

# THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW

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A quarterly journal devoted to the study of Ukraine

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Autumn, 1994  
Vol. XLI, No. 3

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**Price: £5.00 or \$10.00 a single copy**  
**Annual Subscription: £20.00 or \$40.00**

### **Published by**

The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd.  
Organization for the Defense of Four Freedoms  
for Ukraine, Inc. (USA)  
Ucrainica Research Institute (Canada)

ISSN 0041-6029

### **Editorial inquiries:**

The Executive Editor, "The Ukrainian Review"  
200 Liverpool Road, London, N1 1LF

### **Subscriptions:**

"The Ukrainian Review" (Administration),  
49 Linden Gardens, London, W2 4HG

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*Printed in Great Britain by the Ukrainian Publishers Limited*  
200 Liverpool Road, London, N1 1LF  
Tel.: 0171 607 6266/7 • Fax: 0171 607 6737

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**Current Affairs****UKRAINE'S MEDIA: A COG IN THE STATE WHEEL?**

*Oksana Hasiuk*

Ukraine's press has become a kind of a hybrid of Soviet style journalism and a new way of thinking.

Older journalists, accustomed to working for essentially one boss – the Communist Party – have been slow to claim their new freedom to search for interesting facts and make a critical analysis of them. By contrast, young Turks in the reporting and publishing world have welcomed the openness now permitted their profession, but often find themselves constricted by less enthusiastic editors and owners and by financial realities. But what has really complicated matters is that both groups still walk a tightrope between media freedom and government retribution.

It is no secret – nor was it in the past – that Soviet journalism almost solely functioned as a funnel for agitation and propaganda, rather than a means of access to objective information. As the Soviet Union's mechanisms of control rapidly unravelled in 1991, it is not surprising that many talented young people – not yet entrenched in state bureaucracy – grabbed the opportunity to begin anew. Several small underground newspapers surfaced almost immediately, although many went under just as quickly. Larger newspapers have since come on to the press market and continue to challenge weaker competitors to survive.

While young people have managed to infuse the press with a fresh spirit and style, many state-owned publications have been less than conducive to such creative impulses. In fact, it has been difficult for writers of the Soviet generation to adapt to new political and economic realities, and they freely admit so. "I have been working as a journalist for thirty years", asserts Valeriy Zholdak, editor-in-chief of the weekly *Ukrainska Hazeta* (Ukrainian Newspaper). "I am not going to change my style of writing according to new trends in journalism", he says.

As a result, a kind of generation gap has polarised the contemporary Ukrainian press corps. Some journalists have opted to stay in state-funded publications – the only ones with enough consistent funding – and give up on journalistic ideals. The other prevalent alternative is starting one's own publication and facing the probable failure from lack of adequate funds.

Notwithstanding the vagaries of the market, about 71 relatively new publications have been registered in Ukraine between 1988 and 1993, according to the Ukrainian National Press Club. Small regional newspapers are not included in the total, and most of the local papers remain under the control of local government bodies, as they did in the past. A few, in a nominal bow to press freedom, have changed their names, though their content remains similar to that of the past.

The biggest obstacle to keeping newspapers and journals independent from the state is their own heavy reliance on state subsidies. "It is very difficult to find commercial structures which would want to invest their money into a serious analytical press", laments Oleksandr Kryvenko, editor-in-chief of Lviv's *Post-Postup* weekly.

*Post-Postup*, established in 1991, is one of the few publications that has managed to publish news in a manner more closely resembling Western newspaper styles and to maintain a steady readership. It is also one of the very few publications that can boast of correspondents abroad. *Post-Postup* is doing so well, in fact, that it has been able to organise a new high-tech project, *Fax-Postup* weekly (now available on electronic mail), an English-language edition that serves the foreign community in Ukraine with political and economic information.

Not all new and popular Ukrainian newspapers have been as fortunate as *Post-Postup*. The weekly *Respublika* (Republic), established in May 1992, shut down its presses in November 1993 – but for reasons that seem more dubious than simple lack of funds. *Respublika*'s journalists are still awaiting the reopening of their publication.

Government annoyance over the contents of *Respublika* appears to be the core of the problem, although Iryna Pohorielova, *Respublika*'s editor-in-chief, admits there is no clear proof for the allegation. *Respublika*, she explains, belongs to the newspaper and magazine concern RIA-press, and in addition to this weekly RIA-press also owns two newspapers, publishes books, and transports various types of goods within Ukraine. "As a participant in major commercial activity", Pohorielova says, "this concern could have been cooperating with the government". "I can call such shadow cooperation corruption, but I don't have any concrete evidence besides my guesses", she admits.

Interestingly enough, *Respublika* twice faced closure before it finally ceased publication – the first time, when former Prime Minister Vitaliy Fokin's Cabinet of Ministers was replaced in September 1992, and a second time, when former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma's Cabinet was dismissed in October 1993. In November 1993, just before the election campaigns for the Ukrainian parliament got underway, the RIA-press concern simply refused to hand over money and facilities to *Respublika*. Thrown out into the cold, the weekly's journalists played an active role in the work of independent press centres such as Elections-94 and the publication *Vybir-94* (Choice-94).

Even now, one can only postulate that *Respublika* was a victim of politics. The leadership of RIA may have been concerned about *Respublika*'s criticism of

contemporary politicians – a step it took frequently. “At the time, under the auspices of RIA-press, we did not have rights as a juridical entity”, recalls Pohorielova. “Now the press’ leadership allows us to have such rights. So now we can organise our own newspaper – but we don’t have the money”, she says.

Pohorielova says prospects for the future of *Respublika* are grim, even though the newspaper still has not officially disbanded and reporters have been allowed to retain and use their press cards. Pohorielova does not fear persecution from the new governmental and presidential structures but, she says, there is a hidden agenda of the new president in his preferential treatment of certain media. In fact, at an August 9 press briefing, Kuchma spokesman Mykhailo Doroshenko told journalists that the Presidential administration would choose people and publications to spend time with the President. Pohorielova interprets this policy as an international screening of information and audience on the part of Kuchma. “In other words, there will be people, who will have first-hand information and there will be journalists, who will get second-hand facts”, says Pohorielova.

Doroshenko, who prior to his nomination to the post of presidential spokesman was editor-in-chief of the *Ukraina Moloda* (Young Ukraine) newspaper, may smooth things over yet. Problematic access to information has slightly improved recently with the administration’s institution of a weekly press-briefing for Ukrainian and foreign media.

But some Ukrainian journalists have begun to dismiss such official channels as mostly a selective forum for the creation of positive images – an attitude not yet common in Ukraine, even though it is standard practice in the West. As *Post-Postup*’s Kryvenko points out, “We don’t really need information from the President’s office”, citing good reporters as more credible means of finding out the truth.

Still most Ukrainian journalists are not taking a rebel stance and continue to feed on whatever information they obtain. Viktor Kovalenko, Ukrinform’s (official Ukrainian news agency) correspondent openly admits that he works for his agency because of the better opportunity to get good information – and more of it. When, for example, Kuchma met with famous philanthropist George Soros, only official mass media were invited – the parliament newspaper *Holos Ukrainy* (Voice of Ukraine), the government newspaper *Uriadovyi Kurier* (Government Courier), and the Ukrinform news agency. Other mass media got their information about this event from these newspapers, Kovalenko points out.

While this official media claims little objectivity in presenting the facts, it is at least in no danger of becoming the target of the government’s anger or of having to suffer financial trauma. In truth, most of the “democratic” newspapers in Ukraine are facing hard reality. “We have seen better times”, sighs Volodymyr Bodenchuk, editor-in-chief of the *Molod Ukrainy* (Youth of Ukraine) newspaper. Founded in 1919, *Molod Ukrainy* was owned by the Central Committee of the Lenin’s Communist League of Youth of Ukraine

(Ukrainian Komsomol) until 1991. Now a journalists' collective publishes the newspaper. Daily circulation has fallen from 800,000 issues in Soviet times to 67,509 issues at present.

Although *Molod Ukrainy* supported Kravchuk during the presidential campaign and sharply criticised Kuchma for his pro-Russian views, Bodenchuk is not worried about retribution. "We are not afraid of persecution from Kuchma's side, because there is a difference between a presidential candidacy and the presidency", he says. "*Molod Ukrainy* is ready to cooperate with new power structures", he adds. He points to the necessity of government subsidies as the real reason. "It is impossible for our newspaper to get large amounts of money from advertisement because entrepreneurs are not willing to put their money into it. Moreover, the reason we do not get advertisements is that *Molod Ukrainy* is popular generally in small Ukrainian towns and also among the people who are not interested in business".

With government interference playing a major role in the financial problems of publishing, it is something of a miracle that any newspapers have survived at all. Only a very small number of Ukrainian publications like *Post-Postup* can continue to provide themselves with necessary facilities. Other newspaper/publishing houses like *Vsieukrainskiye Vedomosti* (All-Ukrainian News), established in Kyiv in April 1994 and publisher of a Russian-language newspaper, have turned to another Western way in which newspapers keep high readership – by disseminating tabloid news for the masses. The Vedomosti Publishing House now issues the *Vedomosti* daily newspaper which tops the list in providing gossip and spreading rumours about politicians, actors, and other rich and/or famous personalities, as well as sensationalist stories that often turn out to be false.

Vedomosti-style reporting may be a way to circumvent political and financial problems – and while such journalism can be credited with bringing Ukraine further along the road to press freedom – the essential problem of media independence in Ukraine remains. For most independent Ukrainian papers, the crises continue.

Despite offers of accessibility, Ukrainian officials do not appear to have much respect for the press. Cases of media control are said to be a thing of the past, but it is truer to say that the tradition of keeping the screws tight is alive and well. The problem for journalists trying to do battle with the old Soviet ways is that there is no possibility of recourse to the law and indeed often no response at all to complaints – except for more posturing by the accused politicians.

The press itself is partly to blame for its lack of independence, due to the dominant presence of the journalistic old guard, which either does not care for real reporting or is being careful – and rightly so – not to lose valuable state funding of their work. Even if many Ukrainian journalists generally do not understand the important role an independent press can play in society, the fear of retribution for controversial articles acts as a considerable disincentive to would-be rebels. Examples abound: the *Molod Ukrainy* newspa-



per last year sharply criticised the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for inactivity – only to find its journalists later locked out of a meeting between then-President Leonid Kravchuk and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. But the reaction of the newspaper's editor-in-chief was perhaps more telling. "It is normal", he said, "when officials like one publication and do not like another one". No protest ensued from the newspaper's correspondents either – which may be another reason officials so easily dismiss media complaints.

An especially telling example of problems the media faces when it does try to exercise its right of freedom can be found in Crimea. Leonid Pilunskiy, a journalist of the radio station *Ostrov Krym* (Crimea Island) has often accused Crimea's presidential administration and parliament of intentionally putting pressure on reporters and press organisations whose points of view do not coincide with the official views of Crimean authorities.

Crimean officials, most of whom are working for the incorporation of the peninsula into Russia, appear to agree that suppression of dissent is in fact a good policy. "If the *Rossiya* bloc has 90 per cent of the seats in Crimea's parliament, there will be only one point of view on the peninsula – the views of this bloc", asserts Mykhailo Bakhariiev, who heads the Publicity and Press Committee in the Parliament of Crimea.

As a result of such prejudice, all pro-Ukrainian correspondents are now subject to severe censorship. Journalists from *Holos Ukrainy* (Voice of Ukraine), *Molod Ukrainy*, the Internews agency, the Crimean Tatars' newspaper *Advyet* (Response) and correspondents of the independent Russian newspaper *Izvestiya* were banned from the July 20 press conference of republic President Yuriy Meshkov, reports *Ostrov Radio's* Pilunskiy. "Only pro-Russian publications like *Krimskaya Pravda* (Crimean Truth), *Krimskie Izvestiya* (Crimean News), *Mistchanskiye Izvestiya* (Burghers' News) and the official Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform received any information from Meshkov's press secretary Vyacheslav Lebediev about that press briefing", affirms *Molod Ukrainy* correspondent Volodymyr Prytula. The inclusion of Ukrinform was apparently not surprising since, according to Pilunskiy, Lev Riabchikov, Ukrinform's Crimean correspondent, "often defends Meshkov's illegal positions and actions and personally supports uniting Republic Crimea with Russia".

Whether or not some personal journalistic competition was involved – and leaving aside the question of whether Ukraine is spending state money on Ukrinform to air views it does not hold – a more interesting occurrence made the event newsworthy. Reports that Meshkov's chief bodyguard, Ihor Voychik, threatened reporters with a pistol to prevent them from attending the briefing further dramatised the incident, which subsequently received even more media attention. Olha Dmitriyeva, a reporter for the Ukrainian newspaper *Nezavisimost* (Independence) in her coverage of the event, pointed out that the exclusion of the press constituted a serious breach of Ukraine's Law on Information of May 1992 and Law on the Press adopted in October 1992. Both laws guarantee journalist access to information deemed public by state officials.

The incidents surrounding Meshkov's press briefing could themselves have been written off as media hype if it were not for the fact that such violations of press freedom have become increasingly common and that nothing is being done to resolve such disputes. Already fifteen Crimean journalists have appealed to the Crimean Procurator General with a request to investigate the Meshkov affair and punish all officials who violated Ukrainian laws. Crimean journalists are still waiting for an official response. "But we do not have great hopes for a positive solution of this problem", says Pilunskiy. "President Meshkov controls all branches of power on the peninsula. We can only count on our own forces to defend journalists' rights", he adds.

A first step in this direction appeared to be the creation of the Free Union of Journalists of Crimea. Lillia Budzhurova, a deputy in the Crimean Parliament and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Advyet*, was elected to head the union. Members of the union have called for support from the French journalists' organisation Reporteurs sans frontières. The Polish Union of Journalists has promised its Crimean colleagues to help them join the International Journalists' Union.

But factionalism between journalist groups and general disunity on censorship appears to be creating as much havoc as the frequent violations by politicians. Pilunskiy accuses the Free Union of Journalists of being another collaborator. "This organisation has not been created for the defence of journalists' rights, but to impose censorship on the mass media", he affirms. Hryhoriy Taran, who heads the Legal Department of the Union of Journalists of Ukraine, reports that the union has not in fact issued any statements in connection with violations in Crimea. "Our Legal Department has only received appeals from the editors-in-chief of local newspapers asking for our help in defending their rights", Taran reports.

If one can be certain of only one thing, it is that local newspapers are frequently subjected to political games. Local councils and worker collectives together are the usual publishers of such newspapers. This overlap gives regional authorities especially easy opportunities to use the local press for their own purposes. Many instances have occurred when heads of local councils have announced the early retirement of the local editor-in-chief, who just happened to have criticised the actions of local bodies of power inopportunely. Such blatant interference by a co-publisher – even when it takes place at the local micro level – contradicts national legislation: according to Article 23 of Ukraine's press law, one co-publisher of a newspaper, like a regional council head, does not have the right to retire an editor-in-chief without the agreement of another co-publisher – the workers' collective. This clause seems to be universally ignored: only one case charging violations of this article has been brought to court in Ukraine.

If Ukrainian journalists have as little faith in Ukraine's system of justice as they do in their own freedoms, it should not be surprising. Schools of journalism teach nothing about legislation or the legal system. But Anatoliy

Moskalenko, Director of the Institute of Journalism of Kyiv University, says all the trials and problems of Ukraine's press is merely a part of living through a period of transition. "To experience these times and to create a real informational space is a very important thing for Ukraine", he says. The Ukrainian media still has to work to release itself from the cage of official propaganda.

The process will perhaps be complete when the media ceases to feel like a "little cog in the state mechanism", as the founder of the Soviet Union Vladimir Lenin once termed literature and journalism. Until then, Ukrainian reporters will have to do battle with officialdom to force the latter to accept them as the Fourth Estate. ■

## **SOME SIGNIFICANT MEDIA INCIDENTS OF THE PAST YEAR**

### *December, 1993*

- Captain Andriy Lazebnikov, head of the Black Sea Fleet Press Centre, was shot dead at the entrance to his own building. The press centre appealed to all journalists of Crimea to express their protest by suspending publication of journals and transmission of live TV on the day of the funeral.
- The President justified a ban on live coverage of parliamentary sessions, on the grounds that such coverage “could be used for advertising populist ideas”.
- The council of editors-in-chief of newspapers and magazines said that the Kravchuk government is ignoring the “constitutional right of the people to printed information” by doing nothing about soaring costs of paper and printing.

### *February-April, 1994*

- The newspaper *Holos Ukrainy* reported that radio and TV editors in Crimea who held a “position of common sense” were being harassed by pro-Russian groups who demanded their dismissal. Shortly afterwards, Crimean “president” Yuriy Meshkov, dismissed the President of the Crimean State TV and Radio Company, Valeriy Astakov (who advocated policies of ethnic tolerance). His dismissal was contrary to the rules laid down by the Crimean Council of Ministers for the management of the station, and also to the law on the delineation of powers between the Kyiv authorities and Crimea. Ukrainian President Kravchuk eventually issued a decree reinstating Astakov.

### *June, 1994*

- Two Russian journalists, Anna Konyukova and her husband Viktor Sosnovskiy, working in Crimea for NTV (Russian independent TV) reported four months of harassment by Russian activists, demanding that they leave Crimea and cease “defaming” Russia. They said that the persecution started in November 1993, after they made a feature about the murder of the leader of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars, Yuriy Osmanov. They said that appeals to the law-enforcement authorities in

Crimea had been fruitless. In mid-June, Konyukova was beaten up by two unidentified person who threatened that "blood will be spilt" if she and her husband continued their activities.

### *July, 1994*

- Oleksander Moroz, the speaker of parliament stated that the media must create an "appropriate image" of parliament, and that it might be necessary to restrict the accreditation of journalists who write "untruthfully, subjectively and in a one-sided manner" about Parliament's activities.
- Crimean "president" Yuriy Meshkov barred representatives of several leading media organs (*Holos Ukrainy*, *Izvestiya*, BBC and Radio Liberty) from a press conference. His press secretary said that "only those who do not criticise the president" would be admitted.

### *September, 1994*

- Ukraine's new president, Leonid Kuchma issued a Directive "On steps to bring order to prices for some periodicals". This abolished VAT on subscriptions to newspapers and magazines owned by the Ukrainian parliament, government and other central and local official bodies, also those owned by trade unions, writers and journalists unions and public organisations, provided that they were registered on or before 1 August 1994. The import duty on newsprint and printing plates was lifted.
- During a confrontation between Crimean "president" Yuriy Meshkov and the Crimean parliament, the Crimean Radio/TV Centre was seized by members of the law-enforcement bodies who had sided with Meshkov. Members of the Crimean parliament three times tried to gain access to the centre. Two eventually got in, switched off the Russian radio channels and spoke on the first channel of the local broadcasting system, appealing to the public to defy Meshkov, who, they said, had been acting unconstitutionally against parliament. Meshkov sent his own personal guard (the possession of which had been ruled unconstitutional by the Crimean parliament), but eventually this was dispersed, either by the intervention of MPs, or else, according to Viktor Minin, Crimean Minister of State, driven away by Cossacks. Parliament then used the Centre to issue its own two-hourly broadcasts, setting out its own views. ■

**History****THE MYSTERY OF THE GRAVE OF IVAN MAZEPA**

*Volodymyr Rychka*

Mazepa is perhaps the greatest figure in Ukrainian history. The fate of this exceptional personality was difficult and tragic. In the course of his long life,<sup>1</sup> he was to know the heady delights of Europe-wide fame, the joys of victory and the mortal pangs of defeat, and the collapse of all his grand designs.

For twenty-two years (1687-1709) Mazepa stood at the head of the Ukrainian state of the era of the Hetmanate. A sober politician and gifted diplomat, Hetman Mazepa was forced up to a time to come to terms with the centralist policy of the Tsar of Muscovy. But, from that point on, he was convinced of the ruinous consequences of this for the fate of Ukraine. Thus life itself faced the Hetman with an inescapable choice: to live out his life peacefully in his tranquil palace in Baturyn among his beloved books and the pleasure of worldly life, or to try to snatch Ukraine away from "Muscovite slavery" and to establish its independence. Ivan Mazepa chose the latter course. It was a conscious choice, and, to use the words of the author of the *Istoriya Rusiv*: "alien to all passions and purposes, harmful to the soul". Turning to his supporters on the eve of his break with Moscow in 1708, Mazepa said that he was seeking nothing for himself, "except the happiness of that people which honoured me with the rank of Hetman and entrusted me with its fate".<sup>2</sup>

The barbaric destruction of Baturyn by the Russian army and the military disaster at Poltava wiped out Mazepa's plans, but did not compromise the idea of Ukrainian statehood. It was this idea which Tsar Peter I feared most. In the torture chamber he set up in Lebedyn, Peter personally carried out the interroga-

<sup>1</sup> Mazepa's date of birth has still not been unequivocally settled by historians. It is usually given as before 1639 or 1644. In our opinion, the most weight should be given to the view of those scholars who take Mazepa's date of birth as 1639. See, Oleksander Ohloblyn, "Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta yoho doba" (Hetman Ivan Mazepa and his times), *Zapysky NTSb*, New York, Paris, Toronto, 1960, vol. 170, p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> *Vyvid prav Ukrayiny (Dokumenty i materialy do istoriyi ukrayynskoyi politychnoyi dumky)* (Study of Ukrainian laws [Documents and materials on the history of Ukrainian political thought]), New York, 1964, p. 82.

tion and torture of Ukrainians suspected of sympathy to the idea of Ukrainian autonomy. Terming him "criminal" and "traitor", the ideologues of the autocratic regime strove in every way possible to put Mazepa to shame in the eyes of the world. They presented him as an ambitious egoist and careerist, who pursued allegedly only his own interests. On the orders of the Tsar, the Russian Orthodox Church had already excommunicated Mazepa during his lifetime. But this was not enough for the Tsar. Peter hastily took steps to carry through his pursuit of the rebellious Hetman. When he learned that it had been impossible to intercept Mazepa and his companions in the steppes of the Black Sea littoral, the Tsar burst out in an explosion of enraged fury. In a despatch to the Russian envoy in Constantinople, P.A. Tolstoy, the Russian government required him to demand that the Sublime Porte should send instructions to the Crimean Khan and the Hospodars of Wallachia and Muntenia (Eastern Wallachia), "that their lands should neither admit nor receive [him], but that they should give orders for the turncoat Mazepa to be apprehended and kept under guard".<sup>3</sup> To the same end Peter sent epistles to the Sultan of Turkey, the Khan of Crimea and the Pasha of Ochakiv. Meanwhile, pursued by Russian troops, Mazepa and Charles XII with the remnants of their army had managed to avoid capture and to cross the Buh river, setting up their camp near Ochakiv. The Turkish government, ignoring the constant pressure from Russia to hand Mazepa over to the Tsar, granted him asylum in its dominions. There were plans to send Mazepa to Crimea, where the custom was strictly observed not to hand over those who sought the protection of the Khan.

