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THE REAL FACE OF RUSSIA

ESSAYS AND ARTICLES

UKRAINIAN INFORMATION SERVICE

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EDITED BY
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PREFACE

This book appears at a time when the Bolshevik rulers of the Russian communist empire are triumphantly celebrating the 50th anniversary of their take-over of the reins of power. All their huge propaganda machine is working itself up to glorify and magnify the "achievements" of half a century of Bolshevik dictatorship. The sad and shameful history of the Soviet Union in the last five decades is all but forgotten, its bloodstained pages are being surreptitiously torn out or compromising stains erased, uncomfortable skeletons are being hastily buried in the cupboards, and the world is being presented with a glossy picture of a powerful, benevolent and developed state, brimming with energy of happy and united people, multiplied by the harmony between the nations making up the USSR.

Many people in the free world are hypnotised by such a biased picture of the USSR, and even sometimes believe its claims to represent the apotheosis of an internationalist society. Others again believe that the USSR is merely another name for Russia, and do not perceive any distinction between the dominating Russian nation and the subjugated non-Russian nations, who after all constitute no less than 50 p.c. of the population of that immense empire stretching over one sixth of the earth's surface. For them Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians etc. do not exist, or else they are merely regional varieties of the "Russians", whereas in fact they are distinct and separate national entities fighting for their national independence. There are too many worshippers of "holy mother Russia" in the West who make every effort to draw a curtain of silence over the enslavement by Russia of numerous non-Russians nations. They deliberately mislead public opinion about the true nature of Bolshevism and Russian imperialism which presents today a serious threat to national and individual freedom in the world.

Various distinguished authors whose essays and articles appear in this publication trace the origin of the phenomenon notorious under the name of Bolshevism and attempt to define its real nature and character. By and large they come to the conclusion that Bolshevism has deeper roots in the Russian past and Russian mentality than in the writings of Karl Marx. They probe the peculiar aptitude of the Russians to embrace messianic ideas purporting to "save the world" and at the same, incidentally, helping to extend Russian domination over ever new territories. They expose mercilessly Russian chauvinist mentality and hypocrisy of imperialist Russian ideologies.

The contributors to this book analyze, from many different aspects, Russian imperialist ambitions and methods in the past, present and conceivable future. An article deals with the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation for its national independence. Two articles by the same author, concluding the collection, deal with the problem of countering the threat of Russian world conquest in the strategic and ideological spheres.

Hundreds of books have already been written about the Communist Russian ideology and state. What makes the present book different from the others is its deep and, at the same time, concise penetration to the roots of the problem. The authors do not lose themselves in details and superficialities, but get down to the essence of the peril looming over the free world from the totalitarian Russian Bolshevik empire encamped over the vast Eurasian land mass and ready to fill any vacuum on the globe.

V. B.

THE SPIRIT OF RUSSIA

by

Dr. DMYTRO DONZOW

with a Foreword

by Maj.-Gen. J.F.C. FULLER, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

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FOREWORD

(TRANSLATION FROM THE GERMAN EDITION)

This is a profound and fundamental work surpassing all publications on the world crisis I have read so far, in that it presents the core of the problem which has been disturbing the old world for centuries and still today continues to disturb the entire world. It is not the conflict between different faiths or civilizations, important though these may be, but the conflict between the cultures of Europe and Asia that is its subject.

In Russia today, Marxism which permeated the country with a fanatical religious fervour at the time of the Revolution, is merely a liturgical language, and industrialisation has enabled Russia to catch up with the West as regards its material civilization. Nonetheless these factors — to use a Marxist concept — represent only a super-structure of the productive forces of Muscovite Messianism, and whether Russia is regarded as a Third Rome or a Third International, she is constantly striving to extend her territory and to assume the cultural leadership of the world.

Historically, the centuries-old conflict between Asia and Europe began with the clash between Persia and the Greek city states; it revealed itself even more clearly in the fight of the East Roman empire against the Arabs, the Huns, the Alans, the Mongols and many other Asiatic peoples, as well as against the Slavs. This clash appears just as clearly, in the conflict between Christianity and Islam — a conflict which lasted for a thousand years. All these struggles were in essence conflicts between different cultures, as was the case also in the struggle between Sweden and Russia in the Great Northern War. Leibniz, at the time, understood it, for when Charles XII suffered a defeat at Poltava in 1709, Leibniz said: "The Tsar will be a terror to all Europe, for he will, so to speak, become a Northern Turk." With it began the present era of the cultural conflict between Europe and Asia — and this a mere 12 years after the Turkish danger was removed by Prince Eugene on the battlefield of Zenta.

What are the components of the Muscovite Messianism, the spiritual nomadism, which today threatens to extinguish Western culture and with it also the Western way of life? We find the answer to this question in this scholarly and fascinating book. Dr. Donzow has most thoroughly investigated and explained here the factors of which this Messianism consists. He writes: "One can affirm with certainty that the ideology of Muscovite Communism and that of Tsarism are merely two different forms of one and the same thing, namely of the same phenomenon of a more general character and this is nothing

else than the Muscovite Messianism which wages war against the West."

This is, in fact, a book which ought to be read by all those wishing to understand the present-day world crisis, for it explains and plumbs the problem with which at the present time the entire world is concerned.

J. F. C. Fuller

CHAPTER I

THE FORCES OF THE ANTICHRIST

Europe and, indeed, the whole world is dominated by the sign of terror. This terror, created in the year 1917, has not descended upon the world unexpectedly. Our age is one of those eras of which it is prophesied in the Gospels: "And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars... For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom: and there shall be famines and earthquakes in divers places. But all these things are the beginning of sorrows. And many false prophets shall arise, and shall lead many astray. And because iniquity shall be multiplied, the love of the many shall wax cold... and there shall be terrors and great signs from heaven... and upon the earth distress of nations" (Matthew, Ch. 24; Luke, Ch. 21).

Even the time when such catastrophes happen is, it is true, not expressed according to man-made calendars, but nevertheless clearly predestined, as, too, is the place: "Wheresoever the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together." And that is always the case. Wherever there is a smell of carrion, wherever and whenever society begins to rot, the vultures flock together in order to tear their victims to pieces.

And is not that era depicted in the Gospels which began in the year 1917? Are not wars being conducted everywhere in the world between nations and are not civil wars being waged within the nations? Are there not amongst us false prophets from the East, holding swords in their hands? Are we not witnessing the paralysing of the thoughts, hearts and will of many of the mighty of the free world? Is it not evident that only a few have resisted temptation, whilst many, however, "as in those days which were before the flood were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, ...and they knew not until the flood came, and took them all away" (Matthew, Ch. 24).

May it be left to those born blind to search for the fundamental cause of this terror in the material and visible world, — namely in the conflict about state frontiers, countries, worldly wealth, and in the rival struggle between various imperialisms; the cause lies elsewhere. It is a struggle between the ancient Christian civilization of the West and the forces of the Devil, which are preparing their last onslaught on the former; not a struggle for territories or party programmes, but a struggle for the soul of man created in God's likeness. If it were not so, why should the false prophets — the Frenchman Rousseau, the Jew Marx, and the Russian Lenin, strive, above all, to effect the severance from Christ? Why should such an intensive attempt be made to destroy the idea of God in man's soul, to infect man's mind, his heart and his will with rottenness? Why do the "counsel of the ungodly" in the Kremlin as well as their emissaries in the free world pursue this as their main aim?

For the simple reason that they know that wherever this aim is achieved, the deceived peoples will become the willing and obedient tool of the power of darkness and their blind slaves: they know that their satanic power, the power of the false prophets, will then rule the world unchallenged; that this power will assume its rule as soon as the masses and the peoples believe its doctrine, — its doctrine that one should worship the material things in life, mammon, profit and pleasure. If one believes that the false prophets have the power to change stones into bread, one must likewise believe that happiness and well-being will be achieved by undisciplined human reason and by human instincts; one only needs to let the peoples detach themselves from the chief commandment "thou shalt not make any graven image" in place of God, they will then bow down to and worship the evil power and will promptly become a pack of wild beasts or a herd of domestic animals and will willingly allow themselves to be pushed into an iron cage or into a pen.

Ukraine was the first to take up the fight against this evil power. For this power had, in the first place, emanated from Moscow and then remained invisible for a long time; it subsequently, during the fire and smoke of the so-called "October Revolution", showed its grim countenance and its red banner, with the invisible inscription: "Falsehood instead of truth! Evil instead of good! Ugliness instead of beauty! Antichrist instead of Christ!" There are many weaklings on this side of the Iron Curtain who allow themselves to be deceived, bribed and intimidated by the envoys of the Red Star, inasmuch as they establish a regular cult of the "light from the East", worship its idols, propagate its devilish doctrine, exhort those persons who are prepared to share the world with the Devil to engage in co-existence and cooperation with the latter for the purpose of rebuilding the world, and are full of admiration, fear and servility towards the bestial power which is preparing to inflict the same fate on the West

as it has already inflicted on Ukraine and other nations, conquered by Muscovites.

Those who have grown confused as a result of the progressive doctrine of the false prophets, ask: "What is the purpose of this superstition?" In what way is the Devil connected with it? How can one recognize that the invisible power of evil is at the head of the procession of the "era of progress"? — It is not hard for those whose brains have not been confused by Moscow's satanic religion to recognize this. One only needs to consider the works of the Devil's apostles. Must we not then realize that, inasmuch as they promised everyone the annihilation of absolutism and autocracy, they have introduced an autocracy which is a thousand times more terrible? That, inasmuch as they promised the "common people" freedom, they have imposed a servitude a thousand times worse on them, as well as on all social classes and on the peoples that have come under their rule? That, inasmuch as they promised equality, they have created a caste of new rulers of the type described in the Bible? That, inasmuch as they promised brotherhood, they have created a state of affairs in which man behaves like a ravenous wolf towards his neighbours? That, inasmuch as they promised happiness, the socialist paradise, for everyone, they have created a hell? That, inasmuch as they promised prosperity, they have introduced starvation and misery? That, inasmuch as they promised peace, they have waged war constantly against everyone; that, inasmuch as they claimed that they would free human reasoning from the compulsory dogmas of religion, they have created a dogmatism and a conformism such as no theocracy has ever known, and have introduced an inquisition such as has never before been imposed on any era? That, inasmuch as they promised to abolish the divine Commandments — "Thou shalt not kill! Neither shalt thou steal! Neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neighbour!" — they have introduced the commandments of the Devil — "lie, kill and steal." That, inasmuch as they promised truth and life, they have brought falsehood and death with them?... Falsehood! — It is by this weapon that we recognize their leader, whom the Gospel calls the "father of falsehood", and the power which has inspired the false prophets of Moscow; for "the servants of the Devil are fond of creating the impression that they are servants of truth"; they are fond of constructing a chaos of conceptions out of mendacious slogans, inasmuch as they mix right and left, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, in order to lead the human race astray.

Those sceptics who are not satisfied with this proof, should recall another sentence which says: "By their fruits ye shall know them", and should bear in mind that he who cooperates with the Devil, builds on sand and that his house will fall. Indeed, is it not evident that the new tower of Babylon which has been erected by the

Muscovite builders is tottering? Is it not evident that they have created a state of chaos, out of which they will not be able to find a way? Is it not obvious to us that the spiritual foundations of their structure — their ideas — are already disintegrating into dust? Is it not obvious that they are trying in vain to assert their position by sheer despotism?

To those sceptics who are still not satisfied with this proof we can but say, — consider the “Gospel” of the said false prophets! With cynicism and with an unparalleled audacity they declare in their “Gospel” that they have been sent by the Devil to change the world into chaos. Moscow reminds one of the man in the Bible who was possessed of an unclean spirit, who screamed and hurled himself against stones, who rent his chains asunder, and no one had strength to tame him. The Muscovites have been possessed of this spirit of evil and, indeed, from time immemorial they have boasted of this fact; at the same time, they persuade the world — as does their patron saint, the invisible patron saint of falsehood, that the latter possesses a beneficial power, the representative of which is Moscow. Indeed, all the panegyrists of tsarist, democratic and Bolshevik Russia endeavour to persuade the world in general of this fact.

Pushkin flirts with his Devil and affirms that though the latter is a “questionable and mendacious” spirit, he is nevertheless a “beautiful” one. This Russian pagan god is portrayed as a darker, more sinister, more perverse and more terrible Devil in the works of the epileptic *Dostoevsky*, the panegyrist of the mad, the degenerates, and those possessed of Satan. In a conversation with his guest, the Devil, Ivan Karamazov says to him: “You are falsehood, you are the personification of myself.” One Russian critic has affirmed that in his novel “Dostoevsky let the Devil (who dwelt in his breast) express his own most intimate thoughts.” And the same Devil knew what was expected of him. The thoughts expressed by the Devil who visited his “hero” are the thoughts of Ivan Karamazov and of Dostoevsky himself: “The idea of God must be destroyed amongst mankind, and this is the primary task to be carried out.” For once God is destroyed in the human soul, He will also be eliminated from all human actions and works, from all human institutions and society. And Dostoevsky recognized this fact, for he realized that those who, possessed of the Devil, would bring about the Russian revolution, would no longer be persons possessed of demons, but simply “demons” (“Byessy”) themselves, as, indeed, he called them in his novel; he knew only too well that the revolution would be started by those “slaves and lackeys”, who, “in the name of envy, obsequiousness and equality” will trample underfoot the “image of the divine ideal”, the image of God in man’s soul.

This demonic obsession on the part of the Muscovites is even more apparent shortly before the appearance of Bolshevism and even more

significant after the victory of the latter. The Russian writer, *Maximilian Voloshin*, observes that after the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, "man became a devil towards his fellow-men" — in Russia, in the land of demonic slavery. Another writer, *V. Ivanov*, laments that he has been "cast off" by his keeper, his demon, and complains: "My keeper, deserted by you, I have fallen"... In place of a guardian angel, there is a keeper of the Devil, in whose absence the Russian feels "deserted." The same writer continues: "Was not Lucifer the first of all my masks? Was it not I, I in him who ceased to believe that the Father is a living force, inasmuch as I said: I am the only one"... In place of God, the human "ego" of *Ivanov* is called God; Lucifer, the "morning star", taught him that "God is not and that only Man is supreme" (Man with a capital letter).

On this superficial foundation, on this sandy soil, he builds up his intention: "I shall found a mad tower" over the illusion of life — as all Russians do in accordance with the famous example of the tower of Babel. A similar prophet of the Devil was *S. Yesenin*, about whom, as about others, the same *Ivanov* says, "whirled about by the tempest of the revolution, dazzled by it, rid of the measure for good and evil, for truth and falsehood, and obsessed by the idea that they were flying upwards to the stars, they fell down in the dirt on their faces", after they had exchanged "Demon" for God, that is to say, in other words had entered the service of the "evil spirit."

And *Maxim Gorky's* proletarian says of himself: "I shall manifest myself! How? Only the Devil alone knows how. Everything can go to the Devil!" One Russian literary critic affirms that "in Russia the Devil's works are glossed over with God's name more than anywhere else in the world; the Devil has stolen from us that which belongs to God." For this reason, the Russians themselves have from time to time had their doubts and have not known who — in the campaign of the Muscovite Ivan to conquer the world — sits on their backs, "whether it is the Christ Child or the young dog, Antichrist." The Russian writer, *D. Merezhkovsky*, affirms that all *A. Chekhov's* and *Gorky's* heroes "resemble the devils on Goya's pictures." Prior to the revolution, however, *Chekhov* himself wrote: "A storm has broken out all around us. Everything is flying about in all directions, and we, too, are flying about — whether upwards or downwards, whether to God or to the Devil, — it is impossible to say." And the above-mentioned *V. Ivanov* in his memoirs describes the atmosphere of various social classes in Russia prior to the revolution: in the palace of the Tsar — *Rasputin's* orgies, amongst the socialists — the proletarian *Gorky*, in the liberal, bourgeois literary salons — "the destructive poison of insensible ale-house eroticism", a "mystical anarchism", some "third commandment" or other, and blasphemy combined with "searching for God", — all of them mixed together!

V. Ivanov portrays one of the members of the Satanist sect which existed at that time, one of those persons who worshipped "the morning star, the source of grace and power", — the star of Lucifer — and immediately made a pilgrimage to the monastery of Athos... And one of these Lucifer-adherents declaims: "You have turned from God? Good, well done! But it is not enough to turn from God. One has to prove one's worth in the eyes of "the other one." You are of the opinion that "the other one" will immediately accept you and will immediately help you as soon as you have removed the cross that you have been wearing round your neck? One must cherish him alone in one's heart..."

The moment when the entire "progressive" Russia would fall at Lucifer's feet and would worship him openly and no longer secretly as under tsarism, — this was the moment which Dostoevsky foresaw when he regarded the symbolic figure in his vision, the figure of a "common slave, a lackey, who will climb up a ladder in order to mutilate the image of the *divine ideal* in the name of equality, envy and stomach." In these words there lies the entire essence of the Russian revolution, — a revolution of slaves, of barbarians, of lackeys against the divine element in the human soul.

Blok is a cynic: in his poem "The Twelve" he depicts twelve marching Bolshevik soldiers of the Red Army as twelve apostles of a new truth, at their head the Devil, wearing "a wreath of white roses", and the mask of Christ. In his poem "The Scythians" he prophesies an analogous advance of the Muscovite horde — this time in order to subjugate the world — an advance of the millions of the masses, drugged and intoxicated with mystic heathenism, who swear that they love Europe, — the same Europe that they regard "with both hatred and love" — and that it is precisely because of this love that they want to crush Europe: "Are we to blame if your skeleton breaks into pieces in our heavy, loving paws?" Here again everything is combined, — love, murder, the "loving tenderness" of an assassin and the mystical ecstasy of a rogue. Dying in hospital, *Blok* dreams of a rising sun which will shine on the universe, but this sun, in his eyes, is both a universal and a purely Russian one.

The first stage of this evolution was the negation of the existence of God (and the conversion to the Devil); the second stage consisted in worshipping the Devil and subsequently glorifying man. *Ivan Karamazov* says: "It is incomprehensible to me how one can say — "there is no God", without saying at the same time "I am God!". "The main theme of Russian literature", so *D. Merezhkovsky* wrote, "consisted already before the revolution in writing about the relation of man to man, ignoring God, without God, and finally — against God." *Gorky* affirms: "Man is truth! This is everything, the Alpha and Omega. Everything in man, everything for man, man alone

exists!" And Chekhov imitates him: "Man is above everything in Nature; he is even higher than that which is unfathomed and which seems miraculous", — that is to say higher than God.

When the Russians elevated man to the place of God, they did so without recognizing the laws over man and without recognizing any form of discipline. And this was bound to lead to the worship of all that was carnal, of the animal or beast in man. For this reason, the Russian thinker and writer, *Rozanov*, recognized neither Christianity nor Christ, since the religion of Christ, a religion of strict spiritual discipline, was a "religion of death" for this type of Russian. Golgotha in his opinion was a "poisoning of the joy in life." Christianity was too ascetical for him, an armour which was too hard for the naked Russian. Gorky maintained in the same sense that "the stomach in man is the chief thing. All human action comes from the stomach." The natural animal element is L. Tolstoy's god, too. He adores all that is carnal, both feelings and bestiality. The hero of his story *Yeroshka*, says: "I am a grand fellow, I am a drunkard, a thief and a hunter!" For "an animal is wiser than a man, even though it be a pig... It is a pig and yet it is not worse than you, for it is just as much an animal of God as you are" — and this in Tolstoy's heathenish logic means that the swinish nature in man must not be reformed or punished, but, on the contrary, must be extolled. And even the Russian critics of the bare-footed count, who understand all this in his character, namely that the impulse of *Yeroshka's* life consists in "love of freedom, loafing, robbery and war", bow down before him as if before an apostle of the evangelistic truth. The robber, the murderer, the animal, the pig — with all their uninhibited impulses — such is Tolstoy's god. And this is not an accident. *Yeroshka* and Tolstoy know perfectly well what they mean. "There is no sin at all — so *Yeroshka* preaches — take an example from animals!" Religion in *Yeroshka's* opinion is something empty. "We shall die, grass will grow over us, and that is all!" Like an animal, he does not distinguish between good and evil; everything is permissible. "An animal joy in carnal life" — that is how a Russian writer characterizes L. Tolstoy's philosophy.

In the subsequent stage there ensues a devilish confusion in the conceptions and ideas of the Russians, — a confusion of all the "pros" and "cons", of all the affirmatives and negatives, of all that is "permitted" and "prohibited", of all the differences between truth and falsehood, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, — a negation of every form of discipline, both in moral, political and social life. *Konstantin Leontyev*, who realized this only too profoundly, wrote in the 19th century: "The Russian national community (as regards its customs), in any case already egalitarian enough, will proceed along the deadly path of "universal confusion" even more rapidly. And we — to begin with, people without a social class and then

without a Church — we shall engender the Antichrist", — that is to say, shall become godless. And what will be even worse, as the servants of the Antichrist they will appear in the guise of Christ, in order to turn everything into chaos, for where there is no supreme legislator, there is chaos. The confusion of hatred under the guise of love is to be found in Blok and likewise in Pushkin, who allegedly "praised freedom and asked for mercy for those who had erred", but in reality extolled the ruthless Tsar Peter I and condemned all those such as Ukrainian Hetman Mazepa who, like the free Caucasians, brandished the sword of freedom against tyranny and evil. Dostoevsky admits: "Europe arouses in me a deadly loathing, even hate"; and at the same time he is full of praise for the Russian advance towards the West since in this way "the blood shed will save Europe", — Europe which he allegedly "loved" greatly. Merezhkovsky rightly points out that if this is love, then it is the love of a wild beast for its prey. Dostoevsky had his reasons for admiring the robbers — both those on the throne, that is the Tsar, as well as those in prison, where for a considerable period he had an opportunity of striking up a friendship with them. He was greatly impressed by their "enormous will-power, their boundless passion, their eagerness to achieve the aim which they had set themselves", in Dostoevsky's opinion, robbers are "the strongest and the most talented people" in Russia.

Satan is their patron, from whom they derive their spiritual strength, namely according to their own words — the aesthete Pushkin and the "rusticated" Count L. Tolstoy, the apostle of the city rabble, Dostoevsky, and the cynic Blok, who confuse everything in one medley, — good and evil, falsehood and truth, beauty and ugliness, so that all ethical values are destroyed in the general chaos, and so that proof is given that robbery is freedom, murder is love, equality is mutiny against God, beauty is dirt and swinishness. Dostoevsky himself was somewhat confused as to the problem of what a peculiar spiritual ability on the part of the Russians it would be, not to understand "what is sin and what is not", the ability "to cultivate the highest ideal, side by side with the greatest vileness in their soul and to do both quite sincerely." He did not know whether to describe this as the "spiritual breadth of character" of the Russians, which would take them far, or as "simple baseness." It is the baseness with which the Devil has imbued him, and it is also the "spiritual breadth of character" which, by deception and cunning, endeavours to convince the world that this satanic vileness is a "new truth" for the world, which it should accept from the Russian Satanists.

Incidentally, the Russians are not even desirous of understanding their spiritual chaos. In the opinion of a true Russian, "the Russians are drunkards, swine, libertines, liars, but all the same good people" (Chekhov), — good, since they are Russians, the "chosen people",

who, whatever they may do, do everything "for the good of mankind." Thus, Blok, for instance, affirms: "Maybe we are Asiatics, maybe we do not distinguish between love and hate, maybe in our great love for mankind we crush the latter in our loving embrace, — but it is all the same!" "The barbaric lyre summons to the brotherly banquet of work and peace", as does the world barbarian "with leering and greedy eyes", as does the same barbarian nowadays in the United Nations. Even those who, as, for instance, Merezhkovsky, see in the Russian revolution the phenomenon of the coming hooliganism, scorn the West and adore their Russia, whatever it may be like. Like Blok and Dostoevsky, Merezhkovsky, also issues his warning to Europe: "All the external facts of our revolution are known to Europe, but the internal character of the same is incomprehensible to it. It sees the body which moves, but it does not see the motive soul of the Russian revolution... We fly and fall head downwards... You are sober, we are drunk; you are just, we are devoid of all feeling for law... To you policy is knowledge, to us a religion. We are mystics. And the revolution, too, is a religion..." This is the philosophy of a raging horde, which has long since made Satan its god and which only recognizes one *ultima ratio*, — the power of numbers. Pushkin hurled his provocative challenge at the West, at the "people's orators" of Europe: "Why are you threatening Russia with your anathema? Do you think that the Russians are weak? Do you think that we are but few in number? We have extended our empire from Perm to the Taurus, from Arctic Finland to tropical Colchis, from the shaken Kremlin to the walls of immobile China!" All this is "Russian" territory! In short, "we knock everyone down with our caps alone and they fall down dead!" (a Russian saying). And Lermontov writes in a similar strain: "Why did the Caucasian Kazbek Mountain tremble (as the writer believes) before the host of Russians who advanced to the Caucasus?" Because "the grim Kazbek began to count and was forced to leave his enemies uncounted", because he could not finish counting this host... And Blok voices a similar opinion, already during the Bolshevik era, in his provocative challenge to Europe: "You number millions? We consist of infinite numbers and infinite numbers!" Here again there is no reference to ethical or ideological superiority, but only to the numbers of the Russian horde. And Stalin adopted the same attitude: when, on one occasion, certain statesmen of the West wished to discuss the political interests of the Vatican with him, he asked sarcastically, "And how many divisions has the Pope?"

With whatever idea this power of destruction has tried or tries to disguise itself — whether with the idea of the "true faith", or the Muscovite "Third Rome", of the all-Slav brotherhood, or with that of the "liberation of the working classes" as, for instance, under Bolshevik rule, it has always remained the same power of despotism,

the power of triumphant evil under the guise of good, with the watchword: "take the animals as an example!" A power whose warriors, the "sons of the Devil", have always regarded the "dog of an Antichrist" as the symbol of their "guardian angel." The Devil's legions, — possessing not the quality of knighthood, but the quality of a horde.

It was the same half godless, half heathen natural element, which in Muscovite Russia lived for ever both under tsarism and also previously under the grand duchy of Moscow. None other than the great Russian literary critic, *Vissarion Belinsky*, wrote as follows on this subject: "The Russian people — the most religious people in the world? This is a lie! The basis of religiousness is piety, morality, fear of God. Regard the Russian people more profoundly and you will discover that in keeping with their character they are an extremely atheistic people. They have many superstitions, but you will find in them no trace of religiousness... In the Russian people religiousness is not even to be found in the priesthood... The majority of our priests were always characterized by fat bellies, scholastic pedantry and complete illiteracy." There was amongst the Russian people no "sense of human dignity, — this had got lost in dirt and filth in the course of many centuries..."

And it was precisely for this reason that the transition in Muscovite Russia from Tsarism to Bolshevism was effected so easily. The pompous phrases of the Bolshevik magicians rapidly disappeared and the new regime returned to the protection of that dark power which the previous regime had already obeyed. As the saying goes: "The cur returns to his scum", or as Maximilian Voloshin wrote: "Everything was mixed together, the signs and the banners, the forgotten past of the tsars and the present reality of the Bolsheviks..." The Horde, which on the ruins of the free world desires to raise her Satanic banner of shame, terror and slavery.

CHAPTER II

RUSSIAN MESSIANISM

Common opinion sees the cause of the disease with which the social organism of Europe is stricken in the conflict between various forms of imperialism, that are hostile to each other. This opinion is not shared by the author. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the author does not share this opinion completely.

There can be no doubt about the fact that the present state of chaos is a result of the conflict between "imperialisms"; and undoubtedly, the hysterical clamour of the lower classes for a "new social order" is one of the main causes of a deeper or, at least, an older conflict.

This other conflict remains latent in the social struggle which Europe is undergoing. This other conflict was at the bottom of the conflict of 1914 between the two groups of states which were hostile to each other. And the same factor is evident in the revolution of 1648 and 1708-9 in Ukraine and in the national revolutions of 1917 in East Europe. This conflict, which Leibniz and Renan, Napoleon I and Hugo, Engels and Lord Beaconsfield foresaw with considerable alarm, which suggested visions of revenge to Herzen and Leontyev, Bakunin and Gorky, is the great conflict between two forms of civilization, between two political, social, cultural and religious ideals, — *the conflict between Europe and Russia*.

The fact that this conflict is actually based on numerous problems which disturb our era, will best be realized if we consider the last phase of this conflict, that is to say the phenomenon which now bears the ineffaceable designation of Bolshevism, and if we analyse this phenomenon, which many members of our indiscriminating intellectual class regard as the most perfect form of a social revolution.

What is Bolshevism? — those who support it unconsciously ask (for those who support it consciously do not put this question), and answer: it is an international movement and its aim is to overthrow imperialism, capitalism, nationalism and all the other idols of the bourgeois pantheon. Bolshevism, so its opponents retort, is the rebellion of slaves, the negation of logical laws and of the laws of national economy. Bolshevism — a third category of persons affirm — is a conspiracy to suppress Christianity. Both the first, the second and the third category are right, inasmuch as Bolshevik Russia has actually started social movements of international significance. But all three categories ignore the fact that Bolshevism, as its designation signifies, is a *Muscovite* and, indeed, primarily a *Muscovite phenomenon*. It is true that the foremost aim of the paid and of the idealist agents of Bolshevism outside the Soviet Union was the destruction of the European bourgeois order of society. But was that all? Was this the only reason for the violence with which countless such agents in Vienna, Budapest, New-York, Rome, Paris, London, and other centres, large and small, of the West carried on their work of destroying the existing order in the countries concerned? Was the overthrow of a system of exploitation really their foremost aim, or should one perhaps look for other deeper and stronger motives in their violence, motives about which Dostoevsky wrote in his day? In his *A Writer's Diary* he wrote: "Why do practically nine-tenths of the Russians, when travelling abroad, always seek to establish contact with European leftist circles, who, as it were, *disdain their own culture*? Is this not an indication of the Russian soul, to whom European culture has always been something foreign? I personally hold this opinion. The Europeans, however, regard us, rather, as barbarians, who roam about Europe and are pleased to have found something which can be destroyed; who carry out destruction for the sake of destroying and merely in order to enjoy seeing everything fall to pieces, — just as the wild hordes did in the past, as for instance the Huns, who invaded ancient Rome and demolished this holy city without knowing what great cultural treasures they were destroying."¹

Is there at least a grain of truth in these words of this gifted Muscovite? And if so, then do his words only apply to such wanderers of the revolution as Bakunin, or even to Herzen, too, who cursed the Western world with the words: "Long live chaos, vive la mort!" Or do they also apply to Lenin's followers who predicted the decline of European democracy? Or, possibly, also to the head procurator of the Russian "most sacred synod", Pobedonostsev, who violently attacked this same democracy as the "biggest lie of our era"? Do they apply only to Bakunin's intellectual descendants, to the Russian Red Army, or also to the army of the Tsar, which was as eager to

¹) F. Dostoevsky, *A Writer's Diary*.

turn the Galician and other West Ukrainians into "orthodox Russians" as the Bolsheviks were to turn them into Russian Communists? Do they not apply to that army which is trying to force its "pax Moscovitica" on Europe just as violently as Lenin tried to drag the latter into his Communist league of nations, into his "societas Leniniana (or leonina)"? Can the questions raised by Dostoevsky be applied only to the Red cavalry armies which carried their social and political system — that of the tyranny of the "Soviets" — into the West, or also to Catherine II's military rabble, who likewise brought the social and political system of Russia namely tyranny and serfdom, to Ukraine, Poland etc.?

And if that is the case, then must we not regard these migrations in Europe on the part of armed and unarmed Muscovites of various generations, who take a pleasure in destroying something there — as *phenomena of one and the same category*, with a continuance which is more universal and more dangerous than Bolshevism or Tsarism? One can affirm with certainty that *the ideology of Muscovite Communism and that of Tsarism are merely two different forms of one and the same thing, namely of the same phenomenon of a more general character and this is nothing else than the Muscovite Messianism which wages war against the West*. Threateningly and rapaciously, Bolshevik Russia, just like the Russia of Peter I, Nicholas' I day, is constantly on the look-out for "a possibility to destroy something."

The answer to all the above questions has already been given, time and time again, by the Russian intellectuals, — by the same persons who once cultivated "national traits" and later played a part in the "Chekas" and "proletarian culture", — the advocates of the idea of Russian Messianism: the Russian "intelligentsia", who in their own opinion are the guardians and the personification of the ideals of "truth and right", the prophets of the great mission of the Russian people which will make the entire human race happy, but in our opinion are the "propaganda makers" of Muscovite, Petersburg, Petrograd and Leningrad imperialism and of Muscovite imperialism over again, the sentimental apologists of the Muscovite "urge towards the West", the severe prosecutors in the historical law suit of the nations, who, with bloodstained hands, knock on the door of the Occident, — in short, the "advocatus diaboli."

It is possible that the representatives of this Russian intellectual class differed from one another as regards mental powers and genius. But all of them, prophets and harlequins alike, had one characteristic in common, — a deep mystical belief in the great predestination, in the world mission of the Muscovite people. They could paint their people in rosy colours like the national fanatics did, or could compare it to a herd of cattle, as for instance Chekhov did in his "Peasants"

("Moujiks"); or they could kiss the hem of its stinking "caftan", as Count Leo Tolstoy did, or, in fear of its unfathomable and incomprehensible nature, could appeal to the bayonets of the Tsar, like P. Struve and other no less famous writers of the once (after the revolution of 1905) well-known compilation "Signposts" ("Vekhi") did, — it all came to the same thing! Whether angel or devil, Apollo or centaur, half man and half animal, this people was in the eyes of the entire Muscovite intelligentsia a people chosen by God, and if it was an animal, then it was a sacred animal before which all other peoples should bow down in awe and reverence. This people and no other was to preach a new gospel to the agonized West. It alone was to proclaim the redeeming "Let there be light" amidst the chaos of the world.

"I believed and I still believe that Russia, which must take the lead in a new formation of the Eastern states, is to give the world a new culture, too, and is to replace the decadent civilization of Romanic-Germanic Europe by this new Slavic-Eastern civilization", — thus wrote the "Pope" of the Slavophiles, Leontyev, in the days of Nicholas I.² And the Slavophil poet Tyutchev, prophesying the death of the West in the near future, exclaimed: "Above the gigantic ruins of the West, Russia which is even greater will rise up, like the Holy Ark... Who will venture to doubt her predestination?" — "The West has already said all it could say. Ex oriente lux! Russia alone is predestinated to assume the spiritual leadership of Europe!" — such is the passionate cry of that notoriously fanatical advocate of Moscow's Slavophilism, S. Bulgakov. And, moved by these words, Rozanov answers, like an echo, "It was high time this was said." Pushkin idealizes Russian serfdom by contrasting it with the "suppression" of the English peasantry,³ and writes verses imbued with a violent hatred of European civilization.⁴

For years, the Russian patriot and visionary, A. Herzen, dreamt of the longed-for decline of the West and of "new barbarians who would come there to destroy it." The Slavophil Yuriy Samarin rejoices over the role which Russia would play "in the entire world", and the arch-revolutionary Bakunin believes that the Russian people "will bring new foundations into history and will create a new civilisation, as well as a new faith and a new life." Gorky "spits" America and "the sweet France in the face" in the name of the Muscovite lumpen-proletarian ideals; and Lenin usurps the heritage of the prime apostles of the socialist Church to the effect that before his bulls collapse the socialist idols of the West fallen into sin — as

²) K. Leontyev, *The Orient, Russia and the Slav Element*.

³) A. Pushkin, *Conversation with an Englishman*.

⁴) A. Pypin, *Characteristic Features of Literary Opinions*.

once did royal thrones before the bulls of an Innocent or a Bonifacius. And even Chaadayev ends in his "Apology of a Madman" with the belief in Russia's great destiny. "It is our task", he wrote, "to bring the saving principle of order into the world that has fallen prey to anarchy. Russia must not reject this mission imposed on her by the Master of Heaven and Earth." The voices of all representatives of Russian political thought joined in a single pæan in honour of their people; in fact they were all prepared to underwrite the official conception of Russian history which was formulated by the notorious chief of the secret police of Tsar Nicholas I, Count von Benckendorff, in the following words: "Her (Russia's) past was admirable, her present is more than splendid, and her future", wrote the count who apparently must have had foreknowledge of the Bolsheviks, "will surpass everything conceivable by human imagination!"

Some brought forward the "sound forms" of the Muscovite state structure which were to save Europe; others wanted to cure the world with the help of the Muscovite peasant community, the "Obshchina", with its system of land as common property, or saw Russia's mission in the liberation of the Slav peoples (the white internationalists), or in the "liberation" of the world proletariat (the red internationalists), or in the theoretical ideal of an ethical rebirth of mankind through Russia. Some dreamt of Moscow as a "Third Rome", others saw in Moscow the capital of the Third International. The ideologists of Muscovite Messianism differed from one another as far as the individual details of their ideas were concerned, but they were all firmly convinced that the Muscovite people, though perhaps grudgingly and not by any means voluntarily, would nevertheless, like a donkey spurred on by the shouts of its drivers, drag along all other peoples in its wake towards an unknown but great future, in which these theoreticians, obsessed by a political mania, saw the shining vision of either a new "civitas dei", or the Muscovite cross on St. Sophia's Cathedral, or a "socialist fatherland of all workers."

Exaggeration and one-sidedness? But Messianism is not exclusively a peculiarity of the Russian people, — the sceptic will retort. But it is not a case of either exaggeration or one-sidedness, for what I have designated as Muscovite Messianism (and, incidentally, Pan-Muscovitism would be a more fitting designation) cannot in any way be regarded as identical with analogous phenomena amongst other nations and most certainly not with Pan-Latinism or Pan-Germanism.

Sceptics will reply, that may be so, but surely Messianism does not constitute the essence of Bolshevism? They will point out that the form which Bolshevik propaganda assumes in the West is a temporary phenomenon, which is just as transitory as the state forms introduced by Napoleon, which were the outcome of the French Revolution; and this latter event, so they will affirm, resembled Bolshevism

inasmuch as it was surely, a social revolution. And what connection can the conflict between Russia and Europe have with it? — they will ask. — This way of reasoning will no doubt seem irrefutable to those who always ascribe the same significance to social movements which the leaders of such movements endow them with. But if we study this extremely complicated problem more thoroughly, we come to quite a different conclusion, — namely, that the “liberation of the world proletariat” and the “liberation of the Slav peoples” are empty phrases, at the back of which there is quite a different factor. *And this is Muscovite Messianism, which is already known to us.*

Apart from the bombastic phraseology of the Bolsheviks, which they use to impress their subjects, whose intellect has been blunted by starvation, and their foreign adherents, who have been won over by various methods, there is another obvious characteristic trait of Bolshevik ideology; and that is consideration of the entire foreign policy of Bolshevism not from the aspect of such opposing conceptions as “revolution and reaction” or “proletariat and bourgeoisie”, but from the point of view of the *antagonism between Russia, as the vanguard of Asia, and Europe as a whole*. When the Bolsheviks play off national religious movements in the Orient against Occident, they are appealing not to any class conflict, but to the national fight of the East against Europe. When they seek to obtain the help of some Moslem ruler and leader or other, this is not an alliance on their part with the “international revolution” against the “international reaction”, nor a policy of alliance with the working masses, but merely the policy of national interests, the fight for Russia’s supremacy over Europe, — a policy from which the Bolsheviks try in vain to absolve themselves. When Lenin attacked Great Britain and America, he censured their *Anglo-Saxon* (and not their capitalistic) freedoms, which he took good care to put in inverted commas.⁵ When Bukharin criticized the “compromising elements” of the European working classes, he was not so much attacking the “traitors” of the working class as the “German, Austrian, French and English Mensheviks.”⁶ When Trotsky tried to rekindle the “patriotic fire” of his red mercenaries in the war against Poland, it was not so much a war against the “Szlachta” (nobility) as a war against *the Poles*... It is precisely at the *European* “slowness of thought”, at the *French* “petty bourgeoisie” and at the *English* “cretinism” that the Soviet Russian Olympus hurls its thunderbolts. It is Europe that opposes Russia’s political expansion, that is the enemy of Bolshevism and its Asian allies! On one side, Russia, — on the other, Europe! Such is the formula of Soviet Russia’s foreign policy.

⁵) V. Lenin, *The State and the Revolution*.

⁶) N. Bukharin, *The Programme of the Communists*.

And it is interesting to note that this policy considers the other Russian Messianist ideology, the Slavophil trend, from the same point of view. If a Slav problem arises, it is not considered individually or abstractly, but as a preliminary stage in the general campaign against the West. Where the internal affairs of the European peoples, who are either under Russian dominion or not, are concerned, all these questions are considered from the point of view of consolidating Russia's power and Empire with regard to Europe.

A further comparison reveals an even more striking analogy. The Bolsheviks declare war on the European "bourgeois" order by appealing to the proletariat. And the old bourgeois Slavophiles likewise declared war on this same bourgeoisie by appealing to the same proletariat. Were they likewise champions of socialism, or are the Bolsheviks Slavophiles? Neither is the case. But both trends served or serve the same national Muscovite ideal, which necessitates the decline of Europe. Leontyev based his political theory on the following argument: "In this sense of culture and of way of life, which I regard as so valuable, all the Slavs, the Southern and Western Slavs alike, are nothing but an unavoidable evil, since all these peoples in the stage of their intellectual classes offer the world nothing but the most ordinary European bourgeoisie."⁷

"Nothing but the most ordinary bourgeoisie"! How does the tsarist Leontyev come to make such a statement? Is it a slip of the tongue on his part? No, not at all, — it is his firm conviction, for he also writes elsewhere: "It is high time to put a stop to the development of the petty bourgeois, liberal progress!"⁸ And two pages further on, he again refers to the "Slav brothers" and expresses his regret that "these, to judge by all their qualities and faults, resemble the European bourgeoisie of the most mediocre type far more closely than we do." — On page 415, this anti-bourgeois tsarist writes: "If the word is to cast aside bourgeois civilization in the near future, the new ideal of humanity will of necessity spring from Russia, from a people amongst whom bourgeois qualities are less developed." These words might, in fact, have been uttered by Lenin or by Bukharin, who based their idea of the world mission of the Russian proletariat on the argument that it was less permeated by bourgeois morals and the corresponding prejudices than its Western counterpart.

But the author argues quite logically! If this "bourgeois civilization", which he hates so intensely, is dying, then there must be someone to dig its grave. In Lenin's opinion this grave-digger is, of course, the revolutionary, specially Russian proletariat. *And Leontyev holds the same view!* France was the chief herald of the bourgeois

⁷) K. Leontyev, *loc. cit.*, p. 108 of the Russian edition.

⁸) *Ibid.*, p. 384.

culture of those days, and for precisely this reason it was to be destroyed, so the Russian Pan-Slavists maintained, by the proletariat, of course. "If it is necessary for the further independence of Eastern Russian thought from Romanic-Germanic thought and for the adoption of a new cultural course and of state forms, that the prestige of Romanic-Germanic civilization should be lowered further and further in the eyes of the people of the East, and if it is necessary that the superstition regarding this civilization should be transformed into a violent prejudice against it as rapidly as possible, then it is to be desired that the country which has taken the initiative in modern progress should compromise its genius as speedily and finally as possible."⁹ So much for France! And since Leontyev wrote his pamphlet at the time of the Commune of Paris, 1870, he appeals for help to its Phrygian cap, which had been set up on the towers of Notre Dame and which was to proclaim the final decline of the bourgeois world. In his opinion it would, of course, be even better if Paris, with its "bourgeois" churches and its parliamentary buildings, were to vanish from the face of the earth completely; and since this is hardly possible without communist methods, the latter are also recommended by tsarist Leontyev. "Is a victory and the rule of the Commune — so he asks — at all possible without vandalism, without material destruction, of buildings, cultural monuments, libraries, etc.? Surely not; and in view of the modern means of destruction, it is far easier to reduce the greater part of Paris to dust and ashes than it was in ancient times to destroy other great centres of culture, as for instance Babylon, Nineveh or ancient Rome. And this should be the wish of everyone who aims to introduce new forms of civilization",¹⁰ it is — of Russian "civilization."

These words are neither the reflections of a fanatic obsessed by some mania, nor are they a quotation from a leading article in the Bolshevik official state organ "Izvestiya", but, I repeat, the profound opinion of a tsarist, of a Russian patriot, who was fully aware of the irreconcilable hostility between his country and Europe and tried to find voluntary or involuntary allies for his cause everywhere, — just as the salesmen of Bolshevism, who have likewise preached terrorism and vandalism in the name of the "new forms of civilization", have been doing. This does not, of course, mean that Leontyev was a Communist or that Lenin and his comrades were Pan-Slavists. In every case their appeal to the proletariat is nothing but a farce, a means to achieve aims which have as little connection with the liberation of the proletariat, as Russian Pan-Slavism had with the liberation of the Slavs, — a means to kindle a world conflagration which would engulf the entire European civilization.

⁹) *Ibid.*, pp. 433-434.

¹⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 435.

K. Leontyev, incidentally, was not the only person to express opinions which appeared original, when viewed in the light of his era and his personality. The well-known and intellectually fairly important ideologist of Slavophilism, O. Miller, wrote at about the same time as Leontyev: "If we were to begin to support it (the nationality principle) amongst the Slavs, we should stir up the whole of former Europe against us and we should have to seek bases against it precisely in Europe itself, namely in a close cooperation everywhere with its new forces."¹¹ What is meant by "new forces"? Precisely the same forces on which the tsarist Leontyev and the Communist Lenin also set their hopes. To ensure the prosperity of Russia and the destruction of Europe, elements are to be stirred up in the West that are hostile to European civilization. Of what concern is it to the Muscovite supporters of bourgeois trends if these elements march along under the red banner of socialism and take their oath not on the Gospel of St. Mark, but on that of St. Marx? They are only concerned with doing their Russian work! And the supporter of the Russian peasant community and of autocracy, the German Müller, who became a Muscovite Miller, actually stresses that it would be advisable to disregard all the principles of legitimism and to join forces with the Mephistopheles of the revolution! Referring to the mission of Russia, he writes: "It seems to me that it would have a great influence on Europe's attitude towards us, if we were to abandon the policy which we pursued until the Eastern War (i.e. the Crimean War, 1853-1855), and if we were to give up all traditions of our legitimism-mania and our revolution-phobia." Russia (that it, tsarist Russia!) is to show her "firm determination" as well as her "ability to prove to the peoples of Europe by deeds that our task, beyond the borders of the Slav world, too, is liberation." And elsewhere, Miller writes as follows: "But if the peoples of Europe still continue to believe them (their ruling classes), and if these peoples are a blind tool in the latter's hands and declare war on those with whom they ought to make a pact of friendship, in order to combat the all-European reaction jointly, then what is to blame for this fact are, for the most part, the former sins of our own policy and the period in which this policy was suffering from the virus of legitimism and the aversion to freedom with which it had been inoculated."¹²

In other words, the essence of the opinions expressed at length by Miller in his book is that Russia, as regards her policy towards Europe, is to rely on the revolutionary elements there and, with their aid, is to pull down the entire structure of the so-called

¹¹) O. Miller, *The Slav Element and Europe* (in Russian), St. Petersburg, 1877, p. 63.

¹²) *Ibid.*, pp. 99 and 109.

bourgeois or, as the West sees it, European culture as such. Similar opinions are also expressed by other Slavophil "patriotic writers", as for instance, Yuriy Samarin, who advised Russia "to take over the policy of liberation which, sooner or later, whether we want to or not, we shall be obliged to fulfil in the whole world." And the anarchist Bakunin was obsessed by a similar idea: "complete negation of the West" and the great liberation mission of the Russian people, headed by its Tsar.¹³

As for Herzen, however, he hopelessly confuses the mission of tsarism with that of the proletariat and paints a crass picture of the Last Day of Europe, in which he assigns the role of the seraphic herald to the armed Russian horde, who "will come in due course to waken the European Palæologi and Porphyrogeneti, provided that they have not already been wakened by the trumpet-call of the Last Judgement which will be pronounced on them by the socialism of revenge — Communism."¹⁴

But we have said enough as regards Herzen and Bakunin, for, after all, they were to a certain extent socialists, too. How, on the other hand, is one to interpret the opinions expressed by Samarin and Miller or by Leontyev, whom no one is likely to suspect of a liberal, let alone a revolutionary attitude? How is one to interpret the entire practice of Russian policy in Europe from the days of Alexey, the father of Peter I, until the reign of Nicholas II, — a policy which actually broke with the principle of legitimism again and again, inasmuch as it disseminated revolutionary, demagogic propaganda amongst the Ukrainian and Polish peasants against their "masters" of the nobility, and also amongst the Finnish peasants (the "Torpas") against the leaders of the peasants' independence movement, amongst the Balkan "Rayas" against their Turkish "oppressors", and amongst the Slav peasants in Austria-Hungary against the "German and Hungarian bourgeoisie exploiting them"? How is one to interpret the idea of tsarism itself, the "kingdom of the poor", the dictatorship in favour of the indigent, — which so closely resembles the Soviet ideology — also a "dictatorship of the poor against the rich"? Were the initiators of this policy — all the Ordin-Nashchokins, Menshikovs, Panins, Gorchakovs, Izvolskys, Shebekos and Hartwigs and other tsarists — agents of the world revolution? If one considers a Bolshevik idea which is apparently not a plagiarism, — namely, the plan to mobilize the Moslem peoples against "Western imperialism", then in this case, too, not the leaders of the Third International, but their teachers are to be congratulated on having invented this idea; for the said Leontyev had already affirmed that "a danger for Russia has arisen in the West" and that allies must be sought against this

¹³) M. Bakunin, *Letters on Patriotism*.

¹⁴) A. Herzen, *Letters from Italy and France* (in Russian), p. 267.

danger: "Should Islam want to become one of these allies, all the better"; for "there are very strong and marked traits in the Russian character which remind one far more of Tatars or other Asiatics — or of no one at all — rather than of Slavs." An alliance with the Moslems would be advantageous, for the simple reason that they have not yet been imbued with any "Europeanism."¹⁵ Does not Bolshevism for the same reason look for allies there for its "Tartar socialism", as Kautsky called it? One could quote other examples and other Slavophiles without end; the ideas expressed will always be found to tally with Lenin's ideas. One could also study passages from the works and speeches of the latter, — one is certain to come across plagiarism from the Pan-Slavist and tsarist gospel. A toying with the idea of the revolution and of the proletariat, a crusade against the bourgeoisie, amorous glances towards Asia, tirades and attacks against the principle of legitimism, — these ideas and methods are used equally by Lenin and the Pan-Slavists, and tsarists. And in both cases there is one and the same aim — the destruction of "rotten" Europe *ad majorem Moscoviae gloriam* — the Europe that is hostile to all the forms of the Russian state which have existed so far.

Precisely herein and in nothing else lies the common feature of the different forms of Russian imperialism — the tsarist, the Liberal, and the Bolshevik form. Indeed, the Russian pre-revolutionary publicist Strakhov had already realized this fact when he said: "If we consider our nihilism as a whole and from the entire aspect of its expressions, we shall realize that its sceptical opinion as regards Europe (and not of the bourgeoisie! — D. D.) is its most important characteristic. In this respect, persons of the most genuine Russian trend very frequently agree completely with the ideas of the nihilists" (and vice versa, we should like to add, — D. D.).¹⁶ Leroy-Beaulieu, too, realized this fact and held the opinion that nihilism was a form of protest on the part of Russia against Europe.¹⁷ A protest which very soon developed into sadistic dreams and affirmed that Paris would be razed to the ground; which exhorted the workers of Europe "to massacre their leaders who have become middle-class", as for instance Zinovyev-Apfelbaum did at the Congress of the German "Independents" in Halle; a protest on the part of the barbarians who "roam about Europe... and are pleased to have found something which can be destroyed... without knowing what great cultural treasures they were destroying" (Dostoevsky, see above). Their demagogic watchwords are nothing more than merely

¹⁵) K. Leontyev, *loc. cit.*, pp. 28 and 182.

¹⁶) Strakhov, *The Fight against the West in Our Literature*, p. 126 of the Russian edition.

¹⁷) Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Empire Russe*.

a means of warfare, a kind of naphtha which — as Herzen says — should be poured on the edifice of Occidental culture, of which every Russian is aware, so that either an “earthy absolute ruler”, Nicholas Romanov, or a dictator over the world proletariat, Lenin, could establish himself at the scene of the fire. When Russia’s interests demand, a Pan-Slavist and tsarist becomes a revolutionary and an enemy of the bourgeoisie, but a socialist Bolshevik becomes a supporter of red tsarism and an ally of Asiatic chauvinists.

If we consider the part played by Soviet Russia in Europe’s social movements, we realize that its doctrine (like the doctrine of Russian imperialism) only makes a pretence of siding with one or other of the powers fighting each other in Europe; *in principle, however, this doctrine adopts a hostile attitude to all that is European and to Europe as a whole.* Thus, in former times, socialists and Pan-Slavists in Russia joined forces on the basis of the Muscovite “Obshchina”, the peasant community with its system of land as common property. It is still a question of the conflict of two forms of culture, of two national ideals.

Without wishing to deny either the existence of big social and political conflicts in Europe or the part played by Russia in these conflicts, we are of the opinion that behind all these conflicts there is, above all, a more universal conflict, which has weighed heavily on all the conflicts in Europe that have ensued during the past two hundred years.

Russia has always been the champion and supporter of the Messianist ideal, — this is the primary conclusion which we are bound to reach after studying the above-mentioned material and facts. And the second conclusion which we reach is that Russia has always regarded every stage in her expansion, both before 1917 (Pan-Slavism and Neo-Slavism) and later, too (Bolshevism), in the perspective of her fight against Europe as a whole. Whatever methods have been adopted in order to camouflage this fight and under whatever banner it has been conducted, the essence of the matter at issue has never changed. And bearing this in mind, we must now examine another question, namely the reasons for Russia’s fundamental antagonism to Occidental culture.

CHAPTER III

RUSSIAN BARBARITY

It was affirmed in the preceding chapter that the "new gospel" which the Russians bring to Europe, apart from its various formulations, is always the same, inasmuch as it conforms to one and the same conception of the national ideal.

Let us now examine it more closely!

What strikes one most when one compares these two worlds — the Romanic-Germanic world, to which the West Slavs and Ukrainians alike belong, and the Russian Muscovite world? A colourful multifariousness, a certain eminence and grandeur throughout its entire history, the mobility of the masses, a dramatic tension in conflicts, the free play of forces, the powerful role of great personalities, the predominance of justice and of logical thought, — all these characteristics are to be found in the West.

Uniformity, the suppression of personality, the colourlessness of historical events, the lack of differentiation in the primitive forces of the people, the exorbitantly important part played by the state, — these characteristics are typical of Russia.

The conflicts between monarchs and Popes, a conflict fought with dramatic tension, — this is typical of the West. The suppression on the part of the all-powerful Tsar of the powerless clergy, — this is typical of Russia. The grim and determined fight of the feudal lords against kings — in the West. The ruthless execution of his "menials" (kholopy), as he designated his boyars, by Ivan IV — in Russia. The tragic conflict of the old faith with the Reformation and the even more imposing reaction of the former — in the West. The one-sided struggle between the official Church and the "Raskol" Schism — in Russia. On the one hand, Lutheranism, Zwinglianism and Calvinism;

on the other, the "jumpers", the "flagellants" (Khlysty) and the stylites. Great personalities of the French aristocracy, who retained their dignity even on the scaffold, — this is typical of France and of the West. The fainthearted clique of a "conditional aristocracy" by the grace of the Tsar, who spent their time sitting about in the night-clubs and taverns of Constantinople and Prague and waiting for their country to be saved, — this is typical of Russia. The execution of Louis XVI, or that of Charles I, Cromwell's great enemy, — this is characteristic of Europe. The fact that one does not know by whom and how the last of the Romanovs was murdered, — this is characteristic of Russia. An entire constellation of aristocratic names known throughout the continent, whose bearers fought against the French Revolution either at the head of the Vendée or of the coalition armies, — this is typical of the West. Brussilov, Polivanov, Klembovsky, Gutor and a number of Tsarist generals who fought for the Third International, — this is typical of Russia.

If we read the history of Europe, we become acquainted with the history of its *peoples*. But all we perceive when we read the history of Russia are the *obscure masses* who blindly obey their leaders and move in one direction today and in another direction tomorrow. In Europe, history was made by classes, parties, nations and great individuals, in other words by society. In Russia, it was made by the state, by the government, which left both, classes and individuals, as well as society itself, lying in fetters. This latter trait (and we now come to the very essence of the antagonism between Europe and Russia) is characteristic of all primitive communities, including the Russian one.

In primitive communities there is no distinct separation of the "I" from the "We", of the individual from the mass, of individual existence from substance. The individual does not, as yet, live by his own thoughts, but merely by the collective intellect of the masses. Moral, legal, religious and political precepts are not regarded as precepts of one's own ego (that is of "conscience"), but as fundamentally unfathomable decrees from above. Hence, in a community of this kind the relations between individuals or their groups and the complex whole assume a peculiar character. Elsewhere these relations are regulated and fixed by the law, by "imperative and attributive" rules, that is to say, by rules in which the obligation of one party is fixed by the awareness of the other party of the right to which it — the latter — is entitled (as, for instance, the obligation to pay a debt). In primitive communities, on the other hand, the mutual relations between the "I" and the "We" are regulated and fixed by rules of a one-sided "ethical" and purely "imperative" nature; that is to say, by rules in which the obligation of one party is by no means regarded by the other party as a right to which it — the latter — is entitled. Exactly the opposite is the case in communities

with a more highly developed legal awareness. In primitive communities the whole weighs heavily on the individual like an omnipotent divinity, whom one may only ask for mercy, but from whom one may by no means demand one's right. Here, state laws are regarded as moral laws and also vice versa. "Here — so Hegel writes — both moral norm and legal norm constitute the law, which rules the individual as an external power. The norms are fulfilled, but in a purely external way, as a regulation enforced from above. The individual obeys these laws, not because he realizes their justice, but solely because he does not know what he is doing."¹⁸

Accordingly, in such communities the means by which one gains the common recognition of the will of the nation (in the state) or of *truth* in general (in the Church) is also quite different. In more developed communities this means consists in logic and precisely defined legal procedure. In Russia, however, as in all other primitive communities, the corresponding means consists in vague, intuitive guess-work: the principle of "humanity" in the peasants' local meetings ("mirskoy skhod") and — in politics — the idea of a state's diet with no will of its own ("zemskiy sobor"), in religion, the predominance of the commands or the arbitrariness of the ruler. The important part played by individuals and their free grouping, a feeling of personal dignity, of one's own rights and duties, active participation in social organization, — these are the chief traits of the Western society. Insecurity and passivity of the individual, lack of legal mentality, complete absence of autonomous morality which is replaced here with orders and beatings — these are the chief characteristics of the Russian society. And, hence, there is "self-government" in the widest sense of the word in the West, and chaos or despotism in Russia.

This primitiveness, this lack of shape order in the structure of the Russian national organism, is evident in every sphere of life in Muscovite Russia: both in the social sphere, in the sphere of family life, as well as in the political, religious and cultural sphere. If we consider all these spheres in turn, we arrive at the following conclusions:

A typical example of social organization in Russia is the "Obshchina", the peasant community with its system of land as common property, — an institution about which there have been endless disputes, but which has been supported most enthusiastically both by the Slavophiles and by the "Westernisers" headed by Herzen, by the adherents of Tsarism and also by the latter's implacable enemies, the socialist revolutionaries. In the "Obshchina" the individual does not count at all. As part of the complex whole, he

¹⁸) Hegel, *Philosophy of History*.

has no rights whatsoever. He has nothing which he can call his own property; even the plot of land which he has tilled and cultivated with his own hands only belongs to him for a short period, for he is liable to be deprived of it any time. The "Obshchina" can ostracize any of its members at will, and not only on account of some crime, but even on account of some offence of a purely individual kind, as for instance addiction to alcohol; it can force any of its members to sow or plant the crops which it stipulates on their plot of land. And this was the case, too, prior to the 1917 revolution in Russia, and since then in the collective and state farms.

Personal effort and personal ideas are entirely unnecessary in this community and, in any case, are not respected as such. For instance, a plot of forest-land which has been made arable and has been cultivated with great personal effort and labour, may be assigned to an idler at the next re-distribution of land, — on the strength of the principle that all members of the complex whole are equal. No distinction whatever is made between "mine" and "yours", and these two conceptions may be reversed from one day to the next. The "Obshchina" does not recognize any rights on the part of the individual which are independent of the collective, that is rights to the fruits of one's own labour. Nor does it recognize any personal obligations. In this community, where the system of joint suretyship prevails ("krugovaya poruka"), it is not the individual, but the community as a complex whole that is responsible for the payment of taxes. Naturally, all this is not a violation of the peculiar rationality of Muscovite peasant life, but this rationality, if one applies Hegel's terminology, is merely determined by "reason" and not by "intelligence", that is to say not by any "conscious reason."¹⁹ The rationality of the "obshchina" is not a planned organisation of a free collective, but only an automatic order to which the individual subordinates himself, apathetically and with no will of his own, without understanding this order.

