



**Ukraine: Developing a Democratic Polity**  
*Essays in Honour of Peter J. Potichnyj*



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Peter J. Potichnyj



# Introduction

*Stefania Szlek Miller*

This special issue of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* is in honour Peter J. Potichnyj. The theme, "Ukraine: Developing a Democratic Polity," reflects his special interest in Ukraine and his contributions to the advancement of East European studies. While he continues to be affiliated with major universities in North America, Europe, and China, his primary academic home remains McMaster University, where he taught for over thirty years. It is thus appropriate that this Festschrift was sponsored by the McMaster Interdisciplinary Committee on Communist and East European Affairs (ICCEEA), a research committee that Peter founded in 1967 and chaired for many years.

I volunteered to organize the Festschrift not only as the current chair of ICCEEA, but also as someone who has known Peter since his arrival at McMaster University in 1964. He was both my undergraduate and graduate instructor in Soviet and East European politics and my MA thesis supervisor. For a long time we have also been colleagues in the Department of Political Science.

Peter Potichnyj's extensive scholarly contributions are evident in the select bibliography of his works published in this Festschrift,<sup>1</sup> and a number of contributors, especially Howard Aster, refer to his work in their respective studies. Before introducing the articles, I would like to add my own reflections.

Born in 1930, Peter spent his early years in that part of Poland that was predominately Ukrainian. In 1941 his father, who was of Polish descent, was executed by the Russians. Peter's home and entire village were subsequently destroyed by Polish insurgents, and at the age of fifteen he joined the Ukrainian military underground. In 1947 Peter's military unit of 130 men and teenagers fought their way from Ukraine to

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1. He is also the author of approximately ninety book reviews in Soviet and Ukrainian studies in *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, *Choice*, *International Journal*, *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, *Nationalities Papers*, *Slavic Review*, and *Soviet Union*.



the U.S. zone of Germany. He was one of thirty-six survivors and was only seventeen years old at that time. Peter completed high school in displaced-persons camps in Germany before emigrating to the United States in 1950. He was drafted in 1951, fought for three years as a U.S. Marine in Korea, and was seriously wounded. With the help of the GI Bill and the support of his wife, Tamara, he completed his academic training at Temple University (BA) and Columbia University (MA, PhD).

Peter's background explains much about his interest in East European politics and his at times aggressive style as a scholar and colleague. As a professor of political science, he never veered from pursuing his prodigious academic interests in his own way—often at odds with the mainstream of political science as well as Sovietology. Thoroughly versed in the history, cultures, and languages of Eastern Europe, Peter's approach has always been interdisciplinary and grounded in archival research. His many publications include analyses of Soviet agricultural trade unions, political elites, nationality issues, foreign policy, Sino-Soviet and other inter-Communist conflicts, Jewish-Ukrainian relations, and the history of some of the most brutal events of this century. His work and collection of documents on the Second World War and its aftermath are among his greatest achievements in that they will help other scholars to make sense of wanton inhumanity and destruction. Upon his retirement from McMaster in 1995, Peter donated many of his books, archives, and papers to the Mills Library at McMaster and to the Robarts Library at the University of Toronto.

As a teacher, Peter was not easy. He engaged in what we currently call problem-based and self-directed learning. This meant that students were expected to define a problem and present a carefully argued and fully documented account in support of their conclusions. Seminars were battlefields where one was expected to defend a position, especially from his probing and often blunt questioning. His bark, however, was always worse than his bite, and many former students attribute their success in their chosen careers to their learning experience under his tutelage. We also remember his sense of humour. For those of us with "ethnic" names (and we were once a very small minority on university campuses), the highlight was the roll call. He was the only professor who could correctly pronounce names such as Szczepióński, but would stumble over Smith and Jones. Tamara and Peter also entertained students in their home, and it was there that we saw a lighter side of our Professor.

As a colleague, Peter could be very impatient and abrasive, especially with administrators, no matter at what level. He nevertheless obtained very strong support from senior administrators at McMaster University and other institutions for academic endeavours such as the ICCEE. As

founder and chair of that research committee on Communist and East European affairs for over twenty years, Peter organized many interdisciplinary conferences, most of which were published under his editorship and were well reviewed in scholarly journals. Peter also spent considerable time abroad in pursuit of his own research and in presenting papers at major universities in North America, Europe, and Asia. With the support of Dr. Alvin Lee, the former president of McMaster, Peter managed to establish strong links between McMaster and Chinese universities at a time when the People's Republic of China was still closed to Western scholars. After leaving McMaster in 1995, he assumed the position of a dean at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich.

That so many scholars responded to the invitation to contribute to this special issue dedicated to Peter is a mark of esteem for him and his contributions to our knowledge of Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

I would like to acknowledge ICCEEA for sponsoring the *Festschrift*, and Dean Jim Johnson of the Faculty of Social Sciences at McMaster University for providing financial support. Stephanie Lisak and Mara Giannotti contributed valuable assistance in organizing the *Festschrift* and preparing the papers for publication. This special issue would not have been possible, however, without the contributions of scholars in North America, Europe, and China and the support of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*. It was a pleasure to work with Roman Senkus, the editor of the *Journal*.

The theme "Developing a Democratic Polity" provides a conceptual lens for assessing Ukraine's transition from Soviet-style Communism and its development as an independent, sovereign state. The theme is also prescriptive: one hopes that the end point of transition will be a democratic polity, an ideal that has ancient and modern roots. The classical Greek conception of a democratic polity assumes the existence of a distinct and self-governing political community based on the pursuit of the public good. It is the precursor of the modern principles of self-determination of peoples, sovereign statehood, and human rights. These principles are enshrined in numerous international documents, including the 1966 United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

Very few, if any, contemporary political communities or sovereign states measure up to the ideal standard set by either the ancient Greek theorists or the international human-rights covenants. The ideal is even harder to meet for societies such as Ukraine that have only very recently attained independence from foreign domination and are undergoing radical economic and political restructuring. Ukraine, like other nation-states, also needs to define or redefine itself as a distinctive political

community. What are its boundaries? Who is or can be a member of its community? What is its relationship to other peoples and states? How do other states view Ukraine, and to what extent is its development constrained by international political and economic forces? What can Ukraine contribute as an independent political entity to the global problems of peace, structural economic inequalities, and environmental degradation?

The benefit of an interdisciplinary approach is that Ukraine's development can be analysed from a variety of perspectives. Even if there are no definitive answers to the many questions posed by the theme of this issue, the contributors at least alert us to the complexity of Ukraine's history and its current situation. John S. Reshetar, among others, also warns us of the fallacies of establishing theoretical paradigms of analysis without reference to history or careful empirical studies. The emerging field of transitology of post-Communist systems, especially in its assumptions about the relationship of economic capitalist and liberal political transformation based on so-called "Western" models, may be as fallacious as some of the paradigms that were used to analyse the Soviet Union and its model of Communism.

John S. Reshetar provides a scathing critique of Sovietology for its ahistorical approach and failure to recognize the Soviet Union as the successor to the Russian Empire. By identifying with the dominant nationality or "ethnic hegemon" in analysing the multinational, multicultural Soviet empire, Sovietologists ignored not only the inherent problems of Communism, but also the aspirations of the non-dominant peoples for independence. Consequently they failed to predict the collapse not only of Communism, but also of the Soviet Union. Drawing on historical examples from ancient times to the present, Reshetar outlines seven major conditions and areas of investigation as determinants of imperial decline and collapse.

Two important questions are raised by Reshetar's analysis. One: is it possible to develop and sustain democratic polities within multinational societies; and two: what constitutes a nation? Mykola Riabchouk and Paul Robert Magocsi, in their respective studies, show that there are no simple answers to these questions. In his analysis of the "Nativist-Westernizer" debates within Ukrainian cultural circles in the nineteenth century, Riabchouk argues that intellectuals were divided on the issue of Ukrainian collective self-identity. He also notes that the debates between populists and Slavophiles, on the one hand, and Westernizers, on the other, reflected conflicting views on models of development between traditional society and post-enlightenment ideas of modernity. Similar

intellectual conflicts are evident, Riabchouk argues, in the post-1991 political debates in Ukraine.

Magocsi's analysis of Habsburg-Ukrainian relations in the latter half of the nineteenth century reveals other important divisions concerning collective aspirations. He argues that many Ukrainians (Ruthenians) in Galicia and Bukovyna accepted Habsburg imperial rule, especially with its evolution towards a "civil society governed by rule of law." This fact suggests that it is possible to develop a multinational polity that is mutually beneficial to dominant and minority national groups. Magocsi's analysis also suggests that there are cultural and geographical differentiations that one needs to consider in discussions of what constitutes the Ukrainian nation. While this issue is usually addressed with reference to relations between Ukrainians and other national collectivities within post-1991 Ukraine, Riabchouk's and Magocsi's historical analyses show the diversity of intellectual thought and of cultural experiences among Ukrainians. This diversity may reinforce the foundations for a civic, as opposed to ethnocentric, form of nationalism and nationhood.

How the Ukrainians and the Poles view each other and interpret major historical events is the focus of Iaroslav Isaievych's discussion of historiography. He shows how history can be used for political purposes, including the promotion of nationalist ideologies. He argues that Ukrainian nationalism developed as a reaction to attempted assimilation by the Poles and other groups. For instance, he notes that the relative strength of Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia, as opposed to Bukovyna, can be attributed to the influence of or reaction to Polish nationalist resurgence. This interpretation provides another dimension to Magocsi's analysis of Ukrainians' allegiance to Habsburg rule in Galicia and Bukovyna. Isaievych's main concern, however, is that history has been used by Polish and Ukrainian nationalists to reinforce "mutual negative stereotypes" that may adversely affect current relations between Poland and Ukraine. He argues for more collaborative historical research on controversial issues, such as the brutal acts committed by both sides during the Second World War and its aftermath, to lay the foundations for "mutual declarations of repentance."

John-Paul Himka's study of a series of 1943 anti-Jewish articles in *Krakivski visti*, "the flagship of Ukrainian journalism under Nazi occupation," is a good example of the type of empirical research that is required to address the terrible inhumanity of the Second World War. Using archival sources, Himka shows the "callous indifference" of certain Ukrainian intellectual circles to the destruction of the Jewish population, as well as the refusal by some Ukrainian intellectuals to comply with Nazi anti-Semitic directives. In addressing the issue of anti-Semitism,

Himka outlines a number of explanations with reference to social, cultural, and psychological factors. The specific case study and the author's analysis provide a broader understanding of the underlying conditions that breed or support anti-Semitism and other manifestations of genocidal hate.

Henry Abramson's annotated translation of the *Turei Zahav* by Rabbi David ben Shmuel Ha-Levi (1586–1667), a Hebrew commentary on the Code of Jewish law, is a poignant testament to the "flourishing of Jewish religious culture in Ukrainian ethno-linguistic territory." The text also reveals a profound respect for scholars and scholarship. Abramson also notes that the Rabbi survived the upheavals of the Khmelnytsky period, but two sons perished in a pogrom in 1664. Coming to terms with the past to understand the present is dependent on the availability of such historical documents in translation and Abramson's commentary.

The subsequent five articles—by Julian Birch, Bohdan Harasymiw, Zenovia A. Sochor, Steven Rosefielde, and Andrea Chandler—directly address the current political, economic, and social situation of post-1991 Ukraine. Given the recent nature of Ukraine's transition from Communism and the Soviet Union and the complexity of the internal and external factors that need to be considered, the analyses and prognoses can only be tentative concerning the direction of Ukraine's transformation. While many of the themes developed in the articles on the history of Ukraine and its peoples are relevant to the current situation, Ukraine's post-1991 transformation is also marking new and uncharted ground.

Julian Birch develops a typology of various forms of nationalism, and shows that extremist nationalist or xenophobic political parties have had limited success in the ethnically diverse land of Ukraine. At the same time, he argues that it will be difficult to reconcile minority nationalities within a unitary, as opposed to federalist, system of governance. There are grounds for optimism, however, given that Ukraine's post-1991 laws on citizenship and national minorities enshrine principles of citizenship to all residents and guarantee equal civil, political, and economic rights and the free use of minority languages.

Bohdan Harasymiw focuses on the nature of political elites as a determinant of system transformation from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. In his empirical examination of key political decision makers, he concludes that there is a remarkable continuity between the old Communist *nomenklatura* and post-1990 elites and that this factor alone may impede Ukraine's post-Communist development. The lack of an alternative pool from which a new elite could be drawn and the nature of the Communist system's collapse in Ukraine are two explanations offered by Harasymiw for the continuity of political personnel.



Focussing on the same political issue as Harasymiw, Zenovia A. Sochor also concludes that the former *nomenklatura* continues to play a dominant role in the political life of Ukraine. She notes that in the 1994 elections former or renamed Communists effectively exploited the deteriorating economic situation and used the "Russian card" in their appeals to voters. She is, however, more circumspect than Harasymiw in her conclusions concerning the effect of elite continuity on the democratization process. This reflects, in part, her overall scepticism of transitology theories and their potency in predicting outcomes of complex political and social factors or even the direction of change. She emphasizes the importance of strategic choices by political players, the interaction of governing and opposition forces, and the effect of external factors in determining Ukraine's long-term development.

Steven Rosefielde is also critical of transitology theories, especially their application in economic restructuring. He argues that these macro-economic theories are "superficially instructive, but detached from the past, giving the misleading impression that if a few things are set right, prosperity will be quickly self-generating." Such theories do not take into account the "poisoned legacy" of Communism, and they raise societal expectations that can not be fulfilled. In outlining Ukraine's catastrophic economic situation since 1991, Rosefielde's prognosis is that economic recovery may not be apparent until the year 2000.

If Rosefielde is correct in his economic predictions, then political instability and social upheavals will increase. Andrea Chandler's analysis of post-1991 Ukraine's social policies reveals the human costs of the state's inability to sustain the social policies of the old system because of budget deficits and hyperinflation, and the failure by Ukrainian political leaders and external funding agencies such as the World Bank to develop a model of economic restructuring that includes a proactive and empowering social programme. She concludes that this failure is not unique to Ukraine and that it is also evident in well-developed industrialized states, including Canada. She suggests that the problem of Ukraine's social and economic development requires a new, global approach.

The two papers by Liu Dong and Zhao Yunzhong provide another perspective on the issue of development. The People's Republic of China has been undergoing a process of economic restructuring that Liu Dong suggests may be instructive to Ukraine, and that there are positive foundations for increasing trade and other economic ties between China and Ukraine. While joint government initiatives to date have yielded disappointing results, Liu Dong nevertheless argues that there are few impediments to the strengthening of relations in the future. She also presents an elegant case for improving academic exchanges and

education as a means of social and cultural development and strengthening relations between China and Ukraine.

Zhao Yunzhong explains why there was a lack of attention to Ukrainian studies in China before 1991, and he notes the major gaps in rudimentary historical documentation and analyses about each other's histories. The fact that China could be a potential market of over a billion people and a resource in terms of its experience with economic restructuring lends support to his and Liu Dong's emphasis on improving cultural and academic ties between the two countries. Zhao Yunzhong also acknowledges Peter J. Potichnyj's pioneering work in developing Ukrainian studies in China and in furthering exchanges between the two countries.

Howard Aster's reflections on Peter Potichnyj's work concludes the *Festschrift*. He links Peter's academic interest in the study of Ukraine to his East European background and his commitment to democratic values. Using Peter as an example, Aster acknowledges the major contributions of émigré scholars to the advancement of Soviet and East European studies. He poses questions concerning the role of diasporas in furthering our understanding of societies such as Ukraine, and the role that diasporas play in a people's aspirations for self-determination and statehood. Referring to their extensive collaboration in studying Jewish-Ukrainian relations, Aster also notes the special tie of friendship that develops among academics pursuing difficult topics. Many of us share this bond of friendship with Peter J. Potichnyj.



# Imperial Decline and Collapse as a Problem in the Social Sciences

*John S. Reshetar, Jr.*

The breakdown of empire has the fascination of observing the implosion of a large structure that collapses under its own weight as a result of the weakening or removal of its supports and underpinnings. While the implosion can be accomplished in short order, the weakening of the underpinnings may require much time or it may occur relatively rapidly as a result of accelerated change. Despite its inherent fascination, imperial decline has not been given much attention by social scientists—in particular by political scientists. This failure or reluctance to be concerned with a significant macro-political phenomenon can be explained in terms of a number of obstacles that have impeded its study and distorted perception of it.

First of all, there is the impediment of terminology and of correctly identifying things by their proper names. If observers are incapable of identifying an empire upon seeing one, the results of their observation and study are bound to be affected. Sovietologists, as well as journalists and media representatives, frequently failed to identify the Soviet Union as an empire and as the successor to the Russian Empire.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet Union was frequently referred to as a "nation" when, by its own constitutional definition, it was a multinational state. Sovietologists incorrectly used the adjective "national" with reference to the entire U.S.S.R., referring to the central government as the "national" government rather than as the Union government. They mistranslated the adjectives *Vsesoiuznyi* and *Soiuznyi* as "national" instead of "All-Union" or "Union." The non-Russian republics were referred to by the adjectives "local" or "provincial" although they constituted more than half of the Soviet population.

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1. For an incisive criticism of the American Sovietological establishment, see Orest Subtelny, "American Sovietology's Great Blunder: The Marginalization of the Nationality Issue," *Nationalities Papers* 22, no. 1 (spring 1994): 141–55.

As early as 1971 this writer proposed an imperial model for the study of the Soviet political system—as the sixth (and last) of a series of systemic models—and identified the principal attributes of this model.<sup>2</sup> Yet the imperial model was resisted, often silently, at least until its relevance became increasingly evident in 1990. Only belatedly did Sovietologists take to referring to the Soviet Union as an empire. Cleavages and fissures were minimized or ignored even after they developed beyond the stage of incipience. Mikhail Gorbachev was only rarely perceived as a Russian neo-imperialist in his futile efforts to preserve the Soviet Union.

If social scientists are not able to make correct identifications, it is little wonder that their perceptions of the Soviet Union and their projections for its development were utterly inadequate. Worse still, they were guilty of misleading the consumers, users, patrons, and financial backers of this social science. If one is misidentifying a multinational empire as a “nation” or simply as a superpower or megastate without reference to its demographic composition, one should not expect a profound understanding of political realities. Even historians were guilty of not using the official name in referring to the Russian Empire, but simply calling it “Russia” and thus mistakenly implying that it was a conventional ethnic entity or nation-state like France, Germany, Japan, or Sweden.

A second impediment to understanding the imperial order has been the tendency of observers to empathize or even identify with the dominant nationality or ethnic hegemon. In the case of the Soviet Union many scholars empathized with the Russians as a people and as the core of the empire. Thus the historian was not concerned with the history of the Russian Empire in its diversity and entirety, but only with the history of Russians as a nationality—with Russian culture and institutions, rulers, beliefs and customs (often in an idealized form), and social classes. All too often Russian imperialism was defined as “expansionism” and was represented as normal, natural, and justified. Similarly, the political scientist was concerned with Kremlinology, All-Union political structures, and the central leadership rather than with the republics and Russian political values.<sup>3</sup> Of course, the Soviet Russian rulers were also respon-

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2. See the first and concluding chapters in John S. Reshetar, Jr., *The Soviet Polity, Government and Politics in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971; 2d ed. Harper & Row, 1978; 3d ed. 1989).

3. Significantly, the major study of Soviet federalism was published not in English but in French. See Theofil K. Kis, *Le Fédéralisme soviétique: Ses particularités typologiques* (Ottawa: éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1973). For a trenchant

sible for this condition, as they did not encourage foreign interest in the non-Russian republics and often imposed special obstacles apart from those that were inherent in the Soviet bureaucracy.

Although identification with the ethnic hegemon may be the result of an affinity with Russian culture, worship of power, or attraction to Russian religiosity, there were also practical or even venal considerations. Thus the desire or need for a non-tourist visa, an invitation or inclusion in an academic exchange program, or access to certain kinds of sources or data all played a role in promoting identification with the ethnic hegemon or metropole at the expense of the subject peoples. Research topics that displeased the hegemon were readily avoided.

A *third* type of obstacle embraces several attributes of the contemporary social sciences. Increasingly narrow specialization and micro-oriented empirical theorizing have inevitably led to social scientists knowing less about less. A cynical observer might conclude that these are small minds dealing with small subjects. In any case, this approach has often led to inconclusive results and preoccupation with trivial matters and inconsequential issues. It has meant that political scientists have avoided the larger historical perspective and major questions.

The influence of the macro-approach offered by Marxism should not be exaggerated. Yet certain Marxist analytical categories, when applied to imperial systems, can provide important insights and promote awareness of the internal contradictions within empires. Marxism, with its emphasis on dialectical development and the struggle of opposites, incessant change, and maturation and decay, could have contributed to an understanding of the decline of the Soviet empire. However, Marxists' obsession with the "class principle" and their naive belief that the dialectic was "pro-Communist" and not neutral, prevented such understanding. By accepting Stalin's specious and self-serving distinction between "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic" contradictions, Marxists mistakenly exempted the Soviet empire from the workings of the dialectic.

Marxists conferred a mythical immunity on socialism and on the Soviet empire as though each could escape the relentlessness of the dialectical process. Their acceptance of the myth of "proletarian (and socialist) internationalism" caused them to minimize or even ignore nationality problems, ethnic tensions and conflicts, and the importance of

national identity and loyalty. Thus a Marxism that could have identified the major contradictions of the Soviet imperial system was converted into a Marxism-Leninism that denied the fissures in the name of a sterile Russian political orthodoxy.

A fourth obstacle to understanding imperial systems has been a preference for the larger, all-embracing political order and a suspicion or even rejection of centrifugal forces, "separatism" and nationalism. Social scientists had to accept the numerous former colonies and their new nationalisms and presence in the United Nations, although the historian E. H. Carr complained of "the aggravation of the evils of nationalism" with more than sixty sovereign states in the world in 1945.<sup>4</sup> During and after World War II nationalism was often equated with Nazism, although Nazism was a species of imperialism (based on racism) and was not a conventional form of nationalism despite its "National Socialist" label. Nationalism was seen as an undesirable vestige of the past, as an obstacle to integration, and even as a cause of war. Increased attention was given, instead, to such supposedly modernizing integrative efforts as the European Economic Community and NATO as forms of community-building, and they were even equated with the Soviet-controlled Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.<sup>5</sup> Consequently nationalism's role as a dissolvent of imperial systems—while acknowledged in the case of the British, Dutch, French and Portuguese empires after 1945—was ignored with reference to the Soviet Union.

The refusal to "think the unthinkable" regarding the U.S.S.R. was prompted by several considerations. One of these was the questionable assertion that the Soviet Union was a qualitatively different entity than the Russian Empire, that it was a truly "international" formation based on equality and the existence of a "Soviet people" that represented a new stage in relations among nationalities.<sup>6</sup> As these myths lost credibility,

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4. E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945), 24. Carr also noted that "National self-determination became a standing invitation to secession."

5. For example, see the pioneering study by Karl W. Deutsch, ed., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Yet, in the case of the Soviet Union Deutsch was cognizant of the potential for fragmentation. See his "Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 308–33.

6. E. H. Carr expressed the conventional wisdom of the time (1945) that the U.S.S.R. under Stalin represented "emphatic promulgation of a comprehensive

they did not necessarily lead to the abandonment of the belief that "bigger is better." The preference for the larger political entity is seen in social scientists fearing "destabilization" as a result of imperial decline and collapse. "Balkanization" and ethnic conflict were erroneously perceived as the sole alternative to perpetuation of the imperial order. Here awareness of imperial decline was clouded by the fear of change, fear of the unfamiliar, and a reluctance to sail into uncharted waters. Change that was hailed as progressive and desirable (as, for example, Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika) was suddenly feared should it become "destabilizing." Yet "negative" change and the grievances and demands of alleged "extremists" derive from specific causes and need to be explained and understood rather than simply deplored or condemned.

The illusion that certain kinds of change are "positive" and can be promoted while other kinds are "negative" and can be prevented ignores the fact that the varieties of change are interrelated and cannot be separated or turned off at will. Concern over the consequences of imperial "destabilization" and collapse have led observers to ignore or minimize the signs of decay and disintegration. Yet the "stability" of an unstable empire can hardly be regarded as a viable alternative to the change that is feared as destabilizing.

A fifth obstacle to perceiving imperial decline has been the gullibility of social scientists in accepting extravagant claims, false assertions, and the pretence and pomp of empire.<sup>7</sup> The size and the misperceived and often exaggerated military power of empire tend to have a mesmerizing effect, although military power itself cannot sustain the imperial system in crisis. Decline can be concealed in its earlier stages as imperial regimes continue to expend increasingly scarce resources on grandiose public monuments and wasteful projects that give the appearance of wealth and power.

The Ottoman Empire's Dolmabahçe Palace on the shores of the Bosphorus serves as a prime example of this phenomenon. This magnifi-

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Soviet allegiance which embraces in its overriding loyalty a multiplicity of component nations." *Nationalism and After*, 16.

7. Examples of scholarly works that challenged the pretence and conventional wisdom and that encountered resistance include Igor Birman, *Secret Incomes in the Soviet State Budget* (The Hague and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); and Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *L'Empire éclaté: La révolte des nations en URSS* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), the English translation of which was titled *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979). Birman offered much evidence indicating that there were substantial deficits in Soviet budgets instead of the officially claimed surpluses.

cent edifice was constructed at the time of the Crimean War as a symbol of "modernization" (in contrast to the Topkapi Palace) when the Ottoman Empire was in decline and barely managed to confront the Russian menace with the help of the European powers. In Europe the glitter of the Belle Epoch—the quarter century before World War I—and the ostentatious observance of the tercentenary of the Romanov dynasty in 1913 misled observers regarding ensuing events and the collapse of three multinational empires. A comparable example was provided by the Soviet Union in the Brezhnev-Suslov period when funds were wasted on the erection of massive female sword-bearing figures in Kyiv (Kiev) and Volgograd in an effort to conceal and deceive.

The willingness of observers to accept pretence for reality and to be duped rather than to recognize decline is due to the efforts of imperial power-holders to conceal decline. Even when decline is partially acknowledged—as it must when efforts at reform and restoration are undertaken—the rescue efforts can be misinterpreted as "proof" of stability and viability.

A *sixth* obstacle to perceiving imperial decline results from the absence of a clear understanding and recognition of what is pathological in the social sciences. The concepts of normality and abnormality, of health and disease, and of what is aberrational are, at best, only vaguely defined or understood in the social sciences. In a social science that has no accepted criteria for determining normality, there is a reluctance or inability to acknowledge the imperial order as anomalous. Indeed, a system is often perceived and judged to be an aberration only retrospectively and retroactively. For example, Stalinism was generally judged such only after Stalin's death and Khrushchev's "secret speech." Thus the abnormal can be regarded as "normal" until it is declared to have been abnormal after the political leader's corpse can no longer punish followers or withhold rewards and favours. Many Sovietologists judged the stagnation and corruption of the Brezhnev-Suslov period to be "normal," and the regime "stable," while minimizing or ignoring deep-seated problems and systemic malaise. Indeed, the absence of a handbook of pathology in political science has meant that imperial systems have too often been treated as conventional or "normal" systems. It has meant that the death throes of a system can be misperceived as healthy reform efforts. This may be due to observers projecting their own rationality and wishes onto leaders of an imperial system and thinking that the latter are capable of undertaking the drastic reforms needed to prolong its existence. Misperception may also be due to the observer's penchant for bureaucratic and political solutions to problems—especially



social and economic problems.<sup>8</sup> Although such observers may be aware of the pathology of bureaucracy and may have had unpleasant experiences with academic and public bureaucracies, they may still cling to the search for the "good" or reformed bureaucrat or for the efficient and just "socialist" economic system.

Thus observers may suffer from their own perceptual pathology. Indeed, insofar as academic persons guard their "turf" and may also be "empire-builders and maintainers" in their own right, they may be reluctant to acknowledge the decline of an empire, fearing that it will result in the diminution of their field. Thus they may equate any threat to the empire with a threat to their own academic or professional status and importance. They may subconsciously acquire a vested interest in the perpetuation of the empire on which they have based their careers.

A seventh obstacle is related to the sixth: if there is vagueness regarding what is normal, there is a corresponding vagueness regarding moral judgment. Social scientists have regarded their sciences as being value-free, so that perceptual blindness, when it does occur, has been compounded by moral blindness.<sup>9</sup> This has resulted in a certain moral indifference on the part of social scientists. It also explains, at least in part, the discomfort and overreaction prompted by President Ronald Reagan's reference to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."<sup>10</sup> In retrospect Reagan's judgment and his pronouncement can be regarded as a brilliant tactical stratagem. In two words of the most potent shorthand it summarized the blood purges, the Ukrainian famine, the Stalin cult, the mass murders at Vinnytsia, Katyn, Kuropaty, and Bykivnia (and elsewhere), and the entire GULag with its political prisoners and innocent victims as well as the sacrilegious, mendacious and genocidal nature of totalitarian rule. The evil-empire charge was tactically brilliant because it

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8. See Robert Nisbet, *Twilight of Authority* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 70–4, 194–229.

9. For a penetrating discussion of the consequences of scientific-value relativism, the denial of any absolutes, the abandonment of the normative, and the pursuit of knowledge that does not lead to wisdom, see David M. Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship and Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 90–6 and chap. 9.

10. The text of his address to the National Association of Evangelicals on 8 March 1983 is reproduced in Strobe Talbott, *The Russians and Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1984), 105–18, esp. 116–17. President Reagan, in response to a question at his first press conference, observed that the Soviet (Brezhnev-Suslov) leadership was willing to use any methods to achieve its aims, including "the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat in order to attain that." A. P. dispatch, *Seattle Times*, 30 January 1981.



undoubtedly touched the most sensitive nerve of the Soviet political leadership and may have prompted a degree of self-examination and contributed to Gorbachev's efforts at changing the Soviet Union's image.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the social scientist frequently fears and avoids moral judgments as the devil is said to fear holy water or the priest's censer. Evil is not only not condemned, but it is implicitly denied or simply not acknowledged.<sup>11</sup> Of course, this is not to state that social scientists as individuals are devoid of any moral sense, but only to note that they often find themselves compelled to repress their moral sense lest it be viewed as affecting their "objectivity" or compromising their "scientific" findings and their credentials as investigators. As a consequence, one can cite St. Paul's admonition regarding those who are "Ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth" (II Timothy 3:7).

A related failing of value-free social science is the refusal to acknowledge Nemesis, the Greek goddess of retributive justice and punishment, as an intellectual concept. Such acknowledgment would promote a sense of ultimate judgment, reckoning, accountability, culpability, and retribution leading to greater cognitive awareness. A social science that fails to address ultimate consequences is comparable to a science of physics that ignores cosmology or a theology that omits eschatology. In seeking to be value-free and devoid of all moral judgments, social scientists may not only be deceiving themselves but also ignoring vital evidence and significant attributes of the phenomenon being studied. Moral blindness also entails perceptual blindness.

These seven obstacles to perceiving and understanding imperial systems may not be comparable to the seven mortal sins of the Christian catechism, but they have had harmful consequences. Each of these perceptual "sins" or failings—whether of omission or commission—has meant that something vital has been ignored or omitted from the scope of scientific investigation.

Imperial decline can be viewed clinically in terms of a pathology that identifies its principal causes and the signs of debility and decay that result in demise. Historical empires have been compared by several authors and have ranged from the ancient empires of the Egyptians, Persians, Greece, and Rome to the Eurasian empire of the Mongols and that of the Moguls in India and the pre-Columbian empires of the Aztecs,

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11. For a rare example of the use of a moral judgment in entitling a thoroughly documented work based exclusively on Soviet sources, see Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities* (London: Macmillan, 1970).

Mayas, and Incas.<sup>12</sup> The overseas empires of Britain, Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and the German Second Reich represent a separate category and involve the question of claimed hegemony over the international system.<sup>13</sup> The Napoleonic Empire, the Nazi Third Reich, and Fascist Italy represent remarkable efforts at empire because of their rapid rise and abrupt decline owing to military defeat.

More germane to this study are the continental empires that emerged from interaction with (or in the aftermath of) the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire: the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire and its successor the Soviet Union, and Austria-Hungary. The focus here is on the imperial system that is relatively large in terms of contiguous territory, rules over subject peoples and dependencies, and has a dominant ethnic element (or two in the case of Austria-Hungary after 1867)—the ethnic hegemon in control of the metropole or imperial centre.

The Byzantine and Ottoman empires were able to persist over many centuries—the former over a millennium. Yet Constantinople was sacked by Crusaders in 1204 and had to accept a Latin patriarch until Greeks recovered the city in 1261; Venetian and Genoese influence persisted in Byzantium.<sup>14</sup> The successor Ottoman Empire was able to persist, despite being the “sick man of Europe,” because of the support of the European powers and its resistance to Russian acquisition of the Straits and penetration of the Near East. Ironically, Marx and Engels were supporters of the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire, which they saw as the greater evil.<sup>15</sup>

The concept of “Ottomanization” was even applied to the Soviet Union to describe gradual decomposition and protracted debility as well

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12. For a comprehensive comparative synthesis of imperial systems, see Robert G. Wesson, *The Imperial Order* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a strictly sociological approach to “historical bureaucratic empires,” see Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). For an essentially Marxist perspective and analysis see Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

13. The role of empire as would-be international hegemon is discussed in Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).

14. Deno J. Geanakoplos, *Byzantine East and Latin West: Two Worlds of Christendom in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), 18.

15. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, ed. Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), 25–55, 121–202.

as reliance on foreign aid.<sup>16</sup> However, the rapid collapse of the Soviet empire refuted the extended time frame implicit in the "Ottomanization" concept and demonstrated its incompatibility with the information revolution and its mass media and rapid dissemination of news. Efforts to isolate imperial systems from change and crises fail in the end. There is a reduced time span for accelerated decay as popular expectations and demands become contagious and are not readily satisfied or dispelled.

Decline can only be slowed slightly by means of certain policies, but it cannot be prevented. The survival rate of empires can be measured only in terms of how long they can be sustained by "life support" means. Indeed, reform efforts can actually accelerate decay. The eloquence of the historical record concerning the mortality of empire is beyond dispute. In attempting to explain this lack of long-range success, there are at least *seven major conditions*, prerequisites, and areas of investigation that can be said to determine imperial decline and collapse.

*Foremost* among the signs of decline is widespread corruption that acquires a pandemic quality and becomes a source of popular demoralization and outright cynicism. Corruption is reflected in the commonplace nature of bribery, embezzlement, and the selling of influence. For example, Boris Yeltsin, at the Nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, referred to "millionaire bribe-takers" and asked: "Why has the Party Control Committee ... feared and at present fears to bring to account prominent leaders of republics and provinces for bribes, for millions of rubles of damages to the state, etc.?"<sup>17</sup> Previously Gorbachev had acknowledged the existence of "social corrosion" in Soviet society.<sup>18</sup> The fact that the Soviet Communist Party apparat was increasingly referred to as the "mafia" in popular parlance testified to the extent of corruption within the Soviet empire.

Although the extent of corruption has varied in each empire, its prevalence is not debated. As empires have increased difficulties in feeding the population and providing public amusements and distractions, the economic burden becomes onerous. The financial demands of empire become insatiable, and the resultant "compulsion and taxation

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16. Timothy Garton Ash, *The Uses of Diversity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 252–5. Actually, Byzantium's debility was more protracted than that of the Ottoman Empire.

17. *Izvestiia*, 2 July 1988.

18. *Izvestiia*, 28 January 1987. On the extent and forms of Soviet corruption in the Brezhnev-Suslov period, see Konstantin M. Simis, *U.S.S.R.: The Corrupt Society*, trans. Jacqueline Edwards and Mitchell Schneider (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982).

nurture corruption, evasion and often a redistribution of income in favour of powerful bureaucrats and of people close to those in power."<sup>19</sup>

A *second* cause and sign of decay is the imperial bureaucracy which not only fails to solve problems but is also an obstacle to reform, delaying and sabotaging policies that might prolong the empire's existence. All bureaucracy manifests a certain pathology in being intensely secretive, self-serving, self-satisfied, and self-aggrandizing, apart from being arbitrary and committed to established patterns and ways. Bureaucracy stagnates and is only rarely capable of innovating—and then usually to an inadequate degree. The imperial bureaucracy promotes marginal competency and mediocrity because appointment and promotion depend more on loyalty than on competence or originality.<sup>20</sup>

Bureaucracy is at the core of the stultification that characterizes the imperial order. This is seen in its obsession with excessive centralism and its insistence that all be subordinate to the unquestioned authority of the imperial capital, the metropole. The malaise is compounded by the inner rivalries and conflicts as well as the collusion and concealment that characterize imperial bureaucratic behaviour. What renders the imperial bureaucracy fatal for the system is the total lack of regularized and periodic accountability. It is difficult, even in constitutional democratic systems, to render bureaucracy accountable (to elected officials), but in the imperial order it is impossible. Devoid of all accountability, the imperial bureaucracy proceeds along its self-destructive course, acting out the role of one of the principal gravediggers of the imperial order.

A *third* cause and indicator of decay is the imperial military. Military defeat is a pre-condition of imperial decline. World War I saw the demise of two multinational empires, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, and the collapse of the Russian Empire. The final defeat was preceded by Austria-Hungary losing the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Ottoman Empire losing the Turco-Italian War (1911) and the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912–13). The costly Turkish victory at Gallipoli (Gelibolu) in 1915 could not save the Ottoman Empire, but it did contribute to Turkey's emergence as a nation-state. The Russian Empire lost the Russo-Japanese War as well as World War I. In World War II the successor Soviet empire came close to being defeated except for a combination of fortuitous circumstances that permitted Stalin's empire to survive and even expand. However, the Soviet Union was forced to retreat from

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19. Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., *The Economic Decline of Empires* (London: Methuen & Co., 1970), 14.

20. Wesson, *The Imperial Order*, 234–5, 286–93.

Afghanistan in 1989 after a decade of warfare and unacceptable material and human costs.

An imperial system, when finally challenged, has great difficulty in preventing the deterioration of morale in the military. This is compounded if it must rely on conscripts from subject peoples who have become increasingly resentful and unwilling to serve the ethnic hegemon. Decline provides opportunities for the involvement of the military in the politics of the metropole. If it does not supplant civilian rule, it can influence the outcome in conflicts between civilian political factions. Civilian leaders can become dependent on the military, as occurred in the case of Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation, the Russian core empire that remained after the dissolution of the inner empire that was the Soviet Union. This dependence was evident in October 1993 when the defense minister had tank cannons fire at the parliament building held by Yeltsin's opponents, inflicting heavy damage on the structure and providing a revealing example of the ignominy of empire with the metropole in disarray and at bay. Military involvement in partisan political conflicts neither enhances the status of the military nor assures the preservation of even a rump empire.

A *fourth* factor in imperial decline is the rising cost of empire that is aggravated by the high cost of the military and excessive foreign involvements. The imperial order is costly in several respects: maintaining rule over restive and unruly subject peoples requires large police and military forces; excessive and oppressive centralism means exploitation of the provinces and subject peoples; a bloated and insatiable bureaucracy never has sufficient resources with which to pursue all of its questionable projects and grandiose designs. Revenues from taxation decline as the economic base contracts because initiative and labour productivity are discouraged. Substitute sources of revenue need to be found, and this has the effect of further weakening or destroying incentives and of promoting popular indifference and apathy.

Caught in severe economic straits, the imperial power is nevertheless compelled to continue spending as its capacity to produce wealth diminishes.<sup>21</sup> Debasing of the currency and price inflation are accompanied by increased indebtedness as the imperial power becomes more dependent on foreign capital investment and assistance. The debt-ridden imperial

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21. Paul Kennedy, in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, contends that rising military costs cause the leading power to become overextended. The burdens of military power exceed its material resources, economic productivity, and technological and revenue-raising capabilities.

system suffers loss of economic viability and leverage. Robert Wesson has noted that imperial systems have resulted in enrichment for the relatively few and impoverishment for the many, demonstrating the "incompatibility of political monopoly with economic progress."<sup>22</sup> Economic deterioration is essential to imperial decline, although bankruptcy can be concealed temporarily by the issuance of fiat money. However, this can only exacerbate the incongruity between (declining) military power and economic bankruptcy.

A *fifth* condition and sign of imperial decline is hubris—the arrogance and self-deception that the early Greeks recognized as preceding decline and fall. Hubris is akin to the sin of pride—the first of the seven mortal sins—by which is meant arrogance, conceit, and excessive self-satisfaction. Hubris is the ultimate proof of the morally bankrupting, depraved, and perverse nature of imperial rule. Social scientists are uncomfortable with the classical concept of hubris because it implies a moral judgment, acknowledgment of fate, and the notion of retribution. It might be noted that the social scientist who is afflicted with hubris is less likely to perceive the phenomenon in the subject of investigation.

Yet hubris can be readily observed in the overt behaviour and pronouncements of imperial rulers. The metropole claims that subject peoples are an "inalienable" part of the empire yet it demeans them as "lesser" peoples—less numerous and therefore less worthy. It is hubris that enables the hegemon to claim that subject peoples are incapable of independence and would suffer some dire fate outside of the empire.

Empire leads to myopia at best and to blindness at worst. Hubris entails gross insensitivity, obtuseness, and loss of a sense of reality. This was evident in Gorbachev's 1986 Soviet Communist Party program, which asserted that "the nationalities question, inherited from the past, has been successfully resolved in the Soviet Union." Subsequently one of Gorbachev's advisers, Nikolai Shmelev, was to admit that the ensuing nationalities explosion of long pent-up resentment and hostility "was quite unexpected" for the Soviet leadership.<sup>23</sup> Russians have had difficulty in comprehending why Moscow is profoundly disliked and distrusted. Hubris has made it difficult for Russians to understand the reasons for Russophobia or to empathize with the aspirations of non-Russians.<sup>24</sup> Hubris made it possible for Gorbachev and Yeltsin to claim

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22. Wesson, *The Imperial Order*, 270.

23. *New York Times*, 5 July 1989.

24. Illustrative of this difficulty is the essay "Russophobia" by Igor Shafarevich published in *Nash sovremennik*, June 1989: 167–92. For an abstract see *Current*



that the non-Russian republics owed a financial debt to the Russian Republic (Soviet Union) for all of the economic development of which they were the alleged beneficiaries.<sup>25</sup> They apparently could not comprehend why Ukraine should present Moscow with a demand for restitution for the various mass executions, deportations, and false arrests perpetrated by the Soviet security forces, the 1932–33 Ukrainian famine, the destruction of countless historical monuments, the Chornobyl nuclear catastrophe, and industrial pollution of the environment.

However, it can be argued that the hegemon's extravagant assertions and avoidance of reality may also be part of a calculated stratagem designed to mislead outside observers and the empire's subjects. This results in reliance on pretence and what Russians term *pokazukha* (window-dressing, showmanship) in an effort to claim that the empire is historically "legitimate" and a "normal" political entity. The imperial ethos involves boasting such as that in the Soviet state anthem asserting that the U.S.S.R. was an "unbreakable union of free republics united eternally by great Rus'"—a historically absurd statement as Rus' did not exist in 1922–23 when the U.S.S.R. was established. The Russian preoccupation with "glory and might" (the *slava-mogushchestvo* syndrome) is also part of this hubris-related stratagem. Georgii Arbatov, in addressing the Nineteenth Conference of the Soviet Communist Party, conceded that "so many times we were driven to exulting [*likovat*] or pretending to exult when matters were going badly. And when matters began to improve—to exult even more, fearing even to ask ourselves the question: how high a price was paid for one or another success."<sup>26</sup> Thus the blindness that is characteristic of hubris may be calculated as well as delusional.

A sixth aspect of imperial decline deals with the quality of leadership that seeks to perpetuate the imperial system. The lack of effective leadership is crucial to decline if one examines the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. The Austrian leadership was aware that it had a nationalities problem; Archduke Franz Ferdinand wished to make necessary reforms, but the Hungarians were opposed. Austrian awareness was not translated into action before 1914.<sup>27</sup> The Ottoman

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*Digest of the Soviet Press* 41, no. 46 (13 December 1989): 16–19.

25. *New York Times*, 13 March 1990, as reported in Flora Lewis's column.

26. *Izvestiia*, 30 June 1988.

27. On the reform efforts see Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848–1918*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), esp. vol. 2. See also Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson*



Empire retreated by stages as a result of rebellions and wars with the Russian Empire. The reform efforts undertaken by the wily Sultan Abdül Hamid II only bought time for the doomed empire as he played off rival foreign powers against each other. The Russian Empire, with such ineffective leaders as Nicholas II, Stolypin, Goremykin, Stürmer, and finally Kerensky, proved to be incapable of reforming itself. The Russian leadership pretended that it had no real nationalities problem, that "separatism" was the work of alleged "foreign agents" and that the "one and indivisible" empire could survive despite the warnings provided by the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution.

Lenin had remarkable success in reconstituting the Russian Empire as the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the new orthodoxy, Marxism-Leninism. Yet when a new orthodoxy was needed again in the 1980s, the Soviet leadership failed to provide it. The Brezhnev-Suslov leadership consisted of survivors of the Stalinist purges, beneficiaries of denunciation and servility, who represented mediocrity.<sup>28</sup> Gorbachev, the product of this succession of leaders, was aware of the empire's problems but could not act decisively or pursue consistent policies, demonstrating once again the incorrigibility of the imperial order.

The quality of imperial leadership reflects ancillary attributes of empire, especially the related problems of loyalty and identity. Empires require collaboration based on the recruitment of officials who are prepared to betray or abandon old loyalties or identities and to serve the empire in return for promised rewards (the "janissary"-*déraciné* phenomenon). Yet an identity based on opportunism and self-gain is not likely to survive when severely tested. Loyalty that is conditional is easily discarded. An instructive example is the massive abandonment of the Soviet Communist Party by its membership of more than 19 million that dissolved in 1990–91. The overwhelming majority of the membership was not committed, and the Soviet leaders were isolated and abandoned in the end.

A *seventh* area of investigation deals with the circumstances of imperial collapse and focuses on two principal aspects: the failure of nerve and the crisis of confidence. The failure of nerve is an acknowledged

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and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981).

28. The competence of the Brezhnev-Suslov leadership was questioned by Robert Conquest as early as 1970, and found to represent political entropy and degradation and to be unsophisticated and unimaginative. See Robert Conquest, "Stalin's Successors," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1970, 509–24. Guardians of the conventional wisdom greeted this appraisal with scepticism and disbelief.

ment by the leadership of its inability to cope, and a confession of failure. It occurs very suddenly, although the circumstances leading to it may entail much improvising and casting about from one inadequate measure to another. Crises, setbacks, and defeats outpace the attempted solutions, and the leadership is overwhelmed by events that it cannot control. Its only choice is abdication. The failure of nerve is accompanied by a demoralization and a "moment of truth" so that even the well-paid security police cannot preserve the system as they have no one to "secure" and are rendered irrelevant.

The final crisis of confidence occurs when the metropole-centre is discredited and demonstrates that it is bankrupt not only economically but also politically and morally. At that point the metropole is finally perceived as being incapable of providing solutions and is seen as the source of the problem or as the problem itself. Its incompetence becomes evident whether in military defeat, in its inability to cope with rebellious subject peoples, or in economic failure.

In the accumulation of quantitative changes that lead to collapse, there is a final determining increment that tips the balance. A final pivotal issue, challenge, or crisis brings down the old imperial order. In the case of Austria-Hungary it was food shortages and military defeat in 1918. In the Russian Empire it was administrative breakdown and food riots in the capital that led to the abdication of Nicholas II. In the Ottoman Empire it was defeat in World War I and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) that brought the empire to its long-postponed end. The fate of the Soviet empire was sealed by the abortive 19 August 1991 coup in Moscow and by the 1 December 1991 Ukrainian referendum in favour of national independence that enabled the president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, to initiate the dissolution of the defunct Soviet Union.

A genuine "moment of truth" means that the ethnic hegemon must experience a profound trauma and ask itself the most fundamental questions. In the case of Turkey it involved starting anew, abandoning the claims to empire, and moving the capital from its imperial seat to Ankara. To accomplish this it was necessary to establish a new, truly national, government in a new capital and demonstrate the complete break with the imperial past.

The social sciences have not acquitted themselves very well in studying the phenomenon of empire and the methods of imperial rule. They gave attention to overseas colonial regimes and to the phenomenon of imperialism in relationship to capitalism, but they were tardy in perceiving the Soviet Union as an imperial system. The science that ignores a phenomenon or that fails to perceive its essential character does not abolish the phenomenon or impede or prevent its development. The

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principal loser is science itself, and the price paid is in terms of the perpetuation of ignorance and the loss of knowledge and understanding.



# The Nativist-Westernizer Controversy in Ukraine: The End or the Beginning?\*

*Mykola Riabchouk*

The first, if not the only, connotation the term "nativist-Westernizer controversy" evokes in our minds is that of the nineteenth-century dispute between Russia's Westernizers and Slavophiles. As Andrzej Walicki, the leading specialist on that topic, has commented,

the names by which both movements came to be known were invented in the heat of the argument by the opponents, so that the terms "Slavophilism" and "Westernism" at first had a pejorative tinge. [Nevertheless] in the history of Russian thought the Slavophile/Westernizer controversy was a most fertile source of new ideas, a stage whose significance became clearer with the passage of time. Certain historians ... were inclined to interpret almost the entire history of Russian social thought as the evolution of a complex set of problems which only found fully conscious expression in the dispute between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers.<sup>1</sup>

While not subscribing to this view himself, Walicki recognizes that "the issues debated by the Slavophiles and the Westernizers (the individual's relation to society, types of social integration and spiritual culture, the problem of freedom and alienation, the emancipation of personality, and so on) are no less topical today.... In some instances, these issues can be placed in a more meaningful context from our twentieth-century

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1. Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth Century Russian Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 11-12.

perspective, thus making it possible to discover new depths in old nineteenth-century controversies."<sup>2</sup>

I venture to say that from the twentieth-century perspective the entire controversy between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers can be considered simply a particular case of a much more general, global controversy between "tradition" and "modernity," between pre-Renaissance and post-Enlightenment, hierarchical and secularized (emancipated), and collective and individualistic ways of life and thought. This controversy "represents a rejection of 'modernization,' in its Western garb, with all of its attendant political, social, and economic dislocations."<sup>3</sup> In fact, this is an extremely profound and complex controversy that still, one hundred years later, engages the most prominent thinkers around the world and inflames a great variety of the "new social movements," including "the peace movement, environmental movements, the women's movement, various minority liberation and welfare movements, movements for regional autonomy and even fundamentalist religious movements [that] ... express concern not over the distribution of material resources, but concern for 'defending and restoring endangered ways of life' [Habermas]: they are expressions of discontent 'having to do with the grammar of forms of life.'"<sup>4</sup>

There is a vast literature about "modernity" and its various implications and contradictions, which cannot be discussed in detail here. But a few remarks on this topic are necessary.

Modernity, as "a dramatic set of changes in European societies,"<sup>5</sup> is an ambivalent phenomenon that, paradoxically, combines both positive and negative features: human emancipation, political freedom, growing standards of living, and—on the other hand—alienation (Marx), anomie (Durkheim), and the "iron cage" of instrumental reason and "disenchantment of the world" (Weber).<sup>6</sup> Modernity has been perceived everywhere

2. Ibid., 15.

3. Graham Fuller, "The Next Ideology," *Foreign Policy*, spring 1995, 145. See also the very interesting article by Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy, "Must It Be the Rest against the West?" *The Atlantic Monthly*, December 1994, 61–84.

4. John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), 167.

5. Ibid., 142.

6. Tomlinson writes that the "ambiguities of modernity" (p. 146) bring about, on the one hand, "a liberation of the human spirit" (p. 149), and, on the other, "new forms of cultural pathology" (pp. 142–3). Tomlinson views "modernity is an essentially ambiguous cultural condition" (p. 141) because it is "an anxious, uncertain and even dangerous place to live," but "it is ultimately 'our world' and

(and rather reasonably) as a Western invention and imposition, i.e., as another word for imperialism, neo-colonialism, Western expansion, and domination. Thus the controversy between modernity and tradition has been reduced to that between the First and the Third Worlds, between Westernism and nativism; the profound philosophical issue has been contaminated and corrupted by the political one.

I do not mean to say that the political problem is unreal or less important than the philosophical one. I agree with Tomlinson that any attempt "to explain the economic 'underdevelopment' as a purely *endogenous* process—a process determined solely by features internal to the society itself ... ignores the external determinants of 'underdevelopment': the history of economic exploitation under colonialism and the continuance of this within the market structure of global capitalism." As underdevelopment is attributed to "stubborn 'traditional' attitudes and cultural practices ... the categories of 'tradition' and 'modernity' become a mere excuse for the historical dirty work of capitalism in the ages of imperialism and neo-imperialism."<sup>7</sup>

But we should not fall back upon another simplification and ignore the much more general and universal aspect of the tradition vs. modernity controversy. Philosophically it is not a spatial contradiction between countries at all, but rather a temporal one that signifies the fundamental change that has occurred in humankind, in its worldview and self-awareness, since the Renaissance. In some sense human beings have lost their pre-individualistic innocence and have been expelled from the kingdom of "givenness" to the kingdom of freedom (and individual responsibility).<sup>8</sup>

By ignoring this aspect of the tradition vs. modernity controversy, many non-Western people ignore the also extremely significant Western experience not only of modernity but also of tradition, not only of tradition vs. modernity but also of their reconciliation. As soon as they attribute modernity exclusively to the West and tradition exclusively to themselves, they find it hard to avoid the temptation to close the door, to damn the West, to expel modernity as an enemy, and to build a closed,

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we can, somehow, be the cultural masters of it" (p. 148); the "false consciousness" of rigid and narrow traditional beliefs gives way in modernity to a "fragmented consciousness" of consumer capitalism (pp. 167–8).

7. Ibid., 143.

8. "The modernizing shift from givenness to choice appears irreversible. Once an individual is conscious of a choice, it is difficult for him to pretend that his options are a matter of necessity," writes Peter L. Berger in *Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change* (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, 1974), 198.



very traditional society. This is nothing but a dystopian parody of tradition and of modernity.

We cannot escape modernity however much we might hate it, because it is irreversible. No one can return to childhood, to a mythological innocence, to a paradise to lost. We must learn to live as adults however unpleasant it might seem. And we need to adjust to modernity however ambiguous and disquieting it might be.

Socio-economic modernity is the 'fate' of all cultures in that they are integrated at a structural level in the orders of the nation-state system and the global capitalist market; but this integration—which is a structural *fait accompli*, not a cultural 'option'—alters the terms of culture irrevocably, since it entails a one-way journey from 'tradition' to 'modernity'. As this journey is made by human agents and involves the emergence of new senses of possibility—new options, new desires, new freedoms—it too can be understood in 'existential' terms. 'Cultural fate' becomes linked with the realisation of individual human freedom. Cultures are 'condemned to modernity' [Octavio Paz] not simply by the 'structural' process of economic development, but by the human process of *self-development*.<sup>9</sup>

Despite all its ambiguities and discontents, modernity is the only option available at the end of the twentieth century. No genuinely traditional society can be built in the modern world. Therefore, a discussion of modernity and tradition is senseless if its aim is to determine the best option. There is nothing to be discussed because there is no choice. The only available option, be it good or bad, was chosen hundreds of years ago.

But a discussion of the darker sides of modernity can be fruitful. They should be illuminated and treated alongside some elements of tradition that could be preserved, revitalized, and explored. In other words, "there must be major doubt that modern 'developed' societies have a monopoly of wisdom. This does not mean that we have to yield to a romanticised view of the 'natural wisdom' of traditional practices.... What is needed is a critical approach that recognizes the embeddedness of modernity's discontents in a political-economic system which simultaneously offers attractions over 'traditional' societies."<sup>10</sup>

The ambiguous character of modernity also makes any culture's response to it ambiguous. This is the case in both the First and the Third World. Ukraine, as a part of the so-called Second World, is also no exception. What makes the Ukrainian case interesting is Ukraine's own

9. Tomlinson, 140–1.

10. *Ibid.*, 160, 144.

ambiguity. First of all, as a Communist country, Ukraine underwent a process of "socialist" modernization that was extremely selective, restrictive, and ambiguous by its very nature. Secondly, as a colony of Poland and Russia, i.e., as one of the "other" Europe's colonies, Ukraine never had to confront Western imperialism directly and never identified modernity with Western expansion and domination. Thirdly, as an East European "borderland," Ukraine was exposed at different times and in different regions to vastly diverse cultural influences.<sup>11</sup> All of these factors have made the Ukrainian case very peculiar and interesting in theoretical terms. And in practical terms it is even more significant.

A growing number of Western analysts and politicians have recently begun to consider Ukraine a "linchpin of the new post-Cold War Europe because of its geopolitical position."<sup>12</sup> This new attitude towards what was previously dubbed a "nasty Ukraine"<sup>13</sup> has been caused, on the one hand, by the gradual recognition of how important this stable and neutral country of over fifty million inhabitants could be for European security and, on the other, by the gradual disappointment in so-called democratic Russia. In this context the nativist-Westernizer controversy in Ukraine is not a problem of purely academic interest.

