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Correction

In Bohdan S. Kordan's article, "Ukrainians and the 1981 Canada Census Ethnic-Origin Question" (Winter 1985), Column B in Table 2 (page 9) was printed incorrectly. All negative signs in this column should be positive. The percentage change between the projected 1981 census figure (closed to migration) and the actual 1971 census figure for Ukrainian males and females should read 3.81, not 3.51.

THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER*

David R. Marples

CHERNOBYL: A SIX-MONTH REVIEW

Six months have passed since the explosion of the fourth reactor unit at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine. During this period, our knowledge of the events of 26 April 1986 and the aftermath of the accident has increased considerably.

Concerning the technical aspects of the disaster, the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy filed a detailed 300-page report to a Vienna meeting of the 112-member International Atomic Energy Agency. This report was well received by Western scientists, many of whom have since commented publicly on what appeared to them a remarkable display of *glasnost* [openness] on the part of the Soviet authorities. In the eyes of some observers, the Soviet report helped to atone for their original failure to report the accident officially until prompted by several Swedish protests. One can appreciate the efforts of the IAEA to investigate the Chernobyl disaster, but the effects of the accident have been somewhat broader than reported in Vienna. Moreover, the Soviet appearance in that city was a sign that the event had acquired a truly international status rather than a manifestation of any new openness on the part of the Soviet leadership under General Secretary of the CC CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev. It should be stated at the outset that the Chernobyl accident has not

*Editor's note: Because the form "Chernobyl," transliterated from Russian, has been used almost universally in English-language writing about the disaster, it has been adopted in the articles that follow.

changed the political or economic character of the Soviet Union, and it is only through a knowledge of that character that one can find a key to understanding the events following the disaster.

To begin, one might ask who in the Soviet hierarchy has suffered politically as a result of Chernobyl. Mikhail Gorbachev? Ukrainian First Party Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbytsky? How about Kiev oblast First Secretary Hryhorii Revenko? For Gorbachev, the event has been integrated into a careful but evidently unsuccessful campaign that has the declared goal of removing all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth by the year 2000. Reykjavik marked the demise of the first attempt to gain a political victory from a nuclear accident. On Soviet television on 14 May, the Soviet leader emphasized—repeating countless TASS and Radio Moscow broadcasts of the previous days—that Chernobyl had demonstrated the futility of nuclear weapons build-up, providing an example of what would happen if even one small nuclear warhead were detonated.

Soviet propagandists have pursued this line rigorously, but always with the proviso that nuclear weapons and the civilian use of nuclear power are not the same thing. Indeed they are not. I would agree and make the further deduction that the Chernobyl disaster concerns the operation of Soviet nuclear power plants rather than international arms control. Gorbachev has also used the IAEA in this political strategy. Before the accident occurred, the IAEA's main role, in practice if not in theory, was to ensure that civilian nuclear power plants were not being used to produce plutonium, tritium and other elements for the nuclear weapons programmes.

Soviet-IAEA cooperation has at least given the impression that the Soviets are interested and concerned about the IAEA role. In August 1985, the USSR permitted the first IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities, although the sites in question, an experimental station near Moscow and the Novovoronezh "model" nuclear plant, which has containment domes over its reactors (constructed after 1980), were relatively innocuous. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik, but it is safe to assume that his policy will continue and that Chernobyl has been a setback, not a catastrophe for the personal career of Mr. Gorbachev.

Shcherbytsky's future has been hotly debated. Kremlinologists in the West have continually speculated that as a holdover from the Brezhnev years, the 68-year-old Ukrainian party leader has been on the way out since March 1985, when Gorbachev took over the Soviet leadership.¹ Chernobyl was a convenient, even an ideal excuse, it was

claimed. These comments were fuelled by Shcherbytsky's marked absence from the Chernobyl region in the days after the accident. On 2 May he had accompanied Soviet Politburo members Ligachev and Ryzhkov to the area, in a passive role. He then disappeared from public view, while in contrast, his Belorussian counterpart, Nikolai Sliunkov, played an active role in evacuating citizens from the Homel oblast's southern regions, several kilometres north of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

In July, however, Shcherbytsky reappeared in the Chernobyl region. Subsequently he visited the area several times, most recently on 29 August, when he accompanied Ukrainian Premier Oleksandr Liashko to the area, and attended a meeting of the Prypiat city party committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. While the active role in the clean-up of the Chernobyl raion of Kiev oblast has been left to the government commission, which has been headed by a succession of Deputy Premiers of the Soviet government—Borys Shcherbyna, Vladimir Gusev, Gennadii Vedernikov—Shcherbytsky has remained in firm control of the Ukrainian Party apparatus.

The same can be said of Revenko, who took over the leadership of Kiev oblast only in 1985. He has not been reprimanded or even warned as a result of the disaster. So who has taken the blame? In the first place, two ministries have been purged of personnel: Power and Electrification; and Medium Machine-Building (a euphemism for nuclear weapons production). In addition, the State Committee to Supervise the Safe Use of Atomic Energy, which was established only in 1983 after a crisis at a reactor-manufacturing plant in Rostov oblast of the Russian Republic, has also been heavily criticized.

On 20 July a meeting of the Politburo in Moscow declared that:

The Ministry of Power and Electrification of the USSR and the State Atomic Power Safety Committee were guilty of lack of control over the situation at the Chernobyl AES and did not take the necessary measures to secure compliance with safety regulations and to prevent breaches of discipline and operating regulations at the station. Irresponsibility, negligence and indiscipline led to grave consequences.²

The Chairman of the Safety Committee, Evgenii Kulov, a Deputy Minister of Power and Electrification, G. Shasharin, and the First Deputy Minister of Medium Machine-Building, Meshkov, were all relieved of their duties. An odd statement followed that the Minister of Power and Electrification himself, A. Maiorets, "deserved" to be

dismissed also, but was spared because of his brief time in office.³

Another series of reprimands and firings occurred on 14 August after a meeting of the Committee for Party Control within the CPSU Central Committee. The victims included the First Deputy Minister of Power (Maiorets's second-in-command), A.N. Makukhin and V. Sydorenko, the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Atomic Energy, in addition to yet another official from the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building.⁴ The director and chief engineer of the Chernobyl station have been dismissed and thrown out of the party, and dozens of party members have been expelled from the Prypiat party committee, including 27 at the start of September alone, ostensibly for "cowardice and panicking."⁵ Those plant officials who ran away from the scene of the disaster were dismissed in the most scornful terms in the press. By October, however, according to the new director of the Chernobyl station, Erik Pozdyshev, most of them had been reinstated, against his will, through the courts.⁶

The conclusion to be drawn is that the dismissals and reproofs handed out were essentially low-level, and often ritualistic in that party members were often reinstated at a later date. Nothing has been done that might compromise the party or its nuclear energy policy. The Ministry of Power has been cut quite severely, but most of its functions within the nuclear sphere have been transferred to a new Ministry of Nuclear Energy. The retributions to Medium Machine-Building officials are curious. Clearly the reactor that exploded was not for military use,⁷ but the implication is that at some point Chernobyl may have been used for the production of military components, such as tritium, at its first two reactors.

Those officials who have survived the crisis—the names of Andronyk Petrosiants, Valerii Legasov of the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, and Evgenii Velikhov, the Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, spring to mind—have acquired enhanced status. The main reason for this is that while errors at the lowest level at the Chernobyl plant have been acknowledged, the viability of the nuclear plants themselves and the future of the industry are being reemphasized. To the outside world, it appeared that the Soviets carried out major reprisals after Chernobyl. In reality, the political repercussions thus far have been minimal. In Ukraine, the entire party hierarchy has remained intact.

How has the population in the area been affected by the radioactive fallout? The draft version of the Soviet report to the Vienna

conference stated that the radiological effects "will be insignificant against the natural background of cancerous and genetic diseases." On the other hand University of California Professor Emeritus John Gofman has postulated that approximately one million persons will contract cancer over the next several decades as a result of Chernobyl, and that about half this number will die. It is safe to say that neither statement can stand as a viable analysis of the after-effects of the disaster.

At Vienna, the Soviets maintained that approximately 3.5 per cent of the contents of the reactor core had been emitted as a result of the explosion. Earlier, however, fairly reliable Soviet sources had spoken of 10 per cent.⁸ Should one believe the Vienna statement or the earlier ones? The difference is of the utmost significance. The Soviets also indicated four stages in the release of radioisotopes from the damaged reactor:

1. A release of dispersed fuel on 26 April, the composition of which corresponded to that of the irradiated fuel, enriched by iodine, cesium, and tellurium isotopes.
2. A decrease in the rate of release from 26 April to 2 May because of the efforts to put out the reactor fire with sand, boron and lead pellets.
3. A rapid rise in the release of fission products, especially iodine, because of heating at the core of the reactor, on 2-6 May. It was after this stage that health warnings were suddenly issued to the residents of Kiev, and presumably to other cities such as Chernihiv and Homel.
4. A rapid fall in releases from 6 May onward.⁹

According to medical experts, people exposed to high levels of radiation experience blood changes at a dose of 25 rems; sickness occurs at 100 rems; severe sickness at 200 rems; and the death of half the population can occur at 400 rems.¹⁰ All the above figures entail the immediate impact. Over the course of a year, a dose of 400 rems would not necessarily cause a person any harm.

The figures used by Gofman and others to estimate the final tally of deaths from the accident are based on the above Soviet calculations.

They refer to those in the vicinity at the time of the accident. In the reactor area, firemen and plant operators reportedly received over 400 rems, while at a distance of 5-10 kilometres from the accident site, the rates were said to be more than 1000 millirems per hour. Even 15 days after the accident, at a distance of 50-60 kilometres, levels were said to be 5-6 millirems per hour, hardly fatal, but very high nevertheless.¹¹ But there are two reasons why speculation on the ultimate or even immediate fatality figures is unwise. First, the effects of low-level radiation are still a matter of conjecture for scientists (in contrast to the effects of high-level radiation, which are well known). Second, the figures do not take into account other factors, the most important of which is one of the largest clean-up operations in the history of modern industry. Concerning the first point, the Soviets have admitted that there is still some way to go not only in assessing the effects of given levels of irradiation, but also in ascertaining how much workers in the nuclear industry should be allowed to take in. On 2 October 1986, a new all-Union Centre of Radiology opened in Kiev, made up of three institutes: Experimental Radiology, Clinical Radiology, and Epidemiology and the Prevention of Radiation Diseases. According to the Ukrainian Minister of Health, Anatolii Romanenko, one of the goals of this new centre is to find the "maximum permissible radiation dose" for both sick and healthy people, and then to put forward "scientifically substantiated norms" for workers at nuclear power plants and operations linked to ionizing radiation.¹²

It is because of previous Soviet confusion over how to set norms that the clean-up operation after Chernobyl has become such a dangerous operation (albeit one that has been virtually ignored by the Western media), perhaps exceeding in its dimensions the immediate impact of the explosion and fire that left 31 dead. First let us look at what was involved in this operation. Following the disaster, about 135,000 people were evacuated from Kiev oblast of Ukraine, Homel oblast of Belorussia, and Briansk oblast of the Russian Republic. Three zones were demarcated around the ruined unit: a special zone, a 10-kilometre zone and a 30-kilometre zone. About 90,000 residents were taken from their homes on the Ukrainian side of the border between 27 April and 6 May, and moved mainly to the town of Poliske (which took in about 23,000) and farmsteads in neighbouring raions.

On the Belorussian side, the evacuation was a longer process because hot spots of radiation were found several weeks after the accident. About 18,000 were evacuated and Bragin, a town of 7,000,

was decontaminated without moving out the residents. Subsequently, the 30-kilometre zone had to be decontaminated. Old wartime watchtowers were placed around the 108-kilometre rim of the zone to prevent illegal entries. At the same time, not every village within the zone was evacuated, because the radiation was not distributed evenly. And in two villages on the Ukrainian side, people were allowed to return to their homes as early as June. Uncertainty, a shortage of geiger counters to measure radiation, and regional ignorance all played a part in such decisions.¹³

There were two main tasks, both of which were declared to be close to completion by the beginning of October. First, the damaged reactor had to be encased in a huge concrete tomb, which the Soviets termed a "sarcophagus." This concrete shell was built both above and below ground level. It has entailed about 3 million cubic metres of concrete, and has a width of 74 metres.¹⁴ The sarcophagus cannot be simply a closed shell, but requires passageways for ventilation so that the reactor core does not catch fire or explode again. It is essentially a temporary solution, despite original Soviet claims that it might last for thousands of years. Some Soviet scientists have stressed that the future of the construction will depend on future generations, which may provide a more suitable dumping ground for the damaged, but still highly dangerous fourth Chernobyl reactor. Moreover, the structure's completion was delayed by a lack of good-quality cement.¹⁵

Second, the entire 30-kilometre zone has been (or is being) completely decontaminated using a variety of methods. These have included the digging of a trench to hold the run-off water from the reactor, the removal of contaminated topsoil from large areas of agricultural land, and the spraying of contaminated surfaces with a special solution, or the so-called dry treatment whereby the solution used to spray the surface hardens into a film which holds the contaminated particles. These can then be removed, rolled and dumped. The use of dump trucks complicated the situation immeasurably, because the trucks carried radioactive particles on their wheels and churned up dust, which also bore radiation elements.¹⁶

That the entire process of decontamination would raise major obstacles was never in doubt. This would have been the case in any country. What is in question, however, are conditions within the danger zone and the way in which workers have been employed. In the first days after the accident, it appears that the brunt of the clean-up work around the reactor was borne by coal miners, subway builders, officials

of the Ministry of Transport Construction of the USSR, the police and the army. Work around the reactor was measured in minutes rather than hours, and a strict limit of 10 rems of radiation was imposed, after which the worker in question was removed from the zone. This limit was soon raised to 25 rems.¹⁷

By 6 May, military reservists had been brought into the zone, predominantly from the Baltic countries. Approximately 4,000 Estonians were “conscripted,” often at night and apparently with little regard for their domestic situations, i.e., some were ill, or had wives about to give birth. Moreover, although the initial period of work in the zone was set at 30 days, with two days’ vacation during the month, this was extended to two and ultimately to six months, according to a series of articles in the Estonian Komsomol newspaper. Reportedly, the Estonians reacted violently. The reservists downed tools and went on strike for an undetermined period.¹⁸ Soviet authorities have tried to cast doubt on the reports from Estonia, but the concept of using the same workers throughout the clean-up, which entails the gradual accumulation of high doses of radiation, has been confirmed by various Soviet sources.

Thus, on 2 September 1986, *Pravda* revealed that the government commission entrusted with supervising the clean-up work considered that not only should its term of work be extended, but that “it is better if [decontamination] work continues to be done by the same staff. It is in a sensitive stage.” The implication therefore was that the lengthy period in the field had enabled these workers to acquire the necessary experience to finish the job. New forces would entail considerably more work.

Then on 24 October, the Ukrainian workers’ newspaper *Robotnycha hazeta* included a frank article about the clean-up and the housing that was being provided for the workers. It referred to the case of a concreter, Volodymyr Pryvydenko, who had been working in “hot spots”—which would appear to signify high-radiation zones—“from the first days after the accident.” The reason for the discussion was that Pryvydenko, unlike some of his colleagues, did not have a place to live. His wife and four-month-old daughter were staying with relatives. For our purposes, it is clear that Pryvydenko and others (who seem to be blue-collar workers or military reservists) have been in a high-radiation zone from the outset. It is difficult to assess how much danger they have been exposed to unless one knows the level of radiation in that zone. As recently as late August, however, single-figure amounts of

rems per hour were being incurred close to the damaged reactor. Moreover, the working day is a long one, from 10 to 12 hours in length. Since the object is to decontaminate highly irradiated areas, lives are clearly at risk, especially in view of the workers' lengthy spells in the 30-kilometre zone.

It is therefore worth reiterating that the clean-up crew, which numbers thousands, according to Soviet sources which have not given a precise figure, has been exposed to high doses of radiation. According to an Estonian source, one Estonian has already died from radiation poisoning, and others have been hospitalized. Because of the nature and extent of this work, speculation about future cancer rates attributable to the disaster is rendered meaningless. All that can be said with certainty is that additional casualties will be incurred as a consequence of the post-disaster clean-up.

Conditions in the clean-up area are deplorable. According to *Robitnycha hazeta*, the collective's trade-union committee was complaining that it did not have the funds to provide protective clothing for the workers. "It is not because funds are meagre," chided the newspaper's correspondent, "but rather it is a result of the lack of responsibility of the trade union concerned with their distribution."¹⁹ But the organizational question appears to be largely irrelevant in the context of cleaning up after the world's worst civilian nuclear disaster without protective clothing. Referring to an article in the Estonian press on 15 July, Radio Free Europe researcher Toomas Ilves quotes a passage stating that gas masks and protective clothing were necessary "even half a hundred kilometers from the accident site."²⁰

In *Robitnycha hazeta*, two workers complained that they had no place to take a shower at the end of the working day. The showers were located at the rest centre, which involved a two-hour walk in clothing caked with mud. The article emphasized that with winter imminent, it was time that mobile shower units were organized for the clean-up crews. These workers have been in the field for six months, however, and one wonders why the situation was not redressed earlier.

Housing is also a problem, as noted above in the case of Pryvydenko. Most of the workers were still living in summer accommodation in late October, but cold weather had already arrived. Various decrees about the need to transfer them to "warm lodgings" had been adopted over the summer, but were not carried out. One worker voiced another common complaint when he stated that:

We have received good quarters . . . but a new complication has arisen. We have nothing to put in them. Furniture stores are being registered, but it is not known how long we have to wait.²¹

In late October, the Ukrainian press again focused on the lamentable housing situation. It was reported that evacuees had been unable to obtain the housing they required. There were cases of officials awarding themselves accommodation to which they were not entitled, and problems with attracting specialists, such as teachers and doctors, to move into some of the more than 600 homes built especially for them. A huge apartment building, which had been vacated by its residents in order that evacuated families from the Chernobyl area might live there, was standing empty, according to the report.²²

At the same time, doctors at the medical sanitation unit in the area—No. 126—had initially tended to the needs of nuclear plant workers and residents of Prypiat. Almost one thousand specialists who had been in the area at the peak of the crisis had now left, and the remaining doctors were living in the village of Teteriv in cramped conditions with limited facilities.²³

The only solution proposed to these problems, which, the source makes clear, were much more wide-ranging than the examples given, was to impose stricter discipline. One brigadier stated: "We in our collective do not forgive one another the smallest violation." The trade-union committee, however, was said to be more concerned with relating tales of heroism—obviously they had spent too much time reading the Soviet press.

What has happened to the families that were evacuated from the contaminated regions? A substantial number have been transferred for work elsewhere in the USSR. Occasionally, appropriate jobs have been found in the same oblast. The northern part of Homel oblast in Belorussia, for example, has a labour shortage. Consequently, workers evacuated from the southern raions have simply been transferred to the northern. For the most part, however, families have been dispersed, often over great distances: to Kazakhstan, the western borderlands, the Baltic republics, Siberia. On 18 August, *Pravda* published a letter about the problems being encountered by women and infants evacuated from Homel oblast, who were now living in a sanatorium.

Early in September, *Pravda* revealed that people had been allowed to return to the 30-kilometre zone to collect their belongings. Residents of the villages of Cheremoshna and Nivetske had been allowed to return permanently.²⁴ But empty villages abound. In mid-September, the

newspaper *Pravda Ukrainy* discussed cases of theft and burglary in the 30-kilometre zone. The Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior had received complaints about sluggish police work. One evacuee had returned to the Chernobyl area, evidently to check that his property was safe. Instead, he had been apprehended breaking the locks on neighbours' doors. Some maintenance workers from the Chernobyl nuclear plant had been found stealing tape recorders, shopping bags, cigarettes and candy from a vacated Prypiat restaurant.²⁵

Over the summer, a decision was made to restart the first two Chernobyl reactors in October 1986. There is no space here to analyze the wisdom of such a decision. For the plant workers, however, it has entailed further sacrifices. Many are living in tents or on boats on the Prypiat River. Others have spent months at the Kazkovi pioneer camp near Chernobyl.²⁶ Since the summer, however, an enormous construction programme has been under way, embracing 50,000 workers, including construction squads from (in addition to Ukraine and Belorussia) the Russian Republic, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Georgia, Armenia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The squads were given two main tasks. First, to build housing units in various raions of Kiev oblast, particularly Makariv raion, that could accommodate, on a more or less permanent basis, more than 33,000 people who had been evacuated in May, but were to be moved back into the area either to their state or collective farms or to businesses formerly conducted in the now deserted Prypiat. Second, a new town, called Zelenyi Mys, was to be built on the banks of the Dnieper River approximately 30 kilometres from the nuclear plant, specifically for shift workers at the nuclear plant. The plant personnel work 15-day shifts at the station, followed by 15 days of vacation with their families in Kiev and Chernihiv. The town houses 10,000 workers, while 8,000 apartments have been made available for their families.²⁷

By 17 August, according to the newspaper *Selskaia zhizn*, the first of 52 new villages to house evacuees had been completed. Called Ternopilske, the village is located in Makariv raion west of Kiev. By 1 October, 7,250 three-room houses had been built in Kiev oblast of Ukraine, with approximately 4,000 over the border in Homel oblast of Belorussia. A Soviet source complained about the slow progress of construction at Zelenyi Mys, where the "enthusiasm of the builders was not always backed up with sound organization," and "manufacturers sometimes supply goods that have to be rejected."²⁸ Various high-level delegations visited the site of the new town in August: Party Secretary

of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Borys Kachura, on 7 August; Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov and KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov on 8-9 August;²⁹ Ukrainian Party chief Shcherbytsky and Ukrainian Premier Liashko on 29 August.³⁰ All carried the same message, i.e., that the builders must work harder to complete their work by the 1 October deadline.

In late October, the Soviet Ukrainian press revealed that a more permanent abode for the nuclear plant staff was under construction. Whereas Zelenyi Mys is a hastily improvised site with low-quality housing, more care seems to have been taken with this latest new town in Soviet Ukraine. Named Slavutych, it is located in the woodlands of Chernihiv oblast, close to a “forgotten railroad station” called (in Russian) Nerefa. The location was chosen by the all-Union and Ukrainian Institutes of Engineering-Technical Research, and the town is being designed by the Moscow Central Scientific-Research Institute for City Building. The main thoroughfare out of Slavutych will lead directly to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.³¹ The construction of Slavutych may be a sign that Prypiat, unlike the Chernobyl plant itself, is to be abandoned forever.

It may also be a response to public pressure. The long-suffering Ukrainian public is evidently weary of temporary abodes. In an interview in *Pravda* (10 October), Chernobyl nuclear plant director Erik Pozdyshev revealed that:

There is one problem that keeps cropping up. People ask: why is our accommodation allocated on a temporary basis? After all, we are permanent workers, why are our apartments and residence permits temporary? . . . These questions have been raised at all meetings and in party groups and, quite honestly, I cannot come up with a logical response to this question. . . . The point is that the housing for personnel is located in Kiev and Chernigov [Chernihiv] and the temporary residence permits are also issued there. It is true that we will build a new city. A decision to this effect has been taken, but it is a matter of the future.

Barely two weeks later, the construction of Slavutych was announced. The future, for once, came quickly for the residents of northern Ukraine.

Finally, what has been the impact of the disaster on the Soviet nuclear industry and overall energy programme? The rapid start-up of the first two Chernobyl reactors in October suggests that the USSR faces an almost desperate situation in its energy sector, particularly with

the onset of winter. But on the face of it, there seems little reason for alarm. Nuclear power made up only about 11 per cent of the country's total electricity generation in 1985. Graphite-moderated stations such as Chernobyl constituted only 6 per cent, and Chernobyl station itself—the largest in Ukraine and, along with Leningrad and Kursk, the largest in the USSR—approximately 1.5 per cent. New reactors were scheduled to come on-line in 1986 at Rovno, Zaporizhzhia, Khmelnytsky and Kalinin. Why, then, have so many recent editorials in newspapers such as *Pravda*, *Izvestiia* and *Komsomolskaia pravda* focused on the energy situation?

In the first place, one should emphasize that there are factors other than Chernobyl that come into play: the poor performance of some thermal power plants and low water levels in rivers after a dry summer, which have had an adverse effect on output at Soviet hydroelectric stations. At Vienna, the Soviets revealed that their RBMK plants had been shut down for technical improvements. A recent article in *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia* suggested that many are still out of operation.³² Engineers and technical personnel of the nuclear industry have been moved to Chernobyl and to other RBMKs (Leningrad, Ignalinsk, Kursk, etc.) to ensure that improved safety features are installed. Skilled engineers have also descended en masse on Chernobyl to assist with the start-up of reactors one and two there. In turn, this has slowed down work on existing water-pressurized reactors.

In October, Candidate Member of the Politburo Vladimir Dolgikh visited Zaporizhzhia station in Ukraine and revealed a host of problems connected with supply and construction work on a new, third, 1,000 megawatt reactor. The plant was supposed to be on-stream by June 1986, but a delay of at least six months has been anticipated.³³ The problems outlined are only too familiar at Soviet nuclear plants: what is significant is that after Chernobyl they are being taken much more seriously by the authorities. Understandably, the self-confidence of the past, when the main criterion was the rapidity of construction rates, has evaporated. Soviet nuclear installations, however, are still suffering from a lack of skilled personnel, shoddy construction materials, chronic supply problems and an outdated central planning system that has in fact been discarded at some enterprises—the Sumy machine-tool works, for example—in favour of a decentralized system based on self-financing at the local level.

Chernobyl, which suffered from these problems somewhat in proportion to its immense size, has been restarted, presumably because its

reactor has been made safer. But the underlying fundamental dilemmas remain. They have been described most aptly by the *Pravda* science correspondent, Vladimir Gubarev, who recently wrote a play about the Chernobyl disaster called *Sarcophagus*, after the concrete tomb built for the exploded unit. Gubarev was one of the main reporters of the disaster, and has a personal knowledge of the station's make-up and organization. Consequently, the statements are based on fact rather than speculation, and can in fact be verified from other sources. Here is an abbreviated excerpt from the play that appeared in the weekly *Sovetskaia kultura*:³⁴

Monitor: Our machines came from a warehouse somewhere. They were sent to us rather than being written off. We coped as long as there wasn't an accident. We mended and made do. . . .

Operator: The problem was we were always in a hurry; we pledged to have the reactor finished three months early, and in operation two days early. We asked four times for new metres, but no one was in any hurry at the top. . . . The builders rushed the whole thing through. Underneath the reactor you'll find hunks of concrete, a couple of mechanical diggers, and all for the sake of some sort of award. Who needs that sort of speed?