A similar order — so one of the leading authorities on Russian national life, the Russian, *Gleb Uspensky*, affirms — exists in the animal kingdom, too. "The carp in the River Volga, which live in village-communities, like the Russian peasants, also have their envoys and their deputies. The latter usually swim on in advance, in front of their community, and when they come to a barrier set up across the river by fishermen, they first of all test its firmness with their snout; next, they push against it sideways, and then they try to leap over it; and if none of these efforts prove successful, the deputies go back to their community and report on the situation. Thereupon, it is decided in a community meeting of the carp that the barrier is to be removed by joint force and joint action; and the whole

¹⁹) Hegel, *ibid.*

community actually makes a fierce rush at the barrier and pushes it aside by their collective mouth. Many of the carp perish, but the rest force their way through the opening that has been made, and in this way are saved."^{19a}

According to G. Uspensky, the Russian "Obshchina" constitutes a similar community, in which every member lives by the collective wisdom of the mass. Each member of this kind of organization is (rather like Platon Karatayev in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*) "merely a component part, nothing complete in itself"; he has no individual and personal convictions or philosophy of life. Like figures on a chess-board, each of the members of such a community moves in obedience to the hand of the player and in accordance with certain rules; but left to reason things out for itself, however, the figure either remains motionless or falls over. "Such a component part", writes Uspensky, "if forcibly removed from its usual surroundings, may do all sorts of damage; for, accustomed as it is to obeying the will of others unreservedly and blindly, it is prepared to do anything." "Go and fetter them!", "Go and unfetter them!", "Shoot them!", "Release them!", "Beat them!" "Beat them harder!", "Come and save them!" — commands of this kind are all carried out, since these "component parts" are incapable of criticizing or opposing them. Today, such component parts may "crush the revolt", tomorrow they may "take up arms in order to liberate their Slav brothers", whilst the day after tomorrow, they may "fight for the Third International." — "Personally", so Uspensky adds, "they have no idea of what is wise and what is foolish, and of what is good and what is evil." Uspensky describes the helplessness and confusion of such a person, namely of the peasant, in the town, where he is exposed to every form of influence, and adds: "He is a complete stranger here, a man of alien influences, of alien commands, and even of alien ideas and intentions. He has no convictions and no moral principles of his own. He is an empty vessel which can be filled with any kind of contents", — that is either with a tsarist or with a Communist soup. A person of this type submits to all that "God sends" him, to all the blows that fate may "deal" him. He is amoral, for he has no conception of right or of the duties and obligations of others. He is not responsible for his deeds, for he has become accustomed to this state as a result of the feudal system, under which the lord of the manor — and the "Obshchina" — was responsible for him.

And the same applies as regards the constitution of other social groups in Muscovite Russia. None of them had an independent existence, as was the case in the West, but merely existed for the state. None of them were founded on the strength of their own rights, but were called into being by the state. In the struggle amongst

^{19a}) Gleb Uspensky, *The Power of the Soil*.

themselves and against the sovereign power, none of them developed a corporative spirit or a feeling of class-consciousness within themselves, but each group received its privileges from the supreme power without fight or effort. The clergy (even before 1917) became a "Department for Clerical Affairs" under its Minister. The "third class", which in Europe was secure in its rights, in Muscovite Russia became a mercantile body of various "guilds", dependent on the municipal head of the town concerned. The nobility became a "public service class", a class of privileged "tsarist slaves", devoid of the rank-consciousness which feudalism in the West had created. A nobility on the strength of ancestral rights was a thing almost unknown amongst the Muscovites. Their nobility was a reward for service to the tsar. It is true that the classes had their "marshals of nobility", their "city elders", etc., but these were not free delegates of free corporate bodies, but merely ordinary officials of the tsar, that is a kind of Tatar "Baskaks." As in the West, there were in Russia nobles, bourgeois and demos, but no "noblesse", no bourgeoisie, no democracy, and no corporate bodies or classes which were independent of the state or frequently opposed the latter. As if history wished to stress the menial and servile character of the Russian nobility still more, it did not deny the latter the institution which was characteristic of the "Obshchina", — the joint suretyship (collective responsibility): in the days of Ivan IV, the relatives of every "free" noble, who wanted to evade or leave service with the Grand Duke of Moscow, — or the members of any other family of the nobility, too, — were held responsible for him with their lives. And a lasting trace of this truly Russian conception of justice is to be found in Bolshevik practice, namely in the joint security of an entire family for their "counter-revolutionary" relatives. At all times dependent on their lord and ruler, at first, as fond of moving from place to place as was the Muscovite peasant before the days of Tsar Boris (1598-1605), and, later, in possession of a piece of land which was part of the landed property of the tsar, and only sure of their rights to this land as long as they performed the service demanded of them, the Russian nobles, for whom the state thought and acted — just as the "Obshchina" did for the "moujiks", like the latter had no chance to set up their own code of political or corporative morals. In this respect, the Russian noble, like the Muscovite citizen or peasant, remained a nihilist as far as morals and politics were concerned. He subordinated himself to the rules of a collective will, personified by the tsar, but took no active or conscious part in determining this will. As far as the intrinsic character of his status was concerned, he was no better off than the masses and in the eyes of the tsar he was just as negligible a factor as the lowest peasant.

"Apprenez, monsieur", said Tsar Paul in reply to a remark made by General Dumouriez, the French envoy, "qu'il n'y a pas de

considérable ici que la personne, à laquelle je parle, et pendant le temps que je lui parle.”²⁰ These were not the words of a madman, but a very aptly expressed formulation of the relations between “I” and “We”, between the individual and the people as a whole in Russia. Paul expressed an idea, which formed the basis of that truly Muscovite institution known as “official appointment according to family right” (*mestnichestvo*), — an institution of a purely official character: the Russian boyars counted above all on the fact that their fathers and forefathers had been in the tsar’s service, but not on the lineage of their families, nor on the value of a personality, which — without the tsar’s grace — was not and never could be “considérable.”

But that which endowed all three European classes with illustriousness, resistance powers, caste loyalty and a definite code of “savoir vivre”, which had been cultivated for hundreds of years, and gave the individual the feeling of personal dignity, was completely missing in Russia.

And if one considers the Muscovite conception of the family, one encounters this same phenomenon — the repression of the individual and the domination of the family as a whole. The very fact that in all legacy cases customary law holds good for the Russian peasant, deprives the individual within the family of all protection on the part of the civil code, inasmuch as he is completely subordinated to the dictatorship of the family, that is to say to the dictatorship of the person who is regarded as the head of the family. “I confess”, so the well-known Slavophil *Danilevsky* wrote, “that I do not understand those persons who talk about the “sense of family” of our people. I have seen many peoples. In the Crimea, in Ukraine, in Austria and Germany, I have always found one and the same thing. I noticed that almost all foreign peoples, not only the Germans and the English, but also numerous other peoples, such as the Ukrainians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs, have a far greater “sense of family” than we Russians have.”²¹

This same general idea is to be found in Russia’s political order. In no other country was the ideal of the state cultivated as zealously as in Russia. And here, where individuals and corporate bodies counted for nothing, the state became omnipotent. “Here in Russia”, writes the famous Russian philosopher and theologian, *Vladimir Solovyov*, “in a pseudo-Christian community, our own Islam came into being, but it does not refer to God, but to the state.” And one believed in this state as in an “absolute power, in the presence of which man was as nothing”, as in an “absolute personification of our

²⁰) “Know, Sir, that there is no person of esteem here except the person to whom I am speaking and only as long as I am speaking to that person.”

²¹) *Danilevsky, Russia and Europe*, p. 127 of the original Russian edition.

national strength." Just as an orthodox Mohammedan regards all theorizing on the essence and attributes of the godhead as empty talk or a pretentious misuse of words, so the Russian consider it a sin to doubt the right of their god, the State, to do what it likes with them."²² The notorious Russian tsarist publicist, *Katkov*, once said: "Like a raging storm, it (the will of the State) drives the myriad particles of dust wherever it likes."²³

The relations between that absolute and the individual are typical of all public relations in Russia, and they are not determined by any law. They can be compared to the relations between the wolf and the lamb in Saltykov-Shchedrin's satirical fable: "If I want, I shall eat you, and if I change my mind, I may pardon you." Those who can still recall the physical attitude of Russian society in the days of Alexander III or of his son, will understand both Solovyov and Katkov. This same attitude also prevails in Communist Russia.

In those days, for instance, social relief work to help the destitute was subjected to persecution, since it was regarded as interference on the part of the people in state affairs which were no concern of theirs. When, after the appointment of Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky as Minister of the Interior in 1904, the municipal council of Odessa and, subsequently, other municipal councils, expressed their gratitude to him for his liberal proclamation, the authorities likewise regarded this step with disapproval as an unlawful demonstration. When Tsar Nicholas I was informed that the people were angry because of the Russian defeat in the Crimea, he replied indignantly: "What concern is that of the people?" For the right to praise also includes the right to criticize, but this is absolutely inadmissible in cases where there are no legal relations existent between the state and its subjects. It is true that the supreme power had certain duties towards its subjects, but they were not of a legal nature; it only had to account "to God", that is to its own conscience, for the fulfilment of these duties. The subjects of the state had no right whatever to demand either the fulfilment of these duties from the supreme power, or the fulfilment of purely ethical duties. On the other hand, however, the subjects of the state were in duty bound to love the Tsar; but the Muscovite masses did not regard the command to sacrifice their lives for their country in the same light as, for instance, the duty to pay debts of honour, — that is to say, not as a duty towards one's own conscience, but, rather, as a commandment issued by an alien external power, hurled, as it were, from above like a thunderbolt by Moses, — a commandment which must be obeyed as long as Moses held the thunderbolt in his hand, but which it would have been better to evade. And herein, too, lies the cause of the revolution of the *Russian*

²²) V. Solovyov: *The National Problem in Russia*.

²³) Quoted from V. Solovyov's book, *The National Problem in Russia*.

people against tsarism, when the latter became weak (in the case of the non-Russian peoples the cause was another), as well as of the lack of resistance of the same people against Bolshevist tyranny (almost all uprisings against the tyranny occurred in the *non-Russian* territories of the U.S.S.R.).

The very concept "subject" itself most clearly reflects the nature of the mutual relations between the State and the individual. In Europe there are two concepts, — "subject" and "citizen." The former is an object of the state machine, of the supreme power; the latter is an authorized participant in this power, and the state is just as much under an obligation to him as he is to the state. In Russia there is no such concept as "citizen of the state" (*grazhdanin*), and when this word was invented at the end of the 18th century, Paul I promptly forbade its use, in order to prevent any confusion from being introduced into the harmonious system of the Russian state ideology. This step was by no means a whim on his part, but simply reflected the fact that the individual in Russia had no rights whatever.

In connection with this subject, *Herzen* wrote as follows: "In the most troublous times in European history we find a certain regard for the individual, a certain recognition of his independence, and certain rights which were conceded to talent and genius. However ruthless the governments may have been in those days, — Spinoza was not deported to a penal colony, Lessing was not flogged, nor was he forced to become a soldier. This regard not only for material, but also for moral power, this involuntary recognition of individual personality, is one of the outstanding characteristics of European life. There is no such thing as this in our country. *Man was absorbed by the state and lost his identity in the community* . . . The unwritten and instinctive recognition of personal rights, of the right of the individual to free thought, — a recognition which ethically curbed power, could not be and was not transmitted to us... The state power in our country is more self-confident and freer than in Turkey or Persia; it is not restrained by anything, and not by any past."²⁴

The negative attitude towards a legal regulation of the relations between the state and the individual also had a certain influence on the original conception of the organization of the collective will. Elsewhere, constitutional guarantees constitute the means by which the legal relations between the people and the state are determined. In Russia guarantees are rejected both in practice and in theory, for the sole reason that they constitute a legal concept and are operative and attributive norms; and, incidentally, also because every constitution is allegedly a "falsification of the will of the people", a "rebellion" against the whole. In the opinion of the Slavophil

²⁴) A. Herzen (Gertsen), *From the Other Shore*.

Konstantin Aksakov, every definite formulation of the relations between the state and the individual was nonsense. He prefers the "way of free conviction" or of "inner truth."²⁵ Yuriy Samarin does not recognize the principle of the people's representation, since the latter leads to the "disintegration of society into a majority and a minority and to the collapse of the community principle." He points out that the system of representation is also impossible in Russia because "no division is possible here between the supreme representative of the monarchist principle and the people."²⁶ The Muscovite ideal (even before 1917) is a state power unfettered by legal conditions and "freely inspired by national life."

Another ideal in the opinion of Aksakov and the Slavophiles of the first half of the 19th century, as befitted their doctrine, was the Land Diet (*zemskiy sobor*) of the 16th and 17th centuries, an institution in which "the entire state power was to belong to the Tsar and the entire freedom of thought to the people"; that is to say, the same elevation of purely intuitive norms of moral principles to the role of a regulator of the life of the state, — which is a characteristic of all undeveloped communities. This same community or "Obshchina" ideology is also applied to state conditions by the socialist anarchist Bakunin, according to whom "the (Russian) people regard the Tsar as the symbolical personification of the unity, the greatness and the glory of Russia." The reverence of the people for this symbol is, in his opinion, of a purely religious nature. They are bound to each other not by legal relations as in the West, but by purely imperative ones.²⁷ The majority principle is rejected, since the precondition for this principle lies in the disintegration of the masses into independent individuals, for the majority can no longer be an undifferentiated mass if it subordinates itself to the individual, who enjoys freedom of thought and freedom of election, — that is, to the principle of rationalism and individualism. The electoral system, in particular, is a provocation of the masses; even in its most primitive form ("those in favour, go to the right door, — those against, go to the left") it is based on a separation of the individual parts from the mass, — an idea which is entirely unacceptable to the mentality of the Muscovites, who have been trained in the spirit of the herd instinct. "Uniformity" is to prevail in every sphere of life, and since this, as a rule, only leads to chaos and to the logical conclusion of the latter, namely absolutism, "Long live absolutism!" has become the watchword of the entire social ideology of the Muscovites. This watchword is so

²⁵ K. Aksakov, *Historical Works*, Vol. I.

²⁶ Yuriy Samarin, *Collected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 57, 277, 305 of the original Russian edition.

²⁷ M. Bakunin, *Letters on Patriotism*.

Russian that the Bolsheviks also adopted it, that is to say, those who, prior to 1917, had always shouted "Down with absolutism!" Of course, the opinion is also held that the "absolutism" (whether tsarist or Soviet) is an emanation of the will of the people; but this opinion is one of those mysteries of the Muscovite mentality which no non-Russian is able to understand.

This same rejection of the principles of individualism is also in evidence in the Russian Church. And those who wish to examine the reasons for the antagonism between Russia and Europe must not overlook the question of religion.

But can this antagonism really be traced in the sphere of religion, too? Certainly, and, indeed, to a greater extent than is apparent on a superficial consideration of the facts.

Bakunin attacks the "social, legal, political and religious prejudices of the West."²⁸ The well-known Slavophil *Miller* enumerates the three main features of the Polish intellectual class and defines them as "the Catholic-ecclesiastical element, the aristocratic-nobility element, and the democratic-revolutionary element."²⁹ These words provide much food for thought not only for those who occupy themselves with the connection between culture and religion, but also for those who study the problem of the unity of Western civilization, which in all its aspects, even in those which are hostile to each other, opposes the Muscovite East as a cultural complex whole.

Russia derived her Church from Ukrainian Kiev, but this Church soon became a national Russian one and completely dependent on the supreme political power. In this respect it is no exception amongst the other social institutions of Russia. As regards its internal order, it is likewise permeated with the same principles which are in evidence in the political and social structure of Russia. As far back as the earliest days of the history of the Muscovite Church, these principles consisted in the crudeness and vagueness of the ruling class and in an aversion to logical principles, with all the corresponding consequences. In politics the Russian genius abhors all clearly defined forms in which the will of the people should be expressed; for this reason, it refers to the confused, illogical voice of the people, which could be recognized intuitively (cf. the dictatorship of the rabble, of the have-nots). In the Church the Russian genius attacks every precise definition of the means by which religious truth is to be taught; for this reason, it opposes the division of the Church into teachers and pupils and here, too, refers to the same confused voice of the "conscience of the people." In both cases the Russian genius rejects the principle of rationalism, which opposes the "only source of truth", — the opinion of the people as a whole. *Khomiakov* affirms

²⁸) *Ibid.*

²⁹) *Miller, The Slav Element and Europe*, p. 95 of the original Russian edition.

that "the infallibility belongs exclusively to the oecumenical Church" (by which he means the Muscovite Church), and that "the unchangeableness of the dogma, as well as the purity of the rites are entrusted to the protection of not only the hierarchy, but also the whole people of the Church."³⁰ Khomiakov makes no mention of the fact, however, that these dogmas will be just about as well protected as are the flower-beds entrusted to the protection of the public.

If the above really is the case, if the entire people are the protectors of the Church dogmas, then there is no such thing as the division of the Church into teachers and pupils. Everyone can be a teacher. After the same principle, according to which an ensign Krylenko or a sergeant Budyonny can become a commander-in-chief, everyone can become a spiritual leader of the "Church of Christ", on whom God's blessing "rests", — today — the holy synod, tomorrow — the notorious monk, Iliodor, and the day after tomorrow — Rasputin.

"In our Church", says Khomiakov, "there are no teachers and no pupils, since the teachings of our Church are not confined to any set limits determined from above." Every word that "is inspired by the feeling of true Christian love, of living faith or of living hope, is teaching. Every individual, however high his grade in the hierarchy, or, on the other hand, however hidden he may be in the most modest surroundings, — alternatively teaches and is taught. For God gives the gift of His wisdom to whomever He sees fit."³¹

According to *Miller*, who likewise opposes a division of the Church, the truth of the orthodox Church is preserved in equal manner by the "entire orthodox community" and "is confessed with mouths and hearts in unison", without any division of the orthodox community into teachers and pupils, without any unjustified claims of personal reasoning which might set itself up over the community.³² And, finally, Kireyevsky clinches the argument by affirming that "no special genius is necessary to determine the evolution of the characteristic orthodox thought. On the contrary, such genius, the precondition for which lies in originality, might even harm the complex whole of truth." With considerable unwillingness, *Khomiakov* admits that "Christianity expresses itself both in a logical form and in symbols", but that, nevertheless, it is not left to our choice to make the right to teach someone's exclusive privilege: "The entire Church teaches, the Church in its entirety." The Roman Catholics, so he affirms, made a mistake in "setting up the guarantee of human reasoning or some other guarantee in place of mutual

³⁰) Khomiakov, *Collected Works*, Vol. II, pp. 58-61 of the original Russian edition.

³¹) *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

³²) *Miller*, *loc. cit.*, p. 179.

love.”³³ This latter quotation is particularly interesting. It reminds one of Aksakov’s reflections on the perniciousness of guarantees in politics. In both cases — in ascertaining the true will of the people, as well as in determining the true faith of the people — every kind of system was rejected from the start. At the same time, every kind of guarantee for the right interpretation of this will or this truth was also rejected. And, in addition, every kind of rôle or validity of reasoning, which might usurp rights reserved exclusively to the chaotic instinct of the collective, or, as usually happens in such cases, to the command of the state, was also rejected.

The consequences of this and no other kind of organization of the Muscovite orthodox Church, which was subordinated to the secular power, proved fatal for this Church. They are similar to the consequences which the organization of other social institutions in Russia (rural communities, social classes, state) had on the independent activity and development of the same. These consequences were: stagnation and formalism, complete incapacity for action, as well as complete inability to shape and mould the psyche and the convictions of the broad masses whose welfare was entrusted to the Church. “The Russian Church is completely indifferent to everything that is connected with the needs of modern life and modern knowledge... It always remained aloof from the intellectual movement, since it has always given priority to the ritual elements; and, partly, for the simple reason that the standard of the general education of the Russian clergy is a low one. The attempts of the Roman Catholic Church to develop its traditional dogmas still further with the aid of explanations and deductions, and the efforts of the Protestant Church to bring its teachings into line with the progress of knowledge and with the changed trend of the intellectual movement, are equally alien to the spirit of the Russian Church. For this reason it does not engage in any profound theological or philosophical research, nor does it attempt to combat the spirit of irreligion in its modern forms. To a Roman Catholic who attacks science, in so far as it refutes his traditional religious conceptions, and to a Protestant who endeavours to bring his religious views into line with scientific deductions, the Russian Church must indeed appear to be an ante-diluvian fossil.”³⁴

Danilevsky affirms: “The Russian Church maintains that all the problems and dissensions of the Church are already solved in the Revelation, but the Revelation is a word that is meaningless if no means are given by which to preserve its genuineness and indisputability and its true sense and to apply these in the right way in every given case... The relation of the Church to the Revelation

³³) Khomiakov, *loc. cit.*, pp. 65, 66, 72.

³⁴) Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia*, Vol. II, pp. 193, 194.

is the same as that of the court to the civil code. Without judicial power to interpret and apply it, the civil code, in spite of its perfection, is a useless book."³⁵ Actually, it is precisely the lack of a special organ to interpret the doctrine of the Church which condemns the Russian Orthodox Church to complete impotence. "The Russian absolute, so Rozanov says, "rested in the coffins of hundreds of persons who were already dead, "qui dixerunt" ("who have already had their say"), to whom no more can be said, since one can neither start an argument over their graves, nor weep at their graves in order to make them hear us and substitute a *yes* for a *no* and a *no* for a *yes* at the crucial moment, that is in a fatal era of history."³⁶ There is no generally acknowledged authority, and for this reason a reformation is impossible.

The mental immobility and political formlessness of the Russian people and the weakness of the classes and individuals that detached themselves from the latter resulted in a complete incapacity for independent action and in the absolutism of the rabble. And the same immobility of the Russian community of the faithful and the impossibility of a division of the Church resulted in the atrophy of religious life as a whole and in the subjugation of the Muscovite Orthodox Church by the political power. These two results are the consequences of the Muscovite conception of the social organizations, of the relations between the community and the individual.

The most serious consequence of this restrictive organization of the Church consisted in formalism, in blind adherence to the letter, in an alienation from life, and in dependence on the state. In the Russian Church the main emphasis was always on absolutism and subordination to the political factor, a state of affairs which dates back to the 14th century. Peter I enslaved the Muscovite Church by subordinating it to the Holy Synod, but it was the slavish organization and mentality of the Russian Church which, in the first place, enabled Peter to carry out his experiment. In politics the rejection of the "external truth" (of parliamentarianism) and the appeal to the "unanimity" and to the will of the entire people — and both these fundamental ideas were completely anarchic in character — led, in the first place, to some robber-chief, such as Pugachov, being at liberty to interpret the will of the people; but later this right was only conceded to the Tsar, who to the Slavophiles stood for the incarnation of the will of the people as a whole, just as Lenin to the Bolsheviks is the personification of the proletariat. And the same was bound to happen as regards the Church. The dogmas of the orthodox Church, which were entrusted not to the protection of the hierarchy alone,

³⁵) Danilevsky, *loc. cit.*

³⁶) V. Rozanov, *Next to the Church*, Vol. II, p. 63 of the original Russian edition.

but also to that "of the entire people", had in the first place to seek a protector in some Christomaniac or other, and then, later, in the Tsar, who, incidentally, was called the "protector of the dogmas of the Orthodox Church" in the Russian legal code.³⁷ In this respect, however, the Russian scholars adopt a peculiar attitude; Khomiakov, for instance, in his letter to Palmer, in which he discusses the dependence of the Muscovite Church on the secular power, writes as follows: "A society can remain in actual dependence, but in character, however, still free, and vice versa."³⁸ But this already belongs to the sphere of that Russian "mysticism", which those who have been brought up in the "false presuppositions" of the "rotting West" are not allowed to comprehend.

In the intervals of light which dawned on the Russians, they themselves realized the questionable nature of their position. Thus, Samarin, for instance, assailed by doubts, wrote in such a moment: "How is one to know whether the orthodox element really preserves in complete entirety the two extremes into which the Western Church has been divided in the West (Catholicism and Protestantism)? It is possible that this unity, this entirety, is merely an initial indefiniteness. It is possible that the Slav sense of community merely represents such an initial undeveloped state."³⁹ But such intervals of enlightenment occurred only rarely.

The dependence of the Church and its formalism were the fetters which bound Russian orthodoxy, deprived it of its freedom of action and formed the breach which separated it from the sphere of active life. In the West even the monks in the monasteries did not, as a rule, cease to be active in the world for the good of the world. "Monastic life in the West", so the above-mentioned Mackenzie Wallace writes, "has, at various times in its history, shown a powerful striving after spiritual regeneration. And this striving was evident in the founding of new religious communities, each of which pursued its own aim by engaging in activity in some special sphere... There is nothing like this to be found in Russia. The Russians have restricted the activity of the monks to religious rites and prayers... Neither in Russian monastic life as a whole, nor in any individual monastery is there any indication of a definite trend towards a reform."⁴⁰

This dependence on the secular power and this alienation from worldly affairs had still further consequences. Since the Russian Church was not prompted by any permanent and predominant aim or impulse to effect a reform, but adhered either to the "old coffins"

³⁷⁾ *Statute Book of the Russian Empire*, I, Par. 42, 43.

³⁸⁾ Khomiakov, *loc. cit.*, p. 399 of the original Russian edition.

³⁹⁾ Yu. Samarin, *loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 399 of the original Russian edition.

⁴⁰⁾ Mackenzie Wallace, *loc. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 391.

or to the orders of a secular head — at one time the head of this Church was actually a general, it could neither be an ethical and religious support to its community, nor could it endow the latter with any autonomous moral principles. He who has been brought up in the Russian orthodox faith, can go to confession or, in fact, to church, just as a Russian soldier goes into an attack, but in both cases it is the command from above which prompts him, or else his blind adherence to the letter. For he has no inner, autonomous moral principles.

"The Russians think", wrote Solovyov, "that in order to be a true Christian, it suffices to adhere to the dogmas and the sacred rites of orthodoxy, and that they are in no way required to give political and social life a Christian character. They refused on principle to recognize the contradiction between truth and life." And even the only trend to reform to appear in Russia — the so-called Nikonian movement — for the most part merely stirred up a verbal quarrel, which had little to do with the essence of the matter, between itself and the "Old Believers." In order to bring about an essential reform in the Church and in the social order, Russian orthodoxy should have had a moral authority; but, as Solovyov asks, how can "a hierarchy, which has fallen into the hands of the secular power, manifest the moral authority which it has itself renounced?" The complete impotence of the Russian Orthodox Church with regard to a reform of the social order can best be seen from its incapacity to carry on any mission activity — in the widest sense of the word. "The means of compulsion and of coercion which are enumerated in the Russian criminal code", so Solovyov adds, "are, in essence, the only weapons known to our state orthodoxy with which it is able to oppose the indigenous "Old Believers" as well as the representatives of other confessions, which should dispute the power of orthodoxy over souls."⁴¹

It is precisely the Western Church that has succeeded in doing what orthodoxy failed to achieve, — namely, to breed the type of modern European who is conscious of his rights and duties and to make him a "political being." The cruelty and savagery of primitive man, his lack of understanding for the rudimentary conceptions of law, — from these things mediæval man was redeemed by the Church, an achievement, of which the Russian Church has not even effected one-tenth, since, like Saint Cassian, it keeps aloof from the world and fears to sully its white robes with wordly dirt.⁴² This alienation from the world is evident in every feature of the Russian Church, as, for instance, in confession, which here is a purely formal

⁴¹) V. Solovyov, *Russia and the Oecumenical Church*. Introduction, pp. 124, 125 of the original Russian edition.

⁴²) Hegel, *loc. cit.*, pp. 509-550.

procedure, — so formal, in fact, that the people have been obliged to devise the so-called (semi-secular) "Starchestvo" as a corrective substitute for it. The same also applies to the omission of the sermon. In this connection it is interesting to note that the plan to re-introduce the public sermon in the Russian Church aroused fierce opposition on the part of the so-called orthodox against the Patriarch Nikon. The alienation from life of the Russian Orthodox Church is also evident in its ideal of holiness. On this point Rozanov writes as follows: "In the East the ideals of meekness, endurance and steadfastness were fostered, but in the case of suffering, however, that of resignation, — a passive, long-suffering Christianity."⁴³

If we consider this negation of the individual in the Russian Church still further, we find that it is also in evidence in Russian religious art, for which the so-called Hundred Chapter Council (Stoglavy Sobor) of 1550 already laid down set patterns to which the individual work of the painter must strictly conform. To form a clear picture of the characteristic features of Russian religious art which have developed under the entire spiritual influence of the Muscovite Church, we must compare them with those of West European religious art; and on this point Mackenzie Wallace writes as follows: "In the West, religious art from the time of the Renaissance onwards kept pace with the intellectual development. It gradually freed itself from the old forms, transformed dead, typified figures into living persons, and illuminated their dark gaze and expressionless countenance with the light of human reason and feeling... In Russia, on the other hand, religious art never underwent such a development. Both the lack of mobility of the Muscovite Church as a whole and that of the religious art in question are equally reflected in the style of the ancient icons."⁴⁴ If we compare not only Catholicism, but also Protestantism with the Russian Church, it becomes obvious that the latter is as unlike the Russian Church as is the former. Indeed, the ideas of Protestantism met with almost as much fanatical hatred in Russian literature as did Catholicism.

Quotations such as the above suffice for us to be able to say that in the dependence of the Russian Orthodox Church on the secular power, in its adherence to formalism, in its incapacity to shape and mould life, in its cult of the vague instinct of the people as a whole, and in its subjugation of the individual — in fact, everywhere, we find the same characteristic features which come to light in our analysis of other social institutions in Russia, — in the "Obshchina", in the state, in the social order as a whole, — the same features and the same social result: the mechanical nature of social ties and the complete lack of participation of the individual ego in the forming

⁴³) Rozanov, *loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 218.

⁴⁴) M. Wallace, *loc. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 194.

of the collective will, which is regarded by the individual merely as a regulation imposed by an alien and higher power that is far superior to the individual.

Incidentally, it goes without saying that this negative characterization of Russian orthodoxy only applies to Russian Muscovite orthodoxy, but not to Ukrainian orthodoxy, such as was established in historical respect at the time of the mediæval Ukrainian State of Kiev and, later, in the days of the Ukrainian Cossack hetmanate (17th and 18th centuries). Immediately after the February revolution of 1917, Ukraine set about ridding itself of all the Russian influences which had been forcibly imposed on Ukrainian orthodoxy, — both in the use of the Old Church Slavonic text in divine service, in books of ritual and in customs, as well as in the organization of the Church and in the spirit of Ukrainian orthodoxy itself. The fact that Russian orthodoxy is absolutely alien to the Ukrainians was already realized by the great national writer of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko. Thus it was not only in political and structural features of Russian orthodoxy, but also in its peculiarities as regards art, architecture and ritual, that Shevchenko perceived the gulf which separated Russian and Ukrainian orthodoxy. He regarded the Russian churches as heathen temples and felt that he could not pray there. And this will be understandable to those who have realized that the mystical and philosophical foundation of the Christian faith lay in the cultural legacy of ancient Greece. And it was precisely for this reason that the Christian faith took foot so rapidly, easily and profusely in Ukrainian soil — the soil of the ancient Pontus, a soil which from ancient times had been fecundated by the seed of ancient Greek culture and religion. And for this reason, too, those peoples did not accept or rejected Christianity who — like the Russians and the Jews — kept aloof from the influences of the ancient culture of ancient Hellas and ancient Rome.

The confused and chaotic mentality of the Russian is reflected in his face. "The Russian has no face", said *Chaadayev*, and *Goncharov* describes the face of his hero Oblomov as follows: "He was a man of thirty-two or thirty-three, of medium stature, of pleasant appearance, with dark grey eyes, but his features lacked the expression of any definite ideas and any concentration." Such is Oblomov's countenance and also that of almost every Russian, who cannot distinguish between good and evil and who has not yet detached himself from the "collective mouth" which he idolizes... In the state, the peasant community, the fatherland, the Church, — indeed, everywhere in Russia, the substance towered over the ethically and physically subjugated individual — like the august Dalai Lama over his faithful — and allowed him neither freedom of action nor freedom of thought.

The fatal consequences of such an organization of society and of the mentality of the individual have been only too apparent during

the past decades. The inability to defend their rights was clearly obvious in the ignominious downfall of the ruling classes when they came into collision with Bolshevism and in the passivity of the peasantry. The inability to take an active part in determining the collective will was apparent in the ignominious collapse of the Russian fighting front in 1917, which only the Bolshevik scourge succeeded in setting up again. What strikes one most in all this is that collective reason, which permits neither precision nor separation, namely the Hegelian "mere reason", which forms the basis of the Russian social organism and its institutions and which is so very different from the "intelligence" on which the entire structure of Europe is based, — is *consciously* chosen by the Russians as the supreme regulator of their social life. The extent to which the people as a collective whole, the "will of the people" and the "unanimity" was glorified by Russian thinkers and politicians, from the Slavophiles to the so-called Westernisers, can be seen from the above. And a closer study of the theoretician of Bolshevism — Lenin — would lead us to the same conclusion. The same spirit is also in evidence in Russian philosophy, in so far as one can speak of such a philosophy in the European meaning of the word. The most noticeable feature of all Russian philosophers lies in the fact that they have not handed on any system to posterity. Neither V. Solovyov, nor S. Trubetskoy, nor Kireyevsky bequeathed a system to posterity; yet through all their works there runs — though somewhat unsystematically — the apotheosis of that same "inner truth" which, in their opinion, is personified in the "Obshchina", in tsarism, as well as in all the other wonderful institutions of the genial Russian people.

A religious glorification of that "great whole", namely of the sublime substance, the essence of which must be comprehended through feeling, is also to be found in Russian writings and literature, in which the whole philosophy of life and the world in general of the average Russian is likewise reflected. Submission to the mass — as the French would say, the "engenouillement moral" before the obscure, vague and subconscious elements which exist at the root of the psyche of the masses, is the most characteristic feature of Russian literature. The mass — as *Leroy-Beaulieu* points out — is to the Russians the "unaware divinity" ("une divinité inconsciente") who resembles the earliest gods of Egypt and whose divine qualities represent a great, though not yet revealed power.⁴⁵ All, or, at any rate the overwhelming majority of Russian writers stand guard before this new cult of the mass and behind them stands the entire Russian so-called "intelligentsia." And in this respect the object of this cult — the people, the mass, the crowd — is regarded as Uspensky's "collective mouth", in which the individual, with all his aims, opinions and expressions of will, must melt, must dwindle

⁴⁵) Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Empire Russe*, Bk. I, Chapt. 7.

away to nothing. Man must not endeavour to seek his course in life with a clear head and open eyes; nor must he be so presumptuous as to try to influence the mass. His sole aim in life and his right to live consists in listening to the murmur of the universal soul, like an Indian ascetic, and, like a somnambulist with sleeping intellect and closed eyes, in obeying the mystical commands of this soul in his sleep: to have his head battered at the coronation of a tsar one day (as was the case during the coronation of Nicholas II on the field of Khodynka near Moscow), to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem the next day, and to massacre the "bourgeoisie adherents" the day after.

One of the high priests of this cult was Leo Tolstoy, who, as the theoretician of the anti-intellectual campaign in literature, by his personality links up two epochs in Russian history with each other, — that of tsarism, when the masses, at the instigation of the gendarmes, carried out pogroms against the intellectuals, and that of Bolshevism, when the same masses, at the instigation of the people's commissars, carried out similar pogroms against the same intellectuals. In "War and Peace", the behaviour and attitude of Kutuzov before and during the battle of Moscow delights Prince Andrey Bolkonsky: "The more he realized that this old man lacked all personal qualities — for in place of intellect which classifies events and draws conclusions, he had retained only the ability to observe the course of events, — the more confident he became that everything would proceed as it should. This man will not do anything peculiar, he will not devise anything... He realizes that there is something more powerful and more important than his personal will." Bennigsen, on the other hand, endeavoured to do everything in the best way possible; he thought everything over, and it was precisely for this reason that he was no use at all. "He was no use at all precisely because he thought everything over very thoroughly and carefully, as is befitting for every German."

This fundamental idea of his is asserted by Tolstoy in all his works, inasmuch as he regards every intellectual, every judge, lawyer or priest, at best merely as useless persons and, in most cases, as rogues who, for personal egoistic motives, deceive the people and are thus enemies of the people. In this respect, Tolstoy, though a Russian count, was only on the same level as a Russian peasant. And in this respect the ideas of the humblest moujik of Yasnaya Poliana did not in the least differ from those of his titled lord and master. If we look at the heroes of Tolstoy's novels more closely, we see that all those who sought to put their own intellect before the intellect of the mass, all those whose ideal was something other than a human animal like Platon Karatayev, — Vronsky, Andrey Bolkonsky, Napoleon — perish; whilst all those who like somnambulists climb on to roof-top "without wanting to devise anything" — Rostov, Levin, Maria, the daughter of a prince, Pierre Bezukhov — seem to have drawn a lucky number, for they fare so well in life.

Those who fare best of all, of course, are the ones who have laid aside all intellect, as for instance idiots such as Ivan the Fool. Tolstoy's Ivan the Fool is truly a Russian Apostle Peter, the true rock which "will not be overcome by the gates of Hell": "The Devil wanted to tempt him. He came for dinner, and in Ivan's house a servant-girl who was dumb from birth portioned out the dinner. Those who were idlers used to deceive her. Instead of working, they would be the first to come for their dinner and would eat up all the porridge. One day, the servant-girl decided to pick out the idlers by the look of their hands: those who had weals on their hands were allowed to sit down at the dinner-table; but to those who had no weals she only gave what was left over of the meal. The old Devil was just heading for the table when the maid grabbed hold of his hands; she looked at them and saw that they had no weals, but were clean and smooth with long claws. With jeers and cries of derision, the Devil was chased away from the table." — Is this not likewise the philosophy of Bolshevism? "Those who have weals on their hands may sit down at the table! But those who have not, only get the scraps that are left over."⁴⁶ This is the same as the classification of the citizens into certain categories, which is carried out so scrupulously in the realm of the "people's commissars." It is one and the same negation of the intellect and of the intellectual class, which prompted the moujik to resort to the "cudgel" against the intellectuals, and Count Tolstoy to his pen in order to fight this same intellectual class, which they both regarded as the Devil in disguise.

Heroes in the European sense of the word are unknown in both modern and older Russian literature, for in the country of the Ivans and Platons there could be no such persons. It is thus not surprising that whenever such heroes are nevertheless portrayed, we must look for them not in the monotonous Muscovite landscape, but in the Caucasus or the Crimea (Pushkin and Lermontov) and, in any case, amongst foreign peoples (Goncharov's Stolz, Turgeniev's Insarov); in cases where the hero is, however, a Russian — and there have been such cases, he is obliged to show his heroism either in that same "fateful Caucasus" (like Lermontov's Pechorin, for instance), or in the streets of Paris (like Turgeniev's Rudin). The colourless Russian landscape — "the sky, pine-forests and sand" — was incapable of producing anything else other than equally colourless and somnolent human beings. Even in a heroic situation, as leaders of the masses (as for instance Kutuzov or Lenin) they resemble not so much the great leaders of the West, figures which appear to be carved out of marble, but, rather, persons who are half-drunk and seem to act as though in a trance. Gorky's heroes, too, are not heroes in the sense in which the word is used in the West. The words they utter are

⁴⁶) L. Tolstoy, *The Tale of Ivan the Fool*.

devoid of all steely logic, of all consciousness of the great mission of those inspired by the spirit, of all desire to be a leader; all that one perceives in their words is the roar of a hungry beast, which has woken up and wants to feed, the wild bawling of the mob, which has become insolent and presumptuous and surges through the streets of the town. When Dostoievsky, however, portrays heroes who are dissentients, they never manage to retain their position on the heights which they have attained, but, as though seized by a fit of dizziness, fall down into that tough and indefinite mass where there is no such thing as "one's own intellect", where no one ponders on anything, — and atone for their punishable elation by voluntary suffering or voluntary death: Raskolnikov, Stavrogin, Dmitry Karamazov, for instance. What is more, Dostoievsky's favourite heroes are those who passively endure injustices and wrongs which they have not deserved, as for example Makar Dievushkin, Nelly and Prince Myshkin.

* * *

The entire literature of the writers who cultivated "popular and national traits" also followed in Tolstoy's and Dostoievsky's footsteps, inasmuch as it apotheosized the mass as the bearer of the higher truth, to whom the individual must subordinate himself unconditionally. The most talented of the said group of writers, *Gleb Uspensky*, knows only too well that the Russian peasantry could only become independent if it raised itself above the common herd level of the "Obshchina." But, he does not want this to happen! Eternal poverty and ignorance, tutelage of the individual by the "Mir" (community assembly) and even serfdom are to be preferred rather than a freedom obtained by using personal initiative and violating community ties. Just as Tolstoy regards every doctor, lawyer and judge as "evil", so, too, in Uspensky's opinion the "kulak" (well-to-do Russian farmer), policeman and landowner are emissaries of Lucifer, who destroy the idyll of the "collective mouth." Another writer of the same group, *Zlatovratsky*, affirms that every attempt on the part of the "intelligentsia" to raise themselves above the level of the people is treachery to the people; they should adjust their ideals and their views to the masses, they should descend to the level of the people and should humbly impart their knowledge to the latter.

The new socialist ideologists of Russian society followed in the footsteps of their predecessors. And this was hardly surprising! For the Russians had adopted the entire Marxist doctrine not on account of its socialist character, but because of the negation of personality in Russian history, a negation accepted by the Muscovites as entirely comprehensible. This negation is systematically maintained by all the

theoreticians of Bolshevism; thus, for instance, A. Bogdanov attacks the "glorification" of leaders and affirms that leaders should merely be "representatives of the common will." In his Communist "Index librorum prohibitorum" we also find the Book of Genesis, the Iliad and the Odyssey, the Mahabharata, as well as the ancient Ukrainian "Song of Ihor's Campaign" (1187) for all these works deal with the "deeds of gods, heroes, kings and leaders", and there must be no such persons. He also negates the entire literature written so far and all works of art which portray the conflict of the individual with the outer world, his struggle for personal happiness, his deeds, triumphs and defeats.⁴⁷ The aim of the literature of Communism is to destroy every form of individualism in art and every personal feeling in creative work, and to substitute a collective and herd-like activity in place of individual creativeness. According to Kerzhentsev, the story, the characters, their actions, and even the form of a literary work are to be "produced" in common effort by the mass of the writers! There must be no individual inspiration!⁴⁸

He further affirms that the alleged leading personalities are merely ciphers, and that the creator of the events is the inert mass, to which the presumptuous personality must adapt itself.

Tolstoy's story "Three Deaths", in which the philosophy of life of inorganic Nature and of a plant is compared to that of man and recognized as superior, is merely the result of all that Russian writers had propagated for decades: Kutuzov greater than Napoleon, Platon Karatayev greater than Kutuzov, Ivan the Fool greater than Karatayev, a plant greater than Ivan the Fool, — and nihility, so the Muscovite "self-immolators" (a radical sect of the Russian "Old Believers") affirm, is greater than all entity... What an attractive philosophy for the Russian soul, squashed like a midge by the tsarist "obshchina" or by the Bolshevik knout!

And political writers keep pace with Russian literature. Among the entire company of the publicists mentioned above, whether Slavophil or anti-Slavophil, there is not a single one who does not consider the universal development of personality as the greatest evil which could happen to his country. In the opinion of one of them, the Russian ideal has its good points, in so far as it does not contain "an exaggerated conception of human personality such as Germanic feudalism introduced in history,"⁴⁹ nor has it adopted as its own such a "self-respect of the individual as was first assumed by the bourgeoisie, as a result of envy and imitation, and as was called into being by the democratic revolution and all the phrases about the unlimited rights of the individual, and subsequently penetrated all

47) *Neu-Europa*, of October 30 and November 20, 1919, and issue 1918, No. 1.

48) *Proletarskaya Kultura (Proletarian Culture)*, 1919, November edition.

49) K. Leontyev, *loc. cit.*, p. 113-114.

the lower classes of Western society, inasmuch as it made every common worker or cobbler into a being crippled by the nervous feeling of personal dignity."⁵⁰ The author is also indignant at the widespread esteem shown in the West for women, which he likewise regards as the same kind of exaggerated respect for the individual. Another writer objects to the "cult of the human personality", to the European "system of chivalry with its cult of personal honour", as well as to the freedom of research and of individual thought."⁵¹ A third writer, Shevyriov, is of the opinion that the "essence of the historical past of the Russian people and the task to be achieved in the future lies in the degradation of personality."⁵²

The same idea also permeates Russian painting. The vitality and forcefulness of Rembrandt is art, the sunny and brilliant colours of Zuloaga, the painter of old Spanish scenes, the spiritualized madonnas of Murillo who are endowed with a superhuman intelligence, the ecstatic apotheosis of Nature in the works of Böcklin, the glorification of the organized collective in the paintings of the Belgian artist, Meunier, and the hymns to personality when under heaviest strain, which are expressed by Meissonier, the painter of battle-scenes, — none of these qualities are to be found in Russian painting. Here passivity, suppression of the individual, vagueness and the gloomy atmosphere of old Muscovite women's apartments and hermitages prevail. The religious ecstasy of an Ivanov savours of coldness and mildew. As compared to the imposing picture by Meunier of the miners, who, conscious of their physical strength, vigorously set about their work, we find the Russian "Volga Boatmen", who, with bent backs, like oxen dully dragging their yoke, "tow along the tow-path" on the banks of the Volga. Instead of such a masterpiece as Meissonier's "1807", all Russian painting has to offer is a Tolstoyist-Bolshevist hypocritical lament as in Vereshchagin's "Apotheosis of the War" which only has as its theme "mass murder" and death. Levitan's landscape paintings reflect the same gloomy melancholy of an apathetic Nature which has its origin in the chaotic soul of the Russians. Querulousness, servility to an unknown higher power, the same insidious disease which is apparent in the political, social and religious life of Russia, — these are the qualities which characterize Russian painting, too, even when it oversteps the customary limits and strives to attain revolutionary pathos; and the works of the revolutionary masters of Russian painting, as for instance Yavlensky, Kandinsky and others, likewise savour of the commonplace.

So far, one has refused to recognize in the above-mentioned characteristic features of Russian life the main and uniform idea,

⁵⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁵¹) Miller, *loc. cit.*, pp. 68, 76, 258.

⁵²) A. Pypin, *Characteristic Features of Literary Opinions*, p. 136.

which predominates in the social constitution of Russia, in her political and religious life, as well as in her philosophy and literature. The primitive nature of the entire social ideal of the nation, the suppression of the individual, the undeveloped character of the autonomous moral principles and the sense of right that prevail, the unlimited cult of the mass, — this is the main and uniform idea which has made the Russian people a people enslaved, a horde incapable of resisting any will imposed from above, a mass who, because of its numbers, represents a dreadful danger to the Western world, a mass who sets chaos against activity, natural energy against human energy, the knout against organization, servility and instinct against the preeminence of reason and will, and Muscovite formlessness in every sphere of life, whether communal, social or private, against the complex whole of ordered forms.

It is the influence of this main and uniform idea and of the institutions from which it was derived that has determined the peculiar Russian ideal of freedom, equality and democracy, an ideal the like of which exists nowhere in the whole of Europe or America. Whereas the Western ideal of freedom implies the right to influence the state mechanism, which may not accomplish anything without considering the wish of the individuals, the Russian ideal of freedom consists in levelling down all those who rise above the mass, and this process of levelling down may even be achieved at the price of political enslavement. The Russians know democracy — as Danilevsky says — but “not in the sense of government by the people, but in that of equality, or, to be more correct, egalitarianism.”⁵³ But this ideal of equality is not a European one. In the West it is the justified aim of man to become stronger, namely to reach the level of those above him by his activity; in Russia, however, it is the aim of the weaker to drag the strong down to their level, instead of endeavouring to reach the higher level of the strong.

The most drastic expression of this ideal is to be found in the economic life of the Russians. The main factors of economic life — as conceived by the Russian peasants and the Russian intellectuals — were the distribution and standardization of the product. Of the three main sectors of human activity — production, exchange and distribution, the latter was always accentuated. In his “obshchina”, as, incidentally, in state and Church life, too, the Russian was in the habit of neglecting personal initiative; indeed, he had never been able to develop such initiative, forced as he was to submit to the will of the “obshchina.”

In view of this economic system, it was, therefore, hardly surprising that the periodical new portioning out of the land and, in fact, new portioning out in general, became the economic ideal

⁵³) Danilevsky, *loc. cit.*, p. 120.

of the Russians, whilst personal effort, work and production, the basic principles of the entire Western culture, receded into the background. Envy on the part of those who have been unlucky, inability to work one's way up by one's own effort and energy, and a sadistic pleasure in seeing the more successful members of the community levelled down, — such are the characteristics of the Russian equality which Danilevsky emphasizes and which is peculiar both to the "fine gentleman" and to the "moujik" in Russia. It is a logical consequence that this "egalitarian ideal of a new portioning out" leads not only to the doom of the prosperous, but also to that of prosperity as such, to the Bolshevism.

This ideal as a mass phenomenon is as yet unknown in the West. In England, so *Boutmy*, for instance, affirms, "prosperity has been practically raised to the level of a virtue, whilst poverty is regarded as a vice and a disgrace, for the simple reason that prosperity represents the price of effort and intelligence, whereas poverty is an indication of laziness which is especially odious."⁵⁴ To the Russian, prosperity is an object of hatred. In one of his most immoral works from the ethical point of view, his "Tales and Fairytales", Tolstoy in the tale "How the Devil Pledged a Slice of Bread" explains the reason for the drunkenness and immorality prevalent in the rural areas by the fact that the Devil "gave a surfeit of grain to the moujik... This bestial nature is always stirring in him (the peasant) but it does not come to the fore as long as the grain is scarce... When there began to be a surplus of grain over, he (the peasant) began to ponder as to how he could amuse himself. So I taught him the pleasure of drinking brandy" — the Devil recounts. It is thus not human intemperance which must be condemned, but prosperity as such, since the latter is the cause of all sins and of the ethical ruin of man. Personal intelligence and effort, which, in the opinion of the English, lead to prosperity, are, according to Tolstoy, an invention of the Devil.

But the principle of equality also leads to other conclusions. As we have just seen, both the muddled mind of the Russian moujik and the clear mind of Count Tolstoy regard prosperity and intelligence, material as well as intellectual superiority over the masses, as deadly sins. To be logical, one must, in rejecting one of the two, reject the other, too. As we have seen in Tolstoy's stories, both are evil; both represent a challenge to the ideal of equality and both — in particular intelligence — can become harmful and dangerous to the mass. The Russians, with that peculiar straightforwardness which is one of their characteristics, also draw conclusions accordingly. As we have already seen, they reject the intellectual factor as a principle which

⁵⁴) E. Boutmy, *Essai d'une psychologie politique du peuple anglais en XIX siècle*.

guides community life; they reject talent and genius, since a genius may become the leader of the mass and, God forbid, may endow the "collective mouth" with his own human countenance. They reject personal honesty (as, for instance, Leonid Andreyev does in his story "Darkness"), since the individual must not dare to be honest, if the mass is not honest, as he must not wear a white collar and have smooth hands, if the "people" wear sheepskin and have weals on their hands. They reject science and art, since the mass does not understand them; they reject elegance on the part of women, since elegance is a thing for which neither the "people", the "people's commissars" nor the latter's female colleagues with their close-cropped heads show the least appreciation. They reject everything that is above the level of the mass and guide the latter, since all this is contrary to their conception of freedom, namely the conception of a mass of equals and a small group over them. Their appeal is to ochlocracy, to "collective reason", which needs no dangerous means to manifest its will, the will of the "class-conscious" rabble, to massacre the bourgeoisie. In their bold nihilism, which deeply impresses such naïve romanticists as Romain Rolland or Barbusse, but evokes disgust amongst persons of Western culture, they reject everything, — the Church and the State, monarchy and parliamentarianism, the conception of family and law, all institutions which represent some higher idea above the level of the individual, and "personal honesty", which in the opinion of *Leontyev* is nothing but an empty phrase, a ridiculous invention.⁵⁵

Such is the philosophy of life of Bolshevism and, indeed, of the entire Russian revolution. Dostoevsky had foreseen its outbreak when, about fifty years earlier, he raised the question as to what the Russian adherents of egalitarianism (he called them Shigalirov people after his own ideological "hero" in his "The Possessed") would do on the day after the revolution. And he gave the following answer to this question: "All are slaves and all are equal in slavery. In the most extreme cases — defamation and murder, but for the most part — equality. Above all, the level of education, learning and talents will be lowered. A high level of learning and talent is only accessible to the highest talents — talents are not necessary. Persons with the highest talents cannot help being despots and they have always had a more demoralizing than a beneficial influence; they are to be persecuted or executed (to a certain extent Lenin's and his followers' programme — *D. D.*). Cicero's tongue is cut out, Copernicus' eyes are put out, Shakespeare is stoned, — Shigalirov = mankind!" — or equality, as Dostoevsky would say today, for "slaves must be equal, — there must be equality in a herd."

Is this the opinion of a maniac? At least, that was what Dostoevsky's critics thought, who were either not as farsighted as

⁵⁵) K. Leontyev, *loc. cit.*, p. 143.

he was, or else had not the personal courage to rip open the wounds of their own people with such sadistic sarcasm. But in view of the experience gained from the events of the past decades, Dostoievsky's words must not be regarded as the ridiculous ravings of a maniac. They are a grim vision, which in our day has become a grim reality.

Since the Russian revolutionary negated everything, he was incapable of recognizing any ethical absolute principle as dominating, apart from the most evident needs of life and the knout. As a German writer once aptly remarked, "with the exception of alcohol and sexual intercourse, the Russians have analysed everything else away." And to Tolstoy even the latter exception seemed senseless; for the Russians parry everything with the question "why?". "But in that case — so a character in Tolstoy's *"Kreutzer Sonata"* asks — the entire human race would surely cease to exist?"... "Well, and what if it did?" replies the wise man of Yasnaya Poliana, "it isn't necessary." — "Man must be honest..." "Why?" asks L. Andreyev in surprise in his *"Darkness."* "Borrowed money must be returned..." "Why?" asks the Russian in surprise, who, according to Yuriy Samarin "does not know the unfortunate difference between mine and thine."⁵⁶

Such "why's?" are to be found in thousands amongst the Russians since their mentality is devoid of any fundamental ethical principle which has been called into being by the work of generations; for these generations in Russia have, in actual practice, never existed. Only the state power or the "power of the soil" (the *"obshchina"*) has existed in their place. The state power devised certain external rules, but as far as the individual was concerned they always remained alien regulations.

Whenever the Russians were left to do their own reasoning, they rejected everything and, above all, work, which constitutes one of the main conclusions drawn from their revolutionary, egalitarian ideal. "There is little tranquillity in our country", Dostoievsky writes in his *"A Writer's Diary"*, — in particular, little tranquillity of mind, that is to say the most essential form of tranquillity, for without tranquillity of mind one cannot live a satisfactory life. There is no tranquillity in the people's heads — and this applies to all social classes — and no tranquillity in our views, our convictions, our nerves and our tastes and trends. There is no tranquillity in work, still less a conscious feeling that one can only redeem oneself by work. There is no sense of duty, — and indeed, how could there be one?" And elsewhere describing the laborious path, life, by which European Müller or Smith reaches material prosperity, whilst his *"Fatherland"* attains the position of a world power, he rejects this ideal in disgust: "But I — says one of his heroes — would rather

⁵⁶) Y. Samarin, *loc. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 40.

sleep in a Kirghiz tent all my life than worship the German idol. I have only been here (in Western Europe — *D. D.*) a short time, but all that I have had time to observe and to scrutinize more closely rouses indignation in my Tatar soul. Begad, I do not wish to have such virtues. To have to work like oxen and always have to save money like Jews. I would rather debauch in the Russian fashion.”⁵⁷ This ideal, which is peculiar both to the Russian “fine gentleman” (Barin) and to Tolstoy’s moujik, who was tempted by the Devil, as well as to the Bolsheviks, who have turned all Russia into a “Kirghiz tent”, — this ideal, which Dostoievsky perceived everywhere, in all classes of his people, drove him to veritable outbursts of madness and prompted him on several occasions to give vent to feelings which, in his own opinion, were blasphemous. When, for instance, he talks about Turgeniev’s Bazarov, the personification of Russian nihilism, he lets one of his heroes make the following remark: “Bazarov... is a vague mixture of (Gogol’s) Nozdriov and Byron, *c’est le mot*.”⁵⁸ It (that is Bazarov’s revolutionary nihilism — *D. D.*) consists simply of Russian laziness, of our mental inability to create an idea, of our disgusting existence as parasites amongst the nations. *Ils sont tout simplement des paresseux!*⁵⁹ Yes, for the welfare of mankind, the Russians should be exterminated like harmful parasites!” And elsewhere, the following words are addressed to one of the “Shigaliiov people”: “Do you not realize that the sole reason why the guillotine occupies a place of honour with you and your like and is regarded with so much pleasure by you, is that it is easier to chop off heads and hardest to uphold an idea.”⁶⁰

And this perhaps also explains the Russian hatred of the so-called European bourgeois culture. K. Leontyev, whom we have already cited several times, imagines the reply of a Western Slav, a Greek or a Bulgarian to the “anti-bourgeois” twaddle of a Russian agitator as follows: “A bourgeois? — A politician, a wealthy man, — what is evil about them? Such a man is experienced, his morals are sound, and he is conscious of his dignity as a human being.”⁶¹

They are simply lazy! The Russian revolution and all its fine slogans were merely phrases in the mouth of its disciples, which gave life neither new ideals nor new aims. A brilliant characterization of the revolutionary “intelligentsia” was given by Herschensohn in the compiled work *Vekhi* (Signposts), which became famous after the revolution of 1905:

57) F. Dostoievsky, *The Gambler*.

58) “That is the right word.”

59) “They are simply lazy!”

60) F. Dostoievsky, *The Possessed*.

61) K. Leontyev, *loc. cit.*, pp. 277, 465.

"What have the ideas of our intellectuals achieved during the past fifty years?" — he asks. "A handful of revolutionaries went from house to house and knocked on every door: Come out onto the streets, it is a disgrace to sit at home! — and all "the enlightened" flocked to the market square, — the sick, the blind, cripples without arms — no one stayed at home. For fifty years they have been loitering about the market square, shouting and quarrelling. At home, dirt, poverty and chaos prevail, but the master of the house is occupied otherwise; he is publicly active, he is saving the people, and this is a task which is both easier and more interesting than the ordinary task at home... On the whole, however, the everyday life of the intellectual class is dreadful, in truth an abomination and entirely barren, with no trace of discipline, no trace of consistency, not even to outward appearance. The days go by, — who knows how they are spent, today in one way, tomorrow in another, according to one's mood, and everything is turned topsyturvy. Idleness, self-indulgence, Homeric disorder in one's private life, immorality and chaos in one's married life, a naïve lack of conscientiousness in one's work, an unbridled tendency to despotism in public affairs, as well as a thorough contempt of the personality of others, on the one hand an attitude of arrogance, on the other, an attitude of servility to those in authority."⁶²

These were the unlucky ones, the "ones who fared badly", to use an expression of Nietzsche's, and the revolution was their revenge, the revenge of the unlucky, who strive to set themselves on a level with those who are above them, and who are prompted by the feelings of a servant, who, left alone in the dining-room, after looking round timorously, is determined to enjoy the wine that he has so far only been able to sip in secret. These persons introduced new moral principles in the world for their own benefit, inasmuch as they transformed all the possibilities that had lain dormant in the chaotic Russian soul into a certain perfection and synthesis. The famous picture in the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow ("An Evening Party") and the pictures of the Moscow CheKa groups at their parade sessions show us exactly what these world reformers look like. Students with flowing manes, girl-students with close-cropped heads, their clothes and their general appearance dirty and neglected, as though they make little use of soap and water. Peculiar ragged attire, hats that look as though they had come out of the property-cupboard of a small theatre, trousers kept in place by a piece of rope, their faces typically Russian, broad and flat, alternately a friendly or a bestial expression in their eyes, which gleam fanatically with enthusiasm or as a result of taking cocaine, or with wild impatience or sectarian obstinacy, in short, an atmosphere that smells of the smoke of cigarettes that have been thrown on the floor, of conspiracies, bombs and blood. This is the grim atmosphere in which the entire so-called

⁶²) *Sbornik Vekhi* (Compiled work *Signposts*).

revolutionary Russian youth lived from the end of the last century onwards. Anyone who entered the service of the "people" or of the "proletariat" had free access to this society. By nature lazy ("des paresseux"), unlucky, devoid of all ability in private life, they would only have been able to assert themselves in the community as a whole, if they had succeeded in turning their own wretchedness into an ideal which everyone was bound to acknowledge; just as their female comrades could only have laid claim to elegance, if a revolutionary taboo had been put on genuine elegance and refinedness as something "bourgeois" and punishable.

And this they succeeded in doing. With the impudence and arrogance of a have-not who has attained fame, and full of joy at the prospect of humiliating those whose level they could not at the moment climb, they set about their big task of drawing up new commandments for the "rotten bourgeois world." We have already stressed the glorification of poverty in the above. This soon degenerated into the glorification of deformity both physical and moral. Firm convictions, personal courage and honesty and a strong sense of right and justice were incompatible with this attitude, — and still less, the religion of duty, which relentlessly persecuted every crime and every form of idleness. Here, other "virtues" prevailed, in particular the chief virtue, a doglike devotion to their idols, as well as the so-called "humane", considerate, and even admiring attitude toward all other cripples and underdogs who wanted to become the lords and masters of the world... One only needs to recall the episode in Tolstoy's "Resurrection", the episode in the church at Easter, where Katiusha approached the beggar, who instead of a nose had a red scarred ulcer in the middle of his face, and without the least expression of loathing, but, on the contrary, with eyes shining with happiness, kissed him three times. This was a symbolical "communion" with the people, with that which in Tolstoy's opinion represents the absolute. It was the same "crowning of the lousy head of the moujik" with which, according to Dostoievsky's opinion, Russian literature has always occupied itself. It was the same bowing to deformity which is so very popular with the revolutionary and non-revolutionary Russians. According to this philosophy of life, deformity ceases to be deformity, beauty becomes a crime and the criminals become "unfortunate persons" whom one "should not condemn, but, rather, reform" and, above all, pity. Pity — it is herein really that the true religion of the Russian lies, a religion that is more closely allied to the Bolshevik "CheKa" (Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counter-revolutionary Activity, Speculation and Espionage) than would appear at a first glance. For pity is the beginning of the so-called humane attitude; the humane attitude consists in kissing the moujik with the ulcer in his face instead of a

nose and in releasing "unfortunate" gangsters and forgers from prison; and the third stage of this "humane attitude" is the enthronement of physical and ethical deformity, the enthronement of the "triumphant swine", the solemn conferring on him of the authority and power to condemn and sentence the healthy, whose tongue is cut out or who will be ordered to scrub latrines — according to Dostoevsky's original recipe, in order to condemn the great ideal of the Occident, the ideal of all that is strong, healthy and beautiful, the ideal of work, intellect and genius of individualism, which is personified in the Cathedral of Milan or in St. Sophia's in Kiev, in the works of the "clerical" Dante or of the lord Byron, whose genius is unbearable to the builders of a "new world" who have been brought up with Muscovite songs and factory slogans.

