

Ukrainian

Review

8

Institute for the Study of the USSR

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↓ Редис

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Borys Martos

Ukrainian Review

Institute for the Study of the USSR

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1959

Professor Borys Martos **On the Occasion of his 80th Birthday**

I. Bakalo

The prominent Ukrainian public-figure, scholar and publicist, Professor Borys Mykolayovych Martos, is the descendant of an old Cossack family which settled in the Province of Poltava in the XVII century.

Borys Martos was born on June 2, 1879. He received his education at the gymnasium of Lubny, from which he graduated with honors in 1897.

From his early youth and throughout his life, Borys Martos has struggled for social justice, for the independence of the Ukraine and for the national, economic and cultural revival of the Ukrainian people.

When still a young man of 20, he took an active part in the underground activities of the Association of Ukrainian Students. Here he became interested not only in political and educational work, but also in the cooperative movement and in economics to which he devoted his studies and which became the basis for his social, political and scientific work.

In 1900, Martos participated in the First Ukrainian Students' Congress in Galicia and took part in student manifestations; also, he spoke before audiences in Kharkov on social and political topics. For this, he was arrested in 1901, expelled from Kharkov, and forbidden to reside in university cities for a period of two years. These two years B. Martos spent in the Province of Poltava, where he taught political economy and Ukrainian literature at students' circles, at the same time conducting his work of national enlightenment amongst the people. After his return to Kharkov in 1903, he was arrested again and, on his release from prison six months later, he threw himself with still greater enthusiasm into the whirl of the struggle for national liberation. In 1904, he took part in the drafting of the program of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party (USDRLP), and in 1905 when the wave of revolution had spread all over the Russian Empire he actively participated in the revolutionary movement in Kharkov and Lyubotyn.

When the revolutionary upheaval subsided, Borys Martos devoted himself to pedagogical work in Kharkov and continued studying at the university. However, the police soon forbade him every pedagogical activity, and this compelled him to change his plans regarding his future profession.

After graduation from the University of Kharkov, Martos worked from 1909 to 1911, as a supervisor and instructor of cooperative societies in

Volhynia; yet his activity amongst the Ukrainian people never ceased to be under police surveillance.

In order to escape persecution, Borys Martos moved to the Kuban territory, where he worked for over two years for the Administration of the Black Sea—Kuban Railway and for the management of the Kuban Cooperative Bank, at the same time continuing his social and political activities.

In the period 1913—1917, as inspector of the cooperative societies of the Zemstvo of the Poltava Province, Borys Martos devoted his energy to the organization and conducting of courses connected with the cooperative movement of organization of credit banks and unions of cooperative societies in the Province of Poltava. He organized and managed the purchase bureau of the Zemstvo of the Poltava Province, which had the task of providing the population with the necessities of life during World War I. At the outbreak of the Revolution of 1917, he considerably enlivened his social and political activities, especially in the cooperative field and played a leading part in the organization of the Ukrainian Congress of Cooperative Societies. Also, he participated in the First National Congress and in the First Ukrainian Peasants' Congress.

In 1917, Borys Martos was elected a member of the Ukrainian Central Rada, in which he held the position of Secretary General of Agrarian Affairs, and in that capacity he successfully carried out a series of important missions such as: negotiations with the commander of the Kiev Military District about the approval of the 2nd Ukrainian Hetman P. Polubotko Regiment; negotiations with the Supreme Command of the Southwestern Front concerning the recognition of the Secretariat General as the highest authority in the Ukraine; negotiations with the diplomatic representative of France in the matter of financing, and, thus, furthering the development of agriculture.

In 1918, B. Martos occupied the position of Director of the Central Cooperative Committee, and of Chairman of the Board of Auditors of the "Ukrainbank," and was a member of the editorial staff of the periodical *Ukrainska Kooperatsiya*. He lectured at the school of the Cooperative Union of the "Dniprosoyuz" (Dnieper Union) in Kiev, and organized, together with M. Tuhon-Baranovsky and K. Matsiyevych, the Cooperative Institute in Kiev, the first school of this kind on an academical level.

In 1919—1920, Martos was Minister of Finance and President of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. In this capacity he enforced the law concerning the independence and identity of the Ukrainian currency.

In 1920—1921, now an emigre, he made a tour of Germany for the purpose of getting acquainted with the cooperative movement in that country. Later, in 1921, he accepted the position of Director of the Cooperative Bureau under the auspices of the Ukrainian Committee in Prague, and took an active part in the organization of the Ukrainian Academy of Husbandry in Podebrady. In 1922, he was elected assistant professor at this Academy and entrusted with two departments: those of the cooperative theory and cooperative societies.

In 1924, having defended his thesis on "Theory of Cooperation" before the faculty council, B. Martos was nominated professor in ordinary.

After the liquidation of the Academy of Podebrady, Professor Martos helped in the organization of the Ukrainian Technical and Economic Institute (UTHI), and from 1936 to 1938 he was Director of this Institute.

During the period of 1922—45, Professor Martos participated in, and was a member of, many scientific societies, such as the Masaryk Academy of Work in Prague, the International Institute for Cooperative Studies in Paris, the Ukrainian Economic Society in Podebrady, the Ukrainian Scientific Association in Prague, and the Society of Ukrainian Cooperative Workers' in Podebrady; at all of these institutions he lectured frequently.

From 1945 to 1949, Professor B. Martos was Rector of the Ukrainian Academy of Economics in Munich, of which he was one of the most active organizers. In this academy he lectured on political economy, theory of co-operation, and on the practical management of cooperative societies.

In 1948, he was elected Member of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN) and Member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh).

In 1951, B. Martos took up residence in Switzerland where he continued his scientific, pedagogical, social, and political activities.

From 1954 to 1958, Professor Martos worked for the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR in Munich (which was later renamed the Institute for the Study of the USSR), in which he occupied, during different periods, the positions of Chairman of the Learned Council, Secretary of the Learned Council, and Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Institute. The development of the publication activity of the Institute as a whole and, particularly, that of the diverse national groups who had joined the Institute after its reorganization in 1954, is closely linked with Professor Martos' name.

In the autumn of 1958, Professor Martos left for the United States, where he works for the benefit of his people with undiminished energy in the field of science as Member of the Free Academy of Sciences and of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, gives lectures at the Ukrainian Technical Institute (UTI) in New York, and continues his political activities.

Professor Martos' most important scientific papers, published in Ukrainian, Czech, and French, are:

1. The Structure of Cooperative Work (Lecture delivered at the 3rd Ukrainian Congress of Representatives of Cooperative Unions, Kiev, 1918).

2. Definition of the Activities of Cooperative Unions (*Ukrayinska Kooperatsiya*, 1918).

3. The Currency and Its Security in Gold (*Nova Ukraina*, 1922).

4. Theory of Cooperation (Podebrady, 1924).

5. Classification of Cooperative Societies (*Naukovi Zapysky*, published by the Ukrainian Academy of Husbandry in Czechoslovakia, Vol. I, and *Revue Internationale des Etudes Coopératives*, Paris, 1937).

6. Limits to the Development of Cooperative Societies (*Naukovi Zapysky*, published by the Ukrainian Academy of Husbandry in Czechoslovakia, Vol. II, and *Revue Internationale des Etudes Coopératives*, Paris, 1937).

7. Balin and Kozlov (Lvov, 1937).

8. Vasyl Domanytskyi (Lvov, 1938).

9. The Methods of Studying Cooperation (*Ekonomist*, Podebrady, 1928), and many other papers and articles.

Changes in the Population of the Ukrainian SSR (1927-1958)

V. Kubiyovych

The preliminary results of the Soviet census of January 15, 1959,¹ made public in May, provide an opportunity to compare the present population of the Ukrainian SSR with that given by the Soviet census of December 17, 1926.² Such a comparison must be limited to the urban and rural populations, of the Ukrainian SSR as a whole, of single provinces (*oblasts*), and of cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants. Although the figures for 1926 refer to different administrative areas (*okruhy, raiony* and *silrady*, and in the Western Ukraine—*povity, zbirni hromady, hromady*) the fact that these are comparatively small units has made it possible to relate 1926 figures to the present administrative areas. In the case of the Western Ukraine, it was necessary to adjust the data of the censuses in 1921 and 1930—31 to those of the 1926 census.³

A more detailed comparison between the Soviet censuses of 1959 and 1939 is impossible, because the latter gives information only on the population of the *oblasts*, the areas of which have since been altered. The 1939 census was also, in all probability, unreliable, since it tried to cover the losses which the Ukrainian population suffered in the 1930's as a result of Communist repressions. Also, people who were temporarily away from their places of residence were counted twice.

Changes in the Population of the Ukrainian SSR at Different Periods

The comparative figures for 1926 and 1959 (within the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR in those years) are as follows:⁴

	December 17, 1926	January 15, 1959	Changes 1927—58
Urban	7,363,000	19,130,000	+160.0%
Rural	30,532,000	22,763,000	— 25.4%
Total	37,895,000	41,893,000	+ 10.5%

¹ *Radyanska Ukraina*, May 10, 1959.

² *Vsesoyuznaya perepis naseleniya 1926 g.* (The All-Union Census of 1926), Part I, Moscow. Also Tymish Olesyuk, *Statystychni tablytsi ukrainskoho naselennya SRSR* (Statistical Tables of the Ukrainian Population of the USSR), Vol. II, Ukrainian Scientific Institute, Warsaw, 1930.

³ The author's article in *Druhy richnyk* (Second Annual), *Ukrainske ekonomichne byuro* (Ukrainian Economic Bureau), Warsaw, 1934.


⁴ The author's articles: *Entsyklopediya ukraïnoznavstva* (Ukrainian Encyclopedia), Vol. I, Munich, 1949; "Die Entwicklung der Bevölkerung der Ukraine in den Jahren 1890—1932," *Archiv für Bevölkerungswissenschaft und Bevölkerungspolitik*, VI, 1936, No. 5.

In that period the percentage of the urban population rose from 19.5 to 45.6. These changes in population growth, as well as the advance of urbanization, proceeded rather differently at different periods of time and in different geographical regions of the Ukraine: phases of normal population increase alternated with phases of abrupt loss, such as those caused by Soviet repression at the beginning of the 1930's and by World War II. In the period before September 17, 1939, the rates of population growth in the Ukrainian SSR differed from those in the Western Ukraine, which until then was divided among Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia or Hungary. This study will include a survey of the evolution of the population of the Ukrainian SSR by periods—that of normal growth to 1930, demographic catastrophe in the first half of the 1930's, the years 1935—40, the war years, and the postwar years. Particular attention will be paid to the important changes in the Western Ukraine before 1939.

Changes Prior to 1930

Normal growth of population in the Ukrainian SSR continued up to 1930. The years 1924—30 may be regarded as a "demographic optimum" since following losses during the war and the revolution the mortality rate declined considerably, although the birthrate was also somewhat lower than before World War I. The following table gives a picture of the increase of population (per 1,000 inhabitants) during the period prior to 1930.⁵

	Births	Deaths	Increase
1911—13	42.9	22.9	20.0
1926—27	41.2	18.0	23.2
1928—29	36.6	17.1	19.5



Natural Population Changes in the Ukraine, 1910—55
(Per thousand inhabitants—1=Births, 2=Deaths, 3=Natural Increase)

During this period emigration from the Ukraine to areas beyond the Urals was smaller than in the years immediately preceding World War II, which

⁵ *Statystyka Ukrainy* (Statistics of the Ukraine)—*Demografiya* (Demography) Vols. 106, 117, 154, 169, 193, 213, Kharkov, 1927—30; also *Ukraina, statystychny shchorychnyk* (Statistical Annual), Kharkov, 1925—29.

also contributed to the real increase. Movement of population to towns began later, 1929—30, as can be seen from the following figures:

	January 1, 1927	January 1, 1929	January 1, 1931
Urban	4,930,000	5,350,000	6,490,000
Rural	21,110,000	24,900,000	24,910,000
Total	26,040,000	30,250,000	31,400,000

The real increase in population in those years was as follows (per 1,000 inhabitants):

	1927—28	1929—30
Urban	41.0	96.8
Rural	16.1	0.1
Total	20.4	18.0

Developments from 1930 to 1939

Mass terror applied by Soviet authorities in the Ukraine in the thirties, in order to introduce forced collectivization and the purges among the intelligentsia had a disastrous effect on the Ukrainian population. It is estimated that over 1 million people were physically liquidated as a result of these repressive measures, and up to 3 million more died of starvation during the famine of 1932—33; several millions more left the country voluntarily or forcibly for Asia. As a result, the Ukraine lost between 5 and 7 million people, almost one fifth of its population. At the same time many Russians, mostly administrative personnel, moved into the Ukraine. The trend toward urbanization continued.

These changes can be illustrated with the help of official figures for 1931—32, but only partially, since after 1930 Soviet statistics on the subject of population are scarce and incomplete.

According to the same sources, the population of the Ukrainian SSR on January 1, 1933, was 31,900,000; of this, 7,160,000 lived in the cities and 24,400,000 in the country. The annual increase per 1,000 inhabitants during 1931—32 was for the urban population 48.8, while the rural population suffered a decrease of 3.4 per thousand, giving a total increase of 7.9 per thousand.⁶

These figures illustrate best of all the effects of collectivization and industrialization. In 1931—32 occurred the first big drop in the absolute figures of the population, which, according to official sources decreased by 127,000.

Changes in 1932 are not known because of lack of statistics. Although the most critical years were probably 1933—34, in 1935 the first small increase, lower than before collectivization, could be seen. The next year for which statistics are available is 1940. These were first published in 1956⁷ and reveal that in 1940, for each 1,000 inhabitants, there were 27.7 births and 14.6 deaths. The natural increase was 13.1, that is, one third lower than in the 1920's.

⁶ Statistical annuals published by the Gosplan: *Sotsialisticheskoe stroitelstvo SSSR* (Socialist Construction of the USSR), Moscow; *Administrativno-territorialnoe delenie SSSR na 15. VI. 1934* (Administration and Territorial Divisions of the USSR as of June 15, 1934), Moscow, 1935; the author's article on the changes in population of the Ukraine in *Melanges de Géographie, offerts à V. Svambera*, Prague, 1936.

⁷ *Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR), Kiev, 1957.

According to official sources, the following changes took place in the population of the Ukrainian SSR during the years 1933—38:

	January 1, 1933	January 1, 1939	Changes
Urban	7,158,000	11,196,000	+56.2%
Rural	24,742,000	19,764,000	-20.1%
Total	31,900,000	30,960,000	- 2.9%

This shows that the total population of the Ukraine decreased during 1933—39 by 940,000. The official estimate of losses is obviously very conservative. The following table is more likely to be true:

Total Population, January 1, 1933	31,900,000
Natural Increase 1935—38	1,800,000
Losses due to Famine*	2,000,000— 3,000,000
Deaths Caused by Repressions	1,000,000
Emigration (including Deportation)	2,000,000— 3,000,000
Immigration (mostly Russian)	1,000,000

Total Population, January 1, 1939 28,000,000—30,000,000

* Some estimates put the losses during the famine period at between 4,000,000 to 7,000,000. If one accepts these figures, one must also be consistent and take for granted a large influx of replacements from other republics. Regarding this there is no information available. On the famine, see "Holod" (Famine) in *Entsyklopediya ukrainoznavstva*, Part II, and D. Soloviy, "Holod v systemi koloniyalnoho panuvannya TsK KPSS v Ukraini" (The Place of Famine in the System of Colonial Government by the CC CPSU in the Ukraine), *Ukrainsky Zbirnyk*, Munich, No. 15, 1959.

According to this estimate the total population of the Ukrainian SSR in 1939 was between 28 and 30 million. The census of 1939 which puts it at 30 million is obviously inflated.

Apart from Kazakhstan, the Ukraine shows the lowest rate of real increase of all the Soviet republics. From 1926 to 1939 it rose by 6.9 percent (according to official figures), while in the RSFSR the increase amounted to 16.9 percent, and in the entire USSR to 15.9 percent.

Western Ukraine up to 1939

Population changes in the Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia, with Polissya, within Poland; Transcarpathia within Czechoslovakia; a part of Bukovina and Bessarabia within Rumania) were due primarily to the natural increases which averaged 1.2 percent annually in the 1930's. The estimated total population in the Western Ukraine, within the area now a part of the Ukrainian SSR, was 7.8 million at the beginning of 1927 and 9.4 million at the beginning of 1939. At this time, that is, the beginning of 1939, there were living within the borders of the present Ukrainian SSR 40.4 million inhabitants if we take as our basis the Soviet census of 1939: in all probability the figure was something less than 39 million.

Changes During the Period 1939—45

These were brought about by changes in state boundaries and by war. First of all, Transcarpathian Ukraine, after its occupation by Hungary, lost about 30,000 Czechs, who left, and some Ukrainians, while it gained several thousand Hungarians. Considerable changes occurred in Galicia and Volhynia

after Soviet occupation in 1939: on the basis of the German-Soviet treaty on mutual exchange of populations, some 10,000 Ukrainians from the western districts which had come under German rule migrated to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and all of the some 100,000 Germans in Galicia and Volhynia migrated to Germany; over 10,000 Ukrainians moved west in the face of the Bolshevik advance; several tens of thousands in the Western Ukraine fell victim to Soviet repression directed against the Ukrainian population; and, finally, the Bolsheviks deported all the Polish colonists settled in the villages of the Western Ukraine during the Polish occupation and many of the local Polish inhabitants, together about 300,000.

The period of the Soviet-German war brought about colossal changes in the population of the Ukraine, on whose territory and for which the armies of these countries fought. These losses, greater than in any other country of Europe, were the result of direct military actions, repression by the occupiers, and transfers of inhabitants.

Direct victims of the war were the Ukrainians who fell on the fields of battle and the portion of the civil population which fell as the result of military actions. Victims of the war were also the Ukrainian members of the Soviet Army who became prisoners of the Germans and died of the famine which swept the prisoner-of-war camps.

Another group of people who died during the war were victims of the terror exercised by both occupiers. Those who suffered most were the Jews destroyed by the Germans. The Ukrainians also suffered losses both at home and in the labor camps into which they were driven by both the Germans and the Bolsheviks.

In the winter of 1941—42 a famine swept the towns of the Ukraine, causing the deaths of possibly several hundreds of thousands.

In connection with the war there were mass transfers, some of which involved mixing of populations and some settling. The Soviet Army, as it retreated, evacuated a part of the population, chiefly from the towns: the persons affected were mostly Russians and Jews. A far larger number of Ukrainians were taken by the Germans for compulsory labor. As a result of these events the population of the Ukraine declined greatly, the towns being particularly hard struck.

In 1943 the Germans took a population census of a part of the Ukrainian territory under their occupation.⁸ Although it is not entirely accurate, it makes it possible for us to estimate the losses suffered by the inhabitants of the Ukraine in the first years of the war. They were smaller in the Western Ukraine, that is, in Galicia, which then made up a part of the so-called Government-General (a loss of 22 percent for the years 1939—43) and in Western Volhynia and Polissya (a loss of 12 percent. For additional information see elsewhere in this study). By far the greatest losses were suffered by the central areas of the Ukraine, where evacuations were perpetrated on a planned basis and people were also removed to Germany for labor. The population of the so-called Reichskommissariat Ukraine declined from 24 million to 17 million, that is, by 30 percent, or, if the 1939 figures are regarded as inflated, by 25 percent. In the big cities the population declined by 53 percent. Particularly great losses were suffered by the large cities, where there were

⁸ *Amtliches Gemeinde- und Dorferverzeichnis für das Generalgouvernement, März 1943, Cracow, 1943.*

many Russians and Jews, the Russians leaving with the Bolsheviks and the Jews being destroyed by the Germans. The population of Kiev (Kyjiv), which in 1939 was 846,000 was reduced to 305,000; that of Dnepropetrovsk (Dnipropetrovske) fell from 501,000 to 280,000; Zaporozhe (Zaporožja), from 286,000 to 120,000; Nikolaev (Mykolajiv), from 167,000 to 84,000; Poltava, from 130,000 to 75,000.

If we assume that losses in Eastern Ukraine, which was not a part of the Reichskommissariat, were of a similar nature, then it is possible to conclude that the total population of the Ukraine in 1943 was 30 million or 9 million to 10.5 million less than in 1939. The German retreat from the Ukraine caused further losses, including the transfer of practically the entire German population to the Crimea, the evacuation of a part of the Ukrainian population and its transfer to Germany for labor, and the departure to the West of some 100,000 Ukrainians before the arrival of the Bolsheviks, most of these Ukrainians being from the leading stratum and later forming the nucleus of the largest Ukrainian political emigration in history. These changes still farther reduced the size of the population of the Ukraine, which reached its lowest point in 1945.

Postwar Changes in Population

After the reoccupation of the Ukraine by the Soviet regime and particularly after the end of the war, there was a mass return home by those evacuated or deported. The bulk of the Ukrainians transferred to Germany for labor were repatriated and the bulk of those members of the Soviet Army who had been made German prisoners of war were returned to the USSR. It must, however, be noted that not all of those repatriated returned to the Ukraine: the Soviet authorities settled a portion of them elsewhere. The same was largely true of the prisoners of war. Also, only a portion of the Ukrainians evacuated by the Bolsheviks during the war deep into the USSR returned to their homes, most being compulsorily settled in the industrial areas of Asia.

The establishment of a new frontier between the USSR and Poland also led to changes in population. By the provisions of the treaty of 1945, almost the entire Polish population of Western Ukraine returned to Poland. Similarly, Ukrainians living in Poland (about 700,000) were moved eastward (chiefly to Galicia and the Donbas) and in less degree westward (chiefly to East Prussia and Lower Silesia, then occupied by the Poles): only a few Ukrainians stayed on; a part fell in the battles with the Poles fought by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the UPA, or as the result of repressive action by the Poles. From the Crimea the Soviet regime removed all the Tatars, who had numbered 179,000 in 1926. Smaller changes included the departure of 30,000 Czechs from Western Wolhynia and a part of the Hungarians from Transcarpathia, chiefly those who had arrived in and after 1939.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the population of the Ukraine after 1945. According to official figures, the total population in 1940 was 41 million; in 1956, 40.6 million; on January 15, 1959, 41.9 million; all within the boundaries existing at those times.⁹ Taking into account the natural increase

⁹ *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainskoi RSR, 1957.*

during the period 1947—55 it is possible to conclude that the total population in 1947 was about 36 million.

To sum up, the losses during the years 1940—46 were 4.5 million, or in fact 6 million, if we consider the official Soviet figures for 1939 and 1940 to be too high. These losses were partially offset by the influx of Ukrainians from the areas assigned to Poland and a large number of Russians and others from other parts of the Soviet Union.


Soviet statistics concerning the natural increase of population during the last decade are available.¹⁰ The following is a comparative table of the natural increase per 1,000 inhabitants for the years 1913, 1926, 1940, 1950, and 1955:

	Births	Deaths	Increase
1913	44.0	24.9	19.1
1926	41.4	17.7	23.7
1940	27.7	14.6	13.1
1950	22.5	8.4	14.1
1955	19.7	7.4	12.3
1950—55	21.2	8.2	13.0

As can be seen, compared with the 1920's, there is a complete reversal of population trends in the Ukraine. The mortality rate has fallen, but so has the birth rate. Today the Ukraine has one of the lowest mortality rates in Europe, but her birth rate, one of the highest in Europe up to 1929, has now, for various reasons, fallen to the general European average. Also, Ukrainian youths are often sent to the "virgin lands" and in this way the country is depleted of a most vital force. Such factors disrupt family life and have an adverse effect on the growth of the population. It is significant that while the Ukrainian birth rate is lower than the birth rate in the USSR as a whole, the situation is much better in the Russian republic. The following table makes a comparison between increases of the population of the various Soviet republics, and the Ukraine's western neighbors (per 1,000 inhabitants):

	Births	Deaths	Natural Increase
Kazakh SSR	36.9	9.0	27.9
Poland	29.1	9.6	19.5
USSR	25.6	8.2	17.4
Russian SFSR	25.6	8.4	17.2
Rumania	25.6	9.7	15.9
Ukrainian SSR	19.7	7.4	12.3
Czechoslovakia	20.3	9.6	10.7
Hungary	19.6	10.0	9.6

SOURCES: Kazakh SSR: *Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kazakhskoi SSR* (The National Economy of the Kazakh SSR), Alma-Ata, 1957. USSR: *Narodnoe khozyaistvo USSR* (The National Economy of the USSR), Moscow, 1958. Russian SFSR: *Narodnoe khozyaistvo RSFSR* (The National Economy of the RSFSR), Moscow, 1957.



Population Changes in the Ukraine, 1900—59

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

As far as migration within the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR are concerned, we lack the necessary data. We can only call attention again to the continuous transfer of the most skilled labor from the villages and towns of the Ukraine to Asia and the simultaneous influx of Russians into the Ukraine for work in administration and industry. Only a few individuals, chiefly older men and women, are returning from imprisonment and deportation. As to interior migration, it consists chiefly in urbanization, marked by a movement from the grain areas to the industrial areas.


The following table and diagram show changes in the population of the Ukrainian SSR during the last 60 years:

	— Total Population —	— Urban —	— Rural —
1897 . . .	28,800,000 (100%)	4,600,000 (16.0%)	24,200,000 (84.0%)
1913 . . .	35,200,000 (100%)	6,800,000 (19.5%)	28,400,000 (80.5%)
1926 . . .	37,700,000 (100%)	7,400,000 (19.5%)	30,300,000 (80.5%)
1932 . . .	41,100,000 (100%)	9,000,000 (21.8%)	32,100,000 (78.2%)
1940 . . .	41,000,000* (100%)	13,700,000 (33.5%)	27,300,000 (66.5%)
1959 . . .	41,900,000 (100%)	19,100,000 (45.5%)	22,800,000 (54.5%)

* This figure, taken from the Soviet source, is between 1.2 and 2 million too high.

Geographic Distribution of Population Changes in the Ukrainian SSR


The geographic distributions of changes in the status of the population of the Ukraine during the years 1927—58 are illustrated by four maps showing changes in the total population and separately in the urban, rural, and big city populations.



Total Population Changes in the Ukrainian SSR, 1927—58
(In Percentages of 1927)

Changes in the total population (see diagram) vary between a phenomenal increase of 157 percent in the Stalino oblast and a decline of 42 percent in the Poltava oblast. The population of the industrial areas of Donbas and Dnepropetrovsk has almost doubled, while that of the northern and central areas has decreased by approximately one fifth, with the exception of Kiev and Kharkov (Charkiv) oblasts which contain the two largest Ukrainian cities. Rapid growth is visible in the Crimea (68 percent), and Transcarpathia (34 percent), while the remainder of the southwestern steppe Ukraine and the Western Ukraine remain little changed.


The change in population in the cities paralleled that in the country as a whole. The increase in the southeastern Ukraine is above the average,



*Urban Population Changes in the Ukrainian SSSR, 1927—58
(In Percentages of 1927)*

amounting 160 percent for the entire area and 596 percent for Lugansk (Luhanske) oblast alone; the slowest growth is that of the Western Ukrainian cities. The only oblast showing a loss in urban population is that of Ternopol (Ternopil) (15 percent in 1927—58). The only major city in the Ukraine to register a loss of population is Berdichev (Berdyčiv) (55,600 in 1926; 53,000 in 1959), the Jewish population of which, 55 percent of the inhabitants in 1926, was annihilated by the Germans during the war.

The geographic distribution of changes in the rural population presents a more uniform picture. The rural population of the Ukraine is now smaller than in 1926. The only provinces showing a contrary trend are Transcarpathia




*Population Increases of Towns in the Ukrainian SSR
with 50,000 or More Inhabitants, 1927—58
(In Percentages of 1927)*

(up by 23 percent), Crimea (up by 11 percent) and Chernovtsy (Černivci) (up by 1 percent). A relatively small decline in rural population is shown by Western Ukraine (down by 13 percent) and the largest loss is seen in the regions east of the Dnieper (Dnipro) (38 percent) and the industrial southeast regions (down by 42 percent).

The following is a survey of different regions:

The *Donets (Doneć) Basin* (Donbas) shows the greatest increase in population (136 percent) and the greatest urbanization (32.9 percent in 1926; 83.8 in 1959). This is mostly due to the continuous industrialization of the region. The rise of population of the Donbas proper, which includes less than half of the administrative area, namely, the oblasts of Lugansk and Stalino (Staline), is even greater. It had an estimated 400,000 inhabitants in the 1860's; 1.1 million in 1897; 1.7 million in 1926; and almost 5 million in 1959. The natural increase in the Donbas is highest in the Ukraine (27.8 percent annually in 1924—28) and the influx of people from the other regions of the Ukraine and Russia helps to boost the population. The fact that Donbas escaped severe repressions in the 1930's also accounts for the rise in population. The latter is evident only in the cities; the rural population of the area has declined to one half of what it was in 1927. The growth of major cities in the Donbas may be seen from the following table:

	1926	1939	1959
Stalino (Staline)	106,000	462,000	701,000
Makeevka (Makijivka)	52,000	240,000	358,000
Zhdanov (Ždanov)	41,000	222,000	284,000
Lugansk (Luhanske)	72,000	213,000	274,000
Gorlovka (Horlivka)	23,000	109,000	293,000
Kadievka (Kadijivka)	17,000	70,000	180,000
Kramatorsk (Kramatorske)	12,000	93,000	115,000



Rural Population Changes in the Ukrainian SSR, 1927—58
(In Percentages of 1927)

The territory of the Donbas contains the largest urban concentrations in the Ukraine: Stalino-Makeevka with over 1.3 million and Gorlovka-Yenakievo (Horlivka-Jenakijevo) with about 600,000 inhabitants.¹¹

Similar conditions prevail in the *Dnieper industrial region* (Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe oblasts). The rise of population is not as spectacular as in the Donbas (up by 45 percent) but the pace of urbanization is faster (in 1926 only 18.5 percent of the population lived in towns, while today the urban population accounts for 65.6 percent). The following cities show the most rapid growth: Dnepropetrovsk (233,000 in 1926, 658,000 in 1959); Zaporozhe (Zaporizja) (58,000 in 1926, 435,000 in 1959); Krivoy Rog (Kryvyj Rih) (31,000 in 1926, 386,000 in 1959); Dneprodzerzhinsk (Dniprodžeržynske) (34,000 in 1926,

¹¹ "Donetsky baseyn" (Donets basin) in *Entsyklopediya ukrainoznavstva*, Part II.

194,000 in 1959). The total population of these cities put together increased by 342 percent during the period of 1927—58.

The population of the industrial regions of the Donbas and the Dnieper rose from 5.7 million in 1927 to 10.9 million in 1958, while that of the rest of the Ukraine fell from 32.2 million to 31 million during the same period.

The *Crimea* experienced a large growth in population, as shown in the following table (in thousands):

	1926	1933	1939	1950	1959
Urban	330,000	380,000	586,000	483,000	775,000
Rural	384,000	411,000	541,000	340,000	427,000
Total	714,000	791,000	1,127,000	823,000	1,202,000

It is obvious that since the deportation of the Tatars immediately after World War II, the Crimea has regained some of its original population and has absorbed an influx of newcomers.¹²

The *southwestern part of the Ukraine* shows only a slight increase (8 percent). The urban population there has increased by 92 percent and the rural population decreased by 19 percent. The increase in the Odessa (Odesa) oblast is due primarily to the growth of the city of Odessa (421,000 in 1926; 667,000 in 1959). In 1940 the territory formerly known as the Izmail oblast was added to the Ukraine; it had experienced a continuous steady growth and suffered relatively small losses during the war. The increase in the Kherson (Cherson) oblast is due to the growth of the city of Kherson (59,000 in 1926; 157,000 in 1959) and the erection of the Kakhovka hydroelectric station. On the other hand, the Nikolaev oblast showed a slight decline in population (3 percent).

As has been noted, the entire central and northern portions of the Ukraine lost some 10 percent of their population. The reasons were lack of industrialization and concentration on grain-growing, leading to greater losses during the time of famine and Soviet repressions and "voluntary" transfer to the virgin lands and to industrial regions. In addition, the rural population still makes up 60 percent of the population in Left Bank Ukraine (the Ukraine East of the Dnieper) and perhaps 70 percent in Right Bank Ukraine (the Ukraine West of the Dnieper).

