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Professor B. D. Krupnytsky

(1894—1956)

N. POLONSKA-VASYLENKO

Borys Dmytrovych Krupnytsky, the noted Ukrainian historian, was born in the village of Medvedivka, in the Ukraine, in 1894. Although his first work did not appear in print until 1931, the total number of publications to his credit at the time of his death on April 5, 1956, amounted to 120.

These may be divided into several groups. First should be mentioned the series covering the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries and dealing with Hetman Ivan Mazepa and his contemporaries. Krupnytsky's interest in Mazepa and his time dates from the very beginning of his academic career. His professor's thesis submitted to the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, which was written in 1932, was entitled "Mazepa in the Light of Contemporary German Literature," while one of his last published essays was "Mazepa and Soviet Historiography." [1] Krupnytsky's life was dedicated to the study of Mazepa and his name is primarily linked with it. He even studied Swedish in order to be able to read materials contained in Swedish archives. His monograph on Pylyp Orlyk, referred to below, is based on Swedish historical literature and documents discovered by him in the Swedish Record Office, including letters from Orlyk to Swedish statesmen. Similar use was made of Swedish historical sources for the articles "Charles XII in Medieval and Modern Swedish Historiography" [2] and "Mazepa in the Light of Swedish Historiography," [3] and for a number of treatises on Mazepa and his time. These were published by the Ukrainian Institute in Warsaw, in a symposium dedicated to Mazepa, and elsewhere. This use of new and important material enhances the value of Krupnytsky's work.

Among Krupnytsky's works on Mazepa's era, the most important are his extensive monographs "Hetman Pylyp Orlyk (1672—1742): An Outline of His Political Career," [4] in which is given for the first time a complete picture of this hetman as a diplomat and politician, based on historical documents, and "Hetman Mazepa and His Time," published in German by the Ukrainian Institute in Berlin.[5] For this book Krupnytsky made use of documentary

[1] *Ukrainsky zbirnyk,* Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Vol. II, 1955.

[2] *Forschungen und Fortschritte,* Berlin, 1933, No. 17; *Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu v Varshavi,* Vol. XLVI, Warsaw, 1938.

[3] *Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu v Varshavi,* Vol. XLVI, Warsaw, 1938.

[4] *Ibid.,* Vol. XLII, p. 251.

[5] Ukrainisches Wissenschaftliches Institut in Berlin, Leipzig, 1942, p. 260.

sources which enabled him to open up the true significance of Mazepa's era to foreign readers. All his other articles and essays on this subject supplemented the information furnished in these monographs.

The investigation of Mazepa's epoch brought him to the following conclusion, given in one of his last works:

> Mazepa was a Ukrainian statesman, and this fact was of more importance than his dependence on Moscow, although from the point of view of the tsar he was no more important than any governor-general. He was the leader of the Ukraine, the successor of a series of Ukrainian hetmans, starting with Bohdan Khmelnytsky. His policy was therefore based on the tradition of his predecessors. ... We can only do justice to Mazepa as a historical figure if we recognize that the traditional defence of the rights and the freedom of the Ukraine was the central idea of all his work, and consider him as a Ukrainian statesman, the elected Hetman of the Ukraine. ... From this point of view his orientation toward the Swedes—the last and most important act of his career—was nothing more than a means of securing the rights and freedom of the Ukraine, which were being theatened by Moscow.[6]

By means of a careful analysis of documentary evidence, Krupnytsky rejected the interpretation of Mazepa's character formed by his predecessors among Russian, Swedish and Ukrainian historians. He condemned the "psychological method," which attempted to explain all events by means of psychological analysis, and which had been used by the Ukrainian historians Kostomariv, Hrushevsky and Umanets and by the Swedish historians Carlsson and Jenssen. An important factor in his evaluation of Mazepa's actions was his consideration, not only of Mazepa's personal traits and mental capacity, but also of the political situation obtaining outside the Ukraine. One of the events in which Mazepa was compelled to play a part was the crushing of the Bulavin rising, since he had already been denounced by Kochubey. Rejecting the point of view of Kostomariv and Antonovich concerning the relationship between Mazepa and Colonel Semen Paliy, Krupnytsky stressed the participation of Crown Hetman Lyubomyrsky on the side of the Swedes, which enabled Mazepa to occupy the right bank of the Dnieper and decided Paliy's fate.[7]

Krupnytsky completed his study of Mazepa's epoch with the article "Mazepa and Soviet Historiography." He summed up the general situation in the phrase, "Mazepa decidedly did not fit into the new line in Moscow's policy." Generally speaking, in its attitude toward Mazepa, Soviet historiography returned to the traditional views of Russian historians of the first half of the nineteenth century, who regarded him as a traitor. He quoted Shuty, author of the article "The Treason of Mazepa," who explained everything by the personal character of Mazepa, the "traitor" and "envier." "As a whole," wrote Krupnytsky, "this is not an academic work, but a proclamation of certain theses, chiefly that of the inviolability of the alliance between the Ukraine and Moscow."

From the age of Mazepa, Krupnytsky turned to the preceding period, when the Ukrainian Cossack state came into being under the leadership of

[6] *Mazepa v svitli psykholohichnoi metody* (Mazepa in the Light of the Psychological Method), Augsburg, 1949, p. 11.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 7—10.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In 1948, the year of the three hundredth anniversary of Khmelnytsky's rising against Poland, he began writing articles on this subject, which were published in newspapers and magazines. To these should be added his editorship of the symposium published by the Shevchenko Scientific Association on this occasion. His biggest contribution to this subject was written in collaboration with Professor O. P. Ohloblyn as part of *Kurs istorii Ukrainy* (A Course of Ukrainian History), and has not yet been published. This enhances the interest of his essay "Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Soviet Historiography,"[8] in which he goes back to the pre-Soviet period and examines the views of Hrushevsky. Krupnytsky pointed out the skeptical, rather than truly critical, nature of Hrushevsky's attitude toward the Hetman, which was characteristic of Russian populist historians as a whole. In Volume IX of his work *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy* (The History of the Ukraine-Rus), Hrushevsky, while acknowledging Khmelnytsky's individual talents, regarded him as a mediocre politician, and maintained that his part in determining the policies of his country did not have entirely justifiable results. Krupnytsky emphasized that this skeptical attitude toward Khmelnytsky followed upon the more positive assessments made by the Polish historian Kubała and the Ukrainian Lypynsky. Hrushevsky himself, referring to the works of Lypynsky, stated that his (Hrushevsky's) critical approach was intended to check the "unhealthy" idealization of Khmelnytsky and his time. It was precisely this "critical approach" that Krupnytsky disapproved of when he said, "The determining factor [in Hrushevsky's book] was, in fact, not so much a thorough and convincing analysis of the relevant sources as the general ideology of the author."[9] This comment reveals Krupnytsky's frequently expressed opinion of the "psychological method" as applied to Mazepa and his time: the first task of research, in his view, was a thoroughgoing examination of the relevant sources and the exclusion of the subjective element in assessing historical figures.

Krupnytsky drew attention to the shift of emphasis which took place in the Soviet historiography of the thirties, when the Kremlin advanced a new thesis, that of the "leading role of the Great Russian people." In the treatment of Ukrainian history, the subject most affected by this shift was the personality of Khmelnytsky and the significance of his time. All problems began to be solved from the Party viewpoint. This could be seen in the monograph by Petrovsky,[10] who was himself not in sympathy with the new line but who was obliged to submit to it. The central idea of Petrovsky's work was the "reunion of the Ukraine with Moscow," which it was Khmelnytsky's historical mission to bring to fruition.

The activity of Soviet historians received an impetus from the celebration in 1954 of this reunion, when exhibitions of documents were organized and a flood of articles was published in the press. The *pièce de résistance* was a collection of documents, published in three volumes,[11] in connection with

[8] *Ukrainsky zbirnyk*, Vol. III, 1955.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

[10] M. Petrovsky, *Vyzvolna viyna ukrainskoho narodu proty hnitu shlyakhetskoi Polshchi i pryyednannya Ukrainy do Rosii, 1648—54* (The War of Liberation of the Ukrainian People Against the Oppression of the Polish Nobility and the Union of the Ukraine with Russia, 1648—54), Kiev, 1940.

[11] *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossieyu: Dokumenty i materialy* (The Reunification of the Ukraine with Russia: Documents and Materials), 3 vols., Moscow, 1954.

which Krupnytsky's attention was especially occupied with two points. Firstly, here as elsewhere, Soviet historians failed to give due consideration to Khmelnytsky and the Treaty of Pereyaslav: all the problems raised dealt, not with historical figures, but with theses dictated from above. Secondly, none of the literature published on this occasion went further than the year 1654, since the Soviet interpretation of Khmelnytsky would have suffered considerably if the independent policy of his last years had been included.[12] Other Soviet historical publications of the forties and fifties consistently maintained that the Ukrainians were incapable of maintaining an independent state and needed the support of their "elder brother." Thus the "lesser evil"—union of the Ukraine with Moscow—had become a "favor" done by Moscow. There was a change in the interpretation of Khmelnytsky's role: in 1935 he was a "traitor and the sworn enemy of the rebelling Ukrainian peasantry," which, according to contemporary reports, was struggling for absolute power in the Ukraine; after 1954, however, Khmelnytsky's activity was considered to have been an indispensable benefit for the Ukraine.[13]

Krupnytsky held a high opinion of Khmelnytsky, especially of his efforts toward the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. In contrast to Hrushevsky, he considered Khmelnytsky's foreign policy to be extremely successful. In his interpretation Khmelnytsky and Mazepa emerge as the two founders of the Ukrainian state, and the connecting link in their policies is provided by their relations with Sweden.[14]

From the birth of the Ukrainian state, Krupnytsky turned his attention to Mazepa's successors in the hetmanship. Apart from some small-scale articles, this period of his career is marked by an extensive monograph on Hetman Danylo Apostol,[15] which, although published in 1948, was written much earlier in Berlin and was the product of long years of research. The first section contains a description of Danylo Apostol and details of his descent. The second gives an account linking the period of Apostol with that of Mazepa and a description of the reign of Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky. The reader is offered a broad picture of social, economic and cultural conditions under Apostol, which serves as a background for the figure of Apostol himself and the political events of his time. Apostol is portrayed from a standpoint that is still unfamiliar, not only to the general Ukrainian public, but also to historians. He is not idealized, but presented with all his faults; in spite of everything, however, the author stresses that Apostol was one of the statesmen who firmly believed in autonomy for the Ukraine. "The fate of the Ukraine was close to his heart, and he devoted all his energies, both as a soldier and as an administrator, to this cause."[16] After Mazepa, he wrote, the political conflict shifted to the home front. The defence of the interests, rights and privileges of the autonomous hetmanate took first place

[12] B. Krupnytsky, "Bohdan Khmelnytsky i sovyetska istoriohrafiya" (Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Soviet Historiography), *Ukrainsky zbirnyk*, Vol. III, 1955, p. 89.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

[14] "Ukrainska polityka seredyny XVII st. i Shvetsiya" (Ukrainian Policy of the Middle of the Seventeenth Century and Sweden), *Byuleten Naukovo-doslidnoho instytutu*, Ukrainian Technical Husbandry Institute, Munich, 1954, Nos. 39—40, pp. 5—9.

[15] *Hetman Danylo Apostol i yoho doba* (Hetman Danylo Apostol and His Time), Augsburg, 1948.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

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and pushed all other problems far into the background. "That this state persisted until the second half of the eighteenth century and that, thanks to this, the process of reducing the Ukraine to the same level of serfdom as Russia was delayed ... is due to no small extent to the work of Apostol as Hetman." [17] With these words the author concludes his monograph, having taken due account of all Apostol's mistakes, both as a man and as Hetman. It should be borne in mind that Krupnytsky was the first to study this period, and that his monograph is still the only study devoted to Danylo Apostol.

Krupnytsky originally intended to follow up this work with another on the era of Hetman Kyryl Rozumovsky. This project had been planned long before, and in 1952—53 there was a possibility of its being realized. The Rockefeller Foundation proposed to grant Krupnytsky a subsidy which would have enabled him to study archives in Paris, but in the end the subsidy was not granted, and failing health subsequently made it impossible to resume such an ambitious plan. Consequently, we now have only one short article devoted to Rozumovsky.[18]

All the above-mentioned works, which cover the period from Khmelnytsky to the liquidation of the Hetmanate, may be regarded as a history of the Hetman state. In addition, in the *Entsyklopediya Ukrainoznavstva* (Ukrainian Encyclopedia), Krupnytsky gives an outline of the Hetmanate in both Ukrainian and English.

The culmination of this account may be found in the small but interesting article entitled "The Hetmans and the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian State During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," [19] in which the author stresses the relationship between the Hetman regime and the Church. "To be at the head of the country," he said, "meant to have obligations toward the Church, for the Church was a very important member of the national body. The hetmans were obliged to support the Church by interests of state." The author then proceeds to give a concise account of the relationship between the hetmans and the Church and comes to the conclusion that the fate of the Ukrainian state was constantly linked with that of the Ukrainian Church: the rise or fall of the one was accompanied by the rise or fall of the other. Under Khmelnytsky and Mazepa, for example, the importance of the Church increased, while it declined under Ivan Bryukhovetsky, when its subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate, realized later, in 1685, under Ivan Samoylovych, first became a serious possibility, and under Ivan Skoropadsky, when, after the tsar's dethronement of Ioasaf Krokovsky in 1718, the metropolitan see of Kiev remained vacant for some time.

To this series of publications may also be assigned the articles devoted to the Zaporozhe Sech and the essay entitled "On the Occasion of the Four Hundredth Anniversary of the Cossack Navy." [20]

Throughout his career, Krupnytsky was interested in historiography: his doctoral thesis dealt with J. Chr. von Engel, the historian of the Ukraine, and his last published work was "Ukrainian Historical Science Under the Soviets,

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

[18] *Kalendar-Almanakh na 1948 r.* (Calendar for 1948), Augsburg-Munich, 1948.

[19] *Vira i Znannya*, Theological Institute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA, New York, 1954, No. 1.

[20] *Ukrainski visti*, Neu-Ulm, 1949, Nos. 93—96.

1920—50."[21] In all, more than half of his works dealt with historiographical questions. They display the author's breadth of interests, the depth of his erudition and his familiarity with foreign literature. He devoted particular attention to a historiographical study of the works of prominent Ukrainian historians of the time of the Ukrainian Renaissance, including Drahomaniv, Hrushevsky, Doroshenko, Bidnov and Lypynsky. Among Krupnytsky's personal recollections of such historians, his articles on Doroshenko are marked by warmth of feeling and by gratitude and respect for his former teacher and "father in spirit," as he called him. There are also interesting recollections of the universities of Kiev and Berlin and their professors.

Krupnytsky's writings include a number of articles on the *Istoriya Russov* (History of the Ruthenians) and two others, written shortly before his death, on Mazepa and his time as recorded in foreign archives.[22] From 1941 he also occupied himself with Soviet historiography.[23]

Toward the end of his life, Krupnytsky became more and more interested in studies of a historiosophical character. In a letter dated November 10, 1954, written in connection with the award of a stipend by the Ost-Europa Institut, he said:

> My work is historiosophical. I am therefore primarily interested in the ideas, outlook and methods of the new generation of historians, their links with, and dependence on, their "elder brothers," the role of the [Ukrainian] Academy [of Sciences] and the new state universities in the study of history, etc., etc. All this is, of course, based on historiography.

Of especial importance is "The Basic Problems of Ukrainian History," which is one of the last things written by Krupnytsky. This is a symposium of articles already published which had been systematized—in some cases rewritten—and bound together as a single logical entity by the addition of new articles. It was thus given the character of a large-scale monograph, and its importance was enhanced by the summary it contained of the author's historiosophical views.

This work begins with a survey of the usually accepted outlines of Russian and Ukrainian history. The author recognizes that the generally accepted outline of Russian history, i. e., the theory of the gradual shifting of the center from Kiev to the north, dates from Karamzin. In the middle of the nineteenth century, this theory was confirmed by Pogodin, who maintained that in the 10th—12th centuries the Kiev lands were inhabited by Great Russians. Gradually, however, Hrushevsky's theory, which maintained that the Ukraine's historical development had taken place independently of Moscow, gained ground among non-Russian historians. Presnyakov,[24] Lyubav-

[21] *Ukrainska istorychna nauka pid sovyetamy, 1920—1950* (Ukrainian Historical Science Under the Soviets, 1920—50), Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, 1957.

[22] *Ukrainska Literaturna Hazeta,* 1956, Nos. 2, 3 and 5.

[23] „Die ukrainische historische Wissenschaft in der Sowjetunion, 1921—1941", *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas,* Breslau, 1941, Nos. 2—4, pp. 125—51.

[24] E. Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie velikorusskogo gosudarstva* (The Formation of the Great Russian State), Petrograd, 1920.

sky[25] and finally Picheta[26] made it clear that there had never been an influx of the Ukrainian population toward the north, that before the twelfth century (i.e., the period of Yury Dolgoruky) the Rostov and Vladimir-Suzdal lands were already inhabited by Slav tribes, and that the process of Slav colonization had originated in the lands of Novgorod, Pskov and the Krivichi. Under the Soviets, however, historiography made a retrogressive step in once more tracing Russian history back to Kiev, while comparatively recently the works of Pankratova have displayed an obvious attempt to depict Russia as the heir to all the important cultures of the whole world.

In this work Krupnytsky makes a fresh attempt at dividing Ukrainian history into periods. This question had for long interested him, and in 1947—48 he proposed calling a conference of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in order to discuss it. This proposal did not come to fruition, and he undertook the task himself.

> I am convinced [he wrote a propos of his own proposals for dividing Ukrainian history into periods] that this scheme is imperfect to a large degree. This is why I have called it an experiment. The basic problem remains: whether to base one's scheme on a single principle, or to permit oneself a combination of several principles... the confusion [of which would] complicate the scheme and even, perhaps, make it rather obscure.[27]

When he wrote these last words, Krupnytsky had in mind the scheme proposed by Prof. Okinshevych. Taking his criticism of this scheme as his point of departure, he proposed the following division: (1) the prehistorical era; (2) the period of the principalities; (3) the Ukraine as part of the Lithuanian-Russian state; (4) the Ukraine as a Polish colony and the Cossack movement; (5) the hetmanate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and its development as a class state; (6) the Ukraine under Russia and Austria and the national populist movement of the nineteenth century; and (7) the development of the Ukrainian state in the twentieth century under conditions of modern colonial oppression.[28]

The next section of this symposium, which deals with the subject of feudalism (of which the author takes a negative view), is in the nature of a polemic with the German historian Otto Hintze,[29] who asserted that feudalism was "in the first place a reform of the entire military structure of the state"; feudalism marked a stage in the history of all countries, but except for the Teutonic and Latin countries of Europe, it appeared in its most complete form in Japan, the Moslem lands and Russia. As far as Russia is concerned, Krupnytsky rejected this statement outright.[30]

[25] M. Lyubavsky, *Obrazovanie osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii velikorusskoi narodnosti: Zaselenie i obedinenie tsentra* (The Formation of the Basic State Territory of the Great Russian People: The Settlement and Unification of the Center), Moscow-Leningrad, 1929.

[26] V. Picheta, *Ocherednye voprosy belorusskoi istoriografii* (Current Questions of Belorussian Historiography), 1922.

[27] *Osnovni problemy istorii Ukrainy* (Basic Problems of Ukrainian History), Ukrainian Free University, Munich, 1955, p. 27.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[29] O. Hintze, „Wesen und Verbreitung des Feudalismus", *Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Vol. XX, Berlin, 1929.

[30] *Osnovni problemy istorii Ukrainy*, p. 35.

An important section is devoted to the problem of the Ukrainian state. Carefully and objectively, Krupnytsky examines the sources of Ukrainian history and comes to the conclusion that in the history of the hetmanate republican elements were predominant. Fundamentally, the epoch of Khmelnytsky constituted a popular revolution which embraced all the nation's resources. In contrast to the French Revolution, it gave rise, not to free individual citizens, but to free classes. In time, however, the peasants and Cossacks became impoverished, while the importance of the military authorities was enhanced. It was for this reason that the Ukraine in the eighteenth century found herself in a similar position to that of the greater part of Europe. Krupnytsky disagrees with Prof. Okinshevych's conclusion that there were two types of government—the republican, represented by hetmans Vyhovsky and Doroshenko, and the monarchical, represented by hetmans Khmelnytsky, Samoylovych and Mazepa.[31] Krupnytsky's approach is more cautious: under Khmelnytsky, Samoylovych and Mazepa, according to him, the authority of the General Council was generally acknowledged to be higher than that of the hetman. The General Council had the power, not only to elect the hetman, but also to overthrow him; after a time this power was reduced but not abolished. During the eighteenth century, the position was modified: real power, received from the hands of the tsars, was vested in the hetmans, while the authority of the General Council was reduced to nothing but a form. "The principle of a foreign monarchy could not replace that of a native one," writes Krupnytsky. "The principle of electoral democracy became ineffective in the Ukraine, and this was taken advantage of by a foreign monarchy—that of Moscow." His conclusion is as follows: "The hetman was a kind of president of a republic, but his prerogatives were compounded of republican and monarchist elements." This conclusion approaches the formula of Prof. Yakovlev.[32] Krupnytsky's interpretation is of great interest, since it embodies an entirely new understanding of the ideas of "tradition" and "progress": the Ukrainian hetman tradition tends toward a republic, while progress tends toward a monarchy.

Especial attention is devoted to the problem of the contemporary Ukrainian state structure, to which Krupnytsky seeks a solution by analyzing the views of leading figures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Among the representatives of the nineteenth century he gives particular consideration to Drahomaniv, who preached collaboration with liberal, socialist and revolutionary elements; fearing that the Russians might see danger threatening from the Ukrainian quarter, he proposed the "method of concealed aims," and the shifting of matters onto a broad political basis. This led Drahomaniv to the idea of a federation of the Ukrainian lands.[33] In general, in Krupnytsky's opinion, there was no clear understanding of the idea of nationhood: only in the twentieth century did the problem of state and nation become manifest in all its clarity. Here Krupnytsky has in mind the views of the eminent political historians Lypynsky and Tomashivsky. Lypynsky's formula was "through statehood to nationhood," while Tomashivsky's was "through nationhood to statehood." In both formulas the circumstances in

[31] L. Okinshevych, *Istoriya ukrainskoho prava* (The History of Ukrainian Law), Ukrainian Free University, Munich, 1947, p. 87.

[32] *Osnovni problemy istorii Ukrainy*, pp. 50—51.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 59—60.

which their authors' views had been formed are manifest: Lypynsky had in mind the Eastern Ukraine, where national ideas gained ground extremely slowly, while Tomashivsky, a Galician, knew from experience that in the Western Ukraine national consciousness was spreading rapidly and that on this foundation an independent state could be built. Krupnytsky sides with Lypynsky when he declares, "By way of an independent state the formation of a nation is more easily secured and more rapidly completed." [34]

Krupnytsky raises the question of the essence and character of nationalism. From the internationalism of Drahomaniv he arrives at the opposite pole—the nationalism of Dontsov. He dwells on the idea of "territorial patriotism" put forward by Lypynsky, for whom there was no difference between foreigner and native: whoever lives in a given country is also a patriot of that country. Krupnytsky offers a historical explanation of the origin of this viewpoint: this was Lypynsky's reaction to the conception of a nation and of a national elite that was formed in the nineteenth century and made itself felt in the Ukraine during the years 1917—21, when only those persons were considered to be Ukrainians who belonged to the Zaporozhe Sech. This limitation of the concept "Ukrainian" was frequently harmful, and was therefore attacked by Lypynsky. In spite of numerous unfortunate mistakes that were made, Krupnytsky praises the efforts of the Hetman government to enlist the support of the entire population of the Ukraine in the task of building up a Ukrainian state and nation.[35] He also considers the conception of patriotism put forward by Lypa, which he calls "biological" or "racial," in distinction to the territorial patriotism of Lypynsky. In the latter's understanding of the problem, he says, people and nation play no part.[36] The nationalists make no attempt at a synthesis of the concepts of people, nation and land: only one of them, Boyko, introduces the concept of national territory into that of the nation.[37] Krupnytsky concludes by attributing great importance to nationalism: "Nothing can conquer an ethnic mass so rapidly or so easily and change it into champions of the national self as modern nationalism." Here, however, lies a great danger: namely, in the replacement of patriotism by nationalism, which thus extends a helping hand to internationalism. The Soviet Union is a striking example of this. Krupnytsky draws attention to the paradoxical demand of modern nationalism that one should not love one's own, but hate everything foreign. "Later this hatred is transferred to the members of one's own nation—to those who are marked as 'traitors.' " [38]

The problems of nation, nationalism and patriotism lead Krupnytsky to the question of the mutual relationship between people and government, of freedom and authority. He regards Shevchuk's "theory of the man in the street," [39] which he calls "neopopulist," as a reaction to Dontsov's "race of

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 65—68.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[37] Yu. Boyko, *Problemy istoriosofii ukrainskoho natsionalizmu* (Problems of the Historiosophy of Ukrainian Nationalism), 1950, pp. 10—11.

[38] *Osnovni problemy istorii Ukrainy*, p. 77.

[39] H. Shevchuk, "Ii velychnist — malenka lyudyna" (His Majesty the Man in the Street), *Ukrainski visti*, 1948, No. 56.

lords," "the elite," as opposed to the "caste of swineherds" and "paupers." [40] Krupnytsky sees an attempt at a synthesis in Lypynsky's formula, "All power to the government, all freedom to the Ukrainian people," [41] but he does not agree with him, since unlimited authority at the top and unlimited freedom at the bottom are scarcely reconcilable. He gives Lypynsky credit for drawing attention to the need for an organic link between the elite and the mass of the people, even though he (Lypynsky) underrates the importance of the intelligentsia. The important thing, says Krupnytsky, is not whether we are to have a progressive (or "working," as Lypynsky puts it) monarchy or a republic, but that the government should be in the hands of men who are organically linked with the masses.[42] Nevertheless, in spite of all these objections, he underlines Lypynsky's formula of authority at the top and freedom at the bottom.[43]

We will pass over the questions of colonization—Ukrainian colonizing tendencies and Drahomaniv's theory—and of the influence of the Ukrainian landscape—forest, steppe and sea—on the formation of the Ukrainian nation, although both these questions are treated in very interesting fashion, and turn to cultural problems. Krupnytsky gives a succinct but vivid picture of the high culture of the Ukraine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when her influence extended over the whole of Eastern Europe and the Academy of Kiev was the chief pedagogical center and supplied the whole of Russia with teachers. This expansion was based on an independent political and at the same time cultural center. "Baroque culture, as originally adapted and raised to its highest point by our ancestors, sent its products to all the corners of Eastern and Southeastern Europe." [44] Krupnytsky takes the view that not only the Ukraine, but other nations constituting part of the Russian Empire and also Western Europe contributed to the formation of Russian culture. During the eighteenth century, the Ukraine went through a difficult period during which the autonomous life of the state was confined within narrower limits. Young people sought for other opportunities, and, especially during the nineteenth century, readily moved to the capital. Some of them returned to the Ukraine, but these were only isolated cases: the greater number linked their fate with Russia, and the Ukrainian people lost its elite, its intelligentsia, together with its art, science and literature. In the nineteenth century, the Ukrainians became a nation of peasants. A new intelligentsia was born which consisted mostly of representatives of the gentry, together with a few *raznochintsy* and priests, who took upon themselves the mission of going "to the people." The people began to be idealized: culture in its entirety acquired a popular, ethnographical, character. At the beginning of the twentieth century there was a noticeable reaction toward European influences, as may be seen in the work of Lesya Ukrainka, with her search for European and even worldwide themes.[45]

[40] D. Dontsov, *Dukh nashoi davnyny* (The Spirit of Our Past), Prague, 1944.

[41] V. Lypynsky, *Lysty do brativ khliborobiv* (Letters to Our Brother Tillers of the Soil), Vienna, 1926.

[42] *Osnovni problemy istorii Ukrainy*, pp. 96—104.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 143—49.

Krupnytsky devotes particular attention to the "Europeanism" of the Ukraine. He mentions this subject in a number of articles and isolated chapters, but treats it in the greatest detail in the section "The Historical Foundations of the Europeanism of the Ukraine." His approach is historical: he examines the very meaning of the term "Europe"—in particular, "Eastern" and "Western" Europe. As for the Ukraine, she, by the very fact of her conversion to Christianity through Byzantium, determined the issue of the struggle between Europe and Asia to settle her fate—and determined it in favor of Europe. "Christian Russia," he writes, "entered the spiritual homeland of the European peoples and took part in their civilizing process." But, he continues, the Ukraine emphasized her bonds with Western Europe. From the eleventh century on, her links with the East and South were gradually sundered, while on the other hand those with the West were strengthened, especially when Galicia-Lvov superseded Kiev. Krupnytsky emphasizes the dichotomy between Suzdal and Moscow on the one hand, which were drawn toward the East, and the Ukraine, on the other, which turned toward the West.[46]

Krupnytsky considers the position of the Church. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church acquired new forms, above all election to ecclesiastical office, which were alien to Moscow. Even students from the Academy at Kiev who were invited to Moscow were treated as "papists." The fruits of Western learning were brought to the Russian Empire by Ukrainian theologians, including Catholics such as St. Yarovsky and F. Lopatynsky, and Protestants such as F. Prokopovych.

Surveying the salient facts in the Ukraine's past, Krupnytsky compares them with features in Western Europe; thus, for instance, following the example of Drahomaniv and Okinshevych, he singles out the Cossack Council and Parliament, the monastic novitiate, the Renaissance, Reformation and Baroque style; rationalism *(Istoriya Russov)* and romanticism (the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius). Drahomaniv and Antonovych were "Westernizers," even though they disagreed with one another. "The sphere of Western European cultural life," he says, "was also the natural sphere for the Ukraine. Movements in the Ukraine were ever constant: consciously or subconsciously, we followed the same path as Western Europe, even though the Ukraine lay on the outskirts of the Western European world." The future holds out a different prospect: as an isolated continent arises in the East under the influence of independent, de-Europeanizing tendencies, the entire ethnic Ukraine faces a grave threat.[47]

Krupnytsky sees the history of Moscow in quite another light. Here he discerns a constant struggle with Western influences. Moscow's entire history would have taken another turn if her policy-makers had understood the significance of Khmelnytsky's period and had decided to cooperate with the Ukraine. In the seventeenth century, the Ukraine served as a cultural intermediary between Moscow and the West, but Moscow adopted an ill-disposed attitude toward the Western culture of the Ukraine. Krupnytsky emphasizes the difference between the Europeanism of the Ukraine and the merely superficial "Europeanization" of Russia, which was hindered by the expansion

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 157.
[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 164—67.

toward the East. This eastward movement was rooted in tradition, while that toward the West was artificial. The annexation of Finland, the Baltic countries and Poland, while extending the imperial frontiers westward, failed to exert any influence upon the country's political or spiritual structure, for here Moscow followed a policy of centralization and Russification. The appearance in the nineteenth century of the two movements of Westernizers and Slavophils was deceptive: the Westernizers had little that was original to offer, for they merely made use of isolated ideas of Western philosophers, while the Slavophils confined themselves to the ideas of Orthodoxy, nationality and the community, adding for good measure autocracy. In the end, the Slavophils turned to the glorification of medieval Moscow and ignored the other nations that went to make up the Russian Empire.

As for Soviet Russia, she at first followed the path of the Westernizers by taking over one of the fundamental European social trends of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—i.e., Marxism. But even Marxism took on a specific character derived from the Russian mentality with its formalism, pedantry and peculiar dialectic.[48] This tendency toward the West is also, therefore, merely superficial, and Russia is heading, not westward, but eastward. There are the frequent references to the "rottenness" of the West, the claims of a world mission for the "chosen" Russian people, and the efforts to avoid too close a contact with the West. Presentday Russia considers herself sufficiently strong to stand on her own feet. Krupnytsky quotes the words of Yovchuk:

> The representatives of Russian progressive culture have implanted in the consciousness of the Russian public a faith in Russia's great future and the conviction that the Russian people is capable of creating at least as powerful a spiritual and material civilization as has been created in the West.[49]

Soviet Russia has begun to put forward pretensions to leading the world, not only in the political, but also in the spiritual and cultural spheres.

Turning to the present time, Krupnytsky examines those movements that have become fashionable in the West—in particular, existentialism. One branch lays stress on the free person, and another, led by Sartre, on the sovereign, independent person, who creates out of himself. Existentialism does not search for eternal truths, which are of interest only insofar as they concern man: its point of departure is not essences or ideas, but man.

This atheistic existentialism of Sartre's is alien to the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian world outlook is not militant, but conciliatory: it strives toward harmony, and is deeply Christian. Skovoroda strives toward a synthesis of Christianity and classical thought; the author of *Istoriya Russov* toward a synthesis of Christianity and rationalism; and Kostomariv, in his *Knyha bytiya ukrainskoho narodu* (The Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People), toward a synthesis of Christianity and nineteenth-century liberalism. On the other hand, Christian existentialism, which is represented by Romano Guardini, is a

> ... *Welterleben* through the prism of the heart. Man reacts to the sacred truths of God ... not so much with his feeling, as such, as with his

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 175—77.

[49] M. Jowtschuk, "Der Leninismus und die fortschrittliche russische Kultur des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Neue Welt*, Vol. II, Berlin, May 1946.

mind. Here there is much that draws a response from the sympathetically tuned strings of the Ukrainian soul.[50]

Existentialism is a protest against the stifling effect of national-socialist totalitarianism. Both Christian and atheistic existentialism preach the essential worth of the human personality, the principle of human dignity, the right of man to freedom.

The chief question raised by Krupnytsky is

> ... how the intellectual type of Ukrainian reacts to presentday problems ... The fundamentally bright, life-affirming and harmonious Ukrainian intellectual type can scarcely grasp certain features of existentialism, particularly as Sartre sees it. It is easier for him to understand the philosophy of the heart, which for long has been the expression of his own spiritual experiences.

Krupnytsky recognizes the perplexity of the West, its search for new paths, its desire to create a new man, to renew man. The philosophies of Dilthey and Bergson are an expression of this search for a new, living, free man conscious of his own dignity, whose heart is open to his fellows, who has the ability to feel the fullness of life. Philosophy is allying itself to the doing of good deeds; the expression "men of good will" has gained currency throughout Europe. A renewal of the Christian spirit is taking place in France and England.

Krupnytsky observes a definite movement among the Ukrainians also toward a renewal or revival of the nation (as in the writings of Dontsov and Khvylyovy), of the elite (as in Lypynsky) and of the party (as in Dyvnych). In the Ukraine, as elsewhere, he says, there is a struggle going on, not for the recognition, but for the realization, of truths.

The ideas scattered throughout this work are resumed by Krupnytsky in the interesting conclusion that the Ukraine must not vacillate between East and West. By virtue of her being a synthesis of these two worlds, it remains her duty, not merely to transmit the Western spirit, but to create something out of it. For the Ukraine the East no longer exists, since its creative power has been destroyed by the Soviet terror. Presentday Russia represents nothing more than technical progress: spiritually, she has no source of life. In the East, therefore, there remains only China, with her Communism taken over from Russia: will she have any new ideas to offer? [51]

Krupnytsky takes the view that the European spirit is still the world's chief driving force. (It should be added that he includes America, Australia and Africa.) If Europe dies, a light will go out that nobody will be able to replace. The Ukraine must therefore not cut herself off from Europe: on the contrary, she has the great mission to fulfill of representing the West in the East. Her role is a tremendous one:

> As far as national rights are concerned, both the Soviet West and the Soviet East look to the Ukraine: not only the Lithuanians, Estonians, etc., but the Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidzhanis and Turkomans of the Far East and Central Asia. ... They are waiting for this

[50] *Osnovni problemy istorii Ukrainy*, pp. 198—201.
[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 214—15.

> largest of non-Russian Soviet republics to give the lead, for the creative European word, which they can only hear from a creative European Ukraine, a Ukraine which is alive and active and conscious of her tasks and possibilities. Why should it not come from that Ukraine which is today in emigration or has withdrawn within itself at home? [52]

Such, then, is the purport of this work, in which the ailing historian expressed his fundamental historical views. It is not an evaluation of new sources, a task which was especially close to his heart, but an attempt to find an explanation of the past and, in part, to facilitate future research. In it are expressed the author's personality, his particular approach to history and his conception of the character of the Ukrainian people, a knowledge of which enables the reader to appreciate the rest of his work. In it are reflected his patriotism and love for the Ukrainian people and his deep religiosity, which served him as a guide.

In assessing the achievements of Prof. Krupnytsky, one should not overlook his contribution to the knowledge of Ukrainian studies among foreign readers. Approximately a quarter of his work was published in English or German, a record that has been equalled by few other Ukrainian historians. After the publication in German of his first work, he began contributing to German periodicals; some of the publications of the Ukrainian Institute in Berlin were also in German. The most important of Krupnytsky's works published in this language are his "Hetman Mazepa and His Time" and his "History of the Ukraine." The latter work came out in two editions and played an important part in acquainting the German reader with the true history of the Ukraine.

As a historian of the Ukraine, Krupnytsky is an important figure. This importance is enhanced by the fact that in all his work he ceaselessly occupied himself with questions connected with a free and independent Ukraine, which only free men, conscious of their national dignity, could create. Few emigres have consistently and systematically struggled against the Soviet falsification of history by academic methods with such objectivity.

The latter part of Krupnytsky's life was overshadowed by abnormal and tragic circumstances, but neither his position as an emigre, his difficult material situation, his work nor incurable disease could break him. Until the end he dreamed of the Ukraine, and his plans for continuing his study of her history enabled him to endure his physical sufferings. Confined to his bed and isolated from Ukrainian circles, he analyzed the Ukrainian *Weltanschauung,* which "is not militant, but conciliatory; [which] strives toward harmony, and is deeply Christian," and for which atheistic theories are alien and inimical.

[52] *Ibid.,* pp. 216—17.

The Official History of Ukrainian Soviet Literature

M. HLOBENKO

Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury (An Outline of the History of Ukrainian Soviet Literature) was published jointly in 1954 by the Gorky Institute of World Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Shevchenko Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. Written by a group of authors and edited by a board of eight members, it is of considerable interest to the student of Soviet reality.

After the suppression of cultural activity which took place during the period of Ukrainization, the record of twenty years of Soviet literary "achievements" in the Ukrainian SSR was limited to a small manual on Ukrainian literature for use in secondary schools and to official comments in the newspapers by prominent members of the Union of Soviet Writers.

It is hardly necessary to point out how scant this was, especially when compared with earlier Soviet publications such as *Pidruchnyk istorii ukrainskoi literatury* (Manual of the History of Ukrainian Literature), by O. Doroshkevych (1924 and later editions), *Ukrainska literatura* (Ukrainian Literature), by A. Shamray (1927), *Ukrainska literatura,* published by the All-Ukrainian Extra-Mural Institute of Popular Education (1929), and the many articles published in Kiev and Kharkov magazines in the twenties and thirties. Despite their shortcomings, these publications made at least some mention of various books, journals and writers, but, needless to say, they have been banned in the Ukraine for some considerable time. The aim of the *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* is to present Ukrainian Soviet literature in the manner prescribed by official post-Stalin ideology.

This book was written at a time of comparative ideological stability, that is, when official institutions were called upon to explain what was ideologically permissible. It is indicative of the level to which literature and literary scholarship have fallen in the middle fifties after thirty-five years of Communist rule in the Ukraine.

In the Soviet Union, literature and all literary matters are conditioned by official policy. The authors of the *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* repeat Zhdanov's formula:

> In Soviet literature there are not and cannot be any other interests except those of the people and the state. Therefore all preaching on the texts of "no ideology," "no politics" and "art for art's sake" is out of place (Page 324).

The present state of Soviet Ukrainian literature is not the legacy of such unusually adverse conditions as, for example, Stalin's personal tyranny. From its inception Bolshevism has made a purely utilitarian, and therefore destructive, approach to literature and to the arts generally.

In his well-known article *Partiinaya organizatsiya i partiinaya literatura* (Party Organization and Party Literature), published in 1905, Lenin formulated the requirement that literature "should become part of the organized, planned and unified party work of social democracy."

Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury is, of course, permeated with this official dogma; thus, the practical realization of Lenin's thesis is put into these terms:

> The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and also the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, in numerous resolutions concerning literature and the arts, and also through their unremitting attention and solicitude, have at all stages assisted the development of a national Ukrainian literature and culture and called upon writers to create works of high ideological content and artistic value (Page 21).