No doubt it was in one of his sleepless nights that Dostoevsky put the words of a prophetic vision into the mouth of Stepan Verkhovensky (in "The Possessed") — "About the common slave, the common lackey, who will be the first to climb up a ladder with a pair of scissors in his hand in order to cut the divine countenance of the great ideal to pieces, in the name of equality, envy and digestion..." in the name of a new ideal must be added, whose spiritual fathers (like Rousseau for the French Revolution) will be considered to be not only nameless Bolshevik sadists, but also Tolstoy, Gorky, Artsybashev and Skitalets, as well as a whole galaxy of writers who cultivated populist ideas, Alexander Blok and a number of other typical representatives of Russian national genius.

In spite of this fact, this genius of the Russian people is by no means devoid of the "friendliness" of an incalculable blockhead, by means of which it ingratiates itself with all the Slav and non-Slav souls brought up in slavery who fall into self-indulgence. The Russians are not conscious of their rights and duties and for this reason allow themselves to be prompted in their actions by their mood at the time in question. If a Russian gets out of bed on the wrong side, one day, it is quite likely that he may daub the waiter's face with mustard, but next day, he may perhaps give the same waiter a hundred roubles as a present. This is the Russian "incalculability" ("samodurstvo")! Brought up as he has been in an atmosphere of complete slavery, and dependent on every mood of his lord and master, a Russian actually feels most content under constantly changing moods. Without venturing to assert his rights, he at least takes pleasure in enjoying the fleeting favour of his master and in the favourable wind that has changed the latter's mood and, in keeping with the mentality of a slave, he proudly compares the "magnanimity" of his master with the "coldness" and "formalism" of a European, who needs no one's favour or consideration, but who sternly defends his right and who respects the rights of others, but

never forgets a wrong once done to him. Devoid of all convictions of his own, a Russian is capable of doing anything. "It is difficult for a human being (i.e. for a Russian — *D. D.*) — so Dostoevsky writes — to recognize what is a sin and what is not; herein lies a secret that surpasses human (that is, Russian — *D. D.*) reason." And if this is so difficult, then all roads lie open to the Russian and, in any case, he has no definite course. "I have often wondered at this ability on the part of human beings (and, above all, as it seems, of the Russians) — so Dostoevsky continues — to harbour in their soul the highest ideal side by side with the greatest vileness — and all this quite sincerely. Whether this is a special broadmindedness in the case of the Russians, which will get them far, or simply vileness, — that is the question."⁶³

It is precisely this lack of "broadmindedness" or "vileness" in the case of the European that makes the Russians dislike the latter so intensely, as can be seen from the example of a heroine in Goncharov's novel *Oblomov*, who "perceived in the German character no leniency, no sensitiveness, no tolerance, — none of those qualities which make life so pleasant and by means of which one is able to avoid some rule or other, overstep the common limits and not adapt oneself to the order."

And it is precisely for this reason that it is so difficult for the average European to get used to living together with a Russian, even with the most civilized: the latter, for instance, will borrow a book and not return it; he will enter a strange room without knocking on the door; he will interrupt someone in the midst of important work by his empty twaddle; he will open letters that are not addressed to him and will not regard this as an offence; as soon as he makes someone's acquaintance, he will take unthinkable liberties, and he never ceases to be amazed at the "reserve" and "falseness" of the European, who for his part would gladly forgo the drunken kisses of the Russian, as well as all the other manifestations of the latter's "broadminded" nature, and, on the other hand, demands that he should explicitly fulfil the duties that he has taken on.

It is not surprising that such a community could only be held together by absolutism. The Russian mass being, or, as Nietzsche would say, "the herd animal", could never do without some form or other of absolutism. "Russia's main misfortune — so *V. Solovyov* writes — lies in the undeveloped nature of the personality and thus, also, of the community, since these two elements are proportionately related to each other: if the personal element is suppressed, man becomes not a community but a herd."⁶⁴ Such a herd developed out

⁶³) F. Dostoevsky, *A Raw Youth*.

⁶⁴) V. Solovyov, *Collected Works*, Vol. V, p. 206 of the original Russian edition.

of the Muscovite community by suppressing individuality and as a result of the decline of what I designated as an *autonomous moral principle*. The Russians have never known this moral principle of consciously subordinating oneself to the ethical absolute principle. "In Europe — so Dostoievsky continues — laws and duties were moulded and formed for thousands of years. Good and evil were determined and weighed. Standards and stages were set up by the historical sages of mankind and by studying the human soul incessantly. There was nothing of this kind in Russia; neither good nor evil were measured there by one's own conscience; both were dictated from above without the individual having any say at all in the matter." And *Herzen* says: "We (that is the Russians) could not let the unwritten disciplinary moral feeling, the instinctive recognition of the right of the individual, of the rights of opinion, hold in our country." And he continues: "The Europeans have definite moral principles, but we have only a moral instinct. Where their own conscience tells them to stop, we are stopped by a policeman."⁶⁵

The same opinion was expressed by *D. Merezhkovsky* when (in 1905) he affirmed that "there has never been a conscious, religious will to patriotism or to courage in our country; there has only been an elementary will." A similar opinion had already been previously voiced by *Bodenstedt*: "The Russian peasant submits to force just as a German does, but for a different reason. He fears force as if it were an elementary, unreasoning, blind power; and it seems permissible to him to try to evade its destructive effects, irrespective of whatever means he may resort to in order to do so. The German respects the state power, for he recognizes its right to exist; the Russian does not recognize it and thus tries to evade its effects by bribery or by desertion."⁶⁶ Once rid of the compulsion of the state, he is capable of doing anything: "Once a Russian has got off the official beaten track, which in his opinion constitutes the law, be it ever so slightly — so Dostoievsky writes — he immediately does not know what to do. As long as he keeps to the beaten track, everything is clear, — income and status, public position, coach, visits, employment and his wife." But when there is no command from above, he asks "What am I now? A leaf driven along by the wind." *M. Katkov*, who glorified the tsarist state power, wrote: "Like a storm, which nothing can hold back, it will whirl up myriads of particles of dust (i.e. Russian "citizens of the state" — *D. D.*) and will drive them along without troubling to ask what each of them thinks or wants."

⁶⁵) A. Herzen (Gertsen), *From the Other Shore*.

⁶⁶) Bodenstedt, *Russian Fragments*, Vol. I, p. XIII.

And what will happen if the power which drives along these particles of dust or leaves, as Dostoevsky calls them, becomes paralysed? What, indeed? This was the case in the spring of 1917, when Russian troops deserted the front lines, when in spite of all the efforts of that loudmouthed revolutionary Kerensky, all state authority collapsed, when the myriads of "particles of dust" were whirled up in that wild dance which was designated as the "great Russian revolution." Every new class in Europe which took the place of an older one showed a great talent for reconstruction and organization; neither the English after the execution of Charles I, nor the French after the execution of Louis XVI, were in the position of the babes in the wood after the good fairy that had shown them the way had suddenly vanished. As far as the Russians were concerned, however, the situation was a different one. The Russian proletariat started a big revolution, but very soon found itself in the position of one of Gorky's heroes, who says: "I feel I am being driven into a corner and I must therefore make life wider, must change it completely and rebuild it. But how? I cannot think any further... I do not understand, and that is my ruin!" In such a case one had, of course, to turn to those who "understood" the situation, to a new red Tsar, who, like Peter I, "asserted himself by terror rather than by greatness and loathed the 'mise en scène' necessary for a monarchy",⁶⁷ but nevertheless was an autocrat. Those who had no self-discipline, had to set an autocrat on the throne; the inner discipline that was lacking had to be replaced by an external one. And the administrative apparatus which in Russia, whatever the regime, is the only one possible, had to be newly regulated. It is precisely in this connection that *Herzen* writes as follows about the indestructibility of the absolutist tradition of autocracy in Russia: "Russia is administered by means of adjutants and mounted couriers. The Senate, the Imperial Council and the Ministries are simply offices where the matters concerned are not investigated, but merely settled formally. The entire administration is a telegraphic signal by means of which one person announces his will from the imperial palace. It is easier to shake the summit of such an automatic, officious organization than to alter it fundamentally. In a monarchy, if the ruler is killed, the monarchy remains; in our country the despotic machine of a bureaucratic order remains. As long as the telegraph apparatus functions, — it is all the same who is in charge of it, obedience will prevail."⁶⁸

Obedience was shown to Lenin, but Lenin promptly adopted those government principles peculiar to the Russians which had allegedly been overthrown by the revolution. In doing so, he was merely

⁶⁷) A. Herzen (Gertsen), *The Old World and Russia*.

⁶⁸) *Ibid.*

applying those principles in practice which he had been proclaiming a long time. When in 1903 in London, the Russian social democratic party split up into two factions, Lenin, in defending his new party statute, against those who held other views said: "Legal convictions, which could discipline our intelligentsia from within, are alien to them. We need a discipline from without."⁶⁹

Once Lenin had taken over the state power, he began to apply in practice precisely those principles that had also been tsarist principles and which were justified by the amorphous organization of Russian community life and by its complete lack of culture. Perhaps for the very reason that tsarism during its latter years had shown itself incapable of consistently applying the principle of absolutism in practice, inasmuch as it created the Duma (the Russian parliament from 1906 to 1917), a certain freedom of the press and similar institutions and thus caused Russia's national organism, which was incapable of self-administration, to totter, — and perhaps it was for this very reason that Bolshevism appeared at the crucial moment as the "deus ex machina", as the saviour of the Russian "innate fundamental elements." Perhaps it was only an experiment to save the dying Empire, which had been infected by the "poison of West European liberalism." This possibility is also discussed by the "prophets." *Leontyev* mentions the possibility of a transfer of the principles of European culture and European liberalism to Russia, but consoles himself and his readers with the thought that this would not be of any lasting success, since this liberalism "can so easily be crushed between two forces which are by no means liberal, — between the wild nihilistic onslaught and the firm defence of our great historical principles."⁷⁰

This was not achieved by the "defence of the great historical principles" and it had to be replaced by the "wild nihilistic onslaught" which we have witnessed ourselves and at the head of which Alexander Blok saw Christ "in the crown of white roses" — the Antichrist. The purpose of this onslaught was to destroy the germ of European culture in Russia, a germ which was deadly both for tsarism and for the Russian revolution.

And this brings us to the answer to our question as to why Russia is in principle hostile towards Europe and why it is bound to fight Europe. The amorphous Russian mass can only be led by absolutism, the independent European community only by its own action. For this reason, Russia must, on the one hand, defend itself against characteristic European features and must ward off European germs,

⁶⁹) Official Records of the 2nd Regular Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party, Geneva, 1903, p. 33 of the original Russian edition.

⁷⁰) K. *Leontyev*, *Collected Works*, Vol. V, p. 386 of the original Russian edition.

since these features, if inoculated into Russia, can only lead to the chaos and downfall of the state mechanism and the imperium. On the other hand, however, Russia must endeavour to destroy this Europe and to exterminate Europe's ideas throughout the entire European sphere of influence, since these ideas constitute the only protection against every form of absolutism, including Russian absolutism, too. For this absolutism strives to attain domination over the continent in order to destroy the spiritual affinity which in the West unites individuals as groups, classes, societies and nations, and endeavours to turn the individual into an amorphous, unresisting mass. Russia has always combatted these European principles, however much it may have tried to disguise this fight. Russia has fought not against the bourgeoisie, but against the principle of personal dignity and of right, which both Lenin and Leontyev erroneously confuse with the principle of "bourgeoisie." In former times, Moscow fought the aristocracy "which suppressed the people" in Poland and in Ukraine because this social class represented a united body of persons who were hostile to absolutism and who, with sword and pen, led the political life of their nation. Since the Bolshevik revolution, Russia has fought the peasant class in Ukraine, which has become politically conscious and constitutes the greatest obstacle to Muscovite despotism in Ukraine. Soviet Russia fights the "yellow syndicates" and the leaders of European Workers Unions, since the working classes must be turned into an inert and leaderless mass if one wishes to gain control of the West European workers' movement. Soviet Russia fights every idea which surpasses the "ideals" of a barbarous egalitarianism and egoism, which, sooner or later, always lead to absolutism. Soviet Russia fights voluntary cooperation and organized collectivism, based on the principles of a highly developed individualism. It fights on behalf of the ideas which are common to tsarism and Bolshevism. The fight against the Ukrainian Church in the 19th century, and against the Ukrainian peasantry in the 20th century, — this was only the first stage of the Russian campaign against the West; further stages were the fight against the Polish "noblemen" in the years 1832 and 1861, against the Polish Catholic Church under Nicholas II (favouring of the so-called Marianites), and against the European workers' movement. The aim remains one and the same, — the demoralization of the community in question and its disintegration into myriads of "particles of dust", as Katkov calls them, which constitutes a necessary precondition for Russia's domination in Europe.

Whether it is a question of Russia's foreign or home policy, the same can be ascertained everywhere. Inasmuch as Russia now furthers such social classes as the lowest proletariat in the West, it aimed and still aims in the first place to win over to its side those elements abroad who only pay homage to the ideals of egalitarianism

and for the realization of these ideals are even prepared to accept an alien absolutism, that is to say their own political death, since they easily become the victims of Russian demagoguery.

One can, no doubt, leave out of account the problem of a "future Russia" or of a "third Russia", as well as the question as to whether Russia will ever succeed in adopting European principles. *Chaadayev* was right when he said: "Nous avons je ne sais quoi dans le sang, qui repousse tout véritable progrès."⁷¹

One thing, however, is certain, and that is that Russia in the course of its entire history has so far shown itself incapable of adopting the ideas of the Occident or of following the example of the West. Indeed, it does not want to do so. Threateningly, it already stands in the midst of the nations of the West and makes no attempt to conceal its intention to swallow up each of these nations in turn, to subjugate them and break them. Will the West give the new Mongols the answer that they deserve?

⁷¹) "We have something in our blood which repulses every genuine progress"
— *Chaadayev, Lettres sur la philosophie de l'histoire.*

CHAPTER IV

THE APOCALYPTIC DRAGON AND THE WEST

During the 1870-1871 war, *E. Renan* wrote the following grim prophetic words: "Russia will only become a great danger if Europe allows it to form shock-troops out of the conglomeration of the barbarian peoples of Central Asia, — out of the peoples who are at present powerless, but who, once they are disciplined, will, if one is not on one's guard, be capable of flocking together and forming troops under a Muscovite Genghis Khan, as under the Apocalyptic Dragon... Consider what a burden would cause the balance of the world to totter if Bohemia, Moravia, Croatia, Servia, the entire Slav population of East Europe, a heroic and belligerent race, who only need the right commanders, were to join the big Muscovite conglomeration... What would you say then?"⁷²

This grim warning on the part of a prophet, who has long since been forgotten, rises up like a threatening admonition before the unsuspecting West of our day.

So far, the present elite of the Occident has failed to find an answer to this fateful question. And what is more, events happened of which neither Renan nor his contemporaries ever dreamt. At Yalta, Potsdam and Teheran, the politicians of the Occident themselves paved the way which led the Muscovite Genghis Khan into the ancient cities of the West, — Kyiv, Lviv, Prague, Budapest, Berlin and Vienna. Even during the tragic times of Ukraine (1917-1921), of Poland (1920 and 1939) and of Hungary (1956), the West, as if under a spell, remained silent and looked on indifferently whilst these peoples fought their heroic fight against the Apocalyptic Dragon

⁷²) *E. Renan et L'Allemagne*, par E. Buré.

of Moscow, whose representatives, together with the Western politicians, seek to restore the golden age of prosperity and world peace in the organization of the United Nations.

What is the reason for the continual retreat of the West before the Muscovite Genghis Khan? What is the reason for the continual urge of Moscow to the west, to the east and to the north and south, in order to get all peoples under its domination?

The reason for the Russian arrogance and the growing Russian influence in the West is immaterial and diabolical in character. Is it the power of an idea? Yes, indeed, it is! This idea, which mobilized the Russian hordes against the West has constantly changed. It has alternately been the "sole beneficial" power of the Russian shamanic "orthodoxy", the "regulating power" of tsarism as compared to the turbulent West, Pan-Slavism — the "liberation of the Slavs", Communism — the "liberation" of the nations subjugated by "Western imperialism"; the banner of the Muscovite Mohammed changed its colours and its emblems, but one thing remained unchanged, namely the idea of the "chosen" Russian people, a people of "supermen", a "higher race", which was to realize all the above-mentioned ideas and, under the leadership of Moscow, was to make all the "lower races" happy and bring them under Russian rule. The impelling power of the Russian urge was thus the idea, but with certain reservations! For an idea which constantly changes, which is really a disguise and which is based on lies, gradually becomes something more than an idea. It becomes the sheer will to subjugate everything around one. The idea itself only retains the role of a disguise in order to deceive the naïve world as to its carefully concealed aim. It is interesting to note that another prophet of the West already realized this fact a hundred years ago and warned the West accordingly. He was an expert authority on Russia, — Viscount Melchior de Vogüé. He wrote at follows about F. Dostoevsky's famous novel *The Possessed*:

"The greatest merit of this book lies in the fact that it gives us a clear idea of where the strength of the nihilists (the name applied to the Bolsheviks' predecessors), lies. Their strength lies not in doctrine or organization, but in the character of certain men. The author (Dostoevsky) vividly portrays the tense will of these men, whose souls are hard as steel. People feel drawn to them, mainly because of their character, even though their entire energy is devoted to evil. For their character promises the masses a leadership and guarantees a stable order, and this is the primary need of the human collective." Considering the future, de Vogüé adds: "If these nihilists go over to the propaganda of action, they will seem very similar to our own revolutionaries. But if we regard them more closely we shall discover the same difference amongst them as between a wild

beast and a domestic animal. Our worst revolutionaries are merely vicious dogs, but the nihilists are wolves, in fact, raging wolves, which is far more dangerous."⁷³

The unlimited faith in their race "chosen by higher powers", in their "sacred mission" as predestined to be the people to lead the "degenerate West", combined with the savage strength of a raging wolf or a servant of the Devil, — these are the imponderables which give the Muscovite horde their impetus and at the same time, paralyse the resistance of all Western timorous plebeian souls against this two-legged *Boa constrictor*. In order to combat this fanatical power of evil, which is determined to destroy the Christian civilisation of the West, it must be opposed by more powerful idea and spiritual force, in the service of that higher power which, at the beginning of our Christian era, sent its envoys to sinful mankind on the earth. But, unfortunately, there are only a few persons in the West who would be able or willing to bear the banner of this power. The eyes of the leading men of the West are dazzled by materialist idols. They are blind to the danger which threatens and they turn from those superhuman forces which could give our soul and our hands the necessary strength. The power of discernment of the leading elite of the West is dimmed by these materialist idols; this elite is thus demobilized spiritually and morally, and, in spite of the financial and armament strength of the West, physically, too, its will to fight is paralysed, — that same will and also that faith before which the hordes of Genghis Khan and of Attila once retreated.

It is this same incapacity on the part of the present leading circles of the West to assert themselves as the champions of a great, uncompromising anti-Russian idea, that makes them indifferent, if not hostile, to the only saving watchword of today, to that of the nations of Central and East Europe who are fighting for their independence, — namely *the destruction of the monstrous colonialist power, the disintegration of the barbarous Russian empire, the empire of slavery, of godlessness, of genocide and of ignominy*.

During the French Revolution, the famous English thinker and statesman, *Edmund Burke*, sadly wrote the strange visionary words: "the age of chivalry is gone, that of sophists, economists and calculators has succeeded",⁷⁴ and the words were meant more seriously than appears at a first glance. The leading caste of the West today are the "sophists", that is to say men who have no faith in a noble idea, for which one either stands or falls. The leading caste of the West today are the "economists", that is, persons who overrate the power of materialist things, of the economic factor, of money and of material

⁷³) *Roman Russe*.

⁷⁴) Selection from the Speeches and writings of Edmund Burke (The Carlton Classics).

wealth, and fail to realize that it is the soul that is not broken and the appreciation of spiritual and moral values which make a nation strong. The elite of the West today are the "calculators", that is, persons who regard every conflict of international and historical importance in which one side is victorious and the other doomed to ruin, solely as a misunderstanding between two businessmen, a misunderstanding which could have been settled by some kind of fifty-fifty arrangement. These sophists, economists and calculators will never possess the necessary nobleness of soul, wisdom of intellect, far-sightedness and will-power to kill the Apocalyptic Dragon of Moscow. This could only be achieved by a new elite, an elite which possesses the characteristics lacking in the present elite, — the elite of a Charlemagne, a Richard Coeur-de-Lion, or a Joan of Arc. The West needs a new chivalry in order to defend the sacred values and traditions of Christian civilization successfully. The old elite, which Burke scorned, must make room for the new elite and must abdicate. And the same applies to the mafia of Muscovite henchmen who poison the once free air of the Christian West. One must bear in mind the profound words of Demosthenes to his half-hearted fellow-countrymen during the fight against the Macedonians: "You must hate with all your hearts those in your midst who speak for Philip. You must understand that it will never be possible to overcome the enemy outside the walls of the town as long as you fail to overcome those in the town itself who stretch out their hands to him."

ON THE PROBLEM OF BOLSHEVISM

by

EVHEN MALANIUK

FOREWORD

In the first half of the 20th century many Ukrainians left their native land and most of them made their second home in the United States of America. It was the élite of the people that gathered there: poets, political writers, scientists and members of the learned professions generally. Their work, though dealing with the most topical questions, has remained practically unknown in the West because it was written in the Ukrainian language. Many of these publications point to interesting facts, which have been ignored in the West, such as the falsification of history, for instance. Then there is creative writing, which captures naked reality in poetic form. One of these expatriates is the well known Ukrainian poet and publicist, Evhen Malaniuk, whose treatise "On the Problem of Bolshevism" is here offered to the Western reader. Only negligible cuts have been made in order to compress the work.

E. Malaniuk was born in 1897 and has had personal experience of Bolshevism. In the year 1917 we see him in the trenches of the gradually disintegrating Russian army, and later in the Ukrainian National Army. In 1925 appeared his first volume of poetry, "Stiletto and Style", which was followed at intervals of several years by other collections, published in West Ukraine, France and Germany, as well as journalistic work.

Malaniuk's lyrics have a tremendous dynamic force and an exciting rhythm. As a distinguished poet and critic said of him: "He sees the scarlet banners of stormy times fall in the smoke-filled sky. In the vast spaces he hears the yells of Mongols of earlier times. In divine anger he speaks of his home-land and, like Ezekiel, calls it a harlot who gave herself to every comer. He calls down upon her a cleansing rain and prays that she may rise again in the white robes of her snowy fields. — It is every Ukrainian's vision of the future, for they all know that only a national state of their own can provide the conditions in which the spiritual forces of the people can unfold." So much of Malaniuk as a poet.

In 1956 he published in the USA his treatise "On the Problem of Bolshevism", with which he turned from poetry to historical philosophy. In this article he draws not only on his personal experience, but also on the study he made — versed in several languages — of Russian and Western writers on the subject. More than twenty renowned authors serve him as witnesses in his case.

Malaniuk challenges old and deep-rooted misconceptions about the origin of kolkhozes and the whole complex of "Russia" generally. With irrefutable logic he demonstrates that the sovkhoses (state farms) and kolkhozes (collective farms) of the present day have their roots in Tsarist institutions, such as the 'obshchina' (village community) and that Bolshevism is not an idea which Lenin imported from Germany, but a system which grew organically among the Slavonic and Mongolian tribes of Muscovite Russia. He shows how the outwardly monolithic 'Russia' is in fact composed of diverse peoples, who have been harnessed to a system that is alien to them. Particularly interesting are his pointers to the falsifications in Russian history. It has been common knowledge for several decades now that the old history had been grossly distorted. The name 'Ruś', for instance, by which the southern, Dnieper Slavs were known, was appropriated by Muscovy, which caused the former to call themselves 'Ukrainians' in order to dissociate themselves from the Muscovites.

Malaniuk's truthful account of events, his profound knowledge about the old Muscovite empire, the Russian empire and, finally, the Soviet empire, and his penetrating analysis of the soil in which Bolshevism was able to develop, deserve to be acknowledged and heeded by historians everywhere. The evidence Malaniuk produces is so convincing that one is amazed how the facts of the case could ever have been overlooked.

His treatise is divided into the following chapters:

- Introduction
- I. The Ideology
- II. The Fertile Soil
- III. Tsarism
- IV. Church and Tsarism
- V. The Tsardom

There is also an extensive list of sources.

B.

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INTRODUCTION

The term 'Bolshevism', much in use at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, became unfashionable after World War II and is about to disappear altogether. This is probably not so much the doing of the Soviet rulers as that of those camouflaged international circles, who try their utmost to present the official Moscow ideology, i.e. Marxist Communism, as the predominant ideology of the present time, as a vision of the future, as a religion, and who see in it above all the one ideology that can be set against the nationalism they so abhor. These same circles have from the very start given the name of 'Russia' to the empire the Bolsheviks had restored, despite the new constitution and contrary to the official designation of U.S.S.R. (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). The term 'Russia' corresponds no doubt more closely to their sentimental notions and at the same time lends respectability to the imperialist ambitions of the Bolsheviks, who have now become the "aristocracy" of the Soviet Empire.

There is little doubt that Moscow Communism, and the empire it rules, would long ago have ceased to exist but for the help it receives from these circles abroad. It would have collapsed, not only through the active resistance of organic forces within the U.S.S.R., but as a consequence of the absurd internal structure of the Soviet empire, which can only be maintained by millions of police and by the systematic suppression of individuality and the strangling of the spiritual life of the overpowered and enslaved peoples.

Communism is made the peculiar justification for the permanent system of Soviet terror and the periodic bursts of genocide and other kinds of mass murder, on the grounds that great aims demand great sacrifices. Thus criminal actions are presented as necessary measures of defence. In consequence there appeared after the last war similar distortions when the world Press used such cynical expressions as "Communist Koreans", "Communist Czechs", "Communist Germans" etc., as if in the territories concerned there had been an ideological alliance rather than the usual enforced occupation by Moscow of actual fact. The support which the U.S.S.R. enjoys from outside is, of course, not confined to helpful propaganda, but provides material aid, loans, diplomatic cooperation and, above all, political assistance in the final destruction of the peoples subjugated by Moscow. This

is done with an eye to the colonial opportunities in the present U.S.S.R. and, especially, to the colonial potential, which forms an irresistible attraction for the greed of anonymous exploiting capitalism, whose myth Karl Marx has created.

The Communist legend, with its emphasis on internationalism and the "building of socialism" (clearly of the Marxist stamp), is no doubt an important tool in the hands of Moscow, but it is by no means the whole story. It rather serves as a screen, like every fabricated ideology, behind which the true nature of what is termed 'Bolshevism' is hidden. Bolshevism is a far more comprehensive concept than Communism, but the latter provides perhaps the most convenient pseudonym for the former. Neither "Socialism", nor "Marxism", nor "Dictatorship of the Proletariat", nor any other abstract term can adequately render the essence or the meaning of the historical phenomenon which introduced the new era in the history of 'Russia', which has so far lasted for several decades. This historical process cannot be reduced to just another of the many "...isms." It is an historical event which is organically connected with a distinct geographical territory, with a distinct population of a distinct human type, and with the history of a distinct people, and it is conditioned by a distinct cultural climate.

It would be naïve and quite unwarranted to attribute the rise of Bolshevism merely to the fact that in 1917 the emigrant V. Ulyanov (Lenin) returned in a sealed carriage to Russia, or to the "strategic genius" of the journalist L. Bronstein (Trotsky), or to the influence of the writings of the "prophet" Karl Marx. Let us leave this to the discussions among those circles we have already mentioned, whose "specialists on Communism" and "experts on Russia", consciously or unconsciously, either depict Bolshevism as a purely economic system or restrict their view to the aspect of the proletarian revolution or to the so-called economic interpretation of history (Marxism, Socialist Talmudism, etc.). We ourselves have neither the space, nor the time, nor any inclination for such theorising.

I. THE IDEOLOGY

Foreigners do not
understand what
goes on in Russia.

M. Litvinov (Wallach).

We will not begin with a definition. The phenomenon of Bolshevism is too intricate and has too many facets to be defined in more or less scientific terms or even to be comprehended at all by the rationalistic minds of the West. Only a handful of scholars are the exception.

Let us begin with the usual personal reminiscences. It is the autumn of 1917. The Russian trenches of the first World War have become almost deserted. The empire is *de facto* dismembered. It is the period of the Provisional Government under Kerensky. In Petrograd, Lenin's voice resounds from the balcony of the ballerina Krzhesinskaya's palace and keeps repeating the word 'Soviet' in various combinations. In the disintegrated Army any discipline that remains is purely from habit.

My rifle company (in which many Ukrainians served) receives from regimental command a telephonist, a typical Russian from the Ryazan area, red-haired, lively and cunning. At his telephone he avidly follows the course of events at home and treats every soldier to the political news. The speeches by Lenin and his associates particularly appeal to him.

A young cadet officer from an 'Intelligentsia' background, a budding opera singer and graduate of the Academy of Music, who holds liberal-democratic views and is enthusiastic about Kerensky, attempts to re-orient this telephonist. Incessantly one hears such phrases as "liberated Russia", "democratic government", "loyalty to the Allies", "war until victory." The red-haired, snub-nosed telephonist listens and tries to remain courteous (there is still a shadow of authority left), but in the end he burst out: "Do stop about your Kerensky and

Democracy! It makes one sick. We don't need Kerensky. What we need is a firm authority, don't you see? The Bolsheviks, Lenin, that's an authority, but not that law-twister of yours. Lenin is the boss! The comrades tell me over the telephone what he says to the people. One can hear at once that this is the stuff. This is what we, the workers and the peasants, need — you don't, of course, you the masters and intellectuals!"

This red-headed, not very young Russian, who had never heard of Marx, was not a Socialist and belonged to no party, was already Bolshevik. It was amazing to hear with what reverence he pronounced the mere word. Perhaps it reminded him of the word 'bolshoy', or of 'bolshak' (the eldest of a Russian family) hallowed by tradition. Be that as it may, the fact is that in my regiment, in which a great number of non-Russians served (Ukrainians and Cossacks among them), all those who were born Russians were already Bolsheviks in the autumn of 1917, quite independent of what social class they belonged to. They were Bolsheviks, not in the party-ideological sense of the word, but in the almost metaphysical sense of the whole concept, which can only with difficulty be comprehended by merely sociological methods of analysis.

In the first breath of Bolshevism, in the very first of Lenin's speeches, the Russian people sensed behind the Marxist terminology the traditional autocratic spirit, the spirit of historical tsarism, with which the true Russian feels so much at home.

Identifying the Revolution with a revival of religious and national consciousness, it was not only Klyuev and Yesenin, the gifted poets of peasant stock, who welcomed Bolshevism, but also the refined poet and scholar Andrey Belyy (son of Professor Bugayev) and the last of the great poets of imperial times, Alexander Blok, (cf. his poem "The Twelve"), as well as many other eminent Russians who can with justice be called the head and heart of their nation. The most outstanding officers of the old Army became Bolsheviks, as I myself could observe, and they provided for the Bolshevik army a professionally trained General Staff with Brusilov at the head.

In the White Army of Denikin, fighting against the Bolsheviks, the majority were non-Russians, mostly Ukrainians. The nucleus of that army formed the regiments of the Don and Kuban Cossacks. The leader of the Kornilov army, in spite of his name, was equally a non-Russian. It is after all well enough known that it was only the peripheral peoples who resisted the Bolsheviks and not national Russia herself.

By the same token, it can hardly be supposed that the aristocratic Chicherin, the Tsar's former Chargé d'Affaires in London, was a convinced Marxist, and it is certainly not by accident that he became the first Bolshevik Minister of the Exterior.

Enough has been said about these matters in the documentary literature on the subject, and we need not go into them any further.

What can be established without any superfluous documentation is the fact that the so-called "Russian Revolution", which by its nature was to dissolve the empire, has found in the Bolsheviks a relief crew for the running of the imperial machine. The degenerate descendants of the Russian aristocracy were incapable of working that machine, particularly had they failed at that critical moment when with one blow the empire lost its colonies and only a denuded ethnographical Muscovite state remained.

There is an anecdote of those often dramatic days when the Bolsheviks fought for power. When one of the pretenders to high government position, known under the pseudonym of Zinovyev, expressed doubts whether their not very numerous group would be able to take over and maintain the government, Lenin promptly replied: "If tsarist Russia could be ruled by 140,000 noblemen, then that same Russia can be ruled by our Party, which already has tens of thousands of members."

Although Lenin cannot be called a genius, one must admit that he possessed a very wide knowledge, specifically about the psyche of the Russian people, the course of Russian history, the roots of Russian civilisation, and about the nature of power. In this last respect Lenin was certainly superior to our Ukrainian historians and poets (Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko), for he had doubtless studied the work "Of War" by Karl von Clausewitz more closely than the work of the other Karl, the "Capital" by Marx. It is an open secret that immediately after the overthrow the Bolsheviks took over intact the organisation and staff of the notorious tsarist 'Okhranka' (department of the secret police).

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One need not be a mystic to feel that we are living in an era in which evil has become an almost tangible thing.

We — especially we exiled Ukrainians — feel not only the existence, but the very essence of evil, and with such clarity as only medieval man felt it. The demoniac element in the complex of Bolshevism is undeniable, however much the false 'experts' may attempt, under the pretence of professional argument, to put forward their rational definitions, such as political economy, socialism, sociology and, of course, Marxism, i.e. "scientific Marxism."

Such 'experts', 'scholars', new-fangled 'historiographers', — among them a considerable number of somehow or other remunerated Soviet propagandists — assert, for instance, that the terror, the concentration camps, the mass resettlements, the constriction of the natural growth of people, are all inventions of the German Nazis, while every normal person knows that the latter were only inept disciples, two decades late, of the Bolsheviks. About such methodical mass tortures as the two great famines in our homeland, which the Bolsheviks organised

in 1922 and 1933 and in which 30% of our people perished, the 'experts' remain silent; or, if they cannot avoid the topic, they insolently maintain, without any proof whatever, that there was starvation everywhere in the Union, "in the whole of Russia", and that it had been caused by the necessity of "building socialism", or at least by the necessity of "industrialising" the country; or, simply, that the threat from "capitalist" enemies made rearmament inevitable. This cynical lie is then taken up, after long discussions, by other 'experts', is printed in hundreds of tomes and thousands of copies, broadcast over the radio and studied at universities. And so the infernal machine goes on working; for the father of the lie is, as you know, Satan.

For various reasons we shall have to leave the undoubted satanic element of Bolshevism out of consideration, since an analysis of this irrational part of the ideology would require another kind of treatment and a different terminology. In actual life, however, irrational and rational manifestations are so closely intertwined, the real and the mystical so often become merged, that the conscientious researcher frequently arrives at the conclusion that our so-called exact science is very limited and, indeed, it has in the course of the technological 19th century itself acquired the attributes of a strange and purely pagan mysticism (the taboo of the "unscientific").

In the examination of our subject we cannot avoid touching upon the theory, or the "science", propounded by Marx. It is after all the basis of the Communist philosophy and thereby of Bolshevism, which was to be a specifically Russian form of Marxism.

Karl Marx was born in 1818, the son of a christened lawyer from the Rhineland, the descendant, probably, of an old rabbinic family who emigrated from Ukraine in the 17th century. He studied at the universities of Bonn and Berlin and wrote his thesis on Democritus, the materialist philosopher of antiquity. He started to work as a journalist, emigrated to Paris where, together with Heinrich Heine, he published the magazine 'Vorwärts' (Forward). After the revolution of 1848 Marx returned to Germany, but only a year later, in 1849, he moved to London. There he lived, always in financial trouble and dependent on the help from relatives, until his death in 1883.

In view of the general familiarity with Marxism (in the schools of the USSR it is an obligatory subject and has replaced religious instruction), there is no need to give here an account of the bases of Marx's theory, which are expounded in the three volumes of his 'Capital' (first published in Hamburg between the years 1867 and 1894). That theory is so impregnated with economic determinism that every scientific character is lost, a fact which contemporaries and even Marxists themselves have pointed out. This, however, did not and does not prevent interested circles proclaiming Karl Marx a great scholar, who for the first time had provided the economy, and thereby history, with a scientific basis; whose theory represented a

feat of logical thinking; who had turned the whole world of old ideas upside down, had opened up a new era in the history of mankind; and who had become, as a Soviet writer expressed it, "the Sabaoth of a new world." A few of his champions among his kindred, with typical lack of moderation and unconscious blasphemy, do not shrink from placing him as a reformer beside... Christ.

The scientific value of Marxism is, of course, far more modest than one might suppose from the noise made about it by Soviet and pro-Soviet propaganda. Marx's theory has long ago been assigned its proper place in time and space. Even true Marxists no longer dwell on it; they neither discuss nor defend it. In genuine science, Marx's theory has for some time now been the equivalent to "the Emperor's new clothes" of Andersen's fairy-tale.

But, as we have said before, there is a close link between the irrational and the rational, the supernatural and the natural. Marx's turbid, confusedly talmudistic and in the end surely rather primitive theory about "classes" and "values" contained nevertheless something that acted like a spark on the minds of men and was ultimately to connect the author's name with the sea of blood and tears which engulfed above all our native country, which was also the home of the ancestors of the fateful man. There was something in that theory that eludes rational analysis. Between the lines there was perhaps something demoniac, something — I venture to say it — satanic.

The astonishing thing about Marx's theory, even if one considers only its formal character, is the complete absence of the spiritual element, the ethical. While the author is ostensibly concerned with the well-being of man (the proletarian, the worker), he puts in the place of man some transient species of a simplified Darwinian order.

The creative mind is eliminated; manifestations of the human spirit are denied existence; life is reduced to minimal, semi-animal functions. To call it anti-humanism would be an under-statement; it is de-humanisation, an abstraction contrary to all nature, with which that theory confronts us. The doctrine not only does away with God, which would be in keeping with trends in the scientific 19th century; it does away with man himself. For man is above all, whatever science may say, God's image and not a robot or a number in a concentration camp. All this is not a question of mere materialism. Materialism as a system of philosophy had been known long before Marx. The same Democritus (5th century B.C.) on whom Marx wrote his thesis, the originator of the theory of atoms and author of no less than 72 works on subjects of cosmology, ethics and the theory of cognition, was a learned physicist and the first of the materialist philosophers known to us. None of this prevented him, however, from devoting special treatises to spiritual matters.

The naïve, brutal and, in true German fashion, straightforward materialist Ludwig Feuerbach flourished shortly before Marx. He

went as far as to maintain that "man is what he eats" (a pun in German: *Der Mensch ist, was er isst*), which did not save him, however, from being charged with "idealism" by both Marx and Lenin. Compared with what we in our time have seen of the effects of materialism, his maxim appears to us now as no more than the babble of a drunkard.

All this is to say that at the core of Marxism there is not only materialism as a specific philosophic system, but also something abysmal and terrifying. For if man, as depicted in that theory, is no longer linked to family, nature, the universe, the spiritual, God — then man, as we know him, ceases to exist altogether. Marxism is not only atheistic; it is, from an historical point of view, antichristian in the full sense of the word. There is no doubt whatever that under the cloak of quasi-scientific definitions Satanism lurks in the Marxist doctrine.

The first to point this out is said to have been the great Ukrainian poet, Ivan Franko, who in 1898 wrote about Marxism: "...it is to be expected that we shall soon have (in fact we have it already) a formal religion based on the dogmas of hate and the class struggle." Then it was the famous philosopher Nikolay Berdyayev, who in one of his early essays (1906) stressed "the falsehood" in Marxism and called the doctrine a "prison of the mind" and an "evil of the future." Berdyayev was well aware of the demoniac nature of Marxism, with its cult of de-personalisation and "non-being", and foresaw in it the unquestionable antichristianism.

I can still recall the strong impression made on me by the fragment of an article or letter by Karl Marx which I happened to read. It was not the content, but the style that struck me (it was in German). It was decidedly biblical, the style of the Old Testament prophets. The proletariat was compared to the "chosen" people and Marx saw himself as Moses, their leader. Since style tells us much about the author himself, this brief excerpt was illuminating and provided a key to the understanding of the essence of the doctrine which lies behind its "scientific" and "economic" disguises. It also gave the answer as to why, from among other socialist theories, it should have been Marx's theory that so much kindled enthusiasm and possessed such marvellous energy, such an electric charge, that what is after all a grandiose movement could spring from it.

In my opinion, it is above all due to the personality of Karl Marx, to his innate character, which was stronger than the influences of education, environment or official nationality. The man who was supposed to be rationalism personified, emerges from contemporary memoirs and from surviving letters and other documents as a man "possessed", who indeed looked like an Old Testament prophet and who was a born leader — not just some kind of party leader, but a visionary, absorbed in an ideal, a myth, a distant goal...

In ordinary life he was a difficult man, highly intolerant, despotic, not open to argument. Dominated by his ideas, he was able to influence his contemporaries and environment and at times to extort blind obedience from them. He was a man of indomitable mental energy (not "materialistic", i.e. physical) and it was this force, of rather dark origin, which revealed itself in his "scientific" work, his journalism, his exuberant organising activity (Communist Manifesto, 1847), and produced such disastrous results.

The fact that Marx's theory was put into practice on the territory of the Russian empire and not, as one might logically have assumed, in already industrialised Germany, must not be regarded as an accident or as an historical misunderstanding. The communist Moses had for some time had his fanatical eye on that mysterious country to the east of Europe, as his notes and articles prove.

His comrade, Heinrich Heine, poet and acute observer, showed particular sympathy for Russia and associated it with definite hopes. All that was needed was a mental bridge, a metaphysical contact with one specific point in the complex of "Russia" and the psyche of her intellectual élite. And that point was to be the Russian Messianism, for Marxism itself was and is only a quasi-scientific form of Messianism.

Nor was it accidental that Russia's great poet Alexander Blok greeted the Bolshevik overthrow with his blasphemous-messianic poem "The Twelve", in which he placed at the head of the twelve Red guardsmen the figure of Jesus Christ, in reality, of course, Antichrist.

II. THE FERTILE SOIL

Four years after the appearance of the first volume of "Capital", Dostoyevsky published his novel "The Devils" (or "The Possessed") (1871), which one would associate rather with Marx's "Communist Manifesto" of 24 years earlier — "Europe is haunted by the spectre of communism" (1847). It is exceedingly strange, but characteristic, that scholars should take so little notice of this novel, which is a first rate source of enlightenment on Bolshevism and indeed constitutes one of the most important documents in the vast literature on the subject. Unfortunately, the "experts on Russia" preponderate among scholars, and they carefully dissect the problem, with an energy that could be employed to greater advantage, without getting at the heart of the matter. Three quarters, if not 90% of these "experts" tear the historical event of Bolshevism out of the context of history, of time and space, as if it were something that had developed in the stratosphere and not on this iniquitous earth of ours. The anti-historical approach is the worst sin of these "scientists." They split *a priori* the problem seen in abstraction and arrange it into groups of aspects (sociological, social, economic, material, etc.).

"The Devils", it is true, is fiction, a work of literature rather than science. But it can be proved by a number of examples that novels of this kind make a far greater contribution towards the illumination of a problem than documentary material or scientific treatises, especially when such treatises are written by scholars without imagination or on a purely rational basis.

The mere fact that the novel was originally proscribed by the Bolshevik government and appeared only later, when the Soviet empire had consolidated itself, in the "academic" complete (i.e. not popular) edition of the works of Dostoyevsky, is highly significant. One may be sure that the novel is not to be found on the shelves of the public libraries of the U.S.S.R. It is in the nature of things that the book should play no part either in the so-called anti-Communist campaign outside the U.S.S.R. conducted by Russian emigrants, or in the propaganda of the fifth column.

These circles have good reasons for ignoring or keeping silent about "The Devils." In the whole of world literature there is no other work that provides deeper insight into Bolshevism and hence is more anti-Bolshevist than "The Devils", with the exception perhaps of Saltykov-Shchedrin's "History of the Town of Glupov" which is, however, almost incomprehensible to anyone not acquainted with the complex of "Russia" because of its style, and, possibly, the books of the English writer Joseph Conrad (a Pole from Ukraine), "The Secret Agent" and "Under Western Eyes", which do not seem to be particularly popular either.

Dostoyevsky's "The Devils" is probably the greatest work this very prolific author has written. The novel somehow bursts the frame of conventional writing, perhaps even of literature altogether, as is the case with the "Undivine Comedy" by the Polish writer Krasinski: in its visions this crosses the boundaries of ordinary literature and provides another valuable clue to the ideas behind Bolshevism, being at the same time a strange prophecy.

It is well known that Dostoyevsky was a psychological wreck, suffered from epilepsy and was a compulsive gambler. Apart from the difficulties arising from his national origins and his family environment (he was the grandson of a Greek Orthodox priest and the son of an unbalanced father, whom he hated), he had been drawn into a revolutionary circle, was condemned to death and then, under the very gallows, "reprieved" by Tsar Nicholas I and banished to Siberia. This severe mental shock and years of forced labour wrought havoc on Dostoyevsky's sensitive mind. The man, who had already lost his roots, was morally broken for ever. The pathological element in his writing is consequently strong. Far more than anything by a healthy writer, his novels are a rich mine for psychopathologists and criminologists. The actual stories of his novels are interwoven with the treatment of important psychological, philosophical and religious problems, particularly Christianity and Orthodoxy.

Always in financial trouble, he tended to draw out his books and make them more complicated, often to the detriment of composition. This is why, apart from their moral indigestibility, they are so difficult to read.

"The Devils" stands out among Dostoyevsky's other work by the extraordinary clarity of the prophetic vision of Russian Bolshevism and the way in which it uncovers the Bolshevik "subsoil" of Russia. Its clairvoyant description of several historical events in the future (the 9th/22nd of January incident; the Rasputin episode; the figure of Lenin, even of Trotsky; and much else) cannot fail to make a deep impression on the modern reader. It was this epileptic, with his diseased mind and depraved tendencies (Stavrogin's confession in "The Devils" is autobiographical, according to the testimony of contemporaries), who was to foresee the future disasters, and he paid for his prophetic vision with suffering throughout his life. While

referring the reader to the novel itself, I may be permitted to quote here one of the passages which gives the gist of the views held by one of the characters, the "ideologist" Shigalyov. It is the conversation between Verkhovensky and Stavrogin.

"He (Shigalyov) has invented 'equality'... Spying. Every member of the society spies on the others, and he is obliged to inform against them. Everyone belongs to all the others, and all belong to everyone. All are slaves and equals in slavery. In extreme cases slander and murder, but, above all, equality. To begin with, the level of education, science and accomplishment is lowered. A high level of scientific thought and accomplishment is open only to men of the highest abilities! Men of the highest ability have always seized the power and become autocrats. Such men cannot help being autocrats, and they've always done more harm than good; they are either banished or executed. A Cicero will have his tongue cut out, Copernicus will have his eyes gouged out, a Shakespeare will be stoned — there you have Shigalyov's doctrine! Slaves must be equal: without despotism there has never been any freedom or equality [an inconsistency, typical of Dostoyevsky's heroes; see above, about the despotism of higher ability], but in a herd there is bound to be equality — there's the Shigalyov doctrine for you! Ha, ha, ha! You think it strange? I am for the Shigalyov doctrine!

...The moment a man falls in love or has a family, he gets a desire for private property. We will destroy that desire; we'll resort to drunkenness, slander, denunciations; we'll resort to unheard-of depravity; we shall smother every genius in infancy.

...Slaves must have rulers. Complete obedience, complete loss of individuality; but once in thirty years Shigalyov resorts to a shock, and everyone at once starts devouring each other, up to a certain point, just as a measure against boredom. Boredom is an aristocratic sensation; in the Shigalyov system there will be no desires. Desire and suffering are for us; for the slaves — the Shigalyov system.

...We'll have a few fires — we'll spread a few legends... an upheaval will start. There's going to be such a to-do as the world has never seen."

("The Devils", Part Two.)

As a youth I tried to read this novel, but without success. It appeared to me as the fabrication of a psychopath, and I dropped the book. It was only in the early thirties, when a complete picture of Bolshevism had emerged, that I was irresistibly drawn back to "The Devils"; I then read it with great attention and returned to it again and again. It became quite clear to me why the police-controlled education authorities had to hide the book from the general public: It was a prophecy come true, a magic mirror of reality; it unmasked the "Revolution" and provided a relentless analysis of Bolshevism and its roots. Dostoyevsky had also given subtle hints about the threads that connected the "native" Bolshevism with international and communist Socialism.

An important complement to "The Devils" is the work of the satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin, entitled "A History of the Town of Glupov" (from "glúpyy" — stupid). A former Governor himself, the author was the best judge on Russia's administration. In the form of satire, very involved and grotesque for the benefit of the censor, his book gives in essence the history of "Russia." The author was a positivist and rationalist, an educated and shrewd man, who had nothing to do with mysticism (nor, perhaps, with religion). Content and style of his book are, of course, entirely different from those of "The Devils", but it maps out, with near-mathematical conciseness, a kind of ground-plan of the terrible empire. The "Russian system" is brought out in full relief and the potentially Bolshevik foundations are clearly visible (Shchedrin prophetically uses even the word "communism" several times). His stylised "Description of the Governors" (heads of state, chiefs of police etc., i.e. rulers, in whom we recognise the tsars, dignitaries and politicians of the empire), with the brilliantly and prophetically depicted Ugryum-Burcheyev at the top, is an extraordinary literary achievement. The figure of Ugryum-Burcheyev shows so many similar traits of character that it might be a portrait of Stalin.

The author deliberately wrote in the civil service jargon of government offices, a style only comprehensible to those familiar with "Russia", and the book has therefore hardly been translated. It is, of course, in this specific language that the essence of the book is to be found.

The same subject is treated by a foreign eye-witness in the best book ever written on "classical" Russia. It is the well known but little studied book (Paris 1843) by the Marquis de Custine, who was a clear-sighted observer with a very fine ear. His work has nothing in common with the demoniac metaphysics of "The Devils" or the grotesque satire of Shchedrin, but it is a sober and penetrating account, full of that brilliant "esprit" for which his nation is famous.

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A familiarity with the literature on the subject and with historical sources, the knowledge of facts, personal observation and at least a rudimentary feeling for the metaphysical side of things, inevitably lead the impartial investigator to the conviction that the territory of the historical Russia provided a particularly favourable ground for the realisation of Marx's theory and that Bolshevism could only rise in the Muscovite domain.

It is by no means easy to discuss the subject of "Russia", let alone to make assertions about it. One knows from personal experience how this topic has for long been deliberately complicated and obscured and literally surrounded with a smoke-screen of lies, and how it has in certain spheres (scholarship not excluded) become a peculiar taboo. A Ukrainian investigator faces particular difficulties, since his findings, however objective and scholarly they may be, are liable to be dismissed as "zoological chauvinism."

This is precisely what happened to the objective and painstaking Ukrainian historian M. Hrushevsky, whose vast body of work the "revolutionary" Soviet government declared as "zoological chauvinism" and "fascist bogus history" and caused it to disappear, thus depriving generations of Ukrainians of the possibility of studying it. Such measures are after all quite natural for that government and hallowed by tradition. It applies similar methods even to representatives of the "progressive" and ruling nation of "Russia." Is it not a fact that the Russian historian N. Polevoy was eliminated by the government because his conception of history contradicted that of Karamzin, of which the men at the top happened to approve? Has there not for years been a ban on the work of the historian Pokrovsky who, although a Marxist, was a genuine scholar? And did not Tsar Nicholas I declare the eminent thinker Peter Chaadayeve, a former Guards officer of the Moscow nobility and friend of Pushkin's, to be insane (with all the legal consequences that it entailed) only because he had published an excellent historical-philosophical article? There are innumerable examples of this police supervision of intellectuals from the times of the Muscovite State to those of the later Petersburg and Soviet empires.

Abroad the situation is no better when it comes to knowledge about Russia. Moscow's untiring and cunning external propaganda over the centuries has seen to that. Western Europe has never sufficiently evaluated that propaganda, whose intensity, method and scale have only during the Soviet period become evident. Back in the Moscow period, Ivan IV, the Terrible, this first overt imperialist (whom the Soviet writers were instructed to extol as a genius and the prototype of Stalin), had the legend spread abroad that he was a descendant of Alexander of Macedonia and, possibly, of Cleopatra of Egypt, and that his predatory wars were undertaken for the sole purpose of propagating Orthodox Christianity — which did, however, not prevent him from butchering 40,000 Orthodox citizens of Novgorod.

Then there was the considerably perfected foreign propaganda, conducted in masterly fashion by Catherine II, that German adventuress on the Russian throne, the goddess of the (well paid) French Encyclopaedists, the "Semiramis of the North." For the attainment of her own ends she succeeded in winning over three quarters of the Polish élite of the 18th century, who sold the future of their country to its most terrible historical enemy in return for a permanent fixed allowance from the Tsarina.

From extant documents we know that the secret service of Nicholas I endeavoured to bribe such an eminent French writer as Balzac into writing a book on Russia that would counteract the views expressed by the Marquis de Custine. This was by no means an unrealistic approach (Balzac was fond of money and needed it) and it was probably mere coincidence that it came to nothing (thanks

to a rich match Balzac made in Ukraine). But for two centuries there were many small and big Balzacs and Voltaires in the pay of the Petersburg secret service. There are strong grounds for the belief that the famous diplomat of revolutionary France, Talleyrand, the excommunicated bishop who became a minister under Napoleon and Louis Philippe, was an agent of the Tsarist secret service. Moscow's agents abroad in our day have indeed a great tradition and work according to well tried methods. (The mysterious figure of Bormann in the Hitler era may here be remembered.)

But to cut short this aside, although it is a highly important topic, let us simply face the fact that the world has been given a certain picture of Russia, now threatening, now pacifist; now primitive, now mystical; now barbaric, now civilised (ballets, etc.); but at all times the image has been created of an "undivided" national entity, and it is that image which survives to this day.

For the historians of Europe (and of the world in general) this "Russian" conception has remained intact, and other views, e.g. Hrushevsky's, are regarded as being tendentious. Thus, the country which up to the 17th century was officially named "Ducatus Moscoviensis" and during the 17th century "the Moscow State", became in the course of one single century, the 18th, the "Russia" existing since eternity, despite the fact that both the empire itself and its (old Ukrainian) name date only from 1709, the year of the catastrophe of Poltava, so fateful to the whole of Europe.

From the 18th century onwards the Tsars look outwardly like the kings of Western Europe. The Romanov dynasty became in a short time 90% German, and so did a considerable majority of the dignitaries and aristocrats. (The Prussian element took the place of the Tartar element of the former Moscow Principality, as it were, and the numerous Urussovs were replaced by the no less numerous Benckendorffs.)

In short, from outside the Petersburg empire appeared perfectly normal. To the mind of the average European of the second half of the 19th century "Russia" was, perhaps, somewhat exotic and backward, but on the whole a large state like every other state, and it did not display anything out of the ordinary, no trace of "another world." The Marquis de Custine was one of the very few who, in the first half of the 19th century, detected something entirely different...

Among scholars, in literature, in politics, and in the imagination of the West generally, a notion of Russia was formed which, due to the law of inertia, survives and exerts its influence to this day. It is extremely difficult to combat this erroneous idea by literary, rational means, and only an intimate acquaintance with "Russia" can enable anyone to attack it at its roots. Such direct acquaintance is today only too painfully forced upon the Germans, the Czechs and the Slovaks; and the people of Poland, as well as of Bulgaria, Roumania

and Hungary, have in our day renewed experience of that system, for which they have to pay dearly.

We know from personal experience that a Western intellectual would look in astonishment at anyone who told him, for instance, that the Russian peasants had for centuries no legal right to property of any kind. He would politely point out to his informant that this was a statement which was no doubt prompted, quite understandably, by his own nationalist bias and his aversion to (Moscow) Russia. That same European remains in ignorance about the many different, strongly contrasting cultures, which are to be found on the territory of the Soviet empire. The past history of the Caucasus, the ruins of the splendid civilisation of Turkestan, the monuments of antiquity in the Black Sea area — what are these to him? All he knows of Ukrainian history is, perhaps, the romanticised Mazepa (from the interpretations by Byron, Liszt, and the painter Horace Vernet). Even such highly sensitive men of the West as the poet R. M. Rilke are unable to perceive the essential difference between the Cathedral of St. Sophia at Kiev and any other church, e.g. that of Basil the Blessed in the Red Square at Moscow. The outdated, almost fossilised idea of an “undivided”, “great”, “limitless” “Russia” exerts a hypnotic influence on the observer and distorts his view of even the most obvious reality. (Rilke, for one, had seen with his own eyes both Kyïv (Kiev) and Moscow.)

Intellectuals of this kind see in Bolshevism a “great Russian Revolution”, not realising that both “evolution” and “revolution” are in the context with the, for them, wholly inscrutable system of “Russia” nothing but empty words that mock their meaning. (See Joseph Conrad’s brilliant article on the eve of the revolution of 1905, “Revolution and Autocracy.”)

To such intellectuals the incident of “the sealed carriage”, in which Ludendorff is said to have transported Lenin to Russia with the malicious intent to harm the Allies, is more important than the removal of the seat of government from the quasi-European Petersburg to the national Moscow, an event whose significance from the historical-philosophical point of view has not been understood. Such intellectuals would also be surprised to learn (and would explain it as coincidence) that the Cheka (later NKVD) has its headquarters at the Lubyanka, the very spot which housed the notorious torture cells and prisons of the secret service of the old Moscow State.

This type of over-rationalising super-intellectual has lost the art of historical thinking. In the age of technocracy his intellect has become mechanised and his intuition has evaporated. Even the terrible suicidal destruction of Europe, which we have witnessed in the apocalyptic years of the Second World War (brought on by Hitler), is judged from the determinist point of view — that historical philosophy so well reasoned by, e.g., Oswald Spengler, but so catastrophic in its consequences to Europe. And this type of

intellectual is still dominant today (a glaring example is A. Toynbee, as well as men like Sartre and the legion of "repentant communists" and ex-Trotskyites in the literature of our time). Young, promising forces, who chose a new direction, are carefully held in check by those circles who have monopolised the means of mass communication. As Dostoyevsky put it in "The Devils", they "smother every genius in infancy."

It is these factors in our age which contribute to the continued existence of Bolshevism. Even if it decays from within, those interested circles will rush to its aid and preserve it at all costs until the "propitious moment" when its ideology "will shine forth all over the world" from the modern Mecca of "the new faith."

III. TSARISM

With political ends in view, a "history of Russia" was concocted under government auspices, appropriating the unrelated history of the Kiev Ruś, and this approved version was taught for centuries in the schools and universities of the former Russia. After a short Marxist interval, this conception of history was taken up again by the present Moscow rulers and is being expounded in the schools of every country of the Soviet empire, as well as by propaganda. The "history" was subject to many modifications until it lost every shred of scientific value and only served to propagate the myth of the political unity of "Russia" and now of the U.S.S.R.

Russian history is based on the famous "History of the Russian Empire" by N. Karamzin (12 volumes, published 1816-1826). The author, a writer of Tartar descent without any specialist knowledge, was nominated as official historiographer by an ukase of the Tsar. He was, in Karamzin's own words, to "select" historical material about "Russia", "to enliven it, give it colour." The work was to be "attractive, impressive, remarkable, not only to Russians but also to foreigners..."

The first attempt to write Russian history as a history of the people, rather than a record of the state, met with the indignation of the entire élite of the empire with Pushkin and Prince Vyazemskiy at the head. Under attack were the six volumes of "A History of the Russian People" by the Moscow historian Polevoy (1796-1846). Tsar Nicholas I wanted to send the author to Siberia, but contented himself in the end with depriving him of all means of livelihood. Polevoy died destitute and forgotten. A hundred years of historical writing in the service of politics does not remain without consequences, for human memory does not go very far and even fifty years may prove to be a barrier. Even in Western European archives and libraries many documents, testimonies and memoirs are buried under the dust of oblivion. The officially promoted view has thus become the history of "Russia" and has been accepted ever since by the scholars of the world as dogma and guiding principle.

When the so-called Bolshevik Revolution came (which was merely the starting point for an armed restoration of the empire by a series of imperialist wars), not only the world outside but also the former "Russian" peoples were astounded at the barbarous methods of the Bolsheviks, the peculiar structure of the Bolshevik state (Cheka, terror as a system, contempt for the human being), the shockingly bloodthirsty government, the cynicism and inhuman cruelty of the Russian people.

It was generally assumed that these were transitional phenomena of "the Revolution" (like the Jacobins and Marat), unavoidable paroxysms of class hatred, a temporary madness of the very people who in the minds of the educated circles of "Russia" were "the bearers of divine thought." No one heeded the warning which the representative of that people, the poet Alexander Blok, gave to the world when he said at the very beginning of the holocaust: "We shall let you see our Asiatic face..."

