


## About the Author

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After World War II he was on the Faculty of the U.N.R.-R.A. University and of the Free Ukrainian University in Munich, Germany. He also was an interpretor with the Canadian Immigration Mission in Munich.

In 1948 he came to Canada where he served seven years in the ministry of the United Church of Canada and three years in the library work. He taught Greek and Hebrew at the United College, Winnipeg, Man., 1957-59. He spent one year teaching East-European History and Russian at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, replacing the Honorable Senator, Prof. P. Yuzyk. In 1960 he settled permanently in the U.S.A., teaching Russian and German Languages and Literatures, at the South Dakota State University, and since 1965, at Western Illinois University.

Professor M. Yaremko is the author of the book: "Greek Orthodox Church and the World Council of Churches; Evanston-Moscow, 1956 (in Ukrainian). He has prepared manuscripts on Skovoroda—the Ukrainian Socrates and on the Synopsis of the New Testament. At present he is devoting much time to a study of the literary inheritance of W. T. Narizhnyj.

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GALICIA – HALYCHYNA

(A Part of Ukraine)

*From Separation  
to Unity*

by

MICHAEL YAREMKO

With an introduction of Clarence A. Manning,  
Professor Emeritus of Columbia University

Published by Shevchenko Scientific Society  
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**D e d i c a t e d**

to

**“SICH” CENTENNIAL**

**University of Vienna —**

**Ukrainian Students Association**



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## Introduction

Dr. M. Yaremko has performed a useful task in presenting for the first time in English a history of Galicia (Halychyna) for this part of Ukraine has for centuries had its own history quite distinct from that of the other parts of the country. It has been subjected to other influences, chiefly Western, and it has had to contend for its rights and the rights of its population under conditions very different from those facing the other Ukrainians.

The original population of Galicia was Ukrainian and the area was a definite part of the old state of Rus'-Ukraine with its capital at Kiev. As such it was ruled by Princes of the House of Rurik and it participated fully in the life of the state. However, when the bonds between the Ukrainian principalities were loosened and then broken, Galicia, sometimes with and sometimes without its neighbor Volhynia, became more and more isolated. As the most western of the Ukrainian lands with its capital at Halych and later Lviv, Galicia soon became a bone of contention between the two aggressive states of Hungary and Poland. Both sought to extend control by force of arms. It is true that the region was ravaged by the Tartars but for a couple of centuries, it led a precarious existence as a principality and later a kingdom. When the rest of Ukraine passed under the control of Lithuania, Poland was successful in seizing the region but even later when the Polish government took over the other Ukrainian areas from Lithuania, Galicia was handled differently and it did not become free of Polish rule until the division of Poland in 1772, when it fell on the basis of old claims to the Habsburg Empire under Maria Theresa.

From then on the nature of the struggle changed for during the entire nineteenth century, the country was in more or less turmoil as the Poles who had annexed a Polish area to the province, worked and schemed to secure full control under the Habsburgs and to oppress the Ukrainians still further. At the end of World War I, it declared its independence as the West Ukrainian National Republic and in 1919 formally joined the free Ukrainian National Republic but in the disturbances of the day, it proved impossible to weld the two governments together and finally Galicia was awarded by the Council of Ambassadors to Poland under Polish promises that were never carried out. Then in 1939, there came a new division of Poland and Galicia was joined to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to share the same unhappy fate as the rest of Ukraine,

Thus the history of Galicia ranks between a local history of a province and that of a small but separated state seeking union with the main body of its compatriots. Through it all, the Ukrainian population never doubted their kinship with other Ukrainians, they kept intact their language, songs and traditions with surprisingly few deviations. Yet their revival in the nineteenth century was rather typical of Western Europe than of the Eastern Slaves in the Russian Empire.

Dr. M. Yaremko has written an interesting story and we can hope that the book will have the success that it deserves.

Clarence A Manning

Associate Professor of Slavic Languages (Ret.)  
Columbia University

# Preface

It has been said that on the occasion of Ukrainian holidays, one can hear more Ukrainian spoken on the streets of the larger cities of Canada or of the United States of America (Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton, New York, Chicago, Detroit) than in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine. This paradoxical situation is largely the result of two different political systems: the oppressive "proletarian dictatorship" with its program of "Russification" and the Western democracy with its freedoms of speech, press and assembly. There are over one and half million Ukrainians in Canada and in the U.S.A. Their children, although of third or fourth generation are still anxious to learn about the history, culture and traditions of the land of their forefathers.

The present book had been prepared primarily for young readers of Ukrainian extraction, living in Canada or in the United States. For this reason the author has tried to present the material in a popular and narrative style, avoiding mainly as far as possible scholarly type footnotes, tables and statistics. This does not exclude the possibility of its serving students of Eastern and Central European history, however. The need for such a short history of Galicia (Halychyna) in one volume had been felt for a long time. It is hoped that the present book will contribute to an understanding of the national and political complexities in that part of Europe, specifically relations between the Ukrainians and the Poles. It is not meant, however, to stir up the old national antagonism.

It is a study of Galicia from its earliest period up to 1945, and therefore does not deal with the historical events after the second World War when Galicia came under the rule of the Soviet Union. This period deserves a special survey of its own. The material here has been presented in chronological order, and individual chapters can be considered as self-contained. Early history has been dealt very briefly, in a very condensed form. It should be noted, however, that in the second part, in discussing the conditions under the Polish rule for five centuries, the author, in order to remain as objective as possible, has purposely quoted Polish or other foreign scholars and historians. The third part of the work has been given greater importance and the author has used

much material of his Ph.D. thesis (1944) which is published here for the first time. Along lines similar to those of his thesis, the author found another doctoral dissertation by B. Staruch (1949), of a great assistance. The last part contains the history of two World Wars and the intervening period.

The history of this country could be summerized in three words: "*history of tragedy*" Although tragic, it is not depressing or without hope. It exudes optimism, pride and heroism. It is a history shaped not so much by revolutions or by extraordinary men, but rather by many "*little*" men, who with great dedication, self-denial and sacrifice, patiently molded national awaranness in the face of many discouraging setbacks. It should be remembered, that the Ukrainians in Galicia, who were reduced to the status which might be at best called of an "unknown people", consisting of the lowest classes of "peasants and priests" (khlop i pop), were able not only to survive, but to grow into a mature nation that could no longer be ignored by history.

Galicia (Halychyna) is the primary subject of this work, because the greatest number of the early Ukrainian emigrants came to this part of the world from that area. Any idea of particularism or of showing Galicia as the "Piedmont of the Ukraine" was completely outside of the author's intention. On the contrary, while writing this study, it became clear to the author that Galicia, although independent for few centuries has always considered itself an integral part of the Ukraine and when the moment seemed opportune, sought re-union with the motherland. When there has been co-operation and understanding between the leading men of West- and East Ukraine, both parts have benefited. The political and cultural contributions made by P. Kulish, M. Drahomaniv, M. Hrushevsky in this direction at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, tend to confirm this view.

For the sake of simplicity the author has modified the usual scholarly transliteration and thus brought the names of cities and rivers closer to the original Ukrainian sound. Thus, the names Lviv, Peremyshl, Sambir, Dnipro, Dnister have been used, and not Lwow, Przemyśl, Sambor, Dniepr, Dniester, which sound more like Polish or Russian. The names like Kiev, Volhynia remained rather in their "traditional" historical way.

## A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s

I wish to express my gratitude to people and institutions who have contributed in different ways to this book. First of all, to Professor George W. Simpson of the University of Saskatchewan, Canada, who suggested and encouraged me to undertake this study. I am heavily indebted to the Research Fund Committee of the University of South Dakota, Vermillion, for the grant which enabled me to conduct research both, in the New York Public Library and in the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. While being myself on the staff of the above university I received much help from Professors, C. C. Cummins and George Demetrikopoulos, both of the History Department, and Ebmer G. Trozig of the Department of Journalism. Mr. Lynn Hedges, Assistant of the Geology Department of the same university prepared the included maps. The Librarian of the "Interlibrary Loan"-Department Mrs. Corinne Grosse was also of great help and assistance to me.

As English is not my native language, there are also few people who fully deserve my sincere appreciation for their patience in correcting my original text. These are: Mr. Jerry L. Laffey, corrected and typed the first manuscript and prepared the index. Mr. Rudolf Heydeloff aided me greatly in reworking and reshaping the manuscript. Professors James Kilker and James Gardner of the Western Illinois University, Macomb, Ill., did the final linguistic retouching. Mrs. Conie MacLaughlin, secretary of the above university retyped the entire manuscript for the second time.

Professors B. W. Steciuk and Clarence A. Manning deserve my special gratitude for reading and approving the manuscript for its publication by the Shevchenko Scientific Society of New York. Additional thanks go to Prof. C. A. Manning for writing the introduction, and suggesting the subtitle.

Finally I wish to express my appreciation for granting me permission to quote directly from their publications to Vantage Press, and Harvard University Press.

Macomb, — Galesburg, Ill.  
August 1966.

Michael Yaremko  
Western Illinois University



# PART I

## The Princely Period

(862 - 1340)





## CHAPTER I

### **General Historical Background**

The present day Ukraine was known at its origin as the Kievan Rus' (Kievan State). It came into existence in the middle of the 9th century A.D., and its first prince was Ryurik (862 - 879), the founder of the Ryurikovychi dynasty. His followers, Oleh (879 - 912), Ihor (912 - 945), Queen Olha (945 - 957), Sviatoslav (957 - 972) were mainly concerned with the enlargement and unification of their state. Kievan Rus' reached its peak of political power and international influence during the reigns of Volodymyr the Great (980 - 1014), and his son Yaroslav the Wise (1019 - 1054). Their state encompassed a huge territory between the Carpathian Mountains in the west and the Don River and the Sea of Azov in the east, and between the Baltic Sea in the north and the Black Sea in the south. It was surrounded by the Asiatic hordes; the Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns, Khazares, Pechenegs, Polovtsi, and Magyars on the east; by the Goths on the north-west, by the Byzantine population on the south and by the Finnic people on the north.

Volodymyr the Great, deeply concerned about the prosperity and commercial expansion of his realm, gave special attention to Peremyshl, the city located furthest to the west in Galicia, and to Cherven, the exact location of which is difficult to determine accurately. As early as 962 there were brisk trade connections between Bohemia, Krakow and Kiev through Peremyshl. Volodymyr, recognizing Peremyshl and Cherven as forming an important future artery for western trade, decided to tie these cities more closely to the Kievan Realm.

It seems that the author of the Primary Chronicle, our first historical source, was not much interested in the early history of Galicia for he tells us little about the past of this country. In fact Galicia was an extremely remote western part of the Kievan State. However, in the year 981, the same chronicler recorded that the Grand-Prince of Kiev, Volodymyr

the Great, had organized several successful campaigns against the "Liakhy" (a Polish tribe) "deeply penetrating their country" and on that occasion recovered from them the "Cherven cities (horody) and Peremyshl." The next campaign into Galicia followed twelve years later in 993. It was directed "against the White Croatians" who probably had in the meantime rebelled against the strong centralized government of the Kievan Grand-Prince.

After the death of Volodymyr (1015), a feud arose among his sons over the throne of Kiev. One of his sons, Sviatopolk, appealed to the Polish king Boleslav Chrobry (the Brave), (992-1025) his father-in-law, for help. Boleslav successfully intervened on behalf of his son-in-law in the struggle for the princely crown, but on his way home from Kiev in 1018 he occupied Galicia as the price for his aid. The succeeding Kievan Grand-Prince, Yaroslav the Wise (1019-1054), was not willing to accept the loss of Galicia and waited only for a favorable moment to regain it. The opportunity came when Poland, after the death of Boleslav Chrobry (1025), became the scene of domestic disorder caused by fractions struggling for the Polish throne. Taking advantage of the Polish weakness, Yaroslav reoccupied Galicia and made it a permanent part of his realm. In order to defend Galicia better from future Polish attacks he built on the western border the fortified city which still bears his name.

Unfortunately this brief reference though short and incomplete, was to become the heart of the Galician problem and led to the unending conflict between the Ukrainians and the Poles over the possession of this country. On the basis of this remark Polish historians, in the past as well as in the present, have attempted to prove that Galicia up to 981 belonged to Poland. And yet a fuller examination of the same Primary Chronicle reveals that the territory of Galicia with which we are here concerned belonged to Kievan Rus' from the earliest time. First, the Chronicler says that this country was inhabited by three Slavic tribes: White Croatians\*, Lutychi and Tivertsi. The first two had been in this area for

---

\* The White Croatians, an Iranian tribe, came with the Avars from Asia to Galicia, where they became assimilated with the remnants of the Antes (Slavs). A large portion of them, in later years, moved into the Balkans, where they are still known by the same name.

some time and the Tivertsi came later from the Dnipro Valley. These three tribes, as well as the Dulebi (later renamed Volhynians) were mentioned by Nestor as participants in the campaign of the Kievan Prince Oleh against Byzantium in 907 A.D. On the basis of this historical fact it must be concluded that the territories populated by these tribes had joined Kievan Rus' some time before this date. It was only quite natural for these tribes to unite with the Kievan Rus', since they were ethnically, culturally and economically more closely related to the Eastern Slavs than they were to the Slavs living further to the west. (Hrycak)

Secondly, the "Liakhy", against whom Volodymyr the Great undertook his campaign (981) had not yet become a part of the Polish realm created by its first prince Mieszko (Miseko) (963 - 992). The same Chronicler recorded about forty years later (1020) that the above "Liakhy" belonged to the realm of Boleslav Chrobry (the Brave). The historians, Tomashivsky and recently Rhode, maintain that these "Liakhy", as well as Krakow itself were before and after 981 loose dependencies of Bohemia. Furthermore, the Bishopric documents of Prague (973) reveal that Cherven and Peremyshl, recovered by Volodymyr in 981, were under the supervision of the Bishop of Prague in Bohemia. Moreover, there are other historical sources which indicate that Kievan Rus' and Bohemia shared a common frontier. Even the chronicler Nestor, as late as 996 reported that 'Andrew of Bohemia' was a neighbour of Volodymyr the Great. It follows that Cherven and Peremyshl did not belong to Mieszko before 981. Otherwise these two neighboring countries — the Kievan State and Bohemia would have been separated by a Polish wedge. The "Liakhy" and Krakow then, could not have been annexed by the Poles in the years between 981 and 996. The fact is that Mieszko I tried to annex Krakow which at that time belonged to the Moravian principality, and Western Galicia to Poland before 981. However, he was defeated by the Kiev Prince, Volodymyr the Great in 981, who for this reason *deeply penetrated Poland*.

Following the further historical development we find that Yaroslav the Wise before his death (1054) divided the Kievan Realm among his sons. This division soon proved fatal for, instead of one powerful Kievan State, there were now a number of smaller principalities, such as; Kiev, Cher-



nyhiv, Pereiaslav, Novhorod, Suzdal, Turovo-Pinsk, Volhynia, and Galicia. From that time on the Kievan State began to decline, but Suzdal and especially Galicia began to grow and to occupy an important position among the other principalities. Although Yaroslav gave Galicia first to one of his sons (Volodymyr), later to his grandson Rostyslav, it took over thirty years of constant fighting among the Ukrainian princes to make Galicia a completely independent state.

If we look at a map we realize that Galicia is not a large country. It is a long, narrow strip of land along the Dnister River, traversed by a large network of navigable rivers (Sian, Buh, Prut and others). These rivers greatly contributed to the rise of Galicia as an important trade center, not only between the East and the West, but also between the North and the South. This growth occurred after the trade on the Kiev-controlled Dnipro River declined, and caused the trade routes to shift to the Dnister. It was this shifting of the trade routes from Kiev to Galicia that made the latter a prosperous and independent state, rather than sharing in the commonly accepted but overemphasized internal feuds in Kiev. This new trade route through Galicia continued to grow under the impetus of the Crusaders' campaign into the East. As long as the Kievan State with its powerful *horody* (cities) had remained the continental trade route "from Varagians to the Greeks (from Scandinavia to Byzantium)," it was a thriving country. But when the cities lost control, they grew feeble and incapable of offering strong resistance to the last great Mongolian invasion from the Asiatic steppes.

The situation in Galicia was to a certain extent a different one. Here hundreds of cities and towns were thriving. The most important of these mentioned in the first records of Galicia — were Peremyshl, Halych, Zvenyhorod, and Terbovla. Other cities, such as Sianik, Tysmenytsia, Yaroslav, Lviv, and Kolomeya, were also referred to in the early history of the country. All these cities, as centers of trade, were very attractive to foreign settlers whose number constantly increased. In this period the country was becoming very prosperous and it was the most densely populated area of Ukraine. Moreover, agriculture in Galicia was greatly developed because of the *chornozem* — its black fertile soil — and the favorable climate. The main article of trade was salt,

which was exported in all directions: to Poland, Germany, Byzantium, Kiev and Sweden. Galicia prospered during this peaceful period, for it had not yet been attacked by the Polovtsi hordes.

The political and geographical borders of Galicia underwent some changes through the centuries. In the West, Galicia bordered with Poland. The original borderline there ran along the Vyslok, the lower Sian and Vepr (Wieprz) rivers, all tributaries of the Vistula (Wisla). The main Galician cities and fortresses along this border were Krosno, Riashiv (Rzeszov) and Perevorsk (Przeworsk). Further to the North the Lublin district often changed hands between Polish and Galician princes during the 13th century. During the long Polish occupation of Galicia, with its slow but continuous process of Polonization, the Ukrainian-Polish ethnic boundary shifted from the Vyslok River eastward to the Sian River. The Poles also managed to colonize the territory of Galicia proper and to create small Polish ethnic islands, especially in the central, most fertile part of Galicia. The most significant change took place when the western border of Galicia was shifted after World War II. According to the Yalta agreement of January 1945, the Soviets occupied Galicia as far as the Sian River, leaving to the Poles the city of Peremyshl and a great number of the Ukrainians, the so-called "Lemky" who soon afterwards were forcibly resettled either in the U.S.S.R., or in German territories occupied by the Poles. The Lemkys' territory was settled by the Poles, and thus a large part of the western Ukrainian land has been lost.

In connection with this it would be worthwhile to mention the so called "Curzon line", proposed in July 1920 by Lord Curzon, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs.\* This line, which was based more or less on ethnic boundaries, served as a basis for the political agreements of August and September 1939 between the Soviets and Germany. At that time it was called the "Molotov-Ribbentrop" line. This was a modified Curzon line and was finally agreed upon and included in the treaty ratified between the U.S.S.R. and Poland in Moscow on August 16, 1939.

The south-eastern boundary, between the Kievan State

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\* See map, page 266.

and Galicia fluctuated very often. At one time Galicia's boundary extended along the Danube River as far as the Black Sea, after Yaroslav Osmomysl captured Moldavia, Bessarabia and Bukovina. These lands remained under the control of Galicia's princes for many years. Bukovina remained with Galicia up to 1340, in which year it was occupied by the Turks. Bukovina was re-united with Galicia at the time of the Austrian occupation in 1786 to 1849. At the time of Yaroslav Osmomysl, "Little Halych" now named Galati, was built on the Danube. The first Galician princes, Vasylo and Volodar, endeavored to colonize Bukovina and Bessarabia with Bulgars from the Balkans along the Prut and Seret rivers. In 1340, Galicia also lost the Podilia, which was then occupied by the Lithuanians and later by the Turks. After fluctuating back and forth for some time the Zbruch River finally became the eastern boundary and was preserved as such during the Austrian period, and in the period after World War I as well.

To the north, Galicia bordered on another Ukrainian principality, Volhynia, with which there was never a border dispute or conflict. On the contrary, these two countries merged in 1200 and became known as the Galician-Volhynian Principality, later called "Kingdom". In addition to Volhynia, other Ukrainian territories (Polisia, Pidlashia and the Kholm Area) were incorporated into Galicia. This Kingdom lasted until 1340, when Volhynia was united with Kievan Ukraine under the suzerainty of the Lithuanians.

It should be stressed that Galicia never tried to capture any land from the other Ukrainian principalities, Volhynia or Kiev. It often, however, waged defensive wars against the Kievan State, but never for reasons of expansion. There was only one exception; when Volodymyrko occupied a small strip of Kievan land between Volhynia, Kiev, and Galicia — the so called Pohorynia (from the Horyn River) — which he pledged to return but never did.

The southern border of Galicia ran along the Carpathian Mountains, which form the only natural frontier. It must be said that Galicia, due to the lack of natural frontiers, was always an easy prey for greedy neighbors. Behind the Carpathians there were the Hungarians, who settled there at the end of the 9th century and who had annexed the Ukrainian ethnic territory of the so-called Carpatho-Ukraine (Rus').



The Hungarians continued to cast covetous glances across the Carpathians. For this reason they often allied themselves with the Polish, or even with the Kievan princes, in an attempt to extend their authority over Galicia. However, at the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century, the Galician King, Lev I, crossed the Carpathians and took under his control a part of the Carpatho-Ukrainian territory along the Tysa River, which included the cities of Mukachiv, Uzhorod and others.

Originally the people of Galicia (Halychyna) called themselves *Rusyny* (Latinized *Rutheni*), in contrast to the *Russian*, or *Russky* (spelled with two "s") of the Moscovite State. The name *Rusyn* was used throughout the Middle Ages and up to the middle of the 19th century when under the influence of the general national awakening, it was replaced by the other historical name, Ukrainian. The latter name was mentioned as early as in 1189, and it applied to the people of Kiev, as well as to the people of Galicia.\*

Probably no other country has experienced as many name changes as had Galicia. For the most part these many changes did not occur because the inhabitants were displeased with the original name of Galicia. They were almost always imposed changes, made by the different occupying powers.

The Primary Chronicle, as the first historical source, speaks of the area as *Cherven horody*, (Red cities or fortresses). For a long time it was maintained that this territory, a part of Rus' (Kiev), was called "Red Rus'" from the word *Cherven*, a term which distinguished it from the Kievan Rus'. However, many historians today doubt that this was the original name of the country.

The once official name **Halychyna**, (latinized as **Galicia**) has been maintained by the population up to the present day. This name was derived from the city **Halych**, built in 1140 by the Prince Volodymyrko, who transferred his capital from Peremyshl to the newly built city of Halych. After 1200, when Galicia and Volhynia merged, it was called "Principality (later Kingdom) of Galicia and Volhynia". Even the Hun-

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\* The name Ukrainian will be used throughout this book in reference to the people of Galicia, and the name Galicia, in reference to the country.

garians and Austrians of that time called it "The Kingdom of Galicia and *Lodomeria*". \*

When, in the late 14th century, Galicia came under Polish rule, its name was officially changed by the Polish government to "Voyevodstvo Rus'". In the same century the Kievan Rus', Podolie and later Volhynia were in union with the Lithuanian Principality and were called the "Lithuanian-Rus'". To distinguish Galicia as a part of the Kievan Rus', under Polish domination, the people of the Lithuanian-Rus' called Galicia "Mala (Little) Rus'".

In 1772 Galicia came under the domination of Austria. Austria added to the historically Ukrainian Galicia a part of the Polish territory near Krakow, and named this newly constituted province the "Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, with the Great Principality of Cracov, Auschwitz and Zator".

Needless to say this was both historically and ethnically an artificial creation. From that time until 1918, the Ukrainians living under Austria endeavored to bring the Austrian government to agree to a division of the "crownland of Galicia" into two separate provinces; the Polish (West), and Ukrainian (East). Although the demands of the Ukrainians were not carried out, the Ukrainians continued to refer to the Ukrainian part of Galicia, as "East Galicia".

At the end of World War I the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, basing their act on the principle of selfdetermination, proclaimed the "**West Ukrainian National Republic**" which consisted of all the Ukrainian territories under Austria. This proclamation was spelled out by the acts of October 18, 1918 and of November 1, 1918. On January 22, 1919, the West Ukrainian National Republic was united with the eastern independent Ukrainian State and became known as the **Ukrainian National Republic**. This union was foreshadowed in the proclamation of East-Ukraine's independence on January 22, 1918.

After the Ukrainian-Polish war of 1918 and 1919 Galicia, by the decision of the Supreme Council of the Ambassadors in 1923, came under the control of the newly created Polish State. The Poles, between the two World Wars,

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\* *Lodomeria*, a distortion of the name Volodymyr Volynsky, the capital city of Volhynia.

divided Galicia into three *voyevodstvos*,\* Lviv, Stanyslaviv and Ternopil, and gave them an artificial name: "Eastern Little-Poland". The Ukrainians, however, used the old name "Galicia", or even more often "Western Ukraine."

During the German occupation of Poland in World War II Galicia was incorporated into the so-called "General Government." This created further ethnical confusion. The U.S.S.R., by the act of November 15, 1939 (the first occupation of Galicia by the Soviets), proclaimed the union of all the Ukrainian Soviet territories that had belonged to Poland with the Ukrainian Socialist Republic. At present the name Galicia is officially scarcely heard. The Ukrainians, however, prefer to call Galicia "West Ukraine" ("Zapadna" Ukraina), and thus avoid the official name "Ukrainian S.S.R."

Finally, after so many years of instability and changes of the occupants, Galicia came back to its point of departure of approximately one thousand years ago. It became again an integral part of the whole Ukraine.

Galicia, as an integral part of the Kievan Rus', was culturally tied to Byzantium. During its formative period its culture, (including introduction of the Christianity of the Eastern rites), came from the "Eastern Rome," — Byzantium. The culture of Byzantium in the tenth century was decidedly ahead of that of Western Europe. On the other hand, Galicia, as the most western part of the Ukraine, was under a strong influence from western civilization during and after the Middle Ages. Galicia, because of its geographic location, became the cultural *cross-road* between East and West.

A further exploration into its history will reveal whether this location was a blessing or a curse. Perhaps, like most things in life, it has proven to be both.

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\* *Voyevodstvo* — (a Polish word) is neither a state, nor province, nor country. It is something inbetween, more like an American county or a British shire.

## CHAPTER II

### **The Dynasty of the Rostyslavychi (1080 - 1199)**

Until the death of Yaroslav the Wise in 1054, Kievan Rus' remained a united realm and Galicia and Volhynia formed the furthest western provinces of this state.

In the following period Kievan Rus' was divided into various principalities among which Galicia established itself as an independent principedom. Shortly before his death, Yaroslav gave Galicia to his grandson **Rostyslav**. However, the latter was driven out of the country by other claimants who were also sons or grandsons of Yaroslav. Rostyslav went to Tmutorokan, and won fame and popularity as far as the Byzantine settlements in the Crimea where he was assassinated. In the meantime the princes continued to struggle for the possession of the Galician throne. Among them were the three sons of Rostyslav — **Ryurik, Volodar and Vasylo** — who emerged during 1080 - 84 as victors. They succeeded in seizing Galicia and firmly established the Rostyslavychi dynasty. They then divided Galicia among themselves. Ryurik settled in Peremyshl, the most important Galician town at the time; Volodar occupied Zvenyhorod, an important trade centre: and Vasylo resided in Terebovlia, the gateway to the South-East, the Black Sea and Byzantium.

However, their thrones were still somewhat insecure since they had to defend their rights against the encroachments of the Kievan and Volhynian princes, who continued to claim Galicia as their own domain. The most persistent adversary of the sons of Rostyslav was the Volhynian prince David Ihorevych, who in alliance with the Kievan prince, interfered in Galician affairs.

The Ukrainian council of princes at Liubech in 1097 acknowledged the suzerainty of the Rostyslavychi over Galicia. However, David Ihorevych continued his intrigues against the Rostyslavychi and committed a crime by treacherously blinding Vasylo of Terebovlia. He was punished by

being dispossessed of his Volhynian throne, which was given to the Kievan prince, who in turn, immediately put forward his claim to Galicia. He quickly organized a campaign against Galicia and persuaded the Hungarians to join him by attacking from the south. Nevertheless the Rostyslavychi Vasylko and Volodar proved to be able to defend their princedoms from the attacks of the Kievan princes, as well as from their covetous neighbors the Poles and Hungarians. Their statesmanship was demonstrated when they concluded an agreement with David, their former foe, who as a result came to their assistance with a force of nomadic Polovtsi (Cumans). They also concluded the alliance with Byzantium, thereby keeping the Hungarians in check in the south. The climax of these wars was the bloody battle at the walls of Peremyshl in 1099. This ended in disaster for the Hungarians, who lost more than 40,000 soldiers during their speedy retreat across the Sian River. Under the impact of this defeat a Hungarian chronicler states that "such a calamity occurred as can hardly be found in books elsewhere, and it is impossible to describe." Indeed, from the very beginning of Galician suzerainty the Hungarians sought every opportunity to secure these lands for themselves since they had earlier annexed a part of the Ukrainian land, Carpatho-Ukraine. Their defeat during the battle of Peremyshl served to cool their aggressive ambitions and thus their relations with the Rostyslavychi at least temporarily improved. This was also true as far as the Kievan prince was concerned. He did not venture again to challenge the political and military strength of Rostyslavychi. For the moment peace had come to troubled Galicia.

The second half of the reigns of Rostyslavychi was dominated by the wars against the Poles, who constantly attacked Galicia from the west. Vasylko himself admitted in a famous confession that: "I caused much trouble for the *Liakhy* (a Polish tribe) and intended to do even more than to revenge myself for the Ruthenian lands." At one time he was prepared to occupy the whole Poland: "I will take the *whole land of Liakhy*." But he was hindered in his aggressive plans against the Poles by his blindness of which a mention was made before. It fell to his brother Volodar to conduct the anti-Polish campaign with vigour and determination.

By courageously meeting the aggressive outsiders in this fashion, the first Rostyslavychi were able to secure Galicia

for their dynasty and to lay the foundations for the future principedom and kingdom of Galicia, an endeavour which was wholeheartedly supported by a united population.

Vasylko and Volodar ruled Galicia in full harmony, and mutual understanding. When both died of old age in about 1124, Galicia was divided among their four sons into four equal patrimonies. Consequently, Galicia was in danger of sharing the fate of the Kievan state; that is, to be split into small appanages, or city-states, and thereby lose the political identity which had been purchased at such a high cost. Fortunately Volodymyrko, one of the four successors, was able to preserve the integrity of Galicia. **Volodymyrko**, the son of Volodar (1124-1153), was both a capable statesman and a cunning politician. His main ambition was to make Galicia a united, independent and strong state. A combination of fortuitous circumstances enabled him to achieve his lofty goals.

As we have seen, Volodymyrko at first had inherited only one-fourth of Galicia, which included the capital of Zwenyhorod. By 1141 his two cousins died without heirs, an event which enabled him to unite their shares with his own Halych and Terebovlia, thus bringing three-fourths of Galicia under his undisputed rule. At the same time he established the capital of Galicia in Halych, the most populous, richest cultural and trade centre of Galicia. From the name of this capital city, the name of the whole country, **Halychyna** (**Galicia** in Latin) was derived. The only city outside Volodymyrko's realm was Peremyshl, where his nephew Ivan Berladnyk resided. Volodymyrko arranged with Ivan an exchange of the city of Zvenyhorod for Peremyshl. Shortly afterwards, he expelled Ivan from Galicia, and from that time on Ivan was destined to play a fateful role in the country's history. The entire country was again united in the hands of Volodymyrko, who for this reason has been called by the chronicler the *Collector* or *Gatherer* of the Galician Rus'. Galicia henceforth became a major political power in south-eastern Europe.

It was not an easy task for Volodymyrko to maintain the newly established unification of Galicia since the neighboring countries of Poland and Hungary, as well as the Kievan prince desired to unite Galicia with his principality and was determined more than ever to regain it, or at best

to reduce Galician prince to vassalages. Pursuing this end the Kievan prince Vsevolod allied himself with the Poles. Furthermore, the Kievan prince decided also to use the exiled Ivan Berladnyk as a tool against Volodymyrko.

Action commenced in 1144, when Vsevolod organized a coalition of other Ukrainian princes together with the nomadic Polovtsi and moved against Galicia. Volodymyrko's military forces were inadequate to meet this gathering. In addition he had to quell a district rebellion instigated by the discontented burghers and merchants in Zvenyhorod, which however, was quickly suppressed. Volodymyrko demonstrated his diplomatic talents by negotiating with Vsevolod rather than fighting. According to the chronicler, Volodymyrko always "tried to achieve with the fox-tail what he could not get with the wolf's teeth", and succeeded in buying off Vsevolod with the promise of 1400 gold pieces. The satisfied Vsevolod returned home and his coalition soon fell apart. Having averted this danger, Volodymyrko showed that he never intended to live up to his promise. The enraged Vsevolod began hastily to prepare a new coalition against Galicia. However, before this could be done he died in 1146.

His successor, Iziaslav, continued the policy of reuniting Galicia with Kiev. In order to gain this end he supported the claims of his tool Ivan Berladnyk, to the Galician throne. In the meantime, Iziaslav had gained another ally in the Hungarian king who had married his sister.

Consequently, Volodymyrko's position was threatened once more. Diplomacy was again used in order to counter this desperate situation. He concluded an alliance with Yuriy Dolgoruky, prince of Suzdal who claimed the Kievan throne by the right of descent.\* Volodymyrko, though not much impressed by Yuriy, decided to support him against Iziaslav. As far as the Hungarians were concerned, he followed the

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\* Yuriy Dolgoruky was the founder of Suzdal principality in the north, which eventually was incorporated into the Moskovite State, which came to political power in the 15th century. The Kievan people considered the northern population of Suzdal and other principalities as not purely *Rus' people* because of their strong mixture with the Ugro-Finic tribes. After becoming the Russian empire at the time of Peter the Great, the Moscovites began to obscure the identity of the early period of Kievan Rus' by claiming themselves only to be the further extension of it. The consequences were that Ukrainians were denied the right of independence.

family tradition by keeping them in check by his union with Byzantium.

In 1151 and 1155 Iziaslav conducted two campaigns against Volodymyrko. Realizing that he would be beaten by military force, Volodymyrko again applied his art of cunning diplomacy. By bribery he succeeded in persuading high Hungarian officers to abandon the campaign and to return home with their king. At the same time he influenced Yuriy to move against Kiev, while he invaded and occupied the small triangle of land between Kiev and the principedom of Volhynia and Galicia, called Pohorynia. Iziaslav was thereby forced to return to Kiev in order to defend his threatened throne. Iziaslav's second campaign against Volodymyrko was terminated by a treaty through which the latter, being persuaded by the Hungarian king, agreed to return the recently occupied land of Pohorynia, to break the alliance with Yuriy of Suzdal, and to become the ally of Iziaslav. As usual, he had been quick to make promises, only to forget them even more quickly when the danger had subsided.

Iziaslav threatened to embark upon a third campaign. However, he sent first an emissary to Volodymyrko in order to remind him of his promises given under oath which consisted of 'the kissing of the cross' as an affirmation. Volodymyrko, pointing out that it had been only a "*small cross*", deliberately broke relations with the Kievan prince. As it turned out, he did not live to face another war with Iziaslav because he died suddenly in 1153, an event which was interpreted by the Nestor Chronicler as divine punishment.

At one time, in the midst of his internal difficulties, Volodymyrko had to face a domestic problem caused by the burghers who objected to the burden of high taxes used to support the constant war campaigns. In 1145 the inhabitants of Halych rebelled against Volodymyrko, who at that time was absent from the city. These people had secretly invited Ivan Berladnyk to replace Volodymyrko. After a two-week siege, Volodymyrko recaptured Halych and suppressed the rebellion. Many of the insurgents lost their lives and properties, Ivan, the puppet prince, escaped and settled in Pohnysie, the "country on the Danube," from where he continued to plot against the Galician rulers.

This rebellion was of far-reaching consequences. It brought about a change in the social structure of the prince-



dom. It had become rather obvious that the prince could not any longer trust the population of the cities. So he was forced to lean increasingly on his troops, called *druzhyna*, whom he lavishly rewarded with large landgrants for their loyal service. This measure created a new class of landed aristocrats, the gentry, the *boyars* (originally: *bolyar*, meaning 'better' or 'elder' citizen). Since this class became in time a most important element in the shaping of Galician history, it seems proper to pause at this point and examine them against the background of the political and administrative structure of the principedom.

The socio-political system in Galicia was basically adopted from the Kievan state. At the head of the government stood the dynastic prince,\* who was responsible for the military defence of his realm and the administration of justice and who figured as the protector of the church. For purposes of defence he commanded a military retinue, called *druzhyna*, who served in return for landgrants. These ex-soldiers provided the backbone of the wealthy *boyar* class.

Gradually the custom was adopted that all high administrative officials also belonged to this class. Subsequently, the prince called an *assembly of boyars* on special occasions to hear their opinions on such important matters as war and peace as well as government policy. In addition to this *general assembly*, a smaller group of permanent advisers, the *boyar's council*, was consulted regarding policy decisions. This practice limited the authority of the prince and promoted the power and influence of the boyars at the same time. Although they were sworn vassals of the prince through their fiefs, they nevertheless gained more and more economic and political power. During the Middle Ages, when Galicia became independent, the whole of Central and Western Europe was under the feudal system. This led to constant conflicts between rulers and vassals, between dukes, barons, herzogs and *shliakhta*. The boyars in Galicia fitted into this pattern, a fact which shows that Galicia was clearly a part of the socio-economic structure of Western Europe.

The achievement of high social positions for the boyars meant that they gradually strove for political equality with

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\* The Ukrainian word for prince is *kniaz*, which is synonymous with the Norman word *kuning*, or king.

the prince. Being well educated they knew how to take advantage of their situation. They assumed the authority of collecting taxes and administering justice in their own domains, thereby antagonized the peasants. Hence, in a short time they gained an influential position in the state which often rivalled that of the princes themselves. It is not within the scope of this book to examine this controversial periods in Ukrainian history in more detail. However, the problem will be referred to again when the history of the individual princes is discussed.

Viewed in this light, Volodymyrko's policy favouring the boyars over the city burghers and common people left his successors with a two-fold problem: the dependence of the princes on powerful boyars and a discontented and jealous city population.

In 1153 Volodymyrko was succeeded by his son **Yaroslav** (to 1187), a man of such unusual ability that he merited the name *Osmomysl* (one who has eight minds). At the time of Yaroslav's succession, however, Galicia was faced by a critical situation because Iziaslav, the Kievan prince, insisted on a return of the land which Volodymyrko had occupied before (Pohorynia). War was threatened and the Poles, Hungarians and Polovtsi supported Iziaslav. Furthermore, somewhere along the Danube in Ponsyie, waiting for a suitable moment to appear in Galicia, there remained the fateful Ivan Berladnyk.

Yaroslav at first tried to appease the Kievan prince by promising to return the disputed land and to become his ally. By applying this policy he succeeded in breaking up the opposing coalition. The Hungarians were the first to desert Iziaslav and to join Yaroslav and the Poles soon followed suit. Iziaslav was left with the Polovtsi to invade Galicia in 1154. In a bloody encounter at Terebovlia, Yaroslav's forces repelled the invasion and shortly after Iziaslav died, an event which saved the situation for Yaroslav.

For the time being Galicia enjoyed peace and friendly relations with all its neighbours: Poland, Hungary and even Kiev. Only the problem of the exiled Ivan Berladnyk remained to be solved. Ivan had settled in Ponsyie in the city of Berlad, which gave him his name. There he organized bands of Polovtsi and local people, undertaking raids upon the trade caravans which passed along the Dnister and Danube.

Yaroslav decided to put an end to this disturbing activity, and was supported by the Hungarians and Poles, whose trade also suffered from such unexpected raids. At an earlier period Yaroslav, being assured of Polish and Hungarian friendship, insisted on the surrender of Ivan Berladnyk, who operated under the protection of Iziaslav. The latter refused to cooperate and as a result Yaroslav moved against Kiev in 1158, displaced Iziaslav and gave the Kievan throne to his friend prince Rostyslav, and thereby established peaceful relations between Kiev and Galicia. Afterwards, Yaroslav successfully sent his forces against Ivan's strongholds and expanded the Galician principedom to the south as far as the Danube. From this period dates the establishment of the city of Galati (little Halych), which indicates the Ukrainian origin of this centre.

Now peace prevailed in Galicia and Yaroslav was able to exert all of his energy and talent towards making his country prosperous as well as developing its economy and culture. He achieved such measure of success that his name and his principedom became widely known and were held in high esteem among Slavs and others. The *Book of Annals* and the epic *Slovo a polku Ihorevi* (Tale of Ihor's Campaign) are filled with the praises of Yaroslav's character and actions. In the *Book of Annals* we read: "Yaroslav was a prince wise and wellspoken, pious and honoured in foreign lands; and famous by reason of his armies." The author of *Slovo o polku Ihorevi* writes\*: "O Yaroslav Osmamysl of Galicia you sit high on your golden throne propping the Hungarian (Carpathian) mountains with your armies, protecting the way to the king, closing the gates of the Danube. Your fame flows over your lands, you open the gates of Kiev, and from your golden throne you shoot at the sultan beyond the lands."

Yaroslav was less successful in his dealings with the boyars, who in one generation had attained such importance that even Yaroslav was often powerless to control them. At the very beginning of his reign the boyars demonstrated to

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\* *Slovo o polku Ihorevi* is a masterpiece of world literature of that period whose authorship is unfortunately unknown. Some recent authorities claim that Volodyslav Kormylchych, a highly educated Galician boyar, must have been the author of this epic. When in addition we point out two other significant literary works — *Galician Gospel (Evangelium)*, and *Galician-Volhynian Chronicle* of the 12th century — we can cogently conclude that Galicia, in comparison to other countries of that time, possessed a highly developed culture.

him the extent of their influence which they had gained during the rule of his father. They told Yaroslav: "your father loved us and made us prosperous," a statement which showed both respect and new expectations. Yaroslav, realizing the power of this class, attempted to curtail it by removing their most outspoken representatives and favouring the loyal boyars under the leadership of Chahrovy, whose daughter Nastasia became Yaroslav's mistress. Sensing the impending danger, the more powerful boyars waited for a suitable moment both to remove their loyal counterparts and to curb the power of the prince. Yaroslav's private life became the means by which they accomplished their aim. The 'rebels' did not approve of Yaroslav's extra-marital relationship with Nastasia. They assumed the role of moral censors and aroused indignation among the people who, prodded by the boyars, captured Nastasia, burned her at the stake and murdered her father. Indeed, as a result of this "palace revolt", the power of the boyars rose while the prestige of the realm declined.

Yaroslav wanted to secure the Galician throne for his illegitimate son, Oleh. He summoned the boyars before his death and obliged them by oath to acknowledge **Oleh**, the son of Nastasia, as their prince. However, the boyars decided to act differently and sided with **Volodymyr**, Yaroslav's legitimate son, for they expected that the latter would not diminish their power in return for their support.

The hopes of the boyars were in vain. **Volodymyr** (1187-99) showed his desire to be an absolute ruler on many occasions, an ambition naturally repugnant to the boyars. They soon applied moral pressure against their new prince and demanded that he should relinquish his mistress so that she would face the same fate as Nastasia. Volodymyr abandoned the Galician throne rather than submit to such demands. He escaped to Hungary, where King Bela promised him every assistance. The boyars in the meantime elected an outsider, Roman Mstyslavych, prince of Volhynia, as their new ruler.

Shortly after this, by 1188, Volodymyr returned with the Hungarian king. But to his great surprise he was arrested by his ally, who proclaimed his own son Andrew the 'King of Galicia and Lodomeria'. Although the new Hungarian king did not reign for long, the Hungarians have since claimed this title. Significantly enough, the Austrian Habsburgs

used it as a pretext to annex Galicia at the time of the first partition of Poland in 1772. There is little doubt that the boyars, who opposed Volodymyr, assisted the Hungarian king in his action; however, the commoners did not take kindly to the Hungarian occupation and struggled against it. They were morally supported by the Metropolitan of Kiev, who urged other Ukrainian princes to unite and to promote the expulsion of the Hungarians from Galicia.

When Rostyslaw Berladnyk, the son of Ivan, heard about this struggle, he moved with a small army to Galicia, hoping that the boyars would support him and thus assist him in fulfilling his father's dream to occupy the Galician throne. The boyars did not oblige. Rostyslaw was wounded in battle, taken prisoner and finally poisoned by the Hungarians. Due to this revolt, the occupants introduced a reign of terror. According to the chroniclers, the Galician women were raped while the houses of the boyars were turned into stables.

A year later, Volodymyr escaped from the Hungarian prison and fled to the German lands, to ask Emperor Frederick Barbarossa for help. The Emperor responded by sending him his vassal Casimir the Just, the Polish king, who dispatched Polish troops to Halych. The Galicians staged a second rebellion against the Hungarians and expelled their king, Andrew. Volodymyr regained once more the Galician throne and remained there for ten more years, until his death in 1199.

With his death the Rostyslavychi dynasty in Galicia came to an end. This dynasty had not only laid the solid foundation for the independent existence of Galicia, but also led the principality to the forefront of Western and Eastern powers. Within its last ten years before 1199, however, its power was reduced by the growing ambition of the boyar class, who clearly represented a decentralizing force in the structure of the principality. Consequently, Galicia's power and prestige began to decline. A firm and strong ruler was needed to restore its previous glory and power. Fortunately, Galicia found in **Roman Mstyslavych**, the prince of Volhynia, a firm hand to guide its destiny. A new epoch in the history of Galicia began. The principality was merged with Volhynia and a new entity, which was later to become the **Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia**, was created.

## CHAPTER III

### **The Dynasty of the Romanovychi (1199 - 1340)**

Roman Mstyslavych (1199 - 1205) was possibly the most outstanding and remarkable prince in the history of Galicia. Possessing an extraordinary talent for leadership, sharpened by the best obtainable education, he had secured much political experience as the prince of Novgorod and Volhynia. His most significant achievement was in uniting Galicia and Volhynia. By this act he changed the course of Galician history. Roman perceived that neither Galicia nor Volhynia could survive independently. Therefore, the aggression of outsiders made the union necessary. This new Galician-Volhynian principality soon assumed a leading role among other Ukrainian domains. In this respect Roman reversed the policy of the preceding dynasty. The Rostyslavychi had kept Galicia apart and separated from the other Ukrainian lands, particularly Kiev and Volhynia. Roman, on the other hand, brought Galicia into close union with Volhynia and thus was soon able to control Kiev.

Roman's ideas concerning the boyars differed from those of the previous dynasty. Whereas the Rostyslavychi had favoured the landed nobility, Roman kept the boyars under restraint and depended more on the support of the common people and the city burghers. Roman became very popular in these circles and he was soon idolized in folksongs and folktales. His dealings with the boyars were described in such terms as: "One cannot eat honey unless one suffocates the bees," or: "one cannot enjoy the aroma of the roots if one does not crush them first."

Roman was indeed very successful in the internal administration of his realm. Under his strong hand, peace, unity and order were restored to the troubled land. In these tasks he was assisted by his own loyal Volhynian boyars who were resettled and employed in Galicia in great numbers. Those opposing him were expelled. Among those expelled

was the powerful **Kormylchych**, who in later years was destined to make an impact on Galician history.

Having established security and peace at home, Roman turned his attention to foreign policy in an attempt to restore the power and prestige of his principality abroad. The Kievan prince Ryurik, Roman's father-in-law, disapproved of the union between Galicia and Volhynia, for he knew that this would adversely affect the existing balance of power between Kiev and Galicia. Looking around for potential enemies of Roman in order to weaken his position, Ryurik agitated much hatred among the Ihorevychi, who claimed the Galician throne for themselves and who found some support for their claims from the boyars in Galicia. Roman, who had dealt with the boyars in the abrupt fashion, proceeded to handle Ryurik's intrigues in the same manner. In 1202 with the assistance of the people of Kiev, he went to war against Ryurik and forced him to renounce the Kievan throne. This victory enabled Roman to proclaim himself prince of Kiev. However, Kiev was declining and it soon lost all attraction for him. Roman therefore placed his nephew on the Kievan throne under his suzerainty. Roman was appropriately honoured with titles such as "*Autocrat of all Rus'*" and "*Grand Prince*". He was well on the way to establishing an absolute monarchy.

Roman's successes in Kiev and his far-reaching authority among other princes were not appreciated by Vsevolod, the prince of Suzdal, who himself coveted a position of leadership among the Ukrainian princes. Vsevolod secretly encouraged Ryurik, the dethroned prince of Kiev, to fight for his rights. Ryurik then solicited the help of Polovtsi, of whom he had once been the most bitter enemy and in 1203 he raided and plundered Kiev. Roman again sent his armies to Kiev in order to reestablish tranquility. Forcing Ryurik to take monastic vows, he placed Ryurik's son on the throne. The Polovtsi, who had joined Ryurik in his campaigns, aroused Roman's particular anger and had to pay very dearly. Operating from Kiev, Roman twice advanced into the steppe and resoundingly defeated the Polovtsi. Their power now broken, they no longer represented a threat to the Ukrainian territories.

Roman's courage and bravery, demonstrated in the battles with the Polovtsi, found its poetical expression in a

contemporary folksong: "Roman, following in the footsteps of his grandfather Monomakh, attacked the Polovtsi like a lion; was watcheful like a lynx, destroyed his enemies like a crocodile and swept their lands like an eagle; his courage was equal to that of a bison and he was a terror to the heathen Polovtsi." His victories also made him famous in Byzantium, which was especially interested in the destruction of the power of the Polovtsi who had continually molested the Byzantine Empire and even Constantinople. Roman concluded an alliance with Byzantium, whereby he was given the appropriate title *Hegemon*, (Leader). This alliance was Roman's security measure against the Hungarians, who could hardly be trusted. In general, Roman tried to maintain good relations with his neighbors — Poles, Hungarians and Germans — but there were times when he became involved in internal Polish or Hungarian problems and sided with one or the other of the respective claimants to the thrones. In Hungary, Roman supported the candidacy of Andrew, who eventually won the throne. Andrew showed his gratitude by concluding a pact with Roman which included a clause providing that the survivor would take care of the deceased partner's children. As it turned out, it was Roman's children who were forced to utilize this clause.

Meanwhile in Western Europe the struggle between the Pope and the secular power, had reached its peak. Roman took the side of the Holy Roman Empire under Philip of Hohenstauffen. Pope Innocent IV sent his emissaries to Roman possibly in order to change his decision by offering him the King's crown. However, according to the legend, Roman rejected the offer and preferred "his own sword to the sword of Rome." Roman's friendly relations with the Germans disturbed the Polish king, who was on the side of the Pope. At this time Poland was split into many small principalities, continually struggling for the Polish crown. Roman was involved in this domestic strife and supported his own favorites, hoping to utilize the situation by annexing the province of Lublin and thereby expanding Galicia to the West. Many reasons can be given for the deterioration of Roman's relations with the Poles, and each historian tends to stress a different one. The fact remains, however, that Roman prepared a campaign against Poland and in 1205 he was taken by surprise and killed near Zavikhvost. The newly unified



princedom of Galicia-Volhynia had indeed suffered a great loss. Roman's reigning lasted only five years, but he had accomplished a great deal during this short period.

After Roman's death, his sons **Danied (Danylo)** and **Vasylo** were legitimate successors to the Galician-Volhynian principality. Since they were mere infants, their mother, Anna, acted as the regent. But the boyars were determined to prevent the Romanovychi from remaining in power. The boyar opposition resulted in a period of civil war, known as the "Great Revolt" which lasted for forty years. During this long and devastating period changes occurred swiftly. The Galician throne was held by many different princes holding both legitimate and false claims. This situation was constantly made worse by numerous foreign invasions. There obviously was a need for a strong leader who could restore peace and order in the land. Daniel eventually fulfilled this role after a long and difficult struggle.

In the meantime the boyars tried to take advantage of the chaos. Characteristically, they preferred to promote weak princes in order to control them more easily. The Kievan prince, Ryurik, fresh out of the monastery, was the first to claim his 'right' to the Galician throne. In alliance with other princes, he moved against Galicia, only to be repulsed by the boyars. Roman's widow, Anna, asked the Hungarian king for help. They met at Sianik in 1205, where king Andrew II promised to assist her children, asking for concessions in return such as the title of "King of Galicia and Lodomeria."

Next on the list were the princes of Chernyshiv, the **Olhovychi**, who organized a coalition with the Polish king Leszek. The regent, Anna, faced with this new threat along with the opposition from the Galician boyars under the leadership of Kormylchych, fled from Halych to Volodymyr Volynsky. After her arrival, she met Andrew II for the second time in order to secure his help and protection.

Andrew persuaded Leszek to abandon the alliance with the Olhovychi and instead to support the Romanovychi. Leszek, being neutralized in this fashion, allowed the Galician throne to fall into the hands of **Volodymyr Ihorevych**, son of the famous hero of *Slovo o polku Ihorevi*.

The first act of the new ruler and his brothers was to send emissaries to the boyars of Volhynia, demanding the

release of Anna and her two children. Anna, realizing that some of the Volhynian boyars were in sympathy with Ihorevychi, left the custody of the Polish king, who had so recently been the enemy of her late husband. King Leszek had received her with the children only in order to strengthen his own position in Volhynia, while Daniel was sent to the Hungarian king. The boyars then asked the Hungarians to intervene against the Ihorevychi, who had gained the reputation of being too autocratic. The Hungarians expelled the Ihorevychi, occupied Galicia themselves and introduced an even more oppressive and brutal regime. This event cured the boyars of their pro-Hungarian sympathies, and for the second time they turned around and invited the Ihorevychi to rule. The latter were now determined to reign without any interference from the boyars. The conflict between the boyars and the Ihorevychi ended in 1212 with a massacre during which about five-hundred leading boyars were killed and their estates confiscated.

The surviving boyars again appealed to the Hungarians for help against the Ihorevychi and in retaliation they seized and hanged two of the Ihorevychi brothers. They were now prepared to proclaim Daniel Romanovych as their prince and bring him back from Hungary. Since Daniel was only ten years old, his mother became the regent. This was the **first time** that Daniel nominally occupied his father's throne. This did not satisfy the remaining boyars, however, and they started to plot against Daniel and his mother. The widow and her two sons were forced again to emigrate and seek asylum in Hungary.

Having removed the Romanovychi, the boyars proceeded to put one of their own leaders, **Volodyslav Kormylchych**, on the throne in 1214. This caused a violent reaction among the indignant Ukrainian princes who believed that only one of princely blood should rule in Galicia. Such an innovation was indeed too radical to be acceptable to the rulers of the time.

At this opportune moment, the Poles and the Hungarians decided to act, and partition Galicia. Both kings met at Spish in 1214 and agreed that the five-year-old son of King Andrew, Koloman, should take the throne of Galicia and marry the three-year-old daughter of King Leszek. The result was that the western part of Galicia was to be given to Poland (the Lubachiv District, the country of the *Lemky*)

while the eastern part, with its capital Halych, was to remain under the rule of Hungarians. The Romanovychi, on the other hand, were only granted the territory of Volodymyr Volynsky. The 'young couple' were married in 1215 and crowned by the Pope, who received the promise that Galicia would be converted to Roman Catholicism.

Not surprisingly, the Polish-Hungarian friendship was again short lived. Andrew soon quarrelled with Leszek and attacked and captured Posianie, including the city of Pere-myshl, from the Poles. Leszek was angered and thirsted for revenge. However, he was not strong enough to oust the Hungarians. Soon, as a reaction against Hungarian expansionism and Roman Catholic missionary zeal, a rebellion broke out in Galicia against the Hungarians.

At this point the Poles turned against the Hungarians and sided with **Mstyslav, the Daring**, prince of Novgorod, in the hope that the latter would be able to drive out the Hungarians and become an ally of Poland. Mstyslav gladly accepted the offer of the principality of Galicia in 1219 and easily overthrew the shaky Hungarian occupation. While he was proclaimed prince at Halych, the Poles occupied a part of the Volhynian lands west of the Buh River. Mstyslav legalized his claim to Galicia by marrying his daughter Maria to Daniel in 1219 and he promised to leave the Galician throne to Daniel after his own death. Daniel now settled in Volhynia where he began to unite the separate parts of the principality as well as the lands occupied by the Poles. Once Volhynia was firmly reestablished, he formed an alliance with Lithuania against the Poles. Leszek immediately accused Mstyslav of disloyalty. Poland and Hungary were again united against the Galician-Volhynian principedom.

In a Polish-Hungarian campaign which followed, Mstyslav retreated to the steppes where he organized a new army with the help of the Polovtsi, whose ruler was Mstyslav's father-in-law. Daniel remained in Halych and defended it bravely, but was recalled by Mstyslav. Galicia was again occupied by Polish and Hungarian troops. The Hungarian army was led by Fyle, who gained the reputation of being 'the haughty one.' He believed in an easy victory over Mstyslav and Daniel and arrogantly boasted that "a sharp sword and a gallant steed is enough to defeat the Rus'" and that "lots of pots can be broken by one stone." Fyle soon dis-

covered that he had underestimated the staying power of the Ukrainian princes. In a bloody battle at Halych, which the Hungarians seemed to have won, Mstyslav attacked from the rear in the nick of time and encircled Fyle's forces. The 'haughty' Hungarian lost most of his entire force and was taken prisoner along with the 'royal kindergarteners', Koloman and Salomea, as well as some of the pro-Hungarian boyars.

