

The Ukrainian Quarterly

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A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

A Voice from the Soviet Prison Camp

By Vyacheslav M. Chornovil

THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS

AN AMERICAN ANSWER TO THE "50TH"— THE FRAUDULENT RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

By

Lev E. Dobriansky

Georgetown University

*DEDICATED TO ALL FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND HEROES
OF THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA)*

With an Introduction by

The Hon. Edward J. Derwinski,

*Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. Congress*

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50TH ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION AND INDEPENDENCE

Editorial

For four days, December 20-23, 1967, Kiev, the capital of enslaved Ukraine, was treated to spurious manifestations commemorating the 50th anniversary of "Ukrainian independence" a la Moscow. The pseudo-Ukrainian organs, the Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers — all dutifully devoted a series of sessions, solemn meetings and public manifestations to hail the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine.

Leonid Brezhnev, half of the dictatorial duo ruling the USSR, delivered an address in which he assailed "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," who, he deplored, had tried to transform Ukraine into a "bastion of struggle against the young Soviet state." His conclusion: Ukraine "can be free only in alliance with Russia."

His *gauleiter* in Ukraine, Peter Y. Shelest, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, abetted his master by attacking the "Ukrainian nationalists" and eulogizing the "flourishing of Ukrainian culture" under the heel of Moscow.

In total disregard of historical truth, the Communist leaders ruthlessly blanketed the true history of the Ukrainian people. Above all, they smothered the fact that it was the *Ukrainian National Revolution*, and not the Soviet Russian totalitarian dictatorship, which had brought freedom and independence to Ukraine.

LIFE IN A FOOL'S PARADISE

It has now become clear that the Soviet Russian leaders have lived in a fool's paradise so long that they have completely lost all sense of probability and credibility. Even more, they have met the fate of professional prevaricators in ending up by believing their own lies and deceptions.

It was, we recall, the disenchanted Communist ideologist, Milovan Djilas, who said of the "great October Revolution" that "No other revolution promised so much and realized so little."

The Bolshevik leaders promised that with the liquidation of the Czarist regime they would establish a new government of "workers and peasants," and create a new and glorious social and political order. What they did do was to re-enslave all the non-Russian peoples and create a terroristic state without historical parallel.

Lenin, quick to realize the significance of the hatred of the non-Russian nations entertained for Russian imperialism, initially promised "full restitution of freedom to Finland, Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Moslems. . . , including even the freedom to secede. . ."

On November 15, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars issued a declaration, signed by Lenin and Stalin, concerning the "Rights of the Peoples of Russia." The four-point declaration averred that full freedom for all the "peoples of Russia" would be the cornerstone of the policy of the new Soviet government.

Art. 2 of the declaration stated:

The peoples of Russia have the right to self-determination, including the right of secession from Russia and of establishing independent national states of their own.¹

This promise has ever remained a hollow one. The Russian Bolshevik leaders never intended to give up the loot, material and human, amassed by the Czars. As Dean Acheson once aptly remarked, the "Politburo has acted in the same way. It carried on and built on the imperialist tradition. . . The ruling power in Moscow has long been the imperial power and it now rules over a greatly extended empire. . ." ²

In claiming it has brought "freedom and justice" to the peoples it holds captive in the USSR, Moscow unabashedly insists that it has "solved" the problem of the non-Russian nations, or the "nationality problem," in the lexicon of Lenin. In the face of the horrific genocide perpetrated upon the captive nations these past fifty years, the self-delusion of the Soviet Russian leaders has touched the extremes of ludicrousness and tragedy.

¹ Lenin and Stalin: *Sbornik proizvedenii k izucheniu VKP* (b), Vol. II. Moscow, 1936, pp. 17-19.

² Statement of Secretary of State Dean Acheson before the House Foreign Relations Committee, June 21, 1951, Washington, D.C.

UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION vs. RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK
FRAUDULENT REVOLUTION

The Ukrainians are not the only people to reject the Russian Communist "thesis" regarding their "liberation" and "self-determination." Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis and the peoples of Turkestan — all are unanimous in spurning this Russian "theory."

It was the Ukrainian National Revolution, based on the centuries-long aspirations of the Ukrainian people, that finally brought freedom, self-determination and independence to the Ukrainian people fifty years ago. In contrast to the so-called Bolshevik Revolution, the Ukrainian Revolution in every sense was akin to the American Revolution of 1776: its overall objective was liberation from the colonial enslavement of Russia, just as the American Revolution sought freedom and independence for the Thirteen American colonies of Great Britain.

Beginning in March, 1917, well *before the Bolshevik takeover in Petrograd*, the national non-Communist forces of the Ukrainian Revolution brought about the establishment of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, which through a series of historic acts established first an autonomous state, then a full-fledged independent and sovereign state of the Ukrainian people.

Within a period of a few months, the *Rada*, despite strong opposition on the part of the weak and misguided Russian Provisional Government, organized a *de facto* government of Ukraine. It issued two *universals* (on June 23 and July 16, 1917), organized a Ukrainian national army, established Ukrainian schools, introduced Ukrainian judicial and administrative systems, prepared for a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly and provided the national minorities of Ukraine with a broad autonomy. Immediately after the Bolshevik *coup*, the *Rada* issued the Third *Universal* on November 20, 1917, whereby the Ukrainian National Republic was established.

Also to be recalled is that the Communist forces in Ukraine at that time were totally insignificant, contrary to the fatuous boasts of Soviet Russian and Russified Ukrainian historians. Therefore, to claim as they do in Moscow and Kiev, that the Communists brought freedom to Ukraine, is to mock history. Having failed to reshape the future, the Kremlin rulers have taken to reworking the facts of the past.

What puny strength the Bolsheviks possessed was clearly demonstrated at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Peasants,' Workers' and

Soldiers' Deputies, held in Kiev in December, 1917. Out of 2,500 delegates only 60 delegates supported the political position of the Bolsheviks. The overwhelming majority (over 97%) wholly supported the Central *Rada*. The thimbleful of Russian stooges escaped to Kharkiv, where, under cover of Russian Bolshevik bayonets, they proclaimed a "Ukrainian Soviet government," which for all intents and purposes was a puppet agency of the Russian Communist Party.

Having failed utterly in their attempt to subvert the free Ukrainian national government, the Bolsheviks were compelled to recognize the independence of Ukraine. They did so, first in a note of December 17, 1917, and then in a treaty signed by Communist Russia and the Central Powers on March 3, 1918 in Brest Litovsk.

During this time the Central *Rada* kept its troops on the German-Austrian front, a fact which cannot be refuted even by imaginative Soviet "historians." And their claim that the Central *Rada* was an instrument of "foreign interventionists" has as much validity as their claim that the Bolsheviks brought "freedom" and "self-determination" to the peoples of the USSR.

PROCLAMATION OF UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE

Ukraine was at war with Communist Russia, which invaded the Ukrainian territory after their unsuccessful takeover bid in Kiev, when the full and unqualified independence of Ukraine was proclaimed.

Issued on January 22, 1918, was its Fourth *Universal*, which stated among other things:

Henceforth the Ukrainian National Republic becomes an independent, answerable to no one, free and sovereign State of the Ukrainian People.

With our neighboring states, namely: Russia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and others, we desire to live in harmony and friendship but none of them may intervene in the life of the independent Ukrainian Republic.

The power in it shall belong only to the people of Ukraine, in whose name — until the convocation of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly — we will govern ourselves through the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, the representation of the toiling peoples — peasants, workers and soldiers — and its executive organ, which from today on will bear the name of Council of People's Ministers. . .³

The proclamation of Ukraine's independence was neither a rash move nor an unpremeditated decision; indeed, it was both a well-timed and logical and inevitable development.

³ Full text of the Fourth *Universal* appears in the January 1-15, 1968 issue of *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, New York, N.Y.

Clearly the Russian Bolshevik enunciation of the right of self-determination for the non-Russian nations was but expedient lip-service to freedom and democracy, for the new Soviet Russian regime resorted to the old Czarist imperialist policies as soon as it entrenched itself in power.

In spite of Communist Russia's war against Ukraine, the independence of Ukraine was recognized not only by the Central Powers, which signed a peace treaty with Ukraine in Brest Litovsk on February 9, 1918, but also by many other independent states, including France and Great Britain, some 27 in all.

Consequently, Ukrainian historiography, free from Russian Communist encroachments and chains, categorically rejects the allegation of Moscow that the "October Revolution" brought freedom to the Ukrainian people. It maintains and documents in full the converse.

UNEASY "HISTORIANS" IN KIEV

The writings of free Ukrainian historians as regards the two distinct revolutions which occurred fifty years ago, namely the Russian Bolshevik Revolution and the Ukrainian National Revolution (and the national revolutions of other non-Russian peoples as well), have been the targets of heavy propagandistic assaults on the part of Ukrainian "historians" in Kiev.

Typical is a lengthy article by one R. Symonenko which appeared in an official organ of the Communist Party of Ukraine.⁴ The author staunchly takes to task a number of Ukrainian historians, including Michael Hrushevsky and Dmytro Doroshenko (both dead), and Prof. O. O. Frederickson, John Reshetar, Rev. Isidore Nahayewsky, Oleh Pidhainy, Roman Smal-Stocki, Mykola Chubaty, Dmytro Dontsov, Isaac Mazepa (dead) and Yu. Borys—all of whom were accused of "falsifying" the history of Ukraine of fifty years ago.

The attack on this review by *Komunist Ukrainy* was mounted on the issue of the Ukrainian National Revolution vs. the Russian Bolshevik Revolution:

In its first issue of this year *The Ukrainian Quarterly* announced a series of special works to deal with the history of the "Ukrainian Revolution." In the

⁴ R. Symonenko, "The Falsifiers Don't Let Up," *Komunist Ukrainy* (Communist of Ukraine), No. 12, December, 1967, pp. 84-91, as reported in the February 1968 issue of the *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, published by *Suchasnist*, Munich, Germany.

capitalist West the extensive propaganda contained in "jubilee" articles written by Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist counter-revolutionaries is a cardinal ingredient in the anti-Communist ideologist's campaign against socialist countries... Inasmuch as the overall task of the "Soviet studies" is, at all costs, to prove that the October socialist revolution was "illegal" and "accidental," these foreign falsifiers of Ukraine's history aim primarily to prove that the Soviet government in Ukraine was "artificially" established. It is their purpose to make us believe that the government was "introduced" from without, from the North — in other words — from Russia.

This tendency is apparent in the initial books of bourgeois historiography. Later, the same tendency was reflected in the so-called concept of "two revolutions" which permeates all the materials featured in the American *Ukrainian Quarterly*...

The concept of "two revolutions" was most comprehensively set down in *The Ukrainian Quarterly's* "jubilee" editorial. "From the first days of the revolution (February — R.S.), wrote the journal, "two processes, completely independent of each other, evolved in Russia.

"The first signified the social revolution on territory settled by Muscovites (Great Russian people). The second represented revolutions which aimed at national liberation of territories belonging to Ukraine, Finland, and also those held by Poles, the Baltic peoples, Byelorussians, Caucasian peoples and Muslim nations in Asiatic Russia..."

This is characteristic not only of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and those anti-Soviet circles which have grouped themselves around it. Rather telling processes are also proceeding in bourgeois groups which have conventionally existed as the right-wing of the Socialist government's bitterest foes...

Obviously, Soviet scribes and manipulators of historical fact in Ukraine are alarmed because the non-Soviet world is correctly assessing the history of the Ukrainian National Revolution as it actually occurred. Their alarm, of course, reflects the concern of the Kremlin, head of the greatest imperialistic empire on earth ("a society of peoples-brothers," say the scribes). Nonetheless, it is a pity that these historians, whether coerced, self-deluded or deprived of access to source materials — or all three — should be denied their calling. Scholarship is another victim of the Bolshevik "revolution" ushered in fifty years ago.

THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE KNOW THE TRUTH

Yet no matter how arduously the Soviet Russian lackeys in Kiev slave at demonstrating that the "October Revolution" brought freedom to the Ukrainian people, their efforts remain ineffectual.

The Ukrainian people do not believe one iota of their nonsense about the "happy life" in what is now the Soviet Russian prison-house of nations.

Recently, the whole world was stunned by a series of revelations dealing with the suppression of Ukrainian culture and, specifically, the persecution of the Ukrainian intellectual elite by Moscow. These revelations came from people who cannot be characterized easily as "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists"; they themselves are the products of "Soviet" society.

We have in mind such Ukrainian writers and intellectuals as Vyacheslav Chornovil, Svyatoslav Karavansky, Ivan Kandyba, Ivan Dzyuba, Panas Zalyvakha, Mykhailo Masyutko, Volodymyr Horbovy, Yuriy Shukhevych, and others. All of them are now in Soviet jails and labor camps, but their voices protesting the violation of human and national rights by the Soviet totalitarian regime are reverberating throughout the world.⁵

The promises of the Russian Bolshevik leaders have come to this:

...There are some 36 labor camps in the Potma area of Mordovia (east of Moscow). Each holds 2 to 3 thousand prisoners. Some have more, as, for instance, the Yavas Camp, which contains 6 thousand prisoners. Soviet writers Daniel and Sinyavsky are kept there... Women only are kept in Camp No. 6... Altogether there are up to 100,000 prisoners in the Potma area...

(From a Press Report)

...There is no medicine, and the prisoners have no right to receive it from their relatives — not even vitamins, though the food they get is miserably poor... Prisoners who work on construction sites have no warm clothing...

(Letter from a Ukrainian Political Prisoner in Camp 17, Dubravno, Mordovia)

...About 100 Ukrainian writers either were shot or perished in Soviet forced labor camps, and a further 200 were imprisoned. In 1966, 70 Ukrainian intellectuals were sentenced to forced labor terms for opposition to Russification policies...

...The food was very poor, the brown bread was always state... Goods in the department stores of Lviv look shopworn, unattractive and are very expensive. For instance, a shoddy overcoat costs from 200 to 300 rubles (\$200 to \$300)...

(A Western Tourist's Report)

...Only 3 percent of the books in the library of School No. 20 in Kiev are Ukrainian. The rest are Russian...

*(On the basis of data in
Literaturna Ukraina in Kiev)*

⁵ Some of these historical documents appear elsewhere in this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*; others will appear in subsequent issues.

The Russian Bolshevik leaders thus instituted a regime which, far from being dynamic, is of the rigidly static kind characterized by lack of liberty. The ghosts of 6 million Ukrainians doomed to death thirty-odd years ago by artificial famine keep company with the victims of tyranny today.

For such a regime, the chief and only inciting force is terror, and more terror. For the Ukrainians and other captive peoples, this means more and more oppression, persecution and Russification.

On February 17, 1968, Peter Shelest, first secretary of the party in Ukraine, unleashed yet another attack against Ukrainian nationalism at a party conclave in Kiev.⁶

He was compelled to do so, because the purge of Ukrainian intellectuals had gained world-wide publicity, and such renowned newspapers as *The Times* of London and *The Observer* and *New Statesman* (also of London), *The New York Times* and *The New Leader*, as well as a number of great European newspapers had given extensive coverage to the plight of Ukrainians under Soviet Russian domination.

What does all this mean?

In the first place, that the Russian rule in Ukraine has at long last weakened.

Second, widespread opposition to the Communist system on all levels of Ukrainian society, now three generations old since the takeover, indicates that the "October Revolution" will never take root in Ukraine.

Third, that the Ukrainian National Revolution goes on unremittingly, definitive proof that the ideal of Ukrainian independence realized in 1918 lives on and will continue to live until the Ukrainian people become free and unfettered from Soviet Russian domination.

⁶ *Radyanska Ukraina*, February 17, 1968, Kiev; *Pravda*, February 19, 1968, Moscow.

A VOICE FROM THE SOVIET PRISON CAMP

EDITOR'S NOTE: For the past three years a wave of arrests has swept through Ukraine involving over 200 people: university professors, students, journalists, writers, poets, artists and journalists. All of them were arrested and tried on charges of "anti-Soviet propaganda," and for glorifying the Ukrainian past, propagating pre-revolutionary books by Ukrainian authors now banned in Ukraine, and for circulating secretly speeches of Western leaders, such as an encyclical of Pope John XXIII and the address of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, delivered at the unveiling of the Taras Shevchenko monument on June 27, 1964 in Washington, D. C. All these Ukrainian intellectuals are young men and women, reared under the Soviet system. Many of them were convicted to hard labor under Art. 62 of the Penal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, which negates the freedoms guaranteed by the Soviet constitution.

While the Soviet government held public trials of Sinyavsky and Daniel, and later of the Ginzburg-Dobrovolsky group, the arrests and trials in Ukraine were kept in complete secrecy. The Ukrainian political prisoners, incarcerated in the Mordovian prison camps, however, continued their fight against the abuses of Soviet courts and the terror of the KGB. They wrote petitions, memoranda and appeals to the Soviet authorities and party leaders in Ukraine, demanding rectification of injustices to many Ukrainian intellectuals.

These brutalities and injustices of the Soviet Russian regime in Ukraine had been revealed in a series of documents which reached the West in late 1967. Most important among them is a manuscript, Portraits of 20 'Criminals,' by Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, a 30-year-old Ukrainian TV journalist and member of the Comsomol organization. He attended the trials of the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" in Odessa, Kiev and Lviv, and when he saw the flagrant violations of "socialist legality" and coercion by the KGB, he protested. He gathered material — transcripts of secret trials, letters from prisoners, and petitions from those whom he considered to be innocent. He, too, was arrested, tried and convicted on November 15, 1967 to 3 years at hard labor (the sentence was subsequently commuted to 18

months imprisonment). His scathing indictment of the Soviet regime in the form of a "Letter to the Attorney General of the Ukrainian SSR," is a part of his manuscript, which appears here.

LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR

By VYACHESLAV M. CHORNOVIL

(*Excerpts*)

After refusing to give evidence on April 16, at a closed trial in Lviv, I was informed that I will have to answer charges under Article 172 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (refusal to appear). The verdict is itself unjust because I refused to give evidence only at the unlawful closed trial. But even this verdict was not enough for the angry Prosecutor Antonenko and Judge Rudyk. They changed their own decision and on April 19 decided to try me under article 62 of the CC of the Ukrainian SSR. They knew very well what this article 62 is. . .

It is true that the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR overruled this unlawful verdict on May 17 (1966), but only because a signal to imprison the next party of "anti-Soviet agitators and propagandists" had not yet come from "above". . .

. . . We have only scanty information on the closed trials in Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk. I will therefore outline how lawlessness was carried to the extreme in Kiev and in Lviv. The March 9-11 trial was conducted by the head of the Kiev *Oblast* Court, Matsko, people's representatives — Yarko and Zahorodny, prosecutor — Komashchenko; (I had no time to write down the name of the attorney, but he played no part in any case.)

Legality started with the fact that no one, not even the relatives, were notified about the trial. . .

The judges were afraid that the defendants would tell the truth in public (before an audience previously thoroughly checked), just as Moroz told it at Lutsk, that they would speak about the gross violations of Lenin's nationality policy, that they would tell that what interested them in those books and anonymous articles from abroad was not so much the ideas and conclusions of the authors but the factual material (especially on the horrible years of the personality cult) which for some reason cannot be found on the pages of our papers, periodicals or books. The judges were afraid that the mea-

gerness of the accusations, the shameful methods of investigation and the methods of psychological terror would see the light of day.

Two attempts to conduct "public" trials of the defendants ended in full defeat of those who tried. Valentyn Moroz spoke about Russification, about unequal status of our "sovereign" republic and declared that he is no bourgeois nationalist, that he neither wants bourgeoisie nor nationalism but only wants Ukraine to have the same rights as her Socialist sisters — Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia. The students of the Luts'k pedagogical institute also spoke with admiration about their instructors. Suffering a defeat, the administrators of justice took refuge in such an ultra-legal and highly humane measure as a closed trial. . .

When someone criticizes the present nationality policy for its deviation from Lenin's standards (even if he is mistaken), he has every right to do so under the Constitution of the USSR. But according to the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR this individual can be sent to a severe labor camp, explaining the criticism as "propaganda conducted with the aim to subvert or weaken the Soviet regime."

... This can be extended to an unwary intellectual who showed his research notes to someone, or to a man who "because of idle curiosity" took a book from a tourist or a visiting relative from abroad. . . The anecdotes will also have to be touched upon. Many of them are "slandorous inventions" of clear water which 'discredit the government and social order.' Prosecution for anecdotes, so popular among city dwellers, will radically help to solve the housing crisis in big cities. In its honest application Article 62 of the CC of the Ukrainian SSR gives an opportunity to increase the population of concentration camps to Stalin's heights, or even to outdo them. . .

Noticing that the interest in Ukrainian publications from abroad and anonymous manuscript literature is bound up with acute dissatisfaction with the present violations of Lenin's nationality policy with minor or major discriminatory efforts in relation to the native language, culture, etc. — the servants of Themis would inevitably have to question the party and state about the grounds which breed similar attitudes and result in action which the criminal code considers crimes. . .

In 1926 Stalin was not afraid that all who happened to read the book by V. Shulgin would become staunch monarchists and topple the Soviet regime. Ten years later he suspected treason and executed his closest friends, and 20 years later this was called personality cult.

Decades have passed since then and suddenly old notes are discernible in the attitudes of some leaders.

The vice-chairman of the Committee on State Security at the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, Com. Shulzhenko, was wittily telling the intellectuals at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR about foreign intelligence until he reached "ideological diversions." According to his assertions all oppositional attitudes and actions inside our country are solely the result of the influence of bourgeois propaganda and bourgeois intelligence. In such a way as if with a wave of a magic wand, the bourgeois world would suddenly cease to exist, "peace" would reign. In villages all would be pleased by the fate of the passportless serf for life in the *kolkhoz*. In the cities, Ukrainians would be proud that they have become renegades without kin and people.

Nobody would blush for democracy while placing unread papers in the ballot box with names determined in *Oblast* Committees or County Committees. A well-known literary critic, I. Svitlychny, would not have been imprisoned for eight months; art critic B. Horyn and an artist Zalyvakha would not have found themselves behind barbed wire, but, unpunished, would call Russification internationalism and would be peacefully pleased by the achievements of such "internationalism". . .

One more revelation was put before the Kiev intellectuals by the KGB. It seems that an individual with an unstable outlook should read a book with "subtitles" in which the criticism of our regime is hidden when this person has anti-Soviet moods. From here it is not far to the conclusion: protect the people from a book causing trouble by all possible means, even by prison and severe labor camps. But what happens then to the Marxist thesis that social conditions (and not hostile books) determine consciousness?

For ten years I have been taught in the Soviet school. In the last sentence of a composition I always tried to mention the Party and Stalin, even though it happened to be a composition on "*Slovo o polku Ihorevim*" (12th Century poem on the campaign of Ihor). For five years I have diligently studied Marxism-Leninism at the university. All other courses were also firmly based on Marxist foundations. At last, recently I passed a candidate's examination for a Ph.D. in Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

But suddenly I accidentally came across a Ukrainian book published abroad, and instantly I became a bourgeois nationalist (without bourgeoisie!). Later I read a Peking brochure on *Opportunism*

of the CPSU and I have changed into a Maoist. Still later I heard the Pope's speech on the radio — and I became a Jesuit. Is it not to protect the Soviet citizens from such kaleidoscopic changes in outlook that article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR had been invented?