Procurator [to the General]: It was your signature on the document accepting reactor no. 4, wasn't it?

General: Not only no. 4, all of them. I have worked here for fifteen years.

Procurator: Were you aware of the fire at the Bukhara textile factory twelve years ago?

General: Of course. . . .

Procurator: Why did you sign the acceptance documents when the roof was made of the same material and you knew that it was forbidden to use that material in industrial construction?

General: I objected. . . I told the heads of the ministry.

Procurator: But you still signed? . . . That sort of roof was banned twelve years ago. Why was it used?

Head: There was a lot of it in the warehouse. We had a deadline to meet.

General: If I had not signed, someone else would have done. Or do you only sign things you can sign with a clear conscience?

Elsewhere the play focuses on the lack of protective clothing and the failure of the head of the power station to take appropriate action at the time of the disaster. The above excerpt is revealing in hindsight, but

is no more frank than Soviet reports of the past five to ten years, which have focused again and again on alarming reports from various nuclear power plants: the Odessa station was flooded with ground water; the main water-pressurized reactor factory at Volgodonsk collapsed into its reservoir in 1983; Rovno station workers were drunk on duty; Rostov station was found to possess defective materials; the computing system at Zaporizhzhia had to be replaced because of serious defects; the entire plant hierarchy at Khmelnytsky was purged in 1983 for embezzlement, theft and various other transgressions requiring criminal proceedings.³⁵ The lesson is clear: the situation at Soviet nuclear plants before Chernobyl gave cause for serious concern, if not alarm. But has it been learned?

What of the future? How is life in Ukraine after Chernobyl? For the residents of Kiev oblast, the disaster has brought about intense suffering on a variety of levels. More than 30 people are dead and more than 200,000 have been subjected to high levels of radiation. The effects of the cesium isotope are still being monitored, and the city of Kiev now has a reserve water supply from the Desna River, in addition to the Dnieper. Thousands are still living in camps, tents and boats as winter approaches. The clean-up campaign, which has entailed the efforts of thousands of Ukrainians, Balts and other workers, is involving major sacrifices in wretched conditions.

Two reactors at the Chernobyl nuclear plant have been resurrected, and Radio Moscow has announced that the third reactor is to be back on-line by next June.³⁶ (At the same time, it is still not feasible to approach the damaged unit and remote-controlled vehicles are involved in most of the work in that area.) At the World Energy Conference in Cannes, France in October, Valerii Legasov announced that the USSR is to increase its reliance on nuclear power for electricity production. The country had lost more farmland from the construction of hydroelectric dams, he declared, than from the Chernobyl accident.³⁷ Soviet confidence in the future of the industry seems undiminished. The Chernobyl nuclear plant may be back in operation. But one should be assured of an overwhelming fact: the Chernobyl disaster is not over.

Notes

¹ See, for example, *The New York Times*, 8 May 1986.

² *Pravda*, 20 July 1986.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 14 August 1986.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 2 September 1986.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 10 October 1986.

⁷ On 10 February 1986, Radio Kiev confirmed that the Chernobyl plant had been integrated into the so-called MIR system of co-operation in nuclear energy between the USSR and the CMEA countries. The fourth reactor exported electricity to Hungary.

⁸ See David R. Marples, *Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR* (New York: St. Martin's; Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986; London: Macmillan, 1987), 125.

⁹ USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, *The Accident at the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant and Its Consequences*, Part 1. General Material (August 1986), 34.

¹⁰ *United States Information Service*, 5 September 1986.

¹¹ *The Accident at the Chernobyl' Plant*, 37.

¹² *News From Ukraine*, no. 39, 1986.

¹³ Marples, *op. cit.*, 141-6.

¹⁴ Radio Moscow, 6 October 1986.

¹⁵ *Pravda*, 6 August 1986.

¹⁶ *New Times*, no. 29, 28 July 1986.

¹⁷ TASS, 6 June 1986. A "volunteer" from Sakhalin reported that when he spent 30 days in Zone 1, "the most dangerous zone," the time limit for work was 30-60 minutes, after which workers were sent immediately for medical attention. See *Lesnaia promyshlennost*, 30 August 1986.

¹⁸ Toomas Ilves, "Estonians Help At Chernobyl," *Radio Free Europe/RAD Background Report* 122, 10 September 1986.

¹⁹ *Robitnycha hazeta*, 24 October 1986, and ff.

²⁰ "Additional Information on Estonians at Chernobyl," *Radio Free Europe/RAD/Ilves*, 14 October 1986.

²¹ *Robitnycha hazeta*, 24 October 1986.

²² *Pravda Ukrainy*, 31 October 1986.

²³ *Robitnycha hazeta*, 24 October 1986.

²⁴ *Pravda*, 2 September 1986.

- ²⁵ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 16 September 1986.
- ²⁶ See, e.g., *Radianska Ukraina*, 3 October 1986.
- ²⁷ *Pravda*, 23 July 1986.
- ²⁸ *Sovetskii patriot*, 24 August 1986.
- ²⁹ *Izvestiia*, 10 August 1986.
- ³⁰ Radio Moscow, 29 August 1986.
- ³¹ *Rabochaia gazeta*, 26 October 1986.
- ³² *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 30 September 1986.
- ³³ *Izvestiia*, 12 October 1986.
- ³⁴ *Sovetskaia kultura*, 13 September 1986.
- ³⁵ Marples, op. cit., 79-92.
- ³⁶ Radio Moscow, 1 October 1986.
- ³⁷ Associated Press, 9 October 1986.

CHERNOBYL: THE POLITICAL FALLOUT IN UKRAINE

In the early hours of 26 April 1986, the number four reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded, resulting in human casualties and material losses that, because of the very nature of the accident, cannot even be fully estimated until years or perhaps decades from now. Both the CPSU Politburo and a special government investigative commission concluded that "the prime cause of the accident was an extremely improbable combination of violations of instructions and operating rules committed by the staff of the [number four] unit."¹ The disaster at Chernobyl, according to Soviet authorities, was largely the result of human failings and incompetence.

Under the circumstances, the question obviously arises as to the political ramifications of Chernobyl in Ukraine. In this regard, we can delineate three general areas where "political fallout" has either already occurred or is probable. The first concerns the political future of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, who as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine is ultimately responsible for developments in the republic. Given the widespread interest among Sovietologists in "leadership politics," that is, speculation about the political fortunes and misfortunes of leading Party figures, it is perfectly understandable that the fate of the Ukrainian party leadership has occupied the attention of the Western press. Almost without exception, Soviet specialists, journalists, and other observers of the Soviet scene have registered their conviction that Chernobyl spells the end of Shcherbytsky's career. Thus far they have had to remain disappointed. Shcherbytsky has shown no signs of faltering, which raises some interesting questions, not the least of which is the methodological validity of Sovietological exercises insofar as politics on the republican level is concerned. The second area concerns the impact of Chernobyl on various levels of the Party and government bureaucracy in Ukraine. In the aftermath of Chernobyl, the

Soviet press has reported disciplinary measures that have been taken with regard to various individuals deemed in one way or another to have been responsible for the tragedy. Thus far, those who have been affected in Ukraine represent the lowest level of officialdom. And third, it should also be noted that there has been some speculation to the effect that Chernobyl may contribute to a revival of dissent in Ukraine and perhaps even give rise to politically motivated popular discontent in the republic. The focus here, of course, is Chernobyl as a Ukrainian national issue with destabilizing potential vis-à-vis the centre.

Nuclear Nationalism?

The least tangible of these three aspects is that which posits the Chernobyl disaster in terms of a nationality issue, that is, as a Ukrainian-Russian issue. Thus, an article that appeared in *The Christian Science Monitor* less than a month after the accident reported the views of several specialists on Ukrainian affairs who apparently felt that "because it occurred in the Soviet republic of Ukraine, the Chernobyl accident is likely to fan Ukrainian independent-mindedness and resentment of the Russian-dominated state."² One of the respondents queried by the authors felt that "the late 1980s could see the emergence of a new wave of dissident activism revolving around ecological concerns as well as those of Ukrainian autonomy." Another specialist was reported as agreeing "that the accident will exacerbate tensions between the people of the Ukraine and the regime in Moscow." All of this may be true. Nonetheless, it must be stated from the outset that at the moment there is no evidence to support these views. The article's reference to "reliable reports of public anger and dissension among spectators at the May Day parade" in Kiev and, more specifically, that "some Kiev residents were dismayed at what they considered callous celebrations just as reports of dead and injured in and around Chernobyl were emerging" falls somewhat short of qualifying as political dissent.

Another article cited the British mass-circulation *The Mail on Sunday* (13 May 1986) to the effect that "peasants living near Chernobyl painted slogans on the underground bunkers where party officials hid during the accident, with words such as: 'Murderers of the Fatherland' and 'Architects of Death.' Cartloads of hay were set alight and pulled up to the bunker's doors, and some military vehicles were hijacked."³ The only thing that can be said about this kind of

information is that it should be judged by the sources that are reporting it.

Finally, it should be noted that the few reports about Chernobyl reaching the West through *samvydav* channels have thus far been uniformly free of any political connotations insofar as Ukraine is concerned. They provide details about the evacuation of areas affected by radiation, problems with food supply, the lack or unreliability of information made public by the authorities, and the like. However, there is nothing in these reports to suggest that Chernobyl is being viewed as a political issue.⁴ The only dissident activity in the Soviet Union tied to Chernobyl that we know about occurred in Moscow. There the so-called Trust Group conducted several street demonstrations that included distribution of leaflets and the gathering of signatures for an anti-nuclear petition addressed to the authorities.⁵

This is not to suggest that there was no fear, anger, frustration, or even discontent among the population. Indeed there was, and one was able to read about it in the Soviet press. These are human emotions that one would expect under the circumstances. Moreover, there are clear indications that the same kind of questioning about the uses of nuclear energy that led members of the Trust Group to organize demonstrations in Moscow is also present in Ukraine. It surfaced in Oles Honchar's speech opening the congress of the Ukrainian Writers' Union in early June 1986, and again in Borys Oliinyk's presentation at the all-Union writers' congress shortly thereafter.⁶ Oliinyk's remarks about the allegedly "peaceful atom" were particularly forthright:

Chernobyl has forced us to rethink a great deal, including the fact that the common metaphor "peaceful atom" is but a metaphor inasmuch as it is peaceful only in its natural state. Chernobyl demands of us that we convince our scientists that sometimes they are confident to the point of cocksureness, seeming to know everything but in reality far from everything.

Oliinyk returned to the Chernobyl theme once again in a full-page article in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, this time criticizing the authorities' choice of the location site for the power plant on the edge of a major source of water supply and in a flood plain. He also referred to the now often quoted article by Liubov Kovalevska in *Literaturna Ukraina*—which was published shortly before the accident and pointed to persistent problems at the Chernobyl facility—saying that the article went unnoticed by those who should have been interested in its contents

but was in great demand after 26 April.⁷

The thrust of Oliinyk's criticism is directed at the bureaucratic bungling and ineptitude that is commonplace in the Soviet Union. It falls squarely within the boundaries of the officially sanctioned campaign for *glasnost* that is currently being encouraged by the leadership of the Party, and one can expect more of the same in the future. All of this should be evaluated in its proper context, which has nothing to do with dissent, opposition, or nationality problems.

Fixing Reponsibility

The expectation that heads would roll in Ukraine in the aftermath of Chernobyl surfaced soon after the accident. In addition to the obvious reason that Ukrainian Party and government officials are ultimately responsible for everything that goes on in the republic, several additional factors came into play. First, the initial Soviet response to everyone's question following the explosion, namely, how could such a disaster have happened, was that human error was the most likely cause. This was the explanation offered by Boris Eltsin, first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, in an interview with the West German television network ARD on 2 May. Eltsin, who was in Hamburg at the time, said: "The cause lies apparently in the subjective realm, in human error."⁸ In subsequent remarks he was more ambivalent. Interviewed by Associated Press on 4 May, Eltsin stated:

As for the causes, there are differing versions. Humans cannot enter the accident zone. Therefore we can't specify the causes of the accident at this time. There are so many versions [of the cause] that we can't lose time over that now. But one thing certainly is hard to believe, and that is that it had anything to do with the quality of the equipment.⁹

Although more circumspect, the fact that Eltsin virtually ruled out a technical mishap had the same effect as placing the blame on personnel at the Chernobyl plant. Approximately two weeks later, the same verdict was handed down by Ivan Emelianov, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and deputy director of a research institute that designed the Chernobyl-type reactor. Speaking with Western reporters, Emelianov argued that human error and not technical failure caused the Chernobyl blast. He made it clear that he believed that someone at the plant violated safety rules, overriding the built-in systems to prevent a nuclear accident.¹⁰ Irrespective of the fact

that Emelianov's views, given his position, might have been somewhat prejudicial, as it turned out his assessment largely coincided with the main findings of the Soviet report presented in Vienna.

In addition to blaming the Chernobyl staff for the accident itself, Moscow officials also blamed local personnel for initially underestimating the seriousness of the situation. Already on 3 May, an article in *The Guardian* entitled "Ukraine Kept Kremlin in the Dark" cited unnamed Soviet sources to the effect that "local officials in the Ukraine and senior figures in the Soviet ministries and organisations dealing with nuclear power 'misled' the Kremlin by trying to minimise the the nature of the Chernobyl disaster." Boris Shcherbina, head of the government investigative commission, said more or less the same thing at the first Soviet press conference on Chernobyl organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 6 May: "The first information we obtained was not the same which we obtained when we were in the area. In the area, local experts had not made a correct assessment of the accident."¹¹ This was repeated by Valentin Falin, head of the Novosti press agency, in an interview with the West German magazine *Der Spiegel*. Falin made it clear, however, that it was not the local officials but the plant technicians whose initial reports "were incomplete and later proved to be incorrect."¹² This view, it should be noted, appears to have been challenged by Emelianov. At a special briefing for Western diplomats on 13 May, which featured Shcherbina, Emelianov maintained: "They [plant workers] were correct in evaluating the situation and certain measures had been taken, but you saw how large the destruction was and it was difficult for local personnel and personnel on duty to cope with the situation. It was impossible."¹³

The question of incompetence on the local level with regard to initial evaluations of what had happened at Chernobyl is important not only because of the expected political repercussions in Ukraine but also because of the international criticism over the Soviet delay in reporting the accident. Closely tied to this is the question of when Moscow was informed of the accident. This aspect of the problem, however, leaves no room for speculation. At the 6 May press conference, Shcherbina, referring to the government investigative commission formed by the USSR Council of Ministers, stated that "we were in the area within several hours."¹⁴ At another press conference about two weeks later, Emelianov was specifically asked when the commission was established. He responded that it was at work "on the very day of the accident, April 26th."¹⁵ This means, of course, that officials in Moscow must have

been informed very quickly. Subsequent statements by Soviet officials leave no doubt that within a matter of several hours Moscow knew that a nuclear accident had occurred in Ukraine. Thus, Viktor Sidorenko, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in the Atomic Power Industry (Gosatomenergoadzor) told Western correspondents in late May that he was informed three hours after the accident and was at the Chernobyl site the same afternoon.¹⁶ Similarly, the deputy chief of the all-Union industrial association *Soiuzatomenergo*, Evgenii Ignatenko, was quoted by Radio Moscow as saying that he received a telephone call at 3:00 a.m. on 26 April, that is, less than three hours after the accident, and that he was in Kiev and then at Chernobyl within hours.¹⁷ Falin, asked specifically by *Der Spiegel* when Gorbachev had been informed of the accident, answered: "Already on Saturday [April 26], but the question is to what extent." The first detailed information, he added, was not given the Party leader until shortly before a meeting of the Politburo that was convened on 28 April to discuss the situation.¹⁸ This was also the explanation offered by the chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, Oleksandr Liashko, at a press conference in Kiev on 8 May. Liashko explained that the explosion at the fourth reactor was reported to central authorities "within hours," but that the full implications were not realized until two days later. "Moscow was told about this [the seriousness of the situation] on the 28th. It was an evolving situation," he said.¹⁹

The picture that emerges, therefore, is fairly straightforward. The disaster at Chernobyl was caused primarily by incompetent staff who, in addition, at first failed to fully comprehend what had happened. This, in turn, resulted in Moscow being provided with information from Kiev that, although timely, was incomplete and incorrect. The scenario was quite plausible. But whether or not this is what actually happened cannot be independently confirmed. Robert Gillette of the *Los Angeles Times* has looked at the Soviet reports—including a *Krasnaia zvezda* article of 7 June revealing that military planning was already underway the day of the accident—and comes to the conclusion that "the central authorities understood the seriousness of the accident the very day that it occurred." In his view, Moscow's claims that it learned too little too late to inform the outside world of the disaster any sooner than it did lacked credibility, and seemed to be inspired by a desire "to shift the blame specifically away from Gorbachev while allowing it to rest elsewhere in the Politburo."²⁰ In this connection, perhaps it is

worthwhile to cite the remarks of Aleksandr Novgorodov, described by the Reuter news agency as a senior official in the Soviet organization of friendship societies. Arriving in Israel with a Soviet friendship group in early May, Novgorodov is reported to have said that the Soviet Union delayed providing information about Chernobyl because it occurred just before the May Day holiday. "We didn't want to spoil the celebrations," he told reporters.²¹

Dismissals and Reprimands

The first disciplinary measures were reported by *Pravda* on 12 May, naming three officials of the Chernobyl branch of the transportation production association "Iuzhatomenergostroitrans" who were singled out for ineptitude in organizing the evacuation effort. A. Sichkarenko and A. Shapoval, described as leaders of the production association, were both fired. Shapoval was also expelled from the Party, while Sichkarenko was given a severe reprimand. The third official, A. Gubsky, identified as the Party secretary of the enterprise, received a lesser reprimand. This was followed one week later by an article in *Komsomolskaia pravda* revealing that two officials of the Komsomol organization at the plant, Iurii Zahalsky and Halyna Lupii, had fled after the accident. Zahalsky was removed from his post, and his membership in the Komsomol was to be reviewed. The newspaper said nothing about what action would be taken against Lupii.²²

In mid-June, an article in *Pravda Ukrainy* mentioned in passing that Erik Pozdyshev was the new director of the Chernobyl plant, thereby revealing that his predecessor, Viktor Briukhanov, had been dismissed.²³ Soon thereafter, *Pravda*, reporting on a plenum of the Kiev oblast Party Committee, announced that Briukhanov and Nikolai Fomin, the chief engineer at Chernobyl, had been sacked for "failing to insure correct and firm leadership and the required discipline in the difficult conditions of the accident, and displaying irresponsibility and inability to organize." The newspaper also criticized three deputy directors of the power plant—R. Solovev, I. Tsarenko, and V. Gundar—for various failings ranging from negligence to desertion; the chairman of the plant's trade union committee, V. Berezin; the secretary of the Komsomol organization at Chernobyl, Aleksandr Bocharov; and, once again, A. Shapoval, who was now identified as the chief engineer of the Chernobyl branch of "Iuzhatomenergostroitrans." While praising the overall performance of the Party committee at

Chernobyl, the newspaper conceded that there was no doubt that "the Party committee could have done more."²⁴

The next round of dismissals and reprimands was announced by the CPSU Politburo at the end of July after a special session that examined the report of the government's investigative commission. Affected were several leading officials of the Soviet energy industry. At the same time, it was reported that Briukhanov had been expelled from the Party.²⁵ More top Moscow energy chiefs were either expelled from Party membership or reprimanded in mid-August after a review conducted by the CPSU Party Control Committee.²⁶

In Ukraine, twenty-seven Party members were expelled from the Kiev oblast organization for "cowardice and alarmism," according to *Pravda*. The individuals concerned were not even identified.²⁷ The first and thus far the only punishment meted out to Ukrainian Party and government functionaries of any standing was reported on 27 July by *Radianska Ukraina*, which informed its readers that the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party "examined the question of the responsibility of a number of culpable officials," and that the action was taken on the instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Involved were the secretary of the Party committee at Chernobyl, Sergei Parashin, and the first secretary of the Prypiat City Party Committee, Oleksandr Hamaniuk, both of whom were given severe reprimands. Parashin was also removed from his post. The acting head of the Board of the Southwest Region of Gosatomenergoadzor, identified only as Zavalniuk, was also severely reprimanded; it was considered "undesirable" for him to retain his post, the newspaper added. Also, it was announced that the former chief engineer at Chernobyl, Fomin, was expelled from the Party for "serious mistakes and omissions in his plant, and conducting an experiment at the No. 4 energy block without the required preparation and without the consent of the appropriate organs."²⁸

It is, of course, possible that further disciplinary action will be taken in Ukraine. For the moment, however, the individuals affected by dismissals and reprimands, particularly the Party functionaries, represent the lower rungs of the bureaucracy. Neither the Prypiat City Party Committee, which is responsible for political oversight at Chernobyl, nor the Kiev oblast Party Committee, which exercises overall control in the region, have suffered any real consequences. This is a far cry from the political doom of Ukrainian Party leader Shcherbytsky that has been routinely forecast by most Western observers of the Soviet scene both

before and after Chernobyl.

Sense and Nonsense About Shcherbytsky

The disaster at the Ukrainian nuclear power plant removed any lingering doubts that may have been harboured by the Western media as to Shcherbytsky's future. Virtually without exception, everyone agreed that Chernobyl would have very clear negative political consequences for the Ukrainian Party leader. Some commentaries were restrained, noting simply that Chernobyl "may portend unpleasant consequences for such local officials as Vladimir Shcherbitsky, the Ukrainian Party leader, a holdover from the regime of Leonid Brezhnev, three governments back."²⁹ Others were more bold, arguing that Shcherbytsky was "incriminated because of Chernobyl, and he will probably not be able to hold out much longer."³⁰ The conventional wisdom held that Gorbachev had now been presented with a perfect opportunity to oust the Ukrainian Party first secretary. "Experts give Mr. Shcherbitsky a month, and predict a purge of the entire Party apparatus in the Kiev oblast," wrote one newspaper in mid-May.³¹

The conviction with which such judgements were made is quite understandable given the pre-Chernobyl *idée fixe* of Kremlinologists and other "experienced observers" that Gorbachev's election to the CPSU leadership in March 1985 translated into Shcherbytsky's downfall. Without too much elaboration, the notion soon took hold that Shcherbytsky (and Kazakh Party leader Dinmukhamed Kunaev) is a "Brezhnevite," a member of the "old guard," a "leftover," and the like. Speculation about his imminent demise surfaced following Viktor Grishin's resignation as head of the Moscow City Party organization at the end of December 1985. After the departures of Politburo members Grigorii Romanov, Nikolai Tikhonov, and Grishin, it seemed only natural that the remaining "dead wood" would also be removed from the inner leadership of the Party. All the more so since Gorbachev—increasingly portrayed as "young and dynamic" and the leader of a "new generation" with "fresh ideas and bold visions"—had made clear his intention to "reconstruct" Soviet society. Moreover, in Shcherbytsky's case, there appeared to be solid ground for his dismissal. Western diplomats in Moscow, always on the lookout for conflicts and fissures in the top leadership, spotted nothing less than a policy disagreement between Gorbachev and Shcherbytsky. Specifically, the Ukrainian Party leader was said to have questioned the results of the

Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva at the November 1985 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.³²

Speculation mounted in mid-January 1986 after *Pravda* carried an article on the Kharkiv oblast Party conference, revealing that some local officials had been sacked. This was duly registered in the West as further evidence that Shcherbytsky was on his way out. Indeed, it was pointed out that the conference was attended by USSR Procurator General Aleksandr Rekunkov, and that Shcherbytsky was not present. A British newspaper wrote that the conference in Kharkiv was called specifically to discuss shortcomings in the region's economy and violations of Party discipline, and that senior officials had been removed and reprimanded. The Gorbachev purge had now spread to Ukraine, it concluded. A German national daily carried the headline "A Warning to Shcherbytsky?" Soon thereafter, *Pravda* reported that there had been criticism at the Kiev City Party conference, and diplomats in Moscow were now saying that Shcherbytsky was "fighting for his political survival." But one such "expert" cautioned against hasty judgements, offering the view that Shcherbytsky might in fact be encouraging such criticism "in his own backyard" so as to strengthen his position in the Party. Unfortunately, the mechanics of this clever maneuver were never explained. All concurred, however, that at the very least Iurii Ielchenko, the Kiev Party chief, was finished. Then, at the end of January, the Soviet press announced that Vitalii Fedorchuk, the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, had been "transferred to other work." Before moving to Moscow in 1982, first as Iurii Andropov's replacement at the KGB and then as minister of internal affairs, Fedorchuk was head of the KGB in Ukraine, where he supervised the persecution of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the aftermath of Petro Shelest's ouster. At a total loss to explain what was behind the Fedorchuk move, some "seasoned observers" suggested that Gorbachev might be considering Fedorchuk to replace Shcherbytsky.

Clearly, all of this is nonsense. The alleged differences between Shcherbytsky and Gorbachev over foreign policy issues are difficult to pinpoint and still more difficult to document. That Shcherbytsky should have voiced reservations about the Geneva summit comes as no surprise; over the years he has been consistent in his hard-line stance toward the West. But does this necessarily mean that he is in "opposition" to Gorbachev? Others also advocated caution in evaluating the results of Geneva. Indeed, Gorbachev himself was later reported as having told the Italian Communist Party official Giancarlo Pajetta that "the

[summit] talk gave him a favourable impression, although he has no facile illusions and his optimism is always accompanied by great caution.”³³ As for the Kharkiv meeting, there was nothing extraordinary about it; it was one of many being held throughout the USSR during the so-called report and election process. No senior officials were dismissed. With one exception, all of the oblast-level secretaries, including the first and second secretaries, were reelected. This was also the case at the Kiev City Party conference. Concerning Rekunkov’s presence in Kharkiv, the only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that it is standard practice for representatives from Moscow to attend such affairs. Shcherbytsky’s absence, on the other hand, may well be explained by the fact that he had already attended the Kharkiv City Party conference that was held several weeks earlier. Of course, one could only know this from the Kiev press, which is not exactly required reading for most Kremlinologists.

This is unfortunate, because a certain knowledge of developments in the republic would have precluded unwarranted speculation. For readers of *Radianska Ukraina* or *Pravda Ukrainy*, it was perfectly clear by early January, when the local Party organizations in Ukraine concluded their report and election conferences, that the Ukrainian Party organization had emerged virtually unaffected by Gorbachev’s campaign against corruption and incompetence. Thus, a comparison with the preceding round of elections in 1984 shows that 21 of the 25 oblast first secretaries and the first secretary of the Kiev City Party organization, or 81 per cent, were reelected. Moreover, two of the five changes in personnel that did take place involved promotions or lateral transfers. Likewise, a glance at the Kiev newspapers of 25 January would have shown that a plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee held the previous day ended without examining any “organizational questions.” This would have ended, at least temporarily, further speculation about Shcherbytsky’s fate.