However, Mstyslav did not take advantage of this victory, but followed a compromise policy. By a treaty in 1222, Mstyslav agreed to the marriage of Andrew's son to one of his daughters and to give her Galicia as a dowry. Undoubtedly, the boyars had convinced Mstyslav to take such a step, claiming: "If you give Galicia to Daniel, you will lose it; but from Andrew you could take it back." In spite of these arrangements, Daniel remained loyal to Mstyslav. Young Andrew received the Peremyshl district in 1226-27 only to be soon engaged in a conflict with Mstyslav. Andrew enlisted help from King Leszek and his father to drive Mstyslav from Halych. Andrew's forces were defeated, but again Mstyslav failed to take advantage of the situation. He withdrew peacefully to Ponsysie, leaving Galicia to Andrew and the pro-Hungarian boyars who opposed Daniel. Soon Mstyslav retired to his beloved Torchesk and became a monk. Having more time for contemplation, he admitted to Daniel that he had wronged him, but comforted him with a promise: "If God will help me, I will yet gather an army and drive the Hungarians out of Galicia." God decided differently. Mstyslav died in 1228 and Daniel was left alone to carry out the task of regaining the Galician throne.

At the time of Mstyslav's death the Hungarians shared the administration of the country with the boyars, whose leader was Sudyslav. The commoners who stood on the side of Daniel notified him of the absence of Sudyslav and asked him to 'come quickly' and recover Halych. In a sudden attack Daniel took Halych and forced both Andrew and the unfriendly boyars to withdraw into Hungary. It appeared that Daniel held Galicia firmly in his hands. This was **the second time** that he had occupied the Galician throne, but could not retain it because of the boyars.

The boyars and the Hungarians could not accept the fact that Daniel had won out in Galicia, and they staged

a revolt. Daniel ordered his brother, Vasylo, to suppress the rebellion and he himself went to see Bela IV, king of Hungary, in order to settle the dispute over Galicia once and for all. However, Bela was afraid of having in Daniel too powerful neighbour and therefore planned to replace him by his son-in-law Rostyslav the son of a Kievan prince.

Immediately, Daniel made an alliance with Bela's enemy, the Austrian Duke, Frederick, a move which frightened the Hungarian king into withdrawing his support from Rostyslav. Daniel, with the help of the commoners, who flocked to him like "bees to the queen", expelled Rostyslav from Galicia and by 1238 became its undisputed ruler. This was **the third time** that Daniel had gained, or regained the throne of Galicia. He united Galicia into Volhynia once again. Daniel then subdued Kiev and placed his own boyar there in charge. Kiev was now dependent on help from Daniel. The great state of Roman was restored. Unfortunately a short time later the Tatars invaded all of Daniel's territories.

The prestige and influence of the reunited state was widely felt. It seemed as if Daniel's dreams were fulfilled. Up to this time he had met only difficulties and fate had not spared him. Often it had looked as if all the powers had joined hands in order to destroy him. But in spite of most unfavourable conditions, Daniel had been determined to continue his father's ambition by becoming the sovereign ruler of the united Rus'-Ukraine. When his father died, he had been too young to grasp the importance of the task. It was his mother, Anna, herself a capable politician, who had helped to shape the ideas and ambitions of the boy in order to make him a worthy successor of his father. After almost forty years of setbacks, Daniel finally achieved his aim. The story is told that when he was a boy playing with his brother Vasylo, he would often say: "This way or that way, Volodymyr Volynsky will be ours."

Daniel's victory, however, was not as yet complete. Rostyslav fled to Hungary where he gathered an army and moved against him. But at Peremyshl he was defeated and returned to Hungary in 1242. Three years later he gathered an even larger army composed of Polish and Hungarian soldiers. Rostyslav expected an easy victory, but Daniel also had time to assemble a strong force. Mendovg, the Lithu-

anian prince and Conrad of Mozovia (Poland) had assured him of their assistance. However, it came too late.

The climax was the decisive battle at Yaroslav in 1245. Vasytko's armies defeated the Polish forces and made them retreat in panic. Daniel and his son Lev (Leon) attacked the Hungarian positions held by the same 'haughty' general Fyle, who again underestimated the bravery of the Ukrainian forces maintaining that "Ruthenians are quick to attack, but they cannot prolong it, as they lack endurance." The 'Ruthenian' victory, however, was complete and for the next hundred years neither Poles or Hungarians would venture to intervene in Galicia. The Hungarians concluded a friendly alliance with Daniel and Poland itself soon became a victim of domestic strife caused by the rivalry between two houses for the Krakow throne. Daniel was able to intervene on the side of the weaker house and to control the Polish domestic situation. This gave him the chance to appear in Poland more often and to annex Lublin in 1240 — year in which the Tatars invaded Galicia. This unexpected event completely altered the recent political developments.

## CHAPTER IV

### The Tatars and Daniel's External Policy.

At the time when Daniel was conducting the later stages of his prolonged struggle for the possession of the Galician throne, a new and unexpected danger arose from the **Tatars** (or Tartars) who came from beyond Lake Baikal in Asia. They represented a conglomeration of Mongolic and Turkic tribes and under the leadership of Djengis Khan and his son Ogadai they had built the most extensive empire in history. In 1222 a contingent of Tatars appeared in the Ukraine where they came upon the Polovtsi Khanate. The latter appealed to the Ukrainians for help, arguing that: "Today the Tatars have seized our lands and tomorrow they will take yours." Mstyslav, heading a union of all Ukrainian princes, honored request of his father-in-law. Daniel also joined this union. Soon, the united Ukrainian-Polovtsi armies faced the main forces of the Tatars along the Kalka River. On May 31, 1223, after a fierce battle, the Ukrainians and the Polovtsi suffered a disastrous defeat. The wounded Daniel, however, managed to escape capture and returned to Volhynia. Mstyslav was also save. However, the loss of a battle for the first time, shook his self-confidence. This hampered him in his dealings with the Hungarians at home. Pursuing the defeated Ukrainian and Polovtsi armies, the Tatars advanced as far west as the Dniro, devastating the Pereyaslar and Kievan principalities. At this point the Tatars suddenly withdrew into Asia, only to come back again with larger forces.

In 1236 an army of 150,000 Tatars under **Batu** crossed the Urals for the second time. First, they routed the Volga-Bulgarians and following this they moved north along the Volga and conquered one Russian principality after another,

except Novgorod in the north. Rather than advancing further, the Tatars turned south in order to conquer Ukraine and they succeeded in subduing the principalities of Pereiaslav and Chernyhiw. The Kievans now unprotected turned to Daniel for help. To satisfy this request, Daniel sent Commander Dmytro to Kiev. By this move the long lasting decline of Kiev was, for short while, arrested and Daniel was able to extend the frontier of the Galician-Volhynian state beyond the Dnipro. His suzerainty now embraced all of the then Ukrainian territory.

The fall of Kiev opened the way to the west. Passing through this territory, the Tatars destroyed all the cities and, moving quickly through Volhynia and Galicia, captured and destroyed Volodymyr Volynsky and Halych. After splitting up, one group crossed the Carpathian mountains and entered Hungary, while the other group continued its march into Poland and the German lands, only to be checked by German, Polish and Czech knights at Liegnitz in 1241. After the battle of Liegnitz a number of events, such as the death of the Khan and the resulting demise of the Tatar Empire, led to the establishment of the Golden Hordes with its capital at the lower Volga in **Sarai** under the leadership of Batu.

A new period in the history of the Ukrainian, as well as of Russian people, known as the "Yoke of the Tatars" had begun. All local princes were made vassals of Batu and needed his permission (*yarlyk*) to be recognized as sub-rulers. For this reason they had to appear personally at Batu's court, pay tribute and perform the most humiliating obeissances.

The Tatar's domination was felt differently in the various parts of the conquered lands. In Galicia, the remotest part of the Tatar's domain, there was little concern about the foreign suzerainty and life continued its normal course. However, this did not exclude the continuous political surveillance in Galicia by the Tatars, who definitely appeared oppressive to Daniel. Nevertheless, Daniel was able to defeat Rostyslav and the Hungarians in this period and to expand his principdom at the expense of Poland by occupying the Lublin region.

In 1245, just as Daniel had reached the height of his power, he received the humiliating demand from Batu to surrender Halych, or to recognize Khan's supremacy. It was



difficult for him to reconcile himself to the possible loss of this city for which he had fought for forty years. Concluding that he must either visit Batu or perhaps lose Volhynia as well, he decided to go to Batu. Arriving in Sarai, Daniel was surprisingly well received. Khan agreed to leave Galicia in peace and not to send there his own tax-collector (*baskaks*) or other administrative officials. The Tatars always tended to show respect to courageous warriors, and Daniel was known to them from the time of the battle at Kalka in 1223. Although Daniel regarded his visit as an act of humiliation, it resulted in his greatest political victory. He received the *yarlyk* to rule not only over the principality of Galicia-Volhynia, but also over the entire Ukraine. Batu's friendly reception of Daniel greatly increased the latter's prestige among other Ukrainian princes as well as in Poland and Hungary.

On his return from Sarai, Daniel was determined to organize a crusade against the Tatars in order to shake off the "Tatar-Yoke". As a result, the later part of his mature life was devoted to the organization of anti-Tatar campaign. Although Daniel had been well on the way to expand and enrich his domains under the suzerainty of the Tatars, nevertheless, he made a pro-Western decision. For this decision he was criticized by historians like Vernadsky, who states: "He joined West and lost; whereas Russia turned East and won." However, it must be said that Daniel had sufficient reasons to turn against the Tatars. In the past, the Ukraine had suffered from Asiatic hordes and its inhabitants could not entertain much further hope of good treatment at their hands. Furthermore Ukraine had, before the choice became acute, gravitated culturally, socially and politically towards the West, while the East had meant only trouble and hardship.

In order to organize an anti-Tatar crusade, Daniel had to gain support from neighbouring as well as more distant countries and at the same time mask his attitude towards Tatars in his dealings with them. By playing this double game, he assumed a role as a protector of central and western Europe. In the face of a common enemy, relations between Hungary and Galicia improved. The so-called "Austrian Affair", which will be discussed below, caused Bela to change his attitude toward Daniel. After Rostyslav's defeat, Bela even betrothed his daughter Constantia to Daniel's son

Lev\* and Daniel reciprocated by releasing all Hungarian prisoners taken in the battle near Yaroslav in 1245.

It was Bela who was instrumental in establishing a contact between Daniel and the Pope in 1247-48. Due to the Pope's powerful political position during the Middle Ages, Daniel (in order to receive help from the West) had to work through Rome. The Pope had been well aware of the new Asian threat ever since the Kievan Metropolitan Peter Ake-rovich, deposed by the Tatars, had gone to the Lyon Synod in 1245 in order to meet the Pope. A year later the Pope himself sent a delegation under John Plano de Carpini through Ukraine to Batu. Carpini visited Daniel's brother Vasylo on the way in order to discuss the possibilities of a church union in return for military support. Carpini also met Daniel himself who had just returned from Batu. In the course of the negotiations Daniel recognized that his aims were different from those of the Pope. Since Galicia was Orthodox, Innocent IV was mainly interested in establishing church union by placing the Dominican Order in Galicia thereby hoping to convert the population to Catholicism. Daniel, on the other hand, was more concerned with the liberation of his principality from Tatar domination.

It was also under the influence of the Pope and the Hungarian king Bela that Daniel became involved in the "Austrian Affair," which had begun when the Austrian throne had become vacant in 1245. The only legitimate heiress was Gertrude, the daughter of the last Austrian archduke Frederick. However, there was also his sister Margaret, who was married to the Czech king, Otokar. Daniel, in an understanding with the Hungarian king and the Poles, married his son Roman to Gertrude in 1252 and planned a future union

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\* In Middle Ages a practise was widely applied to strengthen any political alliance with other foreign countries by the inter-marrital ties. Daniel also made a use of the prevailing custom and thus married his son Lev to Constantia, daughter of the Hungarian King, Bela. His second son, Roman was married to Gertrude, daughter of the Austrian prince Frederick, and later to the relative of Mendovg, the Grand-Prince of Lithuania. His third son, Shvarno was married to the daughter of the same Lithuanian prince. Daniel himself, having become widower, was also married second time to the relative of Mendovg.; He also married his relative, Anastasia, to the Polish king, Boleslav. In this manner Daniel followed the example of another Kievan Prince, Yaroslav the Wise, who through the "political marriages" was related to the kings of France, England, Norway, Sweden, Poland and to the Greek Emperor.

between Austria and Galicia wherein the dominance of Ukraine would have been established in Central Europe. Since Daniel's plan did not materialize, it was Austria which established its predominance. Over five hundred years later. Austria annexed Galicia in 1772.

Daniel's plan failed because Bela, rightly fearful of the potential power of Galicia, did not support Roman, son of Daniel, sufficiently against the Czech usurper. Daniel had gone to the aid of his son through Silesia, but he was unable to arrive at the right time to furnish effective assistance. Roman and his wife were forced to give up their claim to the Austrian throne in 1253.

Simultaneously with Daniel's power struggles, Mendovg had united the Lituanian tribes and established a powerful new state along the Baltic Sea. As long as Mendovg was in the process of achieving this end, he placed great value on Daniel's friendship which had been cemented by Daniel's marriage to Mendovg's niece. A change occurred in the late 1240's when Daniel became apprehensive about the possible danger to his state from such a strong neighbour in the north. Consequently he tried to check this by organizing a coalition of Poles, Teutonic Knights and some Lithuanian tribesmen. This coalition attacked Lithuania and Daniel succeeded in occupying a portion of land called Black Rus'. During this campaign in 1253, Daniel was crowned king of Galicia in the small border town of Dorohichyn. This honour was bestowed upon him by the papal legate Opiso as an outcome of the improved relations between the Pope and Daniel established during the "Austrian Affair." By the elevation of his principality to a kingdom in 1254, Daniel had attained the peak of his success.

Although Mendovg succeeded in breaking up Daniel's coalition, he preferred to make peace with him, giving Roman a part of the Black Rus' as a fief. Another of Daniel's son, Shvarno, married Mendovg's daughter. Mendovg had now become a firm ally of the anti-Tatar coalition. If this alliance had lasted longer than it did, it might have strengthened the Ukrainian position.

Besides his careful external maneuvering, Daniel did not neglect to prepare his country against a possible renewal of the Tatar invasions. With great zeal he built new cities — Lviv (named after his son Lev), a future capital of Galicia,

Kholm and others — designated as centres of defence, an undertaking which annoyed the Tatars in view of their well known fear of fortified places. The Tatars successes were largely due to their tactic of sudden and unexpected attacks which threw their enemies into a panic. Fortifications served to combat this method most effectively because it required a long time to reduce them.

For some time after Daniel's visit to Sarai, the Tatars did not directly interfere in Galician affairs, but they kept watch of Daniel's foreign activities. However, they began to work against Daniel's political influence by using the '*Tatar people*' against him thereby inaugurated a double-faced policy of their own. These people were a mixture of Ukrainians and Chorny Klobuki (a Turkic tribe) who lived in a densely populated area in the basin formed by the Slush, Horyn and Buh rivers, east of Volhynia. They were secretly encouraged by the Tatars to repudiate the authority of Daniel and instead to accept orders directly from the Tatars. Such actions of the '*Tatar people*' caused much demoralization in other parts of the country. Seizing the opportunity at a time when the Tatars were involved in an Asiatic campaign, Daniel marched against these people and compelled them to acknowledge his suzerainty.

By this action Daniel provoked the Golden Horde which then came to the aid of the '*Tatar people*'. Under the command of Kuremsa the Tatars dispatched their forces against Daniel, raided the borderlands of Volhynia in 1253 and crossed into Galicia the year after. But Kuremsa was defeated repeatedly and was summoned back to the Horde. Burunday, a more capable commander, replaced him and adopted the cunning policy of not attacking Daniel directly. Instead he discredited Daniel in the face of his allies thereby undermining the Galician anti-Tatar coalition. (Tatars were known for having developed the spying system to perfection. Their spies now informed the Khan of Galician plans). Burunday announced an invasion against Poland and Lithuania and called on Daniel to join him as his vassal. This summon was a formal demand of homage. "If you are my allies", Burunday told Daniel and Vasylko, "then come and welcome me. He who does not come is my enemy." Thus Daniel was forced to join the campaign against Lithuania and a year later another against Poland. On this occasion Burunday noticed

the strong fortifications in Galicia, became enraged and ordered them destroyed at once. Consequently, Luck, Danyliv, Lviv and Volodymyr were torn down and only Kholm escaped this fate.

The Tatars new tactics of making Daniel feel frustrated achieved the desired results. Daniel came to realize that the West was not interested in his crusade against the Tatars. The West was not immediately threatened by he hordes of Asiatic Tatars and had not recovered from the failure of the last crusade. All the allies that Daniel was able to organize were mainly the Slavic peoples: Poles, Czechs, Moravians, Serbians, and Pomeranians. Daniel became discouraged and finally lost hope. The coalition never fully materialized, and Daniel's dreams of defeating the Tatars were never fulfilled. He died, a sadly disappointed man, in 1264. Yet, in spite of these shortcomings, he remained in Ukrainian history and folklore a most outstanding prince who had made the Galician-Volhynian kingdom a leading power in East-Central Europe. In his efforts he was supported ably by his brother Vasylo and a steadfast harmony prevailed between them.

Daniel was succeeded in Galicia by his son **Lev (Leon, 1264-1301)**, while Vasylo, Daniel's brother, governed in Volhynia. This arrangement did not amount to a break in the union of the two countries. Lew was an energetic and ambitious man. Practically all of his life he was involved in the Polish domestic troubles and used them to his advantage. He even claimed the Polish throne for himself and undertook campaigns (1280 and 1289) against that country, penetrating as far as the walls of Krakow. He succeeded in re-annexing the Lublin region \* (1290 - 1302) and thereby expanded the western boundary of his state to the Vistula. He also interfered in Lithuanian internal affairs and, by placing his brother Shvarno on that throne, accomplished the first union of the two countries. He maintained good relations with Hungary by helping the king to suppress the rebellion of the nobles. As a reward, he gained a part of Carpatho-Ukraine, and stretched the southern border to the Tysa River. In his campaigns against Poland, Lithuania,

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\* It will be remembered that Daniel occupied Lublin in 1240, but returned it to Poland in order to gain the latter's participation in his anti-Tatars crusade.

and the Hungarian rebels, he had to avoid any direct conflict with the Tatars and rather leaned on their assistance. He also maintained peaceful relations with the Teutonic Knights. Towards the end of his life he came to an understanding with Poland and married his son Yuriy to the sister of the Polish king Wladyslav Lokietek. Poland at that time was frequently exposed to Tatar raids, and Lokietek welcomed any help he could secure from Lev and later from Yuriy.

Lev was followed by his son **Yuriy (George, 1301 - 1315)**, who had gained experience as an administrator and ruler in Kholm. He was a colorful personality. When he was crowned king, he began to sign his name in Latin: "Georgius Rex Rusiae". In contrast to his father, he maintained peace with his neighbors. One result of this peaceful stance was the loss of Lublin to Poland in 1302.

Yuriy left two sons, **Andrew and Lev II**, who in perfect harmony continued to reign over the state. Their hostile outlook toward the Tatars resulted in more active fighting, and thereby protected the West from Tatars' raidings more effectively. For this service they received the acclaim of the Polish king Lokietek, who, in a letter to the Pope in 1323 wrote: "The two last princes of the Ruthenians, a schismatic people, can be considered to have erected an unconquerable shield against the cruel Tatar people." Conducting an anti-Tatar policy, the two brothers had to retain friendly relations with the Teutonic Order as well as the Poles. The above letter has been accepted as the source for defining the date of the princes' death since it mentioned that "they had departed from this world". With them the male line of the Romanovychi dynasty ended. Only **Maria**, the sister of the two princes, remained. She was married to the Polish prince Troyden of Mazovia. Her son Boleslav was the closest heir to the Galician throne. The boyars, who had started again to lift up their voices, favored him, hoping that they might gain the same privileges from Boleslav that the nobles (shliakhta) enjoyed in Poland. Boleslav accepted the invitation from the boyars, embraced the Orthodox faith, and changed his name to **Yuriy II (Yuriy-Boleslav Troydenovych, 1323 - 1340)**. The Poles also supported the candidacy of Boleslav, for they expected that he would promote the interests of Poland in his rule over Galicia-Volhynia and would

gradually bring it under the control of the Polish dynasties. After Boleslav became the prince, both parties were disappointed. To the boyars he made clear that he wanted to rule "by God's grace", using the king's stamp of Yuriy II, and not "by the grace of the boyars". He did not permit any interference from the boyars in civil or foreign affairs, and at home he began to lean strongly on the burghers. He was the first ruler to introduce in Galicia the western system of city administration, the so-called "Magdeburg Law". Sianik was the first Ukrainian city which received this privilege. He also permitted the settlement of many foreigners (Germans and Czechs) in the cities and allowed them to control trade. The country began to prosper.

At the same time, the Poles became displeased with him. Although Yuriy was of the Polish Piast line, he did not conduct his foreign policy with the advantage of the Poles in mind. On the contrary, he maintained friendly relations with the enemies of that country, such as the Teutonic Order and the Lithuanian prince, Gedymin, whose daughter he married. He assisted Tatar raids against Poland and intended to recapture Lublin and annex it to Galicia. In protest against such a policy, the Polish kings enlisted the help of Hungary against Boleslav and stirred up agitation among the displeased boyars by insinuating that Yuriy II intended to abolish the Orthodox church and to introduce Roman Catholicism, that he was changing the laws of the country, and that he favoured foreign colonists. \* The boyars secretly organized a plot and poisoned him on April 7, 1340 in VolodymyrVolynsky. There is little doubt, that the Polish king, Casimir, had his hand in this conspiracy and assassination. Casimir was determined to annex Galicia as a compensation for his losses in the West. By claiming hereditary rights to the Galician-Volhynian throne and making a direct attack upon the country, Casimir attained his goal and ushered in the new period in the history of Galicia, the period of the Polish occupation.

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\* After the first invasion of Galicia by Tatars in 1240, the main cities were destroyed, the land devastated and the bulk of the population either killed or led away as prisoners to Asia. Daniel upon his return from the hiding place in Mazovia (castle Vyshehrad) in order to restore the trade, started to rebuild the ruined cities as well as to build new ones and to colonize them with the people from Armenia, Greece, Poland and Germany. He also invited the Jews who at that time were persecuted in all other countries. The king Lev pursued also the policy of colonizing Galicia by the Jews on a great scale.

## **PART II**

### **Galicia under Polish Occupation**

**(1349 - 1772)**





## CHAPTER I

### The Forty Years' War in Galicia.

The average educated person knows about the Hundred Years' War and the Thirty Years' War, but little has been written about the Polish-Galician War which lasted from 1340 to 1380. This is due partly to the attitude of the Polish government between the First and Second World Wars, for it discouraged any objective investigation of the period concerned. However, in spite of such official timidity, the war represents nevertheless an important landmark in the history of Eastern Europe.

Following the death of Yuriy Boleslav, Galicia went for the second time in its history through a turbulent period of war for forty years, brought about by the Polish king Casimir the Great (1333 - 1370). Poland had lost much of its territory (Pomerania and Silesia) to the West and Casimir laid claims to Galicia, as a relative of Boleslav Troydenovych, a move designed to make up the territorial losses. The Polish king was supported by his nobles and city burghers, who also coveted the possession of the Galician lands. Both Casimir and the Hungarian king, Carl Robert, had to come to some terms on this question. They met in Vyshehrad in 1339 and concluded a secret treaty, according to which (1) the Polish crown should go to Ludvig, Carl Robert's son, if Casimir should die without leaving an heir. and (2) if a son and heir should be born to Casimir, the Hungarians could buy Galicia from Poland for 100,000 florines. The Poles paid a high price — their own crown — for Hungarian military aid against Galicia and other Ukrainian provinces. It is worthwhile to remember that while these preparations were being made, Boleslav Troydenovych was the undisputed ruler of Galicia. A few months later he was fatally poisoned.


Soon after, the Galician boyars approached the Lithuanian prince, **Liubart-Dmytro**, son of Lithuanian prince Gedymin and offered him the throne, but Casimir had already

overrun Galicia. Swiftly moving on Lviv the new capital of Galicia, the Polish king carried away the state treasury and took away the regal insignias, the Golden Throne, crown, sceptre and the coronation robes of the Galician kings. By this action Casimir believed that the election of a new Galician ruler would be made impossible. This initial raid opened the Forty Years' War, involving Poland and Hungary on one side against Galicia, Volhynia and Lithuania on the other. The Pope, being informed that Casimir's action was for the protection of the Catholics, gave him his full blessing for the campaign.

Although taken by surprise, the Ukrainians in Galicia under the leadership of the boyars Dmytro Detko and Daniel of Ostroh offered considerable resistance and forced Casimir to retreat. Dmytro Detko became the actual ruler of Galicia and he turned for help to the Tatars, the nominal protectors of Galicia. With their help he was able to repay Casimir in kind. Taken aback by this show of strength, Casimir at once negotiated with Detko and promised to respect Galicia's separateness, religion, and the customs of the people, as well as to confirm Detko's position as the *de facto* ruler of Galicia. Casimir was humiliated. Detko exercised his rights undisturbed, and invited the foreign merchants to renew their trade with Galician cities.

Immediately after the above agreement, which was confirmed by a solemn oath, Casimir asked the Pope to absolve him from the moral obligation of the oath and to send him Western military aid, claiming that he would use it against the Tatars. Although the Pope willingly freed Casimir from his obligations, military aid was not forthcoming. War broke out again in 1345, the year in which Dmytro Detko died. In spite of his overwhelming military strength, Casimir did not break the resistance of the Galicians and Volhynians and was unable to make any territorial gains in Galicia. He occupied only the Sianik area west of the Sian River. The Liubart came to the rescue of the Ukrainian boyars and stopped any further advance of Casimir. Peace was at once concluded since Casimir needed time to gain the neutrality of the Tatars.

When Liubart suffered a defeat at the hands of the Teutonic Order in 1348, Casimir considered this to be an opportune moment and again attacked in Galicia. The Pope allowed him to use church tithes for military purposes. With



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this financial help Casimir amassed a great army, joined the Hungarians, and invaded Galicia and Volhynia in 1349. Since Liubart was unprepared to meet this onslaught, he lost Belz, Lviv, Volodymyr Volynsky and Berestia. In the next year, however, Liubart regained the latter three cities but failed to oust the invaders from Galicia. The result was that Volhynia remained under Liubart, while Galicia was lost to Poland. However, Liubart and his Ukrainian armies from Volhynia refused to accept this as a permanent loss and tried repeatedly to regain these lands.

In the meantime, Casimir grew bolder and made preparations to gain Volhynia as well. He re-confirmed the Vyshehrad agreement with the new Hungarian king, Ludvig, in 1350 and received the desired aid against Liubart. Large Polish-Hungarian forces moved against Volhynia in 1351. During this campaign Casimir became ill. The Hungarians continued the fight alone. However, soon Ludvig began to dread facing the Ukrainian defences and concluded a peace with the Lithuanian princes Liubart and Keistut, whose forces recaptured Brest, Kholm, Belz and Volodymyr. The latter, however, agreed to become the allies of the Polish and Hungarian kings in the struggle against the Tatars and the Teutonic Order and to accept Roman Catholicism. As soon as the treaty was signed, both princes ignored it and attempted to rid themselves of the Polish-Hungarian occupation. The Ukrainians were equally determined in resisting the invaders. Great heroism was displayed during the defence of the besieged city of Belz under the command of the boyar Drozd. Here, the Hungarian army was repulsed with large losses. On this occasion, Ludvig almost lost his life in the city moat.

Aside from the Ukrainian soldiers fighting under the banner of Liubart, the Volhynian and Galician peasants suffered most from these frequent invasions when they took up arms in order to support the regulars. Ludvig himself was overtaken by such a motley group, when he had taken refuge overnight. However, he narrowly escaped, missing death for the second time at the hands of the Ukrainians. After this harrowing experience, the Hungarian king lost all enthusiasm for further battles with the Ukrainians and decided to come to an agreement with Liubart. The conclusion reached was that Volhynia would remain under Liubart; Galicia under Poland; and some smaller border towns in-between under the local princes. The Galician-Volhynian kingdom was once again divided. By this agreement Liubart secured time to win over the Tatars and even the Teutonic Order to his side. With their help he tried twice to reconquer Lviv and Halych from Casimir in 1353 and 1354 and ravaged Poland on her own territory as far as the walls of Zavikhvost. In 1366 Casimir, with a renewed blessing of Pope — invaded Volhynia, captured Volodymir Volynsky and kept it for few years, regained by Liubart again in 1370.

During these repeated raids, Galicia lost many of its previous possessions. Podolie and Ponişie fell to the Tatars; Moldavia and Wallachia became separate principalities under Tatar suzerainty. The Galician population decreased because of the continuous wars, the land was devastated, and trade and agriculture were ruined. Many people perished in the wars or were captured by the Tatars, who always led away a mass of captives to be sold as slaves. The Galician people longed for peace, but resigned themselves to the new system.

The legal status of Galicia was not yet settled. Casimir had died (1370) without an heir and thus, according to the Vyshehrad agreement, was succeeded by Ludvig of Hungary, who had only two daughters, Maria and Jadwiga. Without a male heir, it was necessary for him to change the order of succession in Poland, keeping in mind his Galician plans. In order to secure the Polish throne for one of his daughters, he had to court the favor of the Polish nobles. He proceeded to do this by extending their privileges, although he was dubious of the utility of such methods. As a safeguard, he decided at least to retain Galicia in case the Polish nobility should refuse to acknowledge one of his daughters as their queen. Moving carefully so as not to antagonize the nobles, he made Galicia semi-independent. Needing a loyal, well-qualified man to administer this country, he chose **Volodyslav Opolsky**, of the Piast line, an outstanding diplomat and administrator. Opolsky had rendered good service to Ludvig before the latter was elected as the Polish king, and he was now (1372) appointed as the permanent administrator and governor of "Regni Russiae", the kingdom of Rus'.

In Galicia Opolsky left no doubt that he interpreted his position to be that of a permanent and independent ruler. Calling himself "dominus et heres", he clothed himself with the self-imposed "divine right". He also introduced his own special coat of arms which combined the Piast eagle and the standing lion, the Galician emblem. He minted his own money with his own image on one side and that of Ludvig on the other. All documents were made official by his colorful regal seal. These acts symbolized the growing independence of Galicia from Poland by enhancing the prestige of an old princely Galicia.

Ludvig did not interfere with these measures since he wanted to gain favor with the Ukrainians in case he decided

to annex Galicia directly to Hungary. He openly attempted to de-Polonize Galicia in order to demonstrate that Galicia was not as inseparable from Poland as the Polish kings wanted it to be. During Opolsky's short reign (till 1378) Galicia appeared, outwardly at least, to rise once more to the height of political influence, culture and prosperity. However, in reality it did not regain its former independence. Opolsky surrounded himself with Germans, Poles, Wallachians and Hungarians and ignored the local population in appointing his officers. Of 120 privileges granted, only fifteen were given to Ukrainian boyars. In his religious policy he favored Roman Catholicism, and the Catholic bishoprics of Halych, Peremyshl, Volodymyr and Kholm were established at that time.

Ludvig succeeded in his diplomatic game. The Polish nobles accepted Jadwiga, Ludvig's younger daughter, as their queen. After his mission was fulfilled, Opolsky was recalled from Galicia in 1378 to become governor of Poland and to prepare the way for Jadwiga to take the throne. The Galician independence, promoted by Opolsky, came to an end, since Poland and Hungary were now united under the same dynasty. Galicia, on the other hand, remained part of Hungary and was ruled by lower officials, starostas and voyevodas from Hungary.

The newly created situation was not satisfactory and the Lithuanian prince attempted for the last time to recapture Galicia in 1377. A new war broke out between Liubart and Ludvig for the possession of this coveted land. Ludvig organized a large Polish-Hungarian army and moved against Liubart, whose position in Lithuania was threatened as well by a new invasion of the Teutonic Order. This forced Liubart to conclude a peace treaty with Ludvig. Belz and Kholm, after withstanding a siege for seven weeks, surrendered to Ludvig and were united with Galicia along with other Volhynian border towns: Kremianets, Olesko, Peremyl, Horodlo and Lopatyn. After Ludvig's death in 1382, these cities were regained by Liubart and united with Volhynia. The succeeding Lithuanian princes captured a great portion of the Ukrainian territories from the Tatars, whose power was on the decline. The newly conquered Ukrainian lands, including Kiev, were united with Lithuania, and thus created a powerful central state, the Lithuanian-Ukrainian Commonwealth.

After the death of Ludvig, Hungary suffered domestic disorder caused by a *coup d'etat*. The Poles elected Jadwiga as their queen and convinced her of the utility of the annexation of Galicia. The Hungarians could not resist the Polish plans. Although Opolsky reappeared in Galicia, he did not venture to take up arms. As Jadwiga proceeded with her armies into Galicia and encountered resistance from the Halych population, Opolsky then suggested that the Galician boyars should appeal to Western arbiters to decide the future fate of their country. Meanwhile Jadwiga occupied the whole of Galicia in 1387, promising many privileges and rights to the Ukrainian boyars and people, a gesture which was to become rather familiar in the future.

With this action of Jadwiga, Galicia reached its end as an independent principality and state. From this time on it was to remain under Polish domination for four centuries until 1772 when it fell under the domination of the Austrian Habsburgs who, in turn, remained in power until the end of World War I.



## CHAPTER II

### **The Polish Rule in Galicia**

In 1349 Galicia began the period of the Polish 'captivity', which was to last until 1772. It is not the intention of the author to give a detailed account of the events of that period, but to present a brief sketch of the conditions existing under the Polish suzerainty.

Viewed as a whole, the period was noted for colonization and extensive Polonization in an ethnographic and economic sense, intensified at times by a more or less systematic uprooting of the Ukrainians by the occupying power. In general, Poland persevered in a policy designed to erase any traces of Galicia's particular Ukrainian background and to transform this country into what was later designed to be the 'historically inseparable Polish country', when Galicia had been renamed "Voievodship of Rus'". Casimir the Great defined the Polish political plans for Galicia early by stating: "I have got Rus' with the help of my own people, and the road to it belongs to no other but my own people."

Galicia became a colony where the Polish nobility and clergy settled and ruled. On top of the Polish immigration, thousands of German artisans and Jewish merchants were brought in. These new elements received far reaching privileges and were instructed to impose their ideas and customs upon the native people in order to assimilate them as quickly as possible. After Casimir's death the colonization was even more intensified. Huge estates and practically all important provincial centres were given to the great Polish magnates: Ryashiv to Jan Pakoslaw, Yaroslav to Tarnovski, Sambir to Szpytko, Podilia to Buczatski. These great nobles were accompanied by many of the lower Polish gentry, who, by legal or illegal means — such as raids, robbery and even murder — seized the most fertile and rich lands in Galicia. Indeed, Galicia with its black soil appeared to them like a "promised land, and land flowing with milk and honey". Once settled

there, they established their own Polish laws and customs, which were somewhat opposed to the old Ukrainian tradition which was based on the rather enlightened Kievan practice with its guaranteed equality and greater privileges for all segments of society, including all peasants. The Polish laws, on the other hand, acknowledged only the rights of the gentry and clergy. Seen in this light, one may conclude that drastic changes were taking place in Galicia.

In order to understand better the predicament of the occupied territories, a general characterization of the Polish gentry is necessary.

It is characteristic of the evaluation of this class, that Polish historians have described the nobles as a destructive element within their own country, a class which was eventually responsible for the breakup of Poland in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Polish gentry (*szlachta*) practically represented a special privileged class which had always enjoyed an exceptional place in society. They felt little responsibility for either the peasants below or the king above. After the Jagiello-Line died out, the monarchy had been elective. This system enabled the gentry to elect constantly weak kings, mostly foreigners like French, Saxon or Swedish princes, people who were unfamiliar with Polish affairs. As a result these kings were usually dependent upon the good will of the electors, who knew well how to increase their privileges in return for support. With significant exceptions like Batory and Sobieski, the Polish kings often cut sorry figures by being mere puppet rulers in the hands of the more influential landowners and magnates. The nobles also exercised a great deal of political power through their small local diets (*sejmiki*), while the central Diet (*Sejm*) was also under the control of this class. The decision had been introduced that the resolutions of the Sejm were binding only if passed unanimously. This meant that any single member could dissolve the Diet by the famous '*liberum veto*'. The result of those privileges was often corruption and excessive provincialism. The '*liberum veto*' was mostly used and abused by delegates in order to reserve larger bribes. At the time of King Wladyslaw IV, the crown treasurer Leszczyński was nominated as vice-chancellor, but his nomination was not approved by the Diet because one delegate used his '*liberum veto*'. Leszczyński, holding the list of all bribed delegates

in his hand, shouted: "To whom did I not give anything?" During the reign of August III (1733-63), not one Diet escaped the fate of being dissolved by this veto. The nobles congratulated themselves on their 'golden freedom' (*swawola*) which they exercised with much excess, often interpreting it as a freedom to violate law and authority.

The Polish historian, W. Lozinski, described this practice in his book *Prawem i lewem* (By Law and Lawlessness) in the following fashion: "Murder and killings were committed openly and secretly everywhere: in the homes, on the roads, in the market places, in the diets, at meetings or banquets, and even in the courts. Murder was performed on the slightest pretext and the murderers went unpunished". Indeed, disregard of law and justice became an integral part of Polish society at the time. Such a system could only result in anarchy. The popular expression: "Poland exists by disorder (*Polska nierządem stoi*) represents another way of describing a system which has been aptly called "a legal anarchy tempered by rebellion."

The Polish nobility was reared in the belief that it was there to rule, to enjoy its 'golden liberty' and to exist in luxury. Their exquisite living, similar to that of the oriental despots, has been described by Starowolski: "Huge sums of money were spent for imported wines, sweets and meats, while no money was granted for the defence of the fatherland. One person consumed goods costing more than many persons could earn. Nobody lived on his own work and everybody desired the possessions of his neighbour..."

This Polish gentry came to Galicia as conquerors and their will was the only acknowledged law. In the first place they acquired huge estates which soon grew into vast independent domains. As an example of the eventual physical extent of such an estate, we may cite the possessions of Andrew Potocki, who owned the whole districts of Pidhaytsi, Husiatyn, Kaminets Podilski, Stanyslaviv, Zbarash, Smolensk, Krystynopil, Sokal, Tysmenytsia, Yezupil, Sniatyn and Sokoliv; which had been granted to his family by decrees of the Diet in 1598, 1607 and 1609. Eastern Ukraine came under Polish domination two centuries after Galicia by virtue of the Lublin Union of 1569. Since the Ukrainian lands were depopulated as a result of the repeated Tatar and Turkish

raids, they were easily absorbed by the Polish magnates. Nobles such as Koniecpolski, Lanckoronski, Zolkiewski and others established huge estates on which they lived like kings, ruling as they pleased. They were nicknamed '*królewiczą*' (small kings) and their domains were in fact "states within a state". By acquiring Lithuania and Eastern Ukraine in this way, Poland became almost twice as large as France without, however, enjoying the advantages of strong central government.

The magnates were entitled to maintain private armies, nominally for protection against the Tatars. But instead, they used such forces in raids against each other as well as against the Ukrainian boyars, churches and even the peasants, while at the same time indulging in atrocities as an expression of their *swawola*. The worst example was Stanislaw Stadnicki, called the 'devil of Lancut', whose raids were frequent and usually climaxed by the cutting off of hands, the gouging of eyes, the flaying of bodies as well as the burning of serfs. Another such 'devil' was Samuel Laszcz, who in 1660 raided the village of Lysianka where he burned the church filled with refugees. For his crimes he was outlawed 236 times and proclaimed infamous thirty-seven times. Such a frequency of 'convictions' tends to demonstrate the ineffectuality of justice. The peasants paid the heaviest toll during such raids. Their lot was described by one Ukrainian peasant: "If one lord becomes involved in a fight with another lord, the peasant must lend his skin to it."

The new order also affected the Ukrainian boyars, churches and monasteries. One could mention the example of the church estate of Perehynsko. The Galician Metropoly had received this estate legally and owned it for almost 150 years. By 1637 the Polish king suddenly granted it to the Polish nobleman Stanislaw Jablonowski who immediately gathered an armed force and raided the seat of the administrator who, in turn, was able to resist and repel the invaders. Jablonowski's reaction was to organize a larger army and to attack again. After a vicious struggle, including the use of artillery, the defenders were killed and their bodies left unburied.

In some instances murder and violence were used in order to confiscate land. During one incident a group of boyars were invited to a meeting in Peremyshl, a centre of

boyar opposition, where all were murdered and their lands seized. Frequently people who were unable to produce documents of rightful ownership were declared *possessores nullo jure* (owners without title) and their land was taken over by Poles. However, not only the boyars and the Orthodox churches lost their lands; the peasants and the cloisters suffered the same fate. In 1444 the Roman Catholic archbishop of Lviv confiscated peasant land in Stavchany near that town. The Jesuit college of Polock was endowed with seventy-two villages which had been taken from the St. Basilius cloisters and the surrounding orthodox churches. The story of the land confiscations is told in some detail in the books of W. Lozinski and Alexander Jablonowski. The result was that by the early part of the 16th century more than 440 square kilometers of boyar land or church land had been confiscated.

Indeed, it was the boyar class which represented the greatest threat to Polish rule in Galicia. From the very beginning of the Polish occupation, the Polish efforts were especially directed against these Ukrainian nobles, who were declared to be the most dangerous anti-Polish element. The boyars had the best means and resources to oppose the Polish rule and it was not an easy task for the Poles to suppress them since they also strongly adhered to their faith, church, culture and tradition. With an admirable display of self-confidence they often regarded themselves as the representatives and defenders of the Ukrainian spirit. Many of them were killed in war, defending Galicia against the Polish invasion and many were forced to leave the country. The simplest goal of the occupants was to exterminate most of them and to Polonize the rest. Extreme political and social pressure on the one hand, and empty promises on the other were used to achieve the Polonization of the boyars. In the first place they were deprived of all their former electoral and civil privileges. They were branded as inferior, ridiculed and looked down upon. Because of their Orthodox faith they were everywhere insulted and were called "schismatics" which was interpreted to mean: heathen. They also felt vexed and humiliated by the limiting of the privileges and strove for centuries to regain some of their old rights. Some Polish kings proved willing to make concessions. But they were effectively checked by their own gentry. Discouraged by this long and futile struggle, oppression and terror, some

boyars renounced their faith as the only way out and accepted the Polish way of life. Some preferred to leave their country and emigrated to Volhynia or Moldavia; others joined the Zaporozhian Kozaks, the free Ukrainian levies, and others like Trubetsky, Olshansky, Bielsky, Olelkovych, Odoyevsky, Vorotynsky and Peremysky, went to Moscovia.

The process of Polonizing the Ukrainian boyars was most effectively carried out by the Jesuit colleges. The Jesuits were brought to Poland in the 16th century to save it from Protestantism. With money from the Polish kings and rich magnates they built the most effective schools in the country and concentrated their efforts on the reeducation of the younger generation of the rich magnates. Such schools were opened in almost all the larger cities of Galicia and the Ukraine: in Yaroslav, Peremyshl, Lviv, Berestia, Luck, Ostroh, Kaminets, Bar, Vynnytsia and Kiev. The children of the so-called 'schismatic' Ukrainian boyars were welcomed to those schools. These young people were encouraged to embrace Roman Catholicism. The result was that these students, at first secretly and later openly, renounced their fathers' faith and became estranged from their parents and people. This led to the paradoxical situation in which fathers supported and defended the Orthodox church, while sons became enemies of it as was the case in families like those of Konstantyn Ostrozhsky, Khodkevych, and Vyshnevetsky.

Another tool of Polonization was intermarriage. Again the Jesuits assisted in this process by seeking rich sons and daughters of boyars and marrying them to Polish partners. During such ceremonies a change from the Orthodox to the Roman Catholic faith was considered a precondition. The process of forced or semi-imposed Polonization was accelerated in the middle of the 15th century and by the end of the next century the majority of the Ukrainian boyars were no longer available to make their contribution to a Ukrainian national development. Only a group of the impoverished and lower Ukrainian gentry remained and eventually made common cause with the peasantry when the cultural and political Ukrainian revival commenced in the 17th century.

Hand in hand with the Polonization of the Ukrainian nobility went the attack against the Orthodox church, the chief sponsor of Ukrainian culture through its system of education and literature. During the princely period, the

church enjoyed a privileged and independent position. It was richly supported by the princes, boyars and merchants. It had accumulated great wealth, which was generally used for the promotion of education.

The situation changed under Polish rule and the Orthodox church also became a victim of oppression and persecution. Already the letters of Casimir the Great to the Pope begging him of money and Western army against Galicia \* indicate that the king was not a friend of the Orthodox church. Casimir's successes made him more desirous to eliminate the Orthodox church. Initially, Roman Catholic archbishops and bishops with judicial rights over the Orthodox churches were set up in the larger centres and church buildings were forcibly taken over and given to Catholics. The church of the Ascension in Lviv was taken in Casimir's time, and the large cathedral in Peremyshl in Jagiello's reign. The tombs of Galician princes and church dignitaries buried there were opened and destroyed. Many Orthodox cloisters were converted to cattle barns or taverns.

The policy pursued by the Roman Catholic clergy, the kings and the gentry aimed to undermine the Orthodox church and clergy by economic ruin. Priests were forced to abandon scholarly and literary pursuits to struggle for their daily bread. They were also obliged to send tithes to the Roman Catholic bishop from their small incomes. By such methods the Roman Catholics assisted in the degradation of the Orthodox clergy. This treatment went hand in hand with a system of organized ridicule. Orthodox church buildings were called 'synagogues', the faith itself called schismatic and orthodox priests were referred to as 'pop' (pip).

Another useful method employed to weaken the Orthodox church was the custom that the king nominated the bishops. In practice, this amounted to open simony. Whoever paid the most, received the offices. Men who had neither formal education nor the moral character were consecrated bishops without theological training or experience in lower clerical offices. Instead of being interested in churchly matters and the Christian way of life, they enjoyed the wealth

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\* "Contra Liffanos, Tartaros et alias infidels as schimaticos" (against Lithuanians, Tatars and other infidels as well as schismatics) "schismatics" referred to Ukrainians of orthodox faith, who were considered alike Tatars or other unbelievers.

which provided them with luxurious living. Candidates were often nominated before a see had become vacant, and the nomination was followed by an argument regarding who had a 'right' to the bishopric. The dispute was often settled by fighting. As S. Kaczala points out in his extensive study, nominations were usually made of men who had displayed superloyalty to the Polish state in military or other services, even though they were ignorant of the meaning of the word 'bishopric' itself.

The lower *szlachta* adopted the patronage of the monasteries and appointed abbots and priests. Such a patron could close a church without a reason or perhaps appoint anyone as a custodian for a small fee. The result was that Poles, Jesuits and Jews were equally disliked by the Orthodox Ukrainians.

Every pretext was used to persecute the Orthodox people. During the Christmas celebrations in 1582, after the Roman Catholic bishop issued an order to introduce the new Gregorian calendar, a group of Ukrainians were holding their Christmas service according to the Julian calendar. Suddenly they were raided and driven from the church, their priests dragged from the altars and the building closed for a long period of time.

At the end of the 16th century, the Jesuits organized their most significant attack against the Orthodox church. They had the full support of the Polish kings and magnates when they proclaimed that the political power and strength of Poland depended on religious unity. The Jesuits were encouraged by king Sigismund II (1587-1632) to enforce this unity of faith. Among the talented orators was the Polish Jesuit Piotr Skarga, who tirelessly preached on the weakness and corrupt morals of the Orthodox church. He blamed the Greeks, rather than the Poles, for the deplorable condition of the Ukrainian churches, claiming: "The cunning Greeks deceived you, brother Ruthenians, when they gave you the holy faith without giving you the benefit of the Greek language, letting you be satisfied with the inferior Slavic language and preventing your true understanding and learning. Only two languages, Greek and Latin, are accepted by the world for promoting the holy faith. Knowing only Slavic language, nobody could become learned and now nobody understands this language". Skarga's objective was



plain — to remove the Slavic language from the Ukrainian churches, for this language was the most important barrier to Polonization. Success in the absorption of the remaining Ukrainians depended upon church union because it was realized by the Poles that Galicia would never be totally converted to Roman Catholicism unless the Jesuits found some Ukrainian bishops agreeable to church union — especially those who had received their nominations from the king, people like Gedeon Balaban, bishop of Lviv; Michael Kopistensky, bishop of Peremyshl; Hipathius Potij, bishop of Volodymyr; Cyril Terletsky, bishop of Lutsk. Some of the church dignitaries proposing union acted purely for idealistic-religious reasons, like the Metropolitan of Kiev, Michael Rohoza. However, most of them acted for personal or socio-political advantages, such as exemption from taxes, free seats in the Polish senate, qualification for state offices, and legal equalization of the Orthodox with the Roman Catholic churches.

Balaban and Kopistensky soon renounced the plan of union, but others, spurred by the Polish king, gentry and the Jesuits, continued energetically to support the idea. The plan was finally brought to the church council at Berestje and officially proclaimed in 1596.

After the proclamation of this union, the Polish government officially recognized only the Uniate Church. The Orthodox church was banned by law and its buildings were turned over to the Unionists. Orthodox priests were barred from performing any clerical duties, the remaining church lands confiscated, schools and printing shops closed. Consequently, disorder and illiteracy spread. Finally, the persecuted people turned for help to the Zaporozhian Kozaks. A chain of Ukrainian revolts supported by the Kozaks in defence of the Orthodox faith followed.

Meletij Smotrytsky in 1612 wrote his famous "*Lament*" of the Orthodox church and the damages done to it by union and Polonization: "O Bishops, . . . are you not satisfied with the losses I have sustained through your carelessness, such losses of gold, silver, pearls and other precious stones? Where is the priceless ruby which shone like a light in other precious stones? Where is that sun among the stars? Where is the princely house of Ostroh which shone with the light of devotion to the old Faith? Where are the other precious

stones, the glorious houses of Ukrainian princes, the priceless diamonds and sapphires? Where are the children of the princes of Slutsk, of Zaslav, of Zbarash, of Vishnevets, Sangushko, Chartorysky, Pronsky, Masalsky, Lukomsky, Ruzhinsky and countless others impossible to enumerate? Where are my other jewels? I mean the old Ukrainian noble houses." Many Polish heroes of later times bore the names of these famous old Ukrainian families.

Although the Uniate church was officially recognized as the national church of the Ukrainians, it fared no better in the 17th and 18th centuries than the Orthodox church had up to the time of the union. Indeed, the hopes of some Uniate bishops were not realized. The Polish king Jan Casimir wrote a letter in 1652 outlining the lamentable situation of the Ukrainian churches and priests, who were reduced to serfdom, performing robot services and prevented from fulfilling their priestly duties. He reaffirmed these statements in a second letter in 1659. A law in 1669 forbade the forcing of priests into serfdom, but it was not enforced because the Uniate church received no favors from the Roman Catholic church or the central government. It must be stated, however, that the failure of the union was not only due to the hesitant and disinterested attitude of the Catholics, but also due to the endemic separatist feeling of the Ukrainian ex-Orthodox members.

As far as the Galician towns and cities were concerned, they fared little better under Polish rule. Ever since the days of the princely independent period, the towns had been accustomed to relative freedom, unrestricted trade, the right to own and cultivate land, and many privileges of self-government which was carried on at general assemblies (*Veches*) with the help of their own elected elders. There had been no restrictions on importing and exporting goods and merchant caravans going abroad were usually protected by military units. The merchants had willingly supported their schools, churches and the arts and they, on the whole, were public-minded and loyal citizens. City life under Polish occupation underwent a complete change. At once the Poles endeavored to remake them into Polish strongholds. Casimir's words: "The road to them belongs to no other than my own people", underline such intentions. Polonization proceeded in the quickest way when Ukrainian burghers were forbidden to

export or import, and all connections with the East or West were cut off.

Inter-city trade was discouraged by numerous hindrances such as the reduction of profits by high taxes. On the road from Turka to Yavoriv, a mere 100 miles, there were no less than 174 toll stations where merchants had to pay a tax of two to six groshen on each animal. The Ukrainian merchants were forcibly replaced by Poles, but when these later proved to be less successful, the Polish kings imported Armenians; German and Jewish merchants and settled them in all Galician cities. Since the German elements predominated, the Magdeburg Law was introduced in city administration, but orthodox Ukrainians were excluded since only Roman Catholics were entitled to take part. The damage done to the import and export trade by the untrained Polish landowners gradually caused the economic and cultural downfall of the cities and eventually of their own state.

The Ukrainian burghers were excluded from professional and social organizations in the cities, they were removed to the outskirts and could not build new churches in the 'central' areas. Furthermore, Ukrainian funeral processions could not pass through the city or use any gate except the one used to take out refuse, a restriction which did not apply to Armenians and Tatars. Ukrainian burghers were no longer allowed to buy or cultivate land and the first '*pogrom*' of Ukrainians and Jews occurred in Lviv in 1496, a pogrom which was organized by the Polish nobleman Szczyrcny in order to ruin the non-Polish urban population. In addition whenever Lviv was besieged by the Kozaks or Swedes, the Ukrainian inhabitants had to furnish the largest percentage of ransom money. In 1704, the Ukrainians, though poorer and fewer in number, had to pay 10,000 Polish gulden as a tribute to the Swedes, while the Poles, by now richer and in the majority, paid only 2,000 gulden. A similar incident had occurred in 1648 during Khmelnytsky's siege of Lviv. Fines were also imposed, such as a fine of up to 100 gulden for not participating in a Roman Catholic church service or procession.

Among those who suffered the most under Polish occupation were the peasants. During the Middle Ages, Poland was the 'peasant hell'. Since according to the Polish system and law there was not a single free landowning peasant, all

the land belonged to the kings, gentry and the church. A Polish peasant could only rent land for which he had to pay in labor service. Therefore, serfdom in Poland was established as early as the 12th century, when the peasants were required to work ten days a year for their lords; in the 15th century 220 days, and in the following centuries this number was increased and included Sundays and holy days.

In princely Galicia the system had been quite different. Under the old Ukrainian law, the peasants had been divided into three groups: the free peasants (*smerydy*) who owned and cultivated their land; the half-free (*zakupy*) who were economically dependent upon the boyars; and the slaves who were mainly prisoners of war. All were under the personal protection of the prince against abuses. Politically they were entitled to elect their own elders at their *veche* (general assembly of the villages).

The situation changed as soon as the Poles introduced their system in Galicia. Now the Ukrainian peasants lost not only their land, but their measure of independence as well. In 1454 the peasants were placed under the jurisdiction of the landlords, who were empowered with the right of life and death. Their decision was generally final. After 1505 the peasants were bound to the land under the penalty of death and could not move from one landowner to another to improve their conditions. W. Lozinski, in his previously quoted book, stated that "the only code which governed the life of the peasants was the heart and conscience of the landowner, and only the egoism and interest of the lord dictated to him to keep alive the human working implement." Even Skarga, who is hardly known for his pro-Ukrainian sentiment, wrote: "On the whole globe one could not find another realm where the peasants suffer worse than in Poland, . . . the landowner kills anyone at any time without hearing a word of rebuke."

The plight of the serfs varied from one district to another, depending upon the type of agriculture. In the wheat districts (Rohatyn) the serfdom was harshest. During the 16th and 17th centuries, Galician grain had a good market in the war-ravaged West and in general increased production demanded increased efforts by the serfs.

This problem was only compounded by the stationing

of hired troops among the villagers. Most of the time the treasury of the nobles was empty, and these mercenaries had not been paid their due. As a result they would tend to "squeeze and beat out" their reward from the villagers. In 1614 Colonel Toporowski occupied Kolomyia, set up his headquarters, and gave permission to rob the surrounding villages until they had collected their pay. Such raids included barbarous mistreatment of the peasants who were forced to walk barefoot on glowing cinders or to witness the rape of their women. The contemporary Polish Hetman Koniecpolski remarked that "Polish soldiers suck the blood of the Ukrainian people."

Another problem was posed by a system of leasing land to administrative officials, called *arrendars*. Since these officials held short-term leases, they desired to make their profit quickly. They increased the number of serfs' working days and compelled them to fulfil daily norms. If the harvest did not produce enough money, they plundered the villagers of their last possessions and left them to starve. A village looted by an *arrendar* often looked worse than one invaded by the Tatars, a phenomenon which still occurred as well.

The misery and lack of lawful protection of the Galician peasants did not escape the attention of the occasional guests and visitors to the Polish government. Many of them wrote their impressions in their diaries. The Nuncio Honorat Visconti wrote in 1636: "In no other place in the world would one find such poor people." A French engineer, Beauplan, remarked that the Polish gentry lived as if 'in paradise' and the peasants 'in purgatory'. A much stronger expression was used by the Italian Pacichelli, who called Poland a 'hell of peasants'.

W. Lozinski affirms that "... the patience of the Ukrainian people was inexhaustible and deserved a reward of a palm crown". Nevertheless, this type of patience and suffering reached its limits and found its expression in repeated attempts to revolt and to defend their naked existence.