This "unremitting attention and solicitude," particularly during the early history of the Ukrainian SSR, is worth mentioning because the appearance in the twenties of a number of outstanding Ukrainian literary works—not because of, but in spite of, this "unremitting solicitude"—led the free world to an unjustifiably rosy evaluation of certain critics and literary leaders who at the time enjoyed the protection of the Party but who were, however, subsequently liquidated.

Since the early twenties the Soviet authorities have insisted upon a rigid control of all literary activity. V. Blakytny, who was formerly a leader of the "Borotbists" (a left-wing party) and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, wrote in 1924:

> It is expedient and useful to publish works which are consistent with Communist ideology... but, on the other hand, works which kill the proletariat's drive for an active part in communal life, soften their revolutionary will, weaken and scatter their forces—such works should be prevented at all costs from wide circulation; prevention should begin by sharp criticism within the body of public writers and culminate in an official ban by the Soviet authorities.[1]

On April 10, 1925 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party passed a resolution concerning Ukrainian art groups: it was naturally consistent with the resolution passed soon afterward — on June 18, 1925 — by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, which dealt with the policy of the Party in the sphere of literature.[2]

The latter resolution, while admitting the right of intellectual writers to exist, carefully directed that they should be reeducated, though it did not impose any restrictions on their style. Absolute priority was given to "proletarian writers," and it was clearly stated that "just as the class struggle in general is unending, so must it continue in the literary sphere as well." Further it was promised that "the capture of positions [by the Party] in the field of literature... must become a fact sooner or later" (Page 61).

[1] V. Blakytny, *Bez manifestu* (Without a Manifesto), Hart, 1924. Quoted from: *10 rokiv ukrainskoi literatury* (Ten Years of Ukrainian Literature), by A. Leytes and M. Yashek, Kiev, 1928, vol. II, p. 440.

[2] A. Leytes and M. Yashek, *op. cit.*, pp. 304—305.

The theses of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party on realizing Ukrainization, drawn up in 1926, make their attitude toward Ukrainian literature and language clear when the advocates of a unified Soviet state are reproached with

> ... underestimating the importance of the Ukrainian language and the development of Ukrainian culture as a powerful means of raising the cultural level of the masses, as a fundamental weapon for strengthening the union of workers and peasants and as an essential condition for the building of socialism.[3]

The resolution on Party policy concerning Ukrainian literature, passed by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party on June 15, 1927, imposed further limitations on Ukrainian culture, in particular literature, as an independent entity by treating it as a "weapon of the proletariat for the ideological management of the whole Ukrainian cultural process."[4]

Before Ukrainian writers had succumbed to complete Communist domination, Party leaders continually described the political angle of Ukrainian literary works with such phrases as "bourgeois ideology," "Ukrainian blue-and-yellow nationalism," "Ukrainian fascism" and so on.

Summarizing the literary controversy over the writings of M. Khvylyovy which took place in 1925—1928, M. Skrypnyk, then People's Commissar for Education and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, declared when closing the debate in the "V. Blakytny House of Literature" (February 18—21, 1928):

> We can and do recognize these [literary] tendencies, but when the representatives of the former Vaplite organization [a proletarian writers' group] expect us to evaluate literature only from the viewpoint of art, we do not and cannot agree with them. Our social and political approach to creative work derives from our purpose of conquering literature, which is only one of the tools in the whole process of social construction. Naturally, in exposing the path to the enemy camp we cut ourselves off from those who follow it...
>
> In his work *Valdshnepy* (The Woodcocks), Khvylyovy has clearly shown that he is moving toward, if he has not already reached, the camp of militant Ukrainian fascism.

He reproached former members of the liquidated Vaplite organization with "refusing to admit the legitimacy of evaluating works of art on the basis of artistic-political-sociological principles."

Skrypnyk went on to explain this statement by saying that "they did not want to reveal the social and political structure of the group to which they had formerly belonged."

He then demanded: "Put your cards on the table: are you for or against Khvylyovy and his *Valdshnepy*? Do you intend to copy his style, or are you on this side of the social barricades?"[5]

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 295.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

[5] M. O. Skrypnyk, *Nasha literaturna diysnist* (Our Literary Reality), Kiev, 1928, pp. 20—23.

In the years that followed there was continuous and sharp criticism in the official press of all Ukrainian literary groups, with the exception of *VUSPP* (All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers). This criticism culminated at the beginning of 1931 in the liquidation of all but the most loyal organizations admitted to *VUSPP*. However, under the pretext that their work was unsatisfactory, all literary organizations in the USSR were disbanded on April 23, 1932; they were then merged in the All-Union Association of Soviet Writers under the direct control of Moscow.

This was the "attention and solicitude" devoted by the Communist Party to Ukrainian literature. It took place during a period of comparative liberalism in Ukrainian Soviet literature and at a time when, despite everything, most works were published in the style in which their authors had written them.

In direct consequence of the trial of leaders of the *Soyuz Vyzvolennya Ukrainy* (Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine), the arrest of literary figures began in 1929. In the spring of 1933 a five-year period of arrests, deportations and executions of Ukrainian writers commenced, notwithstanding the fact that from the very beginning of the regime it was only possible to publish books which had been censored by the authorities.

Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury appeared in the postwar period when the Kremlin was putting an end to the somewhat more liberal censorship permitted during the war years, owing to the necessity of encouraging patriotic feeling—at a time, that is, when the domination of the Party and the Government over literature had become absolute. Four resolutions concerning literature and the arts[6] are quoted on pages 323—324 of this work. These resolutions, passed in 1946—1948 by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, are identical with four other resolutions passed by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party; they mention four discussions on ideological questions and six directive articles which appeared in *Pravda*, but they say nothing of the enormous number of repercussions and interpretations printed in the Ukrainian Soviet press.

The position was complicated by the resolution passed on August 8, 1946 by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, which dealt with the publication of *Narysy istorii ukrainskoi literatury* (An Outline History of Ukrainian Literature) by the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. The authors of *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* make it clear that:

> *Narysy istorii ukrainskoi literatury* ignores the class struggle as a fundamental law governing the development of a class society, and attributes the decisive part to the national element. The authors of *Narysy istorii ukrainskoi literatury*, adopting as their point of departure the harmful theory that the Ukrainian nation was classless and did not possess a bourgeoisie, looked upon literature solely as a vehicle for nationalism and failed to emphasize the struggle between its reactionary and progressive tendencies. The enormous and beneficial influence exercised by Russian literature over that of the Ukraine was

[6] See V. Skobelkin, *Rol partii v razvitii sovetskoi khudozhestvennoi literatury v poslevoenny period 1945—1952* (The Role of the Party in the Development of Soviet Literature in the Postwar Period, 1945—1952), Erevan, 1955.

belittled or altogether ignored. The development of Ukrainian Soviet literature was studied without reference to socialist construction... (Pages 324—325).

This resolution provoked a wave of angry protests in the press against Ukrainian scholars, writers and critics who, say the authors of *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury,* "propagated bourgeois nationalist views, distorted the history of Ukrainian literature, preached narrow-minded nationalism, and idealized the relics of the past..." (Page 325).

This was immediately followed by a campaign against "rootless cosmopolitanism" and "servitude to the West"; a number of critics were persecuted for "aesthetic and formalistic views" or for criticism of "Soviet literary works of a strong political character under the pretext that they were artistically imperfect" (Page 326). Subsequent criticism of Sosyura's work *Lyubit Ukrainu* (Love the Ukraine) and Korniychuk's libretto *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* (1951), together with numerous articles in the Ukrainian Soviet press on the "unsatisfactory work" of the Institute of Literature of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, finally determined the character of the work under discussion.

Even the form of the book differs from normal publications of a similar type and size. The titles of works quoted and the names of their authors are not consistent, some names being transcribed in the Russian spelling such as Oleinik, Belous, Korneichuk.

The work contains 448 pages; it lists a large number of quite insignificant works and devotes far too much space to facts which have little or nothing to do with literature. Moreover, it does not give a comprehensive picture of the activities of literary organizations in the twenties and thirties or of their composition. It does not contain a bibliography; in the concluding chapter only "selected works" of recent years are mentioned, so that a young reader in the USSR who is not acquainted with Ukrainian Soviet literature would be left with the impression that before the war very few books appeared at all.

Instead of division into sections according to the subject or type of work, "the book is divided into periods according to the historical development of our country in Soviet times" (Page 28).

It is clear that such a division is unscientific, giving as it does one pattern for the various literary phenomena in the USSR. Despite the fact that conditions and literary phenomena generally were entirely different in the Ukraine from those in Russia, the authors, although they are unable to deny this, nevertheless assert that "the stages of development of Soviet Ukrainian literature coincide with those of Soviet Russian literature" (Page 28).

Since the authors must be careful to remain within the limits laid down by the resolution of 1946 passed by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, every chapter is constructed in a particular way. First comes the "Stalinist" description of the period on an all-Union scale; then follows a description of the achievements of Soviet Russian literature with the names of authors and their works, which are carefully selected and sifted; finally there is a passage on Soviet Ukrainian literature, which is presented as a provincial branch of Russian literature. The "beneficial" effect exercised on the development of Ukrainian literature by the October Revolution, Lenin and Stalin and the influence of such immediately prerevolutionary Russian writers as Gorky and Mayakovsky are continually stressed. (See particularly pages 136—137, 171, 366 and 372.)

The literary peculiarities of each period are mainly glossed over. Similarly, there is no analysis of the individual qualities of different writers, the most important question being whether or not the subject answers Party requirements. For instance:

> The ideal which the poets are trying to achieve is an artistic mode of expression that is politically well-armed, permeated with genuine emotion and capable of conveying the Soviet man's entire world of feeling and thought (Page 198).

Or again:

> To trace the formation and consolidation of the socialist conscience of the man of our time, to demonstrate the links that bind him with the life of the country, to identify the essentials of social phenomena — this complicated task requires for its realization a logical development of action, shapely composition and a significant theme, which express the actual interconnections of reality itself and the growth of the individual in a socialist community (Page 248).

The *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi literatury* provides an interesting example of the official Kremlin interpretation of literary developments in the Ukrainian SSR during the last thirty-five years. By a judicious selection of writers and quotations from their works, an attempt is made to prove the influence of Russian culture and the total dependence of Ukrainian writers upon it. This influence is assumed to be axiomatic — something which permeates all ideological work in the USSR.

Disregarding the panegyrics on the theses concerning the 300th Anniversary of the Ukrainian-Russian Reunion and the tirades against certain eminent Ukrainian writers, who are qualified as bourgeois nationalists, it is nevertheless worth examining some of the factual distortions which appear in this book.

Writers belonging to various periods and representing entirely different schools of thought such as P. Kulish, B. Hrinchenko, S. Yefremov, M. Hrushevsky, V. Vynnychenko, M. Khvylyovy and S. Semenko are treated indiscriminately, and the text is so adjusted as to make it appear that all these eminent Ukrainians were advocates of backwardness and obscurantism. At the Ukrainian Party Congress held in 1940, Korniychuk quite unjustly leveled this accusation against colleagues of his who had preserved the originality and independence of the Ukrainian nation. In the book under review and similar works published in the last decade, many original modernist writers such as Kotsyubynsky, Lesya Ukrainka and Stefanyk, who differ very greatly from the previous generation of realists, are presented as champions of "critical realism," which they have apparently learned from the Russian realists; their connections with Western European literature, impressionism and symbolism are ignored and, contrary to fact, they are described as the "followers" of Maxim Gorky.

It is stated that "the cosmopolitan parrots preached a theory that the best Ukrainian revolutionary-democratic writers, such as Shevchenko, Franko and Kotsyubynsky, were tragically isolated Gullivers among the mass of reactionary writers" (Page 23).

However, it is not the "cosmopolitan parrots" but the official Soviet interpreters of literature who have for so long depicted the environment of these writers in the most gloomy colors and endeavored to isolate them from their contemporaries by creating a vacuum around their works. This method

is also applied here, when the authors discuss the prewar period, mentioning that A. Teslenko, M. Kotsyubynsky, Lesya Ukrainka, Ivan Franko and L. Martovych had died and that V. Stefanyk, M. Cheremshyna and O. Kobylanska were abroad and therefore far from the influence of the principal literary movement. They conclude: "By the October Revolution, Ukrainian democratic literature had been considerably weakened" (Page 29).

As concerns the deaths of Ivan Franko, Lesya Ukrainka and M. Kotsyubynsky, this is correct; however, apart from the young P. Tychyna and S. Vasylchenko, before the October Revolution there were such considerable literary figures in the Ukraine as V. Vynnychenko, O. Oles, M. Vorony, H. Chuprynka, L. Starytska-Chernyakhivska, H. Khotkevych, A. Khrymsky, M. Chernyavsky, S. Cherkasenko, M. Filyansky and V. Samiylenko. As the works of these writers were confiscated many years ago, the Soviet reader does indeed face a "vacuum" — one which cannot be filled with negative criticism, lack of analysis and a complete absence of the titles of their works.

Nothing is said about the revival of Ukrainian cultural life in 1917—1918; with the exception of *Muzahet,* no mention is made of such publications as *Literaturno-naukovy visnyk* (Literary and Scientific Review), *Shlyakh* (The Way), *Knyhar* (The Bookseller) or *Mystetstvo* (The Arts). The names of the "bourgeois nationalist writers" Vynnychenko, Oles, Cherkasenko and Chuprynka are given without their initials. In describing the advent of the Symbolists — a very characteristic phenomenon of 1918—1919 — the authors refer to them as "decadent bourgeois nationalist writers" who "mourned the destruction of the bourgeois landowners' regime with funeral orations" and whose activities "reflected the ideology of the Ukrainian nationalistic bourgeoisie." The only names mentioned are those of Tychyna and Tereshchenko, and it is not said whether they belonged to this group or not.

If the *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* is to be believed, the cultural revival in the Ukraine during the revolution was brought about by Lenin's decree in 1918 on the type of monuments to be erected to the memories of Shevchenko and Skovoroda and by a decree of the "Government of the Soviet Ukraine" which declared Shevchenko's birthday a national holiday, plus a few exhibitions and the publication of the works of one or two Ukrainian writers in 1919—1920 (Page 36).

The question of when Ukrainian literature became Soviet Ukrainian literature was the subject of considerable dispute at the time when discussions were allowed. Doroshkevych and Shamray mention the first magazines of 1918—1919. V. Koryak, a Party protege, proclaimed the first courageous "Borotbists" as the "fathers of Soviet Ukrainian literature," who advocated "proletarian literature" and whose leader, V. Blakytny, after the organization had joined the Ukrainian Communist Party, played an important part in literary matters. In the thirties, when Blakytny's followers were liquidated, this theory was held to be nationalistic and was forbidden.

On page 56 of the work under review it is maintained that Blakytny, Mykhailychenko and the Borotbist group exerted a harmful influence on Ukrainian literature and that any attempt to credit them with the founding of Soviet literature in the Ukraine is diversionary and entirely in the interests of a "nationalistic counterrevolution." But the authors claim to have discovered the real foundation of Soviet Ukrainian literature in the "artistic creation of the popular masses" (Page 38)—the semi-illiterate verses written, almost always, in Russian and published in army magazines such as *Soldat*

revolyutsii (Soldier of the Revolution), *Krasnaya zvezda* (The Red Star), *V ruzhie* (To Arms!), *Donetsky proletarii* (The Donets Proletarian) and *Chervona Pravda* (Red Truth).

Another source from which Ukrainian Soviet literature is derived is, apparently, to be found in the propaganda verses entitled *Okna Rosta* (The Windows of Rosta) [*Rosta* = *Rossiiskoe telegrafnoe agentstvo* (Russian Telegraph Agency)], by V. Mayakovsky, which were written in Russian and placarded on walls, and Demyan Bedny's doggerel directed against the *Tsentralna rada* (Central Council), which were published in ungrammatical Ukrainian (Page 48).

Eight pages of the book are devoted to the outpourings of Red Army men, while the epoch-making collection of poems by Tychyna, *Sonyashni klarnety* (Trumpets of the Sun), is dealt with in two paragraphs. The authors remark that "the theme of these verses is often very far removed from acute socialist questions." However, "the cheerful and optimistic attitude and clear humanity of the work lend it interest and originality; it is opposed to the mysticism and decadence of the troubadours of the Ukrainian nationalistic bourgeoisie . . ., but the outlook and work of Tychyna at that period contained much that is contradictory" (Page 48).

In his book *Zamist sonetiv i oktav* (In Place of Sonnets and Octaves), Tychyna is said to preach "the denial of the revolutionary struggle," and certain of his poems reflect the influence of nationalist ideology.

Trostyanetsky, the author of this chapter, did not think it worth while mentioning Tychyna's *Zoloty homin* (The Golden Murmur) or the cycle of poems *Enharmoniyne*. A little more attention is devoted to the collection *Pluh* (The Plow), but here again Trostyanetsky discovers the "traces of an idealistic outlook." He attempts no more than a primitive analysis of the themes; he is, however, obliged to recognize the "concrete pictures" it contains, which are presented with "realistic simplicity and conviction" (Page 49). Tychyna's *Psalm zalizu* (The Iron Psalm) is, it seems, one of the first works to "show the leading part taken by the working class and the Communist Party in the socialist revolution" (Page 50). Tychyna's fresh, new poetry, with its delicacy and intricacy of structure, is described as follows:

> Tychyna's verses, permeated as they are with Ukrainian folklore, are deeply realistic. They are very close to the simple, clear and easily comprehended language of traditional folksong (Page 50).

It is fairly obvious that Trostyanetsky's review of Tychyna's early works was written under heavy Party pressure.

The themes of Sosyura's lyric poems enable Trostyanetsky to accept him as a poet of the Revolution, but he is quite at a loss what to say of their style. He does, however, admit the influence of "various modernistic schools" (Page 53), and explains that it is precisely this that accounts for Sosyura's style. He accentuates Sosyura's connection with the "democratic traditions of Russian and Ukrainian poetry" (Lermontov, Nekrasov and Lesya Ukrainka) (Page 53), as though coupling in this way writers so far removed from one another and from Sosyura could clarify the matter. Among other writers of this period S. Vasylchenko, M. Tereshchenko, M. Rylsky and A. Holovko are mentioned.

For practical reasons it is possible to treat the period 1921—1929 under the same heading as that of Chapter III. This was the period when the Soviet regime, after it had become established in the Ukraine, realized that it was impossible to rely on military force alone, and that it was necessary to allow a certain amount of private initiative and to give the peasantry temporary possession of the land. The simultaneous necessity for what was known as Ukrainization facilitated the tremendous increase that took place in Ukrainian cultural life. In 1929 the attack on the peasantry resulted in the tragic extermination of the kulaks, in collectivization and famine: the concurrent attack on the intelligentsia liquidated the last manifestations of free cultural work in schools, literature and the arts. With the early thirties the free search for ideas in the literature of the Soviet Ukraine came to an end.

Chapter III, written by L. Novychenko, is a review of poetry, prose and drama. Though the introduction is mainly devoted to a eulogy of the resolution passed by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in 1925, much information is given on the number of blast furnaces in the country and the percentage of coal mined in a given year, as well as a list of Soviet Russian literary works and a brief mention of Maxim Gorky's "solicitude" for Ukrainian literature and the "festival of Ukrainian literature" which took place in Moscow in 1929, but it has very little to say on the development of Ukrainian Soviet literature.

Novychenko was faced with a very difficult task; on the one hand it was necessary for him to mention the activities of the various Ukrainian literary organizations because of the official view that these bodies reflected many ideologico-political movements which had in fact been referred to by Stalin as anti-Soviet: but on the other, it has been the practice in the Soviet Union up till the present to forbid any mention of "enemies of the people" or of anyone who might be suspected of holding even slightly anti-Soviet views. Hence Novychenko's rather curious description of Ukrainian literary organizations: he divides them into two categories, those which contained certain positive elements and those which were openly hostile.

The first group is described at the beginning of the chapter, albeit VUSPP was created after *Vaplite* and with the very purpose of fighting them, and also quite regardless of the fact that the futurists appeared much earlier than VUSPP and *Molodnyak* and that the neo-classicists—an unofficial group — were the earliest of all. The dates when various organizations were founded are incorrect: *Pluh* (Plough) was established in 1922 and not 1923, and *Hart* (Hardening) not in 1924 but at the beginning of 1923. These mistakes imply a curious lack of information, which leads one to suppose that even the authors of this book were not allowed to take advantage of the "special" (i.e., Party-controlled) departments of the libraries.

The method of describing the composition of literary groups is no less curious. Very little information is given about *Molodnyak,* and the only names of its members to be mentioned are those of Korniychuk, Usenko, Pervomaysky and Donchenko. Of the "hostile" groups the neo-classicists, on the whole, come off best; only Zerov and Dray-Khmara are mentioned as belonging to this organization. For a reference book of 448 pages published by two State academic institutions, this is hardly sufficient. The author's and editors' timidity in naming liquidated members of these groups because they were "enemies of the people," and others who are alive and active because they

must not compromise them by revealing their former affiliations, leads to a comic effect. A footnote about *Hart* gives no names at all, likewise a paragraph devoted to VUSPP. In the latter case this is possible because its leaders, I. Kulyk, I. Mykytenko, I. Kyrylenko, V. Koryak and S. Shchupak, were liquidated in 1937—1938. However, a reference book intended for use in higher schools which says on page 67 that "many talented writers and faithful Soviet patriots were to be found within the ranks of VUSPP" (and a similar remark on page 132) should list at least a few names such as I. Le, L. Pervomaysky, Korniychuk, N. Zabila, M. Sheremet and I. Honcharenko. The membership of *Vaplite* and *Nova Generatsiya* (New Generation) (with the exception of Khvylyovy and Semenko respectively), *Lanka* (later known as *Mars* [*Mars* = *Maysternya Revolyutsiynoho Slova* (Workshop of Revolutionary Writing]), *Avangard, Tekhno-Mystetska Hrupa A* (Technical-Artistic Group A) and *Pluh* is not given. From what follows, the reader may himself conclude to which groupings the various writers belong.

The reader does not find in this lengthy chapter any concrete information as to the artistic structure of these organizations or those who were responsible for their formation, nor is there any reference to the journals in which they published. The manner in which they are described makes it impossible to discover the true attitude of any of them.

The activities of *Literaturny yarmarok* (The Literary Fair), one of the groups led by Khvylyovy, provokes Novychenko to make this accusation:

> Khvylyovy's bourgeois nationalistic group pursued a most bitter and stubborn struggle against the new socialist culture of the Ukrainian nation. In literature it propagated the counterrevolutionary ideas of the nationalist-deviationists Shumsky and Skrypnyk. Of all the enemies of Soviet Ukrainian literature these were the most cunning and ferocious (Page 70).

Since the author is only permitted to refer to such matters in established clichés, he is compelled to make statements which find no support whatsoever in works written by members of *Vaplite* or Khvylyovy himself.

Novychenko talks about the "lack of ideas and aestheticism" and the "independence of culture from politics," but in reality Khvylyovy's followers were accused of carrying on active, hostile political propaganda, spreading fascism and endeavoring to form the minds of their readers in a way which was contrary to the Party line. It is ridiculous to say that Khvylyovy's group spread the ideas of the "nationalist-deviationist" Skrypnyk when it is only necessary to read the speeches the latter made against Khvylyovy and *Vaplite* to realize that he, as well as A. Khvylya, V. Chubar, F. Taran, Ye. Hirchak—a pupil of Skrypnyk—and Mykola Novytsky, who were all official critics from the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, did their utmost to prevent *Vaplite* spreading its influence. But it is only to be expected that today, when Skrypnyk and Mykytenko have been rehabilitated, the matter would be presented in this light. After all, Skrypnyk's differences with the Kremlin were not nearly so grave as those between the Kremlin and *Vaplite*. Reasoned criticism of the Khvylyovists and other similar groups is replaced by such "frightening" accusations as "art for art's sake," "unoriginal inheritors of bourgeois decadence," "anti-popular and anti-realistic movements," "literature of facts," "dirty tricks typical of the followers of Vynnychenko," — charges which completely obscure the facts of literary life and level out the differences between the many movements.

There is no need to deal at length with Novychenko's approach to the various groups; one quotation will suffice to exhibit his fallacious presentation of the facts:

> Since they were aware of the essential hostility of the *Vaplite* movement, eminent Ukrainian writers such as M. Bazhan, author of the collection of verses *Zdaniya* [i.e., *Budivli* (The Buildings)], and P. Panch, who wrote *Golubye eshelony* (The Blue Echelons), became increasingly ruthless in their attacks on the reactionary ideas of nationalism (Page 72).

It is, however, well known that both Bazhan and Panch were far from being "ruthless" in 1927—1929. In fact, the critics at that time constantly attacked Bazhan for his *Budivli,* because it was thought to be too strongly imbued with the traditional Ukrainian interpretation of the past; as far as Panch was concerned, the critics found in his work a great deal of sympathy for Lets-Otamanov and considered that the author did not condemn Ukrainian nationalism as he should have done in his *Holuby eshelyony.* The *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* mentions this point on page 115, and the distortion is here quoted as indicative of the fabrication which is in use today in official biographies.

The sub-chapter on the poetry of the twenties is incomplete for the same reasons as the review of the literary organizations. Though he discusses Tychyna, Bazhan, Rylsky, Sosyura, Tereshchenko, Pervomaysky and Masenko as well as the propaganda pamphleteers Usenko and Honcharenko, Novychenko avoids any reference to the activities of the neo-classicists M. Zerov, P. Fylypovych and M. Dray-Khmara, the representatives of the Symbolists M. Filyansky, D. Zahul, Ya. Savchenko, V. Yaroshenko, O. Slisarenko and the futurist M. Semenko, who, under pressure of circumstances, were forced to change their attitude, or those diverse and interesting, but very unequal, poets Y. Pluzhnyk, T. Osmachka, V. Svidzinsky, M. Yohansen, Y. Yanovsky, O. Vlyzko, D. Falkivsky, P. Polishchuk, K. Bureviy, M. Dolengo, V. Mysyk, H. Kosyachenko, Y. Fomyn, O. Soroka, I. Kulyk, Y. Hryhoruk and V. Ellan.

If poets of the caliber of Honcharenko and Usenko are to be included, then at least a dozen more should be mentioned. But the author of this chapter is unable even approximately to describe the diversity of style or the richness of Ukrainian poetry of that period, and because of this he does his best to narrow the subject and ease the burden of his work by applying the well-known official pattern.

According to Novychenko the fact most in favor of the poets he discusses is that they apparently learned simultaneously from Shevchenko and Franko, from the classicists of Russian poetry, from Mayakovsky, who "gave invaluable aid to Ukrainian poets" in the creation of the "picture of the Party" (page 93), and from Aseev, Bezymensky and Demyan Bedny (pages 74—75), and that their poetic inspiration came directly from the Communist Party.

The conclusions which are drawn from this hotch-potch are naturally neither deep nor penetrating. For instance Tychyna, at the period when he wrote *Viter z Ukrainy* (The Wind from Ukraine), is basically a "realist" whose "fruitful innovations" are based upon the "foundation of folklore and the tradition of classical Russian and Ukrainian verse"; his symbolism is "realistic" (page 81). The whole of Novychenko's review of poetry is treated in this way. Instead of analyzing the various styles of different authors, he jumps from theme to theme in order to present the poets who are recognized today. As always in Novychenko's articles, it is only when he discusses the

"difficulties of growth" that one can find something individual, something at all removed from the uniformity of today.

Tychyna's "image of the Ukraine... is not clearly connected with the picture of our motherland as a whole — the Soviet Union" (Page 80); he is still suffering from the "idealistic outlook which leads the poet toward false and erroneous conclusions" (Page 81). These remarks refer to the poet's *Nenavysty moyei syla* (The Power of My Hatred), *Chystyla maty kartoplyu* (Mother was Peeling Potatoes) and *Kleon i Diodot* (Cleon and Diodotus). His criticism of Tychyna does not necessarily tally with his general statements, as when he reproaches him for his "abstract images, excessive complexity of form and unjustified experiments with words" in *Fuha* (Fugue), *Yaroslavna* and other poems (Page 61).

As far as Sosyura is concerned, Novychenko repeats the usual criticisms, such as his "decadent moods," which are calculated especially for "petty-bourgeois taste," and "nationalistic errors," particularly in the poems *Mazepa* and *Taras Tryasylo,* which are said to have been written "in a spirit of cheap exoticism and pseudo-romanticism" (Page 88).

The influence of the "bourgeois-nationalistic" *Vaplite* is also found in Bazhan's works *Rizblena tin* (The Carved Shadow) and *Hofmanova nich* (Hoffman's Night), which are described as "the fruits of an enthusiasm for the false romanticism of bourgeois Western European literature" (Page 92).

M. Rylsky is described by Novychenko as being "shackled with the chains of aestheticism and indifference to politics." He is far removed from reality and affected by having belonged to "the bourgeois nationalist group of neo-classicists" (Page 94). Novychenko is particularly displeased with Rylsky's book *Synya dalechin* (The Blue Distance) and its desire to escape from reality.

Lack of objectivity completely distorts the review of Soviet prose written during the twenties. Novychenko does dot deny that there was a clear tendency to evolve from lyric to epic forms in the young writers of that time and admits the presence of a deep tradition of lyricism in prerevolutionary Ukrainian prose, but as his attitude toward lyricism is negative he sees in it something contrary to socialist realism. Thus in Holovko and Kopylenko's works (pages 100—101) he finds "an excessive leaning toward metaphor and 'lyrically' fragmentary narrative, which constitute a serious danger."

> An exaggerated enthusiasm for lyricism led to . . . sketchiness, fragmentary presentation and sometimes to the application of certain impressionist devices (Page 105).

The same condemnation as that which was leveled at impressionist lyricism (Page 116) is in store for the "formalism" of Yu. Smolych. "Active romanticism" is even more dangerous since it leads to the "vulgar distortion of reality" (Page 118). This last applies to Yuriy Yanovsky, who, according to Novychenko, "was for a long time a captive to reactionary nationalistic romanticism." His collection *Krov zemli* (The Blood of the Earth) is denounced for "lauding the elemental force of freedom-loving partisans, who completely lacked revolutionary ideals and were entirely permeated with anarchic moods" (Page 118).

Two of the most important prose works of this period, *Mayster korablya* (The Ship's Master) and *Chotyry shabli* (Four Sabers), are not analyzed but are given the following assessment: "The anti-Soviet ideas of Ukrainian bour-

geois nationalism and cosmopolitanism which were expressed in both novels led the writer to a complete abrogation of life and the principles of realism and democracy." (Page 118).

"Vulgar naturalism and decadence," "reactionary political tendencies" and "the spirit of ideological conceptions" are found in the works of I. Senchenko and O. Kopylenko. Novychenko also finds much to criticize in the works of P. Panch despite the fact that his "anti-nationalistic pronouncements" are mentioned, whilst Yu. Smolych is disparaged for reluctance to "break with the nationalistic romanticism of the past" (Page 115).

Novychenko severely condemns Khvylyovy's "counterrevolutionary novel" *Valdshnepy* (The Woodcocks), as it is "full of base lies about the Communist Party and the Soviet people," and M. Ivchenko's *Robitni syly* (The Labor Forces). Ivchenko is described as a "bourgeois nationalist, a member of an underground counterrevolutionary organization," who "preached the fascist ideology of human selection, that is the selection and education of a nationally conscious kulak youth, in order to combat the Soviet regime" (Page 117). Several of his novels are not mentioned at all.

A. Holovko fares quite well despite reservations concerning his book *Buryan* (The Weed); the same is true of Ivan Le, although Novychenko considers the revival in 1940 of his *Roman mizhhirya* (The Novel of the Valley) to have been a serious mistake and he points out that this book was rewritten under pressure of criticism in 1953.

With a little more sympathy Novychenko discusses the novels and short stories of L. Pervomaysky, who, at that time, was not an especially outstanding writer, and the much less satisfactory books on the war of 1918—1920 written by S. Sklyarenko, L. Smilyansky, A. Shyyan and P. Radchenko. These are, of course, reviewed from the Party viewpoint.

It is interesting to note how many well-known prose writers of the twenties and early thirties have been left out of this book, which only shows how very far from historical truth the *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* is in describing that period.

There is no doubt that from 1923 until his death by suicide in 1933, Khvylyovy was one of the most prominent of Ukrainian writers; nevertheless, none of his three volumes of impressionist short stories which were published between 1927 and 1930 by the State Publishing House of the Ukraine or his many pamphlets are referred to. No mention is made of the short-story writer, A. Lyubchenko, who died abroad in 1945, nor of Yu. Shpol (M. Yalovy), whose romanticism is so reminiscent of Yu. Yanovsky. Shpol, author of the novel *Zoloti lysenyata* (Golden Foxcubs), was exiled in 1933.

Besides Smolych, O. Slisarenko and H. Shkurupiy also wrote penetrating short stories. M. Yohansen, apart from his verse and studies of the short story, wrote sketches reminiscent of these writers by virtue of their "experimental" character. All these men were exiled in the thirties.

Several volumes of I. Dniprovsky's works failed to appear on account of his pronounced expressionism and his activities within the group of Khvylyovists. He is likewise passed over in silence in the *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury*. He died in 1934.

Not only are Kosynka and Ivchenko, prose-writers of the *Lanka-Mars* group, ignored, but also V. Pidmohylny, author of numerous short stories and

two novels—one of which, *Misto* (The Town), was the subject of many critical articles—and B. Antonenko-Davydovych, who also provoked discussion with his story *Smert* (Death) and collection of sketches entitled *Zemlya ukrainska* (The Ukrainian Land). No mention is made of the novels and stories of O. Dosvitny or H. Epik—except for a passing reference to *Persha vesna*—despite the fact that they attracted the attention of the so-called "proletarian critics," who spoke of the threat presented by *Vaplite*. The reader fails to find such names as V. Gzhytsky, the well-known author of *Chorne ozero* (The Black Lake), H. Brasyuk, D. Buzko, D. Borzyak, B. Teneta, D. Tas, V. Vrazhlyvy, P. Lisovy-Svashenko and many other lesser-known prose-writers of the twenties and early thirties. With the exception of Domontovych, these were all sent into exile.

Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury deals in a similar manner with drama on pages 119—123 and 163—175.

The work of the producer L. Kurbas is described as follows:

> In the Ukrainian theater there sometimes appeared openly hostile nationalist trash such as *Myna Mazaylo* and *Narodny Malakhy* by M. Kulish. These formalistic monstrosities were introduced to the stage by the bourgeois nationalist Kurbas (Page 119).

Nothing is said about the lasting success of Kulish's plays or the heated discussion which surrounds them, nor is the importance of the group of actors known as *Berezil* mentioned; but a painstaking list of works by Soviet Russian playwrights which were staged in Ukrainian theaters is given. Oddly enough, the *Patetychna Sonata* (Pathetic Sonata), which was banned in the Ukrainian SSR, was put on at two leading Russian theaters in Moscow and Leningrad.

Although the early propaganda efforts of Holovko, Mynko and Bedzyk are discussed, plays by I. Dniprovsky, Ya. Mamontov, M. Irchan and A. Lyubchenko are ignored. O. Korniychuk and I. Kocherha are given pride of place. There are references to some of L. Pervomaysky's plays although they are far removed from "socialist realism," while Korniychuk's predecessor, I. Mykytenko, one of the leaders of *VUSPP* and from 1932 of SRPU *(Soyuz radyanskykh pysmennykiv Ukrainy* [Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine]), is overlooked. Recent events indicate how little history and how much politics there is in *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury;* Mykytenko's works have lately been discovered to be completely orthodox from the Party viewpoint and a commission has been set up to prepare an edition of his prose and plays for publication.

Chapters IV and V of *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* are devoted to the prewar decade.

It has been seen that in previous chapters the authors were at pains to conceal facts about the many literary groups which existed and the conflict over literary policy and styles, and reduced their review to a series of official clichés. It would be too much to expect—it would indeed have been dangerous — for the authors of chapters IV and V to stick to the facts when discussing the literature of the prewar decade:

> During the years of collectivization and the final liquidation of the exploiting classes in the Ukraine, the bourgeois nationalists intensified their undermining activities and joined together with all the other hostile

groups and elements... A great deal of harm was inflicted in the cultural field by bourgeois nationalists led by M. Skrypnyk. The Soviet nation unmasked and destroyed its enemies (Page 129).

And further on:

Those were the times when the Ukrainian nation, led by the Party, defeated these masked traitors—the bourgeois nationalists (Page 138).

This standard formula hides a bloody purge, quite unrivalled in history, of poets, playwrights and critics which took place during the years 1930—1939. Over one hundred people who were literary figures suffered execution, deportation or disgrace. Very naturally, this blood-bath had a damaging effect upon Ukrainian literature, not only by influencing literary activity but also by the fact that the works of every author affected by it were confiscated and banned; moreover, a great many books which had been "reconstructed" under Party orders were confiscated as well.

Further pressure was brought to bear on the remaining writers by the query, "Why does Comrade X write nothing nowadays?" This pressure led to the "reconstruction" of works by Tychyna, Bazhan, Yanovsky, Smolych, Panch, Kopylenko and others who had formerly been members of *Vaplite* and had begun to write according to the formula advocated by Zhdanov and Gorky. The sharp turn in Rylsky's writings was brought about by the even more effective measure of imprisonment for a number of months.

Glossing over the delicate question of the persecution of writers and their works, the authors do not consider it necessary to conceal the rewriting of books and plays to conform with Party requirements. They mention in this connection *Roman Mizhhirya* (The Novel of the Valley), by I. Le, which was rewritten at Korniychuk's request as late as 1948, Panch's *Bily vovk* (The White Wolf) (pages 112—113) and another of his works *Pravo na smert* (The Right to Die), which was rewritten as *Obloha nochi* (The Siege of the Night). A. Holovko's *Maty* (Mother) is referred to on page 180, and it is known that he also rewrote *Buryan* (The Weed), which was, on the whole, well received. The rewriting of *Inzhenery* (Engineers), by Yu. Shovkoplyas, is mentioned on page 178. Even Korniychuk did not escape; he was compelled to rewrite his libretto for the opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*.

The intimidation of writers and their readiness to reconstruct their works went to such extremes that recently it was found necessary to issue an official directive on the subject. Not long ago S. Kryzhanivsky, in the *Literaturna hazeta* (Literary Gazette), wrote on the absurdities to which rewriting can lead.[7]

It is not impossible that quite soon the authors of the *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* will find it necessary to rewrite their own remarks on the influence of Soviet Russian literature on that of the Ukraine. The continuous repetition of such phrases as "the Ukrainian poets are learning from Mayakovsky," "Ukrainian poetry is adopting the creative experience of Mayakovsky," etc. (pages 142, 158 and 205), and "in taking advantage of the experience of Russian writers, Ukrainian prose-writers are basing their work

[7] S. Kryzhanivsky, *Zamitky na literaturoznavchi temy* (Remarks on Literary Subjects), *Literaturna Hazeta*, May 31, 1956.

on the heroic past of the nation" (page 230) etc., and the references to this or that writer who has abandoned his former "erroneous position" and devoted himself to "realistic" new subjects gives the impression that Soviet Ukrainian writers, having been prevented under pressure from indulging in any original activity or thought, are simply copying their colleagues from the RSFSR in glorifying the Stalinist era.

Chapters IV, V and VI cover the prewar and war periods. Apart from the usual introduction of praise for the Communist Party and the lists of achievements in the literature of the RSFSR, there is a summary of the works of writers who "took the path of reconstruction" and also references to younger writers such as P. Usenko, L. Pervomaysky, A. Malyshko, S. Kryzhanivsky, L. Dmyterko, S. Holovanivsky and I. Muratov. They do not differ in the slightest from ordinary newspaper reports which "reflect the achievements" of a given period. The grouping of poets and prose writers is done according to subjects — Party, social construction, the friendship of nations, production achievements or World War II themes. There is an anxiety to avoid any discussion of the peculiarities of individual writers because of the need to present Ukrainian literature from the viewpoint of "socialist realism." In fact the most interesting part of this chaotic and wearisome review is that devoted to the insufficient submission of certain writers to "socialist realism," a phrase which Soviet literary figures find so difficult to define. The difficulty is most probably caused by inconsistencies in official propaganda; consequently, for writers the spirit of "socialist realism" means writing on the lowest possible level. Lyricism becomes imbued with the sugary style of accepted XIX century poets, and in prose works the reader is not required to think because he is given a ready made "moral."