But the vital forces were draining away from the Hetman who had suffered such blows of fate. His last days were passed in Bendery, where Charles XII had established his camp. Feeling that his life was drawing to a close, Mazepa, according to the testimony of his contemporaries, conducted himself heroically, jokingly comparing his fate with that of the poet Ovid, who also died far from his native land. Mazepa died during the night of 21-22 September 1709. As Dmytro Bantysh-Kamenskyi asserted in his time, the Hetman was buried near the village of Varniti not far from Bendery, and later his body was moved to Iasi, and there interred with full solemnities.<sup>4</sup> As eyewitnesses portrayed it, "... the coffin, draped in red velvet with wide gold braid was drawn on a catafalque by six white horses. On both sides of it marched Cossacks, with drawn sabres. In front of the coffin, the Hetman's standard-bearer carried his mace, which was all glistening with pearls and precious stones. Behind the coffin walked many Ukrainian women who had followed their husbands and kinsmen who had remained with the Hetman: according to national tradition, they were all wailing and lamenting... The Cossacks walked with dipped banners and weapons reversed; the coffin of the Ukrainian Hetman was lowered into a grave made

<sup>3</sup> *Pisma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo* (Letters and papers of the Emperor Peter the Great), Moscow-Leningrad, 1964, vol. IX, part 1, pp. 977-88.

<sup>4</sup> D.N. Bantysh-Kamenskyi, *Istoriya Maloy Rossii* (History of Little Russia), Kiev, 1903, 4th ed., p. 410.

ready in a church outside the town, and the Cossacks, as a sign of honour, at that moment fired a volley with their muskets".<sup>5</sup> The death and burial of Hetman Ivan Mazepa near Bendery, and also the plans of the Cossacks to reinter the Hetman in Iasi is attested by "The humble majesty of the Zaporozhian host to his Royal Majesty of Sweden", drawn up in autumn 1709. In the fifth, concluding, point of this very interesting document, it is observed, *inter alia*, "We are grieving over the inglorious interment of His Serene Highness, Hetman Mazepa, and the fact that his dear mortal remains, the heroic soul within which filled the whole world with his glorious deeds, was received by the mean earth of this simple village. Hence the Zaporozhian host are turning to his Royal Majesty, requesting that they might inter the remains of their Hetman, with due ceremony, in a more distinguished town, specifically in Iasi, in the monastery known as the Monastery of Holii".<sup>6</sup> Popular tradition to the present day connects the grave of Hetman Mazepa with a high barrow beside the Dnister river near Bendery. Archaeologists, however, are sceptical about this.

Of unusual interest, however, is a communication from Mykola Usatyi, a resident of the town of Tarashcha in the Kyiv oblast, published in the newspaper, *Kyivska Pravda*, on 14 September 1993, in which he states that just after World War II, he saw with his own eyes a gravestone cross with the name Mazepa. The present author has kept in his files Usatyi's reminiscences about this chance discovery. It happened in 1946 in the vicinity of Bendery. It was a "stone cross on which was engraved the name of Ivan Mazepa. The cross was around half a metre high, maybe a little more". One can only regret that Usatyi did not give this discovery the significance it deserved. Unfortunately, we have not succeeded in locating it today either in topographical material or the holdings of any museums.

Earlier historians, following Bantysh-Kamenskyi, give the place of Mazepa's burial as the town of Iasi. This version of the reburial of the Ukrainian Hetman in the capital of Moldova was taken as an article of faith by such authoritative scholars as M.A. Markevych and M.I. Kostomarov. Certainly, later, after the publication in *Kievskaya starina* in 1883 of the protocol of the interrogation of one of Mazepa's followers, the Poltava "acting colonel" Hryhorii Hertsyk, Kostomarov, in subsequent editions of his famous work on Mazepa, on the basis of Hertsyk's testimony, gave the place of Mazepa's burial as Galati, on the Danube. Hertsyk was arrested by the Tsar's secret police in Warsaw, in 1721, and under interrogation stated, that, "living in the company of Voynerovskiy, I was sent by him with two of his household and with one Wallachian to the Wallachian land, to the little town of Galicia [i.e. Galati] to the Metropolitan of that place with the body of Mazepa which was interred there by the Metropolitan".<sup>7</sup> The fact of the reburial of the mortal remains of the Ukrainian Hetman is attested, albeit similarly, by F. Lagust, who in the middle of the nineteenth century made a visual survey of a locality in the region of Bendery and observed

<sup>5</sup> Quoted from, Vasyl Riznychenko, *Smert Mazepy* (The death of Mazepa), Kyiv, 1919, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Mykhailo Voznyak, "Benderska komisiya po smerti Mazepy" (The Bendery Commission on the Death of Mazepa), in *Mazepa*, Warsaw, 1938, vol. 1, p. 116.

<sup>7</sup> *Kievskaya starina* (Kyiv antiquity), vol. V, March 1883, p. 600.



traces of the grave of Ivan Mazepa, "to the right of the road" which connects Bendery with Varnita.<sup>8</sup> This scholar also considered the burial place of the great Hetman to have been Galati. However, the actual location of the grave and the fate of Mazepa's ashes was undetermined in the historiography of that time.

The question attracted V.B. Antonovych, a professor of the St Volodymyr University in Kyiv, to a scholarly investigation. While making a painstaking study of all the available sources, he came upon a work published in Iasi in 1845: a French translation of a collection of the documentary evidence of the Moldovan chroniclers of the first quarter of the eighteenth century (M. Cogălniceanu, *Fragments tirés des chroniques moldaves et valaques pour servir à l'histoire de Pierre le Grand, Charles XII, Stanislas Leszczyński, Demètre Cantemir et Constantin Brancovan*, Iasi, 1845). In the chronicle notes of Nicolae Costin (Logothete of Moldova, 1662-1711) included in this edition, it is stated that Mazepa was buried in 1710 in the Galati church of St George in the monastery of that name. The chronicler also tells us that Mazepa did not find peace even after his death; a few years after the transfer of the Hetman's coffin to Galati, the Turks captured the town and dug up Mazepa's grave. When they found in it nothing of any significant value, they reportedly emptied the remains of the Hetman of Ukraine on the bank of the Danube.<sup>9</sup> It is worth noting that the Turks' desecration of Mazepa's grave is also reported in other sources.<sup>10</sup> But these give no information about what happened to the Hetman's mortal remains.

The writer Cogălniceanu, who published Costin's Chronicles, became interested in the fate of the Hetman's remains and visited Galati, where he discovered some additional information about Mazepa. He established, in particular, that Mazepa was first buried in the sanctuary of the church, in a brick vault, the surface of which was covered by a marble plate with an engraved inscription and Mazepa's coat-of-arms, and the figure of a one-headed eagle. So Mazepa's grave was preserved after the Turks devastated Galati in 1711. It was Pylyp Orlyk who undertook its renovation and preservation. According to Ilko Borshchak and René Martel, having learnt of the terrible desecration of the tomb of their leader, the followers of Mazepa, "began in haste to search for the

<sup>8</sup> F. Lagust, "Karl XII v Yuzhnoy Rossii" (Charles XII in Southern Russia), *Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostey* (Proceedings of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities), 1853, vol. 3, pp. 333-4.

<sup>9</sup> M. Cogălniceanu, *Fragments tirés des Chroniques...*, pp. 91-2.

<sup>10</sup> *Cronica Ghiculestilor* (Editie îngrijită de Nestor Camariano si Ariadna Camariano-Cioran, Bucuresti, 1965, pp. 46-7.

In 1932 M. Voznyak found and published the travel notes of F. Hostysyetskyi, who, during his journey to Turkey in 1712-14, visited Galati and is a witness to the destruction of Mazepa's grave by the Turks. See M. Voznyak, "Benderska komisiya po smerti Mazepy" (The Bendery Commission on the Death of Mazepa), pp. 106-9; Ks. Franc. Gosciecki, *Posolstwo wielkie jasniewielmoznego Stanisława Chomentowskiego, wojewody mazowieckiego, od najjasniejszego Augusta II, krola polskiego do Achmeta IV, soltana turcekiego, ... proz lata 1712, 1713, 1714* (The Great Embassy of his excellency Stanislaw Chomentowski, Wojewoda of Mazowia, from His Majesty Augustus II, King of Poland... to Achmet IV, Sultan of Turkey, in the years 1712-14), Lwov, 1732, pp. 247-50.

body of Mazepa, and when they found it, they placed it once again in the former grave; only they did not repair the broken flooring leaving it in the state it was as a memorial of the crime.<sup>11</sup> Later, in June 1722, Orlyk, who was on his way abroad, once more visited Mazepa's grave and had a memorial service held for him. In his will, drawn up in 1716 (a copy is preserved in the Swedish Royal Archives), Andriy Voynarovskiy bequeathed a thousand thalers to the "monastery of Galati in Wallachia, where rests the body of His Excellency, Hetman Mazepa of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, my late maternal uncle".<sup>12</sup>

Furthermore, Cogălniceanu asserts that by 1835, the Greek monks no longer knew the name of the person buried under the marble plate where rest the mortal remains of Ivan Mazepa (by that time the inscription on it had been worn away by people's feet). In that year, when they were preparing a place for the burial of the nobleman Dumitru Derekcha-Pasha, the monks came across the vaulting of Mazepa's tomb. Pushing aside these unknown (to them) remains, they buried the body of the aforesaid nobleman in the same tomb.

A few years later, Cogălniceanu says, the Moldovan government forbade burials within church buildings. The relatives of Dumitru Derekcha-Pasha then opened the tomb, and transferred his remains together with those of Mazepa to a new tomb outside the church, to the right of the entrance. The old slab from Mazepa's tomb ended up in the Museum of Antiquities, collected by Mihai Ghica, brother of the former Hospodar of Moldova Alexandru Ghica (1834-42). Giving all due credit to the painstaking research of Cogălniceanu, V.B. Antonovych wrote in the July edition of *Kievskaya starina* for 1885: "We do not know what fate has befallen the museum of Mihai Ghica and the slab preserved in it over the past 40 years – we do not know either if in the church registers of the monastery of St George there is an authentic entry for the burial of Mazepa. But thanks to the ever-precise evidence collected by Mr Cogălniceanu, we may assert that any traveller interested in Ukrainian antiquities may very easily collect in Iasi and Galati, information which does not reach us".<sup>13</sup>

Alas, however, the optimistic expectations of this famous Ukrainian historian were dissipated in the course of time. In the years that followed, the question of looking for Mazepa's grave not only did not advance, but was even held back, becoming overgrown with the contradictory testimony of "eyewitnesses" and various inventions. It was recounted, for example, that during Peter I's expedition to the Prut river, he struck the slab of Mazepa's tomb with his own hand and shattered it to bits. In periodicals published before the October Revolution one often encounters reports that Mazepa's grave was dug up and desecrated by Russian soldiers in 1877 during the Russo-Turkish War. As an example, we may quote an extract from

<sup>11</sup> I. Borshchak, R. Martel, *Ivan Mazepa: Zhyttia i poruyv velykoho hetmana* (Ivan Mazepa: Life and passions of the great Hetman), Kyiv, 1991, p. 102.

<sup>12</sup> Alfred Jensen, *Mazepa*, Kyiv, 1992, p. 115.

<sup>13</sup> Volodymyr Antonovych, "Moldavskie svedeniya o meste pogrebeniya i mogile Mazepy" (Moldovan observations on the burial place and grave of Mazepa), *Kievskaya starina*, July 1885, vol. XII, p. 505.

the book of Mykola Lazorskyi *Svitla i tini* (Lights and Shadows) which Antin Lyaskovskiy kindly sent to the present author from Canada: "Already on the way back home [from the Russo-Turkish War – author], the Russian general, Skobelev, recalled that the great Hetman I.S. Mazepa was buried here. He ordered resourceful sergeant-majors to seek out this grave, a sacred grave of our nation. The grave was quickly found. The coffin was dragged out from the church of St George and blasphemously broken open, the bones and grave clothes were burned..." A similar story was repeated in 1946, when the Soviet Army was in Galati. This story is told by the Kyiv journalist and bard Mykola Lytvyn, on the pages of the weekly *Nash Chas* of 23 April 1993. He wrote it down from the words of an uncle, now deceased, before whose eyes special detachment troops allegedly, "used pickaxes to force an entrance into the vault, which stood on its own to the right of the entrance to the church, having opened the lid, emptied the skeleton, poured petrol over it and set it alight. When the fire had gone out, they brought up a truck with the sides let down, and used shovels to scoop up the still-smouldering ashes and loaded them on to the truck. A major of the special detachments shouted in a raucous voice: 'So be it with all traitors to our great motherland'. He gave a signal and jolting over the potholes, the truck drove away into the open steppe".

We also have the reminiscences of Stepan Matviyenko, recorded by Oleksandr Semenenko. Here the story goes that Mazepa's grave was found in the vicinity of the village of Volontyry and dug up by a police officer from Bendery, a Bulgarian named Kirilov. The remains had apparently been hidden in the attic of Kirilov's house until 1925, when the Romanian Security police took them to the General Siguranza in Bucharest.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, the historian V. Trepke, who visited Galati in 1930 on behalf of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, saw with his own eyes Mazepa's grave on the territory of the St George monastery.<sup>15</sup> At that time, the name of Mazepa was mentioned in the memorial lists of a religious service at which Trepke was present.

Branding Mazepa a "traitor" to the Ukrainian nation, Soviet historiography passed over the question of his grave in silence and did not consider it worthwhile checking out the various versions of the fate of his remains. Quite recently, the All-Ukrainian Society of Political Prisoners and Victims of Repression in conjunction with the Institute of Archaeology and the Institute of the History of Ukraine of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences came forward with a proposal to search out and identify the mortal remains of Hetman Ivan Mazepa and bring them back to Ukraine. We may note in passing that back in 1917 the government of the Ukrainian National Republic also had the intention of organising the ceremonial reburial of Ivan Mazepa in Ukraine.

The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine passed a special resolution, establishing a scientific expedition to search for and identify Mazepa's ashes.

<sup>14</sup> Oleksandr Semenenko, *Kharkiv, Kharkiv...*, Kharkiv-New York, 1992, p. 155.

<sup>15</sup> Vasyl Lutsiv, "Zhyttia i smert hetmana Mazepy na chuzhyni" (The life and death of Hetman Mazepa abroad). In: *Mazepa – lyudyna y istorychnyi diyach* (Mazepa – the man and the historical figure), Kyiv, 1991, p. 32.

The expedition was composed of the archaeologist Hlib Ivakin, the anthropologist Serhiy Sehedra and the present author. After studying the diverse versions regarding the location and fate of Mazepa's ashes, the expedition members last year went to Romania to carry out the necessary search. The materials we collected gave us grounds for confirming what the historical documents state: the fact that the Hetman was buried in the monastery of St George in the Romanian town of Galati. This monastery was destroyed at the end of the 1950s or beginning of the 1960s. The place where it stood is now a small knoll overgrown with grass, standing alone on the bank of the Danube. It guards the secret of Mazepa's grave, for it is difficult to believe that his remains had been dishonoured even before the destruction of the monastery. Certainly it would have been impossible to desecrate the same grave so many times!

One must remember that local popular tales associate Mazepa's name with the church of Our Lady of Protection which still stands in Galati, not far from the place where the church of St George once stood. Until quite recently one of the neighbouring housing blocks and one of its streets bore the name of Mazepa. A traveller walking along this street would willingly turn aside to the church of Our Lady of Protection, taking the opportunity to see the grave of Mazepa. Thus, in one case, reported in 1891 by the newspaper *Yuzhanin* (no. 263), some pilgrims happened to see Mazepa's tomb-slab against the church wall, in the crypt of the church complex. It was stated here that the inscription on the slab was in Greek. According to another source, traces of this slab were sought in the courtyard of the church, in front of the entrance. On 30 April 1978, the Ukrainian weekly, *Shlyakh Peremohy*, published in Munich, carried the reminiscences of Dr M. Halyn, about his visit to Galati in 1929. He writes: "I found the church, for, like Mazepa Street which runs beside it, it is known not only to every cabdriver, but also to every inhabitant of Galati. Looking round the inside of the church I could find no sign of a tomb anywhere, and so I went up to an old woman who was selling candles and asked her where Mazepa's grave was. 'Not here', she replied, 'come with me'. In the courtyard of the church, a few paces in front of the main door, the old woman stopped, facing the door in front of the porch and its threshold: 'Mazepa's grave was here, just here where I am standing, and where these weeds are growing. Long long ago there used to be a marble slab with something written on it, not in Romanian. But thirty years ago, a Russian steamboat came to Galati, and the sailors from that boat came, under the command of their officer and their chaplain, and dug up everything that was under that slab and took it with them to Russia'".

A different picture of Mazepa's grave is given in the memoirs of a famous Ukrainian man of the theatre, Mykola Sadovskiy (1856-1933). During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, when he was doing his military service in the Russian army, he happened to be in Galati. Here, he recalled later, "wandering around the town out of boredom, I went into the cathedral of Galati. While I was having a good look at its architecture and ornamentation, I came upon somebody's tomb which I had not even noticed when I came in. The tomb was

all on its own, like an orphan, on the right as one came into the church. I went up to it. I had a good look at it. A white, fairly small, tomb about the size of a chest on wheels, with a copper plate on top and around it an inscription in copper letters in the Latin alphabet: 'Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa, Hetman of the glorious Lower Zaporozhian Host and of all Ukraine...'. It was like a blow in the face! I stood stock-still. If there had been a thunderclap in a clear blue sky and a bolt of lightning had fallen at my feet, it would not have startled me as much as what I now beheld. I could not believe my eyes. I read it again. Yes, it was true. It was he! Where could I find the colours to paint, or the words to describe the feeling which came over my entire being! My God! How many weighty thoughts at once began swarming in my head".<sup>16</sup> One cannot doubt the sincerity of Sadovskiy's words and feelings. At the same time, how is one to explain what he saw? The description which he gives here does not agree with the information of the available sources on the outward appearance of the tomb and the fate of Mazepa's remains. Perhaps the far-sighted Hetman, foreseeing the hostile intentions of his enemies, before his death had two coffins prepared, and ordered his followers to hide the real one carefully. Mazepa could have stage-managed his "death" and "burial" in Bendery, and then gone in secret to Galati, and lived out his life there. At the very least we do have one document, albeit an unreliable one, known in a French copy (the original is in the archives of the Sublime Porte, in Turkey), which says that Hetman Mazepa, "settled in Galati, in the castle built by the Genoese, was already of a late age, regretted his past mistakes and lived freely as if resting".<sup>17</sup> In this regard the date of Mazepa's death is very significant; it is given by the Moldovan chronicler Nicolae Costin as 18 March 1710(!). From this the Hetman would have had time enough to make reliable arrangements for his real burial, thus cleverly arranging for his eternal rest to be undisturbed.

Further searches in the archives of different countries in Europe, the possibilities of which are only now opening up to Ukrainian historians, may permit the mystery of Mazepa's grave to be unravelled. We place our hope, too, in future archaeological excavations which, together with an anthropological commission, should finally resolve the question of the burial place of Ivan Mazepa and the identification of his remains. ■

<sup>16</sup> Rostyslav Pylypchuk, "Mykola Sadovskiy nad mohyloyu Ivana Mazepy" (Mykola Sadovskiy at the Grave of Ivan Mazepa). In: *Ivan Mazepa: Khudozh. dok. kn.* (Ivan Mazepa – artistic-documentary book), collected and with a foreword by V.O. Shevchuk, Kyiv, 1992, p. 97.

<sup>17</sup> I. Zastyrets, "Mazepyntsi v Turechchyni. Z paperiv Sadyk-pashi (Chaykovskoho)" (Mazepa's followers in Turkey. From the papers of Sadyk-Pasha [Chaykovskiy]), *Ukrayina*, 1914, book 2, p. 71.

## WHO HAS A RIGHT TO CRIMEA?

### (Part 1)

*Volodymyr Butkevych*

#### *Might or right ?*

Ukraine had just declared itself an independent state on August 24, 1991 when Gavriil Popov, the Mayor of Moscow, stated, on August 27, on the Central Television Network: "If Ukraine continues to pursue the course of making this act a reality, without doubt the question will be raised regarding the borders separating Russia and Ukraine, and Russia will definitely come to the aid of its people in Ukraine". How can this be explained? An explanation was soon forthcoming from Russian president Boris Yeltsin's press secretary, P. Poshanov. He maintained that Ukraine should still remain within the structure of a single federation and that, "in the case of a cessation of the present Union-based relations, the RSFSR will reserve the right to raise the question of a review of common borders [between Russia and Ukraine]".<sup>1</sup>

As Russian Secretary of State Gennadiy Burbulis later stated, "Russia cannot become a republic 'like the others...'. Russia can and must become the sole heir of the USSR and all of its structures".<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, in order to clarify any confusion on the part of Ukraine, the explanation was offered that, "[p]resent-day Russia is not simply one of fifteen disenfranchised republics in an empire, but the fully legitimate leader of the former empire".<sup>3</sup> Should the point still remain unclear in the minds of Ukrainians, it was now reinforced. "Anti-Russian attitudes will not be met with silence on the part of the Russian leadership. We must take the example of the US. Must [Ukraine] be reminded of the American reaction when its citizens were maltreated in Grenada?"<sup>4</sup> This general tone was also quite evident in the attitude of Russian Information Minister Mikhail Poltoranin, when he exclaimed "no discussion!" All of the above indicates that the prevailing thought in Russia is that the Russian Federation is the sole and rightful heir of the USSR.

Whether the dialogue involves the issue of creating a Ukrainian army or that of refusing to sign any all-encompassing agreement on a political union, Ukrainians are constantly being presented with the threat of an alteration of

<sup>1</sup> *Izvestiya*, August 29, 1991.

<sup>2</sup> *Megapolis-Express*, October 17, 1991.

<sup>3</sup> *New Times*, no. 36, 1991.

<sup>4</sup> *Rossiya*, no. 38, 1991.

their national borders or the transfer of Crimea to Russia. These threats are echoed in Crimea by the Crimean Parliament's Presidium, which is sympathetic to Moscow's centrist attitude. The Presidium issued a statement which was published in *Izvestiya* on October 17, 1991:

Respecting the right of the people of Ukraine to self-determination, we concurrently hold that an equal level of respect must be accorded to the will of the people of Crimea, to their right to create their own statehood on the basis of a referendum, should this be called for by a change in the political situation.

If the above statement is indeed genuine, one must inevitably conclude that the Chairman of the Crimean Parliament, Nikolai Bagrov, is calling for a necessary review of the legislation regarding the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

One should recall that any such intentions are a violation of international law, and would involve international repercussions. Should any doubt be cast upon this, one need only turn to the UN Charter or the CSCE's Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975. Chapter III of the latter act specifically states:

Member-states consider as inviolable all borders of all states in Europe and thus will refrain in the present and the future from any and all encroachments on these borders.

They will also refrain from any actions or demands that are directed towards the seizure or usurpation of parts or of whole territories of any other member-state.

Chapter IV of the Final Act, "Territorial Integrity of States", reinforces the above with an explanation of additional prohibited actions or statements that may be directed towards the alteration of borders or territorial integrity. It should be noted that these chapters deal with the state borders of Europe, the USA and Canada, and not administrative-territorial demarcations that are the internal matters of individual states.

While claiming to be the sole heir of the USSR, Russia must also take into account the international obligations of the past. Among others, the USSR was a signatory of the Bucharest Declaration of 1966 on the inviolability of state borders and territorial integrity, the Paris Charter of 1972, the Treaty on Principles of Cooperation between the USSR and France of 1971, a 1971 treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, and various joint communiqués with the US, Italy, Austria, Denmark, and other countries. One should also note the treaty signed by the RSFSR and Ukraine on August 18, 1990, which holds both signatories responsible for maintaining the inviolability of their common borders. All these documents categorise any action aimed at violating borders, propagating the idea of such action, or supporting the proponents of such action as a violation of international law. Furthermore, any media used to propagate such ideas are subject to responsibility under the UNESCO Declaration "On the Basic Principles Regarding the Contribution of Mass Media to the Strengthening of Peace and International Understanding, the Development of Human Rights and the Fight Against Racism, Apartheid and the Promotion of War", of November 28, 1978, and the December 16, 1952 Convention on International Law.