The Left Bank Ukraine (Poltava, Sumy, Chernigov (Černyhiv) and Kharkov oblasts) suffered the greatest losses during the war. Only the Kharkov oblast showed an increase, although without the city of Kharkov (417,000 in 1927; 930,000 in 1959) it would have shown a decline of 18 percent. The decline is most drastic among the rural population (down by 62 percent). The famine of 1932—33 was most severe in this region, and in 1943 the Germans deported a large section of its population.

The Right Bank Ukraine (Vinnitsa (Vinnycja), Khmel'nitsky (Chmelnycka), Zhitomir (Zytomyr), Kiev, Cherkassy (Čerkasy) and Kirovograd (Kirovohrad) oblasts) showed a decline of 9—17 percent, except for the Kiev oblast, which without the city of Kiev would also have shown a decrease of 5 percent in comparison with 1926. War losses were smaller here, but urbanization was also slower (increase of 85 percent) than in any other part of the Ukraine,

¹² *Narodnoe khozyaistvo Krymskoj oblasti* (The National Economy of the Crimea Oblast), Simferopol, 1957.

except the Western Ukraine. The reasons for this are lack of industrialization and Nazi extermination of the Jews, who in 1926 formed up to one third of the population of the region west of the Dnieper.

The largest city of this region, Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, more than doubled its population since 1927:

1897	248,000	1932	539,000
1912	418,000	1939	846,000
1923	413,000	1943	305,000
1926	514,000	1959	1,102,000

The population of *Western Ukraine* grew normally up to 1939. During the war the rural population suffered relatively small losses, but in the towns the people (about one third of whom were Jews) were decimated by the Germans. The exchange agreement between Poland and the Ukrainian SSR resulted in a loss of half a million people. The industrialization of this area was slow and therefore the trend toward urbanization was not as great in the eastern parts of the country. Finally, the Western Ukraine suffered greater repression after the war than the remainder of the Ukraine at the hands of the Bolsheviks: there were more cases of arrest and transfer for "voluntary" resettlement in Asia and in lesser degree to the Donbas and several regions of the Russian SFSR.

Today the population of *Galicja* (Drogobich (Drohobyč), Lvov (Lviv), Stanislav (Stanyslav) and Ternopol *oblasts*) is 7 percent less than what it was in 1926. It is estimated that because of the small natural increase (10.7 percent annually in 1930—38) the population of *Galicja* rose by only 19 percent during the period 1927—38. From 1939—43 it decreased by 22 percent. These losses were not absolute since the 22 percent includes a part of the population temporarily evacuated or conscripted by the Germans. Losses in towns were severe due to the extermination of the Jews. Apart from this loss, which was very considerable, the losses among the Christian population amounted to 13 percent of the total, or 10 percent, if allowance is made for the Polish colonists who departed. Today *Galicja* has almost as large a population as it had in 1943, but very different in composition; there are now very few Poles or Jews, but these have been replaced by new settlers who are mostly Russians and Ukrainians from elsewhere in the USSR.

The hardest hit *oblast* in *Galicja* was that of Ternopol, which even before the war showed a very slow rate of increase. The province lost all of its numerous Poles. The opportunities for industrialization are small. The fluctuation of the Galician population can be seen from the following table:

	1931	1939	1943	1959
Urban	1,070,000	1,180,000	810,000	1,250,000
Rural	3,900,000	4,350,000	3,510,000	3,050,000
Total	4,970,000	5,530,000	4,320,000	4,300,500

Similar changes occurred in Western Volhynia (Volyn and Rovno (Rivne) *oblasts*), except that before the war this region underwent a greater increase in population and during the war suffered smaller losses; total losses amounted to 13 percent of which 9 percent constituted the exterminated Jewish population. After the war the population of Western Volhynia decreased more rapidly than that of *Galicja* for reasons that are not very clear:

	1931	1939	1943	1959
Urban	230,000	270,000	120,000	370,000
Rural	1,790,000	2,030,000	1,860,000	1,450,000
Total	2,020,000	2,300,000	1,980,000	1,820,000

The population trend in the *Chernovtsy oblast* was similar. Prior to 1940 this part of the Ukraine (part of Bukovina and Bessarabia) belonged to Rumania. Up to 1939 the natural increase was about 1 percent annually. All Germans (25,000 in 1930) and some Ukrainians left the region before the Soviet occupation of 1940. During the war the Bolsheviks destroyed a certain number of Ukrainians and in 1942—44 most of the Jews were killed, but on the other hand direct war losses were relatively small. Hence the present population is 5 percent greater than that in 1926 (urban population up by 19 percent, rural population by 1 percent). Urbanization is slow.

The most harmonious demographic development can be seen in *Transcarpathia*. This is the only Ukrainian province showing an increase in both urban and rural population. It suffered least from the ravages of war, and was almost exempt from German occupation. Up to 1939 the population of Transcarpathia rose due to natural increase, lack of overseas emigration and influx of Czechs (in 1921—30 a natural growth of 21 per 1,000 and actual growth of 18). During the war, the non-Ukrainian population (Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, Jews) suffered the greatest losses. After the war, the natural increase remained high (in 1956, 24.6 births, 8.3 deaths, and 16.3 net growth per 1,000). The migratory trend to other parts of the USSR was on the whole small, and the influx of foreign elements was also moderate. As a result of all these factors, the population of Transcarpathia grew from 605,000 in 1921 to 706,000 in 1930; to 800,000 in 1939; to 842,000 in 1950¹³; and to 923,000 in 1959.

A summary of all the population changes in the Soviet Ukraine is provided by the following tables:

Total Population of the Ukraine

(In Thousands)

	— URBAN —		— RURAL —		— TOTAL —	
	1926	1959	1926	1959	1926	1959
Donbas	940	5,618	1,920	1,104	2,860	6,722
Dnieper Industrial Region	530	2,736	2,340	1,438	2,870	4,174
Southwest Ukraine	880	1,690	2,690	2,180	3,570	3,870
Crimea	330	775	380	427	710	1,202
Left Bank Ukraine	1,320	2,886	6,980	4,326	8,300	7,212
Right Bank Ukraine	1,805	3,348	9,935	7,548	11,740	10,896
Galicia	1,040	1,249	3,580	3,052	4,620	4,301
West Volhynia	200	369	1,600	1,448	1,800	1,817
Chernovtsy Oblast	170	203	570	573	740	776
Transcarpathia	150	256	540	667	690	923
Total Ukrainian SSR	7,365	19,130	30,535	22,763	37,900	41,893

NOTE: The 1926 figures are based on the census of December 17, 1926; the 1959 figures are based on the census of January 15, 1959.

¹³ *Narodne hospodarstvo Zakarpatskoi oblasti* (The National Economy of the Transcarpathian Oblast), Uzhhorod, 1957.

In index form the changes in the population of the Ukrainian SSR as revealed by the census of January 15, 1959, in comparison with that of December 17, 1926, are as follows (1926 = 100):

	Urban	Rural	Total
Donbas	600	58	236
Dnieper Industrial Region . . .	515	62	145
Southwest Ukraine	192	81	108
Crimea	235	111	168
Left Bank Ukraine	218	62	87
Right Bank Ukraine	185	76	93
Galicia	120	85	93
West Volhynia	185	91	101
Chernovtsy Oblast	119	101	105
Transcarpathia	176	123	134
Total Ukrainian SSR	260	75	110

The table below shows the population of each individual region of the Ukrainian SSR as a percentage of the total for the republic, and the size of the urban population in each region and throughout the republic as a whole:

	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION		URBAN POPULATION (Percentage per Region)	
	1926	1959	1926	1959
Donbas	7.5	16.1	32.9	83.8
Dnieper	7.6	9.9	18.5	65.6
Southwest Ukraine	9.4	9.2	24.6	43.6
Crimea	1.9	2.9	46.5	64.4
Left Bank Ukraine	22.0	17.2	15.9	40.0
Right Bank Ukraine	31.0	26.0	15.4	30.8
Galicia	12.2	10.3	22.5	29.0
Western Volhynia	4.7	4.3	11.1	21.1
Chernovtsy Oblast	1.9	1.9	23.0	26.2
Transcarpathia	1.8	2.2	21.8	28.0
Total Ukrainian SSR	100.0	100.0	19.5	45.6

The Standard of Living in the Soviet Union

Yevhen Glovinsky

The ultimate aim of a national economy should be the steady rise of real wages, accompanied by promotion of the spiritual and physical energies of a people and rejection of all attempts to degrade man to a tool for alien aims.

Adolf Weber

The words of Professor Weber, a well-known modern economist, describe most aptly the nature of a sound economy. The economic activity of individuals or groups, developing within the framework of a society, is what may be called the economic order of that society. On the other hand, the influence or guidance of economic activities by the state or other agencies constitutes an economic policy. The combination of order and policy may be called an economic system.

During the last forty years, the economic system established by the Bolsheviks on the territory of the former Russian Empire has shown many changes. However, two basic factors have remained unchanged. First—the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, and second—the guidance of economic activities according to plans worked out by a central planning agency. The Soviet economic system is regarded by its creators and operators as socialist.

Since it was first established, the Soviet economic system has achieved many outstanding successes. The large-scale industrialization of the country has been accomplished, many new industries have been developed and in the field of heavy industrial production the USSR has climbed to second place on the list of world producers. When one examines the fulfillment of the ultimate goal of a national economy—the creation of the material well-being of a people—the story is rather different. A high price has been paid by the people of the USSR for the rapid pace of industrialization, the vast expansion of heavy industry and the construction of new industrial enterprises. Today, after over forty years of Soviet economic growth, the question arises as to how far the sacrifices and the shortages have been justified. Has it been possible, as a result of the “building of socialism,” to improve the living standard of the vast masses of the Soviet population to the degree that one can speak of a victory of the Soviet economic system? Furthermore, has this system made it possible for the Soviet people to develop fully their physical and spiritual potentialities?

The basis for Soviet economics is provided by Marxism. It is not our purpose here to discuss the justice of Bolshevik claims to be the sole inheritors of Marxism or to enquire how much of Marxist teaching has remained in the

Soviet science of economics as it is taught today in Soviet universities. Also outside the scope of this study is the question how far socialism, as it exists in the USSR, corresponds to Marx's concept of socialism, or whether the path of development followed by socialism in the world at large has been as Marx envisaged it in his writings. One fact beyond dispute is that Lenin's economic concepts were rooted in Marxian economics. Similarly, irrespective of the development in the USSR of what is called "creative" Marxism (i. e., the interpretation and adaptation of Marxism to current demands), Soviet economics has not abandoned such basic Marxian economic postulates as the labor theory of value, the theory of surplus value, the accumulation of capital and the impoverishment of the masses under the capitalist system. Hence, any examination of living standards in the USSR should be preceded by an attempt to analyze the concept of the standard of living as understood by Marx. This concept is discussed by Marx in connection with his theory of the gradual impoverishment of the masses under capitalism. The following quotation from *Das Kapital* expresses Marx's view most succinctly:

The accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i. e., on the side of the class that produces its own product in the form of capital.¹

If, at the time these words were written, i. e., in the middle of the nineteenth century, the economic conditions existing in England, industrially the most highly developed country in the world, warranted such a view, during Lenin's lifetime it became clear that this contention of Marx was fallacious. Lenin, however, refused to abandon it and was unwilling to modify it even to the extent of suggesting that the impoverishment of the masses might be relative instead of absolute (a view which, by the way, is also questionable). Lenin's opinion of this problem is stated in terms no less categorical than Marx's:

The worker grows poorer absolutely; i. e., becomes actually poorer than he was; he is forced to live more meagerly, to feed more poorly, to go hungry more often, to find shelter in basements and attics. Wealth grows in a capitalist society incredibly quickly, side by side with the impoverishment of the masses of the people.²

The thesis of the absolute impoverishment of the masses under capitalism is defended by Soviet economists today. V. Shparlinsky, writing in 1950, stated:

Therefore, the "full dinner plate" of which so much is prattled by American and Western European bourgeois economists and by rightwing socialists, the apologists of the "American way of life," exists only for the exploiters and their servants. A half-empty or even an empty dinner plate is left for the overwhelming majority of the American people. A progressive absolute and relative impoverishment, unemployment, systematic deterioration of the diet, the constant threat of death from starvation and of the diseases resulting from malnutrition—such is the fate of workers and all toilers in the USA.³

¹ Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, Vol. I, Dietz-Verlag, Berlin, 1951, pp. 680—81; *Capital*, trans. C. H. Kerr, Vol. I, Chicago, 1908, p. 709.

² V. I. Lenin, "Obnishchanie v kapitalisticheskoy obshchestve" (Impoverishment in a Capitalist Society), *Sochineniya* (Works), 4th ed., Vol. XVIII, pp. 405—6.

³ V. Shparlinsky, "Ukhudshenie pitaniya rabochego klassa SSHA" (Deterioration in the Diet of the Working Class in the USA), *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1950, No. 5, p. 98.

Another Soviet economist confirms this view:

Along with the relative impoverishment of the proletariat there occurs also an absolute impoverishment, a direct lowering of its standard of living. The absolute impoverishment of the working class expresses itself in the fall of real wages, in the inevitable rise in prices of staple commodities, in an intensification of labor and in a drastic deterioration of the nutritional and housing conditions of the workers.⁴

A Soviet textbook of economics, after citing Lenin's view of the inevitable impoverishment of the workers, adds: "The facts prove that under capitalism the living standard of the working class becomes lower and lower."⁵

Facts prove otherwise. The living standard of the workers in highly-developed industrial countries becomes higher. The rise, to be sure, does not follow a straight line, and there are temporary lowerings. The high living standard of the American worker is beyond dispute, and one can also accept that the workers in Western Europe live better today than did their grandfathers in the 1850's. Soviet economists may be aware of these facts, since they find that a mere denial of them is not enough. The need for a closer analysis of existing conditions is voiced by a leading article in a Soviet journal which deals with world economics:

As is well known, the bourgeois apologists and all kinds of revisionists desperately try to refute the Marxist-Leninist theory of the impoverishment of the proletariat in a capitalist society. In the meantime, life confirms the force and correctness of this theory. It is imperative to create fundamental Marxist works containing an analysis of the movement of real wages, unemployment, the extent of exploitation. These works, overcoming the vulgar interpretation of the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat, would have to deal new blows against the foes of Marxism, to analyze the question of how and in what precise forms the process of relative and absolute impoverishment of the working masses is continuing in the era of the general crisis of capitalism.⁶

Such "fundamental works" have not yet appeared, although some hints on how to combat the vulgar interpretation of the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat in the name of true Marxism may be gleaned from an article by the well-known Soviet economist Varga:

The impoverishment of the proletariat and the working masses as a whole is more than a tendency—it is a law under capitalism. Relative impoverishment is a continuous and uninterrupted process. It even takes place during those intervals in individual imperialist countries when real wages are rising. Absolute impoverishment is a constant tendency in the capitalist world. Yet under the influence of strong counter-tendencies, such as the class struggle of the proletariat or the need of the haute bourgeoisie in imperialist countries to attract to its side some of the proletariat—the working aristocracy—in order to fight Com-

⁴ F. Koshelev, "Neuklonny podem zhiznennogo urovnya trudyashchikhsya v SSSR" (The Steady Rise in the Standard of Living of the Workers in the USSR), *ibid.*, 1952, No. 9, p. 16.

⁵ *Politicheskaya ekonomiya: Uchebnik* (Political Economy: A Textbook), 1st ed., Moscow, 1954, p. 143.

⁶ "Za tvorcheskuyu razrabotku problem mirovoi ekonomiki" (For a Creative Treatment of the Problems of World Economy), *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye ot-nosheniya*, Moscow, 1957, No. 4, p. 4.

minimum and the colonial peoples, the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat does not lead to an uninterrupted general lowering of the workers' real wages. While unmasking the contentions of the apologists of capitalism who refute the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat, it is necessary to emphasize that this process can even accompany a growth of real wages if increasing intensification and monotony of labor is not compensated for by the rise of real wages, if exhausting work leads to over-tiredness and a crippling of the workers' health. This can be especially observed in colonial or semi-colonial countries, where many perish as a result of heavy work on plantations and in the mines.⁷

This view may be regarded as a departure from Marx's categorical assertion concerning the "accumulation of impoverishment" and from Lenin's contention that "life gets worse, food scarcer." It is, indeed, a revision of Marxism-Leninism, although carefully hidden under the cloak of a new interpretation of one of the basic tenets of Marxism. A tendency which as a result of counter-tendencies becomes its opposite is no longer a tendency. The phenomena of monotony and overexertion bear no relation to the problem of the impoverishment of the workers. Moreover, technological progress in the industrial countries makes for less, not more, exertion. Similarly, working conditions in colonial or semi-colonial countries have nothing to do with the law which Marx claimed he had discovered as operating in capitalist countries. The low living standard of these countries is not the result of their colonial status or of the penetration of capitalism. On the contrary, a tendency toward some improvement in the standard of living may be observed even in these countries, although it is much slower than in the industrial countries.

F. Konstantinov, the author of an article published in *Pravda* under the title "Against Contemporary Revisionism," also uses the argument of low living standards in colonial countries as an illustration of Marx's thesis of the complete impoverishment of the proletariat:

When we consider the capitalist world as a whole with today's and yesterday's colonies and semi-colonies in Asia, Africa, South and Central America, where capitalism has ruled for the last two or three centuries, what a bottomless pit of poverty and deprivation reveals itself to the eye of any impartial man!⁸

Yet another attempt to interpret the Marxian theory of the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat may be found in the two articles by A. Arzumanian, published in *Kommunist* in 1956 and 1957.⁹ According to Arzumanian, the impoverishment is evident, not in the lowering of real wages in their absolute aspect, but in the tendency of real wages to fall below the level of the value of labor. The latter is determined by the minimum physical sustenance necessary to keep a man alive and also by the historical and social factors which vary with every period of history. "Therefore,"

⁷ E. Varga, "O tendentsiyakh razvitiya sovremennogo kapitalizma i sotsializma" (Trends in the Development of Contemporary Capitalism and Socialism), *ibid.*, 1957, No. 4, pp. 42—43.

⁸ *Pravda*, February 5, 1958.

⁹ A. Arzumanian, "Voprosy marksistsko-leninskoi teorii obnishchaniya proletariata" (Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of the Impoverishment of the Proletariat), *Kommunist*, 1956, No. 10, pp. 105—19; and "Sotsialist Rember i marksistskaya teoriya obnishchaniya proletariata" (The Socialist Rambert and the Marxian Theory of the Impoverishment of the Proletariat), *ibid.*, 1957, No. 2, pp. 79—94.

contends Arzumian, "the value of labor consists not only of the value of those commodities indispensable for the sustenance of a man's physical existence, but also of the sums expended on the satisfaction of the social and cultural needs of a worker and his family."¹⁰

The outlay to satisfy "social and cultural needs" varies with the course of history. During the economic order named "capitalism" by the Communists (the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century), these expenditures were constantly growing larger, both in scope and in degree. This is what we would term the improvement in the living standards of the working masses in Western Europe and North America. Arzumian does not, in fact, deny it. By introducing, however, a concept of the value of labor as the minimum necessary for the reproduction of labor, he tries to prove that the workers' actual earnings in capitalist countries, i. e., their real wages, have always had a tendency to be lower than the value of labor. Therein, in his view, can be detected the law of the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat.

Such an interpretation, very different from Marx's and Lenin's views, cannot explain the "law of absolute impoverishment." First of all, it maintains that there is under capitalism no impoverishment, but that on the contrary the living standard of the workers is rising. This is called by Arzumian an increase in the value of labor:

The development of the forces of production has given rise to new needs, hitherto unknown to men. The capitalist society of the early nineteenth century had no need for railroads, cars, air transport, electricity, gas, oil, telephones, telegraph, moving pictures, radio or television. In addition, food products and clothing have changed.

Is the value of labor influenced by these changes? Unquestionably it is. It would be foolish to contend that changes in the traditional standard of living of a given country do not embrace the working class...

Therefore, while analyzing wages and their dynamics, it is necessary to bear in mind the sum total of commodities indispensable for the reproduction of the labor force at a given historical moment. An objective analysis of the condition of the working class demands that the living conditions of the modern worker be contrasted, not with the cave life of primitive man, but with the extent to which all the needs which have arisen in modern society owing to the development of productive forces are satisfied.¹¹

No one, of course, expects a comparison of the modern worker's needs with those of a cave man. However, the law of absolute impoverishment was created by Marx to apply to the era of capitalism; and so long as capitalism exists, a comparison between the living conditions of the modern worker with those in which workers lived at the beginning of the last century is quite legitimate. It is, indeed, the only way to check whether the law is operating. It is not.

Secondly, the very concept of the "value of labor" is not clear. Even if one accepts that such an economic category does exist, it is impossible to express it in actual figures. We can estimate physical needs by assessing the minimum number of calories and then translating them into food products

¹⁰ "Voprosy Marksistko-Jeninskoi teorii...", p. 106.

¹¹ "Sotsialist Rember...", p. 85.

and the money necessary to buy them. On the other hand, to assess the exact value of minimum cultural needs is an impossible task, the impossibility of which increases as more widely diversified needs become more and more individualized. Under these circumstances, who can tell what is the minimum of cultural nourishment necessary to sustain the "reproduction of the labor force"?

The standard of living, like the wealth or poverty of the population, is a relative concept, meaningful only in geographical or historical comparison. The best yardstick for the living standard of the proletariat is its real wages, the rise or fall of which really does denote enrichment or impoverishment of the workers. Arzumanian's thesis that the absolute impoverishment of the working class shows itself in the decline of real wages cannot stand the test of criticism because of the vagueness with which he defines the "value of labor."

In a polemic with the French socialist Rambert, Arzumanian argues that the proletariat is assisted in its struggle for better working and living conditions by its strength and organization. He points out, quite correctly, that such a contention contradicts Marx's teaching that the position of the worker under capitalism grows steadily worse. Arzumanian maintains that the "economic struggle of the working class is not without positive results"¹² and that "in any analysis of the dynamics of real wages in any given period, the starting point must be the high [scil., highest] level which has been gained by the working class in its *obstinate class struggle* in the country concerned during this period."¹³

The growth of real wages in the United States is admitted by another Soviet writer, A. Bechin, in the journal *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*. Bechin stated: "In the postwar period, real wages have either very slightly risen or else they have dropped. In the USA, the real wage during the period 1950—57 was lower than in 1944, although it was higher than in 1939."¹⁴

V. Cherpakov, writing in *Kommunist*, attempts to offer a new explanation of the theory of the impoverishment of the working class. He maintains that it is due, not to real wages, which have actually risen in the last two centuries, but to the polarization of living conditions between the monopolistic bourgeoisie and the masses of the people. Hence, the workers "compare their living standard, not with the situation of their forefathers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but with that of the exploiters growing rich at the cost of the working masses."¹⁵

The argument of the polarization of incomes in capitalist countries has no basis in reality. The gap between these two extremes is prevented from growing wider by heavy progressive taxation. All attempts to provide a new explanation of impoverishment deviate from Marx's own view, which, like

¹² "Voprosy marksistko-leninskoi teorii . . .", p. 109.

¹³ "Sotsialist Rember . . .", p. 93 (our italics).

¹⁴ A. Bechin, "Ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii v stranakh kapitalizma" (Concerning the Economic Situation in Capitalist Countries), *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1958, No. 5, p. 53.

¹⁵ V. Cherpakov, "Sovremenny kapitalizm i antimarksizm" (Modern Capitalism and Anti-Marxism), *Kommunist*, 1957, No. 17, p. 81.

his other economic theories, had some logical basis. However, one has only to remove one little link from the Marxian logical chain and the whole structure collapses. It would, therefore, be more plausible to accept the view that, in spite of its falsity, the theory of the impoverishment of the working class under capitalism is used by the Bolsheviks as a weapon of propaganda against the capitalist order.

We shall return later to this problem. For the moment, we must consider the standard of living in the USSR, where, according to the Eighteenth Party Congress, held in 1939, "socialism has been built."

In their economic studies, Marx and Engels concentrated their attention on detecting those economic laws which, in their opinion, governed the society in which they were living, i. e., capitalism. They had no doubt that capitalism contains within itself the germs of its own destruction and that it will inevitably be replaced by socialism. To the concrete problems of the future socialist society, however, they gave rather less thought, so that only a very broad outline of socialism may be found in their writings. First of all, private ownership of the means of production would be replaced by a socialized or collective ownership. It was not clear, however, what type of collective ownership the new order would assume or how socialized production would be guided. As far as the standard of living was concerned, Marx and Engels were sufficiently competent economists not to hope that the liquidation of the "exploiting class" would of itself raise the standard of living. They understood very well that consumption by the rich represents a small fraction of the entire "surplus product" which passes through their hands because they are the owners of the means of production.¹⁶ Socialism was to bring about a radical improvement in the standard of living of the workers as a result, not of the "expropriation of the expropriators," but of greater productivity unshackled by old restricting conditions. The founders of Marxism believed that the abolition of capitalism would increase productivity since the worker would work harder and better for the benefit of a society of which he was a part than he did under capitalist enslavement. Secondly, the production processes would no longer depend on the haphazard functioning of a capitalist economy. Economic crises, a permanent feature of capitalism, would disappear. Economic planning would prevent wasteful and improper investments, which were characteristic of capitalist profiteering and wastefulness. In the future, it was hoped that as a classless society emerged the state itself, which existed to protect the interests of the owners, would "wither away." This would bring about a curtailment of expenditure on defense, police and courts of law, which in turn would increase the national wealth and income. The Marxian blueprint for the future state, based on a study of capitalism, could not fail, in spite of its vagueness, to attract the masses of the people and inspire them with a new faith.

★

It was Lenin who had the unenviable task of putting this theory into practice. Like Marx, Lenin was not interested in the concrete forms of a socialist society. According to V. Valentinov,

¹⁶ According to computations by some economists, not more than 2 percent.

Kamenev, as the editor of the first editions of Lenin's works, correctly remarked that in not one of his [Lenin's] works is there a description of the order for which he was fighting. Apart from the vague notion of a socialist order, appealing to the emotions and derived from [Chernyshevsky's] *What Is To Be Done?*, Lenin (like all the others) had, and, indeed, could have, nothing else to offer. A few lines from Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Program* did not contribute much. Lenin's attitude to the new order was that of a believer to the "Kingdom of Heaven"—with this difference, that for disbelief he could put people into jail and execute them.¹⁷

Lenin's own pronouncements about the future order were mostly calculated to gain support for his cause and often bore the mark of prophecy. In 1913, he wrote:

Under capitalism, the "liberation" of the labor of millions of miners working in coal mines [in consequence of the invention by the British chemist Sir William Ramsay of a process for extracting gas directly from coal] will inevitably give rise to mass unemployment, an enormous increase in poverty and a deterioration in workers' living conditions. The profits from this great invention will be stored away into the pockets of the Morgans, the Rockefellers, the Ryabushinskys, the Morozovs, with their entourage of lawyers, directors, professors and other lackeys of capitalism.

Under socialism, the application of a method which would "free" the labor of millions of miners, etc., would immediately allow the reduction *for all* of the working day from eight hours, for instance, to seven or even less. The electrification of all factories and railroads will make working conditions more hygienic, will rid millions of workers of smoke, dust and dirt, and will speed the conversion of dirty and repulsive-looking workshops into clean, bright laboratories worthy of man.¹⁸

The Revolution has not brought with it any enrichment of the masses of the people. On the contrary, the wars which it caused created widespread destruction and deprived workers and peasants of work. It was at that time, during the Civil War, that the Bolsheviks tried to introduce socialism by establishing new economic forms which would bring this radical change about. The "expropriation of the expropriators" brought about a partial transformation in the standard of living. In the cities, some houses and apartments vacated by "white" bourgeois owners who had either gone abroad or been deported were taken over for the workers. Some peasants seized the land, livestock and implements of the estates. But this amelioration of conditions for the lower classes was sporadic and temporary. Very soon after the Revolution, the general living standard of the entire population began to decline. There was a growing housing shortage, especially in the cities, where housing construction came to a standstill. For the peasants, the immediate benefits of the Revolution were in some instances more lasting, but they too, as a result of the destruction, which the Revolution brought in its wake, found a shortage of implements and other means to cultivate their enlarged farms. In general, it may be said that the economic revolution of these early years was a striking illustration of the view that destruction of the rich does

¹⁷ V. Valentinov, "Chernyshevsky i Lenin" (Chernyshevsky and Lenin), *Novy zhurnal*, No. 27, New York, 1951, p. 201.

¹⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Pravda*, April 21, 1913. See *Sochineniya*, 4th ed., Vol. XIX, p. 42. (Lenin's italics.)

not make the poor any richer. As a result of the forcible redistribution of property, the national income and the general welfare declined, affecting thereby the lower strata of the population. The ravages were aggravated by civil war and by the fighting between the Bolsheviks and the newly-established states such as Poland and the Ukraine.

An historian of the Soviet economy describes this period in the following words:

During the first years after the October Revolution, as a result of the economic destruction arising from world and civil war and foreign intervention, the Soviet government had no opportunity to improve in any way the living standard of the workers. The grim heritage of those years was an undeveloped industry, an obsolete agriculture and a beggarly level of consumption by the overwhelming majority of the population.¹⁹

A most striking illustration of the economic ruin of these times was the devaluation of the Soviet currency, which lasted until 1924. As a result, the wages of white-collar workers and laborers alike showed a tendency to become equalized, quite apart from the policy of the Soviet government directed to that end. This tendency was intensified by the system of food rationing, in which the rations were apportioned on the basis of the number of eaters in a family, regardless of class origin. In those days, the policy of the Soviet government was to promote equalization of wages as a characteristic of a socialist society. On March 18, 1919, Lenin, in his report to the Eighth Congress of the Party, proudly quoted the words of the labor commissar, V. Shmidt, that "as far as the equalization of incomes is concerned, we have accomplished what no bourgeois state has done or could do over a period of decades."²⁰

A well-known Soviet economist, S. G. Strumilin, thus describes the equalizing tendencies during the period of War Communism:

The monthly pay [in Tsarist times] of 25 rubles was the average for workers with all types of qualifications. But for workers whose qualification was equivalent to the present Grade 1 scale, the pay even before the war was not more than 8—10 rubles. On this wage, they barely managed to exist. What has been done by the Revolution? It has placed on that minimum level of 8—10 rubles all workers whatever their qualification.²¹

To be sure, as early as August 1918, the trade unions, which regulated wages, had departed from the principle of egalitarianism; but this had little influence on the total income, since an ever smaller part of it was regulated by wage scales: the rest was paid in kind. The following figures, taken from a table prepared by Strumilin, show the relation, in percentages, of the monthly salary received by Grade 12 (the highest grade) of workers in the USSR to that received by Grade 1 in various months (or on an average over a period of months) during the years 1917—21:

¹⁹ P. I. Lyashchenko, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR* (A History of the Economy of the USSR), Vol. III, Moscow, 1956, p. 169.

²⁰ Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 3rd ed., Vol. XXIV, 1936, p. 143.

²¹ S. G. Strumilin, *Problemy ekonomiki truda* (Problems in the Economics of Labor), Moscow, 1957, p. 511.

1917 (August)	211%
1917 (October)	156%
1918 (June)	120%
1918 (September)	129%
1919 (February)	115%
1919 (September)	109%
1920 (January—December)	104%
1921 (January—June)	102%

SOURCE: S. G. Strumilin, *Problemy ekonomiki truda* (Problems in the Economics of Labor), Moscow, 1957, p. 512.

