all times that my dear soldiers and our community duly recognized my decision not to hesitate, and if needed sacrifice my life for the higher cause of the nation. I never hesitated because I knew the cause and purpose of my step. Divine Providence was with me and with my wife, with whom I became reunited in March 1946.

I do not think it is necessary to elaborate on the role of Colonel Dr. Fritz Arlt and General F. Waechter in the matter of the UNC and UNA. I tried to give an objective and complete characteristic of the aid extended by them. I have not detracted from the important part played by Col. Dr. Arlt, and I believe that not only I personally, but the entire Ukrainian community and soldiers will remember and honor this fine man.

I cannot, however, leave without comment a circular letter published in May 1947 by the leadership of the OUN (M) which stated: "The matter of the existence and activities of the UNC under the chairmanship of General Shandruk should not be given any particular importance . . ." I never expected such appraisal of my work,

but I can state with satisfaction that the rank and file membership of the OUN organization had never made me feel that it shared this opinion. I am happy to state that the OUN (B) and all other organizations recognized and praised the work of the UNC and mine.

I also wish to mention certain characteristic episodes from my post-war activities. I had very many visitors and letters of relatives of soldiers with such inquiries, as: "where is my son (or father, or husband etc.)?" I understood and sympathized with the feelings of these people, but what could I tell them? I had to explain that I was only the Army Commander, and with the 1st Ukrainian Division in particular, I had merely spent several days. Out of over ten thousand men in the Division I met personally only a couple of dozen officers. I had to tell the inquirers that they should understand that the men after whom they were now inquiring went to war, where anything can happen. It is surprising that my several days' visit to the Division created the impression on people who should know better, that I had been in command of the Division. That myth, the origin of which is unknown, circulated among troops of the Division.

Seal. Rome, October 14, 1945. His Excellency, General:
Praised Be Jesus Christ:

Sincere thanks for your valuable letter of July 31, which came into my hands only on October 10, at noon. You must have received my letters in the meantime, and particularly of August 2, in reply to yours of June 20.

We are frequently in touch with the prisoner of war camp of our Ukrainian soldiers in Bellaria near Rimini. Just now, for the past two weeks my secretary, Fr. Dr. Ivan Bilanych has been there and is coming back today or tomorrow, bringing personally I have as yet been unable to see our fine soldiers, and with him about 30 candidates for theological studies. Permit it is not easy to write why. I must say, however, that the greatest difficulty was the presence of a Soviet Committee in-

side the camp for some time which could finally boast of having converted several of our soldiers to return to the Homeland. According to our soldiers, they are not sorry for those who left . . . The present Commander is Captain Yaskevych. Otherwise life in camp has improved. The attitude of the British Command is favorable. I just received news from Fr. Bilanych that all our men have been issued fine winter equipment: clothes, shoes, and blankets. As regards food there is a change for the better, too. I expect Fr. Bilanych to bring a complete report for you, or he will write it here and send it to you at the first opportunity.

Please accept, dear General, expressions of my profound respect, with the assurance that I ask for blessing in my daily prayers for you and your glorious soldiers, and I beseech God to grant you His favor and His bountiful blessing.

Your devoted brother and servant
in Christ Our Lord
† Ivan, Bishop

His Excellency,
Hon. Pavlo Shandruk,
Lieut.-General, Ukrainian Army
Munich

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After the War

AFTER taking all the steps described above on behalf of our soldiers, and primarily the soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Division, most of whom were interned in Italy, a proposition was made to me by the Prime Minister of our Government-in-exile, Dr. K. Pankivsky, to take over the position of Chief of the General Staff and acting Minister of Military Affairs. Pursuant to a Decree of the Council of Ministers of November 3, 1945, an Order of the High Command confirmed my appointment. I was theoretically in charge of this post until May 1946, when I had to resign for personal reasons.

At one brief period I was living with my wife in Hoechst near Frankfort. I mention this because one day, when I was leaving Hoechst on a trip to see President Livytsky in Mainz-Kastel, I met Col. Kryzhanivsky, whom I mentioned before, at the station. Three days later, I received an "invitation" to appear at the C.I.C. post in Hoechst immediately. I was interrogated there as to whether I had collaborated with the Germans, and in what German unit I had been serving. When I gave a brief account about my alleged "collaboration," (incidentally the interpreter was a Jewish gentleman who was quite obviously taking my side), the investigating officer apologized for causing me trouble and showed me an anonymous letter informing on me. During the course of this unofficial part of our conversation, another C.I.C. officer, Mr. Stephen Skubik came in and told me in Ukrainian that the contents of the

anonymous letter alerted them immediately that this must be some kind of provocation. Just a coincidence.