## CHAPTER III

### The Ukrainian Reaction

The period of the Polish occupation was not only full of suffering but also of uprisings and of determined struggles of the Ukrainians against the occupants. As a few examples will show, the Ukrainian people did not accept the Polish subjugation willingly. On the contrary, they sought ways and means to shake it off. Although their efforts were usually in vain, one marvels at the ability of these people to survive as a separate national unit, despite the most adverse circumstances.

We have seen, how during the Forty Years' War, the Ukrainians in Galicia and Volhynia, with the assistance of the Lithuanians, resisted Polish-Hungarian encroachment. Such men as Dmytro Detko, Khodko, Drozd, Yurii Lysy, Michael Elisarovych, Oleksa Moldarovych, Boris Krakula, Datsko of Peremyshl, and Daniel of Ostroh distinguished themselves as fearless leaders by defending their own country. After the Polish occupation of Galicia became a fact, and the Polish gentry started its rule by "law and lawlessness", as W. Lozinski has observed, it must be stated that the independent spirit of the Ukrainians remained too strong to accept willingly the imposed system and ideas.

As soon as the rights and existence of the Ukrainian peasants, the lower boyars and the burghers were threatened, they began to escape to Moldavia. Here they organized themselves into an army of 9,000 men, elected Mukha as their leader, a previous refugee from Galicia and an ex-soldier of the Turkish army, and in 1490 they proceeded to move against the Poles in Galicia. Having crossed the Dnister River, they advanced as far as Rohatyn ravaging the estates of the Polish nobles, as they went. Only with great difficulties and losses did the Polish gentry succeed in stopping the advance of Mukha and in pushing him back behind Dnister. Mukha, however, soon reorganized his army with new refugees from

Galicia, and continued to harass the Polish rulers with his swift moving units.

Another leader, Andrew Borula, stirred up a general uprising in Galicia, during which he proclaimed himself to be the legal heir and ruler of the country. His goal was to separate Galicia from Poland and to place it under the protectorate of the Turkish Sultan, as an autonomous province. Repeated raids of Galician refugees from Moldavia resulted in the Polish-Moldavian war, during which the Moldavian voyevoda (ruler) Stephan, defeated the Polish king Jan Olbracht in the Bukovina Woods in 1494, and advanced as far as Lviv, before he was finally stopped and forced to retreat. His son, Bohdan, continued to attack the Poles in Galicia. It should be stressed that both those Moldavians enjoyed the support of the Ukrainian peasants as well as the poorer boyars whose resistance to the Polish system of ruling never lessened.

The Poles, however, redoubled their efforts to "denationalize" the Ukrainian magnates, the rich and influential boyars in the hope that the rest of the population, deprived of its spiritual leadership, would eventually stop resisting. Indeed, after the majority of the Ukrainian magnates joined the Polish camp, the future of the Ukrainians in Galicia was seriously threatened. However, at the same time, the Ukrainian boyars of lower social standing took the leadership in the struggle for their independence.

In this struggle for survival, the Ukrainian burghers played a significant part. Concentrating mainly on resistance in the cultural field, the Lviv burghers in particular distinguished themselves as leading defenders of Ukrainian culture and an independent education. They formed the so-called "Brotherhood" organizations throughout the country, the origin of which goes as far back as 1439. In its early stage, the Brotherhood took care of church repairs and the support of the poor. This originally semi-religious and semi-charitable organization developed into a centre of the spiritual, cultural and national revival of the whole Ukraine near the end of the 16th century. Sometimes it had to act as a semi-independent "guild" of Ukrainian artisans since the Ukrainian townsmen were forbidden to join the local town-guilds. Above all, the religious freedom and the prestige of their Orthodox Church became a matter of honor and national

duty to defend it. The Brotherhood organizations, spread throughout the country, applying strict measures against members, who betrayed their people, religion or tradition. In order to avoid the uncertain Polish justice, they administered their own courts of justice with their own judges. By 1539 the Lviv Brotherhood succeeded in achieving the reinstatement of the Orthodox bishopric in Lviv by bribing the Polish king with hundreds of steers.

The Brotherhood reached its peak of activity in the years from 1570-1590, shortly after the Lublin Union of 1569 by which all Ukrainian lands, which up to now had been united with Lithuania, came under Polish suzerainty. From the calamity that befell East Ukraine, Volhynia, Podlasie and Podilie, some good resulted, for it removed all artificial boundaries and united all the Ukrainian people. For Galicia it worked like a "shot in the arm". There followed a free exchange of ideas and culture among all Ukrainians. So far the Ukrainians under Lithuanian sovereignty had enjoyed their old rights and privileges as well as their cultural and religious freedom. The Ukrainian language was the official language of the Lithuanian princely court. The Ukrainian magnates, still preserved there as a Ukrainian-minded unit, exercised great political and cultural influence. They continued their position as pillars of the Ukrainian cultural traditions and of the Orthodox Church. On their rich estates they established good schools and printing centres. Thus, Hrihory Khodkevych, with the help of Ivan Fedorovych, a Russian escapee, established the first printing press in Zabludiv 1568. Next, Prince Hrihory of Slutsk erected a well-known Ukrainian school in 1560, supplemented a few years later by a printing press. Prince Michael Vyshnevetsky of Ovruch should be mentioned in this context as a great supporter and lover of Ukrainian literature and art. Yet the most generous patron of all was Prince Constantine Ostrozhsy, best known as the founder of the Ostroh-Academy in 1580, which became a seat of higher education, containing the best Ukrainian and Greek scholars. It was the most competitive Academy in the country. His printing plant likewise gained fame in the whole Ukraine and beyond, especially after the printing of the first Slavonic Bible, the so-called "Ostroh Bible" in 1580, used later by other Slavic Orthodox people. This cultural revival is known in the



history of Ukraine as the Ukrainian Renaissance, an event which contributed much to the development of the Ukrainian mind and identity.

The Lviv Brotherhood of the Assumption Church followed the example of the above Ukrainian magnates by whom it was morally and materially supported in many undertakings. It busied itself with the establishing of schools and printing plants. The leaders of the Brotherhood discovered that the secret of the Jesuits' successful attacks upon the Orthodox Church lay in their better educational system, preaching and writings. To counteract Jesuit influence, the Brotherhood decided to adopt similar methods in order to fight the opponents with his own weapons and stop the loss of Ukrainian youth to Jesuit schools.

Consequently, in 1574 the Lviv Brotherhood established a printing and publishing houses and hired Ukrainian and foreign scholars to publish a series of religious books and pamphlets. The Lviv printing office became the centre of publishing not only for Ukraine, but also for White Ruthenia, Muscovy, Moldavia, and even for the Southern Orthodox Slavs. In 1586, the Brotherhood founded a Gymnasium (Secondary School) which was equal to the outstanding Jesuit schools, employed the best teachers, and emphasized the study of Greek, Latin and rhetoric. This undertaking proved to be very successful.

In the same year, the Assumption Brotherhood received the honorary title of "Stavropighia" from the Constantinople Patriarch. This privilege exempted the Brotherhood from the authority of the local bishop and entitled it to supervise the conduct of the clergy and bishops. These privileges show the influence of Western Protestantism on the Brotherhood in Galicia. The local bishop objected to the independence of the Brotherhood in church affairs, and finally this arrangement and other conditions made the local Orthodox bishops to look for a union with the Roman Catholics.

The Lviv Brotherhood was instrumental in establishing similar organizations in almost all the Galician cities. The Brotherhood movement spread all over Ukraine, and Kiev became the second centre of this influential organization. Its membership multiplied quickly, especially after the Kozaks were allowed to join.

At the beginning of the 16th century still another centre

of militant resistance against the Polish occupation grew up. This was the so-called "Zaporozhian Kozaks" a military unit, consisting of independent and freedom loving men. Originally the Kozaks were half-farmers and half-soldiers, living for a short season in the Ukrainian steppes between the Dnipro and Don rivers. Seasonal farming in the steppe was a dangerous undertaking because of the frequent and unexpected raids by Tatars. In the winter time they used to return home with the fruits of their hazardous labor, constantly on the alert against Tatar raids. On the way home, they were often robbed of their earnings by the Polish landowners, a practice which forced them to search for a permanent settlement. About the year 1530, they selected a suitable site on the Dnipro river, beyond the rapids from which they derived their name, "Zaporozhian Kozaks".

Under the leadership of Ostap Dashkevych and in particular of Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky, a popular Hetman, nicknamed "Bajda", they became a well organized and disciplined military community, living according to Spartan-like rules, especially during military campaigns. The Zaporozhian Kozaks were like an order of Brotherhood, obeying only their own authorities, whom they had freely elected. They considered each man equal to the other, and accepted no class distinctions. From their headquarters, they engaged in daring expeditions against the Tatars and Turks to free their captive brothers on Turkish galleys. Their fame for bravery and their freedom-loving spirit spread quickly and caused the more adventurous peasants, gentry and students to flock to their ranks. There never was a problem of recruiting, since it was an honor to become a Kozak. The popular songs pictured a Kozak as an idealistic man, willing to sacrifice his life for his country and his religion. The Kozak ranks swelled even more after the Lublin Union (1569) which created a wave of Polish colonization to East Ukraine. The local peasants preferred freedom to the oppressive conditions under the Poles.

Time after time, the Kozaks came to the rescue of the Ukrainian people in their struggle against Polish rule. It must be stated, however, that originally these anti-Polish campaigns were waged for purely social reasons. But under the leadership of Hetman Peter Konashevych-Sahaydachny, religious and national motives were added. It was he who

injected a national ideology into the Kozak ranks and directed their energies to the defense of the Orthodox Church and the whole of the Ukrainian people. By this he proved to be an outstanding politician and statesman, in addition to his natural ability as a military leader. A great number of folksongs were dedicated to him, in which he always appeared as the popular, but humble, hero.

Sahaydachny was born in the village of Kulchytsi in Galicia, near Sambir. This is interesting, since it indicates that many other Galician refugees must have been among the Zaporozhian Kozaks, if their Hetman himself was from that part of Ukraine. And yet, Kiev and not Lviv became again a national, religious and cultural centre of the Ukraine, where naturally many Galician scholars made the most outstanding contributions to the development of the Ukrainian Kiev Academy, the print shop as well as the Brotherhood. During his lifetime the equalizing of conditions in West and East Ukraine made visible progress for the better.

As a military leader and a capable diplomat, he obtained for his Kozaks an important place in the Polish state, and thus prepared them to become the nucleus of an independent Ukrainian state.

His political aim was to maintain, by all means, friendly relations with the Polish king, though these relations were often strained by the Polish magnates. Through his friendly policy towards Poland, he practically saved Poland from total destruction by the Turks and Tatars in the battle at Chocim (Khotyn) in 1621. The biographer of king Wladyslaw IV, wrote of Sahaydachny as follows: "On Sahaydachny rested the whole burden of the battle. It was he, who conducted the battle strategy, and his suggestions and plans were followed by hetmans, crown princes and his Majesty the King himself..." The attacks of the 300,000 Turks were directed principally against the Kozaks, whose defeat was the main Turkish aim. Yet they withstood bravely the onslaught and "defended themselves most valiantly." Sahaydachny helped the Polish king in his campaigns against Moscow, during the so-called "Time of Troubles".

Surprisingly, in spite of their loyalty and sacrifices, the Kozaks were not fully appreciated by Polish magnates, who repeatedly insisted on cutting down their number, as well as forbidding them to wage campaigns against the Turks.

The Sejm resolutions in the first half of the 17th century were restrictions which provoked a strong reaction and instigated revolts against Poland, especially when the Poles proceeded to take the residue of so-called "registered" Kozaks above the quota and place them as serfs on the estates of Polish magnates.

The Ukrainians, including the Kozaks, suffered much humiliation and oppression from the Poles. The Polish historian, W. Lozinski, affirms that "the patience of Ukrainian people was inexhaustible and deserved a reward of a palm crown." But this patience reached its limits, when the revolution under the leadership of the famous Kozak Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, broke out in 1648. All Ukrainians, including Galicians, believed that the end of their misery and suffering had come. The news of Khmelnytsky's revolution was received with great enthusiasm by all the Ukrainians, and Khmelnytsky won easy victories, at Zhovti Vody, Korsun, and Pilavtsi. His armies advanced swiftly through Volhynia and Galicia, and were on the march toward Warsaw, granting the local population the same freedom as enjoyed by his Kozak troops. Volhynia came under the jurisdiction of the famous Kozak Colonel Kryvonis (of Scottish decent!) about whom the people sang: "Oh, do not wonder, good people, at what happened in Ukraine. There at Dashava a great mass of Liakhy (Poles) perished." In Podilie again another leader, Morosenko, gained fame and his name has also been preserved in folksongs such as: "Oj, Morose, Morosenko, thou the most famous Kozak..."

The Galician Ukrainians responded no less enthusiastically than the other Ukrainians to Khmelnytsky's invitation to join his troops. Terebovlia, the old capital of Galicia, was the first city to be liberated and to adopt the Kozak political system. Other cities soon followed; Strusiv, Hlyniany Zabolotiv, Sniatyn, Tovmach, Rohatyn, Kalush, Dolyna, Yaniv, and those as far west as Yavoriv, Drohobych, and Sambir. All of them freed themselves from the Polish magnates, Jesuits and Catholic clergy, and drove them out of the country. The city burghers also lent a willing hand in organizing peasant armies. Among the peasants, the remnants of the lower boyar class took the leadership over the armies.

The revolutionary peasant movement started in Pokutie, where Hnat Vysochan of Victorivka gathered an army of

15,000 men, and began to operate in the districts of Kalush, Dolyna and Rohatyn, with his headquarters in Otnia. From this area he made frequent raids upon the castles of landowners in the neighboring villages of Roshnativ, Zabolotiv, Perekhynsko, Bolshivtsi, and Bukhachivtsi. Men like Les Zhurakivsky, Holynsky, Uhernytsky, Berezovsky, Knihyntytsky, Drahomiretsky, Yavnivsky, Hrabovetsky, Tatomyr, Vytvytsky and Rohutsky distinguished themselves as capable organizers and leaders of the peasants revolutionary groups. The population participated in the revolution so fully, that even the Orthodox clergy joined the peasants armies as officers. Rev. Fr. Korytko, the priest of Hrabivka, became a colonel: Fr. Babinsky, priest of Pidhaytsi, was a captain, Fr. Uhrynivsky of Kalush was another captain; and many other priests from Piyla, Dolyna, Zhukovo, Strusiv and Ozeryany, served in their levies as common soldiers. Within a few weeks Galicia was cleared of all Polish landowners, their arrendars, Jesuits and other Roman Catholic clergy. All fled, without resisting, to the strongly fortified Lviv or even farther west into Poland, from where they had originally come.

In the meantime Khmelnytsky, with the main army, moved against Lviv, from which the Polish armies, under the leadership of Hetman Jeremia Wisniowiecki, well known for his cruelty, quickly retreated. Khmelnytsky agreed to spare the Galician capital and abandoned the siege in lieu of a ransom. He then marched through Zamość, on his way to Warsaw.

A description of Khmelnytsky's third appearance before the walls of Lviv has been preserved by the Polish historian, Francis Janowski, in his brochure: "Defense of Lviv, 1655," published 1905: "The columns moved one after another behind the hills of the 'High Castle' until the spectators watching from the city were amazed to see their leader — riding on a white horse — appear quite near them. Something threatening and terrible emanated from him with unusual power. He rode on under the white 'baldachim'. Maroon flags floated over him, and through the clouds of smoke he looked thoughtful, purposeful, frightening, and powerful like a Zaporozhian Kozak Hetman, a demi god of the masses, a ruler of millions."

"'Look! Look!' one whispered to another, 'Khmelnytsky!'"

"Mothers held up their babes to see him. Awe-struck, the people beheld him, and for a long time the sight haunted

them — the unforgettable picture of the man whose march was marked by a pool of blood and a cloud of smoke.”

The Khmelytsky of 1648 was an even more impressive man than he had been in 1655. One could easily imagine how much more he was admired, feared, and respected by the Ukrainians whom he was emancipating, as well as by the Poles, his enemies in Lviv, during his first appearance at Lviv. He had become in reality a ruler of millions — both Poles and Ukrainians.

Unfortunately, Khmelnytsky left Galicia without ample protection against the return of the Polish szlachta. This time the Poles took even more fiendish revenge upon the unfortunate Ukrainians who did not escape to the Kozak territories. An indescribable terror prevailed under the returning Polish Hetman Jeremia Wisniowiecki, who according to his promise — “You must feel that you die” — invented the cruelest punishments, such as impaling people on poles or tearing them apart by horses. Whole villages were razed and Galicia was almost depopulated by the onslaught of wanton soldiers.

Khmelnytsky returned to Galicia in 1649 and again in 1655, but he was met with only ominous forceful silence. Only the inhabitants of Pidhirie supported Khmelnytsky's second and third expeditions to Galicia and after Khmelnytsky had left, they did not disband but continued their partisan war against the landlords, often conquering whole cities and collecting tributes from them. In 1665, and again in 1683, their leader Drosdenko operated in the Dnister region.

These partisan groups were the beginning of a social-national movement in the Carpathian districts. The members of one group, the **Opryshki**, were very active at the beginning of the 18th century. They took advantage of the Polish-Swedish War and grew powerful among the large number of volunteers, and escapees from the landlords' estates. In the years 1703 to 1712 their leaders are Ivan Pysklyvy, Pynta and Ivan Panchyshyn. This Opryshki movement was similar to the Haydamaki which flourished in East Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnipro.

In 1734, during the early operations of the Haydamaki, Captain Verlan transferred his force into Galicia, where they were whole-heartedly supported by the local peasants and burghers. As the number of his army increased, he occupied

Brody and Zhvanets and marched on toward Lviv. Panic again seized the Polish szlachta and they fled their estates, leaving them easy prey to the Haydamaki. But here the Russians intervened, and in cooperation with the Polish forces disarmed them and punished them by death or exile in Siberia. Verlan himself escaped to Moldavia.

In 1750 to 1765 a new revolution broke out under the leadership of Zalizniak and Gonta, During these years they made the lives of the Polish szlachta and Jesuits most uncomfortable and uncertain.


The Opryshki movement in Galicia was revived by **Oleksa Dovbush**, who became a Ukrainian "Robin Hood", and achieved an almost legendary reputation. He was the ideal type of mountain man ("*legin*") and his help to down-trodden peasants and harassed city dwellers became widely known. He protected the poor peasants against the abuses and mistreatment of their landlords. A favorite scheme of his was to send a message of warning to the landlord who had a notorious reputation as an oppressor of the serfs. If this warning was ignored, Dovbush in disguise with a group of his faithful followers would visit the landlord at night and punish him in the presence of his mistreated peasants. Furthermore, these peasants themselves were granted the privilege of executing Dovbush's punishment. His clever activities had a great effect in alleviating the treatment of the peasants and in lifting their morale. The hero Dovbush was treacherously killed, but his work was continued by his followers, Vasyl Paliyiv, Ivan Boychuk, and Vasyl Bayurak up to the time of the Austrian conquest.

Meanwhile the disintegration of Poland became more and more evident. Yet, the Poles believed that they could save their country, by increasing their efforts to destroy the Galicians. By 1713 they engaged in a "project of the complete extermination of the Ukrainian population in Galicia."

There were voices of warning raised by the Ukrainians as well as by some of more realistic Poles that the destruction of Ukraine and Galicia would inevitably end in the destruction of Poland, but their voice was one of "crying in the wilderness." The voice of "*liberum veto*" was stronger and choked all endeavors toward reforms and concessions to the Ukrainians. "Poland fell . . . and destroyed us," said the Ukrainian poet Shevchenko. Yet Poland did not learn a lesson from

her mistakes; on the contrary, the Poles repeated them under Austrian occupation. Moreover, they continued their policy of the extermination of the Ukrainians in their own "reborn" Poland in the short period between the two World Wars (1918-1939).

In spite of living in such conditions, in spite of the continuous oppression, by the Poles in spite of their limited





means for religion, education or selfexpression, the Ukrainians of Galicia survived these dark years. One wonders how they could have survived as a people and as a nation. Historians grasp for facts to explain this phenomenon. There are several; their love for their language, the inspiration of their songs, and their deep attachment to a common tradition. All of these factors served to bind them together and make them feel different from their surrounding neighbors. This cultural unity not only sustained the Ukrainian people during these dark years but as we shall see re-asserted itself at other times of danger in subsequent periods of history.

## PART III

### Galicia under the Habsburgs

(1772 - 1918)



## CHAPTER I

### **The First Austrian Reforms in Galicia**

Taking advantage of the internal weakness of Poland, Prussia, Russia, and Austria developed the plan of the first partition of Poland in 1772.

Austria claimed Galicia on the basis of the vindication of the rights of the Hungarian crown. The Hungarian kings had retained the title of "rex Galiciae et Lodomeriae", since the 13th century and this alone was sufficient for Austria to justify her claim to Galicia. Besides Ukrainian populated Galicia, Austria also annexed the Zips and the principality of Krakow, and united this predominantly Polish section with the historical Galicia, and so created an artificial administrative unity, called: "the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria with the Great Principality of Krakow, Auschwitz and Zator", the whole forming an area of 1500 square miles and containing a mixed Polish-Ukrainian population of approximately three million. This decision proved to be a great handicap to the Ukrainians, who for the rest of the Austrian occupation never ceased trying to undo this arrangement, and they constantly demanded the partition of this territory into Ukrainian and Polish parts. The situation became even more complicated, five years later (1777) when Bukovina, a Ukrainian-populated land, ruled by the Turks, was added to the Habsburg realm and united with Galicia. Now the Ukrainians outnumbered the Poles two to one; however this ratio changed after the Free City of Krakow, inhabited by Poles, was added to the Austrian share, of this "new" Galicia. With the gradual influx of Polish colonists into the Ukrainian sectors, the number of Poles increased until, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Poles and Ukrainians were equally balanced. This Polish increase — one factor among others which will be examined below — enabled the Poles to gain

the political and administrative ascendancy over the indigenous Ukrainian population.

Galicia, at the time of the Austrian annexation, was in a most precarious social and economic state. The prolonged adverse and oppressive Polish domination had left deep scars. The Ukrainians had been forced to become a backward ethnic group, represented only by impoverished "khlop and pop" (peasant and priest). However, feelings of optimism were instilled in the Ukrainians at the time the Austrians took over, since it was believed that nothing could be worse than life under Polish rule. The first Austrian reforms proved that they were not wrong in their expectations. Also, many later Austrian reforms were undertaken to ease the peasants' burden and to raise the entire population to a higher cultural and economic level.

The main reason for such beneficial legislation was the character of the Austrian monarchs and most importantly of the personalities of Empress Maria Theresa and her son, Emperor Joseph II, who instigated most of the progressive reforms.

Joseph II (1780 - 1790) was an example of the so-called "enlightened despotism", who considered himself as the servant of his subjects, yet possessing unlimited and absolute power in order to rule impartially and justly. The physical, cultural and economic well-being of the entire population was theoretically the main concern of the state. The state was there for the benefit of the people, not the people for the state.

This deep concern for the welfare of the commoners caused much discontent among the big Polish landowners in Galicia. Under the old laws the Polish gentry were exempt from taxation, but obliged to render military service. Under the Austrian regime this customs was changed. The gentry were taxed, and the whole population shared in performing military service. In order to enable the peasants to be healthy soldiers and to pay taxes, they had to be freed from their desperate subjection to the feudal lords.

With this objective in mind, the introduction of reforms became a necessity. Shortly after annexation, the Empress Maria Theresa (1740 - 1780) for appropriate taxation purposes ordered the Polish gentry to prepare inventory lists of all their lands and of the lands rented to the peasants.

They also had to list accurate description of the labor required of each serf on the list. Many landlords, accustomed to ignoring such orders and authority, falsified their reports, but this time they were punished. The government issued a second order for correct lists in 1774. The new reports were accepted only after careful checking with the peasants themselves. This measure was of a special benefit to the serfs because the lists officially assured them of their belongings. In addition, the landlords could no longer increase the duties of their serfs. From this time on the peasants were protected against the unjust demands of their lords to work more than the number of days listed. Work on Sundays and holy days was forbidden. Thus the burden of serfdom was considerably eased. Since the acquisition of arms for a lord's own protection was limited, so the disastrous raids made by warlike lords ceased and the system of stationing Polish armies in the villages came to an end.

Soon another decree was proclaimed, which liberated the serfs from the unlimited and unscrupulous jurisdiction of the lords. Corporal punishment was stopped, and the serfs had the right of appeal to the state courts, including the High Court of Appeals in Vienna. They could accuse the landlord in the courts, when he was guilty of mistreating them. This reform returned a sense of dignity and justice to the peasants who had been reduced almost to the status of animals. Peasants were also freed from compulsory buying of homemade alcoholic beverages, produced by the landowners on their estates. \* Also, the nobles could no longer raise the prices of foodstuffs or force the peasants to sell their products only to them.

However, Maria Theresa proceeded very cautiously, and she personally felt more concerned about cultural changes than about the social liberation of the peasants. She, as well as her son Joseph II, had a great respect for general education and believed that the better educated a man was, the better citizen he would become. Education was, so to say, the "source of well-being as well as the source of power." Both monarchs did much to eliminate the illiteracy. In the

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During the eighteenth century when the price of grain dropped, the Polish landowners had developed the production of home brews from grain and potatoes and forced their serfs to buy a certain quantity each year and to pay for it in money or labor.

pre-Austrian period there existed only one Ukrainian gymnasium (secondary school) in Lviv, supported by the burghers' "Brotherhood" of that city. At the same time the Poles operated about twenty-two gymnasiums as well as other private schools. In general, the Polish lords were least interested in education. To them an enlightened serf represented as much of a threat as an invasion by the Tatars. The more illiterate, poor and intoxicated the peasants were, the more secure was the reign of the Polish landlords.

By a decree of December 4, 1774, Maria Theresa introduced three types of schools in Galicia: the parochial, established in the villages and using the local language in teaching; the trivial, in the smaller cities, having three classes; and the normal, in the larger cities, having four classes and using the German and Polish languages. In a relatively short time, by 1828, there were thirty-one normal schools in Galicia and Bukovina, and by 1847 the number had increased to forty-three.

A special School Commission was established in 1776 to select the teachers and textbooks and to supervise the school building programme. Compulsory education was adopted a year later and the Ukrainian language became a required subject for Ukrainian children, even if they attended Polish schools. Also, religious teaching was taught in the mother tongue twice a week in every school. For the religious training new textbooks, Catechisms, were translated into the Ukrainian, Polish, and Armenian languages.

Since qualified teachers were scarce, the church deacons (diak) and priests took over this obligation and undertook a cultural mission among their own people which had astounding results. A promising start had been made toward the general education of the people, and a new feeling of hope for a brighter future was in the air.

The Habsburgs became interested in the plight of the Ukrainian churches and clergy. After the last two Orthodox centers of resistance at Lviv and Peremyshl had ceased to exist in 1709, the Uniate church became the only church. The repeated promises of the Roman Catholic church of Poland regarding the Uniate Church as equal in rights and privileges were never fulfilled.

However, the Uniate church was fortunate in having a dedicated and fearless leader in the person of Lev Sheptytsky,

the Bishop of Lviv at the time of the Austrian annexation. He became a personal advisor to Maria Theresa on church matters in Galicia. Sheptytsky, together with Maxym Rylko, Bishop of Peremyshl, appealed to the Empress for the definite equalization of the Uniate church with the Roman Catholic church and for the reestablishment of the Metropolitan seat in Lviv. The Ukrainian request was counteracted by the Polish Roman Catholic Bishop of Lviv, Wenceslaw Sierakowski, who obtained an audience with Maria Theresa, during which he accused the Uniate church as being the main instigator of Russophilism among the Ukrainians in Galicia, and requested a free hand in converting the Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism. However, Maria Theresa decided the church matter, in favor of the Ukrainians. This was the first time that a decision in ecclesiastical policy had been made which favored the Ukrainians. The Uniate church was officially named the Greek Catholic church, equal in status and rights to the Roman Catholic church. The Empress furthermore admonished the Poles that they should "live in Christian love and harmony with the Ukrainians and Ruthenians in undisturbed peace." As far as the conversionary practices were concerned, she directed the Roman Catholic bishop to follow the rules of the Pope, who believed in a moderate approach.

Maria Theresa also promoted the better education of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic clergy by establishing in Vienna in 1774 the Greek Catholic Theological Seminary, called "Barbareum", where fourteen young Ukrainian theological students from Galicia were accepted every year. After this seminary had been in operation for ten years, another Greek Catholic Theological Seminary (1783) was established in Lviv for the exclusive use of Galician clergy. In these two institutions the course lasted four years and the standards of curricula were high. Many of these well-educated graduates became later leaders of the Ukrainian people. This was due to the fact that the Ukrainian students in Vienna had ample opportunity to become acquainted with the general national awakening among other Slav peoples, and after their return to Galicia they showed much determination to work for the benefit of their own people. Unfortunately, there were also some on whom higher educations have had a rather negative effect. They assumed an attitude of snobbishness toward



their poor and illiterate flocks and restricted their personal contact to only official matters. They also adopted stylish and aristocratic manners and were generally attracted to Polish literature and feudal society, and thereby became estranged from their own people.

When Joseph II (1780 - 90) succeeded Maria Theresa to the throne, he introduced even more progressive reforms. He started a "new era" that, by its liberal and tolerant reforms, saved Austria from the social upheaval which took place in France. He was especially concerned about the development of the new province of Galicia, about which he had first-hand information and accurate knowledge from his visits there during the time when he was co-regent.

In his coronation speech he proclaimed his plan to abolish slavery in the entire empire and to replace it with a "tolerable serfdom." Throughout his short reign he remained faithful to his ideals. By his first decree of 1782, he liberated the peasantry from bondage. This meant that while a peasant was obliged to work for his landlord, his personal life was his own affair; he was free to marry without the landlord's consent, to send his children to any school or trade, and to move to another estate if he so chose. Worthy of note is the fact that at the same time when Joseph II attempted to ease the lot of serfdom in Galicia, (1782), Catherine II, the Russian empress, reduced the serfdom and intensified to its worst form in her holdings in East Ukraine.

The most appropriate reform was in 1786 when serfdom was restricted to thirty working days a year and the hours were shortened to twelve during summer and eight in winter. It was established that the schedule for the whole week had to be announced on Sundays in order to allow the peasants to plan their own work ahead of time. Setting required amount of work was prohibited; work not accomplished in one season could not be performed in another. If a peasant had to use his horses for transporting goods for his lord, the latter was responsible for providing the peasant with food and money. These hauls were limited to 120 miles each year. Standing guard at night was to be deducted from the working day, and landowners were not allowed any longer to divide the peasants' land. The law of the forced sale of alcoholic beverages was declared illegal (Propinationsge-

setz — forceful sale of home-made alcoholic beverages) and abuses were subject to severe punishment.

By yet another decree, the landowners were forbidden to annex additional land. These peasant lands were called "*rusticalien*" and had to be strictly separated from the lords' dominions. Peasants were ordered not to divide their lands among their children, but to bequeath them wholly to their oldest sons. With these reforms came also a special fund, called the "Rusticalien Land Fund", and thereby prevented the unproductive system of strip farming from taking hold.

In his last social reform (1789), Joseph II attempted to abolish the system of serfdom entirely and to replace it by a plan of rental payments. Under the new system the state would be entitled to twelve per cent, and seventy per cent of the income would be for the peasant's own use while the rest would go to the owners. In order to tax land equally, the Emperor ordered a newly created Land Commission to assess all cultivated land in Galicia. After four years of determined hard work, the commission prepared the first "*Land Kataster*" (Land-registration), which was nicknamed "Joseph's land birth certificate". Unfortunately, this last and most important reform was not realized due to the early date of the Emperor's death in 1790.

All of Joseph's social reforms had been intended to minimize the existing class conflicts and to create a more proper class of farmers in an effort to weld them into dedicated Austrian patriots and good tax payers. At the same time the landowners lost some of their social independence and influence and were subjected to more state control. Joseph imported German colonists into Galicia in order to Germanize Galicia and give the local peasants an opportunity to learn more productive and advanced methods of agriculture.

In education, he followed in his mother's footsteps by establishing a few more gymnasiums and in 1784 the new University of Lviv. This University had four colleges (deanships) and the official languages were German and Latin. Soon, however, upon the request of the Ukrainian Bishop of Lviv, Peter Biliansky, the Emperor introduced in 1787 the "*Studium Ruthenum*" with philosophical and theological departments in which many subjects were to be taught in the Ukrainian language. It was hoped that the Ukrainian students would be trained to occupy the professors'

chairs in due time. Unfortunately the Ukrainians did not value their vernacular language highly enough and consequently did not strive to develop a literature or use it for scholarly lectures or writings. Instead, they used in their classes a hodge-podge of old Church Slavic, Polish and Russian, the so-called "*Yasychiye*", which had no appeal to the Ukrainian students. It seems that their first educators missed the opportunity to control the destiny of the University. The serious consequence of the mistake forced the Ukrainians to commit themselves to yet another hard struggle to gain some of the original Ukrainian chairs. In Joseph's time the Polish language was not permitted at the University, and because of this ban, Joseph was accused by some Polish historians of being a special supporter and protector of the Ukrainians and planned to use them against the Polish political and social power, and the Poles went so far as to accuse the government in Vienna of "inventing the Ukrainians" in order to check the Polish national endeavors.

Joseph II, because of his church reforms, was branded as anti-clerical. Here again he was influenced by his personal philosophical views of "enlightened despotism." He believed the power of the Roman Catholic church and clergy should be limited and controlled by the state in order to prevent a "state within a state." A year after he became the absolute monarch (1781), he proclaimed the famous toleration decree (patent) which equalized the standing of all religions, securing freedom of worship for all of them, including the Greek Catholic church in Galicia. State officials were to supervise the education of the clergy at state expense. The number of holy days in the Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches was reduced, and the rates for church duties were regulated to avoid conflict between the laymen and the clergy. He secularized the lands of the cloisters, while establishing at the same time a "religious fund" for the support of the clergy and for public schools. In Galicia 150 monasteries were disbanded. The Greek Catholic church lost little by this act because most of the monasteries had been occupied by abbots appointed by the Polish gentry, who had been more concerned about the possession of land than about fulfilling the Christian and educational duties among the Ukrainian people.

Even by his reforms relaxing discrimination against the

Jews in Galicia, Joseph helped to uplift the local people. The peasants became especially attached to him, and they refused to believe the news of his death, considering it an invention of the landlords.

The ten short years of Joseph's reign were the best years that the Ukrainian people had ever enjoyed under foreign occupation. Long afterwards, a legend circulated that the "good Emperor" would again appear in Galicia and with the help of the peasants regain the throne in Vienna. It was a "happy weekend" in the history of the Ukrainians in Galicia. The Ukrainians, as well as the clergy of the Greek Catholic church, joined with the peasants in praising Joseph's reforms. Joseph inspired in them an extraordinary attachment and loyalty to the government at Vienna, and for many years they retained their original favorable impressions of the Austrian government. Because they became so dependent upon the central government, they were unable or unwilling to organize or lead a separate Ukrainian national policy. Their political and cultural progress suffered under the predominance of "Austrophile" people, who clung to a narrow point of view, and desired to remain as a special nation — "Ruthenians" under the "fatherly" protectorship of the emperor. The group was nicknamed "*Ruthentsi*" (Ruthenians) and was active in the St. Yuriy (George) Cathedral in Lviv. With the passage of the years the political and national life of the Ukrainians crystalized and the "*Ruthentsi*" were limited to a small group, which had no further influence.

It is natural for people to oppose government measures which they feel infringe upon their personal interests or convictions, and so the big landowners and members of the conservative and reactionary camps in Galicia, as well as in Bohemia and Lombardy, violently objected to the reforms of Joseph II. In addition, the belief that "religious tolerance is the parent of dissension" was voiced by Catholic clergy throughout his domain.

Joseph's failure to achieve complete success in his many reforms is blamed on his attempting to accomplish too much in too short a time. It is obvious that Joseph considered his reign a failure, as evidenced by the epitaph on his tomb, which he suggested himself: "Here lies Joseph II, who was unfortunate in all his enterprises"

## CHAPTER II

### **The Triumph of Polonization Under Austrian Rule.**

With the death of Joseph II in 1790, all his liberal and progressive reforms came to an abrupt end. The succeeding monarchs, Leopold II (1790-92) and Francis I (1792-1835), feared and hated liberalism. The reigns of Francis I and of Ferdinand (1835-48) fell under the so-called "Period of Metternich". The reactionary conservative triumph in Galicia should be studied in the light of the European reaction to developments which were characterized by the alliance between the "throne and altar" directed against any kind of socio-political progress. Since the Austrian monarchs had become involved in wars with France against the forces of the French Revolution and Napoleon, they needed the support of the higher nobles, gentry, and of the clergy. The Polish nobles and the clergy made skillful use of the domestic situation in Austria to regain their control in Galicia by exerting pressure on the monarchs at every opportunity. They gained concession after concession, always striving for their principal object: the abolishment of the reforms of Joseph II.

The Austrian chancellor Kaunitz persuaded Leopold II to cancel some of Joseph's reforms and to return the country to the conditions existing in the time of Empress Maria Theresa. The Polish gentry, capitalizing upon this first concession, sent a special delegation to Leopold (1790) for the purpose of gaining a new constitution for Galicia, which would restore all the old privileges and rights of the nobility. They furthermore demanded the reunion of Galicia with Poland. Their main objective was to reestablish the old relationships between serfs and gentry. They argued that serfdom was an economic necessity and that any increase in the freedom and education of the serfs was detrimental to maximum agricultural exploitation. The Polish gentry presented their "Magna Charta" comprising safeguards for their old political and social rights. Leopold modified these

demands somewhat, and his concessions were named "Charta Leopoldina".

Leopold granted the Poles the privilege of establishing the "Postulate Sejm" in Lviv, by which they were entitled to present their petitions (postulates) directly to the emperor. This Diet (Sejm) was supposed to include representatives of all social classes, but in reality, the Polish nobles were in the majority. Consequently, all postulates served to favor them.

Every new concession granted was a gain for the nobles at the expense of the peasants. The conditions of the latter now were worse than ever before. There were no more Kozaks to defend them against Polish abuses and no means of escape by joining the Kozak ranks on the wide Ukrainian steppes. The Poles fully realized their new favorable situation and took maximum advantage of it. Also, during the time of the Napoleonic wars there was a good market for grain and meat, which Galicia could produce in abundance. To increase production, it was necessary to increase serfdom. This the Poles proceeded to do. Although the law regulating the working conditions of the serfs was still in effect the Polish landowners, with their usual disregard for adverse law, continued to make harsher and harsher demands upon the serfs. They also regained jurisdiction over them. This included corporal punishment, and provided that the landlord could obtain permission by stating that the peasants could endure such physical abuse. Usually it was no problem to obtain this permission because most of the state officials were Germans or Czechs and had little interest in the welfare of the Ukrainian peasants. Moreover, the gentry maintained good relations with the officials by inviting them to parties and hunting expeditions and thereby gaining their support. Another advantage was the fact that the nobles spoke German and could talk freely with government officials while the peasant could not. However in places where the officials remained impartial and just, law and order did prevail.

As regards the Galician administrative officials, an imperial decree, issued in 1827, required that the foreign employees in the local offices must speak one of the local languages fluently: Ukrainian or Polish. As a rule it was interpreted as meaning to concern the Polish language only. Thus voluntarily the central government in Vienna helped

the Poles to Polonize the German and Czech officials, who in turn allowed the Poles to do what they pleased in Galicia.

By threatening corporal punishment, the Polish landlords began to compel their serfs again to divide their small holdings among their sons. In that way, the burden of serfdom multiplied. The Decrees of 1805 and 1825 forbidding the splitting of small holdings, were disregarded. As could be expected, the practice of subdivision caused indescribable conditions of pauperism among the peasants. By 1820 one-fifth and by 1848 one-third of all the peasants did not own more than two morgen (3 acres) of land. To make matters worse, the peasants were given the least fertile land. If one happened to own good land, he was forced to exchange it for poorer land or for acreage farther away from his house. The peasants also lost their right to use the communal pastures and forests, a loss which caused continuous strife, and which often led to bloody struggles between landlords and peasants. This intermittent warfare continued even after serfdom was abolished in 1848.

The more adventurous peasants escaped to Bukovina, where conditions were better. As a result some villages were completely deserted. After such an exodus the nobles annexed these vacant lands to their own estates, and thereby sidestepped the laws which forbade it. From 1790 to 1830, over 1,280,000 acres of peasant lands were joined to the large estates. This land grabbing contributed to the further and deeper impoverishment of the peasants. Although decrees were issued to stop this practice, they were again disregarded by the Polish landowners.

The more courageous peasants resorted to force of arms to defend their rights, and numerous rebellions were recorded in the years 1820 to 1832 the period when annexation of farm lands reached its climax. These rebellions — in Vola Yakubova (1819), in Sokal (1824), and in Nahuyevychi (1832) — were mercilessly suppressed by the Austrian army. The rebels, if caught, were shot or hanged. Many of them fled to the Carpathian forests to escape capital punishment, and there they revived the movement of "opryshki" partisans (similar to Robin Hood's merry men). Thus serfdom, supposedly regulated and made more palatable by law, was protected in its worst forms by the Austrian military forces, and continued as late as the middle of the 19th century. The

lot of the peasants was most hopeless because they were left completely without support, with no Kozaks, no Ukrainian nobles, no understanding clergy, and no burghers who would come to their defense. Yet these peasants still clung tenaciously to their religion, their language, their traditions, and their songs. They preserved the Ukrainian awareness in Galicia, even though all the other groups became Polonized.

It is surprising that the Poles, who failed to Polonize the Ukrainians during their own occupation, were more successful under Austrian rule. The Poles had been fully aware of their loss of prestige and power under Maria Theresa and Joseph II. Now they doubled their efforts to surpass their old accomplishments. First, they attacked the educational reforms. Thus the school reforms that should have been beneficial to the Ukrainians in Galicia became the weapon by which the Ukrainian educational achievements were suppressed. The progress which the Ukrainians had made under the school reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II was quite noticeable during the short period from 1774 to 1790. They had obtained a highly educated clergy, many public elementary and higher schools, and the University of Lviv, with equal status for the Latin, German and Ukrainian languages. The Poles were most afraid of educated Ukrainians, and as we have seen, the first delegation of the Polish gentry to Leopold had endeavored to convince him that educating the serfs was an economic and social evil which should be stopped. Soon a second delegation from the Polish Roman Catholic clergy saw Leopold in order to turn the Austrian government against the Ukrainians by accusing them of being biased toward Russia and against Austria. They especially attacked the Ukrainian schools as nests of pro-Russian ideology. This slander and defamation against the Ukrainians was skillfully used by the Poles, who continued such tactics throughout the entire Austrian period. However, it must be mentioned that Vienna viewed favorably the policy of division among the different subjected people. The well-known policy of "divide et impera" can be easily seen in the relationship between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia.

It comes as no surprise that Leopold II, who tended to be ignorant as well as indecisive, complied with the Polish demands and issued a decree (1790 and 1791) abolishing the



Ukrainian trivium schools in places where Polish or German schools existed. By this act many Ukrainian schools were closed in the cities and the urban children were forced to attend only Polish schools. The next step was to remove the Ukrainian language from all public and normal schools. The private parochial schools of the villagers were closed by drafting the teachers into the army, a service which in those days lasted for many years. Those affected were principally the church deacons (diaki) who acted as teachers in the parochial schools. It should be remembered that the law of 1788, by which the teacher-deacons were exempt from military conscription, was still in existence, but not observed. Thus, by 1792 the Ukrainian language had been completely removed from all schools, as was also instruction in the Greek Catholic (Uniate) religion. The Ukrainian teachers were replaced by Poles who were known for their chauvinism. Ukrainian students in the high schools (gymnasia) were prohibited from using their native tongue, even in private conversation, and were severely punished for every relapse. Thus, they became convinced that the Ukrainian language was fit only for serfs, and that an educated man would be ashamed to use it.

As soon as the Roman Catholic hierarchy gained the official right to control the Ukrainian schools, they persuaded the Vienna government to abolish compulsory education for the Ukrainians. Immediately the education of the peasants ceased. In 1805 Lviv University was closed. The General Theological Seminary for Greek Catholic candidates continued, but even there the Polish language became the official language. The young priests did not learn the Ukrainian language as spoken by the peasants, who in turn could not understand the sermons delivered in Polish. Furthermore, the church books written in Cyrillic were transliterated into the Latin alphabet by the priests. Not knowing the language, the priests felt little sympathy for their peasant flocks, who consequently had no trust in them. When Lviv University reopened in 1817, the Ukrainian department "Studium Ruthenum" was permanently eliminated.

Under such circumstances, there were only a few Ukrainians left who possessed the authority to protest against the Polonization of the schools. But even those few — like the Metropolitan of Lviv, Michael Levytsky; the Bishop of Pere-

mysl, Ivan Snihursky; and some other higher educated priests — preferred to use the more prestigious Polish language in private conversation and in their churches. Nevertheless, they favored public education in Ukrainian. They also appealed to the Austrian government and even to the monarch himself to allow the teaching of the Ukrainian language in their communities. Their request in 1808 received the answer from Vienna that “Ukrainians should learn Polish in order to avoid a problem of national separation,” and that the Ukrainian alphabet should be replaced by the Latin in order that the “multiplication of dialects and spelling could be avoided.” When the church dignitaries renewed their request in 1817, they were reminded that the “Emperor himself speaks Polish.” The emperor was Francis I, who was even more lenient toward the Poles than Leopold, especially after the victory over Napoleon. However, after a tense struggle with the School Commission, and upon an order from Vienna, the reopening of Ukrainian public schools was granted, but without the advantage of support from the School Fund. In 1818, the Greek Catholic Consistory gained the supervision over the schools in pure Ukrainian communities. In mixed communities on the other hand the majority decided the language issue. In reality, most mixed communities had a Ukrainian majority, but the Poles devised a method to circumvent this regulation. On the day when the special commission visited a school, the Ukrainian children were dismissed, so that the examiners found a majority of Polish children and recommended their supervision to the Roman Catholic clergy. The results were obvious.

In later years the responsibility for the disadvantages which the Ukrainian schools suffered rested on the local officials who misinformed the central government. For example, in 1843 they reported 190 Polish schools and 921 Ukrainian school. This comparison looked favorable to the Ukrainians, but their 921 were one-room schools, many in the homes of priests or deacons, while the 190 Polish schools were all three or four-room schools with one or two teachers for each room. On the basis of such a report, the Poles could obtain permission to open new schools while it was assumed that the Ukrainians had enough.

The importance of the school issue lies in the fact that education and Polonization went hand in hand. The Poles

extended their educational system until they had six state and nine private gymnasias (secondary schools), as well as other private educational institutions. With the spread of the Polish language, the Polish nationalistic ideology and ambitions made inroads into the minds of the Ukrainian youth, especially the theological students of the seminary. These students often declared themselves glowing Polish patriots, who belonged to the Polish revolutionary organizations and wore Polish national costumes. They expressed only contempt for the Ukrainian language.

The Ukrainian Church hierarchy must be blamed to a great extent for this situation. The higher church hierarchy, educated mainly in Vienna, developed a special loyalty and gratitude toward the Austrian government and felt no interest in the leadership of the Ukrainian national and cultural revival. They supported the ideology of the "Ruthentsi" (Ruthenians), and became completely ignorant of the past or future of their own nation, and instead cultivated a special loyalty towards the Austrian government. They accepted all measures of the Vienna government without reservations. In private and religious matters they used either the Polish or the German language, because they felt an aversion to their vernacular, used only by the lowly oppressed serfs. If occasionally a person indicated an interest in his own language, or history, he was rebuffed, as was the case with Reverend A. Mohylnytsky, who wrote in vernacular a poem, "Joyful Welcome", as a greeting to the emperor. The author was reprimanded and the poem suppressed, and the Metropolitan M. Levytsky asked: "How could one greet such a high personality in such a low language?"

Another disheartened group, the less educated and poorer members of the Ukrainian gentry, embraced Roman Catholicism in order to better their living conditions. It is estimated that about a quarter of a million people turned Roman Catholic. Similarly, in many instances the economic conditions of the lower clergy degenerated until they were not much better off than the peasants. Forbidden to teach the Greek Catholic religion in the schools, the clergy were deprived of remuneration from the Religious Fund. Often these lower clergy were forced to labor like the peasants on the landlords' estates in order to earn food.

By the 1830's with the lack of higher education or even an interest in it, the general condition of the Ukrainian people seemed hopeless. They had not developed a literature or a national culture of their own and there was not even any need for an official censor for the Ukrainian language since nothing was printed. If an official book was printed, it was composed in a mixture of different languages: a hodge-podge, a "yazychiye" which nobody could understand.

Yet in spite of these apparent hopeless conditions — the Polonization of the urban population, the conversion of the masses to Roman Catholicism, the universal use of the Polish language by the clergy, and the lack of unity — something quite unexpected, almost a miracle, happened. Within a short time, from 1835 to 1848, these same people advanced to a new and important position because of the efforts of a few devoted men. One of these dedicated contemporaries was the young priest Markian Shashkevych, who became known as the "national awakener" of the Ukrainians in Galicia.

## CHAPTER III

### Markian Shashkevych — The National Awakener

The short period of the Austrian-Polish oppressive reaction in Galicia, as outlined in the previous chapter, had arrested the development of a Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainians were stripped of their educational facilities and were degraded to the level of some obscure Slavic tribe with a language considered to be a "Polish dialect." As illiterate peasants, the Ukrainian-speaking people were unable to improve their political, cultural or economic conditions. The most tragic fact was that the clergy, from whom leadership was always expected, had become Polonized. It seemed as if the Ukrainians would never arise as a nation again.

These were the conditions in Galicia into which Markian Shaskevych was born. The revival of the Ukrainian language and its application in the literature were the means by which he changed the course of history in Galicia and showed his people the way to a national consciousness. He was the one who reminded the Ukrainians in Galicia that "a Ruthenian (Ukrainian) mother had born us, swaddled and loved us. Why then is her language not dear to us? Why should we be ashamed of this language and use rather a foreign language?" Language was indeed the "lost key" which he found at the bottom of the sea, and with which he could open, as if by magic, the "national treasury" (B. Lepkyj). Today Shashkevych's ideas may sound quite commonplace, but in his day they were revolutionary ideas.

Shashkevych was at once confronted by the bitter opposition from the reactionary elements, including some of his own ecclesiastic superiors. But neither persecution nor poverty broke the spirit in his feeble body. With a stoic patience he endured all attacks, disappointments and suffering; he did not retreat from his calling: to give the Ukrainian spoken language its literary rights and to bring his people into the "family of Slavs", as an equal amongst equals.

Markian Shashkevych was born on November 6, 1811, in the village of Pidlysia, district of Zolochiv, where his father was the community priest. Since it was customary at this time, the young Shashkevych spoke only Polish at home. He learned Ukrainian from his playmates in the village. After a few years of primary school he was sent to the Polish gymnasium in Lviv and Berezhany. Here he displayed his interest and creative talent in poetry. His first poems were written in Polish. After six years at the gymnasium, he continued his education at the "philosophical college" in Lviv, and planned to follow in his father's footsteps and become a priest. This enabled him to live free of cost in the theological seminary. His father, impoverished and with a large family, could not afford to send him abroad or to provide him with private accommodations in Lviv. In the seminary strict discipline prevailed. On one occasion when Shashkevych, through no fault of his own, came in one hour after the curfew, he was expelled from the seminary. He decided then to stay in Lviv and to look after himself. His father became very disappointed and disturbed about his son's future, but he could neither help him nor forgive him. The youth suffered very deeply as a result of his feeling of being unforgiven by his father, and expressed his sorrow in a very lyrical poem addressed to his father, begging him for understanding and forgiveness.

This was a tragic period in the life of young Shashkevych, but his personal tragedy became a blessing for his nation. This was the period during which his mind was maturing. As a diligent reader, he practically devoured all books concerned with the national awakening among the Slavs: Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, and Poles. He became acquainted with the writings and ideas of all the great Slavic national writers — Šafarik, Kollár, Karadžić, Petrović, and Mickiewicz. He discovered that the other Slavic nations, in comparison with the Ukrainians in Galicia, were far ahead in their national consciousness. "Other Slavs", he wrote, "are reaching the top of their national development... but we are still lagging behind in a thick cold valley. Once we had our bards and our teachers also, but they were silenced by the unfriendly storms and thunders, and as a result, our people and literature fell asleep..."

It must be recalled that the other Slav peoples lived

through the same conditions as have been described in Galicia. About twenty years before, many of these Slavs had also forgotten their history and their folk literature and their languages were despised by their upper classes. Their higher clergy were similarly hostile to the native culture. The Jesuits in Bohemia and the Greek clergy among the Serbs and Bulgarians had burned masses of books in the native languages. Among the Czechs and the Magyars at the end of the 18th century, there was also the danger that their native languages would die out. The high nobility had intermarried with the German-Austrian aristocracy and was thereby denationalized, after having accepted the German customs, culture, language, and way of thinking. The upper classes were often no longer able to speak or read their native tongue. Only among the common people were the native languages kept alive. Likewise, there was no mutual understanding or cooperation among the Slavs. As late as 1827 Šafarik himself thought that the Serb and Bulgarian tongues were more closely related to the Turkish than to the Czech or Polish. And Kollár, the father of Pan-Slavism, lamented the fact that the Serbs knew nothing of the Czechs or the Poles, who in turn regarded the Serbs and Bulgarians as Turks. Such were the conditions among the other Slavs at the beginning of the 19th century. Yet in the next two decades they made great progress.

It was the French Revolution and the wars against Napoleon which created among many of the Europeans a feeling of national solidarity and unity. It so happened that in the early 19th century a new literary movement, called Romanticism, developed. Romanticism and nationalism supplemented each other, insofar as Romanticism turned the attention of literary men and scholars to the study of the folklore, the folk art and music, the folk legends, and the heroic past of the people.

Speaking about the national awakening among the Slavs, one cannot ignore the German writer, Herder, whose romantic-national ideas had a great impact upon the Slavs. Although a German, he praised the Slavs and predicted a great future for them. He especially urged the Slav people to cherish and preserve their native languages, literature, and customs. As a consequence, by 1815 the Slavs had produced their own philologists, historians, and men of letters,

who started to accept and follow the ideas of Herder. To select only the most important, we can name among the Croats, Serbs, and Slovaks, Dobrovsky, Jungmann, Kollár, Šafarik, and Palacky; among the Magyars, Szechenyi and Kossuth; among the Poles, Brodzinski and Mickiewicz; among the Russians, Karamzin and other Slavophiles. They all preached the worship of their native culture in semi-religious terms. All were glowing protagonists of their national spirit. A whole series of dictionaries, histories, philological studies, and editions of folk poems appeared in the native Slav languages.

The young Shashkevych studied diligently this movement among the Slavs and read practically everything that these men had written. Under the influence of their literature, he gradually came to the conviction that similar work should be done among the Ukrainians in Galicia. However, he lacked the courage to begin. Fortunately, at this time the writings of the Ukrainians from the Russian Empire came into his hands. He read the *Eneida* by Kotliarevsky, the first book in a pure Ukrainian vernacular, and also the collection of the folk songs by Maksymovych and the Ukrainian grammar by Pavlovsky. Reading these authors, he realized that the Ukrainian vernacular had been used in literature for the first time. This strengthened his decision to apply the vernacular in the literature of Galicia. From that time on he kept in touch with the Ukrainian writers in the Russian Empire and highly welcomed any book written in Ukrainian that was sent to him by I. Sreznevsky. Under the influence of the writings from the Eastern Ukraine he concluded that the "Ruthenians (Ukrainians) in Galicia are the same people (nation) as in the Ukraine." In this Shashkevych was also the first man to recognize the unity and oneness of the whole Ukrainian nation, regardless of the artificial boundaries of the states. This idea became the basis of that political awakening among the Ukrainians in Galicia which has continued to be cultivated since then.

There was yet another factor which stirred the thinking of Shashkevych and led him to draw the logical conclusions. This was the Polish propaganda, which endeavored to enlist the aid of the Ukrainian peasants for a renewed Polish revolt against Russia. To gain the support of the Ukrainian people,



the Poles printed revolutionary leaflets in the Ukrainian vernacular, using the Latin alphabet, and spreading them among the peasants. Concurrently, some Polish romanticists (Vaclaw from Olesko, Zegota) also published Ukrainian folklore in the same manner. These Polish undertakings revealed to Shashkevych the value and the importance of the spoken Ukrainian language, and made him only more determined to use the common language in literature. He soon learned that the vernacular was very rich and elastic in literary expressions. He wrote once: "One can express in this language the high emotions of love of Fatherland, freedom, and truth. One can long in this language like a village girl, but one also can thunder in it like a storm in the Beskids (Carpathians), or roar like the cascades of the Dniro; so why then search for another language?"

In connection with his studies of the language, Shashkevych did not neglect the history of the Ukrainian people and learned that it also possessed a rich and eventful past. Some of this past he put in verse, simply to remind his generation "how it was glorious before, and how sad it is now" and to convince them that "You are not the sons of slavery".