The term "nativist-Westernizer controversy" has never been applied to any intellectual dispute in Ukraine. However, by using it I am not inventing a controversy that never existed in Ukraine nor coining a new term for the controversies that have been known by other names, first and foremost for the populist-modernist controversy that has afflicted Ukrainian intellectual life throughout the twentieth century.<sup>14</sup> My use of

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11. As one Canadian historian has put it, "the very name of the land ['Ukraine' means borderland] emphasizes the importance of geography. And much of Ukraine's history is a function of its location." Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 5.

12. Strobe Talbott, U.S. deputy secretary of state, as quoted by Taras Kuzio in "Ukraine: The Linchpin of Eastern Stability," *The Wall Street Journal*, 11 May 1995. Kuzio's own words, which were headlined, are also revealing: "Whether as a buffer or as a bridge, a prosperous and independent Ukraine can play an important role in balancing Russia's influence in Europe."

13. See Abraham Brumberg's notorious article "Not So Free At Last," *New York Review of Books*, 22 October 1992.

14. This controversy has been thoroughly examined in recent decades, but mostly as a literary-cultural problem. See, for instance, Myroslav Shkandrij, *Modernists, Marxists and the Nation: The Ukrainian Literary Discussion of the 1920s* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992); Oleksandr Hrytsenko, "Kharkivski edipy i moskovskiy sfinks," *Suchasnist*, 1992, no. 1: 136-43, 162-4; Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj, "Anatomy of a Literary Scandal: Myxajl Semenko and the

this new term is intended as a common denominator for different disputes; it transcends particular spheres of literature or politics to the more general realm of *Weltanschauung* or, as Walicki defines it, the "phenomenon of the collective consciousness":

The use of this term implies that it is a comprehensive vision of the world, a meaningful structure and system of cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic values that is internally coherent within its own chosen framework.... Since *Weltanschauungen* are essentially atheoretical, they need not be expressed through concepts, but find a variety of expressions, thus enabling the investigator to use the tool of comparative analysis and to search for the 'common denominator' in many formally different and apparently heterogeneous cultural products.<sup>15</sup>

I recognize also that this article can in no way exhaust such a large, multifaceted problem. It should be viewed merely as an introduction to further research.

The nativist-Westernizer controversy has never been articulated in Ukraine in precisely these terms. Nevertheless, the set of ideas that can be covered by the term "nativism" ("traditionalism") and, consequently, "Westernism" ("modernity") came to the fore in Ukrainian intellectual life in the first half of nineteenth century, more or less at the same time that the similar Slavophile-Westernizer controversy emerged in Russia.

As a Russian colony, Ukraine was subject to unavoidable "metropolitan" influences in all spheres. From the time that it was incorporated into the Russian Empire in the late seventeenth century, an intensive brain-drain of Ukrainian intellectuals to Moscow and, especially, the new, Western-modelled capital of St. Petersburg occurred. Some of these intellectuals returned to Ukraine, and a large number of them, both in Ukraine and in Russia, maintained a "local" (Ukrainian, "Little Russian," "South Russian," "East Slavonic") identity.

They were taking pride in a cultural inheritance which could be presented as more Ukrainian than Russian. Rus', after all, was the name of a medieval east European country whose principal city had been Kiev. Although it existed at a time when the differences between the various east

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Origins of Ukrainian Futurism," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 4 (December 1978): 467-99; and particularly the discussion on Ukrainian literary Modernism by Danylo Husar Struk, Oleh S. Ilnytskyj, Maxim Tarnawsky, and George G. Grabowicz in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 15, no. 3/4 (December 1991): 245-88. For a brief reference to the problem, see George S. N. Luckyj, *Ukrainian Literature in the Twentieth Century: A Reader's Guide* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); and my review of this book in *Slavic Review* 54, no. 3 (fall 1995): 721-3.

15. Walicki, 2.

Slavic peoples were much less clearly marked than they were to become, its strength lay in the southern part of what was later known as the Russian Empire, and its legacy could therefore be said to belong less to Russia than to Ukraine. So when a nineteenth-century Ukrainian spoke of *Iuzhnaia Rus'*, he was speaking of the southern part of an entity which had not always been led by Moscow and St. Petersburg. He was very far from conceding Ukrainian dependence on the Russians.... Ukrainians who spoke of *Iuzhnaia Rus'* were not admitting that they were southern reflections of a northern image. They were claiming full citizenship in a commonwealth which, in the medieval period, they could be said to have directed.<sup>16</sup>

Paradoxically, Ukrainians built or, more precisely, contributed a great deal to the building of the empire that eventually denied their very existence and did its best to prevent their national revival in any form. This paradox can be easily explained if we consider that Ukrainians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not possess a modern national identity: first of all, they were Orthodox; secondly, they were the tsar's subjects (with significant autonomy and historically legitimized rights, but not sovereign in post-Enlightenment terms); and thirdly, they were "locals," i.e., a particular branch of the Rus' (or East Slavic) people.

As a result, their extensive cultural invasion of Muscovy did not challenge the Russian essence of the northern post-Kyivan Rus' state.<sup>17</sup> On the contrary, their regional, pre-national identity contributed significantly to Russia's multi-regional, supra-national *imperial* identity and dramatically delayed the creation of a modern national self-awareness in Ukraine. As early as the seventeenth century,

after the Counter-Reformation had turned the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, for the first time, into a Catholic kingdom, émigré Ukrainian and Belarusian Orthodox clerics added their voices to those of the Greeks in urging Muscovy to stand up for Orthodoxy. It was these eloquent and politically experienced visitors, joined later by representatives of the Cossack elite recruited into the imperial establishment, who firmly

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16. David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1985), 7.

17. This possibility is considered by Iurii Sherekh (George Y. Shevelov). See "Moskva, Maroseika" in his essay collection *Ne dlia ditei* (New York: Proloh, 1964), 34–42. Sherekh suggests that sometimes a culturally superior nation, despite its political subjugation, can wreak vengeance on a dominant one. Ukraine failed to subordinate Muscovy, in Sherekh's view, because of the mostly non-secular character of its culture. In the eighteenth century, after the Petrine reforms, Ukrainian baroque culture became more and more outdated and uncompetitive.

established—in their own interests—the “Kievan heritage” myth for Muscovites, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.<sup>18</sup>

In this context—before the “Age of Nationalism” (Hans Kohn)—we should not be deceived by the fact that “Ukrainians from the former [autonomous Left-Bank Cossack] Hetmanate expressed their Ukrainian identity in the capitals of the Russian Empire”; nor by the fact that “Russian literature drew on Ukrainian at least as early as the first half of the seventeenth century”; that “Ukrainian churchmen dominated the Russian church from the mid-seventeenth century until the accession of Catherine the Great”; and that “a ‘Ukrainian theme’ appeared ... in Russian literature in the first half of the nineteenth century.” The main, if not only, result of the Ukrainians’ “impact” was that

they modified the Russians’ understanding of what it meant to be Russian by preventing them from becoming wholly dependent on contemporary west European culture. Ukrainian culture derived in part from the West, but by the late eighteenth century it looked more “native” and more “Slavic” than the culture of educated society in the empire’s capitals. While the integration of the empire meant the loss of Ukrainian institutions and social forms, it provided Ukrainians with new outlets. Many travelled north to take advantage of them, encouraged by the central government. Once in St. Petersburg, Ukrainians showed in a variety of ways how an understanding of the south could contribute to the complexion of the empire as a whole.... They constituted Russia’s introduction to the wider Slavic “awakening” which was a feature of the early nineteenth century. They played a substantial part in the debates about Russian national identity which dominated intellectual life in the decades after the Napoleonic Wars. Because they had not been brought up in the western-oriented atmosphere of St. Petersburg, they tended to be “more Russian than the Russians”. They stood for the interior of the empire, an interior only just being illuminated by light from Peter the Great’s window on Europe.... When Romanticism arrived in Russia, the politics and culture of the capitals had already acquired a Ukrainian dimension on which Russian Romantics could build.<sup>19</sup>

Nevertheless, the Ukrainians had not been completely assimilated: “Ukrainian proto-nationalists,” as Saunders asserts, could “be found even in the dark days of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”

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18. Edward L. Keenan, “On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors,” in *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. S. Frederick Starr (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 31–2.

19. Saunders, 5–6.

What is even more important, from his point of view, is that many people,

without being Ukrainian nationalists ... expressed their Ukrainian identity and evoked a response to it.... When they lost their autonomy, they cherished its memory. Their outlook was conservative, but they provided part of the inspiration on which later Ukrainian nationalists drew. They showed an independence of mind which some Ukrainians were to employ in making a mark on Russia.... Perhaps the principal feature of Ukrainian "resistance" to integration [was] nostalgia, but not militancy. A feeling for Ukrainian traditions certainly survived. Certainly, too, it provided part of the foundation on which later Ukrainian nationalists built.<sup>20</sup>

By the end of eighteenth century the Ukrainians had not been fully absorbed by the Russian Empire. They had lost their autonomy, their institutions had been abolished, their culture had been impoverished, and their entire life had been provincialized. The Ukrainian peasantry had become enslaved, and the Ukrainian gentry had become corrupted and Russified. Yet the forthcoming "Age of Nationalism" brought them some opportunities, and newly emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia took advantage of them. The same historical force that awoke Russian romantic nationalism and mobilized Ukrainian ("South Russian") regionalism to its service caused irreversible changes within the latter—to the great surprise of the former.

"When romantic nationalism came to Russia, both Russians and Ukrainians made more of Ukraine. Russians became interested in questions which were implicit in the Ukrainian contribution to Russian culture.... In this context Ukrainians and Ukraine came into their own."<sup>21</sup>

In some sense, Russian nationalists were trapped by their own myth of Ukraine as a "Russian Italy" and of Kyiv as the "mother of all Russian cities." While looking for the uniqueness of Russian influences versus Western ones, they turned their eyes from French-speaking St. Petersburg to the "real" Russia. Ironically, the only "Russian" land they found to be really colourful and exciting was ... Ukraine! But if Ukraine was "a bastion of native against foreign culture"<sup>22</sup>; if Ukrainian history, culture, folklore, language, and landscapes were so picturesque, rich, and unique, what, then, was the role of St. Petersburg and the rest of Russia vis-à-vis

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20. *Ibid.*, 11, 20, 29.

21. *Ibid.*, 145.

22. *Ibid.*, 150.



this world?<sup>23</sup> Not much time would pass before this question would be openly articulated in the late 1840s by Taras Shevchenko. Yet, even earlier this question was raised implicitly by the obviously non-political activity of the Ukrainian Romantics, who,

like others in Eastern Europe, focused on such unique features of their ethnic group as their history, folklore, language, and literature. Of course, when Ukrainian intellectuals first embarked on their studies of these fields, they did not have a grand, predetermined plan of creating a Ukrainian national identity. If asked why they were drawn to such seemingly esoteric pursuits as the collection of old documents and rare folk songs or the emulation of peasant speech, many intellectuals would probably describe their activities as a little more than a hobby encouraged by local patriotism or a nostalgic affection for a disappearing world. Nonetheless, as a result of these early, amateurish labors, a consensus arose among a small clique of the educated as to what were the basic elements of a distinctively Ukrainian culture. Eventually, these conclusions would become the basis of Ukrainian national consciousness.<sup>24</sup>

It is hardly surprising, then, that Ukrainian nationalism emerged from an "all-Russian" nativism,<sup>25</sup> and that the ideas of the Slavophiles rather than the Westernizers eventually evoked a significant response in Ukraine. What is really surprising, however, is that all those Western-born but Russian-articulated ideas had been so radically transformed in Ukraine. As Hans Kohn aptly remarked, "the aspirations and trends of the different Slav people are varied and often contradictory. Even Pan-Slavism itself has meant different things to different Slav groups."<sup>26</sup> In

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23. Nikolai I. Nadezhdin's article about Gogol's early ("Ukrainian") short stories provides a rather good example of how dangerously Ukraine could be idealized and overpraised: "Some sort of secret agreement recognizes her as the Slavic Ausonia [Italy] and senses in her an abundant harvest for inspiration ... both her geographical situation and historical circumstances have disposed Little Russia to be the most festive expression of the poetry of the Slavic spirit.... Little Russia was naturally bound to become the Ark of the Covenant, in which are preserved the most lively features of the Slavic physiognomy and the best memories of Slavic life" (quoted by Saunders, 175). The biggest, if not fatal, mistake of the Russian Romantics' "Ukrainophilism" was that they praised Ukraine as the beautiful *Russian* past and never expected it could be a challenging separatist present or a decidedly separate, non-Russian future.

24. Subtelny, 225.

25. More precisely, it emerged from local patriotism. "All-Russian" nativism significantly catalysed those feelings, Russian (and European) romantic nationalism eventually articulated them in cultural terms, and Russian Slavophilism, to a great extent, gave them a particular political dimension.

26. Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (New York: Vintage Books,



the late 1840s, when the Ukrainian clandestine SS. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood Kyiv was uncovered and its members were arrested, the Russian Slavophiles were deeply shocked by the Ukrainian "heresy" and strongly condemned the "conspirators." Aleksei Khomiakov, a leading Russian Slavophile, argued in a letter to Iurii Samarin that "when the social question has only just been formulated and when it is not only unresolved but not even approaching resolution, people who are supposed to be intelligent take up politics! I don't know to what extent the poor Little Russians' delusion was criminal, but I know that their wrongheadedness is very clear."<sup>27</sup>

The crucial difference between Russian Slavophilism and its Ukrainian "hypostasis" was naively (in form) but very acutely (in essence) described by Iurii Andruzky, a student arrested in 1847 as a member of the "Ukraino-Slavic Society," during his interrogation:

there has been a kind of political epidemic at Kyiv University: almost all students have been preoccupied with thinking about the transformation of the state, and many of them have kept drafts of various constitutions ... the Slavophiles are also divided tribally [i.e., ethnically, besides being divided politically into "moderates" and "radicals"] into Little Russians, Poles, and Russians, but among them the most numerous are the first two parties, while among the Russians no more than four or five students are concerned with the ideas of Slavophilism [*slavianizm*]; Moscow is considered the main root of Slavophilism, even though no one there combines political ideas with it but is involved only with researching antiquities and the history of the Slavic tribes [peoples].<sup>28</sup>

Apparently the Ukrainian "Slavophiles" had gone far beyond permissible limits: they began "to think that their culture was worth promoting for its own sake, not merely for the prospect of enrichment that it offered to Russian culture," and they began "setting Ukraine in the context of the Slavic world as a whole" and "advocated a federation of Slavic peoples."<sup>29</sup> From a "true" Slavophile perspective, the "political

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1960), vii-viii.

27. As quoted by Saunders, 250.

28. Quoted in Mykhailo Novytsky, "Shevchenko v protsesi 1847 roku," in Taras Shevchenko, *Tvory*, vol. 13, *Shevchenko i ioho tvorchist: Zbirnyk prats i stattei*, ed. Bohdan Kravtsiv (Chicago: Mykola Denysiuk, 1963), 108. In 1861 Alexander Herzen wrote in *Kolokol* that "the idea of Pan-Slavism was adopted in Ukraine not at all as it was in Russia." Quoted in Ivan Dziuba, *U vsiakoho svoia dolia: Epizod iz stosunkiv Shevchenka zi slovianofilamy* (Kyiv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1989), 89-90.

29. Saunders, 245, 231, 233.

fever" (in Andruzky's words) that affected the students of Kyiv's university had a very strange symptom: it evoked, in the students' minds, the "wrongheaded" idea of how to transform an absolutist monarchy into a constitutional state, an idea that was rather Decembrist and, eventually, more Westernizer than Slavophile.

Moreover, this "political fever" had an obviously ethnic if not nationalistic appearance: it affected mostly Ukrainian and Polish students, i.e., students of oppressed nationalities, not the dominant one. They were the ones who supported federalism—an idea even more suspect and dangerous, in the empire's view, than constitutionalism. As soon as Ukrainian Slavophilism was articulated it proved to be a very strange mixture of genuinely Slavophile features (nativism, idealization of national history, strong anti-Petrine attitudes, pre-nationalistic xenophobia, ethnic messianism) and purely Western borrowings, first and foremost federalism, constitutionalism, and democracy.

To understand this phenomenon, we should examine some Ukrainian peculiarities that made Ukrainian cultural and political development significantly different from the Russian model. First, Ukraine was not a Western but a Russian colony, and the Ukrainian nativists felt threatened by Russification more than Westernization. Therefore the Ukrainian Slavophiles glorified things Ukrainian because they were different from things Russian and not because they were opposed to things Western. They gladly joined their Russian colleagues who criticized St. Petersburg as being too "Westernized" and "hostile," but the emphasis in their criticism was on the city's hostility. For Ukrainians, unlike Russians, St. Petersburg was alien not so much because of its "Westernism" as it was because of its inherent essence—it was the capital of a hostile, zealously anti-Ukrainian empire. In 1844 Shevchenko expressed the quintessential version of this vision in his poem "A Dream": "A city ... of enormous size. Perhaps in Turkey, / Or in Germany, / Or, maybe, even in Muscovy: / Churches, palaces galore, / With plenty of pot-bellied lords, / And not a solitary [peasant] home!"<sup>30</sup>

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30. Taras Shevchenko, *Selected Poetry* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1989), 205. For Shevchenko and his friends St. Petersburg was a symbol of genocide committed by Peter I against the Ukrainian Cossacks, who were used to erect the "city in a morass": "What quantity of human blood / Upon this spot were shed— / Without a knife!" (Ibid., 209). The Russian "reformer," thus, had been pictured as "the rider, bare-back on the horse," who was going "to leap across the sea" and who "held out his arm as though / He coveted to seize / The world entire." Shevchenko's opposition to the Russian "modernizers" had been obviously not "traditionalist" in Slavophile terms: "[Peter] The First was he who crucified / Unfortunate

Secondly, the Ukrainian Slavophiles had even more reason to damn Peter I than their Russian counterparts. Although Peter had destroyed the idealized habits and customs of old Muscovy and eliminated Russian traditional values, he had created an empire that was nonetheless Russian and still could be somehow improved. But he had destroyed everything that the Ukrainians had—their freedom, their uniqueness, their past, and even their future. Political conflict replaced cultural conflict as the problem shifted from the Russian context to the Ukrainian one. While the Russian Slavophiles condemned Peter as a modernizer, the Ukrainians extended this criticism much further: for them, he was a conqueror, a colonizer, an empire-builder, and a symbol of Russian tyranny—both in the past, and in the present.

Thirdly, because Ukraine's cities, gentry, and way of life had become heavily Russified rather than Westernized, Ukrainian nativist xenophobia was directed primarily against Russians rather than "Westerners." Even though there were Poles, Germans, and Jews in Ukraine who exploited the Ukrainian peasantry, their subordinate, secondary role was evident. Russians were the real masters and the real oppressors. The few attempts to change this picture (or, more precisely, to keep it from being changed—just as it had been inherited from Russian Slavophilism) were too naive and clumsy. A good example of this is Mykola Kostomarov's rhetoric in the SS. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood's manifesto:

And the Slavic people, although they endured and endure captivity, had not themselves created the captivity because the tsar and nobility are not an invention of the Slavic spirit but of the German and the Tatar. And now, although there is a despot-tsar in Russia, he is not a Slav, but a German, and his officials are Germans, hence, although there are nobles in Russia they soon turn into Germans or Frenchmen while the true Slav loves neither the tsar nor the lord, but he loves and is mindful of one God, Jesus Christ, King of heaven and earth.<sup>31</sup>

But the most significant difference between the Ukrainian and Russian Slavophiles was in their respective vision of the future—created, to a large extent, as an inversion of the idealized past. Both movements were definitely *passéiste*. Both disapproved of the present and praised national history, but condemned different things in their present and glorified

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Ukraine, / [Catherine] The Second—she who finished off / Whatever yet remained" (Ibid., 213).

31. "God's Law or the Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People," in George S. N. Luckyj, *Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Kiev, 1845–1847* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991), 98.

even more different things in their past. Unlike the Russians, the Ukrainians had searched for and stressed in their own pre-Petrine history the most modern and radical western European ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Here is one more passage from Kostomarov's "Books of Genesis," the ideological credo of the Ukrainian Slavophiles:

Ukraine loved neither the tsar nor the Polish lord and established a Cossack Host amongst themselves, i.e., a brotherhood in which each upon entering was brother of the others—whether he had before been a master or a slave, provided that he was a Christian; and the Cossacks were all equal amongst themselves, and officials were elected at the assembly and they had to serve all according to the word of Christ, because they accepted the duty as compulsory, as an obligation, and there was no sort of seigniorial majesty and title among the Cossacks.... And day after day the Cossack Host grew and multiplied and soon all people in Ukraine would have become Cossacks, i.e., free and equal, and there would have been neither a tsar nor a Polish lord over Ukraine, but God alone, and as it would be in Ukraine, so it would also be in Poland and then also in the other Slavic lands.<sup>32</sup>

Despite its archaic, quasi-biblical style modelled on Adam Mickiewicz's "Books of the Polish Nation and Books of the Polish Pilgrimage," Kostomarov's Ukrainian text was amazingly modern in its main ideas. Its key words appear to have been borrowed from the French revolutionaries: a "brotherhood" of "free and equal people," "no sort of seigniorial majesty and title," "no tsars or lords," but only "officials elected by the popular assembly" who had "to serve the people." These revolutionary ideas were formulated even more openly in other documents of the SS Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood: "Every nation should have its own democratic government and provide absolutely equal rights for its citizens without any regard to their origins, faith, social status and position."<sup>33</sup>

In the "Books of Genesis" Kostomarov refers to two possible sources of his democratic ideas: to the Polish constitution adopted by the Sejm on 3 May 3 1791, two years before Poland was partitioned among its neighbouring empires; and to the Decembrist movement of 1823–25. In

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32. Ibid., 95–6.

33. "The Statute of the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius," in K. Kostiv, *Knyhy buttia ukrainskoho narodu: Vplyvy Sviatoho Pysma i narodopravnykh idei Zaporozkoi Sichi ta Zakhidnoi Evropy na zmist "Knyh buttia ukrainskoho narodu"* (Toronto: World Christian Missions, 1980), 100. See also "The Main Rules of the Brotherhood" and "The Appeal to Ukrainians," in Kostiv, 101–2.

both cases, however, Kostomarov claims that it was Ukraine that inspired both the Poles and the Russians:

For her voice which called all the Slavic peoples to freedom and brotherhood was heard throughout the Slavic world. And this voice of Ukraine resounded in Poland, when on the third of May the Poles decided that there should be no masters among them, that all were equal in the republic, and this Ukraine had desired already one hundred and twenty years earlier.... And the voice of Ukraine resounded in Muscovy when after the death of tsar Alexander [I] the Russians wanted to banish the tsar and destroy the nobility, to found a republic and unite all the Slavs with it in the image of the Trinity, indivisible and separate; and this Ukraine had desired and striven for, for almost two hundred years before this.<sup>34</sup>

As a form of messianism, Kostomarov's preaching was nothing more than a replica of Mickiewicz's Polish model.<sup>35</sup> Yet as a form of "remodelled" history it was something new. Kostomarov was a professional historian, and he undoubtedly knew that the Polish constitution had not been as radical as he described it ("there should be no masters among them") and that the Decembrists never went as far as he wished ("to destroy the nobility")<sup>36</sup>. In his historical works, Kostomarov never ignored or twisted the facts; even when he expressed such partisan views as the "federative foundations of Kievan Rus'," <sup>37</sup> he argued substantially and persuasively. Why, then, was he so self-blinded in this case and, an even more crucial question, why did he deliberately ignore the most relevant and clearest example—that of the French revolution?<sup>38</sup>

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34. Luckyj, *Young Ukraine*, 98.

35. See "Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego," in Adam Mickiewicz, *Dzieła*, vol. 6 (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1955), 7–57.

36. Moreover, there was no room for Ukrainians either in the Polish Constitution or in the Decembrists' programs. Some Decembrists did consider the idea of federation and were ready to give the Poles autonomy, but they never viewed the Ukrainians as a separate nation that might need particular rights. See Volodymyr Miiakovsky, "Shevchenko in the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood," in *Shevchenko and the Critics, 1861–1980*, ed. George S. N. Luckyj (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 370–4.

37. See N. I. Kostomarov, "Mysli o federativnom nachale v drevnei Rusi," in his *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1903), 3–30.

38. Kostomarov does mention the French Revolution in the "Books of Genesis," but without praising its ideas or its Enlightenment heritage: "And the French slew their king and banished their masters, and they themselves began to slaughter each other and they slaughtered until they fell into worse bondage. For in them God wanted to show all people that there is no freedom without the Christian faith" (Luckyj, *Young Ukraine*, 93). Apparently Kostomarov perceived France, and

Of course, the "Books of Genesis" were not intended to be read as history. They were a kind of prophecy: "Ukraine will rise from her grave and again will call to her brother Slavs, and they will hear her call and the Slavic peoples will rise.... And Ukraine will be an independent Republic in the Slavic Union. Then all the peoples, pointing to the place on the map where Ukraine will be delineated, will say: behold, the stone that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone."<sup>39</sup>

The future envisioned by Kostomarov was merely an inversion of the idealized past. The past, in turn, was an inversion of particularly selected ideas and "reinvented" experiences of the present. In Kostomarov's references to the Poles and the Russians, neither the real Polish Constitution nor the actual Decembrist programs mattered; they were important for him only as an assertion of "Ukrainian" values (*liberté, égalité, fraternité*), the "incarnation" of Ukrainian ideals that had stemmed from legendary Cossackdom for "one hundred and twenty" and "almost two hundred years" respectively.

Kostomarov's rhetorical strategy is more or less clear: to persuade his readers (and probably himself) that the Ukrainian case is not too unique and heretical; and that the contradictions between Ukrainians, on the one side, and Poles and Russians, on the other, are not substantial and irresolvable. He presents the Ukrainian case as universal (a sort of embodiment of the Hegelian "world spirit"), but as the most advanced; and he assumes that "true" ("good") Poles and Russians are exactly of the same mind as the Ukrainians.

Contradictions were thus caused by "bad" Poles (ones "too" Catholic) and "fake" Russians (Russified Germans, Tatars, etc.) Kostomarov openly postulated the last thesis: "a despot-tsar in Russia ... is not a Slav, but a German, and his officials are German."<sup>40</sup> This was exactly what the

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the West in general, as a land of godforsaken rationalism, atheism, and self-interest: "And since then [the French revolution] the Roman and German tribes are in mutiny; they again placed kings and masters over themselves, yet they shout about freedom; and they have no freedom because there is no freedom without faith" (Ibid.). This is rather typical of the Russian Slavophiles' anti-Western argument, which Kostomarov accepted. The question, however, is why he (and other Ukrainian Slavophiles), who so radically revised the most fundamental ideas of the Russian conservative utopia, left some its remnants untouched. Was it that the atheism of the French only alienated them so definitely from the entire (and much more complicated) phenomenon of the French Revolution, or was there some other reason to pretend that Ukrainian "Slavophile" demands are not a direct translation of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*?

39. Ibid., 98-9.

40. Ibid., 98



Russian Slavophiles believed, even more so because they usually never mentioned the Tsar and never questioned the essence of Russian autocracy in the way Kostomarov did: "the tsar and nobility are not an invention of the Slavic spirit but of the German and of Tatar."<sup>41</sup>

As we may see, Kostomarov used the conventional discourse of the Russian Slavophiles, but his implications were much broader. For example, Kostomarov's complaint that "nobles in Russia ... soon turn into Germans or Frenchmen" looked like a typical Slavophile accusation that the post-Petrine nobility had allegedly broken with tradition, betrayed national customs, and neglected the native language in favour of more fashionable French. But no Russian Slavophile would have ever agreed with the next part of Kostomarov's same sentence: "the true Slav loves neither the tsar nor the lord." And if Russian noblemen who traded their language for French deserved blame, what could one say about their Ukrainian counterparts? Kostomarov's answer would hardly have pleased the Russian Slavophiles, because both sides knew that Ukrainians had been neither Germanized nor Frenchified: "although these degenerates were of Ukrainian blood," Kostomarov wrote simplistically, "they did not soil the Ukrainian language with their foul mouths and they did not call themselves Ukrainians."<sup>42</sup>

Kostomarov's rhetorical strategy had primarily nationalistic objectives. He used conventional formulas of the dominant discourse to justify the separateness of the Ukrainian nation, culture, and statehood. None of these things were as evident in the 1840s as they are now. Ukraine entered the "Age of Nationalism" exactly when the last relics of its autonomy had been abolished. The imperial discourse of an "all-Russian" nation and militant Orthodoxy dominated the public mind. The Ukrainian nationalists was too weak to challenge this discourse openly. Instead they used a "heretical" modification of dominant discourse to formulate their own program. They created their own discourse that was radical enough for their purposes (emancipation of the Ukrainian nation), yet conventional enough to be accepted and comprehended.

In this context the Westernizers' discourse was certainly unacceptable in Ukraine. Ukrainians felt no need to confront their own tradition, since it was convenient enough and accommodated them with all sorts of

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41. Ibid. These arguments are broadly used today by Russian nativist nationalists, who blame foreigners for all of Russia's failures and catastrophes in this century, including the Bolshevik revolution. The only difference is that the Jews and "Masons" have replaced the Germans and Tatars in the neo-Slavophile *Historiosophie*.

42. Ibid., 97-8.



national-liberation myths. In the arch-conservative context of the Russian Empire, Ukrainian tradition was obviously "Western" and progressive. Ukrainian intellectuals used Slavophile discourse in order to cherish their own "tradition" (i.e., the European, not the Russian) and to criticize "modernity" (i.e., the Russian, not the Ukrainian or European). The Westernizer's discourse may have given them similar opportunities, but it would definitely have brought them into confrontation with Russian officialdom: any cultural problem raised within this discourse would immediately transfer the Ukrainians into the sphere of politics. In official terms, it would take them from ideological deviation, from "wrong-headedness," to state treason. Westernism could not have given the Ukrainians more advantages than Slavophilism, while its disadvantages would have been significant.

We should recall that in the first half of the nineteenth century Ukrainian national self-awareness (consciousness) had not been clearly emancipated from the "all-Russian" one, and Ukrainian writing had not yet become "a national literature but a typical regionalism like that of the Provençal *felibres*."<sup>43</sup> As George G. Grabowicz has recently suggested, throughout the nineteenth century, or at least until it was officially proscribed and persecuted, "Ukrainian literature on the territory of the Russian Empire was inscribed into imperial, all-Russian literature," i.e., "that writing that sustained Ukrainian society was bilingual and probably written more in Russian than in Ukrainian."<sup>44</sup> The political implication of this phenomenon was that "the idea of a Slav federation continued to dominate Ukrainian political thinking well into the twentieth century."<sup>45</sup>

Probably only from this point of view can the ambivalence of Ukrainian Slavophilism be explained. Grabowicz has recently given us a good insight into Kostomarov's "ambivalent role in the large scheme of mid-nineteenth century Ukrainian literary and indeed political history," a role that provided "the antipodes of national assertiveness and (to all appearances) self-abnegation."<sup>46</sup> This role was determined by the

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43. Volodymyr Derzhavyn, "Natsionalna literatura iak mystetstvo: Mystetska meta i metoda natsionalnoi literatury," *Ukraina i svit*, no. 1 (December 1949), 24.

44. Hryhorii Hrabovych, "Semantyka Kotliarevshchyny," *Suchasnist*, 1995, no. 5: 70.

45. Oleh S. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1918* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 7. As late as 1918, when Kyiv was seized by the Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian government was expelled, Ukrainian leaders still harboured federalist illusions.

46. See George G. Grabowicz, "Insight and Blindness in the Reception of Ševčenko: The Case of Kostomarov," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 17, no. 3/4

ambivalence of Ukrainian self-awareness at that time. Even though Kostomarov is probably the most figurative example of this ambivalent identity, it was, to some degree, immanent in all of his friends, including Shevchenko.<sup>47</sup> In fact, all of Ukrainian society was ambivalent in national terms, and its ambivalence deeply affected the way the ideas of Slavophilism were adopted and interpreted in Ukraine.

Nascent Ukrainian nationalism was not able to confront or alter the dominant "all-Russian" discourse. Some other unifying ideology was needed as a substitute for the "all-Russian" myth. Slavophilism seemed to be the perfect choice. It promised sufficient room for both universalism and particularism, for "all-Russian" and local, Ukrainian feelings. The Slavophile goal of an "all-Slavic" brotherhood was even more appealing than an "all-Russian" (East Slavic) one; and it appeared to be ideologically safe since it did not confront Russian dominance, at least not openly. At the same time the alleged "all-Slavic Union" would give the Ukrainians full recognition as a separate nation—unlike "all-Russian unity," in which the Ukrainians were considered simply a regional subgroup of the Russians.

Slavophilism was used in Ukraine as a means of converting local patriotism into modern nationalism given the horizon of expectations of Ukrainian society. To some extent its rhetorical strategies can be compared to those of an earlier Ukrainian discourse, on Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Eneida* (1798). "It is one of the axioms of rhetorical discourse," writes Marko Pavlyshyn, that an audience tends to regard its customary beliefs as truths. A recognized means of persuasion, therefore, is the presentation of a new argument as something that is already familiar, and

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(December 1993): 279–340, here 286. In 1846 the "main theorist and spokesman of the Brotherhood" of SS. Cyril and Methodius, twenty-nine-year-old Kostomarov, insisted that he was not a Ukrainian and that he had associated with the "brothers" only because of their humanist ideas. (See George S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol' and Ševčenko: Polarity in the Literary Ukraine, 1798–1847* [Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1971], 176.) In 1882 the now prominent scholar and broadly recognized ideological leader of Ukraine expressed his view on Ukrainian literature as a "literature 'for home use,' as a literature expressly intended for and focused on 'the people,' the 'narod,' as an addendum to the imperial or 'high' Russian literature" (Grabowicz). Neither renegadism nor political trickery was the case here. Kostomarov was very consistent in his inconsistency. He looks inconsistent from the modern Ukrainian (or any other national) point of view, but not from the point of view of a mixed—local and all-Russian—identity.

47. See George G. Grabowicz, *The Poet as Mythmaker: A Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Ševčenko* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982).

therefore acceptable, to the audience. Such an argument possesses the rhetorical virtue implied in the term *aptum*: appropriateness.<sup>48</sup>

We may assume, to use Pavlyshyn's terms, that nineteenth-century Ukrainian nationalism adopted and amended prevailing attitudes. By means of Slavophilism (in its Ukrainian version) the early Ukrainian nationalists achieved the maximum of what was possible, given the horizon of expectations of Ukrainian (mostly "Little Russian") society. Moreover, they significantly expanded and transformed that horizon.<sup>49</sup> Even though the "Books of Genesis" were published for the first time only in 1905, their main ideas had been passionately articulated in Shevchenko's poetry. Because of the "brothers'" efforts, the foundations of the modern Ukrainian nation had been established and a modern Ukrainian nationalist discourse had emerged.

With the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, Ukrainian intellectual history entered a new era. Before, all the intellectual movements in the nineteenth century were merely reflections of Russian intellectual life (Slavophilism, *narodnost'*, historicism). Often, Ukrainians were satisfied with a niche within these Russian movements, as long as they could indulge in Ukrainian subject matter. Now, although still under the influence of their neighbours, they left behind the years of apprenticeship and developed their own ideas. These centered around their own national destiny.<sup>50</sup>

At the same time, Ukrainian Slavophilism was too short-lived a phenomenon, and its social base was too narrow, for it to have any immediate and apparent influence on Ukrainian society. In 1847 the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius was crushed and all its members were harshly punished. Kostomarov was sentenced to a year in prison and banished from Ukraine. Shevchenko was exiled as a soldier to the Central Asia for an indefinite period. The severity of the sentences is extreme if we take into account the non-violent character of the brother-

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48. Marko Pavlyshyn, "The Rhetoric and Politics of Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 10, no. 1 (summer 1985): 12.

49. *Ibid.*, 12, 23, 24.

50. Luckyj, *Between Gogol*, 180. Even though the term "imagined communities" was introduced by Benedict Anderson in 1985, Luckyj used a very similar term with a similar meaning fourteen years earlier in his description of the emergence of the modern Ukrainian nation: "Ševčenko was also the first to elevate *narod* (the peasants) to the rest of the nation, which, in the eighteenth century included only the gentry, the clergy and the nobility. His works were read with equal enthusiasm by all three groups, thus destroying the gap which separated them and creating a *community of spirit* hitherto unknown" (*Ibid.*, 190). My emphasis.

hood and its mostly cultural and educational objectives. By this punishment, Russian officialdom let everyone know that Ukrainian particularism in any form would be not tolerated and that no concessions to Ukrainian nationalists would be made.<sup>51</sup>

The Ukrainians' offer had not been accepted. The empire did not need their assistance in "unifying the Slavs" under the tsar's auspices—at least not at the price of cultural rights for Ukrainians. Even less did it need any kind of federative union of "equal and fraternal Slavic nations." Ukrainian Slavophilism failed to satisfy both "all-Russian" and "Little Russian" patriotism. The former was shifting towards Russian chauvinism and imperialism, while the latter was transforming into modern Ukrainian nationalism. No compromise nor reconciliation between them was possible. They could co-exist in the premodern, prenationalistic world as two different sorts and *levels* of patriotism—state and local. But they clashed fully as soon as new forms of identity, new "communities of spirit," had evolved from the former dynastic, social-estate, and religious identities and communities.

Ukrainian Slavophilism was an attempt at combining modernity with tradition: at expressing modern nationalistic demands in the traditional form of local patriotism that presumably would not subvert supranational (all-Russian) unity. But the envisioned Slavic federation was apparently not a mere extension of all-Russian dynastic unity, and as a member of this federation Ukraine was not just a medieval "Little-Russian" region. The empire's response to the Ukrainian challenge was harsh but, from the empire's point of view, reasonable and justifiable.

Yet, the end of Ukrainian Slavophilism did not mean the extinction of most of the ideas articulated within this ideology. At the turn of the twentieth century the main contradiction between modernity and tradition that Ukraine encountered had not disappeared. On the contrary, it had become even more extreme and multidimensional. Thus it is hardly surprising that "the phenomenon of nativism, as a natural response to political history and colonial status, in large measure characterizes Ukrainian culture of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."<sup>52</sup> As long as Ukraine was a backward colony it provided fertile

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51. "In the history of tsarism's suppression of Ukrainian movements, the uncovering and crushing of the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius was one of the most important events, with the most far-reaching consequences. A wave of national revival, which promised to become high and mighty, was halted. An incipient young, talented national intelligentsia was suppressed, punished, and dispersed, and its further development was delayed for decades." Dziuba, 104.

52. Hrabovych (Grabowicz), 71. In considering the tendencies of Ukrainian

soil for all kinds of nativism versus Westernism and traditionalism versus modernity. Yet this soil did not produce as bountiful a harvest as might be expected.

We have noted this paradox while considering Ukrainian Slavophilism. The same paradox could be traced throughout Ukrainian history up to the present. Nativism, by its very nature, is *passéiste*, traditionalistic, and anti-modern, i.e., anti-Western. This was the case in the Russian Empire, where nativism was articulated as part of the Slavophiles' conservative social and philosophical utopia. As part of a more general nationalistic agenda, it was gradually transformed into the reactionary political doctrine of Pan-Slavism and "official nationality," which was expansionist abroad and chauvinist at home.<sup>53</sup>

The Ukrainian Slavophiles adopted the nativist discourse and symbols, but accepted neither national superiority nor militant anti-Westernism. In the framework of newly emerging nationalism, Ukrainian nativism was fundamentally reshaped and subordinated to pragmatic nationalistic goals. In their moderate form these goals meant cultural and national emancipation; in their more radical form they meant political independence. To achieve these goals, Ukrainian nationalists could hardly afford any kind of anti-Westernism. On the contrary, because the discourse of Russian dominance was mostly nativist and anti-Western, Ukrainian

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literature's (and hence culture's) dialectical process of dealing with the world at large and with "one's own," Grabowicz concludes that the latter is "indubitably dominant" in Ukrainian culture. Yet the crucial question remains unanswered: "When exactly does its hegemony break down? Does it really occur already with the appearance of Shevchenko? or with the rise of *Osnova*? or only with the beginning of the activities of Drahomanov, Franko, and Lesia Ukrainka? This [question] can be determined by more rigorous research." (Ibid.)

53. "The romantic utopianism of the Slavophiles slowly began to disintegrate in favor of practical considerations that ultimately turned out to reflect the concrete class interests of the gentry.... In its transition from philosophy to politics Slavophilism split into two trends—a conservative reformism on the one hand, and Pan-Slavism on the other.... The events that provided the immediate stimulus for the transformation of Slavophilism into Pan-Slavism were, of course, the Crimean War and the resulting interest in the fate of the Southern Slavs.... Slavophile ideology could not be pressed into the service of Pan-Slavism without undergoing certain essential changes. The inner regeneration of Russian society in the spirit of Christian and ancient Russian principles now seemed less important than the external expansion of the Russian state." Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), 112–13. See also Dziuba, 18. Kohn does not distinguish between Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, but the intrinsic transformation of the phenomenon can be traced in his book implicitly (see pp. 125–60).

"emancipational" discourse became pro-Western and anti-nativist, or at least very cautious and selective in regard to nativism. Being located between Russia and Europe, Ukrainians have had little choice but to look to their enemy's enemies. While their separatism was centrifugal in regard to Russia, it had to be centripetal in regard to Europe.<sup>54</sup>

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries these feelings and views were articulated openly. But implicitly they had developed under the guise of Ukrainian Slavophilism in 1840s, especially in the writing of Taras Shevchenko. All of these "nativists" from the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius could be called Westernizers despite themselves.<sup>55</sup> This was so in Kostomarov's case, whose *passéisme*, as we have seen, was more European and, in fact, modernizing than the futurism of Herzen or Chernyshevsky. Similarly, Shevchenko

in the dark age of absolutism ... unfurled in one of his poems the flag of American republicanism, proclaiming as the ideal of Ukraine "the new and just law of George Washington," and dedicated his nation to the ideals of the American Declaration of Independence of 1776.... Shevchenko shaped and adapted the Ukrainian national ideal and the contemporary Ukrainian nationalism to socially and politically liberating forces, and he inseparably united them with the ideas of western Europe, but especially with those of the Founding Fathers of the United States of America.... Shevchenko instinctively felt the decisive importance of that memorable contribution of the American nation in the struggle for a moral order in the world. The ideas of the American Declaration of Independence represented for him the climax of humankind's battle for freedom.... The cult of Shevchenko is, in fact, a cult of the ideas of the American Declaration of Independence, a cult of the idea of freedom and human dignity under God.<sup>56</sup>

Despite his *khutorianstvo*,<sup>57</sup> even Panteleimon Kulish, the third leading

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54. On this topic see my article "European Dream," *News from Ukraine*, 1992, nos. 48–51.

55. This phrase was inspired by the title of Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak's *Feminists despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884–1939* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988).

56. Roman Smal-Stotsky, "Taras Shevchenko (1814–1864)," in Shevchenko, *Tvory*, vol. 1 (1959), xiv, xvi. Smal-Stotsky's pompous, nationalistic rhetoric looks rather curious from the academic point of view. Shevchenko's commitment to "Westernism" is enthusiastically exaggerated here, but the way Shevchenko has been perceived and interpreted by his nationalistic followers is no less figurative and significant. It has been a kind of *bon ton* for Ukrainian authors to quote Shevchenko's lines about George Washington as proof of his "Westernism" alongside (but not versus) his nativism.

57. That is, "idealization of the existence on a Ukrainian *xutir* [*khutir*]—



figure in the brotherhood, did his best to translate into Ukrainian the western European classics, including Shakespeare, and praised America almost as emphatically as Shevchenko did: "That somewhere beyond the sea a piece of America, moving ahead of the entire world, has seemingly steered civilization toward a proper order, we know and take joy. May fortune serve to the end these good and God-fearing people in [their] great endeavour."<sup>58</sup>

A few decades later Ukrainian Westernism was openly articulated by Mykhailo Drahomanov and Ivan Franko. They had no sympathy for Slavophilism in general or for its Ukrainian version in particular. "We should recognize that the person so much respected and glorified among us, I mean Shevchenko, was the father of our own [ideological] poison, Ukrainian *Khomiakovism*,"<sup>59</sup> claimed Drahomanov in 1877. Franko was more tolerant, but he also did not understand the ambivalent character of Ukrainian Slavophilism.<sup>60</sup>

Here we see another paradox: the Ukrainian Westernizers proved to be almost as ambivalent as the Ukrainian Slavophiles. Since Shevchenko's time and, to a large extent, because of him, Ukrainian nativism had transformed into a populism that was partly socialist, partly nationalist, and partly a mixed, socialist-nationalist modification.<sup>61</sup> Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the prominent historian and first president of the Ukrainian National Republic (1917–19), is perhaps the best example of the nativist-Westernizer controversy or, even more, ambivalency.<sup>62</sup>

In his works Hrushevsky underscored Ukraine's connection with Europe and its organic ties with the various western and central European cultures. At the same time his view of the Ukrainian people

homestead." Luckyj, *Between Gogol'*, 39.

58. Panteleimon Kulish, *Tvory v dvokh tomakh*, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1989), 251. Cf. also Kulish's letter to Kostomarov, as quoted in Luckyj, *Between Gogol'*, 176; and Aleksei Khomiakov's attack on European education, described in Dziuba, 115.

59. Mykhailo Pavlyk, ed., *Perepyska Mykhaila Drahomanova z Melitonom Buchynskym, 1871–1877* (Lviv: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1910), 263.

60. See in particular the article "Khutorna poeziia P. A. Kulisha" (1882), which sharply criticizes Kulish and Shevchenko for the alleged parochialism of their nativist-Slavophile worldview, in Ivan Franko, *Zibrannia tvoriv u 50-ty tomakh*, vol. 26 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1980), 161–79.

61. "The ever-present populism ... ruled supreme at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (Luckyj, *Ukrainian Literature*, 3).

62. By the latter I mean a controversy not between different subjects, different Weltanschauungs, but rather within the same subject, the same Weltanschauung, i.e., a controversy internalized and, to some degree—but not fully—compromised.



(*narod*) was rather naive, and his concept of nation-building was far removed from the contemporary European concepts. Hrushevsky's Westernism was more the obverse of his anti-Russianism than proof of his commitment to modernity.<sup>63</sup> The same could be said about most of his followers: their Westernism cum modernism was, as a rule, subsidiary to the immediate goal of Ukraine's cultural and political emancipation from the Russian Empire. The inferiority complex of the colonized nation influenced both its Westernism and its nativism.

The power of both discourses had been corrupted and undermined. Ukrainian Westernism had been weakened by the backward, premodern plight of the Ukrainian nation, while Ukrainian nativism had been limited and "modernized" by imposing on it the political goals of national liberation, i.e. (in the peculiar Ukrainian context), "Europeanization." As a result, Westernism cum modernism has substantially dominated Ukrainian intellectual life in this century while still remaining rather incoherent and superficial. The left-wing "nationalist" Mykola Khvylovy and the right-wing nationalist Dmytro Dontsov are good examples of how ambivalent and ambiguous Ukrainian Westernism has been. Both of them—one a follower of Marx, the other a follower of Nietzsche—enthusiastically praised Europe as an alternative to Russia. But neither Khvylovy's "proletarian" nor Dontsov's "superman" vision of "Europe" had much in common with reality.<sup>64</sup>

Perhaps only Mykola Zerov, the leader of the small Neoclassicist group of writers in the 1920s, had an adequate vision of Europe and was committed to a Westernism without any populist vestiges and concessions.<sup>65</sup> But his views were limited to the cultural sphere, and his standpoint was successfully marginalized by the Bolshevik state. In the 1930s he was eliminated, as were Khvylovy and thousands of others—

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63. The most open and passionate expression of Hrushevsky's Westernism can be found in his collection of short publicist articles titled *Na porozh Novoi Ukrainy: Hadky i mrii* (1918), particularly in the essays "Nasha zakhidnia oriantatsiia" and "Novi perspektyvy"; reprinted in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Vybrani pratsi* (New York: Holovna uprava OURDP v SSHA, 1960), 61–4, 69–76. His nativism cum populism, however, is not so evident; more substantial and deep structures of his thought should be scrutinized for this purpose.

64. See Mykola Khvylovy, *The Cultural Renaissance in Ukraine: Polemical Pamphlets, 1925–1926*, trans. and ed., with an intro., by Myroslav Shkandrij (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986); and Dmytro Dontsov, *"Rosiiia chy Evropa?" ta inshi esei* (London: Ukrainian Publishers, 1954).

65. See Mykola Zerov, *Tvory v dvokh tomakh* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1990), esp. vol. 2: 568–88 (the cycle "Ad fontes!" first published in 1926).

both the true Communist believers and the fellow-travellers. The right-wing intellectuals (Dontsov, Evhen Malaniuk, V'iacheslav Lypynsky) had emigrated earlier, during or just after the Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine. From the 1930s an anti-Western, nativist discourse dominated in Soviet Ukraine until the late 1980s. But Soviet nativism was of Russian rather than Ukrainian origin. The Ukrainian nativists had little choice but to join the "Westernizers" who had fought Russian dominance.

With Ukraine's proclamation of independence in 1991, local nativism received a new opportunity to revive. Anti-Western attitudes in Ukraine are much more widespread today than they were a few years ago, when Russian dominance had been pushing Ukrainians toward "Westernism," and a kind of economic miracle under Western guidance had been broadly expected.<sup>66</sup> Nothing of that sort has happened. Nevertheless, the disappointment in Ukraine with Westernism is not too strong, and the enchantment with nativism is not too dangerous.<sup>67</sup> So far post-Soviet Ukrainian society has avoided the extremes of political hatred and ideological intolerance.<sup>68</sup> Yet the ambivalence of both Ukrainian Westernism and nativism is being unavoidably transformed into a Westernism vs. nativism contradiction.

As virtually everywhere today, the fiercest anti-Western views in Ukraine are being expressed mostly by the extreme left and the extreme right. The Ukrainian peculiarity, however, is that the left-wing forces are mostly Russian-speaking and Russian-sponsored, and their publications

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66. See George Soros, "Toward Open Societies," *Foreign Policy*, no. 98 (spring 1995): 65-75.

67. "Asked what country they would like to imitate, Ukrainians put Germany and America at the top of the list, and the old Soviet Union at the bottom," reported the author of "Post-Soviet Schizophrenia," *The Economist*, 4 February 1995, 27. A few months later the same magazine expressed open surprise that Ukraine had not submitted to Moscow the way Belarus had: "Though Mr. [President] Kuchma stressed his desire to be friends with Russia when he was elected last July, in practice he has turned firmly to the West" ("In the Slav Shadowlands," 20 May 1995, 47). Both Kuchma's "desire" and his "turn" are examples of the same phenomenon—Ukrainian ambivalence.

68. "Ukrainians seem eager to learn from the West and consider peaceful settlements of internal conflicts," wrote Juliana Pilon in "Moscow, like Kiev, Should Compromise," *Insight*, 24 April 1995, 36. Unlike her colleague from *The Economist*, Ms. Pilon is surprised mostly by the fact that Ukrainians prefer voting ballots to bullets and that they still believe in democratic procedures and some other Western inventions: "It is remarkable," she exclaims, "that such positive attitudes can emerge in an atmosphere of post-communist semi-enlightenment about democracy and individual rights." (*Ibid.*)

are direct or indirect reprints of ones published in Russia. The anti-Western views they express are usually combined with anti-Ukrainian ones. Conspiracy theories are often voiced in these papers, but western Ukrainians are usually substituted there for the Masons and Jews. Ukrainian neofascist papers, like *Zamkova hora* or *Neskorena natsiia*, are very marginal and hardly available except in one place in a few large cities. Their anti-Westernism is subsidiary to anti-Semitism, yet both sentiments are rather marginal, unlike the strong anti-Russian attitude they express.<sup>69</sup>

The most disturbing development is the anti-Western drift of some papers that pretend to be moderate and centrist—*Vechirnyi Kyiv*, *Khreshchatyk*, *Rada*, *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, *Universum*, and *Slovo*. The same can be said about the journals *Osnova*<sup>70</sup> and *Ukrainski problemy*. Yet, however visible these periodicals have become, they are still far removed from the intellectual mainstream in Ukraine and can hardly challenge the prevailing political and cultural discourse.

There are two factors that perhaps have slowed down and limited the growth of anti-Westernism in Ukraine. The first is the semi-mythical, semi-real Russian threat; the second is Ukraine's semi-mythical, semi-authentic participation in Europe.<sup>71</sup> Because the nativist-Westernizer

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69. The typology of the Ukrainian "Reds" and "Browns" has been perceptively examined in two articles by Leonid Pliushch: "Chy maie perspektyvy ukrainskyi fashyzm?" *Suchasnist*, 1993, no. 3: 138–49; and "Im'ia im—legion," *Suchasnist*, 1993, no. 5: 79–91. See also Volodymyr Kulyk, "Novyi ukrainskyi natsionalizm: Try poverkhy vertepu," *Suchasnist*, 1993, no. 3: 150–67; and my articles "Xenophobia," *News from Ukraine*, 1992, nos. 36–7, and "'A Global Jewish-Masonic Conspiracy': The Problem of Anti-Semitism in Ukraine," *News from Ukraine*, 1992, no. 25.

70. For further research on Ukrainian nativism, *Osnova* is of special interest. It claims to be the direct continuation of Shevchenko's nineteenth-century publication of the same title. The editorial in the first issue of the "re-established" journal in April 1993 (pp. 3–6) imitates the style and spirit of Panteleimon Kulish's "Letters from the *Khutir*" published in *Osnova* in 1861. Closer examination, however, shows how far from Kulish's objectives the new publication. Meanwhile, a very interesting discussion related to the problem of nativism vs. Westernism flared recently between two leading Ukrainian writers of the baby-boom generation. See Oksana Zabuzhko, "Psykhologichna Ameryka i aziatskyi renesans, abo znovu pro Karfahen," *Suchasnist*, 1994, no. 9: 141–61; and Viktor Neborak, "Poslannia do O[ksany]. Z[abuzhko]. vkupi zi zvernenniam do velmyshanovnoho chytacha," *Suchasnist*, 1995, no. 2: 145–54.

71. For the political implications of these attitudes, see n. 67 above. For more details, see my articles "Democracy and the So-Called 'Party of Power' in Ukraine," *Political Thought* (Kyiv), 1994, no. 3: 154–60; and "Between Civil Society

controversy is a part of the general contradiction between modernity and tradition, it can never be resolved completely. But it could be substantially moderated if Ukrainians, like other "natives," are exposed to some of modernity's advantages and not just to its well-known disadvantages.

# Ukrainians and the Habsburgs

*Paul Robert Magocsi*

The era of Austrian Habsburg rule in Galicia and Bukovyna, which lasted from 1772 to 1918, represents one of the few instances of direct and long-term interaction between the Germanic world and territories inhabited by Ukrainians. Whether subsequent writers describe the Habsburg presence in western Ukrainian lands in an impartial manner as the "Austrian era" or in negative terms as the Habsburg "occupation," there is no denying that the imperial government in Vienna created in Galicia and Bukovyna a civil society governed by the rule of law in which, at least by the second half of the nineteenth century, an increasing number of Ukrainians came to play an active role in the local and provincial administration. As a result, it was not long before a significant percentage of the articulate elements in western Ukrainian society, and perhaps even a larger proportion of the peasant masses, accepted Habsburg rule and considered Austria to be their legitimate homeland.

What were the basic parameters of the Habsburg-Ukrainian relationship, and what was the attitude of Ukrainians toward the Austrian authorities? More importantly, if those attitudes were positive, did the reasons have to do with Austrian governing practices or with basic elements in western Ukrainian society that made it predisposed to the kind of rule offered by the Habsburgs? These are some of the issues I shall address here.

The Habsburg Empire acquired the bulk of its Ukrainian-inhabited territory in 1772. Before then, only Transcarpathia (Subcarpathian Rus') was under the Habsburg sceptre. That small territory south of the Carpathian Mountains had for centuries been part of the Hungarian Kingdom, which by the outset of the eighteenth century had itself definitively come under Austrian imperial authority. With the first partition of Poland in 1772, the Habsburgs acquired what they officially called the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, or for short Galicia. Three years later, in 1775, they acquired from the Ottoman Empire the small mountainous land of Bukovyna. For nearly a century Bukovyna was part of Galicia, and then it became a separate Austrian province. Of the three Habsburg-ruled Ukrainian lands—Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpa-

thia—Galicia was by far the largest and most important.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the following discussion will refer primarily to developments there.

The fate of Galicia's Ukrainians (or *Ruthenen*/Ruthenians, as they were officially known) was affected significantly by what could be considered the three phases of Austrian rule, as well as by the short but exceptional revolutionary hiatus of 1848–49. Those three phases were: (1) 1772–1847, the Josephinian and pre-March eras, when Austrian rule was characterized first by liberal reforms initiated from above and then reactionary efforts to return to the political and socio-economic status quo before the Josephinian reforms; (2) 1849–1860, a decade of neoabsolutism in which many of the radical changes of 1848 were reversed; and (3) 1861–1918, the era of constitutional experimentation and then parliamentary rule, with changes in the political and to a lesser degree socio-economic spheres being carried out gradually as a result of compromise between the central authorities and the population's representatives.