Marxism-Leninism is without doubt stronger than bourgeois ideologies. Yet we are prosecuted for reading a book published in the West, but our books and newspapers with sharp criticism of capitalism, bourgeois nationalism, current policies of the capitalist states are not hard to obtain (even by mail) in the USA, or Canada, or various other foreign countries.

Visti z Ukrainy is a paper published in Kiev especially for the emigrants, but for us here in Ukraine it is impossible to read it because it contains specialized truth — only for export. Is it possible that non-Marxists have learned better than our own leaders the Marxist-Leninist thesis that revolution and social and economic changes cannot be exported, that an idea can only take root in the new soil when the social, economic and political pre-conditions are ripe for it, that to prohibit the spreading of ideas only gives them more strength and attraction?

Because of the latter, of course, both the instigators and the perpetrators of these arrests and trials which are rolling over Ukraine like an evil wave, are subject to prosecution under article 62 of CC of the Ukrainian SSR. . . What does article 62 of the Ukrainian SSR teach the citizens? It teaches — follow in the footsteps of the latest newspaper norms blindly and accurately; it teaches the bureaucratic morality of the lower middle class: be afraid and look back. . .

They asked for little publicity, a public trial for those arrested at Kiev, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil. A large group of over 70 persons — writers, scientists, civil servants, students and workers — turned to you with inquiries. They, too, asked for little: to be present at the trial of their friends, classmates, acquaintances and relatives. The militia was later even jostling them out from the corridors of the building, where quietly, far from human eyes, a Kiev medical student was being tried. . . Many of them were surrounded by militia and soldiers in the Lviv *Oblast* Court and kept under arrest until the sentence was secretly proclaimed. For long months the mothers, wives, children yearned at least to see their sons, husbands and fathers who were languishing behind bars. The orgy of searches and investigations is still plaguing the Ukrainian intelligentsia, preventing many from doing creative work. You are indifferent to hu-

man drama, to the demoralizing action of fear which as a cold snake is crawling into many a Ukrainian family. . .

The Ukrainians who came to the court building and tried to enter the court room were being threatened by the KGB:

"You will all be there. . ."

In Kiev the court guards were pointing to the "black crow" (paddy wagon) and declaring:

"We have plenty of cars like that. Enough for all of you."

Do you think that creative organizations and offices of Kiev, Lviv and Ivano Frankivsk exhibited signs which said: Go to the trial; listen; convince yourselves of the righteousness of those who judge; do not make the same mistakes. . . Of course not, all the trials after Ozerny's were made secret. In order to avoid unwelcome guests, even the closest relatives were not notified of the trials. . . Witnesses, as a rule, were invited on the second day of the trial; therefore, on the first day nobody disturbed the peace of the administrators of justice. It would seem that there is nobody to be afraid of when in the room there are only the judges, the guards and the defendants. Why, then, were not all witnesses registered? How is it possible to eliminate a witness who, according to the investigations of the KGB and the verdicts, was one of the two who supplied H. with "anti-Soviet" literature. All the more, when Horska herself categorically denied this fact at the previous hearing. . .

Not only the "crime," but also the very fact of political arrests is hidden from the public. The trial of H., March 9-11, was conducted by the head of the Kiev *Oblast* Court Matsko, people's representatives Yarko and Zahorodny, Prosecutor Komashchenko. Legality started with the fact that no one, not even the relatives were notified of the trial. Therefore on the first day Comrade Matsko had peace. On March 10th, witnesses were called, and thus a few found out about the trial. It would be wise to have a closed trial and even without witnesses. Then nobody would know!

Friends and acquaintances of H., his classmates from the Medical School, getting hold of Matsko, began to ask him on what grounds H. was being tried behind closed doors. So that they would not hinder the administration of justice the militia and plainclothesmen threw out the over-inquisitive citizens from the court corridors. Some were pulled by the sleeve, some by the shoulder. . . But the people did not disperse, but — disregarding even the plainclothesmen, began to talk about lawlessness without due reverence.

In order to get rid of them, it was then announced that sentence would be pronounced at 2:00 P.M. the following day (as is known, according to law, the verdict is always read publicly.) As might have been expected the high court lied: the sentence was pronounced around 11:00 A.M. "Don't you know why this has been done" — wondered a "lawyer" at the naivete of the unhappy crowd.

Comrade Matsko miscalculated a little: around the court building several scores of people had nevertheless gathered. And when after the trial three of those present pushed through the militia and the KGB to Comrade Matsko, they asked him three questions:

1. According to which article of what code was the trial closed?
2. Why did the court deceive those present when it announced the time of the sentence?
3. Why were those who wanted to be present at the sentencing not admitted?

The head of the *Oblast* Court could not or did not feel inclined to answer two of the three questions...

A crowd of people who wanted to be admitted to the court room stood outside the court building. Only three persons managed to get inside, including two women: Lina Kostenko and Liubov Zabashta. Their notes on the trial were confiscated by the KGB.

After sentencing, this same Lina Kostenko showered flowers on those convicted. The flowers, of course, were immediately "arrested." Lina Kostenko, herself was questioned "with passion" in the adjoining room, but the triumphal ceremony of the conclusion of the closed trial of the "particularly dangerous state criminals" had been completely ruined. But the rumpled souls of Comrades Matsko and Co. were further disturbed by those unconscious citizens, who after waiting for an hour for the "black crow," supported the convicts by calls and threw flowers under the wheels of the car"...

But the Kiev KGB staff and administrators of justice in comparison with their Lviv colleagues — are winged angels. The Kiev judges at least respect the precepts of law... In Kiev at least relatives and a few strangers were admitted to the sentencing. In Lviv they looked in a more matter-of-fact way at the case: when it is possible to violate article 20 of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Ukrainian SSR in relation to the public court trials then why adhere to the conditions of this article in relation to public sentencing? No one had been admitted to the sentencing at the three Lviv trials.

The Lviv KGB has also distinguished itself in the enforcing of 'order' at the trials. In Lviv the KGB and the militia conducted them-

selves as if on occupied territory and not on Soviet soil. For how else can open threats to the people gathered before the court be explained? What should one call the cynical behavior of the major (wearing plain clothes) who covered the mouth of Olha H. when she tried to show her two-year old daughter her father who had been led from the "black crow"? By what moral standards of our society can the cynical deceit which Lieut. Khersoniuk used in order to "clean up" the floor where the trial was held be explained? Chasing the people downstairs he gave his word that he would notify relatives about the sentence and let in those who wished to hear it read.

When all came down to the first floor they realized that they had been trapped. The militia prevented them from going upstairs and armed soldiers would not let them out into the street. The people were kept under arrest until the sentence was secretly read and those convicted led out by the back door, — the guardians of law were afraid that the history of previous days would repeat itself when Lviv residents showered one "black crow" with flowers and chanted "Slava" (Glory)! When those arrested were let out from the vestibule to the street they saw that the surrounding streets were covered with militia. The crowd then began to chant "shame" to the keepers of the law.

Themselves causing the manifestation of protest, the Lviv guardians of "state security" were forcing the people off the streets in front of the court by driving the cars into them or dispersing them with the help of water hoses (next it will probably be clubs and tear gas). When Lenin's standards of law, which have been trampled in the mud, were pronounced anew it seemed that all sorts of "*triykas*" (three men courts) and closed trials of individuals whose guilt is found only in the fact that their brains can think have become a thing of the past. Is it really true that we have been so wrong in our hopes?

Failing to receive "confessions," experts have been called — men with academic degrees and lulled consciences, who for a handsome fee agreed to substantiate the authorship as suggested by the KGB. These men of science did not pretend to be glorified by their scientific discovery — they were offered good compensation and complete secrecy. But sooner or later a secret becomes known. . .

Such false witnesses and "experts" who served the executioners of the Ukrainian people were the following scholars: Lviv university professor, Z. Matviichuk from the Institute of Social Sciences; Hrytsiutenko — Lviv University; Zdoroveha from the same university;

Kybalchych — Lecturer in the Department of Journalism; Yashchuk — candidate for a Ph.D. in literature and language; Dr. Kobylansky, Z. Khukysh — Lviv; Babyshkin — doctor of philology from Kiev. Of course, there were also those who conducted themselves properly and refused dishonest compensation: I. Kovalyk — LDU; Shabliovsky — Prof. of the Institute of Literature of Kiev; Volynsky — Kiev Pedagogical Institute; Zozulia — Ukrainologist from Moscow; Shurat — the Institute of Social Sciences in Lviv.

Even to Drach, whom the KGB at one time allowed to go abroad, the major of the KGB who was keeping order in the court corridors addressed these words: "Is it you, Drach? Why are you writing all sorts of trash instead of educating the people? And even defending the anti-Soviets? They all should be hanged, the dirty scum!"

Who in Ukraine today is thrown behind bars? The young people, who grew up during the Soviet regime, who have been educated in the Soviet schools, in Soviet universities, in Comsomol, are being tried. They are tried as bourgeois nationalists, the people who do not remember the bourgeois regime, whose parents or grandparents were paupers in their rich native land. And nobody thought of searching for the causes deeper than the tedious nonsense about the influence of the bourgeois ideology and bourgeois nationalism. Who needs all this "bourgeois," dear comrades, if not you, yourselves, for the standard formula which should change honest thinking and courageous search for the road to justice?

The police prophylaxis of the brain is and will be helpless if the eyes continue to be closed to unsolved problems, especially the national problem. Again and again it will be necessary to put those who stubbornly refuse to call black white behind bars. It will be necessary to crumple the consciences of men instead of depending on men with a developed sense of dignity and consciousness. It will be necessary to cut the roots of a tree upon which new suckers should be cultivated, which we need so badly after the violent storms. Later on it will be necessary to rehabilitate these people anyhow and to acknowledge that truth, for which they have sacrificed their youth, was on their side. History always brings everything out into the open. . .

FIRST UNIVERSAL OF THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA

A Personal Memoir

By BORYS MARTOS

The All-Russian Revolution at the beginning of March, 1917 automatically brought the Ukrainians liberty of language and the possibility of developing Ukrainian culture intensively and creating cultural and educational institutions and political organizations.

But the hopes and demands of the Ukrainians went far beyond these objectives. As soon as news of the revolution reached Kiev, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was established (March 7, 1917 — old style). This body united all Ukrainian political, cultural, educational and even economic organizations, which sprang up at the time or emerged from the underground. This provided moral sanction for the Central *Rada* to act on behalf of the Ukrainian people and, according to the enunciation of revolutionary principles, to press the demand for *national and territorial autonomy for Ukraine*, that is, for a *fundamental* change of the centralist regime of the Russian state, established by *basic* laws.

Supporting these demands was a series of Ukrainian national manifestations, which were held not only in Ukraine but in Petrograd itself, under Ukrainian national banners. The all-Ukrainian congresses — the National Congress, the two Ukrainian Military Congresses and the Ukrainian Peasants' Congress — all possessed great authority in speaking for the autonomy of Ukraine. It should be underscored that the Second Ukrainian Military Congress—with about 2,000 delegates representing 1,390,000 Ukrainian soldiers — was a revolutionary act, inasmuch as it convened despite the express ban of War Minister Kerensky.

On June 10 (June 23, new style), 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* issued its *First Universal*. . . "from now on we ourselves will build our life. . ." The *Universal* called for great daring, far-reach-

ing and constructive efforts for "establishing the autonomy of Ukraine."

The *Universal* resounded throughout the whole of Ukraine; it was read at public meetings in cities, towns and villages. It evoked enthusiasm and ardor everywhere.

The solemn proclamation of the First *Universal* in Poltava, where I lived at the time, occurred on a Sunday, which was proclaimed a Ukrainian national holiday. After the Mass at the Sobor, — erected by *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa, a procession consisting of several thousand people and headed by the clergy, with Ukrainian national banners aloft, marched to the Archbishop's palace, where in the backyard stood a revered old wooden church brought from Zaporozhia. The great mass of people flooded the streets around the palace and inside the church where a special *moleben* was observed. After the service an old deacon came out and, in a trembling voice, read the *Universal*. After he finished reading it, the crowd shouted, "Glory! Glory to Ukraine!" Standing close to the old priest, I was able to see tears running down his cheeks. For several minutes the crowd milled around the church, people jubilantly exchanged views, their faces radiating happiness.

On the same day the Ukrainians, heeding the appeal of the *Universal*, collected funds as a "national donation" for the Central *Rada*.

In Kiev the First *Universal* was proclaimed in St. Sophia Square before a crowd of many thousands which roared "Glory" to the tolling of bells in St. Sophia and St. Michael's Monastery.

The reaction to the First *Universal* were the thousands of letters and telegrams which were sent from Ukraine to the Provisional Government demanding that it satisfy the demands of the Central *Rada*.

Already in exile, I frequently heard criticism towards the Central *Rada* for not having proclaimed the full independence of Ukraine in its First *Universal*. Such criticism can be heard even today. But every statesman and student should understand that a proclamation of independence for Ukraine in June, 1917 would have been a disaster not only for the Central *Rada*, but for the whole Ukrainian cause as well.

To have proclaimed Ukraine's independence and be unable to realize it in practice would have been meaningless. The Central *Rada* at that time was too weak physically, financially and politically to implement independence.

Militarily the *Rada* could then rely only on the B. Khmelnytsky Regiment, consisting of some 3,000 to 5,000 men; there was no certainty that the unit would heed a call to arms. It was first necessary to fully awaken the national consciousness of a people who had languished under Russian domination for 200 years.

At this time the commander of the Kiev Military District had a garrison of 15,000 men, almost exclusively Russian and not infected by Bolshevik agitation. It was a well-disciplined force which easily suppressed the Bolshevik uprising in Kiev in November, 1917, although the Bolsheviks then had 6,000 troops.

In addition, if necessary the commander of the Kiev Military District could call up reserves at a moment's notice. And in the event of a proclamation of Ukraine's independence the *Rada* would have had to face several hundred thousands troops in the rear in Ukraine and elsewhere, which were not as yet demoralized by Bolshevik propaganda.

Proclamation of Ukraine's independence and its separation from Russia in the middle of June, 1917, of necessity would have led to an armed conflict between the Central *Rada* and the Petrograd government, inasmuch as Russia could not survive without Ukrainian wheat, sugar, meat, pork, coal, iron ore and the like. We all understood this well. Also, the Provisional Government still had several million troops, factories of ammunition and arms, and the like, while in Ukraine there was only one munitions factory, in Luhansk.

Conclude a peace with Germany? But the whole Western front (Podilia and Volhynia) was saturated with Russian troops, consisting almost entirely of Russians (the Petrograd government had dispatched most Ukrainians to the northern and northwestern fronts). Moreover, we were apprehensive with regard to the Germans: we knew that they did not need an independent Ukraine, but that they were eying Ukrainian territory and Ukrainian wealth. Subsequent events (1918 and 1941) amply demonstrated the validity of our fears.

From the *financial* viewpoint the situation of the Central *Rada* was no better. Although funds were forthcoming from all corners of Ukraine, they arrived *after* the issuance of the First *Universal*, and even these funds were totally insufficient. I remember that on my proposal the Poltava *Gubernia Zemstvo* meeting mustered the sum of 200,000 *karbovantsi*, but even this amount was more a manifestation of sympathy than a real contribution. Other *zemstvos* offered much smaller donations. In general, it was hard to collect any taxes in this revolutionary period, and the currency of the Provisional

Government was sharply devaluated. The *Rada* could not as yet issue its own currency; it would have been worth hardly anything.

Politically the Central *Rada* relied on the all-Ukrainian congresses and local congresses. Undoubtedly, all of them made deep and penetrating impressions upon the Provisional Government as manifestations of the Ukrainian people's will to national freedom. At the same time in all the larger cities of Ukraine were permanent Russian political organizations, such as "Committees of Public Organizations" and "Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," wherein Ukrainians constituted an insignificant minority. At this time (June, 1917) these organizations were in the main composed of Russian patriots.

The Ukrainian national organizations throughout the country were still weak, either being newly-founded or just having emerged from the underground. Of this the *Rada* was realistically aware.

From the start of the revolution in 1917 until June of that year a number of Ukrainian congresses were held: the All-Ukrainian National Congress, the two Ukrainian Military Congresses, the Ukrainian Peasants' and the Ukrainian Pedagogical Congresses. At these congresses as well as at the provincial congresses — such as those in Kiev, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav and Odessa — a series of resolutions were adopted, all of which demanded *autonomy* for Ukraine. At the provincial cooperatives' congress in Kiev (March 27-28, 1917), Delegate Vasylchuk ended his oration thusly: "For Ukraine, for its independence, for our native language and school," and earned thunderous applause. But the congress adopted a resolution demanding the *autonomy* of Ukraine within a federative Russia.

My own observations indicated that the Ukrainian leaders, including those at local levels, all were for the *independence* of Ukraine, but they were against a too hasty proclamation, still mindful of the military power of Russia. In talks with Ukrainian peasants they stated they were not against the independence of Ukraine, but against its premature proclamation.

The authority of the Central *Rada* was based on vast popular support, particularly by the large Ukrainian peasant class. Support also came from the armed forces, and partly from the working class. Understandably, the *Rada* could not rely on Russified state officials, foreign great landowners, or merchants and manufacturers, all of whom were either Russian or foreign.

But, if we start to consider the contents of the First *Universal*, we shall see that it went much farther in its postulates than a mere

autonomy of Ukraine. Actually, it proclaimed the *sovereignty* of the Ukrainian people and their right to their *territory*. This demand, variously expressed, is repeated throughout the document:

"...Let the Ukainian people in their land have the right to manage their lives themselves"; "all laws establishing this order in Ukraine should be rightfully issued *only by our own* Ukrainian Assembly..."; "that... the right to administer *our* Ukrainian lands... belongs to *ourselves alone*..."; "so that *we ourselves* could forge our own fate..."; "from today on *we ourselves* will build our life..."; "Ukrainian People! In *your hands* lies your own destiny..." and the like.

The First *Universal* ends: "...prove... that you can proudly and with dignity stand along with any organized *state-nation*"¹ (all italics added).

This concept in the *Universal* was stressed by Prof. Michael Hrushevsky in his address at the Second Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev. Russian patriots became alarmed, expecting the *Rada* to proclaim the independence of Ukraine.

In my opinion, however, the *Rada* acted wisely and prudently by proclaiming the sovereignty of the Ukrainian people as a principle, and the autonomy of Ukraine as a practical step.

Other peoples, such as the Byelorussian, Georgian and Armenian, did not proclaim even autonomy at this time.

Later on (January 22, 1918) the Central *Rada* proclaimed independence. The Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis proclaimed the Transcaucasian Federation only on April 22, 1918; Georgia proclaimed its independence on May 26, 1918, as German troops approached its frontiers. Yet the Georgian Social-Democrats, at their secret conference prior to the revolution of 1917, adopted a resolution to proclaim Georgia's independence should appropriate conditions present themselves.

Let us recall that Ireland, after a long struggle, obtained autonomy in 1921, but full independence only in 1949. India went through various forms of political organizations from 1919 until it finally achieved full-fledged independence in 1947.

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Preoccupied with the lack of trained administrators and officials, I was sent from Poltava to Kiev to seek support from the *Rada*. But

¹ *Ukrainska Revolutsia: Zamitky i Materialy do istorii ukrainskoyi revoliutsii* (The Ukrainian Revolution: Notes and Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution). Pavlo Khrystiuk, Prague, 1921-22, (4 Vols.), I, pp. 72-74.

in Kiev I found that they were as much in need of experienced personnel as we in Poltava. Upon the suggestion of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, then head of the General Secretariat of the *Rada*, I accepted the post of secretary of land affairs.

At my first meeting of the General Secretariat, I met several acquaintances: three cooperative directors and four members of the Ukrainian Socialist-Democratic Party. The only person I did not know personally was Serhiy Yefremiv, who already possessed a reputation as an outstanding publicist. All were noted Ukrainian patriots who took part in the Ukrainian national movement, were members of Ukrainian secret organizations, and had studied not only the Ukrainian language and history, but also political economy, government and social sciences. All participated in political debates; almost all had been active in illegal political activities. Of the nine general secretaries of the first composition of the General Secretariat, only four had escaped the persecution of the Czarist police. Five had been jailed on several occasions, and Simon Petlura and V. Vynnychenko had been compelled to spend some time abroad.

All were men of high caliber and great talents: V. Vynnychenko was a brilliant writer and orator; S. Yefremiv and S. Petlura were the best known Ukrainian publicists; M. Stasiuk — an economist; Khrystophore Baranovsky, an outstanding leader in the cooperative movement, who was respected not only in Ukraine but in Moscow as well. But none of them, including myself, had been a member of parliament or even a city council or district self-government, nor held any administrative post — a direct consequence of the enslavement of Ukraine by Russia and the reactionary Czarist policy with respect to Ukrainians.

Some critics of democracy, in trying to belittle the Central *Rada*, contend that its members were for the most part youths — students or youngsters lacking in political experience. This is not the case. As far as I know, only Paul Khrystiuk could be called young, as he was only 25 or 26 years old, and in the General Secretariat he became a general record-keeper, or secretary. V. Vynnychenko and S. Petlura, like myself, were 38 years of age, while S. Yefremiv, Kh. Baranovsky, I. Steshenko and M. Stasiuk were over 40. Not all of them possessed higher educations, but every one of them was highly gifted and intelligent and gained knowledge through self-education. For instance, Kh. Baranovsky (who should not be confused with Prof. M. Tuhan-Baranovsky) had only had a secondary education, but anyone conversing with him considered him a highly educated person.

At the meeting of the Board of Directors of the National Bank in Moscow of which he had been a member until 1917, all marvelled at his highly technical arguments and the precise formulations of his motions. S. Petlura attended only an ecclesiastical seminary, but no one could ever think he was not a man of profound erudition. Anyone talking to Petlura took him for a university professor. He was an extremely gifted and intelligent man; intellectually, he towered over other members of the Secretariat.

It should also be noted that members of the clandestine Socialist organizations were very close to the workers and peasants; they had established secret cells and organizations, and therefore were intimately acquainted with their desires and aspirations.

This knowledge of the social and economic conditions of the Ukrainian people, especially the workers and peasants, plus their theoretical acquaintance with political systems in Western Europe which was gained from their travels and visits there, made the Ukrainian Socialists one of the most influential groups in the Central *Rada*.

Standing firmly on the principles of democracy, the Central *Rada* included in its composition representatives of the various Ukrainian organizations — cultural and educational (especially representatives of teachers' organizations), cooperatives and all Ukrainian political parties which then existed or were newly organized.

From the very beginning (March, 1917), the non-Socialists were in a majority in the *Rada*, as most of the members belonged to the Society of Ukrainians Progressivists. At the All-National Ukrainian Congress, held in Kiev in April, 1917, the *Rada* was reorganized and consisted of members of the Union of Ukrainian Autonomists-Federalists, the Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party, the Ukrainian Socialist-Democratic Party, and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries.