In 1833, after a three year break in his formal studies, Shashkevych was readmitted into the Lviv Seminary. This time he entered the institution as a mature man aware of his mission.

In the seminary he was met with the most deplorable conditions among the Greek Catholic Ukrainian theology students, which were referred to before. The students spoke only Polish, belonged *en masse* to Polish revolutionary circles, thought like Polish patriots and were treated by Polish students as "our own brother from the Ruthenian seminary." Here Shashkevych started to propagate his ideas, especially promoting the use of the Ukrainian vernacular in private, as well as in public. From now on he delivered all his addresses and sermons in Ukrainian. In time he gained some ardent followers, but also some enemies who constantly kept denouncing him to the Austrian office of investigation. Soon, on the occasion of the commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the birth of the Austrian emperor, Francis I, he published his ode, which was famous because it was the first poem in Galicia written in the Ukrainian vernacular. His boldness

in reviving the simple language brought him new hatred from those who looked down upon the "low peasants' tongue". However, it also encouraged the quiet sympathizers among his friends who from that time on closely collaborated with him. These were Yakiv (Jacob) Holovatsky (1814-1888) and Ivan Vahylevych (1811-1866). They became known in the history of Galician literature as the "Galician Trio" (Halytska Triytsia). Slowly their circle expanded. Mykola Ustianovych, a future leading Ukrainian scholar, and Velychkovsky were very close to Shashkevych and vigorously propagated and popularized the ideas of their friend. Shashkevych, however, realized that mere preaching and talking about the need of their own language was not enough; it had to be used in literature. It was in this that his poetic talent came to serve his purpose.

With the help of his newly gained friends, he prepared the first collection of poetry under the title "Son of Rus' (1834)." It contained very patriotic ideas and appeals to young people, reminding them that they should "join hands in order to disperse the black and heavy clouds which engulfed Galicia", and that they should dedicate themselves to work for the brighter future of their own people.

The next work which "The Galician Trio" prepared for publishing was the collection of Ukrainian folksongs, translations of the South Slav folklore, and a historical treatise about Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the most celebrated Hetman of the Kozaks. The title chosen for this work was "Zorya" (Star) and it was sent to the official censor in Vienna, B. Kopitar, a Slovene. Kopitar appraised the book very highly, but had some political reservations in connection with the treatise about Khmelnytsky, for he feared that it might cause national friction between Poles and Ukrainians. He left the final decision with the Lviv Metropolitan M. Levytsky, who in turn handed it over to the local censor Professor Venedict Levytsky. Both men were of a very conservative nature and disapproved the publication of the booklet. All possible reasons were brought up, political and moral, to justify this negative decision. Even pro-Russian sympathies of the authors were invented, by misreading the pseudonym of Shashkevych ("Ruslan") for "Russland" which in German meant Russia. However, the main reason for rejection, no

doubt, was the use of the native tongue and the phonetic spelling of the "low peasants' language."

This was a great disappointment for Shashkevych and his friends, but they did not lose hope. The Trio thought of another plan. It was decided to send the manuscript to Budapest and to publish it there. The Magyars were also struggling for their national awakening and for separation from the Habsburgs. Yakiv Holovatsky had a chance to study in Budapest and to get personally acquainted with such Slav national writers and leaders as Petrović, Kurylatz, and Kollár. With their help, the Trio hoped that they would gain approval for the booklet. Shashkevych and his friends revised and rearranged the manuscript "Zorya" and re-named it "Rusalka Dnistrova" (The Dnister Waternymph), and sent it to Budapest with Holovatsky. The local censor Nagy (Magyar) approved the manuscript and the "Waternymph" appeared in December of 1836. This was the first book in Galicia written in the native Ukrainian language. But characteristically, even the "Waternymph" could not enchant the old reactionaries, for they could not tolerate her outside appearance — the language. As soon as the shipment of the "Waternymph" arrived in Lviv (about 800-900 copies), both Levytskys ordered the Lviv police to confiscate and to "jail" the "nymph", and there she remained until 1848. Still another J. Levytsky, professor of theology, expressed his satisfaction for the treatment reserved for the first Ukrainian book in Galicia. He wrote in Polish: "Thanks to the government, that it keeps such a watchful eye, not only on the political issues, but also on the unnecessary new matters and does not allow the 'Waternymph' to be distributed in such a form as it appeared." Only 100-200 copies, which were sent to Holovatsky's brother in Vienna, were passing from hand to hand, and making a great impression upon its readers. Shashkevych and his friends were threatened with new expulsion from the seminary. They were interrogated by the police and by the censor V. Levytsky, before whom Shashkevych declared that he wrote in the Ukrainian language because this was his "mother language and a completely independent language from Polish or Russian." The authors were allowed to remain in the seminary, but their ordination was postponed for many years, the last of the three being ordained eight years after he should have. But even after

their ordination the hand of the church hierarchy weighed heavily upon them. Usually they were sent to the most isolated and poor congregations, where they were prevented from writing or studying. The result was that Vahylevych, disgusted by the unjust treatment, left the Greek Catholic church, became a Protestant, and offered his services to a Polish newspaper. Shashkevych on the other hand bravely endured his treatment by the church hierarchy and succeeded even in making further contributions to the literary awakening of the Ukrainians in Galicia. He turned his attention to the younger generation, for whom he prepared the first Ukrainian reader. He also contemplated preparing an edition of the first Ukrainian dictionary, and for church use he translated the whole of the New Testament and Psalms into the spoken Ukrainian language.

Shashkevych also was a great defender of the Ukrainian alphabet and of the phonetic spelling. There was a group of Ukrainians, who, under the influence of the Poles, was advocating the Latin alphabet for the Ukrainian language. Shashkevych rejected this idea, mainly for political reasons, and wrote a booklet "Azbuka i Abecadlo" (Alphabet and A.B.C.) in defense of the Ukrainian alphabet, by which he again stirred public opinion. His appeal was so powerful that the whole issue was dropped and his views won out.

Shashkevych's bold innovations were making slow but measurable progress. The Polonized, lower clergy were gradually returning to the fold of their native people, and were starting to organize themselves in political and cultural societies. Some of them took the leadership in the national awakening of the Ukrainians, especially during the political upheavals of the year 1848. Tragically, Shashkevych was not able to live to view the full results of his work. He died from tuberculosis on June 7, 1843, at the age of 33.

Shashkevych, under such circumstances, could not have left a large literary heritage, but whatever he wrote appealed to everybody, mainly because of the sincerity of his feelings and their simplicity of expression. It is no surprise that his ideas found such a wide echo and deep appreciation among the simple people, who had suddenly become the backbone of the Ukrainian nation.

The extent of the importance of Shashkevych's works and ideas influenced the Ukrainians in Galicia could be best

illustrated by the 50th anniversary of his death which was celebrated in 1893. In this year it was decided to transfer the poet's remains from the village cemetery in Novosilky to Lviv. Thousands of people came from all corners of the country to pay their last tribute to the man who had reminded them of their "Ruthenian (Ukrainian) heart, and of the Ukrainian faith," things that could not be taken away from them again!

Fifty years previously (1843), there was hardly a priest who would consent to bury the poet, but now (1893) more than thirty priests, plus the Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky, participated at the church service alone, and hundreds of others followed in the procession. Reading about this commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Shashkevych's death one necessarily becomes aware of the great progress that the Ukrainian people had made, thanks to the work of Shashkevych alone. It was only 50 years, but what a difference there was in the national consciousness of the Ukrainians. The awakening, inaugurated by Shashkevych, could no longer be stopped. Galicia was demanding the right for freedom and democracy. During the fifty years following the death of Shashkevych, Galicia was covered with thousands of schools, reading halls and other cultural and national organizations. A Ukrainian book was to be found in almost every house. The enlightened masses of the people, under the leadership of the intelligentsia and the national clergy, were demonstrating their political rights, often sacrificing their lives, and arousing the interest of the outside world.

In reality, Shashkevych's work and ideas were, so to say, "rehabilitated", not in 50 years, but already in the first five years after his death — by 1848 — as we shall see in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER IV

### 1848 — Auspicious Year for Galicia

The once heralded slogan “liberté, fraternité et égalité” and the general national awakenings following the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars could not be suppressed forever. These ideas occupied the minds of European people during the so-called “Era of Metternich” until open revolts, one after another, broke out against the reactionary-conservative systems. The chain of revolutionary upheavals of 1848 started in southern Italy. The sparks of it were carried over to France, where the “February Revolution” in Paris destroyed the government. The flames of insurgency spread quickly over all of Europe. People in all nations rose up to fight for their national independence and constitutional rights. The old world was cracking; a new world emerging.

The Austrian empire, a conglomeration of many nationalities, became the scene of many uprisings everywhere. On March 13 in Vienna, a mob of turbulent workers under the leadership of students erected the first barricades in the streets and demanded the resignation of Metternich and a proclamation of civil rights. They clashed with the police. The situation was perilous, but two days later Emperor Ferdinand I (1835-48), yielding to the demands of the people, abolished censorship, guaranteed freedom of speech, press, and meetings, and promised a constitution which he soon promulgated.

The first news of the revolt in Vienna reached Lviv on March 18. The Poles reacted at once by feverishly agitating for the restoration of Poland within the borders of 1772. Demonstrations with speeches flared up on street corners, in churches, and in theatres resounding with such ambiguous exclamations as “Long live independent Poland”, “Long live Emperor Ferdinand as the Polish king”, and even “Long live Count Stadion”, the governor of Galicia. The excited mobs surrounded the palace of Count Stadion and demanded the

creation of a Polish national guard and the distribution of arms. As the Polish historian K. Bartoszewicz says, "everyone began to use and to abuse freedom."

The leading Polish politicians quickly organized their "National Committee" and launched a petition to the governor and to the Emperor himself. The demands included the introduction of the Polish language into public offices, courts, and schools; the creation of a separate Polish provincial administration with Polish officials exclusively; proclamation of a general amnesty; revision of the land-constitution; restoration of the Polish army with Polish officers; confirmation of the "National Council" as the temporary Polish government in Galicia; creation of an independent ministry for Galicia with J. Lubomirski as head; and the abolition of serfdom.

The Poles treated Galicia as if it were a purely Polish country. There was not a word concerning the national, political, and cultural needs or rights for the other half of the population, the Ukrainians. They were completely ignored. The Poles in their "petitional rage", did not expect any resistance from the Ukrainians, and ventured even to collect signatures from them to support this petition.

However, the Poles had somewhat miscalculated the situation, and the unexpected happened. The politically inexperienced Ukrainian people, under the leadership of a small group of Uniate clergymen as well as a few intellectual laymen, began to voice their own political demands.

It is true that the Ukrainians in 1848 were assisted by the Austrian government in order to oppose the demands of the Poles, but this was not done because of a special Austrian sympathy for the Ukrainians. It was rather a political necessity to gain the support of the peasants as a loyal class to the throne, since the rebellions were conducted by the "*historical nations*" and led by powerful nobles: the Hungarians, Italians, Czechs, and Poles. Consequently Austria, in order to weaken the political aspirations of these nations, supported the so-called "*peasant nations*": Croats and Rumanians against Hungarians; Slovaks against Czechs and Hungarians; and Ukrainians against Poles in Galicia. It is unhistorical, however to say that Austria created these nationalities and basic hostilities. Some Polish writers go as

far as to maintain that Austria, especially Count Stadion, "invented Ruthenians" (Ukrainians). These national hostilities had existed long before 1848, and now a spark was only needed to make them burst into flames. This occasion had now arrived.

The Ukrainian lawyer, Dr. Cyril Vinkovsky, was asked by the Poles to sign the above-mentioned petition. After examining it, he suggested it include the Ukrainian national and cultural requests as well. His suggestion was met with vehement opposition: "There are no Ruthenians. You are a traitor, a Moscovian." This incident demonstrated to the many Ukrainians that there could not be any equal cooperation under the banner of the "Ukrainian-Polish brotherhood". The students of the Greek Catholic Seminary in Lviv were the first who refused to sign the petition for the same reason. The spirit of Shachkevych revived among the walls of this institution early enough. During further protests against the Poles, 250 of these students swore to use no other language but Ukrainian. Thus the old historical conflict between Ukrainians and Poles flared up anew and stood as the beginning of the spontaneous Ukrainian national awakening.

Soon the Ukrainians created a unified political body which provided effective leadership. On April 19 the first Ukrainian general public meeting was held in Lviv, attended by such prominent leaders as Gregory Yakhimovych, Bishop of Peremyshl, later Metropolitan of Lviv; Michael Kusemsky, Bishop of Kholm; and a most energetic layman, lawyer and landowner, Ivan Borysykevych. It was decided to organize a Ukrainian Council, under the name of "Holovna Ruska Rada" (Main Ruthenian Council) and to send a petition to the Emperor requesting the introduction of the Ukrainian language into all schools, the placing of Ukrainians in public offices, and equality between the Greek Catholic and the Roman Catholic churches. This petition, compared to that of the Poles, was a modest one and seemed to have a chance of being favorably received. In fact the Emperor on May 9 promised to fulfill the Ukrainian requests except for the use of the Ukrainian language at the University of Lviv. Instead the government was only prepared to grant one chair of Ukrainian in order to perfect the literary usage of the language and to train Ukrainian teachers, who were badly needed. Yakiv Holovatsky, the friend of M. Shashkevych



and a member of the "Galician Trio", was appointed to this chair.

The "Holovna Ruska Rada" was organized with Bishop Yakhimovych as president and Borysykevych as vice-president. During the first meeting of the "Rada", held on May 2, three hundred Ukrainian delegates were present. They prepared and presented a "manifesto" to all the Ukrainian people in Galicia, urging the Ukrainians to organize branches of the Council in all major cities of the province and to establish a Ukrainian paper *Halytska Zorya* (Galician Star). The Poles sent a delegation of their own to this meeting with instructions to disturb and prevent its organization. However, the determination of the Ukrainians forced them to desist and to leave the meeting.

On May 10 the memorable "manifesto" of the "Rada" addressed to all Ukrainians in Galicia was proclaimed. The manifesto presented a brief history of Galicia and outlined the reasons for organizing the "Holovna Ruska Rada". Furthermore, it stressed the unity of the Ukrainians in Galicia with the Eastern Ukrainians under imperial Russia. Thus Shashkevych's ideals were bearing fruit: "We belong to the great Ukrainian nation which speaks the same language and numbers 15 million people, of whom two and one-half million live in Galicia." It also explained the differences and the independence of the Ukrainian language from the Polish and Russian languages.

It is a most remarkable fact that this national consciousness of all Ukrainians could express itself at this point; in spite of the century-long separation of Galicia from East Ukraine. After 1848, this stirring for unity became the goal not only of the "Holovna Ruska Rada", but of all Ukrainian political parties of future until its realization by the act of January 22, 1919. On all occasions the "Holovna Ruska Rada" continued to emphasize that "we are a part of 15 million Ukrainian people who live in the south of Russia, in southeastern Poland and northern Hungary, and who differ in language, writings, customs, traditions and religion from the Poles." \* Henceforth all political action of the "Holovna Ruska Rada" was based on the premise of preparing the political independence of the whole Ukraine.

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\* In the; "Memorandum to the Central Austrian government."

The "Holovna Ruska Rada" was assisted considerably by the writing of the *Halytska Zorya*, whose editor was a young and energetic lawyer, Antin Paventsky. Within a short time this paper enjoyed great popularity and listed over 4,000 subscribers. It contributed a great deal to the national awakening. Throughout the country thirty-four branches of the "Holovna Ruska Rada" were established, fostering a very active cultural and political movement, especially in Stanyslaviv under the leadership of Father Gregor Shashkevych.

The Poles, disturbed by the Ukrainian activities and their loyalty to the Austrian throne organized on May 23 the "Rusky Sobor" (Ruthenian Assembly) in order to undermine and nullify all the activities of the "Holovna Ruska Rada". The "Sobor" consisted of "Gente Rutheni, natione Poloni" (Ukrainians by birth, but Poles by nationality), such as Puzyn, Didushytsky, Stetsky, and Shumliansky, under the leadership of Count Leo Sapieha, whose families had originally been Ukrainian boyars but who had succumbed to the pressure of Polonization during the 16—17th centuries. The expressed purpose of the "Sobor", was "to maintain by all means harmony and unity with people of our common fatherland." The official organ of the "Sobor" was the *Ruthenian Daily*, printed partly in Cyrillic and partly in Latin letters, which attempted to instill pro-Polish sympathy among Ukrainians, but with little success. It influenced only a few, among them Ivan Vahylevych, previously a member of the "Galician Trio" and now the editor of the *Ruthenian Daily*.

When this attempt proved futile, a group of Polish *szlachta* appeared before Bishop Yakhimovych to declare their readiness to become Greek Catholics. Yakhimovych, sensing their deceit, answered them, "Ukrainians have lost their nobility; now they do not need them." The *Ruthenian Daily* was soon dropped and the "Ruthenian Sobor" was dissolved after the abortive November revolution in Lviv. The ineffectual Polish "National Council" met the same fate.

The "Holovna Ruska Rada", in spite of Polish attempts at obstruction, made progress and not only prospered among their own Ukrainian population, but gained attention abroad.

Czech scholars and politicians, including Palacký, Rieger, Šafarik and Kramar, called a Panslavic Congress in Prague

in early June. It was the first time that nationalism found its expression in "pan" organizations. The Pan-Slavic Congress met with the intention of counterbalancing what they considered to be the Pan-German Congress at Frankfurt and protecting the Slavs from German imperialism. The "Holvna Ruska Rada" believed the Pan-Slavic Congress to be a suitable place for the Ukrainian voice to be heard, and sent a delegation of three men — Ivan Borysykevych, Reverend Gregor Hynylevych, and Oleksa Saklynsky to attend. They were later joined by Adolf Dobriansky, a capable lawyer and politician, from the Carpatho-Ukraine.

The unity of the Pan-Slavic meeting was badly disrupted by the discord between the delegates of the Slav nations. The Poles sent a "Ukrainian" delegation of six men, under the leadership of Sapielha, to represent their small organization "Sobor" and to deny the rights of the delegates of the "Holvna Ruska Rada". Palacký, president of the Congress, joined by the Russian anarchist M. Bakunin, intervened, and a compromise agreement resulted in uniting the two delegations under Sapielha. Sapielha as chairman had no vote; thus the Ukrainians voted in the resolution to divide Galicia into two national parts and leave further action to the local Diet in Lviv. This was the first Polish-Ukrainian political pact, and it proved to be as unsuccessful as were all others following, twenty years apart, in 1849, 1869, 1890, and 1910.

In spite of this set-back the Ukrainian delegation presented their case convincingly. They requested equal rights for the Ukrainian language in offices and in schools. During the discussion on the subject of the reorganization of the Habsburg monarchy, they declared themselves in favor of a loose federation of autonomous territorial nations. Ivan Borysykevych also succeeded in passing a motion which favored the Slovaks and the Ukrainians in Carpatho-Ukraine under Hungary. These Ukrainian requests were included in the letter addressed by the Congress to the Emperor. The Congress witnessed another example of discord when the Poles declined to support the Croats and Slovaks in their request. The Poles were on the side of the Hungarians in their revolt against Austria rather than with the Slavs. The Congress could not finish its work, since it was disbanded by the bombardment of Prague, by the Austrian army on June 12, 1848.

In spite of the shortcomings of the Congress itself, the participation of the Ukrainian delegates was in itself a moral victory for their nation. Ukrainians of Galicia and of Carpatho-Ukraine had stood up for the same ideals and had presented a united front on now a much wider stage.

During this critical and turbulent period, serfdom was abolished in Galicia. The serfs were not, however, freed as the result of the action of a political party or of a special national group. It was instead an independent decision of the Emperor meant to gain the loyalty and support of the peasants for the throne. In this instance the Emperor competed with Polish politicians who had begun to convince their landlords of the necessity of freeing the peasants in order to win their help in a revolution against Austria. The Poles also wished to avoid a repetition of the so-called "Galician butchery" in 1846, when thousands of Polish revolutionaries were killed by the Polish peasants who had remained loyal to the monarchy. Indeed, at that time the Polish anti-Austrian revolution had been suppressed by the Polish peasants themselves. Even though the Ukrainians were often accused of "excessive loyalty" to the Habsburgs, the "Galician butchery" cannot be traced to them.\*

As already mentioned, the revolutions of 1848 were conducted mainly by leaders from the nobility. For this reason, it was only natural for the Emperor to support the peasants against their lords. The Emperor's order for abolishing serfdom was received by the Galician governor, Count Stadion, and publicly proclaimed in Galicia on Easter Sunday, April 23, six months earlier than in the other regions of the Austrian empire.

After centuries of serfdom, the peasants were finally freed. They were free, yet they were still largely dependent on the landlords because they did not receive enough land on which to make a living, although the Polish landlords received a large indemnity for the loss of their serfs. Nevertheless, liberation day was seen by the peasants as the "gift of the Emperor," and each year they commemorated this act by erecting "liberation crosses" in expression of their gratitude and loyalty to the Austrian Emperor.

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\* Unfortunately, there are still some historians in America who do accuse the Ukrainians of participating in this "butchery".

The Ukrainian peasants, now free men, could become more interested in politics. As Yakhymovych expressed in a speech during the first meeting of the "Holovna Ruska Rada" on May 2, "The Ukrainian peasant has awakened. He arrived late for work in his field, but as soon as he started to reap, he caught up with his neighbors. By sundown, he was ahead of them."

The first political challenge was met successfully by the Ukrainian peasants with the election of deputies to the first Vienna Parliament. Of the total 383 members, Galicia as a whole was entitled to elect 96 and Bukovina 30, by universal and equal male suffrage. The "Holovna Ruska Rada" instigated an energetic campaign which resulted in the election of 39 Ukrainian delegates, 34 from Galicia and 5 from Bukovina, among whom were 27 peasants, 9 clergymen, and 3 officials. In comparison with the total Ukrainian population of Galicia, the number elected was not proportionate. Nevertheless, this was the highest number of delegates that the Ukrainians were ever able to elect during the whole constitutional era in Austria. In later elections the Poles applied strong arm methods, which will be dealt with below, but already in 1848 they attempted to keep Ukrainians from the polls by spreading the rumor that the elected representatives were planning a return to serfdom. The peasants, not being used to exercising their political rights, did not even fully trust their own intellectuals and clergymen who endeavoured to instruct them in how to use their new voting privileges.

The Ukrainian delegation was headed by Bishop Yakhymovych. On July 12, the memorable opening of the first parliamentary session in Vienna took place. Three days later a motion was put forth to abolish serfdom in all Austrian domains. A heated discussion followed which lasted for six weeks during which the Ukrainian delegates participated with vigor. Contemporary observers credited the most impressive speech to Ivan Kapushchak, a Ukrainian peasant from Solotwina (Stanyslaviv district). He spoke eloquently: "I want to speak of the indemnities which the landlords demand in Galicia and Silesia. Justice requires that everyone who has lost something against his will should receive redress. Yet it is also just that whoever benefited from an illegal transaction should also pay an indemnity for its illegal use. The landlords were legally entitled to labor from us serfs, but were

they satisfied with what the law permitted them? No! We worked 300 days a year instead of 100; for four days, often seven days a week, and the landlord credited us with only one day in a week. The question arises: Who should pay indemnity to whom? We, to them; or they, to us? They claim the landlords treated their serfs graciously. Oh, what bitter grace it was!" He continued with an argument against the myth that the landlords had "donated freedom" to their serfs: "If the abolishment of serfdom was a 'gift' from the landlords, why should they be paid indemnities for this gift? When was this 'gift' given? In January, or maybe in March, 1848? No! It was given on April 17, after the sons of the Austrian people sacrificed their lives for our freedom. Gratitude belonged not to the Polish landlords, but to the Austrians who forced the lords to accept the changing times." He ended his speech with the remark, "Whips and sticks by which we were so often beaten should remain in memory of us as serfs and be indemnity enough for the lords." This was followed by stormy applause. On the next day the papers reported: "No other speech made such a powerful impression as the words of this simple Galician peasant... It was not empty talk... anger and indignation over the misuse of millions flowed with each sentence."

Father Gregory Shashkevych made a motion to create an arbitrary commission which would solve the problem of servitude, and the common right to use pastures and forests. Even after the abolition of serfdom in Galicia, servitude remained an exclusive privilege of the landlords and caused constant conflicts between peasants and nobles.

Another heated discussion followed in Parliament on the subject of the division of Galicia into two parts, Polish West and Ukrainian East Galicia. The problem of the separation of Galicia became "a matter of life or death of the Ukrainian people" as the "Holovna Ruska Rada" stated it. This demand was repeated with great vigor many times on different occasions in 1848-49, and in later periods.

At the Pan-Slavic Congress in Prague, the Ukrainian delegates had presented this demand for the first time. Simultaneously, the "Holovna Ruska Rada" had sent a written request to Emperor Ferdinand I (June 9) for the separation of Ukrainians in what was once an independent principedom, later the kingdom of Halych, and finally Red Rus' Voyevod-

stwo. Again on July 17, the "Holovna Ruska Rada" submitted another lengthy memorandum to the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the same subject, and issued an appeal on the same day to the Ukrainian people to furnish this petition with signatures.

Every time the Ukrainians renewed their petition, it evoked stormy counteraction from the Poles, who did everything possible to prevent the fulfillment of this request. \*

As the division of Galicia became "a question of life to the Ukrainians" the "Holovna Ruska Rada" sent a delegation under Bishop M. Kusemsky, I. Borysykevych, and Reverend Gregory Shashkevych to Emperor Ferdinand in Olmuts requesting again: the division of Galicia into two provinces (Ukrainian and Polish), the creation of Ukrainian National Guard, the introduction of the Ukrainian language into all schools and offices in Ukrainian Galicia, the removal of mandators and their replacement by government officials, the introduction of commission for investigation of conflicts between landlords and peasants, the removal of unfriendly officials, and equalization of the Greek-Catholic clergy with the Roman Catholic. It was evident that the "Holovna Ruska Rada" had progressed politically and was well aware of the needs of the Ukrainian people: their own territory, army, language, and administration, which would allow them to grow and to become independent. The Emperor promised to give the memorandum his serious consideration, but further political developments in Austria led to the abdication of Ferdinand I (December 2, 1848) in favor of his nephew, the 18-year-old Francis Joseph II (1848-1916). The "Holovna Ruska Rada" sent a new delegation of 32 men headed by Bishop Yakhymovych to the new Emperor on January 20, 1849 and received a friendly reception. They were even allowed for the first time to read their petition in the Ukrainian language. It was a note-

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\* Their malice is quite evident in a letter from Smolka, written in Vienna (August 8): "I have just read that a petition of 'Ruthenen' for a division of Galicia into two governments has been submitted. As you well know, we ('brevis manu') had "twisted the neck" of the intended division of Galicia signed by the Emperor on June 19, but the new petition may renew the question and may be exploited to our disadvantage. Therefore, it is necessary to send a petition of other 'Ruthenen' with many signatures against the division of Galicia."

worthy event in the development of the self-respect of the Ukrainians, for only a few years earlier the Ukrainian poet, Reverend A. Mohylnytsky, had been told by Ukrainian dignitaries that it was inappropriate to greet a royal visitor in such a "peasants' language". The new Emperor promised the delegation that the Ukrainians in Galicia would occupy a respectable place in his empire, perhaps because Austria still needed Ukrainian support for the not yet suppressed Hungarian revolution.

The issue of Galicia's division was also debated in the Kremsier Parliament (November, 1848, to March, 1849). The "Holovna Ruska Rada" had sent a petition, furnished with 15,000 signatures, to Parliament. Bishop Yakhymovych presented the Ukrainian views which were supported by Czechs (Palacký and Rueger) and some Germans (Pinkas). It is of great interest to present the Czechs arguments in this matter. They argued: "if the Ukrainians of Galicia could enjoy full freedom, they could exert great influence upon their brother Ukrainians under Russia, and together they would become a 'mallet against Austria's enemies', especially against Russia. Rueger mentioned that "the Ukrainian literature is filled with freedom which would melt the ice of Russian absolutism and thus become the horn of Archimedes which would tear Tsarism into shreds and liberate millions of Ukrainians from Russia.. The most important event today is the fall of the Russian despot because he is contrary to European freedom. The fall of this despot would be quicker if this tribe (Galicians) could be accepted into the ranks of the other Slavic tribes." When Rueger mentioned that the Ukrainian language was different from the Polish, he was interrupted by the exclamations of the Polish delegate, Ziemialkowski, "Do not speak of things you do not understand!" To this Rueger answered that he spoke both the Polish and Ukrainian languages fluently.

Ziemialkowski and Smolka — the Polish delegates — took some time to explain that there was no special Ukrainian (Ruthenian) nation, that it had been only "an invention of Count Stadion", and that either one of them had every right to be called a Ruthenian.

Pinkas, a German lawyer of Prague, brought a little humor into this hot debate by saying, "Mr. Ziemialkowski introduced himself as a pure-blooded 'Ruthene', and at the



same time he said that the Ukrainian difference from Poles is only an 'invention of Stadion'. The question arises: "Is Ziemiakowski also an 'invention of Stadion'?" (Parliament Protocols of 1848-49).

The Ukrainian delegates went as far as to threaten to walk out over this issue. However, Parliament was already doomed, for on March 7, 1849, the new Emperor dissolved it and proclaimed the conservative constitution of March 4. Later, when the Hungarian revolution was defeated, all liberal concessions were annulled and the Austrian empire was once more ruled by an absolute monarch.

It is interesting to note in connection with the problem of the division of Galicia, that the leader of Carpatho-Rus' (Ukraine), the lawyer Adolf Dobriansky, in 1849, had demanded the separation of Galicia and the creation of East Galicia united with Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine as a territorial administrative entity. This idea of a union of all Ukrainian territories, here only an idea, became a short-lived reality many years later by the decision of the Central Rada in Kiev.

Meanwhile, the Austrian government continued to toy with the promises given to Galicia. There were times when it seemed as if it would keep faith with the Ukrainians. Soon after the Polish revolt of 1846, the so-called "Galician butchery", Ferdinand had sent Stadion a letter (February 22, 1847) advocating the division of Galicia into two provinces with separate governors, Polish at Krakow and Ukrainian at Lviv. Stadion, however, favored just one governor with two separate provincial diets. The "land statutes" of September 2, 1850, referring to the electoral system in Galicia, suggested the creation of three electoral districts, one in Lviv with 50 delegates, one in Krakow with 58, and the third in Stanyslaviv with 42, with a central department responsible directly to the Vienna government. The plan, however, was never put into effect. The Austrian government reverted to the plan of the separation of Galicia into two provinces (decree of April 24, 1854), but again the Poles, politically more experienced and influential than the Ukrainians, blocked the plan and Galicia was merely divided judicially into two parts. Courts of appeal were established at Krakow and Lviv. This division had no political weight

whatsoever. The Ukrainian national territorial autonomy was finally granted at Brest Litovsk on February 9, 1918, by a secret agreement, but even at that late date Austria refused to ratify it in order not to "irritate" the Poles.

While the Vienna parliament was still debating, new disturbances broke out in Vienna and in Budapest. The revolution was spreading very rapidly, especially in Hungary. But Windischgratz and Jelacić finally re-established order.

The Poles in Galicia, encouraged by these events, also staged a revolt on November 1, which was quickly suppressed by Hammerstein's cannon. On this occasion the new city hall and the university, with its library and theater, were destroyed, and about 55 people were killed. Waslaw Zaleski, a Pole, resigned his governorship of Galicia, and the Polish situation seemed to be lost.

The year 1848 was important in another respect. It was the year of the revival of the Ukrainian military tradition, the old Kozak spirit. The threat was made that the Hungarian revolution might spread across the Carpathian Mountains and join its forces with the Poles, and since the Austrian army was detained in Italy, the Galician borderlands were encouraged to form their own military units to protect themselves from a possible Hungarian invasion.

This military formation was given whole-hearted support by the "Holovna Ruska Rada", whose members realized that without a military force the Ukrainian political and cultural advancement was doomed to fail. They issued an appeal to the people to organize a free Ukrainian corps to protect the Carpathian mountain borders: "Do not wait for the fire that rages behind the mountains to spread and reach our homes." The Ukrainians responded and within a short time 3,460 men had volunteered of which only 1,410 were selected.

In March, 1849, the first Ukrainian Free Corps, called the "Ruthenian Sharpshooters" was created. The unit was entirely Ukrainian, with Ukrainian officers and special uniforms. The battalion was divided into six columns, which were stationed at Lviv, Berezhany, Sambir, Kolomeya, Stanyslaviv and Stryj. The mother of Emperor Francis Joseph, Archduchess Sophia, embroidered the blue and yellow (Ukrainian national colors) flag with her name on it and

donated the same to the corps. Soon the "Holovna Ruska Rada" made plans to form a second corps, but A. Goluchowski, the new Polish governor of Galicia, wrote a protest to the Council of Ministers in Vienna: "I consider the increase of the corps to 10,000 men as a very dangerous and risky step which may inspire national and separatist tendencies."

On September 6, 1849, the force was ordered to enter Hungary and assist the Russian army in stamping out the Hungarian revolution. Soon after, the corps was recalled in January, 1850, and unexpectedly dissolved. All volunteers were transferred into the regular Austrian army. This was obviously the act of the Polish governor, Goluchowski, who was actively helping Hungary. However, even this short existence of the Ukrainian corps was sufficient to revive the Ukrainian military spirit, which survived to the time of World War I, when the Ukrainian Free Corps (U.S.S.) fought against the Poles and Russians for the independence of the Ukraine.

Eighteen forty-eight was also notable for the advancement of adult education. A group of Ukrainian intellectuals with the cooperation of the "Holovna Ruska Rada" called a general meeting, a congress of Ukrainian scholars, to plan a program. They met on October 19, with 26 leaders in attendance at the auditorium of the Theological Seminary in Lviv. Goluchowski tried to discourage the meeting by warning them that the Polish national guard might disperse it. The Ukrainians then appealed to the Austrian commander, Hammerstein, who assured them of his protection in preventing this from taking place. The main initiators and organizers of this congress were I. Borysykevych and Reverend M. Ustianovych who, in his speech, declared: "Landsmen, Europe is opening a new page of history, and on it is written 'Resurrection'. The foundations of every nation have been shaken and all have started a new life of freedom and happiness. Did we suffer the harshest serfdom that we should now breathe deadly poison and live behind the shadow of the grave?"

The main issues for discussion and promotion included the use of the Ukrainian language and a unified spelling so that science and education could be widely popularized. The

principal speaker on this subject was Yakiv Holovatsky, who held the first chair of Ukrainian language and literature at Lviv, as well as being a member of the famed "Galician Trio". He read a detailed paper on the Ukrainian language and its dialects in relation to other Slavic languages, pointing out its independence from the Polish and Russian languages. A lively discussion ensued upon the Ukrainian spelling, but it was resolved to follow the ethymological way used by Michael Maksymovych in his collection of folk songs, with some words in phonetic spelling. This became the general pattern until 1892. Unfortunately, these vital and important decisions of the congress were not strictly followed, and the question of language usage was a repeated subject of controversy and was further confused by the introduction of "yasychie", (a conglomeration of Polish, Russian, Church-Slavic and others) by a conservative group of "*Moskvophiles*" who slowed down the development of a national Ukrainian language.

Another accomplishment of this congress, patterned after the Czechs, was to organize an association or institute of Ukrainian scholars, called the "*Matytsia*". Its purpose was to assume responsibility for publishing "good and useful books to strengthen the faith, morality, knowledge, technology, agriculture and education of Ukrainians." The congress warmly advocated this Association of Ukrainian Scholars, and 50 of the members immediately subscribed to it in spite of the high fees. However, this organization later fell under the influence of the conservatives and did not fulfill its original promise.

The congress further advocated building a "Home of Culture", later named the "People's Home" in Lviv, and reading halls in other towns and villages in order to foster adult education. Upon a petition of the "Holovna Ruska Rada", the Austrian Emperor donated for this purpose to the Ukrainians the land and ruins of Lviv University recently destroyed by bombardment. An appeal issued to the people for donations resulted in the erection of the "People's Home", with offices for all cultural organizations, which was finished and opened in 1864. However, as the whole political and cultural life in the 60's was influenced by the "*Moskvophiles*", the People's Home fell under their control and re-

mained so until 1939. The congress also elected a special Ukrainian delegation to the Ministry of Education to present the Ukrainian demands, which corresponded with those of the "Holovna Ruska Rada".

As previously stated, the first activities of the "Holovna Ruska Rada" were cultural rather than political. The equality of the Ukrainian language in schools and offices was one of its first request to the Austrian government. On May 9, the Emperor answered the Ukrainian petition favorably. At once the "Ukrainization" of schools began, but the lack of qualified teachers slowed the process. By a decree of the Internal Minister (August 23, 1849), all streets and business places were marked in the two languages, and all orders and laws of the cities were announced in both tongues. As long as Stadion remained in office these rules were observed. However, after Waclaw Zaleski succeeded him the language battle became a veritable see-saw affair.\*

Another accomplishment of the "Holovna Ruska Rada" was the decision concerning the creation of a Ukrainian national flag and a national anthem in 1848. The flag had two colors, blue above and yellow below. A yellow stylized lion on a blue background became the national emblem of Galicia. Both of these national symbols were confirmed by the National Council in 1918. The words of the hymn, written by Reverend I. Hushalevych, "Peace we bring to

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\* After Stadion resigned as governor of Galicia to accept a position with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he was succeeded by the Pole, Waclaw Zaleski. Upon the latter's recommendation, the Minister of Education, on September 29, 1849, issued a decree by which the Polish language became the only language spoken or taught in the schools of the entire country. The Ukrainian was reduced to an elective subject in the curriculum. The "Holovna Ruska Rada" protested energetically against the new order. Its protest might have had little effect except for the fact that the Polish revolt occurred on November 1 in Lviv. In retaliation, the Minister of Education reversed his order in another decree (December 9, 1848), removing the Polish language from schools and offices and nominally restoring the Ukrainian language. It was a nominal order because it also stated that until there were sufficient Ukrainian teachers and books and their language was further developed, the German language would be in use. Because of this political situation, the Ukrainians gained two gymnasiums, one in Lviv and one in Brody, and the establishment of one chair at the University for Ukrainian language and literature, which was subsequently occupied by Professor Yakiv Holovatsky. German remained the official language in the schools until 1867, when it was again replaced by Polish.

you, brethren," were replaced at the beginning of the 20th century by the present words and melody, "Ukraine did not die yet".

All activities of the "Holovna Ruska Rada" in the fields of national, political, cultural, educational, military and church affairs show that no area was left untouched, and that the "Rada" left a permanent influence on all of them.

Many criticisms were directed at the Council, as was quite natural, but in view of the historical events and situations, it deserves full appreciation. In general, it was reproached for its loyalty to Austria, but the situation was such that this was the only way to gain any Ukrainian advantages. If the Ukrainians had been disloyal to Austria, they would have damaged their own cause for Austria could have easily eliminated the Ukrainians politically and nationally. The Poles, however, even when they were disloyal to Austria, had always had advantageous connections and influence at the Vienna court.

Some radical spirits disliked the "Holovna Ruska Rada" for its clerical leadership. The Poles diligently endeavored to convince Austrian officials that the Ukrainian requests were only the work of a small clerical group. They were indeed clergymen, but they had always fostered the welfare of the whole nation instead of just the interests of their own class. The blame for some disappointments that followed after 1848, should be laid mainly on the Austrian government, which did not keep its promises to the Ukrainians after re-establishing absolutism. Finally (June 30, 1851) the "Holovna Ruska Rada" had to dissolve; the Ukrainians' most successful and best organized political body was lost up until World War I.

The picture of the Ukrainian awakening in Galicia during the so-called "springtime of nations" period (1848-49) would not be complete without presenting the political views of Rev. B. Podolynsky (1815-1876). He was the Greek Catholic priest of a little village in the Lemky district in the most western part of Galicia. He had studied in Vienna and there had the chance to become acquainted with other Slavic people and their histories. Podolynsky's striking political views were expressed in a lengthy article, "A Voice of Warning", which was not published during his lifetime

but it circulated in manuscript form among members of the "Holovna Ruska Rada" and undoubtedly had some influence upon them.

In his article, Podolynsky analyzed the four main political conceptions among the Ukrainians of that time: Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Austrian, Ukrainian-Russian, and independent Ukrainian. He rejected all these concepts except the last one. He warned the followers of the Polish Ukrainian concept of the oppressions and Polonization efforts inflicted upon them by the Poles in the past. Polish relationships to Ukrainians would not be any different in the future. Any political pact with the Poles would work to Ukrainian disadvantage and eventually would lead to national extinction, even though the Poles had not thus far succeeded in the complete Polonization of the Ukraine, because "it is possible to conquer an army of 100,000 soldiers, but it is not possible to Polonize one Ukrainian village." The Poles had always maintained and would continue to maintain that the Ukrainian language was only a dialect of the Polish. With irony he concluded, "If Ukrainians are Poles and Poles are Ukrainians, would it not be better to introduce the Ukrainian language into all schools and then all would think that they are speaking Polish."

Podolynsky considered the second concept, the Ukrainian-Austrian union, also a hopeless one. He berated mainly the leaders of the "Holovna Ruska Rada" for holding this viewpoint. He was very critical of this loyal attitude of Ukrainians toward Austria because he considered the Austrian government not sincere in its dealings with Ukrainians. He regarded the Austrians in the same light as the Germans, who always remained strangers to the Slavs, including the Ukrainians. The Germans never understood or sympathized with the struggles of the Ukrainians or the Eastern problem. The Austrians, like the Germans, would be interested only in Germanizing all the Slavs.

All pro-Russians among Ukrainians (the Moskrophiles) were just as dangerous as the pro-Polish. Actually, the Russians, just as the Poles, were interested only in suppressing the Ukraine and convincing everyone that the Ukrainians and Russians were "one nationality." These Russian efforts would prove to be futile because "Ukrainians

know very well that their nationality is not identical with their religion. One could be a Catholic, Orthodox or heathen; yet he would remain Ukrainian." (Both Ukrainians and Russians were mainly Greek Orthodox.) Hence, panslavic partnerships would be used by the Russians to their own advantage.

Dismissing these three concepts, he advocated a more skeptical and radical Ukrainian attitude, especially toward Austria. But he also warned against union with any of the other nationalities. Rather than a union with any of these nations, which would not profit the Ukrainians, they should rely on their own resources, in their own strength, and on their own independence. It would be necessary to demand and to struggle for only one union, a union of all Ukrainian ethnic territories. Galicia by herself had no future. The future of Galicia could be successful only by uniting with East Ukraine. In this respect, Reverend Podolynsky was the first Ukrainian "sobornyk" (unifier) to hold the political idea of a free, independent and united Ukraine. Many of his views were later reviewed and adopted by future Ukrainian political parties which realized their soundness. Podolynsky's ideas at that time were much more advanced than the contemporary ideas of the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodius in East Ukraine, the most famous member of which was Taras Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet.

Disregarding time, Podolynsky firmly believed in a united, free and independent Ukraine, "What is a century in the life of a nation?" he asked. Podolynsky's ideas no doubt contributed a great deal to the political maturity of Ukrainian nationalism and his ideals were fulfilled by the famous historical act of January 22, 1919, proclaimed by the Ukrainian government in Kiev. It is impossible to estimate the number of people who followed Podolynsky's concept. However, it is reasonable to assume that such a group must have existed during his lifetime.



## CHAPTER V

### Polish Autonomy in Galicia

After the revolution in Austria was suppressed in 1849 by the troops under the command of Windischgratz, the Habsburg Monarchy returned to absolutism. The new reactionary bureaucracy and the military forces ruled the Habsburg realm with a heavy hand. The Catholic Church regained its authority and was entrusted with the system of education and censorship over publications. Once again the church and the throne were allied to subdue the revolutionary spirit. The reactionary aristocracy, supporting wholeheartedly the Monarchy, once more became the most influential class.

The absolutist decade that followed (1850-1860) has often been called "Bach era", so named for the Minister of the Interior. In Galicia this period could as well be called the "Goluchowski era" after the Governor who was at that time serving the first of his three terms in Galicia. \* Goluchowski was a shrewd politician. As a high aristocrat he won the full confidence of the Emperor. Outwardly, he expressed a deep sense of loyalty to the Monarchy; but at home he expressed his glowing Polish patriotism. He used his office and the confidence of the Emperor to remove all obstacles preventing Polish dominance in Galicia and to stifle the budding Ukrainian nationalist conscience. The easiest way to achieve this was by denouncing all Ukrainians as a pro-Russian people

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\* During the years 1848 - 1916 all Governors of Galicia were of high Polish nobility. They were appointed by the Emperor himself to head the administration located in Lviv. Every governor as the president of the province was simultaneously the chairman of the treasury and of the School Council. Since 1853, police forces, economy, education and religion were under his personal supervision. He reserved the right to censor all publications, to control the labor movement and to suppress any organized opposition. Thus upon the order of the governor many innocent peasants were shot under flimsy pretences.

and a dangerous threat to the safety of Austrian. Thus the "Holovna Ruska Rada" [Main Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Council] was forced to dissolve and its leaders were kept under close police surveillance. He also achieved the disbandment of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Free Corps, which during the troublesome years of the revolution in Hungary had proved its value for the Monarchy. Throughout his governorship in Galicia, he was guided by his ambition to suppress the Ukrainian language and to abolish the Ukrainian chair of language and literature at Lviv University, until Professor Y. Holovatsky, became so discouraged by the Governor's intrigues that he finally left the University to embrace the pro-Russian ideology.

Goluchowski was strongly rebuked by the Ukrainian leaders when he tried to replace the Ukrainian phonetic alphabet with Latin letters, and thus assimilate the Ukrainian writing to the Polish. He exercised great pressure upon the hierarchy of the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Church to renounce the old Julian calendar. In 1856 a decree was issued by which the Polish children were freed from the obligatory subject of the Ukrainian language in the schools of Eastern Galicia. Through his wide connections with the aristocratic circles at the Vienna court, he succeeded in persuading Bach to drop the plan of introducing three separate districts in Galicia, Krakow, Lviv, Stanyslaviv.\*

It is quite obvious that Goluchowski's measures created bitterness among the Ukrainians, who in their disenchantment over Austria turned to the Russian Tsar for help. Austrian reaction and Goluchowski's regime in Galicia were mainly responsible for the development of the Russophile movement among the Ukrainians, and this reaction was in turn skillfully used against them by the governor. This became the "vicious circle" of Ukrainian history under Austrian rule.

The year 1859 was an eventful period in Austrian history. Austria's prestige was shattered by her defeats at Magenta and Solferino when she lost all her Italian possessions except Venice. To save face in front of other nationalities, Vienna decided to abolish absolutism and return to constitutionalism. Bach was removed and A. Goluchowski

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\* See page 128.

replaced him as Imperial Minister. Goluchowski was entrusted with the outlining of a new constitution, which was proclaimed by the *October Diploma* of 1860. However, the October Diploma was found to be unsatisfactory and was replaced by the *February Patent* of 1861, by which the undivided Galicia remained intact. Already in 1860 Goluchowski managed to proclaim a decree through which all officials in Galicia were obliged to know both local languages. Since the Polish officials were in the majority, the administration remained under their control.

During the early 1860's when constitutionalism was reintroduced, the Austrian government endeavored to treat all nationalities equally. These were the years of experimenting with parliamentarism, a period when the Ukrainians in Galicia gained two chairs at Lviv University (1862) and when the problem of the division of Galicia into two parts was discussed in the cabinet (1863). It is difficult to say how sincere the Austrian suggestions were. One might suspect that they were preferred in order to frighten the Poles into cooperating more closely with Austria.

It was in 1866 that the great change took place in Austrian-Polish relations. Austria was defeated by Bismark's Prussia and excluded from the German Federation (Bund). Austria lost not only Venice, but the Magyars were successful in demanding the "*Ausgleich*", and as a result a Dual Monarchy was established. Now it was only logical that Austria should look to the Slavs for a "loyal" majority within the Monarchy.\* However, the question remained whether the Slavs were willing to come to the rescue of the Monarchy. The Czechs, for one, were bitterly opposed to the Hungarian "*Ausgleich*" and clamored for independent status.

The Magyar victory had to be ratified by the Reichsrat and the Czechs were determined not to vote for ratification. Because of the new Austrian franchise which established the class "*curiae*", it was obvious that the Ukrainians would not be able to elect delegates to the local Diet in proportion to their population and it was to be expected that the Ukrai-

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\* Germans, 35%; Czechs, 23%; Poles, 15%; Ukrainians, 15% Slovenes, 4.6%; and the rest consisted of Italians, Rumanians, and Jews.

nians would be underrepresented in the Vienna Parliament. Consequently, they could not influence the decisions of the central government in any appreciable measure.

The government was also uncertain of Polish support. The Poles naturally understood the situation and were inclined to strike a bargain. The Poles who had also passed through a process of political maturation after having lost their revolution against Russia in 1863, they gave up their romantic ideals and became more realistic and opportunistic. As the Polish vote in Parliament became of paramount importance, the Austrian government continued to court Polish cooperation and was ready to make concessions, a policy which ultimately resulted in Polish supremacy in Galicia. A. Goluchowski was made Governor of Galicia for the second time. Shrewdly appraising the political situation in Austria, he accepted the nomination under the conditions that: the idea of the division of Galicia should be abandoned once and forever, a number of Galician officials should be discharged, the secondary schools should be reorganized into Polish institutions, the Polish language should become the official language of the administration, a few Polish chairs should be created at Lviv University, the central government should not interfere in the Polish policy towards the Ukrainians, etc. The Emperor tacitly agreed to all of these requirements. Goluchowski, who up to this time had used only German, addressed the Lviv Diet in the Polish language for the first time, and the vice-president of the Diet, Ziemialkowski, appeared in the Polish national costume. The Diet also decided to introduce district councils (*starostas*), thereby taking a first step towards the autonomy of Galicia.

In 1867 the Poles, encouraged by these successes, drafted their famous "Galician Resolution", which was designed to give Galicia a special position (*Sonderstellung*) in the Habsburgs' realm, equal only to the Hungarian "*Ausgleich*". The Poles clamored in the Resolution for far-reaching provincial self-government and in return they declared their loyalty to the throne: "...with Thee, Your Majesty, we do stand, and we do want to remain with Thee ..." Although the Galician Resolution was not accepted in the Reichsrat, the Emperor himself gradually extended privileges to the Poles which made them the supreme lords and rulers in Galicia.

By this policy of abandoning the Ukrainians, the government secured Polish support in parliament.

If the government was unwilling or hesitant to fulfill the demands of the Poles, or if it made any concession to the Ukrainians, the Polish Parliamentary Club threatened to withdraw its usually well-disciplined delegations. The government, in need of their support, always capitulated. Thus, the Polish Parliamentary Club gained an importance that no other party in parliament ever possessed.

The Austrian policy of "appeasement" of the Poles accelerated the process of Polonization of Galicia. Polish was accepted as the official language in the local administration, including the law courts and the secondary schools. In 1871 the railway and the University at Lviv also adopted Polish as the official language. In the same year the Hohenwart cabinet introduced a special office wherein the new "minister without portfolio," was in fact a Polish minister for Galician affairs. The creation of this office was of course unconstitutional and parliament never sanctioned it and tried to remove it, without success. From that time on all problems referring to Galicia had to be brought to the attention of this minister. Hugelmann writes: "His influence went so far, that no decision of an individual minister could be made without first determining his position and getting his consent." This minister cooperated very closely with the "omnipotent" Polish Parliamentary Club. Ministerial offices were often given to the Polish diehards. For example when the autocratic C. Badeni became Prime Minister, five other Poles entered his cabinet. It comes as no surprise that the term: "Polish government in Vienna" was often used. By 1914 there were over 304 high Polish officials in the government, as compared to only 25 Ukrainians. (Hugelmann)

In 1871 A. Goluchowski was appointed for the third time to be Governor of Galicia. Upon his initiative the permanent "Council of the Province" (*Wydział Krajowy*) was established, and this became the main tool for Polish administrative supremacy in Galicia. Its members were appointed by the local diet, and they were responsible to the diet. It was exceedingly difficult for a Ukrainian to be appointed to the Council. The responsibilities of the Council were widened through the years so that all hospitals, welfare, police, jails, culture, scholarships and indemnities

came under its control. It worked only for the benefit of the Poles and for Western Galicia which was almost exclusively inhabited by Poles.

Another organization, similar to the Council, was the School Council, which contributed its share to the Polonization of Eastern Galicia. It was presided over by the local governor and consisted of 27 Poles and not more than five Ukrainians. The School Council regulated the entire system of education in Galicia, as well as the language to be used in instruction.

Having practically all of the administrative power in their own hands (governor, diet, Provincial Council, School Council, police, courts of law), the Poles made their weight felt. It is especially noteworthy that the Vienna administration left the Poles a free hand in these endeavors, and even more often cooperated with them. This was done in spite of the Austrian constitution of 1867, which included the famous fundamental laws, Article XIX, which provided ample provisions for the benefit of the various nationalities. This law stated that "all nationalities in the state enjoy equal rights, and each one has an inalienable right to the preservation and cultivation of its nationality and language. The equal rights of all languages in local use are guaranteed by the state in schools, administration, and public life. In the provinces inhabited by several nationalities, public educational institutions are to be so organized that, without applying compulsion in the learning of a second language, each nationality receives the necessary means for education in its language." This was a liberal document, indeed. Unfortunately it was neither observed nor enforced in Galicia.

In other chapters we will deal with the Ukrainian struggle for these "equal rights" in Parliament, in the local Diet, and at the Lviv University. Here we will limit ourselves to the facts in the field of the general educational institutions to see how this fundamental law of equality of nationalities was misapplied in Galicia. In the period of the so-called "Galician autonomy" (1866-1914) the Poles possessed the following educational institutions: 1) two universities (Krakow and Lviv); 2) the Academy of Learned Society; 3) a College of Fine Arts; 4) the Academy of Agriculture; 5) two Academies for Trade; 6) ten lower

schools for trade; 7) two hundred lower agricultural schools; 8) two Higher Schools for Political Science; 9) over 30 teachers' colleges (and 12 private); 10) a few professional musical colleges (conservatories); 11) over 96 state gymnasia (secondary schools); 12) and fourteen real-gymnasia (with the stress on scientific subjects). With the exception of six state gymnasia (by 1914), the Ukrainians did not have one of the above public institutions,, except private ones. The statistics of the Galicia budget prove this statement. In 1866 Galicia spent 5.2% of its budget for the educational institutions, but in 1911 over 40% on account of the increase of personnel. In the same year there were over 409 university professors (of whom only ten were Ukrainians), 129 professors of the Polytechnic (no Ukrainian), and over 5,963 public and gymnasium teachers (some Ukrainians).

By an act of 1871 all state-supported primary schools were compelled to use Polish as the teaching language. This law also demanded that applicants for a teacher's certificate must have a knowledge of the Polish language. Since there were only six Ukrainian gymnasia compared to 96 Polish by 1914, it meant that one gymnasium was available for every 520,000 Ukrainians, contrasted to one for every 42,000 Poles. The Ukrainian students who wanted to achieve a higher education were forced to attend the Polish gymnasia. But even here they met with difficulties. At the entrance examinations the Ukrainian candidates were rejected in a surprisingly high percentage. In Ternopil 70 Ukrainian students applied for admission, but only 22 were accepted. The figures were even more drastic at the gymnasium in Peremyshl, where only 60 of the 258 Ukrainian applicants were admitted in 1902, while all 44 of the Polish pupils were accepted.

In those Polish state gymnasia where Ukrainian students were in attendance, only religious instruction was offered in the Ukrainian language. All possible limitations were used to prevent the building of a new Ukrainian gymnasium by the Polish local administration. In 1867 the Polish-controlled diet in Lviv passed a law which made the establishment of a Ukrainian gymnasium dependent upon the approval of the diet, whereas the establishment of a Polish secondary school depended only upon the permission

of the Minister of Education in Vienna. The Poles, due to their connections and influences at the Vienna court, were always able to secure his permission easily. Curious situations often arose. When the Emperor himself insisted on granting the Ukrainians a new gymnasium, the Polish diet would refuse as it did with the gymnasium request in Stany-slaviv. If, however, the Poles were obliged to approve a new Ukrainian gymnasium, they then immediately demanded five of their own.

As far as the public schools were concerned it seemed as if the Ukrainian population was adequately served. According to the statistics of 1910, there were 2,457 Ukrainian and 2,909 Polish elementary schools. But here again, while the Ukrainian schools were mostly one or two room buildings, the Polish contained two to eight rooms. The Ukrainian schools were also often staffed by Polish teachers. All these efforts to maintain Polish control over the school system were carried out under the direction of the School Council, against whose system the Ukrainians had to constantly struggle. E. Levytsky surveyed the situation correctly when he stated: "The Ukrainians were forced to carry on a tough and stubborn struggle for each institution, each position, each school, each office, truly, for each word of the Ukrainian language." The determination with which the Poles opposed, by all means, higher education among the Ukrainians cannot be overstressed. Realizing these circumstances, we can more readily understand why the Ukrainians felt that they had been better off during the period of centralized rule before 1866 than during the period of the Polish autonomy in Galicia after 1867.