The world was so hypnotised by the official version and the conception of history held by Russian intellectuals that it did not (or would not) see the reality nor grasp the significance of what lay behind the strange-sounding name of "Bolshevism."

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In the last few decades some European intellectuals have been looking more closely at the phenomenon of Bolshevism and began to study the history of the Mongolian empire of the 13th and 14th centuries. In the course of this analysis they realised that Moscow State had from 1237 to 1480 been a part of the political structure of the Mongolian empire of the Jenghiz Khan dynasty and for some time afterwards had remained, politically and culturally, within the Mongolian sphere of influence. (We refer the reader to the "Eurasian" writers P. Savitskiy, P. Suvchinskiy, G. Vernadskiy, among others). In this connection an interesting publication appeared in Harbin in 1926 under the title "My" (We) by V. Ivanov, which attempted to advance a purely Asian theory for Russia ("In Asia we are at home...").

We see that the Mongolian period in Moscow's history lasted almost half a century longer than the "Europeanized" Petersburg period of the later "Russia" (1709-1917). No matter how falsely that period is being represented in official textbooks, no conscientious historian of the state and people of Muscovy can minimize its true nature and its significance.

It is common knowledge that in the year 1222 there appeared on our steppes the armed hordes of Temuchin (Jenghiz Khan). They were Turko-Mongolian nomads, who were named "Tartars", although the Tartars proper formed only a part of these hordes. After Jenghiz

Khan had passed through China, Turkestan, Persia and the Caucasus, he aimed at the conquest of Europe. The first attempt in that direction met with the resistance of the Kiev State (the battle on the bank of the river Kalka in the spring of 1223). However, its allies, the Polovtsi, fled in panic and the battle was lost. For the Mongols this encounter was of great advantage: It was a thorough scouting operation and must have provided them with valuable information for the strategic planning of their future incursions. Fourteen years later the Mongol forces, aided by Chinese generals and specialists from the conquered nations, had developed into an army which was militarily and politically invincible, given the political state of affairs in Europe at the time (the conflict between Church and secular power; the decline in the art of war: outmoded weapons and tactics of the knights, improvised supplies and, above all, a deterioration in organisation and strategic thinking).

The army, which pushed towards Europe under Batu Khan's command, disposed of all sorts of weapons, including artillery and engineering devices. It was organised in multiples of ten (Tens, Hundreds, Regiment = 1000, Corps = 10,000, Army = 100,000) and had an able General Staff and an efficient Medical Service (Chinese personnel, highly qualified in those days). As it was an army of horse-soldiers it was perfectly capable of covering about forty miles a day. One might compare it to a huge and well trained motorised army of our day, with the most up-to-date equipment (the use of gunpowder for blasting) and provisioning (including meat and milk preserves). Most important, it was an army with a wild, cruel and self-confident spirit, born of the mysterious depths of Asia, a mentality which was strange and utterly incomprehensible to European Christians and Moslems alike. This mental power made itself felt even from afar; by spreading fear and terror, it paralysed and demoralised the threatened peoples. The campaign of Batu Khan was a triumphant march. After destroying the kingdom of the Bulgars on the Volga in the course of a few months, the Mongols overwhelmed and laid waste at the end of 1237 and the beginning of 1238 the territories of Suzdal, Ryazan, Rostov and Tver, securing thereby the right flank of their main drive.

Having set up their administration in the conquered lands, the Mongols moved south and destroyed Pereyaslav and Chernihiv. The Dnieper formed a natural barrier to their advance on Kiev. The Mongols waited until it was frozen and then, on the 6th of December 1240, overcoming the desperate defence of the inhabitants, they captured that capital of Eastern Europe.

1241 was the year of a *Blitzkrieg*. Batu's army passed further westward, devastating Volhynia and Galicia, taking Cracow and Breslau [Wroclaw]. At Liegnitz [Legnica] (9th April 1241) the Czech and Polish knights put up a stout defence. They were defeated and

it was a tragedy like that on the river Kalka (nine sacks full of ears cut off the fallen knights). This resistance, however, gave a certain degree of protection to the North-West of Europe. The march continued to Olomouc in Moravia and on to Magyar Hungary, where Budapest was taken on the 3rd July 1241. The left wing of the Mongol army reached the Adriatic, the Austrian town of Neustadt was occupied, and the fate of Vienna appeared to be sealed.

We have dwelt somewhat on the Mongolian campaign in order to stress the character of that historic event. It is not our task here to examine the reasons why Batu Khan eventually decided to turn back, thereby sparing Western Europe the later invasion by a different species of Huns. (Note: The mounted Bolshevik hordes of the years 1918-1920, as for instance Budenny's cavalry squadrons, were a faint but unmistakable historical reminiscence of those Mongol days. In the early Soviet literature of the 1920s two interesting books dealt with this subject: "Tuatamur" by Leonid Leonov and "Konarmiya" (English translation: "Red Cavalry") by Isaak Babel, the most valuable contributions, perhaps, to Soviet writing.)

As a consequence of the Mongol invasion the whole of Eastern Europe, with the exception of the coastal part of the Balkans, the entire territory of the Kiev empire with its former northern colonies, fell under Mongol domination, the "Tartar yoke", as the chronicles called it. In the western part of the Mongol Empire was the Golden Horde (Altun Orda), a strictly centralised unit, with its capital at Saray on the Lower Volga. Its economy was well organised and one of the main functions of the Golden Horde officials (the so-called *baskaks*) was the gathering of tribute from the conquered peoples.

One might expect that the effects of Mongol domination had been the same in all the principalities of the Rus', that had even earlier become rather disorganised. But the course of history is far more influenced by cultural frontiers than by political ones.

The Kiev empire never had, and never could have had, a homogeneous civilisation. Its parts were not alike, neither ethnographically nor racially. European civilisation extended to the north-western frontier regions of Pereyaslav and Chernihiv and there, too, lay the ethnic borders.

The rapid conquest of the regions of the future Muscovy was no historical accident. Apart from Kozelsk, where there was terrible slaughter, the resistance of the northern principalities was not very strong. In the territory of Ukraine, with its fortified towns, the Mongols had to use all their tactical abilities and proceed in stages, while the poor towns of the North presented no particular difficulties to the ruthless invaders. Besides the material aspects, there was the important difference of the cultural backwardness of the northern population with its primitive Finnish admixture. The people there had no deep-rooted traditions and certainly no spiritual values with

which to oppose the conquerors. Unburdened by any historical tradition, any feeling of solidarity or national integrity, the northern Princes simply accepted the bondage imposed on them and thus surrendered morally.

The Muscovite realm acknowledged the Mongols' authority as a matter of fact. The Khan of the Golden Horde was their "Tsar" and his name was mentioned in church services. The Princes were nominated as governors by the "Khan-Tsar" and served him faithfully. They went as far as to arrest and deliver up for execution disobedient princes (as, for instance, the Moscow prince Ivan Kalita, who took Alexander, Prince of Tver, to the Golden Horde, where he was executed). These Governor-Princes acted as the chief tax-gatherers for the "Tsar of the Horde" and exercised their office conscientiously and with as much cruelty to their subjects as the Mongols themselves would.

It would, however, be one-sided not to mention the positive side of that political regime. The Tsar of the Horde was the acknowledged Tsar of the Muscovite realm; the Muscovite princes obeyed him blindly; the formally Christian Muscovite Church prayed for him; and the "Grand Prince" of Moscow was confirmed by him (even men like Alexander Nevsky).

In the meantime Moscow had become the centre of Muscovy. The autonomous Grand Prince of Moscow extended his power further and further, he stood above all other local princes, was their sovereign in relation to the Khan and, indeed, assumed absolute power over them. The main idea of Moscow imperialism, the "gathering of lands", took shape and began to be bloodily accomplished in the days of the "Tartar yoke." One of the most interesting experts comments on the subject: "...Under the iron heel of oppression our people and our country had come to comprehend the essence of power. It is this understanding which holds our country together and which transformed a mercenary protector of caravans into the autocratic Prince of Moscow... Thus it is to be explained that the Western White Tsar succeeded in uniting under his rule the heritage of the Grand Khan, of the "Sons of Heaven", of Jenghiz Khan and Kubilai Khan, and later to weld Russia into a military empire." (V. Ivanov in "We", chapter IV.)

The political unity of Muscovy and the later Moscow State, achieved by the Princes of Moscow under the supremacy of the Mongols, the characteristic totalitarianism of their political system, their autocratic and indivisible government and the technique of terror to maintain that government — all this was the result of the influence the Golden Horde had exercised for centuries, in short, the Mongolian training.

The totalitarianism of the Soviet regime of our time, the "collectivism" which, on principle, denies every individuality to men or classes, the abolition of private property (as the material basis for

the individual), terrorism as an administrative instrument, and much else (such as the deification of the Government; the army of police inside the country), these are not features of the "Revolution", of Socialism or of Marxism as such, but are the product of an historical process.

The fact that as soon as the Bolsheviks came to power Lenin removed the seat of government from the Europeanised Petrograd to Moscow is in itself of deep historical significance. The decision had nothing to do with Socialist or Marxist thought, but sprang from Lenin's thorough knowledge of the history and psychology of his people. V. Ivanov has this to say on the subject of Moscow: "After 300 years of battles, suffering, toil and heroism, our ancestors had at last found the magic word... That word was "Moscow", which was to create the Moscow State within the borders of the Mongolian empire and beyond them."

History repeated itself when in the year 1917 Moscow once more became the starting point, this time for the "Marxist" restoration of the Tsarist Empire, and the "European" Petersburg period of the empire was crossed out, as a hindrance to this process.

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There appears to be nothing more hopeless and fatal and, as it were, closed in on itself than the history of the Moscow State. And there is, probably, no other people so de-personalised, so severely and permanently violated by their Tsarist system, as the Muscovite-Russian people who are allegedly the masters of their empire. For all their cruelty, they are an unhappy people, even if they themselves are not aware of it.

"They are strong, usually of the same complexion as Europeans...", the German diplomat Adam Olearius wrote in 1633. "It makes one shudder to hear how children talk to their parents and parents to their children..." "They are devoid of shame... During a religious procession a harlot, in a fit of drunkenness, tore off her clothes. A drunken pilgrim tried to take advantage of the situation, but to the great amusement of the crowd he was not able to." "They call spirits the Tsar's wine... Their caviare and sturgeon taste good and are exported to England, Holland and Italy... They beat their wives to death... They are born slaves... In front of the Tsar they debase themselves, calling themselves by the most contemptuous names..." — "They have a despotic government. The nation is ruled by an hereditary autocracy which enslaves everyone. Aristotle would call this form of government a tyranny... The Muscovites say: 'Everything belongs to the Tsar and to God'... The Muscovites do not know what freedom is."

One could quote endlessly in the same vein. Similar descriptions can be found in other books, including contemporary ones, but it will

be enough to quote a writer of the twenties, who said: "The work of Adam Olearius reminds one of reports of the present time."

Has anything changed in the last four decades? "What has changed?" asked the Russian poet M. Voloshin (really Kiriyyenko-Voloshin, of Ukrainian extraction), referring to the years 1917-1918, and answered: "On all roads the same high wind/ With the commissars: the spirit of despotism/ With the Tsars: outbreaks of revolution."

All that had changed was outward appearance and names; the nation itself, which had been shaped in peculiar circumstances and whose education was continued in an essentially identical environment as before, remained unchanged. On the throne of Moscow men of different character, different nationality, even of different race, followed each other. But from the Tsar-Revolutionary Peter I to the Revolutionary-Tsar Dzhugashvili (Stalin) the nature of things was the same. A modern chronicler need only copy what Adam Olearius wrote in the first half of the 17th century. It is possible that Peter I, who spent years of apprenticeship in Holland, really intended to transform the Moscow realm into a modern European empire when he gave it the name of the mediaeval Kiev state. It is possible that the Russian intellectual of Tartar descent, Ulyanov (Lenin), really wanted to destroy the tsarist system of Moscow and build a modern socialist empire. We know only too well what became of the "transformation." Behind the stocky figure of Lenin rose the tall spectre of Peter I, and the communist tsar Stalin was to emulate more and more the particularly typical Moscow Tsar Ivan the Terrible. As we know, Soviet historians were even ordered to rehabilitate that Tsar's image and Soviet writers were recommended to treat topics that would make analogies between that Tsar and Stalin possible.

Joseph Conrad proved to be prophetic and to the point when he remarked about 1905 that the words "evolution" and "revolution" sounded like a cruel mockery in the face of Russian reality. Taking a closer look at the latest "transformation" one realises that it affected — in a destructive form — only the non-Muscovite territories, which the Bolsheviks reconquered and re-occupied in the years 1918-1923 and later. There, Moscow agents introduced an alien form of government, and to there the elements of the Moscow culture were transplanted in a ruthless manner (abolition of private property, collectivisation of agriculture, deprivation of personal and national freedom, disregard for human dignity, extermination of Christianity) and every smallest sign of organic and historic national life was crushed under police and military pressure. Any conscientious and impartial historian must eventually arrive at the conclusion that the so-called Revolution is only one of the many paradoxes of Bolshevism: the national territory of Muscovite Russia knew no revolution. Behind the new trappings, new names, new banners and hymns, the

historically established government of Russia remained unchanged. The Bolshevik "Revolution" was powerless against it, as so many earlier revolutions had been. The historical government has devoured the revolution and historical tsarism has swallowed up "commissarism."

Deep down in its national consciousness the Russian people must have been aware for a long time of its ill-starred and hopeless history; and over the centuries this feeling was bound to produce a complex of inferiority. In the Russian folksongs, these sincerest confessions of the nation's soul, the same theme recurs again and again — not of sorrow, not of suffering, but of a fatalistic hopelessness, against which it is futile to strive. "It created a song, like a deep groan, and its spirit died for ever" — this is how Nekrasov felt, a poet whom even the Bolsheviks esteem as a competent judge of the Russian soul. It is well known that there is little to divide the complex of inferiority from its opposite, megalomania, and how easily it may change into it. The myth of "Moscow, the third Rome", from which a direct line leads to the other myth of "Moscow, the third International", is said to have arisen among the Byzantine emigrants in the 15th century. The relevant documents, however, name the monk Filofey as the first to coin the phrase for the benefit of Moscow. It was he, who from his monastery at Pskov twice appealed to the Grand Princes of Moscow (Basil III and Ivan IV): "The Empire (Byzantine Rome) dissolves into the Third Rome: the new great Russia. The Christian empires of the past converge in you; the first and the second Rome have fallen, but the third Rome, Moscow, stands and a fourth there will not be. You are the Tsar of all Christians in the world."

There, in the old Muscovy, we have the origin of that typical messianism, which the Russian intellectual elite of the mid-19th century — particularly the Slavophiles — did so much to strengthen. The Slavophile and Orthodox poet-philosopher A. Khomyakov (1801-1860) expressed his belief in the words: "Oh, you, who are unworthy, you have been chosen..." Khomyakov and the Slavophiles, of course, never tried in any way to motivate their faith. It was a later generation of Russian messianists who endeavoured to rationalise and, looking into the future, maintained, for instance, that the "direct transition to property-less socialism" was a prerogative, granted by Providence to Russia alone, while in the capitalist West the historically rooted right of possession would constitute a considerable obstacle to the development of socialism... So much for the "socialist" or communist ingredient of Russian messianism. The messianic idea permeates almost every sphere of Russian thought — not excepting that of the Westernisers — and above all Russian literature, to which we refer the reader interested in the subject. The scope of this article permits only a few general observations on the theme. Not-

withstanding the view expressed by V. Lypynsky that the sense of a messianic mission is inherent in every great nation, we are inclined to doubt this and to distrust all these forms of messianism, especially when they inspire our immediate neighbours.

Psychologically, every messianic idea grows on the borderline between inferiority and superiority complexes. Sometimes it can even be the peculiar manifestation of a despair that has its roots in history: hopelessness finding a pseudo-outlet in a more or less fantastic idea. Every genuine messianism is almost a kind of psychosis. And here we must distinguish "genuine" messianism from other forms, such as the British "Rule the Waves" or the German Wilhelmine "Berlin-Baghdad" notions, which are no more than national and political doctrines of a more or less rational order. Even an attempt, as that of Mykola Khvylovyi's "Asiatic Renaissance", to propound a Ukrainian messianism, nowadays strikes us as quite realistic and not at all messianic: it *could*, in certain circumstances, be a political doctrine of Ukraine. What is far worse is the case of a nation cast by its intellectuals in the role of "Christ" and the Queen of Heaven being proclaimed "Queen" of a mundane state.

But the concept acquires a really apocalyptic character in the messianism of Moscow, which, consciously or unconsciously, takes upon itself the mission of absolute Evil on a world-wide scale.

The only means to combat this psychopathic state is, of course, Christianity, true Christianity, the antithesis to the Antichrist.

IV. CHURCH AND TSARISM

In Adam Olearius's book there is a description of a street scene in early 17th century Moscow. Two soldiers meet a drunken pope (priest). They hasten to ask him for his blessing, but the pope loses his balance and falls in the mud of the road. The soldiers set him on his feet again and then receive the blessing from the intoxicated and dirty pope. Olearius mentions this apparently quite typical incident in his usual matter-of-fact style, and this brings out all the more the loathsome and sinister aspects of the situation. The author does not dwell on these impressions and incidents and does not attempt to explain them. This particular episode, however, deserves a somewhat closer look. It does not come as a surprise that a pope should be wandering dead drunk through the streets of Moscow, since we are well enough acquainted with that kind of thing from books (e.g. "The Russian pope of the 15th century" by O. Amfiteatrov). The servant of the Muscovite church at that time was usually illiterate and filthy, used bad language in church no less than his parishioners and was in no respect different from them. In a Christian from abroad the episode described must have left a lasting feeling of disgust. Separated by many centuries, we are today able to see the incident in perspective.

There can be no doubt that religion, whatever it may be, plays a very important part in the life of every human society. It is the most profound, innermost and most essential in human life and through it immediate contact with the soul of a people is established. Man is born with an ineradicable religious instinct. Attempting to oust Christianity, Bolshevism itself turns, consciously or unconsciously, into a satanic modification of historical Orthodoxy. The eminent orthodox thinker George Fedotov (1886-1951), the courageous and most competent judge of Russian political philosophy, has this to say: "In its structure, revolutionary Marxism is a Judeo-Christian apocalyptic sect... in its social class-consciousness and in its dogmatism, it displays the features of Orthodoxy." ("Novyy Grad"; N.Y., 1952, pp. 49-50).

The Russian, too, it seems, had and has an instinctive religious feeling, though in an extremely peculiar, "polarised" form which tends to deviate far from the nominally Christian content of his religion. Notwithstanding its obvious universality, Christianity invariably adapts to the geographic, cultural and political, that is national, environment in which it finds itself. Thus there is a great difference between eastern and western Christianity; and a still wider gap exists between the Orthodoxy of the Greeks and Bulgarians and that of, say, the Ethiopians. There are differences even in the Roman Catholicism of not only Brazil and Italy, but also of France and Germany.

For the Christianity of the ancient Kiev to reach the north-eastern regions of Suzdal, Vladimir and later, Moscow, severe obstacles had to be overcome in the course of several centuries. Since the cultural and moral climate of those regions was unfavourable, the Church had to resort to the difficult and dangerous device of the gradual "Christianisation" of pagan rites and customs. What made these areas particularly inaccessible to the standards of Christian ethics and to the very spirit of Christianity was their ethnic constitution.

The renowned Russian thinker D. Merezhkovsky once expressed his shock at the fact that at the (geographically near) Upsala University the subject of a dissertation was the question: "Are the Muscovites Christians?" — and that in the 18th century! As recently as the beginning of our own 20th century an ethnographical commission discovered authentic heathens in the neighbourhood of Petersburg.

Nevertheless, the religious sentiment of the Russian people cannot be doubted, although it finds its expression in imperfect, sometimes even repellent, quasi-Christian ritual forms, and the report by Olearius goes to confirm this. Very few people, however, know anything about the tragic, distorted and obscure history of Russia's religious development and what has provocatively been dubbed the "Raskol", i.e. heresy or schism.

What is significant in the episode Olearius described is, after all, not the fact that the priest was drunk, but that in spite of it the soldiers helped him up and asked his blessing. The men were obviously prepared to overlook the undignified circumstances in their respect for what the priest stood for in their eyes. To them the dirty, drunk and, no doubt, illiterate pope was still an agent who linked them, if not to heaven then at least to something of a superior order. As the word implies, religion is after all a bond uniting man and God, earth and heaven, soul and mind.

Behind the police and censor's term of "heresy" or the milder conception of the "Old Belief" lies Christianity in its national Russian interpretation; it is the Christian religion with that content and form which corresponded to the sensibility of the Muscovite-Russian people

and which they made their own and cultivated in the course of their historical development. That content and those forms may appear strange, primitive custom alien to us, yet such was the Christianity that flourished in the Muscovite State and came into conflict with the established Church.

The history of the Church in Europe is not without examples of antagonism between Church and State. We need only remember Canossa. The barefooted Emperor Henry IV in the snow before the gates of the castle of Pope Gregory VII is more than just an episode; the event marks an important stage in the history of the European attitude to spiritual power, without which the later historical development of the European continent, or even what we call European civilisation, would have taken rather a different turn. In the old Ukraine, spiritual authority stood inviolate and throughout the country's stormy history was never questioned. Political power bowed in deference before the church, emphasizing in this way that what is God's ranks higher than what is Caesar's.

The relationship between Church and State was of an entirely different character in the Moscow State and the later Russia. Already in pre-Muscovite Suzdal, there was the notorious Prince Andrew Bogolyubsky who, from political considerations, drove out Bishop Nestor, calling him an "unsuitable official." That was in the year 1157. From the 13th century onward, the Church of Moscow became more and more a tool of political power. It was on the orders of Ivan Kalita (that first champion of Moscow's rapacious imperialism) that the Moscow Church excommunicated Prince Alexander of Tver, who had fled to Pskov, cursed him as a criminal and as a "traitor to the legitimate Tsar of the Horde" (a heathen, that is), and at the same time excommunicated the whole of Pskov (1337). About four centuries later similar operation was carried out by the then synodal Petersburg Church against "the builder of churches", the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa...

A sad chapter in history is the conquest of the principality of Tver by Moscow. In 1327 Tver rebelled against the Golden Horde. The insurrection was suppressed by Moscow, which was distrustful of the powerful Tver and saw in the troubles its opportunity to annex the territory in pursuance of its "gathering of Russian lands." Ivan Kalita, as official representative of the Golden Horde, not only crushed the rebellion, but ruthlessly robbed and devastated the once prosperous principality — "towns and villages were laid waste and the people slaughtered", as the chronicler puts it (who, incidentally, was himself a Muscovite). For ten years the exiled Alexander of Tver fought from Pskov and Novgorod for his rights and for the freedom of Tver. Ivan Kalita had in the meantime secured the Khan's permission for his annexation of the territory and now he planned

the destruction of the emigrant Prince himself. With that end in view he started a war against Pskov. When this proved unsuccessful, he persuaded the Khan to "invite" Prince Alexander to a "conference" at the Horde. There, Alexander and his son Theodore were murdered (1339). Thus Tver was "united" with Moscow.

Characteristic and instructive is the campaign against Church and Christianity conducted by the "militant Orthodox" Moscow Tsar Ivan the Terrible. The Metropolitan of the Moscow-Russian Church at the time, Philip Kolychev, of an old Boyar family, was a devout Christian, an educated and courageous man. In front of the altar of the Uspensky Cathedral in Moscow he publicly protested against the terroristic regime of the Tsar and his "bodyguard", the Oprichniki. Ivan IV repented for a while; but on the 8th September 1568 he had the Metropolitan dragged from amid his congregation in the cathedral by one of his chief Oprichniki, the Boyar Basmanov. All the Metropolitan's relatives were killed and the head of one of them was sent as a present from the Tsar to the Old-Nikolsky Monastery, to which the Metropolitan had been banished. But more was to come. On the 23rd of December 1569, the Tsar's "henchman", the Boyar Malyuta Skuratov, appeared at the monastery and on the Tsar's orders strangled the Metropolitan with his own hands.

All this took place before the eyes of the people, before the eyes of the faithful who had been deprived of their beloved spiritual leader. "The people remained silent" — as Pushkin expressed it in his tragedy "Boris Godunov." The people, who had for so long been politically violated, who were like a formless mass without any social structure, that people was incapable of reacting with a deed. But the better part of this silent people could not but pass judgment and draw conclusions in the depth of their hearts.

One more illustration will serve to show up the policies of Moscow tsarism with regard to the Church and religion, and thus to Christianity and God as such. In the year 1577, Ivan IV visited the Pskov Pechersky Monastery, which the Abbot Korniliy had had strongly fortified. This aroused the Tsar's suspicions (not without reason, perhaps) and in his rage the "Orthodox" Moscow Tsar struck the abbot dead with a pointed stick he always carried with him. And, most interesting of all, he had the tombstone inscribed with the words: "The Tsar on Earth has delivered him up to the Tsar in Heaven." This inscription — no less eloquent a symbol than "Canossa" was for the West — is an expression of the general attitude of Moscow towards Church and religion, of the spiritual autocracy of Moscow tsarism and of its ideology, as formulated by one of its greatest exponents.

There is a striking similarity between this inscription and the motto on Jenghiz Khan's official seal: "God in Heaven, Jenghiz Khan on Earth."

The "Raskol", or Great Schism, a phenomenon of great complexity, had its roots deep down in the Russian soul. To begin with, it was an expression of protest against the derision and violation under which religion suffered at the hands of autocratic tsarism. In time, the Raskol of the Church took on a political character, which was a logical and quite natural development. When serfdom — which had originated under the tsar of Tartar descent, Boris Godunov, and had been confirmed as a basis of the Moscow State by Tsar Alexis Romanov in 1650 — became firmly established in law, the Raskol constituted, by virtue of its influence and a decidedly national character, an explosive element in the political life of the Moscow State.

We cannot examine here all the issues that were involved in the Raskol. All we can say is that its history is the history of the national and religious martyrdom of Moscow Russia. It is the record of the systematic moral and physical violation of the Russian people's soul, of their religious consciousness and ethical foundations, of everything most sacred to them, since tsarism denied the people even that minimum of freedom which the worst despotism normally concedes to its slaves. Not much has been written on the Raskol, and what there is usually is too one-sided, treating merely the ritual questions of the controversy. This is not surprising when one remembers the strict police censorship, which has been so typical a feature of every political system in Russia. Although the Raskolniki had sought support outside Russia (e.g. in 1857-58 in France under Napoleon III), the Raskol has unfortunately hardly been studied by scholars abroad.

The immaterial and superficial questions raised by the Raskol concerning church ritual — e.g. the "two-finger blessing" or the "double hallelujah" of the Old Believers, which were so ridiculed by the official Church, although they were after all national and traditional forms of ritual — must not detract from what was essential in the Raskol: 1) The rejection of the blasphemous Caesaro-Papism of Moscow; 2) the rejection of Moscow's political system of Antichrist (as the Raskolniki aptly called it), i.e. tsarist totalitarianism; and 3) active resistance against the violation of the people's soul.

The Raskol brought forth such personalities as the preacher Avvakum, whom the official, adulterated history books of Russia and the U.S.S.R. either ignore or ridicule. Avvakum was a born leader of the most upright character, a brilliant orator and an eminent ecclesiastical scholar. He was cruelly persecuted, twice banished and, when he remained "obstinately unrepentant", burnt at the stake at the head of his faithful followers (1st April 1681). Anyone who associated with him had his tongue cut out by the police of the

"most gentle" of tsars, Alexis Romanov, and whoever did not renounce him was hanged (as, for instance, Avvakum's pupil Avramiy in 1670 at Moscow).

The Raskol often had the armed support of the Moscow "Streltsy" (soldiers). We need only recall the various Streltsy risings in and before Peter I's reign. Peter's own son and heir, Alexis, was an adherent of the Raskol, and this is why he was murdered by his father. The Tsarevich had fled from his father to Vienna in 1716 and sought the protection of the Emperor Charles VI, to whom he was related by marriage. Peter forced his son by threats to return to Russia. After having been tortured and knouted, the Tsarevich was eventually choked to death "silently" between two pillows by his father's henchmen, the "aristocratic" Tolstoy, Buturlin, Ushakov and Rumyantsev.

The citadel of the Raskol, the Solovetskiy Monastery with its ninety cannon, which was later to acquire such a sad fame, was taken by assault after a desperate struggle on the 22nd of January 1676. No less than 20,000 Raskolniki were burned at the stake during the years 1666 to 1690 alone. In the 18th century there was incessant persecution and the Raskolniki committed mass-suicide by burning, often thousands at a time. As late as 1897, that is practically on the eve of the 1905 revolution, there were cases of mass-suicide by immurement.

In our day, we are amazed at the cruelty of the Russian people; and so was the writer Gorky, himself a son of that very people and a Bolshevik sympathiser. But no one cared to see the paths by which this people was led to such cruelty and — more important still — how its terrible spiritual emptiness was brought about.

It was tsarism, which for two centuries had re-moulded the "ruling nation" and trained it for its predatory, imperialist "historical mission", and which had methodically and remorselessly created a gaping spiritual void in the Russian soul (exemplified by nihilism among the intellectuals on the one hand, and the Raskolniki — "Nietovtsy", the negative peasant sects, on the other). The void was filled with messianic ideas of various kinds. Everything was done to breed hatred against all forms of organic culture, and malice and hidden envy mingled in the professed contempt for the "rotten West." Hatred was bred against the "Latin heresy" (Catholicism), against the "Khokhly" and "Cherkassishki" (contemptuous names for Ukrainians), the "Frantsuzishki" and the whole non-Russian world, which sooner or later was to be conquered. Bolshevism recognised and made use of that gaping void in the Russian soul. It drew on all the experience and employed all the means which past history supplied, and on that basis built a system, unprecedented in its reach and the intensity of its impact.

Let us look for a moment at the history of the Raskol in its relation to our own national culture. It is common knowledge that the Raskol and the movement which sprang from it were caused by the correction of the church books, undertaken on the initiative and by orders of the Patriarch of Moscow, Nikon. The grave errors which in the course of centuries had crept into the sacred books had long been obvious. The work of revision was at first assigned to a few Moscow churchmen but, owing to the ignorance and obscurantism prevailing in Moscow, their enterprise failed hopelessly. Nikon, who had previously been Archbishop of the newly annexed Novgorod and thus was used to a different climate in church life and culture, turned for help to the centre of that culture, to our Kiev. In 1649, the Kiev Academy sent a group of learned theologians (Epifaniy Slavynetsky, Arsen Satanovsky, Theodosiy Safanovych) to Moscow, who were to assist the "sister church" in its task. These were later joined by thirty scholars, translators and professors of the Greek language. They were shocked by what they found in the Moscow church books. Their criticism, although expressed in diplomatic terms, aroused a veritable storm of indignation and anger among the Moscow clergy, headed by the Bishop, who accused the revisers of "Latin heresy." It may be mentioned here that at an earlier stage the Greek scholar Arsen, who was the first to apply himself to the correction of the Moscow church books, had for that same "heresy" been banished to Solovetsky monastery and had only in 1656 been brought back by Nikon.

The rather belated attempt to adapt Moscow church life to the Ukrainian pattern did not achieve any positive results. After some time, it rather led to a terrible tragedy within the Moscow Church and finally to the complete subjection of the Church to the State. The official Church lost all influence and was reduced for ever to the role of just another government department in the civil administration of the Moscow State and, afterwards, of the Russian Empire. The attempt made during the Revolution of March 1917 to restore the Moscow Patriarchate, i.e. the autonomy of the Church, was quickly and radically suppressed by the Bolshevik regime and its traditionally Muscovite methods.

These facts show up once more the strong contrast and most essential difference between the Churches of Kiev and Moscow, both supposedly adhering to the same "Orthodox" faith.

In spite of all historical evidence, Bolsheviks as well as anti-Bolshevik Russians continue to cling to the phantom of the "unity of faith" between the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. The so-called Moscow Patriarchate, reconstituted under Bolshevik auspices after World War II, has made "the unity of the Orthodox

faith" and its "militant mission" the basis of its church policy (designed, of course, to prop Soviet imperialism). Thus — to give only one example — it drove, with the help of Soviet security police, Ukrainian Catholicism in Galicia under ground.

But to return to Patriarch Nikon who was Patriarch of Moscow from 1652 to 1658. Like his predecessor of tragic fame, the Metropolitan Philip Kolychev, he was a remarkable man. In contrast to Philip who was a nobleman by birth, Nikon was of humble birth (like Pope Gregory VII). Hardened in his stormy youth, he showed an iron will and great, sometimes overwhelming ambition. It may well be that he tried to model himself on Gregory VII, for there were elements of papal caesarism in his church-reforming activity. It was he who declared that "the priest is above the tsar." He consented to becoming Patriarch only after the Tsar had long and humbly beseeched him and had gone on his knees before him (a humiliation for which Tsar Alexis apparently never forgave him). Before being enthroned, Nikon was able to persuade the Tsar to have the remains of the Metropolitan Philip murdered by Ivan the Terrible transported in state from Solovetskiy monastery to Moscow (1651). In short, the year 1652 was a Russian version of Canossa in the history of the Moscow Church. At a number of Councils, Nikon achieved the *de facto* autonomy of the Moscow Church and eventually even had his own archers, a military force not subordinate to the Tsar's authority. Nikon might very well have solved great historical and church problems if he had not stepped outside the ecclesiastical sphere and reached for political power, and if he had shown some understanding for the Raskol and its leaders.

It is an illustration of the chaotic conditions in Moscow at the time that the Patriarch and the Raskol movement should have become deadly enemies. The conflict was paradoxical, since both sides really pursued the same aim — i.e. spiritual emancipation and independence of Church from State — and had become divided only on purely superficial and unessential issues (the two-finger crossing, the double Hallelujah, etc.). In the course of centuries, these ceremonial customs had become a fossilized, sacrosanct church ritual, which took on the character of dogma and was defended with religious-nationalist fanaticism.

Nikon's radical measures in the matters of Church rite and his unrestrained lust for power eventually led to his ruin. In the meantime, the cunning Tsar Alexis bestowed on him the dubious gift of the title "Gosudar", or sovereign, which in name put him on a level with the Tsar. This caused a violent reaction not only from the nationally oriented Church (the later Raskolniki), but also from national political circles, the Boyars, who saw in it an attempt to weaken the absolute power of the secular government. Tsar Alexis,

who had for some time been aware of Nikon's real intentions, cleverly exploited these antagonisms. In the end, Patriarch Nikon was the loser in the unequal struggle, the Raskol crystallized into its final form, and the tsarist regime acquired its last polish in dealing with church affairs. From now on the tsarist system was able to formulate the principles of its church policy for centuries to come. In this connection Peter I, the son of Tsar Alexis, was to play a decisive role.

Peter's "reform" of the Moscow Church was, in the words of an expert on the subject, "outright blasphemy and mockery." "Peter succeeded in weakening the national forces of Orthodoxy and to deprive them of their sight" (G. P. Fedotov, "Novy Grad"). He "reconstructed" the official Church and added to it a new institution, the Holy Synod (Protestant in origin, but old-Muscovite in content). For the suppression of the Raskol Peter enlisted police and army forces; he imposed special taxes and even decreed special dress for the Raskolniki. During his reign, the watchwords of the Raskol were coined: "The Tsar is the servant of Antichrist" (Peter himself was simply called "Antichrist", or "Usurper", or "the Jew from the tribe of Dan", etc.); "the two-headed eagle is of demoniac ancestry, since only the devil has two heads"; the Synod was called "Jewish Sanhedrin", and the Senate — "Antichrist's Council."

The Pugachev rebellion of a later period (1773-1775) can in all probability be regarded as the armed rising of the Raskol against the "Antichrist's state", just as the earlier revolutionary activity of Razin was no mere coincidence. But it was already the swan-song of a movement, which had had its great chance at the time of its birth and growth around the middle of the 17th century, when Tsar and Patriarch were engaged in the struggle for supreme power. By virtue of its peculiarly Russian nationalist character, however, the Raskol itself was under the spell of "the nationalist conception of power." It is significant that both Razin and Pugachev were Don Cossacks by origin and officers of Cossack forces by profession.*

*) Note: The only study of the movements led by these men is by the Ukrainian historian M. Kostomarov (see his monograph on "The Revolt of Stenka Razin" and other writings). Western scholars have shown hardly any interest in the subject and seem to have accepted the official version of Russian historiographers, according to whom Razin and Pugachev were nothing more than agitators, unbridled and ignorant representatives of the mob. But, first of all, both Razin and Pugachev were officers, not "mob", and they commanded forces numbering tens of thousands. Their enthusiastic followers were the non-Russian Tartars, Mordvins, Kalmucks etc., as well as the population of the Cossack regions. Both men had their own political ideas and principles. These armed rebellions were only with great difficulty put down by the Moscow and Petersburg governments, who used every means from bribery, treason and "fifth columns" to terrorism, including the wholesale slaughter of populations and the burning down of towns and villages.

The Raskol proved unable to found its own anti-tsarist church, with its own teaching and its own hierarchy. It succumbed to the idea that the Tsar was the sole embodiment of national power. The Raskol as such ceased to exist; but the forces which produced it have kept alive.

Peculiarly transformed, the essential features of the Raskol appeared again in such groups as the Slavophiles and the Narodovoltsy (The Will of the People), as well as in the attacks on the life of tsars, in the Rasputin episode, and in the S.R.s (Socialist Revolutionary Party). It was to a large extent the elemental force of the Raskol which gave the first impetus to the early groping attempts of Bolshevism. And it was due to the passive attitude of the nation, which the repression of the Raskol had induced, that the "foreign" seed of Marxism found fertile and historically prepared soil. With a people deprived of its faith and of elementary human rights, condemned to slavery and divested even of the right to personal property, with the structure of society destroyed and reduced to an inorganic "collective" mass, Moscow Russia was indeed "the chosen one", as Khomyakov expressed it.

But chosen by whom and to what purpose?

V. TSARDOM

As the reader will by now have appreciated, the subject under discussion is so vast that it cannot be exhaustively treated even in a number of volumes, far less in one small book. The Polish scholar Jan Kucharzewski collected in the twenties and thirties an enormous amount of material, which he published in the seven volumes of his "From White to Red Tsarism." The author tends, however, to get lost in too many abstractions and theories. He never saw and experienced Russia and thus he is not really familiar with its mentality. For the sheer wealth of material brought together, the work is nevertheless most valuable.

The interest and reasonably well informed reader may justifiably point to serious omission in these pages. Circumstances did not permit to treat or go into detail about certain side issues or subordinate themes, such as Moscow's "German Suburb" in the 16th and 17th century, for instance. This was the district assigned to the merchants and diverse experts from Western Europe who had taken service with Moscow. Not a few of these settlers were adventurers and even criminals, a fact in which one can see certain analogies with the Moscow Comintern of the 1920's and 30's. Historical writing has not shed much light on the part played by the German Suburb, but there cannot be any doubt that it was an important one. Through these foreigners in her midst Moscow became acquainted with the technical achievements of Western civilization and — what is even more important — through them Moscow was able to advance her foreign policies and spread her political myths.

Our account has had to omit such important events in the history of Moscow as the appearance of the pseudo-Tsar Dmitry I in 1605-1606. (There was to be a second false Dmitry as well). Although external forces were quite obviously at work (i.e. Poland, the Vatican, Ukrainian magnates headed by Prince Constantine Ostrozhsky, and the Cossacks of Ukraine), the persistent appearance of Pretenders at that period must primarily be seen as a natural reaction of the Moscow-Russian people to the preceding terrorist regime of Ivan the Terrible. Even the Ukrainian Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, had another Pretender "in reserve" (Timoshka Akundinov) in case he might be needed. Seen in historical perspective, the championing of Pretenders appears to us now as the first and, to that extent, perhaps

the only effort made by Russian society to free itself from its Mongolian past and to join the ranks of Western society and civilization.* For the lack of success the blame does not lie with the Pretender Dmitry I. To judge from the scant information available, he was a remarkable personality, an able statesman and ruler, who fully grasped the problems which confronted him in Moscow. The reasons for the collapse of this westernising attempt at the beginning of the 17th century are to be found in the carelessness of the outside instigators, in their inability to carry through an enterprise of historical importance at that vital time, in their ignorance about the psychology of the Russian people and its religious and national orthodoxy. A further factor responsible for the failure was the attitude of the Boyars at home. They even murdered Dmitry, who had become the idol of the Moscow populace.

On this, as on so many other occasions, the obstacle to change arose out of that obscure psycho-historical complex of Tsardom and Orthodoxy, which defies all attempts at rational analysis. It crystallized in Tartar times and has held the Russian soul in chains which can apparently never be shaken off.

The leaders of the revolutionary attempts that followed — the Don Cossacks Stenka Razin and Yemelyan Pugachev — were, as we have seen, by no means as primitive as official Russian history makes them out. (The most valuable contribution on the subject of these two men was made by M. Kostomarov, who also wrote about the "Samozvantsy", the Pretenders.) Both Razin and Pugachev were men of character and experience, the latter having travelled abroad. Both built their strategy on the strong moral basis of the Raskol. It was in their tactics that they made mistakes. Razin, who had a vast army and whose command extended from the Caspian to the White Sea, was ingenuous enough to declare: "I do not wish to be Tsar." And, yet more naïve, he acted accordingly when the revolutionary struggle was at its peak. Pugachev drew a lesson from Razin's experience and from the start claimed to be Tsar Peter III (who had recently been murdered by the lover of his wife, Catherine II). However, he could not keep up the pretence for long. One of the

*) Note: That "tsardom" in its political aspects was of Mongolian origin — a modification, in fact, of the Tartar khanate — is beyond question. The distinct culture, which the Tartars bequeathed to Moscow, has been clearly outlined by G. Fedotov in his "Novy Grad": "The Tartar element penetrated the body of Moscow and took hold of its soul. This spiritual conquest occurred at a time when the political power of the Horde was on the wane. In the 15th century, thousands of baptised and unbaptised Tartars entered the service of the Moscow Princes, filling up the ranks of the service-gentry, i.e. the future nobility... It was not so much under the 200 years of the Tartar yoke, but *after* it, that Moscow lost its freedom."

Many public figures of the later Petersburg empire were of Tartar descent, e.g. Derzhavin, Aksakov, the extreme Westerniser Chaadayev, and others. Even Turgenev and L. Tolstoy had Tartar blood.

reasons for this was that the "Europeanised" administration of Catherine II functioned more efficiently than that under Tsar Alexis, when there were *de facto* two Orthodox Churches, when the preacher Avvakum made his passionate appeals and the tsarist regime was shaken in its foundations by the storms of the religious controversy.

Pugachev lost his moral influence when the people began to suspect that he was not Peter III, and the talents of General Suvorov helped to bring about his military defeat. By the use of terror and bribery (a reward of 10,000 roubles was on Pugachev's head), the rebellion was crushed. It was to be the last of the revolutionary attempts of this kind in the history of Russia. In the succeeding centuries the spiritually "for ever pacified" Russian nation could do no more than either "remain in silence", to use Pushkin's words, or to lend itself as a blind, soul-less tool to Petersburg and Soviet tsarism.

Another subject for which there is no room in these pages is the peculiar phenomenon of the Russian "Intelligentsia." As Russian-Bolshevik legend and influence spread in the West, this uniquely Russian concept has found its way into the vocabulary of European nations, although it is hard to see why Western social psychology should have burdened itself with an additional concept that never was an element of organic culture.

Let us here only briefly state that the Intelligentsia of the Petersburg empire must not be regarded as identical with what is commonly meant by the term "intellectuals", i.e. members of the learned professions. They did not belong to any distinct national or professional categories, but formed an enclave, an enlarged "German Suburb" as it were, within the society of the empire. They were people of diverse origin, background and education, who had gravitated from the various subject nations into the service of the government, which needed their cooperation as, for instance, primary school teachers, journalists, lawyers, doctors, writers and university professors. These people, who had been uprooted from their native soil, their society and their national culture, were entirely lacking in national consciousness; they were anational. Their official "Russian nationality" was a meaningless formality. This explains the renegade mentality, conscious or unconscious, which resulted in stunted minds and creative impotence. While the lower orders of the Intelligentsia served in the capacity of administrators as tools for the imperial policy of Russification, the upper strata — consisting predominantly of scientists and writers, but also artists — were responsible for creating various myths and, particularly, for perpetuating and elaborating, not without success, the lost legend of the empire. The very existence of the Intelligentsia was taken as "visible" proof of the correctness of the doctrine of the indivisibility of the empire. The same school of thought prevails today among the majority of Russian emigrants, who propagate these ideas outside the borders of the USSR.

The fate of the "All-Russian Intelligentsia" under Bolshevism was a tragic one. After it had found its political expression in the Kerensky government and had played the role of midwife at the birth of Bolshevism, it was destroyed, even physically, by the same Bolshevism it had helped to bring into the world. There were various more or less logical reasons for this turn of events. For one, it is obvious that, with few exceptions, the members of the Intelligentsia, accustomed to the Europeanised atmosphere of the Petersburg empire, were incapable of fulfilling any function in the mediaeval and national Muscovy that was reborn during 1917-1920.

Since the late 1920's, however, the Bolshevik regime can clearly be seen to aim at the creation of a new Intelligentsia, this time calling it "Sovietskaya", which is to play the traditional role of supporting the imperial idea.

There is a considerable amount of literature on the Russian Intelligentsia, yet we would refer our readers to the concise, but weighty, contribution made on the subject by G. Fedotov in his "Novy Grad."

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No historical event of any significance should ever be regarded as a *deus ex machina*. Every occurrence is explained by historical development. The phenomenon of Bolshevism has more than proved this axiom: It exposed to the eyes of the world the inner workings of the Moscow state machine and clearly demonstrated the spirit of traditional tsarism. Let us now look at a few details. The fact that most of those who went abroad never returned to Russia is nothing new. When Tsar Boris Godunov (a Tartar, successor to Ivan the Terrible) sent eighteen youths to study in Western Europe, not one of them came back. "Once one has breathed the air of spiritual freedom one is not likely to return to prison", comments G. Fedotov on the matter.

Neither the sovkhoz nor the kolkhoz is a result of Communism or Marxism, nor are they inventions of the Bolsheviks. Up to 1861, all landed properties in the Moscow and Petersburg empire were state farms, i.e. "sovkhozes"; and every village on ethnographically Russian territory always has been a "kolkhoz." When Ukraine was conquered by the force of arms, there, too, collective farms in the shape of "military colonies" were established by the dictatorial Arakcheyev, the minion of Alexander I. Bolshevism merely continued and intensified traditional policies in agriculture and followed in the steps of Peter I in its methods of "industrialisation."

Among the apostles of the Muscovite "obshchina" (communal ownership) were, besides the reactionary tsarist politicians, such radicals and progressives as Alexander Herzen, Chernyshevsky (the "dishevelled seminarist", as Shevchenko called him), N. Mikhaylovsky

— one of Lenin's mentors — and Karl Marx himself. Around the year 1880, the inventor of "scientific" socialism accepted and confirmed the Chernyshevsky-Mikheylovsky theory, according to which the Russian communist obshchina provided the basis for direct transition to Marxist communist socialism, bypassing "the terribly long road" (Chernyshevsky) taken by "Roman-feudalistic, bourgeois-industrialised Europe" (Herzen).

All these men, together with the declared reactionaries like Leontyev, Pobedonostsev and others, and even Leo Tolstoy (as philosopher), were unanimous in their hatred of the humanist civilisation of Europe.

There is nothing in the history of modern "Russia" that does not have its roots in the past. Neither the open aggressiveness of Moscow nor the carefully hidden inner causes of that aggressiveness are anything new. The whole history of "Russia", of that "military empire", is the history of incessant, rapacious, cynical imperialism.

In the reign of Ivan IV, at a time which did not appear to be particularly favourable for expansionist activity, the biggest and for the history of Moscow most characteristic conquests were made, both in the West and in the East: the Western republics of Novgorod and Pskov, and the Tartar khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. Moreover, in that same period Siberia was conquered by the Cossacks of the so-called "fringe nations", i.e. elements generally incompatible with Moscow. A paradox? No, rather a clever move of the interior imperial policy of Moscow. It achieved thereby the diversion of potentially revolutionary forces, which spent themselves in raids on foreign countries. How often, from Tsars to Soviet, the "political wisdom" of Moscow had recourse to this traditional device! Was not the war with Japan a desperate — and for the Petersburg regime tragic — attempt to evade the 1905 revolution?

In the hope that we have been able in the preceding pages to sketch the rough outline of our topic, let us now leave metaphysics aside and proceed to an examination of the more technical political aspects of the subject. Let us pass from bygone centuries to a period much closer to us, with which contemporaries are familiar either from personal experience or from first-hand description by the older generation.

The names of two eminent statesmen of the last phase of the Petersburg empire, Witte and Stolypin, will not be unknown to our readers. The careers of these two, by now historical figures — at which we shall be looking more closely in a moment — are strikingly symbolic of the perennial problem, which might be called the political doctrine of every kind of "Russia."

Summarizing what has been said before, this political doctrine can be variously formulated: beginning with the "God in Heaven, Tsar on Earth" dictum of Old Muscovy, through the "Orthodoxy and Autocracy" of Nicholas I, to the "Workers of the World, Unite"

slogan of the present. What is most essential and characteristic in this doctrine can be expressed in a few rational, though necessarily somewhat simplified, statements:

"Russia", no matter what her political form may be, can never tolerate within her dominion any kind of freedom, neither the freedom of the individual, nor that of the family, nor that of the race and, least of all, national freedom, not even that of the ruling nation (under Nicholas I the word "nation" was considered "revolutionary" and was prohibited). There can be no freedom for body or mind. Thus even the Church can be no more than a department of the Ministry of the Interior. "Russia" has at all times been based on the extinction of all individuality and hence, on the abolition among her people of private property, as this would provide a basis for personal freedom. "Russia" is therefore either the private domain of an autocrat or the "socialist" property of the formless, impersonal, soulless collective, i.e. ultimately it is part of a centralised state bureaucracy.

Owing to the numerous internal frontiers between nations, races and cultures, that have no spiritual connection of any kind with Russia, the government of the "Russian" empire — whether it is autocratic or "democratic" (and there even was once a democratic Russia) — has to maintain an extensive police apparatus with huge forces, dedicated to repressive action inside the country. (In the present USSR the police force is not much smaller than the standing army.) This state of affairs arises logically from the internal political situation, and no "Kerensky" could get away from the inner law of the "Russian" political structure. Outsiders may have failed to detect it in the reign of the Tsars, but the Bolsheviks have disclosed all the secrets of the basic political "law" to the whole world. The foundations on which the political structure of "Russia" rests can thus be seen as 1) total extinction of individuality, 2) prohibition of private property, and 3) systematic and all-pervading terror, modified and applied as circumstances require. And this, in essence, is "Russia's" political doctrine. Its logical consequences are obvious: military aggressiveness; the building up, by diplomacy, of "neutral zones" and moveable "iron curtains", behind which numerous agents in the shape of "communist parties", "fifth columns" and a host of "experts" are in action. (The latter, who know the defence secrets of their respective countries, often are ostensibly engaged in harmless theoretical "Sanskrit studies" or in practical homosexuality.)

We have seen then that Russia, in its imperialist role, must perforce disseminate the political and cultural ideas of mediaeval Muscovy throughout the countries, peoples and cultures it has conquered ("re-united"). Since this cannot be done without force, "Russia" must always be a militaristic empire and pursue a course of aggression and, to use non-diplomatic language, of robbery and destruction.

Two renowned statesmen of the Petersburg empire had gained a deep insight into the civilization of Western Europe and noted with concern how that civilization steadily pervaded the western parts of the empire. Both had the courage to pursue policies which might well be called revolutionary. But, alas, unknown to themselves they played the roles of tragic heroes. They engaged in a fight against the historical *moira* (to use a classical term) of Russia itself and the outcome could be no other than that of every tragedy.

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Sergei Witte (who on his dismissal was made a Count) was the son of Julius Witte, probably a German settler from the Baltic area or, more likely still, from the region of Odessa. His brilliant civil service career, which sounds almost like a fairy tale — from station-master at Fastov to Prime Minister of the Empire, began with a chance meeting with Tsar Alexander III. Shortly after the railway disaster near Birky in Ukraine, in which the imperial train was involved, Alexander happened to overhear from the window the conversation between the train commandant and some unknown official. The latter said in a raised voice: "The life of my Emperor is more important to me than your regulations. I cannot permit the train to travel at such a speed, because I know the profile of the track on my line." The Tsar had the official called to his carriage and asked him his name. It was Sergei Witte, master of a section on the South-Western Railway. Soon afterwards Witte was appointed Minister of Transport. His rise led in Witte to a peculiar Hamlet mentality: although a democrat of Western type and almost a republican by conviction, he was dazzled by the boundless opportunities with which the absolutist tsarist regime presented a man of his ability and energy and by the vast field of activity which seemed to stretch before him. Witte was also an excellent mathematician (Odessa University had held out to him an academic career) and his versatility and creative energy made him an outstanding personality. His monetary reform, which immensely strengthened the empire's economic position, and his brilliant negotiation of the Portsmouth peace treaty with Japan after what looked like a fatal defeat for Russia — these are examples of Witte's extraordinary talents. He was past master in handling the empire's administration, which he wanted, if not to reform, at least to perfect, and he clearly did so with some success. The later course of his career, however, demonstrated how tragically utopian his plans were.

Witte was fully aware of the peculiar political structure of the empire and saw all the shortcomings in its administration, which to him, a progressive of the 19th century, appeared historically outdated. He perceived clearly the frontiers of nationalities and cultures

which cut across the geographical "unity" of the empire, a unity which could only be maintained by the secret police and large forces of constabulary and gendarmes. As a man of Western background with a mathematician's mind, Witte knew only too well that this "unity" was a function of unknown qualities and could not be relied on. He intended, cautiously and without taking anyone into his confidence, to bring about by evolutionary processes the transformation of the inorganic and internally incoherent "Russian" empire into a centralised-monarchistic, but organic federal state after the German pattern. To achieve his aim, he proposed to enlist — and herein lies the tragic paradox — the help of autocratic and omnipotent tsarism itself. (When Witte was asked one day how he envisaged the future "Russia", he promptly replied: "Like the United States of America." This was presumably during the conference at Portsmouth, N.H., when he came into personal contact with the USA.)

One can hardly assume that Witte was ignorant of the history of Russia or the nature of the Muscovite nation, or that he did not see the significance of certain typically Russian phenomena (he perceptively described, for instance, the established religion as "orthodox paganism"). But there can be no doubt that he was prevented by his German antecedents and European education, as well as by his positivist and rationalist mode of thinking, from comprehending the spirit of historical Muscovite tsarism that lay behind the façade of "emperors" and the German Romanov-Holstein-Gottorp dynasty. His knowledge of the past must have been based on the distorted version of traditional teaching, otherwise he would not have failed to see how over the centuries Moscow had developed the tsarist principle, how it had created an ideology and built a whole system around it. In short, when Witte embarked on his venture he was not aware of the tremendous difficulties ahead of him, nor did he realise that the first and most formidable obstacle barring his way would be the very institution — historical tsarism, his arch-enemy — which he, from his rationalist and European point of view, had naïvely regarded as an ally or at least the Archimedean lever for his reforms.

Witte wanted to overcome tsarism with the help of tsarism — this was the tragic paradox in his undertaking. Never a favourite with the last of the Tsars, Nicholas II (a belated romanticist of orthodox tsardom, who was already under the influence of Rasputin), Witte was called upon to govern only in moments of obvious crisis. ("Jack of all trades" was his own ironic description of himself.) He saved the dynasty and the empire when he quenched the fires of the 1905 revolution by causing the Tsar to issue the Manifesto of 17th October 1905. It was a vague and anaemic document, promising a pseudo-constitution. (It is quite possible, and would be rather like him, that Witte himself genuinely believed in the sincerity of Nicholas II, whose disaster he had averted.)

After the introduction of the gold standard and the Treaty of Portsmouth, this was the third political battle Witte had won. Unfortunately he seemed to be one of those who win every battle but lose the war. The monetary reform and the Portsmouth treaty did not interfere with the essence of tsarism, they rather helped to strengthen it. But the October Manifesto, weak though it was, with which Witte had averted the immediate threat to the tsarist regime, was a different matter. When Witte in his simplicity tried to insist on the fulfilment of the promises made in the Manifesto, he, who was a statesman and devoted servant of the empire, was dismissed by the Tsar like a lackey whose services were no longer required.

Witte's idealistic plans, which he cherished and for which he was prepared to suffer — he often was snubbed by the flunkeys at court, who looked at him as an upstart, — were thus wrecked overnight. They had come into collision with the basic concept of "Russia", with the principle of the inviolate and indivisible historical tsarism which, with the help of "Orthodoxy", had over the centuries been built up into a dogma and become a taboo.

Witte, Count of the "All-Russian" empire, the giant among the nonentities of a degenerate court, whom tsarism had overthrown, died forgotten and dishonoured on the eve of another outbreak of the Revolution whose tide he had stemmed in 1905. As on previous occasions in the history of the Moscow State and of Russia, this revolution was once more to be a "pitiless and senseless rebellion" (to use Pushkin's phrase) — the rebellion of a people whom tsarism had turned into slaves and who, as we now know, fought their battles on tsarist terms.

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The task which another protagonist in the last act of the Petersburg tragedy had set himself appeared far more modest and less revolutionary — at least at first sight.

Peter Stolypin came from a noble Russian family and was certainly one of the best representatives of the nation that ruled the empire. He owned an estate in Lithuania and was for some time Governor of that Western colony. He was thus in a good position to compare the conditions of the Lithuanian peasantry, who owned the land they worked, with those of the Moscow peasants, who had never even known the right to property. He came to the conclusion that if the peasantry of his mother country was to be a support for the monarchy and the tottering empire it had to be put on a sound basis, and that the only way to achieve this was to introduce legislation which made the peasant the owner of the land he cultivated.*

Shortly after Witte's dismissal, Stolypin was appointed Minister of the Interior and subsequently Prime Minister. With great

persistence and energy he worked on the land question and finally persuaded the Tsar, still alarmed by the 1905 revolution, to issue the edict which made it possible for a peasant to claim his holdings as personal property (9 Nov., 1906). This would have eventually transformed the peasant from his traditional status of "kolkhoz-member" of his village community into a free farmer on his own land.

It would seem that Stolypin's plan was perfectly logical and natural and no more than a necessary modicum of reform, but subsequent events were to show that even his moderate aims were revolutionary and, alas, utopian.

In the autumn of 1911, while attending a gala performance at Kiev with the Tsar and the Court, Stolypin was assassinated. The murderer, Bogrov, was able to get into the well-guarded opera house because he was himself an assistant of the Secret Police who were responsible for the security of the building. At the same time he was supposed to have been a member of a revolutionary terrorist group. (If so, one might have expected that he would have assassinated the Tsar himself, the main target of terrorist activity...)

In the history of the Russian revolutionary movement collaboration between revolutionaries (or rather the terrorists among them) and the imperial secret police was not without precedent (Azev, Father Gapon, and others). It is now difficult to analyse the exact circumstances of Stolypin's murder, particularly since the authorities at the time dealt with the matter very rapidly and without leaving any documents or accounts. The circumstances of the Prime Minister's death were certainly strange and will no doubt remain for ever a secret.

There was no secret whatever about the attitude to Stolypin's agrarian reform of the revolutionary movement on the one hand (which contained the seed of the future Bolshevik government) and of the highest nobility close to the throne, on the other. The revolutionaries saw in a strong land-owning peasantry ("kulaks") a danger for their plans, since a prosperous peasant class would not provide a motive force of revolution. But how is one to explain the opposition against the land reform, and the hatred for the man who launched it, on the part of those who were his equals in rank, wealth

*) What is generally known in the history of Russia as the Emancipation of the Serfs amounted to freeing the peasant from personal slavery and from unpaid labour on the estate of the landowner. The land, which had previously been the *de jure* property of the State and had been apportioned, together with the serfs, to various individuals in remuneration of their services, was now the property of the gentry. The peasant himself was not granted the right of ownership of his holding and was burdened with excessive redemption payments. The 1861 Act consequently created a huge agricultural proletariat. Foreseeing unfortunate effects, the more judicious had warned Alexander II of "these half-measures" of reform, as they called them. In the Russian colonies — Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic provinces, etc. — where Roman law of property prevailed for centuries, the agrarian situation developed on somewhat different lines.

and cultural background? What caused the pronounced displeasure of the Tsar with a man whose antecedents were unimpeachable, whose loyalty to the monarchy and whose personal qualities — benevolent intention, sincerity, courage — were beyond question (in contrast to Witte's case)? What was the reason for the fact, reported by contemporaries, that Stolypin's death — allegedly by the hand of a revolutionary — made the Tsar and the top members of the court and of the bureaucracy heave "a sigh of relief"?

There is only one possible answer to these questions: As Witte before him, Stolypin and his land reform had come into serious conflict with the dogmatic basis of the concept of "Russia." They violated the principle which made the State the owner of the depersonalized slave — the subject, who must be held captive in the traditional village commune, and who must not be allowed to have any property of his own, since that would provide a material basis for individuality and personal freedom. In the permanently tsarist Russian system there is no room for individuals. The efforts of both Witte and Stolypin were after all along lines which would inevitably lead to the natural disintegration of "Russia", i.e. the dissolution of the empire. All those anxious to preserve the traditional concept of "Russia" — the Tsar and the monarchists, the "Revolutionaries" and the Socialists, even the Liberals under Milyukov — could not but feel themselves threatened by a genuine revolution which Stolypin's measures had initiated. As a result, Peter Stolypin, faithful supporter of tsarist rule and monarchist by conviction, member of a noble Russian family, was murdered by an agent of both tsarism and "revolution", and with him died the national spirit of his own people.