This system of wage-leveling, which later acquired the name *uravnilovka* (equalization), coupled with low earnings and a general lack of labor discipline, led to a lowering of production. Yet it was a higher rate of productivity which, according to Marx and Lenin, was the chief prerequisite for the victory of socialism. Lenin wrote: "Capitalism can, and will, ultimately be defeated, because socialism creates a new and much higher productivity of labor."²²

The drive for higher productivity was begun in 1919, when Lenin encouraged the "Communist *subbotniki*," who are officially defined as "volunteers working on their free evenings and rest days" (literally Saturday workers):

And here are the hungry workers surrounded by the malicious counter-revolutionary agitation of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the SR's, establishing the "Communist *subbotniki*," working overtime *without any reward* and achieving *an enormous improvement in the productivity of labor*, in spite of the fact that they are tired, exhausted and thin from malnutrition.²³

Many other methods of stimulating higher productivity were employed. socialist competition, shock-work, Stakhanovism. However, the tendency to equalization which was opposed to all this continued to dominate the Soviet economy for some time. According to the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*,

The tendency toward equal distribution also found expression in several enterprises in the early 1930's in equal pay for skilled and unskilled, heavy and light work. The equalization of wages led to fluctuations in the labor force, reduced the incentives to higher productivity and hindered the increase of skilled workers.²⁴

The battle against *uravnilovka* was fought by Stalin. In a speech to industrial workers on June 23, 1931, he sharply attacked egalitarian tendencies:

We cannot tolerate a situation in which a loading hand in a steel mill earns no more than a sweeper. We cannot allow a locomotive engineer to earn the same amount as a clerk. Marx and Lenin say that the difference between skilled and unskilled labor will exist even under socialism, even after the abolition of classes, and that only under Communism will this difference disappear. As a result of this, earnings even under socialism should be according to performance, not according to need.²⁵

²² Lenin, "Veliky pochin (O geroizme rabochikh v tylu: Po povodu kommunisticheskikh subbotnikov)" (A Great Beginning. On the Heroism of the Workers in the Rear: the Communist *Subbotniki*), *Sochineniya*, 4th ed., Vol. XXIX, 1950, p. 394.

²³ *Ibid.* (Lenin's italics.)

²⁴ *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia) [BSE] 2nd ed., Vol. XLIV, 1956, pp. 279—80.

²⁵ J. V. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems of Leninism), 11th ed., Moscow, 1957, p. 335.

From then on, egalitarian tendencies in the wages of industrial workers were condemned as “left deviationist” or as “petty bourgeois.”

Similar egalitarian tendencies could be observed in the 1920’s in Soviet agriculture. They first appeared with the introduction of the “communes,” where not merely the means of production but everything else was socialized. The tendency to equalize wages at a low level was, in fact, a feature of the government’s entire agricultural policy, which was to be seen in its discrimination in favor of the “committees of poor peasants” and against the well-to-do peasants. The same tendency lay behind the system for collecting agricultural produce known as *prodrazverstka*, according to which each farmer was allowed to retain a quantity of produce calculated to suffice him for his own needs, for the maintenance of his livestock and for next year’s sowing, while all the rest was taken by the state. Similarly, taxes imposed on the peasants were intended to limit high profits: the “single agricultural tax”—which in fact was not the only agricultural tax, although the main one—was designed to prevent the development of prosperous individual farms. Finally, the liquidation of the “kulaks as a class” and the collectivization of agriculture were still in the egalitarian tradition.

It is possible to say, therefore, that during the first fifteen years after the Revolution, Soviet economic policy, so far as sharing the national income and securing better living conditions was concerned, followed the line of least resistance and was not very successful. One of the reasons for this policy was the catastrophic decline in the national income as a result of the Revolution and the wars that followed.

According to some estimates, the national income of the USSR in 1922—23 was half of what it had been in 1913 and did not reach the prewar level again until 1926—27. According to the Soviet statistical handbook *The National and State Economy in 1922—23*, the national income of Russia, within her post-World War I boundaries, was in 1912 and 1923 as follows:

	1912	1923
	Gold Rubles	
Agriculture	6,117,000,000	3,955,000,000
Industry	4,451,000,000	1,100,000,000
Total	10,568,000,000	5,055,000,000

SOURCE: *Narodnoe i gosudarstvennoe khozyaistvo v 1922—23 gg.* (The National and State Economy in 1922—23), p. 10 (as quoted in Yevhen Glovinsky, *Finansy USSR* (The Finances of the Ukrainian SSR), Ukrainian Scientific Institute, Warsaw, 1938, p. 37.

In the mid-twenties, the reconstruction of the country’s economy and, later, the industrialization policy demanded new investments which could not be obtained from abroad and had to be procured by restricting consumption at home. There were now no rich people left in the USSR, so that restrictions affected the living standard of the masses.

Another reason for the early Soviet economic policy must be sought in the very nature of the Bolshevik government and of its theory. First of all, Lenin had not paid sufficient attention to the problems of constructing a socialist economy. True, as early as 1919, Lenin was aware that Marx and Engels had rejected the concept of equalization in its literal sense. In his speech to the All-Russian Congress of Adult Education Workers, Lenin observed: “Engels was a thousand times right when he wrote: ‘The concept of equality is the silliest and most absurd prejudice in spite of the abolition of

classes.' ”²⁶ However, as we saw, Lenin supported the “Communist *subbotniki*” and the Communist Party put a ceiling on salaries paid to its members. The contradictions in Soviet economic policy were further aggravated by other factors. It was a widely-held socialist belief that the proletarian revolution must establish “economic equality” just as the bourgeois revolution had established “juridical equality.” The Bolsheviks were also governed by practical considerations, such as the support they sought from the poorer proletariat and peasantry, who were anxious to “get back their own” and exploit the “victories of the Revolution” as an immediate improvement of their own living conditions. Finally, Stalin, in his interview with Emil Ludwig, made this revealing comment: “Egalitarianism has its roots in the peasant’s way of thinking, the psychology of sharing all benefits alike, the psychology of primitive Communism.”²⁷ This “peasant’s way of thinking” relates, above all, to the Russian peasantry, in whom the tradition of the peasant commune (*obshchina*) was still deeply rooted and by whom it was preserved until the Revolution.

A New Policy

The departure from the policy of equalization, announced by Stalin in 1931, was due not so much to his foresight as to economic necessity. None of the plans for the large-scale industrialization of the country envisaged by the First Five-Year Plan could have been realized if the Soviet government had not adopted the system practiced throughout the rest of the world—that of differential wage scales. What is interesting is that subsequent development of Soviet policy has tended to go to the other extreme and create great inequalities in wages.

The new differential wage scales, first introduced for the workers in the coal industry, helped to stabilize the labor force and increase productivity.²⁸ It is true that as late as 1933, the joint resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars and the Party Central Committee issued on April 8, points to the need for “final liquidation of egalitarianism in wages,”²⁹ but it may be taken that in the 1930’s the differential scale of wages became firmly established in the Soviet economy. Today, the differences between the highest and lowest wages in the USSR are no smaller than they are in Western Europe or the United States. According to the law of September 8, 1956, the minimum wage is 300 rubles per month, while the salary of a director of a trust or a top manager may be in the range of 9,000 rubles or more, the ratio being 1:30 or even sometimes 1:45.

A similar trend may be observed in agriculture. Although kolkhozniks’ personal plots have been, in general, cut to the same size, their incomes derived from the kolkhoz, which are based on the system of *trudodni*, or work-day units, differ widely. Thus, on the Molotov Kolkhoz, at Yukhnov, the work-day unit in 1954 was worth only 50 kopeks,³⁰ while on a kolkhoz in Moldavia in 1957 it was worth 31 rubles.³¹ This inequality springs from the varying levels of kolkhoz incomes (*viz.*, the collective incomes of kolkhozes), for which the reasons are many: the fertility of the soil, the type of crop (the kolkhoz in the second example was a vineyard), the efficiency of management,

²⁶ Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 3rd ed., Vol. XXIV, Moscow, 1932, p. 294.

²⁷ *BSE*, 1st ed., Vol. XLVII, 1940, col. 894.

the amount of state deliveries exacted (these are sometimes out of proportion to the farm's output), etc. The rate of financial remuneration per work-day unit does not, of course, finally decide the kolkhoznik's total income. Other factors to be considered are the rate of remuneration in kind, the number of work-day units fulfilled and the income derived from the sale of produce from the kolkhoznik's personal plot. All these factors tend to intensify the differentiation of kolkhozniks' incomes.



An important change in the Soviet attitude to the problem of the standard of living dates from 1935. Until then, to be well off was definitely frowned upon. Moreover, the concept of "labor discipline" laid stress on work as a duty. In a letter from the Party Central Committee to all Party organizations, dated February 21, 1929, and entitled "On Raising Labor Discipline," we read:

Comrade Lenin and our Party have pointed out more than once the vital importance for the victory of socialist construction of a "new labor discipline," a new organization of labor, combining the latest achievements of science and capitalist techniques with the mass unification of politically conscious workers, forming a powerful socialist production.³²

In the same year, by a special resolution of the Central Committee, a new method was introduced designed to increase the productivity of labor and improve labor discipline. This method, known as "socialist competition between factories,"³³ came to play a very important role in the Soviet economy.

The resolution of January 10, 1933, adopted by a joint plenum of the Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission and devoted to the results of the First Five-Year Plan, mentions the inadequate progress made in raising the standard of living (which, in fact, had not risen at all) and the necessity of abolishing unemployment and "uncertainty about the future" among the workers.³⁴

The change of attitude was announced by Stalin in his speech to the First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites on November 17, 1935, in a phrase which has since become notorious: "Comrades, life has become better, life has become gayer."³⁵ In certain respects, Stalin was quite right. The rationing system had by then been abolished, the terrible famine of 1932—33 was over, and material conditions were, by comparison with earlier privations,

²⁸ *Ocherki razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva Ukrainskoi SSR* (An Outline of the Development of the Economy of the Ukrainian SSR), Moscow, 1954, p. 339.

²⁹ *Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo Pravitelstva po khozyaistvennym voprosam* (Directives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government on Economic Questions), Moscow, 1957, Vol. II, p. 377.

³⁰ *Pravda Ukrainy*, March 27, 1955.

³¹ *Ibid.*, January 23, 1958.

³² *Direktivy KPSS . . .*, Vol. II, p. 14.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 368. Abolition of unemployment has been possible in the USSR only because a large part of the surplus labor is employed in concentration camps as forced labor.

³⁵ Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

a little better. At that time, too, Soviet economists and politicians began to devote more attention to the problem of raising the standard of living. In the resolutions adopted on March 20, 1939, at the end of the Eighteenth Party Congress, which confirmed that the first phase of Communism—socialism—had in the main been completed, we read:

The problem now is no longer how to liquidate unemployment and poverty in rural areas. This has been solved fully and forever. Now the problem is to create such a state of well-being and cultural advancement among the workers as shall correspond to the increased demands of the Soviet people, which are unattainable by the richest capitalist countries and signify the beginning of a real flowering of the forces of socialism, the flowering of a new, socialist culture.³⁶

If this resolution speaks of the creation of a state of well-being as of a promise or a task still to be fulfilled, the official attitude to the problem of the living standard changed markedly after World War II, when what was hoped for in 1939 was declared to be an accomplished fact. These declarations were designed to suggest that life in the Soviet Union had become better simply because it must have become better—since Soviet citizens by this time were already living in the era of socialism—the transitional stage of Communism.

In the USSR, the capitalist law of the impoverishment of the working class does not operate. The socialist reconstruction of the national economy has created a marked increase of consumption in the Soviet economy, and this enhanced well-being is characteristic of all its strata. The wages of the workers have risen, the earnings of the kolkhozniks have increased, surpassing several times over the income of the individual peasant farmer before the Revolution.³⁷

This was written in *Voprosy ekonomiki* in 1948, not quite three years after the end of the war. In his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Stalin gave the following definition of the “basic law of socialism”:

Is there a basic economic law of socialism? Yes, there is. What are its main features and objectives? [These] can be formulated in roughly the following terms: the securing of maximum satisfaction for the steadily growing material and cultural needs of the whole of society through the uninterrupted growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques.³⁸

For the brochure from which this quotation is taken, Stalin was publicly praised as one who had “posed and solved all the basic problems of the political economy of socialism.”³⁹ Stalin’s great “contribution” was praised in these words:

The discovery by Comrade Stalin of the basic economic law of socialism represents a generalization of all the vast experience of socialist construction in

³⁶ *Direktivny KPSS . . .*, Vol. II, pp. 581—82.

³⁷ I. Anchishkin and S. Partichuk, “Vse dorogi vedut k kommunizmu” (All Roads Lead to Communism), *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1949, No. 2, p. 12.

³⁸ J. V. Stalin, *Ekonomicheskie problemy sotsializma v SSSR* (The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR), Moscow, 1952, p. 40.

³⁹ A. Rumanytsev, “O kharaktere ekonomicheskikh zakonov pri sotsializme” (Regarding the Nature of Economic Laws Under Socialism), *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1952, No. 11, p. 13.

the USSR. This law uncovers and explains the reasons for the irresistible growth of [the country's] productive forces and the unbroken rise in the material well-being and cultural level of the workers in a socialist society.⁴⁰

A Soviet textbook of political economy gives a more detailed background of this law:

Marx and Engels foresaw that under socialism the aim of a planned production would be to satisfy the needs of society as a whole and of each of its members. In developing this Marxian premise, Lenin wrote in the draft program of the RSDLP [Russian Social Democratic Labor Party] in 1902 that the replacement of a capitalist society by a socialist one would be realized "in order to secure the complete well-being and the free and manifold development of all its members." Lenin worked out scientifically ways of improving the well-being of the workers and a program for the uninterrupted growth of production and the development and application of higher techniques under socialism, thereby revealing the initial premises of the basic economic law of socialism, which became the cornerstone of the policy of the Communist Party and of the Soviet government.⁴¹

If anyone should be singled out as the first to maintain that socialism would lead to the well-being of the workers, it should be the French "Utopian socialist" Charles Fourier (1772—1837). The history of the establishment of socialism in the USSR proves the contrary: until now, it has cost the people great sacrifices. The thesis that socialism is bringing about a higher standard of living is used in the Soviet Union as a justification for these sacrifices and shortages. It is also used to demonstrate that once socialism is established, the standard of living must be higher. So, a higher standard of living is not a sign of approaching socialism, but *vice versa*:

The socialism which is already built in the USSR has demonstrated in practice that the predominance of socialized property creates unlimited scope for the development of the productive forces and a limitless prospect of opportunities for satisfying the growing needs of the people.⁴²

In this passage, that which remains to be proved is taken as having been proved already. There is no direct relation between the socialization of the means of production and a higher standard of living. The former is a juridical, while the latter is an economic process. Similarly, labor productivity is not a function of the form of ownership of the means of production.

To be sure, a higher national income depends upon increased labor productivity; but an increased national income does not mean greater well-being for the masses of the people. It does affect the standard of living, but ultimately the latter is determined by the system of distribution, which in turn depends on many factors such as the amount of savings, the structure of taxation and the degree of social security. When, therefore, another Soviet commentator on Stalin's basic law of socialism writes, "Distribution, under socialism, cannot but be determined by the demands of the basic law of socialism—the task of securing the maximum satisfaction of the constantly

⁴⁰ G. Kozlov, "Osnovnoi ekonomichesky zakon sotsializma" (The Basic Economic Law of Socialism), *ibid.*, 1952, No. 10, p. 23.

⁴¹ *Politicheskaya ekonomiya: Uchebnik*, pp. 404—5.

⁴² G. Kozlov, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

growing physical and cultural needs of society as a whole,"⁴³ he is right insofar as the task of securing this satisfaction today confronts the socialist order just as it does all other societies. The raising of the living standard under socialism is, therefore, not something automatic: it is a task which must be solved.

Soviet economists attempt to prove that this task has been solved. In the statistical volume issued on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Revolution, the following figures are given to illustrate the rise in the standard of living between 1913 and 1956. During this period, it is stated, the real incomes of wage and salary earners, excluding taxes and including pensions, aids, free education, medical treatment and other benefits, rose by 240 percent. If the abolition of unemployment be included, the increase amounted to 270 percent, and, with the further inclusion of the shorter working day, to 380 percent. During the same period, the real incomes, in money and kind, of working peasants (excluding "kulaks") from communal farms and personal plots, excluding taxes and other payments, rose, per laborer, by 300 percent. If free education, medical treatment and other benefits from the state be included, this increase amounted to 440 percent, and, with the further inclusion of the appropriate share of kolkhoz reserves and indivisible funds, to 500 percent.⁴⁴

Similar data may be found in other sources: the annual reports of the Central Statistical Administration, the reports and speeches of leading delegates at Party congresses or at sessions of the Supreme Soviet, or newspaper and magazine articles. The official statistical survey of the Soviet economy published in 1956 states that between 1950 and 1955 the real incomes of all wage and salary earners engaged in the national economy rose by 39 percent, and that during the same period the incomes, both in money and in kind, of peasants (i.e., kolkhozniks) from collectivized agriculture and personal plots rose, per laborer, by 50 percent. According to the same source, the directives of the Twentieth Party Congress on the Sixth Five-Year Plan laid down that during the period 1955—60 the incomes of wage and salary earners and of kolkhozniks were to increase on an average by approximately 30 percent and not less than 40 percent respectively.⁴⁵ The report of the Central Statistical Administration on the fulfillment of economic plans for 1956 states that in comparison with 1955 the average income of wage and salary earners increased by 3 percent and that the earnings of kolkhozniks, in money and kind, rose by 12 percent per laborer during the same period.⁴⁶ The report for 1957 assesses the corresponding increases for the period 1956—57 at 7 percent and 5 percent respectively.⁴⁷

These are impressive statistics which seem to indicate a rapid growth in the well-being of the Soviet citizen. Their most serious drawback is that one must take these and many other Soviet figures on trust. Soviet literature on

⁴³ V. Doroshev, "Osnovnoi ekonomichesky zakon sotsializma" (The Basic Economic Law of Socialism), *Kommunist*, 1953, No. 1, p. 33.

⁴⁴ *Dostizheniya Sovetskoi vlasti za sorok let v tsifrakh: Statistichesky sbornik* (The Achievements of the Soviet Regime During Forty Years in Figures: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1957, pp. 329—30.

⁴⁵ *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR: Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1956, p. 37.

⁴⁶ *Izvestia*, January 31, 1957.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, January 28, 1958.

the subject seldom offers any explanation of how these figures are arrived at.

Sometimes, when one compares Soviet data, a discrepancy will result which is difficult to explain. Thus, we saw that, according to one Soviet source, the real incomes of wage and salary earners, taking into account the abolition of unemployment, rose between 1913 and 1956 by 270 percent. A textbook of political economy states that these incomes (again taking account of the abolition of unemployment) were over three times as high in 1940 as they were in 1913.⁴⁸ According to the statistical record mentioned earlier, they increased between 1940 and 1955 by 75 percent.⁴⁹ Thus, if we take the last two sources, the overall increase in the real incomes of wage and salary earners between 1913 and 1955 should be at least 425 percent—i. e., over 150 percent higher than that given by the first estimate.

Soviet economists fail to offer any comparison of the living standard of the Western European or American worker with that of the Soviet. All that one finds is propagandist literature painting the life of the American worker in black colors.⁵⁰ Generally, these descriptions offer unsubstantiated conclusions such as:

Only the destruction of capitalism will secure for the workers a prosperous and culturally rewarding life,⁵¹

or—

At a time when in the United States and other capitalist countries there is a systematic decline in the living standard of the population, the material welfare of the people in the USSR and the people's democracies is steadily improving. This clearly demonstrates the enormous superiority of the socialist economic system over the capitalist.⁵²

In the present state of affairs, Western students of the Soviet economy are thrown back on their own resources. Their task is not an easy one, in view of the absence of much statistical material that they need and the unreliability of that which is available. Only in an atmosphere of freely conducted and unbiased research can one arrive at anything like a correct picture.

⁴⁸ *Politicheskaya ekonomiya: Uchebnik*, p. 408.

⁴⁹ *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR: Statistichesky sbornik*, p. 37.

⁵⁰ For example, L. Opatsky, "Obnishchanie trudyashchikhsya kapitalisticheskikh stran i ukhudshenie ikh pitaniya" (The Impoverishment of Workers in the Capitalist Countries and the Deterioration of Their Diet), *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1948, No. 2, pp. 97—106; A. Kats, "Usilenie obnishchaniya trudyashchikhsya SShA" (Intensified Impoverishment of the Working Class in the USA), *ibid.*, 1952, No. 6, pp. 68—81; and Shparlinsky, *op. cit.*

⁵¹ Opatsky, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁵² Shparlinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

Trade Unions in the USSR

F. Hayenko

The announcement of the forthcoming celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet trade unions was made almost casually in a speech by V. V. Grishin, Chairman of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council (VTsSPS) during its Sixth Plenary Session (June 11—12, 1957). The celebration of the trade union jubilee in 1957 came as a surprise not only to the ordinary Soviet citizen, but also to historians of the trade unions, since there was no historical basis for its commemoration. The Soviet press too was taken aback by this unexpected development, and was, initially, at a loss how to respond to such an unusual occurrence. The campaign to prepare and publicize the jubilee was only launched by the Soviet press a month after the publication of special theses and a resolution of the VTsSPS devoted to this subject. The resolution explicitly called for a "widespread celebration, during the coming August, of the fiftieth anniversary of the trade unions of the USSR by all trade union organizations."¹

Later it was revealed that this spurious anniversary had been planned as one of the highlights in a large-scale campaign by the Communist leadership to develop the activities of the Soviet trade unions. This campaign was intensified during the latter half of 1957 and is continuing. A feature of this campaign has been the attempt to render trade unions more active not only by prompting them to discharge their obligations to their employer, the Soviet state, more efficiently—this, after all, has been done frequently in the past—but also by extending their rights, increasing their say in social and legal questions, and their authority in general, in short, by restoring to them their role as representatives of the workers, of which they have been deprived during the last twenty years.

This question is regarded as an issue of the utmost importance, and plenary sessions of the VTsSPS dealing with it followed closely one after another (June, August and December 1957). A radical reorganization of trade unions is taking place. In August 1957, the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet trade unions was celebrated with great pomp, the publication of special theses, invitations to foreign delegations and large-scale sporting events. The Central Committee of the CPSU addressed a special congratulatory message to the trade unions, and the Soviet Government bestowed upon them the Order of Lenin. In December more than 7,000 trade union officials and *aktiv* members were awarded Soviet orders. Finally, on December 17, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU passed a resolution providing for the extensive development of trade union activities.

¹ *Trud*, July 12, 1957.

This display of consideration for the trade unions resulted from the economic and social problems encountered by the Communist leadership in recent years:

1. The failure of the Sixth Five-Year Plan and the fall in the rate of industrial expansion. The greatest deficiency was in the sector most vital to the plan—increase in productivity. Plans to increase industrial output by some 65 percent, with an increase in productivity accounting for more than four fifths of this figure, were a complete failure. The preparation of a new plan for 1959—65 merely provided official confirmation of this.

2. The realization by the people that their low standard of living is due to increased centralization, especially in the sphere of economic planning, which acts as a brake to further industrial development.

3. The growth of contradictions within the Soviet economy—especially in the distribution of the surplus product, which is a monopoly of the Communist Party—and the possibility of their exposure.

The government apparently came to the conclusion that the Party alone, with its almost completely bankrupt administrative methods, would be unable to carry out its self-imposed program. A more powerful instrument was needed and the government saw in the trade unions, with their forty nine million members, just such an instrument.

Khrushchev admitted in an interview with *The Times* that “previously our industry and agriculture were predominantly controlled by administrative methods” and “the Party, trade union and Komsomol organs were not as active as they should have been.”²

By expanding the activities of the trade unions, the Communist Party aims to realize all their potentialities, and not merely those which have been developed by administrative methods of coercion. To achieve this, however, it is necessary, as the Central Committee resolution points out, to enhance the authority of the trade unions so that the masses “may look upon them as friendly, personal organizations.”³ At the same time the resolution implies that the Communist leadership has no intention of relinquishing its guiding role in the trade unions. Indeed, it is trying to represent this role as the natural consequence of the historical process of the rise and development of the trade union movement in prerevolutionary Russia. This was the chief motive and provided the underlying theme for the celebrations, which had been planned with this objective in mind, regardless of the historical facts.

The anniversary provided the occasion, and the tendentiously selected historical material the “evidence” on which to base the following assertions:

1. That long before it came to power, the Communist Party was fundamentally allied to the working class as its organizer and leader.

2. That the workers of the Soviet Union, united in their trade unions, are utterly devoted to the Communist Party and voluntarily accept its leadership.

3. That the Soviet trade unions play an exceptionally important role as an organization protecting the interests of the workers.

These assertions are by no means new, but the leadership of the CPSU evidently regards them as particularly timely. There is no need to stress the

² *Pravda*, February 16, 1958.

³ *Radyanska Ukraina*, December 19, 1957.

discrepancy between these statements and the actual state of affairs, but it might be worthwhile recalling some aspects of the history of the trade union movement in Russia since contemporary Soviet sources are full of inaccuracies and even deliberate distortions.

Aspects of the History of the Trade Union Movement

Like all branches of history in the Soviet Union, the history of the Soviet trade union movement has been rewritten many times in accordance with the changes in the "general line" of the Communist Party. It has, however, conformed mainly to the pattern outlined by Stalin as early as 1925:

The most characteristic feature of the history of our trade unions is that they arose, developed and gained strength in the wake of, and in friendly cooperation with the Party.⁴

But apparently Stalin's formula is already regarded as inadequate, for the "collective leadership" found it necessary to develop it a stage further by asserting that:

The Soviet trade unions came into being and developed under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party... The Soviet trade unions have been, and will continue to be, staunch propagators of Communist Party policy.⁵

Despite their rhetorical nature and historical inaccuracy, these assertions are binding upon Soviet trade union historians, who are obliged to reflect them in their works while omitting or distorting historical evidence to the contrary.

The first trade unions in Russia were formed during the period of the great strikes which were entirely spontaneous. Lenin himself stressed that "this strike movement was certainly of a spontaneous character."⁶ One of the first trade unions was that formed by the bakers in Kiev in 1903.⁷ A large-scale development of trade unions in Russia occurred at the height of the strike movement in 1905. The number of trade unions increased from 199 in 1905 to 453 in 1906 and 652 at the beginning of 1907, with a membership of 245,000 (3.5% of all industrial workers).⁸ In 1905 some trade unions amalgamated and formed all-Russian organizations, such as the Union of Postal and Telegraphic Workers.⁹ In October 1905 the First All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions was held; it was followed, in February 1906, by the Second Conference.¹⁰ Writing of the stormy days of October 1905, Lenin remarked that "an unprecedented number of workers' trade organizations were formed

⁴ J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, 1954, VII, 104.

⁵ *Trud*, August 21, 1957.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, 4th ed., 1951, V, 346.

⁷ *Sovetskie profsoyuzy*, 1957, No. 8, p. 23.

⁸ *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), BSE, Moscow, 2nd ed., 1955, XXXV, 160; *Trud*, August 21, 1957.

⁹ F. E. Los, *Revolutsiya 1905—1907 rokiv na Ukraini* (The Revolution of 1905—1907 in the Ukraine), Kiev, 1955, p. 239.

¹⁰ *Sovetskie profsoyuzy*, 1955, No. 12, pp. 17—19.

during that period.”¹¹ A year later he stated: “There is a widespread desire among the working masses in Russia to form trade unions.”¹²

A law entitled “Provisional Rules for Trade Associations” was passed on March 4, 1906, under which the formation of trade unions was legalized.¹³ Some limitations were placed on their political activities and their amalgamation on an all-Russian basis. F. E. Los, a Soviet student of the working class problem, states that “the trade union movement was gathering momentum throughout 1906 and during the first half of 1907.”¹⁴ During the period 1905—07 trade unions published over a hundred newspapers and periodicals.¹⁵ By 1907 the trade union movement in Russia was well enough organized to be able to send representatives to attend the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart in August 1907.¹⁶

These few dates and facts indicate that, while the Soviet trade unions can be traced back to prerevolutionary days, it would be inaccurate to regard 1907 as the year in which they originated. In fact, that year marked the beginning of a decline of the trade union movement in Russia. Comparison of the following figures shows that, at the beginning of 1907 trade union membership was 245,300; in 1908 it fell to 40,000, and in 1909 to 13,000.¹⁷ This decline continued until 1912, when an improvement in the economic situation brought about a revival of trade union activity. Thus, the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet trade unions in 1957 came as a complete surprise. The organizers themselves undoubtedly recognized the spurious nature of this date, since neither publications issued in connection with the anniversary, nor the special report of the chairman of the VTsSPS specifically mentioned the date of the foundation of the trade unions, apart from general references to the period 1905—07.

As to the role of the Communist Party in the organization of the trade unions, a recent Soviet statement claims: “The Bolshevik Party was the inspirer and organizer of the trade unions. It directed the entire political and economic struggle of the working class.”¹⁸ This assertion is totally at variance with the facts, and there is abundant material available, including that from Soviet sources, to refute it. The Bolsheviks were not interested in the economic aspect of the trade union movement and campaigned resolutely against such activities on its part. Their interest in trade unions was limited by the extent to which they could utilize them for their own political ends. This is implied in many of Lenin’s writings as well as in the proceedings of almost all prerevolutionary Party congresses, from the Second (1903) to the Sixth (1917).¹⁹

In fact, prior to their seizure of power, the contribution of the Bolsheviks to the trade union movement was very modest. Of the twenty two delegates to the Second All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions in February 1906, only two were Bolsheviks—the representatives of the editorial board of

¹¹ F. E. Los, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

¹² *Lenin o profsoyuzakh* (Lenin on Trade Unions), Moscow, 1957, p. 226.

¹³ *Sovetskie profsoyuzy*, 1955, No. 12, p. 18.

¹⁴ F. E. Los, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

¹⁵ *Sovetskie profsoyuzy*, 1955, No. 12, p. 21.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁷ *BSE*, *loc. cit.*

¹⁸ *Sovetskie profsoyuzy*, 1957, No. 8, p. 1.

¹⁹ *KPSS o profsoyuzakh* (The CPSU on Trade Unions), Moscow, 1957, pp. 3—47.

Vestnik prikazchikov and the Union of Commercial Employees—while there were 11 Mensheviks, 5 Bundists, one independent Social Democrat and three non-party delegates.²⁰

G. I. Petrovsky, a former Bolshevik member of the Fourth Duma, states in his memoirs that only in the fall of 1912, at the time of the elections to the Duma, and not in 1905—07, did a number of trade union organizations, and then not the majority, follow the Bolshevik Party.²¹ Thus, according to Petrovsky, this spread of Bolshevik influence affected only “a number” of trade union organizations; it occurred at a time when the working class movement in Russia was reviving, toward the end of 1912. This date is confirmed in the theses of the VTsSPS, but these, of course, refer to “all” workers’ organizations:

During the revival of the workers’ movement (1912—14) the Bolsheviks won control of all the legal working class organizations (trade unions, insurance institutions, community centers, clubs, etc.) and made them strongholds of the revolutionary struggle.²²

But if this were true, why did Mensheviks form the majority of delegates to the Third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions in June 1917? According to a recent statement by one of the Bolshevik delegates to this conference, his party was not in the majority.²³ Of 35 persons elected to the newly created VTsSPS, only 17 “sympathized” with the Bolsheviks, and the resolutions adopted were “Menshevik in spirit.”²⁴ This despite elaborate preparations by the Bolsheviks who, unlike the Mensheviks, sent their special representatives to all the principal trade union organizations.²⁵ It was only after this that the Bolsheviks succeeded in gaining control of the unions of metal and textile workers, miners and tanners. Nevertheless many trade unions still remained in the hands of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries.²⁶ The Bolsheviks never obtained a majority in the VTsSPS through democratic elections. It was only the demonstrative secession of the Mensheviks that “opened the way for the Bolsheviks.”²⁷

Even after the October Revolution, the Communists found it difficult to bring the trade unions under their control. They achieved it mainly by administrative measures, such as repeated purges of the trade union apparatus and their insistence that only Communists be elected to central and provincial trade union offices. Thus, in 1922, the Eleventh Party Congress passed a resolution which, under existing conditions, had the force of law:

The next task facing the provincial and Central committees is the reorganization of the main provincial and central organs of the trade unions. In this connection, the following basic rules should be observed: (a) Party membership of

²⁰ P. Kolokolnikov and S. Rappoport, *1905—1907 gg. v professionalnom dvizhenii* (1905—1907 in the Trade Union Movement), Moscow, 1925, pp. 425—426 (quoted from *Sotsialistichesky vestnik*, 1957, Nos. 9 and 10, p. 179).