Throughout each of these phases, it was obviously in the interests of Austria's Habsburg rulers to integrate as much as possible the many nationalities living within its vast borders. In practice, however, the central government's efforts at integration were often counterbalanced and even negated by the disintegrative effects of the activity of the empire's diverse nationalities as each strove in varying degrees to attain cultural and political autonomy or even independence. Throughout the integrative-disintegrative or centripetal-centrifugal cycles that marked the internal history of the last century of the Habsburg Empire, the Ukrainians of Galicia were among the most consistent of Austria's many nationalities. From the very beginning of their association with the Habsburgs in 1772 until and even after the demise of the empire in October 1918, the Ukrainians generally remained *Habsburgtreu*. Indeed, there were many and repeated instances of their loyalty to the Habsburgs to warrant the epithet of endearment by which they came to be known—the "Tyrolians of the East."

The Ukrainians' loyalty was a function of the concrete advantages given the group by Austrian rule. At the time of its annexation in 1772, Galicia was administered by a Polish aristocratic elite and urban administration. The heretofore dominant role of Poles in Galician society was to be replaced by an Austrian bureaucracy under the direct control of the central government in Vienna. Knowing that the former leading

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1. For an introduction to Ukrainian Galicia and the relevant literature on the Habsburg era, see my *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), esp. 92–173.

Polish echelons would hardly be content with their political, social, and legal demotion, the Habsburg authorities looked to assuage and hopefully gain the support of the other major population element in Galicia, the Ukrainians (who at the time of the first reliable census of 1849 comprised a plurality of 46.8 percent of the province's inhabitants). Whether one prefers to describe Austrian policy as some kind of nefarious *divide et impera* or simply as the normal practice of a state acting in its own interests for self-preservation, the practical result was that in relation to what existed before, the status of Ukrainians in Galicia under Habsburg rule between 1772 and 1918 was to improve in both relative and absolute terms.

Those improvements took place both within the cultural, religious and socio-economic spheres, and they began almost immediately in 1772 as part of the general Josephinian reform era. They have been described many times before and will be recalled here only in barest outline.<sup>2</sup> Besides the legal equality accorded the Uniate Church, newly renamed the Greek Catholic Church, vis-à-vis the Roman Catholic Church, and the eventual re-establishment of the Greek Catholic metropolitanate in Lviv (1806), Ukrainian education and national life in general was given a decisive boost with the establishment of new seminaries (in Lviv and Vienna), a university-level program (the Studium Ruthenum in Lviv), and elementary education in the vernacular. The existent and future intelligentsia was not the only stratum of the Ukrainian population to feel the benevolent (or politically opportunistic) aspects of Austrian rule. In 1785 Emperor Joseph II's government abolished personal serfdom (*Leibeigenschaft*); it issued decrees to protect the annexation of peasant (rustical) land by the landlord's manorial estates (demesnes), and it separated the local judicial system from its previous dependence on the manor. Although some of these reforms were repealed soon after Joseph's death in 1790, the "good emperor" was literally immortalized in the Galician Ukrainian peasant psyche. "The emperor," generations upon generations

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2. From the extensive literature on various aspects of Habsburg rule in Ukrainian-inhabited Galicia, useful introductory surveys can be found in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," in Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn, eds., *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 23–67; and Wolfdieter Bihl, "Die Ruthenen," in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, vol. 3: *Die Völker des Reiches*, pt. 1 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 555–584.



of the peasantry continued to feel, "was all for us; only the landlords don't allow him to do all that he wants."<sup>3</sup>

Thus, already before the end of the eighteenth century, Habsburg Austria had won over the two strata of Galician-Ukrainian society, the peasant masses and the clerical intelligentsia—the proverbial *khlopy i popy*.<sup>4</sup> The *khlopy*, or peasants, reflected a kind of naive monarchism in which the *tsisar*, or Habsburg emperor, ostensibly had the welfare of his people in mind and could do no wrong. The persistence of such attitudes is generally attributed to the low political and cultural level of the Ukrainian peasantry. As for the *popy*, their Weltanschauung was later described in the following terms: "Polish or German in language and conservative or aristocratic in attitude, the Ukrainian clergy in Austria strove with all its might to please the central authorities.... Such a manner of thinking ... later came to be dubbed aptly by the term *rutenstvo* [Ruthenianism]."<sup>5</sup>

Given this state of affairs, it would seem easy to predict how Ukrainians would react to the upheavals that wracked the Austrian Empire in 1848. As documents from that era indicate, the Ukrainian view of contemporary political events was based almost exclusively on the actions of the Habsburg emperor, and as I have suggested elsewhere, "that view was consistently and unequivocally positive throughout the revolutionary period."<sup>6</sup> During the 1848 revolution it was the emperor who was credited with granting his peoples a constitution (March 25), and it was he who was credited with liberating the peasants from serfdom (May 15), for which one of the many local Ukrainian councils that sprang up at the time issued a "promise of our loyalty and support to his enlightened throne."<sup>7</sup> When the newly established parliament

3. A common peasant attitude cited in Iuliian Okhrymovych, *Rozvytok ukrainskoi natsionalno-politychnoi dumky* (Lviv, 1922), 26.

4. A good discussion of the clergy's and the peasantry's relationship to Austrian rule is found in the introductory chapters of Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia, 1815–1849* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 15–28.

5. Okhrymovych, 28–9.

6. Pavlo Robert Magochii, "Podii u Vidni 1848 r. ochyma ukraintsiv," in his *Halychyna: Istorychni ese* (Lviv: Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto, 1994), 119.

7. Cited in a letter, dated 7 June 1848, from the Ruthenian Council in Kalush to the Supreme Ruthenian Council in Lviv, in H. Ia. Serhiienko et al, eds., *Klasova borotba selianstva Skhidnoi Halychyny, 1772–1849: Dokumenty i materialy* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1974), doc. 215, p. 393.

(Reichstag) in Vienna debated as early as the summer of 1848 the question of indemnity to the landlords, a speech delivered by a Ukrainian peasant deputy, Ivan Kapushchak, drew a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the wicked designs of policy makers who had ostensibly distorted the good intentions of the emperor and, on the other, the "good emperor," to whom "we should be grateful."<sup>8</sup>

The Ukrainian intelligentsia had much to be thankful for in 1848. In a desperate attempt to find or to reinforce loyalties wherever they could be found, local Austrian officials led by Governor Count Franz Stadion made possible the creation of several organizations that indeed enhanced the rebirth of Ukrainian national life on lands under the Habsburg sceptre. In 1848 alone, Ukrainians founded their first political organization (the Supreme Ruthenian Council), their first newspaper (*Zoria halytska*), their first cultural organization (Halytsko-Ruska Matytsia), their first university department (the Chair of Ruthenian Language and Literature at the University of Lviv), and their first modern military units (a frontier defense unit and the Ruthenian Sharpshooters). Commenting on this period, the late nineteenth-century Galician-Ukrainian proponent of independent statehood, Iuliian Bachynsky, asked, "What was this so-called national revival among the Rusyns [Ukrainians]?", in order that he could provide an ironic response: "The national movement among the 'Rusyns' in 1848 was exclusively the activity of the Austrian absolutist government—an artificial and tactical manoeuvre of the Austrian government in its struggle with the Polish revolutionary bourgeoisie in eastern Galicia."<sup>9</sup>

Regardless of latter-day commentators, the second half of the nineteenth century began with Ukrainian loyalty to the Habsburgs being as strong if not stronger than it had been even during the liberal days of the Josephinian era. Indeed, the third phase of Austrian rule, which began in 1861, coincided with a growth of national consciousness among a broader segment of the Galician-Ukrainian population. The entry of secular leaders (lawyers, teachers, doctors, etc.) into the intellectual and political elite broadened the spectrum of political thought. As a result, the budding ideas of national exclusiveness that they promoted sometimes clashed with the older clerical-oriented ideology of Ruthenianism and its commitment to the Habsburgs.

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8. *Verhandlungen des österreichischen Reichstages nach der stenographischen Aufnahme*, vol. 1 (Vienna: K.-K. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1848), 586.

9. Iuliian Bachynsky, *Ukraina irredenta*, 3d. ed. (Berlin: Ukrainska molod, 1924), 50–1.

This new ideological dichotomy took the following form during the second half of the nineteenth century. Some of the Ukrainian intelligentsia (the Old Ruthenians/*starorusyny*)—even those of an Austrophile clerical bent—began expressing a desire for cultural and even political unity with some vague East Slavic world. Others were more specific, proclaiming their nationality as being either Ukrainian (the populists or Ukrainophiles) or Russian (the Russophiles) and hoping for a political solution that would result in an independent Ukrainian state or unity with “Holy Russia.” While such independentist and irredentist attitudes were in the air (and in the relatively liberal Habsburg Empire they could be expressed more or less openly), and while today they are given much attention by the crisis mentality that forms the basis of much historical research, at the time the loyalist attitude of the empire’s Ukrainian population for the most part remained unchanged. The rural masses, despite their sometimes unenviable socio-economic conditions, continued their staunch loyalty to the Habsburg monarchy. The image of the Habsburgs seemed like a fine wine improving with age as Francis Joseph increasingly took on the mantle of a benevolent father figure supposedly above the fray of day-to-day political and social realities.

The intellectual and political leadership was, as a whole, not less loyal. To be sure, from time to time Ukrainian activists sent out signals so that “Austrian politicians understand that we Tyrolians of the East will be forced to encourage in our hearts other feelings if we are not permitted the rights due to us.”<sup>10</sup> In retrospect, however, these turned out to be little more than efforts at obtaining political leverage in the ongoing struggle of Ukrainians to improve their status vis-à-vis the Poles in Galicia. More telling were the acts and expressions of pro-Austrian loyalties, as those expressed during Vienna’s conflict with the Vatican in 1874, in the platforms of new political groupings (the People’s Congress, 1880; the People’s Council, 1885; the Russophile People’s Congress, 1882), and on the eve of World War I, when Ukrainian politicians united to express their unswerving support for Austria (December 1912 and August 1914).<sup>11</sup> More importantly, these words were backed by deeds. Consequently, during the war Ukrainians fought bravely for Austria in distinct units (the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen) as well as in various divisions of the imperial army. In marked contrast to other Slavic units, there were

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10. An attitude expressed at the dawn of the so-called New Era in 1890, as related in Kost Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halytskykh ukrainsiv, 1848–1914*, vol. 1 (Lviv: the author, 1926), 235–6.

11. For details on these and other similar events, see *ibid.*, 138–723 *passim*.

no large-scale or even noticeable numbers of desertions by Ukrainians. Finally, when it was clear to almost everyone else that the Habsburgs and their empire were a thing of the past, the stubborn "Tyrolians of the East" still somehow hoped beyond hope that a distinct Ukrainian province of eastern Galicia would come into being under the gracious sceptre of the Habsburgs.<sup>12</sup> In this sense, the very proclamation of West Ukrainian statehood on 1 November 1918 came about by default. This is because Ukrainian political leaders justified their preparations for self-rule not on some inalienable universal right, but on the guidelines of the 16 October imperial manifesto. In short, Galician Ukrainians declared independence only after the emperor had abdicated. While this left them bereft of their monarch, some Ukrainian leaders nevertheless still hoped that the Habsburg Empire would survive or, like some mystical phoenix, experience a reincarnation.<sup>13</sup>

What were the reasons for this unswerving Ukrainian loyalty to the Habsburgs? Was it simply the result of opportunistic manoeuvring on the part of generations of Austrian politicians and government officials, as some defenders of the national cause would have us believe? Was it simply local circumstances that made it politically wise and inevitable that the Ukrainians be solicited as a counterweight to, in Austrian terms, the more dangerous Poles, as most accounts of this era suggest? Or, was it the result of something more endemic in Ukrainian society?

Elsewhere I have suggested that "the explanation why Ukrainians were *Habsburgtreu*, or more precisely *Kaiserstreu*, can be found in what may be called long-term cultural or psychological reasons."<sup>14</sup> In summary, that argument goes as follows. Like all Ukrainians (and for that matter all Eastern Slavs), Galician Ukrainians came from an Eastern

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12. Michael Lozynskyj, *Wiederherstellung des Königreiches Halytsch-Wolodymyr Galizien und das ukrainische Problem in Österreich* (Lviv, 1918).

13. During the last two weeks of October 1918, Galician-Ukrainian leaders welcomed the continuance of their relation to Austria-Hungary as long as Polish domination of the eastern half of Galicia ended. Furthermore, the Galicians also decided against union with the rest of Ukraine to the east for fear of alienating the Entente, should the latter still somehow favour the preservation of all or part of the Habsburg monarchy. For a critical view of Galician-Ukrainian policy during these crucial days, see Mykhailo Lozynsky, *Halychyna v 1918–1920* (Vienna: Institut sociologique ukrainien, 1922), 28–40. For a more positive appraisal, by the head of the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv and later the first head of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, see Kost Levytsky, *Velykyi zryv: Do istorii ukrainskoi derzhavnosti vid bereznia do lystopada 1918 r. na pidstavi spomyniv ta dokumentiv* (Lviv: Chervona kalyna, 1931), 108–42.

14. Magochii, 124.

Christian (Orthodox) and traditionally patriarchal society, the basic characteristic of which was its clearly defined hierarchical structure. In its purest form that structure comprised three elements: a large mass of serfs, a small stratum of lords or hereditary nobles, and the king or emperor at the apex. The only other significant element was the Eastern Christian clergy, which acted as an intercessor or kind of transmission belt between each of the secular hierarchy's components and the religious world beyond. As Christ was the ruler, protector, and father of the spiritual world, so then the earthly emperor appointed by divine right—and therefore the only legitimate source of political action—was the ruler, protector, and father of the temporal world.<sup>15</sup>

Even after the outset of the eighteenth century, when the last Galician Ukrainians gave up Orthodoxy and became Uniate Greek Catholics, traditional patriarchal or authoritarian attitudes prevailed. In that context it would be interesting to test in part the validity of this hypothesis by seeing, at least through published sermons from the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, how often texts of submission to temporal powers—Christ's precept to render unto Caesar and Paul's admonition to the Romans to submit to existing governments—were used as the basis for homilies at the local Galician-Ukrainian parish level.<sup>16</sup>

For their part, the Habsburgs were not at all reluctant to emphasize on every possible occasion their role as protectors of the realm's various peoples, an ideological position made easier to uphold because of the tacit approval and encouragement of the Catholic Church of whatever rite. Thus, as we have seen in our discussion of loyalty, the tone was set by the Ukrainians' first Habsburg ruler, Joseph II. As emperors, he and his successors, culminating with Francis Joseph, simply could do no wrong.

Indeed, submission to temporal authorities or naive monarchism was characteristic of much of Christian Europe and was hardly unique to Galician-Ukrainian society.<sup>17</sup> In the course of the nineteenth century,

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15. On the sources for the divine nature of the secular ruler as perceived in the Eastern Christian/Orthodox world, see Ernst Benz, *The Eastern Christian Church: Its Thought and Life* (Garden City, N.Y., 1963), 163–7.

16. The biblical texts in question are: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's," repeated in slightly varied form in Matthew 22:21, Mark 12:17, and Luke 20:25; and Paul's "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers ... that are ordained of God. Whosoever resisteth power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation." Romans 13:1,2.

17. Moreover, some Galician Ukrainians looked for salvation not from their

however, secularization and industrialization helped to challenge and eventually undermine traditional modes of belief in many European societies. Galicia, at least before 1914, had not yet effectively passed through these processes, and Ukrainian society there continued to lack other social strata whose interests might have counterbalanced the traditional patriarchal outlook. In the absence of a Ukrainian secular elite (which had been Polonized centuries before) and a Ukrainian urban middle class (industrialization began in Galicia—and then only very slowly—at the very end of the nineteenth century), all that remained was a small clerical elite and a mass of semiliterate peasants. These two groups, each for its own reasons, had a vested material and/or psychological interest in maintaining a patriarchal monarchist outlook.

This situation did not change in any significant way during the last phase of Austrian rule, after 1861, when a Ukrainian secular intelligentsia made up of teachers, lawyers, journalists, and other professionals came onto the scene and were given the opportunity to participate in a parliamentary and multi-party political system. Even this so-called new Ukrainian elite was (with few exceptions) unable to shed its patriarchal cultural baggage, forcing its members to remain, as we have seen, loyal to the Habsburgs until the very end. As for the rural masses who stayed in their native villages, their monarchist loyalties remained firm; as the results of recent research have shown, those loyalties may even have been buttressed because of satisfaction with a generally improving economic situation in certain areas of Galicia during the empire's last decades.<sup>18</sup>

Besides the patriarchal characteristic of Galician-Ukrainian society, there is another aspect of Ukrainian intellectual development that, in its Galician form, made it compatible with Habsburg Austria: the national revival. This is not the place to elaborate upon specific characteristics of the Ukrainian national revival. Suffice it to say that a dichotomy existed within the movement, regardless whether it took place in the Russian or

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own *tsisar* in Austria, but from the *tsar* in Russia. See John-Paul Himka, "Hope in the Tsar: Displaced Naïve Monarchism among the Ukrainian Peasants of the Habsburg Empire," *Russian History* (Tempe, Ariz.) 7 (1980), nos. 1–2: 125–38.

18. The traditional gloom-and-doom view of Galicia's economically downtrodden rural masses—an attitude that had formed the basis of Soviet and still much non-Soviet Ukrainian writings on the subject—has, with much convincing contemporary documentation, been challenged with regard to five of eastern Galicia's provinces, where the economic situation at the village level actually is shown to have been improving in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Cf. Stella Hryniuk, *Peasants with Promise: Ukrainians in Southeastern Galicia, 1880–1900* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991).



Austrian empires. That dichotomy can be seen in the differences between what may be called the principle of the hierarchy of multiple loyalties versus the framework of mutually exclusive identities.<sup>19</sup>

According to the first principle, it was quite natural to find in multinational states individuals belonging to national groups who felt perfectly comfortable with one or more "national" loyalties or identities—what social scientists have recently begun referring to as "situational ethnicity."<sup>20</sup> Thus, for some Ukrainians it seemed perfectly normal to be both a Little Russian (Ukrainian) and a Russian, or a Ruthenian and a Pole. In this context, the figures of Nikolai Gogol and the young Volodymyr Antonovych in the Russian Empire and the "Ruthenians of the Polish nation" (*gente Rutheni natione Poloni*) and later the Russophiles in the Austrian Empire come to mind.<sup>21</sup> In stark contrast was the framework of mutually exclusive identities, in which an individual felt he or she had to be either a Russian or a Ukrainian, or a Pole or a Ukrainian, but not both. First and foremost in this category in the Russian Empire was Taras Shevchenko, and in the Austrian Empire Markiian Shashkevych or Ivan Franko.

Because the era of Habsburg rule coincided with the Ukrainian national revival, which commonly reached its foremost evolution in Galicia, the question of Ukrainian loyalty to the Habsburgs should be explored from the standpoint of the national movement. If one accepts the premise that the Ukrainian national revival was ideologically marked by the presence of a hierarchy of multiple loyalties as well as mutually exclusive identities, then it could be argued that Habsburg rule provided an ideal compromise between the two attitudes.

For the most part, Galicia's Polonophile or Russophile Ukrainian elite would sooner or later give up its native Ruthenian identity for a Polish or Russian one. The process would often begin with a loss of Ukrainian vernacular speech and be followed by giving up Greek Catholicism for Roman Catholicism or Orthodoxy. While the pro-Austrian ideology of

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19. For further elaboration on this problem, see my "The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 21 (1989), nos. 1-2: 45-62.

20. On the concept of "situational ethnicity," see Martin O. Heisler, "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 433 (1977): 32-46.

21. The problem of multiple loyalties and identities was not limited to the nineteenth century. It was present in the debates about religious rite and liturgical language in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and it remained a problem for Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.



Ruthenianism (*rutenstvo*) that was espoused by the Greek Catholic clergy did have potential as a national ideology, its propagators (the Old Ruthenians [*starorusyny*]) never really developed a clear program. Consequently, by the end of the century the Old Ruthenians were superseded by Russophiles, who identified themselves as Russians and often promoted a tsarist political orientation.<sup>22</sup>

Not surprisingly, Austrian circles were greatly concerned with what was described as "Ruthenian irredentism" directed towards tsarist Russia.<sup>23</sup> Such "irredentism" was limited, however, to the Russophile intelligentsia and a few villages that had come under the influence of an Orthodox revival. Moreover, by the late nineteenth century, the Russophile orientation was eclipsed by the more numerous and influential Galician-Ukrainian Austrophiles.

There were also eastern-oriented Galician-Ukrainian irredentists like Iulian Bachynsky, who called for independent Ukrainian statehood and anticipated legal constitutional changes in the Russian Empire that would eventually lead to Galicians joining their brethren farther east.<sup>24</sup> In practical terms, however, the possibility of liberalization in pre-World War I tsarist Russia was as remote as a victory of the Russian national orientation among Ukrainians in Galicia. Finally, there were Galician Ukrainophile activists going back to Iakiv Holovatsky in the 1840s, who saw their homeland as a piedmont that would attract their fellow Ukrainians in the Russian Empire to join them to create a unified Ukrainian entity under the benevolent sceptre of the Habsburgs.<sup>25</sup>

Despite such political speculation, most Galician Ukrainians had limited horizons that remained within the bounds of Austria-Hungary. In cultural terms the Ukrainian orientation was based on the use of the vernacular as a literary language and, at one level, the acceptance of exclusivity with relation to national identity. Accordingly, Ruthenians

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22. On the complex and often misunderstood distinctions between the Old Ruthenians and Russophiles, see my "Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism: A New Conceptual Framework for Analyzing National Ideologies in Late 19th Century Eastern Galicia," in Paul Debreczeny, ed., *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists*, vol. 2 (Columbus, Ohio, 1983), 305–24. For a contemporary view, which despite its title is actually sympathetic to the Old Ruthenians, see Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Konets rutenstva!" *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 40 (1907): 135–47.

23. See Himka above; and Stanislaus Smolka, *Die reussische Welt: Historisch-politische Studien. Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Vienna, 1916).

24. Bachynsky, 80.

25. See Okhrymovych, 36.

were part of a distinct Ukrainian nationality; they were not Poles or Russians. For their part, the Austrian authorities were pleased to encourage a group of people within its borders whose exclusivist Ukrainian identity would, by definition, shield them simultaneously from external Russian as well as internal Polish irredentism. And since the Habsburgs were operating within a Germanic world, there was no fear that the Ukrainians would become Austro-Germans. Therefore, the patriarchal tradition so dear to the hearts and minds of Galician Ukrainians could remain in place at the same time that both trends in the national revival—multiple loyalties and mutually exclusive identities—could function and mutually reinforce each other. In other words, one could be simultaneously a Ukrainian patriot and a loyal Habsburg subject. The combination turned out to be mutually advantageous to both parties.

In summary, Ukrainian-Habsburg relations from 1772 to 1918 were characterized by the mutual benefits that accrued to each side. Expressions of Ukrainian loyalty were not mere political or opportunistic rhetoric. They reflected instead a real appreciation for the political and cultural achievements that Ukrainians attained in Austria, and they fitted in with the historical context of Ukrainian society. That context reflected, on the one hand, a patriarchal system and, on the other, a compromise between the principle of a hierarchy of multiple loyalties and a framework of mutually exclusive identities that characterized the Ukrainian national revival.

The real problem—some would say tragedy—was that for all their participation in a modern political and parliamentary system, most of Galicia's Ukrainian leaders intrinsically expected that the Habsburg Empire would last forever. When it was no longer there, they were forced to face the postwar world alone. In that new world, however, they no longer had the "good and benevolent emperor" and his imperial Austrian system to cushion the blows of the harsh realities of Europe after World War I.

# Ukrainians and Poles: Recent Developments in Politics and National Historiographies

*Iaroslav Isaievych*

More often than not, historians and historiographies are categorized along national lines. According to the established tradition in Western Europe and Northern America, this usually has political meaning, whereas in Central and Eastern Europe, nations are perceived as ethnic communities of a certain level. In both cases, however, the existing terminology reflects the role of historical writing in promoting national feelings and providing scholarly or quasi scholarly arguments for political positions of states and ethnic communities. For historians who believe that their métier is primarily to seek truth (or to approach it as much as possible), such a situation is not edifying.<sup>1</sup> It would be much more desirable if we could divide historians into those who are more objective and less objective, using ethnic or national labels only to define the field of study of particular historians. Nevertheless, the fact remains that history was and is used as a tool for shaping public opinion. It is true that in the contemporary world professional historians have a rather limited audience, but the importance of their influence on historical novelists, screenwriters, and journalists, that is, the shapers of public opinion, should not be underestimated.

Historical scholarship in Poland and Ukraine provides a good example of the use and misuse of historical tradition for creating both ideologies that helped these nations to survive, and myths that were and continue to be obstacles in pursuing rational politics in various spheres, including the Poland and Ukraine's mutual relations. The focus of this

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1. Even those who emphasize the relativity of anything accepted as true would perhaps consider essential the difference between authors who are trying to avoid falsification and authors for whom history is only a tool for achieving group goals, be they national, class, confessional, or any other.

paper is the contemporary situation of Polish-Ukrainian relations and the most recent developments in their historical interpretation. We should remember that many modern developments have very deep historical roots.<sup>2</sup>

The long history of Polish-Ukrainian relations includes not only positive mutual influences but also tragic misunderstandings and bloody conflicts. Despite the latter, Poland took a major step toward overcoming the negative side of this historical experience when it became the first state to recognize the independence of Ukraine *de jure*. This official recognition was announced on the very first day after the 1 December 1991 referendum that confirmed the Ukrainian parliament's declaration of independence. Since that time the Polish and Ukrainian governments have asserted repeatedly the importance of close co-operation. There is a common understanding that curbing the independence of either country would be dangerous for the independence of the other.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, concrete actions aimed at co-operation have not followed as quickly as was first envisaged. There are many obstacles, caused by differences in political and social conditions in the two countries. One of the negative factors is the lack of confidence caused by persistent mutual negative stereotypes, which, in most cases, are based on different interpretations of history. Those forces that are against Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement have used mostly historical arguments. Independent Ukraine's first diplomatic representative in Poland, Teodosii Starak, declared that the two nations' differences in the understanding of the historical past is the only serious obstacle to establishing excellent relations. Although this is perhaps an overstatement, it is true that the historical memories of both nations continue to influence political relations.

Even now many Poles see the centuries-long eastward expansion of their state as a messianic promotion of Western civilization in regions that, without their assistance, would have remained a cultural wasteland. On the other hand, Ukrainian historical consciousness was shaped by the fact that the modern Ukrainian national movement developed as a reaction against assimilation by the Russians and Poles. Yet, for many Ukrainian national activists the Polish national movement and its

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2. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and present*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 3–31.

3. Stephen R. Burant, "International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours—Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45, no. 3 (1993): 409–13; and Ian J. Brzezinski, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis," *Survival*, autumn 1993, 26–37.

ideology have served as models. Ukrainians have often copied both the good and bad sides of Polish nationalism. For example, the controversial concepts of Franciszek Duchiński acquired popularity among Ukrainian intellectuals.<sup>4</sup>

It has sometimes been said that the higher level of national consciousness of Galician Ukrainians compared to that of their brethren in the Russian Empire was the result of political and cultural development within the Habsburg Empire. But Bukovyna was under Austrian rule just as long as Galicia; nevertheless, the Ukrainian national movement there remained weak. Thus, the relative strength of the movement towards Ukrainian national revival in Galicia can be attributed partly to the influence of Polish patterns and partly to Polish political provocation and pressure. In the movement's early stages, Polish authorities in Galicia helped Ukrainian politicians to overcome Russophile trends, but later influential Polish political circles reversed that orientation and began sympathizing with those who could be dangerous for the unity of the Ukrainian camp, including the Russophiles and Lemko separatists.

As long as the Ukrainian movement remained weak, Polish public opinion was unable to recognize the Ukrainians as a separate political entity or to abandon plans to restore the "Poland within its historical borders," which included Belarus, Lithuania, and most of Ukraine. We cannot blame Polish political thought for this, however, because until recently all modern nations considered political expansion justified whenever it was possible.

On the other hand, it was not an accident that Ukrainian political thinkers were not able to elaborate a long-term strategic attitude toward the Poles and their political plans. The Poles were the Ukrainians' natural allies against Russian expansionism, but the prospect of being assimilated by the Poles was as unattractive as the prospect of Russification. The impossibility of stable Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in Galicia and Right-Bank Ukraine was determined by the fact that the Ukrainian national movement overlapped with social conflict between the Ukrainian peasants and Polish landowners.<sup>5</sup> This overlap contributed to the successes of Ukrainian patriotic parties in Galicia, while in Right-Bank

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4. See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Franciszek Duchiński and His Impact on Ukrainian Political Thought," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3-4 (1979-80): 690-705.

5. John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988); and Daniel Beauvois, *La bataille de la terre en Ukraine, 1863-1914: Les Polonais et les conflits socio-ethniques* (Lille: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1993).

Ukraine it at least prevented any pro-Polish solutions for future political development.

There was no possibility of serious mutual reconciliation as long as both nations continued to underestimate the importance of each other as crucial factors in shaping regional politics. Marshal Piłsudski's idea of a Polish-Ukrainian alliance was a major step forward, but in practice his troops and civil servants treated Ukrainians not as allies but as vassals.<sup>6</sup>

The period of interwar Polish rule in Galicia, the Kholm region, and Western Volhynia contributed to the worsening of mutual stereotypes. Polish authorities treated their Ukrainian co-citizens in a way very similar (*mutatis mutandis*, of course) to how the Poles themselves were treated by the Prussian and Russian occupational authorities before World War I. The Ukrainians' natural response was also similar to the Poles' response to the "occupying states" (*państwa zaborcze*).<sup>7</sup> It is true, however, that the situation of the Ukrainians under Poland was not as tragic as the situation of the Ukrainians and other nations under Soviet rule in the 1930s, and that Polish policy in Western Volhynia provoked a rise of Ukrainian nationalism that did not happen in Soviet-occupied Eastern Volhynia. This development can be explained by a variety of factors: the existence of some essential political liberties, even during the period of Polish history labelled as fascist; the pro-Ukrainian orientation of some Polish officials (especially those who took seriously Piłsudski's ideals); and, on the other hand, the promotion of privileged Polish colonization and the officials' offensive attitude, especially at the local level, toward national minorities (which were a majority in those regions).

With time, old conflicts, bitter as they were, are being forgotten. Memory of them now influences only a minor part of Ukrainian public opinion, especially in Galicia. In Poland today, however, there is a trend toward underestimating the bitterness of the old conflicts and treating the bloody feuds in Western Ukraine during World War II separately, considering differences over them to be the only major obstacle to Polish-Ukrainian mutual trust.

The continuing underestimation of relative strengths was a major cause of the absence of serious attempts at meaningful political dialogue between the Ukrainians and the Poles during the war. This, in turn, made

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6. See Michael Palij, *The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance, 1919-1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1995), 112-13.

7. See, for example, Danuta Sosnowska, "Próba wschodnia państwa Polskiego," *Krytyka*, 1994, no. 45: 82.



it impossible to avoid armed clashes between Polish and Ukrainian underground forces in Volhynia and Galicia that were accompanied or followed by cruel murders of many civilians and the destruction of numerous villages. Many Polish authors have repeated Edward Prus's assertion that "the Ukrainians" murdered as many as 500,000 Poles, "mainly women, old people, and children." Such figures were taken by many Polish newspapers from a press release distributed by the Polish Press Agency in 1990.<sup>8</sup> In more recent Polish publications the estimated number of Polish victims has been reduced to 50,000, and the number of Ukrainian victims has been estimated at nearly 20,000.<sup>9</sup> Almost all Polish authors are sure that Ukrainians instigated the bloodshed and, thus, that Polish actions were only retaliation. According to Ukrainian historians, however, the origin of the conflict can be traced back to when the interwar Polish state incorporated territories with a Ukrainian majority and tried to assimilate their population. Ukrainians believe that the conflict was also provoked by Polish wartime plans to restore Polish rule in Western Ukraine, where the majority of the population categorically rejected the prospect of Polish domination.

In his monograph on Poles and Ukrainians during World War II, the Polish historian Ryszard Torzecki quotes a report by a Volhynian representative of the Polish government-in-exile that stated that the first Ukrainian terrorist actions were aimed against those Poles who served, voluntarily or involuntarily, for the German administration.<sup>10</sup> More importantly, he also proves that both the German and Soviet authorities and their agents contributed largely to provoking the bloody Polish-Ukrainian feud.<sup>11</sup>

There is hope that Ukrainian and Polish intellectual elites will prepare the ground for mutual declarations of repentance similar to the famous exchange of letters between the Polish and German episcopates. Perhaps both societies are still not ready for such a step, though understanding is growing that history should not be an obstacle to improving relations.

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8. *Nowiny*, 10 July 1990.

9. "Komunikat polsko-ukraiński dotyczący krwawego konfliktu obu narodów w latach 1942–44," *Gazeta wyborcza*, 27 July 1995.

10. Krzysztof Tomasz Staszewski, "Antypolskie akcje ukraińskie na Wołyniu w latach 1941–44," *Biuletyn informacyjny sesji popularno-naukowej Polska-Ukraina: Potrzeba dialogu i zbliżenia* (Rzeszów, 1991), 13.

11. Ryszard Torzecki, *Polacy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1993), 101.



It was only during the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine and Poland at the end of the war that some detachments of the Polish military underground and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army tried to co-ordinate their activities against Communist rule. But such cases of co-operation were rare exceptions. In general, Communist propaganda succeeded in further inflaming the mutual negative stereotypes that the Poles and Ukrainians had. In Ukraine the Soviet propaganda machine insisted that the Russians had liberated the Ukrainians from the Polish yoke. Meanwhile the authorities of Communist Poland demonstrated their Polish patriotism by claiming that Communists were defending Poland's national interests from the Ukrainian danger. In 1947 almost all of the Ukrainians who had lived since time immemorial in Poland's southeastern regions bordering on Ukraine were forcibly deported to the formerly German territories that had been incorporated into Poland according to the Yalta agreements. A large group of such Ukrainians was also transferred to Soviet Ukraine, while the majority of Poles still living in Western Ukraine were moved to Poland. This action was termed "repatriation." For some people the transfer was voluntary, but in most cases it was a tragedy, for many thousands of people were deprived of their fundamental right to live where they wanted. Poles living in eastern and central Ukraine were denied the right to resettle in Poland.

Owing to historical experience and various political events, attitudes toward the Poles and Poland in Western Ukraine developed differently than elsewhere in Ukraine. In Galicia and Western Volhynia many people have feared Poland, but their fear is now irrational rather than based on sober reflection. Remembering former Polish policies, such people are afraid that Poland has not abandoned plans to re-establish its domination over Western Ukraine. Such views are not typical elsewhere in Ukraine, although anti-Polish and anti-Catholic stereotypes promoted by the Soviet regime and the Russian Orthodox Church have influenced public opinion there.

In postwar Poland many, even most, Poles treated the Polish Communists as agents of Moscow, and the idea of a Polish-Russian alliance was not very popular. Nevertheless, the authorities had some success in exploiting anti-German feelings and anti-Ukrainian stereotypes as arguments for the inevitability of Poland's dependence on Moscow. Most Poles, in defiance of Communist propaganda, revered Piłsudski as a national hero and sympathized with his anti-Russian and anti-Communist policies. Still, even Poles who were hostile to the Soviet Union could not accept Piłsudski's ideas about the strategic importance of an alliance with Ukraine. Contributing to this attitude were not only still widely held stereotypes from the past but also an official propaganda campaign that

exaggerated the extent of Ukrainian co-operation with the Germans and played down the role of Ukrainians in the armed struggle against the Third Reich. In Polish publications the co-operation of some Poles with the Nazis has been justified by the need to survive. No similar excuse has been allowed for Ukrainian collaborators. (On the question of collaboration, it should be emphasized that for Ukrainians the German occupation did not mean the destruction of their own nation-state, which it did for the Poles. For the Ukrainians it meant only a change from occupation by one foreign regime to occupation by another.)

In postwar Polish history textbooks the official Communist concepts of the friendship of nations and of class struggle were obligatory. In them the Soviet Russian interpretation of history could not be questioned, even cautiously, as it could in scholarly publications. In the textbooks both the Ukrainian national uprising against Polish rule led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the annexation of Ukraine by Russia were presented positively. But because of their Marxist and pro-Russian bias, the textbooks could not have possibly been as influential among the Poles as horror-stories and films about the "Ukrainian bandit terror." Most postwar Polish scholarly monographs and articles on the history of Ukraine maintained high academic standards, however, reflecting the traditionally sophisticated level of historical research in Poland and the fact that, with the exception of the years 1949–53, the Polish Communist authorities did not succeed in establishing an ideological control that was as strict as it was in the other Soviet-bloc countries and in the USSR itself.<sup>12</sup> It is difficult to assess how much Polish historical studies influenced Polish public opinion, but it is certain that for Ukrainian intellectuals and students Polish studies were a much more reliable source of information than Soviet publications.

The postwar political situation made obvious the necessity of co-operation between patriotic Poles and Ukrainians, although not all of them were able to recognize this immediately. It is well known that in the Soviet Union the idea of Russian supremacy was disseminated under the rhetorical guise of internationalism. Thus, in theory, cultural contacts between the Soviet republics and Moscow's satellite states were welcome. In reality, they remained extremely limited, and were discredited by the fact that so-called cultural exchanges were misused for the purpose of spreading Communist propaganda. Nevertheless, some writers and

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12. See Stephen Velychenko, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 202–3 and *passim*.

scholars did their best to promote authentic cultural contacts. The achievements in this regard of the Ukrainian poet and translator Maksym Rylsky and of Polish philologists, including Marian Jakubiec and Ryszard Nieuważny, were significant.

In the Soviet era, real political dialogue between the Poles and the Ukrainians was possible only in the Western diaspora. The most important initiatives were made by the Polish monthly journal *Kultura*, published in Maisons-Laffitte near Paris. In addition, in October 1977 Professor Peter J. Potichnyj organized a conference on Polish-Ukrainian relations at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. It was a very important step toward the discussion of difficult problems in the spirit of mutual good will.<sup>13</sup> In the mid-1980s Professor Jaroslav Pelenski published a special issue of the short-lived Ukrainian journal *Vidnova* devoted to the Polish-Ukrainian political dialogue.<sup>14</sup>

Unfortunately, in both Ukraine and Poland information on such initiatives was available only to regular listeners of Radio Free Europe or the Voice of America. Still, many citizens of Poland, even those who were hostile to Communist propaganda, continued to accept the latter's thesis that the Ukrainians were essentially Poland's enemies. The anti-Ukrainian stereotypes were more readily held by people educated under the Communist regime. But within Polish intellectual circles, particularly among those closely linked to the Catholic Church, the idea of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation became increasingly popular.

A new stage in the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue was begun by members of the political dissident movements. An especially important event was the appearance in the Polish underground press of a book by Bohdan Skaradziński (under the pen name Kazimierz Podlaski) on whether the Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians were the Poles' enemies or brethren.<sup>15</sup>

In the late 1980s, the founders of the Ukrainian movement Rukh tried to take as their model, at least in some important aspects, Polish Solidarity and the Lithuanian Sajudis movement. Although Rukh's relative strength remained far behind that of its Polish and Lithuanian counterparts, the stages in the development of all three movements was

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13. The conference was sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and McMaster University's Interdepartmental Committee on Communist and East European Affairs. The proceedings were published in Potichnyj, *Poland and Ukraine*.

14. *Ukraina i polska opozycja*, no. 4 (1985-6) of *Vidnova* (Munich).

15. Kazimierz Podlaski, *Białorusini-Litwini-Ukraińcy: Nasi wrogowie czy bracia*, 2d ed. (Warsaw: Przedświt, 1984).

very much alike. First, there was mass euphoria and widespread hope that their total success would come easily. But disillusionment soon set in, marked by factional conflicts, growing civic inertia, and finally the corruption and opportunistic behaviour of many allegedly democratic functionaries. Still, at the time when Solidarity and Rukh were on the upsurge they managed to organize very important affable meetings between leaders of the Polish opposition and Ukrainian patriotic circles.

To some degree, the meetings of the opposition activists initiated a political dialogue that culminated, after the rebirth of Ukraine's independence, in the mutual visits of the heads of the two neighbouring states. On 18 May 1992 Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Lech Wałęsa signed in Warsaw a treaty on neighbourly relations and co-operation and a number of accompanying agreements.<sup>16</sup> The most dedicated exponents of Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement revived the idea of *miedzymorze*, i.e., of close co-operation among the nations inhabiting the region between the Baltic and the Black Sea. For various reasons, however, politicians in both countries are now less enthusiastic about such a plan than they were initially. It now seems that the most important aim of Polish foreign policy is joining the NATO alliance. Many Ukrainians have expressed the fear that if Poland joins NATO, the West will abandon its support for Ukraine, leaving it in the Russian sphere of influence. Even some Western political scientists have shared this point of view. Now that there are indications that the Western nations, especially the United States, realize that Ukraine plays a stabilizing role in Europe, Ukrainian public opinion is inclined toward believing that Poland's entry into NATO will improve Ukraine's geopolitical position.<sup>17</sup>

The Polish and Ukrainian governments have agreed to render more assistance to the cultural development of the Polish community in Ukraine and the Ukrainian community in Poland. Not everything, however, is proceeding smoothly in this regard. In Poland there are

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16. Władysław Gill and Norbert Gill, *Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą w latach 1989–1993* (Toruń and Poznań: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 1994), 24–6. The text of the treaty is on pp. 104–11.

17. On 14 September 1995, in Brussels, Ukraine's foreign minister, Hennadii Udovenko, signed a document bringing Ukraine into NATO's Partnership for Peace program and a document on special dialogue between NATO and Ukraine. Besides Russia, Ukraine is the only country to have a treaty on special relations with NATO. Udovenko stated that NATO's eastward expansion is a matter between NATO and the countries that want to join it. He cautioned, however, that Ukraine has no intention of becoming a buffer zone between NATO and Russia. See the *Financial Times*, 23 September 1995.

several revanchist associations, among them the Society for the Investigation of Crimes of the Ukrainian Nationalists, and many other organizations promoting nostalgia for the so-called lost Polish territories. At conferences devoted to Polish-Ukrainian relations, Polish participants have often stressed that such groups kind were organized by a generation which that will soon fade from the political scene. Nonetheless, a danger remains that older activists may inculcate old stereotypes within some part of the younger generation.

Meanwhile, among the Ukrainians who were forcibly resettled in Poland's western and northern regions or emigrated (again forcibly, in most cases) to Soviet Ukraine, there are people whose experiences have defined their attitudes toward Poland and the Poles. Some of them have considered it their national duty "to make people know about Polish atrocities", just as their Polish counterparts have about "Ukrainian atrocities". In such a context, the use of both "Polish" and "Ukrainian" has been perceived as offensive by the other side. Speaking about the atrocities of "Polish nationalists" or "Ukrainian nationalists" has not changed much, because the notion of nationalism has not had the same pejorative meaning in Eastern Europe that it typically has had in Western Europe and North America.

Polish attitudes towards Ukrainian problems have been much more diverse than Ukrainian attitudes towards Polish problems. Poland has had both active pro-Ukrainian groups of intellectuals and organized groups purposefully preserving and even spreading hostility toward Ukrainians. The best-known exponents of hostility have been Edward Prus and Wiktor Poliszczuk, who, while declaring the need for good Polish-Ukrainian relations, have spared no effort to make mutual understanding impossible. Prus has expressed full confidence in KGB-prepared propagandistic materials whenever they have had an anti-Ukrainian bias.

By contrast, Ukraine has not had active "full-time specialists" on Ukrainian-Polish relations nor, thankfully, any associations specializing in anti-Polish propaganda.<sup>18</sup> It is a pity that Ukrainians who understand the overall importance of Polish-Ukrainian co-operation have lacked both an organizational framework and good specialists. Extremist activities and intellectual inertia have contributed to the non-recognition by most Ukrainians and most Poles of the full extent to which, for geopolitical and other reasons, Poland and Ukraine are the most natural of allies. But

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18. The extremist declarations that have appeared in some Ukrainian newspapers have originated from groups whose primary focus is not Polish affairs.

there have been many attempts to improve the situation. For example, very important work was launched by the Polish Federation of Institutes of East-Central European Studies. The most active has been the Institute of East-Central Europe in Lublin. Its director, Professor Jerzy Kłoczowski, was elected the first president of the federation. In Ukraine an Institute of East-Central European Studies has been established in Kyiv, with a branch in Lviv. One of the projects sponsored by the federation—a co-operative effort to produce textbooks of Belarusian, Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian history, with the provision that each of them will be published in all four languages—is nearing completion. Professor Kłoczowski has organized a successful series of conferences on Poland's relations with Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine. The first such conference was held in Rome in 1990;<sup>19</sup> it was followed by sessions in Lublin, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Hrodna, Trakai, and again in Rome. Important collections of papers delivered at other jointly organized Polish-Ukrainian conferences have also been published.<sup>20</sup> Polish and Ukrainian scholars have also established joint commission for the discussion of difficult historical problems and for the mutual revision of geography and history textbooks. The existence of such commissions is a positive development, even though their activities are still very limited.

A very important development has been the growth of Ukrainian studies in Poland and the creation there of several departments of Ukrainian philology. Polish historians have continued publishing excellent books on Ukrainian history. But some Polish textbooks now contain nationalistic interpretations that were previously avoided. The changes in Ukrainian textbooks have been, in most cases, of another kind. Under Soviet rule, when it was forbidden to condemn Russian

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19. The proceedings were published in Jerzy Kłoczowski et al, eds., *Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine: The Foundations of Historical and Cultural Traditions in East Central Europe. International Conference, Rome, 28 April–6 May 1990* (Lublin: Institute of East Central Europe, and Rome: Foundation John Paul II, 1994).

20. Stanisław Stępień, ed., *Polska-Ukraina: 1000 lat sąsiedztwa. Studia z dziejów chrześcijaństwa na pograniczu etnicznym*, 2 vols. (Przemyśl: Południowo-Wschodni Instytut Naukowy, 1990, 1994); Iaroslav Isaievych et al, eds., *Polsko-ukraiński studii: Materiały mizhnarodnoi naukovoï konferentsii. Kamianets-Podilskyi, 29–31 travnia 1992* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1992); Zygmunt Mańkowski, ed., *Pogranicze: Studia z dziejów stosunków polsko-ukraińskich w XX wieku* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1992); Zygmunt Mańkowski, ed., *Spotkania polsko-ukraińskie* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu M. Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1992); Kazimiera Łach, ed., *Polska i Ukraina w nowej Europie: Materiały polsko-ukraińskiej konferencji naukowej. Warszawa, 16–17 listopada 1992 r.* (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 1993).



expansionism, some patriotic Ukrainian historians tried to foster a historical consciousness in their readers by glorifying the Cossacks' battles with the Polish army. Now the emphasis in many Ukrainian history textbooks has changed, and such facts as the Hadiach Treaty between the Hetman state and Poland or the pro-Polish and pro-Swedish policy of Hetman Ivan Mazepa are presented positively. Even elements of *szlachta* democracy in the public life of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which were once sharply condemned in Ukrainian populist historiography, have now been recognized by some scholars in Ukraine as the nucleus of a civil society.

Cultural contacts between Poland and Ukraine, including exchanges in the visual and performing arts, can be characterized as having been episodic, and in many cultural spheres the situation has worsened. It is hoped that on both sides there are dedicated enthusiasts who will try to fill the gap. In this regard, the activities of the Foundation of Saint Volodymyr in Cracow are particularly important. This institution, founded in 1989 and directed by Włodzimierz (Volodymyr) Mokry, provides a framework for the cultural work of Ukrainian community activists in Poland and those Polish intellectuals who understand the importance of Polish-Ukrainian co-operation.<sup>21</sup> The Foundation has done its best to acquaint the Polish public with Ukrainian art and culture. There have also been some Polish grass-roots initiatives to promote mutual understanding. The Ukrainian public in Poland highly values the activities of the Poland-Ukraine Society in Warsaw, the festivals of Ukrainian art in Lublin, and the exhibitions of Ukrainian art supported by the municipal authorities in Jaworzno.<sup>22</sup>

In general, however, the cultural exchange between the two neighbouring countries remain negligible. During the Soviet era, Poland was for Ukrainians a window to the West. The Polish press and Polish books were a unique source of alternative information for Ukrainian intellectuals. Now residents of Ukraine are not able to subscribe to the Polish press because it is too expensive for them. Books from the United States,

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21. See *Horyzonty Krakowskie/Krakovski obrii*, 1995, nos. 1-2: 1-17. Mokry was born in 1949 in former Eastern Prussia to Ukrainian parents deported there from their native village. A lecturer in Ukrainian philology at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, in the first free elections in postwar Poland, in 1989, he was elected to the Sejm from the Solidarity list.

22. Just after the war Jaworzno was the site of an internment camp where many ethnic Ukrainians were imprisoned. When she became aware of their suffering, Barbara Sikora, a native of Jaworzno and a librarian at the local library, decided to work on behalf of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation.



Canada, Great Britain, and Australia reach Ukraine because there are charitable foundations and government institutions there that promote book exchanges and collect and deliver book donations. But nobody is involved systematically in promoting Polish books and periodicals in Ukraine or Ukrainian books and periodicals in Poland.

In the economic sphere, relations between Poland and Ukraine are still in *statu nascendi*. It is encouraging, however, that private companies, municipal bodies, and government institutions in both countries have begun co-operating in the creation of infrastructures needed for expanding commerce. For example, it was decided recently to open new border crossings and to extend the Western European-type narrow-gauge railway from the Polish-Ukrainian border to Lviv. There have been other small indications of improved every-day cooperation.

The American political scientist Paul Goble has stated that "Ukrainians now know that the Europeans will not solve their security problems and they also know that Russia will continue to be a security threat. Hence, they must look around—and in the first instance, to their other neighbours."<sup>23</sup> The most important of these neighbours is Poland. Under present conditions, formal regional blocs (like the interwar Little Entente) could hardly be functional. Ukraine should be open to international contacts in all directions. As far as Ukrainian-Polish relations are concerned, what is needed is the determination of both Ukrainian and Polish society and their governments to proceed slowly but steadily towards better practical co-operation, which is in their mutual best interests. Historical traditions could play a role in promoting mutual understanding as long as each side tries to understand the arguments of the other and fully appreciates the full extent of their common interests.

In 1977 the participants of the McMaster conference organized by Professor Potichnyj expressed a belief that objective circumstances seemed propitious for a Polish Ukrainian rapprochement and that co-operation between these two nations could be beneficial not only for them, but also for the creation of a new European order. It is encouraging to see that these objectives are being pursued.

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23. Paule Goble, "The Ukrainian Security Trap," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (fall 1994): 234.



# *Krakovski visti* and the Jews, 1943: A Contribution to the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Second World War

John-Paul Himka

The history of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during World War II is one of those subjects that has generated much more heat than light.<sup>1</sup> This is strikingly evident when one compares Philip Friedman's pioneering article on the subject, originally published in 1959,<sup>2</sup> with two later interpretations, both published in the late 1980s, by Taras Hunczak and Aharon Weiss.<sup>3</sup> Although a generation had passed since the publication

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1. Earlier, Ukrainian-language versions of this article were presented at conferences on Ukrainian-Jewish relations held in Kyiv (1991) and Jerusalem (1993). I would like to thank the Central Research Fund at the University of Alberta for the grant to travel to Jerusalem. I would also like to thank my wife, Chrystia Chomiak, for reading this text; as is often the case, her critical insights resulted in a number of improvements and clarifications. Other readers to whom I am in debt for pointing out problems and suggesting improvements are Natalia Chomiak, Chrystia Freeland, and Alan Rutkowski. In the case of this particular article, I would like to say explicitly what should go without saying: that I alone am responsible for the views expressed herein.

2. Philip Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," his *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust*, ed. Ada June Friedman (New York and Philadelphia: Conference on Jewish Social Studies, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1980), 176–208. The article first appeared in the *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* 12 (1958–9).

3. Taras Hunczak, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations," in *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath. A Symposium*, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 39–57; Aharon Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine during the Holocaust," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988, 1990), 409–20.

of Friedman's article, both Hunczak and Weiss relied on essentially the same source material as Friedman; the most substantive addition to their source base was Raul Hilberg's monumental study of the destruction of the European Jews.<sup>4</sup> To Friedman's and Hilberg's materials Hunczak and Weiss primarily added their own interpretive spin, defensive in the case of Hunczak and accusatory in the case of Weiss. I do not wish even to suggest that interpretation is not a primary task of scholarship; but I do want to point out how little hard research has been conducted. The history of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the last world war remains relatively uninvestigated, disproportionately so when one considers the stereotypes and passions that surround the issue. It is this anomalous, and indeed unhealthy, situation that has induced me to offer the present study of a concrete incident in the history of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during World War II—the appearance in the spring and summer of 1943 of a series of anti-Jewish articles in the flagship of Ukrainian journalism under Nazi occupation, *Krakivski visti*.

The primary sources for this study, aside from the articles themselves, are the editorial correspondence and records of *Krakivski visti*, which were acquired by the Provincial Archives of Alberta in 1985, a year after the death of the newspaper's chief editor, Mykhailo Khomiak (Michael Chomiak).<sup>5</sup> It is worth noting that this collection seems to constitute the fullest set of editorial documentation of any of the legal newspapers published in Nazi-occupied Poland (the *Generalgouvernement*).<sup>6</sup> The papers in the Provincial Archives of Alberta make it possible to identify the authors of the anti-Jewish articles, none of whom signed their real names to these contributions, to ascertain at whose initiative the articles appeared, and to acquire more insight into Ukrainian attitudes to

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4. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, revised, definitive ed., 3 vols. (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1985). The first edition appeared in 1961.

5. Michael Chomiak Papers, Provincial Archives of Alberta, accession no. 85.191. For this study I have relied on: item no. 32 (lists of authors and honoraria, June 1940–June 1944); item no. 40 (general editorial correspondence, April 1943–30 June 1943, and undated); and item no. 41 (general editorial correspondence, 1 July–31 December 1943 and undated).

6. A description of the other surviving documentation can be found in Lucjan Dobroszycki, *Die legale polnische Presse im Generalgouvernement, 1939–1945* (Munich: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1977), 8–9. Dobroszycki's book was recently published in English translation under the title *Reptile Journalism: The Official Polish-Language Press under the Nazis, 1939–1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

the fate of the Jews under Nazi rule—not just the attitudes of the authors and editors, but also those of wider circles of Ukrainian public opinion.

I must emphasize at the outset that my sources do not provide a complete picture. At least one letter from a potential contributor of an anti-Jewish article seems to have been destroyed by the editorial board because the author of the letter refused to write against the Jews and presumably explained the grounds for this refusal. The retention of such a letter could have constituted a grave risk for its author, and the editorial board prudently did not retain it in their files.<sup>7</sup> In fact, there is no letter of refusal in the editorial files, although it is clear that several individuals who were approached to write anti-Jewish articles declined to do so. What else had never been included in the editorial records that would shed a different light on the incident under investigation can only be a matter of speculation. Moreover, a daughter of the chief editor, who interviewed her father about his wartime experiences, has informed me that Mykhailo Khomiak and the editorial board as a whole worked to some extent with the anti-Nazi resistance; in particular, they issued false papers for members of the underground.<sup>8</sup> Such activities, of course, are not directly reflected in the official editorial records. The sources, then, are fragmentary and one-sided, and this must be kept in mind by readers of this study. The sources do cast light on the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the war, but they leave many shadows. Fuller illumination can only be the result of sustained scholarly research into a wide range of individual problems and incidents relating to the interaction between Ukrainians and Jews during the Second World War. Only then will it be possible to construct meaningful scholarly syntheses of the overall problem.

### ***Krakivski visti*: Background**

*Krakivski visti* first appeared in Cracow on 7 January 1940, and for the duration of the war it played an important and, generally, positive role in Ukrainian life. When the Soviets occupied Lviv, the capital of Ukrainian Galicia, in 1939, many Ukrainian intellectuals and political

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7. Marian Kozak, of the editorial board of *Krakivski visti*, wrote to Iurii Lypa on 15 May 1943 to solicit an anti-Jewish article from him. In a subsequent letter, dated 26 May 1943, Kozak thanked Lypa for his "long letter" in reply. From the tone of Kozak's second letter and from the absence of an anti-Jewish article by Lypa, it is evident that Lypa had responded that he would not write the desired article. Usually the editors scrupulously filed letters and even postcards from contributors, but Lypa's reply is missing.

8. Personal communication from Natalia Chomiak.

activists fled to Cracow in the German zone of occupation, both to avoid eventual arrest by Soviet security organs and to maintain some Ukrainian institutions independent of Soviet control and censorship. *Krakovski visti* was able to publish, even within the limits imposed by the German occupation authorities, many excellent articles on Ukrainian history and culture that are still worth reading a half-century later. Volodymyr Kubijovyč described it thus: "*Krakovski visti* was not a German paper in the Ukrainian language, but was a Ukrainian paper edited within the German reality."<sup>9</sup> The paper was closely associated with the Ukrainian Central Committee (UTsK), which Kubijovyč headed, and, like the Utsk, it served as a buffer between the German occupation authorities and the population of the Generalgouvernement.