Secondly, with all its frequent assertions of its right to Crimea, it would greatly strengthen Russia's case to produce at least one international or even national document where this right is legally justified. If it cannot produce such evidence, then international law relegates the matter to historical right. "Historical right" refers to the justifiable acquisition of previously unclaimed territory – *terra nullius*.

### *What is Russia's historical right regarding Crimea?*

The logical starting point for this discussion would be the eighteenth century, when Russia first expressed a formal desire to annex the Crimean peninsula. Until this time, formal relations with Crimea were conducted by Ukraine. Sharing a common fate with Crimea (Ukraine being a vassal state of Russia, and Crimea of the Turkish Sultanate), Ukraine, as early as the seventeenth century under the Cossack state, had begun to develop friendly relations with the Crimean Khanate. In the majority of their dealings with Russia, the Cossacks strove, at the same time, to maintain a peaceful alliance with Crimea. This was a basic principle of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's<sup>5</sup> policy in dealing with Russia. It was also the mainstay of the policy of his successors, including Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi, who, in a treaty with Poland in 1658, had specifically stipulated (Article 17) that Ukraine's right "to maintain a friendly relationship with the Crimean Khan" is guaranteed by the treaty. Hetman Ivan Samoylovych attempted to persuade Russia to include in the Bakhchisaray Peace Treaty between Russia and Turkey in 1681 a clause on the necessity of maintaining good relations between Ukraine and the Crimean Khanate. However this attempt failed because Moscow was vehemently opposed to any strong ties developing between Ukraine and Crimea.

To put it bluntly, it was simply not in Russia's interests for such relations to exist. In order to sow the seeds of discord between the Zaporozhians<sup>6</sup> and the Turks, the Russians forced the latter to include certain concessions to the Cossacks in the Bakhchisaray Peace Treaty. Among these was an agreement permitting Cossack use of the southern fishing waters under Turkish jurisdiction. Unfortunately for Russia, this did not spark the intended discord. Both the Zaporozhians and the Turks understood that they were pawns in the hands of the "imperial" powers in Moscow and Constantinople. As a statement from Moscow issued to Hetman Ivan Mazepa illustrates:

<sup>5</sup> Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was Hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and later of all of Ukraine from 1648-54. He had succeeded in driving the Poles completely from Ukrainian lands, only to be forced into a treaty with Russia in 1654, which Russia used as a pretext for its own occupation of Ukraine.

<sup>6</sup> The Zaporozhian Cossacks were the basis for Ukrainian socio-political, economic and religious organisation from the sixteenth to the late nineteenth centuries. The Cossacks formed as escapees from Polish serfdom, choosing a martial and religious lifestyle based at their island fortress, the Zaporozhian Sich, on the Dnipro (Dnieper) River. Their military campaigns were famous all over Europe, and their social order was highly democratic and religious.



The Zaporozhians will never have peace with Crimea... and this warning cannot be emphasised enough. Traders from Little Russian cities had better cease travelling to Crimea with their goods and selling horses there as well.

Mazepa was forced to relay this order to the Zaporozhians, which was met with the following riposte: "When the Khan returns from the Hungarian war, the Zaporozhians will conclude a peace treaty with him at that time and then start marching on 'Great' Russian cities".

Faced with such opposition from the Zaporozhians, Tsar Peter I attacked the Sich on May 14, 1709. In response, the Zaporozhians left Moscow's protectorate and proceeded to seek an alliance with Crimea, which was finally concluded by the Peace of Prut (1711). Henceforth, until 1733, for almost a quarter of a century, the Zaporozhians and the Crimean Khanate shared a common state structure. For their part, the Ukrainian Hetmans<sup>7</sup> (Pylyp Orlyk, Ivan Skoropadskyi, Pavlo Polubotok, Petro Doroshenko) were constantly striving, during their successive leaderships, to gain autonomy for Ukraine, to unite with the Sich for this purpose, and to establish good relations with the Crimean Khanate. However, this only resulted in Russian annexation of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1739.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, Russia went on to develop a plan for the annexation of Crimea. However, St Petersburg had set itself an extremely difficult and complex aim. The annexation of Crimea became possible primarily due to the final victory over Turkey, and this war could not have been won without the support of the Zaporozhian Sich. At that time, the Otaman<sup>8</sup> of the Zaporozhians categorically refused to fight against the Crimean Khanate. Moreover, he continued to pressure Moscow for the reinstatement of Ukraine's borders, in accordance with the treaty with Russia signed by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. It was not until the Otaman was assured that the war would be waged exclusively against Turkey and that the borders of Ukraine would be respected that an agreement was reached. A significant role here was played by an anonymous report forwarded to St Petersburg by a Zaporozhian officer, P. Savytskyi, in 1767, in which he denounced a plan by Otaman Petro Kalnyshevskyi to go to war with Russia while "he prepared to send twenty of his best warriors to the Turkish emperor to ask for his support".

Catherine II put off dealing with Kalnyshevskyi until after the war. In the meantime, she sent emissaries to persuade him to go to war against the Turks. Promising the Zaporozhians large sums of money as remuneration, the emissaries admitted to Kalnyshevskyi that it was only the Zaporozhians who had a force strong enough to destroy the Turkish fortresses on the shores of the Black Sea. The Zaporozhians received a reward for quickly destroying the

<sup>7</sup> The Hetman was the leader of the Cossacks. He was elected by the Cossack assembly and his decisions had to be approved by what was called a Chorna Rada (Black Council).

<sup>8</sup> Following the establishment of the Cossack state, its centre moved to Chyhyryn, where the Hetman was based. The Sich then came under the leadership of the Otaman.

Turkish encampments. General Field-Marshal Pyotr Rumiantsev reported on the excellent leadership displayed by "General" Petro Kalnyshevskyi. In addition, Grigoriy Potemkin requested to be admitted into the ranks of the Kushchiv company of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in order to improve his martial skills. However, this praise was short lived, since Russia was preparing for the annexation of Crimea. The main obstacle to this was the Zaporozhian Sich, which continued to support the Crimean Khan. The Cossacks' position was immutable and remained so while Russo-Turkish relations deteriorated. They joined forces to win back some saltwater fisheries in Crimea and forest lands surrounding the Sich. When the Crimean Khan, Girei, attacked Southern Rus' in 1769, the Zaporozhians refused to come to Russia's aid. When Zaporozhians fell prisoner to the Turks in the war and were being transported across Crimean lands, the Khan always freed and returned them to the Sich without demanding a ransom. In their legal proceedings, the Tatars and the Cossacks enjoyed a cooperative atmosphere. The Russian agent Nikoforov informed St Petersburg that the Sich and the Khanate annually exchanged services equivalent to the sum of 60,000 roubles in gold and silver, at a time when this was considered a considerable sum.

### *Why was the Sich destroyed ?*

Henceforth relations between St Petersburg and the Sich quickly deteriorated and Catherine began to give serious consideration to the final destruction of the Sich. This, she felt, would once and for all deal with the "Little Russians" and open an unobstructed corridor to Crimea. The problem was to put this plan into operation. In spite of the fact that Catherine's generals attributed Russia's success over Turkey to their own acumen, Catherine was well aware of the level of their military abilities. She knew that they would not have stood the slightest chance in a war with the Zaporozhians. Her aides constantly reminded her that the Sich had the support of the people of Ukraine. The only solution, therefore, was to deprive the "criminal" Cossacks of this popular support. But to do this, it was necessary to oust the Cossacks from their territories.

Thus, Catherine returned to an earlier plan that had first emerged in the early 1760s. Under her initiative, in 1762, the Imperial Senate issued an *ukaz*<sup>9</sup> and a Manifesto on the recruitment of foreigners for settlement in Ukraine. In 1763, Catherine issued another Manifesto, outlining a programme for the acceleration of foreign colonisation in Ukraine. These documents promised the following conditions to prospective colonists, all detrimental to the interests of the people of Ukraine: a) resettlement at the cost of the state within two years of departure; b) two years' cost-free food supply, housing and transport (responsibility for which would lie directly with the local villagers in Ukraine);

<sup>9</sup> An *ukaz* was a form of imperial decree, which could be issued at any time and at the complete discretion of the Tsar or the Tsarina. It had binding legal authority and was enforceable by legal penalty.

c) in accordance with the choice of the settler, an allocation of up to 60 *desiatyny*<sup>10</sup> of the most fertile land per person; d) the granting of long-term loans for construction, supply and sowing purposes; e) a tax holiday for thirty years; f) an exemption from military conscription; g) hereditary privileges for acquiring local serfs; h) a guarantee of political rights, religious freedom and local authority, schools, churches, community organisations and so on.

The settlers were recruited from Serbs, Bulgarians, Moldovans, Greeks, Prussians, Austrians and other Europeans. In this manner, thirty thousand Moldovans alone were resettled in Ukraine along with nineteen thousand Greeks. To ensure that the settlers did not choose to leave their new homes, Catherine established a Chancellery for the Protection of Foreigners and allocated 200,000 roubles to finance the resettlement programme.

The enabling *ukaz* on the allotting of lands to the colonists was issued by the empress in 1765. However, in exchange for the lands to be colonised, the empress demanded the lands of the Zaporozhian Sich. This demand encountered great opposition from Kalnyshevskiy, who was still striving for a rapprochement with the Crimean Khanate. On her part, Catherine II promised Kalnyshevskiy an immediate resolution of the situation, taking his position into consideration, while at the same time sending her governors-general into Ukraine to begin the colonisation of Ukrainian lands. It was on these events that Russian historians base their erroneous contention that Catherine II and Kalnyshevskiy enjoyed good relations. This attitude served to mask the actual details of Russia's colonisation of Ukraine, while at the same time failing to give a satisfactory explanation of Catherine's harsh solution to the "Kalnyshevskiy problem" in 1775.

Ignoring Kalnyshevskiy's protests, Catherine issued an *ukaz* acknowledging the rights of Russian colonists in Ukraine. Later that same year, she initiated the creation of a coordination centre for colonisation attached to the Little Russian Collegium, and allocated 42,000 roubles for this purpose.

At this time Kalnyshevskiy realised that Catherine's policy was slowly leading towards the destruction of both the Sich and the Crimean Khanate. He took his suspicions to the Crimean Khan and proposed to him a joint effort to stop the spread of Tsarism into Ukraine and Crimea. The Crimean Tatars then journeyed to the Zaporozhian Sich and wintered there. This caused St Petersburg to accuse the Sultan of Turkey of complicity during talks in Bucharest in 1772. The empress' emissary, O. Obreskov, stated that, "In two years over 11,000 Tatars have crossed over into Zaporozhian Cossack lands and have wintered there".<sup>11</sup>

Meanwhile Catherine continued her attempts to undermine the relationship between the Zaporozhian Sich and the Crimean Khanate. The Governor-General of Slobodian Ukraine,<sup>12</sup> Ye. Shcherbinin, was sent tem-

<sup>10</sup> A *desiatyna* is approximately 2.7 acres.

<sup>11</sup> *Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossii do snosbeniia s Turtsiei [Hereafter AVPR], 1744/154-55/122.*

<sup>12</sup> The north-eastern part of Ukraine that was the only territory under Russian jurisdiction.

porarily to Crimea to convince the Khan that Russia had no intention of annexing Crimea and that it merely wanted the peninsula to become a state independent of Turkey. Russia also sent P. Veselytskiy, an official Resident, who insisted on having his credentials recognised. A different version of this episode was put forth by Nikita Panin:

According to accepted European tradition and etiquette, there can be nothing more truly, clearly and satisfactorily proven than the recognition by the local court of Tatar independence and the proposition that they are worthy of direct relations and correspondence with respected states.<sup>13</sup>

At the outset the Khan refused to embrace friendly relations. Then Shcherbinin provoked a neighbouring Muslim group, the Nogais, to attack the Tatars. Thus in 1772 the Crimean Khanate was forced to sign a treaty with Russia,<sup>14</sup> and to take upon itself a whole series of responsibilities vis-à-vis the latter. The treaty specifically proclaimed "the union, friendship and trust between Russia and the Crimean Khanate" (Article I).

"Neither the Russian Empire nor the Ottoman Porte [the title of the formal seat of Turkish power] and other allies have the right to interfere in anything [regarding affairs of the other party]; but by resolution of the Khan, it will be permissible for the Russian High Court to do so" (Article II). In return for an undertaking to refrain from demanding military aid from the Khan, Russia persuaded the Khan to sever all ties with the Zaporozhian Sich. Russia also reserved the cities of Kerch and Yenikan for itself in return for granting the Khan the right of passage across Russian territory to the Kuban region (Article VII). In addition, Russia also secured the right to quarter its army and fleet in Crimea as a "guarantee of the security of Tatar independence", while questions of trade, borders and an exchange of diplomatic representatives were dealt with in Articles XVII, LXXIX and XIII respectively.

### *Who gained from the 'self-determination' of the Crimean Tatars?*

The Russian generals managed to convince the Crimean Khan that a treaty without a Declaration on the State Separation of Crimea from Turkey would carry little weight. The salient point here is that Russia was simultaneously conducting talks with Turkey at Kuchuk Kainarji, at which Turkey had taken on an inflexible position. The Turkish diplomat Resiyi Akhmet Effendi, had learned of the talks between Russia and Crimea, and proceeded to accuse the former of interfering in the internal affairs of the Khanate to achieve the same result as with Ukraine. Obreskov reassured Effendi by stating that "according to the Tatars the treaty will proclaim that neither side will interfere in the affairs of the other; the Porte must be satisfied with this kind of outlined responsibility".<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Arkhiv Kniazia Vorontsova*, vol. 26, p. 87.

<sup>14</sup> See AVPR, *op. cit.*, 1723/89/8/67-70.

<sup>15</sup> See V.A. Ulyanytsky, *Dardanelly, Bosfor i Chernoe more v XVIII veke*, 1883, p. 124.

Under pressure from Russia, the Crimean Khan adopted a Declaration on the State Separation of Crimea from Turkey, in which he appealed to Turkey: "We hope for fairness and compassion from the Sublime Porte, that we may not only be left in peace by her, but also that after the end of the war she recognise the Crimean peninsula with its free Nogai Horde as self-determinate and her own jurisdiction on her own land as independent". The Khanate appealed to other states to adopt a position of trust regarding the Tatar document.

Obreskov quickly presented the Tatar document to the Turkish diplomat Abdul-Rezak, stating that it "has already been announced in all European courts".<sup>16</sup> Russia's aim became quite clear: to force Turkey into signing a disadvantageous treaty. However, Russia did not anticipate an unforeseen development. After reading the document, Abdul-Rezak began to grow even less conciliatory. He spoke of the decision taken by the Crimean Khan in the following terms:

The principles of our faith do not tolerate two Muslim rulers being equal, unless they rule at a great distance from one another. Otherwise it is absolutely necessary that one destroy the other. Then the Almighty can acknowledge as the rightful ruler the one to whom, by His Right Hand that is unfathomable to the Fates, He gives victory over the opponent. The assertion by the Khan and the prayers in the name of the Sultan of all Muslims must adhere to the Commandments of the Sultan.<sup>17</sup>

Russia was thus forced to accept a compromise, according to which the elected Khan of Crimea and the Judges of the Khanate were obligated to obtain the blessing of the Turkish Sultan before carrying out any duties.

All remaining obstacles were quickly resolved, and on 10 July 1774 a twenty-eight-article treaty was signed in Kuchuk Kainarji, with two secret articles annexed. Article III of the treaty was wholly dedicated to recognising the independence of Crimea. It specifically stressed the fact that "all Tatar peoples, Crimean, Budzhat, Kuban, Yedisán, Zhambuilu and Yedichkul, without exception, have the right to be recognised as free and completely independent from all foreign power, yet remaining under the state jurisdiction of their Khan of the line of Genghis. The whole collective and structured Tatar society, which is ruled by their ancient laws and customs, will be held accountable to no foreign state in any affairs; and neither the Russian Court nor the Ottoman Porte has the right to interfere in the councils or structures of the above-mentioned Khan, in domestic, political, civil and internal affairs in any form, but must recognise and consider the Tatar nation in its political and civil state in the same vein as other states, under self-rule, self-sufficient and independent of everyone except God Himself...".

Having secured the Declaration of Crimean independence, Russia devised a programme for its annexation. Before this could be completed, though, the Zaporozhian Sich had to be destroyed. Conscious of the fact that the

<sup>16</sup> *AVPR, op. cit.*, 1747/9.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 1747/9.

Cossacks had the opportunity to flee to Turkish territory, Russia included in Article II of the treaty the following clause:

If, following the conclusion of this treaty and its ratification, anyone from the said two empires committing any severe violation wishes to seek refuge or escape to one of the two sides, such must not be accepted under any pretext, nor protected, but must be immediately returned or, in an extreme case, be driven back from the territories of that state into which he has fled, so that no judgments or conflicts between the two empires will arise. This excludes only those in the Russian Empire who have accepted Christian Law and those in the Ottoman Empire who have accepted Mohammed's Law. Moreover, should anyone from the two above-mentioned empires, Christian and Muslim, commit any crime or similar act, for whatever reason, and flee from one empire to another, then upon demand he must be immediately returned.

Having established her legal framework, Catherine II could begin her operation to destroy the Sich. While a delegation sent to St Petersburg by Kalnyshevskiyi to resolve the territorial question was being shuffled around from reception room to reception room, Catherine ordered his arrest and the destruction of the Sich. On 5 June 1775, General Pyotr Tekeliy attacked and destroyed the Sich. Kalnyshevskiyi was ambushed and taken to the Solovki monastery. To the dismay of the empress, Kalnyshevskiyi was able to survive torture and mistreatment to the age of 112 years. Held in a stone cell, he was kept from any human contact for twenty-five years. He soon lost his eyesight and his health. However, his faith in his people remained unbroken.

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians from the central and southern regions left their homes and were relocated or simply driven away. The south of Ukraine was soon left barren and bereft of any population.

### *The road to Crimea is opened*

Tsarist diplomats and generals, aware of Catherine's aims, soon began to present her with various plans for the taking of Crimea. In 1778 Pyotr Rumiantsev asked Catherine to "accelerate the final decision regarding Crimea, and in the meantime to consider all the options and necessary provisions in the case of war".

One year earlier, in 1777, a well-known diplomat from Catherine's court, Bakunin, had devised and presented the court with such a plan entitled "Considerations of a Russian patriot on past relations and wars with the Tatars, and methods for the Service to cease them for all time". The essence of his plan was straightforward: to set the Tatars fighting amongst each other, and settle the Crimean steppes with loyal Ukrainians, while the areas left empty in Ukraine would be settled by Russians from the central Russian regions. This would weaken Ukraine even further and eventually drive the Tatars out of Crimea.

Rumiantsev's plan proved attractive to Catherine, and on 9 March 1778 she signed a decree "On the resettlement of all Christians to the southern

Russian land". The speed with which the army began to prepare land for resettlement in the southern Ukrainian provinces is evident from the fact that Russia's General Aleksandr Suvorov had thirty-two thousand males (whole families were not resettled) moved per day. However, many Russians could not grow accustomed to their new homes and simply fled. Without proper tilling and farming, the land slowly went to waste. A war with the Tatars was also looming, and the people were not at all prepared for it. On 5 May 1779 Catherine published an *ukaz* permitting Ukrainians from beyond Ukraine's borders to be settled in these lands. They would be granted pardon for any "transgressions": escape from their masters, service with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and so on. Many Ukrainian serfs, who had earlier escaped to Poland, took advantage of this opportunity.

However, these concessions could not rectify the situation completely. On 20 April 1780 a second *ukaz* was issued, extending the terms of the original one of the previous year.

In the meantime, Turkey had learned of Russia's preparations for war, and became increasingly uneasy. In order to divert Turkish attention from the Crimean problem, Catherine ordered her diplomats at the Porte to begin negotiating a new treaty with Turkey. Among her instructions was an order to re-emphasise the terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, in some cases reiterating points, and in others, taking new positions. It was clear to the Russian negotiators that Catherine had not the least intention of adhering to any of the terms. As an earnest of good intentions, Russian state counsellor O. Stakhiev signed the Ainali-Kavak Convention on 10 March 1779, along with the Turkish representative Abdul-Rezak. Almost half the articles of the convention (four out of nine) dealt with the Crimean question.

This was the final internationally-recognised document that ratified the state independence of the Crimean Khanate. However, the treaty had absolutely no effect on strengthening Crimea's international standing. Russia had no intention of adhering to the treaty and Turkey was in no position to defend it. Moreover, Turkey continued to regard Crimea as a colonial territory that was forcefully detached from it. Within four years the Crimean Khanate would cease to exist altogether as an entity recognised by international law. At the same time, Russia concluded no international treaties either before or after the Ainali-Kavak Convention giving it any legal right to claim the territory of the Crimean peninsula. Its annexation of Crimea was simply a matter of might.

Grigoriy Potemkin, who was responsible for preparing the southern regions of Ukraine for a possible war with Crimea, informed Catherine in 1780 that "the taking of Crimea by Your Highness is justifiable by prestigious reason, that is, a cessation of all wasted efforts and the constantly arising conflicts with the Porte. The Khan, who will in no way be able to remain in power without Your support, will be greatly benefited by Your making him into a Persian Shah".

At the beginning of 1783, Russia seized Crimea and announced the *fait accompli* with the Manifesto of 8 April proclaiming the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian empire. Russia's long-standing policy towards the annexation of territories remained the same as ever. Crimea, like Ukraine earlier, was regarded by Russia as "lebensraum", and no account was taken of the interests of the indigenous population. It is, therefore, not surprising that many of the articles of the 1772 treaty with the Crimean Khan were simply copied from the Russian treaty with Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi of 1654. Nor was the similar manner in which the two treaties were drawn up and then violated by Russia a coincidence. The system of rule in the occupied territories was identical in both cases. Identical, too, was the attitude of the Russian rulers towards the inhabitants of Ukraine and Crimea. The primary concern for Russia was to ensure that the indigenous populations never outnumbered the Russian incomers. At the time of the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, in the Novorossiysk *guberniya*<sup>18</sup> alone, there were 65,259 Ukrainians, 38,996 Russians, 2,471 Moldovans, and 704 Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Georgians, Hungarians, Poles, Swedes and Germans. The fact that there were more Ukrainians than Russians did not bode well for Tsarist plans, and for this reason, massive resettlement plans were adopted to move native Ukrainians out of these territories. The artificial vacuum so created was to be filled by Russians, and if there were too few of them, then, as we have already seen, other foreigners were recruited.

### "Divide and Rule"

This policy engendered a unique demographic cycle. In spite of the destruction of the Sich and the subsequent mass resettlement programme, the number of Ukrainians began once again to increase – and was met by a legislative counterattack. In 1785 Catherine issued a manifesto on the recruitment of foreign settlers to Ukraine. However, the resettlement policy soon led to a crisis. Within two years of the manifesto, over twenty five thousand Ukrainians had been deported to central Russia, while Russia encountered great difficulties in finding its own people to resettle the abandoned lands. This, quite naturally, was reflected in the economic development of the region; there was a huge shortage of labour. Catherine's response was to issue an order for the recruitment from abroad of previously deported or willingly resettled Ukrainians. All across Europe, Russian recruitment offices began to appear.