Tychyna, who "in these years finally emerges as . . . poet and propagandist of the great ideas of Communism" (page 144), is reproached for trying to "defy all criteria and laws of the poetic art" (page 146) in his collection *Chernyhiv* (Chernigov). Of Bazhan it is said that his writing is complicated and "obscure" (pages 151 and 205). Rylsky apparently uses an archaic vocabulary (page 157). Pervomaysky is chastized for "abstract pathos" (pages 161 and 172), Smolych for "formalistic tricks" (page 179) and Yanovsky for "undisguised admiration of the survivals of the past," "artificial conflicts," "quotations from folklore sources" and "a desire to escape from the truth of life" (pages 228 and 232). Contrary to fact Yanovsky is proclaimed a realist, although *Vershnyky* (The Riders) is very far from realism. Nevertheless, it is by far the best story in his collection *Shlyakh armiy* (The Path of the Army), the title story of which is, *par excellence,* a propaganda piece and was written with the express aim of getting the collection through the censorship.

The ruthless subjugation of lyric poetry to propaganda was a categorical necessity in the opinion of various writers in the *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury.* This is clearly illustrated by references to purely lyrical tendencies in certain poets of the thirties:

> In prewar poetry there was another alarming symptom which was not at that time noticed by the critics. Some poets, under the pretext of the "struggle for lyricism," sang of stars, grass, and flowers, or found delight in fishing. This "deviation" into "pure lyricism," this tendency to avoid political themes, meant dangerous escapism from the life of the country and was, perhaps, the reason for the ideological downfall

which even such eminent poets as M. Rylsky and V. Sosyura did not escape during the war years (Pages 223—224).

This "downfall" occupies a great deal of space in the last two chapters of the work under review. It is known that during World War II it was permitted, and even recommended, to express patriotic feelings. The weakening of the censorship and possibly the expectation of many people that the official line might be changed encouraged the appearance of a number of works which were quite different from the stereotyped literature permitted after 1933—1934. But the Party resolutions previously referred to and the newspaper campaign against nationalism and cosmopolitanism in 1946—1952 laid down the fundamental requirements which have since then moulded the structure of Soviet Ukrainian literature.

S. Kryzhanivsky has this to say about works published during the war:

> Not all poets properly understood the difference between Soviet patriotism and the patriotism of our ancestors; not all writers realized which traditions are acceptable to our Soviet literature, which is based upon the irremovable foundations of Marxist-Leninist teaching, and which are rejected... Some poets expressed nationalistic tendencies. They depicted the Ukraine as being outside the epoch and quite separate from the life of other Soviet republics... These poets looked on the Ukrainian national character as something solid and permanent, they delighted in antiquity and dressed their heroes—Soviet soldiers—in Cossack costumes (Page 292).

One of the most striking manifestations of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" is the poem *Lyubit Ukrainu* (Love the Ukraine) by V. Sosyura. It was written in 1944, and in 1951 became the subject of a wave of sharp criticism. "Nationalistic ideas, pessimistic motifs... and even mysticism" were found in other works by Sosyura. Recently it was officially recognized that these accusations are unjustified. M. Rylsky's poem *Mandrivka v molodist* (Wandering into Youth) "draws an abstract picture of the Ukraine which is outside historical reality"; it idealizes the past and certain "bourgeois nationalist leaders." Similar "mistakes" were found in his poem *Zhaha* (Desire). Decadent motives which "coincide with . . . European bourgeois nationalist ideas" were discovered in L. Pervomaysky; S. Holovanivsky, in addition to these crimes, was found to support Ukrainian nationalism and cosmopolitanism. A. Malyshko is guilty of national narrow-mindedness and T. Masenko (pages 292—293) of "servitude to bourgeois culture," while Yu. Smolych is accused of violating the principles of socialist realism. O. Kundzich's *Ukrainska khata* (The Ukrainian Cottage), and L. Smilyansky's *Sophia* and *Zoloti vorota* (The Golden Gates) are also considered to be nationalistic and particularly harmful. The plays of O. Kopylenko, L. Yukhvyd and Yu. Kostyuk are also condemned.

Apart from Rylsky's and Sosyura's works, the novels *Zhyva voda* (Living Water) by Yuriy Yanovsky and *Yoho pokolinnya* (His Generation) by I. Senchenko were exposed to sharp criticism in the postwar years because of their "bourgeois nationalistic errors, distortion of the image of Soviet man and idealization of the past," but the authors of *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* prefer not to deal with them.

The achievements of Soviet Ukrainian literature since the campaigns of 1946—1951 are very pale and unconvincing. Among the most important prose works are O. Honchar's novel *Praporonostsi* (The Standard-Bearers), which

has some interesting passages but is obviously written to order, and *Velyka ridnya* (The Great Family) by M. Stilmakh. V. Kozachenko's *Atestat zrilosty* (Graduation Diploma) is not worth mentioning. The latest of Yu. Yanovsky's short stories do not, except for perhaps two which are not mentioned in the *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury,* possess their former strength; his writing deteriorated after the extremely severe and dangerous criticism which he permitted himself in his *Zhyva voda* at the time of *Vaplite,* when he was accused of every literary sin.

The many postwar works which "reflected the processes of Communist construction" and which were written to the established pattern were later condemned at a writers' congress by O. Korniychuk—himself an eminent practicioner of the Party pattern in drama (Page 335). No works can be artistic when the author is in permanent danger of committing so many mortal sins, the enumeration of which occupies such a remarkable amount of space in this book.

Naturally, the same rules apply to poetry, of which it is said: "Never before have there been so many bright and independent talents in Ukrainian poetry" (Page 367). Further on, however, there are admissions that poetry is not up to standard (pages 382, 384 and 390).

To the student of the Ukrainian SSR it is interesting to see in the *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury,* published in the spring of 1954, an indication of the influence of the post-Stalin period. Matters which were previously forbidden can now be mentioned, and the falsified presentation of reality achieves its peak. It seems as if the writers, though under continual pressure from official critics, were able to criticize more and are freer to say what they wish:

> It must be admitted that writers did not help the Party to discover and to uproot those serious shortcomings in agriculture which, with Bolshevik candor and fearless truthfulness, were admitted in the resolutions of the September Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1953. Writers . . . presented the life of a kolkhoz village in rosy colors . . . (Pages 344 and 363).

When mentioning the "excellent verse . . . devoted to the Communist Party and its leaders Lenin and Stalin," the authors of *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury* speak of "numerous errors" and of the "rejection of the method of socialist realism." "Certain poets," they say, "reduced the subjects indicated by the Party to the lauding of individuals and exaggerated the role of personality in history . . . " (Page 382).

This work under review is an interesting political document of an age when the Ukraine is experiencing its greatest spiritual enslavement, but it is not a reference book and has no scholastic value. By today it must also have lost its value as a piece of propaganda, for the new changes in Kremlin policy completely frustrate the efforts of the authors and editorial board to adjust their work to Party dogma. It is sufficient to compare the book with the articles written to order in *Voprosy istorii* (Problems of History) and *Literaturna hazeta* during 1956 to see how much will have to be changed in the book, and how worthless the literature is which is produced under conditions of enslavement.

In an article by S. Kryzhanivsky, one of the authors of *Ocherk istorii ukrainskoi sovetskoi literatury,* entitled *Zamitky na literaturoznavchi temy* (Remarks on Literary Subjects) and published in Nos. 22 and 23 of *Literaturna hazeta,* the journal of the Union of Ukrainian Writers, he writes of the importance of approaching literature as the "mastery of the word," of studying the works of I. Mykytenko, M. Irchan, O. Dosvitny, V. Gzhytsky and Ya. Mamontov and of raising the curtain on the conflict which took place in the new Ukrainian literature. Although, therefore, it would appear that a new trend is emerging, that of understating the dependence of Ukrainian literature on its Russian counterpart, it should be remembered that such a trend is purely Party-controlled and can be modified, denounced or strengthened at the sole behest of the Party.

The Communist Party of the Ukraine — 1955

B. LEVYTSKY

There are two important events in the history of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in recent years which enable us to draw a fairly accurate picture of its current organizational and political conditions.

These events are two Party Congresses, namely the XVII Congress which took place on September 23—25, 1952, and the XVIII congress held on March 23—26, 1954. The leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Party disclosed at both these congresses a number of official facts about its present state.

These facts enable us to draw certain definite conclusions concerning the numerical strength of the Party, its development and also the nature and direction of its activities. In addition reference will also be made to information published in the Soviet daily press and in the official publications of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

General Information on the Communist Party of the Ukraine

Data concerning the number of members of the Communist Party of the Ukraine were published at the XVII and XVIII Congresses. These are as follows:

	XVII Congress 1952	XVIII Congress 1954
Members . .	676,190	780,615
Candidates . .	101,642	53,162
Total . .	777,832	833,777

These numbers indicate that the membership of the Party increased during 1952—53 by 55,945 members. However the number of members in 1954 also included a new Ukrainian oblast, the Crimea, with 32,000 members and candidates. Therefore the real increase in the membership of the Communist Party of the Ukraine between 1952 and 1954 is approximately 24,000 members and candidates. Considering that in 1954, at the time of the Pereyaslavl celebrations, a special recruiting drive was held throughout the Ukraine, it will be seen that this increase is rather small.

The majority of the Party's members belong to 51,267 cells. At the time of the XVII Congress of the Party there were apparently only 48,352 basic cells.

As the number of Party cells in the Crimean Oblast is not known, it is impossible to estimate precisely the total increase in the growth of the Ukrainian Party cell network during the last two years.

The distribution of the Ukrainian Communist Party's membership is shown in the following table:

Oblast	1952	1954
Kiev	100,000	94,000
Kharkov	80,000	84,000
Stalino	75,000	83,000
Dnepropetrovsk	60,000	70,000
Odessa	55,000	61,000
Western Ukraine	100,000	100,000

NOTE.—Figures in the first column are based on the number of delegates to the XIX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—1 delegate per 5,000 members. Figures in the second column are based on the number of delegates to the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine—1 delegate per 1,000 members.

This table shows that the bulk of the membership is concentrated in five oblast committees. Kiev and Kiev Oblast are the largest with 100,000 members, followed by Kharkov, Stalino, Dnepropetrovsk and Odessa. The smallest membership is in the western oblasts of the Ukraine. There, in the seven oblast Committees—Volhynia, Drogobych, Transcarpathia, Lvov, Rovno, Stanislav and Tarnopol—the total number of members is more or less the same as in the Kiev Oblast Committee alone.

Analysis of Personnel Changes in the Party

If we compare the personnel composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in 1954 with that in 1952, it can be seen that there have been no important changes in the Party's leadership. General N. M. Popov, Colonel-General K. N. Halytsky, General S. A. Kolpak, Minister of Internal Affairs T. A. Strokach and Chairman of the Committee for State Security B. F. Nikitchenko, who were then the candidates for the Central Committee, were elected members. Among the members of the Central Committee we also find Marshal V. I. Chuikov, Commander of the Kiev Military District. As far as general changes are concerned, it is apparent that the Ukrainian element in the new Central Committee has been strengthened fairly considerably. The following table shows the composition of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party:

	1952	1954
Ukrainians	61.7%	72%
Russians and others	38.3%	28%

The very significant changes made in 1952 which throw light on the present situation, took place in the Bureau, then in the Presidium, and also in the Secretariat. These changes reflect certain deeper processes which were operative in the Soviet Union as a whole as well as in the Ukrainian SSR after Stalin's death. In June 1954 L. H. Melnikov was removed from his post as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party; until then he had been

virtually dictator of the Ukraine. He is a Russian who arrived for the first time in the Ukraine from Moscow with Khrushchev in December 1947.

As early as 1948 Khrushchev made him First Secretary of the Stalino Oblast Committee, and later Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. When Khrushchev returned to Moscow in 1949, Melnikov became First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

His name is associated with the Russification policy of the Party between 1949 and 1951, and with the suppression of Ukrainian cultural life which at first involved the persecution of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists and later, in 1952, of the Jewish bourgeois nationalists also. The removal of Melnikov was explained by official condemnation of his Russification policy in the Western Ukrainian oblasts.

His removal was followed by radical structural changes in the leadership of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. His place as First Secretary of the Central Committee was taken by O. I. Kirichenko, and thus for the first time in many years the real leader of the Party was a Ukrainian.

Another important change which took place at the same time was the promotion of M. V. Podhorny. At the XVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine he was elected candidate to the Bureau of the Party's Central Committee. Little is known about him in the Ukraine. In 1952 he emerged as First Secretary of the Kharkov Oblast Committee, where he revealed himself as a close collaborator of Melnikov. He is also responsible for extensive Russification measures taken in the Kharkov Oblast. As apparently Podhorny comes from the Ukraine, we may assume that his sudden promotion to the post of Second Secretary of the Party's Central Committee was associated with the need to find a new form of equilibrium between the Ukrainian and Russian wings of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. A Ukrainian, I. D. Nazarenko, remained in the post of Third Secretary.

Further significant changes in the Party's Central Committee took place in November 1954. At that time two new secretaries of the Central Committee were nominated, namely O. I. Ivashchenko, formerly Second Secretary of the Kiev Oblast Committee, and M. D. Bubnovsky, until then First Secretary of the Vinnitsa Oblast Committee.

Corresponding changes took place simultaneously in the Presidium of the Ukrainian Communist Party. O. E. Korniychuk and M. V. Podhorny became new members. In November 1953 L. A. Korniets ceased to be a member of the Presidium and was nominated Minister of State Purchases of the USSR. From Korniychuk's statement concerning his retirement from Party and state activities, we may assume that as from the spring of 1954 he ceased to be a member of the Presidium of the Party's Central Committee. At the same time Marshals I. S. Konev and V. L. Chuikov became candidates for membership to the Presidium of the Party, and Z. T. Serdyuk, who had been a candidate, was transferred to the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Moldavia.

These changes in leading Party figures must be considered as extremely important, but at the same time it must be pointed out that changes in the oblast committees of the Party which took place concurrently were really quite insignificant.

In the Kharkov Oblast Committee, Podhorny's place was taken by D. M. Titov. In the Stalino Oblast Committee, A. I. Struev was removed from the

post of First Secretary. As, in 1952, Struev was a candidate for the Bureau of the Party's Central Committee and therefore among the 13 most important members of the Party, his removal should be regarded as a most significant alteration in the administration of oblast committees in the Ukraine. Struev was replaced by I. E. Kazanets, who was until then a secretary of the Makeevka Municipal Committee in the Stalino Oblast. V. S. Markov was removed from the post of Second Secretary of the Odessa Oblast Committee and nominated First Secretary of the Chernigov Oblast Committee. A certain L. I. Naydek appeared as First Secretary in Kirovograd. With the transfer of Bubnovsky, First Secretary of the Vinnitsa Oblast Committee, to the secretariat of the Central Committee, a fundamental reorganization took place in the Vinnitsa Oblast Committee.

Information on conditions in the Crimean Oblast Committee is rather scanty. In 1951 the First Secretary of the Crimean Oblast Committee was P. Titov. After the Crimea was joined to the Ukraine, this committee was reorganized. In 1954 D. S. Polansky became the First Secretary together with four others. At the beginning of 1955 the Crimean Oblast Committee was reorganized yet again, and M. D. Surkin was nominated Third Secretary; in February 1955 he was elected a candidate to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine.

On the strength of information disclosed by Kirichenko at the XVIII Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and taking into account the reports which appeared in the Ukrainian press, we may assume that considerable changes took place among secretaries of lower Party echelons throughout the Ukraine, and that this was especially intense at the beginning of 1955 when the Party, according to instructions which were binding for the entire Communist Party of the Soviet Union, began a systematic purge of the "less talented and bureaucratized" elements from posts in the lower Party organizations. Moreover, there was a continuous movement to replace the secretaries of local Party cells by more politically developed elements, mostly graduates of Party schools. In Kirichenko's report to the XVIII Congress he stated that 867 Party functionaries were made secretaries or instructors of Party organizations in the raion committees, 411 of whom were made secretaries of the raion committees, and 456 secretaries of the kolkhoz Party organizations.

The following conclusions may be drawn from this information: in 1953 and 1954 very important changes took place in the leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party, that is in the Presidium and the Secretariat, but in the oblast committees, that is the middle strata of Party functionaries, the situation can be described as still very static. On the other hand, fundamental changes in personnel took place in the lower Party cells, starting with the raion committees. On the basis of press reports it may be assumed that these changes are still taking place, and that there is a tendency to replace the secretaries, especially in Party organizations among the kolkhozes and MTS, by elements which, in view of the present urgent economic problems, might best fill these posts.

The Ideological and Political State of the Ukrainian Communist Party

At present, the ideological political structure of the Communist Party of the Ukraine is closely connected with two vitally important facts.

A process of "de-theorization" took place last year, and all activities were concentrated on "the unshakeable determination to fulfill all practical economic tasks." Thus the compulsory ideological training of Party members was dispensed with and the voluntary principle for studying Communism was introduced. Theoretically this was to be carried out in such a way that most Party members would study Marxism-Leninism privately in their spare time. In fact, however, it seems that a decline in all ideological activities is taking place throughout the whole of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. The *Radyanska Ukraina* of April 15, 1955, writes about this:

> The realization of the voluntary principle in political education this year brought substantial changes to the system of Party education. The number of Communists who are learning in groups and political schools has considerably decreased and the number of those who are studying Marxism-Leninism privately has increased. More than half of the Communists in the Khmelnytsky Oblast are now studying Marxist-Leninist theory privately.

Basing one's conclusions on similar press reports, it seems probable that in the Ukraine more than 75% of the Party members are studying Marxism-Leninism "privately." As there is no possible means of checking on how far the individual Communist is successful in this private study, there is no positive information on the ideological training of Communists in the Soviet press. However there are apprehensive reports which indicate that the Communists have taken advantage of the new instructions on voluntary ideological study and have ceased altogether to occupy themselves with theoretical problems. The Communist Party of the Ukraine is trying to solve this problem by increasing the number of lectures and by enlarging the groups of lecturers in all oblast committees. The Soviet press makes no secret of the fact that these are only half-measures and that the ideological work of the Party has come to a standstill.

For example, *Radyanska Ukraina* of March 20 of this year, in its leader entitled "Improving the Leadership in Party Education," draws attention to an ideological decline among Party members:

> Many Party committees and basic Party organizations have not obtained appropriate leaders for the education of Communists. They have not explained to Party members and candidates that the voluntary principle does not exempt a Communist from discharging his duties in the systematic work of increasing his understanding of the principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine as established by the statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The voluntary principle means simply that Communists can choose their own ways of fulfilling these duties.

The second reason for the current ideological crisis in the Party is to be found among theoreticians of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. The theoreticians of the Ukrainian Communist Party supported the so-called "new course" of Malenkov far more consistently than their counterparts in other republics of the Soviet Union, and thought it necessary

to encourage this policy by all possible means. The journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine carried a number of articles in which Ukrainian theoreticians tried, from the Marxist point of view, to prove the necessity of revising Stalinism, especially as far as the economy was concerned.

The abandoning of the "new course" at the beginning of 1955 only aggravated the already tense ideological atmosphere in the Party, which was compelled to condemn its theoreticians for these views. In the February issue of *Komunist Ukrainy* the editorial staff was condemned in a special declaration for publishing articles by Ukrainian theoreticians. This read:

> In the first issue of *Komunist Ukrainy* for the year 1955, an article appeared by M. Herasymenko entitled "On Socialist Reproduction." The article contains the incorrect assertion that in the next few years the rate of increase in consumer goods production will surpass the rate of increase in the production of the means of production. Basing his conclusions on data which cannot be checked, the author of the article forms the conclusion that the principle of a higher rate of increase in the production of the means of production under expanding *[rasshirennoe]* socialist reproduction at the present stage of Communist construction appears in a "special form." A similar mistake was also made in an article by O. Notkin, "Production and Consumption under Socialism" (issue No. 4, 1954).
>
> The anti-scientific views expressed in these articles distort the actual situation in the development of our socialist economy, are at variance with the Marxist formula on the necessity of a higher rate of increase in the production of the means of production and are contrary to the policy of the Communist Party.

It is true that the reference in this case was to the economic field, but in previous years the same *Komunist Ukrainy* was also sharply attacked for ideological deviation from the national and cultural policy of the Party. A typical example of this is the article in *Kommunist* published in November 1952 and headed "Serious Shortcomings of the Journal *Komunist Ukrainy*." This article reveals with what great delay and unwillingness Ukrainian theoreticians were condemning articles by Ukrainian authors on literary subjects which tried to prove that the Ukrainian writers Ivan Franko and M. Kotsyubynsky were the predecessors of proletarian literature in the Ukraine. *Kommunist* wrote: "This is leading toward isolation and alienating the development of Ukrainian democratic literature from that of Russian proletarian literature, the forefather of which was Gorky." But neither the Institute of Ukrainian Literature nor the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR showed any willingness to contradict this theory. This is recalled only in order to show that even earlier, ideological issues in the Ukrainian Communist Party were a serious problem affecting the Soviet Union as a whole. It is true that now, after Stalin's death, old questions and old disputes have partly lost much of their urgency, but as regards the sphere of economic theories, deviations from the general line by Ukrainian theoreticians have increased considerably.

The Ukraine has set up a complete network of Party schools for the training of cadres. In Kiev there is the so-called Republican Three-Year Party School, attached to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Every oblast committee also has its own Three-Year Party School. In

addition there are in the Ukrainian SSR 14 permanent one-year Party courses. At the XVIII Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Kirichenko stated that these schools are attended by 4,000 state and Komsomol officials every year.

At the end of the Party school year in April 1955, the Ukrainian press published a great deal of information on the state of education in these schools. The *Radyanska Ukraina* of April 28, 1955, wrote that "the state of education in Party schools tolerates a number of shortcomings and mistakes." It also revealed that the struggle against the unwillingness of Communists to study theoretical questions is one of the greatest worries of the Party. *Radyanska Ukraina* stated:

> Communists, taking advantage of the voluntary principle, are not discharging their statutory obligations toward raising their understanding and study of Marxism-Leninism. In theory they have chosen an independent method, but they do not, in practice, study. Public opinion should be directed against such Communists. The Party organizations should carry on a decisive fight against the indifference of individual Communists toward theoretical questions.

The difficult situation which prevails in the Party schools is not only caused by this top-level ideological chaos, but also by confusion among lecturers in Party schools. The Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is trying to solve this problem by organizing seminars at regular intervals for Party lecturers. The ideological crisis, however, is reflected even in these seminars. The instructors avoid theoretical questions and confine themselves to historical or present-day economic themes.

At the start of the new school year in Party schools, the Central Committees of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the All-Union Communist Party are to take decisive steps to improve ideological and theoretical levels of education. New educational programs on Marxism-Leninism are planned, as well as on the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Efforts are being made to interest the teaching staffs of Party schools in these matters.

The unwillingness of Communists to deal with theoretical questions, the deep ideological crisis among the theoreticians and Communist Party leaders are facts which cannot fail to have some influence on the present generation in the Ukraine, which is closely linked to the Communist Party. There is, incidentally, even less interest in theoretical problems among the Komsomol than among Party members.

The Communist Party of the Ukraine and Agriculture

The main efforts of the Party's Central Committee and its entire apparatus are concentrated on the agricultural sector of the Ukrainian economy. This is the result of a decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party held on February 15—17, 1955, in the presence of Khrushchev. The plenum stated the tasks which the Communist Party of the Ukraine would have to carry out in the near future in agriculture. These are basically as follows: an increase in grain production, securing by 1960 a gross output of not less than 1,880,000,000 poods, and an

immediate increase of the sowing area under corn to 5,000,000 hectares. The plenum also passed other resolutions designed to increase the production of meat, milk, eggs, wool and other goods, and also to help increase the fodder crops and the mechanization of Ukrainian agriculture. The Communist Party of the Ukraine has imposed upon all its members the task of fighting for the realization of the decisions of the above-mentioned February plenum.

Consequently a number of measures were taken in order to put village Party organizations in the vanguard of the struggle. These were: the fight to improve the backward kolkhozes and MTS, and to reorganize village Party organizations.

Judging by the official reports which appeared in the Soviet republican and central press, such measures have had, it seems, very little success.

It has been substantially shown that the Communist Party of the Ukraine and especially the municipal Party organizations do not possess trained cadres, sufficiently acquainted with agricultural problems. In certain oblasts Party organizations were only able to discharge their duties "statistically," i. e., a certain number of Party functionaries were transferred to work in kolkhozes, but in fact this transfer of man power in no way helped to improve matters in the countryside. A classic example is contained in an article by V. Titov, First Secretary of the Kharkov Oblast Committee, which appeared in *Kommunist* in March 1955. Titov gave data on the grandiose scope of the aid to be given to kolkhozes and backward agriculture in the Kharkov Oblast. He wrote:

> During the period since the September plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, over 2,300 agricultural specialists have been transfered to the MTS and kolkhozes of the oblast. From enterprises in Kharkov, 23 persons were sent to work as directors of MTS, 43 persons as chief engineers, 195 as section mechanics and workshop managers. At present all chief engineers and over 60% of MTS directors in the oblast are persons with a higher education; the majority also possess the necessary knowledge and practical experience; 192 Communists and over 3,400 Komsomol members left raion organizations for permanent work on kolkhozes. In addition, 960 specialists were sent from Kharkov to work in agriculture in a number of oblasts in the Ukraine and in neighbouring oblasts of the RSFSR.

The same article states that over 3,000 persons, including 1,495 Communists, were recently sent to work in kolkhozes or to various posts in basic Party organizations. All this gives the impression that the transfer of people from towns to work in agriculture is at present one of the biggest schemes of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In fact it is only the figures that give such an impression. Soon after Titov's article appeared, another article was printed on April 20, 1955, in the *Radyanska Ukraina* entitled "Cadres for the Countryside Should be Selected with Particular Care." In this article we read of conditions in the Kharkov Oblast Committee:

> The following fact illustrates the irresponsible attitude of Party organizations toward the selection of cadres for kolkhozes. The Kharkov Party Municipal Committee, evidently trying to avoid trouble when making its selection, hastily recommended a large group of comrades to the Party oblast committee for work in the countryside. The oblast committee's attitude was not particularly selective and in principle they

accepted the recommendations of the Kharkov Municipal Committee. The majority of those selected have not the necessary organizational abilities, nor do they posses the high qualifications needed as managers of kolkhozes. And this happens in Kharkov, which has first-class cadres!

As, in the Kharkov Oblast Committee, which possesses one of the most efficient Party machines in the Ukraine, this action has not proved successful, it may be presumed that in other oblast committees. the situation is much worse. This presumption is supported by numerous reports in the Ukrainian press which suggest that the newly arrived "helpers" have caused even greater disorder in the kolkhozes, and have not improved, but rather lowered the economic production of the country.

To save the situation, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party decided as late as April 1955 to stop the transfer of Party officials and municipal specialists to agricultural work, and at the same time instructed all oblast committees to organize immediately special courses for all those wishing to undertake such work.

The Ukrainian news agency RATAU announced on May 10, 1955, that these special courses were being organized. The communiqué stated:

> In the majority of oblast centers special courses have begun for workers selected for managerial posts on kolkhozes. A group of nearly 100 persons who expressed a wish to work on kolkhozes arrived on the first day of the courses organized by the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy. The courses started with an introductory lecture given by the First Secretary of the Kiev Party Oblast Committee, Comrade H. E. Hryshko, on the tasks facing agricultural workers in fulfilling Party and government directions for a sharp increase in agricultural production. Among those who will lecture are the Rector of the Agricultural Academy, Professor P. D. Pshenychny, Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Professor T. T. Demydenko, Professor T. A. Hirko and others.
>
> During the course students will visit the Terezino Research Station for Livestock Raising in Kiev, where they will become acquainted with the mechanization of labor processes; they will also visit the Bila Tserkva MTS. On the Shevchenko Kolkhoz, in the Kiev-Svyatoshyno Raion, students will be taught methods of managing mixed farming. The head of this kolkhoz, Comrade Stolar, will discuss his working experiences.
>
> In the laboratories of the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy the students will learn the agrotechnical method of raising crops and techniques of obtaining hybrid corn seeds.
>
> In the research sectors, the students will be given practical instruction in the most advanced methods of raising agricultural crops.
>
> These courses have also started at the Kharkov, Odessa, Voroshilovgrad and Simferopol Agricultural Institutes. Lectures on the tasks imposed by the Party and government for the increase of production in agriculture were held by the secretaries of the oblast Party committees.

Consequently the campaign to strengthen agricultural cadres is now entering an entirely new phase. If such an action is to be successful, it will only be at some distant date, when the personnel chosen has received sufficient training. This applies not only to economic organizations, but also to Party units in kolkhozes and MTS.

Despite the failure of the above-mentioned measures, others steps have been taken in the country by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, which may be considerably changing the work of local Party organizations. These steps are aimed at "de-bureaucratizing" the lower Party apparatus, reducing to a minimum the number of meetings, and reorganizing the agendas of conferences and discussions to make them more practical and businesslike in character.

In spite of criticism in the Soviet press, these measures have doubtless been successful, and action taken to diminish red tape at lower Party levels has accomplished its purpose to a far greater extent than the attempts to diminish bureaucracy in the oblast committees and the Party's central machine.

The Communist Party of the Ukraine and the Cultural Sphere

Certain changes in the cultural policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party took place after Melnikov was removed from the Ukraine. Until then it was marked by a continuous propaganda for Russification. It is true that the Ukrainian language was tolerated in literature and education, but nevertheless the most important task of the Party's cultural policy was to support Russification in every aspect of Ukrainian life and especially in the higher centers of learning. After Melnikov's downfall there were indications that this course had somehow been frustrated.

Since then there has been a definite easing of tension in the cultural sphere. The Ukrainian press quite often publishes articles which appeal for the preservation of the purity of the Ukrainian language and urge that the announcers on the Ukrainian radio, teachers, etc. should really master the language. Knowledge of Ukrainian is also proposed as a prerequisite for admission to most universities and colleges and for certain official posts.

At the beginning of 1955, a Union-Republican Ministry of Higher Educational Centers, headed by Minister B. A. Koval, was set up in the Ukraine.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the Party's Central Committee would be able to take practical steps to make good Melnikov's so-called "distortions of national policy." The data published by V. Feliks in *Vpered* (Munich) in October 1955 indicated that after Melnikov's removal the percentage of Russified schools and higher educational establishments in the Ukraine did not decrease. The majority of colleges and universities and nearly half the technical schools in the Ukraine continue to use Russian as the language of instruction. Particularly those higher educational establishments in the Ukraine which are subordinated to the All-Union authorities in Moscow teach in Russian, and this is why, according to the data supplied by V. Feliks, over half the students in the Ukrainian SSR, i. e. approximately 296,000, study in these schools. It must be concluded that despite Melnikov's departure, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party has not been able to carry out the "de-Russification" of higher educational centers. It is also true that the network of schools which is being developed in the country districts is Ukrainized to a far greater extent than that in the town, in spite of the fact that ethnographically the Ukrainian element is predominant today in most Ukrainian towns.

A very important activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party is publishing. Compared with the Stalin period, Party policy shows certain variations in this respect. This is mainly because the circulation of books and newspapers published in Ukrainian is noticeably larger than in previous years. According to information published by Y. Lazebnyk in the *Komunist Ukrainy* in April 1955, there are at present in the Ukraine 14 republican, 7 oblast, and 3 university publishing houses. While in 1913 in the Ukraine only 400,000 books were published in Ukrainian, in 1954 the gross circulation of books published in Ukrainian was 72.5 millions. In 1955 the publishing houses of the Ukrainian SSR are to print editions of 2,432 books on various subjects with a gross circulation of 81.5 million copies.

In addition, there is an enormous network of newspaper publishing houses in the Ukraine. Apart from the central press, every oblast committee produces its own newspaper, as do most raion committees. About 75% of all newspapers in the Ukraine are published in Ukrainian. Especially noteworthy are literary and scientific journals published in Ukrainian such as *Zhovten*, *Vitchyzna* and *Dnipro*.

The Communist Party of the Ukraine and the Problem of Youth

Apart from a decline in ideological study, the situation of the Komsomol in the Ukraine appears to be a most critical problem for the Party. At the XII Congress of the Komsomol (according to *Pravda* of March 21, 1954), Shevel, then secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Komsomol, gave some general information concerning its numerical strength in the Ukraine; he referred to the "one-and-a-half-million strong Komsomol" army. However, there is no exact data on its actual numbers. The same political lethargy and general turpitude of young people has occurred in the Ukraine as throughout the Soviet Union. However, because the German occupation led to conflicts between the Party and the younger generation which experienced that occupation during World War II, their demoralization is of a special nature. It has been aggravated by lack of consistency in the policy of the Party's Central Committee toward the Komsomol. On the one hand, Moscow demanded that the Central Committee should send the largest possible number of Komsomol members to Kazakhstan, while on the other hand, the Central Committee wanted these members to be primarily at the disposal of the country so that they could help with the increase in livestock production and in the coal industry.

At the end of 1953 the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Komsomol was reorganized: two members of the Bureau of the Central Committee, L. K. Shendryk and P. Didkovsky, were expelled. In October 1953 the plenum elected the new secretariat of the Komsomol of the Ukraine. It consisted of the following: H. H. Shevel, V. I. Drozdenko, S. K. Kirilov, S. V. Tarasov, and L. K. Balyasna. *Radyanska Ukraina* of March 2, 1955, reports that at the new plenum in March 1955 new changes in the leadership of the secretariat of the Komsomol Central Committee were made. Shevel, who was transferred to Party work, was replaced by V. I. Drozdenko as First Secretary, and M. K. Kirichenko was elected Second Secretary. In both cases the changes were made in the presence of Podhorny, Second Secretary of the Central Committee of

the Ukrainian Communist Party, and the press has published sufficient information to show that these changes were connected with the unsatisfactory political and organizational state of the Ukrainian Komsomol.

In 1954 the Ukrainian Komsomol was required to send at least 25,000 of its members to work in Kazakhstan. According to information given by Shevel at the XII Congress of the All-Union Komsomol, over 11,000 young volunteers had by then left the Ukraine for Kazakhstan. At the beginning of 1955, after a much-publicized meeting of the Komsomol in Moscow, a campaign was started in the Ukraine to induce Komsomol members to go to Kazakhstan. This campaign produced very meager results, and the number of members who volunteered was so small that the press did not even mention it at all.

The campaign of January 1955 was also the last of its kind in the Ukraine. In the ensuing months the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party encouraged the Komsomol to send its members to work in the country areas, mainly on livestock-raising farms. If the Soviet press is to be believed, this action produced substantial results in many oblasts, and the number of Komsomol members employed on such farms and on backward kolkhozes is said to be large. Starting in May 1955, the Party's Central Committee began a new campaign, that of transferring Komsomol members to the Donbas. As far as is known from the Soviet press, the coal mining industry of the Ukraine has not fulfilled its production program for a number of years. Presumably because of the Donbas' urgent needs, all previous campaigns, especially the one to Kazakhstan, will be forgotten.

General Characteristics of the Ukrainian Communist Party

The Communist Party of the Ukraine, compared with Communist Parties in other republics of the Soviet Union, is very closely linked with its bureaucratic apparatus. When, in 1953, there were obvious misunderstandings in the Soviet Union between Party and state administration, the situation in the Ukraine was entirely different. Between the Party and state apparatus in the Ukraine there exists a very close cooperation. This is explained first by changes in the policy of the Party's Central Committee, which after Stalin's death and Melnikov's downfall took increasing account of Ukrainian republican interests.

Already at the XVIII Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, the centralized Union Ministries were sharply attacked and the creation of Union-Republican Ministries was demanded. Thus, for instance, S. I. Tyshchenko, Minister of the Ferrous Metal Industry of the Ukrainian SSR, demanded the reorganization of the All-Union Ministry of Transport, and I. P. Kazanets, First Secretary of the Stalino Oblast Committee, criticized the Union Ministry of the Coal Mining Industry. Others demanded the decentralization of All-Union Ministries. The leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Party, taking advantage of the situation which prevailed after Stalin's death, decided to gain as much as possible from Moscow for their republic, and in doing so they supported the tendencies of their state-bureaucratic machine. Presumably this shift of Ukrainian bureaucracy toward "republican patriotism" was the background against which a close coordination and amalgamation of the Party and state apparatus in the Ukrainian SSR took place.

It should be pointed out that this change is basically the result of the supremacy of the Ukrainian element in the administration of the Ukrainian Communist Party. However, reports published in the Ukrainian press say that after Melnikov's removal, the local Russian elements in the Ukraine also started to support decentralization as well as the further emancipation of Ukrainian bureaucracy.

A factor which is undoubtedly connected with political processes within the Ukrainian Communist Party concerns the rehabilitation of those Ukrainians who during World War II were under German occupation. During Stalin's lifetime it was openly suggested that all these people were guilty of disloyalty toward their homeland. Official Soviet organs were especially suspicious of the younger Ukrainian generation and of those who during the German occupation had some connection with the antifascist resistance and who in fact also combated Communism. At the end of 1954, a large number of Ukrainian partisans were officially rehabilitated. On December 17, 1954, *Partiinaya zhizn* published an article by P. Komarov, Deputy Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which mentions this event. Komarov stated:

> Recently the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party passed a resolution on the rehabilitation and reinstatement in the Party of a number of active participants in the partisan movement. Instead of sifting facts, the individual workers of the Vinnitsa Oblast Municipal Committee of the Party approached irresponsibly and unobjectively the question of reviewing the activities of underground organizations which had acted during the war behind enemy lines. An unhealthy atmosphere was created around certain former underground fighters and partisans; they were accused of antipatriotic behaviour during their stay in the areas temporarily occupied by the Hitlerite invaders. Investigations were carried out in an irregular and biased fashion. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine has reversed this decision and reinstated in the Party those comrades who were unjustly accused. The Party is taking steps against the workers guilty of an unobjective approach towards the question of partisan activities by Soviet patriots.

This episode in the Vinnitsa Oblast Committee should be taken only as one of many examples. For seven years the MGB and the Party apparatus persecuted those young Ukrainians who, at the time of the German occupation, behaved in an independent manner and who, although they organized themselves into underground Komsomol bodies, were not particularly willing to maintain contact with the so-called "Headquarters of Ukrainian Partisans" which was situated behind the front lines. This rehabilitation process should be considered as the beginning of a radical change in the attitude of the Party to this issue. Certain echos can also be found in Ukrainian literature. It suffices to mention Korniychuk's last drama *Wings* or Nekrasov's novel *In the Native Place.*

The conflict between the Party and the younger generation of Ukrainians is definitely an event of the greatest importance for the further development of the Party. All this is connected with a profound sociological metamorphosis in the Soviet Ukraine which began after Stalin's death. Despite purges and Russification measures, the number of Ukrainian officials in the Ukrainian SSR increases every year. It should be remembered that in 1953 a process of consolidation and simultaneously of political emancipation took place in the Ukrainian civil service, which is still having repercussions.

On the whole, the Communist Party is not popular in the Ukraine. If we remember that the population of the Ukrainian SSR is today over 42,000,000, then 833,777 Party members is very little. If we compare the number of Party members and candidates in the Ukraine with that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we shall see that the state of the Ukrainian Communist Party is most unhealthy, for there are nearly 7,000,000 Party members in the whole of the USSR. As already stated, the Party is very weak in the western oblasts. When, in June 1953, Melnikov was expelled, leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Party hoped to improve this situation.

At present, however, Party organizations in the Western Ukraine have very few members. Furthermore, Party members from the western oblasts do not play an important part in Party and state administration. The Communist Party of the Ukraine personifies primarily the bureaucratic strength of the Ukraine; its connection with the broad masses of the peasants and workers is negligible.

Two problems in the Party are bound to evoke alarm among its leaders. First, the decline of ideological activities among Party members. The causes of this phenomenon have already been pointed out. It must, however, be stressed once more that this situation will leave its mark on the present generation of Ukrainian Communists, to whom theoretical problems of Marxism-Leninism are becoming more and more alien. Second, the problem of cadres and Ukrainian youth. From the table indicating the composition of the Party shown at the beginning of this article, it will be seen that these cadres are rather limited, and that the number of leading, reliable and able officials in the Ukrainian Communist Party is very small. There are no signs which indicate that new and younger cadres are being prepared within the Party to replace the present generation, and which would be able to take over successfully its heritage. This is complicated even more by the demoralization of Ukrainian youth, by disorder in the Ukrainian Komsomol, and by a general lack of political interest among Ukrainian youth as a whole. This is why, moreover, present Party leaders, most of whom are between 35—50 years old—that is the middle generation—are trying at all costs to consolidate their ranks and to avoid highly controversial issues and mutual competition. The Communist Party of the Ukraine is not only an instrument of Ukrainian bureaucracy; it is also closely bound up at present with this middle generation. It contains no veterans, since they for the most part were shot by Stalin. It also contains few young people since they have shown a pronounced tendency since 1945 to be estranged from the Party. This process in the Ukraine has been intensified by local conflicts between the population and Communist bureaucrats.