²¹ *Sovetskie profsoyuzy*, 1957, No. 8, p. 17.

²² *Trud*, July 12, 1957.

²³ *Professionalnye soyuzy*, 1948, No. 4, p. 28.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁶ *Sovetskie profsoyuzy*, Moscow, 1957, No. 9, p. 51.

²⁷ F. Romanov, *Profsoyuzy v period podgotovki i provedeniya velikoi oktyabrskoi revolyutsii* (Trade Unions before and during the Great October Revolution), Moscow, 1953, p. 83.

secretaries and chairmen of the central organs should date back at least to October 1917, and that of members of the presidium should be a minimum of three years; the secretaries and chairmen of the provincial trade union councils should have been Party members for at least three years, and members of the presidium for at least two years.²⁸

Though this, like all Party Congress resolutions, was enforced with special vigor, a resolution of the Sixteenth Congress in 1930 again stressed:

The purge of the trade union apparatus must be carried through with resolution. . . . The Congress puts the trade union and Party organizations under an obligation to overhaul the apparatus as quickly as possible.²⁹

Thereafter the purge engulfed Communists who took seriously their role as the representatives of the workers and tried to defend the interests of the trade unions against the encroachments of state and Party. During the NEP period the economy required some measure of differentiation in wages, while trade unions (including their leadership) showed a marked preference for standardization. In 1928, the Eighth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions stated that during the previous few years the trade unions had succeeded in narrowing the gap between the wages for skilled and unskilled labor, and instructed its members to continue this trend.³⁰

The tradition of political indifference and the predominance of economic interests remained quite strong in the Soviet trade unions long after the Revolution. It was only in 1929, when Tomsky was replaced as chairman of the VTsSPS by Shvernik and the whole trade union apparatus was thoroughly reorganized, that these independent tendencies were eradicated and the Communist Party finally won control of the trade unions.

National Elements in the Trade Union and Labor Movements

The western areas of the former Russian Empire (Finland, the Baltic countries, Poland and the Ukraine) played a prominent part in the early history of the trade union and labor movement. It was here that the first trade unions were formed, and their development was more intensive than in the rest of Russia. There were several reasons for this. First, the feeling of oppression was especially acute in these areas where economic exploitation was aggravated by national grievances. This combination increased the activity of the labor movement and caused it to assume a more radical form. Second, these areas were directly influenced by the labor movement in Western Europe.

Certain misconceptions regarding the labor movement in the non-Russian parts of the empire, especially the Ukraine, are current. The activity of the working class in the Ukraine sometimes surpassed even that of the St. Petersburg workers. Indeed, the first political labor organization in the former Russian Empire was the South Russian Union of Workers, formed in Odessa in 1875. Only three years later was a similar organization formed in St. Peters-

²⁸ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh* (The CPSU in Resolutions), Moscow, 7th ed., 1953, Part I, p. 612.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Part II, p. 615.

³⁰ S. N. Prokopovich, *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR* (National Economy of the USSR), New York, 1952, Vol. II, p. 90.

burg. The Union of Polish Workers was established in the nineties.³¹ Of the 197 trade unions in Russia in 1905, 80 were located in five Ukrainian cities (30 in Odessa, 18 in Kiev, 13 in Kharkov, 11 in Ekaterinoslav and 8 in Nikolaev).³² The Ukrainian workers reacted strongly to the notorious Lena massacre. In the Ukraine, "political protest strikes took place earlier than in the rest of Russia."³³

The Bolshevik policy toward the nationalities in the labor field, as in other fields, was two-faced. Article IX of the party program of Russian Marxists (adopted by the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1903) spoke of the right of nations to self-determination; yet the RSDWP attempted to bring all nationality parties under its control. In 1906 the Fourth "Unity" Congress of the RSDWP "stood out firmly against the organization of trade unions by nationalities."³⁴ Nevertheless, some purely national workers' organizations maintained their independence, since the August 1913 Conference of the Central Committee of the RSDWP demanded the "amalgamation" of workers of all nationalities in unified proletarian organizations (political, professional, cooperative, educational, etc.).³⁵ Current Bolshevik assertions that Marxism held a monopoly among the workers and that the nationality question was of little significance in non-Russian areas are at variance with the historical facts, and they can be refuted by the imperialistic measures taken by the Russian Marxists of the time.

Statements by some Ukrainian authors regarding the complete Russification of the workers in the Ukraine and their indifference to the Ukrainian question are also inaccurate. According to the 1897 census, the number of workers in the basic industries in Russia who used Ukrainian as their mother tongue was 424,100. In view of the fact that the number of workers in the whole Russian Empire was only 2,792,000,³⁶ we shall see that the number of Ukrainian workers was almost proportionate to that of the Ukrainian population in the Russian Empire.³⁷ The contribution of the Ukrainian workers to the industrial development of Tsarist Russia was not inferior to that of the workers of any other nationality, including the Russians themselves.

As for the development of industry in the Ukraine, it was at first based primarily on local labor. The census shows the proportion of non-residents among the workers of eight Ukrainian provinces as only 20 percent;³⁸ by

³¹ A. Lozovsky, *Mirovye professionalnoe dvizhenie* (The World Trade Union Movement), Moscow, 1926, Vol. III, p. 247.

³² F. E. Los, *op. cit.*, pp. 240—242.

³³ P. A. Lavrov, *Rabochee dvizhenie na Ukraine v 1913—1914 gg.* (The Working Class Movement in the Ukraine, 1913—1914), Kiev 1957, p. 9.

³⁴ *KPSS o profsoyuzakh*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³⁵ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh*, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 315.

³⁶ *BSE*, 1st ed., 1940, XLVII, 858.

³⁷ A. A. Nesterenko, *Ocherki istorii promyshlennosti i polozheniya proletariata Ukrainy v kontse XIX i nachale XX v.* (A Historical Outline of Industrial Development and the Proletariat in the Ukraine at the End of the Nineteenth and at the Beginning of the Twentieth Centuries), Moscow, 1954, p. 160.

³⁸ F. E. Los, *Formirovanie rabochego klassa na Ukraine i ego revolyutsionnaya borba* (The Formation of the Working Class in the Ukraine and its Revolutionary Struggle), Kiev, 1955, p. 93.

1902, however, it rose to 43.4 percent.³⁹ It should also be borne in mind that "the term 'non-resident' referred partly to the natives of other provinces and districts, and partly to those of the remote townships of the same district," and not solely to those from outside the Ukraine.⁴⁰

Under pressure from Moscow, contemporary Soviet scholars studying the working class problem in the Ukraine tend to exaggerate the role of workers from outside the Ukraine. Actually this role was negative, at least from the local workers' point of view. First, the Ukraine had a surplus of labor, and the arrival of large numbers of workers from other parts of the Empire depressed the labor market. Second, these workers sent a considerable proportion of their earnings to their families outside the Ukraine, thus reducing opportunities for the development of local industry and the prospects for employment of native workers.

The Russifying tendency of the Tsarist government was especially strong in cities and industrial centers. But this does not mean that all Ukrainian workers should be disregarded simply because they used the Russian language at work. Apart from the fact that the number of Ukrainian-speaking workers was almost proportionate to that of the Ukrainian population in general, it should be added that the Ukrainian workers were by no means indifferent to the Ukrainian cause and were aware of the tragic situation of the Ukraine under Russian rule. Moreover, we have evidence of their active intervention in defense of the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian schools and Ukrainian culture. The workers of Ekaterinoslav, for example, wrote in 1912 in their "Instructions" to G. I. Petrovsky, deputy of the Fourth Duma:

We greatly value our mother tongue as a powerful instrument of cultural development. . . . We authorize Comrade Petrovsky to secure for us Ukrainians schools where our native tongue is the language of instruction, permission to use the Ukrainian language in courts and in all administrative establishments in areas with a Ukrainian population, as well as freedom for the activities of Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions which are at present persecuted in a most ruthless manner.⁴¹

Similar "Instructions" were issued to M. Muranov, a workers' representative from the Kharkov province.⁴² During the Revolution, Ukrainian workers took part in the armed struggle for the independence of the Ukrainian state. The regular Ukrainian Army included some volunteer detachments composed exclusively of workers, such as the Republican Railroad Workers' Regiment (later expanded into the Ninth Railroad Division), the Greter Factory Company, the Arsenal Company, etc.⁴³

A feature of the development of the Ukrainian working class was the fact that it was deprived of the opportunity to develop as an organic whole. This was due to its multinational character (primarily Ukrainian and Russian) and inter-nationality differences, which are mentioned both in Party documents and in special police reports of the time. This problem was frequently a matter of concern to the local labor leaders: during the 1905 strike in

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁴¹ P. A. Lavrov, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Istoriya ukrainskoho viyska* (A History of the Ukrainian Army), Winnipeg, 1953, p. 377.

Kherson, the local organizers "appealed to the workers to counter hostility between the nationalities."⁴⁴

A continuous influx of workers from outside the Ukraine, especially from Great Russia, the use of Russian as the official language, and the Russian management of undertakings, certainly gave the Ukrainian working class an all-Russian complexion. This was further enhanced by the predominant influence of Russian political parties which were more numerous, better organized and less persecuted than their Ukrainian counterparts. Moreover, at least some of them were legal, while Ukrainian political parties and even cultural and educational groups were constantly suppressed by the police and had to continue their activities underground.

Before the Revolution, three of the political parties active in the Ukraine were connected with the working class movement, namely the RSDWP (including both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks), the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and the Bund. Trade unions developed, however, as joint organizations, with a tendency toward centralization on an all-Russian basis. This can be explained by the fact that the trade union movement's primary concern was economic problems affecting the working class, while politics and the nationality problem were of only secondary interest. While it is true that the RSDWP supported the unification of trade unions, its influence was slight, especially in Poland, where the nationality problem was of particular significance and the RSDWP was unable to prevent the formation of exclusively national trade unions.

Trade union organizations in Tsarist Russia were almost always persecuted, even when they were legal, because they bolstered up the labor movement and encouraged the workers to defend their rights with greater confidence. Therefore the foundation of every trade union was regarded as a great achievement of the working class.

The popularity of the concept of the unity of economic interests of the working class and the unity of the trade union movement among Ukrainian workers is shown by the fact that even after the proclamation of an independent Ukrainian state, the trade unions of the Ukraine maintained their affiliation to the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions. This was partly due to the weakness of the USDWP, which, while it enjoyed considerable prestige in such working class centers as Ekaterinoslav, had, for the most part, but little influence.

An All-Ukrainian Trade Union Council was not created until the Second Congress of Trade Unions in November 1924. The First All-Ukrainian Congress of Trade Unions was held in March 1919.⁴⁵ Later the All-Ukrainian Trade Union Council was transformed into a mere branch of the VTsSPS—a Republican Trade Union Council, whose actual status does not differ much from that of a provincial trade union council in the RSFSR. Under the "Statute of the Trade Unions of the USSR" a system was introduced whereby smaller branches were brought under the control of higher groups (Article XII); all funds (for the most part membership dues) were centralized in the VTsSPS (Article XLV), and the republican councils were made completely dependent on the latter.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ P. A. Lavrov, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁴⁵ *BSE*, 2nd ed., 1956, XLIV, 106.

⁴⁶ *Ustav professionalnykh soyuzov SSSR* (The Statute of the Trade Unions of the USSR), Moscow, 1955, p. 30.

The basic unit of Soviet trade unions is the organization in an undertaking or establishment. The highest organ of a trade union is its congress, which elects its central committee. Supreme authority rests with the All-Union Congresses of Trade Unions; between congresses administration is in the hands of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council.⁴⁷ Each republic has its Republican Trade Union Council except the RSFSR, where its place is taken by the VTsSPS. Thus the structure of trade unions is very similar to that of the Communist Party. After the establishment of the Communist Party Bureau for the RSFSR, trade union circles too began to discuss the possibility of electing a Republican Trade Union Council for the RSFSR.⁴⁸

Trade union membership in the Ukraine has risen from 1,239,000 in 1921, to 1,889,500 in 1927, and to over 8,000,000 in 1956.⁴⁹

The Trade Union Policy of the Communist Party

Communist trade union policy can be traced back to Lenin's work *What is to be Done?* (1902) where he states that "the working class can, by its own efforts alone, develop only trade union consciousness [i.e. defend its economic interests]."⁵⁰ Since this diverts the attention of the working class from the political struggle, it is necessary to wean it from this spontaneous craving for trade unionism, and utilize it for a different purpose.⁵¹ This is the origin of the "theory of utilization" of the working class which was later to be exploited by the Soviet state first for political, and then for purely economic purposes. The Third Party Congress stressed in its resolution on trade unions: "All legal and semi-legal workers' groups, associations and other organizations... should be utilized... as strongholds... of the Party in Russia."⁵²

These instructions are still in force. The Communists continue to deny the independent and constructive role of the working class and attempt to subject it to their leadership. They interpret dictatorship of the proletariat so as to stress the controlling power of the Communists over the proletariat "Without this the dictatorship of the proletariat is unthinkable."⁵³

The real attitude of the Communist Party toward the working class may be gauged from the workers' opposition within the Party and the discussion of the role of trade unions which took place in the twenties. The fact is that Article V of the program adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Party early in 1919, while the Bolsheviks were still struggling for power and were being liberal with their promises, stressed that "trade unions should concentrate the control of the entire national economy in their hands as a single economic whole."⁵⁴

The idea of industry being controlled by the producers themselves was quite popular with the workers, especially after the seizure of power by the

⁴⁷ BSE, 2nd ed., 1957, L, 279.

⁴⁸ *Trud*, August 21, 1957.

⁴⁹ BSE, 2nd ed., 1956, XLIV, 106.

⁵⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, 1954, VII, 347.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

⁵² KPSS o *proisoyuzakh*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁵³ KPSS v *rezolyutsiyakh*, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 531.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

Bolsheviks, which explains its inclusion in the Communist Party program. As a result, measures taken to realize this policy found support within the Party mainly among the workers' representatives, especially those who were active in the trade union movement (hence the term: "workers' opposition"). Accordingly:

The control of the national economy is the responsibility of the All-Russian Congress of Producers united in trade unions, which elect the central authority responsible for the whole national economy.⁵⁵

But since the power was already securely in the hands of the Communists, they obviously did not intend implementing this decision. Therefore, in order to avoid repudiating its own program while preserving its control of the national economy, the Communist Party proclaimed itself the supreme organization of the working class. This was stated quite clearly, if indirectly, by Stalin in his *Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party*:

They [the workers' opposition] held that the trade unions, and not the Party, were the highest form of working class organization.⁵⁶

Thus a movement which did not transgress the Party program was regarded by the Communist leadership as an internal opposition and was ruthlessly suppressed. The Tenth Party Congress which was particularly concerned with this question resolved "to regard the propagation of these ideas as incompatible with membership of the Russian Communist Party."⁵⁷ Despite its severity, this resolution did not bring the hoped-for results, and the next congress of the CPSU (1922) ordered the mass expulsion from the Party of members of the workers' opposition. Subsequently, any connections with the workers' opposition or even a conciliatory attitude toward it were punished by expulsion from the Party, and later by other repressive measures. Many Party members were expelled for the same "errors" during the purge of 1933, including such leaders of the movement as Shlyapnikov and Medvedev.⁵⁸

The "theory of utilization" of trade unions still remains the basis of Communist policy toward the trade union movement. It has transformed trade unions into mere auxiliary organs of the state apparatus. The theory of "nationalization" of trade unions was first put forward by Trotsky at the outset of the October Revolution, and was rejected by the Second All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in 1919.⁵⁹ It was never officially adopted by the Party, and the Party resolutions dealing with this subject are of a contradictory nature. Trade unions were recognized by the Ninth Party Congress as "one of the basic organs of the Soviet state,"⁶⁰ and the next Party congress confirmed this even more explicitly by stating that "the state function of trade unions will be gradually increased."⁶¹ At the same time, however,

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 530.

⁵⁶ *Istoriya vsesoyuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (bolshevikov), Kratky kurs* (Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party), Moscow, 1951, p. 241.

⁵⁷ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, op. cit.*, p. 532.

⁵⁸ *BSE*, 2nd ed., 1955, XXXV, 430.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 1st ed., 1940, XLVII, 420.

⁶⁰ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, op. cit.*, p. 490.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 539.

a resolution of the Ninth Congress reduced the role of trade unions by urging their members to infiltrate into Soviet organizations; in this way, trade unions were to be transformed "into the keystone of the Soviet economic apparatus."⁶²

These contradictions were not fortuitous. First, it was necessary to cloak the quite unequivocal terms of Article V of the Party program (the Tenth Congress was instrumental in achieving this), and to create conditions which would enable trade unions to fulfill the functions of the state apparatus. Communist policy was characterized by insincerity and motivated by narrow Party interests, without any consideration for the interests of the workers. Lenin's directives on trade unions, expounded for the benefit of West European Communists in his work, *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder* (1920), serve as a classic example of double-dealing, insincerity, and open encouragement to fraud:

... if necessary [we must] resort to all sorts of stratagems, maneuvers and illegal methods, to evasion and subterfuge, in order to penetrate the trade unions, maintain our position there and carry on Communist work in them.⁶³

It is noteworthy that this passage was omitted from the symposium *Lenin on Trade Unions*, published in 1957.

All talk of concentrating control of the national economy in the hands of the trade unions resulted only in promises that the workers would be allowed to participate in the management of industry, but this pledge too remained unfulfilled. The Communist leadership found a very simple way out of this awkward situation. It began to claim that the goal envisaged by the Party had already been achieved and that the workers participated in the management of their factories by attending production conferences. According to an authoritative statement by V. V. Grishin, the chairman of the VTsSPS: "Production conferences are the most important form of workers' participation in the management of industry."⁶⁴ The latest innovation of the Central Committee is the participation of workers in the management of industry through socialist competition. As a recent resolution of the Central Committee puts it, "socialist competition is one of the most important ways whereby workers participate in the management of production and a well-tried method of Communist construction."⁶⁵

Thus, when two workers compete with each other to produce more goods, or if someone overfulfills the production norm (which is the most prevalent form of socialist competition), the persons involved are participating in the management of production. Evidently, if one is to accept this viewpoint, one can logically claim that Frederick Taylor's workers too, participated in the management of production.

The logical result of Communist policy was the complete subordination of the trade union movement to the CPSU, not only through the Party members in the trade union apparatus, but also through administrative channels. The Ninth Party Congress resolved that "decisions of the VTsSPS can be repealed by no Party organ except the Central Committee."⁶⁶

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 491.

⁶³ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, 1950, XXXI, 37.

⁶⁴ *Trud*, August 21, 1957.

⁶⁵ *Radyanska Ukraina*, December 19, 1957.

⁶⁶ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh*, *op. cit.*, p. 492.

The Functions and Powers of Soviet Trade Unions

The very fact that the Soviet leadership began to lay particular emphasis on enhancing the functions and powers of trade unions would seem to indicate that, even from the official point of view, the existing situation was not entirely satisfactory. The present campaign has unmistakably demonstrated that Soviet trade unions have reached an impasse in their work and that the Soviet rulers, realizing this, are looking for a way out of their predicament.

The most important tasks of Soviet trade unions, as conceived by the CPSU and recorded in the Statute of Trade Unions (adopted on June 15, 1954) are as follows:

Trade unions organize socialist competition among workers and employees for an all-round increase of labor efficiency, for fulfillment and overfulfillment of state plans, . . . for an improvement of quality and reduction of production costs, for a full utilization of all resources of the socialist economy.⁶⁷

According to *Sovetskie Profsoyuzy*, the official organ of the VTsSPS, "this is the major task facing the trade unions."⁶⁸ A resolution of a plenary session of the Central Committee describes it as the "fundamental task of trade unions" in the future.⁶⁹ Constant demands that the trade unions concentrate their activities in this field have produced a situation which forces them to neglect their direct responsibilities. Today the function of trade unions in such vital questions as that of wages, labor protection, and providing the workers with living quarters has been reduced to nothing. N. M. Shvernik, former Chairman of the VTsSPS, admitted in his address to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU that "during the last few years, the VTsSPS and the Trade Union Central Committee have ceased to pay any attention to problems of working conditions and wages."⁷⁰

There are numerous instances of inadequate safety precautions and accident prevention. Frequently, new workshops are put into operation before they are complete, with ventilation and safety equipment not yet installed. As a rule overalls are not provided, nor facilities for buying them. Similarly there are no workers' canteens, as stipulated in collective agreements. Even individual protective equipment, such as gloves, aprons and goggles, is not always available. The plenary session of the Ukrainian Republican Trade Union Council in January 1958,

. . . criticized serious defects in safety precautions in many undertakings, especially the coal and metal industries of the Voroshilovgrad, Stalino and Dnepropetrovsk Economic Regions. There are serious deficiencies in the supply of overalls, special footwear and individual safety equipment to workers as well as in accident prevention.⁷¹

Pits have, as a rule, no protection against coal dust, in spite of the considerable technical advances in this field. The capacity of bath-houses at

⁶⁷ *Ustav professionalnykh soyuzov SSSR, op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁶⁸ *Sovetskie profsoyuzy*, 1956, No. 4, p. 17.

⁶⁹ *Pravda*, December 19, 1957.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, February 24, 1956.

⁷¹ *Radyanska Ukraina*, January 19, 1958.

pits is inadequate, and workers have to queue for hours to take a bath. *Partiinaya zhizn* gives instances:

... Five successive collective agreements with the workers of pit No. 5 of the "Voroshilovugol" trust have provided for bathing and recreation facilities and year after year funds have been assigned for this purpose but construction has not yet started. The bathhouse is so small that the miners have to queue for hours. Complaints to their trade union have proved of no avail. The same careless attitude toward the needs of the miners prevails in Dzherzhinsky pit No. 3, where the workers have for years been demanding dust extractors and sprinklers in the sorting room. Air pollution considerably exceeds safety limits but the local trade union does no more than formally include these demands in the collective agreement.⁷²

This situation arose because Soviet industrial managers and organizations in individual enterprises have been preoccupied with fulfilling their production plans. Any deficiencies in this respect are subject to severe punishment, while a violation of workers' rights is punishable only in individual cases and then usually as an aggravating circumstance for those guilty of production offenses.

The arbitrary attitude of industrial managers has been condemned in many resolutions of the presidium of the VTsSPS. Thus, for example, it denounced "the callous attitude toward workers and employees" and "the violation of the collective agreement" by one Ektov, the director of the metallurgical plant at Enakievo, and proposed "stern punishment" for the culprit. This punishment was limited, however, to a reprimand he received from Sheremetev, the Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy of the USSR.⁷³

One should bear in mind that there is no uniform approach to these questions, as is demonstrated by an almost analogous case involving one Onyshchenko, the director of a mine at Fedorovka. It was established that he "displayed an irresponsible attitude toward the workers' proposals, ignored the views of members of the trade union mines committee and grossly violated the labor code." As a result, Onyshchenko was dismissed from his position at the request of the local trade union.⁷⁴ Why this difference in treatment? Evidently, Ektov's rank in the party hierarchy was higher than that of Onyshchenko.

These examples show that not only bilateral collective agreements but also the labor code have been often grossly violated. Even the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU had to admit that industrial managers "are guilty of infractions of the labor code." The resolution goes on to propose "calling to account industrial managers who fail to fulfill their obligations under the collective agreements and systematically violate the labor code."⁷⁵ This shows that hitherto those guilty of violations of collective agreements and the labor code were not called to account. It is doubtful whether any essential changes have taken place in this respect. Even in the medical services, where there have admittedly been certain improvements, the conditions are far from satisfactory. According to a speech

⁷² *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1957, No. 13, p. 43.

⁷³ *Trud*, August 8, 1956.

⁷⁴ *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1957, No. 13, p. 42.

⁷⁵ *Radianska Ukraina*, December 19, 1957.

by M. D. Kovrigina to the Sixth Session of the Supreme Soviet in February, 1957,

...20% of new tuberculosis cases occur through contact in everyday life... In the current Five-Year Plan perhaps not every tuberculosis patient will obtain a separate, isolated room, and...patients will be obliged to live with their families... The shortage of beds in hospitals and sanatoriums for tuberculosis patients does not make it possible to organize prolonged six to eight month treatment in hospitals.⁷⁶

The expression "contact in everyday life" throws light on the extremely unsatisfactory housing conditions. In the twenty-two-largest cities of the USSR with a population over 500,000, average living space in 1956 was 7.3 square meters per person.⁷⁷

Infringements of workers' rights, no matter how common, are regarded by the authorities as due to inadvertence or as violations of duty on the part of individual employees, while in general the Soviet workers are enjoying all the advantages of social welfare:

Every year the socialist state assigns vast sums of money for safeguarding of labor and accident prevention, thus creating such favorable working conditions for the Soviet citizen as do not and cannot exist in any capitalist country.⁷⁸

This statement can only be compared with that made by Stalin, when, shortly after several million people in the Ukraine had been starved to death, he boasted to the First Congress of the Stakhanovites: "Life has become better, life has become merrier, comrades."

How can the trade unions influence the Soviet state which not only regulates working conditions, but is at the same time the supreme authority—legislative, executive and judicial. The legal status of trade unions is not defined by any specific law. Article CXXVI of the Constitution of the USSR merely states that trade unions may be organized and that they are guided by the Communist Party, while Article CXLI affirms their right of nominating candidates in the elections to the Soviets. According to the chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Council of Trade Unions;

In our opinion, it is very important to determine the legal status of trade unions, to extend their rights... In fact, there is no official statement defining the rights of the trade unions in our country.⁷⁹

The trade union membership is powerless to react against existing conditions under a totalitarian regime, and the trade union bureaucracy, guided by the statements about the "most favorable working conditions," can only intensify its pressure on the workers to increase their output and reduce costs for the state. Obviously, it dare not plead with the employer for the workers' everyday needs.

Such important measures as the increase in wages of lower-paid workers, the two-hour reduction in the working week, the increase in pensions and

⁷⁶ *Izvestia*, February 8, 1957.

⁷⁷ *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR za 1956 god* (National Economy of the USSR in 1956), Moscow, pp. 30 and 178.

⁷⁸ *Radyanska Ukraina*, December 19, 1957.

⁷⁹ *Trud*, December 15, 1957.

the abolition of the law against absenteeism were introduced without any initiative on the part of the trade unions. Today, no demands are being made for the introduction of a forty-hour working week, although it has been introduced long ago in many non-Communist countries, where free trade unions are about to achieve a further reduction of the working week without a corresponding cut in wages.

The subsidiary role of trade unions in the Soviet economy can also be demonstrated by the instability of their structure. They are constantly being reorganized, divided into smaller units or amalgamated mainly because of changes in the economic structure of the country. "Their organizational structure used to follow the structure of the economic organs," *Partiinaya zhizn* admits.⁸⁰ If we add to this various purges and periodic demands on the part of the Communist Party for reorganization of the trade union apparatus, we shall build up a picture of the permanent "re-shuffle" of trade unions proposed at the outset of the Revolution by Trotsky, who had already recognized the non-Communist tendencies of the trade union membership. This policy is demonstrated by the fluctuating number of trade unions. Up to 1930, it remained unchanged at 23, but in 1931 it rose to 45, in 1934 to 154, in 1939 to 168 and in 1944 to 176. In 1948, it decreased to 136, and by 1954, to 43; finally after a temporary increase to 47 in 1957, it again fell to 23 as a result of the reorganization of trade unions which followed later in the same year.⁸¹

This process of reorganization was carried out in an arbitrary manner, mostly through administrative channels. Trade unions were liquidated or formed without the approval of their own supreme organs. The All-Union Trade Union Congress did not meet from 1932 until 1949, although the Statute specified that it should at least once every four years. Soviet trade unions are organized on a departmental basis being "created in conformity with ministries and departments."⁸² Individual trade unions are not differentiated by any specific features. They are, for the most part, departmental institutions which come into being simultaneously with the setting up of a new department, and disappear as soon as it is liquidated. No wonder that some responsible Party and trade union workers have expressed themselves in favor of the abolition of the sectional system of trade unions and for the creation of a single countrywide trade union of workers and employees. In their opinion, this would "simplify the organizational structure of the trade union organs in conformity with the economic administrative regions."⁸³

In spite of the obvious expedience of such a reorganization from the economic and administrative point of view, it was not endorsed by the Soviet leaders who were evidently reluctant to emphasize too strongly the official role of trade unions in the USSR. Besides, this reform would remove the only resemblance between the Soviet trade unions and their counterparts in the West, which is valuable to the Communists since, with the help of the Soviet trade unions, they are able to control the World Federation of Trade Unions.

⁸⁰ *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1957, No. 13, p. 37.

⁸¹ *BSE*, 1st ed., 1947, SSSR, 1954; *ibid.*, 2nd ed., 1955, XXXV, 112; *Trud*, June 12—13 and August 21, 1957.

⁸² *Partiinaya zhizn*, 1957, No. 13, p. 38.

⁸³ *Trud*, June 2, 1957.

Prospects for the Development of Trade Union Activities

The relegation of trade unions to the role of "driving belts" of the Communist Party has made the working masses completely apathetic toward their trade unions and has resulted in the decline of trade union activities. Evidence of this apathy is to be found in numerous Party resolutions on trade unions which stress the need to counter it by developing Party activities. At the same time, the achievements and importance of trade unions are emphasized in the official speeches of their leaders and impressive facts and figures are quoted. It is asserted that the trade unions exercise a controlling influence over the enforcement of labor legislation, labor protection and accident prevention. Since 1933, when the People's Commissariat for Labor was abolished, they have administered the state social insurance program and paid old age disability pensions to workers and employees.⁸⁴

They have over 11,000 clubs, buildings and palaces of culture, 115,000 "red corners," 18,000 libraries, 11,000 film projectors, 8,200 recreation and tourist buildings.⁸⁵

At first sight, these figures seem to be most impressive, but if we bear in mind that the trade unions' control over the enforcement of the labor code is but a sham, that the functions of state institutions are often transferred to trade unions (as in the case of the People's Commissariat for Labor), that they are forced to carry out many duties in the field of national economy even if they conflict with the vital interests of the workers, and that usually, the difference between trade unions and state institutions is hardly perceptible, the picture at once changes. The rank-and-file members of trade unions regard these organizations as ordinary state institutions.

The trade union leaders refer to the many millions of active members who are working voluntarily and without any remuneration for various public causes. Thus the chairman of the VTsSPS spoke of 416,000 trade union organizations (or 96% of the total) where work is being done "by the trade union *aktiv*," without making use of paid workers. To those who are familiar with conditions in the Soviet Union, it is entirely clear that this work is being carried out as a "social obligation." This official term emphasizes the word "obligation" and thus defines rather accurately the position of the so-called trade union *aktiv*. Besides, one should bear in mind that in a Communist country there is no essential difference between the concepts "social" and "state."

Membership of trade unions is compulsory, though officially it is claimed that they are voluntary workers' organizations. The Statute of Trade Unions, however, does not specifically mention their voluntary nature and merely states that "every... worker can join a trade union."⁸⁶ On January 1, 1957, the trade unions of the USSR had 47,100,000 members compared with a figure of 50 million registered workers at the end of 1956.⁸⁷ Thus, some three million workers remained outside trade unions. This figure comprises temporary workers as well as those who started to work only recently and

⁸⁴ BSE, 2nd ed., 1957, L, 279.

⁸⁵ Trud, August 21, 1957.

⁸⁶ Ustav professionalnykh soyuzov SSSR, op. cit., p. 4.

⁸⁷ Trud, August 21, 1957.

have had no time to become trade union members. By the end of 1957 this figure considerably decreased, since union membership had risen to "over 49 million workers and employees."⁸⁸

Although all trade union leaders belong to the Communist Party, the trade unions as such are non-party organizations. The powers of trade unions are at present slight. It is doubtful whether present attempts of the Communist leadership to develop trade unions will make much difference. This does not mean, however, that such changes are impossible. Internal contradictions do exist in the Soviet Union; they are bound to increase in force and intensity as the process of differentiation of society advances. The re-awakening of the trade unions will inevitably occur as soon as these contradictions reach a certain stage of development.