Having already developed a deportation strategy for Ukrainians, Russia now began to apply these same principles to the indigenous population of Crimea. Before annexation by Russia, Crimea had had a population of over 400,000. A few months after incorporation into the Russian empire, there were 70,269 males, and a total population of around 140,000. The deporta-

<sup>18</sup> *Guberniyas* were territorial-administrative divisions akin to states or provinces, with a governor as the chief administrative figure.



tion was so rapid that by the spring of 1784 the Khan, Shahin Girei, had also been deported. He was presented with a choice of Kaluga, Orel or Voronezh for his new home. In 1787 Potemkin issued an order to dispose of all remaining Tatar administrators left in Crimea.

The absence of a productive native population left the Russian army in a difficult logistic situation, since it was left with no local source of supplies. It thus could not carry out Catherine's orders for reconstruction in the area. Moreover, after the seizure of Crimea, many European states adopted a hostile attitude towards Russia. Russia was able to trade some Polish territories from Prussia and Bessarabian territories from Austria. But while the Russian court was able to make a few other minor advances in foreign policy, this was insufficient to rescue the situation caused by Russia's poor standing in Europe. It was then that Russia resorted to the announcement that the sole reason for the seizure of Crimea was to civilise the "barbaric" local population.

In response to this explanation, many highly placed European state officials travelled to Crimea to be convinced of the process of "civilisation" that was being carried out in the southern regions of Ukraine and Crimea. Potemkin was then ordered to rebuild the countryside immediately. There was, however, insufficient labour and resources to complete the task. Undaunted, Potemkin decided to construct fake villages along the route to be taken by the European delegates, and placed painted façades of villages further in the distance, giving rise to the term "Potemkin villages".

Tsarist policy was inherently aimed at completely severing all ties between Ukraine and Crimea. For this reason Russia did not favour the option of resettling the depopulated Crimean lands with Ukrainians. No effort was spared to ensure that the lands would be settled primarily with Russians. However, this plan met with failure due to an overwhelming reluctance on the part of most Russians to resettle so far away from their homes. The first attempt at Russian resettlement utilised the army. Russian soldiers were promised demobilisation if they accepted permanent settlement in Crimea. To make the offer more attractive, Catherine issued an *ukaz* on 14 January 1785 authorising the soldiers opting to remain to send for their wives. But the *ukaz* succeeded in recruiting only 4,425 wives. A further attempt was made to find female volunteers to travel to Crimea and wed unmarried soldiers there. In spite of a fairly generous bounty for volunteers (five roubles apiece was the advertised rate), very few Russian women came forward.

Russia then tried to encourage "Little Russian" women to volunteer to marry soldiers in Crimea. This, too, proved unsuccessful; only 1,497 Ukrainian and 2,353 Moldovan women came forward. A majority of Russian soldiers, who wanted to get free of their service obligations, agreed to permanent settlement in Crimea and then, after demobilisation, fled back to their homes in Russia. As a result, between April and November 1784, the Russian army in Crimea was reduced to half its original complement, but there was no significant corresponding increase in new settlers. This was the

main reason that Russia agreed to allow Ukrainians to settle in Crimea. However, it made sure that these would not be Ukrainians with well developed relations in Crimea, opting instead to recruit settlers from Polish-occupied Ukraine. Potemkin wrote to Catherine in 1787 that, "it would be against the interests of the state to forbid the acceptance of Ukrainian settlers from Poland. Poland then would be able to take advantage of them as a resource. It would be desirable to encourage as many representatives of the Ukrainian people in Poland as possible to leave Poland for Crimea". This was in essence an admission of Russia's failure in its Crimean aspirations.

In the ensuing years Ukrainians began to settle Ukrainian territory as defined by its present frontiers, as well as adjacent territories now incorporated into other states. As regards the territory of the former Crimean Khanate, by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries it was inhabited by a majority of Ukrainians. For example, in the Tauride *guberniya* Ukrainians made up 42.2 per cent of the population, Russians – 27.9 per cent, Tatars – 13.0 per cent, Germans – 5.4 per cent, Jews – 3.8 per cent, Bulgarians – 2.8 per cent, with a mixture of other nationalities comprising the rest. The area settled by Ukrainians in Crimea greatly surpassed that inhabited by Russians. The Tsarist government had by this time realised that its attempt at selective demographic development was a failure. Between 1897-1914, St Petersburg undertook an unprecedented resettlement programme in which 1.69 million Ukrainians were deported from nine Crimean *guberniyas* to Siberia and the Far East. A new influx of Russians and non-Ukrainians into Ukraine began concurrently. Describing Tsarist demographic policy, Stalin quite justifiably wrote that, "Tsarism deliberately settled the prosperous outer regions with colonial elements in order to squeeze out local populations, force them into worse regions and sow national enmity".<sup>19</sup> But following the Bolshevik takeover in 1917, Stalin himself adopted these very same Tsarist principles of "demographic selection".

### *The end justifies the means*

The history of relations between Russia and Crimea up to the twentieth century gives absolutely no grounds for the contention that Russia can claim a right to Crimea. In all the international treaties it concluded, Russia recognised the Crimean Khanate as a sovereign and independent state. The seizure of Crimea in 1783 is not legally justifiable by accepted international law and cannot be considered a basis for the inclusion of Crimea into Russia. However, should one power seize the territory of another country and then return its legal status, such an act takes on legal proportions and must be recognised as such by all subjects of international law. Among the criteria for recognition are state development, effective government on a defined territo-

<sup>19</sup> J.V. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 4, p. 355.

ry, the condition of the population, and the effectiveness of the economy that is linked to the economy with which the country is united. The main legal basis for the recognition of territorial unification is the principle of the self-determination of peoples and nations. This is clearly upheld in Article II of the United Nations Charter and in other documents of international law.

Furthermore, the principle of self-determination is explained by current international law as not merely a basis for secession from an existing state, but also for the maintenance of an existing state's territorial integrity. Rights connected to secession do not take precedent over the rights of unification. In other words, if a people is united with other peoples in a single state structure and if the state in no way infringes on their rights, then the attempt to use the principle of self-determination as a basis for secession is a misapplication of that principle. This is directly addressed by the 1970 UN Declaration on International Law, which states that the principles of self-determination "cannot be applied in the context of sanctioning or encouraging any acts that would lead to the dismemberment or partial or full violation of the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign, independent states... with governments that represent the whole people of a given territory, without regard for race, religious conviction or skin colour".

It should also be noted that this principle applies only to the people itself, as a social community characterised by a common historical heritage, territorial cohabitation, a common language and economic life, among other criteria. This community must be historically stable. When considering Crimea, it is difficult to apply the idea of historical stability when it is realised that the population of Crimea has grown in the post-war period from 780,000 to 2.5 million, primarily due to forced resettlement. This process of forced resettlement was halted as recently as 1978.

Thirdly, the people of Crimea, comprising a social community, can turn not only to the principle of self-determination, but also to that of a people's right to decide its own fate. This principle is described as "the right to define under the conditions of full freedom, when and how a people desires, its internal and external political status without foreign interference and to realise according to its own judgment its political, economic, social and cultural development".<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, an attempt can be made to consider the issue from the point of view of those who maintain Russia's claim to Crimea. It is an accepted historical conclusion that following the Bolshevik overthrow in 1917 Crimea mistakenly employed Lenin's proclaimed principle of self-determination to unite with Russia.

Prior to 1917 Lenin had on several occasions espoused the right of peoples and nations to self-determination. However, it is a misconception to interpret this as meaning that Lenin was an advocate of national rights. He

<sup>20</sup> *In the Name of Peace*, Kyiv, 1975, p. 20.

and his party approached the issue of self-determination simply as a matter of political expediency.

Before the Bolsheviks came to power, Lenin supported self-determination to the point of secession. "National self-determination", he wrote, "is exclusively understood as political self-determination. In other words, it is the right of secession and the creation of an independent national state".<sup>21</sup>

However, once the Bolsheviks were in power, Lenin's views quickly altered. He now supported the principle of self-determination only insofar as it would lead to a federal relationship with Russia. Lenin paid special attention to the processes developing in Ukraine at the time. "The details of the elections at the First Constituent Assembly indicate that as of November 1917 the Ukrainian SRs [Social Revolutionaries] and Socialists still maintained a majority in Ukraine", Lenin wrote in 1919.<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that at this time Lenin had designated Crimea as Ukrainian territory. Establishing a Bolshevik government in Ukraine was still out of the question. As Vynnychenko wrote,

In Ukraine Bolshevism had no power at this time. Several attempts by the Bolsheviks to seize power ended in failure.<sup>23</sup>

Fearing that Ukraine would soon declare independence, Lenin appealed in his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine":

May the communists of Russia and Ukraine unite in a patient, insistent and determined effort to defeat the nationalist advances of the bourgeoisie or nationalist superstitions of all kinds, and demonstrate to the workers and peasants of the whole world a truly strong union of workers and peasants of various nations in the struggle for Soviet power, for the destruction of capitalist and landowner oppression, for a global Federation, a world-wide Federal Republic.<sup>24</sup>

This matter was addressed even more directly by Yakov Sverdlov, then the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In a confidential memorandum to one of the proponents of Soviet power in Ukraine, Fyodor Sergeev (Artem), Sverdlov wrote,

My Dear Artem!

I am writing about this only to you. I am sometimes truly terrified by this wave of independence thinking that is sweeping Ukraine, as well as Latvia, Estonia, Belarus and so forth. Do not allow this silliness to continue. Make sure of this.<sup>25</sup>

The slogan "self-determination of nations" was often employed as a method of countering anti-Bolshevik organs of power with the aim of annexing certain territories to Russia. With this aim (among others) in mind, numerous representatives of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Russian Communist Party

<sup>21</sup> V.I. Lenin, *Sobranie Sochineniya*, vol. 24, p. 248.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 40, p. 47.

<sup>23</sup> V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia Natsiyi*, Kyiv, 1990, pp. 81-2.

<sup>24</sup> Lenin, *op. cit.*, vol. 40, p. 47.

<sup>25</sup> Y. Sverdlov, *Izbranie Sochineniya*, Kyiv, vol. 3, p. 155.

(RKP[b]) were sent to various territories to organise “congresses” and “conferences” at which independence and unification with Russia were to be simultaneously proclaimed. This method was particularly applied to areas where Ukrainians lived, and thus one saw the emergence of Black Sea, Northern Caucasus and Kuban-Black Sea Socialist Republics; Soviet Stavropol; the Odessa Soviet Republic; the Mykolayiv District Socialist Workers’ Commune; the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Republic and so on. All of these had also created their own respective Soviet People’s Committees. However none of these “republics” took into account ethnic distribution when marking their borders. Nor did they uphold the national-territorial principle of border demarcation. Furthermore, the will of the local populations was ignored.

Then, when the Bolsheviks lost the elections to the First Constituent Assembly, they responded by calling plenary sessions of the Donetsk and Kryvyi Rih Soviets, at which the following resolution was adopted:

Widespread agitation for the secession of Donetsk and Kryvyi Rih, along with Kharkiv, and their union with Russia must be increased. This would be accomplished with the understanding that the former would become part of a single, administrative and self-governing province [of Russia].<sup>26</sup>

However, when the local populations began to oppose the creation of these “states” and their “governments”, the Bolsheviks invariably turned to the use of terror and assassination.

It is evident, therefore, that the term “self-determination” was used purely as a propaganda tool to appease world public opinion. Sverdlov spoke quite candidly of this during the debates on the proposed Ukrainian SSR Constitution on March 4, 1919:

It must be emphasised here with all certainty, that what we are defining as a separate Ukrainian republic in the eyes of the international community today, will tomorrow possibly become the legal part of an All-Russian republic in a changed international situation... It would be generally more rational to adopt – with amendments – the constitution of Soviet Russia than one of a Ukrainian republic. Its deep meaning would then transform it into an international constitution which is even now an example for the whole world proletariat.<sup>27</sup>

Sverdlov was not speaking on the highest level of government in Ukraine at the Third Congress of the Bolshevik Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP[b]). Nevertheless, he was confident that even the government of the republic would heed his words. That very day, he added a memorandum on the Ukrainian constitution to the list of proposed Congress resolutions, stating that, “the Third Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party agrees to adopt completely and generally the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet

<sup>26</sup> *Donetskyi Proletariy*, December 2, 1917.

<sup>27</sup> Sverdlov, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 173.

Republic, allowing for changes that take into account local conditions".<sup>28</sup> Having arrived at an agreement with party leaders outside the Congress hall, Sverdlov was assured that the Congress would not dare oppose him.

When opponents used the principle of self-determination to support their positions, the Bolsheviks invariably deemed such arguments illegal and without justifiable motive. This situation arose in Crimea as well. In the Soviet of Peoples' Commissars' (Sovnarkom) appeal "To All Working Muslims in Russia and the East", of 20 November 1917, the following was included:

Muslims of Russia, Tatars of Crimea! Create for yourselves a free life. You have a right to this... You yourselves should be masters on your own land. You yourselves must create your own life according to your own image and wishes. You have this right because your fate is in your hands.<sup>29</sup>

The Tatar population in Crimea decided to avail itself of this proclaimed right and thus a congress was called for 26 November 1917 in Bakhchisaray-Kurultay. The congress elected a Tatar National Government and proclaimed its independence from Russia. Proclaiming the slogan "Crimea for the Crimeans", the government furthermore proclaimed its desire to remain united with Ukraine, being unwilling to break the historical national, economic and cultural ties with the Ukrainian mainland.

The Sovnarkom was not disposed to allow this. It did not recognise this act of self-determination as legal or legitimate and proclaimed the Tatar National Government "...counter-revolutionary and clinging to the sole support of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Ukrainian counter-revolution". Revolutionary Red Guards and sailors from Sevastopol were sent against the Tatar National Government to dispatch the tiny Tatar army, after which they proceeded to arrest the entire government. In a reply sent to the Sevastopol Military-Revolutionary Council (the Bolshevik military organisation first created and headed by Trotsky in Moscow, comprised exclusively of Russian Bolsheviks in Crimea), the Tatar National Government was compared to a military dictatorship set up as a vassal by the Ukrainian Rada. Russia also accused the Rada of

devis[ing] a clever and treacherous plan – with the help of the Sevastopol and Simferopol councils, as well as the Crimean Tatar army – to seize power firstly in the cities of Crimea, and then the fortress at Sevastopol.<sup>30</sup>

The support of the Crimean Tatar people for separation from Russia and union with Ukraine greatly perturbed the RKP(b) leadership. Representatives of the RKP(b) Central Committee were immediately sent to Crimea. At first reliance was not placed on the use of force, since at the time there were hardly enough dedicated Bolsheviks to implement it. Only seven members

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 176.

<sup>29</sup> *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, Moscow, 1959, vol. 1, pp. 34-5.

<sup>30</sup> *Bor'ba za sovetskuiu vlast' v Krymu: dokumenty i materialy*, Simferopol, 1957, vol. 1, p. 153.

appeared in Simferopol at the first conference of Bolshevik organisations in the Tauride *guberniya* on October 2, 1917 (one each from Sevastopol, Yalta, Yevpatoriya, Feodosiya and three from Simferopol).

Soviet historiography maintained that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 supported the incorporation of Crimea into Russia. However, there is no explicit or implicit reference to support such a contention anywhere in the Brest-Litovsk text. Regarding border demarcations between Russia and Ukraine, Article VI of the treaty stated:

Russia is bound by this treaty to conclude an immediate peace with the Ukrainian National Republic and recognise the Peace Treaty between this state and the states of the Central Powers. The territory of Ukraine must immediately be freed of all Russian armies and Russian Red Guards. Russia will also cease all agitation or propaganda against the government or social institutions of the Ukrainian National Republic.<sup>31</sup>

No mention is made of Crimea.

*To be continued*



<sup>31</sup> *Dokumenty vnesbnei politiki SSSR*, vol. 1, p. 122.

**Literature**

**FOREST SONG**

*Lesya Ukrayinka*

**Act II**

*(Late summer. In places the dark dull foliage of the trees is splashed with autumnal yellow. The lake has shrunk, and now has a broad beaches. The thin leaves of the reeds and bulrushes rustle dryly.*

*A house has been built in the clearing, and a vegetable patch planted. There are two strips of grain – one of rye and of wheat. There are geese swimming on the lake. Laundry is drying on the shore, pots and pans are hanging on bushes near the hose. The grass has been mown, and a hayrick piled under the oak. From among the trees can be heard the cackle of chickens and the lowing of cattle. Somewhere near at hand, a pipe is playing a lively dance.)*

MOTHER: *(coming out of the house and calling)*  
Lukash, hey, where are you?

LUKASH:  
*(emerging from the forest, carrying his pipe and a carved walking-stick)*  
Right here, Mother!

MOTHER: Haven't you had your fill of music yet?  
Piping, that's all! But, work, *you* don't get done!

LUKASH: What work d' you mean?

MOTHER: What's that you say? What work?  
And who's supposed to fence the cattle-yard?

LUKASH: Oh, very well, I'll fence it right away!

MOTHER: But when will that "right away" come to pass?  
You're always running off somewhere or other  
With that stray wench of yours, that good-for-nothing!

LUKASH: Who's running off? I drive the beasts to pasture  
And Mavka helps me.



MOTHER: A fat lot of good  
Such help is!

LUKASH: But you said yourself that when  
She looks after the cows, that they let down  
More milk.

MOTHER: Well, all the same – a witch's spawn!

LUKASH: There clearly isn't any pleasing you!  
When we put up the house, didn't she bring  
The wood for us? And who was it that planted  
The garden with you and helped sow the grain?  
Did we ever have such a crop before?  
And look how she planted the flowers there  
Beneath the window... Doesn't it look pretty?

MOTHER: So much we need these flowers! But I don't have  
A girl here in the house to do the work.  
And *his* head is all full of flowers and songs!

*(LUKASH gives an impatient shrug and starts to leave.)*

Where are you off to?

LUKASH: To fence in the yard.

*(He goes behind the house and in a few moments there is a sound of wood being chopped.)*

*MAVKA emerges from the forest, decked in a profusion of flowers and with her hair hanging loose.)*

MOTHER: *(in a disagreeable tone)*  
What do *you* want?

MAVKA: Say, Aunty, where is Lukash?

MOTHER: What do you want with him? It isn't proper  
For a girl to go chasing a young man!

MAVKA: Nobody ever told me that before!

MOTHER: Well, for once you can hear it! It won't hurt you!  
Why do you always go about like that?  
Why do you always comb your hair out so?  
You look just like a witch! It isn't decent!  
And what is all that nonsense you have round you?  
It's not the least bit suitable for working!

I've got some things left of my poor dear daughter's.  
Go, put them on – they're hanging up inside –  
Yours, if you want, you can put in the chest.

MAVKA: Well, good. I shall go in and change my clothes.

*(Mavka goes into the house. UNCLE LEV comes out of it.)*

MOTHER: And not a word of thanks!

LEV: Well, sister, why  
Do you keep on and on at the poor lass?  
Or what has she done to upset you so?

MOTHER: And, you brother, had better hold your tongue  
On things that don't concern you! You'd bring in  
All of the witches from the forest here.

LEV: If you had something to say that made sense  
I'd listen – but this "witches from the forest"...  
Where are there witches in the forest, say?  
The witches live in villages...

MOTHER: Well, you  
Know all about it! Well, then, attract them in,  
Bring in this forest scum, and you will see  
What good comes of it!

LEV: What's that? Yes, I'll see!  
What's in the forest isn't scum, my sister.  
All kind of treasures come from it...

MOTHER: *(ironically)*

For sure!

LEV: From lasses like her, humans come, that's what!

MOTHER: What sort of humans? You've been drinking? Huh?

LEV: What do you know about it? My old grandpa  
Used to say: if you only know the word  
Then you can bring into a forest nymph  
A human soul, the very same as ours.

MOTHER: But then where will the witch-soul it replaces  
Go off to?

LEV: You're on your old theme again?  
I'd better far get back and do some work,  
Why should I stay chattering here!





It is more wondrous than the magic bracken  
Which reveals treasure, for your song *creates* it.  
It was as if a second heart was born  
Within me when I heard it. In that moment  
A fiery miracle took place...

*(breaking off suddenly)*

You're laughing?

LUKASH: But truly, though, it does seem rather funny...  
A girl in working clothes, making a speech  
As if it were a festival oration! *(laughs)*

MAVKA: *(tugging at her clothes)*  
I'll burn the lot!

LUKASH: And make mother scold worse?

MAVKA: What does that matter, if this dress has made me  
Seem different to you?

LUKASH: I knew it, though!  
Now the reproaches and complaining start...

MAVKA: No, dear one, I am not reproaching you,  
I am just sad, because you cannot raise  
Your life up to the level of yourself.

LUKASH: I somehow cannot grasp just what you're saying.

MAVKA: See, that is what I love you for the most,  
That you do not understand what is in you,  
Although your soul can sing about it all  
Clearly, sincerely, through your pipe's sweet voice...

LUKASH: Well, what is it?

MAVKA: Something more beautiful  
Than all your fine, beloved, handsomeness,  
But I, too, cannot find the words for it...

*(Sadly and lovingly, she gazes at him for a moment in silence.)*

Play to me, beloved on your pipe,  
And let the music charm away all evil!

LUKASH: Eh, this is no time for me to be playing!

MAVKA: Embrace me then, so that I may forget  
This conversation.

LUKASH: (*looking round*)

Hush! Mother will hear you!  
Already all the time she speaks of you  
As hussy.

MAVKA: (*flaring up*)

You're right! No one who did not  
Grow up with you will understand you. What  
Does "hussy" mean? Is it because I love you?  
Because I was the first to speak? It's shameful,  
Is it, to have a generous heart that does not  
Keep its treasures hidden, but straightway  
Bestows them all upon the one it loves.  
Not waiting to be given pledges first?

LUKASH: But there was hope that they'd be repaid later...

MAVKA: Another strange word I can't understand:  
"Repaid". You gave me all the gifts you wished  
To give, and I gave my gifts so to you.  
Unmeasured, and uncounted...

LUKASH: Well, that's fine.  
When neither has reason to blame the other.  
And you said it yourself – remember it!

MAVKA: But why must I remember what I said?

MOTHER (*coming out from the house*)  
So that is how you reap? And fence the yard?

(*LUKASH hastily drags the wood behind the house.*)

Well, look here, lass, if you don't want to reap,  
I shall not force you. Somehow I shall manage  
To do it all myself. And, comes the autumn,  
Please God, I'll get a daughter-in-law to help me.  
There's a young widow, a strong, active wench –  
She's been making enquiries through her friends,  
And I replied, that, unless Lukash happens  
To... Well then, dear, you'd better let me have  
The sickle – it's the only one we own.

MAVKA: No, I shall reap. You go and do the hemp.

(*The MOTHER crosses the clearing and disappears behind the reeds. MAVKA swings the sickle and stoops to cut the rye. Suddenly, out of the rye, springs up the FIELD RUSALKA. Her green garment is visible here and there through the*

*cloak of her golden hair which covers her small figure. On her head she wears a garland of cornflowers, and her hair is interwoven with pink flowers of corncockle, camomile, and convolvulus.)*

FIELD RUSALKA (*throwing herself beseechingly towards MAVKA*)

Sister, I beg you, no!  
Do not destroy my beauty so!