After my appointment as Chief of Staff, I came into frequent contact with our senior generals, the late Gen. M. Omelyanovych Pavlenko, and the late Gen. Vsevolod Petriv. We discussed and worried about our military and political future, about the problem of preserving the traditions of our struggle for independence, and we sought means to keep up a martial spirit among our soldiers who were our sole military potential. We understood well, and regretfully, that there was not the slightest cause for optimism, and that all our efforts, both of the Government as well as of the men themselves, should be confined to a preservation of the substance of the organization in quasi military form. Thus, was reestablished the Organization of Soldiers of the UNR from the Liberation Struggle period, and then came: the Brotherhood of Soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Division, later Brotherhoods of Soldiers of the UPA and KUA (Carpatho-Ukrainian Army) and other organizations of youth of a semi-military nature. I did not directly participate in setting up these organizations, but in my opinion, they were a great asset to our military life.

For quite a long while I did not take part in political and civic activities of emigres, but spent my time studying. I also established contact with representatives of other nationality groups of the Prometheus Organization and we discussed chances of reestablishing that organization. Many people of that group were living in the neighborhood of Munich, and I had no difficulty in keeping in touch with them. Professor Roman Smal-Stocki was President of Prometheus, Prince Dr. G. Nakashidze was Vice-President, and Mr. B. Bilatti (an engineer) was Secretary; the two last-named lived in Munich. I succeeded in establishing contact with the representative of the Slovaks, Dr. Josef Pauco, the Polish officers Major Ponikewski and Captain

Alexander put us in touch with Prometheus members who were living in London: General Tadeusz Pelczynski, Col. Tadeusz Schaetzel, and Mr. Stanislaw Paprocki. Prince Nakashidze was to leave for South America soon, and in the absence of Dr. Smal-Stocki, who had already gone to the United States, he transferred the leadership of Prometheus to me. In spite of all efforts and a friendly atmosphere of cooperation, external circumstances prevented us from reviving the activities of Prometheus.

Toward the end of 1947, as a result of continued efforts on the part of President Livytsky, Ukrainian emigres came to a decision that unification of all political and civic emigre forces was indispensable toward successful realization of our political and propaganda activities. This brought about the establishment of the Ukrainian National Council (UNRada). The formal part of this organization fell on Professor I. Mazepa. His work was long and arduous, but finally the composition of the UNRada was agreed upon, and it convened. I had the honor to be invited to its inaugural meeting on February 7, 1947. Chief of the Executive Branch of UNRada, Professor I. Mazepa again offered me the position of Chief of the General Staff. I consented, in spite of my doubts about possibilities to work. I also cautioned Professor Mazepa that I was making efforts to go either to the United States or to Argentina. Circumstances did not favor any constructive work, and there were no funds available even for a minimum amount of activities. Hopes were dim. I made a decision, that as long as I was able to work, I would go to the United States or to Argentina. My old friend, Colonel I. Ukhiv was in Argentina, and he sent me an affidavit. But thanks to the efforts of Professor Smal-Stocki and Professor and Mrs. Petro Andrusiv, I found refuge in this wonderful Land of the Free. Professor Smal-Stocki suggested that I should write a scholarly treatise and engage in scholarly work, but

unfortunately, it was too late in life for me to do this. I had to earn a living, particularly since my wife was not well. Therefore, in spite of my age (70) I engaged in manual labor. In my rare spare moments I do research work and write articles on military subjects.

On a motion of Professor V. Kubyovych made in 1948, I was elected to a regular membership in Shevchenko Scientific Society.

31

The Struggle for the Independence Of Carpatho-Ukraine

I DID NOT, at the appropriate time, have an opportunity to acquaint myself in more detail with the struggle of the westernmost part of the Ukrainian nation—our brothers beyond the Carpathians. The lot of this part of our nation was more harsh than of any other because circumstances of geography prevented its direct ties with Galicia, while political conditions put it under the rule of neighbors, who were stronger both politically and economically. I was, however, always interested in the Carpathian Ukrainians, and I was impressed with the ability of their leaders to take advantage of any weakness of their imperialist neighbors, particularly on the eve of World War II, and during the war.