Shcherbytsky was reelected first secretary at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine in February, and several weeks later, at the conclusion of the CPSU congress in Moscow, he was reelected to full membership in the Politburo. When, at the same time, Fedorchuk was dropped from membership in the Central Committee, the notion that he had ever been a candidate for Shcherbytsky’s job was quietly forgotten. The “veteran Soviet watchers” were baffled. One commentator considered the possibility that perhaps Gorbachev could not find a suitable candidate for the post in Kiev. At the moment, the

prevailing view is that Shcherbytsky's continued membership in the Moscow Politburo illustrates that Gorbachev's power is not as all-embracing as it was once thought to be.³⁴ This is entirely plausible. At the same time, such explanations continue to be accompanied by dubious assumptions about Shcherbytsky's political views—as if these could be gauged with any degree of accuracy—and, in some instances, by pure fantasy. A case in point:

An indication, however, that Gorbachev has not entirely had a free hand in determining the leadership is the continuing presence of two unreconstructed Brezhnevites, Kunaev and Shcherbitsky, in the Politburo. . . . The survival of Kunaev (in the face of well publicized economic failures in his republic) and Shcherbitsky (despite criticism of similar failures in the Ukraine) implies that Gorbachev is not able to act with complete impunity when it comes to dumping older members of the Politburo.³⁵

It is not entirely clear to what criticism the author is referring. Criticism by *Pravda's* correspondent in Kiev of bureaucratic bungling and mismanagement at some factory or enterprise? Poor harvest results in some oblasts? This is an almost daily occurrence in the Soviet press that, in fact, predates Gorbachev by several decades. In any case, Shcherbytsky himself has yet to be personally criticized by Gorbachev or by anyone else, for that matter. Indeed, at the Party congress in Moscow, the CPSU general secretary was quite positive about economic performance in Ukraine. "Party organizations in Ukraine should be commended," he said, "for creating scientific and technological complexes and engineering centres, and for their productive work in effectively utilizing recycled resources."³⁶

One commentator, writing from London, is confident that "the Ukrainian party leader is notoriously hostile to the new General Secretary, being another native of Brezhnev's home town."³⁷ It would be interesting to learn why this is so. Even more colourful is the recent discovery by a Moscow correspondent of personal animosity between Shcherbytsky and Gorbachev:

Indeed, bad blood between Gorbachev and two conservatives on the Politburo, Vladimir Shcherbitsky of the Ukraine and Dinmukhamed Kunaev of Kazakhstan, dates back five years when, acting on Andropov's anti-corruption orders, Gorbachev supervised the ousting of a number of regional bosses, the largest number being in the Ukraine and

Kazakhstan.³⁸

This would also be interesting if it were true. Unfortunately, no one but the author of this particular report is aware of a purge in Ukraine at the end of 1982. More examples along these lines are available upon request.

The purpose of this exercise is not to relish the *Schadenfreude* of someone else's failings but rather to underscore the dangers of simplistic assumptions about Soviet politics, particularly in the republics. The fact of the matter is that we actually know next to nothing about Shcherbytsky's role in Kremlin politics. Analysts of Soviet affairs perform an important service when they call our attention to little-known facts that surface in the Soviet media, or when they identify specific patterns of development over a given period of time. It has been pointed out, for example, that Shcherbytsky's direct participation in the Chernobyl evacuation and clean-up effort, as witnessed by his relatively rare visits to the plant site, has been minimal. His counterpart in Belorussia, Nikolai Sliunkov, on the other hand, has played a much more active role in the work that was done in the southern parts of Homel oblast, which were also affected by radiation.³⁹ But it would be unwise to draw sweeping conclusions from this alone. However, some things can be said for certain: Shcherbytsky is 68; one day he will leave his post; and then everyone who ever predicted this will have been correct.

Notes

¹ USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, *The Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and Its Consequences: Information Compiled for the IAEA Experts' Meeting, 25–29 August 1986, Vienna*, Part I. General Material. Draft. August 1986. Working Document for the Post-Accident Review Meeting, 23. The report presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also cited the design of the reactor as a contributing factor. For the CPSU Politburo's review of the conclusions reached by the government commission, see *Pravda*, 20 July 1986.

² George Zarycky and Adrian Karatnycky, "Chernobyl: Stirring Nationalism?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 13 May 1986.

³ Taras Kusio, "Chernobyl: Spur to Opposition," *Soviet Analyst*, v. 15, no. 5 (30 July 1986), 4.

⁴ See "The Soviet Coverup of the Chornobyl Disaster," *Smoloskyp*, v. 7, no. 30 (Summer 1986), 1 and 16, and Arkhiv Samizdata no. 5770, "Otryvki iz pisma neukazannomu adresatu o nekotorykh aspektakh poslechernobylskoi zhizni na Ukraine (bez mesta, konets iiulia 1986)," *Materialy Samizdata* (Radio Liberty, Munich), vypusk 30/86, 19 September 1986.

⁵ See Arkhiv Samizdata no. 5737, "Gruppa doveriia. Zaiavlenie o deistviiakh Gruppy v sviazi s Chernobylskoi katastrofoi i o novykh repressivnykh merakh protiv Iuriiia i Olgi Medvedkovykh, Moskva, 16.6.86," *Materialy Samizdata*, vypusk 26/86, 8 August 1986. *The Times*, 21 May 1986 reported the Trust Group's first attempted demonstration on the previous day, which failed to materialize because of arrests and detentions. See also the West Berlin *Die Tageszeitung*, 2 October 1986, which provides information on subsequent street actions organized by the Trust Group as related by one of its members, Olga Medvedkova, who is now in the West. The Trust Group's statement opposing civilian nuclear programs and its open letter to the Soviet leadership are published in *END. Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament*, no. 22–3 (Summer 1986), 6.

⁶ *Literaturna Ukraina*, 12 June and 3 July 1986.

⁷ *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 24 September 1986.

⁸ AP, 3 May 1986.

⁹ AP, 4 May 1986.

¹⁰ *Los Angeles Times* and *The Times*, 20 May 1986.

¹¹ *The Times* and *International Herald Tribune*, 7 May 1986.

¹² *Der Spiegel*, 12 May 1986, 139.

¹³ AP, 13 May 1986. Emelianov was among the group of officials that was sacked in July. See *Pravda*, 20 July 1986.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, 7 May 1986.

¹⁵ AP, 19 May 1986.

¹⁶ *The Washington Post*, 22 May 1986.

¹⁷ Radio Moscow, in Russian, 24 May 1986.

¹⁸ *Der Spiegel*, 12 May 1986, 139–40.

¹⁹ Reuter, 8 May 1986.

²⁰ *Los Angeles Times*, 20 July 1986.

²¹ Reuter, 8 May 1986.

²² *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 17 May 1986.

²³ *Pravda Ukrainy*, 11 June 1986.

²⁴ *Pravda*, 15 June 1986.

²⁵ *Pravda*, 20 July 1986.

²⁶ *Pravda*, 14 August 1986.

²⁷ *Pravda*, 2 September 1986.

²⁸ The same information was also later reported by *Pravda Ukrainy*, 30 July 1986, and *Pravda*, 6 August 1986.

²⁹ *The New York Times*, 9 May 1986.

³⁰ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 August 1986.

³¹ *The Washington Times*, 16 May 1986.

³² The speculation about Shcherbytsky's future is documented in Roman Solchanyk, "The Perils of Prognostication," *Soviet Analyst*, v. 15, no. 5 (5 March 1986), 3–4.

³³ *Corriere della Sera*, 5 February 1986.

³⁴ Stephen F. Cohen in the *International Herald Tribune*, 2 April 1986.

³⁵ Terry McNeill, "Gorbachev: Squaring the Circles," *Soviet Analyst*, v. 15, no. 6 (19 March 1986), 1.

³⁶ *Pravda*, 26 February 1986.

³⁷ Andy McSmith, "The Spectre of the KGB," *New Statesman*, 9 May 1986, 21.

³⁸ *The Boston Globe*, 7 October 1986.

³⁹ See David Marples, "Chornobyl: Political Consequences," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 28 September 1986, and Eberhard Schneider, *Der XXVII. Parteitag der KPdSU: Personelle Veränderungen im Politburo und im ZK-Sekretariat*, "Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche Studien," 30–1986, 2.

MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHERNOBYL

Introduction

On 25 April 1986, engineers at Unit 4 of the RBMK-1000 type nuclear power plant at Chernobyl in Soviet Ukraine were preparing to perform experiments aimed at testing the effectiveness of a number of safety features of the nuclear reactor in the event of a sudden interruption of steam supply to the electrical turbine generators. In the course of the day, at least six safety rules were violated, including the removal of too many control rods needed to shut the reactors down in an emergency, shutting off the automatic controls, bypassing the automatic shutdown mechanism, and switching on too many cooling pumps. At 1:23 a.m. on Saturday, 26 April, approximately 40 seconds into the experiment, the power level of the reactor surged from 7 per cent (200 million watts (MW)) to 50 per cent of full power in less than 10 seconds. This resulted in the rapid formation of steam at high pressure, which burst the reactor's cooling tubes. The steam in the damaged reactor reacted chemically with the hot zirconium fuel cladding to produce hydrogen, which formed a combustible mixture with the air and resulted in a powerful explosion that blew off the roof of the refuelling building above the reactor and started a number of fires. Radiation levels in the immediate vicinity of the breached reactor reached extremely high levels, well in excess of tens of thousands of rem per hour.¹ Millions of Curies of volatile radionuclides such as Iodine 131 and Cesium 137 were released into the atmosphere² and dispersed downwind from the reactor site.

This paper compares the scale of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster with the three most serious reactor accidents that have occurred to date—at Windscale (now called Sellafield) in the United Kingdom in 1957, at Idaho Flats in the United States in 1961, and at the Three

Mile Island power plant in the United States in 1979. An assessment is made of the acute and chronic medical consequences of the Chernobyl accident on the population of the Soviet Union and other countries around the world which were subsequently affected by the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl.

Nuclear Reactors

In 1942 Enrico Fermi constructed in Chicago the world's first nuclear reactor, which was used for the development of atomic weapons by the Allies during World War II. This nuclear research work culminated with the atom bomb attacks on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The Soviet Union developed a hybrid military-civilian reactor at Obninsk with an electrical power output of 5 MW, which became operational in 1954. A large military-civilian hybrid reactor with an electrical power output of 50 MW was opened by the Queen at Calder Hall in the United Kingdom in 1956. Hundreds of nuclear reactors are now being used throughout the world for a wide range of military, scientific and industrial tasks. These include well over 300 units³ whose sole function is to generate electrical power by using the heat generated in the nuclear reactor to produce steam and thereby drive an electrical turbo generator. The Chernobyl site had four operational reactors rated at 1000 MW electrical power each and a further two units under construction. The Chernobyl-type reactors are based on a graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled, pressure-tube design which is not used for commercial power generating purposes outside the Soviet-bloc countries.

Reactors generate heat from nuclear fuels, such as Uranium 235, which can undergo a breaking-up process known as fission. This process is associated with the enormous release of energy, with the typical energy release associated with nuclear fuels being millions of times larger than the energy released when comparable masses of fossil fuels such as gas, oil or coal are burned. This heat is produced in the reactor core at a controlled rate and is extracted from the core by means of one of a variety of coolants, such as carbon dioxide gas or water. The heated coolant passes through a heat exchanger, and the energy extracted in this fashion is used to generate steam. The mode of production of electricity is subsequently identical to that encountered in any conventional fossil-fuel-type power station in which steam is employed to drive turbo generators.

One of the major problems of operating a nuclear power plant is the build-up in the reactor core of very large amounts of waste produced by the fission of the Uranium 234 nuclear fuel. The waste products, which are highly radioactive, include volatile radionuclides such as Iodine 131 (8-day half-life*) and Cesium 137 (30-year half-life) and enter easily into the human food chain. They also include extremely toxic and long-lived radionuclides such as Plutonium 239 (24,000-year half-life) and other elements heavier than uranium (transuranics). Under normal conditions, reactor operators are shielded from these radioactive waste products by a containment vessel which physically prevents the escape of radioactivity from the reactor core and by a thick wall that absorbs the harmful radiation emitted by those radionuclides as they undergo radioactive decay. Spent fuel rods removed from reactor cores are highly radioactive and are generally stored in deep-water pools for many years to permit the decay of the short-lived radioactive wastes. The ultimate disposal of the long-lived radioactive waste is currently the subject of intense research throughout the world. No technologically acceptable solution to this problem has yet been developed.

When a reactor is breached, the radiation levels may become dangerously high and the potential exists for the release into the environment of very large quantities of radioactivity. The types of radionuclides that may be released are highly dependent on a wide range of technical factors relating to the reactor type and the specifics of the accident conditions. Subsequent dispersal of the radioactivity is primarily determined by the meteorological conditions prevalent at the time of the accident. Detrimental effects to human populations and the whole ecosystem occur when the radioactivity decays by emitting radiation which is harmful when absorbed in sufficiently high quantities by any living systems. Individuals can be irradiated from external sources, such as a passing cloud of radioactivity or radioactive deposits on the ground. In addition, radioactivity may be taken into the body by direct inhalation or ingestion of contaminated food and water, which will irradiate the affected individual as the radioactivity decays. The presence of long-lived radioactive waste in spent nuclear fuel can result in very serious environmental contamination problems for many years

*The half-life measures the rate of decay of radionuclides where after a period of one half-life, 50 per cent of the initial radioactivity remains; after two half-lives, 25 per cent remains, and so on. After ten half-lives, only 0.1 per cent of the initial radioactivity will remain.

into the distant future if these materials escape from their containment. The classic demonstration of this type of problem is the dispersal of radioactive waste materials in a presumed chemical explosion at a waste-storage site in the Kyshtym region of the Soviet Union at the end of 1957 or the beginning of 1958.⁴ Lev Tumerman, a Soviet scientist who emigrated to Israel in 1972, reported that in 1960 he drove along a highway that crosses the contaminated area and saw "a large area . . . in which any normal activity was forbidden, people were evacuated and villages razed, evidently to prevent inhabitants from returning; there was no agriculture or livestock raising, fishing and hunting were forbidden."⁵

Radiation Effects

Knowledge of the detrimental effects to humans from radiation has been obtained by studying groups of individuals who have suffered from radiation exposure in the course of their work (e.g., uranium-ore miners), for medical reasons (e.g., therapeutically irradiated patients), and for military reasons (e.g., survivors of the atom-bomb attacks at Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The biological effects of radiation are measured using the scientific unit known as the rem, which takes into account the amount of radiation absorbed by an individual and the effectiveness of the radiation type in causing harm. Radiation effects can be conveniently divided into two distinct categories. The first category relates to non-stochastic, *acute* effects which generally occur when individuals receive radiation doses in excess of about 100 rem, while the second category relates to the stochastic (random), *chronic* process of carcinogenesis and genetic effects which are the principal concerns for individuals exposed to radiation doses below 100 rem.

Doses well in excess of 1,000 rem result in the rapid onset of severe nausea and vomiting, followed by convulsions and tremors. States of stupor alternate with hyperexcitability, and death inevitably follows within a few days. At doses in excess of about 700 rem, nausea, persistent vomiting and hemorrhagic diarrhea dominate; all are associated with the destruction of the intestinal lining. Exhaustion and delirium may follow, dehydration develops, the circulation fails, and coma and death generally follow about a week after exposure. Individuals exposed in the range of 200–600 rem also experience nausea and vomiting accompanied by the loss of appetite, diarrhea and apathy for two to three days. The white cell and platelet levels in the blood

drop over a period of days as the bone marrow stops producing cells and the patient's condition deteriorates. Three to four weeks after exposure, fatigue, chills and shortness of breath develop, the gums and tonsils become ulcerated and bleed, and hair loss occurs. Alterations in the immune system make the individual susceptible to infection, and death may occur. Current estimates are that perhaps half of those exposed to this dose range could die within 25 to 35 days following exposure. And individual who survives this acute stage will have an elevated lifetime risk of dying from a radiation-induced cancer of about one per cent per 100-rem radiation dose. This is a significant increase above the "natural" cancer mortality rate of about 13 per cent in the general population of an industrial society such as the Soviet Union.

Individuals exposed to radiation levels below 100 rem are estimated to have a risk of developing a fatal cancer of about 0.0001 per rem. This means that if 10,000 individuals were each to be exposed to a radiation dose of one rem, then over a lifetime, one extra radiation-induced fatal cancer would be expected to occur over and above the "natural" incidence of 1,300 (13 per cent) cancer deaths in this population. Radiation-induced cancers cannot be distinguished from "natural" cancers and possess latent periods that are measured in years for leukemias and decades for solid tumors. In studying exposed groups such as the Japanese survivors of the atom-bomb attacks, scientific and medical work to assess the late effects of radiation is still being undertaken to this day, more than 40 years after the original exposure to radiation. In assessing the carcinogenic effects of radiation it is necessary to note that most human data on this radiation risk have been obtained at high doses in excess of about 50 rem. The use of these risk factors for individuals exposed at radiation levels as low as 10 rem, one rem or even 0.1 rem is problematical, as current uncertainties in the radiation risk are typically factors of two to three. Thus, estimates of cancer deaths among members of the public arising from an accidental release of radioactivity into the environment are based on data involving the exposure of a relatively large number of individuals to relatively low radiation doses. This is the case for the populations exposed to radiation from the Chernobyl fallout remote from the reactor site and is the best scientific *estimate* currently available. An immediate corollary of this fact is that by collecting scientific and medical data on the population groups exposed to the higher radiation doses from the Chernobyl accident, valuable information can be obtained to improve the current status of the limited scientific knowledge on the carcinogenic effect of

radiation.

In addition to the induction of cancer, exposure to low levels of radiation is associated with an increase in risk of producing serious abnormalities in an individual's offspring. The average genetic radiation risk is generally taken to be about 30 per cent of the fatal cancer risk for a typical adult population. Individuals exposed to doses below 10 rem are subject to a risk that is considerably smaller than the "natural" incidence of genetic abnormalities, which is about 3 per cent for serious defects and 11 per cent for all types of genetic defects in all live-born infants.

To interpret the significance of a given radiation exposure, it is convenient to summarize the radiation doses to which typical populations may be exposed. Everyone on earth is exposed to natural background radiation from cosmic rays originating in outer space and from primordial radionuclides still remaining since the formation of this planet. On average, any individual receives an annual radiation dose of between 0.1 and 0.2 rem, although there are certain geographical regions where this background may be considerably elevated because of higher concentrations of radioactivity in natural ores. Individuals who work with radiation in medical institutions and in industry are subject to regulatory dose limits of 5 rem per annum, although average doses received by such workers are generally closer to 0.5 rem per annum. Regulatory dose limits also exist for members of the public and are currently set at 0.5 rem per annum. However, there are indications that this regulatory limit will be reduced to 0.1 rem per annum in the near future. Experience has shown that actual radiation doses to members of the public from activities involving radiation are considerably smaller than the regulatory dose limits currently in force.

History of Reactor Accidents

On 8 October 1957, an air-cooled nuclear reactor at Windscale in the United Kingdom used to produce plutonium for the military caught fire during routine maintenance work.⁶ After three days, the authorities succeeded in extinguishing the fire and preventing a serious explosion. A large number of uranium fuel rods were seriously damaged, which resulted in the release of approximately 20,000 Curies of Iodine 131 and 600 Curies of Cesium 137. In addition, an estimated 240 Curies of the considerably more hazardous alpha-emitting Polonium 210 were also reported to have been released,⁷ although the full details of this aspect

of the accident are still uncertain because of the secretiveness of the British military authorities.⁸ The magnitude of the release of radioactivity was fortuitously minimized by the presence of particulate air filters on top of the tall stacks above the reactors. These air filters, belatedly added after construction of the stacks had commenced at the insistence of Sir John Cockroft, head of Britain's Harwell nuclear centre, were known locally as "Cockroft's follies." Although no individual was seriously injured in the accident, contaminated milk from dairy herds in the surrounding 500 square kilometres was poured down disused mineshafts to minimize radiation exposure to the population. The UK National Radiological Protection Board issued a report in 1983 which estimated that perhaps 30 extra cancer deaths in the general population could be expected as a result of the release of radioactivity in the Windscale accident. This is an extremely small number of detrimental effects. It is orders of magnitude too low to be detected directly and insignificant in comparison with the number of cancer fatalities expected in the same population. The nuclear reactor, however, was shut down and embedded in concrete. It remains entombed to this day. The reactor will ultimately have to be dismantled and disposed of, together with long-lived radioactive wastes, and this will certainly pose major technological, radiological and financial problems to the authorities.

On 3 January 1961 at the National Reactor Testing station near Idaho Falls in the United States,⁹ three men were servicing control-rod motors on the small 3 MW (thermal) water-cooled SL-1 reactor. A control rod was inadvertently removed from the reactor core, causing a massive surge of heat that flashed the water coolant to steam. The reactor core was shattered and the entire reactor vessel rose three metres, demolishing the floor above it. The radiation levels were in excess of 500 rem per hour, which severely hampered the rescue work. One serviceman was impaled by a control rod in the reactor building roof, another was found dead by rescue workers, and the third died in an ambulance on the way to Idaho Falls. All three victims were so radioactive that they had to be interred in lead-lined coffins. The ruins of the SL-1 reactor were decontaminated and dismantled by the end of 1962. In the course of this operation, several hundred workers received significant radiation exposure.

Prior to the Chernobyl disaster, the Three Mile Island incident at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was the world's most famous reactor accident.¹⁰ The accident in the 900 MW (electrical) water-cooled

reactor began at 4:00 a.m. on 29 March 1979, when a water pump failed in the cooling circuitry. A series of technical problems and operator errors brought the reactor to the edge of disaster. Although the reactor core was badly damaged and major technical and financial resources will be required to ultimately dispose of the highly radioactive structure, the actual impact on the adjacent population was primarily psychological, owing to the confusion of the authorities dealing with the incident. No operator at the plant was injured or seriously exposed to radiation, and only a relatively modest 20 Curies of Iodine 131 were released to the environment. The maximum radiation dose to any individual was estimated to be less than 0.1 rem, and no detrimental effects are expected to occur in the population.

Chernobyl Accident

Following the explosions that damaged the Unit 4 Chernobyl nuclear reactor, there was a major fire in the reactor building which reportedly took 90 minutes to bring under control. A separate fire involving the reactor core's graphite moderator was extinguished by 5 May using helicopters to drop more than 4000 tonnes of sand, boron, lead, dolomite, and clay onto the reactor. The release of radioactivity to the atmosphere continued for a further eight days before it was finally stopped. In total, about 100 million Curies of radioactive elements were released into the atmosphere. This corresponds to 3.5 per cent of the reactor's total inventory, and includes all the gaseous fission products plus about 20 per cent of the radioiodines and 10 per cent of the radiocesiums.¹¹ The radiation fields in the immediate vicinity of the crippled reactor have remained at high levels, posing major technical and radiological problems in attempts to bring the reactor under control. These major undertakings included the digging of a 400-foot tunnel beneath the reactor in order to construct a concrete barrier that would prevent the possible leakage of radioactivity into the ground. Following the installation of more control rods to reduce the reactor's remaining power surges and the total encasement of the reactor in thick concrete, one of the other reactors on the Chernobyl site was started up again on 1 October.

An area of approximately 1000 square kilometres around the reactor site, including the towns of Prypiat and Chernobyl, was seriously contaminated, making it necessary to evacuate 135,000 inhabitants. The contamination of large sections of the countryside with long-lived

radionuclides such as Cesium 137 (30-year half-life) is likely to pose major technical, logistical and radiological problems for the Soviet authorities. Whether these difficulties can be satisfactorily resolved, enabling all the inhabitants of the region to return, is still in doubt. Total damage to the reactor has been estimated at \$3.6 billion,¹² although the final reckoning of cost could be much higher. In addition to the ultimate cost of disposing of the crippled reactor's highly radioactive remains, electricity supplies have been seriously disrupted, and expensive modifications are to be made to improve the safety of all the 27 RBMK-type nuclear reactors in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there are large costs associated with the environmental and medical consequences of the release of radioactivity from the Chernobyl site, which has caused considerable disruption in Soviet society and involved the diversion of valuable resources to deal with the accident's aftermath.

Medical Aspects

The plume of radioactivity released from the Chernobyl reactor spread over substantial areas of the Soviet Union and covered most of Europe within 5–6 days of the accident. Detectable amounts of Chernobyl fallout were also measured by 6 May in air, rainwater and milk samples in places as distant from Chernobyl as Canada¹³ and Japan,¹⁴ where slightly elevated levels of radioactivity persisted for up to two months. The medical consequences of the reactor accident and subsequent release of radioactivity are considered in detail below by examining the following population categories:

1. The 230 highly irradiated workers at the nuclear site
2. The 135,000 inhabitants who required evacuation from a 32 km. zone around the nuclear plant
3. The 75 million inhabitants of the Soviet Union most affected by the Chernobyl fallout
4. The population of neighbouring states, such as Poland and Finland
5. The population of the United Kingdom

6. The Canadian population.

1. Two people died in the reactor explosion on 26 April, and a further 29 individuals are reported to have died from injuries sustained at Chernobyl, primarily from the acute effects of severe radiation sickness. Approximately 200 are still suffering from acute effects of radiation, and their average radiation dose has been estimated at about 230 rem. An excellent first-hand report of the medical treatment these irradiated individuals have been receiving was published by Dr. Michael McCally, professor of clinical medicine at the University of Chicago.¹⁵ The survivors in this group have a reasonably optimistic prognosis for full recovery, although they will all continue to carry an elevated risk of contracting of radiation-induced cancer—especially leukemia, as well as cancer of the thyroid, bone, breast and lung. In addition, the survivors also run the elevated risks of the induction of eye cataracts and of producing offspring with birth defects. For an average population of 200, up to 26 individuals would die of “natural” cancer. Since the average dose to this surviving group of workers is estimated to be approximately 230 rem, an extra six cancer fatalities would be expected, which corresponds to a 22 per cent increase in the “natural” rate of cancer fatalities. Although the expected increase in the cancer fatality rate is high, the relatively small sample size and the stochastic nature of the cancer induction process will result in statistical difficulties in determining a causative link between deaths and the radiation exposure. This group of individuals will undoubtedly undergo careful medical monitoring for the remainder of their lives and, despite the small sample size, may well demonstrate a statistically significant increase in the induction of thyroid cancer and leukemia. Increased incidence of thyroid cancer is predicted to arise in this group, because the thyroid is the most radiosensitive tissue for cancer induction in the body. However the mortality rate for individuals with thyroid cancer is low and is normally taken to be about 10 per cent. In the case of leukemia, the “natural” incidence of the disease is small, and radiation-induced leukemias have relatively short induction periods of a few years, which facilitates the epidemiological task of establishing a cause and effect relationship between radiation exposure and the appearance of the disease.