Attempts of the Communist leaders to demonstrate a harmonious development of productive forces and industrial relations in the USSR are based on a strained interpretation of Marxism. As soon as Marxist theory is allowed to develop more freely, it should be easy to refute them from the Marxist standpoint. Even the Chinese Communists have admitted the existence of contradictions between state and people in a socialist country. It is too early to speak of a mass exposure of these contradictions, but the wave of strikes which swept through the Soviet concentration camps is very significant. Similarly the passive resistance of coal miners in the Ukraine, which continued on a mass scale for more than a year during which the Soviet government was unable to fulfill its plan for coal production there, is also symptomatic. In the fourth quarter of 1956, the government hurriedly extended the projected experimental reform of wages to the whole Donets and Lvov-Volhynian basins instead of limiting it to a few mines. Wages were increased and the length of the working week was shortened.

However, totalitarian methods of administration continue to obstruct exposure of the existing contradictions. Besides, the continued intensive industrial development of the country provides the Soviet leaders with enough excuses for the existing hardships, although how convincing these arguments are, is another question. The tempo of industrialization is already slowing down and the time will come when it will reach a certain degree of stabilization which is typical of all industrialized nations. It will then turn from the quantitative growth of production to the problems of quality and selection and to satisfying the increasing needs of the population. Stabilization of industrial development will lead to a stabilization of the country's economy, and then all the defects of the Soviet system will come to the surface.

It has been officially proclaimed that the exploitation of man by man has been abolished in the USSR, and this has been confirmed in Article V of the Soviet Constitution. Nothing, however, is said of the exploitation of man by the state. Yet, a standard textbook of political economy, edited by a special commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, admits that the product of a worker consists of two parts: "the product for himself and the product for society."⁸⁹ Thus, the Soviet worker, like his counterpart in a capitalist country, produces surplus value, a portion of which (rather considerable in practice) is appropriated by the state. This appropriated surplus

⁸⁸ *Radyanska Ukraina*, December 19, 1957.

⁸⁹ *Politicheskaya ekonomiya* (Political Economy), 2nd ed., Moscow, 1955, p. 544.

value enables the state to pay increased salaries to the Party bureaucracy (which far exceed the average earnings of the producers). These funds are also used to pay Lenin and Stalin prizes amounting to hundreds of thousands of rubles and maintain the villas, country houses and special sanatoriums of the Party bureaucracy. Since surplus value produced by the worker and appropriated by the state for the "needs of society" is used to pay off all these expenses, the claim that there is no exploitation of man by man obviously cannot bear criticism from the Marxist standpoint. The people are aware of these facts even now, but this awareness will come into its own with economic stabilization, when they will realize the full extent of the surplus product. The incessant cultural development of the working masses and their increasing requirements in various fields will also play a part. Even today the Soviet leaders are forced to take some measures to rectify this situation.

Thus, in addition to political factors which can stir up the working masses (as they did in the concentration camps of the USSR, in Germany, Poland and Hungary), the economic development of the Soviet Union, too, must inevitably lead to a real activization of the Soviet trade unions and trade union masses.

The Soviet Film Industry in the Ukrainian SSR

A Survey of the Last Forty Years

L. Halchenko

The history of the Ukrainian cinema dates from pre-Revolutionary times, when during the years 1896—1916 several Ukrainian producers and actors, among them Fedetsky, D. Sakhnenko, Shantser, A. Oleksiyenko, D. Marchenko and others, worked in the Russian film industry. Some well-known actors with reputations established before 1917 (M. Zankovetska, F. Talaniv, L. Levytska, Z. Barantsevych, L. Hakebush, G. Zamyckivsky, and Bystrytska) continued to perform after the Revolution in Soviet Ukrainian films. Some pre-Revolutionary cinema-theater managers, including P. Chardynin, M. Saltykov and Pavlenko, later became well-known producers.

Until 1918 there was, however, no distinctly Ukrainian film production. In that year, an organization known as Ukrainfilma was established in Kiev with the support of the "Hetmanite [Skoropadsky's] officials."¹ In 1919—20, the Red Army operated some film units during its occupation of the Ukraine. Its employees were almost exclusively Russians (as for example, V. Gradov, A. Nikitin, B. Leonidov and Dukelsky). For a short time in 1919 a Bolshevik Film Center was in existence in Kiev, but it was disbanded as soon as the Red Army withdrew under the pressure of the National Army led by Petlyura.

On January 27, 1919, a film Committee was established in Kharkov, the seat of the first Soviet Ukrainian "government," under the aegis of the Council of People's Commissars. Later it was transferred to Kiev. The Film Committee was responsible for the production of several propaganda pictures, such as *Paroslav im. TsVK* (S. S. "Central Executive Committee") or *Pershy peresuvny potyah* (The First Armored Train), and newsreels which presented life in the Ukraine from a Bolshevik point of view. At the same time, the Political Section of the 41st Red Army Division, having requisitioned Kharitonov's studio in Odessa, started to produce short propaganda movies with the help of local Ukrainian and Russian talent.

At the end of 1919, a special Film Section of the Theatrical Committee was created at the Council of People's Commissars in Kharkov. In 1920, it was renamed the All-Ukrainian Film Committee and in 1922 it became known as the *Vseukrainske fotokinoupravlinnya* (The All-Ukrainian Motion Picture Authority), or VUFKU. This body played a prominent part in the cultural life of the Ukraine until its dissolution in 1930.

In 1920, all film studios and motion picture theaters were nationalized, together with all their equipment. Among them were the "Khudozhniy ekran" studio in Kiev, Kharitonov's studio in Odessa and Khanzhonkov's in Yalta.

¹ *Zhurnal VUFKU*, Kiev, 1929, No. 6, p. 2.

Most Soviet propaganda films produced in the Ukraine in 1919—e.g., *Vstavay, proklyatiem zakleimenny!* (Arise, Ye Prisoners of Starvation!), *Zapuganny burzhuy* (The Frightened Bourgeois), *Krasnye po belym* (Red after White)—can hardly be called Ukrainian. They were all in Russian and directed by Russians. An exception was *Zhertvy pidvalu* (Victims of the Cellar), directed by the Ukrainian L. Zamkovy, which treated the subject of tuberculosis as a social malady.² Several early Ukrainian documentaries—including *Haydamatski ofitsery* (The Haydamak Officers) and *Parad i taktychni zanyattya hetmanskykh viysk* (Hetmanate Forces on Parade and in Practice Drill)—made in 1919, possibly by Ukrainifilma, are preserved in the State Film Archives in Moscow.³

In 1920, the All-Ukrainian Film Committee produced approximately fifteen pictures, mostly short and propagandist in content. Among them was a longer movie, *Chervony Kasiyan* (The Red Cassian), made by the Ukrainian director Chardynin in the Odessa studio. Of special interest are the early documentaries, which preserve historical scenes of the war between the national and Bolshevik forces in the Ukraine. Many such films, as well as weekly newsreels, were produced before 1922. Some young Ukrainian producers made their first non-political films, e.g., *Kvity na kaminnnyakh* (Flowers on Stones), by H. Tasin.



The period of VUFKU (1922—30) represents the highest development of the Soviet Ukrainian motion picture industry. Many outstanding films were made which did not conform to and sometimes even criticized the official Party ideology.

During its early phase, VUFKU had at its disposal only the studios in Odessa and Yalta, since the Kiev studio was dismantled and probably removed by one of the Red Army units. Later, the studios at Odessa and Yalta were considerably enlarged and a new small studio, specializing in color photography, was built in Kharkov. Finally, in 1929, the center of VUFKU production was transferred to a large newly-built studio in Kiev. For a short time, VUFKU had the exclusive right of controlling the showing of films in the Ukraine. This was later abrogated by the central Soviet authorities, who in 1928 also transferred the Yalta studio to “Sovkino,” “Mosfilm” and “Lenfilm.”

In a letter written on January 17, 1922, to Litkens, chief of the Soviet motion picture industry, Lenin demanded that Soviet film producers make pictures of a “specially propagandist nature” and that they be checked by “old Marxists.”⁴ These and similar demands made by the Party on the film industry never altered, although in the 1920’s the Party was incapable of enforcing them. The result was that many films were produced not to preach politics but to create good art.

One of the first of such films in the Ukraine was *Shvedsky sirnyk* (The Safety Match), directed in 1922 by the reformer of the modern Ukrainian theater, Les Kurbas. The picture was a brilliant satire on Tsarist officialdom

² *Ocherki istorii sovetskogo kino* (Sketches in the History of the Soviet Cinema), Vol. I, Moscow, 1956, p. 45.

³ *Voprosy kinoiskusstva* (Problems of Film Art), Moscow, 1956.

⁴ *Partiya i kino* (The Party and the Cinema), Moscow, 1939, p. 28.

and police. It also made use of some technical innovations. It is interesting to note that in the first volume of a recently published Soviet study, *Ocherki istorii sovetskogo kino* (An Outline History of the Soviet Cinema), the direction of this film is attributed to Lorentso and Saltykov with the clear intention of ignoring Kurbas, who was "purged" in the late thirties. That this is a false attribution may be seen from other Soviet publications:

During the years 1919—29, various works of Gogol, Chekhov, Kuprin, Franko, Nechuy-Levytsky, Kotsyubynsky, Paul Lafargue, Upton Sinclair and Sholom-Aleikhem were screened in the Ukraine . . . , for example, Chekhov's short story *Shvedskaya spichka*, directed by L. Kurbas.⁵

The well-known Ukrainian film director Petro Chardynin returned to Odessa from the West in 1923. Several young directors and actors owed a great deal to this talented teacher, who was responsible for the direction of *Ukraziya* (Ukrasia) in 1925, *PKP* in 1926, *Taras Shevchenko* in 1926, and *Taras Tryasylo* in 1927. The Russian director V. Gardin worked several years for VUFKU, and during that time he thoroughly acquainted himself with Ukrainian history and folklore. His pictures included *Otaman Khmel* and *Ostap Bandura* (1924). The latter was one of the first VUFKU films to be made entirely in Ukrainian. Although it tendentially showed Bandura dying for the Soviet regime, it portrays him as an idealist who trusts that the Bolsheviks will respect the Ukraine's aspirations toward cultural freedom and social justice. The picture included some scenes filmed by E. Tisse and others in 1918—19 as documentaries during the Civil War, showing the battles between the National forces and the Red Army. In spite of its great popularity, *Ostap Bandura* was not shown after 1925.

During this first period, VUFKU relied almost exclusively on old actors such as O. Frelikh, Panov, M. Saltykov, Zoya Barantsevych, F. Talaniv and Khudoleyev, but later it engaged some young actors and actresses from the Kiev and Kharkov theaters. In 1924, the following were included in the cast of *Vendetta*, directed by Kurbas: Yosyp Hirnyak, S. Shahayda, H. Babiynva and N. Pylypenko. In 1926, the two-part picture *Taras Shevchenko* was filmed under the artistic direction of V. Kryckevsky, with a cast including A. Buchma, V. Lyudvynsky, I. Zamyckivsky, H. Dobrovolsky, V. Lisovsky and others. Many Ukrainian writers, among them Y. Yanovsky, D. Buzko, Mykola Bazhan, M. Panchenko, H. Epik, G. Shkurupiy, wrote scenarios for VUFKU.

Some early films deserve to be mentioned for their artistic quality and their relative freedom from political tendentiousness. Chardynin's two-part *Ukraziya*, which presented a broad panorama of the Ukrainian south during the war between the Bolsheviks and the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic, was condemned by Soviet critics for "perversion of Civil War history."⁶ *Syniy paket* (The Blue Packet, 1926), directed by F. Lopatynsky, which contained many technical innovations, was condemned for glorifying the ideas of the prominent Soviet Ukrainian writer, Mykola Khvylyov, and the well-known historian Hrushevsky. The film's director was described as a "bourgeois nationalist" who tried to prove "the possibility of the transition of the kulaks to socialism."⁷ In addition to featuring the great actor Buchma in

⁵ *Mystetstvo*, Kiev, 1957, No. 5, p. 28.

⁶ *Ocherki istorii sovetskogo kino*, Vol. I, p. 104.

⁷ N. Lebedev, *Ocherki istorii kino SSSR* (Sketches in the History of the Cinema in the USSR), Moscow, 1947.

the title role, Chardynin's *Taras Shevchenko* contained equally memorable scenes from the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. The film was produced over a period of two years in the Odessa studio. Some parts were shot near Kos-Aral in Asia, where Shevchenko was exiled. Krychevsky's carefully arranged sets, Zaveliv's masterly photography, the acting and finally the inspired direction of Chardynin, who was not prepared to distort history for the sake of pleasing the Party—all these contributed to making this film a masterpiece. Yet the official history of the Soviet film described *Taras Shevchenko* as falling under "bourgeois-nationalist influence" and "distorting the biography of the great poet."⁸ In spite of the great popularity of this film, a great deal of it was cut, especially the scenes dealing with the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, on the pretext of adapting it to sound, and in this distorted and much shortened form it was shown until the beginning of 1940.

One of VUFKU's greatest achievements was Oleksander Dovzhenko's film *Zvenyhora* (1928). Based on a scenario by M. Yohansen, it was conceived as a "screen poem" illustrating the Ukrainian past, and had for its hero the symbolic figure of an immortal old man who is seeking the truth. The subject matter of the film—the history of the Ukrainian people—was in itself unwelcome to the Party, which wanted to develop as rapidly as possible the new patriotism of the "Soviet man." With particular emphasis, Dovzhenko dwelt upon the historical continuity of the Ukrainian people and its centuries-old struggle against various invaders, from the Tatars to the Poles. The general effect of this account was to convince the spectator that it is the duty of the people to overcome any assault. The picture ended with a vivid picture of the dilemma now facing the Ukraine: on the one hand, the pro-Bolshevik Tymish remains on the side of the Soviet regime, while his brother Pavlo emigrates in order to continue the struggle for his country's liberation. Technically, the film made the bold innovation of interweaving history and legend (in the person of the immortal old man) with the present.

Zvenyhora was severely condemned by Soviet critics and soon banned from movie theaters. It was charged that the script was "written by a Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist and distorted the history of the Ukrainian people, while the director, Dovzhenko, failed to overcome these shortcomings."⁹ Contrary to this Party view, the great Russian directors Eisenstein and Pudovkin greeted *Zvenyhora* as a sign of real promise and Western European critics were favorably impressed by the film, which was shown in Paris.

In 1929, the well-known director I. Kavaleridze made the picture *Zlyva* (Cloudburst), which was notable for its experiments. Based on Shevchenko's poem *Haydamaky*, it seemed to come as a call to arms.

The greatest achievement of VUFKU, however, was unquestionably Dovzhenko's *Zemlya* (Earth), made in 1930. This has been acclaimed as one of the world's masterpieces of the silent film. The French critic G. Sadoul wrote that "Dorozhenko's work exerted a great influence on the young film artists of France and England."¹⁰ The American critic Lewis Jacobs had this to say about Dovzhenko's art:

Arsenal and *Soil* are the only two of his [Dovzhenko's] films which were seen in America. Both are laconic in style, with a strange, wonderfully imaginative

⁸ *Ocherki istorii sovetskogo kino*, Vol. I, p. 163.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

¹⁰ G. Sadoul, *Histoire de l'art du Cinéma*, Paris, 1949, p. 181.

quality difficult to describe. Says Dovzhenko, "Excitement runs like a red thread through all my films." Neither of these works has a story; both spring from moods, concepts and images of Ukrainian legends. Both contain some of the most pictorial compositions the screen has ever known, superbly related in angle, tone and movement. So personalized are these pictures that they achieve the emotional intensity of great lyrical poems; so concentrated, rich and unexpected are their images that Dovzhenko, perhaps more than anyone else, can be called the first poet of movies.¹¹

Zemlya was made at the time of the forced collectivization in the Ukraine. It was a most eloquent protest against the annihilation of millions of Ukrainian peasants in its demonstration of the indestructible aspects of country life. Naturally, it came in for severe disapproval from the Soviet critics, who condemned it for its "biologism," pantheism, "intellectualism" and nationalism.

Apart from these pictures, which are among to finest ever made in the Ukraine, VUFKU produced several propaganda movies directed by guest directors. Among them were: *Radyanske povitrya* (The Soviet Air, 1925), by L. Shefer; *Vbyvstvo selkora Malynovskoho* (The Murder of Village Correspondent Malynovsky, 1926), by P. Sazonov; *Tsement* (Cement, 1927), by V. Vilner; *Zemlya klyche* (The Earth is Calling, 1928), by V. Ballyuzek; *Oktya-bryukhov i Dekabryukhov* (1928), by A. Smirnov; *Komsomoliya* (1929), by Y. Pechorin; and *Nakyp* (Scum, 1930), by L. Lukov.

During the seven or eight years of its work, in spite of strained relations with the Moscow Glavrepertkom (Central Authority for the Control of Spectacles and Repertories, i. e., central censoring office), VUFKU managed not only to produce some outstanding pictures and develop promising directors, actors, scriptwriters, etc., but also to publish a film library series, some works of criticism (e. g., L. Skrypnyk's *Narysy z teorii kino* [Essays in the Theory of the Film], published in 1928), a paper (*Kinohazeta*) and an illustrated magazine (*Kino*), which were banned in 1930. This it did with the help of many writers in the Ukraine and abroad, e. g., M. Irchan in Canada and Y. Deslav in France. The latter, a young director sent to France by VUFKU to improve his knowledge and experience, refused to return home and became a well-known director of short films in France, Spain and Switzerland. VUFKU also initiated competitions in photography and scenario writing and organized a film research center at Odessa. Government permission was obtained to show films abroad. On more than one occasion, representatives of VUFKU protested the publicizing of Ukrainian films abroad by *Sovkino* as Russian.¹² In order to satisfy the demand for short features, VUFKU produced several short films of general cultural and educational interest, e. g. *Kinoatlas Ukrainy* (Cineatlas of the Ukraine). The first Ukrainian cartoons were also made at that time, e. g., *Klubnychne varennnyia* (Strawberry Jam) and *Kazka pro bilku-hospodynku* (The Tale of the Industrious Squirrel). In 1930, when VUFKU was dissolved, the cartoon studio in Khar-

¹¹ Lewis Jacobs, *The Rise of the American Film: A Critical History*, New York, 1939, pp. 322—23.

¹² For example, in the article "Velmy dyvni vypadky" (Very Strange Incidents), VUFKU's organ, *Kino* (Kiev, 1929, No. 5), protested against the showing of H. Stabov's film *Dva dni* (Two Days) in America.

kov was disbanded. From then on, all Soviet cartoons were made in Russian, in Moscow.

It may be stated without exaggeration that the flowering of the Ukrainian motion picture industry during the VUFKU period was characterized, not only by a high artistic level, but by the development of a definite style—a mixture of lyricism and romanticism with undertones of dramatic tension. This was achieved in conditions not entirely conducive to original work, since Party pressure was continually increasing.

In 1924, Stalin, speaking at the Thirteenth Party Congress, declared, "The cinema is a powerful medium of mass agitation: our task is to grasp this in our hands." At the first all-Union conference of the film industry, held in 1928, it was stated that "the cinema cannot remain apolitical."¹³ On January 11, 1929, a resolution of the Party Central Committee stressed the "imperative need for the review of personnel in all motion picture organizations."¹⁴ This was the signal for the purge of all those whom the Party regarded as harmful influences in that industry.

★

The purge of the Ukrainian film industry was part of the campaign of terror which the Party conducted in the field of Ukrainian culture, literature and scholarship. Victims of the purge included the directors F. Lopatynsky, H. Stabovy, Y. Halytsky and a number of actors and technical assistants. Some, like L. Lyashchenko and H. Stepyak, were forbidden to work again in the film industry.

VUFKU was formally replaced by a new organization, Ukrainfilm, which two or three years later came under the complete control of Glavrepertkom and subsequently of GUKF (*Glavnoe upravlenie kinematografii*, or Central Film Authority), in Moscow.

During the first few years of its existence, Ukrainfilm produced several pictures which, although politically tendentious, bore the mark of the great directors who had created them. Among these were Kavaleridze's *Pisnya pro Perekop* (Song of Perekop, 1930), which was notable for its sculptural qualities, including the precise calculation of speech and gesture, Lopatynsky's last film, *Karmelyuk* (1931), which sounded like a call to arms and was soon banned, and Dovzhenko's first talking picture, *Ivan* (1931). The latter was an attempt on Dovzhenko's part to conform to the new demands of the Party. As one critic put it, the director "tried to approach in this work a new material—i. e., those social processes which were taking place... at the time of the broad offensive of socialism."¹⁵ The presentation of peasants absorbed in new industries, especially in the construction of Dneproges, was convincing and the impression one gathers is that in the film the Ukrainian peasant is depicted as the main force in the socialist construction of the Ukraine.

The highly poetic film by Kavaleridze (camera by Topchii) *Koliivshchyna* (1933), which bore the subtitle "Oforty z istorii haydamachyny" (Sketches from Haydamak History), dealt with the uprisings of the Ukrainian peasantry against the Poles in 1768. Screened at the time of the great famine in the

¹³ A. Slesarenko, *Mystetstvo kino* (The Art of the Cinema), Kiev, 1956.

¹⁴ *Kino*, Kiev, 1929, No. 4, p. 2.

¹⁵ *Ocherki istorii sovetskogo kino*, Vol. I, p. 305.

Ukraine, it sounded like a clarion call to an uprising. *Koliivshchyna* was quickly withdrawn from distribution and Kavaleridze's next picture, *Prometey* (Prometheus, 1936), based on Shevchenko's poem *Kavkaz* (The Caucasus), which was spoken in Ukrainian, Georgian and Russian, was at once banned for "harmful nationalist deviations."¹⁶

The period 1932—33 witnessed the climax of Red terror in the Ukraine. Perhaps the hardest hit were the intellectuals and writers, many of whom were deported or executed. A particularly serious loss to the Ukrainian motion picture industry was the dissolution of the Kharkov Berezil Theater in 1933, and the execution or exile of the writers D. Buzko, M. Yohansen, A. Paniv, B. Teneta, V. Gzhysky, H. Epik, H. Kosynka and many others, who had often collaborated with VUFKU; Skrypnyk and Khvylyovy committed suicide. The demands of "socialist realism," which after 1934 became the official aesthetic dogma, became even sterner. Under such conditions, both quality and quantity inevitably suffered: the output of Ukrainfilm, with its studios in Kiev and Odessa, fell from 25 pictures in 1931 to 10 in 1932, 7 in 1933, 6 in 1934, 4 in 1935, 3 in 1936 and finally in 1937 to 2, these being new versions of Ukrainian classics, *Zaporozhets za Dunayem* (The Zaporozhian Cossack Beyond the Danube) and *Natalka Poltavka*. Every year the newsreel *Radyanska Ukraina* (The Soviet Ukraine) became duller and duller. Gradually all the originality and independence of the Ukrainian film industry was extinguished.

From 1931 on, the themes of pictures were dictated more and more by the demands of the Party. They included "socialist construction," operetta-type ethnographism, the "friendship of Soviet peoples," and tendentiously depicted folk art. The following films are representative of this period: *Korintsi Komunizmu* (The Roots of Communism), by L. Lukov; also his *Batkivshchyna moya—Komsomol* (The Komsomol—My Fatherland); *Vyrishalny start* (The Decisive Start), by B. Tyahno, and *Molodist* (Youth) by Lukov. Leonid Likov, a Russian who became a leading director of Ukrainfilm, was a prominent exponent of "socialist realism."

In 1935, Stalin, in his "address" to the workers of the Soviet film industry, wrote:

The Soviet government expects from you new successes—new films which, like *Chapaev*, will glorify the greatness of the historic deeds [performed] in the struggle for the government of the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union, which will mobilize [the people] for the discharging of new tasks, . . .¹⁷

The demand that directors imitate the Russian film *Chapaev*, produced by the brothers Vasilev in Moscow, meant the death knell for all non-Russian schools and styles, for all individualism and interest in developments abroad. From then on, dreary uniformity reigned unchallenged. In the Ukraine, film publications and schools for training screen artists were discontinued. The Odessa studio was turned into a training school for technical personnel. In film literature, not a single work appeared devoted to theory or aesthetics; the magazines were full of exhortations to conform to the Party line and condemnations of errors and deviations.

¹⁶ *Entsyklopediya ukrainoznavstva*, Vol. I, Book III, Munich—New York, 1949, p. 888.

¹⁷ I. Bolshakov, *Sovetskoe kinoiskusstvo v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny* (Soviet Film Art During the Years of the Great Fatherland War), Moscow, 1948.

The greatest Ukrainian film director, Dovzhenko, left (or was forced to leave) the Ukraine and found himself in Siberia, where he produced the picture *Aerograd* (1935—36), which neither in content nor in form has anything to do with the Ukraine. No new talent in the motion picture industry appeared in the Ukraine. On the other hand, many Russians rose to prominent posts in what remained of Ukrainian movies, including A. Room, I. Pyryev, V. Rosenstein and I. Pomeschikov. In 1937, the name "Ukrainfilm" appeared on the screen for the last time.

The Odessa studio suffered great losses during the purge of 1933—37. In the Kiev studio, Ivan Pyryev produced in 1938 several pictures which parodied Ukrainian customs. Among them were the so-called "comedies from kolkhoz life"—*Bahata narechena* (The Rich Bride) and *Traktorysty* (Tractor Drivers). These films were produced in Russian and were shot partly in Moscow and partly in Kiev. "Many performers... were not Ukrainian and did not pretend to be."¹⁸

The most outstanding film of that period is unquestionably Dovzhenko's *Shchors* (1939). Although made in accordance with Stalin's wish to create a Ukrainian *Chapaev*, this film, "in spite of its excessively Bolshevik tendentiousness, demonstrated to a certain extent the heroism of the Ukrainian people; with regard to form, it was an accomplished piece of filmcraft."¹⁹ There was an ironic ring in Shchors' words, "Years will pass and the Revolution will be completed and people will live like brothers on this earth. The whole world will be covered with gardens, and we shall pass before them in a mighty column... sober, brave, without swearing or flattery."²⁰

In general, Ukrainian films of that period do not differ from each other or from Russian films. *Vohni nad berehamy* (Fires Over the River Banks), by Solovyov, and *Voroh odyn* (The Only Enemy), by Kolomyitsev, or *Zahybel eskadry* (The Death of a Squadron), by Kordyum, are practically indistinguishable. Screen versions of the classics such as the color films *Mayska nich* (A May Night) and *Sorochynsky yarmarok* (Sorochintsy Fair), based on Gogol's works, had little artistic quality. Such films were particularly numerous because of the lack of original screen plays resulting from Moscow's rejection of one script after another for failing to adhere to the Party line. The predominance of Russian actors in pictures made in the Ukraine reached its climax in 1941, when the cast of the historical film *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, on a subject which was purely Ukrainian, consisted for the most part of Russians, including P. Mordvinov, S. Ilyushin, M. Zharov and N. Semenov. The film, based on the play by Oleksander Korniychuk, tendentially presented the great Cossack hetman as an exponent of friendship with Russia.

During World War II, the studios in Kiev and Odessa (the latter was being used exclusively for Russian films) were evacuated to Ashkhabad and Tashkent respectively. In order to win the sympathy of the Ukrainian people, who were then under the heel of the German invaders, the Soviet government permitted the production of some films in these studios which had a slight national coloring. Among these were *Partyzany v stepakh Ukrainy* (Partisans of the Ukrainian Steppes), by I. Savchenko, and *Parkhomenko*, by

¹⁸ *Soviet Cinema*, London, 1948, p. 59.

¹⁹ *Entsyklopediya ukrainoznavstva*, *op. cit.*

²⁰ I. Groshov, *Obraz sovetskogo cheloveka na ekrane* (Soviet Man on the Screen), Moscow, 1952, p. 100.

Lukov. The cast included the Ukrainian actors N. Uzhviy, D. Milyutenko, H. Yura, A. Khvylya and Y. Ponomarenko and some Russians—B. Chirkov, S. Kayukov and A. Pankratev. All these pictures, but especially *Rayduha* (The Rainbow, 1943) and *Nezdolani* (The Unvanquished, 1945), by M. Donskoy, preached the “friendship of Soviet peoples” and the superiority of the “big brother”—Russia.



Immediately after the war, the spread of Russian nationalism, encouraged by Stalin, seriously threatened the existence of the non-Russian cultures to the extent that “even ethnographic Ukrainian films were regarded as... nationalist if they did not contain motifs of political propaganda.”²¹ The film *Ukrainski melodii* (Ukrainian Melodies, 1945), by I. Zemhan and H. Ihnatovych, was banned for this reason.

On September 4, 1946, the All-Union Party Central Committee passed a resolution on Lukov's film *Bolshaya zhizn* (The Great Life) in which, it was claimed, “the reconstruction of the Donbas occupies an insignificant place and the main attention is concentrated on the primitive portrayal of various personal experiences and scenes of everyday life.” The same resolution reprimanded the great Russian director Eisenstein for portraying Ivan the Terrible's “progressive oprichniki” as so many “bandits” in Part II of the film *Ivan Grozny*.

After the publication of this resolution, the censorship became even stricter than before. In these days, Russian studios (Mosfilm, Lenfilm, Soyuzdetfilm and others) exercised a virtual monopoly in film production. In the Ukraine, only the Kiev studio was in operation, producing no more than two or three films annually. Among them were some panegyrics of Stalin, including *Tretiy udar* (The Third Blow, 1948), by Savchenko, and, by the same director, a new film on the life of Shevchenko, who was made out to be a Russophile. Of the films that were based on such safe subjects as the classics of Ukrainian nineteenth-century literature, the following deserve to be mentioned: *Ukradene shchastya* (Stolen Happiness), *Maksymka*, *Martyn Borulya*, *Nazar Stodolya*, *Lymerivna* and *Zemlya* (Earth), based on the work of Franko, Stanyukovych, Tobilevych, Shevchenko, Myrny and Kobilyanska respectively. Most of them were simply filmed productions of the Franko State Theater in Kiev. As one critic later pointed out: “In recent years our cinematography, including the Ukrainian, has been strongly influenced by the [practice of] imitating the sister art, which has blunted the expressiveness of the language of the screen.”²²

Ukrainian audiences, bored with “socialist realism,” eagerly awaited foreign films, especially those of Charlie Chaplin. This popular disapproval of native fare had no effect upon Party policy, which sternly imposed upon every new film specifications as to content and plot which were, in effect, “contrary to the very nature of art.”²³

In 1933, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, which now controls the film industry, ordered the production of a film, *Dolya Maryny* (The Fate of Maryna), based on the life of a Ukrainian kolkhoz. It was directed by V. Iv-

²¹ *Entsyklopediya ukrainoznavstva*, Vol. I, Book III, p. 889.

²² *Mystetstvo*, 1956, No. 4.

²³ *Pravda*, September 12, 1956.

chenko and I. Shmaruk and the scenario was written by L. Kolomiyets. The film, which, it was hoped, would win great laurels, proved a complete failure both at the International Festival in France and in the Ukraine. Later, after Stalin's death, one critic admitted that it was characterized by the "varnishing of reality."²⁴

Developments in the years 1954—56 were thus described in a leading article in *Mystetstvo*:

During the last three years, the [Kiev] studio produced 27 films, 20 of them full-length. Yet, as far as artistic quality is concerned, only *Taras Shevchenko*, *Podvyh rozvidnyka* [The Exploit of a Scout], *U myrni dni* [Days of Peace], *Pedahohichna poema* [A Pedagogical Poem] and one or two others have received public recognition. The rest, among them such pictures as *Bohatyr*, *Zirky na krylakh* [Star on Wings], *Nach Cheremoshem* [On the Cheremosh] and *Komanda z nashoi vulytsi* [A Team from Our Street], are mediocre and show traces of haste.²⁵

"Public recognition," be it noted, should read "recognition by Party critics." The classification of *Nach Cheremoshem* as "mediocre" is of particular interest. This film, based on a scenario by Stelamkh, was directed by H. Krykun, with music by V. Homulyaka and photography by L. Kokhno. The cast included P. Masokha, F. Radchuk, H. Kozachenko, K. Kluchytsky, V. Sokyрко and V. Zhyrakhvosky. It is no exaggeration to say that this picture represented the first all-Ukrainian effort since the liquidation of Ukrainfilm. Although strictly conforming with the Party demand to show the blessings of the union of the Transcarpathian Ukraine with the USSR and of the collectivization of a Hutsul village, it drew the wrath of some officials for its national background, Ukrainian music and language and the Hutsul dialect. We learn from an official Soviet source:

The artistic accomplishment of the group working on *Nach Cheremoshem* was achieved at the cost of great tension, in an atmosphere of extreme hostility to the film and to the scenario on the part of some workers of the Kiev studio, who first talked of its worthlessness and later tried to "edit" the scenario and make it even worse.²⁶

The extreme caution and suspicion shown toward everything national is characteristic of the Soviet attitude not only to the Ukrainian but also to other national cultures.