MAVKA: I must!

FIELD RUSALKA: Already I'm in tatters now,  
My flowers destroyed and scattered now  
And my flowers' constellations all  
Into desolation fall!  
Fiery burned my poppies red,  
But now they are black and dead,  
Flow like drops of blood so rich,  
And congeal there in the ditch.

MAVKA: Sister I must. Your beauty will return  
Next year in even greater, richer splendour,  
But if my happiness today should wither,  
It goes for ever!

FIELD RUSALKA:

*(wringing her hands, and bowing with grief, like an ear of grain bows in the wind)*

Woe is me! My lovely hair!  
All my radiant golden tresses!  
Alas, Alas! My beauty fair!  
All my youthful lovelinesses!...

MAVKA: Your beauty is not fated to live long,  
For this it grew up, so that it would fall.  
It is in vain you plead to me and cry,  
For someone else will reap it, if not I.

FIELD RUSALKA: See sister, see, how the waves are still playing,  
From end to end swaying,  
Let us partake of this paradise smiling,  
While summer's beguiling,  
While the rye-ears have not fallen yet,  
While dread doom has not befallen yet.  
Grant me one moment, one moment my sister dear,  
Then my poor beauty will fade and will disappear,  
Of itself it will lie down!  
Sister, wear not winter's frown  
That will not yield to entreaty or prayer.

MAVKA: Willingly, sister, I'd spare you,  
I am not free, though, I'm bound to this labour!

FIELD RUSALKA: *(raising herself up, to whisper in MAVKA's ear)*  
Does it not come to pass when reaping, maybe,  
Hand may be wounded by sharp-bladed sickle,  
See my pain, sister, and pity!  
One small drop of blood would be sufficient to save me.  
Well? Is my beauty not worth some blood!

MAVKA: *(slashing her hand with the sickle, and letting the blood fall on the golden hair of the FIELD RUSALKA)*  
Here, sister! May it do good!

*(The FIELD RUSALKA bows before MAVKA in thanks, and disappears down into the rye.*

*From the direction of the lake approaches the MOTHER, and with her KYLYNA, a buxom young woman, wearing a red fringed kerchief, and a beetroot-coloured finely pleated skirt, a similarly pleated green apron with appliquéd white, red and yellow bands; her blouse is densely embroidered in red and blue, and a necklace of gold coins jingles on her plump white neck, her belt hugs her figure closely, making her rounded, well-nourished shape seem even more voluptuous. She strides along so fast that the MOTHER can barely keep up with her.)*

MOTHER: *(in a very amiable tone)*  
Come, now, Kylyna. There beside the birch  
The herbs are still fresh. There's hypericum,  
You'd like to brew a pitcher of it, maybe?  
It's really brings the milk on, dear, you know.

KYLYNA: But I've more milk now that I well can cope with!  
Would that the fair was due, I'd buy a vat!  
The cow I've got is Turkish breed – my late  
Lamented picked her up somewhere – a milker,  
Lord, what a one! But you know how it is,  
I've the field work to do, and then I've got  
To do the house on top of that. Oy, Aunt, y,  
A widow's got to cut herself in two!

*(she puts on a woeful voice and pulls a long face)*

MOTHER: Well dear, but I'm sure you get through it somehow!  
Goes without saying if someone's hard-working  
And strong... But we, we've only a small plot.  
But God gives us no respite...



KYLYNA: (*looking at the rye-plot, where MAVKA is standing*)  
But who's that  
You've reaping there?

MOTHER: That's a poor orphan lass,  
(*in an undertone*)

But, God forgive me, she's not fit for much...

KYLYNA: (*approaching MAVKA with MOTHER*)  
Good-day, lass! Is the reaping going well?

MOTHER: (*clasping her hands*)  
O heaven help us, she's not even started.  
O how life plagues me! What have you been doing!  
You stupid, useless lazy good-for-nothing!

MAVKA: (*in a dull tone*)  
I've cut my hand...

MOTHER: Indeed, I might have known it!

KYLYNA: Well, give the sickle here, and let me do it.  
(*MAVKA hides the sickle behind her back, and looks at KYLYNA with enmity*)

MOTHER: Give her the sickle, then. It isn't yours!  
(*She snatches the sickle out of MAVKA's hands and gives it to KYLYNA, who begins to reap like wildfire, so that the straw whistles under the sickle.*)

MOTHER: (*approvingly*)  
Now that's what I call work!

KYLYNA: (*without breaking off her work*)  
If someone could  
Twist up the bands for me, then I could reap  
The whole field in one go.

MOTHER: (*calling*) Lukash, come her!

LUKASH (*entering. To KYLYNA*)  
God grant you strength!

KYLYNA: Thank you!

MOTHER: Lukash, you  
Can help this fine young woman bind the sheaves.  
Your "helper's" gone and cut herself already.

*(LUKASH begins to bind the sheaves)*

Well, reap away, my children, and I'll go  
And get some fruit-soup boiling for your dinner.

*(She goes into the house.*

*MAVKA goes to the birch-tree, and leaning against it, watches LUKASH and KYLYNA through the long branches.*

*For some time, KYLYNA continues to reap furiously, then she stops, stands up straight and looks at LUKASH bending over the sheaves, smiling to herself; in three long strides she goes over to him, and slaps him on the back.)*

KYLYNA: Well, speed it up, lad! Don't crawl like a snail!  
There's masses to do yet!

LUKASH: *(also straightening up)*

How fast you go!  
But better not challenge me, for I'll win!

KYLYNA: *(puts down the sickle, and puts her hands on her hips)*  
Indeed, indeed! Well, let us see who wins!

*(LUKASH runs at her; she catches his arm, and they "try their strength", palm to palm; for a time they are balanced, then KYLYNA draws back a little, laughing hysterically and making eyes at him. LUKASH, heatedly, forces her arms wide apart and tries to kiss her, but just as his lips are about to touch hers, she trips him and he falls.)*

KYLYNA: *(standing over him, laughing)*  
Well, then? Who won? I beat you, didn't I?

LUKASH: *(getting up, breathing heavily)*  
Cheating doesn't count as winning!

KYLYNA: No?

*(A door bangs in the house. KYLYNA darts back to the reaping and LUKASH to binding the sheaves. Soon the plot is dark with stubble and covered with sheaves; while many other bundles of rye lie on the spread straw-bindings, like conquered prisoners who have not yet been fettered.)*

MOTHER: *(from the lobby)*  
Come along in, you reapers! Dinner's ready!

KYLYNA: Well, I've done all my part, but Lukash there  
Has nowhere finished his.

LUKASH: I shan't be long.

MOTHER: Well, finish up! And you, come in, Kylyna!  
(KYLYNA goes into the house. The door closes. MAVKA emerges from behind the birch.)

LUKASH: (*a little confused at seeing her, then pulling himself together*)  
Aha, it's you? Well, come and bind the sheaves,  
And I'll go in.

MAVKA: I cannot bind the sheaves.

LUKASH: Well, have you simply come out here to watch,  
If you don't want to help?

(*he continues with the binding himself*)

MAVKA: Lukash, you mustn't  
Let that woman come here any more, –  
I do not like her; she's an evil creature,  
She's like an otter!

LUKASH: You know nothing of her.

MAVKA: O yes, I know! I heard her laugh and voice.

LUKASH: That isn't much!

MAVKA: No, it is quite enough.  
That woman's like a lynx, rapacious.

LUKASH: Really!

MAVKA: Don't let her come out here into our forest!

LUKASH: (*standing upright*)  
Have you become queen of the forest then,  
And pass decrees who may come in the forest,  
And who may not?

MAVKA: (*sadly, and with menace*)  
The forest has its pit-falls,  
Well-hidden under bushes, under branches.  
No animal, no human ever sees them,  
Till they fall in...

LUKASH: Once again, you are talking  
Of evil and rapacity. Be quiet!  
I see I've never really known your nature!

MAVKA: And, maybe, I myself have never known it...

LUKASH: Well, listen here: If I have got to ask you  
Every time who is allowed to come  
To see me, and who not, I'd better leave  
The forest and go settle in the village.  
At least I'd not be lost there among people.  
For I can't simply stay and sit with you  
Like a fox in a trap!

MAVKA: I never set  
A trap for you. You came of your own will.

LUKASH: And I'll go of my own will if I want,  
No one has anything to bind me here?

MAVKA: And did I ever speak of binding you?

LUKASH: Oh, what's the point of all this conversation?

*(He binds up the last sheaf and, without looking at MAVKA, goes into the house, MAVKA sits in a furrow, among the stubble, bowed in gloomy thoughts.)*

UNCLE LEV: *(coming out of the house)*  
What is the matter, lass, why are you grieving?

MAVKA: *(quietly and sadly)*  
The summer's going, uncle!

LEV: Yes, for you,  
That is grief! Indeed, I'm quite surprised  
You don't yet need your willow for the winter.

MAVKA: And where am I to go, then?

LEV: As for me  
I'd not feel cramped to have you in the house...  
If but my sister had a different nature,  
But one can't speak with her. I've tried already.  
Well, that's the way it is... If only I  
Were master here, you would not have to ask,  
But I've made over land and house to them,  
It's not my will counts here! I'm going back,  
To winter in the village, in my home.  
If you were able to live in a village,  
I'd take you with me.

MAVKA: No, I cannot do it...  
But if I could, I'd come. You're so good, uncle!

LEV: Bread is good, my lass, but people never.  
But yet, in truth, I've somehow grown so close  
To all you forest folk. And when it's time  
To die, then beast-like I'll come to the forest,  
Under that oak, there let them bury me.  
Hey, oak, old friend, will you be standing there,  
When this grey head of mine is in the dust?...  
Well, once there were still greater oaks than this  
But they've all been cut down. But you stay green,  
My curly friend, right up until the frost,  
And then... will God grant me to last till spring?

*(He stands there, sadly leaning on a flail.*

*MAVKA slowly picks out the wilting flowers from the mown rye and gathers them into a posy.)*

*The MOTHER, KYLYNA and LUKASH emerge from the house)*

MOTHER (to KYLYNA)

Why are you hurrying? Sit here awhile?

KYLYNA: No, Aunty, it's time I was on my way.  
See, it is getting late, and I'm afraid.

MOTHER: Lukash, you could see her home...

LUKASH: Of course.

KYLYNA (looking at him)

But maybe there's some work to do...

MOTHER: What work

Is there to do at evening? Go, go son,  
And see Kylyna home, right to her door.  
It's gloomy in the evening in this forest.  
And she is still a young and handsome woman, –  
Suppose someone should pounce on her!

KYLYNA: Oh, Aunty,

Now you've got me completely terrified!  
Lukash, let us be off before it's dark,  
Or else we'll both of us be scared!

LUKASH: What, I?

Scared in the forest? Not a bit of it!

MOTHER: He is a fine bold lad, this son of mine,  
Careful, Kylyna, don't offend his honour!

KYLYNA: No, I was only joking...  
*(catching sight of UNCLE LEV)*

Uncle Lev?

Are you off home, then?

LEV *(pretending to mishear her)*

Huh? Well, then, goodbye.

*(he goes into the forest)*

KALYNA: Goodbye, and all the best to you, dear Auntie!

*(She attempts to kiss the MOTHER's hand, but the MOTHER will not let her, and, wiping her mouth on her apron, she kisses Kylyna three times, "ceremonially".)*

KYLYNA *(already on her way)*

Farewell I say, remember us, I pray.

MOTHER Goodbye, good cheer – and come back soon, my dear!

*(She goes into the house and fastens the door behind her  
 MAVKA raises herself up and quietly, as if wearily, goes to the lake, sits down  
 on the leaning willow, bows her head on to her hands, and quietly weeps.  
 A fine drizzle begins, covering clearing, house and forest with a dense net.)*

RUSALKA *(Swimming up to the bank, and looking at MAVKA with surprise  
 and interest)*

Are you weeping, Mavka?

MAVKA: And have you  
 Never wept, then, Rusalka dear?

RUSALKA: What, I?  
 If I weep only for one little minute,  
 Someone will have to laugh himself to death!

MAVKA: Rusalka, you have never been in love...

RUSALKA: I've never been in love? You have forgotten  
 Just what proper loving ought to be.  
 Loving is like the water, flowing, swift.  
 It rushes, plays, fondles, allures and drowns.  
 Where there is heat, it boils, where cold, it freezes,  
 Becomes as hard as stone. That is my loving!  
 But yours is but a frail will-o-the-wisp  
 A sickly infant. It sways in the wind,

Is trampled underfoot. It strikes a spark  
But does not strive to burn, and from it there  
Remains only black charcoal and grey ash..  
And if it is rejected, tossed aside,  
Then it lies down and rots away, like straw  
In the cold water of a fruitless grief,  
Under the late cold rainshowers of repentance.

MAVKA (*raising her head*)

You say repentance? Go and ask the birch  
Whether she feels repentance for that night  
When the springtime breeze unbraided all  
Her flowing tresses?

RUSALKA: So, why does she grieve?

MAVKA: Because she cannot embrace her beloved,  
Clasp him in her long boughs for evermore.

RUSALKA: Why so?

MAVKA: Because her love's the springtime breeze!

RUSALKA: Why did she fall in love with such as him?

MAVKA: Because he was gentle, that springtime zephyr,  
Singing he tousled all her tender leaves,  
Caressingly, he plucked apart her garland,  
And, fondling, scattered dew upon her tresses...  
Yes, yes, he truly was the springtime breeze,  
And with no other could she fall in love.

RUSALKA: Well then, let her now droop her mournful grief  
Down to the ground, for she cannot embrace  
That breeze forever – he's flown off already.

*(Quietly, without splashing, she swims away from the bank and disappears in the lake.)*

*MAVKA once again bows over, her long black hair falls to the ground. A wind springs up and heaps together grey clouds, and together with them black skeins of migrating birds. Then a stronger gust of wind blows away the rainclouds, and the forest becomes visible, already in bright autumn colours against the dense blue twilight sky.)*

MAVKA (*quietly, with deep sorrow*)

Yes... he's flown off already...





FOREST ELF: Now I no longer am afraid for you.

*(Nodding his head solemnly, he walks with measured step into the thicket, and disappears. BRUSHWOOD-ELF comes running out of the forest.)*

MAVKA: You again?  
*(she starts to run away)*

BRUSHWOOD ELF *(scornfully)*

Don't run, I don't want you.  
I'd come to find Rusalka in the rye,  
But I see she's asleep already. Pity!  
But you have wilted somewhat.

MAVKA *(proudly)* So you think!

BRUSHWOOD ELF:  
So I think, you say? Well, let me see!

*(He moves towards her. MAVKA retreats.)*

But why are you so terrified, I know  
That you're betrothed.- I'm not going to attack you.

MAVKA: Be off! Don't mock me!

BRUSHWOOD ELF:  
Don't be touchy! So  
I was mistaken... Listen, Mavka, let us  
At least be brother and sister.

MAVKA: You and I?

RUSHWOOD ELF: And why should we not be? Now we're in autumn?  
For, look, even the sun has now grown cold.  
And all our blood turns chilly. You and I  
Once were good comrades, whether we but played  
Or loved, after it's hard to say. But now  
It's time for brotherhood. Give me your hand!

*(MAVKA somewhat irresolutely gives him her hand.)*

And let me place one small brotherly kiss  
Upon your poor pale face.

*(MAVKA draws away, but nevertheless, he kisses her.)*

Oh, now at once  
Flowers are blooming on that face once more,  
Fair and chaste, unperfumed, autumnal flowers...

*(without letting go of her hands, he looks round the clearing)*

Look yonder, where the gossamer is flying,  
Spiralling and circling in the air,  
And so are we...

*(He suddenly snatches her into a dance.)*

And so are we,  
Swirling and whirling.  
In circle free,  
Stars of the fairest,  
Golden sparks rarest  
Bright and lovely fires are flaring,  
All is a-glitter,  
All a-flitter  
All in an unceasing skitter!  
And so am I,  
And so am I  
And so, my love, like spark, come fly!

*(The dance whirls rapidly. Mavka's silver veil curls upwards, like a glittering snake, her black resses strum out and mingle with the fiery curls of the BRUSHWOOD ELF.)*

MAVKA: Enough, Let me go!

BRUSHWOOD ELF:

In sincere concord so  
Do not cease, love, the dance ever plying,  
Happiness may betray us:  
So revel and play now,  
Fine is that which forever is flying!

*(the dance becomes mad)*

Let us whirl,  
Let us curl,  
In the whirlwind, let us swirl,  
Let us live,  
Let us thrive,  
In fiery heaven flying!

MAVKA: Enough, let me go. I'm fainting... I'm dying.

*(her head falls on to his shoulder, her arms hang loose; BRUSHWOOD-ELF whirls her in the dance, fainting. Suddenly, from beneath the earth appears a dark, broad, terrible PHANTOM.)*

PHANTOM:                 Render unto me what is mine. Release her!

BRUSHWOOD ELF (*stops, and unclasps his arms from MAVKA; she falls powerless on to the grass*)

BRUSHWOOD ELF: Who are you?

PHANTOM:                                 Do you really not know me?  
  I am the Rock-Dweller!

(BRUSHWOOD ELF shudders, and with a swift moment, runs and disappears into the wood. MAVKA recovers consciousness, stirs a little, opens her eyes wide, and looks with terror on the PHANTOM, which stretches out its arms to grasp her.)

MAVKA:   No, I don't want to!  
  I don't want to come to you! I'm alive.

ROCK-DWELLER: I will lead you to a distant land,  
                          An unknown land, where dark and tranquil waters  
                          Peacefully spread like dead and misty eyes,  
                          Above those waters there rise silent crags,  
                          Dumb witnesses of actions dead and gone.  
                          There it is peaceful, never tree nor bough  
                          Will whisper there, thither no daydream comes,  
                          No traitor daydream to keep one from sleep,  
                          No wind will ever carry thither songs  
                          Of unfulfilled desire, no greedy flame  
                          Will ever blaze there; the sharp lightnings shatter  
                          Themselves upon those crags, and have no power  
                          To penetrate in the dense dark and peace.  
                          There I shall take you. There you shall lie down,  
                          You are pale from the fire, you faint from movement,  
                          Your happiness is shade, you live no more.

MAVKA (*rising*)                                 No, I am living! I shall live for ever.  
  My heart holds something which will never die.

PHANTOM:                 How do you know this?

MAVKA:   I know it because  
                          I love my torment and I give it life.  
                          If I could only wish I could forget,  
                          Indeed I'd be able to come with you.  
                          But there is no force in the whole wide world  
                          Which could make me wish for forgetfulness.

*(In the forest there is heard the noise of some human being approaching.)*

See, here he comes, he who gives me this torment!  
Begone, you phantom. Here he comes, my hope!

*(LUKASH emerges from the forest. MAVKA goes to meet LUKASH. Her face is deathly pale against her brilliant clothing, her great dark eyes are filled with an agonized hope her movements are abrupt and jerky, as if something is breaking inside her.)*

LUKASH:                   How grim you look! What do you want with me?

*(He hurries to the house, raps on the door, the MOTHER opens it, without coming out)*

LUKASH *(on the threshold, to MOTHER)*

Mother, please bake the loaf for the match-makers,-  
I'm sending them tomorrow to Kylyna!

*(He goes into the house. The door is closed. The ROCK-DWELLER approaches MAVKA and seizes hold of her)*

MAVKA *(tearing off the purple robe)*

Take me away! I want forgetfulness!

*(The ROCK-DWELLER touches MAVKA; with a cry, she falls into his arms; he covers her with his black robe. Together, they sink into the earth.)*

CURTAIN

*Translated by Vera Rich*



## OLEH OLZHYCH (1907–44)

Oleh Olzhych (1907–44) was the son of the Ukrainian poet and dramatist, Oleksander Oles (see *The Ukrainian Review*, no. 2, 1994, pp. 59–60). He was born on 8 July 1907 in Zhytomyr, and, from 1923, lived in Prague – at that time a major centre of Ukrainian émigré life. Here he studied Archaeology at the Charles University, eventually becoming, in 1930, an assistant lecturer in the Department of Archaeology of the Ukrainian Free University, which was located at Podebrady, near Prague, and (under his real name – Oleh Kandyba) publishing scholarly works on the ceramics of the Trypillya (Tripole) culture.

As a political activist, he devoted his life to Ukraine's national liberation struggle, working on raising the consciousness of the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia, a region with a majority population of ethnic Ukrainians, which nevertheless, after World War I, had been incorporated into the new Czechoslovak republic.

His output as a poet was fairly modest in size. During his lifetime, he published only two collections: *Rin* (Gravel), in 1935, and *Vezhi* (Towers), 1940. A third collection, *Pidzamchya* (In the shadow of the castle) was brought out posthumously, in 1946, and a number of individual poems, published in the journals of the time, still remain uncollected. His significance in the development of Ukrainian literature is, however, considerable. In particular, his various experiments in the use of language and verse-forms considerably extended the scope of the Ukrainian literary language. As one small example of his subtle understating and uses of language, we may note, for example, in the selection given here, the untitled *rhyme riche* obtain beginning “Evening, I look on the blue rock-faces”, with its grammatical “pun” – the identity of spelling (exact in Ukrainian, but differenced by an apostrophe in English) between the vocative plural and genitive singular.

In addition to his original writing, Olzhych became, in 1934, one of the editors of the Prague-based journal *Proboyem* (Breakthrough), one of the most influential publications in the Ukrainian language of the inter-war years.

During World War II, Olzhych was arrested by the Nazis, and sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he died on 9 April 1944.

### MORNING PRAYER

Not the bright peace of depths well loved and known  
Of a transparent and unsullied learning,  
Not orchid's golden inspiration, mounting  
Out of its tenderness beyond all counting, –  
Send to me, I pray, this gift alone:  
In her name boldly to bear torments burning,  
And in that dread, iron day, to pay, requiting,  
In a grey jacket from grenade-burst dying.

\* \* \*

Evening, I look on the blue rock-faces,  
Golden, the sky rests on the rock-faces.  
In the rear the fires splutter merry,  
Round the hearths are comrades, also merry.

Ah, you strange unconquerable valleys!  
The smoke pulses, flows out to the valley's  
Side, and we, tomorrow too shall flow there,  
Like a river unrestrained, shall flow there.

### THE PROPHET

No dream this of years of childhood,  
No musing of days of youthhood,  
It is long since from green uplands  
The girls came down to go dancing.

Long time past since figs were gathered,  
No more breathe the vine-boughs heavy,  
The streams flow no more with water –  
But with stone, all black and arid.

O my eyes ablaze with fire,  
And my lips grown grey and thirsty,  
That behold the bright sun only,  
So the one word, "Truth", be shouted!

So that women's faces yellow,  
So that their attire grows heavy,  
So that their wombs, moist and fruitful,  
May become like empty vine-boughs.

So that shield and armour vanish,  
Vestments be torn from the shoulders,  
And with unrelenting knife-edge,  
Men should fall upon their horses.

Clasp your hands upon your breast, then,  
And defend the soul within you –  
But let no one look for mercy –  
I a stone am from God's labour.