The precarious situation in Galicia would not be fully described if the social and economic conditions were ignored. In anticipation, one must say that these conditions were very unhealthy and extremely unsatisfactory. Galicia was predominantly an agricultural region, in which three-fourths of the entire population were farmers (76.6%) Industry, for many reasons, was practically non-existent; at least, it was very poorly developed (8.8% in trade, 4% in commerce, and 10.6% in army and in other professions). There were two sharply divided classes of landowners —large and small, with a small percentage of middle-sized holdings (about



10% of the farmers). The large landowners were not numerous (only 3,000 families), and by nationality they were Poles. Although 76% of the Galicians lived by farming, 40.5% of the entire cultivated land was owned by the Polish nobility, a small minority group. On the other half of the cultivated land over six million farmers, Polish and Ukrainian were holding very small acreages. There were about two million farmers with holdings of 2-5 acres (the real "dwarf-farmers"), and another two million had farms of 5-7 acres, so that about four million of the farmers (half of the entire population) were living on 29% of the entire cultivated land. On the other hand, there were just 25 families in the class of the great landowners, who possessed one-fifth of the entire cultivated land.\* This unequal distribution of land caused constant social tension which was very closely associated with the national struggle. "At first sight, these dumb and non-speaking statistical figures," as Professor Buzek says, "could make so many events in the history of Galicia understandable to anyone who otherwise, not being well acquainted with the conditions of the country, could never understand them..." The Polish nobility still lived in the feudal age. They showed no sympathy for their peasants especially the Ukrainians while they themselves did not care about a progressive system of farming. They lived in their "liberty", spending great sums of money abroad and incurring great debts, and thus brought about the ruin of their own farms. In the years between 1902 and 1910, over 180 farm holdings of the nobility had been parcelled out. The distribution could have helped the land-hungry Ukrainian peasants, but the Poles, representing the policy "not a foot of land to the Ukrainians", distributed such lands to Polish colonists from West Poland (Mazuria), striving to create in Eastern Galicia a hard-core Polish element. This practice contributed very much to the embittering of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

The Ukrainian peasants, as poor as they were, were forced to work on the landowners' estates for a ridiculously small salary (twenty cents for a hard day's labor) to supplement their wretched living. These unhealthy social conditions and Polish abuses led to the landstrikes, of which the

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\*For example, A. Potocki — see page 66.

well-organized and successful strike of 1902 was a good example. This victory gave a moral boost to the Ukrainian peasants and made them aware of the value of an organized struggle for their rights. Such strikes also attracted the attention of foreign correspondents, who quite eagerly painted accurate accounts of the miserable conditions of the local peasants. During this strike many farmers were arrested and were treated like bandits, being brought in chains to the overcrowded jails, where they had to stay for long periods without any judicial rights.

Many of the farmers were forced to emigrate, or to go for seasonal work to Germany. The *Canadian Year Book* of 1911 relates that 14,268 Ukrainian farmers from East Galicia settled in Canada in this one year alone, and the same number in America. A great number of the farmers continued to seek seasonal work in Germany. In the summer of 1912-13, over 100,000 Ukrainian peasants were working in Germany. Many more would like to have gone, but the Polish administration, and especially Governor A. Potocki, objected to this mass emigration to Germany, and kept many of them back on one pretext or another. The Poles suspected the Germans of inflaming Ukrainian antagonism against them. The real objective was, however, that the Poles wanted to keep the Ukrainians in poverty, for they hoped to make them more submissive. In reality, the results were exactly opposite. In addition, the Ukrainians were aggravated and irritated, knowing that all subsidies and support of the central and local government were directed to West Galicia. Improvements such as drainage, and flood control, etc. were exclusively carried out in West Galicia. The Polish administration was anxious to help their own farmers by encouraging and officially supporting economic organizations such as Land Banks, cooperatives, etc., while the Ukrainians received only difficulties and harassments from the Polish officials. The Ukrainian farmers' communities also objected to the Polish political control of their local affairs. The villagers were not admitted to run their communities on their own, by their own election of the elders and the mayor. Instead the district councils (*starostas*) as a rule interfered in the elections and in time only those officials were elected whom the *starosta* wanted and supported.

Under such political, cultural and economic conditions, the Ukrainians could not remain silent onlookers. A vigorous reaction was provoked and the Ukrainians mobilized all their strength to resist the Polish supremacy in defence of their constitutional rights. Thus the Polish-Ukrainian hostilities found their expression in every field. In this struggle the national and political spirit of the Ukrainians was reborn and they emerged from these struggles a mature nation.

In conclusion, let us summarize the advantages gained by the Poles from the autonomy:

Firstly, the Poles were able by abusive methods at the elections, to gain the majority of the representatives to the Vienna Parliament, where they were rewarded for their support to the central government by all kinds of political, cultural, and economic concessions.

Secondly, in the cabinet they always held two to five ministries and utilized them for the benefit of their position.

Thirdly, after 1871 they were represented by a "minister without portfolio," "who, in fact, was the minister for Galician affairs with "veto" privilege.

Fourthly, from 1848 to 1916, the governor of Galicia was always a native Pole, like A. Goluchowski, C. Badeni, A. Potocki, and others who were known for their partisan policies.

Fifthly, the Galician Diet was in the hands of the Poles, while the Ukrainian representation was kept down to eight members. This diet possessed the special legislative prerogatives.

Finally, Polish became the official language in the administration and in education. Ukrainian was hardly tolerated, in spite of the fact that by law the use of this language was protected. The Ukrainians were excluded from any office of importance, and their place was taken by Poles who knew how to preserve the political supremacy of their Polish nationality in general and of the Polish nobility in particular.

## CHAPTER VI

### The Formation of the Ukrainian Mind

To appreciate fully the consequences of the rapid cultural and political development of the Galician Ukrainians from 1866 to 1914 it will be helpful to review their situation in the 1850's and 1860's.

It has been indicated that the year 1848 was an important milestone on the road to Ukrainian national maturity. In this year they advanced very rapidly both politically and nationally, and their organizations compared favorably with those in the other nations under Austrian rule; but this good fortune did not last long.

During the decades (1850-1859) characterized by absolutist-reactionary regimes, the Poles gradually regained their privileged position in Galicia. The political and national demands of the Ukrainians, often considered as criminal, were ignored. The Austrian attitude created disillusionment and resentment among the Ukrainians, whose national and political life was losing its vitality. All political and cultural organizations were gradually closed down. Some of the Ukrainian leaders were turning to Russian Pan-slavism, organized by the Russian Professor M. Pogodin. With Russian government money he generously supported the pro-Russian movement led by D. Zubrytsky, a well known Galician historian, among the Ukrainians in Galicia.

The return of constitutionalism in 1860-61 did not improve the situation in the 60's for the Poles were elevated even higher than before. The Poles skillfully used the situation and were tireless in strengthening their position over the Ukrainians. All Ukrainian attempts to change the course of Austrian and Polish policies failed, for they were still led by the sentiment that the Austrian government would "do everything for us of a good will."

At the Galician Diet of 1861, the Ukrainians formed a

quarter of the entire body, but were gradually eliminated because they were unable to take advantage of the parliamentary system. Conditions were no better at the imperial Reichsrat, where their representation sank to three members, nicknamed the "*Galician Trio*". Galicia in the 1860's became an underling of Poland. The Polish politicians calumniated the Ukrainians as the sworn foes and worst enemies of the Polish nationality and of the Austrian Monarchy. Treason trials of the Ukrainians followed, and disillusionment among the Ukrainians increased. Practically all Ukrainians lost faith in the possibility or ability of the people of Galicia to elevate themselves by their own efforts. A small group of them, under the leadership of Judge J. Lavrivsky turned to the Poles for understanding and cooperation, and gave up the demand for the division of Galicia into Polish and Ukrainian sectors. The first Ukrainian-Polish agreement ended in disappointment. As a result, a greater number of the Ukrainians began to nourish feelings of sympathy toward the Russian Tsar as the only "protector" of the Ukrainians against Polish oppression and Austrian indifference. Thus the Russophile (or "*Moskvo-phile*") movement, fostered definitely by the Poles, expanded in Galicia and for a long time remained a 'cancer in the Ukrainian body'. The Russophiles, called often the Old Ruthenians, denied the rights of the Ukrainian people to independence, proclaimed the ethnic unity of Ukrainians and Russians, and treated the Ukrainian language as a Russian dialect. To confuse the matter more they introduced into their writing and everyday usage a pseudo-'Russian' language, which no Russian could understand. The alphabetical dispute which occurred as the result of an official attempt by A. Goluchowski, Governor of Galicia, to introduce the Latin alphabet, only added "oil to the fire." The Russophile movement developed from a cultural and literary character into distinctly political movement especially after the Austria was defeated by Prussia in 1866, when a rumor was widely spread that Austria might surrender Galicia to Russia. It is needless to recall that Russia always followed the traditional imperialistic policy of "gathering all Russian lands". These policies were publicly proclaimed by the Russophile organ "*Slovo*". The union with Russia became their political *credo*. These ideas were simultaneously

summed up by their delegate Ivan Naumovych in the Lviv Diet in 1866 in the following words: "We are not *Ruthenes* of 1848, but essentially Russians, and we stand for the political unity of the Galician Ruthenians with the Russians." The movement was mainly dominated by the Uniate clergy with their headquarters in the St. George Cathedral in Lviv. Soon other cultural institutions, such as the Stauropegian Institute, the People's Home, and the Galician Matytsia, fell under their influence. Their main leaders were D. Zubrytsky, Adolf Dobriansky, Ivan Naumovych, V. Dudykevych, and A. Didushytsky. Their political agitation was quite effective, since it was richly supported by the Russian "*ruble*".

Again for a while it seemed as if the idea of national independence would be buried forever. Yet surprisingly enough, when everything seemed to be lost, the first poems of Taras Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet, were brought into Galicia by the merchant W. Demet and aroused great enthusiasm and inspiration among the youth, who were seized with a desire to strive for reawakened national aspirations. A spiritual revival started anew. A small group composed of younger and progressive clergy, of a secular intelligentsia and of many more young students, turned their backs on the outside "allies" and put their trust in the resources of their own people. They became ardently interested in the peasant masses, who were still living in semi-feudal relations to the Polish landlords. This group of enthusiasts adopted the people's language, folklore, and customs; and always wore the traditional costumes in order to stress their close association with the peasants. For this reason they were nicknamed "populists" (*Narodovtsi*), a name which they gladly adopted. With a little advice from the Ukrainian patriots in Kiev plus their financial help, they began to publish a number of patriotic papers, which stressed the development of Ukrainian literature as the link to a national revival. They started with the paper "*Vechernytsi*" in 1862, and when this venture failed, they began "*Meta*" (1863), "*Nyva*" (1865), "*Rusalka*" (1866), and finally "*Pravda*", which lasted from 1867 until 1880 under the capable editorship of Alexander Barvinsky. The Ukrainian students in Vienna already by this time were well organized in their academic association "Sich" and for a

long time they were guiding force in this movement. The *Narodovtsi* movement was for many years more a literary and educational movement than a political one. They founded the club, "Ruska Besida" in Lviv, which supported a Ukrainian theater. In 1868 the cultural association "Prosvita" (Enlightenment) was formed, an organization which made remarkable contributions in later years toward the general national awakening. Then in 1873 the "Learned Society of Taras Shevchenko", was born which in 1893 was reorganized as the Academy of Science. In these cultural institutions the *Narodovtsi* formed their national ideology, and their political platforms, and participated in public discussions with the Russophiles on the subjects of language, phonetic spelling, and politics in general. The cleavage between these two groups was growing increasingly wider.

The year 1879 was a turning point. The defeat of the Ukrainians at the elections to the Vienna parliament when only 3 delegates (the "*Galician Trio*") were elected, forced the Young Ukrainians to enter politics. It so happened that the Ukrainians in Galicia by this time received another "shot in the arm" by a great influx of Ukrainian writers, scholars, and political leaders from East Ukraine. Tsar Alexander II issued orders ("*ukazy*") in 1863 and 1876, by which the use of the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian learned societies, and publication or circulation of books in Ukrainian were forbidden. The Ukrainian writers of note, such as Marko Vovchok, I. Nechuy-Levytsky, Lesia Ukrainka, Kvitka, Kotsiubynsky and Hrinchenko started to publish their works in the *Narodovtsi* papers and magazines in Galicia. Some of them, as P. Kulish, V. Antonovych, and O. Konysky settled for a period in Galicia and fostered there the national revival. One of these men was to exert the greatest influence yet on the political and national development in Galicia. This was Professor M. Drahomaniv, as well as in later years Professor M. Hrushevsky, who held after 1894 the chair of the Ukrainian History Department at the University of Lviv and was extremely influential. These two men ushered in a new era in Galicia, Drahomaniv in politics and Hrushevsky in culture and science.

Drahomaniv, whose socialist-radical views ("in culture — realism; in politics — federation; in social questions — democracy") caused him to be deprived of his position as

professor at the University of Kiev, emigrated to Geneva, Switzerland. There he developed energetic political activities, publishing his magazine "Hromada" and a number of books and pamphlets, while at the same time contributing articles to English, French and German papers. Throughout his years in exile he maintained close relations with his friends in Galicia, especially with Ivan Franko, M. Pavlyk and O. Terletsy, and gave them direct instructions in politics. He was well acquainted with the conditions and situations in Galicia from first hand accounts.

He stood close to the Narodovtsi, whom he kept admonishing to abandon trivial discussions about spelling and instead to devote their time and efforts to practical activities for the betterment of the masses. He wrote of the masses in 1887 "One of the principal differences of opinion between the *Narodovtsi* of Lviv and us is evident in the fact that we had constantly to remind them that the Poles had pushed them out of the Diet and the Russophiles out of their institutions. We advocated that they give up their policy of compromises and denunciation of each other and instead go to the people and organize associations, reading halls, and stores; to call mass meetings, including the Polish peasants; and to elect a representative committee from all institutions and organizations which would become a real and powerful diet. Having accomplished this, they could then appear in the official parliamentary bodies as a powerful factor and not as servants or beggars. They could appear as representatives of the masses, not as lone individuals." (1887) \*

Regarding the Russophiles, Drahomaniv proposed a separation from them. Following his suggestion, the Lviv students resigned from the Russophile students' organization

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\* Drahomaniv's views were whole-heartedly endorsed by Ivan Franko, the greatest Ukrainian poet and politician of Galicia. In addition, here is the opinion of D. Doroshenko, the great Ukrainian historian, second to Michael Hrushevsky. "I hold Drahomaniv as a patriot, as a scholar and as a socially-political worker in very high esteem. His political views, just as his socialist ideas belong to history and are the subject of historic criticism as does his political activity. This activity was inspired by such a sincere and glowing love for his native people... It seems to me that the Ukrainian case would have been poorer idealistically and weaker morally but for Drahomaniv. Without Drahomaniv it would be, let us say, as without Shevchenko". Quoted after: *The Ukrainian Historian*, 1-2, New York 1966, Excerpts of D. Doroshenko's letters to O. P. Ohloblyn, p. 104.



and established their own society. Many of the Russophile students joined the Narodovtsi movement and the Russophile party thus started to decline.

The *Narodovtsi*, who previously had had no political program, considered Drahomaniv's ideas as too radical and too socialistic. For this reason, an estrangement or at least indifference to the political ideas of the East Ukrainians was noticeable among the Ukrainians in Galicia, who in many respects were still too conservative and as such were endeavoring to remain loyal to Austria. However, Drahomaniv, though a socialist, was able to subordinate the ideal of the international fraternity of workers to the political interests of the Ukrainian nation. He wrote once that "socialism in our country must go hand in hand with the interest of our own people in national rebirth." He stated that the Polish socialists were doing exactly this. "I never trusted the Polish socialists because in the first place, they were the 'old Poles inside'. I came to the conclusion that it is necessary to busy oneself with the matter of building one's own house; having accomplished that, then the brothers "will come along and congratulate us."

The *Narodovtsi* in 1880 entered a new stage of development. The movement was led now by the newly educated classes, consisting mainly of "professors", and lawyers such as Julian Romanchuk, Omelian Ohonovsky, Alexander Ohonovsky, Alexander and Volodymyr Barvinsky, and Nataly Vakhnianyn. They were all idealists and dedicated workers for the benefit of their nation, the defenders of the constitutional rights. Julian Romanchuk assumed the leadership and inspired the *Narodovtsi* to new activities through his very popular paper *Batkivshchyna* (Fatherland). As an example of the idealism and sacrifice of those men for the benefit of the Ukrainian cause, it should be recalled that Volodymyr Barvinsky worked for years without any remuneration as editor of the paper "*Dilo*" which was founded in 1880, and a few years later became a leading Ukrainian daily in Galicia. For years "*Dilo*" \* was the organ most instrumental in forwarding the national revival.

The movement made remarkable headway, and the Russophiles kept losing ground. The *Narodovtsi* must be

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\* It survived until World War II.



**M. Shashkevych**



**I. Franko**



**T. Shevchenko**



**M. Drahomaniv**



**M. Hrushevsky**



credited with the first mass meeting of 2,000 people at Lviv. They also organized the "*Narodna Rada*" (National Council), the first political body since the "*Holovna Ruska Rada*" of 1848, which formulated programs similar to these of its predecessor: the division of Galicia into Polish and Ukrainian parts, and the union in a national autonomy of the Ukrainian areas in Austria, Hungary, and Rumania.

The more radical wing, mainly the younger members and students, the followers of Drahomaniv — Ivan Franko (the greatest poet, novelist, journalist and politician in Galicia), Michael Pavlyk, Ostap Terletsky, Evhen Levytsky, and Teophil Okunevsky — banded together and organized the first "Ukrainian Radical Party" whose political program demanded the full independence of the whole Ukraine. In 1895 the fourth party congress accepted this idea. Thus 1890 became as important in Galician history as 1848, for it was a year of general political fermentation and crystallization of national aspirations an event which, of course, centered around the struggle against Polish supremacy.

The year 1890 was also important for other reason. Some of the leaders, influenced by Alexander Konysky and Professor Volodymyr Antonovych from East Ukraine, came to an understanding with the Poles through Count Casimir Badeni, Governor of Galicia. By this "pact" the *Narodovtsi* were expected to break completely with the Russophiles and to stress their unconditional loyalty to Austria. In return, they would receive from the local diet some financial subsidies for their cultural institutions plus other small concessions. The agreement was supposed to begin a "new era" of peaceful coexistence. However, the results were just the opposite. The Polish-Ukrainian hostilities increased, and a split within the *Narodovtsi* was provoked. The "pact policy" was energetically opposed by the Radicals, Moskvophiles, and that part of the *Narodovtsi* under E. Olesnytsky.

This policy was also unpopular with the Ukrainian people as a whole, since they did not trust the Polish sincerity in the agreement. The agreement was also doomed to fail because of the differences of approach by the two sides. The Ukrainians interpreted it to mean a free autonomous development of their national, cultural and social life; while the Poles, on the other hand, understood it to mean an allegiance of Ukrainian loyalty to the Poles and to the Austrians. The

Poles, who never wanted to acknowledge the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation, did not treat this pact seriously as a contract between two equal partners. Only a year after the agreement, when the smallest of the Ukrainian expectations (that of increasing the number of representatives to Parliament) was not fulfilled, it became apparent that the Poles did not feel obliged to keep the agreement. The original champion of this *uhoda* (agreement), J. Romanchuk, repudiated it publicly and started with new vigor to organize the *Narodovtsi* with clearer political views. At the 1892 meeting of the "Narodna Rada", the *Narodovtsi* organized their political party, stressing the point that the "Ukrainians in Austria are a part of the Ukrainian nation, which lost its independence, fought for centuries for its political rights, and will never give up its goal of national independence."

The ensuing events in Galicia, especially the famous "bloody election" to the local diet in 1895 and the frustrating result of the mass delegation to the Emperor (1895) whose unforgettable words of nonchalant dismissal, "Good-by, my gentlemen", opened the eyes of the Ukrainian politicians. The mass deputation from Galicia requested an audience with the Emperor to present their grievances and complaints about their situation in Galicia, including the terroristic practices at the last elections. But the cabinet, headed by the same C. Badeni who had been most responsible for the "bloody election", intervened and allowed only 5 delegates to appear before the Emperor. The Emperor's refusal to listen to their complaints cost Badeni the good will of many Ukrainians whose trust and loyalty to the Monarch had been indestructable. The leaders became convinced that only by their own strength and effort could something be achieved — nothing could be expected from the "grace of the Emperor" or by the "grace of the Iron Governor (Badeni)". The political leaders concentrated their attention on organizational work among their own masses. During the last half of the 1890's political consciousness in Galicia made rapid progress. Organizations among the masses began to spring up. Mass meetings were called at frequent intervals to discuss all kinds of political and social problems. The common people were encouraged to stand up for their own rights, rights granted them by the constitution, which the leaders diligently studied and explained. The Radical Party

especially gained great popularity because of its energetic and enlightening work among the masses. The selfless and sacrificial work of the intelligentsia was highly appreciated by the common people, who in turn were willing to participate actively. Self-supporting, independent economic organizations such as the cooperatives, credit unions and banks were whole-heartedly embraced by the masses. The people, seeing the benefits from these organized institutions accepted their leaders with full confidence. All of the Ukrainian political parties, regardless of individual ideologies participated in organizing the masses. Mutual respect and understanding made them support one another, for party fanaticism was unknown even though party convictions differed.

Into Ukrainian politics a new political grouping entered at the turn of the century. In 1899 a more moderate wing of the Radical Party — under Ivan Franko, Volodymyr Ochrymovych, and Eugen Levytsky, in cooperation with Professor Michael Hrushevsky — united with the *Narodovtsi* to organize the *National Democratic Party*, which became the strongest party and took the decisive lead in the political life of the Ukrainian people. The new party endeavored, politically, “to achieve the ultimate unification of the whole Ukrainian nation into one single national organization”, and socially “to buy up the land from the large landowners in order to redistribute it among the landless.” A year later another political party, the *Social-Democratic Party*, under the leadership of Mykola Hankevych and Julian Bachynsky (author of *Ukraina Irredenta*), was organized with a program demanding “a free Ukrainian State, a Ukrainian Republic”. There were also attempts (1896) on the part of Alexander Barvinsky to create a clerical party, the “Catholic National Union”, but it did not gain a great following because the clergy, being cured of Russophilism, joined the ranks of the National Democratic party instead. The Ukrainians were now making progress toward the goal of an independent Ukrainian nation.

Parallel with the political developments were great improvements made by the Galician Ukrainians in their cultural and social life. The Ukrainian leaders, and the intelligentsia agreed that the general education of the masses and the creation of better living conditions would hasten the national revival among the common people.

The Ukrainians decided to concentrate on the establishment of secondary schools. The Ukrainian delegates to Parliament and the Diet arranged with the government for the increase of state supported Ukrainian gymnasias. At the same time the leaders of the intelligentsia promoted the creation of 15 private educational institutions and a normal coeducational college. Since these private schools were supported by donations alone, their upkeep and teachers' salaries required loyal support from the people. In spite of the general poverty, the Ukrainians maintained these institutions by diligent and sacrificial generosity. A special board, the "Land School Union" (Soyuz) created in Lviv, assumed the financial and moral responsibility for these institutions.

During the long struggle for a Ukrainian University (described more fully below) some minor concessions in the form of separate Ukrainian chairs were granted by the government, so that by 1914 there were seven full professors and four lecturers.

The leaders were occupied with another pressing problem: providing needy college students with inexpensive accommodations. With the aid of donations from the general population, about 100 homes, each housing 200-300 students, were made available. Even the University students in Lviv acquired their own "Academic Home", where they found adequate living quarters at reasonable prices.

Of great value to the cause was the "Ukrainian Pedagogic Association" in Lviv, which provided three private schools, a coeducational normal school, several lodging homes, and less expensive used textbooks. This association also sponsored a special teachers' organization with its own credit bank and bookstores.

Along with the education of youth in different types of schools went the efforts for adult education throughout the country. Here again the "Prosvita" contributed greatly. The whole country was covered with a network of reading clubs to spread knowledge into the darkest corners and to cultivate national faith and hope. Each reading hall maintained a library with books, newspapers, and magazines; a choir; an amateur theatrical group; and recreational programs. In attendance, the "Prosvita" halls were equaled only by the churches. Old and young spent their spare time there

joyfully and gratefully, participating in organized educational courses in agricultural, reading, and even anti-alcoholic circles. In 1912 there were 74 branches of the main Lviv center and 2,611 reading halls, with over 130,000 members. The main center counted 35,500 members and published monthly a useful, practical book which was sent free to all members.

By 1912 "Prosvita" had published 3,115,395 copies of 445 books. They also established 45 scholarships to support students in high schools and at the university. The "Prosvita" center owned a suitable building, and its wealth surpassed one million crowns, even though the society itself existed on donations alone. The dignity, idealism, and national honor of "Prosvita" were exemplified in 1875 — just seven years after its beginning — when its board rejected an annual government subsidy of 2,000 crowns because the Poles would have made some reservations in regards to their cultural activities.

The highest achievement of their educational work was the establishment of the "Shevchenko Scientific Society", an association of intellectuals concerned with the regeneration of Ukrainian literature and scholarship. It was transformed after some changes in 1892 and 1898 into an Academy of Science. The Shevchenko Society, designed to increase studies in Ukrainian history, philology, and natural science, gained international recognition for its learned publications. It especially flourished under the direction of Professor Michael Hrushevsky. This man was endowed with extraordinary energy and the ability to attract the most talented and idealistic scholars from the entire Ukraine as his co-workers at the Academy. With generous financial help from art patrons — Vasyl Symyrenko, the owner of sugar refineries in Kiev, and Evhen Chykalenko, a landed proprietor in Kherson province — publishing activities in the fields of history, archæology, ethnology, folklore, language and literature were carried out. By 1914 over 300 volumes of scientific research had been published. The Academy owned a large scholarly library of unique books and its own museum. It had its own printing office in an Academy-owned building. "Literaturno-Naukovy Vistnyk" (*The Literary-Scientific Messenger*), a monthly literary magazine, was valuable to European reviews because it informed readers of important



events in European literary and cultural life. All the prominent and gifted writers in Galicia assembled around this magazine — Ivan Franko, Olha Kobylianska, Wasyl Stefanyk, and Andrew Chaikovsky, to mention only a few.

A great impetus to the cultural development of Galicia was also provided by the Metropolitan Count Andrew Sheptytsky, who in this respect could be compared to the stalwart and fearless J. G. Strossmayer, Bishop in Croatia. Sheptytsky founded the "National Ukrainian Museum" in Lviv (1913). The Uniate clergy, under his leadership, broke completely with the Russophiles and became active leaders among their own flocks. In many villages and cities where they assumed such leadership they remained loyal to the national ideal even under Soviet auspices between 1945 and 1948.

The theater, a "wandering stage" also contributed a great deal to the general awakening of the nation. Performing historical dramas, it impressed the simple people with the beauty of their own language and instilled pride in their history. The theater in general gained a warm reception among the people, who generously supported it and strove to establish a permanent theater in Lviv. A site was acquired in Lviv and with the donations from the people a theater was erected. A privately supported conservatory of music, the "Lysenko Musical Institute", was also functioning.

Closely allied with the educational activities of the "Prosvita" were two athletic organizations for the younger men and women. Especially effective in this area were "Sokil" (1898) and "Sich" (1900), which combined physical training with the promotion of patriotic and cultural interests. Both bodies maintained their own reading halls, choirs, libraries, theater groups, and numerous self-educating courses, spreading the national sentiments and consciousness among the youth. The colorful uniforms and the historical insignias had a special attraction to the young members.

The organizer and leader of "Sich" was an aggressive speaker and delegate to the diet and to parliament, a lawyer from Kolomyia, Dr. Cyril Trylovsky. Since he was a leading member of the Radical party, "Sich" came under its influence. By 1912, there were 794 members in "Sich" and 866 in "Sokil", with Ivan Bobersky and Vasyl Nahirny as their leaders. Both organizations, the nucleus of the future

Ukrainian army, joined in forming a voluntary division of "Ukrainian Sharpshooters" (Sichovi Striltsi). who achieved much fame in Ukrainian history for their struggle against the Russian army in the Carpathian Mountains in 1914-1915, and again in the war against the Poles for the independence of the West Ukrainian Republic (1918-19).

Aside from education, the Ukrainian political leaders were concerned with the improvement of the socio-economic status of the poverty-stricken population. They soon realized the uselessness of talking about lofty ideals to people with empty stomachs. Not speeches, but action was required. "Prosvita" took the first step publishing many popular books on the subject of better farming methods. It sent out a group of specially trained agriculturists on a lecture tour throughout the country to encourage the farmers to use modern methods. It organized summer schools and supplied over 550 stores which sold farm implements at reduced prices. It enabled the peasants to purchase these tools by establishing over 260 small loan associations which charged low interest rate.

Still much remained to be done. With the assistance of "Prosvita", other societies were created to take part in the responsibility to improve the general welfare of the peasants. In 1898 the "Silskyj Hospodar" (Village Farmer) was established. It worked for the benefit of the farmers who had suffered exceptional disasters from hail, flood, or fire. Small machinery stations were also set up to enable farmers to have the use of the machines at a low cost. It maintained some experimental farms which were visited by thousands of young farmers. Due to the shortage of Ukrainian agricultural schools, every year it organized 30 special agricultural courses with the best instructors to teach the peasants how to make the land more productive. It was also the first organization to help the farmers with the sale of their cattle. Within a short time it developed many activities, and almost every farmer was affected. In 1912 there were 90 branches and over 1,150 circles with 27,000 members.

Of invaluable assistance to the farmers were the credit unions, organized in 1898; especially those of the Raffeisen type, which were a definite success in Galicia. Where they operated, usury disappeared. The credit unions elevated

the people economically as well as morally, Loans were extended to people in good standing, and in order to become eligible for loans, many people changed their way of living, especially giving up drinking. "Vidrodzhennia" (rebirth) organizations were also active in this respect. The credit unions became very popular and were established in almost every small village. Working with the credit unions, consumer cooperatives were maintained and usually located in the same buildings as "Prosvita" reading halls. There were also a few cooperative "Land Banks" and other savings institutions. The center of all the cooperative organizations was the "Provincial Audit Union" (*Kraievyy Revisyinyi Soiuz*). in the cities the "Narodna Torhovla" (*People's Trade*) was serving the people. Another organization was the "Dairy Co-op", with its center in Stryj and branches around the country. Another was an insurance association, "Dnister" (1892), which grew in importance as time went on. Almost all sociologists and historians agree that the Ukrainians, although living under oppressive conditions, surpassed the Poles in organizing cooperatives.

The political parties, especially the Radical Party, worked for immediate improvements in the living conditions of the farmers. They succeeded in arranging for seasonal work for the peasants in Germany, where they were better paid and better treated.

In 1902 the peasants staged their successful land strike, which proved the value of being well-organized and having capable leaders. All political parties aided this strike, but the Radical Party was most active and gained great popularity afterwards among the peasants. The strike was a moral as well as an economic victory. The peasants, encouraged by this success, became more active in other political, national, educational, and social, groups.

In this connection the women's organizations ("*Soiuz Ukrainok*") should be also mentioned. These organizations definitely helped to promote the general awakening of the nation.

It is evident that great strides toward national development were made in a very short time, especially in the 15 years from 1895 to 1910. But when we remember the state of Galicia in 1867, it is almost impossible to believe what

had been accomplished since then. The Ukrainians at last achieved political importance in Austria-Hungary. Of this period Hrushevsky aptly said: "If, therefore and in spite of all, in the face of such untold obstacles, so much has been accomplished in Galicia in so short a time regarding the Ukrainian national development, it serves as very eloquent proof of the vitality and endurance of the Ukrainian nation, which has not degenerated under an oppression of 500 years, and of its ancient civilization which has not been lost during so many centuries of slavery and decadence."

## CHAPTER VII

### **The Ukrainian Struggle for the Right of Democratic Suffrage to the Vienna Parliament and the Local Diet**

Because of the internal and external misfortunes of the preceding years Austria was forced to return to constitutionalism in 1860. By an imperial diploma of October of the same year, and much more by the February Patent of 1861, the parliamentary system in Austria was restored. The constitution underwent further changes in 1867. In this year Austria was reorganized into the Dual Monarchy (Austro-Hungarian) in which Hungary was almost independent, bound to Austria only by personal union. Austria proper was divided into 17 territorial (seldom national) provinces or crownlands, with their local assemblies (diets) and governors (*Statthalter*), nominated by the Emperor. The constitution of 1867 guaranteed the civil rights of all men, as well as freedom of speech, of the press and assembly, and the provinces received additional powers of self-rule.

The central Parliament in Vienna consisted of two chambers: the Upper and the Lower House. The members of the Upper chamber were nominated by the Emperor. These were the so-called "virilists", who as a rule came from the higher social classes: dynastic aristocrats, heads of noble families, leading ecclesiastics and distinguished individuals. The members of the Lower chamber were up to 1873 delegates selected by the provincial diets, and later elected through the system of "*curiae*".

Broad powers were now assigned to this Parliament. Matters of finance and currency (budget), tariffs, the armed forces quotas, international treaties, and all affairs of primary and higher education as well as religion were handled by this institution. The ministers, though nominated by the Emperor, were responsible to the Parliament and the deputies were free to interpollate or impeach them. However, all bills passed by both chambers had to be approved by the Emperor

himself in order to become law. The Emperor retained the right to summon, adjourn or dissolve the Parliament. He also was entitled to issue decrees when parliament was not in session, but they had to be endorsed by the responsible minister.

Each of the seventeen provinces of the Monarchy had its own local assembly (diet) of a single house. The competence of the diets through the years was enlarged to the extent that some provinces, like Galicia, received wide provincial autonomy. In general, all local matters not restricted to the central parliament belonged to the diets. Matters, such as education and religion, although they were decided upon by the central parliament, were sent back to the diet for implementation. The Emperor, however, reserved the right to approve all the decisions of the diets and to appoint the provincial governor, the administrative overseer who presided over the diet, and decided the order of business, and who could dissolve the diet. The Land Commission, another organ of central control, worked hand in hand with the governor.

For our purposes the Austrian franchise system is important because it affected the Ukrainian representation both in parliament and in the local diet at Lviv.

According to the February constitution of 1861, the members of the Lower chamber were elected by the provincial diets. This system prevailed through the constitution of 1867 and lasted until 1873, after which the deputies to parliament were elected by the population, which was divided into different classes (*curiae*) of voters. At first the Galician diet counted 150 members and was entitled to send 38 members to the Vienna Parliament, which consisted of 203 deputies in all. Among these 38 delegates sent to Vienna, there were only 11 Ukrainians, or less than one third of the allotted number (see tables on page 166). The Ukrainian population, however, was in the majority in Galicia. Consequently, the franchise was highly undemocratic and discriminatory. There was no equality of nationalities, even though the fundamental law stressed this point.

In the Austrian franchise system that lasted to 1907, many old, conservative and feudalistic rules remained, as well as the division between "*historic*" and "*non-historic*" nations. The Poles, considered as an "*historic nation*", fared

exceptionally well in the new constitutional era. It should be remembered that the October decree of 1860 was drafted by Count Agenor Goluchowski, who as a Pole was concerned principally with the well-being of his own aristocratic class.

The franchise was based upon four *curiae* or classes: 1.) great landowners; 2.) members of the chambers of commerce; 3.) townspeople; and 4.) villagers. The *curiae* were established, not in proportion to the population, but to the amount of taxes paid. Of the last two *curiae*, only those who paid at least ten gulden (florins) in taxes were eligible to vote, and their vote was indirect; that is, they elected their electors, who then cast their votes for the deputies. Equality of voting rights did not exist. The delegate who was a nobleman was often elected by twenty to thirty votes (women exceptionally, in this class were given the privilege to vote), while the deputy of the peasants needed 110,000 votes to carry his election. Under such a system the 3,235 families of the Polish nobility in Galicia could and did elect the majority of representatives to the diet, and hence sent more of their candidates to the Vienna Parliament, than the remaining six million people.

The suffrage laws were not fully rectified by the slight revisions made in 1882, when voting rights were extended to those who paid five instead of ten gulden of direct tax. This did not amount to much of a change, for the great landowners found ways to influence their peasant voters. By bribery and pressure they preserved their dominant role in parliament and in the diet.

In 1873 the selection of the parliamentary deputies by the diets was changed. From that time on, the whole empire was divided into electoral districts, from which only one deputy was elected. Also the number of deputies was raised from 203 to 353. The Poles resisted the proposed reform bill and during the debates they left Parliament in protest, but their final support of the bill was again bought by a number of concessions to them. In 1871 they received a special "minister without portfolio" for Galicia, who became an important lobbyist representing Polish interests in Vienna. Among other concessions, the map of the electoral districts of Galicia was drawn in such a way that the hegemony of Polish deputies remained unchallenged, and the system of "*curiae*" remained untouched.

Such suffrage amounted to a great injustice to the Ukrainian population who could vote only in the last *curia*. This was a legal setback. The number of Ukrainian representatives in Parliament and in the Diet remained in disproportion to their population and to their historical position in Galicia. The Austrian government treated them as a "non-historic nation" and placed them under Polish supremacy. If Article 19 of the fundamental law, which guaranteed equality to all nationalities, had been enforced, the Galician Ukrainians would have been represented by half of 150 seats in the Galician Diet. \*

The suffrage based on taxation amounted to another disproportionate representation of the Ukrainians in Vienna. In 1910 the Ukrainians in Galicia constituted 13.20 per cent of the total Austrian population, but possessed only 6.4 per cent of the number of delegates to the Vienna Parliament. The suffrage laws subjected the Ukrainians to many grievances and limitations. The Poles numbered 16.59 per cent, including Jews, but they occupied 15.70 per cent of the seats, making their representation in Parliament almost equal to their total population. Naturally, the Poles had no reason to complain about the suffrage, which legally secured them a large majority both in Parliament and the Diet.

This situation may be better illustrated graphically. The table below shows the number of representatives to the Parliament and Diet in the years between 1861-1914.

At first glance at the table below, it will be noticed that there is a sudden falling off in the number of Ukrainian

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\* The census of 1910, conducted by Polish officials, indicated 57 per cent of the total population in Galicia as Poles and only 43 per cent Ukrainians; however, 800,000 Jews and over 200,000 Roman Catholic Ukrainians were included in the Polish majority. Without these two groups the Poles could not have exceeded 40 per cent. Yet in that same year they elected 75 per cent of the representatives to the Vienna Parliament, whereas the Ukrainians, only 25 per cent of the total number (106) from Galicia. This was still considered a great step forward by the Ukrainians since there had been many years when the total number of Ukrainian delegates was kept down to a token representation of 4.7 per cent in Vienna in 1879 and 8.5 per cent in the local diet in 1883.

Frequent references will be made to the ratio of the Ukrainians to the Polish population. A map based on the census of 1910 is attached to the rear cover of the book and illustrates clearly the percentage of each group. This map was taken from Dr. B. Staruch's Ph.D. thesis; *Kampf der Galizischen Ukraine um ihr Selbstbestimmungsrecht im alten Oesterreich (1772-1918)*, Innsbruck, 1949, and has been used here with his permission.



### VIENNA PARLIAMENT

Period	Year	Total Number Delegates	Galician Total	Ukrainian Total	% of Ukrainian Delegates
1	1848	383	96	35	36.4
2	1861	203	38	11	28.9
3	1867	203	38	4	15.2
4	1870	203	38	4	15.2
5	1873	353	63	15	23.8
6	1879	353	63	3	4.7
7	1885	353	63	5	7.9
8	1891	353	63	7	11.1
9	1897	425	78	9	11.5
10	1901	425	78	8	10.2
11	1907	516	106	27	25.4
12	1911	516	106	26	24.5

### LVIV DIET

Period	Year	Total	Ukrainian Delegates	Ukrainian Virilists	% of Ukrainian Delegates
1	1861	150	46	3	32.6
2	1867	150	35	2	24.6
3	1870	150	32	2	22.6
4	1877	150	14	2	10.6
5	1883	150	11	2	8.6
6	1889	150	17	3	13.3
7	1895	152	14	3	11.1
8	1901	161	13	3	9.9
9	1908	161	20	3	14.2
10	1913	161	32	3	21.7
New Reform	1914	228	62	4	27.2

delegates to Parliament (from 11 to 4) starting with the second session of 1867. The policy of limiting the number of these delegates is reflected in the following years up to 1907. Never again in the remaining years of the constitutional era were the Ukrainians even able to attain the ratio of 1861.

Beside the discriminatory suffrage system, is there another explanation for these losses? Part of the blame may be placed on the Polish administration whose officials since 1867 had been guilty of irregularities in election procedures. Only a few years before, however, in 1861, the Ukrainians had the highest percentage of delegates in their whole parliamentary history. This was because the election of 1861 was relatively fair.

The fairness of this election was not entirely due to its being the first one. Ulterior motives were present: the Poles were anxious to win over the Ukrainians to obtain their support in preparing for the revolution against Russia which was eventually to take place in 1863.

By the time of the next election (1867), the Poles, imitating the Czechs, had devised a plan to present in Parliament their famous "Polish Resolution" (see Chapter 5, pg. 139 by which Galicia should receive autonomy and at the same time remain legally under their rule. Fearing that their "Resolution" would meet opposition from the Ukrainian delegates who backed the idea of centralized government, they recognized that the maximum legal number of Ukrainian deputies was detrimental to their plans. Hence, they decided to cut this number to the bare minimum. The Poles soon learned that the above described franchise presented opportunities for all kinds of subversion. They did not hesitate to indulge in fraud, corruption, forgery, vote stealing, violence and terror.

The records of the Parliament and Diet provide the best historical sources of material on the methods of abuses inflicted at each election. There are hundreds of interpellations and emergency motions in reference to these abuses. In addition, a mass of books, pamphlets, and treatises written on the subject of Galician elections were based on the personal experiences of the candidates.

In the next election years these election abuses were

performed with greater skill and perfection. Soon the whole administrative apparatus, which was in the Polish hands anyway — schools, judicial courts, police forces, finance, and tax offices — was prevailed upon to help the Polish candidates win their elections. During Prime Minister Badeni's time, in the years 1895-97, the use of gendarms and soldiers was introduced. Consequently the Ukrainian voters were treated with increased brutality at the election time.

As a rule the officers conducting the elections were exclusively Poles, always armed and accompanied by gendarmes, who were specially rewarded if they succeeded in electing the candidates of the nobility. For committing such abuses, they were referred to as the "election hyenas and jackals".

Without going into details, a few bare facts are sufficient to show how systematically the Poles repeated these practices at every election.

In the first place, the lists of voters were falsified. This was the practice in every voting place of Ukrainians in Easter Galicia. As a rule, the names of pro-Ukrainian voters were stricken off and replaced by names of those not entitled to vote under the law — names of people who had years before emigrated to the United States of America, or even names of the dead. Naturally, these lists were not exhibited for public inspection. If lists were corrected before the election, they were put aside and only falsified lists were used on election day. Often the election officers possessed both lists and interchanged them, depending on the assumed intelligence of the voter. In this way many qualified voters were prevented from exercising their right to vote.

According to the law the time and place of each election was to be announced a few weeks in advance. In reality, this was never done. In many places the officers would arrive at the polls a few hours before the election, and meet there only a small group of voters who had been secretly informed ahead of time. These voters were bribed to cast their ballots for the governmental candidates. When the mass of voters arrived at the designated time, the officers would close the election, stating that the watches of the voters were slow (as much as two or three hours) and only the officer's watch was correct. Or the officers would arrive

secretly in the night at the manors of the great landowners and there hold the election with a few people previously instructed and bribed.\* In the villages where the time and place had been announced ahead, the officers changed them at the last moment and appeared in another location, making it impossible for the voters to reach it on time. As soon as the governmental candidate had received the necessary majority, the elections were closed, and the pro-Ukrainian voters were driven out by the gerndarmes.

Another method devised to "falsify" the election was stealing votes. Legally every party had a right to send a representative to be present at the counting of the ballots; however, Ukrainians were seldom admitted to witness the count. Under such conditions the majority became the minority. The results of the "ballot counting" were supposed to be certified by the local mayors, who in most cases refused to do so. If this happened the officers proceeded to attach the mayors' seals to their falsified statements in lieu of the signatures. If the voters were especially keen and watchful, and the Ukrainian candidate received the majority of votes, the elections were postponed or declared invalid. Also, the district administrators (starostas) exercised great influence during elections. They openly and officially instructed the village mayors to work for their candidates. "You do as I tell you, or you will not be the mayor any longer." In other instances they distributed ballots fixed with the names of the favored candidates and the spaces for the others spotted with ink. If the starostas were informed that the Ukrainian villagers were determined to vote for their own candidate, the tax collectors, the least pleasant officials anywhere, were ordered to terrorize the voters by the most drastic method of collecting taxes — by requisitions. If the villages resisted such practices, the starostas sent gendarmes who made use of guns and bayonets. Still another custom was to station military units among the farmers, whose possessions became an easy prey of the soldiers.

Abuses were also conducted against the electors. It was quite easy to prevent them from voting, by placing them in jails until after election day. Dr. I. Makukh, a long standing

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\* One should not forget the so-called "Galician poverty and misery."

Ukrainian representative to the Diet, wrote in his memoirs that it was necessary to warn the electors many days before an election and hide them in barns to insure their safety before election day.

The Polish administration spent vast sums on this kind of election, misappropriating even funds assigned for the aid of the poor who had suffered damages from hail, storm, flood, or other disaster. Michael Bobrzynski, governor of Galicia, testified quite openly that he had used less of such a fund (1,100,000 crowns) than had his predecessor Potocki (1,300,000).

These methods were greatly surpassed at the elections to both the Diet in 1895 and the Parliament in 1897, during Badeni's term as governor of Galicia and later as Prime Minister of the Monarchy. Badeni was a great landowner in Galicia. During these elections ten Ukrainian peasants were killed by bayonets, 30 were seriously wounded, and over 800 voters were arrested. Only nine Ukrainian delegates, all pro-Badeni men, were elected, and the principal leader of the Ukrainians, Julian Romanchuk, lost his election. The election went into history as the "bloody election".

The extent to which the electoral abuses and violence existed during Badeni's period is best illustrated in the case of Ivan Franko, a most popular and admired figure among Ukrainians. He ran for office three times and each time lost. In 1895, when Franko then a candidate to the Lviv Diet tried to get in touch with the electors in his constituency (Peremyshl-Dobromil-Sambir) he was simply jailed before the election. In 1897 and in an additional election in 1898 to the Vienna Parliament he lost by 10 votes (256-266) against an obscure opponent in the Ternopil-Zbarash-Skalat constituency, though he was leading 2 to 1 during the entire counting. The final results, however, were changed.

Speaking of Badeni we have to go back to the franchise reform in parliament, which was the main issue of discussion in the years 1893-1896. Windischgraetz, the Prime Minister, had already proposed the additional fifth *curia*, which would elect 45 delegates. The project met great opposition, mainly from the Poles, and the Windischgraetz cabinet fell. His place was taken by Count Casimir Badeni, who presented a new project to parliament. Badeni had

an easier time with his project because three other ministerial portfolios were occupied by the Poles, who backed him strongly.

Badeni left the old electoral system — voting by *curiae* — untouched. He added, however, the fifth *curia* of all men over 24 years of age with residence established for six months, who would elect an additional 12 deputies. The total number of deputies was increased from 353 to 425. By creating the fifth *curia*, about 5,250,000 new voters were made eligible to vote. However, a deeper examination of Badeni's scheme reveals that it was not an extension of suffrage in the ordinary sense of the word. Discrimination was not removed, and one delegate still represented each of the following groups: 19 landlords, 3,000 city population, 9,000 peasants, and 50,000 voters of the fifth *curia*. However, his project was accepted and sanctioned. The degree of disproportion was even greater in the Galician election of 1897 under the new franchise, in which one Ukrainian deputy was elected to represent each 183,000 voters, while his Polish counterpart represented 74,000 voters.

At the first sessions of the newly elected Parliament in 1897, the Ukrainian delegate Dr. Okunevsky brought forth an emergency motion pointing to the abuses of the last election and demanded that Badeni be brought before a court of investigation to be condemned for his illegal actions. Badeni, fully relying on the support and trust of the Emperor, applied his "strong hand" in the central parliament as he had done before in the Diet of Galicia and ordered the opposition delegates to be removed by force. But these methods would not work in Vienna. The revolt that broke out in Parliament was carried out into the street. The mass demonstration in front of Parliament demanded Badeni's dismissal. On the eve of that same day the Emperor relieved him of his duties.

The Ukrainians protested vehemently in all legal ways possible against the election abuses, but all their protests to the Governor in the press and at public meetings, and to the Prime Minister and to the Emperor himself (see page 154) went unheeded. The Poles usually defended themselves against these accusations by making the Ukrainian population responsible for disturbing the "public peace" and defending the pres-

ence of the police who they said were merely there to restore order. In reality, the Ukrainians were only claiming their legal rights. There is no doubt that the abuses could have been stopped if the civil administration had been ordered to follow the legal election procedures. However, this did not fit into the political goal of the Poles to rule Galicia as if there were no Ukrainians. The Austrian government, including the Emperor, also had reasons not to abolish these abuses. The Austrians needed the Polish votes in Parliament, for the Poles always voted for the government's proposals; consequently, the more delegates the Poles won at elections, the more votes for the Austrian government. Indeed; for the policy of supporting the Austrian government, the Poles were allowed a free hand in Galicia during the elections.

The situations of the Ukrainians in Parliament and in the Diet seemed to be hopeless. There was no doubt in their minds that only a change in the suffrage could bring an improvement. They had been always enthusiastic supporters of universal, free, direct, secret, and equal franchise (the so-called "*five adjectival suffrage*"). They believed that with the change of franchise a new era would dawn for them. They felt that when they had a large enough group of their own representatives in Parliament and in the Diet, they could then constitutionally achieve the passage of favorable solutions to the others problems, which meanwhile had to be wrested from the Poles with the greatest and sometimes bloody efforts. Reasoning in this way, they supported the recurring demands for suffrage reform during the debates in Parliament. At home they began a mass movement in favor of the reform. Their victory in the agricultural strike in 1902 lifted their spirits and inspired them to higher political and national aims. The struggle for the reform of the suffrage took precedence over any other struggle — for schools, a University, or economic concessions. The movement reached its peak in 1905, stirred up even the most apathetic districts and contributed much to the general awakening of the masses. The Poles, for obvious reasons, opposed any voting reform, and their administrators attempted to suppress the movement by forbidding public meetings for improvised reasons, finally using violence to stifle the awakened spirit. To mention only one incident in the village of Ladski four men were killed outright and nine, among

them a woman, were mortally wounded by the gendarmes, who had come to the district for no apparent reason.

The old *curiae system* was against the spirit of the time. Even the most conservative and reactionary government in Russia had to grant a limited constitution to the people after the revolution of 1905. This, no doubt, had an effect on the Austrian government. The Monarch declared himself in favor of the new reform. Soon after, the projects of the reform, one after another, were brought before Parliament. The year of 1906 was filled with heated discussions on the matter and the Poles opposed the proposed changes from the beginning. They feared that the result of universal and equal suffrage would be an increase in the number of the Ukrainian representatives, and thereby a challenge to the Polish supremacy in Galicia and their secure position in Vienna. Again the Ukrainian representatives exerted all their efforts to enact the democratic reform and make their aspiration a reality. They insisted mainly on a proportionate distribution between the Polish and Ukrainian nations for future representatives. However, the reform bill could only be passed if the Polish Parliamentary Club (all Polish deputies, even of various parties, maintained a well disciplined and unified block) would vote for it. In order to gain these Polish votes the other political factions as well as the central government itself, had to make all kinds of exceptions and concessions to the Poles, who thus managed to retain their supremacy and make a mockery of the reforms. Finally in November, 1906, the reform became law. It was a new discriminatory act against the Ukrainians, who felt great frustration over the new reform since all their hopes set on universal suffrage were diminished. Nevertheless, they decided to campaign in the election as a united front in order to elect as many delegates as they could.

Of 106 delegates, the total number from Galicia, the Poles secured 78 (73.6 per cent) and the Ukrainians only 28 (26.4 per cent). Furthermore, Galicia was divided into special voting districts, which introduced an elaborate and complicated "electoral geometry", by which the cities and towns, long since Polonized, were separated from the general population, making it easier for the Poles to elect their candidates. (The voting districts were practically the same as the previous *curiae*, small in Western (Polish) Galicia



and twice as large in Eastern Galicia. In addition to that, the system of *two-mandate districts* was introduced only into Eastern Galicia. By this method two representatives were elected, the first by 50 per cent of the votes and the second by only 25 per cent. The second candidate was, of course, one from the Polish party. This system was still far from introducing equality or representation by population. It almost equalled the old curiae system since according to this new reform, one Polish delegate would represent 52,000 voters while the Ukrainians needed at least 120,000 votes for one delegate.\*

Out of 28 delegates, as much as the new reform was giving them, the Ukrainians sent 27 representatives to the Vienna Parliament: 19 from the National Democratic party; 5 from the Radical Party, 2 from the Social Democrats, and 1 from the Russophiles; losing only one delegate, and this was because of the official pressure, including terror and violence, which prevailed at the elections as much as before. For example, in the village of Horutsko, four men were killed and nine were wounded when the people demanded a re-election because they discovered that a fraud was committed in counting the ballots. In another district some Ukrainians, provoked by corruption, attacked the election officials. Bukovina, by winning 5 Ukrainian representatives, was able to boost the Ukrainian number to 32 hand-picked members in the new Parliament, which by now had a total of 516 delegates.

The number of the Ukrainian delegates was, comparatively, not a large one, but it considerably strengthened and improved the Ukrainian position in Parliament. The proportion of votes in the new Parliament varied from issue to issue so that, for the first time, the government needed the votes of the Ukrainian delegates and was forced to treat them with respect and give them occasional concessions. They were able to introduce and present their most important needs in the general discussion, such as the division of Galicia, the autonomy of the Ukrainian population, suffrage reform for the local Diet, the need for Ukrainian schools, a separate Ukrainian University in Lviv, and the removal of the Polish minister for Galicia (officially "minister without

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\* In Italy only 38,000 votes were needed.

portfolio"). For the first time the voice of the Ukrainian deputies in Parliament was heard widely and they hastened to present the real and lamentable situation in Galicia, presenting their grievances concerned with Polish oppression and rule. It must be stated that the new threat of a war with Russia made Austria change its attitude toward the Ukrainians, although it came far from fulfilling all their requests. Nevertheless, it was a hopeful period, a period which encouraged the Ukrainians to attempt bolder action. This change of attitude was especially evident during a discussion (May 20-26, 1908) on the subject of election abuses, mainly on the events in Horutsko. Not less than four emergency motions were presented by Dr. Okunevsky, Dr. Tsehlynsky, Dr. Olesnytsky and others, supported by the Polish-Jew Dr. N. Lieberman of the Social-Democratic party and the Pole Ignacy Daszynski. When the majority in Parliament wished again to ignore their accusations, the Ukrainian delegates were strong enough to offset the Polish block. More often, however, singing of the national anthem ("The time has gone for serving Muscovite or Pole") accompanied Ukrainian demands. Deputy L. Bachynsky set a record by filibustering for 14 hours.

Speeches of two non-Ukrainian delegates, seconding the Ukrainian emergency motion, should be at least partly quoted, as an illustration of the situation. Dr. Lieberman said: "Once more I ask you to accept our interpollation because by rejecting it you give us the right to rebel, the right to employ force, in order that the enslaved masses may remove their oppressors and the violators of the laws. This is not a threat. When neither the government nor Parliament is powerful enough to safeguard the people against the assaults of criminal officials, when the Governor of Galicia cannot be compelled to bow before the authority of Parliament, then by this corruption — I say it once more — you foster the spirit and right of revolution." (Records of the Austrian Parliament, July 3, 1907.)

Another member of the same party, Ignacy Daszynski, pointed out in his speech that the Ukrainians, in comparison with the Czechs, Germans and Poles, had been completely neglected politically. He straightforwardly asked: "What do the Ukrainians possess? Tell me, what do the Ukrainians

have? Where is the Ukrainian portion of self-government. The small village communities? The poor community elder? This is not enough for three million people. Even though Mr. Golombinski maintained that the Ukrainians have many schools, gymnasia, banks and other institutions, they lack the most important thing, self-government, self-representation. This is, gentlemen, the crux of the movement." (Records of Austrian Parliament, 18th session, 1908.)