Also, an impressive number of *Rada* members came from professional, cultural and educational groups, and from cooperatives; these belonged to various organizations and parties. F. Kryzhanovsky and V. Koval, representatives of the cooperatives, founded a non-Socialist "Labor Party" in the *Rada*.

There was also a group of Ukrainian nationalists, headed by Mykola Mikhnovsky, a lawyer from Kharkiv.

But the Ukrainian non-Socialists failed to come up with any fervent show of activity in the first days of the revolution. The Ukrainian nationalists called their first All-Ukrainian congress in De-

cember, 1917, in Kiev. The Ukrainian Federative Democratic Party was founded in the middle of December, 1917, when Ukraine was already on the eve of proclaiming its independence. The Constituent Assembly of the Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party was held on June 29, 1917, i. e., after the issuance of the First *Universal*.

Members of the *Rada* belonged to various classes of the Ukrainian people: peasants, workers, artisans, military, intellectuals, professionals. My personal acquaintances among landlord members included writer V. Leontovych and the great Ukrainian humanitarian and philanthropist, Eugene Chykalenko.

Owing to the fact that the First *Universal* had been written (from a political viewpoint) exceedingly well, all nationally-conscious Ukrainians recognized the *Rada* as their representative body, many of them considering it as their government. Moreover, the *Universal* had awakened national awareness and consciousness in those who had been driven by the Czarist regime into passivity.

The revolution had awakened Ukraine, and the First *Universal* projected for the spontaneous popular movement a clearly national direction. Thousands of the so-called "Little Russians" were compelled to question: Who are we? Whose children are we? Ukrainian congresses and meetings, the Ukrainian press, brochures and books (many of them written by M. Hrushevsky, as, for instance, *Who Are Ukrainians?*)—all contributed to the transformation of "Little Russians" into Ukrainians. All this required patience and time.

In addition, thousands of patriotic and nationally-conscious Ukrainians lived beyond the borders of Ukraine: in Russia, Siberia, the Far East, the Caucasus and elsewhere on far-flung fronts. There were those Ukrainian patriots in Ukraine who still were afraid to reveal their true national feelings, fearful for their government positions; some were pessimistic regarding the revolution, remembering the reactionary terror that ensued after the revolution of 1905.

It was exactly because of the lack of nationally-conscious and politically prepared Ukrainian intelligentsia in the cities, large and small, at the beginning of the revolution that political influence was exerted by Russians, "Little Russians," Jews, Poles and others. Especially powerful were the "Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," with very few Ukrainians in their leadership.

The revolution was set to destroy that which was old and inconsistent with the requirements of contemporary life. All had to be replaced with a new order, new laws and a new understanding of life, new ideas consonant with the needs of the revolutionary people.

But it was not so easy to identify what was old and unnecessary; it was even more difficult to introduce changes.

The Central *Rada* needed people who were acquainted with the pressing requirements of the time, people who had initiative, daring imagination and courage, who would not hesitate to make bold political moves and assume full responsibility for them.

When I came to the Central *Rada*, elected by the First All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress, I found there neither "Great Russians" nor "Little Russians." Among its members I saw known Ukrainian national leaders, especially those who lived in Kiev.

To repeat, some of the critics of the *Rada* contend that it consisted, above all, of students. I was then 38 years of age, and the majority of members of the plenum of the *Rada*, as well as those of the "Little *Rada*," were the same age if not older.

It is true that there were students among the *Rada* members, but all of these were at least 25 years of age. Most of them were capable and intelligent men, excellent speakers and organizers, imbued with Ukrainian patriotic zeal, and well acquainted with the current Ukrainian situation.

I especially recall two students who were members of the *Rada*: Mykola Lubynsky and Alexander Sevriuk, both of whom were about 25-26 years old, excellent orators, incisive and intelligent. Later, both of them served as delegates of the Ukrainian government at the peace negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest Litovsk.

Lubynsky's verbal attack against Leon Trotsky in Brest Litovsk was rated by General M. Hoffmann, a member of the German peace delegation, as *die ausgezeichnete Rede* (the "outstanding speech").²

According to Doroshenko, both General Hoffmann and Count Ottokar Czernin, Austrian Foreign Minister, in their memoirs praised the Ukrainian representatives, especially Lubynsky and Sevriuk, for their diplomatic skills and adroitness. Both Ukrainian delegates were working under extremely unfavorable conditions: Kiev was then surrounded by the Soviet troops of Col. Muraviev, and the two Ukrainians were confronted by such seasoned statesmen and diplomats as German Chancellor Count Hertling, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs von Kuehlmann, Gen. Hoffmann, General Ludendorf; Austria's Foreign Minister Count Czernin, Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, Grand Vezir Talaat Pasha, and others, and on the Bolshevik side — Joffe, Kamenev and Trotsky. Both Lubynsky and Sevriuk

² *Istoriia Ukrainy, 1917-1923 rr.* (History of Ukraine, 1917-1923 Years), Dmytro Doroshenko: Uzhorod, 1932, Vol. I, p. 310).

proved to be extremely capable negotiators, demonstrating an "unusual hardness and presence of spirit" and a "remarkable cleverness,"³ These two young Ukrainian diplomats were instrumental in winning a great victory for the young Ukrainian republic: full-fledged recognition from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria.

By way of comparison, Winston Churchill was elected to Parliament when he was 25 years old, and at the age of 33 he became Minister of Trade.⁴

The Ukrainian leaders of 1917 are sometimes called "populists," because they are supposed to have relied too much on popular desires. This, too, is not quite correct. They were no "populists" in the sense of Russian "populists," who idolized people without actually helping them. Ukrainian leaders, both Socialists and non-Socialists, were true democrats who endeavored to introduce in "their own home their own truth," a "holy and righteous law"; what they wanted was freedom and order for the people as a whole, or to paraphrase the American axiom, liberty "of the people, by the people and for the people." Otherwise the First *Universal* could not have contained such phrases as, "Ukrainian People, People of Peasants, Workers and Laboring People. By your will you have placed us . . . on guard for the rights and liberties of the Ukrainian land. . ." and the like. The whole *Universal* stresses democratic principles as the basis of government.

Another criticism leveled against the *Rada* by those who do not grasp the essence of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 was that the Ukrainian leaders "placed social problems above national ones," that their "party programs were placed over the national interests," and the like.

This, of course, is not true. In reality, the national problem was tightly interwoven with social problems; it was extremely difficult to delineate one from the other. Over 80 percent of the Ukrainian people at that time lived in poverty. (75 percent of the peasant families of the rich Poltava province had no more than 5 ha. of arable land, while some 30 percent had less than 1 ha. of land). Workers had to labor 10 hours a day, and yet their wages were insufficient to feed the family. Artisans could not compete with the industrial production of the factories, and were underpaid. Every year, 8 percent of the peasant families of the Poltava province had to send their children as seasonal workers to the Don and Kuban

³ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 315)

⁴ *Life Magazine*, January 29, 1965.

territories, the Kherson province, and other places. Thousands of Ukrainian peasants had to look for better opportunities in Siberia or in the trans-Atlantic countries of the United States and Canada. At the same time, in Poltava province Herzog Mecklenburg-Strilitsky alone owned 60,000 ha. of arable land.

This was one reason why the First *Universal* announced that with respect to all land owned by great landowners, Czarist appointees and others, the Constituent Assembly must have the ultimate decision in the matter of fair distribution of land, and the right of use of the land should belong to the Ukrainian Assembly (*Soym*).

In this respect, we can see that the social problem becomes a national problem as well.

In adopting this principle the *Rada* negated powerful arguments used by Bolshevik agitators to the effect that the *Rada* was a government of "rich exploiters and capitalists."

It is recalled that the late President John F. Kennedy, in one of his speeches, declared:

We must remove the manifestations of heavy social and economic injustice which create a fertile breeding ground for Communism.⁵

We also hear quite naive arguments that "our fathers" and "leaders" were thinking only of Socialism, because they were "Marxists." I did not see a single portrait of Marx or Engels either in the Central *Rada* or during the numerous congresses and manifestations. Everywhere, however, I saw portraits of Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's greatest poet, and heard his "Testament" and "Ukraine Has Not Died" (Ukrainian national anthem). There is not a word about Socialism in the First *Universal* of the *Rada*.

Still another charge against the leaders of the *Rada* is that they "believed in Russian democracy," without explaining in what that "faith" was placed. Truly, they did believe that Russian democracy, i. e., Russian National Socialists, Social-Democrats-Mensheviks, Socialists-Revolutionaries and the Labor Party, would not oppose the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools, in courts, nor be against the development of Ukrainian culture, or against the autonomy of Ukraine.

But they also knew that all these parties would be against the independence of Ukraine, especially during the war against Germany. They also knew that the Party of People's Freedom (K-D), whose representatives were in the Russian Provisional Government, would be against the autonomy of Ukraine, and that more conservative

⁵ *New York Daily Mirror*, September 29, 1963.

Russian groups would be even against the development of Ukrainian culture. They also knew that the Bolsheviks would not oppose the autonomy of Ukraine, but they also were very much aware that the Bolsheviks could not be trusted, since Bolshevik policies were subject to sudden changes, and because, basically, the Bolsheviks were Russian centralists.

Trying to establish the most favorable possible conditions for the cultural and economic development of the Ukrainian people, and at the same time standing firmly on the principles of democracy, the Central *Rada* endeavored to reach a workable understanding with the national minorities in Ukraine. It recommended that local Ukrainian organizations and leaders get in contact with the "non-Ukrainian people" and invite them to work towards "organizing an autonomy of Ukraine."

That this policy was to pay off was clear to the leaders of the *Rada*. As early as April, 1917, during the conference of the Ukrainian Socialist-Democratic Party, representatives of the Russian Social-Democrats-Mensheviks who came as guests, declared that they, too, recognized the principle of Ukraine's autonomy.⁶

At the regional conference of the Russian Social-Democrats-Mensheviks in Kiev, April, 1917, a resolution was adopted which, although it rejected the proposal for a federative system in Russia, nevertheless recognized for "the countries which possess different ethnographic and cultural-economic characteristics" the right to autonomy with their own representative assembly, which would guarantee the people of these countries the opportunity for the widest possible cultural and national development."⁷

Prior to the revolution the Ukrainian cause in the Russian *Duma* was supported by Socialists and Labor party members (*trudoviki*).

In the fall of 1915 the Social-Democratic and Labor members of the *Duma* introduced a resolution, protesting the liquidation of the Ukrainian press in Russia.⁸

Also, Russian policy in occupied Galicia was criticized in the *Duma* not only by the Ukrainian members, but also by Russian Socialists and even by P. Miliukov (Constitutional Democrat).

In the Katerynoslav *Zemstvo* executive board in 1917 there were only three Ukrainians out of its total of eight members. Nonetheless, they succeeded in introducing the Ukrainian language in the

⁶ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 51.

⁷ Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 128.

⁸ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 13.

schools and in the publication of Ukrainian textbooks whose cost was borne by the *Zemstvo*, and introduced a Ukrainian page in its organ. This would not have been possible, had the Russian Democrats been against it.⁹

Even in the City of Kharkiv, which was heavily Russified, the City Council, thanks to the support of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, decided to introduce the teaching of the Ukrainian language in all primary schools of the city.¹⁰

In Poltava the "Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," wherein Ukrainians constituted a minority, adopted a resolution hailing the First *Universal* and calling on all Democrats to support the Central *Rada*.¹¹ Prior to the First *Universal*, the same "Soviet" decided that one of its slogans at the May 1 parade would be "Autonomy for Ukraine." This was in evidence during the parade, along with a Ukrainian national flag and a banner reading, "Long Live Autonomous Ukraine in a Federative Russia." This I saw with my own eyes.

After the proclamation of the First *Universal* the Bolshevik daily, *Zvezda* (The Star), in Katerynoslav, wrote that the "Bolsheviks stretch out a hand in brotherly fashion to the Ukrainian people" (note: to the "Ukrainian people" not to the "proletariat").¹²

Finally, the "All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies," welcoming the Ukrainian people being reborn to national life and promising the Ukrainian democracy its full support, proposed to the Provisional Government that it "enter upon an understanding with the organs of Ukrainian revolutionary democracy for the purpose of organizing a general provisional organ and for instituting and realizing concrete measures necessary for the satisfaction of the national needs of the Ukrainian people."¹³

At the congress of the "Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" of Ukraine in the summer of 1917, I was probably the only Ukrainian in attendance. I heard an impassioned speech by a young Jewish woman, member of the Social-Democratic "Bund," on the necessity of granting Ukraine autonomy. After a debate in which I participated, the congress adopted a resolution supporting Ukraine's

⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 62.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 65-66.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 67.

¹² *Ukraina v ohni i buri revoliutsii* (Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of the Revolution). Isaac Mazepa, Vol. I, p. 32, "Prometheus," No. 1, 1950; No. 2, 1951.

¹³ Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 84.

autonomy by the "Soviets." It should be noted that at that time the Bolsheviks constituted an insignificant minority in these "soviets" and did not have the powerful influence which they were to acquire later.

On the other hand, all Russian democratic parties were extremely hostile to national independence for Ukraine and to the creation of a separate Ukrainian army.

Had the Central *Rada* proclaimed independence, there would have been a war on three fronts: against the Russian government and the Russian people, against its own "Little Russians" and some national minorities, and against the German army. Or it would have had to surrender at once to Germany.

By presenting a demand for the autonomy of Ukraine with a Ukrainian National Assembly (Parliament), the *Rada* mustered the support of the Ukrainian people as a whole, expressed at the All-Ukrainian congresses. Ranged against it were a part of the "Little Russians" and a part of the Russian minority in Ukraine. Another part was neutral, still another supported the Central *Rada*, recognizing the Ukrainian people's right to self-determination, "including full separation."

Especially important to us was the support of the All-Russian Congress of "Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," which, as mentioned, promised Ukrainian democracy its full support and proposed that the Provisional Government reach an understanding with the Central *Rada*. This decision was one of the most important factors compelling the Provisional Government to send three ministers to Kiev, to accept recognition of the autonomy of Ukraine and to approve the organization of two Ukrainian army regiments (the B. Khmelnytsky and the P. Polubotok Regiments).

An extremely hostile attitude toward the First *Universal* was displayed by all the conservative and anti-democratic elements of non-Ukrainian origin, especially those of Russian origin.

Partisans of the chauvinistic "Union of the Russian People" and reactionaries of all hue and color were in general hostile to all the manifestations of Ukrainian national life not only in the field of politics, but in the cultural domain as well, viewing it as injurious to the "all-Russian" culture, which they considered so august and beautiful that the cultivation of the Ukrainian language and culture seemed to them to be the worst sort of chimera. Particularly antagonistic were the so-called "Little Russians," who, although they recognized

their Ukrainian origin, had been educated in the Russian culture and felt no national nor cultural bonds with the Ukrainian people.

But we must not forget that there were newspapers which held opposite viewpoints. For instance, *Russkaya Volya* (Russian Will), printed an article by Prof. M. Chubynsky, "The Ukrainian *Universal* and Its Critics," in which the author justified the validity of Ukrainian demands and castigated the ineptitude of the Provisional Government in meeting these demands. It was an expression of true democracy.

The Central *Rada* was fully aware that it would have to perform herculean labors in the fields of information, organization, legislation and administration in order to attain its goal. It knew well that it was confronted, as acknowledged in the *Universal*, by "a great and high wall, which would have to be destroyed" — a wall of inimical bureaucracy, retrogressive prejudices, chauvinism, political illiteracy and ignorance of the requirements of a new era. Therefore, the *Rada* was ordered to undertake the powerful task of enlightening the people and then take over the administration, where it had remained in inimical hands.

Also important for the success of *Rada* policies was the full understanding it reached with the national minorities of Ukraine. In achieving it, the *Rada* was transformed from a revolutionary organ of the Ukrainian people into an organ of state legality.

The Second *Universal* made the Central *Rada* and its General Secretariat full-fledged state institutions, a fact which was recognized by the national minorities and obligated them to render loyal support.

The Third *Universal*, by a revolutionary course, proclaimed the *independent* Ukrainian National Republic. As an independent state Ukraine was recognized not only by the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian people, but also by the "Little Russians," Russians and the national minorities.

In the course of a half year the Ukrainian political revolution took place, but another revolution occurred in the thoughts, views and feelings of millions. The spontaneous Ukrainization of primary schools and the establishment of some 60 Ukrainian secondary schools (*gymnasiums*) took place almost overnight. Are these not the expression of a revolution?

Some people will not admit that the Third *Universal* of November 20, 1917, proclaimed Ukraine an *independent* state. In it was clearly stated:

From today on Ukraine becomes the Ukrainian National Republic.

Furthermore, it delineated the territory of the new republic, in accordance with the will solely of the Ukrainian people, not brooking any foreign power. Finally it stated:

Until the Constituent Assembly of Ukraine convenes, all the power to create an order in our lands, to give laws and to rule, belongs to us, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and our government, the General Secretariat.

Thus all the prerogatives of an *independent* state — the people, territory and the government — were present.

In this *Universal* notice was given as to the date of the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly and also the date of its convening. The Constituent Assembly would promulgate new basic laws, which would replace in Ukraine the old laws of the Russian empire. Such a change was certainly revolutionary.

Thus did the Central *Rada* understand the Third *Universal*. In like manner did the whole population of Ukraine regard it, as well as the representatives of European governments who were present at the proclamation of the Third *Universal*.

The proclamation of the independence of Ukraine on January 22, 1918, was only the formalization of what had been outlined by the Central *Rada* in the Third *Universal* four months earlier.

RUSSIFICATION OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, 1917 - 1967

By LEO HEIMAN

This article is based on scholarly research carried out by the Institute of the Military in Tel Aviv, and on material provided by the Committee of Soviet Army Veterans in Israel — whose members have returned their medals and citations to Moscow in protest against the Kremlin's anti-Israeli policy. The author is also grateful for the assistance and access to the files of the World Jewish Congress in Jerusalem (East European Section) and the Association of Immigrants from the USSR.

I

A top-level investigating commission, headed by Marshal Matvei Zakharov, the aging Chief of the Soviet General Staff, spent 12 days in Egypt in June of 1967 to probe the causes, results and long-range effects of Egypt's disastrous defeat in the six-day war against Israel.

At the same time a sub-committee headed by Marshal Ivan Sokolov, Zakharov's dynamic deputy and leader of the "hawk" faction in the Soviet military hierarchy, investigated the reasons for the Syrian Army's defeat in the war, attempting to determine how much Soviet hardware and secret equipment gurgled down the drain or fell intact into Israeli hands. Veteran military observers in the Middle East are certain that the Israeli-Arab war will have far-reaching results not only on the political scene, but on the Soviet Union's strategy, operational doctrines and eventual reorganization of armed forces as well.

"Heads will roll in the Kremlin sooner or later. The Russians never forgive or forget such errors as those leading to the Mid-East debacle. They will purge the uppermost levels of the Communist Party, Foreign Ministry, Intelligence Service and General Staff," an expert forecast.

For buried in the sands of Sinai, smashed in the mountains of Syria, sunk in the blue waters of the Mediterranean were not

only Soviet-made Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi tanks, planes, guns, vehicles, missile boats and submarines — but the Soviet military doctrine, Moscow's prestige and the Kremlin's plans for domination of the Middle East, Africa and the Mediterranean.

On July 10, 1967, one month after Egypt and Syria conceded defeat in the war against Israel and pleaded for a cease-fire on all fronts, Moscow sent three flotillas, totalling 32 warships, to visit the Syrian port of Lattakia and the Egyptian harbors of Port Said and Alexandria, at the invitation of the Arab government which assumed the presence of Soviet missile carriers, submarines and destroyers would provide them with the illusion of security they lacked.

Within 24 hours of his arrival in Egypt, Admiral Igor N. Molokhov, the Commander of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, said his flotillas would take an active part in repelling "imperialist aggression" against the United Arab Republic.

Teletypers of international news agencies were still chattering in editorial offices of daily newspapers and diplomats in Washington, Paris and London were pondering over the possible meaning of Molokhov's truculent warning, when the hypocrisy and the weakness of Soviet military intervention were exposed by an Israeli naval task force off Port Said.

Intercepting an Egyptian torpedo boat squadron attempting to land saboteurs in the rear of Israeli forces deployed along the Suez Canal, the Israelis sank two brand-new Soviet-made torpedo boats in plain view of Adm. Molokhov's fleet. Forty-two Egyptian officers and men went down in the burning wrecks of their craft to a watery grave, and the Soviet warships did not fire a single shot nor budge from their protected anchorage at Port Said.

Indeed, when more serious battles erupted along the Suez Canal the next day, as Israeli Navy craft entered this vital waterway to exercise the right of passage, Adm. Molokhov warned the Egyptian commander at Port Said to stay put and not to open fire.

Heavy fighting raged all along the canal, from Port Ibrahim in the south to El Kantara in the north. The Egyptian cities of Ismaila, Kantara West and Suez went up in flames after artillery duels lasting 48 hours. White flags fluttered over administrative buildings and residential quarters of Egyptian cities whose inhabitants assumed the Israelis would cross the canal and advance upon Cairo. They chose to surrender rather than resist. But the Israelis remained on the eastern bank, and stressed in their report that the only sector which remained quiet, and in which no gunfire was ex-

changed at all, was Port Said — where the Soviet admiral had told the Egyptian general that his ships would hoist anchor and sail back to Odessa and Sevastopol should they become exposed to Israeli counterbattery fire and possible air attacks.

In practical terms, this means that the Soviet doctrine of military intervention is as dead in the Middle East in 1967 as it was bankrupt in Cuba in 1962. And just as the Cuban crisis was followed by a shakeup of Soviet top brass and reorganization of Moscow's military hierarchy, the Middle East debacle will probably lead to similar developments within the near future.

No one can foresee which way the Russians will turn next in their quest for world domination without world war. But the lessons of the Israeli-Arab war will not be lost upon them. If 2.5 million Jews could defeat 100 million Arabs, backed by the Soviet Union, Red China and the entire Communist bloc, there is no reason why the captive nations of East Europe should not be able to shake off the shackles of traditional Russian imperialism.

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II

The 1967 war in the Middle East turned history's clock 50 years back to the last days of the old Russian Army. Communist historians who have survived the constant rewriting and re-editing of Soviet doublethink, stress today that the Russian Army's value as an organized fighting force at that time was nil — no doubt thanks to communist subversion, organized murder of officers, civil war incitement and mass desertions encouraged by communist *apparatchiks* to undermine the hated Kerensky regime.

The so-called Revolution was carried out by bands of mutinous sailors, pro-communist deserters from the army clandestine "action squads" of the Bolshevik underground. The Red Guards, as these "spearheads of the working class" were called, survived less than three months. By 1918, it had become evident that regular armed forces were needed to defend the Soviet regime against military intervention from the outside and counter-revolutionary moves from within.