When the Austro-Hungarian monarchy disintegrated after World War I, the local assembly of Carpatho-Ukraine (Krayevyi Soym) proclaimed unification with the Ukrainian National Republic on January 21, 1919. The victorious Allied powers, however, in continued disregard of the independence struggle of the Ukrainian nation, incorporated this part of Ukrainian ethnographic territory in the newly established republic of Czechoslovakia by the Treaty of Saint Germain concluded on September 10, 1919.

In the course of events affecting Czechoslovakia and initiated by Hitler, Carpatho-Ukraine took advantage of existing tensions, and on October 7, 1938, in pursuit of

its struggle for political rights, proclaimed its autonomy within the Federated Czecho-Slovakian Republic. The Ukrainian Government was headed by Monsignor Dr. Augustine Voloshyn.

I had no direct contact or information on developments in Carpatho-Ukraine, but from what was then public knowledge, and from more detailed accounts given me by Dr. V. Kubyovych, I can summarize the situation in that part of Ukraine as follows.

In the fall of 1938 the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine was faced with the necessity of organizing a defense force, and that is when the "Carpathian Sich" came into existence, a substitute of an armed force. It became necessary to resist Hungarian attempts of conquest of Carpatho-Ukraine by force. Hungary based its claims to that land on extending its boundaries around it during the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The "Carpathian Sich" turned into a real military force within a very short time, but, as was usually the case with Ukrainian armies, it lacked arms. In March 1939 the Hungarians began massing their troops on the southern border of Carpatho-Ukraine and appeals of the Government to the Central Government in Prague produced no response. The assembly of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of the Carpathian Ukrainian National Republic and elected Monsignor Dr. A. Voloshyn its President, and Julian Revay as Premier. At that time, Hungary was already in alliance with Nazi Germany, and Hitler personally intervened in this matter, demanding that President Voloshyn surrender Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary. In answer to this, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine ordered mobilization. Hungary put four divisions in the field against a total of 12,500 men (the entire army and police force of Carpatho-Ukraine). Ukrainian armed resistance was so strong that Hungary appealed for help to Poland and Rumania. In spite of these

odds, the armed struggle continued until the end of March. Underground and partisan warfare, aided by the UPA, continued in Carpatho-Ukraine even after World War II. Although the Hungarians admired the heroic resistance of the Carpathian Army, they had no qualms about killing prisoners of war and civilians.

A long time after these events I had an opportunity to hear first-hand reports about the struggle and about Hungarian and Rumanian atrocities from Dr. S. Rosokha, an official of the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine. Hungary conquered the land, but after World War II it was "liberated" by the Russians.

32

My Wife's Story

“AFTER you went to Berlin, I kept the theatre going showing pictures supplied by the German command. Skierniewice was subjected to heavier and more frequent bombing. The city was full of German troops, but they behaved fairly quietly. One day I saw among the Germans in the theatre several soldiers with shoulder patches “UVV” (Ukrainske Vyzvolne Viysko—Ukrainian Liberation Troops). I asked some of them from what part of Ukraine they came, and one of them answered: ‘I am not a Ukrainian, we are from Kaluga. They ordered us to wear this brand, so we are wearing it.’

“Soviet troops entered Skierniewice on January 14, 1945 in the afternoon. I watched through the window and saw Soviet soldiers wearing rags of civilian clothes and with feet wrapped in more rags, go from house to house. A soldier came into our house and turned everything upside down, pulling out all drawers. When I asked him what he was looking for, he said: ‘for a German.’ He took all your underwear and some clothes and asked for food. I pointed to some bread and bacon in the cupboard, what was left of a barter deal for a pair of shoes. He saw a pickle, took it, and ate it with bread. That night our former maid, Helen came running and told me to leave and hide because the Bolsheviks were looking for me. I was going to her home (she had married in the meantime), when one of the Polish non-coms of the 18th Infantry Regiment came running and brought me a pass issued by the Polish Underground with