A detailed analysis of present Party leadership in the Ukraine shows that most members of the Central Committee and nearly 75% of the secretaries of the Party oblast committees of the Ukraine. gained leading posts in the administration during World War II as organizers of Communist partisan warfare and the antifascist underground movement in the Ukraine, which was established on directives from the Central Committee of the Party. This fact is of importance if the special position of present-day cadres in the Ukrainian Communist Party is to be understood. These cadres are basically Ukrainian; this is because, on Stalin's orders, the main organizers of the underground movement behind the German lines were chosen for their knowledge of the local language in order to establish easy contact with the local population.

This element emerged loyal to Stalinism and proved itself reliable despite wartime difficulties. The process of "Ukrainization" in the Ukraine is a very specific phenomenon. It is not a result of the upheaval in the Soviet system which took place after Stalin's death, but began at the time of World War II. Obviously the events of recent years should intensify this process and possibly bind the leading cadres more closely to the interests of the republic.

The basic current task of the Party is to fulfill the economic program. Agriculture is the most vital issue here. Within the framework of this program are such grandiose schemes as the plan to increase the sowing area under corn by 5,000,000 hectares and the sowing area of sugar beet by 300,000 hectares, and to achieve a sharp boost in livestock breeding. These tasks are closely connected with Party policy throughout the USSR.

In the Ukraine, however, there are additional and arduous tasks in heavy industry, housing and transport. The endeavours of the Party to resolve these economic problems are designed to put the Communists in the front rank of the struggle to reorganize the economy and fulfill current tasks. This change is producing a new type of Communist, a man not only practical, but at the same time closely connected with local economic problems and interests.

It is, of course, difficult to foresee whether or not the Ukrainian Communist Party will manage to fulfill the planned economic tasks. This factor will decide the fate not only of the Ukrainian Communist Party, but ultimately of the whole Communist system of the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX

APPARATUS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UKRAINE
(September 1952—July 1955)

Central Committee
(elected at the XVIII Ukrainian Party Congress)

Members:

N. M. Aleksandrov
P. N. Angelina
S. N. Andrianov
M. P. Bazhan
K. V. Baranov
A. M. Baranovsky
T. H. Barylnyk
V. A. Behma
K. E. Bondar
A. I. Botvynov
N. D. Bubnovsky
N. D. Burkatska
I. T. Valihura
V. N. Valuyev
I. M. Vash
V. I. Voytovsky
A. I. Hayevoy
K. N. Halytsky
D. H. Hapiy
P. A. Hmyrya
M. V. Hnatenko
A. S. Holyk
S. H. Horshkov
S. K. Horyunov
M. S. Hrechukha
I. E. Hryshko
I. S. Hrushetsky
N. M. Huryeyev
A. I. Davydov
A. I. Denysenko
P. E. Doroshenko
V. N. Druzhynin
F. I. Dubkovetsky
A. A. Yepyshev
I. A. Ivanov
O. I. Ivashchenko
I. P. Ivonyn
I. P. Kazanets
N. T. Kalchenko
K. S. Karavayev
A. P. Kyrylenko
O. I. Kyrychenko
K. S. Kyslyakov
V. K. Klymenko
N. N. Klymchenko
I. L. Koval
S. A. Kovpak
I. K. Kozyulya

I. D. Kompanets
V. H. Komyakhov
I. S. Konyev
O. Y. Korniychuk
D. S. Korotchenko
Y. H. Kreyser
Y. N. Kryvenko
P. F. Kryvonos
F. K. Kruglyak
M. H. Kuzmenko
Y. M. Kuznets
N. M. Kylakov
L. I. Kukharenko
K. S. Lytvyn
M. K. Lazurenko
A. S. Malenkin
V. S. Markov
M. M. Marchenko
Y. S. Morozova
K. F. Moskalets
I. D. Nazarenko
D. I. Naydek
V. F. Nikitchenko
S. M. Novikov
V. P. Onyshchenko
H. P. Onyshchenko
O. V. Palladyn
D. Kh. Panasyuk
K. D. Petukhov
A. P. Poborchy
N. V. Podhorny
D. S. Polyansky
M. M. Popov
M. A. Posmitny
K. I. Pochenkov
M. A. Pashyn
M. H. Rohynets
N. M. Rozhanchuk
A. P. Rudakov
M. Kh. Savchenko
H. L. Sakhnovsky
V. K. Siminsky
I. S. Senin
M. S. Synytsya
P. Y. Synyahovsky
M. S. Slobodyanyuk
M. S. Spivak
I. I. Stafiychuk
M. M. Stakhursky
F. T. Stepchenko
T. A. Strokach
S. N. Tarasov
V. N. Titov
S. I. Tyshchenko
I. I. Turyanytsya
P. H. Tychyna
A. F. Fedorov
A. T. Chekanyuk
V. I. Chuykov
H. H. Shevel
H. I. Shevchuk
P. L. Shupyk
F. K. Shcherbak

Candidates:

D. I. Adamets
F. H. Ananchenko
R. V. Babiychuk
K. M. Balakirev
N. K. Bilohurov
P. M. Bezkrovnov
A. A. Bulhakov
H. P. Butenko
S. D. Vyshtak
S. H. Holubar
V. S. Hryhoryev
P. F. Hrytsenko
V. I. Hisyev
F. L. Dod
I. I. Dyadyk
P. M. Yelystratov
A. P. Yeremenko
I. I. Yesypenko
Y. H. Klymenko
A. H. Koval
F. T. Koval
P. S. Kozlanyuk
M. M. Konopkyn
O. S. Kremenchuhska-Muray
D. D. Lelyushenko
S. F. Malikov
I. H. Mesentsev
I. T. Nazarenko
H. S. Nezhevenko
P. F. Noshchenko
Y. I. Pantelyuk
M. M. Pidtychenko
F. I. Piznak
H. P. Pinchuk
D. P. Piznyachevsky
D. M. Prykordonny
N. Y. Prusakov
L. O. Rechmedyn
F. N. Reshetnyak
P. V. Rudnytsky
N. N. Savkov
A. I. Selyvanov
A. P. Sydorenko
V. V. Skryavin
Y. D. Soroka
V. V. Stepychev
A. A. Tytarenko
M. Y. Tkachuk
H. I. Tretyakov
S. Y. Trotsenko
K. A. Trusov
V. P. Tulchynska
H. A. Turbay
P. A. Usov
Y. N. Khokhol
B. A. Zypanovych
P. Y. Shelest
F. I. Shynkarenko
V. V. Shcherbytsky
A. F. Chernyavsky
I. I. Yavorsky
S. S. Yakymenko

Reviewing Commission

H. B. Baklanov
I. Y. Bihunets
N. H. Blyaton
N. Y. Havrylenko
I. Kh. Holovchenko
H. H. Dementyev
V. P. Ivanov
V. T. Kalachev
V. A. Koval
F. Y. Kosytsky
N. A. Kolosov
M. K. Kondratyuk
F. I. Korotkov
S. N. Kosenko
I. F. Levchenko
H. P. Lytovchenko
I. M. Lohvyn
I. K. Lutak
M. Y. Malushchenko
P. A. Mazuy
L. M. Mesyurenko
F. Y. Mokrous
A. M. Muzhytsky
S. S. Nechyporuk
Y. Y. Pashko
O. I. Perederiy
V. A. Peshkov
N. T. Podolsky
D. M. Prylyuk
M. A. Rudych
M. A. Rudenko
I. S. Savelyev
M. V. Slon (†)
V. I. Smyrnov
S. V. Sudeyko
I. H. Filonov
P. F. Khrapunov
I. S. Shchokale
A. P. Shcherbyna

Bureau-Presidium of the Central Committee

Bureau (elected by the XVII Ukrainian Party Congress, 1952)	Presidium (as elected by the XVIII Ukrainian Party Congress, 1954)	Presidium (as of May 1955)
Members:	*Members:*	*Members:*
L. H. Myelnikov	O. I. Kyrychenko	O. I. Kyrychenko
O. I. Kyrychenko	M. V. Podhorny	M. V. Podhorny
D. S. Korotchenko	D. S. Korotchenko	D. S. Korotchenko
A. A. Hrechko	O. Y. Korniychuk	M. S. Hrechukha
M. S. Hrechukha	M. S. Hrechukha	N. T. Kalchenko
N. T. Kalchenko	N. T. Kalchenko	I. S. Senin
L. R. Korniyets	L. R. Korniyets	I. D. Nazarenko
I. S. Senin	I. S. Senin	
I. D. Nazarenko	I. D. Nazarenko	*Candidates:*
Candidates:	*Candidates:*	H. Y. Hryshko
H. Y. Hryshko	H. Y. Hryshko	I. S. Konyev
Z. T. Serdyuk	Z. T. Serdyuk	V. I. Chuykov
O. I. Struyev		
M. V. Podhorny		

Secretariat of the Central Committee

1952	*1954*	*1955*
L. H. Myelnikov	O. I. Kyrychenko	O. I. Kyrychenko
O. I. Kyrychenko	M. V. Podhorny	M. V. Podhorny
I. D. Nazarenko	I. D. Nazarenko	I. D. Nazarenko
		O. I. Ivashchenko
		M. D. Bubnovsky

Branches of the Central Committee
(as of July 1, 1955)

L. V. Andriyenko	Head of Agricultural Department
O. O. Burmistrov	Head of Coal Industry Section
M. M. Kyrylenko	Head of Consumer Goods Section
Y. Y. Pashko	Head of Propaganda Agitation Division
Y. A. Lazebnyk	Deputy Head of Propaganda Agitation Division
I. S. Savelyev	Head of Machine Construction Department
M. P. Serdyukov	Head of Municipal Construction Section
S. V. Chervonenko	Head of Cultural Section
I. I. Vivdychenko	Head of Party Organs Division
V. M. Druzhynin	Central Committee Head for the Kakhovka Power Station
S. N. Tarasov	Head of the Central Committee Party Commission
M. S. Chekanyuk	Director of the Central Committee Party School
M. S. Holnyev	Editor of *Komunist Ukrainy*

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Mykola Skrypnyk: His National Policy, Conviction and Rehabilitation

PANAS FEDENKO

In 1954 a Communist author, A. Likholat, published a book entitled *Razgrom natsionalisticheskoi kontrrevolyutsii na Ukraine, 1917—22* (Defeat of the Nationalist Counterrevolution in the Ukraine, 1917—22), in which, in compliance with Stalin's orders, he gave no consideration to documents or facts in his attempt to carry out a task assigned to the historians of the Soviet Union; namely, to place the blame for the failures of the Bolsheviks in their struggle against the adversaries of their regime upon "enemies of the people," and especially upon Communists who were subsequently liquidated on Stalin's order. Likholat carried out the Party orders: many of the prominent Communists of the Ukraine who were later executed he did not even mention in his book, while others whom he could not pass over in silence he called saboteurs and traitors. For instance, he accused Commissar V. Antonov-Ovseenko, an Old Bolshevik well-known as the invader and conqueror of the Ukraine, of having aided and encouraged the insurrection headed by the Ukrainian Ataman Hryhoriiv in the summer of 1919. "We have reason to assume," wrote Likholat, "that Hryhoriiv's counterrevolutionary uprising was organized with the direct participation of the Trotskyist Antonov-Ovseenko." [1]

Likholat also made mention of Mykola Skrypnyk, an Old Bolshevik, who was Commissar of Education in the Ukraine from 1926—1933 and who committed suicide on July 6, 1933. He accused Skrypnyk of nationalist deviation.

Likholat's book was favorably reviewed by M. A. Rubach and N. I. Suprunenko in the Soviet monthly *Voprosy istorii* (Problems of History), No. 4, 1955. Later on, however, *Voprosy istorii* criticized the review for failure to place greater emphasis on the value of the book.

Since 1955 the Party directives for historians have undergone a change. Issue No. 3 of *Voprosy istorii,* 1956, carried a new review of Likholat's book under the title "Za pravdivoe osveshchenie istorii proletarskoi revolyutsii" (For a Truthful Interpretation of the History of the Proletarian Revolution). The authors of this review, I. S. Oslikovskaya and A. V. Snegov, analyzed the book according to new Party directives. It was easy for them to prove on the basis of documents that Likholat's statements regarding many Com-

[1] A. V. Likholat, *Razgrom natsionalisticheskoi kontrrevolyutsii na Ukraine, 1917—22* (Defeat of the Nationalist Counterrevolution in the Ukraine, 1917—22), Moscow, 1954, p. 339.

munists who had worked in the Ukraine and who had been liquidated by Stalin's terror machine were pure inventions. For instance, Likholat had described as follows the events in Kiev after the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic entered the city on December 14, 1918: "The Kiev Soviet of Workers' Deputies followed no clear line in its struggle against the bourgeois nationalist Directorate, because it was headed by those actual supporters of Petlyura, Bubnov and Kosyor who were later convicted as traitors and enemies of the people." [2]

Following the current Party line, the new reviewers of Likholat's book voice their "moral indignation" at the wrong thus done these Old Bolsheviks. They declared:

> A. V. Likholat called Comrades S. V. Kosyor and A. S. Bubnov accomplices of Petlyura, traitors and defeatists. On pages 152—53 he went so far as to claim that these distinguished revolutionaries and Bolsheviks had conducted a policy aimed at discontinuation of the struggle against the counterrevolutionary Directorate and that, from the very first days, they had been fighting to restore capitalist conditions in our country.

While one can sympathize with the desire of these last reviewers of Likholat's book to revise the "historical picture" which the historians of the Stalinist era had been forced to draw, it must be noted that the new order issued by the "collective dictatorship" to write the truth about the past was intended to apply only in specific cases. The review by Oslikovskaya and Snegov contains statements which are directly contrary to the facts and quite in the spirit of the previous Party directives. For instance, the review declares that "on December 14, 1918, the Petlyura troops took Kiev with the aid of the German occupying forces and the Denikin Army." It is known, however, that the German units in Kiev had opposed the Ukrainian army from the very beginning of the uprising led by the Directorate of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic against Hetman Skoropadsky, and had assisted the Hetman and the detachments supporting him. It was not until the government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had guaranteed a safe withdrawal to the German units in the Ukraine, that the Germans left Kiev together with Skoropadsky.

In compliance with the new Party directives, the authors of the review also defended Skrypnyk against the accusation of "bourgeois nationalism." For this purpose, they cited a passage from a speech made by Skrypnyk in Moscow in 1918 at the First Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, in which he said: "Even at the time of the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets was opposed to separation. And now, too, we are against separation because at present independence serves as a pretext for the counterrevolutionary struggle against the Soviet regime." The reviewers comment: "As far as we can see, there is not even a trace of nationalist deviationism in what M. O. Skrypnyk said. The chance erroneous remarks concerning the national problem which Skrypnyk made several years later, cannot be made the basis for slandering an old functionary of the Bolshevik Party and the Ukrainian government."

Since Skrypnyk's activities have been, and continue to be, interpreted from diametrically opposed points of view in the Soviet press and in Soviet

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

"scientific" literature, it is necessary to give some account of the conditions under which he carried on his activities as a member of the government of the Soviet Ukraine and also to throw light on the "deviations" which led him to commit suicide.

Mykola Skrypnyk was born in 1872 as the son of a railroad employee near Ekaterinoslav. After graduating from secondary school he enrolled at the Technological Institute in St. Petersburg where he became an active member of the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Worker's Party. As a "professional revolutionary," Skrypnyk was a Party organizer and secretary in Riga, St. Petersburg, Ekaterinoslav and other cities of the Russian Empire. He was arrested several times and deported to remote places in Siberia, from which he was able to escape. He was arrested for the last time in 1914, in St. Petersburg, and again deported. After the Revolution, he returned to what was now Petrograd. During the war he had been a determined "defeatist," and in Petrograd he became a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee which was preparing the Bolshevik coup d'état there, which took place in October 1917.

After the Bolshevik coup d'état, Skrypnyk was sent to the Ukraine to organize the Soviet regime there. In December 1917 he participated in the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Kiev, which was summoned at the instance of the Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks were defeated at this Congress because the overwhelming majority voted for the Ukrainian Central Council (Rada) which had proclaimed the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on November 20, 1917. Skrypnyk and other Bolsheviks, along with a small group of participants in the Kiev Congress of Soviets, proceeded to Kharkov where they proclaimed the establishment of a rival government of the Soviet Ukraine. It is a curious fact that there was only a Workers' and Soldiers' Section in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Ukraine, because not a single group of Ukrainian peasants was willing to support the Bolshevik government at that time.

The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Ukraine in Kharkov appointed a People's Secretariat (Government of the Soviet Ukraine) in imitation of the government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic which, until January 22, 1918, called itself the General Secretariat. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Ukraine and the People's Secretariat consisted almost entirely of persons alien and hostile to the Ukrainian national renaissance and contemptuous of the Ukrainian people and their language and other national characteristics. Still more chauvinistic with regard to the Ukrainian language were troops sent from Russia to the Ukraine under the command of Antonov-Ovseenko and Muravev. It should be noted here as an interesting detail that the members of the People's Secretariat wished to act as the de facto authority in the Ukraine from their very first moment in office. This desire led to conflicts between the People's Secretariat, Antonov-Ovseenko and others. The People's Secretariat demanded of the commander of the Russian Bolshevik units sent to the Ukraine from Russia that he undertake no action in the Ukraine without the agreement of the People's Secretariat. Yevgeniya Bosh, a member of the People's Secretariat, dismissed all the commissars appointed by Antonov-Ovseenko to serve with the Ukrainian railroads. When Lenin learned of these conflicts, he wrote to Antonov on February 15, 1918, "For heaven's sake, get on good relations with them [the People's Secretariat] and acknowledge their

sovereignty in all matters. This is an exceedingly important thing from the point of view of the state." [3]

Not only did the commanders of the Bolshevik troops sent from Moscow to conquer the Ukraine refuse to recognize the authority of the People's Secretariat, but some of the local organizations of the Russian Bolshevik Party in the Ukraine also refused to recognize it. For instance, the Bolshevik organization of the industrial regions in the Southern Ukraine established what they called the Krivoi Rog—Donets Republic and refused absolutely to recognize the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, which these Bolsheviks suspected of separatist tendencies. In his capacity as head of the People's Secretariat and Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Ukraine, Skrypnyk, himself an Old Bolshevik, enjoyed considerable authority among the Bolsheviks. Unlike the overwhelming majority of the Communists who were then active in the Ukraine, Skrypnyk knew Ukrainian and called himself a Ukrainian. He was opposed to separation of the Soviet Ukraine from Russia, but in favor of broad autonomy for the Ukraine, and he wished the authority of the People's Secretariat to be expanded over all regions inhabited by Ukrainians. As a Ukrainian, he had a more profound understanding than the other Communists of the importance of the Ukrainian national movement, which was generally considered "bourgeois-nationalist" by the rank and file of the Bolshevik Party.

After the treaty between the Central Powers and the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was signed on February 9, 1918, Skrypnyk was in favor of coming to an agreement with the government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic for the purpose of establishing a single common Revolutionary government for the Ukraine. It was, however, the group of irreconcilables led by Antonov-Ovseenko who got the upper hand at the Second Congress of the Soviets of the Ukraine, which took place in March 1918 in Ekaterinoslav, despite the fact that, for tactical reasons, this Congress adopted a resolution confirming the independence of the Soviet Ukraine.

When under pressure by Ukrainian and German troops, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Ukraine moved to Taganrog, the People's Secretariat was dissolved there in May 1918. At a conference of the Communist organizations of the Ukraine, the Communist Party of the Ukraine, which held its first congress in Moscow in July of the same year, was founded. In opposition to the Russophile group of the Bolsheviks of Ekaterinoslav, including Y. Epshtein-Yakovlev, who was later Commissar of Agriculture of the USSR and was liquidated in 1934, S. Gopner, E. Kviring, Averin and others, which suggested that the party be named Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, Skrypnyk came out in favor of the title of Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine. The Congress approved a resolution, "To fight for a revolutionary unification of the Ukraine and Russia based on centralization of the proletariat within the limits of the Russian Soviet Republic." [4]

Skrypnyk's name is mentioned for the year 1918 in materials published by Sisson as evidence that the Russian Bolshevik government was at that

[3] Antonov-Ovseenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine* (Notes on the Civil War), vol. I, p. 173.

[4] *Protokoly I sezda KP(b)U* (Minutes of the First Congress of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine), Kharkov, 1925.

time dependent upon the government of Germany. It has been taken for granted that the Sisson materials were faked; however, after recent publication of the German Minister Kühlmann's secret telegram to Kaiser Wilhelm II concerning the German government's financial aid to the Bolsheviks, the Sisson documents should be subjected to a new analysis. The document in question in which Skrypnyk is mentioned is a letter from the German Colonel, R. Bauer, to the head of the Soviet government, Lenin, dated March 30, 1918, and containing several demands. There is a note on the letter reading: "Invite Comrade Raskolkov for consultation. N. Skrypnyk." [5] If Mykola (Nikolay) Skrypnyk is the person mentioned in the Sisson documents, this is proof that the Bauer letter is a forgery because in March and later on Skrypnyk was in the Ukraine as a member of the government of the Ukraine.

In January 1919 Skrypnyk was appointed Commissar of State Control in the government of the Soviet Ukraine and in 1920 was People's Commissar for Workers and Peasants Inspection.

Skrypnyk was strongly in favor of introducing agricultural communes in the Ukraine. In 1920 in a brochure entitled *Nachalo kollektivnogo khozyaistva na Ukraine* (The Basis of Collective Economy in the Ukraine), published in Moscow, he declared: "Despite the unfavorable political circumstances, the movement for collectivization developed in the Ukraine more rapidly than it did in Russia." In the 25 provinces of Russia, he reported, only 500 communes existed in 1920, whereas in the nine provinces of the Ukraine, 497 communes and agricultural cooperative units ("artels"), which had been established within the short period of six months.[6]

As a member of the government of the Soviet Ukraine and a Chekist, Skrypnyk fought against the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and against the mass insurrections of the peasants which prevented the Bolshevik regime from consolidating its position in the Ukraine. He was thus compelled to fight against the Ukrainian people in assisting the Bolshevik Party to seize power in the Ukraine. On this matter he asserted in an article which was printed in the Kharkov Russian-language *Kommunist* in 1920: "Our tragedy is that we have to win over to our side the peasantry and the peasant proletariat, which is Ukrainian in its national composition, with the help of the working class, which is Russian by nationality or Russified, and which frequently adopts an attitude of contempt toward the slightest sign of the Ukrainian language or Ukrainian culture." [7]

As a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine and a member of the government of the Soviet Ukraine, Skrypnyk supported the right to use the Ukrainian language in official institutions, schools and the press, although in this matter he was resolutely opposed by his Party colleagues. For instance, Khrystiyan Rakovsky, who was prime minister of the Ukraine from 1919—24, regarded the revival of the Ukrainian language and culture a hopeless cause. Yet after some time as head of the government of the Soviet Ukraine, he began to demand, probably under the influence of Skrypnyk, that the rights of the

[5] E. Sisson, *The Hundred Red Days*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1931, p. 441.

[6] N. Skrypnyk, *Nachalo kollektivnogo khozyaistva na Ukraine* (The Basis of Collective Economy in the Ukraine), Moscow, 1920, p. 9.

[7] *Kommunist*, Kharkov, 1920, No. 4.

Ukraine be increased as against the centralizing tendencies of Moscow. This fact is illustrated by a request addressed by Rakovsky and Skrypnyk to Herbert Hoover's American Relief Administration (ARA) in the spring of 1922 in Kharkov, in which they asked that the representatives of the ARA sign a special agreement with the Soviet government of the Ukraine concerning the activities of ARA in the Ukraine since, as they claimed, the agreement signed with the Russian government in Moscow was not binding in the Ukraine. H. H. Fisher, in *The Famine in Soviet Russia* (1927), has described as follows the visit of the ARA representatives Hutchinson and Golder to the Ukraine in late 1921, when the famine had already caused terrible devastation in the Southern Ukraine:

> Dr. Christian Rakovsky, the gifted head of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Ukraine, could not be present at the welcome, and the government was represented by Comrade M. Skrypnyk, Commissar of Internal Affairs. Hutchinson and Golder explained to Skrypnyk that the purpose of their visit was to secure the cooperation of the Ukrainian government in the carrying out of the relief action, which ARA had already embarked on in Russia, in compliance with the specifications of several conditions agreed upon with the government of the Russian Socialist Federal Republic. To the Americans' great surprise, the Commissar declared with caustic emphasis that the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic had not participated in the setting-up of these conditions, did not know anything about them and was not obliged by them in any way. When the Americans remarked that, as far as ARA had understood, these conditions were obliging in all federated republics including the Ukraine, and that the central authority in Moscow had confirmed this by its attitude, Skrypnyk replied politely that they were not fully informed and that the Ukraine and Russia were independent countries, true, in close alliance—but as equals. When asked straightly whether the Ukraine would permit ARA to organize its work on her territory complying with the conditions established with the RSFSR, the Commissar refused to assume any responsibility prior to consulting his colleagues. Skrypnyk gave them his answer on the next day. He said that the conditions in the southern parts of the Ukraine were much worse than expected, and, therefore, the ARA would be welcome to assist if it made an agreement which would take into consideration this government's independence as well as its laws and regulations.
>
> This brought the dispute back to the point from which it had started the day before, namely to a discussion about the political status of the Ukraine.
>
> "These problems," the Americans declared, "are not our responsibility. We have come to the Ukraine not to discuss politics, but to feed the hungry."
>
> "But you do interfere with politics," the Commissar called out. "if you make a difference between two republics; if you negotiate with the other; if you consider the one as a sovereign state, and the other as a subordinated one." [8]

On this note the conversation between the ARA representatives and Skrypnyk ended. Hutchinson and Golder returned to Moscow. In late December they met Rakovsky, who had come to Moscow to attend the Congress of Soviets. It was this congress that proclaimed the creation of the Union of

[8] H. H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, New York, 1927, pp. 248—50.

Soviet Socialist Republics. Both Skrypnyk and Rakovsky were opposed to the system of centralism adopted. Hutchinson and Golder reported that Rakovsky, "having magnanimously explained the ARA representatives' ignorance of the sovereign status of the Ukraine by their being foreigners from a far country, strictly refused to ratify the Riga document [the agreement between ARA and the government of Moscow], demanding that a new treaty be set up, or else none at all. ARA agreed to a new document which included the paragraphs of the Riga document with minor addenda. In order to preserve the dignity of the given word, they used the following formula: "Taking into consideration that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic declares that it is not participating in the [Riga] agreement and is not bound by it, . . ." [9]

The agreement with ARA for extension of its relief work to the starving people of the Ukraine was signed on January 10, 1922, and contained the above formula stressing the "independence of the Ukrainian SSR." Rakovsky signed for the government of the Soviet Ukraine.

In the terrible famine then raging in the Southern Ukraine, every crumb of bread could save human lives, and it was at such a time that Skrypnyk and Rakovsky demanded of ARA that it respect the "sovereign rights" of the Soviet Ukraine.

It can well be imagined that his condition was only a maneuver on the part of the Communists, who did not want American assistance in the famine-stricken regions of the Ukraine, which constituted a particularly serious threat to the regime because of the local insurrectionist movements. Fisher described the tactics of Skrypnyk and Rakovsky as comedy.

Yet it is curious that in 1923, at the Twelfth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, in Moscow, Skrypnyk and Rakovsky declared that the Moscow central organs had seized from ten to twenty times more power over the non-Russian republics than they had had before the proclamation of the Soviet Union: "Every district executive committee knows its own rights better than do the national republics."

Skrypnyk and Rakovsky demanded that the union between the Ukraine and Russia be based on the principle of confederation. Skrypnyk complained in speeches at the Twelfth Party Congress that the Ukrainians were being denationalized in the Red Army and that the seven million Ukrainians in the RSFSR, outside the borders of the Soviet Ukraine, had neither Ukrainian schools nor a Ukrainian-language press. Skrypnyk protested that the "Communists of the Ukraine" were opposed to the use of the Ukrainian language in official institutions and in Party life.[10]

After the Twelfth Party Congress and after the adoption of the constitution of the USSR on July 6, 1923, more scope was allowed for Ukrainizing the press, the school system and the state apparatus in the Ukraine. This was a special concern of the Commissar of Education, Oleksander Shumsky, a former leftist Social-Revolutionary of the Borotbist group.

In 1926 the All-Union Communist Party accused Shumsky of deviation. And in fact Shumsky made much the same statements as Skrypnyk about the nationalism of the Russian Communists in the Ukraine. For in-

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Protokoly XII sezda VPK(b)* (Minutes of the 12th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), Moscow, 1923.

stance, he declared at a session of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Ukraine on May 12, 1926: "The Party is ruled by the Russian Communist, whose attitude toward the Ukrainian Communist is one of distrust and hostility." Shumsky was dismissed from his post as Commissar of Education in 1926, and was replaced by Skrypnyk, who was not yet suspected of "bourgeois nationalism." In his new role as Commissar of Education, Skrypnyk wished to create "a culture Ukrainian in form and Communist in content."

Skrypnyk voiced the need for Ukrainization of the state apparatus, the press and the school system. He insisted not only on the right of the Ukrainian people to develop their culture freely, but also pointed out that the Ukrainian problem was one of great significance for a Communist revolution in Central Europe. The Soviet Communist Party, it will be recalled, was supporting the Communist movements in the Western Ukraine which continued until 1939 to belong to Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, and Moscow wished to take advantage of the national discontent of the Ukrainians in this area to expand its influence in the West. Skrypnyk wrote in a foreword to a book by O. Badan, *Zakarpatska Ukraina* (The Transcarpathian Ukraine): "The resolution of the Fifth Comintern Congress concerning the nationalities problems of Central Europe and the Balkans fully demonstrated the importance of this Ukrainian problem for the entire proletarian revolution in Europe." [11]

He also demanded incessantly that Ukrainization be extended to Ukrainian areas of the RSFSR, including the Northern Caucasus, the Kursk region, the Voronezh region, the Zeleny Klin or Green Wedge area on the Amur River, and in Kazakhstan. These demands met with the stubborn resistance of the Russian bureaucracy, and it was not until August 30, 1929, that the Commissariat of Education of the RSFSR adopted a resolution that the language of instruction for compact masses of Ukrainians living within the boundaries of the RSFSR was to be the language of the Dnieper Ukraine.[12] This decision was a victory for Skrypnyk. But after the introduction of the Stalin "general line" it was no longer possible to make adequate use of the resolution.

During the NEP (New Economic Policy) period, the Communist dictatorship had "turned its face to the countryside." In order to win over the masses of the peasants, it had been thought necessary to support Ukrainization. But during the general line period, the policy of the Party was directed toward the destruction of the peasant as an independent producer. The general line with its forcible collectivization, requisitioning and deportation of peasants to the northern regions of the RSFSR led to national discontent in the Ukraine as elsewhere. In 1929, Kaganovich wrote: "The grain requisitionings have caused a growth of chauvinism which manifests itself in such a way that people are now talking about orders to export grain, sugar, etc., to Moscow. Such chauvinism originates not only in the higher strata, but also in the lower.[13]

Under these circumstances, the policy of Ukrainization and its accompaniments failed to enlist the sympathy of the non-Russian population for the

[11] Ol. Badan, *Zakarpatska Ukraina* (The Transcarpathian Ukraine), Kharkov, 1929.

[12] Z. Ostrovsky, *Problemy ukrainizatsii i belorussizatsii v RSFSR* (Problems of Ukrainization and Belorussification in the RSFSR), Moscow, 1931.

[13] L. Kaganovich, *Kommunistychna konstytutsiya Ukrainy* (The Communist Constitution of the Ukraine), Kharkov, 1929.

Communist regime. The development of the national cultures and the growth of national consciousness among the peoples of the various "national republics" tended to increase opposition to the general line. It was for this reason that Moscow adopted an attitude of distrust toward Skrypnyk, as a partisan of Ukrainization. In articles and speeches, he criticized the policy of the All-Union Communist Party concerning the nationalities problem, writing for instance: "For the majority of the members of our Party, the Ukraine as a national unit was non-existent. There was only Little Russia as a part of the one and only indivisible Russia, something indefinite, both in its relation to Russia as well as regarding its territory and even its language." [14] He also wrote regarding the nationalities policy of the Communists in the Ukraine: "Our Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine occupied for rather a long time a false position with regard to the Ukrainian national problem."

Formally, Skrypnyk followed Lenin's theory according to which the cultural and national requirements of each people must be guaranteed either in a centralized state or in national autonomous regions. But Skrypnyk went further: he argued that it was necessary to develop the national consciousness of the Ukrainian masses and attempted to prove that by means of the national culture the new values could be made accessible to the Ukrainian workers and peasants. He believed that the theoretical side of the nationalities problem had not yet been sufficiently worked out by the Communists and that it required further study and investigation. From the point of view of Leninism and its prophet, Stalin, who was already a rising star, these views were absolute heresy.

The general line called among other things for increased grain deliveries from the Ukraine. In the autumn of 1932 Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in the Ukraine with new demands for grain. In conference with them Skrypnyk declared that the Ukraine had delivered so much that it was swept clean of grain. But this reply merely increased the distrust of the Moscow delegates toward him and he was dismissed from his post as People's Commissar of Education and made head of the State Planning Commission. In January 1933 Stalin sent Pavel Postyshev to the Ukraine with the title of Second Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and with extraordinary plenipotentiary powers. His task was to carry out a general purge in the organization of the local Communist Party.

Postyshev set vigorously to work to carry out his instructions. In the first ten months of 1933, all 137 secretaries of the Party raion committees, 279 chairmen of raion executive committees, and 158 chiefs of raion control commissions were dismitted from their posts.[15] Postyshev especially persecuted the Ukrainian Communists from the Western Ukrainian regions, whom he accused of having become agents of Pilsudsky and Hitler. Skrypnyk in particular had many associates among the Western Ukrainian Communists whom the Komintern envisaged as the advance guard of the proletarian revolution in its march to the West. It had been Skrypnyk's plan to recruit teachers for the Soviet Ukraine from the Ukrainian territories which, at that time, were under Polish rule.

[14] M. Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy* (Articles and Speeches), Kharkov, 1932, vol. I, p. 291.

[15] *Izvestia*, Moscow, November 28, 1933.

[16] *Kommunist*, Kharkov, July 6, 1933.

When the purge organized by Postyshev began, many of these Western Ukrainian Communists were liquidated. Among those who perished was Dr. Oleksander Badan, who had come originally from Galicia, had lived for a time in the Transcarpathian Ukraine and had later, in the Soviet Ukraine, been close to Skrypnyk. When Badan had been ousted from the Party in 1929, Skrypnyk had fervently defended him, and had even appealed on his behalf to the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party. Although his appeal had proved useless and Moscow considered Badan a provocateur and spy, Skrypnyk appointed him, in February 1931, to the post of professor of the History of Western Europe.[16] Skrypnyk's overt as well as covert opposition to Moscow's new course evoked dissatisfaction in the Kremlin, and Postyshev gathered strength to deal with the Old Bolshevik.

The July 6, 1933, issue of *Kommunist,* the central organ of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, was dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the ratification of the constitution of the USSR. On the first page it carried the speech which Stalin had delivered at the First All-Union Congress of Soviets of the Soviet Republics on December 30, 1922, along with his picture. In this speech, Stalin had said that "it is necessary to use all the financial and economic resources of the republics for the reconstruction of the basic branches of our industry. From this follows the necessity of uniting all Soviet republics into one federal state."[17] The editorial in the same issue of *Kommunist,* entitled "The Union of Brotherhood and Unity of the Peoples," quoted Stalin's reference to "that portentous organization of the concert of peoples which is called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and which is a living prototype of the future unification of the peoples in one single world economy." The editorial also attacked "bourgeois-nationalist elements" and Skrypnyk in particular: "Local nationalism tries to weaken the unity of the peoples of the USSR in the face of universal imperialism and thus to support the latter's interventionist plans and intentions." The Ukrainian Party organizations were to blame for this trend. Because of their insufficient alertness, "the impudent enemy has penetrated into some important sectors of socialist construction (agrarian institutions, cultural and educational organizations) and there, hiding behind the backs of some Communists, engaged actively in espionage and subversive nationalist activity (the People's Commissar of Education, the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, etc.)." The article specified Skrypnyk's errors as follows: "These deviations (especially Comrade Skrypnyk's errors in his theoretical writings and speeches as well as in his practical work), which have been adopted by bourgeois-nationalist Petlyurist elements, have taught us a lesson, namely: to increase our alertness to the maximum, i.e., to expose and relentlessly crush even the slightest attempts to smuggle in any nationalist contraband."

The same number of *Kommunist* carried an article by H. Petrovsky, head of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Ukraine, and one by Vlas Chubar, head of the Council of People's Commissars. Chubar's article called attention to the "destruction of the remnants of Petlyurist espionage, kulak and sabotage organizations" and gave warning that "the remnants of hostile elements which have not yet been exposed and punished are trying to make use of alleged errors for the purpose of disseminating nationalist ideas and of strengthening their positions, i.e., the positions of the Fascist

[17] *Ibid.*

agencies of Herr Rosenberg, the same who is calling on the whole capitalist world to tear the Soviet Ukraine away from the USSR."

On its first page, *Kommunist* announced a meeting of the Party activists of Kharkov, to take place on July 7, with only one item on the agenda, "Nationalist Deviation in the Ranks of the Ukrainian Party Organization and the Task of Combating It." The speaker was to be M. M. Popov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. The obvious purpose of the meeting was to listen to Skrypnyk's "auto-criticism" and "repentance." Preparations for the meeting included a lecture delivered by an Old Bolshevik, O. Shlikhter, and discussions on the danger of "local nationalism" at the VUAMLIN (All-Ukrainian Association of Institutes of Marxism and Leninism). Shlikhter spoke on "The Present Tasks of the Cultural Front in Connection with the Resolution of the June Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine and Comrade Postyshev's Speech." The VUAMLIN meeting lasted from 6 p.m. on July 4 until 1 o'clock the next morning, and was resumed later on the same day. Volodymyr Zatonsky, Skrypnyk's successor in the People's Commissariat of Education, also participated.

Shlikhter's speech and the debate constituted an indictment of Skrypnyk. The participants reiterated Postyshev's words to the effect that "behind Comrade M. Skrypnyk's broad back have hidden not only deviators from the general line of the Party concerning problems of national culture, but also such saboteurs and spies as Badan, Erstenyuk, and others."

Skrypnyk was accused of having "taken a stand in defense of a large group of Communist and non-Communist professors whose works contained many anti-Leninist tendencies. Exerting his influence on the selection of cadres for scientific institutions, Comrade M. Skrypnyk tended to retain people with a bourgeois scientific *Weltanschauung*."

The gist of these discussions was probably known to Skrypnyk, who was head of the All-Ukrainian Society of Marxist Historians and who occupied the chair of the nationalities problem in VUAMLIN. A number of his own associates who had assisted in the editing of his paper and had worked with him in developing the theoretical side of the nationalities problem, took the floor to condemn him during the VUAMLIN debates. A certain Chebanenko and other co-workers expressed their repentance for "not having fought M. Skrypnyk's distortions; especially for not having duly rebuffed him when he had declared that nationalism existed on the other side of the border [*scil.* the Russian-Ukrainian border, since Skrypnyk regarded pan-Russian chauvinism as the chief offender]."

The participants in the discussion following Shlikhter's lecture attempted to prove Skrypnyk's "nationalist deviations," claiming among other things that his co-workers had written "openly nationalist articles and books." By way of an illustration of such nationalism, one of the participants cited the Communist Kantselyarsky's book, *Radyanska vlada i yevreyske naselennya* (The Soviet Regime and the Jewish Population) and said: "The author of this book, basing himself on M. O. Skrypnyk's conception of the nationalities problem, adopted literally the standpoint of the Zionists." [18] His VUAMLIN colleague Hurevich said of Skrypnyk that "in his works on the course of the

[18] *Ibid.*

Revolution in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and on the national liberation struggle in the Western Ukraine, he distorted Lenin's directives and constantly and surreptitiously propagated ideas of the unity of the national liberation movement and of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie and its progressive role in this struggle."

An accusation charging M. Skrypnyk with deviations on the literary front was made by the "proletarian writer" Ivan Mykytenko (who himself was later liquidated as a bourgeois nationalist). Mykytenko accused Skrypnyk of having held anti-Leninist views in theory and practice during his activity as People's Commissar of Education; he said:

> Let us recall the peak of our struggle against Khvylyovism. All comrades remember that Comrade Skrypnyk was against the units of proletarian literature, and that he always supported all kinds of bourgeois and patently reactionary writers and groups of writers such as Literaturny Yarmarok (Literary Fair), Polishchuk's Avangard (Avant-garde), etc.... Comrade Skrypnyk's favorite expression was: "There exists no litmus paper by means of which one can determine a proletarian writer."