The Red Army of Workers and Peasants, as the Soviet armed forces were originally known, was initially composed of Red Guard teams and non-Russian elements, among whom the Latvian, Chinese, Mongol and Hungarian units were rated the best.

It soon became apparent, however, that voluntary enlistment and internationalization were no substitute for old-fashioned conscription, drafts and Russification. In other words, behind the thin facade of communist internationalism, the Red Army assumed the organizational, operational and administrative forms of the Old Russian Army it had allegedly destroyed.

It is known today that the Red Army was trained, led and organized — but not controlled — by Russian military specialists, that is, officers of the Old Czarist army who were forcibly mobilized to serve the Communist cause, on pain of death for themselves and their families.

In the end, the Civil War was won by Russian troops from the Russian heartland, fighting against non-Russian troops on the peripheries of the erstwhile Czarist empire: Ukrainians in the southwest, Cossacks in the south, Tartars in the southeast, Poles in the west, Finns in the northwest, and so forth.

After 50 years of communist rule, the Soviet Union is once again a Russian-led empire masquerading behind the fissured facade of communist internationalism to pursue the three principal aims of the Czars and Russian imperialism:

- enslavement of non-Russian nations along the periphery of the Russian heartland;
- access to and domination of vital waterways outside the landlocked seas (Black Sea, White Sea, Baltic, Caspian, Okhotsk, etc.);
- territorial expansion.

And the Soviet Army is in reality a Russian Army, utilizing non-Russian elements as cannon fodder and junior-ranking expendables.

From the organizational-manpower-leadership viewpoints, the 50-year history of Soviet armed forces can be divided into five distinct periods:

- 1918-1925 — Civil War and postwar reorganization of the Red Army on a territorial militia basis;
- 1926-1939 — formation of regular cadres, new military caste, purges of Civil War commanders;
- 1940-1946 — Second World War and enslavement of East European nations;
- 1947-1962 — nuclear age, missile era, space conquest, Berlin and Cuban debacles;
- 1963-1967 — Vietnam war and Middle East crisis.

From the functional viewpoint, Soviet military history can be compartmentalized into three categories:

The decision-makers (Supreme Command, General Staff, Military Section of C. P. Central Committee);

The cadres (field commanders, theoreticians, the men behind the scenes);

The troops (specialists, cannon fodder, expendables.)

The first period (1918-1925) was characterized by a preponderance of non-Russian elements on the decision-making level and a steady infiltration of Russian regulars into the cadres and an almost total dependence on Russian troops.

Apart from Lenin, military decisions during the Civil War were taken by the Revolutionary War Committee whose membership varied but usually numbered a dozen persons. Of the twelve key men, three (Trotsky, Sklyanski, Goldberg) were Jews, two (Avanesov-Avanesyan and Myasnikov-Myasnikyan) Armenians, one each: Ukrainian (Smilha), Lithuanian (Vacetis) and Latvian (Berens), and four Russians — Gusev, Kamenev, Podvoisky, Rykov.

Of the twenty prominent field commanders and military theoreticians of that time, two (Yakir, Gamarnik) were Jews, six (Fedko, Pavlenko, Krylenko, Parkhomenko, Dubovoy, Kosior) Ukrainians, three (Peterson, Sievers, Gittis) Latvians, and nine Russians (Tukhachevsky, Antonov-Ovseyenko, Bonch-Bruyevich, Yegorov, Parsky, Uborevich, Nemits, Lebedev, Frunze).

Reliable estimates are lacking concerning exact composition of the troops. The Red Army proper consisted at that time of twenty field armies whose size varied from that of a division to that of a full-sized army group. According to Soviet publications which reveal mobilization figures of that period, these twenty field armies were 95 percent Russian. In addition, the Communists sponsored the formation of so-called Ukrainian, Turkestan, Far Eastern, Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijanian "national armies," which were 50 to 60 percent Russian.

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The second period in the development of Soviet armed forces was marked by the gradual disappearance of Civil War commanders,

culminating in the bloody purges of 1937-1939, and their replacement by *apparatchiks* who were faithful yes-men for Stalin's dictatorship but inept military leaders.

None of the people mentioned on the decision-making and military cadre levels in 1918-1925 survived the second period. Some died a natural, or almost-natural, death. But most were shot in the dim basement of Moscow's Lubyanka Prison on Stalin's orders, to forestall a possible military conspiracy against his police state regime.

The new decision-makers — insofar as decisions were at all possible under Stalin's oppressive rule, were all Russians: Voroshilov, Budenny, Timoshenko, Kulik and Kuznetsov. Budenny and Timoshenko are sometimes mistakenly classified as Ukrainians. (Although they are of Ukrainian descent, they belong to the category of so-called "Russified Ukrainians" who played an important role during and after World War II.)

As far as the cadres were concerned, the elimination of senior commanders provided unprecedented opportunities for rapid promotion of junior officers. This made for a gradual infiltration of upper command levels by non-Russian generals and admirals on the eve of and during the Second World War.

Once again, the role played by Ukrainians and Jews is significant because it points up the virtual non-participation of other nationality groups in the defense of the Soviet Union. The Armenians and Georgians provided only one top-ranking commander each (Bagramyan and Leselidze); the Tartars, Mongols, Buryats, Circassians, Turkmenians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Azerbaijanis, none at all.

Of the 100 top-ranking commanders of World War II, three (Chernyakhovsky, Mekhlis, Kreizer) were Jews, seven were "Russified Ukrainians" (Kostenko, Shtemenko, Yeremenko, Moskalenko, Grechko, Skrypko, Kyrponos) and 90 were Russians.

As far as troops were concerned, the situation had undergone drastic change in the course of World War II. Of the 20 million men and women mobilized for military service in the USSR, 14 million were Russians, 4 million were Ukrainians, Jews half a million, and 1.5 million divided among Tartars, Mongols, Uzbeks, etc.

Once again, the disproportion is evident and significant. The 120 million Russians provided 14 million soldiers (12 percent of the total Russian population), the 40 million Ukrainians who lived within Soviet borders at that time provided 4 million (10 percent), the 4 million Jews responded with 500,000 servicemen (12½ percent),

but the remaining 36 million Soviet citizens provided only 1.5 million soldiers — or less than 5 percent.

The answer must be sought in the psychological rather than political sphere. As regards political and patriotic reliability, the minorities were neither better nor worse than the others. Russians and Ukrainians deserted en masse, to join Andrei Vlasov's ROA and other German-sponsored Russian and Ukrainian anti-communist nationalist formations.

Ironically, the Jews who later were purged and whom Soviet propaganda equates with Nazis today, were the only absolutely reliable element in the Soviet armed forces of that period. They could neither desert nor surrender to the Nazis, which explains their high rate of conscription and mobilization.

On the other hand, Stalin, who considered himself an expert on the Soviet Union's nationalities, had a very low opinion of Asiatic soldiers. Even during the 20th and 22nd Communist Party congresses, at which Nikita Khrushchev "exposed" Stalin's crimes, no mention was made of the notorious Regulation 100-YAT, signed by Stalin on February 22, 1942. It barred soldiers of 22 national minority groups from entering military academies and officers' schools, flight courses and specialized training units. It also relegated soldiers of 17 national minority groups from front-line combat service to "labor battalions" (i. e. forced labor) in the rear.

Among the victims of Regulation 100-YAT were Uzbeks, Turkmenians, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Mongols, Buryats, Tartars, Circassians, Armenians, Karelians, Georgians, Azerbaijanians, Komi, Chukchi, Osetins, Ingushes, Kalmuks and five smaller groups.

Underlying this discrimination was Stalin's feeling that the Asiatics are poor soldiers to begin with, unaccustomed to the freezing climate of Russia proper, and of little use especially against the Wehrmacht. This did not prevent him from expending Asiatic minorities as cheap labor on various projects. They died like flies from cold, disease and malnutrition, hacking out military supply routes through snowbound forests, manually hauling barges with ammunition and rations up rainswept canals and rivers, loading and unloading equipment, preparing airfields with primitive tools, digging ditches, building fortifications and putting up barracks for combat troops.

There was another reason as well. Many — in fact most — of the Asiatics did not understand Russian. The Soviet Command was faced with the choice of incorporating them into Russian-speaking units and risking confusion and misunderstandings in battle or select-

ing some of them for training as junior officers at intermediate levels of command. The second course was a logical one. It had been chosen by the communists in the Civil War and Territorial Militia periods. But now the Supreme Command ruled against it. The Soviet Army had to be a Russian Army, and national minority formations had no place in it. This explains almost everything, except why Regulation 100-YAT was suddenly rescinded towards the end of 1944, in the last few months of war. Perhaps the Soviet Union was already looking forward to its postwar role as a self-styled champion of Afro-Asians.

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I V

The fourth, nuclear age, period of Soviet military organization was marked by Stalin's death, the intramural struggles for power, intrigues within the Central Committee and the showdown between the military and party *apparatchiks* which culminated in the overthrow of Marshal Zhukov.

It was also marked by the gradual disappearance — through death, age or retirement — of non-Russian officers, though Russian Marshals were retained as Defense Ministry Inspectors and military advisers well into their seventies.

No Jews were to be found among the military delegates to the 22nd Communist Party Congress. Among the Military Officers in the C. P. Central Committee elected by the Congress were only two real Ukrainians (Hetman, Stuchenko), ten (!) "Russified Ukrainians" (Grechko, Moskalenko, Timoshenko, Budenny, Chabanenko, Yeremenko, Koshevoy, Rudenko, Sudets, Skrypko) and 20 Russians. The reliance on "Russified Ukrainians" is surprising, unless one assumes that they have superior and unusual leadership qualities and that their willingness to embrace Russian nationhood makes them indispensable to the Soviet military machine.

This period was also marked by an agonizing dispute over Soviet global strategy and military doctrines, in which Nikita Khrushchev's championship of strategic rocket forces and their multimegaton thermonuclear weapons gained an upper hand over the vehement opposition of orthodox, conventional-minded generals.

The Cuban crisis exposed the basic fallacy of this Soviet strategy. Lacking a strong Navy with aircraft carriers and amphibious forces

and having deprived itself of options and escalation flexibility, the Soviet doctrine had to concede bankruptcy.

It veered in favor of conventional forces in the fifth period. It assumed that global domination can be achieved step by step through sponsorship of "national liberation wars," anti-imperialist drives, anti-colonialist guerrilla campaigns and patient subversion and infiltration of dependent countries.

This was achieved in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Yemen and Iraq. But the results were disappointing. Egypt and Syria collapsed militarily after a six-day war against Israel. Three billion dollars worth of Soviet military aid went down the drain. Iraq hastily pulled out of battle after the first defeats. In Yemen, the Royalists are gaining the upper hand despite barbaric poison-gas attacks and napalm-bombing by Soviet-Egyptian air squadrons. Only Algeria has remained truculent, possibly because it did not commit and suffer the loss of any forces in the war.

The Mid-Eastern setback must inevitably lead to a weakening of the ideological aspect of Soviet military doctrine with a concomitant accentuation of its purely opportunistic and narrowly pragmatic aspects. When Admiral Molokhov told the Egyptians on July 11, 1967, that his fleet would protect them against "imperialist aggression," but ordered the Egyptian commanding general to hold his fire, he demonstrated that the Soviets do not always practice what they preach. The Western press currently devotes a great deal of analysis and speculation to the apparent dispute between Soviet "hawks" and "doves." Prominent Kremlinologists stress the "reasonable" attitudes of the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny triumvirate vis-a-vis the more extremist military circles.

It seems, however, that such speculation is encouraged, indeed sponsored, by carefully planned leaks from the Kremlin itself. but reach the opposite conclusion: the Kremlin big shots had pushed the military into disastrous adventures for which they were not ready, and that many years will have to pass before the Soviet war machine is ready for successful escapades outside the immediate land boundaries of Moscow's Europe-Asian empire.

A critical dissection of Soviet strategy and operational doctrines is outside the scope of this article. Yet the Achilles Heel of Soviet military effort is, was and has always been the nationality question. Today more than ever.

Assuming the USSR is unable and unwilling to fight a global thermonuclear war (unless it does not mind committing virtual

suicide) three courses are open to Moscow's military doctrine in the future:

1. *Continuation of pre-1967 policies*, featuring pressure, threats and nuclear blackmail. This seems impossible, if only because no one will be impressed by Soviet threats and rocket rattling after having seen little Israel challenging and successfully defying the Soviet colossus. It would be inaccurate to say it is a colossus on feet of clay. It stands on multimegaton feet. But it has no guts, and national disputes are eternally gnawing at its heart.

2. *Military isolationism*, pulling out of costly military assistance projects which cost Moscow billions of rubles a year, selling out the Arabs, North Vietnam, Cuba, etc., devoting all efforts to consolidation of Soviet economy and to conventional military power. This course seems the most attractive to some Soviet generals, but experts doubt whether it will ever be accepted by the Kremlin political leadership for fear of repercussions within the world communist movement, the Soviet bloc and automatic accession to leadership of international communism by Red China.

3. *Military adventurism*, based on global task forces, à la the U.S. Sixth Fleet and U.S. Marine Corps, plus a network of bases in the Arab countries to begin with. This seems the most promising course of action to the Kremlin, except for two things: the Soviet economy simply cannot stand the strain of bankrolling the costly space race, shoveling additional aid down the bottomless hatch of recipient countries and changing the whole layout and composition of the Soviet armed forces. The Russians lack experience with aircraft carriers and amphibious forces. And on top of everything, they simply lack manpower. This may sound like levity, considering the USSR masses, human wave tactics and multitudes of barefooted peasants. Yet no precedent exists for Soviet military operations conducted outside the Europe-Asian heartland, even fringes adjacent to Soviet borders. In the 50 years of Soviet military history, overseas intervention was attempted only twice—in Spain in 1936 and in Cuba in 1962.

In both cases, Soviet policy suffered severe setbacks. In order to rule an empire with so many unreliable partners and dissident national minorities, to stand guard against possible Red Chinese moves in Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia, to prevent break-away trends and secessionism, or a repetition of the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, the Soviets are obliged to keep huge masses of troops at home and in the territories they control.

Examination of Soviet troops stationed in East Germany, Hungary and Poland in 1967 shows that all senior commanders, 95 percent of the Junior commanders and 90 percent of the troops are Russians. This means that the Kremlin relies solely on Russians only for aggressive military adventures abroad. It is inconceivable to think of Soviet "volunteers" in terms of Kazakh, Uzbek, Tartar, etc. regiments. Expert opinion is unanimous in that only Russians will be used—if at all.

But if too many Russians are deployed outside the USSR, who will mind the store at home? One simply cannot imagine a situation wherein—should another war break out in the Middle East or some other part of the world in which Moscow is vitally interested—the Kremlin would decide to rush in Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian, Armenian troops. Such soldiers would desert at the first opportunity, rather than fight and die for Russian imperialism.

Not even Russian troops are considered reliable overseas by the Kremlin. Of the 887 military technicians, naval and air force instructors and tactical advisers sent by Moscow to Egypt in recent years, 826 were Russians, 25 Poles, 18 Bulgarians, 10 Czechs and 8 East Germans.

Of the 312 Soviet personnel in Syria, 299 were Russians, 6 were Poles, 6 were Czechs and only one (Lt. Col. Andrei Zhilko) was a Ukrainian. But advisers are not fighting troops, and nationality problems inherent in direct mobilization for overseas service are obvious. Thus it is not a question of "hawks" vs. "doves" but of virtual bankruptcy of Moscow "revolutionary" strategy, limited possibilities for overseas intervention, utter reliance on the Russian element in armed forces and shortage of suitable personnel—all of which makes large-scale Soviet military adventurism overseas not merely improbable, but impossible.

NEW PATHWAYS FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

The mounting confusion in the United States concerning its presence in Vietnam, its role in the Middle East, its policy toward the Soviet Union and the Red states in Central Europe, just to mention a few areas of dangerous portent, is a barometer of the increasing lack of leadership and vision shown by this supposed leader of the Free World. Reliance on sheer, brute power, whether military or economic, to bolster the American image is rapidly corroding as the depressing aspects of our military engagement in Vietnam are soberly appraised and the successive battering of the dollar in the international gold market becomes more generally understood. Add to these developments the shameful Pueblo incident, the spread of irresponsible dissent in the United States, and the widespread fear of guerrilla warfare in large American cities during the hot months, the image of the Free World leader looks rather beaten, weak and sick. And at that, needlessly so.

Notwithstanding all this, there is good cause for optimism over the long pull. The present period of mass confusion is not unique in our history. As an excellent synopsis of similar periods in the past shows, the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, both World Wars, and the Korean War were also phases marked by dissent, campus uproar and eccentricities, demands for review, the conduct of warfare by commissions, and recurring decrease in enthusiasm for war as well as draft-dodging and the like.¹ If the lessons of history have forceful meaning, and empirical evidence suggests they do, we can look forward toward many productive results from this period of confusion, contention, and uncertainty. Indeed, this is all in the nature of the democratic process and, God willing, given the time, out of this purgative process a strong leadership, a renewed dedication to the moral and religious

¹ "Historical Attitudes of Our People During Our Nation's Wars," *Congressional Record*, March 18, 1968, pp. H2017-2020.

principles found in our own Declaration of Independence, more enlightened foreign policies, and the real and true image of America will certainly evolve.

THE NEW PATHWAYS

In the midst of confusion, contradictory policies, and many illusions regarding the Cold War, the communist mythology, peaceful coexistence and so forth, there are healthy indications of critical thought being given to new pathways for U.S. leadership. For many of these, the thought still is in an embryonic stage, and different emphases are placed on various developments. Here, let us survey the suggested new pathways and, with appropriate current emphasis, concentrate on a movement which in time will have its impact upon all parts of the world — one that emerges from Free Asia.

First, of course, is a new pathway leading to Vietnam and the victorious resolution of the problems confronting us there. Our military presence in this area has been, to say the least, a confused one, although many fine military officers have long recognized the relative futility of conventional war tactics in an environment that screams for revolutionary warfare responses and offense. Senator Russell of Georgia properly criticized General Westmoreland for applying "World War II tactics" in a theater of operations which is most unsuited to them. But what in another context is more important is the persistent demand in the halls of Congress for a review of U.S. policy in Vietnam.²

A Congressional review involving public hearings would demonstrate the shallowness of those who oppose our engagement in Vietnam and, at the same time, would enable many competent analysts to show the shortcomings of the Administration's policy in that war-torn country. Certainly, the absurdities of Senator Eugene McCarthy's 8-point program to end the Vietnam war (e.g. "Cease attempts to uproot the Vietcong from areas they have controlled for many years") would be properly publicized.³ In short, the Vietnam case should be thoroughly and openly reviewed, and one conclusive result of such a review would be a more sober public awareness of the fact that Vietnam cannot be divorced from Red

² E. g. Robert K. Walsh, "Congressional Viet Review Proposed by 137 in House," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C. March 20, 1968.

³ Senator Eugene McCarthy, "How to End the War," *Glamour* magazine, April 1968.

operations in other parts of the world. The roles of Peiping and Moscow would receive basic value. The plight of the captive 17 million North Vietnamese would be placed in sound perspective. The healthy sign in all of this is the growing recognition that Vietnam is not an isolated case of Red aggression but rather a continuation of Red psycho-political warfare in the world at large.

The second new pathway for American leadership is the equally growing realization in responsible quarters that we are conspicuously deficient in the art of psycho-political warfare. Our bungling in Vietnam is an excellent example of this. Naive statements on the part of some of our leaders illustrate the deficiency further, as, for instance, there is no Soviet menace now, according to Senator Mansfield, because "The barriers are coming down — trade, travel and other exchanges, from the Atlantic to the Urals, are beginning to flourish." ⁴ Moscow's strategy of "peaceful coexistence" is obviously paying handsome dividends. Meanwhile, what informed analysts have known for some time, "wars of national liberation" are being intensively advanced throughout southeast Asia, this behind the shield of "peaceful coexistence." One columnist who is beginning to learn something about the art of psycho-political warfare accurately observes that "in every Asian country, the Communist underground is active," but he concludes somewhat erroneously that the "urgent question, which the policymakers in Washington have yet to solve, is how to combat the Guevara strategy." ⁵ Ernesto Che Guevara, the Cuban revolutionary, was only a pygmy compared to Russian instructors in the art. In short, these foreign experiences coupled with a few "hot summer" domestic outbreaks, under cover of poverty and civil rights, should revive official interest in the Freedom Academy bill for training along these lines; indeed, a new pathway for American leadership.

Another important pathway is the slow but sure recognition on the part of the American public that Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism is the basic and ultimate enemy, not Communist mythology, nor mainland China, or for that matter any other part of the Red Empire, singly or in toto. Increasing numbers of Americans are beginning to realize that Soviet Russian power is the determinative factor in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

⁴ "Mansfield Urges Shift In U.S. Foreign Policy," *The Washington Post*, March 10, 1968, p. A14.

⁵ Jack Anderson, "Reds Attack Throughout SE Asia," *The Washington Post*, February 24, 1968, p. E13.

Its power is reflected in North Korea and its humiliating assaults against both the United States and the Republic of Korea; it shows quite clearly in mainland China and against Mao and his regime; it is the essential mainstay of Hanoi's aggression in South Vietnam; and it is making considerable inroads in India, Pakistan and other Asian states with tactics ranging from offers to modernize their armies to economic lures of all kinds. This Russian power, thriving on exploited, captive non-Russian resources within and without the USSR, is seen also among the Arabs in the Middle East, communist elements throughout Africa, and Cuba and many states in Latin America. Just a sensible reading of USSR's gross economic product, liberally estimated today at \$ 355 billion, in relation to the inferior, aggregate product of all the other Red states combined, would show the base of the threat to us and the Free World.

Frivolous talk about Communist polycentrism, the weaning-away from Russian domination and influence of certain assertive Red regimes, such as Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia, and Yugoslavia, the Soviet-Chinese rift, and numerous other splits and disagreements within the Red Empire is a perfect measure of the wishful thinking that persists in this country and saps the leadership which we are supposed to exercise. A mere perception into the power structure of the Red Empire, based fundamentally and forcefully in Moscow, is enough to show the lack of political common sense displayed by those clinging to these straws of wishful thinking. Plainly, would any leadership in a non-Russian Red regime, including Belgrade, Prague, Bucharest and Peiping, seek to guarantee its demise by a real divorce from the Russian power? As in Vietnam, real unity is manifested by all when the chips are down. Ready cognizance of this essential fact is spreading, and as one editorial aptly puts it, "'Polycentric' communism is no less dangerous than communism totally directed by Moscow. Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro and other figures of 'polycentric' communism are enormously dangerous. They fit into the overall Soviet plan of world conquest."⁶

No doubt, to regain full popular balance along this pathway and attain to higher levels of leadership will require a little time. As an example of imbalance and sheer drivel heard today, just consider this: "These facts and others which I shall touch upon are somewhat significant when we consider that self-appointed vigilantes in the United States, those witch hunters who consider themselves sup-

⁶ "Real Communist Unity," *Charleston News and Courier*, South Carolina, March 1, 1968.

erduper patriotic Americans, are always talking about a monolithic Communist conspiracy and about Communists' infiltration of basic institutions in the United States. Yet, they could not name one Communist in the State Department." ⁷ To be sure, there are anti-Communist fanatics and many who would reify international Communism, misunderstanding completely the core enemy, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, which I have attempted to show in the first chapter of my current work.⁸ However, reading such obtuse statements, one would think that the Hisses, Dexter Whites, Philbys and countless others were just ghosts.