my name as Marianna Kowalska. He said that the Bolsheviks were looking for me all over, but that when they were asked for my address, all Poles replied that I had gone west. I went to Helen's home and spent the next two days there as her sick mother, but I was warned again that I must escape. They all advised me to go to Warsaw because it would be easier to get lost among the crowds there. In the bitter cold Helen's husband took me on a bicycle to the town of Wlochy near Warsaw, the trip taking 10 hours. My toes were frozen and I had to rub them with snow to get circulation back into them. It was very hard to find a place to sleep in Wlochy, but I finally found shelter in a hospital which was run by nuns. Next morning I went to the Warsaw suburb of Praga and looked up some Polish friends. They had a very small apartment and I lived in a room without windows until April. I was looking for work all over, but at the same time avoiding meeting anyone who would inform on me, even unwittingly. I could not get ration cards: for this it was necessary to join some Communist organization and accept work assigned by them. Finally I found work in a little grocery store, my wages were 100 zloty a month (enough to buy 3 pounds of bread) and room; in addition I had two meals a day, so-called coffee and bread. That summer was a very difficult time for me, working in the store I was wearing a worn overcoat and galoshes, my shoes had all worn out and it was impossible to buy anything, at least not with my pay. Late in August my guardians from the Polish Underground (P.P.) informed me that the Bolsheviks had picked up my trail. A wife of one of the officers picked me up and took me to another woman who also ran a small grocery store. I rested up a little there, and there the soldier sent by you for me found me after a long search. He took me out of Poland as a repatriating German. The trip was full of suspense and really close moments. On the

way the Polish Security Police (U.B.) searched us an uncounted number of times, and the boy was beaten many times to admit who I was. This way we reached Berlin where we were put up by a German family for whom he had worked during the war. I could not leave Berlin because of my health and because of lack of documents. He went to you, leaving me with that German family who were very nice and hospitable. They fed me, since I had neither ration cards nor money. All this was in the Soviet zone of Berlin.

"Only in March 1946 a Ukrainian lady came to me to East Berlin and took me to West Berlin. The lady had been asked to take care of me by an American officer of Ukrainian descent, Lieutenant Ph. Hryhorchuk. He took care of me and told me that you had telegraphed him asking him to save me. Lt. Hryhorchuk brought food for me and the other lady every day, and after a lot of effort he was able to put me in an UNRAA camp. Later Lt. Hryhorchuk helped me get documents to travel to the British Zone in West Germany. It would take too much space to relate all my adventures during this period, particularly my trip west, which took nearly two and a half months.

"It might be interesting to add some comments on the way the people of Poland greeted the conquering Soviet troops, and that they came to realize within a few days of the new Soviet occupation that they had fallen into an abyss. It was quite understandable that following the inhuman terror, torture and mass liquidation of the Poles by the Germans, the people looked to Soviet troops as their liberators. I was told, that right on entering the city of Skierniewice (and this seems to have happened all over), the Bolsheviks began robbing the people of everything that had the slightest value. Women were raped, also small girls, and within two months nearly 10% of the women in

Poland were infected with venereal disease. The Poles took out their revenge on the Bolsheviks. Every morning hundreds of corpses of Soviet soldiers killed with knives were found in the streets of Warsaw and other cities. And in spite of the inhuman behavior of the Germans, the Poles treated German soldiers with compassion when the Bolsheviks rounded up German prisoners of war and kept them behind barbed wire under the open sky without any food: the Poles, themselves near starvation, gave bread and food to the Germans saving them from death. Soviet robbery led to a new wave of hunger in Poland which affected even the soldiers. Soviet troops began to pilfer military property. For example, they would bring to the store where I was working drums of gasoline and kerosine, cigarettes, and soap, and sell them for a fraction of their value, just to get something to eat. There were many instances where Soviet soldiers sold horses to Polish peasants, mostly in barter for food. The peasants were glad to buy horses because the Germans had requisitioned them all. The Soviet trick, however, was that several hours later a different batch of Red Army men would come along and requisition the horses.