## YURIY LYPA

### On the 50th anniversary of his tragic death

*Petro Kindratovych*

Yuriy Lypa, poet, publicist, political activist and doctor, one of the most influential figures in Ukrainian national thought in the inter-war years, died at the hands of the communists in August, 1944.

He was born in 1900, in Odessa, the son of Ivan Lypa, himself a writer and activist, who later, in 1918, was to become a minister in the government of the short-lived independent Ukrainian National Republic. Yuriy Lypa spent the inter-war years in Poland where he studied medicine at the University of Poznan, and later worked as a doctor. During World War II, until his death, he served in the medical department of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

His published works include poetry: the collections *Svitlist* (Brightness, 1925), *Suvorist* (Severity, 1929), *Viruyu* (I believe, 1938), and an "almost complete" edition of his poems, produced in Canada, in 1967, under the auspices of the (Canadian-based) Ukrainian Medical Society, a novel *Kozaky v Moskoviyi* (Cossacks in Muscovy, 1931), a collection of essays *Bitv za ukrayynsku literaturu* (The Battle for Ukrainian Literature, 1935), and also two works on herbal medicine: *Fitoterapiya* (Phytotherapy, 1933) and *Liky pid nohamy* (Medicines Underfoot, 1943).

The memorial tribute published below is by a member of the Lviv region memorial committee set up to organise the ceremonial commemoration of his death – Ed.

August 20, 1944 marks the 50th anniversary of the heroic death at the hands of the communists of Yuriy Lypa, a great patriot and son of Ukraine, writer, publicist, historiosophist, social and political activist, theoretician of Ukrainian nationalism, participant in the struggle for national liberation, by profession a physician and a teacher of medical personnel for the medical service of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

Yuriy Lypa was born on May 5, 1900, in Odessa, the son of Ivan Lypa, a well-known writer, social and political activist, who later [in 1918] would serve as a Minister in the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The whole of Yuriy Lypa's literary output, at first poetry and later, especially, publicistics, was aimed at overcoming the feeling, held by many Ukrainians, of being "little Russians", their "national minority complex", and of creating a completely new pan-Ukrainian national and political "I", based on the joining together of all Ukrainians in the name of a common goal – the building of a great, independent Ukrainian state.



All of Lypa's patriotic, social and political activity, beginning with his induction as a Volunteer-Cossack into the Marines of the Ukrainian National Republic, and later, his illegal organisational and political work at the University of Poznan (where he was a student of medicine), the establishment in Warsaw of illegal research and publishing institutes dealing with questions of Ukrainian culture and identity, his direct active contacts with the Ukrainian insurgent movement in Volyn [Volhynia], Polissya and in Galicia from their first beginnings until the establishment of the pan-Ukrainian Ukrainian Insurgent Army, define the essence of his special national and political "I".

In his publicistic works, and especially in those which together constitute the *Trilogy of Pan-Ukrainian National and Political Thought* ("The Definition of Ukraine", "The Black Sea Doctrine", and "The Division of Russia"), Yuriy Lypa augmented the theory of Ukrainian nationalism of his predecessors and developed it to the level of contemporary needs and future prospects.

The appearance of Yuriy Lypa in Ukrainian society signified the manifestation by the Ukrainian nation of self-defence against foreign occupation, while he, Yuriy Lypa himself, has come down in history as a saviour of the Ukrainian nation.

In 1943, Yuriy Lypa left Warsaw for Ukraine, for Yavoriv. His arrival in Yavoriv fired the revolutionary spirit and insurgent movement in the area, while his tragic death invoked in the Ukrainian insurgents an upswelling of resolution, patriotism and sacrifice, and only reinforced their desire for vengeance.

From his arrival in Yavoriv in the spring of 1943, Lypa closely associated his life and activity with the Ukrainian insurgent movement: he was constantly involved in the training of nurses and paramedics for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and he himself treated members of that army in the villages and forests of the Yavoriv region, carried out specialist medical consultations, and prepared leaflets and appeals for the insurgents. At the beginning of July, 1944, when the Lviv region was under bombardment [by the Soviet Red Army] he categorically refused to go to the West; he and his family moved to the village of Buniv, near Yavoriv, from where he went to the village of Ivanyky, three kilometres from Buniv, which was the base of the UPA unit of Petrenko and a branch of the Ukrainian Red Cross and the insurgents' regional hospital.

Prior to the arrival of the NKVD, the UPA group made a tactical withdrawal into the Yavoriv forest. Lypa refused to go with them, hoping that by masquerading as a villager he could survive this critical moment. This was a fatal mistake, which cost him his life, and robbed Ukraine of a patriot, philosopher and great human being.

On August 19, 1944, at around mid-day, the NKVD ambushed him at a farm in Ivanyky, where his wife and two children were living. He was taken for interrogation to the neighbouring village of Shutova where he was killed the next day.

The villagers found his body under some builders' rubble, and buried it clandestinely in the Buniv cemetery. For a short time, there was a birch cross on his

grave, but the communists tore it down. The patriotic villagers of Buniv quietly kept watch over the grave, trying to keep the communists from finding out who was buried there, for fear they would desecrate it. The grave was preserved, and since 1989, it has been marked by two crosses, a birch one erected by the people of Buniv, and an oaken one from his daughter, Marta.

### SAINT GEORGE

Nation, that was born of fire indeed,  
Nation, mighty nation, watch and pray;  
Radiant-armoured George, as in old days,  
Once more sits upon his mighty steed;  
A white avalanche, it seems, now speeds,  
The crags' echoes make small hearts afraid,  
Mist of poison scatters and recedes  
From the radiance of that wondrous face;  
Nation that was born of fire indeed,  
Thy George comes now, resurrected bright,  
See how he reins in his mighty steed,  
Stretches out his arm to heaven's height.

### CURSE

To homeless dogs that lick the bone of drought,  
Do Thou grant shelter, Lord, in a warm refuge;  
Show to the muddy toads a bunch of leaves,  
And to the skylarks show their thorny nests.

But to those who sow rottenness of evils,  
The murderers of souls, appear in wrath,  
Pointing a road that has no further end –  
Let them, with faces lunatic from fear,  
Depart from out their own true native Land,  
And find no other through eternity.



## TWO LITTLE-KNOWN BELARUSIAN-UKRAINIAN CULTURAL CONTACTS

*Usievalad Rahojsa*

Until very recently, the name of the poet Hryts Chuprynka would have meant virtually nothing to the Belarusian reader. Even in Ukraine, this talented poet could only be mentioned, during the Soviet era, in a negative sense. But the history of Chuprynka's connections with Belarusian literature goes back a long way. Thus, even at the very beginning of the twentieth century, the Belarusian writer and *litterateur* Siarhiey Palujan became a friend of the Ukrainian poet. They were by no means of equal age – Palujan was younger than his Ukrainian brother-writer by eleven years. What was it that united them? Evidently, the unity of their views on national and political issues, the closeness of their literary and aesthetic tastes, and their work together for the Kyiv newspaper *Ukrayinska Khata*, from its very foundation in 1909.

Palujan was a lonely figure. The son of a poor Paleussian landowner, he had been thrown out of the family home by his father, on account of his commitment to the Belarusian revival and the dream of a future national, democratic and free Belarus. He made his way to Kyiv, the nearest centre of intellectual life, where he eked out a precarious living as a journalist. His friendship with Chuprynka seems to have been the one bright spot in his existence – indeed the strength of the bond between these two impoverished writers is witnessed by the fact that at one point they made a kind of undated suicide pact: if at some time one of them decided to kill himself, so would the other. And, indeed, in 1910, losing hope in a better future, and having no reliable material support, Siarhiey Palujan did, indeed, commit suicide. But, just at that time, Chuprynka had found the support he needed – first and foremost in the person of an unexpected benefactor, Oleksa Kovalenko, who collected and published at his own expense all the poet's works. It was probably this fact which kept Chuprynka from keeping his pledge to Palujan and committing suicide, and allowed him to live another eleven difficult, but fruitful, years.

Nevertheless, Chuprynka clearly was not easy in his conscience about surviving his friend, as the following poem reveals – a poem dedicated to Palujan, and entitled "At a comrade's grave"

Speak to me from the grave, friend, tell me rightly,  
Is it worth so to abide  
In that faith so holy, so glowing, so mighty,  
In which you lived and you died?

Speak truly from your long home, tell the reason, –  
Is it worth so this life to lose –  
Or should one, despairing, turn towards treason,  
And betraying so, other gods choose?

For, without will or power, long we were roaming,  
With shards of the faith of warriors long-past,  
Like living corpses without death nor tombing,  
Seeking with the dead to be at last.

I know that faith is no more needful, even,  
For him who like sleepwalker, in the mist roams,  
But is it now surging and surging to heaven  
Or with the worthless corpse hid in the tomb?

\*

In the Lviv Museum of Ukrainian Art there is preserved a painting by Taras Shevchenko – a portrait of his father. On a fairly small piece of paper, mounted on white card, is a pen-and-wash ink full-length picture of the poet's father – a typical Ukrainian peasant of that time in a shirt, with a wide girdle, and wide "Zaporozhian" trousers, tucked into boots. Under the painting is written in Ukrainian: "This is my father".

Today even the museum staff do not know how one of the earliest paintings of the Ukrainian poet and artist came into their collection. We can learn about this, however, from a short item published in 1921 in the Belarusian newspaper *Kryvica*.

The portrait of Shevchenko's father was presented to the Lviv Museum of Ukrainian Art by the famous Belarusian scholar, archaeologist and activist, and founder of the Belarusian Museum in Vilnius, Ivan Luckievic. Shevchenko had painted the portrait of his father in 1829, in Vilnius, when he came there, as a fifteen-year-old serf-boy, in the entourage of his master, Engelhardt. The latter, who had noticed the boy's talent and who felt it would be an asset to have a trained artist among his serfs, sent Shevchenko to study painting with Professor Jan Rustem of Vilnius University. During his stay in Vilnius, Shevchenko kept the picture of his father, mounted in a frame, hanging in his room. But when he left with Engelhardt for St Petersburg, it was left behind, and sold off together with the furniture and other effects. For some years, the portrait of Shevchenko senior adorned a Jewish shop, where it eventually caught the eye of Luckievic, who acquired it and returned it to Ukraine. ■

## KINGIR, 1954

This year, in addition to the anniversaries of such major figures in Ukrainian history and culture as the bicentenary of the death of the philosopher Hryhoriy Skovoroda, the fiftieth anniversary of the death of the head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi, and of writers Oleksander Oles, Oleh Olzhych and Yuriy Lypa, Ukrainians throughout the world have been paying tribute to the memory of some 500 Ukrainian women, who in 1954 were crushed to death by Soviet tanks, during a protest strike in the concentration camp, at Kingir, Kazakhstan.

## MEDITATION

*On the death of 500 Ukrainian women, crushed to death  
by Soviet tanks, during a strike in the concentration  
camp of Kingir, Kazakhstan, 1954.*

So always she has fought,  
Woman against the dark, the cold, the hunger  
That draw a steely ring round the lighted hearth,  
Fighting for child, for husband, sweetheart, brother,  
And from the dawn of chaos, building life  
Out of the shreds and nothings of the void.  
She has fought hunger in the miles of bread-queues,  
Has wrestled death back from a midnight cradle,  
She lives, her tenderness to sheathe the sword  
Of tempered spirit burnished into fight.

So always she has fought,  
And when the dark, the cold, the hunger threaten  
Ranged in the massing ranks of tyranny,  
She fights, no more for life, but a dearer freedom,  
Nurse, messenger or soldier, takes her stand  
Fighting beside her brothers; some in secret,  
Some in the glory of a heroic scaffold,  
Starvation, or the dawn-lit firing party,  
Her soul alive and free, she laughs at death.

So always she has fought,  
And these five hundred, ranked in a hopeless chain,  
Clasped hands against the grinding wheels of death.  
A last calm stand, the hopeless for the hopeless,  
Vain sacrifice, the doomed to save the doomed,  
What of their glory? Not the emblazoned name,  
The portrait shrined by future generations,  
The medals voted tear-proud relatives –  
Joined in the anonymity of death  
They have no names but “sister”, “wife” and “mother”,  
No dying dreams of family or home,  
But a sure smile that clasps a martyred nation,  
Gathers the last soul orphaned of its freedom  
And, in defiance of sharp-gear'd destruction  
Cries: “You that shall triumph – are our eternal children !”

*Vera Rich*

Reprinted from *Portents and Images*,  
London, 1963.

## News From Ukraine

### Politics

#### Ukrainian TV-Radio Boss Fired

KYIV, August 30 — President Kuchma sacked the president of the state broadcasting company — “Derzhtele-radio” — in an attempt to give Ukraine’s dull, Soviet-style television and radio a facelift, his spokesman said.

“It’s been necessary for a long time to start transforming state television into something contemporary and competitive”, Mykhailo Doroshenko, press secretary, said.

Kuchma appointed Kyiv newspaper editor Oleksander Savenko, 39, to replace veteran Mykola Okhmayevych, who headed the state radio and television company for 15 years. He has come under sharp attacks by many Ukrainian broadcast journalists for hampering the development of the credible Ukrainian television and radio company. Okhmayevych reportedly remained in the position so long because of his close relations with former president Leonid Kravchuk.

The broadcasting company’s vice president, Zynoviy Kulyk, said that only more money, not new leadership, would bring real changes.

“Trying to reform Ukrainian television is absolutely hopeless. The system is stronger than any new leadership. It needs to be rebuilt from the bottom up”, Kulyk told Reuters.

Kuchma blasted state television during the presidential campaign last spring, accusing it of devoting most of its air time to his opponent, incumbent Leonid Kravchuk.

Ukrainian television has changed little since Soviet times, when it was an arm of the Communist Party’s propaganda machine. Nightly news broadcasts include long features on farming and culture, with minimal political analysis or talk shows.

Most viewers get their news from the Russian Ostankino station which is broadcast throughout the former USSR.

#### Udoenko Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs

KYIV — Hennadiy Udoenko, former long-time permanent representative of Ukraine at the United Nations, has been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by President Kuchma as he continues to replace members of the Cabinet of Ministers with his own appointees.

The appointment of Udoenko, who, until recently, was Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland, must be con-

firmed by the Parliament when it returns from its summer break in mid-September.

Udovenko, who was born in 1931 in Kryvyi Rih, is a career foreign service officer and diplomat. He has held the diplomatic rank of extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador since 1985 and was deputy foreign minister in 1980-85.

He graduated from the Department of International Relations at the Taras Shevchenko Kyiv State University in 1954. His first assignment was with the Ukrainian Scholarly-Research Institute of Economics and Agriculture.

Udovenko's first major diplomatic post came in 1965, when he was assigned to the United Nations office in Geneva. In 1977 he began working with the UN Secretariat in New York.

From 1985 to 1992 Udovenko was the permanent representative of Ukraine at the United Nations, eventually becoming one of the senior diplomats at the international body. After the declaration of Ukrainian independence on 24 August 1991, Udovenko, the dean of the Ukrainian diplomatic corps, became the *de facto* chief representative of Ukraine in the United States. During the early months of Ukraine's independence he divided his time between working at the United Nations and travelling to Washington to present Ukrainian views on key issues of the day.

In September 1992 Udovenko was named Ukrainian ambassador to Poland.

In the course of his diplomatic career, Udovenko represented Ukraine at many international organi-

sations and at various sessions of the United Nations. He chaired meetings of the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council. He also served as chairman of various special economic and political committees of the General Assembly.

On the eve of the third anniversary of Ukrainian independence, editors of the Ukrainian newspaper *Homin* in Poland asked him about Ukrainian-Russian relations. He replied, "I want to emphasise that our cooperation with Russia will only be built on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of our state. At the same time we will develop our relations with other European countries".

The official announcement of Udovenko's appointment stated that the previous foreign minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, was replaced in view of a new assignment, which official sources said will be an ambassadorial post.

### **Civilian Named Defence Minister**

KYIV — For the first time in the recent history of Ukraine, a civilian has been named the country's Minister of Defence. President Leonid Kuchma appointed Valeriy Shmarov, a native of the Vinnytsia region, to the post on Friday, August 26, pending parliamentary ratification on September 15, when the legislature convenes.

Shmarov, 49, who until recently was deputy minister in charge of the military-industrial complex and defence conversion, was born in 1945.



An engineer by profession, Shmarov graduated from Kyiv State University in 1972. He spent most of his career in the defence industry. He worked as a director of a Kyiv defence plant from 1987-92. From 1992-93 he was the first deputy chairman of the National Space Agency of Ukraine.

Shmarov's predecessor, General Vitaliy Radetskyi, who succeeded independent Ukraine's first defence minister General Kostyantyn Morozov in October 1993, was relieved pending reassignment.

### **Pynzenyk Named Kuchma's Adviser**

KYIV – President Leonid Kuchma, due to present an economic reform package to parliament, created on September 16 a council of economic advisers to help elaborate policies.

Kuchma issued a series of decrees setting up the nine-member council dominated by reform-minded economists.

Its most prominent member is Viktor Pynzenyk, a member of parliament and a former deputy prime minister who last year quit the government of Kuchma's predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, saying he was being hindered in proceeding with reforms.

Other members include the head of one of Ukraine's largest banks and top academics.

### **Kravchuk Wins Seat in Parliament**

KYIV – Leonid Kravchuk, the former first president of Ukraine to be popularly elected after independence, won a seat from western Ukraine in the country's parliament on September 25.

Kravchuk said the following day he wanted to help the current administration to develop Ukrainian statehood.

Kravchuk, who was beaten in the July presidential elections by Leonid Kuchma, won the seat in a single run-off election with 87 per cent of the vote in Terebovlya.

Kravchuk's challenger for a seat in the 450-seat parliament, Mykola Novosilskyi, a candidate of the Ukrainian Conservative-Republican Party, headed by Stepan Khmara, got only 10 per cent of the votes, said Valentyn Kirnenko, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission. Unlike many recent elections in Ukraine, turnout in the western Ternopil region was high, with 85 per cent of the eligible voters casting ballots.

Kravchuk, 60, said he intends to establish his own political party and rebuild his power base.

"I plan to create a union of patriotic, democratic and centrist forces, which unite a wide political spectrum... I don't plan on joining the right or the left – the centrists appeal to me most", Kravchuk said. "I don't think I would like to be in opposition. To the contrary – in parliament I want to help the government and the president to develop Ukrainian statehood".

Kravchuk declined to pass judgement on Kuchma's tenure in office, saying "one does not criticise the president's first 100 days". But he said the same problems he faced as president remain, and gave that as his reason for running for a parliamentary seat. "Ukraine needs to be

protected and my goal is to continue working for the good of Ukraine – no matter in what position”.

“Victory is always pleasant. The main thing is that I have found proof that people still value my work of the past three years. And it also proves that people still value independence”.

Kravchuk is the 393rd member of Ukraine's first democratically elected parliament. The remaining 57 seats in parliament will be filled with elections in November.

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### **Foreign Affairs**

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#### **Baltic-Black Seas Alliance Seen as Hope Against Russian Expansion**

KYIV — Feeling threatened by Russia's newest imperial device, encapsulated in the concept called the “Eurasian Region”, seven Ukrainian political parties, among them the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), and political institutions from eastern Europe have formed a Baltic-Black Seas Alliance to thwart a possible rejuvenated expansion by Moscow from eastern Europe to Vladivostok.

Called in translation “League of Parties Between the Seas”, its founders expressed hope that it will be transformed into a bulwark against Moscow's imperialistic drives. The Eurasian Region, an arrangement which has its supporters in the new Kyiv government, with a political centre in Moscow, they fear,

would return Russia to its previous dominant position in the region.

Mykhailo Horyn, chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party and a former people's deputy, said the signing ceremony on July 30 in the former premises of the Central Rada of 1917-20, was an historic event. Horyn, one of the promoters of the alliance, explained that one of the goals of this parliamentary-based alliance is to institute closer contacts and cooperation between political parties in the Baltic-Black Seas region.

“After many years this is an attempt to create a commonwealth and an expression of mutual interests and desires to remain independent states and to prohibit neoimperialism”, Horyn said.

“Actually this is a counterbalance to Russian imperialism. This is an association to disassociate ourselves from Russia”, observed Bohdan Pavliv, second vice-president of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists.

Pavliv further noted that it would be inappropriate to overlook organisations such as the Antibolshevik Bloc of Nations, which should exist as long as there are Ukrainian colonies inside the Russian Federation. “Everything that is directed against the empire should be welcomed”, he said.

Instead of submitting themselves to a process of integration with Russia, the representatives of the political parties have set their sights on integration in central and eastern Europe, which would consolidate as reality the statehood of its members.

Among the Ukrainian political parties present at the signing were KUN, the

Ukrainian Republican Party, the Democratic Party of Ukraine, Rukh, the Party of Greens, the Party of the Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine, and the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine.

The non-Ukrainian parties which joined the League included: the National Front of Belarus, the United Democratic Party of Belarus, "Fatherland" (Estonia), For the Fatherland and Freedom, the National Conservative Party (Latvia), the Conservative Party of Lithuania, the Lithuanian National Association, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, the Republican Party of Poland (Third Force), and the Third Movement of the Republic (of Poland).

Also present were representatives of political parties in Bulgaria and Romania, who, along with counterparts from other central and east European political institutions, are expected to join the League in the near future.

The alliance's founding document states:

"In order to coordinate the efforts to strengthen peace, security and multilateral cooperation in central and eastern Europe, acknowledging the importance of political guarantees of these processes, we, representatives of political parties in the countries between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas, declare the establishment of the League of Parties of Countries in the Baltic-Black-Adriatic Region (Between the Seas).

The League is a voluntary association of political parties that have representatives in the parliaments of their respective countries.

The political parties, which acceded to this document agree to:

Conduct regular inter-partisan consultations about the most important questions of international bilateral and multilateral relations.

Establish a permanent representative, consultative organ from among the representatives of the parties, which acceded to this document.

Through partisan factions in the parliaments of their countries:

To encourage the development of bilateral and multilateral relations among the countries Between the Seas.

To encourage the expansion of cooperation between the countries Between the Seas and the countries of the European Union".

As regards the League's premise as a counterbalance to the Eurasian Region, the section dealing with the goals and purposes states:

"Encourage military cooperation of the states Between the Seas.

Conduct a wide-scale information campaign regarding the baseless attempts by official diplomatic circles of Russia to endow the CIS, which is not a state, with the status of a subject of international rights.

Oppose attempts by Russia, as an imperial recidivist, to have its armed forced declared United Nations peacekeeping forces.

Support the demands by political parties in Estonia, Latvia, Belarus and Ukraine for the withdrawal of Russian military units from the territories of these independent states.

Support the idea of a demilitarised Kaliningrad Oblast".

During the press conference at the conclusion of the signing ceremony, Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Democratic Association "Ukraine",

stated: "Many forces have joined the efforts to save the empire. However, without Ukraine, the empire cannot exist. Consequently, those forces want to include Ukraine in the Eurasian Region. We have united in order to include ourselves in Europe because the geographical centre of Europe is in Ukraine".

Among the League's immediate goals are to publish the proceedings of the inaugural conference, establish the groundwork for the upcoming conference, which will be held in Poland, expand its membership throughout central and eastern Europe as well as Scandinavia. The League is also planning to form an interparliamentary commission on ethnic minority rights. Between conferences the League will be rotationally administered by each national representation.

Based on its strong desire to become a full-fledged member of the European Community, when asked about Russia's possible membership, the political leaders unanimously stated that, because of Moscow's Asiatic slant, it cannot attempt to join the League.