The final, vital pathway leads into the area of the captive nations and, particularly, those in the Soviet Union itself. The truly courageous opposition shown by Ukrainian intellectuals against the Russian occupation of their Ukraine and all its genocidal manifestations indicates by itself the puppetry of Soviet Ukraine and the real state of affairs in the Soviet Union.⁹ The turbulence in Ukraine, the largest non-Russian captive nation both in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, is further seen by this example of day-to-day propaganda: "With their filthy ambitions, imperialists serve all kinds of renegades and traitors. They attempt to exploit the various Ukrainian anti-Soviet immigrant organizations and their bosses, who hid in the back alleys of the capitalist world in order to escape the national punishment which they deserved. In the service of their masters — the American imperialists — these organizations pile slander upon slander on the Ukrainian nation, and its sister Russia." ¹⁰ The field of nationalist pressures is not restricted, of course, to Ukraine alone, but as the writer shows in a continuing conflict with a leading newspaper, it extends to every other captive, non-Russian area in the USSR.¹¹ This pathway should lead to an unprecedented Congressional review of our policy toward the Soviet Union.

⁷ Senator Stephen M. Young, "Communist Troubles," *Congressional Record*, February 19, 1968, p. S1431.

⁸ Lev E. Dobriansky, "Marx's Outlook On The Prison House of Nations," *The Vulnerable Russians*, New York, 1967, pp. 1-22.

⁹ "Excerpts From Documents On Ukrainian Trials in '66," *The New York Times*, February 9, 1968.

¹⁰ P. Yu. Shelest, Address, *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, Soviet Ukraine, December 24, 1967.

¹¹ Lev E. Dobriansky, "From Moscow's *Izvestia* to Washington's *Post*," *Congressional Record*, March 20, 1968, pp. E2096-E2099.

ASIA FOR FREE ASIANS

With the conflict in Vietnam still attracting world attention and the problems of Asia remaining in the forefront of daily discussion, this survey on pathways to U.S. leadership can now emphasize a new pathway being forged by Free Asians themselves, and yet one that can serve as an excellent pathway for our own leadership in the spirit of Asia for Free Asians. This pathway hinges on the new world anti-Communist movement generated in the Far East under the sponsorship of WACL.

WACL (pronounced "Wah-kl") is a new symbol circulating in all of Free Asia. Because of dominant developments in Asia and their ramifications in other sectors of the globe, it should become a familiar trademark in the Free World at large. WACL stands for the World Anti-Communist League, and its origin, scope and impact have at this time the same ring as ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council, a ministerial conference body) and ASPU (Asian Parliamentarians Union).

Similar to these new Asian institutions, WACL represents another formidable stride in creating an Asia for Free Asians. Unlike them, it seeks to project itself on a global scale, integrating the popular movement for an expanded Free Asia with the struggles for national independence and democratic growth on both sides of our divided world. It seeks to relate itself with every force for national self-determination and independence in the Soviet Union. Also in sharp contrast to these and similar institutions, which by and large are governmental, the World Anti-Communist League is founded on the enthusiastic support of private, non-governmental organizations with grass-root moorings and with orientations that are acutely attuned to the revolutionary type of warfare being waged by the Red imperio-colonialists.

These free Asians are daily targets of the Reds. Faced by the immediate realities of Red aggression and psycho-political warfare, the free Asians who are responsible for WACL, may yet perform a valuable service for the security of the United States by effectively counteracting some of the unrealistic and even nonsensical notions gripping the minds of several of our public figures. When a Senator Thruston B. Morton states that "American foreign policy is hung up on the dated dogma of the cold war," a WACL Korean who has just observed the near-assassination of his President by a band of North Korean psycho-political warriors and senses deeply the humiliation

caused the United States by the Pueblo incident, doubtlessly asks himself "In what dream world does this representatives of Kentucky live?"¹²

But, in ways of human reactions, this surely is not all. For example, a WACL Chinese, who grieves over the millions of captive brethren recently slaughtered by Mao's "cultural revolution" and hears daily Peiping's threats against Free China, cannot but think that what follows is a voice from a world of make-believe. "We cannot wage holy wars of anti-Communism," says Senator Charles H. Percy of Illinois.¹³ "If we remain inflexibly addicted to a world view which is no longer relevant, we shall soon lose any semblance of leadership," he says. Quite plainly, no respectable analyst has ever urged any melodramatic "holy war of anti-Communism"; rather, the prime objective has consistently been an understanding of the techniques of psycho-political warfare in order to cope with persistent Red aggression toward the ends of preserving national freedom, staving off a hot global war, and eventually expanding the areas of freedom. The WACL Chinese could tell the Senator, "Live with us for a while on Kinmen, and you'll learn what is relevant and what is not." The recent U.S. suggestion for Free China to abandon Kinmen and Matsu because of costs is another example of illusory existence.

In addition to his frequent, unrealistic utterances on a one-China policy, the words of a Senator Mike Mansfield would sound equally fantastic to a WACL Vietnamese. The Senate Democratic Leader questions "policies which were designed two decades ago for two decades ago and largely for jousting with what was then assumed to be the indivisible monolith of Communism."¹⁴ Despite the verbal squabbles among the Communist Parties, the free Vietnamese witnesses a complete Red solidarity behind totalitarian Hanoi, with monolithic support in one form or another flowing from Peiping, Pyongyang, Bucharest, Prague, Belgrade, and Havana. All about him throughout Southeast Asia, in Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, and the Philippines, the Communists are pressing forward their revolutionary warfare against the established governments, and he begins to wonder, "Have some American leaders lost all sense of reality?"

¹² "Senators Criticize Anti-Red Policy," *The Washington Post*, January 26, 1968.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

One can cite numerous other expressions of official fantasy. But these few examples go a long way in explaining why the World Anti-Communist League was formed by free Asian groups. Alone or in concert, their countries could not withstand the subverting pressures of Red psycho-political warfare, backed in the final analysis by both Peiping and Moscow. They know all too well that the independence of their respective nations and the hope for a Free Asia depend ultimately on the understanding and support of the Free World, particularly the United States. As a consequence, WACL was established to convey on the popular level the realities of Red aggression against the free nations of Asia and to impress upon the world the growing spirit of Asia for free Asians.

Thus, it was no accident that WACL was formally planned for in November, 1966 at the 12th Conference of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League in Seoul, Korea. Long before the series of mounting incidents precipitated by Pyongyang, the near-assassination of President Park, the Pueblo hijack, and doubtless more Red provocations in the future, it became quite evident to those conversant with Red psycho-political maneuverings in Asia that North Korea would serve as an important base for this type of warfare. The Red Tricontinental Conference in Havana, in which delegates from Moscow, Peiping and other Red capitals worked in solidarity at the beginning of 1966, designated North Korea as the training base for psycho-political operatives throughout Asia. Also, the Russian-bred North Korean Premier, Kim Il-sung, waxed increasingly belligerent with open statements on "the revolutionary determination to liberate their South Korean brothers at all costs," "to subordinate everything to the struggle to accomplish the South Korean revolution." The role of Moscow in North Korean affairs is something most Americans do not appreciate.¹⁵

APACL itself is a living and moving symbol in Asia. The Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, which has now been in existence for over 13 years and consists of members from Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and others, has created an unprecedented organization in WACL. As a world anti-Communist center, it is the first of its kind. Spirited by free Asians, WACL naturally places at this time top priority on the problem of Asia. Article 3 of its Charter emphasizes this, but it also recognizes,

¹⁴ See Anthony Harrigan, "The Pueblo Incident: Communist Aggression In North Asia," American Security Council, *Washington Report*, February 12, 1968.

perhaps somewhat vaguely, that at some future date this priority may rest elsewhere.

Timing is always of essence. Quite appropriately, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, WACL was concretely launched in Taipei, the Republic of China. At the end of September, 1967 the First Conference of the World Anti-Communist League was held in a five-day meeting with 220 delegates and observers from 67 countries and 13 international organizations participating. This unique event received the congratulatory blessings of Pope Paul VI. The President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, hailed WACL as "an expression of strength that truly represents the universal longing and determination to redress the intolerable balance of a world half free and half slave."

Space forbids quoting from all the messages received. But among numerous other messages sent by Heads of State on this historic occasion, the President of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu, declared WACL "will strengthen the bonds of friendship and solidarity between all nations advancing the ideals of freedom and human dignity and facing the common danger of Communist expansion and enslavement." In effect, he was pleading for a rational understanding of the plight of his beleaguered Vietnamese as a case example of Red aggression, whether direct or indirect, that cannot be divorced in thought from Red takeover pressures in Korea, Thailand, the Middle East or Latin America. Free Korea's President, Park Chung Hee, pragmatically looked forward in his message to "concrete measures to crush Communism." These are just a few examples of the innermost feelings expressed by leaders who have to guide their free nations on the present battlelines of freedom in Asia.

From the viewpoint of American interest, many essentials concerning WACL should be borne in mind. This first WACL conference gave functional birth to a going world anti-Communist concern. It adopted a charter which clearly outlines the organizational structure, membership requirements, and the objectives of WACL. The supreme organ of WACL is the annual conference that will be held in the different capitals of the member countries. In 1967 it was Taipei; this year it is scheduled in the fall for Saigon, South Vietnam. The conference assembly elects the chairman, vice-chairman, and the WACL council. The council consists of the former two, a secretary-general, and chief delegates from each member unit. It is the governing body between conferences and sets up the executive board.

It is also important for prospective American participants in

WACL to know the following points. When the council is not in session, the executive board administers WACL's affairs. It is composed of nine members with three year terms. The present board has representatives from Argentina, Germany, Libya, Iran, Korea, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Canada. One of the main functions of the board is its close administration of the permanent secretariat which is now located and functioning at the Freedom Center in Seoul, Korea. The secretary-general is elected by the conference.

Now, judging by the structure and representation of WACL, it is evident that the first conference succeeded notably in translating into action the welcoming remarks of China's President Chiang Kai-shek. At the opening ceremony in the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Hall, the President declared to an audience of 1200 that "As the Communists never limit their goal of aggressive expansion, the free people should not try to fight each of their own battles by themselves alone and run the risk of being defeated one by one. . . . Our task today is to forge a free world unity and defeat the divided and self-contradictory Communist order." In addition to establishing WACL, the first conference provided the opportunity for each delegation and observer group to report on its anti-Communist activities over the past year, and in every instance the unity spirit of Chiang's remarks was powerfully reflected. One outstanding advantage of the annual conference is this exchange of information and ideas for a tighter coordination of activities on various continents.

Since many American organizations are already moving toward WACL, some basic requirements should be mentioned. Requirements for membership in and affiliation with WACL are also specifically provided for in the adopted charter. First, admission is predicated on the performance and accomplishments of all Free World organizations and groups whose stand against Communist ideas and tactics is unequivocal and firm. Second, the categories of membership or affiliation are by country, territory, or an international anti-Communist organization recognized by the executive board. Chapter units of a WACL affiliate in a respective country are accommodated and encouraged, as are also regional affiliates in North America, Latin America, Europe and elsewhere in the Free World. And third, full and associate memberships are available with varying voting and participational privileges. Yearly dues are set at a minimum of \$300.

MUTUAL FREE ASIAN-AMERICAN OBJECTIVES

Political mutualism is the needed standard for American-Free Asian enterprise and objective. In a real sense, the objectives of WACL can be gleaned from the Declaration of mutually shared beliefs and convictions that attracted over 200 delegates and observers to the first conference. This Declaration establishes the basic guidelines for the world anti-Communist movement. "First, it is our firm belief that the anti-Communist struggle is an historic one between freedom and slavery." In our day, the mountain of evidence justifying this fundamental proposition should be enough for all enlightened men to start with this premise, but it appears that geographical distances of 4,000 or 7,000 miles from the obvious battlelines can dim and distort the outlook of many a leader. A cardinal objective of WACL is to bring this truth home to free men in countries like the United States, France or Sweden where relatively comfortable circumstances and target areas of skillful Red propaganda combine to produce notions of unreality and illusions regarding the current struggle in Asia.

Also, the Declaration reads, "it is our firm belief that freedom is indivisible and that freedom and slavery cannot coexist. To permit over one billion people to be enslaved is both a shame to mankind and a danger to those who are yet free." None of the superficial changes, rifts, and squabbles in the extensive Red Empire with its syndicate of totalitarian governments can blind a WACL advocate to the stark reality of captive nations and peoples. Such growing blindness, as seen particularly in North America and Western Europe, can only induce rampant wishful thinking and a whole array of misdirected policies. This frank WACL outlook predicates the further objective of dissipating the myth of coexistence by uniting and intensifying resistance to Red aggression and infiltration in every corner of the earth.

"Lastly," the Declaration concludes, "it is our firm belief that with the downfall of Communism, the last serious obstacle in the age-long struggle for freedom, man will have realized his cherished ambitions and all captive nations and peoples will have been liberated." The third operational objective implied here is the consummation of agreement by all legitimate anti-Communist organizations as to overall strategy and common action in bringing about the collapse of the Red Empire. As gauged by its resolutions and tone of thought, the first WACL conference unmistakably pointed to the desperate need in the Free World for training and experience in psycho-poli-

tical warfare, especially in techniques and tactics of revolutionary warfare. At long last, we Americans are beginning to appreciate this need in South Vietnam.

Understood with perspective and mutual feeling, all of this offers a concrete pathway for genuine U.S. leadership. WACL is now in a developing operation. Its full members are national units from countries not only in Asia but also in Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Its first conference established a machinery that for the present is at work in the Asian sphere, but it also passed numerous resolutions, such as barring Red China from the U.N., propelling the captive nations movement on a global scale and observing the Tenth Captive Nations Week on July 14-20 on all continents, and seeking the liberation of North Vietnam, that in time will extend WACL's influence in non-Asian spheres.¹⁶

From its secretariat in Korea, WACL issues a monthly magazine, *The WACL Bulletin* which covers Red activities and anti-Communist operations in all parts of the world. With the several concomitant crises in Asia, the secretariat has recently been releasing timely statements and communiques on the significance of the events and how to cope with them. For example, concerning the Pueblo and Park's near-assassination, an early release pointed out that "the secret talks at Panmunjom began and the Republic of Korea was not represented... the Pueblo and its remaining men are still in North Korea. But what is worse, the story of the 31 intruders seems to have faded into the background. To the South Koreans, this is the unkindest cut of all." As one writer shows, we are losing face in Asia. His quotation of an old Chinese proverb is quite apt: "When the Dragon is stranded in shallow waters, it is easily teased by a swarm of shrimp."¹⁷

In Asia, we can dislodge the shrimp. WACL's future seems to be assured. Its Asian base is solid and vigorous. The danger of any exclusive stress on Asia and non-recognition of the fundamental imperialist Soviet Russian threat in Asia and elsewhere will be obviated in necessary amendments to its charter at the second conference. What is most promising is the preparation now being made by several American organizations to participate as full members in this world organization. History is full of fortunate accidents.

¹⁶ "Resolution on the 10th Observance of Captive Nations Week, July 14-20, 1968," *Congressional Record*, November 29, 1967, pp. H16052-53.

¹⁷ John F. Lewis, "Loss of Face: The Public Legacy," American Security Council, *Washington Report*, March 18, 1968.

CURRENT SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS*

By YAROSLAV BILINSKY

On January 30, 1924, the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs addressed a formal note to all states with which the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations. The note requested that the states no longer use such expressions as "Russia," "Russian Government," etc., and use instead, the new terms "USSR," "Soviet Government," for henceforth the People's Commissariat would represent the entire Soviet Union and not only Russia herself.¹ Herein more than ordinary diplomatic protocol was involved. The writer will try to show that the Soviet Union is an empire of a more sophisticated modern variety. It is unique indeed, combining economic and social progress with cultural perversion and political oppression. The Soviet Union has helped some peoples to grow and prosper but has also engaged in genocide on a scale exceeded only by Stalin's more notorious contemporary. The Soviet Union appears, above all, as a bundle of contradictions — with or without the addition of Marxian dialectics.

What have been some of the outstanding achievements of Soviet nationality policy and what has been their price? Rightly or wrongly — in the USSR as well as in the uncommitted Third World — industrialization is widely regarded as a prime indicator of economic and social development. The growth of industry in many non-Russian Republics has been impressive indeed, especially when compared with such countries as Turkey or Iran. The comparison gains in poignancy when we recall that the inhabitants of Soviet Azerbaijan are of Turkic origin and that the citizens of the Tadzhik SSR are closely related to the Persians. Alec Nove, an eminent authority

* This article is an abbreviated version of a public lecture delivered by the author at the University of Delaware, October 30, 1967.

¹ USSR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR* (Documents of Foreign Policy; Moscow, 1963), Vol. VII, p. 50. Reference courtesy of Vsevolod Holubnychy.

on the Soviet economy and J. A. Newth, an expert on Soviet Central Asia, last year jointly published the first book-length assessment of the economic development and social growth of eight Soviet peoples: the Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Transcaucasia, and the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz and Turkmen. They write:

Those nations have benefited... not only from being part of a much larger whole, but also, or even particularly, from the fact that the Government of the USSR had an industrializing ideology, equated social progress with industry, and paid special attention to the development in formerly backward areas.²

A somewhat different light on the very same process is shed by the Columbia trained economist Vsevolod Holubnychy. In a study that will be published shortly by the same house that issued Nove's and Newth's book, Holubnychy, on the basis of Soviet data, has demonstrated that there takes place in the Soviet Union a development akin to the proverbial widening gap between developed and underdeveloped countries in the capitalist world. Concretely, he has shown that the disparity between the *per capita* industrial output of the Russian Republic and that of most of the non-Russian Republics has grown over the years.³ For instance, Uzbekistan's *per capita* industrial output in 1913 was 51 per cent. Armenia, however, proper, in 1940 it amounted to 36 per cent, in 1958 to as little as 17 per cent, in 1965 it increased to 24 per cent. Armenia, however, possibly thanks to Mikoyan's patronage, did improve her relative position, from 43 per cent of Russia's industrial output in 1913 to 53 per cent in 1965. But neighboring Azerbaijan, once the oil supplier of the Empire, declined from 111 per cent in 1913 to as little as 31 per cent in 1965. Such a comparison may be more appropriate than Nove's and Newth's frequent references to the USSR average, for, after all, the Russian Republic is the former metropolis of the Empire. Admittedly, the population increases faster in the Moslem Republics than in Russia herself so that *per capita* figures would tend to deflate the total increase in those Republics, but this is cer-

² Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, *The Soviet Middle East: A Communist Model for Development* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 45.

³ "Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Nationalities," in Erich Goldhaven, ed., *The State of Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, to be published by Praeger in 1968.

tainly not a meaningless artificial deflation: living standards do depend to a large extent on *per capita* incomes, even in the USSR. Admitted also is that the Russian Republic includes some non-Russian nationalities such as Tatars and Bashkirs who may profit from the economic growth of Russia. There may also be more plentiful and better resources in the Urals and Siberia than, say, in Turkmenistan. But this is not the full explanation for the growing relative prosperity of the Russian Republic.

In an even more revealing table Holubnychy has demonstrated that the marginal capital product in industry, expressed as *per cent growth of output over per cent growth of investments*, in 1954-62 was higher in a series of non-Russian Republics than in Russia. Similarly, the *percentage of profit on investments* in 1959-63 was higher in some Republics than in Russia. In plain English, investment capital was more productive and/or more efficient in some Republics (e. g., Byelorussia and Latvia) than it was in Russia. Yet there is evidence that in 1956-60 the investments were channelled to Russian and to the even more expensive Kazakh industry rather than to Byelorussia, Latvia or, for that matter, Ukraine. Politics rather than economics seems to determine the crucial matter of distribution of investments, with the non-Russians sometimes winning a battle but often losing the war. For example, since about 1960 Soviet Ukrainian Party leaders and economists have vigorously lobbied in Moscow for higher investments in hydroelectric power stations in Ukraine. With Khrushchev's backing they won over the adherents of Siberian development in the Gosplan. The Uzbek leaders have — unsuccessfully, so far — advocated the development of textile manufacturing in their Republic, which is the largest producer of raw cotton in the USSR. In short, Nove and Newth hold that the Soviet government has been rather generous to the eight Republics in the South, whereas Holubnychy argues that, on the whole, it has been even more generous to the Russian Republic. Whatever the interpretation of Soviet data by an objective Western economist might be, the political fact is that in the view of many non-Russian leaders the government has not been generous enough. They derive little comfort from the fact that their Republics have outdistanced Turkey and Iran.

There are other and better known drawbacks of the industrialization process with which we shall deal but briefly. In the 1930's the industrialization was achieved at the expense of peasants who were herded into collective farms. Wherever peasants and nomadic herds-men put up strong resistance they were deported or suffered worse

fates. The American demographer Frank Lorimer has calculated that between 1926 and 1939 the USSR lost about five million people. Hard hit were Russian peasants in the lower Volga region and the Northern Caucasus, Ukrainian peasants throughout the Republic and, above all, the Kazakhs. According to the 1926 census, there were 4.0 million Kazakhs. In 1939 only 3.1 million were left. Had the Kazakh population kept pace with the average Soviet population increase, their number in 1939 would have been about 4.6 million, not 3.1 million, which gives a deficit of 1.5 million, or the loss of 37.5 per cent of a nation. Impolite though as it may be during the 50th anniversary celebrations, we would still call this genocide, nonetheless real for resulting from an economic policy applied throughout the Soviet Union.

Less grim is another concomitant of the industrialization: the transfer of Russians and, to a lesser extent, of Ukrainians and Byelorussians to the non-Slav Republics in such numbers as to upset the ethnic balance in the smaller ones. This is particularly true of the Baltic states.

...The percentage of Russians in Latvia, writes Professor Vardys, has climbed from prewar 10.6 percent to 26.6 percent in the census year of 1959, and in Estonia from 8 percent to 20.1 percent. In Lithuania the Russian numbers increased more modestly, from an estimated 2 percent before the war to 8.5 percent in 1959.⁴

To these figures should be added Ukrainians and Byelorussians. It has been estimated that if the immigration continues Estonians will be in a minority in their own country in 1985 and the Latvians by 1975. In 1959 Latvian Party leaders tried to restrict the influx of Russians. But for this and related acts of contumacy Khrushchev purged the First Latvian Party Secretary, the Republic's Deputy Prime Minister, the head of the Latvian Comsomol, and many others.

In Central Asia, with the exception of Kazakhstan, Slavic immigration has not been on so massive a scale. Nevertheless, the immigrants do take the better positions in administration and even among the factory workers. A reviewer of Nove's book noted:

In 1960 some Orientalists visiting a large factory in Tashkent (the Uzbek capital — Y.B.) elicited the information that only a third of the workers, and none of the technicians and managers, were Central Asians "because they prefer to work in agriculture" — a sentiment that sounded familiar.⁵

⁴ V. Stanley Vardys, "How the Baltic Republics Fare in the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 44 (April 1966), p. 512.