I was told by eye-witnesses that when the Soviet troops were entering Skierniewice hundreds of people went out into the streets and greeted them with raised arms. The soldiers, however, noticing rings on their fingers and watches on wrists, robbed them. "Give me your watch" was the word of greeting with which Soviet soldiers responded to a welcome. The phrase became so popular that when a newsreel was shown in Lodz with Roosevelt and Churchill meeting Stalin at Yalta, and Stalin extended his arm to Roosevelt, the entire audience shouted: 'give me the watch.' "

Note by the author: Mr. and Mrs. L. V. Serdyuk found a soldier late in November who volunteered to go to

Poland and look for my wife. This soldier spoke German and Polish very well and could pretend that he was a Pole being repatriated from Germany, and in turn when he would be going back to Germany with my wife, they would pretend to be Germans. Good people helped a lot, particularly Mr. R. Toporovych, commandant of the camp in Karsfeld near Munich, and Mr. M. Duzhyi, commandant of the camp in Mittenwald who provided this soldier with valuable goods which he could use during his trip. He was successful and found my wife although I could not tell him where she was, but merely indicated how to look for her, and also gave him a password by which she would recognize him as a person to be trusted.

Early in January 1946 when I was with my brother who was in command of a camp at Offenbach near Frankfort, our Judge—Lt.-Col. I. Kuklovsky took me one evening to see the American Lieutenant, Ph. Hryhorchuk who was on his way home on furlough and wanted to meet and tell me some things that he knew about me. He had been a liaison officer and interpreter in the American High Command in Berlin. When order was restored in Berlin and the city was divided into zones, the American Command received a list of Ukrainian emigres from the Soviet Command demanding their surrender. The first name on the list was that of President A. Livytsky, followed by mine. I was charged with a number of criminal acts, while the others on the list, about two hundred in all, were merely accused of political crimes. At the suggestion of Lt. Hryhorchuk the American general asked the Soviet commandant to specify the criminal acts of which I was being accused, but the Russians dropped the subject entirely. Lt. Hryhorchuk gave me his Berlin address and said I could ask for his help when needed. This was again the hand of Divine Providence: when I got news of the whereabouts of my wife, I turned to Lt. Hryhorchuk through

the American Command in Munich and he helped save her. I am profoundly grateful to Lt. Ph. Hryhorchuk for this.

I wish to add here that I had never been a Soviet citizen and my foot had never set on Soviet territory. While still in Ukraine, I was fighting them as occupants of my homeland.

33

Why?

HOW MANY times did I seek an answer to the tragic problem, particularly during the critical days: why were we not helped in our struggle for freedom? In this struggle when the Ukrainian people were baring their chests to an overwhelming enemy, and at the same time defending the West! Why did not those, in whose hands rested the opportunity once and for all to determine with finality the struggle of millions of peoples for political liberation from Moscow and for complete national statehood, consider the pleas and aspirations of those peoples? Where should we seek the genesis of aid extended by the West to all kinds of Russian imperialists like Denikin and Co.? All these western nations have, in the course of their own history, traversed the stage of struggle for national liberation, for the national and personal freedom of their people.

Is there really truth behind the German statement (Jurgens Thorwald) that "whom the gods will destroy, they punish with blindness?" Did not the leaders of the free world see in their blindness (a political blindness) that they were giving power to the threatening force to rise to a position of being able to destroy them and their nations?

If one hears sometimes that the West was harboring a conviction that the Ukrainians were identical Bolsheviks with the Moscow Bolsheviks, (thesis of Russian White-

guardists) how come they did not see a telling sign in the fact that those same Ukrainians were fighting Moscow?

The reason is difficult to find. Perhaps history will some day shed light on it. For it is hard to believe that Ukraine was refused aid and permitted to have untold, unnecessary, sacrifices in war through the influence of people like Mil-yukov, Sazonov, Izvolsky and Co. But if it were so, then Messrs. David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau and Company had been acting in conspiracy with those enemies of the Ukrainian nation and of other nations enslaved by Moscow, and they are guilty of bequeathing to the world a life of tension and uninterrupted worries. They bequeathed to the world the perverted idea of Marx, and the practices of Stalin and Hitler, and the future practices of Khrushchev. They were guilty of World War II, and if a new world cataclysm takes place, it will be their fault, too.

Does the Western world finally realize what it has to face in the future? Is there any hope that the era of black-mail will end someday, and mankind will be able to live in peace instead of having to think about constructing shelters and readying for the most difficult times? Continued uninterrupted tension and readiness for war will bring mankind to a nervous breakdown, with spiritual and material impoverishment.