2. A total of 20 million Curies of radioactivity is estimated to have fallen within a 30 km. radius of Chernobyl. Individuals inhabiting this region would receive external irradiation directly from the radioactive plume passing by, as well as from ground deposits of radioactivity.

Further radiation doses would occur via inhalation of radioactivity from the air and ingestion of contaminated food and water. To minimize the radiation doses to individuals in this type of accident situation, it is general practice in most Western countries to give serious consideration to performing a general evacuation when the cumulative radiation doses to the population at risk could exceed 10 rem. The evacuation of the 45,000 inhabitants of Prypiat, which is situated only 2 km. from the reactor site, was delayed until 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, 27 April, 36 hours after the accident occurred. Accounts of this evacuation describe an efficient operation involving 1000 buses to complete the task of driving away the inhabitants of Prypiat in less than three hours, limiting the average radiation dose to the 45,000 evacuees to about 3 rem. Unfortunately, the seriousness and extent of the radioactive fallout were not fully appreciated until six days later. This meant that the remaining population in the vicinity of the damaged reactor received radiation doses much greater than those received by the inhabitants of Prypiat. Twenty-four thousand people received average radiation doses of 45 rem before being evacuated, and a further 65,700 received an average radiation dose of about 5 rem. In total, 135,000 individuals were evacuated. The radiation levels in the evacuated region have prevented the permanent return of any individuals to their homes. It is unlikely that Prypiat and other badly contaminated areas can be reinhabited for many years to come, although the Soviet authorities have indicated that this remains a long-term goal.

The evacuated population did not receive radiation doses in excess of 100 rem and was not therefore subject to the acute effects of radiation sickness. On the basis of data made available at the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna convened at the end of August to discuss the Chernobyl accident,¹⁶ up to 280 individuals in this group are expected to die from radiation-induced cancer.¹⁷ A comparable number are also expected to develop non-fatal radiation-induced cancers. Radiation-induced cancer fatalities would correspond to an increase of only 2 per cent in the "natural" cancer fatality rate. In addition to the cancer effects, the total number of serious genetic abnormalities in the next two generations of this population is likely to be about 80, with a total comparable number expressed in all subsequent generations. These numbers are very small in relation to the "natural" incidence of genetic abnormalities, and it is extremely unlikely that any future scientific follow-up study would show any statistically significant increase. This is supported by the absence of

statistically significant findings of radiation-induced genetic effects in the offspring of the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The 135,000 individuals who were evacuated from this region of Soviet Ukraine are reported to have undergone individual medical examinations in a massive effort requiring the mobilization of several thousand physicians and health workers.¹⁸ Studies of the white blood-cell count and chromosomal abnormalities were initiated, with the Soviet scientists reporting that plans are under way to make a major effort to medically monitor this population. The large population size and the significant radiation doses will provide a very large data base for follow-up studies of the long-term effects of radiation exposure. This is likely to bring about a significant improvement in the scientific understanding of the chronic effects of radiation similar to that which resulted from the long-term study of the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

3. A total of 75 million people inhabit the 11 regions of the Soviet Union that were affected by fallout from the Chernobyl reactor. The preliminary Soviet assessment of the collective radiation dose to this population group from *external* radiation from ground deposits of radioactivity is 20 million person-rem,¹⁹ which corresponds to an average individual dose of about 0.3 rem. 13.6 million inhabitants of central Ukraine will receive an average radiation dose of 0.7 rem, with the remaining Ukrainian population of 37.2 million receiving an average dose of 0.2 rem. The highest radiation exposures outside the immediate vicinity of Chernobyl occurred in south-eastern Belorussia, where a population of 7.9 million will receive an average radiation dose of 2.4 rem from external deposits of radioactivity.

In general, these levels of (external) radiation exposure are relatively modest and would be expected to produce a total of 2,500 cancer deaths, corresponding to an increase of only 0.03 per cent over and above the "naturally" occurring cancer deaths expected in a population of 75 million over the next 70 years. At this low level of exposure to radiation, there is no need for any special medical examination or medical surveillance and, in general, the increases in cancer mortality will not be detectable.

There will also be *internal* radiation doses to this population as a result of eating and drinking contaminated food and water. Two radionuclides, Iodine 131 and Cesium 137, are of major importance in this respect. The short-lived Iodine 131 (8-day half-life) concentrates in milk products and is taken up by the thyroid gland. The doses received

by the population in the Soviet Union are very dependent on the effectiveness of the restrictions that were imposed on the sale of contaminated dairy products. In rural areas in particular, the consumption of locally produced dairy products was only sporadically interrupted, and there are reports of individuals receiving thyroid doses on the order of hundreds of rems. The total number of extra cases of thyroid cancer in this population resulting from internal exposure to Iodine 131 has been estimated to be 1,500.²⁰ In the regions of the Soviet Union with the highest thyroid radiation exposures, the increase in incidence of this disease could be significant in comparison to its "natural" incidence and may well be directly observable in Soviet cancer statistics over the next few decades. The 30-year half-life of Cesium 137 will result in high levels of contamination in Soviet food products from contaminated soil for decades. Accurate estimates of radiation doses to the population from food contaminated with this radionuclide are extremely difficult to obtain because of uncertainty about the future ecological behaviour of the millions of Curies of Cesium 137 deposited in the Soviet Union. Initial Soviet "guesstimates" have suggested up to a total of 210 million person-rems²¹ over the next 70 years, which may result in up to 26,000 extra cancer deaths in this period. Thus the detrimental effects of internal radiation exposure could be up to an order of magnitude higher than those due to external exposure. However, it is important to note that the former estimate has been described as unduly conservative,²² and is very dependent on the ecological behaviour of radioactive Cesium in the food chain.

4. The first reports of the Chernobyl disaster in the Western media occurred three days after the explosion of the nuclear plant, when Swedish scientists detected increased radiation levels north of Stockholm, some 1,200 km. north-west of the reactor site. The subsequent spread of radioactivity across Europe clearly demonstrated that the consequences of a serious nuclear accident can extend far beyond the borders of a given state and gave rise to considerable concern about possible detrimental health effects and contamination of agricultural products in the affected countries. Precise radiation doses to populations in neighbouring countries are difficult to obtain because of the large variability in local weather conditions and uncertainty about the effectiveness of counter-measures, such as restriction of sales of contaminated food and the issuing of Potassium Iodide tablets to protect the thyroid gland. Examination of data from Finland and Poland indicates that average doses were generally of the order of 0.1 rem,

although there are likely to be isolated hot spots where exposures may have been substantially higher. For a million people exposed to this relatively small level of radiation, where the "natural" cancer mortality is expected to be about 130,000, an extra 10 radiation-induced fatal cancers would be expected. This minute increase above the "natural" rate will not be detectable directly. However, one example of the observable environment impact of the Chernobyl fallout is the serious interruption of the reindeer hunt in the Lapland region of Finland. This is due to elevated levels of radioactivity in the reindeer, which feed primarily on lichen that has absorbed substantial amounts of radioactivity directly from the atmosphere.

5. In the United Kingdom, initial estimates of radiation exposure showed significant differences between the "north" and "south" because of meteorological variations. This caused the average dose to the population in the "north" to be a factor of 15 higher than the corresponding dose in the "south."²³ The mean dose weighted for population distribution was estimated to be 0.007 rem, with approximately 50 per cent due to external radiation and the remainder due to radiation from inhaled and ingested radioactivity. Although this radiation exposure is only a small fraction of natural background (0.1–0.2 rem per year) and is not expected to be any cause for concern, it is nonetheless an undesirable burden which resulted in measurable quantities of Iodine 131 in the thyroids²⁴ of some individuals and is expected to cause an extra 50 cases of cancer in the United Kingdom population of 55 million. This absolute number is trivial in comparison with the 8 million "natural" cancer deaths expected in this population. However, this result is directly comparable to the estimated 30 cancer deaths that were calculated to occur following the Windscale reactor fire in 1957, and both figures are obtained by using the same scientific method of extrapolating the radiation carcinogenic risk estimates to very low radiation doses. No possibility exists for the direct demonstration of the detrimental effects of the Chernobyl fallout to any segment of the UK population. The doses to the population are too low and the normal variability in the "natural" incidence of cancer will be much greater than the size of the effect estimated as being due to Chernobyl.

6. Radioactivity from the Chernobyl plant was first detected in Canada on 6 May and detectable amounts of a number of radionuclides (e.g., Iodine 131 and Cesium 137) were eventually measured in air, rainwater and milk samples in all the inhabited regions of the country. Trace quantities of Chernobyl fallout were detectable for up to two

months after the accident. An assessment of the radiation doses to the Canadian population from this fallout produced a value of less than 0.0001 rem,²⁵ which is insignificant in comparison to natural background and will not result in any adverse health effects in the Canadian population of 25 million.

Conclusion

The disaster at the Unit 4 nuclear reactor on the Chernobyl site is by far the most serious reactor accident that has occurred in the world since the initial development of this technology during the Second World War. To date, a total of 31 individuals, all workers at the Chernobyl plant, have died and as many as 200 others who suffered acute effects of radiation sickness have been hospitalized. The damaged nuclear plant released very large quantities of radioactivity into the environment, which resulted in serious contamination in the vicinity of the reactor and spread contamination throughout the world. A total of 135,000 inhabitants from a 32-kilometre region around the reactor received substantial amounts of radiation and required evacuation. A total of 280 fatal cancers is expected in this group, which is a 2 per cent increase in the "natural" incidence of fatal cancer. Lifelong follow-up studies in this population category are likely to provide valuable scientific information on the late effects of exposure to radiation. The total number of cancer fatalities within the Soviet Union resulting from external radiation is estimated to be about 2,500 among the 75 million people most affected by the Chernobyl fallout. The number of cancer fatalities due to internal radiation is more difficult to estimate, but may be up to an order of magnitude higher. These numbers of extra cancer deaths are small in comparison to the 9.5 million "natural" cancer fatalities expected in the same population and are unlikely to be directly observable. In the special case of thyroid cancer incidence, however, a significant increase of this disease in the Soviet population is a distinct possibility. The radiation exposures in neighbouring countries are generally comparable to the magnitude of the annual levels of natural background. Estimates of increased cancer fatalities in these countries are very small in comparison to the "natural" incidence of cancer, but could total a theoretical expectation of up to several hundred in Europe excluding the Soviet Union. Although Chernobyl radioactivity was also detected as far away as Japan and Canada, the resultant radiation exposures are trivial and will not lead to any detrimental health effects.

The costs arising from the Chernobyl accident are evidently considerable and will have major repercussions for the future. It is important to note that the handling of this reactor accident is by no means complete. It may take many years of effort to deal with all the medical and environmental consequences of the release of radioactivity. This is an ironic postscript for the chief Chernobyl engineer, Viacheslav Akinfiev, who was quoted as justifying the Soviet Union's development of nuclear power plants on environmental grounds, stating that "the Chernobyl nuclear power station is much cleaner than a thermal station of identical capacity. It does not eject harmful fuel combustion products into the air and does not consume oxygen for the burning of fuel." He added, in confirmation of this, that storks had built their nests at the power station, which in Ukraine is a sign of good luck.²⁶

Notes

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³ *International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin*, Summer 1985, 56-7.

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⁵ "Soviet Radwaste Spill Confirmed," *Science* 216 (1982), 274.

⁶ R. Herbert, "The Day the Reactor Caught Fire," *New Scientist*, 14 October 1982, 84-7.

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¹⁵ M. McCally, "Hospital Number Six: A First Hand Report," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, August/September 1986, 10-12.

¹⁶ "Experts Meeting to Learn Lessons from Chernobyl," *Globe and Mail*, 25 August 1986.

¹⁷ "Chernobyl Toll Expected to Hit 6,500," *Globe and Mail*, 26 August 1986.

¹⁸ H.L. Abrams, "How Radiation Victims Suffer," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, August/September 1986, 13-17.

¹⁹ "Western Experts cut Forecast of Chernobyl Cancer Deaths," *Globe and Mail*, 29 August 1986.

²⁰ "The Aftermath of Chernobyl," *Science* 233 (1986), 1141-3.

²¹ Ibid.

²² *Globe and Mail*, 29 August 1986 (see note 19 above.)

²³ F.A. Fry, R.H. Clarke, M.C. O'Riordan, "Early Estimates of UK Radiation Doses from the Chernobyl Reactor," *Nature* 321 (1986), 193-5.

²⁴ C.R. Hill, I. Adam, W. Anderson, R.J. Ott, F.D. Sowby, "Iodine 131 in Human Thyroids in Britain following Chernobyl," *Nature* 321 (1986), 655-6.

²⁵ W. Huda, A.M. Sourkes, B. Tracey, "The Radiological Impact of Chernobyl on Canada," paper submitted to the *Journal of the Canadian Association of Radiologists*.

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Ярослав Гординський

ЖІНОЧЕ ПИТАННЯ В ПОВІСТІ РАДЯНСЬКОЇ УКРАЇНИ

(закінчення з ч. 19)

V

Тому, як ми бачили, ідеал жінки зовсім змінюється супроти дореволюційних поглядів. У романі Івана Ле „Юхим Кудря“ сільський більшовицький діяч Данило закохується в гарній дівчині Одарці Кудря, що не вміла себе пошанувати й завлалась з офіцером протибільшовицької армії. Свою помилку пізнала вона аж тоді, коли виступили признаки небезпечної хвороби. Данило займився лікуванням легкодушної Одарки й закохався у ній, міркуючи:

„Данило навідувався до лікарні. Краса Одарчина, її журливий спокій чарували дуже істоту, загартовану в клетках бур часу. Настя (досьогочасна Данилова наречена), з її лагідним норовом та осілими селянськими турботами, набридла. Треба боротьби, треба колючих переживань, а не гладеньких любовців „під тихими хмарами“. А він не винен перед нею: на поцілунки відповідав тим же, а далі не йшов!... Ні, Настя не по йому. Одарка боролась за життя. Хоч за погане власницьке життя, але боролась. Перед Одаркою страшенна боротьба помсти за знівчене життя, за потрошену душу, а Настя... готова в перший ліпший момент лише стати матір'ю. І Данило з корінням вріс у мрійне кохання до Одарчиної боротьби. Нею треба керувати, її слід оздоровити, витягти з цього клясового багна, де промучилася вона вісімнадцять років“.

І коли Neosalvarsan вилікував Одарку, Данило заклочує з нею шлюбний договір у комісаря. Оця романтика новітнього кохання має в собі, без сумніву, риси своєрідного суспільного героїзму, хоч вона зовсім порушує етичні погляди звичайної людини. Але це спроба — і то спроба у великому стилі — розв'язати одне з найболючіших питань людства: вможливити поворот до правильного суспільного життя — жінкам, що скотились на саме дно деморалізації й скалічили себе морально і фізично. Данило пішов задалеко у своїх міркуваннях: він поставив вище розкаяну, та все таки розпутну грішницю навіть від доброї матері — але дати спромогу такій грішниці зреабілітувати себе шляхом повного духового переродження — це справа, що заслугує на поважну увагу. І тому такі теми доволі поширені в радянській літературі. Нпр. у повісті М. Ледеянка „В імлі позолоченій“ (1929) Клара, бажаючи рятувати свого милого, дозволяє себе поцілувати розпусному акціонеру Ліньї й відпокутує це також

страшною недугою, але в Швейцарії її скоро вилікують, а більшовицький бойовик Матвій Столярів одружується з нею, бо:

„Бідна моя... Відштовхнути, коли біда... Кларо! Ось так одружився Матвій Столярів, що його в дитинстві називали Ваню, що коліскою йому були блискучі гори, а за вихователя місто із закуреними вежами на березі брудного моря і вязищі російські! Той Столярів, що перший приніс на рудні слово — Товариш“.

У зв'язку з такими поглядами підкреслюється часто й героїзм вуличних дівчат у революційних боротьбах. Уже між Шкурупівці батальйонерки попадають вуличні дівчата з міського „сальону“, а одна з них, Франя, стає навіть приятелькою-повірницею добре вихованої Жанни та визначається разом із нею в наступі на багнеті. В Забіліному „Тракторобуді“ вулична дівчина Катря Полякова вступає як робітниця до комунки на будівництві та доносить до ДПУ про шкідницьку роботу в тому будівництві, після чого вона перероджується на корисну громадянку в комсомолі. Так перероджується й Катя у згаданому Ледянковому романі — ця остання жінка між шахтарями почуває в собі відразу людську гідність, як тільки Трохим запропонував їй допомогу ув'язненим шахтарям-революціонерам.

І хіба єдиний сумнів у неї:

„А хіба я можу? Дурна... Отака... Чого дурна... А що така, то хіба ти винна? А допомогти можеш. Ти з робочих, ти — наша... Слухай сюди, Катю... Вдячно подивилася — всі казали на неї „Катька“, з різними додатками, гидкими, болючими“. Коли ж їй обіцяють за те гроші, вона відмовляється від заплати: — „Та я й без грошей... Я... Невже я... Господи! Невже не буду пропаща!“

Порівняймо з цією постаттю іншу жінку, також тиху героїню, але в іншому розумінні, в тому самому романі. Це зовсім пририта безвихідним горем Марта, жінка немилосердного розпусника Хоми Опаренка, що покинув її у важкій недужі разом із дітьми на голодне горе, а сам знайшов собі іншу. І ось ця безсила мучениця зважується для добра своїх дітей на добровільну смерть.

„У Марти настирлива думка — як помре, візьме Хома дітей до себе... Їм буде краще... Їй же яке життя... Фершал увесь час нагадував за тепло. Розчинила двері й стояла боса в одній сорочці на порозі... Одягав мороз льодову одежу на розпалене тіло... — Марто, що ти?! — схопилася Ярина, прокинувшись од холоду. — Та води... — Куди ж ти пішла! Шарпнула з порога. Померла Марта... Ніхто не знав думок і переживань тихої, затурканної жінки... Забрав Опаренко дітей“.

Але чим така глибина безмежної матерньої любові — супроти голосистих революційних діячок?

Оті дівчата з вулиці — це, здається, єдині виразні й плястичні жіночі постаті з-поміж міського та робітничого пролетаріату, що на них спромоглась досі українська радянська повість. Майже все вони наділені романтичними рисами: причиною їх

упадку є майже все важка матеріальна безрадість, несамостійність у житті та брак життєвого досвіду; майже все під маскою цинізму жевріють у них кращі людські почування; майже все хочуть вони видобутись до іншого, кориснішого життя. З того боку найтрагічніша є доля дівчини, прозваної Зайчиком, у Копиленковому „Визволенні“. Зовсім недосвідня сільська дівчина попадається в незнане собі велике місто, де її прибирають до рук несумлінні люди та спихають на дно суспільного болота. Та вона сповняє свою мрію: видобувається якось і пробує вчитись. Та коли власне тоді скривдив її тяжко на честі брутальний студент, — Зайчик кидається під трамвай. Сільська жертва деморалізованого міста, як колись у Мирного. Не така вже трагічна постать Ніни Сергіївни в замітній повісті А. Любченка „Образ“. Вона, дівчина з вулиці, вийшла заміж за урядовця Костя й постановила забути на попереднє життя й стати „справжньою“ людиною. Тому вона відчула як велику образу, коли Кость, допустившись грошевих зловживань на гру в карти, домагався від неї, щоб вона для поладнання справи стала полюбовницею його начальника. Ніна, вражена таким торгом, ударила в лице Костевого начальника й знову пішла на вулицю. Подекуди зближена до таких постатей і Зоська з роману В. Підмогильного „Місто“; вона не вуличниця, але стрінувшись із письменником Степаном Радченком, вона радіє в дитячій наївності, улажкуючи собі сходи з ним. Але коли Степан раз запропонував їй поважно подружжя, а на другий день, злякавшись одноманітності й нудоти довгого спільного життя, легкодушно відмовився від учорашнього наміру, Зоська, — ота весела, безтурботна дівчина — кінчить самогубством.

Поза тільки що згаданими типами не створила ще українська радянська повість виразно зарисованої постаті ані міської, ані робітничої пролетарки (з винятком згаданих інтелігентних, або напівінтелігентних комсомолок). Навпаки, жіночі постаті із робітничої верстви все якісь невикінчені, або змальовані ледве кількома, дуже загальними й трафаретними рисами. Такі є всі жінки-робітниці нпр. у великому романічному циклі життя углекопів у Ледеянка: „На-гора“, „В імлі позолоченій“ (1929), „Всі на-гора-а-а“, де розказано про революційні рухи між углекопами від 1905 р. аж до більшовицьких часів.

Робітничому жіноцтву припали тут тільки дуже підрядні ролі і навіть постать вагонеткової відкотниці Уляни, що згадується ще найчастіше, вийшла зовсім неясна та нецікава. Автор надто скоро переходить до панського чи інтелігентного жіноцтва й так жінка-робітниця відступає в тінь. Те саме треба сказати й про Поліщуківу „повість“ із життя Донбасу, де, за словами самого автора, все жіноцтво говорить по-українськи. І тому тим більшу шкоду відчуває читач, коли автор так мало говорить нам про ту дівчину-відкотницю, що розмовою з нею він і починає свою „повість“. Це „приємна пружава дівчина, якась арифметичне середне

поміж комсомолкою з шахти і так званою запашною квіткою українського стелу“.

Вже короткою розмовою з вами здобуває вона симпатію, бо „ви здогадуєтесь, що то ви їдете із звичайними людьми до живих звичайних людей, що мають душу й тіло й різні прості запитання, а не до якихось механізмів, що крешуть одні іскри діла й ідеології, як про це незмінно пише багато наших письменників високого стибу“.

На жаль, Поліщук сам пішов аж надто за тими письменниками „високого стибу“ і замість мистецького твору дав нам агітаційний опис Донбасу та його заводів. Серед того зникає скоро оця цікава дівчина й хоч бачимо її ще раз при роботі — то й це триває надто коротко й не дає нам ясного образу, що зображує її як людину.

VI

Зате виразніше вийшло сільське жіноцтво. Тут маємо не тільки сільську жінку Горпину, названу за її енергію Трактором, в агітаційній повісті — плякаті В. Чередниченка. Горпина, не вважаючи на опозицію мужчин, організувала сільських жінок, почала порядкувати селом і стала навіть головою сільради, а голодного року вміла розумно зарадити лиху. Та це, як згадано, не так мистецький твір, як радніше агітаційна стаття, і то доволі низького сорту, хоч Чередниченко ще намагається бодай назовні зберегти белетристичну форму. Багато нижче з того боку стоїть „Повість про комуну“ Костя Гордієнка (1930), що є властиво тільки здіяльогізованою більшовицькою агіткою про сільську бідняцьку комуну на Славенщині з похвалами для комуністичного ладу. Тому постаті сільських комунарок у цій повісті (Ладька, Антонина, Атаска) не тільки шаблонові, але й далекі від справжнього життя, агітаційно виідеалізовані (одне видання тієї „Повісті“ показує тираж 25.000!). Всі ті комунарки — колишні наймички, що їх господарі-куркулі не тільки використовували несумлінно від дитячих літ, але й поводитися з ними нелюдськи жорстоко. Всі вони знавали кращої долі аж у створеній серед важких перешкод бідняцькій комуні, де вони не тільки почули себе вперше справжніми людьми, але й зазнали спокійного життя серед радісної праці, бо комунa розвивалась при допомозі уряду на правду гарно й скоро. Тут упорядковується їх праця, тут улагоджується їх семейне життя в щасливому подружжі й у дитячих яслах. І тільки одна тінь паде на цей виідеалізований рай — важкі обставини в початках розвитку комуні:

„Взяли ми діти, ліжко, постелиться там якнебуль, і сплять на соломі... На ніч відлала дітей в ясла; пішли вечеряти. Подали юшку з картоплею, ліжко, хліб хазяйський та обмаль. Як це жити, думаю, дають порцію хліба? Що це за комунa? Іду нагодувати дитину — дві няньки, а дітей шіснадцять. Солома застелена дрантям — сорочки рвані, спідниці, на соломі сплять. Пора і нам спати. В кімнаті повно людей, жонаті, хлопці, дівчата, покотом на соломі... Як тут спати? Яке життя? Задихнемся. Через

сіни діти кричать. Хочу йти до них, бо не можу ж чути, як кричить моя дитина. Мене не пускають, лежу і плачу. На ранок устали вмилася, всі втираються моїм рушником...”

Автор упевняє, що ця біда скоро минулась, але читачеві якось не легко повірити в таке американське темпо в тому поступі.

Із сільських діячок згадаємо ще освічену героїню роману Я. Кечури Ольгу, що організує в селі комуну — але й вона має стільки агітаційно-партійних рис, що ніяк не можемо її признати за мистецьку постать.

Багато краще вийшли в українській радянській повісті ті сільські жіночі постаті, що в них підкреслені теплі почування особистого, а не громадянського характеру. Тут маємо передовсім глибокі материнські почування, що їм присвячений роман А. Головка „Мати“. Катря, селянка з Вітрової Балки, мала трьох синів від трьох батьків і одну дочку.

„Від коли овдовіла, — зосталася сама собі з дитиною в злиднях, то за роботою ніколи й світу білого не бачила. Хіба що в неділю — до церкви сходить, а пообіді з жінками за ворітьми посидить... То чи й дивно ж, що стільки вже прожила в самоті, набідувалась, а мов і нічого. Як невидюща була... Багато про життя не роздумувала: про себе одне знала, що як не судилося їй життя щасливе, то буде вже так. І щоб серця не ятрити дармо, то навіть у минуле не оглядалася. А про малого свого так само вперед у думці не забігала. Жила собі, як жилось. Та думала, що вже так воно й буде“.

Та не так сталося, як думала Катря. Бо в її характері, окрім схильности до невсипушої праці, були ще два могутні почування: захоплення хвилиною і безмежна материнська любов. І тому вона піддалась без довгого роздумування чарівному впливові мрійливого маляря Сави, що перший відкрив їй очі на значіння України, і одночасно стихійній силі Коваля Юхима, що важкою ремісничою рукою виковував ідеал нового революційного життя.

„Не розпушта — любила одного його, Саву, а Юхим силою брав. Та отак і жила з обома. І дитина народилася... не знала, хто йому батько. Одинадцять років не знала“.