Aside from an educational and opinion-forming function, the newspaper served the Ukrainian community by providing a source of income for the Ukrainian intelligentsia during the difficult years of the war. This was a particularly valuable service to the nation, because the Ukrainian intelligentsia, relatively young and small in number to begin with, had suffered tremendous blows in the interwar years as a result of physical liquidation in Stalin's Soviet Union and discrimination and exclusion from employment under Poland and Romania. The contributors to *Krakovski visti* represented all regions of Ukraine, including, after 1941, what had been Soviet Ukraine. Writing for the newspaper were some of Ukraine's most prominent intellectuals—poets, novelists, art historians, literary critics, linguists, theologians, politicians, historians, and physicians. The list of contributors reads like a *Who's Who* of Ukrainian intellectual and public life. Among them were Dmytro Doroshenko, Panas Fedenko, Damian Horniatkevych, Myron Korduba, Iurii Kosach, Father Havryil Kostelnik, Hryhorii Kostyuk, Ivan Kryp'iakkevych, Zenon Kuzelia, Bohdan Lepky, Denys Lukiianovych, Iurii Lypa, Evhen Malaniuk, Vasyl Mudry, Oleksander Ohloblyn, Evhen Onatsky, Sofiia Parfanovych, Iuliian Revai, Lev Shankovsky, Iurii (George Y.) Shevelov, Mykhailo Vozniak, and Andrii Zhuk.

There were certain topics the paper had to avoid, and about other topics the paper could only write from a pro-German perspective. At times the editors had to publish material that they knew to be false and pained them to print. For example, the editorial board was well aware that Ukrainian forced labourers in work camps in Germany were treated

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9. Volodymyr Kubijovyč [Kubijovyč], *Ukrainci v Heneralnii hubernii, 1939–1941: Istoriia Ukrainskoho tsentralnoho komitetu* (Chicago: Vydavnytstvo Mykoly Denysiuka, 1975), 276.

as slaves, but nonetheless they had to publish enthusiastic reports about the workers and the conditions in which they lived. The editors went ahead and printed the false reports because the German authorities had made it clear that disobedience would result in the appointment of a German as editor of the paper.<sup>10</sup> In that case offensive materials would appear more frequently and the precious Ukrainian cultural work carried on by the paper would be undermined. The relative autonomy that *Krakivski visti* enjoyed by having a Ukrainian editor was an unusual privilege, since from fall of 1939 until the spring of 1944 all the editors of Polish periodicals in the Generalgouvernement were German.<sup>11</sup>

### Motivations of the Anti-Jewish Articles

In May 1943, as the editorial correspondence establishes beyond a doubt, the German press chief, Emil Gassner, demanded that the paper print a series of anti-Jewish articles.<sup>12</sup> It is not clear from the sources why the German authorities demanded such a series at this particular time. One of the editors, Marian Kozak, speculated that the order was issued "in the first place in order to divert attention from other matters."<sup>13</sup> I understand this to mean that the Germans were seeking to distract attention from their brutal treatment of the Ukrainian population in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. But the Germans may have had other

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10. "The publication in January 1940 of information on the Soviet-Finnish War, information based on German sources and published without editorial commentary, resulted in a warning by the press chief [Emil Gassner] to the editor-in-chief [at that time], Borys Levytsky, and later to his removal from the position of editor. For reprinting an obituary of Mykhailo Konovalets, Evhen's father, from the daily *Krakivski visti* in the weekly, the latter's editor, Vasyl Kochmar, had to leave; for a lead article that made reference to the inimical attitude towards the Ukrainian people of Ukraine's western neighbours, editor Vasyl Mudry lost his job in *Krakivski visti*. Editor-in-chief Khomiak was being threatened that he would be sent, along with the other editors, for 're-education' and that his place would be taken by a German." Kubiiovych, *Ukrainci v Heneralnii hubernii*, 274. The editorial correspondence in the Provincial Archives confirms that the Germans kept the editorial board in a state of anxiety about various alleged lapses that had occurred.

11. Dobroszycki, *Die legale polnische Presse*, 100.

12. From Marian Kozak's letter to Iurii Lypa, 15 May: "For your information, we received an order to publish a series of anti-Jewish articles." Kozak to X [the addressee is still living], 22 May: "We have an order to conduct an anti-Jewish campaign." Kozak to Oleksander Mokh, 15 May: "All these [anti-Jewish] articles will be published, for such is the desire expressed by the 'Pressechef der Regierung.'"

13. Marian Kozak's letter to Iurii Lypa, 26 May.



reasons for wanting anti-Jewish articles to appear. In the spring of 1943 they were suppressing the Warsaw ghetto uprising. Perhaps they feared (correctly, as it turned out) that an uprising would also break out in the Lviv ghetto, which they were about to "clear" completely, and the articles were intended as a prophylactic against possible Ukrainian sympathy for the insurgent Jews. Or possibly the articles were connected with the changes in German policy towards occupied populations that began to take place after the defeat at Stalingrad. Perhaps the articles were intended to foster a more positive attitude to the Germans. This was also roughly the time when the Germans exhumed or permitted to be exhumed the mass graves of victims of Stalinism in Katyn and Vinnytsia.

Although the editors of *Krakovski visti* did not initiate the anti-Jewish series, they thought that they could turn it to the advantage of the Ukrainian cause. Marian Kozak wrote to Iurii Lypa on 15 May: "We received an order to publish a series of anti-Jewish articles. Now it is a matter of making use of this opportunity from our standpoint." On 26 May he wrote to Lypa again: "When there is an opportunity to remind people of the harmfulness of Jewish influences, we have to do it so that the understanding will not be lost that the Jews continue to be an important factor in international life. They might still have more than one chance to do us harm."

## The Articles and Their Authors

The anti-Jewish series started off with an article by Oleksander Mokh entitled "At the Sources of the Universal Conspiracy," which appeared in the 25 May issue. Mokh was a Catholic publicist, editor, and publisher; his publishing house, *Dobra knyzhka*, was based in Lviv, and after the war it was re-established in Toronto. On 15 May Editor Kozak had written to him: "We need serious articles that would reveal the harmful and disintegrative role of the Jewish element in literature, the press, art, and philosophy.... You are the only one who knows these matters well and you feel strongly about them." Mokh accepted the invitation and wrote a whole series of articles under such titles as "A Nation of Desperados," "The Jews are Depraving Europe" and "How They Helped the Bolsheviks."<sup>14</sup> Taken together, his articles constituted a fairly

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14. M. L., "U dzherel vsesvitnoi zmovy," *Krakovski visti*, 25 May 1943; M. L., "Taina vplyviv i uspihiv," *Krakovski visti*, 30 May 1943; M. L., "Za dushu inteligenta," *Krakovski visti*, 3 June 1943; "Natsiia desperadiv," *Krakovski visti*, 4 June 1943; M. L., "Zhydy depravuiut Evropu," *Krakovski visti*, 5 June 1943; M. L., "Idealy i nosii rozkladu," *Krakovski visti*, 8 June 1943; M. L., "Iak spomahaly bol'shevykiv," *Krakovski visti*, 9 June 1943; M. L., "Spravedlyvyi u Sodomi,"

comprehensive exposition of anti-Semitic doctrine. They mainly focused on what Mokh saw as the secret but powerful and corrupting influences of the Jews and their loyal collaborators, the Masons. Mokh's articles were general and theoretical in character, since the editors asked him to refrain from dealing with the specifics of the Ukrainian case. He cited a varied corpus of anti-Semitic literature—West European and Polish—and frequently referred to "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion."

Kost Kuzyk, an editor of a local paper in Sambir, contributed two articles to the series. The content of the first of them is clear from the title: "Ivan Franko and the Jewish Question."<sup>15</sup> The selection of Franko's texts and their interpretation in the article were, of course, quite one-sided. Kuzyk's second article concentrated on economic problems, specifically exploitation of the peasantry of the Boiko region by Jewish taverners, merchants, leaseholders, and Drohobych mineowners, as well as unscrupulous lawyers and physicians. The article also stated that the Jews "always took the side of our enemies," especially in the years of the first Soviet occupation of Galicia (1939–41), when they "penetrated into all Bolshevik institutions, not excluding the NKVD."<sup>16</sup>

Luka Lutsiv, a literary critic and later, for many years, an editor of the newspaper *Svoboda* in Jersey City, also contributed two articles: on Jews as agents of demoralization, and cosmopolitanism in the realm of literature.<sup>17</sup>

One longish article, published in two parts, was contributed by Olena Kysilevska. Kysilevska was a well-known activist in the Ukrainian women's movement, the editor and publisher of the women's fortnightly *Zhinocha dolia* in Kolomyia, and a former Polish senator associated with the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance; after the war she continued her activities as a leader of the émigré Ukrainian women's movement in the West. Her article, entitled "Who Ruined the Hutsul Region?"<sup>18</sup> concentrated on Jewish economic activities in the Carpathians, but also mentioned the role of the Jews in propagating Communism.<sup>19</sup>

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*Krakivski visti*, 10 June 1943; M. L., "Pered naizdom Dzhingiskhana," *Krakivski visti*, 11 June 1943.

15. K. K., "Ivan Franko i zhydivske pytannia," *Krakivski visti*, 28 May 1943.

16. Boiko, "Tin Ahasfera nad Boikivshchynoiu," *Krakivski visti*, 29 May 1943.

17. L. Hranychka, "Pro smikh, zhydiv, radnyka Shchypku i Makolondru Miska (Nashym humorystam pid uvahu)," *Krakivski visti*, 1 June 1943; L. Hranychka, "Deshcho pro roliu zhydivskykh pysmennykiv," *Krakivski visti*, 27 June 1943.

18. Kh., "Khto ruinuval Hutsulshchynu?" *Krakivski visti*, 16–17 June 1943.

19. After the war, as an émigré, Kysilevska wrote the article "Za dobre im'ia ukrainskoho narodu" (For the Good Name of the Ukrainian People), originally

The well-known economist, former minister of internal affairs under the UNR Directory, and professor of the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy and the Ukrainian Free University, Oleksander Mytsiuk, contributed a lengthy article entitled simply "The Jews in Ukraine." Devoted to examining the negative role of the Jews in the economic life of Ukraine, it was serialized in six issues of the paper, with rather long intervals between them.<sup>20</sup> The first part came out in the Pentecost issue (mid-June), and the last in the issue of 11 September; with this last instalment, the anti-Jewish series came formally to a close.

There was, however, one other author. (He is still living, and I will refrain from naming him.) The editors did not print his contribution. Editor Kozak wrote to him on 18 June: "The article on Jews could not appear because you touched upon too many issues in it. Furthermore, it's hard to maintain the position that the Jews alone are responsible for everything."

The editorial board of *Krakovski visti* felt that it had been able to remain objective in publishing the anti-Jewish series. Having it specifically in mind, the editor-in-chief wrote to Volodymyr Levynsky on 10 July, as the series was drawing to a close: "It seems to us that we approach every issue in the most objective manner and try to shed light on the problems that life itself suggests or forces upon us. We try to do this *sine ira et studio*."

## The Negative Reception of the Anti-Jewish Articles

The editorial board of *Krakovski visti* and the authors of the anti-Jewish articles were aware that at least some Ukrainian circles would disapprove of the publication of the articles. It is telling that all the articles were signed with pseudonyms or initials, while the normal practice of the paper was to publish articles signed with real names. When the editors informed Oleksander Mokh that they were not going to print what he had written "about our [i.e., Ukrainian] Jews and Masons," Mokh responded, in his letter of 28 May: "You want to put off the examples for another time, but it will never come. If you sincerely

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entitled "Do spravy zhydivsko-ukrainskykh vidnosyn" (On the Issue of Jewish-Ukrainian Relations). In it she stated that the Jews were the enemies of the Ukrainians in Galicia—they exploited them and got them drunk, and they actively collaborated with their oppressors; nonetheless, Ukrainian peasants helped and fed Jews during the war. Copy in the Olena Kysilevska Collection, National Archives (Ottawa), MG 31, H42, vol. 4, file 37.

20. O. M., "Zhydy v Ukraini," *Krakovski visti*, Pentecost (*zeleni sviata*, June), 29 June, 7 July, 12 August, 13 August, and 11 September 1943.

want to open the eyes of society, then you can only do it right now—later you will have to write the way Dr. Mykhailo Rudnytsky and other ‘Europeans’ tell you. Being polite in these matters will no longer help you, because the publication of anti-Semitic theory has decided your fate as an ‘uncultured’ editor; a person who dared to publish this cannot occupy a prominent place in democratic Europe.”

A negative attitude to the anti-Jewish series probably explains why some potential authors did not accept the invitation to participate in it. Among those who refused to write were: the prominent National Democratic politician Stepan Baran; the writer and physician Iurii Lypa, who a year later died as a physician in the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); the editor and economist Levko Lukasevych, who, at the very time he was asked to write against the Jews, was himself hiding a Jew in Warsaw;<sup>21</sup> and the leading poet of the nationalist camp, Evhen Malaniuk. In fact, the editors had difficulty getting a sufficient number of anti-Jewish articles. As Marian Kozak wrote in a letter on 22 May: “We have an order to conduct an anti-Jewish campaign, but there’s not enough material.”

The appearance of the anti-Jewish articles provoked indignation among a part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. I cite from the letter of the editor-in-chief to Volodymyr Levynsky, 10 July: “I have to confess that we have written enough on the Jewish question, and we have heard our fill of accusations from many people that we are conducting or, rather, justifying the action against the Jews, [and] also that we are acting in bad conscience and thinking only of our own backyard and that we are running away from reality and responsibility.” And from another letter, to Oleksander Mytsiuk, 20 August: “Many people are upset that we are touching upon this sensitive theme in such conditions as we are now ourselves forced to live in. It is also true that very many people express their approval of the good manner in which the authors approach this painful problem.”

## Some Reflections on the Material

What is probably most striking to the modern reader of *Krakivski visti*’s articles against the Jews and related editorial correspondence is the callous indifference displayed to the great tragedy that struck the Jewish population of Ukraine under Nazi occupation. That the editors solicited and published articles against the Jews does not of itself indicate lack of

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21. Levko Lukasevych, *Rozdumy na skhylku zhyttia* (New York: Ukrainske pravoslavne vydavnytstvo sv. Sofii, 1982), 243.

sympathy with the Jews' plight or a willing complicity in the Nazi crimes. Had they refused to assemble the required series, the only relatively autonomous Ukrainian newspaper would have lost its autonomy and they personally would have been exposed to severe punishment, probably dispatch to a concentration camp. And these consequences would have been precipitated by a gesture that was symbolic rather than effective, since their own refusal to prepare the series would not actually have prevented its appearance. This is not to deny that they could have taken a stand anyway, consequences be damned; one should be aware, however, that the impediments to such conduct were formidable. Yet, that more than submission to coercion came into play in the preparation of the anti-Jewish series is suggested by the conviction on the part of the editors that they could use the series to promote the Ukrainian cause.

Indifference to the fate of the Jews on the part of the authors of the anti-Jewish articles is more readily apparent: they were under no compulsion to accept the proposal to write these articles (as the number of refusals demonstrates), although it cannot be excluded that not all of the authors realised this. There were also certain passages in some of the articles that expressed approval of what the Nazis were doing to the Jews. Olena Kysilevska ended her account of Jewish exploitation in the Hutsul region on what for her was an optimistic note: "Today there are no more Jews in the mountains," and the Hutsuls appear to be on the verge of economic revival.<sup>22</sup> Oleksander Mytsiuk, after describing the economic ruin of Transcarpathia through the agency of Jewish usurers, quoted with approval what Transcarpathian peasants had told him in 1938: "If only Adolf Hitler would come to them, to their Jewry, even for a month!"<sup>23</sup>

What were the sources of this indifference to and even approval of the destruction of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis? From this specialised study it is impossible to formulate generalizations with any certainty, and what are offered here are no more than reflections intended to move the analysis of the problem forward. These reflections were suggested in part by a close reading of the sources to this study, but in part they also stem from a more general consideration of the Ukrainian-Jewish relationship during the war. It seems to me that three broad causes primarily lay behind the lack of sympathy exhibited by some

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22. Kh., "Khto ruinuvav Hutsulshchynu?" *Krakovski visti*, 17 June 1943.

23. O. M., "Zhydy v Ukraini," *Krakovski visti*, 13 August 1943.

Ukrainians with respect to the suffering of the Jewish people in their midst:

1. deep-seated animosity towards the Jews on the part of some Ukrainian circles, exacerbated by the pervasiveness of the nationalist world-view and by the penetration of modern anti-Semitic ideology;
2. the abnormality of the moral-political universe in which the Ukrainians found themselves; and
3. the inability to assimilate the magnitude of the crime that was being perpetrated.

This list could be expanded, but I will limit myself here to a brief consideration of these three factors.

It must first be understood that there was a history of genuine Ukrainian-Jewish conflict in Galicia that had nothing to do with ideological anti-Semitism.<sup>24</sup> It was a conflict in many ways similar to, and indeed related to, the Ukrainian-Polish conflict. The feeling of many Ukrainians towards the Jews was akin to, if not identical with, an anticolonial rancour, the main grievance being socio-economic. Although the articles by Kuzyk, Kysilevska, and Mytsiuk painted the picture in the darkest colours, the general outline that emerges from their depictions is a recognizable likeness of reality. Many Ukrainian peasants, and their spokesmen in the leadership of the national movement, felt that Jewish usurers, taverners, merchants, and leaseholders were responsible for the economic ruin of the Galician countryside. And although they did not understand the problem from the standpoint of the larger economic processes at work, they were certainly correct in their analysis that the economic interests of large sectors of the Jewish population were antithetical to the interests of even larger sections of the Ukrainian population. This socio-economic antagonism had its roots deep in the feudal era, but was profoundly exacerbated after the abolition of serfdom and the penetration of a money economy into the Galician village. *Mutatis mutandis*, a similar antagonism existed in other regions of Ukraine.

In the nineteenth century a political dimension was grafted on to this essentially economic conflict. Leaders of the Ukrainian national movement resented the fact that the Jews tended to assimilate culturally to the politically dominant nationality—to the Polish in Galicia, to the Russian in Right-and Left-Bank Ukraine, to the German and later the Romanian

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24. By no means, however, was the history of Ukrainian-Jewish relations marked exclusively by antagonism. For a useful corrective, see Ia. R. Dashkevych, "Vzaiemovidnosyny mizh ukrainskym ta ievreiskym naselenniam u Skhidnii Halychyni (kinets XIX–pochatok XX st.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1990, no. 10: 63–73.



in Bukovyna, and to the Magyar in Transcarpathia. Political antipathies were particularly pronounced in Galicia in the period after 1873 and before 1907, when Jews as a group supported Polish candidates against Ukrainian candidates to the Austrian parliament and Galician diet; and again in the 1930s, when many Ukrainians placed their hopes on Hitler's Germany (for reasons that had nothing to do with anti-Semitism) and Jews, of course, opposed Hitler (precisely because of his anti-Semitism). From this background of genuine national conflict, stemming from legitimate grievances and differences, it was perhaps inevitable that national hatred would emerge.

But one must add to this the peculiar distortion of vision that resulted from the permeation of Galician-Ukrainian society by the nationalist worldview. An aspect of nationalism that had a particularly deleterious effect on the Ukrainian-Jewish relationship was the tendency to equate the actions of individual Jews or particular sectors of Jewish society with the Jewish nation as a whole. This tendency infuses all the anti-Jewish articles in *Krakivski visti*, but it stands out very clearly in one passage from Kysilevska: "Although all of the Hutsul region was dotted with taverns and little Jewish stores, the Jews were unable to wait for the Hutsul to come to them. They collected all sorts of petty merchandise in a sack and wandered over the mountains, pushing their wares almost by force."<sup>25</sup> What is remarkable about these sentences is Kysilevska's equation of the Jewish taverner with the Jewish pedlar as if they were just different organs of the same body, although in reality the social and economic distance between them was great. Perhaps the combination of these two factors—the genuine antagonism and the nationalist vision—were sufficient to produce the kind of enmity that would permit indifference or even *Schadenfreude* when the enemy suffered.

And yet one more exacerbating factor must be included in this complex cause: the influence of modern anti-Semitic ideology, i.e., the set of views, with strong irrationalist underpinnings, that demonizes and ultimately dehumanizes Jews. Galicia was receptive terrain for this ideology to take root, given the animosities and nationalist mind-set already described. It was also a territory with prolonged exposure to political cultures in which anti-Semitism formed an important component, namely the political cultures of old Austria, where Hitler himself learned anti-Semitism, and interwar Poland. The military success of Nazi Germany and its occupation of Galicia must have had the effect of confirming, to some, that anti-Semitism was a force to take seriously. The

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25. Kh., "Khto ruinuvav Hutsulshchynu?" *Krakivski visti*, 17 June 1943.

influence of modern anti-Semitism can be felt in all the anti-Jewish articles in *Krakivski visti*, although Mokh's contributions stand out for their exposition of the pure doctrine.

The second major cause for this indifference, I believe, had less to do with the particular victims, i.e., the Jews, than with those whose attitude is under consideration, i.e., the Ukrainians. They had experienced so much national discrimination and political violence directed against themselves that they were somewhat desensitized to what was happening to the Jews around them during the Nazi occupation. In interwar Poland the Ukrainians were a persecuted minority. The Polish government used violence against them, although, for the most part, not of the deadly variety: largely mass beatings (the Pacification of 1930) and the destruction of property (particularly of Orthodox churches in Podlachia in the 1930s). However, over the border, in Soviet Ukraine, Ukrainians experienced systematic mass violence in the decade preceding the outbreak of the war. The Galicians were keenly aware of the dekulakization, the famine of 1932–33, and the mass arrests and execution of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Then in 1939–41 the Soviet regime came to them and claimed thousands of victims. The Nazis too, particularly but not exclusively in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, killed many Ukrainian POWs and civilians. In short, Ukrainians inhabited a world in which mass murder was frightfully commonplace. From the perspective of their experiences, the Nazis' mass murder of Jews more closely approximated "normal" politics than it would have for people who had known more peace and security.

The third cause of the indifference was that the full magnitude of the unprecedented crime against the Jews, its exceptional character, was not comprehended. It is perhaps only with the passage of time and in historical perspective that we can begin to appreciate the meaning of Hitler's attempt to extinguish an entire people. Over the past half century we have become familiar with the memoirs and testimony of survivors, the tragedy has been interpreted in literature and cinema, and philosophers and historians have studied it; we have even given it (although we might argue about its appropriateness) a name—the Holocaust. We understand it and its place in human history better than we did before, and in the future we may come to understand it yet more fully. There was much less perspective in 1943. The enormity of what was happening often even escaped the victims, the Jews themselves.<sup>26</sup> I am not suggest-

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26. "After information filtered into the ghettos about the mass shootings in the outdoors, about the operations of mobile death vans, about gassing installations

ing that the Ukrainians who published and wrote anti-Jewish articles in *Krakovski visti* were unaware that the Nazis were killing the Jews, but only that they were unable, perhaps also even unwilling, to think the matter through to the end.

## Conclusions

*Krakovski visti* was an important institution in Ukraine under the Nazi occupation. In difficult circumstances it was able to preserve and develop Ukrainian cultural life and offer a source of income to the threatened Ukrainian intelligentsia. The newspaper could conduct this cultural work only under the condition that it was obedient to the directives of the occupational authorities. In May 1943 these authorities demanded from the editors of the paper a series of anti-Jewish articles. The editorial board agreed, hoping that it would be able to turn the anti-Jewish articles to the advantage of the Ukrainian cause. The editors believed that they had succeeded in maintaining their objectivity in preparing the series. The articles were written by figures prominent in Ukrainian cultural and political life, but under pseudonyms. Socio-economic themes dominated in the articles, but the articles also broached other themes, especially pro-Communist sympathies among Jews and the questioning of traditional morality in the works of Jewish writers. One author wrote a series of articles on anti-Semitic theory. The articles showed indifference to the tragic fate of the Jewish population of Ukraine during the war. The roots of this indifference lay perhaps in the long-standing, pre-eminently socio-economic conflict between Jews and Ukrainians, exacerbated by ideological factors; also in the abnormal, brutal moral-political environment in which the Ukrainians found themselves; and in the inability, resulting from the lack of distance, to comprehend the exceptional character and historical significance of the Hitlerite crime. Although these factors gave rise to indifference among some Ukrainians, others felt that, at a time when the Hitlerites were conducting their actions against the Jews, it was impermissible to publish anti-Jewish articles. Thus some prominent representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia refused to write anti-Jewish articles. Judging from the editorial correspondence ("we have heard our

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in desolate camps, the first response everywhere was disbelief grounded in shock. Even the wanton and unconstrained killings and cruelties committed by the Germans had not prepared the Jews to grasp the facts of systematic mass murder.... The information about the death camps was rejected all over Europe, not only by the Jews, who, as the first targets and victims, would be expected to disbelieve most because the news threatened them most." Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The War against the Jews, 1933–1945* (New York: Bantam Books, 1986), 349–50.

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fill of accusations from many people”), the reaction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in general to the appearance of the anti-Jewish articles was more negative than not.



# Foreword to the *Turei Zahav* of Rabbi David ben Shmuel Ha-Levi (Volodymyr, 1586–Lviv, 1667)\*

*Henry Abramson*

The work of Rabbi David ben Shmuel Ha-Levi is representative of the flourishing of Jewish religious culture in Ukrainian ethno-linguistic territory. He is popularly known as the Taz, an abbreviation of the title of his greatest work, *Turei Zahav*, or “Rows of Gold,” an allusion to the *Arba Turim*, an earlier codification of Jewish law and in turn an allusion to the breastplate of the High Priest (see Exodus 28:17). This work is an encyclopedic commentary on Yoreh Deah, a section of the Code of Jewish Law (the *Shulhan Arukh* [Prepared Table], codified in the sixteenth century). The work gained wide popularity soon after its printing, and its study was considered so essential that it was traditionally printed alongside the text of the *Shulhan Arukh*. To this day, mastery of the *Turei Zahav* is a standard requirement for candidates to Orthodox rabbinical ordination. The Taz spent most of his life working in Ukrainian ethno-linguistic territory, serving as a rabbi in several Galician communities, including Lviv and Ostroh, where he composed this foreword. He was active in the Council of the Four Lands, a Jewish regulatory body within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He survived the upheavals of the Khmelnytsky era, but lost two sons to a pogrom in 1664.<sup>1</sup>

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\* This translation was prepared while I was a post-doctoral fellow at Yeshivat Ohr Somayach in Monsey, New York, and was completed during my appointment as the Slovin/YIVO Visiting Assistant Professor in Eastern European Jewish Studies at Cornell University. I am grateful to Rabbi Ben-Zion Kokis and Mr. Jay Margolis for their comments on earlier drafts. All errors remain my responsibility. I am also grateful to the Houghton Rare Book Library of Harvard University, which allowed me to examine a rare seventeenth-century edition of the Taz.

1. For a brief biography, see Elijah Schochet, “Taz”: *Rabbi David Halevi* (New York: KTAV, 1979).



The foreword is illustrative of several salient features of the rabbinic culture that developed in Ukrainian ethno-linguistic territory from the Middle Ages until the devastations of the twentieth century. First of all, the text evinces a profound respect for scholars (whether teachers or students) and an even greater respect for scholarship, as the Taz writes, "for there is no jealousy and no competition, only the acceptance of the truth from those who speak it." The foreword provides a glimpse of the intellectual culture of the Jewish population, with communities contributing sums to support adult educational institutions such as the Yeshivah (lit. "sitting" place, centre for Talmudic study) headed by the Taz in Ostroh. Also evident is the deep fear of sin, as the Taz refers to the possibility of errors in his work and begs his readers to come forward with their questions.

The massive corpus of rabbinic writings in eastern Europe is also exceptionally valuable as a unique source of information on the social, economic, and religious life of the region. On several occasions, for example, the Taz refers to relations between Jews and non-Jews. On the one hand, he writes that "most of the time the gentiles do not oppress [us]—quite the contrary, their practice is to deal kindly with Israel."<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, however, occasional references indicate a more strained relationship. Commenting on a passage in the *Shulhan Arukh* to the effect that Jews should use red wine for the Passover service, the Taz writes: "today we refrain from procuring red wine because of the blood libel," that is, non-Jews would be less likely to accuse Jews of drinking the blood of Christians if the Jews used only white wine for the spring holiday.<sup>3</sup> The devastation of the Jewish community in the wake of the Khmelnytsky rebellion is also referred to periodically.<sup>4</sup>

The Taz also takes a strict position with regard to Jews involved in counterfeiting currency; since they place the community as a whole in danger of receiving collective punishment, he rules that they should be handed over to the authorities.<sup>5</sup> While these glimpses into everyday life are fascinating, unfortunately very little distinction is made among the various non-Jewish nationalities in rabbinic writings of this era. Whether a given passage refers to Poles or Ukrainians or any other non-Jews must

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2. Divrei David on Deuteronomy 7:22, cited in Schochet, "Taz," 20.

3. *Shulhan Arukh*, Orakh Haiim 472:11:9. For more details on the blood libel, see Gavin Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), esp. chaps. 9–12.

4. See Schochet, "Taz," 19–20 and 51–4 for references.

5. *Shulhan Arukh*, Yore Deah 157:1:7. The reference in Schochet, "Taz," 68 n. 75, is a typographical error.

be carefully clarified within its context. Rabbinic sources such as the Taz have not been fully exploited for their value as sources for social history.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, their primary importance—the sense in which they are written, and the spirit in which this brief translation is included in this Festschrift—is as documents of the rich internal religious life of Ukrainian Jewry. While living in Ukrainian ethno-linguistic territory and participating in the economic and, to an increasing degree, social life of the region, these seventeenth-century Jews lived an intellectual life that had more in common with the ancient Temple of Israel, the Talmudic academies of Babylon, and the medieval legal schools of western Europe.

I am honoured to offer this translation in a Festschrift for Professor Peter Potichnyj, who has done so much pioneering work on Jewish-Ukrainian relations. He has profoundly influenced the direction of my own research in this difficult area. I have been personally inspired by the level of dedication and objectivity he attempts to bring to this controversial topic, and I have been hard pressed to maintain a similar academic posture in my own work. I hope that this brief chapter communicates some of the value of Jewish culture to those unfamiliar with it, just as Professor Potichnyj's work helped me realize the uniquely Ukrainian contribution to the civilizations of humanity.

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6. Of notable exception is the work of Jacob Katz. See, for example, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); and *The "Shabbes Goy": A Study in Halakhic Flexibility* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989).

IN ORDER TO EXPAND the extent of the Children of Israel, to increase their numbers and might, and fill the earth [with] the knowledge of God, in Talmud and [the work of] legal decisors, to cause increase upon increase, seeing small things that had heretofore been hidden from the eye;<sup>7</sup> for all of those [people] from among the holy ones who turned [their attention] to understanding what Israel should do in legal matters; God sent before them a person who was sold as a slave, YOSEF,<sup>8</sup> the slave who is served by the city,<sup>9</sup> by all the tribes of Israel. He is the provider of nourishment, he weakens the belt of the powerful,<sup>10</sup> for every broken heart<sup>11</sup> with his great and important work THE HOUSE OF YOSEF<sup>12</sup> and the Shulhan Arukh.<sup>13</sup> And [this] pure man collected [legal opinions] from all holy encampments<sup>14</sup> and brought [them] together by his hand.<sup>15</sup> This his name is Yosef, meaning God will add [yosef] to us another son who is comparable to him.<sup>16</sup> This [other son] was Moshe [Moses],<sup>17</sup> the man who led [us] like the flock of Yosef, and

7. This is a reference to "novellae" (*hidushim*), logical implications of the Torah that had previously gone unnoticed. The discovery of such novellae is one of the principal occupations of Talmudic scholarship.

8. The Taz is making a poetic connection between Rabbi Yosef Karo, the author of the *Shulhan Arukh*, and his biblical namesake Yosef (Joseph), who was sold into slavery by his brothers, rose to power in Egypt, and later became their benefactor (see Genesis 37–47). Cf. Psalms 105:17.

9. An unusual phrase that apparently refers to both the biblical Joseph as well as the widespread acceptance of Rabbi Karo's work by the rabbinical establishment.

10. Job 12:21. This is a reference to individuals with worldly, as opposed to spiritual, power. This is an oblique reference to Shabbetai Tsvi, who led a seventeenth-century messianic movement. See Berel Wein, *Triumph of Survival* (New York: Shaar, 1990), 25–6; Schochet, "TAZ," 21–4.

11. "God is close to the broken-hearted" (Psalms 34:18). The Taz is making a pun on the words "provider" (*ha-mashbir*) and "broken-hearted" (*lev nishbar*).

12. *Bet Yosef*, an encyclopedic commentary on the *Arba Turim*.

13. The authoritative codification of Jewish law, published in 1564.

14. That is, from all places of Jewish settlement. The term "encampment" is a biblical allusion to the temporary settlements of the Jews in their wanderings after the Exodus from Egypt.

15. The methodology of Rabbi Karo was to collect all the major legal opinions on every issue and formulate a single text that would attempt whenever possible to meet the requirements of the majority view.

16. At Yosef's birth, his mother Rahel proclaimed "God will add to me another son." Genesis 30:24.

17. A reference to Rabbi Moshe Isserles (1520–72), the author of the *Mapah*

the two of them built the House of Israel in laws, decisions, and recensions. And all the people saw and were delighted and rejoiced for they arrived at the place of their desires,<sup>18</sup> [understanding] every moment that it was permitted to eat or forbidden, or if one was obligated or exempt.<sup>19</sup>

And behold, after I saw in the foreword of our teacher, the author of the House of Yosef, who worried about the possibility that the Torah might be made into several Torahs because of the differences of opinion that existed among legal decisors, [and thus] paid attention and researched and put the house in order<sup>20</sup> to verify the matters correctly. And in this, our generation, there is once again cause for [similar] worry,<sup>21</sup> for several great ones in Israel have risen after him [Rabbi Karo]. The one in particular from our people was the Pride,<sup>22</sup> the Great One, Our Master, the Rabbi,<sup>23</sup> Shlomo Luria,<sup>24</sup> and after him in our times the Prides Our Master, the Rabbi, Our Teacher [Yehoshua] Falk,<sup>25</sup> their memory for a blessing,<sup>26</sup> and my Master, my father-in-law the Pride our Teacher, the Rabbi, Our Teacher Yoel [Sirkes],<sup>27</sup> his memory for a blessing. [They] wrote famous writings, each one great in conform-

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(Tablecloth), an important commentary on the *Shulhan Arukh* (Prepared Table). The *Mapah* is printed in the standard edition as italicized glosses within the text of the *Shulhan Arukh*. In terms of legal matters, the *Shulhan Arukh* tends to lean in the direction of Sephardic decisors, that is, Jews of Spanish and North African descent. The *Mapah* amplifies the text of the *Shulhan Arukh* and often brings differing opinions from Ashkenazi sources, that is, German and Eastern European decisors.

18. Psalms 107:30.

19. That is, they achieved clarity in Jewish law.

20. The standard text reads, "paid attention and examined a house." This passage follows the text of the of the Prague 1694 edition (*izen hiker ve-tiken bayit*) in the Houghton Rare Book Library of Harvard University. Cf. Ecclesiastes 12:9.

21. Lit., "the worry has returned to its place."

22. Gaon, an honorific for exceptional Torah scholars.

23. While these terms seem excessive in English, they are commonly applied to great scholars in Rabbinic Hebrew. Long honorifics are often abbreviated.

24. The author (1510–73) of *Yam shel Shlomo*, an important Talmudic commentary.

25. The author (c. 1555–1614) of several studies in Jewish law.

26. This phrase is often applied to exceptional individuals who have passed away. Here it is abbreviated and may be read in the singular or plural. In the singular, however, it would exclude Rabbi Luria, and it is doubtful that this was the author's intent. I have accordingly translated it in the plural.

27. The author (1561–1640) of *Bayit Hadash*, a commentary on the *Arba Turim*.

ity with their [respective] honour. And the eyes of all Israel were upon them, all [readers] understanding according to their own abilities. This one [author] built, and another destroyed, this one dreamed, and another interpreted.<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless, the true path before us who are perplexed is to find the truth of their words.<sup>29</sup> Even though it may happen that [by merely hearing] the sound of the pen [and] the sound of the parchment [unfolding,<sup>30</sup> it may appear that their words are] not in consonance with the law, one should not open up the gates of one's mouth to utter a word, and not [even] half a word,<sup>31</sup> to embitter the eyes of the honoured ones, Heaven forbid.<sup>32</sup> [Indeed, one should do precisely] the opposite, placing one's soul in one's hands to settle [the disputed points] as far as is possible. "Innocence before guilt, and before the negative shall be the positive," as is explained in the laws of all conditional agreements, in which this is essential ...<sup>33</sup>

And all of these words are beneficial to say that there is nothing except the honour of Torah, and the "wise shall inherit honour,"<sup>34</sup> and their names shall be remembered with fondness. To perform an act, however, [which requires] a practical legal decision, the Rabbis of Blessed Memory already taught us that one does not give honour to a rabbi who is forced to [make] a temporary ruling [which is not based on widely

28. That is, one author sometimes defeated another's arguments, and sometimes what was mysterious to one was resolved by another.

29. A basic principle of Talmudic study is that even rejected or minority opinions have value and must be studied and understood.

30. That is, reading superficially. A reference to the Babylonian Talmud, *Gittin* 6a.

31. Possibly an allusion to the Talmudic concept of *hatsi shiur asur min ha-Torah*, "a half measure is forbidden by the Torah." For example, if one were culpable for eating an egg's volume of forbidden food, one would also be culpable for intentionally eating the volume of half an egg.

32. Meaning there is some truth in their opinions even if they seem to contradict the law. One must be patient to understand their logic before one dismisses their views.

33. What follows is a lengthy discussion of Talmudic law regarding contractual agreements, a flourish of logistics that gracefully demonstrates his mastery of Talmud and its commentaries. A rendition of this section adequate enough to make it accessible to readers unfamiliar with Talmud is beyond the scope of this translation.

34. Proverbs 3:35.

accepted precedent].<sup>35</sup> And the one who opens<sup>36</sup> the eyes of the teacher [indicating] that there is a refutation [of his ruling] in the words of some later authority, certainly the rabbi would forgo the honour due him in this, and he himself would be pleased with this [correction], for there is no jealousy and no competition, only the acceptance of the truth from those who speak it. And one of the references to this [type of situation] is in section 371<sup>37</sup> in the matter of the [laws of possible] spiritual impurity of a priest, and this [ruling] was contrary to an explicit Mishnah,<sup>38</sup> as we will discuss there, if God wills it. And without a doubt this righteous individual [who made the erroneous ruling] would be pleased that this be made public, and one who wishes to honour the practical ruling [of the erroneous opinion] is among the credulous. Similar references will be found in our book with the help of Heaven. And behold, this matter is a caution to the wise ones, who have received a share of knowledge and intelligence from the Blessed One,<sup>39</sup> as this problem can lead to harm. For there is one [claimant] who has [something] and does not want [it], and there [another who has] the opposite, and there is one who has much good but is under the control of others, occupied with [needs of] the community, and the matter requires a clear head.<sup>40</sup> And behold from the day that I was appointed to instruct [in the law] in [this], my place, I was perpetually disturbed by the verse,<sup>41</sup> "I said I will make myself wise," and so on.<sup>42</sup> The necessity [of seeking

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35. This is a reference to controversial "temporary rulings" that permit an otherwise impermissible action based on pressing circumstances. Talmudic law provides for a wide range of contexts and indicates when some laws may be violated to protect more essential laws. The Taz is referring to a rabbi who declares that it is time for such a violation without adequate argumentation.

36. Reading Prague 1694, "*ve-ha-pikeah*."

37. 371:1:3.

38. Mishnah, an authoritative body of Jewish law codified c. 200 C.E. The Taz is referring to a decision made by an unnamed authority that he respectfully demonstrated to be incorrect.

39. An allusion to the blessing recited upon seeing an exceptional Torah scholar: "Blessed are you, Lord our God, Monarch of the Universe, who has apportioned wisdom to those who fear God."

40. Meaning the complexities of practical Jewish law are exceptionally difficult and require much caution. Cf. Rashi s.v. "Tsiluta," Babylonian Talmud *Megilah* 28b.

41. Reading Prague 1694, "*ba-pasuk*."

42. The verse concludes with "yet she [wisdom] was far from me," Ecclesiastes 7:23. The disturbing part of the verse is the latter part; the Taz is following a convention of "not providing an opportunity for Satan" (*al tiftah piv le-Satan*,



wisdom despite its perpetual distance], however, did not depress me, and I placed my hope in the Blessed One that [God] would show me the true way and that [God] might realize in me [the verse] "one thing I have sworn in my holiness, not to deceive David."<sup>43</sup> The yoke of earning a livelihood was removed from me,<sup>44</sup> and slowly my shoulder [learned] to endure the yoke of Torah and significant students, from whom I grew, as the Sages of Blessed Memory said.<sup>45</sup> And my prayer bore fruit, for many novellae were born to me, thank God, whether in explaining the words of the Sages of Blessed Memory, or [in matters that] came to me for instruction. And I said in my heart, "they are for You alone, and none other besides You,"<sup>46</sup> for what am I to instruct others? Nevertheless, my lot, said my soul, is to print these words that they may stand for many days.<sup>47</sup>

And behold these three years I have been received by this holy community of holy communities, Ostroh, to disseminate Torah among them. And they set up for me a great House of Study,<sup>48</sup> a meeting place for the gathering of scholars,<sup>49</sup> and much good. And the above-mentioned community graced me with gold dripping from their pockets to provide enough for my needs and enough for my great and important Yeshivah, thank God, [and] gathered to me from near and far, from the ends of the earth, students of note, the likes of which I have never seen, to form this important Yeshivah. And I prepared my table<sup>50</sup> before them [laden with the knowledge] I merited [to receive] from the High Table.<sup>51</sup> And they listened to my statements for they were pleasant, and they urged me to bring these words to the printers. Yet my heart was hesitant to listen to them out of worry that since even one's personal obligations

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Babylonian Talmud *Berakhot* 19a) by omitting the conclusion from the written text. His readers would be familiar with the verse and would understand his meaning.

43. Psalms 89:36. The Taz is making a poetic connection between himself and his namesake, King David.

44. A reference to *Avot* 3:6: "Rabi Nehunyah son of Kana says: 'All who accept upon themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of earning a livelihood is removed from them.'"

45. A reference to the Talmudic concept that one learns more from one's students than from one's teachers or colleagues.

46. Cf. Proverbs 5:17.

47. Cf. Jeremiah 32:14.

48. In Hebrew *Bet Midrash*, a place where the Talmud is studied publicly.

49. Cf. Mishnah *Avot* 1:4.

50. A pun on the *Shulhan Arukh* (Prepared Table).

51. That is, from God.



are not pleasant for a person to accept, how much more so [are the obligations imposed by] another.<sup>52</sup> [This holds true] even if this does not come by way of legal decision, but rather by way of give and take.<sup>53</sup> In any case, there is a [potential] trap for one who sees words in print from [an author] who did not reach [the level of] instruction, and learns from the commentary some legal decision and relies upon it in practical affairs as well [as in purely theoretical matters, which have less immediate importance].<sup>54</sup> The chain hangs around the neck of one who causes this, and the Merciful One should rescue him from the punishment that might, Heaven forbid, result from this. All this occurred to my heart to stay my hand from the work of publication.

Afterwards my consolation returned and I was able to spread the idea before important people, both students and other learned people, and it was pleasing in their eyes, thank God, and I hoped that the Blessed One would prepare it in the eyes of the wise ones of the generation, the lovers of truth, from the position of the truth of Torah and no other, Heaven forbid. And I have called the name of this, my book, TUREI ZAHAV, so that people should recognize in this the words of the [author of the Arba] Tur[im]<sup>55</sup> himself, and the Shulhan Arukh with its other commentaries,<sup>56</sup> and [as an] allusion to the idea that [whoever contemplates the Tur] is like [one who contemplates] golden thoughts.<sup>57</sup> I also included in this many questions that were asked of me in the matters of instruction dealt with in Yoreh Deah, and what I answered with the help of the Blessed One.

In truth I wished to make public that several years have passed since I began to write this commentary on the section Yoreh Deah and the Shulhan Arukh, but a certain reason prevented the fruit of my pen, for

52. Meaning a person finds it difficult to accept the logical implications of his own thought when it comes to legal obligations, and it is even harder for him to accept someone else's conclusions.

53. That is, explaining the reason for the obligation than simply ordering it.

54. The Taz is expressing his fear that he has not actually reached "the level of instruction," even though he was the head of a Yeshivah. The printed word has great permanency, and the Taz is worried that he may not be able to correct any errors that he might have made.

55. Torah scholars are traditionally known not by their given names but by the title of their most significant work (e.g., the Taz, the Tur, the Hafets Hayim, and so on). A notable exception is Yosef Karo, the compiler of the *Shulhan Arukh*, who is honoured by the title "the Author" (*ha-mehaber*).

56. Reading Prague 1694, "*bahutsot ka-zeh*."

57. *Turei Zahav*: Rows of Gold.

it was not in my power to fulfil my wishes [with] enough [for] my needs in matters of properly acquired funds.<sup>58</sup> And between these [various problems] I lost several notebooks, and thus I was forced to study anew, for the hand of God was good to me.

And I bow down and cover myself in the dust of the feet of the Sages<sup>59</sup> as I write occasionally to contradict their words, so that they should not hold me culpable. For I am witnessed from the heights that I agonized over this many times when I was brought to this situation, but the proof could not be refuted.

And the tower of my request is open before all who delve into this book, so that if some matter should trouble the [reader's] heart, [the reader] should not hurry to destroy the building from the beginning of study. And for all of the days that the One who is Blessed and Elevated will give me life, I will know [how] to solve [such] difficulties and I will not be ashamed in a matter of law.<sup>60</sup> And I will trust in God that by means of this book many sweet legal novellae will be awakened, [and that] I will be worthy<sup>61</sup> to publish also my commentary on Hoshen Mishpat<sup>62</sup> and its *Shulhan Arukh*,<sup>63</sup> which was prepared first for God by my hand, along with many sweet novellae, with the help of the Blessed One. May God complete through me, do not forsake the work of Your hands.<sup>64</sup> Much peace to the lovers of your Torah—for them there is no stumbling block.<sup>65</sup>

A prayer of DAVID,<sup>66</sup> he who is the least of the sons of my master and father, my teacher the Rabbi, our Rabbi, SHMUEL HA-LEVI, his memory for a blessing for life in the world to come.

58. Reading Prague 1694, which abbreviates "*be-divrei*."

59. Cf. *Mishnah Avot* 1:4.

60. Cf. Psalms 119:46.

61. The text reads "I will recall" (*ezker*), which is most likely a printer's error. The text should read *ezkeh*. The orthographic difference between the two Hebrew letters is minimal.

62. A section of the *Shulhan Arukh* dealing with damages.

63. The phrase is odd, since Hoshen Mishpat is a section of the *Shulhan Arukh* itself. The Taz may be referring to the corresponding section in the *Arba Turim*, also called Hoshen Mishpat; thus "its" The *Shulhan Arukh* means the decisions of Yosef Karo based on the *Arba Turim*. This concurs with Schochet's research on the Taz's approach to these two works. See his "TAZ," 39–49. This commentary, although prepared first, was not published in its entirety until 1776.

64. Cf. Psalms 148:8.

65. Psalms 119:65.

66. Cf. Psalms 17:1.



A page from the standard edition of the *Shulhan Arukh*, section Yoreh Deah. The text in the top centre is the *Shulhan Arukh* itself, with the italicized glosses of the *Mapah*. This is surrounded by various commentaries, with the *Turei Zahav* in the place of honour on top alongside the binding (here on the upper right).

# Ukraine—a Nation State or a State of Nations?

*Julian Birch*

Ukraine, particularly in the years of the cold war, gained a widespread reputation in the outside world for a fearsome nationalist fervour. Indeed, the partitioned Ukraine of the interwar years had witnessed in its nationalists what has been described as the "turn to the right."<sup>1</sup> The subsequent sad episode where sizeable numbers of Ukrainians perceived Nazi Germany as a potential saviour from Stalinist Communism and joined the ranks of the Nazi forces was then to be followed by a heroic struggle against the reimposition of the Stalinist murder machine. Ukrainians were also at the forefront of the dissident movements of the 1960s through 1980s and, in the likes of Danylo Shumuk and Sviatoslav Karavansky, produced nationalists who made Nelson Mandela seem something of an amateur. Such zeal created an image of Ukrainians as nationalists of a peculiarly obdurate order. What then, it was often asked, would be the attitude of an independent Ukraine, both internally towards its minorities and externally towards its neighbours?

The purpose here is to explore purely the internal dimension of this—the relative position accorded to the rival concepts of "nation state" and "state of nations" in the transition to independence.

## **Integral Nationalism and the Nation State**

Part of the ideological baggage of practically any nationalist movement is the assumption that its members would be better off determining their own agenda and running their affairs themselves. From this assumption frequently flows the proposition that this can best be done within the framework of their own state, where the nation's language, religion, culture, and customs can take the leading position

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1. Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1980).

within an association of people who have chosen to stay together over the course of centuries and within a political entity matching their ethno-linguistic frontiers. Indeed, every ethnic group seeking the removal of an overlord group dominating them has a reasonable expectation that it will thereafter rule itself.

The character of a state emerging from such preconceptions can indeed range from the national exclusivist (nation-state) ruled merely in the interests of the newly empowered majority group, to the national democratic (state of nations) in which the now ruling majority group ensures its wishes predominate but the minorities are fairly protected.

Integral or exclusivist nationalism is a relatively new phenomenon, following on from the emergence of the first modern nation states. Essentially it sought to emulate the pattern of those new states but to take the process further towards an entity that we would now declare to be in effect ethnically cleansed. It was then, and is, an intolerant approach to state building, with a secondary agenda involving voluntary or involuntary demographic changes, socio-cultural measures, and economic restructuring.

## Integral Nationalism in Ukraine

As Roman Szporluk has pointed out, for many centuries Ukrainians lived in other people's states and were never the masters in their own land.<sup>2</sup> Hardly surprising was it then to find a strong desire to control their own affairs within their own state. Thus many Ukrainian nationalists perceived it as no more than normal to desire the rights that others, such as the Poles, were seen to have already.

Some, however, were to go further and elevate the idea of a Ukrainian nation, within its own independent and united state, to the level of the highest value in political life. In this view, it was to such a state that ethnic Ukrainians were to owe total and ultimate allegiance above all else.

Such ideas became the stock in trade of the likes of Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973).<sup>3</sup> By the mid-1920s he had become an admirer of clear, simple, populist ideas based on the deepest instincts of the Ukrainian peasant masses; of an active, even militant, rather than a merely passive

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2. Roman Szporluk, "The Ukraine and Russia," in Robert Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 162.

3. See Mykhailo Sosnovsky, *Dmytro Dontsov: Politychnyi portret. Z istorii rozvytku ideolohii ukrainskoho natsionalizmu* (New York: Trident International, 1974); and Motyl, 61–85.

nationalism; and of the success of the strong nation over the weak in the struggle of the fittest to survive. As such he was anti-internationalist in approach.<sup>4</sup> Russians were for him the chief enemy of Ukraine.

These and similar ideas took organisational form in the most prominent nationalist group, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), from its foundation in 1929 up to the 1980s.<sup>5</sup> Similar ideas were expressed in the ideological programme of the wartime Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), which proclaimed: "The preservation of a nation's life, national unity and culture constitutes the primary and highest goal of any sound national organism. A sovereign national state is the chief guarantee of the preservation of a nation's life, its normal development and the well being of its citizens." This program did, however, go on to guarantee citizenship rights to all national minorities in Ukraine, albeit without any mention of autonomy.<sup>6</sup>

Actually, until the 1940s a substantial proportion of Western Ukrainians had had only limited contact with most of Ukraine. They had been born and brought up variously under Austria-Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Romania in areas steeped in at least one version of "traditional" Ukrainian culture and values. Predominantly Catholic and rural, they were natural anti-Communists, the more so having witnessed Stalinism from without and then suffered it at its peak from within. Much of what they saw they also associated with Russia and the Russians, as well as with Jews and other seemingly rootless internationalists of the Russian empire. Even after the defeat of their armed resistance movement in the early 1950s, studies of Ukrainian nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s continued to show the most independence-minded nationalism to be concentrated still in this western region.<sup>7</sup> Here, too, Ukrainian integral nationalism continued to draw its support and retain its strength. It thus was and remained a somewhat localized form of Ukrainian nationalism.

This pattern continued right up to the gaining of independence in 1991. The survivors of the guerilla actions of the 1940s and 1950s were released from prisons and camps in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and, along with those who managed to return from exile in Siberia (where many had been sent after the Soviet incorporation of Western Ukraine),

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4. Motyl, 68–70.

5. On the OUN's early years and ideology, see Motyl, 153–61.

6. See the text in *ABN Correspondence* 55, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 47–8.

7. On the distinctiveness of Western Ukraine, see Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia," *Soviet Studies* 31, no. 1 (January 1979): 76–98.



they either became active again themselves or passed on their even more vehemently held values to their children and grandchildren. This integralist radicalism thereby acquired new supporters, especially among student activists in the western city of Lviv, but even in the capital, Kyiv. Thus it was that by the years 1989–91 a militant nationalism was well entrenched in the western part of Ukraine, one group actually forming a Club of Supporters of Dmytro Dontsov. The Gorbachevian policy of openness not only allowed some unwanted historical cats out of the bag, but also witnessed the expression of previously publicly unspeakable integral-nationalist ideas. In many respects this could be seen as a reversal of what many Ukrainians were accusing the Soviet Russians of doing to them—that is practising Russification, denationalizing them to create not so much an internationalized Soviet people as a group of ersatz Russians. Now many ethnic Ukrainians appeared to be seeking not only a new, strong state of their own within their full ethnic frontiers, but also calling on any of the hopefully few Russians and others intent on remaining in independent Ukraine to take on the character of Ukrainians—in effect a process of Ukrainianization. A multinational, multi-homeland state was seen as a threat to the integrity and security of the Ukrainian people. Instead of mere spatial identity with the territory, ethnic identity and exclusiveness was being espoused. As with Russification previously, it would involve three main processes: Ukrainianization of the population, Ukrainianization of education and culture, and Ukrainianization of power and political life.

It was not that no thought was given to minorities within Ukraine by the integralists, merely that, as in other respects, the priority concern was with the Ukrainian nation itself. In so far as other peoples were considered by the integralists, they were seen as having the right to states of their own, but in their own homelands. For example, the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of the OUN declared in 1943, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is fighting for an independent, united Ukrainian state and for the right of every nation to live a free life in its own independent state. The only way to effect a just solution to the national and social problems in the world is to bring an end to the subjugation and exploitation of one nation by another and to establish a system of free people living in their own independent states." O. Hornovy (Osyk Diakiv), in commentary upon this, wrote, "The OUN maintains that the Russian state should correspond to Russia's ethnic territory and should not extend beyond those boundaries. We aspire to the closest possible co-

operation with the Russian people as long as they live in their own national state as defined by their ethnic boundaries.”<sup>8</sup>

This was not at all an unusual posture for nationalists to take during the quest for independence. The main struggle was perceived as being between Ukraine and the Soviet centre in Moscow, and in such a critical time the interests of any ethnic minorities had to be subsumed under the more general interests of the majority people. Dissent from minorities was perceived as the work of a treacherous fifth column aiding and abetting by its actions the main enemy.

## The Integral-Nationalist Parties in Ukraine

Proponents of such views in Ukraine have been known variously as the national radicals or the ultra-nationals. There was to be a lack of unity. The radical nationalist parties have differed particularly over the role of the state in the economy and over elements of strategy and tactics. Nevertheless most of them have accepted the fundamentals of integralism. Among the groups that have achieved a measure of stability, and indeed attempted to break out of the west Ukrainian stronghold, are: the Ukrainian National Party (UNP); State Independence for Ukraine (DSU); the Ukrainian Nationalist Union (UNS); the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA); the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU); and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN).<sup>9</sup>

The UNP's first branch, in Lviv, was established on 3 November 1989, and others soon followed.<sup>10</sup> Its views were aired particularly in its journal *Ukrainskyi chas* and its paper *Pryzyv natsii*, and its program was aimed at the restoration of the Ukrainian National Republic (formed on 22 January 1918) and the Western Ukrainian National Republic with which it united on 22 January 1919—Ukraine's “ethnic territory.”<sup>11</sup>

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8. *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Fight for Freedom* (New York: Dnipro Publishing Co., 1954), 165–77; and Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, eds., *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943–1951* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 320.

9. On the formation and development of these parties in general, see M. A. Babkina, ed., *New Political Parties and Movements in the Soviet Union* (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1991), 89–98; Andrew Wilson and Arthur Bilous, “Political Parties in Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 45, no.4 (1993): 693–703; and Bohdan Nahaylo, “Ukraine,” *RFE/RL Research Report* 43, no. 16 (22 April 1994): 42–9.