Regarding Kuchma's views on Ukraine's regional role, the President of Ukraine expressed his views at a July 22 meeting with the foreign diplomatic corps based in Kyiv. He said, "Let's not fool ourselves with the question where is Ukraine heading, west or east. Ukraine does not need to head anywhere. It is there, where history and geography, and, allow me, God, placed it — at the edge between Europe and that, which today is called the Eurasian continent. Ukraine should not be a buffer, but a useful bridge, a useful liaison".

## **Chinese President Meets with Kuchma; Two Leaders Pledge Tight Relations**

KYIV — Chinese President Jiang Zemin spent almost an hour in private talks with President Leonid Kuchma shortly after arriving here on Tuesday afternoon, September 6, for a three-day visit to Ukraine.

The two leaders confirmed their intent to strengthen an already solid relationship between China and Ukraine, a Chinese official said. "Our goal is to work together with Kuchma in mutually convenient relations that will bring us into the 21st century", Wu Jianmin, head of the Chinese delegation's information service, told journalists after the meeting.

The two countries are already major trading partners, with yearly trade equalling almost \$600 million, up 77 per cent from last year. It was confirmed that Ukraine would not recognise Taiwan or post representatives there, Wu said.

The two countries signed five documents on Tuesday. These included a cooperation agreement between the two presidents, an agreement on naval trade and shipping, on postal and electronic communication, and on cooperation between the interior and foreign ministries.

Jiang is still scheduled to meet with parliamentary speaker Oleksander Moroz and with Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol. Also scheduled is a visit to an electronic welding plant.

China is one of Ukraine's largest trading partners, according to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, which hopes the Chinese summit will solidify relations and boost trade.

"We put enormous hope on the results of this visit, that they will be successful and that we will be able to deepen our relations with China", Oleksander Nikonenko, deputy head of the Far East Administration at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, told a press briefing earlier on Tuesday.

This means increasing the current trade turnover to bring it up to \$3.5 billion by the end of this century. "Today China is our main trading partner in all of Asia as far as volume is concerned", he said.

Nikonenko declined to give any concrete details on Ukrainian-Chinese trade in the area of military hardware or to confirm whether any military deals will be signed while the Chinese delegation is in Ukraine.

"The question of military technology will be raised", said Nikonenko. "One could say both sides would be interested in an agreement, but none has been planned for this visit".

Jiang flew to Kyiv from four days in Russia, which began with a Kremlin summit with President Boris Yeltsin and ended with a trip to the Ural Mountain city of Yekaterinburg. The Chinese-Russian summit produced a new declaration of cooperation, a border accord, and an agreement on missile detargeting. The two countries also discussed increasing their trade, which is down 40 per cent from last year's \$7.7 billion peak.

## **Ukraine Keeps CIS at Arms' Length**

MOSCOW — Despite President Leonid Kuchma's campaign pledges to bring Ukraine closer to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent

States, the Ukrainian delegation here for a CIS head of governments meeting shocked the participants by refusing to sign two of three documents.

Ukraine made it clear on Friday, September 9, that it would seek to maintain its detached stance within the CIS. At the first meeting of CIS premiers since July's election of Kuchma, Ukraine shied away from aspects of plans for developing ties within the Moscow-dominated bloc.

"Russia has to understand that there is no alternative to an independent, integral Ukraine. There is no return to the past. There can be no return to supranational structures in their old form", Ukraine's acting Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko told reporters.

Journalists covering the meeting highlighted in their stories the conflicts between Ukraine and Russia. Reuters, for one, wrote, "Disagreements have focused on the Black Sea fleet, Ukrainian payments for energy supplies and other strategic issues. Kuchma, elected in July, predicated his campaign on building an economic union with Russia to reestablish broken Soviet era economic ties. Some Russian leaders said Kuchma would be more "realistic" in economic policy and in his approach to the CIS. However, once elected, he also made clear Ukraine would pursue independent policies".

Ukraine declined to sign a draft agreement on the creation of a payments union between the 12 members of the CIS, saying it would be premature. "Each country will participate in this union taking account of its own national interests", Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol told reporters.

Ukraine also declined to embrace the provisions of a draft memorandum on the development of CIS integration, which sought, among other things, to foster military political cooperation.

"The direction of our cooperation is exclusively in the area of military technology. That is, there is no question of joint military action or of a military union", said Ukrainian First Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Bizhan.

Kyiv also disagreed with a provision envisaging joint control of CIS borders, insisting this was an internal matter for each state, and on proposals for joint peacekeeping within the Commonwealth.

However, Ukraine did agree to sign an agreement to create a CIS inter-state economic committee, the first body within the CIS to have supranational powers. Each country's power within the committee, which will be able to enforce decisions on signatories, will depend on its "economic weight". Officials said Russia would have 50 per cent of the votes out of 80 per cent needed to pass decisions, compared with a 14 per cent share for Ukraine.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan did not sign the agreement. "Our parliament has not given me powers to sign this document", Azerbaijan's Prime Minister Suren Huseinov told reporters. "The idea of this committee as a controlling and executive organ does not correspond to Azerbaijan's interests". Turkmenistan's delegation members said they would decide whether to join in the CIS premiers' summit due in October.

Masol explained that Ukraine needed to sign this document

because it gave Ukraine's producers access to Russian markets.

The Interstate Economic Committee will coordinate energy, transport and communications ties and control common property of the CIS countries. But it will also be authorised to enforce some decisions in those CIS members which had delegated powers to it.

"For the first time, leaders of the states will have to pluck up courage and responsibility and abandon a part of their national functions... and determine the limits of the powers which they agree to pass over to the committee", CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya said in a statement.

"Russia will always be able to find another state, a companion, to ensure a decision is passed", Russian CIS Minister Vladimir Mashchits told reporters.

Explaining the reason for the payments union, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Shokhin told reporters, "The creation of a payments union on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements will create a monetary system not worse than in the European Union".

Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, pushing the concept of deeper integration, told the meeting that improving ties between the republics was an urgent task. "It took 35 years to create the European Union; we do not have that time", he said in an opening address.

### **Udoenko Outlines Independent Ukrainian Foreign Policy**

UNITED NATIONS – Setting Ukraine's foreign policy goals and priorities at the 49th Session of the General Assembly

of the United Nations, Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko emphasised that Kyiv rejects external pressure and polarisation and will conduct its own, independent foreign platform.

Udovenko, speaking on Wednesday, September 28, in the General Assembly, where he had served for many years as Permanent Representative of Ukraine, listed many factors which contributed to drastic, yet positive, transformations around the world. However, he underscored that one recent development will not change: Ukraine will not lose its independence.

"The state policy of Ukraine will be consistently based on that authority which was established by the Ukrainian people when it almost unanimously confirmed its choice of independent development during the national referendum held in December 1991. This reality is predominant and rumours that Ukraine will eventually lose its sovereignty are absolutely unfounded. We will continue to follow the path of building an independent state and a return to the situation that prevailed in the former USSR is impossible", Udovenko said in the opening minutes of his speech.

Udovenko outlined for the international diplomatic corps a foreign policy, which will accentuate bi- and multilateral relations with individual countries and regions rather than a merely strong association with Russia. Answering a rhetorical question which is on the minds of many statesmen, namely, where is independent Ukraine heading, Udovenko said:

"Today, the world is becoming more integrated, and political marks

of geographical affiliation of countries disappear step-by-step. Ukraine, like any other state, cannot just simply 'go' East or West. It is there, where it has been for ages and where it will stay forever. Its many tasks as an historically old but politically young state consists of integrating gradually in the European and world political, economic, humanitarian and other processes as a reliable link in a new global system of international relations".

Ukraine intends to develop "mutually beneficial and equitable cooperation" with Russia and the other countries of the CIS, but among equally important target countries and regions that Udovenko listed are: the United States, Germany, Canada, countries of Central and Eastern Europe, countries of Asia, China and Japan, as well as other countries of the Pacific Rim, Africa and Latin America.

"That is to say that the sphere of our interests is very large. I would like to emphasise that on the international level, Ukraine will protect its national interests, including economic ones, with increasing dynamism and pragmatism", he added.

At the same time, Udovenko continued, Ukraine reserves the right to make "corrections", in its foreign policy which despite domestic changes "remains as President Leonid Kuchma stated predictable, consistent and weighted".

Though Ukraine is committed to carrying out its foreign obligations, Udovenko said that the country is facing many domestic problems

which affect the pace of implementing its promises. "The wave of political romanticism gave way to severe hardships in the political, social and economic lives of the newly-independent states, which emerged out of the former Soviet Union", he observed.

Borrowing from two popular novels, Udovenko characterised the mood in those countries as "great expectations, gone with the wind".

Udovenko noted that neither those problems nor that mood bypassed Ukraine and, while the country is struggling to fulfil its pledges, it only recently experienced foreign understanding of its fate. Despite these good intentions, Ukraine is encountering reluctance on the part of its foreign partners to appreciate the essence of its difficulties.

"The reality of the current situation of Ukraine consists of the fact that so far we still are under pressure and suspicion from the outside, and sometimes we encounter open reluctance to understand the essence of problems we face", Udovenko said.

Ukraine's goal is to overcome the "economic crisis, normalise the social and economic situation, create favourable domestic and international conditions for gradually raising living standards of the population", he indicated. To accomplish this task, he urged, Ukraine needs foreign investments, which should be attractive to the international community "because, owing to its geopolitical situation, the establishment of Ukraine as a sovereign and economically powerful state is one of the important factors of securing

peace and stability on the European continent".

Udovenko called economic support for Ukraine an "investment into the strengthening of international security".

The collapse of the Soviet Russian empire led to the establishment of many countries that are in transition to market economies, among them Ukraine, the Minister said. However, rather than helping these countries in transition, the economic powers restrict their aid to polite diplomatic declarations, he charged. "It seems that donor-states, while declaring their support for the implementation of reforms in countries in transition, nevertheless are too cautious in providing adequate support to specific projects in Eastern Europe and CIS countries. Such an attitude is becoming a serious problem", Udovenko explained.

Ukraine expects that international organisations, such as the World Trade Organization and GATT, will create a favourable trade climate for boosting exports from countries of that region, "particularly Ukraine", he urged.

As part of its international obligations, Ukraine is contributing its troops to the UN Peacekeeping Forces in the former Yugoslavia, where nine of its soldiers have been killed and 30 wounded. While Ukraine does not intend to renege on this or other world-wide commitments, Udovenko requested UN understanding that the sanctions imposed on the Balkans have cost Ukraine \$4 billion in lost business. "Collective actions aimed at imple-



menting coercive measures cannot be carried out on such an unfair basis. This increases the danger of losing confidence in the institute of sanctions", he warned.

Due to the changing nature of international peacekeeping operations, Udovenko said, Ukraine is proposing the establishment of rapid deployment forces, "which would recruit volunteers and have an ex-territorial nature. Ukraine has already declared its readiness to take part in this process".

Turning to security matters, Udovenko said that Ukraine, as a European country, is deeply concerned with this issue. At a time when the Partnership for Peace, NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and even the United Nations are becoming incapable of guaranteeing peace and security, Udovenko stated that Ukraine "strongly supports initiatives aimed at all-European cooperation in different fields, including security".

"Ukraine advocates exactly such an approach, i.e., strengthening partnership and cooperation in an all-European dimension, instead of searching for new geometrical figures, which, in fact, would secure division of the small as it is, in respect of global scale, European continent", he said.

One step in this direction is "confidence building" in the Black Sea region, Udovenko noted. "This region is extremely important for us as a crossroads between Europe and Asia, North and South. Elaboration and implementation of specific confidence-building measures in military and political fields in the Black Sea

would promote good neighbourly relations, political and economic cooperation of Black Sea countries".

As for Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, which Udovenko said has been consistently on the minds of the international community, the Minister attempted to calm global anxieties about Kyiv's plans. "It should be emphasised that Ukraine is the first state in the world which voluntarily and unilaterally assumed the obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons located on its territory", he said.

Pointing out that Ukraine means to become a non-nuclear state, Udovenko said that before parliament ratifies this decision, Kyiv requires an agreement from the nuclear states guaranteeing the national security of Ukraine.

"Ukraine stands for corresponding guarantees which are to be multilateral and addressed directly to Ukraine as the state, which for the first time in history, on its own, is getting rid of nuclear weapons; these guarantees should provide a mechanism of consultations which could come into play should the security of Ukraine be threatened. In this process, we attach great importance to the United Nations as the most authoritative international organisation", Udovenko remarked.

### **Kuchma's Chief of Staff Discusses Bilateral Relations**

WASHINGTON, DC – Dmytro Tabachnyk, President Kuchma's Chief of Staff, at 31, is one of the youngest people in Ukrainian politics.

Visiting the United States to discuss with the White House staff and the

State Department the upcoming visit of Ukraine's president, Tabachnyk took time to speak at a press conference at the National Press Club on Thursday, September 29. He was escorted by the chargé d'affaires of the Ukrainian Embassy, Valeriy Kuchynskyi, and press attaché, Dmytro Markov, who acted as interpreter.

Tabachnyk discussed the politics of Ukraine's current administration. "Ukraine celebrated its third anniversary of independence and for the first time in its history there was a democratic change in all the branches of government. This has proved that democratic reforms in Ukraine are very viable", Tabachnyk said.

However, because of the changes he is often asked what changes there will be in the country's foreign policy. Will it lean more to the East or to the West?

To answer this question, Tabachnyk used an excerpt from President Kuchma's campaign statement, saying "Ukraine will not lean this way, or that. Ukraine will stay where it is, according to its destiny, its history and geography".

Tabachnyk went on to say that the world is changing and policies must change in order to accommodate those changes but one thing will always remain the same and this is the devotion and loyalty to the idea of the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine.

The Kuchma administration is introducing certain changes in its policy towards the Russian Federation and other countries of the CIS, which will be orientated towards mutual equality and interest. However, he noted, "no matter how our relations

continue to develop, it will in no way affect our attitude towards our relationship with the West".

In principle, he said, Kuchma is very interested in continuing to develop relations with the West, in particular the United States, Germany and Canada.

"If I were asked what was the main difference between the new leadership and the one before it, I would say that the period of romanticism is over. The new government will be approaching solutions to all problems from a pragmatic position of common sense and the economic value of the decision which is made".

Responding to a question about Ukraine's reaction to the possible influence of Russia on Ukraine, Tabachnyk answered that "Ukraine will be choosing its own partners and will develop its own world outlook".

When asked about Russian President Boris Yeltsin's postponement of his trip to Ukraine, Tabachnyk explained that both presidents felt that they could attain a higher level of summitry if they were to delay it for a few more weeks.

Discussing whether President Kuchma will be accorded the same diplomatic courtesies as was his Russian counterpart, including a state dinner, Tabachnyk said that Vice-President Gore indicated during his visit to Kyiv that Ukraine was a high priority for Washington. Tabachnyk expected that similar protocols will be observed and the visit would be on as high a level as Yeltsin's visit. ■

## Books & Periodicals

### **Trevor Taylor, EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION – Dangers, Opportunities, Gambles, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994, 176 pp, £9.95**

This is an unashamedly Western-orientated book. Its aim is to determine and analyse the new security issues which the West must address, as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union. At the same time it focuses on the potential impact of three factors “carried forward” from the Cold War – “the role of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a sort of successor entity to the Soviet Union, the importance of the Russian government, and the centrality of NATO to Western policies”.

Taylor is concerned, therefore, with identifying military threats and security risks as seen from a Western perspective. At the outset, he rejects the possibility of a frontal attack by an ex-Soviet state on the heartland of the West as “remote”. Only Russia has the conventional forces which could attempt such a penetration, and the disruption in both the Russian defence industry and its conscription arrangements make – for the moment – such an attack seem remote, particularly as – from the end of 1994 onwards –, to reach the west of heartland Europe, this putative invasion force would have to cross Belarus, Ukraine and Poland. But Taylor is not blind to the possibility of a flanking attack. He rejects the triumphalism of “one Ukrainian author”, who claimed that “The Soviet threat to the West which existed for over seven decades, was removed at one stroke by the December 1991 vote by Ukraine for independence”. Two NATO states, Norway and Turkey, he points out, still share a common border with the states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) – one of them, Norway, with Russia itself. The Norwegians are still very concerned, Taylor says, about the concentration of Russian forces in the Kola peninsula.

But even ruling out as remote the likelihood of a head-on clash of arms with the West, Russia inevitably poses the greatest threat to European security. Not only on account of its sheer territorial size and its inheritance of the lion's share of the former Soviet war machine – but also because of what it insists on terming the “near abroad”, both to “maintain stability” in contiguous states and also to defend the interests of persons “ethnically and culturally” identified with Russia. There remains, too, the threat of Russia's nuclear arsenal. Even when the START-2 agreement is implemented (and implementation could well be delayed), Russia will

have more than three thousand strategic nuclear warheads. Even if the possibility of a direct nuclear attack by Russia on the West seems, at the moment, in Taylor's words, not "a realistic option", there is, he argues, the danger of a launch unsanctioned by the political or military leadership. Either a small, desperate, even insane element in the CIS armed forces (military supporters of Zhirinovskiy, maybe?) might "try to cause chaos" by launching a strategic nuclear weapon (Taylor is clearly sceptical of Russian assurances that the presidential "nuclear button" is sufficient to prevent such an occurrence) – or else such a weapon could be launched by accident. He cites an incident in March 1994 when "a Russian soldier, apparently a mentally deranged recruit from Dagestan, went on the rampage at a nuclear missile installation, and killed several people... [T]here were real fears that a bullet hitting a missile could have ignited the fuel". (Even more alarming, as we close for press, reports are coming in of a Russian nuclear base having its electricity supply cut off, for failure to pay the bill – and control over the missiles being, apparently, lost!) Taylor, following Bruce Blair (*The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War*, Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., 1993) considers that, at the time of writing (June 1994) the possibility of a loss of Russian central control over these weapons must be a "concern for the West", but is not, at present, an "alarming one".

A greater threat, Taylor says, is the physical deterioration of the existing weapons – leading to an explosion and the radioactive contamination of East, Central and possibly Western Europe. This was, of course, one of the main arguments used both by the Russians and by Western "experts" to urge the early removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine. The tacit assumption in such arguments was that the Russians had the know-how to keep their warheads safe until they were eventually dismantled, and it was only the Ukrainians, who had never been trusted by the Soviets with such sensitive information, who were unable to deal with the safety of the missiles they had inherited. He cites a leading Russian nuclear weapons designer, Boris Gorbachov, to the effect that "gas will build up to dangerous levels within warheads, that older warheads have problematic detonators, that there will be insufficient experts to dismantle the weapons, and that explosions involving nuclear materials will occur". It is not clear from the context whether the weapons under discussion were those based in Ukraine or in Russia also. But even if it refers primarily to those in Ukraine, it is clear that if there are insufficient experts in Russia to dismantle the warheads returned to Russia from Ukraine, then there certainly cannot be enough to dismantle the warheads within Russia, scheduled for destruction under the START agreements. And "problematic detonators" must be a feature of all the older-type weapons, not merely those which happened to be sent to Ukraine.

Leaving aside such accidental detonations, Taylor concludes that, at the present time, the "direct military threat" (capability + intention) posed by Russia to the West is, for the moment, "minimal". He does not, of course, rule out a change of policy leading to a military attempt to regain control of East-Central Europe and the Baltic States, or that, within a couple of decades, the Russian Federation might become, once again, "a great military power which tries to take over its neighbours". But

this, he says, would demand "considerable economic and military strength, the prospects for which do not seem good. At least for the moment!"

Having disposed (at least to his own satisfaction) of the direct threat from Russia, Taylor moves on to the second nuclear threat – "proliferation". After reviewing – with unusual perceptiveness – the various ways in which Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus have approached the problem of their unexpected nuclear legacy, Taylor discusses the possibility that Russia's stockpiled weapons of mass destruction – chemical and biological as well as nuclear, could be sold off – or, which in the long run is an even greater threat, that scientists working in these fields might seek employment abroad. He notes, correctly, that states wishing to develop their own weapons programmes might find it worthwhile to recruit not only the relatively small élite with extensive knowledge of these weapons, but members of the far more numerous scientific community with partial – but vital – expertise in some ancillary technology. He calls into question the assurances received by the West that "the sense of responsibility of these people will keep them at home" – particularly in the face of "sustained economic deprivation" in Russia's isolated former secret defence cities, and alludes to various reports in the Russian media that China and North Korea have been recruiting Russian nuclear scientists.

Taylor then proceeds to the more general threat posed by "military sector resources" – in other words by the fact that, under the Soviet system, the military sector was not accountable or subordinate to the civilian administration. Now that the political control over the armed forces exercised by the Communist Party has disappeared, the military is effectively autonomous, and, in the smaller successor states as much as in Russia, still largely dominates defence policy making. Even where, as in Ukraine, there is a civilian minister of defence, there is only a limited amount of available civilian expertise on military matters. And even if it is true, as Taylor claims, that the post-Soviet military would "rather do anything, including pick potatoes, than try to rule their turbulent country" and that a coup would only be feasible with a completely professional army, nevertheless, from the viewpoint of Western thinking on defence, the sooner civil-service staffed Ministries of Defence are operating and there is "effective democratic and civilian supervision of defence" in the successor states of the Soviet Union, the better. But this, as Taylor stresses, will take a long time to establish.

Taylor next addresses the problems of restructuring the former Soviet armed forces, including the breakdown of the conscription system, and the fact that a large proportion of both conscripts and officers in the Soviet army were based outside their native republics. The example of Ukraine is used to pinpoint a number of key issues – the refusal of 25 per cent of army officers to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, and the long dispute over the Black Sea Fleet. On other republics, Taylor seems somewhat less well-informed; he observes, for example, the problems Belarus faces in building a "native" army – but fails to mention its even greater problem, the sheer density of military personnel (41 per 1000 of the population), the highest in the post-Soviet space, which the

state budget simply cannot afford to maintain. Reorganisation of armies goes hand-in-hand with the reorganisation of the arms industry. The old slogan of "conversion" of military production has proved, in many cases, unworkable, but armaments factories cannot simply be closed. At the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the Military-Industrial Complex employed some 6.5 million people in Russia and 1.2 million in Ukraine – that is, 4.4 and 2.9 per cent of the population respectively. (For comparison, Britain's defence industry, which was often criticised as "excessively large" never exceeded 1.1 per cent, even at the height of the Cold War). Furthermore, the Soviet defence industry was often effectively the only employer in a given area, and closure would mean major social disruption. Yet, with arms cuts due under the CFE agreement, and no money to pay the wages of an idle workforce, there is, Taylor stresses, the possibility of arms firms being drawn into "irresponsible" sales of their technology and wares abroad.

Following a brief review of political "hotspots" which could possibly trigger a major military confrontation, Moldova, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the problems associated with Russian withdrawal from the Baltic states, Taylor proceeds to discuss Western goals and priorities in the area. These he identifies as:

- 1) the prevention of nuclear and other non-conventional weapons proliferation in the former Soviet Union and beyond, in conjunction with continuing arms control and disarmament on the regional and global levels;

- 2) the building and maintaining of relationships of cooperation among the successor states of the Soviet Union and with the West – which must be based on genuine Russian recognition of the other successor states as sovereign entities;

- 3) the maintenance of a cooperative relationship with Russia at the United Nations on matters of internal order;

- 4) the establishment of sustained economic growth in the successor states, especially in Russia and those with a significant Russian population;

- 5) the further building of democratic political systems (including the subordination of the military to civilian authority) in the successor states; and

- 6) the maintenance of a Western alliance to generate Western solidarity and coherence on the range of problems arising in the former Soviet Union, and to respond should Russia once more turn to a foreign policy of intimidation and expansion.