⁵ Charles Issawi, in *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXVI (September 1967), p. 504.

A similar complaint was voiced in the Soviet press in February, 1960. Tadzhik First Party Secretary Uldzhabayev wrote that the Party did not pay sufficient attention to the "great political significance" of advancing trained personnel from among the local population. "In the Leninabad Silk Kombinat, for example, there were in 1958, 1,800 workers of local nationality, but today" — said he — "there are only 1,100." In April of 1961 Uldzhabayev was purged allegedly for falsifying economic reports, but there were also hints that central Party authorities had objected to his preference for indigenous personnel. We ought to be careful in interpreting statistics of economic progress in Central Asia: to a considerable extent the true beneficiaries might be Slav immigrants.

Let us now turn to a brighter aspect of Soviet nationality policy. All the peoples in the USSR, large or small, are given equal access to some kind of primary and secondary education, part of which is given in the pupils' native languages. In the school year of 1966-67, e. g., 35.3 per cent of the elementary and secondary pupils in Kazakhstan were Kazakhs, numbering 855,000, compared with only 30 per cent Kazakhs among the total population. Possibly Kazakh families had more children than those of Slav immigrants. But it is a remarkable achievement nevertheless: during Czarist days, in 1911, less than 7,000 Kazakh children attended school.

Advances in higher education are also very impressive, particularly if one considers that some peoples had to start from scratch. For instance, in 1927 there were only 300 Kazakh college students, who constituted but 0.2 per cent of the total student population, at a time when the Kazakhs made up 2.7 per cent of the total Soviet population. In 1965-66 Kazakh students numbered almost 70,000 or 1.8 per cent of the total Soviet *student* population, the Kazakh share in the population at large having declined to 1.7 per cent. The Soviet government has deliberately applied nationality quotas in admissions to colleges roughly equivalent to the share of the people among the total USSR population.

On closer analysis, however, several points emerge from a scrutiny of Soviet figures alone. The Kazakhs, e. g., have still some way to go before they fill their quota share of professional positions in their Republic. At the end of 1960, e. g., only 24 per cent of the professional jobs in the Kazakh SSR were held by Kazakh college graduates. The same applies for the Uzbeks. In the Uzbek Republic, where the Uzbeks constitute 62 per cent of the population, Uzbeks fill but 37 per cent of the professional positions. *Preferential*, not

proportional, quotas for some of the less well developed nationalities might have been in order had the government wanted to achieve genuine equality. Such was the Soviet policy in the 1920's. In the 1960's, however, the advancement of indigenous cadres is being deemphasized.

Secondly, even proportional higher education quotas are not always observed. In analyzing the figures for 1965-66 the writer found an exact correlation in only three cases out of fifteen: among the Azerbaijanis, Lithuanians and Estonians. Higher education is being accelerated for Kazakhs, Georgians and Armenians. It is lagging behind for Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, Moldavians, Latvians, Kirghiz, Tadzhiks and Turkmens. Of great significance is the fact that Russians have been favored in college admissions: their population share is about 55 per cent, but they make up 61 per cent of all college students, roughly 2.4 million in number.

Of great importance for the evaluation of the educational process is the content of curricula, particularly as it impinges on the national heritage of the individual peoples. Since 1958 Russian has been strongly emphasized as a medium of instruction, and comprehensive statistics on non-Russian language schools have all but disappeared. We know, however, that in the early 1960's one third of all Kazakh children attended Russian-language, not Kazakh, schools. In Azerbaijan, in 1940-41, 12 per cent of Azerbaijani pupils attended Russian language schools. By 1960-61, despite opposition from Azerbaijani educators and Party officials, the percentage had risen to 25.1 and is said to have increased even more by 1966. In the non-Russian schools, too, the Russian language is taught more hours than the indigenous language. Thirdly, bilingual schools with a section taught in Russian and another in a different language are being strongly encouraged, particularly in Central Asia and in the Baltic states.

In mid-November of 1966 the theory of the inevitable fusion of all peoples in the Russian nation was sharply attacked at the Fifth Ukrainian Writers Congress. Despite the fact that the theory—enshrined as it had been in a pseudo-qualified "dialectic" form in Khrushchev's Party Program of 1961—was not repudiated by Brezhnev, one speaker denounced it as "paper communism... garrison communism, ...the direct descendant of a dogmatic... 'Red Guards' muse." Sergey Baruzdin, the visiting Secretary of the Writers Union of the Russian Republic, admitted:

I, as a Russian, could not always understand the haste with which we suddenly began to talk about the merging of cultures... Some of us have hurried too much and — there is no hiding the truth — have provoked other than friendly sentiments towards this process.⁶

The spirited protests of writers notwithstanding, the official pressure for Russification seems to continue unabated. Earlier, in 1959, Party leaders in several Republics had tried to resist the Russifying implications of Khrushchev's school reform of 1958-59. Partly for this reason, the First Party Secretaries of Latvia and Azerbaijan were purged and a junior Party Secretary in Ukraine was "honorably" exiled as Ambassador to Communist China.

We will be brief on the political arrangements, for they are best known. All the important decisions are made in Moscow in the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Communist Party. Under Khrushchev, whose political career had been linked with Ukraine, two Ukrainians were taken into the very important Secretariat, which in fact is the executive arm of the Communist Party. Since April of 1966 the Secretariat has been composed exclusively of Russians. Brezhnev has continued to use Ukrainians as junior partners in the Politburo, but has tried to counterbalance their influence by introducing Byelorussians as second junior partners. At the present time there are 10 Russians on the Politburo, 4 Ukrainians, 2 Byelorussians, and one Kazakh, Uzbek, Georgian and Latvian each. The representatives of the smaller peoples, except possibly the Latvian, one of the Byelorussians and two of the Ukrainians, are in fact *ex officio* representatives of their Republics, not political figures in their own right. The role of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians on the Politburo appears an ambiguous one: they may have been instrumental in obtaining some economic concessions for their Republics, as did the Ukrainians in 1962, but they have been either not able or not willing to stem Khrushchev's cultural Russification drive.

On the Republican level, the most important person is, as a rule, the Republican First Party Secretary. He is almost invariably a native of the Republic, though under Stalin the Secretaries of Ukraine were usually Russians. It is significant that in the last nine years, starting in December, 1958, the First Secretaries of the Turkmenian, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Latvian, Tadzhik, Kirghiz, and Armenian parties were all removed from office for nationalist deviations of one sort or another, and that the First Secretary of Kazakhstan was

⁶ *Literaturna Ukraina*, November 22, 1966, p. 3.

temporarily demoted to Prime Minister. The last purge in Armenia took place as late as February of 1966: the reason was a combination of economic and political disagreements with Moscow.

Almost as important as the First Secretary and sometimes even more important, is his deputy, the Second Secretary, whose job it is to supervise the placement of Party and government personnel in the Republic. The Second Secretary frequently acts as watchdog on Moscow's behalf. A recent study found that in 1966 only in four non-Russian Republics (Ukraine, Byelorussia, Armenia and Estonia) were there native Second Secretaries. In all other Republics the Second Secretary was either a Russian or, in fewer instances, a Ukrainian. Moscow thus tries to exercise control over all the Republics' Party organizations by placing *doubly* trusted emissaries in key positions. We emphasize *doubly* because the First Secretaries, too, are all cleared with the personnel section of the Central Committee in Moscow. A similar development takes place in the parallel government structure, where, e. g., secret police positions are frequently filled by outsiders.

A few remarks on a particular nationality before our conclusions. Soviet Jews constitute a special problem, but they also furnish the acid test of Soviet policy towards other peoples. Hitler's savagery had reduced the number of Soviet Jews from about 4.8. million in 1939 to some 2.3 million in 1959. Jews are dispersed over several Republics, 38 per cent of them living in the Russian Republic, 37 per cent in Ukraine, and 7 per cent in Byelorussia. Only 20.8 per cent of the Jews in 1959 (472,000) gave Yiddish as their native language, almost all the others opted for Russian. The Jews have practically no political organs of representation: their contingent in the USSR Supreme Soviet is ridiculously low, they have no Republic to call their own. Above all, rightly or wrongly, Soviet Jewry is accused of harboring a certain national allegiance to the State of Israel and of not being indifferent towards their coreligionists in the United States. Soviet Jews also show certain strengths: they are heavily urbanized and highly educated. They are well represented among Soviet doctors, scientists, artists and communication specialists.

We will not dwell on Stalin's policy toward the Jews: his anti-Semitism has been admitted by none other than his daughter. All surviving Yiddish cultural institutions — schools, theaters and publishing houses — were closed down in 1948, some two hundred Jewish writers shot, and a bloody purge of the rest was being prepared in

the last month of Stalin's life. But, the threatened purge aside, the situation of the Jews under Khrushchev and Brezhnev has not significantly improved. No Yiddish school has been reopened, allegedly because demand is insufficient. No permanent Yiddish theater has been reestablished. Between 1948 and 1959 not a single Yiddish book was published in the USSR, between 1959 and the end of 1966 there appeared a total of nine books, all in small editions. A single Yiddish periodical is published and a single newspaper. At the same time, the Mari-speaking Maris, a Finnic people in the Volga region, a group similar in size to Yiddish-speaking Jews, do have Mari schools, hundreds of books, ten newspapers and five periodicals. By 1966 the number of synagogues had been further reduced to about 60-70, which is to be compared to about 600 churches for the three million Lithuanian Catholics, a people of comparable size. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that a deliberate attempt is being made to destroy the Jews as a cultural and religious community, to practice "culturocide," or cultural genocide.

But the tragedy of the Jewish community is that a considerable number of Jews would like to assimilate themselves to the Russians but are discriminated against as individuals. Max Hayward of Oxford University writes:

An eminent Moscow cultural worker told me that despite his graduating from a secondary school with a gold medal in 1952 he could not enter Moscow University on account of his Jewish origin, but had to go to the provinces. Our greatest tragedy, he told me, is that we feel ourselves Russians.⁷

He had fallen victim to the nationality quota system which, as a rule, operates against the Jews: in 1929 Jews made up 13.5 per cent of the Soviet student body; by 1959 their number had been cut down to about 4 per cent, and in 1965-66 it had dwindled to 2.5 per cent. (Jews constitute 1.1 per cent of the total Soviet population.) Such discrimination against individual Jews was confirmed by Mrs. Alliluyeva-Stalin in her news conference in New York on April 26, 1967. Jews have also been removed from certain government offices, notably the Soviet diplomatic corps. By such measures almost completely assimilated Soviet Jews are sharply reminded of their Jewishness. Latent and not so latent anti-Semitism among the other Soviet peoples, who see in them their economic and social rivals, also works in this direction. On the other hand, emerging is a cer-

⁷ *Jews in Eastern Europe*, Vol. III, No. 4 (June 1966), pp. 42-43.

tain *entente cordiale* between Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals; witness Yevtushenko's "Babiy Yar," and Smolych's call for publishing Yiddish books in Ukraine (at the last Ukrainian writers' congress).

What conclusions can be drawn from this overview which, by its very nature, can barely scratch the surface? A substantial economic and cultural advance of the Soviet peoples is there, but it looks somewhat less impressive when compared with that of the Russian Republic. It may also have been bought at the price of serious demographic dislocations or losses and of humiliating manipulation of their cultural heritage. The Jews may constitute an extreme example, but they also furnish a warning that under Soviet conditions a complete fusion of nations may be tantamount to the annihilation of the smaller among them.

Are the non-Russian peoples disappearing? The growth in the rate of ethnic intermarriages would have been a persuasive indicator of assimilation. Soviet authorities, however, still have not released precise comprehensive statistics. In 1959, 10.2 per cent of Soviet marriages were between partners of different nationalities. The figures range from a low of 3.2 per cent in the Armenian SSR to highs of 15.8 per cent in Latvia and 15.0 per cent in Ukraine. Unfortunately the 1959 figures are not correlated with nationalities, so that it is impossible to tell who actually marries, and it is impossible to tell who actually marries whom. Nor has this writer been able to locate comprehensive all-Union statistics in the 1926 census. From other sources it appears that the intermarriage rate in Ukraine has gone up: in 1959, 18.5 per cent *urban* Ukrainians were married to non-Ukrainians compared with 14.8 per cent in 1927.

Soviet scholars frequently cite the figure of 10.2 million non-Russians who had given Russian as their "native" language to the 1959 census-takers as evidence of widespread linguistic assimilation (native language in this context means the language in which the respondent is most fluent, as determined by the census-taker). The census of 1926 had listed 6.5 million non-Russians as having given Russian as their "native" language. Between 1926 and 1959 the number of Russian-speaking non-Russians increased by 3.7 million, i. e., by 56.9 per cent, while the entire USSR population increased by only 25.5 per cent. Russification is indeed outpacing the general population increase. The impact of linguistic Russification has not been uniform, however. Furthermore, in order to interpret the political significance of linguistic assimilation it might be useful to dis-

tinguish between acculturation and assimilation proper. Acculturation is defined as "the adoption by a person or group of a culture of another social group, or the process leading to this adoption." Assimilation proper, on the other hand, entails "the adoption of a culture of another social group to such an extent that the person or group no longer has any characteristics identifying him with his former culture and no longer has any particular loyalties to his former culture."⁸ It has been pointed out by a Western author that all Soviet Jews are acculturated, but a large number of them are not assimilated. Objectively and psychologically many Russian-speaking Jews are Jews but not Russians.

It would be rather fanciful, however, to speak of widespread bourgeois nationalism in the Soviet Union in the meaning of a desire to restore non-Communist or even anti-Communist independent states, though such a sentiment should not be completely ruled out in the Baltic states or in Ukraine. But it appears to this writer that national communism — the desire to combine the Communist socio-economic and political structure with a genuine respect for the national interests of the Republics does not only exist but may actually be growing with the increase in numbers of the non-Russian intelligentsia. As Professor Richard Pipes, the foremost historian of Soviet nationalities, has recently pointed out, the pseudo-federal form of the Soviet Union reinforces this tendency. Pipes' viewpoint is seconded by one of the most perceptive observers of Soviet politics, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, formerly of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State. He said in a recent address:

The problem of nationalities is rising in intensity... When we think of the Soviet Union, we only too often tend to forget that 50 per cent of the Soviet population is not Russian; increasingly these peoples are beginning to have a sense of national identity and national desire for self-expression. I submit that this will become a major domestic problem in the Soviet Union in the decades to come.⁹

We are inclined to agree for one simple reason known to Lenin but frequently ignored by his successors: pride in one's ancestry is a universal human trait, it is not the exclusive possession of Russians.

⁸ Zvi Gitelman, "The Jews," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XVI, No. 5 (September-October 1967), p. 100.

⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Toward a Community of Developed Nations," *Department of State Bulletin*, March 13, 1967, p. 417.

THE PROBLEM AND DANGER OF ASIAN COMMUNISM

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Today, when our papers and journals are full of accounts on the clashes between the ideology of the Russian and that of Chinese Communism, it is not easy to understand exactly what is the difference between the two brands, much less to trace their history and their goals. Yet both have the same primary hate: the West, labelled at will as capitalist, imperialist, neo-colonialist, etc. They have the same basic goal, the formation of a Communist imperium which is to embrace the entire world, and towards that they are ready to use any and all means, regardless of personal integrity or the pledged word, to achieve. Compared with this, other details and feuds become trifling, even though the Western world is willing to grasp at any straw, no matter how tenuous, even if it remotely seems to promise a vestige of peace.

From the very beginning of the Russian Czarist collapse in the spring of 1917, we can distinctly trace in the thought and still more in the writings of the time the two views of the future of Russian Communism. The one was the ideal that was taught by Lenin with his reliance upon the Russian workmen, the Bolsheviks under his discipline. The other was expressed by the seemingly more liberal thinkers and poets about the role that would be played in the future by the still un-Russianized natives of Asia, by the idea of Pan-Mongolism expressed in Block's *Scythians*, by the feelings of Vsevolod Ivanov in such stories as *The Child*, and by other writings that reflect more or less dimly the mystery that lay hidden in Mongolia, a vague term to many of the European Communists who at first thought only of Petrograd and Europe.

But there were Asian Communists from the very beginning. There were Red Guards composed of Chinese Communists who played vital roles in the disposal of the Whites and the massacres that took place in many of the western cities of the Empire. The same Vsevolod Ivanov in *Armored Train 1469* tells how the Communists were freed

from the menace of a White armored train because a humble Chinese voluntarily laid down his head on the rails and allowed himself to be used as a block for the train so that the Communists could bring it to a halt and be ready, when the doors opened, to board and seize it.

It was only a few years after that, still in the early days of Stalin, that the Moscow Soviet approved the sending of one Borodin to Communize China to bring back some of the up and coming Chinese leaders to Moscow. The mission of Borodin proved to be singularly ineffective; it was from among the young men whom he recruited that many of the anti-Communist leaders of Taiwan emerged. After the failure of his mission had become evident, Borodin vanished from history and he has not yet been rehabilitated, even under his own name, for he used an alias throughout his career.

During the period of the warlords, when it seemed as if the central government of China had never even existed, Communism became a minor issue. The Communists finally secured control of northern Manchuria and expelled the anomalous Russian regime left over from imperial times. The Southern Manchurian army of Japan consolidated its grip on the south where it had become ensconced after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Factories sprang up and the industrialization of both sections went on rapidly, while the central government of the Kuo-Ming Tang was barely able to maintain itself in the Yangtse cities. The situation changed rapidly after the Japanese military decided to cement their position more firmly by unseating the nominal rulers of Manchuria. When their attack succeeded, they installed the last Emperor of China, the puppet known then as Henry Puyi, as ruler of what they called Manchukuo. From this it was but a step to the actions intended to cement Japanese rule over all of East and Southeast Asia: the train of events was started that led up to Pearl Harbor and the shattering of whatever stability had been achieved in Southeast Asia.

With the attempted return of the former colonial powers to the area after Japan's defeat the situation changed totally. The old prestige that had allowed a handful of Western officials to maintain a rough sort of order among the millions of the native populations was gone. It was relatively easy for native leaders, cutting themselves off from the system of the past to seize political power and, perhaps for lack of more accurate term, call themselves Communists. As it happened, Moscow, despite some glaring mistakes as the Borodin incident showed, was by and large fortunate in its young men who had been taken or who had fled to Moscow to pass the war years so far as indoctrination was concerned. It is perhaps less certain how much

Mao Tse-tung learned directly or indirectly from his Moscow experience. But there can be no doubt that Ho Chi Minh had been a good and astute student of the Muscovite theories.

After the Teheran Conference and the subsequent meeting in Cairo between President Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek, one would be hard put to say which of the war leaders knew less of the situation. Many of the representatives of the United States decided that Mao and his group were merely agricultural reformers and tried in every way to bring about a reconciliation between Chiang and Mao, naturally to no avail, and it was these advisers that gave, unconsciously perhaps, indirect encouragement to Mao and his peasants on their southern march and helped make for the forced withdrawal of Chiang to Taiwan.

On the other hand, there seems to be abundant evidence that Stalin, himself an oriental spider, did not like the ideas of Mao. At one time he doubted whether Mao could work out a suitable Communist system for the area under his control. As a result, when the South Manchurian army collapsed, Stalin claimed the factories and machinery as booty in recompense for the great losses suffered by the Soviet Union in the "Fatherland War." The Russians hurriedly carted away all this booty to build up their Trans-Ural bases, while Manchuria, under another name and stripped of its manufacturing resources, was turned over to Mao's China as rapidly as possible. It was only the personal influence of General MacArthur that saved Japan from that ravaging that marked the progress of the Soviet forces into Eastern Europe and that made it possible for the Russian Orthodox mission in Japan to continue without being subjected to bans such as those imposed upon the Orthodox and Catholic Churches in the homeland.

When the outcome of the war against Germany was already evident, grandiose plans were made for the Organization of the United Nations. Based on the idea that the five great nations of the Grand Alliance would cooperate in maintaining world peace, they were granted an absolute veto power in the Security Council. These five were the United States, Great Britain, France, nationalist China and the Soviet Union at the height of the enthusiasm, ratification was pushed through the United States Senate with almost no discussion at all and the attempt was made to win the good will of Stalin by giving him virtual *carte blanche* in extending Soviet power throughout Europe. By accepting Stalin's view that all dissenting elements in the border countries were either Nazi or imperialistic, the West gave Stalin a free hand to do what he wanted. Even in Korea, where a

boundary line between American and Soviet influence had been put at the 38th parallel, no progress was made at unification, and it very soon turned out that Stalin was exerting every possible influence to Communize North Korea. It was only through the foresight of Winston Churchill, who named the resulting situation the cold war, that the danger of further Communist advances in Europe was stemmed and Greece was rescued from a Communist revolt through British and then American intervention.

Shortly afterward the North Koreans launched an attack across the dividing line. For the only time ever, the absence of a Soviet representative on the Security Council made it possible for the United Nations to take consistent action, declare North Korea an invader and send a force, chiefly American, to stop it. When this succeeded, Red China under Mao sent its volunteers into the battle, probably with Soviet arms. After some years fighting it was decided to recall MacArthur, and when General Eisenhower was elected president, in 1952, he went to Korea and an armistice was arranged to be guaranteed by neutrals, one of the pro-Westerners which had sent few troops and a Communist Poland which had not been further involved. The armistice commission continued to meet spasmodically but, as to be expected, the control commission brought in sterile reports. While Stalin was alive, the situation was allowed to simmer with no progress toward unification.

Yet with the Korean position apparently stabilized, the same thing happened in what had been French Indo-China. The French put in an Emperor, Bao-Dai, and treated the area as a part of the French Republic. Bao-Dai turned out to be one who preferred to draw his income from his homeland and enjoy himself in Europe. It was not long before the French were faced with an open revolt led by Ho Chi Minh, who achieved fame by compelling the French to evacuate their stronghold Dien Bien Phu, with a heavy loss of men. Then came the first of the Geneva Conventions which provided for the division of the area into the states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the three chief components of the region, with Vietnam being subdivided at the 17th parallel into a Communist north around Hanoi and an anti-Communist south around Saigon. All three states were to be completely independent without military support from outside. The Communists all retired to the north and the anti-Communists to the south. Here again was a paper solution: India, Canada and Poland were appointed to a control commission and again no unanimous report could be adopted. Contrary to the conventions, North Vietnamese Communist units began to appear in Laos to help

the Laotian Communists under Prince Souvamaphong. Once again Asian Communism was on the march to prevent the new system from taking shape.

The situation in Laos became so confused with the control commission unable to agree as to the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos that a new conference was held in Geneva. This provided for the merger of the three armed forces in Laos: the royalist troops in the south, the Communists in the north and a neutralist force under Souvanna Phouma in the centre. This, of course, did not alter the situation. Souvanna Phouma took over and more or less unified the south and centre but the Communist forces in the north refused. Prince Souvannaphong, who was supposed to be one of the three coordinate rulers of Laos, declined despite all guarantees to go to the capital and fill his post, on the ground that his life was in danger. So in essence nothing changed.