Сава пішов у світ, Юхим оженився з Катрею, хоч як вона мучилась, ділячи серце між ними обома. І так три її сини вдалися у трьох батьків: господар, малюк, ремісник. Та вкінці Юхим дізнався. І маляреві Юркові довелося у ночі почути таку розмову між Юхимом і Катрею:

„Якось серед ночі Юрко був прокинувся і чує — тихо плаче хтось. Прислухався стривожено — мати плачуть. Поночі в хаті не видно, але чути, що отак: затулила лице долонями й зіщипивши зуби... Як нагло батьків голос похмурно й гнівно: — Не плач, тепер уже слізьми не допоможеш. Якби тоді не була ти... — хлопце аж замер од батькової страшної лайки, а мати враз заголосола приглушено в долонях. Батько говорив далі: — то зналаб ти, чиї в тебе діти. А я дванадцять літ не взивав би чужого сина своїм... Та мати ні слова, тільки плакала. І це було довго отак...

Потім знову батьків голос, але тепер уже тихий, ніби з жалем: — Катре, ну годі, не плач! Мене теж болить. — Тиша в хаті, навіть і мати урвала свій плач. — Огоді, як прийшов Сава, мов серця шмат одірвав. Коли б уже одірзав зовсім, а то ж на якійсь жилі ще теліпається. Ще як не бачу — нічого, а тільки гляну, в голові каламутиться. — Змовк і дихав важко. Тоді мати, уперш затамувавши плач: — Юхиме, рідний мій, ну потерп, ось уже незабаром поїде од нас. І не втрималась: зірвалась у плач*.

Довелось Катрі випити гірку чаю матеріного горя. Юхим помер у в'язниці від ран у часі заворушень 1905 р., Юркові довелось признатись, хто йому батько. Бо коли він, міський учень, знайшовся з матір'ю за містом над Дніпром, він —

„рзптом звів голову й тихо, з благанням промовив: — Мамо, ну, скажіть же мені хоч щось. — Слухай, сину. Ти вжене вперше питаєшся мене за це. Огоді влітку теж. А я й тоді не сказала тобі. Не через те, що таїтися хочу від тебе. Може ти мене не зрозумієш зразу, бо дитина ще. Потім зрозумієш. Але ж так сталося, сину, що я й сама не відаю того — чий ти. Може Юхимів, а може й ні. Може якраз Сава є твій батько... Юрко нерухоми мовчки стояв на кручі. Потім, не обертаючи обличчя до матері, мов не до неї, а до когось у темряві на крижанім Дніпрі, промовив піднесено: — Спасибі вам, мамо, й за це, що сказали! Що — „може“. А вже тепер я й сам знаю напевне. Але не бійтеся, мамо, й не тривожтеся: хто б не був моїм батьком, то однаково ж ви — моя мати. І ніколи в світі я вас не скрияджу й не забуду. Мати тільки зідхнула на синову клятьбу й нічого не сказала. Дивилась, задумана, на нього і вже не вперше сьогодні передумувала кожне слово його сьогоднішнє, кожен рух та вираз на обличчі. І от ізнов, як уже було не раз, тільки зараз і дужче, і виразніш — аж із болем у серці відчула, — що й слова в цього непевні, і сам увесь непевний якийсь і вже ніби... трохи чужий*.

І мусіла мати переживати важкі хвили розлуки з усіма своїми синами: всіх їх доля вигнала у широкий світ. Одначе, не вважаючи на серце, переповнене такими сильними почуваннями, Катря вміє в найважчих життєвих хвилях знайти енергію. От коли в місті подали їй жорстоку вістку про Юхимову смерть у тюрмі:

— Ой, діти-діти! — Катря склепила в тузі очі й тихо, не наче заперечливо, хитала головою. — На кого ж ви тепер zostалися, діти мої, діти? — Нагло ніби згадала щось і заціпила себе... Лице сухе й суворе в жінки. І вже не плакала, хоч і стояли очі повні слізьми... Катря нахилилась і без рук втерла очі об стару Юхимову кожушину. А за тим мовчазна й неприродно рівна, наче сліпа, тихо пішла...“

Коли ж усі сини розійшлись від неї, то, випровадивши останнього, Катря:

„Повернулась іще на схід — глянула вздовж Великого шляху. Та й зідхнула... і ожили у пам'яті, як давній розвіяний сон, гіркі спогади з далекого минулого... Нема що дурити себе, гірка була

й молодість... А проте, хоч і як трудно було, та біля серця діти. І росила ж їх, про життя тихе із ними вкупі на старість марила. А воно бач, що маєш собі, мамо, на старість. Та й що тим дітям — який талан дала? — Простелила шляхи назхрест на всі чотити вітри та й вирядила... Та й чи ждати вже їх, та й звідки виглядати — з якої дороги? І які ваші, діти, — знаки будуть? — Стояла німа і нерухома, край шляху в тяжкій задумі. Од палиневого духу аж тяжко вже дихати грудям, і від спогадів та думок — дум материних, аж у голові туман. А вона все стояла в задумі край шляху біля могили, як кам'яна „баба“ з віків, не всилі зрушитись з місця, — убога, у старій джерзійбоса, — на роздоріжжі невідомих синовніх доріг“.

Катрина постать має, щоправда, ще багато романтичних рис типу Марка Вовчка, але заразом це вже жінка, що стоїть на роздоріжжі старих і нових часів — події в Україні тягнуть її силоміць у свій головокружній крутіж.

Дещо інша вже, якась сильніша, ота мати з повісти А. Головка „Можу“ (1922), що мандрує із своїми голодними дітьми з Катеринославщини — її матрина любов так захоплює мрійливого Гордія, що він покидає вигідне життя у своїх батьків і мандрує з незануою йому матірю на майбутні злидні.

Огріті теплим, глибоким почуванням, виходять живіші й природніші декуди навіть селянки-революціонерки, як нпр. трохи шабльоноза, але все таки живо змальована постать бідної наймички в багатіїв-куркулів, Зінька, в повісти А. Головка „Бур'ян“ (1926). Під впливом гарячого кохання до організатора сільської бідноти Давида Мотузки, Зінька стає справжньою героїнею: вона не тільки повідомляє свого коханого про підслуханий намір убити його, не тільки виривається в розпачливій боротьбі з рук озвірілого начміліції, але й починається своєю відвагою до врятовання життя Давидові. Контрастом до скромної Зіньки є розкішна жінка хорого на груди Тихона Марія. Краса й гаряча кров доводять її так далеко, що вона готова покинути Тихона й накидається Давидові; але Давид не хоче зрадити свого приятеля й відповідає їй:

„Якби ми, Маріє, з тобою в табуні бродили, тоді б і не балакали. А то ми живемо в громаді людській. А це — куди як складніша штука. Отже, теж давай цю балачку залишимо“.

Оця висока етична гадка не переконала Марію. Щоб позбутись свого хорого чоловіка, Марія важиться віддати його зрадливо в руки ворогів на певну смерть. А одначе ця гарна тілом, але низька характером Марія має в своєму вибуховому темпераменті багато більше природних прикмет, ніж виідеалізувана Зінька.

VII

В українській радянській повісти бачимо жінку в різних суспільних організаціях — і то від найменшої дитини: дівчатка в яслах і притулках, комсомолки, батальйонерки, бойовички, бу-

дівниці, романтичні вуличниці, фабричні робітниці, сільські організаторки й революціонерки — і читач, утомлений тією галерією комуністичних діячок з їх великими словами й ділами, питається вкінці з розпущеною: а де ж тільки жінка, справжня жінка, жінка-людина, з людським тілом і людською душею? Справді, не легко знайти у вирі тих накинених партійним наказом ідей та постатей — звичайну жінку людину. Але вона таки є й читач заповідливо виловлює такі постаті, хоч етично вони його гнівлять своїми гріхами й проступками. І ось перед нами не тільки згадані вже: Марія з „Бур'яну“ А. Головка і частинно Одарка Кудря Івана Ле, тут передусім повно й плястично виступає Любка Прохорівна в „Романі Міжгір'я“. Основна прикмета її душі й головне змагання всього її життя це кохання. Невдоволена своїм чоловіком, лікарем Храпковим, людиною визначною, але зовсім бездарною в життєвих справах, Любка шукає кохання поза подружнім життям. Вона живе — самими нервами. Ось її психологія:

„Бувають такі чоловіки, що, кохаючи тіло своєї дружини, тремтяче, свіже... впевняються самі й упевняють інших, що вони люблять свою дружину. Але бувають і такі жінки, що за щоденними вишуканими пестощами забувають бодай згадати про оте кохання. Хіба до любови тут, коли вигуляна кров, що... бурхає по жилах... Не до любови тут. Не до чарів вечірнього шепоту душі. Це надто ніжні струни молодого організму, й вони мовчать, заглушені неймовірними барабанами, дужою музикою ситої життєвої вахханалії... Любка Прохорівна ще молода, навіть надто молода, щоб не кохати свого Женю, й, скажемо, гарна, соковита, щоб не належати цьому дотепному хірургові Храпкову. Належати як річ, як святковий одяг. Він мав добрий смак на жінок, він гаразд розбирався в незліченних їх гатунках, і коли пухленька студенточка інституту зовнішніх зносин, Любочка Марковська, випадково навернулася йому на очі — за хвилину вирішив, що йому прийшов час одружитися. А змогла б якась інша, хоч би й старша на літа дівчина перечити такій силі розуму, такому лікарському хистові молодого, дужого, як дуб, кавалера? За два місяці, йдучи до шлюбу, Любка, з жалю до своїх колишніх кавалерів, доброзичливо позирала на них, навіть не розуміючи гаразд, що означає оте „заміж“. Переїхавши до Намангану, Євген Вікторович створив потрібні умови догоди й засмітив ними всі стежки, що ведуть у найкращі кутки людської душі“.

І ось ця жінка — гарна, молода, недосвідня, кинена серед розкішного лінивства в азійське місто — очаровує поставного інтелігентного й наділеного бистрим розумом узбека Саїд-Алі Мухтарова.

„Чи була ж і справді щаслива Любка своїм сімейним життям, як це здавалося з першого погляду? Ніхто її про це не питав, а самій їй, за молодими ще літами, не припадала така думка. Коли б вона почула якусь скруту, якісь злидні, може б само запитання напросилося... У чоловіка Любки Прохорівни було дуже багато діла... Тому то таким завжди свіжим гостем був він

задля дружини... Її молодість ще не набула того гарячого стану, коли міцні чоловікові сні вночі виловують у молодих незадоволених жінок неврастенію й інші жарти з нервами. Її Женя не набридав пестощами, бо зморювався своїми вічними ділами, й гаразд — вона за це немов ще більше, ніжніше його любила... Брак дітей теж мало турбував Любку... Але було хоч зрідка й таке, коли Любка почувала дивні внутрішні хвилювання, гострі, похитливі, й довго не могла заснути, перевертаючись необережно в ліжкові“.

І така жінка познайомилась із гарним Саїдом:

„Знайомство двох оцих істог набирало раз у-раз нового характеру. Любка Прохорівна впевняла себе, що нічого особливого в тому нема, що вона знайома з розумною інтелігентною людиною, хоча вона, ця людина, й була з узбечів. А що вона й досі не сказала своєму Жені про це — байдуже. Обійдеться. — Так. Вона таки не сказала чомусь своєму коханому Жені, що вона познайомилась з цікавим узбеком. Якось не припало до речі... Він такий зморений. Вона така ніжна до нього. Хіба тут до якогось там чудернацького знайомства з узбеком, азійцем, підперезаним трьома шовковими хустками! А може в неї є інші думки? Може вона хоче прирозуміти таке щось дике, божевільне? Може, вона вже щось пригадала, вирішила? Вона вирішила. А чи слід про це знати її законному коханому чоловікові? Коханому? Любка швиденько скочила з канапки й, мовчки оповивши плечі Жені, що вже сидів за своїм столом, поцілувала його теплим, вогким поцілунком у чоло. Навіть сама вона почувала мертвяцький смак в отім поцілунку наслиненіми, майже похолоднілими губами й на додачу притулилася також мов від спеки, змороною шоксю. То був перший Юдин поцілунок, а за ним народилися червоні камелії на грудях, дезорганізована мораль і чергове кільце „Єви“-жінчини“.

Почалась лубковна історія — і звичайні жіночі хитрощі:

„Любці Прохорівній раптом здалося, що і в її житті шойно йде тільки пишне літо. Намагалася згадати весну. Не було. Не було зеленого пахучого розквіту в лоскотливому теплі. Не було солодких підмарних мрій, свіжого, як у казці, кохання... Її весна спіткнулася об щось неодмінно й винувато відкрила шляхи гарячому літу. Поглянеш на оцього Євгена Вікторовича, на оцього Женю, на його засідання — жаль обіме молоду істоту. Невже ж отак повинні всі жити, дбаючи лише про кар'єру, задля якої й молоді дружини не жаль? А може то дійсне захоплення працею, дійсне громадське задоволення... Може... То навіщо ж йому дружина?... І прикортіло за всяку ціну зманеврувати... Зманеврувати на просторі блискучому, як сонце, безкрайому, як дулька, щоб із нечуваною швидкістю нестись без озирання, наздогінці неспробуваному... Треба наздогнати п'яноші першого кохання, улитись отруйними любистковими пахощами. — Женю! Котік Женічка! Беби, рідненький, відпустку“.

І Женя, розуміється, взяв відпустку. А коли він виїхав на три

дні на якусь раптову операцію, Любка перебралась в узбецьку „паранджу“ і, забувши про гріх, перебула три шалені доби у Саїда. Але тоді вона, випечена росіянка, пізнала нараз, що Саїд — тільки узбек і вона затужила за своїм чоловіком. Саїд не розумів, не пускав її, а тоді Любка кинула йому:

— „Ви узбек—а я... — й замовкла, бо було сказано більше, ніж треба, ніж хотілося“.

Саїд хотів уже забути для Любки й Узбеччину, але почув тільки: — „Прощайте“. Саїд знайшов скоро лік на свої почування у широкій громадянській праці, а Любці вдалось, покищо, обдурити довірливого чоловіка. Храпков приймав навіть у себе дома Саїда, але провалля між Саїдом і Любкою зростало, тим більше, що у Любки знайшлась дівчинка Тамара — дочка Саїдова. Любка все більше драгувала Саїда, запрошувала його до себе й показувала дочку. І тут її легкодушність перейшла міру: У Саїда відізналась зненависть до Любки за національну образу й разом із тим нестримна батьківська любов до Тамари. Вкінці Саїд викрав Тамару. Прийшло до судової розправи — їй прислухувалась і Любка Прохорівна. Але Саїд не зрадив справжньої тайни — після важкої душевної боротьби він заявив, що справді вкрав чужу дитину. А тоді:

— „Ах-ах!.. Ах-ха-ха-ха-а!.. — пролунало різке по залі. В божевільному реготі билася об підлогу Любка Прохорівна... Мозок не витримав борні, та й серце чи забється радісно в грудях. Історія осих людей взяла свою останню дань. До столу стурбованих суддів підбігла повіспована, що крейда зблідла жінка. Вона підхопила здивоване дитинча на руки й кричала, перемагаючи клеїт залі: — Я... Я все скажу!.. Неправда це!.. Ця дівчина... Неправда... Вона його дочка!.. Він дочку свою украв, щоб помститися... То була Марія, наймичка Храпкова“.

З того часу життя Любки Прохорівни скочувалось скоро униз, бо один проступок легко веде до інших. Жадоба жити й розкошувати не покидала її й тепер, навіть після такого скандалу. Храпков розлучився з нею, Саїд прогнав її від порога свого дому, коханці у Любки змінялись. Щоб пімститись на Саїді, вона не побоялась навіть звязатись із його ворогами, що намірились його вбити. Ще й сама поїхала, щоб бути свідком Саїдового вбивства. Але Саїда не вбили, а всіх ворогів його діла: перемінити Узбеччину в культурну країну -- викрили. А Любка

„дійшла до останнього перехрестя!.. Що з того, що вибралася заміж не за комісаря якогось, а за лікаря Храпкова? Що з того, що не зрозуміла любови сильного мужчини й для чистоти свого європеїзму потоптала ту любов?... — Ах, куди я дійду?.. Любов Прохорівна відчувала, що з нею щось негарне, хоробливе твсрється... Останнє перехрестя! Вона піде найтяжчим шляхом, аби тільки знов жити. Вона ще раз спробує повернути до себе дочку, Саїда“.

Одначе Саїд не хотів її слухати, а як вона спробувала його ще шантажувати заявою, що Тамара — не його дочка, він сказав...

— Кінчено! Он дзері! Я не хочу більше слова вашого чути! Ну!..

Ще одна спроба — вбити Саїда кинжалом — і рука Саїдоваго приятеля відкинула її так сильно, що, падаючи, вона вбилась. Саїд подружився з інтелігентною узбечкою Бімба-хон. Любов Прохорівна згинула марне, ганяючись за рознузданим життям. А хоч читач напевне не симпатизує з тією розбещеною жінкою — він почуває в ній все таки тіло й кров живої, хоч і зовсім неопанованої, людини — це не маріонетка, — що їй підповідають гадки та вчинки.

Бо справді, повну рацію має Саїдів приятель, український письменник Борисюк:

— „Не можна бо так просто відірвати, як серце вирвати з грудей, і кинути під ноги те, що скрашувало, опоетизувало до противности грубий, біольогічний акт продовження людського роду. І чи буде повною доба соціалізму, коли в людині не буде розвинуто глибоко-етичних і естетичних відчуттів взаємин? Справа ж бо не тільки в статевих взаєминах“.

VIII

Чи це припадок, що далеко, в азійській Узбеччині, дійшов до такої гадки власне український письменник, названий анонімно Борисюком? Одначе — це підставова гадка, що схоплює в сутній точці взаємовідносини мужчин і жінок, чи, говорячи іншими словами: жіноче питання! Ця туга за „глибоко-етичними й естетичними взаєминами“ — є й основною проблемою, що непокоїть краших українських письменників, бо тільки в ній добачують вони єдино можливу розв'язку тих взаємин.

І тому з такою елементарною силою виступає в українських радянських повістях проблема сім'ї. А ця сім'я, пущена більшовиками на бистру воду розбурханих індивідуальних пристрастей і химерних настроїв без стриму й контролю, розбилась зовсім.

„Немає, тату, тихої пристані! Є велике море, море без берегів, що бється в хвилях усе, і кого велика хвиля-бурун настигне, тому треба прощатися з життям. Море лютує, тату! Сьогодні я з квитком на далеку плавбу рушаю до нового міста... Не покинути вам, тату, пристань; але покиньте, тату, мрії про тиху пристань, море кругом вас, а не Дніпро. Широке море. Ви з одного боку моря, а я з другого, і далеко-далеко від вас до мене. І ніяк те море переплисти. Щоб не забути, і щоб менше вам думок про Любу... Вона шукала (слухала вас, тату) тихої пристані, але попала на таку станцію, де багато поїздів іде до кращого, але тільки йдуть повз станцію, ніхто її не візьме. А втім може зупинитися вантажний, може пощастить їй виїхати?“

Так писав молодий Арсен до свого батька, Касира, у Дніпровій пристані, що задумав створити працею свого життя тиху родинну пристань для своїх двоїх дітей, але діждався того, що син і дочка вилетіли в світ на нові, бурхливі шляхи, а „тиху пристань“ залишили йому самому. (С. Склярєнко „Тиха пристань“).

Розбилась тиха пристань родинного життя, бо діти забажали свобіднішого життя. Це — відвічна проблема „батьків і дітей“. Вона нераз розбиває сім'ю. Що більше, родинне життя видається молодим працівникам соціалістичного будівництва вже смішним, як оцій Тані Кааб у романі О. Копиленка „Народжується місто“ (1931—2).

Друга — ще важніша проблема: це відсутність згаданих етичних і естетичних почувань у відносинах між подругами. На їх місце приходять: сурогат химерних хвилих настроїв, що доводять до необдуманих учинків, подиктованих хвилими зворушенням. На тому тлі довелось пережити глибоку трагедію донні Анні — Ганні Бачинській у романі Г. Брасюка, що по-мистецьки вмів схопити розклад новітньої сім'ї в Радянській Україні. Поча-

ток був такий звичайний в історії подружого життя. Ганна, „пишна, красива жінка“, дізналась випадково, що її чоловік, славний винахідник Нік, зраджує її з Вандою в Харкові. Причиною того була хвилева недостача сильної волі в Ніка — але Ганна ані не знає про те, ані не пробує зясувати собі ті причини. Вона бачить тільки, що:

„Нік підло затуманював їй очі, щоб зробити з неї культурну куховарку й пристойну самицю... Нік мав рацію радіти з її наївності й незіпсованости. Він обертав її навколо пальця, як нитку. В дійсності на світ треба дивитись зовсім не тими очима, що дав їй Нік, бо й сам він дивиться іншими очима. Він носить магичне слово „мораль“, щоб забезпечити за собою вигідніше становище власника. К черту всяку мораль! Бери життя таким, яким воно дається. Будь про око вірною й чесною, а поза тим... О, Нік тепер мусів би її поважати! Він ще не знає, що у неї крім таланту бути вірною криється ще більший талант чесно зраджувати. Ганна тепер не відстане від віку. Вона від сьогодні так закрутиться в коловороті втіхи, що тільки брязки полетять каскадами. І раптом болісно відчула: каскадами липкого бруду й смороду хвороб. Серце щавило прошиплюючим морозом, але десь у глибині ворохнулася капля гарячої крові і вмить прокинулася палюча туга за світом інтимного споріднення, за світом любови“.

І Ганну не ошукало прочуття: вона пішла за „коловоротом втіхи“ й обкидала себе „каскадами лепкого бруду“. Даремне Нік признався їй у своїй помилці, даремне „стояв біля порога, як жебрак, принижений, змучений. — Прости, як можеш“. Одиначе справа не ладналась: „Нік почав виходити щовечора і Ганна так само залишалася самотня зі своєю нерозгаданою тривоною. Вона не насмілювалась говорити про неї, бо Нік щораз уникав інтимної розмови; його видимо гнітила присутність Ганни, його гнів той внутрішній конфлікт, що з ним мусів ховатись від неї. Щораз вони все більше чужились одне одного і Ганна почувала, що той поріг, через який вони не мали можности переступити з початку, тепер виростає в загрозливу стіну... замкненість подружжя ніби легалізувалась. Вони тепер уникали одне одного з неприхованою боязкістю. Ганна роздумувала над тим, яких форм набере їхнє співжиття надалі: Нік буде приходити мовчазний на обід і знову зникатиме на завод, а вона мусить куховарити, щоб за це почути кілька раз на день „дякую“. Можливо, що це нормальні стосунки подружжя, що зістарілося, але Ганна почувала себе ще досить молодою, щоб погодитися з таким станом“.

Ганна піддавалась необережно бажанню жити ширшим любовним життям. І що ж дивного, що коли Ганна знайшлась самітня з дочкою серед гарної лісової природи на дачі, вона зішлась із поетичним музиком Володимиром Андрійовичем? Привела його до матері дочка, Таля. А коли Нік, повернувшись

до Ганни, застав її разом із Володимиром, Ганні довелось стати свідком такої розмови:

„Володимир раптом стрепенувся й рішуче ступив у двері до Ніка. — Не треба, — злякано скрикнула Ганна, — я сама поговорю! — Але Володимир уже був за дверима. — Я з Вами одверто. Я хочу забрати вашу дружину! — Пульс зупинився Ганні від жаху. Як він про неї говорить! Яке він має право? Здавалось, що ту ж хвилину Нік розщемить Володимира на тріски, але на диво Нік з нотою іронії промовив: — Беріть! Вона мені непотрібна. — У ту ж мить до болю морозлива хвиля підборкала Ганну. Вона не встигла скрикнути, як холодом заціпило їй вуста, все тіло, все серце“.

Це було перше глибоке приниження Ганни за її нерозважну пімсту. І з того часу почалася Ганнина терниста путь. Таля не хотіла покинути батька й це Ганні боліло. Скоро виявилось, що все те було тільки прикрим непорозумінням і що тієї розлуки не бажав у дійсності ані Нік, ані Ганна, тим більше, що Ванда покинула його.

„Врешті Нік промовив: — Я зовсім не хочу тебе обвинувачувати, а себе виправдовувати. Я є такий, як є. А взагалі обоє ми — люди. Може досі найбільшою нашою помилкою було те, що ми ідеалізували одне одного. Тверезо глянувши, я зробив те, що властиво мужчині, а ти — що властиво жінці“.

Одначе залишилась Таля. Почалось дивне Ганнине й Нікове життя. Таля погодила її вкінці з Ніком, але Володимира вона не покинула. Володимиріві була Ганна жінкою, але за згодою обидвох бувала в обидвох. Володимир ставав все брутальніший і Ганна зрозуміла, як багато вона втратила, вирікаючись доброго Ніка. А Нік починав ставати славним, бо винайшов електричний струм великого напруження та почав його пристосовувати практично. Та сталось нещастя — власний винахід убив Ніка. Здавалось би, що для Ганни настала справжня воля. Але тінь скривдженого легкодушно Ніка йшла все за нею. Таля підросла й незабаром Ганна дізналась, що вона, її власна дочка, відібрала їй Володимира. Тоді Ганна пробувала отруїтись, однак її врятували, вона вспіла тільки перегризти руку Володимирові, що кидає їй цинічно:

„Чи ти троїлася б і тоді, коли б віддала дочку „законно“ заміж?... Не забувай, що тій дитині шіснадцять років і що вона тверезіше міркує, аніж ти в свої сорок. Ти вже своє віджила. Ти мала два чоловіки, а до того, мабуть, з двадцять полюбовників... Ти знала перше тільки молоде кохання, а я знав тільки тебе“.

А коли Ганна спитала, чому він відривав її від першого чоловіка Ніка Бачинського, він признає:

„Так, я зробив непростимий гріх перед Бачинським. Але знову ж таки через твою хитру гру на самолюбстві. Та я зовсім не хочу покутувати цілий вік чужі гріхи. Я хочу прожити молодю. Єдина твоя цінність — донька. Я її беру з цілковитим мораль-

ним празом. Досить грати в темну. Знай, що Таля моя жінка, а ти — її мати. Жадного насильства тут нема. Таля мене кохає так само, як я її. — Ганна, трясучись від люті, підвелася на ліжку, ладна вбити супротивника одним поглядом, але Володимир з посмішкою на вустах витричав погляд. В ньому почувалась уже самовпевнена деспотична істота: хай би посміла Ганна дотикнутися до його руками — він не подивився б на її хворість і брязнув би нею так, що тільки пляма залишилася б від її сухорлявої постаті. Але він повернувся й рішуче відійшов. Він своє зробив, а плач його зовсім не обходить“.