Once the reform of universal suffrage to parliament was a reality, the Ukrainians undertook with greater vigor and perseverance to renew the campaign for a suffrage reform in the local Diet, expecting thus to improve their conditions in Galicia. Because of the old curiae system of the franchise, elections for the local Diet were completely and crushingly controlled by the Polish conservative nobility, who were mainly concerned with their own class interests and economic predominance. After 1867 the Diet had great privileges, which the Poles proceeded to use for their own national benefit. The Diet was openly called the "Polish Parliament", where the Polish language was used, Polish delegates often appeared dressed in their traditional national costumes, and laws were passed to further Polish national interests, culture, schools and economic gains. Ukrainians obtained no justice in this Diet. The laws passed were often in direct opposition to constitutional and fundamental laws, and permitted the Polish majority to carry on their national policy of turning Galicia into a Polish Piedmont. As for the Ukrainians the Austrian central government applied the policy as outlined in the warning of Prime Minister Beust, who already in 1867, declared: "The question to what extent, if at all, the Ukrainians continue to exist will depend upon the decisions of the Galician Diet."

The Ukrainian delegates in the Diet, though few in number, defended their rights as much as they could and struggled for the amelioration of the Ukrainian situation in their own country. Being in a minority in the Diet, they exercised the only weapon known to minorities, the weapon of obstruction, or even of walking out from the Diet. In 1866 they withdrew from the Diet on the occasion of voting for the creation of a School Council which was directed to the Polonization of the Ukrainian schools, and again a second time when it was decided to introduce the Polish

language into the Ukrainian schools. In 1901 a bill was introduced which would have brought harmful consequences for the Ukrainians. In protest, the Ukrainians walked out for the third time. This Diet was soon afterwards dissolved.

The Ukrainians at this time were led by an active and capable lawyer from Stryj, Dr. Eugen Olesnytsky, who by his firm policy left an impressive mark on the Diet as well as furthering the Ukrainian national consciousness at the beginning of the twentieth century. He promoted and supported his slogan: "Everything for the people, with the people, and by the people." In the newly elected Diet of 1901, he presented his points to the Poles: "We desire to work together with you for the good of the country, but we demand that our political, economic and cultural requests be treated fairly with those of the rest of the nation, that nothing should be resolved without us or against us. If your relationship with us does not improve, does not change for the better, it will not be our fault if we are forced to leave this Diet again in order to defend our rights outside the Diet."

In spite of their willingness to cooperate, two years later (1903) the Ukrainians again seceded from the Diet when the Poles stubbornly refused to grant the building of a Ukrainian gymnasium in Stanyslaviv., which had been personally promised to them by the Emperor on his last preceding visit to Eastern Galicia.

It was generally believed that only a change of the curial system of elections to the Diet would bring any improvements in Ukrainian-Polish relations. There were three possibilities for changing the legal situation: by a royal decree, by popular revolution, or by a law passed by a majority in the Diet. All of them by now were out of the question. The Ukrainians took the only course left to them; the agitation for a universal, secret, direct and equal franchise. Already in 1903 Deputy Olesnytsky made the first emergency motion in the Diet for this suffrage reform. After his initial motion, the same demand was repeatedly brought before the Diet, but the Poles opposed and suppressed it. The situation changed after the Parliament reform became a law in 1906. It was evident now, even to the Poles, that a Diet reform would be inevitable. Therefore, the Poles attempted to pass all kinds of laws to strengthen their legal position in Galicia, so that there would not be much left for

the Ukrainians to profit by in case the suffrage laws to the Diet were reformed. The Ukrainians, however, did not give up their struggle for the reform. A strong movement was instigated throughout the country in favor of the reform. The Ukrainian representatives in Vienna, by repeated demands for the reform of the Diet, moved the central government to use pressure on the Poles to agree to discuss the necessity of suffrage reform. Once again the Ukrainian delegates walked out of the Diet (1907). This Diet then had to be, therefore, dissolved, and the following Diet was forced to proceed with the plan for reform. In the interim the Ukrainians mobilized all their political resources and organizations to win the coming election and to send their best qualified and trained men to compete with the Poles in parliamentary discussions and to counteract their intentions of postponing the reform. This time the central government was for the reform of suffrage to the Diet. The Polish press at once accused Austria of favoring the Ukrainians.

The Poles, especially Governor Andrew Potocki, sensed the situation and decided to defeat the Ukrainians by discrediting them in the eyes of the government and undermining the Ukrainian influence and integrity in Parliament. Andrew Potocki, a notable Polish nobleman and Governor of Galicia after 1903, acquired for himself a reputation as an enemy of the Ukrainians; a reputation which was enhanced by his refusal to allow the opening of a Ukrainian savings bank in Lviv. In addition, he dissolved many of the Ukrainian cultural clubs, especially "Sich" and "Sokil", and enforced all restrictions against the migration of seasonal farm workers to Germany. He chose a small group of Russophiles to be his instrument to discredit the Ukrainians. Potocki made a secret pact, which was not revealed until 1913, with those Russophiles to defeat the Ukrainians at the polls in 1908 thereby to weakening them from within. This was not the first time in the political history of Galicia that the Poles had used this method — "Let out the Ruthenians against the Ruthenians." ("*puść Ruśina na Ruśina*").

Potocki, although under pressure from the Austrian government to conduct the election honestly, secretly resorted to violence. For example, the Ukrainian peasant Marko Kahanets of Koropetz (Buchach District) was shot because he protested against fraud. The Ukrainian repre-

sentatives in Parliament were able to present many letters addressed to the Ukrainian peasants with threats of death if they would vote for their own delegates. Kahanets had received such a letter. As a result of this "bloody election", only 12 Ukrainian delegates were elected while the Russophiles scored 8. The Ukrainians were stunned with disappointment and their indignation was totally aroused. A young Ukrainian student at Lviv, Myroslav Sichynsky, during an audience on April 12, 1908, assassinated Potocki, exclaiming, "This for the wrongs done to the Ukrainian people and for the death of Kahanets." Sichynsky, sentenced at first to death and then to 20 years imprisonment, was smuggled out of prison and out of the country to America, where he continues to be a politically active leader among Ukrainians.

This incident stiffened and sharpened the conflict between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia. A famous Austrian historian, R. Charmatz, in a long article frankly blamed Austria for the desperate situation of the Ukrainians in Galicia. He stated that Austria had long ago committed the Ukrainians to the mercy of the Poles. Now the international situation was so grave (threat of war with Russia) that Austria could not afford the discord of two nations in a territory directly bordering on Russia. The central government assumed the mission of mediator and counselor between these two nations in order to find a *modus vivendi*. Some Poles, realizing their past mistakes, appealed for mutual understanding, but the voice of reasonable Poles was choked by R. Dmowski, leader of the young Polish National Democratic party (eN-Dek). The entire year of 1908 passed in this oppressive atmosphere, and the diet was not able to accomplish much on the suffrage reforms. The year 1909 witnessed a hard and desperate struggle by the Ukrainian delegates in the Diet. They applied the age-old method of obstruction to frustrate the majority and prevent them from transacting any legislation on the matter in the Diet. By October of 1910, the obstruction became even louder. The Ukrainians brought all kinds of musical instruments into the Diet and played during the meetings. This "musical concert" lasted 10 days, during which the Polish delegates could communicate only by gestures, and the budget was accepted under such circumstances.

In the same year, Deputy Olesnytsky resigned from the Diet and was replaced by Dr. Eugen Petrushevych, known for his fiery speeches against the illegal Polish supremacy in Eastern Galicia. Addressing the Polish majority in the diet (1910), he said: "Give us back our rights. Move away from here! This is our land! We will oppose you here in the Diet and in the whole country by such a storm that you will tremble even behind the backs of the army."

However, the "music" was more effective than malicious speeches, and was played again for two days in November. This unusual "musical" obstruction attracted the attention of foreign correspondents, who came to Lviv from all the countries of Europe. They acquainted the outside world with the unbearable situation of the Ukrainians in Galicia and sympathized with the Ukrainians and their "musicians" in the Diet. Björnson, an author of international standing, took up his pen in defense of the Ukrainians, and published many articles. Thus the Ukrainian problem became widely known, and the subsequent sympathetic reaction of world opinion became embarrassing to the Austrian government. The Poles did indeed "shiver behind the backs of the army" and were forced to diminish their opposition to the reform. Finally, a suffrage commission started to work, and numerous conciliatory meetings of the representatives from both nations followed. The most controversial point was the percentage of Ukrainian delegates to be elected to the new diet. The Poles started bargaining with 16 per cent, but the Ukrainians demanded 40 per cent.

The new Governor, M. Bobrzynski, who applied an "appeasing policy" toward the Ukrainians, and Prime Minister Sturgh contributed a great deal to the final agreement. However, the diet failed to pass the compromise, and the Emperor dissolved it in 1913 and ordered a new election. At this new election the Ukrainians elected 32 of their independent delegates and with the two Russophiles gained 34 delegates. This election serves as a contrast to show how badly the Ukrainians had been cheated of their representation in the past when they sometimes had only ten delegates in the diet. (See table on page 166). Even with this increased number, the Diet made little progress; mainly because of reluctance of the Polish church hierarchy on the question

of the Diet reform. In protest Governor Bobrzynski resigned from his office.

Finally, after five years of weary and stubborn struggle by the Ukrainian nation for the diet reform, the Polish resistance was broken and a compromise was made. The new Diet would be increased to 228 members, of which 62 (27.2 per cent) would be Ukrainians. The number of Ukrainians in the diet after the so-called compromise was not even as high as it had been in 1861, a year when the Ukrainians had obtained 33.33 per cent of the delegates without any special compromises. This new compromise did not promote amiable relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians. The Poles continued in their efforts toward domination, and the Ukrainians vigorously continued in their struggle for complete emancipation.

In reality, the suffrage reform was a mixture of the old and new systems. It retained the undemocratic curiae system slightly modified by the democratic principle of universal voting. The Ukrainians were permitted to elect one delegate in the great-landowners curiae, 6 delegates in the cities, 3 in the general cities' curiae, and 48 in the villages. Among the four virilists (appointees by the Emperor) was the future president of the Ukrainian University, a sign that the weary problem of a University, as it will be described in the next chapter, was approaching its end. This reform bill passed in the diet on February 14, and was endorsed in July, 1914. The short-lasting Diet was dissolved, and a new one was supposed to be composed of members elected (October-November, 1914) on the basis of the new reform, but World War I interrupted any further functioning of the Diet in Galicia.

Politically, the reform was not a complete victory for the Ukrainians in their struggle for democratization of the Diet, but it pointed to great progress for constitutional privileges and liberation from the Polish supremacy in Galicia. It certainly, was a great moral victory, which encouraged the masses of the Ukrainians to rely on their own strength, which in the near future proved itself to be best policy.

Being aware of the unjust treatment the Ukrainians received in Parliament, and in the Diet, one could not help but ask why the Ukrainians did not ignore completely these



institutions and keep away from them as, for example, the Czechs had done. The Ukrainians could not afford to imitate the Czechs and throw off the sounding-board which definitely helped to forward their interests in the outside world.

## CHAPTER VIII

### The Lviv University — A Burning Issue \*

When the University was established in 1784, it was the intention of the founders to hand it over to the Ukrainians as soon as they had sufficiently developed a language of their own. Unfortunately, this promise had never been carried out. Some historians are quick to blame the Ukrainian intellectuals of that period alone for their failure to make the Lviv University an influential Ukrainian institution. Actually, they did neglect the development of the vernacular into a literary language. Instead, as it is known, they became deeply involved in stubborn quibbling over the "soft" and "hard" sign (yorchyk) in phonetics and continued to use the *yazychie*, mixture of languages. On the other hand, one should not forget that all promises by the Austrian Central Government during the first liberal and later the constitutional period were broken, or at least easily put aside during the following reactionary and absolutistic decades. Austria definitely returned to the old policy of Germanization. Operating through the schools and universities was the best way of achieving this goal. In addition, as we already know, during the absolutistic period the Poles managed to improve their situation considerably. Naturally, they did not overlook the value of the University for the development of their own culture. This, of course, resulted in a bitter struggle between the Ukrainians and the Poles in later years for the ownership of the Lviv University.

The Poles, from the very beginning, were constant and indefatigable in their endeavor to establish a Polish chair at the University. Their wish was granted in 1822, when the chair of Polish language and literature was founded. The Poles managed to retain this chair until 1848. Yet, as

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\* For further information on this subject see: Dr. Kost Levytsky, *Istoria Politychnoi Dumky Halyckyykh Ukrainciv 1848-1914*, Lviv 1926.

late as 1848 it was officially stated by the university rector (president) Tauger, that: "This university can be considered as Ukrainian. It will be German-Ukrainian for a short time, but eventually the Ukrainian will be sufficiently developed as a language to replace German." In the same year the chair of Ukrainian language and literature was reinstated. Rev. Yakiv Holovatsky, the best Ukrainian scholar and linguist of this period was nominated as head professor of this chair. In addition, other Ukrainian chairs were created in the theological school. In 1862 two more Ukrainian chairs were added in the college of law, and these were occupied by Ukrainian professors.

In the meantime, the Poles also regained their chair of language and literature in 1856, on the personal intervention of the governor of Galicia, Agenor Goluchowski. The establishment of this chair did not interfere with the prevailing German-Ukrainian character of the university, which lasted until the early 1870's. Meanwhile, the political situation in Austria veered again to favor the Poles, who were adept opportunists, and the subsequent history of Lviv University took a different course than that which was originally planned.

On July 4, 1871, Emperor Francis Joseph II issued a decree replacing the German language with Polish and Ukrainian, leaving the professors free to choose which one to use for their lectures. Theoretically, it provided for the equality of both languages; practically, however, it encouraged Polonization of the existing university, and the process advanced very quickly. Almost all the chairs were by this time occupied by Polish professors whose aim was to eliminate the Ukrainian language, as well as the Ukrainian chairs from the institution. By 1878 the newly elected Polish university president, Leo Bilinski, in his first address stated that Lviv University should become Polish in character, thus ignoring the Emperor's decree of 1871, which was still in effect.

The Ukrainian professor and dean of the philosophical faculty, Omelyan Ohonovsky, protested against such presumptions. His protest was brought to the attention of the Minister of Education, who reminded the university authorities of the existing bilingual character of Lviv University.

Additional secret agreements continued between the Poles and the Emperor, the results of which was the Emperor's decree of 1879, confirming Polish as the official language for Lviv University. Thus, the Emperor yielded to Polish aspirations and acted here as a protector of Polish cultural rights in East Galicia. The Ukrainian language was forced to accept an inferior position in the future of the university. It could be used in the administration, but only upon the insistence of the Ukrainian students. The Polish officials, however, ignored this clause and used various tactics to dissuade the Ukrainian students from using their native language. As the years passed, they were more open in their anti-Ukrainian feelings and simply denied the students the right to use their own language in communicating with university officials.

The Ukrainian students soon became aware of their humiliating situation. At their students' organizations — "Sich" in Vienna, "Sojuz" in Chernivtsi, and "Academic Brotherhood" in Lviv — the newly developed situation at Lviv University became a major item for discussion. In the years 1880-84, general meetings of all Ukrainian students were called to search for the best solution to their position at Lviv University.

But the officials, in their attempts at complete Polinization of the University, did not stop with their abuse of the students. The very existence of the Ukrainian chairs was threatened by the Polish practice of refusing to nominate a Ukrainian professor to fill a vacancy when it occurred, but instead to fill it with a Polish candidate. For example, the chair of civil law was vacant for two years before a special decree by the Minister of Education in 1882 appointed the Ukrainian Professor Alexander Ohonovsky.

In the year 1899 the University question entered a new phase. At a general meeting held in Lviv of all Ukrainian students in Austria, it was unanimously decided (July 13, 1899) to request the establishment of a separate and independent Ukrainian university in Lviv. The idea was quickly adopted by the whole Ukrainian population, which henceforth supported this proposal at their numerous public meetings. It was widely recognized that only an independent university could properly cultivate the national culture and produce

the educated intelligentsia capable of becoming the future leaders. The Ukrainian delegates to Parliament in Vienna and the local Diet in Lviv (Alexander Barvinsky, Evhen Olesnytsky, Okunevsky, and others) repeatedly raised the question of a separate Ukrainian university. In their arguments they pointed out that 800 Ukrainian students were in attendance at the university, and that there were enough Ukrainian professors working in various institutions to staff adequately an independent Ukrainian university. Yet their pleas fell on the deaf ears of both Polish and Austrian parliamentarians. The only concession the Ukrainians received was the establishment of a chair in Ukrainian history at Lviv University in 1894, to which the foremost Ukrainian historian, M. Hrushevsky, from Kiev, was invited.

Not to be discouraged, the Ukrainian students called a second general meeting in 1901, which was attended by 300 students and some Ukrainian professors (Hrushevsky, Dnistriansky, and Studynsky). They resolved to strive for a separate Ukrainian university; but until such could be founded, parallel Ukrainian chairs should be created in all three colleges — law, medicine, and philosophy — at the existing Lviv University. They asked also that the university questionnaires be printed in both languages. With a steadfast determination they concluded their resolutions: "We expect the fulfillment of our requests and hope that the authorities will not force us to use more radical means in our legitimate struggle."

A new wave of public meetings in support of the students' demands followed. Resolutions and petitions with a hundred thousand signatures attached were sent to Parliament, to the Ministry of Education, and to the individual Ukrainian delegates in Parliament. The University question became a burning issue.

The Poles, on the other hand, had no intention of granting the Ukrainian requests. Having absolute power in Galicia and exerting a wide influence in the central government, the Poles vetoed the creation of an independent Ukrainian university, fearing that it would become a "hotbed of Ukrainian Irredentism" (A. J. May). Before that could happen, they proceeded with the process of Polonization of the University more vigorously than ever before. They

strove to eliminate the use of the Ukrainian language entirely. In 1901, Dean Fialka forbade the Ukrainian theological students to fill out their registration books in their own language. Furthermore, Professor Hrushevsky was prohibited from using the Ukrainian language at faculty meetings, as he had done customarily in the past. As a final Polish triumph, the university rector gave his commencement address only in Polish.

These and similar encroachments of the university authorities provoked the Ukrainian students to take to "more radical means" in defense of their constitutional rights. In the fall of 1901, they called another special meeting during which they repeated their former demands. As an expression of their indignation against the actions of the Polish professors, they organized a street demonstration after the meeting. It so happened that Julian Romanchuk, one of the leading Ukrainian politicians, presented in Parliament on the same day an emergency motion in favor of a separate Ukrainian university in Lviv. He pointed out that the Poles, who were in a minority, had two universities, one in Krakow and one in Lviv, for their cultural and scientific needs. For the time being, he suggested the reinstatement of the present Ukrainian chairs and establishment of additional chairs with Ukrainian as their teaching language. In support of Romanchuk's emergency motion, the Ukrainian students in Vienna, well organized under the students' organization "Sich", held a public meeting.

In retaliation for the Ukrainian demonstration, the university senate voted at its next meeting to close the university for an indefinite period and to arrange an investigation of the Ukrainian students. This decision only aggravated the situation. When news of the investigation reached the Ukrainian delegates in Vienna, two of them, Romanchuk and Barvinsky, appealed to the Minister of Education on behalf of the demonstrators and drew his attention to the fact that students of other nationalities such as the Italians and Slovenes had demonstrated in struggles for their independent universities and had gone unpunished. In other words, the students' demonstrations were not exclusively a "Ukrainian barbarism", but were practiced by other peoples as well.

Another delegation of students appeared before the

Minister of Education, and requested his protection against Polish practices. The Minister sympathized with them and was willing to close the University until the situation could be clarified; but in the meantime, new events took place. The Poles felt little concern over the "academic freedom" of the Ukrainian students involved, and expelled two of them permanently and three others for two semesters. In addition, the senate of the University issued an appeal to the student body, condemning the demonstration as being insolent and savage on the part of the Ukrainians. These offensive words only added oil to the fire. Because the integrity of the Ukrainian students was at stake, they reacted immediately. They decided to walk out of the University. The students all 600 of them, informed the rector of their decision to leave the University and that they would not re-enter until they could do so without any risk of the humiliation of their academic and national honor.

A few days later, a delegation of Ukrainian intellectuals from Lviv, under the leadership of Romanchuk, appeared before the Minister of Education to request that he use his authority to settle the conflict in a positive manner. As the Minister was reluctant to take action, Romanchuk pressed the matter further by placing a new "interpellation" in Parliament: "Would the Minister order the University senate to issue proclamation to placate all students? Would he order the University authorities to respect all the rights of the Ukrainian language? Could the students return to the University without danger of being persecuted for their actions? Did the government intend to create a separate Ukrainian university or at least create parallel chairs in all departments for the exclusive use of the Ukrainian students?" The Minister, again sided with the Poles.

The boycott continued. Ukrainian students withdrew from the University and registered in other universities in Vienna, Prague, Krakow, and elsewhere. It is significant that as a gesture of solidarity with them the Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky approved the action of the students and ordered the closing of the theological seminary. Furthermore, the Ukrainian population of Galicia solidly endorsed the action taken by the students and collected funds for their studies abroad. They also deluged the Vienna Parliament

with over 800 petitions demanding a separate Ukrainian university in Lviv.

This time the Ukrainian delegates, instead of demanding emergency measures in Parliament, decided to register their protest by opposing a proposed budget by which the government was seeking support for its fiscal policy. A similar opposition policy by Ukrainian delegates was applied in the Lviv Diet by Olesnytsky and his colleagues.

Cornered by the opposition of the Ukrainian delegates in Parliament, government influence induced the Minister of Education to issue a decree on March 29, 1902, by which the free use of the Ukrainian language in intercourse with the administration of the University was guaranteed. This small concession did not move the majority of the students to return to the University, but the theological seminary was reopened.

The year 1902 witnessed another successfully organized struggle, the general strike by the Ukrainian peasants. The students, wanting to be of assistance to the striking peasant masses, decided to return to Lviv University. They did not, however relinquish the idea of a separate Ukrainian university.

Simultaneously, another struggle was imminent — the struggle for general suffrage to the Vienna Parliament — which overshadowed the University question. The Ukrainian students readily gave time and energy to make the new struggle for general suffrage a success, but at the same time they continued their unrelenting opposition to new efforts at the Polonization of the University. Thus, in 1903 they protested the election of the known militant professor Fialka as rector and bombarded him with rotten eggs. A new investigation followed, and a few more students were expelled from the University. By this time the Polish students were ready to defend the "Polish character" of Lviv University and they placed an armed student guard at the entrance to the University to hinder the Ukrainian students from attending lectures. Upon the intervention of the Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky this armed guard was removed. A few years passed in comparative peace — a lull before the storm — which was to break out later with even greater violence.

The next outbreak of resistance came to a head in a



bloody conflict on March 2, 1906, between the Polish and Ukrainian students in the University corridors. This scuffle was the result of the provocative behavior of the University president, who declared to a delegation of Ukrainian students that he did not understand Ukrainian and insisted that the students address him in Polish. The Polish students then came to the defense of the Polish rector (president).

Almost a year later, January 23, 1907, there occurred a much more furious demonstration under the leadership of the Ukrainian student, Paul Krat (Crath), a well-known political leader and in later years a leader of the Ukrainian Protestant movement in Canada and in the United States. Ukrainian students cleared the University auditorium of Polish national emblems, pictures, and statues, and instead, the Ukrainian (blue and yellow) national flag was hoisted on the building and barricades were built in the corridors. The police force was by law forbidden to enter the university, but by the request of the rector they did so and arrested over 100 Ukrainian students. This action by the police caused great indignation among the whole Ukrainian population, as well as elsewhere in the Austrian Empire. Under the auspices of the Ukrainian students in Vienna, organized in their active society "Sich", a great protest meeting of all Slav and German students in Vienna and Chernivtsi was held to support the Ukrainian students in Lviv in their struggle. This demonstration attracted the attention of foreign correspondents, who described the factual conditions of the unconstitutional ruling in Galicia. Notes of protest from Ukrainian delegates (Romanchuk, Olesnytsky, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky) were presented in Parliament and in the Diet and were followed by heated discussions.

The Polish authorities in Galicia were little concerned about world opinion and kept the students in jail for weeks on "trumped up" charges. After a month of frustrated waiting in jail, the Ukrainian students proclaimed a hunger strike which lasted four days (February 21-24, 1907). When news of the hunger strike came out, huge masses of Ukrainians gathered daily in front of the jail. The atmosphere was tense. The Polish court agreed to release some of the arrested students. They refused to leave jail during the hunger strike, however, unless all their friends were also

freed. Finally, the central government in Vienna, under pressure of foreign opinion and student demonstrations of other nationalities in Vienna, gave the order to the Polish administration in Galicia to free all the arrested students on bail. Their release was greeted with general enthusiasm and the Ukrainian population, along with the liberated student, arranged a joyous demonstration through the streets of the city.

For the next few days the Polish press was filled with raging protests against the central government, for interfering in domestic judicial affairs. The trial was set for September. Paul Krat, meanwhile, had escaped from Galicia, and the "Ukrainian Committee" lost its bail for him. P. Krat eventually immigrated to Canada, where he eventually became the leader of the Ukrainian Protestant church movement.

Just two months later, in March, another act of violence occurred at the University. At this time the Polish students forcefully pushed the Ukrainian theological students from the lecture halls and set an armed guard at the entrance to prevent the Ukrainian students from entering the University. Bloody fighting ensued in front of the University. After this incident the rector ordered the University doors closed for the second time, but again the Polish professors decided at their meeting to enforce the "Polisch character" of the existing University.

These last events at the University convinced the leading Ukrainians that the only solution to the problem was the establishment of their own separate university. On behalf of this decision, a special delegation of Ukrainian professors — I. Horbachevsky, J. Komarnytsky, S. Smal-Stocky, S. Dnistriansky, O. Kolessa and K. Studynsky — left for Vienna, where together with Romanchuk and Vasyloko they visited Prime Minister Beck, Minister of Education Marchett, and Financial Minister Korytowski (a Pole) on April 4, 1907. These ministers would only agree to introduce a few more Ukrainian chairs, but not to create a separate university. Prime Minister, Beck, in later conversations with some of the Ukrainian deputies to Parliament, promised to solve the university question in favor of the Ukrainians. Meanwhile, he advocated the opening of the new Ukrainian chairs which could serve as the first step in establishing an independent, separate Ukrainian university.

It may be noted that Prime Minister Beck was the first and only official to admit openly the faulty policy of Austria toward the Ukrainians, and he felt deeply enough concerned to remedy the situation by making some concessions. The Ukrainian deputies, who had experienced so many disappointments, did not lightly accept these promises, but continued on all occasions in Parliament and in the Diet to remind the central government of the necessity for a separate university. Even A. Potocki was ready to acknowledge the demands of the Ukrainians. It was he who said once to the Ukrainian delegates: "I would rather agree to grant you a separate university than to permit seasonal Ukrainian workers to go to Germany."

Instead of the fulfillment of these promises, Lviv University witnessed another bloody registration day on December 14, 1907, caused by the rector's decision to read at the students' commencement, the oath in Polish instead of in Latin, as had been done previously. The Ukrainian students protested this violation of tradition and were at once physically attacked by the Polish students. Many were wounded, and the incident was the subject of discussion in Parliament a few days later. When the budget was introduced for consideration, the Ukrainian deputies obstructed action by filibustering, during which Julian Bachynsky became the prominent speaker. Order was reestablished after the Minister of Education declared that the central government was examining a plan for the establishment of a Ukrainian university and that, for the time being, other Ukrainian chairs would be created.

Another period of peace followed for three years, until the university question was revived in 1910. It started with a Polish request to the central government to legalize the Polish character of Lviv University. This renewed Polish attempt was brought to the attention of the Ukrainian representatives (Romanchuk, K. Lewytsky, and O. Kolessa), who in an interview with the new Minister of Education, Count Sturgkh, on March 4, 1910, declared that they would consent to the Polish demand only if a separate Ukrainian university were founded in Lviv. The moment seemed to be auspicious for the Ukrainians to speak more boldly in favor of their university because the central government had satisfied the Italians in their demand for

their own university at Trieste. Political logic dictated that the Ukrainians be granted the same privilege. Numerous public meetings of Ukrainians were held in almost every city and village in support of a separate university. They pressed for more decisive action by their representatives in Parliament. The Metropolitan Count Sheptytsky even spoke in the Upper Chamber on the necessity of a Ukrainian university. Other deputies brought up the subject before the budget committee the most vulnerable place in the parliamentary system.

These new efforts on the part of the Ukrainians provoked countermeasures by the Polish students, who again organized their "armed guard" (*bojówka*), which molested individual Ukrainian students even more often. This situation alarmed the Ukrainian students and finally led to a new battlefield at the University on July 1, 1910, when firearms were used. As a result of this clash, a Ukrainian student, Adam Kotsko, was killed and many others were wounded on both sides. The police entered the University again and arrested 127 Ukrainians, but none of the Polish students. This was the tragic climax in the student battles over a Ukrainian university.

After receiving the news of the catastrophe at the University, the president of the enlarged Ukrainian Parliamentary Club, K. Levytsky, interviewed Prime Minister Bienert and suggested an immediate solution to the University question to avoid similar explosions in the future.

The Ukrainian professors sent a letter to the Minister of Education, in which they declared that they would never relinquish the existing rights of the Ukrainian language at the University until a separate Ukrainian university was created.

The university question was further discussed in Parliament during the budget debate. At the same session (February, 1911), the question of the university of Italians and Slovenes was brought up. The Ukrainian delegate K. Levytsky (second only to Romanchuk among the leading Ukrainian politicians) presented a motion to establish a separate Ukrainian university in Lviv. Unfortunately, Parliament was soon dissolved, and the legal solution of the university question was postponed.

Meanwhile, the Polish court proceeded in its trial against

101 Ukrainian students who had been arrested as a result of the fighting on July 1, 1910. All of these students were sentenced to jail terms and the loss of their academic rights. Nicholas Zalizniak, later to become known as a politician and historian, was to be deported from Austria. However, by an act of the Emperor, all but ten students were set free.

In 1912 the new Minister of Education, Hussarek, held a few conferences with the Ukrainians, as well as with the Polish representatives, in an attempt to bring about some satisfactory solution. For further negotiations a special committee of Ukrainian professors (Horbachevsky, Dnistriansky, Kolessa, and Smal-Stotsky) was formed.

The Austrian central government declared that it was ready to create a Ukrainian university in Lviv, and the Polish club seemed also to agree. This declaration was made known to K. Levytsky, by Prime Minister Sturgkh in 1912, and he also promised that the Emperor's detailed proposal would soon be presented.

However, the Polish ruling class would not hear of a separate Ukrainian university and under the leadership of a strong new Polish group, the National Democratic Party, they planned counteractions. The Polish professor of economics W. Grabski, distinguished himself in this action. The Lviv City Council, controlled by the Poles, at its meeting refused to sanction the creation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv. It should be remembered that the same council also refused to assign a place in the city for a monument to the greatest Ukrainian patriot and poet, Taras Shevchenko. \*

On June 4, 1912, the Emperor's first draft for a university project was presented to both negotiating groups. According to this plan, the Ukrainian university would be built by 1921-22. Until then, all the existing Ukrainian rights should be observed. The site, however, was not mentioned. These propositions were not accepted by the Ukrainians, who requested a shorter period (five years at the longest) for the creation of the new university and insisted that it must be

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\* For a difference of attitude, it is interesting to note that the Canadian and American governments gave hearty consent for the Shevchenko monuments in most prominent sites of Winnipeg and Washington, D.C., in 1962-63, not so the Poles in the Ukrainian country. Not a single Ukrainian bank, or theatre could be erected in Lviv, in spite of the fact that the Emperor gave his consent.

located in Lviv, which was the most suitable place because it had become the main center of all Ukrainian political and cultural life. Here were all kinds of libraries and archives so indispensable for scientific research. The Kievan Ukrainians extended their moral support to the Ukrainians in Galicia in a letter expressing their sincerest admiration for the tenacity of the Galician Ukrainians in the prolonged struggle for their own university. There was no question about the tremendous influence a new Ukrainian university at Lviv would have on the national education of the Ukrainians in Imperial Russia.

Strengthened by the support of the whole Ukrainian nation, their representatives were by this time determined to lead the struggle to a successful conclusion. Again many public meetings were held throughout Galicia, and more speeches were given in Parliament and in the churches.

The Ukrainian delegates applied pressure tactics in Parliament to keep their bill before that body and to bring it to a rapid and favorable vote. It was necessary to sidetrack other legislative items. Lev Bachysnsky, for example, a flaming orator, spoke for 14½ hours, on this occasion. Under this pressure the central government yielded ground. The external situation, especially relations with Russia, became very tense. One proposal followed another until the fifth was finally accepted as a basis for negotiations, with 1916 set as the final year for the establishment of the university. If the site could not be agreed upon by then, the government would proceed by eliminating the Ukrainian chairs from the existing university and organizing them into a temporary separate Ukrainian university in Lviv.

It seemed that at long last the University question would be settled favorably, but the Poles unexpectedly requested a new conference in 1913. To confuse the issue more, the Poles planned to celebrate a fake 250th anniversary of the University, which they claimed had been founded by the Polish King Jan Casimir. In preparation for that event, they insisted on the immediate proclamation of the Polish character of the University.

At this last, yet very memorable meeting on January 19, 1913, the Minister of Education, Hussarek, surprised the Ukrainian delegates with a completely new proposal and

threatened the Ukrainians by saying that if they refused to negotiate he was on his way to see the Emperor, who supposedly would agree to no other plan. Later Hussarek admitted that this proposal had been dictated by the Poles. Answering for the Ukrainian delegation, K. Levytsky made this declaration: "We protest most vigorously against such procedure by the government, and we will publicly announce that this project was forced upon the government by the Poles against our will, and that the government broke its promise of December 18, 1912." He then left the room.

Prime Minister Sturgkh regretted the action of Hussarek very much and tried to persuade the Ukrainian delegation to renew the negotiations. The Ukrainians, however, by this time had lost confidence and faith in the good intentions of the government at Vienna to solve this problem impartially, and therefore rejected participation in further negotiations. In this way the University question, which had seemed so close to a favorable solution, was once more postponed indefinitely. The Poles tried again to negotiate regarding the University in 1914 and in 1916, when many Ukrainian students were drafted or voluntarily joined their own military units. The war had brought to the fore other problems of more immediate concern. If the World War I had not come when it did, the university problem would have, in all probability, been solved.

No doubt the absence of a Ukrainian institution of higher learning was a serious obstacle to the development of Ukrainian intellectual leadership and scientific achievements. The Ukrainian Academy of Shevchenko (N.T.Sh.), under the leadership of M. Hrushevsky, later chairman of the Ukrainian Central Council in Kiev, tried to fill this gap. Although he raised the scholarly work of the Academy to a level that could have been envied by any learned society of Western Europe, the Academy could not replace an independent university.

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Before moving on to discuss "Galicia from 1914 to 1945", I would like to re-emphasize the four most important aspects of the Ukrainian struggles for freedom under the Austrians.

In the first part of the twentieth century the Ukrainians fought so to speak, on four fronts: for universal suffrage to parliament, for equal representation in the diet, for improvement of social conditions among the peasants, and for an independent university. Had they tackled any one of these problems individually, they could have achieved complete success, but to fight for all four simultaneously demanded more than the limited means at their disposal could accomplish.

If the Ukrainian struggle for freedom had not been interrupted by World War I, it is quite conceivable that they could have successfully wrestled important concessions from the Poles and the Austrians. It must be emphasized that their successes in the few years prior to the war were paving the way for major changes in their social and political conditions.



## **PART IV**

### **Galicia**

**(1914 - 1945)**



## CHAPTER I

### Galicia and World War I

After the beginning of the 20th century, relations between Austria and Russia grew increasingly worse. The main issue in their conflict was a struggle for the control of the Slavs, particularly of those in the Balkan States. The theory of the Russian Panslavism demanded that all Slavs should be united under the Russian tsar. Austria, with half its population Slavic, endeavored also to gain influence over the other Slavic countries, and in 1908 annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. This aggressive act and the following Balkan Wars (1912-1913) served further to impair Austro-Russian relations. The atmosphere in the Balkans remained explosive and the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and of his wife in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, was the spark which set the world in flames. World War I began.

The Galician Ukrainians had many reasons to be the least enthusiastic about the war. It was obvious that Galicia, as the borderland between Austria and Russia would become a raging battlefield. For this reason alone it was difficult to decide which position to take. In addition, there were other political complications. Austria did not offer the Ukrainians any official assurance as to their political future. An eventual victory of Austria would be of little profit to the Ukrainians because the Poles, as usual, demanded that East Galicia, together with all the rest of Ukraine be included in a new reorganized Poland. The Poles had already declared their loyalty to the Austrian monarchy. This step complicated the situation further and resulted in the Ukrainian policy of the previously mentioned opposition in parliament and the diet. The Poles continuously maligned the Ukrainians as Russophiles in order to undermine Austro-Ukrainian relations. On the other hand the Ukrainians could not ally themselves with the *Entente*, of which Russia was

a partner, because this would mean a voluntary union of Galicia with the Russian Empire. Russia, even long before the war, had made no secret of her desire and preparations to annex Galicia, if only for one reason: to liquidate permanently the Ukrainian separatist movement there. No Ukrainian could hope for any change of the Russian attitude toward them, and the Western powers did not wish to interfere in Russian domestic problems. Besides, anyone comparing conditions under Austria with those under Russia, would credit Austria with some constitutional concessions, while in Russia a complete suppression of the Ukrainians continued. Therefore, the Ukrainians in general, expected some improvement of their position and even their eventual national independence only with a Russian defeat. They hoped to be able to persuade Austria to create an autonomous Ukrainian province consisting of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine, in union with Austria. These political speculations and hopes eventually encouraged the Ukrainians to declare themselves on the side of Austria against Russia.

A few days after the outbreak of war, the Ukrainians on August 3, created the "Holovna Ukrainska Rada" (Main Ukrainian Council) in Lviv, composed of representatives from all political parties, the deputies to both, Parliament and the Diet and leading members of "Sich" and "Sokil" with Dr. K. Levytsky as chairman. Two days later the Main Council issued a manifesto to the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, entreating them actively to support Austria in the war against Russia. Their next move was the formation of the Ukrainian voluntary military corps, "Ukrainian Riflemen of the Sich" (*Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi*). Within a short time over 28,000 volunteers responded to the call, mainly those under 20 or over 40 years of age who were ineligible for the official military draft, because they were either too young or too old. This great response was a demonstration of the Ukrainian national patriotism which had developed during the last 15 years. However, this mobilization of Ukrainian military power was not in accord with the Polish plans. As they had done once in 1848, the Poles again exerted influence and pressure upon the Austrian General Staff to reduce the Ukrainian unit to 2,500 men. The rest were discharged and sent home. The Poles, however, were

permitted to organize five of their own brigades under the leadership of J. Pilsudski.

Meanwhile, in Vienna the few immigrants of East (Great) Ukraine organized the so called "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" (*Sojuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy*). The primary purpose of this organization was to educate and inform the Western powers about the political conditions in Ukraine. For this purpose a series of books and pamphlets were published in different foreign languages about Ukraine and her problem. In this literature the liberation of Ukraine from Russia was the main theme. The members of the "Union" also developed a national program of enlightenment among the Ukrainian prisoners of the Russian army in Germany and Austria who in later years voluntarily joined the Ukrainian military formations and fought against the Bolshevik revolution.

Because of the Russophile movement in Galicia before the war, which the Polish officials had supported to the detriment of Ukrainian interests, Austria ordered, for security measures, the Polish administration to purge Eastern Galicia of "Russophiles and Russian agents." Most of them were arrested within a few days and sent to prison camps in Thalerhof, Gmind and other notorious places. By reading only a few of the official reports of the governor, V. Korytowski, it is apparent how the Poles and their administration worked to make practically any Ukrainian a suspect and unworthy of fair treatment, including even church officials. A massive purge of the Ukrainian population in Galicia occurred further during the retreat of the Austro-Hungarian armies before the massive Russian offensive in the first months of the war. The retreating army had to find some scapegoat for its defeats and the loss of Galicia. The rumor artificially created by the Poles of the "*Ukrainian treason*" found a receptive ear in military circles, especially among Hungarian troops. It was sufficient to be arrested, court-martialled and executed if a man, being asked who he was answered, "Rusyn", which sounded to the Hungarian soldier like "Russian". (Rusyn, meaning Ruthenian, was still used by some Ukrainians in Galicia at this time). The Poles, who usually presided as the judges at these court martials, were quick to pronounce a death sentence — en masse. Zagurski alone, a Polish lawyer in Lviv, daily sent over 100

innocent people to death. Such mass killing of innocent peasants, clergy and members of the intelligentsia has rarely been known in the history of other nations. Dr. M. Stachiv reports in his book *West Ukraine* Vol. I, that 36,000 Ukrainians were thus executed and almost as many perished in deplorable prison camps. Only after repeated interventions of the Ukrainian deputies to Parliament, this horrifying practice was finally stopped.

But one disaster had hardly ceased when another descended upon the unfortunate Ukrainians. This time it came from the Russian "liberators", who appeared in Lviv on September 5, only one month after war was declared, and remained there for the next ten months.

Truly, the Russian "liberation" that ensued was nothing less than a "liquidation" of the Ukrainians in Galicia. According to the Russian imperialistic theory, the Ukrainians were not acknowledged as a separate nation, but were referred to as "South Russians" or "Little Russians", whose language was only one of the many Russian dialects. The Russian military occupation, as well as the civil administration under the governor, Alexey Bobrynsky, considered the Ukrainians of Galicia as Russian subjects who were traitors to Russia because of their demands for national independence and should, therefore, be punished. Following this theory, all prominent Ukrainian leaders and patriots — among them Professor M. Hrushevsky and Count Andrew Sheptytsky, Metropolitan of Lviv, Bishop Chekhovych of Peremyshl — were arrested and immediately deported deep into Russia where they spent three to four years. In the same manner over 12,000 Ukrainians were removed from Galicia and their homes and properties were plundered and confiscated. Next, the Russians directed their attacks against all cultural or economic institutions and societies, such as the reading halls, schools, cooperatives, credit unions, and banks. These were all closed down. Further publishing of Ukrainian books and magazines was prohibited. Libraries were ordered not to lend Ukrainian books. The Russian language became the official language in schools and government, and the people were punished if they refused to use it. The Uniate church was declared by the Russian hierarchy to be an improvised church; therefore, the people must return to their *fathers' faith*, the Orthodox belief. Many of the

Uniate priests shared the fate of their Metropolitan; that is, they were exiled. As soon as the Uniate priests were arrested and deported, their churches were taken over by Russian Orthodox priests especially imported from Russia, whose main concern was to "Russify" the local people. Church affairs were placed in the hands of Russian Bishop Evlogi, who gained notoriety in Ukrainian church history as the greatest enemy of the Ukrainians, since he was of a psychopathic type. To climax the efforts at "Russifying" the church and civil administration, Tsar Nicholas II, himself, visited Lviv in the spring of 1915, congratulated the local population as "truly Russians" upon their "liberation", and proclaimed the union of Galicia, "this ancient Russian land", with "Mother Russia".

After the first surprising successes at the beginning of the war (1914-1915), however, the Russians encountered stiff resistance on the German front and in the Carpathian mountains, where the *Ukrainian Sichovi Striltsi* were placed in the front lines. The Russian armies followed the route of 1848, trying to capture the Carpathian mountains and thus cut off the Hungarian plains from Austria. Here, while defending the Carpathian front, the Ukrainian detachments (U.S.S.) distinguished themselves, especially in the days from April 29 to May 2, 1915, at Makivka. The military reports of the Austrian officers were full of admiration and praise for the bravery and courage of these Ukrainian forces, despite the fact that they were ill-equipped and inadequately trained. Lysonia was another place where the *Ukrainian Sichovi Striltsi* exhibited their unshakable fighting spirit. It was not long before Russian military plans failed and they started to retreat.

If the life of the Ukrainians in Galicia under the Russian occupation was "an uninterrupted martyrdom," as Professor D. Doroshenko says, then their hardships during the Russian retreat were even more severe. Whole villages were depopulated — the inhabitants forced from their homes with no plan or organization and driven like cattle out of Galicia into different sections of Russia. The purpose of this planless evacuation was to protect the "Russians" from the influence of the Germans, who were allegedly responsible for the promotion of Ukrainian separatism. On the march thous-

ands of these "*rescued Russians*" died from starvation, exhaustion, and epidemics. The result of the Russian occupation and the horror of the enforced evacuation was such that even the Russophiles were cured of their pro-Russian sympathies. The Russian citizens themselves strongly criticized the Russian government for the inhuman treatment of the Ukrainians in Galicia and branded in the Duma this enforced "exodus from Galicia" as the "European scandal".

Upon the return of the Austrian armies and administration (1915), the Ukrainians resumed more or less their normal cultural activities. The fact that Galicia, for the first time since 1848, had as a governor not a Pole, but a German, contributed much to the willingness of the population to rebuild. The Ukrainians were permitted to reopen and to reorganize again their shattered cultural institutions. The legend of "Ukrainian treason" disintegrated, for the Ukrainians had fully demonstrated their loyalty. Nevertheless, the Austrians did not feel obligated to recompense the Ukrainians for their losses, although the Ukrainians suggested some political concessions. For example, the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" proposed (May 12, 1915) that Austria establish an independent Ukrainian state consisting at least of Kholm, Pidlasie, Polisie, and Volhynia — territories recaptured by the Germans. Such a political concession would stir up hopes among the Ukrainians under Russia. The General Ukrainian Council in Lviv (reorganized in 1915) also emphasized the necessity of such a state and suggested that Galicia and Bukovina be added to it. Both requests, however, were ignored. The most that Austria did was to give an empty promise, through Prime Minister Sturgkh, for the division of Galicia, a goal for which the Ukrainians had been striving since 1848. The promise was insincere, for Austria at the same time was secretly dealing with the Poles, promising them an undivided Galicia. In 1916 it seemed as though the Polish demands would be fulfilled. On October 23, 1916, the German and Austrian Emperors jointly issued a "Manifesto to the Poles" in which they solemnly declared they would rebuild Poland as an independent state out of the Polish provinces freed from Russia and detach Galicia from Austria and place it under the Poles, enlarging their autonomy in this country.

Following this announcement, the three-man Polish



“Regency Council” was formed and soon after, on December 6, 1916, the “Council of State” (Rada Stanu), consisting of 25 members, was appointed by both Emperors. With these arrangements Poland became nominally an independent state, and was in a position to work toward the fulfillment of its “historical aims”. These events shocked and disillusioned the Ukrainians, for they had not expected such treatment from Austria for their loyalty to the monarchy.

Some Ukrainian historians, especially M. Lozynsky, blame the contemporary Ukrainian political leaders for this callous attitude of Austria toward the Ukrainians. He maintains that the Ukrainians put too much confidence in Austrian justice, and, therefore, made no effort to establish relations with the *Entente*, which would have served the Ukrainian political purposes much better. This might have made Austria more cautious in her dealing with the Ukrainians and more willing to grant concessions to them in order to “buy their loyalty” just as they did the Poles’. The contact with the *Entente* could have been established through the emigrants in the United States or in Canada. It must be remembered, however, that the Ukrainian emigrants there were neither numerous nor politically that skillful. They were, mainly, a pioneering and working group, and they had among them no Paderewski or Masaryk.

Though the Ukrainian General Council protested against the Austrian action, it was nevertheless widely accused of being too lenient toward Austria and was consequently forced to dissolve. Instead, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation under Dr. Evhen Petrushevych took the political leadership against Austria. Among the younger Ukrainian generation, especially the students and military units, the movement “away from Austria” became popular and spread widely. The students’ organization “Sich” in Vienna at its April meetings (and much more strongly in December, 1917) passed a resolution demanding the union of all Ukrainian territories under Austria (Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine), with Great Ukraine which after the Russian revolution (February 17, 1917) had proclaimed its own government: the Ukrainian National Council under the leadership of Professor M. Hrushevsky. These same students and the members of the secret Ukrainian military organization proposed the union of all Ukrainian

military detachments (Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi) and other Ukrainian regiments in the regular Austrian army with the army of Great Ukraine. There were also plans to take these Ukrainian soldiers to France, form independent Ukrainian military units under the auspices of the *Entente*, and to use them against Austria. If these pleas had been realized, perhaps the Ukrainians would have had successes similar to the Czechs, who practiced this policy from the very beginning of the war. However, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representatives were still hesitant, because they hoped that Austria would annul the promises given to Poland; and they tried to appease the revolutionary minded Ukrainian youth.

A fatal characteristic of the Ukrainian leadership during the Austrian supremacy was also apparent in their subsequent history. Many capable leaders appeared, but not all of them were given opportunities to prove their talents. It was usually the case — and, unfortunately, still is — that a man who was successful as a leader in one organization was almost automatically elected as a leader in many other organizations. Thus it happened that Dr. K. Levytsky, who was undoubtedly an energetic and capable man, was chairman, both before and during the war, of at least four leading organizations: the National Committee, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Club in Vienna, the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, and the Main Ukrainian Council. He was also chairman of other occasional committees, such as temporary election boards. No wonder he was teasingly called the “dictator.” The result of such a practice was that if the “dictator” failed in one field, all the other organizations had to suffer, and it took a long time to replace such a man. Yet at the same time there were other capable men, such as E. Olesnytsky, A. Barvinsky, E. Petrushevych, K. Trylovsky, to mention only a few. The age of the leader was also important, for it was believed that age would add prestige to his position. Unfortunately, this opinion is prevailing to the present day among some groups and leaders. This was the main reason why the plans of the young students and officers were not taken so seriously by the “old leaders”, who still relied on the “*trust of the Kaiser*” (Emperor).

The Ukrainian Parliamentary Representatives, rather

than the more aggressive students and officers, were favored by the further development of events.

The United States under the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson had entered the war against the Central Powers in April, 1917. In 1916 the old, rigid and unfriendly Francis Joseph II died and the more liberal Charles had become the Austrian Emperor. Russia, meanwhile, had become a communist country and was anxious to make peace with Germany and Austria "without annexations." Germany and Austria also favored a peaceful settlement with Russia and signed a treaty with the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk in February, 1918. The Ukrainian National Republic participated in this peace treaty and successfully pressed Austria to agree to form a Ukrainian autonomous crownland of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine within the boundaries of the monarchy. The previous plan favoring the Polish demands were now abandoned. For a while it seemed as if the long struggle of the Ukrainians for the division of Galicia had ended successfully. However, the Poles immediately started to protest the treaty at Brest-Litovsk, denouncing the Ukrainians as great friends of the Central Powers. Such pressure was put on Austria that the clause was never put into effect.

The Austrian monarchy was approaching its end. The power of the monarchy declined rapidly. The new Emperor Charles offered a separate peace treaty to the *Entente* (September 14, 1918), but his plans failed. Hungary, Bulgaria, and other countries broke all ties with Austria. Charles was willing to reorganize Austria and transform it into a federation of individual autonomous national states. In this hope he issued a "Manifesto" on October 16, 1918. But with the exception of the Ukrainians, the other nationalities were no longer interested in a federation of Austrian states. The idea of "self-determination" proclaimed in the Fourteen Points of President Wilson appealed to them much more than the "Manifesto", and they proceeded with their own plans for the formation of independent countries. The Ukrainians of Galicia were now the only nation willing to negotiate with Austria along the lines of concessions that should have been made at least sixty years before. Unfortunately now it was too late.

The "Manifesto" certainly did not produce the results the Emperor expected. After it became obvious that the end of the Austrian Empire was near, the Ukrainians also decided to act on their own. On October 18, 1918, they called a meeting in Lviv of representatives from all Ukrainian political parties, who subsequently formed the "Ukrainian National Council" (Rada), with Dr. E. Petrushevych as its president. Many of the former Parliamentary Representatives were re-elected to the Council. Again they proved that the same men chosen to act as leaders used the same ineffective methods of action. The Ukrainian leaders were criticized because of their delayed diplomatic dealings with Austria, which lost the precious time necessary to plan and organize their independent state through their own strength and resources. They had been accused of having lost the opportunity to establish contact with the *Entente* and again with the Ukrainian National Republic. In fact, however, the Council at once proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian State, consisting of East Galicia, the Lemky territory, Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine. The national minorities (Poles, Jews, Germans, and Rumanians) were invited to send their deputies to the Council. A constitution based upon general, equal, secret and direct suffrage was proposed. The Council declared its intention to send a separate delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Union with Great Ukraine was not yet officially proclaimed, but the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Dr. N. Hankevych, publicly urged it strongly. The Council consigned executive responsibilities to the three main delegations: Vienna, Lviv, and Bukovina. The Vienna delegation was supposed to obtain the transfer of the Galician administration into Ukrainian hands; but the Vienna government was indecisive, and still continued making minor unrealistic plans for concessions.

Meanwhile, the Polish Congress called at Krakow established a "*Liquidation Commission*", which informed the Austrian government of its intention to take over the Galician administration on November 1, 1918. The Poles, being in a better position than the Ukrainians, did not ask permission from the Austrian government, but practically dictated it. The Poles had their own army, organized by J. Pilsudski, and their own semi-independent government "Rada Stanu" (Council of State), granted by the German and Aus-

trian emperors (December 6, 1916). Most advantageous of all, they had good friends among the members of the Allied Forces, including President Wilson, who under the influence of Paderewski, the pianist-statesman, insisted in his Fourteen Points on the reestablishment of an independent Poland with access to the Baltic Sea.

The situation for the Ukrainians was critical. Fortunately, a few Ukrainian secret military leaders in Lviv advocated immediate action for the occupation of Lviv by force on the night of October 31 — November 1, 1918. The main instigator and leader of this plan was Dmytro Vitovsky, a major in the Ukrainian Sichovi Striltsi, stationed at that time mainly in Bukovina. There was some hesitation about the forceful action when Dr. Longin Tsehelsky, courier of the Vienna Ukrainian delegation, arrived at Lviv with the assurance that the Emperor would sign the act allowing the Ukrainians to take over the administration of the country on November 1, 1919. However, as Count Huyn, the governor, refused to turn over the administration to the Ukrainians, they now had no choice except to approve the plan for forceful occupation. With a small group of soldiers — 1400 men and 60 officers — Major Vitovsky on the night of November 1 took over Lviv, disarmed the entire Austrian garrison there, and placed Governor Huyn under house arrest.

The whole action was performed without any violence or bloodshed. The Ukrainian National Council proclaimed the independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic (November 1, 1918) and informed the people in a manifesto which read: "By the will of the Ukrainian people the Ukrainian State has been created on the Ukrainian territories of the previous Austro-Hungarian monarchy... From today you, the Ukrainian people, are the owners of your country and free citizens of the Ukrainian State. The fate of this nation is in your hands... therefore, sacrifice all your means to strengthen the independent Ukrainian State." For the first time the Ukrainian national flag of blue and yellow colors, the symbol of the Ukrainian government, was hoisted over the city hall.

Needless to say, those most surprised over this bold action were the Poles, who had been for once outdone by the Ukrainians. After some confusion and consternation, the

Poles in Lviv started a counteraction, at first secretly and then openly, by using large organized forces, such as the Polish military command with its many branches and volunteers from previous Polish legion members. They had a great reserve of men in the city, where the Polish citizens comprised over 88 per cent of the population. Polish historians wrongly credit the school youth ("orlęta") for the anti-Ukrainian resistance, and overlook the local military organizations. No doubt there were school students just as there were in the Ukrainian Galician army, and they were the most idealistic group.

The organized Polish resistance rapidly grew stronger and soon gained the railway station with its stores of arms and ammunition. The most annoying losses suffered by the Ukrainians were the unexpected attacks and shootings from behind windows, doors, and blind street corners by Polish citizens, who knew the city well and took advantage of their knowledge. The soldiers of the Ukrainian army, — which was quickly organized and officially called *Ukrainska Halycka Armia* (Ukrainian Galician Army), — being recruited mainly from the villages, were unfamiliar with the plan of the city. After a few days of hard street fighting, the Poles reoccupied a few main buildings; but with the arrival of the Ukrainian Sichovi Striltsi from Bukovina, all losses were regained. The Poles immediately asked for an armistice, a maneuver used in order to stall the action until reinforcements could arrive and a more advantageous position secured. They repeated this method (November 15-17) when the Ukrainians were reinforced by a small but courageous detachment ("Gonta") from Great Ukraine under Ataman Dolud. The truce proved to be fraudulent. The Poles received reinforcements from Poland and the Krakow district and undertook an offensive on November 20 which forced the Ukrainians to evacuate the city the next day. The decision of the Ukrainian Chief of Staff to withdraw came as a surprise and remains unexplained. The situation was not that hopeless even though the purely Ukrainian regiments in the Austrian army could not help, for they were still involved on the Italian front and their transfer to East Galicia was barred by the communist revolution in Hungary. The Ukrainian forces laid siege to the city which continued throughout the entire winter (1918-1919).

As soon as the news of the Ukrainian revolution in Lviv spread, the other East Galician cities proceeded to set up their own administrations, all without violence or opposition. Peremyshl, an important railway link between Krakow and Lviv, was the only city the Ukrainians lost in the early days of the revolution; and it was lost because of the trust of the Ukrainians in Polish promises not to resist. The loss of this city proved to be fatal to the Ukrainians, since the Poles were now able to supply the besieged Lviv with food and arms from all parts of Poland.

With the evacuation of Lviv the Ukrainian National Council moved temporarily to Ternopil and later to Stany-slaviv where it completed its organization and membership and established a separate office of State Secretary, headed by Dr. K. Levytsky.