On the other hand, various South Vietnamese Communists began to infiltrate into their home areas under the name of the Viet Cong and to torture any prominent individuals who were working in the area to restore and improve living conditions. Then under the guise of an independent nationalist effort, they established a National Liberation Front with headquarters in Hanoi. The situation became ever more critical as the new infiltrators began to move freely along mountain paths in the eastern side of Laos along what has come to be known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. Along this road has moved a steadily increasing amount of men and machines in a so-called war of liberation, following the approved plans of both Khrushchev and Mao, the two differing on what constitutes a war of liberation and who should be involved in it but both have agreed that it is the opposition of a people to a foreign imperialist power, in this case the Americans and all other nations which have sent detachments to support a hard pressed South Vietnamese government. The initial support given by American advisors and instructors after the inauguration of President Kennedy has continued on a magnified scale by President Johnson, arousing much American criticism. But even so, still maintained is the theory that this is not a war to decommunize North Vietnam, and the American air force has not bombed the actual port of Haiphong. The Russians are free to send in as many supplies by ship as they desire, while the American carriers offshore are constantly spied upon by Soviet electronic ships which are able to report at once when planes leave the carriers.

The third of the three states, Cambodia, under the control of Prince Sihanouk, has protested stoutly that the Americans are threatening to invade the country, which is strictly neutral. The Prince blames it on the American support for Thailand, since the Thais and the Khmers, the main peoples in the two states, have been bitter enemies for centuries, and he has aspired to a neutrality which has been wholly favorable to the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. Lately, despite his arguments, there has been increased evidence that the port of Sihanoukville in the south, built with American money and connected by good roads with the interior, is now becoming a main source of supplies for the Communists. Still more disturbing to the Prince apparently has been the growing evidence that the North Vietnamese with Chinese backing have been shown to be using Cambodia as another staging area for attacks on South Vietnam. In addition, there is the unwelcome discovery—although he is not yet fully convinced—that the Communists are not going to stop with this but that they are trying to set up a Communist rule in at least some portions of the Cambodian territory with possible dangerous repercussions on his own position.

To the east of the mainland we have the case of Indonesia. Sukarno long prided himself on being one of the neutralist leaders of the world. Typically, he resorted liberally and generously to the loans offered for military equipment and grandiose construction by Moscow, while he came to look with a jaundiced eye on the aid that America liberally furnished, even to the point of putting pressure on the Netherlands to turn over to him the Dutch portion of New Guinea which was still in the Stone Age. Red China brought him to a confrontation with Malaysia and the Philippines and fanned the flames of discontent, until the vain Sukarno broke with the United States almost completely and even withdrew from the United Nations. Then came some still unexplained events. There was apparently an attempt either with or without the knowledge of Sukarno to murder the leading non-Communist military officers. The attempt miscarried. Some of them escaped and though wounded were able to assert their control over enough troops to seize Jakarta. This culminated in a massacre of known or suspected Communists, and Indonesia, which had seemed safe in Communist hands, is now beginning despite Communist plots to try to restore some financial stability and repair some of the harbor works which had been built by the Dutch and allowed to go to decay under Sukarno's policy.

If there may be hopes for Indonesia and its resistance, it does not end the role of Asian Communism. The interior of both Thailand and Burma is populated by hitherto almost neglected tribes — some akin to the Vietnamese and others not — similar to the mountain tribes which have been despised for years in both Vietnams and in Laos. Those akin to the Vietnamese in northern Thailand are being subjected to infiltration by Vietnamese Communists. While the United States has air bases in Thailand, it is obliged to try to encourage the Thais to reform their administration and to provide better conditions of life in the interior. There can be good hopes that this can be accomplished for Thailand and its rulers, including the military; a considerable part of the population have long been accustomed to Western contacts, and even though they have not interpreted democracy and democratic institutions like the West, they have a certain sense of the meaning of law and may pass this test as they did the freeing of their country from Western overlordship in the nineteenth century.

The case of Burma is even stranger. The celebrated Burma Road built by American engineers during World War II against tremendous odds led through Kachin and Shan territory into Burma proper. The road was built to carry supplies to Southern China while the Japanese held the seaports and it was over this road that Vinegar Joe Stillwell retreated when it was impossible to struggle further. As the area settled down, that road became a way of entry for the Red Chinese, but for some years the government of Burma has watched the Kachin and the Shan states with an anxious eye, for both have demanded self-determination. Early American Baptist missionaries had achieved a strong position with their hospitals and work among the Kachins, and this displeased the Burmese government, which under General NeWin again has tried to preserve a strict neutrality even at the cost of checking trade and even tourism. He boasted that with a long boundary with China he had maintained peace by this policy, but now it is becoming evident that there are Chinese Communists adding to the efforts of the Kachins and that the boasted neutrality has created for him a new danger to the unity of the state, if we can term this traditionally Burmese area to the north as being within the fold.

The danger is that all this may easily spill over into India and the almost insurmountable problems that that state faces: in the northeast again among mountain tribes and in the language split between the Hindi-speaking people in the north and the Tamils in the south not to speak of the Moslems now included in Pakistan,

and the danger from the Chinese reconquest of Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama into India, where he remains an unwelcome but necessary guest, while in the disturbances over Kashmir and various areas in the north Pakistan has established contacts with China that are too close. Finally, India, on the way of changing some of its policies, is at least flirting dangerously with the Soviet Union.

Lastly, we must not forget the recent seizure of the "Pueblo" by the North Koreans in international waters, the invasion of South Korea by a group of North Koreans with the object of murdering the President of South Korea and the repeated demands in the United Nations by the Soviet Union and its communist allies that the United States give up the United Nations mandate to protect South Korea and allow the North Koreans to liberate it as the Soviet Union did the democratic or near-democratic elements in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. We find the same forces working in the Near and Middle East and the same paralysis seizing all the operations of the United Nations there and in Africa.

Basically this danger of the spreading of the Communist infection is what is meant in those statements that loss of face in Vietnam by the United States would result in the toppling of one government after another in the area. The statements by President Johnson to the effect that the United States is not trying to decommunize North Vietnam but to show that Communist aggression does not pay is only a part of the truth. The remedy is far deeper, for if there has been a slowing down of infiltration into Europe it has come only because the barriers to it have been strengthened during the past years despite the sabotage of all American aims in the United Nations and the Security Council. It is far less clearly seen by the intellectual and student classes and the religious groups who are stressing the need of universality in action and are therefore talking about the withdrawal of the American power. It is not understood by those in this country and Europe who are calling for the cessation of bombing of the North lest we destroy the people we are trying to save and hence the opposition to the operations. The Western world, especially since World War II and the discovery of the bomb, wants to do everything possible for peace to avoid the threat of a holocaust in World War III and to promote business and international relations. Yet these classes cannot see that their program is bringing about exactly opposite results and increasing the menace that they fear. At the present time it is very unlikely

that the United State can force North Vietnam or North Korea to honest negotiations on any possible terms. -

As Lord Avon (Anthony Eden) said recently, negotiations could begin tomorrow if the Soviet Union gave the signal, for the key to the situation is in Moscow. Yet Moscow as well as Peking are putting pressure on the Communist states to increase the bitterness of their resistance to bleed the United States white. Any measure proposed to build bridges between the two worlds is futile; such bridges are only a one-way street. Any hope of using the other lane is vain and meaningless and weakening to the free world.

The benighted populations of East Asia have only two choices. The old stagnant past is doomed. Technology is coming in often against their will, and the question is whether that change is to be oriented toward a growth of human rights or a new trend toward slavery. That is the way it must be presented to the Asians and to our own people. That is in line with the American tradition throughout the centuries and that is what the army in Vietnam is endeavoring to secure. We can only hope that victory will come to the cause of freedom without such adulteration that it will compel the reopening of the struggle at a later time.

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BOOK REVIEWS

STORMY ROAD TO FREEDOM. By Nicholas Prychodko. With a Foreword by Igor Gouzenko. Vantage Press, Inc. New York-Washington-Hollywood, p. 356, \$5.95, 1968.

The tragic and unfinished saga of the suffering and persecution of the Ukrainian people under Communist Russia is again eloquently brought to the fore in a new book by Nicholas Prychodko, entitled *Stormy Road to Freedom*. Published in the first weeks of 1968, the book serves to confirm the voices of protests and rebellion emanating from Ukrainian writers, poets and intellectuals in enslaved Ukraine.

Author Nicholas Prychodko is not unknown to the English-speaking public. Now a Canadian citizen, Prychodko was born in Ukraine and is a holder of two academic degrees (the Pedagogical Institute and the Politechnic Institute, both in Kiev, capital of Ukraine). He was associate professor of technology at the University of Kiev, and he is author of five technical books, published in the Ukrainian language. In 1938 he was arrested during the worst era of Stalinist terror and spent three years in a Siberian slave labor camp. He escaped just before World War II. His experiences during this time are described in his book, *One of the 15 Million*, published in the United States by Little Brown and which also appeared in 8 other foreign languages.

The present book is in the form of a novel, a drama-packed account of the Ukrainian family of Hlobas, whose members are caught up, torn apart and scattered in the turmoil of the brutal enslavement of Ukraine by Communist Russia.

Although *Stormy Road to Freedom* is written in fiction form there is little doubt about the validity of its characters. The story is a vivid and genuine illustration of life under Stalin's regime; as such, it is the obverse side of the coin to Svetlana Alliluyeva's book, *Twenty Letters to a Friend*. The story told by Prychodko happened time and again in Ukraine and in Siberia, at a time when Stalin was dandling his daughter on his knee in the Kremlin.

In a sure but light style the author unveils a vast panorama of life with moving clarity: how ordinary men and women in Ukraine lived, loved and laughed throughout years of terror, Siberian slave labor camps, tortures by the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, the German-Soviet war of 1941-45, life in DP camps in West Germany, and — for some — finally exit to freedom — emigration to the United States.

The Ukrainian Hlobas were a typical and patriotic Ukrainian family; when the Russian Bolsheviks took over Ukraine in 1920 after destroying its independence, they immediately were considered to be "enemies of the people." They were caught in the first onslaught of Communist Russia against the Ukrainian people — the mass deportation of *kulaks* (*kurkuls* in Ukrainian, denoting

wealthy farmers), the nights of pillage, rape and murder — during which the Bolsheviks arrested hundreds of thousands of the best Ukrainian farmer families and shipped them in cattle trains to eventual death in Siberia.

The hero of the book is Roman Hloba; his 17-year-old sister, Christina, is forced to barter her body with the party officials in order to save her family. Roman, surviving years of horror in death camps, finally escapes to commence a fantastic trek across the boundless Siberian *taigas*. He manages to live for years with false passport, even creating a new family.

With the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in 1941 Roman is mobilized, and witnesses the incredible, savage execution of Red Army soldiers charged with "desertion" to the German side. Eventually, as a tank commander Roman is captured by the Germans, and is assigned to a squad dismantling time bombs dropped by the allied air force over Germany.

The final chapters of the book are dedicated to the hero's efforts to escape the dreamed Soviet repatriation commissions in West Germany and to his and his family's successful voyage to freedom — to the United States under the DP act.

Author Prychodko, to whom the meaning of Russian Communism is no mere academic term, has dedicated his book to "American Soldiers Fighting in Vietnam — in the Centennial of my Great Country, Canada."

In his foreword, Igor Gouzenko states that "The book is embroidered with no less thrilling events than James Bond's stories, but these events actually happened. And it is the author's talent that makes it possible to believe in the adventures of his heroes. We follow their stormy roads with undiminished interest and bated breath from beginning to end. The author also leaves no doubt about his genius for describing communal existence..."

Stormy Road to Freedom is more than just another book describing conditions under Communist rule. It is above all a deep human interest story, involving all human frailties and strengths. It gives a decisive rebuff to the Great Soviet Lie that the Russian Bolshevik Revolution brought freedom, prosperity and justice to the peoples of the USSR. Nothing could be further from the truth. It serves as a warning to the free world that the nature of Russian Communism is basically unchangeable. Stalin and Khrushchev have gone, but the system remains.

Recent disclosures of unbridled Russian persecution of Ukrainian writers and intellectuals, especially Vyacheslav Chornovil, Svyatoslav Karavansky, Ivan Kandyba, and others — only confirm the story so compellingly and searchingly related by Prychodko. At bottom it is a dramatization of the plight of the captive nations in the USSR.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

WORKERS' PARADISE LOST, Fifty Years of Soviet Communism: A Balance Sheet. By Eugene Lyons, Funk & Wagnalls, New York, 1967, pp. 387.

Appearing on the eve of Moscow's celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, this factually-packed work served a good, constructive purpose. Its impact was immediate, and its worthy and valuable aspects will endure for some time. As every analyst expected, Moscow's propaganda machine went into full swing on the glorious advances made in economics, the arts,

the happy coexistence of nations in the USSR, and in the growing power of the Soviet Union under the direction of its Communist Party. These were supposedly the fruits of the Bolshevik revolution. In balance sheet form (though a profit-and-loss statement would have shown up the costs more emphatically) the author points out the many myths underlying these ostensible advances.

In recounting the histories of Soviet Russia and the later Soviet Union these past fifty years, the author performs in part a valuable service for our younger generation. Most in the new generation are totally unaware of how the Bolsheviks came into power, how the Soviet Union came into being, and what the ambitions and techniques of the Soviet Russian imperio-colonialists have been to this day. Although there is really nothing new by way of substantive content in this book, it provides, nevertheless, a useful and instructive summary for the unfamiliar, that is, as far as it goes. Even those of the older generations, many who knew but have forgotten and also those who never knew even to forget, stand to profit from some portions of the work.

Except scholars and very serious-minded students willing to plod through hardrock evidence, one can hardly expect the average American reader to pour over the historic reports of the Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression (U.S. House of Representatives, 1953-54) or the developing studies of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Soviet Russian empire, meaning the Soviet Union itself. Both factually and analytically, these sources far exceed what is contained in this book. They certainly don't perpetuate some of the myths found in this exposition against prevailing myths, and they unquestionably furnish more accurate and solid frameworks for interpretative analysis. From the viewpoint of foreign policy action, this work is limited and possesses certain shortcomings.

The strong aspects of the book are the author's easy, narrative, almost reportorial style and his exposure of numerous myths circulating in the Free World. These myths embrace the notions that the USSR is a "classless society," that Soviet Russian communism is "Marxist" and "socialist," that the nations in the USSR "love the communist system," that the Soviet Union "has become 'liberal' and is evolving toward democracy, and that "the coexistence slogan means what it says." Concerning these and several others, the writer does an effective job. He is especially effective on Lenin's promises and subsequent deeds, the Russian Bolshevik perversion of Marxism, totalitarianism in the USSR, and to some degree on Soviet Russian imperialism.

However, what is gained by a roving, narrative style is lost in careful, precise analysis. This is shown by a terminological mishmash throughout the work, indicative in itself of conceptual confusion, and a poorly weighted assignment of priority values to the forces at work in the area designated now as the Soviet Union. In stating this, the reviewer does not intend to deflect the meritorious features of the work, for they are clearly substantial, nor does he seek to indulge in any invidious comparisons between Mr. Lyons' past writings and this one.

Having known the author for well over a decade, even having engaged in several sharp battles with him, I cannot but find many portions of this work quite comforting and encouraging, for they represent creditable progress and advances in thought and outlook. There can be no question of the author's authoritative contributions to America's understanding of the myth of Communism and of the dangers of "international communism," but, until perhaps

now, there has been sharp disagreement over fundamentals, such as Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, historical continuities of institutional import, ranging from an imperialist-colonialist system to police state methods, censorship, and genocide, and the hollowness of the Russian complaint about "separatism" where the goal of freedom and national independence is the right of every nation or people, whether in Eastern Europe, Asia, or Africa. Though introduced more or less incidentally, secondarily or parenthetically, portions in the work dealing with the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR make for some satisfying reading. A clear-cut difference in analytic outlook and frameworks of reference regarding the consummate problem of the Soviet Union may be easily discerned by the reader by comparing the conceptual structure of the reviewer's current work on *The Vulnerable Russians* and Lyons' latest effort.

It is regrettable that a book which does an excellent job in exposing numerous outstanding myths on Communism should start with a dedication to two other lingering myths. "The Peoples of Russia," an old Czarist imperialist usage, is a myth that even Red Moscow verbally avoids, and about the Russians themselves being the "worst victims of communism," this, too, by all evidence is a myth. Objectively, one must admit that the Russian people were the "first" victims of communism, in the sense of its initial entrenchment in Russia, but, with broader perspective, one must also admit that most of the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union were the first and worst victims of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the matador behind the red cloth of communist mythology. This basic, conceptual confusion runs throughout the work and, curiously enough, is constantly contradicted by the non-Russian elements the author introduces.

Space permits only these further criticisms. Because of the basic, conceptual deficiencies of the work, an alert reader wouldn't know that existentially there are fundamental differences between Russia and the Soviet Union, Georgians and the Russians, etc. Also the book is studded with many "factual" myths, such as the USSR being in existence for fifty years (p. 11), Khrushchev being a Ukrainian (p. 49), that, contrary to Berdyaev, Fedetov, Walsh and numerous other scholars, Bolshevism just implanted itself in an institutional vacuum in Russia proper (chap. 2). Moreover, significant omissions abound in the work, such as the Nixon-Khrushchev encounter and the Captive Nations Week Resolution (p.103), the concentration camps and the heavy percentage of non-Russian political prisoners, which Dallin and Nicolaevsky honestly observed (p. 330), and the imperialist Russian and free non-Russian conflict in the Vlassov movement (p. 120). Concerning Nixon, since his publication of *Six Crises*, he has come to understand fully why, in his words, "The Captive Nations Resolution was the major Soviet irritant throughout my tour." Inaccuracies also abound because of misleading concepts, such as the national characters of World-War II refugees (p. 103).

Despite all this and more and viewed as a process of contributing thought, this book deserves open-minded examination. It fails to achieve a much-needed balance of thought and fact oriented toward the freedom of and humanistic passion for all peoples, but it persuasively sets forth part of the record covering fifty years of Soviet Russia and then the Soviet Union.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Robert Goldston, Indianapolis-Kansas, New York City, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966. 224 pp., \$ 4.50.

To write in 1966 another book on the Russian Revolution, which took place in 1917, is to attempt an arduous and complex task on account of the exhaustive treatment this subject already has received in the Western languages, to say nothing of the great number of propagandistic pamphlets which the Soviet Union spews forth. The scholar and expert on Sovietology who is familiar with the studies of H. H. Fisher, E. H. Carr, W. H. Chamberlin, among others, may wonder about Mr. Goldston's decision to add another volume to this period of Soviet history.

It is obvious, however, that the book under review does not pretend to belong to the category of the works of the aforementioned authors. It contents itself with trying to provide a concise approach to events which still interest and puzzle Western man. It is patently aimed at the general reader who lacks background knowledge. Only as such is its very publication justified. It does not follow, however, that its attempt to cover the Russian historical background, Marxism, and developments in the Soviet Union up to the present in merely 213 pages is satisfactory. Shortcomings are quite apparent; e.g., the disproportionately long chapter on the rise of Marxism with its concentration on Marxist philosophy of Western Europe all of which adds very little to the understanding of Russian Bolshevism, rooted as it is in Russian traditions rather than Western thought. Marx and Engels had their impact, of course, yet without Chernov, Nechaev, and the Russian terrorists of the nineteenth century, Lenin and his followers would have mustered only an episode, and not a revolution. Another basic shortcoming lies in the cropping up of the author's personal bias, e.g., his preference for the Mensheviks and Leon Trotsky. The latter appears as a sympathetic figure who always did right. His participation in conspiracies and in Bolshevik atrocities in his capacity as head of the Red Guard are not even mentioned. Among minor shortcomings some erroneous statements should be set aright. The White Russians (Byelorussians) are not "Russians with a heavy admixture of Polish and German blood" (p. 14). Communal land (after 1861) cannot be considered "state property" (p. 23). The Communist Manifesto is usually identified with the year 1848 (p. 42). Austria's ultimatum was not accepted in all points by Serbia (p. 90). The Ukrainian Kozaks did not "enjoy almost autonomous self-government in their territories in the Ukraine" (p. 104). The Bolsheviks have never "devoted their lives to a struggle for freedom" (p. 192). Germany signed a treaty with Ukraine not in Kiev but in Brest Litovsk (p. 197). Furthermore, oversimplifications, too numerous to be discussed here, are scattered throughout the book.

On the other hand, several well-taken approaches tend to compensate for the flaws of the work. Moreover, it contains a number of pictures and drawings as well as a list of suggested reading material and an index.

Eastern Illinois University

STEPHAN M. HORAK

SLAVS IN CANADA. Proceedings of the First National Conference on Canadian Slavs. Editorial Committee: Yar Slavutych, Chairman, Vol. I. Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs, Edmonton, 1966, 171 pages. \$3.50.

Slavs in Canada contains the proceedings of the First National Conference on Canadian Slavs which was held during June 9-12, 1965, at the Banff Centre

for Continuing Education. At this conference, which was attended by over one hundred persons, eighteen inter-disciplinary papers were presented by scholars and civic leaders from Canada. The idea of the conference originated with the Inter-Departmental Committee on Slavonic and Soviet Studies of the University of Alberta. An important result of this conference was the consensus of the participants to hold such conferences every two years.

The objective of this publication is obvious: to provide the reader with scholarly material covering Slavic groups living in Canada. Each of the eighteen papers is a whole in itself, describing the history, life, culture, and labors of the Slavic groups from their early beginnings on Canadian soil. Although the book is scholarly and carefully documented with fresh material, it will attract the general reader who desires to know something of the history, culture and life of the Slavs. Of special general interest are papers like "Canadian Slavs: Problems and Prospects," by Stanley Haidasz, M. P.; "Canadians in the Making: Political Allegiance of the Immigrant," by Sava D. Bosnitch from the University of New Brunswick; "Slavic Ethnic Culture within the Canadian Framework," by Jerzy A. Wojciechowski from the University of Ottawa, and "Unity and Conflict among Canadian Slavs," by Vincent C. Chrypinski from the University of Windsor. These papers delineate serious problems which have to be solved in Canada today, such as finding more effective ways of cooperation between the Slavic and the dominant groups. Of great importance is the problem of gaining increased respect and regard for the extensive Slavic groups in Canada. To overcome the inferiority complex common among Slavic groups, the Slavs need recognition as equal partners with the English- and French-speaking Canadians. Greater contributions on their part would follow.

Four papers are devoted to Ukrainians in Canada: "Three Phases of Ukrainian Immigration," by V. J. Kaye; "Problems of Research on Ukrainians in Eastern Canada," by E. D. Wangenheim; "Some Demographic Aspects of the Ukrainian Population in Canada," by Warren E. Kalbach from the University of Alberta, and "Adjustment of Ukrainians in Alberta: Alienation and Integration," by Charles W. Hobart from the University of Alberta.