The decline in Soviet film production prompted the Soviet Ministry of Culture to voice a demand in 1955 for an increase in the output of films, and in response the Kiev studio during this year produced 13 films, most of them screen versions of literary subjects. The picture *Maty* (Mother), based on Gorky's novel, attracted no attention at the International Festival at Cannes. Some films, e. g., *Kalynovy hay* (Cranberry Grove), based on the play by Korniyuchuk, were based on the works of Soviet Ukrainian writers, and one, *Zirky na krylakh*, by I. Shmaruk, was criticized in the Soviet press for "literary primitivism."²⁷ More valuable were short scientific films issued by

²⁴ *Literaturna hazeta*, Kiev, 1955, No. 40.

²⁵ *Mystetstvo*, 1956, No. 2. Leading article.

²⁶ *Literaturna hazeta*, 1955, No. 33.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1957, No. 57.

the same Kiev studio, e. g., *Slidamy nevy-dymykh vorohiv* (On the Track of Invisible Enemies), dealing with the control of infectious diseases.

The cultural "thaw" after Stalin's death has not, as we have seen, brought about any radical improvement in the Ukrainian film industry. Although at the Twentieth Party Congress much was said about the abolition of the "cult of personality" and the "varnishing of reality," the principle of Party guidance of culture was not abandoned. There were great shortages of trained personnel, although this was the natural result of the absence of any schools in this field in the Ukraine. The Odessa studio was formally returned to Ukrainian control, but it was staffed mostly by Russians, some of whom showed great promise (Khutsiev, Mironer).²⁸

Early in 1957, the studio at Yalta was also turned over to the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture. Ivanov was appointed its manager and Olefirenko his chief assistant. It was stated in 1956 that by 1960 this studio should be producing 4 full-length pictures annually.²⁹ Increased film production made it necessary to look for new writers of scenarios. Voices were raised in favor of more Ukrainian directors working on Ukrainian films. "It is no secret," wrote one critic, "that the scenario writers and directors who are sent for a short period from other [Soviet] republics do not attempt to study properly the culture of the Ukrainian people."³⁰

In 1956—57, the first articles devoted exclusively to the history and the problems of the Ukrainian film began to appear in literary magazines. Some half-hearted attempts were made to rehabilitate some films of VUFKU, condemned to oblivion in the thirties. Critics argued that "workers in the Ukrainian film industry should raise artistic standards... resolutely reject oversimplification, vulgarized sociology, prettifying, etc."³¹ During the "thaw," two young directors from the Odessa studio, Khutsiev and Mironer, pleaded for greater realism in film making which would show not the clean, main boulevards, but "alleys where much has not been swept away."³² In compliance with these demands, the Kiev studio's "artistic section" was restored and the Minister of Culture in the Ukraine, Babychuk, publicly declared that some films would be made in Ukrainian.³³

According to all-Union plans, the Kiev and Odessa studios were to produce 16 films and the Yalta studio 2 or 3 films in 1957. Many of them were devoted to the 40th anniversary of the Revolution: *Pravda* (Truth), by V. Petrov; *Perekop*, by T. Levchuk; and *Narodzheni bureyu* (Born in the Storm), by Y. Bazelyan. Some depicted the collectivization of agriculture: *Daleke i blyzke* (Far and Near) by Makarenko; *Slidamy mynuloho* (In the Tracks of the Past), by K. Lundinov; and *Dyktatura* (The Dictatorship), by V. Lapoknysh. Others presented the perennial theme of the struggle between the old and the new: *Matros ziyshov na bereh* (The Sailor Came Ashore), by H. Aronov; *Povist pro pershu lyubov* (A Tale of First Love), by V. Levin; and *Moya dochka* (My Daughter), by V. Zhylin. The following novels were filmed:

²⁸ For the state of the Ukrainian cinema in 1956, see the article by L. Poltava in *Ukrainsky zbirnyk*, Munich, No. 10, 1956.

²⁹ *Mystetstvo*, 1956, No. 5, p. 28.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1956, No. 1, p. 26.

³² *Iskusstvo kino*, Moscow, 1957, No. 1.

³³ *Ukrainske slovo*, Paris, February 24, 1957.

Divchyna z mayaka (The Girl from the Lighthouse), by Honchar; *Dorohoyu tsinoyu* (A High Price), by Kotsyubynsky; *Malva*, by Gorky (actress Rittensberg won an award for her performance in the leading part at the Venice Festival); and *Moral pani Dulskoi* (The Morals of Mrs. Dulska), by Zapolaka. Travel films produced in 1957 included *Dnipro* (The Dnieper), by L. Ostrovska, *Po richtsi Ros* (Along the River Ros), by V. Ivashchenko, and *Pisni nad Dni-prom* (Songs Over the Dnieper) by V. Vronsky.

★

There is a great shortage of young screen actors in the Ukraine, simply because there is no special school where they would be trained. The main source of new talent is therefore the theater. In spite of the improvements brought in by the period of the Twentieth Party Congress, when the life of the film industry throughout the country received a new impulse, the behests of the Party continue as before to act as a brake upon individual initiative. There are also other difficulties: the Ukrainian film industry still has no journal of its own, no research institute or archives. Any effort to make a real contribution to Ukrainian film traditions and hence to Ukrainian cultural traditions in general are thwarted by the fact that most new talent comes from outside the republic. Hence, just as the Ukrainian cinema's past is kept obscure—no history of Ukrainian films has yet been published and the best VUFKU films of the silent period are never shown—so its future is also problematical.

Exploitation of the Ukraine as Illustrated by Data on Retail Commodity Turnover

D. Solovey

The average per capita figure for retail commodity turnover, including public catering, is a useful indication of national well-being. A small or declining figure testifies to poor or even poverty-stricken living conditions, a high or rising figure suggests a high standard of living. This is true, however, only when the value and prices of commodities remain stable over a given period. If there is inflation and prices are rising, a rise in per capita retail commodity turnover may not be an indication of a better life, but on the contrary, of deterioration.

Khrushchev's statements on the status of this question in the USSR do little to throw light on the actual situation. "The growth of the material welfare of the Soviet people is reflected in the rise of national consumption and the development of Soviet trade." "In the USSR the workers buy more and more varied commodities and they have begun to eat better, to dress better, and to live better."¹ High Party bureaucrats in the Ukraine have made similar generalizations: "One of the best examples of the material well-being of the workers is the growth of commodity turnover."² "The workers of the Republic now have the opportunity to buy more provisions, clothes, appliances, that is, to live better."³

On the basis of statistics contained in official Soviet publications in 1956 and 1957,⁴ it is impossible to determine whether the national well-being is growing or declining, because the data relating to retail commodity turnover lack the necessary information about the state of the currency, annual price commodity levels, and wage funds. The concealment of this information leads one to believe that actual conditions are not as rosy as they are painted. As to the relative status of the various national groups, Khrushchev has said that "as a result of thorough application of the Leninist nationality policy in the USSR, the friendship of the peoples has become firmer, and for the first

¹ N. S. Khrushchev, "Forty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution," *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, November 7, 1957, p. 3.

² M. Y. Shchetinin, *ibid.*, January 29, 1957, p. 4.

³ O. O. Burmistrov, *ibid.*, January 29, 1958, p. 3.

⁴ *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1956; *Narodnoe khozyaistvo RSFSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the RSFSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1957; *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSR. Statistichny zbirnik* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR: A Statistical Compilation), Kiev, 1957.

time in history it has been possible to abolish economic and cultural inequalities.”⁵ In another study I have devoted some space to an analysis of the cultural inequalities within the USSR.⁶ Here I am concerned with economics. The official figures on capital investment in the various Soviet republics are in themselves a sufficient indication of inequality. The data on retail commodity turnover confirm this impression. One must, however, approach the official figures from the viewpoint of comparative analysis, in which case it is possible to draw conclusions without the information withheld in Soviet statistics. We may assume that the living conditions of all national groups existing under the Soviet system of planned economy are almost the same. Therefore, a comparison between retail commodity turnover, including public catering, in the non-Russian republics with the same data for the RSFSR offers an opportunity of assessing the Soviet claim that economic inequality between the peoples of the USSR has been abolished.

The statistical reports published in 1956 and 1957 offer some opportunity to compare the figures for retail commodity turnover, including public catering, but it is necessary to supplement these figures with some derivatory data to make possible a comparison between the various republics.

On the basis of the available statistics we can set up comparative tables for 1928, the last year before the introduction of the Five-Year plans. It would have been better to make comparisons for the three years, 1926, 1927, and 1928, but this is impossible because of lack of data, and for our purpose the single year will suffice. In 1928 private trade still existed in the USSR and most provisions were bought from the peasants in open markets. This part of retail commodity turnover was not registered in any official statistics. This fact as well as the high rate of the ruble explains the narrow scope of per capita retail commodity turnover reported for 1928. Only manufactured goods and some foodstuffs requiring processing, such as sugar, candy, macaroni, and sausages, were procured through state and cooperative outlets. This condition was, in general, the same in all the republics and therefore could not be reflected in percentage comparisons between the various republics. The real factor reflected in percentage comparisons was purchasing power, which in certain republics depended chiefly on wages.

Data for 1928 present the following picture of the relationship between the various republics:

Retail Commodity Turnover, Including Public Catering, for 1928

	Millions of Rubles	Per Capita in Rubles	Percentage of RSFSR
RSFSR	7,900	78.30	—
Ukrainian SSR	2,500	86.20	110.1
Other Union Republics	1,400	81.20	103.7
USSR (Total)	11,800	80.20	102.4

⁵ N. S. Khrushchev, *op. cit.*

⁶ D. Solovey, "The Slow Strangulation of Ukrainian Scholarship," *Novi dni*, Toronto, 1958, Nos. 97, 98; and, "Evidence of the Discriminatory Policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the Book and Magazine Sector," *Vilna Ukraina*, Detroit, 1958, No. 17, pp. 52—62.

SOURCES: *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the RSFSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1957, p. 281; *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSS. Statistichnyy zbirnik* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR: A Statistical Compilation), Kiev, 1957, p. 393; *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1956, p. 201. Figures for other republics have been computed on the basis of the available data. Per capita figures are based on the 1926 census, which gives the population of the RSFSR as 100,891,000, the Ukrainian SSR as 29,018,000, the other republics as 17,119,000, and the USSR as a whole as 147,028,000.

As shown in the table, the per capita purchasing power in the RSFSR was the lowest (78.30 rubles) and in the Ukraine it was the highest (86.20 rubles), or 10.1 percent higher than in the RSFSR, while in the other Union republics it was 81.20 rubles, or 3.7 percent higher than in the RSFSR. This relationship changed as soon as a planned economy was introduced. The table below showing comparable data for the year 1940 illustrates the change.

Retail Commodity Turnover, Including Public Catering, for 1940

	Millions of Rubles	Per Capita in Rubles	Percentage of RSFSR
RSFSR	116,700	1,082	—
Ukrainian SSR	32,000	780	72.1
Other Union Republics	26,400	617	57.0
USSR (Total)	175,000	913	84.4

SOURCES: *Narodnoe khozyaistvo RSFSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the RSFSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1957, p. 281; *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSS. Statistichnyy zbirnik* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR: A Statistical Compilation), Kiev, 1957, p. 397; *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1956, pp. 18 and 201.

Here the picture is quite different from that in 1928. The highest per capita purchasing power is in the RSFSR (1,082 rubles), the Ukraine trails with 780 rubles, or 27.9 percent less than in the RSFSR, and the other Union republics are even worse off, with 617 rubles, or 43 percent less than in the RSFSR. The high absolute figures are due primarily to the depreciation of the ruble. The difference between the maximum and the minimum of the separate republics, which in 1928 was 10.1 percent, has after two and a half Five-Year plans increased four times to 43 percent. The RSFSR which in 1928 was last on the list is now at the top and the Ukraine has fallen from first place to second with 27.9 percent difference. The decline of purchasing power in the Ukraine did not stop at the 1940 level. For comparison, the following table is presented for the years 1950—1955.

Retail Commodity Turnover, Including Public Catering, for 1950—55

(In Millions of Rubles)

	RSFSR	Ukrainian SSR
1950	236,600	57,312
1951	247,800	59,854
1952	257,500	61,974
1953	280,800	69,143
1954	312,200	78,232
1955	323,800	80,647
Total	1,658,700	407,162

SOURCE: FOR the RSFSR, *Narodnoe khozyaistvo RSFSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the RSFSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1957, pp. 281, 288; For the Ukrainian SSR, *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSS. Statistichnyy zbirnik* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR: A Statistical Compilation), Kiev, 1957, p. 397.

Using these data we can establish the per capita comparative relationship between the RSFSR for the period of six recent years, that is from 1950 to 1955.

Retail Commodity Turnover, Including Public Catering, for 1950—55

	Millions of Rubles	Per Capita in Rubles	Percentage of RSFSR
RSFSR	1,658,100	14,629	—
Ukrainian SSR	407,000	10,025	68.4
Other Union Republics	462,900	9,976	68.2
USSR (Total)	2,528,900	12,627	86.3

SOURCE: *Narodnoe khozyalstvo SSSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1956, p. 202. The data on the Karelian-Finnish Republic used in earlier tables are included. In addition to the 2,528 billion rubles for the total of the separate republics, the total of 2,547.1 billion rubles includes also 19.1 billion rubles not allocated.

In the period of these six years the purchasing power of the Ukrainian population had fallen 31.6 percent below the level of the RSFSR. By incorporating the data from all four tables above, we get a picture of the changes in the relative well-being of the Ukraine over the twenty-seven years from 1928 to 1955. In 1928 the Ukraine stood 110.1 percent above the RSFSR, but by 1940 they were 72.1 percent below, and at the end of 1955 were even further below by 68.4 percent. Thus we see that after the introduction of the Five-Year plans the relative well-being of the Ukrainian population as reflected in retail commodity turnover gradually declined in comparison with the RSFSR. Here we have to do with what is evidently an example of colonialism in the bad sense of the word. Not only has the relative well-being of the Ukrainian people suffered in comparison with the RSFSR, but so has that of the other non-Russian republics which have declined to 31.8 percent below the RSFSR. It was also 13.7 percent lower for the population of 87,000,000 in the non-Russian republics as a whole than for the 113,200,000 people of the RSFSR. The fact that the non-Russian population of the fourteen non-Russian republics was much worse off than the population of the RSFSR hardly supports Khrushchev's contention of the equality of the Soviet peoples.

Of special interest is the question of foodstuffs. Official statistics give the following picture of the total and the per capita retail commodity turnover, including public catering, in the Ukraine in 1955 in comparison with the RSFSR.

Total Retail Commodity Turnover in 1955

	RSFSR		Ukrainian SSR	
	Millions of Rubles	Percent	Millions of Rubles	Percent
Food Products	185,537.4	57.3	41,301.9	51.2
Textiles, Clothing, Footwear	79,331.0	24.5	21,757.5	27.0
Other Non-Food Products	58,931.6	18.2	17,587.5	21.8
Total	323,800.0	100.0	80,646.9	100.0

Per Capita Retail Commodity Turnover in 1955

	RSFSR Rubles	Ukrainian SSR Rubles	Percentage of Turnover in RSFSR
Food Products	1,639.00	1,017.30	62.1
Textiles, Clothing, Footwear	700.80	535.70	76.4
Other Non-Food Products	520.60	433.30	79.3
Total	2,860.40	1,986.30	69.4

SOURCES: Figures on the percentages of total retail commodity turnover, including public catering, divided into groups — food products; textiles, clothing, and footwear; other non-food products — were taken for the RSFSR from the *Narodnoe khozyaistvo RSFSR. Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the RSFSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1957, p. 284, and for the Ukrainian SSR: *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSR. Statistichny zbirnik* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR: A Statistical Compilation), Kiev, 1957, p. 401. Totals in rubles are from the same sources: for the RSFSR, p. 288; for the Ukrainian SSR, p. 399. The per capita computations are based on a population of 113,200,000 for the RSFSR and 40,600,000 for the Ukrainian SSR.

These figures, especially those for the purchasing power of Soviet citizens in 1955, show that economic conditions in the Ukraine were much worse than in Russia. In the RSFSR in 1955 the average citizen could spend 2,860.40 rubles to purchase the essentials of life, while in comparison, an inhabitant of the Ukrainian SSR could spend on an average only 1,986.30 rubles per capita, or 30.6 percent less. As far as food products alone were concerned, the situation in the Ukraine was 37.9 percent worse than in the RSFSR. In purchases of products other than food, this difference was not as great, but the difference of 20.7 percent was still considerable. Lastly, for the consumption of such products as clothing and footwear the difference was 23.6 percent in favor of the RSFSR.

Another interesting aspect of the statistics dealing with food products in the Ukraine, with amounted in 1955 to 51.21 percent of all consumer goods, is the breakdown of foodstuffs into various categories.⁷ Of the 51.21 percent of the food products consumed in the Ukraine, 15.57 percent were “alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages and other foodstuffs.” This means that this rather mysterious category accounted for 30.4 percent of all food products. Of twenty-four different food products listed, fifteen amount to less than one percent of the total retail distribution (e.g. fish — 0.94 percent, herrings — 0.82 percent, canned meat — 0.10 percent, canned fish — 0.57 percent, oil — 0.90 percent, cheese — 0.27 percent, eggs — 0.23 percent, tea — 0.09 percent, potatoes — 0.60 percent etc.).⁸ None of the nine other food products on the list amounts to more than the 3.83 percent for sugar. It is strange that the group of “alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages and other foodstuffs,” which amounted to 15.5 percent of the total, is not subdivided. One possible reason for this could be that the Soviet government wishes to conceal the fact that consumption of alcoholic beverages is very high in the USSR. For instance, we know that in 1955 about 148.17 million liters of alcoholic beverages were produced in the Ukraine, which indicates that the consumption was around 3.7 liters per capita.⁹ Naum Jasny, well-known economist, stressed in his analysis of the 1940 figures that in the USSR, “vodka and tobacco alone were relatively plentiful in 1940.”¹⁰ He also reported the following figures for the same year, which are reduced to percentages in the table below.

⁷ *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSR, op. cit.*, p. 401.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹⁰ *Sotsialistichesky vestnik*, New York, 1957, No. 7, p. 141.

Sales of Baked Goods and Beverages Through State and Cooperative Trade Outlets in the USSR in 1940

	Millions of Rubles	Percent
Bakery Products	30,100	51.9
Cereals	6,100	10.6
Beverages*	21,700	37.5
Total	57,900	100.0

* Not Including Hot Beverages, such as Coffe, Tea, etc.

Jasny states that in 1940 — a year of hardships for the population of the USSR — the retail commodity turnover in the category of foodstuffs, including public catering (exclusive of restaurant sales taxes) was 105,800 millions of rubles, of which the sale of baked goods and beverages, together totalling 57,900 millions of rubles as shown above, amounted to 54.7 percent. It is interesting that the proportionate trade in these products was almost the same as in 1955, when the Ukraine consumed 6,904.7 million rubles worth of bread and baked goods, 2,694.1 million rubles of cereals, and 12,562.1 million rubles of “alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages and other foodstuffs,” or a total of 22,160.2 million rubles, which represents 53.7 percent of the total food consumption of 41,301.9 million rubles.”¹¹

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to compare the figures for 1955 in the Ukraine with the corresponding figures for 1940 for the entire USSR, because the compilers of statistics for 1955 have, by design, combined the alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, and even added “other food articles.” There is little doubt that in this category the consumption of alcohol is dominant. Even if one assumes that alcoholic beverages make up one-half (i.e., half of the 12,562 million rubles), the following picture emerges:

Sales of Baked Goods, Cereals, and Alcoholic Beverages Through State and Cooperative Trade Outlets in the Ukrainian SSR in 1955

	Millions of Rubles	Percent
Bread and Bakery Products	6,900	43.4
Cereals	2,700	17.0
Alcoholic Beverages	6,300	39.6
Total	15,900	100.0

Comparison of the last two tables, those for 1940 and 1955, shows a striking similarity, with a small increase of two percent for the sale of alcoholic beverages in 1955.

On the basis of official data released for 1940, Jasny remarks that the rural cooperative stores in the USSR sold 2.5 kilos of sugar and close to 5 liters of vodka per capita. In the Ukraine alone, 141 million liters of alcoholic beverages were produced in 1940 and 148.17 million litres in 1955.¹² For the

¹¹ *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSR, op. cit.*, p. 399.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

population of the Ukraine—41,027,000 in 1940 and 40,587,000 in 1955¹³—the consumption of liquor increased then from 3.4 liters per capita in 1940 to 3.7 liters per capita in 1955. The gloomy picture which Jasny painted for the entire USSR is therefore even gloomier for the Ukraine. In a speech to the peasants of Belorussia on January 22, 1950, Khrushchev stated:

It is known to us that many people make *samogon* [home distilled spirits] out of sugar [of which the Ukraine is the principal producer in the USSR], although they know that sugar is allocated for the nourishment of workers. The time has come to pose sharply the problem of the fight against drunkenness and against those who distill spirits at home (applause). This is the duty of all citizens and of those whose job it is to see that the laws of the country are enforced. Whoever distills spirits or makes people drunk is damaging the interests of the state and of society and must be justly punished. It is necessary to combat in every way propaganda in favor of drinking. In Belorussia I saw a film "Before It Is Too Late," produced by a Lithuanian studio. In that picture the heroes quite frequently take a drink. Sometimes even playwrights in their plays let the hero come onto the stage with a large decanter of vodka. Drunkenness must not be made into a cult.¹⁴

In view of what has been said, it may seem that Khrushchev is not so much concerned with drunkenness as with the competition which *samogon* is creating for state-produced vodka. At no time does he call for a curb on the high production of the latter. He also fails to disclose what is no doubt the principal reason for drunkenness in the USSR, the feeling of frustration and unhappiness of Soviet citizens, who try to drown their sorrows in vodka.

A comparison of the turnover of commodities in the city and in the country is also of interest. The retail commodity turnover, including public catering, in the Ukraine in 1955 in cities and villages in comparison with that in the RSFSR was as follows:

Total Retail Commodity Turnover in 1955

	RSFSR		Ukrainian SSR	
	Million Rubles	Percent	Million Rubles	Percent
Cities	241,000	74.4	60,118.6	74.5
Villages	82,800	25.6	20,528.3	25.5
Total	323,800	100.0	80,646.9	100.0
Public Catering	36,700	10.8	10,745.4	13.3

The Population of the RSFSR and the Ukraine in 1955

	RSFSR		Ukrainian SSR	
	Actual	Percent	Actual	Percent
Cities	54,600,000	48.2	15,962,000	39.3
Villages	58,600,000	51.8	24,625,000	60.7
Total	113,200,000	100.0	40,587,000	100.0

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁴ *Radyanska Ukraina*, January 26, 1958, p. 2.

Per Capita Retail Commodity Turnover in 1955

	RSFSR Rubles	—— Ukrainian SSR —— Rubles	Percentage of Turnover in RSFSR
Cities	4,414	3,767	85.3
Villages	1,415	834	58.9
Total	2,860	1,986	69.4

SOURCES: Data on total commodity turnover were taken from *Narodnoe khozyaistvo RSFSR, Statistichesky sbornik* (The National Economy of the RSFSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1957, pp. 281 and 285; *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSR, Statistichny zbirnik* (The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR: A Statistical Compilation), Kiev, 1957, pp. 393—97.

For the RSFSR, per capita turnover in the villages in 1955 was only 32.6 percent as high as in the cities (1,415 rubles versus 4,414 rubles). For the Ukraine, this difference in favor of the cities was even greater, where the per capita turnover in the villages was only 22.1 percent that in the cities (834 rubles versus 3,767 rubles). For both cities and villages, the average per capita turnover in the Ukrainian SSR was much lower than in the RSFSR; 14.7 percent lower in the case of cities and 41.1 lower in the case of the villages.

As for the reasons why the purchasing power of the Ukrainian population is so much lower than that of the inhabitants of the RSFSR, it is difficult to find in the figures given any explanation except that of exploitation of the Ukraine as a colony by an imperialist power. There is little doubt that in the Soviet Union the Russians enjoy a privileged position as the "leading nationality," as Stalin, for example, indicated in his well-known toast in 1945. Depression of the living standard of the Ukrainian peasants to a level 41.1 percent below that of the level of the peasantry of the USSR was clear discrimination by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which is responsible for policy.

A comparison of retail commodity turnover, including public catering, in the Ukraine and the central areas of the RSFSR, limited as it is by lack of some necessary data, is possible if one excludes from the RSFSR three of the non-Russian autonomous republics, the Mari, Chuvash, and Mordvinian. In April 1956, the population of the remaining areas of the RSFSR amounted to some 40,600,000, that is, approximately the same as the Ukraine.¹⁵ For the period of 1951—55 the retail commodity turnover, including public catering in these central provinces amounted to 532,497 million rubles, or 13,116 rubles per capita.¹⁶ The corresponding figures for the same period in the Ukraine were only 349,859 million rubles, or 8,617 rubles per capita, that is, 34.3 percent less than in the central areas of the RSFSR.¹⁷

If one excludes from these statistics the cities of Moscow in the RSFSR and Kiev in the Ukrainian SSR, the difference between the Ukraine and the central provinces of the RSFSR is only about one-third as great, the average per capita turnover in the RSFSR being 9,327 rubles as against 8,221 rubles in the Ukraine, or a difference of 11.9 percent. It is obvious that the per capita

¹⁵ *Narodnoe khozyaistvo RSFSR, op. cit.*, pp. 50—51; *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSR, op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁶ Computed on the basis of *Narodnoe khozyaistvo RSFSR, op. cit.*, pp. 288—89.

¹⁷ Computed on the basis of *Narodnye hospodarstvo URSR, op. cit.*, p. 397.

retail turnover in the two capitals is very high; 39,287 rubles in Moscow and 24,303 rubles, or 38.1 percent less, in Kiev. The managerial and Party elite live very well in these two capitals, even if not as well in Kiev as in Moscow. The higher turnover in Moscow might have been influenced to some extent by the visits of foreign tourists. However, such influence was probably negligible. Foreigners visited other Soviet cities as well as Moscow. During the period 1951—55 the Soviet treasury gained from the foreign currency of tourists only at the official exchange rate of four rubles to the dollar, as against the more realistic exchange rate of ten rubles to the dollar.¹⁸ Neither rate had any effect on retail commodity turnover. There were not as many visitors in the USSR during 1951—55 as there have been during later years.

Apart from these considerations, it may be assumed that the prices of some agricultural products in Moscow and Leningrad might have been higher than in Kiev or Tbilisi, but on the other hand consumers in Moscow must have been compensated for higher prices by better service. It may also be true that some manufactured goods were cheaper in Moscow than in Kiev, and some may have been obtainable in one city and not in the other. All these factors tend to cancel each other from the consumer's point of view.

The conclusion that the managerial and Party elite enjoy a high standard of living in comparison with the rest of the population is borne out by many foreign observers.¹⁹ The gap between the privileged and common people is wide indeed. The purchasing power of the average citizen of the Ukraine is only one-fifth that of the inhabitant of Moscow, the center of power.

Retail commodity turnover, including public catering, for Moscow and Leningrad together compares with that of the Ukraine as follows. Since in April 1956 the population of the two cities amounted to 7,653,000 (Moscow 4,839,000 and Leningrad 2,814,000) and their total turnover for 1951—55 was 275,854 million rubles, for the five years in question the average per capita turnover was 36,045 rubles, as compared with 8,617 rubles in the Ukraine. The purchasing power of the average inhabitant of the Ukraine was, accordingly, only 23.9 percent of that of a person living in one of the two large Russian cities.

The above analysis, based on official Soviet statistics, casts light on the truth behind the Soviet claims regarding the "national equality" of the Soviet republics.

¹⁸ Advertisement in *Svoboda*, Jersey City, January 18, 1958, p. 2.

¹⁹ K. Krupsky in *Svoboda*, April 26, 1958, p. 2; Jens Feddersen, "Wie lebt der Sowjet-Bürger?" *Neue Ruhr-Zeitung*, August 22, 1956.

The Distinguishing Characteristics of the Ukrainian Church

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The following article is devoted to a description of the canons, beliefs, and customs of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church which have developed in the course of its history and have given it a distinctive character. The Church itself, is no longer in existence in the Soviet Union, where it has been completely wiped out. All places of worship have been confiscated; the clergy have been liquidated; and large numbers of the members of congregations were deported or suffered other reprisals for participation in Church life. The very name of the Church is still banned in Soviet publications in spite of the fact that since World War II, a measure of religious freedom has been restored to the official Russian Orthodox Church. An understanding of the distinctive nature of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church will make clearer the reasons for its continued persecution by the Soviet regime. Details of its destruction and continued suppression, forming a part of the program of genocide directed against the Ukrainian people in the USSR, may be found in a publication of the Institute for the Study of the USSR entitled *Genocide in the USSR: Studies in Group Destruction* (Munich, 1958).

The Editors

The Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church has an ancient history dating back to the Chronicle account of the first mass baptism in Rus (the Principality of Kiev) in 867, during the reign of Prince Askold. The view that this event, occurring after Askold's campaign against Constantinople in 860, marked the beginning of Kievan Christianity, is now gaining more supporters among scholars in the field.¹ There is no doubt that a Christian Church of St. Elijah (Illya) existed in Kiev during the reign of Prince Ihor. Therefore one can safely agree with most scholars that the official Christianization of Rus by Prince Volodymyr was in a sense recognition of the fact that Christianity was already in existence there.

In 1037 the first metropolitan, a Greek, was appointed for Kiev. Yet in 1051 the chronicler makes careful note of what must have been an important event—the appointment by Prince Yaroslav of Ilarion, a “Russian,” as metropolitan of Kiev. The elevation of a local individual to the highest post in the ancient Church was evidently an attempt to emancipate the Church from Greek influence.² The attempt, however, ended in failure, since all metropolitans after Ilarion were again Greeks, until in 1145 a sharp rift occurred

¹ P. Kovalevsky, *Istorichesky put Rossii* (The Historical Path of Russia), Paris, 1949, p. 12; M. de Taube, *Rome et la Russie*, Paris, 1947, pp. 25, 552.

² O. Lototsky, *Avtokefaliya* (Autocephaly), Warsaw, 1938, Vol. II, pp. 265—71; O. I. Nazarko, *Mytropolyt Klym Smolyatych i yoho poslannya* (Metropolitan Klym Smolyatych and His Message), Philadelphia, 1952.

between Grand Prince Vsevolod II and the Greek metropolitan of Kiev, Mikhail, who left for Constantinople. In 1147 Grand Prince Izyaslav appointed Metropolitan Klym (Clement) a Kaluga Rusin, together with six bishops. Both Ilarion and Klym were men of great culture and erudition.³ In 1156 the Greeks again won the upper hand when as a result of Prince Yuri Dolgoruky's efforts, a Greek metropolitan was sent to Kiev. This seesaw battle for the position of the metropolitan of Kiev continued until the Tatar invasion.