It is noteworthy that in the Duma of 1906 the liberal democrats, with Milyukov at their head, who were supposed to be extremely "Western" in their outlook, came out against Stolypin's reform and in favour of maintaining the old collective ownership of land by the village community. Even to these "Europeanised" circles the "commune" was taboo. Their arguments were pretty confused; Stolypin's plan, it was said, was governed by the policy of the nobles, the landed gentry would be replaced by the kulaks, and it was tantamount to "destroying" the historical evolved "commune"...

The Leftists demanded that the allotments should remain the property of the village community as a whole and should not be allowed to be sold to individual peasants. They called for increased production by intensive farming, mechanisation and cooperative methods (P. Milyukov, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2). So we see that as early as 1906 the Left had kolkhozes, sovkhoses and MTS (i.e. machine and tractor stations) in mind.

It is significant that the death of Stolypin was sincerely deplored only in Ukraine. The villagers were grateful to him for making their economic emancipation from the empire easier, and the "Little

Russian" nobility saw in him a man who could have brought about a healthy reorganisation of the empire and thus rendered it viable (at least for a time). The only monument erected to the memory of Stolypin in the whole of the empire therefore stood — until 1917 — in Kiev, in front of the town hall of the Ukrainian metropolis.

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THE RUSSIAN HISTORICAL ROOTS OF BOLSHEVISM

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Life urgently demands from us an explanation of the phenomenon of "Bolshevism", what it consists of, what is its historical basis, and whence it derives its vital force. It is only by outlining the solution of this basic problem that we can decide on the manner in which Bolshevism can be studied in connection with Soviet facts and reality.

When we consider the subject, "The Russian Historical Roots of Bolshevism", we are confronted by a vast amount of material which so far has not been examined in detail by anyone.

West European and American men of learning have only occasionally touched on the subject. Such works as the monograph by Prof. Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki of the University of Milwaukee, entitled *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*, are happy exceptions. Neither have Ukrainian scholars so far achieved much in this respect. Among the writings which deserve mention in this connection are the articles written by D. Donzow, in which there are some excellent observations, and the pamphlet entitled *Stalinism* by M. Sciborskyj.

The Russian element in evidence in the mental make-up of Bolshevism is for the most part tendentious, and obscures rather than elucidates the subject: though it must be admitted that there are one or two interesting cases in which the authors, for some reasons or other, have endeavoured to achieve a certain amount of objectivity.

The outstanding Russian philosophers of the past century and of the beginning of this century who analysed the character of Russian intellectual life, in particular in the revolutionary sector, on numerous occasions foresaw the consequences of this mental attitude on the part of the Russian revolutionaries. Dostoievsky, in particular,

whose powers of discernment and judgment were extremely keen, succeeded in giving his readers an excellent psychological study of the type of Russian revolutionary who was heading towards Bolshevism.¹ Hatred of the revolution whetted Dostoevsky's analytical faculties, and though his Stavrogin, his Shigalyov, and his Verkhovensky manifest certain exaggerated traits he nevertheless succeeded in drawing the attention of his readers to these symptoms, which at that time were still in the course of development. In an excellent manner Dostoevsky depicts the narrow mental attitude of the Russian revolutionary, the precursor of Bolshevism — his fanatical adherence to dogma, to which he would like to adjust the world, his atheist principles, according to which man was to supersede God. In his heroes Dostoevsky shows us the crazy world of Messianism which inspires the revolutionaries.

On reading Dostoevsky we find in his mental complex an intricate web of feelings, experiences, and ideas which leads us directly into the sphere of the peculiar mental make-up of Bolshevism. Dostoevsky foresaw many things which caused him to shudder, and similarly we, too, shudder at his mental vision. He himself, by his own mentality, helps us to understand the phenomenon of Bolshevism. In this respect Dostoevsky paved the way for the Russian author, Merezhkovsky, who, in connection with the attempt on the part of the Bolsheviks to assume power during the December uprising of 1905 in Moscow, undertook to depict the intellectual aspect of Bolshevism in his sketches, entitled *Cad of the Future* (*Gryadushchiy Kham*) and to forecast the future development of Bolshevism. Indignant at the events of the revolution, Merezhkovsky described Bolshevism as the expression of an unwholesome mental attitude on the part of the Russians, drew attention to the sources of Bolshevism, and interpreted the meaning of the pictures painted by Dostoevsky.²

During the turmoil of the revolution, when feelings of sorrow, of having been outraged, of hatred still smouldered in the hearts of the representatives of the social classes that had left the country, no one paused to consider the future political consequences which this union of Bolshevism and the Russian soul might have. Thus the books written by Berdyayev at that time are now of considerable interest. Berdyayev examined the nature of Bolshevism in his books, *Dostoevsky's Philosophy of the World*, *The Philosophy of Inequality*, etc.

During the early years of Communism Berdyayev ruthlessly exposed the morbid Russian mind in Bolshevism. In the year 1923 he wrote as follows:

1) F. Dostoevsky, *The Possessed*.

2) D. Merezhkovsky, *Polnoye sobranie sochineniy*, Vol. 13. Moscow, 1914.

"Only by simple humility and remorse and by stern self-discipline of its mind can the Russian nation attain a new life and a spiritual rebirth. Only in this way can the Russian nation regain its spiritual strength. The renunciation of Messianist aspirations should strengthen the national mission of Russia³."

Later, however, Berdyayev was less severe in his criticism and designated Bolshevism as only a partial expression of the Russian soul. This is evident in his work, *The Russian Idea*, which appeared in Paris in 1946. Here Berdyayev sets himself the task of tracing the logic of events in the history of Russia and of examining the ways of intellectual self-fulfilment of the Russian people. A certain amount of attention is devoted to the subject of Bolshevism in every section of the book, and the author mentions — though, it must be admitted, in a biased way — the potential and dynamic elements in Russian intellectual life of the 19th and 20th centuries which later created Bolshevism. Here Bolshevism appears to be a temporary stage in the historical development of the Russian people which is to be logically surmounted by the development of the Russian mentality.

In Berdyayev's opinion the elements which are opposed to Bolshevism are to be sought in the "realm of the Holy Ghost" among the Russians, in Russian idealism and in Russian orthodoxy. In describing these — in his opinion positive — qualities of the Russian soul Berdyayev is an impressionist, though he rightly comprehends the historical preconditions of Bolshevism and in doing so relies on actual facts.

Towards the end of his life Berdyayev held the opinion that Bolshevism is the expression of Russian Messianism, though in a distorted form. He now regards Messianism as a permanent quality of Russian historical consciousness and Bolshevism as its historical form. This subjective treatment of Bolshevism deprives historical and philosophical writers of their power of discerning the misanthropical nature of the phenomenon concerned. The fact must not be overlooked that Berdyayev remained a Russian imperialist, and for this reason it is futile to look for any indication in his works of the Russian chauvinism of the Bolsheviks.

Berdyayev decided in favour of Bolshevism towards the end of his life, and this is characteristic of the Russian writers who criticize Bolshevism.

In his book, *The Origin of Bolshevism* (*Proiskhozhdenie bol'shevizma*) published in New York in 1946, the well-known Russian writer, Menshevik F. Dan, quite openly idealises the Kremlin rulers and expresses the conviction that they will help Russia to assert her historical role in the world.

Dan completely fails to understand the true nature of the Soviet regime, as can be seen from his statement to the effect that the

³) N. Berdyayev: *Mirosozertsanie Dostoyevskogo*, p. 194. Prague, 1923.

Stalinist Constitution of 1936 represents a step forward in the direction of democracy. There are certain accurate statements in his book which show the connection between Bolshevism and the fundamental traits of the Russian mentality, but on the whole the work gives the reader an entirely false impression of Bolshevism. Both Dan and Berdyayev are examples of the intellectual capitulation of Russian emigrants in the face of the present Moscow regime, and for this reason their works cannot be accepted as a basis from which to proceed if one wishes to examine Bolshevism. The only material in their works — and in the case of Berdyayev more so than in the case of Dan — which is likely to be of use to anyone who wishes to examine the misanthropical nature of Russian Sovietism objectively, are certain statements and observations here and there.

Of all the Russian writers who criticize Bolshevism G. Fedotov deserves to be mentioned as the most outstanding. He attacks the idea of Russian imperialism and regrets it as an evil which represents an obstacle to the normal development of the Russian nation. Thanks to his clear-sightedness, Fedotov is in a position to elucidate the connection between Leninist Communist theory and practice and the fundamental factors of Russian history. He makes the following important statement in his work:

"All the minorities (i. e. national minorities — Y. B.) see in their detachment from Bolshevism their severance from Russia, that has created this Bolshevism. The Russians who advocate a Greater Russia fail to understand this attitude, since they are of the opinion that we are all equally responsible for Bolshevism and that we should all enjoy the fruits of our common errors, even if it is true that the Russian party has absorbed all kinds of revolutionary and predatory elements from all the nations of Russia, though not to an equal extent. The Russians were for the most part the ideologists and founders of the party. Bolshevism established itself in Petersburg and Moscow without a struggle; there was hardly any civil war worth mentioning in Russia proper, whereas the border-countries, on the other hand, put up a fierce resistance against Bolshevism. Some factors in the tradition of Russia proper were more favourable to the growth of Bolshevism than any other soil of the imperium — and these were serfdom, the peasants' communal system of the "Obshchina", and autocracy⁴."

The fact that the above statement was made by a Russian is important. But Fedotov only expresses such and similar thoughts in passing, as it were, without troubling to lay a foundation for them. Although he breaks with the traditions of Russian imperialism, he fails to go the whole length and does not realise the extent to which imperialist tendencies have permeated Russian intellectual life and, in particular, Russian literature, which Fedotov regards as the "Conscience of the World."

On studying those Russian works which deal with the intellectual sources of Bolshevism, we are bound to discover that Russian

⁴) G. Fedotov, *Sud'ba Imperiy*, Novy Zurnal, 1947, XVI. p. 169.

scholars and writers have for the most part elucidated the subject in question in a very imperfect, one-sided, and sometimes tendentious manner.

We are thus confronted by the task in all its complicated entirety. In the course of this short essay, however, we shall only be able to outline the solution of a few important problems pertaining to this extensive subject.

Mention must above all be made of the fact that Marxism found its first adherents among the Russians, sooner than anywhere else outside Germany. Marx was hardly very pleased at this, and, in fact, he voiced his opinion in this respect with ill-concealed irony.⁵ Naturally, he expected his ideas to be adopted in the first place by the "capitalistically mature" nations, where, in his opinion, the problem of the proletarian revolution was the question of the day; for this reason he was considerably surprised at the success which his ideas met with in barbarous Russia and he thus regarded his Russian supporters most warily. They, on the other hand, were full of enthusiasm for him. Annenkov was greatly interested in Marxism; the "Petrashevets" Speshnyov was absorbed by the *Misery of Philosophy* by K. Marx⁶, and in his letter to Marx at the end of the 1840's and beginning of the 1850's, Sazonov, the proselyte of Marxism, again and again stresses his devotion to Marx and his ideas, and suggests the joint publication of a journal.⁷

Even in those early days the definitely Russian element in Marxism, which much later comes to the fore in Bolshevism, was evident. Sazonov tended to simplify things; he combines the nihilistic Russian attitude and his Marxist faith; he is most decidedly an anti-individualist, and advocates barbarism as a counterbalance to European civilisation. In his opinion Marxism is destined to play an important part above all in the Orient, among the Slav nations and the nations of Central Asia. He suggests plans for an international federation of the Communists of France, Germany, and Italy, in order to realise "ideas for the future" "almost without a struggle."

At the same time Sazonov supports Herzen's idea of the peculiar historical development of Russia, and the significance of the peasants' communal system, the "Obshchina", which is to serve as the basis for the future social order. He is most enthusiastic about Communist radicalism and compares it with Christianity.

Neither Sazonov nor various later adherents of Marxism received any support from Marx. This fact, however did not deter a number of Russians, during the 1860's and the 1870's, from openly showing

⁵) P. Sakulin, *Russkaya literatura i sotsializm*, I. p. 247. Moscow, 1924.

⁶) P. Sakulin, *op. cit.* p. 254. See also *Iz istorii russkoy filosofii XVIII-XIX vekov*, *Sbornik statey* (further quoted as *Sbornik*) p. 306. Moscow, 1952.

⁷) P. Sakulin, *op. cit.* p. 270.

their interest in Marxism and declaring themselves to be Marxists.⁸ In doing so they endowed Marxism with a definitely Russian element. At first the Russian revolutionary democrats and later the extreme revolutionary elements of the national trend, the so-called "Narodniki" (Populists), were fond of quoting the ideas and even the complete works of Marx and Engels. Chernyshevsky's periodical *Sovremennik* gave Engels' work, *The Position of the Working Class in England*⁹, a most enthusiastic reception, and in 1865 the journal *Russkoye Slovo*, published an abbreviated translation by Tkachov of K. Marx's work, *A Criticism of Political Economy*, which, according to a statement by Marx himself, aroused a "storm of enthusiasm" in Russia. But the first Russian adherents of Marxism, or rather its apologists, also Russified it and more or less combined it with revolutionary democratic, and later populist, convictions. This prompted Engels to remark in the conclusion of his essay, "Social Conditions in Russia", that Russia was not yet ready for Marxism. He stresses his belief that the proletarian revolution will first of all spread to the West European countries with a highly developed capitalism and will triumph there, and that it will subsequently be the turn of Russia, where the victory of socialism will be facilitated since

"part of the population there has already adopted the intellectual results of the capitalistic development and thus, during the revolution, Russia will be able to accomplish the reconstruction of its social system almost at the same time as the West does."¹⁰

The energetic fight waged by Marx and Engels against the eclectic combination of Communism and Russian revolutionism delayed the process of the Russification of Marxism, and when, in 1883, the group "Liberation of Labour" ("Osvobozhdenie Truda") declared itself to be social democratic, it first of all, in a polemical manner, opposed all branches of the Populist movement, the "Narodnichestvo", a fact which, of course, did not prevent this group from maintaining a close intellectual contact with Russian revolutionary traditions. For a long time, however, the international character of the social democratic movement was manifested, at least outwardly, the West European intellectual roots of Marxism were stressed and efforts were made to preserve its orthodoxy. For a considerable time the Russian Marxists, and in particular the Bolshevik wing, devoted themselves with fanaticism to the task of fighting to preserve the orthodoxy of Marxism. And it is in this fanatical blind adherence that we see the true Russian national characteristic, the adherence to the letter which was so typical of the Raskolniki of the 17th century.

⁸) *Sbornik* p. 315. Leningrad, 1951; *Perepiska K. Marksa i F. Engelsa s russkimi politicheskimi deyatelyami*, Izd. 2-oe, 1951.

⁹) *Sbornik*, p. 302.

¹⁰) *Perepiska*, op. cit. p. 291.

This blind adherence was also typical of the Slavophiles. Granovsky describes this characteristic of the Slavophiles as follows:

"The entire wisdom of humanity was exhausted in the works of the holy fathers of the Greek Church which were written after its severance from the Western Church. We can only learn it; but we cannot add to it. Kireyevsky expresses this in his prose and Khomyakov in his poetry.¹¹"

In the works of Marx all wisdom was contained, so his fanatical adherents affirmed, and nothing could be added to it. Plekhanov and later Lenin adhered to this principle enthusiastically. The latter, however, was destined to utter various ideas which are in keeping with Russian characteristics; at first he did this unconsciously and sought to conform to the letter. Later on, both he and Stalin were canonised and raised to the rank of saints, and their ideas adapted to the mentality of their Russian adherents. And although Lenin endeavoured to make his ideas depend on those propounded by Marx and Engels, Bolshevism nevertheless, either consciously or unconsciously, as far as the Russification of Marxism was concerned entered upon the course which Sazonov, Utkin, Tkachov and other early Russian Marxists had prepared for it.

The Russian character with its tendency to universality and its claims to a world revolution was regarded as dangerous by Marx. Whilst Marx dreamt of the world-role which the German workers' movement was to play, Bakunin, who took part in the revolutions in Vienna, Prague and Berlin, in France, Italy, and Spain, and not only became the Red phantom of Russia but also of the whole of Europe, was already opposing his ideas.

For many years Marx's interest was concentrated on his controversy with Bakunin. Incidentally, he also hated Herzen, whom he called a "half-Russian", though he believed that Herzen was a "genuine Muscovite" and ridiculed the latter's remedy for "rejuvenating Europe by means of the whip and an unlimited introduction of Kalmuck blood.¹²" Engels, too, ridiculed Herzen. He affirmed that Herzen resorted to his "Obshchina-Socialism" in order to show up his "sacred" Russia "in a more glaring light" in contrast to the degenerate West, and in order to rejuvenate and reinvigorate this degenerate West, if needs be by armed force. "The Russians possess those things which neither the degenerate French nor English, despite all their efforts, are able to achieve.¹³" Engels scoffs at the Utopian socialist ideas propounded by Herzen.

The attitude of the Bolsheviks, on the one hand, and the attitude of Marx and Engels, on the other hand, towards Herzen are thus contradictory. Lenin regarded Herzen as one of the greatest thinkers of the day and stressed Herzen's interest in the class-warfare of the

11) E. Andreyevich, *Opyt filosofii russkoy mysli*, p. 114. Petersburg, 1909.

12) *Perepiska*, op. cit., p. 293.

13) *Perepiska*, op. cit., pp. 285-286.

proletariat and in the Marxist International, and affirmed that the proletariat could realise the significance of the revolutionary theory from Herzen's example.¹⁴ Lunacharsky regards Herzen's work as a "curative spring" which sparkles in the sun.

"Herzen — he says — appears to us so full of youth and beauty that he truly is a hundred times more living and a hundred times more in keeping with the fiery background of our revolutionary times than the many corpses of our literature of the fairly recent past."¹⁵

The various opinions held by the classicists of Marxism and Bolshevism about Herzen are very interesting, since they show us the Russian characteristic of Bolshevism and the close ties which exist between the latter and Russian cultural traditions.

Neither Lenin nor Lunacharsky object to Herzen's Russian socialist Messianism. Indeed, Lenin himself after a time strikes a Messianist note, though, at first, only softly, as the echo of former national experience, as the belief that the Russian nation is destined to be the champion of the world revolution, after it has broken asunder the weakest link in the chain of world-imperialism.

During the early years of the revolution Lenin still endeavours to remain an orthodox Marxist; he is of the opinion that the revolutionary wave will sweep all Europe after it has passed over Russia, and he believes that the Russian revolution will only be victorious if it joins forces with the victorious German proletariat. But life destroys theories. Bolshevism establishes itself in one sixth of the world. The world revolution is postponed indefinitely, and the longer it is postponed, the more the forecasts made by Marx and Engels, about the vanguard-role of the capitalistically developed countries in the so-called proletarian revolution, appear as Utopian ideas. Since they are aware of this fact the Bolsheviks now open all the sluices which they had so far kept closed, and the waves of the Russian intellectual tradition now inundate Bolshevism and radically change its appearance, which so far had, in any case, manifested genuine Russian traits.

There is a story that Bolshevism did not ally itself with the Russian patriotic idea until the 1930's. Those who affirm this would like to regard Bolshevism as a universal and international phenomenon, and they try to make it appear as though its alliance with Russian patriotism is merely a tactical manoeuvre and not the expression of its inmost nature. Such an opinion reveals either complete incompetence or gross tendentiousness. The only truth in such an opinion is that Bolshevism in the past wanted to appear international.

¹⁴) V. Lenin, *Pamyati Herzena*, Soc. Izd. 4, XVIII, pp. 9-15.

¹⁵) A Lunacharsky, *Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen*. Sbornik: *Herzen v russkoy kritike*, p. 194. Moscow, 1949.

Berdyayev was quite right when he said of Lenin, "he was a typical Russian with certain Tartar traits.¹⁶" One of Lenin's closest friends, Zinoviev, wrote as follows after the death of the leader of the October Revolution:

"He was a Russian, one might say, from top to toe. He was the incarnation of Russia, and he knew it and felt it. Despite his long exile and the many years during which he lived the life of an emigrant, he personified the Russian mind and soul. When he was living in Cracow, about four and half miles away from the Russian frontier, he frequently used to drive to the frontier in order to "breathe Russian air."¹⁷

Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, smiled sympathetically at Lenin's yearning for Russia — during his residence in Cracow — and affirms that he became a "terrible nationalist."¹⁸

In his essay, *The National Pride of the Great Russians* (*O natsional'noy gordosti velikorossov*), Lenin found a formula to combine the international catchword and his nationalism. He is proud of the democratic element in Russian culture and stresses its value, thus ensuring his nationalism, as seen from the point of view of a doctrinarian of the world revolution, a legalised and "progressive" place. This does not however mean that he feels himself in any way bound to observe this formula. When in his work, *What Is To Be Done?* (*Chto delat'?*), he mentions the general importance of Russian literature as a whole and is not merely dealing with one of its branches, he maintains his former point of view as regards this literature. He continues to regard Pushkin as his literary idol, even though the democratic branch of literature cannot be ascribed to the latter.

In the hands of the Bolsheviks internationalism became the most skilled and the most modern tool of nationalism. Even in the first decade of our century the Bolsheviks made use of internationalist principles for their own national Russian interests, inasmuch as they condemned the formation of separate organisations of the proletariat of the subjugated nations in their national social democratic groups (as for instance the Jewish and the Ukrainian groups). The proclamation of the right "to national self-determination inclusive of separation", though, incidentally, it was stressed at the same time that it was not advisable to make use of this right since it would not be in the interests of the national unity of the workers, was a most cunning method to preserve the fundamental structure of the Russian imperium.

These skilful and astute tactics, however, are not an invention on the part of the Bolsheviks, but are already in evidence in Herzen's works which were written during the 1860's.

¹⁶ N. Berdyayev, *Russkaya ideya*, p. 250. Paris, 1946.

¹⁷ G. Zinoviev, *V. I. Lenin*, p. 159. Leningrad, 1925

¹⁸ N. Krupskaya, *Vospominaniya o Lenine*, p. 107. Moscow, 1931.

There can be no doubt about the fact that during the early years of the Soviet regime the international catchword was widespread and played a much more important part in Bolshevik phraseology than it did later on. But even in those days there was striking enough proof of the Russian imperialist consciousness of the Bolsheviks. In those days that staunch Ukrainian Bolshevik and national Communist, Skrypnyk, despite the fact that he possessed considerable authority in party circles, fought in vain for the incorporation of the Kuban territory and the ethnographical Ukrainian districts of the province of Kursk into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; in those days Gorky, after his return to the Soviet Union from Capri, seized the opportunity to defame the Ukrainian language publicly when he affirmed that it was useless to translate his works into Ukrainian since everyone could understand them in Russian. The Ukrainian writer Slisarenko showed considerable courage in venturing to object to Gorky's attitude; in fact, his protest later cost him his life.

In those days the author of the well-known book *Cement* — Fedor Gladkov — expressed his definitely imperialistic views during his visit to the "Vanguard" commune in Zaporizhya in Ukraine, as follows:

"Why revive the pre-Peter period?" he said, "why galvanise the Ukrainian language, which is already covered with dust? All this only delays the progress of socialist construction. The Ukrainian writers are endeavouring to compete with the Russian writers, but all they do is to imitate them.¹⁹"

And finally, those were the days in which Brashnyov's novel, *In the Smoke of Bonfires* (*V dymu kostrov*), which described conditions during the civil war of 1919, appeared in Moscow in the series of publications entitled, "Library of Proletarian Writers." In this novel Ukraine is represented as a libertine, as a hotbed of counter-revolutionary movements whose members become most enthusiastic about the re-writing of signboards in the Ukrainian language, and, in a paroxysm of hate, the author depicts scenes showing the Russians taking revenge on the Ukrainians.

We are of the opinion that these few examples suffice to show that Bolshevism has never detached itself from its Russian nationalism and that its international catchwords have been nothing but a kind of mimicry.

Those who regard the internationalism of the Bolsheviks solely as mimicry, however, have failed to comprehend it completely. Their internationalism is allied to Russian Messianism, and herein lie the fundamental causes of the Russian element in Bolshevism. Messianism, the historical mission of the Russian nation in the world, is the fundamental trait of the Russian mentality throughout the centuries and finds its fulfilment in Bolshevism. In the year 1909 the Russian

¹⁹) The monthly, *Zhyttia i Revolutsiya*, 1929, II p. 95.

historian and philosopher, Andreyevich, declared that it is a permanent and mental characteristic of the Russian to regard themselves as social beings of a "higher type", to believe that they will be the first to realise the ideal of equality and brotherhood, that they will do so sooner, better, and more easily than other nations, and to maintain that Russian life offers all the necessary preconditions to enable them to realise this ideal.²⁰ In 1923 Nicolas Berdyayev wrote as follows in his book *Dostoevsky's Philosophy of the World*:

"Russian Messianist consciousness is derived from the idea of a "Third Rome", it can be traced throughout the 19th century, and culminates in the works of the great Russian philosophers and writers. This Russian Messianist idea continues to exist until the 19th century, but its tragic fate becomes apparent. Imperialistic Russia had little resemblance to the "Third Rome", for here — to quote Dostoevsky's words — the Church was paralysed and its position was one of degrading dependence on the Tsar. The Russian Messianists now turned to the "Heavenly Jerusalem", since they had no Jerusalem of their own. They hoped that a new kingdom, the millennium of Christ, would be created in Russia.

And then the Russian imperium fell into decay and the revolution followed; the strong fetters which had bound the Russian Church to the Russian State were torn asunder. The Russian nation tried to set up a new kingdom on earth. It substituted the "Third International" for the "Third Rome." But the consciousness of those who realised the Third International likewise manifested peculiar Messianist traits. They imagined that they were carrying the torch of the East which was to light up the path of those people who were living in the "bourgeois" darkness of the West. Such is the fate of the Russian Messianist consciousness, a fate which is apparent not only in the case of the monk, Filotey, but also in the case of Bakunin.²¹"

Berdyayev is quite right when he makes this affirmation. In the course of the 19th century the belief of the Russian people in their divine mission, a belief which continued to exist as an ecclesiastical and religious complex, was secularised and permeated various spheres of Russian intellectual life. Both the extreme reactionaries and the extreme revolutionaries were Messianists. Doomed to an inevitable fate, Messianism was heading for its pathetic manifestations. And, strange to say, even in the highest stage of its national pathos it resorted to catchwords about national self-denial.

This is already apparent in the works of the socialist visionary and mystic, Pechorin, of the 1830's, who writes:

"How sweet it is to hate one's native country and wait impatiently for its destruction! And to see in the destruction of one's country the dawn which heralds a general rebirth!... I shall burn your twin-eagles and your very foundations and shall do what Herostrates did, but my fame will be even greater!²²"

20) Andreyevich, *Opyt filosofii russkoy mysli*, p. 38.

21) N. Berdyayev, *Mirosozertsanie Dostoyevskogo*, pp. 188-189.

22) P. Sakulin, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

Pechorin only wanted to burn his native country, guarded by the two-headed eagle, so that it should become more famous and that the morning-sun of his country should shine on the whole world.

Surely there is already a hint of the Bolshevik philosophy of the world in his words! The only difference there is lies in the fact that the Bolsheviks are definitely practical-minded and that their Messianism is realistic and calculated to be materially advantageous to the champions of this Messianist consciousness.

In their practical application of this idea the Bolsheviks adopt the idea propounded by Byelinsky, who affirmed that the Russians are the heirs of the world, since, as regards their many-sided characteristics, they adopt all kinds of characteristics from various other nations and combine these.²³ The Bolsheviks are notorious imitators of Pogodin, who was even more practical-minded than Byelinsky, and who, during the 1830's tried to arouse the enthusiasm of the Tsarist regime for his vision of Russia as a world power, and propagated Pan-Slavism as a means of ruling the world. He affirmed that Russia was destined to rule the Slav world, but that it was loath to do so since it was so modest, and added that life, however, demanded that it should do so since it was the greatest Slav nation.

"Hence the miracle that Russia rules one-ninth of the world!" Enormous riches will be found in a Russia which rules the Slav world. Pogodin goes into ecstasies about the future aspect of this power, which, concentrating on one aim and guided by the will of the Russian Tsar, is to confront Europe which has been disintegrated by conflicts.

"I ask you, is there anyone who is a match for us? Is there anyone whom we cannot force into obedience? Does not the political fate of Europe and hence the fate of the world rest with us, if we wish to determine it?... My heart leaps for joy — oh! Russia, my country! Thou, thou alone, art destined to complete and achieve the progress of mankind!"²⁴

When we consider the Soviet peace propaganda of today, which is closely connected with the propaganda that the Kremlin star shall shine on the whole world, we are undoubtedly reminded of the Slavophile Khomyakov, who said that the Russian nation was peace-loving, but nevertheless destined to be the ruler.²⁵ What a striking coincidence of convictions!

The Bolsheviks reject Dostoievsky as a reactionary, and very few ideologists of Bolshevism are acquainted with his works. But in the logical course of national development it was precisely the Bolsheviks who were destined to comprehend and imitate the grim and

²³) V. D. Byelinsky, *Sochineniya*, I, 1919, p. 449.

²⁴) A. Pypin, *Panslavizm v yego proshlom i nastoyashchem*, 1913, pp. 87-89.

²⁵) N. Berdyayev, *Russkaya ideya*, p. 49.

misanthropical nature of Dostoevsky's universalism, intuitively and instinctively.

Dostoevsky, the reactionary, who appeared to carry on the evolution idea of his intellectual opposite, Byelinsky, was an out-and-out chauvinist; he hated the various nations and disseminated the idea of the universal mission of the Russians. Russia, he says, has for a whole century been living not for its own interests but for those of Europe. A Russian can only be a genuine Russian if he becomes a European, for it is only then that he fulfils Russia's main task — to reconcile and combine all the nations.

"Yes, the importance of the Russians is all-European and world-wide", he says. "To be a genuine Russian can mean and does mean... to be the brother of all men, a universal man, as it were."

Dostoevsky on numerous occasions stresses this idea of brotherhood and brotherly love for all mankind. But, as Merezhkovsky very aptly remarks, this brotherhood and this brotherly love is very suspicious. In our opinion these insistent brotherly caresses are of the same type as are described by Alexander Blok in *The Scythians*:

"Are we to blame if your skeleton is crushed by our heavy, tender paws?"

Dostoevsky had a passion for the cultural past of Europe — its piles of ruins. He talked of his love for Europe as though it were a task, and he treated it like a programme which elevated him, on the waves of ecstasy, into realm of the divine mission; but in reality he hated Europe with all his soul, and he believed and hoped that the proletariat would destroy Europe. He was of the opinion that the Germans were a people with no future, and that the French would destroy themselves, and affirmed that "it is futile to mourn for such people."

He was convinced that Europe would be inundated by Russia. In his divided feelings towards Europe, in his preachings about the brotherhood of nations in which he conceals his hatred of these same nations and his predatory greed, Dostoevsky is the precursor of Bolshevism. And yet he has a strange effect on the Bolsheviks, for he reveals the pathology of the nihilism of the Russian revolution, the pathology in which Bolshevism recognises itself.

The revolutionary democrat, Serno-Solovyevich, whom Lenin greatly respected and regarded as one of the precursors of Russian social democracy, was likewise a Messianist. He had visions of Russia conquering the world and becoming supreme, a plan which was to be made possible by rounding up the masses for social and state tasks. And just as the Bolsheviks nowadays draw up Five-Year Plans, in order to "catch up with and overtake" the other nations, so, too, Serno-Solovyevich in the past drew up a twenty-five-year plan which was to ensure Russia the highest position in the world.²⁶

²⁶ V. Romanenko, "Filosofskiye vzglyady N. A. Serno-Solovyevicha" Sbornik: *Iz istorii russkoy filosofii XVIII-XIX vv.* p., 212.

Bolshevism thus reveals various aspects of the Russian Messianist consciousness: on the one hand, many of its monstrosities; on the other hand, the Russian Messianist consciousness which is at the root of the chief Bolshevik menace to mankind.

Another organic defect of the Russian soul is likewise concealed in the totalitarian quality of Bolshevism. Lenin and his successors have merely disclosed and augmented it, and have realised that which had long lain hidden in the Russian nation. It is precisely this same defect which filled Pogodin with enthusiasm in the 1830's and about which he wrote in his report to the Russian government. In his opinion the Russian imperium was the expression of the highest form of harmony; all the various forces form one single mechanism, which can be simply and successfully operated by one hand, namely by the hand of the Tsar, who with a single movement of his hand can start this mechanism and give it a certain direction and a corresponding speed. This mechanism is inspired by one feeling alone.²⁷ These words reveal the author's enthusiasm for an imaginary perfection of the totalitarian system, which during the 19th century — that is to say in the days of the Tsar — was still not quite attainable, but which eventually became reality under the Bolshevik system with one-man dictatorship and its alarming "unity of thought" of the Russian nation.

Entire generations, both of reactionaries and revolutionaries, have striven to realise this totalitarian system. The Russian intelligentsia always thought in terms of totalitarianism; monkish fanaticism constantly narrowed down and simplified its consciousness.

"One must never permit foreign ideas", wrote "the Westerniser"

Ogaryov, "conviction is not a personal matter, but a general gain."²⁸

The Slavophile Kireyevsky regarded the "Unity of Thought" as the noblest quality of the Russian people:

"There had always been a large number of monasteries scattered throughout the vast country of Russia", he wrote, "and these served as the source of enlightenment. From here the light of self-confidence and of learning emanated, evenly and uniformly, to various tribes and principalities."²⁹

Byelinsky regarded the totalitarian self-confidence of the Russians as a national fate, and wrote as follows:

"Life is a mouse-trap and we are the mice. Some of us manage to seize hold of the bait and escape from the trap, but the majority of us perish and have perhaps only smelt at the bait... Let us therefore drink and enjoy ourselves, if we can; today belongs to us, for no one listens to our lamentations! There is only one universe, and we are only silhouettes, the waves of the ocean — there is only one ocean, but there have been many waves, there are and will be many waves in the future."³⁰

²⁷) A. Pypin, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-89.

²⁸) *Iz istorii russkoy fil. XVIII-XIX v.*, p. 144.

²⁹) G. Plekhanov, *Sochineniya*, XXIII, p. 190.

³⁰) J. Boyko, "Visarion Byelinsky i bolshevyzm", *Ukrains'kyi Samostiynyk*, 15. 7. 1952, No. 25 (126), p. 3.

This surely is the origin of the historical consciousness of the Soviet Russian man, who has resigned himself to being a "silhouette" and a "wave of the ocean."

And here we encounter an important characteristic of Russian history, a characteristic which has been in evidence in particular under Bolshevism. The administrative course of development in Russian history and its impersonal aspect had already been emphasised by Klyuchevsky.

This idea is stressed in particular by Andreyevich, in his work, "Characteristic Features in the History of Russian Literature of the 19th Century", where he writes as follows:

"Russian history has actually never (with the exception of a few rare and striking cases) given a person freedom, either as regards personal work or initiative. "Personality" has always been held in fetters and has been confined within narrow limits, in ignorance, in humble devotion, and in slavish subjugation. Countless numbers have defended the country against the approaching enemy, and conquered and colonised vast territories. In Russian history we see, above all, the tedious and silent work of the masses, who do not count their sacrifices or trouble themselves with thoughts of these sacrifices, who dig graves for the masses so that other masses can walk over them. It is the eternal repetition of the living bridge, which a well-known artist has depicted: a pit filled with soldiers and the artillery rolls over their heads.³¹"

These significant words were written in the year 1902, and they came true in the Soviet Union during World War II.

In their mechanisation of man and in the manner in which they have misused man for their own aims, the Bolsheviks have gone to even greater lengths than Dostoevsky ever imagined. Those who saw with their own eyes the hordes of emaciated, famished, and confused creatures, who, with the stupidity of locusts, swarmed into Ukraine in the spring 1943, in order to launch an offensive against the Germans — those who saw them, as they pushed forwards, silently and resigned to their fate, only to be mown down by cannon fire as blades of grass are mown down by a scythe — those who saw all this will fully realise the extent to which the Russian totalitarian system has already mechanised men and, in keeping with the Russian tradition, has trained them to abandon their instincts of self-preservation completely. Masses trained in the spirit of totalitarianism and ruled by a psychological complex are a grim and dreadful spectacle, which stands in front of the gateway to the future like a ghost.

In the course of Russian history there have hardly ever been any personalities who manifested an initiative of their own. On the contrary, Russian history has to a very great extent practised despotism. The tyrant is the opposite pole to the amorphous masses, which can only obey a tyrant. A superman, who is omnipotent, rules

³¹) E. Solovyov (Andreyevich), *Ocherki po istorii russkoy literatury XIX v.*, p. 96. Petersburg, 1902.

the masses. The mysticism of the deification of the people's leader resembles the deification of the Tsar, but it has been more forcibly impressed on the masses.

Paradoxical though it may seem, another factor of Russian historical collectivism is likewise of decisive importance. In former days the Slavophiles announced their distrust of the personal "ego", and they were only prepared to recognise mass-mentality which, in their opinion, was more powerful than individual mentality.

Later on, the "Populists" (Narodniki) exaggerated this idea until it became the deification of the mujik, or simple peasant. To become one of the people was, in the opinion of the active supporters of this idea at that time, to endeavour to find national wisdom. Bolshevism has adopted this tradition of paying homage to mass-mentality to the detriment of individual mentality — with the exception of the dictator, of course!

Bakunin, as though he foresaw future events, affirmed that despotism is most powerful if it is based on a false representation of the people. And this has actually been proved correct in the Soviet democracy.

Space and time do not permit us to describe other truly Russian characteristics of Bolshevism in detail. One of these characteristics is the nihilist attitude which, as far as the Russian thinkers of the 1860's were concerned, "Bazarov", Pisarev, and others, was merely a theory and a manifestation, but has become a grandiose social practice with the Bolsheviks. The enthusiasm shown for the reflexivity of the 1920's is merely a continuation of Bazarov's experiments with frogs. The restriction of literature exclusively to "socialist realism" is merely a continuation of the daring utilitarianism manifested by Pisarev, who considered that boots were of more value than Shakespeare's works.

The anti-religious, materialistic attitude of Bolshevism is not merely a continuation of Marx's theory, namely that "Religion" means "Opium for the Masses."

Recent Soviet investigation reveal that some of the conspirators of the Decembrist Revolt had already taken an anti-religious catchword as their motto. The anti-religious attitude of the Russians was frequently accompanied by a form of hysteria which reminded one of the Russian "klikushestvo." And the anti-religious attitude of Byelinsky and Bakunin was of the same nature; a similar type of hysteria was manifested for a time by the Bolsheviks in their religious policy, inasmuch as they allowed the instincts of the fanatical masses, who reviled all that was holy, free play. This fanaticism is re-echoed today in the fact that the Church is only allowed to exist on sufferance by the state.

The Bolshevik philosophy of the world contains various peculiar characteristics of the Russian soul and of Russian historical and psychological experience. Bolshevism can be likened to a magnifying glass which, when it unites various rays of the Russian philosophy of the world in one concentrated beam, is capable of setting the world on fire. Russian self-confidence shows up most perfectly in the prism of Bolshevism and reveals its dangerous and destructive elements. Bolshevism is in fact a manifestation of the Russian mentality, and this mentality in its destructive perfection, represents a terrible danger for the entire world.

Even though certain individual elements of the Russian mentality and of Russian culture may exercise a certain power of attraction on persons of the West, one must not overlook the fact that such bait contains a poison, which can only have the effect of nectar when it is not taken in concentrated doses.

There are, however, other elements in the Russian mentality which lead one to hope that seeds of a kind other than those of Bolshevism may some day flourish on this soil. Russia needs the aid of all the forces of mankind as a whole, in order to purge itself and be restored to health.

**THE
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM**

by

Dr. BAYMIRZA HAYIT

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I. INTRODUCTION

Whereas there is plenty of material available on British, Dutch, French and Portuguese imperialism and colonialism, very little has been written about the origin and development of Russian imperialism. Those interested in this subject are obliged to search through numerous works of reference. This complex of questions is of especial interest at the moment, when Soviet Russia's lust of expansion once again seems particularly menacing. It is indeed surprising that the freedom-loving West has so far never attached any special importance to investigating and studying the origin and development of Russian imperialism, even though it has always known that Russia has for hundreds of years sought to expand its territory in every direction.

As a result of the lack of enlightenment in this decisive field, the average person in the West today does not know how to assess this Russian "gigantic power" of our day in a Soviet form.

The free world is agreed that imperialism and colonialism are outmoded. But very little is said or written — and if so then only with considerable reserve — about active Russian, i. e. Soviet imperialism. So far the Russians have to a large extent succeeded in passing off their imperialistic plans as a technical and political action necessitated by the demands of the times and in disguising their fundamental lust of expansion. The more Europe was occupied with its own problems, the more active did Russian imperialism become. The present role of the Soviet Union as a major power and as a colonial power in international politics is the result not merely of its own strength, but also of the indifference and credulity of the other powers with regard to the perpetual expansion aims firstly of the Russians and then of the Communist Soviet leaders.

The history of Russia is eloquent proof of Russian imperialism. It is absolutely essential that at the present time, when the Kremlin itself has started an offensive against imperialism and colonialism, especially in the developing countries, a critical study should be made of the origin and development of imperialism in Russia.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

In the course of its history Russia has as a rule acted according to the Russian saying: "Where Russian horses leave their tracks, that is Russian soil." The transformation of other countries into "Russian soil", with which the principality of Moscow began, continued until the year 1520 under the motto "collection of Russian soil." After Moscow had annexed various independent neighbouring principalities such as Tver, Smolensk and Ryazan, as well as the provinces of Great Novgorod, under this motto and had incorporated them in the principality of Moscow, it felt that it was strong enough to advance against other peoples. It can be seen from the history of Russia that the conquest of neighbouring countries from the beginning of the 16th century onwards up to the present time has always been in keeping with the Russian mentality and conduct, although some of these annexations were at first more or less only measures of security to guard against a renewed subjugation by the Tatars.

This lust of expansion is clearly evident from the following chronological list:

- 1552 Conquest of the Khanate of Kazan on the Volga
- 1556 Conquest of the Khanate of Astrakhan on the Volga delta on the Caspian Sea
- 1558 Beginning of the campaigns to conquer Siberia
- 1582 End of the conquest of Siberia as far as the River Lena
- 1654 Incorporation of part of Ukraine; beginning of the campaign against Poland
- 1667 Incorporation of East Ukraine as far as the Dnieper line
- 1680 Annexation of the Kyiv region of Ukraine
- 1689 Advance as far as Kamchatka in the Far East
- 1709 Defeat at Poltava of the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazeppa and King Charles XII of Sweden
- 1721 Conquest of Estonia and Livonia
- 1723 Incorporation of the west coast of the Caspian Sea
- 1734 to 1784: Extension of Russian protectorate rule to the Turkic nomad khanates of Kitchi-Dzu, Orta-Dzu and Ulu-Dzu between the Ural River and the Sea of Aral as far as the Syr Darya and its mouth
- 1772 Occupation of the Eastern part of White Ruthenia
- 1783 Conquest and incorporation of the Crimea
- 1793 Occupation of the Ukraine West of the Dnieper, of White Ruthenia,
- 1795 Incorporation of Courland and Lithuania
- 1801 Annexation of Georgia

- 1809 Subjugation of Finland
- 1812 Annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Azerbaijan
- 1814-15 Incorporation of Central Poland
- 1828 Conquest and incorporation of East Armenia
- 1829 Annexation of the region of the Danube delta and the east coast of the Black Sea
- 1852 Beginning of the campaign against the Khanate of Kokand in Turkestan
- 1858 Incorporation of the Amur region in the Far East
- 1860 Incorporation of the Ussuri region in the Far East 1864 Conquest of the North Caucasus
- 1866 Beginning of the campaign against the Emirate of Bokhara in Turkestan
- 1868 Extension of protectorate rule to the Emirate of Bokhara
- 1876 Abolition of the Khanate of Kokand and annexation of this territory; advance as far as the Tien-Shan mountains
- 1873 Extension of protectorate rule to the Khanate of Khiva after years of war
- 1884 Conclusion of the campaigns of conquest in the settled territory of Turkmenistan with the occupation of the town of Merv (Mary) in Turkestan
- 1897 Conclusion of the conquest of the territory of Turkestan with the annexation of the Pamirs region
- 1900 Occupation of Manchuria

THE SOVIET PERIOD

- 1918 Beginning of the re-conquest campaigns against the national independent Republics of Ukraine, Crimea, North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Tatar-Bashkiria and Turkestan, which were established after the 1917 October revolution
- 1921 Conclusion of the re-conquest campaigns against the national republics; invasion of Mongolia by the Red Army and proclamation of the People's Republic of Mongolia
- 1934 Conclusion of the operation by the Red Army against the national uprisings in Turkestan (began in 1918)
- 1939 Annexation of the territories of West Ukraine and West White Ruthenia occupied by Poland
- 1940 March, conclusion of the campaign against Finland and annexation of the Karelo-Finnish territories
- 1940 June, re-incorporation of Bessarabia and annexation of Northern Bukovina
- 1944 Incorporation of Tuva
- 1945 Incorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine, part of East Prussia, Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.

The line of this policy is characterized still further by the following facts:

- 1945 Occupation of North Korea and proclamation of the People's Republic of Korea (North); occupation of Central Germany; August 2, 1945: annexation of the East Prussian region (Königsberg)
- 1945 to 1948: Bolshevization of East Europe by the formation of "people's democratic" regimes (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria)
- 1953 June 17th, suppression of workers' revolt in Berlin and in the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany
- 1956 November 4th, suppression of the national revolt in Hungary

As a result of Russian and Soviet expansion, the Muscovite principality, which at the end of the 13th century covered an area of 16,200 square kilometres, developed into an "imperium" of about 22,430,000sq. kilometres by the middle of the 20th century, without counting the satellite States.

This has been achieved by Russia by means of numerous wars, by skilfully playing off powers against each other, and, in addition, thanks to the weakness of Russia's neighbours.

After the revolution the Bolsheviks took over the territories of tsarist Russia that were inhabited by the subjugated peoples (with the exception of Finland, Poland, and Baltic countries), with a total area of 13.65 million sq. kilometres. Soviet Russia, however, not only obtained the tsarist Russian imperium, but also extended it very considerably. During the years from 1918 to 1945, for instance, it annexed about 2.16 million sq. kilometres of territory with a population of 20.71 million. After 1945 further countries and peoples of East Europe and some countries of Asia, with a total area of about 1.1 million sq. kilometres and a population of 99.13 million, were incorporated in Moscow's sphere of influence. These figures, incidentally, do not include Communist China. At the present time the Soviet Union possesses a number of colonial countries, which have a total area of about 16.8 million sq. kilometres. The population of these colonial territories numbers more than 188 million persons, who have become the subjects of the Russian colonial power.¹ Such is the alarming balance-sheet of a lust of political power and of imperialistic aims to subjugate and exploit other peoples.

Whereas the West after World War II began to de-colonize its colonial territories, Russia began a renewed colonization process. Which country will be the next victim of this imperialism cannot be foreseen.

¹) Cf. "Das Kolonialreich der Sowjetunion" in *Der aktuelle Osten*, Bonn, IV, 1960, No. 5, p. 6.

III. RUSSIAN IDEOLOGY AS THE BASIS OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

Russia's rulers and leaders have always been unanimously agreed on the question of their lust of conquest. The Russian desire to subjugate other peoples can be traced back a long way in the history of that country. In the 15th century the tsars adopted the Byzantine, i. e. the Eastern Empire, double-headed eagle as the symbol of their state as a result of the marriage of Ivan III to Sophia Paleologue, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, in 1472. They considered themselves as the successors of the Byzantine Empire. Russia wanted to keep the world in order and to set an example to other peoples; it planned to assert itself as administrator of the world. These ideas, symbolized by the adoption of the double-headed eagle of the Byzantine Empire, were not however able to effect the realization of the Russian dream of succession to the Roman Empire. For this reason another idea had to be created. Hence, in the 16th century a Russian Orthodox priest proclaimed the following dogma:

"Great Rome fell through heresy. The Second Rome (Byzantium) allied itself with the Latin nations and the Christian Church sought refuge in the Third Rome, which is the new great Russia."²

From then onwards, the Russian intelligentsia, the clergy and the tsars were obsessed by this idea. Moscow was to become the Third Rome. The double-headed eagle, as the symbol of the power of ancient Rome, and the dogma "Moscow is the Third Rome" determined Russia's Messianistic course, which it pursued for a considerable time. From the reign of Peter I onwards, the idea of Russia's historic mission in the world was cultivated. The revolutionary and anarchist Bakunin (1814-1876) affirmed:

"The star of the revolution will rise in Moscow and it will become the lodestar of all liberated mankind."

But first of all, all the Slavs were to be united under Moscow's rule. Hence the Russians in 1857 founded a Slav Committee in Moscow, which placed Pan-Slavism in the foreground. Instead of the former idea of "collecting Russian soil", the idea on which the rulers of Russia now concentrated was the collection of all the Slavs under the protection of the Russians. The Congress of Berlin in 1878, however, put a damper on Pan-Slavism. But Russia has never completely renounced this idea. To this end Moscow, for instance, furthered the Balkan League against Turkey. This resulted in the Balkan Wars in 1912-13. Actually it was not until after World War II

²) For further details of the "Third Rome" dogma, see H. Schaeder, *Moskau, das dritte Rom*. Studien zur Geschichte und politische Theorien in der slawischen Welt. Darmstadt 1957. Page 215, as well as "The Ukrainian Review", No. 3, 1961.

that the Russian Pan-Slavic ideal was realized, namely after all the Slav countries had been brought under the rule of Soviet Russia by various methods. Since 1947 a periodical "Slavyane" ("The Slavs"), which resulted out of the aim to cultivate and foster the feeling of affinity of the Slavs to the Russians, has been published in Moscow as the organ of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union.

The Russian ideology has been the basis for Russia's imperialism since the 16th century and up to the present day. The evolution of these ideas and the conquests carried out by Russia ran parallel to each other. The world of ideas of many Russians is characterized by the following fundamental ideas:

- 1) The salvation of mankind by the Russians (Russia as the saviour).
- 2) Occidental culture to be replaced by Russian culture.
- 3) The civilization of the world by the Russians.
- 4) The unification of all the peoples of the world round the Russian empire.
- 5) The domination of Europe to be effected by the collection of the Slavs.
- 6) To assert influence in Asia as a European power and in Europe as an Asian power.

Those who advocated these ideas were convinced of Russia's mission on this earth. Hence Messianism was the fundamental idea of Russian imperialism. And Messianism at all times (also during Communism) has constituted the basic principle of Russia's world policy.

The first world war and its outcome led to a renovation of all outmoded ideas in Russia. All the ideas which had held good hitherto were reformed by Bolshevism-Communism; hence the free world gradually gained the impression that Bolshevism was something completely new. Many persons seemed to think that "Bolshevism had dropped from heaven on to Russian soil." But in the West, too, certain circles began to realize that the Bolsheviks and the Russians were alike in character. For instance, the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" (of January 7, 1957) affirmed: "Soviet is also Russian!" Moreover, the Russian philosopher Nicolai Berdyaev had also written as follows about the fusion of the old Russian Messianism with Bolshevism: "Bolshevism is a Russian national phenomenon" and "In its ultimate non-secularized but undeified form Russian Messianism is now at last appearing as Bolshevism."

Classical Russian Messianism was also in evidence in the form which modern Communism assumed. As early as 1919 the Soviet government founded the 3rd (Communist) International to take the place of the "Third Rome", and endeavoured to effect the world domination of Communism with the aid of this International.

Under pressure of the Allies, Soviet Russia was obliged to dissolve this world organization on May 15, 1943. But this step was only a tactical manoeuvre on the part of the Communist leaders, for in place of the Communist International the Soviet Union on September 30, 1947, founded the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau). This organization, too, was dissolved on April 18, 1956, on account of internal differences between the Communist leaders. Since 1957, as a substitute, conferences of the Communist and workers' parties of the whole world have been held in the Kremlin. All these attempts to concentrate its plans for world domination prove that Communism continues to be the executor of a dangerous imperialism.

The Communist leaders are firmly convinced that about 36 million Communists will "rule the whole world." Indeed, this aim has even been set up as a dogma. The Moscow ideologists of Communism "proclaimed" that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was in a position, on the strength of its experience, to lead the Communist parties of the world to a Communist victory. And this idea was also accepted by the Communist Party leaders of all the other states at the end of November 1960 in Moscow. This fact alone is proof that the Communists are endeavouring to achieve a hegemony in the whole world. With the aid of the Communist ideology the Soviet Union has already succeeded in becoming a world power.

In this respect Berdyayev remarked:

"In place of the Third Rome the Russian people have realized the Third International. In this Third International the fateful union of the Russian national Messianistic idea with international proletarian Messianism is effected."

The Russians regard themselves as a kind of "supermen." For instance, the Russian historian Mikhail Pogodin wrote in 1839:

"Russia — what a wonderful appearance on the world stage! How admirably spiritual and physical strength are balanced in her! Who can compare themselves with us?"

Over a hundred years later, namely in 1946, Andrey Zhdanov, one of the leading Russian Communist Party ideologists, said:

"Where are such a people or such a country as ours to be found?"

The Russians have always regarded the subjugated peoples as "foreigners" (*inorodtsy*), and this attitude still holds good today, even if it is no longer openly expressed. The present Communist leaders are acting entirely in keeping with the views of that Russian arch-revolutionary and anarchist Bakunin, who expressed the opinion: "the Russian people will create new civilization, and even a new faith, new law and a new way of life."³

³) Dmytro Donzow, *Der Geist Russlands* (The Russian Mentality), Munich, 1961, p. 26.

Thus the Soviet rulers and ideologists completely agree with the old aims of the Russians. And this trait of character is described by the satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin in his work "The Gentlemen of Tashkent" as "constantly guzzling but never satisfied." Imperialism is therefore part of the mentality of the Russian statesmen and a dynamic force in Russian society. And in this respect there is no difference between the Russian absolute rulers (Samoderzhtsy) and the dictators of the proletariat in the Kremlin. According to the Russian historian Mikhail Pravdin, the Russian imperium has lost "neither its historical character, nor its lust of conquest" in our modern times.⁴

⁴) Mikhail Pravdin, *Russland* (Russia), Stuttgart, 1951, p. 366.

IV. MODE OF OPERATION OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

Russian imperialism is extremely flexible, adaptable and intensive. Whenever Russia intends to subjugate a people, it prepares its campaign years beforehand. Tsarist Russia relied mainly on military means, namely according to the motto: "Where there is no order, order must be introduced."

Whenever Soviet Russia plans to conquer another country, these purely military operations are very carefully worked out beforehand from the psychological aspect. These preparations usually consist in systematically causing alarm amongst and agitating the population of the country to be conquered, in order to undermine their moral powers of resistance. For this purpose either Soviet Russian agents are employed, or else natives of the country in question who are prepared to work in the interests and services of Russia. Once the powers of resistance of the population appear to have been weakened sufficiently, a military attack is launched. If the military operations are successful, then this victory is celebrated accordingly. If the attack fails, however, then Soviet Russia always endeavours to end the matter, at least for the time being, by negotiations, but nevertheless continues to pursue the original aim in order to launch another attack at an opportune moment.

Thus Russia during the past 200 years, for instance, carried out warlike operations on 70 occasions against Turkey, some of which were successful, whilst others were not. Even today Moscow has still not abandoned its plans as regards Turkey. Soviet Russia continues to pursue the old aim of gaining control of the straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles). It is a characteristic of Russian imperialism that it acts slowly. Thus Russia took about 169 years to conquer Turkestan. By means of attacks carried out in gradual stages, Russia succeeded in conquering the whole country (about 3.7 million sq. kilometres) from the beginning of the 18th century until the end of the 19th century (1897). These two examples clearly show that the Russians take their time when realizing their plans; they are capable of waiting patiently until conditions and circumstances are ripe for their operations, and then they attack. And it was on the strength of this fundamental Russian attitude that Lenin was able to set up his theory of "two steps forward and one step backward." This implies that, if possible, the aim in mind shall be pursued tenaciously and that as much as possible of the aim shall be realized. But if difficulties arise, or the campaign threatens to be a failure, then one should immediately retreat, but without, however, abandoning the original aim.

Under the Soviets Russian imperialism has not changed its character but merely its outward appearance. Soviet Russia found a new method as regards the mode of operation of Russian imperialism, namely through Communism. The Russians have always denied that they were acting imperialistically. Their aggressive campaigns against other peoples have always been represented as "spreading civilization." For centuries the idea of "Holy Russia" has characterized the national arrogance of the Russians. This characteristic trait has readily been adopted by the Soviet Russians. Whatever the Russians themselves may say about the manner of their conduct towards other peoples, there is no denying the fact that despotism has continued to remain a decisive factor of all their expansion plans.

Nikolay Berdyayev for instance openly admitted:

"We are equally justified in describing the Russian people as despotically minded or anarchistically susceptible; and we are just as equally justified in talking about the trend to nationalism and to national self-conceit, or the inclination to universalism."

According to Berdyayev, the Russian people are cruel yet human, savage yet compassionate. But of these qualities, those of cruelty and savagery dominate when it is a case of putting imperialistic ideas into practice. It is precisely these characteristics which guide Russian imperialism to success, since all feeling of consideration for others is eliminated. For some of the Russian intellectuals Communism in 1917 became a new ideal, by means of which they wanted to realize their traditional desire for a universal world domination on the part of the Russians. And it is interesting to note that they firmly believed in this.

Soviet Russia was, however, obliged to readjust itself and to adapt itself to the psychology of other persons and peoples. The mere promise that Communism meant the prospect of bread was bound to be ineffective, since everyone asked what the further prospects, after bread, were likely to be. For this reason the Communists propagated the slogan of the freedom of the peoples. But it transpired that this slogan was interpreted in Communist Russia as the subjugation of other peoples. As early as November 1917 the Communists issued a proclamation on the rights "of the peoples of Russia." In this proclamation they promised that every people subjugated by Russia, whether large or small, had the right to determine their national life themselves, and even had the right to declare their state independence and to secede from Russia. In view of conditions at that time this proclamation was regarded as extremely considerate and obliging. The subjugated peoples hastened to found their own national states without delay. Hence, during the years 1917 to 1920 the following national states were founded: Ukraine, Byelorussia, North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Idel-Ural (Volga-Ural), the Crimea, Bashkiria, and Turkestan. Finland, the Baltic states and Poland seceded from the Russian state union.

Thereupon the Soviet Russians clearly showed what they had meant by the freedom and the national right of self-determination of the peoples. They attacked the national states and succeeded in overthrowing all the national governments. Their slogan of freedom was changed into one of re-conquest. For the word "freedom" they substituted the word "liberation." They "collected" the former colonial possessions of tsarist Russia under one uniform Soviet imperial flag. Such, in the opinion of the Soviet Russians, was liberation.

Moscow applied two different standards when assessing the liberation of the colonial peoples of Russia and the secession of the colonies from Western colonial rule. This is obvious from a statement made by Stalin in 1920, in which he said:

"We are in favour of the secession of India, the Arab countries (Arabia, Egypt, Morocco) and other colonies from the Entente, because secession in this case means the liberation of these subjugated countries from imperialism, the weakening of the position of imperialism and the strengthening of the position of the revolution in Russia. We are against the secession of the periphery (non-Russian countries) from Russia, because secession in this case means imperialistic bondage for the periphery, weakening of the revolutionary power of Russia and strengthening of the position of imperialism. For this reason the Communists, who are in favour of the secession of the colonies from the Entente, cannot at the same time fight for the secession of the periphery from Russia.⁵⁾"

Thus the Communist leaders regarded it as right that other colonies should strive to attain independence, but wrong for the colonies of Russia to do so.

In March 1921 Stalin limited the meaning of the national right of self-determination considerably. He affirmed:

"Apart from the right of self-determination of the peoples, there is also the right of the working class to the consolidation of their power, and the right of self-determination is subordinate to this right.⁶⁾"

The idea of the right of self-determination of the peoples therefore became meaningless. It is thus obvious that Communism does not acknowledge any national right of self-determination if this does not fit in with its policy. The Soviet leaders only make use of the right of self-determination for their own purposes. Lenin acknowledged that fundamentally every nationality had the right to state independence, but by this he did not mean a right of self-determination with all its consequences, even though there was talk of this in the propaganda that was disseminated abroad. Lenin formulated a right

⁵⁾ J. V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Problem*, Tula, 1920, p. VII.

⁶⁾ Kazakhstan, Alma Ata, 1930, p. XII.

to "free secession and to the formation of an independent state", but it is obvious from Stalin's interpretation at the 10th Party Congress what is meant by this.

"At the present time when the liberation movement in the colonies is spreading, this watchword is in our opinion a revolutionary watchword. Since the Soviet states are united in a federation in accordance with the principle of voluntariness, the peoples belonging to the R.S.F.S.R. of their own free decision made no use of the right to secession. But when it is a question of colonies that are subjugated by England, France, America and Japan, and when it is a question of subjugated peoples such as those of Arabia, Mesopotamia, Turkey, or Hindustan, that is to say of countries that are colonies or semi-colonies, then the right to secession is a revolutionary watchword."

A few months previously, Stalin, who at that time was People's Commissar for Nationalities and thus competent for this question, had written:

"Naturally, the peripheral regions of Russia, the nations and tribes that inhabit these peripheral regions, like all other nations have the inalienable right to secession from Russia... But here it is not a question of the rights of nations which are indisputable, but of the interests of the masses of the population, both in the heart of Russia and in the peripheral regions... But the interests of the masses indicate that the demand for secession on the part of the peripheral regions is, in view of the present stage of the revolution, an out-and-out counter-revolutionary demand."