Kalbach's demographic study, illustrated by eleven graphs, emphasizes the fact that Canada's Ukrainians have increased more rapidly than has the total population for the fifty years prior to 1951. Also he notes an interesting trend among Ukrainians in Canada toward a normalization of the sex ratio as the excess of foreign-born male immigrants is depleted through the normal aging process.

Two papers are devoted to Poles and their cultural problems, one to Slovaks and one to Russians in the Greater Vancouver area. An interesting paper by Yar Slavutych from the University of Alberta covers "Slavic Literatures in Canada." As a scholar of literature, a poet and critic, Slavutych masterfully covers the literary production of each Slavic group, emphasizing the fact that the Russian, Czech, Slovak and Polish literatures in Canada are represented only by isolated authors while the Ukrainian literary production can be divided into periods and different trends. Slavutych notes that there have been over one hundred Ukrainian authors in Canada. Slavic literatures, in his opinion, are an integral part of Canadian culture as a whole. Canada offers to Slavic writers unlimited opportunities to create, to retain and develop a cultural heritage brought here from Europe.

Of interest to the scholar is "The Case for Slavic Folklore in Canada," by Robert B. Klymasz from Indiana University. The conference program included a "Panel on Canadian Schools and the Slavic Linguistic and Cultural Heritage," which is here summarized by Victor O. Buyniak from the University of Saskatchewan. "Canadian Slavs through the Mirror of their Press," is the subject of the paper by P.J. Kellner from the Canadian Citizenship Branch. The conference heard also an interesting paper, "The Slavic Vote," by R. Baird from the University of Alberta, wherein the author pointed out that there is considerable range in the patterns of ethnic voting.

The publication on its first page carries the Prime Minister's greetings, L. B. Pearson with pride acknowledging that "Canada has been greatly enriched by the contribution of Canadians of Slav origin."

Slavs in Canada merits the careful attention of all interested in Slavic groups. We hope that this publication proves a powerful stimulus for the appearance of studies on a more extended scale. In order to increase the value of this publication as important source material, an index should be added, and some papers deserve a better summary of their leading points for convenience of reference.

Texas Technological College

W. T. ZYLA

MURDER TO ORDER. By Karl Andres. Devin-Adair, New York, 1967. Pp. 127, \$3.95.

It is a timely coincidence that Devin-Adair should bring out this elegant edition of Karl Anders' *Murder to Order* just when Moscow is trying to gild the Red Revolution as a milestone to liberty (it in fact was a regression to pre-Christian barbarism). In earliest times political assassinations were the order of the day. This book shows that for the tyrants of the Kremlin it, too, is a policy; moreover, a satanically perfected one. *Murder to Order*, which in its original German *Mord Auf Befehl* (Tuebingen, 1963) shocked the Continent, describes two case histories of political assassination, ordered by top Kremlin officials in peacetime in a neutral country. The type of murder in America traditionally associated only with gangsters and the underworld is shown to be the standard practice of the Soviet Secret Service, but plotted and executed with far better methods than our gangland can muster.

In a terrifyingly interesting manner the book relates the two political assassinations by order of the Soviet Secret Service which the Kremlin agent Bogdan Stashynsky committed in neutral West Germany. On October 12, 1957, this 26-year-old Red agent in Munich passed Dr. Lev Rebet on the stairs, discharged a poison gas pistol at him, and disappeared. The coroner pronounced Rebet dead: "coronary insufficiency." Dr. Rebet had been a leader of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The murder weapon, a thin tube eight inches long, wrapped in a newspaper and loaded with a capsule of cyanide gas developed by the Russian Secret Service, was what enabled Stashynsky to commit the perfect crime.

Stashynsky returned to Berlin, reported to his chief that he "met the person in question. . . I greeted him and I am sure the greeting was satisfactory" (p. 11). In the meantime the coroner in Munich diagnosed the heart attack: "There was nothing to suggest that he had died violently or unnaturally" (p. 12).

Upon his next assassination Bogdan Stashynsky was decorated with the Order of the Red Banner by the chairman of the Committee for State Security, none other than Alexander Shelepin, who ordered these murders and who later was promoted to the post of Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the Party State Control Committee and in 1964 to full membership in the Soviet Presidium!

Shelepin ordered Stashynsky to follow up the murder of Dr. Rebet with that of Stepan Bandera, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). After months of painstaking preparation, on October 15, 1959, he let himself into Bandera's Munich apartment building with skeleton keys, waited till Bandera was about to enter, strode toward him and discharged his newspaper-wrapped cyanide pistol in his face. He then "crushed the ampoule containing the anti-poison and breathed it in" (p. 54) and escaped unhurriedly.

This time, however, owing to the action of the door, which Bandera had just been opening, the crime was not perfect. Splinters of glass in Bandera's face and a rigorous post-mortem which revealed cyanide gas in his stomach led to suspicion of murder and search for a suspect.

Moscow, in order to divert suspicion from its secret service, rushed into print with the totally fabricated charge that the German Minister of Expellees, Dr. Theodore Oberlaender, had instigated the murder. When an alibi eliminated that charge, Moscow accused the Bonn Secret Service of it, that Bonn had assigned one Dmytro Myskiw to assassinate Bandera, after which it in turn killed Myskiw. But Bonn was able to show that at the time Myskiw had been in Rome and that his subsequent death was from natural causes.

The truth came to light when Stashynsky, who in April, 1960, had married a German girl, developed scruples and defected to West Germany, giving himself up to the Americans. On September 1, 1961, he was turned over to the German authorities. There followed a sensational trial, which exposed the Soviet policy of political assassination and brazen slander. Stashynsky was convicted of the two murders but given a lenient sentence of only eight years in appreciation of his voluntary and invaluable testimony.

Former Congressman Charles J. Kersten, counsel for Mrs. Bandera, said:

"The trial has clearly demonstrated that practically any nation of the free world can be the hunting ground of the KGB... It has been proved that Bandera's murder was decided upon by the government of the Soviet Union. Soviet science was used to produce a weapon against which the West knew no antidote... Bandera was the symbol of the struggle for a free and independent Ukraine, a non-Russian nation of 42 million people... Russian Communist methods in crushing the Ukrainians' struggle for freedom are so merciless that they are without parallel in the history of tyranny." (pp. 125-26)

The book is enhanced by twelve pages of illustrations, including some depicting the agent, his victims and the murder weapon. Its 127 pages read like a murder novel — with this difference, that it is not fiction, but an account of terrifying, brutal facts. America and the Free World can only profit by knowing the facts of Soviet Russian slander, terror and murder. Whoever reads this book will realize as never before that Soviet Russia's imperialism is a monstrous tyranny, that it is not benevolent in any way, and that it is not mellowing.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"WORLD FREEDOM FIGHTERS," an article by F. C. Lu. *Free China Review*, Taipei, Taiwan, China, November 1967.

"Man's struggle to terminate enslavement and assure freedom entered upon a new era on Monday, September 25" is the way the writer introduces the first conference of the World Anti-Communist League. WACL, as it is now called, was formed in the Republic of China at this time, and some 220 delegates and observers from 67 countries and 13 international organizations attended this first conference.

The United States was represented by a dozen anti-Communist leaders. "Both Judd and Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, a leader of the Captive Nations Week movement in the United States," writes Mr. Lu, "said American public opinion is becoming more favorable toward the Republic of China's counterattack against the Chinese Communists." He continues, "Dobriansky said the opportune moment for action will come when Red Chinese military leaders split among themselves and try to carve out warlord fiefdoms." WACL provided an excellent occasion for a full exchange of views and ideas. WACL has an important future.

"THE DISSENT OF AMERICANS OF UKRAINIAN DESCENT," remarks by the Honorable John R. Rarick. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., November 20, 1967.

Taking full note of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians in November, Congressman Rarick of Louisiana declares, "Glory be for the spunk and liberty of our Ukrainian Americans. They are wide awake and recognize the Communist regime for what it really is: totalitarianism." On many occasions the Congressman has lauded the diverse activities of Americans of Ukrainian background.

In support of his comments the Congressman introduced into the *Record* the UPI report of November 19, 1967, covering the events of the Congress. In particular, the march to the Soviet U.N. Mission attracted his attention. Over 2,000 made the march and witnessed the burning of the USSR flag.

"HALF-CENTURY FOR FINLAND," an editorial. *The New York Times*, New York, N.Y., December 6, 1967.

The editorial lauds the independence of Finland which was attained fifty years ago when the Czarist Russian Empire collapsed. One sentence in the editorial stands out for the perspective that one should maintain to some extent.

"The political miracle represented by this event is best understood if it is remembered that of all Russia's subject peoples who sought national sovereignty after the 1917 breakup of the Czarist empire — Ukrainians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Georgians, Armenians and others — only the Finns today still remain independent and free."

In a real sense this is a miracle. But one must also remember that the costs and sacrifices borne by the others, who fought the forces of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, contributed heavily to this miracle. Russian absorption in the other non-Russian areas diverted resources that could not be spared for additional conquests, though they attempted it at the end of the 30's.

"50 YEARS OF SOVIET COMMUNISM," a series of commentaries. *National Review*, New York, N. Y., October 31, 1967.

For an interesting account of various subjects pertaining to both the Czarist Russian Empire and the USSR this issue of the *National Review* is impressive. Articles dealing with "Russia Before the Revolution," "The Status of Jews," "The Status of Christians" and so forth do furnish many insights for an evaluation of the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution. Yet, after all this is admitted, the issue missed the boat as concerns the most crucial point of the entire subject, namely Russian imperio-colonialism and the two empires it has sustained.

All that is offered and explained in the articles really are secondary and derivative. For by simple logic much of this wouldn't have occurred if both the Czarist and Soviet Russian empires had been extinguished. In the whole American picture of evaluating the Russian Bolshevik "50th," this organ scarcely distinguished itself, as indeed it could have, from scores of other publications which literally exhibited their ignorance of East European history in its essentialist character.

"THE SOVIET UNION AFTER FIFTY YEARS," an article by Leonard Gross. *Look*, New York, N. Y., October 3, 1967.

The title of this superficial article indicates at the very start how off beat this "spectacular" presentation is. The USSR has been in existence only forty-five years, but the 1917-22 period is absolutely a vacuum as far as this writer is concerned. This article is an excellent example of how popular magazines feed falsehoods to the uncritical popular reader in the U.S. Its value to the propaganda campaign of Moscow is virtually incalculable — all done at no charge to the Soviet Russian totalitarians and quite inadvertently, not to say ignorantly.

At least the reader is shown a map of the USSR with its 15 republics. But he's also told, in sharp defiance of the facts, that "The first task of the Revolution was to build an industrial society out of 15 disparate republics." There were no such republics in 1917, and the first task of the Russian Revolution was to entrench the Bolshevik regime in Soviet Russia. Myth-making couldn't be at its best than here.

W. Averell Harriman's article "From Stalin to Kosygin: The Myths and The Realities" is no less myth-making and far more critical because of his over-extended stay in this Administration. He should have been retired to quiet pastures long ago. We're told, for example, that several "Soviet leaders I talked to in 1926 complained of the difficulties they were encountering in attempting to organize a rural than an industrial nation." The USSR a "nation"! The average sophomore in history today knows better than this.

"RUSSIA'S FIFTIETH," a letter to the editor by Askold Skalsky. *National Review*, New York, N.Y., November 14, 1967.

This letter sums up the relative paucity of the mentioned articles in this conservative periodical. It begins, "You have managed to devote three articles to 'Russia' without once mentioning the existence or the plight of the non-Russian captive nations within the USSR." Amazing, isn't it? But true.

It also hits at the reactionary tone of one article. "And, with the inclusion of Eugene Lyons' article, you have extended your silence on this issue even to the history of Czarist Russia. Will not the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, and the Georgians, among others, be surprised to learn how much easier things were under the Czars, those Czars who subjugated these nations in the first place?" We're supposed to take comfort in an ostensibly milder form of imperio-colonialism than a harsher form.

"A CHAMPION CYNIC," an article by A. Ter-Grigorian. *Izvestia*, Moscow, USSR, July 7, 1967.

Once again Moscow reacts vituperatively to the annual Captive Nations Week observance. Both the Week and its originator are taken to severe task and ridicule. Dobriansky is viewed as "the champion cynic," patriots of the captive nations are deemed "emigre' scum," and "prominent government leaders of the U.S.A. shed a few tears, too."

What triggered off this reaction was the Week's concentration on "the disastrous condition of the 17 million enslaved North Vietnamese." "However," Moscow assures us, "no champions of cynicism will be able to save the American propaganda performance from another bankruptcy." Well, on to the 1968 Captive Nations Week — the tenth observance in behalf of justice and freedom, and thus peace.

"FIFTY YEARS OF FRAUD AND OPPRESSION," a Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Spurious Russian Revolution. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York, N.Y., November 7, 1967.

In sharp contrast to the rose-colored presentations of "the USSR these past fifty years," this declaration is factually accurate, drives home the essential point of the Soviet Russian Empire, and demonstrates the tragedy Moscow has foisted upon mankind. The declaration was opportunely released and distributed on November 7. It was a necessary offset to much of the nonsense circulated by numerous American periodicals and newspapers.

The theme of the declaration is summed up in the statement that "Ukrainians categorically reject the Russian Communist 'thesis' regarding their 'liberation' and self-determination. It was not the Russian Bolshevik revolution, but the Ukrainian National Revolution that brought freedom and independence to the Ukrainian people fifty years ago." In essence, the declaration negates the fraudulent theses of the Russian Bolshevik revolution and, at the same time, positively affirms the Ukrainian National Revolution, which is a continuous movement and is akin to our own American Revolution.

"NO TOMB FOR FREEDOM," a commentary by Melvin Munn. *Freedom Talk, Life Line*, Dallas, Texas, October 2, 1967.

Quite often this commentator refers, either directly or indirectly, to the tragic experiences endured by the Ukrainian people under the heel of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. In this radio script Miss Betty Wilhelm, a Youth Freedom Speaker, is quoted as saying "Khrushchev, under orders from Stalin, coldly and deliberately starved over 7 million Ukrainian men, women and children to death in the winter of 1933 and 1934."

In this period of so-called relative stability of relations with the USSR, it is important to keep reiterating the essential facts of the past as well as of the present. The new generation must be exposed to the truths of Soviet Russian practices, and Moscow must be given to understanding that we are not naive to forget how the empire developed to its present position. To believe that Moscow's present play for time is a foundation for stable relations would be the acme of human naivete.

"PICKETS ASK POLITICAL AMNESTY," a report by John Carmody. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., October 8, 1967.

The Taras Shevchenko statue in Washington was the site for an orderly protest march by members of Amnesty International. The march was on behalf of 6500 political and religious prisoners throughout the world. The group periodically stages such marches, and it is significant that they chose as their site "22d and P Streets, N. W. where the Ukrainian patriot-poet Shevchenko is honored."

Reporting in *The Washington Post* must somewhat be distinguished from its editorializing. This event is a good example of this. Washingtonians recall some four years ago how the *Post's* editors sought to prevent the erection of the Shevchenko monument. Their faces should be crimson by now. The practical uses of the memorial are many, and this event illustrates one of them with pointed meaning.

"BLAME GOES TO SOVIETS, NOT RUSSIANS," a letter to the editor. *The Wanderer*, St. Paul, Minnesota, September 21, 1967.

The writer of this letter, a certain Donald F. Campbell of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, appears to be disturbed about the editor's comments in the August 10th issue regarding the book, *The Vulnerable Russians*. At that time the book, written by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University, was only being pub-

lished, but the title itself seemed to annoy the writer. He was just one of about three dozen objectors to the title during the summer months.

In brief, the writer objects to the term "Russians" because, as he puts it, "This in effect blames the Russian nation as a whole for that which the Soviet hierarchy and the Communist Party, a minority it is hoped, are responsible." Simple logic dictates that by being anti-Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist doesn't mean being against the Russian nation and holding its people at large responsible. In fact, to conceal the crime of the Soviet Russian totalitarians behind the vague concept of "the Soviet" or "Soviets," or even the vague Communist Party, suggests that one really believes the Russian people as a whole gloat in the triumphs of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.

To maintain that prior "to the revolution Russia's policy was no more imperio-colonialistic than our own..." demonstrates how little the writer is aware of the subject or, if he is, how rationalizing he is about traditional Russian imperio-colonialism. His letter is replete with false rationalizations, which, as shown below, were adequately rebutted by a professor of history.

"WHITEWASH OF CZARIST RUSSIA," a letter to the editor by Donald H Meracle. *The Wanderer*, St. Paul, Minnesota, October 12, 1967.

Mincing few words, the writer, a professor of history at Mary Manse College, takes to task the "gentleman from Brazil" who "attempted to whitewash Czarist Russia by writing off five hundred years of Muscovite imperialism as a natural and harmless extension of her sons and daughters..." He goes on, "Poor Mr. Campbell completely ignores the savage conquest of millions of people who make up today the non-Russian minorities within the Soviet Union." In different definitional contexts, they are, of course, not "minorities."

The writer traces in rapid fashion Muscovite expansion, the "Third Rome" doctrine and "the imperialistic messianic mission of the Czars." "Mr.. Campbell," he writes, "uses a confused form of logic to defend historic Russian imperialism." The apologist tried to explain away Russian imperialism on the grounds that Britain, France, Spain, etc. were also imperialistic. Need more be said about the ingrained biases of the first letter writer. The professor ends by stating that "Russia was an aggressor and a mighty colonizer long before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution." An accurate and sound perspective!

"THE UKRAINIANS," an article by Robert S. Sullivant. *Problems of Communism*, September/October 1967, U.S. Information Agency, Washington, D. C. 1967.

This special issue on "Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR" was supposed to be a calculated, official answer to Moscow's celebration of the Russian Bolshevik "50th." An analyst in the Kremlin would regard it as a comforting and substantial measure of America's protracted ignorance of the Soviet Union. How amateurish the entire issue is can be immediately grasped from the captioned terms "Minorities — Major and Minor" and "The Yakuts" are thrown in as a minor nationality at the expense of the national entities such as the White Ruthenians and the Georgians. At this stage of the U.S. knowledge development regarding the USSR, this issue constitutes a good example to be used in some forthcoming Congressional hearing on official backwardness with respect to our prime enemy.

This article is sufficient in itself to indicate an academic naivete toward the Ukrainian problem. The writer, who is supposed to know something about Ukraine, continually uses the Russian provincial style of "the Ukraine" without knowing its innuendo. At the very outset, concerning the UPA, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the reader faces this "profound" observation: "In retrospect the struggle carried on by these small forces over a period of more than a dozen years seems to have left little legacy beyond its reminder that certain Ukrainian elements have found it difficult in the past to accept one or another aspect of Russian or Communist rule." One would think that the Ukrainian record of resistance to Russian rule ceased in 1950. Although the writer incorporates much worthwhile data, his insights and perspectives are very much askewed, as, for example, his absorption with "assimilation" rather than a Russian policy of genocide. But these are only a few points among many.

"K.G.B. IS SAID TO HARASS UKRAINIAN INTELLECTUALS," a special report. *The New York Times*, New York, February 8, 1968.

Vyacheslav Chornovil is a Ukrainian name that hit countless newspapers and periodicals in the winter and spring of 1968. This report is only one among many about a courageous, fundamentally nationalist Ukrainian who has revealed mass arrests by Moscow's K.G.B. of about 200 Ukrainian intellectuals.

Himself sentenced to 18 months in a Russian labor camp, Chornovil protested the illegal arrests to Pyotr Y. Shelest, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. His protest was lodged within the framework of the USSR Constitution. The report quotes at length the letter written by the 30-year-old television journalist and also those from the incarcerated in the Russian slave labor camps. Reading all of this, one cannot but conclude that Ukrainian resistance against Russian domination is unyielding, that Moscow has substantially re-Stalinized itself, and that slave labor camps still thrive in the USSR under conditions similar to those in Nazi Germany before the last war.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS: AN INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE," an article by Donald L. Miller. *The New Guard*, Washington, D. C., November 1967.

A short, concise article on all of the captive nations is presented in this publication of the Young Americans for Freedom. Well-written and pungent in style, it states, "Worldwide expressions of sympathy for the freedom aspirations of captive peoples, stimulated by the Captive Nations Week Resolution, have encouraged the spirit of liberty inside Communist-dominated countries."

The piece dwells on Lenin and his promises, the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, and the Nixon-Khrushchev debate. "Armenia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Georgia and others," the article points out, "...were subdued in 1920-22." After describing this historical background, it covers the Captive Nations Week resolution and then states that "Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev instantly denounced the resolution and tried vainly to convince Vice President Richard M. Nixon there were no captives in the U.S.S.R." For those unfamiliar with the captive nations movement, this lucid essay covers the highlights.

"ENSLAVED UKRAINE, SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS BARE SOVIET SUPPRESSION," an article by Sid Goldberg. *Sunday Star-Ledger*, Newark, N. J., March 10, 1968.

The celebrated Chornovil case is elaborated upon at length in this article. The writer is most accurate in stating, "Though the Chornovil trial and others like it have revealed scant and belated attention in the Western press, experts rank them in importance with the highly publicized Sinyavsky-Daniel trial in Moscow." To be sure, this can be attributed to the distorted notions most Western journalists have of the Soviet Union.

On the trials, the writer makes another illuminating observation. "Their significance," he writes, "lies in the flood of light they shed on Soviet abuse of its own laws, and on the Ukrainians' persisting struggle to maintain their national identity." These two chief elements have always been present in the course of Soviet Russia's domination over Ukraine. This excellent article is filled with additional, balanced perspectives.

"SCONA PANELISTS DEFEND U.S. POLICY IN SE ASIA," an article by Charles Rowton. *The Battalion*, College Station, Texas, December 8, 1967.

Under a sub-caption "'Expedite War,' Dobriansky Urges," the writer quotes at length the statements delivered by the panelists at this nationally-renowned Students Conference on National Affairs, held annually at Texas A. & M. College. Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University, who also served as moderator, maintained that "If it would expedite ending the war in Vietnam, there is no reason why we shouldn't expedite our war effort."

Joined with Thai Ambassador Anand Panyarachun and Mr. Tracy S. Park, Jr., director of research for the Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, the Georgetown professor and president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America stressed the role of Soviet Russian power in Vietnam and in Red Asia generally.

"EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENTS ON UKRAINIAN TRIALS IN '66," a special report. *The New York Times*, New York, February 9, 1968.

These excerpts are sobering for those mesmerized by "evolution" and "liberalization" in the USSR. They were written by Vyacheslav Chornovil who, in a letter to Shelest, plainly states, "It is not as an ordinary journalist that I am addressing myself to you. I am addressing myself to you as one Soviet citizen to another Soviet citizen, as a Ukrainian to another Ukrainian. And he proceeds to state his case, pungently and fearlessly.

"Even under Communism," he writes, "people will suffer, the suffering of an ever-searching intellect. Even under Communism there will be conflicts, even tragic conflicts. There will be contradictions of spirit and deed..." For those versed in so-called Communist ideology, this is heresy.

L. E. D.

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