At the end of December (1918) and the beginning of January (1919), the Ukrainian Army, now led by General Omelanovych Pavlenko, launched a successful offensive against Lviv nearly encircling it. It looked as if the Polish forces would have to surrender. At this critical moment the Poles again used the tactic of negotiation, and the Supreme Council in Paris itself intervened now to stop the Ukrainian-Polish fighting. The Ukrainians, being in the better strategic position, hesitated to agree to the negotiations, but the Supreme Council would grant admittance of a separate Ukrainian delegation to the Peace Conference only on the condition that they cease fighting and accept the truce (February 25, 1919). This special Allied Truce Commission was led by the French General Berthelemy (officer of the French Intelligence Service). Other members of the Commission were: Professor Robert Lord, American; Carton de Wiart, English; and Commander Stabile, an Italian. This commission spent some time in Warsaw, where it was strongly indoctrinated by the Poles. Several times when the Ukrainians objected that the Poles were breaking the armistice, the commissioners displayed their anti-Ukrainian sentiments by pounding their fists on the table, slamming doors, or leaving the conference room. Indeed, the proposals of the commission were unacceptable to the Ukrainians. The terms included withdrawal behind a demarcation line, leaving Lviv, Peremyshl, and the rich oil fields of Boryslav and

Drohobych to the Poles. From the attitude and provisions of the commission it was evident that the *Entente* was not impartially informed concerning conditions in East-Central Europe. The same commission met later with Ataman S. Petlura, head of the Ukrainian Directory and again displayed no understanding of his aims.

In addition to the success on the Galician front, early in the year 1919, the hopes of the Ukrainian National Council passed a resolution uniting the Western Ukrainian Republic with the Ukrainian People's Republic on January 3, 1919. The ceremonial proclamation of the Act of Union took place on January 22, 1919, on St. Sophia's Square in Kiev in the presence of foreign representatives and delegates from most of the Ukrainian provinces. The act of union was documented by a special "*Universal*", which read: "From henceforth on all parts of the Ukraine, which have been divided for centuries, Halychyna, Bukovina, Carpatho-Rus' and Dniπρο-Ukraine, will be one great Ukraine. The old dreams of centuries for which the best sons of Ukraine have lived and died have been fulfilled. From this day forward there will be one independent Ukrainian National Republic."

The historical values of this act were thus expressed in the "Universal". It documented the fact that the artificial boundaries dividing the Ukrainian sections from one another for centuries had not been able to kill the spirit of unity and their national gravitation to each other. Even Carpatho-Ukraine, apparently the most backward, oppressed and denationalized section, expressed its desire to belong to the Ukrainian Democratic Republic through its 420 delegates.

It was quite natural that this "act of union" inspired the soldiers on the front to a renewed offensive, which called for the intervention of the Berthelemy Commission, which, as we mentioned, favored the Poles. The Poles gained more time — time to reinforce their first positions and to make a counter-offensive. They also anticipated help from the well-equipped and trained Polish army of six divisions under General Haller, which had been organized in France from previous prisoners of war and Polish Americans. This force was supposed to be used only against the Bolsheviks, but as soon as it arrived in Poland (April, 1919), it went to the Polish-Ukrainian front. Participation of this army weighed



heavily on the results of the Polish Ukrainian war in West Ukraine, mainly in Galicia.

At the Peace Conference in Paris the Polish delegation under Paderewski agreed to stop fighting and to conclude an armistice, but the Poles disregarded Paderewski's telegram (April 17). Paderewski, as a result, decided to resign; but Pilsudski refused to accept his resignation and explained to the Peace Conference that the Ukrainians had been the ones who had started the offensive and the Poles were merely defending themselves. In reality, the exhausted and poorly equipped Ukrainian army could not hold its lines and was forced to retreat. Here for the first time the Ukrainians requested an armistice (April, 1919). Upon the intervention of the Ukrainian delegates at the Paris Peace Conference, the Supreme Council created an Inter-Allied Commission, headed this time by General R. Botha (from South Africa), who after interviewing both sides, submitted a new plan on May 12, 1919. The new demarcation line, leaving Drohobych and Boryslav oil with Ukraine, was more favorable to the Ukrainians than that suggested by Berthelmy; but the Poles, now having the advantage, rejected it and skillfully persuaded the Allied Powers and the Peace Conference that the Western Ukrainian army was a hostile force because of the German and Austrian volunteer officers participating in it. The Ukrainians responding to this minor accusation were willing to replace them by officers appointed by the Allies. The above accusation was not the main issue. The problem was that the Poles considered East Galicia as a "historical part" of Poland and desired to occupy it by any means. Thus, in spite of the fact that the Botha mission was still functioning, the Poles began a decisive offensive on all the fronts (May 14, 1919), and pushed the Ukrainians eastward where they encountered attacks from the Bolsheviks, who were on their march westward. The situation was grave, as the Ukrainian army had to fight on two fronts. All protests of the Ukrainian delegates to the Peace Conference were of no avail, for the Poles always found more sympathetic hearings among the allied members, especially the stubborn French Premier Georges Clemenceau, who could not forgive the Ukrainians for making a separate peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. Thus the Ukrainian conflict with the Poles found little sympathy in Paris. France,



**K. Levitsky**



**J. Romanchuk**



**A. Sheptytsky**



**E. Petrushevych**



**S. Petlura**



fearful of a German revenge, sided with Poland, seeing in her an ally against Germany and a bulwark against the Communists in Russia. For this reason, the French military authorities ordered the Rumanian army to invade a part of Ukrainian territory (Bukovina and Pokutie) on May 24, 1919, and drew a "common border" with Poland along the Dnister River with Stanyslaviv and Nadvirna on the Rumanian side. This amounted to a stab in the back. Stanyslaviv, the seat of the Ukrainian National Council, was evacuated. The army was pushed back into a small territory, forming a triangle between the Zbruch, the Dnister, and Horyn. This position history dubs the "*triangle of death*" with the Poles on the west, the Bolsheviks on the east, and the Rumanians on the south. The situation was, indeed, hopeless. There were suggestions of surrendering to the *Entente* in Rumania. To cope with the situation, the Ukrainian government was forced to make some changes. Petrushevych was nominated as dictator by an act on June 8, and General Grekov, was made Chief Commander of the army.

Surprisingly enough, the Poles as well as the Bolsheviks remained inactive for some time on the eastern front. The *Directory* of East Ukraine headed by Symon Petlura used this short rest period to reorganize its army and renew its attacks against the Bolsheviks and regained some territory, including Kamynets Podilsky. This act on Petlura's part encouraged the Ukrainian Galician army, which launched a surprise offensive (the so-called Chortkiv offensive) on June 6. The impossible became a reality. The Ukrainian army, lacking food, clothing, and ammunition, almost empty-handed drove the daring attacks of the superior Polish forces back close to the gates of Lviv, and recovered all East Galicia territory in a short time. However, the complete lack of arms and ammunition (the Ukrainian soldiers dug up the old trenches in search of arms) compelled the Ukrainian Galician Army to stop its advance. For the second time the Ukrainian forces began to retreat before the Polish army, which used more munitions in one day than the whole Ukrainian army had possessed before the Chortkiv offensive. On July 16 the West Ukrainian army of 60,000 to 70,000 men crossed the Zbruch River (the border between Austria and Russia) to unite with the remaining forces under Petlura in Kamynets Podilsky.

After the union of the two Ukrainian armies and governments (West and East Ukraine) in Kaminets Podilsky, a new campaign against the Bolsheviks was planned. There were, however, some differences of opinion between the two main Ukrainian leaders. Petrushevych, who now became a member of the *Directory* under Ataman Symon Petlura, suggested a determined march on Odessa to establish a direct connection with the *Entente*. Petlura, on the other hand, insisted on marching to Kiev. The new slogan, "Through Kiev to Lviv", was more appealing. Within a month the united armies under command of General Yunakiv cleared the Ukrainian territory on the right bank of the Dnipro of Bolshevik occupation and entered Kiev (August 31, 1919) amidst the great enthusiasm of the Kiev population. The Third Corps of the West Ukrainian army, under General O. Kraus, was the first to appear on the streets of the liberated Kiev. However, it was not the fate of the Ukrainian army to remain long in Kiev or to continue the successful campaign against the Bolsheviks in the east; another army approached from the south. This was Denikin's army, which was organized from former "white" Russian officers and well supplied and equipped by the *Entente* to fight the Bolsheviks. Pursuing the same goal, Petlura believed Denikin his ally and ordered his troops not to fight. Denikin, however, thought differently. To him Petlura as head of an independent Ukraine was worse than the Bolsheviks themselves, for the separation of Ukraine did not coincide with Denikin's belief in the *indivisibility of Russia*. He refused to recognize the government of Petlura and turned his army of 200,000 men against the Ukrainians instead of continuing his march on Moscow against the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian army was now surrounded on all four sides. It was beyond human ability to fight on four fronts, and so the Ukrainians began a retreat. To make matters worse, a terrible epidemic of typhus broke out; and for lack of medical supplies, large numbers of the exhausted Ukrainian soldiers and many civilians died. Over 90 per cent of the Ukrainian army was struck down by this plague, by October 1919. In Zhmyrenka alone over 10,000 soldiers died in one month. The reports of the army doctors and managers described scenes that make one's hair stand on end. "Our troops are not an army any longer. This is not even a hospital, but a wandering storehouse of corpses", reported

Dr. A. Burachynsky, the chief of physicians. The tragic end of the army was evident as the "*square of death*" closed in. The question of what to do to save the remnants of the armies tormented both leaders, Petlura and Petrushevych. Finally, Petlura decided to sign an alliance with Poland, seeing in her the natural enemy against Moscow. The Western Ukrainians, under Petrushevych, were opposed to such a plan and preferred to negotiate with Denikin. Discord between Petlura and Petrushevych increased. General Myron Tarnavsky, Commander-in-Chief of the remaining Ukrainian Galician Army, effected an armistice with the "white" army of Denikin (November 6, 1919). He was courtmartialled for his desperate action to save what was left of the Ukrainian Galician Army, but later he was acquitted. Petrushevych left Ukraine and emigrated through Rumania to Vienna, where he engaged in energetic political action in an attempt to win a favorable solution to the Galician problem from the Allied Powers. Petlura went to Poland and signed a secret military alliance with Pilsudski (April 21, 1920), relinquishing Western Ukraine to Poland.

In the spring of 1920, Denikin's army suffered utter defeat and was dissolved by the Bolsheviks; and the remnants of the Galician army, which had dropped to 18,000 men, were absorbed into the Bolshevik army, (*Red Army*), and consequently "*purged*" of any national elements. It proved, however, that coexistence with the Bolsheviks was impossible; and as soon as Petlura's new army, in alliance with Pilsudski, marched into Kiev (April, 1920), the bulk of the previous Ukrainian Galician army joined Petlura. Here, they experienced another disappointment. Many of them who had been taken prisoners by the Poles, were disarmed and sent to Dombie prison camp. Only a small group of officers and soldiers under General Kraus managed to break through and find refuge in Czechoslovakia. Those again who, under the circumstances, remained with the Bolsheviks were disarmed, arrested and in most cases sent to Siberia. This was the end of the once existing Ukrainian Galician Army.

The Bolsheviks defeated Pilsudski and Petlura's army and under the command of General Tuchachevsky, advanced on Warsaw in the summer of 1920. Galicia, for a short while, was occupied by Budienny's army. But at the Wisla (Vis-

tula) the Bolsheviks were finally stopped and defeated by the Polish and East-Ukrainian armies and soon asked for an armistice, which was signed in Riga on March 18, 1921. \* This treaty of Riga was another milestone in Galician history. By the terms of this treaty both the Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine agreed to cede Galicia to Poland. Poland broke its agreement in the secret, former alliance with Petlura, by which it had promised not to enter peace negotiations with a third party without the consent and approval of the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Galician delegation was not even admitted to the peace negotiations.

East Galicia was thus practically (de facto) occupied by Polish forces although the nominal (de iure) sovereign of this country was the Allied Powers, according to the Saint-Germain peace treaty, at which time Austria had relinquished all her historical rights to Galicia in favor of the Allies. When the Polish-Ukrainian "hot war" ceased, the struggle for Galicia continued at the Peace Conference. Polish diplomats strove in an all-out effort to achieve a legal decision that would make Eastern Galicia an inseparable part of Poland. The Allies were indecisive, or at least not unanimous, about granting the Polish claims and delayed any final decision. France was the only country which sided with Poland without any reservations. It took a few years, however, until Galicia nominally was acknowledged as a part of Poland, as we shall see in the next chapter.

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\* Other sources date it: October 12, 1920.

## CHAPTER II

### **Galicia — An International Problem**

Eastern Galicia and the other West Ukrainian territories were occupied by Polish military forces immediately following the Ukrainians' defeat in their war against the Poles (1918-1919). By the act of June 25, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference consented to Polish occupation as far as the river Zbruch under the pretense of protecting the population from the Bolsheviks. This document clearly stated: "This authorization constitutes no encroachment on the decisions which the Supreme Council will subsequently take to define the political status of Galicia." The *Entente* was reluctant and often indecisive about solving the "Galician Problem" and often postponed any final decision. In the meantime, the Poles interpreted this delay as permission for the permanent possession of East Galicia and ushered in their administration with an excess of terror and suppression. The Poles habitually took advantage of the indecisiveness of the Supreme Council. By vigorously presenting their claims that body usually yielded to their demands.

Meanwhile, the struggle between the Poles and the Ukrainians for the possession of East Galicia continued at the Paris Peace Conference, where the Poles always had an advantage over the Ukrainians. The Poles claimed Galicia on the basis of their "historical" right as well as for economic, cultural and strategic reasons. The Ukrainians, the indigenous people of the province, relying upon Wilson's principle of self-determination of nations, demanded that the Ukrainian government in exile, headed by Dr. E. Petrushevych, be placed in power.

At first the Polish claims received criticism from the members of the Peace Conference. They were called "unjust, aggressive, and imperialistic". Even the French negotiators hesitated to support them. Then as time passed, the situa-



tion changed. President W. Wilson, the main supporter of the doctrine of self-determination and the advocate of the idea that only territories inhabited by Poles should go to Poland, broke down physically and his opponents gained the ear of American public opinion. The Americans at that time reverted to their prewar isolation policy. The leadership of the Conference there shifted to the French Premier, G. Clemenceau who, for reasons of French security, had become an energetic crusader for Polish domination. He believed that a strong Poland would serve as a *buffer state* between France and revolutionary Russia and a potentially aggressive Germany. Only Prime Minister Lloyd George, seemed to remain constant in his support of the principle of a *plebiscite* in occupied territories. He was accordingly accused by the Poles of being "hostile" to them. In World War II Winston Churchill received this same criticism from the Poles.

The *Entente* made many attempts to solve its "hardest diplomatic problem" — the settling of the Polish eastern border dispute. The first attempt was in November, 1919. On November 21, the Council of Ambassadors, represented by France, England, Italy, and Japan, formed the so-called "Statute for East Galicia", mainly upon the initiative of Lloyd George. According to this statute, Poland was given a mandate over the state organization and administration of Eastern Galicia for a period of 25 years. Galicia was granted territorial autonomy with her own Diet, school system (including a university, and military units). The Polish and Ukrainian languages were to have equal official status; however, the Poles, considering themselves sole owners of the province, rejected this stipulation. The Council, being in no position to enforce its resolution upon the Poles, left it "provisionally in suspension." The western border of East Galicia was defined as the "Curzon line", \* which ran east of Peremyshl straight south to the Carpathian Mountains, leaving the River Zbruch as its eastern border. A small part of northwestern Bukovina was also included. At the end of twenty-five years, the League of Nations, after taking a *plebiscite* of the population, would decide the future of the country by revising or changing this Statute.

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\* See map, page 266.

The Poles, however, were interested only in the integration and annexation of Eastern Galicia and naturally rejected the Statute, especially the clause for reconsideration by the League of Nations after 25 years. The reason of the *Entente's* failure to impose its decision upon Poland was because it desperately needed the Polish army to fight the Bolsheviks. The Poles no doubt understood the situation and were gaining time by bargaining with the Western Powers. They made their own terms by which they agreed to appoint a special minister without portfolio for Eastern Galicia to their Polish cabinet in Warsaw as their adviser on Galician problems. The Galician administration would be directed by a governor appointed by the chief of the Polish government. The Ukrainians would be permitted to elect their own representatives to the Warsaw Sejm (Diet) but in return Poland demanded the right to draft Ukrainians into the Polish army.

Simultaneously with the Polish diplomacy abroad, propaganda was set up which enabled the Poles to indulge in intrigues and plots. Britain was accused of leniency toward Germany, and a free or autonomous Eastern Galicia was pictured as a future target for German intrigues which would result in a possible attack by the Germans from both the east and the west. France would not allow this contingency. Consequently, Clemenceau personally visited Lloyd George in London to persuade him to suspend the decision of the Supreme Council. Clemenceau completed his mission and on the same day happily informed the Polish government of his success. Thus, the Poles continued to govern Eastern Galicia as a conquered country.

As long as the legal status of Eastern Galicia was not clarified, the Ukrainians in Galicia refused to cooperate with the Poles and did whatever was possible to secure independence for Eastern Galicia and western Ukraine. The great crusader for this goal was the Ukrainian government, headed by the former President of the Republic, Dr. E. Petrushevych, in exile in Vienna. Although he did not achieve any success at the Peace Conference or with the Supreme Council — all his protests were ignored — his activity, nevertheless, was greatly appreciated by his own people. He made the interests of Galicia the “problem of the day”, whereby it was

broadly discussed by many other world organizations. The Western Ukrainian government in exile missed no opportunity, whenever the future of Eastern Galicia was discussed, to inform the independent delegations of the wishes of that nation and to try to win sympathetic friends. In this capacity a Ukrainian delegation appeared at the Riga peace treaty conference (1921). The Bolsheviks were willing to admit this delegation to the meetings, but the Poles protested. Another delegation was sent to the League of Nations in Geneva (Nov., 1920) to present their cause in a note demanding (1) respect for the wishes of the Ukrainians in Galicia for "self-determination", (2) the defense of Eastern Galicia against Polish occupation and persecution, and (3) the turning of Eastern Galicia over to the administration of the Ukrainian National Council.

As a result of these requests, the League of Nations, meeting in Paris in February, 1920, concluded that Poland, according to international law, had no political right to Galicia, which was still nominally under the sovereignty of the *Entente*. At the next meeting of the League of Nations (September, 1921) the Canadian delegate Doharty spoke favorably for the Ukrainians in Galicia. In Great Britain a similar favorable opinion was voiced. The legal status of Galicia was also brought there to the attention of the British Parliament, and delegate Robert Cecil questioned several times the legality of Polish presence in Galicia.

In the spring of 1920, Pilsudski concluded a military alliance with Symon Petlura, who, as the main military leader of Ukraine, resigned his rights to East Galicia. This fact was used to advantage by the Polish diplomats in Paris, who stressed the "disinterest of Ukraine in a union with Galicia." Pilsudski then went with Petlura to "liberate" Eastern Ukraine. The Poles had hoped that the Ukrainian masses would rally around Petlura as they had always done in the past, but this time the masses remained silent and immovable because they hated the Poles as vehemently as they did the Bolsheviks. The united armies, nevertheless, entered Kiev in May, 1920, but were soon repulsed and forced to retreat rapidly by the Soviet counter-offensive. The Red army pushed westward towards Germany and soon reached the gates of Warsaw. Poland was in a perilous situation and appealed to the *Entente* for help. The Polish Premier, Wladyslaw Grab-

ski, appeared before the Supreme Council at Spa to make his plea. Lloyd George offered to act as mediator if the Poles would fulfill certain preliminary conditions, such as the return of the Wilno territory to Lithuania and the acceptance of the "Curzon line" in Galicia as a truce line. Lloyd George at first also insisted on a plebiscite in East Galicia, but later retracted that in favor of admitting the Eastern Galician delegates to the future peace conference with the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks, however, rejected the British mediation offer for an armistice. That changed the attitude of the West toward Poland. Now all realized that Poland must be helped; and military units and supplies were rushed to Warsaw. As a result of this assistance and the strategic plan of the French General Weygand, the Red offensive was broken on the River Vistula, and the Bolsheviks were forced to retreat and finally to accept the peace treaty at Riga signed on March 18, 1921. The peace treaty was concluded with Poland on one side and Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine on the other side. The Galician delegates were not admitted, although the Bolsheviks requested their presence as well as a plebiscite for East Galicia. Both conditions were rejected by the Poles. The Peace of Riga marked another partition of the Ukraine between Poland and Russia. A vast territory of West Ukraine, 132,000 square kilometers with a population of over 8 million, of which at least 6 million were Ukrainians, was allotted to Poland. This expansion no doubt gratified the ambitions of Warsaw but it was not for long. Two decades later Poland itself was partitioned and lost its "historical" territories, which in turn had become the main basis for an understanding between Hitler and Stalin. The Poles have always been sentimental about their own partitions; yet the fact remains that each major partition of Poland was preceded by a partition of Ukraine by Polish authorities.

Needless to say, after her victory over the Bolsheviks Poland ignored all obligations taken at Spa and refused to sign a new treaty with the *Entente* in Sevres (August 10, 1920), in which autonomy for East Galicia was included. The Allied Powers, on the other hand, refused to sanction the Peace of Riga; but the Poles, spurred by their latest victory, did not heed the warnings of the *Entente* and continued their policy of *fait accompli* in Eastern Galicia and in the other

Ukrainian occupied territories, ruling these as would a rightful sovereign power. Eventually, with the American withdrawal from European affairs, Wilson's principle of "self-determination" fell into disrepute. It became easier for Polish diplomacy to convey to the *Entente* through French channels the idea of her "strategic importance". Thus the annexation of Galicia was strategically necessary for Poland against the Bolsheviks. Again Clemenceau, with his containment policy against the Bolsheviks and the Germans, used all his diplomatic influence to convince the *Entente* that they should acknowledge Polish sovereignty over Galicia and other parts of West Ukraine. Gradually the *Entente*, tired of the difficult Galician problem, indicated a willingness to accept on condition that Poland would grant some kind of autonomy to Galicia. At once the French delegates unofficially informed the Polish government of the situation. Poland at first objected to the condition, but realizing the international disadvantage of leaving Galicia's legal status open indefinitely, finally accepted. On September 26, 1922, the Polish Sejm passed a law granting autonomy to the three provinces of Eastern Galicia — Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Ternopil that would be established. This law, known as the "autonomy of the wojewodstvos" was so vaguely worded and limited that it was a mere pretense to hide the Polish colonization of Eastern Galicia in spite of the promise to establish a Ukrainian university. Nothing was changed but the passing of the law achieved its desired effect in Paris.

The Council of Ambassadors, who assumed the powers of the Supreme Council ratified the Peace of Riga (Act of March 14, 1923) and transferred all legal rights of sovereignty over Eastern Galicia to Poland. Poland had won a victory, but this turned into a disaster for her. Poland had annexed too many non-Polish territories whose population amounted to 33 per cent of her total population, an act which resulted in a domestic problem that Poland was unable to master. By applying force and terror, Poland further alienated national minorities instead of winning them over. All of them waited for a change in the international situation, and when the downfall of Poland came in 1939, the non-Polish nationalities felt only relief, even though the new masters provided a type of government which removed the Ukrainians from one tyrannical power to another.

## CHAPTER III

### Galicia Under Poland — 1919 - 1939

From the beginning of their occupation of Galicia in 1919, the Poles made no secret of their intentions toward the Ukrainians. All the Ukrainian territory was to be treated as a Polish colony, and Ukrainians were to be polonized.

Without waiting for legal authorization, the Poles immediately introduced their own civil administration. First, they dissolved all Austrian autonomous institutions (January, 1920), such as the local Diet, the Land Council, and the Land-School Commission. A Polish governor appointed by the central government was sent to rule Galicia. In that same year the Warsaw Sejm passed a resolution prohibiting the use of the old historical name Galicia (*Halychyna*) and replacing it by the artificial name "*Eastern Little Poland*" in order to remove any historical connection with the old Ukrainian Galician Principality. Even the old Poland of Jagiello's dynasty had been more tolerant in this respect, leaving the official name "*Voievodstvo Rus'*" and thus preserving outwardly the ethnic character of the province. The "reborn" Poland especially forbade the name Ukrainian, which had been generally accepted, and ordered the use of the name "Rusin (*Ruthene*), *Rusinsky*, *Ruski*", which was very offending and humiliating to the Ukrainians.

This new "Eastern Little Poland" was divided into three provinces: Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Ternopil. The borders of these provinces were manipulated so that the Ukrainian majorities were diminished. This was especially true in the province of Lviv, where eight western Polish counties were added to boost the Polish population. The purely western Ukrainian areas around Lemky were, on the other hand, attached to Krakow instead of to Lviv.

Only the Polish language was used in the administration, and Ukrainian officials were discharged or removed into

Poland proper. The school system was placed under direct control of the Ministry of Education in Warsaw, which gradually turned Ukrainian schools into Polish institutions.

In the hope of achieving a rapid assimilation of the masses, thousands of the more prominent and active Ukrainian patriots were arrested, while many others were deported. According to Red Cross statistics for 1919 alone, there were over 23,000 Ukrainians in Polish prisons and concentration camps. In the years 1919-20, the number of prisoners grew to 70,000, many of whom died in the overcrowded and unsanitary jails. Other acts of Polish terror during the first years of occupation are listed in the "Bloody Book", published in Vienna by the Western Ukrainian Republic (1919). The neutralization of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was the special aim of the Poles. The conditions of the Polish jails and the mistreatment of political prisoners became the subject for articles of protests in many newspapers in France and Great Britain but, because of the censorship none in Poland.

The "Galician poverty" of the Ukrainian peasants was recognized throughout the world. World War I and the Polish-Ukrainian war that followed had brought vast destruction and ruin, and the new Poland did nothing to alleviate these conditions. On the contrary, in Galicia, which was always overpopulated, the Polish landowners who constituted less than one per cent of the total population held more than half of the land, while 75 per cent of the population possessed the other half. It reminds one of the feudal conditions in the Middle Ages. Because of this situation, the farmers' holdings were too small and inadequate for even a minimum existence, and most of the people were exposed to year-round famine conditions. For purely political reasons, this overpopulated and poverty-stricken country was selected to become a colony for new Polish settlers. In 1919 the Polish Sejm approved a resolution to colonize East Galicia. The Land of some Polish landowners was divided and distributed to the ex-servicemen of the Polish army to Polonize the country. At the same time, however, it was forbidden to sell land to Ukrainian farmers. In two years alone, 1921-22, 100,000 Poles moved into the cities and over 200,000 of them were placed in the overcrowded Ukrainian villages. They received 872,000 acres of homestead land.

Such colonization practices especially aroused the hatred of the natives and proved to them that their national struggle was inseparably linked to their social struggle. The Ukrainian resistance became so stubborn that for a short period the colonization policy was stopped. However, after the Agrarian Reform of 1925, colonization of the "borderlands" was carried out with greater pressure, and slogans such as "Destroy the Ruthenians (Ukrainians)", and "Not a foot of land to the Ukrainians" became common. During the 1930's Ukrainian farmers could not sell or transfer any land within an area of thirty kilometers from the Soviet border, apparently for security reasons. For the same reason the Ukrainian farmers upon the slightest suspicion of disloyalty to the Polish government were dispossessed and deported. In their place came more Polish settlers.

Wilson, in his Thirteenth Point explicitly said: "An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by an indisputably Polish population."

<b>1. NATIONALITY (%)</b>				
Year	1900	1910	1912	1931
Ukrainian and Rusyny	62.5	58.9	54.2	52.3
Poles	33.7	39.8	38.3	41.7
<b>2. DENOMINATION (%)</b>				
Year	1900	1910	1912	1931
Greek Catholic Greek Orthodox	63.5	62.7	60.2	58.3
Roman Catholic	22.6	25.3	26.9	30.6

The Poles realized that the crux of the problem lay in the ethnic numerical relationships of the groups inhabiting Galicia. Thus the Poles prepared the censuses of 1921 and



of 1931 by which they contrived to prove that the western Ukrainian territories, occupied by Poles, had a Polish majority and not Ukrainian. Figures were juggled and all kinds of census devices were invented to show a decrease in the national minorities and an increase in the "indisputably Polish population". Two tables are presented above, as examples of the official censuses drawn up according to "nationality" and "denomination".

One glance at the above tables shows that the Poles according to the "nationality" and denominational censuses (Roman Catholic) were steadily increasing, and the Ukrainians decreasing. These figures, however, did not correspond to the truth. The fact is that the Austrian censuses of 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910 as well as those conducted by the Poles in 1921 and 1931 were neither accurate nor reliable. The Austrian censuses, which were conducted on the basis of language as an equivalent of "nationality", were unreliable for at least one reason: they did not acknowledge either Yiddish or Hebrew, as an independent language. As a consequence over 659,706 Jews in the 1910 census were added to the number of Poles, and this meant a 10% increase in the Polish population. Furthermore, in both cases — with Austria, as well as with Poland — the official censuses were always carried out by local Polish officials, who used various pressures to achieve the desired numbers of their own nationality and denomination. For example: according to the 1910 census, there were in Eastern Galicia 3,132,233 Ukrainians (58.9 per cent) and 2,114,792 Poles (39.8 per cent). The Austrian censuses according to denomination were more accurate and reliable. According to the same census the Roman Catholics amounted to only 1,350,856, or 25.4 per cent. It must be noted, that not all Roman Catholics were automatically Poles. Among the Roman Catholics there was a group, the so-called "*Latynnyky*" who were Roman Catholics according to religious affiliation but Ukrainians in their national feelings. They constituted almost 8 per cent of the general population. The number of Poles who are Roman Catholic then represent 16.05 per cent. Although the Austrian denominational censuses were more reliable, inaccuracies crept in here too. "This may be illustrated by the following fact: there were more individuals speaking Ukrainian than there were members of the Greek-Catholic denomination

because Ukrainian was also spoken by the *Latynnyky*: however, the census of 1900 showed the number of Ukrainians to be 20,000 fewer than the number of Greek-Catholics, and the census of 1910 — 153,000 less” \*

Of even a more exaggerated nature were the Polish censuses of 1921 and 1931. “For example”, to quote the same author further, “the census of 1921 recorded 351,000 Poles of Greek-Catholic denomination, and that of 1931, 475,000 of them scattered all over the country. Actually no more than 32,000 individuals belonged to this group...” \*

As a means of falsifying the census of 1931 the Poles referred to the Ukrainian population by two different terms: “Ukrainian” and “Rusky” (“Rusyn”). Both terms were supposed to be equivalent. However, when the census was officially published, the above terms were not used as equivalents, but rather as separate nationalities. Both these groups together made up a little more than half of the population (51 per cent). When, however, these groups were counted separately, as they in fact were, the Polish population of 41 per cent then constituted the largest national group. Thus it was “proved” that Eastern Galicia was “inhabited by an indisputably Polish population”, as Wilson’s Thirteenth Point demanded...

According to the research conducted by the outstanding Ukrainian geographer and demographer Professor V. Kubijovyč who used as sources mainly church records of both Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics, the Ukrainians even as late as 1939 — that is to say, after twenty years of exposure to polonization — constituted 64,2 per cent, the Poles 16 per cent, *Latynnyky* 8.8. per cent and Jews 10.2 per cent. \*

Even serious Polish authors such as A. Krynski and Maliszewski recognized the number of Ukrainians as being higher than the official census figures. Their findings are in close agreement with the figures of Professor Kubijovyč.

By purposely dwelling longer on the census taking methods it can be seen how distorted the statistics were that

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\* Volodymyr Kubijovyč: *Western Ukraine within Poland 1920-1939*. Chicago, 1963, p. 14. (See also the attached map of Galicia’s population in 1910).

\* Ibid:

\* Op. cit. p. 17, and Stepan Ripetskyj: *Ukrainian-Polish diplomatic struggle 1918-1923*, Chicago, 1963, p. 36.

the Poles presented at the Verailles Peace Conference. Using these figures they succeeded in confusing the Western diplomats who lacked reliable knowledge of the Galician situation.

As a matter of principle the Ukrainians refused to recognize the first Polish census of 1921 because they were not yet officially "Polish citizens". Nonetheless, in the same year the Poles began drafting Ukrainians into the Polish army. This action only intensified the resentment of the Ukrainians against the liberties taken by the Polish administration and many draft-aged Ukrainians refused to comply.

In November, 1922, a new election to the Polish Sejm and Senate took place. The Poles wanted the Ukrainians to participate, but the Ukrainians, still trusting in the promises of the Allied Powers to grant Eastern Galicia autonomy with her own diet, boycotted the election and resorted to terroristic acts against the Poles and against Ukrainians who cooperated with them. Five Ukrainians who were in the Polish secret service were elected by the Poles, and in the Sejm they were compelled to declare that the Ukrainians would accept the *status quo* and cooperate with the Polish occupation and administration in Eastern Galicia. The Poles then made use of this declaration in the international forum. The newly elected Sejm and Senate also approved a new Polish constitution without the participation of the Ukrainians. This constitution further intensified the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.

The Polish policy of acting upon a *fait accompli* proved embarrassing to the *Entente*, but it was powerless to prevent Poland from violating international obligations or from introducing laws, which were aimed at the final assimilation of the Ukrainian population.

The Ukrainian resisted Polish suzerainty with every means possible and never came to acknowledge it as legally or morally binding. Although the Ukrainians had lost the war to the Poles, they had never capitulated and continued their struggle for independence. Different tactics were now used — both legal and illegal.

Immediately after the war the former officers under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalts formed a well-disciplined underground resistance group called the "*Ukrainska Viyskova Orhanizacia*" (Ukrainian Military Organiza-

tion) (UVO), which employed widespread sabotage to weaken the Polish occupation forces. Police stations were bombed, railroads and telegraph wires damaged, military armories destroyed, and estates of the Polish landowners burned. Top Polish officials were assassinated, usually as reprisals against new Polish laws. In Lviv on September 25, 1921, an attempt was made on the head of the Polish state, Joseph Pilsudski, by a Ukrainian student, Stephan Fedak. In 1922 the first governor of Lviv, Grabowski, was assassinated in protest against changing the name of Galicia to "Eastern Little Poland." Furthermore, during the election of that same year, Sydor Tverdokhlib, a collaborator with the Poles, was killed.

Legal political parties and cultural organizations were active too. They staged repeated demonstrations to stir up the patriotic feelings of the people. Any special occasion was used to excite the masses to keep the spirit of resistance alive. For example, the birthday celebration on February 27, 1921, in honor of the eldest Ukrainian parliamentarian, Julian Romanchuk, turned into a mass demonstration. The sixtieth anniversary of Shevchenko's death on March 6, 1921 was another stormy occasion. The fifth annual commemoration of Ivan Franko's death on May 29, 1921 drew masses of peasants into Lviv. Recent historical events, such as the proclamation of the West Ukrainian Republic on November 1, 1918 and the Act of Union of West and East Ukraine on January 22, 1919 were also observed by spirited crowds with demonstrations. The climax of these demonstrations was a spontaneous protest against the decision of the Council of Ambassadors on March 14, 1923, which allotted Eastern Galicia and other parts of West Ukraine to Poland. Just one week later, great masses of Ukrainians gathered at St. George Place in Lviv and swore a solemn oath, read by Julian Romanchuk, now 82 years old: "We, the Ukrainian people, swear that we will never recognize Polish rule; we shall use every chance to throw off the hated yoke of Polish slavery and to unite with all Ukrainian people in an independent Ukrainian state embracing all Ukrainian lands . . . and we swear our loyalty to the Western Ukrainian State."

This decision of the Council of Ambassadors was a particularly hard blow to the Ukrainians, who for four years

(1919-23) had believed firmly that justice brought to bear by the *Entente* would solve the Galician problem in a manner favorable to them. Now they realized that the justice of the *Entente* was no different from the justice of the Austrian Emperor.

The high ideals of Wilson's "self-determination" were ignored and the Western Powers ratified the partition of Ukraine. This decision made the Ukrainians understand that the Polish occupation was likely to last a long time. Self-preservation dictated the necessity of an adjustment to the new situation created by increased Polish oppression. The Ukrainians decided to organize their activities in a legal way and to make the best of their constitutional rights. If possible, they would increase their national, cultural and economic development by their own resources.

This time the initiative was taken by the legal political parties: the Labor Party, the Ukrainian Social-Radical Party (U.S.R.P.) and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (U.S.D.P.) The strongest and most influential party was the Labor Party, which revived the publication of *Dilo* (Deed) (1923), a very widely read Ukrainian paper. Adherents to the *Dilo* policy pledged themselves to work for reconstruction within the framework of the Polish state. In 1925, under the leadership of this group, the Labor Party was reorganized into a new party, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (U.N.D.O.) The second strongest party which had a strong appeal among the peasants, was the Ukrainian Social Radical Party, consisting of the old Radical Party and the Socialist Revolutionaries of Volhynia. Its publication was *Hromadskyi Holos* (The Voice of the Community). A youth organization, "Kameniarri" (Stonecutters), was founded under the auspices of this party. The third ranking party was the Social Democratic Party (U.S.D.P.), which unfortunately was dissolved because of communistic infiltration. Later, however, it was renewed under the leadership of Lev Hankevych, 1929. It was founded to safeguard the small Ukrainian city proletariat which was in immediate danger of becoming polonized.\* For some time there existed an

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\* All political parties, especially the three main parties, had a number of prominent and idealistic leaders whose influence was felt on the development of Ukrainian national, cultural, and economic life. In the U.N.D.O. were Dmytro Levytsky, the party leader; S. Baran;

active underground Communist Party of West Ukraine (K.P.Z.U.), which later merged with the Polish Communist Party. In 1929 it was discredited by Stalin and excluded from the Comintern. After the period of famine in Soviet Ukraine (1933), when millions of Ukrainians died of starvation, any further remaining Soviet sympathies died out in Galicia. As a result, the three pro-communist branches of the "Selrob" Party were arrested in their development.

Although the principal Ukrainian political parties often presented a united front of freedom, they differed greatly in their political programs. Nevertheless, they all worked together toward one goal: the strengthening of the national consciousness of the Ukrainians. There were issues on which they all agreed, such as the boycott of the 1921 census, the boycott of the 1922 election, and the protest against the proclamation of the Council of Ambassadors in 1923. They also unanimously condemned the Soviet policy of starvation and suppression in the Ukraine (1933).

By the law of 1922, the Poles were pledged to grant autonomy to Eastern Galicia to erect a Ukrainian University and to stop the colonization of Ukrainian territories. In reality, however, they had no intention of keeping promises, which had been made primarily to gain the support of the Western Powers on the one hand and to pacify the Ukrainians on the other. As soon as Eastern Galicia was legally assigned to Poland by the Act of March 15, 1923, the Poles, now assured of non-interference by any outside power, redoubled their efforts to assimilate and polonize the Ukrainians. This time the attack was directed mainly against the Ukrainian schools. As a result of this attempted polonization, not only did the Ukrainians fail to secure their university, but they also lost nearly all of their elementary schools. In 1924 a new school law was passed. Its author, Count W. Grabski,

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W. Murdyj; V. Bachynsky; S. Vytvytsky; A. Horbachevsky; M. Halushchynsky; K. Levytsky; I. Kedryn-Rudnytsky; O. Lutsky; L. Makarushka; V. Ochrymovych; Milena Rudnycka; Y. Pavlykovsky; and others. In the U.S.R.P. there were Leo Bachynsky, I. Makuch, I. Blazhkevych, M. Kobersky, D. Ladyka, O. Pavliv, M. Stakhiv, S. Zhuk. And in the U.S.D.P., L. Hankevych, V. Starosolsky, I. Kvasnytsia, Y. Ostapchuk. In 1939 many of these individuals were deported by the N.K.V.D. (Bolshevik Secret Police) to Siberia, where they died. Others succeeded in escaping to the United States after the end of World War II.

believed that after 25 years there would be no sign of the Ukrainian nation. Prior to the Polish occupation there were 2,420 Ukrainian schools in Eastern Galicia. A year after Grabski's law went into effect this number was cut to 1,055 and by 1927 to 740. Ten years later there were only 450, which meant that only 5 per cent of the Ukrainian children were being taught in their native tongue. While the polonization of Ukrainian schools did not achieve the expected goal, it did cause a high percentage of illiteracy among Ukrainian children who disliked Polish schools and the Polish language.

In other sections of West Ukraine, for example, in Volhynia, the situation was even more devastating. From approximately 1,000 Ukrainian school in 1919, only seven remained in 1929, representing only 0.02 per cent of the Ukrainian children being taught in their mother tongue. All Ukrainian teachers of the converted schools were simply discharged or, in the case of the better qualified, transferred to Poland proper, and new Ukrainian teachers could not find jobs.

The Gymnasia (secondary schools) fared similarly. By 1930 only six state and four private Ukrainian gymnasia remained in Easter Galicia, representing one gymnasium for every 230,000 Ukrainians. At the same time the Poles had 67 state and 49 private gymnasia or one gymnasium for every 16,000 Poles. During the "pacification" in 1930, two Ukrainian gymnasia in Drohobych and Rohatyn and the state gymnasium in Ternopil were closed and not allowed to reopen. Many students were arrested and jailed for months under the pretext of possessing arms intended to be used to overthrow the Polish government. Teacher training colleges suffered a similar fate. In 1933-34 the Ukrainians had only one public and six private normal schools. Technical Ukrainian schools were practically non-existent, and the possibilities for the employment of skilled Ukrainian tradesmen diminished.

The plight of the Ukrainian University was even more acute now than it had been under Austrian rule. Under Austria there were at least some Ukrainian professorial chairs in the University of Lviv. Under the Polish system these were all abolished, and the Poles made no attempt to fulfill their pledge to erect a separate Ukrainian university. On the contrary they dissolved the underground private university

composed of 60 chairs, that had been organized by the Ukrainians with funds contributed by American and Canadian Ukrainians. This university functioned secretly for five years (1921-1926) and reached an enrollment of 1,500 students before it was permanently closed. At the Polish University in Lviv in most faculties (medicine and technical science) there was a *numerus clausus* restricting Ukrainian students. The few who were admitted to other courses were eliminated at examinations for political-national reasons rather than for lack of ability. The Poles naturally opposed the education of Ukrainians because the intelligentsia were usually the leaders in political, cultural, and economic activity.

Under such conditions the Ukrainians had to help themselves through improvement organizations, in order to withstand Polish educational policies. A Ukrainian educational society, "*Ridna Shkola*" (Native School), was formed; and by 1928 it had founded and maintained 17 private gymnasia, nine teacher-training colleges, four professional schools, and 31 elementary schools. The work of the *Ridna Shkola* was widely recognized and generously supported by even the poorest communities. Its membership and branches grew rapidly, so that in 1928 there were 395 branches with over 23,000 members. By 1939, there were, 2,000 branches with nearly 105,000 members.

Another organization that contributed to the upholding of Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions was "*Prosvita*", which was rebuilt from nothing after its branches had been closed in 1919-20. In almost every community there existed a *Prosvita* reading club, where activities such as the theater, choirs, and self-educational circles flourished. By 1938 *Prosvita* had over 360,000 members using 3,000 libraries in 80 branches.

The Ukrainians took a special interest and pride in the "Shevchenko Scientific Society," which performed a great service in publishing numerous scientific and historical volumes in spite of all kinds of persecutions from the Polish administration. This society was indispensable to Ukrainian scholars because of its unique and valuable library. Similar to the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv was the "Ukrainian Scientific Institute" in Warsaw, founded by the Polish government in 1930. Instead of the promised University, the Ukrainians received only this institute from the Poles, and



it was located in Warsaw, not in Lviv or any other Ukrainian city. Nevertheless, the scientific work of Professor I. Ohienko and Professor D. Doroshenko who held chairs in the Institute at Warsaw contributed a great deal to Ukrainian culture and history. Professor I. Ohienko, who is now the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox Church in Canada, chaired the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Warsaw. This Seminary fulfilled the needs of Volhynia, Kholm and Polisie for clergy.

The Greek Catholic Academy in Lviv, founded in 1928, attempted to fill the needs of higher education by introducing a Faculty of Philosophy.\* This Faculty had enrollment of over 1,000 students, and it was financially supported by Sheptytsky. He also maintained the Ukrainian museum in Lviv, which preserved valuable historical and national relics. Another museum was affiliated with the "Shevchenko Scientific Society."

It must be strongly emphasized that all of these educational institutions were able to function only because of the amazing generosity of the Ukrainian people, who were not rich but possessed a deep-seated respect and appreciation for the work of these institutions. Hundreds of touching examples of endowments made by the poorest peasants and widows to "Ridna Shkola" or "Prosvita" and the sacrifices of the teachers who taught in these institutions for low wages made the work of these institutions possible. The result was that the plans of the government to polonize the Ukrainians through the destruction of their educational institutions failed because the Ukrainians were stirred to stronger resistance against the new order. It must be mentioned that the Polish government often applied all kinds of chicanes in order to stop or hinder the normal growth of these institutions.

After proving themselves capable of establishing an independent educational system, the Ukrainians revealed even greater skill in developing their own economic institutions which came to be worth millions of dollars. Again, paradoxically, the Polish traditional policy of "pauperization and exploitation" was mainly responsible for the impetus of resistance in the field of economics. Poland itself was always econo-

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\* Faculty of Philosophy in European Universities is the equivalent of a College of Liberal Arts.

mically poor. Yet, the annexation of vast non-Polish territories forced the government in Warsaw to support large military and police forces which consumed the lion's share of the state budget. What was left went to maintain the Polish economy. The national minority groups could expect no aid from the government in the form of employment or credit. A Ukrainian could not be employed, even in road construction, unless he changed his birth certificate from Greek Catholic to Roman Catholic. The main sources of state income were the Galician petroleum fields in the Drohobych and Boryslav basin. In the petroleum refinery at Polmin, 600 workmen were employed, but only 10 were Ukrainians, and they had to refrain from joining any Ukrainian national organization or party.

The Ukrainian nation was 75 per cent peasant and had no rich capitalists or an aristocracy. There was, however, a group of Ukrainian soldiers who, during the war, broke through the Bolshevik lines under General Kraus into Czechoslovakia, where they ultimately found refuge. There with the help of the Czech government under a highly humanitarian President, Masaryk, they obtained higher university degrees and in the middle of the 1920's they returned to Galicia. When they could not secure jobs, they began to work on the development of the Ukrainian cooperatives. These co-ops had previously existed in Galicia under Austria, but had been practically destroyed or closed during the war and the first years of the Polish occupation. In 1923 there were about 830 consumers' cooperatives, but under the leadership of Pavlykovsky, who reorganized the Ukrainian Audit Union of Cooperatives (*Revizyinyi Soiuz Ukrainskykh Kooperatyv*, R.S.U.K.) in Lviv the network of cooperatives soon covered the whole land. From 1,030 in 1925 they grew to 3,013 by 1935 and to 3,100 in 1937. The Audit Union supervised all kinds of enterprises, such as dairy cooperatives the *Maslosoius*, credit and savings cooperatives, the *Centrobank*, and consumers and retail cooperatives the *Centrosoiuz* and *Narodna Tarhovla*. The idea of cooperatives appealed to the Ukrainians, and they found in them the financial help they needed. By 1935 the Ukrainian cooperatives had created 12,500 jobs, and included over 542,000 members. In 1937 the number of members had increased to 661,000. Coincidental with this great increase in members, there was also

a proportional increase in new jobs. The Ukrainians also successfully operated a "*Zemelnyi Bank Hipotechnyi*" (Agrarian Mortgage Bank), which worked closely with another organization, called "*Silskyi Hospodar*", which had 63 branches and 107,200 members, and the purpose of which was to improve farming methods. They also restored the old insurance organization "*Dnister*" in Lviv. All these cooperatives each year allotted a major part of their dividends to the Ukrainian charitable organizations, to the "*Ridna Shkola*", and to other educational institutions. The Polish cooperatives supported by the government could not compare with the Ukrainian cooperatives which never received any help or credit from the Polish Ministry of Agriculture, but were instead hampered in their rapid development by all kinds of restrictions, police harassments and fines imposed by the Polish administration. The Poles were deeply concerned about the growth of the Ukrainian cooperatives and feared the financial power of the Ukrainians. In order to temper the fears of the Poles the Ukrainians adopted a policy of "normalization", even though it was not generally accepted.

Period	Total Deputies	Total Senators	Ukrainian Deputies	Ukrainian Senators
1922-28	444	111	Galician Boycott	Galician Boycott
1928-30	444	111	25	6
1930-35	444	111	36	11
1938	208	96	19	6

In order to combat by legal means the effects of the enforced Polish occupation the Ukrainian political parties decided to participate in the 1928 second election to the Polish Sejm and Senate. In spite of election abuses by Polish officials, similar to those of the old Austrian times, 36 Ukrainian deputies were elected to the Sejm: From the U.N.D.O. party, 23; From the U.S.R.P., 8; From the Selrob right, 8; From the Selrob yednist, 3; From the Selsoius, 2; (Selrob and Selsoius were pro-ommunist) and the Polish list (B.B.) 3 (Polish candidates). Also they elected Ukrainian Senators.

From Volhynia there were only eight deputies, compared to 18 in 1922. The above table compares the number of Ukrainian delegates to the total number of members in the Polish Sejm and Senate.

Because of the hostility in the Polish parliament, the Ukrainian representatives were unable to make needed changes so they started sharp opposition tactics. At the first session the spokesman for the Ukrainian group, the leader of the U.N.D.O. party, Dmytro Levytsky, made the following declaration: "The Ukrainian people have been indigeneous from time immemorial on lands which are now included in Poland. These lands formerly belonged to the Ukrainian Kiev state, then to the Galician-Volhynian state. Later, although under foreign rule, the Ukrainians never lost their ethnic individuality and never renounced their aspirations for an independent state. In 1918 to 1920 seas of blood were shed by the Ukrainians fighting for statehood. An independent, sovereign, and united Ukrainian state including all Ukrainian territory is our supreme and inviolate ideal. Therefore, we hold as invalid and not binding all international acts which violate the right of the Ukrainian people for self-determination in the areas designated from time immemorial as parts of Ukrainian territory, such as Eastern Galicia with Lemky, Kholm, Volhynia, Pidlasie and Polisie and their surrounding areas that are now assigned to Poland. These acts are the Peace Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, and the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 14, 1923, which violate the right of the Ukrainian people for self-determination. Entering these lawmaking chambers, we shall seek here to attain the realization of the supreme right of the Ukrainian people." The spokesman of the U.S.D.P. made a similar statement: "The Ukrainian working people are of the opinion that the present victory of foreign imperialism and the forced occupation of Ukrainian lands by Poland, Russia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia is of a temporary nature. The Ukrainian working people do not recognize and never will recognize the so-called legal foundations of this occupation outlined in several treaties signed without consulting the Ukrainian people and contradicting their right to self-determination as generally accepted in the civilized world."

Occasionally some Poles suggested policies for better

relations between the Poles and Ukrainians and were willing to offer some concessions to the Ukrainians, but these few Poles were quickly silenced and removed from their influential positions. When in 1926 the Minister of Education, A. Szykowski, and Minister of Internal Affairs, K. Młodzianowski, gave serious thought to a Ukrainian university, the Polish Diet immediately expressed lack of confidence in these ministers. In the face of such attitudes, the Ukrainian deputies had no choice except that of opposition. Once their terms of office expired, many representatives were brought to trial for the speeches or declarations they had made in the Diet.

Along with legal attempts of the Ukrainians to better their conditions, the underground military organization pursued illegal activities. In 1924 the U.V.O. made an attempt on the life of the Polish president, S. Wojciechowski and the superintendent of the Polish schools was killed in 1926. Ukrainians who cooperated with the Polish government or who could not withstand Polish pressure were also assassinated. Throughout the especially violent years of 1929-30 the Ukrainian underground continued to bomb state buildings, attack post offices, sabotage railroads and telegraphs and burn the large estates of the Polish landowners.

The U.V.O. was significantly reorganized and expanded at the 1928 Congress of Vienna and Prague, after which its name was changed to the O.U.N. (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). Colonel Evhen Konovalts, who had been the leader of the U.V.O. continued as the leader of the newly established illegal party O.U.N. O.U.N. was a broader organization than the strictly military U.V.O. and spread through the whole social and political life of the Ukrainians to become a powerful party whose members had to follow the strict discipline set by its top leaders. D. Dontsov's book *Nationalism* became the Handbook of the Ukrainian Nationalists. The members were recruited mainly from students of the university and gymnasias. The main headquarters of the O.U.N. was abroad yet local representatives such as S. Bandera, O. Bojdunyk, J. Vasjan, G. Holovinsky, Z. Kossak, B. Kravtsiv, M. Lebed, S. Lenkavsky, S. Ochrymovych, R. Shukhevych, and V. Yaniv, were active representatives and local spokesmen for the party. The organization also pro-

duced a number of heroic figures, among them D. Danylyshyn \* and V. Bilas who were executed for their underground activities. In protest against these executions many thousands of Ukrainians gave up smoking and drinking thereby undermining the Polish economy because these items were state's major sources of income.

All Polish schemes to Polonize and assimilate the Ukrainians failed. The resistance of the Ukrainians emerged stronger than ever. Quite unexpectedly in 1930, the Poles applied a wave of open terror and brutality to subdue the Ukrainians. By the personal order of Marshal J. Pilsudski, special military and police detachments were selected and sent into the villages and towns of Eastern Galicia to "pacify" the Ukrainian people by brutal means. In official language, they were sent to "restore order." This bloody *pacification* lasted from September 16 to November 30, 1930, during which over 700 villages were terrorized. Men and women were dragged from their homes and beaten with clubs. Clothing and products were trampled in mud and manure. Under the pretext of searching for arms, roofs and floors of houses and barns were torn apart and ruined. The Prosvita halls, cooperatives and even churches under the "care" of the pacifying forces were simply demolished. Even the priests and deputies to the Sejm were not spared beatings and mistreatment: eleven priests and seventeen deputies were jailed. In all over 30 people died and many more were hospitalized.

Although the Polish government tried desperately to suppress all reports of the pacification at home and abroad, news of the Polish terror leaked through, and the world press printed the reports of the chaos in East Galicia. The *Manchester Guardian* of October 14, 1930, reported: "The Polish terror in the Ukraine is now worse than anything that is happening anywhere else in Europe." The article ended; "The 'pacification' of the Ukraine by means of these 'punitive expeditions' is probably the most destructive onslaught yet made on any of the national minorities and the worst violation of a minority treaty. Indeed, it is a whole civilization, and

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\* Danylyshyn was a Roman Catholic, offering further proof that the so-called "*Latynnyky*" were not automatically Polish as the official statistics listed them to raise the number of the Polish population.

a very high one, that has been punished within the last three weeks. The cooperatives, schools, libraries, and institutes have been built up in years of work, sacrifice, and enthusiasm by the Ukrainians, almost entirely out of their own resources and in the face of immense difficulties. They feel the loss of these things almost as much as their inhuman physical sufferings . . ." \* Damages done to those institutions amounted to millions of dollars.

The American reporter of the magazine *Nation* was arrested while he was on a trip trying to cover the events, which he later reported in the January 7, 1931 issue.

Professor S. L. Sharp, \* confirmed the fact that the Poles were much concerned about keeping the events of the pacification secret: "The published State Department material for the period contains a series of dispatches concerning negotiations with the Polish government for indemnity to be paid to one Justyn Fedoryszyn, an American citizen visiting his Ukrainian relatives in Eastern Galicia, who was caught in the 'pacification' action of the Polish authorities and, as a Ukrainian, brutally beaten by uniformed soldiers of the Polish army. When Fedoryszyn insisted that he was an American, the officer in charge of the punitive expedition said, 'We will give it to you *po Amerykansku* (the American way)!' The lengthy negotiations ended with the expression of regrets by the Polish government and the payment of a sum of \$4,000. The American government also received the thanks of the Poles for not giving the matter any publicity."

Fedoryshyn in his misfortune was fortunate to have the protection of the American Consul in Warsaw, something which was not available to the other victims. All the legal protests of the Ukrainians in the Sejm against the inhuman Polish treatment and terror were rejected as not the "existing facts". Even the intercession of Metropolitan Sheptytsky at the Vatican proved of no avail. Furthermore Sheptytsky was refused a meeting with his brother, a high-ranking officer in the Polish army, whom he wanted to beg to intervene with the Polish government.

The Ukrainians turned to the League of Nations for

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\* Quoted in S. Horak: *Poland and Her National Minorities 1919-39*, N.Y. 1961, p. 163-4.

\* S. L. Sharp: *Poland White Eagle on a Red Field*, Harvard University Press 1953, p. 282.

protection and justice, for at the Versailles Conference (1919) Poland had signed the "Treaty for the Protection of National Minorities". Yet even in the League, the Ukrainians found no sympathy until English public opinion backed by a memorandum signed by over 60 English representatives of Parliament forced the League of Nations to consider the Ukrainian complaints. However, the matter was postponed from one year to another until the League finally proclaimed that "Poland does not carry on any policy of persecution against the Ukrainians". The League by this time was so much on the decline that in 1934 the Poles repudiated the "Treaty for Protection of National Minorities." Poland had been very active in the League of Nations at its beginning and participated in its conferences with great zeal and vigor. With their repudiation of the above treaty, the Poles decided to "protect" their national minorities in a different way. Upon a decision of the Polish President in 1934 they built the first Polish concentration camp in Bereza Kartuska\* and another at Bila Pidlaska in 1936, to which they committed Ukrainians without hearings or trials. By 1939 there were over 8,000 men, women and children imprisoned in Bereza Kartuska alone.