Again and again the Communist Party of the Soviet Union maintains that the non-Russian peoples have realized their national right of self-determination under the leadership of the Soviet Russians, and that they therefore belong to the Soviet Union "voluntarily" and regard the Russians as their "big brother." But if one of the Soviet Russian colonial countries were to venture to demand voluntary secession from this Union on the strength of the Constitution of the Soviet Union, the leading forces would be branded as counter-revolutionaries and, in accordance with Paragraph 58 of the Criminal Code, would most certainly be sentenced to death.⁷ So far, at least, no one who demanded the secession of his country from the union of the Soviet Union has ever remained alive.

At present 15 non-Russian Soviet Republics (S.S.R.), 20 Autonomous Soviet Republics (A.S.S.R.), and 8 non-Russian Autonomous Regions (A.O.) belong to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which was founded on December 30, 1922. In theory the Union Republics are

⁷ Hugh Seton-Watson, "Das Nationalitätenproblem in der Sowjetunion" (The National Problem in the Soviet Union), in *Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst*, No. 44, Bonn, 1960, p. 115.

independent, but in actual practice they are by no means independent. On the contrary, if some "independent" Republic of the Soviet Union attempts to criticize or to disregard one of the decrees of the Union government in Moscow, the persons responsible are promptly arrested. The security organs acting on the instructions of the Soviet government see to this. The federative appearance of the Soviet Russian state has given rise to an erroneous opinion abroad, namely that the Soviet Union is a community of states which has been formed on the strength of the voluntary union of the peoples concerned. Thus an Indian scholar, for instance, failed to comprehend that there is a vast difference between the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R. He pointed out that no one had forced independent India to join the Commonwealth and was of the opinion that this example could also be applied to Soviet conditions.

Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 26, 1960, Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker in replying to the question raised by Khrushchov regarding colonialism, courageously unmasked the nature of Soviet domination when he said: "The General Assembly is still concerned with the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. How are we to reconcile that tragedy with Mr. Khrushchov's confident assertion of a few days ago in this Assembly: 'It will always be the Soviet stand... that countries should establish systems... of their own free will and choosing.' What of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia? What of freedom-loving Ukrainians and other Eastern European peoples?"

Erroneous conceptions of the federative structure of the Soviet Russian colonial empire unfortunately prevail not only in Asia and Africa, but also in Europe and America, a fact which leads to illusions regarding the true nature of Soviet Russian imperialism. Many people have not yet realized that the Soviet Union is not a voluntary but a compulsory union of the peoples and that its composition is tactically determined by what only appear to be national principles. In its national policy Soviet Russian imperialism has resorted to terrorism in dealing with individuals and with whole peoples. This terrorist character of Soviet Russian imperialism is clearly evident from the cases of genocide perpetrated since World War II (1946) against small colonial peoples of the Soviet Union such as the Crimean Tatars, Balkars, Karachays, Chechen-Ingush, Kalmucks and Volga-Germans. These national groups were for the most part murdered, or else expelled for many years from their native region. As regards the terrorist period of 1937 to 1939, the leading men of the Soviet Union avoid mentioning them.

The following figures show the results of the extermination policy pursued by the Soviet Russians with regard to the Turkic peoples. According to Soviet statistics, there were about 30 million Turks in the Soviet Union in 1920. According to the 1959 census, however,

there are only about 23 million Turks now living in the Soviet Union. Instead of a natural increase in the population of the Turkic peoples, who usually have large families, an artificial, decrease in the population figure is apparent.⁸

In addition, Soviet Russian colonial policy also pursues the aim of Russifying the non-Russian peoples. In tsarist Russia the Russification of the non-Russians was openly admitted to be a political aim. The Soviet Russians do not openly admit this fact, but they pursue an even more intensive Russification policy towards their colonial peoples than was the case in tsarist Russia. They disguise this policy by calling it "internationalism." Formally the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union are allowed to develop on national lines, but in actual practice and in character they must follow Russian "socialistic" example. Representatives of the non-Russian peoples have on various occasions had to affirm that Russian has become their second mother-tongue. Since 1938 Russian is a compulsory subject at school for non-Russian children. To this end a special decree was issued. And the schooling law of 1959 guarantees the priority of the Russian language over the non-Russian languages. Non-Russian children "can" now, if their parents "wish", be taught in Russian. But this "can" and "wish" is not decided by the parents of the children, but by the Party functionaries. Even non-Russian functionaries have stated that the children "of course" want to be taught in the "language of the revolution — of the big brother— of progress and of Lenin."

The tsars engaged mainly in economic colonization. The Soviet Russian colonization policy, however, is more intensive, even though it is disguised as "brotherly help to build up and establish socialism and Communism, as well as to further the cultivation of the former backward colonies of Russia." Khrushchov ushered in a new era in Russian colonization policy when he started his campaign for the cultivation of virgin regions in 1954. In this connection he said in 1956:

"We must quickly seize possession of the virgin lands in the East (beyond the Urals: Turkestan and Siberia) and must consolidate our position there."⁹

The northern regions of Turkestan, the present Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, were particularly badly hit by the Soviet Russian colonization policy. At present (according to the 1959 census) there

⁸) See also Gerhard von Mende, "Die Türkvolker in dem Herrschaftsbereich der Sowjetunion" (The Turkic peoples in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union), in supplementary edition *Das Parlament*, Bonn, No. 16/60; pp. 257-271.

⁹) Baymirza Hayit, "Unter sowjetischer Kolonialherrschaft" (Under Soviet colonial rule), published in *Basler Nachrichten* of January 29, 1959. P. 2.

are 4,014,000 Russians living in Kazakhstan and, as a result of Moscow's compulsory resettlement policy, 762,000 Ukrainians, 108,000 Byelorussians, 53,000 Poles and a number of Germans (Soviet statistics do not mention any figure in their case), that is to say, according to official statistics, 4,937,000 new settlers as compared to 2,755,000 native Kazakhs. The population of Kazakhstan numbers 9,310,000 (1959 census). This population figure is arrived at by adding the number of persons of various nationalities, who do not belong to either of the two afore-mentioned groups, i. e. the Kazakhs and the new settlers. The native inhabitants of this Soviet Republic, however, only constitute 29.6 per cent of the total population.

Moscow designates its colonization policy as cultivation and brotherly economic aid on the part of the Russian "big brother." On the other hand, however, it cannot conceal the fact that the territories of the "little brothers" possess considerable economic advantages. The colonial territories of Soviet Russia are rich in raw materials. For example, their share in the entire Soviet production of coal amounts to 59.4 per cent, and similarly for oil to 95 per cent, for iron ore to 65 per cent, for manganese ore to 100 per cent, for non-ferrous and rare metals to 80 per cent, and for uranium ore to 100 per cent.

During the years 1954 to 1959 the Soviet government invested 20 milliard roubles in Kazakhstan for the opening up of virgin regions for purposes of cultivation. In return the state received grain to the value of 31 milliard roubles. "Hence the net profit of the state amounted to 11 milliard roubles", so the official Soviet paper *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* of August 24, 1960, which is published in Alma Ata, wrote.

Colonization measures in Kazakhstan reached their culmination at the end of December 1960. On December 26, 1960, a "Virgin Land Province", with a total area of about 600,000 sq. kilometres and an arable area of 17 million hectares, was founded in Kazakhstan. The entire management of this "new land province" was entrusted to Russians.

A further characteristic feature of Soviet Russian colonialism and imperialism is the partition policy. In 1924 Turkestan, for example, was divided up into five "Republics." This partition of a people was designated as "reunification of individual peoples." Five national tribes were transformed into five separate peoples.

Those who advocate the unity of Turkestan are severely punished, since an attitude of this kind is regarded as Pan-Turkism and persecuted accordingly. Moscow applies various standards, however, as regards the national unity of other peoples. In North Korea, for instance, one can talk about aims for the reunification of Korea quite

openly. As regards the question of the unity of Germany, the Soviet Russians adopt yet another standpoint. Moscow constantly talks about two German states which have allegedly come into existence as a result of the partition. As far as Moscow is concerned, their reunification would only be possible under the sickle and hammer.

"When the question of Germany is discussed, they (the imperialistic powers) refer to the right of the peoples to self-determination and demand the reunification of Germany, even though the latter consists of two states with entirely different social and economic orders"...

"The right of the peoples to self-determination is a national question. The unification of Germany is, however, under the present circumstances, above all a class question. The Germans have been separated as a result of a different development of individual parts of the former German Reich and in consequence of the formation of two states with a different social and economic order.¹⁰"

Fundamentally all this merely amounts to different versions of one and the same game, as played by imperialism: Soviet Russia aims to rule the peoples in the manner which seems most effective to it from its point of view.

One of the most important methods to which Soviet Russian imperialism resorts is the systematic training of intellectuals of the various nationalities in the Soviet Russian sphere of influence. In this respect Moscow has achieved considerable success. These national forces are even entrusted with leading posts in Soviet services for a limited period. Russians, of course, act as their deputies or co-workers. When these national forces become a menace to the Soviet regime by trying to rectify Moscow's policy in their native countries to the advantage of their fellow-countrymen, they are promptly removed from public life by Moscow and are replaced by other newly trained forces. This kind of procedure is constantly being repeated in the Soviet administrative apparatus. In this way the national resistance is rendered innocuous, and Moscow is thus able to continue to assert itself in the subjugated countries.

By its skilful strategy Moscow has included millions of persons in its sphere of influence. The meeting-place and headquarters for all of them is Moscow, and Communism is the common basis. All the countries of the Soviet bloc are dependent on the Soviet Union. Their Communist leaders adhere to Moscow and go on hoping that Communism will achieve world domination. The feelings of the people play no part whatever in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Uprisings on the part of the peoples are promptly and brutally crushed. This was the case in Central Germany in 1953 and in

¹⁰) *Pravda* of June 29, 1961.

Hungary in 1956. Suppression of all manifestation of the national will is a characteristic of Russian imperialism.

Moscow has had considerable experience in the subjugation of other peoples. As long as Russia heads the Soviet bloc, it will undoubtedly do its utmost to prevent the subjugated peoples from becoming independent, that is to say, it will never relinquish its rule over them. It can also be assumed for certain that the Soviet Union will make good use of its influence on the East bloc and the Communist parties to determine world politics in its favour. Soviet Russia is already a universal colonial world power. The free world is in danger of succumbing to the imperialistic lust of expansion if it abandons its determined defensive attitude. The purpose of coexistence watchwords is to delude the peoples whilst Communism prepares to attack. This was obvious from the speech which Khrushchov held at the Party College in Moscow on January 6, 1961. He demanded a policy of "peaceful" coexistence, but also an intensification of the economic, political and ideological fight. On all continents the Soviet Union has already adopted a fighting position against the free peoples. But above all it has intensified its activity in Asia and Africa in order to take the place of the former colonial rulers there and to use these countries as a base from which to bring pressure to bear on free Europe and America. The opportunities in Asia and Africa seemed particularly favourable to the Soviet Union: on the one hand, because the countries there have not yet stabilized their independence; and on the other hand, because of a certain natural contrast to the former rulers. For this reason it is absolutely imperative that the attention of the Afro-Asian countries should be drawn to the menace of Soviet Russian imperialism.

V. THE COURSE OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM IN ASIA AND AFRICA

The countries of Asia and Africa seem to Moscow to be a very suitable field for activity directed against Europe and the USA. As early as the beginning of the 20th century the Russian Prime Minister Count Witte affirmed:

"From the shore of the Pacific Ocean and the peaks of the Himalayas Russia will control not only Asiatic but also European affairs.¹¹"

The Soviet government elaborated this thought still further:

"The Foreign Minister of the tsars, Gorchakov, has said that the future of Russia lies in Asia. This indicates the line which Russia must take in its policy towards the Orient.¹²"

And the Soviet government expressed itself even more clearly in the following words:

"West European imperialism, having been repulsed and defeated in the Orient, will fall into decay and will die a natural death."

Moscow thus intends to deal Europe a blow in the Orient first of all and then to conquer it.

One of the main principles of the Soviet policy in the Orient is the aim "either to win over the peoples of the Orient, or else to neutralize them in the clash with Europe." The Orient has thus become one of the most important objectives of Soviet Russian imperialism. Moscow's aims in the Afro-Asian countries can be summed up as follows:

- 1) The Russians advocate anti-colonial ideas in Asia and Africa in territories which formerly were or still are colonies, in order to first of all establish contact with the peoples of Asia and Africa.
- 2) For years Moscow has been endeavouring to foster and strengthen the attitude of resentment maintained by the former colonial peoples against their former colonial masters.
- 3) The Soviet Russians are endeavouring to influence the feeling of solidarity of the peoples of Asia and Africa in keeping with Communist world propaganda and to use this feeling of solidarity against the West. To this end they use every possible opportunity to disseminate and realize their own propagandistic ideas.
- 4) Moscow is taking an active part in the intellectual life of the Asian and African peoples in order to influence them ideologically in the Communist sense.

¹¹) Dieter Friede, *Das russische perpetuum mobile* (The Russian perpetuum mobile), Würzburg, 1959, p. 31.

¹²) Cf. *Novyy Vostok*, Moscow, No. 3/1923, p. 90.

- 5) All efforts on the part of the government of the Soviet Union in the developing countries are concentrated on changing the economic structure of these countries. In this way the Soviet Russians are hoping to change the economy there from a free-enterprise economy to one that is based on a Communist forcibly guided and planned economic system. The aim of Moscow's economic assistance, disguised as "aid", has so far been to infiltrate Communism into the developing countries.
- 6) The Kremlin has succeeded in setting up numerous camouflaged organizations in the countries of Asia and Africa and in finding supporters of the Communist regime. The latter enable the Soviet Union to carry on its subversive activity to an ever-increasing degree in the developing countries.

It is the obvious aim of the Soviet Union in the Afro-Asian countries to sovietize the latter as far as possible. But the conservative attitude of these peoples, their adherence to traditions, their dread of every type of colonialism, and the influence of religion have proved a natural bulwark against Communism. The starving population, which would indeed be a favourable field of activity for Communism, has however not been tempted by Moscow's assurances and promises. Soviet Russia has therefore abandoned its plan of asserting itself in the developing countries with the help of the starving population, and instead, is now trying to win over influential personalities of ecclesiastical and political life, businessmen and, above all, discontented intellectuals. Moscow is at present relying on these "progressive" circles.

The Soviet Union would like to combat the "imperialism and colonialism" of the West in the Asian and African countries. The course to be taken in this respect is as follows: in the first place to sever the Asian and African peoples from the West and then obtain national independence for these peoples; to set up a so-called national front; to undermine the social, political and economic structure of the young nations by internal conflicts which have been provoked intentionally; finally, to spread the notorious watchword of "class conflict" and in this way oust the so-called reactionary citizens from their positions and help the so-called progressive citizens to seize power. The latter are then to rule their country in the name of Communism. The Soviet leaders are of the opinion that this course is the easiest and the shortest.

To a certain extent the Soviet leaders have already realized their aim "to win over and neutralize the Orient." True, they did not manage to win over the free peoples of the Orient entirely because this part of the world advanced into the foreground of international political differences, but they did at least encourage the neutralist aims and aspirations of the peoples of the Orient. Today the majority

of these peoples tend towards neutralism. The opinion is expressed in numerous Soviet publications that the neutralism of the Orient is more appropriate for the fight against the West than an over-hasty attempt to rope in the Orient openly in the Communist world conquest plans. Moscow's imperialism is thus pursuing its original aim, namely to defeat Europe and recently, America, too, in Asia and Africa. Should Asia and Africa succumb to Moscow's wiles and become its tool as a result of Soviet subterfuges, diplomatic manoeuvres, economic temptations and the disintegration of the established middle class, then Europe will be greatly endangered.

**BOLSHEVISM
AND
INTERNATIONALISM**

by

OLEXANDER YOURCHENKO

It may seem axiomatic that Communism, or Bolshevism — if not exactly adequate as a phenomenon of the so-called “scientific socialism” of Marx and Engels and its practical realisation in subsequent historical and geographical circumstances — is at least an ideological deduction from Marxism that remains more or less true to Bolshevik postulates and historic objectives. For the Bolsheviks themselves published, in official declarations, the theoretical principles of the two German socialists of the last century, although these principles had, of course, been duly “developed” and “examined” by the Russian, V. Ulyanov-Lenin, and his successor in office, Djughashvili-Stalin, into an ideological Koran, the only permissible — or rather, obligatory — conception of life within the boundaries of the Communist state.

One may ask whether contemporary Russian Bolshevism attains to the theoretical claims and demands of German Marxism of the last and current centuries, and whether this Bolshevism has its entire origin in the “scientific socialism” of the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848?

Is it the case that the philosophical, social, political and historical system which originated in the concrete conditions of social development of Western Europe, and which, according to the statement of its creators, had its roots in purely European sources — English political economy, French socialism and German philosophy — is indeed so nigh to the future socio-theoretical re-organisers of Russia, a country on an incomparably lower level of political, social and economic development? Or is it that the system acted at the most as the ideological singpost for the fathers of Russian “revolutionary Marxism?”

First of all we should bear in mind the important fact that the Bolsheviks themselves, while underlining their Marxist orthodoxy, call their ideological faith not simply “Marxism” but “Marxism-Leninism.” In this way emphasis is laid upon the new independent

contribution made by the Bolsheviks to the Marxist philosophical doctrine. In accordance with an official statement, "Leninism" — to take this term separately — is the Marxism of the "period of imperialism and of proletarian revolutions"; which means that it is, as asserted by its creators and theorists, an elaboration of Marxist doctrine in the light of the new historical situation after the death of its creators. On the other hand, should one try to denote the doctrine as a whole, then the old name is quite inadequate in the eyes of its Russian followers and their successors. And therefore it appears that there is in question not only a further — in point of time — projection of Marxism, but also a more or less significant revision of its fundamental principles. In studying the Leninist theorists it may indeed transpire that, under a camouflage of "completions", "further developments", and so on, of Marxism, contemporary Russian Communism carried out a far-reaching revision of the theoretical structure of the doctrine of Marx and Engels, especially in those sectors that did not harmonise with the objectives, aims and tactics of their Russian "revolutionary" successors. In connection with this revision one may recall the following tenets of modern Communism: the possibility of a socialist revolution "in one country", the theory of Lenin concerning the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as instanced in the Soviet government, the theory of the so-called "breaking of the weaker link" of world capitalism, the theory of the Communist Party as the "champion of the class struggle", the "theory" of Stalin that a one-party system is the only form of "dictatorship of the proletariat", and so on. One cannot deal here with all the changes and additions made by Bolshevik theorists to Marxist dogma, hitherto considered orthodox and inviolable. It is only necessary to stress the point that the leaders and followers of "revolutionary Marxism" — as asserted by Lenin himself — were not inclined to treat Marxist theory as something exclusive and sacrosanct. For Lenin considered an "independent elaboration of Marxist theory" by Russian Marxists as "especially urgent." His successor Stalin preferred "creative" Marxism to "dogmatic" Marxism and asserted that he must support the former.

Especially interesting with reference to our subject is the innovation of Russian "creative Marxism-Leninism" as a highly gifted deduction by Stalin himself with regard to the "championship by Russia" of world revolution; also the false idea that "only Europe can guide us", the assertion that the centre of the revolutionary workers' movement had been transferred to the East during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, and the theses dealing with the leading role of the Russian proletariat, *et cetera*.

The points just quoted briefly above should show clearly enough that the roots of peculiarities in Russian "revolutionary Marxism"

do not only lie in conflicting conceptions within the common ideology, but also in the differing sources of German "scientific socialism" and of Russian Bolshevism.

Lenin and his followers have always emphasised the fact that, while being inveterate Marxists, they did not deny the ideological and political legacies of the Russian "pre-Marxist socialists" or "revolutionary democrats" — Byelinsky, Chernyshevsky and others. Lenin saw in this heritage, on the contrary, the national pride of the Great Russians (Muscovites) who to his way of thinking had contributed generously to the "enrichment" of socialistic world thought. The official Party history remarks, certainly with a degree of precaution, on an ideological "dullness" in the "pre-Marxist period." But the part that the latter period played is significant inasmuch that without its contribution "creative Marxism" could not have taken root in Russia.

Sources of non-official Soviet history of Bolshevism prove clearly that the part played by non-Marxist predecessors in the formation and development of Russian Communism was far more important than admitted by official historians: it was these factors and not the Western conceptions of Marx and Engels that were decisive in the evolution of the doctrine and method of Russian Bolshevism. As Lenin himself confessed, Chernyshevsky's influence upon his own ideology was almost decisive. He admitted also that thanks only to Chernyshevsky, "he first became acquainted with philosophical materialism." It was Chernyshevsky who demonstrated to the future leaders of Bolshevism "what qualities a revolutionary should have, what rules he should follow, how he should gain his ends, by what method he should proceed." In other words, the future methods of Russian "revolutionary Marxism" — the main weapon of Russian Marxism in the struggle for domination and in the organisation of the total subjugation of the peoples of the former Russian empire — was elaborated, first of all, under the direct influence of Chernyshevsky.

In the well-known proclamation *The Young Russia*, published by an underground circle in May 1862, which continued the social-political programme of Chernyshevsky, there were, as stated by a members of this circle, Mitskevich, many catchwords that have been realised by the October revolution: one may find here the prophecy that Russia would first perform the great task of socialism; here the organisation of collective factories is called for, collective trade advocated, the nationalisation of the land, the confiscation of ecclesiastical wealth, the categorical demand for a strict centralised party to complete the revolution. After a successful revolution this centralised party was to lay as quickly as possible the foundations of a new economic and political life by means of a dictatorship; and

this dictatorship would regulate election to a national assembly in such a way that no adherents of the old social order could be elected to that body. All these demands were met in the October revolution with the one exception that there was no proletariat. The ideas and maxims of "classical" Marxism were by no means all realised after the October revolution, and it was noticeable that the Russians were not even attempting to realise them. The principles of *The Young Russia* on the other hand were carried out in their entirety by the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in accordance with the teachings of Lenin and Stalin; for this idea — "dictatorship of the proletariat" — had taken shape in the mind of the founder of Bolshevism under the influence of *The Young Russia* rather than of the Marxist formulae. An active adherent of the "Young Russia" group, Mme Yaseneva, once stated that Lenin always stressed one point of its Jacobin programme when discussing with her problems of taking over power. She added: "I am now more than ever convinced that he was already at that time speaking of a dictatorship of the proletariat." It was Lenin himself, moreover, who "completed" Marx by asserting that the working class does not evolve the essentials of a socialist consciousness in the course of its natural development, but that socialist consciousness must be brought to the proletariat "from without" — an assertion termed as an ideological heresy by the orthodox Marxist Plekhanov. Lenin in fact accepted the whole programme and method of the "Jacobins" but failed to perceive one important element: on what "people" would the promoters rely? And it was in looking for the answer to this question that the future Russian dictator seized upon the idea of Marx. The proletariat, the "grave-digger" of the former social order, a class that would not create the new ideology or a new order, but would be the executor of new ideas brought "from without" by socialist intellectuals. Special appreciation of the non-Marxist predecessors of Bolshevism has found its official expression in contemporary Soviet historical doctrine and political theory. A Soviet document of 1947 characterises these pre-Marxist trends amongst Russians as follows: "The higher form of pre-Marxist socialism consisted of the theories of the great Russian revolutionary democrats of the 19th century — Herzen, Byelinsky, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov..." In revolutionary effort the great Russian utopians excelled by far the utopian socialists of the West, and, in consequence, "scientific socialism" originating in Germany with Marx and Engels and then "supplemented and enriched" by Lenin in Russia has been conditioned by Russian pre-Marxist socialists rather than by Western historic development. The "Leninism" that originated in Russia and adopted inferences and conclusions of Marx with regard to the development of the capitalist world, together with a certain prognosis of Marxism on the basis prepared by Russian "revolutionary democrats", has become a real and complete "scientific Communism."

Such are, to a certain extent, the features of a conscious or half-conscious historical connection between the Bolshevism of Lenin and its non-Marxist predecessors. But far more important for a clear understanding of the spiritual nature of Russian Communism are those phenomena that arise and crystallise within it without contradiction to it. The Russian — that is, the deeply national — nature of Bolshevism is national in the sense that it originated in the specific conditions of the Russian historical process, and has sources not merely in the Russian ideological processes, and movements of the last historical period. Its roots may be found also in the more removed periods, and traced through all epochs of Russian history since the Rostov-Suzdal principality on the 12th century. It will be appropriate here to cite but a few of the characteristics of Russian national history, making use of the works of the two most prominent Russian intellectuals of our time — Berdyayev and Fedotov.

On the dependence of Bolshevism — as discussed above — upon the “revolutionary democrats” of the mid 19th century, Berdyayev declares that even Byelinsky “could be considered... as one of the predecessors of Marxist socialism and perhaps of Communism as well.” To verify the assertion further one may look at portraits common to the early “enlightener” of the last century and the future “revolutionary Marxist.” Berdyayev states: “It is erroneous to believe that the socialism of Byelinsky was sentimental. Byelinsky was vehement... and to a certain extent malicious.” One finds in Byelinsky that distinctly developed distrust with regard to the people, the tendency towards leadership and domination of the broad masses despite all propaganda declarations — “The people are so foolish that they must be led to their happiness by force.” Berdyayev is convinced that the political cynic and terrorist Tkachov was a “greater forerunner of Bolshevism than Marx and Engels.” In this Berdyayev is supported by Fedotov who takes it for granted that another Russian “Jacobin”, the “malicious Nechayev”, gave — perhaps unconsciously — to Lenin the impulse “to learn organisational and tactical immorality.”

The way for Bolshevism was prepared by those specific circumstances of Russian historical development that brought forth a feeling of submission towards organs of government both among the leading circles and the people of Russia. This resulted from the destruction of all symptoms of Russian civic culture that might have revived inclination to individual responsibility and democracy. And this characteristic led Fedotov to believe that the “new Soviet human being was not so much cemented in the Marxist school as produced in the former Muscovite Tsardom, receiving a slight polish at the

same time." To look at the generation of the October revolution for a moment: their grandfathers lashed each other in the district courts: they would visit the Winter Palace of the Tsars on 9 January, thus instilling their innate monarchical feelings into the new red rulers. According to Berdyayev, the Russian people had neither political freedom nor freedom of spirit. And this is why a liberal revolution of the bourgeoisie in Russia which would require to be effected by legal means was always a utopia beyond the reach of Russian traditions and prevailing revolutionary ideas, which by virtue of these peculiarities of the Russian political and civil system were always totalitarian, theocratic or socialistic. They were products of that special political and ideological climate of Russian history which "in the Tartar school and in Muscovite service" had created a "special type of Russian — a Muscovite type which proved to be the firmest and most obstinate of all changeable phenomena of the Russian national scene throughout all its history." To this inveterate Russian national type, according to the same author, there is peculiar a sense of humility and servitude on the one hand and of national exclusiveness on the other. His native country is unique in orthodoxy and in its socialism, and takes first place in the whole world — it is the "third Rome." The Russian despises the other, the Western, world; he does not know it, he does not like it and he is afraid of it. His pathos is not freedom but that Russian "liberty" which is an unlimited arbitrariness without regard to others. His civic awareness is weak, his imperial consciousness but the stronger. This consciousness, Berdyayev says, "was nourished not so much by the interests of the state (apart from the people) as by the thirst for power." It issues from the sense of inequality, eagerness for destruction and violence towards the weak. The Russian national conscience is not acquainted with the "bourgeois virtues that are so highly appreciated in the Western Europe and with civic responsibility as well." As Berdyayev believes, the idea of messianism is developed among the Russians in the same degree as it occurs among the Hebrews, and may be followed throughout the course of Russian history up to the era of Communism. For these reasons Moscow is believed to be the "third Rome", the Third International connected with the Russian idea. Communism may be said to be a Russian phenomenon irrespective of the Marxist ideology. Lenin impressed Berdyayev as "a genuine Russian with a tinge of Tatar feature", impressed him on the grounds of his messianic idea that, through a mission of the proletariat, could be connected and identified with the Russian messianic idea — and "that is why Leninism-Stalinism is no longer classical Marxism."

Despite this, the leaders of Bolshevism declared Marx to be their ideological example, their ideological guide for the purpose of realising their plans for political and social reconstruction not only in Russia but throughout the world. The reasons for this declaration

would be out of place in this essay, but one has already been given — namely, the notion of the proletariat as the principal basis and the “fighting” force of the future social-political revolution upon which the Bolshevik “socialist intelligentsia” could rely. The “revolutionary democrats” and “Young Russia” sought “their support among the abstractly imagined people”, especially among the Great Russian peasants, i. e. among the dispersed masses who had recently been in bondage and were in no way capable of either organised or general and spontaneous action. Lenin pointed out that intellectual political terrorists were mistaken in this respect when they began to fight against the Tsarist autocracy on behalf of the autocracy of the “revolutionary party.” The young Russian proletariat was not very significant but it was numerous enough to represent “masses” and play a parallel role of that of the young German partisans of Hegel in the *Communist Manifesto*, and thus it was a sheet anchor for the revolutionary ideas and plans of the Russian Jacobins, as was noted by Vladimir Ulyanov, the nobleman of Simbirsk whose elder brother, Alexander, perished in the struggle for the ideas of “Young Russia.” And yet, on the other hand, to learn from the West in the matter of purely national interests has been the Russian political tradition since Peter I. This latter “Bolshevik on the throne” — to use the words of Berdyayev — was enraptured with Western patterns and forms of political organisation, at the same time filled with aversion for the earlier forms of Russian state organisation, even of ancient Muscovite customs; and the same tendencies are found in Lenin who remarked on the backwardness of Russia which had led to its being beaten by “the Tartar Khans, Turkish Sultans and Polish landlords.” But it would be as great an error to see in this merely external aversion of Lenin to Russia any proof of his international sentiments as to read into the Moscow-phobia of Peter I — the greatest reformer of the Russian state before the Bolsheviks — any indifference or hostility towards the idea of Russia as a great power.

Be this as it may, from all the ideas and philosophical trends of the West advanced in the political and social sphere Lenin chose Marxism — above all, chose its former dogma of an overthrow by force and of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This ideological and allegedly organic connection of Bolshevism with German “scientific socialism” compelled the Bolsheviks to imitate the latter in principle, and for this reason one cannot evade the question as to what is national and what international in Marxism.

K. Marx and F. Engels, pupils of German classical philosophy, are considered to be the first precursors of the notion of internationalism. In 1848 they concluded their first programme-document with words that have since become the sacred formula of this idea. Its nature

had to be based not so much on principles of the solidarity and union of peoples — for such watchwords and ideas are not lacking in world history — but rather on instances of the preponderance of social over national and of class over the national in-group. The thesis of the *Communist Manifesto* was designed by the authors to mobilise and organise all adherents of a European social revolution to form one centralised body for purposes of action. And such hindrances to this aim as state frontiers and the instinct of cohesion within the national communities had to be somehow thrust aside.

By inviting the “proletarians of all countries to unite”, the authors of the London Manifesto were far from wishing to eliminate national problems from their immediate plans or from further perspectives of the world — or Europe. The fathers of German “scientific socialism” did not approve of the international extremism of their friends and followers. Lenin justly emphasises the fact that “the theory of Marx is as far from disregarding national movements as the earth is from the sky.”

According to Engels, organisation of political and social life beyond the national framework is impossible. He asserts that as long as national independence is denied a great people is unable to discuss its own inner problems seriously in the light of history. The contention of Marx’s son-in-law, Lafargue, that nationality and nation may be merely outmoded prejudices, was refuted by his German father-in-law with great indignation because he could see in such formula a far from international motive. “My son-in-law” wrote Marx, “does not understand that in denying nationality he is probably showing a preference for the swallowing of nationalities by the classical French nation.”

It is, of course, undeniable that these first attempts to realise their plans by the London emigrants — of which the publication of the Manifesto was a part — or at least, to prepare a basis for such plans, was made under the conditions and within the framework of the European revolutions of 1848-49, above all of the German revolution. Marx and Engels were on the extreme left-wing of the German revolutionary camp, they promoted and stood for its most extreme watchwords and objectives. It is no secret that this revolution was, above all, a struggle on behalf of the German national ideal, to unify the German people into one state, and that the German radicals of the years 1848-49 were radicals not so much in the social as in the national sphere. It may also be well-known that Marx and Engels remained to the end of their lives adversaries of Bismarck not only because he stood for political conservatism but primarily because he had created the “Little-German” conception of union, with Prussia as the leader while excluding Austrian lands from a unified German state. In this they probably differed most widely from F. Lassalle, the problem of German national unity being fundamental to all their

plans for political and social reconstruction. In saying that the proletariat should "organise the unity of the nation", Marx set an aim whose realisation the weak German bourgeoisie could in no way achieve.

In denying the heretical conception of Lafargue that appeared to him dangerous to the German national revolution, Marx — albeit unwittingly — had no objection to the supposition that the German "classical" nation should play the leading part in subsequent European history. And with truth, for of the three national sources of international "scientific socialism" the Germans were to act as the synthesis without which the whole conception of European social revolution could neither be visualised nor prepared. The national and political formation of the German nation was a preliminary condition not only for the solution of German "internal affairs" but also for the future of socialistic Europe. The conception of a national political reorganisation of itself existed for Engels above all as problem of national self-affirmation and a right to greatness as a nation. Marx and Engels combatted the national liberation movements of the Slavic peoples of Austrian Empire in 1848 by terming them as counter-revolutionary, since the Slavic peoples in Austria were rebelling against the interests of European democracy as represented by the German revolution in this respect. The Danube Slavs, according to Engels, should "wait" till the German people were united in one state and, by virtue of their revolution, were democratised in the political respect so that a new social and political order could be brought into being for the Slavs.

The conception of future revolution, so far as Marx and Engels were concerned, started from the provision that such revolution must take place simultaneously in all or in most of the civilised countries. Among these, thought the founders of Marxism, belonged those countries from which they themselves derived their own social theories, the central place being occupied by their native Germany. Marxism originated and developed on German soil. It had to consolidate the German community in order that this community might accomplish its historical task in Europe. It is worth nothing that so-called classical Marxism nowhere else except in Russia spread so rapidly as in Germany and in the German-speaking provinces of Austria — not even in England and France, countries of its source. The figure of French socialism was, for example, Jaurès rather than Lafargue, while the British Labour Movement originated, according to Attlee, not from Marx but from the Bible.

For these reasons it may be concluded that the "scientific socialism" of Marx and Engels, appearing and growing as it did on German soil, was primarily an ideological trend of German social development. This supposition together with the actual political

activity of its leaders and adherents in the German political and social scene lead us to assume also that the internationalism of the authors of the London proclamation was itself a phenomenon of German great-power ideology coupled with the notion of German leadership of the "civilised nations", while these latter would also have leading functions with regard to the remaining "uncivilised" world.

Russian Bolshevism-Leninism has been quick to take advantage of these elements in classical Marxism to further its own historical interests; it has extended the mission of "civilised nations" — with socialist Germany in the centre — to devolve on Russia as regards leadership of a reorganised future world that will reach almost to planetary dimensions.

By proclaiming itself the most orthodox revolutionary form of Marxism, Bolshevism has announced its international postulates and watchwords with especial emphasis. Under the cloak of an extreme class internationalism Lenin commenced a certain policy during the First World War: Russian Bolshevism began to oppose so-called "social patriotism", the defection of the major part of the socialistic world movement from the "purity" of international Marxist theory thus providing an absolute defence. Stalin had already emphasised that the workers of the whole world are "above all members of a unique class or family, members of the unique army of socialism." elements in national and other orders which hinder the realisation of the idea of international solidarity must be removed. All attempts to take as principles of social life the principles of nation and nationality as fundamental to organic human community were blamed as phenomena of anti-proletarian "bourgeois" tendencies and influences which should be mercilessly opposed. "Bourgeois" nationalism and proletarian internationalism are, according to the teachings of Lenin, two hostile watchwords incapable of compromise in that they represent two class camps of the capitalistic world, and express two policies — even two philosophies.

And yet, during this period of the greatest emphasis on international watchwords, Lenin keeps away from extreme international trends in Bolshevism and in world social-democracy (viz. Rosa Luxemburg, E. Bukharin, Pyatakov, Artem and others who, like Paul Lafargue, denied the existence of the national problem for "proletarian socialism" by describing it as a "historical relic.") The motives for denial on the part of Lenin of the "national nihilism" advocated by so-called followers of Luxemburg were certainly not the same as those which impelled Marx against his son-in law. Marx feared that behind these cosmopolitan extremes of the French Marxist there lurked a tendency to place France in the lead of a socialist world instead of Germany. The leader of Russian Marxism was, however,

not afraid of being overrun by the German or Polish followers of Luxemburg since Russian Marxism was alive and established in a great power of vast extent. On the other hand, the international conception of the followers of Luxemburg seemed to offer great possibilities to Russian Bolshevism which aimed to gather the broadest possible "masses of workers of all nationalities on the broad basis of a struggle for socialism." The leader of the Russian "revolutionary proletariat" did, however, fear that the proclamation of the principles of "national nihilism" would immediately incite all the national liberation movements of the numerous peoples of Tsarist Russia against his policy. In addition, by directing his future reforms not only against the former political and social order in Russia but also against "world imperialism", that is against the whole system of the national-political relations of the Western world, Lenin attempted to utilise the immense forces of the liberation movements of the colonial nations. For this purpose, international direction of Leninist Bolshevism includes in its propaganda arsenal the watchwords of national maximalism, such as the right of peoples to self-determination "inclusive of their national separation." It is true that Bolshevik theory tries from time to time to limit this "right" and to subordinate it to the exigencies of international propaganda: "We should not forget", wrote Stalin in one of his articles, "that beside the right of nations to their self-determination there is also a right of the working class to strengthen its power"; and this right is a "higher right." In the event of collision, the first therefore should cede to the latter.

The internationalism of Lenin was, even in its prime, deprived of any cosmopolitan features such as negation of the nation and of nationality as political and social factors. It was as much "supra-national" as the German "scientific socialism" of Marx and the French internationalism of Lafargue. Lenin was profoundly convinced that the "classical" — in this case the Russian — nation would play leading role in the future international movement. The proclamation of the most extreme international and cosmopolitan watchwords and principles could in no way endanger the culture and political independence of a great nation provided these watchwords and principles were not promulgated by the active forces of another and greater power. Also the deliberate restriction of the right to national self-determination — in the interests of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", naturally — did not endanger either the statehood or the independence of Russia. The right had hitherto been demanded by people deprived of their own statehood, while the higher right of the proletariat to political power, was always guaranteed for the imperial nation thanks to the independent and dominating position of the latter. Thus the internationalism of the Russian Bolsheviks, no more than the watchword of the German authors "Workers of all

countries — unite!", was in no way the expression of supra-national trends in social life, but merely an instrument of great power ambitions — in this case those of the Russians, though camouflaged by a form of the national assimilation of smaller and greater nations by the immense national organism of Russia. This inner nature, and, to some extent, hidden aim of Russian Marxism and Bolshevism was aptly termed "Proletarians of all countries — Russify yourselves!" by the creator of Ukrainian non-Marxist socialism, M. Drahomanov, who declared that the well-known watchword of the London *Manifesto* would sound better in the Russian idiom.

The second quarter of the 20th century was remarkable for the acute crisis of ideas, or watchwords, concerning internationalism throughout the world. In the Soviet Union, according to Stalin, the national movement of the people of the former Tsarist Empire aiming at the liberation and self-determination were far more dangerous for Russia than the Russian "internationalists" prior to 1917 could have imagined.

Under such conditions, and particularly in consequence of the non-arrival of world revolution resulting in the necessity "of building up socialism in one country only", the international-proletarian basis of the Communist empire became small and insufficient. In the 1930's there commenced a thorough revision and revaluation of formerly existing Marxist-Leninist international definitions and slogans. The Bolsheviks themselves began to unmask the ideological and practical principles and aims of Bolshevism. Instead of the idea of the world proletariat the Bolsheviks pushed forward the idea of the "native country." In place of the international solidarity of the proletariat, "Soviet patriotism" was given first place in Russia. The conception of internationalism itself — not officially refuted — had been interpreted in the sense that the notion of internationalism does not exclude such patriotism but "on the contrary originates from genuine patriotism — from the love of the fatherland, from pride in its famous progressive revolutionary tradition and from hatred of its subjugators." Thus writes a contemporary Soviet citizen. The greatest expert of Soviet state science, P. Vyshinsky, tried to "throw a bridge" between the old international watchwords and the later conceptions of patriotism on the eve of the Second World War: "The fatherland that is the political, cultural and social milieu is the most effective factor in the class struggle of the proletariat... The native country, the fatherland, belonged in the historical sense to the respective people that inhabit it, who develop their culture and defend their independence and freedom."

The historical problems of the proletariat and its own class party acquired another character forthwith. Instead of struggling for international unity among "the workers of all countries", the Communists of Europe and Asia have, before all, to defend the national sovereignty

of their countries, allegedly endangered by "American imperialism." In November 1952, at the XIXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stalin, in addressing the foreign Communists and their political adherents, spoke as follows:

"The banners of national independence and sovereignty have been jettisoned. You and no-one else but you will have to bear these banners because you are the representatives of the Communist and democratic parties; you must carry the banners if you wish to be patriots of your country and if you desire to become a ruling force in your nation."

Especially flagrant are these new forms of Bolshevik political ideology if the so-called "rootless cosmopolitanism" is considered. In 1937 it was held to be a political utopia which could not be attained apart from the internationalist framework, but in 1953 this cosmopolitanism is termed a "reactionary bourgeois ideology that refutes the national traditions and national sovereignty, preaches an indifferent attitude towards the fatherland and national culture." The party "combats cosmopolitanism without mercy" because it "humiliates itself before the rotten bourgeois culture and is unfriendly towards the great Russian culture." It is interesting to note that the former Russian dominant circles are reproached — not with their nationalistic and imperialistic attitudes — but with their humiliation before the West and their hatred of the Russian people, their great democratic culture, their national traditions. The October revolution of 1917 was declared by the supreme representative of the Soviet state, K. Voroshilov, as a certain Russian national revolution, a political action that had to be taken to save the Empire "from national catastrophe."

But these national patriotic definitions and watchwords of Bolshevism, like its earlier international formulas, served the same historical purpose: first, to save, then, to strengthen the Russian great power and to realise its aspirations of world leadership. After the decline of the attraction of international watchwords of world revolution, these watchwords were refuted in the non-Communist world; and Bolshevism, the most effective organised force of modern Russian imperialism, has mobilised first of all Russian aggressive nationalism for the purpose of realising its aims. Patriotic watchwords for the non-Soviet peoples had to be merely subsidiary instruments in the struggle against the great forces of the free world.

The old international class conception of a world proletariat as unique and equal in all its national ramifications has been replaced by the idea of a community of "socialist nations" — and also of those marching towards socialism — that are said to have equal rights but not the same political opportunities. A new idea of a "leading nation" has been launched by the Russians; and this leading nation should

have the only historical right to universal political and cultural development in the community of the nations of the whole world. Other nations would have more or less limited opportunities for the development of their national life. The great, leading — i.e. Russian — nation must create the greatest values of mankind because the Russians were the first who — not only in consequence of certain historical, economic and political reasons, but also because of certain peculiarities of their national character — created a new and most progressive political and social order. A contemporary Soviet publication concerning V. Byelinsky emphasises the positive role of this prominent Russian of the last century since he alone foresaw the possibility of the Russian nation “creating the greatest culture that has no equal in the world.” No nation, even if “socialist”, can be recognised as equal in respect of creative potentialities with the great Russian nation because that nation was the first among equal nations to play a decisive role in extending socialism within the Soviet great power. According to this view the Russian nation is unique among other Slavic tribes in that it created a strong and powerful state and should accordingly be “at the head of the whole civilised world.” The Russian nation created “the most progressive” political and social theory in the world — Leninism. And therefore all nations of the world should recognise the leading role of the Soviet Union over which rules the Russian nation.

Bolshevism as a philosophical, political and social theory and system has existed for over 60 years. In the course of this period it has undergone many stages of ideological and tactical organisation. Also during this period, the Bolshevik leaders and theorists have proclaimed varying and often contrary principles and “truths” that sustained changes from an extreme internationalism to a vulgar notion of a nationalistic great power. However, in the course of its existence and development as an ideology of political movement and state system, Russian Bolshevism — that had its origin in complicated and conflicting processes of Russia’s historical past, and which in addition was provided with ideological method from the “scientific socialism” of the German West — has remained right up to the present day the bearer of one principal historic idea, aiming at the conservation and strengthening of a mighty world power with Russia at its head. According to the partisans of the Bolshevik religion, in the achievement of this decisive aim in world history, there would also be realised the ideals of international world Communism, the seeds of which have fallen on favourable soil — on, that is, the idea of universal Russian leadership.

THE “SCIENTIFIC” CHARACTER OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

by

U. KUZHIL

I

The enormous development of science in the 19th and 20th centuries has resulted in its being placed on a hitherto unheard of pedestal. Everybody realizes objectively that it has amazing prospects as regards the far-reaching control and exploitation of the forces of Nature. Thus, it is not surprising that science is becoming of decisive importance in the opinion of the non-expert, too, and that the latter is beginning to regard all theories in any sphere, provided that they are based on scientific arguments, as being above criticism.

It is a well-known process in the clash of ideas and world philosophies to resort to science in order to strengthen one's own position. Science is a weapon and, if used skilfully, guarantees great chances of success. The Bolsheviks have rightly realized this fact and have unreservedly made use of the "scientific" arguments to the advantage of their world philosophy, in order to confuse the consciousness of the uncritical and one-sidedly trained Soviet citizen. It is an established fact that no normal Soviet citizen has a chance to study reference works or any kind of basic scientific works, in order to become acquainted with any other ideology. It is true that there are scientific books in the Soviet Union, but they are all imbued with Marxism and do not reflect any of the original thought and arguments of the scholars and philosophers of world-fame. Since the Bolsheviks know that science nowadays is accepted unreservedly as the decisive factor and that the intellectual level of the average person is such that he is incapable of seriously criticizing the "scientific" foundation of dialectical materialism, they juggle with the words "science" and "scientific character". As soon as it came into being, Marxism proceeded to strengthen its position by the self-deception that it was the one and only conceivable

scientific world philosophy, firmly based on the indubitable results of natural science. The materialism of that era lightheartedly faced and disposed of logical difficulties and, in doing so, appeared to take as its starting-point facts themselves and to eliminate all misunderstanding. Even in those days Marxist socialism — as compared to all other socialist trends — boldly designated itself as a scientific socialism, in order to stress its scientific foundation. It claimed to be a world philosophy that was based solely on what can be corroborated by the senses and by experience, that is to say on positive science. And what argument can the average Soviet citizen advance against such an authority as a scientific theory, seeing that he has no chance to read anything else save the last expression of Soviet philosophical thought, namely Paragraph 6 of the 4th chapter of the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (of the Bolsheviks)", on "dialectical and historical materialism!" The non-expert (the layman) must bow to science. If, however, one takes into consideration the fact that for decades this poor creature has had such sentences as "in order to make no mistakes in politics, etc., one must apply the scientific, dialectical method, which is the only method which allows the right conclusions to be drawn", hammered into him, then it is not surprising that he regards the political wisdom of the Bolshevik Party as infinite, for it was guided solely by science. Every law became incontestable, and a state which is based on such a scientific idea becomes "invincible."

The materialists base their arguments solely on the experience of the senses and on positive knowledge. But do the empiric sciences show us the origin and causes of existence? By no means! They only show us the facts and phenomena which appear in sequence one after the other, and in examining them they corroborate a certain continuity of law which connects them. But the empiric sciences in no way mention the origin of the active causes, the reality of the plan, outlined in advance, of the development of the phenomena. And at the same time the materialists without any misgivings base their arguments on these sciences in order to solve problems which do not belong to the latter's sphere at all. Are we not justified in affirming that materialism expresses a certain principle but bases this principle on arguments which do not prove anything?

No scientist of the empiric school will refute our statement when we affirm that, in view of the present status of science, no positive data permit such conclusion to be drawn as are drawn by materialism about the substance and about the first causes of natural phenomena; that, by reason of their very nature, the empiric science cannot deal with questions such as the substance and the first causes of natural phenomena; that science shows us the

reality, the present status and, at most, the fact, but not the origin of things; that the direct "how" and the immediate cause of things are the most that science can give us; that the moment materialism becomes an explicit and doctrinarian negation of metaphysics (that is to say, in the scientific sense of this term, the science of basic conceptions — substance, existence, etc.), it becomes a different form of metaphysics itself; that is to say, in attempting to use the data of the empiric sciences, it begins to affirm things that are not contained in these data.

So much for our first argument! Secondly, can science advance dogmatic arguments about the future or guess the inevitable consequences of causes? Materialism likes to base its arguments on positive knowledge, but at the same time it rejects the latter's sceptical caution and in its way degenerates into a dogmatism of a natural science character, a dogmatism which, as regards questions not yet solved by science, is only based on belief, and orders everyone to believe in its dogmas. If we briefly consider the history of the world philosophies of a natural science character, we realize the extent to which their dogmatism is inconsistent.

Primitive man, confronted by the countenance of Nature, which to his superficial power of discernment and judgment seemed just as senseless as he himself was, began to conceive Nature according to his own pattern. He began to ascribe what he erroneously imagined to be a chaotic confusion of the universe to the moods and temper of the gods, that is to say to good or evil spirits. It was only after considerable research on the part of man that he recognized the great law of causality and later found that it ruled all inanimate Nature. He discovered that individual causes, separated by reason of their effect, always called forth the same result. If something happened, it was not due to the incalculable will of super-natural beings, but simply evolved from the direct state of things as a result of unchangeable laws. And this state of things must in its turn have been caused by a previous state and so on, and infinitum; the entire course of events was thus determined beforehand by the state of things which existed at the moment when the world first came into being. Since this was realized, it became evident that Nature could only follow a predestined course to a predestined aim; in other words, the act of creation not only called the universe into being, but also outlined its whole future history in advance.

Man, however, did not cease to believe in his ability to influence the course of events by his own willed action, but in this respect he was guided by instinct rather than by logic, science or experience. From now onwards, all events which had formerly been ascribed to the action of supernatural beings were attributed to the effect of the law of causality. The final recognition of this law as a leading and fundamental principle of Nature was one of the triumphs of

the 17th century, the illustrious century of Galileo and Newton. It was ascertained that celestial phenomena are the result of the general laws of mechanics and that comets, regarded in former times as an omen of the decay of empires or the death of kings, simply move according to the formulas of the general law of gravitation. These conceptions led to a tendency to visualize the entire material world as a machine. This school of thought became stronger and stronger until it finally reached its height in the second half of the 19th century. One only needed to concentrate more on acquiring a knowledge of the universe and inanimate Nature as a whole would reveal itself to man as a perfectly functioning machine.

All this was obviously bound to influence the explanation of the significance of human life to a very considerable degree. Every extension of the law of causality and every triumph of a mechanical interpretation of Nature was inevitably bound to undermine man's belief in the freedom of will; for if all Nature was governed by the law of causality, why should life be an exception in this respect? It was from such conceptions that the mechanistic philosophical systems of the 17th and 18th centuries derived their origin, as did the idealistic theories which came into being later, after these systems, as natural reaction. Until the beginning of the 19th century, however, life was regarded as something distinct from inanimate Nature. It was precisely at that time that the discovery was made that living cells consist of the same atoms as does inanimate Nature, and this led to the conclusion that the development of these living cells is undoubtedly determined by the same laws of Nature; the question obtruded itself as to why the atoms, which are part of our body and our brain, should not be governed by the laws of causality. Not only did one begin to assume but one also affirmed unreservedly that life was likewise a purely mechanical phenomenon. It was affirmed for instance that the mind of Bach, Newton or Michelangelo differed from a printing press, an organ or a sawmill only in the degree of complicated working, and that the function of the mind consisted exclusively in a limited reaction to external stimuli.

The turn of the century brought with it a kaleidoscopic change in scientific conceptions. The 19th century had given science time to convince itself that certain phenomena, above all the phenomena of radio-activity and gravitation, cannot be explained in a mechanistic way. Theoreticians continued to discuss the possibility of building a machine which would be able to reproduce the emotions of Bach, the thoughts of Newton or the enthusiasm of Michelangelo, but all attempts in this direction failed completely.

At the end of the 19th century, Professor *Planck* carried out a certain experiment to clarify the phenomena of radio-activity

which up to that time had been inexplicable. The first experiments carried out in this connection later led to the modern "quantum theory", which today forms one of the dominating basic principles of physics. At the same time, this theory marked the end of the mechanistic age of science and the beginning of a new era. Planck's original theory did little more than assume that Nature proceeds with slow and slight movements like the fingers of a clock. In 1917, however, Einstein proved that this newly created theory, based on Planck's arguments, leads to a number of revolutionary conclusions. This theory had obviously ousted the law of causality from its position and now appeared to be ruling the course of the natural phenomena from this position. Science in former times self-confidently affirmed that Nature could follow only one course, a course predestined from the beginning of time to the end passing through an unbroken chain of causes and results: namely, that after state A, state B would inevitably ensue. And so far, modern science, too, has not been able to tell us any more, save that after state A, state B may ensue, and, equally, also state C or state D or innumerable other states; it is true that modern science can affirm that there is a greater probability of state B, C or D ensuing, but precisely because it resorts to the categories of probability, it cannot foresee with absolute certainty which state will ensue after the preceding one.

As can be seen from this brief survey, science is not in a position to answer questions for us which refer to the basic philosophical problems. The picture of the world which science presents to us changes with every age of new epoch-making discoveries in the sphere of natural science, and science has not been able to prove whether each of these pictures is an approach to the objective picture of the world, or whether they are pictures of a world that is considered from a different aspect again and again. None of the scientists who have experienced the past thirty years is too dogmatic, either with regard to the future direction of scientific progress or to the direction in which objective truth is to be sought. One cannot therefore affirm that modern science has something great and new to reveal to us; on the contrary, one might well affirm that science today is not in a position to foresee or to reveal anything, since the course of science has changed its direction too often.

Such is the status of science and such are its prospects, and for this reason it strikes one as particularly paradoxical that the Belsheviks should rely on the prestige of science to such an extent. By propagating the illusion of the strictly scientific character of the Bolshevik philosophy of the world, they force people who are ignorant of the status and prospects of science to believe blindly in a policy which is allegedly based on exact and unconditional disciplines.

In order to ascertain what actually corresponds to positive knowledge in the Bolshevik philosophy of the world and what is only a hypothesis or an arbitrary conclusion which is not based on any scientific data, let us consider Paragraph 6 of the 4th chapter of the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (of the Bolsheviks)", which deals with "dialectical and historical materialism." It is precisely this work by *Stalin*, which must be taken into consideration, since it is of especial significance in the Soviet world. The regime officially presents this book to both workers and university professors as *the source* of Bolshevik philosophical wisdom; it is maintained that it contains the only correct interpretation and explanation of the entire philosophical doctrine of Marxism. Incidentally, nothing new had appeared on this subject since the last philosophical treatise by Lenin, "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", in 1908. Modern Bolshevik philosophical thought merely repeats old platitudes and dishes up quotations from Engels or from the above-mentioned "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" at every opportunity.

According to the dialectical method, however, everything in the world is changeable, every category is endowed with a new meaning in a new epoch, which is formed by epoch-making scientific discoveries. An examination of the fundamental conceptions in this respect or a change in their definition in connection with later scientific discoveries did not, however, take place. On the contrary, all experiments undertaken in this direction were condemned as "deviations" and the authors concerned were designated as "enemies of the people." In this way Bolshevik philosophy has become the victim of stagnation and its unfounded assertions to the effect that recent scientific discoveries are to corroborate its theories, lack all proof.

What strikes one most in the above-mentioned work by Stalin as well as in all Bolshevik works is the peculiar terminology, which is not used anywhere else in the scientific world and is actually in some cases a contradiction of the basic conceptions of science. In Stalin's work the entire explanation of the dialectical method is based on the contrast between this method and metaphysics. Since post-Aristotelian times metaphysics has had a certain explicit significance; it is a science which concerns questions that are not answered by modern natural science, that is to say questions pertaining to the being, the basic substance which forms the world, etc. The Bolsheviks class all theories and philosophical systems, etc., which do not tally with Marxist dialectics, together as "metaphysics." And what is more, by means of the Marxist contradistinction between metaphysics and dialectics, the Bolsheviks endeavour to create the impression that all former philosophical systems were

most absurd and unscientific and that they all regarded the world as a system of separate phenomena which were in no way connected with one another. In a theory of this kind the entire world facet of man's philosophical thought is deprived of all connection with science. The idea is suggested that the first scientific explanation and even the corresponding conception of the universe begins with Marxist dialectics. But who of the philosophers of recent times has questioned the changeableness of things or the mutual dependence of natural phenomena etc.?

To resort to stereotyped phrases such as "in contrast to metaphysics" is merely to set up and tilt at windmills in the manner of Don Quixote and to ridicule the entire non-Marxist philosophy, in order to emphasize still more the "geniality" of Marxism as regards its determination of the natural law of evolution.

On the other hand, it is definitely unscientific and simply foolish to recommend the dialectical method as the only expedient means of solving all problems, from the less important problems of political and social life to the fundamental problems of philosophy. The fact is overlooked that method alone is not everything. By means of the same dialectical method *Hegel* set up an apotheosis of Prussian imperialism. What the doctrinarian application of a method can lead to, is excellently illustrated by what happened in the case of *Hegel*; with the aid of his dialectics, he ascertained that there could be no other number of planets than those which were already known in his day; but soon afterwards another planet Neptune (and later on, the planet of Pluto, too) was discovered. Somewhat alarmed, *Hegel's* assistants hesitantly drew his attention to the fact that his theory was not in keeping with the facts, whereupon they received the significant answer, "all the worse for the facts." And all the worse for the facts today if they do not fit into the framework of Paragraph 6 of the 4th chapter of the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (of the Bolsheviks)" and do not develop accordingly. It appears to be characteristic of the Bolshevik philosophy of the world that it endeavours to adapt natural phenomena, above all those of social and political life, to an a priori method of research.

The two chief characteristics of the dialectical method are not an invention of Marxism. It has not the credit of having ascertained the two generally known and recognized laws of Nature, that of the mutual dependence of the phenomena of Nature and that of their changeability in time and space. As regards the sudden and erratic or "leaping" origin of the phenomena matters are not so simple. Above all, the definition of the "leap" as a conception is not precise. What speed is needed in order to be able to describe the transition from one state to another as "leaping?" A "leap" according to the Marxist definition is a relative conception. So far it

has not been possible to prove an absolute "leap" in the case of natural phenomena, for such a "leap" would have to bring about a qualitative change in the course of the section of time 0. *Stalin* defines the "leaping" transition as a process in the course of which "changes take place not gradually, but quickly, suddenly." But what is meant by "quickly" and "suddenly"? Surely this is only a subjective conception. Let us assume for instance that in the case of a human being, who on an average lives 50 to 60 years, the duration of a phenomenon which takes place "quickly" is one hour or one minute; then in the case of another being that lives seven years or, like the cockchafer only one month, the conception "quickly" in proportion to the human conception of "quickly" will be one-tenth or one-thousandth of an hour or minute. Thus, the conception of a "leap" is not an objective conception or one that holds good for the whole of Nature, but merely one that has been adapted to man's way of thinking and to man's conception of time. It is perhaps possible to ascertain a number of phenomena in which the transition from one qualitative state to another is rapid, but, on the other hand, one could quote thousands of examples where this transition takes a long time and where qualitative changes actually run parallel to quantitative changes. But before we advance further arguments let us consider the example of water boiling as a standard "leaping" process. Engels writes as follows: "For instance, the temperature of water has, to begin with, no significance for its liquid state, but when the temperature of the water rises or drops there comes a moment when the entire state of the water changes to steam in the first case, to ice in the second case." This is an incorrect explanation of the phenomenon in question. It is an established fact that water changes to steam at any temperature. Water in an open vessel already evaporates at normal room temperature. If the temperature of the water rises, it evaporates quickly, that is to say the amount of water which becomes steam in a second increases as the temperature rises. This speed of evaporation is greatest at boiling-point, but no "leap" takes place; on the contrary, a certain parallelism is evident: simultaneously with the quantitative increase of the movement of the water molecules, that is to say, with the rise in the temperature of the water, an acceleration of evaporation takes place. Surely one cannot talk about a quick and sudden transition in this case?

It is true that certain natural phenomena have a quick, or as Marxism says a "leaping" course (as for example a qualitative atomic change), but the majority of natural changes take place gradually and simultaneously with the quantitative changes. If the length of waves of light gradually increases, the quality, that is to say the colour of light likewise changes gradually and simultaneously. Thus, as can be seen from the above examples, the Marxist conception of

the "leap" is a combination of naive observations and even more naive generalizing conclusions.

In trying to characterize Marxist philosophical materialism, *Stalin* writes as follows: "The world and the nature of its laws are entirely cognizable, and our knowledge of the laws of Nature, tested by experience and by practice, becomes a reliable knowledge which possesses the validity of objective truth." This statement leads up to a "scientific" explanation of the fundamental principles of social life and of the infallibility of the Party, which is based on the same "scientific" arguments. In view of the criminal activity of the Bolshevik party and all its artificial, unnatural social and political experiments, it seems imperative that we should examine the above arguments more closely. In this connection we should, however, like to point out in advance that we shall not take into consideration the question of the primacy or non-primacy of matter or the question of the justification of the materialists or the idealists regarding the problem of the basic substance or being. *This is a matter of belief since science has so far not been able to answer all these questions.* Our sole concern is to ascertain whether the Bolsheviks are not abusing the possibilities of science by using its prestige solely to designate their own senseless theories as correct. The Bolshevik point of view as regards the above-mentioned question has already been characterized briefly and concisely by Stalin's arguments. In order to solve the problem we must, in the first place, answer the following two questions:

- 1) Can man have an objective knowledge of Nature?
- 2) On the strength of the laws of Nature discovered so far, can one set up dogmatic theories about the future of Nature and of human society, or only so-called working hypotheses with all the necessary reservations?