10. *ABN Correspondence* 51, no. 3 (May–June 1990): 41.

11. For its program, see *ABN Correspondence* 40, no. 6 (November–December 1989): 19–21.

Officially it proclaimed it would abide by the internationally recognized rights of man and of national minorities, though it was far from clear how far they would extend these rights. The party merged with the Ukrainian People's Democratic Party in June 1992 to form the Ukrainian National Conservative Party (UNKP).<sup>12</sup>

The DSU was formed in April 1990 and was closely aligned with the OUN Bandera faction in the West. It was headed until the end of 1993 by the long-term nationalist dissident Ivan Kandyba (who then left to form the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine). The movement's newspaper, *Neskorena natsiia*, which in 1993 became *Nezbornyma natsiia*, had as its slogan "Ukraine for the Ukrainians." Under the guidance of Kandyba and its chief ideologist, Roman Koval, the DSU has explicitly confined its membership to Ukrainians.<sup>13</sup> Ukraine, it declared, should be ruled by Ukrainians in a state marked by order and discipline. There should be an end to mixed marriages and immigration, and Russians and Jews should be returned to their homelands. Although only numbering a few hundred members, the DSU set up its own paramilitary wing, Varta.<sup>14</sup>

The UNS was also formed in 1990 from, among others, extremist members of the Lviv branch of the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM) who had gone on to form a Club of Supporters of Dmytro Dontsov and a journal entitled *Natsionalist*. The chief ideologist of the UNS was Dmytro Korchynsky, an open admirer of Dontsov who was soon to reappear in the UNA.<sup>15</sup>

The UNA was born out of the coalition Inter-Party Assembly (MPA)—itself formed from the UNP and other groups—and founded in the June 1990. From its offices in Kyiv, it became the best organized of the ultra-nationalist groups, claiming a membership of 3,500 to 4,000 by early 1993.<sup>16</sup> It portrayed itself as the nation's saviour from the corruption of the other parties, and was prepared to consider extra-parliamentary means to attain power.<sup>17</sup> Its paper *Holos natsii* included in its pages calls for racial purity, Ukraine to be ruled by the Ukrainians, and deportation of minorities not permanently resident in Ukraine, such as Armenians, Gypsies, and Jews—peoples they claimed to be responsible

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12. Nahaylo, 47.

13. Nahaylo, 44–6.

14. Nahaylo, 46.

15. Nahaylo, 43, 45.

16. Nahaylo, 43–4.

17. Nahaylo, 45.

for Ukraine's economic ills.<sup>18</sup> The UNA also came to condemn the separatist Russians in Crimea, declaring that the peninsula should be "either Ukrainian or depopulated."<sup>19</sup> It also wished to extend Ukrainian influence over neighbouring territories with a Ukrainian population, such as the Don and Kuban regions of Russia and Transdnistria in Moldova.<sup>20</sup> To play a part in these and other regions, in late 1991 the UNA formed its own paramilitary wing, the Ukrainian People's Self-Defence Force (UNSO), which, under the leadership of Oleh Vitovych, was soon several hundred strong. This body staged demonstrations in Crimea in March 1992 and later despatched volunteers to defend the Ukrainian minority in the so-called Dniester republic. Subsequently, as it grew more and more chauvinistic, the UNA/UNSO turned against the leadership of post-independence Ukraine and came to be condemned by the head of state security as giving Ukraine a bad name and merely provoking a backlash from the minorities.<sup>21</sup>

The SNPU was founded in Lviv at the end of 1991 as the country moved into independence. Its black-shirted supporters, under the leadership of Iurii Kryvoruchko, have as their emblem a swastika-like version of the traditional Ukrainian trident.<sup>22</sup>

The last of these groups, KUN, was not formed until 1992, after the attainment of independence, but it has played a part, under the leadership of Iaroslava Stetsko, in attempting to influence the shape and outlook of the new state. Among its supporters are members of the émigré OUN Bandera faction who formerly backed the integral nationalism of the DSU but are now seeking to project a somewhat more moderate image.<sup>23</sup>

Among other minor ultra-nationalist groups active in the early 1990s were the Brotherhood of the Eastern Cross, the Legion of the New Order, Conscious Ukrainian Youth (all in Kyiv), the National Socialist Party of Ukraine (in Poltava), the National Conservative Party, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (under M. Slyvka).<sup>24</sup>

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18. See, e.g., *Holos natsii*, no. 23 (July 1993).

19. *Ukrainskyi obrii*, no. 8 (1992).

20. Nahaylo, 45.

21. I. Marchuk in *Kievskie vedomosti*, 4–7 September 1993.

22. Nahaylo, 47.

23. On the KUN, see *Molod Ukrainy*, 18 March 1994.

24. Nahaylo, 48; and M. Wasylyk, "Ukraine on the Eve of the Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no. 12 (25 March 1994).

## The Failure of Integral Nationalism

The failure of the integral-nationalist cause revealed itself in numerous ways in both the buildup to and the initial stages of Ukrainian state independence. It could, by its very nature, only have great appeal where the Ukrainian identity was strong, but this was a fairly localized phenomenon, as Arel's data shows very clearly.<sup>25</sup> In the western oblasts—such as Ternopil oblast, where in 1989–90 just two percent of the population was Russian, ninety-seven percent of children were in Ukrainian-language schools, and 0.2 percent of Ukrainians claimed Russian as their mother tongue—support for the integral nationalists was, not unnaturally, substantial (in so far as it could be considered particularly significant when set against the support for others). In the south—particularly in Crimea, where sixty-seven percent of the population was Russian, no exclusively Ukrainian-language schools existed, and forty-seven percent of Ukrainians declared Russian as their mother tongue—the pattern was more or less totally reversed. The central oblasts fell in between these extremes. Not unnaturally, the integralists could seek some support there, especially in Kyiv, but not the relative strength found in the west.

The general election of 1990 did not allow the new integralist parties to show their strength or weakness, as they were still not able to register as parties or to compete openly under Gorbachev's strange conception of democratization.

The UNA sought to nominate its leader, Iurii Shukhevych—one of the best-known nationalist political prisoners until 1988—for the presidential election on 1 December 1991, but failed to collect the 100,000 signatures needed to have him registered as a candidate.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, despite the presence of these groups and organizations, the politics of the period of buildup to independence and immediately afterwards was remarkably tranquil when compared with some other parts of the collapsing Soviet Union. In actuality, even at their peak in 1989–91 all the nationalist parties together, including the more moderate groups, could only muster the support of about twenty-five to thirty percent of polls in Ukraine and were never strong enough to take power on their own.<sup>27</sup>

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25. Dominique Arel, "The Parliamentary Blocks in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do They Represent?" *Journal of Soviet Nationalities* 1, no. 4 (1990–1): 133–4.

26. Nahaylo, 44.

27. Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine in 1993," *Russia and the Successor States Briefing Service* 2, no. 1 (February 1994): 3.

The performance of the ultras since independence has been no less unimpressive. Surveys in 1993 and early 1994 cited by Nahaylo indicated the UNA as having the backing of no more than two to three percent of the Ukrainian population of voting age, though the figure was higher in the western oblasts.<sup>28</sup> Their position was tested further in the parliamentary elections of March and April 1994 when just one UNA candidate was elected in the first round, for a fairly safe seat in Ternopil.<sup>29</sup> Two other UNA candidates who reached the second round were elected in Lviv—including the commander of the UNA's paramilitary wing, the UNSO, though the UNA's local leader, Andrii Shkil, was defeated. Thus, in elections with a substantial turnout, three UNA people secured seats in the parliament and amassed around 100,000 votes in Lviv oblast. The KUN was rather more successful, winning six seats from the first two rounds of voting, mostly in Lviv oblast, where it gained some 150,000 votes. The SNPU's candidates were totally eliminated, the party leader receiving a mere five percent of the vote and the party attaining just 50,000 votes in Lviv oblast.<sup>30</sup> Thus, in the Ukrainian parliament the integralists have been too small a group to constitute a serious faction.

Overall, integral nationalism is a movement whose time has come—and, it seems, gone. While it could conceivably re-emerge as a force in the future, it remains essentially strong only in the few oblasts (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Ternopil) of western Ukraine. But those oblasts account for only 10.4 percent of Ukraine's population, and even there integral nationalism's appeal has been and is limited. Demographic changes elsewhere make it appear a cause that has in any event already been lost.

Most integralists have tended to take for granted that all Ukrainians knew what Ukraine was and who Ukrainians were, as if this identity had been hovering over a place and a people since time immemorial. Questions need, however, to be asked about both. With respect to the question of "what is or where is Ukraine?", Kaiser recently reminded us of the importance to nationalists of the concept of homeland—a concept having both objective and subjective, geographic and historical, dimen-

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28. S. Hrabovsky's article on the UNA-UNSO in *Visti z Ukrainy*, 1994, no. 13.

29. On the ultras' performance in these elections, see *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 March 1994; *Ukrainian News*, 18 April 1994; "Analysis of Current Events, no. 18 (June 1994)," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no. 26 (1 July 1994): 16–18; J. Marko Bojcun, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March–April 1994," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 2 (March 1995): 229–49; and Sarah Birch, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994," *Electoral Studies* 14, no. 1 (March 1995): 93–9.

30. Nahaylo, 47.



sions.<sup>31</sup> Thus Ukraine may to a degree be loosely delineated by objective geographic factors such as the Carpathian Mountains and the Dniester River to the west, or in parts of the south by the sea. In other parts of the south, as well as the east and the north, frontiers are much less easy to define, lacking as they are in major natural features. The very name *Ukraina* means frontier territory, and those open frontiers have varied over time. In the same way, reference to the historical past to locate the "traditional homeland" is never very satisfactory as a guide to the area of contemporary interest. It is invariably located in a period of maximal power and influence. Like other homelands, that of Ukraine has been a changeable entity, gaining its present dimensions only quite recently—1954 in the case of Crimea.

As for the question "who are the Ukrainians?" that too depends upon the criteria deployed, most notably the spatial or the ethno-linguistic. On the one hand it could simply be anyone permanently resident within the geographic entity; on the other it could depend on ethnic and cultural characteristics. Nationalists generally reject the spatial approach, but their own ethno-linguistic alternative has its own complications. All of the sub-factors within their approach (common descent and historical experience, shared language, common culture and religion, shared self-identification, and identification by others as a distinct group) break down to a greater or lesser extent under close analysis. Ethnic/linguistic Ukrainians simply have not had a common history, living for long periods in quite different states—hence today's problems between the east and west of the country. Horizontal cultural consolidation and intermarriage between Ukrainians and Russians has been extensive and prolonged in central and eastern Ukraine. Even many western Ukrainian peasants were scarcely aware of being part of a community larger than the village until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.<sup>32</sup> History is once again being rewritten to suit contemporary needs. Similarly the idea of a shared language overlooks the dominance of other languages over large areas for long periods in the past (Polish, German, and Tatar) and the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians who (for whatever reason) have come to adopt Russian as their mother tongue. In 1989, in all some eleven percent of Ukrainians were predominantly Russian-speaking, the figure rising to forty-three percent in Kharkiv.<sup>33</sup> Ukrainian itself, while now possessing a standardized form,

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31. Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4.

32. See, e.g., Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 263–307.

33. Serhiy Tolstov, "Dimensions of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Ukraine," *The*



has significant dialects among the Hutsuls, Boikos, and Transcarpathian Rusyns of the west, the Polishchuks of the Polissia marshes in the north, and the descendants of Cossacks in the south and east. Indeed, some Rusyns do not want to be part of independent Ukraine.<sup>34</sup> Ecclesiastical unity was lost in the sixteenth century. Ukrainian identity, again like that of many others, is no more than a "flexibly delimited community of interest."<sup>35</sup> The reality is that Ukraine has for some time been and currently is a multinational entity. Indeed, the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in present-day Ukraine has actually declined from 76.8 percent in 1959 to 72.7 percent in 1989.

### The Multinational Dimension of Independent Ukraine

The presence of others on "Ukrainian" territory is a fact of life that the integralists had not frightened off before independence and had to be addressed by other parties and the government after independence. Out of the total population in 1989 of 51,452,034, the minorities numbered 14,033,081, or 27.2 percent.<sup>36</sup> Thus over a quarter of the new state's population was not actually Ukrainian at the outset.

Of these, the Russians constituted a massive 11,355,582, or 22.2 percent of the total population, and clearly would need some special attention.<sup>37</sup> The position of the remaining five percent was more complex, varying as they did from nearly half a million Jews to 5,000 to 10,000 Slovaks. Most, like the Belarusians (440,045 in 1989), Moldovans (324,525), Hungarians (163,111), Romanians (134,825), Slovaks, and, to some extent, the Poles (219,179), were essentially indigenous overlap populations at the extremities of Ukrainian territory and with their own countries adjacent. At first sight autonomy for them within a newly independent Ukrainian state, other than simply in respect of cultural

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*Ukrainian Review* 40, no. 2 (summer 1993): 34; and *Verchirnyi Kharkiv*, 30 July 1990.

34. See Alfred A. Reisch, "Transcarpathian Hungarian Minority and the Autonomy Issue," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 7 (14 February 1992): 17-23; and Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre/Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 1 (1994): 61-3.

35. Kaiser, 21.

36. For the breakdown of the Ukrainian population, see *Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniia SSSR: Po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g.* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991).

37. See Roman Szporluk, "Russians in Ukraine and the Problems of Ukrainian Identity in the USSR," in Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Ukraine in the Seventies* (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1977), 195-217; and Ian Bremmer, "The Politics of Ethnicity," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 2 (1994): 261-83.

freedom, seemed unlikely. Indeed, Poles in particular continued to leave in considerable numbers for the new Poland, as they had been for some time.<sup>38</sup> However, almost half the Hungarians around Berehove in Transcarpathia oblast did support a referendum on the creation of a Magyar national district in December 1991.<sup>39</sup>

Some groups without a neighbouring territory of their own could also be considered indigenous in the sense of being well established on Ukrainian territory, in particular the Greeks (settled there since ancient times though mostly the descendants of eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century immigrants); the Jews (present in southern and eastern Ukraine since the time of the Khazar kingdom, and in the west since the twelfth century); the Armenians (small numbers settled as merchants for centuries); and the Germans (introduced by Catherine the Great).<sup>40</sup> But most of these groups have undergone a significant population loss through emigration and are, in any event, fairly widely distributed or located mainly in large cities. Autonomous status was thereby rendered unlikely. Curiously it was a non-indigenous group, the Bulgarians (and Gagauz), who, by overwhelming support in a December 1991 referendum, called for a national territory in Bolhrad raion of Odessa oblast. Implementation of this was, however, to be deferred.<sup>41</sup> Apart from the problem of the large and growing Russian population in the south and east of the country, a re-emergent question has been the status of the Crimean Tatars returning from Central Asia, some 255,000 being officially registered by January 1994.<sup>42</sup> They had possessed administrative autonomy before mass deportation by Stalin, and continue to expect some separate status in the territory formally acquired by Ukraine only in 1954.

Inevitably, the position and status of these minorities has had to be taken into account in any realistic approach to the distribution and devolution of power in the new state. Ethnic homogeneity quite simply

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38. Ronald Wixman, *The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 70; and Bremmer, 265.

39. Reisch, 20.

40. On Greeks in Ukraine, see *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 19 December 1989; *The Financial Times* (London), 6 January 1990; *The Times* (London), 13 January 1990; *The Guardian* (London), 22 February 1990; and *The Times Higher Educational Supplement* (London), 11 January 1991. On Jews in Ukraine, see, e.g., *Encyclopedia Judaica*, vol. 15 (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 1512. On Germans, see, e.g., Oleh Shamshur and O. Malinovska in *Innovation* 7, no. 2 (1994): 166, 174.

41. *Holos Ukrainy*, 7 December 1991.

42. *Visti z Ukraini* (1994), as cited in Shamshur and Malinovska, 166. On the Tatars, see Wilson, 15.

is not an option, though, as Somalia shows, that offers no guarantee for harmony and stability in a new state.

## The State-of-Nations Alternative

The parties of moderate nationalism were able to take this more complex image of Ukraine on board, and in their programs the rights of the minorities have been more fully addressed. Short of demands for autonomy or even full independence, the coalition Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DPU), and the URP-DPU-led coalition Congress of National Democratic Forces (KNDS) have all been able to offer respect for the cultural and linguistic rights of the minorities—a nationalism fused with democracy.<sup>43</sup> Thus Rukh, in its initial program of 1989, certainly sought Ukrainian as the official language of the state, that all citizens should learn it, and that further immigration be curbed, but citizenship was to be open to all on the existing territory of Ukraine, not on any basis of ethnicity qualification. At its second congress in October 1990 it even went so far as to advocate national-territorial autonomy for those peoples without states of their own outside Ukraine, besides the territorial cultural autonomy previously on offer; representation in the parliament; a parliamentary committee on ethnic issues; a ministry of minority affairs; and publishing and broadcasting facilities to foster an ethnic-minority revival. The movement, however, split apart after independence on the crucial issue of whether such democratic features or the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood should come first. By the 1994 elections the nationalist tide—limited as it always was—appeared to have abated somewhat.

The key proponents of the state-of-nations model for Ukraine are, however, not the moderate nationalists, but rather the still internationalist-oriented former *nomenklatura* figures who were able to attract not only the support of many in Rukh and the URP, but also large numbers of people on the democratic and newly democratic left.

These people, with their widespread support among Russified Ukrainians in the centre and east of the country, had already won the

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43. On these parties and their views, see *RL Research Report* 324/88 (17 July 1988); G. Sajewich and Andrew Sorokowski, eds., *The Popular Movement of Ukraine, Rukh: Program and Charter* (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 1989); *Literaturna Ukraina* (31 May 1990): 4–5 (manifesto of the DPU); Arel, 108–54; Babkina, 89–98; Bohdan Szajkowski, ed., *New Political Parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Harlow: Longman, 1991), 290–2; *Report on the USSR*, 13 December 1991, 14–17; *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 16 (16 April 1993): 14–17; and Wilson and Bilous, 693–703.

confidence of much of the Russian population in the east and south, both in the election of 1990 and the independence referendum of 1991. Even the western Ukrainian Leonid Kravchuk had much to recommend him as a conciliator of the conflicting ethnic interests manifested even before the 1991 revolution and which were to continue thereafter. While an open supporter by 1991 of Ukrainian independence from the USSR, it was he who declared that "I start from the premise that Ukraine is multinational.... I would consider it the greatest tragedy if inter-ethnic strife were to break out here as it has in other republics. I will do everything I can to prevent that."<sup>44</sup> Subsequently he went on to proclaim that "Russians in the Ukraine should not be compared with the Russians in the Baltic republics. Here they are indigenous residents, they have lived in this land for hundreds of years."<sup>45</sup>

With the fall of the Communist regime, the new leadership of ex-Communist nationalistic internationalists passed a number of important measures to protect the rights not only of Russians, but of all the minorities. Various these were to make citizenship open to all residents, guarantee equal civil, political, and economic rights for minorities, and enshrine the free use of minority languages in areas of concentrated settlement.<sup>46</sup>

### The Failure of the State-of-Nations Approach?

In the initial years of independence the fears of the minorities that they had given up domination by Moscow for an even less successful Ukrainian central domination from Kyiv surfaced and were exacerbated. The lack of ethnic consensus revealed itself both in the 1994 elections and in more direct developments in three regions—the Russian autonomists and irredentists in the Donbas; the autonomist and independence-oriented Russian and Tatar populations of Crimea; and the irredentist movement on the western periphery.<sup>47</sup> Crimea represents the most troublesome of these; in the independence referendum of 1991 only 54.19 percent of its population voted in support.<sup>48</sup> Dire predictions in 1994 of imminent civil war, from commentators and the CIA alike, did, however,

44. *Report on the USSR* 2, no. 47 (23 November 1990): 14.

45. *Pravda* (Moscow), 16 July 1991.

46. See the texts in *Holos Ukrainy*, 2 and 16 November 1991; *Izvestiia* (Moscow), 4 November 1991; and *Holos Ukrainy*, 16 July 1992.

47. On the election results, see n. 46. On these regional problems, see D. J. B. Shaw and M. J. Bradshaw, "Problems of Ukrainian Independence," *Post-Soviet Geography* 33, no. 1 (January 1992): 10–16; Solchanyk, 47–68; and Wilson, 14–15.

48. *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 5 December 1991.

rather assume the existence of a totally inactive and unresponsive government. In fact, since October 1991 it has possessed powers to ban extremist parties and individuals threatening to jeopardize the territorial integrity of the country; in April 1993 it created a new Ministry of Interethnic Relations and Migration, initially with a left-of-centre minister in charge of handling such problems; and in March and April 1995, with Russia militarily occupied in Chechnia (and thus in no position to cry "foul" at Ukraine), it took decisive action against the Crimean rebel parliament and presidency. The government abolished the constitution and presidency of Crimea and then, in effect, its autonomous status granted in 1992.<sup>49</sup> Doubtless this was a signal to other parts of the country to take heed of the new, Russified eastern Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma.

Of the three main options for handling these problems in future—a unitary state, an essentially unitary state with limited autonomy in areas of minority concentration, or a federal state—the unitary model now lies at the forefront.<sup>50</sup> It is backed not only by the nationalist parties, but also by the mainstream non-nationalist parties, after the experience with Crimea. Federalism based on ethnic territories, with its dangers of being a stalking horse for independence movements, has its supporters primarily among Russian groups in the Donbas and Crimea and among some of the minorities on the western periphery. While many can see sense in the middle path, achieving a stable and agreeable balance between freedom and conformity and between central and devolved powers will be a major task for the new Ukraine's first constitution.

## Postscript

While by no means as successful and stable as some nationalists had hoped, Ukraine, in the year or so since this article was originally written, has continued to see the marginalization of the integralists. Some had already begun to throw themselves at Russia's colonial meddling activities elsewhere, such as in Abkhazia, rather than pursuing more success at home. Meanwhile, in Ukraine the pressures from Russians in the Donbas, but more particularly in Crimea, have been carefully and thus far successfully contained by the moderation of Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma. The Crimean Tatar problem has certainly grown with

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49. On the actions against Crimea, see, e.g., *The Independent* (London), 21 March 1995; and *The Daily Telegraph*, 3 April 1995.

50. On attitudes to the unitary/federal approaches, see RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 13 (27 March 1992): 64–8; and V. L. Hesli, "Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 1 (1995): 91–115.

continuing immigration, but it still poses anything but an insuperable problem if handled with similar tact.

In consequence, the Ukrainian state of nations still looks more secure than any Ukrainian nation-state would be, and more likely to persist than its ill-developed Belarusian neighbour. Ukrainians can indeed hope to benefit from the cultural diversity that has enriched so many other countries as they institute their new post-Soviet political culture. In this process the term "Ukrainian" will, for the foreseeable future, take on less of an exclusively ethnic dimension and more of a geographic one, at least until such time as the minorities are absorbed into a common Ukrainian cultural identity.

March 1996

# Ukraine's Political Elite and the Transition to Post-Communism

*Bohdan Harasymiw*

Hardly is the corpse of Sovietology colder than its successor, transitology, is already being pilloried.<sup>1</sup> In these circumstances, it may be foolhardy to use the words Ukraine and transition in close proximity, all the more so if a smooth and easy transition to democracy is assumed either to have taken place or as being under way. Of course, the battle over transitology is a bit quixotic, since both common sense and scientific caution would dictate that the end point of Ukraine's development is certainly not predetermined.

One of the variables that will determine the outcome—be that consolidated democracy or something else—is the transformation of the political elite. A commonly expressed opinion is that there is in Ukraine a remarkable degree of continuity with the period before 1991 and independence. The old Soviet *nomenklatura*, it is often said, is still in control. That is, while the former Communist Party's monopolistic and centralized machinery of political elite recruitment, assignment, and transfer—in short, its political patronage network—may no longer exist, the personnel who made their careers in that system—the beneficiaries and dispensers of that patronage—remain in positions of power. They do so for two reasons. Ukraine's exit from explicitly Communist dictatorship was by former Communists pre-empting the democratic movement rather than through a pact between them and their opponents (a pacted transition) or a displacement of them by their opponents (a democratic

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1. Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" *Slavic Review* 54, no. 1 (spring 1995): 111–27. Her comment was in response to Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?" *ibid.*, 53, no. 1 (spring 1994): 173–85, who were in turn responding to Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "Thinking About Post-Communist Transitions: How Different Are They?" *ibid.*, 52, no. 2 (summer 1993): 333–37.



revolution). Secondly, there is simply no obvious alternative pool from which a new political elite can be drawn. Whether the old political elite—those who made their careers in the *nomenklatura*—can be eased out of positions of power, and new pools created and tapped, therefore, will be critical for the kind of transition Ukraine undergoes. It will be critical not just in cosmetic terms, such that we see new faces in the political arena and in the electronic and print media, but in substance, which means that the new faces are no longer the products of the old system and capable only of reproducing (a perhaps modified version of) the old system—something like a bureaucratic-authoritarian or plebiscitarian communist dictatorship with a democratic facade.

In a recent book, Eva Etzioni-Halevy has put forward an appealing theory about the mutual interdependence of democracy and elites.<sup>2</sup> Elites are essential for democracy, she says, far from being antithetical to it. The key lies in the relative autonomy of elites from control by other elites and by the government.<sup>3</sup> "It is the mutual autonomy of elites, ... this countervailing and limiting [of] government power, which is a major requirement for democracy."<sup>4</sup> In this regard, the USSR, Soviet Ukraine included, was the very antithesis of elite autonomy and therefore of democracy. As mentioned below, there was a single, unified, centralized, and exclusive political elite all managed under one system, the *nomenklatura*. The dismantling of the latter institution was certainly critical for Ukraine's transition to democracy. It was not, of course, sufficient. Despite appearing to be a bureaucracy, the *nomenklatura* was never such in the Weberian sense of operating on the basis of impartiality, rationality, and merit. Instead it operated to a significant extent on the basis of patronage.<sup>5</sup> In Soviet Ukraine, not only were, say, cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and the state elite formally lacking in autonomy because of being managed through the monopolistic *nomenklatura* system, but, being

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2. Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *The Elite Connection: Problems and Potential of Western Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993).

3. *Ibid.*, chap. 5.

4. *Ibid.*, 101.

5. "Getting into the ranks of the *nomenklatura* elite was not straightforward. First it was necessary ... 'to decide the matter of partisan affiliation' in the Communist Party, then to manage to get into the *nomenklatura* of a party committee, ... and most importantly, to become a member of an informal clan that hauled its adherents up to the top of the power pyramid." Valerii Bebyk, "Politychna elita suchasnoi Ukrainy: Stan i tendentsii rozvytku," *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 23 March 1995.

members of various patron-client networks, were also informally deprived of autonomy. Without autonomy there was no democracy.

What remains of the *nomenklatura* system in Ukraine—the patron-client ties and the related expectations of those experienced in that system—still poses a risk to democracy. The autonomy of the public service from the Cabinet, as well as of the parliament from the government, will remain questionable so long as patronage prevails. A law on state service, passed in December 1993,<sup>6</sup> had eighteen months later still not been effectively implemented. So long as resources are predominantly state-controlled, or are relatively monopolized by the government, Ukraine's post-Communist transition will indeed be something short of consolidated democracy.

A study of the political elite of Ukraine spanning the period from 1990 (the year of the first semi-competitive elections) to the beginning of 1996 (the time of this writing), should tell us whether there has been a trend away from the Communist and towards a truly post-Communist, democratic leadership. While a change of the political elite itself will not guarantee or indicate the transition to democracy, no meaningful departure from Soviet Communism is possible without it. Valerie Bunce has forcefully posed the necessary question: "if the communists—now ex-communists—continue to occupy important posts in eastern Europe and if the media in most of these countries is still subject to undue control by the government in office, then is it accurate to argue, as Schmitter and Karl do, that these regimes have moved from the transition period to a period of democratic consolidation?"<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, this paper will examine the personnel of several key institutions to determine their potential for democratic leadership: the Cabinet of Ministers; the Presidential Administration; top officials of the government below ministerial level; the Presidium of the Supreme Council (*Verkhovna Rada*, i.e., parliament); and the leaders of Ukraine's political parties.

The principal indicator of the continuity of the old political elite used here is membership in the former Communist Party *nomenklatura*. In the Soviet era everyone who held any administrative post, no matter how lowly or exalted, was inscribed in the party's *nomenklatura*. Today, therefore, virtually everyone with any experience of organizational responsibility from before 1991 would have to be counted as a member of the old political elite. So broad an indicator would not be useful. A narrower definition of service in the *nomenklatura* is needed. In this study, if an

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6. "Pro derzhavnu sluzhbu," *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 4 January 1994.

7. Bunce, p. 113.

individual held a *nomenklatura* post in the Party or state in 1991 or earlier, he is considered a member of the old political elite; if he held a post outside the Party-state bureaucracy but in his own field (e.g., engineering, education, science, or medicine), then he is not.<sup>8</sup>

Another critical indicator of change has to do with whether or not the old pattern of promotion from within is still being practised. In the case of government ministers in particular, if still appointed from among vice-ministers (usually in the same department), then this is a technocratic or simply bureaucratic rather than democratic process, a continuation of the old style of personnel selection. In other words there is not a distinction (which is in normal circumstances by no means absolute, of course) between the political role of the minister and the administrative roles of his top officials, a distinction that is an essential aspect of party government in democracies. Furthermore, as both the minister and his officials (who aspire in future to become ministers) are still beholden to the President for their appointment and promotion, then the bureaucracy cannot easily develop the sort of autonomy it needs to be a proper civil service, autonomous of the political leadership of the state.<sup>9</sup>

A third indicator is simply the turnover of personnel itself, based on the assumption that in a democratic polity a change of political executive normally brings with it a change of supporting staff, if not a thorough partisan house-cleaning. Besides, in general, regular change of leadership is the sign of a healthy democracy. Continuity and change are therefore observed and recorded here as between: (1) the very end of the Soviet era, 1990–91; (2) the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk, December 1991–July 1994; and (3) the first eighteen months of the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, July 1994–January 1996.<sup>10</sup> Altogether, three tests are applied,

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8. Since virtually all of the persons covered by this study happen to have been male, as will become depressingly obvious presently, I have dispensed with the more equitable and sensitive designation "he or she."

9. The Law on State Service establishes fifteen ranks, grouped in seven categories, for public servants. Those in the first category fall under the President; the ones in the second, under the Cabinet; and the rest, under the respective department head. *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 4 January 1994. Although appointments and promotions are supposed to be made on the basis of merit, since there is no equivalent of the Civil Service Commission to standardize the criteria, the law's provisions in fact authorize a system of patronage rather than meritocracy.

10. The main sources of data for what follows are: *Khto ie khto v ukrainskii politytsi: Dovidnyk*, issue 1 (Kyiv: Kyivske naukove tovarystvo imeni Petra Mohyly, 1993); and the computer databank version of the same, entitled *Who's Who in Ukraine: Politicians* (Petro Mohyla Academic Society of Kiev, 1993 [but diskette updated to 30 June 1994]), further updated by this writer from the newspapers

looking (1) for the retention of persons who served in the *nomenklatura* (and are liable to govern or administer in the old dictatorial style); (2) for patterns of recruitment into political leadership similar to those of the Soviet era (which would inhibit autonomy and party government); and (3) for the straightforward turnover of personnel in leadership positions regardless of their background.

## The Cabinet of Ministers

Soviet Ukraine's first semi-competitive elections to the national parliament took place in the spring of 1990.<sup>11</sup> Subsequently the Supreme Council "elected" the Council of Ministers, as it was then called. This government consisted of Vitalii Masol as the chairman, two first deputy chairmen, six deputy chairmen, and fifteen ministers.<sup>12</sup> Out of this body of twenty-four men, at least twenty-one (87.5 percent) had been members of the Party-state elite (in the narrow sense employed in the present study) before then.<sup>13</sup> Sixteen (two-thirds) of the twenty-four were holdovers from the previous government.<sup>14</sup> Of the eight newcomers, six were promoted from within (usually from the position of first vice-minister of the same department); and two were from the academic world. These figures can serve as a benchmark for our later comparisons. At that time, of course, there was a unified system of political elite recruitment, including the careers of government ministers: no one in the political elite had any autonomy from the ruling Communist Party and its *nomenklatura*.

In October 1990 Masol was forced out of office and replaced by Vitold Fokin, who was likewise forced out two years later. In April 1991 the designation Council of Ministers and its Chairman were changed to

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*Holos Ukrainy* and *Uriadovi kur'ier*, 1992–February 1996.

11. As Bebyk argues, these elections permitted the emergence of a "second, intermediate echelon of the former Communist Party *nomenklatura*." He estimates the turnover in the political elite at that time to have been between thirty and forty percent.

12. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 29 June 1990; and *Radianska Ukraina*, 20, 27, 29 July, and 5 August 1990. Also for background, see *Pravda Ukrainy*, 15 December 1989.

13. The exceptions were the deputy chairmen Serhii V. Komisarenko, a physician, and Viktor G. Urchukin, an engineer and holder of a doctorate in economics, who had been first appointed in 1987; and Minister of Education Ivan A. Ziaziun, an academic with a doctorate.

14. Two ministers had been in their posts since 1984; six, since 1987 (including the Prime Minister, before which he had been the head of the State Planning Commission, *Derzhplan*); three, since 1988 (one of whom had, however, been a minister of another department since 1984); and the remaining five since 1989.

the Cabinet of Ministers and Prime Minister respectively.<sup>15</sup> These changes were in line with the country's transformation from an assembly model of government to semi-presidentialism or parliamentarism. Later that same year the office of President was introduced, and it was won in December by Leonid Kravchuk. By 1992, along with formal independence, Ukraine also had executive structures resembling at least nominally those of liberal democracies: a President, Prime Minister, and Cabinet.

A new government was formed by President Kravchuk in October 1992, with Leonid Kuchma as the Prime Minister.<sup>16</sup> Kuchma himself was an engineer, and head of what has been called the biggest missile factory in the world, but until that time he had not held any full-time Party or state position. His first vice-prime minister was Ihor Iukhnovsky, a physicist likewise uninvolved hitherto in Soviet politics or government, except for an unsuccessful bid for the Presidency in December 1991.<sup>17</sup> There were five other vice-prime ministers, only two of whom represented the old political elite; of the twenty-three ministers, however, all but five had been in the Party-state *nomenklatura*. Altogether, of the thirty members of this Cabinet, twenty, or two-thirds, were of the old political elite, a significant departure from the Soviet precedent (see above).<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, the ministries of Defence, State Security, the Police, and External Affairs were all staffed by career officers from those departments who had been appointed well before independence.<sup>19</sup>

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15. *Radianska Ukraina*, 23 April 1991.

16. *Holos Ukrainy*, 28 October 1992.

17. Iukhnovsky obtained 1.7 percent of the vote.

18. Iukhnovsky remained as the First Vice-Prime Minister. Among the other vice-prime ministers were the old *nomenklatura* hands Vasyl I. Ievtukhov and Volodymyr V. Dem'ianov; they were joined by newcomers to the political elite: Iulii Ia. Ioffe, Viktor M. Pynzenyk, and Mykola H. Zhulynsky—an engineer and two academics. Pynzenyk was simultaneously named the Minister of the Economy, but resigned in August 1993 owing to conflicts with President Kravchuk. Other ministers not in the old political elite were Ivan I. Herts, Orest D. Klympush, and Anatolii K. Lobov, all of them engineers, in External Economic Relations and Trade, Transport, and the Cabinet respectively; and the academics Petro M. Talanchuk and Iurii I. Kostenko, in Education and Environmental Protection. Talanchuk was a candidate in the 1994 presidential elections.

19. Kostiantyn P. Morozov had been the Minister of Defence since September 1991; Ievhen K. Marchuk, the Chairman of the State Security Committee (later renamed the Security Service of Ukraine—SBU) since January 1991; Andrii V. Vasylyshyn, the Minister of Internal Affairs (i.e., the police) since August 1990; and Anatolii M. Zlenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs since July 1990.

Similarly, nineteen members (63.3 percent) of the Cabinet were hold-overs from the previous administration; the Prime Minister and all of his vice-prime ministers were newcomers, as were four of the ministers. Only two of the new additions to the Cabinet were promoted from within; the rest were outsiders. A further encouraging sign of democratic transition was the presence of ten parliamentary deputies in the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister and all but one of the six vice-prime ministers. This overall mixture of outsiders and insiders in the Cabinet, along with the infusion of parliamentarians with experience of the recently liberalized political atmosphere, appeared to be a good start on the road to a truly post-Communist government, but the momentum was not sustained.

By October 1993 Kravchuk's Cabinet had changed somewhat, owing to disagreements between the President and his ministers (including the Prime Minister), retirements, and reorganizations.<sup>20</sup> Iukhym Zviahilsky, a mining engineer who had served in the Socio-Economic Collegium of the short-lived State Duma (an advisory body to President Kravchuk), was brought in as the First Vice-Prime Minister in June 1993. After Kuchma's resignation as prime minister in September, Zviahilsky was appointed acting prime minister. The departure of Iulii Ioffe (in June) and Viktor Pynzenyk (in August) allowed Kravchuk to bring in Valentyn I. Landyk and Valerii M. Shmarov (until then the first deputy chairman of the National Space Agency) as vice-prime ministers responsible for foreign economic trade and investment and for the military-industrial complex respectively. Dmytro O. Chernenko, like Shmarov an engineer outside the Party-state elite, was appointed the Minister of Machine-Building, the Military-Industrial Complex, and Conversion. Two other non-elite appointees were Ivan M. Dziuba (in November 1992) as the Minister of Culture, and Oleksandr I. Iemets (in April 1993) as the Minister of Nationalities Affairs and Migration. At the same time, Kravchuk's friend and adviser Oleh I. Sliepichev was made the Minister of External Economic Relations, while his associate from their days together in the Communist Party of Ukraine's Central Committee apparat, where he had apparently been in charge of assigning apartments, Ivan P. Dotsenko, replaced Valerii P. Pustovoitenko as the Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers.<sup>21</sup> Instead of declining, the representation of members of the old political elite in the Cabinet rose to 71.9 percent (twenty-three out of thirty-two). Altogether, fully twenty-nine out of thirty-two members of

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20. *Holos Ukrainy*, 30 September, 8 and 9 October 1993; and FBIS-SOV-93-194: 61, -196: 90, and -198: 38.

21. FBIS-SOV-93-191: 18-19.



the Cabinet at this time were holdovers, so the opportunity for renewal was not taken advantage of by Kravchuk; the number of parliamentarians in it was similarly allowed to decline to eight.

On the eve of the 1994 presidential elections, according to the "Who's Who in Ukraine" diskette, which included three more bodies as being counted in the Cabinet (the Security Service of Ukraine, Ministry of Social Welfare, and Anti-Monopoly Committee), the percentage of members of the old political elite in the Cabinet was 68.6 (twenty-four out of thirty-five), not far out of line with the previous autumn. All thirty-five were holdovers from the earlier government. This meant that Kravchuk was not pursuing vigorously a policy of renewal of this part of the political elite over which he had control, but rather was, if anything, engaged in a holding operation. Indeed, in response to a spate of resignations in early July,<sup>22</sup> Kravchuk made several last-minute appointments just before leaving office. Only one of them clearly went to a person outside the Party-state old-boys' network: to Viktor M. Petrov as the Minister of Machine-Building, the Military-Industrial Complex, and Conversion; like his predecessor, Petrov was an engineer rather than a Party-state bureaucrat. Meanwhile, Masol was given his old job back as prime minister (in a bid by Kravchuk to enhance his presidential chances by currying favour with old Communists) and was confirmed by the newly elected parliament in mid-June. Zviahilsky resigned under a cloud of suspicion about corruption<sup>23</sup> and was replaced as the First Vice-Prime Minister by the heretofore Minister of Forestry, Valerii I. Samoplavsky. Except for a two-year stint as a USSR people's deputy, Samoplavsky had been a minister since 1987. Dem'ianov was replaced as a vice-prime minister by the SBU head, Ievhen K. Marchuk, who was in turn relieved by his first deputy, Valerii V. Malikov. Anatolii F. Diuba and Volodymyr N. Plitin were added as vice-prime ministers; the first had been a state committee head since January 1987, the other, the Minister of Construction from August 1990. P'iatachenko was replaced as the Finance Minister

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22. These included Vasyl Ievtukhov, Volodymyr Dem'ianov, and Valentyn Landyk, all as vice-prime ministers; Dmytro Chernenko as the Minister of Machine-Building, the Military-Industrial Complex, and Conversion; Orest Klymush as the Minister of Transport; Hryhorii P'iatachenko as the Minister of Finance; Iurii Serbin as the Minister of the now-abolished Ministry of Construction and Architecture; Iurii Spizhenko as the Health Minister; Petro Talanchuk as the Education Minister, after his unsuccessful run at the Presidency; and Oleksandr Iemets as the Minister of Nationalities Affairs and Migration.

23. Zviahilsky subsequently fled to Israel, from which extradition proved impossible.



by one of his deputies, Petro K. Hermanchuk, and Iurii P. Spizhenko as the Health Minister likewise by Volodymyr I. Maltsev. Oleksandr Iemets was replaced as the Minister of Nationalities Affairs and Migration by the former CPU Central Committee apparatchik in charge of these matters, Mykola O. Shulha. Like many another departing chief executive, Leonid Kravchuk did his packing well.

It is important to examine in terms of continuity and change how the new president, Leonid Kuchma, once formally installed on 19 July 1994, dealt with his predecessor's legacy of an obviously stalled transformation of the governmental portion of the country's political elite. Within days he replaced Dotsenko as the Minister of the Cabinet, but with an old hand, Valerii P. Pustovoitenko, who had, in fact, been Dotsenko's forerunner in 1993. He also replaced the Internal Affairs Minister, Andrii Vasylyshyn, but with someone having a career background in state security going back to 1971, Volodymyr I. Radchenko. (Radchenko was made the Deputy Head of the SBU in September 1993; his move to Internal Affairs may have been part of the jockeying among the state's coercive agencies for control over law and order, in which case the police were now subordinated to the Security Service.) In August, Mykola Zhulynsky was replaced as the Vice-Prime Minister responsible for humanitarian affairs by Ivan F. Kuras, a historian and academician, but who had been engaged in Party and state work in the early part of his career. The career military man, Gen. Vitalii H. Radetsky, was relieved as the Defence Minister by the civilian Shmarov. Sliepichev, Kravchuk's infamous crony, was replaced in External Economic Relations by Serhii H. Osyka, an academic jurist with no experience in the old *nomenklatura*, who had served as a consultant to the government and parliament since 1991. Zlenko was despatched to serve as the Ambassador to the United Nations; his place as the Foreign Minister was taken by Hennadii I. Udovenko, who had served in the diplomatic service since 1959 and held the UN post from 1985 to 1992. Kuchma's first priority seems to have been certain ministerial changes.

In fact, only one of those last-minute appointments was undone by the new President. Masol was kept on as the Prime Minister until his retirement on 1 March 1995. Samoplavsky was not removed as the First Vice-Prime Minister until October 1994, and even then he was reappointed to his old portfolio of the Minister of Forestry. Shortly thereafter Marchuk was promoted to First Vice-Prime Minister; when Masol stepped down, Marchuk was named the Acting Prime Minister. Shmarov was made the Minister of Defence, also in October. Diuba and Plitin remained ensconced as Vice-Prime Ministers, as did Petrov, Malikov, Hermanchuk, and Shulha in their respective ministries. Out of the whole

group of last-minute favours dispensed by Kravchuk, Maltsev alone was removed in August and replaced as the Health Minister by a total outsider, Volodymyr O. Bobrov, a physician.

Thus, at the end of May 1995 exactly two-thirds (twenty-two out of thirty-three ministers) of Kuchma's Cabinet consisted of members of the old Soviet Party-state elite, two percentage points fewer than a year earlier and hardly an impressive change. Out of the twenty-two holdovers in the Cabinet from Kravchuk's term, eighteen were from the old elite, but Kuchma's appointees were almost equally balanced between those with and without this background characteristic. Statistically, Kuchma's appointments did not at that point constitute a significant departure from the hitherto prevailing norm of reliance on the old political elite (see table 1).<sup>24</sup> The only favourable note for elite circulation was that on average, those ministers not previously in the old Soviet political elite were 6.3 years younger than those who had been—a hopeful sign, but not yet a full-scale generational change.

**TABLE 1**  
**MEMBERS OF THE OLD SOVIET PARTY-STATE ELITE**  
**IN THE CABINET OF UKRAINE, 31 MAY 1995**

	In Old Elite	Not in Old Elite	Totals
Holdovers (Kravchuk's appointees)	18	4	22
Newcomers (Kuchma's appointees)	5	6	11
Totals	23	10	33

President Kuchma was finally presented with the opportunity to place his very own stamp on the government and to move forward the process of elite renewal when the Cabinet lost a vote of confidence in parliament on 3 April 1995, by 292 to fifteen. Even so, it was not until the beginning of July that the initial but still incomplete list of twenty-four appointments was announced. This was followed by several more appointments over the next six months. By January 1996 Kuchma's nearly

24. Applying Yates's Correction, the value of the correlation coefficient chi-squared ( $X^2$ ) is 3.03; with one degree of freedom, this means that  $p > .05$ , which is another way of saying that the chances that this distribution is random are more than one in twenty.

new Cabinet of thirty-eight contained twenty-three holdovers and fifteen newcomers, for a turnover of just under forty percent. At least twenty Cabinet members had served in the old political elite; fifteen had not; and information on the remaining three members is unavailable. In other words, twenty out of the thirty-five Cabinet members about whom there was background information—i.e., 57.1 percent—had been part of the *nomenklatura*. The percentages of holdovers and of those with careers in the *nomenklatura*—60.5 and 57.1 respectively—were slightly less than the lowest figures during Kravchuk's term. As table 2 shows, a statistically significant departure from the traditional reliance on the old political elite had not yet been achieved under Kuchma.<sup>25</sup>

**TABLE 2**  
**MEMBERS OF THE OLD SOVIET PARTY-STATE ELITE AND RENEWAL**  
**IN PRESIDENT KUCHMA'S CABINET (PRIME MINISTER MARCHUK),**  
**31 JANUARY 1996**

	In Old Elite	Not in Old Elite	Totals
Holdovers (in Cabinet before July 1995)	15	8	23
Newcomers (in Cabinet since July 1995)	5	7	12
Totals	20	15	35

Two thirds of the newcomers in the Cabinet as of January 1996 were outsiders rather than being promoted from within the state bureaucracy. Of the entire Cabinet, nine had been deputies in the 1990–94 parliament. These figures did not surpass the corresponding ones from when Kuchma himself was installed as the Prime Minister in October 1992, so the President has not yet outdone himself on those accounts.<sup>26</sup>

25. With Yates's Correction, chi-squared for table 2 is 0.95. For one degree of freedom, this means that  $p < .5$ , or that there is about a fifty-fifty chance that the distribution is random. Information on service in the Party-state *nomenklatura* for three incumbents was unavailable; thus the total is thirty-five instead of thirty-eight.

26. In the October 1992 Cabinet there were ten parliamentarians and nine out of eleven newcomers were outsiders, but nearly all of this renovation was introduced at the vice-prime-ministerial rather than ministerial level.

Taking a longer perspective than year-to-year, it should be said in Kuchma's favour that at the beginning of 1996 his Cabinet did contain only twelve carry-overs from Kravchuk's term. This represents a continuity of 31.6 percent, which is very low for a period of less than two years. Only seven of today's ministers had been in the Cabinet of then Prime Minister Kuchma in October 1992, and only four could trace their tenure back to the twilight of the Soviet era, in April 1991.<sup>27</sup> While the actual individuals differ from the persons in Kravchuk's or even Masol's time, however, the pool of eligibles from which Cabinet members are drawn continues to produce remarkably similar profiles. Systemic change is slower than the passage of individuals.

Since tables 1 and 2 are not exactly comparable in respect of changes from Kravchuk's presidency to Kuchma's, it may be helpful to introduce a third table. Table 3 shows that in the Cabinet in office in January 1996, Kuchma's appointees were much more evenly drawn from the old political elite than from those without such experience, in contrast to the ministers first appointed by Kravchuk. Statistically, however, the shift in recruitment pattern—away from the old *nomenklatura* personnel—was still not yet significant.<sup>28</sup>

**TABLE 3**  
**THE CARRY-OVER OF PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S APPOINTEES IN**  
**PRESIDENT KUCHMA'S CABINET, 31 JANUARY 1996**

	In Old Elite	Not in Old Elite	Totals
Holdovers (Kravchuk's appointees)	10	3	13
Newcomers (Kuchma's appointees)	10	12	22
Totals	20	15	35

27. The four who dated from April 1991 were the then SBU head (later the Prime Minister) Ievhen Marchuk and Valerii V. Borzov, Mykola I. Borysenko, and Valerii I. Samoplavsky, all three still in 1996 in their posts as the Ministers of Sport, Statistics, and Forestry, respectively.

28. With Yates's Correction, chi-squared for table 3 had a value of only 2.14, which with only one degree of freedom meant that  $p > .10$ .

## Presidential and Cabinet Offices

Owing to a number of practical difficulties, membership in the old Party-state *nomenklatura* cannot be used in studying change in the Offices of the Presidential Administration and of the Cabinet of Ministers, the executive support agencies in the Ukrainian government. The major problem is that background information on the personnel in those offices is much less readily available than on ministers. Often even identifying a name with a position, or vice versa, is impossible. A second problem is that few, if any, of the personnel have had their biographies revealed, and unlike most new ministers, the newly appointed personnel's biographies have not been published in the period under study. Thirdly, in the final nine months of the Kravchuk administration, when the President took on the responsibilities (but not the title) of the prime ministership, the presidential and cabinet offices were combined, yet no source is available on the configuration of this amalgamation. Because it was so short-lived, perhaps this change was not significant in terms of the personnel involved and their responsibilities. A comparison of the two executive offices in mid-1993 and mid-1995 is therefore necessarily very incomplete.

Instead of using membership in the old elite as the major criterion, we must resort to other indicators for a meaningful comparison. Changes in the staffs of the Presidential Administration and of the Cabinet of Ministers over the first eighteen months of the Kuchma administration may be compared with the ministerial changes observed above. They should have been more sweeping, both because they were not subject to parliamentary scrutiny and because backroom politicians in a normal democracy always experience turnover with the accession of a new chief executive. An apparent housecleaning of the central agencies would be indicative of something approaching normal democratic politics; a relatively heavy carry-over from one administration to the next, especially in the Kravchuk-Kuchma transition, would indicate the prevalence of tradition.

The *Who's Who in Ukrainian Politics* published in 1993<sup>29</sup> listed thirty-one positions in the Presidential Administration of that time as having the designation of adviser, director, or department head (*radnyk*, *kerivnyk*, and *zavidiuiuchy* *viddilom*, respectively). Press reports from July 1994 to May 1995 indicated that President Kuchma made some eighteen or nineteen appointments to these positions, although in six cases it was a matter of reappointment to the analogous post held under President

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29. See *Khto ie khto*.

Kravchuk. If a total of twelve newcomers was named, then the rate of renewal in the President's staff was almost exactly the same as it was in the Cabinet (see above). This suggests a modest housecleaning.

Among the "new" appointees was Dmytro V. Tabachnyk as the Head of the Presidential Administration, a position analogous to the chief of staff. Tabachnyk, apparently a public relations specialist whose immediately preceding post was as the First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Publishing, Printing, and Book Distribution, had served as Prime Minister Kuchma's Press Secretary in 1993. A candidate of historical sciences, he became a deputy to the Kyiv City Council as a representative of the Democratic Bloc after the elections of March 1990.<sup>30</sup> Another of Kuchma's appointees was Volodymyr H. Iatsuba, a deputy in the 1990–94 parliament who had before that served as the First Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk City Committee of the CPU. Iatsuba's appointment as the Director of Territorial Questions was announced in November 1994; in March 1995 he was promoted to First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, presumably directly under Tabachnyk. One of the reappointments was that of the academic jurist Ivan A. Tymchenko, a former member of the Collegium on the Question of Legal Policy of the former State Duma (at one time one of President Kravchuk's advisory bodies), as the Director of the Juridical Department of the Presidential Administration. Apart from the new heads of several minor departments, the only other significant changes in personnel occurred among the advisers on macroeconomic questions and on domestic policy and the directors of the Secretariat, the team of the President's immediate assistants, and the Domestic Policy Branch; the head of the President's own office (*kantseliaria*) was reappointed from the same post held under Kravchuk.

Another housecleaning took place in December 1995, when even some of President Kuchma's own recent appointees were released. In particular, Aleksandr V. Razumkov, the Director of the Group of the

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30. Tabachnyk was dismissed on 10 December 1996, apparently because of having antagonized numerous other top politicians—among them parliamentary speaker Oleksandr Moroz—by his control of access to the President. In his place, on 20 December, Kuchma appointed Evgenii Kushnarev, the ethnic Russian mayor of Kharkiv. Kushnarev was the head of the New Ukraine political association and a leading member of the Popular Democratic Party. He is forty-five years old, i.e., twelve years older than Tabachnyk. An engineer by profession, he served in the Communist apparat in Kharkiv from 1987 until being elected the city council's head in 1990. *Ukrainian News/Ukrainski visti* (Edmonton), 18 December 1996–1 January 1997, 2–28 January 1997.



President's Aides and Representatives, was replaced by Vladimir A. Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov had hitherto been the Director of the Economic Administration of the President's Office, and before that (in 1993) he had served as an adviser to Prime Minister Kuchma on macroeconomic questions and market reforms. The Director of the Foreign Policy Administration, Volodymyr V. Furkalo, was replaced by Volodymyr S. Ohryzko.<sup>31</sup> Besides these changes, three advisers—on domestic policy, military matters, and state security—were also fired. This particular organizational convulsion, however, was apparently not so much initiated by the President as by his right-hand man, Tabachnyk, owing to conflicts with Razumkov and Razumkov's supporters in the Presidential Administration.<sup>32</sup>

The staff of the Cabinet of Ministers included some thirty heads of departments in 1993. According to my reading of the government and parliamentary press, fourteen senior appointments were made to this staff during the period from July 1994 to May 1995.<sup>33</sup> Four of these, however, were likely promotions or reappointments made in connection with a reorganization (implicit in the terminological changes to the names of the units concerned), so that the total number of new appointees was probably no more than ten. This represented only one-third of the total, or about the same proportion as the changes President Kuchma had made earlier to the Cabinet. Such a slow rate of change is all the more remarkable when it is remembered that there were two holders of the prime ministership during this time, Masol and Marchuk, although Marchuk's acting status may have been an inhibiting factor. Even though he was clearly associated with the previous administration, the First Vice-Minister of the Ministry of the Cabinet of Ministers, Dotsenko was pensioned off only in February 1995. A more traditional pattern of elite

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31. Furkalo was named the Ambassador to Canada on 24 January 1996, and he presented his credentials at Rideau Hall in Ottawa on 14 February 1996. *Uriadovyi kur'er*, 27 January 1996; and *Ukrainskyi holos* (Winnipeg), 26 February 1996.

32. *Rukh Insider* 2, no. 1 (4 January 1996).

33. At least two of them, Iurii Iu. Khotlubei and Valentyn P. Lemish, had been CPU apparatchiks before 1992. Khotlubei, appointed the head of the Market for Goods, Trade, and Services Department, was a parliamentary deputy in 1990–4 and simultaneously the head of Mariupol's city council. Before 1990 he worked in the CPU Central Committee apparat. Lemish, also a parliamentary deputy, and the head of the parliamentary commission on defence and state security from October 1992, was named the head of the Cabinet's Main Administration (Soviet organizational terminology lives on!) on Defence Matters. Earlier he was a state administrator in the field of construction.



circulation, rather than one associated with the uncertainties of competitive politics, seemed to be evident here as well.

Seven advisers to the Prime Minister were named (two of them as volunteers) in the period in question, though the significance of this is impossible to assess. Their status is unknown, as is their total number and whether it is fixed or flexible. Nor is whom they replaced known. At any rate, Leonid H. Iakovyshyn was one of these seven. An agricultural economist and candidate of economic sciences, he was also a deputy to parliament in 1990–94. He was appointed under Zviahivsky, reappointed under Masol, and apparently continued to serve under Marchuk as well. There is no evident partisanship here, except that Iakovyshyn had been a member of the CPSU (and hence probably acceptable to the establishment). Two other advisers who were appointed in the summer of 1994, however, did not survive for long after Masol's retirement. One was Iurii I. Zbitniev, a medical doctor, parliamentary deputy with no background in the Party-state apparatus, and the head of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, who was apparently removed because of some incompatibility between his status as a public servant and his partisan activities. The other was Vitalii H. Melnychuk, a Rukh member and economist, who was apparently "transferred to other work." Both were relieved on 13 April 1995, about a month after Masol's retirement and his replacement by Marchuk.