Ганна ще хотіла дочку витягнути з того морального багна, грозила їй судом і

„дико скочила з ліжка й стиснула Талі руку: — Паскудице, ти забула, що він мій чоловік? — Таля визивно піднесла очі... — Був твій, а тепер мій, — вона вирвала руку й демонстративно вийшла“.

З того часу Володимир і Таля зовсім не зважали на присутність Ганнину. А тоді не вперше думала Ганна з роздукою: чому Нік так скоро відійшов від неї. Ганна відвідувала Нікову могилу й знаходила там моральну підтримку. Незабаром Ганна дізнається, що ненадійна Нікова смерть не була випадком: його вбили умисне при допомозі Володимира, щоб присвоїти собі його винахід. Та Ганна не зміла довести того. І вона залишилась у Володимира, глядячи з боєм на те, як її Таля скочується щораз глибше в пропасть розпущеного життя.

„Ганні стало сумно. Таля не здійснив її надій, як не здійснила й вона, Ганна, своїх намірів... Над нею тяжить утома минулого її життя, втома сьогоднішнього дня“.

Та шкода думати про все: „вона раптом згадує, що не обмірковувала ще меню на завтрішній день“. До того довело її нестримне бажання жити „повним молодим життям“, не зважаючи на долю хоч би власних дітей, вона стала куховаркою для злочинного Володимира, що був чоловіком і їй і її дочці.

Подібний мотив лежить в основі Копилечкового роману „Визволення“, тільки тут того „визволення“ від семейних звязків бажає мужчина, діяльний Петро Гамалія, що покинув, як уже знаємо, глибоко йому віддану, але надто поєдинчу для його ширших поглядів Уляну, й опісля виправдувався перед сином:

„Усю свою енергію, всі сили я віддавав, коли боролися на фронтах, так само й тепер роблю, як умію, відбудовуючи наше господарство... Є в кожній людині і в нас, партійців, теж трохи все ж таки свого, особистого життя. Отой малесенький куточок, оті чотири стіни, де людина хоче зостатися на одинці, зблизьким ближчим другом, чи як там його назвати. До того куточка ніхто не має права втручатися. Своє особисте життя я творю сам. Ти мене розумієш?.. І не будеш питати, чому я зробив так, а не інакше. Конкретніше: чому я зійшовся із другою? Бачиш, про різні особисті міркування й бажання я говорити не буду. Але я ніколи не осуджу того, хто в цій справі, справі родичного

життя, навіть зробить якусь величезну помилку. У нас, у більшовиків, ще не вироблено певної моральної норми, закону, що регулював би такі справи. Може тому, що в нас немає часу цим зайнятись, а може тому, що в нас немає ще сталого побуту. Побут формується віками, а після революції не минуло ще й десять років. — Але це не дає відповідальному партійцю покидати на злидні свою дружину з дітьми і сходитися з якоюсь непманкою, — з краплиною отрути в цих словах і в тоні перебив Сава. — А це ще невідомо. Перш за все хто тобі сказав про непманку? Подруге, я всіх зусиль прикладав, щоб допомогти вам, але я не міг зламати Ульяної упертості. І найголовніше: давай не говорити „своє“, „твоя“ дружина. Коли ми йшли, руйнуючи все старе, ми змітали на своєму шляху палаци, маєтки, будинки. Ми розруйнували міцно сформоване козацьке колишньої Росії і спокотали різну болотяну тваріску великоросійського міщанства. Тоді ми йшли проти власності. Все було твоє, моє, їхнє, інакше кажучи, спільне, пролетарське. А після непи, коли зявилися жирні вітрини і масні пики спекулянтів, знову зявилося оте саме „своє“. Але ми також звільнили і жінку, надали їй всіх прав і мене завжди ображає, глибоко мучить, коли я почую, як хтось каже — моя дружина, або ще гірше — моя жона, мій муж. Так колись казали „моя крамниця...“ — На превеликий жаль, надто ретельно всі виконують лише в один бік отаку філософію... те, що розуміємо ми з тобою, інші не розуміють і не можуть зрозуміти — посміхнувся Сава“.

Сава мав не тільки в тому рацію — життя не все йде в парі з теорією. Нова Гамалієва жінка, Маряна, стала випадково любовницею його власного сина, він сам випадково поранив автомобілем Ульяну, що не могла його забути й приїхала за ним, хоч поглянути на нього. При хорій Ульяні сходяться: син, батько і Маряна, але для Маряни вже не було місця. „Визволення“ з родинних звязків закінчилось поворотом Гамалії до Ульяни.

Однак звільнення жінки від родинних звязків наступає не тільки під впливом хвиливого подратованого афекту, або з волі чоловіка, що йому сприймалась жінка; воно наступає і з продуманої волі самої жінки, як це діється з героїнею Кротевичевого роману.

„Може звязди жило в мені щось, що ніколи цілком не замирялося з моїм поневоленням“ — каже вона сама про себе. Вихована без родинного оточення з Дитячому Притулку, Олена просто не була здібна до справжнього родинного життя. Бо тільки так хіба можна пояснити її зрештою мало зрозумілу поведінку з її чоловіком Андрієм. Він знайшов Олену поранену на шосі, куди вона попала перед найважчого бідуння. І ось Андрій, директор фабрики, бере її за дружину, але чомусь не може її прихилити до себе. Олена постійно глядить на Андрія з підзорами й недовірою. Вона не може погодитись із його поглядами на дисциплінованість міщанської родини, її дратують Андрієві відносини до неї, до дітей, до рідні до партії й под. Словом, маємо перед со-

бою якусь дуже химерну жінку, що не може перенести ніяких розходжень із своїми поглядами з боку найближчого оточення, що хотіла б, щоб усі їй поступались, а вона нікому. І, розуміється, Олена покидає свого чоловіка, приневолює Андрія погрозами віддати їй дітей і починає працювати в Дитбудинку, що вступає їй сімю. З тріумфом проголошує вона:

„О, моя шановна, не дивіться так здивовано на мене — я ж бо не винна, що звільнилась від усього того, що ще так цупко тримає вас у своїм полону... що можу вже робить і те, і се, зовсім не зважаючи, чи то буде пристойно з вашого погляду“.

Та найцікавіше, що вона здобуває за таку поведінку признание Андрієвої мами, що її власний син, після конфлікту з Оленою, вмовляє покинути його дім — вмираючи, ця жінка, із старими поглядами, висловила Олені свою вдяку за те, що почула від неї: „багато я передумала за оцей місяць, далеко більше, ніж за все життя своє“. Одначе все ж читач мало переконаний Олениними вчинками. Одначе, не зважаючи на те, що Оленина постать не зовсім ясна для читача — може власне тому вона якась ближча до живої людини, ніж багато зрозуміліша Дарка Безфамільна у Явловської, бо Дарчині вчинки надто підібрані для агітаційно-партійної пропаганди так, що ця безпритульна показує мало мистецьких елементів.

Отже родина — розбита. Але подружжя признається все вищою формою співжиття між чоловіком і жінкою, і тому часто повісті згадують про шлюб. Ясна річ, не є це церковний шлюб, а тільки реєстрація подружжя в уряді (загсі); до того така реєстрація не є конечна й часто читач, стрічаючи подружжя, не знає, чи воно загалом може бути урядово зареєстроване. В романі „Юхим Кудря“ сільський більшовик виразно відкидає церковний шлюб:

„А ранком здохана пара стояла в комісара. — Яке ж це вінчання? — сміялась Одарка. — Ніякого вінчання! — теж усміхнувся комісар, Андрій Тихонович. — Це так собі, торговий договір, хто порушить цей договір — під суд його!... — Та так таки й обійдеться без попа? — ніяково цікавилась повна щастя... Одарка. — Яюсь обійдемося, може... — кинув їй Данило, розчиркуючи своє прізвище в комісарських книгах. — Розпишіться, молодець...“

Але є ще оригінальніше подружжя. Стара Надія Степанівна в романі Н. Забіли таке розповідає про шлюб своєї молодшої дочки, інженерки комсомолки Галини:

— „Хіба ж з цією молоддю договоришся? Хіба дізнаєшся, що та як? Я з самого початку була проти цього шлюбу. Але ви знаєте, що суперечити молоді не в моїх принципах. Я й не казала їм нічого — хай живуть, як знають, — кожний бо сам кує собі щастя. Познайомилися вони в інституті, однокурсники, студенти. Спочатку зацікавилися разом, іспити готували, складали... А потім, одного дня, дочка мені заявляє, що вона одружена... Що? Як? Коли? — „Та вже понад три місяці. Не хотілося тобі

раніше казати, мамо, бо не знала — чи це „всерйоз та надовго“, чи так тільки, спроба... Ну, а тепер іду до лікарні... — А він же як, чоловік, твій, чи так, просто, як це тепер називається? — А вона сміється: — Не турбуйся, мамо, — законний чоловік. Спеціально заради тебе до загсу вчора ходили, от бачиш: „запис про шлюб“, — не стану ж я для такої дрібнички порушувати спокій твоїх ретроградних поглядів“... Три місяці, як одружена, вчора до загсу, а сьогодні тільки про це матері сказала та до лікарні йде, — як це вам сподобається?... А далі — вибралася вона від мене, поїхала з ним разом на практику, ще зиму окремо від мене жила. Заходила інколи... забіжить на хвилинку, про інститут, про іспити, про комсомол — і побігла знов. Коли це рік тому... приходять з валізкою, з портфелем. — Ну, мамо, приймай назад „блудную доч“! Розлучилася з чоловіком, хоч знову з тобою жити. Гадаю, що ти нічого не матимеш проти внука?... Отак і живемо ми з того часу: вона на роботі, я з Лесиком. Лесикові скоро вже рік буде. Мені, правду кажучи, нічого веселіше, ніж одній жити, та тільки дивуюся я все ж таки нашій молоді... — А що ж він, чоловік її? — Ні разу й не заходив. Сина й не бачив. Дочка й прізвища своє синові дала. Чи бачиться вона з ним, які там у них взаємини, не знаю нічого“.

Наслідки такого подружжя прийшлося заплатити дитині: вона померла. А тоді батько дитини Андрій говорить Галині.

„Багато ти віддала дитині?... Я може й не бачив його ніколи, але ж я знаю і це я тобі вже не вперше говорю: з тебе мати була така ж, як з мене батько... Я не заперечую — з мене батько нікудишній, тому то я й не хотів ним бути. Але, на мою думку, значно чесніше перед суспільством, перед майбутніми поколіннями, перед нашими дітьми — визнати, що не маєш права бути батьком і одмовитися ним бути, ніж так, як ти: взяти на себе відповідальність і не змогти донести її... Ти ж знала, що в тебе робота, комсомол, учоба, громадські навантаження. Знала, що відмовитися від цього не зумієш, не зможеш. Значить, ти знала наперед, що дитині ти зможеш віддати лише невеличкі рештки свого часу, свого життя. Так як же ти наважилася взяти все ж таки відповідальність за це маленьке життя, за це створіння, що вимагає цілковитої відданості, самовідреченості від матері? Як посміла ти віддати на поталу, покинути на призволяще нашого сина, мого сина?... Це ж злочин — ти розумієш. І не тільки передо мною, перед дитиною — це злочин перед суспільством“.

Так деклямував той Андрій, що ніколи не бачив свого сина, що навіть не був на його похороні. Та найцікавіше, що він ще раз сходиться з Галиною, що завважує:

„Не камінь, і я піддалася... він був знову моїм чоловіком протягом близько двох місяців“, але вкінці вони розійшлися остаточно й Андрій одружився з іншою.

IX

Отже, як ми бачили, за таку легковажну й нероздуману розлуку платять не тільки жінки, але й інколи чоловіки й передусім діти. Тому в українських радянських повістях вживається тісно з жіночим питанням також дитяче питання. Погляд на дитину починає змінюватись, але й самі діти змінюються:

„Бо Володислав — дитина в романі Г. Епіка „Першавесна“ — не потребував ні ефемерної, вигаданої слинявими інститутками та сентиментально-дешевенькими поетиками „материнної ніжності“, ні „батьківського ока“, що, як і „материна любов“, відоме тільки своїм майже тваринним егоїзмом. Бо саме він визначає батьківське ставлення до дитини, як до „священної“ непорушної власності, відриває її від потрібного... колективного оточення, тримаючи її, цю „дуже цікаву“ цяцьку, між ганчірками та брудом „щасливої, зразкової“ родини, отрокує цілі покоління будівників майбутнього традиціями й ідеями старого смітника. Тваринний егоїзм батьківської любови призводить до найгіршого паскудства, узаконненого віками й правом. Тішачися дитиною, він призводить її до нудної, сірої одноманітності, обмежує тюрмою родинної кухні її соціальний досвід, виховує з них безвольних, тупих людей з обр'яма і смаками власного кутка“.

Героїня Кротевичевої повісти застановляється над тим, як погодити звільнення жінки з обов'язками матері. Вона сама любить дві свої донечки, стежить заповпадливо за їх розвитком, намагається вплинути на їх виховання, але замість найпростішого способу виховати діти: гарного владштовання сім'ї, вона пропонує таку складну програму спільного „міста дітей“, що має заступати індивідуальну сімю:

„I. Жінка заявляє про своє бажання мати зв'язок зі своєю дитиною. І тоді вже до року, до закінчення годівлі дитини молоком матері вона не має права без поважної причини... відмовитись від цього. Спеціальні засоби сполучення возять її потрібне число раз до дитини з місця проживання та праці. Вночі їй навіть дається ліжко біля дитини. Дні відпочинку вона теж проводить біля неї. II. Жінка зразу ж рішуче відмовляється від дитини — і втрачає, розуміється, всяке право на неї. Але вже й одно те, що вона виконала обов'язок свій щодо продовження роду, надає їй право деякої допомоги на випадок інвалідності... Минає рік. I. Жінка вдруге може відмовитись від зв'язку з дитиною. За виконання часткового (годілля) обов'язків матері вона одержує в належнім випадковій допомозі не тільки від комуні, а в деякій частині і від спроможної потім на це дитини. II. Жінка бажає бути матір'ю й надалі дитині. Вона входить тоді, як рівноправний член, до ради колонії, має крім того право контролю й апеляції до найвищої ради всіх дитячих установ. Кожної декади дитина може провести день у матері. Право її на допомогу збільшується. Минає сім років. I. Втретє мати має право відмовитись від дитини. II. Коли ж ні — теж вступає до ради школи

з правом контролю й апеляції. Крім того кожного вихідного дня (двічі на декаду) дитина перебуває в матері. Розмір допомоги, розуміється, ще більший. І останній період: чотирнадцяти — п'ятнадцяти років дітей. Закінчення нормальної трудової школи. Не тільки мати, але вже й дитина заявляють про своє обопільне бажання або повного родинного зв'язку, або цілковитого роз'єднання. І в позитивному випадкові дитина переходить з дитбудинку до матері назавжди, підлягаючи постійному контролю трудових одиниць, де продовжує вона свою освіту".

Оце має бути те звільнення жінки від дитячої кімнати. Як відбивається на дитині така, не кажемо вже розлука з матір'ю чи недобровільна, як у Дарки Безфамільної, чи добровільна, як у Галини, але вже саме розбиття родинного життя, як у донни Анни, чи у Гамаліїв — про це говорять українські радянські повісті й романи з дивною єднотісністю. Ані жінка, ані дитина не досягає в тих повістях тоді щастя — навпаки, це доводить до важких катастроф.

Зрештою, вихованню дитини поза родину присвятили українські радянські повісті ще мало місця. Почини дитячих ясел при робітничих комунах пробує зобразити Забіла — фабричні робітничі улаштовують добровільно примітивні дитячі ясла; сільський притулок для дітей малює кількома загальними рисами Головка в романі „Можу“; ширший, але агітаційний образок дитячого життя, інколи дуже важкого, в сільській незаможницькій комуні дає Гордієнко; поза тим маємо ще приюти й притулки для дітей, улаштовані на стару моду, у Кротевича й Яволовської.

З дитячих установ стелиться перед дитинсю, позбавленою батьківської опіки, подвійний шлях: або вона опиниться в комсомолі, де переживає долю, змальовану Кириленком та Первомайським, або вона дістається на вулицю — а тоді жде її жахливе життя на самому суспільному дні. Стравні картини, що морозять кров, із життя таких безпритульних „вуркаганів“ — „пацанів“ (передовсім одеських) дав І. Микитенко в своїх творах „Вуркагани“ (1929) і „Ранок“. На жаль, Микитенко розповідає про життя безпритульних хлопців, що живуть у справжній пропасті нелюдської бідноти та неймовірних злочинів — про безпритульних дівчат він не згадує.

X

Отакий образ жіночого питання розгортають українські радянські повісті й романи. Важне ще, наскільки цей образ відповідає справжній дійсності й наскільки він мистецький. З того боку вражають читача дві риси, що надто часто повторюються в тих творах. Переговсім найчастіше дрібніші, рідше ширші протирелігійні випадки. Майже все, як згадано, є вони дуже низького сорта, крайне нетактовні, бруталні й до того за часто так дуже не вяжуться з цілістю, що псуєть повістеву структуру й викликають осоружливе враження. З того виходить ясно, що такі проти-

релігійні випадки не подиктовані справжнім життям чи мистецькими міркуваннями. Вони роблять враження елемента чужого, вставленого насильно — тобто накиненого урядовим курсом. Тільки в дуже нечисленних випадках є вони відблиском справжнього життя.

Друга така, ще багато яскравіша риса — це вихвалення совітського будівництва. Ця риса налягла важкою зморою на наші радянські повісті і просто зруйнувала їх мистецький рівень, заваливши акцію дешевенькою агітацією. Тому всім жіночим постатям, що визначаються в повістях на полі совітського будівництва, бракує справжнього життя — це якісь стипізовані агітаторки-маріонетки, що деклямують усе ті самі, вивчені фрази. Такі будівничі інженерки, сільські агітаторки, колгоспниці, комунарки, промовниці на мітингах, і деякі комсомолки мають не багато справді людського, живого; з мистецького боку є вони невдатні, бо позбавлені творчих індивідуальних рис. Багато живіші є деякі постаті бойових фронтівочок — бойовий динамізм оживляє їх мимохоть і різьбить їх по-мистецьки. Зате там, де жінка виступає як тільки жінка, а не як партійна, виявляє вона все повну життєздатність і пориває читача бурєю елементарних почувань, творячи справді мистецькі, повні переконливої сили постаті. Та до вершків чистої поезії доходить жінка у глибоко продуманому символі. Отже українська радянська повість відбила в загальних рисах — справжню сучасну дійсність: розбиття родини, захитаної й без більшовицької пропаганди; визволення жінки до нового, ніби повного життя, не звязаного релігійними, родинними, чи економічними обставинами; повний хаос у відношенні жінок до мужчин, спричинений більшовицькими розпорядками; деколи справді незavidне становище жінки серед тих революційних відносин; і найважніша річ — велика загроза для існування дитини. Але хоч цю загальну дійсність схопили українські радянські повістярі вірно, то деталі нашим повістярям не все вдалися; їх жіночі постаті деколи мало мистецькі — і то не вважачи на те, що українські радянські повістярі часто орудують прекрасно романістичною технікою, здобутою важкою працею над собою в сумлінних студіях над європейською повістю.


І тільки там, де український радянський повістяр умів стати на власному ґрунті, де він умів відхилитись від тієї агітаційної теорії — створив він живі й мистецькі жіночі постаті. Жінки українки з давніми виразно зазначеними національними зверхніми рисами — властиво немає тепер в українській радянській повісті. Її заступило інакше розуміння справи: виступають істотні риси української жінки, що відрізняють її яскраво від сірої більшовицької буденщини. Прототипом тих жінок являється росіянка Агля у „Вальдшнепах“ М. Хвильового. Бо це, щодо жіночої психології, рівнодушне, якої народности така жінка: росіянка, туркиня, алтайка чи й українка. Але всіх їх характеризує психологічний індивідуалізм, що прямує до повного визволення жінки та до вияву її енергійної вдачі, що домагається

належного місця у світі. Це виразний протест проти більшовицького змеханізовання жінки. І тому нас захоплюють такі Аглаї, чи навіть донни Анни, або Любки Прохорівні, хоч із морального боку вони нас навіть, як згадано, гнівають і обурюють. Зрештою, й самі письменники підкреслюють страшні наслідки такого нестримного індивідуалізму для самої жінки, але з другого боку не бачать без нього справжньої людини. І в тому українські повістярі найбільше відхилились від загальної теорії, не зважаючи на крик офіційної критики, що це — явна контрреволюція.

На такому тлі й виростає спроба створити новий етичний ідеал, коли християнську етику не допускають урядово. І тут звважаємо дуже замітні явища, що свідчать про те, як поважно ставляться до своїх завдань справжні письменницькі таланти в Радянській Україні. Вже згадано про важний мотив повороту вуличних дівчат до суспільного життя — але цей мотив лежить загалом у програмі комуністичної партії. Зате цікавіші є гадки про родинне життя й про становище дитини. Тут стоять українські письменники перед двома контрастивими явищами: з одного боку повне визволення жінки з увагою на її індивідуальні й чуттєві вимоги — з другого: неможливість погодити ті принципи власне з самою жіночою природою. Переміг рішуче клич за сильною, самостійною жінкою — але всі автори показують, як така жінка заломлюється у своїх почуваннях. Всі автори показують, що розбити родину дуже легко, але разом із тим вони й показують, якою справжньою катастрофою є для жінки оте розбиття родинного звязку та бажання нестримного, все „молодого“ життя. Треба признати, що проблему родинного огнища поставили бодай деякі кращі українські радянські повістярі болюче поважно. Жіночої проблеми з того боку вони не розв'язали, бо без вповні християнських поглядів годі її розв'язати, але їх жіночі постаті все важко покутують за легкодушне розбиття родинного звязку і передовсім за нервозне бажання жити, за всяку ціну, т. зв. повним, все молодим життям.

Щодо дитини, то, щоправда, деякі повістярі заговорили про тваринність батьківських та материнських почувань, але всі кращі автори показують, як страшно відбивається на дітях розбиття домашнього огнища й передовсім відсутність материнської опіки.

Отже хоч як намагаються урядові кола знищити самостійну ідеологію українських письменників, вона стихійно проломлює накинені їй кайдани і намагається витворити самостійний світогляд. При чудовій, пребагатій мові, при широкій, всесвітній тематиці, при високо вже розвиненій техніці, при постійній, упертій праці авторів намагаються бодай кращі українські радянські повістярі і на ідеологічному полі унезалежитись від більшовицьких поглядів, осягнути свої власні завдання і створити своєрідні мистецькі твори.



RESEARCH NOTE

Stella M. Hryniuk

THE PEASANT AND ALCOHOL IN EASTERN GALICIA IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A NOTE

Alcohol abuse and drunkenness are frequently mentioned in both the historical and the popular literature on Eastern Galicia as causes of physical disability, social discord, and the region's economic backwardness. Ukrainian peasants in particular have carried the stigma associated with being consumers of excessive amounts of alcohol. Perhaps this was due to the temperance propaganda of the period, perhaps to the perceived link between taverns and money-lending by their lessees.¹ Whatever the reason, many contemporary moralists, publicists, and historians have echoed, implicitly or explicitly, Volodymyr Navrotsky's assertion of 1882 that "People in Eastern Galicia are given over to drunkenness."²

It is not likely that there will be general agreement on what constitutes "excessive" use of alcohol. It may well be, however, that the picture of drunkenness in the villages of Eastern Galicia has been overdrawn. At the very least, a fresh look at neglected evidence may cast new light upon the scene.

By Austrian legislation of 1849, tabular landowners in Galicia were allowed to retain their ancient right of propination; thus they kept their monopoly of production and sale of alcohol. In 1867 the right to rule on propination was transferred to the Sejm, and this body decided in 1875 to cancel the propination rights, but with effect only from 1910. Although the 1875 law abridged slightly the tabular landowners'

monopoly on the production of alcohol, they retained until 1910 the exclusive right to own the village tavern.³

Naturally, the alcohol monopoly was a source of income for the estate owners, who often charged exorbitant rates to their almost exclusively Jewish concession holders who were the actual tavern keepers. The latter were also frequently willing to lend money to their customers for drinks as well as for other purposes. The connection was often made that the income of the tavern keepers as well as that of the owners came at the expense of the general public. Since money-lending occurred in taverns, and sometimes at high interest rates, drinking of itself was perceived as being the cause of peasant indebtedness. Also, as the Austrian state collected an excise tax on the production of alcohol and a fee for the keeping of taverns, and the Galician Land imposed a tax on the sale of alcohol to consumers, "government" too was seen as oppressing the peasant. Most of the antagonism in respect of the real or alleged peasant over-indulgence in alcohol was, however, directed against the Jews.⁴

In view of the traditional depiction of the Galician Ukrainian peasantry as unduly alcoholic, it is worth examining the official data on the production of beer and spirits, not to see whether Ukrainians or Galicians drank "too much," for that is in part a matter for individual judgement and in part not really ascertainable, but to put the issue into some perspective. Wine is not considered here, as it was scarcely produced in Galicia and there is no indication that it was drunk in any large quantities; it should be borne in mind, however, that wine was extensively consumed in other parts of Austria in addition to beer and spirits.