The presence of a Greek metropolitan in Kiev was the only tangible connection with the Patriarch of Constantinople. For all purposes the Kievan Church was autocephalic, as has long been recognized by historians.⁴ This status was primarily due to the distance between Kiev and Constantinople and to the complex political structure of Byzantium. The Church in the Ukraine felt itself to be independent and began to develop the traditions which set it apart throughout the ages until the Bolsheviks seized power. It was governed by a Church council (*sobor*) in which the clergy and the faithful, in the presence of the prince, elected bishops, archimandrites, and abbots. All attempts by a metropolitan to seat his protégés from Constantinople as bishops, were met, as in 1145, with strong resistance. When in 1187 Prince Vsevolod III refused to accept a bishop nominated by the metropolitan, he explained that the bishop "was not elected by the people of our land."⁵

Many other historical facts confirm the independence of the Kievan Church. In contrast to Byzantium, the metropolitan and the bishops of Kiev took part in princely councils. Prince Volodymyr the Great introduced the custom of donating one tenth of his income to the Church, a custom not practised in Byzantium, but known in Western Europe. The *Nomocanon*, the code of Church law, was known in Kiev in the Bulgarian, not the Byzantine, version. As early as the eleventh century the Rus Church canonized local saints, against strong opposition from the Greeks.

Independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople was further attested by the contacts of the early Kievan Church with the West. It celebrated the occasion of the removal of the remains of St. Nicholas, which was not a holiday in Byzantium.⁶ It offered prayers to Catholic saints not recognized by Byzantium, such as Beowulf, Albertus Magnus, Canute, Olaf, Alban, and the Czechs Vitos, Vyacheslav, and Lyudmila.⁷

The independence of the Kievan Orthodox Church increased even more during the period of the flourishing of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. After

³ N. Polonska-Vasylenko, "Yaroslav the Wise," *Zbirnyk UVAN*, Munich, 1958.

⁴ E. Golubinsky, *Istoriya russkoi tserkvi* (A History of the Russian Church), Moscow, 1900, Vol. I, Part 2, p. 500; Lototsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 272—73; I. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii ukrainskoi tserkvy* (An Outline of the History of the Ukrainian Church), New York, 1955, Vol. I, pp. 36—37.

⁵ Vlasovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 46.

⁶ P. Vladimirov, *Istoriya russkoi literatury* (A History of Russian Literature), Kiev, 1900, pp. 147, 208; S. Tomashivsky, *Istoriya tserkvy na Ukraini* (A History of the Church in the Ukraine), Philadelphia, p. 142.

⁷ A. Sobolevsky, "Russian Prayers Remembering Western Saints," *Materiyaly i is-sledovaniya v oblasti slavyanskoi filologii*, St. Petersburg, 1910; same author: "The Attitude of Ancient Rus to the Division of the Churches," *Isvestiya Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk*, St. Petersburg, 1914, pp. 38—39.

protracted demands to consecrate a local metropolitan and after the Kiev metropolitans had, of their own accord, left Kiev for Suzdal and Moscow, a council of bishops in 1415 in Novohrudok consecrated Gregory Tsavmblak as metropolitan, contrary to the wishes of the Patriarch. It is interesting that the election was officially motivated by the precedents of Ilarion and Klym. The importance of the Sobor itself also increased. In the 16th century church brotherhoods were organized to counter the activities of the Roman Catholics. These brotherhoods performed many cultural and educational tasks and greatly influenced the life of the churches.⁸ It was traditional in the Kievan Church for Church parishes to act as independent units. A vital stimulus toward autonomy for the Church was provided by translations into the living "Rus" language (Ukrainian and Belorussian), including that of the Bible by Dr. Franciscus Skoryna in 1517—19; the School Gospel published in Zabludiv in 1569 and the so-called Peresopnyts Gospel, 1556—61, intended "for better understanding by the people of the Christian Community" and others. It was an important development that the living "Rus" language came to be used in Church services, where the Gospels were read in the "Rus" language and which was more important, the sermons and instructions, which played a large part in the services, were heard in the living "Rus" language.

This state of affairs continued until 1686, when as a result of an agreement between the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Moscow, the Church came under the jurisdiction of the latter.⁹ From the nominal jurisdiction of the distant Patriarch of Constantinople, on the whole favorably disposed, the Ukrainian Church passed to the jurisdiction of the nearby Patriarch of Moscow, who well understood that the Church was a powerful tool for ruling the entire state.

During the era of the Kiev metropolitanate the diocese of Volodymyr on the Klyazma, or Suzdal, was founded in 1214. Beginning with the reign of Prince Yury Dolgoruki, the principality of Suzdal grew in importance and quite reasonably wished to separate from Kiev in ecclesiastical matters. In 1160 Prince Andrey Bogolyubsky requested the Patriarch in Constantinople to consecrate a metropolitan for the principality, but in the face of strong objections from the metropolitan and the other princes of the Kievan state, the request was rejected.

After the Tatar invasion the metropolitans of Kiev generally resided in Volodymyr, and from 1300 on, the Metropolitan Maxim made it his official see. Then, still with the official title of Metropolitan of Kiev, the metropolitan moved to Suzdal and later to Moscow. A struggle broke out between the Ukraine and Suzdal for control over the Kiev metropolitanate. Not until 1458 was the former Kiev metropolitanate divided into two separate units, one at Kiev, the other at Moscow, both quite independent of each other. This state of affairs lasted for 228 years, until 1686, when, on the request of the Russian Tsar, the Patriarch of Constantinople gave permission for transfer of the Kiev metropolitanate to the jurisdiction of Moscow.

⁸ M. Hrushevsky, *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy* (History of Ukraine-Rus), Vol. V, pp. 401—402; Lototsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 300—02; O. I. Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva* (The Ukrainian Church), Vol. I, pp. 199—215; Vlasovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 13—20, 28—40; I. Ivanys, "Church Brotherhoods and Their Significance for the Ukrainian People," *V oboronu viry*, Toronto, 1955, Vol. I, pp. 71—92.

⁹ Lototsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 368—80.

During these 228 years the two churches continued to live according to their separate traditions. The Ukrainian Church, which was located on territory under the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later of Poland, free from interference by the state, developed many of its own customs and traditions. The Ukrainian people without a state of their own and under a foreign government, tended to regard the Church as the main expression of their nationality. The entire Church became the basis of their intellectual life. The close contacts between the upper layer of the Ukrainian people and Western culture through education, literature, and science fostered the creation of a highly cultured clergy, who brought enlightenment into such centers as Ostroh, Lviv, and Kiev, with their outstanding scholars and academies.¹⁰

The struggle against the Union with Rome at the end of the sixteenth century offered an opportunity for the Orthodox Church to develop its own polemical literature and presented a challenge to its strength and popularity. These tests were successfully withstood and the Church became even more firmly rooted in popular traditions and customs.¹¹

These customs were carefully recorded in the missals (mass-books) and *trebnyks* (service-books). Among the most prominent is the missal of Gedeon Balaban printed in Stryatyn and Ostroh in 1606. The missal of Peter Mohyla of 1646 includes many ritualistic details taken from older missals, while it rejects some old Greek customs. Some were borrowed from Latin missals. Ukrainian missals also contained, apart from prayers and rites, explanations of liturgical and canonical customs. Mohyla's missal contained descriptions of 126 actions, 37 of them new and 20 not known in other Greek or Slavonic missals. It was the most complete of all the Slavic missals. The missal of Yosyf Tryzna, printed in 1653, contained some old customs which Mohyla rejected.

The Ukrainian clergy used the Bulgarian version of the Nomocanon known as the "Kormchi Books." One of these books, dating from the sixteenth century, included a collection of documents supporting the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Some of the Kormchi books contained, apart from canons, practical instructions for the clergy.¹² Having many able men among its hierarchy, the Ukrainian Church was distinguished not for ritualism but for a deep spirituality. Moreover it suffered no schisms or internal conflicts.

On the other hand, the Muscovite Church was isolated from foreign influences. It had inherited from Byzantium the idea of the Third Rome and regarded itself as the only true Christian Church. The declaration of the Muscovite Patriarchate in 1589 was intended to elevate it to the level of the Eastern Patriarchates: "Since Ancient Rome has fallen victim to the Apollinarian heresy, and the Second Rome, which is Constantinople, is occupied by the Hagarian grandchildren of the godless Turks, . . . the Third Rome will surpass all in devotion and all devout kingdoms will unite under it." This idea became even more popular in the second half of the 17th century, when

¹⁰ Ohienko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 128.

¹¹ O. Lototsky, *Ukrainski dzherela tserkovnoho prava* (Ukrainian Sources of Ecclesiastical Law), Warsaw, 1937, pp. 6—7.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 6—6, 55—68, 78—99.

it gained the support of Patriarch Nikon and, for different reasons, of the Old Believers.

Autocracy in administration on the one hand, and external ritualism on the other, were the main characteristics of the Muscovite Church in the seventeenth century. These features led to many conflicts, sects, and schisms. The controversy over the restoration of the original text of the missals and the Bible led to the "Raskol" (schism) and the rise of the "Old Believers."¹³ Muscovite formalism lent itself to fanaticism and obscurantism. The situation was aggravated by the low educational level of the Muscovite clergy.¹⁴

This was the condition of the two Churches before 1686, when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church fell under the domination of Moscow. Even before, many Ukrainians, for various motives, moved to Moscow, where they occupied prominent positions. Among them were Arsen Satanovsky, Epifany Slavinetsky, Damaskyn Halytsky, Fedir Rtyshchev, and Semen Polotsky. When Patriarch Nikon undertook to revise the mass books he was assisted by the Ukrainians and as a result was later accused of a "Ukrainian bias." Ukrainians were treated in Moscow with the greatest suspicion as being contaminated with "Latinism" and Western European ideas.¹⁵

The hostility of Moscow toward the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was increased by differences in ecclesiastical traditions and customs. These can be divided into the following categories:

Sacraments. A controversy arose between the Kiev and Moscow schools of thought as to the exact moment of the Holy Eucharist—the transformation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Our Lord. According to the old tradition mentioned in the *Ispovidanie* of Mohyla this moment is reached as the priest pronounces the words, "This is my body—this is my blood." The Muscovites held that the vital moment was at the time of the prayer, "You have created this bread..." In the polemics aroused by this dispute two Greeks, the brothers Lichud, also participated. In the end the Ukrainian interpreters were branded as heretics and given the derogatory name of "bread-worshippers." The whole controversy stirred great interest and indignation in the Ukraine. Sylvester Medvedev, a proponent of the Ukrainian view, was in the meantime executed in Moscow. Patriarch Yoakym attempted to incriminate the Ukrainian monastic orders by asking them to submit their views on doctrinal matters and accusing them of deviations before the Eastern Patriarchs. The dispute became so serious that a split between the Ukrainian and Muscovite Churches was a distinct possibility. Under heavy pressure the Kievan Metropolitan Gedeon and the Archimandrite of the Kiev Lavra, Varlaam Yasynsky, accepted the Muscovite interpretation. However, Lazar Baranovych, the bishop of Chernihiv, attempted cautiously to defend the views of the Ukrainian clergy: in a letter to the Patriarch he wrote that the Kievan Church had always in the past regarded the exact moment of the Holy Eucharist as that of the words, "This is my body... this is my blood," and that this interpretation came not from Latin but from Greek sources. In support he quoted a number of books published in Kiev. Under threat of trial

¹³ O. Ohloblyn, *Moskovska teoriya III Rymu v XVI—XVII st.* (The Muscovite Theory of the Third Rome in the 16th and 17th Century), Munich, 1951, pp. 36, 43.

¹⁴ Lototsky, *Avtokefaliya*, Vol. II, p. 385; I. Vlasovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 94; A. Pypin, *Istoriya russkoi literatury* (History of Russian Literature), Vol. II, p. 261.

¹⁵ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. II, pp. 153—55; Pypin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 263.

the old bishop capitulated. In 1690, at a Church Council, the Patriarch condemned the writings of the Kievan school, which were ordered to be burned.¹⁶

A second controversy concerned the sacrament of baptism. In the Ukraine this was always performed by immersion and sprinkling, while in Muscovy only immersion was used. The Muscovites referred to the Ukrainians as "Sprinklers," and considered them on an equal footing with all unbaptized infidels. The Moscow Sobor in 1620 voted to rebaptize all such persons. The entire controversy aroused fierce passions. Thus Bishop Ezekiel (Yosyf Kurtsevych), consecrated as bishop of Volodymyr in Kiev in 1620 by the Patriarch Teophan, was later given the diocese of Suzdal. Many of his clergy accompanied him. In a few years he and his clergy were denounced as "Sprinklers" and were asked to be rebaptized. The whole matter reached the Patriarch. Not until 1667 did the Sobor rescind the earlier regulation that all foreigners, including Ukrainians, must be rebaptized.¹⁷

These issues helped to create the belief in Muscovy that the Ukrainians were not true Christians but were tainted by foreign religious influences. How strong was this prejudice can be seen from one striking example. After the death of Patriarch Yoakym one of the candidates to replace him was a Ukrainian, Markel, Bishop of Pskov. He was a man of excellent education and very tolerant, and perhaps because of this his candidacy was opposed by the conservative section of the Muscovites, who succeeded in electing Adrian, the metropolitan of Kazan. In the "Life" of Yoakym there is the following characterization of Markel: "He was a foreigner, but pretended to be a Russian as if he was eligible to be elected Patriarch. However, owing to Divine Providence, prayers, and the apostolic letter by St. Dosifey, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, foreigners and Poles were not allowed to become clergymen in Russia."¹⁸ Markel was obviously treated as a foreigner. To most Muscovites, the Ukrainians appeared to be foreigners, and there were instances when funeral rites were refused them in Christian cemeteries in Russia.¹⁹

The ceremony of church marriage was different in the Ukrainian and Muscovite Churches. In the Ukraine there were two stages in a church wedding—the engagement and the wedding. As in the early Christian days, the engagement was regarded by the Ukrainian Church as a necessary precondition to marriage. In 1702 permission was given for the first time to break off a "church engagement." This custom was strongly objected to by the Russian Church and in 1775 the two rites were combined into one.

Mohyla's missal describes in detail the traditional church marriages. According to this source the priest was to ask the young couple if they had made earlier promises to marry others, whether they were now marrying voluntarily, and whether they were ready to take an oath to remain faithful to each other. The bridegroom in the ceremony of the engagement and marriage says, "I take you as a helper," and the bride repeats the same words. The priest then instructs them, in the vernacular: "You are taking your bride for a true friend and comrade, not for a slave or a footstool, since God created

¹⁶ I. Shlyapkin, *Dmitriy Rostovsky i ego vremena* (Dmitriy Rostovsky and His Time), St. Petersburg, 1891, pp. 110, 148—80; Lototsky, *Avtokefaliya*, Vol. II, pp. 395—98.

¹⁷ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. II, p. 79; Lototsky, *Avtokefaliya*, Vol. II, p. 391.

¹⁸ Lototsky, *Avtokefaliya*, Vol. II, pp. 350—51.

¹⁹ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. II, p. 91.

her not from a foot but from a rib, which is nearer the heart." This type of church wedding was preserved in the Ukraine until the end of the 18th century and survived even longer in Galicia, in the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Church. The popular use of the word *shlyub* (oath) was also preserved. Accordingly, it may be seen that the concepts of the woman's role in marriage differed in the Ukraine and in Muscovy.

Ritual. The Ukrainian Church ritual differed from the Russian at funerals, especially the funerals of clergy, whose coffins were placed in the church with their heads to the east, to the altar, as if in remembrance of the former position facing the congregation. In Russia the clergy were buried like everyone else, with their feet facing the altar.²⁰ There were also considerable differences between the rites of the soul's departure from the body: in the Ukrainian ritual the use of the vernacular was preserved.²¹

According to the custom of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the mother of a new-born child could not enter the church for ten days. Then she had to bring the baby into the church. As she entered the priest read prayers, one for the mother and one for the child, and then carried the child to the holy gates of the altar, if the child was a girl, and up to and around the altar if the child was a boy.²²

Church Services. The most marked difference between the Ukrainian and the Russian services was in the reading of the Bible. In the Ukraine, the priest reading the Gospels faced the congregation, while in Russia he faced the altar. During the service the holy gates remained open in the Ukrainian Church longer than in Russia. If the service was conducted in the Ukrainian Church by several priests, they all stood in front of the altar; in Russia only the eldest did so, the others remained at the sides. During the so-called Great Exit the deacon carried the discos on his shoulder, not on his head as in Russia.²³ In the Ukrainian Orthodox Church the "elevation of the cross" was a special ceremony. As the priest raised the cross three times, the choir sang "Lord have mercy upon us" fortissimo, and as he lowered it, it sang the same chant, but pianissimo. In Russia the priest simply carried a cross without elevating it.

The so-called "Orthodox Sunday" mass was celebrated differently by the two Churches.²⁴ Particularly offensive to Ukrainians was a custom of having the anathema against Hetman Mazeppa read at this service, a custom which was continued until the middle of the nineteenth century. An important place in a Ukrainian service was taken by the sermon, which was delivered after the reading of the Bible. Some preachers were laymen, and Ukrainian sermons of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were of very high literary quality such as those by Yoanniki Galyatyvsky, Antony Radvylyvsky, and Dmitry Tuptalo. They were mostly delivered in a semi-vernacular language or in literary Ukrainian, but rarely in Church Slavonic. When this Ukrainian tradition was brought to Moscow, it met with great hostility. "You hypocrites,"

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 195—213.

²¹ Mytropolyt Ilarian, "The Funeral of a Priest," *Vira i kultura*, Winnipeg, 1955, No. 7, p. 6.

²² Mytropolyt Ilarion, "The Sacrament of Holy Baptism," *Vira i kultura*, Winnipeg, 1955, No. 3/15, pp. 9—10.

²³ "On the Openings and Closing of the Holy Gates," *Bohoslovsky visnyk*, Stuttgart, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 164—69.

²⁴ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. II, p. 93.

we read in a Russian source, "have started a new heresy. You teach people in church and we never did this before. . . . You are possessed of the devil and all of you are hypocrites."²⁵

Special Church Services. A number of special church services were held in the Ukraine but were unknown in Russia. On Fridays during the first five weeks of Lent there were the "passions," during which reading of the Lord's passions from the four Gospels were made. The "Passions" were adopted by the Russian Church in the nineteenth century. Litanies were celebrated on August 1 to consecrate poppies and other flowers, and on August 6, a litany was celebrated to consecrate the harvest.²⁶

Ukrainian services on the occasion of the consecration of new clergy were very distinctive. The candidate was first of all tonsured, symbolizing the transition from the lay to the clerical life. There were several grades of clerical apprenticeship. The first was that of doorkeeper. The origin of this is very ancient, and the function was symbolically that of keeping the church door open or closed. The second grade was that of exorcist, to whom was given the book of exorcisms. Both of these functions were discontinued in the late seventeenth century. The seven other grades of Ukrainian clergy were those of churchman, candle carrier, reader, sub-deacon, deacon, presbyter, and bishop. The last three were *chirotons*.²⁷

The practice of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was to have several deacons and priests officiate at the liturgy consecrating the new clergy, a custom unknown in the Eastern patriarchates. Although the Patriarch of Alexandria found nothing objectionable in the custom, the Sobor in Moscow in 1666—67 outlawed it, although such a ban was contrary to canonical law, the Ukrainian Church being at the time under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople. It was, however, continued in the Ukrainian Church and eventually revived by the Russian Church.²⁸

The consecration of bishops was more ceremonious in the Ukraine than in Moscow. The ceremony lasted for several days with the congregation taking part. After his selection a candidate was officially called up by the metropolitan, kissed, and asked to take the vows, after which he was proclaimed a candidate and installed by the laying on of hands.²⁹

The Ukrainian Church had many special consecration ceremonies unknown in Muscovy, such as the blessing of vestments, vessels, crosses, bells, etc.³⁰ As for special church services there were, according to Peter Mohyla's missal, 125 of these, of which 37 were known only in the Ukraine. Among them were services and litanies for the sick, the cattle, bees, before going on a journey, before starting an academic career, for a new home, a new

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 119, Vol. II, p. 93.

²⁶ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. I, p. 117.

²⁷ O. Lototsky, *Ukrainski dzerela tserkovnoho prava*, pp. 58—62.

²⁸ Vlasovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 238.

²⁹ Lototsky, *Ukrainski dzerela* . . . , p. 65—68; Vlasovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 235—36.

³⁰ "On the Opening and Closing of the Holy Gates," *Bohoslovsky visnyk*, 1948, Stuttgart, Vol. II, pp. 164—69; Shlyapkin, *op. cit.*, p. 108; Mytropolyt Ilarion, "Rituals and Customs of the Orthodox Church," *Vira i kultura*, Winnipeg, 1957, No. 4/40, pp. 19—20.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

well, etc.³¹ The great variety testifies to the piety of the Ukrainian population. The calendar of the Ukrainian Church consisted of two parts, one consisting of saints' days of the Ancient Greek and Byzantine Churches, and the other of Ukrainian saints' days. A Ukrainian missal of 1659 does not contain a single saint recognized by Moscow. In 1784 the Ukrainian Church was ordered by the Holy Synod to accept the Russian calendar.

The first saints canonized by the Kievan Church were Borys and Hlib, murdered in 1015 and canonized in 1072 on the initiative of Archbishop Ivan II. In spite of their services, Volodymyr and Olga were not canonized until later, Prince Volodymyr in the fourteenth and Princess Olga in the thirteenth century. This late recognition of their services to Christianity could have been due to the lack of miracles at their graves or to the reluctance of the Greek metropolitans to acknowledge their achievements. We know that the Greeks opposed the canonization of Theodosiy and Antony of the Pecherska Lavra. There were many local saints of the pre-Tatar period, including Prince Petro-Yaropolk, Grand Prince Fedir-Mstyslav, and so on.³²

The Ukrainian Church had its own holidays: the consecration of the Church of the Tithe, and the festivals of Borys, Hlib, Yuri, Mykhailo, Holovosik, Iov Pochaiivsky in Volhynia, and Antony and Teodosiy in the Kiev region. Moscow refused to acknowledge these festivals in the eighteenth century. The festivals of the Virgin Mary, the Annunciation, and St. Mary the Protectress were also popular in the Ukraine. The last did not become a Church holiday in Greece until the nineteenth century. The festival commemorating the moving of the remains of St. Nicholas was established as early as the Kievan period, a custom not known in the Byzantine Church.³³

Linguistic Differences. At first the official language used in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was Church Slavonic. It was the literary language of the time and was understood by the people and spoken by the upper classes. In the course of time Church Slavonic became archaic and increasingly removed from the vernacular. The Ukrainian Church realized the need for bringing itself closer to the people, and hence encouraged the publication of Ukrainian translations of the Bible and allowed the so-called "Rus" language (a mixture of Ukrainian and Belorussian) to be used in the missals, church wedding ceremonies, and above all, in sermons. The Church Slavonic which was still used in the services acquired a Ukrainian pronunciation. All these factors helped to make the language of the Church understandable to the people.³⁴

The linguistic policy of the Russian Church was quite different, since it was violently opposed to any concessions in favor of the vernacular. At first the Muscovite Church was dominated by the so-called "trilingual heresy," according to which services could be held only in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin. In spite of the condemnation of this heresy by St. Cyril in the ninth century

³¹ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. I, pp. 116—117.

³² Mytropolyt Ilarion, "Piznya kanonizatsiya knyazya Volodymyra i knyahyni Olhy (The Late Canonization of Prince Volodymyr and Princess Olha)," *Nasha kultura*, Winnipeg, 1952, No. 6, pp. 5—8; *Korotka istoriya pravoslavnoi tserkvy* (A Short History of the Orthodox Church), Stuttgart, 1948, pp. 74—86.

³³ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. I, pp. 118—19; Vladimirov, *op. cit.*, pp. 147—208; Tomahivsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 141—42.

³⁴ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. II, p. 94—95.

and the advice given by St. Paul in the Epistles to the Corinthians that sermons should be given in intelligible language, the Russian Church strongly opposed the Ukrainian tradition. Later, Old Church Slavonic was added to the three languages in which services were allowed. The Mohyla Academy graduates were often criticized for their Ukrainian pronunciation. Recognition of the use of Ukrainian in the Orthodox Church was not granted until 1905, when a modern Ukrainian translation of the Bible was allowed to be used and in 1917, when the campaign against the Ukrainian pronunciation of Church Slavonic was stopped.³⁵

External Differences. The Patriarch of Moscow forced upon the Ukrainians several external customs of his Church. In the old Ukrainian Church priests had no prescribed uniform or vestments and could and did shave and cut their hair. Even monks wore their hair short as may be seen in the contemporary illustrations to the "Miracle in the Caves" in the *Pechersky Prayer Book*. The *Stoglav* Sobor in Moscow in 1551 ruled that long hair and beards were compulsory for all Orthodox clergy and this rule applied to the Ukraine after 1686. The decision was repeated in 1686 when the newly-elected Patriarch Adrian in his first letter to his flock forbade the shaving of heads so as not "to resemble cats and dogs."³⁶

The Ukrainian form of address for a bishop was *vладыко* (Highness), while the Russian was *gospodin* (Lord). Ukrainian bishops wore crosses on their mitres. At the Sobor in Moscow in 1666—67, when the Patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria ruled that the Muscovite bishops were not entitled to wear these crosses, the Ukrainian bishops present, Lazar Baranovych and Methodiy Fylymonovych, ignored the ruling on the plea that they had received this privilege from the Patriarch of Constantinople. Priests were addressed in the Ukraine as *pan-otets* (Sir Father), and as *batyushka* (Little Father) in Russia.³⁷

Art and Architecture. Ukrainian churches were built in a highly distinct architectural style. Wooden churches had one to three cupoles placed from east to west; some had two additional cupolas, one on the south and the other on the north side of the main three. Muscovite church architecture developed a very characteristic cubic style with one cupola in the center and one at each corner of the cube. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there developed in the Ukraine a distinct Ukrainian baroque under Western European influence. This was the period of Mazepa, with such magnificent churches in Kiev as those of St. Nicholas, Bratsk, All Saints, the Kiev Pechersk Monastery and the Mezhynirsk Monastery. In the seventeenth century the Ukrainian style exercised a strong influence on Moscow and the Russian provinces. The Church of the Virgin Mary in Putinka is a good example.

Ukrainian church painting showed deep traces of the Renaissance combined with old Ukrainian traditions. Frequently, religious themes provided an excuse for independent compositions on local or national themes. "The Holy Family was transformed into family groups, the wedding at Cana in Galilee into a banquet scene. In this way, Ukrainian artists, like the Italian,

³⁵ Lototsky, *Ukrainski dzherela* . . . , p. 37—38.

³⁶ E. Golubinsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part 2, p. 550; Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. II, p. 96.

³⁷ Lototsky, *Avtokefaliya*, Vol. II, p. 371; Mytropolyt Ilarion, "Istoriya slova pip (History of the Word Pip)," *Slova istyny*, Winnipeg, 1950, No. 10—11, p. 8.

German, French, and others, . . . clothing God and the saints in local dress, showed on the one hand their national awareness in demonstrating that their nation enjoyed divine recognition and, on the other hand, portrayed, as it were, the interest taken by the saints, Christ, and the Virgin Mary in the life of the people.”³⁸

Ukrainian icons had some unique themes: Christ as the Vintner or Gardener; the Virgin Mary with swords in her heart; the coronation of the Virgin Mary; Christ as a child with a scepter; the Virgin Mary as the Protectress of the Cossacks, etc. Under Renaissance influence, Ukrainian painters of icons often pictured faces and people in a not too stylized form. A picture of the crucifixion, dating from the seventeenth century, is typical of this realism. Against the background of a golden sky we see the lone cross with the crucified Christ, behind it a silhouette of a Ukrainian belfry, and in the foreground three figures: two apostles and a Zaporozhian Cossack, with hands folded in prayer.³⁹ Another excellent example of this folk content in religious art in the Ukraine is the picture “Entering the Temple” in the Spas Church in Sorochyntsi dating from the eighteenth century. The Virgin Mary is here represented as a small country girl. A foreign traveler, Paul of Aleppo, who traveled through the Ukraine at the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, wrote that “Cossack iconographers borrowed beauty of form, figure, and color from the Western masters, uniting it with the demands of the Orthodox icon.” During the baroque period this realistic trend was intensified.

The influence of Ukrainian painting on Muscovy cannot be denied, although it was strongly resisted. It is interesting that some Ukrainian painters, among them Vasyl Poznansky, were responsible for paintings in the Kremlin.⁴⁰

Sculpture was used abundantly in the interiors of Ukrainian churches, e. g., the gravestones and monuments of Prince Ostrozhsky in the Lavra dated 1534, and those of the Synyavsky family in Berezhany dated 1574. Carved ornaments in Ukrainian churches were very popular during the baroque period and in some instances the entire iconostas was adorned with wooden figures. The most beautiful were in Kiev, in the Cathedral of St. Nicholas, the Church of St. Sophia, and in the Lavra. The dominant motifs were the grapevine, borrowed from Northern Italy, and the sunflower characteristic of the Ukraine. Some compositions were more elaborate, e. g., the “trees of life” growing from the rib of Jesus and with branches holding separate icons, in the Church of St. Sophia. There were also statues of saints, most of which were destroyed in the nineteenth century, such as statues of the angels in the iconostas of the Cathedral of St. Nicholas.

In the so-called Rightbank Ukraine, the roadside crosses at crossroads were very popular. They too were destroyed in the nineteenth century on the charges that they were Uniate.

It is interesting that very frequently what was admired in Ukrainian church art by Russia in the seventeenth century was later proscribed. The

³⁸ D. Antonovych, *Ukrainska kultura* (Ukrainian Culture) and K. Shirotsky, *Bilousivska tserkva*, cited in Vlasovsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 287.

³⁹ *Entsyklopediya ukrainoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Ukraine), Munich, 1949, Vol. I, Plate XV.

⁴⁰ A. Uspensky, *Tsarskie ikonopistsy* (The Tsarist Iconographers), Moscow, 1912, Vol. I.

Russian Holy Synod banned the building of churches in the Ukrainian style and frowned upon Ukrainian iconography.

In church music, too, the Ukraine had quite a distinct history. Choir singing, based on harmonious polyphony, was known in the period of the principalities. Church songs were noted down by special signs in books like *Minea* or *Stikhariy*. Most of the songs which have been preserved date from the twelfth century.⁴¹ In the fourteenth century there developed the so-called Kiev school of church singing, which became dominant in the Ukraine, although several others were known, as in Chernihiv, Lutsk, Lviv, and Kharkiv.

The famous peasant choir at the Kiev Lavra consisted of four voices, two tenors, a bass, and a baritone. Church songs and choirs developed in close relationship with Ukrainian folk music. The church brotherhoods paid great attention to the training of choirs, as in Lutsk. Paul of Aleppo preferred Ukrainian church songs to Russian, and the Pole Hrebinius considered them superior to the Western European.⁴²

In the seventeenth century, Ukrainian church music found many admirers in Muscovy. Tsars Alexey and Fyodor highly valued this music and demanded its introduction to Russia. In 1658 the Archimandrite Mykhailo went to Russia with some Ukrainian church singers. Many Ukrainians were recruited for Russian church and palace choirs in the eighteenth century. Among them was Alexander Razumovsky, the future husband of the Empress Elizabeth. Yet it was very difficult to teach Ukrainian singing to the Muscovites who were requested by the Domostroy to sing "clearly, in one voice." Feofan Prokopovych complained during the reign of Peter I that the Muscovite singing was like "the bellowing of an ox." A. V. Preobrazhensky observed that "Muscovite art, which developed under the strong influence of a higher culture over the course of a long history, failed to develop its own independent tendencies." In the eighteenth century the three prominent "Russian" composers, M. Berezovsky, A. Vedel, and D. Bortnyansky, were of Ukrainian origin. Their works were based on Ukrainian church music. A purely symbolic reminder of Ukrainian influence on Russian church music was the uniform which Russian choristers wore throughout the period of the Empire up to 1917, which was patterned on a Ukrainian costume.⁴³

Contrary to the Muscovite Church tradition, the Ukrainian Church tolerated a great deal of folk influence. This was especially true in the case of the so-called school drama. Borrowed from the Jesuits in the seventeenth century, these plays became very popular in the Ukraine, where they were performed by churchmen, such as Dmytro Tuptalenko's *Comedy on the Birth of Christ*, the *Action on Christ's Passion*, and works by Georgy Konysky, Mytrofan Dovhalevsky, and others. These plays were dramatizations of

⁴¹ F. Steshko, *Dzherela do istorii pochatkovoi doby spivu na Ukraini* (Sources for the History of the Early Age of Singing in the Ukraine), Prague, 1929.