Man recognizes and studies the phenomena of Nature with the aid of his senses. Thus, the objectivity of his knowledge in this respect is already refuted, since the structure of the senses concerned determines the degree and the quality of this knowledge in advance. All external impulses travel through the senses concerned and the nervous system before they reach human consciousness. The fact that impressions pass through this entire apparatus changes them accordingly, inasmuch as this process creates impressions of colour, of the degree of solidarity, of form, etc. With the progress of science, instruments of the greatest precision are invented which can, for instance, show the limitations of human sight and, at the same time, enable one to see white sunlight as a diffracted spectrum, but this latter impression is nothing but an external impulse which only reaches our consciousness after having passed through the entire system of the senses concerned. Thus, it follows from the fact that

man recognizes the world by means of his senses that his conception of the world is subjective and dependent on these same senses. The blind have a different conception of the world, and a being which had another sense not known to us would form still another conception of Nature. Which of these different kinds of cognition can we then designate as objective? All attempts to study the nature of substance will fail as long as we have no external basis of cognition. If one is only a very minute part of the world as a whole, it is not possible to regard the latter from a distant perspective or to comprehend the problem in its entirety. Do we by any chance know whether the distant celestial bodies which we cannot even see with the help of the largest telescope are not governed by other laws, by laws which are entirely different from those which we have discovered in the world that is accessible to us through a telescope? Let us consider science once more, from the point of view of whether it has so far provided us with any basis for the cognition of substance, or whether it has merely described and studied laws which guide the changes of substance and in this way determine the phenomena of the external world.

No one actually saw the electron; it was merely observed in rotation, that is in action; its behaviour was observed and this was adapted to the natural phenomena usually observed by our senses. Once science has progressed still further in the field of electronic research, it will set up more precise questions regarding the behaviour of the electron, but these will not be formulas which might ascertain the essential nature of the electron. For the further we progress in science, the more do we convince ourselves that matter is not what we have so far taken it to be.

The splitting of the atom has not only destroyed our former conception of matter, but has also provided us with a new conception of matter, but whether this is one that is closer to objective truth, we do not know.

The mechanistic conception of the universe is, according to Marxism, a relative truth, a truth which is based on the present state of science. It is affirmed that every subsequent relative truth must proceed along the path of progress and perfection to absolute truth. But what does all this look like in reality? The subsequent theories — be it the quantum theory or the theory of Einstein — create a new picture of the universe, but it is a picture which is based not on perfect mechanistic foundations, but on entirely different arguments which, as compared to the previous era of science, are revolutionary. But were not all the laws of Newton proved by experiment? And yet, Einstein, as we know, ascertained certain deviations from the law of gravitation by experiments and formulated new propositions which are based on the theory of relativity and invalidate Newton's conception of gravitation. The symbols used to designate the behaviour of individual phenomena of Nature were canonized by the

popularization of science as formulas in order to enable man to comprehend these phenomena more easily and more objectively. This false popularization is also characteristic of the picture of the universe created by the Marxist philosophy of the world; it is a system complete in itself, in which there are no deviations and everything proceeds according to known causes and results which can be foreseen. The result is a clear and easily comprehensible picture, which is, however, a false one.

Accordingly, the place of dialectical materialism in the field of the natural sciences can be determined on the basis of the present status of science. Before exposing the illogicality and absurdity of the so-called dialectical method, the indisputable *fact must be stressed that not a single scientist outside the Soviet Union (and its satellites) is interested in the said "theory."* Scientists and philosophers with entirely different philosophies of the world support certain theories and oppose others, but none of them wastes his time discussing the naive philosophical absurdity of Marxism. A closer study of all the inferior Bolshevik publications dealing with philosophical subjects reveals that the said "theory" is merely a confused conglomeration of aphorisms which are in no way connected. For no reason whatever the laws of evolution of individual natural phenomena are generalized with regard to Nature as a whole. Facts discovered and known centuries ago and scientific theories proved long ago are emphasized, in order to acclaim Marx and Engels as discoverers and innovators. In reality, not a single "basic argument" in all the Marxist talk about natural philosophy is in keeping with the present status of science; on the contrary, the entire Marxist scientific "theory" is a very obvious contradiction of the latest experimentally and theoretically proved deductions of physics.

One more point must be taken into consideration; Marxist philosophy affirms categorically that there are no inalterable dogmas in the development of science, but for some reason or other regards its own theory as unchangeable. The Marxists maintain that in the course of the development of every scientific theory internal and essentially necessary contradictions arise, which put an end to the theory in question as such. Why then should Marxist ideology remain unchangeable and perfect? The Marxists refuse to admit what every objective reader realizes from the outset when reading their authors, namely, that their entire theory is one big contradiction. Of what importance then is it to us to realize the true value of Marxist materialism as a philosophy founded on scientific argument? The answer is of considerable importance. For just as it is said to be to Marx's credit that he applied the fundamental principles of dialectical materialism concerning natural phenomena to social life, so, too, the doctrine of historical materialism concerning social life has the same value as the doctrine of dialectical materialism regarding

Nature as a whole, that is to say the value of a fantastic illusion. It is a well-thought out picture of social development as one wants to imagine it, but not as it really is. The entire historical and dialectical materialism of the Marxists is an abstract system, of which a corroboration in Nature and human society is hardly likely to be found. And all the sad and indeed tragic consequences of a search for such supposed corroborations in social and political life are clearly evident in the Soviet Union.

EDITOR'S NOTE

The Ukrainian original of this article appeared for the first time in a publication of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Ukraine in 1947. The author was one of the active members of the revolutionary Ukrainian national liberation movement.

**THE HISTORICAL NECESSITY
OF THE DISSOLUTION
OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE**

by

Prince NIKO NAKASHIDZE

The decay, or rather the dissolution of the multinational and colonial empires, began as early as the 19th century. Turkey lost all the Balkan countries which then became independent states.

After the first World War, Austria-Hungary and the Russian empire were disintegrated. Turkey lost all the Arabian countries, and Polish territory was severed from Germany. New states were now created consisting of those nations which for hundreds of years had been subjugated to foreign rule.

Nothing happens by accident or chance in history. And the historical process of the decay of the old empires was a perfectly logical historical development.

The nations incorporated in foreign empires had never become reconciled to this state of affairs. They were always conscious of their historical past as civilized nations. The strongly developed national consciousness and national will of these peoples and their consequent urge to attain national freedom played an important part in determining their historical development. And this development was to a considerable extent furthered and accelerated by another historical factor.

The rights of man, championed by Christianity, attained as a result of political and social progress, and recognised by the civilised world, were in the course of time granted to the nations, which represent the natural community of mankind. For man cannot be free if the nation itself is not free.

And in this way, the principle of the nations' right of self-determination was established.

After both the World Wars many of the European, Asian and African peoples asserted their claim to this right and obtained their national freedom. They restored their independent states, that is to say, they set them up anew.

The Russian empire, however, continued to exist as before, but it was no longer confined to its former boundaries since it subjugated other countries and peoples of Europe. Incidentally, the old Russian tsarist empire, too, was built up on the annexation of foreign countries and the subjugation of foreign peoples.

Most of these peoples are not related to the Russians either by their origin, history, or culture, and many of them not even by their language. They were originally independent nations and their states were already in existence several hundred years before the Russian nation had been formed or the Russian state founded.

Whereas in other empires the foreign peoples possessed certain national, cultural and social rights, the foreign peoples in the Russian empire were completely deprived of all national, political and cultural rights, and every attempt was made to Russify them as far as possible.

After the collapse of the tsarist empire in 1917, the Finns, Poles, Baltic and Caucasian peoples, the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Turkestanians, and Cossacks severed themselves from Russia and set up their own states again, namely as democratic republics.

In none of these states did Bolshevism succeed in gaining a firm footing. It was only in Russia that it proved successful, and the Russian people themselves supported and effected the Bolshevik revolution.

The non-Russian countries of the present Soviet Union were at various times crushed and conquered by Russia's superior military power, as was later the case, too, in the satellite countries. And in this way the Russian Soviet imperium, which rules the peoples by means of a brutal terrorist regime, came into existence once more. It is an artificial state structure which has been created by inconceivable violence and coercion and is preserved by the same methods.

The Soviet Union is a Russian continental colonial empire. The Russian tyrants would have the world believe that it is an internationalist, proletarian and Communist union in which the peoples are united voluntarily on the strength of their common interests. Internally, however, it is really a peoples' prison in which man is deprived of all human rights and the nations are constantly threatened by the dreadful danger of all being reduced and degraded to one common level. In its essence it is an ultra-imperialistic state structure. It disguises its imperialistic designs by claiming to be the champion of the rights of the proletariat and the liberator of the latter from capitalist rule. It conceals the fact that it is itself a state of totalitarian and reactionary monopoly capitalism. It stands to reason that in an empire such as this the people long for individual and national freedom.

A state structure of this kind, by reason of its very character, cannot exist permanently. Its collapse is inevitable; if it were not so, it would be futile to have any faith in progress in this world.

Other empires artificially created by coercive methods have long since ceased to exist. Why then should the Russian empire prove an exception in this respect?

An empire of this kind will always be a menace to the world. A dictatorship cannot be pacific in character since it constantly aims to expand its power and its territory.

The danger (for the free world) is aggravated immeasurably by the fact that Russia has millions of supporters in the free world who, in the interest of the "liberation of the proletariat", are willing to abandon their countries and their peoples to the Russians. They are not merely ideological supporters but soldiers of Russia and, as such, will fight on the side of Russia.

At present, the government and the supreme party leadership of the Soviet Union, with the exception of only a few persons, consists exclusively of Russians who pursue not an internationalist but a Russian policy.

It is a grave error to believe that the problem of the satellite countries could be solved separately, in order to detach these countries from the Russian sphere of influence. This problem is so closely connected with that of the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union that the two cannot be separated.

The Russians will never relinquish their position nor renounce their power in these countries. Nor will the Communist governments there ever agree to Russia withdrawing her aid in these countries, since such a measure would result in collapse of the Communist regime.

To recognise the right of possession of the Russians over the foreign peoples of the Soviet Union as a vested right, that is to say, to regard their problem as an internal matter which only concerns Russia, would be to deny all the recognised moral and lawful principles of the civilised world. The free world must not recognise a right enforced by violence as legally valid. "*Ex injuria non oritur jus*"!

The non-Russian countries of the Soviet Union have already been recognised as states, for Ukraine and Byelorussia have been admitted to the U.N.O. The question at issue is therefore, as in the case of the satellite countries, too, the liberation of these countries from the Russian compulsory union.

Certain political circles in the West graciously concede the right of self-determination to our peoples. But they do not need this right since they were formerly nations with states of their own and were forcibly subjugated to Russian rule. It is a question of making

restitution for the right that has been violated, abolishing and eliminating violence and injustice, and restoring these nations to their former status.

We are living in an age of mighty national, political and social upheavals, in the age of the disintegration of multinational empires based on force. And this process cannot be checked in any way — not even by cannon or atomic bombs. All the imperiums have been disintegrated and their peoples are now free, but the Russian imperium still continues to exist.

The cynical statements made by Soviet Russian leaders about the alleged Western neo-colonialism does not meet with a fitting answer on the part of the West. No one replies, in answer to those remarks, that Russia ruthlessly annexes foreign countries and subjugates the peoples of these countries, and that Russia is a colonial empire. No one mentions the crimes which Russia has committed and is still committing as far as these peoples are concerned. No one points out that Russia's war-booty since 1939 amounts to 18 countries with a total area of 3.2 million square kilometres and a total population of 107 millions.

More than a hundred years ago Karl Marx wrote as follows in the *New York Tribune*: "Russia has declared herself for peace and the statements she has made are an expression of her peace-loving attitude . . . She is prepared to allow the other powers to engage in conferences, provided that they on their part are prepared to allow her to occupy such countries as she desires, in the meantime." And this certainly holds good for present times, too!

The subjugated peoples of the Soviet Union will never understand and reconcile themselves to the fact that, in Western Europe, America, Asia, and Africa, even the smallest nations have independent national states of their own and enjoy complete freedom, whilst they alone are forced to remain under Russian tyranny.

These subjugated peoples are in a state of political ferment and some day they will rise up against their oppressors in a mighty revolt!

We are frequently asked how we intend to achieve our aim. By war? The answer is "no"! We know only too well that in the event of war our native countries would become theatres of war, and we do not wish to see them transformed into devastated and "scorched earth" countries and their population wiped out. But it is not the wish and will of the Western world alone which will decide whether there is a war or not, but the Soviet rulers, and for this reason it is absolutely imperative that we should be prepared for every eventuality. In this respect, the fact must be borne in mind that the Soviet tyrants will designate the war kindled by them as a "war of

liberation", that is to say, they will allegedly be fighting for the liberation of the workers from capitalism and for the liberation of the subjugated peoples from colonial rule.

It is our aim and endeavour to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union from within. The free world must, of course, support our peoples in this unequal struggle. It would be disastrous for the free world to assume that the Soviet tyrants have changed their attitude. In this respect, we should like to quote a well-known Swiss paper, which writes as follows: "Moscow is at present trying to canvass for confidence. Mistrust — so it is affirmed by the Communists in their propaganda and repeated mechanically and guilelessly by many non-Communists — is the real evil which poisons international relations and prevents political tension from being eased. It would certainly suit the gentlemen of the Kremlin very well if the West were to abandon its attitude of mistrust towards the Soviet Union and towards the Communist Party's apparatus of conspiracy and power which extends over the whole world! We continue to regard with mistrust a man like Schlüter who has published a few books by Nazi leaders — are we then likely to abandon our attitude of mistrust towards a group of persons who have a criminal past which is unique in the entire history of mankind?"

As long as the Russian Soviet imperium continues to exist, the world will constantly be in danger. It is a serious error to believe that these two worlds can exist in peace side by side, permanently. There is bound to be a clash and an explosion some day, for the Russian imperium and its Russian Bolshevik rulers will never abandon their world conquest plans.

In order to ward off this danger, the subjugated peoples must be afforded every possible support in their fight so that this peoples' prison and empire of tyranny collapses.

We are likewise asked what our plans for the future are and whether we intend to remain as separate states without forming a union with other states. In the first place, the admittedly sound idea of a European federation of states is as yet only wishful thinking, and, in the second place, it will be a long time before this idea can be realised. The regional formation of state alliance is a matter to be decided by the individual nations themselves in accordance with the free resolutions of their parliaments.

Our nations, when they attain their freedom and independence, will join the community of the nations of Europe, that is of the world. It is our desire to occupy a fitting place in the community of free nations in the future, in which case our peoples will fulfil their duties conscientiously.

History demands the dissolution of the Russian imperium. The peoples ruled by Russia also have a right to live their own free life

as individuals and nations. Justice demands that this should be so! These peoples must not be forgotten and sacrificed!

If the democratic free world allows itself to be prompted by "sacro egoismo" and purchases co-existence at the price of our peoples, it will bring about its own ruin!

If the West wants to be the loser in the clash with Russia, it only needs approach the peoples of the East with the idea of a federation. Hitler, too, talked about a European union and under this pretext subjugated nations. Napoleon likewise wanted to "unite" Europe. Fichte unmasked this hypocritical idea most thoroughly. And for this reason, Europe as regards its present ideology must take into consideration all the negative factors of past ideologies in this respect, and, in order to win over the East European peoples to the idea of a European unification, must in the first place actively help these peoples to attain complete independence and must leave any decisions pertaining to European integration to the free judgment of the parliaments of these independent states.

It is no good forcing decisions on others! Europe must not be limited to whatever boundaries the Soviet sphere of influence may set up! No tactical considerations can excuse such a policy.

We are of the opinion that the best guarantee of peace and security lies in the membership of all peoples in the United Nations, on the basis of full equality, since in this kind of organisation there can be no clash between regional blocs nor can any powerful state in the course of time forcibly unite the other states and use such a regional structure for the purpose of conducting an aggressive war.

But before these problems of the future can be seriously discussed, the idea that the dissolution of the Russian imperium is inevitable must be accepted, and to this end all the peoples of Europe and the rest of the world must co-operate in joint effort.

Today, Russia is the only colonial empire in the world. In this age of the liberation of peoples, of mighty political and social progress and achievements, Russia alone rules foreign countries and nations and subjects peoples to a most terrible dictatorial regime, under which man is degraded to the level of collectivity and industrial slavery and is deprived of even the most fundamental human rights.

All Russians on this side of and beyond the Iron Curtain, however, are unanimously agreed that this peoples' prison must be preserved.

A nation and its members who subjugate foreign peoples, who refuse to recognise the right of these peoples to independent states of their own, and who advocate the preservation of an empire of violence, cannot be regarded as Europeans or as belonging to Europe, in the free world. The right to restore their independent states is at present only being conceded in Europe to the nations whose countries

were occupied after 1939. What crime have the other nations committed, that this right is not conceded to them, too? Since when has the right of individuals and nations to freedom been regarded as being limited by time?

"In the present conflict", as the Archbishop of Cologne, Cardinal Joseph Frings, said, "the question at issue is, who will be the victor, Christianity with its moral and spiritual values, or Bolshevist imposture with its heroes who have attained power by blood and tears and by the inhuman subjugation of mankind, who have cast the Lord aside, and, with fiendish arrogance, have set themselves up as God Almighty."

And if Europe makes compromises with such evil spirits as these, it will never be victorious!

Maybe it is nowadays considered reactionary or undemocratic to quote Bismarck, but, nevertheless, the fact cannot be denied that he was a far-sighted statesman, whose ideas were based on his wealth of experience in life and as a statesman. And it was he who said, "No one will ever be rich enough to buy his enemies with concessions."

And the Western world will never succeed in buying and winning over the Soviets! The free world will be the loser!

UKRAINIAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE

by

Professor LEV SHANKOWSKY

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UKRAINE AT THE CROSSROADS

"There never has been and never will be a Ukrainian language or nationality", a Russian Minister of the Interior (Count Valuyev) declared in 1863. Yet almost a hundred years later, 30,072,000 people in the Ukrainian SSR contested Count Valuyev's assertion in the Soviet census of 1959 by determining both their language and nationality as Ukrainian. They constituted 72 per cent of the entire population of the Ukrainian SSR.

It must be added that out of 41,869,000 people listed by the 1959 census in the Ukrainian SSR, 32,158,000 or 76.8 per cent were Ukrainians according to their declared nationality. Out of the entire population of the Ukrainian SSR, 19,147,000 or 46.4 per cent lived in the cities. Among these, 11,782,000 were Ukrainians, who constituted 61.5 per cent of the entire urban population of the Ukrainian SSR.

The urbanization of Ukraine is a very recent process, and one of its results is that Ukrainians now constitute a majority in the cities.

By his assertion of 1863, Count Valuyev implied that the Ukrainians did not exist. He counted them among the Russians, and considered the Ukrainian language as a "Russian" dialect. Despite ample evidence to the contrary, it may be surprising to see that many in the West still subscribe to Count Valuyev's theory. To quote, e.g., a prominent authority on Slavic languages and literatures, the late Professor Samuel Hazzard Cross of Harvard: "A Ukrainian is precisely as much a Russian as the purest Great Russian born in the shadow of the Kremlin."

From this can be seen that the Russian imperialists have succeeded in imposing upon the Western world their own conception of "Russia" which is treating the Soviet Union as one whole (and holy) "Russia" and its population as the "Russian people." Even today such a misleading terminology is used not only by the press, but also in the encyclopaedias, textbooks, scholarly works.

If one encounters such unscientific terminology, one cannot help to state that centuries ago the cultural world was better informed about Ukraine than in the present era of telegraph, radio and television. Ukraine was a very popular name in Western Europe in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as can be seen from the works of Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan, Jean Bénédict Scherer, Johann Christian Engel, Charles Louis Lesur, Voltaire, Prosper Mérimée and many others. Maps published in many countries at that time bore always designation "Ukraine" and one of the oldest maps bearing that designation, was the map of Ukraine dated 1572 and made by order of Charles IX for his brother Henry of Anjou. This map has been kept in the Archives of the French Foreign Ministry.

Unfortunately, also for Europe, Ukraine was not able to consolidate as a modern nation. Incessant struggle against the invaders retarded the process of consolidation for centuries. From early days Ukraine was at the crossroads of the world. She was situated on the natural highways between the east and west and from the north to south, and was accessible from all sides. Invasions of different races were a common experience of the people of Ukraine. The Goths had established an empire where the ancient Scythians and Sarmatians had once been, and the overthrowing of the Gothic rule in Ukraine was the beginning of Attila's European conquests. A torrent of Oriental races rushed in upon the track of the Huns: the Avars, the Pechenegs, the Polovtsians (Cumans) and, finally, the Tatars, all coming along the same route and all fundamentally changing the course of history. Perhaps there would certainly be a different history to write of Ukraine, had she not been situated at the gates of Asia and had she not acted as a shield of Europe against all the invaders from the East.

Indeed, Ukraine acted like a shield. We may even say that this role was sometimes recognized and appreciated in the West at an earlier date. So, e.g., more than 700 years ago the Ukrainian Prince of Halych, Danylo (Daniel), was crowned by a Papal legate king of Galicia and Volhynia (Lodomeria) (1253) in recognition of his stand against the menacing Tatars. Sixty seven years later, this kingdom was named *antemurale Christianitatis* according to the accolade given by the Pope John XXII to the Galician Princes Lev and Andrew who perished in a battle against the Tatars (1320). Again we may say that behind the protective wall of Ukrainian resistance against the Tatars the European nations were able to develop and consolidate as modern nations. Not so Ukraine; for her the position of a borderland of Western civilization was of no advantage, it was the source of disasters.

In the struggle against the hordes of the steppes, in the struggle against the imperialisms of both the Muscovite Tsars and the Polish

nobility, the Ukrainian people did not succeed in maintaining their national state organization without interruption throughout their history. The state of Kievan Rus' fell under the blows of the Tatars; the Cossack Republic did not hold out in the struggle against Tsarist Russia and patrician Poland. After the fall of Poland, the Ukrainian lands were divided between the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian empires. The Ukrainian National Republic fell in the struggle against the Red and White Russians and the reborn imperialistic Poland. Within the boundaries of foreign states the Ukrainians suffered savage persecution, exploitation and tyrannical abuse. While other nations were making great advances in every field, the Ukrainians were continuously falling behind; they were losing more and more of their rights and the abuse of their language, culture, and religion by the enslavers was becoming more and more impudent. Economic exploitation of the Ukrainian people by their enslavers only completed the general picture.

In such a situation it was not difficult for the Ukrainians to realize that the sole cause of their troubles was to be found in the lack of national independence, the absence of their own independent state. A concrete and earnest expression of this consciousness was the creation of the Ukrainian National Republic on the ruins of Tsarist Russia and Austro-Hungary in 1918 and, later, the armed struggle of the state by the Ukrainian Army in 1918-1920. And a concrete and powerful manifestation of this consciousness was the underground revolutionary struggle for their own state conducted by the Ukrainian people between the two world wars, during the second World War, and after it. There are many indications that this revolutionary struggle, though in different forms, is being carried on by the Ukrainians even today. The leaders of the Soviet Union have always been aware of its existence and importance, and have repeatedly singled it out as a "major danger" to the Red Muscovite empire.

The Ukrainian liberation struggle was born out of the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people for their independent state. It was the result of painful historical experience of the Ukrainians. In the light of this experience, the conception of independent Ukraine appears the most logical, real, living, and the only valid and possible political conception for the Ukrainian people. In this sense, the conception of independent Ukraine gains the status of *the supreme truth* for the Ukrainians. However, the Ukrainian liberation struggle emanating from this conception, is not a thing apart from the present day developments. It is a progressive force which entirely corresponds to the movements which rouse humanity at the present time. For millions the world over the liberation struggle has become something that involves the very fabric of life, that involves the security and happiness of the peoples, that goes into their daily psychological, political, social, and economic relationships: FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE — an inborn, unalienable right of men.

"AND UKRAINE WAS LOST, — BUT THIS ONLY SEEMED SO"

The prophetic character of these words, uttered in 1846 by the well-known historian and the chief ideologist of SS. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood (the first Ukrainian organization which had a definite political programme), N. I. Kostomarov, became evident when the 1917 Revolution started in Petrograd by a Ukrainian Regiment, swept the autocratic Russian empire and resulted in its abrupt dismemberment into various independent national states. Among those who immediately asserted their legitimate rights to freedom, were also the Ukrainians.

This acted like a shock on Russian imperialists of all brands. When, on April 1, 1917, more than 100,000 Ukrainians and among them many men in the military uniform paraded in the streets of Kiev in a mass demonstration, and demanded proclamation of a complete independence for Ukraine, Russian newspapers in Kiev could hardly find words to conceal their utter surprise and dismay. At the same time, the initiative for creating separate Ukrainian military units came from Hetman Polubotok Military Club in Kiev, founded and headed by Mykola Mikhnovsky, father of modern Ukrainian nationalism. On April 1, 1917, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment, the first Ukrainian regiment was organized in Kiev, and its organization was subsequently authorized by the Russian HQ under Gen. Brusilov.

This was the beginning of the Ukrainian mass movement within the former Imperial Russian Army. Everywhere, on the front and in the rear, Ukrainian military councils sprang up and started organization of the Ukrainian military units. Already on May 18-21, 1917, 700 delegates representing nearly one million Ukrainian soldiers and sailors, gathered at the First Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev, and violently attacked the Russian Provisional Government in Petrograd for ignoring demands for territorial autonomy of Ukraine. A still more uncompromising attitude could be observed at the Second Ukrainian Military Congress (June 18-23, 1917) which met against Kerensky's orders, and where 2,414 delegates representing 1,732,000 Ukrainian soldiers and sailors, adopted a resolution calling upon the Central Rada (Ukrainian Provisional Parliament) to cease negotiating with the Russian Provisional Government and to turn, instead, to the organization of an autonomous Ukraine in agreement with the national minorities. Richard Pipes, the American student of the disintegration of the Russian empire in 1917, states in his book (*The Formation of the Soviet Union*) that "the general tone of these sessions was so extremely nationalist that Vynnychenko (Ukrainian

writer and dramaturgist, one of the leaders of the Central *Rada*) felt forced to plead with the delegates to remain loyal to the Russian democracy."

It is true: Ukrainian soldiers hardened by three years of war were much more firm in their "nationalist" demands than the civilian members of the Central *Rada*. The latter tried at all costs to cooperate with the Russian Provisional Government and supported its war effort on the Austro-German front to the very end. Being Socialists they firmly believed in the unity of the "revolutionary forces" and were not willing to "betray the Revolution" by following a separate Ukrainian action. It is no wonder that this attitude of the Central *Rada* was widely criticized by Ukrainian nationalists as an "appeasement policy" toward the Russian Provisional Government, and it was argued that at that time with the Central *Rada* supreme in Ukraine, with the Russian Provisional Government collapsing and with the Russian army disintegrating, it would be better for the Ukrainians to proclaim their independence and to conclude immediate peace, relying upon the existing Ukrainian troops. It was doubted whether the Russian Provisional Government could effectively have prevented such a development.

At any rate, an attempt to carry on such a policy was made in Kiev in July, 1917, by the Hetman Polubotok Infantry Regiment. In the night of July 18, 1917, the Regiment left its barracks, captured the Pechersk fortress and the Arsenal, and brought all Kiev into its hands by disarming the Russian units and militia. On the morning of July 18, 1917, Kiev was completely in the hands of 5,000 armed Ukrainian soldiers, who occupied all important military objectives, bridges, official buildings, banks, etc. The Russian authorities completely lost their heads, and the local military commander, Col. K. Oberuchev, fled the city. However, the Central *Rada* disavowed the coup and let the other Ukrainian regiment of the Kiev garrison, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment disarm the *Polubotkiivtsi*. The "order" could be reestablished by the efforts of the Central *Rada*.

The "Ukrainization of the bayonet" in 1917 was proceeding at the rapid speed on the front and in the rear. Finally it embraced fully 3 army corps (XXXIV, VI, XXI) and elements of 4 other army corps. There was a total of 17 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions with corresponding 17 reserve infantry regiments and 4 reserve cavalry regiments in the rear, which were totally Ukrainized towards the end of 1917. It must be said that Russian commanders on the front supported the "Ukrainization of the bayonet" against the opinion of ruling "Russian democracy" because they realized the capacity of Ukrainian national units to withstand the demoralizing effects of Bolshevik propaganda. In fact, the Ukrainian units on the front

preserved their morale and discipline to the end in spite of violent Bolshevik propaganda, and they were the only ones which held the front long after the others, including the disciplined Cossacks, had left the trenches and gone home. The Ukrainian units abandoned their positions only on the orders and mostly tried to return home as a military body. So, e.g., the IIIrd Ukrainian army corps (formerly XXIst) returned home to the Chernihiv area in February 1918, i.e. at the time when the German army was already occupying Ukraine. With the exception of the Ist Ukrainian army corps (formerly XXXIVth) which prevented the Bolsheviks to seize Kiev already in 1917, the participation of the Ukrainized units of former Russian army in the first Ukraine's war against the Soviet Russia (1917-1918) was insignificant; they all served at distant fronts while their own country was in danger.

The Ukrainian units preserved order and discipline at the time when the dissolution of Russian units was marked by violent outbursts and killings of officers, when thousands of deserters were swarming the cities in the rear and bands of AWOLs made the whole countryside insecure by their excesses. On the eve of the October Revolution, according to the data of the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly (Nov. 12-14, 1917) the Ukrainians in the Army and the Navy who voted for the Ukrainian parties supporting the Central *Rada*, were the third largest group in the Old Army. They numbered 535,843 voters in the Army and the Navy while 1,646,194 voted for the Bolsheviks, and 1,551,013 for the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Other votes were insignificant.

The formation of the regular Ukrainian Army, which carried on regular warfare against the Red and White Russians and the Poles in 1918-1920, would hardly have been possible if in 1917 the process of disintegration of the Old Russian Army had not eliminated Ukrainian army corps and divisions and the Ukrainian military leadership. Many higher officers of Ukrainian descent found through Ukrainized units of the Old Army their way to the Ukrainian Army and nationality, and to the participation in the Ukrainian liberation struggle. Also numerous senior officers of Russian and other descent fled to the Ukrainian units for refuge from the Red terror raging in the Russian units, and many of those non-Ukrainians served with the Ukrainian army to the very end. In this way a force was formed which was able to oppose the invasion of Ukraine from all sides for two years. It was a regular Ukrainian Army which obeyed the orders of the Ukrainian Government through regular channels: The Staff of the Supreme Commander (HQ) with Simon Petlura as the Commander-in-Chief and the War Ministry.

UKRAINIAN LIBERATION WAR (1917-1920)

Said Lenin in 1917: "If Finland, Poland, or Ukraine secede from Russia, there is nothing bad in this. What harm is there? Whoever says there is one, is a chauvinist. One would need to be crazy to continue Tsar Nicholas' policy."

Under his leadership, the Russian Communist Party was that crazy. At the time of the disintegration of the Russian empire, the Russian Communist Party continued the policy of Tsardom. Dialectic of Lenin's pronouncements like above, only helped him to disguise the true intentions of his policy toward the non-Russian nationalities, and to give the Soviet aggression against Ukraine and other non-Russian countries some spurious semblance of moral and ideological justification.

In the case of Ukraine, Lenin proclaimed the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination and recognized the independence of the Ukrainian National Republic, proclaimed by the Central *Rada* on Nov. 20, 1917, but at the same time (Dec. 17, 1917) he presented the Central *Rada* with an ultimatum demanding nothing less than surrender of Ukraine to Soviet power. Along with the recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Soviet Government announced that unless its demands of this ultimatum were accepted within forty-eight hours, the Soviet Government would consider the Central *Rada* "in a state of open war against the Soviet regime in Russia and in *Ukraine* (all italics added — L.S.)."

There was not a basis for a *Soviet regime in Ukraine*. Elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly presented a clear and decisive evidence as to the will of the majority of the Ukrainian people. The Bolsheviks obtained in Ukraine only 10 per cent of all the votes, while the Ukrainian parties supporting the Central *Rada* obtained 53 per cent of all the votes apart from another 13.9 per cent of the votes which they obtained in joint lists with the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries. This meant 66.9 per cent of the Ukrainian vote cast for the Central *Rada*, but if we add the vote of non-Ukrainian parties which were not opposed to the policy of the Central *Rada* and participated in its Government, we can say that the Central *Rada* obtained 72 per cent of the vote, cast in Ukraine in the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly. At the same time, in Central Regions of Russia the Bolsheviks received about 40 per cent of the vote which means that the most of the Bolshevik vote came from Central Russia and from the Army.

The war between Soviet Russia and Ukraine was a logical conclusion of the Soviet ultimatum to the Central *Rada*. With intervals in 1918 when the German and Austro-Hungarian armies stayed in Ukraine, this war lasted to 1920 and ended with the defeat of the Ukrainian National Republic and its Army. In November 1920, the Ukrainian Government and the Army withdrew from Ukraine into exile, and the Soviet invaders were able to take Ukraine over. But their control of Ukraine was not complete as Lenin himself admitted in October 1920: Ukraine was Soviet only in form, while in fact the Ukrainian insurgents were the real masters of the countryside. During the whole of 1921, 1922, 1923, and even 1924, the Ukrainian countryside waged an armed struggle against the Soviet invaders. The Ukrainian risings did not stop, although their number and scope diminished from year to year. According to Soviet data, in 1921, the Soviets liquidated in Ukraine 19 "bands" with a total of 1,450 "bandits" killed, and in 1922 accepted voluntary surrender of 10,000 "bandits" including 200 *otamany* (guerrilla leaders). Finally, the Soviet amnesty to all insurgents, growing stabilization of the Soviet regime because of the peace, and last but not least: the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the Soviet Government were able to remove the ground from under the Ukrainian insurgency.

Thus, with the liquidation of the Ukrainian insurgency, the Ukrainian Liberation War was over. The liberation struggle was over, but it was not entirely lost. On the one hand, it forced the Soviet occupants to acquiesce in the existence of what they claim to be a "sovereign and independent" Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. If there were no Ukrainian struggle for independence, it may be doubted whether the Russian Communists would have recognized even the formal existence of the Ukrainian SSR and not dismembered it in various Red Russian "general-governorships" as they tried to do in 1918. At that time they were anxious to separate the Ukrainian industrial region or the Ukrainian Black Sea district from the rest of Ukraine and to establish there separate "Soviet Republics."

On the other hand, the Ukrainian liberation struggle as waged by the Ukrainian regular Army in 1917-1920 or by the Ukrainian insurgents all the time up to 1924 or even later, helped the Ukrainians to consolidate and to emerge as a modern nation. The Ukrainian liberation struggle helped to rouse and to educate the nation and the consequences of this were visible in the unparalleled resurgence of the Ukrainian science, literature, and arts in the twenties, in the growing nationalism of the Ukrainian thought after the liberation war which influenced even the Ukrainian Communists (Skrypnyk, Khvylovyi, and others), and in such recent phenomena as the Ukrainian revolutionary struggle by the Ukrainian nationalists during and after the World War II. From the point of view of these consequences one can say that the Ukrainian Liberation War (1917-1920-

1924) ended with a *lasting victory*. This is also the opinion of the American students of the war, as, e.g., Prof. Arthur E. Adams of Michigan State University.

In connection with the establishment of the Ukrainian S.S.R. it is necessary to say that no idea could be more erroneous than the idea propagated by the Soviet historians and followed by some Western historians, as, e.g., E. H. Carr, that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was established by the Ukrainians themselves, and that the triumph of Russian Communists in Ukraine as well as the destruction of the "bourgeois" Ukrainian National Republic was carried out by the Ukrainian workers and peasants to the "enthusiasm" of the entire Ukrainian population. Contrary to E. H. Carr, the mentioned Prof. Adams showed convincingly on many pages of his book (*The Bolsheviks in the Ukraine. The Second Soviet Campaign 1918-1919*) that the establishment of the Soviet regime in Ukraine was not a consequence of the internal political and social situation, but a result of external intervention and the military victory of the Red Army. Three basic elements were combined in the conquest: the employment of overwhelming, better armed and equipped military forces, both regular and partisan, the incitement of class warfare and internal subversion, and skilful use of propaganda which introduced an element of disintegration into the Ukrainian forces (e.g. revolt of the Ukrainian leftist elements, the so-called "borot'bisty" and "nezalezhnyky") which weakened the power of Ukrainian resistance. The combination of these basic elements served the Soviets later for the Sovietization of many a country in Europe and Asia.

However, the most important cause of the Ukrainian defeat, was the total misconception of the Ukrainian liberation struggle in the West, and lack of its assistance to Ukrainian forces which waged their uneven struggle against the Soviet invaders. It was this factor which largely contributed to the downfall of the democratic Ukrainian National Republic and to the rise of the totalitarian Soviet power in Ukraine and elsewhere. The Ukrainian Liberation War showed that the Western democratic powers were not interested in the national liberation movements opposing Russian Bolshevism. So, e.g., the Entente powers saw the Ukrainians locked in a desperate struggle against the Soviet Russian aggression, but they did nothing to help them. On the contrary, they had decided to back the adversary of the national liberation movements, the White Russian Volunteer Army of Gen. Denikin and in order to help it in the struggle against the Ukrainians, they instituted a terrible blockade against the territory, occupied by the Ukrainian Army. This was a fatal measure: not only arms and munitions, but also medical supplies were not allowed to pass, e.g., from Poland or Rumania, into "Petlura's territory." It is

obvious that this measure caused indescribable suffering also for the Ukrainian civilian population including women and children. There were no medicines and vaccines which could stop the epidemics ravaging the country as the blockade prevented their importation into Ukraine, and hundreds of thousands died because of the blockade imposed by the Entente. In this "quadrangle of death", with typhus raging inside, and with the enemy armies advancing from all sides, the Ukrainian Army lost more than 50,000 officers and soldiers who died because of the uncontrolled typhus epidemic. This was nearly a half of its effectives at that time and, therefore, many Ukrainians have suspected the sudden outbreak of typhus epidemic in "Petlura's territory" as being the first case of bacteriological warfare in the history of mankind.

The lack of assistance for Ukrainian armed forces in their struggle against Russian Bolshevism, moreover, the terrible blockade of the Ukrainian territory by the Entente powers, were instrumental in the final victory of the Red Army. Entente's betting on Gen. Denikin proved entirely false; myopic policies of this Entente horse succeeded only in alienating all who could make common cause with him in fighting Bolshevism, not excluding even the Cossacks who constituted the bulk of his Army. Bolshevism emerged victorious on all fronts, and its adversaries were defeated. However, the Ukrainian Army which was compelled to fight upon two fronts (against the Red Army and the Russian Volunteer Army of Gen. Denikin) and for some time was also forced to oppose the Poles in the west, and the Rumanians in the south, was able to achieve some important victories (as, e.g., the seizure of Kiev in August, 1919) or carry out remarkable military operations (as, e.g., the Winter Campaign 1919-1920). Comprising, in Summer of 1919, some 150,000 fighters, the Ukrainian Army constituted a considerable factor in the over-all struggle against Russian Bolshevism, and if it lost the Ukrainian Liberation War, it was not its fault alone. The Ukrainian Army served the Ukrainian cause with an unequalled self-sacrifice and devotion up to the very end, and it was other forces which have the indisputable merit for the salvation of the Russian colonial empire. The Red Army has it, too.

THE RISE OF THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA)

The abortive alliance between Hitler and Stalin could not endure. On June 22, 1941, Hitler ordered his powerful *Wehrmacht* to invade the Soviet Union. The attack against Soviet Russia before the war with the British Commonwealth has ended, was one of Hitler's greatest gambles, but it failed only by a hair's breadth. It failed not because of the strategic blunders of the *Wehrmacht*, but because of diabolic savagery and endless stupidity of the Nazi *Goldfasanen* who had lost their war in the East long before the German generals lost it on the battlefield.

There is a persistent tendency by the German authors to ignore the *political* side of the ill-fated campaign in the East. However, every *Landser* who made it in Ukraine, remembers well that while he swept forward in the initial surge, he was greeted everywhere with traditional Ukrainian symbols of welcome: bread and salt. In the cities and towns he was showered with flowers and hailed as liberator. Even within the Soviet Army in those early Summer days, desertions on a mass scale were common. So, e.g., the 5th Soviet Army of Gen. Potapov which should have opposed the advance of the 6th German Army as well as the *Panzergruppe* of Gen. Kleist in Volhynia, simply disintegrated in a few days. Officers and soldiers of this army, mostly Ukrainians, surrendered or "disappeared" in the Ukrainian villages giving their arms to the Ukrainian underground fighters. Nor was the situation better with the 6th Soviet Army of Gen. Vlasov and the 26th army of Gen. Kostenko in Galicia. These armies fell back almost without a pretence of opposition, mercilessly harrassed by the Ukrainian freedom fighters. In Galicia alone some 30,000 Red Army men surrendered to the latter.

Thus, on both sides of the Eastern front, in the initial days of the campaign, the spirit of revolt was strong, and nationalist feelings against the Red Muscovite domination prevailed everywhere: in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, among the Caucasians and the Turkestanians. It was an ideal time for spawning a powerful national-liberation movement against Moscow, which could have knocked Russia out of the war. This statement is no exaggeration: 3,600,000 officers and soldiers of the Red Army surrendered to the Germans during the first seven and a half months of campaign according to the data presented at the Nuremberg trial. They surrendered not because of the superiority of the German Army, nor because they were cowards on the battlefield, but because they refused to fight for hated Stalin's tyranny. They were mostly non-Russians and they offered their services to fight against their enslavers for the liberation of their countries. It was a large plebiscite within the Red Army, and its outcome turned against Stalin and

Moscow. Again it is no exaggeration: one cannot forget the fact that after all the bitter experience with the Nazi Germany, there were still at the time of the Anglo-American invasion some 800,000 former Soviet prisoners of war who served with the German Army, and 100,000 who served in the Navy and Luftwaffe. It is true that Hitler knew almost nothing about this development: on March 23, 1945 he exclaimed at a conference in his headquarters: "We just don't know what is floating around. I have just heard for the first time, to my amazement, that a Ukrainian SS Division has suddenly appeared. I don't know a thing about this." He was always decidedly against putting Ukrainians or Cossacks into German uniform.

Thus, the incredible stupidity of Hitler and his clique contributed to the ultimate failure of the Eastern campaign. The Nazis rejected the offered hand in the beginning of the campaign and continued to reject it nearly up to the very end. They rejected all constructive policy in the East, and dreaming of the total destruction of "inferior" peoples and of transforming the conquered territories into the "Lebensraum" of the German "master-race", they entered upon a policy which hardly could have been more detrimental and catastrophic for the outcome of the war. Not strategic blundering of the *Wehrmacht*, but the Nazi policy in the conquered territories condemned the Nazi leaders to the punishment of the most drastic failure in history.

The Nazi treatment of the Soviet prisoners of war who surrendered to them voluntarily, was a mockery of all customs of civilized nations. Many captured Soviet soldiers, among them the Turkestanians who were the most astute opponents of the Soviet regime, were shot on the spot, because the Nazi captors thought of them as being "inferior" Mongols. Many others were intentionally starved to death, or died of cold, typhus, and complete lack of medical attention. During the fall and winter of 1941-1942, some 40 per cent of Soviet prisoners of war died of typhus, starvation, and cold. Naturally, the news of the fate of Soviet war prisoners reached the lines of the Red Army and quickly spread among the Red army men and the populace. Resistance by the Red Army stiffened and mass surrendering stopped in 1942 and 1943. Instead, anti-German partisans appeared in the countryside where the paths of German tanks were strewn with flowers not so long ago. This was now a *Partisanengebiet* to which entrance was allowed only in convoys, and Peter Kleist is right in stating that in Ukraine the first partisans were disillusioned Ukrainian nationalists, and not Stalin's or Khrushchev's henchmen (*Zwischen Hitler und Stalin*). And, truly, Ukrainian nationalists had ample reasons for being disillusioned!

On June 30, 1941, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) under the leadership of Stepan Bandera (who was murdered in Munich, on October 15, 1959, by a Soviet agent) proclaimed, in Lviv

(Lvov) the reestablishment of the Ukrainian State and ordered the mobilization of the Ukrainian people against Moscow. At the same time a National Assembly was created and a Provisional Ukrainian Government was established with Yaroslav Stetzko as its Prime Minister. Simultaneously in all Ukrainian cities, towns and villages, which were liberated from Russian-Communist tyranny, the Ukrainian administration was established. The Nazi reaction to these events was swift and revealing. They started with the arrests of several members of the Ukrainian Government, including Premier Stetzko and the OUN leader Bandera, who were deported to the Nazi concentration camp in Sachsenhausen, and with the arrests and shootings of prominent Ukrainian nationalists. Among others, two brothers of Stepan Bandera were murdered in the concentration camp in Auschwitz. Arrests were followed by the dismemberment of the Ukrainian territory and incorporation of its parts into different Nazi satrapies: Galicia was annexed to Frank's General Gouvernement, Transnistria with Odessa into Antonescu's Rumania, and from the rest of Ukraine a "Reichskommissariat of Ukraine" was formed under the notoriously cruel "Reichskommissar" Erich Koch. The story of his rule in the occupied Ukraine consists of a long list of sins and blunders which turned the friendly Ukrainian population into a bitter foe of Nazi Germany.

The emergence of the OUN at the head of the Ukrainian anti-Nazi resistance movement was the culmination of a logical process of development. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists evolved in 1929 from the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), which in turn had been founded in 1920 by an outstanding Ukrainian military leader, Col. Evhen Konovalets, for the continuation of the liberation struggle by underground methods. With the foundation of the OUN, the cadres of the UVO began to be assimilated with the OUN. The Commander-in-Chief of the UVO, Col. Evhen Konovalets' was appointed leader of the OUN. The growing tension of the international situation and the constantly increasing power of the OUN prompted Moscow to organize assassination of Col. Evhen Konovalets' which took place in Rotterdam on May 23, 1938.

By fall, 1942, Ukrainian anti-Nazi resistance movement assumed also partisan forms. Armed groups of self-defence were formed by the OUN, which, eventually, united into a powerful Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Soon the UPA was joined by former Soviet prisoners of war, by the local youths who refused to go to Germany as slave labourers, and by Ukrainian police who refused to serve the German occupants. The UPA hardened in the struggle against the Nazi occupants and the Soviet partisans whose activity was primarily directed against the UPA. By fall 1943 the UPA was in substantial control of the country districts of Volhynia and southwestern Polissia, while the Germans held the towns and with difficulty maintained

movement on the principal roads. By the end of the year (1943) large areas of the country were under the full control of the UPA which set up its own "state apparatus", including military training camps, hospitals, and a school system. The total number of persons involved in the movement — including medical, administrative, and instructional personnel, was hundreds of thousands. By July, 1944, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) was established and incorporated all Ukrainian groups committed to the independence of Ukraine. The OUN subordinated itself to the UHVR as did the UPA command.

Under the command of Gen. Roman Shukhevych (*nom de guerre*: Taras Chuprynka) the UPA entered the new period of the Soviet occupation of Ukraine. To emphasize the unity of the Ukrainian resistance movement, the Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, Taras Chuprynka, was elected Chairman of the General Secretariat of UHVR under the pseudonym of "Roman Lozovsky." He was also the chairman of the OUN Leadership (*Provid*) where he was known under the pseudonym of "Tur." It need hardly be stressed that the initiative for creating the UHVR lay with the OUN, which thus tried to win a broader popular basis for the Ukrainian liberation struggle.

By July, 1944, nearly all of Ukraine was reconquered by the Red Army. Under the command of Gen. Taras Chuprynka the UPA challenged the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia and, facing the victorious armies at their peak strength, stood ground at least until 1950 — for five years after the conclusion of the war. Western Ukraine (Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia) "became the seat of the strongest anti-Soviet guerrilla force which has ever developed" (Prof. John A. Armstrong in *Soviet Partisans*). It became the revolutionary *place d'armes* of the Ukrainian liberation struggle, which the Ukrainian insurgents tried to hold under any circumstances. The question is what happened to Western Ukrainian *place d'armes* under the concentrated Soviet pressure? This is the question we shall try to answer at the end of this article.

THE REVOLUTIONARY PLACE D'ARMES IN WESTERN UKRAINE

During and following World War II, active resistance in Ukraine against both the Nazi and the Soviet occupation forces, was split from top to bottom into two parts, which were to perform two distinct functions for the duration of the liberation struggle. One part was to be concerned only with military operations, and was known as the UPA (*Ukraïns'ka Povstancha Armiya*) and was composed of nationally conscious order of men and women who volunteered for service with its ranks. After passing a rigid training with a recruit company, the volunteers were called to swear the UPA oath of allegiance and became "fighters" of the UPA. The UPA system of military discipline was very rigorous, and excesses were severely punished. In principle, absolute and unquestioning obedience towards superiors was required. Military salute was made compulsory throughout. Military uniforms and insignia were introduced as well as a system of military ranks. A very extended and clever use had been made of medals and awards for individual achievements, and the UPA decorations: *Cross of Battle Merit*, *Cross of Merit*, both in three classes, and the Medal: *For Struggle under Particularly Difficult Conditions* were instituted. Courts martial could be convoked any time by the Company Commander who appointed three judges from his company's personnel; the political officer served as a prosecutor, and the defendant selected his advocate among his colleagues. If the court martial passed a death sentence, it had to be approved by the Commander of Military District. Nine military districts were known as having been organized in Western Ukraine and they were known as territorial channel of the UPA HQ; otherwise the UPA was divided into operational groups, tactical sectors, task forces, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. In addition to combat units and diversion groups, there were also recruit companies, training companies (incl. officers and NCO schools), convalescent companies, transport companies, administrative companies and field gendarmerie (uniformed military police). The weapons of the UPA consisted chiefly of small arms, rifles, automatic rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, and mortars. Artillery (mountain and anti-tank guns) was used on rare occasions. However, the UPA made extensive use of mines, and it must be said that during the German retreat large amount of German "S" Mines was captured, which were later skilfully used by the UPA.

The other part of the active resistance in Ukraine was the responsibility of the OUN. It had an underground network with the clandestine organization looking back at traditions of 25 years duration. During the war, 1939-1945, the clandestine organization of the OUN had to expand far beyond the exigencies of the "peace time." It had to assume more and more functions which were previously unknown to its members. So, e.g., in addition to its purely political functions, the OUN network had to carry out different functions for the UPA, such as security service, reconnaissance and counter-intelligence, logistics and supplies, communications and liaison, medical service, and political propaganda. From 1947 on, the OUN network included also guerrillas from the disbanded UPA units, and conducted military operations of its own. During the years of the extended struggle of the UPA, the OUN network performed miracles. It built underground bunkers, underground hospitals, cared for the supplies, arms, munitions, printed books, magazines, and leaflets and distributed the propaganda materials among the population, fought enemy's infiltration, and maintained lines of communications between the different parts of the UPA and the OUN. Even the underground field post service was established within the OUN network, which was able to deliver in Volhynia letters and communications posted in the Carpathians within 3 days.

The UPA proper existed until mid-1946, when its Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Taras Chuprynka ordered most of the UPA units to be disbanded and transferred to the underground network of the OUN. Although this marked the formal termination of the functions of the UPA (with the exception of the continued UPA activity in the Carpathian Mountains and in the territories beyond the Curzon line, i.e. in Poland), in Ukraine the name of the UPA was continuously used for designating also the activities of the Ukrainian armed underground (*zbroyne pidpillya*) which now consisted of "guerrillas" and "underground fighters." While in Ukraine and in the West, the designation UPA serves to denote both the UPA and the Ukrainian armed underground, the Soviet sources rarely use it. Instead, they prefer using the appellation *banderivtsi* formed from the surname of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the faction of the OUN, which mostly contributed to the emergence and the activities of the UPA.

The broad political objective of the OUN-UPA-UHVR was the creation of an independent Ukrainian State, and the political propaganda of all these formations made a considerable effort to win widest popular support for this objective by presenting it as the surest road to political liberty and social welfare. While being successful in this regard, the Ukrainian underground leaders were quite unfortunate in another one: neither during the war nor after it was there an outside power interested in aiding the Ukrainians to achieve independence. Consequently, the UPA had to fight against

both powers contending for Ukraine, i.e., the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Russia without any outside help. After the war the UPA struggle extended on four fronts: against the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, as well as against pro-Soviet elements in Ukraine. A formal treaty between the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia was announced in Warsaw on May 12, 1947, having for purpose the elimination of the UPA from the territories of the interested parties.

The UPA struggle was chiefly waged on in Western Ukraine, in its northern and southern parts. The Polissian marshes and swamps and the Volhynian forest lands in the North as well as the mountainous, heavily forested part of Galicia, Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine in the south were highly advantageous to partisan warfare. This cannot be said of the wooded steppe regions of Central Ukraine or the open steppes of Eastern Ukraine where, necessarily, Ukrainian (and Red) partisan activities were of limited importance. However, the territory of the intensified partisan warfare by the UPA embraced one-third of Ukrainian territory with 75,000 square miles in size and population over 13,000,000.

It is this territory where the UPA was able to achieve its most spectacular successes: in May, 1943, when it ambushed and killed the Nazi SA Commander, Victor Lutze with his escort; in February, 1944, when it ambushed and severely wounded Marshal M. F. Vatutin, the Soviet Commander of the First "Ukrainian" Front (Vatutin died of wounds in Kiev), and in March, 1947, when it ambushed and killed the Polish Vice-Minister of Defence, Gen. Karol Swierczewski, who achieved fame as "General Walter" during the Spanish Civil War. To this list, the UPA added the assassination (in October, 1949) of the Soviet Ukrainian writer, Yaroslav Halan, who specialized in the propaganda against the UPA and the Ukrainian liberation movement, and was the most hated traitor in Western Ukraine.

With the formal termination of the large-scale partisan operations in 1946, the UPA went underground. The emphasis shifted from active combat to psychological warfare. Underground publications and their distribution became the most important tasks of the clandestine organization which took place of the UPA. However, the audacious raids of the UPA troops in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Lithuania, and even Eastern Prussia continued throughout 1947-1948 and acquired a wide publicity in the world. More than 500 armed Ukrainian insurgents succeeded in 1947 in fighting their way from Ukraine to Germany after traversing the length of Southern Poland and Czechoslovakia. In Germany, they surrendered their arms to the U.S. Army.

While the UPA proper never numbered more than 50 field battalions with roughly 30,000 officers and men, the estimates of the UPA strength by the Nazi and Soviet experts ran considerably higher. The Soviets estimated the UPA at 300,000 men; the Nazis even higher.

It is probable that their figures included all *UPA* activities and sympathizers. In fact, in the case of the *UPA*, famous Mao's simile on "perfect partisan warfare" could fully be justified: the *UPA* were the "fish", and the surrounding and the supporting Ukrainian population "the water." According to Mao's teaching, only a just people's struggle can be waged by a "perfect" partisan force led by the progressive revolutionaries against a hated regime of reactionary oppression and colonialist exploitation, and the *UPA*'s struggle was indeed a just struggle. Mao's marxist definition of partisan warfare is quite correct, but in case of the *UPA* it bears only witness to the fact that such a progressive revolutionary struggle must not be a communist monopoly.

It took the Soviets and their allies more than 10 years to wear down and decimate, but not completely destroy, the *UPA* and the Ukrainian underground in Western Ukraine. Of course, the Soviets were able to inflict the Ukrainian underground severe wounds in their protracted struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists. On March 5, 1950, the *UPA* Commander-in-Chief, Lt.-Gen. Roman Shukhevych—Taras Chuprynka was killed in battle against the Soviet security forces in a suburb of Lviv (Lvov). He was a mechanical engineer by profession, a concert pianist by dedication, and a military leader by conviction. He had a very good military training in the Polish and German officer schools as had his Chiefs of Staff: Gen. Dmytro Hrytsay (1944-1946) and Col. Oleksander Hasyn (1946-1949) who also perished in the struggle. Gen. Shukhevych-Chuprynka was killed after having served almost 7 years as the leader of the anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet resistance forces in Ukraine. His death was a severe blow to the Ukrainian underground because Gen. Shukhevych-Chuprynka was very able strategist of the partisan warfare, who had a special gift of balancing and combining the political and military factors of the liberation struggle in every situation. Besides Gen. Shukhevych-Chuprynka had a clear conception of what a political and social order should be established on the ruins of the Soviet-Russian colonial empire. He envisaged its break up into free democratic national states within their ethnic boundaries, and for this aim he already worked in 1943 while organizing the First Conference of the Enslaved Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, the forerunner of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). National combat groups in the *UPA* (Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijan, Turkestanian, Tatar) were the immediate consequence of this Chuprynka's initiative.

Gen. Chuprynka rightly understood the significance of the epoch. He foresaw the downfall of the colonialist empires and he foresaw the destruction of the Soviet Russian colonialist empire by common revolutionary efforts of the subjugated peoples. For the purpose of the intensification of the revolutionary struggle, one Ukrainian generation under the leadership of Gen. Chuprynka built a revolutionary *place d'armes* in Western Ukraine dedicated to deepening the

revolutionary process in the entire Soviet Union. After Chuprynka's death, the Ukrainian revolutionaries defended their revolutionary *place d'armes* against all odds and at tremendous sacrifice on their part. It was no mere coincidence that, shortly before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow, the Soviet authorities issued their eighth appeal to the Ukrainian underground forces to surrender. It was published in the Volhynian paper, *The Red Banner*, on Feb. 11, 1956, and it was the best proof that up to this time the Soviet power had not succeeded in physically destroying the Ukrainian revolutionary *place d'armes*.

In fact Ukrainian revolutionaries were able to defend their "bridge-head of the National Revolution" in Western Ukraine, and were able to expand it over the territory of the entire Soviet Union. The most curious aftermath of the Ukrainian liberation struggle waged on the revolutionary *place d'armes* in Western Ukraine, developed in the concentration camps of the USSR in 1953-1956. It was the strikes and uprisings of the political prisoners consisting mostly of former Ukrainian *UPA* and underground fighters. Over forty thousand prisoners of different nationalities (Ukrainians, Cossacks, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Caucasians) took part in the uprisings and witnessed their suppression by the Soviets using all kinds of weapons, including tanks. There is today a considerable literature in the West on the strikes and uprisings and the names of the localities where they took place, Vorkuta, Norilsk, Kinguir, Tayshet, etc. are familiar in the entire world. Many a former German P.O.W. who returned home from the Soviet concentration camps will remember them all his life because they opened him the way to freedom. In 1955, letters from Ukrainian political prisoners written on linen, were smuggled out with the help of freed Germans, and presented to the Division on Human Rights of the United Nations.

On the basis of the evidence contained in different sources, an evaluation of the underground revolutionary struggle in Ukraine can be advanced and formulated in the following points:

(1) Revolutionary *place d'armes* in Western Ukraine continues to exist and its psychological influence has been quite real in accordance with the predictions of such ideologists of the Ukrainian revolutionary struggle, as P. Poltava, O. Hornovyi, and others;

(2) Its existence has been hidden behind other forms than those, employed 15 years ago, as it has been witnessed by reports also by recent Soviet defectors like Dr. Rathaus;

(3) The revolutionary *place d'armes* of the Ukrainian underground has been extended over the entire Soviet Union. The Ukrainian underground ceased being an isolated case of Western Ukrainian resistance, but became international in its scope;

(4) The Ukrainian underground as it was evidenced by the strikes and uprisings in the Soviet concentration camps was powerful enough

to enlist non-Ukrainians into the struggle: Balts, Cossacks, Caucasians, Turkestanians, Poles, Germans, the British (Sgt. Piddington), Japanese and others.

(5) Continuance of the UPA struggle in Ukraine prevented a wholesale deportation of Ukrainians, planned by Stalin after the war, and reported by Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU;

(6) Having been in Ukraine and in the concentration camps the first and preeminent instance of the anti-Soviet resistance, the Ukrainian underground challenged the terroristic apparatus of the Kremlin and showed that terrorization has its limits and that the terrorization may rebound at the terrorization apparatus and destroy it;

(7) By extending the liberation struggle into the concentration camps, the Ukrainian underground shook the foundations of the Soviet colonialist empire. This was the reason why despite all violent crushing of strikes and uprisings, the Soviet terroristic apparatus was compelled to bring about the relaxation of terror, the liquidation of camps, the release of their prisoners (cf. Burmeister and Passin in *Encounter*, London, IV, 1956), and Soviet leaders were compelled to proclaim "destalinization" of their regime. The initial stages of this "destalinization" process took place in Ukraine where young boys and girls of the Ukrainian underground were challenging the Soviet power with a profound disregard for personal consequences at least during ten years after the conclusion of World War II.

(8) The Ukrainian liberation struggle in Ukraine, the strikes and uprisings of the Ukrainians in the concentration camps brought a wide publicity for the Ukrainian liberation struggle throughout the world. Under the conditions of almost total ignorance of the Ukrainian problem or of intentional silencing of the Ukrainian liberation struggle, such a publicity has its political significance.

Voltaire's famous dictum that "Ukraine has always aspired to freedom" has received a new light under the conditions of the present-day liberation struggle. Indeed, Ukrainians are now struggling for freedom everywhere: in their own country and in the countries of other peoples where they have been resettled. They are struggling in Ukraine and in Siberia, in Kazakhstan and in the Far East. And the support for the Ukrainian liberation struggle comes from the United States, Canada, Latin America, Australia, and Europe. Two different worlds are at the present time in conflict with each other, and one of them must inevitably fall, if the other is to continue to exist. The Ukrainians believe in the victory of indivisible freedom and in the independence of Ukraine, and their belief is not an ideology learned and repeated by rote, but a moral power able to back up their struggle.