The production of beer in Galicia rose from 597,088 hectolitres in 1881-2 (September 1 to August 31) to 708,373 hl in 1887-8, 921,703 hl in 1892-3, and 930,875 hl in 1894-5.⁵ In the 1892-3 year, Galicia accounted for 17.6 per cent of Austria's beer production—certainly a far lower share than its proportion of Austria's population. A contemporary Austrian authority concluded that beer was mostly consumed in the crownland in which it was produced, and it is instructive therefore to note that Bohemia, with a somewhat smaller population than Galicia, produced 5,231,306 hl of beer in 1881-2, and 7,272,691 hl in 1892-3.⁶ There is no indication in the data that Galicians consumed "excessive" quantities of beer, nor indeed does the descriptive literature pinpoint beer as a problem. The production figures cited above are the equivalent of annual average consumptions per capita of c. 8.75 litres of beer in 1881-2 and c. 12.5 in 1894-5. At least one contemporary authority

regarded the increase in beer consumption in Galicia as a very positive step, for it was a drink often substituted for vodka.⁷

Between 1880–81 and 1892–3, Galicia produced annual amounts of spirits which varied from a low of 19,062,098 litres of 100 proof alcohol in 1883–4 to a high of 48,581,394 litres in 1892–3. Production of spirits increased markedly after 1885–6. With about 28 per cent of Austria's population, Galicia had c. 33.5 per cent of Austria's production of spirits in 1891–2, and 37.9 per cent in 1892–3; for the same two years Bohemia's share was 38.5 per cent and 31.4 per cent. On a per capita basis, Bohemia's production, and that of other Crownlands, exceeded Galicia's in some years.⁸

Austrian data unfortunately do not allow the quantities of spirits used and consumed in each Crownland to be accurately ascertained. F.C. Presl calculated that Austrian production of spirits amounted to 3.2 litres of 100 proof alcohol per capita in 1880–81 and 5.2 litres in 1892–3. After taking imports and exports⁹ into account, he estimated that the amounts retained in Austria in the two years were 2.7 and 4.5 litres per capita respectively (compared with 14 litres in France and 10.5 litres in both Germany and Belgium). To arrive at actual personal consumption these quantities would have to be reduced by some unknown factor to take into account industrial use.¹⁰

Even if one were to assume that Galician personal consumption of spirits was somewhat greater than the Austrian average—and the only grounds for doing so would be that Galicia's per capita production was greater than Austria's—and one were then to assume that the consumption would be one-third above the Austrian average (because per capita production in some years was roughly one-third more than the Austrian average), the resultant figure would be at most 6 litres of 100 proof alcohol per person in 1892–3 and probably less (and considerably less in the early 1880s and again in 1893–4, when Galician production of spirits declined to just over 38 million litres.)¹¹ This is a significantly lower figure than V. Navrotsky's calculation that in 1876 26 litres of 50 proof liquor were sold per person in Galicia. Yet it is this latter quantity that has been cited, as an ongoing truth, in some historical literature.¹²

Possibly alcohol consumption in Galicia dropped significantly between the 1870s and 1880s; possibly the purported 1876 data were erroneous. Such reports certainly alarmed reformers, who focused much of their criticism on the number of taverns where spirits were dispensed. The popular picture conveyed in the literature of the day was that of

the avaricious Jews dispensing alcohol to allegedly ignorant Ukrainian and Polish peasants in innumerable taverns across the land.¹³ Some data on taverns may therefore be instructive.

During the twelve-year period 1882–93, and despite the constant increase in population, there was only a slight increase in the number of taverns in Galicia—from 19,104 to 19,248. It is noteworthy that Bohemia, with a smaller area and population, had significantly more taverns, as well as many more “off-license” retailers, than did Galicia. The total number of dealers in spirits—taverns, “off-license” retailers, and traders and wholesalers—increased in Galicia from 19,596 in 1882 to 19,939 in 1893. The number of outlets per capita actually declined, from one for every 302 persons in 1882 to one per 328 in 1893. There were in fact far fewer taverns per capita in Galicia than in Austria as a whole (1:206 in 1882; 1:210 in 1893), or in almost any other Crownland. The decline in the number of taverns per capita in Galicia continued, so that by 1901 it was calculated that there was one tavern per 347 persons in towns and one per 462 in villages.¹⁴ Most of the Galician taverns served only spirits, a fact which differentiated them (and those in Bukovyna) from those elsewhere in Austria. Nevertheless, they served a social purpose, particularly before reading clubs became numerous; they were gathering places for villagers, for they came there to exchange news, to gossip, and to play games such as dominoes and cards.¹⁵

So far, it has been established that the consumption of legally produced alcohol in Galicia in the last two decades of the nineteenth century was not as great as has been supposed, and that the number of taverns per capita was (a) declining, and (b) not nearly as great as in Austria as a whole. No distinctions have been made between Western and Eastern Galicia. Certainly by far the greater number of distilleries was in Eastern Galicia. Navrotsky, citing Adolf Lipp’s *Der Handel nach dem Osten* published in Vienna in 1876, reported that in 1874, of Galicia’s 640 distilleries, 146 were in Western Galicia and 494 in Eastern Galicia.¹⁶ By 1900, the total number of Galician distilleries had increased to 698, with the growth in number being almost entirely in Eastern Galicia.¹⁷ Given the growth of the railway network, the increased population of the cities and towns, and the export trade, it is unlikely that the increase in the number of Eastern Galician distilleries and increased production there signified a corresponding increase in local consumption of alcohol. Far more significant, in all likelihood, was the decline in the total number of liquor outlets between the 23,269

reported by Navrotsky in 1876 and the 19,596 that were in business in 1882. Of the 1876 total, 22,129 were described as belonging to the owners of propination rights, and of these, 15,373 were in Eastern Galicia, which had one tavern per 235 inhabitants, compared with one per 269 (actually 270) in Western Galicia.¹⁸ The suggestion can be ventured but thus far not verified that the greater proportion of the decline in the number of Galician liquor outlets between 1876 and 1882 occurred in Eastern Galicia, and that this decline was associated with the partial success of the sobriety campaigns.

In 1877 the Austrian parliament passed a special law on drunkenness, applicable only to Galicia and Bukovyna. Evidently there was then a perception of a special problem in these two Crownlands, though subsequently some experts wished to see the law extended to the whole of Austria.¹⁹ Under its provisions there were each year thousands of convictions in Galicia for "habitual drunkenness." The numbers of such convictions increased from less than 20,000 per annum in the early eighties to a peak of 26,814 in 1887, after which they declined progressively to 16,580 in 1899. Generally just over one-half of the convictions were recorded in Eastern Galicia, which, however, had a considerably larger population than Western Galicia.²⁰ It is not clear with what severity or degree of uniformity the law was enforced, or whether the decrease in the number of convictions was due to a decline in drunkenness or to a less strict enforcement of the law. If the data are taken at face value, 0.91 per thousand of population were convicted of alcoholism in 1890 and 0.64 per thousand in 1899. These statistics indicate that drunkenness declined.

One contemporary authority, N. Cybulski, certainly concluded that there had been a reduction in the drinking of vodka. Cybulski ascribed this development to the combined effects of the law against drunkenness, the activities of the church brotherhoods and other sobriety societies, and the higher price of vodka;²¹ he may not have been right in respect of the deterring effect of price.²²

The sobriety movement in Eastern Galicia, with which the long-established church brotherhoods and also separate "sobriety brotherhoods" were associated, dated back to the 1850s. It was given fresh impetus by the publication in 1869 of Fr. Stepan Kachala's pamphlet *What is destroying us and what can help us*. In Kachala's view, drunkenness, together with laziness and wastefulness, were the bane of the Ukrainian peasants' existence; he prescribed hard work, sobriety, and thrift as the antidotes that would bring about a better

life.²³ The sobriety campaigns of the 1870s brought many villagers together in a common cause, and in many villages they continued into the next century. Temperance activities have been positively identified in 25 villages in southern Podillia,²⁴ and there were probably many more. In many instances it was the Greek Catholic parish priest who took the lead; in one case it was the *diak*.²⁵ Vows to abstain from alcohol were generally made in church, and in one village it was the priest's daughter who was the first to take the pledge.²⁶ Where the sobriety movement was at its most successful, for example in Zalissia, Borshchiv county, the village was described as "lovely with its pretty houses and other buildings: it does the heart good just to look at it." Moreover, the village tavern was locked up, snow was not cleared in front of it, and "not even the birds go near it."²⁷

It is likely that some persons became permanent abstainers—Cybulski thought that in some areas of Galicia, including Terebovlia county, one-third or even one-half of the people did not drink vodka at all.²⁸ In many instances the sobriety societies contributed to the development of sensible drinking habits rather than to ongoing abstention from all alcohol. Some persons interpreted their abstinence vows as applying only to vodka, and instead drank beer, mead, home-produced fruit wine or cider, or rum (in tea).²⁹ In Hovylyv, Husiatyn county, the people in fact vowed specifically that they would not drink whiskey, and so drank only beer, with its three or four per cent alcohol content, although there was some backsliding among some of the younger generation, who drank whiskey.³⁰ No doubt such practices were not completely satisfying from the perspective of the organizers of the sobriety movement. At times particular individuals took matters into their own hands to save their fellows from drink: in Ivankiv, Borshchiv county, the reeve—a big, burly man who was "terribly opposed to the tavern keeper"—physically dragged people from the tavern.³¹

Possibly, however, neither the tavern nor the tavern-keeper played as great a part in contributing to what was regarded as "excessive" alcohol consumption as contemporaries supposed. Rather, "home brew" may have played a role. But the evidence for this is far from firm. Peasants in some parts of Eastern Galicia, for example in Chortkiv, Husiatyn and Terebovlia counties, did make their own apple cider, fruit wines, and "sweet waters" (i.e., liqueurs).³² And alcohol, according to one contemporary expert, was frequently kept in the home: in almost every house in Galicia "one sees what are in effect miniature corner

taverns which are the most dangerous of all dispensers of spirits.”³³ Possibly the liquor was legally bought, but given the customs of Galician Ukrainians in Western Canada, one is inclined to doubt it.³⁴

The question of home brew is not likely to be easily resolved: writers, perhaps not unnaturally, have not dealt with it.³⁵ Leaving that aside, it may be stated with some confidence that nothing in the statistical data indicates that Galicia or Eastern Galicia had an extraordinary problem with alcohol in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Nor is it likely—whatever may have been the case in the 1870s—that in the 1880s and 1890s people in Eastern Galicia generally drank to “forget their misery” or out of despair. That explanation may have appealed to temperance advocates and to Ukrainian radicals who looked for poverty and misery and did not take note of the significant progress around them. The 1880s and 1890s were in fact decades of marked development in Eastern Galicia, with notable improvements in animal husbandry and in most regions increases in the productivity of crops. As well, there was a growth in literacy, and the increasing involvement of Ukrainian villagers in the activities of the growing number of reading clubs and cooperative societies, and in the political process, especially at the local government level.³⁶ Undoubtedly, in the Eastern Galician villages as elsewhere, some people drowned their sorrows in alcohol. More generally, alcohol usage was extensively associated with festivities: more was drunk on holy days and at celebrations such as weddings than on working days.³⁷ Alcohol was certainly a fact of life for many Ukrainian villagers in Eastern Galicia, and a very welcome one at that, but the extraordinarily bibulous Ukrainian peasant, it is here suggested, was a myth, not a reality.

Notes

¹ In an unpublished article, J.-P. Himka states that “the clergyman’s slogans for the peasantry were enlightenment, sobriety, diligence, and thrift”; J.-P. Himka, “The Church and Nationbuilding,” 47. See also S. Inglot et al., *Historia chłopów polskich*, vol. II, *Okres zaborów* (Warsaw, 1972), 247.

² Anon. (V. Navrotsky), “Pianstwo i propinatsiia na Halychyni,” *Hromada* (Geneva), vol. 5, 56. See also *Terebovelska zemlia: Istorychno-memuarnyi zbirnyk* (New York, 1968), 71; O. Martynowych, “Village Radicals and Peasant Immigrants: The Social Roots of Factionalism Among Ukrainian Immigrants in Canada,” M.A. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1978, 14; and J. Skwarok, *The Ukrainian Settlers in Canada and Their Schools, 1891–1921* (Edmonton, 1959), 6: “Overburdened by taxation, unable to meet their most meagre needs, lacking sufficient land to support themselves properly, they drowned their despair in drink at the tavern.”

³ Inglot, op. cit., 247–8. In 1910 the owners of propination rights in Galicia were awarded substantial compensation for the final loss of these rights out of a special “propination fund” (ibid., 251). Austrian legislation of 1881 divided vendors of spirits into three categories. Numerically by far the largest group were taverns (*Ausschankstatten*): these served spirits in open containers of varying sizes to customers who might be seated or standing; they could also sell alcohol for off-premise consumption. The second category were the small “off-license” retailers (*Kleinverschleisse*) who were permitted to sell spirits only for consumption off the premises. Finally there were the large dealers and wholesalers of spirits; F.C. Presl, “Produktion, Ausschank alkoholhältiger Getränke und die Trunkenheitsgesetzgebung,” *Statistische Monatschrift* (Vienna), vol. 22, 588–9. Here we are concerned with taverns.

⁴ K. Grzybowski, *Galicja 1848–1914: historia ustroju politycznego na tle historii ustroju Austrii* (Cracow, 1959), 219; Kostrowicka et al., *Historia gospodarcza Polski XIX i XX wieku* (Warsaw, 1966), 83–4; Inglot, op. cit., 252–3; also *Batkivshchyna* (Lviv), 15 February 1889. J.-P. Himka’s unpublished paper “Ukrainian-Jewish Antagonism in the Late Nineteenth Century” analyzes 281 reports and items of correspondence that appeared in *Batkivshchyna* in 1884 and 1885 in order to ascertain the “world view of the correspondents as well as their vision of what was transpiring in the village.” 107 items referred to Jews and all but two were anti-Jewish. “In the correspondence referring to Jewish tavern keeping the theme most often repeated is that Jews grew rich from the peasants’ drunkenness” (38). Although Himka acknowledges that the accounts “were exaggerated,” he nonetheless concludes, without citing data on alcohol, that “If the tavern keeper wanted to pay his rent and make something for himself, he had no choice but to foster the alcoholism of the peasants and to extract as much as possible from them in payment by employing sharp practices or by encouraging them to drink on credit. This is why the Jewish tavern

keeper, the agent of demoralization and economic ruin, was such a hated figure to representatives of the Ukrainian national movement" (40). The same theme may be found in novels by L. Martovych and O. Makovei. In Stefanyk's short story "In a Tavern," Ivan says to Protz: "Protz, my friend, here we are drinking, and you are treating me, but we're spending our own money which we earned with our bloody sweat. We're drinking our very life-blood, and helping the Jew to feed his brats," Stefanyk, *The Stone Cross* (Toronto, 1971), 36–7.

⁵ The data are from Presl, op. cit., 575, except for those for 1894–5, which are from *Geschichte der Österreichischen Land und Forstwirtschaft und ihrer Industrien, 1848–1898* (Vienna, 1899), vol. II, pt. ii, 517.

⁶ Presl, op. cit., 575.

⁷ N. Cybulski, *Proba badań nad żywieniem się ludu wiejskiego w Galicyi* (Cracow, 1894), 9 and 143–4.

⁸ Presl, op. cit., 580–81.

⁹ Galicia exported considerable quantities of alcohol (though the exact amounts are unknown) to Bohemia and other western parts of Austria, to Germany, Switzerland, and other European countries, as well as to some overseas destinations, *Oesterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild*, vol. 19, *Galizien* (Vienna, 1898), 864; see also S. Szczepanowski, *Nędza Galicyi* (Lviv, 1888), 39; J. Rutkowski, *Historia gospodarcza Polski*, vol. II, *Czasy porozbiorowe* (Poznań, 1950), 334; and J. Lukasiewicz, *Kryzys agrarny na ziemiach polskich w końcu XIX wieku* (Warsaw, 1968), 228.

¹⁰ Presl, op. cit., 581–4.

¹¹ *Oesterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild*, vol. 19, *Galizien*, 864.

¹² Navrotsky, op. cit., 50. Navrotsky claimed that actual production of spirits in Galicia was four times greater than the official data showed, although in arriving at his 26 litres per capita consumption he multiplied the official statistics by only 2 1/2. He made no allowance for exports or industrial use, *ibid.*, 49–50. For recent citation of the 26 litre figure see V. Kubijovyč, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (Toronto, 1984), 1: 47, and O.T. Martynowych, *The Ukrainian Bloc Settlement in East-Central Alberta, 1890–1930: A History* (n.p. [Edmonton], 1985), 19. Liquor sold in taverns was 40–50 proof. Presl, op. cit., 582, estimated that in 1892–3 the human consumption of spirits in Austria amounted to approximately 9 litres of 40–50 proof alcohol per capita per annum. He deemed this to be unhealthily high.

Presl's estimates and the inferences I have drawn from them are in large part confirmed by a study conducted by Professor N. Cybulski of the Jagellonian University, Cracow, in the early 1890s and published in 1894, cited in note 7. *Inter alia* Cybulski asked teachers in various towns and villages in Galicia to estimate the average consumption of vodka by local adult populations. The teachers' guesstimates varied enormously, for example in Terebovlia county

from 1/2 litre per annum in Dolne to 24 litres in Strusiv (Cybulski, op. cit., 113—the complete table is to be found on 84–117). Acknowledging that his data did not provide a sound basis for accurate findings, Cybulski contented himself with the estimate that the average annual consumption of spirits *per adult* in Galicia was most frequently in the range of 5–20 litres (ibid., 145). Cybulski's totals do not distinguish between 100 proof and lower strength alcohol, but probably refer to the latter. Cybulski also made the plausible inference that men drank more than women, ibid., 146.

¹³ See note 4 above.

¹⁴ Presl, op. cit., 590–92; for the distinction between the types of dealers in spirits see note 3 above; for the 1901 data see V. Najdus, *Szkice z historii Galicji* (Warsaw, 1958), 1: 131. According to Navrotsky, op. cit., 41, there had been one liquor outlet per 233 persons in Galicia in 1876.

¹⁵ *Batkivshchyna*, 11 April 1884; see also the stories “In a Tavern” and “The Master Builder” in Stefanyk, op. cit., 34–7 and 41–4. On the difference between taverns in Galicia and Bukovyna and those elsewhere in Austria see Presl, op. cit., 597. Presl deemed taverns in Austria generally to have been badly lit, ill-ventilated, malodorous holes.

¹⁶ Navrotsky, op. cit., 48.

¹⁷ T. Pilat, ed., *Podręcznik statystyki Galicyi*, vol. VII, pt. 1, 168.

¹⁸ Navrotsky, op. cit., 41–2.

¹⁹ Presl, op. cit., 595.

²⁰ Pilat, op. cit., vols. VII, pt. 2, 325, and VIII, pt. 2, 328. The number of persons confined to lunatic asylums on account of alcoholism rose in Galicia from 116 in 1878 to 197 to 1893 (Presl, op. cit., 602–05), but these numbers are not statistically significant.

²¹ Cybulski, op. cit., 143.

²² The average annual price per litre of “better quality” vodka at the Lviv market was 36 Kreuzer in 1875, 42 kr in 1880, 36 kr in 1885, 38 kr in 1890, 48 kr in 1895 and 46 kr in 1900. “Second class” vodka cost 28 kr in 1875, 35 kr in 1880, 29 kr in 1885, 32 kr in 1890, and 37 kr in 1893, after which prices were not available; S. Hozzowski, *Ceny we Lwowie w latach 1701–1914* (Lviv, 1934), table 69.

²³ J.-P. Himka, “Priest and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867–1900,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 21, no. 1, 6–8.

²⁴ *Lastivka*, Lviv, no. 5, 1878; *Terebovelska zemlia*, 269; M. Pavlyk, “Pro rusko-ukrainski chytalni,” *Tvory* (Kiev, 1959), 518 and 524; *Istorychno-memuarnyi zbirnyk Chortkivskoi okruhy*, Ukrainskyi arkhiv, vol. XVI (New York, 1974), 231, 322, 360–61, 369, 390–91, 444, 445–7, 452, 468, 604, 607, 625, 628, and 642. Southern Podillia consists of the five counties: Borshchiv, Chortkiv, Husiatyn, Terebovlia, and Zalishchyky in the eastern part

of Eastern Galicia.

²⁵ For examples of priests taking the lead in sobriety campaigns see *ibid.*, 231, 322, 361, 390, 444, 452, and 628; the *diak* is referred to in *ibid.*, 642.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 322.

²⁷ *Batkivshchyna*, 22 February 1889.

²⁸ Cybulski, *op. cit.*, 143.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 143–5.

³⁰ *Istorychno-memuarnyi zbirnyk Chortkivskoi okruhy*, 390.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 589.

³² Cybulski, *op. cit.*, 144.

³³ Testimony given by a Galician expert, Baczewski, before an Austrian parliamentary investigation into drunkenness in the late 1880s, as cited in Presl, *op. cit.*, 595.

³⁴ For the illegal distillation of spirits by Ukrainians in Western Canada see, for example, M. Paximadis, *Look Who's Coming: The Wachna Story* (Oshawa, 1976), 88–90. However, V. Havrysh, *Moia Kanada i ia: spohady i rozpovidi pro ukrainskykh pioneriv u Kanadi* (Edmonton, 1974), 22, recounted that his father kept a litre of whiskey at home which he bought, very inexpensively, from the local landowner's distillery at Christmas.

³⁵ I have found only one reference to the smuggling of whiskey (i.e., vodka), to Russia, *Istorychno-memuarnyi zbirnyk Chortkivskoi okruhy*, 447; there was no indication whether or not this was legally produced liquor.

³⁶ See Stella Hryniuk, "Peasant Agriculture in East Galicia in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Slavonic and East European Review* 63, no. 2, 228–43, and *idem*, "A Peasant Society in Transition: Ukrainian Peasants in Five East Galician Counties, 1880–1900," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manitoba, 1984.

³⁷ Cybulski, *op. cit.*, 147–8. At a "wealthy" wedding in Hovylyv, Husiatyn county, which had foresworn whiskey, it was estimated that normally 400–500 litres of beer and 2–3 litres of whiskey would be consumed; *Istorychno-memuarnyi zbirnyk Chortkivskoi okruhy*, 391. "Whiskey" and "vodka" have been used as interchangeable terms.

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GUIDE TO RESEARCH

Marta Tarnawsky

UKRAINIAN LITERATURE IN ENGLISH PUBLISHED SINCE 1980: PART 2*

This bibliography is part of a larger bibliographical project that eventually will cover books and pamphlets, as well as journal articles, translations and book reviews on Ukrainian literature published in English from the earliest known publications to the present time. For scope and methodology see the introduction to my forthcoming research report, *Ukrainian Literature in English: Books and Pamphlets, 1890–1965: An Annotated Bibliography*, which is to be published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Material published in the 1980s will eventually be cumulated, supplemented with additional titles and an index, and published as a separate research report.

* An attempt will be made to provide an ongoing, comprehensive coverage of books and pamphlets, as well as articles, book reviews, and translations of poetry, prose and drama published in monthly and quarterly journals and collections. Persons wishing to bring additional material to my attention are requested to write to me at the University of Pennsylvania Law Library, 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Inclusion of a title will be postponed, however, until the item is personally examined and until the bibliographical information is verified.

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BOOK REVIEWS

BENJAMIN PINKUS, *THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE JEWS, 1948-1967: A DOCUMENTED STUDY*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1984. xvi, 612 pp.

This book exhaustively records and examines the major events and forces that have impinged on the lives of Soviet Jews in the post-Second World War period. The topics covered include the place of Jews in Soviet government ideology and policy, Jewish culture and religion, Zionism, Jews in Soviet government and literature, popular and official anti-Semitism, and the Oriental Jews of Soviet Central Asia. Nearly half the book consists of commentary on these subjects. More than half consists of English translations of material from 173 documents—newspaper articles, laws, official statements, excerpts from academic publications—most of which were originally published in Russian. As such, the book is an invaluable resource for students of Soviet Jewry, conveniently bringing together important and relatively inaccessible material on a wide range of significant topics.

Whether the book amounts to good history is a separate matter. Few of the analytically tough questions about the recent historical experience of Soviet Jewry are addressed in a sufficiently rigorous manner. Consequently, the book presents us with a peculiar mix: a painstakingly careful collection of facts and documents combined with statements on issues of great importance that are sometimes based more on assertion than on the careful weighing of evidence.

The most problematic assumption of the book is that the recent history of Soviet Jewry is best viewed from an "Israelcentric" perspective. Pinkus thus delimits his study by the creation of the state of Israel (1948) and the Six-Day War (1967), thereby suggesting that these are the major turning points in post-war Soviet Jewish history. A string of corollaries follows: levels of government anti-Semitism are positively correlated with the degree to which Soviet Middle East policies are anti-Israeli; the major force underlying the decision to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate in 1971 was their reawakened sense of Jewish national consciousness provoked by Israel's 1967 victory against its Arab neighbours; Soviet Jewish identity is determined less by objective social, economic, and political realities in the USSR than by widespread subjective and spiritual feelings of belonging to a Jewish nation; and so forth.

All this discourages enquiry into the *endogenous* forces that have, at least in part, helped shape the history of Soviet Jewry.* Thus, whatever the documentary value of this book, from an analytical point of view it presents us with a one-sided story.

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WILLIAM M. MANDEL, *SOVIET BUT NOT RUSSIAN*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985. 382 pp.

During the last few years those interested in the USSR have read with relish the excellent accounts by Hedrick Smith, Robert Kaiser and David Shipler. Their books are critical, yet give due attention to positive aspects of the Soviet system and provide insight into life in the Soviet Union. Mandel's book, at first sight, seems to belong to the same genre. Issued by an academic publisher and with an impressive selection of quotations about its merits reproduced on the back cover, Mandel's book is presented to the reader as "impressive" and "scholarly."

Mandel focuses on the non-Russian nationalities, beginning with a general overview of their position in the USSR based upon what official representatives have told him. Naturally, these people point out how they and their countrymen have benefited from Soviet rule. The author himself then contrasts the difficult position of non-whites in the USA and the United Kingdom with that of non-Russians in the USSR, and claims that the latter are better off. Indeed, this is the major theme of his book. His observation, however, is not balanced by a discussion of the fact that despite the difficult position of natives and other non-whites in Western industrial countries, the main flow of non-white emigration in the world continues to be to America, Canada and Britain. There is no similar emigration to the USSR.

Normally, such an oversight would be overlooked on the assumption that the author would return to the matter and deal with it in greater detail in the main text. But further reading soon indicates that Mandel's failure to account for the direction of non-white emigration is not due to oversight, but to a blatant and uncritical pro-Soviet bias hidden under a veneer of scholarship. In short, Mandel diligently ignores facts which could either disprove or cast doubt upon the main argument of his book, which is that Moscow's policy toward non-Russians in the USSR is worthy of praise, if not emulation.

* For an analysis emphasizing such forces, see Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym, *Soviet-Jewish Emigration and Soviet Nationality Policy*. London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's, 1983.

For example, in his discussion of Lenin's position on nationalities, the author notes that in pre-revolutionary Russia, the question of self-determination revolved primarily around the issue of secession for geographical nations, not equality of rights for minorities within a dominant nationality. Yet he does not explain why Lenin fought tooth and nail against attempts to organize non-Russian workers into their own national communist parties, and then into their own national communist states. Mandel then remarks that the Soviet government is not racist but fails to mention the role of Russian second secretaries in the Asian republics, the plight of the Crimean Tatars, and the almost total absence of Asians in the Central Committee, Politburo, and higher officer corps. Would it not have been relevant, for instance, to discuss why almost all Asian conscripts find themselves in labour and support battalions, and almost none find their way into the elite military formations? Conspicuous is the absence of reference to the *nomenklatura*, which is not mentioned even once, although the issue of social mobility and equality of opportunity in Soviet society is given considerable space in the book. Similarly, although the author deals with women's rights throughout the text and illustrates female emancipation with figures on female lawyers, managers and doctors, he does not draw attention to the dearth of women in such decision-making bodies as the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the top echelons of Gosplan.