Kuzmenko and Rubach, both authors of works on history, expressed repentance for their errors, especially for having "idealized the Tsentralna Rada and the leftist bourgeois Ukrainian parties." Later on, in 1955, Rubach wrote a favorable review of Likholat's book, condemning Skrypnyk, and was then attacked by other reviewers for lack of objectivity. V. Zatonsky, in accusing Skrypnyk of deviation from Leninism and exaggeration of the nationalities problem, quoted the following passages from Skrypnyk's writings:

> It is not true that in our country the nationalities problem is subordinated to the theory of the class struggle. Lenin considered the nationalities problem as an inseparable part of the general theory of the class struggle, and not as subordinated to the latter.... You do not understand that Lenin elaborated two disciplines: the theory of the nationalities problem and a policy on the nationalities problem, just as Lenin established a theory of the agrarian problem and an agrarian policy.

In his capacity as newly appointed People's Commissar of Education, Zatonsky blamed Skrypnyk for the large number of lessons dedicated to the nationalities problem in curricula:

> As sources for the study of this discipline were recommended a little of Lenin's works, a moderate quantity of Stalin's, and inordinately much of his, Skrypnyk's, own works, i. e., Leninism and Skrypnykism was to be taught.

Zatonsky charged Skrypnyk with "enforced Ukrainization" of the system of education and with dependence on the "bourgeois nationalists" on the "language front":

> With Comrade Skrypnyk's assistance, the saboteurs on the language front did a disgraceful job of tearing away the literary language from the living, the spoken language which is formed in the process of the class struggle and socialist construction. They invented various terms, incomprehensible to the masses and aimed at separating their terminology from the Russian and international terminology in general use.

Not only did Comrade Skrypnyk overlook these factors, but he even fostered this trend in the field of creating new terms, being solicitous about the "purity" of the Ukrainian language and delighting in archaisms and nationalist neologisms.

In this connection, Zatonsky quoted the following passage written by Skrypnyk:

> On the other hand, the introduction of international terms instead of national is still far from internationalization of the language, because these terms are by no means internationalisms, they are Europeanisms; and it does not in the least become us to be ailing from European limitations.

Zatonsky described this statement as an ideological argumentation for a nationalist distortion of Ukrainian terminology. He declared:

> The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and the Party organizations have repeatedly pointed out his errors to Comrade Skrypnyk, given him time to consider these errors and a chance to understand them and admit them, and thus to help the Party correct them. However, Comrade Skrypnyk persisted too long in his errors, and when admitting them, he tried to mitigate everything in the above-quoted manner, twisting words and getting himself entangled. And so it has actually become necessary, as Comrade Postyshev justly remarked, to help him wash himself clean of the nationalist blemish which has stuck to him, and thus to save Comrade Skrypnyk for the Party.[19]

The resolution adopted by the VUAMLIN Party cell on Shlikhter's report was published in *Kommunist* on July 10, 1933. The resolution mentioned the "leader of the Party and of the world proletariat, Comrade Stalin" and condemned "Shumskyism" as an "agency of the class enemy":

> The nationalist program of the Shumskyists, its orientation toward the bourgeois West and its aim of tearing the Ukrainian SSR away from the Soviet Union have been leading the Soviet Ukraine into actual subordination to the bourgeois world, whose agents the Shumskyists were. The remnants of defeated Shumskyism continued to conduct their counterrevolutionary work by means of hyprocrisy and treason and often under cover of the Party card, at the same time acting as spies and agents for the counterintelligence services of certain states ... The worst infiltration of sabotaging counterrevolutionary nationalist elements was on the front of cultural construction. Because of the lack of Bolshevik alertness on this front, headed by Comrade Skrypnyk, bourgeois nationalist counterrevolutionary elements launched their forces on the most important sectors of cultural construction, thus carrying out the ideas of bourgeois nationalism directed toward undermining the Soviet state and against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

These saboteurs, the resolution continued, had attempted "to separate the development of the Ukrainian language from the general socialist construction and from the language spoken by the broad masses of Ukrainian workers and peasants." Skrypnyk, it claimed, had been responsible for the activities of the "saboteurs":

[19] *Ibid.*

The extremely crude errors in the field of the nationalities problem made at different times by Comrade Skrypnyk have developed during recent years into undisguised conciliatoriness toward Ukrainian nationalist deviation within the ranks of the Party.

The resolution then analyzed Skrypnyk's errors in theory as well as in practice. This portion of the resolution may be summarized as follows:

1. Exaggeration of the significance of the nationalities problem within the framework of the proletarian Revolution; erroneous and politically harmful treatment of the "underestimation" of the nationalities problem as a "Leninism which has not been seen through to the end," and an equally erroneous and politically harmful treatment of the "overestimation" of the nationalities problem which as such, so he says, does not exist in theory. This treatment, which was an open revision of Leninism, namely of Comrade Stalin's speech at the Tenth Party Congress, averted the blow aimed at the "overestimation" of the nationalities problem in the ranks of the Party (i. e., at the deviation tending toward Ukrainian nationalism), and actually nullified the Party's struggle on two fronts with regard to the nationalities problem: Comrade Skrypnyk's defense of the nationalist thesis concerning national consciousness could not fail to lead to a strengthening of the position of Ukrainian nationalism. (Skrypnyk had emphasized in his articles the necessity of developing the national consciousness of the Ukrainian people.)

2. Minimizing the role of Lenin and Stalin in elaborating and developing the theory of the nationalities problem.

3. A wrong evaluation of the role played by the Tsentralna Rada and the Ukrainian bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist parties, thus obscuring their bourgeois nationalist nature.

4. Erroneous treatment of cultural construction in the Ukraine as a "national construction unrestricted by anything"; separation of cultural construction from the task of training conscious builders of socialist society along international lines.

5. The anti-Party and politically harmful "theory" of "national Bolshevism," which was an attempt to whitewash and conceal the bourgeois-nationalist nature of the nationalist deviations within the Party and the Ukrainian petty-bourgeois nationalist parties and had led, in particular, to an apologia of UKP-ism. (The UKP, or Ukrainian Communist Party, had emerged from the group known as the Independent Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party under the leadership of A. Richytsky, Mykhaylo Avdiyenko, Anton Drahomyretsky, and others, in 1920. In 1924, the UKP was dissolved and some of its members were admitted to the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine. Skrypnyk had had some ideological connections with members of this group. The UKP had stood for an independent Soviet Ukraine.)

6. The incorrect demand for Ukrainization of entire districts of the USSR, which the cultural requirements of the working population of these districts did not require and which were made use of by the Petlyurist elements sent there from the Ukraine to sabotage the Party policy in the field of collectivization and liquidation of kulaks as a class. (This paragraph of the resolution is interesting inasmuch as the leaders of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine, headed by Postyshev, did not regard instruction of Ukrainians in their native language as essential to "the cultural requirements of the working population," i. e., of Ukrainians living outside the administrative borders of the Soviet Ukraine.)

7. The incorrect evaluation of the part played by the working class and the Party in the revolutionary-proletarian solution of the nationalities problem in the Ukraine; the slanderous statement about the contemptuous attitude of the working class toward the Ukrainian language and culture; the erroneous "theory" of the continuous mistakes made by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine regarding the nationalities problem—despite the fact that the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine, under the immediate leadership of Lenin and Stalin, fought hard in its time against the underestimation of the nationalities problem and against deviation in favor of the great powers on the part of a number of leading Party functionaries in the Ukraine (Pyatakov, Bosh, Lebed) and within some of the Party organizations. (Skrypnyk and his adherents in the Communist Party of the Ukraine held the view that the Bolshevik Party had made continuous mistakes with regard to the Ukraine from the very beginning of the Soviet regime in Russia.)

Comrade Skrypnyk's nationalist errors are inseparably linked with other equally crude mistakes, all of which are grist for the mill of Trotskyism and right-wing opportunism. These mistakes have manifested themselves in slanderous statements on ideological dissensions in the Party in 1917, and about "old" and "new" Bolshevism. The anti-Leninist conception of the existence of a so-called national-Bolshevik current, along with anti-Party statements about an old and a new Bolshevism were, objectively, supporting Trotskyism and right-wing opportunism in their struggle against Leninism.... Comrade Skrypnyk's anti-Leninist views on the nationalities problem were reflected in the theoretical work concerning the nationalities problem conducted by scientific workers who were close to him and who, during recent years, participated in the Commission for Nationalities Problems attached to the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (headed by Comrade Skrypnyk). Following Comrade Skrypnyk, they inflated the significance of the nationalities problem, idealized and embellished the Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist movement and the Tsentralna Rada, maintained the theory of continuous errors of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine, etc., and presumed to state that Comrade Skrypnyk developed and extended Lenin's theory of the nationalities problem, that he raised Lenin's theory to a higher theoretical level, thus obscuring the role and significance of the leader of the Party, Comrade Stalin.[20]

Skrypnyk did not live to read these accusations. In any case he would not have been able to defend himself against the reproach of having deviated from Lenin's theory of the nationalities problem. Skrypnyk was close to the Marxists of the "Austrian School" (Renner, Bauer and others) in his demand that the Ukrainian workers and peasants be awakened to the national consciousness which had been lulled to sleep during the many centuries of the tsarist regime. On this issue, his views agreed with those of Lev Yurkevych, the well-known critic of the Lenin theory of the nationalities problem and a distinguished figure in the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party. Yurkevych was often referred to as a bourgeois nationalist in Lenin's polemics conducted during World War I when Yurkevych was publishing the periodical *Borotba* (The Struggle) in Switzerland.

The proletarian dictatorship failed completely to liquidate nationalism, which merely assumed other forms. Skrypnyk thought it necessary to foster

[20] *Kommunist*, Kharkov, July 10, 1933.

the national and cultural renaissance of the Ukraine which he believed had been so deeply wronged by the tsarist regime. But these views were regarded in Moscow as nationalist deviation, although Skrypnyk took his point of departure from the principles of the "proletarian revolution." These views sealed his personal fate and that of his policy.

It must be mentioned that Skrypnyk was interested in the movements of even such small peoples as the Lusatian Sorbs in Germany. In 1926, he visited this area and he mentions the Lusatian Sorbs in his foreword to Badan's book on the Transcarpathian Ukraine. For the Lusatians he saw no prospects for a successful national renaissance because of the fact that they were bilingual, speaking both Lusatian-Sorb and German. The Transcarpathian Ukraine, connected as it was with the great Ukrainian national massif, had, in Skrypnyk's opinion, prospects of a national renaissance based on a proletarian revolution.

After Skrypnyk's death, the Ukrainization of the national minorities which had only just been initiated in the Kuban area and in other districts of the RSFSR inhabited by Ukrainians came to an end.

Skrypnyk had been planning publication of a *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia* and was a member of the editorial board of this enterprise, together with A. Richytsky and Hettler. After his death, this enterprise was forgotten. Richytsky, a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Ukraine, was shot in 1934 for "forced collectivization," having been charged with "distorting" the Party line.

Kommunist wrote of Skrypnyk in 1934: "It was Skrypnyk who sowed distrust toward the Party's nationalities policy when he said in his speeches and wrote in his books that the Bolsheviks were not sincere in their pursuit of Lenin's nationalities policy, and that the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine voted for the Lenin policy without actually implementing it." [21]

Skrypnyk did not live to witness the great purges in which Stalin undertook his systematic destruction of the Old Bolsheviks. Skrypnyk's colleagues and accusers—Chubar, Zatonsky, Postyshev, and others—were either liquidated after trial or disappeared without trace. On account of his early death he was not listed among the "enemies of the people" and could be rehabilitated by Stalin's successors.

To sum up the nature of the accusations directed against Skrypnyk, the gravest, from the point of view of Stalin, who at that time was taking his first steps toward complete autocracy, was evidently that Skrypnyk wished to think independently and did not regard the theories of Lenin and Stalin as inviolable dogmas. A man with such a character had no chance to reach old age under Stalin's dictatorship.

Is it true that Skrypnyk's co-workers were agents of Hitler and Pilsudski and had Skrypnyk, as the accusation claimed, "neglected his duty to be vigilant" in this matter? The Communists from the Western Ukraine were determined adversaries of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia and dreamed of unification of the Western Ukrainian lands with the Soviet Ukraine. But at the same time, they desired the expansion of the rights of the Ukraine within the limits of the USSR. These Communists were far from being "Titoists," because the international and internal situation of the time was

[21] *Kommunist*, Kharkov, January 26, 1934.

quite different from that in Yugoslavia during World War II. In their minds, however, considerable embitterment had accumulated against the Bolshevik tendencies to centralization and against Moscow's contempt of the national dignity of the Ukrainians regardless of their Party affiliation. It was only for appearances' sake that Stalin led the campaign against "Russian great-power chauvinism," while in fact closing his eyes to its existence. For instance, after Skrypnyk's death, the school manuals were rewritten, and even the Ukrainian orthography was so reformed as to make the Ukrainian language bear more resemblance to the Russian language.

There is no doubt that the oppositional trend among Communists of Ukrainian origin was especially strengthened by the artificial famine of 1933, which destroyed millions of Ukrainians. The famine weakened the Ukrainians physically, while the purges carried out within the Communist Party of the Ukraine after Skrypnyk's death swept the Party clean of all elements capable of intellectual independence. After that, the Party was dominated by the obedient "functionary" who was prepared carry out unconditionally all orders issued by the Kremlin.

The Last Days of Academician M. Hrushevsky

H. KOSTYUK

Introduction

November 25, 1954 marked the twentieth anniversary of Academician Mykhaylo Hrushevsky's unexpected death. Not only the cause of his death but also the circumstances of the last three years of his life have not yet been really clarified. A study of the contemporary press and political events contribute in some measure to an understanding of this problem and this is what the present article will undertake. For his sources the writer has mostly had recourse to the Soviet press, statements by Party and Government leaders and memoirs of contemporaries.

January 1931—November 1934

The beginning of 1931 saw the destruction of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the arrest of Hrushevsky's former political adherents and disciples, including Prof. Mykola Shrah, author of a number of publications embodying the results of his research into legal history, especially *Derzhava i sotsiyalistychne suspilstvo* (The State and Socialist Society); Pavlo Khrystyuk, a prominent figure in the Ukrainian revolution, member of the *Tsentralna Rada* (Central Council) and the Labor Congress and author of a four-volume work on the history of the Ukrainian revolution: *Zamitky i materiyaly do istorii ukrainskoi revolyutsii 1917—1920 rr.* (Notes and Materials Concerning the History of the Ukrainian Revolution 1917—1920); M. F. Chechel, chief of the Roads and Communications Department under the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, later professor at the Kharkov Building and Technical Institute and author of *Budivelna mekhanika* (Mechanics of Building), which was published, I believe, after his arrest without mentioning its author's name; Hryhoriy Kosak, a commanding officer of the Ukrainian Galician Army, and a large number of other distinguished personalities who had come, or returned, with Hrushevsky to the Ukraine in 1924. Hrushevsky himself was not arrested then. Instead he was urged to leave the Ukraine.[1]

This was nothing new for Hrushevsky: the tsarist Government had arrested him in 1914, sent him to Kazan and put him under close police supervision. The Bolshevik Government had ordered him in 1931 to leave the

[1] O. M., *Ostanni roky zhyttya Mykhayla Hrushevskoho* (Mykhaylo Hrushevsky's Last Years), *Nashi dni* (Our Days), Lvov, 1943, No. 3.

Ukraine, submit to "voluntary" deportation to Moscow and live there under the still closer supervision of the GPU—NKVD. While he was released from his first sentence to deportation by the revolution of 1917, it was unexpected death which released him from the second one.

On March 7, 1931, having taken leave of his old colleagues and pupils,[2] Hrushevsky, accompanied by his daughter Kateryna (his wife, Mariya, stayed on in Kiev for a short time), departed for his place of deportation in Russia.[3] Upon his arrival in Moscow Hrushevsky fell ill on March 9 and took to his bed with a temperature.

Early in March 1931, he was arrested by NKVD agents. On March 12 he was in Kharkov, being questioned by Yuzhny, examining magistrate of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR. Several days later this investigation was suddenly discontinued and Hrushevsky brought back to Moscow. Here he was immediately released from detention. The police apologized for having troubled him, and advised him to return home.[4] On March 18 or 19, Miss Hrushevsky wired her mother again from Moscow that she come immediately as her father was ill again. On March 20, Mariya Silvestrivna left for Moscow. From that time on, Hrushevsky and his family lived in a single cold and damp room in Moscow.[5]

The cold which Hrushevsky had caught before he was arrested and his experiences during the preceding ten days resulted in a slight attack of pneumonia. Several weeks later the physicians announced a complete recovery and expressed surprise at the robustness of Hrushevsky's constitution, considering his advanced age. Several weeks after his recovery, Hrushevsky received a letter from the GPU, in which he was invited to call on the official in charge of his case. What passed at this meeting is not known, but subsequently Hrushevsky was obliged to appear regularly, at appointed times, for registration (and frequently also for talks at the GPU). This was an everyday affair and compulsory for all those who, for political reasons, were in so-called "voluntary exile." Hrushevsky had, therefore, to accustom himself to this new life under supervision: he had the right to move freely only between his billet and the archives. "Yet, hard though the conditions in which he lived were, both materially and morally," the author of the memoirs writes, "he never changed his daily routine: he got up at four o'clock in the morning, perhaps even earlier (his family, at any rate, when waking up, always noticed that he had already begun work); at ten o'clock he left for the archives or

[2] O. M., who was one of Hrushevsky's pupils, has described the following scene: "On March 6, Mykhaylo Serhiyovych told us that he was going to leave the next day. He took some papers and said good-bye to his pupils ... He went out—and then came back once more; once more he looked round and went ... went, never to return to these quiet rooms, which he had furnished with so much love and taste."

[3] O. M., *op. cit.*

[4] This information has been taken from a letter written by Hrushevsky's daughter and a telegram from her to her mother. Both letter and telegram were published in O. M.'s memoirs.

[5] This building belonged to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The living apartments it contained were intended for members of the Academy who were staying in Moscow to pursue their archeographical studies. It was situated in the center of Moscow, not far from the former Archives of the Ministry of Justice, now the Central Depository of Archives.

the library and came home for dinner at 5 p.m. After dinner he would work at home till late at night. It is unknown when and how long Mykhaylo Serhiyovych rested."[6]

Even under these conditions, Hrushevsky worked hard in his field of study. He took advantage of the immensely rich archives in Moscow and wrote — frequently even publishing[7] — a series of minor treatises on the history of Ukrainian literature and public opinion in the XVIII century, thus contributing to existing knowledge of the sources and foundation of the Ukrainian national renaissance in the XIX century. During his three years' exile in Moscow, Hrushevsky completed the seventh, eighth and, in part, ninth volumes of his history of Ukrainian literature (volume VI had been ready for printing when he left Kiev), and prepared his material for the further volumes of his *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy* (History of the Ukraine-Rus). (Volume X of this work had also been left in Kiev ready for the press.) He wrote, but did not complete, a biographical novel about Ivan Kotlyarevsky. All this time, at the appointed hour, he reported regularly for registration at the GPU. Some time went by before he was told that he no longer needed to report. Thereafter, at unexpected times, he would be visited at intervals by a GPU agent.

This is how Hrushevsky's days passed in Moscow. In the Ukraine people were dying of starvation and the terror under Postyshev raged. Almost all of Hrushevsky's pupils were arrested. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and Hrushevsky's department of Ukrainian history were liquidated. The historians who still enjoyed their freedom became, after repeated arrests (as, for instance, Prof. O. P. Ohloblin) completely paralyzed in their work; others were not permitted to work, and many of them suffered reprisals. Within the Communist Party, F. M. Konar (Palashchuk) and his group were shot, as also were Konyk and a group of other responsible workers of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture for the Ukraine. M. Khvylyovy shot himself (on May 13, 1933), the poet Hirnyak took poison, Havryliv, director of the Kharkov Pedagogical Institute, shot himself, and, finally, M. O. Skrypnyk, People's Commissar of Education, committed suicide on July 7, 1933. The November of 1933 brought sensational news, which intimately affected Hrushevsky. At the crucial November plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine, which legalized the newly-launched anti-Ukrainian policy and the overtly centralistic policy of the Kremlin, P. Postyshev[8] and S. Kosior[9] officially announced in their reports that the "Ukrainian National Center," which was exposed in early 1931, had been headed by M. Hrushevsky. Moreover, in the resolution adopted by the

[6] O. M., *op. cit.*

[7] M. Hrushevsky, *Ob ukrainskoi istoriografii XVIII veka* (Ukrainian Historiography of the XVIII Century), *Izvestiya Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Journal of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR), 1934, Series VII.

[8] *Pravda,* November 24, 1933, "Results Achieved During the Agricultural Year 1933 and the Current Tasks of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine." Postyshev's speech at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine, delivered November 19, 1933.

[9] *Pravda,* December 2, 1933, "Results so far Achieved and Immediate Tasks in the Realization of the Nationalities Policy in the Ukraine." Kosior's report to the November joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine.

plenum,[10] which was the guiding line for Moscow's further practical policy with regard to the Ukraine, Prof. Hrushevsky was described as the leader of the all-Ukrainian resistance against the new policy of the Communist Party. It was stated in this resolution that the Party's adoption of its collectivization policy had activated hostile nationalist forces and intensified their resistance and duplicity. "These new tactics," the resolution reads, "were inspired by the old leaders of the Ukrainian counterrevolution such as Vynnychenko, Hrushevsky and Shapoval."[11]

The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine also informed the plenum of the recently exposed "Organization of Ukrainian Social-Revolutionaries." Logically, this too concerned Hrushevsky. Thus, matters had grown so serious that the "organizational" consequences of these official declarations were to be expected any day. In the Soviet Union such declarations are never pronounced without some special purpose. Nevertheless, the expected arrest did not take place. Instead, summonses to appear at the GPU became more frequent and the conversations more prolonged; later (September 1934), Hrushevsky had to report to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. "O. M." states that these talks at the Central Committee took place between Hrushevsky and L. M. Kaganovich, the expert on Ukrainian affairs.

After September 1934, Hrushevsky was not summoned again to appear before the Central Committee. He was apparently left in peace. On October 15, 1934, he and his wife were at the KSU[12] sanatorium at Kislovodsk (in the Caucasus). In early November he suddenly developed in the back of the neck a carbuncle which was caused by an infection. An operation seemed advisable and Hrushevsky was transferred for this purpose to the surgical department of the municipal hospital. Mariya Silvestrivna asked permission from Khurgin, the surgeon in charge, to call in for this operation a surgeon whom she knew and who was also in Kislovodsk at the time. Khurgin refused this permission flatly and performed the operation alone. After the operation, Hrushevsky's state grew rapidly worse. On November 24, greatly alarmed by this unexpected turn of things, Mrs. Hrushevsky called in, without informing Khurgin, a prominent Moscow surgeon who was taking a holiday at Kislovodsk.[13] He examined the patient and stated that he was dying. It was too late for anything to be done. On November 25 (the author of the memoirs gives the date as November 24), at 5 o'clock in the evening, Hrushevsky died.

Hrushevsky and the Ukrainian National Center

From what was stated at the beginning of this essay it follows that Hrushevsky's banishment from the Ukraine in March 1931 and the simultaneous arrest of all his former political and ideological followers were

[10] *Pravda,* November 27, 1933. "Results so far Achieved and Tasks Lying Immediately Ahead in the Realization of the Nationalities Policy in the Ukraine." (Resolution of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine, based on Kosior's report and approved November 22, 1933).

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] KSU: *Komissiya sodeistviya uchenym* (Commission for Rendering Assistance to Scholars).

[13] O. M. gives this surgeon's name as Butsenko.

an event of the same social and political nature. Having dispatched the last trainload of people convicted in the SVU (Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine) case to Northern and Siberian concentration camps, the GPU immediately set about liquidating the next group of the Ukrainian democratic intelligentsia — the group which, to a greater or lesser extent, politically or scholastically, was connected with Hrushevsky. The liquidation of this social group took place under the label of the "Ukrainian Nation Center" (UNTs), and was attested both by Soviet documents and by memoirs written by those who were convicted for their affiliation with the "Ukrainian National Center." According to these sources, the UNTs was supposed to embrace (and, as Postyshev declared, did embrace) all those political and scholastic forces of the Ukrainian democratic intelligentsia which for various reasons were not, and could not, be involved in the SVU trial, which had taken place just before. The UNTs, with Hrushevsky at its head, was intended to be an extensive, all-Ukrainian organization which stood for a united independent Ukraine and which would be able to embrace all Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik social forces, beginning with the organizers and officers of the Ukrainian Galician Army and ending with the Shumsky opposition and the Borotbists in the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

In January 1934, Postyshev politically defined the Ukrainian National Center as "a bloc of Ukrainian and Galician nationalistic parties ... and a militant national-fascist organization."[14]

S. Kosior, in his report, mentioned above, to the November plenum of the Central Committee, declared:

> Many Party members engaged in subversive work were closely connected with it [the UNTs]. One of these double-faced individuals was Mykhaylo Levytsky ...

Elsewhere, Postyshev stated:

> Having embarked on the road of counterrevolutionary underground activity, this group of hypocritical Borotbists is forming the closest contacts with nationalists of the Hrushevsky type.[15]

On the same occasion Postyshev cited the "testimony" of one of the many victims at that time of the NKVD, the former Borotbist Kyko-Shelest: "Through M. Poloz, Shumsky and other individuals, the Borotbists maintained illegal connections with Hrushevsky, who united the national forces."

Thus the Communist "preservers" of the empire claimed that they evaluated the Ukrainian National Center very highly. Under this pretext they really wanted to destroy those members of the Ukrainian elite who had survived the liquidation of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine. In the first

[14] Postyshev, *Sovetskaya Ukraina na novom podeme* (Renewed Progress in the Soviet Ukraine) (political report of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party delivered at the XII Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party), *Pravda*, January 24, 1934.

[15] Postyshev, *Pidsumky perevirky partiynykh dokumentov u KP(b)U i zavdannya partiynoi roboty* (Results of the Check of Party Documents Within the Ukrainian Communist Party and Tasks Involved in Party Work) (extract from a report delivered at the plenary session of the Central Committee of he Ukrainian Communist Party, January 29, 1936), *Bilshovyk Ukrainy* (Bolshevik of the Ukraine), 1936, No. 3.

place, it was Prof. Hrushevsky with whom allegedly everybody, from Yevhen Konovalets, leader of the Ukrainian nationalists in exile in Galicia, to Oleksander Shumsky, leader of the Ukrainian Communist opposition within the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine, sought to cooperate.

In connection with the significance which leading circles at that time in the USSR ascribed to the UNTs and to Hrushevsky it is interesting to enquire why there was no public trial of the Ukrainian National Center after the pattern of, let us say, the trial of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.

One of the victims of the examining procedure against the Ukrainian National Center, who concealed his identity under the pseudonym O. Buzhansky, gives in his memoirs the following explanation for the breakdown of the public trial of the Ukrainian National Center, which had already been prepared.[16]

> Nearly two years of solitary confinement, without any prospect of even a horrible future, unbalanced the people. Prisoners began to send for the prosecutor, to renounce their own confessions, to proclaim a hunger strike. [As a result of this], one night they loaded us onto cattle trucks and deported us to the North.

This was, in fact, the end of the UNTs affair.

The circumstances leading to this denouement were the following. Some time in late 1932, the trial of the Ukrainian National Center, which GPU examining magistrates had been preparing so carefully and for so long, began to disintegrate. In the first place Prof. Hrushevsky, who it was intended should figure as the ideological leader of the movement, was wrested from them by the will of Stalin himself and put under constant supervision in Moscow, for reasons strange and incomprehensible even for the organizers of the case against UNTs, which had to prepare for a public trial without its central figure. This was the first setback, and a considerable one, in the official plans. The second reason for the collapse of the UNTs case was that those persons who were to have played a leading part in the new trial (M. Chechel, M. Shrah, P. Khrystyuk, V. Holubovych, H. Kosak, Iv. Lyzanivsky and V. Mazurenko) proved "inaccessible." It was, obviously, very difficult to break them down and to turn them into the obedient puppets that were required. This is why the procedure of preparing them for this rôle lasted two years.

The year 1933 arrived and with it the January resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks concerning the Ukraine. Political conditions and tactics underwent a complete change. A new plan was conceived. According to this plan, not only the old, but also the new cadres of the democratic intelligentsia, which had formed themselves after the Revolution, were doomed to extermination. Moreover, the destruction of the entire cultural and political élite of the Ukrainian Soviet republic was decided upon, with the object of eradicating the very idea of Ukrainian national sovereignty in whatever form it might appear. These plans for wholesale terror no longer provided for any public trials which assumed the semblance of legal procedure; from now on they were to be dispensed with.

Thus, in late 1932, the whole question of a public trial for the Ukrainian National Center was made irrelevant by the course of political events. The

[16] O. Buzhansky, *Za gratamy GPU-NKVD* (In a GPU-NKVD Prison), *Svoboda* (Freedom), Jersey City, N. J., Nos. 288—300, 1950.

practical side of the matter had, however, already been completely realized. By that time, thousands of Ukrainian citizens, scholars and scientists, writers, public, cooperative and cultural figures, engineers, technologists, students and teachers were arrested on a charge of having been affiliated to the Ukrainian National Center and liquidated or sentenced to many years' imprisonment in a concentration camp.

The Political Objective in Reviving the Ukrainian National Center

Why, then, was the question of UNTs raised once more in late 1933? Why did the authorities remember it at a time when the persons who were supposed to have belonged to it had already been removed and an open trial had ceased to be a requirement of the day?

The new course of Moscow's policy concerning the Ukraine contributed to the "exposure" of a great many "underground organizations" in which, as the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks explained at the time, the leading part had been played by "counterrevolutionaries with Party cards in their pockets."[17] This was an entirely new and altogether different phase of the struggle. It was necessary to establish a connection between the "counterrevolutionaries with Party cards" and Ukrainian "national fascism" and the Petlyura movement. The only organization which had in the past borne the stamp of the ideology of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and of contacts with the emigration — the SVU — had long ago been tried and convicted. But even if it had been resurrected, it would in no wise have been suited to provide the necessary link. None of the "counterrevolutionaries with Party cards in their pockets" could be associated with it. Such an association would have been particularly difficult to establish, since many of them had acted as judges and prosecutors at the trial of this organization. Some other body was required which would answer the description of an all-national movement comprising different parties. The organization most suited for this purpose was the one which, for reasons already stated, was not revealed to the light of day and which was supposed to be headed by Prof. Hrushevsky. This was exactly what was needed, a center "uniting all Ukrainians." At the same time, "it was a militant national Fascist organization" (Postyshev).[18] This is why just at that time, in late 1933,

[17] S. Kosior, *op. cit.*; P. Postyshev, *O zadachakh vesennego sezona v reshenii TsK VKP(b) ot 24 yanvarya 1933 goda* (On the Tasks for the Spring Season as Laid Down by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in its Decision of January 24, 1933), *Pravda*, February 8, 1933.

[18] Eloquent confirmation of these statements is provided by two forgeries which at that time were officially made known under the title "Circulars of the Ukrainian Underground." The first was given out by M. M. Popov, one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, in his speech before the November plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in 1933 (*Visti* of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, December 10, 1933; and *Chervony Shlyakh*, 1933, No. 10, Kharkov); the second by the chief of the Ukrainian GPU himself, V. A. Balytsky, in his speech at the XII Congress of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine in January, 1934 (*ibid.*, January 21, 1934).

the case of the Ukrainian National Center was brought out of the GPU archives and, possibly, also why some of its members (Serhiy Vikul, for instance) were recalled from solitary confinement and subjected to fresh interrogations adapted to the new requirements. An organizational and ideological connection between the "spokesmen" of the new underground and the Ukrainian National Center[19] was established, the treason committed by the Borotbists and former members of the Ukrainian Communist Party "proved by documentary evidence" and the moral and legal verdict pronounced — exactly as required.

The "Organization of Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries"

This, however, was only one of the reasons for which the specter of the Ukrainian National Center was resuscitated. There is another possible reason, which so far has not been mentioned by anyone.

Kosior's report, delivered at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in November 1933, contains, apart from the exposure of several Ukrainian anti-Soviet organizations, a reference to the "recently-exposed Organization of Ukrainian Social-Revolutionaries." "Recently" means the period between July and September 1933. Apart from the title of this body, Kosior mentions only H. Pyrkhavka, a Social Revolutionary who was well known in the period 1917—1920 in political and insurgent circles, but was later almost forgotten. This Social Revolutionary organization was mentioned in Postyshev's, Popov's and Balytsky's speeches, without, however, any details being given.

According to Kosior's account, Pyrkhavka made the following statement:

> The Committee in Emigration of the UPSR (Ukrainian Party of Social Revolutionaries) in Prague has stated that it wholeheartedly supports the intervention plans and is cooperating in this matter with the Ukrainian Fascists, led by Konovalets. Taking into consideration that our local forces will not suffice to overthrow the Soviet regime, hold the front, and maintain a new independent Ukrainian state, we too have adopted a policy of intervention.[20]

This article will not examine the question whether or not Pyrkhavka, a former guerilla leader and Sovietophile emigre of the Prague group, who returned to his native country after having been "amnestied" some time in 1927, was right in his statements. It only wishes to emphasize the points they contain, considered as evidence doubtless necessary to the GPU: (1) that an organization of Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries existed in the Ukrainian SSR; (2) that it maintained contact with the Committee in Emigration of the Ukrainian Party of Social Revolutionaries in Prague; (3) that the center abroad, as well as its underground organization at home, adopted a policy of intervention and (4) that they constituted a single anti-Soviet national front.

In this connection, Prof. Serhiy Vikul's evidence is also important. According to the same source, i. e., Kosior's report, he deposed the following testimony:

[19] See the evidence of Kyko-Shelest, referred to above, and of S. Vikulo, referred to by Kosior in his speech, *op. cit.*

[20] Kosior, *op. cit.*

Beginning from 1927, the organization conducted activities the objective of which was to prepare an armed insurrection against the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Ukraine. These activities were part of a general plan for intervention directed against the Soviet Union as a whole.

The political center of the organization, at the head of which stood Prof. Hrushevsky, agreed with Russian Constitutional Democratic circles, with the Georgian Mensheviks and the Belorussian Nationalists to undertake joint action intended to overthrow the Soviet regime.[21]

Prof. Vikul explicitly mentions the political center of an organization headed by Prof. Hrushevsky, the logical inference being that this center was the Ukrainian National Center. It is suspicious, however, that Prof. Vikul nowhere gives it a specific name. He consistently speaks only of an "organization." The question arises whether this was not, therefore, the "organization of Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries," in whose name Pyrkhavka had just been speaking, and whether the GPU—in the new conditions obtaining in 1933—did not decide to present the former Ukrainian National Center as an "Organization of Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries." Unfortunately, although events already described tend to answer these questions affirmatively, there is no conclusive evidence in this respect.

At this point new and interesting questions arise: why did Stalin suddenly display, as the author of the memoirs assumes, such uncommon magnanimity toward Prof. Hrushevsky? Why did Stalin, according to the same author, tear Hrushevsky from the clutches of the GPU immediately after he was arrested and thus unhinge, as has been seen, the entire plan for a new political trial, that of the "Ukrainian National Center"?

O. M. says the following about it in his memoirs:

In Moscow, Mykhaylo Serhiyovych was patronized by Lomov, a relative on his mother's side.[22] Having learned that Mykhaylo Serhiyovych had been arrested, Lomov went to the Kremlin to a meeting of the Politburo. As always at these meetings, Stalin was present. He professed to know nothing about the matter; he expressed great indignation at the GPU's arbitrary act and gave orders to release Prof. Hrushevsky immediately.[23]

This naive passage, written by a person who was evidently unable to see things in their factual political aspect, probably contains a grain of truth. Of course, Lomov may have been a relative of Hrushevsky's (this has yet

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] Lomov (Oppokov), Georgiy Ippolitovych, was born at Saratov in January, 1888. An old Bolshevik (since 1903), he was an active figure in the October Revolution, a member of the Central Committee and of the first People's Commissariat of the RSFSR; People's Commissar of Justice; member of the Presidium of the Higher Council of the National Economy; permanent member of the All-Union Central Executive Committee; chairman of the All-Russian Syndicate for the Oil Industry and author of many scientific and popular works on general economic questions, especially on the subject of oil. *Entsiklopedichesky slovar russkogo bibliograficheskogo instituta "Granat"* (Encyclopedic Dictionary of the "Granat" Russian Bibliographical Institute), 7th ed., vol. 41, part I. Appendix: Public Figures in the Soviet Socialist Republic and the October Revolution, pp. 337—340).

[23] O. M., *op. cit.*

to be established) and may have intervened in this case before Stalin himself. No doubt Stalin ordered Hrushevsky to be released from arrest (because without his order they could not have released a prisoner of Hrushevsky's importance) and detained him in his place of deportation. It is certain, however, that Stalin did not do this in consideration of Lomov's request or because of the merits of the great Ukrainian historian. He did it because at that time he already had his own special plans concerning Hrushevsky. In these plans Stalin had, obviously, assigned a role to Hrushevsky in comparison with which the even latter's part as leader and ideologist of the "Ukrainian National Center" in 1931 appeared to him (Stalin) as negligible and of little political importance.

In order to make this point clear, it should be recalled that Hrushevsky's removal from the Ukraine in early 1931 may have been the result of two motives which probably had very little, if any, connection with one another. One of them was the realization of a plan elaborated long before—possibly even at the same time as the plan for the SVU—for the liquidation of Prof. Hrushevsky and his historical school. After the arrest of the first group of his colleagues and supporters (Chechel, Shrah and Khrystyuk) it was Hrushevsky's turn. It was necessary to isolate him completely, to tear him away from the social and national environment which was familiar to him. Moscow was the place which fully answered these requirements.

The other was a motive of a type peculiar to Stalin. At that time, he already had plans of his own concerning Prof. Hrushevsky. For the better realization of these plans, Stalin needed to isolate Hrushevsky from Ukrainian life and Ukrainian scholastic circles. Hrushevsky's deportation to Moscow suited Stalin well, but his premature arrest disturbed his plans.

Hrushevsky's Sudden Death

Stalin's new intentions with regard to Hrushevsky were, no doubt, closely connected, on the one hand, with the "Organization of Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries," through which Stalin was anxious to compromise the then active center in exile of the Ukrainian Party of Social Revolutionaries, and, on the other hand, with the "bloc of Ukrainian Nationalist Parties," which was also invented by the NKVD, and of which the "Organization of Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries" was supposed to be a component part.[24] In both cases, Hrushevsky's role might have been decisive.

It was no mere chance that Prof. Hrushevsky's frequent summons to the NKVD in Moscow and to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks began at the very time when the press was publishing information about the "exposure" of these Ukrainian underground organizations. What the talks Hrushevsky had at these institutions were about, especially with Kaganovich, is not known. We only know that Hrushevsky was in a state of depression after each of these conversations at the Central Committee. Obviously, it was a heavy burden that Kaganovich tried to load on the shoulders of the first President of the reestablished Ukrainian state.

[24] *Visti* of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, January 21, 1934; Balytsky's speech at the XII Congress of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine.

> Some time in September 1934, Mykhaylo Serhiyovych was summoned to Kaganovich and requested to make a statement. Mykhaylo Serhiyovych refused. Two days later, a relative of Lomov's called on Hrushevsky and told him that Lomov sent him the following message: if Mykhaylo Serhiyovych refused to make a statement, then he, Lomov, could not vouch for Mykhaylo Serhiyovych's personal safety. "Well, so that's that," said Mykhaylo Serhiyovych calmly, and nothing more was said on the subject.[25]

Unfortunately, the author of the memoirs gives no explanation as to the nature of this statement or its political significance, because, most likely, he had no explanation to offer. The mere fact, however, of Hrushevsky's refusal and his reply to the threat contained in Lomov's message offer some slight explanation in themselves.

It was a few weeks after these occurrences that Hrushevsky received permission to visit the sanatorium at Kislovodsk. The circumstances leading to his death soon after have already been described.