The Polish government misjudged the Ukrainians when they decided that terror and "pacification" would foster blind obedience and loyalty upon them. The result was just the opposite in that it inflamed the old feud to an even higher pitch. Regardless of the consequences, even the most indifferent Ukrainians joined the revolutionary movement to fight the Polish imperialists. Through the O.U.N. they intensified their retaliations after 1930. A chain of attacks on the post offices followed; in Truskavets (August 8, 1931), near Pechenizhyn (August 31, 1931), near Bibrka (July 30, 1932), and in Horodok (November 30, 1932). A number of high Polish officials were assassinated, among them the journalist T. Holuwko in Truskavets (1931) and the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, Bronislaw Pieracki (June, 1934) in Warsaw. Polish security measures were tightened against members of the O.U.N. (known before as the U.V.O.), against whose members a total of 870 years of imprisonment was assessed, and a number of death sentences.

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\* Polish concentration camp was built long before Hitler's concentration camps.



The various cultural and economic legal organizations tried to inform the Polish government of the nationalistic feelings of the masses by staging all kinds of demonstrations. Even a religious group, "The Ukrainian Youth for Christ", was used for this purpose when 100,000 young Ukrainians appeared at Lviv from all over the country. Another demonstration by thousands took place at the funeral of the Galician Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief, General M. Tarnavsky (1938). The 30th anniversary of the Audit Union of the Ukrainian Cooperatives was another impressive demonstration. Also, a wave of political enthusiasm arose for the legal sports organizations, "Sokil" with 8,000 members and "Luh." The Ukrainian women's organizations (Soiuz Ukrainok) sponsored by the political parties became very active in supporting the legal struggle for Ukrainian political rights. In 1937 the "Soiuz Ukrainok" (Union of Ukrainian Women) included 1,101 groups with 45,000 members and was under the leadership of Milena Rudnytska, a Senator in the Polish Senate.

In the 1930's the Poles continued to stiffen their hold upon the Ukrainians. Self-government in the predominantly Ukrainian villages was abolished, and the Poles simply appointed their own officials. Police forces were enlarged and better equipped, and their power was total. All official business — even of the lowliest nature — was handled only in the Polish language. In Kholm and Pidlasie, the Ukrainian language was forbidden even in private conversation. Four fifths of the Ukrainian judges were removed from Polish courts and the threat of "Bereza Kartuska" hung like the sword of Damocles above the head of anyone who was politically or culturally active.

In 1935 the old Constitution of 1922 was changed. Poland became more and more an authoritarian state with the power of the President enlarged at the expense of the Parliament. The number of deputies in the Sejm was reduced from 444 to 208. The President was given the right to appoint one-third of the Senators who had previously been elected. Voting for members of the Diet became less democratic because the electoral colleges had the authority to nominate the candidates. After the death of Marshal Pilsudski, who died in 1935, was followed by Edward Rydz-Smigly, who had few

military or political qualifications. The "draconic" law about land in the border belt, the concentration camps, the all-powerful K.O.P., (defensive border units) — all these changes had a tremendous influence on the Polish-Ukrainian relations. Polish reprisals provoked only a stronger Ukrainian opposition. There seemed to be no end to further strain on the relationship between the Poles and the Ukrainians, for the Poles constantly failed to resolve their internal problems.

Gradually the legal Ukrainian parties for practical reasons began to oppose the illegal tactics of the O.U.N., maintaining that the violent resistance did not weaken the Polish state, but rather provoked it to general reprisals and made legal activities of Ukrainians impossible. In the early 1930's the Ukrainian Catholic People's Party, sponsored by Gregory Khomyshyn, the bishop of Stanyslaviv, was founded to promote loyal cooperation with Polish authorities. The main ideologist of this group was Joseph Nazaruk, editor of *Nova Zoria* (New Star), the organ of this party. The party was not popular, but it had some influence on the thinking of the Ukrainian leaders. Among some members of the U.N.D.O. Party, under the leadership of one of the Senate's Vice-Marshals, (vice-president) W. Mudry, conciliatory views toward the Poles began to take root, which were aimed at introducing a "normalization" policy. "Normalization" was interpreted as an agreement of co-existence. Talks about normalization were begun by the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, Koscialkowski, right after the "pacification" and lasted for several years. The Ukrainian converts to the "normalization" idea were skeptical about Polish promises. And rightly. But the tragic events in the Soviet Ukraine (1930-33) \* — the starvation and brutal repression of millions of the Ukrainians there — tipped the balance in favor of "normalization" in Polish-Ukrainian relations. All that the Ukrainians gained from "normalization" was the election of 15 deputies (14 U.N.D.O.) to the Sejm and five Senators (4 U.N.D.O.), 1 Ukrainian Catholic People's Party in 1935, the release of some prisoners from the Bereza Kartuska concentration camp, a project (the plan only) of amnesty

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\* Up to 1930 the U.N.D.O. Party was pretty hopeful about the development of the Ukrainian progress under the Soviets.

for political prisoners, and some loans for the Ukrainian economic institutions. In return, the newly elected Ukrainian deputies declared their complete loyalty to the Polish state, voted for the budget and all military credits, and stopped radical anti-government opposition.

The "normalization" policy" was not accepted by either the Radical Party or by the majority of the U.N.D.O. members themselves. This produced a party split, and Dmytro Paliyiv organized a new party called the "Front of National Unity" (1933) which included in its ranks some of the previous members of the O.U.N. This party was strongly anti-Polish and anti-Soviet. In 1938 another group headed by I. Kedryn-Rudnytsky, V. Kuzmowych, and D. Levytsky broke away from the U.N.D.O. Milena Rudnytska, the prominent organizer of the Women's Associations, was also opposed to "normalization" (co-operation). Even the main defender of the "normalization" policy, V. Mudryi, lived through many painful disappointments caused by the unchanging attitude of the Poles toward the Ukrainians. All his suggestions for improvements were rejected by the Sejm and his pleas though often prophetic, went unheeded by the Poles. On the eve of World War II, a speech of his depicted the negative results of the "*uhoda*" (agreement): "The situation is very bad indeed... The whole of Europe seems to be rumbling, quaking like a volcano, and it seems only a matter of days or hours until it will erupt. Out of the resultant cataclysm we have the right to take as many advantages for ourselves as possible, for we have much to gain and little to lose. Poland, however, will have much to lose if a war overtakes her in such a condition as now prevails — a land torn by conflicting interests and unsettled questions, among which is that of the Ukrainians."\*

Nevertheless, Poland, as late as 1938, continued its hard policy against the Ukrainians, especially concentrating its attacks against Kholm and Volhynia. These two countries were separated from Galicia by an artificial border — the so-called "Sokal border", — to "protect" these territories from being influenced by the national struggle in Galicia. The Poles here directed their destruction against the Ortho-

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\* S. Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-1939*, N.Y. 1961, pp. 168-170.

dox church, which in a few months lost 167 church buildings which were simply torn down. According to the Polish constitution, every citizen had freedom of worship; but this clause, in reality, applied only to Roman Catholicism, which was the state religion. Other denominations experienced the rude interference of the state officials. This could be said of the young Ukrainian Protestant movement, which was growing rapidly especially in Volhynia, and even of the Uniate (Greek-Catholic) church, whose priests were often arrested and fined for spelling the names of the Ukrainians in Ukrainian instead of Polish. These methods of "inquisition" as well as the uncontrolled killing of Ukrainians by the "Strzelcy" (Sharpshooters), an organization of Polish youth, awoke a new wave of protests in Galician leaders, who openly criticized the "normalization" and its results.

At the Peace Conference in Paris the Poles once protested the possibility of Galicia's independence on the grounds that this country could not be economically independent. The statistics quoted by the Polish author, Stanislaw Skrzypek, in his book, *The Problem of Eastern Galicia* in support of the Polish policy, dramatically contradicted this argument. Because of the favorable climatic conditions in Galicia, the area produced 27.2 per cent of Poland's total wheat crop. In addition to her rich agricultural land (69.5 per cent of the country is farm land; another 27.2 per cent is forest land), Galicia has an overabundance of natural resources, including oil (63 per cent of Poland's total supply), the largest potassium deposits in Europe (reserves estimated at 450 million tons), salt, natural gas (providing 90 per cent of Poland's supply), manganese, ozokerite (the only mines in Poland) phosphates, brown coal, Carpathian iron ores, lime, gypsum, alabaster, quarries, as well as numerous mineral springs in the sub-Carpathian region.

Moreover, the official statistics for the year 1937 showed that Eastern Galicia occupied a prominent place in Poland's industrial production, providing 83.8 per cent of the oil production, 100 per cent of the ozakerite mines, 100 per cent of the potash mines, 22.2 per cent of the flour mills, 21.8 per cent of the breweries, 54.5 per cent of the tobacco plants, 51.4 per cent of the gypsum works and 39.8 per cent of the pneumatic drill factories. Other industries included pharmaceutical products, basketry, cigarette tubes, yeast products,

carpets, tapestries, brandy, woollen yarn, cotton, wool, and others. Her combined industries ranged from 25-60 per cent of Poland's total production. In addition, Galicia's textile works, brickworks, paper-mills, glassworks, quarries, chemical and other works amount to 5 - 15 per cent of Poland's total industrial output.

Galicia also contributed generously to Polish exports. Twenty per cent of Poland's butter export came from the Ukrainian dairy co-op "Maslosoiuz"; and 62 per cent of the exported eggs and poultry, 12 per cent of the meat and bacon products, and 40 per cent of the exported timber came from East Galicia. Keeping these figures in mind, one must come to the conclusion that Galicia was not in danger of committing "economic suicide" by separating from Poland. On the contrary, Poland, whose economy was always inadequate, needed this rich country. It must be mentioned also that it was the Austrian monarchy, not Poland, that developed this country and its industry. Poland did not even make full use of Galicia's rich natural resources, which are still being discovered at present by the Soviet occupation.

What did Poland do for the indigenous Ukrainian population in exchange for the richness of the country? Besides the jails, police stations, and concentration camps, Poland did not give anything to the Ukrainians in return for what she took. As was mentioned before, the Ukrainians could not even gain employment in these rich industries. What the Ukrainians achieved in culture and economy was done exclusively through their own efforts and resources; and all the while, they were subject to unexpected harrassment from the official Polish government. It is not surprising that the Ukrainians were not sympathetic when Poland fell in World War II. No Ukrainian concerned himself with the hope of better Polish-Ukrainian relations under a continued independent Poland. The treatment of the Ukrainians under this state precluded such thoughts of sympathy for quite some time. Tense relations between the Poles and Ukrainians continued to the last day of Poland's independence.

## CHAPTER IV


### Galicia and World War II (1939 - 1945)

After his rise to power in 1933, Hitler was determined to organize his "New Europe". He realized that his plan would lead to war and so prepared for such an eventuality from the start. The Western Powers, alarmed by the aggressive attitude of Nazi Germany especially after the Sudeten crisis, attempted again to win over Soviet Russia to their side as late as 1939. In the midst of the negotiations that were carried on with British and French diplomats, Stalin instead concluded a non-aggression pact with Hitler on August 23, 1939. This gave Hitler a free hand against Poland. Only one week later, September 1, 1939, Hitler's armies staged their attack on Poland. But finally Britain and France abided by their pledge and declared war on Germany. In three weeks Poland was crushed by the so-called "Blitzkrieg", and on September 17 Lviv and a part of Galicia was occupied by the German forces.

On the same day, and in spite of the non-aggression pact with Poland, the Red Army under Stalin's orders crossed the Polish-Soviet border, and in a swift march took possession of West Ukraine and Belorussia "to put the lives and property of the people of West Ukraine and West Belorussia under Soviet protection", according to the official Soviet communique. As to the non-aggression pact with Poland, Stalin declared that Poland *de facto* had ceased to exist, therefore, the treaty with Poland was no longer binding. Upon the approach of the Soviet armies, the German forces quietly withdrew to the Sian-Buh River line, known as "Ribbentrop-Molotow Line" as previously agreed upon in secret negotiations. The Soviet armies marched, without encountering any resistance, into the vacated territory.

These events happened so rapidly and unexpectedly that there was no time for any organized retaliation by the Ukrainians. It is, however, a fact that here and there the old

Polish-Urainian hatred flared up with the Ukrainians being the victims. Surely, the Ukrainians had no reason to feel sad over the fall of Poland; however, they were not overly happy about the German victory either. The German treatment of Carpatho-Ukraine six months earlier was neither forgotten nor forgiven. Hence the Germans were greeted coolly and with reservations; but the Soviet troops were given an even less friendly reception, despite their boast that they came "to free their Ukrainian brothers from the Polish yoke." Their presence seemed neither reassuring nor prophetic of a



better regime, and as a result thousands of Ukrainians left their homes to escape westward upon the first sight of the Red Army. They were joined by thousands of other escapees in the weeks and months following the Soviet occupation.

The outbreak of the war placed the Ukrainian politicians in a hopelessly desperate situation. What course of action could they take? There was no question about the direction of nationality policies in the Soviet Union. Instead of a free national development of each minority, there had been since the 1930's a degenerated chauvinistic Russian nationalism, supported by Stalin's terror. No Ukrainian could even think of co-operation, or an alliance with the Soviets. However, cooperation with the Poles could not be considered either. That left only Germany. But Germany was now a close ally of the Soviets; and in addition, the Nazi policy was also unreliable. The future was not bright. The only hope for the Ukrainian people was for the development of a split between two ruthless dictators, who for years had been in direct opposition to each other. The continued worsening of the situation under the Soviets occupation led the Ukrainians to place their hope on Germany. This decision, given the situation, should be considered a "policy of despair."

On September 28 Germany and the Soviet Union signed a new agreement establishing the demarcation line between them, roughly the old Curzon line along the Sian and Bug Rivers. The Soviets occupied the West Ukrainian territories and the Germans took in possession Poland and some slices of Ukrainian lands — Lemky, Kholm, and Pidlissie. Poland thus disappeared and was now reshaped into the "General Government" (G.G.), under German occupation.

In the German controlled areas, the Ukrainians constituted a small number (about 1,500,000) and were not nationally important because they, being nearest to Poland, had been the most polonized. For a long time no Ukrainian school or other cultural or economic organization had been allowed there, but now strengthened by the help of the many emigrés from the Soviet controlled territories, the Ukrainians used all their opportunities to advance culturally. The Germans treated them as political equals to other national minorities (Poles and Jews), and gave them no concessions or privileges. All political activities were banned. The only



organization the Germans allowed was the "Ukrainian Central Committee". It must be stated that Poles and Jews were granted similar committees which were formed for the purpose of relief and were subsidized by the German government. The International Red Cross also helped these committees with food and some medical supplies.

The Ukrainian Central Committee, under the chairmanship of Professor V. Kubijovyč, a well known scholar and a native of Lemky, managed to supervise an amazing amount of economic and cultural activity. The Committee succeeded in opening Ukrainian public schools in almost every Ukrainian community, in starting a few high schools, and in setting up a network of trade cooperatives which employed thousands of workers. It also convinced the German government of the necessity of restoring the former Orthodox church in Kholm under Metropolitan Ohienko. The Greek Catholic Church too, underwent revival and reforms with the old Russophile priests being gradually replaced by younger Ukrainian clergy.

The Committee by no means neglected to carry out its primary duties of caring for the increasing numbers of refugees from the Soviet territories, by providing them with jobs and living quarters and by visiting the camps of war prisoners and arranging their release. It also gave financial support to a number of Ukrainian students enrolled in German universities. The committee was located in Krakow, a Polish city, which became the hub of the Ukrainian cultural and national organizations.

This was the extent of what the Ukrainian Committee could accomplish in the General Government, but its existence and activities were envied by their brothers under the Soviet regime, and the ranks of the refugees continued to swell. Many of these refugees were the veteran members of the O.U.N. (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) who were released from Polish prisons at the end of the German-Polish phase of the war. It is not surprising that the underground Ukrainian forces flourished in the General Government, especially since all legal political parties were forbidden. However, the O.U.N. suffered a fatal setback during this period because it was split into two factions (1941) a conservative group under Colonel Andrew Melnyk and a radical-revolutionary group

under Stephan Bandera — at the very time when unity of the national forces was imperative. The O.U.N. branches were active in the Soviet-controlled territories, but they suffered great losses there.

Just what was the situation in Galicia under the Soviet occupation? During the early days of the occupation, the Soviets attempted to convince the local Ukrainians that they had come as “liberators” with the best intentions. Being well trained in the control of other nationalities, they at first encouraged the Ukrainian masses in Galicia to express their national and social aspirations and to establish their own administration, while the Russians vented their wrath on the Poles, the national oppressors of the Ukrainians. All Polish officials, police and army officers, teachers, and “colonists” who did not escape were arrested and sent to concentration camps in Siberia. Galicia, in a brief time, was cleared of the Poles, and Lviv was declared a Ukrainian city.

This “honeymoon” period did not last long, for the Soviets were interested only in the advancement of their ideology and desired to use the newly acquired country for the welfare of their Russian empire. First, however, Galicia had to be “legally” annexed. Marshal Timoshenko of the Red Army (an Ukrainian by birth), accompanied always by Nikita S. Krushchev, as an army “*politruk*” ordered the people on October 6, 1939 to hold an election as early as October 22 to choose deputies to the People’s Assembly of West Ukraine. The so called “free election” was used as propaganda for the consumption of foreign countries and had little in common with the electoral system in democratic states. There was only one official Party which nominated candidates, mainly the officials of the Soviet political police (N.K.V.D.). Anyone daring to suggest an independent candidate was considered an instigator of a “counter-revolutionary” movement and, in consequence, was deported to a concentration camp in Siberia.

In this manner 1,484 delegates were elected to the People’s Assembly of the Western Ukraine and met immediately, on October 26. Nikita Khrushchev, the future Chairman and dictator of the Party Presidium, held the welcome-speech. This Assembly acted in true Soviet tradition. It elected Stalin as an honorary president and sent a

note of thanks to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for the "liberation" of Western Ukraine.

After these formalities the Assembly "with great enthusiasm unanimously passed" a resolution requesting Stalin, who, it must not be forgotten, was not the nominal president of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, but the party boss of the Soviet Union, to grant them permission to unite Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Permission was granted and the "Act of Union" was "legalized" on November 15. How different was this "Act of Union" from the one proclaimed by the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919!

Soon the system of "Sovietization" began. Banks, industries and land estates were nationalized. The Soviets abolished all traces of the Polish political and economic system and brought Galicia to the level of the rest of the Soviet countries that had been under its system for over 20 years. Accordingly, the tempo of "Sovietization" in Western Ukraine was much faster and therefore much harsher. By December, 1939, Soviet laws, courts, and administration had replaced the old Polish ones. Officials of the Communist Party and members of the mostly feared N.K.V.D., mainly of Russian origin, were stationed throughout the new territories to supervise the innovations. An abhorrently terrifying and oppressive spy system was introduced. As a result, the remaining Ukrainian leading intelligentsia and the more enlightened farmers were practically liquidated. First, the editors of the various periodicals and other Ukrainian political leaders were arrested and condemned to forced labor in concentration camps as "enemies of the people". The mass arrests usually were performed during the night. The police trucks by which the victims were transported to the overcrowded Soviet jails, called "Black Crows", were feared by all. During the 22 months of the Soviet occupation of Galicia, over 400,000 men, women, and children were taken away and sent to the concentration camps, mainly in Kazakhstan. The lightest sentence that any of them received was 8 years of forced labor, and it was pronounced arbitrarily by the administrative authorities without any investigation or trial. With the exception of the newly organized Ukrainian Communist Party, all Ukrainian political groups from the extreme right to the left wing Socialists were on the list of

the "people's enemies" who had to be eliminated from the Galician landscape. All previous Ukrainian deputies to the Polish Sejm were deported to Siberia, among them N. Bura, W. Tselevych, O. Kohut, I. Kvasnytsia, A. Ohorodnyk, K. Tershakovets, D. Velykanovych, and senators D. Levytsky, O. Lutsky, N. Malytsky, W. Starosolsky — all of them perished in the labor camps of Kazakhstan. Only a very few saved themselves by obtaining the status of *Volksdeutsche* who were able to leave Galicia with the help of the official German "resettlement commission" under Professor Hans Koch, who had been born in Galicia and was a friend of the Ukrainians.

After solving the political problem, cultural, economic, and social liquidations followed. Everything was "communized" or "nationalized". The private Ukrainian schools and societies were closed down. The Uniate church and clergy did not escape persecution either. The priests who were not deported, suffered nevertheless, because their churches were taxed so heavily that they could not meet the burden and gradually became inactive.

The farmers at first were able to retain some land, but soon they were forced to give up all individual farming and move to the "kolkhosey" (collective farms). At the end of the first Soviet occupation, about 15 per cent of all peasant households were collectivized in Western Ukraine. The "Stakhanov" (piece-work) system with ten-hour days was enforced in factories and on the collective farms. The farmers who opposed the collectivization were made to work on the construction of numerous airfields hundreds of miles from their homes with no provision for food for them or their horses, forcing them in this way to apply for "voluntary" admittance to kolkhoses.

The only positive gain during the Soviet occupation of Galicia was the de-Polonization of the schools, in which the Ukrainian language was made official as well as in Lviv University (now renamed Ivan Franko University) and in the government and courts. With these concessions the Bolsheviks tried to impress the people that they were their "liberators" and thereby gain their support.

Mass terror continued to spread before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war (1941-45), and a great percentage

of the farm population, especially the men, took refuge in the fields and forests, where they remained for few months.

Meanwhile, Soviet-German relations deteriorated until on June 22, 1941, German forces attacked the U.S.S.R. and achieved immediate successes. The Soviets began a quick retreat applying the "scorched earth" tactics. Whatever was movable was taken away; whatever was not, was destroyed. Galicia suffered the most from this maneuver because the Soviets had no time for a planned evacuation. The Ukrainian political prisoners were simply shot in their cells or in the jail yards. Over 10,000 prisoners were massacred in Lviv alone, and similar butchery occurred in Stryi, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Sambir, \* Zolochiv, and Lutsk.

In the first days and weeks the German Wehrmacht advanced rapidly, taking thousands of Soviet prisoners. The Wehrmacht was given a friendly reception in Galicia, for it was known that the leaders of the Wehrmacht for some time had advocated the necessity of an independent Ukraine for strategic military purposes and the recreation of the Baltic States as well. The Ukrainians in general believed that the German political leaders would support their claim for the independence of a united Ukraine to gain them as reliable allies against Bolshevism. But they soon were to experience a painful disappointment.

Before the war with the Soviets, and even in the early days of fighting, the Nazis behaved as if they officially supported the policy of liberation of the enslaved people under the yoke of Stalin. During this short period the Bandera group of the O.U.N. (Ukrainian Nationalists) concluded an agreement with the Wehrmacht on the basis of which they mobilized mainly the Ukrainian University students and some forced laborers in creating the Ukrainian military detachments "Nightingale" (*Nachtigal*) and "Roland"; these units

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\* To be more specific, the following facts should be expressed. In the jailyard of Sambir alone, the author's native city, the following of his classmates were massacred along with other hundreds of innocent victims: Alexander Pryk, Roman Kulchytsky and his older brother Ivan, Iziaslav Martynovych and his older brother Myron. In addition, there are eyewitnesses of this massacre who miraculously escaped and are now living in the U.S.A. These are: Nicolas Yaremko, in Baltimore, Md., still with the machinegun bullets in his stomach, and Ivan Yaremko in Chicago, Ill. Both are of the author's native village Wykoty, and not relatives of the author. About half a dozen other peasants and laborers of the same village perished in this manner.

were sent to the front. The "Nightingale" and "Roland" were meant to become the nucleus of the future independent Ukrainian army. Certain members of these groups were used as interpreters in the German Army. They received secret orders from the O.U.N. to defect from the German Army upon reaching certain locations and to influence the local population in favor of the O.U.N.

A week after the war started, the German Army entered Lviv (June 30). On the same day the branch of the O.U.N., under the leadership of Stephan Bandera, called the Ukrainian National Assembly, which proclaimed the independence of Ukraine and a provisional Ukrainian government was established with Yaroslav Stetsko as its prime minister. As an advisory organ to the government the Revolutionary Parliament (Ukrainian National Council — Rada) under President Dr. Kost Levytsky, a well known politician of the old Republic, was created. The Ukrainians took this action, reasoning that the Germans would not oppose but rather cooperate in order to gain Ukrainian support and that of other enslaved countries — Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and White Ruthenia, It was possible that the Ukrainians could raise an army of some three million men to fight the Bolsheviks. One should not forget that the initial rapid advance of the Germans into the Ukraine was due not only to their superiority of arms, but also to the anti-Communist feelings of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red army, who at first hailed the invading German armies as the long-awaited liberators, and voluntarily surrendered by hundreds of thousands to the Germans in the hope of fighting against Stalin's tyrannical state. In the battle of Kiev alone over 675,000 soldiers, mainly Ukrainians, went over to the Germans (September, 1941). Instead, they were starved to death in different "*Stalags*".

The Declaration of Independence of Ukraine in Lviv forced the German Nazis to reveal their true intentions. As soon as German forces occupied practically the whole Ukraine (two months after the war started), the Nazis, now drunk with power and success, applied the policy laid down by Hitler in his book *Mein Kampf* (1925). In brief, it was not the policy of cooperation, but of suppression; not the policy of liberation, but of enslavement and destruction of the

Ukrainians. Ukraine was supposed to become a German colony to provide the German "master race" with "Lebensraum". All Slavs, including Ukrainians, were declared a "sub-human race" and fit only to be made the slaves of the German "superman".

The Ukrainian Provisional Government was at once dissolved and its members arrested, including Stetsko and Bandera, and deported to the Nazi concentration camp at Sachsenhausen. Many other Ukrainian nationalists were shot or imprisoned, and the Ukrainian military units "Nightingale" and "Roland" were disbanded with many volunteers being arrested and shot. The rest were commanded to join the local police forces.

The general and fanatic reign of terror by the Nazis followed reminiscent of what the Soviets had earlier perpetrated. The territories of Ukraine were divided. Galicia, on August 11, 1941, was detached and incorporated into the General Government. Bukovina and Bessarabia were returned to Rumania (the Soviets had annexed them in 1940). Rumania also occupied the Odessa district and renamed it "Transnistria Province". What was the original Soviet Ukraine was transformed into the "Reichskommissariat Ukraine", the administration of which was entrusted to the "Reichskommissar" Erich Koch, with his seat in the city of Rivne. Koch soon became better known by the nickname "the butcher" or "the hangman of the Ukraine". He was the man most responsible for causing the Ukrainians to hate and to fight the Germans. He blindly applied the Nazi race ideology, as expressed in his speech in Kiev on May 3, 1943: "We are a master race and we must remember that the lowliest German laborer is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the native population here." He governed accordingly. The record of Nazi brutalities in the Ukraine is too long and too painful to list here. Generalizing, one could say, that indescribable terror prevailed with mass shootings and hangings becoming common practice. People were seized on the streets or in the fields and transported for slave labor in Germany. There they were also exposed to air raids and inhuman treatment.\* This left no doubt in the

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\* Quite rightly A. Martovych analyzed the regime of Koch: "His policy was well rounded by the following despicable features: all-out

minds of the Ukrainians that Hitler had no plans for the independence of the Ukraine.

A somewhat different situation, however, existed in Galicia, now the fifth district of the General Government. Here the cultural and economic conditions were comparatively much better than in any other Ukrainian land, but still all political parties and activities were forbidden. The Ukrainian National Council with its General Secretariat in Lviv was dissolved and its place was taken by the Ukrainian Land Committee, under C. Pankivsky, an organization similar to the Ukrainian Central Committee in Krakow, with which it was merged in 1942. Professor V. Kubijovyč remained its president. He endeavored to activate schools, adult education, cultural levels and economy and relief work in Galicia. The Ukrainian Land Committee was responsible for the organization of Ukrainian elementary, secondary, vocational, and technical schools. For adult education the old "Prosvita" was revived and did much to uplift depressed spirits by singing contests and dramatics. The Committee reestablished some of the old cooperative societies, which, however, had to remain under German control. The Committee organized aid for the starving villages in Carpahto-Ukraine in 1942 and staged a protest against German plans for resettling the Ukrainians of Galicia and colonizing their abandoned land with imported Germans in 1943. The German Land Commission had already begun assessing Galician lands and dividing them into special sections, but after the protests of the Committee, and especially those of President, Professor V. Kubijovyč, this plan was not implemented.

Perhaps the main reason why these plans were not completed rests in the intimate relationship between Himmler and his private physician, Kersten, a Dutchman himself. Hitler, in 1941, proposed to colonize areas of Galicia with around 3 million "irreconcilable" Dutchmen. *Hitler's Table Talk*, 1953, p. 25 confirms this plan. The task of carrying

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terror against the Ukrainian population; forced deportation of the people for slave labor in Germany; closing of Ukrainian schools, teachers, and institutions; plundering of Ukrainian villages; extermination of the population by dissemination of contagious diseases; extermination of the Ukrainian intelligentsia; extermination of Ukrainian prisoners of war (by starvation); extermination of Ukrainian nationalists; persecution of religious life in the Ukraine."



out this plan was ultimately turned over to Himmler. Himmler, however, was at the time in very poor health and under the constant care of Kersten. Kersten predicted that the added strain which would result from carrying out this project would be very dangerous to Himmler's health. In this way Kersten persuaded Himmler to postpone the implementation of the project until the war was over. It was also known that Himmler later regretted not having followed Hitler's order.

Politically, the Committee was concerned about the welfare of the Ukrainians and advised them to refrain from acts showing anti-German feelings. It continued to bring moral support to the forced laborers in Germany who were treated no worse than other workers, except that they were not branded by special badges ("ost") or similar signs.

Galicia also had its delegate governor, Otto von Waechter, who was quite a different administrator from E. Koch or H. Frank,\* and allowed some Ukrainians to occupy the lower ranks of civil and judicial positions. But all higher posts, the better hotels, houses, restaurants and transportation were reserved "for Germans only" (*Nur fuer Deutsche*). The non-Germans endured "starvation rationing" and were deprived of free movement and expression. The farmers were heavily burdened by certain quotas of grain and cattle which they had to deliver to the government. Besides, the villages had to supply the "live" quotas of youth to serve as laborers in Germany. But in time the people in Galicia learned how to live with these restrictions and even to undermine them. The "black market", though strongly forbidden, thrived. The farmers hid food, clothing and other goods from the German raiders. The youth, predestined for slave labor in German industry and agriculture, escaped to Ukrainian partisan groups or volunteered for the "Halychyna" (Galicia) Defense Division.

The situation on the German front changed for the worse, and the Ukrainians, although not wishing the return of the Bolsheviks, did not desire German victory either. In

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\* H. Frank was the Governor-General to whom Galicia as part of G.G. was subordinated and who once said: "It is a matter of indifference to me whether or not the Ukrainians and the Poles would be mixed and grounded into 'hamburgers'."

this situation a spirit of indifference prevailed. Everybody was concerned only about the present, for the future looked far from promising.

After the Germans had suffered their major defeat at Stalingrad, the Nazi terror increased. An open massacre of the Ukrainians ensued. For one German Gestapo officer killed, 28 Ukrainian hostages were killed in Lviv, 52 in Chortkiv, and 20 in Drohobych all in open market places. In the period from October, 1943, to June, 1944, 366 Ukrainians were shot in Drohobych alone. A special concentration camp was built in Skole for young people who refused to go as slave laborers to Germany. These are merely random examples of the German brutality and terror that occurred in Galicia starting in 1943.

After the formation of the "Galicia" Division, the German terror lessened, and Galicia became comparatively quiet and an almost normal place in Eastern Europe under German occupation.

The creation of the above mentioned "Galicia" Division was of great historical importance. Governor Waechter, Professor V. Kubijovyč, and the older Ukrainian army officers of World War I must be credited for obtaining permission to form the Division. Many Ukrainians saw in it the nucleus of a future regular national army and thus favored it. The leaders of both groups of the O.U.N. objected to the idea of the formation of such a division, because in the meantime they had succeeded in organizing an independent Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.). But realizing the need for proper military training and being assured that individual volunteers would join them after such training, they were resigned to the plan. The Germans agreed to the Ukrainian conditions that the Division when organized would be used only against the Bolsheviks on the Eastern front, that it would preserve its separate status, that Ukrainian chaplains would be admitted (German S.S. armies did not have chaplains), and that a special corps of Ukrainian officers would be trained to lead the units along with German officers.

In 1944, the "Galicia" Division, having completed its training, was ordered to the Eastern front, where the Bolsheviks had advanced and reoccupied the greater part of Galicia. A bloody battle was fought at Brody. The division

was encircled with great loss of life and equipment. The remnants of the unit partly deserted to Ukrainian partisan groups and partly moved to Slovakia where they were re-organized into a new combat unit. The Bolsheviks pushed the Germans back until by the middle of 1944 all of Galicia was in the hands of the Red Army. By now it was obvious to everyone that Germany had lost the war, and for the first time the Nazis were willing to make small concessions to the subjugated nations. But it was too late. They freed the Ukrainian political prisoners (S. Bandera, Y. Stetsko, A. Melnyk, and Taras Bulba) and sought their help, but they refused to cooperate. As late as the spring of 1945, the Germans agreed to the creation of the Ukrainian National Council under General P. Shandruk, who assumed command of the Galician Division and turned it into the Ukrainian Army, known as the First Ukrainian Division, operating in Styria. Ukrainian politicians and army officers became concerned about the possibility of falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks. They succeeded in withdrawing the Division and having it surrender to the British, who interned it in Rimini, Italy. Later the Unit was transferred to England and after some time released. Many of the soldiers remained there, but the majority migrated to Canada, the United States, and Australia, where they continue to preserve their traditions and cultivate friendly companionship in their veterans clubs,

Throughout the war the underground groups of the O.U.N. now under the leadership of Maxim Ruban advocated armed resistance against the German occupation forces and busied themselves in organizing guerilla detachments, since there was no way to compromise with the Nazi invaders. The first Ukrainian partisans were formed in Polisie as early as in September 1941, where they were well protected by forests and swamps. Their leader was the school teacher V. Borovets, better known as "Taras Bulba". This group, called "Sich of Polisie", consisted of young people from slave contingents or of those whose names were on Gestapo lists. The movement grew rapidly and spread to Volhynia. In 1942 its numbers were strengthened by remnants of the Ukrainian divisions "Nightingale" and "Roland", which were officially dissolved but actually went over to the partisans with their desperately needed arms and ammunition. Borovets (Bulba),

however, was arrested and sent to a German concentration camp.

The O.U.N. members assumed leadership and sent out a mobilization order. The ranks swelled, and small individual groups sprang up in all districts. They were led by officers of the former Ukrainian army of Ataman (General) Petlura and Ukrainian officers of the recent Polish army. The leaders of these guerrillas were confronted with two major problems, the unification of individual groups under a high command and the acquisition of arms. Colonel R. Klachkivsky assumed command, with General A. Stupnytsky as his chief of staff of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.). Both leaders later fell while fighting the Bolsheviks. In the spring of 1943 the U.P.A. (Ukrainian Partisan Army) enlisted the help of the Ukrainian police to procure arms. They began raids, usually surprise night attacks against Germans transport vehicles bearing food supplies, slave laborers, uniforms and ammunition. Occasionally they attacked the local Nazi administrators. In May, 1943, they overpowered a German patrol and killed Victor Lutze, the commander-in-chief of the Nazi S.A. and a close associate of Himmler.\* A year later, the highest Red Army officer, Marshal Vatutin, was mortally wounded in the same area by the Ukrainian partisans.

German soldiers had to withdraw from the villages to more strongly fortified garrisons in the larger cities. Thus whole districts were liberated from the German occupation troops. The partisans were joined by soldiers of other enslaved nations: Georgians, Azerbaidzans, Tatars, Turkestanians, Kazakhs, and others. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army not only molested the German occupation troops and supplies, but had to fight against Bolshevik partisans who were parachuted behind the German lines. The Bolshevik partisans were concentrated mainly in Vohlynia and Podilie. Their chief commander was General Kovpak, who broke through and advanced to Galicia to operate from the Carpathians (1943). The U.P.A. from Volhynia hastened to help the Galicians against Kovpak, whom they pushed back. They themselves remained in the Carpathians, where they established their headquarters. From here they were able

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\* The official Nazi communique declared it a car accident.

to protect the Ukrainians against the renewed German terror of 1943, because of the active support given to them by the local population.

The name and actions of the U.P.A. were widespread. The other enslaved nationalities — White Ruthenians, Georgians, Armenians, Bashkirs, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Ossetins, Cherkes, and Chuvashes — looked to the U.P.A. for leadership and cooperation. In 1943 a conference was held to form the so-called United Liberation Movement of Oppressed Nations, to which 13 nations sent 39 delegates. At the same time, however, the outside world was misinformed about the U.P.A. by German propaganda which stated that these national groups were pro-Soviet and Soviet-supported “a Bolsheviks’ provocation”. The Soviets, on the other hand, admitted the existence of such groups, but denounced them ideologically as the “allies of Nazis”... The Germans organized special troops to fight the U.P.A., but the stronger the German terror grew, the stronger the U.P.A. became. Its manpower was estimated at over 200,000.

The Bolsheviks were then returning to Western Ukraine, and forcing the U.P.A. to fight on two fronts at once. During this period the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada – U.H.V.R.) was formed (July, 1944) as the temporary governing body of the Ukrainian people. It issued an appeal for political consolidation and its political program was stated with seven main principles.

By the autumn of 1944 nearly all the territory of Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet army. The Ukrainian partisans, now under the leadership of General R. Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka), remained in the Carpathians and continued fighting the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks, like the Germans before them, made every effort to liquidate the Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik movement. Nikita Khrushchev himself conducted the 1945 campaign against the partisans, but with little success. It is known that U.P.A. detachments were active against the Soviet until 1950.

These, in brief, were the events which took place in Galicia during World War II. But at the same time, Galicia, or rather the Polish eastern border was a controversial problem in international policy — a problem between the members


of the "Big Three" (Britain, United States, and the Soviet Union) and the Polish government-in-exile in London. During the five years of World War II, these powers held numerous conferences, both private and official, in attempting to solve satisfactorily the important question: To what country should Galicia be given? It must be remembered that the problem of Galicia, or the Polish insistence on pre-war frontiers, became, according to Churchill's words, "the first of the great causes which led to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance."

Concluding the mutual assistance pact with England in May, 1942, the Soviets pointed out that they would return to the "Ribbentrop-Molotov" line of 1939. They agreed that this line had lost its historical validity and accepted, in later years, the Curzon Line as the border between Poland and the Soviets. Then Britain accepted this demand and tried to persuade the Polish government-in-exile headed at first by General Sikorski and after his death by Mikolajczyk, to agree to the Curzon Line. The American President (Roosevelt) also agreed with the Curzon Line, hoping to achieve some modification in favor of the Poles e.g. the transfer of Lviv and the oil fields of Drohobych to Poland. The Polish government-in-exile would, however, be satisfied with nothing less than the pre-war frontiers.

The question of Galicia came up during the Teheran Conference (November, 1943); in the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in October, 1943; in private talks of Churchill, Mikolajczyk and Stalin in Moscow in October, 1944; and at the Yalta Conference.

In Teheran, Churchill agreed that a strong, independent Poland was "a necessary instrument in the European orchestra", and that for the loss of Galicia, Poland should be compensated with territories from Germany up to the Oder and Neisse Rivers.

Roosevelt withheld his opinion on the matter of Poland's frontiers in view of the approaching presidential election in which he needed the votes of "six to seven million" Americans of Polish extraction. Stalin and Molotov still insisted on restoring the Ribbentrop-Molotov line, with a small modification. The Poles in London, after this news was related to them, refused to accept the Teheran plan, considering the German territory in question as legitimately Polish anyway.



Upon the entrance of the Red Army into Galicia on January 4, 1944, the Soviets (Stalin) decided that Galicia *de facto* belonged to the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, negotiations on this matter continued. The Poles now demanded the return to Poland of the government-in-exile. Stalin would not hear of this demand, pointing out that the relations with this government had not existed since April, 1943. Later, however, Stalin did admit a few Polish members from London into the new Polish government, but their admission depended upon their acceptance of the Curzon line. Because of Polish obstinacy, they lost in the end both the possibility of participation in the new government and their "pre-war" frontiers, exactly as Churchill had predicted.

Of special interest to us is the meeting of Churchill, Stalin, and Mikolajczyk in Moscow on October 13, 1944. Here Churchill, for the last time, tried to convince the Poles of the necessity of accepting the Curzon Line in the east and the Oder line in the west. Mikolajczyk refused. Churchill's irritation over the Polish attitude was obvious when he uttered: "In your obstinacy you do not see what is at stake . . . You will start another war in which twenty-five million lives will be lost. But you don't care . . . Twenty-five years ago we reconstituted Poland . . . Now again we are preserving you from disappearance, but you will not play ball. You are absolutely crazy. You are callous people who want to wreck Europe. I shall leave you to your own troubles . . . I will have to call on the other Poles and this Lublin Committee may function very well. It will be the *Government* . . . If you want to conquer Russia, we shall leave you to do it. I felt like being in a lunatic asylum." \* In spite of his sharp words, Churchill and Roosevelt tried to persuade Stalin to leave Lviv and Drohobych to the Poles. But Stalin, having occupied not only Galicia but the whole of Poland, sealed the fate of Galicia.

At the Yalta Conference in February, 1945, the whole problem of Galicia was revived, but Stalin remained firm in his decision to keep Galicia united with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic. At this time Stalin, having set up the pro-Communist government in Poland, and having thus

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\* S. L. Sharp, cit op. page 193, differs in quotation when he says, "You ought to be in a lunatic asylum."



made Poland a satellite state, had no further troubles with the Poles concerning Galicia. It was decided that the Poles would move out of Galicia, and that the remaining Ukrainians (Lemky) in the Polish state would return to be resettled in Galicia.

The Ukrainians throughout World War II maintained their aspirations for the freedom and independence of their fatherland. The democratic principles and rights proclaimed by the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918 survived and in the future will continue to at least illuminate the spirit of the Ukrainians who have experienced many setbacks in their long history.

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## Conclusion:

After almost a thousand years of separation, Galicia was reunited with her motherland Ukraine, by the "Act of Union" of November 15, 1939, and by the military occupation of Galicia and other territories of Western Ukraine in 1944 by the Soviet armies. At that time the western part of the Ukraine, including Galicia, became an integral part of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (U.S.S.R.). Similarly, Bessarabia and Bukovina that had been occupied by Rumania, and the Carpathian Ukraine that had been occupied partly by Czechoslovakia and partly by Hungary were incorporated into the U.R.S.R. (Ukrainska Radianska Socialistychna Respublyka).

It is true that this reunion was not enthusiastically greeted by the majority of the Galician population, as the reunion of 1919 was. In fact, it was only accepted with a certain amount of dreadful expectations. When analyzing closer the conditions under which this reunion was concluded, one must realize that there was no other plausible alternative; there was no independent Ukraine. The situation was one of "either - or"; either to remain under Poland and continue to be treated as a "national minority", or to reunite with the U.R.S.R. Reunion with the U.R.S.R. meant that Western Ukrainians would no longer be in the category of a "national minority". For this reason alone, then, the reunion should be viewed more positively than it generally is. Therefore, despite the reluctance of some to accept the reunion, one finds it only advisable and morally justified to consider certain positive elements of the reunion when attempting to assess its impact.

Throughout the history of both Western and the Eastern Ukraine as well, the desire and endeavor for a national and

a cultural reunion of both parts of the Ukraine has always been strongly noticeable. The leaders in both parts of Ukraine stressed the basic unity of their peoples. Markian Shashkevych, known as the awakener of Ukrainian national consciousness in Galicia, once said: "We Ruthenians (Ukrainians) in Galicia are the same people (nation) as in Ukraine." His ideals found much stronger expression a few years later in the "manifesto" of the "Holovna Ruska (Ukrainian) Rada" of 1848, which reads: "We belong to the great Ukrainian nation which speaks the same language and numbers fifteen million people, of whom two and one-half million live in Galicia." Similarly, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the greatest Ukrainian historian and scholar, who had lived and worked in both parts of Ukraine and who in the revolutionary years of 1917-1918 became the President of the Ukrainian National Republic, was always concerned about the unity of the Ukrainian territories. As late as 1926, when he was living under the Soviet regime in Ukraine, Hrushevsky reproached the Soviet Ukrainian government for cosigning the Riga agreement of 1922, which allowed Ukraine to be partitioned between Poland and the Bolsheviks. Hrushevsky asked. "Where is Kholm in which I was born? Where is Lviv where I sacrificed 20 years of my work? Where is Ostroh and Lutsk? Where is Uzhorod and Chernivtsi? Where is Khotyn and Akerman?" The partition of Ukraine into four parts after World War I was, according to Hrushevsky, the "greatest obstacle" to the growth and development of the Ukrainian consciousness. This obstacle had been realized by the Western Ukraine political parties in whose programs "*Sobornist*" (national unification) was one of the primary goals. By the end of 1939 the "*Sobornist*" had been implemented by Soviet regime. However, in the last Polish-Soviet agreement of 1944 the cities of Peremyshl, Sianik, Kholm, and others were surrendered to the Polish Soviet Republic, and were consequently isolated from fresh Ukrainian influx. Hence, those cities may be ethnically lost to the Ukrainian territory.

One can conclude from past experiences that whenever the union of Galicia with Ukraine proper occurred it always had the effect of a "shot in the arm" for both parts of Ukraine as it has been illustrated in the early chapters. One can hope that the same positive effect will result now, with

the incorporation of about eight million Western Ukrainians, who for a generation have been reared in a spirit of militant anti-Communism. The Western Ukrainians could give further impetus to the increasing national self-consciousness in the whole of Ukraine and thus, even impede the process of forced Russification. Besides, no matter what the future may hold for Galicia, one thing is certain: the basic unity of the Ukrainian people will be more strongly in evidence. A united Ukraine also serves to guarantee that a disastrous partitioning will not be repeated, no matter how emphatically the previous occupants may claim the rights of re-annexation of the various parts of Ukraine.

No one should be surprised that the partitioning of Ukraine and its subjection to different occupants (Russia, Austria-Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and lately the Czechs) have left some imprint on the national characters of both groups of Ukrainians. For centuries they were exposed to different political systems, pressures, and cultural influences. This varied exposure, no doubt, contributed to the noticeable differentiation among the Ukrainians, not to mention other differences such as physical geography, climate, and language pronunciation. This ethnic differentiation found its most unhealthy expression after World War II, when the main bulk of political immigrants from Western and Eastern Ukraine met in Germany, Canada, or the United States of America, where they almost humiliated each other by calling each other "Eastern" (Skhidniak) or "Western" (Zakhidniak). If these differentiations were apparent for some time among the immigrants abroad, it is certain that they existed in the homeland also, where they were encouraged by the Moscow regime for political purposes. However, the natural law of nations would dictate that these differences will gradually disappear or at least diminish when the union of the peoples has been achieved. The negative features of the national character of one group will be eliminated or at least refined and then will merge with the positive and healthy aspects of the other group, until the full equalization of characters and endeavors for the common good will prevail. Naturally this process of equalization could be much more carefully cultivated, intensified, and carried out if the present Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic enjoyed a greater amount of national and political freedom. But at present it is con-

trolled by the Bolshevik regime, favoring strongly the Russian nationalism.

There are a few significant negative features of the national character which developed under the pressure of the occupation forces. It is a fact, for example, that the Eastern Ukrainians, especially the class of the *dvorianstvo*, living under Russian occupation — the harshest of all occupations regardless of the “white” or “red” regime — in order to survive adopted the policy of cooperation with the Russians. The century-long hammering of Russian political and cultural propaganda about the ethnical similarity of the Russians and the Ukrainians resulted in an **over-eagerness to cooperate** with and contribute to the political and cultural development, the growth and importance of the Russian nation. Even as recently as in the Khrushchev period and at present in the Brezhnev government, the Ukrainians are in great number in the Presidium (the highest Party Council). One cannot but wonder what Russian culture (literature, art, music) and science would have been without the rich contributions of outstanding Ukrainians, starting with T. Prokopovych and continuing through Gogol, and Dostoyevsky, in the older period, and Zoshchenko, Paustovsky, and Kapytsia (atom bomb) in the newer period, to name only a few. The above names are known in the world as Russians, but actually all of them were of Ukrainian descent, and Ukrainian themes and motifs are undeniable in their art. Such a group of people who, without any reservation, are willing to cooperate with Russians are nicknamed “Maloros” (Little Russian), a term interpreted by the Russians to diminish the national differences between the Russians and the Ukrainians. Although many Ukrainians chose to cooperate with the Russians, others preferred to work for the benefit of their own people but even these were able to do this on the **cultural level only**. This statement needs a further explanation. It does not mean the rejection of the value of literary writings as a possible expression of political or social opposition. Whenever one ventured to criticize the existing conditions, he disguised it under the guise of literature. Thus often literary writings became a means of expressing dissatisfaction. But the Ukrainians have been too long accustomed to this as the only way of

political opposition. The so much lately acclaimed "Ukrainization" of the Ukraine conducted in the late 20's and the beginning of the 30's under M. Skrypnyk, the Minister of Education of the Soviet Ukraine, was, in the final analysis, more a cultural movement than a political one. In speaking of these things, one must understand that it is not the purpose of this book to discredit or to discourage the endeavors of the Eastern brothers.

The Ukrainians from Galicia lived for almost 150 years under the Austrian regime and were fortunate to experience the constitutional period of the last 50 years during which they developed the political sense of "national self-determination", to use Wilson's phrase long before Wilson had adopted it as his political slogan in reshaping Europe after World War I. They became hardened through the constant struggle with the Poles for their political and national equalization with other nationalities under the Austrian Monarchy. The will to resist and the feeling of separatism were very strongly impressed upon them. In their struggle to maintain their own cultural institutions and political-constitutional rights, they learned to appreciate in their organizations the value of higher discipline, especially that of following their leaders. These feelings of separatism and discipline still prevail, and it is easy to understand why the Russian Communist officials of Russia proper are not very anxious to go to Galicia — they feel lonely there and isolated from the population as in no other part of the Soviet Empire. It is to be hoped that the Eastern Ukrainians, as a result of their contact with the Western Ukrainians, will not be as willing to cooperate with the Russians and gradually emerge from the narrow confines of "*kulturshchyna*" into the sphere of political and national demands. Some might object that such an emergence would require great sacrifices, but what about the millions of victims during the terror of Stalin's epoch who were without an organized method of resistance?

On the other hand, in the further process of mixing and merging with the Eastern Ukrainians, the Ukrainians from Galicia will rid themselves of the social class-consciousness which was so deeply rooted in them by the influence of Western culture. This class-consciousness was the most

unhealthy and unnatural feature of the Ukrainians in Galicia. They had lost their nobility long ago; nevertheless, under the Polish influence they managed to preserve this social differentiation in respect to professional occupations with their professional-educational titles, and degrees.

The reunion of both Ukraine will serve to improve the Polish-Ukrainian relationship. However, before discussing this matter, it should be remembered that the reunion arrived for Galicia, so to say, at five minutes before twelve. To be sure, a few years longer and the semi-dictatorial government of Poland would have suppressed the Ukrainian national, cultural, and economic achievements to such an extent that the Ukrainians in Galicia would have experienced conditions far worse than they were at the end of the five centuries of occupation by the Poles; that is to say that the Ukrainian nation would have been reduced to a mass of illiterate "peasants and priests" (khlop i pop). It is true that Russian Communism has, in its turn, suppressed the Ukrainian national life in Galicia in less than a year; however, the difference lies in the possibility of higher education, which is enabling a new Ukrainian intelligentsia to develop.

The Polish government-in-exile during World War II insisted, as some Polish organizations in the emigration still do, on their "historical rights" to Galicia as well as to other Western Ukrainian territories, and claim possession of those lands. But sooner or later the Poles will have to realize that their "historical claims" are nothing but unrealistic imperialistic desires. An example from Polish history could be cited to support the previous statement. In 1863 the Poles waged an uprising against Russia. The program of the Revolutionary Committee was to liberate Poland and rebuild it in "the borders of 1772." This meant that Eastern Ukraine and Lithuania would be annexed to Poland. The Poles were defeated, and after a few generations World War I broke out. At the end of that war the Poles raised their "historical claims" not for the whole Eastern Ukraine but for Galicia alone. For this reason, a bloody war developed between the Poles and the Ukrainians in Galicia in 1918-1919. On the other hand, the eastern German territories, up to the Neisse-Oder, were originally populated by the Poles, who were gradually pushed further east by the pressure of the German

“Drang nach Osten” and their colonization. After World War II the Poles needed to be encouraged by the British and the Russians to claim their original territories to the West, because after a few centuries the Poles themselves had accepted the idea that those lands belonged to Germany for good. Moreover, having finally occupied those lands, the Poles did not feel secure for years, even though the Germans (about seven mililon in number) had evacuated the lands voluntarily. As it did in the past, the same process will work today. If Galicia can remain united with the rest of the Ukraine for a sufficient length of time, the new Polish generations will accept reality and forget about their “historical rights” to Galicia. Then, and only then, will the relations improve between the Poles and the Ukrainians and the two nations become close friends. Indeed, political and geographical conditions dictate the necessity of such a friendship between these nations. Because of their geographical location, the Poles have been and still are threatened by the imperialism of Russia and Germany; the Ukrainians are threatened in the same manner. If a political union could be formed between the Poles and the Ukrainians, and possibly include other nations located between Russia and Germany, the combined forces would enable the Poles and the Ukrainians to outnumber and withstand one of the major powers which threaten them. By political maneuvering the Poles and the Ukrainians could avoid the possibility of being partitioned, which has happened a few times in the past. The prerequisite for such a political union is the mutual respect and acknowledgement of the ethnical borders of each nation. Without this mutual understanding and friendship, it seems that the question of the liberation and freedom of Poland as well as that of Ukraine will remain illusory.





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## E R R A T A

Only errors which will result in misunderstanding of the author's intent are included.

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
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p. 76, 18, l. from bottom.	an	and
p. 84, 17, l. from bottom	leiu	lieu
p. 97, 19, l. from top	perpared	prepared
p. 125, 8, l. from top	donatel	donated
p. 137, 1, l. from top	Austrian	Austria
p. 137, 18, l. from bottom	aristochatic	aristocratic
p. 140, 17, l. from top	polish	Polish
p. 141, 15, l. from top	these	this
p. 145, 6, l. from bottom	admitted	permitted
p. 156, 6, l. from bottom	spead	spread
p. 160, 13, l. from top	in	In
p. 191, 7 & 8, l. from top	student	students
p. 211, 1, l. from top	as	at
p. 218, 10, l. from top	Glacian	Galician
p. 220, 16, l. from top	Churchchill	Churchill
p. 234, 13, l. from top	school	schools
p. 238, 2, l. from bottom	pro-ommunist	pro-communist
p. 250, 1, l. from top	Polish-Urainian	Polish-Ukrainian
p. 273, 5, l. from bottom	proress	process
p. 274, 6, l. from top	Ukraine	Ukraines

### II. Bibliography:

Paul Hrycak, *The Duchy of Halych-Volhynia*, Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York, 1958. (in Ukrainian)

### III. Map:

p. 266. "Ukraine" should be located under the word "West" and extend north over the Pinsk and Berestia areas only.



## NATIONALITIES OF GALICIA

*Census of December 31, 1900. Denominations were used because they indicate the nationalities closest to the real status.*

*Eastern Galicia  
50 Districts 3,436,976 sq. mi.*

<i>Greek-Catholic</i>	<i>3,022,929</i>
<i>Roman-Catholic</i>	<i>1,131,330</i>
<i>Israel</i>	<i>618,801</i>
<i>Others</i>	<i>41,111</i>

<i>Roman Catholic</i>	
<i>Ukrainians about</i>	<u><i>300,000</i></u>
<i>Total</i>	<u><i>4,814,171</i></u>

*Greek-Catholic = Ukrainian  
Roman-Catholic = mostly Poles  
Israel = Jews*



**EXPLANATION**

- Province border
- District border
- Ukrainian ethnic border
- Dividing line of east and west Galicia

- Greek-Catholic
- Roman-Catholic
- Israel
- Others

**ENTIRE GALICIA**  
*4,875,317 sq. mi*

<i>Greek-Catholic</i>	<i>3,108,972</i>
<i>Roman-Catholic</i>	<i>3,345,780</i>
<i>Israel</i>	<i>811,183</i>
<i>Others</i>	<i>50,000</i>
<i>Total</i>	<u><i>7,315,939</i></u>



*The percentage figures below the graphs represent denominations within the entire province and the number below the entire population within the district.*

*Scale 1:400,000*