A spate of appointments to the Cabinet Office followed the confirmation of Marchuk as the Prime Minister. Eleven heads of departments and directors of main administrations were designated, although at least four were being reappointed to renamed units. Since some of those removed, as well as some of those reappointed, had been in their posts in 1993, it is difficult to see these changes as wholesale housecleaning. Six advisers to the Prime Minister were also appointed, including the outgoing head of the SBU, Valerii V. Malikov, and Iurii P. Bohutsky, who had been an adviser to President Kravchuk in 1993. Altogether, out of the twenty appointments recorded between June and November 1995, only one (Iurii Iu. Khotlubei, a former Communist apparatchik) had been a deputy in the 1990–94 parliament—not an encouraging sign for relations between the Cabinet and parliament.

It has been suggested that the high rate of turnover among parliamentary deputies in 1994 had a positive impact on the democratic transition in Ukraine. Many former deputies, who had served in the open and competitive atmosphere of the 1990–94 parliament, were subsequently drawn into administrative work for parliament itself as well as the President's and Cabinet Offices. There

they brought their experience of parliamentary work into the operation of the governmental structures, and thereby, undoubtedly, they have influenced the socio-psychological atmosphere in the corridors of power and have objectively furthered the formation of new viewpoints as to their functioning. And one can speak with a great measure of certainty about the fact that, on the whole, the initial experience of the activity of the political and ruling elite of Ukrainian society—in the circumstances of the formation of democratic institutions through elections—to a certain extent has changed the way of thinking and the psychology of those people concerned with the problems of directing society.<sup>34</sup>

This is indeed a consummation devoutly to be wished, but at this time it remains, in my estimation, more possibility than fact.

Indeed, of the above new appointments made in 1994–95 to the President's and Cabinet Offices, a relatively small proportion were former parliamentary deputies. Of Kuchma's top-level appointments (department heads and their equivalents) to the Presidential Administration, which have been described above, only one went to a former deputy. This individual, Volodymyr H. Iatsuba, was also a former Communist apparatchik, so it is not clear whether he was chosen for that reason or for his parliamentary experience. One out of twenty-two appointments is a very small percentage. Beyond the top level, fifteen other appointments by Kuchma—various consultants, assistants, and advisers to the President—could be identified. Only three of them had been parliamentary deputies.<sup>35</sup> Altogether, the Presidential Administration brought in only four ex-parliamentarians for the thirty-seven new appointments. In the Cabinet Office the situation was not much better: only five out of the forty appointments reported in the press went to ex-parliamentarians, three of whom had been in the Party-state *nomenklatura*. All in all, out of the seventy-seven new staff appointments in the President's and Cabinet Offices, only nine went to ex-parliamentarians. This was certainly better than none, and a step in the right direction.

## Top Government Officials

Below and beyond the Cabinet of Ministers, in the government of Ukraine there is a myriad of lesser bodies under a myriad of categories, including state committees, agencies, state companies, state concerns, state corporations, departments, committees, and funds. The most

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34. Bebyk.

35. Albert V. Korneev, the director of the group for ties with the Supreme Council; Iulii Ioffe, an unpaid adviser on fuel and energy; and Vasyl V. Shepa, a scientific consultant on agrarian policy.

important of these, generally speaking, are the state committees, but their complement is not fixed because of the government's constant spasms of Brownian-movement-like reorganization. In President Kuchma's first year of office, for example, the State Committees on Material Resources, Confessional Issues, and Oil and Gas were liquidated; the State Committees on the Coal Industry and Fisheries each became ministries; and the State Committee for Publishing, Printing, and Book Distribution was combined with the State Committee on State Secrets in the Press and Other Mass Media to become the Ministry of the Press and Information. Further transformations can be expected, and therefore great significance should probably not be read into elite circulation patterns at this level.

Nevertheless, as of the end of May 1995, of the fourteen un-restructured state committees then presumed to be in existence, the chairmanships were equally divided between Kravchuk's and Kuchma's appointees. This meant that Kuchma had been more active there than at the ministerial level, where, at the same time, he had named new people to only one-third of the Cabinet. Five out of Kravchuk's seven appointees had backgrounds in the old Party-state elite; one did not; and information about one of them is unavailable. Of Kuchma's appointees, on the other hand, only three had been in the Party-state *nomenklatura*; two had not; and information about two of them is unavailable. From July 1995 to January 1996, eleven heads of state committees were appointed. Seven of them were newcomers (including for the first time a woman); of these seven, five were promoted from within the government bureaucracy.<sup>36</sup> Five had served in the old political elite, including the new customs chief, L. V. Derkach, who had had a career in state security. These numbers are too small for statistical analysis, but it is safe to say that they indicate no dramatic move away from the old *nomenklatura*.

We also do not see any particularly strong evidence of strategy in the appointments that Kuchma made. He removed Anatolii A. Dron as the Chairman of the State Committee on Housing because he was also a full-time parliamentary deputy, and replaced him with Heorhii I. Onyshchuk, a candidate of economic sciences and *nomenklatura* alumnus. The chairman of the State Committee on Land Resources was relieved and transferred to some other work. In this case, a member of the old political elite (Borys M. Chepkov) was displaced by an academic outsider (Pavlo

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36. An interesting case was that of Iurii P. Spizhenko, who had been a parliamentary deputy in 1990-94 and had served as the Minister of Health in 1989-94. Re-elected to parliament in 1994, he was prevented by law from continuing as minister and therefore was named head of the State Committee on the Medical and Microbiological Industry instead.

I. Haidutsky). The chief of the customs service was relieved, initially by his first deputy and then two months later by a career police officer also brought in from outside; in July 1995 the former first vice-head of the SBU was brought in. The head of the State Committee on Guarding the State Borders (not to be confused with the Border Guards Service, a military formation) was picked by Kuchma to be the Inspector General of the General Military Inspectorate attached to the President; his place was taken by the First Deputy Chairman, Viktor I. Bannykh, a career border guards and military officer. This was a case of normal military promotion. After the director-general of the National Space Agency, Volodymyr P. Horbulin, was selected to be the Secretary of the National Security Council (an advisory body to the President), his place was taken by Oleksandr O. Nehoda, on whom I have no biographical details. After Volodymyr V. Priadko became the Vice-Minister of the Military-Industrial Complex, he was relieved as the chairman of the State Property Fund by Iurii I. Iekhanurov, an economist and engineer who had served from August 1993 to September 1994 as the Vice-Minister of the Economy. Finally, Mykola F. Okhmakevych, the President since August 1991 of the State Television and Radio Company, and before that the head of its Soviet-era counterpart (Derzhtele-radio URSR) and an official in the CPU Central Committee apparatus, was relieved at the end of August 1994. He was immediately replaced by a relative outsider, the chief editor of the newspaper *Kyivskyi visnyk*, Oleksandr M. Savenko. A journalist by profession with a candidate's degree in philology, Savenko may have had some connection with state security, since he worked for *News from Ukraine* from 1980 to 1990. If there is any common thread to these appointments, in terms either of the sphere of these committees or of the characteristics of the new chairmen, it must be that of security. Perhaps this was a mark of the influence of the then Acting Prime Minister, Marchuk, himself a career security-service officer.

### The Parliamentary Presidium and Factions

As of 1 September 1993 the Presidium of the Supreme Council consisted of twenty-seven deputies. It was made up of the presiding officers of the assembly—its Head, Ivan S. Pliushch, and his First Deputy Head, Vasyl V. Durdynets (the post of Deputy Head was vacant at that time)—and, presumably ex officio, the chairmen of the various commissions (standing committees). According to available information, nineteen (70.4 percent) of them, including Pliushch and Durdynets, had held positions in the old Party-state elite. Thus about the same percentage of the leadership of the national parliament as of the Cabinet at the same time were individuals who had had careers in the *nomenklatura*. In May

1994, after the first rounds of elections, new officers were elected in the Supreme Council. Oleksandr O. Moroz, the leader of the Socialist Party, was chosen as its head, while Oleksandr M. Tkachenko, the leader of the Agrarian Party, and Oleh O. Domin, a *nomenklatura* businessman, were elected as the first deputy head and a deputy head, respectively. They, together presumably with the twenty-two heads of standing commissions, made up the Presidium of the new parliament. All told, only the biographies of ten of these twenty-five persons are known, but of those ten no fewer than seven had been in the old *nomenklatura*, which is the same ratio as before. Perhaps the parliamentary leadership has been equally as slow as the Cabinet, if not more so, to change away from the predominance of the old political elite.

A much smaller proportion of the leadership of parliamentary factions appears to have been included in the *nomenklatura* net. In 1993 there were eleven recognized groups in parliament, with a total of thirty-four leaders or spokesmen. Only fifteen of those thirty-four, or 44.1 percent, could be said to have been members of the old Party-state elite, a significantly lower figure than in either the Presidium or the Cabinet. In July 1994 there were nine such factions in the new parliament, with thirty-nine leaders and spokesmen. Backgrounds on only twenty of the latter were available, but only seven (thirty-five percent) of them had been in the *nomenklatura*. This suggests that the farther away we get from the state's highest echelons, the less predominant are members of the old political elite in the new, post-Communist political elite.

Beyond parliament, according to the *Who's Who* source, as of mid-1993 there were twenty-seven political parties in Ukraine. Together they had thirty-two chairmen or co-chairmen, only twelve of whom were parliamentary deputies. Of the twenty-three on whom biographies were available, only six (26.1 percent) had backgrounds in the Party-state elite. There does not appear to be a predominance of former apparatchiks in the leadership of the political parties, but that does not yet mean that a post-Communist political elite has emerged. It may be emerging, but it is taking a long time to do so.

## Interpretation

Does it matter for the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine whether personnel from the Communist *nomenklatura* remain predominant in the political elite? Does it even matter if the pattern of selection of the political elite continues to resemble that of the *nomenklatura*? After all, it might be argued, in the Eastern European states former Communists, having refashioned themselves as social democrats and having retained a distinctly stronger organization than their rivals, have returned to

power and, having passed through the gauntlet of elections, are no longer a threat to democracy and its consolidation.<sup>37</sup> In Ukraine the rule is that parliamentary deputies must resign from the legislature if appointed to the Cabinet. It would be another story altogether if Ukraine had a parliamentary democracy.

We are dealing, however, not with a parliamentary system, and certainly not with the parliamentary segment of the political elite, but with the governmental. There the signs of democratization are meagre. Ukraine has a semi-presidential, not a parliamentary, system of executive-legislative relations, which precludes even elected Communists from serving in the current government. Even in Ukraine's semi-presidential system, the idea of party government has not yet caught on. If ministers are selected predominantly from the bureaucracy, then they will bring with them to office their departmental perspective and political control over the administration, one of the functions of a cabinet, will be undermined. If vice-ministers are appointed by the President, as they are at present, then the bureaucracy will not have the autonomy that it ought to have in a properly operating democracy. The carry-over of the Soviet pattern of political recruitment—the *nomenklatura* without the Communist Party—in the executive branch of government in Ukraine can only serve to inhibit accountability and the checking of power by power because of the principle of separation of powers, regardless of what else may be happening in the legislative branch.

## Conclusion

If their country is to become a democracy, then among the habits that Ukraine's would-be politicians must break is the closed, orderly, and personalistic system of political-elite recruitment and management. A beginning was made in the formation in 1992 of the first post-Communist government by Leonid Kravchuk. But it appears to have become stalled since then, and Cabinet appointments continue to be made according to who is next in line in the department concerned. Usually this is a veteran of the *nomenklatura* system. The political staffs of President Kuchma and Prime Minister Marchuk and his Cabinet were not very different from their predecessors'.<sup>38</sup> True, there are now among them a few parliamen-

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37. Alison Mahr and John Nagle, "Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 28, no. 4 (1995): 393–409; and Paul G. Lewis, "Political Institutionalisation and Party Development in Post-Communist Poland," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 5 (1994): 779–99.

38. Marchuk was dismissed by President Kuchma on 27 May 1996 and replaced



tarians from the unprecedentedly free 1990–94 convocation, who are supposedly infused with the spirit of public debate, contestation, image-making, and perhaps accountability. But on the whole the process of elite circulation is moving slowly—the legacy of the Soviet *nomenklatura* carries considerable inertia in the politics of post-Soviet Ukraine.

27 January 1997

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as the Prime Minister by Pavlo I. Lazarenko. The official reason for the firing was Marchuk's failure to pursue economic reforms, his lack of commitment thereto, and that he paid too much attention to his own political image instead of running the government. Marchuk has continued to serve as a parliamentary deputy. In October 1996 he was chosen the leader of the Market Choice faction in parliament, a group including other former leaders, such as Vitalii Masol. He also announced then his intention to contest the presidential elections in 1999. Lazarenko, an agricultural specialist, came, like Kuchma, from Dnipropetrovsk oblast and was until 1992 a local government official there (in the *nomenklatura*). He served as President Kravchuk's Representative in that oblast for two years before being elected to parliament in 1994. He is regarded as Kuchma's ally and supporter. *Ukrainian News/Ukrainski visti* (Edmonton), 5–18 June 1996; and OMRI Daily Digest, pt. 2, 28–9 May and 3 October 1996.



# From Liberalization to Post-Communism: The Role of the Communist Party in Ukraine

*Zenovia A. Sochor*

In the first, heady days after the collapse of Soviet communism, it seemed natural to assume that an accompanying collapse of the Communist parties would follow suit. The parties were badly demoralized, banned, scattered, and voted out of power. Within two or three years, however, the facile assessment was challenged by the reality of a renewed Communist presence; indeed, the focus has since shifted to Communist retrenchment and its impact on democratization. Instead of an on-going process of transformation, "the transition towards democracy has slowed down, and these systems have crystallized into something semi-permanent.... Post-communism is much more than a transitional stage and may well be the dominant feature of politics in [Central and Eastern Europe] for the foreseeable future."<sup>1</sup>

One of the reasons for reassessment is that the existing post-Soviet societies do not look nearly as democratic as their political pluralism suggests. Their new political leaders are not entirely new (they are more likely to be ex-Communists than democrats), and elections have boosted former (or renamed) Communist parties into new leading roles. "Ex-communist parties and politicians—appearing as social democrats, socialists, reform communists, populist-nationalist demagogues, or unreformed apparatchiks—have returned to join those who never left."<sup>2</sup>

The objective of this paper is to examine the role of one of the more entrenched parties, namely, the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). The CPU invites investigation because it rebounded, within a short period of time, from outlawed party to a victorious party in the parliamentary

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1. George Schopflin, "Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction," *Daedalus* 123, no. 3 (summer 1994), 127–8.

2. Charles Gati, "Mirage of Democracy," *Transition* 2, no. 6 (22 March 1966).

elections of 1994. More than that: the CPU achieved success despite remaining doggedly conservative, barely bothering with the window dressing that most other Communist parties have devised. How is this anomaly to be explained? What strategy has the CPU pursued, and why has it resisted any effort at reform? What are the implications for the democratization process?

Comparative studies indicate that parties might change to adapt to altered environmental conditions, e.g., new electoral laws or increased political competition. Alternatively, parties might change because of internal factors, e.g., in-fighting among elites.<sup>3</sup> The CPU lends itself to a comparison of the relative weight of external versus internal factors in bringing about or deterring changes in a Communist party.

Prima facie, it would seem that the external factor, above all Moscow, would be the key to the party's stance. The CPU was not an independent actor, and any earlier efforts at self-assertion were typically slapped down.<sup>4</sup> During the perestroika upheaval, however, contradictory messages emanated from Moscow and the surrounding environment about the best strategy to follow. Gorbachev spoke of reform but seemed to prefer stability in Ukraine. The CPU had to decide for itself whether it was best to join the flood of reformers or to stand pat and wait for the political tidal wave to subside.

The uncertainty of what to do created intra-party conflicts that split the CPU on the eve of 1991. Strategic choices made by the elites were essential to the direction the party and, ultimately, society as a whole would take. The fate of the party and democratization processes were intertwined. Neither were simply predetermined outcomes of structural conditions; both were products of choices and decisions made by elites in the face of dramatic and complex transformations.<sup>5</sup>

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3. See John T. Ishiyama, "Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe," *Comparative Politics*, January 1995, 163.

4. For earlier studies of the CPU, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Party of Ukraine after 1966," in Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Ukraine in the Seventies* (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1975), 239–55; and Bohdan Krawchenko, "Changes in the National and Social Composition of the Communist Party of Ukraine from the Revolution to 1976," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 9, no.1 (summer 1984): 33–54.

5. For an elaboration of the theoretical assumptions, see Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective," in Nancy Bermeo, ed., *Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 117–26. See also Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

## **Liberalization: The Vanguard Party Encounters Reform Communism**

The development of tensions and fissures within the governing elite is a necessary feature of the liberalization process and the breakdown of authoritarian systems. Reformers challenge regime hard-liners with new solutions to accumulating problems. Gorbachev's reform communism represented an attractive alternative to Brezhnev's stagnating communism, consequently splitting the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and dethroning its vanguard status in society.

Within the Ukrainian context, however, there was little evidence of a split between hard-liners and reformers. In the midst of dramatic changes during the Gorbachev era in most of the neighbouring republics, Ukraine stood apart. It remained "the absolute outpost of Shcherbitskyism," defending "anti-*perestroika* and anti-Gorbachev" positions.<sup>6</sup>

Although some hopes were raised when Volodymyr Ivashko replaced Volodymyr Shcherbitsky, the new first secretary of the CPU resigned his post within a year to accept Gorbachev's nomination as the vice-general secretary of the CPSU. Ivashko's brief tenure as the CPU boss was at best lacklustre, and under him relations with the reformists were strained. At the Twenty-eighth CPU Congress in June 1990, Party conservatives openly criticized him for providing no clear guidance during a tumultuous period in Ukrainian politics. As his parting shot before leaving for Moscow, Ivashko returned the favour by denouncing the "anticommunist, unconstructive forces" that hindered "productive work" in the Ukrainian parliament.<sup>7</sup> Ivashko was replaced by another conservative, Stanislav Hurenko.

More convincing evidence of reform-minded intellectuals in the CPU may be discerned in the founding of the pro-independence popular front movement, Rukh. A number of prominent writers and CPU members, such as Ivan Drach and Dmytro Pavlychko, joined former political prisoners, such as V'iacheslav Chornovil and Lev Lukianenko, to create Rukh. In October 1989 Drach, the chairman of Rukh, remarked that the CPU was composed not only of the pupils of Brezhnev, Suslov, and

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Press, 1986).

6. Roman Solchanyk, "The Beginnings of 'Rukh': An Interview with Pavlo Movchan," in Roman Solchanyk, ed., *Ukraine: From Chernobyl' to Sovereignty* (New York: St. Martin's Press; Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 15.

7. See Kathleen Mihalisko, "Volodymyr Ivashko and Ukraine," *Report on the USSR*, 20 July 1990.

Shcherbytsky, but also of "new forces." "I believe absolutely in these new forces that will come to cooperate with 'Rukh' and with the Communists [e.g., Pavlychko, Drach, Myroslav Popovych, and V'iacheslav Briukhovetsky] who work within 'Rukh.'"<sup>8</sup> By exerting pressure on the CPU, Rukh hoped to strengthen the hand of the reformers and to circumvent the recalcitrant leadership.

Nevertheless, despite Rukh's initial moderate stance, the Party's reaction was almost uniformly hostile, whether under Shcherbytsky, Ivashko, or Hurenko. Within a year the same reform-minded writers, together with a larger number of supporters, left the CPU, disillusioned by its reaction, and embarked on an increasingly more radical course of action.

Yet another concerted effort to transform the Party from within came from the group of Communists who formed the "Democratic Platform." These reform-minded individuals gathered in informal discussion groups and "Party clubs," first in Moscow and Leningrad and later in Kyiv and Kharkiv. In January 1990 they founded the Democratic Platform of the CPSU.<sup>9</sup> The first republic-level conference took place in March 1990 in Kharkiv. The basic objective of the "demcommunists" was to transform the Party from within. According to one member, "democratization within the Party is proceeding at a significantly slower pace than in society as a whole, because there are many people in it who think in stereotypes, [who are] bound by certain ideological and political dogmas."<sup>10</sup> Members of the Democratic Platform envisaged the Party eventually becoming a "normal," parliamentary political party.

The "demcommunists" had little success in promoting their ideas at the Twenty-Eighth CPSU Congress in July 1990. The preservation of the principle of democratic centralism, the actual prohibition of "platform groupings," together with the Party apparatus's continued monopoly of the mass media, removed the last shred of hope for self-reform within the CPSU. Members of the Democratic Platform announced they were organizing a new party whose principle objective would be the "destruc-

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8. Roman Solchanyk, "The Current Situation in Ukraine: A Discussion with 'Rukh' Chairman Ivan Drach," in Solchanyk, 52. For a detailed account of the founding of Rukh, see O. B. Haran, *Ubyty drakona: Iz istorii Rukhu ta novykh partii Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1993).

9. See M. Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 42.

10. Ruslan Harbar, *Visti z Ukrainy*, 26 June 1990.

tion of the administrative-bureaucratic or totalitarian system, which had been created over the last decades."<sup>11</sup>

Neither the reformers in Rukh nor those in the Democratic Platform made any headway in altering the Party's stance. Despite clear evidence of disenchantment with the CPU (150,000 members quit the party in 1990) and the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe, the CPU stood its ground. The Party press indicated that the CPU could make little sense of the new political realities. Even if some of the propositions of the Democratic Platform were reasonable, it was impossible to forgive "the rejection of [Party] discipline, of the principle of democratic centralism." "Are we, Communists, also going to scatter into various platforms, factions, [and] national quarters?"<sup>12</sup>

First Secretary Hurenko urged a "unity of actions of Communists" to overcome "organizational disorder, erosion of Party structures." While stating that the Party "fully relinquished [its] political monopoly" (in keeping with the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR constitution), he affirmed the opposite: "Of course, we are striving for the Party to be the political vanguard of the people of Ukraine, effectively influencing all aspects of its life."<sup>13</sup>

Neither internal nor external forces proved to be strong enough to exert pressure on the CPU to change in the direction of reform communism. The reformers did not belong to the Party elite; they were intellectuals on the periphery who could be discounted more readily. Gorbachev, unwittingly or not, doomed the chances for reform communism to succeed in Ukraine when he called Ivashko to Moscow. Ivashko left with hardly a backward glance at Kyiv.

## **Resistance to National Communism**

For many reasons, national communism would have been the obvious strategy for the CPU to follow if it were intent on salvaging its vanguard role. The CPU experienced two periods of national communism in Ukraine, during the 1920s and again during the 1960s and 1970s. National communism was the strategy adopted by other conservative Communist Parties, for example, in Serbia and in Romania, as a way to combat democratic reformers and preserve power. The CPU, however, resisted taking up the banner of nationalism, which meant in the first instance

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11. See *Ukraine Today*, 25 July 1990.

12. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 18 July 1990.

13. *Radianska Ukraina*, 3 July 1990.

coming to terms with Rukh. It was precisely the issue of nationalism—not reform or democratization—that split the Party.

By the time of the Second Congress of Rukh, in October 1990, the political situation had become so radicalized that perestroika was pushed aside in favour of a more daring goal—independence. Eastern Europe was in a state of upheaval; the Baltic states were moving towards independence, and political mobilization in Ukraine was expanding across the country and across the political spectrum. The CPU could not simply remain impervious to the changes swirling about it.

Indeed, there were some efforts to pursue a more national stance. In October 1989 Ukraine's Supreme Soviet adopted a language law that declared Ukrainian the state language and proposed to increase the use of Ukrainian over a period of ten years. On 16 July 1990 a Declaration of Sovereignty was passed in the Supreme Soviet, with a vote of 355 to 4. Some of the provisions in the declaration, such as the supremacy of republic-level laws over all-Union laws or the right of military recruits to serve their term of duty within their own republic, had initially been advocated by Rukh and considered heretical by the CPU. In addition, there was growing sentiment that the CPU itself should seek an independent status rather than continue as a branch of the federal CPSU. An opinion poll of the 1,300 delegates to the first session of the Twenty-eighth CPU Congress, in June 1990, revealed that fifty-one percent advocated an independent program and statutes, while one-third rejected the idea because of anxiety about the "unity of the CPSU." Interestingly, Hurenko himself expressed the opinion that a three-million-strong CPU could not remain "an oblast-level organization of the CPSU, as it had actually been in the past."<sup>14</sup>

And yet, these efforts were feeble. They were the minimum the CPU could do given the radicalization of the entire political spectrum and the assertion of nationalism throughout Eastern Europe and most of the republics within the USSR. Language laws had already been passed in other republics, and Russia itself had issued a Declaration of Sovereignty. National communism did not develop inevitably, although the logic of the situation certainly suggested it.<sup>15</sup> CPU First Secretary Ivashko had

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14. Ibid.

15. For an emphasis on the inevitability of national communism, see Alexander J. Motyl, *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). See also Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).



turned toward Moscow and away from the nationalist alternative. And his successor, Hurenko, resisted nationalism to the bitter end.

It was not the CPU First Secretary, but its former ideological secretary, Leonid Kravchuk, who embraced the strategy of national communism. Moreover, he did so in his new role as the chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet, not as one of the Party's leaders.<sup>16</sup> Kravchuk chose a strategy that split the Party but catapulted him to power. National communism was the result of a choice made by a certain sector of the political elite; it was part of a power struggle within the CPU and a gamble for survival within the deteriorating Soviet edifice.

The Communist deputies in the Supreme Soviet who elected Kravchuk as the chairman by a vote of 239 were also the same group that issued the declaration "For a Soviet Sovereign Ukraine." The declaration made clear that the Communists envisaged a limited sovereignty for Ukraine, located well within the confines of a renewed union. According to Kravchuk, the Group of 239 "saw Ukraine only as part of the CPSU and part of the great state of the USSR, but with a greater degree of independence."<sup>17</sup> In short, as of July 1990 the CPU had not committed itself to a national communist position. It took the active intervention of Kravchuk to reconfigure the Party, break up the Group of 239, and persuade a portion of the Party to pursue national communism. As one analyst affirms, "the leading organs of the Party and the majority of local Party committees actively fought for 'a renewed federation' right up to August 1991."<sup>18</sup>

What forced the issue was Gorbachev's own efforts to rein in the increasingly assertive republics, forcing local Communists to decide whether to support or defy the leadership in Moscow. Gorbachev proposed a referendum, for 17 March 1991, to demonstrate that the majority of the Soviet population supported a continuation of the USSR, albeit as "a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics." The Group of 239 no longer responded as a group thanks to Kravchuk's manoeuvring. Only when Kravchuk added a second question underscoring Ukrainian sovereignty were there enough votes to agree to Gorbachev's referendum. Although the results of the referendum were contradictory (about seventy percent responded yes to Gorbachev's

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16. Kravchuk was elected the chairman of the Supreme Soviet on 24 July 1990; on 23 August 23 he was relieved of his duties as the second secretary of the CPU's Central Committee.

17. As quoted in Valentyn Chemerys, *Prezydent* (Kyiv: Sventas, 1994), 184.

18. A. O. Bilous, *Politychni ob'iednannia Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1993), 50-1.



question; eighty percent said yes to Kravchuk's question), Kravchuk ignored the Gorbachev results and acted on his own question.

Opposition from the Party leadership failed to prevent the formation of two opposing blocs: the "imperialist Communists" (headed by Hurenko) and the "sovereignty Communists" (headed by Kravchuk). On 27 June 1991 the Ukrainian parliament, by a vote of 345, decided to postpone signing the Union Treaty, much to Gorbachev's displeasure. There was little doubt that the Ukrainian position was worked out by Kravchuk as the chairman of parliament. Once committed, Kravchuk pursued the sovereignty line, emboldened with each successful manoeuvre, until independence was secured with the December 1991 referendum.

Why did Kravchuk adopt a national communist position while the rest of the Party leadership resisted? Although Kravchuk, as the Ukraine's president, liked to underscore his western Ukrainian roots, where national consciousness has run high, he displayed little nationalist verve until late in the game, when the USSR was already beset with fissures and cracks. A likely explanation includes political ambition, foresight, and fortuitous circumstances. When Ivashko was called to Moscow, he vacated two offices simultaneously: the chairmanship of parliament and the first secretaryship of the CPU. Following Ivashko's advice, these positions were to be offered to two different people. An unexpected opportunity for promotion presented itself. Hurenko was elevated to first secretary, and Kravchuk was promoted to second secretary. Next, Kravchuk was nominated for chairman of parliament, probably to keep both the Party and the state in safe hands.

Heretofore there would have been little doubt which of the two positions was the more important. Under changed circumstances, however, with the Party's monopoly no longer guaranteed by Article 6 of the Soviet constitution, parliament became "the center of political gravity."<sup>19</sup> As the Party looked increasingly moribund, parliament teemed with politics.

As the head of state, Kravchuk was exposed to the changing political scene in a more direct and dramatic way than the more insulated Party leadership. Within parliament it was the national democrats who set the tone. They made clear that they sought full independence for Ukraine and the removal of the CPU from power. Not only did their demands

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19. Bohdan Krawchenko, "Ukraine: The Politics of Independence," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 81-2.

mean direct confrontation with the CPU, but also, from Kravchuk's perspective, they were far more effective in pressing their demands. As Kravchuk recalled, in the early days of parliament "The [democrats] spoke, while the Communists sat mute; they did not know how to act, because from previous times they were used only to raising their hands to signal affirmation of others' thoughts.... As soon as the [First] Secretary of the Central Committee ... rises to speak, the National Council [democratic bloc] shouts 'Shame.'... I think it is for this reason that Ivashko fled."<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, the emboldened press, the vastly expanded network of groups and associations, and the participants in street actions and demonstrations all picked up the democrats' cry. Kravchuk could not escape the growing threat to the Party. When students in Kyiv went on a mass hunger strike in October 1990, they initially demanded the resignation of Kravchuk and Prime Minister Masol.

Clearly the situation was coming to a head. There was a political vacuum in Ukraine; Gorbachev was losing his nerve; and the Soviet empire was coming apart. Kravchuk could have tried to shore up the faltering CPU and USSR—a task that appeared difficult but not impossible as late as the first day of the attempted coup in Moscow. Instead he decided to jump ship. Whether or not he became a "born-again nationalist" is a moot point; national communism was one method of staying in power.

Even earlier, when Kravchuk denounced Rukh and the national democrats he was careful not to burn his bridges completely. He facilitated the publication of Rukh's program in *Literaturna Ukraina*; he gave permission for some buses to be used in the Rukh-sponsored human chain; and he made a point of publicly shaking Drach's hand in parliament. Kravchuk's manoeuvring in parliament as the head of the "sovereignty Communists" paved the way for a rapprochement with the national democrats. More than that, the new alliance between the "national communists" and the national democrats was the key to securing Ukrainian independence through the stormy and unpredictable events of the August 1991 putsch and the December 1991 referendum. Clearly it was the Ukrainian national movement that initiated and promoted, against all odds, the goal of independence. Nevertheless "it was the national communists' jumping onto the opposition bandwagon that finally created sufficient momentum towards independence."<sup>21</sup>

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20. As quoted in Chemerys, 185–6.

21. Kuzio and Wilson, 205.

The coalition that produced independence also produced a political hybrid. The "national communists" were in fact misnamed, since those members of the Party who supported nationalism quickly shed their Communist affiliation. They were more likely to be officials of the state apparatus. On the other hand, the "hard core" of the Party, the apparatchiks, did not adopt nationalism as their newfound ideology. As with Mykola Skrypnyk in the 1920s and Petro Shelest in the 1960s, it was difficult, perhaps impossible, to be both a nationalist and a Communist at the same time.

## Post-Communist Outcomes

In the immediate post-independence period it seemed obvious who the winners and losers were within the CPU. Those who remained hard-line Communists to the bitter end, making no allowances for the winds of change sweeping through Ukraine, lost out. The CPU was banned immediately after the failed coup of August 1991. Those Party members who traded in their Communist credentials for nationalist ones won out; they clustered around Kravchuk as the new "party of power."<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, in the parliamentary elections of 1994 the CPU made a remarkable comeback. Eighty-six Party candidates were elected, in comparison to only twenty-five Rukh candidates. Subsequent run-off elections confirmed the strength of the leftists. Out of the 420 deputies elected (out of a total of 450), eighty-nine joined the Communist faction, while only twenty-nine belonged to the Rukh faction. The three leftist factions—the Communists, Socialists, and Agrarians—claimed thirty-three percent of the seats in parliament; the nationalist-reformist factions—Reforms, Rukh, and Statehood—held twenty-one percent of the seats. (Since a number of independents and deputies ostensibly not belonging to factions also adhere to the leftist bloc, the figures for the left are actually even higher.)<sup>23</sup> Has the CPU managed to redefine itself for the post-communist period?

Typically, Communist parties have repositioned themselves on the political spectrum by adopting one of two strategies—national communism or social democracy. In the first instance, the Communist Party (even if it has been renamed) continues to claim a vanguard role in society but has added nationalism to its agenda and its make-over. There

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22. See Mykola Ryabchuk, "Democracy and the So-called 'Party of Power' in Ukraine," *Politychna dumka*, 1994, no. 3: 154–9.

23. *Khto ie khto v ukrainskii politytsi*, issue 3, *Informatsiia stanom na traven 1996 roku* (Kyiv: K.I.S., 1996), 331–45.

is a commitment to minimal or modest economic reforms and mostly a token embrace of democracy. National communism may be an attractive alternative to the Communist parties in power (e.g., in Romania or Azerbaijan) or those attempting to gain power (e.g., in Russia). It is a strategy that is inimical to the democratization process and the most conducive to a semi-authoritarian outcome.

Social democracy, on the other hand, is a strategy that is much more compatible with democratization. Communist Parties, in this instance, transform themselves into parliamentary parties willing to engage in democratic, competitive processes and coalition-building. They are committed to market reforms, although they place more emphasis on social-safety nets and egalitarian policies than their centre-right counterparts. The current Communist parties in East-Central Europe and the Baltic fall into this category. Successful, i.e., elected, Communist leaders emphasize pragmatism and professionalism over ideology.<sup>24</sup>

In the post-communist period, the CPU has adopted neither national communism nor social democracy as its new image. For the Party, the national communist position has been associated with the renegade Kravchuk. The social democratic position has been associated with the reformers who quit the Party to found their own parties, such as the Party of Democratic Revival or the Democratic Party of Ukraine. Those who have remained in the CPU are the hard-core cadres who have found it difficult to reconcile themselves with the demotion of the Party's vanguard status. Despite the dramatically different political environment, the CPU has made few efforts to adopt a new and innovative strategy. The previous intra-Party struggles pre-empted the most relevant strategies and have left the CPU on the outside.

Having been banned at the founding of the new political system, the Communists have expressed little commitment to that system and its rules of the game. Not surprisingly, the CPU has settled on "disloyal opposition" as its preferred strategy.<sup>25</sup> It has not shed its vanguard image, and has consistently challenged the rules of the game. In particular, the Communists have not been willing to accept the outcome of the 1991 referendum as permanent.

The head of the CPU, Petro Symonenko, has actively advocated both bringing back communism and restoring the USSR. He has heaped scorn

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24. See Zoltan Barany, "The Return of the Left in East-Central Europe," *Problems of Post-Communism*, January–February 1995, 41–5.

25. For a discussion of "disloyal opposition," see Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

on democratic and market reforms and the "nationalists-extremists" who introduced them. According to Symonenko, Ukraine is in the midst of a "counter-revolution" led by "anti-socialist, bourgeois-nationalist forces" who are acting according to "the dictates of imperialist circles and international financial dealers" to bring about a capitalist restoration. "It is becoming entirely clear that the path of capitalization created by the 'free market economy' and 'national privatization' is disastrous for Ukraine, as it is for other countries that were formed from the ruins of the Soviet Union."<sup>26</sup> While he has only hinted that workers and peasants will know "what to do" when the time comes, his supporters at leftist rallies have openly called for an armed revolt to wrest power from the nationalist bourgeoisie.

Why does this strategy of "disloyal opposition" yield positive results? The most obvious reason is the economic collapse that Ukraine has witnessed since the declaration of independence. People who have lost their jobs and their sense of stability amidst inflation and the curtailment of social-welfare benefits may very well prefer "the good old days." In fact, an "authoritarian nostalgia" has been typical of many countries undergoing transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, when "memories of repression faded" and have been replaced by "images of order, prosperity, and economic growth."<sup>27</sup>

Another element of the "disloyal opposition" strategy that has contributed to the CPU's electoral success is the "Russian card." The CPU has appealed to the Russian-speaking sectors of the population in eastern and southern Ukraine by proposing dual citizenship, Russian as an official language, and close ties with Russia. To those who have had a weak sense of national identity, or a vague Soviet identity, the restoration of the USSR has represented less of a threat and more of a promise of renewed economic ties and prosperity.<sup>28</sup>

The CPU also did well in the elections because its organizational network and infrastructure has remained intact, even after it was legally disbanded. Although in some regions the CPU has literally collapsed, in others it has remained unchallenged as the "vanguard party." Certainly

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26. *Holos Ukrainy*, 28 February 1995.

27. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 256-7, 262-3.

28. For a further discussion, see my "Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Elections in Ukraine, 1994," in Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 208-26.

there are enough Party strongholds, especially in the villages, to be able to call upon "Party discipline" to bring out the vote in elections.

In the long run, however, the profile of a Communist voter will remain problematic for the CPU. Its supporters have tended to be older. In a 1994 survey, the CPU had the support of six percent of respondents who were younger than thirty, six percent of those between thirty-one and forty-four, fifteen percent of those between forty-five and sixty, and seventeen percent of those over sixty.<sup>29</sup> The CPU's unmitigated attacks on capitalist restoration have found favour with those who are fifty or older, but not with those under thirty. Asked how they would react to a candidate for parliament who espoused a "capitalist path of development for the economy," about forty-three percent of the respondents under thirty responded "positively," while forty-two percent of those aged fifty-one to sixty and fifty-three percent of those over sixty said "negatively."<sup>30</sup> In other words, there may be an important generational divide emerging within the population, and the CPU holds limited appeal for the younger, "post-communist" generation.

Moreover, the majority of the population supports economic reform. In 1994 thirty-eight percent advocated a full-scale transition to the market, and another nineteen percent were in favour of "some changes." Only nineteen percent supported "restoration of the economy that existed several years ago."<sup>31</sup>

Not only does there seem to be a divergence between the CPU's program and the preferences of the majority of the (younger) population, but also continued scepticism towards that party itself. In May 1994, in answer to the question, "What do you think the Communists and Socialists are trying to achieve?" eighty-one percent of the respondents replied "power" and sixty percent said "satisfying personal ambitions." The third-most frequent answer was "broadening of co-operation with Russia." Only thirty-three percent responded "social justice."<sup>32</sup>

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29. Valerii Khmelko, "Khto iaki partii pidtrymuie?" *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 March 1994.

30. Ie. I. Holovakha, *Stratehiia sotsialno-politychnoho rozvytku Ukrainy: Dosvid pershykh rokiv nezalezhnosti ta novi oriientyry* (Kyiv: Abrys, 1994), 36.

31. *Societies in Transformation: Experience of Market Reforms for Ukraine* (Kyiv: Democratic Initiatives Center, 19-21 May 1994).

32. Power and personal ambitions came in as the first and second-rank answers regarding the national democrats as well, but the third-rank answer was the polar opposite: "independence of Ukraine." *A Political Portrait of Ukraine: Results of a Public Opinion Poll of Citizens in the South and East of Ukraine. May-June 1994.* (Kyiv: Democratic Initiatives Center), 6, 9.



At least one signal that the CPU cannot readily replicate its earlier electoral successes comes from the results of local elections. In the 26 June–10 July 1994 elections of the oblast and city councils and their chairmen, reform-oriented candidates were elected as the mayors of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Lviv, Odesa, and Uzhhorod. The Communists won a relatively small number of seats in the Donetsk oblast and city councils (thirteen out of seventy-five filled seats) even though they had won most of the that oblast's seats in the spring elections to the national parliament. In Odesa and Donetsk oblasts, Kuchma's supporters, rather the Communist candidates, were elected the oblast councils' chairmen.<sup>33</sup>

On the whole, the Communists' visions are old visions and are mostly attractive to the nostalgic, older population. The allure of Russia to the residents of eastern and southern Ukraine (with the possible exception of Crimea) is heavily dependent upon economic factors. If Kuchma succeeds in making economic progress and holding out a real glitter of hope for an improvement in material circumstances, the role of the CPU as a party of malcontents and the socially disadvantaged will be undermined.

## **The Two-Way Impact of the Democratization Process**

The CPU's head-in-the-shell reaction to change has influenced the democratization process every step of the way. The insistence on maintaining a vanguard strategy during the Perestroika years posed obstacles to a gradual liberalization, the first significant step in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Instead the CPU's strategy promoted the development of a revolutionary situation, with the unreconstructed party on one side and the radicalized Rukh on the other. A deadlock was created because the CPU was no longer able to assert itself as before, especially since its props within the large Soviet context were crumbling. Rukh, on the other hand, had not yet developed a massive enough movement to seize power.

The impasse persuaded the Kravchuk group to abandon the vanguard strategy. They did not, however, adopt reform communism as a way of resuscitating the CPU, partly because there was too little internal support and partly because reform communism could no longer save them. Political events had swept aside any lingering appeal for Gorbachev's line. Only an alliance with Rukh held a chance for survival.

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33. "Regional Elections Shift Power in Oblasts and Cities," *FBIS Trends*, 3 August 1994.

The impact was substantial: it guaranteed the break-up of the USSR and secured Ukrainian independence; it also put democracy on a back burner.

Immediately after the declaration of Ukraine's independence on 24 August 1991, the imperatives of state-building took precedence over reforms. Nationalist forces rallied around the former *nomenklatura*, while reform voices hesitated even to form a loyal opposition. As the "party of power" replaced the old Communist Party almost seamlessly, many analysts warned that Ukraine was entering a neo-totalitarian phase.<sup>34</sup>

If President Kravchuk did little to foster reforms, he nevertheless did little to obstruct the democratization processes that had been unleashed. Certainly he tried to avoid early elections, brought on by a new round of miners' strikes, but in the end he agreed to both parliamentary and presidential elections. The elections were considered fair by international overseeing organizations. Most importantly, and in contrast to a number of post-communist countries, the elections resulted in a peaceful transfer of power.

At the same time, the slow pace of reforms and a worsening economic crisis encouraged the CPU, which had been restored in 1993, to continue its "disloyal opposition" strategy. Indeed, the CPU contributed to the slow pace of reforms by reverting to the domineering tactics of the Group of 239. The Communists produced frequent executive-legislative confrontations; they kept alive old debates; they refused to adopt a new political constitution; and they challenged the very existence of an independent Ukraine. These tactics complicated the formation of a new national identity and cast doubts on the value of a democracy.

Over the longer term, however, the CPU has found it difficult to sustain the "breakdown game."<sup>35</sup> Not playing by the rules of the game runs the risk of being out of the game. The democratization process has exerted its own influence on the leftist parties, albeit in subtle ways, and the CPU has had little choice but to accept democratic methods, namely elections, as the framework for action, even though Communist candidates have enunciated radical or revolutionary programmatic goals. This step, by itself, has shifted the CPU from a disloyal to a semi-loyal opposition. Moreover, the leftist forces in the new parliament have lost the ability to set the political agenda, unlike the old Group of 239. When confronted with President Kuchma's initiatives, whether on economic reform,

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34. See Volodymyr Polokhalo, "From Communist Totalitarian Ukraine to Neo-Totalitarian Ukraine?" *Politychna dumka*, 1994, no. 2: 123.

35. For a discussion of "breakdown games," see Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

the Power Bill (the "little constitution"), Crimea, or foreign-policy overtures towards the West, the leftist bloc has not been able to rebuff the initiatives or act in complete unity. The Socialist and Agrarian party factions, in particular, have shown less discipline than the Communist faction and have entered into the parliamentary game of bargaining and negotiating. The factions and coalitions have been in a state of flux. The democratization process may prove more effective in the end than Perestroika was in bringing about changes in the CPU. Certainly a corner was turned on 28 June 1996 when parliament voted 315 to thirty-six (with twelve abstentions) in favour of Ukraine's new constitution. The vote clearly shows the split in the leftist bloc; even more importantly, it has engaged the Communists in the new rules of the game. The CPU can no longer claim to have been "absent at the founding," although, of course, it can still play an obstructionist role.

While the democratization process has offered the Communists new opportunities, it has also required strategic choices. Oleksandr Moroz, the leader of the "post-Communist" Socialist Party and the speaker of parliament, has been trying to play both sides of the aisle. But he has found it increasingly difficult to be both in government and in opposition to it. Moroz's support for President Kuchma on key issues, such as the Power Bill, has caused more radical members of the Socialist Party to criticize him openly.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, his support for the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and the warm welcome he gave to the Russian Communist Party's leader, Gennadii Ziuganov, during the campaign for the 1996 Russian presidential elections earned him sound criticism from Kuchma. Although Moroz has stated that he would remain the head of the Socialist Party if forced to make a choice between that role and his parliamentary function, he has sounded ever more a pragmatic politician than an ideologue. At the Second Congress of the new CPU, in March 1995, Moroz urged a rethinking of the orthodox Communist line: "It is essential for our [leftist] parties to make a choice: to stand in opposition to the process of transformation ... or to head this process and undertake corrections that would best ensure just social consequences for the people." Moroz advised the CPU to adopt the latter course.<sup>37</sup>

If the Socialist Party moves to decouple its tight link with the CPU and pursues social democratization, the CPU will be confronted with real

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36. Two of the critics, Natalia Vitrenko and Volodymyr Marchenko, were promptly expelled from the Socialist Party, whereupon they declared their intention to form a separate party dedicated to "revolutionary, not sweet, socialism." *Intelnews Weekly Digest*, 26 February 1996.

37. *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 March 1995.

competition from the left end of the spectrum. The CPU will then have to think seriously about programs, constituencies, and voter appeal.

The pressure for change has resounded even more strongly in the wake of Ziuganov's loss in the Russian presidential elections. Even under difficult economic circumstances, Russia's citizens chose not to support a return to a Soviet-type command economy. This lesson could not have been entirely lost on the CPU. As the prospects of restoring the USSR recede further and the Russian Communist Party struggles to find its own niche in Russia's evolving political system, the CPU will have to make its own choices. It will have to respond to the dynamics of post-communism and fashion a role for itself within the context of an independent Ukraine, or risk being reduced to the political margins.



# Ukraine's Economic Recovery Potential to the Year 2000

*Steven Rosefielde*

## Introduction

Ukraine's gross domestic product and standard of living have plummeted since it became an independent nation in December 1991, falling by more than fifty percent (Winiecki 1991; Pyrozhev and Popovkin 1995; Economic Commission for Europe 1996). This catastrophe is partly explained by the severance of inter-industrial production links with Russia and the disbandment of the CMEA (Van Selm and Dölle 1993; Van Selm and Wagener 1993; Chu and Grais 1994; McCarthy et al 1995; Van Selm 1995). But dislocation is clearly only part of the story. Ukraine is in the midst of a hyper-depression that is nearly twice as intense as the Great Depression of 1929 in the United States and shows no signs of abating, even though the leadership has eschewed shock therapy and sought to preserve the stability provided by the old Soviet system. What went wrong?

A great deal has been written on the subject, emphasizing grand transition strategy and macro-economics (transitology). Much of this literature is superficially instructive, but it is detached from the past, giving the misleading impression that if a few things are set right, prosperity will be quickly self-generating (Åslund 1994a,b, 1995a; Murrell 1995; Rosefielde 1994, 1995; Campbell 1994). This essay investigates the plausibility of this hypothesis. It argues that Soviet Ukrainian accomplishments were less than met the eye, and that communism has bequeathed Ukraine a poisoned legacy: an infungible capital stock, a degenerate production potential, and transmuted anticompetitive institutions that cannot be easily extirpated.<sup>1</sup> Although there are no compelling reasons

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1. Reference here is restricted to a few key technical bequests. The destructive political and human effects of communism are, of course, far more extensive. See Conquest 1986.



for believing that Ukraine cannot eventually prosper, the evidence suggests that the nation will be fortunate to recover before the year 2000.

## The Illusion of Soviet Ukrainian Growth

This assessment of the baneful effects of communism's legacy is at variance with past scholarly descriptions of Soviet Ukrainian economic performance. Official statistics reported in table 1 indicate that national income rose steadily throughout the Soviet postwar era and more than doubled between 1970 and 1990, implying a concomitant rise in production potential. According to the Central Intelligence Agency the dollar value of the Soviet gross national product in 1989 was two-thirds of America's,<sup>2</sup> and new fixed investment exceeded it by six percent,<sup>3</sup> suggesting that Soviet Ukraine's size-adjusted accomplishments were correspondingly grand. Why then has Ukraine had such a hard time harnessing this industrial prowess to maintain and extend its past achievements?

## The Roots of Self-Deception

There are four possibilities: (1) authoritative estimates of Soviet Ukrainian production potential were exaggerated; (2) the old production potential cannot be adapted to the post-communist environment; (3) prevailing institutions are anti-competitive; and (4) the decline is a normal part of the process of Schumpeterian creative destruction that will soon usher in an era of sustained prosperity. The first three explanations imply that post-communist Ukrainian economic prospects are being shaped significantly by the dead hand of the Soviet past, while the fourth, favoured by the G-7, suggests that the triumph of competitive markets over residual forces of disorder and control is just around the corner.

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2. The dollar value of Soviet GNP used here differs from the figure in CIA 1989, 274, which was derived by the CIA from the geometric mean of its ruble and dollar size ratios misleadingly expressed in dollars. The 67 percent ratio correctly compares the CIA's dollar estimate of Soviet GNP directly with America's. Soviet and American GNP were 2,500 billion dollars and 4,862 billion dollars. The corresponding per capita figures were 8,700 dollars and 19,800 dollars valued in 1988 prices. See CIA 1990b, A5. For a detailed discussion of the CIA's dollar sizing methodology, see Edwards, Hughes, and Noren 1979, 1981.

3. CIA 1988, table 8 (p. 32).

**TABLE 1**  
**SOVIET UKRAINIAN NATIONAL INCOME GROWTH, 1970-90**  
**(1970 = 100)**

1970	100
1980	148
1985	177
1986	182
1987	194
1988	200
1989	209
1990	205
Compound Annual Rates (%)	
1970-80	4.0
1980-85	3.6
1980-90	2.4

Sources: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* 1990, 12; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* 1987, 123.

Although these factors are not mutually exclusive, the G-7 explanation has tended to hold sway because many specialists are reluctant to admit that their prior appraisals of Soviet economic performance were wrong or to acknowledge that socialist and related controls have survived the formal abolition of administrative command planning. The first task, therefore, in understanding why Ukraine's transition has faltered is to clarify the record by revisiting the issues of Soviet performance and the mechanisms of socialist control.

## Production Potential

The most fundamental measure of any nation's economic capabilities is its production potential, understood as the maximum competitive value of goods and services producible from its capital, labour, and natural resources if all factors are efficiently employed (Rosefielde 1994, 1997b). For most countries this magnitude is higher than its actual output because production is never fully efficient, and lower than it could be had its factories been equipped with the world's best technologies and had its resources been allocated optimally across the globe. Since production potential in any of these senses is difficult to estimate econometrically, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) statistics are often used as surrogates, on the assumption that most countries are equally inefficient (Bergson 1953, 1963, 1978a,b, 1987, 1989, 1994;

Rosefield 1990). Table 2 displays CIA estimates of this sort for 1989 that suggest that Soviet Ukraine's production potential was fifty-two percent of America's, above Eastern Europe's as a whole, and on a par with Spain.

These data will surprise those who believe that administrative command planning was inefficient, especially given Ukraine's late industrialization and relative backwardness, because its performance is not notably inferior to that of many developed Western European nations despite the competitive advantages of capitalism. This implausible result has prompted several scholars, including Birman (1983) and Åslund (1988), to reject the CIA's ranking, arguing that it overstates Soviet production potential because the composite dollar-ruble ratios used to convert ruble values into dollars do not properly take account of the inferior quality of Soviet goods and their unsaleability on world markets. These criticisms have been parried in the usual way by denying that quality adjustments were inadequate and that saleability mattered.

Under ordinary circumstances, such perfunctory rejoinders would be dismissed because the composite goods employed in the agency's calculations could not possibly be properly micro-adjusted and noncompetitiveness clearly diminished their value. But the CIA's position was supported by a set of specious theories that made it seem that these concerns were misplaced.

Abram Bergson (1953, 1963, 1978, 1987, 1989, 1994, 1995) contended in a series of seminal works that while Soviet GDP statistics did not measure market-competitive production, they did closely approximate production potential in the sense that firms operated near their production possibilities' frontiers and transformed goods at opportunity costs that could be estimated with adjusted ruble-factor costing. The CIA's adjusted ruble-factor cost estimates based on this interpretation validly measured production potential in an important technical way that encompassed most aspects of efficiency other than the responsiveness of assortments to consumer demand, and even here it was suggested that production potential could be construed to reflect planners' preferences.

A corollary of this approach was that the distinction between production potential and value could be carried over to dollar estimates of Soviet per capita GDP, with these competitive market values interpreted as the American dollar-factor cost of manufacturing Soviet goods (products with characteristics that markedly differ from their Western counterparts), assuming fungible technologies and given planners' preferences. In this way it could be acknowledged that dollar estimates of Soviet goods overstated their international market value while asserting their validity in other senses; this was a point stretched even

further by the use of composite dollar-ruble ratios in practical applications for calculating dollar estimates, which concealed qualitative differences between Soviet and Western products through aggregation.

TABLE 2  
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA

	1989
OECD <sup>a</sup>	
United States	100.0
Australia	72.8
Canada	87.7
Japan	76.4
Sweden	77.0
Switzerland	94.8
European Community	69.3
Belgium	72.2
France	77.4
West Germany	80.9
Italy	70.7
Netherlands	69.6
Spain	51.9
<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>51.6</b>
United Kingdom	71.1
Selected East European countries <sup>b</sup>	
Bulgaria	25.9
Czechoslovakia	37.3
Hungary	29.8
Poland	22.1
Romania	17.6
Former Yugoslavia	24.8

Ukraine's gross domestic product per capita was computed in three steps. First the CIA's dollar estimate of Soviet GDP in 1989 is computed by multiplying America's GNP in 1989 valued at 1991 prices by the CIA's dollar-size ratio of Soviet to U.S. GNP—sixty-seven percent. (5,659.2 billion dollars) (.67) = 3,791.7 billion dollars. Second, Ukrainian GDP in 1989 valued in 1991 dollars was calculated from its ruble share of Soviet GNP reported by the CIA: (.162) (3,791.7 billion dollars) = 614.2 billion dollars. Third, Ukrainian GDP per capita was calculated by dividing the figure from step 2 by the population in 1989: (614.2 billion dollars)/(51.6 million people) = 11,903 dollars per capita.

The size ratio of Ukrainian GDP per capita to American GDP per capita was computed by dividing the former by the latter:  $(11,903 \text{ dollars}) / (22,977 \text{ dollars}) = .518$ . See CIA 1992, tables 7, 21, and 31 (pp. 24, 38, and 59). A detailed explanation of the CIA's sizing methodology is provided in Edwards, Hughes, and Noren 1979, 1981. Detailed estimates for 1987 are provided in table A1 below. The dollar parity for 1989 was computed from the CIA's statement that the geometric mean in 1989 was about fifty percent. It is possible that the dollar parity was closer to sixty-six than sixty-seven. See CIA 1990b, A.5.

<sup>a</sup> GDP figures used to compute these data were converted to U.S. dollars by purchasing power parities calculated by the OECD.

<sup>b</sup> See CIA 1992, table 7, notes c and d for an explanation of the methodology used to estimate GDP.

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Because most economists were reluctant to concede the magnitude of the Soviet system's shortcomings, it was impossible to persuade the profession that these arcane rationalizations drastically exaggerated the USSR's relative capacity to produce desirable goods and services while the Soviet Union existed. The collapse of communism has radically changed matters. With the cancellation of state contracts by the post-Soviet authorities, it has become clear that the manufactured products and the capital durables required to produce them have little value domestically, and none abroad. Now that the planners are gone, the fiction that Soviet goods were valuable has been glaringly exposed, and with it the justification for pretending that the CIA's dollar- and adjusted ruble-factor cost estimates measured comparative international production potential.

Whether adjusted ruble-factor costing renders Soviet prices proportional to marginal rates of transformation and whether firms operate near their production possibilities' frontiers are less easily settled by post-communist events. However, it has been demonstrated mathematically by Rosefielde and Pfouts (1995, 1997) that adjusted factor costing cannot reliably have the properties claimed. Likewise, econometric stochastic production frontier studies undertaken by Nowakowski (1994) and Afanas'ev (1997) for multiproduct firms and output at different stages of production have revealed that enormous inefficiencies afflicting Soviet firms were concealed by aggregation. It therefore follows directly that the CIA's comparative production-potential estimates for the Soviet Union were grossly exaggerated on all counts. Instead of Ukraine being in the second tier of the world's nations ranked by production potential (see Table 3), it actually falls in the fourth tier or below, as Åslund (1988) claimed without providing adequate theoretical justification.