[25] O. M., *op. cit.*

Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Revolution

(1917—1921)

F. PIGIDO

The Jews, escaping from persecution in Western Europe during the XVI and XVII centuries, found a haven of refuge in Poland, which at that time was engaged in expanding its boundaries into the Belorussian and Ukrainian provinces of the Grand Duchy of Rus-Lithuania. Great stretches of land were granted by the Polish kings to those local aristocrats who accepted Polish rule, as well as to Polish nobles who moved into the newly organized territories. Settlers to work the land were enticed from regions under Polish rule. The Jews were called in as merchants, artisans, and especially as "tax collectors, tax-farmers, financiers and particularly stewards and overseers of their [the Polish nobles'] estates. But these positions, while adding to their power, increased their unpopularity. The peasants, who were being exploited by the nobles, hated the tools of tyranny more than tyranny itself . . ." [1]

It is true that after the Ukraine (with the exception of its westernmost province) came under Russian rule (1772—1792), the rebellions and massacres died down for almost a century. At the same time, however, the tsarist government hemmed the Jews into "the pale of settlement," which, chiefly, was comprised of the former Polish territories—parts of present-day Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belorussia and the whole of the Ukraine. The Jews were subjected by the government to the most inhuman limitations and restrictions. Only Jews who had a college education or were rich merchants were permitted to dwell or travel in the rest of the Empire. This persecution of the Jews reduced them more closely to the level of the peasants and helped to bring the Ukrainian and Jewish masses closer together.

The Jewish historian, Jacob Shatzky, must be credited with having unearthed a copy of the protest of Russian intellectuals, signed by Taras Shevchenko among others, against the government-sponsored anti-Jewish campaign. The Ukrainian peasants who, toward the end of the XIX century, joined the officially proscribed Baptist movement (Shtundysty) by the thousand, protested openly in 1881 against the Russian-inspired pogroms.[2]

A young enthusiast of the theater, Symon V. Petlyura, who afterwards became the leader of the Ukrainian struggle for independence, in his introduction to Evgeny Chirikov's drama *The Jews* declared "The suffering of Nakhman [a character in that drama] will evoke deep compassion from every-

[1] Abram Leon Sacher, *A History of the Jews*, New York, 1935, p. 240.
[2] *Progress*, Chicago-New York, June 7, 1893, p. 11.

body, even from those who do not belong to that nationality which was fated to bear such a heavy burden of oppression and persecution ... The importance of this drama lies in the fact that it creates in the hearts of the audience warm feelings for the oppressed nationality and sincere sympathy for their sufferings, at the same time provoking wrath and hatred for the regime under which such savage atrocities toward innocent victims are possible." [3]

In the notorious trial of Mendel Bailis, a Jew of Kiev, who was accused by the tsarist government and the heads of the Russian Orthodox Church of the ritual murder of a Christian boy, the jury composed of Ukrainian peasants from the suburbs of Kiev rejected the flimsy accusations of the government and set Bailis free.

Dr. Arnold Margolin, a prominent Jewish Ukrainian leader and statesman and one of the founders in 1906 of the Jewish Territorial Organization in Russia, in his book *The Ukraine and the Policy of the Entente (Notes of a Jew and a Citizen),* recounts how, at a pre-election meeting held before the elections to the first State Duma and arranged by the bloc of Constitutional Democrats and a group of the Peasant-Toilers' Party for the Chernigov Province, one of the candidates of the Constitutional Democrats (a Christian) was rejected, and how he (Dr. Margolin) was put up as a candidate to replace the other by a great majority of the peasant vote. However, the tsarist government refused to accept his candidacy for the Chernigov Province and, later on, for two districts in the Kiev Province; whereupon the peasants protested against the government's refusal, finally reaching the Ministry in St. Petersburg with a demand for his reinstatement as their candidate—but to no avail. Dr. Margolin considers this attitude on the part of the peasants to be "a symbol of the peasants' desire to live on friendly terms with the Jews." [4]

These friendly relations passed through a difficult period during the time of the 1917 Revolution, culminating in the Jewish pogroms of 1917—1921, mainly in the Ukraine. It has been customary ever since to lay the blame for these pogroms on the Ukrainian people and on the government of the Ukrainian National Republic. In his aforementioned book, Dr. Margolin describes the difficulties the Ukrainian national movement encountered in the West:

> Such is the fate of all young movements. The general reactionary conservatism, coupled with the desire to keep the old map of Europe unchanged, as well as the constant propaganda carried on by many members of the All-Russian intelligentsia (who were aided by their knowledge of languages, external good manners, and their worldly upbringing) created an atmosphere of distrust toward the Ukrainian movement. Its enemies did not hesitate consciously to spread abroad untruths in order to present the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian political parties as both Bolsheviks and reactionary pogrom-makers. This is why Lancing and the British government so stubbornly (and for such a long time) supported Denikin and Kolchak ... The fallacy of their schemes and plans, their ignorance and lack of understanding of the newly emerged aspirations of the nationalities of old Russia, became apparent much later when the Denikin and Kolchak forces, equipped by

[3] Evgeny Chirikov, *Evrei* (The Jews), foreword by Symon Petlyura, Kiev, 1907.

[4] A. Margolin, *Ukraina i politika Antanty: Zapiski evreya i grazhdanina* (The Ukraine and the Policy of the Entente: Notes of a Jew and a Citizen), Berlin, 1921, pp. 19—20.

England and America, showed themselves at the peak of their power to be the advocates of the blackest reaction and anti-Semitism.[5]

In studying the question of pogroms in the Ukraine during the years 1917—1921, one must consider a number of historical factors in order to understand exactly why the Ukraine became the arena of so many pogroms. Among these the following are most important:

At the time of the 1917 Revolution probably not more than half of the Russian Jews lived in the Ukraine. The fact that the Poles and the Balts were able at that time to organize their governments without White or Red Russian interference accounts for the comparative absence of anti-Semitic outbursts there. It was only in the territories of the Ukraine, where Russian rule persisted or where it tried to entrench itself, that progroms were unleashed.

Since the end of the XIX century the reactionary internal policy of the tsarist government was based, in part, on the state monopoly of alcohol production and overt anti-Semitism. The just hatred of the people for the social order of that time and for the lawlessness of the Russian bureaucracy was intentionally, openly, and persistently re-channeled by the tsarist regime against the Jews. To spread wide confusion among the nationalities within the tsarist empire, the administration made every kind of fantastic accusation against the Jews, including the aforementioned Mendel Bailis trial. The Ukraine, where Jews in the area east of the Dnieper constituted twelve or fourteen per cent of the population, became the center of terror. It was in Kiev that special publications, such as the *Kievlyanin,* edited by Pikhno, openly preached the policy of pogroms, and the notorious initiator of pogroms, Vitaly Shulgin, carried out such activities. Special political parties and organizations such as the Union of the Archangel Michael, the Union of the Russian Nation, the Union of the Two-Headed Eagle and others openly inspired and carried out Jewish pogroms. They were supported by the Russian police and blessed by the Russian Orthodox Church. The members of these organizations were chiefly recruited from the urban, often criminal, population.

The activities of these organizations did not cease after the 1917 Revolution. Immediately after the fall of the tsarist regime (March—April 1917), intensified agitation in favor of pogroms was apparent in the Kiev and Poltava provinces. This soon spread to Odessa, Tiraspol, Elisavetgrad and other places in the Southern Ukraine, and later to the city of Kiev itself. Anti-Semitic agitation was at its height throughout June and July when food was in short supply and expensive, the Jews being accused of hoarding foodstuffs. The excesses which took place in Zhitomir and Elisavetgrad were started for precisely these reasons. Monarchist reactionaries were quick to take advantage of this state of affairs and circulated pamphlets aimed directly at inciting pogroms. The following appeal is a typical example:

> Russian people, awake! Not long ago the sun was shining, the Russian tsar was visiting Kiev, but now the Jews are everywhere. Let us shake off this yoke! We will not tolerate it. They are leading our Motherland to disaster. Down with the Jews! Unite, Russian people! Give us back our tsar! [6]

[5] *Ibid.,* pp. 301—2.
[6] *Razsvet,* 1917, No. 9.

At the end of March, the Ukrainian *Tsentralna Rada* (Central Council) had issued, as one of its first acts, a manifesto to the Ukrainian people appealing for the preservation of peace and the rejection of propaganda put forth by reactionary elements and aimed at inciting pogroms. [7]

Another reason that made the Ukraine the center of so many pogroms was the fact that it was located in the immediate hinterland of the Rumanian and Southwestern fronts in World War I. Even at the beginning of the 1917 Revolution, large numbers of army deserters caused grave disorders in Ukrainian towns close to the front, both to the west, and to some extent to the east, of the Dnieper. In an Order of the Day to the forces on the Southwestern front, issued on September 1, 1917, it was stated:

> The districts of Ushitsya, Mohyliv, Lityn, Lyatychiv, Starokonstantyniv, Izyaslav and Ostroh are groaning under the influx of demoralized bands . . .[8]

V. Kedrovsky, former Inspector-General of the armed forces of the Ukrainian National Republic, has said that the first organized pogrom in the Ukraine was carried out by the Russian Second Guards Corps. In this pogrom, seventeen Ukrainian villages in the Province of Podolia were looted and burned.[9]

I. Cherykover, the well-known Jewish writer, describing the start of the Jewish pogroms, says:

> The front line and the roads taken by soldiers deserting from the front passed through the densely populated Jewish towns and villages on the right bank of the Dnieper. The consequences of desertion and the lost war affected, first of all, the Jewish population in the rear of the front . . . "Our country is being progressively overtaken by anarchy," says a letter from Volhynia. "The Jewish people are finding themselves in grave difficulties. Men dressed as soldiers loot, plunder and burn. It is impossible to describe the terror. The soldiers stationed in those localities call themselves 'Bolsheviks.' They spread terror and intensify the anarchy. These soldiers say, 'It is not our property. We are not Ukrainians.' " [10]

According to Cherykover, this anarchy increased after the defeat at Ternopol. The Bolsheviks' crude agitation among the soldiers was very successful; overtired and almost crazed, they began to desert the front. On their way they looted landowners' estates, small towns and villages; they robbed spirit refineries and government stores, and sometimes these spontaneous disorders turned into pogroms. The defeated Russian army retreating from Galicia sacked the towns of Ternopol and Kalush; there was looting, violence and murder directed mostly against the Jewish population, although the non-Jewish population also suffered.

[7] V. Ivanis, *Symon Petlyura — Prezydent Ukrainy* (Symon Petlyura—President of the Ukraine), Toronto, 1952, pp. 142—43.

[8] Order No. 1021, *Kievskaya Mysl*, Oct. 10, 1917.

[9] V. Kedrovsky, "Borotba z pohromamy v Ukraini" (The Struggle to Suppress Pogroms in the Ukraine), *Svoboda*, New Jersey, 1933.

[10] Report from the Jewish community in Sudylkov, Volhynia, dated Dec. 13, 1917 (Archives of the Ministry for Jewish Affairs, Document No. 293), as quoted in E. Tscherikower, *Antisemitismus und Pogrome in der Ukraine, 1917—18*, "Ostjüdisches Historisches Archiv," Berlin, 1923, p. 52.

A month before the first question was asked in the Ukrainian *Tsentralna Rada* on the Jewish problem, A. Shulhin, Secretary General for National Minorities, in a special appeal issued on October 20, 1917, unequivocally condemned anti-Jewish propaganda and appealed to the Ukrainian people to help him in his efforts to end disorders caused by criminal elements. Simultaneously, V. Vynnychenko, Secretary General for Internal Affairs, issued a special order to the provincial and district administrators directing them to undertake the most resolute measures against all attempts to start pogroms, even to the extent of using arms. In November, a similar order was issued to the Ukrainian armed forces by Symon Petlyura, Secretary General for Military Affairs.[11]

Another serious factor which encouraged the incidence of Jewish pogroms in the Ukraine was that during the first years of the Revolution, 1917—1920, the Ukraine was the battlefield of the Germans and Austrians against the Red Russians, of the Ukrainians against the Red Russians, of the Ukrainians against the White Russians, of the White Russians against the Red Russians, and of the Poles against the Red Russians, concurrently. The Russian Bolsheviks and the armies of Denikin, and later Wrangel, as well as the Polish army, each occupied large areas of Ukrainian territory at various times. In addition to this, many insurgent detachments were operating in the Ukraine. At some stages, the government of the Ukrainian National Republic controlled only a small area of Ukrainian territory, the rest being in the hands of one or the other of the above forces, who frequently persecuted the defenseless population, both Jewish and Ukrainian. It is sufficient to recall Bolshevik General Muravev's massacre of Ukrainians in Kiev in January 1918, or Denikin's brutality not only in Kiev but also in many other towns in the Ukraine.

The Jewish pogroms, perpetrated by demoralized units of the tsarist army, were followed by even more ruthless pogroms carried out by the Bolshevik Red Guards and a naval detachment at the beginning of 1918, during the Bolshevik retreat from the Ukraine. Somehow, very little is known in the West about these pogroms organized by Bolshevik units and the part played by the Petrograd government.

Describing this wave of pogroms, Cherykover says:

> Hlukhiv, Novhorod-Siversk, Seredynna Buda, and their surrounding districts were for a time the scene of acts of unbelievable cruelty against, and slaughter of, Jews... There were new participants in these events, namely, disorganized Bolshevik military units... [who] were brought in by a power foreign to the country—Red Guards and sailors, who came from the North, hiding under Bolshevik slogans the kind of socially anarchistic hooliganism as was first shown by the demoralized soldiery in the summer of 1917 in the little towns of Volhynia and Podolia.[12]

A bloody pogrom took place at Novhorod-Siversk on April 6, 1918. This, says Cherykover, was perpetrated by "the rearguard of the Soviet forces retreating from Sosnytsya toward Bryansk." [13]

[11] Tscherikower, *op. cit.*, pp. 81—82 and 143—44.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[13] *Ibid.*

The barbarous cruelty shown by the Red Guards and sailors during the pogroms was quite exceptional. The Lenin-Trotsky Bolshevik Government openly speculated on, and hoped to use to their own advantage, the anti-Jewish pogroms organized by front-line units, already demoralized by Bolshevik propaganda, and by gangs of Bolshevized deserters. In order to gain the sympathies of the local population and enlist voluntary recruits for the Red Army from the ranks of the workers, especially of the Jewish youth, the Bolsheviks attributed the responsibility for the pogroms to the Ukrainians since they took place in the Ukraine.

An article under the significant title "The Pogrom Insinuations" appeared in the paper *Naye Tsayt,* published by the United Jewish Socialists, in which the author maintained that the guilt leveled against the Ukrainians for the pogroms was a dishonest Bolshevik insinuation, spread "in order to implant fear of the Ukrainians among the Jews." "But," he goes on later, "the Ukrainian *Rada,* the Ukrainian revolutionary democracy, and its organs are innocent; they did not play a double game in this issue." [14]

This was written in Kiev on February 19, 1918, when the city was occupied by gangs led by Muravev, and therefore the author, who risked his life by publishing this article, cannot be accused of merely wanting to gain favor with the Ukrainians.

Cherykover also accused the Bolshevik government in Petrograd with purposely suppressing all information about the above-mentioned pogroms. In the dispatch on the capture of Hlukhiv by the "glorious Roslavl detachment," one of the most terrible progroms was referred to simply as a "battle episode." At a demonstration organized in Petrograd and also at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, Cherykover goes on to say, though the slaughter of Jews in the Ukraine and of Armenians in the Caucasus was mentioned, nothing was said about the brutality perpetrated by the Red troops in Hlukhiv and other parts of the Ukraine. It is also significant that "the bloody events in Hlukhiv and Novhorod-Siversk were never investigated by the Soviet authorities, and the guilty did not suffer any punishment; the whole 'episode' was glossed over as being of no importance." [15]

Cherykover, of course, cannot forgive the Ukrainian national liberation movement its struggle for independence since he refers to it as "national Bolshevism" or "spontaneous rebellion;" [16] nor is he able to forgive the Ukrainian authorities their proclamation of the IV "Universal" (Manifesto), which he considers to be "a breach of constitutional unity with Russia, an act which sanctions the partition of Russia and divides Russian Jewry into two parts." [17]

Although Cherykover cannot be considered a friend of the Ukrainian struggle for independence (in many cases he attributes pogroms to the "*haydamak* inclinations of the Ukrainian peasantry"),[18] still he tries hard to be an objective researcher, and the facts quoted from his work speak for themselves.

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[14] M. Brener, "Pogrom-rekhiles," *Naye Tsayt,* Kiev, Feb. 19, 1918.

[15] Tscherikower, *op. cit.,* pp. 147—51.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 48.

[17] *Ibid.,* p. 71.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 14. In the eighteenth century, Cossacks who rebelled against Polish rule in the Ukraine were known as *haydamaky.*

Immediately after the start of the Revolution, the Ukrainian *Tsentralna Rada* was set up in Kiev; in a very short time it became the Revolutionary National Parliament. At first the Tsentralna Rada included representatives of all Socialist parties, peasant and military organizations, and also members of cultural, professional and cooperative bodies, and local councils. But from July 1917 onwards, 30 per cent of the seats were allotted to the national minorities (Poles, Russians, Jews, etc.), although they composed only about 20 per cent of the population.[19] Thirty seats were allocated to the Jews, as well as five seats in the "Little Council," the latter divided among all the Jewish political parties.

Cooperation between the various nationalities developed fairly well within the Tsentralna Rada, though sincerity in such cooperation was badly lacking, particularly in the Russian groups (from extreme left to extreme right) and in the Polish group. The Jewish deputies were equal members of the Tsentralna Rada, with full political and national rights. However, this kind of relationship prevailed only between the leadership of the Jewish parties and the Ukrainian political circles. The attitude of the Jewish masses was entirely different. Cherykover commented:

> It should be admitted that the idea of an independent Ukraine, although it was supported by Jewish political parties, did not penetrate the masses of the Jewish population, which approached the question with a lack of confidence that was especially noticeable in their ridicule of the Ukrainian language and in their passive resistance to Ukrainianization in general. The Jewish masses feared the idea of Ukrainian independence, which was alien to them; and, despite all their suffering of recent years, they still believed in the Russian state and culture...
>
> The ideology of centralism and Russification [continues Cherykover], which had been developed under the old regime, was very strong not only in the Russian population of the country but also among the Jews. This was strengthened among the Jewish bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and some of the workers by a feeling of assimilation...
>
> Those Jewish political parties that gave their support to the Ukrainian cause undoubtedly became separated from the Jewish masses... While a certain number of Jewish workers joined the Red Guards, they did not contribute one single volunteer to the Ukrainian Army.[20]

But certain differences between the Jewish and Ukrainian parties became apparent a little later. Cherykover says:

> As long as the Ukrainian leaders supported autonomy, federation with Russia and a united revolutionary front with Russian democracy, and did nothing to sever national ties with Russia, the Jewish parties gladly cooperated with them. When, however, in October and November of 1917 the Bolsheviks came into power in Leningrad and the Ukrainian movement turned toward independence and the severance of all ties with Russia, the Jewish parties stopped cooperating.[21]

During the discussion concerning the convening of the "Ukrainian Sovereign Constituent Assembly" the Jewish ranks split. The Jewish political

[19] *Entsyklopediya Ukrainoznavstva* (Ukrainian Encyclopedia), Shevchenko Scientific Society, Munich-New York, Vol. I, 1949, p. 164.

[20] Tscherikower, *op. cit.*, pp. 115—16.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

parties spoke in favor of convening the Assembly, but M. Rafes, the "Bund" representative, in his address to the Ukrainians said: "... we consider a break with the Russian Constitutional Assembly a counterrevolutionary act and we shall fight against it." [22]

A similar stand was taken by the Russian parties which, as it happened, were led by Jews—Balabanov (Social-Democrat Menshevik) and Sklovsky (Russian Social-Revolutionary). On November 9, all the Jewish parties had voted for the III "Universal" (Manifesto), which declared that the Ukrainian state was being set up without "... breaking away from the Russian Republic but preserving unity with it." According to Cherykover, this statement was inserted at the insistence of the Jewish parties.

In the winter of 1918, the tension increased with the Bolshevik Army moving into the Ukraine on the order of the Soviet government, thus causing civil war and forcing the Ukrainian government to accept German proposals to seek a separate peace with the Central Powers. According to Cherykover,[23] all the Jewish parties and the All-Russian parties of the Social-Democrats and Social-Revolutionaries, under Jewish leadership, fought against such an alliance. The Soviet attack forced the Ukrainian Revolutionary Parliament to declare the independence of the Ukraine in the IV "Universal." The Jewish "Bund," the Russian Social-Democrats, and the Russian Social-Revolutionaries fought against such a declaration. The rest of the Jewish parties and the Polish Central Union, according to Cherykover,[24] refrained from voting. The representative of the Bund, A. Zolotarev, declared openly that his party could not go along with their Ukrainian comrades against the unity of Russia.[25]

Quoting P. Khrystyuk and A. Margolin,[26] Cherykover says:

> Parts of the Russian and Jewish working masses started an [anti-Ukrainian] uprising in Kiev itself, under the influence of Bolshevik agitation; the first anti-Bolshevik unit, which had given allegiance to the Mensheviks, the Social Revolutionaries and the Bund, refused to defend Kiev ...
>
> The followers of Rafes, Balabanov and Sklovsky—the greatest enemies of the Bolsheviks in the Tsentralna Rada—[continues Cherykover] now stood apart ...this "neutrality of minorities" was depressing to Ukrainian democracy.

Cherykover maintains that during the first days of the Bolshevik siege of Kiev, M. Porsh, the Ukrainian Social-Democrat leader and Minister, asked the minorities in the Tsentralna Rada why they were neutral, but they avoided a direct answer.

> The workers and the intelligentsia in Kiev were divided into two camps, not so much according to their social status as according to their nationality; on the one hand there was the anti-Ukrainian Russo-Jewish camp, and on the other the ever more isolated and reduced forces of Ukrainian revolutionary democracy ...

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 71—72.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[26] Margolin, *op. cit.*, pp. 52—55; P. Khrystyuk, *Zamitky i materiyaly do istorii Ukrainskoi revolyutsii* (Notes and Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution), Vol. II, 1921, pp. 126—27; and Tscherikower, *op. cit.*, pp. 110—16.

Describing this period in another passage, Cherykover says:

> When the Ukrainian government and a part of the Rada fled to Zhitomir, there was not a single representative of any of the national minorities among them—neither Russians, Poles, nor Jews.[27]

Having thus reviewed these events, rich in most interesting facts, Cherykover comes to this rather unexpected conclusion:

> The [Ukrainian] anger against the Russians unexpectedly provoked anger against the Jews. The anti-Semitic feelings which had lain dormant within the Ukrainian community were suddenly released.[28]

It would seem obvious, however, that the consistent neutrality or open support by the Jewish political parties of Russian unity, even at a time when the Russian Red Army invaded the Ukraine, would tend to increase Ukrainian-Jewish tension. It is only thanks to the responsible Ukrainian democratic leadership and to the few farsighted Jewish leaders that Jewish-Ukrainian relations favorable to both parties were continued.

*

Arnold Margolin states in his work *The Ukraine and the Policy of the Entente—Notes of a Jew and a Citizen* that neither at the time of the Ukrainian Tsentralna Rada nor during the Hetmanship, nor in the first months of the Ukrainian *Directoire* were there any pogroms in the Ukraine. It should be added, however, that the command of the German Army of Occupation during the Hetmanate did its share to incite anti-Jewish feeling in the Ukraine, blaming "Jewish Bolshevik agitators" for the unrest among the Ukrainian peasants.[29]

Solomon Goldelman, a well-known participant in the events of that time, and at present a Professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, explains the reasons for the pogroms at the time of the Directoire thus:

> The first reports of the pogroms arrived in March 1919: Ovruch, Berdychev and Zhitomir were the first victims of the collapse of the army, its retreat before the Bolsheviks, the provocative work of Russian officers, the criminal attitude of the insurgent commanders toward the national interest, and the complete lack of authority of the central government—the Directoire.[30]

The large number of pogroms in the Ukraine were provoked by the Bolshevik underground, which thus expected to, and to some extent did, weaken the government of the Ukrainian Directoire. According to Elias Heifetz,[31]

[27] Tscherikower, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 300—301 (photographs of proclamations by German Army commanders in 1918).

[30] Soloman Holdelman, *Lysty zhydivskoho sotsiyal-demokrata pro Ukrainu: Materiyaly do istorii ukrainsko-zhydivskykh vidnosyn za chas revolyutsii* (Letters of a Jewish Social-Democrat Concerning the Ukraine: Materials on the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Revolution), Vienna, 1921, p. 46.

[31] Elias Heifetz, *The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919*, New York, 1921, pp. 202—34.

the convention of Bolsheviks of the Province of Podolia, held toward the end of January 1919 in Vinnitsa, carried through a resolution to start an uprising in all the cities of the province. The uprising did not materialize in full force with the exception of the city of Proskurov, where all the Socialist groups, among them the Bund, were informed ahead of time that the uprising was scheduled to take place on February 15. It was postponed for twelve hours, but on the morning of February 16 Bolshevik detachments, composed chiefly of local Jewish youth, occupied the Post and Telegraph Office, arrested the local Ukrainian Commandant, and attacked the Ukrainian troops at the railroad station. Similar attempts were contemplated for the towns of Felshtyn and Yarmolintsy. Confronted with stronger Ukrainian Army units, the Bolshevik partisans retreated to Proskurov. And then the poorly disciplined Ukrainian troops, under the irresponsible leadership of their commander, retaliated brutally and caused one of the most dreadful pogroms.

In other cases, more responsible commanders or better-organized intelligence were able to suppress Bolshevik provocations, or to prevent blind retaliation, which was always welcomed by the Black Hundred residue of Russian-Ukrainian extraction, at that time quite numerous throughout the Ukraine.

Describing this period, Margolin says:

> In any event one should be very careful of generalizations. As we, the Jews, justly repudiate any responsibility for the actions of Jewish Commissars and for the inhuman acts of those Jews who took part in the work of the Bolshevik "Cheka," the Ukrainian nation has an equal right to deny liability for the scum who dirtied their hands in pogroms... and when we say "all Ukrainians are pogrom-mongers" we make the same mistake as those who claim that "all Jews are Bolsheviks." [32]

The government of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) consistently and faithfully pursued a most resolute policy against the demoralized elements, so numerous in the Ukraine at that time, who were influenced by Bolshevik, and particularly anti-Jewish, propaganda. This is borne out by the many appeals to the Ukrainian people, and by the orders from the government of the Ukrainian National Republic, as well as those of a number of army and unit commanders. It is also proved by the severe sentences imposed by the courts-martial and by the executions of those who took an active part in anti-Jewish pogroms.

An important part in the fight to prevent pogroms was played by the Ministry for Jewish Affairs, and especially by the Minister himself, Pinkhas Krasny. Even Cherykover admits this.[33]

Let us mention some of the documents on the position of the Jews in the Ukraine, which are contained in a collection published by the Ukrainian Legation in Berlin: [34]

On April 12, 1919, B. Martos, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, issued an appeal to the Ukrainian people which read in part:

[32] Margolin, *op. cit.*, pp. 320—21.
[33] Tscherikower, *op. cit.*, pp. 94—95.
[34] *Die Lage der Juden in der Ukraine*, Berlin, 1920.

> The government will ruthlessly exterminate bandits and pogrom-makers. The government particularly will not permit anti-Jewish pogroms and will apply the severest measures to those who, by their crimes, blacken the name of the Ukrainian people.

On May 27, 1919, a law signed by Symon Petlyura, Makarenko and Shvets was passed by the Directoire setting up a special commission to investigate Jewish pogroms. Simultaneously, the commission was given extraordinary powers to suppress pogroms.

In a telegram addressed to the Prime Minister, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Minister of War and the Minister for Jewish Affairs, published on July 9, 1919, in *Visnyk Ukrainskoi Narodnyoi Respubliky,* Petlyura proposed an intensification of the struggle against anti-Jewish excesses and pogroms. He noted the sacrifices made by the Jews for the Ukrainian Republic and recalled occasions known to him personally when Jews had given help to Ukrainian soldiers, especially the sick and the wounded, for which acts of kindness they were subsequently shot by the Bolsheviks. Petlyura ended his telegram with a demand that all possible steps be taken to prevent further action by provocative elements.

On August 15, the sum of eleven million hryvnyas was allotted as aid to Jewish victims of pogroms by an order of the government signed by B. Martos. A little later an All-Ukrainian Central Committee for Aid to the Victims of Pogroms was set up at the Ministry for Jewish Affairs and a further sum of twenty million hryvnyas was put at its disposal.

On August 18, the Council of Ministers, after hearing the report of the Minister for Jewish Affairs, passed a number of decisions concerning the campaign against pogroms. The Army Command was instructed to arraign before courts-martial all military commanders who were unable to prevent pogroms, and to impose severe punishment, even up to the death penalty. It was also proposed that the military authorities appeal to the insurgent units operating behind the enemy lines to do what they could to counteract the incitement of pogroms that was being spread by various provocative elements.

On August 26, an order to the army signed by Petlyura decreed that all agitators responsible for inciting pogroms were to be treated as traitors and handed over to the courts.

On August 27, Petlyura appealed to the army to preserve law and order. At the end of his appeal he reminded them that lawbreakers and provocateurs could only expect the death penalty.

In a report to Petlyura, the Commander-in-Chief, which is mentioned by Dr. Margolin, it is stated that in the autumn of 1919 four people found guilty of taking part in pogroms in the village of Vakhnovka (Lipovets District) were shot; at the railroad station of Khrystynivka 83 people were found guilty and shot; and in the market town of Talne five people were shot on the spot by order of the unit commander. The names of all these individuals were published in the army order.[35]

Further on, Margolin remarks that Deshchenko, the Commanding Officer of the 4th Kiev Cavalry Regiment, had the pogrom-maker Novokhatsky

[35] Margolin, *op. cit.,* p. 280.

summarily shot in the town of Husyatyn. In the locality of Chernovo, a soldier of the 4th Kiev Rifle Division suffered the same fate.

It is stated by General Omelyanovych-Pavlenko, by Pinkhas Krasny, the Minister of Jewish Affairs, and by many other prominent people, according to Margolin,[36] that a number of pogrom-makers were summarily executed at the scene of their crimes, and that many death sentences were passed upon robbers and pogrom-makers by the courts-martial.[37]

These are only a few of the measures taken by the Ukrainian government in its efforts to combat pogroms and anarchy. This policy has been confirmed by many Jewish writers, scholars and political leaders, some of them quoted above, and was highly valued at the time by international Jewish circles.

The well-known Zionist, Zhabotynsky, writing on the part played by the Ukrainian government and leading Ukrainian circles in fighting anti-Jewish pogroms, has this to say:

> It is a fact that neither Petlyura nor Vynnychenko, nor any other outstanding member of the government was a pogrom-maker. I grew up with them and together we carried on the fight against anti-Semitism; no Zionist from Southern Russia, myself included, will ever be convinced that people of that type could be described as anti-Semites.[38]

The national, cultural and political rights of the minorities in the Ukraine—Russians, Jews, Poles and others—have always had the understanding and respect of the government of the Ukrainian National Republic. The Jewish population of the Ukraine was regarded as a natural ally by Ukrainians because they had suffered especially cruel persecution from the tsarist regime.

Let us briefly recount the most important measures taken by the Ukrainian government to satisfy the cultural, economic and political needs of the Jewish population of the Ukraine. The Jewish language was officially recognized. Jewish schools were established and the Ukrainian University at Kamenets-Podolsky opened a department of Jewish history and literature. A responsible representative of the Jewish community—the Minister for Jewish Affairs—was introduced into the Council of Ministers, under whose auspices the Jewish National Council continued its work.

A number of eminent Jewish political leaders held high government positions: Dr. Margolin was a member of the Supreme Court of the Republic, and later a member of the Ukrainian Legation in Paris, and still later an Envoy in London; M. Rafes occupied the position of Controller General; Dr. M. L. Vishnitser, a well-known historian and journalist, was Secretary of the Diplomatic Mission in Great Britain; during the Directoire, Pinkhas Krasny was the Minister for Jewish Affairs, and so on.

Among the most important measures taken by the Ukrainian government was the law of national and personal autonomy, passed unanimously on January 9, 1918. This law was hailed with great enthusiasm by the Jews.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 270—95.

[38] Elie Dobrovski, *L'Affaire Petlura-Schwarzbard,* Union Fédérative Socialiste, Champigny, Seine.

M. Zilberfarb, the Secretary General for Jewish Affairs, said: "The law we have passed may be compared with the acts of the great French Revolution. Then the Rights of Man were proclaimed; today it is the Rights of Nations." M. Rafes, the Bund representative, described the law as "an act of the greatest importance unknown in any other European country." The leader of the Zionists, N. Syrkin, wrote: "My old dream has become a reality."

On the occasion of the passing of this law, the Jewish leaders sent telegrams to all their centers—to Petrograd, to America, and to Austria.[39]

In the aforementioned book, Margolin states that wherever the Directoire gained power the pogroms stopped. Other Jewish scholars of the period confirm this.

Speaking of the attitude of the local Ukrainian population to the pogroms, N. Shtyf says:

> ... In the great majority of cases, the local Christian population deeply sympathized with the fate of the Jews and hid them in their houses. They defended them, and for this very reason they sent a delegation of members of the local government and other organizations to the authorities. Some people acted on their own, sometimes with great self-sacrifice. Such cases occurred in Bila Tserkva, Horodyshche, Hostomel, Korsun, Cherkassy, Vepryk, Borozna, Konotop, Nizhen, Novy Mhlyn, Boryspol, Dzhuryn and Kryve Ozero.[40]

Solomon Goldelman has this to say about the pogroms during Denikin's rule:

> You abroad must have already heard about Denikin's pogroms. *Anti-Jewish pogroms such as these and with so many victims have never occurred before in the Ukraine or anywhere in the world* [Goldelman's italics]. What a blow to the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia and the prosperous Jewish town population, who expected Denikin to be a source of order and of strength! [41]

Hence, as a result of its geographical position, its unpropitious inheritance of reactionary tsarist policy, and, at times, of unhappy coincidences, the Ukraine became the scene of tragedy for the Jewish nation. The Jewish historian Cherykover states:

> ... The Ukraine was the territory where the pogroms began. The participants in the pogroms were not Ukrainians by origin, or at least only a few of them were; in general they were Russian soldiers.[42]

*

Let us, at the end of this brief review of the events which took place in the Ukraine during the Revolution, give the last word to Cherykover, who though biased, is nevertheless a penetrating student of Ukrainian-Jewish relations.

After describing the Ukraine as an agricultural country—the "most agricultural country in Europe"—he says:

[39] Tscherikower, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[40] N. Shtif, *Pogromy na Ukraine: Period Dobrovolcheskoi Armii* (Pogroms in the Ukraine: The Period of the Volunteer Army), Berlin, 1922, pp. 24—25.

[41] Holdelman, *op. cit.*, pp. 86—87.

[42] Tscherikower, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

Here, in this kingdom of "muzhiks," [43] the "revolt of the muzhik element," which started under the fatal banner of Bolshevism, was especially intense in the first years of the Revolution. When the Ukrainian countryside refused to accept the Communist experiment and the Moscow Soviet government forcibly asserted its authority, all the "insurgents" and "partisans" started a stubborn armed struggle against it; then the peasantry turned its wrath against the towns, in which the Jews formed a large proportion of the population. The Jewish Communists were very often in important positions and were energetic followers of the "Moscow" policy. Probably in no other place did the Soviet authorities pursue their policy so stubbornly as in the Ukraine, provoking the civil war and completely ignoring the complicated national relations which existed there and the unavoidable consequences suffered by the Jewish community, the first symptoms of which were already noticeable. This act of throwing a lighted torch into the powder magazine gave an excuse to the enemies of the Soviet authorities for shedding rivers of innocent Jewish blood.

This quotation from Cherykover is not given to prove the existence of certain pro-Bolshevik sentiments among the Jews, or to prove which nation held more of such beliefs. This problem is of long standing and such a comparison will do nothing to help matters. Not only the Jews but also the Ukrainian youth and the youth of other nations within the former Russian Empire supported Communist ideas.

It is a fact that there were proportionally more Jews, compared with other nations within the Soviet Union, in various Bolshevik and particularly Party posts; but, as Margolin justly says, this is explained by the historic conditions of Russian imperialism:

> The lack of civic rights in Russia caused the Jewish youth to grow up in abnormal conditions, in the repressive atmosphere of the "pale of settlement." Its craving for knowledge and education was reduced to reading demagogic pamphlets describing the future socialist paradise. The percentage quota forced Jewish children to struggle for the right to be admitted to secondary schools . . . The difficulties in attaining any position or distinction in the army or the civil service developed a sickly egoism and conceit in those who were able to surmount all the obstacles. Add to all this the general background of the hopelessly difficult struggle for a beggarly existence, the crowding in filthy, dusty little towns within the "pale of settlement" and the high-handedness of the police . . .
>
> No wonder that under such conditions Jewish youth was inclined toward Marxism in all social and national questions. No wonder that among the Bolshevik Commissars in the towns within the former "pale of settlement" so many Jews were to be found.[44]

Moscow's Bolshevik policy of the "lighted torch in the powder magazine" caused the shedding not only of rivers of Jewish blood that Cherykover mournfully reports, but also of a sea of Ukrainian blood (at least 10 million Ukrainians were killed); in the twenties and thirties, Jewish and Ukrainian blood mingled in one stream. Nevertheless, neither the Ukrainian political

[43] *Muzhik* is a Russian name for a peasant frequently used in contempt.

[44] Margolin, *op. cit.*, pp. 321—22.

leaders nor the Ukrainian people as a whole have tried to lay the responsibility for this on the Jews. Cherykover tries to explain the anarchic terror which followed the overthrow of the tsarist regime as being due to the "rebellious" traditions of the peasantry.

The Russian people as a whole cannot be blamed for the crimes of Denikin's army, nor any other nationality whose members served in the units of the Denikin or the Bolshevik armies and took part in the pogroms. So, equally, the crimes of the demoralized elements of the Ukrainian army cannot be placed on the shoulders of the whole Ukrainian nation. The chaos, which arose essentially as a result of the war lost by the tsarist regime, is chiefly responsible for those sad events. According to Cherykover,[45] the guilt lies in the "morbid militarized psychology" of the masses, who had "become familiar with guns." The guilt is in the general cruelty of individuals—soldiers exhausted after four years of bloody revolution and civil war. The guilt is in the policy of the "lighted torch in the powder magazine" which the Bolsheviks so assiduously pursued. Lastly, the responsibility is in the political passions incited by the policy of the Bolsheviks, who skillfully took advantage of criminal elements in order to drown the Revolution in blood and to destroy the young, newly-acquired freedom of all the nationalities of the former Russian Empire, including that of the Russians themselves.

[45] Tscherikower, *op. cit.*, pp. 25—26.

Forest Depletion in the Ukrainian SSR

O. PARAMONIV

In 1955, the government of the USSR suddenly decided to have *half* of all the "conditionally" mature timber felled in the forests of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and also in the thinly forested part of European Russia. The reserve of mature timber in these forests amounts to only 3.5% of the mature timber reserve of the entire USSR. Another strange aspect of the matter is the fact that the Soviet government had long ago declared that these forests were protected catchment areas and that it was therefore prohibited to cut more than the annual increase of timber in them. Now they will be deprived of the increment of many years ahead, i.e. the felling against annual increment was mortgaged for many years to come. Almost all of the above-mentioned forests were occupied during the last war by the Germans, and most are situated in the countries which seceded from Russia after the Revolution and were later reannexed. For a better understanding of the significance of this new decision by the Soviet government, we give below a short survey of the main stages of the organization of the forest economy in the Ukraine up to 1955. In the light of this survey we shall examine the details of the above-mentioned decision and the government's explanation concerning it.

The chief principle governing forest conservation in the Ukraine prior to World War I (no matter to what state the various parts of the Ukraine belonged), was to cut only the equivalent of the annual increase of mature timber in any given forest range, thus avoiding the reduction of standing timber reserves. Only natural disasters (fires, animal pests, etc.) or extraordinary circumstances (e.g., the construction of a railway through solid forest), could alter this system of forest conservation. This rational system of conservation was conducted in the Ukraine until the Soviet regime was established there.

In the Eastern Ukraine, which was the first to become sovietized, the forests suffered greatly from clearings for war purposes. Later, when the Soviet regime was firmly established, the forests suffered still more. To obtain foreign currency and thus bolster its economy, including industry, the Soviet regime began to export the country's finest timber, taken from the forests of the Ukraine. The climate of the Ukraine, and its thick layers of fertile soil provide the necessary conditions for a fine growth of trees. The average annual timber increment per hectare of forest amounts to 3.4 cubic meters in the Ukraine (A. G. Soldatov, 1955) as against 1.1 cubic meters for the USSR as a whole (E. Więcko, 1954). Most of the finest and most valuable stands of oak and ash grew in the Ukraine; no such stands were located near Leningrad or Moscow. Mention must also be made of the period when the

Soviets began exporting rough-sawn lumber. This wood was of excellent quality, free from knots and other defects. Lumber exported from the Ukraine was mostly in the form of round timber and three-quarter squared logs. The price per cubic foot of partly planed logs was from 1.26 to 1.45 gold rubles ex forest (D. F. Rudnyev, 1928).