⁴² P. Matsenko, "Ukrainsky tserkovny spiv" (Ukrainian Church Singing), *Vira i kultura*, Winnipeg, 1953, No. 3, p. 14, No. 4, pp. 16—17; Z. Lysko, "History of Music," *Entsyklopediya ukrainoznavstva* (Encyclopaedia of Ukraine), Munich, 1949, Vol. I, p. 869.

⁴³ Z. Lysko, *ibid.*; N. Polonska-Vasylenko, "Naslidky Pereyaslavskoho Dohovoru v haluzi dukhovoi kultury" (The Results of the Pereyaslav Treaty in the Spiritual Field), *Visnyk*, New York, 1955, No. 2; A. Preobrazhensky, *Kultovaya muzyka v Rossii* (Cult Music in Russia), Leningrad, 1927, pp. 16—17; Matsenko, *Vira i kultura*, Winnipeg, 1953, No. 4, p. 17; N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Naslidky . . .*, p. 14.

biblical events or of the lives of saints. During the intermission there were so-called intermedia, which were short comedies played in Ukrainian. Among the audience for the plays performed in the Kiev Academy, were many outsiders.⁴⁴

In the villages the so-called *vertpey* (puppet theaters) performed a similar function. They consisted of an upper and a lower stage. Above, the puppets performed a religious drama, below, a folk play in succession. Symbolically, they represented the relationship of life on earth and in heaven. These theaters were operated by the resident theological academy students and were very popular throughout the country.⁴⁵

Religious poems were sometimes sung and many blind lyre-players had in their repertory religious songs. All these peculiarities of the religious life in the Ukraine slowly disappeared.

Role of the Sobor. From its earliest beginnings the Ukrainian Church was governed by a Sobor comprising the clergy, the prince, and representatives of the people. It was convened at least once a year. The metropolitan administered his affairs through a *kliros*, consisting of some older clergy and laymen. A lay member was in charge of tax-collecting. The *kliros* administered all matters of the diocese between meetings of the Sobor.⁴⁶

The Sobor continued to exist during the period of the Lithuanian state. Its members elected the metropolitans and bishops and other officials. The participation of the laity was essential. The Orthodox section of the Council of Brest in 1596 in explaining its opposition to Catholicism, noted the absence of laity in Catholic Church councils. In 1629 the Sobor declared that it was not in a position to discuss the question of the Union with Rome because of the insufficient participation of laymen. The election of clergy, bishops, and metropolitans was always conducted with the participation of the lay public. There are many instances when elections were ruled invalid because the "people were not sufficiently represented."⁴⁷

All this was gradually wiped out by the Russian Church. Elections by sobors continued until 1721, when the Holy Synod began to appoint rather than elect all the senior clergy in Russia. Parish priests were elected till the middle of the nineteenth century. The actual power of the Synod was in the hand of the Chief Procurator, a layman. In the eighteenth century some metropolitans appointed by the Synod were Ukrainians, but after that date all were Russians.

There is evidence that both the Ukrainian clergy and laity resisted the Russification of the Orthodox Church, but their protests were ineffective. A petition signed by the monks of Mezhyhirsk Monastery read in part: "The brothers used to elect from among themselves a worthy man to be their superior—and he would become their abbot. . . . Today, however, the superiors are sent to us by the archimandrite, who, when he comes to our monastery, acts according to his own whims, does not respect our constitution, and does not consult our brothers, but decides everything himself, according to his own

⁴⁴ V. Rezanov, *Istoriya Ukrainskoi dramy* (A History of the Ukrainian Drama), Kiev, I, 1927.

⁴⁵ Vlasovsky, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 280—291.

⁴⁶ Lototsky, *Avtokefaliya*, I, p. 178.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 41—42; Vlasovsky, *op. cit.*, I, p. 157.

fancies." Arsen Matsievych, Metropolitan of Rostov, a Ukrainian, objected to the fact that a layman had supreme power in the Synod and that all the members of the Synod were required to take an oath of allegiance to the Russian tsar. As a result he was incarcerated for life. In 1767 a Ukrainian petition to restore the ancient rights to the Church in the Ukraine remained unanswered.⁴⁸

The Ukrainian people were painfully aware of the loss of the independence and ancient traditions of their Church. The unknown author of the *History of Rus* at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries concealed his identity under the pseudonym of Metropolitan Yuri Konysky. In his work he mentioned the grievances of the Ukrainian Church, especially the case of the Kievan bishop Varlaam Vavatovych, who was exiled in 1730 ostensibly for refusing to say a litany for the Tsar, but in reality for giving permission to print Stefan Yavorsky's book attacking Feofan Prokopovych.⁴⁹

The case of Bishop Vanatovych created great concern in the Ukraine, where he was regarded as a martyr of the Ukrainian Church. Hryhory Pokas, a representative of the Ukrainian autonomists, wrote in his book *Description of Little Russia*, that Vanatovych had been arrested for advocating the separation of the Ukraine from Russia. *The History of Rus* devoted some space to Vanatovych and relates the details of his differences with the Synod, for which he was finally exiled. Dmitro Doroshenko has said correctly that "the Ukrainian people entered the nineteenth century not only deprived of their autonomous government and their schools, but also of their national Church. A dark night spread over their spiritual life."⁵⁰

The tsarist policy of refusing to appoint Ukrainians to higher ecclesiastical positions was very consistent and reached absurd proportions. The Emperor Nicholas I wished to resettle all Ukrainian priests in the Rightbank Ukraine and replace them by non-Ukrainians, and the project was abandoned only because of the exorbitant costs involved. The Church brotherhoods which had played such an important role, ceased to exist early in the nineteenth century and, although they were restored in 1864, never again regained their earlier importance.⁵¹

The Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine became a branch of the tsarist administration and lost all spiritual meaning for the people. How great was the gulf between conditions in the eighteenth century in comparison with earlier times, can be seen from the practice of the confessional. The Kievan Canon of 1620 strictly forbade the priest to ask the name of the penitent or to divulge his sins. Later, the church laws of Peter I required priests to report to government authorities all subversive acts against the tsar confessed by the faithful. Priests were also charged to report deserters and those without passports. When in 1855 rumors swept the Ukraine that the Cossacks were going to be reinstated, the peasants attacked the priests, whom they accused of

⁴⁸ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. II, pp. 89—90; Lototsky, *Avtoketaliya*, Vol. II, pp. 419, 413—14; *Ibid.*, pp. 430—431, 446.

⁴⁹ Lototsky, *Avtoketaliya*, Vol. II, p. 439.

⁵⁰ O. Ohloblyn, "Hryhory Pokas ta yoho Opisanie o Maloy Rossii" (Hryhory Pokas and His Description of Little Russia), *Naukovy Zbirnyk UVAN v SSHA*, New York, 1952, I, pp. 62, 70.

⁵¹ Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. I, p. 212; Vol. II, p. 101.

withholding this news, an indication of the width of the gulf separating the shepherds from their flocks.⁵²

The spiritual decay of the Orthodox Church in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to the creation of many sects. People looked for spiritual nourishment outside the Church. The famous Ukrainian philosopher Hryhoriy Skovoroda was typical of the individualist philosophy common in the Ukraine at that time. His influence reached as far as the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodius in the 1840's. In the 1750's the sects of the Dukhobors and Molokans began to spread in Ekaterinoslav Province. Especially, the Mennonite Stundists, so called from the *Stunde* or hour devoted to Bible reading, became prominent in many provinces in the Ukraine. In the 1870's there were 700,000, and on the eve of World War I almost 4,000,000 Stundists in the Ukraine. Stundists were persecuted and often deported for their practices. In 1869 the Russian Minister of the Interior advised the Synod to take a lenient attitude toward the Stundists, but this advice was not followed. Not until 1905 were the Stundists given the right to worship in their own fashion. Among mystical sects in the Ukraine, mention should be made of the *Malyovantsi* and *Shaloputy*.⁵³ A comparison of the histories of sectarianism in Russia and in the Ukraine is of great interest. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Russian Church was torn by internal strife and finally was divided into "old Believers" and "Nikonites," the Ukrainian Church remained undisturbed by heresies. These came to plague it only in the nineteenth century, at the time of its rapid decay. The period of national awakening in that century came to a nation without a strong national Church.

Linguistically, the Russian Church service was becoming more and more Russianized. Old Church Slavonic, still the official language of the Church, "in the course of time has turned in Russia into an artificial and deformed language, which is now used in church services and is called the Church Slavonic language. This 'corrupt language should not be confused with the Old Church Slavonic language." In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Holy Synod issued various prayers and special services in what was merely archaic Russian.⁵⁴

In the Ukraine attempts were made in the nineteenth century to furnish new translations of the Bible in contemporary literary Ukrainian. Such translations were begun almost at the same time in Kharkiv by Kvitka and in Galicia by Shashkevych. Of the greatest importance was the translation by Panteleimon Kulish of the four Gospels which was published in Vienna in 1881 and republished in 1886. A complete version of a Ukrainian translation

⁵² Lototsky, *Ukrainska dzherela . . .*, pp. 95—96; S. Shamray, "Z istorii kyivskoi kozachchyny 1855 r." (From the History of the Kiev Cossacks in 1855), *Zapysky Ist Fil. Viddilu VUAN*, Vol. XX, Kiev, 1928.

⁵³ V. Yasevich-Borodaevskaya, *Borba za veru* (Struggle for Faith), St. Petersburg, 1912, pp. 211—18; O. Novisky, *Dukhobortsy* (The Dukhobors), Kiev, 1882, pp. 50—62; I. M. Rozov, *Molokane*, Moscow, 1931, pp. 37—41; V. Yasevich-Borodaevskaya, *ibid.*, 24—25, 35—38, 40—108; Bonch-Bruevich, *Materialy k istorii russkogo sektantstva* (Materials on the History of Russian Sectarianism), Vol. III, 1910, pp. 9—57; M. Hrushevsky, *Z istorii relihiynoi dimky* (From the History of Religious Thought), Vienna, pp. 138—49.

⁵⁴ F. Fortunatov, *Leksii po fonetike staroslovyanskogo yazyka* (A Course in Phonetics of Old Church Slavonic), St. Petersburg, 1919, p. 2; Ohienko, *Ukrainska tserkva*, Vol. I, p. 121.

of the Bible, began by Kulish and finished by Pulyuy, was published in 1903 by the British and Foreign Bible Society in London. Importation or printing in the Ukraine were forbidden.

In 1860 P. Morachevsky submitted to the St. Petersburg Metropolitan Isidor his own translation of the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. John, but was informed by him that the Holy Synod would not agree to the publication of this or any other translation. In spite of the fact that Morachevsky's translation was highly recommended by the Russian Academy of Sciences, which praised it as a work of scholarship, the Synod repeatedly refused permission to print it. In 1904 the matter was taken up again by a Ministerial Committee under the chairmanship of Witte and with the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Grand Duke Constantine, and Metropolitan Antony present. The President of the Academy and the Metropolitan favored the publication "in the interests of human culture." The translation was printed but its circulation was restricted to private use. A translation of the "Acts of the Apostles" was banned.

The revolution of 1917 brought to a climax the desire for national freedom and restoration of old Ukrainian traditions and practices in all fields, including the Church. Immediately after the revolution, parish and diocesan councils were formed. In May 1917 a diocesan convention in Poltava heard a report on the need for restoration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with all its traditions and customs. This report was printed in book form. It was also adopted by the convention. A convention in Podillya called for the creation of an Autocephalic Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Some Church conventions were opposed to Ukrainization and to all reforms, for instance in the province of Chernihiv, where the clergy were Russified, Archbishop Antony alone having imported 200 Russian priests to that province.⁵⁵

At the end of 1917 a Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council was formed in Kiev, comprising clergy and laity. On its initiative an All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Sobor was convened. At first the supporters of autocephaly were in the minority. Only later, when the Ukrainian state became established, did the idea begin to gain ground rapidly. The Hetmanite government made preparations for the creation of an autocephalic Church and during a Church Congress in the fall of 1918 the Minister for Church Affairs, Lototsky, declared that a Ukrainian Autocephalic Church would be formed, since "in an independent state there must be an independent church," and "Autocephaly for the Ukraine is not only a Church necessity but a national necessity for us."⁵⁶

On January 1, 1919, the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic issued a proclamation on autocephaly for a Ukrainian Church and made attempts to gain recognition for the new Church by the Eastern Patriarchates.⁵⁷ These plans failed since in February of that year the Bolsheviks reoccupied the Ukraine.

⁵⁵ D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (A History of the Ukraine), Uzhhorod, 1932, Vol. I, p. 407; Lototsky, *Avtokefaliya*, Vol. II, p. 459.

⁵⁶ Doroshenko, *Istoriya . . .*, Vol. I, pp. 408, 410; Vol. II, pp. 333—34.

⁵⁷ Lototsky, *Ukrainski dzherela . . .*, Dodatok, *Istorychna zapyska pro UAPT's* (Supplement: A Historical Note on the Past of the UAPT's), Munich, 1954, p. 10; D. Doroshenko, *Pravoslavna tserkva*, p. 53—54.

At first the Soviet government in the Ukraine showed little animosity to the movement for a new Church, perhaps because it underestimated its strength. In each city one or more churches were turned over to Ukrainian congregations and services began to be held in Ukrainian. In 1919, the Ukrainian parishes elected an All-Ukrainian Church Council which became their supreme organ in ecclesiastical matters.

Church diplomacy was complicated by the departure of Metropolitan Antony (Khrapovitsky) abroad and his excommunication of all who conducted church services in Ukrainian.⁵⁸

A problem immediately facing the Ukrainian Church was the election and consecration of bishops. In 1921 attempts were made in Kiev to elect Bishop Parfeniy of Poltava as Metropolitan, but this failed since Patriarch Tikhon refused to confirm his election. Soon Metropolitan Mikhail (Yermakov) was sent to Kiev from Moscow, but he refused to ordain Ukrainian bishops. The crisis became more acute. Accordingly an All-Ukrainian Church Sobor convened in Kiev and attended by 472 delegates, decided on October 23, 1921, to elect a metropolitan. This it did on the basis of the words of the Scriptures "instead of me the Church has God for its shepherd (Romans, IX)." The new Metropolitan, Vasyl Lypkivsky, was consecrated in an impressive ceremony celebrated by thirty priests in the Cathedral of St. Sophia. On the next day Nestor Sharaevsky was consecrated a bishop and five other bishops and several priests were also ordained.⁵⁹ This was indeed an historic occasion, indicating the determination of the people to create an independent Church. The Sobor proclaimed the founding of a Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church and restored all the old traditions and services.

The new Church had a short life span. It came under heavy persecution from the Soviet government and in 1930 was officially dissolved.⁶⁰

In 1921 a Sobor of Orthodox Churches in Poland proclaimed the Orthodox Church in Poland autocephalic. This act was acknowledged by the Polish government and by the Patriarch of Constantinople. In his proclamation the Patriarch condemned the subjugation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by Moscow. For a short period during World War II, in 1941—42, the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church was temporarily revived in the Ukraine. Today it exists only in the emigration, in the countries of Western Europe and other parts of the free world.

⁵⁸ "Mytropolyt Vasyl Lypkivsky, Ukrainska Avtokefalna Tserkva i radyanska komunistychna vlada" (Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Ukrainian Autocephalic Church and the Soviet Regime), *Vilna Ukraina*, 1955, No. 4, pp. 49—50.

⁵⁹ A. Richynsky, *Problema ukrainskoi relihiynoi svidomosti* (The Problem of Ukrainian Religious Awareness), p. 11—13; I. Teodorovych, *Blahodatnist ierarkhii UAPT's* (Devotion of the Hierarchy of the UAPT's), Regensburg, 1947, pp. 99—113.

⁶⁰ Mtyr. V. Lypkivsky, *Khyby v zhyt'te UAPT's* (Errors in the Life of the UAPT's), *Vidomosti gen. tserk. upravlinnya UAPT's na Britaniya*, 1951, No. 9, pp. 9—10; No. 12, pp. 12—13; M. Yardas, *Materialy do Pateryka UAPT's* (Materials on the Pateryk of the UAPT's), Munich, 1951, pp. 15, 21; *Vilna Ukraina*, 1955, No. 6, pp. 30—35.

Volodymyr Symyrenko

Ivan Rozhin

The Symyrenko family is closely connected with the modern social and economic history of the Ukraine. Volodymyr Symyrenko can be regarded as one who brought to fruition the plans and ideas of his forefathers. He became the founder of Ukrainian pomology, and his fame as one of the greatest modern scientists in fruit-growing, was world wide. In his work, he achieved a synthesis of all branches of Ukrainian pomology, and conceived of a great plan of expansion of fruit-growing in the Ukraine as an integral and vital part of the country's economy. Symyrenko worked out a detailed plan for every geographic region, taking into account the economic factors of consumption, transportation, canning, storage and export. When he was arrested in 1933, Symyrenko was at the pinnacle of his achievement. He was the director of the Mliev horticultural research station, professor at several universities, editor of *Pomolohichna knyha* (Annals of Pomology) and *Sadivnytstvo, vynohradarnytstvo ta horodnytstvo* (Horticulture, Viticulture and Gardening), and consultant to the Michurin Research Institute in Kozlov. Symyrenko must be credited with the establishment of special training schools in horticulture, the introduction of new, productive types of fruit trees into the various regions of the country, the creation of a new branch of scientific study in the Ukraine, pomology, and the authorship of such outstanding works as *Plodovi asortymenty Ukrainy* (Fruit Assortments in the Ukraine), *Plodovi rozsadnyky* (Fruit nurseries) and *Pomolohiya* (Pomology).

The Symyrenkos were of old peasant stock. They possessed, therefore, all the qualities of determination and industriousness characteristic of the Ukrainian peasantry. Their desire for self-improvement is well illustrated by the fact that one of the earliest Symyrenkos of whom we have a record, Fedir, was rich and farsighted enough to send two of his sons, Platon and Vasyl to France to study the technology of sugar-refining in Paris. Fedir Symyrenko was born a serf, yet through his own talent and with the help of his brother-in-law, Yakhnenko, he bought his freedom and became a successful manager of mills on the river Ros in the Kiev Province. Together with Yakhnenko he bought land from Count Vorontsov in Horodyshche and built a small sugar factory. These were the beginnings of the sugar industry in the Ukraine, with sugar being manufactured not by a process of extraction but by pressing. Soon the Symyrenko brothers became prosperous. Following the Polish uprising in 1863, the landowners who loaned money to the Symyrenkos demanded its repayment and Count Vorontsov built his own sugar factory and refused to lease his hands for beet growing. As a result, the Symyrenko enterprise went bankrupt and only a small property was left to the once-wealthy sugar tycoons. What was left of the business, was inherited by Fedir's son, Platon.

Platon Symyrenko, who in his youth studied in Paris, continued the family tradition and soon his efforts were crowned with success. He had four sons (Lev, Platon, Mykola, Oleksiy) and one daughter (Maria). Having rented some land from the landowner Balashov, Symyrenko built a modern sugar refinery and on his own farm he started an orchard which was destined to gain historic significance. In combining his interests in sugar production and in horticulture, Platon Symyrenko was following not only a family tradition but also a somewhat neglected but ancient Ukrainian industry—that of fruit-growing. To his work Symyrenko brought exceptional talent as well as enthusiasm. Far from being an amateur, he put Ukrainian horticulture on a scientific basis. Many of the new fruit trees which he introduced and made popular in the Ukraine proved ideally suited to the country's climate. Apart from the orchard on his farm, Symyrenko owned two large orchards in a forest, where his son Lev started an experimental school of fruit growing. These orchards became the center of Ukrainian pomology, and in the course of time fruit trees from this orchard, bearing the name of Mliev, became well-known not only in the Ukraine but in other neighboring countries, such as the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the Volga region. Thousands of horticulturalists trained at Mliev carried their knowledge to all corners of the Ukraine. It was also there that the world-famous *Symyrenko renet* (russet, a winter apple with a rough brownish skin) was developed. The recognition of the Mliev achievement is well attested by many prizes and honorable mentions awarded at national and international exhibitions.

Platon Symyrenko was a Ukrainian patriot and actively assisted the national movement. He supported the cultural organization *Stara Kyivska Ukrainska Hromada* (The Old Kiev Ukrainian Hromada) financially, and provided funds for the publication of an edition of Shevchenko's *Kobzar*. He died in 1863, and because his children were still under age, the management of Mliev was taken over by Platon's brother, Vasyl, who had also received his higher education in France. Vasyl Symyrenko did not have to start from the beginning like his brother. He improved the already thriving sugar refinery by some technical inventions of his own. Well versed in contemporary scientific literature on the subject, Symyrenko read everything that was published in foreign languages. It is related that his mail was usually hauled by cart, not carried by a postman.

Having come to the conclusion that his enterprise would develop better on a new property, Symyrenko bought an old ruined sugar plant in Sydirivka, in Kiev Province, also securing the rights of Platon's children who had now come of age. From Sydirivka, Symyrenko sent regularly, for the next forty years, financial contributions to the aid of many Ukrainian publications such as *Ukrainska staryna* (Ukrainian Antiquity) and *Ukrainische Rundschau*. Ten percent of his annual income he donated to Ukrainian cultural activities, and in 1912 he gave 100,000 gold rubles toward the building of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lvov. Being childless, Vasyl Symyrenko took advice from Volodymyr Antonovych and drew up terms for the settlement of his estate, according to which, after the death of his wife, all his property was to be turned into a trust fund entitled "Committee for the Assistance of Ukrainian Literature, Science and Art." The Committee administering the fund consisted of V. Antonovych, M. Lysenko, V. Naumenko, M. Komar, L. Smolensky, I. Shrah, and V. Leontovych, P. Stebnytsky and Ye. Chykalenko, who were co-opted later.

Symyrenko intended to organize a Ukrainian school in Sydirivka which was to be modeled on the one in Mliev. However, as it was impossible to obtain government permission to conduct lessons in Ukrainian, the whole project had to be abandoned. Symyrenko was particularly concerned about the education of orphans for whom he had established a school in Kiev and a special library containing a large collection of Ukrainian books published in the Ukraine, Galicia and even in North America. He was also a generous patron of the Ukrainian theater and often entertained not only the directors and actors of the Sadovsky Theater, but the entire company.

Apart from many inventions in sugar refining, Symyrenko introduced the production of the so-called "pastille," a confectionary product which consisted of sugar, apples and white of eggs. It was a favorite with the general consumer and was often prescribed by doctors for its medicinal value.

Symyrenko's wife, Sofiya Ivanovna, came from a French aristocratic family of Albrand. She learned Ukrainian and was a devoted companion of her husband in all his work. Vasyl Symyrenko died in December 1915. His name, like that of his family, who were pioneers in the field of horticulture and sugar refining in the Ukraine, is not even mentioned in the Soviet publication *U istokov sveklosakharnogo proizvodstva* (The Beginnings of the Sugar Industry) by A. Korchinsky (in *Priroda*, publ. by the Academy of Sciences, No. 10, 1950), the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, or the *Agricultural Encyclopedia*.

Vasyl Symyrenko concentrated his efforts on the sugar industry in Sydirivka and Lev Symyrenko devoted most of his time to horticulture in Mliev, after his return from exile for having actively participated in the *People's Will* movement. Lev Symyrenko, as a trained scientist, attempted to improve the condition of the Mliev orchards and, after the death of Vasyl Symyrenko, he assumed control over Sydirivka. He continued supporting Ukrainian cultural enterprises and intended, following his uncle's example, to donate one tenth of his income to the cultural needs of his countrymen. He was also a pedagogue and a teacher in the horticultural school at Mliev. Among his works the following deserve to be mentioned: *Generalny katalog plodovykh derev* (A General Catalogue of Fruit Trees, 1902). *Krymske plodivnytstvo* (Fruit growing in the Crimea, 1912) and *Sortoznavstvo* (Science of Fruit Varieties, unpublished). His general achievement in the field of horticulture was recognized by the award of a medal at the international exhibition in 1894.¹

Lev Symyrenko welcomed the Revolution of 1917, since he was himself active in radical circles and was in exile from 1879 to 1887. However, the Revolution brought him no relief. In 1919 he was found murdered in his own house under mysterious circumstances. After his death the work at Mliev was continued by his son, Volodymyr. Conditions generally changed for the worse—the property was devastated by the war and was later nationalized.

Volodymyr Symyrenko was born in 1891. In 1918 he graduated from the agricultural faculty of the Kiev Polytechnic Institute. His interest lay exclusively in horticulture—he was not at all interested in sugar-refining, or, for that matter, in politics. This allowed him to concentrate all his talents on the development of pomology. From some personal papers of the Symy-

¹ M. Shcherbyna, *Sadivnytstvo plodove ta yahidne* (Fruit and Berry Growing), 3rd ed., Kiev, 1926, p. 38.

renko family which are now in the United States, it has been possible to reconstruct in general the activity of this great scientist.

It is known that in 1928 there were 40,000 different hybrid specimens in his nurseries at Mliev. This achievement was due to Symyrenko's ability to enrol the cooperation of hundreds of trained horticulturists for a single purpose. He also collaborated closely with the Ukrainian cooperative movement which was actively supporting research in fruit-growing.

Volodymyr Symyrenko began his academic career as a lecturer in the Odessa school of horticulture. From 1920 he was a professor at the Agricultural Institutes in Kiev, Uman and Poltava. Throughout this time he was an active researcher and from 1920 to 1926 he headed the horticultural section of the Ukrainian Scientific Agricultural Committee in Kiev which was in fact the highest scientific institution of this kind in the country. From 1921 until the day of his arrest, Symyrenko was the director of the Scientific Institute of Research in Fruit and Berries in Kytaiv, in the vicinity of Kiev, which he helped to establish.

The scientific career of Volodymyr Symyrenko was immeasurably aided by the heritage of his family. The experience and accumulated knowledge of several generations was literally bequeathed to him. He was also conscious of his inheritance and what he regarded as his duty to continue the work of his family.

In 1921 Symyrenko established in Mliev a horticultural research station. In spite of very unfavorable circumstances and no encouragement from the Soviet government, the Mliev station developed rapidly. Its area in 1921 was 10 hectares, and in 1924 it grew to 640 hectares. The famous orchards at Mliev, brought to ruin and decay by Civil War and Revolution, were restored to their former glory. During the period of the NEP, Symyrenko received needed government support for further development. In 1930, with the Mliev horticultural station as a basis, Symyrenko organized the All-Ukrainian Fruit-Growing Research Institute which formed a branch of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and, after its dissolution in 1933, became a part of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in Moscow.

Symyrenko's inspired leadership and indefatigable energy helped to make the Mliev station the foremost in the USSR. The best testimony to the respect in which Symyrenko was held by the Russians may be seen in the following excerpt from a letter written on May 1, 1930, by Professor Shpiler, the director of the Michurin Research Institute in Kozlov: "Without the slightest pretension, one must grant, Volodymyr Lvovych, that your book *Plodovi rozsadnyky* (Fruit Nurseries) is a treasury of science and literature. The accomplished erudition, the richness of practical experience and scientific material show the consummate skill of the author, a master of organization and technique. The concise, but at the same time, beautiful style and the simple language are the vehicles of science, experience and practical advice. The central idea of the book is devotion to horticulture as a significant factor in the transformation of agriculture. Spontaneously the book comes to life and one's sympathy is engaged on the author's side in the cause to which he is dedicated. All this testifies to the high quality of the work and the merit of the author" (from the private archives).

This opinion of Symyrenko, expressed by a Michurinite, is of special importance in view of the later official charges against the Ukrainian scientist who was accused of "sabotaging" Michurinite assortments in the

Ukraine. Michurin himself held Symyrenko in high esteem and regarded himself as a pupil of the "Symyrenko school." On one occasion he had this to say about Symyrenko: "Volodymyr Lvovych does not agree with me in everything, but I too can be wrong. Everyone should have his own opinion and initiative. Volodymyr Lvovych deserves recognition because he is the only specialist deeply acquainted with Ukrainian horticulture" (from the Symyrenko papers).

Symyrenko was a frequent visitor at Kozlov (later renamed Michurinsk) and was always welcomed. In a letter inviting him to deliver a series of lectures at the Michurin Institute at Kozlov we read the following: "It was most pleasant to hear of your intention of visiting Michurinsk again. We should like to invite you to give a series of lectures to our graduate students. We are leaving the choice of subject and time to you. Our students are already dancing with joy at the thought of your assent."

The above documents, taken from the private archives of the Symyrenko family now in the United States, clarify sufficiently the relationship between Symyrenko and Michurin. Many scientists regard the former as a greater pomologist. It must also be borne in mind that Michurin's successes were achieved only after the Communist Party gave him all the support he needed for his projects. Many of Michurin's new fruit-trees proved unsuitable for the Ukrainian climate and this fact was acknowledged by Michurin himself.

Symyrenko was not merely a successful selectionist like Michurin or Burbank, but he regarded pomology as an integral part of the country's economy. In his works he stressed, above all, the nutritive value of fruit. He wrote that "the produce of an orchard must be regarded not as a luxury but as a constant ingredient of the daily diet."

In 1928 the orchards of the Ukraine, which comprised more than half of the total orchard area of European Russia (210,500 hectares in the Ukraine; 406,775 hectares in Russia), had failed to satisfy these needs. Three-quarters of Ukrainian orchards were small in size (average size 0.25 hectare). As a rule, an orchard formed only 0.12 of a hectare on an individual farm. Horticultural technique was primitive and most orchards were in a semi-wild condition. The orchard soil was rarely properly cultivated and no methods were available to combat diseases and pests. Windfalls amounted to 50—60 percent of the total crop. Too many different types of fruit trees (almost 700) were being cultivated, some of them quite unsuitable to the climatic conditions. Only ten percent of them had a high productive value. The fertility of Ukrainian orchards was very low, averaging 2,500 kilograms from one hectare, while double that amount would be regarded as normal. The marketed share of all fruit amounted to 25—30 percent of the total (665,000 tons in absolute figures); 465,360 tons were consumed locally, the rest (169,640 tons) was exported.

Having made this survey of Ukrainian fruit growing, Symyrenko suggested a drastic reorganization. Old orchards were to be modernized and new modern orchards were to be planted. He planned to increase the orchard area in the Ukraine to one million hectares plus 100,000 hectares of berry growing areas by 1937. These plans were never realized. After Symyrenko's arrest in 1933 all measures to implement his plans were stopped. Just before World War II, there were only 500,000 hectares of orchards and 48,000 hectares of berry-growing lands in the Ukraine.²

Symyrenko's plan was not a mere blueprint. Its author worked out the minutest details and conducted preparations in every field to secure success.

Symyrenko established hundreds of nurseries which were to supply the peasants with new fruit trees, and new experimental stations which developed fruit trees most suitable for various regions. He divided the country into eight regions which had different economic needs as far as fruit consumption was concerned. Not only villages, but also municipalities, were to have orchards with facilities for the storage, preserving and canning of fruits. A steady supply of trained personnel was secured by means of various specialist schools.

Symyrenko's plan was approved by the government and in the first years of its operation it showed remarkable progress. In 1928 the orchard area was increased to 230,879 hectares, in 1931 it was 307,700 hectares, in 1932—380,950 hectares and 30,000 hectares of berry-growing lands, and in 1933, 500,000 hectares of orchards and 38,000 hectares of berry-growing lands.² It seemed that the dream of this last representative of the Symyrenko family to turn the Ukraine into a country of blossoming orchards might come true. Then came the sudden blow. On January 8, 1933, Symyrenko was arrested in his institute in Kytaiv. He was at first sentenced to death, but later the sentence was commuted to 10 years of hard labor. He spent eleven months in Kiev prison and was transferred, in April 1934, to the NKVD corrective labor camp in Kherson, where he worked together with 30,000 other prisoners. In 1937 his sentence was reduced to 5 years and taking into account the period already served, it was decided to release him but without permission to reside in the Ukraine. Symyrenko moved to the province of Kursk and found work in a nursery. He was then rearrested and sent to Kursk. After October 3, 1938, his family had no news of him, but it was reported that he was either shot or given another long sentence. However tragic the end of this great Ukrainian scientist and patriot may have been, his work was not done in vain. Symyrenko's fruit trees and his contribution to Ukrainian pomology will probably survive those who destroyed him.

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