Of these goals, Taylor says, the first three relate to the cooperative nature of international relations which would best serve the West, the fourth and fifth to the conditions within the former Soviet Union most likely to promote such relations, and the sixth is an acknowledgement of the need to prepare for the worst while working for the best! The discussion of these aims which follows ranges over a wide spectrum of topics, including the possible disintegration of Russia – which, he fears, would lead to significant violence, disorder, nuclear proliferation, and a huge refugee problem, but in which (should it happen), the West's role would have to be limited to damage containment as far as the world at large is concerned. He returns, once again, to Ukraine's nuclear missiles, and the "harsh precedent" set by the West in being unwilling to provide significant economic

help to a government threatening to "go nuclear". Ukraine's "size, location, history, economic potential and needs", he says, justify a significant aid programme, but since "preventing proliferation is the supreme western concern", the West "must be prepared to risk political and social instability in Ukraine, following from economic problems, if Kiev withdraws its readiness to cooperate on nuclear matters". Yet in the very next paragraph he gives what could well be construed as a reason for Ukraine not to comply with the West: Western interest in preventing proliferation, he says, also means directing economic and other aid to Russia, in order that "effective government "as opposed to civil war" is maintained, "so that control is not compromised over the 30,000 nuclear weapons involved". "This suggests... *that almost any effective government in Russia is better than no government*" (our emphasis). But what if the only government capable of holding Russia together were one with nationalist and expansionist policies, with Ukraine in the first line of attack?... This is a problem which Taylor, like virtually all Western defence experts who place non-proliferation at the head of their agenda, implicitly fail to address. He does, however, stress the need for Ukraine to have strong and well-equipped conventional forces (within the constraints of the CFE agreement, arguing that the better Ukraine's conventional defence capability, "the less interest it should have in the nuclear dimension". (But this ignores the psychological deterrent force of nuclear, as opposed to conventional ones, which almost fifty years of Cold War propaganda did much to instil).

One way of containing Russian expansionism would be to impose constraints on its "peace-keeping" activities in the Former Soviet Union. The Russian argument to date is that it has been obliged to act in the conflicts contiguous to its borders because no one else was willing to. Taylor argues, correctly, that the West should show itself willing to take part, via the United Nations, in such peace-keeping and peace-making activities, "The UN should not be allowed to evolve as a body which takes little interest in the FSU", says Taylor. One may add that, as Taylor points out, there are certain elements in Russia, particularly in the military, who see the stimulation of such conflicts as a way of re-establishing Russian control in the area. A perceived Western readiness to become involved should, to some extent, call their bluff.

Taylor's final chapter, "The Institutional Dimensions of Western Policy", deals with the role of such organisations as the CSCE and NATO in the post-Soviet world. He notes that, with the winding up of CoCom, the West, in its larger sense, has no agency for taking unified action, even in the economic sphere, towards the countries of the former (political) East. He notes that the West has, in principle, three limited assets, "brainpower, solidarity and wealth", which it must "use well", not only – in the worst case, to defend itself against a possible revanchist Russia, but also to strengthen its relations with the successor states. But these assets, Taylor says, currently look "more than a little flawed" – and their weaknesses should be targeted by governments as "urgent areas for repair".

Arguing from the perspective of 1994, Taylor maintains that "the west must seek to move closer to Russia... while keeping NATO as a non-provocative insur-

ance policy in case things go wrong". This, he says, will "undoubtedly involve the prudent granting to Russia of great power status, and of Western recognition that Russia is the most important variable in the future security of Eastern Europe". (In other words, of accepting what would appear to be the only sound pragmatic basis for negotiations which could draw Russia into compliance with internationally recognised norms of behaviour). But, he warns, "handling this will not be easy". The alternative, pessimistic view, is to write off the attempt to integrate Russia into the wider Europe, and for the West to be content in defending itself as far east as possible, whether on the border of Germany, Poland, or Ukraine. But such thinking, says Taylor, should be rejected as "premature".

Taylor's analysis and arguments – of which only a brief outline is given here – do not make easy reading. His status, however, as an Associate Fellow in the International Security programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Professor of International Relations at Staffordshire University, makes him a voice of some authority, and although the opinions expressed in this book, as the note on the flyleaf stresses, are his own responsibility and not that of any organisation, a high official of NATO has publicly stated his general concurrence with the views expressed here. For all those concerned with the future and democracy of the countries of the former Soviet Union, this book, as an expression of the thinking of Western defence and security theorists, should be required reading.

Vera Rich



**Jonathan Sutton, "Religious Education in Contemporary Ukraine", in RELIGION, STATE AND SOCIETY, vol. 22, no. 2, 1994, pp. 209-35**

*Religion, State and Society* is the only scholarly journal in the English language specifically devoted to issues of church, state and society in the former communist countries. The current issue is devoted entirely to the subject of religious education in the former Soviet Union. Jonathan Sutton's contribution, "Religious Education in Contemporary Ukraine", forms part of a research project at the University of Leeds, and gives a detailed analysis of religious studies courses at a variety of educational institutions, both state and confessional, for the academic year 1993-4.

Dr. Sutton argues that, although Article 6 of Ukraine's Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations (23 April 1991) perpetuates the old Soviet principle of the separation of religion from education, nevertheless, there is, to a considerable extent, *de facto* religious education in secular educational establishments at the primary, secondary and tertiary level – first and foremost in the "cultural studies" courses which replace the old, mandatory "foundations of scientific atheism".

The following courses and syllabi are discussed in detail:

Lviv oblast syllabus for state school courses on Christian ethics for years 5-9 (10-14-year olds);



Ethics and Religious Studies Courses at the Ivan Franko University, Lviv;  
History of World Religions Course at Kharkiv State University;

Foundation Course in Religious Studies at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy; and, in less detail, the work of the Religious Studies department of Donetsk State University.

From his material, Dr Sutton notes a number of interesting developments. On the one hand, a number of higher education institutions have made it obligatory for all undergraduates to take courses in either religious studies or the history of religion (thus replacing the old obligatory courses in Marxist philosophy and scientific atheism), although, as of February 1994, the Ministry of Education has not yet made this a requirement nationwide. At the same time, while the former "Theme 10, Free thought and religion" disappeared from the Kharkiv Institute of Culture religious studies course in 1993-4, several university-level courses include a lecture (usually the final one of the course) on freedom of conscience and free thought. Since many lecturers in religious studies formerly worked in departments of atheism, this provision, Dr Sutton suggests, may provide scope for "special pleading" from the atheist side. Nevertheless, he concludes, "[t]he benefits of discussing the topic, for students and lecturers themselves and for the promotion of a truly pluralistic society, are plain to understand, and these far outweigh any possible misuse of the topic by those seeking to steer academic discourse back towards the false 'certainties' with which they themselves feel most comfortable". Special pleading is also apparent from the "religious" side in certain cases; the first "theme" of the Institute of Culture course is devoted to justifying the concept of religious studies as an academic subject – in a manner, as Dr Sutton notes – that would be thought unnecessary in a comparable course in the West.

Dr Sutton continues his survey with a review of study courses in denominational institutions for the training of future clerics: the Russian Orthodox Seminary in Odessa, the (Kyiv-Patriarchate) Orthodox Seminary in Lviv, the Greek Catholic Theological Institute in Ivano-Frankivsk and the Seminary of the Holy Spirit at Rudno, near Lviv, and the Baptist Theological Seminary in Odessa and the Bible College in Donetsk. He also outlines the plans for a new Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lviv (modelled partly on the Catholic University of Lublin in Poland). The syllabi of these specialist institutions are much what one would expect – Bible study, patristics, homiletics, church music, etc. – though in the Orthodox institutions which existed (precariously) under Communism, courses in Ukrainian History and the History of Ukrainian Literature have replaced the former obligatory "History of the USSR" and "Constitution of the USSR". The Baptist Bible College, moreover, seems to be unique in offering a specialised course in radio-communication skills, including studio equipment, cross-cultural communication, script-writing and – interestingly – English language.

Finally, Dr Sutton draws a number of insightful conclusions, noting, in particular, the prominence in all courses of Ukrainian religious thought and cultural identity, "as might be expected" he observes, "in a country that is engaged in the processes of growing independence and self-affirmation". He notes, too,

the prominence given to the educational and ethical aspects of family life, which is brought out strongly, for example, in the Lviv oblast school syllabus, and the courses of the Baptist Bible College and the Greek Catholic Seminary in Rudno. It is particularly significant, he considers, "that one of the five planned institutes which will be affiliated to the Greek-Catholics' Theological Academy in Lviv is to be an 'Institute of the Family and Christian Marriage'".

Jonathan Sutton's name is a new one in the field of Ukrainian Studies. He approaches his subject, however, with considerable academic insight and a sympathy for Ukrainian views, taking care in his notes to correct assertions of the Soviet period (such as the alleged "atheism" of Ukraine's greatest poets, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko) the falsity of which might not be immediately obvious to a reader whose prime interest in this study was from the religious or pedagogic, rather than the Ukrainian aspect. One looks forward to seeing more of his work in this field.

*Vera Rich*



### **PHYSICS WORLD, vol. 7, no. 8, 1994**

This is the monthly of the London-based Institute of Physics, and, as such, is targeted principally at a readership of scientists. Vol. 7, no. 8 contains in its news section an article on a new initiative to preserve research links among scientists in the former Soviet Union, without involving the old cooperation structures which were, inevitably, Moscow-centric and Moscow dominated. Accordingly, 27 democratically-minded scientists and scholars from Belarus, Ukraine and Russia have set up a new organisation, the International Eurasian Academy of Sciences. This will have its capital in Minsk (Belarus), and membership will gradually be extended, first to scientists and scholars from other post-Soviet republics, then to the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and then to Western Europe and – eventually, to scientists and scholars world-wide. Membership will be by election, and the main purpose of the Academy will be to organise specialist and interdisciplinary conferences, allowing for the exchange of ideas and the establishment of personal contacts, as a basis for cooperation.

The article ends with a quotation from the new Academy's secretary-designate, the Belarusian mathematician Uladzimir Sivcyk: "Science was banalized by the Soviets, and we want to restore it to its old position of honour, so that, in looking to the future, we may build upon all that is best in the long traditions of Europe's science and culture".

*Vera Rich*



**EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH AFFAIRS, vol. 24, no. 1, 1994**

The latest issue of this scholarly journal contains three items of specifically Ukrainian interest. In "The Scattering of Amalek: A Model for Understanding the Ukrainian-Jewish Conflict", Henry Abramson, Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Documentation of East European Jewry of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, analyses the roots of traditional enmity between Jews and Ukrainians, and demonstrates that traditional Ukrainian antipathy to Jews is not, strictly speaking antisemitism, but rather a reaction to specific historic circumstances, as a result of which Ukrainians perceived individual Jews as the agents of the (Polish or Russian) "occupiers" of Ukraine. He rejects the "erroneous assumption" of traditional Jewish historiography that "Jews must be viewed solely as victims and never as victimisers", noting that, during the Polish occupation of Ukraine in the early seventeenth century, "Dubnow's characterization of Jews as caught between 'hammer and anvil' – that is, between the demands of the Polish lords and the anger of the Ukrainian peasants – is simply misleading. The Jews were very much part of the 'hammer', part of the economic machinery that executed Polish control over Ukraine". Likewise, Abramson points out that present day Ukrainian hostilities to Jews arise not from religious nor ethnic theories, but rather because the Ukrainian popular consciousness (with some substantial historical basis) equates "Jews", with "communists". Looking at the brief history of newly independent Ukraine, Abramson considers that there are grounds for "cautious optimism for the future" of Ukrainian-Jewish relations, and observes that "with few exceptions, the relationship between Ukrainians and Jews during and following the collapse of the Soviet Union has been exemplary – something which cannot be said for Jewish-Russian relations".

Abramson also contributes to this issue a review of Yakiv Suslenskyi's book, *Spravzhni heroyi: pro uchast bromadian Ukrayiny u Ryatuvannnyu yevreyiv vid fashytskoho henotsydu* (True heroes: the Part played by Ukrainian Citizens in Rescuing Jews from the Fascist Genocide) – a work which appeared at the end of last year with a preface by the then President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, and the imprimatur of such prestigious Ukrainian institutions as the Ministry of Education, the Institute of Nationality Relations and Political Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the International Ukraine-Israel Association and the Ukrainian Association for Jewish Culture. While noting that this book (which is implicitly recommended for use in secondary schools) is only the first in a series of biographical studies of Ukrainians who saved Jews during World War II, Abramson suggests that its overall tone is unbalanced, both by failing to emphasise the "enormity of Jewish losses during the Second World War", and also by its lack of the scholarly apparatus of foot notes and bibliography", and by the over-brief discussion of – for example – the exclusion of the Ukrainian Catholic leader, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytskyi (who was responsible for saving at least 150 Jews), from the Avenue of the Righteous among the Nations at the Yad Vashem memorial complex in Jerusalem. "Hopefully, future volumes will be more substantive", Abramson concludes.

A second review, by Ephraim Tabory, deals with *Between East and West: the Jews of Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk: Identity, Antisemitism, Emigration* (ed. Howard Spier, Macmillan/New York University Press, for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London. A detailed review of this work will be published in a subsequent issue of this journal. For the present, one may perhaps point out that the reviewer, Ephraim Tabory, falls into the traditional trap of treating the Jewish communities of these cities, so different in their historical and social ambience, as if they were identical.

Vera Rich



**THE HUNGARIAN QUARTERLY,  
vol. 35, no. 134, Summer, 1994**

The latest issue of this ever-interesting journal includes an article: "Resistance, Collaboration and Retribution during World War II and its Aftermath", by Istvan Deak, who holds the Seth Law Chair of European History at Columbia University. This article, a translation of a paper read by Professor Deak on the occasion of his induction into the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, addresses the problem of anti-Nazi resistance and collaboration, and the efforts by governments, throughout post-occupation Europe, in the immediate post-war period, to sanitise the record of collaboration. Deak argues that in all occupied countries, the number of collaborators exceeded the number of resistance-fighters – although he admits that score-keeping is confused by the fact that many apparent collaborators were, secretly, members or helpers of the resistance. At the same time, he says, "[e]ven in countries that ring loud with the praise of resistance heroes and where, according to historians, German propaganda proved unsuccessful, more men volunteered for service in the Waffen SS than took an active part in the resistance... in Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Baltic countries and... Western Ukraine, more men proved willing to sacrifice their lives in the War against Bolshevism, than to risk their lives fighting the Germans and their hirelings". Undoubtedly, many scholars will challenge this – particularly since, in most cases, Deak cites no numbers to substantiate this claim – and when the occasional number does appear (e.g. that in "the Netherlands, 22,000-25,000 men served the Germans as armed volunteers"), no source is given. Nor is his suggestion that all those who served the Nazis did so specifically to wage "War against Bolshevism" – their motives, particularly in Western Europe, were undoubtedly more complex.

Nevertheless, this is an interesting attempt to tackle, at a scholarly level, one of the most emotionally loaded issues in the history of the Second World War. And for once, a scholar with no apparent Ukrainian connections (Deak is a Hungarian-born US citizen), discusses, albeit briefly, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Ukrainian anti-Nazi resistance in the over-all context of this era.

Vera Rich



## Conferences

### POST-SOVIET GAS – RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Vera Rich

"The thing that attracts me about Sakhalin", remarked one American gas technologist, "is that *Gazprom* is not there!"

"Well, at least not so far!", replied a British colleague/competitor gloomily.

This exchange over lunch, during the latest in a series of conferences on the Post-Soviet Gas Industry, co-organised by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) and the Centre for Foreign Investment and Privatization (Moscow), was symptomatic of a growing feeling in the international gas community that *Gazprom*, the Russian gas extraction and transport monopoly, is growing dangerously large and aggressive. The gas business, like any other commercial activity that can command a multi-billion international market – is no place for weaklings. Nevertheless, business, as conducted in the traditions of market capitalism, does have its rules of play, in which the optimum strategy is to reach an agreement satisfactory to all parties. *Gazprom*, however, uses a style of adversarial tactics which is beginning to prove off-putting to at least some of its potential Western partners.

This constitutes a marked difference in Western attitude from the previous conference, just a year before. Then, one of the Western keynote speakers publicly counselled the gas transport enterprises of Ukraine and Belarus that they would be better advised, instead of charging transit fees for conveying Russian gas across their territory, to establish joint ventures with *Gazprom*. This, the financial pundit explained, would yield a more reliable income. Similar advice, indeed, is still forthcoming in certain circles, although aimed now at *Gazprom* itself. Thus, the leading article in the issue of the newsletter *World Gas Intelligence* which appeared during the Conference urged that the acquisition of assets in the downstream pipeline and distribution sectors is essential if *Gazprom* is to ensure payment for the gas it supplies. *Gazprom*'s problem with cashflow from the non-Russian countries of the Former Soviet Union are now becoming critical. Media coverage of the debt-collection problem usually concentrates on the difficulties of the debtor countries. The editor of *World Gas Intelligence*, however, saw it as a problem for *Gazprom*'s own survival, which, he opined, can only be ensured by "aggressively moving downstream".

"The more pipeline and distribution companies that *Gazprom* can invest in, the more stable its cash flow is liable to become. As for others not indebted to *Gazprom*, the firm could use equity-for-equity swaps to build an asset base throughout Europe and Asia as an option".

Such advice, however, presupposes a level of business sophistication which, to date, *Gazprom* has shown little sign of having acquired. Its attempts to acquire the distribution system of the FSU is beginning to appear, even to the Western gas community, as crude "empire building", rather than a well-planned business strategy in the style of a Western multinational. And *Gazprom's* business style is now becoming of considerable significance to Western gas firms. Hitherto, their dealings with *Gazprom* have been at the level of cooperation agreements and joint ventures, supplying the Russians with technology and/or know-how in return for gas supplies. But the present conference marked a potentially major change. *Gazprom* has completed its first two tranches of privatisation – share sales firstly to its own work-force and then to the local inhabitants of areas in which it is the major employer. Now it is open to outside, including foreign, investment.

To attract foreign capital, *Gazprom* will have to put its financial house in order. It is currently the world's largest gas producer, by volume (465 billion cu.m. annually) and has estimated reserves of 35 trillion cu.m. But the assessment methods used in setting up Russia's voucher privatisation scheme scaled down the value of *Gazprom's* assets to a mere \$150 million, whereas the real value, according to various Western estimates, is thought to lie between \$200-\$900 billion. Equally importantly, however, it has to convince potential Western investors that it is a good business risk. Post-Soviet Russia has shown a distressing tendency to change the rules of the investment game in mid-stream. (The "Rosshelf" affair, in particular, still rankles. Western firms were invited to tender for exploitation rights in this rich off-shore hydrocarbon field in the Russian Arctic. Several consortia were formed, and devoted considerable financial and intellectual capital to preliminary studies – only to be told, at the last moment, that only a 100% Russian consortium could be permitted to work it.) Potential Western investors will require sound guarantees that, if they acquire equity in *Gazprom*, they will not suddenly find themselves forced to sell it back to the Russians at a price which is little more than confiscation! At the same time, since investors will expect a return for their money, *Gazprom* will have to do something about its payment problems. Unpaid bills from all consumers (including defaulting Russian concerns), stood, at the time of the Conference, at around US \$3 billion, with only 30% of FSU bills for 1994 settled to date. And debt-for-equity swaps, even at the most pragmatic level, cannot be more than a temporary solution. Even if the governments of the countries concerned allow *Gazprom*, under the guise of creating joint ventures, to gobble up 100% of *Ukrhazprom*, *Bieltranshaz*, *Gruztransgaz*, *Moldovagaz* and the rest, what happens if consumers in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova still cannot meet their bills? Cutting

off defaulters' supplies is possible only on a limited scale; too large a cut-off would cause problems at the upstream, extraction, end...

So the Western gas experts, while maintaining their usual business cordiality towards their opposite numbers from *Gazprom*, at the same time showed a markedly greater interest, in comparison to previous conferences, in what the teams from other FSU countries had to say. And here there emerged a clear subtext: Russia's western neighbours are not prepared to surrender their gas-industry assets without a fight. For Ukraine, Viktor Rozhonyuk, Deputy Chairman of *Ukrhazprom*, described the new National Hydrocarbon Programme, with extraction targets of 7.5 million tonnes of oil and 35.5 billion cu.m of gas by the year 2100. He also gave further details of Ukraine's major commitment to refurbishing transit pipelines and extending its system of underground gas storage facilities in the worked-out oil-fields of Galicia. He noted, too, that although *Ukrhazprom* has an agreement with *Gazprom* to create a "joint stock company" (*Gazprom*'s preferred euphemism for a take-over), Ukraine's parliament has frozen this. (Interestingly, from Belarus, Mikalaj Mocarniuk reported a similar reluctance of the Belarusian parliament to ratify the agreement authorising a *Gazprom-Bieltransgaz* joint venture, signed between the Prime Ministers of Russia and Belarus back in September 1993, this deal is vital to *Gazprom*'s plans to deliver gas from the Yamal fields of the Russian Arctic to Western Europe, via a new pipeline across Belarus and Poland, bypassing the current pipeline network through Ukraine). Rozhonyuk also stressed that, even if the *Gazprom-Ukrhazprom* "joint stock company" does materialise, it will not take in the whole of Ukraine's gas-related activities – the refurbishment programme, in particular, will not be included. He indicated, too, some significant technical breakthroughs in the production of high-efficiency pumping equipment, in particular, the new turbines produced by the Mykolayiv shipyards.

Reports from the other non-Russian FSU states struck a similar note. From Georgia, I. Zazashvili, General Director of *Gruztransgaz*, reported efforts to return to its *ante bellum* extraction figure of 3.5 million tonnes of oil (60% of national requirements) a year, "now that we have the victory over the mafias", and noted that letters of intent had been signed with US and Australian firms on the production of oil and oil-field associated gas. He spoke, too, of geological survey work to find possible underground storage sites for gas – so far, without great success. But efforts would continue to locate such sites, he said, since "Georgia cannot be left without them!"

*Gazprom*'s FSU customers, whether consumers or pipeline owners, clearly do not want to quarrel with their source of supply. *Ukrhazprom*, in particular, wants to increase its transit trade to Central Europe and the Balkans to a target of 140 billion cu.m by the year 2000. Properly managed, and in a non-adversarial business atmosphere, the former Soviet gas industry could be a major source of income for all concerned – not the least, for future Western investors. (*Gazprom*, incidentally, seems willing also to let Western investors

buy into the "joint stock companies" established with its western FSU neighbours, on, it would appear, a case-by-case basis).

But there is still considerable room for confidence-building measures on the part of *Gazprom*, both towards its FSU partners and towards potential Western investors who have a growing wariness of the Russian company's perceived propensity for empire-building. And in the meantime, for Westerners seeking a stake somewhere in the FSU gas industry, the rich gas fields off Sakhalin island, from which the gas can be exported, liquefied, by sea, to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, without (to date, the involvement of *Gazprom*), look increasingly attractive ■