Another reason for the importance of the Ukrainian forests as a source of raw timber is that they are located in densely populated regions where transport is excellent and manpower easily available. Needless to say, the Soviet regime has not spared forests outside the Ukraine either, if they contained anything suitable for export.

When the Soviets increased the rate of clearing of timber in about 1926, the prerevolutionary scientific rules of rational forest conservation were proclaimed as capitalistic and anti-Soviet. The protests which the foresters raised against this procedure resulted merely in a reduction of their own ranks.*

During this export fever, the forests of the Ukraine were deprived of their finest stock of trees, which were cut down even in forests of scientific importance. Only part of the superior lumber, especially that of the so-called "aviation ash," was used for the internal requirements of the USSR, namely, for military requirements. When the export fever subsided, because there was not much left to export, the clearing of the forests was continued so as to satisfy the requirements of the socialist economy.

In 1931, the government noted that only a few forests were left in the densely populated section of the USSR. Therefore, a law was issued which divided the forests which were important to the whole state into "industrial" and "protective" forests. To the latter category belonged the forests of the Ukraine and of other parts of the USSR where most of the timber had already been cleared. In these protective forests it was forbidden to fell more than the annual increment of timber. However, because of the constant failure to fulfill the logging programs in Siberia and in the North of European Russia, the law of 1931 concerning the protective forests remained primarily on paper, though it continued to be formally in force. There was always some pretext or other for unscheduled felling in one section or another of the protective zone, and such fellings have been continued, though less intensively.

By 1936, the forests in the densely populated sections of the USSR had become so few that the attention of military authorities was attracted. At the same time it was observed that the rivers were beginning to silt up and were becoming less navigable. There was even talk of a change in the climate and lower fertility as a result of deforestation. In most cases the remaining forests were denuded of saplings and in many cases there had been

* Next to the clergy, it was the foresters who suffered most heavily at the hands of the Soviet regime: living in the forests they had to operate individual farms and for this reason were listed as "bourgeois" or "kulaks" after the Revolution. They suffered from the frequent changes in regime during the civil war since there were always persons hiding in the woods who were hostile to one regime or another, usually to the Soviets. The regime demanded the aid of the foresters in hunting down such fugitives, while the latter attempted to use the foresters as contacts with the outside world, to procure food, etc. But regardless of what role the foresters played, many lost their lives. When, in 1931, the staff of the forest experimental station at Darnytsya near Kiev protested against the destruction of forests of scientific value they were threatened with punishment, the station itself was closed and the forest felled.

no attempt at replanting. This combination of circumstances forced the government to adopt decisive measures in order to prevent the forests from being completely destroyed. In 1936, a law concerning the catchment forests was issued. Approximately 54,000,000 hectares of forest-grown area which were situated within 2 to 20 kilometers from the banks of rivers, chiefly the Dnieper and its tributaries, were declared to be catchment woodlands. It was forbidden to cut more than the annual growth of mature timber, and in a so-called prohibited zone only the injured, sickly or withering trees, and those which interfered with the growth of better-quality trees, were permitted to be cut down. In order to enforce the law of 1936, the government established a Chief Administration for Forest Protection and Forest Planting under the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR, while similar administrative bodies were attached to the Soviets of People's Commissars of the republics on the territories in which catchment forests were situated. Lizhdvoi was appointed chief of the Ukrainian Administration for Forest Protection and Forest Planting, and Demyanovych, one of the most prominent Ukrainian forestry experts, was made his deputy. Both were soon arrested and replaced by Chernikov and Shlyakhanov. The former was also plenipotentiary from the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR to the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, which meant that he held a much higher position than that of chief of the above-mentioned Administration. This circumstance makes it clear that the government was seriously concerned with the problem of protecting the forests in the Ukraine. The rapacious clearing was discontinued and measures were taken to plant the old clearings where saplings had not sprung up naturally. This improvement in forest conservation in the Ukraine lasted till the outbreak of World War II. It must be mentioned that the sums the government apportioned for this purpose were so large that they could not always be fully used.

In 1941, an event took place which had, perhaps, something in common with the event which we mentioned in the beginning of this article. The width of the prohibited zones along the rivers was diminished, sometimes even by half, with the obvious purpose of immediately obtaining a certain quantity of lumber in view of the impending war. The development of the war, however, very soon forced the Red Army to withdraw from almost the whole of the catchment forest zone, and there was no opportunity to cut the timber.

In 1943, during the German occupation, a new and important forestry law was issued in the USSR, which remained in force until 1957. All the forests of the USSR, except those on kolkhoz land, were placed under the control of a state institution, of which there were several at the time. These forests were divided into three groups according to the purpose they were to serve. The first group consisted of scientific preserves, protective forests, health resort parks and green zones around some cities. In the forests belonging to this group no trees were to be felled except those superfluous from the point of view of forestry management. The second group, consisting of catchment forests, was set apart in 1936. The system of exploitation of these forests remained unchanged: in the prohibited zones only superfluous trees were to be felled, and in other areas not more than the annual increment. The third group, industrial forests, were located chiefly in northern Russia.

After the war, the greater part of the forests of the Ukraine were classified in Group II and the remainder in Group I.

In 1946, the area of catchment forests in the entire USSR increased from 54,000,000 to 75,000,000 hectares, of which about 20,000,000 hectares constituted the prohibited zone. Thus, in spite of the acute need of timber for the reconstruction of the war-ravaged country, the Soviet government limited forest exploitation in the densely populated and thinly forested sections of the USSR to a greater extent than before the war. This measure of conservation may be attributed either to a calming down of the government after the war or to the fact that many new territories had been acquired or taken under control.

In 1947, Ministries of Forestry based on the already existing Administrations of Forest Protection and Forest Planting were established in the USSR and in the republics of the Union. These ministries were given control over all forests with the exception of those belonging to the kolkhozes and some wooded areas classified as Group I. A. G. Soldatov was nominated Minister of Forestry in the Ukraine.

In 1948, the government of the USSR adopted a gigantic plan for the "reconstruction of nature" in which protective forest belts occupied a place of first importance. The title of the Ministry of Forestry was expanded by adding the words "and of Protective Afforestation." Later, special Forest Institutes were established for the first time at the Academies of Sciences. This step shows the importance which the government attached to the plan of reconstructing nature. Academician Petro Stepanovych Pohrebnyak was appointed head of the Institute of Forestry of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

In 1953, all the Ministries of Forestry and Protective Afforestation were attached, as part of a move to reduce the number of ministries, to the Ministries of Agriculture and they were renamed Chief Administrations of Forestry and Protective Afforestation. This change had no detrimental results on forest conservation as the government's concern for this activity did not diminish till 1955.

However, a distinction must be made between Soviet legislation and actual practice. A good illustration of this discrepancy is an article written by L. D. Shlyakhanov, deputy chief of the Chief Administration of Forestry and Protective Afforestation, attached to the Ministry of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR. In this article Shlyakhanov wrote:

> The present fellings have led to a reduction in reserves of stocks of trees and in the Carpathians to erosion and the devastation of mountain slopes. In the past ten years alone, in spite of repeated instructions that stocks should be preserved in the thinly forested parts of the state, more than 100 million cubic meters of wood have been felled, i.e., the whole utilizable stock for ten years in advance. As a result of systematic over-logging, i.e., felling in excess of the program, young stands now predominate in our forests with a proportion of 56%, as opposed to 10% of mature stands. In the last ten years, if we include over-logging, an annual average of 11 million cubic meters has been felled.

In fact, there are even less mature stands, because the so-called "conditionally mature" stands are now considered mature, although they have not reached the normal state of maturity.

A characteristic picture of the distribution of stands according to age is given by N. A. Selitskaya for the Gnivan forest, where, as a result of previous over-logging, there are now 1,815 hectares of young stands, 331 hectares of medium and only 15 hectares of older stands. Under normal conditions these

areas should be about equal. In areas that have been subjected to Soviet timber economy fairly recently, there are relatively fewer stands, but the rate of felling for mature stands is very rapid. According to S. I. Mokritsky, the state forest potential in Moldavia, which consists of 205,600 hectares, counts 91,000 hectares of young stands, i.e. 48.9%. At the same time the author, who is deputy Minister of Agriculture, insists that the age for the maturity of timber should be reduced by 20 years.

In 1955, several articles appeared which showed that although the Soviet government had not rescinded its earlier resolutions concerning the system of exploitation in the forests belonging to Groups I and II, it intended to take from them within the next five years at least one half of the trees which, with some reservations, could be considered as mature. These articles were written by the following persons, who at the time of writing were still occupying leading positions in forest conservation: B. M. Perepechyn, chief of the Department of Forest Exploitation of the Supreme Administration of Forestry and Protective Afforestation attached to the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR; A. G. Soldatov, chief of the Supreme Administration of Forestry and Protective Afforestation attached to the Ministry of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR; and B. N. Lukyanov, Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR.

The bulk of the material concerning the change in forest exploitation was submitted by Perepechyn. The other two authors were only masking the nature of the change by drawing attention to the "increase in the productivity of the forests of the Ukraine," making the change appear to be a new campaign. Soldatov's article was published immediately after B. M. Perepechyn's and ostensibly as a continuation. Moreover, it is striking that the one voice from Moscow was supported by two from Kiev and that, after this, no one was given the opportunity to speak on this question, indicating probably the large scale of the planned fellings in the Ukraine which will become obvious from the following analysis of the pertinent figures.

Perepechyn remarked that as a result of the earlier large-scale clearings in the densely populated part of the USSR, there remained in this area only 3.5% of the entire amount of mature timber in the USSR. He declared that despite a long series of measures which the government of the USSR had applied in the course of many years with the object of shifting the tree fellings from densely to thinly populated regions where there are large forests, this scheme could not yet be realized. In 1954, for instance, only 35% of the felling and extraction program had been fulfilled in the northern part of European Russia, only 51% in the Ural Mountains and only 35% in Siberia. Further on, Perepechyn discussed the most important issue as follows:

> In order to supply industry and agriculture on time and in abundance with timber, it has been recognized as necessary to increase the felling slightly in the forests of Group II [the catchment forests]. In the forests of this Group the additional logging quota has been fixed at 18,348,000 cubic meters, and the annual additional logging quota for the period of 1956 to 1960 amounts to 102,367,000 cubic meters of lumber. This additional logging quota in the Group II forests necessitates an increase of wood cutting by 11% over the original calculations. Yet this increase in the number of forests released for clearing has not been distributed evenly among all Group II forest areas, but is centered mostly in the 30 regions and republics of the center,

south and west [as the forest conservation districts of the European part of the USSR]. In these districts it is planned to fell, in the period 1956—60, 72,500,000 cubic meters of timber per year, which constitutes 120% of the original estimate of the yield of the wood cutting area. In the course of the Five-Year Plan period, the additional clearings will amount to approximately 62,000,000 cubic meters of lumber, while the wood reserves in these 30 regions and republics (including the Ukrainian SSR, the Belorussian SSR, and the Baltic republics) will be reduced by 56% of the stock of wood reserves as existing on January 1, 1956.

It is clear what is meant by the expression "to increase the felling slightly." For the Ukraine at least, it means that the wood increment will be removed scores of years in advance. Unfortunately, Perepechyn failed to submit any figures referring specifically to the Ukraine: he merely mentioned an annual logging of 72,500,000 cubic meters of wood, while Soldatov stated that the annual forest cuttings in the Ukraine would amount to an annual minimum of 20—25,000,000 cubic meters. It is obvious that of the felling planned for the 30 regions and republics, at least one third was to be contributed by the Ukraine. There is no doubt that these fellings will take place in the forests of Galicia, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia, as well as in the forests of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, none of which have yet suffered from such rapacious methods of logging. In Belorussia, it is the forests that before the war belonged to Poland which will have to suffer.

Referring to the cutting of the 56% of mature timber, Perepechyn continued:

> In order to prevent this, it would be necessary to reduce, beginning in 1961, the annual timber release in these regions and republics to less than half. Yet there is no need for this, because a very favorable distribution of the stock of trees according to age groups has been established in the central districts of the USSR, where intensive forest exploitation has already been conducted for many decades. Here there are considerable reserves of maturing stocks of trees which surpass the mature stocks both in quantity and quality.

To corroborate his statement about the "very favorable distribution," Perepechyn adduced a table on the timber resources of some of the areas only, declaring that the situation was exactly the same throughout. From this table it can be seen that there are at present the following stocks of trees (in thousands of hectares):

	In the Ukraine	In Belorussia	In Latvia
Medium Aged .	881.0	513.5	206.6
Maturing . .	420.0	354.9	61.6
Mature . . .	417.2	174.1	41.2

Using various calculations of his own as a basis, Perepechyn stated that the felled mature trees would be replaced by 1974 by those now maturing, and that, from 1975 onwards, the annual exploitation of the wood cutting areas would be normal. There is, probably, no point in discussing his calculations, since he gave no data on stocks of less than medium age and did not specify at what age he considered a stock of trees to be mature. Lacking an answer to these questions, all calculations are worthless.

It still remains to be explained what stocks of trees are now considered mature. This is a matter of great importance.

Before the Revolution, the normal felling cycle for the oak and pine stocks of the Ukraine produced from seed was recognized to be a period of at least 120 years. Under especially favorable conditions it was sometimes increased to 180 or even 240 years. During the period of feverish exploitation all the really big trees were felled and later all the trees of over 90 years of age were also cut if they were suitable for industrial purposes. Soldatov, writing about the present felling cycle, did not state what period it embraced. From his materials it can be seen, however, that for hornbeam and oak growing from stools the period is 60 years, and for oak and pine produced from seed it is about 90 years. In future, however, it will be even less.

Perepechyn's calculations concerning the alleged "very favorable distribution of tree stocks according to age groups" are accordingly intended only to conceal the real state of affairs and to explain somehow the very considerable deviation from the earlier rule permitting the felling of no more than the annual timber growth. Taking into consideration the fact that before the Revolution there were more old tree stocks in the Ukraine than young (contrary to the present situation), the forests had already been deprived of their yield for 100 years in advance by 1939. It was this that compelled the government to adopt decisive measures to protect the remaining forests.

As to the forests belonging to Group I (scientific reservations, protective forests, health resort woods, and the woods and "green zones" around such cities as Kiev), Perepechyn stated that they too would be subject to logging, but to no more than 1% of the mature stock reserves annually. As a result of these fellings, the forest conservation authorities will, according to his calculations, "succeed in replacing all mature trees by young ones within 26 years." Since these figures of 1% and 26 years are incompatible, the authorities will no doubt "succeed" in cutting down all trees suitable for industry in a much shorter time.

Since Group I includes a great variety of forests—beginning with the small trees of protective forest belts and ending with the giant beech trees of the Crimean reservation (which now belongs to the Ukraine)—and since the information on this group of forests presented by Perepechyn is very small, it is not possible to furnish an analysis here of the nature of the problem. It is obvious, however, that the forests of Group I will also fail to benefit from the new felling program. This much can be gathered from the passage in Perepechyn's article in which he referred to the forest Groups I and II together, saying the "the increase in the extent of wood fellings will cause a certain divergence from the existing felling regulations." Here the matter in question is no longer the extent of the fellings, but the system applied. Immediately after, he remarked that these new measures "may be harmful to the woods" if reafforestation is not guaranteed.

Perepechyn expressed the opinion that the afforestation of the clearings was guaranteed by the permission for reafforestation, provided the logging industry could obtain the necessary machinery and manpower to reafforest the clearings. He wrote, "Thus the forest economy has at present incomparably broader possibilities for the restoration of forests in the clearings." This is strange since the reafforestation of clearings, under conditions obtaining under normal forest exploitation, is usually carried out by the Chief Administration of Forestry and Protective Afforestation. Only these Administrations have suitable machines at their disposal for the planting of

trees, and not the lumber industry, which has only machines suitable for the logging and transportation of timber.

From Perepechyn's statements, it is clear that at present, when the new big fellings of tree stocks have already begun, the reafforestation of cleared land is by no means guaranteed. If this were not so, the government would not be giving the above-mentioned "permission"; on the contrary, it would oblige the loggers to provide everything necessary for the reafforestation of the clearings. It must be kept in mind that the logger's aim is a maximum fulfillment of the program with a minimum of expenditure and that the problem of reafforestation is therefore of secondary importance. The government is very well aware of this fact. The catchment forests had been set apart not only to protect them from rapacious logging, but also so that the woods in the areas where the logger had left behind him only tree stumps would be restored. At present the Soviet government apparently pays even less attention to the problem of reafforestation than was the case during the previous two decades.

Perepechyn concluded his article with the remark that the increased felling was "only a temporary measure." This may be so, but as a result of this "temporary" measure the wood accretion will be collected for many years in advance, and from the very forests which are important as scientific, protective and water conservation forests, or as health resort parks.

If we do not compare the present state of the cutting stock of the Ukraine with the pre-revolutionary state, but proceed from the forest situation as of January 1, 1956, Perepechyn's statistics permit an approximate estimate of the number of years for which the Soviet government wishes to collect the timber increment in advance. "The development of forest conservation," of which there is so much talk at present, consists actually in the fact that the riches and resources which earlier generations safeguarded are now being spent and wasted.

Only a few words remain to be said about Soldatov's article. He enlarged upon a number of measures which should be used to increase the productivity of the forests of the Ukraine. Among them are many that would answer the purpose, yet there is probably no point in discussing them since Soldatov's entire article is aimed at masking the rapacious loggings and focussing the public's attention on the "productivity" of the forests. Among other things, he wrote: "In the program for the development of the forest economy, the annual timber release should, in the immediate future, amount to a minimum of 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 cubic meters. Such an annual release of wood can be achieved only if the average annual increment per hectare increases by two to two and one half times." The measures recommended by Soldatov, even if they were all taken and were actually put into effect, do not guarantee such an increase, because all, such as the improvement of sandy areas and marshes, are calculated to bear results only in the distant future. Although he realized this very well, he had to give the local forest officers such advice as would enable them, when working out plans for the raising of the productivity of the forests, to submit indices justifying the logging now of the already determined number of trees. It was for this reason that he gave "controlling figures" within a limit of even 0.01 cubic meters! According to his figures, the "productivity" of tree stocks can be increased in the near future as follows: pine from 3.27 cubic meters average increment per hectare to 4.39 cubic meters (or 39%), and oaks from the present increment of 2.5 cubic

meters to 3.48 cubic meters (or 37%). On concluding his article, Soldatov pointed out clearly exactly what must be done to increase immediately the productivity of the forests. He said: "... It is necessary to establish at what age the stocks of trees should be logged to secure the supply of a maximum number of assortments of the required qualities within the shortest possible time." That is, the logging cycle is to be reduced still further and trees of medium age are to be considered mature. It is evident that it is only thus that the increase in the productivity of the forests of the Ukraine is to be obtained, "in the immediate future," because no method of producing a true rise in the productivity of forest areas can yield results so quickly.

In order to understand the sharp change which took place in the forest policy of the USSR in 1955, the following factors must be taken into consideration:

1. The forests which are scheduled for enforced logging constitute only 3.5% of the reserves of "mature" timber in the USSR. In addition, they are situated in a zone with few forest reserves and are of protective, scientific, catchment, and sanitary (health resort) significance. It was for this reason that they were not subject to over-logging even during the period of postwar reconstruction.

2. Until now, the non-fulfillment of the logging plans has caused no great infringement on the system of management in the non-industrial forests.

3. The government of the USSR no longer pays as much attention as before to the question of reafforestation of the forest clearings in the western parts of the USSR.

4. In 1941, on the eve of the outbreak of the war, extensive loggings in the catchment forests were also planned.

Taking everything into consideration, only one of two conclusions can be drawn: either the USSR has found itself in an exceedingly precarious economic situation, or the Soviet government wishes to have all timber of superior value removed from the endangered zone in case of war.

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Socialism: Does It Exist in the USSR? *

I. VASYLEVYCH

Prof. M. Vasyliv's work is valuable for its penetrating analysis of the Soviet economic system with its intricate structure aimed at the exploitation and oppression of the working masses.

The only flaw in the above-mentioned work is, in our opinion, the erroneous theoretical characterization of the Soviet economic and social order which it presents.

In his article, Prof. Vasyliv unreservedly employs the official Bolshevik propagandist terminology. For instance, he calls the Soviet prison of nations a "socialist" state, the state capital investments exacted by the ruthless exploitation of human labor "socialist accumulation," and the conditions of slave-labor "socialist relations."

The author completely disagrees with the definition of the whole Soviet economic and social system as a system of state capitalism. Instead he calls the Soviet economic order "consistently socialist," because, according to him, it fulfills the two basic requirements of socialism: (a) "socialization of all the means of production and their transference to the control of the state and (b) all-out economic planning."

But as far as social relations are concerned in the USSR—where, according to Bolshevik promises, a classless society was to be established, and every kind of exploitation of man by man abolished, where a new mentality was to be created and a new attitude toward work was to be cultivated which was to raise the material standard of all working people to a considerably higher level than in the capitalist countries—here, conditions have not only not improved, but have even grown much worse. The author therefore looks for a new general term to describe the whole Soviet system, i.e., that system which, according to him, combines a "consistently Socialist" economic order with a conflicting system of social relations, and finally defines it as "pseudo-Socialism." We do not share Prof. Vasyliv's view.

In the first place he identifies, without any reservations the concepts of society and state and, thus, of socialization and nationalization.

Socialization of the means of production is not always identical with nationalization, especially in non-democratic countries where the authority

* Remarks on Prof. M. Vasyliv's article "Do pytannya pro pryrodu sovyetskoho hospodarskoho i sotsiyalnoho ustroyu" (Toward the Problem of the Nature of the Soviet Economic and Social Order), *Ukrainsky zbirnyk* (Ukrainian Review), Munich, 1956, No. 4, pp. 87—110. We are publishing them to illustrate a different view of the nature of the Soviet economic system.—*Ed.*

of the state is wielded by an insignificant minority against the will of the majority of the people. The Soviet Union offers a particularly striking example of this: the USSR is not a free society and therefore there are no public or communal organizations established by the free initiative and will of their members and operating under the free self-administration of these members. The place of society is taken by the state administration, recruited from the ruling caste of the monopolistic Communist Party, which, by means of coercion and terror, wields dictatorial power over the subjugated peoples under the camouflage of the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat," and thus controls every branch of economic, social and cultural life. The history of mankind has never known such insidious and total despotism.

In order to arrive in this complex issue at a correct theoretical evaluation of the Soviet economic and social system and, at the same time, to avoid being arbitrary in our conclusions, the most simple procedure, in our opinion, will be to refer to the ideas of the creators of so-called "scientific socialism" whom the present Bolshevik dictatorship considers the infallible source of all "Socialist" wisdom, i.e., Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Marx and Engels made a careful distinction between the concepts of society and state, and assigned particular importance to the socialization of the means of production as constituting the road to socialism. According to Engels, the state was to disappear altogether as soon as socialism was realized. All the economic, social and cultural functions of human life were to be assumed by society—without the state and its apparatus of coercion. In general, Marx and Engels always maintained an attitude of distrust and dislike toward the state.

For instance, in his critique of the program of the German Workers' Party, which was accepted in Gotha in 1875,[1] Marx expressed some characteristic thoughts, illuminating his attitude toward the state and society. Thus, criticizing, for instance, the German Workers' Party's demand, contained in the above-mentioned program, for the creation of productive cooperative societies with the assistance of state loans, Marx said:

> The idea that it is possible to build up a new society like a new railroad with the assistance of a state loan, is worthy of the fantasy of a Lassalle. As for the contemporary cooperative societies, they are of value only inasfar as they have been created by workers, independent of governments as well as of the patronage of the bourgeoisie."

Referring to the problem of the "foundations of the state in relation to freedom," Marx wrote:

> Freedom is the extent to which the state has been turned from an organ to which society is subordinated into an organ which is subordinated to society. Today, too, there exist different types of states granting society higher or lower degrees of freedom dependent on how much they limit the "will of the state."
>
> The German Workers' Party demonstrates—at least if we are to judge by its program—how shallow its understanding of socialist ideas is, if, instead of considering the presentday society (and this refers to every future society as well) as the foundation of the presentday state

[1] *Kritik Karl Marx am Gothaer Programm,* republished under the title *Das Gothaer Programm,* Bollwerk Verlag Karl Drott, Offenbach a. M., 1947, pp. 147—48.

(or future state for the respective future society), it considers the state rather as some self-contained entity possessing its own spiritual and moral foundations in addition to the foundations determining the extent of freedom.

Is this not an indirect condemnation of the whole contemporary Bolshevik anti-social state despotism?

True, Marx also furnished the Kremlin dictatorship, if only indirectly, with considerable formal propagandist ""arguments" for the Soviet "socialism." Thus the entire socialist phraseology coined by Marx and Engels has been skilfully appropriated; proclaiming the "scientific socialism" of the latter as infallible, the Soviet leaders do not hesitate in practice to falsify and twist it for their own ends.

The progress of science and of economic and social life has demonstrated that not all of the teaching of Marx and Engles has stood the test of time. Marx's materialist conception of history, for instance, is unreal and unscientific, as are also his sociological prophesies of the inevitable proletarianization of the majority of the people and of the inevitable and automatic change of capitalism into socialism, and especially his phrase about the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat" during the transitional period between capitalism and socialism, which has been an invaluable cover for Soviet despotism. Marx used this phrase about the dictatorship of the proletariat in his above-mentioned criticism of the Gotha program of the German Workers' Party, without supporting it by any arguments and without ever mentioning it anywhere again. According to his own theory about the inevitable proletarianization of the overwhelming majority of the people, the proletariat would eo ipso have become that majority and would not need to resort to dictatorship—because the concept of dictatorship involves the suppression of the majority by a minority. After Marx's death, Engels tried to erase the former's lapsus linguae, claiming that when speaking about a "dictatorship of the proletariat," Marx was thinking of the Paris Commune, which, as is known, had a democratic regime freely elected by all the strata of the population of Paris.[2]

In any case one thing is certain: neither Marx nor Engels ever advocated the idea of a dictatorship of any single party or the need for a monopolistic party at all. In their "Communist Manifesto"[3] they stated expressly: "The Communists are not a special party as against *other* workers' parties."

In this respect, Lenin and his successors, the "faithful" disciples of Marx and Engels, quite obviously falsified and distorted their teachers' ideas.

Engels expresses his ideas concerning the issue of the nationalization of the means of production still more clearly in his "Anti-Dühring."[4] In it, he writes:

> The modern state, whatever its form, is essentially a capitalist machine; it is the capitalists' state, it is the ideal total capitalist. The more productive forces it takes over into its possession, the more it

[2] Engels' foreword to Marx's *Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich.*

[3] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Das Kommunistische Manifest,* Sozialistische Partei Österreichs, 1945, Vienna 1, p. 21.

[4] Friedrich Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft,* Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, Marx-Engels Institute, Moscow, p. 288.

becomes an all-round capitalist and the more it exploits its citizens. The workers remain wage earners, proletarians.

In a remark contained in the same work, Engels expresses his opinion on the question of the nationalization of the means of production still more clearly:

> ... but somehow, recently, since Bismarck advocated nationalization, a kind of a false socialism has emerged, here and there it has even turned into a policy of obsequiousness *(Wohldienerei)* which has unreservedly proclaimed every act of nationalization—even Bismarck's—as socialist. Indeed, if the nationalization of tobacco is socialist, then Napoleon as well as Metternich should be considered as belonging to the founders of Socialism ... Yet these were by no means Socialist measures—neither direct nor indirect, neither intentional nor unintentional.

Thus, it appears that Engels did not consider the nationalization of the means of production to be in itself the realization of socialism, nor did he call a state which nationalized even all the means of production a socialist state.

Prof. Vasyliv declines to describe the Soviet system as state capitalism. He says: "The definition of the Soviet system as a system of state capitalism will not stand up to criticism—neither from the logical nor from the methodological point of view. In the Soviet economy we find none of the features most characteristic of capitalism: private property, personal interest, profit, competition, spontaneity of economy, and a free market." This is true—with some exceptions. "Spontaneity of economy," for instance, is now being increasingly obstructed by modern capitalism with the assistance of planning and the capitalist state. This, for instance, is the case with the directives issued by the government of the USA concerning the regulation of agricultural production, etc. Competition, too, is not so much an inalienable feature of the capitalist system as a method of getting control over the market. Modern capitalism is even apt to eliminate competition by means of organizing cartels and trusts wherever it can do so. But none of these things prevents capitalism from being capitalism. Capitalism is not inconsistent with monopolies, be they state monopolies or private ones.

Since the days of Karl Marx, capitalism has made considerable progress before reaching its present stage of socialization, so to speak. This is, by the way, why Marx's *Kapital* is in great need of "rejuvenation." [5]

The above-mentioned characteristic features of the capitalist system, as specified by Prof. Vasyliv, pertain to *private* capitalism, but not to *state* capitalism.

It might be assumed that the term "state capitalism" has been invented by modern Social Democrats to save the face of their socialism, but this is not at all the case. As we have already seen, Engels designated the state, which appropriates the means of production, as a "total capitalist" *(Gesamtkapitalist)*.

But why delve into the remote past? Let us rather recall what Lenin, the creator of the whole Bolshevik system, said on this subject.

In a long article entitled "About Leftist Infantilism and Philistinism," [6] which was published in the *Pravda* of 9th—11th May, 1918, Lenin expounded

[5] Paul Sering, *Jenseits des Kapitalismus.*

[6] Lenin, *Über linke Kinderei und Kleinbürgerlichkeit,* Sämtliche Werke, Vol. XXII, Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, p. 577.

his view, which he had conceived in 1917, on the necessity of a total socialization of all the means of production in Russia, and condemned the "leftist" opposition within the Party, which saw in this criticism a danger for socialism. Lenin did not say then that nationalization is identical with socialism. On the contrary, he pointed out that Russia must pass through a phase of capitalism. Not once did he use the term of, for instance, "state socialism" for this nationalization, but he called it "*state capitalism*" or even "*monopolistic state capitalism*" or "*state greatcapitalism.*" This is what Lenin wrote:

> State capitalism would be an enormous step forward ... In the first place, state capitalism stands incomparably higher than does our present economy. In the second place, it represents absolutely no danger for the Soviet regime, because the Soviet state is a state guaranteeing the authority of the workers and the unpropertied population ... Now, it is petty-bourgeois capitalism which predominates in Russia, and the same road leads from this petty-bourgeois capitalism to state greatcapitalism and to socialism ... You will see that, in a real revolutionary democratic state, monopolistic state capitalism infallibly represents a step, several steps, toward socialism. Because the state capitalist monopoly is nothing but the next step in the direction of socialism ... monopolistic state capitalism is the all-round material preparation for socialism; it is the threshhold to it ...

In addition, Lenin gave practical directives for preparing the way to this "threshold of socialism":

> As long as the outbreak of a revolution is still lagging behind in Germany, it is our task to study German state capitalism and somehow to implant it in our country. We must not hesitate to apply even stronger dictatorial methods to enforce this process of appropriation than did Peter the Great in his struggle against the aversion of the barbarous Russians to Western culture. We should not hesitate to employ whatever barbaric methods are necessary in our struggle against barbarism.

Stalin and his companions-in-arms carried out Lenin's instructions punctiliously, determinedly, and ruthlessly: they established in the USSR a thoroughgoing monopolistic state capitalism.

We believe that, in view of this, Prof. Vasyliv ought to accept Lenin's own characterization of the nature of the Soviet economic and social system quoted above.

The only question which remains is whether or not this system of monopolistic state capitalism has progressed in the meantime in the direction of socialism or, for that matter, Communism, as the successors of Lenin and Stalin generally claim. And today, as before, the answer is no. *There is no socialism in the USSR* of the kind that has been, and is to this day, understood by European ideologists or even by Marx and Engels. Instead, there is an increasingly perfected system of monopolistic state capitalism in the USSR, which is under the unlimited control of the ruling class of the monopolistic Communist Party. This ruling caste of exploiters has nationalized not only all the means of production, all the economic, communal, social, cultural, scientific, and even sports and religious organizations which existed prior to the establishment of the Soviet regime, but even the people itself. There is no free society in the USSR or, rather, there is no society

which is in a position to express its own thoughts, to display any initiative of its own or to exert its own free will independent of the "omnipotent" Communist Party. Under these conditions there can be no question of socialization of the means of production, or of social capital because, although both capital and the means of production exist in the Soviet Union, the subject itself, free society, is nonexistent.

Socialist theory has evolved to produce a new concept of "socialization," which, however, is still widely misinterpreted as involving wholesale compulsory liquidation of private property and of individual initiative of every kind. As the record of those democratic countries with socialistic governments demonstrates, socialization is by no means incompatible with private property and private initiative. Its objective is to manage the entire national economy by means of general state planning and social state control to the advantage of society as a whole. The Social-Democrats demand the nationalization of only the most important segments of the economy, such as, for instance, mines, railroads, banks (and not even all of them), etc.

State planning is by no means an invariable criterion of Socialism either, because planning can have different objectives such as, for instance, the militaristic and imperialistic objectives of Soviet planning. Such planning is diametrically opposed to genuine socialist planning, the only goal of which is to satisfy the requirements of the entire population of the country. Moreover, such planning should be carried out not by a dictatorial planning center alone, but by means of social decentralization which at all times takes into consideration the fluctuating requirements of the free market, i.e., supply and demand.

A New Work on the History of the Struggle for Liberation in the Ukraine

1917—1918

D. SOLOVEY

Dr. Matviy Stakhiv: *Zvidky vzyalasya sovyetska vlada v Ukraini ta khto ii buduvav?* (The Establishment of the Soviet Regime in the Ukraine and its Contrivers). Published by the Ukrainian Free Community in America. "Scientific and Political Library," Nos. 16—17. New York—Detroit—Scranton, 1955; small octavo; 104 pages.

Dr. Matviy Stakhiv: *Persha sovyetska respublika v Ukraini* (The First Soviet Republic in the Ukraine). Published by the Ukrainian Free Community in America. "Scientific and Political Library," Nos. 18—21. New York—Detroit—Scranton, 1956; small octavo; 240 pages.

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Ukrainian historical literature has been enriched by Dr. Matviy Stakhiv's work under the general title *Narys istorii rosiyskoi agresii ta konstytutsiynoho rozvytku sovyetskoi vlady nad Ukrainoyu* (Outline of the History of the Russian Aggression and the Constitutional Development of the Soviet Regime in the Ukraine) in two parts.

Both parts throw light on the period which ended with the peace treaty of Brest Litovsk of February 9, 1918, and the removal of the Russian Red Army from the territories of the Ukraine. These books were published by the Ukrainian Free Community in America (Ukrainska Vilna Hromada, Scranton Branch, 524 Olive Str., Scranton 10, Pa., USA), which had already issued ten titles.

The author, whose manner of writing is popular and easily comprehensible, made use of sources which are now practically unavailable not only abroad, but also in the USSR itself, since the authors of many of these works have in the meantime been liquidated by Stalin's regime; and this means that also their works have been withdrawn from use.

In Stakhiv's work we find reference to, and important quotations from, such works as: V. Shakhray, *Do khvyli* (Toward the Present Moment), Saratov, 1919; I. Puke, *Voenno-revolyutsionny komitet i oktyabrskoe vosstanie* (The Military Revolutionary Committee and the October Uprising), Kiev, 1917; M. Rafes, *Dva goda revolyutsii na Ukraine* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine), Moscow, 1920; M. Yavorsky, *Revolyutsiya na Ukraini v ii holovnishykh etapakh* (The Main Stages of the Revolution in the Ukraine), Kharkov, 1923; *Istoriya Ukrainy v styslomu narysi* (A Short Outline of the History of the Ukraine), Kharkov, 1928; M. Skrypnyk, "Nacherk istorii prole-

tarskoi revolyutsii na Ukraini" (Outline of the History of the Proletarian Revolution in the Ukraine), *Chervony Shlyakh,* Kharkov, 1923; H. Lapchynsky, "Borotba za Kyiv — sichen 1918 r." (The Fight for Kiev—January 1918), *Litopys Revolyutsii,* Kharkov, 1928; "Zarodzhennya radyanskoi vlady" (The Origin of the Soviet Regime), *Chervony Shlyakh,* Kharkov, 1925; *Ezhegodnik Kominterna za 1923 g.* (The Yearbook of the Comintern for 1923); M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy* (The History of the Communist Party of the Ukraine), 1923; V. Zatonsky, *Natsionalna problema na Ukraini* (The National Problem in the Ukraine), Kharkov, 1926; "Uryvok iz spohadiv pro ukrainsku revolyutsiyu" (Excerpt from Memoirs on the Ukrainian Revolution), *Litopys Revolyutsii,* Kharkov, 1929; "Iz spohadiv pro ukrainsku revolyutsiyu" (Memoirs on the Ukrainian Revolution), *Litopys Revolyutsii,* Kharkov, 1930; *Pidsumky ukrainizatsii* (The Results of Ukrainization), Kharkov; V. Antonov-Ovseenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine* (Notes on the Civil War), Vols. I and II, Moscow, 1924 and 1928; N. Popov, *Nacherk istorii KP(b)U* (Outline History of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine); and A. V. Likholat, *Razgrom natsionalisticheskoi kontrrevolyutsii na Ukraine, 1917—22* (The Suppression of the Nationalist Counterrevolution in the Ukraine, 1917—22), Moscow, 1954. Among the references to Ukrainian authors whose work has been published outside the Soviet Union, we find: P. Khrystyuk, *Zamitky i materiyaly do istorii ukrainskoi revolyutsii, 1917—20* (Notes and Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917—20), Vienna, 1921—22; V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennya natsii* (The Rebirth of a Nation), 1920; M. Zaliznyak, *Spohady* (Memoirs); H. Piddubny, *Za radyansku Ukrainu* (For a Soviet Ukraine), 1921; V. Levynsky, *Yedyna sovitska respublika* (A Single Soviet Republic), Vienna, 1920; and D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy 1917—23 rr.* (A History of the Ukraine, 1917—23).

The considerable amount of source material—documents, decrees, and excerpts from works which were destroyed by the Bolsheviks in the USSR—adduced by the author, makes his work especially valuable.

Analyzing the materials and the testimonies deposed by military leaders of the armed Bolshevik march against the Ukraine (Muravev, Antonov-Ovseenko, and others), the author of the present paper arrives at the well-founded conclusion that the Soviet regime was introduced into the Ukraine exclusively by imperialist armed aggression on the part of Soviet Russia. This is clearly expressed in the ultimatum, signed by Lenin and Trotsky, which the Soviet of People's Commissars sent the Central Council in Kiev on December 17, 1917; it is demonstrated by the fact of the offensive of the Soviet Red Guards against the Ukraine as described by the commander of the Russian Soviet troops, Antonov-Ovseenko; it is evident also from Colonel Muravev's order No. 14, which he issued after his troops had taken and occupied Kiev. In it this colonel wrote:

> We have brought this [Soviet] regime from the far North on the points of our bayonets, and wherever we have established it, it will be maintained with all possible means by the force of these bayonets (Part II, p. 119).

Muravev's report to Lenin is just as cynical: "I have transferred all the power which we established by means of bayonets, to the Soviet of the Ukraine" (Part II, pp. 137, 188).

There are testimonies to the fact that when Muravev's troops occupied Kiev on February 9, 1918, the Red Army soldiers shot down everyone who

spoke Ukrainian to the military patrols or owned a certificate written out in Ukrainian, even if it had been issued by the Soviet government of the Ukraine which had just been established in Kharkov. Among others V. Zatonsky, a member of this Soviet government, in his book *Natsionalna problema na Ukraini* (The National Problem in the Ukraine), published in 1926, also bears testimony to this fact. From this book the author of the treatise quotes the following significant passage:

"It belongs to the sphere of the dialectics of life that those very Red Army men who hated Petlyura and with him everything that was Ukrainian, the same who in Kiev, under Muravev's rule, almost shot Skrypnyk and me—they, not Hrushevsky, actually established the Soviet Ukraine. I, too, was to have been shot and was saved only by chance: they found a mandate signed by Lenin in my pocket. This saved me. Skrypnyk was recognized by somebody and this saved his life. It was a lucky accident, because when a patrol stopped me in the street I had a Ukrainian mandate issued by the All-Ukrainian Central Council of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers' Deputies in Kharkov. Because of this "Ukrainization" I almost lost my life. This was just after the rebellion at the Arsenal when 200 corpses were blocking the streets of Kiev.[1] A group of persons held out in the railroad workshops until the arrival of the Red soldiers under Muravev's command. Skrypnyk and I were also there. We entered the city: corpses, corpses, and corpses... At that time everybody who had any relation to the Central Council was shot on the spot" (Part I, pp. 47—48).