In the chapter on Ukraine the author explains that the country remained loyal to the USSR during the Second World War, even after Stalin had massacred all its leaders, because for every leader executed "ten if not a hundred" new ones emerged. But how is this to be understood in light of comments by Djilas, who wrote in *Conversations with Stalin* that, during the war, "it was not possible to conceal the passive attitude of the Ukrainians toward the war and toward Soviet victories. The population left the impression of a somber reticence. . . . Although the officers with whom we were in contact covered up or embellished the behaviour of the Ukrainians, our Russian chauffeur cursed their mothers because the Ukrainians had not fought better and because now the Russians had to liberate them." Mandel claims that before 1917 leaders such as those who rose under Stalin could never have developed, because the people were locked in poverty and illiteracy. Where, then, did those that Stalin executed come from? Mandel mentions in passing the famine of 1933, but seems to imply that the dead deserved to die because they resisted collectivization.

In the chapter on Belorussia, Mandel devotes a paragraph to the monument erected in memory of the village of Khatyn, which was destroyed by the Nazis. He does not mention the lack of a monument at Katyn, where Poles were murdered by the NKVD. In the chapter on the Jews, Mandel draws attention to the existence of anti-Semitism, but places greater importance on the benefits the Jews enjoy in the USSR and stresses that very few of them actually want to emigrate. On the other hand, he totally ignores the religious dimension of the Jewish question in the USSR, and thus conveniently avoids having to

explain why today half of the approximately sixty operating synagogues in the USSR are in the Asian republics, where less than 10 per cent of Soviet Jews live.

Soviet But Not Russian is an example of pseudo-scholarship, a quaint relic of what fifty years ago was written by "fellow-travellers"—persons either too naive, too cynical, or too deluded to criticize the USSR. According to Viktor Surovov (*Soviet Military Intelligence*, (London: Grafton Books, 1986), 135–6), even their Soviet sponsors have nothing but contempt for such people:

We are talking about the numerous members of overseas societies of friendship with the Soviet Union. Officially, all Soviet representatives regard these parasites with touching feelings of friendship, but privately they call them "shit-eaters" (*govnoedy*).... The use of these words has become so firmly entrenched in Soviet embassies that it is impossible to imagine any other name for these people....

Mandel, of course, is entitled to his sympathies and bias, and is free to argue his case as he wishes. Also, he is free to choose to have his work published by a North American publisher instead of Novosti or Progress Publishers, and thus to have his book priced at fourteen dollars instead of five dollars or less. But why did the University of Alberta Press publish a book which amounts to nothing less than official Soviet propaganda? Did the reviewers of this book not realize that Mandel was obviously ignoring evidence which contradicted or failed to substantiate his preconceptions? Was there no one in Edmonton who could have pointed this out to the editors? The appearance of Mandel's book under the auspices of the University of Alberta Press was scandalous, and Canadian academics will therefore be pleased to know that shortly after its publication the book was dropped from the press's catalogue.

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BOHDAN STRUMINSKY, *PSEUDO-MELEŠKO: A UKRAINIAN APOCRYPHAL PARLIAMENTARY SPEECH OF 1615–1618*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1984. 168 pp.

The present study is a very detailed scholarly treatment of the so-called "Meleshko Speech," which until the appearance of this book had been treated either as a real speech supposedly delivered by I.I. Meleshko at the Polish

Parliament in Warsaw in 1589 in the presence of King Sigismund III or as a parody of this speech dating from the late sixteenth or the seventeenth century. On the basis of linguistic and historical evidence, Struminsky has brilliantly demonstrated that this textbook information is not only vague, but also false. The book begins with the history of research on the “Meleshko Speech,” provides the reader with the most complete Ivan I. Meleshko biography to date, analyzes all eleven texts of this speech (five known previously and an additional six discovered by Struminsky in Polish archives), and juxtaposes these texts phrase by phrase, providing an English translation for each. By collating all eleven texts, Struminsky has been able to subdivide them into two groups—an original Ukrainian group with a Ukrainian authorship and a secondary group edited by a person whose language was influenced by Russian. Through further linguistic analysis Struminsky has pinpointed the real author as a native of the Ukrainian-speaking southern part of the Pinsk area of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Moreover, on the basis of a brilliant analysis of historical and linguistic information, he has been able to narrow the limits of the time-span during which the manuscript was written by “our man from western Polissia” (111). Specifically, he has narrowed the period from between 1615 (when Meleshko became the Castellan of Smolensk) and 20 July 1663, “when a White-Ruthenian Cyrillic copy (from a Polish script text) was copied in the eastern corner of the Berestia palatinate,” to the time of the war between the Polish Commonwealth and Muscovy, i.e., the very short period between 1615 and 1618 (112). According to Struminsky, the author’s roots can be found in a family of Polish-Ruthenian *szlachta* from the Smolensk region which helped to win back the city of Smolensk from Muscovy for the Polish Commonwealth in 1611. The book also has four appendices, providing the reader with a hypothetical stemma of the MS, a map showing the author’s homeland, an attempted reconstruction of the protograph, and Meleshko’s letters to Prince K. Radziwiłł, as well as a glossary, notes, and an index of names.

And yet, despite the great erudition shown by the author, the book is far from perfect, for it suffers greatly from a plethora of mistakes in the use of the English language and from a poor choice of certain terminology which will only confuse the English-speaking reader. These mistakes range from such elementary grammatical errors as the misuse of English prepositions, relative pronouns, and articles as, for example, “he jumped as far as *to* [sic] his country” (122); “strong and old *houses* of the Ruthenian nation *who* [instead of: *which*] had abandoned. . . .” (13); and “He owed his career to [*the*—G.P.] Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (12),” to much more serious errors resulting from the use of interpolations which impede comprehension, poor syntax, and poorly translated phrases and sentences which not infrequently betray an underlying Ukrainian original. Thus, one can hardly attribute to good English usage the cumbersome use of interpolations in such sentences as: “He also theorized that Meleşko actually made a maiden speech at the Senate when he became the Castellan of Mścisłaŭ (*i.e. ca. 1603 according to Hruševs’kyj*,

but actually ca. 1606, see p. 13—cf. the reference to his wife as 'Madame Mścistaŭ Castellan in phrase 25) and that he amused his audience with his conservatism and became an anecdotal figure and a *basis* [subject?—G.P.] for a satire" (10). Neither are parenthetical comments which separate nouns from their modifiers helpful to the reader in sentences such as the following: "By 1598 he must have married Hanna Furs (*probably much earlier*) who was most likely a daughter of the tribunus (*vojskij, wojski, responsible for local security during a levy en masse*) of Mozyr and land judge of Pyn'sk Ivan Furs" (12–13). In all likelihood these examples represent the transfer of certain characteristics of Ukrainian scholarly prose to the English language, in which, however, they unfortunately stand out like a sore thumb.

Apparently also under the influence of Ukrainian, Struminsky shows little regard for the use of tenses in English, as the following examples demonstrate: "By nationality or language those copyists could very well *be* [*have been*—G.P.] Poles. . . ." (97), in reference to seventeenth-century copyists!) or "If the word 'here' in phr. 35 about 'Germans' *applies* [*applied*—G.P.] to Smolensk [no comma!] then the most appropriate frame of reference would be Sigismund III's siege of Smolensk in 1611" (107). Moreover, he fails to realize that a pause in speaking does not automatically call for a comma in written prose as, for example, in ". . . Hieronim Dunin and Hryhory Mirski, were, in 1647, commissioners" (112) and that commas do not separate complete sentences in English as, for example, in the "sentence"—"He has swollen in the Senate like a turkey cock [no comma!] and you don't ask him for truth, *all is misleading talk*" (14).

Not only such errors of syntax, but also poor choice of words, mistranslations, and phrases and sentences which can be simply labelled "stylistically poor English" betray a Ukrainian original in Struminsky's study. Among the most glaring instances are sentences such as the following: "Since I.I. Meleško was the most prominent among the Meleškos, this must be about him. . . ." (13) [Tomu shcho I.I. Meleshko був найvydatnishyĭ z-pomizh Meleshkiv, tse musyt' buty pro n'oho. . .] and phrases such as "old good times" (107) [stari dobri chasy] for the obvious "good old times."

Yet what hurts the study most—since this book has as its core the correlation and English translation of various texts of Meleshko's speech—is that many of the specimens of poor English and mistranslation are to be found in the translation of the phrases of the speech itself. Thus, the very first phrase already serves as proof that one cannot translate literally without producing such an awkward English rendering as Struminsky's "Most gracious Royal Majesty and you (P: my good), *gentlemen brothers, kind to me*" (23), whose English equivalent could have been either "my gracious lords and brethren" or something in a similar vein (in which *pany* is translated as "lords," not "gentlemen"). The next two examples, with my corrections enclosed in square brackets, "who would sit at his (P: King's) side and *machinate* [*scheme*] (O: a great deal)" (44) and "Something must have *grabbed* [*taken hold of*] us, and we go around like fools. . . ." (46), need no comment. However, one cannot help

but wonder if anyone other than Struminsky, who thanks several people in his preface for proofreading the book, actually performed this task, for in addition to these obvious mistranslations one also finds “yes” treated as a verb in the phrase “. . . we *yes* [*say ‘yes sir!’ to—G.P.*] them with our flattering tongues” (47)! Unfortunately, these are only some of the more blatant examples.

And finally, as far as the use of certain English terminology is concerned, one wonders what meaning, if any, the English-speaking reader without a specialist’s knowledge of Ukrainian and Belorussian history will derive from Struminsky’s statement that “in the terminology of this book the United Nations’ term Byelorussian (or Belorussian) is replaced with White Ruthenian, which is better inasmuch as it stresses a link with Ruthenian (Ukrainian—‘Belorussian’) rather than Russian (Muscovite)” (7). In the opinion of this reviewer, this statement, made without any explanation, will only add more confusion to an already confusing matter. Moreover, the book—despite the great erudition shown by its author—is not without an occasional lacuna. Thus, on p. 11, Struminsky states that “the period between the 1930’s and 1950’s was not very propitious for the study of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian past. The next, but even less convincing, contribution to the investigation of the MS was not made until 1955.” Given that Struminsky uses the Ukrainian form of Ukraine’s capital—i.e., *Kyjiv* instead of *Kiev*—throughout the book, the lack of information for the English-speaking reader as to why this period between the 1930s and 50s was “not very propitious” is puzzling indeed.

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OSYP ZINKEWYCH AND REV. TARAS R. LONCHYNA, EDS., *MARTYROLOHIIA UKRAINSKYKH TSERKOV. TOM II. UKRAINSKA KATOLYTSKA TSERKVA. Dokumenty, materialy, khrystyianskyi samvydav Ukrainy*. Toronto and Baltimore: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers, 1985. 839 pp.

On the occasion of the millennium of official Christianity in Ukraine, Smoloskyp Publishers have undertaken a four-volume martyrology of the Ukrainian churches. From 1985 to the millennial year of 1988, they plan to publish one volume each year. However, Volume I, on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, is to appear in 1986, while the volume under review appeared in 1985. According to the publishers’ introductory note, this reversal of the normal order was due to the difficulty of collecting material on the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and to the fact that 1985 marks the fortieth anniversary of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the arrest of its hierarchy

and clergy. The two subsequent volumes will cover the Protestant faiths in Ukraine (1987) and Ukrainian churches and monasteries (1988).

The very title of the series, "Martyrology of the Ukrainian Churches," alerts the reader to the principal objection that might be raised regarding its scholarly worth. Can a martyrology be objective? Will it present a balanced view of the subject?

First it must be noted that, as its subtitle indicates, this is not an historical study but a collection of "documents, materials, and Christian *samvydav*." Second, the subject it proposes to cover is not the history of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church under Soviet rule but, in the words of the publishers, "the martyrology and vitality of the Ukrainian Catholic Church" in Ukraine and other countries with communist regimes. Thus, the critical question is whether the materials collected in this volume present a fair and accurate view of the persecution, sufferings and continuing life of that Church.

It may be objected, of course, that such a delineation of the subject matter precludes scholarly objectivity, for it presumes the existence of phenomena tendentiously described as "martyrology and vitality." True, one's hypotheses are best described in neutral terms, and a work should not distort historical reality by virtue of its very scope. But those who are convinced that the Ukrainian Catholic Church has been persecuted under the Soviet regime, and furthermore that this persecution constitutes a discrete and important part of its recent history, will not object to this approach.

The publishers' preface is followed by a foreword by Archimandrite Lubomyr Husar of the Studite order. Archimandrite Husar places the documentary material contained in this volume in spiritual and historical perspective, pointing out the continuing processes in the life of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. He notes that the new generation of Catholic believers in Ukraine has progressed from the primarily emotional faith of their forebears to a mature, committed and philosophically coherent faith tried and tested in the crucible of persecution. Tempered by the onslaughts of atheist propaganda, this intellectually advanced yet mystical form of religious belief contrasts with the superficial rationalism of much Western religious belief.

Archimandrite Husar's foreword is followed by the Testament of Cardinal Iosyf Slipy and a preface by his successor, Cardinal Myroslav I. Lubachivsky.

Of the eleven sections of the main part of the book, several merit special attention. The first section, entitled "Martyrology of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 1939-1985," includes two important new contributions to Ukrainian church scholarship. The first is a chronology of the activity, persecution and liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. The second is a list of Ukrainian hierarchs and close to 500 Ukrainian priests, monks and nuns who were killed or imprisoned in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Following this are forty pages of photographs, mostly of these individuals, many of which have never been published before. This section also provides statistics, compiled by the Vatican

and first published in 1953, on the Church's losses between 1939 and 1947, and explains the changes in its legal status. The Church's losses on Ukrainian ethnic territory from 1943 to 1979 are tabulated in detail.

Section II deals with the first Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, in 1939–41. The author and date of the introduction to this section are not identified; we are only told that "the publishers received it from the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome." The introduction includes a sub-section on the German occupation (1941–4), which lies outside the period to be covered by the section. Indeed, it is unfortunate that the volume lacks a separate section on the German occupation.

Like the second section, the third is introduced by an unsigned, undated essay "received from the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome." It does, however, provide a most useful summary of the relevant events of 1944–6 in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Particularly valuable among the ensuing documents are those relating to the Lviv pseudo-Sobor of March 1946, which purported to liquidate the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

The following sections contain a variety of documents concerning Ukrainian Catholic clergy and hierarchy in confinement and exile (including letters and epistles of Metropolitan Slipy), as well as activists such as Fr. Hryhorii Budzinsky and Iosyp Terelia. While falling outside the scope of most of the materials in this volume, Fr. Irynei Hotra's reminiscence of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky's 1914–17 exile is a valuable inclusion. Also noteworthy are Orthodox priest Vasyl Romaniuk's letter in defence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and two writings of Russian Orthodox believer Elena Sannikova in defense of Iosyp Terelia. A brief section on the destruction of Ukrainian churches and religious monuments is accompanied by telling photographs.

Section VIII, on the Action Group for the Defence of the Rights of Believers and the Church, might have been included in Section VI (Ukrainian Catholic activists in the Ukrainian SSR, 1958–84). The inclusion in Section IX of an appeal of Polish Catholics living in Ukraine is charitably intended, but not strictly within the topical limits of a work concerned with the Ukrainian churches. Furthermore, neither this document nor its companion, an appeal by Ukrainian Catholics in Poland to the Polish Episcopal Conference, reflects events or conditions belonging under the rubric of martyrology.

Section X describes the situation of the underground Ukrainian Catholic Church and its faithful in the USSR from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. The lengthy letter sent by a group of anonymous believers to the editors of the journal *Science and Religion* in 1972 is published here for the first time. Also interesting are the *samvydav* document "From the Life of the Ukrainian Catholic Church" (January 1980) and an article on the Church published in no. 49 of the "Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church" (8 September 1981).

The final section comprises appeals on behalf of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Portions of Pope Pius XII's encyclical "Orientales omnes Ecclesias" of

23 December 1945, and his encyclical “Orientales Ecclesias” of 15 December 1952, are provided, although the latter is translated from the Italian rather than the Latin, and the title of neither is given. The rest of the section consists of appeals by Russian activist Anatolii Levitin-Krasnov and by Cardinal Iosyp Slipty.

The ample addenda include a most useful glossary of religious terms, Cyrillic and Latin indices of personal names, and a selective index of institutions, names and events. The valuable fifteen-page bibliography lists books and brochures as well as articles in journals, collections and newspapers, both in Ukrainian and (separately) in other languages. The separate listing of “books against the Ukrainian Catholic Church, anti-Catholic books and books on religious legislation published in the Ukrainian SSR and USSR” may jar scholarly sensibilities, but will only surprise those unfamiliar with the nature of most Soviet publications on religion. A serious fault of this bibliography, however, is the absence of even a brief note on archival sources.

A list of illustrations and documents rounds out the volume. It is unfortunate that the detailed table of contents does not sufficiently identify some of the items in the book: it does not name the authors of the articles on p. 349 and the declaration on p. 748, supply the proper title of the document on p. 707, or give the important sources of the articles on pp. 683 (the “Ukrainian Herald”) and 726 (the “Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church”).

This book is illustrated with a goodly number of photographs. Particularly valuable are those of imprisoned, exiled and murdered hierarchs and clergy—some depicted on their funeral biers—following Section I. (A few of the other photographs, depicting religious activity in Ukraine, unfortunately are not given even approximate dates.) Equally interesting are the reproductions of handwritten documents such as Christmas and Easter epistles written from exile by Metropolitan Slipty in 1954, and the first and last pages of Iosyp Terelia’s open letter to KGB chief Iurii V. Andropov (1976).

The book is firmly bound, handsomely designed, and set in clear, readable type. Misprints are few.

In his foreword, Archimandrite Lubomyr Husar asks rhetorically whether this book is only a collection of documents, a history, a *threnos* or lament of our times, or an indictment. In their introductory note the publishers do offer several stimulating historical interpretations based on the material to follow. Nevertheless, the book is not quite a history, for it omits important aspects of the history of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, such as its rehabilitation in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which would have no place in a martyrology. At the same time, its contents touch on subjects not properly pertaining to martyrology either—namely, the church’s life in contemporary Poland. The book could more appropriately be called either a lament or an indictment. Most fitting, perhaps, is the publishers’ own characterization of this tome as “first-hand proof that faith in God and faithfulness to one’s national traditions are stronger than any ideologies or political systems” (10). However, the editors’ obvious sympathies

for the Ukrainian Catholic Church have not vitiated the scholarly value of this work. Within its confines it gives a fairly balanced, objective view.

In fact, the most important aspect of this second volume of the *Martyrolohiia* is the most obvious. For the first time, an ample and representative number of documents on the persecution and struggles of the Ukrainian Catholic Church since 1939 has been collected in a single volume. This fact suffices to establish its value.

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I.S. KOROPECKYJ, ED., *SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS OF UKRAINIAN SCHOLARS TO ECONOMICS*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1984. 231 pp.

The history of Ukrainian economic science is an important part of the intellectual heritage of the nation and, as such, is necessary for an understanding of the status of scholarship and culture in present-day Ukraine. Unfortunately, the study of the contributions of many prominent Ukrainian economists (with the exception of M. Tuhan-Baranovsky and E. Slutsky) has been deliberately suppressed in Ukraine and ignored abroad. Given the extensive gap in our knowledge about the development of Ukrainian economic thought, the publication of this volume is a welcome contribution to Ukrainian studies.

In 1981, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute hosted the second Conference on Ukrainian Economics with the aim of examining the development of Ukrainian economic thought from the middle of the last century to the present day. All the chapters except the last in the volume under review are based on the papers presented at this conference.

In order to tie the essays together, the editor defines "Ukrainian economists" as "(1) those who considered themselves ethnic Ukrainians regardless of the country in which they worked; and (2) those of other ethnic groups who were engaged in scholarly work in the Ukraine for the better part of their lives."

Sergio Amato's essay traces the influence of Tuhan-Baranovsky's theories of markets, accumulation and industrialization both on European economic and socio-political thought and on modern economic historiography. It should be recalled that by the end of the last century the social philosophy of European Marxian revisionism required an explanation of economic crises and depressions which would differ substantially from the role attributed to them in the orthodox Marxian scheme of economic cataclysm. A theory that met these requirements, and yet preserved some characteristic elements of the Marxian analysis, was furnished by Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovsky (1865-1919), "the most

eminent Slav economist of that period" (J.A. Schumpeter) and "the most important figure of international theoretical revisionism" (K. Kautsky). Whereas Tuhan-Baranovsky abandoned the labour cost theory in favour of the marginal-utility approach to the concept of value and eliminated from his explanation of the fluctuations of business activity any reference to changes in the rate of profit, he adopted the Marxian belief in the planlessness of the capitalist economy and concentrated his analysis on processes of production, especially on the proposition that the overexpansion of capital-goods industries was an inherent tendency of the capitalist economy. As a remedy, he recommended controlling the expansion of production by means of administrative devices, especially large-scale monopolies. Tuhan's explanation of crises was very useful to the leading theoreticians of Austrian and German social democracy, as evidenced by the formal acknowledgement of the debt in Rudolf Hilferding's *Finanzkapital* (1910). The essay also shows that Tuhan's contribution to economic thought is no less significant and lasting in its influence on the economic-historiographical debate concerning both Russian and Soviet industrialization models, particularly in the English- and German-language literature.

In the history of economic thought, the name of Eugene Slutsky is associated with the development of demand theory and the theory of business cycles. The brief essay by Leon Smolinski, "Slutsky and Metaeconomics," discusses what might be Slutsky's third major theoretical contribution. In contrast to the first two, it was left relatively undeveloped and actually remained unnoticed both in the USSR and in the West. Smolinski bases his discussion on Slutsky's brief paper (1926), published in German. It represents an attempt to construct a metalanguage for pure economic theory, with the ultimate aim of stating its basic propositions, definitions and concepts in the form of a self-contained axiomatic system. Using such fundamental concepts as system, time, activity, purpose and economic power, Slutsky outlines some of the resulting interrelationships and obtains preliminary results that foreshadow such modern research programs as activity analysis, dynamic programming and praxeology.

If Smolinski's interpretation is correct, this emphasis on power as a central notion of economic activity might have led Slutsky and his Soviet colleagues directly toward the development of a pure economic theory around the notion of decision-making power, as opposed to the mixture of institutionalism and technocracy that passed for economics in the USSR during the next few decades. Unfortunately, the oppressive academic and political climate of the Stalin period forced Slutsky to abandon economics and switch into politically neutral fields of research (geophysics, mathematical statistics).

The subject of the concise and substantive essay by Ralph S. Clem is a review and assessment of demographic works by M.V. Ptukha (1884–1963), an eminent figure in the field of demography and statistics both within and outside the USSR. Describing Ptukha's scholarly record, Clem classifies his research

interests into the following principal areas: 1) studies in the history of demographic thought, 2) investigation of marriage data, 3) empirical work on mortality, 4) various projects on the demography of Ukraine, and 5) activities connected with the 1959 Soviet census. Thus, Ptukha's academic record reflects his wide range of interests and ability to pursue the full complement of demographic subject matter. One of Ptukha's major contributions to the field of population studies in Ukraine and the USSR was his role as a mediator for the transfer and preservation of Western demographic thought and methodology, a role for which he was uniquely qualified both by his training and his extended academic travel abroad.

In the USSR, Ptukha's academic contribution was honoured by his election to the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (as a full member) and of the USSR (as a corresponding member). Outside the USSR, Ptukha was elected in 1929 to the International Statistical Institute and participated in the work of the UN Statistical Commission. His articles were published outside the USSR and were cited in the Western demographic literature.

The name of Roman Rozdolsky is well known to any serious student of the economic and socio-political history of Ukraine and Eastern Europe. However, after his immigration to the USA in 1947, his scholarly interests were concentrated mainly on the general methodological problems of the theoretical system of Marx's *Capital* and its previous interpretation in Marxian literature. Two principal explanations can be advanced for this new orientation. First, the scholar found himself divorced from the major documentary sources for his historical studies. The second reason lies in the discovery of one of the few copies of the original edition of Marx's *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*. The essay by Manfred Turban and the comment by John-Paul Himka concern themselves with Rozdolsky's contribution to the revival of Marxian economic thought in the West.

As Turban argues, Rozdolsky was actually the first scholar in the West who became aware of the relevance of the discovered text to both the genesis and the methodology of Marx's economic thinking. Specifically, Turban addresses one of the complicated theoretical subjects discussed by Rozdolsky: the dispute surrounding Marx's schemes of reproduction that took place after Marx's death and continued until the early 1930s.

F.I. Kushnirsky's paper examines the contributions of the Kiev scholars affiliated with the Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences to mathematical economics. The discussion demonstrates that during the 1960s and 70s profound theoretical results were obtained in such branches of optimization theory as combinatorial optimization, convex programming, optimal control, game theory and stochastic programming. In the author's view, two factors, namely, a normative approach to decision-making in a centrally planned economy and the centralized management of the Ukrainian economy, can account for the concentration of academic effort on optimization methods as opposed to econometric research. Nevertheless, those readers who are familiar

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with the development of mathematical economics in the West will realize the close similarity between the theoretical problems of planned and market economies.

The thoroughly researched and very enlightening essay by Ivan Koropec'kyj deals with the major currents and leading figures of Ukrainian academic economics over the period from the early nineteenth century until the outbreak of World War I. Three major conclusions arise from this study: 1) in Ukraine, the academic study and teaching of economics began almost concurrently with the rise of this new science in Western Europe; 2) advances in economic science in Germany exerted the most marked impact on Ukrainian academic economists, who were able to follow closely the progress of various schools of economic theory (historical school, institutionalism, laissez-faire, marginalism, Marxism) thanks to their solid knowledge of languages, academic trips and travels abroad; 3) Ukrainian economists rejected both laissez-faire and Marxist doctrines and showed their preference for historical and institutional approaches in their research and teaching.

On the whole, the contributions are soundly researched, well edited, and furnished with extensive bibliographies. Specialists in Ukrainian studies or in the history of economic ideas will find this volume useful, and it should stimulate further research in a field which certainly deserves greater attention.

Gennady Ozornoy
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г — h	л — l	ч — ch
г' — g	м — m	ш — sh
д — d	н — n	щ — shch
е — e	о — o	ю — iu
ё — ie	п — p	я — ia
ж — zh	р — r	ь — -
з — z	с — s	-ий — y in endings
и — y	т — t	of personal
і — i	у — u	names only