**TABLE 3**  
**GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA, 1991**  
**(IN 1991 U.S. DOLLARS)**

More Than \$15,000		
Australia	Germany	Norway
Austria	Iceland	Qatar
Belgium	Italy	San Marino
Bermuda	Japan	Sweden
Canada	Liechtenstein	Switzerland
Denmark	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
Finland	Monaco	United States
France	Netherlands	
\$10,001 to \$15,000		
Andorra	Hong Kong	Spain
Aruba	Ireland	<b>Ukraine (Dollar)</b>
Cayman Islands	Israel	United Arab Emirates
Faroe Islands	New Zealand	Virgin Islands, British
Guam	Singapore	Virgin Islands, U.S.
\$2,001 to \$10,000		
Algeria	Estonia	Mauru
American Samoa	Falkland Islands	Man, Isle of
Anguilla	French Guiana	Martinique
Antigua & Barbuda	French Polynesia	Mauritius
Argentina	Gabon	Mexico
Armenia	Georgia	Moldova
Azerbaijan	Gibraltar	Montserrat
Bahamas, The	Greece	Netherlands Antilles
Bahrain	Greenland	New Caledonia
Barbados	Grenada	Northern Mariana Islands
Belarus	Guadeloupe	Oman
Bosnia & Hercegovina	Hungary	Pacific Islands, Trust Ter-
Botswana	Kazakhstan	ritory of
Brazil	Kuwait	Panama
Brunei	Kyrgyzstan	Poland
Bulgaria	Latvia	Portugal
Chile	Lithuania	Puerto Rico
Cook Islands	Libya	Reunion
Croatia	Macau	Romania
Cyprus	Macedonia	Russia
Czechoslovakia	Malaysia	St. Kitts & Nevis
Dominica	Malta	St. Pierre & Miquelon

Saudi Arabia	Suriname	Turkmenistan
Serbia & Montenegro	Syria	Turks & Caicos Islands
Seychelles	Taiwan	<b>Ukraine (Geometric)</b>
Slovenia	Tajikistan	Uruguay
South Africa	Trinidad & Tobago	Uzbekistan
South Korea	Turkey	Venezuela

\$501 to \$2,000

Albania	Indonesia	Peru
Angola	Iran	Philippines
Belize	Iraq	St. Lucia
Bolivia	Ivory Coast	St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Burma	Jamaica	Senegal
Cameroon	Jordan	Solomon Islands
Cape Verde	Kiribati	Swaziland
China <sup>a</sup>	Lebanon	Thailand
Colombia	Maldives	Tokelau
Comorons	Marshall Islands	Tonga
Congo	Mauritania	Tunisia
Costa Rica	Mayotte	Tuvalu
Cuba	Micronesia, Federated States of	<b>Ukraine (Exchange Rate)</b>
Djibouti	Mongolia	Vanuatu
Dominican Republic	Morocco	Wallis & Futuna
Ecuador	Namibia	West Bank
Egypt	Niue	Western Samoa
El Salvador	North Korea	Yemen
Fiji	Papua New Guinea	Zambia
Gaza Strip	Paraguay	Zimbabwe
Guatemala		
Honduras		

Less Than \$501

Afghanistan	Guinea-Bissau	Niger
Bangladesh	Guyana	Nigeria
Benin	Haiti	Pakistan
Bhutan	India	Rwanda
Burkina	Kenya	Sao Tome & Principe
Burundi	Laos	Sierra Leone
Cambodia	Lesotho	Somalia
Central African Republic	Liberia	Sri Lanka
Chad	Madagascar	Sudan
Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Tanzania
Ethiopia	Mali	Togo
Gambia, The	Mozambique	Uganda
Ghana	Nepal	Vietnam
Guinea	Nicaragua	Zaire



Source: CIA 1992, figure 1 (p. 10).

Comments: Ukrainian per capita GDP in 1991 was \$10,193, computed by adjusting the figure for 1989, \$11,903, for the negative growth in 1989–1991 shown in table 4. The geometric mean pseudo-dollar estimate is  $.50/.67 (\$10,193) = \$7,607$ .

<sup>a</sup> Estimates of China's per capita GDP range from \$315 to over \$3,000. The wide discrepancy among the figures is in part due to the difficulty of assessing the size and rates of growth for various economic sectors as Beijing attempts to reform its socialist structure, and to the poor quality of much of China's data. Nonetheless, many studies have placed China's per capita GDP within the \$500 to \$2,000 range.

## Growth

This reassessment, which has been gradually gaining ground, has not gone unchallenged. It has been counterargued that even if adjusted ruble-factor-cost prices did not reliably reflect opportunity costs, Soviet growth closely tracked the West European mean in a variety of prices that included official established rubles and dollars, indicating that physical outputs of all kinds, and therefore production potential, were steadily increasing. As always, estimates of per capita GDP may be imprecise, but the price insensitivity of Soviet growth rates, it has been asserted, demonstrates that whatever the Soviet Union's comparative production potential may have been initially, the command system was sufficiently efficient to enable it to keep pace with capitalist competitors.

The CIA's per capita GNP growth statistics in table 4 illustrate this remarkable similarity between the performance of capitalist and communist countries in the years 1970–89; this finding may well understate Soviet growth because of the disputable downward adjustment the CIA made to the military component of Soviet production data for the alleged consequences of "hidden" inflation (Rosefielde 1988). It should be remembered, however, that official Soviet growth statistics are much higher because they did not deflate the military and civilian machine-building sectors for hidden inflation, as was the CIA's contestable practice (Rosefielde 1990). Should it therefore be conceded that the proportional growth of outputs, hidden inflation aside, assured that Soviet production potential increased by fifty-one percent in the 1970s and 1980s despite all of Gorbachev's complaints about stagnation?

The answer is no, because the characteristics of the physical goods in question did not have any obvious connection with demand and utility. The amassing of machines to produce more useless goods according to Marx's famous extended reproduction paradigm does not increase the

	1971-80	1981-5	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
	3.2	2.3	2.9	3.2	4.2	3.1	2.8
	2.8	2.5	2.9	3.1	3.9	2.5	1.9
	4.6	2.9	3.3	4.1	4.7	2.4	3.2
	4.5	3.7	2.6	4.1	6.2	4.6	5.0
	1.2	1.4	2.9	2.0	2.9	3.9	2.8
	3.0	1.4	2.8	2.9	4.0	3.3	2.8
	3.2	1.5	2.4	2.2	3.8	3.6	2.8
	2.8	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.1	1.2	-15.3
	2.7	1.1	2.2	1.4	3.7	3.3	4.1
	3.8	1.4	2.9	3.1	4.1	3.0	2.8
	1.9	1.9	3.9	4.8	4.2	2.3	3.2

	2.4	1.7	4.1	1.3	2.1	1.5	-2.4 to -5.0
	2.8	.9	2.7	.2	-.7	-1.9	-11.2
	2.8	1.2	2.0	.9	2.2	.8	-2.8
	2.7	.7	2.2	1.7	1.7	-1.8	-6.3
	3.6	.6	3.3	-1.5	2.3	-1.6	-9.3
	4.7	.5	1.6	-2.0	-.3	-3.4	-10.3
	5.0	1.3	4.2	-1.2	-1.4	-1.3	-7.3
	5.8	9.2	7.8	10.3	10.6	3.8	5.0

8 (p. 26).

shown for 1990 are preliminary and subject to greater uncertainty than usual. The estimated routine application of standard CIA estimating methods. Corrections for two measurement would change this figure to about -4 to -5 percent. The first measurement problem is that we es data on gross output (the total value of output in a given sector), while the standard defi added by primary inputs of labour and capital. We believe that this simplification usually do estimates, but given the breakdown in transportation and distribution that occurred in 1990, u

seriously in 1990, and inflation accelerated sharply. Our estimate of the change in GDP might be reduced by roughly one-half of a percentage point on this count. The above corrections for overestimation might be partly offset, however, by an adjustment for under-reporting of output in physical units. In the past, production managers had incentives to overstate the output they reported to the statistical authorities because a considerable share of their incomes—and that of their workers—depended on reported output. Incentives for under-reporting may have increased in 1990, partly because acute shortages made barter deals between factories more attractive than deliveries to the central supply system. Unfortunately, the impact of such a change in reporting cannot be quantified at this time.

<sup>b</sup> Estimates of GDP comparable to those through 1990 are not yet available for 1991. According to official statistics for the former Soviet Union, GDP fell by seventeen percent in 1991 on the territory of the new Commonwealth of Independent States (which was not joined by Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). This drop in output is too steep to be consistent with official statistics for Russia and Ukraine, which reported decreases in GDP of nine and ten percent respectively. Reasons for the discrepancy probably include inconsistencies in adjusting for inflation and accounting for changes in foreign trade.

economy's production potential for manufacturing competitively valuable things. The Soviet Union's capital stock may well have grown rapidly during the Brezhnev and Gorbachev years, but this did not enhance the USSR's ability to manufacture goods with commensurately enhanced international worth.

## Hyper-Depression

Soviet Ukraine's production potential reached its maximum in 1989, when it was 11,903 dollars per capita expressed in 1991 American prices using the CIA's dollar-index-sizing methodology. The CIA's published figure, misleadingly labelled dollars but actually derived from the geometric mean of its ruble and dollar comparative size indices, was 8,883 dollars per capita.<sup>4</sup>

The hyper-depression that subsequently overtook the USSR and the Soviet bloc reduced Ukraine's GDP by forty percent by the end of 1993 according to the Economic Commission for Europe (see table 5), and by fifty-seven percent by the end of 1994 according to Pyrozhev and Popovkin's (1995) estimates. According to the Economic Commission for Europe (1996), Ukraine's GDP fell another twelve percent in 1995 and was forecast to decline further in 1996. Other things being equal, production potential measured by Ukraine's per capita GDP fell by the beginning of 1996 to 4,504 dollars and 3,362 geometric ruble-dollars. But these figures, low as they are, falsely imply that Ukraine's products were competitive on the global market (Starostyna and Samonis 1995; McCarthy et al 1995). Although an accurate assessment of the real competitive value of its GDP is impossible because of residual controls, an estimate at or below 1,000 dollars per capita is hardly unthinkable and puts Ukraine's plight in a more realistic perspective,<sup>5</sup> even without further consideration of the West's growth after 1989 or its environmental liabilities. Ukraine's per capita GDP at the end of 1994 estimated through the exchange rate, assuming proportionality with the revision in Russian

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4. The geometric comparative GDP size ratio in 1989 was approximately 0.50. The CIA's corresponding per capita GDP figure for 1989 valued in 1991 prices therefore is approximately  $(.50/.67) (\$11,903) = 8,883$  pseudo-dollars. See CIA 1990b, A5.

5. Russia's GNP per capita fell from 15,631 dollars in 1989, based on the CIA's dollar calculations, to 1,327 dollars in 1995, computed by annualizing first-quarter results through the exchange rate. Assuming proportionality, the estimated dollar value of Ukrainian per capita GNP in 1995 was 1,011. See Rosefielde 1997a.

	1991	1992	1993	Forecast	1990	1991	1992	1993			
								Jan.- March	Jan.- June	Jan.- Sept.	Jan.- Dec.
3.1	-29.4	-6.0	11.*	8	-7.8	-30.0	..	..	..	..	-1. <sup>a</sup>
9.1	-11.7	-7.7	-6.*	..	-17.2	-22.2	-16.2	-10.9	-8.2	-8.5	-9.3*
1.6	..	..	..	..	0.9	-10.5	-25	..	..	..	..
8.5	-29	-8	-8.*	-	-11	-28.5	-14.6	-1.1	-1.5	-3.7	-6.0*
1.2	-14.2	-7.1	-0.5	1.5-2.5	-3.3	-24.4	-10.6	-7.3 <sup>c</sup>	-6.7 <sup>c</sup>	-7.4	-7.1 <sup>c</sup>
3.3	-11.9	-5.0	-2.*	..	-4.5	-19.1	-9.8	0.1	2.4	4.2	3.8
1.6	-7.6	1.5	4.0	4.5	-24.2	-11.9	4.2	7.1	9.3	8.3	7.4
8.2	-13.7	-15.4	1.	1.5	-19.0	-18.7	-22.1	-16.0	-6.7	-1.2	1.3
2.5	-14.5	-7.0	-4.7	..	-4.0	-25.4	-12.9	-26.2	-18.2	-14.7	-15.4
4.7	-9.3	-6.0	1.	1	-10.5	-12.4	-13.2	-7.4	-6.7	-4.8	-2.8
0.2	-12.1	-13.4	-15.0*	-8	-11.0	-17.4	-15.8	-2.3	-7.5	-12.4	-15.0*
8.4	-11.2	-26.1	-30.3	-10	-11.7	-17.6	-22.4	-39.8	-41.1	-38.7	-37.4
7.9	-12.3	-7.4	-3.	1*	-15.1	-18.1	-10.0	-7.6	-4.6	-3.6	-4*
7.5	-10.2	-2.2	1.	3*	-15.3	-16.8	-2.4	0.2	2.2	2.1	2*
8.6	-15.0	-14.5	-8.	-2*	-15.0	-19.6	-19.2	-16.7	-12.9	-10.5	-10*

NMP* or GDP <sup>a</sup>					Gross Industrial Output						
1990	1991	1992	1993	1994 Forecast	1990	1991	1992	1993			
								Jan.- March	Jan.- June	Jan.- Sept.	Jan.- Dec.
8.2	-11.4	-46.0	-9.9	..	-7.5	-7.7	-52.5	-58.4	-51.4	-39.9	-11.1
1.3	-0.4	-28.1	-13.3	..	-6.3	4.7	-24.0	-20.4	-12.4	-11.6	-6.8
3.2	-1.9	-10.6	-10.	..	2.1	-1.0	-9.4	-16.5	-16.3	-14.9	-10.9
4.3	..	-43.4	-35.	..	-5.7	..	-45.8	..	..	..	-26.6
0.9	-10.3	-14.2	-12.8	..	-0.8	-0.9	-14.8	-11.3	-10.7	-11.8	-16.1
4.8	-5.2	-19.0	-17.4	..	-0.6	-0.3	-26.8	-22.4	-24.6	-26.0	-24.2
1.5	-18.0	-21.3	-4.	..	3.2	-11.1	-21.7	0.2	0.9	7.0	-10. <sup>d</sup>
4.0	-14.3	-22.0	-13.	..	-0.1	-8.0	-18.0	-19.3	-18.0	-16.7	-16.2
2.0	-12.9	-18.5	-12.	-(8-10)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
0.2	-8.4	-31.0	-21.	..	1.2	-3.6	-24.3	-28.2	-30.5	-24.5	-19.5
1.8	-4.7	..	7.8	..	3.2	4.8	-16.7	5.1	16.9	15.9	5.3

11.1	-10.0	-14.4	-2	..	-3.6	-9.0	-36.9	-39.8	-34.9	-31.8	-26.6
2.7	-8.3	-33.8	-19.9	..	-0.2	-0.6	-35.1	-41.9	-40.9	-38.4	-34.6
6.9	-13.1	-37.7	-17*	..	-2.8	-4.9	-51.6	-52.0	-51.9	-48.5	-46.0
3.9	-10.8	-31.5	-14.8*	-2*	-2.5	-4.2	-43.3	-45.2*	-44.7	-41.7	-38.2
4.8	-12.3	-16.9	-10.0	-6*	-3.6	-8.8	-15.7	-16.3	-15.0	-13.8	-13.8
5.5	-29.1	9.7	7.0	6-7	-27.3	-49.1	-6.2	-2.3	2.2	4.4	5.5*

mission for Europe 1994; national statistical publications and statistical office communications to Romania; and non-governmental forecasts. Aggregates for Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the CE secretariat computations based on 1992 weights, and some estimates for missing components. Generally end-1993 forecasts of national conjunctural institutes.

Eastern Europe (twelve countries), divided into sub-aggregates CETE-4 ("central European transition economies"—Poland, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and SETE-8 ("south European transition economies"—Albania, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic); the CIS (the twelve member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Lithuania); and the total transition countries.

roduced) unless otherwise noted.

value added of the material sphere including depreciation).

five or more employees.

out indicators. Since March 1993 the Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics has published two indicators of industrial output. One is based on the deflated gross output value analogous to those shown for other CIS countries, and one based on a physical indicator. The former shows much more moderate rates of output contraction in 1993 (five percent for January–December, 7.4 percent for January–December), but may be affected by inadequate deflation procedures. Similar physical indicator measures of industrial output for the full year 1993 are 10.0 percent, vs. 4.2 percent growth in deflated output value) and Uzbekistan (-7 percent, vs. 4.1 percent). These values are recorded in the table.

values, was 4.1 percent of the American level.<sup>6</sup>

## A Paupers' Paradise

Despite massive investments and steadily rising volumes of physical output, the inability of the Soviet Union to keep pace with the West's continuously improving capacity to satisfy the economic demands of the global community provides profound insight into the source of its failure. Experience has revealed that although administrative command planning did not bring production to a grinding halt as predicted by von Mises (1920), Robbins (1932), and von Hayek (1935), it also did not work in the no-frills sense described by Bergson (1953), Nove (1969), and the CIA (1982, 1990a, 1992) or in the visionary fashion claimed by Dobb (1969). Instead, the command economy was epitomized by its inefficiencies. It worked to the extent that things were produced that crudely satisfied minimal human requirements for food, shelter, clothing, health, transportation, education, and leisure, but at an exorbitant cost in terms of capital, labour, and personal liberty. The characteristics of the goods produced were inferior, and even when they met some high engineering standard they were discordant with demand. The assortment of goods, likewise, was macro- and micro-economically deficient. Too many guns and capital durables to produce them were manufactured, while there were omnipresent shortages of things people wanted and gluts of goods they did not need.

This, no doubt, is what Gorbachev really meant when he spoke of stagnation, official growth statistics to the contrary notwithstanding. The Soviet Union, as became painfully clear, was on the fast track to nowhere, requiring either urgent radical reform (*perestroika*) or the adoption of a new system (*perekhod*).

According to Gorbachev and his Western advisers, radical reform and transition were the Soviet Union's only options. Administrative command planning would either be debugged or have to be junked and replaced by competitive markets that would purge the economy of all its inefficiencies. But this either/or problematic begged the fundamental question of whether past inefficiencies might survive the institutional changes contemplated. Did it really follow that the abolition of administrative command planning would initiate a rapid capitalist market transition

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6. Ibid. Russia's per capita GDP in 1989 was 68 percent of the U.S. level valued in dollars; it fell to 5.4 percent at the end of 1994 calculated through the exchange rate. Assuming proportionality, Ukraine's per capita GDP fell from 51.6 to 4.1 percent.



unconstrained by a communist legacy steering the system on a different path?

## **Infungibility, Socialism, and Post-Communist Inefficiency**

The case for rapid transition rests on the assumption that Soviet inefficiencies were endemic to its command institutions and could be discarded with them by rescinding Gosplan's authority to issue legally binding directives and contracts, revoking various state monopolies—including the domestic material-technical supply system [Gossnab]—and partially decontrolling prices and denationalizing some of the means of production, with property rights transferred to collective and, in some cases, individual private owners. Once proprietors are free to design their own goods, set prices, acquire inputs, and distribute outputs in competition with other former state enterprises without government direction, it would seem that demand-driven market processes should eradicate Soviet inefficiencies. But one should not jump to conclusions.

First, even if markets were perfect, the characteristics embodied in Soviet-manufactured capital and consumer goods cannot be easily altered. In order to adapt old embodied technologies to new uses, capital durables would have to have been originally engineered to accommodate these modifications. This runs counter to the command culture because, in a planned order, adaptivity is superfluous and costly. As a consequence, having imperfectly foreseen present needs, Soviet-embodied technologies are extremely infungible and cannot be used to switch from inferior goods to those desired by the market. Although Ukraine has an immense physical capital stock, its production potential remains severely constrained by the communist past.<sup>7</sup>

Similarly, while enterprises are described as being free, socialist culture persists (Lanis and Patel 1995; Haddad 1995). Housing, education, medicine, municipal transportation, communications, and public recreation are mostly provided collectively at a token cost by the government. Private ownership is inversely correlated with size and national priority. The government continues to control key prices (e.g., for electricity) and micro-regulates all aspects of business. The old monop-

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7. See table A1. The dollar value of new Soviet fixed investment in 1987 was 20 percent greater than America's, or 928 billion dollars. The Ukrainian share of the Soviet capital stock was 15.5 percent in 1988 valued in rubles. See CIA 1992, table 31 (p. 59). The dollar value of Ukraine's new fixed investment therefore was approximately 143 billion dollars, 80 percent of the United Kingdom's level and nearly equal adjusted for population.

olies continue to reign in their respective markets, and the state pursues egalitarian objectives with nearly confiscatory profit taxes (Klotz 1995). And, of course, the government determines macro-economic policy by printing money, coercing banks to grant credit, and managing foreign trade (Kushnirsky 1995; Bornefalk 1995). Constraints may be milder than before, but they still pervasively impair economic efficiency.

The deleterious effect of governmental socialist regulation is compounded by new institutions and coteries primarily interested in looting state assets and restricting market competition. Some of these are kleptocrats—state officials seeking to privatize society's wealth for themselves and living passively off their assets or incomes generated by influence peddling. Others are managers and criminals more concerned with building monopolies and extortion than competitively maximizing wealth through investment and improved efficiency (Kleiner 1994; Rosefielde and Pfouts 1988; Åslund 1995a,b; Cohen 1995). They operate in their own distinct fashion but have the common effect of suppressing the kind of textbook entrepreneurship that is essential if Ukraine is to make the transition into competitive market capitalism instead of some destructively exotic variant of kleptocratic market socialism.

## **Rehabilitation, Recovery, and Modernization**

It is premature to judge whether Ukraine's reconstruction, to the extent that it will occur, will be governed by some mutated form of its communist legacy or by entrepreneurial capitalism. Nonetheless, the preceding analysis illuminates the alternatives and their determining factors. First, as already explained, Ukraine's hyper-depression is the inevitable consequence of past communist inefficiencies that could only have been papered over by preserving administrative command planning, although sounder policies could have mitigated much pain. Second, the level of production can be quickly increased by reactivating idle capacities and putting redundant factors to alternative use through sundry public-works projects, but only if the leadership is prepared to rehabilitate a system already shown to be on a treadmill to nowhere. Third, if Ukraine is to acquire a production potential capable of serving the global market, its leaders must empower competitive entrepreneurship by eradicating kleptocracy, graft, corruption, excessive socialist regulation, and all critical non-state barriers to market entry. Playing at capitalist transition will not suffice, and muddling through is unlikely to be any better, because the heritage of communism is too deeply encoded in the nation's physical environment, institutions, and culture. In this regard communism, with all its complexities as an ideology and political and economic mind set, may prove to have more explanatory power as

a trans-epochal phenomenon than Sovietology, transitology, or consolidation.

## **Conclusion**

Ukraine's recovery potential to the year 2000 is clouded by the physical, institutional, and cultural vestiges of Soviet communism. Although disparities between performance during and after the Soviet period, the dismantling of command planning, the dissolution of the state distribution network, the decontrol of prices, the partial denationalization of the means of production, and the emergence of some market forces might seem to refute this assertion, close analysis has shown otherwise. Ukraine's shockingly low capacity to produce goods competitively in the international market is a direct consequence of past Soviet failures, disguised by authoritative misinterpretations of the data but made explicit by the revocation of assured state demand for useless goods and services. Ukraine's inability to rectify the situation is likewise explained by the infungibility of its Soviet capital stock, communist survivals, and new and transmuted institutions steeped in anticompetitive attitudes, none of which is apt to fade away of its own accord. As a consequence, Ukraine's prospects for capitalist transition depend crucially on an incorruptible and resolute leadership that empowers entrepreneurship by eradicating barriers to market entry. If it is forthcoming, recovery and modernization will be swift; if not, the inefficiencies of Soviet communism will combine with new anticompetitive institutions to thwart and distort Ukraine's production potential, even if there is a resumption in the physical growth of unwanted things.

	(1982)			(1982)			are Compared Dollars and Rubles
	USSR <sup>b</sup>	U.S.	USSR as a % of U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR as a % of U.S.	USSR as % of U.S.
	766	1,857	41	2,608	3,797	69	
	408	1,536	27	1,253	2,637	48	
ment	217	233	93	928	776	120	

8 (p. 32).

for making international economic comparisons is to convert each country's GNP to the current dollar. When comparisons can be made, one in rubles and one in dollars. The two comparisons will yield different results. This is known as the "index number problem"; it results from differences in the relative price and quantity of goods produced in relatively large quantities in either country tend to sell at relatively low prices. Since the U.S. GNP was, therefore, a large share of U.S. GNP when comparisons are made in dollars, because of the higher prices did on investment and defense goods, which accounted for larger shares of output in the

about index numbers is that valuations in either rubles or dollars are equally correct. When a single index is required, economists conventionally often use the geometric mean of the ruble and dollar values, which falls between the two.

The comparison is presented here, although the reader is cautioned that it is used for its presentation. The geometric mean, representing a more valid result than that presented in either currency.

The GNP in dollars presented here is different from the one given in CIA, 1988, table 7, which uses the official foreign exchange rates for consistency with the other data in that table. The approach used in this table, however, is

established prices should not be used in conjunction with Soviet foreign trade data appearing in the table. We use official foreign exchange rates to derive dollar values for trade; we have yet to estimate the share of actual purchasing power, which would allow for an estimate of the share of foreign trade

The Soviet end-use components were calculated to measure value of output compared with the U.S. The share of total economic resources devoted to a particular end use (such as defense) and the share of the total sector (for example, agriculture or industry) in the USSR should be measured in internal rubles

Components of GNP are defined as follows: (1) Consumption includes personal expenditures for goods and services, government outlays by government for goods and services for health and education. (2) New fixed capital formation includes expenditures for the gross private domestic investment net of inventories for public construction

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# Social Policy and Political Discourse in Post-Soviet Ukraine\*

*Andrea Chandler*

The breakup of the Soviet Union allowed Ukraine to consolidate its independence at the end of 1991, but it also left Ukraine, like other former Soviet republics, with serious social problems. The widespread environmental damage, the shortcomings of the health-care system, and the economic uncertainties that the population had increasingly endured under Soviet rule meant that social policy was likely to be a prominent issue in the transition from communism. Social-policy reform, however, has been one of the most serious problems of post-Soviet states, and it has triggered a debate over the relationship between economic reform, internal political struggles in the new democracies, and social welfare.

Ukraine's elites initially backed off from radical market reform, partly because Russia's example of "shock therapy" was shown to have very high social costs. Yet despite the slow progress of reform, Ukraine's social hardships mounted, and by 1994 the newly elected president, Leonid Kuchma, argued that market reform presented the only available alternative for improving citizens' standard of living. This raises a number of interesting questions relevant to the debate on social-policy reform in post-communist countries in general: are Ukraine's deficiencies in social policy the result of failures in government leadership, or are

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they an inevitable outcome of a transition to independence that left Ukraine at an economic disadvantage? Does market reform significantly change the prospects for improved social policy, be it for better or for worse?

This paper will argue that the politicization of the social-policy issue in Ukrainian political discourse and political actors' initiatives and strategies on social policy have been the most important factors in determining the government's role in social policy. In Ukraine the government's statist approach to social policy effectively eroded its effectiveness. Sadly, in a country where the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster galvanized citizen demands for a more socially protective state, economic crisis has weakened the state's provision of social programs for the population. The breakup of the USSR caused a drastic disruption to the budgetary system in Ukraine, while an increasingly expensive fuel dependency on Russia dramatically restrained Ukraine's available funds.<sup>1</sup> The economic desperation of the country caused social-welfare policy to be ever more loosely defined as stopgap payments and wages to the population rather than the establishment of an effective social infrastructure or redesigned programs. As one scholarly observer has argued, the Ukrainian state has maintained a "paternalistic" attitude towards society: it cannot sustain its citizens' ability to earn a living wage, yet it cannot offer them viable opportunities to improve their lives outside of the existing economy.<sup>2</sup>

## Social Policy in Post-Soviet Countries

Social policy can be defined as the state's responsibility; it includes laws, the allocation of budget priorities, and the operation of institutions for social welfare and for the socio-economic rights of citizens. In the Soviet period under Brezhnev, social policy (or "social protection") developed as an expansive set of government programs: the state sponsored policies for social assistance, health care, and education, but also for price subsidies, wage policies, and housing.<sup>3</sup> Price subsidies and

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1. On the Ukrainian state's management of economic policy, see Francisco Nadal de Simone, "Ukraine's New Currency and the Unstable Ruble Currency Area," *Communist Economies and Economic Transformation* 6, no. 1, (1994): 99-112; Simon Johnson and Oleg Ustenko, "Ukraine on the Brink of Hyperinflation," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, no. 50 (18 December 1992): 51-9.

2. A. Sekarev, "Ukraina: Krizis na fone neiasnoi ekonomicheskoi politiki," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1994, no. 4: 36-49.

3. Linda J. Cook, *The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 23-4.

other social benefits associated with the welfare state were seen as important priorities.<sup>4</sup> Although enterprises, trade unions, and lower levels of government administered some of these social mechanisms, the state was still the essential source of resources.<sup>5</sup>

Ukraine is not the only post-communist state where social policy is widely considered to be one of the most burning political issues. Experts have identified three main factors complicating social policy in those countries. First of all, the newly independent states are overwhelmed by the accumulated problems left behind by previous Communist rulers. Recent research suggests that by the 1980s the Soviet Union's ability to fund its commitments to social services had declined and that health care, for example, was low on the Soviet regime's list of priorities.<sup>6</sup> As James R. Millar and Sharon Wolchik argue, a combination of neglect, corruption, and over-bureaucratization left the USSR's social-welfare system in an appalling state, although the Soviet regime led citizens to believe they could expect high-quality social services from the welfare state.<sup>7</sup> As a result, former communist states lack the financial resources for social-policy reform, even though, in some cases, society is facing inflation and other realities associated with marketization.<sup>8</sup>

This has led to the second factor affecting social policy, namely the transition to a market economy, which has produced pressure for social-

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4. James R. Millar and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Introduction: The Social Legacies and the Aftermath of Communism," in Millar and Wolchik, eds., *The Social Legacy of Communism* (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7. Donna Bahry makes a similar argument based on survey data, which she argues suggests that citizen support for state intervention will constrain reform. See her "Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika," *Slavic Review* 52, no. 3 (fall 1993): 512-54.

5. See Catherine Cosman, "Labor Issues in Post-Soviet Society," *Central Asia Monitor*, 1993, no. 3: 11-16; Stephen Crowley, "Barriers to Collective Action: Steelworkers and Mutual Dependence in the former Soviet Union," *World Politics* 46, no. 4 (July 1994): 589-615; Donna Bahry, "The Union Republics and Contradictions in Gorbachev's Economic Reform," *Soviet Economy* 7, no. 3 (1991): 215-55.

6. Cook, *The Soviet Social Contract*, 49-53; Mark G. Field, "Postcommunist Medicine: Morbidity, Mortality, and the Deteriorating Health Situation," in Millar and Wolchik, *The Social Legacy of Communism*, 178.

7. Millar and Wolchik, "Introduction," 1-21.

8. See these issues are raised in the discussion of the Polish case by Louisa Vinton, "Poland's Social Safety Net: An Overview," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 17 (23 April 1993): 3-5. Nonetheless, Vinton considers Poland's reform to have been a success.

welfare systems to provide adequately for vulnerable social groups.<sup>9</sup> The market transition that is under way to a greater or lesser extent in post-communist countries has displaced and imposed hardships on many citizens. During the Soviet period, some social benefits had been provided through the workplace, partly in order to attract scarce workers, yet economic reform could threaten this arrangement as more workers competed for fewer jobs.<sup>10</sup> It has been argued that while post-communist societies have suffered increased unemployment and economic hardship, their leaders have not necessarily paid the commensurate attention to social policy; post-communist leaders have been slow to redefine the roles that the state and the private sector should respectively play in providing for social needs.<sup>11</sup>

This, in turn, has led to a third factor affecting social policy: the politicization of this issue. As Adam Przeworski argues, citizens affected by the adoption of a market-based system would be more likely to put pressure on leaders in their new democracies and make it difficult to ignore their demands for basic social guarantees.<sup>12</sup> Economist Jeffrey Sachs has argued that the maintenance of the social-welfare state is so important to voters in post-communist countries that it has contributed to the renewed power of left wing parties, and has discouraged leaders from undertaking any social reform that would jeopardize the existing social-welfare system, no matter how costly it might be to maintain.<sup>13</sup> All three of the factors listed above have worked together to complicate social policy. Regardless of their own reform strategies, post-Soviet governments have had to be more responsive to the pressures of the international market than their predecessors, and they have had to be more self-reliant in their finances. This, in turn, has had a major impact on the funds available for social spending. Yet social policy is more than

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9. Sheila Marnie, "Economic Reform and the Social Safety Net," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, no. 17 (23 April 1993): 1-2.

10. Donald Fitzer, *Soviet Workers and the Collapse of Perestroika: The Soviet Labour Process and Gorbachev's Reforms, 1985-1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 6-7.

11. Branco Milanovic, "A Cost of Transition: 50 Million New Poor and Growing Inequality," *Transition* 5, no. 8 (October 1994): 1-4.

12. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 134-5, 174-5.

13. Jeffrey Sachs, "Postcommunist Parties and the Politics of Entitlements," *Transition* 6, no. 3 (March 1995): 1-3.

a question of pure public administration; it is a political problem involving controversy over state priorities.

## Social Policy in Ukraine

Before perestroika, Soviet sources claimed that great strides had been made in Ukraine's social welfare, noting, for example, increasing health-care expenditures in Ukraine through the late 1970s.<sup>14</sup> Statistics suggested that Ukraine's levels of health-care provision were among the highest of the Soviet republics.<sup>15</sup> In the Soviet system the republics had responsibility for many areas of social policy, for which they were dependent on funding from the central government.<sup>16</sup> For example, each republic had its own Ministry of Health, which had primary responsibilities for medical care.<sup>17</sup> The payment of pensions, however, was an all-Union budgetary responsibility, financed by payroll contributions; since the latter were increasingly insufficient for the needs of pensions, the Soviet government had to allocate extra funds from the budget by the 1980s.<sup>18</sup> Donna Bahry has argued that under the reforms of perestroika, the same dynamic that encouraged republican demands for economic independence also made the republics vulnerable to increasing social pressure.<sup>19</sup> But Gertrude E. Schroeder has argued that partly because of the Chernobyl disaster, by the late 1980s Ukraine found it increasingly difficult to meet social needs and provide an effective social-welfare system.<sup>20</sup> This would ensure that Ukraine would enter into the period of independence with some of the requisite institutions for carrying out

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14. V. S. Steshenko, ed., *Demograficheskoe razvitie Ukrainskoi SSR* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1987), 195.

15. See Gosudarstvennyi komitet po statistike, Informatsionno-izdatelskii tsentr, *Sotsialnoe razvitie SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1990), 248–83.

16. Donna Bahry, *Outside Moscow: Power, Politics and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1.

17. Christopher M. Davis, "The Organization and Performance of the Contemporary Soviet Health Service," in Gail W. Lapidus and Guy E. Swanson, eds., *State and Welfare USA/USSR: Contemporary Policy and Practice* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1988), 116–17.

18. Bernice Madison, "The Soviet Pension System and Social Security for the Aged," in Lapidus and Swanson, *State and Welfare USA/USSR*, 173–6.

19. Donna Bahry, "The Union Republics and Contradictions in Gorbachev's Economic Reform," *Soviet Economy* 7, no. 3 (1991): 215–55.

20. Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Living Standards in Ukraine: Retrospect and Prospects," in I. S. Koropec'kyj, ed., *The Ukrainian Economy: Achievements, Prospects, Challenges* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1992), 276–7.

social policy, but would have a difficult adjustment period in terms of the financing of social-policy needs.

There has been relatively little scholarly analysis of the current problems of social policy in Ukraine. A report published by the World Bank in 1993 argued that Ukraine had a very thorough but essentially unaffordable social-safety net, which was not adequately meeting the needs of the poorest groups in society.<sup>21</sup> Another study argued that since 1993 Ukraine's social welfare has occupied an increasing share of national resources, yet Ukrainian society has nonetheless demonstrated increased poverty, a decline in life expectancy, an apparent (although difficult to verify) increase in job layoffs, and the distinction of the world's lowest minimum wage in 1994.<sup>22</sup> A number of factors have made the policy of social transition very difficult for Ukraine. First, the country's severe economic crisis was worsened by the fuel crisis and hyper-inflation of 1992–93. Secondly, the high costs of medical care and social protection associated with the Chernobyl disaster have constituted a particular social-policy concern. Finally, the novelty of independent statehood in 1991 and the nature of President Kravchuk's elite orientation increased the likelihood that spending on politicized state sectors such as the military would become more prominent issues of concern than social policy. In addition, government effectiveness has been constrained because of the inexperience and adjustment process of state officials, who were accustomed to answering to and lobbying for funds from a larger central government.<sup>23</sup>

Yet, Ukrainian independence raised hope for the improvement of the population's standard of living. Apparently the parliament actually increased social protection in response to criticisms that the Soviet government had reduced or disrupted it sharply during the final years of the USSR.<sup>24</sup> As the controversial nationalist politician Stepan Khmara argued, "Only in an independent state—one based on the rule of law—

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21. See Mykola Zhulynsky's preface in *Ukraine: The Social Sectors during Transition* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1993), 1–2, 26. The report argues that over fifty percent of the Ukrainian population received some form of social assistance (p. 7).

22. International Labour Office, Central and Eastern European Team, *The Ukrainian Challenge: Reforming Labour Market and Social Policy* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), 20–5, 48–9.

23. See Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 149–50.

24. *Ukraine: The Social Sectors during Transition*, 59–60, 69.



can we count on social protection."<sup>25</sup> The Ukrainian government established new programs for unemployment insurance and the Chornobyl Fund that were financed by payroll contributions.<sup>26</sup> President Kravchuk, elected in December 1991 at the same time as the independence referendum, clearly wanted to show that he was choosing a different course than Russia, where Yeltsin's government was imposing "shock therapy," including a price liberalization to take effect on 2 January 1992. Kravchuk's leadership decided to introduce the coupon partly in order to help protect the availability of cheaper food and consumer goods in Ukraine. Meanwhile, public-assistance payments were raised, and salary increases were established for government workers, teachers, and medical workers.<sup>27</sup> The measures taken stressed increased social-assistance payments, stipends, salaries, and other sums paid by the state government to citizens.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile, legislation was passed on unemployment benefits.<sup>29</sup> Comprehensive legislation on children's allowances and maternity leave was passed in December 1992.<sup>30</sup>

## Social Policy and the Budget

Despite these advances, the process of developing the budget, and its aftermath, would bring sombre news with respect to the Ukrainian state's social-policy options. In introducing the 1992 budget to the parliament (Verkhovna Rada, or Supreme Council), Finance Minister Hryhorii O. P'iatachenko argued that social protection and the environment were among the policy areas for which Ukraine had formerly depended on funds from Moscow.<sup>31</sup> Some parliamentary deputies expressed fear that

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25. Mariia Bazeliuk's interview with Stepan Khmara, *Za vilnu Ukrainu*, 23 July 1992, trans. in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia* (hereafter FBIS), FBIS-USR-92-111 (30 August 1992), 75.

26. *Ukraine: The Social Sectors during Transition*, 4-7.

27. "Coupons Introduced in Ukraine," *Trud*, 31 December 1991, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-004 (7 January 1992), 64.

28. The Council of Ministers' resolution "On Implementing Urgent Measures to Guarantee Social Protection for the Population in Conditions of Price Liberalization," *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 1992, no. 2 (48), trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-014 (22 January 1992), 74-5.

29. L. Tkachenko, "The State Assists the Unemployed," *Rabochaia gazeta*, 18 August 1992; trans. in FBIS-USR-92-115 (8 September 1992), 82-3.

30. The law "On State Benefits for Families with Children," *Rabochaia gazeta*, 17 December 1992; trans. in FBIS-USR-93-024 (4 March 1993), 89-98.

31. See his speech in *Biuletyn Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1992, no. 48 (21 April): 62.



the government's preoccupation with political and military concerns would lead to a neglect of funds for women, children, and the Chornobyl disaster.<sup>32</sup> Residents from the irradiated areas of Ukraine were reported to be demonstrating outside the Supreme Council for increased budget allocations for Chornobyl-related social problems.<sup>33</sup> In the adjusted budget presented to the Supreme Council on 18 May, P'iatachenko presented social welfare as the budget's first priority, yet deputies expressed scepticism that the government could collect adequate revenue for the budget.<sup>34</sup> The parliament debated the relative proportions of budgetary resources that were to be allocated to the army on the one hand and to social protection on the other. To those who valued both state independence and social programs for the citizenry, this would obviously be a difficult trade-off.<sup>35</sup>

Over the next few years, budget debates became contentious because the limited resources of the Ukrainian government made it difficult to accommodate deputies' demands for more attention to social welfare. In 1993 (under Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma, who had replaced Vitold Fokin in the second half of 1992) the same budgetary issues and problems arose as in the previous year.<sup>36</sup> The government faced serious criticism from the Supreme Council for the shoddy state of social protection; in effect, it was accused of not meeting its legal and moral obligations to society. As a result, the government and parliament repeatedly raised wages and social-assistance benefits throughout 1992 and 1993 to keep up with accelerating inflation and the partial price liberalization of January 1993. As inflation increased, the government was pressed to increase wages and benefits also.<sup>37</sup> As early as 1992 the former vice-prime

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32. For instance, see *Biuleten Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1992, no. 50 (22 April): 14-15.

33. "Supreme Soviet Discusses Budget," FBIS-SOV-92-081 (27 April 1992), 51.

34. See P'iatachenko's speech, 5-20, and the subsequent discussion, 52ff., in *Biuleten Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1992, no. 66 (18 May).

35. Ludmilla Vasileva, "Parliamentary Week: When Social Protection is a Luxury," *Vechernii Kiev*, 28 April 1992; trans. in FBIS-USR-92-063 (29 May 1992), 74-5.

36. *Biuleten Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1993, no. 22 (6 April): 16.

37. See the Supreme Council's resolution "On Social Protection of the Population and the Internal Market of Ukraine" (4 January 1992), *Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1992, no. 17 (28 April): 492; the Supreme Council's resolution "On Increasing Social Guarantees" (29 April 1992), trans. in FBIS-USR-92-062 (27 May 1992), 98; the Council of Ministers' decrees "On Raising Social Guarantees for the Population" (26 May 1992) and "On Increasing the Tax-Exempt Minimum Wage

minister and minister of the economy, Volodymyr Lanovy, was paraphrased as saying in effect that such increases were "economically inexpedient, [but] it is a demand of the socio-political situation."<sup>38</sup> In 1992 wages, social assistance and salaries were indexed in an attempt to maintain a standard of living against inflation.<sup>39</sup> Owing to the state's budgetary shortfalls, which spilled over to the enterprises, often workers and pensioners went unpaid for months, while the central social-insurance bureaucracy admitted that inflation had contributed to further delays in processing social-assistance payments.<sup>40</sup>

In Ukraine, social protection has been defined very broadly, and wages and prices have become the cornerstone of the government's social policy. This means that there has not been much left for other social expenditures, and this shortfall has become a serious political concern. As former Prime Minister Fokin noted with regret in the discussion of minimum-wage and pension laws, Ukrainian pensions and wages would fall far behind Russian levels.<sup>41</sup> The pressure to keep up social-assistance payments amid the onset of hyper-inflation created a vicious circle that worsened the revenue situation. In presenting a draft law on social protection to the Supreme Council in November 1992, Vice-Prime

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of Citizens" (26 May 1992), trans. in FBIS-USR-92-097 (3 August 1992), 76-7; the Cabinet of Ministers' decree "On Measures in Conjunction with Raising Minimum Wages" (26 January 1993), trans. in FBIS-USR-93-038 (26 March 1993), 78-89; the Supreme Council's resolution "On Raising Minimum Wage and Pension Levels" (27 August 1993), *Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1993, no. 38 (21 September), 951; the President's decree "On Targeted Assistance to Low-Income Citizens during the Fall-Winter Period of 1994-1995" (1 October 1994), trans. in FBIS-USR-94-111 (13 October 1994), 75; Decree no. 720 of the Cabinet of Ministers (20 October 1994), trans. in FBIS-USR-94-118 (1 November 1994), 81-2; the Supreme Council's decree "On Increasing the Minimum Wage and Old-Age Pensions" (1 June 1993) and the corresponding decree of the Cabinet of Ministers (2 June 1993) and its decree "On Targeted Monetary Assistance to Citizens with Minimum Incomes," trans. in FBIS-USR-93-079 (25 June 1993), 90-2; and the Supreme Council's resolution "On Raising Wages, Pensions, and Social Assistance," *Holos Ukrainy*, 25 October 1994.

38. Aleksandr Litvinov, "Will We Live Better?" *Pravda Ukrainy*, 5 May 1992, trans. in FBIS-USR-92-061 (22 May 1992), 79.

39. "Regulations on the Indexation of Monetary Incomes of the Population," *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 1992, no. 15 (April), trans. in FBIS-USR-92-094 (26 July 1992), 65-9.

40. Anatolii Skichko's interview with Boris G. Aleinik, the vice-minister for social security, "Before It Will Be Done, One Can Starve," *Vechernii Kiev*, 27 August 1992, trans. in FBIS-USR-92-142 (6 November 1992), 82-4.

41. *Biuletten Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1992, no. 52 (23 April): 22-3.

Minister and Minister of the Economy Viktor Pynzenyk expressed his frustration with this situation: "In raising the amount of alleged social guarantees, we are merely blowing soap bubbles and showering people with pieces of paper that are backed with nothing. It is difficult to say whether there was ever another similar situation in world history.... In such a situation what will we be able to use to protect our citizens? Pieces of paper? After all, we will not be receiving any additional financial resources."<sup>42</sup> Arguing against continued indexation, Pynzenyk, along with Prime Minister Kuchma, claimed that only a stringent program of economic stabilization would serve the long-term interests of society.<sup>43</sup> Speaking to the Supreme Council on 18 November 1992, Kuchma argued that the "catastrophic" budget deficit was a primary source of Ukraine's economic crisis.<sup>44</sup> As a Finance Ministry official argued, social policy was progressive "on paper," but the funds to pay for them were insufficient.<sup>45</sup> Such arguments relied on a discourse that assumed that fiscal discipline and economic productivity, rather than the state, are the best guarantees of social well-being.

The basic position of the Kuchma government on social policy was that stabilizing inflation and reducing the budget deficit were the best forms of social protection: allocating new monies to social assistance without the budgetary revenues to back them up would only increase the inflationary spiral, rendering any spending increases meaningless. At the end of 1992 Kuchma's government decided to stop indexing wages and to introduce some price liberalization, which provoked criticism from the parliament and social groups.<sup>46</sup> The Supreme Council responded with a decree demanding the reversal of some of these measures and calling for price limits on essential food products and for more funds to be devoted to social protection.<sup>47</sup> A few months later the parliament passed

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42. Pynzenyk's speech to the Supreme Council, *Pravda Ukrainy*, 18 November 1992, trans. in FBIS-USR-92-157 (9 December 1992), 62.

43. *Ibid.*, 63.

44. "Kuchma Reports on Anticrisis Measures," *Pravda Ukrainy*, 20 November 1992, trans. in FBIS-USR-92-160 (16 December 1992), 96.

45. Viktoriia Yasnopolskaia's interview with Volodymyr Matviichuk, "Social Protection Can Be Built Only on a Firm Financial Foundation," *Pravda Ukrainy*, 13 August 1993, trans. in FBIS-USR-93-118 (13 September 1993), 36.

46. "Supreme Council Meets amid Socioeconomic Crisis," FBIS-SOV-93-012 (21 January 1993), 54-5.

47. The Supreme Council's resolution "O sotsialno-ekonomicheskomykh polozhenii v Ukraini i merakh po ego stabilizatsii, sotsialnoi zashchite naseleniia, sovershenstvovaniiu raboty Verkhovnoho Soveta Ukrainy v slozhivshikhsia usloviakh,"

another resolution expressing displeasure with the inadequacy of the policies of the Kuchma government with regard to the social well-being of the population.<sup>48</sup> The head of the Supreme Council's Commission on Questions of Social Policy and Labour argued that notwithstanding inflation, the state must fulfil its responsibility to its citizens.<sup>49</sup> The parliament's concerns were therefore based on moral grounds, since serious social-policy reform proposals were not forthcoming.

In fact, the structure of the budget meant that social assistance was given a very large share of budget resources. In 1992, social "protection" was to receive about twenty percent of total expenditures (108 billion *karbovantsi*). This sector comprised wage increases, social-assistance payments such as mothers' allowances, price subsidies, and unemployment assistance. Separate amounts were allocated to education and culture, the Chernobyl Fund, and subsidies to the regions, which, according to the budget, were responsible for additional social-assistance payments, housing, and local social services. Yet the various oblasts were allowed to keep greatly divergent amounts of the tax revenues they collected, with the lowest percentages going to Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Luhansk oblasts.<sup>50</sup> Deputies from those regions appealed to the Supreme Council about the unfairness of this system, and it was cited as a cause of the strike of teachers and health-care workers in Donetsk.<sup>51</sup> In the Donbas, where the taxes the local authorities were allowed to keep were low (reflecting their former status as well-off, centrally subsidized Soviet industrial areas), this was sometimes perceived as political discrimination against eastern Ukraine.<sup>52</sup>

It should be noted that the budget was proven not to be a very accurate indicator of the Ukrainian government's public spending, for which it was subsequently subjected to intense criticism.<sup>53</sup> As such, it is

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*Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1993, no. 13 (27 January): 335-7.

48. The Supreme Council's resolution "O sotsialno-ekonomicheskomyi politicheskomyi polozenii, slozhivshemsia v Ukraini, i putiakh vykhoda iz krizisa" (2 June 1993), *Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1993, no. 28 (13 July): 709-10.

49. Interview with N. Beloblotsky, *Holos Ukrainy*, 10 August 1993, trans. in FBIS-USR-93-113 (30 August 1993), 44-6.

50. "Law on the State Budget of Ukraine," *Holos Ukrainy*, 8 July 1992, trans. in FBIS-USR-92-110 (1 September 1992), 52-6.

51. See the remarks by V. I. Gusev, *Biuleten Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1992, no. 50 (22 April), 11-13.

52. See Monika Jung, "The Donbas Factor in the Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 27 March 1994.

53. See for example, "Unruly Child: Survey of Ukraine," *The Economist*, 7 May

difficult to measure or ascertain what the government's expenditures actually were. Yet, clearly, social protection of the citizenry was one of the key issues in Ukrainian politics by 1993. The parliament was under obvious pressure from the trade unions, social groups, and concerned citizens to continue to increase social-assistance payments. Given Ukraine's situation, there seemed to be few alternatives for help with Ukraine's finances: one of them was increased international assistance, from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other sources. Such aid was unlikely to be forthcoming until the government committed itself to an economic-reform program. This did not occur until after the election of Leonid Kuchma as the president in July 1994.

### Social Programs and Funds

To some extent the government's social policy was a response to pressure regarding the question of collective bargaining. The government's dialogue with enterprises and trade unions influenced social policy.<sup>54</sup> In 1992 Ukraine's independent trade unions demanded inclusion in collective bargaining with the government, lest strikes result.<sup>55</sup> That year strikes spread throughout the Donbas: following the miners, other workers demanded higher wages and benefits.<sup>56</sup> The government responded to the social pressure for improved assistance and disbursements. As a result, independent trade unions were eventually incorporated into the collective-bargaining process. In the 1992 bilateral agreement with the unions, the government committed itself to provide social assistance for society's poorest groups, to help protect workers' real earnings, and to improve the implementation of policy for those affected by the

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1994, 6-7.

54. Yet from those left out of what was called a "social partnership" process, there were strong critiques that the government was ignoring workers' needs for social protection and bypassing the rights and guarantees supposedly enshrined for the workers themselves. For example, the Ukrainian Solidarity trade union argued that since the Ukrainian Social Insurance Fund was partly administered by the formerly official trade unions, those bureaucratic structures received preferential treatment and retained considerable control over social facilities, at the expense of new labour movements. Iu. Pivovarov's remarks recorded by V. Seleznev, in "Solidarnost Chairman on Social Insurance Program," FBIS-USR-92-076 (22 June 1992), 101-2.

55. "Trade Unions Seek Negotiations with Government," FBIS-SOV-92-116 (16 June 1992), 52.

56. P. Shevchenko, "Archipelago Donbass," *Nezavisimost* (Kyiv), 5 June 1992, trans. in FBIS-USR-92-076 (22 June 1992), 92.

Chornobyl disaster.<sup>57</sup> In 1993, when Kuchma was the prime minister, he signed an agreement with the trade unions that made extensive commitments regarding workers' rights, social insurance, wage levels, and an ongoing dialogue to work out better social-policy alternatives.<sup>58</sup> Given that the state was essentially the main employer, and given the budgetary shortfalls that Kuchma had so often discussed, it was difficult to see how the government would be able to meet the commitments of this document.

The Ukrainian budget figures suggested that health care and medicine were weak areas in the budget. As one example, the Kravchuk government had stated that the Chornobyl disaster was a strong priority of social protection. There was a ministerial portfolio devoted to Chornobyl-related issues, and it had established its own Chornobyl Fund. In 1992 a set of legal decrees and resolutions were passed to amend social-assistance benefits for Chornobyl victims, to ensure tax exemptions for affected individuals, and to delineate government responsibilities regarding the effects of the Chornobyl disaster.<sup>59</sup> While the Chornobyl Fund had been established with payroll contributions to assist in paying the costs, expenditures for Chornobyl came from the state budget.<sup>60</sup>

The government's approach towards addressing the social and health consequences of the Chornobyl disaster were subjected to unrelenting criticism. In April 1992 the Supreme Council's Commission on Questions of the Chornobyl Disaster published a statement accusing the government and the presidential administration of "open sabotage" of the laws on the disaster and of "feeling no compassion" towards its victims. As evidence, the commission noted the inadequacy of revenues devoted to rehabilitation of the victims, the unacceptably slow progress of their resettlement from irradiated areas, and the lack of policy co-ordination between the central and local governments policy regarding the victims.<sup>61</sup> Such statements were part of the ongoing struggle between the parliament and

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57. See the "Agreement between the Government and Unions of Ukraine for July–December 1992," *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 August 1992, trans. in FBIS-USR-92-116 (11 September 1992), 50–4.

58. "General Wage Agreement for 1993 between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Trade Unions Association of Ukraine," FBIS-USR-93-073 (14 June 1993), 68–72.

59. See the laws on the Chornobyl disaster passed on 1 July 1992, trans. in FBIS-USR-92-121 (24 September 1992), 110–20.

60. *Ukraine: The Social Sectors during Transition*, 107.

61. "Chy diit zakony? Zaiava Komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan Chornobylskoi katastrofy," *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 April 1992.



the government for increasingly scarce resources. Yet, the commission was attacking not only the paucity of funds allocated for the disaster, but also the quality and commitment of the government's endeavours in recognizing the Chernobyl problem. In August 1994 the Minister of Health Protection reportedly told the Supreme Council that the government did not have adequate funds to carry out its proposed Chernobyl programs.<sup>62</sup>

What was really lacking was a serious, co-ordinated effort to examine the possibility of a comprehensive reform of social policy. In recognition of the problem of social protection, proposals were advanced for an overhaul of the social-insurance and pension system to meet the needs of the population better.<sup>63</sup> A full two years after Ukraine achieved independence, the Supreme Council passed into law a comprehensive statement on Ukrainian social protection as one of its final acts before the 1994 elections.<sup>64</sup> Officially Ukraine avoided large increases in unemployment.<sup>65</sup> Yet relatively little had been done to change social policy in the years 1991–93. The political discourse on social policy became increasingly acrimonious, and by 1994 criticisms were flying from all sides. For instance, it was later alleged that some funds collected for pensions ended up being spent on other budgetary needs.<sup>66</sup> Two health-care experts associated with the parliamentary commission on health denounced the government's "contempt" for health care, pointing to rises in outbreaks of cholera and diphtheria as examples of a medical crisis that the authorities had left unaddressed.<sup>67</sup> If nothing else, all of these problems reveal a discourse of accusation between political actors who blamed others for the defects of social policy, but also an absence of a concerted effort to resolve problems.

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62. "Rise in Chernobyl-Related Illnesses Noted," FBIS-SOV-94-170 (1 September 1994), 42.

63. For example, Borys Nadtochii, "Sotsialnyi myr: Zaporuka ekonomichnoho prohresu," *Holos Ukrainy*, 16 April 1992.

64. "Kontseptsiiia sotsialnoho zabezpechennia naselennia Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy*, 19 January 1994.

65. Iurii Dotsenko's interview with Andrii Prosulenko, an expert on employment in Ukraine, "Pro bezrobittia, i ne tilky," *Holos Ukrainy*, 6 October 1993.

66. According to the new parliament's head of the Commission on Questions of Social Policy and Labour, Iurii Buzduhan, in an interview with Volodymyr Krasnodemsky, "Svoi sotsialni prava treba ne vyproshuvaty, a vidstoiuvaty," *Holos Ukrainy*, 25 February 1995.

67. Liubomyr Pyrih and Volodymyr Rudy, "Tsina—zdorov'ia," *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 November 1993.