All those who know the essence and method of action of Moscow imperialism which, in one form or another has always the same purposes, and under presently existing circumstances is characterized by a cynical disregard of the free world, keep warning of the danger. It must be noted, however, that the warnings are not heeded because more attention is paid to "expert advisers" with Americanized names instead of to voices of the nations who are in the vanguard of the struggle against red slavery in the shape of Moscow imperialism. Those advisers and the pro-

ponents of Russian indivisibility at all cost would gladly reconcile themselves with facts of annihilation of entire nations only for the sake of keeping Russia intact, be it called the USSR or any other name. They give approval, at least silent, to facts of destroying by hunger of the resistance of Ukrainians and others. Does the West realize that: "peasants (Ukrainian), who had once supplied half of Europe with grain, went to the cities for a piece of bread which was being taken away from them because they refused to be volunteer ants in a new slave order . . . cold peasant huts smitten by the hand of famine turned into huge coffins with swollen corpses. The peasants could not get up all day, they looked at their homes from which roofs had been torn off to heat soup made of weeds and ribs of the last cats and dogs in the village. The more healthy peasants went to the cities begging hopelessly for bread, city streets were thickly covered with corpses, thousands of them on sidewalks, in roadways, and in alleys. There were daily reports of instances of cannibalism. Near a small railroad station a factory was discovered making sausages from the flesh of children. Two barrels with salted meat were found—meat from children. There were also instances where mothers with several children would kill the younger and feed the older with their flesh—that's how they saved some . . ."* All this was done on Stalin's orders in 1933 when over 6,000,000 Ukrainians perished in the famine. Nobody even protested. And the "genius" Stalin camouflaged the terror with a phrase "life is better, life is happier now."

Whole nations have been made to disappear, the Crimean and Volga Tatars, the freedom-loving peoples of the Caucasus and Turkestan: slowly made to disappear are the Baltic nations, the Komi, and others.

The whole world, and particularly the unfortunate

*"Paradise"—Wasył Barka; published by "Svoboda" 1953 N.Y.

nations in the "happy Soviet paradise" owe former President Harry S. Truman a debt of gratitude for his timely and excellent exposure of the Soviet political swindle, when he opposed the attack on Korea with arms.

Mention should be made of the fact that the Communists tried to destroy the Ukrainians by direct means. Working within the UNRRA and IRO they tried to get at those Ukrainians who had managed to flee the USSR and were now in DP camps. They had their agents in these institutions—also men in top positions,—e.g. Menshikov, but it was mainly through secret agents that the Soviets got their men installed as commandants or chiefs of DP camps. They used all possible means to compel Ukrainian and other DPs to go "back home." We are deeply grateful to General Lucius Clay who, as Commander of the American Zone in Germany looked into these matters, cleaned out the Communists, and halted the crimes being committed on the DPs.

The hand of the red conspiracy can be discerned all over. But now Moscow is looking for a way out by provoking a clash between the United States and China, Moscow fearing the latter's potential growth. In this instance a far-sighted United States policy should be able to see which way to direct this potential aggression of China, arising from ethnical necessities. The Russian historian and writer V. Soloviev foresaw the present situation in his novel "The Yellow Peril."

In perspective of time the world is facing, sooner or later, a contest of decision, and if the West will continue along the same road of concessions and compromises, in which Moscow is always the winner, and if it will have no political foresight or simply no political plan, then one does not have to be a prophet to see the final victory of communism.

Regarding the past which should be looked upon as the

source of the present and of the future, it is necessary to state clearly today: if the Ukrainian people had been given help in their struggle, and if such help had been forthcoming to other nations, there would have been no World War II because there would have been no Bolsheviks nor Stalin to help Hitler rise to power. There would be no Bolshevism if the West had not permitted the Moscow imperialists to conquer Ukraine.

Haven't these events taught us a lesson?

THE END.

Appendix

November 11, 1945.

Dear Pavlo Theofanovych:

Officers delivering this letter to you have complete trust in my "military entourage." Please listen to information brought by them and get things going in this serious matter. I think it advisable for you to have those officers sent to that certain Mr. T. in order to find out at least what goes on there, and perhaps even to take direct measures. Although that man is not a disciplined person, perhaps you will be able to pull him up. . . . Perhaps you will have to come to us to deliberate this mysterious matter. . . . Mr. Mudry came to see me, and we discussed everything . . . in the presence of Messrs. Re-vay, Baran, my son, and Bishop Mstyslav . . . I hope to see you with good news in about a week or two. With best wishes, Yours, A. Livytsky.

(The full text of this letter will be published in the Ukrainian edition of the book).