At that time, the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine were neither numerous nor strong, and they were aliens. They had no chance of seizing power there with their own forces. When, on the initiative of the Kiev Bolshevik organization, and with its most active participation, the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Councils was convoked in Kiev, they succeeded in collecting at that Congress—despite the demagogical slogans and measures so lavishly used by the Bolsheviks—only 3 or 4 per cent of the deputies to the Congress, of whom there were about 2,000. Nevertheless, having moved to Kharkov under the guard of the Russian Soviet troops that had occupied the city, they proclaimed themselves as the "genuine" congress of the councils of the Ukraine. And in March, 1918, when the Eastern Ukraine and Kiev were occupied by the troops of Soviet Russia, the Party of Bolsheviks in the Ukraine consisted, according to Bolshevik information, of a mere 4,364 members, only 3.5 per cent of whom were Ukrainians, i.e., about 150 individuals! (Part I, p. 40). Moreover, the weakness of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine at that time was later confirmed also by Lev Trotsky, then Minister of Military Affairs of the Russian Soviet Republic, in his work on Stalin which appeared in 1946 in New York in English. We quote:

"During the early years of the Soviet regime, Bolshevism was very weak in the Ukraine" (Part II, p. 23).

No wonder that also the "Soviet government" of the Ukraine, whose composition was determined by the government of Soviet Russia (or, rather, by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party) consisted basically of non-Ukrainians. Ukrainians were in it only for camouflage, and they

[1] According to the material which the Ukrainian Red Cross collected in early March, 1918, nearly 5,000 persons were shot during the first days after the Russian Red Guards had occupied Kiev (Part II, pp. 121—22).

played subordinate parts. The Russian Soviet government itself in Petrograd and Moscow, while appointing governments for the Ukraine, considered this procedure a comedy forced upon them by the circumstances. A similar comedy and deception was also the proclamation of the decree about the nation's right to self-determination—"including secession," because such secession was immediately suppressed by the armed force of the government of the Russian Soviet Republic, as in the case of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, and elsewhere. The same cynicism and hypocrisy were displayed also by Stalin himself when, in April, 1918, he said on the telephone to the representative of the "Soviet regime" in the Ukraine, V. Zatonsky: "Let's now stop playing that game of republics and governments" (Part I, p. 54).

Yet the new situation which was created by the revolution of 1917 and by the national and political renaissance of the Ukrainian people which resulted from the proclamation of the four Manifestoes of the Central Council and the appearance of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the international political forum (the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918) forced the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party in Petrograd (and later the Moscow Central Committee) to continue "playing the game of republics and governments." They were forced too by the fact that at that time it was their only means of deceiving the masses and, thus, of keeping the non-Russian territories, including the Ukraine, for the purpose of colonial exploitation. By nominating, however, the governments for the territories which were conquered by force of arms, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks—later the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks—formed (and still forms) these governments of individuals dependent on, and devoted to, the Central Committee and obviously hostile toward the oppressed peoples. In the autumn of 1918, for instance, when Stalin launched the new offensive against the Ukraine, he established on his arrival in Kursk, as Zatonsky relates, on the basis of a resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Moscow, a government for the Ukraine which consisted of five non-Ukrainians and one Ukrainian, namely: Pyatakov, Yalkin, Antonov, Artem (Sergeev), Kviring, and Zatonsky. Recalling all this, Zatonsky says:

"Artem argued, as I remember now, that it would be a reactionary undertaking to establish a politically independent Ukraine—even a Soviet Ukraine" (Part I, p. 26).

The same applied to all the later nominations of Soviet governments for the Ukraine. From this alone one can well imagine how these nominees acted the role of members of the "government of the Soviet Ukraine"—people who were adverse to the very idea of a Ukrainian state, because this idea was as alien to them as they themselves were alien to the Ukrainian people. They did not need it, this independence of the Ukraine, and they therefore tried to treat it as a reactionary affair. Matviy Stakhiv has collected a good deal of interesting testimony on this matter from genuine Soivet sources and presents them in his paper.

Having, however, taken possession of the Ukraine by force of arms and turned her into a colony again, Moscow has also been compelled to recognize, at least in name, the independence of the Ukraine and—to quote Stalin—"to play the game of republics." This was absolutely necessary in order to appease the Ukrainian people and to keep them in submission, because, as we have said before, it was no longer possible, after the revolution of 1917, to

continue carrying out colonial exploitation without camouflage. Kh. Rakovsky, whom Lenin had nominated prime minister of the "Soviet government" for the Ukraine,[2] was forced to write in *Ezhegodnik Kominterna* which appeared in Moscow in 1923:

"In 1920 and 1921 we were witness to the mighty revolutionary peasant movement in the Ukraine, which, in its nature and elemental force, reminded one of the early months of the revolution in Great Russia and embraced the whole of the Ukraine" (Part I, p. 28).

But, as the author remarks quite justly at the beginning of the second part of his work:

"Even purely declarative forms of government have a deep social significance. In the first place, the constitutional declaration made by the occupation government in the Ukraine implies that the occupation regime had thus to recognize against its will by daily administrative deeds the rights of the Ukrainian nation as an individual state, even though it be Soviet in form" (Part II, p. 9).

The analysis of facts and of official material and documents from the legal point of view, as made by Matviy Stakhiv in this present work, is novel in its approach to this material and original in its treatment of it (e. g.: Part II, pp. 83—84, 91—94, etc.). Despite the journalistic layout, the two works by Dr. Matviy Stakhiv reviewed here are valuable contributions to Ukrainian historical literature.

[2] Cf. an interesting episode from the history of this nomination in *IV Konferentsiya Instituta po izucheniyu SSSR* (IVth Conference of the Institute for the Study of the USSR), Munich, 1954, Vol. II, p. 46.

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SOME UKRAINIAN PUBLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTE

Prof. B. KRUPNYTSKY. "Ukrainian Historical Studies under the Soviets (1920—1950)." Series II, No. 58, 122 pp. Preface by Prof. N. Polonska-Vasylenko, XLVI pp. Munich, 1957.

In the development of Ukrainian historiography of the revolutionary period the author distinguishes the following stages:

First stage (1921—23): The period during which the country's research workers were mobilized and Ukrainian national independence had not yet finally expired. This stage, during which the former subjects of historical research continued to be elaborated, was dominated by the work of prominent Ukrainian scholars of the Kiev historical school. It was characterized by the difficult conditions attending the occupation of the Ukraine by the Bolsheviks and by militant Communism; nevertheless it served as a prelude to the national rebirth of Ukrainian studies and the flourishing of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) during the NEP period.

Second stage (1923—30): The heyday of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Within the framework of the Academy historical studies assumed many organizational forms, including commissions, departments and institutes, in which hundreds of researchers were employed (see Prof. N. Polonska-Vasylenko's work *The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: An Outline History, Part I (1918—30),* Munich, 1955, published by the Institute for the Study of the USSR). The leaders of this period were the Academicians M. Hrushevsky, S. Yefremov (both of the populist school), A. Krymsky (oriental studies), N. Vasylenko (historico-juridical and economic school), Ol. Novytsky (history of art) and others, who were the authors of classical works in the sphere of Ukrainian historical studies. Toward the end of this period there was also M. Yavorsky (Marxist school).

Research was concerned with the historical forms of Ukrainian independent statehood and culture (the period of the Grand Principality, the hetmans, and social movements of the 19th and 20th centuries). Historical research institutions functioned not only in Kiev but also in Kharkov, Poltava, Odessa, Chernigov, Dnepropetrovsk, Nezhin, Kamenets, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir and other cities.

During the period of collectivization in the Ukraine, this creative resurgence was crushed in 1930 by the Bolsheviks by a series of political trials of prominent scholars and democrats. The trials of the SVU (Association for the Liberation of the Ukraine) and the political parties ended in the suppression of all the historical institutions of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (see Prof. N. Polonska-Vasylenko's work, Part II, Munich, 1957).

Third stage (1930—53): This period saw the complete destruction of historical studies in the Ukraine, the banishment of its scholars, the branding of Ukrainian historical studies as counterrevolutionary in schools throughout the country, and the subordination of Ukrainian historical research to the imperialistic aims of the Bolsheviks in Moscow (the cult of Stalin, Alexander Nevsky, Minin, Pozharsky, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Peter the Great, and the celebration of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654).

Marxist historians who were fanatical believers in a single Pan-Russian state were sent to the Ukraine, and a new generation of historians schooled in the ideas of militant Communism submissive to the Kremlin arose. Obedient and well-disciplined, they repeated the directives of the Kremlin with such subservience that even Moscow critics began to re-

proach them for their lack of Ukrainian patriotic feeling. All this, in the form of an analysis of the historical studies published during this period (1930—53), constitutes the foundation of this work by Prof. Krupnytsky, whose recent death, notwithstanding all that he had given to the Ukraine, was so premature.

As an introduction to this, Prof. Krupnytsky's last work, the editors have added an outline of his academic career by Prof. Polonska-Vasylenko and as complete a bibliography of his works as circumstances allow.

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Prof. N. POLONSKA-VASYLENKO. "The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: A Historical Outline." Part I (1918—1930).

The foundation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences represents one of the most important achievements of Ukrainian culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Throughout the nineteenth century Ukrainian scholars and scientists continually tried to found such an academy in order to further Ukrainian national studies.

The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was formed by a Ukrainian state decree signed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky on November 14, 1918. At its foundation there were three departments—History and Philology, Physics and Mathematics, and Social and Economic Studies. The Academy included a National Library, an Astronomical Observatory, several institutes, museums, biological stations, botanical and acclimatization gardens, reservations and various commissions. The number of academicians was fixed at seventy-two.

The Academy had complete autonomy in academic matters. Its governing body was a council of academicians. Work in the various departments was directed by a board of academicians from the given department.

The council of the Academy elected the President of the Academy and a Permanent Secretary. This method of electing the leading members continued until 1929.

Despite the fact that the exact date of the foundation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences is known and that many works have been written on its origins during the last 15 years, Soviet publications continue to assert that the Academy was established by the Soviet regime after its victory over the Ukrainian nationalists. Even the "Large Soviet Encyclopedia" reflects this historically absurd view in both its editions.

In February 1919, the Ukraine was occupied by the Bolsheviks. The attitude of the Soviet regime toward the Academy was different in the various periods of policy which ensued.

The first period, War Communism, lasted from 1919 until 1924. This stage was notable for complete inattention to the Academy. The buildings were not heated and the employees did not receive their salaries on time, which led to demands for increases. The scholars, nevertheless, continued with their work. One positive aspect of this period was that the Soviets and the Communist Party did not interfere in the Academy's affairs and that the difficult conditions strengthened the contingent of enthusiastic scholars who were devoted to the Academy.

The second stage—the New Economic Policy, beginning in 1924—led to considerable changes in the life of the Academy. Material conditions improved considerably and the number of publications increased. Many monographs, reports of departments and the results of the work of commissions were issued. This period was, however, marked by the beginning of the ideological offensive and political trials which affected the Academy. The first was the trial of "The Action Center" from 1923 to 1924. Many scholars from the Academy, including Academician M. Vasylenko, were involved. Another noteworthy event in the life of the Academy was the return from abroad of Academician M. S. Hrushevsky. He was exceptionally active in its work. His Kiev anniversary in 1926 became a national holiday for Ukrainian culture.

The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences continued until 1929 on the basis of its 1918 constitution. It was headed by the following elected officers:

Presidents:

Academician V. I. Vernadsky (1918—1919),
O. I. Levytsky (1919—1921),
M. P. Vasylenko (whose appointment in 1921 was not approved by the government),
V. I. Lypsky (1921—1928),
D. K. Zabolotny (1928—1929),
O. O. Bohomolets (from 1930).

Permanent Secretaries:

Academician A. Yu. Krymsky (1918—1928, elected),
A. V. Korchak-Chepurkivsky (1928, appointed).

Presidiums of Departments:

First Department

Chairmen:

Academician D. I. Bahaliy (1918—1921),
A. Yu. Krymsky (1921—1929).

Secretaries:

Academician S. O. Yefremov (1919—1928),
O. P. Novytsky (1928—1929),
D. I. Bahaliy (1929—1930).

Second Department

Chairmen:

Academician M. T. Kashchenko (1918—1919),
P. A. Tutkovsky (1919—1928).

Secretaries:

Academician V. I. Lypsky (1919—1928),
I. I. Shmalhauzen (1928—1930).

Third Department

Chairmen:

Academician O. I. Levytsky (1918—1921),
R. M. Orzhensky (1921—1922),
M. P. Vasylenko (1922—1929).

Secretaries:

Academician M. V. Ptukha (1919—1929).

Each academician had one or several commissions under his control. M. Hrushevsky directed twelve such commissions.

In order to exert economic pressure on the Academy, the Bolshevik government reduced the number of scholars at the Academy each year.

In 1924 the Academy was given many buildings, large houses, reservations such as Koncha-Zaspa, Askaniya Nova, Prokhorovka, Karlovka in the Poltava region, and, most important, a printing house for the Academy's exclusive use (the former printing house of the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery). During this period the importance of the Academy continued to grow. Several old and respected Ukrainian research institutes combined with it, such as the Historical Documents Commission (founded in 1843), the Kiev Ukrainian Research Society (1908), the Historical Society of Nestor the Cronicler (1873), the Odessa Historical Society (1825), the Law Society, the Society of Naturalists and the Society of Economists. The Academy had branches in Odessa, Vinnitsa, Kharkov, Chernigov and Lvov. Many researchers who did not live in Kiev were linked in their work with commissions of the Academy (F. Kolessa, M. Voznyak, K. Studynsky, V. Shchurat, V. Herasymchuk, I. Svyentsitsky and many others). The Academy united scholars thoughout the Ukraine.

The third stage in relations between the Soviet government and the Academy began after the appointment of M. Skrypnyk as People's Commissar for Education of the Ukrainian SSR. Then Soviet government interference in the life of the Academy began. The first sign of this was that two scholars (F. Mishchenko and K. Kharlampovych) were deprived the rank of academician. The reason for this was that they had both previously been professors in theological colleges. Simultaneously the work of the Academy was limited to study furthering "socialist construction." In 1928 seven Communist Party members, appointed by the government, joined the Academy.

In May 1928, reelections for the Presidium of the Academy took place and the seven Party members participated. The appointment of Academician A. Krymsky as Permanent Secretary, which was approved by an overwhelming majority of the voters, was not confirmed by the government.

In the discussion and nomination of candidates Party and trade organizations took part as well as factory newspapers. In 1928 thirty-four new academicians were elected. Among them were genuine

scholars, but the majority were simply Party officials without the necessary qualifications who had little in common with research. In the fall of 1929 the Academy was reformed and the Presidiums of Departments were headed by Communists. The Academic Council lost its legislative functions. Officially the Academy was directed by the Presidium, but in fact it was controlled by a Party committee.

In 1930 further changes took place. The political trials of the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" were held. Academicians S.Yefremov and M.Slabchenko were convicted at this trial. They, together with other scholars from the Academy, were exiled. Some were even executed. The terror continued after the trials, which marked the commencement of a new government policy—open hostility toward Ukrainian culture in general and the Academy of Sciences in particular. Further "reforms" took place at the Academy. The History and Philology and the Social and Economic Departments were abolished. A large number of works already printed and manuscripts sent for printing were destroyed. The Academy was turned into a typical Soviet establishment retaining its Ukrainian character only where externals were concerned.

At the Academy the struggle continued, but it was by then a lost cause.

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F. PIGIDO. "The Ukraine under Bolshevik Occupation." Series I, No. 34, 140 pp. (In Ukrainian.) Munich, 1956.

This work describes the history of the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the occupation of the Ukraine by Bolsheviks from Petrograd and Moscow. This struggle was the immediate continuation of the Ukrainian War of Liberation (1917—1920) against the RSFSR. The Ukrainian People's (Democratic) Republic (UNR) was compelled to wage this struggle against the army of the Communist governmenf of Lenin and Trotsky.

On November 21, 1920, the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic, together with its legal government, was forced by the overwhelming military forces of the Bolsheviks to retreat into the neighboring territory of Poland. The struggle of the Ukrainian people, however, did not cease when the army of the UNR was interned. For a further five years numerous insurgent detachments continued an armed guerilla campaign against the occupying troops. The lack of weapons and especially of military equipment and medical supplies, an epidemic of typhoid fever, the introduction by the Bolsheviks of *otvetchiki* or hostages (groups of 50—100 peasants nominated by the authorities as liable to pay with their lives for anything that might occur in their villages), together with a considerable strengthening of the garrisons of the occupying forces, finally broke the insurgent movement. Of importance also were the concessions that the occupying administration was obliged to make, both in the economic sphere and in that of national politics.

The history of Bolshevik domination in the Ukraine is divided by the author into three basic periods: (a) War Communism; (b) the tactical withdrawal of the Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian revival; and (c) Red reaction.

I. In the first part of his work, after giving a general description of the period of "War Communism," the author acquaints the reader with the Ukrainian national forces operating during the years of occupation and their mutual cooperation. He divides the active national forces into two basic groups: the first, which numbered millions, consisted chiefly of non-Party individuals, who were the most nationally conscious, while the second, smaller but more active, was composed of young people not only from within the Party (Communists and Komsomol members) but also without.

II. ("Tactical Retreat of the Bolsheviks Before the Ukrainian Revival During the Years of the Soviet Occupation.") In order to preserve the power of the Communists, Lenin had recourse to the tactical principle, "one step back, two steps forwards." The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party decided to introduce the New Economic Policy (NEP). On Nov. 22, 1922, a new agrarian law was approved. Declaring all land to be state property, the law handed over the cultivation of agricultural land to the peasants with the right to decide how the land was to be exploited. Permission was given for in-

dustrial undertakings to be leased and developed, chiefly for the purposes of light industry; the currency was reformed and permission given for the products of agriculture and industry to be exchanged on the free market. These measures had enormous effect: the country's economy rapidly recovered, the peasants prospered as they supplied the towns with food and raw materials. The system of consumer and agricultural cooperatives grew rapidly, becoming an important factor in the economy.

At the same time, the Communists made a number of concessions to the conquered national republics: the occupation regime was modified, particularly its policy of Russifying newly-conquered peoples; relatively legal forms of agitation were permitted on the national-cultural front. In the face of pressure from the unceasing armed struggle waged by the national liberation movement, Moscow was obliged to make concessions. At the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, held on April 17, 1923, the emergence of local nationalist movements in the national republics was condemned and it was stated that pan-Russian chauvinism was a basic threat to the Revolution. A new period of national policies began. On September 1, 1923, the so-called "Ukrainization" decree was issued. This decree recognized Ukrainian culture to be the state culture of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Prof. M. Hrushevsky, former President of the Ukrainian Tsentralna Rada (Central Council), returned from exile, and together with him a number of scholars and politicians. At the same time a number of academic and historical institutions were set up at Kharkov (under the leadership of Academician D. Bahaliy), Odessa (under Academician M. Slabchenko), Dnepropetrovsk (under D. Yavornytsky), etc. The publishing activities of "Hrushevsky's historical institutions" grew to previously unheard-of proportions and provided a tribune for discussion, independent of official Communist doctrine.

Ukrainian culture acquired powerful weapons for influencing the masses: the cinema and the press, while Ukrainian opera theaters appeared, particularly in the workers' centers.

At the same time, in order to protect Kharkov, which had been made the capital of the Ukrainian SSR by the occupation Government from the hostile influence of Ukrainian elements in Kiev, a new administrative and later a national-cultural center began to emerge. Despite the efforts of the occupation powers to unite all Ukrainian writers in the organization known as "Proletkult," the Union of Revolutionary Ukrainian Peasant Writers "Pluh" was created in 1922, the Union of Proletarian Writers "Hart" in 1923 and the literary association of revolutionary youth "Molodniak." In January 1926 a group of writers headed by M. Khvylyovy seceded from "Hart" and set up the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature (VAPLITE). Along with Communist writers such as Mykola Khvylyovy, Mykola Kulish, Mykhaylo Yalovy and others, this organization was joined by such non-"proletarian" writers as Yuriy Yanovsky, Maik Yohansen and Arkadiy Lyubchenko.

Khvylyovy's followers, like many of his non-Communist predecessors, tried to orient Ukrainian literature toward the West and the highest achievements of world literature, in contrast to the efforts of the Communist Party to make it an ideological prisoner of the "center of world revolution"—Moscow, which, in Khvylyovy's words, had been transformed into the "center of all-federal petty bourgeoisie." The participants in the discussion decided whether Ukrainian literature was a springboard toward world revolution or a weapon for strengthening the Ukrainian state in favor of Europe and against Moscow. Khvylyovy's second slogan was an Asiatic revival or renaissance. He considered that the backward nations of Asia, headed by the Ukraine, would, thanks to the Revolution, overtake Europe. Khvylyovy wanted to drag the Ukraine out of its provincial stagnation and set before it tasks of worldwide significance. The city — so considered Khvylyovy — is the center for the entire spiritual and material life of a nation; it is the key to the national life of a country. Hence the third slogan: Khvylyovy's call to a struggle for the creation of a Ukrainian working class, for a specifically Ukrainian revolutionary intelligentsia and for the training of Ukrainian engineers. Romantic vitalism—the fourth slogan adopted during the discussion—is the art of the militant stage of the transitional period. In practice, "romantic vitalism" was tantamount to a ne-

gation of so-called "proletarian realism"; it represented the struggle against cheap Soviet literary propaganda.

In the Soviet system a discordant note was struck by the influence of an anti-Soviet atmosphere, everyday reality with its occupation regime, the Red terror, mass executions and hundreds of thousands of homeless children, whose parents had been liquidated as "counterrevolutionaries." All this gave rise to a constant conflict between what was preached by the government and what was said at home. In the midst of this chaos there appeared other forms of resistance, to which the trials of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (SVU) and the Union of Ukrainian Youth (SUM) bear witness.

The Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, headed by Vasyl Lypkivsky, Metropolitan of the Ukraine, came forward as a powerful factor motivating the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the occupation government.

III. "The Red Reaction": Toward the end of the twenties, agriculture as well as industry and trade was to a considerable extent restored. By this time, however, the whole of the USSR, especially the Ukraine, was covered with a dense network of the so-called People's Militia, detachments of special GPU troops, Komsomol and Party organizations and GPU secret agents ("seksoty"). When it had completed the organization of its powerful apparatus of oppression, Moscow proceeded to implement its plans. The collectivization of agriculture was undertaken. Craftsmen were forced to join artels. In the national republics a colonial policy was carried out.

In 1933 there began a campaign of wholesale terror against Ukrainian culture, as a result of which large numbers of Ukrainians prominent in public life were physically eliminated. Even leading Communists, such as M. Khvylyovy, M. Skrypnyk and P. Lyubchenko, committed suicide.

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O. YURCHENKO. "The Nature and Function of the Soviet Federative Forms." Series I, No. 31, 136 pp. (In Ukrainian), Munich, 1956.

The beginning of the period during which the political and legal concept of the federative state was formulated may be set for purposes of argument at 1789, the date of the creation of the first "federal state" in history, the United States of America. For the great majority of federative organizations their "union" structure was a means of creating a state out of a national community previously broken up as to political-legal organization into separate state bodies, as in Germany, the United States, and the Spanish-American federations.

Federative forms of structure in single-nationality state formations are conditioned chiefly by: (a) the existence of regional political traditions; (b) the need for political and administrative decentralization of a national territory, as in the USA and other American federations, and (c) motives connected with the nature or the interests of the political regime of the state, as in the German Federal Republic.

The theories and plans of inter-nationality federations generally either developed from efforts to solve a nationality problem in unitary multi-national state structures, or emerged from tendencies toward a closer unity on the part of independent national-state organisms. Both trends toward inter-nationality federative concepts evolve from various historical conditions and are dictated by various historical aims and requirements.

Similarly, unions of independent national states are also still in the stage of political ideas and plans. However, the presence of a certain ideological tradition on the basis of these plans has brought about a broadening of the meaning of the term "federation," which in current political discourse frequently includes any kind of union of state organized units. The distinction between the classical state-legal concept of a "federation" as a federal state *(Bundesstaat)* and a "confederation" as a union of states *(Staatenbund)* is thus obliterated. This broadening of the concept does not so much reflect a lack of sufficient legal precision of definition as a broadening of the sphere of phenomena embraced by the definition.

The problem of federalism as a principle of political organization in Marxism

and Communism has a special history of its own.

In Russian Bolshevism, which adopted from the ideological heritage of early Marxism the thesis of dictatorship as the basic and most characteristic feature of state organization, the ideas of self-administration and decentralization, whose highest form is a federal state organism, were cast aside at its very founding. The only principle of every political and social organization was declared to be "democratic centralism," the basic marks of which are: (1) elective directing organs (the mark of formal democratism); (2) operational subordination of lower organs to the higher; and (3) unquestioning fulfillment by the lower organs of the directives of higher organs.

The bases of federalism were, accordingly, simply irreconcilable with the abovementioned postulates of Bolshevism. The federative form was considered either as completely unsuitable for the state structure of either a "bourgeois" or a "proletarian" state (D. Zlatopolsky), or as permissible as a transitional stage "from monarchy to a centralized republic." Lenin and the Bolsheviks, in developing to the maximum, both in theory and practice, the centralistic ideas of early Marxism almost to the very seizure of power, took a negative attitude toward federation as a form of future structure for the Russian state. A change in this attitude was evoked by the situation which arose in the area of the former empire after October, 1917, as a result of which, as Stalin recognized, "a large number of nationalities of Russia were actually in a state of complete separation," while the national movements of these peoples "had gone so far that in a number of cases the old plan of autonomy (by oblasts) was not realizable."

Thus, the circumstances conditioning the rise of Western and Soviet federative concepts and their aims are basically different. The former type, if one has in mind already created federations, are state unions of separate nations and regard their historical problems as far as area is concerned as settled. The latter type have their origin in a compulsory union of multinational components within the borders of a "federative" whole.

The new Bolshevik propositions regarding the necessity of introducing federative forms into the state structure of the Soviet Republic found their legal formulation in a "Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring and Exploited Nation," published by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets on January 18, 1918 and in the Constitution of the RSFSR, approved in the summer of the same year. Nevertheless, at the moment of publishing both acts, the majority of the proposed objects of Soviet federative unification were beyond the borders of sovereignty of the Soviet state power.

The process of military and political conquest by the Moscow dictatorship of the "border areas" which had fallen away did not lead to the automatic inclusion of the latter in the composition of the "Russian Federation." The actual creation of a unified Soviet state community, united by a single, highly centralized political power, the Russian Communist Party, took the form of interstate alliances. The "border" states newly united to their former metropolis were legally regarded as "treaty" republics, that is, state organisms connected with the RSFSR by special treaty arrangements known as "military-economic alliances."

It was only in the course of further state-political consolidation that this type of alliance was given the form of a "federation." This step was reached with the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is characteristic, however, that even the fact of the creation of the USSR on the basis of the Treaty of Alliance of December 30, 1922, did not determine the final legal nature of the Union. The period between the conclusion of the treaty and the ratification of the Constitution of the Union on July 6, 1923 was occupied by a stubborn political struggle during which several elements of the so-called national republics attempted to retain in the newly-created USSR a confederative relationship among its members, as in the so-called "Ukrainian project."

The Soviet political leaders and lawmakers did not, however, limit themselves to carrying over the form of single-nationality federative unions into a multi-nationality complex. They also attempted, by applying these forms, to draw the main

attention to factors stressing the legal nature of the federation as a single state.

It is a striking fact that Soviet political and institutional historians have attempted to make the definition of "federative" cover several types of state structures which from the point of view of state law cannot be regarded as such. The Soviet federation includes first of all the largest Soviet republic, the RSFSR. The state-legal structure of this formation, in particular the legal nature of the constituent parts, consisting of the Russian territories and the so-called autonomous units, and also the character of the state relations between them, clearly testify to the unitary character of the structure of the Soviet Russian Republic. In order to justify the name of "federation" applied to it for purely tactical reasons, contemporary Soviet political scientists attempt to base the alleged federative character of the RSFSR on an artifically created theory of "two forms" of Soviet federative structure. If the first of these, the "federative union of sovereign republics," agrees in general with the concept of federative structure known to juridical science, the second, the "Soviet federative republic as a federation resting on the autonomy of national state formations," is a theory invented by Soviet students of law to meet requirements of a propagandistic and political character already discussed.

According to Soviet constitutional law, the union republics, members of the federation of the first of the "two forms," are endowed with sovereign powers. However, the "autonomous republics," included in the "federative" union organized according to the "second form," do not enjoy "state sovereignty." The question of principle, as to whether or not sovereignty is an indispensable mark of every state or only of an independent state not a constituent part of another state, remains open in Soviet legal science.

The Constitution of the USSR, unlike the federal constitutions of the West, does not place limits on the powers of the government of the Union, but regulates its structural details strictly on the basis of Lenin's statement that "in the government of the Soviet Union the unified state direction requires the greatest uniformity in structure of state organs in the entire country."

While recognizing the indisputable primacy of the powers of the Union over those of constituent republics (Art. 15, Constitution of the USSR), the Soviet lawgivers did not provide guarantees for the defense of the rights of the individual republics, with the exception of the purely formal Article 17 of the constitution, which foresees the right of a republic to secede from the Union. In the absence of criteria for the practical application of this right and in view of the possibility of easy amendment of the constitution, including the article in question, this extremely broad guarantee is, as Soviet students themselves assert, practically valueless.

As far as guarantees for the members of the Union through its system of higher state organs are concerned, a glance at the structure of the highest body of the USSR, the Soviet of Nationalities, shows that it is aimed less at protecting the rights of member states than at the propagandistic side of the problem.

In 1936 Stalin put forth the theory of "three marks." According to this theory, a national-political organism can claim the status of a direct member of the Union, that is, "a union republic," if it bears the three following marks: (1) a border geographical location; (2) the presence on the given territory of an absolute majority of one nationality; and (3) a minimum population of one million. In 1940, incidentally, with the transition of the Karelo-Finnish SSR from the status of an autonomous republic into that of a union republic, these requirements were disregarded.

In regard to the legal form, the union republics have the marks of their own statehood: their own territory, citizenship and higher state organs. Nevertheless, under the conditions of the Communist dictatorship, resting on a basis of "democratic centralism," they are incapable of realizing their sovereign rights within the framework of these forms.

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I. KRYLOV. "The Educational System in the Ukraine, 1917—1930." Series I, No. 28, 96 pp. (In Ukrainian.) Munich, 1956.

The Ukrainian people, after losing their sovereignty, stuggled continuously and stubbornly for a national school system, that is, for teaching in the Ukrainian language in the schools of the Ukraine.

Although these efforts had been unsuccessful under Russian tsarism, they prepared the Ukrainian people for a spontaneous rise, immediately after the Revolution of 1917, of a system of Ukrainian elementary schools, *gymnasia* and other secondary schools, and later on universities. The process was capped by the creation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

Two systems of elementary education were in existence in 1917—1930. One was the system of the Ukrainian National Republic and the other the system of Grinko and Ryappo, created by the Bolsheviks after their occupation of the Ukraine and distinct from the Bolshevik system adopted in the RSFSR.

The system of the Ukrainian National Republic was basically outlined by two All-Ukrainian Teachers' Congresses, held in Kiev on April 5—6 and August 10—12, 1917. The resolutions adopted by these two congresses, and other contemporary documents, give a clear picture of the system.

During the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic (1917—1920), a draft of a Unified School System was worked out, chiefly based on the concept of the school system as a method of upbringing. At the base of the system was the *kindergarten,* for children from the ages of four to eight; this was followed by the *younger primary school,* for children from seven or eight to twelve, and the *older primary school,* for children from twelve to sixteen. After this there were to be one- or two-year trade schools for children in industry, while children who continued their general education would enter a *college,* the third step in the Unified School System, rounding off secondary education with humanist, practical *(real),* and economic specializations, where the period of schooling, as in each of the first two steps, was four years. Then followed the *university,* with five years; *institutes,* with four or five years, and other higher educational institutions of special types. Even the Bolsheviks approved this plan for a Unified School System, and named ther own school system the Unified Labor School.

Immediately following the occupation of the Ukraine by the Bolsheviks, the government of the Ukrainian SSR at Kharkov created a People's Commissariat for Education, whose task it was to reeducate the entire population of the Ukraine in the spirit of Communism. In consequence, the basic concept and aims of the school system in the Ukraine were altered.

The Ukrainian Communist system of education was adopted at the First All-Ukrainian Conference of Directors of Provincial Departments of Public Education in March, 1920, and was known as the Hrynko System, after H. Hrynko, the first People's Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR.

The Unified Labor School consisted of two basic elements: (1) "social upbringing," and (2) professional and technical education. The period of "social upbringing" continued to the age of fifteen, and comprised two age groups, from four to eight (when the child attended a "children's commune") and from eight to fifteen respectively. This was followed by the period of professional education, including as a rule two years of trade school in some specialty, a year of work in industry, and three years at a *tekhnikum,* again made up of one year of practical work and two in an institute. With this the period of professional education was ended; then came two years of academy, awarding the title of scholar in a particular specialty.

The striking feature of this school system was the absence of universities and the professionalization of all education, explained by the authors of the system as due to "the immense demand of the proletarian government for the speedy transformation of the mass of the youth into a skilled working force."

The system of public education in the RSFSR was considerably different from the Soviet Ukrainian system of Hrynko and Ryappo: in the RSFSR the universities were retained, the *tekhnikums* were secondary schools in contrast to the Ukraine, where they were higher schools for a narrow specialization, and so on. In view of the fact that both systems were Communist and that their authors, People's Commissar for Education Lunacharsky in the RSFSR and People's Commissar for Education Hrynko in the Ukrain-

ian SSR, vigorously defended the orthodoxy of their systems, the warfare between the two systems was of long duration. It did not end until both People's Commissars for Education were changed: N. Bubnov now filled the post in Russia and M. Skrypnyk in the Ukraine. Then, following a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the system of public education in the Ukraine was changed with Skrypnyk's consent, and the system of the RSFSR was made the single system throughout the USSR.

The special system in the Ukraine was finally abolished in 1933 after the physical liquidation of a great number of members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Since the abolition of the system had already been begun in 1930, this date may be taken as marking the end of the Soviet Ukrainian system.

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H. SOVA. "A Ukrainian's Twenty-Five Years in the USSR." Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 24, 100 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

The author, a participant in the Revolution of 1917, has been a Soviet civil servant, a political prisoner of the Soviets and local administrator in the German-occupied Ukraine. The present work draws from his memoirs to present valuable material on the Bolshevik system and, to some degree, on the German occupation of the Ukraine.

Dwelling on the early years of Soviet power in the Ukraine, this work deals particularly with the famine of 1921 and the beginning of the struggle against religion, including the closing and destruction of churches. The New Economic Policy resulted in economic improvements in the region. As a member of the raion administration in Novy Sandzhar, near Poltava, the author became well acquainted with all the aspects of life under the Soviets. He goes into detail on the reasons for and the circumstances surrounding the second great famine in the Ukraine, 1932—1933. He points out the economic and political background of the famine and the true motives of the Kremlin, which was responsible for the tragedy that caused the death of some seven million Ukrainians.

Other chapters describe the Soviet system of justice and the concentration camps, presenting a list of the most important of the latter. It is pointed out that in 1913 in tsarist Russia there were 32,758 prisoners, about 5,000 of whom were confined for political reasons. In the USSR today their numbers run into millions.

In 1936, suspected of sympathy with the right-wing deviation of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the author was arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment in the concentration camp in Kolyma. He describes in detail his experiences in Kolyma and the geography of the surrounding territory, where around two million prisoners, mostly engaged in goldmining operations, were kept.

In 1940 the author returned to the Ukraine, where, after a short period of work as a Soviet civil servant, he was caught up by the German occupation. As a raion administrator he had an opportunity to become acquainted with the German methods of administration and, at the same time, to observe how the Germans exploited the resources of the Ukraine.

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M. KOVALEVSKY. "Opposition Movements in the Ukraine and the National Policy of the USSR." Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 26, 73 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

In examining the national liberation movement of Ukrainians within the confines of the USSR, the author takes as his starting point the chief stages in the Ukrainian revolution of 1917. At that time, when Petrograd and Moscow became the main centers of Bolshevism (colored with internationalism), Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, was the organizing center for the peoples of the former Russian Empire.

In his analysis of the national policy of the Bolsheviks, the author dwells on Lenin's ideas and points out the variance between revolutionary theory and the Bolsheviks' revolutionary practices. A result of this policy was the creation by the Bolsheviks in December 1919 of the Ukrainian SSR, which together with the Belorussian

SSR and others, concluded Federation agreements with the RSFSR and renounced their sovereign rights.

The author explains all the Bolsheviks' attempts to liquidate national differences in the USSR as primarily the result of Communist doctrine, which aims at complete centralization. To this end, the paradoxical methods of Ukrainianization, Belorussification and Georgianization are used under the mask of "the right of the peoples to self-determination." Against the background of these characteristics of the nature of Communism in the national question, the author describes in detail the opposing national and Communist movements in their relation to the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks and their colonial policy in the Ukraine. The opposition's speeches against the All-Union Communist Party had a great effect on the rulers in Moscow.

The task of solving the problem of Ukrainian opposition was given to the executive committee of the Comintern, as was the problem of the "nationalist" deviations in the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine and of its leader Maksymovych. Apart from considering opposition movements in the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the author throws light on the ideology and history of the national organization "The Soviet for the Liberation of the Ukraine" on the basis of the stenographic report of the trial of 45 members in 1930.

The author also mentions the new forms of opposition and the national policy of the USSR.

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IVAN MAYSTRENKO. "The Crises in the Soviet Economy." Series II (Mimeographed Publications), No. 29, 124 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

The author analyzes the Soviet economy and devotes special attention to the crises which, in his opinion, arise in connection with the collectivization of agriculture and industrialization, or rather the militarization of Soviet industry.

The economic system of Stalinism was bureaucracy, a system of "war communism" first introduced during the Civil War. Stalin returned to this system after the collectivization of agriculture.

During the 25 years of its existence, the Stalinist economic system has been unable to establish a healthy economic life which would both ensure the development of the economy and satisfy the needs of the population. Throughout the period the Soviet Union has been in a permanent economic crisis. Enforced collectivization led to the decline of the peasant's interest in the results of his work. It was therefore essential to establish an enormous bureaucratic machine, both in agriculture and in industry, in order to drive the workers and peasants to work harder. The systems of "socialist competition" and "Stakhanovism" which were conceived by the Soviet bureaucrats failed to give positive results.

The weak spot in the Soviet regime is agrarian overpopulation. Collectivization only made this problem more acute and brought it out into the open. Tens of millions of peasants found themselves to be superfluous under the kolkhoz system. This provided the reason for a harsh Bolshevik offensive against Soviet society in the form of resettlement and even the liquidation of millions of persons.

Postwar developments and the emergence of the atomic bomb may make wars impossible. The reflection of these developments in the USSR has been a crisis in the military economy. Stalin's death made this crisis apparent. Consequently the Soviet economy is showing a tendency to transfer gradually and carefully to a peacetime footing. To a certain extent this is taking place in an elemental way, although it is in part being furthered by government measures. However, the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus left behind by Stalin will hardly be able to demilitarize the Soviet economy.

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P. FEDENKO. "The Ukraine After Stalin's Death." Series II (Mimeographed Editions), No. 39, 86 pp. (In Ukrainian.)

The author has used the most recent Soviet periodicals and newspapers to throw light on a number of questions con-

cerning the role that Stalin and his assistants, particularly Beria and Khrushchev, played in the life of the Ukraine. Much information is provided on the effect the late leader's death had on the Ukraine and a picture of the Kremlin's post-Stalin policy toward the republic is given. The author dwells at length on the significance of the transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine, an act which he views as an attempt to throw part of the Soviet Communist Party's guilt for the genocide of the Crimean Tatars on the Ukraine.

The author analyzes the difficulties of agriculture in the republic which are aggravated by the need to provide machines and manpower to carry out Khrushchev's plans for cultivating the virgin and fallow lands of Kazakhstan.

After Stalin's death the ruling Kremlin hierarchy changed, to some extent at least, its policy toward the Ukraine, but only in method, not in principle. The policy became more elastic and for the first time in the history of the Ukrainian Communist Party, a Ukrainian was permitted to be elected to the post of First Secretary of the Party. There are indications that the Ukraine is to be elevated to the status of a second "elder brother."

UKRAINIAN PUBLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTE

I. *The "Bolshevik Occupation" of the Ukraine and the Other Slavic Lands*

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