THE ROAD TO FREEDOM AND THE END OF FEAR

by

JAROSLAV STETZKO

FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF UKRAINE

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UNITED FRONT AGAINST TYRANNY

In the darkest period of the world's history in modern times, at a time when two of the deadliest forms of imperialism, Nazism and Bolshevism, clashed, and it seemed as though the resistance put up against them by the subjugated nations that they had attacked was futile, in an epoch in which a hitherto unheard of regime of tyranny and despotism, a system of national murder by means of death chambers and deportations, and massacres of women and children prevailed, the cause of right and freedom was championed by Ukraine.

At a joint conference of the subjugated nations, held on 21st and 22nd November 1943, revolutionaries and supporters of the cause of freedom from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Idel-Ural, North Caucasia, Turkestan, Ukraine, and Byelorussia founded a coordination committee for a common and united fight against tyranny, imperialism and totalitarianism, and for the purpose of restoring the national and state independence of their countries.

This committee was formed at a time when France was oppressed by Hitler, and Russia, aided by the Western Powers, was beginning to smash Hitler's war-machine in the East. In their fight for absolute truth and justice the revolutionary forces of our nations had the courage to oppose these two Powers, these two systems of tyranny. Their fears at that time as regards a coalition of the West with Russian despots have come true. The entire free world is seriously menaced by its ally of yesterday, namely by Russia, whose aim it is to subjugate this free world. Hardly any of the men who were the originators of the A.B.N. are alive to-day. The Georgian major who was in command of the guard at the Conference was killed in the course of a combat with Gestapo units in 1943, General T. Chuprynka, the C-in-C of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was killed in the course of combats with M.V.D. units in 1950, whilst others have vanished without a trace. But their ideas and their conception of a united fight of all the nations subjugated by

Bolshevism live on. The national freedom movements, the national underground and insurgent forces continue to fight for the cause of freedom and in this way organise the masses. Underground methods have replaced mass revolutions; the fight has been intensified and extended to all spheres of life, to the political, social, economic, and cultural; attention is paid, in particular, to the propaganda effect of our ideas and also to winning over the troops of the Soviet Army to our side. The final aim remains the same, namely, to disintegrate the Bolshevist empire from within by the united efforts of the subjugated nations. The fight has become slow and intensive rather than extensive, and its ultimate aim is a general national revolution, an aim which forms an important feature of the A.B.N.'s revolutionary liberation idea. The confidence which the A.B.N. has in the national strength of the peoples beyond the Iron Curtain makes it imperative that the masses should be organised for the fight, and in this connection the major powers of the West should offer their co-operation and assistance.

No one will make us a present of freedom; freedom must be gained by sacrificing one's own blood. The secret of the success of future revolutions lies in the masses.

THE HIGHER MEANING OF OUR FIGHT

In order to conquer Bolshevism a universal solution to all vital problems must be found. Bolshevism is a menace to the whole world; the resistance which is offered must, therefore, be universal. The countries which are still free must not continue to live on calmly for the time being, at the expense of our national struggle and protected by the resistance of our nations, only to be drowned *themselves* in the near future in the Bolshevist flood, after the champions of our cause have laid down their lives.

In order to justify the millions of victims of the two world wars before God, mankind and history, in order to perceive a deeper significance in the deaths of countless innocent women, children, old and young persons alike, and in order to escape from the depths of despair when pondering on the senselessness of all these sacrifices and self-sacrifices, it is imperative that the fight which is in progress should represent the settling of the last big account, as it were, with the forces of evil, crime, imperialism, barbarity, and cruel and satanic tyranny, and that this fight should result in a genuinely better, more just, noble and peaceful life, and should be followed by a permanent peace. This peace must not, however, involve tyranny and misery, but must be a just peace with freedom and

equality of rights for all, so that all nations and men may feel that they have been liberated from fear, need, cruelty, national subjugation and social injustice for all time, and all peoples and nations may lead a free, happy, and independent life.

This is the higher and deeper meaning of our fight, which is not concerned with political hatred!

Mankind, to-day, should be more interested in the ethics of this fight, in its moral aspect, and in its spiritual attitude towards fellowmen and neighbours, than in its political significance, for only then will man's political attitude change and he will cast aside all that is bestial, cruel and unmannerly, since he has been created in God's image.

A nation which has been subjugated has a deeper and more sensitive feeling for right and wrong than one which is free. A prisoner longs for freedom more than he does for bread. Once the Western world has comprehended this spiritual attitude and has adjusted its own way of thinking and its own system of watchwords to this attitude, it can continue to rely on the unity of the unwavering front of the free and the subjugated nations.

Communism has become a "religion" of evil and the faith of fanatics who have lost their own sense of values, which they, however, believe they are preserving, whereas in reality they are devoting themselves to erroneous ideas with a zeal which would be worthy of a better cause. For this reason the idea that atomic bombs and military supremacy would suffice to exterminate Bolshevism must be rejected. Bolshevism can only be conquered by the faith and conviction of those who take up the fight against it — a fight which will not remain an empty threat but will materialise!

Let us simply define our principles of truth with which we oppose Communist lies and deception! Only clarity and singleness of purpose, only political and other offensive activity, in keeping with our ideas, can ensure a victory.

DIVINE AND HUMAN VALUES

Bolshevism destroys all sublime, divine and human values, denies God; kills religion and destroys churches and undermines Christian morals; that is why the anti-Bolshevist revolution for liberation must put God first, before anything else, take a stand for the protection of religion, and place human actions on a heroic moral basis. A deepening of religious experience and a revival in religion in practical life will then be a positive result of the new revolution,

so that man, even in an age of brutal sadism and barbarism, will receive refreshment in an atmosphere of the good and noble. Persecutions have never been able to wipe out religion, but have only strengthened it, for it is better for religion and the Church to be persecuted than to be mere protégés of a state. Every religion contains elements of martyrdom for the sake of truth.

Bolshevism sows hate, envy, implacable class-conflict, and international dissension; propagates chauvinism and serves Russian imperialism; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution must preach love among the well-meaning sons of the same nation, international harmony and solidarity, inter-state cooperation, mutual support between individuals and peoples, by condemning chavinism and imperialism.

Our revolution must meet the hatred of all that is good and noble with a love of all that is sublime and good, and with an abhorrence of evil and corruption. Bolshevism has done away with freedom, and for this reason the anti-Bolshevist revolution for liberation must be a triumph of freedom and the general liberation of peoples and individuals.

Bolshevism had put an end to personal liberty and activity, as well as to free creative work; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution must promote personality and give the creative initiative of the individual free play.

Bolshevism aims at the subjection of the individual and of the nation, at collectivism, following the complete levelling of human personality and all national characteristics; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution must overthrow collectivism and place the individual in the focal point of interest, with his initiative and freedom to work for social justice and the national weal.

AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND WORLD-CONQUEST AIMS

Bolshevism is a totalitarian system of subordination; therefore the anti-Bolshevist national liberation revolution must realise genuinely democratic ideas, without hampering them with any "democratic" imperialism or hypocritical exploitation. The complete freedom of nations and individuals within the framework of international solidarity and social justice must be guaranteed.

Bolshevism bases its doctrine on materialism and Marxism, subjecting practically all life to state and party bureaucracy, which, like a Moloch, devours and exterminates; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution must abolish class-warfare, the doctrine of

materialism and Marxism, and exploitation of the individual by the state or other persons.

The State is a means for the development of forces, for furthering the nation and the individual, but not a means by which to enslave the citizen, either by state or by one-party bureaucracy.

Bolshevism disavows the nation and the national idea by putting forward an internationalism which is merely camouflaged Russian imperialism; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution must set national liberation and the ideal of a national state for every nation subjugated by Bolshevism, in the forefront.

Bolshevism has, as its final aim, a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics spread over the whole world, i. e. a despotic world empire under Russian domination; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution pursues such fundamental aims as freedom for nations and individuals irrespective of race, religion, size, or wealth, each in its own democratic national state where the individual is guaranteed complete independence.

Bolshevism aspires to a world-conquest in which it is supported by the Russian people, a fact which is corroborated by the Russian philosopher, *Berdyayev*, in his work. "The New Middle Ages"; the author, a Christian-minded philosopher, writes as follows on the subject of Bolshevism:

"Bolshevism is a distorted and subversive realisation of the Russian idea, and for this reason it has triumphed.

"Bolshevism is in keeping with the mentality of the Russian nation; it is merely an expression of the spiritual disunion of this nation, of its apostasy of faith, its religious crisis, and its extreme demoralisation. Bolshevist ideas are completely in keeping with Russian nihilism.

"Dostoevsky was the prophet of the Russian revolution and he realised that socialism in Russia is a religious problem, a question of atheism, and that the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia is not concerned with politics but solely with the question of saving mankind without God.

"The Russian emigrants are not sufficiently aware of the fact that *in the case of the Russian problem it is by no means a question of a small group of Bolsheviks who happen to be in power and who can be overthrown, but of a new and infinitely large class of persons who have now become the rulers of the country and cannot be easily overthrown. The Communist revolution has, above all, materialised out of Russian life.*"

Berdyayev also deals with the organic connection between Russian imperialism and Bolshevism, in detail and from every aspect. He

identifies the latter with Russian imperialism and describes Bolshevism as the most exaggerated form of aggressive Russian annexation aims. Since this is the case, the anti-Bolshevist revolution for liberation must strive to liquidate all kinds and forms of Russian imperialism as the fundamental source of the whole evil, and to accomplish *the disintegration of the Russian imperium into national states, as Communism without the support of Russian imperialism, which it serves, would not be such a great danger to the world.*

Bolshevism is a synthesis of Communism and Russian imperialism.

Bolshevist imperialists have saved the Russian empire from being involved in national liberation wars; it is, therefore, pure nonsense to retain what has existed with the support of the Bolsheviks or to revive the results of the Bolshevik revolution in some kind of reformed variant.

Bolshevism has consolidated the Russian empire; therefore it must be overthrown by the Anti-Bolshevist revolution which must be anti-imperialist and national.

AGAINST THE EXPLOITATION OF MAN

Bolshevism is the embodiment of social injustice; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution for liberation must be a realisation of social justice. Before the Bolshevik revolution there was in Tsarist Russia a semi-feudal order of society, the exploitation of man by man, in particular of the non-Russian nations by the Russian regime of tyranny; since the Bolshevik revolution there has been a totalitarian Communist order of society, namely the exploitation of man by the state; the anti-Bolshevist national liberation revolution must — in contrast to both the above — abolish all exploitation of the population by the state as well as by individuals. This process, which began in 1918 in the national states set up by the peoples subjugated by Moscow, was cut short by the armed occupation forced upon them by the Bolshevik hordes of new Russian imperialists. But it will be renewed by the armed forces of the insurgent armies.

Bolshevism has proved to be the arch-enemy of the peasantry; the anti-Bolshevist liberation revolution must have regard to the rural population as a vanguard in battle, from which the bulk of the revolutionaries will be recruited and which will play its part in the final decision.

Bolshevism has likewise betrayed the cause of the workers by creating a caste of Russian party-leaders who, as bearers of all state

power, are strangling the subjugated nations; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution must vest the power in the people of the national states and they will then choose from among their own ranks representatives of all classes to govern them, these representatives being responsible to them.

Bolshevism has throttled all creative work among the intellectual classes; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution must see to it that every possibility for free creative work is guaranteed in the democratic national states.

Bolshevism has destroyed all idealistic values in life; therefore the anti-Bolshevist revolution must bear them inscribed on its banner.

BOLSHEVIST REACTION

What is often regarded as revolutionary in the West is highly reactionary in the East. Every Communist, every Marxist in the East, is a reactionary. Whoever advocates the nationalisation of all means of production is a preserver of the present existing conditions, and is a counter-revolutionary as regards the national and social revolution for liberation which is beginning in the East; he who seeks to preserve an empire is a reactionary in the East, as he is working against those progressive forces which serve the cause of freedom and justice.

We are fighting against imperialist wars, against imperialist conquests, and for real peace, genuine friendship among the peoples, based on a system of free national states for all the nations of the world. Our ideals are those of real social freedom, real freedom for individuals and fellow-citizens, genuine equality and justice.

The revolutionaries in the East combat the Russian empire, totalitarianism, radical nationalisation, collectivism, but fight for national states, for a democratic order of society, private property, for an extensive middle-class, for individual initiative within the framework of social justice, for de-collectivisation and de-nationalisation, for peasant-owned property, for workers' property, and for a new significance for certain state services.

THE DANGER OF APPEASEMENT

Russia's Achilles' tendon is the nationality problem. Russia, a partner in the victorious Entente, fell, in 1917, under the pressure of the national revolutions and wars of independence, when the

independent states of Ukraine, Caucasia, Turkestan, Byelorussia, the Baltic countries, Poland and others were created. Russia was also the losing party at the time of the Crimean War in 1855 and the Japanese War in 1905, since inner conflicts had commenced within the empire. Russia will only yield to power but not to negotiations; for this reason all conferences and all attempts to pacify the Moscow bear are futile. They only demobilise the subjugated nations by creating the impression that an agreement will be reached at the expence of these nations and thus shaking the latter's confidence in the West. It is, however, impossible for Russia and the Western world to reach an agreement, and it is time the latter realised this fact and ceased cherishing false hopes, which will only result in blinding the masses to the danger which threatens them. The leading statesmen of the West must not conceal the irrefutable truth from their nations, namely that Russia will only yield if faced by armed power. They must not reach any agreement by which Moscow would be allowed to retain the countries which are at present occupied by it, since in this case Russia would become too mighty and would automatically destroy Western Europe either during our life-time or that of our children. Do the statesmen of the West intend to disregard their responsibility towards their own children and consolidate Russia, so that their descendants may become the victims of the latter? Is it not obvious that it is better to engage with a weaker opponent, especially if one has profited from the experience of one's forefathers and has sufficient sense of responsibility, than to leave the final decision to one's inexperienced sons when it is, in any case, already too late to change matters? The notorious saying, "After us the deluge", surely cannot hold good in this case!

Provided that one adopts the right political and military attitude and defines the term "enemy" precisely, there is no reason to fear Russia. The enemy is located in the ethnographical Russian territory. The nations subjugated by the enemy are well-disposed towards the West, just as occupied Norway, France or Serbia, during World War II, were not hostile to the U.S.A. and Great Britain. The West must detach our nations from the enemy's camp; it must attract them to its own phalanx and must also regard their territories as the countries of friendly nations. More appropriate at the present time than ever would be a *Great Charter of Freedom*, which should be proclaimed by the Western major powers and with which they could give battle to Bolshevism. A character of this kind would represent both a basis for cooperation with the subjugated nations and also a united front of the entire freedom-loving world.

It is not right to reduce individuals and groups to a common denominator by technical and financial methods, which is what some Western statesmen are trying to do; it is far more important to define one's attitude, one's ultimate aims, and one's conception of

a future world in which justice prevails, since these are the questions at issue. In this respect no compromise, as regards ideals and from the political point of view, is possible between the Russian imperialists, whatever principles they may uphold, and ourselves, for it is not feasible to co-ordinate the disintegration of the Russian empire and its preservation. There is and never will be a compromise of this kind!

We reject the idea of a compromise with the Russian imperialists, whether they be white or red. We also reject all efforts on the part of certain circles in the West to make a compromise with the U.S.S.R. and we oppose all conferences, pacts and agreements with Bolshevik Russia. Such a step would mean the perpetuation of our enslavement and the downfall of Western Europe, which would be attacked by Russia once the latter had strengthened its inner forces and broken down the resistance of our nations.

AN APPEAL TO THE WEST

We admonish the Western world to beware of the cunning tactics of the Kremlin by which — together with the aid of Fifth Columns, Communist Parties and the internal disintegration of the West — it seeks to undermine the strength of the nations of the West prior to launching an attack on the divided and demoralised West.

Only if the West adopts the ideas for which the subjugated nations are fighting, and only if the ideas and watchwords of the Western crusade are in perfect unison with the ultimate aims and principles of the subjugated nations, will the West be able to gain a victory.

It would be disastrous for the united front of the entire freedom-loving world, if the two anti-Bolshevist partners failed to co-ordinate their plans of action and if these two plans of action, that of the free world and that of the subjugated nations, were in certain respects opposed to each other. There is a serious danger of this being the case if the free world does not take into account the demands of the nations subjugated by Russia, their underground movements and insurgent forces. Only the unity of the Western world and its unanimous agreement with the underground movements and national liberation organisations of the nations behind the Iron Curtain can ensure a victory. For this reason we address the following appeal to the West:

(a) To discontinue all negotiations with the Bolshevik tyrants, whose hands are stained with the blood of millions of victims, and to abandon the idea of reaching an agreement with them at the expense of the subjugated nations;

(b) To give active support, by political and technical means, to the fight for freedom beyond the Iron Curtain, in order to destroy Bolshevik tyranny from within;

(c) To proclaim the Great Charter of Freedom for the nations of the world — a charter which would reject every form of imperialism, above all in connection with the nations subjugated by Bolshevism, and which would express the ideas and principles for which the nations behind the Iron Curtain are fighting, namely those of national independence, personal freedom and social justice in keeping with the noble doctrines of religion, and national solidarity;

(d) To promote the armament of the Western world in every way and to abandon all false hopes of a peace, which does not exist and never will exist as long as the Bolshevik regime of tyranny and the Russian empire continue to exist in some form or other;

(e) To make the utmost endeavour to strengthen the Atlantic Pact and all other military alliances of the free nations, as soon as possible;

(f) To bring about, as quickly as possible, a co-ordination, in every respect, of the plans of action of the Western factors with the national liberation movements and organisations, which take an independent national stand and have never served Bolshevism or Russian imperialism in any way nor have collaborated with either of them;

(g) To disband the Communist parties and their affiliated organisations in the entire Western world, to fight all Fifth Columns as agencies of the enemy in the West and as traitors to their own countries;

(h) To take the offensive, in every respect, against Russia, since Russia, as history teaches us, has never relinquished its positions voluntarily, but has only yielded to threats and power.

THE MEANING OF THE NATIONAL IDEA

Any concession to Russia as regards her occupation in the future of the countries at present occupied by her would mean the destruction of Europe. The leading statesmen of the West, we repeat, must not conceal this danger from their nations, nor must they try to postpone a final solution of this problem because they are afraid to make a decision and wish to leave this to the next generation, which would, in this case, be doomed to destruction by Russia, by

a Russia whose power will be so great by the next generation that it will be invincible. We make no secret of the fact that we are convinced that Russia can never be driven out of the East Zone of Germany or out of the other occupied countries by conferences and treaties, but only by active opposition. Despite the pressure of a conference, Russia has, for instance, not left Korea, but has remained exactly where she was before the conference. Only the active support on the part of the West of the revolutionary process and an offensive taken by the West will help to defeat Bolshevism and liquidate its empire; negotiations are futile in this respect. The mightiest weapon is the national idea, which is more powerful than all atomic weapons.

The A.B.N. is fighting for the liberation of all the nations subjugated by Russia, irrespective of whether their political emigrant organisations are members of the A.B.N. or not. It would be a mistake to assume that the representatives of the national liberation movements and underground organisations are asking the West for help. We ask for nothing; we only warn the free nations against the Bolshevik danger which is imminent.

We are convinced that the cause for which we are fighting is a just one, despite the fact that countless obstacles are being put in our way, even by the West. But this does not discourage us nor does it break our spirit. We shall continue to fight for our cause, regardless of difficulties, and we shall be victorious! THE WEST HELPS ITSELF AS IT HELPS US.

A fight for freedom which brings national independence with it also solves all political, social, cultural and economic problems in the interests of the nation and of the working classes. The fight against Bolshevism is a struggle to overthrow the whole regime and the entire system, and at the same time represents the construction of a new world which is diametrically opposed to the old one in intellectual, national and social respects. Our anti-Bolshevik revolution is not merely a revolution directed against a regime nor merely a social revolution, but an anti-imperialist and national revolution which includes all the essential factors of a social revolution. Nowadays, in the midst of the fight for the liberation of whole nations, there can be no national revolutions without social revolutions, since the national idea is no longer represented and supported by certain elite circles but by the masses. The essential difference between our conception of liberation and that of certain circles in the West is that we stress national liberation as an important part of our conception, whereas the above-mentioned circles place more emphasis on the social aspect, or to put it more accurately, they rely on a revolution which is directed against the regime, whereas we rely on an anti-imperialist revolution. These are two entirely opposite conceptions of the historic process of development and thus

result in two entirely different military conceptions. The national idea, that is the idea of a national and state liberation of the nations and a solution of complicated world problems which is based on this idea, is at present the most fundamental idea as regards restoring a balance in the world. Imperial and supra-national "large area" solutions and conceptions are out of date. The Bolshevik imperialists have realised this, and thus they support the fight for freedom of the dependent nations outside the Iron Curtain by opposing colonial imperialism and its social characteristic, the feudal order, though they themselves deprive these nations of their national freedom to an even greater extent, namely, by Russian totalitarian enslavement and Communist social subjugation.

A CLEAR DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM

The national idea is in conformity with the idea of a universal concord and co-operation of the nations with the complete exclusion of imperialism and chauvinism, racial discrimination, and mutual national hatred. The national liberation of the subjugated and dependent nations shall lead to a world union, to the unification of the world on the basis of freedom and equality of the nations irrespective of their size, race, religion, and wealth! All nations are God's creatures, and just as all men are equal before God, so, too, shall all nations be granted the same freedom and justice.

The Communist and materialistic system of evil and crime must be opposed by a unified system of good and noble, and all questions of existence must be solved in this light and must not be shirked. For Bolshevism is a Russian pestilence which infects the healthy world. A spiritual revolution is a pre-condition if Bolshevism, which spreads hatred, envy, crime, evil, apathy, nihilism among people of the same nation, is to be destroyed. In view of this and in view of the nature of Communist action and interference, life cannot be safeguarded solely by preaching a solution which involves a freedom that is not precisely defined. A vaguely promised freedom will not suffice. The values and the aims which are to be accomplished by this freedom must be clearly defined. Freedom is an essential basis for the realisation of noble thoughts. Freedom is a prerequisite for the materialisation of the idea of justice, which represents the highest moral value on earth.

Freedom and justice are two inalienable values for which man has been fighting throughout the ages and will continue to fight. Millions have laid down their lives and will continue to do so for these two values. Wars and revolutions have been fought on behalf

of these values. They have always paved the way for great national and social changes. It was not starvation which prompted men to revolt but the feeling of having been treated unjustly and of having been deprived of their freedom. The watchwords of freedom have been, and always will be, misused by imperialists. Both Stalin and Hitler conducted their inhuman wars of conquest under the motto of freedom and justice. Since the nations have already been deceived on several occasions, they now demand clearly defined and indisputable ideas and watchwords.

For this reason, too, they demand precise definitions of the conception of the state, not merely as a framework but as a definite social and political state order.

The nations will no longer allow themselves to be misled; they will no longer acclaim new impostors and new would-be liberators, whether they be democratic or totalitarian in their ideas. The nations are striving to gain their freedom, which means above all national and state independence and the downfall of the Russian empire. Without these factors there can be no freedom either for the individual or for the nation. Our nations are not fighting for federations or unions with their conquerors, but for their own states!

There can be no personal freedom without an independent national state and without national self-determination; there can be no true democracy if the national state idea is not realised, for no sincere democrat would strive to obtain freedom for the individual and at the same time reject the idea of the state independence of the nation.

Freedom is a pre-condition if right and justice are to be realised. It is not an end in itself, since it can result in anarchy, too, and in the exploitation of the individual by an individual. Justice imposes limits on individual freedom if the latter should prove to be to the disadvantage of the community.

If the crusade of the West is to be successful, the ideas and the attitude of the West as regards the subjugated nations must conform to the demands for truth, justice and freedom which are made by the nations and peoples enslaved by Russian imperialism and for the fulfilment of which they are prepared to sacrifice their lives in the fight for freedom.

It is possible by means of these ideals, which are based on profoundly religious and ethical principles, to win over all noble-minded peoples and nations, and, what is more important, various points of view are hereby clarified. For who can reject or oppose these ideas without revealing his own plans which are based on a hatred of mankind! Who would venture to co-operate with the murderers of nations when it is a case of reaching a final decision?

MEASURING BY TWO DIFFERENT STANDARDS

We are convinced that the whole East policy of the U.S.A. and of various American "private" circles would present an entirely different appearance if Americans of true American descent, descendants of Lincoln and Washington, would promote, prepare the way for, guide and work out the plans for a psychological war, instead of employing "experts" for this purpose, who yesterday were still the hirelings of foreign powers. The idea of "non-predetermination" as regards East Europe and Soviet Russian Asia is not an American idea. The American nation, as represented by its best sons, consists of a people whose ideas and attitudes are honest, candid, and clearly defined. The American nation has developed the idea of freedom to an unheard-of extent without subjugating any other nation. Washington severed the Gordian knot of colonial dependence on the British Empire with the sword, namely by a plebiscite of bloodshed, and it would thus be ridiculous to discuss the problem of "non-predetermination" or the question of a national plebiscite in America in those days, seeing that America forcibly detached itself from Great Britain. The first "separatists" of the West were the Americans of Washington's day! And Admiral Mentz points out most aptly that the "separatist" doctrines originated in the U.S.A. The Americans considered it an honour to be "separatist." So far, no one has suggested a plebiscite to India or Pakistan, to the Philippines or Palestine, to Burma or Morocco. The blood which has been shed for the cause of independence has, so far, always been regarded by all as the most explicit form of all national decisions.

Why are our nations and states, which have been forcibly incorporated with the Russian empire, treated differently by certain circles of the Western world than are the nations of the British or French empires? It is most peculiar that the dark powers of the Western world are doing their utmost to preserve the Russian empire, whilst at the same time they are helping to bring about the downfall of other empires, despite the fact that the latter have in some cases achieved much that has been of positive value. Why this tendency to favour the most dreadful empire of tyranny that the world has ever experienced, and why this attitude of hatred towards other empires? Why should the Russian empire, though it is the most despotic, arouse so much sympathy in the world, whereas the British and French empires, which are so much more progressive and democratic get no sympathy whatever? The age of empires is past; the British empire has become a Commonwealth, a free union

of nations; but the Russian empire, to many people in the West, seems not to be what it really is, a prison of nations, it means something different. Why do certain circles in the West support the new Asian and African states, but ignore the ancient and highly civilised nations of the Ukrainians, Georgians, and Turkestanians and abandon them to the fate of being murdered by the Russians? The Fifth Columns have already written off Europe and have delivered it up to Russia as a degenerate and biologically exhausted part of the world. The only part of our continent which they consider as being of importance is the geographical territory of Russia, which has a great future in store. Whilst despising Europe they occasionally, in order to disguise their own intentions, show some enthusiasm for America, that is to say for the latter's ideas of freedom, but solely for its technical development. Europe's ideas, however, are still alive. They are still powerful and clearly emphasise the ultimate aim of the liberation of the nations that have been subjugated by Bolshevism. Biologically, Europe is likewise still a mighty power, sound and with a great future in store. But we are concerned not so much in this respect with the remnants of what is still free Europe but with that part of Europe which extends beyond the Dnipro and the Don as far as farthest Caucasia. Whereas the population of the U.S.A. has increased in the course of a century to 100 million persons, the population of Europe during the period from 1800 to 1914 increased from 180 millions to 460 millions. Is this not an incontestable proof of its biological strength? This same Europe is still strong enough to become a partner, on an equal footing, of the great American democracy. If, in addition, we include in the present anti-Bolshevist bloc the subjugated nations of Asia, together with the people of Turkestan and the people of Siberia, and also take into account the newly created forces of freedom-loving Asia, and the newly awakened national liberation process of a new "National Spring", then it becomes obvious that the U.S.A., provided the right policy is adopted, will be able to set up a unified world bloc against Russia's world Bolshevism. At the present time the nations of Asia and Europe that have been subjugated by Bolshevism represent a third and separate force in the world-arena which is characterised by the fact that it refuses to acknowledge the possibility of any compromise being reached with Bolshevism. Its extraordinary role as a third and separate force consists in its uncompromising attitude towards Bolshevism and in its unceasing and fierce fight for national state sovereignty and social justice. This fight for national and state independence, this struggle to bring about social changes which will benefit the working classes and the masses, changes which are based on deeply religious and ethical principles and not on Marxist and materialistic doctrines — are greatly in evidence.

A VICTORY BY SPIRITUAL SUPREMACY

Bolshevism must above all be destroyed from within. It must be opposed by a new ideological principle as regards culture and power. Ideological supremacy must be stressed above all. The worship of mammon and the golden calf is one of the chief characteristics of the materialistic philosophy of life. Where little of practical value from the point of view of social idealism is done and no important measures are introduced to protect those in financial need, an appeal to apply the theoretical doctrines of idealism can avail little, since no faith, whatever it may be, is alive if it is not expressed in deeds. So far all revolutions set their hopes on something new, better, and greater, but they never led to a restoration of the pre-revolutionary order. It is nonsense to attempt to restore the factors which led to a revolution, for that which is outmoded is always part of the revolutionary process. The Bolshevik revolution cannot be overcome either by the principles which held good in the Tsarist empire before its day or by the principles which it set up in the course of its development. For this reason neither the reactionary social order of Tsarism, whether in the imperial or social sense, can be reconstructed, nor the reactionary Bolshevik social order (in the same two senses) be preserved. No one will be prompted to fight by the idea of restoring the Russian empire, such as it existed under the Tsar or under Kerensky, or by efforts to preserve that empire in some form or other, nor will he allow himself to be won over by reform measures as regards Bolshevism, which are based on national Communist or other "genuine" Marxist ideas. What has gone before and that which is, are already part of the irrevocable past. The Bolshevik ideological, political, social, economic, and cultural system must be confronted by something which is greater, new, creative, healthy, and diametrically opposed to Bolshevism. Only under these conditions will a victory be possible — the A.B.N. fulfils all these requirements. The ideas it propounds are an answer to all the problems which have been created by Bolshevism, and the solution of these problems according to the principles of the A.B.N. will most certainly bring about the downfall of Bolshevism.

TWO KINDS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION

KYÏV VERSUS MOSCOW AND PEKING

by

JAROSLAV STETZKO

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MAOIST VANDALISM

The Chinese Communists are out to destroy the "old" way of thinking, the "old" culture and "old" manners and customs. The permanent revolution, by which is meant the eradication of everything great and noble, every tradition and everything creative, is to engage the young in a purely destructive Maoist campaign which aims to destroy not only the values of Chinese culture, the Confucian ethic and the wisdom accumulated over a thousand years, but also all the old European values which have taken root in China, European music, art and literature.

Despite its negative aspects of imperialism, we are indebted to the great European revolution of 500 years ago for having brought peoples, races, civilisations, religions and the ways of life of the individual nations and continents closer to one another. All this gain communist Maoism now wants to nullify. Worse still, it intends to destroy what has made the Chinese people great and has moulded their character. It is of little consequence here that the works of Beethoven, Shakespeare, Goethe or Plato are being thrown overboard. What really matters is that Confucius himself is to be abolished, and with him all reverence for ancestors and the mother country. Thus everything that is negative and destructive in the human make-up is bred and fostered, and the children publicly insult their elders. Just as it happened in the USSR with the informer Pavlik Morozov, children who denounce their own fathers and mothers are celebrated as heroes. The young are turned into traitors to their ancestors and to everything held sacred by mankind all over the world from time immemorial. Humanism, morals and tradition have become worthless. What the Maoist mob reveres above all is Mao, that prophet of evil; then Marx, the spiritual and moral gangster of the West; Lenin, that abominable demon of ruin and destroyer of all human values, of family, nation and religion; and, finally, Stalin, the genocidal monster and the worst criminal of all times, perhaps. These are the heroes of the Chinese Communist mob. The wonderful long-practised

art of painting, the philosophy of a Lao-tse, the wisdom of a people who prizes its country and traditions above everything — all this is being destroyed, together with the Confucian teaching which sees the family as the nucleus of the state. Confucius's five relationships, i.e. between ruler and civil servant, father and son, husband and wife, older and younger brother, friend and friend, exemplify the virtues of charity, justice and mutual respect. The profound and sincere respect for each other forms the basis of the life of the family and of society as a whole. It transcends our life on earth and finds its reflection in the cult of ancestor-worship. Confucius taught five hundred years before Christ and determined the spiritual content of the Chinese people. All this Mao and his communism want to destroy by sending the mob into the streets in order to prevent, as he says, the Revolution from freezing up. All attempts to make a success of the communist way of life have been in vain. The "Great Leap Forward" proved to be a fiasco and it was doomed to fail since no Commune modelled on the hysterical Paris Commune can ever achieve anything.

Old traditions are not easily torn up by the roots. When the mob forces old people to make "confessions" in the streets, beats them up and jeers at them, in order to demonstrate the complete rejection of the past, such behaviour only proves the sheer destructiveness of the movement and not the revolutionary and creative content of something entirely new. It rather goes to show that old, revered tradition is not eradicable, and that types like Pavlik Morozov can become models only for traitors and party henchmen, but not for decent folk who are ashamed of those who inform against their own parents. What God has planted into the hearts of men no power of hell can eradicate.

MOSCOW — THE SOURCE OF EVIL

With less noise, but all the more systematically than the Maoists and Peking cut-throats, the Russian Communists pursue exactly the same aims in Ukraine and other occupied countries. Their crimes are even worse, because they are committed on foreign soil and against other peoples and all they hold sacred. The Chinese may tear Beethoven and Shakespeare from their pedestals, but this is nothing compared to what the Russians are doing when they ruin the cave monastery of Pecherska Lavra, famous *Ukrainian* sanctuary, destroy *Ukrainian* culture and thousands of *Ukrainian* cultural monuments, devastate *Ukrainian* libraries by arson and even prohibit

Ukrainians from using their own *Ukrainian* mother tongue. They have not only closed *Ukrainian* churches, but have murdered thousands of *Ukrainian* priests and faithful. They even persecute the Russian "Orthodox" Church of Patriarch Alexey which they themselves have introduced into Ukraine by force. Between 1959 and 1961 Moscow proceeded in the most brutal manner to close as many churches as possible, in which the faithful — though outwardly acknowledging Alexey — worshipped in the traditional way. In 1961 and 1962 Ukraine was the first to suffer when, through the so-called parliamentary institutions of the *Ukrainian SSR*, Moscow intensified anti-religious legislation in order to root out "the last remnants of religion." Finally, between 1963 and 1966 an all-out attack was mounted against the last and most resistant stronghold of the Christian faith, the Christian family. Every effort was made to break up the family unit and thus to remove the children once and for all from "ruinous religious influences." All over the world the faithful were deeply impressed by the resistance of the monks of our Pochaivska Lavra in Western Ukraine to official policies and by the spirit of the *Ukrainian* population who rallied to protect them.

In every field of the arts — literature, music, sculpture and painting — Moscow makes the free development of the *Ukrainian* genius impossible. Moscow stifles the spiritual life of our nation and by force and terror imposes upon the *Ukrainian* people the Russian way of life. Mao is only an inept disciple, for Moscow itself is in no hurry but proceeds slowly and systematically. For Moscow this is only too natural a process, an instinct which is firmly implanted in every Muscovite and which he follows ruthlessly wherever he advances. Behind the Russian bayonets rises the image of the Russian Antichrist, the image of an inhuman, despotic and at the same time slavish nature. Humanism, religion, human dignity, creative freedom, mean nothing to the Muscovite. This, then, is the kind of "cultural revolution" they carry on incessantly in Ukraine and other subjugated countries. They destroy the native culture, the independent way of life and the traditions of other peoples and substitute for these their alien and ruinous Russian mentality. But there is no genuine cultural revolution of any kind in Russian Eurasia.

Russia forces herself upon *Ukrainians* and other enslaved peoples, whose mentality, ethics, religion and culture are entirely at variance with her own; she violently thrusts upon *Ukrainians* and other non-Russians, who are used to a different form of society, her own repulsive ways. Her actions are retrogressive in a most loathsome manner. These, then, are the features of the "Russian revolution", characteristic of what Russia has adhered to for a long time: the culture of the *obshchina* (communal property), Tolstoyism, negative Dostoievskyism — in essence a centuries' old Bolshevism.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION OF KYÏV

In Kyïv, Ukraine's capital, eternal and holy city of Ukraine, we see unfold before our eyes a spiritual, truly cultural revolution against Russia.

The cultural revolution of Ukraine endeavours to protect, support and strengthen the positive and noble in human aspiration, its fight is for a creative development and for values which will sustain the people and the nation. It seeks to vanquish and destroy the noxious Russian ways forced upon Ukraine, to defeat militant atheism as well as the so-called social realism fettering the work of artists, poets and scholars. It combats the Russian mentality and mounts an offensive for the revival and realisation of those Ukrainian ideas which the Ukrainian poets of the "Sixties" group have so powerfully defended. Even outwardly Russified Ukrainians of the Hohol and Tarsis type try to shield this non-Russian cultural ideology against their own "Little Russian" political leanings and to maintain Hellenistic — Roman — Christian, Ukrainian world of ideas against the hostile Russian ideology.

Ukraine is on the march, and Kyïv, our ancient holy Kyïv, the city of learning and the arts, the mother of the nation that loves freedom, is in the van of the universal ideological struggle.

Never before has conflict between two civilisations, between two ideologies, between Kyïv and Moscow, flared up as intensely as at present. Peking's mockery of a "cultural revolution", staged by the rabble in the streets, is not the struggle of a nation defending its own values, but is a campaign for the propagation of an alien philosophy, for ideas peculiar to Peter I, Ivan the Terrible, Marx and Lenin, in short, for a typically Russian and Marxist ideology.

Since Stalin thought it necessary to have his party creatures under perpetual tension and to keep his ochlocratic Russian nation constantly on the move in order to prevent them from sliding into bourgeois habits, he resorted to murder "in the interests of a permanent revolution in one country" and continually purged the party apparatus so that always new men should come to power. He had everyone killed whom he considered ambitious, so that fear should spread wide and far, the "bourgeois" should not grow "impudent" and the communist not become a "bourgeois." In this he emulated types like Andrey Bogolyubsky, Ivan Kalita ("Money-bag"), Ivan the Terrible, Peter "the Great", who exterminated the innocent population — men, women and children — destroyed the towns and killed the inhabitants of Novgorod the Great in 1471, Tver in 1485, Smolensk in 1514, Pskov in 1570, Baturyn, the

Ukrainian Cossack capital, in 1708, and others. Moscow committed genocide even before the Bolsheviks.

Chinese history does not provide Mao with such "lessons in revolutionising the populace." He therefore tries to achieve "permanent revolution" with the help of the mob in the street, by trampling on tradition, by inciting partisan warfare, by sending the people on forays and infiltrating Red Guards into other countries. Their task is to spread abroad not the great Chinese tradition and the cultural values of Confucius and Lao-tse, but Russian and Marxist ideas.

For this purpose Mao must rouse in the mob the worst and destructive instincts, so that they are capable of burying human beings alive, just because they are "bourgeois", and of gloating over their horrible death. Mao has indeed chosen as his teachers Andrey Bogolyubsky, Ivan Kalita, Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, Lenin and Stalin, rather than Confucius or Lao-tse.

A NEW FORM OF RUSSIAN SATANOCRACY

The Russians admired Stalin, for they need and love tyrants, and when one of them dies they lament and mourn him. In his article "What is Pan-Russia?", an ideologist of the Russian emigré anti-Communist group of NTS (National Labour Union — the Solidarists), G. Pegov, excellently describes the Russian soul in these terms: "In the Russian soul dwell side by side despot and cringing slave, oppressor and oppressed, opulence and misery, licentiousness and self-contempt. We find these contrary qualities in characters like Nicholas I and Stenka Razin, Arakcheyev, Bakunin and Lenin, the Karamazovs, the Starets Zosima, the deaf-mute Gerasim, Smerdyakov, Chichikov, Manilov, Oblomov, Khlestakov, in the terror-inspiring tsars Ivan and Peter... In the endless galleries of literature detestable and repellent types predominate. But it remains for Russian literature to take a positive delight in the treatment of repulsive themes... the need for self-abasement is a typically Russian trait, well illustrated, for instance, by Nikita's confession in L. N. Tolstoy's *The Power of Darkness*."

"The polymorphic nature of the Russian, his 'Russianness', makes him of all people on earth the most capable of encompassing the world, from which it follows that he has the best qualifications for bringing about and guiding the unification of mankind." Here, then, we have the clear statement, in accord with the doctrines of both Dostoevsky and Lenin, that the Russian is destined to rule the world. This conviction is so much ingrained in every Russian that the

Russian emigrants, too, now air this view, for the above quotation comes from the work of G. Pegov, published by NTS in 1952.

The concept of Eurasia, i.e. the "confederacy of Eurasian nations", for which Stalin (whom NTS, Pegov's publishers, consider as "without doubt a great statesman" [v. p. 33]) "laid the foundations", is to lead up to "Pan-Russia", the universal state. That is what is behind Russian rapacity all over the world, and G. Pegov — only waving a different banner — cherishes exactly the same picture of the future as the Russian Communist Party. This is, of course, in keeping with Berdyayev's ideas, with the definition of the Russian nation as a supnation, a concept which the NTS adopted as its party line in 1959. G. Pegov formulates the Russian notion of Eurasia very clearly and unequivocally, and it is completely identical with Lenin's messianic doctrine and with Bolshevik political practice. Pegov suggests that the Eurasian union should embrace: a) nations adhering to the orthodox form of the Christian faith, whose world view accords with Eastern Christianity; b) nations directly linked with Asia as a consequence of Mongolian and Turkish domination; and c) those nations which have adopted European culture. As a symbol for this idea stands the Russian — or rather, Pan-Russian — two-headed eagle, facing towards Europe as well as Asia. The quintessence of that Eurasia is "unity of faith", which makes the policies of the Tsars and of the Bolsheviks who succeeded them entirely comprehensible. It amounts to forcible conversion to Orthodoxy and to the Communist "unity of faith." Thus there is a close relationship between NTS, the Russian Communist Party, Berdyayev, "Eurasia", the World-USSR, Dostoievsky's "cosmopolitanism", and the Russian national idea is nothing else than the belief in the absolute necessity of turning all men into Russians. This is the aim common to them all, and they all are the exponents of Russian messianism, rapacity, hypocrisy and domination, no matter of what hue, white or red, under the two-headed eagle or under hammer and sickle. The NTS have no scruples about stealing the Ukrainian national emblem, the Trident with the Cross of St. Volodymyr and distorting it into the devil's pitchfork to make a Pan-Russian symbol out of it.

For these Russian neo-imperialists, who now dream of taking over power from the Bolsheviks, "Eurasia is exactly the same as Pan-Russia." There is no longer a geographical distinction made between a European and an Asian Russia; there is simply a central continent, "Eurasia", with only two minor worlds at its periphery, the Asian and the European (Pegov, p. 54). This Eurasia (read: Russia) is, according to Pegov, a separate and independent cultural unit upon which, in our era, devolves the lead in the succession of human civilisations.

Russian Orthodoxy is presented by Pegov as the new and at the same time old faith of the new Pan-Russia. The Eurasian civilisation

must be set against the civilisations of Europe and Asia, and, "once conscious of being a Eurasian, one must become conscious also of being a Russian"... "Do not chase after a once famous Europe, which has already had the wind taken out of its sails and has lost its soul in the pursuit of material things... Don't let yourselves be dazzled by Europe nor by its most recent American offshoot, for in spite of all their technical achievements they are mentally more repulsive than ever... Cherish instead the Orthodox view of life and guard it like the apple of your eye... Thus you will redeem not only yourselves but the whole world perhaps"... So everything is expressed as clearly as a dogma. Pegov, Berdyayev, NTS, and Alexey who acted as an accomplice of the atheist Bolshevik regime in the forcible destruction of the Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainian churches, are of one and the same opinion with Lenin and Stalin, Shelepin and Brezhnev, when it comes to the new "mission of Pan-Russia." With his proclamation of "Russia's world-embracing role", Pegov is essentially in agreement with Lenin and Stalin. There is only one difference: Lenin refers in this context to Marx; Pegov, Berdyayev and NTS refer to St. Paul. Quotations from St. Paul are used in an interesting way. "He who does not work shall not eat" is taken to justify the Communist terror, for this is what Pegov has to say about it: "It must be admitted that the principle of *work*, which Communism has introduced as the new basis of social life, is essentially a Christian one — an attribute which can by no means be applied to the European order based on money and anti-religiousness" (p. 22). He goes on to comment that "if the State enlists the cooperation of the Church in the Orthodox East" this would be "altogether justified and wholly in the interests of Eurasia." Apparently this also holds good for the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches by brute force. All this is clearly expressed and leaves no doubt whatsoever. And not only that: with the statement that the powers that be "act in the interests of the Greater Country (Pan-Russia — Ed.), a fact which has become evident of late", all the murders committed by the Bolsheviks among non-Russian nations are apparently vindicated.

Commenting on the split in the Social Democratic Party in 1903, the Russian "anti-Communists" explain that, because of his eagerness to set the World Revolution in motion, Lenin "insisted on a totalitarian revolutionary war, and his strategy and tactics took advantage of the polarity of the Russian and his propensity to span the whole world." "In substance, the idea of the 'International' does not fall short of the Gospels and, moreover, it remained free from religious prejudice." How could any "progressive" Russian intellectual help responding heart and soul to such an appeal? And the mass of the people — was this not exactly what they hoped and wished for? Pegov is perfectly frank about the fact that there were other persons,

not Russian by origin, like Catherine II for instance, who helped to enlarge the Empire. In this connection he speaks about "the noble example of the Russian neophytes, who, though foreigners by blood, have assimilated the spirit of Russia and have become loyal sons of their adoptive Russian fatherland" . . . Pegov continues: "The ideal of the unitarian state was the driving force in the creation of Russia and it commanded the sympathy and cooperation of the unpolitical masses." He goes on to suggest what Russia needs in the future: "Autocratic leadership, which must not be hereditary nor elective, but must be handed on from ruler to ruler; for this method alone will ensure the government's undiminishing vitality . . ."

The Eurasia of this so-called anti-Communist extends to the shores of the Adriatic, for in Yugoslavia, too, there is "Orthodoxy." According to Pegov's theory, even Albania, Hungary and the Baltic area ought to be associated with Eurasia, i.e. Pan-Russia, for historical, cultural, geographic, economic, and even ethnic reasons. No doubt, this Eurasia, as the centre of the world, would eventually have to include Alaska as well, since it once was "Russian." It was A. I. Herzen who, in his *Byloye i Dumy* (My Past and Thoughts) wrote: "The Pacific Ocean is the Mediterranean of the future." He also made it quite clear that for him "Slavdom" was synonymous with "Russian-ness." Dostoievsky defended the Eurasian concept in 'A Writer's Diary' (1873-1881) by pointing out that Russia's future lay most probably in Asia . . . "Close contact with Europe might one day become repugnant; it could exert a negative influence on the Russian ideology, or even pervert Orthodoxy itself and lead Russia onto the road to ruin . . ."

Russian "socialism" is in its aim and origin the manifestation on earth of the one and all-embracing Church. "Constantinople must be ours sooner or later . . . Russia must become the protectress of all Orthodox peoples . . . European civilisation has always been incompatible with the Russian soul . . . The Europeans who look upon us as Tartars, were never able to understand that we sought to be not Russians but cosmopolitans (obshche-chelovekami) . . . Europe is on the precipice of another serious general decline . . ." Europe and the whole world are to be saved by Russia in accordance with the messianic vision of Pushkin "who expressed two principal, or guiding, ideas, both comprising the symbol of the whole future character, of the whole future mission of Russia, and, therefore, of our whole future destiny", as Dostoievsky says. "The first idea is the universality of Russia, her responsiveness, her most profound kinship with the geniuses of all ages and nations of the world . . . The second idea is the turn toward the people, the reliance upon their strength, the conviction that only in them we shall fully discover our Russian genius and the cognizance of its destiny."

THE IMMUTABLE CHARACTER OF RUSSIAN MESSIANISM

The messianism of Russia appears in ever new guises, be it Eurasia, Slavophilism, Orthodoxy, the idea of a super-nation (NTS), Bolshevism, "anti-colonialism" or World Revolution, for without a world-encompassing doctrine there would be no justification for Russian imperialism.

In his book *Russia and Europe* (1869) N. Y. Danilevsky states clearly: "Russia does not belong to Europe... There is no such thing as a universal human civilisation. This is an ideal that could only be achieved through the amalgamation and further development of all those types of civilisation which in their independent ways have so far shaped the history of mankind... Slavdom (more than two thirds of it consisting of the great Tsarist empire) stands on its own and is on a par with Hellenic, Roman and European cultural values... Europe is nothing more than the Germanic-Latin civilisation."

Slavic (Russian) culture will be the first in history to present a genuine fusion of all four basic types of civilisation, in which the religious, cultural, political and social-economic elements are brought to perfection. Never before — in Danilevsky's view — has there been a synthesis of this kind. In the social and economic order he regards as an important principle the peasant allotments and the collective ownership of land by the whole village community (*obshchina*), "which lends to the social structure of Russia a stability entirely lacking in the West." Here we have quite clearly premonitions of Communism...

In his book *Russia and the USSR*, one of the NTS leaders, A. R. Trushnovich, writes as follows: "The Russian civilisation and the Russian language are Pan-Slavic"... "In the given period, the Bolsheviks have solved the nationality problem fairly correctly"...

The NTS take as their motto the words — meaningless to a Russian — of Alexander Nevsky in the 13th century, and later repeated by the starets Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov*: "God is not with might, but with right." This is sheer hypocrisy, for in the same breath Trushnovich says: "The youth of Russia has to live for the greater glory of Russia in the gigantic spaces between the Carpathians and Vladivostok"...

"Russia is a world of its own... From Russia will proceed the religious and spiritual regeneration of mankind... The acquisition of the Russian language and the adoption of Russian culture as the

basic civilisation common to all is the precondition for the unification of all Slavs with Russia . . . Russian ideas go far beyond mere Pan-Slavism. Slavdom merges in the wider Russian idea of pan-humanity . . . At the centre of the Slav world must be the ideologically strongest nation — and that nation is Russia” . . .

“Slav solidarity is to be understood as a transition stage on the way to pan-human solidarity on a Christian basis . . . Moscow envisages a ‘Slav Commonwealth’ extending from Vladivostok to Vladizapad.” (The latter phrase means: from the town called “Ruler of the East” to an imaginary town named “Ruler of the West.”)

“The Russian nation is chosen to fulfill a grand and very special mission . . . Russia brings divine truth to all the peoples of the earth”...

Trushnovich does not fail to insert such phrases as “love of mankind”, for instance, a slogan which was curiously elaborated by Byelinsky after his reading of *Poor Folk*: “I am beginning to love mankind after the fashion of Marat. In order to bring the greatest happiness to a small number of men, I would gladly destroy the rest of the world by fire and sword” . . . “Human beings are so stupid that they have to be made happy by force.” This, then, is the manner in which the NTS, this new aspiring class of Russian predators, means “to bring the world to the Christian faith.” And if evil is to triumph after all, then let this evil at least be a “Russian” one, says Trushnovich. There you have their messianism! If the world has to be ruined, then it shall be by them, these Russian Herostrati.

“The Russian people have somehow adapted themselves to that evil”, says Trushnovich. With incredible perfidy he uses the statement that “Russia is an instrument in the Creator’s plans” — borrowed from Berdyayev, who thinks as he does — in order to provide for the naïve and snobbish a logical basis for a new Russian imperialism. In his view, “it was necessary that all the high values, upon which the Russian Christian civilisation had been built, should at first be rejected outright, so that they could rise again in their old purity and glory.” This, then, means that the Russians murdered millions of innocent men, women and children, whole nations in fact, in order to come nearer to Christ. There really seems to be no limit to the perversion in ideas and morals!

“Indeed, among all the nations of the earth it will be the Russian people who will proclaim God; that is their destiny” . . . “Russia has to work out a great design.” A design, certainly; not God’s, however, but the Devil’s.

About some British politicians who are in favour of partitioning the Russian empire, Trushnovich has the following to say: “According to their cold and sharp reasoning Russia is to be dismembered here

and now. Such an attitude prejudices relations with the future Russia."

On Europe he writes: "It is incapable of offering resistance. It has itself become infected by this evil. It cannot even die an honourable death. The days of Waterloo are past when the motto was 'The regiment dies, but it does not surrender.' There will not be a second Stalingrad in Europe, except perhaps in the Pyrenees... For what sum can I buy myself off? asks the European, the hero of our time."

Referring sarcastically to Mazzini's discerning evaluation of Russian imperialism: "Europe will be either Russian or red", he does not deny that it may become red, but whether it becomes Russian depends on "us, the Russians."

For the present he sees Russia's goal in this: "Russia will revive Christianity and will bring to all peoples on earth the ideas of Christian humanism... From the day this happens, mankind will begin to recover its health... In this way our nation will accomplish the task the Creator has designed for it."

That is the vision of NTS, Russia's new, supposedly anti-communist, leading clique, who want to make fools of the innocents of this world, dupe all those "Little Russians" among different nations, in order to keep a tight rein on everybody everywhere, this time in the name of Christ.

Here the words of Jesus come to mind: "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves" (Matthew VII, 15).

Danilevsky was firmly convinced that the Pan-Slavic League, or Confederation of all Slavs, must incorporate — by choice or by force — all countries from the Adriatic to the Pacific, from the Arctic to the Aegean, including the Greek, Rumanian and Magyar nations. And the capital, succeeding Byzantium—Constantinople—Istanbul, should, at long last, be "Tsargrad", the "City of the Tsar."

This, then, is the list of imperialist formulae, all identical as to contents: Pan-Slavic League, Association of Eurasian Nations, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Russian Super Nation, "a spontaneous linkage of countries and peoples, unique in the history of mankind" (*NTS Programme*, 1959, p. 14). Nowhere is there any mention of an ethnographic Russia, i.e. of Russia proper. Every one of the formulations betrays its imperialistic and predatory nature, whether they appear in Danilevsky, Dostoievsky, Mendeleyev, (*K poznaniyu Rossii* — Towards an Understanding of Russia — 1906), A. I. Herzen, Lenin, or Pegov and Trushnovich of the NTS.

Superficially thinking Western politicians and scholars are trying their utmost to see Russia as a part of Europe, an outpost against Asia, e.g. China. The Russians themselves, however, dispute this.

René Grousset, historian and member of the French Academy of Sciences, wrote in 1946: "The Russian soul is Eurasian, and it remains independent between Asia and Europe." And it is precisely this at the same time anti-European and anti-Asian quality of Russia which makes her policies comprehensible.

THE ROLE OF THE ETERNAL CITY OF UKRAINE

We are today threatened by the terrible avalanche of Russia's demonic forces and its recently revived messianic barbarism, which in the past, present and future remains essentially the same, whether it calls itself Christian Orthodox, Eurasian, Slavophil or Bolshevik. Against this onslaught stands the Ukrainian vision of the offensive forces of Our City, the embodiment of the national idea, of heroic humanism, of militant Christianity, which resists any kind of violation of our country and people, and which has become the vanguard in the fight against imperialist aggression, against atheism and other disruptive Russian tendencies. To Russia's disastrous visions we must oppose the creative and noble values of Ukrainian ideas.

The fierce contest between two civilisations, which the Ukrainian political thinker D. Donzow has so penetratingly described and explained in his book *The Foundations of our Policy*, is still continuing. Moscow's vicious and cunningly contrived campaign against Ukrainian civilisation calls for a vigorous counter-attack. And Kyïv will not remain silent. It will assume the offensive as befits the vanguard of a national Christian civilisation, defending true and eternal human values, the nation and the Faith.

With so many people in the West betraying the values of their own civilisation and working for the victory of a Russian ideology of ruin and destruction, why can the nobler members of mankind, who stand for God, their country, and for man as the image of God — why can they not stand up for the sublime ideas defended by Ukraine as for their own and help them to triumph?

The religious dynamic of Ukrainian spiritual development makes Ukrainians antagonists of utilitarianism and hedonism, of atheism and social Darwinism, as well as of materialism, and only if we take a stand against these trends can we mount a political offensive against the forces of evil and destruction, against Bolshevism.

The world of a Diocletian and a Nero arrayed its forces against the world of the Catacombs, and it seemed as if newly born Christianity were to be drowned in a sea of blood. But no — it triumphed!

Le Bon once said: "A nation can be enslaved, but it is no easy matter to change a people's soul, which is the product of centuries."

"My nation IS, and it will be for ever.
Its living spirit no-one will extinguish!"

Thus exclaimed the Ukrainian poet V. Symonenko (d. in 1963), confirming Le Bon's statement. And he continues:

"Tremble you murderers, repent you lackeys!
Life spews you out, you cancerous brood.
Villains and renegades will perish
with all the hideous monsters of the conqueror's horde.
You bastards, hangmen by the grace of Satan,
vile wretches that you are, remember this:
My nation IS,
and the hot blood of Cossaks in its veins
pulsates and roars!"

This is the imposing vision that the Ukrainian poet Symonenko, who no longer is among us, conjures up before our eyes. And he does very much more: he affirms the uniqueness of Ukraine's position in the world: "Let Americas and Russias be silent when I am talking with you..." And he talks with Ukraine, which stands up for man, for the dignity, the Nation and for the Faith. God's terrible vengeance will fall upon those who destroy the shrines of the holy city of Ukraine, the city of St. Andrew, the Apostle, and who trample on everything sacred to Ukrainians. "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God"... "Heaven and Earth will be on fire", says St. Paul. St. John warns: "The time will come when only a few in the world can save themselves... All will be stricken with blindness." And Plato tells us: "On an evil day, in an evil night Atlantis sank under the sea."

It is the city of Kyïv, engaged in a long and frightful struggle against the forces of Antichrist, suffering pain and hardship, putting up a heroic resistance and fighting for the eternal values of man created in God's image — it is this holy city of Ukraine which is divinely appointed to turn away God's wrath from the penitent and righteous, who might otherwise be condemned with the guilty.

Without a spiritual renewal, without the dynamism of the Christian religion, without patriotism and an affirmation of heroic humanism, those who live only for a material culture, devoid of higher ideas, morals and eternal visions, are hopelessly doomed.

Here, then, we have a head-on collision of two civilisations, symbolised on the one hand by Kyïv, on the other by Moscow and Peking.

The Ukrainian nation faces a long and terrible war. The battle for Kyïv is steadily gaining in dimension and intensity, for without

Kyiv, without the Cathedral of St. Sophia, the new emerging Russian élite cannot succeed in its deception. The Kremlin will not do as the symbol of "reborn Russian Christianity" destined to "save" the world. Berdyayev, the prophet of this latest Russian fraud, has, with his "philosophic" writings perverted the judgment of Western intellectuals by arrogating to Russia our Kyiv, as well as the independent period of the Kyiv Rus', for the destruction of which the Russian invaders were responsible. They detested our Kyiv because it was alien to them and had ideas and values entirely different from theirs, and because as a centre of civilisation it was a thorn in their flesh. Andrey "Bogolyubsky" saw Kyiv as a hated opponent and destroyed it, something the West Ukrainian prince Roman of Galicia would never have done. On the contrary, all our West Ukrainian princes yearned for and revered Kyiv, "the Mother of the cities of Rus'." But to the Muscovites it was an enemy to be eliminated, for its spirit and its culture were foreign to them.

About twenty years ago, I pointed out in the journal *Vyzvol'nyi Shliakh* (The Liberation Path, London) that the ancient Ukrainian Code of Laws, the *Rus'ka Pravda* of Prince Yaroslav the Wise (11th C.), had no death penalty. Nor was it known in the Christian Ukraine of the Middle Ages, which also had none of that primitive religious fanaticism and its excesses like witch hunts, for instance. There was no corporal punishment in our Kyiv Rus', while Moscow had known it since it was founded. Novgorod the Great modelled itself in every respect upon Kyiv, reason enough for the Muscovites to raze that city to the ground. The professor of history at a German university once asked his students by what characteristic the Novgorod authorship of trade agreements between Novgorod and the Hanseatic League could be detected. He then explained to his puzzled audience that treaties drawn up by the city of Novgorod never admitted any clauses providing for the corporal punishment of thieves or other offenders. Following the example of Kyiv, Novgorod disapproved of humiliating punishment out of respect for the dignity of man. In the Hanseatic towns, however, that kind of punishment was quite usual in those days. The freedom-loving spirit of Novgorod was utterly repugnant to the Muscovites. This is why they exterminated the population of the city of Novgorod in a most terrible mass slaughter, hoping thereby to root out for ever the moral influence of Kyiv.

Novgorod was broken, but not Kyiv; and Kyiv never will be broken.

It may well be that the task of making Christianity flourish during the next thousand years has been entrusted by Christ himself into the hands of our Ukraine, which battles in the very front line against the onslaught of the evil forces of Russia, against militant atheism and enslavement.

Only those who believe that this is Kyïv's role, who have strong faith in the immortality of our capital and our country, can gain the victory. But the faith required is not the kind that Tolstoy preached, but a belief in the Cross *and* the Sword with which the just and true cause of Christ must be fought at the risk of one's own life.

Truth does not conquer by itself; only its passionate champions and defenders can make it triumph.

That is the will of God; and that is how the Christian faith won the victory, when the Apostles and uncounted other martyrs gave their lives for the Faith. When Kyïv is free, when St. Sophia is free, then Christ's people will be free, too. Nothing and no-one will then fetter the creative urge of the Ukrainian nation. Under the blue and gold banner of Ukraine we are fighting not only for our own victory, but for the victory of all freedom-loving mankind.

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