April 5, 1950

Dear General:

. . . My best wishes to you and your Mrs. on the occasion of the Holiday, and I wish you success in your patriotic moves. . . . Don't be surprised and don't feel dejected, that it takes so long for promises to be kept. . . . But, Christ is risen, Ukraine will rise, too, perhaps even in my lifetime, although I am beginning to weaken. . . . I went to Ulm and Augsburg to take care of official matters. . . . I have always had a high regard for you and I respect you sincerely. My best regards to Madam, Your A. Livytsky.

(The full text of this letter will be published in Ukrainian edition).

Dear General:

. . . In my opinion, the organization of a High Military Council will be welcomed. I have nothing against its personnel, with the exception of Captain B., who does not fit this thing because of the mistakes he has made, both through his own fault, and without . . . General P. wants to see me after November 28. Sincere greetings to you, Your M. Omelanovych Pavlenko. November 19, 1945.

(The full text of this letter will be published in Ukrainian edition).

Dear General:

1. . . . In the matter of the High Military Council, as per your letter of December 25, I am mailing invitations to members to the first meeting today. . . .

3. The story with Munich Branch proves that our party politicians want to wreck every cause. . . .

5. The nice officer Horoch completed the first course for non-commissioned officers in Ingolstadt, he retrained 30. . . .

8. I am sending you two clippings (mine and Col. D's) from which you will see, General, that they are not leaving us in peace. . . .

That is all for now, and I wish you a Merry Holiday. Yours, M. Om. Pavlenko.

Dear General:

Today, after long and sometimes very interesting debate, we finished our work (organization of the High Military Council) . . . we reverted to the old position, as during the time of the UNC (General M. Omelanovych Pavlenko was Chairman of the High Military Council in the UNC—author).

Sincerely yours, M. Om. Pavlenko. January 16, 1946.

Dear General:

One of the conventions raised the idea of renewing the activities of some of our institutions: to merge the Military Science and Military History Societies. . . . I take the liberty to request that you take part in this meeting. . . . Respectfully, V. Petriv.

July 27, 1947

Dear General:

. . . The whole trouble is with that "micro-politics". . . Yours respectfully, V. Petriv. March 6, 1948.

Dear General:

. . . I also read the draft on the High Military Council . . . it's the old Austrian Hofkriegsrat which nearly buried Austria. . . . Well, when we get together we are going to talk about it. My best wishes to you and your family. Yours, V. Petriv.

June 15, 1948

Dear General:

Vsevolod Mykolayevych asked me to let you know that "he is going out of circulation" for some time because he is seriously ill and is now in the Servatius Stift Hospital. Doctors have found intestinal trouble caused by undernourishment. . . . Sincerely yours, Tamara Petrova. (Wife of the late General Petriv).

Dear General:

Could you kindly come to Augsburg this coming Sunday, June 20, at 12 noon. I will come to the station, and we could meet there. . . . There are some matters which I would like to discuss with you Sincerely yours, I. Mazepa

June 15, 1948.

Dear General:

In connection with renewed activities in various branches of the Executive Department of the Ukrainian National Council (Rada), I would like to talk to you concretely about the matter of. . . . Please come at your convenience, I will be in my office.

Sincerely yours, I. Mazepa.
January 28, 1949.

Ukrainian National Council. Executive Department. No. 36/49. February 7, 1949.

To Lieutenant-General P. Shandruk in Munich:
Dear General:

. . . With reference to your consent expressed to me in a conversation on February 1, the Executive Department decided at its meeting held on the 5th inst., to appoint you to the position of Chief of the General Staff. . . .

Chairman of the Executive Department, I. Mazepa.

Dear Pavlo Theofanovych:

I received a letter from Mr. Mazepa in which he informs me that he would like to see me in person about his high appointment (as Prime Minister—author). I wish to accelerate this meeting because circumstances demand it, and the “community” is pressing. I had hoped that you would come over the holidays, but you evidently postponed the trip. If so, please take Isaac Prokhorovych (Mazepa—author) with you, even if you were only going to Ulm . . . General V. started to behave so nicely that I have nothing against promoting him along with Gens. Udovychenko, Petriv, and Zagrodsky. The official representative of the Polish Government finally came to see me, and I had long talks with him in an atmosphere of mutual trust.

With best wishes, yours, (—) A. Livytsky.

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