## Social Policy under Kuchma's Presidency

Discontent over the state of the economy and the fate of the citizenry were among the crucial issues in the 1994 election results: in the parliamentary elections, the Communists and Socialists made impressive gains, but Kuchma was the elected president in the subsequent elections to that office.<sup>68</sup> The economic-reform program launched by newly elected president in the fall of 1994 demonstrated an intention to harmonize the reform of the economy with social policy. Shortly after Kuchma's election, a delegation from the International Monetary Fund met with him to discuss the possibility of assisting Ukraine's economic program.<sup>69</sup> Later, with assistance from the World Bank, Ukraine embarked on a re-evaluation of its social-welfare system.<sup>70</sup>

While presenting his economic-reform plan to the Supreme Council, Kuchma slammed the Kravchuk regime for ineptitude in coping with inflation (notwithstanding Kuchma's own year-long tenure as the prime minister during Kravchuk's less than three years as president). Kuchma called for a comprehensive reform to establish a "socially oriented market economy."<sup>71</sup> His arguments were practical rather than ideological: in his view, the statist approach had been disastrous and ineffective. He advocated a more minimalist social-safety net, aimed at assisting the poorest groups, but considered that some benefits should be temporary in nature and ultimately phased out.<sup>72</sup> He also introduced the controversial prospect of user fees for social services, and suggested that social services should be decentralized.<sup>73</sup> One hopes that Kuchma was not suggesting that only the regions, not the central government, should worry about social policy.

Yet the president evidently had his work cut out for him. Kuchma continued to face strong pressure from the new parliament to provide

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68. See Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia?" *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no. 32 (19 August 1994): 3, 6. A similar argument can be found in Marko Bojunc, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March–April 1994," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47 (1995), no. 2: 246.

69. Marta Kolomayets, "International Monetary Fund to Assist Ukraine's Recovery," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 31 July 1994.

70. "IMF Announcement of Credits Cites Progress for Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 16 April 1995.

71. "Kuchma's Report on Economic Reform" to the Ukrainian parliament, trans. in FBIS-USR-94-120 (7 November 1994), 55.

72. *Ibid.*, 70–1.

73. *Ibid.*, 71.

social assistance during the market transition. A week after his Supreme Council speech introducing the reform plan, the parliament demanded further raises in wages, pensions, and social-assistance payments.<sup>74</sup> In the winter of 1995 the Supreme Council was reportedly working on legislation and amendments to cover social assistance during the market transition and to correct some of the previous abuses, including a draft "Conception of Social Policy" and laws to regulate social insurance.<sup>75</sup> Kuchma still faced strong criticism for the high cost of living amid inflation, and price increases continued to contribute to pressure for commensurate wage and social-assistance increases.<sup>76</sup> Part of Kuchma's program included raising prices for household fuel consumption, which led the parliament to pressure the government for compensation payments.<sup>77</sup> Even as Kuchma was trying to secure support for his stringent 1995 budget, the parliament considered new laws on wage levels and social-assistance payments, despite the government's assertion that this would increase the budget deficit.<sup>78</sup>

In appealing to the parliament to pass his budget in the second reading, Kuchma claimed for the first time a new vision of what he presented as an "activated" social policy. Its prongs would include investment in the social infrastructure and in services such as health care and education; rationalized protection for the groups hit hardest by the market transition; the increased involvement of lower levels of government in social policy; and the establishment of a new system of social insurance. Kuchma warned against a "populist" increase in wages that no one could afford to pay.<sup>79</sup> His speech seems to have been persuasive; the Supreme Council speaker, Oleksandr Moroz (a Socialist), claimed that the president's words had a decisive effect on the deputies' decision to

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74. The Supreme Council's resolution "Pro pidvyshchennia zarobitnoi platy, pensii ta sotsialnykh vyplat," *Holos Ukrainy*, 25 October 1994.

75. Krasnodemsky's interview with Buzduhan, "Svoi sotsialni prava treba ne vyproshuvaty, a vidstoiuvaty."

76. Marta Kolomayets, "Another Round of Price Increases Batters Consumers in Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 5 February 1995.

77. See the Supreme Council's resolution "Pro nezadovilnyi sotsialnyi zakhyst naselennia u zv'iazku z pidvyshchenniam taryfiv na zhytlovo-komunalni posluhy," *Holos Ukrainy*, 24 March 1995.

78. Serhii Vusaty, "Bud iaki reformy vymahaiut zhertv. A khto khoche buty zhertvoiu?" *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 February 1995.

79. President Kuchma's speech to the Supreme Council, 4 April 1995, in *Holos Ukrainy*, 6 April 1995.

pass the 1995 budget two days later.<sup>80</sup> Yet, a glance at the budget suggests that some compromises were made, judging by the attention to social-assistance and compensation payments.<sup>81</sup>

Other than the possibility of receiving international aid, Kuchma offered few clues as to how he would realize this new vision of social policy. As an article in *Holos Ukrainy* argued, Kuchma proposed that the state scale back its activities to allow new opportunities for citizens to take initiatives, but failed to specify how average people could benefit from this state of affairs within their lifetime.<sup>82</sup> Both Moroz and the Ukrainian Communist leader Petro Symonenko critiqued the Kravchuk regime for its insensitivity to the needs of the population and for failing to address the problem of inflation, calling for a more socially oriented economic reform. For instance, Moroz advocated higher production (presumably to be achieved by continued state support of industries) as a means to improve economic well-being, with the state maintaining social assistance and a minimum standard of living.<sup>83</sup> It is difficult to see how this position differed from that of Moroz's predecessors, and Moroz did not propose how he might realize goals that had proved so difficult to reconcile in the past. Moroz spoke of "social justice" and maintaining "collective traditions" during privatization, but his solution to the problem of social welfare seems to have consisted mainly of collecting more taxes.<sup>84</sup> This is an option that Kuchma's team no doubt thoroughly considered.

Kuchma's market reforms continued throughout 1995 with mixed results. It was clear that his economic reform would be accompanied by social hardships, including increased unemployment resulting from structural changes to the state's support of enterprises; by reductions in state subsidies for housing, utilities, and consumer prices, which would bring further blows to the standard of living; by the continuation of a

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80. Vasyl Tuhluk, "Nareshti: Derzhbiudzheth -95 pryniato," *Holos Ukrainy*, 7 April 1995.

81. The budget was published in *Holos Ukrainy*, 21 April 1995.

82. Iaroslav Illiasevych and Volodymyr Doroshkevych, "Prezydent i narod Ukrainy: Iednist chy konfrontatsiia?" *Holos Ukrainy*, 25 February 1995.

83. See, for example, Iakiv Halchenko's interview with Petro Symonenko, "Komunisty Ukrainy za sotsialnu spravedlyvist i narodovladdia," *Holos Ukrainy*, 12 July 1994; and Oleksandr Moroz's speech to the Supreme Council, 15 June 1994, "Osnovni zasady i napriamy stanovlennia ekonomiky Ukrainy v kryzovyi period," *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 June 1993.

84. See Oleksandr Moroz, "My derzhavu buduiemo ne lyshe dlia politychnykh syl odnogo spektra," *Holos Ukrainy*, 17 March 1994.

fiscal austerity program, which would sharply limit the funds available for social protection; and by privatization, which would bring new uncertainty to citizens' economic livelihoods. Clearly, all of these programs were long-term ventures, which the government could not simply impose on its own. Therefore Kuchma's plans would continue to be constrained by the need to solicit and maintain the co-operation of a number of actors. A significant source of support, but also to some extent a political liability, was Kuchma's dependence on international organizations and foreign assistance from Western countries, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.<sup>85</sup> Kuchma required the continued support of the parliament in order to provide the legal structure to institutionalize reforms such as privatization and to pass legislation and budgets consistent with the budget's plans. Finally his plans would be dependent on the co-operation of civil society and particularly local governments, whose considerable responsibilities for social policy had never been properly clarified in law or in constitutional discussions, but which would doubtless bear the brunt of the reforms.<sup>86</sup>

To its credit, the Kuchma team seems to have considered the social-policy implications of its market reform with respect to the need to facilitate society's adjustment and to prevent destitution. The government's strategy considered the importance of social protection and addressing local governments' needs for resources. For example, the liberalization of prices and reductions in consumer subsidies meant that many citizens would be expected to pay more for housing, utilities, and some foodstuffs. However, the liberalizations were to occur gradually, while categories of citizens who were in greatest need would be eligible to receive continued subsidies to avoid being hit hard by the increases.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, local governments were allowed to have some power both to

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85. The World Bank was reported to be considering granting Ukraine approximately \$3 billion over three years, provided that economic reforms proceeded as planned (reported by Moscow Interfax, 19 November 1995). See FBIS-SOV-95-223 (20 November 1995), 62-3. The IMF assistance was intended to help Ukraine manage its debt payments. Marta Kolomayets, "IMF to Help Restructure Ukraine's Debt to Russia," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 19 March 1995.

86. The point about the lack of well-defined local-government powers for social assistance, as well as the argument that constitutional reform and adherence to negotiated agreements is essential for a well-maintained social policy in Ukraine, is made in *The Ukrainian Challenge*, 199-202, 262.

87. See M. Tarnavska's interview with Viktor Kalnyk, the vice-minister of the economy, *Kyivska pravda*, 25 July 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV-95-149 (3 August 1995), 68-70.

decide upon the implementation of the liberalizations and, presumably, to benefit from the proceeds.<sup>88</sup> The government also declared a number of policies as signs of its commitment to social protection. For example, principles such as the need to improve the delivery of back pay, strengthen unemployment benefits and job-relocation programs, fulfil a minimum-subsistence social-assistance program, and uphold citizens' rights to fair working conditions, adequate wages, and existing social programs such as medical assistance and pensions were incorporated into the agreement that the government signed with the trade unions in the summer of 1995.<sup>89</sup> That year Kuchma signed an agreement with the parliament regarding a provisional agreement on the division of powers, an accord that established a basis for co-operation between the executive and legislative branches and creating a firm jurisdiction for each, delineating among other things the government's powers and responsibilities for implementing economic reform.<sup>90</sup>

Yet, given the serious economic situation in the country and the already dire quotidian situation of its citizens, the government continued to face much criticism from the press and from the parliament for the harshness of the economic reform and the inadequacy of social-protection mechanisms. Throughout 1995 and 1996 the government and parliament continued to undercut each other; each side was seemingly anxious to present itself as the champion of social interests, such as when the Supreme Council attempted to establish a poverty line law that the government claimed would have required it to surpass its budget provisions for wages and social assistance.<sup>91</sup> In early 1996 Donetsk coal miners went on strike against the government, as they had done in the summer of 1995.<sup>92</sup> It has been argued that strikes in eastern Ukraine sometimes transcend workers' demands to incorporate a broader regional and social

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88. Lidiia Ruta's interview with Arkadii Ershov, the minister of social security, *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 12 October 1995, trans. in FBIS-SOV-95-213-S (3 November 1995), 83.

89. "General Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Trade Union Associations of Ukraine," FBIS-SOV-95-183 (21 September 1995), 72-8.

90. "Konstytutsiinyi dohovir mizh Verkhovnoiu Radoiu Ukrainy ta Prezydentom Ukrainy pro osnovni zasady orhanizatsii ta funktsionuvannia derzhavnoi vlady i mistsevoho samovradiuvannia v Ukraini na period do pryniattia novoi konstytutsii Ukrainy," *Holos Ukrainy*, 10 June 1995.

91. The Cabinet of Ministers' statement in "Cabinet Criticizes Parliament's Low Income Threshold," FBIS-SOV-95-199 (16 October 1995), 74-5.

92. "Miners Strike Due to Delay in Pay," FBIS-SOV-95-163 (23 August 1995), 57.

agenda.<sup>93</sup> Rather than being purely strikes against employers, they involve demands on the central government for continued economic support, which, given their resonance in eastern Ukraine (where many Russophones are found), could conceivably become a potential threat to political stability and cohesion.<sup>94</sup>

Ukraine's continuing economic crisis has cast doubt on whether the government's social commitments could be maintained. Unable to finance all of the country's pre-existing government structures, economy, and social subsidies, Kuchma has been drawing from a widespread discourse among contemporary governments containing an assumption that social welfare is better served by reducing the state's role in the economy.<sup>95</sup> Yet, at least in the short term, much of the country's economy is considered to be economically unprofitable and unviable, leaving few options for citizens.<sup>96</sup> In the absence of a vigorous economy, the government lacks the tax base to expand social programs. For example, a sociological study on Ukrainian unemployment has observed that citizens who are laid off from their jobs or who otherwise have trouble making ends meet often work in the informal second economy, but since they gain their income "under the table," the state does not receive any tax revenue from this activity.<sup>97</sup>

Therefore, at present the notion that the private sector will be able to provide for social needs lacks credibility in Ukraine. Meanwhile Kuchma's reluctance thus far to address the issue of the power and privileges of the country's governing and economic elites has weakened his claim that he has few alternatives, and has added to the perception that the reforms have been imposed "from above" on a vulnerable popu-

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93. *The Ukrainian Challenge*, 187.

94. Stephen Crowley, "Between Class and Nation: Worker Politics in the New Ukraine." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 28 (1995), no. 1: 43-69.

95. David Purdy discusses what he calls a "neo-liberal" discourse in "Citizenship, Basic Income and the State," *New Left Review*, November-December 1994, 30-48.

96. For example, a U.N. report claims that Ukraine has "one of the environmentally 'dirtiest' economies in Europe.... [it is] over-saturated with chemical, metallurgical and mining enterprises using obsolete technology." United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, *An Assessment of the Situation in Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ukraine* (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1994), 49.

97. Mykola Rubanets and Oleksandr Iaromenko, "Sociology: The Job Market in Large Cities," *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 29 June 1995, trans. in FBIS-SOV-95-136-S (17 July 1995), 55-7. The authors are discussing a study by the Social Monitoring Centre of the National Institute of Strategic Studies of Ukraine commissioned by the World Bank.



lace.<sup>98</sup> Yet the above suggests that social policy has crucial political and economic dimensions, and it must be seen in the broader context of Ukraine's establishment of new patterns of government and social relations.

## Conclusion

Ukraine's approach to social policy has had three serious weaknesses. First, it has been reactive and has relied on monetary payments with money that has had little value. Secondly, given the absence of a working budgetary system, there have been few mechanisms and little accountability to ensure that expenditures were proportionally allotted to social protection or that they reached groups in need. Thirdly, in the absence of a serious re-examination of the economy, social protection has been extremely broadly defined to comprise the sustenance of an entire population in a collapsing economy. This would be an impossible task for any government. Finally, social protection has been defined primarily as state payments and subsidies to the population allocated from a bureaucratic government structure. This statist policy has neglected encouraging autonomous institutions, lower levels of government, charities, individuals, or co-operative groups to play a constructive role in social policy. The government has tried to prop up the citizens' basic needs, but on the most minimalist level. The government cannot be accused of bad intentions. Indeed, the government and the legislature have produced a considerable volume of legislation, agreements, programs, and decrees on social policy. Yet it has been difficult to assess whether these measures on paper have been observed in practice.

The Ukrainian political discourse on social policy has tended to focus on the question of subsidies and assistance, depicting the state-society relationship as unidirectional rather than considering the creative potential that society might be able to offer to the state in the reform process. To be sure, post-communist Ukrainian leaders have had a great deal on their plate: confronting the problems inherited from the Soviet past as well as the many economic and political pressures that have accompanied the breakup of the USSR. However, Ukrainian leaders cannot escape responsibility: the case of Ukraine suggests that a lack of ideas and initiatives for social change may be just as detrimental as the shortage of resources.

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98. See, for example, the critique of the reform leadership and the social effects of reform in Vasyly Tkachenko and Vasyly Holovatiuk, "Will We Trip Over the Tension Threshold?" *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 24 October 1995, trans. in FBIS-SOV-95-223-S (20 November 1995), 79-84.





# Sino-Ukrainian Co-operation: Prospects and Problems\*

*Liu Dong*

While historically relations between China and Ukraine were inhibited by the fact that the latter country was not a recognized sovereign political entity,<sup>1</sup> this situation changed with the establishment of the independent Republic of Ukraine in 1991. Several factors now favour the development of strong Sino-Ukrainian co-operative links.

First, as developing countries, China and Ukraine have a great deal in common. They share similar views on fundamental issues such as peace and development, disarmament, and the curtailment of the arms race; and they also oppose hegemony and power politics. Both states are nuclear powers, but they have not and do not intend to use these weapons against other countries first.

Secondly, the two countries respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Ukrainian government has recognized Taiwan as an inseparable part of China and promised not to establish any official ties with Taiwan. Both sides also firmly believe in the right of every nation to choose its own path of development and that social and ideological differences should not hinder any nation from developing normal relations with other states.

Thirdly, both countries are pursuing full-scale economic reforms and an open-door trade policy. The Chinese government is pursuing its declared goal of establishing a modern market economy in the next thirty to fifty years with a commensurate superstructure. Progress towards this goal is dependent on peace and on no large-scale incursion against China by a foreign enemy. Ukraine is one of the states that supports China's

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\* This is an abridged and edited version of Professor Liu Dong's article. S. S. Miller.

1. For a discussion of China's position on Ukraine before the latter country's independence in 1991, see Zhao Yunzhong's article. S. S. Miller.

hopes for establishing a safe and stable international environment for development.

Fourthly, both countries have embarked on the "shift" from a socialist planned economy and have a lot to learn from each other's experience, aside from being in a position to complement each other economically in the transition to a market economy.

Finally, the two peoples have had no fundamental conflicts historically, and there are no unsettled political or territorial problems between the two states.

For all of the above reasons, the Chinese government recognized Ukraine shortly after its independence. Subsequently there have been numerous governmental and ministerial exchanges between the two states, including the visit of then President Leonid Kravchuk to China and the visit of Jiang Zeming, the chairman of the People's Republic of China, to Ukraine. The two governments have also signed eleven co-operative agreements dealing with economic, cultural, and other matters.<sup>2</sup> Although these agreements provide the foundations for the development of strong links between the two countries, to date the results have been disappointing in that very few of the agreements have been implemented. Both countries share responsibility for this situation.

Since independence, Ukraine's economic and political situation has not been conducive to strengthening Sino-Ukrainian relations. Its political institutions are weak, and various political parties and factions continue to compete for power. In the last three years there have been three different premiers and two presidents, and each change in leadership has resulted in the reorganization of decision-making bodies and changes in policies and laws. These dramatic shifts have also been reflected in foreign policy.

As one of the world's economic powers, China has its own problems that inhibit its economic relations with Ukraine. China's economy is strained by inflation, corruption, and regional and social disparities. Co-operation and trade between China and Ukraine is also difficult because of foreign-exchange problems, including Ukraine's extremely high rate of currency devaluation. Moreover, Ukraine is not currently a high priority in China's foreign policy. For all the above reasons, it is unlikely that Sino-Ukrainian economic relations will develop significantly in the short term, but this may change in the future.<sup>3</sup>

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2. These agreements included provisions for the mutual exemption of visas, co-operative agreements on trade, the protection of investments, and cultural exchanges. (Source: Liu Dong's original article). *S. S. Miller*.

3. In the original article, Liu Dong outlined a number of recommendations for

In terms of scientific and cultural co-operation, the situation since 1991 has deteriorated. With the exception of the so-called Great Cultural Revolution period, Sino-Ukrainian co-operative links were well-developed before 1991. This was especially the case in the 1950s, when Ukraine sent a great number of experts to help China develop its economy and many Chinese workers and students were accepted for training and study in Ukrainian state enterprises, colleges and universities. There were also numerous academic and student exchanges and co-operative scientific research projects and meetings. These scholarly and other cultural links have had a positive influence in promoting Sino-Ukrainian friendship.

Unfortunately, in recent years Sino-Ukrainian scientific and cultural ties have been curtailed, and book and newspaper exchanges between the two countries have been significantly reduced. For example, Wuhan University imported, on a reciprocal basis, some 5,086 books and forty-four periodicals from the Soviet Union in the years 1987–92. In 1993 only about a hundred books and no more than eleven periodicals were exchanged. Subsequently periodical subscriptions were reduced to five, and almost no books have been received.

China is now seriously short of books and other materials in Ukrainian studies. Beijing University's library, which is the largest in China, has only six reference books on Ukraine, all of which were published in the Soviet Union. A similar situation applies regarding materials on China in Ukraine, where there is a paucity of up-to-date reference sources, newspapers, and journals on China. Consequently Ukrainians know little about contemporary China after its many years of reform. Ironically, they have access to free newspapers and other materials from Taiwan.

The problem of funds has also inhibited joint scholarly ventures. For example, the 1991 agreement on scientific co-operation between the first Chinese Centre for Ukrainian Studies, at Wuhan University, and the Institute of Linguistics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine has not met its minimal target of reciprocal exchanges. The situation in student exchanges is very similar. Wuhan University used to send one student per year to study in the Soviet Union; no one has been sent to Russia or Ukraine since 1992. Meanwhile in Ukraine students studying

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improving economic ties between the two countries. They include the establishment of joint productive enterprises, especially between comparable regional areas in China and Ukraine; improving transportation and telecommunications between the two countries; the negotiation of treaties on taxation, banking, accounting, and insurance; and co-operative research ventures. *S. S. Miller.*

Chinese at Kyiv University or the Kyiv Institute of Foreign Languages have had on-going problems because of the shortage of funds.

In both countries good, young researchers are leaving institutes of higher learning for better-paying jobs. The Centre for Ukrainian Studies at Wuhan University used to have five researchers. Three of them have retired, and one is still in Canada. Currently there is only one researcher; being in her early fifties, she will retire relatively soon. The situation is even worse in Ukraine. Researchers have to hold down at least three jobs to support themselves financially, and most students cannot afford to study full-time. Government financial support for education and scientific research is grossly inadequate in both China and Ukraine, especially compared to developed countries.<sup>4</sup>

It is universally acknowledged that education is essential to the cultural and economic life of a nation. At one time Ukraine had nearly eliminated illiteracy and had a highly developed educational system and scientific research program. It is thus particularly distressing to see its present crisis in education and science. If the Ukrainian government continues to ignore this important area, the country faces poor prospects for social and cultural development.

To address the deteriorating situation in education and scientific endeavours, China and Ukraine should strive to increase educational funds to four percent of their GNP by the end of the century. In both countries education as a legal right should be guaranteed, and teachers should be paid adequate salaries. An international academic exchange fund should be established. It should be financed initially by the governments but then be funded by non-governmental sponsors. This exchange fund should be used to support collaborative research projects and scholarly exchanges.

While the above analysis outlines some of the problems inhibiting the growth of Sino-Ukrainian relations, the long-term prognosis is not a pessimistic one. There are good foundations for strengthening relations between Ukraine and China.

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4. In the original article, Liu Dong provides some relative statistics. For example, in 1993 China devoted 2.6 percent of its GNP to education, i. e., U.S.\$12.92 per capita. The per capita investment in education in the developed countries is U.S.\$42.00. *S. S. Miller.*

# The Study of Ukraine's History in China: Problems and Tasks

Zhao Yunzhong

In China's research institutes and universities, one can find textbooks and monographs on the history of all European countries with the exception of Ukraine, one of the largest countries of that continent. What is even more surprising is that in China to this day there is not a single translation of the history of Ukraine, let alone a book on Ukraine written by a Chinese author. Even articles that touch on some aspect of the history of Ukrainian people are quite rare. One reason for this unfortunate situation is that until 1991 Ukraine was viewed simply as one of the Union republics of the USSR. Although de jure Ukraine was considered a sovereign state, de facto it did not function as one. Consequently Ukrainian history was viewed as a component of Russian history or of general Soviet history, and it was viewed as not meriting analysis as a separate entity. In China an unwritten rule has prevailed: that only the history of independent countries is studied. Thus the history of Ukraine could not become an object of independent study or analysis. Such a task was never even contemplated by Chinese scholars.

In the 1950s several articles by Soviet authors were translated into Chinese quite by chance.<sup>1</sup> In the 1970s Ivan Dziuba's *Internationalism or*

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1. For example, M. Tikhomirov and A. V. Lykholat, "The 300th Anniversary of the Reunification of Ukraine with Russia," *Shixue Yicong* (Translations in Historiography), 1954, no. 1; "Theses on the 300th Anniversary of the Reunification of Ukraine with Russia, 1654-1954," *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), 18 January 1954, and *Xinhua Yuebao* (Hsinhua Monthly), 1954, no. 2; A. I. Kozachenko, "Ancient Slavic Tribes: The General Ethnogenesis of the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians," *Minzu Wenti Yicong* (Translations in Nationality Problems), 1955, no. 4; O. A. Rabanov, "Questions on the Formation of the Old Rus' Tribes in the Works of J. V. Stalin," *Shixue Yicong* 1953, no. 3; M. M. Leshchenko, "The Formation of Class Society and the State of the Eastern Slavs," *Shixue Yicong*, 1954, no. 3; K. M. Tarnovsky, "The Conditions for the Development of Feudalism among the Eastern Slavs," *Shixue Yicong*, 1955, no. 3; Tokarev, "On the Cultural

*Russification?* (1972) and Petro Shelest's *Ukraine—Our Soviet Land* (1974) appeared in Chinese translation. But these publications were restricted to a small circle of readers for use as documentary materials that pointed to the complex political situation and nationality problems in the Soviet Union.

A rather narrow circle of questions connected to Ukrainian history were touched upon by Chinese scholars, but only within the parameters of Russian history. Since Soviet nationality issues or, more precisely, nationality relations were closely linked with the history of the various peoples inhabiting the USSR, Chinese articles dealing with the origins of the Eastern Slavs and with their states did appear,<sup>2</sup> and a few others discussed aspects of Ukrainian history.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the absence in China of systematic studies of Ukrainian history, two articles, by Wang Oumin and Shen Yun, should be noted.<sup>4</sup>

Unity of the East Slavic Peoples," *Minzu Wenti Yicong*, 1956, no. 2; I. B. Grekov, "Sources on the Culture of Rus' and the Culture of the Dnieper Banks in the Sixth to Eighth Centuries," *Jiaoxue Yu Yanjiu* (Teaching and Research), 1957, no. 3; and I. V. Sozin, "Questions Regarding the Reasons for the Transition of the Eastern Slavs from a Primitive Order to Feudalism," *Minzu Wenti Yicong*, 1958, no. 1.

2. For example, Zhang Chunian and Chen Qineng, "On Normanist Criticism about the Origin of the Ancient Rus' State," *Lishi Jiaoxue* (Teaching of History), 1962, no. 6, 1962; Zhu Huan, "On the Origin of the Ancient Rus' State," *Shehui Kexue Zhanxian* (Front of Social Sciences), 1979, no. 1, 1979; Li Jiejian, "The Origin of Rus' according to the Laurentian Chronicle," *Qinghai Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao* (News from the Qinghai Pedagogical Institute), 1980, no. 4; Sun Bingying, "About 'Normanism'," *Hunan Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao* (News from the Hunan Pedagogical Institute), 1982, no. 1, 1982; Wang Qiliang, "Studies on the Origins of the Eastern Slavs," *Sulian Lishi* (History of the USSR), 1983, no. 1; Liu Kunzong, "Discussion of Questions on the Origin of the Kyivan Rus' State," *Shandong Daxue: Renwen Kexue* (Humanities: Shandong University), 1984, no. 1; Cheng Renqian, "Some Questions Regarding the Ancient Slavs and the Early Slavic States," *Shanxi Daxue Xuebao* (News from Shanxi University), 1978, no. 2; Li Jianyu, "The Preconditions for the Formation of the Feudal Order in Ancient Rus'," *Gansu Daxue Xuebao, Lishi Jiaoxue Yu Yanjiu* (News from Gansu University, Teaching and Research in History), 1959, no. 3; and Wang Gexian, "The Nature and Essence of the Early Period of Feudalism in the History of the Eastern Slavs," *Qufu Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao* (News from the Qufu Pedagogical Institute), 1963, No. 1.

3. For example, Yuan Sihui, "The National Question in Ukraine," *Waiguo Minzu Wenti Yanjiu* (Research on Nationality Problems of Foreign Countries, Beijing), 1981; and Guo Simian, "The Historical Background of Ukraine's Declaration of Independence and of Its Relations with Russia," *Xueshu Ziliao Jiaoliu* (Exchange of Scientific Information), 1992, no. 1.

4. Wang Oumin, "On the Question of Nationality Relations between Ukraine



Besides providing a general overview of the stages in Ukraine's historical development (the medieval Rus' state and the formation of the Ukrainian people, the Cossack state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the awakening of a Ukrainian national consciousness, and the attempts at independent statehood in the years 1917–20), these articles address controversial questions, such as the conscious ethnicity of the Ukrainians; who are the successors of Kyivan Rus'; the role of the Ukrainians among the Eastern Slavs; the consequences of the forcible annexation of Ukraine by Russia; the role of Hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Mazepa and other historical personalities; and the nature of the struggle for Ukrainian independence. They also discuss concepts such as the "new historical community of peoples," the "single Soviet people" and "Soviet nation," and the struggle against Russian chauvinism and Russification in Ukraine.

Because of the general unavailability of works on Ukrainian history in China, however, as a starting point Chinese historians interested in Ukrainian studies must familiarize themselves with the various works dealing with the Ukrainian historical process.<sup>5</sup>

In 1991 a new era in Ukrainian history began. On 24 August of that year the parliament of Ukraine declared the independence of Ukraine and the establishment of sovereign Ukrainian state. This act was supported by the national referendum of 1 December 1991. At long last, Ukraine became an equal member of the world community of nations. Since that time relations between China and Ukraine have been qualitatively different, and both countries must now get to know each other from a new perspective. It is quite clear that they lack sufficient knowledge of each other. Much of what we thought we knew must be thoroughly reviewed so that truth can be separated from stereotypes and falsifications. To further Sino-Ukrainian mutual understanding, friendship, and co-operation, we must understand each other's history. Therefore the study and analysis of Ukraine's history is the most important and

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and Russia," *Sulianxue Yanjiu* (Research in Problems of the USSR, Jilin), 1982; and Shen Yun, "The Ukrainian National Question: An Analysis of the Historical Reasons for Inter-nationality Problems in the USSR," *Sulian Dongu Winti* (Questions of the USSR and Eastern Europe), 1983, no. 4.

5. The situation in other fields is not so bleak. There are Chinese translations of works by Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Lesia Ukrainka, Marko Cheremshyna, and other Ukrainian writers. In many cases, however, even these important literary figures have been presented to Chinese readers not as national writers but as fighters against autocracy. Among Soviet Ukrainian writers, Oles Honchar is best represented in Chinese translation.

fundamental task facing Ukrainian studies in China. Only now is it taking shape there as a new and independent scholarly field.

Let us briefly analyze the conditions in which the first Chinese scholars of Ukrainian history find themselves. With the declaration of an independent and sovereign Ukraine and with the collapse of the USSR, the ideological prohibitions on the study of Ukrainian history were removed, making it possible to discard the many stereotypes based on the official Soviet interpretation of the Ukraine's history. Now there is open access to various historical interpretations and a possibility of objectively and freely discussing sensitive historical questions and Ukraine's historical relations with Russia and other countries.

Since China and Ukraine are separated by great distances and their histories and fates have not been intertwined, there are no major impediments to the development of good relations between them or to the possibility for Chinese scholars to assess objectively the controversies surrounding Ukrainian history. Therefore Chinese specialists in Ukrainian studies have confidently taken on the task of informing the readers of their country (which has a population of more than a billion people) about Ukraine's history, contemporary life there, and the thoughts and expectations of its people.

The most important priority for Ukrainian studies in China is the publication of a short survey history of Ukraine from Kyi to Kuchma. Even if it will not be distinguished by its erudition or originality, this work will nonetheless be the first book on the history of Ukraine written in China and the first such work by a Chinese scholar. Hopefully it will be of scholarly interest because of its approach and its treatment of various controversial issues. It will provide millions of Chinese readers with a systematic study of Ukraine.

It is also important for Chinese scholars to begin a study of the history of Sino-Ukrainian relations. There is much that needs to be explored. For example, when we speak of the traditional friendship between the Chinese and the Ukrainians, what do we mean? When and how did their first contacts take place? To these and many other questions we lack reliable answers that are supported by documentary evidence. To this day, we in China have not systematically studied about the history of migrations from Ukraine to China or from China to Ukraine, or about life and activities of Ukrainians in China. For example, in a recently published reference book, *Zarubizhni ukrainsi* (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1991), we read that in the fall of 1918 a consulate of the Ukrainian People's Republic began functioning in Harbin. If this is true, it must mean that there were official diplomatic relations between the republics of Ukraine and China. Yet there has been no documentary

study of these relations. This extremely interesting subject will be successfully examined only if the scholars from China, Ukraine, and the Western countries engage in collaborative research, fostering co-operation among Ukrainianists of many countries.

In the last few years, Chinese scholarly contacts with foreign specialists in Ukrainian studies have increased, and we have developed our collection of materials on Ukraine. A survey of the state of historical scholarship in Ukraine has been completed, and a plan for the systematic study of the important questions in Ukrainian history has been elaborated. This author has published an article that familiarizes the Chinese reader with the formation of Ukraine's modern territory.<sup>6</sup> He presented a study of the annexation of Ukraine by Russia in the mid-seventeenth century at the Second International Conference on "China and Ukraine: Paths of Co-operation" held in late May 1995 in Beijing; it offered a critical assessment of the official Soviet documents on the annexation. This author also wrote an article on the Ukrainian Cossacks and the first Cossack-peasant rebellions in Ukraine, and his survey history of Ukraine should be completed this year.

When Chinese scholars discuss the modest accomplishments of Ukrainian studies in China, particularly in the field of history, they must acknowledge the debt they owe to Peter J. Potichnyj. To my knowledge, he was the first foreign specialist to realise the necessity of Ukrainian studies in China, and he has shown great initiative in this regard. Professor Potichnyj's tireless efforts began in 1979, when Ukrainian studies in China were non-existent. He successfully established effective contacts with Chinese scholars in many cities of our large country and fostered scholarly contacts between Chinese and foreign specialists. With his help, Chinese students have had opportunities to study the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian history, at first in Canada and since then in independent Ukraine. The contacts with foreign specialists have increased. In 1989 a Chinese representative took part in the First Congress of the International Association of Ukrainianists, which was held in Lviv. With Professor Potichnyj's support, a group of linguists under the direction of Professor Zheng Shupu prepared a Ukrainian-Chinese dictionary; it was published in 1990. In 1994 Professor Liu Dong of Wuhan University published a Ukrainian language textbook for Chinese speakers and a Chinese-Ukrainian phrase book. Both Zheng Shupu and Liu Dong studied in Canada thanks to Professor Potichnyj's efforts.

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6. Zhao Yunzhong, "The Rebirth of the Ukrainian People: From Kyi to Ukraine's New Statehood," *Lishi Jiaoxue*, 1995, no. 3.

In July 1993 the Chinese Association of Ukrainian Studies was founded. Since that time it has actively co-ordinated the efforts of all Chinese researchers in that field. The association periodically publishes a bulletin. Its members took part in the First International Conference on "Ukraine and China: Paths of Co-operation" held in September 1993 in Kyiv, which brought together scholars from China, Ukraine, and Canada. The conference proceedings were published in Chinese and Ukrainian. A second such conference took place in May 1995 in Beijing, and the materials from the conference will shortly be published. At this conference, Professor Potichnyj was elected the honorary chairman of the Chinese Association of Ukrainian Studies in recognition of his contribution to the development of Ukrainian studies in China.

# Reflections on the Work of Peter J. Potichnyj

*Howard Aster*

Knowledge is one thing to which we aspire, and it is endlessly perplexing and difficult. Familiarity may appear to be more simple and easier to come by. It comes from interaction, habit, recognition. Friendship, especially in institutional settings, requires nurturing and trust, loyalty, and commonality of vision, shared enterprise, and respect.

I have known Peter Potichnyj for some twenty-five years. We have shared a common search for knowledge in relation to a variety of intellectual topics, but none more deeply than our mutual search for an understanding of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. In our search, we have become familiar with each other, with who we are, where we came from, what we share in common, and what makes us different. Over the last twenty-five years we have developed a profound friendship.

What an unlikely twosome! I, born and raised as a Canadian and a Jew in the security of the New World and a member of the postwar generation. Peter, born in the interwar period in an occupied country and in a war-ravaged world. But we possess a common but unforgiving and misanthropic past: my people were nearly destroyed by Hitler but resurrected by the statehood of Israel; Peter's people was impoverished by occupiers, brutalized by ideology, enslaved to an empire, and denied all avenues of normalcy of language, religion, and culture. Today both peoples continue their struggle to establish their own resurrections and institutions of statehood. History has a capacity to heal and an ability to engender seemingly impossible conjunctions. On a human level, on the level of friendship, I think my relationship with Peter Potichnyj is a testament to this fact.

Much of the driving force for the development of the social sciences in North America and of Soviet studies in Canada has, surely, been the generation of scholars and intellectuals who immigrated to the New World from Eastern, Central, and Western Europe in the interwar and postwar periods. In the United States the contributions of that émigré generation have been well documented and extensively researched and

analyzed in studies focusing on particular individuals, their work, their lives, and their interactions with other Americans. The impressive list includes Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Theodor W. Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Zbigniew Brzeziński. In almost any field of intellectual, academic, or cultural development in the United States, this émigré generation has stood out.

In Canada there has been a parallel generational development in academia and culture. However, the émigré contribution there has been less documented, analyzed, or researched. The Canadian émigré generation is now in its twilight years. Many of its members have retired, and many others are now seniors in the university or cultural community. Some have passed on. There is no doubt that this interwar and immediate postwar generation's intellectual interests have derived from where they came from. Their biographies have defined their intellectual and academic or cultural preoccupations. Significantly, in Canada they have established the foundations of many institutions and defined the direction of academic studies in the politics, economics, culture, literature, and religion of Central, Eastern, and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe.<sup>1</sup> Their full generational history is yet to be written in Canada.

It is worth noting that the notion of "generational history" has been explored extensively in historical studies. But it has not been used, as far as I know, in the exploration of Canadian studies. The notion itself is wrought with difficulties, but it is an immensely suggestive and helpful analytical category if we accept a rough definition of generation as "an attitude toward life, a nuance of sensibility, and a collective state of mind."<sup>2</sup> The study of a particular generation need not be confined to a specific country, but can transcend borders and encompass many national experiences as long as there is a commonality of "experience, feeling and fate that transcend(s) national borders."<sup>3</sup> The notion is further enriched

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1. Howard Aster, ed., *The Interdepartmental Committee on Communist and East European Affairs: A Twenty-Five Year History* (Hamilton: ICCEEA, McMaster University, 1991), an inventory and history of the conferences, their contributors, and the academic papers presented there. The names and topics document this kind of institutional and generational history to which I refer. A fuller academic history of this generation would be found in the archives, papers, and conference programs of the Canadian Association of Slavists. As far as I know, this history has not yet been written.

2. See Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 36. Wohl offers a very full explication of the utility and shortcomings of the notion in his excellent book.

3. *Ibid.*, 3.

if we layer onto it the reality of émigré generations, namely, those people whose primary sensibilities were defined by a certain "collective state of mind" but who then dispersed into other countries.

Peter Potichnyj's work as a political scientist in Canada for some thirty years can be identified with this generational orientation. He spent his formative years in Central and Eastern Europe, came to North America in 1950, and emigrated to Canada in the early 1960s. He thus belongs to a generation whose "experience, feeling and fate" transcends national borders. Biographical roots define intellect, but they do not circumscribe intellectual development.<sup>4</sup> Place and people—Canada and Canadians as well as Ukraine and Ukrainians—have had a tremendous impact upon the evolution and transformation of Peter's academic work.<sup>5</sup>

### Searching for the Old and the New, 1941–91

For some twenty years Peter Potichnyj has been deeply involved, as the coeditor, in a major, multivolume publication project of primary documents, *Litopys Ukrainskoi povstanskoï armii* (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA]). Probably the best single assessment of its volumes was written by Luba Fajfer.<sup>6</sup> She states: "Compared to what exists elsewhere on the UPA, *Litopys UPA* is the largest accessible collection of primary sources not only on the history of the UPA as the military arm of the Ukrainian liberation movement, but also on Soviet military and political activities in Western Ukraine during and after the war. The editors of this collection undertook a monumental task of compiling the documents and materials from various sources, and thus

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4. Stanley Hoffman, reflecting on his French and American biographical roots which may have influenced his studies of international relations and the politics of France, writes: "I am not at all sure that I understand my relation to the study of France as clearly as I understand why I chose to study world politics. The latter subject for me primarily involves intellectual questions; but the study of France raises fundamental issues of personal identity which I have certainly not fully elucidated." See his "To Be or Not to Be French," in *Ideas and Ideals: Essays on Politics in Honor of Stanley Hoffman*, ed. Linda B. Miller and M. J. Smith (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 45.

5. For a valuable and, to my knowledge, the only statement in Peter Potichnyj's work relating to this question of origins and influence, see Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes*, 2d ed. (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1987), 72–84.

6. "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Documents," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1988, 77–85.



documenting extremely complex areas of 20th-century Ukrainian history."<sup>7</sup>

Collecting the record on this uniquely perplexing period of Ukrainian history is valuable in itself in that it makes the primary sources accessible to generations to come. But a key to understanding Peter's own involvement in this massive project may be found in his introduction to another volume that he coedited with Yevhen Shtendera, entitled *Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground, 1943–1951*.<sup>8</sup> Peter writes that the study of the primary documents during the years 1943–51 reveals that the Ukrainian nationalists, who fought both the Germans and the Russians, "made a significant contribution to the development of Ukrainian political thought."<sup>9</sup> His analysis of the documents reveals that there were two distinct periods in the development of this liberation movement and its political thought. During the first period (1941–45) the

underground writings ... fully reflected the conditions of the struggle. They exposed the criminal policy of the Nazis toward Ukraine and neighbouring countries. They discussed the hostile attitude of the Ukrainian population to the occupiers. They indicated the need to develop proper countermeasures against the forcible conscription of young people for work in Germany and advised how best to resist the enemy. The writings of this period, which are full of optimism, express the belief that in the cataclysmic confrontation of the two brands of imperialism, Nazi and Soviet, both would perish, and that all the subject peoples of Europe, including Ukrainians, would win a free and independent existence in their sovereign states.<sup>10</sup>

During the second period (1945–51) the underground came to the sober realization that the prospects for liberation and independence were more remote. Its writers "were fully aware that the contest would be very long, complex, difficult and full of sacrifices. Nevertheless, they concluded that in the conditions of Soviet totalitarianism underground warfare was the only viable form of political struggle."<sup>11</sup>

For Peter the struggle for Ukraine's national liberation was more than an armed struggle. It was also a time of intense ideological debate, and, significantly, by studying these primary documents of the UPA one can secure the sources of the genuinely pluralistic, democratic Ukrainian

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7. Ibid., 83.

8. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986.

9. Ibid., xi.

10. Ibid., xii.

11. Ibid., xii.

society that he values. These documents "represent the 'culmination of the development of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology towards greater emphasis on economic and social welfare, and upon securing individual rights.'"<sup>12</sup> For Peter, defining the future of an independent Ukrainian state meant delineating the programmatic basis of such a state and its society. Within the UPA and OUN we already had the beginnings, foundations, and, perhaps, conclusions of such a programme.

There is a powerful dose of helplessness but also a measure of misplaced bravado lodged in the saga of the Ukrainian underground and the UPA. For Peter and others, however, the study of this period in Ukrainian history through the prism of the underground's documents is a very important antidote to other views of Ukraine at that time, namely, that Ukraine was either a willing puppet or even a junior partner of Nazism and later Stalinist totalitarianism, or that Ukraine was a helpless victim of insurmountable historical forces that had conspired for so long to deny Ukraine its proper independence. An example of this latter portrait is found in Taras Hunczak's "Between Two Leviathans: Ukraine during the Second World War."<sup>13</sup> In his conclusion Hunczak declares: "In the final analysis, Ukrainians were powerless, hapless victims. Their attempt to play an independent political role was doomed to failure, an assessment that many OUN and UPA members would have shared. Yet, as many members of the nationalist underground admitted, they fought to earn a place in history. In that respect, they did not fight in vain."<sup>14</sup>

As we know—but to the surprise of almost everybody—independence did come to Ukraine in December 1991, not by armed struggle or by an insurgent army, but by a vote! Since that time Peter has been tracking the development of political movements and political parties in the new Ukrainian state.<sup>15</sup> His articles reveal two major preoccupations. First, he wishes to assess the ideological character of the emerging movements and

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12. Ibid., xvii, quoting John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 163.

13. In Bohdan Krawchenko, ed., *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present*: (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 97–107.

14. Ibid., 104.

15. See his "Elections in Ukraine," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* (Köln), 1990, no. 36; "The March 1990 Elections in Ukraine," in Krawchenko, *Ukrainian Past, Ukrainian Present*, 123–133; "The Multi-Party System in Ukraine," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, 1992, no. 3; and "The Formation of Political Parties in Ukraine," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, 1994, no. 1.

parties in Ukraine and to "map" them out on the ideological spectrum. Second, he looks upon these movements' and parties' formation, deformation, and reformation as symptoms of the progression of Ukrainian society towards what he has called "the democratisation of political life."<sup>16</sup>

Throughout Peter's work we witness the reverberations of and concerns for the same themes of political thought that we discovered in the *Litopys* project. In trying to sort out the numerous political movements and parties in Ukraine since the late 1980s, Peter has been concerned with a number of fundamental questions: their ideological orientations and electoral platforms, their position on the fundamental policy issues facing the Ukrainian state today, where they stand in relation to the value system of democracy, their position on the problems of national independence and foreign-policy issues vis-à-vis Russia and Europe, and how they define the role and nature of the state vis-à-vis Ukraine's ethnic minorities. The response to the latter question is particularly relevant in defining the nature of Ukrainian democracy.<sup>17</sup>

Are these new questions? Surely not. These very same issues plagued Ukraine's political leaders in the period of independence of 1917–20 and the UPA's and OUN's leaders of 1941–51. They also seem to be persistent issues of concern and debate in contemporary Ukraine.<sup>18</sup> The issues of state and society in Ukraine are always circumscribed by geopolitical realities, the structure of the economy, the cultural and religious traditions of the society, and other factors.

Aside from analysing political movements and parties in Ukraine, both historical and contemporary, Peter has also examined Ukraine's strategic, geographic position as a bridge between East and West, as part of the Russian and then the Soviet empire, and as an outpost of the West in relation to Asia. He has explored these relations in a variety of manners. He well understands that Ukrainian independence and statehood are not simply a matter of what Ukraine wills for itself. They are also contingent on what relations Ukraine forges with its neighbours or what its neighbours will for it.<sup>19</sup>

16. Potichnyj, "The March 1990 Elections in Ukraine," 123.

17. For an interesting analysis of the issue of the multinational state, see Peter J. Potichnyj, *Rozvytok iuhoslavskoho federalizmu* (Munich: Ukrainisches Technisch-Wirtschaftliches Institut, 1974).

18. For a reflection on an aspect of this issue, see Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj, "Journalists, the Media, and Democratization in Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 2 July 1995.

19. See, for example, Peter J. Potichnyj and Grey Hodnett, *The Ukraine and the*

There has been a continuity between the past and the present in Ukraine, as in any other society. As a political scientist, Peter knows that familiarity with the past tempers and deepens one's understanding of the present. His research also raises a philosophical question that affects deeply the very foundations of social science, i.e., what is the relationship between concepts and ideas and social reality and political life? It is wise to remember Jules-Henri Poincaré's aphorism: "Whereas natural scientists discuss results, social scientists argue about their concepts. The presumption that it points to—that once conceptual and technical tools are really sharp, understanding social life will be easy—is surely so questionable as to induce healthy scepticism towards the very enterprise of paradigm generation. 'Theoretical praxis,' to use the awful term invented by Western Marxists, does not necessarily make for powerful social science."<sup>20</sup> By studying primary documents and by analyzing the varieties and shapes of Ukraine's history, its relations with its neighbours, and the evolution of movements and political parties there, Peter can surely not be accused of "theoretical praxis."

## The Dynamics of Diasporas

Peter Potichnyj's work extends beyond his formal academic research and is overtly related to his involvement in the Ukrainian communities in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere, his links to the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, and, most recently, his efforts to develop Ukrainian studies in China. These activities may appear to be normal for a person whose identity emanates from a homeland to which he could not return until recently. Making a new life while maintaining a connection to the past is part of the phenomenon. Yet, there is also another dimension to these activities.

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*Czechoslovak Crisis* (Canberra: Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 1970); Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Dissent in the Soviet Union: Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference ... October 22 and 23, 1971* (Hamilton: Interdepartmental Committee on Communist and East European Affairs, McMaster University, 1972); Peter J. Potichnyj and Jane P. Shapiro, eds., *Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1976); Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980); and Peter J. Potichnyj et al., eds., *Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992).

20. Quoted in John A. Hall, "Ideas and the Social Sciences," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 31.

Gabriel Sheffer, in an article entitled "A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics,"<sup>21</sup> asserts that this new field of study has been created by "ethnic groups which transcend the territorial state," i.e., these ethnic groups operate by networks which are "trans-national." He states that "trans-national networks are structured connections established by groups, institutions and corporations across national and state boundaries that evoke loyalties and solidarities inconsistent with and sometimes even contradicting the traditional allegiances to territorial states. The networks created by ethnic diasporas are becoming more important in the international arena, and have peculiar and interesting characteristics due to their being part of complex triadic relations between ethnic diasporas, their host countries and homelands."<sup>22</sup> Sheffer claims that "Modern diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their homelands."<sup>23</sup> And, contrary to many expectations, the passage of time, the coming into being of statehood for the homeland, or the processes of modernization do not appear to have resolved the issue of ethnic diasporas. Indeed, one can argue that modern communications have made the diaspora communities even stronger and more important.

Peter Potichnyj and his generation, whether they be Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, Germans, Palestinians, Lebanese, Punjabis, or anyone else, constitute an important symptom of this development. They have constituted modern diasporas in pluralistic societies. Certainly, in North America, they appear to have flourished; they have not "gone home," they continue to act in and influence the politics, economics, and cultural life of their host societies, and they have been effectively organized nationally and trans-nationally. Many such diaspora communities have also influenced politics in their homelands. The question is: how does a newly independent homeland, like Ukraine, relate to its diaspora community? If one looks for answers in the relationship of the Jewish diaspora with the state of Israel, one has at least close to a half-century of experience to draw on.<sup>24</sup>

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21. In Gabriel Sheffer, ed., *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

22. *Ibid.*, 1.

23. *Ibid.*, 3.

24. For a good summary discussion of this issue in relation to the Jewish diaspora and the state of Israel, see Daniel J. Elazar, "The Jewish People as a Classic Diaspora," and Gabriel Sheffer, "Political Aspects of Jewish Fundraising for Israel," in Sheffer, *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, 212–94. For a more

A number of factors should be examined in assessing the role of contemporary diasporas. The first is their new role and importance in international affairs. During the period of the struggle for independence, before 1991 in the case of Ukraine or before 1948 in the case of Israel, the diaspora communities had a clearly defined and focused set of international activities because independence and statehood were the primary objectives. The same was true of the South African diaspora before 1994. The national congresses of diaspora communities must be established, solidified, and expanded. International relations between these institutions must be forged. Activities, often militant, driven by the goal of liberation and independence are enacted nationally and internationally. But the advent of statehood begins to redefine radically the international activities of diaspora communities. They must search for new activities; they must reconstitute the foundations of their institutions; and they are forced to reconsider their objectives and their operations.

The second factor concerns the role of states in the modern world context. Do nation-states retain their traditional and monopolistic roles in defining, representing, and executing national interests in international affairs? Or do diaspora communities have a place in defining and representing national interests internationally in the post-independence periods? Further, how do newly independent national governments establish and sustain links to their diaspora communities?

The third factor is the very complex relationship between the diaspora community and the independent homeland. Is the diaspora's role always to be supportive financially and economically? Is it to be the critical conscience of the policies and practices of the new nation-state? Is it to provide human resources, skills, and various forms of material support? Does it have any useful role to play in the new context of achieved statehood?

The fourth factor is the problem of identity itself in its psychological, sociological, and cultural dimensions. Many people living in a diaspora community accept the notion of dual identity or dual loyalty. One can be a Canadian and yet one can have a strong affinity and loyalty to Israel, retaining an ideological commitment to Zionism. One can be a Canadian and also have a strong affinity and loyalty to the Ukrainian state or Ukrainian nationalism. For diaspora communities in the context of achieved nationhood can have more than one identity. This seems natural



and desirable, even enriching, to people who are part of diaspora communities. To people who are not, this may be perplexing, unacceptable, or even a matter of disloyalty.<sup>25</sup>

Seen in the light of the dilemmas of diaspora communities, Peter Potichnyj's community and academic activities characterize and reflect the changing nature, responsibilities, and role of Ukrainian Canadians in the context of Ukrainian statehood.

## Jews and Ukrainians

Peter Potichnyj has always existed as an "outsider," whether it was during the years of World War II and immediately afterwards, during his years in the United States (where he received his university education), when he served as a U.S. Marine in Korea, or even during the many years he has lived in relative security and tranquillity in Canada. It is the fate of émigrés to be outsiders, but it is these very outsiders who are able to transform their marginality into a unique form of intellectual energy and achievement.

In his brilliant book *The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays*, Isaac Deutscher defined the sensibility of marginality. Addressing the specifics of the Jewish experience, he clarified the significant meanings of the "outsider":

They were a priori exceptional in that as Jews, they dwelt on the borderlines of various civilizations, religions, and national cultures. They were born and brought up on the borderline of various epochs. Their minds matured where the most diverse cultural influences crossed and fertilized each other. They lived on the margins or in the nooks and crannies of their respective nations. Each of them was in society and yet not in it, of it and yet not of it. It was this that enabled them to rise in thought above their societies, above their nations, above their times and generations, and to strike out mentally into wide new horizons and far into the future.<sup>26</sup>

The conception of the outsider also defines and explains the value systems with which outsiders are preoccupied. The themes of history and freedom appear to be central to that value system. It is certainly true for many Jewish "outsiders," and it is certainly true of Peter Potichnyj.

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25. A helpful discussion can be found in Desmond Morton, "Divided Loyalties? Divided Country?" in *Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship*, ed. William Kaplan (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 50-64.

26. Isaac Deutscher, *The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 27.



Since 1983 Peter and I have attempted to find points of conjunction between Jewish and Ukrainian history.<sup>27</sup> This has not been an easy task, in view of the peculiar relationship between Jews and Ukrainians over the centuries. Henry Abramson, relying upon the work of Shimon Redlich, has characterized that "triangular" relationship:

During the seventeenth century Jews together with Poles opposed Ukrainians. In the revolutionary era Ukrainians opposed the Jews, whom they conflated with Russian Communists. During the Holocaust Ukrainians joined Nazis against the Jews—the former for largely political reasons, the latter on more pathological grounds. In all these periods Ukrainians and Jews tended to regard themselves exclusively as victims and members of the other group exclusively as victimizers. This popular self-perception adds to the bitterness of the animosity between the two groups, who demand recognition of their respective claims on each other.<sup>28</sup>

Numerous scholars in the past ten years have begun to explore the depths and particulars of this triangular relationship in the hope of resolving the "nightmare" that both the Jews and the Ukrainians have experienced.

For the first time in their history, both the Jews and the Ukrainians have independent homelands. Their statehood has created conditions for new relationships. It is no wonder, therefore, that there has been a significant extension of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Israel since 1991.<sup>29</sup>

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27. Our published works include Aster and Potichnyj, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations*; Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988, 1990); Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes," *Jahrbuch der Ukrainekunde* (Munich), 1982, 102–39; Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, "Modernization and Its Impact on Jewish-Ukrainian Relations," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 1983, nos. 5–8 (30 January–20 February) and in *Zbirnyk na poshanu prof. dr-a Volodymyra Ianeva/Symbolae in honorem Volodymyri Janiw*, ed. Olexa Horbatsch (Munich: Ukrainische Freie Universität, 1983), 1050–68; and Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, "Ievreisko-ukrainski vidnosyny." *Suchasnist*, 1992, no. 8 (August): 165–7.

28. Henry Abramson, "The Scattering of Amalek: A Model for Understanding the Ukrainian-Jewish Conflict," *East European Jewish Affairs* 24, no. 1 (1994): 46.

29. Some of these new relations were explored in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, "Autonomy, Self-Determination and Territoriality: Some Aspects of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," a paper presented at the Conference on "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in the 20th Century: Coexistence and Controversy," Jerusalem, 13–18 May 1993.

For Peter Potichnyj, Jewish history, Jewish survival, and the achievement of Jewish statehood have acted as an example and inspiration for his own concerns with Ukrainian survival and the achievement of Ukrainian statehood. Our collaboration on Jewish-Ukrainian relations has taught us how to understand each other to overcome the history of victimization that has plagued the Jews and the Ukrainians for centuries. Given that there is now an independent Ukrainian state, Peter's commitment to the hope that Jews and Ukrainians should learn from each other is not far-fetched. As both he and I have learned, there is more that conjoins Jews and Ukrainians than divides them. We are obliged to search our histories, forgive the excesses of our common past, and look to the future.

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